[JPRT, 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



106th Congress 
 2d Session              JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
_______________________________________________________________________

 
     COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999--VOLUME II

                               __________

                              R E P O R T

                            submitted to the

                       COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL

                               RELATIONS

                     U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                                and the

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                              U.S. SENATE

                                 by the

                          DEPARTMENT OF STATE

     IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN 
                   ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]CONGRESS.#13


                               APRIL 2000

Printed for the use of the Committees on International Relations of the 
U.S. House of Representatives and Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate 
                              respectively



                  COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

                 BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania       SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A LEACH, Iowa                  TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois              HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska              GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 
DAN BURTON, Indiana                      Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California           MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina       ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California         SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois         CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California          ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York              PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South     BRAD SHERMAN, California
    Carolina                         ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona                 STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York               JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California             EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York             WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas                   GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina         BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio                JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California     JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
                    Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
          Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
                                 ------                                

                     COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

                 JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana            JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska                PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon              CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota                 JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas                RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming                PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri              BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee                ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
                   Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
                 Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director



                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                                VOLUME I

                                                                   Page
Foreword.........................................................   VII
Letter of Transmittal............................................    IX
Preface..........................................................    XI
Introduction.....................................................    XV
Africa:
    Angola.......................................................     1
    Benin........................................................    14
    Botswana.....................................................    20
    Burkina Faso.................................................    29
    Burundi......................................................    39
    Cameroon.....................................................    47
    Cape Verde...................................................    69
    Central African Republic.....................................    74
    Chad.........................................................    85
    Comoros......................................................    94
    Congo, Democratic Republic of................................    99
    Congo, Republic of...........................................   128
    Cote d'Ivoire................................................   138
    Djibouti.....................................................   155
    Equatorial Guinea............................................   166
    Eritrea......................................................   173
    Ethiopia.....................................................   182
    Gabon........................................................   203
    Gambia, The..................................................   211
    Ghana........................................................   220
    Guinea.......................................................   237
    Guinea-Bissau................................................   249
    Kenya........................................................   256
    Lesotho......................................................   279
    Liberia......................................................   288
    Madagascar...................................................   299
    Malawi.......................................................   305
    Mali.........................................................   313
    Mauritania...................................................   321
    Mauritius....................................................   337
    Mozambique...................................................   343
    Namibia......................................................   357
    Niger........................................................   369
    Nigeria......................................................   379
    Rwanda.......................................................   402
    Sao Tome and Principe........................................   412
    Senegal......................................................   415
    Seychelles...................................................   427
    Sierra Leone.................................................   433
    Somalia......................................................   442
    South Africa.................................................   449
    Sudan........................................................   464
    Swaziland....................................................   482
    Tanzania.....................................................   490
    Togo.........................................................   505
    Uganda.......................................................   518
    Zambia.......................................................   535
    Zimbabwe.....................................................   547

Latin America, Canada, and the Caribbean:
    Antigua and Barbuda..........................................   569
    Argentina....................................................   573
    Bahamas......................................................   584
    Barbados.....................................................   590
    Belize.......................................................   594
    Bolivia......................................................   601
    Brazil.......................................................   611
    Canada.......................................................   634
    Chile........................................................   641
    Colombia.....................................................   656
    Costa Rica...................................................   691
    Cuba.........................................................   698
    Dominica.....................................................   718
    Dominican Republic...........................................   722
    Ecuador......................................................   737
    El Salvador..................................................   747
    Grenada......................................................   763
    Guatemala....................................................   767
    Guyana.......................................................   792
    Haiti........................................................   801
    Honduras.....................................................   815
    Jamaica......................................................   829
    Mexico.......................................................   834
    Nicaragua....................................................   857
    Panama.......................................................   872
    Paraguay.....................................................   885
    Peru.........................................................   896
    St. Kitts and Nevis..........................................   924
    Saint Lucia..................................................   928
    St. Vincent and the Grenadines...............................   932
    Suriname.....................................................   936
    Trinidad and Tobago..........................................   943
    Uruguay......................................................   948
    Venezuela....................................................   954

East Asia and the Pacific:
    Australia....................................................   971
    Brunei.......................................................   978
    Burma........................................................   984
    Cambodia.....................................................  1006
    China (includes Hong Kong and Macau).....................1018, 1089
    China (Taiwan only)..........................................  1095
    Fiji.........................................................  1106
    Indonesia....................................................  1113
    Japan........................................................  1153
    Kiribati.....................................................  1166
    Korea, Democratic People's Republic of.......................  1179
    Korea, Republic of...........................................  1169
    Laos.........................................................  1189
    Malaysia.....................................................  1199
    Marshall Islands.............................................  1227
    Micronesia, Federated States of..............................  1230
    Mongolia.....................................................  1234
    Nauru........................................................  1239
    New Zealand..................................................  1242
    Palau........................................................  1247
    Papua New Guinea.............................................  1251
    Philippines..................................................  1256
    Samoa........................................................  1268
    Singapore....................................................  1272
    Solomon Islands..............................................  1288
    Thailand..................................................... 12928
    Tonga........................................................  1306
    Tuvalu.......................................................  1309
    Vanuatu......................................................  1312
    Vietnam......................................................  1316

                               VOLUME II

Europe:
    Albania......................................................  1337
    Andorra......................................................  1348
    Armenia......................................................  1351
    Austria......................................................  1366
    Azerbaijan...................................................  1375
    Belarus......................................................  1390
    Belgium......................................................  1414
    Bosnia and Herzegovina.......................................  1422
    Bulgaria.....................................................  1440
    Croatia......................................................  1458
    Cyprus.......................................................  1479
    Czech Republic...............................................  1488
    Denmark......................................................  1503
    Estonia......................................................  1507
    Finland......................................................  1515
    France.......................................................  1519
    Georgia......................................................  1531
    Germany......................................................  1546
    Greece.......................................................  1559
    Hungary......................................................  1574
    Iceland......................................................  1585
    Ireland......................................................  1590
    Italy........................................................  1598
    Kazakhstan...................................................  1606
    Kyrgyz Republic..............................................  1628
    Latvia.......................................................  1640
    Liechtenstein................................................  1649
    Lithuania....................................................  1652
    Luxembourg...................................................  1661
    Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia........................  1664
    Malta........................................................  1675
    Moldova......................................................  1678
    Monaco.......................................................  1688
    Netherlands, The.............................................  1691
    Norway.......................................................  1698
    Poland.......................................................  1702
    Portugal.....................................................  1719
    Romania......................................................  1725
    Russia.......................................................  1735
    San Marino...................................................  1797
    Serbia-Montenegro............................................  1799
    Slovak Republic..............................................  1844
    Slovenia.....................................................  1857
    Spain........................................................  1861
    Sweden.......................................................  1875
    Switzerland..................................................  1882
    Tajikistan...................................................  1890
    Turkey.......................................................  1902
    Turkmenistan.................................................  1937
    Ukraine......................................................  1947
    United Kingdom...............................................  1970
    Uzbekistan...................................................  1988

Near East and North Africa:
    Algeria......................................................  2009
    Bahrain......................................................  2020
    Egypt........................................................  2031
    Iran.........................................................  2050
    Iraq.........................................................  2070
    Israel and the occupied territories..........................  2092
    Jordan.......................................................  2124
    Kuwait.......................................................  2137
    Lebanon......................................................  2151
    Libya........................................................  2162
    Morocco......................................................  2170
    Western Sahara...............................................  2189
    Oman.........................................................  2192
    Qatar........................................................  2201
    Saudi Arabia.................................................  2207
    Syria........................................................  2219
    Tunisia......................................................  2230
    United Arab Emirates.........................................  2248
    Yemen........................................................  2256

South Asia:
    Afghanistan..................................................  2277
    Bangladesh...................................................  2294
    Bhutan.......................................................  2315
    India........................................................  2325
    Maldives.....................................................  2367
    Nepal........................................................  2374
    Pakistan.....................................................  2389
    Sri Lanka....................................................  2434

Appendices:
    A. Notes on Preparation of the Reports.......................  2457
    B. Reporting on Worker Rights................................  2459
    C. International Human Rights Conventions....................  2462
    D. Information on International Human Rights Conventions 
      Listed in Appendix C.......................................  2468
    E. FY 1999 U.S. Economic and Security Assistance (Actual 
      Obligations)...............................................  2469
    F. 55th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Voting 
      Record.....................................................  2474
    G. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights......  2478



                                FOREWORD

                              ----------                              

    The country reports on human rights practices contained 
herein were prepared by the Department of State in accordance 
with sections 126(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, as amended. They also fulfill the legislative 
requirements of section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended.
    The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations 
that are members of the United Nations and a few that are not. 
They are printed to assist Members of Congress in the 
consideration of legislation, particularly foreign assistance 
legislation.

                                    Benjamin A. Gilman,    
                    Chairman, Committee on International Relations.
                                           Jesse Helms,    
                          Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.



                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                       Department of State,
                               Washington, DC, February 25, 1999.  
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.
    Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I 
am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices for 1998, prepared in compliance with sections 
116(d)(1) and 502(B)(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 
as amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as 
amended.
    We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we 
can provide any further information.
            Sincerely,
                                        Barbara Larkin,    
                          Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
    Enclosure.


                              PREFACE 1999

                              ----------                              


                          HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS

Why The Reports Are Prepared
    This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department 
of State in compliance with sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the 
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and section 
504 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. The law provides that 
the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate, by February 25 ``a full and complete report 
regarding the status of internationally recognized human 
rights, within the meaning of subsection (A) in countries that 
receive assistance under this part, and (B) in all other 
foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and 
which are not otherwise the subject of a human rights report 
under this Act.'' We have also included reports on several 
countries that do not fall into the categories established by 
these statutes and that thus are not covered by the 
congressional requirement.
    The responsibility of the United States to speak out on 
behalf of international human rights standards was formalized 
in the early 1970's. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation 
creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of 
State, a position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. In 
1994 the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for 
Women's Rights. Congress also has written into law formal 
requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into 
account countries' human rights and worker rights performance 
and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an 
annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only 
countries receiving U.S. aid, numbering 82; this year 194 
reports are submitted.
How The Reports Are Prepared
    In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen 
further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections 
in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to 
corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts 
were made to link mission programming to the advancement of 
human rights and democracy. In 1994 the Bureau of Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, reflecting both a 
broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking 
issues of human rights, worker rights, and democracy. The 1999 
human rights reports reflect a year of dedicated effort by 
hundreds of State Department, Foreign Service, and other U.S. 
Government employees.
    Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the 
reports, gathered information throughout the year from a 
variety of sources across the political spectrum, including 
government officials, jurists, military sources, journalists, 
human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This 
information-gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. Foreign 
Service Officers regularly go to great lengths, under trying 
and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of 
human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to the aid of 
individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human 
rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their 
governments.
    After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were 
sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in cooperation with other 
State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate, 
analyze, and edit the reports, the Department officers drew on 
their own sources of information. These included reports 
provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign 
government officials, representatives from the United Nations 
and other international and regional organizations and 
institutions, and experts from academia and the media. Officers 
also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee 
issues, military and police matters, women's issues, and legal 
matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant 
information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly, and fairly 
as possible.
    The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for 
shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance, 
training, and other resource allocations. They also will serve 
as a basis for the U.S. Government's cooperation with private 
groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized 
human rights.
    The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover 
internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and 
worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. These rights include freedom from torture or 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; 
from prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or 
clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of 
the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.
    Universal human rights aim to incorporate respect for human 
dignity into the processes of government and law. All persons 
have the inalienable right to change their government by 
peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of 
expression, association, assembly, movement, and religion, 
without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national 
origin, or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a 
necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus the 
reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights, 
including the right of association; the right to organize and 
bargain collectively; prohibition of forced or compulsory 
labor; the status of child labor practices and the minimum age 
for employment of children; and acceptable work conditions.
    Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 
the editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of: 
Editor in Chief--Marc J. Susser; Supervisory Editor--Leslie A. 
Gerson; Managing Editor--Jeannette P. Dubrow; Technical 
Editor--Larry Arthur; Editors--Liana Brooks, Frank B. Crump, 
Joan Garner, Stanley Ifshin, David T. Jones, Lisa N. Kaplan, 
Susan F. Kovalik, Amy E. McKee, Gregory P. Moody, Diana D. 
Perry-Elby, Yvette Saint-Andre, Rachel D. Settlage, John C. 
Sheerin, Carol A. Timko, James C. Todd, Stephen W. Worrel; 
Assistant Editors--John Bradshaw, Charles J. Brown, Christine 
Camillo, Douglas B. Dearborn, Carol G. Finerty, Jose Garriga, 
Ramona Harper, Peter Higgins, Ann Hudock, Alex Kronemer, Susan 
Keogh, Paul Martin, Edmund McWilliams, Robert L. Norman, David 
Park, Maria Pica, Susan O'Sullivan, Tamara J. Resler, Mark D. 
Schall, Madeleine Seidenstricker, Wendy L. Shapiro, Wendy B. 
Silverman, Mark A. Simonoff, Yvonne F. Thayer, Amy Young, 
Robert C. Ward; Editorial Assistants--Charmaine Coleman, Linda 
Hayes, Katie Janick, Laura Muir, Carrie O'Connell, Jennifer 
Pekkinen, Joshua Rubinstein, Vonzella Taylor, Eunice Watson.


              INTRODUCTION TO THE 1999 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

    I. The Third Globalization: Transnational Human Rights Networks

    Today, all the talk is of globalization. But far too often, 
both its advocates and its critics have portrayed globalization 
as an exclusively economic and technological phenomenon. In 
fact, in the new millennium, there are at least three universal 
``languages:'' money, the Internet, and democracy and human 
rights. An overlooked ``third globalization''--the rise of 
transnational human rights networks of both public and private 
actors--has helped develop what may over time become an 
international civil society capable of working with 
governments, international institutions, and multinational 
corporations to promote both democracy and the standards 
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
    In Davos recently, President Clinton noted that ``Since 
globalization is about more than economics, our interdependence 
requires us to find ways to meet the challenges of advancing 
our values.'' In 1999 the United States continued to meet that 
challenge. As a leader in promoting democracy and human rights 
around the world, the United States played an essential and 
catalyzing role in the process of creating transnational human 
rights networks. Just this past year, President Clinton and 
Secretary Albright helped forge international solutions to the 
crises in Kosovo and East Timor by encouraging a wide range of 
governmental and nongovernmental actors to join together in 
public-private networks to promote international justice. The 
United States is committed to the long-term project of helping 
such networks develop into an international civil society, an 
effective partnership of governments, international agencies, 
multinational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's) that will support democracy worldwide and promote the 
standards embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.
    The great American civil rights leader Martin Luther King, 
Jr. acknowledged ``the interrelatedness of all communities and 
states . . . caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, 
tied in a single garment of destiny.'' What Dr. King 
understood, even 40 years ago, was the need--in an increasingly 
interdependent world--for governments, businesses, NGO's, and 
individuals to work together as agents of change. But what Dr. 
King could not fully envision was an era in which these growing 
national networks would face both the profound opportunities 
and the challenges posed by globalization.
    Traditionally, networks have evolved out of communities of 
like-minded individuals who gather around shared interests and 
values. Often they begin as informal conversations, over dinner 
tables and conference tables, which help individuals identify a 
shared set of values and standards upon which they can base 
their behavior. They help generate what de Tocqueville called 
``habits of the heart''--those characteristics of human nature 
that encourage otherwise isolated individuals to connect with 
one another into a broader community. At times, private 
networks coalesce into a single NGO. More frequently, however, 
they remain loose coalitions of membership-based citizens' 
lobbies, labor unions, foundations, academics, professional 
associations, religious bodies, and other groups that share a 
desire to identify solutions to a single problem.
    Such networks developed at the neighborhood, the community, 
and at times the national level. But today, new kinds of 
networks--linked by air transport, telecommunications, the 
global media, and the Internet--are helping create 
transnational communities of shared institutions, shared ideas, 
and--most importantly--shared values. We are rapidly moving 
toward a global network of government officials, activists, 
thinkers, and practitioners who share a common commitment to 
democracy, the universality of human rights, and respect for 
the rule of law.
    Not surprisingly, the emergence of global 
telecommunications and commercial networks--the two other new 
``global languages''--have served as important driving forces 
behind this trend. Just as the Berlin Wall once stood as a 
physical barrier to movement and the free spread of democracy, 
governments that abuse human rights also seek to build walls 
that will stop the free flow of information. But the global 
information revolution has perforated such walls: E-mail, the 
Internet, cell phones, and other technologies have helped 
activists from around the globe to connect with one another in 
ways that were impossible only 10 years ago. The Internet has 
created a world in which traditional hierarchical, 
bidirectional models of authority have been replaced by 
nonhierarchical, multidirectional systems that naturally feed 
the growth of transnational networks. Similarly, the global 
commercial revolution has multiplied contact points between 
open and closed societies. As corporations, banks, 
international financial institutions, and private investors 
engage with transitional societies, they increasingly serve as 
transmission belts for human rights norms and advocates for 
human rights improvements.
    Increasingly, some of the most successful transnational 
networks are those that partner with, respond to, or support 
government initiatives on behalf of democracy and human rights. 
Perhaps the best example of the power of such public-private 
network partnerships can be found in the developments over the 
past year in Kosovo and East Timor. In the days and weeks 
leading up to both NATO's decision to use military force to 
stop Serb atrocities in Kosovo and the United Nations' decision 
to use military force to stop militia and army human rights 
abuses in East Timor, transnational networks of human rights 
activistsplayed a key role. During and after the Kosovo crisis, 
networks of human rights advocates and humanitarian relief workers 
worked closely with governments, the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the Former Yugoslavia, and NATO and KFOR forces to document 
allegations of war crimes and violations of humanitarian law. In both 
Kosovo and East Timor, NGO's are working with U.N. missions to build 
networks to support reconstruction, document human rights abuses, and 
support justice initiatives.
    When nongovernmental groups worked with intergovernmental 
agencies and national governments in Kosovo and East Timor, NGO 
efforts enriched government policy-creation efforts, and 
governments in turn helped guide and coordinate the work of 
NGO's. As a result of this public-private collaboration, 
governments successfully pooled their military and financial 
resources to halt the atrocities, and the international 
community began the hard work of rebuilding badly damaged 
societies.
    Transnational human rights networks of governments and 
nongovernmental actors have also worked closely together to 
secure the adoption of a wide range of declarations, 
international treaties, conventions, and protocols addressing 
key human rights issues. Many of these networks emerged from 
the world human rights conferences that took place in the 
1990's. At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 
1993 and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 
1995, NGO activists worked with democratic governments to 
combat efforts made by dictatorships to distort the 
conferences' final declarations. Both conferences also led to 
the creation of permanent confederations of NGO's, which have 
continued to work in partnership with democratic governments. 
More recently, NGO's and governments have worked together to 
secure agreements on eliminating the worst forms of child labor 
and ending the use of child soldiers.
    Transnational networks have played an important role in 
shaping the robust debate over how to guarantee international 
justice. While various actors in the international community do 
not yet agree fully on how best to address past human rights 
violations, particularly in the context of difficult democratic 
transitions, a great deal of concrete progress nonetheless has 
been made. As recently as the Vienna Conference on Human 
Rights, most governments (and many NGO's) regarded efforts to 
establish international judicial mechanisms to promote justice 
as remote or even utopian. Yet 7 years later, the world has 
witnessed the establishment of International Criminal Tribunals 
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Indeed, there also has 
been active and sometimes controversial domestic civil and 
criminal litigation against former dictators.
    Each of these developments took place in part because like-
minded governments worked with NGO's to create a public-private 
network through which ``the international community'' could 
address critical human rights concerns. To be sure, no 
international consensus yet exists on many international 
justice issues, including the establishment of an International 
Criminal Court. However, the critical achievements of 
transnational human rights networks have been to place 
international justice issues on the agenda and to search for 
forums in which justice ultimately can be reached.
    The United States continues to be a leader in the formation 
of new transnational human rights networks. For example, the 
U.S. Institute of Peace and the Department of State recently 
hosted a roundtable on justice and reconciliation at which 
visiting Indonesian officials drew on the experiences of five 
other countries--El Salvador, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, 
and South Korea--that have confronted the human rights abuses 
of prior authoritarian regimes while making the transition to 
democracy. Participants focused on the advantages and 
disadvantages of a range of mechanisms for promoting justice 
and reconciliation: Truth commissions, noncriminal sanctions, 
criminal accountability, and compensation for victims. Other 
recent successful efforts at human rights networking began at a 
private-public conference at the United States Holocaust Museum 
in Washington to discuss the design of an atrocities prevention 
information and action network and at a public-private 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
supplemental Human Dimension Meeting on Roma and Sinti issues.
    In a number of critical areas, the Department of State has 
appointed special representatives to take the lead on building 
and working with existing human rights and civil society 
networks. As 1999 ended, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury 
Stuart Eizenstat, in his role as Special Representative of the 
President and Secretary of State on Holocaust-Era Issues, 
catalyzed efforts by the German Government and German industry 
to capitalize a multibillion dollar foundation to make payments 
to those who worked as forced and slave laborers for German 
companies during the Nazi era and to others who were injured 
during World War II. He also helped stimulate the work of the 
historical commissions of 19 nations, including the United 
States, to examine their roles during the War and their 
relationship to Holocaust-related assets.
    Others have played an equally important role. Under 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Alan Larson has worked 
with a wide range of civil society groups in the Department's 
advisory group on international economic policy and the 
transatlantic consumer dialog. He also plays an active role in 
bringing the private business sector together with other civil 
society groups to address issues ranging from foreign economic 
policy to corporate responsibility. Robert Seiple, Ambassador 
atLarge for International Religious Freedom, has worked closely 
with advisory groups and religious organizations, as well as the 
Commission on International Religious Freedom, to develop strategies to 
expand religious freedom worldwide. David Scheffer, Ambassador at Large 
for War Crimes Issues, has undertaken similar efforts along with 
governments, intergovernmental entities, and NGO's dedicated to 
accountability and justice for past abuses and prevention of future 
atrocities. Joseph Onek, the Department of State's Global Rule of Law 
Coordinator, has built partnerships with bar associations, ministries 
of justice, judicial and prosecutorial training centers, and legal 
academics to promote rule of law and legal institutions worldwide. 
Theresa Loar, the Department's Senior Coordinator on Women's Issues and 
Director of the President's Interagency Council on Women, has worked 
closely with existing global networks to promote women's rights as 
human rights leading to the fifth anniversary of the Beijing Women's 
Conference. Sandra Polaski, the Secretary's Special Representative for 
International Labor Affairs, has strengthened the connection between 
the Department of State and the international labor movement by 
regularly convening the Secretary's Advisory Committee on International 
Labor Diplomacy and expanding the international labor function within 
the Department of State.
    Over the past 2 years, public-private transnational 
networks also have helped advance and promote the cause of 
democracy, as both a fundamental human right in itself and as a 
means to greater protection for a wide range of human rights. 
One of the most startling political changes of the post-Cold 
War era has been the explosion in the number of democracies 
worldwide: By most counts the number of democratic governments 
expanded fourfold in the last quarter of the 20th Century, from 
30 in 1974 to some 120 today. The U.S. Government's democracy-
promotion efforts have played an important role in bringing 
about this fundamental revolution in the way most nations are 
governed.
    In 1999 U.S. democracy-promotion strategy set out upon four 
new paths: Priority-setting; resource-matching; standard-
setting; and network-building. First, in an effort to give 
greater priority in U.S. support to countries that are at 
critical transition points in their movement toward democracy, 
Secretary of State Albright designated four countries--
Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Ukraine--as ``democracy 
priority'' countries. Second, the Secretary used her 
legislatively enhanced authority over the Agency for 
International Development to gain greater oversight over the 
assistance budgeting process, thereby seeking to channel more 
resources directly to the democracy priority countries. Third, 
to make clear that the right of democratic governance is not 
simply a privilege or a luxury, the United States introduced a 
resolution at the 55th Session of the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission in Geneva that explicitly reaffirmed that 
each individual has not just a hope of, but a right to, 
democratic governance: the resolution passed by a margin of 51-
0, with only 2 member countries abstaining.
    Fourth and finally, an impressive series of gatherings has 
helped lay the groundwork for creating a worldwide community of 
democracy activists and practitioners. In Mali, African 
governments and democratic activists met with aid officials 
from donor nations to discuss democratic development. In India, 
the world's democratic NGO's gathered in the first meeting of 
the ``Worldwide Movement for Democracy'' to discover shared 
values that transcend regional, cultural, or religious 
differences. In Yemen, small and emerging democracies met to 
identify common concerns. In Romania, new and restored 
democracies agreed on an agenda of action to support democracy 
in international fora. In the Republic of Korea, activists 
gathered at separate events to discuss the interrelationship 
between democracy and economic growth and the need for a 
network of Asian democrats. In Austria, Iceland, Northern 
Ireland, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay, women from 
government and NGO communities gathered at Vital Voices 
conferences to promote greater political participation for 
women in democratic dialog.
    In the first months of 2000, U.S. democracy-promotion 
efforts have expanded in two new directions. First, as 
challenges to democratic governance have emerged in Paraguay, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, and Pakistan, the global democratic 
network has worked to develop common strategies not just to 
promote ``democratic advance,'' but also to combat ``democratic 
backsliding.''
    Second, to develop a full-fledged intergovernmental dialog 
among those nations of the world committed to pursuing a 
democratic path and to explore how best to strengthen 
democratic institutions and processes, the foreign ministers of 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Chile, India, the Republic of 
Korea, Mali, and the United States have agreed to convene in 
Warsaw, Poland, in June 2000 a meeting of the ``Community of 
Democracies.'' This intergovernmental gathering should provide 
an unprecedented opportunity for established, emerging, and 
aspiring democracies to exchange experiences, to identify best 
practices, and to formulate an agenda for international 
cooperation in order to realize democracy's full potential. 
Concurrent with the ministerial meeting, a number of 
distinguished thinkers and path-breaking promoters of democracy 
from around the world will gather in Warsaw to discuss 
complementary issues and ideas. These representatives of 
intellectual life and civil society will present to the 
ministerial meeting their ideas as to how governments and 
citizens can better work together to strengthenand preserve 
democracy, thereby helping to strengthen the public-private regime 
dedicated to democracy-promotion and preservation.
    Transnational human rights and democracy networks also can 
play an influential role in securing change within 
international institutions. In recent years, the World Bank, 
Regional Development Banks, and the United Nations Development 
Program, with the support of the U.S. Government, all actively 
have sought out dialog with a wide range of human rights and 
democracy groups to integrate respect for human rights, 
democratic governance, and the rule of law into their vision of 
human development. Much of the work of the U.N. Commissions on 
Human Rights and the Status of Women now takes place on the 
margins of the formal sessions, in informal networking among 
governments, and between NGO's and governments. Other U.N. 
bodies, such as UNICEF, UNIFEM, and the offices of the U.N. 
High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights frequently 
seek out the counsel of networks of like-minded governments, 
NGO's, and regional organizations, such as the European Union, 
the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American 
States, and the Organization for African Unity.
    In addition in areas ranging from environmental protection 
to human rights, corporations have begun to meet regularly not 
only with unions but with broader transnational human rights 
networks to identify how they can work together to solve 
problems. Corporate social responsibility increasingly has been 
accepted as a core tenet of global corporate citizenship, 
generating gatherings from Davos to San Francisco to London, as 
well as new networks of concern, including the new Global 
Sullivan Principles, the Fair Labor Association, the Worker 
Rights Consortium, the SA 8000 initiative, the ``No Sweat'' 
Initiative, and the Apparel Industry Partnership.
    The U.S. Government has sought to encourage this trend by 
interacting and building alliances with multinational 
corporations that share a commitment has to establish a public-
private network devoted to human rights advancement. In 
partnership with American companies, we have developed a set of 
voluntary Model Business Principles; we also have worked with 
the business and labor communities as well as the International 
Labor Organization to promote 1998's Declaration on Core Labor 
Standards. We are working closely with the garment and footwear 
industries, trade unions, and community activists to combat the 
still-too-pervasive reality of sweatshop labor at home and 
abroad. Most recently, we have been exploring new ways to work 
together with community activists, human rights NGO's, and 
corporations working in the extractive industries to promote 
human rights, support democratic institutions, and strengthen 
the rule of law, particularly in the three democracy-priority 
countries of Colombia, Indonesia, and Nigeria.
    In every area, the work of the U.S. Government in 
democracy, human rights, and labor is increasingly being done 
not in isolation, but in partnership: Not just with other 
public entities, such as governments and intergovernmental 
organizations and international financial institutions, but 
with private entities, such as human rights and humanitarian 
NGO's; the media; labor unions; religious organizations; and 
corporations and commercial entities. As the new millennium 
unfolds, these transnational human rights networks will only 
expand and flourish. As international commerce and 
telecommunications continue to bind the world's peoples 
together, the United States will remain committed to using the 
universal language of human rights to build public-private 
networks to promote democracy and human rights worldwide.

                         II. The Year in Review

    Perhaps because there was no defining moment like the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall, few analysts noticed that 1999 saw 
as profound a positive trend toward freedom as 1989. Thanks to 
democratic elections in Indonesia and Nigeria, two of the 
world's most populous states, more people came under democratic 
rule than in any other recent year, including 1989. In 
addition, the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the international 
intervention in East Timor demonstrated that the international 
community has the will and the capacity to act against the most 
profound violations of human rights.
    Yet these significant gains in democracy and human rights 
cannot overshadow the fact that the past year also saw a number 
of profound challenges to human rights. Serbia's expulsion of 
over 850,000 Albanians, the Indonesian military's complicity in 
the militia rampage through East Timor, and the horrors 
perpetrated by rebels in Sierra Leone all show that the world 
still has a long way to go before it fully adheres to the 
precepts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 
addition, the coup in Pakistan and popular dissatisfaction in 
Latin America clearly demonstrate that the road to democratic 
governance is not without its problems and challenges. And 
despite the gains in Nigeria and Indonesia, too many 
authoritarian governments continue to deny basic human rights, 
including the right to democracy, to their citizens. The 
following sections highlight key developments over the past 
year in human rights, democracy, and labor.

                    A. Developments in Human Rights

    1. The Right to Democratic Dissent. Article One of the 
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states 
that ``Everyone hasthe right . . . to promote and to strive for 
the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.'' All too often, we take this principle for granted. Yet each 
year, dedicated human rights activists and democratic dissidents around 
the world lose their lives defending this remarkable, transforming 
idea. In a large number of the countries covered in this report, human 
rights defenders and democratic dissidents face harassment, 
imprisonment, disappearances, or torture; in some cases, the risk comes 
from government sources. In many others, however, the risk is from 
nongovernmental insurgent, terrorist, or criminal elements.
    Certain countries seem to take particular pleasure in 
restricting the right to democratic dissent. Take Serbia, where 
the Government of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President 
Slobodan Milosevic initiated a brutal and indiscriminate police 
and military crackdown against ethnic Albanian opponents in 
Kosovo and sought to limit and suppress dissent closer to home. 
The Kosovo campaign ended only after the international 
community intervened militarily. Before and during the 
conflict, Kosovar Albanians known to oppose the regime were 
murdered, raped, disappeared, expelled, or detained in Serbian 
prisons. In addition over 850,000 Kosovar Albanian civilians 
were expelled forcibly to neighboring Albania, Montenegro, and 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Severe violations of 
human rights, though less dramatic, also characterized the 
situation in the Serbian heartland, where the regime muzzled 
independent voices and forcibly dispersed citizens peaceably 
protesting government policies.
    Similarly in Cuba, the regime of Fidel Castro continued to 
suppress opposition and criticism. Cuban authorities routinely 
harass, threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and 
defame human rights advocates and members of independent 
professional associations, including journalists, economists, 
doctors, and lawyers, often with the goal of coercing them into 
leaving the country. The Government denied political dissidents 
and human rights advocates due process and subjected them to 
unfair trials. Many remained in prison at year's end. Although 
the Government sought to discourage and thwart foreign contacts 
with human rights activists, it did publicly state before the 
Ibero-American Summit in November that visiting delegations 
were free to meet with any person in the country, and about 20 
dissidents met with 9 different delegations, including 3 heads 
of state. Prior to the summit, however, authorities temporarily 
detained a number of human rights activists to prevent them 
from preparing for meetings with the visiting leaders.
    In Asia, dissidents and defenders face a range of 
challenges. In China, authorities broadened and intensified 
their efforts to suppress those perceived to threaten 
government power or national stability. Citizens who sought to 
express openly dissenting political and religious views faced 
widespread repression. In the weeks leading up to both June 
4th, the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, and 
October 1st, the 50th anniversary of the founding of the 
People's Republic, the Government moved against political 
dissidents across the country, detaining and formally arresting 
scores of activists in cities and provinces nationwide and 
thwarting any attempts to use the anniversaries as 
opportunities for protest. Authorities targeted members of the 
China Democracy Party (CDP), which had already had three of its 
leaders sentenced to lengthy prison terms in December 1998. 
Beginning in May, dozens of CDP members were arrested in a 
widening crackdown, and additional CDP leaders were convicted 
of subversion and sentenced to long prison terms in closed 
trials that flagrantly violated due process. Others were kept 
detained for long periods without charge. In addition both 
leaders and followers of the popular Falun Gong spiritual 
movement faced harassment, beatings, arrest, detention, and in 
some cases, sentences to prison terms for protesting the 
Government's decision to outlaw their practice. Many not 
formally arrested reportedly were sentenced administratively, 
without trial, to up to 3 years in reeducation-through-labor 
camps. By year's end, almost all of the key leaders of the CDP 
were serving long prison terms, and only a handful of 
dissidents nationwide dared to remain active publicly.
    In North Korea, government repression is so severe that no 
organized opposition to the regime is known to exist. The 
Government regards almost any independent activity--including 
listening to foreign broadcasts, writing letters, and 
possessing ``reactionary'' printed matter--crimes against the 
state. In Burma, the military junta intensified its systematic 
use of coercion and intimidation to restrict further freedom of 
association. Authorities undertook a sustained, systematic 
campaign to destroy the National League for Democracy (NLD) 
without formally banning it, pressuring thousands of NLD party 
members to resign and closing NLD offices throughout the 
country. Hundreds of prodemocracy activists remain in jail. 
Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has had to constrain her 
activities as a result of threats from the junta, which has 
severely restricted her freedom of movement.
    Dissidents and defenders in the former Soviet Union also 
faced problems. In Belarus, two well-known opposition leaders 
disappeared under mysterious circumstances. Government security 
forces closely monitored human rights activists and arbitrarily 
arrested, detained, and beat political opponents and average 
citizens. Similarly in Uzbekistan, security forces arbitrarily 
arrested or detained human rights activists, pious Muslims, and 
other citizens on false charges. At least one human 
rightsactivist died in prison, allegedly after not receiving adequate 
medical care. In Turkmenistan, opposition figures and human rights 
activists regularly face arbitrary arrest, prolonged pretrial 
detention, unfair trials, and interference with privacy.
    In the Middle East, dissidents and defenders had to contend 
with similar difficulties. In Iraq, the regime of Saddam 
Hussein continued to commit widespread, serious, and systematic 
human rights abuses, summarily executing actual and perceived 
political opponents. In Syria, the Government uses its vast 
powers to quash all organized political opposition.
    Defenders and dissidents in Africa also faced severe 
challenges. In Sudan, despite the adoption of a new 
Constitution through a referendum in June 1998, the Government 
continues to restrict most civil liberties, including freedom 
of assembly, association, religion, and movement. Government 
security forces regularly tortured, beat, harassed, arbitrarily 
arrested, and detained opponents or suspected opponents of the 
Government, and they did so with impunity. Government forces 
also were responsible for extrajudicial killings and 
disappearances. In Equatorial Guinea, the Government encouraged 
the illegal kidnaping and involuntary repatriation of political 
opponents living abroad. There are no effective domestic human 
rights NGO's, and in April the Government promulgated a new law 
that further restricted NGO's and precluded them from 
functioning in the area of human rights.
    A growing trend around the world is the threat posed to 
democratic dissent by nongovernmental insurgent, terrorist, or 
criminal forces. In Colombia, for example, paramilitary forces, 
some with links to the armed forces, were responsible for the 
murder of numerous human rights activists as well as threats 
against many others. Guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) murdered three American indigenous 
rights activists who had traveled to that country to work with 
local indigenous leaders. In Sri Lanka, human rights defender 
and Tamil parliamentarian Neelan Tiruchelvam was killed by a 
suicide bomber believed to be linked with the separatist 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
    Some countries saw improvements in the treatment of 
defenders and dissidents. Domestic human rights organizations 
continued to play a significant and increasing role in securing 
improved human rights conditions, although some NGO's reported 
monitoring and interference by the authorities. In April the 
Parliament repealed the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law, although it 
subsequently incorporated six crimes specified in that law into 
the Criminal Code. In March, the Habibie Government freed 52 
political prisoners, and in December the Wahid Government freed 
196 more. However, activists working in East and West Timor, 
Aceh, and Papua (Irian Jaya) continued to face significant 
restrictions on and interference in their activity.
    A number of governments took the positive step of releasing 
prominent defenders and dissidents. In Turkey, the Government 
suspended for 6 months the sentence of former Human Rights 
Association Chairman Akin Birdal, citing medical reasons 
stemming from injuries Birdal sustained during a May 1998 
attempt on his life. However, Birdal is subject to 
reimprisonment to resume his sentence in March 2000 and also 
faces many other charges. In Tunisia, the Government released 
on early parole Tunisian Human Rights League Vice President 
Khemais Ksila, who was arrested in September 1997 and convicted 
on charges of defamation of the public order, dissemination of 
false information, and inciting the public to violence. In 
Morocco, political dissident Abraham Serfaty, who had been 
exiled since 1991, was allowed to return. In Bhutan, the 
Government released dissident and former government official 
Tek Nath Rizal, who had been held for nearly 10 years. In 
Russia, retired Russian naval captain and environmental 
activist Aleksandr Nikitin was acquitted of espionage charges, 
but his legal difficulties and official harassment continue. 
The passport and visa services office has refused to issue him 
an international passport, and the local tax police have called 
him in for questioning, claiming that he owes personal income 
tax on all funds that western organizations raised and spent on 
his legal defense.
    2. Human Rights in Countries in Conflict. Civilians 
continue to endure human rights abuses, war crimes, and 
violations of humanitarian law in those countries facing 
internal insurgencies or civil war. Throughout the world, 
insurgents, paramilitary forces, and government security, 
military, and police forces used murder, rape, and inhumane 
tactics to assert control over territory, to secure the 
cooperation of civilians, and to silence opposition voices. As 
was the case in previous years, tens of thousands of civilian 
men, women, and children continued to die not only from 
conflict, but also from premeditated campaigns intended to 
instill terror among civilian populations.
    Africa continues to be the locus of many of the world's 
worst conflicts. In Sierra Leone, rebel forces committed 
numerous egregious abuses, including murder, abduction, 
deliberate mutilations, and rape. Progovernment militias also 
committed abuses, albeit on a lesser scale. The rebels 
continued their particularly vicious practice of cutting off 
the ears, noses, hands, arms, and legs of noncombatants--
including small children and elderly women. Rebel forces 
abducted missionaries, aid workers, U.N. personnel, and 
journalists; ambushed humanitarian relief convoys; raided 
refugee sites; and extorted and stole food. They abducted 
children to use as soldiers and other civilians to serve as 
forced laborers, sex slaves, andhuman shields. After the May 
cease-fire, insurgents continued to commit abuses, although 
significantly fewer were reported.
    Continued civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo saw government forces lose control of more than half the 
country's territory to rebels, who were often supported by 
troops from other African countries. Government security forces 
increasingly used arbitrary arrest and detention throughout the 
year and were responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings, 
disappearances, torture, beatings, rapes, and other abuses. 
Rebel forces also committed serious abuses, including murder, 
disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, rape, extortion, 
robbery, harassment of human rights workers and journalists, 
and recruitment of child soldiers.
    In Angola, fighting between government and rebel forces led 
to numerous, serious human rights abuses by both sides. In 
Burundi, government forces killed both rebels and civilians, 
including women, children, and the elderly. Rebel forces also 
attacked and killed civilians. Rebel attacks on the military 
often generated army reprisals against civilians suspected of 
cooperating with the insurgents. At year's end, the army 
forcibly relocated an estimated 330,000 Hutus in 
``regroupment'' sites in an effort to stop rebel attacks. In 
Uganda, insurgent groups, including the Lord's Resistance Army 
and Allied Democratic Forces, killed, tortured, maimed, raped, 
and abducted many persons (including children).
    Other parts of the world were not immune to conflict. In 
Serbia, Government military and security forces forcibly 
expelled over 850,000 Kosovar Albanians from their homes. Many 
women were raped in the process. The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is in the process of 
investigating reports of 11,000 persons killed and buried in 
529 mass graves and has indicted Yugoslav Federal President 
Slobodan Milosevic and several other senior Government 
officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity. At the 
conclusion of the conflict, the international community assumed 
responsibility for the administration of Kosovo; since then it 
has had to contend both with Kosovar Albanian reprisals against 
the rump Serbian population and Serb attacks against Albanians 
in the remaining Serb enclaves.
    In Russia, the seizure by armed insurgent groups from 
Chechnya of villages in the neighboring republic of Dagestan 
escalated by year's end into a full-fledged attack by Russian 
forces on separatists in Chechnya, including the Chechen 
capital of Groznyy. The Russian attack included air strikes and 
the indiscriminate shelling of cities predominantly inhabited 
by civilians. These attacks, which in turn led to house-to-
house fighting in Groznyy, led to the death of numerous 
civilians and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more. 
There are credible reports of Russian military forces carrying 
out summary executions of civilians in Alkhan-Yurt and in the 
course of the Groznyy offensive. As this report was going to 
press, there were credible reports that Russian forces were 
rounding up Chechen men of military age and sending them to 
``filtration'' camps, where they allegedly were tortured. The 
Russian Government has a duty to protect its citizens from 
terrorist attacks but must comply with its international 
commitments and obligations to protect civilians and must not 
engage in extrajudicial killing, the blocking of borders to 
prevent civilians from fleeing, and other violations in the 
name of internal security. Chechen separatists also reportedly 
committed abuses, including the killing of civilians.
    Afghanistan suffered its 20th consecutive year of civil war 
and political instability. Both the ultraconservative movement 
known as the Taliban (which controls roughly 90 percent of the 
country) and the United Front for Afghanistan (also known as 
the Northern Alliance) committed serious human rights abuses, 
particularly against women and girls, in the areas they 
occupied and during their attempts to conquer territory. Both 
also were responsible for the indiscriminate bombardment of 
civilians. Years of conflict have left an estimated 2.6 million 
Afghans living outside the country as refugees, while another 
250,000 are internally displaced.
    In Indonesia, civil conflict and violence continued or 
worsened despite the country's relatively successful struggle 
to move from dictatorship to democracy. A variety of motives 
drove the violence. Dissatisfaction that had remained pent up 
under the long-time rule of Soeharto boiled over under 
successor Governments. Anger at Indonesian military, security, 
and police units only fed widespread popular support for 
independence in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua (Irian Jaya). In 
Aceh, military forces and police committed numerous abuses, 
including extrajudicial killings, excessive force, 
disappearances, rape, arbitrary arrest, and detention without 
trial. Military forces sometimes resorted to force in order to 
disrupt peaceful demonstrations. Thousands of Acehnese 
residents fled their villages during various security 
crackdowns against separatist groups. In addition, dozens of 
low-level civil servants, police, and military personnel were 
murdered and abducted, most likely by separatists. In Ambon and 
throughout Maluku, fighting between Moslems and Christians left 
more than 1,000 dead by the end of the year. In West 
Kalimantan, more than 200 persons died in fighting pitting 
Madurese immigrants against indigenous Dayak and Melayu groups.
    In East Timor, paramilitary units supported by or under the 
control of the Indonesian military went on a rampage of 
violence, looting, and destruction after a United Nations-
sponsoredreferendum saw more than 78 percent of Timorese vote 
for independence. Elements of the Indonesian security forces and the 
prointegration militias (which were armed and largely supported by the 
military) were responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings. In 
September hundreds of persons were killed in a wave of military-
sponsored militia violence after the announcement of the 
proindependence vote. Over 250,000 East Timorese fled the violence. 
Violations included summary executions, massacres, rapes, deportations, 
and the destruction of property. Both an International Commission of 
Inquiry and an investigative commission established by the Indonesian 
Human Rights Commission subsequently concluded that the Indonesian 
military failed to stop, colluded in, or participated in the violence. 
In the early part of the year, proindependence groups also committed 
serious abuses, including killings.
    In Sri Lanka, the Government's conflict with the separatist 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued to result in 
serious human rights abuses by both sides. Government security 
forces committed extrajudicial killings and at least 15 
individuals disappeared from their custody. The Government did 
begin to investigate allegations that as many as 400 Tamils 
killed by security forces were buried in multiple graves in the 
town of Chemmani. Two exhumations recovered 15 bodies, but 
authorities have not yet sought criminal indictments against 
security forces in relation to the killings. LTTE forces were 
responsible for extrajudicial executions, disappearances, 
torture, arbitrary arrests, and detentions. LTTE attacks and 
suicide bombings killed close to 100 civilians, and at least 14 
persons who were found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-
described courts were executed publicly.
    In Colombia, despite the Government's efforts to negotiate 
an end to hostilities, widespread internal armed conflict and 
rampant political and criminal violence persisted. Government 
security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotics 
traffickers all continued to commit numerous serious abuses, 
including extrajudicial killings and torture. Throughout the 
country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured, and threatened 
civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an 
orchestrated campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their 
homes. These groups were responsible for numerous massacres. 
Guerrillas regularly attacked civilian populations, kidnapped 
numerous individuals, committed massacres and summary 
executions, killed medical and religious personnel, and 
forcibly recruited civilians (including children). The 
Government took important steps toward ending collaboration by 
some security force members with the paramilitaries. President 
Pastrana, Vice President Bell, and members of the military high 
command declared repeatedly that collaboration--whether by 
commission or omission--by members of the security forces with 
paramilitary groups would not be tolerated. The President 
removed from service four generals and numerous mid-level 
officers and noncommissioned officers for collaboration, for 
failing to confront paramilitaries aggressively, or for failing 
to protect the local population.
    3. Religious Freedom. In September the Department of State 
delivered to Congress the first Annual Report on International 
Religious Freedom. The Department carries a statutory 
responsibility to prepare these reports annually. The Report 
sought to create a comprehensive record of the state of 
religious freedom around the world and to highlight the most 
significant violations of this right. The Report demonstrates 
that violations of religious freedom, including religious 
persecution, are not confined to any one country, religion, or 
nationality. Throughout the world, Baha'is, Buddhists, 
Christians, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, and other believers continue 
to suffer for their faith.
    Too much of the world's population still lives in countries 
in which religious freedom is restricted or prohibited. 
Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes remain determined to 
control religious belief and practice. Other regimes are 
hostile to minority or ``unapproved'' religions. Some tolerate, 
and thereby encourage, persecution or discrimination. Still 
other governments have adopted discriminatory legislation or 
policies that give preferences to favored religions while 
disadvantaging others. Some democratic states have 
indiscriminately identified minority religions as dangerous 
``sects'' or ``cults.''
    The International Religious Freedom Act also required the 
President or his designee (in this case the Secretary of State) 
to use the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom and 
other resources to identify those countries where the 
government has engaged in or tolerated ``severe'' or 
``particularly severe'' violations of religious freedom. In 
October Secretary Albright informed Congress that she was 
designating five ``Countries of Particular Concern'': Burma, 
China, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan. The Secretary also informed 
Congress that she was identifying as particularly severe 
violators the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Government 
of Serbia. This last action was not taken under the auspices of 
the International Religious Freedom Act because the United 
States does not regard the Taliban as a government or Serbia as 
a country as envisioned by the act.
    In Burma, the Government arrests and imprisons Buddhist 
monks who promote human and political rights. Security forces 
destroyed or looted churches, mosques, and Buddhist monasteries 
in some insurgent ethnic minority areas. In some insurgent 
China ethnic minority areas, security forces used coercive 
measures to induce Christians to convert to Buddhism.
    China continued to restrict freedom of religion and 
intensified controls on some unregistered churches. Unapproved 
religious groups, including Protestant and Catholic groups, 
continued to experience varying degrees of official 
interference, repression, and persecution. The Government 
continued to enforce 1994 State Council regulations requiring 
all places of religious activity to register with the 
Government and come under the supervision of official, 
``patriotic'' religious organizations. In some areas, 
authorities guided by national policy made strong efforts to 
control the activities of unapproved Catholic and Protestant 
churches; religious services were broken up and church leaders 
or adherents were harassed, fined, detained, and at times, 
beaten. According to reports, there were instances of torture. 
At year's end, some remained in prison because of their 
religious activities, while others remained unaccounted for. In 
Tibet, the Government expanded and intensified its ``patriotic 
education campaign'' aimed at controlling monasteries and 
expelling supporters of the Dalai Lama, increasing pressure on 
Tibetan Buddhists. Controls on religious freedom in Xinjiang 
also remained tight. The Government also launched a crackdown 
against the Falun Gong spiritual movement in July. Tens of 
thousands of Falun Gong members reportedly were detained in 
outdoor stadiums and forced to sign statements disavowing the 
Falun Gong before being released.
    In Iran, the Government committed numerous human rights 
abuses based in part on religion. Religious minorities, in 
particular Bahais, continued to suffer repression by 
conservative elements of the judiciary and security 
establishment. Thirteen Jews were arrested in February and 
March on suspicion of espionage on behalf of Israel, an offense 
punishable by death, leading to charges of anti-Semitism. In 
Iraq, the Government of Saddam Hussein has conducted a campaign 
of murder, summary execution and protracted arbitrary arrest 
against the religious leaders and adherents of the Shia Muslim 
population. Security forces have murdered senior Shia clerics, 
desecrated mosques and holy sites, and arrested untold numbers 
of Shi'a. In Sudan, discrimination and violence against 
religious minorities persisted. Government security forces 
harassed and detained persons on the basis of their religion. 
Eyewitnesses reported aerial bombardments of Christians, 
Muslims, and animists in the Nuba Mountains. Government-
supported forces conducted raids, abducted persons--including 
women and children--and sold them into slavery. Many non-
Muslims were converted forcibly to Islam.
    In Afghanistan, the ultraconservative movement known as the 
Taliban, which controls about 90 percent of the country, 
enforced their interpretation of Islamic law through 
punishments such as public executions for adultery or murder 
and amputations of one hand and one foot for theft. Taliban 
militiamen often judged accused offenders and meted out 
punishments, such as beatings, on the spot. In Serbia, a 
predominantly Christian Orthodox country, authorities employed 
killing, torture, rape, and the forced mass emigration of 
Kosovar Albanians, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, in an effort 
to drive them from the country.
    Other countries also saw significant violations of 
religious freedom. In Saudi Arabia, neither the Government nor 
society in general accepts the concept of separation of 
religion and state. The religious police enforce adherence to 
Islamic norms, intimidating, abusing, and detaining citizens 
and foreigners. In Pakistan, both the pre and postcoup 
Governments, as well as sectarian groups, continued to 
discriminate against religious minorities, particularly Ahmadis 
and Christians. Three Ahmadis sentenced in 1997 to life in 
prison for blasphemy remain incarcerated. Religious and ethnic-
based rivalries resulted in numerous killings and civil 
disturbances. In India, there was widespread intercaste and 
communal violence.
    In Uzbekistan, the Government harassed and arrested 
hundreds of Islamic leaders and believers on questionable 
grounds, citing the threat of extremism. While the Government 
tolerated the existence of some Christian denominations and 
even facilitated their registration, its laws still have the 
potential to limit the activity of some evangelical Christian 
groups. In Vietnam, the Government arbitrarily arrested and 
detained citizens for the peaceful expression of their 
religious views. The Government significantly restricts the 
operation of religious organizations other than those approved 
by the State.
    In countries such as Indonesia, the problem was not 
government repression, but communal violence. In Maluku 
province, fighting principally involved Muslims and Christians 
(mostly Protestants). More than a thousand died and tens of 
thousands were displaced. Clashes began in the provincial 
capital of Ambon in January, then spread to neighboring 
islands. Economic tensions between native Christians and 
Muslims who migrated to Maluku in recent decades were a 
significant factor. Christian and Muslim communities in Maluku 
blamed each other for initiating and perpetuating the violence. 
Exhaustive mediation efforts, including an initiative launched 
by the Indonesian military in April, failed to secure a durable 
peace.
    In Azerbaijan, the news was better. President Aliyev 
publicly took law enforcement and security officials to task 
for the harassment of religious believers. He also pledged that 
such abuse would not continue and that violators would be 
punished. The Government rescinded deportation orders for 
foreign religious workers, secured the reinstatement of 
believers who had lost their jobs, and prosecuted members of a 
local police force accused of harassment.
    4. Press Freedom and the Information Revolution. Attacks on 
independent media--whether print, broadcast, or electronic--
remained commonplace. Journalists continued to risk harassment, 
arrest, and even death to report the news. Murder remained the 
leading cause of job-related deaths among journalists 
worldwide. A wide range of governments throughout the world 
continue to utilize a variety of tools, including licensing, 
limits on access to newsprint, control over government 
advertising, jamming, and censorship, to inhibit independent 
voices. The growth of new, Internet-based media did help 
facilitate public access to a wide range of information, but 
some governments continued to develop means to monitor e-mail 
and Internet use and restrict access to controversial, 
political, news-oriented, and human rights web sites. Other 
governments have chosen to prohibit Internet access or limit it 
to political elites.
    In China, control and manipulation of the press by the 
Government for political purposes increased during the year. 
After authorities moved at the end of 1998 to close a number of 
newspapers and fire several editors, the press and publishing 
industries were more cautious. Nonetheless, the press continued 
to report on cases of corruption and abuse of power by some 
local officials. As part of its crackdown against the Falun 
Gong, the Government used the state-controlled media to conduct 
a nationwide propaganda campaign. By some estimates, as many as 
8.9 million Chinese citizens had access to the Internet, but 
the Government increased its efforts to try to restrict 
information available on the Internet and to monitor usage.
    In Cuba, the Castro regime continued to tightly control 
access to information. In February the National Assembly passed 
the Law to Protect National Independence and the Economy, which 
outlaws possession and dissemination of ``subversive'' 
literature or information that could be used by U.S. 
authorities in the application of U.S. legislation. The 
Government has not yet charged anyone under the new law, but 
many independent journalists have been threatened with arrest, 
some repeatedly. National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon 
told foreign correspondents that even reporters working for 
accredited foreign media could be sentenced to up to 20 years 
in prison under the new law. The Government continued to 
subject independent journalists to internal travel bans, 
arbitrary and periodic brief detentions, small acts of 
repudiation, harassment, seizures of office and photographic 
equipment, and repeated threats of prolonged imprisonment. The 
Government tightly controls access to computers, limiting 
access to the Internet to certain Government offices, selected 
institutes, and foreigners.
    In Serbia, the Government of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
President Slobodan Milosevic continues to harass and detain 
journalists and shut down their newspapers and radio stations. 
At least one journalist was murdered under suspicious 
circumstances. In Serbia's sister republic of Montenegro, 
however, the Government worked to provide a hospitable working 
environment to independent media, including media that were 
harassed, threatened, or shut down by Serbian authorities.
    In Ethiopia, fewer journalists were detained than in 
previous years, but at least eight remained in detention at 
year's end. Some 45 journalists obtained bail during the year 
but still are subject to trial. In Peru, the Government 
inhibits freedom of speech and of the press. Journalists faced 
increased government harassment and intimidation and practiced 
a great degree of self-censorship.
    In Ukraine, the Government increasingly interfered with 
freedom of the press, most notably in the period before the 
October presidential elections. Government authorities stepped 
up pressure on the media, particularly broadcast outlets, 
through tax inspections and other measures. In Russia, 
journalists complained of increasing governmental interference. 
In mid-January 2000, Russian authorities detained Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent Andrey Babitskiy and held 
him incommunicado, but they did not make public his detention 
until the end of the month. On February 3, the Government 
claimed that Russian forces had turned Babitskiy over to 
Chechen forces in exchange for Russian soldiers; neither 
Babitskiy's wife nor his employer has heard from him since, and 
his whereabouts remain unknown.
    In Turkey, Parliament suspended for 3 years the sentences 
of writers and journalists convicted of crimes involving 
freedom of expression through the media. By the end of the 
year, at least 25 had been released. However, the law did not 
apply to crimes committed through speech, and human rights 
observers and some released writers said the conditions for the 
suspension amount to censorship. Limits on freedom of speech 
and of the press remained a serious problem. Authorities banned 
or confiscated publications and raided newspaper offices, and 
security forces occasionally beat journalists. Police continued 
to interfere with the distribution of some Kurdish newspapers, 
and radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish remained 
illegal. Although Kurdish music recordings were widely 
available, bans on certain songs and singers persisted. The 
Committee to Protect Journalists estimated at year's end that 
at least 18 journalists remain in prison.
    5. Women. The plight of women in Afghanistan continued to 
be the most serious women's human rights crisis in the world 
today. Taliban discrimination against women and girls remained 
both systematic and institutionally sanctioned. The Taliban 
imposed strict dress codes and restricted women from working 
outside the home except in very limited circumstances such 
ashealth care and humanitarian assistance. They also severely 
restricted women's and girls' access to many levels and types of 
education. The impact of Taliban restrictions is most acutely felt in 
cities such as Kabul and Herat, where there are a number of educated 
and professional women.
    Elsewhere, women continue to face a wide range of human 
rights abuses. On a daily basis, women faced violence, abuse, 
rape, and other forms of degradation by their spouses and by 
members of society at large. Women suffer domestic violence in 
most if not all countries around the world. Many governments 
still fail to act against ``honor killings,'' domestic 
violence, and even rape. In Nigeria, for example, the law 
allows a husband to ``chastise'' his wife, as long as it does 
not result in ``grievous harm.'' In China, many women contended 
with domestic violence. Coercive family planning practices 
sometimes included forced abortion and forced sterilization. 
Trafficking and prostitution continued. In India, Bangladesh, 
and Nepal, dowry-related violence remained a serious problem. 
In Egypt, India, Iran, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Yemen, and a number of other societies where religion and 
tradition play a predominant role, societal and cultural 
constraints kept women in a subordinate position.
    In Kuwait, women do not have the right to vote or seek 
election to the National Assembly. Although the ruling Amir 
issued a decree in May which sought to give women the right to 
vote, to seek election to the National Assembly beginning with 
the parliamentary election scheduled for 2003, and to hold 
cabinet office, the Parliament vetoed it on constitutional 
grounds. Subsequent identical legislation introduced by Members 
of Parliament was defeated by a two-vote margin.
    Female genital mutilation, which has negative, life-long 
health consequences for women and girls, continues to be 
practiced in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and to varying degrees 
in some countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, Oman, 
and Yemen. Trafficking of women and children remains endemic in 
many parts of the world; in response, the Department of State 
has for the first time established a separate section in each 
Country Report to highlight U.S. concern about this serious 
problem (see Section C.2 below).
    6. Protection of Minorities. In some states, majorities in 
power choose to mistreat or persecute those not like 
themselves. However, persecution and discrimination is not 
confined to states but also can be present in societies. Much 
remains to be done on the national level, and far too many 
governments do not grant individuals their rights because of 
race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status. In 
many cases, such repression inevitably leads to violence and 
separatism.
    In China, for example, particularly serious human rights 
abuses persisted in minority areas, especially in Tibet and 
Xinjiang, where restrictions on religion and other fundamental 
freedoms intensified. Some minority groups, particularly 
Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs, came under increasing 
pressure as the Government clamped down on dissent and 
``separatist'' activities. In Tibet, the Government expanded 
and intensified its continuing ``patriotic education campaign'' 
aimed at controlling the monasteries and expelling supporters 
of the Dalai Lama. In Xinjiang, where violence between the 
Government and separatist forces has escalated since 1996, 
authorities tightened restrictions on religion and other 
fundamental freedoms in an effort to control independence 
groups.
    In Serbia, discrimination and violence against Kosovar 
Albanians, Muslims, Roma, and other religious and ethnic 
minorities worsened during the year. The Milosevic regime's 
oppressive policies toward Kosovo's ethnic Albanians imperiled 
prospects for interethnic cooperation and encouraged a 
separatist insurgency. In response, the regime launched a 
brutal police and military crackdown against the insurgents, 
which escalated into a full-fledged campaign of ethnic 
cleansing against civilians. As many as 850,000 Kosovars fled 
the province for squalid camps in neighboring states. After 
diplomatic intervention failed to resolve the matter, NATO 
forces began an air campaign against the Serbian regime. In 
June Serbia withdrew its forces from Kosovo, and the 
international community assumed responsibility for the 
province's administration. Since then, international 
peacekeeping forces have had to contend both with Kosovar 
Albanian reprisals against the rump Serbian population, and 
Serb attacks against Albanians in remaining Serb enclaves.
    Although the erection of a wall to separate Roma from their 
neighbors in the Czech city of Usti nad Labem captured 
international attention, the problems facing Roma and Sinti 
populations in Europe went far beyond the building of a wall. 
Both populations suffer disproportionately from poverty, 
unemployment, and other socioeconomic ills. In many countries, 
particularly in Central and Southeastern Europe, they face 
prejudice, discrimination, and abuse.
    7. The Holocaust: Completing the Historical Record. 
Spearheaded by Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart Eizenstat in 
his capacity as Special Representative of the President and 
Secretary of State on Holocaust-era issues, the United States 
promoted further international recognition of the need for 
justice and remembrance for the victims of the greatest human 
rights violation of the 20th Century, the Holocaust. German 
industry and government pledged DM10 billion to capitalize a 
foundation that, among other things, will make payments to 
those who worked as forced and slave laborers for German 
companies during the Nazi era.Nineteen nations, including the 
United States, have established Holocaust Commissions to review their 
own involvement with Holocaust-era assets. Consistent with the 1998 
Washington Conference on Art Principles, millions of dollars worth of 
art stolen by the Nazis are being returned to rightful owners. At the 
Stockholm International Forum in January 2000, the United States, along 
with over 40 other governments, made an unprecedented common political 
commitment to strengthening Holocaust education, remembrance and 
research activities, and to opening archives bearing on the Holocaust.

B. Developments in Democracy

    1. Democracies Under Threat. In The Third Wave, his seminal 
study of democratization, Samuel Huntington warned that the 
wave of democratization that began with Portugal in 1974 (and 
continues today) might suffer significant reversals in 
countries where conditions for democracy are weak. Over the 
past year, the number of democracies around the world continued 
to grow, but a small number of countries on the path to 
democracy saw reversals or threats to democratic governance.
    This trend was particularly notable in Latin America, where 
elected governments in Ecuador and Paraguay confronted 
attempted coups or instability, and an elected government in 
Peru undermined democratic governance by concentrating power in 
the executive. In Ecuador, what could have been a disastrous 
coup became instead an unfortunate but ultimately 
constitutional succession. Indigenous activists, with the 
support of elements of the military, occupied the Ecuadorian 
Congress building, demanded the resignation of President Jamil 
Mahuad and attempted to replace him with a three-person junta 
that included an indigenous leader, a former Supreme Court 
judge, and a military officer. To end the institutional crisis, 
President Mahuad asked Ecuadorians to support Vice President 
Gustavo Noboa as his constitutional successor. The National 
Assembly confirmed the change in presidents the same day.
    In Paraguay, President Raul Cubas Grau, a protege of 
retired General and coup plotter Lino Oviedo, sought to 
undercut the constitutional authority of the legislative and 
judicial branches. In March, Cubas' foe and Vice President Luis 
Maria Argana was assassinated, allegedly by Oviedo supporters. 
On March 28, after widespread demonstrations against Cubas and 
Oviedo, Cubas resigned, and Oviedo fled Paraguay. Senate 
president Luis Gonzalez Macchi assumed the presidency, forming 
a national unity Government that included, for the first time 
in 50 years, the two major opposition parties. By the end of 
the year, however, the Government faced economic difficulties, 
rural unrest, and increasing opposition.
    In Peru, a dominant executive branch often uses its control 
of the legislature and the judiciary to the detriment of the 
democratic process. The Constitutional Tribunal has not 
functioned effectively since 1997, when Congress removed three 
of its members for opposing an interpretation of a law 
permitting President Fujimori to run for a third consecutive 
term. In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez Frias, the leader of 
an attempted coup in 1992, was elected President on a promise 
of radical reform, including constitutional change through the 
election of a National Constitutional Assembly (ANC). In April, 
voters overwhelmingly approved his referendum, giving the ANC a 
6-month mandate to rewrite the Constitution. The ANC, which was 
dominated by Chavez's political party, drafted a new 
constitution, which was approved by voters in December. At 
year's end some observers remained concerned that too much 
power was being concentrated in Chavez's hands.
    In other parts of the world, the main threat to democracy 
came from the military. In Pakistan, Army Chief of Staff 
General Pervaiz Musharraf overthrew the elected civilian 
Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in an October 
bloodless coup. Musharraf, in consultation with senior military 
commanders, designated himself Chief Executive, and suspended 
the Constitution, the National Assembly, the Senate, and the 
provincial assemblies. Despite repeated promises to restore 
democracy, Musharraf at year's end had not established either a 
timetable or milestones; his decision early in 2000 to require 
judges to swear a loyalty oath to the military (rather than the 
Constitution) further distanced his regime from a return to 
democratic rule.
    In Cote d'Ivoire, retired General Robert Guei took over the 
Government after a mutiny that began in December evolved into a 
major military revolt and culminated in the dismissal and 
forced departure of President Henri Konan Bedie. The Guei 
regime arrested numerous Government ministers and military 
officers; by year's end, it had released all except 40. Guei 
has pledged to rewrite the Constitution, clean up government 
corruption, and hold fair and transparent elections.
    2. Free and Fair Elections. According to Freedom House, 
there were 120 democracies at the end of 1999, a net increase 
of 3 over the previous year, and the largest number ever. As 
noted above, however, this trend away from dictatorship saw 
several reversals, most notably in Pakistan. Although Indonesia 
and Nigeria, two of the world's most populous states, made 
great strides toward democratic rule, a number of other states 
saw tainted or flawed elections stall their transitions to 
democracy.
    Indonesia made significant progress in its transition from 
authoritarian to democratic rule. In June, the country held its 
first pluralistic, competitive, free, and fair 
parliamentaryelections in 43 years. A new Parliament (DPR) and People's 
Consultative Assembly (MPR) were installed on October 1st. In 
accordance with constitutional procedures, the MPR subsequently 
elected, in a transparent balloting procedure, Abdurrahman Wahid as 
President, and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice President.
    In Nigeria, the military regime of General Abdulsalami 
Abubakar completed its transition to democratic civilian rule 
with the election and subsequent May inauguration of retired 
General Olusegun Obasanjo as President. In accordance with 
Abubakar's transition program, members of the new civilian 
Government were chosen in four elections held over a 3-month 
period. Elections for local Government leaders were held in 
December 1998, those for state legislators and governors in 
January, and those for national legislators and president in 
February. The elections, most notably the presidential 
election, were flawed, but most observers agreed that the 
election of Obasanjo as President reflected the will of the 
majority of voters.
    Several states saw limited gains. In Tunisia, the October 
presidential and legislative elections marked a modest step 
toward democratic development, with opposition presidential 
candidates allowed to participate in the presidential race for 
the first time in Tunisia's history. However, the campaign and 
election processes greatly favored the ruling party, and there 
was wide disregard for the secrecy of the vote. In Niger, 
President Ibrahim Mainassara Bare, who overthrew a 
democratically elected Government in 1996, was assassinated in 
January by members of his presidential guard. A group of 
military officers led by Major Daouda Malam Wanke asserted 
control over the Government and announced a 9-month transition 
to a democratically elected Government. In July citizens voted 
to approve a new Constitution. In November they voted for a new 
National Assembly and for a new President; Tandja Mamadou was 
elected President with 60 percent of the vote in an election 
that was considered by international observers to be generally 
free and fair.
    Other countries were not as successful in their 
transitions. In Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko's legal term as 
President expired in July. He had extended arbitrarily his term 
of office until 2001 after the illegal 1996 constitutional 
referendum. In Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev was elected in 
January to a new 7-year term in an election that fell far short 
of international standards. Parliamentary elections held in 
October were an improvement over the presidential election but 
still fell short of international standards. In Azerbaijan, the 
country's first-ever municipal elections held in December, were 
marred by a nearly universal pattern of interference by local 
officials, which allowed them to control the selection of the 
election committees that supervised the election. In Armenia, 
irregularities marred both the May parliamentary elections and 
the October local elections. OSCE observers categorized the 
parliamentary elections as a step toward compliance with OSCE 
commitments, but said that they still failed to meet 
international standards.
    In Haiti, a prolonged stalemate between President Rene 
Preval and the opposition-controlled legislature prevented the 
holding of elections in autumn 1998 to replace the Parliament 
as legally required. Preval announced that he would not 
recognize Parliament's decision to extend its incumbents' 
mandates until new elections could be held, thereby leaving the 
country without a functioning legislative branch for over a 
year. In March, Prime Minister Alexis formed a cabinet after 
negotiations with the five-party opposition coalition. Due to 
the absence of a parliament, the new ministers took office 
without being confirmed. The international community is 
assisting Haiti in preparations for new elections, scheduled 
for March and April 2000, with the goal of restoring the lapsed 
democratic institutions.
    In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni, elected to a 5-year 
term in 1996 under the 1995 Constitution, continued to dominate 
the Government. The 1995 Constitution formally extended the 
one-party movement form of government for 5 years and severely 
restricted political activity. Although Museveni supporters 
remained in control of the legislative branch, Parliament acted 
with increasing independence and assertiveness during the year. 
A national referendum on whether to allow multipartyism again 
is scheduled for 2000.
    3. Civil Society. In many nations, civil society--that 
broad array of nongovernmental organizations, clubs, societies, 
trade unions, and political parties that are the domestic 
counterparts to transnational networks--played an increasingly 
influential role. Although some critics have warned that the 
emergence of the Internet culture would stunt social 
interaction, civil society groups showed no sign of slowing 
down at year's end, and as noted above, many were taking 
advantage of technological developments to establish new 
transnational networks of common interest and concern.
    Many governments continue to seek means to limit, repress, 
or shut down the growth and development of civil society, which 
they regard as a profound threat to their authoritarian rule. 
In Belarus, for example, Government restrictions prevent an 
embryonic civil society from developing further. The security 
services infringed on citizens' privacy rights and monitored 
closely the activities of opposition politicians and other 
segments of the population. Restrictions on freedom of speech, 
the press, and peaceful assembly continued, and the Government 
did not respect freedom of association.
    In Iraq, then-U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq Max Van der 
Stoel noted in his February and October reports that freedom of 
speech, press, assembly, movement, and association do not 
exist. The Government effectively has eliminated the civil 
rights to life, liberty, and physical integrity and the 
freedoms of thought, expression, association and assembly. In 
Cuba, the Government denied citizens the freedoms of speech, 
press, assembly, and association. Authorities routinely harass, 
threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and defame 
members of independent associations, including human rights 
advocates, journalists, economists, doctors, and lawyers, often 
with the goal of coercing them into leaving the country.
    In China, an unknown number of persons, estimated at 
several thousand, have been detained for peacefully expressing 
their political, religious, or social views. Persons or groups 
seeking to promote political change, monitor human rights, or 
in any way challenge the authority of the Communist Party were 
repressed, their leaders often harassed, beaten, and jailed. At 
the same time, most average citizens went about their daily 
lives without significant interference from the Government, 
enjoying looser economic controls, increased access to outside 
sources of information, greater room for individual choice, and 
more diversity in cultural life. Social groups with economic 
resources at their disposal continued to play an increasing 
role in community life. Pilot experiments with contested local 
village elections continued.
    In Malaysia, a U.N. Special Rapporteur reported that the 
Government systematically curtailed freedom of expression. 
Government restrictions and proliferating slander and libel 
suits stifled freedom of speech, and the Government 
significantly restricted freedom of movement, association, and 
assembly. The Government prohibited some peaceful gatherings, 
prevented students from participating in some political 
activities, and regularly and harshly criticizes domestic NGO's 
that venture into the political arena.
    In Turkey, which has an active and growing civil society 
movement, the Government still continued to limit freedom of 
assembly and association, and police harassed, beat, abused, 
and detained a large number of demonstrators. The Saturday 
Mothers, who had held weekly vigils in Istanbul for more than 3 
years to protest the disappearances of their relatives, 
discontinued their gatherings this year in the face of ongoing 
police harassment, abuse, and detention of the group's members. 
In general, the Government continued to harass, intimidate, 
indict, and imprison individuals for ideas that they had 
expressed in public forums. However, there were some signs of a 
growing tolerance for civil society: State Minister Irtemcelik 
and President Demirel met with NGO's, and one office of a human 
rights NGO reopened in October after being closed for 5 years.
    4. Rule of Law. All too often, authoritarian governments 
insist that they respect the rule of law when in fact they 
abuse the law to justify their rule. In far too many 
countries--Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, 
Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam, for example--
absolute rulers use the legal system to serve their own 
interests. Without the rule of law, these leaders violate human 
rights with impunity, suspend democracy, void contracts, and 
engage in corrupt practices. Governments that respect the rule 
of law have transparent and fair legal systems that feature 
professional and independent judges who act as final arbiters 
of the law.
    In China, abuses included instances of extrajudicial 
killings, torture, and other mistreatment of prisoners, forced 
confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy 
incommunicado detention, and denial of due process. In many 
cases, particularly in sensitive political cases, the judicial 
system denies criminal defendants basic legal safeguards and 
due process. A number of statutes passed in recent years hold 
the potential to enhance citizens' rights. If fully 
implemented, these laws would bring criminal laws closer toward 
compliance with international norms. However, the new statutes 
are violated routinely in cases involving political dissidents.
    In Malaysia, police continued to use certain provisions of 
the legal code to detain some individuals without trial or 
charge. Prolonged pretrial detention occurs in some cases. The 
police were criticized for reports of physical abuse of 
prisoners and other citizens, although the number of police 
extrajudicial killings declined during the year. Many observers 
expressed serious concern about the decreasing independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary and about apparently politically 
motivated selective prosecution by the Attorney General.
    In Pakistan, rule of law problems were rampant both before 
and after the October coup. The judiciary was subject to 
executive and other outside influence and suffers from 
inadequate resources, inefficiency, and corruption. The former 
Sharif Government used special antiterrorism courts to try the 
crimes of murder, gang rape, child molestation, and ``illegal'' 
strikes. After the coup, General Musharraf illegally detained a 
number of political figures from the Sharif Government and 
their families.
    In Algeria, the authorities did not always respect 
defendants' rights to due process, and security forces 
committed extrajudicial killings, tortured detainees, and 
arbitrarily detained many individuals suspected of involvement 
with armed Islamist groups. However, there were no reports of 
new disappearances during the year in which the security forces 
were suspected. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trial 
delaysare problems, as are illegal searches and infringements 
on citizens' privacy rights.
    In Peru, arbitrary arrest, prolonged pretrial detention, 
lack of due process, and lengthy trial delays remained 
problems. In July, the Government announced its withdrawal from 
the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
after the Court determined that Peru had failed to provide due 
process in the case of four Chileans convicted by a military 
tribunal of treason. In Haiti, the judiciary remained plagued 
by understaffing, inadequate resources, and in many cases, 
corrupt and untrained judges. Judicial dockets remain clogged, 
and fair and expeditious trials are the exception rather than 
the rule. In a number of key cases, the executive branch 
continued to detain persons in defiance of release orders 
issued by judges. The 5-year-old Haitian National Police 
continues to benefit from international assistance, but it is 
grappling with problems of excessive use of force and other 
human rights abuses, including a marked increase over last year 
in the number of extrajudicial killings. Arbitrary arrest and 
detention and prolonged pretrial detention also remained 
problems.
    Several countries saw positive developments in the rule of 
law. In Israel, a September decision by the High Court of 
Justice resulted in a significant reduction in the number of 
abuses committed by members of the security forces during the 
interrogation of security prisoners. In Cambodia, the 
Government withdrew a draft NGO law that had been criticized 
for its potential to place NGO's under arbitrary and severe 
restrictions on their ability to operate.
    In Colombia, the Pastrana administration took measures to 
initiate structural reform and strengthen the rule of law. In 
July, the regional ``anonymous'' court system was abolished and 
replaced with a new specialized jurisdiction. In August, 
Congress passed a military penal reform bill that, while not 
yet implemented, is expected to correct some of the worst 
abuses in the military justice system and to be of great help 
in the fight against impunity. Thanks to the diligent efforts 
of the Prosecutor General's Human Rights Unit, a number of 
security force members were investigated, prosecuted, and 
convicted of past human rights violations. Impunity, although 
still widespread, is no longer total. Nonetheless, the civilian 
judiciary remains inefficient, overburdened by a large case 
backlog, and undermined by intimidation.

C. Developments in Labor

    1. Worker Rights. Throughout the year, the impact of 
globalization on worker rights was the subject of serious 
discussion in many international forums. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Ministerial in Seattle saw a transnational 
network of human rights, environmental, and labor organizations 
focus debate on public concern that workers and their families, 
particularly in developing countries, receive a fair share of 
the benefits derived from the global economy. In response, the 
United States sought to win support for a proposal calling for 
establishment of a working group in the WTO that would examine 
the relationship between trade and labor. On several occasions 
in Seattle, President Clinton strongly urged both the WTO and 
the international community to remember that free trade cannot 
come at the cost of excluding workers.
    Despite the fact that Seattle did not lead to a new round 
of negotiations, a number of positive developments did take 
place during the year. In June, member nations of the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) unanimously adopted a 
landmark convention on the prohibition and immediate 
elimination of the worst forms of child labor. By this action, 
member nations pledged to ban a number of abuses, including 
child slavery; bonded labor; work that is inherently harmful to 
the health or morals of children, such as dangerous work or 
child prostitution; and the forced or compulsory recruitment of 
children under 18 for use in armed conflict.
    President Clinton traveled to Geneva to support the 
adoption of the convention, and worked with Congress to ensure 
that the United States was one of the first countries in the 
world to sign and ratify it. In January 2000, governments again 
met in Geneva to adopt a draft optional protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child that prohibits 
governments and insurgencies from using child soldiers. It is 
expected that the protocol will be formally adopted by the 
United Nations General Assembly later this year. President 
Clinton has indicated that the United States is committed to a 
process of speedy review and signature and to working with the 
Senate to ensure ratification.
    Notwithstanding the growing international consensus in 
support of worker rights, certain governments continued to 
violate core worker rights in defiance of their obligations 
under the ILO's Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work. Trade unions continued to face harassment and 
closure, many workers continued to face discrimination, and 
bonded and forced labor remained significant problems.
    Despite the new convention, child labor remained a severe 
problem in many parts of the world. According to the ILO, more 
than 250 million children under the age of 15 work around the 
world, many in dangerous conditions. The ILO's International 
Program on the Elimination of Child Labor, to which the United 
States is by far the largest contributor, made some progress, 
but much more remains to be done.
    Another problem common to many parts of the world is the 
misuse, mistreatment, and abuse of domestic labor. In much of 
the Middle East and parts of Europe, Asia, and the Americas, 
workers who travel from developing countries to work as 
domestic servants, as well as native-born workers, must contend 
with poor working and living conditions, minimal or nonexistent 
wages, violence, and sexual assault. Although some governments 
have taken steps to minimize abuses, many domestic workers find 
they must tolerate terrible working conditions to support their 
often far-off families.
    Workers in a number of countries faced significant 
violations of their rights. In China, the Government continued 
to restrict tightly worker rights. The Communist Party controls 
the country's sole official union, and independent trade unions 
are illegal. The Government continued to detain and arrest 
independent labor activists, sentencing at least seven to terms 
ranging from 1 to 10 years. Neither the Constitution nor the 
labor law provides for the right to strike. Forced labor is a 
serious problem, particularly in penal institutions. Some 
prisons contract to perform manufacturing and assembly work, 
while others operate their own companies. A 1999 directory of 
Chinese corporations published by a foreign business-
information company listed at least two prisons as business 
enterprises. The Government also maintains a network of 
reeducation-through-labor camps, whose inmates are required to 
work. There have been reports that products made in these 
facilities are exported. Most anecdotal reports conclude that 
work conditions in prison factories are similar to those in 
other factories, but conditions on the penal system's farms and 
in mines can be very harsh.
    In Burma, the Government continued to restrict worker 
rights and ban unions. The forced use of citizens as porters by 
the army remained a common practice. Forced civilian labor 
remained widespread, although its use on major infrastructure 
projects has declined due to the use of soldiers. Child labor 
including forced child labor remained widespread. In Vietnam, 
the Government continues to restrict worker rights. Child labor 
is a problem and there were some reports of forced child labor. 
In Indonesia, enforcement of labor standards remained 
inconsistent and weak in some areas. Forced and bonded child 
labor remained a problem, particularly on fishing platforms, 
despite government efforts to reduce the problem. In Thailand, 
forced labor and illegal child labor are problems.
    In the former Soviet Union, Belarus in particular stands 
out for its repression of the rights of workers. In Russia, 
workers face long delays in receiving their wages, as do 
pensioners. Conditions of work are health and even life 
threatening in many industries. Workers do have the right to 
join unions, but plant managers frequently work with the 
Federation of Independent Trade Unions, the successor to 
Communist trade unions, to destroy new unions. Court rulings 
have further limited the right of association by ruling that 
collective action based on nonpayment of wages is not a strike 
and that individuals who participate in such actions are not 
protected by the law. The Labor Code prohibits forced or 
compulsory labor, but there were credible reports of soldiers 
being ``sold'' by their superior officers to perform work for 
private citizens or organizations.
    In Guatemala, poverty, the legacy of violent repression of 
labor activists and others, the deep hostility of many in 
business and the military towards trade unions, and a weak 
labor inspection and labor court system continued to constrain 
worker rights and limit enforcement of standards. In one case 
in which vigilantes abducted union leaders, physically abused 
them, and forced them to resign from their jobs and union 
positions, none of the vigilantes has been arrested, although 
more than a dozen suspects have been indicted on charges 
ranging from coercion to illegal detention. While the 
Constitution bars employment of minors under the age of 14, 
child labor remains a serious problem. Most child labor occurs 
in agriculture, domestic service, construction, stone 
quarrying, and family businesses. According to the Guatemalan 
Labor Ministry, 3,000 to 5,000 children are employed in the 
illegal cottage fireworks industry. This dangerous employment 
violates ILO Convention 182 banning the worst forms of child 
labor.
    In Colombia, the Government, under strong international 
pressure, bowed to the demands of its unions, agreeing to the 
dispatch of a special ILO team to investigate killing and 
kidnaping of trade unionists and other worker rights 
violations. Physical intimidation of trade unionists, including 
killings, remains a very serious problem.
    In India, the use of forced and bonded adult and child 
labor, though illegal, continues. While programs sponsored by 
the ILO and private groups have moved many children from, for 
example, carpet looms to classrooms, enforcement of child and 
bonded labor laws is spotty. Dalits and tribals, who constitute 
the majority of India's bonded labor, continue to face 
widespread discrimination. In Pakistan, child and bonded labor 
remains a serious problem. Thousands of families work in debt 
bondage, with children born into a life of bonded labor. While 
the Government has worked with the ILO to move children from 
work to school in several industries, enforcement of the laws 
against bonded and child labor has been inadequate. In 
Bangladesh, the Government failed to keep promises it had made 
to the international community with regard to worker rights, 
notably affording workers freedom of association and the right 
to organize in export processing zones. However, the Government 
hasworked constructively with the ILO on a program to reduce 
child labor.
    2. Trafficking of Persons. Trafficking in persons is a 
growing global problem that touches countries on every 
continent. The insidious reach of this modern-day form of 
slavery hurts women, children, and men from all walks of life, 
and of every age, religion, and culture. Traffickers rob their 
victims of basic human rights. They exploit and trade in human 
hopes and dreams to profit from inhuman suffering and misery. 
Victims are treated as chattel to be bought and sold across 
international and within national borders. This human tragedy 
rips the fabric of communities and tears families apart.
    The trafficking industry is one of the fastest growing and 
most lucrative criminal enterprises in the world. Profits are 
enormous, generating billions of dollars annually and feeding 
into criminal syndicates' involvement in other illicit and 
violent activities. Trafficking in persons is considered the 
third largest source of profits for organized crime, behind 
only drugs and guns.
    Trafficking cases appear in many forms. In some cases, 
traffickers move victims through transit countries using drugs, 
violence, and threats to ensure cooperation. In other cases, 
economically desperate parents sell their child to traffickers. 
Many times, trafficked victims begin their journey voluntarily 
and unwittingly fall into the hands of trafficking schemes.
    In Russia and the Ukraine, for example, victims who yearn 
for economic independence within economies that offer few jobs, 
are lured by advertisements promising well-paying jobs abroad. 
However, once victims arrive in countries of destination, they 
are held captive and forced into bonded labor, domestic 
servitude or the commercial sex industry through threats, 
psychological coercion and severe physical brutality, including 
rape, torture, starvation, imprisonment, and death.
    The majority of trafficking victims are girls and women. 
The reasons for this are linked to the economic and social 
status of women in many countries. Not all victims are women, 
however. Boys are frequently trafficked for prostitution, 
pornography, and in at least one country, used as camel 
jockeys. Men from a number of countries such as China are 
trafficked overseas to work in restaurants or in sweatshops in 
the garment industry. They travel to their destinations in 
rickety boats or cargo containers before becoming indentured 
servants to pay their ``debts.'' If they try to leave 
employment, they risk violence or the extortion of their family 
members back home.
    The underground nature of trafficking makes it difficult to 
quantify. The most reliable estimates place the level of 
trafficking at 1 to 2 million persons trafficked annually. As 
this report documents, trafficking into the commercial sex 
industry is merely one form of a broader range of trafficking 
exploited by organized criminal enterprises.
    The problem is particularly widespread in South Asia. India 
and Pakistan are significant countries of origin, transit, and 
destination. Poor economic conditions in Nepal, Bangladesh, and 
rural areas of India result in women and children being 
trafficked into major cities for the sex trade and forced 
labor. In many cases, girls from poverty-stricken families are 
sold to traffickers by parents or relatives. Women who seek to 
return home often face stigmatization. Many are HIV positive. 
While criminal laws against trafficking exist, inadequate 
enforcement and lax penalties do little to stem trafficking 
patterns.
    In East Asia, many women are coerced into prostitution 
under the guise of overseas employment contracts. In Thailand, 
women from hill tribes and neighboring countries are especially 
vulnerable to exploitation because of their inability to speak 
Thai. In Burma, women and children in border areas and from the 
Shan ethnic minority are particularly susceptible to being 
forced by traffickers into neighboring countries to work as 
prostitutes. In the Philippines, some women are lured into 
entering employment contracts overseas by unethical recruiters. 
Once they arrive at their destination, the women are subjected 
to work in the sex entertainment industry or suffer abuse at 
the hands of foreign employers or husbands.
    The range and scope of trafficking in Africa remains 
largely undocumented. Officials in Europe, however, report an 
active and growing market from trafficking in women and 
children from Nigeria. There is evidence that Nigerian crime 
syndicates may use threats, physical injury, and legal coercion 
to stop women forced into the sex trade from escaping. Inside 
Nigeria, there is an active trade in child laborers, some 
exported to neighboring countries, from the Niger Delta region.
    Trafficking also exists in the Western Hemisphere. Forced 
prostitution is also a problem in the Dominican Republic, where 
there are disparities in law enforcement. In Brazil, the sexual 
exploitation and prostitution of children is a serious problem. 
Prostitution rings foster a sexual tourism industry that 
exports children from the Amazon region to large urban centers 
and major cities.

                            III. Conclusion

    The events of the past year have demonstrated the 
undisputed and growing power of transnational public-private 
networks in promoting democracy, human rights, and labor. 
Traditionally, ``norm entrepreneurs'' have been individuals 
whose role in society or government has given them the ability 
to influence the direction of policy. Oscar Arias Sanchez, 
former President Jimmy Carter, the Dalai Lama, Mahatma Gandhi, 
Vaclav Havel, Pope John Paul II, Martin Luther King, Nelson 
Mandela, and Eleanor Roosevelt are but a few of the human 
rights advocates who instantly come to mind. Such individuals 
still have an important role to play, but increasingly, public 
and private networks of transnational actors are becoming 
``norm entrepreneurs'' in and of themselves--networks capable 
of mobilizing popular opinion and political support at the 
national and international level in order to secure 
international recognition and acceptance of new principles, 
standards, or approaches to complex human rights problems.
    These transnational networks increasingly wield influence 
comparable to the power of individual nation-states, in their 
capacity to spotlight abuses, mobilize shame, generate 
political pressure, and develop structural solutions. But 
recent history also teaches that such networks cannot succeed 
without involving democratic governments dedicated to the same 
human rights goals. As President Clinton noted in Davos 
recently, all sides need to ``lower the rhetoric and focus on 
results.'' No transnational network can firmly or permanently 
entrench human rights, democracy, or the rule of law in 
unfamiliar soil without forging partnerships with democratic 
governments and other domestic and international members of the 
emerging human rights community. These partnerships, which 
cross public and private, institutional and national lines, 
will be increasingly challenged to work together and prod one 
another to yield creative and enduring solutions to emerging 
problems. As this new century unfolds, the United States will 
continue to be a leader in creating and partnering with such 
transnational networks to seek democracy and human rights for 
all the world's peoples.
                                 Harold Hongju Koh,
                              Assistant Secretary of State,
                      Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
                                 EUROPE

                              ----------                              


                                ALBANIA

    Albania is a republic with a multiparty parliament, a prime 
minister, and a president elected by the Parliament. The Prime Minister 
heads the Government; the presidency is a largely ceremonial position 
with limited executive power. The Socialist Party and its allies won 
121 of 155 parliamentary seats in 1997 elections held after a 5-month 
period of chaos and anarchy. Observers deemed the elections to be 
acceptable and satisfactory under the circumstances. The largest 
opposition group, the Democratic Party, ended its 10-month long boycott 
of the Parliament (its second such boycott in 2 years based on charges 
of unfair practices by the ruling Socialists and their coalition 
partners) in July. Socialist Pandeli Majko served as Prime Minister 
until October. After losing the October electoral contest for 
chairmanship of the Socialist Party, Majko resigned, and the Party 
chose Deputy Prime Minister Ilir Meta to replace him; Meta took office 
in October. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; 
however, continued political instability, limited resources, political 
pressure, and endemic corruption weaken the judiciary's ability to 
function independently and efficiently.
    Local police units that report to the Minister of Public Order are 
principally responsible for internal security. One of the most serious 
problems involving public order and internal security is the fact that 
police officers are largely untrained and often unreliable. The 
international community established training programs to improve the 
quality of the police forces; the programs have trained a large number 
of police officers. The Ministry also has a small force of well-trained 
and effective police officers organized into special duty units. During 
the year the Government reestablished law and order in areas of the 
country that had been almost totally beyond central government control 
since 1997. Police waged major operations in the districts of Tropoja, 
Vlora, Shkoder, Burrel, Fier, and Gjirokaster, where criminal gangs 
were active. The Ministry claims that it broke up at least 32 criminal 
gangs. Serious problems in the area of policing remain nonetheless. The 
police are affected by, and are sometimes part of, the country's 
endemic corruption. The National Intelligence Service (ShIK) is 
responsible for both internal and external intelligence gathering and 
counterintelligence. The armed forces did not have a role in domestic 
security until 1998, when a special 120-man ``commando'' unit was 
authorized. The new unit operates in an antiterrorist role under the 
Minister of Defense. During times of domestic crisis, the Minister of 
Public Order can request command authority over the unit. The police 
committed human rights abuses.
    Albania is a poor country in transition from central economic 
planning to a free market system, and many issues related to 
privatization, ownership claims, and appropriate regulation of business 
are not yet resolved. The country experienced slow but stable progress 
in its recovery efforts from the collapse of 1997 and turmoil of 1998. 
The inflation rate dropped from about 10 percent during 1998 to close 
to zero in 1999. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew by about 8 percent. 
The official unemployment rate was 18 percent, a slight increase from 
the 17 percent of the previous year. With two-thirds of all workers 
employed in agriculture--mostly at the subsistence level--remittances 
from citizens working abroad are extremely important, as is foreign 
assistance. The GDP may be underestimated because considerable income 
also is thought to be derived from various organized and semiorganized 
criminal activities. A variety of other unreported, noncriminal 
activities, such as unlicensed small businesses, along with the 
Government's inability to collect fully accurate statistics, also 
contribute to the GDP's underestimation.
    There continued to be problems in the Government's human rights 
record in several areas; however, there were some improvements in a few 
areas. The opposition Democratic Party continued to allege that the 
Government was responsible for the murders of some of its members 
during 1998 and made additional allegations regarding alleged murders 
during 1999. The police beat and otherwise abused suspects and 
prisoners, and there were deaths in custody. The Democratic Party often 
legitimately complained about incidents of police harassment of its 
members and of the dismissal of some of its members from official 
positions for political reasons. The police at times arbitrarily 
arrested and detained persons. Prolonged pretrial detention is a 
problem. The judiciary is inefficient and subject to corruption and 
executive pressure. There were complaints of unqualified and 
unprofessional judges and credible accounts of judges who were 
intimidated or bribed by powerful criminals. The Government often 
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Government respect for freedom 
of speech and of the press improved; however, police at times beat 
journalists, and academic freedom was constrained. These improvements 
were largely offset by the Government's continued passive approach to 
basic law enforcement: in too many instances crime, corruption, and 
vigilantism undermined the Government's efforts to restore civil order. 
The country hosted nearly 450,000 refugees from neighboring Kosovo 
during the violent conflict and NATO military action in that province. 
Violence and discrimination against women, trafficking in women and 
children, and child abuse were significant problems. Discrimination and 
violence against religious and ethnic minorities, particularly against 
Roma, remained problems. The Government took some steps to improve the 
treatment of ethnic minorities. Child labor is a problem. Vigilante 
action resulted in many killings.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed cases of political killings by the Government, despite 
repeated claims by the main opposition party that its members were 
harassed, beaten, and sometimes murdered by government agents. The 
Democratic Party claimed that over 21 members, supporters, local 
government officials, and former national party officials were killed 
during the 2 years that the Socialists were in power (1997-99). The 
Party claimed that at least three of its members were killed during 
1998: The chairman of the local branch of the Democratic Party of Kish-
Arra village of Shkoder, the deputy chairman of the polling station in 
the Gjinar commune of the Elbasan district, and the chairman of the 
Democratic Party branch of Boric village in Malesia e Madhe. The 
Democratic Party accused the Government of failing to investigate these 
crimes, noting that no suspects were tried for the murders. The 
Democrats asked for the creation of an independent investigatory group 
that would oversee the investigation of these crimes (which the Party 
considers to be political).
    Police committed extrajudicial killings. In January a 19-year-old 
man from Elbasan, Kastriot Bega, was arrested by police on charges of 
murder. He was taken first to the police station and later to the 
hospital, which he reached in critical condition, and died soon 
thereafter. The police claimed that he died a natural death, but the 
hospital staff said that his body bore multiple marks from beating and 
mistreatment. In December Bardhyl Balliu, a Kavaje citizen, was 
detained by the Tirana police force; he died in police custody while 
awaiting trial.
    The country continued to experience high levels of violent crime. 
When Minister of Public Order Spartak Poci took office in May, he 
estimated that overall crime had increased by 20 percent compared with 
the previous year; violent crime rose by 28 percent, and murder by 16 
percent. The press reported in June that the house of the Prefect of 
Shkodra was blown up; he was not at home at the time.
    Ministry of Public Order statistics show that 432 murders took 
place throughout the country during the year; 62 of them were in 
Tirana. The February 21 murder of a prominent lawyer, Kleanthi Koci, 
who was chairman of the Association of Defense Attorneys, led to a 
large public demonstration at his funeral against crime, which was an 
expression of public frustration with the lack of order and security in 
the country. On June 10, near Bajram Curri, two employees of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were killed; 
their official vehicle was ambushed by gunmen along a rural road. The 
OSCE closed its office in Bajram Curri following the incident.
    Shelling across the border by Serbian military forces killed 
several persons. For example in April Serbian artillery fire killed 2 
persons and wounded 12 others in the towns of Tropoja and Padesh. Two 
persons were killed in May in the small border village of Cahani.
    Many killings occurred throughout the country as the result of 
individual or clan vigilante actions sometimes connected to traditional 
``blood feuds,'' or in conflicts involving various criminal gangs.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically 
motivated disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution stipulates that ``no one can be subject 
to torture, or cruel and brutal treatment;'' however, the police often 
beat suspects in the process of arresting them, and the Albanian 
Helsinki Committee reported that the police beat or otherwise 
mistreated prisoners. The Penal Code makes the use of torture a crime 
punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment. According to the Albanian 
Helsinki Committee, major police stations were the sites of the worst 
abuse of detainees, and all stations were overcrowded. There were at 
least two deaths of suspects in police custody (see Section 1.a.).
    There were a number of reports of police violence. The Socialist 
Party newspaper Zeri i Popullit on June 1 described a violent raid in 
May by the police in the village of Spotalte in Lushnje. Ministry of 
Interior special forces reportedly were looking for a criminal, but 
when they failed to find him they brutally mistreated members of the 
community; police beat persons and made unauthorized searches of 
houses. They allegedly arrested two villagers and stole money from 
local residents. The press reported a similar incident in the town of 
Cerrik, where dozens of persons voiced their protest against police 
violence, which also apparently was directed at the community due to 
its alleged ties to organized criminal gangs.
    According to the Democratic Party, Besnik Jaku, the leader of the 
Tirana University student hunger strike was beaten in police custody in 
December 1998. In April Besim Biberaj suffered multiple broken bones 
while illegally detained for 3 days at a Tirana police station.
    Police at times beat journalists (see Section 2.a.).
    The majority of police officers receive little or no training. 
Western governments continued police training programs aimed at 
improving technical expertise, operational procedures, and respect for 
human rights. These training and education programs began to improve 
the level of professionalism of the police, but the overall performance 
of law enforcement remained weak.
    Police corruption remains widespread. Sources in the Ministry of 
Interior stated that more than 491 police officers were fired from 
their jobs during the year because of incompetence, lack of discipline, 
or violations of the law.
    Prison conditions remained poor, although they improved during the 
year with the construction of new prisons and the repair of old ones. 
While the Government financed much of this work, it has also received 
international assistance, particularly from European Union (EU) 
countries. All prisons were destroyed or severely damaged in 1997 when 
armed groups stormed them and released the prisoners. The Government 
reopened 8 prisons (housing over 1,000 inmates), but the existing 
facilities are inadequate to house properly all current prisoners. 
Overcrowding created very difficult living conditions.
    In previous years, as a result of the overcrowding in prisons, 
juvenile and adult inmates shared cells. The Government took steps 
during the year to separate them. The Ministry of Justice ordered the 
construction of a new facility for juvenile inmates in Kruje and sought 
foreign assistance to complete this project. The opening of the new 
prison in Lezhe (with a capacity of 800 inmates) is expected to help 
reduce overcrowding and facilitate the process of repatriating Albanian 
prisoners from foreign prisons, mainly from Greece and Italy. (More 
than 2,000 Albanians are serving sentences in Greek prisons, and over 
1,500 others are serving sentences in Italian prisons.) By year's end 
the prison's construction was more than 70 percent completed; its 
completion date was unknown. In 1998 the first five inmates were 
transferred from Greek prisons to Albanian prisons. Another 35 requests 
for transfers were filed with the Greek Ministry of Justice. Family 
visitation is allowed.
    The Government has cooperated with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross and with other nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and 
has improved access for prison inspections.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police at times 
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The 1995 Penal Procedures 
Code sets out the rights of detained and arrested persons. By law a 
police officer or prosecutor may order a suspect into custody. Detained 
persons must be informed immediately of the charges against them and of 
their rights. A prosecutor must be notified immediately after a suspect 
is detained by the police. Within 48 hours of the arrest or detention a 
court must decide, in the presence of the prosecutor, the suspect, and 
the suspect's lawyer, the type of detention to be imposed. Legal 
counsel must be provided free of charge if the defendant cannot afford 
a private attorney.
    Bail in the form of money or property may be required if the judge 
believes that the accused otherwise may not appear for trial. 
Alternatively a suspect may be placed under house arrest. The court may 
order pretrial confinement in cases where there is reason to believe 
that the accused may leave the country or is a danger to society.
    The Penal Procedures Code requires completion of pretrial 
investigations within 3 months. The prosecutor may extend this period 
by 3-month intervals in especially difficult cases. The accused and the 
injured party have the right to appeal these extensions to the district 
court. In practice lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. Delayed 
investigations are also a serious problem, and the cases of many 
detained persons exceed the time limits set by law. In September a 
Democratic Party paper alleged that three persons from the northern 
city of Kukes were held in police custody for more than 16 months 
without trial.
    The Democratic Party claimed that the Government detained and sent 
to prison dozens of its supporters during the year. Some of them were 
victims of cruel and inhuman treatment (see Section 1.c.).
    There were no clear cases of detainees being held for strictly 
political reasons, but several notable arrests appeared to be motivated 
by politics as well as by law enforcement interests. In September 1998, 
the police arrested a number of persons associated with the Democratic 
Party who participated in the events of September 14, 1998, and 
prosecutors charged them with taking part in an ``armed rebellion'' and 
in ``a failed coup d'etat'' (also see Section 1.e.). The Democratic 
Party complained that the arrests were purely political, which is a 
claim highlighted by the presence of the chairman of the Monarchist 
Legality Party, the third largest political party in the country, among 
the arrestees. The case had not come to trial by year's end.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, continued political instability, 
limited resources, political pressure, and endemic corruption all 
weaken the judiciary's ability to function independently and 
efficiently. Corruption remains a serious problem, especially with the 
growth of organized crime, and judges are subjected both to bribery 
attempts and intimidation.
    Many court buildings were destroyed in the civil unrest in 1997, 
and although all reopened, important records and legal materials were 
lost permanently. Long case backlogs are typical. The removal of court 
budgets from the control of the Ministry of Justice to a separate, 
independent body, the Judicial Budget Office, and the establishment of 
a school for magistrates were useful steps towards strengthening the 
independence of the judiciary. A board chaired by the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court runs the Judicial Budget Office. All other board 
members are judges.
    The judicial system comprises district courts of the first 
instance, military courts, six courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court. 
There is also a separate and independent Constitutional Court. The 
Supreme Court hears appeals from the Courts of Appeal, while the 
Constitutional Court reviews those cases requiring constitutional 
interpretation.
    The President heads the High Council of Justice, which has 
authority to appoint, discipline, and dismiss judges of the courts of 
first instance and of the courts of appeal. Judges who are dismissed 
have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. In addition to the 
President, the Council consists of the Minister of Justice, the head of 
the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General, three judges (chosen by 
sitting judges), two prosecutors (selected by the prosecutors), and 
four independent lawyers named by the Parliament.
    The President of the Republic nominates the President and Vice 
President of the Supreme Court, and the Parliament elects all of the 
Supreme Court's justices. The President selects four of the nine 
members of the Constitutional Court; five are elected by the 
Parliament. Parliament has the authority to approve and dismiss the 
judges of the Constitutional Court and the members of the Supreme 
Court. According to the law, dismissal only may be ordered after 
conviction for a serious crime or for mental incompetence. In May the 
Chief Judge of the Supreme Court was dismissed 3 years before the 
expiration of his mandate. The Parliament judged that the mandate of 
the Chief Judge had ended because of the entry into force of the new 
Constitution; the Chief Judge claimed that the term of his mandate had 
not ended and that he had 3 more years to serve. He filed charges with 
the Constitutional Court against the decision of the President and the 
Parliament. The Constitutional Court found the decision to be in 
accordance with the law and approved the removal. He then took his case 
to the European Court of Human Rights. The opposition criticized his 
removal and claimed that it was anticonstitutional and illegal. In 1998 
three other judges were nominated to be members of the Supreme Court 
without the prior experience required under the Constitution. These 
judicial candidates openly maintain ties to the ruling party.
    Constitutional Court justices in theory serve maximum 9-year terms, 
with three justices rotating every 3 years. Justices of the Supreme 
Court serve for 7 years.
    Under the 1998 Constitution, the President appoints the prosecutor 
general with the consent of the Parliament. The President appoints and 
dismisses other prosecutors on the recommendation of the prosecutor 
general.
    Parliament approves the courts' budgets and allocates the funds. 
Each court may determine how it wishes to spend the money allocated to 
it. The Justice Ministry provides and approves administrative 
personnel.
    Courts operate with very limited material resources. As a result, 
in many instances the court system was unable to process cases in a 
timely fashion. Public opinion holds the judiciary, in particular, 
responsible for government failure to stop criminal activity. In July 
police forces in Shkoder, the country's third largest city, blocked the 
main entrance of the District Court and did not allow officers of the 
court to enter the building as a sign of protest following the court's 
release of suspected criminals who were detained by the police. The 
judge and prosecutors argued that this protest constituted intimidation 
and violated the court's independence. The situation was defused 
relatively quickly and without complications, but it brought to light 
the serious problems that the judicial system faces. A tense atmosphere 
exists between the police and the judiciary. Each side cites the 
failures of the other as the reason that many criminals avoid 
imprisonment. The courts accuse the police of failing to provide the 
solid investigation and evidence necessary to prosecute successfully, 
and the police allege that corruption and bribery taint the courts.
    The Constitution provides that all citizens enjoy the right to a 
fair, speedy, and public trial, except in cases where the necessities 
of public order, national security, or the interests of minors or other 
private parties require restrictions. Defendants, witnesses, and others 
who do not speak Albanian are entitled to the services of a translator. 
If convicted, the accused has the right to appeal the decision within 5 
days to the Court of Appeals.
    The Democratic Party also asserted that the chairman of the 
Legality Party (the Monarchists), Ekrem Spahia, and 12 members and 
supporters of this party are being tried unfairly for participation in 
the events of September 14, 1998, which followed the murder of the 
Democratic Party parliamentarian, Azem Hajdari, by unknown persons. The 
Democrats believe that all these individuals are being imprisoned for 
political reasons.
    Fatos Nano, the former Prime Minister, was acquitted of charges of 
corruption and abuse of power by a Tirana court on October 5. A court 
spokesman said that the court decided that a 12-year sentence given to 
him 5 years ago was ``not based on facts.''
    Local human rights groups and the political opposition complained 
about procedural violations in the legal case against six former 
government officials, including the former Ministers of Defense and the 
Interior, who were charged in August 1998 with crimes against humanity 
for their role in suppressing the popular uprisings in 1997. In 
February the Government released them from house arrest but still had 
not tried them by year's end.
    On March 22, a Tirana court ordered that Vlora gang leader Zani 
Caushi be released from jail. Observers suggested that Caushi's friends 
in Vlora intimidated some of the witnesses in his case, while the 
opposition press accused the Socialist Party of having links to Caushi 
and therefore seeking to ensure his release. Seven other members of 
Caushi's gang received prison terms of between 3 and 15 years for 
crimes ranging from armed robbery to kidnaping.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms 
provides for the inviolability of the individual person, of dwellings, 
and of the privacy of correspondence; however, the Government often 
infringed on these rights. Police often conduct searches without first 
obtaining warrants. The Democratic Party claimed that in August the 
police surrounded the house of a Democratic Party Member of Parliament, 
Myslim Murrizi, and later broke into his house and terrorized his 
family. The police confiscated two properly licensed hunting guns owned 
by the family. In February DP opposition leader Sali Berisha reported 
that a court ordered that his telephone be wiretapped. Justice Minister 
Thimio Kondi said that wiretapping is legal and denied that the 
authorities had political motives for wiretapping Berisha's telephone.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Law on Fundamental Human 
Rights and Freedoms provides for freedom of speech and of the press, 
and the Government generally respected these rights; however, police at 
times beat journalists. The media are active and unrestrained but have 
developed little sense of journalistic responsibility or professional 
integrity. Sensationalism is the norm in the newspapers, and the 
political party-oriented newspapers in particular print gossip, 
unsubstantiated accusations, and outright fabrications. Some 
publications appear to be making efforts to improve professional 
standards and to provide more balanced and accurate reporting.
    Political parties, trade unions, and various societies and groups 
publish their own newspapers or magazines, and competition with 
commercial publications is very keen. An estimated 200 publications are 
available, including daily and weekly newspapers, magazines, 
newsletters, and pamphlets. Five newspapers and two magazines are 
published in Greek in the south. A difficult economic situation, 
coupled with readers' distrust of the press, resulted in a significant 
drop in newspaper sales during the year. The total daily circulation of 
all newspapers dropped from about 75,000 copies to less than 65,000 
copies. This came after a drop in 1998 from 85,000 to 75,000 copies. 
Newspaper and magazine publishers considered 1999 a very bad year for 
circulation and readership. The opening of many new private radio and 
television stations, as well as an increase in the price of newspapers 
and magazines, are the main reasons for this sharp fall in circulation.
    In May state-run radio and television was converted into a public 
entity. Its outlets provide the most widespread and universally 
accessible domestic programming. This entity no longer is financed by 
the State and has no direct connection to the Government. Rather, it is 
run by the Leading Council of Radio and Television, a body elected by 
the Parliament.
    Fifty private television channels and 30 private radio channels 
operate, unregulated, all over the country. The wide availability of 
satellite dishes provides citizens with easy access to international 
programming. The Government established new licensing procedures during 
the year to promote a more stable broadcasting environment. The 
Parliament created the National Council of Radio and Television, which 
is responsible for issuing private radio and television licenses. The 
Council consists of seven members: Three members appointed by the 
ruling parties, three members from the opposition parties, and one 
member appointed by the President. The chairman serves a 6-year term 
while other council members are elected to 5-year terms. As of 
September, the opposition had not yet proposed its members for both 
councils. The licensing of private radio and television stations had 
not yet begun by year's end.
    Attacks on journalists continued--both beatings by the police and 
assaults by unknown assailants. According to human rights NGO's, in 
July police officers in Elbasan mistreated two journalists of the 
independent Koha Jone. In September two persons attacked and maltreated 
a Koha Jone journalist in Vlore. In September the independent press 
accused the Tirana chief of police of violence against a cameraman from 
a private television channel who was filming a murder victim downtown. 
The cameraman allegedly was beaten by the police on orders of the chief 
of police who was present at the scene. Unidentified gunmen seriously 
injured journalist Vjollca Karanxha while she was filming in Pogradec 
on November 22. Karanxha is a reporter for the local radio and 
television station and often has written about the role of local 
officials in smuggling and corruption.
    Academic freedom continues to be limited. University professors 
complain that some faculty members are hired or fired for political 
reasons and that students who have the right political connections get 
preferential treatment regardless of their personal qualifications. The 
Government maintains that changes in university staffing are made on 
the basis of merit. The Tirana University hunger strike, begun in 
December of 1998 to protest the Government's indifference towards the 
poor living conditions at the university, ended after 2 weeks.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Law on 
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms provides for the right of 
peaceful assembly, and the Government generally respected this right in 
practice. According to the law, organizers must obtain permits for 
gatherings in public places, which the police may refuse to issue for 
reasons such as security and traffic. In practice rallies and 
demonstrations were very common. The Government made no concerted 
efforts to prevent them, and the police generally maintained order with 
due respect for citizens' rights; however, in some cases individuals 
claimed that the police or secret agents of the ShIK intimidated them 
because of their participation in opposition rallies, while others 
claimed that they were fired from their jobs because they participated 
in opposition rallies.
    The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms provides for the 
right of association, and the Government generally respected this right 
in practice. A political party must apply to the Ministry of Justice 
for official certification. It must declare an aim or purpose that is 
not anticonstitutional or otherwise contrary to law, describe its 
organizational structure, and account for all public and private funds 
it receives.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. According 
to the 1998 Constitution, there is no official religion, and all 
religions are equal. However, the predominant religious communities 
(Muslim, Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) enjoy de facto recognition by 
the authorities that gives them the legal right to hold bank accounts, 
to own property and buildings, and to function as juridical persons 
based on their historical presence in the country. Religious 
movements--with the exception of the three de facto recognized 
religions--can acquire the official status of a juridical person only 
by registering under the Law on Associations, which recognizes the 
status of a nonprofit association irrespective of whether the 
organization has a cultural, recreational, religious, or humanitarian 
character.
    The majority of citizens are secular in orientation after decades 
of rigidly enforced atheism. Muslims, who make up the largest 
traditional religious group, adhere to a moderate form of Sunni Islam. 
The Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches are the 
other large denominations. The Albanian Orthodox Church split from the 
Greek Orthodox Church early in the century, and adherents strongly 
identify with the national church as distinct from the Greek Church. 
The current archbishop is a Greek citizen, even though the Albanian 
Orthodox Church's 1929 statute states that all its archbishops must be 
of Albanian heritage, because there are no Albanian clerics qualified 
for this position. Bektashis, (Muslim believers who adhere to a very 
loose form of Islam), form another large denomination in the country.
    Foreign clergy, including Muslim clerics, Christian and Baha'i 
missionaries, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and many others freely 
carry out religious activities. The Religious Council of the State 
Secretariat, an office that functions under the Prime Minister's 
authority but that has no clear mandate or decisionmaking power, was 
renamed ``The State Committee on Cults'' in September. The Committee 
chairman is to have the status of a deputy minister, and this office is 
to coordinate all issues connected with religion and the State. This 
office estimates that there are 12 different Muslim societies and 
groups with approximately 324 representatives throughout the country 
and more than 79 Christian societies and sects with 344 missionaries 
representing Christian or Baha'i organizations.
    The Government has not yet returned all the properties and 
religious objects under its control that were confiscated under the 
Communist regime in 1967. In cases where religious buildings were 
returned, the Government often failed to return the land that surrounds 
the buildings. The Government also is unable to compensate the churches 
adequately for the extensive damage that many religious properties 
suffered. The Orthodox Church has complained that it has had difficulty 
in recovering some religious icons for restoration and safekeeping.
    The Albanian Evangelical Alliance, an association of Protestant 
Churches, has complained that it has encountered administrative 
obstacles to building churches and to accessing the media. The growing 
evangelical community continues to seek official recognition and 
participation in the religious affairs section of the Council of 
Ministers.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and 
Freedoms provides for freedom of movement within the country and for 
freedom to leave the country and return, and the Government respects 
these rights in practice.
    A pressing problem that arose as a result of uncontrolled internal 
migration is the problem of local registration and status. A survey 
conducted by an NGO, The Society for Democratic Culture, from April to 
August highlighted the fact that many families (the numbers vary from 
hundreds to thousands) moved from the poor northeast to more prosperous 
zones and are no longer registered at all. The survey conducted covered 
three pilot zones: An area near Durres with 15,000 inhabitants, an area 
in the Vlore district with 12,000 inhabitants, and a Tirana area with 
over 20,000 inhabitants. The survey found that during election 
campaigns, these citizens are registered as inhabitants of these zones 
and thus are permitted to vote; however, in the period between 
elections, these citizens are not considered inhabitants of these zones 
and are denied even basic education. In many educational institutions, 
students must have, among other documents, an official document from 
the district that acknowledges that they are inhabitants of the 
district. The lack of such documents prevents many students from these 
areas from attending school.
    Citizens who fled the country during or after the Communist regime 
are welcomed back, and if they lost their citizenship they may have it 
restored. Albanian-born citizens who emigrate may hold dual 
citizenship.
    The Constitution gives foreigners the right of refuge in the 
country, and a 1996 asylum law includes provisions for granting refugee 
or asylee status. The Government accepts the entrance of refugees, does 
not expel those with valid claims to refugee status, and works with the 
international community to provide housing and support for them. It 
also provides first asylum. Over 450,000 Kosovar Albanians were 
afforded refuge during the Kosovo crisis, finding shelter with extended 
family or in facilities operated by the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) or other international entities. The Government 
cooperated with the UNHCR and others to provide support to the 
refugees.
    Organized criminal gangs have made the smuggling of illegal 
immigrants--Albanians, Kurds, Pakistanis, Chinese, Turks, and others 
from the Middle East and Asia--into a lucrative business. Italy is the 
most common destination. The Government claims that it has taken steps 
to combat the problem, but that a lack of resources hinders its 
efforts. Italian military and border patrol squads operate in various 
coastal zones in an effort to stop the flow of illegal immigrants. 
Individuals who become stranded in Albania while trying to use this 
illegal pipeline are eligible for a ``care and maintenance'' program 
run by the UNHCR and the Albanian Red Cross and can have their cases 
evaluated by UNHCR officials. There were no reports of the forced 
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution states that ``Governance is based on a system of 
elections that are free, equal, general, and periodic;'' citizens 
elected a government in 1997 in what international observers considered 
to be a satisfactory process, given the proceeding months of chaos and 
anarchy.
    The main opposition group, the Democratic Party, boycotted the 
Parliament throughout most of the year, refusing to participate in 
virtually all government functions at the national level. Top DP 
officials, including former president Sali Berisha, refused to testify 
in the investigation into the September 1998 killing of DP 
parliamentarian Azem Hajdari, stating that the investigation was 
politically motivated. The DP, led by Berisha, returned to the 
Parliament in July after the Government committed itself to investigate 
Hajdari's murder fully and fairly.
    The Constitution prohibits the formation of any party or 
organization that is totalitarian; incites and supports racial, 
religious, or ethnic hatred; uses violence to take power or influence 
state policies; or is nontransparent or secretive in character.
    No legal impediments hinder the full participation of women and 
minorities in government, and the major political parties have women's 
organizations and have women serving on their central committees; 
however, women continue to be underrepresented in both politics and 
government. In the Parliament 10 of 155 members are women (1 of whom 
serves as deputy prime minister). In the current government three 
ministers are women. Ethnic Greeks constitute the largest minority. 
They are represented in the current Government and participate actively 
in various political parties.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government generally permitted human rights and related 
organizations to function freely, although the lawlessness in some 
areas of the country severely limited the practical access of some of 
these organizations. The Albanian Helsinki Committee, the Albanian 
Human Rights Group, the Albanian Human Rights Documentation Center, the 
Society for Democratic Culture, the Albanian Institute for Contemporary 
Studies, and the Women's Center were among the most active domestic 
NGO's involved in human rights activities. Despite the assistance of 
international donors, the work of all of these organizations is 
hampered by a shortage of funds and equipment; the Government 
cooperated only minimally with these local groups.
    In February the Parliament ratified a new law to create the 
country's first national human rights ombudsman; however, no one had 
been appointed to the post by year's end.
    A wide variety of international human rights NGO's visit or operate 
within the country with the cooperation of the Government and generally 
without restriction. These organizations are free to publish and 
disseminate their findings, including criticisms of the Government. The 
Government also cooperates with the United Nations and other 
international entities on human rights issues. During the Kosovo 
conflict and the influx of refugees into Albania, the number of NGO's 
active in Albania increased several fold. The Government played a key 
role in facilitating and coordinating their work.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions prohibits discrimination 
based on sex, race, ethnicity, language, or religion. However, women 
and some minority groups complain that discrimination continues in 
practice.
    Women.--Violence against women and spousal abuse still occur in 
this traditionally male-dominated society. Cultural acceptance and lax 
police response result in most abuse going unreported. No government-
sponsored program protects the rights of women. An NGO maintains a 
shelter in Tirana for abused women, but the facility has the capacity 
to house only a few victims at a time. The same NGO also operates a hot 
line that women and girls can call for advice and counseling. The line 
received thousands of calls during the year. The UNHCR reported some 
cases of rape and sexual assault of Kosovar Albanian women in refugee 
camps. The concepts of marital rape and sexual harassment are not well 
established, and most such acts would not be considered crimes.
    Many men, especially those from the northeastern part of the 
country, still follow the traditional code known as the ``kanun,'' in 
which women are considered chattel and may be treated as such. Also 
under the kanun, it is acceptable to kidnap young women for brides; 
this practice, too, continues in some areas of the northeast.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a 
significant problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Women are not excluded, by law or in practice, from any occupation; 
however, they are not well-represented at the highest levels of their 
fields. The Labor Code mandates equal pay for equal work, but no data 
are available on how well this principle is implemented in practice. 
Women enjoy equal access to higher education, but they are not accorded 
full and equal opportunity in their careers, and it is common for well-
educated women to be underemployed or to work outside the field of 
their training. An increasing number of women are beginning to venture 
out on their own, opening shops and small businesses. Many are 
migrating along with men to Greece and Italy to seek employment.
    Children.--The Government's commitment to children's rights and 
welfare is codified in domestic law and through international 
agreements. The law provides for the right to at least 8 years of free 
education and also authorizes private schools. School attendance is 
mandatory through the eighth grade (or age 18, whichever comes first); 
however, in practice many children leave school earlier than allowed by 
law in order to work with their families, especially in rural areas. A 
study by the Albanian Helsinki Committee noted that a few thousand 
children, largely from the underdeveloped northeast of the country, 
were forced to quit school because their families were involved in 
``blood feuds'' that endangered the safety of even minor family 
members.
    Child abuse is a little-reported problem, but the authorities and 
NGO's believe that it exists. Trafficking in children is a problem (see 
Section 6.f.). Criminals may kidnap children from families or 
orphanages to be sold to prostitution or pederasty rings abroad. Within 
the country, Romani children often work as beggars, and the police 
generally ignore the practice.
    People with Disabilities.--Widespread poverty, unregulated 
occupational hazards, and poor medical care pose significant problems 
for many disabled persons. The disabled are eligible for various forms 
of public assistance, but budgetary constraints mean that the amounts 
that they receive are very low. No law mandates accessibility to public 
buildings for people with disabilities, and little has been done in 
that regard.
    Religious Minoritites.--The Archbishop of the country's Orthodox 
Church has noted incidents in which the Orthodox and their churches or 
other buildings have been the targets of vandalism. There were reports 
that a number of Orthodox churches in the south were burned. The 
Albanian Helsinki Committee issued a report on August 26 stating that 
unknown persons damaged or desecrated more than 10 Orthodox churches 
and monasteries in 1998 and 1999. In January a Greek Orthodox church 
was burned to the ground. In July a Greek Orthodox church in Ksamil was 
desecrated with human feces smeared on icons, then set on fire. Also in 
July, a Greek Orthodox church in Metohi was burned down.
    The Sunnis and Orthodox Christians consider Baha'is to be a threat 
and exercise increasing pressure on authorities to ostracize them. In a 
press interview, Hazhi Hafiz Savri Koci, the leader of the Sunni Muslim 
community, declared that ``the virus of pseudo-religions, such as the 
Baha'i Faith, has infiltrated our weak body. We are at war with them, 
because they are trying to corrupt our souls through the power of 
money, spreading religious beliefs and superstition that are totally 
alien to the Albanian character and tradition.''
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government played a 
constructive role in maintaining the nation's generally positive record 
on the treatment of minorities. While no recent official statistics 
exist regarding the size of the various ethnic communities, ethnic 
Greeks are the most organized and receive the most attention and 
assistance from abroad. There are also substantial groups of 
Macedonians, Vlachs, and Roma.
    Greek-language public elementary schools are now common in much of 
the southern part of the country, where almost all ethnic Greeks live. 
However, there are no Greek-language high schools. There is a Greek 
chair at the University of Gjirokaster. The Greek minority association, 
known as Omonia, continued to press the authorities for more measures 
to protect the rights of the Greek minority, including the creation of 
additional Greek-language classes in some parts of southern Albania. 
The organization also complained that a number of Orthodox churches in 
the south (mainly in areas inhabited by the Greek minority) were burned 
in acts of ethnic violence. The organization reported that during 1998, 
more than 14 persons, mainly from the ethnic Greek minority, were 
kidnaped and held for ransom. This organization appealed to the 
Government to take measures to stop what it called ``attacks against 
the ethnic Greek minority.''
    Classes in the Macedonian language are available to students in the 
districts of Pogradeci and Devolli on the border of the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The FYROM Government provides texts for 
these classes. A small group of ethnic Montenegrins and ethnic Serbs 
exists in the north. No discrimination was reported against the Vlachs, 
who speak Romanian as well as Albanian, or against the Cams, non-
Orthodox ethnic Albanians who were exiled from Greece in 1944. Both 
groups live mainly in the south.
    Two distinct groups of Roma, the Jevg and the Arrixhi (Gabel), are 
established in the country. The Jevg tend to be settled in urban areas 
and are generally more integrated in the economy than the Arrixhi. Roma 
are clearly the most neglected minority group. Broadly speaking, they 
suffer from high illiteracy, poor public health conditions, and marked 
economic disadvantages. Roma encounter much societal discrimination, 
but generally neither the police nor individuals target Roma for 
violence.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form 
independent trade unions. The 1993 Labor Code established procedures 
for the protection of workers' rights through collective bargaining 
agreements. Two major federations act as umbrella organizations for 
most of the country's unions: The Independent Confederation of Trade 
Unions of Albania (127,000 members) and the Confederation of Trade 
Unions (80,000 members). Both organizations experienced a drop in 
membership during the year. Some unions chose not to join either of the 
federations. No union has an official political affiliation, and the 
Government does not provide any financial support for unions.
    The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions and other legislation 
provide that all workers except the uniformed military, the police, and 
some court officials have the right to strike. The law forbids strikes 
that are declared openly to be political or that are judged by the 
courts to be political. The two unions organized a number of national 
and local strikes during the year. Major strikes were carried out by 
the teachers, drivers, health workers, and miners unions. In June 
Tirana airport ground staff went on strike; they returned to work after 
receiving a 30 percent salary increase.
    Government statistics indicated that approximately 330,000 workers 
were employed formally (111,000 in the private sector and 213,000 in 
the public sector) and that an additional 761,000 persons worked in 
agriculture. A total of 235,037 persons were registered as unemployed. 
The official unemployment rate was 18 percent during the year.
    Unions are free to join and maintain ties with international 
organizations, and many do.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Citizens in all 
fields of employment, except uniformed members of the armed forces, 
police officers, and some court employees, have the right to organize 
and bargain collectively. In practice unions representing public sector 
employees negotiate directly with the Government.
    Labor unions did not operate from a position of strength, in view 
of economic conditions, which consisted of very high unemployment, slow 
recovery from the economic collapse, and extensive destruction of 
economic infrastructure due to recurrent episodes of violence and 
looting. Effective collective bargaining in these circumstances is very 
difficult, and agreements are hard to enforce.
    There are no functioning export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Law on Major 
Constitutional Provisions and the Labor Code prohibit forced or 
compulsory labor, and generally it is not known to occur; however, 
traffickers kidnap women for prostitution, and family members sell 
daughters, sisters, and wives to traffickers against their will (see 
Section 6.f.). The law also forbids forced or bonded labor by children, 
and the Government generally enforces these prohibitions; however, 
there were reports that children are trafficked and forced to work 
abroad as prostitutes or beggars (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age of employment at 16 
years and limits the amount and type of labor that can be performed by 
persons under age 18. Children between the ages of 14 and 16 legally 
may work in part-time jobs during summer vacation. Primary school 
education is compulsory and free through age 18 or the eighth grade, 
whichever comes first. In rural areas, children continue to assist 
families in farm work.
    The Ministry of Labor may enforce the minimum age requirements 
through the courts, but no recent cases of this actually occurring were 
known. In Tirana and other cities it is common to see children selling 
cigarettes and candies on the street. The law forbids forced or bonded 
labor by children, but there were some reports of such practices (see 
Sections 6.e. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for all 
workers over age 16 is approximately $50 (6,750 lek) per month, which 
is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker 
and family. Many workers look for second jobs, which are difficult to 
find. Remittances from those working abroad are very important for many 
families. The law provides for social assistance (income support) and 
unemployment compensation, but these are very limited, both in terms of 
the amounts received and the number of persons actually covered. The 
average wage for workers in the public sector is approximately $100 
(13,500 lek) per month.
    The difference between the monthly average wage of persons who live 
in the rural and urban areas is considerable: persons who work and live 
in urban areas earn almost 50 percent more than those who live and work 
in rural areas. Data from the National Institute of Statistics 
indicated that in rural areas more than 20 percent of persons live 
under the official poverty line, while in urban areas the figure is 11 
percent. Nationwide, over 17 percent of the population live under the 
official poverty line. No data are available for private sector wages, 
but they are believed to be considerably higher than in the public 
sector.
    The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours, although in practice hours 
typically are set by individual or collective agreement. Many persons 
work 6 days a week.
    The Government sets occupational health and safety standards, but 
it has limited funds to make improvements in the remaining state-owned 
enterprises and a limited ability to enforce standards in the private 
sector. Actual conditions in the workplace are generally very poor and 
often dangerous. In the two cases of deaths recorded in the 
construction industry during the year, the victims' families did not 
receive any financial support from the state social security 
administration because the workers were not insured. The Labor Code 
lists the safety obligations of employers and employees but does not 
provide specific protection for workers who choose to leave a workplace 
because of hazardous conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No laws criminalize trafficking in 
persons, although antikidnaping laws may be used to prosecute such 
cases.
    Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a significant problem. The country is both a 
significant transit and source country for such trafficking. NGO's 
estimate that there are 30,000 Albanian women currently working abroad 
as prostitutes. The country is also a major conduit for trafficked 
women from Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Criminal 
gangs recruit or coerce women to work as prostitutes abroad, most often 
in Italy and Greece. There are also reports that traffickers kidnap 
women for prostitution and that family members sell daughters, sisters, 
and wives to traffickers against their will.
    The Government has had only periodic success in arresting the 
criminal organizers. During the year there was a shift in the 
prostitution network. Albanian traffickers began to recruit prostitutes 
from other East European countries, mainly from Moldova, Ukraine, 
Russia, and Bulgaria. These young women are ``bought'' for a price of 
$1,000 to $3,000 from international traffickers and forced into 
prostitution in Western European countries, mainly Italy and Greece. 
The Albanian police detained a large number of such prostitutes and 
arrested some of the Albanian traffickers, but no suspects were tried 
in connection with these crimes. In February police dismissed an 
officer who was involved in a network that smuggled illegal immigrants 
into the country via Rinas airport. In August police cracked a network 
that was smuggling prostitutes from Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, and 
Romania via Albania to Italy. Police detained 13 prostitutes and three 
men in a motel near Shodra. Also in August, Prosecutor General Arben 
Rakipi said that Italian Mafia bosses actively were engaged in 
trafficking in Albania; in July Albanian police arrested Giuseppe Muolo 
of Sacra Corona Unita, a Mafia group in southern Italy.
    Anecdotal evidence gathered from victims outlines the trafficking 
process. Organized crime groups responsible for trafficking in persons 
have the power to move their victims easily from one place to another 
without intervention. These traffickers steal the victims' 
identification documents so that they have no freedom of movement. 
Cases have been reported in which trafficked women and girls were 
raped, sexually assaulted, beaten, and injected with heroin. Women and 
girls have reported that they have been isolated, infrequently fed, and 
denied sleep. Women and girls who are able to escape their traffickers 
face rigid notions of family honor upon their return to their 
communities, which make it extremely difficult for them to marry or 
continue their lives as before.
    Trafficking in children is also a problem. Criminals may kidnap 
children from families or orphanages to be sold to prostitution or 
pederasty rings abroad. In May gangsters belonging to a prostitution 
ring in Vlora killed a 16-year-old refugee girl in a kidnap attempt. 
Children also are forced to work as beggars.
    A number of women's associations and NGO's are seeking to raise 
public awareness of prostitution and related crimes. Most of the work 
done to assist trafficked women is performed by small, local NGO's, 
consisting of one to five women who work with few resources and almost 
no external support. One NGO organized a national seminar on this issue 
and prepared a TV documentary on trafficking in women. The campaign 
waged by this NGO, ``Stop the Trafficking of Albanian Women,'' was 
aimed at sensitizing the public to this serious problem. In July 1998, 
a major conference was held in Tirana on ``Trafficking in Albanian 
Women and Children: Human Dimensions and Legal Responses,'' which was 
attended by 130 participants, including NGO's, journalists, judges, 
prosecutors, and government officials. In September the International 
Organization for Migration and the British Department for International 
Development held a workshop to address the problem of trafficking; 
national and international NGO's attended.
                                 ______
                                 

                                ANDORRA

    The Principality of Andorra is a constitutional parliamentary 
democracy. Two Princes with joint authority representing secular and 
religious authorities have headed the Principality since 1278. Under 
the 1993 Constitution, the two Princes--the President of France and the 
Spanish Bishop of ``Seu d'Urgell''--serve equally as heads of state and 
are each represented in Andorra by a delegate. Elections were held in 
1997 to choose members of the ``Consell General'' (the Parliament), 
which selects the head of government. The judiciary functions 
independently.
    Andorra has no defense force and depends on neighboring Spain and 
France for external defense. The national police, under effective 
civilian control, have sole responsibility for internal security.
    The market-based economy is dependent on those of its neighbors 
France and Spain. Andorra is recovering from a serious economic 
recession, but the economy provides citizens with a good standard of 
living. Tourism is still an important source of income. Because of 
banking secrecy laws, the financial services sector is growing in 
importance.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of 
dealing with individual instances of abuse.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
observes these prohibitions.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The highest judicial body is the five-member Superior Council of 
Justice. One member each is appointed by: The two Princes; the head of 
government; the President of the Parliament; and, collectively, members 
of the lower courts. Members of the judiciary are appointed for 6-year 
terms.
    The judiciary provided citizens with a fair and efficient judicial 
process.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides citizens with safeguards 
against arbitrary interference with their ``privacy, honor, and 
reputation,'' and government authorities generally respect these 
prohibitions. Private dwellings are considered inviolable. No searches 
of private premises may be conducted without a judicially issued 
warrant. The law also protects private communications.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice. Since adoption of the 1993 Constitution, the Government has 
registered seven political parties.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
Constitution acknowledges a special relationship between the Roman 
Catholic Church and the state, ``in accordance with Andorran 
tradition.'' The Catholic Church receives no direct subsidies from the 
Government. Catholic religious instruction is provided in public 
schools to those students who elect to receive it. Recent governmental 
attempts to eliminate this practice met with resistance from parental 
groups and the Spanish Co-Prince.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. It 
is government policy not to expel persons having valid claims to 
refugee status, and there were no reports of such expulsions. The issue 
of first asylum did not arise during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    Progress has been made, but women continue to play a relatively 
minor role in politics. Despite the absence of formal barriers, few 
women have run for office. Only 2 of 28 Members of Parliament are 
women, and only 2 women occupy cabinet level positions. Prior to the 
current administration, only two women held elective office.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government accepts international and nongovernmental 
investigations of allegations of human rights abuses. During 1998 the 
first two domestic human rights groups were formed. One defends the 
rights of foreign residents; the other actively supports women's 
rights. However, the Government declined to create a secretariat of 
women's affairs, as the latter association requested.
    In one case, a citizen filed a complaint with the European Court of 
Human Rights when the judge in his case disallowed his appeal to the 
Constitutional Court. The appeal contended that his trial was not 
sufficiently impartial.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution declares that all persons are equal before the law 
and prohibits discrimination on grounds of birth, race, sex, origin, 
religion, opinions, or any other personal or social condition, although 
the law grants many rights and privileges exclusively to citizens. The 
Government effectively enforces these provisions.
    Women.--Little data exist regarding marital abuse, although the 
police received four complaints of physical or psychological abuse 
during the year.
    In theory there is no legal discrimination against women, either 
privately or professionally, but the Association of Andorran Women 
reports that in practice, there have been many cases of women dismissed 
from employment due to pregnancy. The Association actively promotes 
women's issues through information exchanges and limited direct support 
to those in need.
    Children.--The Government's commitment to children's welfare is 
demonstrated by its systems of health care and education. Free public 
education begins at age 4 and is compulsory until age 16. The 
Government provides free nursery schools, although the existing number 
falls short of the needs.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. The law mandates access to new buildings for people 
with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in 
practice.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Spanish nationals are the 
largest group of foreign residents, accounting for approximately 43 
percent of the population. Other sizable foreign groups are Portuguese, 
French, and British. A small but fast growing group of African 
immigrants, especially from North Africa, work mostly in agriculture 
and construction.
    Although the Constitution states that foreign legal residents enjoy 
the same rights and freedoms as citizens, some immigrant workers 
believe that they do not have the same rights and security. Recent 
legislation has improved the quality of life for immigrant workers. 
Nevertheless, many immigrant workers hold only ``temporary work 
authorizations.'' These permits are valid only as long as the job 
exists for which the permit was obtained. When job contracts expire, 
temporary workers must leave the country. The Government prohibits the 
issuance of work permits, unless workers can demonstrate that they have 
a fixed address with minimally satisfactory living conditions.
    More than 4,000 immigrants do not have work permits or residence 
permits, due to the fact that the quota for immigration is not as high 
as the number of workers needed and employed in the country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes the right 
of all persons to form and maintain managerial, professional, and trade 
union associations without prejudice. In accordance with constitutional 
provisions, a registry of associations was established in 1996 and is 
being maintained. Strikes were illegal under the old system, and the 
new Constitution does not state explicitly that strikes are permitted.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution states that both ``workers and employers have the right to 
defend their own economic and social interests.'' Parliament is charged 
with adopting legislation to regulate this right in order to guarantee 
the provision of essential services. Antiunion discrimination is not 
prohibited under the law. A police trade union was registered during 
the year. It is the first such association to exist in the country.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor, 
including that performed by children, is not specifically prohibited by 
law, but it has not occurred.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Children under the age of 18 normally are prohibited from 
working, although in exceptional circumstances children ages 16 and 17 
may be allowed to work. The Labor Inspection Office in the Ministry of 
Social Welfare, Public Health, and Labor enforces child labor 
regulations. Forced and bonded labor by children is not prohibited 
specifically, but there were no reports of its practice (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The workweek is limited to 40 
hours, although longer hours may be required. The legal maximums for 
overtime hours are 66 hours per month and 426 hours per year. An 
official minimum wage is set by government regulations. Other, higher 
wages are established by contract. The minimum wage is approximately 
$4.20 (641 pesetas) per hour, and the Labor Inspection Office enforces 
its observance. The minimum wage barely provides a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. Workers can be dismissed with 15 days' 
to 6 months' notice depending on how long they have been working for 
the company. A minimal indemnification of 1 month's salary per year 
worked is paid if a worker is fired without justification.
    A dismissed worker receives unemployment and health benefits for 
only 25 days. A board composed of Andorran nationals, although they 
represent only a small portion of the work force, controls retirement 
benefits. The Labor Inspection Service hears labor complaints.
    The Labor Inspection Service sets occupational health and safety 
standards and takes the necessary steps to see that they are enforced. 
The law authorizes employees to refuse certain tasks if their employers 
do not provide the customary level of protection.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                ARMENIA

    Armenia has a constitution that provides for the separation of 
powers; however, the directly elected President has extensive powers of 
appointment and decree that are not balanced by the legislature or an 
independent judiciary. The President appoints the Prime Minister, who 
is in charge of the Cabinet. Robert Kocharian was elected President in 
a multicandidate election in 1998 after former President Levon Ter-
Petrossian was forced to resign in February by his former political 
allies in the Government and Parliament. Then President Ter-
Petrossian's reelection in 1996 was flawed by numerous irregularities 
and serious breaches of the election law. There also were serious flaws 
in both rounds of the 1998 presidential elections. Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers witnessed very 
substantial irregularities and concluded that the elections seriously 
challenged international democratic norms in regard to most key 
criteria. It appears that ballot box stuffing, discrepancies in vote 
counts, a large number of unauthorized persons in polling stations, and 
other fraud perpetrated by local power structures inflated the number 
of votes for Kocharian. Nonetheless, the 1998 elections and the May 
parliamentary and October municipal elections showed continued 
improvement with respect to voting practices and vote-counting as well 
as to the ability of a pluralistic group of candidates to campaign 
freely. Although irregularities marred both the parliamentary elections 
and local elections, OSCE observers categorized the former as an step 
toward compliance with OSCE commitments, but stated that they still 
failed to meet international standards. Observers reported that the 
situation was much improved in terms of ending ballot box stuffing and 
overt intimidation by supporters of various candidates; however, they 
still noted problems in many precincts with inaccurate or obsolete 
voting lists, the presence of unauthorized personnel during the voting 
and counting processes, and possible irregularities involving voting of 
military personnel. Some local observers reported that municipal 
elections also were flawed. The Parliament differs from previous ones 
in two important ways: First, members are required to serve full-time 
and not to hold jobs outside the legislature; and second, the number of 
seats was reduced from 190 to 131. The current parliamentary majority 
usually votes in support of the Government. The legislators do not 
always represent effectively either the needs of their constituents or 
the existing political party composition, although they do so more 
effectively than in previous parliaments. The current majority, made up 
of a coalition, called Unity, of the two largest parties, the Peoples' 
Party and the Republican Party, also attracts the votes of most 
deputies elected as independents. Although the leaders of both parties 
were killed in the October 27 terrorist attack on parliament, this did 
not appear to affect the continuity of their coalition by year's end. 
The legislature approves new laws, must confirm the Prime Minister's 
program, and can remove the Prime Minister by a vote of no confidence. 
Both the Government and the legislature can propose legislation. The 
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in 
practice, the courts are subject to pressure from the executive branch 
and corruption.
    The Ministries of Internal Affairs and of National Security, 
formerly one ministry which was split in June, are jointly responsible 
for domestic security, intelligence activities, border controls, and 
the national police force. Members of the security forces committed 
human rights abuses.
    The transition from a centralized, controlled economy to a market 
economy continued to move forward, although the industrial sector still 
is not functioning at full capacity and its output remains low. 
Unemployment remains high, resulting in a high degree of income 
inequality, but the exact figure is difficult to quantify. This is 
because a significant amount of economic activity, perhaps as much as 
40 percent, is not captured by government accounting or taxation; 
unemployment is approximately 50 percent. Women form a 
disproportionately large number of the unemployed. Most small and 
medium-sized enterprises have been privatized, as has most agricultural 
land. About 75 percent of landowners now have secure title to their 
land. The gross domestic product (GDP) fell slightly to about $590 per 
capita. Inflation fell to 2.1 percent for the year. Foreign assistance 
and remittances from Armenians abroad play a major role in sustaining 
the economy, although the financial crisis in Russia, where many 
Armenians went to look for work, cut deeply into the flow of 
remittances. The Government is working to resolve its current budget 
crisis through increased taxes on gasoline and imported tobacco, as 
well as through cuts in most areas of government spending.
    The Government's human rights record was poor in several important 
areas, and problems persist. Substantial intervention by local power 
structures in the election process continues to restrict citizens' 
ability to change their government peacefully. Members of the security 
forces committed extrajudicial killings, routinely beat detainees 
during arrest and interrogation, arbitrarily arrested and detained 
persons without warrants, and did not respect constitutional 
protections regarding privacy and due process. Impunity remains a 
problem, and the Government rarely investigates abuses by members of 
the security forces. Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening, 
and lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. The judiciary is subject 
to political pressure and does not enforce constitutional protections 
effectively. There are some limits on press freedom, and many 
journalists practice self-censorship. State television, which refrains 
from criticizing government policy, remains the major source of news 
for most of the population, but independent television and newspapers, 
along with private radio stations, offer substantial competition. The 
nongovernmental media often criticize the country's leadership and 
policies. Burdensome registration requirements hinder freedom of 
association. The law places some restrictions on religious freedom, 
including a prohibition against proselytizing by religions other than 
the Armenian Apostolic Church. Registration requirements for religious 
groups kept Jehovah's Witnesses from operating legally, and eight 
members of Jehovah's Witnesses are in jail for refusing military 
service; three more arrested on those charges were released on bail. 
The Government places some restrictions on freedom of movement. 
Discrimination against women, the disabled, and minorities remains a 
problem.
    After his election, President Kocharian appointed an opposition 
presidential candidate to head two presidential commissions charged 
with improving human rights and reforming the Constitution to create a 
more even balance of power among the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches. A subsequent commission on balancing the powers of 
the three branches of government presented several proposals that would 
weaken the influence of the executive over the other branches. These 
proposals are scheduled to be voted upon in a national referendum in 
May 2000. To date the Human Rights Commission has submitted a number of 
proposals, one of which is establishment of an office of ombudsman; 
however, there was no action taken on the ombudsman proposal by year's 
end.
    On October 27, five terrorists entered the National Assembly and 
opened fire, killing the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the National 
Assembly and six other Members of Parliament and wounding at least five 
more persons. Investigation of the killings, conducted by the Deputy 
Prosecutor General, was continuing at year's end. Fifteen persons were 
detained for interrogation, including a Deputy of the National 
Assembly, a former presidential chief of staff, and the deputy chief of 
state television. Defense attorneys and the press accused the Deputy 
Prosecutor General of using coercion, including physical abuse of the 
accused, to extract evidence, and President Kocharian expressed concern 
that the rights of the accused be respected.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by police or security forces during the 
year; however, there were numerous reports of extrajudicial killings. 
Local human rights groups reported five cases of death in custody as 
result of beatings and torture. Oleg Arishin, who died on April 27, and 
Stepan Gevorgian, who died on April 15, had been charged with robbery 
and assault. During the trial, Gevorgian filed motions of mistreatment 
that were rejected by the court; his family stated that his corpse 
revealed clear evidence that he was beaten severely. Yerevan native 
Arsen Stepanian was taken to a district police headquarters in July to 
testify on a dispute with a representative of the local electric power 
net. Stepanian died several hours later at home; post mortem 
examination confirmed that he had suffered broken bones and a heart 
attack. No one was charged in these deaths. On October 12, the 
International Helsinki Federation requested that President Kocharian 
investigate these cases; however, by year's end, no legal action was 
taken.
    Two other cases of death in custody involved Edward Vardanian, who 
allegedly committed suicide during interrogation at the police precinct 
in the city of Abovian in March, and Artush Ghazarian, military 
commissar of the city of Tashir, who allegedly died of beatings in 
September while in custody during his interrogation on unspecified 
charges.
    There was a significant number of deaths of military servicemen 
reportedly due to mistreatment (see Section 1.c.).
    Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening and medical 
treatment is inadequate. Three were a number of deaths due to disease 
(see Section 1.c.).
    Charges against five police officers for a 1993 death, a case 
repeatedly remanded for investigation by the Supreme Court, were never 
pressed despite assurances by a previous Prosecutor General.
    On October 27, five terrorists opened fire on a session of the 
National Assembly with automatic weapons. They killed the Prime 
Minister, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the two Deputy 
Speakers, the Minister for Special Projects, and three Deputies, and 
wounded the Minister of Privatization and four other Deputies, some 
critically. The gunmen claimed that they intended to kill only the 
Prime Minister, and that the other victims died in a cross-fire with 
guards, although video footage clearly showed the terrorists firing 
into victims in other parts of the room. Announcing that they were 
carrying out a coup against alleged corruption in the Government, they 
then held approximately 150 hostages inside the Parliament building, 
gradually releasing them during the night.
    On the morning of October 28, the terrorists released about 50 
remaining hostages and surrendered to security forces. According to 
their reported statements, their motives were related to frustration 
over the direction in which the country was going, but also may have 
included personal grievances. Security at the Parliament building, 
which was handled by special parliamentary guards, was extremely lax, 
and criticism mounted, including from the Ministry of Defense, against 
the Ministers of National Security and of Interior and the Prosecutor 
General; the two latter officials submitted their resignations on 
October 29. Their resignations were subsequently were accepted by the 
President. The Minister of National Security resigned on November 1, 
and subsequently was appointed presidential chief of staff. The Deputy 
Prosecutor General (who is also military prosecutor general) was placed 
in charge of investigating the killings. Fifteen persons were detained 
for interrogation by year's end, including a Deputy of the National 
Assembly (who was stripped of his parliamentary immunity by a vote of 
that body), a former presidential chief of staff and advisor, and the 
deputy chief of state television. The investigation was criticized by 
attorneys for the detainees, by the media, and by representatives of 
several political parties for reported human rights abuses (see Section 
1.c.). Gagik Jahangirian, the military prosecutor who is conducting the 
investigation into the parliamentary shootings, repeatedly rejected 
calls for the creation of a special parliamentary committee to ensure 
an impartial investigation. The chairman of the National Democratic 
Union, Vazgen Manukian, and other opposition politicians charged the 
authorities with manipulation of the investigation for political 
reasons.
    On the night of February 9, the body of Artsrun Margarian, Deputy 
Minister of Interior and National Security and Chief of Internal 
Troops, was found on the roadside near Yerevan. Margarian's two 
bodyguards, arrested after his death and charged with homicide, were 
released from custody in July and not charged for lack of evidence (see 
Section 1.c.). The third person allegedly involved in Margarian's 
death, Doctor Hrant Papikian, is charged with not reporting plotted 
crimes. Court hearings on the Margarian case began in October; however, 
there was no verdict by year's end.
    Margarian's case was one of a number of high-profile murders during 
the last 2 years that may have been related to corruption or criminal 
activities. Another case, the murder of Deputy Minister of Defense 
Vahram Khorkhoruni on December 10, 1998, is still under investigation. 
The lack of progress on the Margarian and Khorkhoruni cases was one of 
the reasons given by the Defense Ministry for demanding the 
resignations of the three major nonmilitary security officials. 
Investigation of the August 1998 murder of Prosecutor General Henrik 
Khachatrian by a subordinate was completed; the official verdict was 
``homicide and suicide.''
    In June the Prosecutor General's office completed investigation of 
a criminal indictment against former Minister of Interior and former 
mayor of Yerevan Vano Siradeghian, former commander of Interior 
Ministry troops Vahan Harutyunian, and others. Siradeghian's indictment 
listed 10 counts, including, among other charges, the 1993 murder of 
Armenian railroad director Hambartzum Ghandilian, the murder of 
Ashtarak district executive committee chairman Hovannes Sukiasian, and 
the attempted murder of the chief of the Prosecutor General's 
investigation department, Vladimir Grigorian, as well as kidnaping and 
bribery. Court hearings in the Siradeghian case, which also involves 11 
other defendants, began in September but were postponed several times 
at the request of Siradeghian's attorneys. At year's end, the case was 
in progress in a Yerevan court.
    Another Siradeghian-related court case involved the trial of an 
armed gang led by Armen Ter-Sahakian. Most of the gang members were 
former Interior Ministry employees. The gang allegedly was responsible 
for a number of murders of top officials carried out since the country 
gained independence, as well as for extortion, robbery, and illegal 
possession of weapons. At year's end, the trial was in its intermediate 
stages.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    In September the Government unilaterally released three POW's under 
OSCE auspices; Azerbaijan reciprocated by unilaterally releasing four 
POW's. In October two more Azeri POW's were released, and still one 
more was released in December.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture; however, 
the practice of security personnel beating pretrial detainees during 
arrest and interrogation remains a routine part of criminal 
investigations, and prosecutors rely on such confessions to secure 
convictions. Most cases of police brutality go unreported. Impunity 
remains a problem.
    Local human rights groups reported five cases of death in custody 
due to torture and beatings (see Section 1.a.).
    Attorneys for the five gunmen charged in the October 27 killings in 
Parliament claimed in the media that the accused were being held in 
inhuman conditions and were beaten during interrogations. The 
government-appointed Commission on Human Rights made several attempts 
to see the prisoners to verify charges that they were being physically 
abused but was not able to see them. An attorney for National Assembly 
Deputy Mushegh Movsesian, who was detained in connection with the case, 
also claimed that his client was beaten, and a parliamentary candidate 
who examined him agreed. The attorney requested that Movsesian be 
examined for a severe ulcer from which he reportedly was suffering; the 
deputy prosecutor general's office agreed to this on December 24.
    Although defense lawyers may present evidence of torture in an 
effort to overturn improperly obtained confessions, and according to 
law all such charges must be investigated, judges and prosecutors 
routinely ignore such complaints even when the perpetrator can be 
identified.
    The Government has not conducted investigations of abuse by 
security services, except in rare cases where death has resulted and 
under pressure from human rights groups. The number of deaths of 
conscripts from training accidents and physical abuse decreased by 33 
percent between 1997 and September, according to government figures. 
While this number cannot be verified, based on information from human 
rights groups the figure of 120 noncombat deaths during the year 
appears to be accurate. Amnesty International stated that a conscript 
arrested for being absent without leave was beaten so badly in August 
1998 that subsequently he died. The case currently is pending in the 
Echmiadzin regional court. The military prosecutor's office reported 
that in September investigations were continuing in 32 cases involving 
deaths. President Kocharian met in November with the parents of 
conscripts who died or were injured severely during training and 
promised them that the cases would be investigated fully. There are no 
separate military courts (see Section 1.e.). Military cases that go to 
trial (many are settled administratively) in civilian courts are 
handled by the military prosecutor's office. Members of the Yezidi 
ethnic-religious minority complain that ``hazing'' and beating of 
conscripts, common throughout the former Soviet Union, are especially 
severe for conscripts from their ranks.
    According to a March letter from the President's Office to Human 
Rights Watch, the military Prosecutor General or the military Inspector 
General had fired 18 employees of those 2 offices since July 1997 for 
violations of criminal procedure leading to suicides or accidental 
deaths of servicemen. The President's letter also stated that the 
military Inspector General and Prosecutor General had prosecuted and 
convicted 80 military officers in 1998 for violations of the military 
code; 32 were for abuse of power, 3 for murder or attempted murder, 2 
for causing suicides, and 2 for causing maiming or severe bodily 
injury. The Ministry of Defense declined to provide exact details on 
cases involving national security while the country remained 
technically in a state of war with Azerbaijan.
    Homosexuals complain that police physically and mentally abuse 
them, especially if they have no means to pay police extortions. Those 
accused of homosexuality in the military generally are believed to 
suffer beatings and other physical abuse.
    Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. Facilities are 
often overcrowded and food is inadequate to preserve health unless 
supplemented by assistance from families. Medical and sanitary 
facilities in prisons are inadequate. Tuberculosis and other 
communicable diseases are common, and there were a number of deaths 
from such diseases during the year. Although agreement in principle was 
been reached in 1997 to transfer responsibility for prisons from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice to improve 
oversight, no action to that effect was taken by year's end. Physical 
abuse by guards and by other prisoners is a problem. After a visit to 
the principal prison in Yerevan for detainees held by the Ministry of 
the Interior, the head of the Armenia Human Rights Commission reported 
on December 23 that complaints by prisoners had focused on poor 
conditions in their cells and on reported physical and verbal abuse by 
Interior Ministry personnel.
    According to his lawyer, Ministry of Internal Affairs staff beat 
former Minister of Education Ashot Bleyan while he was in prison on 
August 18. He was awaiting trial on corruption charges (see Section 
1.d.).
    According to the Armenian Helsinki Association, the two bodyguards 
of the late Deputy Interior Minister Artsrun Margarian were subjected 
to torture in February during the investigation into Margarian's death 
(see Section 1.a.).
    The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had free access 
to detention facilities run by the Ministry of Interior. In these 
facilities, the ICRC is able to visit, according to its standard 
modalities, any prisoner in whom it has an interest, whether in prisons 
or in local police stations. Also, the ICRC had regular access to POW's 
from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the prison of the Ministry of 
National Security and the military police stations. The ICRC also had 
access to POW's in Nagorno-Karabakh.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Authorities continued to 
arrest and detain criminal suspects without legal warrants, often on 
the pretext that they were material witnesses. The police frequently 
imprison detainees without notification of their family members. It 
often is several days before family members obtain information as to 
whether someone has been arrested and the person's location. Security 
agencies often restrict access of lawyers and family members to 
prisoners until the preliminary investigation phase is complete, a 
process that can last weeks. During the year, the amount of time that 
detainees could be held without being charged officially was extended 
from 72 to 96 hours.
    The transitional provisions of the Constitution provide that 
Soviet-era procedures for searches and arrests were to continue until 
the new Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code came into effect in 
January. Although the Criminal Procedure Code entered into force, the 
Criminal Code remains under consideration in Parliament, and the likely 
date of its passage remains unclear. A suspect may be detained for no 
more than 12 months pending trial, after which the suspect must be 
released or tried. However, this latter provision is not always 
enforced. There is no provision for bail, although detainees may sign a 
document and remain at liberty under their own recognizance pending 
trial.
    Former deputy chief of customs Mihran Movsesian, a relative of 
detained National Assembly Deputy Musegh Movsesian, told the media that 
he was called to the Ministry of National Security in early November 
for questioning about the killings in Parliament. Movsesion said that 
he was detained for the next 30 days in the Ministry's holding facility 
for national security cases without being charged, in violation of the 
legal provision that detainees must be charged within 96 hours. 
Movsesian then was released without charge and was never given any 
official explanation for his detention.
    Former Education Minister Ashot Bleyan was detained by two law 
enforcement officials on May 14 after being charged with embezzlement 
of public funds intended for the purchase of textbooks (see Section 
1.c.). Supporters of Bleyan formed a committee for his defense. Human 
Rights Watch reports that according to his lawyer, he was beaten while 
in detention by Interior Ministry officials, and Bleyan stated in 
September that the procuracy official handling the case was present 
during the beating; the lawyer's report was not confirmed 
independently.
    Armed forces recruiters sometimes take hostages to compel the 
surrender of draft-evading or deserting relatives (see Section 1.f.).
    A local human rights group alleges that there are cases in which 
security authorities use confinement in mental institutions as an 
alternative form of detention.
    The ICRC reported that civilian and military personnel on all sides 
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict occasionally engage in cross-border 
hostage taking, sometimes to win release of a friend or relative held 
on the other side, but sometimes for financial gain. Such incidents 
reportedly declined significantly during the year.
    There were no reports of forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution nominally 
provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice courts are 
subject to pressure from the executive branch and to corruption. The 
Constitution's provisions do not appear designed to insulate the courts 
from political pressure. Other legal and constitutional provisions make 
judges and prosecutors dependent on the executive branch for their 
employment. The inherited Soviet system views the court largely as a 
rubber stamp for the prosecutor and not a defender of citizens' rights. 
Prosecutors still greatly overshadow defense lawyers and judges during 
trials. Under the Constitution, the Council of Justice, headed by the 
President, the Prosecutor General, and the Justice Minister, appoints 
and disciplines judges for the tribunal courts of first instance, 
review courts, and the Court of Appeals. The President appoints the 
other 14 members of the Justice Council and 4 of the 9 Constitutional 
Court judges. This authority gives the President dominant influence in 
appointing and dismissing judges at all levels. Judges are subject to 
review by the President through the Council of Justice after 3 years. 
Thereupon, their tenure is permanent until they reach the age of 65.
    According to the transitional provisions of the Constitution, the 
existing courts retained their powers until the new judicial system 
began to function in January. During the transition, district courts 
tried most cases, with a right of appeal to regional courts and then to 
the Supreme Court.
    The 1995 Constitution requires a new three-level court system. The 
highest court, the Court of Cassation, began functioning in the summer 
of 1998. First instance courts try most cases, with a right of appeal 
to the Appellate Court and then to the Court of Cassation. The 
Constitutional Court rules on the conformity of legislation with the 
Constitution, approves international agreements, and decides election-
related legal questions. It can accept only cases proposed by the 
President, by two-thirds of all parliamentary deputies, or election-
related cases brought by candidates for parliament or the presidency. 
Due to these limitations, the Constitutional Court cannot ensure 
effectively constitutional human rights safeguards.
    Judges for the two lower-level courts, the Appellate Court and 
courts of the first instance, began functioning in January. The 
selection of judges was based on: their scores on a multiple choice 
test to determine their fitness to be judges under the new system, 
based on previously published information regarding the new legal 
codes; and their interviews with the Minister of Justice. Next, the 
list of nominations was approved by the Council of Justice and, 
finally, by the President. About 55 percent of the appointed judges 
were judges under the old structure. The executive branch continued to 
have a dominant role in judicial selection. Based on the results of 
this four-stage selection, 123 judges were appointed to the new courts 
on January 12. Unless they are found guilty of malfeasance, their 
tenure is permanent until they reach the age of 65.
    The judicial system continued to be in transition. As part of the 
package of judicial reform legislation mandated by the Constitution, 
both prosecutors and defense counsels began a process of retraining and 
recertification in order to retain their positions. Even though the 
newly passed legislation reduced significantly prosecutors' supervision 
of civil cases, prosecutors still greatly overshadow defense lawyers 
and judges during trials.
    The new Criminal Code, which is intended to clarify contradictory 
provisions of the law and create a more unitary, modern, and workable 
legal system has not yet been approved. Two other new codes, the Civil 
Code and the Criminal Procedures Code, were passed in the summer of 
1998 and went into effect in January. Under the new codes, prosecutors 
are expected to continue to have more influence than judges do. The 
functions of the Ministry of Justice have been reduced substantially 
with the establishment of the Council of Court Chairs, which is 
responsible for financial and budgetary issues for the courts. The 
Council of Court Chairs includes 21 court chairs (the senior judges of 
multi-judge panels) at all levels.
    The new criminal procedure code does not allow detainees to file a 
complaint in court prior to trial to redress abuses by the procuracy, 
police, or other security forces during criminal investigations. Under 
the new code, the police may detain individuals for up to 12 hours 
before notifying family members, witnesses have no right to legal 
counsel during questioning while in police custody--even though failure 
to testify is a criminal offense--and detainees must seek permission 
from the police or procuracy to obtain a forensic medical examination 
to substantiate a report of torture.
    President Kocharian established in June 1998 a constitutional 
reform commission, one of whose stated goals is to strengthen the 
independence of the judiciary and give the courts more authority in 
safeguarding human rights. On March 1, the commission submitted its 
suggestions for constitutional amendments to the President. One 
proposed change was to remove the prohibition against dual citizenship. 
The President disbanded the old commission and by a July 23 decree 
appointed new members to amend the Constitution's chapter on the 
judiciary. Such constitutional revisions must pass both Parliament and 
a national referendum.
    The military legal system operates essentially as it did in the 
Soviet era. There is no military court system; trials involving 
military personnel take place in the civil court system and are handled 
by military prosecutors. Military prosecutors perform the same 
functions as their civilian counterparts; pending passage of a new 
criminal code, they operate in accordance with the Soviet-era Criminal 
Code. In 1998 the military prosecutor abolished military ranks for the 
prosecutors in his service.
    All trials are public except when government secrets are at issue. 
Defendants are required to attend their trials unless they have been 
accused of a minor crime not punishable by imprisonment. Defendants 
have access to a lawyer of their own choosing. The court appoints an 
attorney for any defendant who needs one. Defendants may confront 
witnesses and present evidence. The Constitution provides that those 
accused of crimes shall be informed of charges against them. However, 
the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence is ineffective, 
and acquittals are rare once a case comes to trial. Defendants and 
prosecutors have the right of appeal.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    The five remaining defendants in the ``Dro'' case remain in prison 
following conviction of criminal charges of murder. Two were condemned 
to death, but given the country's current moratorium on the death 
penalty, they may instead serve life or 25-year sentences. A sixth 
Dashnak prisoner, convicted of the murder of a policeman in a separate 
case, also remained in jail under sentence of death.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits unauthorized searches and 
preserves citizens' rights to privacy and confidentiality of 
correspondence, conversations, and other messages; however, authorities 
at times infringed on these rights. The security ministries must 
petition a judge for permission to wiretap a telephone or intercept 
correspondence. The judge acting alone purportedly must find a 
compelling need for the wiretap before granting the agency permission 
to proceed. No evidence of illegal wiretapping came to public attention 
during the year.
    The law requires security forces to obtain a search warrant from a 
judge before conducting a search. Security forces were refused issuance 
of warrants due to lack of evidence in several cases; however, in 
practice there are charges that searches continue to be made without a 
warrant. The Constitution provides that the judiciary must exclude 
evidence obtained without a warrant. Legislation passed in 1997 to 
improve security of bank deposits has been enforced.
    There continued to be violations of the right to privacy during 
army conscription drives. Armed forces recruiters sometimes take 
hostages to compel the surrender of draft-evading or deserting 
relatives. There are credible reports of improper conscription of 
ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, who by law are exempt from 
military service. There were no reported cases of punitive conscription 
of males who offended local officials.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and the press; however, while the Government 
generally respects freedom of speech, there are some limits on freedom 
of the press and journalists practice self-censorship. There is no 
official censorship, publications present a variety of views, and the 
opposition press regularly criticizes government policies and leaders, 
including the President, on sensitive issues such as the Nagorno-
Karabakh peace process and privatization.
    However, to avoid retribution experienced in years past on the part 
of powerful officials and other individuals, many journalists practice 
self-censorship, particularly in reporting on major corruption or 
national security issues. Many journalists remain cautious in their 
reporting, and the range of subjects considered sensitive for national 
security is relatively large.
    Newspapers, with the exception of Hayastani Hanrapetutyun and 
Respublica Armenia (both joint ventures between Parliament and their 
staffs), are privately owned. The state printing house and distribution 
agency both now function as commercial enterprises, with no visible 
government intervention.
    The sensationalist political tabloid Oragir and its successor 
Haykakan Zhamanak were subjected on several occasions in 1999 to legal 
pressure and intimidation stemming from articles that accused 
government figures of corruption and revealed alleged dubious 
connections between the then-Minister of Interior and National Security 
and a gasoline importing private company. A series of court cases and 
incidents included a public scuffle in June, when court bailiffs tried 
unsuccessfully to seize Oragir's equipment to satisfy a libel judgment. 
In September Oragir editor Nikol Pashinian was found guilty of libel, 
slander, libeling a public official, and contempt of court (for not 
publishing a retraction demanded by a court) and sentenced to 1 year of 
corrective labor and ordered to pay a fine of $25,000 (13.5 million 
drams). Pashinian appealed the judgment and not paid the fine; other 
journalists, who up to then had been largely nonsupportive of his case, 
passed a resolution criticizing the punishment as unduly harsh and for 
several weeks rallied almost daily in front of the President's office 
demanding a more lenient sentence. At year's end, no decision on the 
Pashinian case had been announced by the appeals court.
    On December 23, the offices of Haykakan Zhamanak were invaded by 
approximately a dozen men who beat and kicked Pashinian and other male 
members of the staff. They reportedly were led by a local businessman 
who was angered by an article in Haykakan Zhamanak that accused him of 
corruption. Pashinian afterwards announced that he would not file 
charges against his assailants, but that he expected them to apologize 
to all journalists for the attack. On December 25, the Russian 
newspaper Novoye Vremya had reprinted an article originally published 
in the Russian press accusing the late Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsian 
of corruption. Novoye Vermya's editor subsequently reportedly received 
a threatening telephone call purporting to be from the Yerkrapah Union, 
a social/political faction of veterans of the Nagorno-Karabakh war 
founded by Sargsian. The caller warned the editor that if his paper 
continued to ``insult'' the slain Prime Minister, his house would be 
burned. On December 31, a fire characterized by media reports as arson 
damaged the Yerevan offices of the Russian newspaper.
    Newspapers operate with extremely limited resources, and none are 
completely independent of patronage from economic or political interest 
groups or individuals. Due to prevailing economic conditions, newspaper 
circulation is small (a total of 40,000 copies, by the Department of 
Information's estimates, or about 1 copy per 100 persons). The state-
owned newspaper printing and distribution companies have been 
privatized, except for a small government stake. There were no 
complaints of official government pressure on news media.
    State institutions that previously had tended to exert control over 
the media have lost most of their functions. The Department of 
Information, created in 1997 to replace the disbanded Ministry of 
Information, continued to exist, but with no clear purpose beyond 
allocating small government subsidies to newspapers and occasionally 
interceding with the state-owned newspaper distribution agency to 
forward a share of its receipts to the newspapers. A board was created 
in late 1997 with representatives from the President's Office, 
Government, and Parliament, to supervise the transformation of the 
state-owned press agency, printing, and newspaper distribution into 
commercial enterprises. The board has not been active during the past 2 
years, and state-owned enterprises remain under government control. The 
President's Office continued to influence state television news 
coverage.
    The most widely available of the two state-owned television 
channels takes policy guidance from the Government; presenting mostly 
factual reporting, it avoids editorial commentary or criticism of 
official actions. During the May parliamentary elections, the coverage 
of political parties on state television and other media generally was 
balanced and largely neutral. Single-mandate candidates were not 
entitled to free programing, but had no restrictions on paid time. In 
Yerevan and major regional media markets, private television stations 
now offer independent news coverage of good technical quality. Most 
radio stations are private. Opposition parties and politicians receive 
adequate news coverage and access on these channels. Legislation has 
not been passed yet to regulate the current arbitrary and 
nontransparent process of license issuance. Draft broadcast and media 
laws, the subject of intensive discussion among journalists, were 
revised extensively, but for a second year they were not discussed by 
Parliament. One new measure announced in October 1998, a 25-fold 
increase in licensing fees for television broadcasters, was expected to 
have a serious effect on struggling private stations; these stations 
appealed for the measure's cancellation. After the President's 
intervention, the overall increase was significantly lowered (to three-
fold). The few international newspapers and magazines imported are not 
censored. There are no restrictions on reception of satellite 
television and other foreign media, and this material is not censored.
    The Government partially respects academic freedom. There are more 
than 80 private institutions of higher education. The Ministry of 
Education must approve the curriculum of all schools that grant degrees 
recognized by the State, seriously limiting the freedom of individual 
schools and teachers in their choice of textbooks and course material.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice. The Constitution provides for freedom of 
association, and the Government generally respects this right in 
practice; however, there are some important exceptions. There are 
cumbersome registration requirements for all political parties, 
associations, and organizations. The process of registering an 
organization is time consuming, and some human rights or political 
organizations have been compelled by the Government to revise their 
bylaws several times in order to have their registrations accepted. No 
human rights or political organization reported problems with 
registration during the year.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the law specifies some restrictions on the religious 
freedom of adherents of faiths other than the Armenian apostolic 
church, which has formal legal status as the national church.
    The 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience, amended in 1997, establishes 
the separation of church and state, but grants the Armenian Apostolic 
Church special status. The law forbids ``proselytizing'' (undefined in 
the law) except by the Armenian Apostolic Church and requires all 
religious denominations and organizations to register with the State 
Council on Religious Affairs. Petitioning organizations must ``be free 
from materialism and of a purely spiritual nature,'' and must subscribe 
to a doctrine based on ``historically recognized holy scriptures.''
    A presidential decree issued in 1993 supplemented the 1991 law and 
strengthened the position of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The decree 
enjoins the Council on Religious Affairs to investigate the activities 
of the representatives of registered religious organizations and to ban 
missionaries who engage in activities contrary to their status. The 
Council on Religious Affairs took no action against missionaries during 
the year and even members of Jehovah's Witnesses, which is not 
registered, were allowed to engage fairly openly in missionary 
activity.
    In 1996 Parliament passed legislation tightening registration 
requirements by raising from 50 to 200 adult members the minimum number 
required for registration. The law banned funding for foreign-based 
churches from centers outside Armenia. The 1996 legislation also 
mandated that religious organizations except the Armenian Apostolic 
Church need prior permission from the State Council on Religious 
Affairs to engage in religious activities in public places, travel 
abroad, or to invite foreign guests to the country. Despite these 
mandated restrictions, in practice there is no restriction on travel by 
the religious personnel of any denomination, including those that are 
unregistered. Members of unregistered minority religious organizations 
are allowed to bring in small quantities of religious literature for 
their own use, but large shipments by unregistered groups are 
prohibited.
    As of year's end, registered religious groups had reported no 
adverse consequences from the law. The ban on foreign funding has not 
been enforced and is considered unenforceable by the Council on 
Religious Affairs. The Council has such limited resources that it has 
not performed any acts except the annual reregistering of religious 
groups. No registered religious group was denied reregistration under 
the amended law. All existing denominations reregistered except the 
Hare Krishnas, who reportedly dropped below even the previous 50-member 
threshold and hence did not seek to reregister and are no longer 
active. A few new organizations registered, in some instances groups 
created after splits in previous organizations, bringing the number of 
registered groups to 48.
    However, the Council on Religious Affairs continued to deny 
registration to Jehovah's Witnesses, no longer on the grounds that the 
group does not permit military service, but because its ``illegal 
proselytism'' is allegedly integral to its activity and because of the 
``dissatisfaction and tension'' caused in some communities by its 
public preaching. A regional leader of Jehovah's Witnesses held 
meetings with the Council on Religious Affairs in September, which he 
described as ``encouraging,'' but there was no change in the denial of 
registration by year's end. Jehovah's Witnesses have challenged their 
nonregistration in the courts as recommended in 1998 by the President's 
Human Rights Commission.
    Eleven members of Jehovah's Witnesses remained in detention, 
charged with draft evasion or, if forcibly drafted, with desertion. 
According to Amnesty International, at least one Jehovah's Witnesses 
conscript was beaten severely by military personnel in December 1998 
for refusal to wear a uniform. Around 50 Jehovah's Witnesses were 
reportedly in hiding from the draft. Alternative nonmilitary service is 
sometimes available for persons willing to act as teachers in remote 
villages, an option not available under current law to members of 
Jehovah's Witnesses. The President's office stated in March that a law 
was being drafted that would regulate alternative service for Jehovah's 
Witnesses and other conscientious objectors, but it had not been 
introduced by year's end. At least one member of Jehovah's Witnesses 
detained for draft evasion during the year indicated in writing his 
willingness to perform alternative service. A Jehovah's Witnesses 
official noted that some forms of alternate service would be 
problematic for members of his group, due to their creed's prohibition 
of participation in some government organs.
    Police curtailed a Jehovah's Witnesses convention held in September 
at a privately owned, rented facility outside Yerevan and tried to 
disperse the meeting nonviolently, citing an alleged decree by the 
National Security Council; however, they were unable to produce such a 
decree, and an official of the Council on Religious Affairs stated that 
it had not authorized dispersal of the meeting and was not aware of the 
decree. The police left without dispersing the meeting, but shortly 
thereafter power to the building was interrupted. Jehovah's Witnesses 
ended their meeting prematurely but peacefully. No agency admitted 
responsibility for the power interruption.
    According to the law, a religious organization refused registration 
cannot publish a newspaper or magazine, rent a meeting place on 
government-owned property, have its own program on television or radio, 
or officially sponsor the visas of visitors. Jehovah's Witnesses 
continue to have problems renting meeting places. Lack of official visa 
sponsorship means that visitors of Jehovah's Witnesses must pay for a 
tourist visa.
    The Armenian Apostolic Church elected a new head, or Catholicos, at 
an ecclesiastical conference in October attended by delegations from 
around the world. Although several candidates for this office alleged 
government interference in the election process, the vote was held in 
an open atmosphere and there were no signs of pressure or intimidation 
by government agencies.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and 
repatriation; however, the Government places restrictions on some of 
those rights. The Government may deny passports to persons possessing 
state secrets, to those subject to military service, and to those whose 
relatives have made financial claims against them. Men of military age 
must overcome substantial bureaucratic obstacles to international 
travel. The Government does not restrict internal movement, and 
citizens have the right to change their residence or workplace freely. 
They must negotiate with a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy to 
register these changes, but this practice is now more a nuisance than 
an impediment. In addition registration of a residence is a difficult 
process, particularly for those who live in a rented dwelling.
    After the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan in 1988, ethnic minorities on both sides were subject to 
discrimination and intimidation, often accompanied by violence intended 
to drive them from the country. Almost all the ethnic Azeris living in 
Armenia at the time, some 185,000 persons, fled to Azerbaijan. Of the 
400,000 ethnic Armenians then living in Azerbaijan, 330,000 fled and 
gained refugee status in Armenia. The majority of the rest took refuge 
in Russia, with small numbers remaining in Azerbaijan.
    The National Assembly passed a law on citizenship in 1996 that 
provides for refugees of Armenian ethnicity to gain citizenship, 
provided they are stateless and have resided in the country for the 
past 3 years. In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for the 
law and began new efforts to encourage refugees to accept Armenian 
citizenship. In January the Government decided to allow refugees to 
naturalize when registered under their factual residence (the residence 
at which the refugee actually resides), and in March the refugee law 
was adopted by the National Assembly. During the final months of the 
year, the Government established a new system at the local level, 
making the acquisition of citizenship easier for refugees. As a result, 
an increased number of refugees chose to accept citizenship: from 
August through November, 6,473 refugees received citizenship, compared 
with a total of 7,200 total in 1998. However, a government report at 
year's end said that most refugees are still reluctant to become 
citizens, fearing the loss of free housing, military service 
exemptions, and other benefits accorded refugees.
    The Government cooperates with the Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting ethnic Armenian refugees. The newly passed refugee law has 
provisions for granting refugee and asylee status in accordance with 
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol. The Government respects the right of first asylum. 
During the year, at least one Sudanese was granted asylum based on fear 
of religious prosecution if he returned to Sudan.
    Border officials have no training on asylum issues. In some cases, 
persons denied permission for legal residence are subjected to fines 
for illegal residence when they attempt to depart the country. There 
were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they 
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Serious flaws in the 1998 presidential election continued to 
restrict the constitutional ability of citizens to change their 
government peacefully, as had the previous Government's manipulation of 
the 1996 presidential election. Serious breaches of the election law 
and numerous irregularities in the 1995 parliamentary elections, and 
the 1996 and 1998 presidential elections resulted in a lack of public 
confidence in the integrity of the overall election process.
    In both rounds of the 1998 presidential elections, OSCE observers 
witnessed very substantial irregularities and concluded that the 
elections seriously challenged international democratic norms in regard 
to most key criteria. There were unusually high voter turnouts in 
certain areas, particularly in the second round, and these increases 
corresponded directly to high vote percentages for then Acting 
President Kocharian. Based on detailed analysis of the results tracked 
by observer reports in certain districts, it appears that ballot box 
stuffing, discrepancies in vote counts, a large number of unauthorized 
persons in polling stations, and other fraud perpetrated by local power 
structures inflated the number of votes for Kocharian by well over 
100,000 votes in the second round, which he won by approximately 
290,000 votes. Some military units were compelled to vote without 
exception for Kocharian, and officials used pressure to encourage a 
large turnout for the ``official'' candidate. Voters enjoyed a full 
spectrum of choices among candidates; all presidential candidates were 
provided opportunities to present themselves to the electorate through 
the provision of free and paid access to state media. However, state 
television, the most influential single source of information, provided 
coverage biased heavily in favor of the acting president. The electoral 
process fell far short of the authorities' commitments to their 
citizens. There were no legal consequences for electoral fraud. The 
Government pursued only minor violations and no penalties were 
announced. There was no criminal investigation of the amply documented 
ballot box stuffing.
    The May parliamentary elections showed continued improvement toward 
compliance with OSCE commitments, but still failed to meet 
international standards. Nonetheless, during the election, observers 
from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) noted 
improvements in the electoral framework and the political environment. 
Freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression 
were respected during the campaign. The previously banned party ARF-
Dashnaksutyun reentered political activity in 1998. The May 30 
elections took place under a new electoral code that represented a 
substantial improvement compared with previous legislation and 
incorporated recommendations of international organizations. For 
example the code provides for the accreditation of domestic nonpartisan 
observers. It abolishes one level of election bureaucracy (the 
community election commissions) and provides for the courts to address 
electoral complaints during the campaign rather than after results are 
announced.
    However, election administration was uneven on election day. In 
many precincts, election officials, candidates' proxies, and domestic 
observers worked together to provide transparent voting and counting 
procedures. The areas of most concern witnessed by OSCE/ODIHR observers 
included the poor quality of the voter lists, which often were outdated 
or inaccurate; mistakes in registration; voting by military personnel; 
problems in the formation of the election commissions and the status of 
their members; and the presence of unauthorized personnel in precincts 
during voting and counting procedures. Thousands of voters had to 
appeal to local courts on election day in order to cast their votes, 
after finding that their names had been left off local voter lists. 
Opposition parties such as the National Democratic Union, the Self-
Determination Union, the Communist Party, Hayrenik, and Azatutuyun 
criticized the exclusion of numerous residents from the lists. The 
Central Election Commission blamed the omissions on the negligence of 
some civil servants. Twelve criminal cases related to parliamentary 
election fraud, involving 16 persons, remain under investigation by the 
Prosecutor General's office at year's end.
    In the May parliamentary elections, many observers witnessed 
soldiers closely supervised by their commanding officers and left alone 
for a few minutes to cast ballots; in some cases, soldiers were 
instructed to vote for the Unity Alliance. In addition press reports 
and a number of election observers noted that supporters of many 
candidates offered both monetary and other inducements to voters to 
encourage votes for their candidate.
    In the October municipal elections, the three major problems were: 
the politicization of election commissions, obsolete or incorrect voter 
lists, and the use of old seals (the election law mandates that new 
ones be provided by regional election commissions for each election, as 
a check on ballot box stuffing), presumably because the funds were 
lacking to buy new seals.
    Four districts of Yerevan held local by-elections on July 11. In 
the Achapniak district, violence erupted when armed supporters of one 
of the candidates beat and fired upon supporters of another candidate. 
The Central Elections Commission suspended this vote and declared it 
invalid. A criminal investigation was launched, which resulted in the 
arrest of 14 persons; the police still are seeking 10 more persons 
allegedly involved in the Achapniak violence. Those arrested are being 
prosecuted, but at year's end, the accused were free on bail and were 
not brought to trial due to continuances requested by their attorneys. 
The by-election in Achapniak was rescheduled 6 weeks later. Neither of 
the candidates whose followers were involved in the original violence 
ran in the rescheduled election, although they were not barred from 
doing so. The election took place without incident.
    Further improvements were made to the electoral framework and 
election administration for the October 24 municipal elections of 
community mayors and councils of elders. Candidate proxies, media, 
domestic observers, and international observers were entitled to 
monitor all stages of the election process; however, international 
observers did not monitor all stages. Shortly before the election, an 
amendment addressing procedures for military personnel to participate 
in municipal elections was passed, restricting military voting to the 
place of the soldier's permanent residence. This amendment, in 
practice, prevents a majority of the military from voting, as many 
soldiers are stationed far from their permanent residences and cannot 
obtain leave to return home to vote.
    On October 16, the Constitutional Court struck down the Law on 
Local Self-government and the Law on Refugees, which prohibited 
refugees with permanent residence (``propiska'') in Armenia from 
participating in municipal elections, concluding that they were in 
conflict with the Constitution and provisions of the electoral code. 
The Constitutional Court decision gave refugees with permanent 
residence the right to vote in such municipal elections. Nevertheless, 
by presidential decree, municipal elections were postponed in 
communities where refugees make up more than 50 percent of the 
population.
    Mayors and other community heads, in conjunction with relevant 
authorities, updated and significantly improved the voter lists before 
the October 24 municipal elections. As a result, the number of citizens 
appealing for inclusion on voter lists in the Court of First Instance 
was reduced significantly. Council of Europe observers described the 
October 24 election as free and fair; however, the observers noted 
several minor irregularities, including use of previously used seals 
(the law provides that new ones should be provided for each election as 
a check on ballot box stuffing) and defects in the voter lists. 
However, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the newspaper 
Haykakan Zhamanak, few parties fielded candidates in the elections 
other than the two progovernment coalition parties. The nonpartisan, 
professionally trained Armenian election observers from ``It's Your 
Choice'' highlighted serious flaws in the distribution of power within 
election commissions, and inaccurate voting lists, noting that ``many 
voters whose names were not on the lists, out of weariness and 
frustration, did not appeal to the court and thus could not exercise 
their constitutional right.'' This group's election report suggests 
that there were only serious multiparty contests in less than one-third 
of the precincts.
    The Government recently confirmed its decision to postpone a 
national census until 2001 for budgetary reasons. This has raised 
political concerns about the integrity of the process that is to create 
new electoral districts, since existing voter rolls and other 
population records are in some areas out-of-date and seriously flawed.
    Under the Constitution, the President appoints the Prime Minister 
and makes the final selection of qualified candidates for judgeships. 
The Constitution provides for independent legislative and judicial 
branches, but in practice these branches are not insulated from 
political pressure from the executive branch.
    The Government appoints the 10 regional governors (marzpets) and 
the mayor of Yerevan. The Constitution gives local communities the 
right to elect local authorities. However, local elected officials have 
limited powers and are overshadowed in practice by the appointed 
governors, who can remove them from office.
    In compliance with the Constitution, the newly elected National 
Assembly operates as a full-time Parliament. It consists of 131 
deputies; 56 are elected on a proportional basis and 75 on a district-
by-district majority basis. Regular sessions are held twice a year: the 
first from mid-September to mid-December; and the second from early 
February until mid-June. Given the press of legislative business 
connected with the total reform of the legal system, special sessions 
frequently are called, but may not last more than 6 days. Following the 
deaths of the speaker and his two deputies in the October 27 terrorist 
attack, the National Assembly elected a new speaker and deputies on 
November 2 according to established constitutional procedures.
    There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women and 
minorities in government and politics; however, due to traditional 
social attitudes, both groups are underrepresented in all branches of 
government. There are no female cabinet ministers. Only 4 of the 131 
deputies in the Parliament are women. There are no minority 
representatives in the Cabinet or in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are several human rights NGO's that are active and operate 
openly, criticize abuses publicly, and publish their findings on 
government human rights violations. In general public access to 
information on human rights cases usually is adequate, with extensive 
media coverage of significant court cases, and more openness by 
civilian and military prosecutors. During the year, one domestic human 
rights group, the Armenia Helsinki Association for the first time was 
allowed to visit death row and talk with convicts sentenced to death.
    In February a Ministry of Defense official warned a member of an 
organization dealing with conscripts to desist from cooperating with 
international human rights organizations. In March Mikael Danielyan, 
chair of the Armenia Helsinki Association, was accused of making 
unfounded accusations after he complained about the refusal of the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs to grant access to pretrial detention 
facilities for monitoring; Danielyan had submitted written requests and 
made repeated attempts to gain access for over a year.
    An office created by the Prosecutor General in July 1997 to 
communicate with international observers was responsive to requests for 
information, although information about criminal cases stemming from 
elections remained relatively general and incomplete. International 
observers requesting information on election-related complaints 
received more precise and detailed information on their resolution.
    In 1998 President Kocharian appointed a prominent opposition 
politician to head a new human rights commission within the President's 
office. The commission exists essentially as a reference bureau and has 
no formal legal powers. However, it has had a modest impact in getting 
authorities to review official actions on social issues ranging from 
apartment allocations to police behavior, in some cases winning 
official reconsideration. It refers such cases to the appropriate 
agency, but it does not follow up on specific issues.
    The Government has permitted monitoring of human rights by the 
Council of Europe and by the ICRC, which retains full access to 
civilian detention facilities.
    The Government invited an OSCE/ODIHR election observer mission to 
observe the May parliamentary elections, and provided domestic and 
international observers with unimpeded countrywide access to both the 
May and October elections (see Section 3). Current electoral law allows 
local observer organizations to monitor parliamentary but not 
presidential elections, and such local organizations reported no 
impediments to election observation during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, 
religion, disability, language, or social status. However, cultural and 
economic factors prevent women, ethnic and religious minorities, and 
persons with disabilities from participating fully in public life. The 
religion law discriminates against some religious groups.
    Women.--There is no specific law banning violence against women, 
and few cases of rape, spousal abuse, or other violence against women 
were reported; however, their number is likely higher than the 
statistics indicate. Domestic violence cases usually are not reported 
to the police, and women are not protected from it. There is at least 
one nongovernmental organization that provides shelter and assistance 
to battered women; it is located in the Gyumri area, but embarrassment 
and concerns for family honor make the problem particularly sensitive 
and difficult to quantify. Even womens' groups and health professionals 
decline to offer specific figures, but do not indicate that such 
violence is especially common.
    In the first 11 months of the year, the Prosecutor's Office 
registered 18 cases of rape. The Prosecutor General's Office also 
reported nine attempted murders against women involving serious 
injuries. The law (the old Soviet Criminal Code) cites specific 
punishments for rape, forced abortion, forbidding a woman from 
marrying, and discrimination in hiring due to pregnancy.
    Prostitution is not illegal, and according to anecdotal evidence, 
most prostitutes stopped by police for street-walking are simply sent 
to a hospital or physician for a medical check-up. Armenian women work 
as prostitutes in the Middle East, and there have been reports of 
trafficking in women and girls in the past, but there were no reports 
during the year (see Section 6.f.).
    Males often play a dominant role in many societal institutions. In 
the workplace, women receive equal pay for equal work, but generally 
are not afforded the same professional opportunities given to men and 
often are relegated to more menial or low-skill jobs. The 1972 Law on 
Employment prohibits discrimination in employment, but the extremely 
high unemployment rate makes it difficult to gauge how effectively the 
law has been implemented to prevent discrimination. Formerly, labor 
unions protected women's rights in the workplace at least nominally, 
but the current weakness of unions (see Section 6.a.) likely has 
rendered them even less effective in this role. According to official 
statistics, women make up 65 percent of those officially registered as 
unemployed. Currently there are more women receiving university and 
postgraduate education than men. This statistic may be accounted for in 
part by the Nagorno-Karabakh situation, which necessitates a high 
number of males in military service, and in part by the economic 
situation, which has caused males to emigrate in search of employment.
    Children.--The Government does not have the economic means to 
provide fully for the welfare of children. Education is free, 
universal, and compulsory through age 16, but many facilities are 
impoverished and in poor condition, and teachers are forced to tutor 
pupils privately to supplement salaries that are low and irregularly 
paid. Some teachers are known to demand bribes from parents in return 
for good or passing grades for their children. Free children's health 
care is available for treatment of some diseases and for emergency 
cases, but it is often of poor quality, with an increasing trend toward 
overt or concealed payment of fees for service.
    Girls and boys receive equal educational opportunities. The 
Government focuses its efforts regarding children's rights and welfare 
on measures to insulate large families--those with four or more 
children--from the effects of the country's current difficult 
circumstances. The Government similarly directs foreign humanitarian 
aid programs toward larger families. Despite social programs, the 
problem of street children remains significant. However, the family 
tradition remains strong, and child abuse does not appear to be a 
serious problem.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides for the right 
to social security in the event of disability. The 1993 Law on Invalids 
provides for the social, political, and individual rights of the 
disabled, but does not mandate the provision of accessibility for the 
disabled. During the year, expenditures for the health sector were cut 
by approximately $4.8 million (2.6 billion drams) from the projected 
level, which affected the disabled, who are supposed to be treated 
free. According to the former Minister of Social Security, the social 
sector budget also is being cut by approximately $550,000 (300 million 
drams). In the current economic circumstances and in an effort to meet 
international financial institution guidelines on reduction of the 
budget deficit, the Government has had difficulty fulfilling its 
commitments in this area.
    The Government's enforcement of the rights of the disabled remains 
rudimentary. Legal safeguards for those with psychiatric problems are 
inadequate to protect patients' rights. There is societal 
discrimination against the disabled. Hospitals, residential care, and 
other facilities for the seriously disabled do not meet international 
norms. A local human rights group alleges that there are cases in which 
security authorities use confinement in mental institutions as an 
alternative form of detention.
    Religious Minorities.--There was no reported violence against 
minority religious groups. However, newer religious groups are viewed 
with suspicion, especially by some clergy in the Armenian Apostolic 
Church and their supporters in the bureaucracy.
    A relatively high percentage of members of some religious 
minorities, particularly Hare Khrishnas but evangelical Christians as 
well, joined the wave of emigration from the country, for social, 
economic, and philosophical reasons. Despite the Government's previous 
pledge to apprehend alleged members of the Yerkrapah Union political 
faction who staged a series of destructive attacks against a dozen 
religious groups in 1995, the authorities still had taken no steps to 
bring the perpetrators to justice.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population is around 94 
percent ethnic Armenian. The Government does not discriminate against 
the small, officially recognized ``national'' communities, although the 
economic and social situation of such groups has deteriorated 
substantially since independence in 1991. Groups that the Government 
includes in this category are Russians, Jews, Kurds, Yezidis, 
Georgians, Greeks, and Assyrians. As a result of the protracted 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there is no significant Azeri minority (see 
Section 2.d.). Several hundred Azeris or persons of mixed Azeri 
heritage still living in the country maintain a low profile in the face 
of societal discrimination.
    The Constitution grants national minorities the right to preserve 
their cultural traditions and language, and the 1992 law on language 
provides linguistic minorities with the right to publish and study in 
their native language. There are token publications in minority 
languages, but the Government has devoted minimal resources to 
maintaining minority language schools. The large network of Russian-
language schools has dwindled in recent years. In practice virtually 
all students, including members of the Yezidi and Greek communities, 
now attend Armenian-language schools, with very limited classes 
available in their mother tongues. In the Yezidi community, a high 
percentage of pupils do not attend school, partly for family economic 
reasons and partly because of discrimination by ethnic Armenian 
students and teachers.
    Yezidi leaders continued to complain that police and local 
authorities subject their community to discrimination. The Yezidis, 
whose number is estimated at 60,000 by Yezidi leaders, speak a Kurdish 
dialect and practice a traditional, non-Christian, non-Muslim religion 
with elements derived from Zoroastrianism, Islam, and animism. They 
cite numerous incidents of unfair adjudication of land, water, and 
grazing disputes; nonreceipt of privatized agricultural land; an 
unusually high number of beatings of Yezidi conscripts in the army; and 
lack of police response to even serious crimes committed against 
Yezidis. The Yezidi complaints likely reflect societal discrimination 
as well as the more general problem of poorly functioning local 
government bodies. The Yezidi leaders met in July 1998 with the 
President's human rights commission with which and received an 
affirmation that the Government would improve the situation; however, 
the Government took no action during the year.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides employees 
with the right to form and join trade unions and the right to strike. 
The Constitution stipulates that the right to form associations--
including political parties and trade unions--may be limited with 
respect to persons serving in the armed services and law enforcement 
agencies. A 1993 presidential decree prohibits the Government and other 
employers from retaliating against strikers and labor leaders, but 
workers have little confidence in this protection. In practice labor 
organization remains weak due to high unemployment and the weak 
economy. Workers have neither the financial resources to maintain a 
strike nor enforceable legal protection against retaliation, and 
existing unions play a relatively passive role. However, there were no 
reports of retaliation against strikers or labor leaders. The 
purportedly independent labor federation created in December 1997 
continues in operation, but took no action during the year.
    The absence of real unions and of accurate employment data 
precludes a reliable estimate of the percentage of the work force that 
is unionized.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations, but 
none did so during the year.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is not practiced. The Constitution provides all citizens 
with the right to a just wage no lower than the minimum set by the 
Government. Although the 1992 Law on Employment provides for the right 
to organize and bargain collectively, voluntary and direct negotiations 
do not take place between unions and employers without the 
participation of the Government because most large employers remain 
under state control. The near collapse of major industrial production 
has undercut the organization of labor unions.
    The Government encourages profitable factories to establish their 
own pay scales. Factory directorates generally set the pay scales 
without consultation with employees. The Arbitration Commission 
adjudicates wage and other labor disputes.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
the 1992 Law on Employment prohibit forced and bonded labor, including 
that by children, and it generally is not known to occur. There were 
reports of trafficking in women and girls in the past; however, there 
were no such reports during the year (see Section 6.f.). This provision 
is enforced by the local community councils, unemployment offices, and, 
as a final board of appeal, the Arbitration Commission.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--According to the 1992 Law on Employment, 16 years is the 
minimum age for employment. Children may work from the age of 14 with 
the permission of a medical commission and the relevant labor union 
board. The Law on Employment is enforced by local community councils, 
unemployment offices, and, as a final board of appeal, the Arbitration 
Commission. Forced or bonded labor by children is prohibited, and it is 
not known to occur.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the minimum 
wage by decree. In October 1998, Parliament quintupled the national 
minimum wage to less than $10 (5,000 drams) per month; however, the 
minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for 
a worker and family. The majority of the population lives below the 
officially recognized poverty line as a result of economic dislocations 
caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 1988 earthquake, the 
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the resulting blockade by Azerbaijan 
and Turkey, and disruptions in trade. However, a significant amount of 
economic activity takes place unrecorded and untaxed by local 
authorities. The extent to which this improves the overall economic 
situation is unknown.
    The majority of industrial enterprises are either idle or operating 
at a fraction of their capacity. Some furloughed workers still are 
receiving minimal partial compensation from their enterprises, but most 
are no longer receiving any payment if they are not working. The 
standard legal workweek is 40 hours; many persons work multiple jobs.
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to clean and safe 
work places, but Soviet-era occupational and safety standards remain in 
force. Labor legislation from 1988 places responsibility on the 
employer and the management of each firm to ensure ``healthy and 
normal'' labor conditions for employees, but it provides no definition 
of healthy and normal. The employment situation is such that workers 
are reluctant to complain about hazardous working conditions due to the 
risk of losing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The legal code does not prohibit 
specifically trafficking in persons, although it does prohibit 
exploitation by force of persons for financial gain. The Criminal Code 
specifically prohibits the keeping of what are generally considered to 
be brothels. Armenian women work as prostitutes in the Middle East, and 
there have been reports of trafficking in women and girls in the past. 
There are reports that older girls in a local orphanage were approached 
with offers to engage in prostitution, either locally or abroad. The 
Criminal Code does not forbid prostitution. The 10 cases of trafficking 
in women or procuring currently in court are being prosecuted under the 
Criminal Code prohibition on brothels.
                                 ______
                                 

                                AUSTRIA

    Austria is a constitutional democracy with a federal parliamentary 
form of government. Citizens choose their representatives in periodic, 
free, and fair multiparty elections. The judiciary is independent.
    The police are subordinated to the executive and judicial 
authorities. The national police maintain internal security. The army 
is responsible for external security. The police are generally well 
trained and disciplined, although some members of the police were 
responsible for instances of human rights abuses.
    Austria's highly developed, market-based economy, with its mix of 
technologically advanced industry, modern agriculture, and tourism, 
affords its citizens a high standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. There were some reports of abuse by 
police, which involved occasional beatings but mainly involved verbal 
abuse and threats. Legislation went into effect to increase protection 
for women against domestic violence, which has been a problem and is 
considered to be greatly underreported. Trafficking in women for 
prostitution is a problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    In May an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant died while being 
deported; his hands and feet were cuffed and his mouth was taped shut 
to control his violent behavior (see Section 2.d.).
    On September 15, police shot and killed Horst Ludwig Meyer, a 
suspected member of the German terrorist group Red Army Faction, when 
he opened fire on them near Vienna. Meyer and an accomplice are 
believed to have killed a German diplomat, Gerold von Braunmuhl, and, 
in a separate attack, German businessman Heinz Beckurts and his driver, 
in 1986. Meyer and his accomplice also are accused of killing a 
Deutsche Bank spokesman, Alfred Herrenhausen, in 1989 and involvement 
in a 1988 attack against a NATO installation in Spain. His accomplice, 
Andrea Klump, was arrested and subsequently extradited to Germany on 
December 23.
    In March Franz Fuchs was convicted for killing four Roma in 1995 
and injuring 15 other persons in a letter bomb campaign between 1993 
and 1997 (see Section 5).
    A French appeals court was considering an Austrian government 
request for the extradition of the terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez 
(alias ``Carlos the Jackal'') at year's end. Austria formally has 
sought the extradition of ``Carlos'' since French authorities captured 
him in 1994. He is wanted on charges of manslaughter, kidnaping, and 
blackmail in connection with the terrorist attacks at Vienna's OPEC 
headquarters in December 1975.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Although the Constitution prohibits such practices, 
government statistics for 1998 showed 356 complaints against federal 
police officials for ``unjustified use of force,'' compared with 321 in 
1997. Of the 356 complaints, 288 resulted in investigations (compared 
with 339 in 1997). The number of suspensions dropped from 31 in 1997 to 
22 in 1998. Four police officials were convicted of excessive use of 
force in 1998; two officers were convicted in 1999. Of the 158 cases 
pending in 1998, 44 have been dismissed due to lack of evidence; the 
other cases remain pending. Types of abuse ranged from slander to 
kicking and hitting, resulting mainly in bruising. Some of the violence 
appears to be racially motivated.
    In May an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant died while being 
deported; his hands and feet were cuffed and his mouth was taped shut 
to control his violent behavior. Two of the three police officers who 
accompanied him were suspended and a committee was created with the 
goal of ensuring that the police and gendarmerie respect human rights 
while carrying out their duties (see Section 2.d.).
    According to some witnesses, in March a dark-skinned French citizen 
suspected of dealing drugs, known only as Mohammed S., allegedly was 
beaten by police officers during an arrest. Witnesses alleged that two 
officers kicked, hit, and sprayed the man with pepper spray after he 
had been immobilized. After a short period of time, additional officers 
and an ambulance arrived and the suspect was taken to the hospital. 
Minister of the Interior Karl Schloegl invited the witnesses to tell 
him personally what happened and stated that his Ministry, the district 
attorney, and police management would investigate the matter. Several 
other witnesses later came forward and contradicted the earlier 
testimony. Charges were filed against the police officers, but were 
dropped in July due to lack of evidence.
    On March 16, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) expressed concern regarding reports of serious 
cases of police brutality towards persons of foreign origin and ethnic 
minorities.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards and the 
Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. In 
individual cases, investigating judges or prison directors have 
jurisdiction over questions of access to the defendant.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and the Government observes 
this prohibition.
    In criminal cases the law provides for investigative or pretrial 
detention for up to 48 hours; however, in cases of charges of 
``aggressive behavior'' an investigative judge may decide within that 
period to grant a prosecution request for detention of up to 2 years 
pending completion of an investigation. The grounds required for such 
investigative detention are specified in the law, as are conditions for 
bail. The investigative judge is required to evaluate an investigative 
detention after 2 weeks, 1 month, and every 2 months after the arrest.
    Forced exile is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, and the Government generally respects this right 
in practice, although stringent slander laws tend to discourage reports 
of police brutality. Publications may be removed from circulation if 
they violate legal provisions concerning morality or public security, 
but such cases are extremely rare.
    The government monopoly in television and national radio is 
gradually being dismantled. A 1993 law permitted licensing of regional 
private radio stations, but legal challenges by unsuccessful applicants 
for licenses delayed implementation of the law. Rewritten radio 
frequency rules went into effect in April 1998. As of July, there were 
51 private radio stations. Second quarter figures show that while 71.3 
percent of citizens listen to the state-run radio stations, 20.1 
percent listen to private stations.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly and association, except for Nazi 
organizations and activities (an exception stipulated also in the 
Austrian State Treaty of 1955). The Law on the Formation of 
Associations states that permission to form an organization may be 
denied if it is apparent that the organization will pursue the illegal 
activities of a prohibited organization.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion of individuals and the Government generally respects this 
right in practice. However, the status of religious organizations is 
governed by the 1874 ``Law on Recognition'' of churches and by a 
January 1998 law establishing the status of ``confessional 
communities.'' Religious recognition under the 1874 law has wide-
ranging implications, for example, the authority to participate in the 
state-collected religious taxation program, to engage in religious 
education, and to import religious workers to act as ministers, 
missionaries, or teachers. Although in the past nonrecognized religious 
groups have had problems obtaining resident permits for foreign 
religious workers, administrative procedures adopted in 1997 have 
addressed this problem in part. Officially, 75.3 percent of the 
population are Roman Catholic, and there are 11 other recognized 
religious organizations.
    Religious organizations may be divided into three different legal 
categories (listed in descending order of status): officially 
recognized religious societies, religious confessional communities, and 
clubs.
    Under the law, religious societies have ``public law corporation'' 
status. This status permits religious societies to engage in a number 
of public or quasi-public activities that are denied to other religious 
organizations. The Constitution singles out religious societies for 
special recognition. Among the many benefits provided to religious 
societies that are not granted to other religious organizations are 
state subsidies for religious teachers (at both public and private 
schools), and access of the clergy to hospitals, prisons, and the 
military chaplaincy.
    Previously, some nonrecognized religious groups were able to 
organize as legal entities or associations, although this route has not 
been available universally. Some groups even have done so while 
applying for recognition as religious communities under the 1874 law. 
Many such applications for recognition have languished in the Education 
Ministry, in some cases for years. Following years of bureaucratic 
delay and an administrative court order instructing the Education 
Ministry to render a decision, in 1997 the Ministry denied the request 
for recognition of Jehovah's Witnesses. Jehovah's Witnesses appealed 
this decision to the Constitutional Court.
    In January 1998, a law went into effect that allows nonrecognized 
religious groups to seek official status as confessional communities 
without the fiscal and educational privileges available to recognized 
religions. Religious confessional communities, once they are recognized 
officially as such by the Government, have juridical standing, which 
permits them to engage in such activities as purchasing real estate in 
their own names, contracting for goods and services, and other 
activities. To apply groups must have 300 members and submit to the 
Government their written statutes, describing the goals, rights, and 
obligations of members, membership regulations, officials, and 
financing. Groups also must submit a written version of their religious 
doctrine, which must differ from that of any existing religion 
recognized under the 1874 law or registered under the new law, for a 
determination that their basic beliefs do not violate public security, 
public order, health and morals, or the rights and freedoms of 
citizens. A religious organization that seeks to obtain this new status 
is subject to a 6-month waiting period from the time of application to 
the Ministry of Education and Culture. The new law also sets out 
additional criteria for eventual recognition according to the 1874 law, 
such as a 20-year observation period (at least 10 of which must be as a 
group organized as a confessional community under the new law) and 
membership equaling at least two one-thousandths of the country's 
population. Many religious groups and independent congregations do not 
meet the 300-member threshold for registration under the new law. Only 
Jehovah's Witnesses currently meet the higher membership requirement 
for recognition under the 1874 law.
    In a decision issued in March 1998, the Constitutional Court voided 
the Education Ministry's decision on Jehovah's Witnesses and ordered a 
new decision based on the January law on the Status of Confessional 
Communities. In July 1998, Jehovah's Witnesses received the status of a 
confessional community. According to the 1998 law, the group is now 
subject to a 10-year observation period before they are eligible for 
recognition.
    As of July 10, 1998, the Education Ministry had granted the status 
of ``confessional community'' to eight religious groups, including for 
example, Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, and Seventh-Day Adventists. The 
Church of Scientology and the Hindu Mandir Association withdrew their 
applications. Later, the Hindu Mandir Association reapplied as the 
Hindu religious community and was granted confessional community status 
in December 1998. The Ministry rejected the application of the Sahaja 
Yoga group; in 1998 the group appealed the decision to the 
Constitutional Court.
    Proponents of the law describe it as an opportunity for religious 
groups to become officially registered as religious organizations, 
providing them with a government ``quality seal.'' However, numerous 
religious groups not recognized by the State, as well as some religious 
law experts dismiss the purported benefits of obtaining status under 
the law and have complained that the law's additional criteria for 
recognition under the 1874 law obstruct claims to recognition and 
formalize a second-class status for nonrecognized groups. Experts have 
questioned the law's constitutionality.
    After the Education Ministry granted Jehovah's Witnesses the status 
of Confessional Community, the group immediately in 1998 requested that 
it be recognized as a religious group under the 1874 law. The Education 
Ministry denied the application, on the basis that, as a confessional 
community, Jehovah's Witnesses would need to submit to the required 10-
year observation period. The group has appealed this decision to the 
Constitutional Court, arguing that a 10-year waiting period is 
unconstitutional. A decision is expected in 2000.
    Also in 1998, Jehovah's Witnesses filed a complaint with the 
European Court for Human Rights, arguing that the group has not yet 
been granted full status as a religious entity under the 1874 law, 
despite having made numerous attempts over more than two decades.
    Religious associations that do not qualify for either religious 
society or confessional community status may apply to become ``clubs.'' 
This status is granted relatively freely, although clubs do not have 
legal standing and are unable to purchase property, churches, or engage 
in other activities permitted to the other two legal categories.
    During the year, the Government continued its information campaign 
against religious sects considered potentially harmful to individuals 
and society. As part of the campaign, the Family Ministry established a 
new Federal Office on Sects, which is responsible for collecting and 
providing information on sects active in the country. While the law 
stipulates that the Office has independent status, the head of the 
Office is appointed and supervised by the Minister for Environment, 
Youth, and Family, and the Office is supported by public funds. In 
September the Family Ministry released a second edition of the brochure 
entitled ``Sects: Knowledge Protects,'' describing numerous 
nonrecognized religious groups in negative terms found offensive by 
many of the groups listed. The brochure lists Jehovah's Witnesses, 
despite its confessional community status.
    Members of the Unification Church and the Church of Scientology 
complained of discrimination and harassment by the police and the 
public.
    In April the conservative Austrian People's Party (OVP) convention 
formally adopted a decision made by the party's executive board in 1997 
that party membership is incompatible with membership in a sect. This 
policy led to the resignation of a local OVP official in 1997. Shortly 
after this decision, a member of the provincial parliament of Upper 
Austria called for a requirement that civil service applicants and 
employees sign a declaration that they are not members of the Church of 
Scientology and that they do not support the Church's goals. False 
statements would be grounds for disqualification or rejection from the 
applicants' employment pool. Any person who already was employed and 
found to be a member of the Church of Scientology would be dismissed. 
The requirement had not been made law at year's end.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict 
movement, including emigration. Citizens who leave the country have the 
right to return at any time.
    Austria has signed the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, but subscribes to the ``safe 
country'' concept, which requires asylum seekers who enter illegally to 
depart and seek refugee status from outside the country. In response to 
continuing criticism by the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations, the Government 
passed an amendment to the 1991 asylum law in 1997 designed to bring 
some improvements to the ``safe country'' rule and the appellate 
procedure. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organizations generally approve of the 1997 asylum law, 
but there is still some dissatisfaction with its implementation. A 
January amendment to the 1997 asylum law, which authorizes the Ministry 
of Interior to draw up a ``white list'' of ``safe third countries,'' 
drew sharp criticism from human rights and refugee advocacy groups. 
There is widespread opposition to this concept based on the fear that 
it compromises the principle of individual investigation of claims. 
This principle was upheld in a February ruling of the Administrative 
Court, which reversed a denial of asylum made on the basis of the 
``safe third country'' rule. Individuals found to be bona fide refugees 
by government authorities are not sent back to the countries from which 
they fled. In 1997 the Government established an appeal body for 
refugees--the Independent Federal Asylum Senate. Asylum seekers whose 
claims have been rejected by the Federal Asylum Office may appeal to 
this body; the Administrative Court is the court of last instance.
    Of the estimated 95,000 Bosnian refugees who arrived between April 
1992 and July 1993, the Government provided temporary protected status 
(TPS), similar to first asylum, to 47,000, which made them eligible to 
receive government assistance without having to file asylum 
applications. Most of the other 48,000 refugees were deemed to have 
other means of support, either from families already present in Austria 
or from nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). The overwhelming number 
of all Bosnian refugees has been integrated into the labor market. They 
now hold ``gastarbeiter'' status, which means that their residency 
permit is evaluated each year on the basis of the country's overall 
labor demand. Many of the refugees have chosen voluntarily to return to 
their homeland, a process that still continues. In 1997 4,200 Bosnians 
returned to their homeland; a similar number returned by the end of 
1998. In December 482 Bosnian refugees still remained in the country in 
TPS, and still received public assistance. In July 1998, temporary 
residency rights for citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina were extended 
beyond the deadline of July 31, 1998 until the summer of 2000. TPS is 
reserved for those who cannot be absorbed readily as foreign labor or 
into the community, such as the elderly, the sick, traumatized persons, 
and illiterate persons.
    During the Kosovo crisis, Austria accepted an estimated 10,000 to 
15,000 refugees. A total of 5,080 Kosovar Albanians were evacuated 
directly from Macedonia and admitted to Austria under cover of TPS. 
Also, the immigration law was modified to allow Kosovar Albanians 
already in the country in a variety of statuses to extend their stay. 
In December approximately 1,593 Kosovar Albanians of the total of 5,080 
refugees under TPS remained in the country. They receive public 
assistance under a care program similar to the one set up during the 
Bosnian crisis. In December the deadline for the end of TPS for Kosovar 
Albanians was extended beyond December 31 to March 31, 2000, or July 
31, 2000, depending on the level of destruction of housing in the area 
of residence and other individual criteria. A new incentive program for 
voluntary returnees was developed. About 1,500 Kosovars are expected to 
stay in the country until March 31, 2000, while about 800 could extend 
their stay until July 31, 2000.
    Asylum applications more than doubled in 1998, from 6,719 in 1997 
to 13,805. In 1998 500 applications were accepted and 3,491 requests 
were denied, compared with 639 approvals and 7,286 denials in 1997. The 
1998 approval figure includes asylum seekers from the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY) (6,647), Iraq (1,963), Iran (950), Afghanistan 
(467), and India (472). A majority of asylum seekers are male. In the 
first half of the year requests for asylum more than doubled to 9,830 
from 4,526 in 1998. The increase is attributed to the Kosovo conflict: 
80 to 85 percent of asylum seekers from the FRY are Kosovar Albanians; 
about 55 percent are Kurds from Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Improved 
border controls resulting from the Government's full implementation of 
the Schengen Agreement in April 1997 also have led to an increase in 
asylum applications. Aliens who formerly used the country as merely a 
transit point are now filing asylum applications.
    On May 1, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant, Marcus 
Omofuma, died while being deported to Lagos via Sofia, Bulgaria. 
Omofuma's violent, uncooperative behavior led authorities to increase 
their normal escort from two to three immigration officials. Omafuma's 
hands and feet were cuffed so that he could not injure himself or 
others. Additionally, en route to Sofia, the officials taped his mouth 
shut to silence his loud outcries. Believing that the man had lost 
consciousness during the flight, the officials summoned a doctor after 
landing; the doctor pronounced Omofuma dead. A preliminary Bulgarian 
autopsy found that he had suffocated; a subsequent autopsy performed by 
an Austrian physician found that Omofuma's death was a result of a 
heart attack, brought on by extreme stress and a heart weakened by 
disease. The two doctors are expected to examine each others' reports 
in the hopes of arriving at an agreement as to the cause of death.
    Interior Minister Schloegl promised to review thoroughly internal 
procedures regarding deportations and temporarily suspended any 
deportations of individuals expected to behave violently, and turned 
the case over to the state prosecutor. Two of the three police officers 
who accompanied Omofuma were suspended. In June Schloegl announced the 
creation of a committee, composed of representatives from the Justice 
and Interior Ministries, as well as from NGO's, with the goal of 
ensuring that the police and gendarmerie respect human rights while 
carrying out their duties. Schloegl also announced a new policy 
requiring that all potentially violent individuals be deported via 
chartered aircraft, rather than on commercial flights. The first such 
chartered flight took place in late June. Schloegl stated that 
deportees being returned by air should only be accompanied by properly 
trained officials. The investigation into the Omofuma case was 
continuing at year's end, and the police officers remained suspended.
    Civil charges were filed on behalf of Omofuma's young daughter 
stating that Omofuma's human rights were violated. The case was first 
filed in the administrative appellate senate in the province of Lower 
Austria. The senate rejected the case, saying that it did not have 
jurisdiction, and that the case should be handled by the city of 
Vienna. The decision of the administrative appellate senate in Vienna 
was pending at year's end.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully. Citizens exercise this right in practice through 
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage. National elections were held on October 3, in which the 
Social Democrats won 65 seats in Parliament; the Freedom Party, 52; and 
the People's Party 52. Negotiations on forming a new coalition 
government were underway at year's end.
    Approximately 32 percent of the members of Parliament and 4 of 16 
cabinet members are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. In some cases, they have been dissatisfied with the 
information that the authorities have supplied in response to specific 
complaints.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law provides for protection against any of these kinds of 
discrimination in employment, provision of welfare benefits, and other 
matters, and the Government generally enforces its provisions 
effectively.
    Women.--Violence against women remains a problem. In June the 
Minister for Women's Affairs reported that an estimated 300,000 women 
are abused annually. Police and judges enforce laws against violence; 
however, less than 10 percent of abused women are estimated to file 
complaints. Overall, the Women's Ministry estimates that one-fifth of 
the country's 1.5 million adult women has suffered from violence in a 
relationship. Many public officials and the media considered this to be 
an extremely high figure, and as a result, legislators in July passed 
an amendment to the 1997 Law on the Protection Against Violence in the 
Family. This amendment extends the period during which police can expel 
abusive family members from family homes from 7 days to 2 weeks; in 
special cases, a court order can extend the period for up to 3 months. 
Between May 1997, when the violence protection law entered into force, 
and March, the interdiction to prevent abusive family members from 
returning home was applied in 4,478 cases. The Government also sponsors 
shelters and help lines for women. A 24-hour women's help line, as the 
first point of contact for abused women and children, was established 
in 1996 and has been used by 12,550 women.
    Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.). While 
prostitution is legal, trafficking for the purposes of prostitution is 
illegal.
    Most legal restrictions on women's rights have been abolished. In 
1994 the European Court of Justice ruled that the country's law 
prohibiting women from working nights was not permissible and gave the 
Government until 2001 to adapt its legislation to gender-neutral 
European Union (EU) regulations. Legislation went into effect in 
January 1, 1998, requiring that collective bargaining units take action 
by 2001 to eliminate restrictions on nighttime work for women.
    In addition to the federal Women's Affairs Ministry, a federal 
Equality Commission and a federal Commissioner for Equal Treatment 
oversee laws prescribing equal treatment of men and women. Sixty 
percent of women between the ages of 15 and 60 are in the labor force. 
Despite substantial gains, women's incomes average 30 percent less than 
those of men.
    As of January 1, 1998, women were allowed to serve in the military 
voluntarily. On April 1, 1998, the first women began training. On 
December 1, 1998, the first women, both doctors, were taken into the 
military. The long-term expectation is that women may make up about 5 
percent of the military. As of June, there were a total of 73 female 
soldiers; in November there were 89. Of those, 12 women were pursuing 
the officer career track while 46 women were pursuing the 
noncommissioned officer (NCO) career track. The remaining 31 include 5 
medical doctors (4 of whom are already officers) and 26 women who are 
in the military strictly to train as high-level athletes. There are no 
restrictions on the type or location of assignments given to women. It 
was expected that approximately 12 more women would enter the military 
before the end of the year. The first females to complete a course of 
instruction in the NCO academy graduated in December.
    Although labor laws provide for equal treatment for women in the 
civil service, they remain underrepresented. To remedy this 
circumstance, a 1993 law requires hiring women of equivalent 
qualifications ahead of men in civil service areas in which less than 
40 percent of the employees are women; however, there are no penalties 
for failing to attain the 40 percent target.
    Women may be awarded compensation of up to 4 months' salary if 
discriminated against in promotions because of their sex. The Labor 
Court also can order employers to compensate victims of sexual 
harassment.
    Women's rights organizations are partly politically affiliated, and 
partly autonomous groups. In voicing their concerns, they receive wide 
public attention.
    Children.--Laws protect the vast majority of children's rights 
established in international conventions and in some respects go beyond 
them. Each provincial government and the federal Ministry for Youth and 
Family Affairs has an ``Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents'' 
whose main function is to resolve complaints about violations of rights 
of children.
    While 9 years of education are mandatory for all children, 
beginning at age 6, the Government also provides free education through 
the level of technical or vocational programs or university. 
Educational opportunity is equal for girls and boys. Comprehensive, 
government-financed medical care is available for all children without 
regard to gender.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children, although 
heightened public awareness of abuse has led the Government to increase 
its efforts to monitor the issue and prosecute offenders. Reports of 
suspected sexual abuse of children in 1998 increased to 945, compared 
with 895 in 1997. The number of related convictions increased to 351 
from 314. The rest of the cases remain pending or were dismissed. The 
growing number of reported incidences of child abuse is considered a 
result of increased public awareness of the problem. According to the 
Penal Code, sexual intercourse between an adult and a child (under 14 
years of age) is punishable with a prison sentence of up to 10 years; 
in case of pregnancy of the victim, the sentence can be extended to up 
to 15 years.
    Stricter regulations on child pornography went into effect in 1997. 
Under the new laws, any citizen engaging in child pornography in a 
foreign country becomes punishable under Austrian law even if the 
actions are not punishable in the country where this violation was 
committed. The laws also entail more severe provisions for the 
possession, trading, and private viewing of pornographic materials. For 
example, exchanging videos is now illegal even if done privately rather 
than as a business transaction.
    In the context of its EU presidency, the Government advanced a 
multiyear plan to prevent misuse of the Internet. In February 1997 
authorities set up a 24-hour ``tip line'' for citizens to report leads 
on child pornography on the Internet and to lodge complaints. In 
December 1998, the Government announced its action plan to combat the 
promotion of child abuse and child pornography through the Internet.
    The Government cosponsored an international conference in Vienna 
from September 29 to October 1, on combating child pornography on the 
Internet. The conference aimed to establish international practices 
acceptable to law enforcement and justice officials, as well as to the 
Internet service provider industry, to purge child pornography from the 
Internet.
    People with Disabilities.--The law protects disabled individuals 
from discrimination in housing, education, and employment. In July 
1997, Parliament passed an amendment to the Constitution explicitly 
requiring the State to provide for equal rights for the disabled ``in 
all areas of everyday life.'' The law requires all private enterprises 
and state and federal government offices to employ 1 disabled person 
for every 25 to 45 employees, depending on the type of work. Employers 
who do not meet this requirement must pay a fee to the Government, and 
the proceeds help finance services for the disabled such as training 
programs, wage subsidies, and workplace adaptations. However, the law 
has received some criticism, since many observers believe that 
penalties are too low to discourage companies from bypassing the 
requirement. No federal law mandates access for the physically 
disabled; some public buildings are virtually inaccessible to those 
unable to climb stairs.
    Mentally retarded women can be sterilized involuntarily at the 
request of parents, in the case of minors, or, by request of the 
responsible family member or by court order, in the case of adults. One 
political party has called for restrictive legislation to make it more 
difficult to sterilize mentally retarded women; however, no legislative 
action has ever been taken on this proposal.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to an Interior 
Ministry report on rightwing extremism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, 
in 1998 there were 244 reported rightwing incidents, 31 anti-Semitic 
incidents, and 8 xenophobic incidents. A total of 41 individuals were 
convicted. In 1997 the Ministry reported 279 rightwing incidents, 32 
anti-Semitic incidents, and 11 xenophobic incidents; criminal 
convictions were obtained in 47 cases. In 1997 the Anti-Defamation 
League opened an office in Vienna for Central and Eastern Europe. The 
EU opened an office against racism and xenophobia in Vienna in July 
1998. On March 16, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) expressed concern regarding reports of serious 
cases of police brutality towards persons of foreign origin and ethnic 
minorities.
    Legislation in 1997 provided law enforcement agencies with expanded 
investigative tools, such as electronic eavesdropping, merging of 
databases, and witness protection programs. Criminal investigations 
begun in 1995 against three Austrians for spreading fascist and extreme 
rightwing propaganda through the Internet were dropped in 1997 due to 
lack of sufficient evidence. Cases against two individuals accused in 
1997 of spreading rightwing propaganda via the Internet were dropped in 
1998, again due to insufficient evidence.
    In October authorities arrested 69 suspected neo-Nazis in the 
province of Upper Austria. The group had contacts with neo-Nazis in 
several other countries. In a separate action in November, 17 skinheads 
in the same province were charged with violation of the law against 
neo-Nazi activities.
    In March Franz Fuchs, the suspect accused of masterminding a 
xenophobic, deadly letter bomb campaign between 1993 and 1997, was 
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The attacks killed four 
members of the Roma minority in Burgenland province in 1995 and injured 
15 other persons in Austria and in Germany. Fuchs was barred from the 
proceedings after yelling xenophobic slogans at the start of the trial.
    During the national election campaign, the Freedom Party (FPO) 
exploited the fears of many citizens that EU expansion and a continued 
influx of asylum seekers and refugees from the Balkans and other areas 
would result in uncontrolled immigration. The Vienna FPO chapter widely 
distributed placards carrying antiimmigrant slogans, including a call 
to stop ``over-foreignization.`` In reaction, on November 12, several 
tens of thousands of demonstrators attended a Vienna rally against 
racism and xenophobia.
    Religious Minorities.--In March CERD noted a number of reported 
acts of anti-Semitism and hostility against certain ethnic groups. The 
head of Austria's Jewish community reported an increase in expressions 
of anti-Semitism in the course of the campaign leading up to the 
October 3 elections, as well as after the elections. Members of the 
community reported receiving threatening mail, being attacked verbally, 
and occasionally being shoved forcefully aside by pedestrians. The head 
of the Jewish community concluded that this reflected an increasing 
intolerance toward minorities and appealed for the cooperation of all 
political forces to combat xenophobia and racism.
    The second suspect in the desecration of the Jewish cemetery in 
Eisenstadt in 1993 has not been apprehended, and the investigation is 
no longer being pursued actively.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form and 
join unions without prior authorization, under general constitutional 
provisions regarding freedom of association. In practice trade unions 
have an important and independent voice in the political, social, and 
economic life of the country. Fifty-two percent of the work force are 
organized into 14 national unions belonging to the Austrian Trade Union 
Federation (OGB), which has a highly centralized leadership structure. 
Individual unions and the OGB are independent of government or 
political party control, although formal factions within these 
organizations are allied closely with political parties.
    Although the right to strike is not provided explicitly in the 
Constitution or in national legislation, it is universally recognized. 
Historically, strikes have been comparatively few and usually of short 
duration. In 1998 there was a strike by employees of the Finance 
Ministry. A major reason for the record of labor peace is the 
unofficial system of ``social partnership'' among labor, management, 
and government. At the center of the system is the Joint Parity 
Commission for Wages and Prices, which has an important voice on major 
economic questions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. Almost all large companies, 
private or state-owned, are organized. Worker councils operate at the 
enterprise level, and workers are entitled by law to elect one-third of 
the members of the supervisory boards of major companies. Collective 
agreements covering wages, benefits, and working conditions are 
negotiated by the OGB with the National Chamber of Commerce and its 
associations, which represent the employers. The Joint Parity 
Commission sets wage and price policy guidelines. A 1973 law obliges 
employers in enterprises with more than five employees to prove that 
job dismissals are not motivated by antiunion discrimination. Employers 
found guilty of this offense are required to reinstate workers. Labor 
and business representatives remain in a longstanding disagreement over 
how to comply with the obligation under the International Labor 
Organization's Convention 98 to provide legal protection to employees 
against arbitrary dismissals in firms with five employees or fewer.
    Typically, legal disputes between employers and employees regarding 
job-related matters are handled by a special arbitration court for 
social affairs. The OGB is exclusively responsible for collective 
bargaining. The leadership of the Chamber of Labor, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and the OGB are elected democratically.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is 
prohibited by law and generally is not practiced. Trafficking in women 
for the purpose of forced prostitution remains a problem (see Section 
6.f.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and 
enforces this prohibition effectively.
    Former forced laborers have filed suits against Austrian companies 
that used forced labor provided by the Nazi government. In October 
1998, the Government set up a commission to analyze several Nazi-era 
issues, including forced labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum legal working age is 15 years. The Labor 
Inspectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs effectively enforces the 
law. The Government has adopted laws and policies to protect children 
from exploitation in the work place. The law prohibits forced and 
bonded child labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition 
effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated national 
minimum wage. Instead, nationwide collective bargaining agreements set 
minimums by job classification for each industry. The generally 
accepted unofficial minimum gross income is $13,000 (ATS 168,000) per 
year. Every worker is entitled to a variety of generous social 
benefits. The average citizen has a high standard of living, and even 
the minimum wages are sufficient to permit a decent living for workers 
and their families.
    Although the legal workweek has been established at 40 hours since 
1975, more than 50 percent of the labor force is covered by collective 
bargaining agreements that set the workweek at 38 or 38\1/2\ hours.
    Extensive legislation, regularly enforced by the Labor Inspectorate 
of the Ministry of Social Affairs, provides for mandatory occupational 
health and safety standards. Workers may file complaints anonymously 
with the Labor Inspectorate, which may bring suit against the employer 
on behalf of the employee; however, this option is rarely exercised, as 
workers normally rely instead on the Chambers of Labor, which file 
suits on their behalf.
    The Labor Code provides that workers have the right to remove 
themselves from a job if they fear ``serious, immediate danger to life 
and health'' without incurring any prejudice to their job or career.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no single law covering 
trafficking in persons generally, but several laws contain provisions 
that apply to this problem. Trafficking for the purpose of prostitution 
is illegal, and the law provides for a jail sentence of up to 10 years 
for convicted traffickers. (Prostitution itself is legal.) Another law 
covers trafficking in persons for purposes other than prostitution. 
NGO's report that enforcement is weak and that convicted traffickers 
generally receive sentences of less than 3 years' imprisonment. The 
country is both a significant transit and destination point, primarily 
for women from Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet 
Union, who are trafficked into prostitution and other forms of forced 
dependency. Organized crime groups from these areas also are involved 
in trafficking. The country is particularly attractive to traffickers 
due to its geographical location and the fact that citizens of the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary do not require visas to enter the 
country.
    A witness protection program granting temporary resident status to 
women willing to testify against their traffickers went into effect on 
January 1, 1998. In the past, because so few witnesses agreed to 
testify against their traffickers, prosecution was difficult and those 
trafficked often simply were expelled from the country. The witness 
protection plan is aimed at generating more support from witnesses; 
however, victims still rarely agree to testify, due to fear of 
retribution. The temporary resident status allows victims to stay in 
the country only during a trial; no provisions are made for them to 
stay in the country following their testimony. Virtually all victims 
are deported. Various NGO's, with the support of the Government, have 
begun to broaden their assistance and strong support for battered 
spouses to include those women seeking to flee from the prostitution 
traps created by criminal elements. There is one NGO center that 
provides comprehensive counseling, educational services, and emergency 
housing to victims of trafficking. In 1995 the Government established 
an interministerial working group on trafficking in women, which was 
disbanded in 1998.
                                 ______
                                 

                               AZERBAIJAN

    Azerbaijan is a republic with a presidential form of government. 
Heydar Aliyev, who assumed presidential powers after the overthrow of 
his democratically elected predecessor in 1993, was reelected in 
October 1998 in a controversial election marred by numerous, serious 
irregularities, violations of the election law, and lack of 
transparency in the vote counting process at the district and national 
levels. President Aliyev and his supporters, many from his home region 
of Nakhchivan, continue to dominate the Government and the multiparty 
125-member Parliament chosen in the flawed 1995 elections. The 
Constitution, adopted in a 1995 referendum, established a system of 
government based on a division of powers among a strong presidency, a 
legislature with the power to approve the budget and impeach the 
President, and a judiciary with limited independence. The judiciary 
does not function independently of the executive branch and is corrupt 
and inefficient.
    After years of interethnic conflict between Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis, Armenian forces and forces of the self-styled ``Republic 
of Nagorno-Karabakh'' (which is not recognized by any government) 
continue to occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory. A cease-fire 
was concluded in 1994, and the peace process continues. The Presidents 
of Azerbaijan and Armenia held a series of direct meetings in the 
second half of the year to discuss a compromise resolution. However, 
exchanges of fire occurred frequently along the Azerbaijan-Armenian 
border and along the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, causing 
casualties. Military operations continued to affect the civilian 
population. There are 800,000 Azerbaijani refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDP's) who cannot return to their homes. In the part 
of Azerbaijan that Armenians control, a heavily militarized ruling 
structure prevents ethnic Azerbaijanis from returning to their homes. 
In the part of Azerbaijan that the Government controls, government 
efforts to hinder the opposition continue to impede the transition to 
democracy.
    Police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of 
National Security are responsible for internal security. Members of the 
police committed numerous human rights abuses.
    Azerbaijan continued its economic transition from central planning 
to a free market. Reforms continued on paper, but stagnated in 
practice. Economic growth has been spurred by substantial foreign 
investment in the hydrocarbon sector, but it is offset by a highly 
organized system of corruption and patronage. While government 
statistics pointed to continued economic growth during the year, the 
real economy was hit hard by a large-scale drop off in foreign business 
activity, due largely to low oil prices early in the year, endemic 
corruption, and a deteriorating business climate. The country has rich 
petroleum reserves and significant agricultural potential. Oil and oil 
products are the largest export, followed by cotton and tobacco. Other 
key industries are chemicals and oil field machinery. The Government 
signed several new oil production sharing agreements with foreign oil 
companies in 1999. Agriculture employs 33 percent of the labor force 
and makes up 20 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The 
leading crops are wheat, fruit and vegetables, cotton, tobacco, and 
grapes. Privatization of industry continues through auction sales of 
small- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises. Large enterprises 
remain almost exclusively under government control and operate at a 
fraction of their capacity. Accumulation of large wage arrears is 
common. Private retail enterprises, cotton gins, and grain mills are 
proliferating. About 90 percent of the nation's farmland is now in 
private hands, but new small farmers have poor access to credit and 
markets, and commercial agriculture remains weak. Per capita GDP is 
approximately $500 per year. Much of the labor force is employed in the 
state sector where wages are low. The overall economic situation of the 
average citizen remains tenuous, although in urban areas a growing 
moneyed class with trade and oil-related interests has emerged. 
According to official statistics, the economy now is only 60 percent of 
the size of the economy in 1991. According to the World Bank, 60 
percent of the citizens live in poverty. Economic opportunity for the 
average citizen still depends largely on connections to the Government. 
Severe disparities of income have emerged that are attributed partly to 
patronage and corruption.
    The Government's human rights record was poor, and serious problems 
remained; however, there was significant improvement in one area. The 
Government continues to restrict citizens' ability to change their 
government peacefully. Police beat persons in custody, arbitrarily 
arrested and detained persons, and conducted searches and seizures 
without warrants. In most instances, the Government took no action to 
punish abusers, although perpetrators were prosecuted in a handful of 
cases. Prison conditions remained harsh, and some prisoners died as a 
result of these conditions. The judiciary is corrupt, inefficient, and 
subject to executive influence. Corruption continued to pervade most 
government organs, and it is widely believed that most persons in 
appointed government positions and in state employment purchase their 
positions. The Government holds an estimated 50 political prisoners, 
down from 75 in 1998. A number of prisoners were released upon 
expiration of their sentences, and others were granted amnesty. The 
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government 
continued to impose some limits on freedom of speech and of the press. 
Although the Government abolished censorship in August 1998, government 
officials throughout the year sought to intimidate independent and 
opposition newspapers by repeatedly suing them for defamation. As a 
result, journalists practiced self-censorship. Nevertheless, scores of 
opposition and independent newspapers continued to publish and discuss 
a wide range of sensitive domestic and foreign policy issues. However, 
journalists were subject to violence on occasion by unknown assailants 
who sought to stop media criticism of the Government. Lengthy pretrial 
detention is still a problem. The Government continued to deny 
broadcast licenses to all truly independent organizations applying to 
open television and radio stations. The Government also tightly 
controlled official radio and television, the primary source of 
information for most of the population. In July and August, authorities 
forced all but two of the regional television stations that were 
broadcasting without licenses to close.
    The Government restricted freedom of assembly and association. 
Police suppressed or refused to allow any large-scale peaceful public 
demonstrations, while allowing smaller ones (of less than 50 
participants) to occur. Opposition political parties, unable to mount 
large-scale public activities, focused on holding smaller-scale 
meetings and seminars throughout the country. In many cases, opposition 
attempts to hold meetings in the regions outside the capital initially 
were refused by local authorities and were allowed only after 
intervention by the central Government. The Government tolerated the 
existence of many opposition political parties, although it continued 
to refuse to register some. After maintaining a pattern of low-level 
harassment against activity by religious minorities throughout most of 
the year, the lower levels of Government escalated this activity by 
cracking down on the legally registered Russian Baptist Church in 
September. However, the Government took steps to improve its record on 
religious liberty in the wake of President Aliyev's public commitment 
to do so in November. The Government also acted to redress earlier 
harassment, including arrests, deportation orders, and a failure to 
register religious groups, by lower-level government and security 
officials. Local authorities restricted freedom of movement in some 
instances.
    The Government held the country's first-ever municipal elections on 
December 12; however, the electoral process was marred by a nearly 
universal pattern of interference by local officials, which allowed 
them to control the selection of the election committees that 
supervised the election. The Government was critical of certain 
domestic human rights activists, although it was open to limited dialog 
with domestic and international human rights organizations. Societal 
discrimination and violence against women and discrimination against 
certain ethnic minorities are problems.
    Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict continued. They resulted in injuries and deaths among 
combatants and occasionally civilians, and the taking of prisoners, 
including civilians. Insurgent Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and 
the occupied territories continued to prevent the return of IDP's to 
their homes. This restriction resulted in significant human suffering 
for hundreds of thousands of persons.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other clearly extrajudicial killings.
    There were several reports of deaths of prisoners resulting from 
other than natural causes while in official custody (see Section 1.c.).
    There were at least two reports of deaths of prisoners, due at 
least in part to prison conditions while in official custody, and 
several prisoners were killed during a reported uprising at a prison in 
January (see Section 1.c.). At year's end, the Government had not 
released its long-awaited report on the prison uprising.
    There have been no further confirmed developments in the cases of 
the death of Firuz Gurbanov in August 1997, after which a police 
official was arrested, or in the death of Samir Zulfugarov in Baku in 
August 1997 where a police official reportedly was under investigation 
in connection with the death.
    There has been no action by the Government in the killing of 
opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front member of Parliament Shakhmerdan 
Jafarov in July 1995.
    Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict occasionally resulted in injuries to civilians. During the 
year, three persons were killed and five were wounded by land mines 
laid near the disputed area of Nagorno-Karabakh. These mines were laid 
by the Governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the Karabakh Armenian 
authorities.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    The Government released by year's end all six Armenian prisoners of 
war, including civilians, that it had been holding. Nagorno-Karabakh 
authorities released two Azerbaijani prisoners and reportedly still 
hold three prisoners. The ICRC repeatedly asked the concerned parties 
for notification of any person captured in relation to the conflict, 
access to all places of detention connected with the conflict, and 
release of all such persons. The ICRC also urged the parties to provide 
information on the fate of persons reported as missing in action. The 
Government again presented to the ICRC a list of 856 persons allegedly 
held by the Armenians; the list was also presented in 1998.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Torture is illegal; however, there are credible reports 
that the police practice of beating prisoners during arrest, 
interrogation, and pretrial detention was widespread. The Government 
does not hold most members of the police accountable for their actions. 
Impunity continues to be a problem, and in most instances, the 
Government took no action to punish abusers, although perpetrators were 
prosecuted in a handful of cases. In an August report, Human Rights 
Watch noted that the most severe and routine physical abuse of 
detainees takes place just prior to and during the preliminary 
investigation, as police and other investigators ``isolate detainees 
from all contact with the outside world, and beat and coerce 
confessions from suspects and statements from witnesses.''
    Police forcibly dispersed an unsanctioned demonstration on May 8. 
The demonstrators, organized by a combination of opposition parties, 
were attempting to assemble near a Baku cemetery to march to the 
Karabakh front over a hundred miles away to protest Armenian occupation 
of Azerbaijani territory. The Government refused to issue a permit for 
the march and ordered police to break up the rally. Several protesters 
were detained briefly before being released without charges (see 
Section 2.b.).
    Police harassed, detained, and arrested members of evangelical 
Christian and other groups, conducted illegal searches and seized their 
documents and property (see Section 2.c.). President Aliyev criticized 
these actions in November (see Section 2.c.).
    Prison conditions are harsh. The quality of food, housing, and 
medical care is poor. Prisoners must rely on their families to procure 
food and medicine. There are widespread and credible reports that 
authorities deny or give inadequate medical treatment to prisoners with 
serious medical conditions. Authorities severely limit opportunities 
for exercise and visits by lawyers and family members of prisoners in 
security prisons. Some prisoners are kept in ``separation cells'' often 
located in basements, in which prisoners reportedly are denied food and 
sleep in order to elicit confessions from them without actually leaving 
physical evidence of abuse. Men and women are housed in separate prison 
facilities.
    On January 7, 14 persons, including 11 prisoners and three 
government personnel, were killed when the authorities suppressed an 
alleged attempted escape by some of the inmates of the Gobustan prison. 
Those inmates killed were in prison on various coup and assassination 
convictions. Independent media speculated that frustration over the 
Government's failure to include any ``political'' prisoners in the 
December 31, 1998 amnesty granted to 12,000 convicts (including some 
convicted of serious crimes) may have sparked the prison incident.
    Human rights organizations were able to visit prisons on several 
occasions. However, the Government continued to deny the ICRC access to 
prisons except those where persons held in relation to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict were detained. Various foreign embassies have 
petitioned the Government for permission to visit all prisons. In 
general the Government denies access to detainees held in security 
prisons that hold both high risk common criminals and high risk persons 
sentenced for crimes with a political connection, for example, persons 
sentenced in connection with coup attempts and military mutinies.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Authorities arbitrarily 
arrest and detain persons without legal warrants. Often authorities do 
not notify family members after arrests. Frequently, it is days before 
family members are able to obtain information as to whether authorities 
have arrested someone and where authorities are holding the detainee. 
Family members do not enjoy the right of visitation. Authorities 
generally deny bail to detained individuals and often do not inform 
detainees of the charges against them. There is no legal protection 
concerning the right of detainees to be charged or released within a 
certain period of time, or for accused persons to receive an 
expeditious trial. While the situation appears to be gradually 
improving, lengthy pretrial detention is still a problem. In July the 
Constitutional Court ruled that detainees could have access to a lawyer 
from the time of detention rather than only after they have been 
charged with a crime, but access to lawyers is often poor. In the past, 
police sometimes detained relatives of suspects being sought in an 
attempt to force the family to reveal a suspect's whereabouts (see 
Section 1.f.).
    During the year, police detained members or supporters of 
opposition parties who were participating in small demonstrations or 
other political activity. All were released after brief detentions and 
without further charges.
    The Government continued to harass parties critical of the 
Government by arbitrarily arresting party members, including close 
associates or relatives of opposition party leaders. During the summer, 
the Government arrested Etibar Guliyev, a nephew of Rasul Guliyev, co-
chairman of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party. He was accused of 
smuggling on his return to Azerbaijan from abroad. Rza Guliyev, another 
nephew of Guliyev, was arrested in 1998, convicted of tax evasion after 
initially being charged with embezzlement, and is serving a sentence of 
8 years in prison. Guliyev had been forced to resign as Chairman of the 
Parliament in 1996. He now is living abroad and is accused by the 
Government of large-scale embezzlement. The action taken against 
Guliyev's nephews appeared to be politically motivated. In June several 
members of the Popular Front Party were arrested and briefly detained 
following small demonstrations. This pattern of arrests and detentions 
recurred throughout the year.
    Police detained protesters in Baku in May in an unsanctioned 
demonstration (see Section 2.b.). Police beat, harassed, detained, and 
arrested members of evangelical Christian and other groups, and seized 
their documents and property (see Section 2.c.).
    In 1998 the Government arrested an aide to the chairman of the 
Popular Front Party, accusing him of illegal possession of a pistol and 
hand grenade, which independent observers believe were planted. It 
arrested two other associates of the Popular Front Party chairman at a 
demonstration in November 1998. All were convicted; one on a weapons 
charge and the other two of disturbing public order and resisting the 
police. The first was amnestied during the year, but the other two are 
still in prison. The Government convicted of embezzlement and jailed a 
deputy director of a state oil refinery previously run by Rasul 
Guliyev, a former chairman of the Parliament now living abroad whom the 
Government accuses of large-scale embezzlement.
    In addition, the Government originally rejected the appeal for the 
release of journalist Fuad Qahramanli, who was being kept in prison for 
having written an unpublished article discussing opposition rally 
tactics. In July Qahramanli was granted amnesty (see Section 2.a.).
    In 1997 an aide to opposition leader Isa Gambar and a relative of 
Gambar, initially detained for political reasons, were charged with 
failure to notify the Government of a crime, convicted, and sentenced 
to 3 years in prison (see Section 1.e.). Both were released in July.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a 
judiciary with limited independence; however, in practice judges do not 
function independently of the executive branch. The judicial system is 
subject to the influence of executive authorities. The President 
appoints Supreme and Constitutional Court judges, subject to 
confirmation by Parliament. The President directly appoints lower level 
judges with no requirement for confirmation. The Constitutional Court, 
formed in 1998, overruled several minor administrative and legislative 
acts as unconstitutional in its first full year of activity, but the 
short-term effect was limited. The judiciary also is widely believed to 
be corrupt and inefficient.
    Courts of general jurisdiction may hear criminal, civil, and 
juvenile cases. District and municipal courts try the overwhelming 
majority of cases. The Supreme Court also may act as the court of first 
instance, depending on the nature and seriousness of the crime.
    The Government organizes prosecutors into offices at the district, 
municipal, and republic level. They are ultimately responsible to the 
Minister of Justice, are appointed by the President, and are confirmed 
by Parliament. The Constitution prescribes equal status for prosecutors 
and defense attorneys before the courts. In practice, however, 
prosecutors' prerogatives greatly outweigh those of defense attorneys 
and often those of the judges themselves. Investigations often rely on 
obtaining confessions rather than obtaining evidence against suspects. 
No judge has dismissed a case based on a prisoner's claim of having 
been beaten.
    Cases at the district court level are tried before a panel 
consisting of one judge and two lay assessors. The judge presides over 
and directs trials. Judges frequently send cases unlikely to end in 
convictions back to the prosecutor for ``additional investigation.'' 
Such cases may be either dropped or closed, occasionally without 
informing either the court or the defendant.
    The Constitution provides for public trials except in cases 
involving state, commercial, or professional secrets, or matters 
involving confidentiality of personal or family matters. The 
Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence in criminal 
cases and for numerous other rights, including an exclusionary rule 
barring the use of illegally obtained evidence and for a suspect's 
right to legal counsel, to be informed immediately of his legal rights, 
and of the charges against him. However, the Government has not made 
significant efforts to enforce these rights throughout the criminal 
justice system. Defendants may confront witnesses and present evidence. 
The court appoints an attorney for indigent defendants. Defendants and 
prosecutors have the right of appeal. The Government generally has 
observed the constitutional provision for public trial. Foreign and 
domestic observers generally are able to attend trials.
    Opposition political parties and NGO's credibly estimate that the 
Government held about 50 political prisoners at year's end. The 
reduction from 75 prisoners in 1998 apparently reflected a combination 
of releases of some prisoners in a general amnesty and completion of 
jail sentences for others.
    The Government continues to assert that it holds no political 
prisoners.
    On February 17, a Baku district court found 14 participants in a 
November 8, 1998, opposition demonstration guilty of disturbing public 
order and resisting police. Four of the defendants are from the Popular 
Front Party, six are from the National Democratic Party, and six others 
are unaffiliated. The demonstrators were participating in a legally 
sanctioned rally that reportedly transpired without incident until a 
dozen assailants separate from the rally disrupted the event.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government infringed on these rights. The 
Constitution provides for secrecy of correspondence and telephone 
conversations, subject to limits provided by law in criminal 
investigations or in prevention of a crime. The Constitution allows 
searches of residences only with a court order or in cases provided by 
law. However, citizens widely believe that the Ministry of National 
Security monitors telephones and Internet traffic, especially those of 
foreigners and prominent political and business figures. Police often 
conducted searches without a warrant, and investigations sometimes 
resulted in confining the individuals to their city of residence or a 
brief jail sentence for questioning. There were credible allegations 
that police continued to intimidate and harass family members of 
suspects.
    There were credible reports that individuals linked to opposition 
parties were fired from their jobs (see Section 2.b.). The Government 
continued to harass some opposition party leaders by arresting their 
relatives (see Section 1.f.). Police harassed and detained members of 
evangelical Christian and other groups, carried out arbitrary searches, 
and seized their documents and property (see Section 2.c.).
    In June a court ruled in favor of a group of Muslim women who sued 
for the right to wear Islamic headscarves in passport photos. In 
September the Supreme Court overturned the lower court ruling; the case 
was on appeal in the Prosecutor General's office at year's end (see 
Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press and specifically outlaws press 
censorship; however, the Government in some cases did not respect these 
rights in practice. The Government did not take any measures to 
reinstitute press censorship, which was abolished in 1998; however, 
actions taken by several prominent government officials, including an 
ongoing series of libel suits, many of which ended with the levying of 
excessively high fines (which, if ever collected, would immediately 
bankrupt any independent or opposition newspaper), created an 
atmosphere in which journalists exercise self-censorship. Most of the 
excessive fines have been appealed; however, in those cases in which 
there have been rulings, the appeals were denied. Prominent opposition 
politicians criticized the Government without reprisal; however, in one 
case, former president Elchibey was charged with slander in 1998 after 
he accused the President of having helped organize a terrorist 
organization, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), during the Soviet 
era. The charges were dropped in January.
    While the press debated a wide variety of sensitive topics 
throughout the year, other factors restricted the public's ability to 
be informed about and discuss political issues. Most newspapers are 
printed in the Government's publishing house. The Government's near 
monopoly of publishing facilities and its control over the price of 
newsprint gives it leverage over the press, a critical matter given the 
precarious finances of most opposition newspapers. Some editors 
complain about having their print runs limited by the state printing 
press, and many cite the threat of increases in paper and printing 
prices as a constraint on the free press.
    The spate of lawsuits by prominent government officials against 
opposition or independent media outlets also had a negative effect on 
freedom of the press in practice. Courts invariably ruled in favor of 
the government plaintiffs, while ruling against opposition plaintiffs 
pursuing similar charges against progovernment media outlets in all but 
two cases. It appears that the extremely high financial penalties 
levied by the courts were designed to repress criticism rather than to 
foster responsible journalism. However, none of the fines had been 
collected by year's end, and no media outlets were closed for that 
reason. Nevertheless, the media outlets in question credibly claimed 
publicly and privately that the threat of the charges forced them to 
exercise self-censorship.
    Journalists were subject to violence. Several incidents were 
reported in June and July in which masked assailants kidnaped, beat, 
and threatened journalists. Two of the three cases of harassment of 
journalists involved journalists from Hurriyet, a newspaper associated 
with Rasul Guliyev. Although the number of violent incidents against 
journalists decreased during the year, despite promises of rapid 
action, police have yet to determine the identity of any of the 
assailants. While the Government denies any relationship with the 
assailants, the incidents involved opposition journalists who were 
warned to stop criticizing government officials or policies.
    Rovshan Ismailov of Ganun (Law) magazine was beaten on April 13 in 
the Izami district of Baku. He said that he was shopping when several 
plainclothes police officers approached him, and he identified himself 
as a journalist. Following a verbal confrontation, Ismailov said that 
the officers beat him. At year's end no action had been taken against 
the officers.
    In June unknown assailants kidnaped opposition journalist Kamil 
Tagisoy, whom unknown assailants kidnaped, beat, and warned to stop 
writing about President Aliyev's health. On June 30, three persons 
claiming to be employees of the National Security Ministry intercepted 
a car in which two journalists from the opposition newspaper Yeni 
Musavat were traveling and abducted the newspaper's deputy editor, 
Shirzad Mamedli. Mamedli was released 1 hour later after having been 
beaten severely.
    Approximately 30 journalists and members of NGO's held an 
unsanctioned protest on July 6 in front of the Prosecutor-General's 
office in Baku to protest such harassment and violence against 
independent journalists. The previous day the Baku mayor's office had 
refused permission to stage the protest.
    In May the Government rejected an appeal for the release of 
journalist Fuad Qahramanli of CAG newspaper (published by the Democracy 
Development Foundation), who was being kept in prison for having 
written an article that was never published. In June 1998, police from 
the Department Against Organized Crime declared the article, entitled 
``The Opposition Rally Tactics,'' to be dangerous and subversive. On 
July 11, the Government granted amnesty to Qahramanli (see Section 
1.d.).
    There has been no further action taken on the following cases: The 
beating of a journalist in February 1998; the attack on 34 journalists 
by police when they were reporting on an opposition rally in Baku in 
September 1998; and the attack on 4 journalists when they were 
protesting peacefully the defamation trial of Yeni Musavat in November 
1998.
    Despite government pressure and such attacks, the independent and 
opposition press played an active, influential role in politics. 
Articles critical of government policy and high government figures, 
including the President, and discussion of sensitive areas of domestic 
and foreign policy, appeared routinely in the opposition and 
independent print and broadcast media. The independent press does not 
always meet internationally accepted journalistic standards.
    A large number of newspapers continued to publish. One reliable 
source put the number of registered newspapers at 600, and the number 
actually publishing at least once a month at nearly 100. These included 
independent newspapers and newspapers with links to major and minor 
opposition parties. Government-run kiosks and 27 independent news 
distributors distributed opposition and independent newspapers. A 
number of editors continued to complain that the government-run kiosks 
refuse to carry their newspapers or claim to have sold all received 
copies while, in fact, retaining many unsold copies in stock.
    The Government tightly controlled official radio and television, 
the source of information for much of the population because the cost 
of newspapers makes them unaffordable for most persons. Television and 
radio stations require a license to operate, and the Government used 
this requirement to prevent several independent stations from 
broadcasting. Since 1993 no truly independent broadcaster has received 
a frequency from the State Commission on Radio and Television 
Frequencies and the Ministry of Communications. There are a limited 
number of private television stations, whose broadcasts can be received 
only in Baku or in local areas outside the capital. Only one of the 
private stations is not directly under the control of a government 
official, and it is believed widely that this station also has 
compromised its independence. Independent radio, preferred by the 
overwhelming majority of listeners, largely is oriented to 
entertainment, but one independent station airs political topics, 
although news is only a small portion of its program. Opposition 
parties had virtually no access to the official electronic media. The 
Government periodically used state television to conduct campaigns of 
denunciation and harassment against political parties and leaders 
critical of the Government.
    Three independent television stations operate in Baku. Six 
independent television stations operating outside of Baku, which had 
been rebroadcasting without frequency licenses, were closed in July and 
August. In July and August, authorities--in one case armed with guns--
forced all but two of the regional television stations that were 
broadcasting without licenses to close.
    During the fall, authorities shut down the independent, foreign-
owned television station SARA on the grounds that the law prohibits 
foreign ownership of domestic television stations. Observers noted that 
for 5 years Sara aired without problems as a mainly entertainment 
channel, until it started airing political programs in the summer; the 
Government closed down the station after it gave a prominent platform 
on a program to opposition leaders discussing the Nagorno-Karabakh 
dispute. On December 24, the Economic Court upheld a Lower Court ruling 
against SARA's owners.
    At year's end, there were four independent television stations 
operating outside of Baku, one each in the cities of Ganja, 
Mingechevir, Quba, and Sumqayit. Four other independent stations in 
Quba, Tovuz, Zagatala, and Belakan, remain closed. Three Russian and 
three Turkish television stations and radio programs are rebroadcast 
locally through Azerbaijani facilities and are seen and heard in most 
parts of the country. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of 
America broadcast without restriction. There are no restrictions on 
reception of foreign stations via satellite. The Government granted new 
broadcast licenses to a few foreign radio stations, plus several 
regional television stations directly under the control of the local 
executive commission. The Government has delayed action for more than a 
year on the applications to broadcast of more than 10 independent 
broadcasters.
    The Government allowed limited Internet access. There are 2 
Internet service providers, although more than 12 vendors sell 
accounts. Both providers have formal links with the Ministry of 
Communications. Connecting costs, which average $3 per hour (down from 
$10 per hour in 1998), are still beyond the budgets of most citizens; 
few citizens have accounts of their own. Many persons believe that the 
Government monitors Internet traffic, especially that of foreign 
businesses and opposition-oriented intellectuals and leaders (see 
Section 1.f.).
    Appointments to government-controlled academic positions are 
heavily dependent on political connections. Nevertheless, several 
professors with tenure are active in opposition parties. There were no 
complaints of violation of academic freedom or of censorship of books 
or academic journals.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts 
this right when it decides that it is in its interest to do so. 
Authorities frequently prevented political parties critical of the 
Government from conducting many indoor meetings as well as outdoor 
gatherings. The Government allowed some political party gatherings, 
such as the Popular Front's 10th anniversary meeting in July. 
Authorities also permitted opposition parties to organize so-called 
``pickets,'' demonstrations with less than 50 participants. Authorities 
cited questionable security considerations repeatedly to ban any larger 
demonstrations throughout the year.
    The Government detained persons at unauthorized rallies and 
meetings, but released them without charges after brief detention. 
Police briefly detained demonstrators at the May 8 rally before 
releasing them without charges. Police forcibly dispersed an 
unsanctioned demonstration on May 8. The demonstrators, organized by a 
combination of opposition parties, were attempting to assemble near a 
Baku cemetery to march to the Karabakh front over a hundred miles away 
to protest Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory. The Government 
refused to issue a permit for the march and ordered police to break up 
the rally. Several protesters were detained briefly before being 
released without charges (see Section 1.c.). In July journalists and 
members of NGO's held an unsanctioned protest in Baku to protest 
harassment and violence against independent journalists (see Section 
2.a.).
    Heads of local governments in several different sections of the 
country repeatedly refused the requests of opposition members of 
Parliament, such as Popular Front First Deputy chairman Ali Kerimov, to 
hold organized meetings with constituents and interested citizens. On 
several occasions, central government authorities intervened to 
overrule the local authorities and allow Kerimov and other opposition 
members of Parliament to hold the meetings.
    Four participants in a November 1998 opposition rally were arrested 
and sentenced to jail terms of up to 3 years; however, none of the 
persons who attacked these peaceful demonstrators has been arrested, 
despite the fact that the faces of the attackers apparently were 
recorded on film. At year's end, no action had been taken against the 
attackers.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, although in 
practice the Government continued to restrict this freedom when it was 
in its interest to do so. The Government requires political parties to 
register. There are over 30 registered political parties. Some of these 
are affiliated with or support the President's party. At least 10 
registered parties are considered opposition parties. The Government 
continued to refuse to register the Azerbaijan Democratic Party; the 
Supreme Court is to hold a hearing early in 2000 on the Democratic 
Party's suit against the Government. Other unregistered parties have 
not met the legal requirements for registration. Nevertheless, 
unregistered political parties continued to function openly, and 
members of unregistered political parties can run for president but 
must be sponsored by a registered party or an independent ``voters 
initiative group.'' Members of unregistered parties may run for 
Parliament, but only as independents in a direct constituency, not on a 
party list. A party must be registered to run a list of candidates. 
Members of unregistered parties running in municipal elections had to 
run as independents, or be nominated by a registered party or another 
voter initiatives group.
    Credible reports of harassment, including beatings, of political 
figures continued. There were credible reports that individuals linked 
to opposition parties (and their relatives) were fired from their jobs. 
Members of Parliament who switched to opposition parties were, in some 
cases, subjected to criticism in the government media and to anti-
member rallies promoted by local authorities in the home districts of 
those members. The Government has not yet returned the Popular Front's 
headquarters nor many of its regional offices, which were seized in 
1993.
    Explicitly ethnically or religiously based parties have not been 
registered.
    The Government generally allowed private associations to function 
freely. The Ministry of Justice requires private organizations to 
register but does not grant this registration freely and expeditiously. 
It denied or unduly delayed registration for numerous private voluntary 
organizations, including two private human rights organizations. 
Nevertheless, unregistered associations functioned openly.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution allows persons of all 
faiths to practice their religion without restrictions, and the 
Government respects this provision in practice for Shi'a and Sunni 
Muslims, Russian Orthodox Christians, and Jews; however, other 
religious groups, which lack a long history in the country, are 
subjected routinely to low level harassment. The Government frequently 
used clauses in the Law on Religious Freedom to restrict religious 
activity by foreigners and nontraditional religious groups. There is no 
state religion, and the right to choose or change one's religious 
affiliation is provided for.
    The Law on Religious Freedom contains provisions that allow the 
Government to restrict effectively religious activity by foreigners and 
even Azerbaijani members of nontraditional religious groups. These 
restrictions consist of burdensome registration requirements, 
limitations on freedom to proselytize, and interference with 
dissemination of printed materials. Most of the groups affected note 
that these restrictions have been applied sporadically, and most groups 
operate freely. Where these restrictions are applied, they are used to 
harass minority religions rather than eliminate them. In addition a law 
on foreigners and stateless persons contains language that prohibits 
religious ``propaganda'' by foreigners. This provision was reinforced 
by a presidential decree in 1997, and the Government uses these and 
other legal provisions to restrict religious activity by foreign, and 
to a lesser degree Azerbaijani, members of nontraditional religious 
groups. There is no state religion.
    In early November President Aliyev announced to the National 
Security Council, and later in a nationwide television broadcast, that 
the Government henceforth would abide by OSCE standards of religious 
liberty. Apparently in conformity with his directives, government 
officials subsequently took steps to rectify some past violations of 
these standards, including the registration of a number of religious 
organizations that previously had been denied registration.
    The most common restriction on religious freedom results from the 
requirement in the Law on Religion that all religious organizations be 
registered by the Government in order to function legally. This is in 
principle done by obtaining approval from the Department of Religious 
Affairs and then applying for formal registration with the Ministry of 
Justice. The Government states that so far it has registered 
approximately 190 Muslim organizations and 50 ``other'' groups. In 
practice, however, the process suffers from a lack of transparency, 
particularly within the Department of Religious Affairs. This office, 
an independent entity subordinated directly to the Council of 
Ministers, has been a bottleneck in the registration process. A wide 
variety of religious groups have been subjected to interminable delays, 
and a number of them remain unregistered; however, in response to the 
President's November calls for adherence to international standards of 
religious liberty, the Government took several steps to rectify 
previous problems.
    Registration enables a religious organization to maintain a bank 
account, legally rent property, and generally to act as a legal entity. 
Lack of registration makes it harder, but not impossible, for a 
religious group to function. Unregistered groups often continue to 
operate, but participants are subject to arrest, fines, and--in the 
cases of foreigners--deportation. Human Rights Watch alleged in 
February 1998 that officials responsible for registration have taken 
bribes in order to facilitate registration. Religious groups are 
permitted to appeal registration denials to the courts, but the only 
group to do so to date--the Pentecostal ``Word of Life'' Church--lost 
its case in May 1998. The Catholic Church was registered in April after 
an 18-month delay. Following the President's November statements, the 
Government, specifically the Department of Religious Affairs and the 
Ministry of Justice, took action on several applications by religious 
groups for registration that had been languishing, in some cases for 
years. The Cathedral of Praise and the Nehemiah were registered in 
December, but at year's end Jehovah's Witnesses were not registered. 
Prompted by the November statements, some other religious groups that 
had been operating under continual low-level harassment because the 
Religious Affairs Department earlier had denied them registration were 
seeking registration at year's end.
    The Religious Affairs Department repeatedly sought to interfere in 
the internal affairs of at least two religious groups, refusing to 
permit a Catholic Church to select its own priest and refusing to 
recognize the Evangelical Lutheran Church's right to select its own 
leadership. In December, the President's office overruled the Religious 
Affairs Department and officially recognized the right of both groups 
to make their internal organizational decisions freely and without 
interference.
    Six Jehovah's Witnesses were fired for their religious affiliation 
in September in Garadag, and, along with two others, were given 
administrative fines by the local government. In November, following 
President Aliyev's public comments, the six were reinstated in their 
jobs with full back pay. The eight members now are pursuing an appeal 
of their administrative fines through the court system. A member of the 
Jehovah's Witnesses in Khachmaz was detained by police in August; he 
reportedly was beaten, and his religious material was confiscated. In 
December the prosecutor's office opened an investigation into the 
police actions.
    In September police interrupted a service at the legally registered 
Evangelical Baptist church and detained approximately 70 worshippers. 
Authorities sentenced two Azerbaijani church officials to 15 days in 
jail on charges of resisting police. Other religious groups reported 
police harassment in August and September. Some religious groups 
reported that the harassment ceased after President Aliyev's public 
comments in November.
    The Law on Religion subordinates all Islamic religious 
organizations to the Azerbaijan-based Spiritual Directorate of Caucasus 
Muslims. In June a court decided in favor of a group of Muslim women 
who sued for the right to wear Islamic headscarves in passport 
photography. The judges ruled in favor of the women, who said that 
there was nothing in the law that prevented them from wearing Islamic 
headscarves in official photographs. In September the Supreme Court 
overturned the lower court ruling; the case was on appeal in the 
Prosecutor General's office at year's end (see Section 1.f.).
    The Law on Religion also permits the production and dissemination 
of religious literature only with the approval of the Department of 
Religious Affairs and with the agreement of local government 
authorities. The Government now interprets this provision to mean that 
only religious groups can engage in such activity and argues that 
booksellers and other entrepreneurs are forbidden to engage in that 
activity. For example, the Department of Religious Affairs in October 
1998 held up a shipment of books imported by a private individual not 
associated with a local congregation for sale at a legally registered 
bookstore in Baku after it determined that some of the books had 
religious content. The books were held until June when the Deputy Prime 
Minister's office overruled the Religious Affairs Department and 
ordered the books released to the bookseller. In one case, officials 
delayed the importation of a shipment of religious literature by a 
private individual not associated with a local congregation; on June 10 
the shipment was released by customs.
    The Department of Religious Affairs sought throughout the first 
half of the year to prevent a local bookstore from importing books with 
religious content. The Department based its restriction on a clause in 
the Law on Religious Freedom that states that religious groups may 
produce, import, and disseminate religious literature. The Department 
of Religious Affairs argued that this clause means that only religious 
groups may engage in such activities. The Council of Ministers 
overruled the Department in June, ordering the books released to the 
bookseller.
    Some government bias against foreign missionary groups persisted. 
Foreign Christian and other groups complained credibly of official 
harassment. Members of unregistered groups are subject to arrest and 
fines, and foreigners can be deported. Foreign Christian and other 
groups were subject to harassment and detention under a provision in 
the Law on Religious Freedom banning ``religious propaganda'' by 
foreigners. The Department for Religious Affairs also used the 
provision of the law on foreigners and stateless persons that prohibits 
religious ``propaganda'' (i.e., proselytizing) by foreigners, to harass 
foreign missionaries and religious figures. In September nine 
foreigners were arrested and sentenced to deportation under this 
provision. In November the Supreme Court overturned these sentences, 
ruling that they violated constitutional provisions for religious 
freedom. In January and June, articles appeared throughout the press 
crudely depicting Christian missionary groups as a threat to the 
nation. In August several evangelical Christian and other religious 
groups reported a wave of police harassment, including detention, 
arbitrary search and seizure of documents and other private property, 
and warnings to desist from religious activity. In September the police 
interrupted a service at the legally registered Baptist Church and 
began questioning worshippers. Without giving a reason for their 
action, uniformed and plainclothes police officers refused to release 
persons until obtaining their names and addresses. Police criticized 
ethnic Azeri Christians for dropping their Muslim affiliation. 
Approximately 70 Azeris and foreigners were detained for several days 
of questioning. Two Azeri pastors were sentenced to 15 days in jail for 
allegedly resisting the police, a charge contested by all available 
witnesses.
    Because of anti-Armenian sentiment and the forced departure of most 
of the Armenian population, Armenian churches remained closed (see 
Section 5). The same situation prevails for Azerbaijani mosques in the 
portions of southwest Azerbaijan controlled by Armenian separatists 
(see section 5). The Jewish community has freedom to worship and 
conduct educational activities and, during the year, enjoyed the public 
support of the Government.
    Places of worship seized by the former Soviet Government during the 
Communist era from the Baha'is, the Catholics, the Lutherans, and the 
Baptists have not yet been returned to those groups.
    Some government officials share the strong popular prejudice 
against ethnic Azerbaijanis who have converted to Christianity and 
other religions (see Section 5). For example an ethnic Azerbaijani was 
subjected to administrative fines by local officials in Baku in July 
for possessing Christian literature, and another ethnic Azerbaijani 
reported that he was arrested, beaten, and imprisoned in August for 
changing his religious affiliation and becoming a member of Jehovah's 
Witnesses.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right 
of citizens to choose freely their place of domicile and to travel 
abroad and return, and the Government generally respects these 
provisions; however, at times it limited the movement of members of 
opposition parties. In at least one case, the Government limited the 
movement of members of opposition parties. Residents of border areas in 
both Azerbaijan and Iran travel across the border in this restricted 
zone without visas. Foreigners and citizens require a visa to travel to 
the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan. Local officials harass and deny 
passports to some members of the Armenian minority who wish to 
emigrate.
    In late 1998 and early this year, former president Abulfaz Elchibey 
was prevented from traveling outside Baku for approximately 2 months 
while under investigation and on trial for insulting the President; the 
charges were dropped in February.
    The Government officially recognizes freedom of emigration. Jewish 
emigration to Israel and other countries is unrestricted by the 
Government. However, with the majority of those who wish to emigrate 
already having left, the number of Jewish emigrants is now small. The 
remaining Armenian population in Azerbaijan (other than Armenians 
residing in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan) is approximately 
10,000 to 20,000, almost exclusively persons of mixed descent or in 
mixed marriages. While official government policy is that ethnic 
Armenians are free to travel, low-level officials seeking bribes 
harassed Azerbaijani citizens of Armenian origin who sought to emigrate 
or obtain passports.
    There were no draft notifications that restricted movement during 
the year. Draft-age men must obtain documents from military officials 
before they can leave for international travel.
    The number of refugees and internally displaced persons from the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is approximately 800,000. Armenians have 
settled in parts of the occupied territories. However, Armenians have 
not allowed the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis who were forced 
out of the now-occupied territories to return to their homes. The 
Government provides almost no assistance to these persons, who rely on 
donations from foreign countries. Most of these internally displaced 
persons continue to live in camps and other temporary shelters, often 
at below-subsistence levels, without adequate food, housing, education, 
sanitation, or medical care. The parties to the conflict have cut 
normal trade and transportation links to the other side, causing severe 
hardship to civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and the Azerbaijani 
exclave of Nakhchivan.
    The Constitution provides for political asylum consistent with 
international norms. The Government is receptive to international 
assistance for refugees and IDP's. It cooperates with international 
organizations to provide aid for them. The Government cooperates with 
the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The issue 
of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no reports 
of the forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee 
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    In theory the election law and Constitution allow citizens to 
change their government by peaceful means; however, the Government 
continues to restrict citizens' ability to change their Government 
peacefully by interfering in elections.
    Azerbaijan is a republic with a strong presidency, and a 
legislature that the Constitution describes as independent. However, in 
practice the legislature's independence from the executive is marginal. 
The Parliament exercises little legislative initiative independent of 
the executive. As a result of the flawed 1995 parliamentary elections, 
the New Azerbaijan Party led by President Aliyev, along with other 
parties and nominally independent deputies loyal to the President, 
occupy the overwhelming majority of seats in the 125-member Parliament. 
The ruling party held its first party congress in December. Parties 
considering themselves as belonging to the opposition hold 20 seats and 
formed a unified bloc in April, but their ability to influence 
legislation is less than marginal. Opposition parties continued to be 
active outside the Parliament, agitating for their views in their 
newspapers and through public statements. However, the Government 
continued to deny registration to the opposition Azerbaijani Democratic 
Party (see Section 2.b.).
    Parliamentary by-elections were held on two occasions and were 
marked by claims of fraud, although the lack of independent observers 
made verification impossible.
    The 1998 presidential election was an improvement over the previous 
elections, especially in regard to reduced multiple voting and the 
presence of domestic observers. However, some domestic and 
international observers witnessed ballot stuffing and irregularities in 
vote counting, and some were barred from observing the vote counting. 
Neither domestic nor international observers were allowed to monitor 
the compilation of the national vote totals. The observed 
irregularities and lack of transparency in vote counting led to serious 
doubts about the accuracy of the 76 percent of the vote officially 
recorded for President Aliyev. In August newspapers quoted the chairman 
of the CEC as admitting that Aliyev's vote total had been overstated by 
12 to 15 percent. International observers, including the OSCE/ODIHR, 
concluded that the election did not meet international standards.
    Courts did not give serious consideration to the complaints filed 
by runner-up E'tibar Mammedov, who charged that the President did not 
receive the necessary two-thirds vote to avoid a run-off. The CEC did 
not publish vote totals of election districts within the time period 
required by the election law, and by the end of 1999, it still had not 
published vote totals for election precincts. The election law required 
that the full vote totals be published within 30 days of the election; 
that is, by November 11, 1998.
    During and prior to the presidential election campaign, the 
Government took a number of steps to improve the election and overall 
political environment. In addition to amending the election law, the 
Government abolished press censorship, ended the criminal investigation 
of certain opposition figures, allowed the opposition to conduct some 
rallies, and gave registered opposition presidential candidates access 
to state broadcast media. On the other hand, the state media's 
reporting on the election was biased heavily in favor of the President. 
The CEC and local commissions were insufficiently representative and 
did not function impartially. The Government did not fully respect 
freedom of assembly.
    The 1995 Constitution required that the country's first-ever 
municipal elections be held by November 1997. However, the elections 
were delayed repeatedly until they were finally held on December 12. 
The municipal election process was deeply flawed. The legislation 
governing the elections reflected some recommendations of international 
observers, but several serious problems were not remedied. The process 
of selecting territorial and precinct electoral commissions to oversee 
the municipal elections was marred by widespread irregularities with an 
overwhelming pattern of favoring the ruling party and supporters of 
local authorities. The process of registering candidates was marred 
similarly by widespread irregularities, that favored the authorities. 
The elections themselves were criticized heavily by observers, 
including the Council of Europe (COE), which noted numerous instances 
of ballot-stuffing, voter intimidation, and other violations.
    Major opposition parties, with the exception of the unregistered 
Azerbaijan Democratic Party (see Section 2.b.) and the Azerbaijan 
National Independence Party (chaired by presidential election runner-up 
Mammedov), agreed to participate in the December municipal elections.
    There are no legal restrictions on women's participation in 
politics; however, traditional social norms restrict women's roles in 
politics. In past elections and also in the December municipal 
elections, in a practice known as family voting, men often cast the 
votes of their wives and other female members of their families. In the 
1998 presidential election, this practice was seen less often. There 
are 11 female Members of Parliament and 2 women with ministerial rank.
    There are no restrictions on the participation of minorities in 
politics as individuals; however, explicitly ethnically or religiously 
based parties have not been registered. Members of indigenous ethnic 
minorities such as Talysh, Lezghis, and Kurds occupy some senior 
government positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several human rights organizations monitor the human rights 
situation in the country. For the most part, the Government posed no 
objections to international human rights groups. Some of these groups 
investigate human rights abuses and disseminate their findings through 
the media. However, the Government has been critical of certain 
domestic human rights activists who have raised politically sensitive 
issues.
    The Government has demonstrated a limited willingness to discuss 
human rights problems with international and domestic nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's). The ICRC has had access to prisoners of war as 
well as civilians held in relation to the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh. However, the ICRC has requested and been denied access to 
prisoners not related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict being held in 
special security and other prisons.
    Government officials occasionally criticize human rights activists. 
The chief prosecutor threatened the chairman of the Azerbaijan Human 
Rights Center, Eldar Zeynalov, with criminal prosecution if he 
continued to claim that Azerbaijan held political prisoners. Zeynalov's 
organization continues these claims about political prisoners, and he 
has faced no legal action. The Government registered the Azerbaijan 
Human Rights Center in November; its chairman Eldar Zeynalov now is 
routinely granted access to prisons and the Center operates normally.
    The Ministry of Justice continued to deny registration to many 
local human rights NGO's, but the Government has not tried to halt 
their activities. Registration enables a human rights organization to 
maintain a bank account legally, rent property, and generally to act as 
a legal entity. Lack of registration makes it harder, but not 
impossible, for a human rights group to function.
    The ICRC conducted education programs on international humanitarian 
law for officials of the Ministries of Interior and Defense, and for 
university and secondary school students.
    In August the Government created a Commission on Human Rights, 
funded by a $400,000 U.N. Development Program grant, which is headed by 
Justice Minister Sudaba Hasanova. By year's end, the commission had not 
taken any significant actions.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights without respect to 
gender, race, nationality or national origin, religion, language, 
social status, or membership in political parties, trade unions, or 
other public organizations. However, in the wake of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, there is widespread anti-Armenian sentiment in 
society. Preventing discrimination is not a major government priority.
    Women.--Discussion of violence against women is a taboo subject in 
Azerbaijan's patriarchal society, but it remains a problem. In rural 
areas, women have no real recourse against violence by their husbands, 
regardless of the law. Rape is severely punishable, but, especially in 
rural areas, only a small fraction of offenses against women are 
reported or prosecuted. Police statistics note that, compared with the 
first 6 months of 1998, rape and rape attempts increased by 50 percent 
in the first 6 months of the year. This increase appears to be due to 
both an increase in actual instances and an increase in the reporting 
of such cases, although the figures still reflect considerable 
underreporting, especially from conservative rural areas. There are no 
government sponsored or funded programs for victims of violence. There 
are no specific laws concerning spousal abuse or spousal rape.
    Prostitution is a prominent problem, particularly in the capital 
city of Baku. Most women become prostitutes in order to support their 
family, and sometimes it even is encouraged by the family due to the 
large amount of money to be made. The Society for the Defense of 
Women's Rights (SDWR) held a mid-February conference to highlight 
concerns over the growing incidence of prostitution and sexually 
transmitted diseases. At the conference, it was reported that there are 
more than 30 illegal houses of prostitution in Baku alone, the majority 
of which are run by high-ranking officials in government and routinely 
used by members of the prosecutor's office and the police.
    Trafficking in women is a problem, and the country is a source and 
transit point for trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
    Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men, including the 
right to participate in all aspects of economic and social life. In 
general women have extensive opportunities for education and work. 
However, traditional social norms continue to restrict women's roles in 
the economy. Representation of women is sharply lower in higher levels 
of the work force. There are few women in executive positions in 
leading economic enterprises.
    Eighteen women's NGO's are registered and deal with the problems of 
women. The Association for the Defense of Rights of Azerbaijani Women 
spends most of its time fighting uniquely post-Soviet problems. It has 
helped divorced women, widows, and wives whose husbands are in prison, 
all of whom have become socially and legally vulnerable since the fall 
of the Soviet Union. It assisted widows whose landlords privatized 
their apartments and then evicted them. It also worked with divorced 
women who feel that they have been treated unfairly by divorce courts. 
Two of the 18 women's NGO's deal with the problems of prostitution and 
women trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
    Children.--The Constitution and laws commit the Government to 
protect the rights of children to education and health; however, 
difficult economic circumstances limit the Government's ability to 
carry out these commitments. Education is compulsory, free, and 
universal until the age of 17. The Constitution places children's 
rights on the same footing as those of adults. The Criminal Code 
prescribes severe penalties for crimes against children. The Government 
provides minimum standards of health care for children, although the 
quality of medical care overall is very low. The Government has 
authorized subsidies for children in an attempt to shield families 
against economic hardship in the wake of price liberalization, but 
these subsidies do not come close to covering the shortfall in family 
budgets. There are a large number of refugee and displaced children 
living in substandard conditions in refugee camps and public buildings. 
Children sometimes beg on the streets of Baku and other towns.
    There is no known societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--The Law on Support for the Disabled, 
enacted in 1993, prescribes priority for invalids and the disabled in 
obtaining housing, as well as discounts for public transport, and 
pension supplements. The Government does not have the means in its 
current financial crisis to fulfill its commitments. There are no 
special provisions in the law mandating accessibility to buildings for 
the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--There is considerable popular concern about 
the conversion of ethnic Azerbaijanis to faiths considered alien to 
Azerbaijani traditions. Opposition to proselytizing within the 
population thus far has been limited to verbal criticism and appears 
focused against two groups. The first consists of evangelical Christian 
and so-called ``nontraditional'' religious groups. There is some 
evidence of widespread prejudice against ethnic Azerbaijanis who have 
converted to Christianity. During the year, articles periodically 
appeared in progovernment and independent newspapers and electronic 
media crudely depicting Christian missionary groups as a threat to the 
identity of the nation. The perceived threat from such groups is 
primarily cultural rather than religious. Often these articles attempt 
to associate evangelists with the intelligence sources of Christian 
Russia and Armenia, portraying them as part of a plot to undermine or 
control Muslim Azerbaijan.
    Occasionally, popular reaction goes beyond verbal criticism. In 
August a crowd of Muslims reportedly broke into a Baptist summer camp 
in Nardaran, threatening inhabitants and causing significant property 
damage. Police made no attempt to intervene and said that they found no 
evidence of the incident.
    Several members of Jehovah's Witnesses reportedly were subjected to 
humiliation and degradation in early September when a factory manager 
assembled the plant's work force and berated the members of Jehovah's 
Witnesses for betraying their country by adopting a new religion. 
During the event, the father of one of the members of Jehovah's 
Witnesses publicly disowned her for adopting the new religion. In 
November, the factory reinstated the members with full back pay (see 
Section 2.c.).
    The second target of societal hostility is Muslim groups, mostly 
from Iran, which seek to spread political Islam. Newspaper articles 
appear periodically depicting certain foreign-backed Muslim 
missionaries as a threat to stability and civil peace, and in some 
cases, as part of an Iranian strategy to destabilize and ultimately 
establish control over Azerbaijan.
    Reflecting the intense popular hostility toward Armenians that 
prevails in the country and the forced departure of most of the 
Armenian population, all Armenian churches, many of them damaged in 
ethnic riots which took place over a decade ago, remain closed. As a 
consequence, ethnic Armenians who remain in Azerbaijan, estimated to 
number between 10,000 and 30,000, are deprived of an opportunity for 
public worship. A similar situation exists in the Armenian-controlled 
portions of Azerbaijan, from which the Armenians forced approximately 
550,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis to flee their homes and where those mosques 
that have not been destroyed are not functioning.
    Jews generally do not suffer from societal discrimination. However, 
according to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, two Baku synagogues 
were desecrated in the fall of 1998. According to press reports, 
evangelical Christians are not welcome in Nagorno-Karabakh, a part of 
the country not under government control.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The outbreak of hostilities, 
anti-Armenian riots, and economic collapse in the final years of the 
Soviet Union led to the expulsion of almost all Armenians and the 
departure of Russians and others. An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 
Armenians still live in Azerbaijan, mostly women with ethnic 
Azerbaijani or Russian husbands. Most seek to shield their national 
identity. Some have changed their nationality, as reported in their 
passports, to Azerbaijani. With the nearly complete departure of the 
Armenian population, the number of problems reported by this ethnic 
minority has decreased. Armenians have complained of discrimination in 
employment and harassment at schools and workplaces and of refusal of 
local government authorities to pay pensions. The problem of local 
government authorities refusing to grant passports to Armenians has 
been reduced. Armenian widows have had permits to live in Baku revoked. 
However, some persons of mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani descent continue to 
occupy government positions.
    Indigenous ethnic minorities such as the Talysh, Lezghis, Avars, 
and Georgians do not suffer discrimination. However, Meskhetian Turks 
displaced from Central Asia as well as Kurdish displaced persons from 
the Lachin region complain of discrimination.
    In the area of the country controlled by insurgent (Armenian) 
forces, the Armenians forced approximately 800,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis 
to flee their homes. The regime that now controls these areas 
effectively has banned them from all spheres of civil, political, and 
economic life.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The overwhelming majority of labor 
unions still operate as they did under the Soviet system and remain 
tightly linked to the Government. The Constitution provides for freedom 
of association, including the right to form labor unions; however, one 
or another subbranch of the government-run Azerbaijani Labor Federation 
organizes most industrial and white-collar workers. Most major 
industries remain state-owned.
    An independent union of oil workers that was displaced by a 
progovernment union in 1997 has not been revived. In 1997 the state oil 
company formed a progovernment union, the Azerbaijan Union of Oil and 
Gas Industry Workers, which took over the former independent oil 
workers union without a vote of the union membership. It continues to 
operate without a vote of its rank and file workers. An independent 
group of oil workers, the Committee to Defend the Rights of Azerbaijani 
Oil Workers, operates outside of established trade union structures and 
promotes the interests of workers in the petroleum sector.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and there are no 
legal restrictions on strikes or provisions for retribution against 
strikers. There were a number of threatened strikes in the oil industry 
during the year over wage arrears, all of which were prevented through 
negotiations and compromises. Oil workers continue to demand 
restoration of wage arrears amounting to several months pay. They do so 
internally but not through public protest. There are no established 
mechanisms to avoid wildcat strikes.
    Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate with 
international bodies; however, none has done so.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1996 law 
provides for collective bargaining agreements to set wages in state 
enterprises. A labor inspectorate was established in 1997. However, 
these laws have not produced an effective system of collective 
bargaining between unions and enterprise management. Government-
appointed boards and directors run the major enterprises and set wages. 
Unions effectively do not participate in determining wage levels. In a 
carryover from the Soviet system, both management and workers are 
considered members of the professional unions.
    There are no export processing zones. A 4-year effort supported by 
the United Nations Development Program to create an economic zone in 
Sumgait was abandoned early in the year; Parliament never considered 
legislation to create such a zone.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
allows forced or compulsory labor only under states of emergency or 
martial law or as the result of a court decision affecting a condemned 
person, and the Government has not invoked this clause; however, women 
are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 
6.f.). Two departments in the General Prosecutor's Office (the 
Department of Implementation of the Labor Code and the Department for 
Enforcement of the Law on Minors) enforce the prohibition on forced or 
compulsory labor. There are no constitutional provisions or laws 
specifically prohibiting forced and bonded labor by children, but such 
practices are not known to occur. There were no reports during the year 
of compulsory cotton picking by children or adults.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum employment age is 16 years. Primary school 
education is compulsory, free, and universal. Children are normally in 
school until the age of 17. The law allows children between the ages of 
14 and 15 to work with the consent of their parents and limits the 
workweek of children between the ages of 14 and 16 to 24 hours per 
week. Children at the age of 15 may work if the workplace's labor union 
does not object. There is no explicit restriction on the kinds of labor 
that 15-year-old children may perform with union consent. The Labor and 
Social Security Ministry has primary enforcement responsibility for 
child labor laws. With high adult unemployment, there have been few, if 
any, complaints of abuses of child labor laws. The Government does not 
specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such 
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the 
nationwide administrative minimum wage by decree. It is $3.00 (12,500 
manat) per month. This wage is not sufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. The recommended monthly 
wage level to meet basic subsistence needs was estimated to be $50 
(215,000 manat) per person. Since practically all persons who work earn 
more than the minimum wage, enforcing its low level is not a major 
issue in labor or political debate.
    The disruption of economic links with the rest of the former Soviet 
Union continues to affect employment in many industries. Idle factory 
workers typically receive less than half of their former wage. Under 
these conditions, many workers rely on the safety net of the extended 
family. More workers and unemployed persons turn to second jobs and 
makeshift employment in the informal sector, such as operating the 
family car as a taxi, selling produce from private gardens, or 
operating small roadside shops. Until the collapse of the Russian 
economy in 1998, many Azerbaijanis (estimates range as high as 1 
million) supported themselves on remittances from relatives working in 
Russia, primarily as street traders. This source of support was 
curtailed severely during the year, although reliable statistics as to 
the precise amounts involved are not available. Combinations of these 
and other strategies are the only way for broad sectors of the urban 
population to reach a subsistence income level.
    The legal workweek is 40 hours. There is a 1-hour lunch break per 
day and shorter breaks in the morning and afternoon. The Government 
attempts to enforce this law in the private sector of registered 
private businesses, but does not enforce these rules in the informal 
sector where the majority of citizens make their living.
    Health and safety standards exist, but usually they are ignored in 
the workplace. Workers cannot leave dangerous work conditions without 
fear of losing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Azerbaijan is a source and a transit 
point for trafficked women. The women who are trafficked engage in 
labor, mainly associated with the sex industry, and forced 
prostitution. Women from Azerbaijan usually are sent to the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) or Western Europe, mainly Germany, to participate as 
workers in the sex industry (for example, in strip clubs) and as 
prostitutes. Women from Iran, Russia, and sometimes Iraq, are 
transported through Baku to the UAE, Europe, and occasionally the 
United States for the same purposes. The problems of trafficking in 
women and sexual exploitation are addressed briefly in the Criminal 
Code, but are largely unknown and ignored. Two of the country's 18 
women's NGO's deal with the problems of trafficking in women and 
prostitution, mainly by concentrating on educating women, particularly 
those in rural areas, about the dangers of such practices.
                                 ______
                                 

                                BELARUS

    Belarus has a government in which nearly all power is concentrated 
in the hands of the President. Since his election in July 1994 to a 5-
year term as the country's first President, Alexandr Lukashenko has 
consolidated power steadily in the executive branch through 
authoritarian means. He used a November 1996 referendum to amend the 
1994 Constitution in order to broaden his powers and extend his term in 
office. The President ignored the then-Constitutional Court's ruling 
that the Constitution could not be amended by referendum. As a result, 
the current political system is based on the 1996 Constitution, which 
was adopted in an unconstitutional manner. Most members of the 
international community criticized the flawed referendum and do not 
recognize the legitimacy of the 1996 Constitution, legislature, or 
Alexandr Lukashenko's continuation in office beyond the legal 
expiration of his term in July. Although the amended Constitution 
provides for a formal separation of powers, the President dominates all 
other branches of government. The current acting legislature was not 
elected directly, but was created out of the remnants of the former 
Parliament, which Lukashenko disbanded soon after the 1996 referendum. 
The Constitution limits the legislature to meeting twice per year for 
no more than a total of 170 days. Presidential decrees made when the 
legislature is out of session have the force of law, except--in 
theory--in those cases restricted by the 1996 Constitution. The 1996 
Constitution also allows the President to issue decrees having the 
force of law in circumstances of ``specific necessity and urgency,'' a 
provision that President Lukashenko has interpreted broadly. The 
judiciary is not independent.
    Law enforcement and internal security responsibilities are shared 
by the Committee for State Security (KGB) and Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (MVD), both of which answer directly to the President. Civilian 
authorities do not maintain effective control of the security forces. 
Under President Lukashenko's direction, the Presidential Guard--
initially created to protect senior officials--continued to act against 
the President's political enemies with no judicial or legislative 
oversight. On May 25, the Law on the State Guard officially entered 
into force. The law, which already had been operative on a de facto 
basis for a number of years, gives the President the right to 
subordinate all security bodies to his personal command.Members of the 
security forces committed numerous human rights abuses.
    The country's political leadership opposes any significant economic 
reforms and remains committed ideologically to a planned economy. 
Government officials claimed that the gross domestic product (GDP) grew 
during the first 6 months of the year by 3 percent, but most 
independent analysts agree that any growth that has occurred was the 
result principally of continued massive credits to the debt-ridden 
state sector. Discriminatory foreign exchange controls have contributed 
to sharp declines in foreign trade and investment. Both exports and 
imports continued to fall given the country's growing isolation from 
world and regional trade flows. Foreign investment fell by 42 percent 
to $30 million during the first 6 months of the year. Per capita GDP 
remained constant at approximately $1,100, but in reality was probably 
much lower. Leading exports are trucks, tractors, chemical fertilizers, 
and fibers. The majority of workers are employed in the state 
industrial and agricultural sectors. Although the unreliability of 
official statistics makes it difficult to assess accurately economic 
conditions, living standards for many segments of society continued to 
decline. Annual inflation was over 350 percent. Following a doubling by 
the Government on May 1, average monthly wages stood at approximately 
$40 at mid-year. Residents of small towns and rural areas, where 
incomes are particularly low and wage arrears more prevalent, sustain 
themselves through unreported economic activity and small gardens.
    The Government's human rights record worsened significantly. The 
Government severely limits the right of citizens to change their 
government, and the President took severe measures to neutralize a 
large-scale public campaign initiated by opposition leaders to draw 
attention to the expiration of his legal term in office on July 20. 
Well-known political figures disappeared under mysterious 
circumstances. Security forces continued to beat political opponents 
and detainees. There were reports of severe hazing in military units 
during the year. Prison conditions remained poor. Security forces 
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens, and the number of 
apparently politically motivated arrests increased, although most of 
those arrested soon were released. Prolonged detention and delays in 
trials were common and also occurred in a number of politically 
sensitive cases. Although one political prisoner was released, at least 
one other individual whose conviction human rights groups believe was 
politically motivated remains incarcerated. The security services 
infringed on citizens' privacy rights and monitored closely the 
activities of opposition politicians and other segments of the 
population. Restrictions on freedom of speech, the press, and peaceful 
assembly continued, and the Government did not respect freedom of 
association. The Government continued to impose limits on freedom of 
religion, and restricted freedom of movement. Government security 
agents monitored closely human rights monitors and hindered their 
efforts. Domestic violence and discrimination against women remained 
significant problems. Societal anti-Semitism persists. Authorities 
continued to restrict workers' rights to associate freely, organize, 
and bargain.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--On May 7, former Minister of Internal Affairs 
Yury Zakharenko disappeared shortly after he told his family in a 
telephone conversation that he was on his way home. Zakharenko, a close 
associate of the then-detained former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir, 
disappeared after voting began in an opposition presidential election 
initiative, in which Chigir was one of the principal candidates. 
Witnesses reported seeing Zakharenko on the evening of his 
disappearance being pushed by several men into an unmarked car. 
According to Zakharenko's family, government security officials did 
little to look for him or inquire into the details of his 
disappearance. On May 19, Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakov 
stated publicly that there was ``no information'' to indicate that a 
crime had been committed against Zakharenko. An investigation into the 
disappearance apparently was begun only several months later after 
another opposition political figure disappeared in mid-September.
    On September 16, following a meeting earlier during that day 
broadcast on state television in which President Lukashenko ordered the 
chiefs of his security services to crackdown on ``opposition scum,'' 
13th Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Viktor Gonchar disappeared, along 
with local business associate Anatoliy Krasovsky. Shortly before his 
disappearance, Gonchar telephoned his wife to inform her that he was on 
his way home. Broken glass and blood were discovered later at the site 
where relatives and friends of the men believe the vehicle in which the 
two were travelling may have been stopped. A high-profile 
antigovernment politician, Gonchar was considered an active fund raiser 
for the opposition. Although government authorities denied any 
involvement, there is no public evidence of concrete progress by 
government investigators to resolve the cases.
    In mid-December, former National Bank chairwoman Tamara Vinnikova, 
who disappeared from an apartment where she had been held closely 
guarded under house arrest since November 1997 (see Section 1.d.), 
reappeared. Vinnikova apparently was able to escape from her guards and 
eventually make her way to another country (see Section 1.d.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The 1996 Constitution provides for the inviolability of 
the person and specifically prohibits torture, as well as cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, police and prison guards beat 
detainees and prisoners. Law enforcement and prison officials may use 
physical force against detainees and prisoners if the latter are 
violent, have refused to obey the instructions of the prison 
administration, or have violated ``maliciously'' the terms of their 
sentences. However, human rights monitors credibly report that 
investigators coerce confessions through beatings and psychological 
pressure. Although such behavior is against the law, the Government 
seldom, if ever, punishes those who commit such abuses. Guards use 
force against detainees to coerce confessions as well as during routine 
activities. Police also beat demonstrators (see Section 2.b.).
    On April 2, plainclothes security officials beat opposition 
activist Halina Kunina following an unsanctioned demonstration in 
Minsk, during which over 20 persons--including 9 minors--were detained. 
Kunina reportedly was hospitalized with a concussion for several days.
    On April 25, Omon special forces militia in the city of Grodno used 
truncheons and tear gas to break up a peaceful demonstration of 
approximately 40 youths who were staging a march to mark the 
anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. Subsequently, nine demonstrators 
were detained briefly for between 2 to 4 days, including one who 
required medical attention for a concussion she received during the 
incident.
    On June 11, following a trial closed to the public, press, and 
international observers, the Supreme Court sentenced Viktar Yancheuski, 
Anatol Haurylau, and Raman Radzikouski to 11, 5, and 4 years in prison, 
respectively (Radzikouski later received amnesty) for their alleged 
roles in the murder of Lukashenko adviser and Mahileu local government 
official Yauhen Mikalutski. Mikalutski was killed in October 1997 by a 
radio-controlled car bomb. Independent local analysts speculate the 
murder was probably connected with the illegal trade of alcohol to 
Russia. Government authorities claimed that Valery Tkachev, another 
suspect in the case, committed suicide by hanging himself in a 
detention facility in December 1997. Relatives of Yancheuski, Haurylau, 
and Radzikouski claimed that government investigators used physical 
coercion against the defendants in order to try to get them to confess 
to a crime that they did not commit. The officers of the Minsk Advisory 
and Monitoring Group (AMG) of Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), who were permitted to interview the defendants, found 
that their statements of beatings while in detention were credible, 
noted that it was clear that they were under heavy psychological 
pressure to cooperate, and that they had not been given access to legal 
counsel.
    On July 17, Uladimir Antonaw, a 20-year-old member of the youth 
branch of the opposition Belarusian Popular Front, was detained by 
militia officers in Minsk for allegedly writing anti-presidential 
slogans on public buildings. No charges officially were brought against 
him, but Antonaw was detained for 5 days. Antonaw claims that militia 
officers beat him with truncheons and tried to coerce him to confess. 
The local human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Spring '96 
confirmed Antonaw's account of the treatment he received while in 
detention.
    Over 70 persons were detained briefly following demonstrations in 
Minsk and other cities on July 21 and July 27. Government security 
officials beat some of the detainees (see Section 1.c.).
    Following the July 21 demonstration, militia officers in Minsk beat 
Oleg Volchek, an opposition activist and chairman of a nongovernmental 
commission investigating the disappearance of former Internal Affairs 
Minister Yury Zakharenko. Volchek, who was treated and released that 
evening for the injuries he sustained, later filed an official 
complaint about the conduct of the militia officers with a local 
prosecutor's office. Charges of ``malicious hooliganism'' filed against 
Volchek for his participation in the demonstration later were dropped; 
however, government authorities also did not take any disciplinary 
action against the officers involved in the beating incident.
    Pavel Znavets, deputy of the 13th Supreme Soviet, illegally 
disbanded by Lukashenko after a 1996 referendum (see Section 3) also 
was detained and beaten following the July 21 demonstration. Militia 
officers in Minsk reportedly also beat Alyaksey Lapitski, a member of 
the Frantsysk Skaryna Belarusian Language Society (BLS), whom they 
detained for participating in the demonstration. A subsequent medical 
examination confirmed Lapitski's account of physical abuse. The BLS 
filed an official complaint with local authorities. There were reports 
that no disciplinary action was taken against the officers involved in 
these cases.
    On July 27, 21-year-old Yawhen Asinski was detained for allegedly 
kicking a militia officer during an opposition demonstration 
commemorating the anniversary of the declaration of Belarusian 
sovereignty from the Soviet Union (see Section 1.d.). At a news 
conference held by the human rights NGO Spring '96, following his 
release on September 6, Asinski claimed that uniformed militia and 
plainclothes government security officers hit him in the abdomen, 
kidneys, and back both before and after his arrest. According to 
Asinski, he was subjected to food and sleep deprivation during his 
first three days in detention and placed with 18 other prisoners in a 
cell meant for up to 10 persons. An OSCE observer who later interviewed 
Asinski found his claims of physical abuse to be credible. Charges of 
``malicious hooliganism'' filed against Asinski remained pending at 
year's end.
    On October 17, uniformed and plainclothes security forces beat 
demonstrators who were detained following a large antigovernment 
demonstration in Minsk (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). At least 20 of the 
demonstrators subsequently registered their accounts of physical abuse 
while in custody with the Minsk-based Independent Association for Legal 
Assistance to the Population. On October 19, police officers of the 
Sovietsky District station in Minsk beat 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy and 
well-known independent journalist Valery Schukin following his 
detention for participation in the demonstration.
    On December 13, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy Andrei Klimov, who had 
been held in pretrial detention on politically motivated charges since 
February 1998 (see Section 1.d.), was beaten severely by prison guards 
after he refused to attend a court hearing on his case. During the 
beating, Klimov suffered a concussion and other injuries. Despite the 
recommendation of examining doctors, Klimov was not permitted immediate 
hospitalization. On December 23, the Procurator General's office 
announced that it would not institute criminal proceedings against the 
officers involved in the incident since they had taken ``adequate 
measures'' with regard to Klimov.
    The Ministry of Defense announced in 1996 that ``dedovshchina,'' 
the practice of hazing new recruits, would no longer be tolerated. 
However, this practice apparently has not abated. According to official 
data, 48 cases of ``dedovshchina'' were reported during the first 8 
months of the year. During 1998 73 cases were reported.
    Prison conditions are poor, and are marked by severe overcrowding, 
shortages of food and medicine, and the spread of diseases such as 
tuberculosis, syphilis, and AIDS. Conditions at prison hospitals also 
are poor, according to human rights monitors. Detainees in pretrial 
detention facilities also reported poor conditions and denial of 
medical treatment, which contributed to their declining health while 
they awaited trial. AMG officers who visited a detention facility in 
Vitebsk during June noted that in 1 cell 16 female prisoners shared 10 
beds, while in another, 14 prisoners between the ages of 14 and 17 
shared 8 beds. During an interview with a government newspaper in 
February, the deputy procurator general acknowledged continued severe 
prison overcrowding. He stated that detention centers and corrective 
labor institutions house 150 percent of the authorized number of 
prisoners, and noted the problem facilitated the spread of contagious 
diseases. On November 3, Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakov 
publicly acknowledged that the country's total prison population 
remained at over 60,000 persons, and that prison conditions in the 
country did not meet ``basic standards.'' A government amnesty for 
lesser offenders that went into effect on January 21 was intended to 
decrease the total prison population by approximately 8,000 inmates, 
but it is unclear to what extent it was implemented. Those convicted of 
alleged ``economic crimes,'' for example, reportedly were granted 
amnesty and released from prison only after payment of financial 
restitution.
    Male and female prisoners are housed separately. Following an 
inspection of a correctional facility for women in Gomel on June 22, 
Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakov noted in an interview with 
the official press that, although it was intended to house only 1,350 
inmates, it currently held 2,800. He commented ``here women are not 
serving time but are suffering, and correctional facility Number 4 is 
our headache.''
    Human rights monitors sometimes were granted access to observe 
prison conditions, although the Government did not honor some requests 
to meet with individual prisoners. OSCE AMG officers, for example, were 
permitted to visit former Minister of Agriculture Leonov and State Farm 
Director Staravoitov (see Section 1.d.) on August 13 and 24, 
respectively. However, an official AMG request to visit Viktor Gonchar, 
who was detained on March 1 for 10 days on charges related to his 
involvement in an opposition presidential initiative, was not granted 
(see Section 1.b.). The AMG was not given access to Gonchar despite an 
appeal by the OSCE that he be released and reports that Gonchar was on 
a potentially health-threatening nonliquid hunger strike (see Section 
2.b.). Despite his weakened condition, government security officials 
released Gonchar upon completion of his sentence by dumping him from a 
car into a pile of snow near his home. Gonchar subsequently disappeared 
in September. (see Section 1.b.)
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government has 
amended only slightly its Soviet-era law on detention, and during the 
year, security forces continued to arrest arbitrarily and detain 
citizens, most often in connection with demonstrations, some of which 
were not authorized. There continued to be politically motivated 
arrests, although most of those arrested soon were released. The 
Criminal Procedure Code provides that police may detain a person 
suspected of a crime for 24 hours without a warrant, within which time 
the procurator is notified. The procurator then has 48 hours to review 
the legality of the detention. If the procurator deems the detention 
legal, a suspect can be held for a maximum of l0 days without formal 
charge. However, usually once the decision is made to hold a suspect, a 
formal charge is made. Once a suspect is charged, a trial must be 
initiated within 2 months, although in some cases the Procurator 
General can extend pretrial detention to 18 months to allow for further 
investigation. Alternatively, a suspect who has been charged can be 
released on a written pledge not to flee, in which case there is no 
time limit on the pretrial investigation. The law allows detainees the 
right to apply to the court (rather than the procurator) to determine 
the legality of their detentions. However, in practice, suspects' 
appeals to have their detentions reviewed by the courts frequently are 
suppressed because detainees are at the mercy of investigators, and 
detention officials are unwilling to forward the appeals. There is no 
provision for bail under the current legal code. According to the 
Belarusian-Helsinki Committee, in late 1998 there were 64,000 persons 
in detention.
    By law detainees may be allowed unlimited access to legal counsel, 
and, for those who cannot afford counsel, the court appoints a lawyer. 
However, investigators routinely fail to inform detainees of their 
rights and conduct preliminary interrogations without giving detainees 
an opportunity to consult counsel. The information gained then is used 
against the defendant in court. Even when appointed by the State, 
defense attorneys are subordinate to the executive branch of power.
    Detainees and lawyers both report restrictions on consultations. 
Following the arrest of opposition leader and former Prime Minister 
Mikhail Chigir on March 30, government authorities initially refused 
his request that his wife, an attorney, officially represent him. 
However, this decision later was changed to allow Mrs. Chigir to act in 
this capacity. Chigir was released on November 30, but informed that he 
still faced trial on charges of negligence and abuse of power. 
Government authorities have disbarred or threatened to disbar a number 
of attorneys who have been involved in politically sensitive cases.
    Although on August 10 the Ministry of Justice agreed to register 
the Association for Legal Assistance to the Population (ALAP), an 
independent organization that provides legal assistance to those who 
have suffered from police brutality or political persecution, it 
subjected the organization to a comprehensive ``inspection'' on October 
20, shortly after a large antigovernment demonstration during which the 
ALAP maintained that a large number of persons were beaten by 
government security officials. On November 9, the Ministry of Justice 
suspended the ALAP's license due to such irregularities as alleged 
violations of the advertising law in its newspaper advertisements. On 
December 28, the Ministry of Justice informed the ALAP that its license 
to provide legal services would not be renewed. However, the ALAP 
maintains that a license is required only to work with business 
organizations, and intends to continue to try to assist private 
individuals.
    Prominent human rights attorney Vera Stremkovskaya, who was 
threatened with disbarment by the Ministry of Justice and Minsk 
Collegium of Advocates in late 1998 for comments she made during a 
foreign trip that were critical of human rights violations in Belarus, 
was charged with slander by a local prosecutor's office on April 14. 
The charge stemmed from comments she made during judicial proceedings 
in defense of Vasiliy Staravoitov, a state farm director charged with 
embezzlement. The procurator general's office pursued the case 
throughout the year and called Stremkovskaya in for official 
questioning on September 29. However, the charge subsequently was 
dropped in late December due to lack of evidence. The treatment of 
Stremkovskaya highlighted the lack of a truly independent bar 
association and political interference in the legal process (see 
Section 1.e.).
    As in 1998, the Government again held hundreds of political 
detainees during the year. Most were peaceful participants in 
antigovernment demonstrations who were held anywhere from several hours 
to several days (see Section 2.b.). For example, Yawhen Skocha, a 
deputy chairman of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF) youth movement, 
was given a 10-day ``administrative'' sentence on February 15 for 
leading an unsanctioned, but peaceful, antigovernment demonstration the 
previous day in Minsk, following which a total of 15 persons were 
detained briefly. On June 10, Skocha was given an additional 1-year 
suspended sentence on a charge related to the demonstration--
``organization of a group action in violation of public order.''
    On May 1, 19 opposition activists, including the chairman of the 
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (BSDP), were detained briefly for 
attempting to participate in an official Labor Day celebratory event in 
Minsk. Viktor Babayed, the chairman of the Belarusian Congress of 
Democratic Trade Unions, also was detained briefly.
    On July 21, government security officers arrested and briefly 
detained 53 persons who participated in an unsanctioned, but peaceful, 
antigovernment demonstration. On July 27, 19 persons were detained for 
participating in an unsanctioned, but peaceful, demonstration to 
commemorate Belarus's 1990 declaration of sovereignty from the Soviet 
Union. BSDP chairman Mikalay Statkevich was detained following the 
demonstration and given a 10-day prison sentence for organizing the 
demonstration. However, Yawhen Asinski was held until September 6 (see 
Section 1.c.).
    On October 17, approximately 93 persons were arrested for 
participating in a large unsanctioned demonstration and protest march. 
In a series of assembly line-style court judgements, roughly 17 persons 
were sentenced to prison terms of up to 15 days, and 19 persons were 
fined. A number of opposition leaders associated with the 
demonstration, including Mikolai Statkevich and Lyudmila Gryaznova were 
arrested at their homes on the evening of October 17. A number of other 
opposition political figures went into hiding to escape wide-ranging 
roundups conducted by government security officers. Gryaznova 
subsequently was fined approximately $500 (300 million rubles) while 
Statkevich was released on October 31 following the intervention of the 
chairman of the OSCE parliamentary assembly committee on Belarus.
    On October 19, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy and United Civic Party 
deputy chairman Anatoliy Lebedko was arrested for his role in the 
October 17 demonstration. He was given a 10-day sentence even though he 
did not participate in the protest march that ended in clashes with 
security officials. Despite backing out from participating in the 
demonstration and protest march, opposition Youth Front member Yevtgeny 
Afnagel was given a 15-day sentence. While searching for his father, 
government security briefly detained the son of independent newspaper 
editor Pavel Zhuk for questioning.
    Unidentified, nonuniformed officials working for the security 
services regularly apprehend participants in antigovernment 
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). There are credible reports that 
plainclothes security officials sometimes infiltrate antigovernment 
demonstrations in order to either report on opposition protesters or 
provoke clashes between demonstrators and police. Security officers on 
occasion also preemptively have apprehended organizers and individuals 
considered to be potential participants prior to demonstrations, 
including those that had been sanctioned by the Government.
    Security force officials detained journalists and NGO officials 
during the year (See Sections 2.b. and 4.).
    Following demonstrations, government security officials have held 
some detainees incommunicado.
    In addition to the hundreds of antigovernment protestors, whom 
authorities held for several hours or days, there were several 
prominent political detainees whom the Government held for prolonged 
periods in pretrial detention, some for over a year.
    On March 30, opposition leader and former Prime Minister Mikhail 
Chigir was arrested on charges of alleged financial impropriety and 
exceeding his authority during his tenure as a head of a state bank 
several years previously. Chigir's arrest occurred just prior to a 
public ceremony to register his participation in an opposition-
organized presidential election initiative aimed at drawing attention 
to the upcoming end of Lukashenko's legal 5-year term in office. It 
also followed several warnings from government security officials to 
Chigir that to cease his political activities. He remained in pretrial 
detention until November, although the procurator's office failed to 
present any substantive or specific evidence of his alleged crimes. 
Despite protests from the OSCE and a number of foreign governments 
Chagir remained in pretrial detention until November 30. Trial 
proceedings, which government authorities indicated would be followed 
through, remained pending as of year's end.
    In February 1998, police arrested Andrei Klimov, a successful 
entrepreneur and member of the Parliament that was dissolved in late 
1996, on charges of embezzlement and other financial irregularities. 
Kilmov's supporters and some human rights observers believe that his 
arrest was politically motivated, because Klimov is an outspoken critic 
of President Lukashenko and had participated in a commission that 
examined violations of the law and the Constitution by the President. 
Klimov's period of pretrial detention was extended on several 
occasions. He was beaten severely by prison guards in December (see 
Section 1.c.). As of year's end, Klimov remained in detention while his 
trial, which began on July 22, continued.
    Former director of the joint-stock agribusiness (Rassvet) Vasiliy 
Staravoitov and former Agriculture Minister Vasily Leonov were arrested 
in late 1997 for allegedly embezzling state credits. Authorities denied 
appeals for their release on their own recognizance due to age and poor 
health. The trial of the 75-year-old Staravoitov, which officially 
began in November 1998, was delayed repeatedly due to his weak physical 
condition aggravated by poor prison conditions. On May 30, Staravoitov 
was found guilty and sentenced to foreiture of property and 2 years 
(including time already served) in a labor camp. Staravoitov was 
released on November 11 after completion of his sentence. Domestic 
human rights groups believe that both Staravoitov and Leonov were 
arrested to draw attention away from a poor harvest on heavily 
subsidized state farms. The Government is dedicated to maintaining a 
Soviet model of agriculture and Rassvet's demonstrated independence in 
implementing reforms not sanctioned by the Government apparently posed 
a threat to such efforts. Immediately following Staravoitov's arrest, 
the Government renationalized his company. The trial of Leonov, which 
began in Minsk on August 17, was ongoing at year's end. While in 
detention, Leonov has suffered two heart attacks. Leonov also initiated 
a hunger strike to protest the initial refusal by prison authorities to 
provide him with medical supplies brought by his relatives.
    Former National Bank chairwoman Tamara Vinnikova was arrested in 
January 1997 on allegations of malfeasance during her previous tenure 
as head of a state bank. The timing of her arrest, which coincided with 
her increasingly public challenges to President Lukashenko's economic 
policies, led observers to suspect a political motive. Due to her 
failing health, following 10 months in a KGB facility, Vinnikova was 
allowed to continue her period of pretrial detention under house arrest 
beginning in November 1997. While under house arrest, her visitors and 
incoming phone calls were monitored around-the-clock by guards from the 
Presidential Security Service. On April 8, Vinnikova disappeared. She 
was apparently able to escape from her guards and eventually make it to 
another country. Following her reappearance in mid-December, Vinnikova 
claimed in a radio news interview she went into hiding in order to 
escape a suspected conspiracy against her life (see Section 1.b.).
    Statistics on the current number of persons in pretrial detention 
and the average length of pretrial detention were not available. As of 
August 1998, there were approximately 11,000 persons in pretrial 
detention.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however in practice the judiciary is not 
independent and largely is unable to act as a check on the executive 
branch and its agents. Reforms adopted to support the independence of 
the judiciary in 1995 were not implemented. Without major structural 
reforms, the independence of the judiciary cannot be realized. The 
November 1996 constitutional referendum further subordinated the 
judiciary to the executive branch by giving the President the power to 
appoint 6 of the 12 members of the Constitutional Court, including the 
chairman. The remaining six are appointed by the Council of the 
Republic, which itself is composed of individuals appointed by the 
President or elected by individuals influenced by the President. The 
President also appoints the chairmen of the Supreme Court and the 
Supreme Economic Court. The President also has authority under the 
Constitution to appoint and dismiss all district and military judges.
    The criminal justice system follows the former Soviet model and has 
three tiers: District courts; regional courts; and the Supreme Court. 
Several modifications have been made, brought about by the passage of 
the new Constitution, including direct presidential appointments. The 
Constitutional Court was established in 1994 to adjudicate serious 
constitutional issues, but, dependent on the executive branch, it does 
not challenge presidential initiatives. In addition the Constitutional 
Court has no means to enforce its decisions.
    Judges adjudicate trials; only in capital offense trials in which 
the defendant pleads not guilty and demands a jury trial do juries 
determine innocence or guilt. Judges are dependent on the Ministry of 
Justice for sustaining court infrastructure and on local executive 
branch officials for providing their personal housing. In addition 
judges owe their positions to the President. Although the Procurator's 
Office categorically denies it, there are widespread and credible 
reports that ``telephone justice'' (the practice of executive and local 
authorities dictating to the courts the outcome of trials) continues.
    On February 24, Belarusian judge Yury Sushkov announced at a press 
conference in Germany that he had asked for political asylum from 
German authorities. Sushkov claimed that KGB officials forced him to 
sentence two Belarusian customs officers to several years in prison, 
despite a lack of conclusive evidence of their guilt. He stated that he 
could no longer, ``make dishonest decisions and act against principles 
of juridical consciousness.''
    On August 5, while on an inspection tour in the Brest oblast in the 
western part of the country, Lukashenko told local reporters that he 
personally exercised control over ``certain'' ongoing judicial cases, 
including that of former Prime Minister and opposition leader Mikhail 
Chigir (see Section 1.d.). Lukashenko stated, ``I have them under 
control, I am not going to allow any injustice there myself.'' On 
August 30, during a government interagency commission on crime covered 
by the official media, President Lukashenko reportedly stated, ``It is 
natural for the Head of State to exercise control over one criminal 
case or another . . . especially in our country, where the Head of 
State controls all the branches of power--legislative, executive, and 
judicial.''
    Prosecutors, like the courts, are organized into offices at the 
district, regional, and republic levels. They are ultimately 
responsible to, and serve at the pleasure of, the Procurator General 
who, according to the Constitution, is appointed by the Council of the 
Republic.
    In May 1997, Lukashenko issued presidential decree number 12, 
``Several Measures on Improving the Practice of Lawyers and Notaries,'' 
which, according to international legal experts and human rights 
monitors, seriously compromised the independence of lawyers from the 
Government. The decree, which ostensibly was issued in response to 
allegedly exorbitant attorneys' fees, subordinated all lawyers to the 
Ministry of Justice, which controls the licensing of lawyers, and 
placed the bar association under much greater Ministry of Justice 
control.
    During 1997 and 1998, the Government used the decree to strip 
several lawyers of their licenses, including President Lukashenko's 
political opponents, such as former Supreme Soviet chairman Mecheslav 
Gryb, and prominent defense attorneys Garry Pogonyailo and Nadezhda 
Dudareva. Human rights activist and defense attorney Vera Stremkovskaya 
was threatened with disbarment following her public criticisms of the 
Government while on a visit abroad in 1998. She was charged with 
``slander'' in April for comments she made in a court while defending a 
client. The charge was dropped later in the year (see Section 1.d.).
    The Constitution provides for public trials, although exceptions 
can be made in cases established by law (for example, in cases of rape 
or on grounds of national security). Defendants have the legal right to 
attend proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence on their 
own behalf. However, these rights are not always respected in practice. 
Defendants' legal right to be represented by counsel also is not always 
respected in practice. While the 1996 Constitution establishes a 
presumption of innocence, in practice defendants frequently must prove 
their innocence.
    Both defendants and prosecutors have the right of appeal, and most 
criminal cases are appealed, according to legal sources. In appeals 
neither defendants nor witnesses appear before the court; the court 
merely reviews the protocol and other documents from the lower court's 
trial. Appeals rarely result in reversals of verdicts. In criminal 
cases, the prosecution has the right to appeal an acquittal for retrial 
to a higher court on the same charge.
    On July 22, according to the OSCE's AMG, the well-known lawyer, 
journalist, human rights activist, and 13th Supreme Soviet deputy 
Valeri Shchukin was detained illegally in a court building while 
attempting to attend the trial of Andrei Klimov (see Section 1.d.). The 
trial proceedings were open to the public. In front of OSCE observers 
and acting without any legal basis or written order, militia officers 
removed Shchukin from the building by force. Shchukin summarily was 
given a 15-day prison sentence for ``petty hooliganism'' by a judge 
who, by way of explanation to one of the OSCE officers, stated that the 
action was taken because Shchukin was ``not normal.'' Shchukin 
subsequently was released after serving 7 days of the sentence.
    Antigovernment protestors arrested after demonstrations were 
subjected to assembly line style trials, sometimes without the right to 
counsel or the opportunity to present evidence or call witnesses.
    On February 23, political prisoner and BNF youth front member 
Aleksei Shidlovskiy was released from prison 2 days prior to the 
conclusion of one year of an 18-month sentence for ``malicious 
hooliganism with extreme cynicism'' in a hard-regime labor camp. The 
charges stemmed from his alleged spray painting of antipresidential 
slogans in August 1997. Despite his youth (Shidlovskiy turned 19 while 
in detention) and the nonviolent nature of the charges, Shidlovskiy was 
denied release pending trial. During the trial, Shidlovskiy and Vadim 
Labkovicyh, another teenage defendant in the case, were held in a 
guarded cage as if they were dangerous criminals. A representative of 
Human Rights Watch who observed the trial in February 1998 referred to 
it as an ``absurd parody of criminal justice and a grotesque show trial 
aimed at intimidating young people from expressing their opposition to 
the current regime.'' The sentence of Labkovich, who also was held for 
6 months in pretrial detention, was suspended and no further action has 
been taken against him. The prolonged and harsh pretrial detention, the 
punitive use of what apparently was a relatively minor charge, and the 
disproportionate nature of the sentences handed down to Shidlovskiy and 
Labkovich were both excessive and reminiscent of Soviet-era practices 
(see Section 1.c.).
    Vladimir Kudinov was convicted in 1997 and sentenced to 7 years in 
prison and full confiscation of property for allegedly bribing a police 
officer. He is considered by many opposition activists and human rights 
observers to be a victim of political persecution. Prior to his arrest, 
Kudinov was an active and vocal critic of President Lukashenko. 
Government authorities first began to harass Kudinov in 1995 during his 
campaign for a seat in the Supreme Soviet. In 1996 Kudinov signed an 
impeachment petition against Lukashenko. His conviction and lengthy 
sentence appear to fit a government pattern of using charges of alleged 
economic related crimes to silence and intimidate critics. As part of a 
general presidential amnesty, Kudinov's sentence was reduced by 1 year 
in January.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection against 
illegal interference in a citizen's personal life, including invasion 
of privacy, telephone, and other communications. However, the 
Government does not respect these rights in practice. Although the 
inviolability of the home also is provided for by the Constitution, 
which states that, ``no one shall have the right to enter, without 
legal reason, the dwelling and other legal property of a citizen 
against such a citizen's will,'' in practice, government monitoring of 
residences, telephones, and computers continued unabated. The KGB is 
widely believed to enter homes without warrants, conduct unauthorized 
searches, and read mail. Political, human rights, and other NGO's 
believe that their conversations and correspondence are monitored 
routinely by the security services. Some opposition figures have 
reported a reluctance to visit some foreign embassies due to fear of 
reprisal.
    Nearly all opposition political figures assume that the Government 
monitors their activities and conversations. The Lukashenko Government 
did nothing to refute these assumptions. Militia officers assigned to 
stand outside diplomatic missions are known to keep records of visits 
by political opposition leaders. In addition even government officials 
do not appear to be exempt from monitoring.
    On February 12, militia in Gomel, claiming a bomb threat in the 
building, conducted an illegal search of the local office of the 
Belarusian Helsinki Committee, a human rights NGO. No bomb was found, 
but the militia officers seized 14,000 leaflets concerning the recently 
declared opposition presidential election initiative.
    On April 26, just short of a month after his arrest on charges of 
alleged financial impropriety, the office of former Prime Minister 
Mikhail Chigir was broken into. A computer containing data related to 
an opposition political campaign in which Chigir was participating was 
stolen, along with other equipment. Opposition activists allege that, 
in view of the almost certain continual government surveillance of the 
office, government security officials likely were behind the incident.
    On May 11, government security officers in Minsk used the pretext 
of a bomb threat to search the offices of the Francisak Skaryna 
Belarusian Language Society (BLS). The involvement of the BLS in an 
ongoing opposition presidential election initiative suggests a 
political motive for the incident.
    On May 14, Ministry of Interior officers searched the Minsk office 
of Irex/Promedia, an international organization involved in the 
implementation of projects to strengthen independent newspapers, 
without legal authorization. The local head of the organization, her 
daughter, and a staff member were questioned by these officers over a 
period of several hours. The OSCE later protested the incident with 
government authorities.
    On September 11 and October 28, under the pretext of looking for 
the offices of an independent newspaper that tax inspectors were trying 
to shut down, police officers attempted to search the headquarters of 
the opposition United Civic Party in Minsk without a warrant.
    The KGB, MVD, and certain border guard detachments have the right 
to request permission to install wiretaps, but under the law must 
obtain a prosecutor's permission before installation. The Presidential 
Guard (or security service) formed in 1995 reportedly conducted 
surveillance activities of the President's political opponents. There 
is no judicial or legislative oversight of the Presidential Guard's 
budget or activities, and the executive branch repeatedly has thwarted 
attempts to exercise such oversight.
    In June the National Assembly revised the administrative offenses 
code to increase the penalties for those who obstruct KGB officers. For 
example, a new article prohibits preventing KGB officers from entering 
the premises of a company, establishment or organization, and for 
failing to allow audits or checks to be made, as well as for 
unjustified restriction or refusal to provide information, including 
access to company information systems and data bases.
    In early 1997, the Ministry of Communications renegotiated 
contracts for supplying telephone service. The new contracts forbid 
subscribers from using telephone communications for purposes that run 
counter to state interests and public order. The Ministry has the right 
to terminate telephone service to those who breach this provision.
    Presidential decree number 218, issued in March 1997, prohibits the 
import and export of printed, audio, and visual information that could 
``damage'' the economic and political interests of the country (see 
Section 2.a.).
    In October security forces searching for his father detained the 
young son of a newspaper editor (see Section 1.d.).
    On November 23, President Lukashenko signed decree number 40, which 
allowed the Government to nationalize the property of any individual if 
the President determines that the individual has caused financial 
damage to the State.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech, as well as the freedom to receive, retain, and 
disseminate information; however, the Government restricts these rights 
in practice. The executive branch continued its suppression of freedom 
of speech. Despite the constitutional provisions, a 1998 government 
decree limited citizens' right to express their opinions. As part of an 
overall crackdown on opposition activity, the Government stepped up its 
campaign of harassment against the independent media. Although the 
Constitution prohibits a monopoly of mass media, the Government also 
continued to restrict severely the right to a free press through near-
monopolies on the means of production and on national level broadcast 
media and by denying accreditation of journalists critical of the 
regime. The Government also kept up economic pressure on the 
independent media by pressuring advertisers to withdraw advertisements, 
as well as through fines and other administrative harassment. Employees 
at some state-run enterprises are discouraged from subscribing to 
independent newspapers and journals.
    In 1996 President Lukashenko signed a decree ordering that all 
editors in chief of state-supported newspapers would henceforth be 
official state employees and would become members of the appropriate 
local level government council. Another decree granted the Ministry of 
Press the authority to assign graduates of state supported journalism 
schools to work in state-owned media organizations as a means of 
payment for their schooling. These decrees remain in effect.
    Presidential decree number 5, issued in 1997, prohibits a range of 
broadly defined activities and limits freedom of expression. For 
example, the decree prohibits individuals from carrying placards or 
flags bearing emblems that are not registered officially with the 
State, as well as ``emblems, symbols, and posters whose content is 
intended to harm the State and public order, rights, and legal 
interests of the citizens.'' The decree also bans activities that are 
``humiliating to the dignity and honor of the executive persons of 
state bodies.''
    On March 2, government authorities in the Lenin region of Grodno 
launched an investigation of the activities of cartoonist Alexsei Surov 
on suspicion of insulting the honor and dignity of high-ranking 
government officials. The investigation was opened on the basis of a 
small booklet of political cartoons about President Lukashenko by 
Surov. Surov's workplace at the Grodno puppet theater also was 
searched. A local prosecutor reportedly later decided to close the 
case.
    On October 14, police officers in Minsk detained for 5 hours a 13 
year old boy, Roman Shkor, who was handing out leaflets advertising an 
upcoming opposition demonstration. The leaflets were confiscated.
    On November 7, police officers in the town of Borisov briefly 
detained Alesya Yasyuk, a member of the Belarusian Social Democratic 
Party (BDSP), after she displayed at a public event the traditional 
white-red-white national flag now associated with the opposition.
    The Defamation Law makes no distinction between private and public 
persons for the purposes of lawsuits for defamation of character. A 
public figure who has been criticized for poor performance in office 
may ask the public prosecutor to sue the newspaper that printed the 
criticism. In June 1998, the lower house of the National Assembly 
approved a bill that stipulated that public insults or libel against 
the President could be punished by up to 4 years in prison, 2 years in 
a labor camp, or a large fine. However, there were no reports that 
anyone has been arrested or charged subsequently for this offense, and 
the bill apparently was devised principally as a means of intimidation.
    In 1997 the Council of Ministers issued a decree that prohibited 
and restricted the movement of goods across customs borders. The decree 
specifically prohibited the import and export of printed, audio, and 
video materials, or other news media containing information that could 
damage the economic and political interests of the country. Some 
bulletins affiliated with the opposition published outside of the 
country appeared to be targeted by the decree, and there were a number 
of incidents in 1997-98 in which customs officials confiscated 
opposition materials at the country's borders.
    In January 1998, more stringent regulatory provisions, introduced 
by amendments to the Law on Press and Other Mass Media that were 
adopted by the Council of the Republic in December 1997, went into 
effect. The new regulatory provisions grant greater authority to the 
Government to ban and censor critical reporting. For example the State 
Committee on the Press was given authority to suspend for 3 months 
publication of periodicals or newspapers without a court ruling.
    In December 1998, new regulations went into effect restricting the 
distribution of legal information to specially licensed media. The 
regulations required the independent media that publish legal acts to 
apply for licenses from a commission under the Ministry of Justice; 
several independent informational bulletins subsequently were denied 
licenses.
    On December 17, President Lukashenko signed new amendments to the 
law ``On Press and Other Media.'' The amendments ban the media from 
disseminating information on behalf of political parties, trade unions, 
and NGO's that are not registered with the Ministry of Justice.
    Independent newspapers are widely available in Minsk, but outside 
of the capital most towns carry only local newspapers, only some of 
which are independent. On February 17, the State Committee on the Press 
officially warned six independent newspapers (Naviny, Narodnaya Volya, 
Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, Imya, Zhoda, and Pahonya) that they 
risked closure if they continued to publish information about an 
opposition presidential election initiative aimed at drawing attention 
to the approaching end of Lukashenko's 5-year legal presidential term. 
Mikhail Podgainy, the head of the State Committee on the Press, 
announced publicly that the newspapers would be shut if they ignored 
the warning. On May 13, the Supreme Economic Court dismissed appeals 
filed by the independent newspapers that there were no grounds on which 
the State Committee on the Press could issue such an official warning.
    On May 26, the State Committee on the Press issued its second 
warning to Naviny after it published an article entitled ``Carbuncules 
of Lawfulness'' for which the newspaper was accused of ``inciting 
social discord and defaming police officers.'' The Supreme Economic 
Court upheld the warning on August 26, following an appeal by Naviny. 
On June 24, the State Committee on the Press issued its second warning 
to Imya for an article the newspaper published relating to President 
Lukashenko. Under the December 1997 amendments to the Law on Press and 
Other Media, newspapers can be banned if two warnings are issued. The 
Committee to Protect Journalists and Article 19, another international 
NGO, both sent open letters to the Government expressing concern about 
the possible closure of independent newspapers.
    In addition to warnings from the State Committee on the Press, the 
judiciary and security services also were used to exert pressure on the 
independent media. For example on July 26, Judge Nadezhda Chmara, the 
presiding judge in the trial of former state farm director Staravoitov 
(see Section 1.d.), won a libel suit against Belorusskaya Delovaya 
Gazeta. Chmara claimed that the newspaper in one of its articles on the 
case had accused her indirectly of professional misconduct. Belorusskya 
Delovaya Gazeta was ordered to print a retraction and to pay the judge 
an unprecedented fine of approximately $6,550 (or 2 billion rubles at 
the then official rate). The ruling is currently under appeal by the 
newspaper. The ruling was appealed by the newspaper.
    On September 24, the newspaper Naviny lost a libel suit brought 
against it by National Security Council Chairman Viktor Sheiman for an 
article that had implied that Sheiman possessed property valued beyond 
what his official salary could provide. Sheiman apparently was ordered 
to file the lawsuit during a September 16 meeting with President 
Lukashenko. The newspaper and one of its reporters were ordered to pay 
a combined fine of approximately $30,000 (10 billion rubles at the then 
official rate). The unprecedented size of the fine forced Naviny, which 
published its last issue on September 29, into bankruptcy. Newsprint 
owned by the paper was confiscated by government authorities, and its 
bank account was frozen. On October 26, tax officials in Minsk 
inventoried the personal property of Naviny editor Pavel Zhuk. On 
November 8, a Minsk city court upheld the libel judgement, which had 
been appealed by Naviny.
    On September 30, the Belarusian State Committee on the Press 
annulled the registration certificates of nine independent newspapers 
and periodicals, including a successor newspaper to Naviny, on the 
pretext that they had not submitted documentary approval of their 
office addresses. The registration certificates later were renewed on 
November 4.
    On March 2, government security officials raided the offices of the 
independent newspaper Pahonya in Grodno and confiscated material 
related to the opposition's May 16 presidential election initiative. On 
April 7, KGB officers detained and questioned Naviny journalist Aleh 
Hruzdzilovich for several hours. Hruzdzilovich recently had written an 
article entitled, ``A Secret Plan Against the Opposition,'' based on a 
reportedly confidential government document outlining methods to be 
used to crack down on the opposition.
    On July 22, militia officers and government prosecutors searched 
the offices of Imya, confiscated computer equipment, and briefly 
detained for questioning chief editor Irina Khalip. A local 
prosecutor's office in Minsk recently had begun an investigation into a 
criminal case of libel against the newspaper for an article in which it 
detailed infighting and high level corruption within the Government. In 
a letter sent to the Minister of Justice, the Paris-based human rights 
NGO Reporters Sans Frontieres protested the judicial harassment of 
Khalip.
    Also in July, OSCE Freedom of Media representative Freimunt Duve 
issued a public statement protesting reported threats by government 
security officers against Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta chief editor 
Piotr Martsev, whose paper also had published a series of articles 
detailing government corruption and infighting. On October 4, Duve sent 
a letter of complaint to the Foreign Minister concerning the 
Government's ``continued attempts to stifle freedom of expression.''
    On November 4, two independent journalists were barred from 
attending a government conference on health care issues held at Brest 
regional executive committee offices. However, state media 
representatives were permitted to cover the event. A spokesperson for 
the Brest regional executive committee explained that, in addition to 
accreditation, journalists were required to have the permission of the 
executive committee chairman to observe its meetings.
    Until government authorities shut it down during 1996, Radio 101.2 
had been the sole Belarusian language independent station in the 
country. The Belarusian Patriotic Union of Youth, a government-
subsidized presidential youth organization, was permitted to take 
control of Radio 101.2.
    State-controlled Belarusian television and radio (B-TR) maintains 
its monopoly as the only nationwide television station. Its news 
programs regularly featured reporting heavily biased in favor of the 
Government and refused to provide an outlet for opposing viewpoints. 
Local, independent television stations operated in some areas, and were 
relatively unimpeded in reporting on local news. However, some of these 
stations reported that they were under pressure not to report on 
national-level issues or were subject to censorship.
    Broadcasts into the country from Russian television stations 
represent the only significant source of independent information from 
broadcast media and constitute a frequent source of irritation to the 
Lukashenko Government. However, to transmit their video material to 
Moscow, Russian stations rely on the B-TR broadcasting facility. 
According to Russian television crews, authorities sometimes have tried 
to limit access to this facility, although there were no reports of 
this occurring during the year.
    On May 21, the government newspaper Respublika criticized 
Belarusian language programs broadcast by a Polish radio station in 
Warsaw for negative reporting about President Lukashenko.
    In March 1998, the presidential administration issued an internal 
directive entitled ``On Strengthening Countermeasures Against Articles 
in the Opposition Press.'' The directive specifically lists 10 
independent media organizations covered by these provisions, and 
prohibits government officials from making comments or distributing 
documents to non-state media. It also forbids state enterprises from 
advertising in non-state media. Although the directive does not 
restrict directly independent media or impinge on the right of citizens 
to receive information, it does restrict government officials in 
speaking to the independent media and gives further advantages to the 
state press.
    On January 6, Anna Shidlovskaya, a correspondent for the 
independent news service Belapan and newspaper Belorusskaya Delovaya 
Gazeta, was prevented from attending an open session of the Gomel 
executive committee by the head of the committee's information 
department. The independent Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ) 
later protested the decision to order Shidlovskaya out of a conference 
hall 5 minutes before the executive committee was due to meet.
    A 1997 Council of Ministers decree nullified the accreditation of 
all correspondents and required all foreign media correspondents to 
apply for reaccreditation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the 
application form for accreditation requested biographic information, as 
well as a record of the applicant's journalistic activity. Journalists 
who were residents of Belarus also were required to register with the 
state tax authorities. The impact of the decree is still unclear, 
although it does not appear that the Government specifically invoked 
the decree during 1998 or this year as a tool to exclude certain 
journalists.
    On June 20, the poet Vladimir Neklyayev, who chaired the Belarusian 
Writers' Union, sought asylum in Poland. Neklyayev accused government 
authorities of disrespect for the Belarusian language, history, and 
culture and claimed that recent financial inspections of a magazine 
that he edited were motivated politically.
    On August 11, the international NGO Reporters Sans Frontiers 
described Belarus as an enemy of the Internet. A public statement 
issued by the organization noted that citizens were not free to explore 
Internet independently. Although there are several Internet providers 
in the country they all are state controlled. The Government's state 
monopoly on Internet service offers high prices, poor quality, and 
limited service, and allows for the monitoring of practically all e-
mail traffic. Although the Government has full control, it does not 
appear to be cutting off access entirely, and those who do have access 
appear to be able to contact a full range of unfiltered international 
web sites.
    The Government restricts academic freedom. A sharply critical Human 
Rights Watch report released in Minsk on July 27 detailed government 
restrictions on academic freedom. The report noted that the Lukashenko 
Government had suppressed research on controversial topics, 
recentralized academic decision making, and maintained a ban on 
political activity on campuses. At the same time, a ``systematic 
crackdown'' on political dissent on campuses had targeted outspoken 
students and lecturers who were threatened with expulsion, often for 
their off-campus political activity. The report also asserted that 
state university authorities issue reprimands and warnings to 
politically active lecturers, independent historians, and other 
academics. It stated that university employees who challenge the status 
quo are told to curtail political activities or change the focus of 
their academic inquiry. University administrators target research into 
politically sensitive issues, such as the Belarusian independence 
movement during the Soviet era, a theme that is seen to challenge the 
State's policy of integration with Russian and is discouraged actively.
    The Government continued to harass students engaged in 
antigovernment activities, such as demonstrations. Aleksey Shidlovskiy, 
who was released in February from a hard labor facility where he had 
been sentenced for spray painting antipresidential graffiti (see 
Section 1.e.), was expelled from his university while in pretrial 
detention. Members of the propresidential, government-funded Belarusian 
Patriotic Union of Youth served as the regime's watchdog against 
antigovernment activities. Moreover, members of the Union reportedly 
received preferential treatment at state schools.
    On December 21, Ales Ostrovsky, a professor at the Grodno State 
Medical Institute, was detained for 2 days and reprimanded by local 
authorities for allegedly ``violating public discipline'' after he 
attempted to speak out against the Belarus-Russia Union Treaty during a 
meeting of the pro-Lukashenko Belarusian Patriotic Youth Union. He also 
reportedly was warned by the rector of his university not to violate 
``labor discipline.''
    In 1997 the Council of Ministers issued a decree, effective as of 
the 1997-98 academic year, requiring students who receive free 
university education from the state to accept jobs assigned by the 
Government upon graduation. It remains unclear to what extent this 
decree is actually enforced. On May 30, 15 members of the youth wing of 
the Belarusian social democratic party staged a demonstration in Minsk 
against the practice, including the reported assigning of students to 
jobs in areas contaminated by radiation by the Chernobyl disaster.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government 
restricts this right in practice. Organizers must apply at least 15 
days in advance to local officials for permission to conduct a 
demonstration, rally, or meeting. The local government must respond 
with a decision not later than 5 days prior to the scheduled event.
    President Lukashenko issued decree number 5 in March 1997 in part 
to regulate what he termed the ``orgy'' of street protests taking 
place. The decree further limited citizens' ability to assemble 
peacefully by restricting the locations where rallies may take place 
and allowing local authorities to put strict limits on the number of 
participants. The decree also prohibited the display of unregistered 
flags and symbols, as well as placards bearing messages deemed 
threatening to the State or public order (see Section 2.a.). The 
decree, along with subsequent amendments adopted by the acting 
legislature, imposed severe penalties on those who violate the law, 
particularly the organizers of events. Although the decree allows for 
either monetary fines or detention for up to 15 days, courts frequently 
impose high fines knowing that those convicted cannot pay. When 
individuals fail to pay fines, authorities threaten to confiscate their 
property. The courts punished organizers of rallies with fines of 
several times the average monthly wage.
    In late January, an opposition coalition ``congress of democratic 
forces'' undertook to arrange for alternative presidential elections to 
be held from May 6 to May 16 in order to draw attention to the end of 
President Lukashenko's legal 5-year term in office (See section 3). In 
response, authorities initiated a widespread crackdown on opposition 
political activities throughout the country. Procurator General Oleg 
Bozhelko warned in a public statement on February 8 that participation 
in the opposition initiative could result in prosecution for attempting 
to ``seize power unconstitutionally and destabilizing society.''
    Public demonstrations occurred frequently in Minsk but were always 
under strict government control, including through open videotaping of 
the participants by the police and plainclothes security officers. 
Demonstrations also occurred in other parts of the country, but were 
less frequent in areas in the east close to the border with Russia. 
Following some sanctioned and unsanctioned demonstrations police and 
other security officials continued to round up, beat, detain, and try 
to coerce forced confessions from some demonstration participants (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    On April 2, 13th Supreme Soviet deputies Anatoliy Lebedko and 
Valery Shchukin were detained for leading an unsanctioned demonstration 
to protest comments by some government officials hinting at a possible 
redeployment of nuclear weapons into the country. Local authorities had 
notified the demonstration organizers at the last moment that their 
march could not be held. Lebedko was held in administrative detention 
for 3 days and fined approximately $150 (44 million rubles). Shchukin 
was given a 5-day sentence. Approximately 18 other persons also were 
detained after the march, including one who required hospitalization 
after a beating inflicted by security officers (see Section 1.c.).
    On April 16, a local court fined Valeri Kostko and Dimitri 
Bondarenko, members of the local human rights NGO's Belarusian Helsinki 
Committee and Charter '97, the equivalent of about $150 (44 million 
rubles) and $160 (47 million rubles), respectively, for leading a 
demonstration in Minsk on February 27. Although the demonstrators had 
received approval to march on a public sidewalk, they were fined after 
being forced to use a lane in the street because the sidewalk was 
blocked by snow.
    On April 21, a court in Grodno fined Association of Belarusian 
Poles chairman Tadeusz Gavin approximately $230 (67 million rubles) for 
leading an unsanctioned demonstration on April 17. Local authorities 
twice earlier had denied the Association of Belarusian Poles permission 
to hold a demonstration.
    On April 25, special forces militia troops in Grodno used force to 
break up an unsanctioned, but peaceful, opposition demonstration (see 
Section 1.c.).
    On April 27, a court in Grodno sentenced local United Civic Party 
and Entrepreneurs' Association chairman Valery Levonevsky to 13 days in 
prison for allegedly staging an unsanctioned demonstration near the 
offices of the local executive committee. Levonevsky, who pleaded not 
guilty to the charges, claimed that he had had an appointment within 
the building in question and that the arrest probably was made only as 
a precautionary measure because of a scheduled upcoming session in 
Grodno of the parliamentary assembly of the Belarusian-Russian Union.
    On May 1, 19 persons, including the chairman of the Belarusian 
Social Democratic Party, were detained in Minsk for attempting to 
participate in an officially sanctioned Labor Day celebration. Charges 
later were dropped against the participants (see Section 1.d.).
    In June 1998, following numerous complaints filed by citizens and 2 
days of public hearings, the Minsk city council passed a resolution 
that called for the Ministry of Interior to consider ways of preserving 
public order during demonstrations that did not violate civil rights 
and to increase the personal accountability of its officers. However, 
the effect of this resolution, if any, appears principally to have been 
that security forces usually try to detain individuals after 
demonstrations already have concluded and to do so out of sight of 
witnesses.
    On June 15, Minsk city officials denied permission to the 
Belarusian Social Democratic Party and Belarusian Popular Front to hold 
a demonstration against war, dictatorship, and fascism, citing the 
deaths of 52 people in a stampede in a metro station 3 weeks earlier to 
justify their decision.
    Over 70 persons were detained briefly following demonstrations in 
Minsk and other cities on July 21 and July 27. Government security 
officials beat some of the detainees (see Section l.c.). BSDP chairman 
Mikalay Statkevich was detained and sentenced to 10 days in prison for 
leading the sanctioned July 27 protest on an unauthorized march route. 
Government authorities also subsequently opened an investigation 
against Statkevich for ``disrupting public order,'' a charge that could 
carry up to 3 years in prison.
    Four participants (Grodno medical institute lecturer Ales 
Ostrovsky, BNF local leader Sergei Malchik, Pahonya editor Nikolai 
Markevich, and businessman Nikolai Voron) in an antigovernment 
demonstration in Grodno on July 21 were given fines of between about 
$100 (30 million rubles) and about $400 (120 million rubles), 
exceptionaly high in a country where the average monthly wage was then 
$40 (12 million rubles). Since they could not pay immediately, local 
authorities reportedly indicated that they would begin to confiscate 
their property. According to Ostrovsky, local authorities also told him 
that 20 percent of his monthly salary would be deducted until his fine 
was paid.
    On December 8, following a small unsanctioned protest in Minsk 
against the signing of a union treaty between Belarus and Russia, at 
least six demonstrators, including Belarusian Popular Front deputy 
chairman Vyuacheslav Sivchik and noted poet Slavomir Adamovich, were 
briefly detained. Dmitry Kasperovich, a 17-year-old member of the 
Popular Front's youth wing lost a tooth while being taken into custody. 
On December 15, Sivchik was fined about $300 (218 million rubles). 
Others were given lesser fines or official warnings.
    In connection with a new presidential decree entitled ``On Measures 
to Prevent Emergencies During Mass Events'' promulgated in early 
September, President Lukashenko told high level security officers in a 
September 16 meeting that opposition demonstrations in Minsk should be 
allowed only at locations outside of the city's center. It subsequently 
became more difficult to obtain permission to hold public protests. 
Opposition party organizers were denied permission to hold a March for 
Freedom demonstration, which had been planned for the downtown area on 
October 17. When protesters decided nevertheless to march toward the 
center of Minsk, special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
blocked their way and forcibly dispersed the crowd (see Section 1.d.). 
The acting head of the OSCE office in Minsk noted publicly on October 
18 that the refusal by Minsk city authorities to allow the March was 
``at the base of the conflict.''
    On October 22, Minsk city authorities also banned the annual Dzyzdy 
commemorative march held in Minsk. However, as the march route led away 
from the center of Minsk, government security officials did not prevent 
opposition supporters from going through with the march.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government does not respect this right in practice. According to 
members of parties in opposition to the President, authorities 
frequently deny permission to opposition groups to meet in public 
buildings. Employees at state-run enterprises are discouraged from 
joining independent trade unions, and the Ministry of Justice long 
denied registration to the Congress of Independent Trade Unions (see 
Section 6.a.). The Government regularly harasses members and supporters 
of opposition parties, and confiscates their leaflets and publications. 
Government officials have warned alumni of foreign-sponsored education 
programs against continued affiliation with their program's sponsoring 
agency.
    On January 26, just before a coalition of opposition parties held a 
large ``congress of democratic forces,'' President Lukashenko issued 
decree number 2 requiring that all political parties, trade unions, and 
nongovernmental organizations reregister with authorities by July 1. 
Such public associations already had completed a lengthy reregistration 
process in 1995. The timing of the decree, which increased the scope of 
operations and number of members organizations would need to 
demonstrate to qualify for reregistration, apparently was intended as a 
method of political intimidation at a time of increased opposition 
activity. On July 1, regulations prohibiting private organizations from 
using private residences as their legal addresses were announced. In 
view of Government control or ownership of many office buildings, the 
regulations had the effect of complicating the reregistration process.
    The deadline for reregistration subsequently was extended until 
August 1 and again to October 1. Although most of the major political 
parties, unions, and NGO's that applied eventually were allowed to 
reregister, the process in practice often was complicated and drawn 
out. After the reregistration period had begun, government authorities 
announced that organizations would have to alter their charters to 
indicate recognition of the 1996 Constitution, and that the words 
``popular'' or ``national'' could not be used in their titles. On 
December 17, an amendment to the law on public associations officially 
went into effect that prohibits political and social organizations from 
using the words ``Belarus,'' ``Republic of Belarus,'' ``National,'' or 
``Popular'' in their titles. The Belarusian Association of Poles was 
denied reregistration twice before finally getting approval. The All-
Belarusian Club of Voters was given permission to reregister in mid-
November only after suing government authorities in court. As of year's 
end, the Association of Young Politicians, headed by well-known 
opposition leader Anatoliy Lebedko, the Belarusian Human Rights League, 
and the Belarusian Independent Association of Industrial Trade Unions 
had not been allowed to reregister. On December 17, President 
Lukashenko signed into law a bill on amendments to the Administrative 
Offenses Code that would make any work on behalf of unregistered NGO's 
punishable by fines. On December 27, the amendments entered into force. 
By the end of the year, the Ministry of Justice had reregistered 17 of 
27 political parties (18 had applied), and 38 of 42 national trade 
unions. Of approximately 2,500 NGO's, approximately 1,316 were 
reregistered.
    In April the Ministry of Justice blocked efforts by the Belarus 
Lambda League, the country's first and only lesbian and gay rights 
organization, to gain official registration as an NGO. The Ministry 
cited technical reasons, although Belarus Lambda League members claimed 
authorities were seeking to deny registration to a gay and lesbian 
organization and initiated an appeal to the Supreme Court.
    Members of local human rights NGO's also were harassed for 
involvement in or association with the opposition presidential election 
initiative. Gomel branch Belarusian Helsinki Committee (BHC) head 
Yevgeny Murashko was detained briefly in February following his 
participation in a human rights seminar with opposition Central 
Election Commission chairman Viktor Gonchar. In late June, Murashko 
also was given a 2-year suspended sentence ``for violating procedures 
of holding an assembly.''
    On February 16, local KGB officials in Vitebsk issued an official 
warning to opposition Central Election Commission Deputy Chairman Iosif 
Naumchik that his political activities could result in charges of 
conspiracy to seize state power under article 61-1 of the criminal 
code, punishable by 8 to 12 years in prison. Similar warnings were 
issued to opposition Central Election Commission members Lidiya 
Sazonovets and Sergei Obodovsky in February.
    On February 25, government security officials raided a meeting of 
the opposition Central Election Commission in Minsk and arrested its 15 
members. Commission chairman Viktor Gonchar subsequently was sentenced 
to 10 days in prison for organizing an ``unsanctioned rally'' (see 
Section 1.d.). He remained under investigation on charges of illegally 
claiming a public office until he disappeared in September (See section 
1.b.) Other commission members were sentenced to 5 days in prison, 
fined between about $40 (10 million rubles) and about $60 (15 million 
rubles), or given official warnings.
    On March 12, the Ministry of Justice issued a public statement 
calling on citizens ``not to give in to provocations on the part of 
irresponsible politicians.'' Further official warnings from the KGB 
later were given to a number of opposition activists including Central 
Election Commission member Nikolai Pokhabov and BNF member Tatyana 
Leschinskaya.
    A number of opposition election initiative workers complained that 
either they or their family members were threatened by intimations that 
they could be fired from their jobs because of their political 
activities. Government security officials frequently confiscated ballot 
forms to be used in the opposition election initiative.
    On June 23 the 13th Supreme Soviet sought to hold a meeting in a 
Minsk Restaurant, but the members were driven out by a special-purpose 
police detachment that claimed that a bomb had been planted in the 
restaurant. The chairman, Seymon Sharetsky, told a reporter that the 
bomb story had been planned much earlier. The session continued on the 
street near the restaurant and adopted an appeal to Lukashenko for 
political dialog.
    On July 22, following a meeting the previous day of the 13th 
Supreme Soviet (Supsov) in Minsk held to mark the end of Lukashenko's 
legal 5-year term in office, Supsov chairman Semyon Sharetsky sought 
temporary refuge in Lithuania due to his fear that he might be 
arrested. As of year's end, Sharetsky remained in Lithuania.
    The Government continued to attempt to limit severely the 
activities of NGO's (see Section 4).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice. The 
Government enforces a 1995 Cabinet of Ministers decree that controls 
religious workers, in an attempt to protect orthodoxy and prevent the 
growth of evangelical religions. Foreigners generally are prohibited 
from preaching or heading churches, at least with respect to what the 
Government views as ``nontraditional'' religions, which include 
Protestant faiths. A 1997 directive by the Council of Ministers 
prohibits teaching religion at youth camps. Further restrictive 
regulations governing the activities of foreign religious workers and 
clergy were passed by the Council of Ministers in February, although it 
remains unclear at year's end to what extent they were being enforced.
    The Government's State Committee on Religious and National Affairs 
(SCRNA), which was established in January 1997, appears to categorize 
religions and denominations. Some are viewed as ``traditional,'' 
including Russian Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam (as 
practiced by a small community of ethnic Tatars with roots in the 
country dating back to the 11th century); some are viewed as 
``nontraditional,'' including some Protestant and other faiths; and 
some are viewed as ``sects,'' including Eastern religions and other 
faiths. The authorities deny permission to register legally at the 
national level to some faiths considered to be nontraditional, and to 
all considered to be sects. Without legal registration, it is extremely 
difficult to rent or purchase property in order to hold religious 
services.
    While all registered religious organizations enjoy tax-exempt 
status, any government subsidies appear limited principally to the 
Orthodox Church. Citizens are not prohibited from proselytizing, but 
foreign missionaries may not engage in religious activities outside the 
institutions that invited them. Only religious organizations already 
registered in the country may invite foreign clergy. Foreign religious 
workers who do not register with the authorities, or who fail to get 
approval for religious activities--often a difficult bureaucratic 
process--have been expelled from the country.
    The Government and the President encourage a greater role for the 
Orthodox Church. However, the effort has not slowed the growth of Roman 
Catholic and Protestant churches. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church has 
experienced difficulty getting permission from authorities to bring in 
a sufficient number of outside religious workers to make up for a 
shortage of native clergy. According to an independent Russian press 
report, President Lukashenko told Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch 
Aleksey II, during a visit by the Patriarch to Minsk in September 1998, 
that Christian values should become ``the state ideology of Belarus.''
    During a press conference held in Minsk in late 1998, Vyacheslav 
Savitskiy, an official of the State Committee on Religious and Ethnic 
Affairs, emphasized the existence of ``destructive sects'' in the 
country. According to Savitskiy, the Government had denied registration 
requests of 11 such "sects." For example, the authorities consistently 
have denied the repeated registration attempts of the Belarus Orthodox 
Autocephalous Church. On November 7, Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox 
Church priest Yan Spasyuk announced a hunger strike to protest the 
continued unwillingness of local authorities in Grodno to register his 
parish, as well as a recent police raid on his house while he was 
conducting a prayer service. On November 28, at the urging of his 
family and parishioners, Spasyuk called off the hunger strike.
    During a religious conference held in Minsk on April 22, Belarusian 
Orthodox Church Patriarchal Exarch Filaret stated that the Orthodox 
Church does not seek the role of interconfessional leader or to become 
a state-run church. However, he stressed, the Orthodox Church would 
cooperate only with religious faiths that have ``historical roots'' in 
the country. Filaret also remarked that he was against the ``invasion 
of those foreign religions that corrupt souls.''
    The President granted the Orthodox Church special financial 
advantages, which other denominations do not enjoy, and has declared 
the preservation and development of Orthodox Christianity a ``moral 
necessity.'' Bishops must receive permission from the State Committee 
on Religious Affairs before transferring a foreign priest to another 
parish.
    According to the Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish 
Congress, in March 1998 material from The Protocols of the Elders of 
Zion was included in a government-controlled religious broadcast. In 
spite of protests from the Jewish community, the program was 
rebroadcast in May and again in July. In a television interview given 
in Moscow in December 1998, President Lukashenko remarked that ``the 
main anti-Semites in Russia are representatives of the Jewish 
population'' (see Section 5.). However, government authorities in 
general appear to try to maintain good relations with leaders of the 
Jewish community. Following an arson attack on April 11, 1999 at the 
main synagogue in Minsk (see Section 5), police reportedly responded 
quickly. On April 16, the SCRNA agreed to a four-point plan with the 
head of the Union of Jewish Religious Organizations of Belarus to 
combat anti-Semitism. It remains unclear to what extent SCRNA may 
implement this plan.
    Restitution of religious property remained limited during the year. 
A key obstacle is the lack of a legal basis for restitution of property 
that was seized during the Soviet era and the Nazi occupation. The few 
returns of property to religious communities have been on an individual 
and inconsistent basis, and local government authorities in general are 
reluctant to cooperate on the issue without some form of compensation 
to replace properties that sometimes have become important public 
facilities. Over the past several years, the Jewish community has 
lobbied the Government successfully to return three synagogues in Minsk 
and several buildings outside the capital. In August 1998, following 
extensive restoration, the Catholic community reconsecrated a church in 
Pruzhany that had been shut down by Soviet authorities following World 
War II. The consecration ceremony was lead by the church's former 
priest who had spent 10 years in Siberia during the Soviet period.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--According to the Constitution, citizens 
are free to travel within the country and to live and work where they 
wish; however, the Government restricts these rights in practice. All 
adults are issued internal passports, which serve as primary identity 
documents and are required for travel, permanent housing, and hotel 
registration.
    On June 1, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional an 
article of the Administrative Code barring enterprises, establishments, 
and organizations from employing persons without a ``propiska'' (pass), 
or the compulsory registration of their residence address. Under 
Article 182 of the Administrative Code, employers faced fines for 
giving jobs to persons who had no stamp in their passport indicating 
that their residence and their new place of employment were located in 
the same city or district. However, it remains unclear to what extent 
this court decision actually has affected local security officials. In 
practice the right to choose one's residence appears to remain 
restricted. On November 29, the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced 
a three-stage program to replace the ``propiska'' system in the period 
2000-05; however, there were no reports of any action to implement the 
program at year's end.
    Government regulations on entry and exit require citizens who wish 
to travel abroad to receive first a ``global'' exit visa in their 
passport, valid for between 1 and 5 years. Once the traveler has these 
documents, the law does not restrict travel.
    Following the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in 1996, the 
Government took measures aimed at limiting the travel of opposition 
politicians who refused to submit to the legislature created by the 
November 1996 referendum. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in 
December 1996 that those Parliamentarians who did not join the new 
legislature could no longer travel on their diplomatic passports, 
despite the fact that these individuals had been assured that they 
would retain their status as deputies until their terms of office 
expired. Although their diplomatic passports were not confiscated, the 
border guards reportedly had a blacklist of opposition members who were 
to be denied exit from the country if they used a diplomatic passport. 
Subsequent to the January 1997 refusal by border guards to allow former 
Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich and parliamentary deputy 
Anatoliy Lebedko to travel abroad on their diplomatic passports, a 
number of members of the former Supreme Soviet have either acquired 
regular passports and have been allowed to travel abroad, or have 
departed from Russia using their Belarusian diplomatic passports.
    Government authorities canceled the ``global'' exit visas in the 
regular passports of 13th Supreme Soviet deputies Pavel Znavets and 
Viktor Gonchar in July and August respectively, based on ongoing 
investigations related to their political activities (see Sections 1.d. 
and 2.b.). Citing pending charges against him related to his 
participation in antigovernment demonstrations in Minsk in July and 
October (see Section 1.d.), and despite an invitation from the OSCE, 
government authorities denied permission to Belarusian Social 
Democratic Party leader Mikalay Statkevich to travel with an opposition 
delegation to the OSCE summit held in Istanbul in November.
    According to official data, the State did not deny any citizen 
permission to emigrate. However, legislation restricting emigration by 
those with access to ``state secrets'' remained in effect, and any 
citizen involved in a criminal investigation also was ineligible to 
emigrate. Prospective emigrants who have been refused the right to 
emigrate may appeal to the courts.
    The Constitution gives aliens and stateless persons the same rights 
as citizens, except in cases established by law, international 
agreement, or the Constitution. The Constitution also allows the State 
to grant refugee status to persons who were being persecuted in other 
states for their political and religious convictions, or because of 
nationality. The Government does not have a law on first asylum, nor 
has it signed readmission agreements with any of its neighboring 
states.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. In May 1997, the Government implemented for the first time 
the 1995 Law on Refugees, granting refugee status to a group of 
Afghans. As of October, the Government had granted official refugee 
status to 248 persons (including 185 from Afghanistan, 31 from Georgia, 
18 from Ethiopia, and 11 from Tajikistan) many of whom have lived in 
the country prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since its 
formation in early 1997 from the State Migration Service, the Committee 
on Migration within the Ministry of Labor has turned down 17 
applications for refugee status.
    On July 17, the chairman of the Migration Committee announced that 
there were between 100,000 and 150,000 illegal migrants in the country. 
As of early in the year, 2,700 potential asylum seekers had registered 
with the UNHCR in Belarus. Some refugees continue to report difficulty 
registering with local authorities, and continued delay in establishing 
a comprehensive asylum policy and refugee policy has made the lives of 
these individuals difficult. The UNHCR had no reports of any case of 
bona fide refugees being forced to return countries in which they 
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Government severely limits the right of citizens to change 
their government. In November 1996, the executive branch conducted a 
controversial constitutional referendum that was neither free nor fair, 
according to credible international observers, including 
representatives of the European Union and the OSCE. Many Members of 
Parliament and of the Constitutional Court actively opposed President 
Lukashenko's proposals for both substantive and procedural reasons. The 
justices asserted that the referendum gave Lukashenko control over the 
legislative and judicial branches of government and extended his term 
in office. They also criticized it on procedural grounds as an 
unconstitutional means to eliminate the Constitution's checks and 
balances and grant the President virtually unlimited powers.
    In the period leading up to the referendum, opponents of President 
Lukashenko's proposals were denied access to the media, election 
officials failed to record the names of early voters, and no texts of 
the proposed Constitution were made available to voters until several 
days after citizens began voting. As a result of these irregularities, 
the head of the Central Election Commission (CEC) announced prior to 
the event that he would not be able to certify the results of the 
referendum. President Lukashenko promptly fired him, although the 
Constitution in force at the time gave the Parliament the exclusive 
authority to appoint and dismiss the CEC Chairman. Members of the 
security forces forcibly removed the head of the CEC from his office. 
Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir resigned in protest 
of President Lukashenko's refusal to cancel the widely criticized 
referendum.
    Most members of the international community chose not to send 
election monitors to observe the referendum because of the illegitimacy 
of the entire process. Human rights organizations, including the 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, and Human Rights Watch, protested the conduct of the 
referendum.
    The Constitutional Court formally ruled that the issues posed in 
President Lukashenko's referendum could not be decided legally through 
a referendum, and that its results should be purely advisory, 
consistent with the Constitution. However, after winning the 
referendum--according to the Government's own official count--President 
Lukashenko began to implement it immediately. The new Constitution 
established a bicameral legislature. Its 110-member lower house was 
formed out of the membership of the existing Supreme Soviet; deputies 
volunteered or were lured by promises of free housing and other 
benefits to serve in the body. The 64-member upper house was created by 
a combination of presidential appointments and elections by the 6 
regional or oblast councils and the Minsk City Council. The transition 
left 86 electoral districts unrepresented because the new Constitution 
reduced the number of representatives, and also because a full Supreme 
Soviet had never been seated, largely due to the executive branch's 
intervention in the 1995 elections.
    Despite consultative assistance provided by the OSCE's AMG, 
President Lukashenko's National Assembly passed in December 1998 
seriously flawed legislation on local elections, which were held on 
April 4 and 18. A late modification to Article 33 of the law, inserted 
at the insistence of the President, effectively bars many opposition 
candidates from running in local elections by prohibiting the 
participation of individuals who have been fined administratively by 
government authorities. The OSCE issued an official statement that the 
provisions of the law did not provide for a free and fair election 
process. Consequently, the OSCE did not organize an election 
observation program.
    On August 31, amendments to the referendum law came into force, 
which the OSCE declared were not in accordance with international 
standards. The amended law provides that referendums may be initiated 
by the President, the President's National Assembly, or 450,000 
signatures--including a minimum of 30,000 in the city of Minsk and in 
each of the country's 6 oblasts. The law makes 10 percent of all 
signatures subject to verification, and all signatures may be 
invalidated if the commission finds just 1 percent (4500 signatures) to 
be faulty. It also gave the President the prerogative to decide on the 
validity of referendum results.
    In late January, an opposition coalition ``congress of democratic 
forces'' undertook to arrange for alternative presidential elections to 
be held from May 6 to May 16 in order to draw attention to the end of 
President Lukashenko's legal 5-year term in office in July. In 
response, authorities initiated a widespread crackdown on opposition 
political activities throughout the country. Procurator General Oleg 
Bozhelko warned in a public statement on February 8 that participation 
in the opposition initiative could result in prosecution for attempting 
to ``seize power unconstitutionally and destabilizing society.''
    A number of opposition election initiative workers complained that 
either they or their family members were threatened by intimations that 
they could be fired from their jobs because of their political 
activities. Government security officials frequently confiscated ballot 
forms to be used in the opposition election initiative (see Section 
2.a.).
    There are no legal restrictions on women's participation in 
politics and government; however, with the exception of the judiciary, 
social barriers to women in politics are strong, and men hold virtually 
all leadership positions. In the acting legislature, women hold 19 of 
110 seats in the lower house and 5 of 64 in the upper house. The Deputy 
Chair of the upper house is a woman. The Minister of Social Security is 
the only female member of the Council of Ministers. The head of the 
Government's Central Election Commission also is a woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are several domestic human rights groups active in the 
country; however, members of domestic human rights organizations 
reported that the Government hindered their attempts to investigate 
alleged human rights violations. The Government monitored NGO 
correspondence and telephone conversations. The Government also 
attempted to limit severely the activities of NGO's through a time 
consuming reregistration process, denial of registration, questionable 
tax audits, and other means (see Section 2.b.). The Ministry of Justice 
tried to restrict the Belarusian Helsinki Committee to providing 
support only to members of its own association and warned initially 
that it might otherwise not be allowed to reregister. Human rights 
monitors of the BHC also briefly were detained and interrogated by 
government security services during the year (see Section 2.b.).
    The Ministry of Justice issued official warnings to the BHC during 
March after materials related to an ongoing opposition presidential 
election initiative were found in one of its regional offices. However, 
following an appeal by BHC, the Supreme Economic Court annulled one of 
the warnings on December 8. On November 25, the administrative 
department of the Presidential Administration, which controls either 
directly or indirectly a significant amount of commercial real estate 
in Minsk, informed the BHC that it would have to vacate its offices. 
However, at year's end, it appeared that the BHC would be allowed to 
remain at its current premises.
    On October 4, uniformed and plainclothes security officers, 
including a Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, broke into the Minsk 
office of the human rights NGO Spring '96. The officers did not present 
a warrant while conducting a comprehensive search of the premises. 
Computer equipment, which included a comprehensive database of human 
rights violations, was confiscated. Although the equipment later was 
returned, when Spring '96 chairman Ales Bialatsky was summoned to a 
police station to pick it up on November 18 he was arrested for his 
participation in an antigovernment demonstration in Minsk in mid-
October. A judge later dismissed the charges against Bialatsky.
    The country's poor human rights record continued to draw the 
attention of many international human rights organizations. In general 
the Government has been willing to discuss human rights with 
international NGO's whose members have been allowed to visit the 
country. At a press conference held in Minsk on July 15, the chairman 
of Human Rights Watch criticized the Government for its ``regular 
attacks on democracy.''
    In February 1998, after protracted negotiations, the Government 
finally approved the opening in Minsk of the OSCE's Advisory and 
Monitoring Group office. Although government authorities often have 
disregarded OSCE intervention on human rights cases and its advice on 
draft legislation, the OSCE's presence in Minsk provides a potentially 
important forum for dialog on these issues. In September 1999, through 
OSCE-brokered meetings initiated by OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's 
Belarus ad hoc committee chairman Adrian Severin, government and 
opposition representatives began a dialog to try resolve the country's 
ongoing constitutional and political crisis. However, at year's end, 
the government's cooperation in this process had come to a standstill.
    On August 20, a draft resolution critical of the country's human 
rights practices was removed from a vote at the U.N. subcommission on 
Human Rights Encouragement and Protection after the Government agreed 
to a number of measures on the adoption of human rights-related 
reforms. The Government took no action on implementing these reforms by 
year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that all citizens are equal before the law 
and have the right, without any discrimination, to equal protection of 
their rights and legitimate interests. However, the Constitution does 
not prohibit specifically discrimination based on factors such as race, 
sex, or religion. The Law on Citizenship, passed by the Parliament, 
grants citizenship to any person living permanently on the territory of 
the country as of October 19, 1991. Those who arrived in the country 
after that date and wish to become citizens are required to submit an 
application for citizenship, take an oath to support the Constitution, 
have a legal source of income, and have lived in the country for 7 
years.
    Women.--Although statistics are not available, domestic violence 
including spousal abuse against women is a significant problem, 
according to women's groups. There are laws that prohibit spousal 
abuse. Knowledgeable sources indicate that police generally are not 
hesitant to enforce the laws against domestic violence, and that the 
courts are not reluctant to impose sentences. The main problem, 
according to women's groups, is a general reluctance among women to 
report incidents of domestic violence. Violence against women was not 
the subject of extensive media coverage, marches, or demonstrations 
during the year.
    Although government authorities and local human rights observers 
report that prostitution does not yet appear to be a significant 
problem within the country, there is much anecdotal evidence that it 
may be growing. Local street prostitution appears to be growing as the 
economy deteriorates, and prostitution rings operate in state-owned 
hotels. Young women seeking to work or travel abroad also are 
vulnerable to sexual exploitation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
claims that very few women are deported back to Belarus for engaging in 
prostitution. However, it acknowledges that Russian criminal 
organizations may try actively to recruit and lure Belarusian women 
into serving as prostitutes in Western Europe and the Middle East. 
There is evidence of trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment is reportedly widespread, but there are not any 
specific laws to deal with the problem other than laws against physical 
assault.
    The law requires equal wages for equal work; however, such is not 
always the case in practice. Women have significantly fewer 
opportunities for advancement to the upper ranks of management. Women 
report that managers frequently take into consideration whether a woman 
has children when considering potential job opportunities. The state 
press reported in September that approximately 64 percent of those 
considered by the Government to be long-term unemployed are single 
mothers.
    The level of education of women is higher than that of men. Women 
make up approximately 58 percent of workers with a higher education and 
approximately 66 percent of workers with a specialized secondary 
education. In these sectors, between two-thirds and three-fourths of 
employees (mostly women) live beneath the official poverty level. Women 
legally are equal to men with regard to property ownership and 
inheritance. There are active women's groups, most of which focus on 
issues such as child welfare, environmental concerns (in the aftermath 
of Chernobyl), and the preservation of the family. A private university 
in Minsk established the country's first gender studies faculty during 
1997.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare and 
health, particularly as related to consequences of the nuclear accident 
at Chernobyl, and, with the help of foreign donors, tries to give them 
special attention. By law everyone is entitled to health care, 
including children. There does not appear to be any difference in the 
treatment of girls and boys. Children begin school at the age of 6 and 
are required to complete 9 years, although the Government makes 11 
years of education available at no cost and began in 1998 to develop a 
12-year education program. Higher education also is available at no 
cost on a competitive basis. Families with children receive token 
government benefits. According to one World Bank study, the majority of 
those living in poverty are families with multiple children or single 
mothers.
    The Government continued to discourage the promotion of, or the 
teaching of students in, the Belarusian language by limiting the 
available of early childhood education in Belarusian. According to one 
study by the Francisak Skaryna Belarusian language society, the share 
of first graders studying in Belarusian-language classes shrank from 
75.3 percent in 1993-94, prior to the Lukashenko presidency, to 28.7 
percent in 1997-98. In the capital city of Minsk, the share reportedly 
decreased from 58.6 to 4.8 percent. Only 11.2 percent of secondary 
students in Minsk currently are taught in Belarusian. Government 
authorities claim that the only schools that have been closed which 
taught in the Belarusian language are those that experienced 
diminishing enrollment.
    There does not appear to be a societal pattern of abuse of 
children.
    People with Disabilities.--A 1992 law mandated accessibility to 
transport, residences, businesses, and offices for the disabled; 
however, facilities, including transport and office buildings, often 
are not accessible to the disabled. The country's continued difficult 
financial condition makes it especially difficult for local governments 
to budget sufficient funds to implement the 1992 law. The central 
Government continues to provide some minimal subsidies to the disabled. 
However, continued high inflation and sharp decline in the value of the 
Belarusian ruble greatly reduced the real worth of those limited 
subsidies.
    Religious Minorities.--Societal anti-Semitism exists but usually is 
not manifested openly. Senior government officials, including the 
President and the state media, sometimes have used coded anti-Semitic 
language in their attacks on perceived opponents. In a television 
interview given in Moscow in December 1998, in which he sought to 
criticize Russian financier and Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States Boris Berezovskiy, President Lukashenko stated 
that Berezovskiy's activities, ``might result in Jewish pogroms in 
Russia.'' Lukashenko also remarked that ``the main anti-Semites in 
Russia are representatives of the Jewish population.''
    In April there was an arson attempt on a synagogue in Minsk, during 
which the door to the structure sustained minor damage, and the 
graffiti, ``Kill Yids, save Russia,'' was spraypainted on a wall. 
However, police reportedly responded quickly. In reaction to the 
incident, the State Committee on Religious and National Affairs agreed 
with the head of the Union of Jewish Religious Organizations to a four-
point plan to combat anti-Semitism. It remained unclear at year's end 
to what extent the Government would implement this plan.
    According to the Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish 
Congress, in March 1998 government-controlled radio broadcast material 
from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion on a religious program. In 
spite of protests from the Jewish community, the program was 
rebroadcast in May and again in July. Following a written complaint 
from the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, the chairman of the State 
Committee on the Press noted publicly on May 4 that local newspapers 
that publish anti-Semitic material would be given official warnings. In 
June an official warning was given to Lichnost, one such local 
newspaper. Under the December 1997 amendments to the Law on Press and 
Other Media, newspapers can be banned if two warnings are issued (see 
Section 2.a.). According to the Anti-Defamation League and World Jewish 
Congress, a number of newspapers regularly print anti-Semitic material.
    On October 15, the Belarusian Judaic Religious Association (JRA) 
spoke out publicly against an anti-Semitic article that appeared in the 
newspaper Slavyanski Nabat, written by National Assembly deputies 
Valery Drako and Sergei Kostyan. Drako and Kostyan asserted in their 
article that many Jews held high rank in the Nazi Wehrmacht and equated 
Zionism with fascism.
    A number of Jewish cemeteries and sites have been desecrated in 
recent years. In February a cemetery was desecrated in Rechitsa, which 
had also been vandalized in 1997. Cemeteries were desecrated in Borisov 
and Orsha in April 1998, and in Gomel and Berezino in July 1998. In 
August 1998, a memorial to Holocaust victims in Brest was desecrated. A 
15-year-old skinhead was caught in connection with the Brest 
desecration. Local officials reportedly have failed to come up with any 
leads in the other cases. In September the head of a local Jewish 
organization in Brest issued a statement complaining about continued 
incidents of anti-Semitic graffiti appearing in the city, and what he 
claimed to be the apparent indifference of local authorities. As of 
year's end, there were no reports of action by the authorities.
    Many members of the Jewish community remain concerned that the 
Lukashenko Government's plans to promote greater unity with Russia may 
be accompanied by political appeals to groups in Russia that tolerate 
or promote anti-Semitism. Lukashenko's calls for ``Slavic solidarity'' 
are well received and supported by anti-Semitic, neo-Fascist 
organizations in Russia. For example, the organization Russian National 
Unity has an active branch in Belarus, and its literature is 
distributed in public places in Minsk. On February 5, members of this 
organization severely beat Charter '97 human rights activist Andrei 
Sannikov when he objected to their distribution of leaflets on a public 
square in downtown Minsk. A criminal case against Sannikov's assailants 
was later suspended on the grounds of lack of evidence.
    The country's small Muslim community, with roots in the country 
dating to the Middle Ages, does not report significant societal 
prejudice. However, on August 9, the Slonim mosque--the first mosque to 
open in the country during the last 60 years--was vandalized just prior 
to the holding of a Tatar youth convention in the city.
Section 6. Worker rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution upholds the right of 
workers, except state security and military personnel, to form and join 
independent unions on a voluntary basis and to carry out actions in 
defense of worker rights, including the right to strike; however, these 
rights are not respected in practice. The independent trade union 
movement is still in its infancy. The Belarusian Free Trade Union 
(BFTU) was established in 1991 and registered in 1992. Following the 
1995 Minsk metro workers strike, the President issued a decree 
suspending its activities. In 1996 the BFTU leaders formed a new 
umbrella organization, the Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BCDTU), 
which encompasses four leading independent unions and is reported to 
have approximately 15,000 members.
    On December 9, a branch of the independent Free Union of Metal 
Workers (FUMW) was evicted from its offices at the Minsk Automobile 
Factory. On December 16, six independent union representatives, 
including FUMW activist Dimitry Plis, were arrested at the Minsk 
Automobile Factory for picketing its entrance. Some later were found 
guilty of holding an unsanctioned rally and fined.
    The Government has taken measures to suppress independent trade 
unions. For example, members of independent trade unions have been 
arrested for distributing union literature, had material confiscated at 
the borders, have been denied access to work sites, have been subjected 
to excessive fines, and have been pressured by their managers and state 
security services to resign from their jobs because of trade union 
activities. Despite the repeal by the Government of its illegal ban on 
the BFTU, as well as the Ministry of Justices' reregistration of the 
BFTU and BCDTU (following a Presidential decree issued in January 
requiring that all public organizations, including unions, reregister), 
government authorities have continued to threaten and harass 
independent union members.
    For example, according to the BFTU, Georgy Mukhin was fired by the 
Minsk Tractor Works in early March as a result of his activism on 
behalf of the FTUMW. Sergei Antonchik, a union organizer affiliated 
with the BFTU who heads the National Strike Committee, was detained 
briefly on March 6 for organizing an unsanctioned demonstration in the 
city of Orsha. He subsequently was fined by a local court. Antonchik's 
Minsk office also was raided by government security officials who 
confiscated antigovernment bulletins.
    In October the Ministry of Justice turned down the application of 
the Belarusian Independent Association of Industrial Trade Unions 
(BIAITU), which represents approximately 340,000 workers and is 
composed of 3 large official unions that have been critical of the 
Government's economic policies, to reregister as a legal organization. 
The decision apparently was based on a finding that the BIAITU's 
charter was inconsistent with its status as an umbrella organization of 
different unions. In early November, Minsk city authorities refused a 
request submitted by BIAITU leaders for permission to hold a public 
demonstration to protest the Ministry of Justice's decision.
    The Government continues to discourage employees at state-run 
enterprises from joining independent trade unions. Lukashenko signed a 
new restrictive Presidential decree (number 29) to ``tighten labor 
discipline'' July 26. The decree, which has as one of its aims the 
placement of all workers on individual rather than collective 
contracts, was criticized heavily by both independent and official 
union leaders, who believe that it was designed principally to enable 
the presidential administration to increase its control over the labor 
sector.
    The Official Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus (FTUB), formerly 
the Belarusian branch of the Soviet Union's All-Union Central Council 
of Trade Unions, consists of approximately 4.4 million workers 
(including retirees) and is by far the largest trade union 
organization. According to official union federation figures, 92 
percent of the workforce is unionized. Although wary in the past of 
challenging the regime seriously, some FTUB leaders are becoming 
increasingly vocal in their criticism of the polices of the Lukashenko 
regime. In retaliation, some FTUB officials claim they have been 
subjected to threats and harassment from the Government. In late 
January the BFTU and FTUB-affiliated automobile and agricultural 
equipment manufacturing union held a joint demonstration in Minsk to 
protest falling living standards.
    On September 30, the FTUB held a demonstration in Minsk, also 
supported by independent unions, to protest presidential decree number 
29. However, Minsk city officials allowed the protest rally to take 
place only in a location away from the city center. Prior to the 
demonstration, President Lukashenko ridiculed the leaders, accusing 
them of manipulating popular hardship for political advantage, and 
warning them that persons who did not adhere to the Government's 
restrictions in the demonstration would ``get it in full.''
    Although sometimes willing to try to cooperate with official union 
leaders to achieve mutual objectives, such as on September 30 and 
during a joint demonstration held in late January, independent labor 
union leaders remain skeptical that most FTUB representatives are 
prepared to promote effectively workers' rights. Independent labor 
leaders also maintain that the official trade unions' continued control 
over social welfare functions usually performed by the State (such as 
pension funds) is an obstacle to the growth of true, independent trade 
unions. On December 17, approximately 100 members of the free trade 
union picketed the Zenit factory in Mogilyov to protest the fact that 
state managers would allow only representatives of an official union to 
maintain an office at the plant.
    Tight control by the Government over public demonstrations (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.b.) makes it difficult for unions to strike or hold 
public rallies to further their objectives. Although union members 
undertook work stoppages, usually in response to late payment of wages, 
precise data on the number of strikes that took place is unavailable.
    Unions may affiliate freely with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Legislation 
dating from the Soviet era provides for the right to organize and 
bargain collectively. However, according to a poll conducted by the 
Ministry of Labor's Labor Research Institute in January 1998, although 
most industrial workers believe that the terms of their employment were 
governed by collective bargaining agreements, only 17 percent of the 
workers polled thought that collective bargaining agreements were 
executed as stipulated. Some analysts believe that the new presidential 
decree on labor discipline (see Section 6.a.), which aims at placing 
all workers on individual rather than collective contracts, could 
significantly threaten the principle of collective bargaining. Since 
the economy is still largely in the hands of the State, unions usually 
seek political redress for their economic problems. Workers and 
independent unions have recourse to the court system.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor, except in cases when the work or service to be 
performed is fixed by a court's decision or in accordance with the Law 
on the State of Emergency or martial law. The Constitutional provision 
prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens, although 
its application to children is not specified. With the possible 
exception of juvenile prisoners, however, forced and bonded labor by 
children is not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law establishes 16 as the minimum age for employment. 
With the written consent of one parent (or legal guardian), a 14-year-
old child may conclude a labor contract. The Prosecutor General's 
office reportedly enforces this law effectively. The constitutional 
provision prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens, 
although its application to children is not specified (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--During 1998 average monthly real 
wages declined significantly from about $88 to about $30 a month. The 
minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker 
and family. Agriculture workers are paid approximately 39 percent less 
than the average monthly wages. The country's continuing economic 
problems make it difficult for the average worker to earn a decent 
living. At year's end, major wage arrearages remained, especially in 
the agricultural sector.
    The Constitution and Labor Code set a limit of 40 hours of work per 
week and provide for at least one 24-hour rest period per week. Because 
of the country's difficult economic situation, an increasing number of 
workers find themselves working considerably less than 40 hours per 
week. Factories reportedly often require workers to take unpaid 
furloughs due to shortages of raw materials and energy and lack of 
demand for factory output.
    The law establishes minimum conditions for workplace safety and 
worker health; however, these standards often are ignored. Workers at 
many heavy machinery plants do not wear even minimal safety gear, such 
as gloves, hard hats, or welding glasses. A State Labor Inspectorate 
exists, but does not have the authority to enforce compliance, and 
violations often are ignored. The high accident rate is due to lack of 
protective clothing, shoes, and equipment, nonobservance of temperature 
regulations, the use of outdated machinery, and inebriation on the job. 
Official data indicate that 130 workers died in industrial accidents 
during the first 6 months of 1999, half of which were due to drinking 
on the job. According to the Ministry of Labor, 294 persons died and 
1300 were injured in workplace accidents during 1998. There is no 
provision in the law that allows workers to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without risking loss of their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no specific law against 
trafficking, although it is possible in theory that existing laws would 
be sufficient to prosecute traffickers. There were no reports of 
government efforts to prosecute traffickers.
    A 1999 OSCE report, while acknowledging that reliable data are 
impossible to obtain, describes Belarus as a source country for women 
being trafficked to Central and Western Europe for purposes of 
prostitution. Information from such scattered destinations as the 
Netherlands, Lithuania and Bosnia, refer to Belarus among the source 
countries for women being trafficked to or through their countries.
    There is much anecdotal evidence that young women are being 
trafficked by the Russian mafia, and end up in Cyprus, Greece, Israel, 
and Western Europe working as prostitutes. The Ministry of the Interior 
acknowledges that Russian criminal organizations may try actively to 
recruit and lure Belarusian women into serving as prostitutes in 
Western Europe and the Middle East.
                                 ______
                                 

                                BELGIUM

    Belgium is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch 
who plays a mainly symbolic role. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet), 
led by the Prime Minister, holds office as long as it retains the 
confidence of the lower house of the bicameral Parliament. 
Constitutional reforms enacted in 1993 transformed Belgium from a 
unitary into a federal state with several levels of government, 
including national, regional (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels), and 
community (Flemish, Francophone, and German) levels. The judiciary is 
independent.
    The Government maintains effective control of all security forces. 
The Police Judiciaire and the Gendarmerie currently share 
responsibility for internal security with the municipal police, but the 
two organizations are to be merged at the federal level, and the 
Gendarmerie and municipal police are to be integrated at the local 
level under a reorganization plan that is to be implemented fully by 
April 1, 2001.
    The country is highly industrialized, with a vigorous private 
sector and limited government participation in industry. The primary 
exports are iron and steel. The economy provides a high standard of 
living for most citizens.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of 
dealing with individual instances of abuse. The Government is taking 
steps to combat violence against women and trafficking in women and 
children.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    In February Parliament enacted legislation that further defines 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide and also imposes 
penalties for such crimes.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no 
reports that officials employed them.
    In addition to the integration of the police forces, the 
reorganization plan calls for the creation of an independent oversight 
body for the federal police and also for the creation of a new 
anticorruption unit.
    Prison conditions vary. Newer prisons meet international standards. 
Older facilities meet or nearly meet minimum international standards 
despite their Spartan physical conditions and limited resources. In 
September the prison system, designed to hold 7,533 prisoners, held 
8,350 inmates. A continuing program is intended to improve overall 
conditions and expand capacity to 8,000 beds by 2000. Women and men are 
housed in separate prisons. Men constitute 95 percent of all detainees. 
A third of male prisoners are under the age of 25; 70 percent are under 
the age of 35.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this 
prohibition. Arrested persons must be brought before a judge within 24 
hours. Pretrial confinement is subject to monthly review by a panel of 
judges, which may extend pretrial detention based on established 
criteria (e.g., whether, in the court's view, the arrested person would 
be likely to commit further crimes or attempt to flee if released). 
Bail exists in principle under the law but is granted rarely. The 
Government no longer separates convicted criminals and pretrial 
detainees. Pretrial detainees receive different benefits from convicted 
criminals, such as the right to more frequent family visits. 
Approximately 40 percent of the total prison population consists of 
pretrial detainees. Arrested persons are allowed prompt access to a 
lawyer of their choosing or, if they cannot afford one, to an attorney 
appointed by the state.
    The law prohibits exile, and the government does not employ it.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The judicial system is organized according to specialization and 
territorial jurisdiction, with 5 territorial levels: Canton (225), 
district (27), provinces and Brussels (11), courts of appeal (5), and 
for the whole Kingdom--the Cour de Cassation. The latter is the highest 
appeals court.
    Military tribunals try military personnel for common law as well as 
military crimes. All military tribunals consist of four officers and a 
civilian judge. At the appellate level, the civilian judge presides. 
The accused has the right of appeal to a higher military court.
    Each judicial district has a Labor Court, which deals with 
litigation between employers and employees regarding wages, notice, 
competition clauses, and social security benefits.
    The judiciary enforces the law's provision for the right to a fair 
trial. Charges are clearly and formally stated, and there is a 
presumption of innocence. All defendants have the right to be present, 
to have counsel (at public expense if needed), to confront witnesses, 
to present evidence, and to appeal.
    The Government continued to implement judicial reforms in the wake 
of public dissatisfaction with the handling of the 1996 Dutroux 
pedophile investigation (see Section 6.f.). The reform legislation 
included the creation of a board of attorneys general, whose purpose is 
to oversee and streamline nationwide policy on criminal prosecutions. 
Changes also were made in the procedure governing the appointment and 
promotion of magistrates. The Government also created a High Council on 
Justice to supervise the appointment and promotion of magistrates. The 
Government plans for the Council to serve as a permanent monitoring 
board for the entire justice system and to be empowered to hear 
complaints against individual magistrates.
    Following its review of the judicial system, the Government 
implemented several reforms that granted stronger rights to victims of 
crime. These measures allow victims to have more access to information 
during an investigation, as well as the right to appeal if an 
investigation does not result in a decision to bring charges. As part 
of its program of judicial reform, the Government since 1997 opened 11 
``justice houses.'' These facilities combine a variety of legal 
services under one roof, including legal aid, mediation, and victims' 
assistance. The Government plans to open a justice house in the 
remaining 16 judicial districts by 2001.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to 
effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for these 
freedoms, and the Government respects these rights in practice. An 
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic 
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
    The Government operates several radio and television networks but 
does not control program content. Boards of directors that represent 
the main political, linguistic, and opinion groups supervise programs. 
A government representative sits on each board but has no veto power. 
Private radio and television stations operate with government licenses. 
Almost all homes have access by cable to television from other Western 
European countries and elsewhere abroad. Satellite services are also 
available.
    There are restrictions on the press regarding libel, slander, and 
the advocacy of racial or ethnic discrimination, hate, or violence. A 
law passed in February prevents political parties that espouse 
discrimination from receiving federal funds.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. However, during the year two demonstrations were banned. In 
March the city of Brussels banned all protests and demonstrations 
concerning the NATO air strikes in Kosovo. City authorities cited law 
and order reasons for this decision. In April a local politician 
climbed the fence at Klein Brogel air base as part of an antinuclear 
demonstration and was cited for breaking and entering. Local 
authorities banned future antinuclear demonstrations at the base. In 
July a district judge ruled that the legal case against the politician 
did not fall under the jurisdiction of the district court. No further 
action was taken on the matter.
    The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government 
respects this provision in practice. Citizens are free to form 
organizations and establish ties to international bodies; however, the 
Antiracism Law (see Section 5) prohibits membership in organizations 
that practice discrimination overtly and repeatedly. In April a 
district judge in Ghent ruled that the ``Hells Angels'' are a private 
militia as defined by the law and ordered that the group be disbanded. 
The organization appealed the decision and related sanctions, and the 
appeal verdict was pending at year's end.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the government respects this right in practice. The 
Government does not hinder the practice of any faith. The law accords 
``recognized'' status to Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, 
Anglicanism, Islam, and Greek and Russian Orthodoxy, and these 
religions receive subsidies from general government revenues. Taxpayers 
who object to contributing to religious subsidies have no recourse. By 
law each recognized religion has the right to provide teachers at 
government expense for religious instruction in schools, but not all 
avail themselves of this right. For recognized religions, the 
Government pays the salaries, retirement, and lodging expenses of 
ministers and also subsidizes the renovation of church buildings.
    The lack of independent recognized status generally does not 
prevent religious groups from freely practicing their religions.
    However, in September 110 national police officers raided Church of 
Scientology facilities and the homes and businesses of about 20 members 
of the Church. One member's home in France was raided simultaneously by 
the French authorities. At year's end, an investigation continued, and 
no arrests had been made.
    Although Islam was declared a recognized religion in 1974, Muslims 
have not had an elected body to act as their representative in dealings 
with the federal government. In December 1998, Muslims held nationwide 
elections for an assembly consisting of 51 persons representing 
numerous communities of the Muslim faith. Of those elected, four were 
women. The Muslim representative body recognized by the Government 
currently is composed of 16 members appointed by the elected assembly 
and the current Muslim executive council. A 17th member may be 
appointed in the future, although no individual has been named to fill 
this position.
    The Evangelical Association (a group of evangelical Christian 
organizations) continued to claim discrimination due to the 
Government's refusal to grant it recognized status separate from the 
Protestant religion. Despite the Government's refusal, it is 
negotiating with the group in an effort to ensure that the Evangelical 
Association enjoys the same benefits as recognized religions by 
mediating discussions to enable the evangelical association to obtain a 
seat in the leadership of the recognized Protestant church.
    In 1998 Parliament adopted recommendations from a 1997 commission's 
report on government policy toward sects, particularly sects deemed 
``harmful'' under the law. The report divided sects into two broadly 
defined categories: It characterized a ``sect'' as any religious-based 
organization, and a ``harmful sect'' as a group that may pose a threat 
to society or individuals. One of the primary recommendations was to 
create a ``Center for Information and Advice on Harmful Sectarian 
Organizations.'' The Center opened in October and is working with a 
limited staff of two persons. It is tasked with collecting publicly 
available information on a wide range of religious and philosophical 
groups and providing information and advice to the public regarding the 
legal rights of freedom of association, freedom of privacy, and freedom 
of religion. The Government has not yet published regulations for its 
operations. In 1998 the Government also created an interagency body 
designed to work in conjunction with the Center to coordinate 
government policy on sects, but this body had not been set up by year's 
end. Nor had the Government or Parliament yet taken any action to 
establish a special police unit on sects or to designate special 
magistrates to monitor cases involving sects, which were two other 
recommendations of the 1997 commission.
    The parliamentary report also recommended that the country's 
community governments sponsor information campaigns to educate the 
public--especially children--regarding the phenomenon of harmful sects. 
In March the Francophone Community government launched a prevention 
campaign called ``Gurus, Beware!'' The campaign was intended to fulfill 
the commission's recommendation to educate the country's youth on the 
dangers posed by harmful sects. Information for the campaign was 
disseminated through pamphlets, brochures, television, and motion 
picture advertisements. On one page, the brochure discussed 20 of the 
groups listed in the 1997 commission report and stated that the country 
harbors certain ``dangerous sects.'' In April 1999, one of the groups 
discussed in the brochure, the Anthroposophic Society (which is based 
in Antwerp), filed suit to halt its distribution. An Antwerp court 
issued an order enjoining the Francophone Community government from 
further distribution of the brochure until all defamatory language 
referring to this group was removed from the text. The Francophone 
Community agreed not to publish any additional brochures.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The law include provisions for granting refugee or asylee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the 
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government 
provides first asylum, and during the first 11 months of the year 
approximately 31,000 new applications for asylum were filed, compared 
with 21,947 for all of 1998. A total of 1,404 applicants, mostly from 
previous years, were granted permanent residence. Counting those from 
previous years, 33,730 applications remained pending. Of new asylum 
seekers during the year, 35 to 40 percent were displaced residents of 
Kosovo.
    In May the Government decided to extend special asylum status to 
about 15,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who entered the country 
illegally in the past year. This regularization of status enabled these 
refugees to receive the same benefits, including the right to work and 
claim social security benefits, as 1,200 Kosovars already welcomed by 
the Government. In late 1999, the Government planned to abolish the 
special status held by Kosovars, but those still holding this special 
status are to be able to obtain extensions for up to 6 months. They may 
then apply for regular refugee status, which 2,300 members of this 
group already have done.
    Extensions of a special program initiated in 1992 for refugees from 
the former Yugoslavia were discontinued at the beginning of the year. 
The displaced persons admitted under that program were allowed either 
to adjust their status and become permanent residents or to apply for 
political asylum.
    Asylum seekers arriving by air with no papers are detained for up 
to 5 months while awaiting consideration of their cases. The children 
do not attend school. If no asylum decision has been reached by the end 
of the 5-month period, then the asylum seeker is released or 
voluntarily repatriated. At the discretion of the Minister of Interior, 
the Cabinet may exempt certain cities, which have already accepted 
large refugee populations, from giving legal residence to new refugees 
or asylees.
    In 1998 a Senate commission recommended reforms to immigration law 
designed to create a more ``just and humane'' immigration policy. The 
commission criticized the conditions in detention centers and advocated 
the upgrading and renovation of certain centers. In addition to 
improving the physical infrastructure of the centers, the commission 
recommended that detainees receive improved access to legal, medical, 
and social services.
    The commission also proposed the creation of a national body to 
oversee the quality of conditions in detention centers.
    In September 1998, a Nigerian woman died following a struggle with 
police who were trying forcibly to repatriate her. In the aftermath of 
this incident the Government fully adopted new policies on asylum in 
1999, which mirrored recommendations made earlier that year by the 
Senate commission with regard to matters such as limiting the period of 
detention, adding staff and funding, reviewing cases and documentation, 
and enlarging reception centers. The Government also created a task 
force to monitor asylum policy in November. In addition, based on the 
recommendations, the Gendarmerie unit that deals with forced 
repatriations was enlarged and better trained.
    After the change in government in July, immigration and asylum 
measures became a focus of the new Government. The Minister of Interior 
created working groups to develop a plan for the Government and hired a 
significant number of additional officials in the Aliens Office to 
handle processing and interviewing.
    As a first step in the comprehensive changes in asylum and 
immigration policies, in October the Government initiated a mass 
repatriation of 74 Slovak Roma who were denied asylum. Some reports 
indicated that not all deportees departed voluntarily but were tricked 
into appearing for the repatriation. In December the Government used 
military aircraft to carry out a second repatriation. This time 15 
Nigerians who were living illegally in Belgium were sent home.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The law provides citizens with the right to change their government 
peacefully. Citizens ages 18 and older exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal and compulsory (under penalty of fine) suffrage. Direct 
popular elections for parliamentary seats (excluding some Senators 
elected by community councils and others elected by Senate members) are 
held at least every 4 years. Opposition parties operate freely.
    In 1998 the European Court of Justice censured Belgium for its 
failure to comply with a European Council directive requiring members 
states to accord to all citizens of European Union (EU) countries 
resident in another EU country the right to vote in municipal 
elections. In 1998 Parliament amended the Constitution to extend that 
right to EU citizens and passed implementing legislation in January.
    The Federal Government is responsible for such matters of state as 
security, justice, social security, and fiscal and monetary policy. The 
regional governments are charged with matters that directly affect the 
geographical regions and the material well-being of their residents, 
such as commerce and trade, public works, and environmental policy. The 
linguistic community councils handle matters more directly affecting 
the mental and cultural well-being of the individual, such as education 
and the administration of certain social welfare programs.
    Women are underrepresented in government but hold some senior 
positions. Of 18 federal ministers, 3 are women. In the Federal 
Parliament, 34 of 150 house members and 20 of 71 Senators are women. 
These numbers show a slight increase in the role of women in the 
Federal Government, partially due to a 1998 law that requires that 33 
percent of the candidates on the ballot in all elections be women. 
Following the June 13 general elections, for the first time two women 
became Vice Premiers in the Cabinet.
    The existence of communities speaking Dutch, French, and German 
engenders significant complexities for the state. Most major 
institutions, including political parties, are divided along linguistic 
lines. National decisions often take into account the specific needs of 
each regional and linguistic group.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Numerous human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive 
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination based on these factors, and the 
Government enforces it. With Dutch, French, and German as official 
languages, the counry has a complex linguistic regime, including 
language requirements for various elective and appointive positions. In 
February the Senate passed a new law intended to prevent official 
financing of any racist or xenophobic party or any party that does not 
respect human rights.
    Women.--A 1997 parliamentary report described domestic violence 
against women as still ``covered by a culture of silence.'' In one 
academic study, an eminent sociologist found that slightly less than 1 
percent of the women in a particular town had reported incidents of 
domestic violence to the authorities. However, the number of unreported 
incidents is higher, and other studies suggest that approximately 6 
percent of women in several other towns were abused by their domestic 
partners.
    A 1998 law defines and criminalizes domestic violence. The 
legislation aims to protect married and unmarried partners. Women's 
groups believe that it is an important step in recognizing domestic 
violence as constituting a offense distinct from other forms of 
aggression. The legislation allows social organizations to represent 
victims of domestic violence in court provided that they have the 
victim's consent. In early 1999 a law was passed allowing police entry 
into a home without the consent of the head of household when 
investigating a domestic violence complaint. According to its 
proponents, the police do not use the law enough. The legislation also 
requires the Government to maintain a database of statistics on the 
subject, but by year's end it had not made any progress on implementing 
any provisions of the law and did not yet have any accurate statistics 
on domestic violence.
    A number of shelters and telephone help lines operate throughout 
the country. In addition to providing women with shelter and advice, 
many offer assistance on legal matters, job placement, and 
psychological counseling for both partners. Approximately 80 percent of 
these organizations' budgets are provided by one of the three regional 
governments.
    The law prohibits organizing prostitution or assisting immigration 
for the purpose of prostitution, but not prostitution itself. 
Parliament enacted a law in 1995 that defined and criminalized 
trafficking in persons, but cases of trafficking in women continued 
(see Section 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment is illegal. The Government implemented procedures 
to monitor sexual harassment claims in the private sector in 1992 and 
in the public sector in 1995. Victims of sexual harassment have the 
right to sue their harassers under existing law. A 1998 government 
investigation of sexual harassment determined that one out of three 
women is harassed sexually in the workplace. Due to improper 
interpretation of sexual harassment and victim denial, this figure is 
considered understated.
    In May a revision of the law on equal opportunity in the workplace 
was passed, which stated that sexual harassment can be a form of sexual 
discrimination. The act outlaws discrimination in hiring, working 
conditions, promotion, wages, and contract termination. Due to the 
revision, sexual harassment can result in civil and administrative 
action by the Ministry of Labor. It now has a broader legal basis in 
court, and victims of sexual harassment have an additional recourse--
reversal of proof, which requires the defendant to provide evidence in 
the case. Reversal of proof only occurs in cases in which sexual 
harassment is judged in a court as a form of sexual discrimination. As 
a result of the new codes, more cases now go to the Labor Court. 
However, despite the new laws, most cases of sexual harassment are 
resolved informally.
    Equal treatment of men and women is provided for by the 
Constitution, federal law, and treaties incorporated into law. The 
Government actively promotes a comprehensive approach to the 
integration of women at all levels of decisionmaking. The Division of 
Equal Opportunity, a part of the Ministry of Labor, focuses 
specifically on issues affecting women, including violence against 
women, sexual harassment, and the participation of women in the 
political process. Beginning in 1999, federal law requires that one-
third of all candidates for elected office be women.
    The female unemployment rate (10.9 percent at the end of 1998) 
exceeded the male unemployment rate (6.7 percent), according to one 
government study released in June. The net average salary for a woman 
is only 84 percent of the national average salary.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded system of public 
education and health care. It provides compulsory education up to the 
age of 18. The Francophone and Flemish communities have agencies 
specifically dealing with children's needs.
    Government and private groups provide shelters for runaways and 
counseling for children who were abused physically or sexually.
    There are comprehensive child protection laws. Children have the 
right to a voice in court cases that affect them, such as divorce 
proceedings. The law states that a minor ``capable of understanding'' 
can request permission to be heard by a judge, or that a judge can 
request an interview with a child. In 1995 the Government enacted laws 
designed to combat child pornography by increasing penalties for such 
crimes and for those in possession of pedophilic materials. The law 
permits the prosecution of Belgian citizens who commit such crimes 
abroad and provides that criminals convicted of the sexual abuse of 
children cannot receive parole without first receiving specialized 
assistance and must continue counseling and treatment upon their 
release from prison.
    Belgium is both a transit point and a destination for trafficking 
in children (see Section 6.f.).
    In another response to public criticism of the handling of the 
pedophile case (see Sections 1.e. and 6.f.), the Government assisted in 
the establishment of Child Focus, a center for missing and exploited 
children that opened in December 1997. During its first 9 months of 
operation, the center's hot line received 23,000 calls, averaging 80 
calls per day, resulting in 639 active cases. A total of 77 percent of 
the cases related to runaways or parental abductions. The remaining 
cases involved missing children (12 percent) and sexual exploitation 
(11 percent). By comparison, in the first 9 months of 1999, the hot 
line averaged over 120 calls per day.
    Child prostitution is of limited scope, but in response to 
recommendations made in a 1994 government study, the police received 
instructions to be especially diligent in combating prostitution among 
those who appear to be under the age of 18.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
    People with Disabilities.--The law provides for the protection of 
disabled persons from discrimination in employment, education, and in 
the provision of other state services. The Government mandates that 
public buildings erected since 1970 be accessible to the disabled and 
offers subsidies to induce the owners of other buildings to make 
necessary modifications. However, many older buildings are not 
accessible.
    The Government provides financial assistance for the disabled. It 
gives special aid to parents of disabled children and to disabled 
parents. Regional and community programs provide other assistance, such 
as job training. Disabled persons are eligible to receive services in 
any of the three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, or Brussels), not just 
their region of residence.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities--Belgium is a pluralistic society 
in which individual differences in general are respected, and 
linguistic rights in particular are protected. Some 60 percent of 
citizens are native Dutch speakers, about 40 percent are French 
speakers, and fewer than 1 percent are German speakers.
    An Antiracism Law penalizes the incitement of discrimination, hate, 
or violence based on race, ethnicity, or nationality. It is illegal for 
providers of goods or services (including housing) to discriminate on 
the basis of any of these factors and for employers to consider these 
factors in their decisions to hire, train, or dismiss workers.
    In 1998 the Center for Equal Opportunity and the Fight Against 
Racism, a parliamentary organization tasked with investigating 
complaints of discrimination based on race, handled 1,241 complaints 
leading to mediation or court action in 848 cases. In the first 6 
months of 1999 the Center handled approximately 550 complaints, 299 of 
which resulted in mediation or court action.
    In 1998 legal actions were completed against six paratroopers who 
participated in the 1993 U.N. peacekeeping operation in Somalia and who 
were accused of dishonorable, racist acts there. Two were acquitted due 
to lack of evidence, two received probation, one received a suspended 
sentence unrelated to racism, and one received a 12-month prison 
sentence, a fine, and a 5-year suspension of civil and political 
rights. In the aftermath of the process, the armed forces performed an 
internal investigation of racism, but the review found no indication 
that it was a systemic problem. Despite this finding, during the year 
the armed forces began mandatory diversity training for all new 
employees.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Under the Constitution, workers have 
the right to associate freely, which includes the freedom to organize 
and join unions of their own choosing. The Government does not hamper 
such activities, and workers fully and freely exercise their right of 
association. About 60 percent of workers are members of labor unions. 
This number includes employed and unemployed workers. Unions are 
independent of the Government but have important links with major 
political parties. The Government does not require unions to register.
    In its 1999 report, the International Labor Organization's 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and 
Recommendations reiterated its criticism that the Government should 
adopt legislation establishing ``objective, predetermined, and detailed 
criteria'' to enable employers' organizations and trade unions to have 
access to the National Labor Council. Because of restrictive 
interpretation of the legislation in force, only the Christian, 
Socialist, and Liberal trade union confederations have access to the 
National Labor Council.
    In order to exclude trade unions from the Criminal Organizations 
bill, the trade unions forced amendment to the bill in a January 10 
act. Unions feared that the bill would undermine their basic rights, 
including the right to strike.
    Unions have the right to strike, and even strikes by civil servants 
and workers in ``essential'' services are tolerated. However, seamen, 
the military, and magistrates have no right to strike. In January the 
Gendarmerie obtained a limited right to strike as part of the police 
reform package; this provision is to be implemented by April 1, 2001.
    Even though many strikes begin as wildcat actions, strikers are not 
prosecuted for failure to observe strike procedures in collective 
bargaining agreements. Crimes committed during a strike action, such as 
causing bodily harm or damage to property, are clearly illegal strike 
methods, which the authorities prosecute.
    The December 1998 act on the merger of the police forces gave the 
federal police the right to strike. The Government has the authority to 
order necessary forces back to work during a strike in order to 
maintain law and order.
    The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in its 
``Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 1999'' again 
mentioned that for several years employers made applications to civil 
courts to end strikes. The report added that, more recently, judges 
tend to rule that labor conflicts are not within their jurisdiction. 
This stance reinforces the widely accepted practice that any discussion 
of the right to strike is a subject for collective bargaining between 
workers and employers and not a legal matter. Although draft laws were 
submitted, no legal action was taken by Parliament to end the legal 
confusion.
    Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and 
are free to affiliate with international labor bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively is recognized, protected, and 
exercised freely. Every other year the employers' federation and the 
unions negotiate a nationwide collective bargaining agreement, covering 
2.4 million private sector workers, that establishes the framework for 
negotiations at the plant and branch levels. In the fall of 1998, 
employers and unions agreed on a nationwide collective bargaining 
agreement that focuses on collective bargaining at the branch and plant 
levels and limits compensation increases to 5.9 percent for the 1999-
2000 period. The agreement covers cost of living adjustments, wage 
increases, and job creation measures.
    The law prohibits discrimination against organizers and members of 
unions and protects against the termination of contracts of members of 
workers' councils, members of health or safety committees, and shop 
stewards. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are 
required to reinstate workers fired for union activities. Effective 
mechanisms such as the labor courts exist for adjudicating disputes 
between labor and management.
    In May and in anticipation of the merger of the police forces, 
Parliament enacted new legislation on collective bargaining procedures 
between the federal authorities and the unions and professional 
organizations representing all law enforcement agents.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The law also 
prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government enforces 
this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 15, but 
education is compulsory until age 18. Youths between the ages of 15 and 
18 may participate in part-time work/study programs and may work full 
time during school vacations. The labor courts effectively monitor 
compliance with national laws and standards. There are no industries 
where any significant child labor exists. The Government prohibits 
forced and bonded child labor and enforces this prohibition effectively 
(see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly national minimum 
wage for workers over 21 years of age is $1,228 (45,427 Belgian 
francs); 18-year-olds must be paid at least 82 percent of the minimum, 
19-year-olds 88 percent, and 20-year-olds 94 percent. The minimum wage, 
coupled with extensive social benefits, provides workers with a 
standard of living appropriate to a highly developed nation. Minimum 
wages in the private sector are set in biennial, nationwide collective 
bargaining meetings (see Section 6.b.), which lead to formal agreements 
signed in the National Labor Council and made mandatory by royal decree 
for the entire private sector. In the public sector, the minimum wage 
is determined in negotiations between the Government and the public 
service unions. The Ministry of Labor effectively enforces the law 
regarding minimum wages. By law the standard workweek cannot exceed 39 
hours and must have at least one 24-hour rest period. Many collective 
bargaining agreements set standard workweeks of 35 to 38 hours. The law 
requires overtime pay for hours worked in excess of the standard. Work 
done from the 9th to the 11th hour per day or from the 40th to the 50th 
hour per week is considered allowable overtime. Longer workdays are 
permitted only if agreed upon in a collective bargaining agreement. 
These laws and regulations are enforced effectively by the Ministry of 
Labor and the labor courts.
    The law calls for comprehensive provisions for worker safety. 
Collective bargaining agreements can supplement these laws. Workers 
have the right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their 
safety or health without jeopardy to their continued employment, and 
the law protects workers who file complaints about such situations. The 
Labor Ministry implements health and safety legislation through a team 
of inspectors and determines whether workers qualify for disability and 
medical benefits. The law mandates health and safety committees in 
companies with more than 50 employees. Labor courts effectively monitor 
compliance with national health and safety laws and standards.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--A 1995 law defines and criminalizes 
trafficking in persons. Under the law, victims of trafficking may be 
granted temporary residence permits and are eligible to receive aid 
from government-funded reception centers. Since 1994 the majority of 
cases were victims of either sexual or economic exploitation. The 
victims of sexual exploitation increasingly are women under age 18. 
Since enactment of this law, a magistrate was designated in each 
judicial district to supervise cases involving trafficking in persons. 
As a result of the new law, the Government reports significant 
increases in witness testimony and the successful prosecution of 
traffickers.
    Belgium is both a transit point and destination for trafficking in 
women and children. In September the three NGO's involved in assisting 
victims of trafficking in persons reported 185 active cases of 
trafficking in women from over 30 countries. The largest number of 
victims were Albanian. Cases on 28 children from 7 different countries 
also were active; the largest number were from Albania and Macedonia.
    In 1996 the authorities uncovered a suspected pedophile/child 
pornography and trafficking ring. The criminal investigation of this 
suspected ring continued during the year. Five suspects remained in 
detention; however, their trial is unlikely to begin before mid-2000. 
In February a parliamentary commission, appointed in the aftermath of 
this case and tasked with investigating allegations of corruption and 
complicity in the law enforcement and judicial systems, issued its 
report. The commission sharply criticized the entire judicial system, 
including both the police and judiciary for undisciplined, inept, and 
potentially corrupt handling of the pedophile scandal and associated 
crimes. It also recommended that disciplinary action be considered 
against numerous police officers and magistrates involved in this 
investigation. As of September, only one police officer received a 
warning. No other officials were disciplined.

                         BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

    The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords) created the independent state of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, previously one of the constituent republics of 
Yugoslavia. The agreement also created two multiethnic constituent 
entities within the state: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS). The Federation, which 
has a postwar Bosniak and Croat majority, occupies 51 percent of the 
territory; the RS, which has a postwar Bosnian Serb majority, occupies 
49 percent. The Constitution (Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords) 
establishes a statewide government with a bicameral legislature, a 
three-member presidency (consisting of a Bosniak, a Serb, and a Croat), 
a council of ministers, a constitutional court, and a central bank. The 
Accords also provided for the Office of the High Representative (OHR) 
to oversee implementation of civilian provisions. The entities maintain 
separate armies, but under the Constitution, these are under the 
ultimate control of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1998 
Bosnia and Herzegovina held its most peaceful and pluralistic elections 
since the 1995 Dayton Accords put an end to 3 years of war. Multiethnic 
parties committed to building on the foundation established at Dayton 
made some progress during the presidential and assembly elections. At 
the same time, the largest political parties, which won a majority of 
assembly seats, continued to be ethnically based. These were the 
Bosniak-dominated Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian 
Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ), and the Serb 
Democratic Party-Serb Radical Party coalition (SDS/SRS). Although 
formally independent, the judiciary remains subject to influence by 
political parties and the executive branch.
    One of the two entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was established in March 1994 and 
transformed the government structure of the Bosnian territories under 
Bosniak and Croatian control. The President of the Federation appoints 
the Prime Minister subject to parliamentary approval. The Federation 
Parliament is bicameral. Federation structures have been implemented 
only gradually. Major steps were the creation of canton governments, 
the unification of Sarajevo under Federation control in spring 1996, 
and the 1996 and 1998 elections of the Federation Parliament. However, 
serious ethnic and political rivalries continue to divide Croats and 
Bosniaks. Parallel Bosniak and Croat government structures often exist 
in practice.
    The Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RS) is the other 
entity. In 1997-98 most of the RS political and administrative agencies 
moved from Pale, a stronghold of former Bosnian Serb leader and 
indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, to Banja Luka. The President 
and Vice President were elected in 1998 for 2-year terms. Their terms 
of office are to increase to 4 years after the 2000 elections. The RS 
National Assembly is unicameral and elected on a proportional basis. 
The 1998 elections were relatively free and fair but resulted in the 
election of a hard-line president, Nikola Poplasen of the SRS. He 
refused to nominate a candidate for prime minister with sufficient 
support in the RS Assembly to form a government. This episode 
eventually contributed to a confrontation with the OHR in which the OHR 
removed Poplasen from office on March 5. Vice President Nikola Sarovic 
has not yet been permitted to step into the position.
    Also on March 5, but unrelated to Poplasen's dismissal, Roberts B. 
Owen, arbitrator for the Brcko Arbitral Tribunal, announced a final 
award, whereby the entire prewar Brcko municipality was to become a 
``self-governing neutral district,'' which would belong to both 
entities. The award delegated to the district's internationally 
appointed supervisor the responsibility for deciding when the district 
would begin to govern itself under a new district statute. Until then 
the supervisor would retain ultimate authority over the district. The 
final disposition of this region was a highly sensitive issue since the 
region of Brcko connects the eastern and western sections of the RS. 
Until new laws are issued or existing laws are adapted, the supervisor 
retains discretion as to which laws, Federation or RS, are to apply in 
Brcko. A new district statute was issued by the supervisor on December 
7, and a districtwide multiethnic police force was to be established 
officially in January 2000. Demilitarization of the Brcko district was 
underway and scheduled to be completed by the end of February 2000. On 
August 18, the Brcko Tribunal issued an annex to the final award, 
clarifying implementation of the award. In particular, it established 
the citizenship status of district residents and confirmed the right of 
transit by military forces of both entities. It also directed the 
supervisor to address such issues as taxation, law enforcement, 
district management, and composition of the district assembly.
    The Constitution gives the government of each entity responsibility 
for law enforcement in accordance with internationally recognized 
standards. The Stabilization Force (SFOR), led by NATO, continued to 
implement the military aspects of the Dayton Accords and create a 
secure environment for implementation of the nonmilitary aspects of the 
settlement, such as: Civilian reconstruction, the return of refugees 
and displaced persons, elections, and freedom of movement of the 
civilian population. The International Police Task Force (IPTF), 
established by the United Nations under Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords, 
oversees police restructuring and training. The IPTF also may 
investigate human rights abuses. Police in both entities have violated 
international standards and discriminated on political, religious, and 
ethnic grounds. However, with training and increased professionalism of 
the police and the increasing activism of professional standards units, 
these cases were decreasing compared with 1998. During the year, both 
the Federation and the RS used internal affairs units to investigate 
and dismiss officers. Police continued to suffer from the legacy of a 
Communist system, with ``special'' or secret police operating in all 
areas. These forces were outside the normal police chain of command, 
reporting directly to the senior political leadership. In addition to 
locally recruited police forces, each entity also maintains an army. 
Security forces committed human rights abuses throughout the country.
    The economy remains weak and dependent upon international 
assistance. During the year gross domestic product (GDP) was $3.5 
billion in the Federation; estimates of the GDP in the RS were lower. 
According to government statistics, GDP per capita was $600 for both 
entities. The continued return of refugees from abroad was expected to 
compound the problem of job creation and to reduce remittances. 
International assistance financed infrastructure reconstruction and 
provided loans to the manufacturing sector.
    The commitment to respect citizens' human rights and civil 
liberties remains tenuous in the country, and the degree of respect for 
these rights continues to vary among areas with Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, 
and Bosnian Serb majorities; serious human rights abuses continued in 
several areas.
    There were four deaths in custody, all in the RS, and isolated 
instances of political, ethnic, or religious killings continued. 
Killings due to bombings and booby traps also continued. Human rights 
abuses by the police continued during the year, and serious problems 
persisted. Police continued to commit abuses throughout the country, 
principally the physical abuse of detainees. Some police in the RS beat 
refugees. Police in all areas also used excessive force, or did not 
ensure security, to discourage minority resettlement in majority areas. 
Members of security forces also abused and physically mistreated other 
citizens. Prison conditions continued to be poor in both entities.
    In the RS, criminal procedure legislation that was held over from 
the prewar Yugoslav period granted police wide latitude to detain 
suspects for long periods of time before filing charges. However, there 
were fewer cases of arbitrary arrest and detention than in the previous 
year. Confusion over the rules for arrest and detention of suspects for 
The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has led in some instances to questionable detentions 
in both the Federation and the RS. While its rhetorical support for 
cooperation with the ICTY has improved, the RS continues its de facto 
refusal to take action against any Serbs indicted by the ICTY.
    The judiciary in both entities remained subject to coercive 
influence by dominant political parties and by the executive branch. In 
many areas, close ties exist between courts of law and the ruling 
parties, and those judges who show independence are subject to 
intimidation by the authorities. Even when independent decisions are 
rendered, local authorities often refuse to carry them out. Authorities 
in all areas infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
    Authorities and dominant political parties exerted influence over 
the media and freedom of speech and of the press was limited to varying 
degrees in the different entities. During the year, the High 
Representative imposed a new media law for the Federation and a series 
of amendments to the media law in the RS. The High Representative also 
imposed measures removing criminal penalties for slander and libel. 
Academic freedom was restricted. Authorities imposed some limits on 
freedom of assembly and association. Religious discrimination remained 
a problem. Both governments and private groups continued to restrict 
religious practices by minorities in majority areas. Although freedom 
of movement continued to improve, some limits remained in practice.
    Discrimination against women persists, prostitution is widespread, 
and trafficking in women and trafficking in women and girls is a 
serious problem. Severe discrimination continues in areas dominated by 
one ethnic group, particularly in the treatment of refugees and 
displaced persons. The political leadership at all levels, in varying 
degrees, in both entities continues to obstruct minority returns. Local 
authorities and mobs (in most cases believed to be organized or 
approved by local authorities) harassed minority returnees and 
violently resisted their return. The destruction of minority-owned 
houses continued, particularly in Croat-controlled areas. Marginal 
economic conditions and severe discrimination in the educational system 
also complicated returns. Enactment of property legislation proceeded 
in both entities under pressure from the international community, but 
implementation was sporadic and very slow. Mob violence was a serious 
problem. Some restrictions on freedom of movement continued. Ethnic 
discrimination remains a serious problem.
    During the year, there were increased efforts on the part of SFOR 
to apprehend perpetrators of wartime atrocities. SFOR's more aggressive 
approach of apprehending individuals indicted by the ICTY, which began 
in the summer of 1997, resulted during the year in the apprehension of 
7 (including 1 killed) indictees out of the 93 publicly indicted by the 
Tribunal. This brought the total number of indictees taken into custody 
since the Tribunal's inception to 35. At year's end there were 32 
persons in ICTY custody awaiting trial or on trial. There was one death 
in custody during an attempted arrest of an indictee, and several 
deaths in custody during the year. There were 31 public indictees still 
at large at year's end. ICTY trials during the year resulted in 2 
convictions and no acquittals.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by police; however, there were four 
deaths in custody, all in the RS. On August 13 in Kozarac, a Bosniak 
returnee shot and killed the leader of an Orthodox religious 
association. A Bosniak who recently converted to the Orthodox religion 
also was killed in the incident. The shooting stemmed from a dispute 
over the property where the shooting occurred. The perpetrator died in 
police custody. While his death was judged a suicide by local 
authorities, IPTF officials are not convinced of that determination, 
and their investigation into the incident was ongoing at year's end.
    On March 16, Federation Deputy Interior Minister Jozo Leutar, a 
Bosnian Croat, was injured fatally in a car bombing in the center of 
Sarajevo on March 16; he died on March 28. Two other persons in the car 
also were injured. Ethnic divisions within the police and political 
interference from some quarters hampered progress of the investigation, 
which remains a contentious political issue. At year's end, no suspects 
had been arrested. However, UN officials have stated publicly that 
suspects were identified.
    In April a Sokolac court in the RS acquitted six Bosniak suspects 
who had been tortured by RS police while they were being interrogated 
for the August 1998 murder of Pale Public Security Center Deputy Chief 
Srdjan Knezevic. The judge found that there was insufficient evidence 
to link them to the crime.
    In May a trial began against Bosniak Muris Ljubucic for the July 
1998 bombing that killed Croat Travnik police officer Anto Vajan. This 
was the first indictment and trial since violence against Croat police 
officers began in 1998. The trial ended in an acquittal.
    Many, if not most, of the perpetrators of killings and other brutal 
acts committed in previous years remained unpunished. This includes war 
criminals indicted by the ICTY, those responsible for the up to 8,000 
killed by the Bosnian Serb Army after the fall of Srebrenica, and those 
responsible for up to 13,000 others still missing and presumed killed 
as a result of ``ethnic cleansing'' in Bosnia. In April a Sarajevo 
court sentenced Goran Vasic to 10 years in prison for war crimes during 
the 1992-95 conflict, although he was acquitted in the 1993 murder of 
Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic due to lack of evidence.
    During the year, there were increased efforts on the part of SFOR 
to apprehend perpetrators of wartime atrocities. SFOR's more aggressive 
approach of apprehending individuals indicted by the ICTY, which began 
in the summer of 1997, resulted during the year in the apprehension of 
7 indictees out of the 93 publicly indicted by the Tribunal. Seven were 
detained forcibly, and none turned themselves in to NATO troops. This 
brought the total number of indictees taken into custody since the 
Tribunal's inception to 35. At year's end there were 32 persons in ICTY 
custody awaiting trial or on trial.
    In January indicted war criminal Dragon Gagovic was killed during 
an attempt by SFOR to detain him (see Section 1.b.). The ICTY indicted 
Gagovic in June 1995 for crimes against humanity and for grave breaches 
of the laws or customs of war. During SFOR's attempt to arrest him, 
Gagovic attempted to ram SFOR soldiers with his car. The soldiers 
opened fire and hit Gagovic, who was pronounced dead on arrival at a 
nearby hospital. There were several other deaths in custody during the 
year. On June 7, Dragan Kulundzija who was charged with murder was 
arrested by SFOR. According to the ICTY indictment, Kulundzija 
subjected detainees to torture and inhumane treatment while serving as 
a shift commander at the Keraterm concentration camp near Prijedor. In 
June SFOR troops arrested Radomir Kovac, a subcommander of the RS 
military police and a paramilitary leader in Foca, who was charged with 
a ``grave breach'' of the 1949 Geneva Convention and crimes including 
the rape and enslavement of women. In July SFOR troops arrested 
Radoslav Brdjanin who was the Bosnian Serb Vice President during the 
war. Austrian police arrested Momir Talic, commander of the RS army, in 
Vienna on August 25 during an Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE) sponsored conference on military ethics. Talic was the 
subject of a sealed indictment from the ICTY for war crimes against the 
civilian population and ``willful killing'' when he served as the 
commander of Serb forces in northwest Bosnia in 1992. Talic was 
transferred to The Hague immediately after his arrest. In December SFOR 
troops arrested former Bosnian Serb Major General Stanislav Galic. Of 
the 31 public indictees still at large at year's end, the majority 
reportedly live in the RS (many allegedly in Prijedor and Foca), 
although RS authorities made no effort to arrest these indictees. The 
ICTY during the year issued 2 convictions and no acquittals. This 
brings the total number of convictions to 13 since ICTY's inception. In 
October the ICTY acquitted Bosnian Serb Goran Jelisic on genocide 
charges; Jelisic previously had pled guilty to 31 counts of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances during the year.
    The OHR in late 1997 took the lead in forging an agreement among 
the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb commissions for missing 
persons to expedite exhumations across the interentity boundary line 
(IEBL). The State Commission for Missing Persons reported that the 
remains of an estimated 1,199 persons had been recovered in the first 8 
months of the year. Of those, 829 were Bosniaks, 120 were Croats, and 
240 were Serbs. In addition to those killed in Srebrenica and Zepa, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that since 
1995 it received requests from family members to trace 19,834 persons 
missing from the war years: 2,024 of these persons were accounted for 
(281 of whom were found alive). The ICRC noted that Serb, Croat, and 
Bosniak authorities were in a position to provide more information in 
response to its inquiries, particularly those concerning 286 persons, 
known to have been detained at one time in connection with the war, who 
remained missing.
    The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) funds the 
interentity exhumations process, provides support to families of the 
missing, and puts political pressure on Bosnian officials to provide 
information on missing persons.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the right to freedom from 
torture and cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; however, in all 
areas of the country, police and prison officials abused and physically 
mistreated persons at the time of arrest and during detention. There 
were reports of RS police beating refugees during the year, and there 
were serious incidents of police beatings and torture in Pale and 
Teslic in the RS and in Capljina in the Federation in 1998.
    U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and OSCE monitors heard 
reports from Kosovar refugees of numerous human rights violations 
perpetrated by RS police. These violations included beatings, 
harassment, and extortion of money (see Section 2.d.). Refugees also 
reported incidents of RS police confiscating and destroying refugees' 
documents.
    The military at times used force to prevent the eviction of 
soldiers and the return of prewar owners (see Section 2.d.).
    Serb police continued to employ excessive force to prevent Bosniak 
former residents from returning to, or staying in, RS territory. 
Similar patterns of abuse occurred in Croat majority areas. A pattern 
of poor police protection and violence against minority communities 
continued in several areas. Police in Stolac and in Gacko proved 
unwilling or unable to contain the numerous instances of arson designed 
to intimidate returnees. In January the IPTF and the U.N. determined 
that the Stolac police had failed to respond adequately to over 70 
instances of violence against or intimidation of returnees in 1998. In 
addition, the IPTF found that the command structure of the Stolac 
police department was inadequate and vulnerable to outside influence. 
As a result, every member of the Stolac police administration was 
placed on a 3-month probation starting February 3. In May the IPTF 
determined that surplus officers had been removed, integration of 
minority officers had progressed, and security planning for returning 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's) had improved. 
However, the Stolac police force is not yet sufficiently integrated, 
effective, or professional. The IPTF concluded that the deficiencies of 
the Stolac police force were symptomatic of law enforcement problems 
throughout the Herzegovina-Neretva canton.
    There also were instances in which police did not act to halt mob 
violence. In August the OSCE replaced Drvar mayor Mile Marceta with 
Momcilo Bajic after repeated threats against Marceta made it impossible 
for him to fulfill his responsibilities. Marceta was supportive of Serb 
returns to Drvar. The Drvar police did not make a sufficient effort to 
protect Marceta. The OSCE also removed Borivoj Malbasic as president of 
the municipal council. In addition, the High Representative, working 
with the IPTF, removed the interior minister of Herzeg Bosna canton 
after he failed to promote security in the canton and to investigate a 
number of violent incidents.
    At times some police officers impeded the enforcement of the law by 
their unwillingness to execute eviction orders. Government leaders in 
both the RS and the Federation often have used a variety of tactics, 
including public statements, to inhibit the return of IDP's (see 
Section 2.d.).
    In April a Sokolac court in the RS acquitted six suspects who had 
been tortured by RS police while they were being interrogated for the 
August 1998 murder of Pale Public Security Center Deputy Chief Srdjan 
Knezevic.
    The IPTF made significant progress in its efforts to restructure 
and increase professionalism in the police force. The IPTF neared 
completion of its programs to provide human dignity and basic skills 
training to all Federation and RS police officers. The IPTF continued 
its certification of Federation and RS police and decertified officers 
on a variety of charges. This process involved written and 
psychological examinations. In addition, an IPTF unit in The Hague 
checks all names of police officials through the ICTY data base. In 
October the RS police academy graduated its second class, with 81 men 
and 27 women representing different ethnic backgrounds. At year's end, 
the Federation Academy had begun training its fourth graduating class, 
containing a majority of ethnic Serb cadets. All Federation canton 
governments have agreed to an ethnically mixed police force in 
principle. The Federation police include Croat, as well as Bosniak, 
officers and generally reflect the appropriate ethnic mix within each 
canton. However, the police forces throughout the country generally do 
not reflect higher standards of ethnic representation required by 
various agreements. In practice, the majority of cantons have parallel 
police forces, with separate budgets and chains of command, divided 
along ethnic lines. Cooperation between the RS and the Federation 
Interior Ministries often is better than cooperation between federation 
cantons. The integration of women into the police force is uneven. Of 
the 22 academy cadets from Tuzla canton, 21 are women, and more than 
half of the cadets in the Federation police academy are women. However, 
in Brcko none of the 230 officers are women. In January three Roma 
became police officers in the Tuzla-Podrinje canton in the Federation.
    IPTF certification of officers proceeded more slowly in the RS, but 
there was progress on significant law enforcement reforms. In July 
1998, the RS National Assembly passed a law separating the police and 
intelligence forces. Police officials were trying to recruit more 
minority candidates. RS police and international monitors were in the 
process of establishing an IPTF physical presence within RS police 
facilities to ensure proper IPTF monitoring of police reforms. 
Authorities in the RS adopted a policies and procedures manual that 
instituted, among other reforms, a public information bureau and 
internal affairs unit. Under these reforms, the RS authorities fired 
officers accused of graft or brutality.
    In addition to attacks on members of other ethnic groups committed 
in both entities, Serbs in the RS threatened members of international 
organizations. On January 9, five IPTF monitors were injured, two of 
them seriously, in Foca following the death of indicted war criminal 
Dragon Gagovic (see Sections 1.a. and 4). The IPTF station was 
ransacked and two U.N. vehicles were burned. Gagovic died during an 
SFOR attempt to detain him. Later, 100 local residents attacked the 
IPTF station, badly damaging the office, equipment, and vehicles. 
International activities in Foca were suspended after the attack, and 
the IPTF currently has only a limited presence there. The RS Interior 
Ministry appointed the Foca chief of police to investigate the 
incident. The IPTF is monitoring the investigation.
    On March 5, in Ugljevik in the RS, a mob of between 15 and 20 
persons attacked 4 SFOR soldiers as they left a restaurant. As the 
soldiers ran for their vehicle, on was struck from behind with a club. 
When he was attacked a second time, he fired his weapon twice. His 
attacker, a local policeman, was pronounced dead on arrival at a local 
hospital.
    In late March, an SRS and SDS-inspired mob attacked international 
offices, including the U.S. embassy branch office in Banja Luka, which 
resulted in extensive damage and injury to a security guard. The mob 
was protesting the NATO bombing campaign against the FRY. Also in 
March, the OSCE reading room in Visegrad was the target of a rocket 
attack. There were bombings in or around IPTF stations in Trebinje, 
Gradiska, Bijeljina, and Pale. U.N. vehicles were burned in Bijeljina, 
Doboj, and Zvornik.
    In May two rocket propelled grenades and struck the living quarters 
of the Joint Commission Observer (JCO) in Zvornik. There were no 
reports of injuries, but two buildings were damaged.
    In August the residence of the European Union's Joint Commission 
Observer (JCO) in Doboj was attacked and slightly damaged by unknown 
perpetrators. No one was injured and local authorities were continuing 
their investigation at year's end.
    On October 14, an estimated 200 students threw rocks and bottles at 
troops from SFOR's Mobile Specialized Unite (MSU) outside the Interior 
Ministry building in Mostar. There were no reports of serious injuries. 
The attack came after SFOR began raids against municipal offices in 
Mostar that were undermining the Dayton Accords and after local radio 
broadcasts called on Croat residents to protest SFOR's actions (see 
Section 2.a.).
    On October 30 and 31, SFOR and IPTF personnel in Zvornik in the RS 
were targeted in separate grenade attacks. There were no injuries to 
SFOR or IPTF personnel, but one civilian was slightly injured in the 
attack.
    On October 6, it was reported that two masked men attacked and 
stabbed municipal council member Munib Hasanovic in the Srebrenica 
municipal building in the RS. RS police opened an investigation into 
the attack and the IPTF was monitoring its progress closely, although 
there was no progress in the case by year's end.
    Individual and societal violence continued to be a problem and 
numerous bombings caused injuries. On February 10, a Bosnian Croat 
policeman in Travnik was injured by a car bomb, which detonated when he 
opened the door of his private vehicle, parked near the Travnik police 
station. The IPTF is monitoring the investigation by local authorities, 
which continued at year's end. Local police have not concluded their 
investigation, but this attack was one of a series of violent incidents 
in Central Bosnia canton, an area with a population almost equally 
divided between Bosniaks and Croats.
    A pattern of deliberate mob violence against Serbs who sought to 
return to their prewar homes continued throughout the year, especially 
in Travnik, but such incidents decreased in number and severity 
compared to 1998. In June eight persons were injured in the RS village 
of Tarevci during visits by returning refugees and IDP's. A crowd of 
Serbs gathered and threw sticks and stones at the approximately 60 
Bosniak returnees there, who reportedly yelled provocative statements 
as they drove through town. An unidentified Serb threw a grenade into 
the crowd. Local police did not take effective action to improve the 
situation or to find those responsible for the attack. In July several 
violent incidents occurred in Drvar. Croat residents protested against 
further returns after the alleged rape of a Croat woman by a Serb man. 
(International law enforcement officials have concluded that this 
allegation was untrue.) SFOR increased its presence in the area. On 
July 3, an elderly Serb couple was attacked by Croat youths and 
injured. On July 4, another violent physical exchange occurred between 
Croats and Serbs. In August Bosnian Croat residents of Drvar beat three 
elderly Bosnian Serb returnee men. Local police at the scene allowed 
the perpetrators to leave but took the victims to the police station to 
give statements. On March 20, a Bosniak-owned home was bombed in the 
predominantly Croat town of Stolac. In April there were several violent 
incidents directed at Bosniak returnees in Borovnica in Prozor-Rama 
municipality, including a hand grenade that damaged a mosque and the 
arson of homes of several Bosniak returnees. Also in April, Bosniak and 
Croat residents traded gunfire between the Croat village of Urici and 
the Bosniak village of Memici-Blace. On April 27, unknown persons 
planted a bomb that exploded and caused a fire at the home of middle 
Bosnia canton former governor Ivan Saric in a village outside of Gornje 
Vakuf. No one was injured. An investigation was opened by canton and 
Federation antiterrorism officers. In May two Bosniak returnee houses 
in the Novi Grad area of the RS were attacked. One was destroyed by an 
explosion. Novi Grad continues to be a stronghold of hard-line Serbs. 
On September 9, unknown persons attacked the Bosniak village of 
Fazlagica Kula near Gacko in the RS with what appeared to be hand 
grenades. There were no reported injuries.
    Prior to the attack, Bosniak returnees in the village were harassed 
with taunts and driveby shootings.
    During the year there were several attacks on the homes of Romani 
families returning to Bijeljina, including grenades and bombs thrown 
into the yards outside their houses.
    Conditions in Federation and RS prisons are poor and well below 
minimum international standards in terms of overcrowding, hygiene, and 
access to medical care. Facilities are antiquated and extremely poor.
    International community representatives were given widespread and 
for the most part unhindered access to detention facilities and 
prisoners in the RS as well as in the Federation.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There were fewer cases 
of arbitrary arrest and detention in both the Federation and the RS 
compared with 1998. In prior years, police in both entities enjoyed 
great latitude based on Communist-era criminal procedure laws that 
permitted them to detain persons for up to 6 months without bringing 
formal charges against them. The Federation revised these laws, 
removing this power from police, although not from investigative 
judges. The detention laws remain in force in the RS.
    In one unconfirmed report, RS police in Sokolac detained several 
draft-aged male refugees from the FRY at the police station in the 
spring.
    Human rights NGO's contend that there are cases in which persons 
who ostensibly are detained on criminal charges actually are 
incarcerated for political reasons. For example, Ibrahim Djedovic, a 
parliamentary deputy for the Democratic National Union (DNZ), which the 
ruling Bosniak SDA views as a renegade party due to its activities 
during the war, was arrested and jailed in May 1997 for war crimes, 
after he arrived in Sarajevo to take up his parliamentary seat. The 
ICTY investigated Djedovic and decided not to arrest him for his 
alleged activities. Most local and international observers believe that 
Djedovic was arrested due to his political affiliation and not because 
of alleged war crimes. The Sarajevo cantonal court convicted and 
sentenced Djedovic to 10 years in 1998. He remained free at the end of 
1998 pending appeal of his conviction to the Federation Supreme Court 
and currently serves as a DNZ deputy in the Federation House of 
Representatives. A retrial in the case was ordered in June.
    There were no reports that forced exile generally was used as a 
legal punishment. However, in some Croat-dominated areas of the 
Federation, local Croat authorities and civilians attempted to expel 
returning Serbs. For example on July 3, the Canton 10 interior minister 
instructed the local police to expel all returnees who failed to change 
their registration from their previous temporary residence to Drvar and 
failed to obtain identification cards within 10 days. The action was an 
attempt to harass returnees since authorities also hindered returnees 
attempts to register (see Section 2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Both the Federation and RS 
Constitutions provide for an independent judiciary; however, the 
executive and the leading political parties continue to influence the 
judicial system. Party affiliation and political connections weighed 
heavily in the appointment of prosecutors and judges.
    The existing judicial hierarchy in the Federation consists of 
municipal courts, which have original jurisdiction in most civil and 
criminal cases; cantonal courts, which have appellate jurisdiction over 
the canton's municipalities; and three central courts (Constitutional, 
Supreme, and Human Rights--although the third of these is not 
operational). Reforms introduced by the OHR are to allow the Supreme 
Court to take immediate jurisdiction as the ``court of first instance'' 
for crimes including terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, and 
intercantonal crime. The Federation Constitution provides for the 
appointment of judges by the President, with the concurrence of the 
Vice President and the approval of the Assembly, to an initial term of 
5 years. Judges may be reappointed following this initial term to serve 
until the age of 70.
    The RS judicial hierarchy includes a Supreme Court to provide for 
the unified enforcement of the law and a Constitutional Court to assure 
conformity of laws, regulations, and general enactments with the 
Constitution. The RS has both municipal and district courts, with the 
district courts having appellate jurisdiction. Judges are appointed and 
recalled by the National Assembly and have life tenure.
    In June judicial associations in both entities adopted identical 
codes of ethics for judges and prosecutors. In August the OHR imposed 
laws strengthening the Federation prosecutor's office and protecting 
the identity of witnesses in sensitive cases in the Federation. The 
international community continued training programs in the Federation 
to familiarize judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the police 
with the Federation's newly reformed Criminal Code, which entered into 
effect in November 1998. The RS has not yet adopted similar criminal 
law reforms. Some NGO's expressed concern over the judicial selection 
process in eight federation cantons, especially in Sarajevo and Tuzla. 
Legal experts argued that the laws on judicial selection in those two 
cantons were inconsistent with the canton and Federation Constitutions.
    Both the Federation and RS Constitutions provide for open and 
public trials and give the accused the right to legal counsel.
    In May the RS Supreme Court ruled that three Bosniaks were 
wrongfully convicted of the 1996 murders of four Bosnian Serb 
woodcutters in Zvornik. A fourth defendant's conviction was upheld, but 
his sentence was reduced from 10 to 6 years. The convictions of three 
other defendants were overturned in May during an appeal in the RS 
district court in Bijeljina on the grounds that the defendants were 
denied the right to choose their own counsel. The original trial of all 
seven defendants was marred by pervasive and systematic human rights 
abuses. Confessions, coerced by torture, were the primary evidence used 
by prosecutors in the first trial. In its decision to release three of 
the remaining four defendants, the RS Supreme Court made no mention of 
human rights abuses committed by RS authorities during the 
investigation, the original trial, or the appeal. No date for a new 
trial was set by year's end.
    In March the cantonal court in Sarajevo acquitted Bosnian Serb 
Miodrag Andric, who was being tried for war crimes, after the court 
finally permitted witnesses to testify in a court in Rogatica in the 
RS.
    Human rights organizations reported that judicial institutions in 
both entities were controlled or influenced by the ruling parties. 
Courts were often reluctant or unwilling to try cases of human rights 
abuse referred to them. A lack of resources and a huge backlog of 
unresolved cases provided a convenient excuse for judicial inaction. 
Even when the courts rendered a fair judgment, local officials often 
refused to implement their decisions. This was especially the case for 
those who won decisions mandating eviction of illegal occupants from 
their property. In addition, organized crime elements sought to 
pressure judges, especially in central Bosnia and Herzeg-Neretva 
canton.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides 
for the right to ``private and family life, home and correspondence,'' 
and the right to protection of property; however, authorities in all 
areas infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
    Since the war, large numbers of citizens have been denied the right 
to their property, either privately-held or collectively-owned 
property, to which citizens had occupancy rights under the Communist 
system. Enactment of property legislation has proceeded in both 
entities under pressure from the international community. Registration 
of property claims is largely complete in the Federation and underway 
in the RS. However, resolution of claims and implementation of 
decisions is extremely slow in both entities, and few claims were 
resolved during the year. The political leadership at all levels in 
both entities continues to obstruct minority returns by delaying needed 
reforms and refusing to implement decisions. The situation is 
particularly bad outside of Sarajevo canton. In particular, cases 
requiring evictions are subject to political manipulation and 
obstruction at every phase.
    Throughout the country, membership in the political party 
affiliated with one's ethnic group was considered the surest way to 
obtain, retain, or regain employment, especially in the management of 
socially owned enterprises (see Section 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; this right was respected partially 
in the Federation and in the western RS, but less so in the eastern RS. 
Within the Federation press freedom was restricted more severely in 
Croat-majority areas. Some progress was made in establishing 
independent media in some Federation cantons and in the RS, 
particularly in Banja Luka. The primary restraints on press freedom are 
control of the principal media by governing political parties and, in 
the case of newspapers, the unwillingness of Governments in either 
entity to provide access to kiosk networks under their control. Party-
controlled media--particularly Croatian state radio and television--are 
the dominant electronic media and information source in Croat-majority 
areas of the Federation. Most media continued to be noticeably biased.
    The ruling SDA party largely controls the Dnevni Avaz newspaper, 
which enjoys wide distribution in the Federation. Some opposition and 
independent newspapers operate in the Bosniak-majority areas of the 
Federation and in the RS, principally in Banja Luka. Oslobodjenje and 
Vecernje Novine are the leading independent dailies, and Dani and 
Slobodna Bosna are the most influential independent magazines in the 
Federation. One of the few independent magazines in the RS is Reporter, 
a weekly published by a former foreign correspondent of the Belgrade-
based independent Vreme, while Nezavisne Novine is an independent 
newspaper published in the western RS. Also in the RS, the Social-
Liberal Party publishes an opposition magazine, Novi Prelom, and the 
Social Democratic Party publishes a daily newspaper.
    Early in the year, authorities in Gradacac allegedly forced 
journalists to submit articles for review to a municipal office before 
they could be published.
    There is only one high capacity printing facility, Oko, in the 
Federation, and it is aligned closely with the newspaper Dnevni Avaz, 
which is backed by the ruling Bosniak SDA party. In June Oko delayed 
printing an issue of the magazine Dani which included a confidential 
Sarajevo internal affairs ministry document about government 
connections to criminals and the mafia. The official reason given for 
the delay in printing was damage to the printing press. However, in the 
meantime the internal affairs office publicly released some of the 
information in the article, i.e., a list of 14 criminals known to be 
residing in Sarajevo canton. In the RS, the state-owned printing 
company Glas Srpski also has a virtual monopoly. According to the 
editor in chief of the daily and weekly newspaper Nezavisne Novine, 
before the newspaper was to publish an unfavorable article about 
indicted war criminal Zeljko Raznjatovic (``Arkan''), he received 
threats from Raznjatovic who reportedly was tipped off about the 
article by Glas Srpski. The day the article appeared street vendors who 
were selling the newspaper allegedly were beaten by Arkan supporters, 
who also stole all that day's issues.
    It was difficult for independent and opposition media in the RS to 
gain access to the government-controlled kiosk distribution system. The 
same was true of some areas of the Federation, particularly in Croat-
controlled regions. In addition, the ruling parties exerted economic 
pressure by refusing to allow state-owed companies to advertise in the 
independent media. Some independent media in the two entities, for 
example, Dani and Reporter, assist in the distribution of each other's 
publications in their respective entities.
    On October 22, a car bomb attack on independent daily Nezavisne 
Novine editor in chief Zeljko Kopanja in Banja Luka resulted in the 
loss of his legs. The RS Interior Ministry and the Banja Luka police 
opened investigations into the case, but there were no results by 
year's end.
    In May unknown assailants in Mostar allegedly beat two Croatian 
journalists from Rijeka and accused them of publishing unfavorable 
articles for the Croatian opposition newspaper Novi List about 
Herzegovina politics and crime.
    The Independent Media Commission (IMC), established by the High 
Representative in 1998, is empowered to regulate broadcasting and other 
media in the country. In this capacity, the IMC licenses broadcasters, 
manages and assigns spectra for broadcasting, sets licensing fees, and 
enforces adherence to the code of practice. The IMC has broad authority 
to punish violations to the code of practice. It may issue warnings, 
impose fines, suspend or terminate licenses, seize equipment, and shut 
down operations of any broadcaster or media outlet in violation of the 
code of practice. The IMC issued numerous fines for violations of 
broadcasting standards by stations in both entities.
    In July the High Representative determined that the Governments of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the constituent entities had failed to take 
appropriate action to reform the broadcasting system. As a result, the 
High Representative imposed a series of laws and amendments 
restructuring the broadcasting system. These decisions provided for the 
liquidation of the current broadcaster, Radio Television Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (RTV BiH). In its place, OHR established a state-wide 
public broadcasting corporation, the Public Broadcasting System of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (PBS BiH), which is to produce and broadcast at 
least 1 hour of news programming for radio and television. This 
programming is to focus on issues of statewide interest and joint 
institutions. The three constituent peoples of the country and other 
minority groups are to be represented in the system's administrative 
and editorial structures. PBS BiH is to represent the country in all 
international broadcast organizations.
    The July decision also established Radio Television of the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RTV FBiH) as the public 
broadcasting company of the Federation. RTV FBiH is to broadcast on two 
stations, one offering primarily Croatian-language programming and one 
offering Bosnian-language programming. RTV FBiH is required to provide 
programming for other minority groups in their own languages. The High 
Representative's decision specifies that ``programming must be based on 
truth, must respect human dignity and different opinions and 
convictions, and must promote the highest standards of human rights, 
peace and social justice, international understanding, protection of 
democratic freedoms and environment protection.'' The OHR appointed 14 
of the 21 members of the Board of Governors and imposed the remaining 7 
members who were to have been chosen by Parliament. As a result, there 
was no SDA influence on the Board. However, the SDA tried to obstruct 
the Board's activities by pressuring the political and business 
interests of board members.
    Croat-controlled areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina are covered by 
Croatian State Television (HRT). The three HRT channels come into the 
country by means of an over-the-border terrestrial broadcasting 
satellite, and an extensive rebroadcasting operation managed by the 
Mostar-based, Zagreb-controlled Erotel company. HRT's news programs and 
editorials frequently criticize the Dayton Accords. A December 1998 
decision by the IMC was intended to terminate the direct rebroadcast of 
the HRT by requiring that RTV BiH and Croat television broadcasters 
establish a Federation television system that meets the needs of all 
BiH citizens. However, availability of the HRT and satellite broadcasts 
were unchanged at year's end.
    Citing the RS government's lack of progress on an acceptable 
broadcasting law, in August the High Representative imposed a set of 
amendments to the RS broadcasting law. These amendments required Serb 
Radio Television (SRT) to change its name to Radio Television of 
Republika Srpska (RTRS). The High Representative required RTRS to 
comply with the country's broadcasting laws, regulations made by the 
IMC or its successor, and the laws of the RS. RTRS is required to 
provide timely, unbiased programming for all citizens of the RS. 
Finally, the OHR ordered that the RTRS Board of Governors was to 
consist of: ``six members representing independent journalism, the 
legal profession, the economic sector, the academic community, the 
syndicate of the Republika Srpska, and the employees of the RTRS, 
taking into account the cultural and linguistic diversity of the 
citizens of the Republika Srpska.'' RTRS restructuring is still in 
process. For the most part, the RTRS now adheres to IMC standards, a 
dramatic improvement over previous years. On November 5, RS Prime 
Minister Milorad Dodik and his cabinet decided to remove RTRS director 
Andelko Kozomara for his alleged hard-line bias and named Slavisa 
Sabljic as acting director. However, only the RTRS Board of Governors, 
and not the RS Government, has the right to replace the General 
Director.
    In April several associations of journalists from both entities 
agreed to an OHR-sponsored press code setting out the rights and 
responsibilities of journalists. The code includes articles prohibiting 
ethnic, gender or other discrimination and encouraging accurate and 
objective reporting.
    In July the High Representative, citing the failure of the State 
and entity level Governments to ensure protection of journalists' 
freedom of expression, suspended ``the applicability of imprisonment as 
a sanction under the provisions concerning libel and defamation.'' On 
September 2, the amendment decriminalizing slander and libel was 
published in the official gazette. There were no reports of journalists 
being tried for slander since the law was imposed by the OHR. The 
possibility of imprisonment for slander and libel was used to threaten 
journalists, and authorities apply slander laws selectively to punish 
opponents.
    For example, in June the municipal court of Sarajevo sentenced the 
editor in chief of Slobodna Bosna, Senad Avdic, to 3 months in prison 
and 1 year suspended sentence on charges of slander against former 
Zenica-Doboj canton minister of the interior, Semsudin Mehmedovic. 
However, on August 20, Avdic was acquitted of one charge of slander 
against former mayor of Prijedor Sead Cirkin. Avdic faces a total of 12 
charges of slander from various articles regarding corruption in the 
Federation.
    Despite this case, OHR's July decision to impose a law 
restructuring the media, if fully implemented, was expected to decrease 
political influence in broadcasting, improve objectivity, and generally 
increase freedom of expression in Bosnia. To date, the relevant 
authorities have not yet fully implemented the restructuring. The PBS 
BiH and the RTV FBiH existed only on paper at year's end. However, the 
RTRS is broadcasting under its new name.
    The international donor-supported television Open Broadcast Network 
(OBN) provides independent news and public affairs programming. The 
international community launched the OBN to be a cross-entity 
broadcaster and source of objective news. OBN can be seen by 80 percent 
of the population. The OBN still is working to improve its broadcast 
range. However, only a minority of viewers cite the OBN as their key 
source of news compared to TV BIH, the HRT, and the RTRS.
    Other independent television outlets include TV Hayat, Studio 99, 
OBN Banja Luka affiliate Alternative TV (ATV), and Independent TV (NTV) 
also out of Banja Luka, and several small TV stations scattered around 
the country. These broadcasters were originally municipal stations. 
They have not yet been fully privatized, and their legal ownership 
status remains unclear.
    In May the mayor of Zenica told the editor in chief of RTV Zenica 
that he would lose his job unless several other of the station's 
editors were dismissed. However, the situation was resolved after the 
editors sent a protest letter to the OHR and informed it of their 
situation.
    In April the OHR endorsed the decision by the IMC to rescind the 
license of Kanal S, which is based in Pale. Observers noted the 
channels inflammatory broadcasting, prior to the IMC's decision. At 
year's end, Kanal S was back on the air after fully complying with all 
IMC demands.
    In November the IMC ordered the private station Erotel TV to stop 
broadcasting. Mostar-based Erotel TV retransmits programs from state-
run Croatian Television and was operating without a license for 2 years 
before the IMC's decision.
    Radio broadcasting in the Bosniak-majority areas of the 
Federation--particularly in Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla--is diverse. 
Opposition viewpoints are reflected in the news programs of independent 
broadcasters. Independent or opposition radio stations broadcast in the 
RS--particularly in Banja Luka and Trebinje. Nezavisni Radio, Nezavisna 
Televizija, and Radio Pegas report a wide variety of political 
opinions. Local radio stations broadcast in Croat-majority areas, but 
they are usually highly nationalistic. Local Croat authorities do not 
tolerate opposition viewpoints. Independent Studio 88 was launched in 
Mostar in July. The station will cover both sides of the ethnic divide, 
the first multi-ethnic broadcaster in Herzegovina.
    After the announcement of the Brcko decision in March, angry crowds 
destroyed the offices of independent Radio Osvit.
    In October the IMC ordered a 90-day closure of a Bosnian Croat 
radio station in Mostar after it broadcast incendiary calls for the 
city's Croat residents to take to the streets protesting SFOR raids on 
municipal offices which were undermining the Dayton Accords. As a 
result, some 200 students threw rocks and bottles at SFOR troops (see 
Section 1.c.).
    While some foreign journalists who represent recognized media were 
able to travel freely to most areas of the country, others encountered 
difficulties. Local police and security officials in the RS and west 
Mostar harassed local and foreign journalists associated with 
opposition parties or minority ethnic groups.
    Academic freedom was constrained. In the Federation, Serbs and 
Croats complained that SDA party members receive special treatment in 
appointments and promotions at the University of Sarajevo. The 
University of Banja Luka limits its appointments to Serbs. All 
institutions suffer from a lack of resources and staff, as well as the 
legacy of the Communist period. The University of Mostar remains 
divided into eastern and western parts, reflecting the continued ethnic 
divide in the city. However, the East Mostar University, despite 
persisting reports of ethnic discrimination, has significant ethnic 
diversity in its student body and staff. The staff and student body of 
West Mostar University is much more homogenous, reflecting, as least in 
part, the desire of most Croats to work and study in a Croat-dominated 
area.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, authorities imposed 
some limits on this right in practice. Opposition political parties 
enjoyed greater latitude in staging rallies and campaigning than they 
had during the 1996 national elections. However, there were still 
instances in which incumbents attempted to use their positions to 
hinder the activities of opposition parties.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and a wide 
range of social, cultural, and political organizations functioned 
without interference; however, authorities imposed some limits on this 
right and indirect pressure constrained the activities of some groups. 
Although political party membership was not forced, many viewed 
membership in the leading party of any given area as the surest way for 
residents to obtain, regain, or keep housing and jobs in the state-
owned sector of the economy.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, including private and public worship, and in general, 
individuals enjoyed this right in their religious majority areas. 
However, the efforts of individuals to worship in areas in which they 
are an ethnic/religious minority were restricted, sometimes by societal 
violence. Some incidents resulted in damage to religious edifices and 
cemeteries.
    In July the Human Rights Chamber determined that the Government of 
the RS had denied the right of the Muslim community to freedom of 
religion by refusing to allow the reconstruction of mosques destroyed 
in the war. The Chamber specifically established that the Muslim 
community had property rights to 15 sites and that the community had 
the right to enclose the properties. According to the decision, the 
Government of the RS may not allow other construction on these sites 
and must issue any construction permits necessary to rebuild mosques on 
seven of the sites (see Section 4). However, there were reports that 
local authorities in the RS were obstructing attempts to rebuild 
mosques, particularly the Ferhadija Central Mosque in Banja Luka.
    In a positive development, Muslims were able to celebrate Bajram, 
an important religious holiday, on January 19 in the mosque in Prozor-
Rama for the first time since the war. About 200 Muslims attended the 
service without incident. The local Bosnian Croat police force provided 
security.
    Catholic priests are able to hold Mass in the RS without incident. 
In the case of a large Mass, Catholic Church officials work with RS 
local officials to obtain necessary permits.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for ``the 
right to liberty of movement and residence'' and freedom of movement, 
including across the IEBL, continued to improve; however, some limits 
remained in practice. The IPTF and SFOR completed the dismantling of 
all permanent police checkpoints, greatly enhancing freedom of 
movement. However, for most minorities movement across the IEBL and 
into areas dominated by other ethnic groups remained somewhat limited 
and cautious in practice. The eastern RS remained under hard-line 
control and unwelcoming to a minority presence.
    Freedom of movement improved significantly with the introduction of 
universal license plates in 1998. The new plates do not identify the 
vehicles as being registered in predominantly Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, or 
Bosnian Croat areas. The U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(UNMIBH) reported that in the first week after the inauguration of the 
new plates, about 4,000 vehicles crossed the IEBL.
    Statistics on refugee returns remained difficult to obtain. Between 
the end of the war and the end of the year, 350,000 persons who left 
the country had returned. More than 160,000 returned from Germany 
alone, due to the German Government's policy of actively pressuring 
refugees to return to Bosnia. Most of those returning from Europe were 
unable to return to their prewar homes. Efforts by hard-line Croats to 
resettle returning refugees to consolidate the results of ethnic 
cleansing have ceased for the most part. Although the return figures 
are much less exact for those returning from other places within the 
country, the UNHCR estimated that approximately 296,000 IDP's returned 
to their prewar homes between the end of the war and the end of the 
year. While different refugee organizations provide different estimates 
on the numbers of minority returns, they all agree that the rate of 
minority returns in 1999 was probably twice that of 1998.
    The UNHCR ``open cities'' initiative, begun in 1997, linked 
economic assistance to cooperation on minority return (positive 
conditionality) and helped the UNHCR's effort to break down the 
influence of ethnic separatists.
    Several factors prevented an even larger number of returns, 
including the hard-line obstruction of implementation of property 
legislation, political pressure to remain displaced in order to 
increase ethnic homogeneity of the population in a specific area, the 
lack of an ethnically neutral curriculum in public schools, and 
insecurity caused by the NATO campaign in Kosovo (see Section 5).
    The February 1998 Sarajevo Declaration was intended to showcase 
Sarajevo as a model city in terms of tolerance. The declaration was to 
provide for improvements in areas that hindered return: Legislation, 
housing, security and public order, employment, and education, with a 
goal of 20,000 minority returns for the canton during 1998. The level 
of returns so far has been disappointing. By year's end, the UNHCR 
announced that nearly 20,000 minority returns had occurred in Sarajevo 
canton after nearly 2 years. Although the rate of evictions in Sarajevo 
was increasing at year's end, the processing of property claims and 
evictions was still very slow.
    During 1998 the Federation army unlawfully took control of 4,000 
former Yugoslav military (JNA) apartments that had been abandoned and 
repaired by a Dutch company. Prewar residents continue to wait to 
return to these, while authorities encourage occupants to start the 
purchasing process. After inadequate action by local authorities, 
several of these cases were brought before the Human Rights Chamber. No 
returns have taken place to former JNA apartments. The military has 
attempted to evict legal occupants. In some cases the military 
prevented soldiers from being evicted, at times using force, and 
stopped prewar owners from reoccupying their apartments.
    The continued influence of ethnic separatists in positions of 
authority also hindered minority returns. Much of Croat-controlled 
Herzegovina and the eastern RS remained resistant to minority returns. 
Displaced persons living in those areas, even those who privately 
indicated interest in returning to their prewar homes, frequently were 
pressured to remain displaced, while those who wished to return were 
discouraged, often through the use of violence (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.). The increased number of ethnically integrated police forces 
helped improve the climate for return, but security in general remained 
inadequate in many areas.
    In May a group of Serbs in Kotor Varos blocked the road to prevent 
Bosniaks from returning to the town. Earlier the municipal assembly 
voted unanimously against the return of Bosniaks.
    The continued depressed state of the economy throughout the country 
and the consequent lack of employment opportunities for returnees 
remained a serious obstacle to a significant number of returns. As a 
result, most minority returnees were elderly. This presented a new 
burden for receiving municipalities. Younger minority group members, 
who depend on adequate wages from employment to support families, 
generally remained displaced, especially in cases where they had 
managed over the past 6 years to find work.
    On April 14, the OHR cancelled the permanent occupancy rights of 
individuals who acquired apartments during and immediately following 
the war in both entities. These individuals can remain temporary 
occupants of their apartments only until the prewar occupant applies to 
return to that apartment. Previously, permanent occupancy rights 
blocked effectively the return of minorities who left during or 
immediately after the war, since they were granted to persons who 
occupied these ``abandoned'' residences.
    In June the mayor of Berkovici in the RS unsuccessfully attempted 
to impede the return of 60 Bosniaks by declaring their return illegal. 
Local government officials continue to obstruct minority returns to 
Drvar. On July 3, the canton 10 interior minister instructed the local 
police to expel all returnees who failed to change their registration 
from their previous temporary residence to Drvar and failed to obtain 
identification cards within 10 days. The action was an attempt to 
harass returnees since authorities also hindered returnees' attempts to 
register. Residents without identification cards are not entitled to 
social benefits and their freedom of movement can be restricted. 
Expulsion also is illegal; the maximum legal penalty for failure to get 
an identification card is a fine. The OHR recommended that Serb returns 
to Drvar be slowed temporarily as a result of this incident.
    Government leaders in both the RS and the Federation often have 
used a variety of tactics, including public statements, to inhibit the 
return of IDP's (see Section 1.c.).
    Officially, the Government grants asylum and refugee status in 
accordance with international standards. At times the Government 
cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. In October 1998, the Bosnian Council of Ministers 
issued an instruction on temporary admission of FRY refugees from the 
province of Kosovo. This entitled needy refugees from these areas to 
free accommodation, food, primary medical care, and education. In May 
after the NATO campaign began against the FRY, the Council of Ministers 
extended these protections to refugees arriving from all parts of the 
FRY.
    Some 13,000 Kosovar Albanians entered the country in the 12 months 
before the NATO air campaign began on March 24. After March 24, 8,700 
additional Kosovar Albanians entered the country, along with 25,000 
Muslims from the Sandzak region of Serbia. Additionally, about 35,000 
other refugees from Serbia and the FRY entered the country after March, 
of whom the vast majority were Serbs formerly displaced from Croatia 
and Bosnia during the 1991-95 war. As of October 1, roughly 9,000 
Kosovar Albanians, 11,000 Sandzakis, and 22,000 of these Serbs were 
estimated to remain in the country as refugees. The Kosovar Albanians 
and the Sandzakis are in the Federation and the Serbs are in the RS. 
Nearly all are in private accommodations.
    UNHCR and OSCE monitors heard reports from refugees of numerous 
human rights violations perpetrated by RS police. These violations 
included harassment, beatings, and extortion of money (see Section 
1.c.). Refugees also reported incidents of RS police confiscating and 
destroying refugees' documents. There were no reports of the forced 
return of persons to a place where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Even though a permanent election law is not yet in place, the 
Dayton Accords commit the parties to ``ensure that conditions exist for 
the organization of free and fair elections, in particular a 
politically neutral environment'' and to ensure the right to ``vote in 
secret without fear or intimidation.'' These rights were respected in 
the national and entity elections in 1998, which were the most fair and 
pluralistic since the Dayton Accords were signed. Voter turnout was 
over 70 percent with over 83 political parties, independent candidates, 
coalitions, and alliances competing for office. The OSCE released a 
draft of the election law in December that would transfer 
responsibilities for running elections to the Government.
    However, continued party control of the media and security 
apparatus precluded full citizen participation without intimidation, 
especially in Bosnian Croat areas and parts of the RS. To varying 
degrees, all major parties seek to exclude other parties in areas they 
control. This was especially true in areas controlled by the SDS or the 
HDZ. However, observers believe that recent changes to the media law in 
the RS and the new media law in the Federation may improve the 
situation somewhat (see Section 2.a.).
    The 1998 elections were relatively free and fair, but resulted in 
the election of a hard-line SRS President, Nikola Poplasen. Poplasen 
refused to nominate a candidate for prime minister with sufficient 
support in the RS Assembly to form a government, including the 
candidate with the most support, current Prime Minister Milorad Dodik. 
This episode eventually sparked a confrontation with the High 
Representative in which Poplasen was removed from office on March 5. In 
announcing the dismissal, then High Representative Carlos Westendorp 
said that Poplasen had ``acted against democratic principles and abused 
the authority of the Office of President by refusing to consult the 
parties and coalitions represented by the National Assembly in order to 
nominate the prime minister.'' Immediately after Poplasen's dismissal, 
Vice President Sarovic refused to take his place because Sarovic did 
not accept the legitimacy of the High Representative's decision. At 
year's end, Sarovic was attempting to assume the powers of the 
Presidency, but was told by the High Representative that this would not 
be permitted.
    Implementation of the 1998 elections at the national and entity 
levels was far less difficult than implementation of municipal election 
results. The 1997 municipal election results were implemented in June 
when the Srebrenica municipal assembly met and approved a government. 
The government was certified by the OSCE.
    Also on March 5, but unrelated to Poplasen's dismissal, Roberts B. 
Owen, arbitrator for the Brcko Arbitral Tribunal, announced a final 
award, whereby the entire prewar Brcko municipality was to become a 
``self-governing neutral district,'' which would belong to both 
entities. The award delegates to the district's internationally 
appointed supervisor the responsibility for deciding when the district 
would begin to govern itself under a new district statute. Until then 
the supervisor retained ultimate authority over the district. The final 
disposition of this region was a highly sensitive issue, since the 
region of Brcko connects the eastern and western sections of the RS. A 
democratically-elected, multiethnic local government is to administer 
the district under the direct oversight of the Brcko supervisor. Until 
new laws are issued or existing laws adapted, the supervisor retains 
discretion as to which laws, Federation or RS, are to apply in Brcko. A 
new district statute was issued by the supervisor on December 7, and a 
district-wide multiethnic police force was to be established officially 
in January 2000. Demilitarization of the Brcko district was underway 
and scheduled to be completed by the end of February 2000. On August 
18, the Brcko Tribunal issued an annex to the final award, clarifying 
implementation of the award. In particular, it established the 
citizenship status of district residents and confirmed the right of 
transit by military forces of both entities. It also directed the 
supervisor to address such issues as taxation, law enforcement, 
district management, and composition of the district assembly.
    Women generally were underrepresented in government and politics, 
although a few women, such as the former President of the RS, have 
occupied prominent positions. In the three legislatures, women were 
underrepresented seriously. To address this concern, the OSCE election 
rules required parties to include no fewer than 3 members of each 
gender among the top 10 names on their candidate lists. In the state-
level House of Representatives (lower house), 12 of 42 deputies are 
women. There are no women in the state-level House of Peoples (upper 
house), whose representatives are appointed by the entity legislatures. 
In the Federation legislature, 21 of 140 deputies in the House of 
Representatives are women, and 7 of 72 deputies in the House of Peoples 
are women. In the RS unicameral legislature, 18 of 83 deputies are 
women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The authorities generally permitted outside investigations of 
alleged human rights violations. International and local NGO's involved 
in human rights appear to operate somewhat freely. The OHR reports that 
foreign government and NGO human rights monitors were able to travel 
without restriction in all areas of the country. International 
community representatives were given widespread and for the most part 
unhindered access to detention facilities and prisoners in the RS as 
well as in the Federation.
    While monitors enjoyed relative freedom to investigate human rights 
abuses, they were rarely successful in persuading the authorities in 
all regions to respond to their recommendations. Monitors' 
interventions often met with delays or outright refusal.
    The caseload of the Human Rights Chamber and the Office of Human 
Rights Ombudsperson, two institutions created under Annex 6 of the 
Dayton Accords, expanded during the year. Decisions of the Chamber are 
final and cannot be appealed to the Constitutional Court. During the 
year, the Chamber's caseload increased to 3,449 registered cases; and 
the Chamber issued 294 final case decisions. While governmental 
cooperation with the Chamber is still weak, there was noticeable 
improvement during the year. Both Federation and RS officials complied 
with several decisions, including reinstating returning residents to 
Yugoslav National Army apartments (JNA) and payment of compensation 
awards. These successes were the result of OHR cooperation in 
monitoring authorities' responses and coordinating intervention in 
cases in which the authorities failed to meet their obligations to 
cooperate.
    Cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague is a key factor in the 
implementation of the Dayton Accords and the establishment of respect 
for human rights. In 1998 RS Prime Minister Dodik altered the RS policy 
of defiance of the Tribunal and the Dayton Accords by instructing his 
officials to cooperate with the ICTY. He also offered office space in 
Banja Luka to the ICTY. His actions helped to reduce the behind-the-
scenes political influence of former wartime RS President Radovan 
Karadzic and his SDS allies. During the year, RS authorities 
facilitated the ICTY's investigation in Srebrenica. However, a majority 
of the 31 ICTY public indictees who remain at large reportedly live in 
the RS, some allegedly in Prijedor and Foca. RS authorities made no 
effort to arrest these indictees.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The parties agreed in the Dayton Accords to reject discrimination 
on such grounds as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, or association with a 
national minority. Nevertheless, there were many cases of 
discrimination.
    Women.--Accurate statistics on violence against women, including 
spousal abuse and rape, are not available. Throughout the country, rape 
and violent abuse are considered criminal offenses. However, domestic 
violence usually was not reported to the authorities, and a sense of 
shame reportedly prevents some victims of rape from coming forward to 
complain to authorities. There are laws that prohibit rape in both the 
Federation and the RS. Spousal rape and spousal abuse are also illegal 
in the Federation. There are no available estimates of the extent of 
violence against women.
    Trafficking in women from the former Soviet Union for purposes of 
forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    It is illegal to run a brothel in Bosnia, but local police have 
focused primarily on women engaged in prostitution rather than 
procurers or those managing the brothels. As a result, women who have 
been coerced or forced into prostitution have little recourse. 
Authorities generally treat prostitution as a minor misdemeanor 
regarding the woman involved, but employers and customers do not face 
charges. Women convicted of prostitution can be fined, imprisoned for 
60 days, or deported. It is estimated that there are some 700 brothels 
in the RS and some 300 in the Federation, where some 15,000 prostitutes 
work. Police officials in Brcko have been removed from office for 
involvement in prostitution.
    There is little legal or social discrimination against women, and 
women hold a few of the most responsible positions in society, serving 
as judges, doctors, and professors. However, a male-dominated society 
prevails in both entities, particularly in rural areas, with few women 
in positions of real economic power or political power.
    Women have been discriminated against in the workplace in favor of 
demobilized soldiers. Anecdotal evidence indicates that women and men 
receive equal pay at socially owned enterprises but not necessarily at 
private businesses. Women are entitled to 12 months' maternity leave 
and to work no more than 4 hours per day until a child is 3 years old. 
However, women in all parts of the country encounter problems with 
regard to the nonpayment of maternity leave allowances and the 
unwarranted dismissal of pregnant women and new mothers. The 
International Human Rights Law Group and local NGO's organized seminars 
and information campaigns to raise awareness of the issue, and the 
Tuzla cantonal assembly passed a resolution to pay women all maternity 
leave allowance debts since 1998. A woman with underage children cannot 
be forced to do shift work.
    Children.--The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child is 
incorporated by reference in the Dayton Accords and has the effect of 
law in both entities. The end of the fighting brought a major 
improvement in the human rights of children. During the war nearly 
17,000 children were killed, 35,000 wounded, and over 1,800 permanently 
disabled.
    Children suffer from an extreme paucity of social services. 
Disabled children lack sufficient care and educational opportunities. 
Education is compulsory through the age of 15 in both the Federation 
and the RS. The most serious issue is the ethnic division of the 
education system. Students in minority areas frequently face a hostile 
environment in schools that do not provide an ethnically neutral 
setting. At times minority children are barred from attending school at 
all. Local education officials excuse these abuses by claiming that 
minority children should have their own schools and curricula. 
Obstruction by politicians and government officials has slowed 
international efforts to remove discriminatory material from textbooks 
and enact other needed reforms.
    In February the International Human Rights Law Group issued a 
report finding that segregation and discrimination were entrenched in 
Bosnian schools, particularly in religious education. For example, in 
Sarajevo only Muslim religion classes were offered in public schools, 
which denied children of other faiths the practical opportunity to 
study their own religious traditions in school. Since the beginning of 
the school year, ethnic divisions in schools have become more apparent. 
In an effort to block returns to the area, municipal officials in 
Capljina, Stolac, and Bugojno refused to allocate space in public 
schools to allow minority children to be taught under their own 
curriculum, in direct defiance of a directive of the High 
Representative. There is concern among the international community that 
this situation may further harden existing prejudices and ethnic 
hatreds.
    There was no societal pattern of abuse against children. 
Nonetheless, they continue to suffer disproportionately from the 
societal stress of the postwar era. Trafficking in girls for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    People With Disabilities.--The Federation Government is required by 
law to assist disabled persons to find employment and to protect them 
against discrimination. In the RS discrimination against the disabled 
also is prohibited by law. Currently there are few jobs available, and 
thousands of newly disabled victims entered the job market after the 
war. The Government has limited resources to address the special needs 
of the disabled. There are no legal provisions mandating that buildings 
be made accessible to the physically disabled. There are a number of 
international NGO's that assist the disabled in the country.
    Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are identified 
closely in the country. The Interreligion Council, established in 1997 
and composed of the main leaders of the country's four major religious 
communities--Muslim, Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Jewish--
continued its efforts to promote national reconciliation. The OSCE and 
the OHR facilitated many interfaith meetings at the local level as 
well.
    However, throughout the country, religious minorities felt pressure 
and were intimidated by the ethnic/religious majority.
    Catholic priests have frequently been able to hold Mass in the RS 
without incident. In the case of a large Mass, Catholic officials work 
with RS local officials to obtain necessary permits. On December 13, a 
group of young men attacked a group of Catholic priests led by 
Archbishop Vinko Cardinal Pulic on their way to celebrate Mass in 
Derventa. One member of Pulic's party was injured, but the service took 
place as planned. There was no known government involvement in this 
attack. A demonstration delaying Pulic's departure from the same church 
occurred in 1998.
    None of the mosques in the RS destroyed during the war have been 
rebuilt or repaired, despite requests from the Muslim community for 
reconstruction (see Section 2.c.). Religious minorities throughout the 
country at times faced interference from the authorities in their right 
to worship freely. However, Catholic priests reported that they were 
able now to conduct masses in the RS with little or no problems.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Claimed ``ethnic differences'' 
were used to justify the war and remain a powerful political force in 
the country. Although some politicians still support the concepts of a 
``Greater Serbia'' and a ``Greater Croatia,'' mixed communities exist 
peacefully in a growing number of areas, including Sarajevo and Tuzla. 
The SDS, HDZ, and to a lesser extent the primarily Bosniak SDA, sought 
to manipulate the movement of persons and the access to housing and 
social services that they control to ensure that the ethnic groups with 
which they are associated consolidate their position in their 
respective geographic regions. Some hard-line local authorities in the 
eastern RS sought to keep information regarding the right to return and 
conditions in return sites from reaching displaced persons in their 
areas, so as to dissuade them from attempting to return to their former 
homes.
    In December 1998, the RS passed new property legislation 
establishing a claims process at the municipal level. The law went into 
effect when it was published in the official gazette on February 10. On 
April 13, the High Representative imposed several amendments and 
indicated that more were needed to make the law effective. The High 
Representative also imposed a 6-month extension of the June 15 deadline 
to file claims on socially-owned apartments, and on December 10 issued 
a further extension of 4 months. The new deadline was set for April 19, 
2000. In addition, the OHR issued on October 27 a series of decrees 
amending a number of property laws in both entities to provide all 
citizens just and equal protection of their property rights, which is 
considered essential in order for IDP's to return home.
    Despite hopeful signs in some areas, harassment and discrimination 
against minorities continue throughout the country, often centering on 
property disputes. These problems include desecration of graves, damage 
to houses of worship, throwing explosive devices into residential 
areas, harassment, dismissal from work, threats, assaults, and, in some 
cases, killings (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    According to the 1997 report of the Federation Human Rights 
Ombudsman, ``Equality before the law is not observed in the everyday 
practice of state authorities that decide on the rights and obligations 
of the citizens.''
    Bosnian Serb and Croat politicians seek to increase the ethnic 
homogeneity of the population in areas they control by discouraging 
IDP's of their own ethnicity from returning to their prewar homes if 
they would be in the minority there. Hard-liners also encourage members 
of their groups currently living in areas where they are minorities to 
move to areas where their ethnic group is the majority. For example, 
hard-line Bosnian Croats have discouraged Croat returns to central 
Bosnia and have actively recruited Croats still living there to 
resettle in Herzegovina. This effort sparked an open dispute among 
Bosnian Croats, and the Catholic Bishop of Banja Luka publicly 
criticized the practice.
    Although the new RS Government is on record as supporting the right 
to return, it continues to obstruct returns at all levels. Bosniak 
authorities appear tacitly to support some Bosniak resettlement 
efforts, including resettlement of returnees, in ``strategic'' areas of 
the Federation where Bosniaks are in the minority.
    In some cases, opponents of refugee returns employed violence, 
including sporadic house burnings, and orchestrated demonstrations in 
an effort to intimidate returnees. While incidents of violence have 
decreased due to improved security and freedom of movement, other forms 
of discrimination have not. In particular, discrimination in employment 
and education are now key obstacles to sustainable returns. Widespread 
firing of ethnic minorities during and after the war has not been 
reversed in many cases. Recently there have been more cases of 
employment discrimination based on political affiliation.
    Throughout the country, membership in the political party 
affiliated with one's ethnic group was considered the surest way to 
obtain, retain, or regain employment, especially in the management of 
socially owned enterprises. Membership was also influential in 
obtaining or keeping housing (see Section 2.b.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Federation and RS Constitutions 
provide for the right of workers to form and join labor unions. Both 
the Federation and the RS have a union organization. There are informal 
links between the two unions, and there have been some very preliminary 
and initial steps towards merging the two under one banner. Workers in 
the RS or the Federation are not prohibited from joining the union in 
the entity where they are a minority. However, the membership in the RS 
is overwhelmingly Serb and the membership in the Federation is 
overwhelmingly Bosniak. Bosnian Croats have informal labor 
organizations in areas where they are the dominant ethnic group, but 
generally are represented by the federation union.
    Unions have the right to strike, but there were few strikes during 
the year because of the economic devastation and joblessness caused by 
the war throughout much of the Federation. However, on October 25, some 
8,000 demonstrators attended a labor rally in Sarajevo to protest 
nonpayment of salaries and pensions in addition to other social issues. 
Some of the protest's organizers claimed that government officials and 
managers of state firms threatened workers with the loss of their jobs 
if they attended the rally.
    Unions may affiliate internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There was 
little collective bargaining in labor-management negotiations during 
the year. In both the RS and the Federation workers have the right to 
collective bargaining, and the law prohibits antiunion discrimination.
    There were no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits servitude or forced labor, including that performed by 
children; however, women and girls were trafficked for the purpose of 
forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.). Despite rumors that work camps 
exist in isolated areas, investigations have not turned up any 
corroborating evidence.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children in the 
Federation and in the RS was 16 years. Children sometimes assisted 
their families with farm work and odd jobs. Children are covered under 
the Constitution's prohibition of servitude or forced labor, and such 
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage in the 
Federation was $46 (80 KM). In the RS, the monthly minimum wage was $34 
(60 KM). The minimum wages were insufficient to provide for a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. Many workers still had 
claims outstanding for salaries earned during the war but were being 
paid in full only for current work. Similarly, many pensioners had 
outstanding claims.
    There are no legal limits on the number of hours in the workweek. 
Overtime pay is not required by law.
    In March the RS Government began paying most government salaries 
and pensions in convertible marks (KM). However, private employers 
continue to pay salaries in Yugoslav dinars. This allows employers to 
purchase dinars at the black market rate but pay employees at the much 
lower official rate, usually pocketing the difference. As a result, 
some workers in the RS suffer a significant reduction in their 
purchasing power.
    Due to the high level of taxes levied on employers, many persons 
are forced to work outside the government benefits and tax system. The 
Government levies taxes equaling up to 80 percent of an employee's 
salary to pay for health and pension benefits. Unfortunately many 
employees do not receive these benefits even if their employers do 
contribute to their government plans.
    Occupational safety and health regulations generally were ignored 
because of the demands and constraints imposed by an economy devastated 
by war. Neither entity has completed passage of new laws to enforce 
international worker rights standards.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women from the 
former Soviet Union for the purpose of forced prostitution is a serious 
problem. The country is an origin, transit, and destination point for 
women and girls trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution. A 
significant number of women are manipulated or coerced into situations 
in which they work in brothels in conditions close to slavery. The 
country is extremely vulnerable to trafficking in persons, since it has 
weak laws, border controls are almost nonexistant, and the police are 
easily bribed. As many as 9,000 trafficked women may be working in the 
country.
    It is illegal to run a brothel, but local police have focused 
primarily on women engaged in prostitution rather than procurers or 
those managing the brothels. As a result, women who have been coerced 
or forced into prostitution have little recourse. Authorities generally 
treat prostitution as a minor misdemeanor against the woman involved, 
but employers and customers do not face charges. Women convicted of 
prostitution can be fined, imprisoned for 60 days, or deported. In the 
fall, the OHR issued directives governing police raids on brothels to 
ensure that trafficked women found were provided assistance. The 
country's deportation laws permit local police to release trafficked 
individuals in neighboring jurisdictions or across the border in 
Croatia. Police in Bihac, Gradacac, and Tuzla have broken up 
trafficking rings in recent years and deported the women. In one case 
of deportation, after a cantonal court in Zenica in the Federation 
ordered the removal of six prostitutes from the canton, local police 
took them to Doboj in the RS. Reportedly they all later appeared for 
sale at the Arizona Market in Ravne Brcko. It is estimated that there 
are some 700 brothels in the RS and some 300 in the Federation, where 
some 15,000 prostitutes work. Brothel operators reportedly earn $50 
(100 DM) per hour per woman; while in some cases women reportedly 
receive as little as $13 (25 DM) per month for personal expenses and 
are forced to find other money (often through begging) for essentials, 
including condoms. Other prostitutes reportedly earn $100 (200 DM) per 
month. Police throughout the Federation have arrested and deported 
Russian and Ukrainian women working as prostitutes. Organized crime 
elements control the trafficking business. Police officials in Brcko 
have been removed from office for involvement in prostitution, and 
there are allegations that police officers in other cities also may be 
involved.
    Women are trafficked to the country from other East European 
countries and countries of the former Soviet Union, including the 
countries of Central Asia. The majority of trafficked women come from 
Ukraine, but also from Romania, Moldova, Russia, Belarus, and 
Kazakhstan. The main route into the country for trafficked women was 
from the FRY. Some are brought in by traffickers specifically to work 
in the country's brothels. Others for a variety of reasons are stranded 
or abandoned by traffickers en route to other countries. Women 
trafficked to the country usually are promised jobs as secretaries, 
waitresses, or dancers in Western countries and wages of $1,500 (3,000 
DM) per month. Some women often are trafficked to Croatia to work as 
prostitutes there or then trafficked to other countries. Others are 
sold to middlemen or to brothel operators in the country, often at the 
Arizona Market in Ravne Brcko. The price is usually $1,500 (3,000 DM) 
per woman, and women often are expected to repay their ``owners'' this 
amount out of their ``share'' of their earnings.
    The Government has done little to combat the problem of 
trafficking. However, various international organizations and NGO's, 
both local and foreign, are addressing the issue. The Swedish NGO 
Kvinna Till Kvinna provides financial assistance to a shelter that 
houses trafficked women while they await return to their countries of 
origin. During the year, 50 trafficked women were repatriated from the 
country with NGO assistance.
    The women received airline tickets home and $150 to assist them 
with reintegration into their home country. The returnees also are 
urged to contact the local Organization for International Migration 
offices in their home country for follow-up counseling. The IPTF works 
with local police forces to free trafficked persons and to crack down 
on traffickers. There were two arrests of traffickers to date, in 
Bijeljina and Brcko.
                                 ______
                                 

                                BULGARIA

    Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic ruled by a democratically 
elected government. President Petar Stoyanov of the Union of Democratic 
Forces (UDF) began a 5-year term of office in January 1997 following 
his election in late 1996. UDF leader Ivan Kostov currently serves as 
Prime Minister. The judiciary is independent but suffers from 
corruption and continues to struggle with structural and staffing 
problems.
    Most internal security services are the responsibility of the 
Ministry of the Interior, including the Central Service for Combating 
Organized Crime, the National Security Service (civilian intelligence), 
internal security troops, border guards, and special forces. Although 
government control over the police is improving, it still is not 
sufficient to ensure full accountability. The Special Investigative 
Service (SIS), reduced in size by a recent reorganization, is a 
judicial branch agency and therefore not under direct government 
control. Some members of the police committed serious human rights 
abuses.
    The post-Communist transition economy continued to be heavily 
dependent on state enterprises, many of them unprofitable, although the 
growing private sector now accounts for over 60 percent of economic 
activity. Most persons are employed in the industrial and service 
sectors; key industries include food processing, chemical and oil 
processing, metallurgy, and energy. Principal exports are agricultural 
products, cigarettes and tobacco, chemicals, and metal products. 
Following a severe financial, economic, and political crisis in 1996 
and early 1997, a reformist government introduced a successful 
macroeconomic stabilization program. The program quickly stabilized the 
economy and cut the triple digit inflation of 1996-97 to less than 1 
percent in 1998. Inflation grew to 6.2 percent in 1999. The economy 
grew by 3.5 percent in 1998 and by 2.5 percent in 1999. The Government 
has placed a great deal of emphasis on attracting foreign investment 
and has promised far-reaching structural reforms, although the 
privatization process has not moved forward as quickly as hoped. The 
annual per capita gross domestic product of $1,500 provides a 
relatively low standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, problems remained in some areas, while there were 
improvements in a few others. Police used questionable lethal force 
against five suspects. Security forces beat suspects and inmates and 
often arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Reforms designed to 
increase accountability have improved the Government's control over the 
security forces; however, its control remains incomplete. Problems of 
accountability persist and inhibit government attempts to end police 
abuses. Conditions in some prisons were harsh, and pretrial detention 
often is prolonged, although this situation improved somewhat during 
the year. The judiciary is underpaid, understaffed, and has a heavy 
case backlog; corruption is a serious problem. The Government infringed 
on citizens' privacy rights. There were reports of police abuse of 
journalists. Constitutional restrictions on political parties formed on 
ethnic, racial, or religious lines effectively limit participation for 
some groups. Police, local government authorities, and private citizens 
continued to obstruct the activities of some nontraditional religious 
groups, although there was some improvement in their treatment by 
central government authorities. Violence and discrimination against 
women remained serious problems. Discrimination against the disabled 
and religious minorities is a problem. Discrimination and societal 
violence against Roma were serious problems, resulting in two deaths. 
Because of a lack of funds, the social service system did not assist 
homeless and other vulnerable children adequately, notably Romani 
children. Security forces harassed, physically abused, and arbitrarily 
arrested and detained Romani street children. Child labor was a 
problem. Trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, in five cases, police officers 
used questionable lethal force against citizens, one of whom was a 
member of the Romani minority. There was one report of a death in 
custody.
    The Ministry of Interior Act regarding the use of firearms by law 
enforcement officials permits them to use firearms to apprehend persons 
committing crimes or who have committed crimes, even if the crimes are 
only minor. Law enforcement officers also may use firearms to stop the 
escape of a person who has been arrested for any crime.
    On January 29, Tencho Vasev was shot and killed by border police 
near Novo Selo while trying to cross the Bulgarian-Greek border 
illegally. An investigation into the case was completed on May 28. On 
June 14, the Military Prosecutor's office prepared an indictment 
against the officer responsible for the shooting. The case was ongoing 
at year's end.
    On May 13, Nikolai Filipov was shot and killed by police officers 
during an attempted car theft near Pravets. Filipov died from a gunshot 
wound to the head. The use of lethal force in this instance was ruled 
legal self defense by the Military Prosecutor's office after an 
investigation.
    On June 6, a 28-year-old criminal suspect, Gancho Vuchkov, was shot 
and killed while trying to escape police in Sofia. Police were carrying 
out a warrant for Vuchkov's arrest in connection with a series of car 
thefts. Following a car chase and an exchange of gunfire with police, 
Vuchkov was shot in the temple. A relative of Vuchkov who reportedly 
arrived on the scene soon after the shooting and saw the body, alleges 
that Vuchkov was killed after police apprehended him and not while in 
pursuit. The case was under investigation at year's end.
    On June 14, Oleg Georgiev was shot and killed by border police 
during an attempt to cross the border near the town of Kulata in the 
southwest.
    On September 21, Kostadin Sherbetov was found dead in his cell in a 
district police station in Sofia. Earlier that day, guards from a 
private security firm that protects schools in Sofia detained Sherbetov 
on suspicion of pedophilia and turned him over to police. An ambulance 
was called to the police station, and doctors established that 
Sherbetov had died. According to his forensic medical certificate, he 
suffered from several broken ribs and numerous bruises. The chief 
secretary of the Ministry of Interior admitted that Sherbetov was a 
victim of violence but contended that the policemen and guards deny any 
involvement in the abuse. The Military Prosecutor's Office launched a 
preliminary investigation into four police officers.
    The investigation into the 1998 shooting death case of Tsvetan 
Kovatchev was reopened in June after legal wrangling resulted in a 
repeal of the Military Prosecution's initial ruling in January that the 
use of force was justified.
    In July charges were brought against the police officer involved in 
the 1998 fatal shooting of Yordan Yankov. The police officer was 
sentenced to a term of 15 years in prison and fined approximately 
$6,000 (Lev 11,000) to be paid to Yankov's family. An appeal to reduce 
the sentence is likely.
    The 1998 case of Staniela Bugova was on appeal following sentencing 
in the fall of the police officer involved in the shooting to 2\1/2\ 
years. The sentence was upheld in one appeal; this was the last 
opportunity for appeal in the case.
    There were no further developments in the 1997 beating death case 
of Mincho Simeonov Surtmachev. The case was still under appeal at 
year's end. Pending appeal, the two police officers involved remain in 
custody serving sentences of 7 years and 4 years. The case also 
resulted in the firing of the chief of the Dobrech police precinct.
    Two 1997 cases were dismissed. The Military Prosecutor's office 
dismissed the Georgi Biandov case in 1998 and ruled that police acted 
within their authority. The 1997 death of Elin Karamanov also was 
dismissed by the Military Prosecutor's office in June 1997, and the 
dismissal was confirmed on review by the Chief Military Prosecutor in 
September 1997 on the grounds that the use of lethal force was legal.
    The Military Prosecutor's office sentenced in February 1998 the 
police officer involved in the 1997 death-in-custody case of Stefan 
Stanev to 2\1/2\ years. The case is pending appeal.
    The 1996 murder case of former Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov 
remains unsolved. The investigation was ongoing at year's end, with 
several suspects arrested and released during the year. On June 1, 
authorities arrested Yurii Lenev in connection with the murder of 
Lukanov and reportedly beat him before he was taken to the SIS 
detention facility. Lenev's family members reported that when they were 
permitted to see him finally on June 12, his bruises from the beating 
still were visible. The Military Prosecutor's Office opened an 
investigation into this case, but no progress was made by year's end. 
Angel Vasiliev was extradited from the Czech Republic in September. 
According to press reports, Vasiliev is suspected of having paid 
$100,000 for the murder of Lukanov. Before his death, Lukanov 
criticized the Socialist Party's special treatment of the Orion group, 
to which Vasiliev's construction company belongs and which is suspected 
of misappropriating funds from several banks.
    There were two instances of members of the Romani ethnic minority 
being killed by private citizens. An incident of racial violence 
resulted in the beating death of a Romani woman at the hands of teenage 
boys. In another incident, a trespassing Romani boy was shot by a 
private citizen (see Section 5).
    The 1996 case of Anguel Zabchikov, a 17-year-old Romani boy who 
died in police custody, was still ongoing at year's end, pending a 
hearing before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
    In February four policemen were convicted of murdering an ethnic 
Turk during a protest against the forced assimilation campaign in May 
1989; the highest sentence meted out was 2\1/2\ years.
    There was no progress in the trial concerning the notorious death 
camps set up by the Communists after they took power in 1944.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture and cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, despite this prohibition, 
police commonly beat criminal suspects and members of minorities, at 
times to extract false testimony. In particular, security forces 
physically abuse street children, the majority of whom are Roma.
    The Human Rights Project (HRP) reported that on January 17, a 
police officer in Pleven harassed and beat Stefka Madjarova. After 
ordering her to leave the market where she was selling her goods, the 
police officer demanded her identification. He then ordered Madjarova 
to follow him to a police station at the market where she was beaten 
with a club. Madjarova was struck on the legs and has forensic evidence 
(a medical certificate) for the injuries that she sustained. There were 
three witnesses on the scene. A complaint has been filed with the 
Regional Military Prosecutor's Office in Pleven.
    In January two policemen beat Rom Kiril Nikolov Spasov from Russe 
and forced him to give false testimony.
    On July 22, police officers in Pavlinkeni reportedly beat two Roma, 
Atanas Assenov and Assen Assenov, who had been detained and left a 
third Rom, Anton Assenov, who had been shot earlier by a private 
security guard without medical attention for several hours. The private 
security guard accused the Roma and their companions of stealing fruit 
and reportedly shot at them when they tried to escape, wounding one Rom 
in the back of his head. When police arrived and called an ambulance, 
the emergency medical technicians reportedly refused to treat him. The 
police officers detained the Roma and took them to the Pavlinkeni 
regional police department, where they reportedly beat Atanas and 
Assen. Anton reportedly was left outside the police department in a 
horse cart for several hours, after which the police called another 
ambulance, and he received medical treatment. The Roma filed complaints 
against the police officers and security guard involved. The Military 
Prosecutor's office on November 16 declined to initiate a criminal 
proceeding on the matter.
    On September 8, three police officers beat a Romani woman, Tanya 
Borissova, outside of the labor bureau in Pazardzhik. A large number of 
Roma had assembled outside the bureau to obtain information about jobs. 
Three police officers beat Borissova after claiming that she had pushed 
one of them. They arrested her, and that same day the Pazardzhik 
district court sentenced her to 5 days in custody for ``minor 
hooliganism.''
    On October 2, a police officer in a police car approached a group 
of five Roma--Lilyan Zanev, Spas Berkov, Nedyalko Zanev, Simeon Zanev, 
and Roumyana Berkova--gathered on the outskirts of Pleven and 
questioned them. Another police car with two officers joined the first, 
and the three beat the five Roma with truncheons for approximately 30 
minutes and told the Roma that they suspected them of intending to rob 
nearby homes. One Rom obtained a medical certificate documenting his 
injuries and filed a complaint with the regional military prosecutor's 
office in Pleven.
    In July authorities arrested parliamentary deputy Tsvetelin Kanchev 
of the Euroleft Party for kidnaping, beating, robbing, and blackmailing 
persons in his district of Zlatiza. His trial began in November, and 
several persons who were involved in the beatings were set to testify.
    In March the Military Prosecutor's office closed the investigation 
into the 1998 mass police raid of a Romani neighborhood in the village 
of Mechka, citing the impossibility of positively identifying the 
individuals involved. The March 1998 case of Rossen Alekov who 
reportedly was beaten by police was closed in June 1998, when the 
Military Prosecutor's office declined to initiate a criminal 
investigation.
    There were reports of police abuse of journalists (see Section 
2.a.).
    According to Ministry of Interior (MOI) data, 40 cases of police 
brutality were confirmed for the period January 1 to July 22. The 
police generally have refused to make investigative reports available 
to the public. The MOI statistics reflect only those complaints 
registered by the alleged victims. Human rights monitors report that 
they receive many more complaints from persons who are too intimidated 
to lodge an official complaint with the authorities.
    Reports continue that criminal suspects in police custody run a 
significant risk of being mistreated. The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee 
(BHC) conducted a survey in prisons in January and found that 51 
percent of interviewed prisoners reported that police officers used 
physical force against them during arrest; 53 percent reported 
mistreatment at police stations. Romani prisoners reported being abused 
more frequently than other prisoners. Very seldom are allegations of 
police abuse properly investigated nor are the offending officers 
consistently punished. In particular, the Military Prosecutor's office 
has not investigated incidents of alleged police abuse thoroughly or 
expeditiously. In a shift from previous years, human rights observers 
were granted access to SIS detention facilities for the first time in 
February. Observers still are prohibited from interviewing detainees in 
the SIS facilities, unlike in regular prisons.
    Crime and corruption remained primary concerns of the Government 
during the year. The criminal justice system is in a time of 
transition. New legislation was enacted in late 1998 intended to 
improve and streamline the criminal justice process, which has long 
been an acknowledged problem. The new law, whose provisions all were to 
be enacted by January 1, 2000, was to reorganize and reallocate 
authorities among police, the SIS, prosecutors, and judges, and devolve 
greater authority to regional authorities. The full details of the 
plan's implementation and its effectiveness in achieving real reform 
remain to be seen.
    There have been unconfirmed reports of local or police involvement 
in trafficking in persons (see Section 6.f.).
    Conditions in some prisons are harsh and include severe 
overcrowding, inadequate lavatory facilities, and insufficient heating 
and ventilation. The SIS's parallel network of jails and prisons, newly 
transferred as of December to Justice Ministry control under recent 
legislative changes, contains many of the harshest detention 
facilities. Credible sources reported numerous cases of brutality 
committed by prison guards against inmates. However, there were no more 
reports during the year of prisoners being placed in solitary 
confinement after complaining about their treatment. The BHC reports 
that the Government has taken vigorous and effective action to combat 
the tuberculosis outbreak reported last year, much reducing this 
problem. Justice Ministry information for 1999 indicates a 40 percent 
decrease in tuberculosis infections from 1998 figures. The BHC further 
reports that nutritional deficiencies which had exacerbated this 
problem also have been improved. The process by which prisoners may 
complain of substandard conditions or of mistreatment does not appear 
to function effectively.
    The Government cooperated with requests by independent observers to 
monitor conditions in prisons and detention facilities. The European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) inspected a number of 
prisons and detention facilities during the year. Human rights 
observers reported that several of the country's worst detention 
facilities were closed down by the Government prior to the CPT visit 
and remain closed.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides for protection against arbitrary arrest and detention; 
however, police often arbitrarily detain and arrest street children, 
the majority of whom are Roma.
    The Constitution provides for access to legal counsel from the time 
of detention. However, a survey of prisoners conducted by the BHC found 
that 54 percent of prisoners complained that they had no lawyer present 
during preliminary investigations. Police normally obtain a warrant 
from a prosecutor prior to apprehending an individual; otherwise, in 
emergency circumstances police may detain individuals for up to 24 
hours on their own authority; however, authorities must rule on the 
legality of such detention by the end of that time period. If the 
person is released without being charged before the 24-hour period 
elapses, there is no judicial involvement in the case. Human rights 
observers charge that police commonly handle minor offenses by 
arresting the suspect, beating him, and releasing him within the 24-
hour period. Defendants have the right to visits by family members, to 
examine evidence, and to know the charges against them. Charges may not 
be made public without the permission of the Prosecutor General. In the 
interests of a speedy trial, investigations now are prescribed by law 
to last no more than 2 months under normal circumstances, although this 
period may be extended to 6 months by the head regional prosecutor, and 
up to 9 months by the Prosecutor General. In practice, persons often 
have been detained for 1 to 2 years without a conviction. It is not 
unusual for cases to be returned by the prosecutors or judges for 
further investigation. This generally restarts the clock, although some 
recent court interpretations have directed that the time limits should 
apply cumulatively to all the investigation periods on a given case. 
Under the terms of a 1997 amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
pretrial detention can last no more than 1 year or, if the alleged 
offense is punishable by over 15 years' imprisonment, life 
imprisonment, or capital punishment, no more than 2 years. Spurred by 
the new law and by decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the 
Government starting in August for the first time released a number of 
pretrial detainees whose detentions had exceeded the limit and 
announced its intention to abide by these limits from that point on. 
Typically if a judge returns a case to the prosecutors for further 
work, the clock is restarted on the time limit, although this process 
has not been tested yet thoroughly in the courts.
    Data confirm that the Government made progress in reducing the 
number of pretrial detainees during the year. According to the Ministry 
of Justice, as of June 30, 646 inmates were in pretrial detention, 
which represents a 35 percent drop from 993 in mid-1998. The number of 
persons on trial as of that date was 1,616--an almost 18 percent drop 
from 1,960 in 1998. (Defendants are categorized as ``on trial'' after 
their cases have been sent first to a trial judge, even though the 
judge may have sent the case back to the prosecutors and SIS for 
further investigation.) As of June 30, there were 8,669 convicted 
prisoners in the prison system. Thus the total inmate population in the 
prison system was 10,931. These figures do not include persons 
incarcerated in the separate SIS detention facilities, for which 
current data have not been made available. As of June 30, 1998, the SIS 
had 3,257 detainees, of whom 842 were in pretrial detention.
    In the event of a conviction, the time spent in pretrial detention 
is credited toward the sentence. The Constitution provides for bail, 
and some detainees have been released under this provision, although 
bail is not used widely.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the Constitution, the 
judiciary is granted independent and coequal status with the 
legislature and executive branch; however, the judiciary continues to 
struggle with problems such as low salaries, understaffing, antiquated 
procedures, corruption, and a heavy backlog of cases. Partly as a 
legacy of communism and partly because of the court system's structural 
and personnel problems, many citizens have little confidence in the 
judicial system. Human rights groups complain that local prosecutors 
and magistrates sometimes fail to pursue vigorously crimes committed 
against minorities. Many observers believe that reforms are essential 
to establish a fair and impartial, as well as efficient, judicial 
system.
    The court system consists of regional courts, district courts, and 
Supreme Courts of Cassation (civil and criminal appeal) and 
Administration. The Constitutional Court, which is separate from the 
rest of the court system, is empowered to rescind legislation that it 
considers unconstitutional, settle disputes over the conduct of general 
elections, and resolve conflicts over the division of powers between 
the various branches of government. Military courts handle cases 
involving military personnel (including police personnel) and some 
cases involving national security matters. The Constitutional Court 
does not have specific jurisdiction in matters of military justice.
    Local observers contend that organized crime influences the 
prosecutor's office. Few organized crime figures have been prosecuted 
to date, but in 1997 the Government made the battle against organized 
crime a priority and reformed the Penal Code to that end. The Ministry 
of Interior has requested and received assistance from Western 
countries in its efforts to close legal loopholes and strengthen 
enforcement capabilities against criminal economic groupings engaged in 
racketeering and other illegal activities.
    In December 1998, a reformulated Supreme Judicial Council 
overturned its predecessor's appointment of a new Prosecutor General in 
a controversial move that nonetheless was approved by the 
Constitutional Court. It then named a new Prosecutor General, who has 
moved to strengthen the prosecutor's office with a view toward 
increasing the country's low prosecution rate.
    A draft law on a new criminal procedure code was passed by the 
National Assembly in the fall of 1998. The aim of the new law is to 
reform the judiciary and remove the more cumbersome aspects of its 
functioning, such as the long delays created by the referral of cases 
back and forth between different offices. It also increases executive 
branch oversight of judges and prosecutors. All of the provisions of 
the new law are to become effective by January 1, 2000. Under the new 
procedure, the role of the SIS was curtailed, and most investigators 
were assigned to work directly for local prosecutors, while the 
National Police Service also is to take a larger role in 
investigations. However, before this system can become effective, the 
Government must assure that magistrates, and especially investigators, 
receive the appropriate training--a need of which senior officials are 
acutely aware.
    Despite recommending its own dissolution in December 1998 when it 
announced that Bulgaria had made sufficient progress in democracy and 
human right to no longer require monitoring, the Observation Committee 
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe nonetheless 
restated its concerns about inadequate safeguards for the independence 
of the judiciary in the country.
    Judges are appointed by the 25-member Supreme Judicial Council and, 
after serving for 3 years, may not be removed except under limited, 
specified circumstances. The difficulty and rarity of replacing judges 
virtually regardless of performance often has been cited as a hindrance 
to effective law enforcement. The 12 justices on the Constitutional 
Court are chosen for 9-year terms as follows: One-third are elected by 
the National Assembly, one-third appointed by the President, and one-
third elected by judicial authorities.
    The Constitution stipulates that all courts shall conduct hearings 
in public unless the proceedings involve state security or national 
secrets. There were no reported complaints about limited access to 
courtroom proceedings. Defendants have the right to know the charges 
against them and are given ample time to prepare a defense. The right 
of appeal is provided for and is used widely. Defendants in criminal 
proceedings have the right to confront witnesses and to have an 
attorney, provided by the state if necessary in serious cases.
    Human rights observers consider ``Educational Boarding Schools'' 
(formerly known as ``Labor Education Schools'') to which problem 
children can be sent as little different from penal institutions. 
However, since the schools are not considered prisons under the law, 
the procedures by which children are confined in these schools are not 
subject to minimal due process. Human rights observer groups such as 
the Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights criticize this denial of due 
process. Children sometimes appear alone despite the requirement that 
parents must attend hearings; the right to an attorney at the hearing 
is prohibited expressly by law. Decisions in these cases are not 
subject to judicial review, and children typically stay in the 
Educational Boarding Schools for 3 years or until they reach majority 
age, whichever occurs first. In late 1996, the Parliament enacted 
legislation that provided for court review of sentencing to such 
schools, set a limit of a 3-year stay, and addressed other problems in 
these institutions (see Section 5). Some observers dismiss this court 
review provision as a formality, since the child is not present to 
speak on his or her own behalf (nor is the defense lawyer or the 
child's parents).
    There was no progress in a case begun in 1993 relating to the 
forced assimilation and expulsion of ethnic Turks in 1984-85 and 1989.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the 
home, the right to choose one's place of work and residence, and the 
freedom and confidentiality of correspondence, and government 
authorities generally respect these provisions.
    One nongovernmental organization (NGO) complained that the Minister 
of Interior's discretionary authority to authorize telephone wiretaps 
without judicial review is excessive, although it is unknown to what 
extent this authority is employed. It is also alleged that warrants to 
investigate suspects' private financial records sometimes are abused to 
give police broad and openended authority to engage in far-ranging 
investigations of a suspect's family and associates. There are regular, 
albeit not conclusive or systematic, reports of mail, especially 
foreign mail, being delayed and/or opened.
    Traffickers in persons use threats against women's families and 
family reputations to ensure obedience (see Section 6.f.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice. The Electronic Media Bill was adopted 
by the National Assembly in October 1998. In November 1998, President 
Stoyanov vetoed the bill because of provisions concerning the structure 
of the National Council on Radio and Television, the ban on airing 
commercial advertisements during prime time, minority language 
programming, and the funding of Bulgarian National Television (BNT) and 
Bulgarian National Radio (BNR). The National Assembly accepted all of 
the revisions forwarded by the President with the exception of the 
proposed lifting of the ban on primetime advertising. In June the 
Constitutional Court considered a motion from opposition Members of 
Parliament (M.P.'s) concerning the constitutionality of 60 provisions 
of the bill and found all of them to be constitutional except the one 
concerning the means of collecting television fees. The M.P.'s 
complained that the National Council for Radio and Television, a quasi-
governmental body that governs national media and regulates private 
broadcasters, was too vulnerable to political manipulation by the 
ruling party of the day.
    Among media professionals and the broader public, the belief 
persists that the Government exerts an unduly large influence on the 
media though official channels, i.e., the Radio and Television Council, 
and unofficially by influencing advertisers not to use media outlets 
that are too critical of government policy or officials. While such 
claims are widely made and believed, little hard evidence exists to 
document concrete examples of government intimidation of editors or 
their broadcasters.
    A variety of newspapers are published freely by political parties 
and other organizations representing the full spectrum of political 
opinion. Journalists frequently color their reports to conform with the 
views of the political parties or economic groups that own their 
respective newspapers. However, the leading opposition newspaper Douma 
was forced to suspend publication on June 18 because it was unable to 
pay the more than $100,000 (Lev 180,000) it owed the State Printing 
House. Publication resumed on July 22, after a new investor bought a 51 
percent stake in the newspaper. While the leader of the Bulgarian 
Socialist Party, which sponsors the newspaper, believed that the 
printing house's action against the newspaper was politically 
motivated, the new majority owner declared that the newspaper's 
suspension had been strictly an economic problem.
    There were repeated reports of police abuse of journalists. In July 
Darin Kirkov took photographs of Varna municipal workers tearing down 
illegal buildings, and police officers destroyed Kirkov's film. 
Interior Minister Bogomil Bonev swiftly responded to the incident with 
an order specifically banning police violence against journalists. On 
June 28, unidentified assailants stabbed and beat Aleksei Lazarov who 
works for the independent weekly Kapital; however, they did not rob 
Lazarov. Lazarov suffered a broken leg and multiple knife wounds. The 
Bulgarian National Combat Service Against Organized Crime opened an 
investigation into the incident, but there was no progress in the case 
at year's end. On July 7, unidentified assailants attacked Svetla 
Asenova, a layout editor for the Computer World weekly. Asenova was 
beaten and robbed, and as a result hospitalized with a skull fracture. 
According to the NGO Human Rights Watch, at least 11 violent attacks 
were carried out against media representatives in 1998, including 
physical assaults and bombings of newspaper offices. Attempts to 
intimidate journalists investigating corruption were thought to be the 
motivation for the attacks.
    Libel is punishable under the Criminal Code. In July Parliament 
passed an amendment to the Penal Code changing the punishment for libel 
from imprisonment to the imposition of a fine of up to about $16,200 
(Lev 30,000)--a heavy fine in the Bulgarian context. A convicted 
journalist failing to pay the fine would then face imprisonment. It is 
the firm conviction of several human rights organizations, as well as 
the majority of the journalist community, that prosecutors use their 
authority to curb free expression in the press, particularly when such 
expression is critical of prosecutors. In recent years this law has 
been used sparingly, but there have been two cases in the last 3 years 
in which reporters have been convicted of libel and sentenced to prison 
terms or large fines. In January the outgoing Prosecutor General Ivan 
Tatarchev initiated a criminal investigation of Tatiana Vaksberg of 
Radio Free Europe for ``insulting state authority'' and offending 
Tatarchev's ``honor and dignity,'' after she broadcast a commentary 
critical of Tatarchev. Charges were filed against Tatarchev, and the 
case was still pending at year's end. The Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe Observation Committee visited the country in 1998 and 
expressed continuing concern that media independence still remained at 
risk and disappointment that libel and slander remained criminal 
offenses. However, the Committee also was abolished on its own 
recommendation based on the country's progress towards achieving human 
rights standards.
    Only the two state-owned national television channels have 
nationwide coverage. In July the Government initiated procedures to 
license a private national television station. Should this occur, the 
private station will be in direct competition with the remaining state 
television entity (to be renamed Public Television). To date, plans for 
BNT to broadcast in Turkish have not been implemented. However, local 
affiliates of BNR have been broadcasting limited programming in Turkish 
in areas where there are sizable Turkish-speaking populations.
    Television and radio news programs on the state-owned media present 
opposition views, but opposition members claim that their activities 
and views are given less broadcast time and exposure than the those of 
the ruling party. There are no formal restrictions on programming. Both 
television and radio provide a variety of news and public interest 
programming.
    There are more than 30 independent radio stations (both local and 
regional). The licensing procedure for both commercial and public radio 
and television operators started in 1998, but the process has seen 
chronic delays. As a result, all private electronic media are operating 
currently without a license. Owners of private radio stations have 
expressed concern that the authorities intentionally were delaying the 
process in order to exert censorship leverage prior to the October 
local elections. Some private radio stations still complain that the 
strength of their transmission is restricted unduly, with the result 
that they cannot compete fully with national (state-owned) radio. All 
transmission facilities are owned by the central Government.
    Foreign government radio programs such as the British Broadcasting 
Corporation, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of 
America have good access to commercial radio frequencies.
    Private book publishing remained unhindered by political 
considerations.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and the Government 
generally respected this right in practice. The authorities require 
permits for rallies and assemblies held outdoors, but most legally 
registered organizations routinely were granted permission to assemble. 
Vigorous political rallies and demonstrations were a common occurrence 
and generally took place without government interference.
    The Government has undertaken to respect the rights of individuals 
and groups to establish freely their own political parties or other 
political organizations; however, there are constitutional and 
statutory restrictions that limit the right of association and 
meaningful participation in the political process. For example, the 
Constitution forbids the formation of political parties along 
religious, ethnic, or racial lines and prohibits ``citizens' 
associations'' from engaging in political activity. This provision is 
designed to prevent the development of parties based on a single ethnic 
or other group that could prove divisive for national unity by stirring 
up ethnic tension for political purposes. Nonetheless, the mainly 
ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) is represented in 
Parliament. The other major political parties generally accept the 
MRF's right to participate in the political process. In August the 
Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the Ilinden-Pirin United 
Macedonian Organization (OMO)--an ethnic-Macedonian organization--be 
registered to participate as a political party in municipal elections 
in October. The Court overruled the decision of the Central Commission 
for Local Elections, which failed to register the group on August 25. 
The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court was final and could 
not be appealed. On February 12, a Sofia municipal court first 
registered the group. In March a group of 61 M.P.'s petitioned the 
Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the group's 
registration. The Court declined to rule on the case before the October 
local elections.
    The Constitution also prohibits organizations that threaten the 
country's territorial integrity or unity, or that incite racial, 
ethnic, or religious hatred. The Government has refused since 1990 to 
register a self-proclaimed Macedonian rights group, OMO-Ilinden (not 
the same organization as the similarly named Ilinden-Pirin OMO noted 
above), on the grounds that it is separatist. There were no reports of 
any prosecutions for simple membership in this group.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice for 
some non-Orthodox religious groups. The legal requirement that groups 
whose activities have a religious element register with the Council of 
Ministers remained an obstacle to the activity of some religious 
groups, such as the Unification Church and the Church of the Nazarene 
(which has tried repeatedly to register for more than 5 years), prior 
to or in the absence of registration. Furthermore several municipal 
governments established local registration requirements for religious 
groups, despite the lack of clear legal authority to do so. In some 
cases, local authorities used the lack of registration as a pretext for 
interference against some groups and employed arbitrary harassment 
tactics against others. In 1998 the ability of a small number of 
religious groups to conduct services freely came under attack, both as 
a result of action by local government authorities and because of 
public intolerance. Such reports subsided during the year.
    Jehovah's Witnesses finally received central government 
registration in October 1998, after a lengthy delay. A member of 
Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to serve in the military was sentenced 
to a prison term in 1998 and was imprisoned from December 1998 until 
March 1999. He was released due to a presidential pardon. A new law 
providing for a civilian alternative to military conscription went into 
effect on January 1. However, the alternative civilian service requires 
double the time commitment of military service. According to Human 
Rights Watch, police also have arrested children and adult members of 
Jehovah's Witnesses for distributing religious tracts, and detained 
other members of Jehovah's Witnesses for proselytizing.
    Some observers note with concern a tendency by certain 
municipalities to enact regulations that may be used to limit religious 
freedoms if a perceived need arises. For example, a regulation passed 
by Sofia municipality in February forbids references to miracles and 
healing during religious services, a provision that many fear may be 
employed as a pretext to ban or interrupt services by charismatic 
evangelical groups. The regulation cites a Communist-era law dating 
from 1949, which is technically still in effect and which forbids 
foreigners from proselytizing and administering religious services in 
the country. The decree, although subsequently modified in response to 
NGO objections, is still criticized by religious rights groups as 
containing provisions that are either discriminatory or ambiguous and 
open to abuse. Other municipalities have enacted similar regulations. 
In January the city council in Burgas refused to register the local 
branch of Jehovah's Witnesses, despite the fact that they were 
registered by the central Government. The council asked the group to 
prove that they had not been banned in any European Union country in 
order to be registered. The 1949 law also has been criticized in its 
own right as an outmoded potential impediment to free religious 
activity. However, despite the law's continued technical validity, 
foreign missionaries can and do receive permission to proselytize in 
the country, and many have noted a marked improvement in both 
governmental and societal attitudes since the start of 1998. A new law 
on religious activity currently is being drafted but has not yet been 
moved to the floor of the National Assembly for a vote.
    In June the city of Plovdiv fined an Austrian citizen about $300 
(Lev 500) for proselytizing on behalf of Jehovah's Witnesses, on the 
grounds that the Church was not registered with the city. However, many 
observers dispute the legal authority of municipal governments to 
require local registration.
    Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
(Mormons) reported several incidents of harassment by police and by 
local authorities, with police interrupting services to demand 
passports and registration documents for the Church and its members. 
For example, in July police officers in Stara Zagora interrupted a 
Mormon religious service and demanded to see the identification 
documents of those who were present. The officers claimed that the 
Church's registration was out of date. Mormon missionaries reported 
several incidents of police harassment.
    There were instances of police interference with religious groups' 
worship services and of their ``streetboarding'' efforts (in which the 
groups erect a signboard and invite passersby to learn more about the 
denomination's precepts).
    On May 21 in Plovdiv, police interrupted the streetboarding 
activities of missionaries of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints (LDS Church), claiming that the Church must have registered with 
the municipal government to operate in the city, although there is no 
legal basis for such a requirement.
    On July 11 in Stara Zagora, three police officers interrupted a 
service of the LDS Church by demanding that church officials and 
parishioners present their identification documents.
    On July 15 in Burgas, several LDS missionaries again were 
interrupted in their streetboarding activities by several police 
officers, citing unspecified laws against it. Police confiscated the 
signboard.
    In March a schoolteacher in Gabrovo who is a member of a 
Pentecostal church resigned from her job. She claimed that she was 
intimidated into resigning as a result of her religious beliefs. Her 
lawsuit against the school currently is pending.
    The Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the 
``traditional'' religion. The Government provides financial support for 
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and other denominations it considers to 
be ``traditional.'' Along with the Orthodox Church, the Muslim, 
Catholic, and Jewish minority religious communities generally are 
perceived as maintaining a long-standing place in Bulgarian society and 
hence benefit from a relatively high degree of tolerance, as well as 
some government financial support.
    For most registered religious groups there were no restrictions on 
attendance at religious services or on private religious instruction. A 
school for imams, a Muslim cultural center, university-level 
theological faculties, and religious primary schools operated freely. 
In December the Ministry of Education announced that schools would 
begin offering classes on Islam in 2000 in regions with a significant 
Muslim minority. Since 1997, religious classes on the Bible have been 
available to students whose parents approve such instruction. Bibles 
and other religious materials in the Bulgarian language were imported 
freely and printed on most occasions, and Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish 
publications were published on a regular basis.
    Although previously during compulsory military service most Muslim 
conscripts were placed in construction units rather than serving in 
combat-role military units, late in the year the Government ended this 
practice and abolished such construction battalions (see Section 5).
    There were no indications that the Government discriminated against 
members of any religious group in making restitution to previous owners 
of properties that were nationalized during the Communist regime. The 
Government in general has supported actively property restitution for 
the legally recognized organization representing the Jewish community, 
although the return of two lucrative commercial Jewish communal 
properties continues to encounter administrative obstacles and legal 
challenges.
    At the Department of Theology of Sofia University, all students are 
required to present a certificate of baptism from the Orthodox Church, 
and married couples must present a marriage certificate from the Church 
in order to enroll in the Department's classes. It remains impossible 
for non-Orthodox applicants to be admitted to the Department of 
Theology.
    The Government refused to recognize an alternative Patriarch 
elected by supporters in 1996, and the schism that opened in the 
Orthodox Church in 1992 continued, despite the death of this 
alternative Patriarch in April. The Government nevertheless encouraged 
the feuding factions to heal their prolonged rift. By year's end, these 
efforts had not met with success.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement within the country and the right to leave it, and these rights 
are not limited in practice, with the exception of border zones where 
access is limited for nonresidents (the border zones extend 1.2 to 3 
miles inward from each border). Every citizen has the right to return 
to the country, may not be forcibly expatriated, and may not be 
deprived of citizenship acquired by birth.
    The Government grants asylum or refugee status in accordance with 
the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Law on Refugees, which went into 
effect August 1, regulates the procedure for granting refugee status as 
well as the rights and obligations of refugees. The Agency for 
Refugees, formerly the National Bureau for Territorial Asylum and 
Refugees, is charged with following this procedure and cooperating with 
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
    The Government provides first asylum. However, during the Kosovo 
crisis, the Government's definition of first asylum became very narrow. 
Although the Government initially expressed its willingness to 
temporarily shelter 5,000 Kosovar refugees, it soon proved reluctant to 
accept more than the approximately 200 Kosovar Albanians who had 
arrived by mid-April. Citing economic difficulties, the desire to avoid 
ethnic and religious conflicts within its own borders, and the priority 
accorded to potential ethnic Bulgarian refugees, the Government pledged 
to accept only those refugees who expressed an explicit desire to come 
to Bulgaria. According to Prime Minister Kostov, first asylum applied 
only to those refugees who came to the country directly (passing 
through Serbia proper to do so) and not those who first arrived in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Thus instead of 
accepting refugees from the over-crowded FYROM camps, the Government 
established and ran a refugee camp in FYROM. The Government also 
provided FYROM with medical facilities, prefabricated houses, portable 
showers, and meal sites.
    In recent years, domestic and international human rights 
organizations have expressed concern over the Government's handling of 
asylum claims and reported that there may have been cases in which bona 
fide refugees were turned away at the border. No such cases were 
reported during the year. However, because NGO's lack institutionalized 
access to the country's borders, it is often difficult for them to 
monitor the Government's handling of asylum cases. For the first 6 
months of the year, the Ministry of Interior reported that 803 persons 
applied for refugee status. Authorities granted 60 applicants refugee 
status, while 295 were granted temporary humanitarian status for either 
6 months or 1 year.
    The Agency for Refugees reports that, from its inception in 1993 
until June 30, a total of 3,637 persons applied for asylum. Of these 
applications, 930 were accepted, 248 refused; for 683 applicants the 
procedure was terminated (usually because the applicant could not be 
found). Citizens from Afghanistan and Iraq generally constitute the 
majority of asylum seekers, but during the first half of the year, the 
majority were citizens of Serbia-Montenegro, including the province of 
Kosovo. Domestic and international human rights organizations complain 
that the adjudication process is slow, but the UNHCR notes that the 
Agency for Refugees has begun a major restructuring project to reduce 
the adjudication time to a period of 3 months. The restructuring 
project itself is expected to take 4 years. In 1997 and 1998, the 
UNHCR, in cooperation with an NGO, opened three transit centers near 
the Greek, Turkish, and Romanian borders and assisted the Government 
with opening a small reception center in Banya. During the Kosovo 
crisis, the Bulgarian Red Cross also set up emergency refugee centers 
in Pirin. Plans to open a reception center at the Sofia airport 
continue to be delayed due to a lack of funding. However, the UNHCR 
currently is working on plans to open a transit center in Kapitan 
Andreevo, on the border with Turkey.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government and head of 
state through the election of the President and of the members of the 
National Assembly, although the constitutional prohibition of parties 
formed on ethnic, racial, or religious lines has the effect of 
circumscribing access to the political party process for some groups 
(see Section 2.b.), particularly those Roma who have expressed a desire 
to create their own party. Suffrage is universal at the age of 18.
    No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in 
government and politics; however, they are underrepresented. Women hold 
just under 11 percent of the seats in the current Parliament. However, 
a number of women hold elective and appointive office at high levels, 
including three cabinet-level posts and several key positions in 
Parliament. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leader of the 
United Democratic Forces parliamentary group (the dominant party in the 
Government) are both women.
    No legal restrictions hinder the participation of minorities in 
politics, apart from the prohibition of ethnically, racially, or 
religiously based parties. However, while ethnic Turks' representation 
in the National Assembly is close to commensurate with their share of 
population, there were only two Romani Members of Parliament; an 
improvement over 1998, when there were none. Both groups are 
underrepresented in appointed governmental positions, especially 
leadership positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Domestic and international human rights groups operate freely, 
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. 
Government officials, especially local officials, occasionally are 
reluctant to provide information or active cooperation. Local human 
rights groups now are permitted to visit the SIS detention facilities 
to which they previously were denied access.
    Legislation reportedly is pending to establish the post of human 
rights ombudsman, but to date the position has not been created.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for individual rights, equality, and 
protection against discrimination; however, in practice discrimination 
still exists, particularly against Roma and women.
    Women.--Domestic abuse is a serious and common problem, but there 
are no official statistics on its occurrence. The Animus Association 
(AA), an NGO that offers assistance and support to female victims of 
violence, estimates that one in five women suffers from spousal abuse. 
Spousal rape is a crime, but it rarely is prosecuted. Currently, the 
law exempts from state prosecution certain types of assault if 
committed by a family member, and the Government does not assist in 
prosecuting crimes of domestic assault unless the woman has been killed 
or injured permanently. Courts and prosecutors tend to view domestic 
abuse as a family rather than criminal problem, and in most cases, 
victims of domestic violence take refuge with family or friends rather 
than approach the authorities. Police are not allowed to intervene in 
cases of domestic abuse, even if a woman calls them seeking protection 
or assistance. No government agencies provide shelter or counseling for 
victims. While the municipality of Sofia promised a building to the AA 
2 years ago to use as a shelter for abused women, it has yet to follow 
through on its promise. However, the NGO Nadya De Center provides 
shelter to battered women. The courts prosecute rape, although it 
remains an underreported crime because some stigma still attaches to 
the victim. The maximum sentence for rape is 8 years; convicted 
offenders often receive a lesser sentence or early parole.
    Ministry of Interior figures reveal that during the first half of 
the year, 300 rapes and 60 attempted rapes were reported.
    During the year, the AA reported 1,049 cases of domestic violence, 
105 cases of sexual violence, and 59 cases of trafficking in women. The 
actual incidence of each form of violence is certainly much higher, as 
these represent those cases in which the victim (or, in some 
trafficking cases, an overseas women's group) was willing and able to 
contact the AA. The association also operates a 24-hour hot line for 
women in crisis that is staffed by the association's 12 full-time 
professional therapists.
    In 1997 the Government enacted a law against trafficking in women, 
and trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem (see Section 
6.f.).
    Local observers believe that sexual harassment is a problem; it is 
not currently illegal.
    Many of the approximately 30 women's organizations are closely 
associated with political parties or have primarily professional 
agendas. Some observers believe that women's organizations tend to be 
associated with political parties or professional groups because 
feminism has negative societal connotations. Of those organizations 
that exist mainly to defend women's interests, the two largest are the 
Women's Democratic Union in Bulgaria, heir to the group that existed 
under the Communist dictatorship, and the Bulgarian Women's 
Association, which disappeared under communism but now has reemerged 
with chapters in a number of cities.
    The Constitution forbids privileges or restrictions of rights on 
the basis of sex, and women are not impeded from owning or managing 
businesses, land, or other real property and do not suffer from 
discrimination under inheritance laws. However, women face 
discrimination both in terms of job recruitment and the likelihood of 
layoffs. Official figures show the rate of unemployment for women to be 
higher than that for men. Women are much more likely than men to be 
employed in low-wage jobs requiring little education, and the 
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB) reports 
that the average woman's salary is 68 percent of that earned by the 
average male. Statistics show that women are equally likely to attend 
universities, but they have less opportunity to upgrade their 
qualifications and generally end up in lower-ranking and lower-paying 
positions than their male counterparts. Fewer girls than boys are 
attending schools, especially among minorities. Women generally 
continue to have primary responsibility for child rearing and 
housekeeping even if they are employed outside the home. Since 80 
percent of employed women work in the lowest-paying sectors of the 
labor force, they often must work at two jobs in addition to their 
household duties in order to provide for their families. Female-headed 
households frequently live below the poverty line. There are liberal 
provisions for paid maternity leave; however, these actually may work 
against employers' willingness to hire and retain female employees. 
This is especially noticeable in higher-paying positions in the private 
sector, where many women with engineering degrees are compelled to work 
as secretaries.
    No special government programs seek to address economic 
discrimination or integrate women better into the mainstream of society 
and the economy.
    Children.--The Government generally is committed to protecting 
children's welfare but, with limited resources, falls short in several 
areas. It maintains, for example, a sizable network of orphanages 
throughout the country. However, many of the orphanages are in 
disrepair and lack proper facilities. Government efforts in education 
and health have been constrained by serious budgetary limitations and 
by outmoded social care structures. The Constitution provides for 
mandatory school attendance until the age of 16. However, fewer girls 
than boys are attending school, especially among minorities.
    Credible sources report that there is no provision for due process 
of law for Romani and other juveniles when they are detained in Labor 
Education Schools run by the Ministry of Education. Living conditions 
at these reform schools are poor, offering few medical, educational, or 
social services. The Labor Education School at Slavovitsa has been the 
target of the harshest criticism. Generally, staff members at many such 
institutions lack the proper qualifications and training to care for 
the children adequately. Degrading and severe punishment, such as the 
shaving of a child's head, reduction in diet, severe beatings, and long 
periods of solitary confinement, are common at the schools. In 1996 the 
Ministry of Education acknowledged problems at the schools and 
attributed the cause to a lack of funding. In late 1996, Parliament 
enacted legislation providing for court review of sentencing to such 
schools and addressing other problems in the reform school system (see 
Section 1.e.).
    The vast majority of children are free from societal abuse, 
although some Romani children are frequent targets of skinhead violence 
and arbitrary police detention; the homeless or abandoned were 
particularly vulnerable. Family or community members forced some Romani 
minors into prostitution. Police made little effort to address these 
problems. Some observers believe that there is a growing trend toward 
the use of children in prostitution, burglaries, and narcotics 
distribution. Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    People With Disabilities.--Disabled persons by law receive a range 
of financial assistance, including free public transportation, reduced 
prices on modified automobiles, and free equipment such as wheelchairs. 
However, as in other areas, budgetary constraints mean that such 
payments occasionally fall behind. Disabled individuals have access to 
university training and to housing and employment, but architectural 
barriers are a great hindrance in most older buildings. For example, 
there are no elevators in schools or universities. Problems of general 
unemployment and economy undermine initiatives aimed at advancing equal 
opportunity for the disabled. According to the director of the 
Rehabilitation and Social Integration Fund, 82 percent of the disabled 
are unemployed.
    Labor laws intended to protect the interests of the disabled and 
create greater employment opportunity sometimes have a mixed effect. On 
one hand, the law provides incentives for small firms to hire disabled 
workers. For example, the Bureau of Labor pays the first year's salary 
of a disabled employee. On the other hand, workers with disabilities 
are entitled to shorter working hours, which often leads to 
discrimination against them in hiring practices. According to the law, 
any enterprise employing more than 50 persons must hire a certain 
number of disabled workers (between 3 and 10 percent, depending on the 
industry). Those who fail to do so must pay a fine, the proceeds of 
which go to a fund for the disabled. Nevertheless, due to low fines and 
delays in the judicial system, collection rates are extremely low.
    Effective in July students with disabilities must pay the 
university's initial application fee but are exempt from semester fees 
if accepted. In February a Day Center for Social Rehabilitation and 
Integration of the Disabled was opened. Built on land granted by the 
municipality of Sofia and with financial donations, the facility is the 
first of its kind to be fully equipped to address the needs of the 
disabled. In May the city of Russe received with foreign assistance two 
vehicles for use in transporting disabled persons. Recent public works 
have taken the needs of persons with disabilities into account. In July 
one of Sofia's main arteries underwent construction to add ramp access 
to sidewalks. Sofia's new subway system also was designed with 
wheelchair access to stations. Nevertheless, enforcement of a 1995 law 
requiring improved structural access for the disabled has lagged in 
existing, unrenovated buildings.
    Policies and public attitudes prevalent during the Communist era, 
which separated mentally and physically disabled persons, including 
very young children, from the rest of society have persisted. Some 
complain that the effective segregation of disabled children into 
special schools has lowered the quality of their education. However, in 
a recent positive development, construction of a training and 
rehabilitation center for disabled youth in Pomorie began in September. 
The center aims to improve the overall physical and intellectual state 
of disabled youth and to encourage them to acquire new skills and 
participate more actively in the social life of the country.
    Religious Minorities.--Discrimination, harassment, and general 
public intolerance of `'nontraditional'' religious minorities (i.e., 
the great majority of Protestant Christian religions) remained a 
problem, although the number of reported incidents decreased during the 
year. Strongly held suspicion of evangelical denominations among the 
Orthodox populace is widespread and pervasive across the political 
spectrum and has resulted in discrimination. Often cloaked in a veneer 
of ``patriotism,'' intolerance of the religious beliefs of others 
enjoys widespread popularity. Such mainstream public pressure for 
containment of ``foreign religious sects'' inevitably influences 
policymakers. Nevertheless, there were fewer reported incidents of 
harassment of religious groups during the year as society appeared to 
have become more accepting of previously unfamiliar religions.
    Certain religions, including both groups denied registration and 
those officially registered, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, faced 
discriminatory practices (see Section 2.c.), as did other groups, 
which, despite full compliance with the law, were greeted with 
hostility by the press, segments of the public, and certain government 
officials.
    Non-Orthodox religious groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses, the 
Church of God, and the Emmanuel Bible Center, have been affected 
adversely by societal attitudes. Numerous articles in a broad range of 
newspapers as well as television documentaries, drew lurid and 
inaccurate pictures of the activities of non-Orthodox religious groups, 
attributing the breakup of families and drug abuse by youths to the 
practices of these groups and alleging that evangelicals were drugging 
young children.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Turks constitute almost 
10 percent of the population. In the 1992 census, 3.7 percent of the 
population identified itself as Romani; however, the real figure 
probably is closer to 6 or 7 percent, since many persons of Romani 
descent tend to identify themselves to the authorities as ethnic Turks 
or Bulgarians. Ethnic Bulgarian Muslims or ``Pomaks'' are a distinct 
group of Slavic descent, constituting 2 to 3 percent of the population, 
whose ancestors converted from Orthodox Christianity to Islam. Most are 
Muslim, although a number have become atheists or converted back to 
Christianity. These are the country's largest minorities. There are no 
restrictions on speaking Turkish in public or the use of non-Slavic 
names.
    Voluntary Turkish-language classes in public schools, funded by the 
Government, continued in areas with significant Turkish-speaking 
populations, although some observers complained that the Government was 
discouraging optional language classes in areas with large 
concentrations of Muslims. The Ministry of Education has estimated that 
approximately 40,000 children now study Turkish. Some ethnic Turkish 
leaders, mainly in the MRF, demanded that Turkish-language classes be 
made compulsory in areas with significant ethnic Turkish populations, 
but the Government has resisted this effort.
    In May representatives of the MRF and mayors in the Kurdzhali 
region called for the region's governor, Plamen Ivanov, to be dismissed 
for his reported threats against some Turkish mayors in the region. The 
representatives and mayors believed that Ivanov's actions would cause 
ethnic tensions in the region to escalate. Prime Minister Kostov 
launched an investigation into the complaints against Ivanov.
    Cooperation among Romani groups generally improved following 
agreement on the new government Program for Social Integration of Roma, 
adopted in April. Under the plan the Government created Roma Expert 
Committees, under the rubric of the National Council on Ethnic and 
Demographic Issues. The Committees consist of Roma representatives 
appointed by the various Romani NGO's which are members of the Council. 
The Committees (Discrimination, Media, Social Policy, Housing, 
Education, Health, Culture, and Economy) are to work with their 
counterpart Ministries of the Government to implement the program. The 
Discrimination Committee is the centerpiece of the new effort. The 
Discrimination Committee is to study EU countries' experience in 
antidiscrimination legislation and practice, after which it is to 
propose changes in the Penal Code, the Penal Procedure Code, and law 
enforcement regulations. Eventually, the Discrimination Committee is to 
become a permanent legislative branch agency, designed to review 
legislation for discriminatory provisions. It also is to be empowered 
to impose sanctions against discriminatory practices in the country and 
is to have regional offices in each of the country's 28 administrative 
districts. However, the Government has not implemented any of the 
legislation required to enact the program.
    Attacks by private citizens on Roma continued. On January 16, 
several assailants beat Rom Blago Atanassov from Ghelemenko, and he 
died later as a result of his injuries. The district prosecutor in 
Pazardjik opened an investigation into the incident, which led to an 
indictment against the suspected perpetrators. The case did not go to 
trial by year's end. On June 15, four teenage boys were involved in the 
beating death of a 33-year-old Romani beggar, Nadezhda Dimitrova. The 
Sofia city prosecutor's office launched an investigation into the 
murder, but there were no results at year's end. The boys are not known 
to have any connection to organized hate groups.
    In February 16-year-old Rom Nikolai Georgiev was shot while 
trespassing with several other children on private property in an 
affluent neighborhood near Sliven. Accounts differ about whether the 
children were caught in the act of theft or merely seeking shelter from 
inclement weather. Georgiev was shot in the leg, either by the 
homeowner or a security guard, and later bled to death before receiving 
any medical assistance. The case is currently under investigation.
    Police harass, physically abuse, and arbitrarily arrest Romani 
street children (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). There was one arrest in 
the 1998 attack on eight Romani boys by skinheads in Sofia. Little 
progress has been made in other cases of violence against Roma during 
previous years, and these largely remain in the investigatory phase.
    As individuals and as an ethnic group, Roma faced high levels of 
discrimination. The Romani population clearly occupies the bottom rung 
of society. Roma encounter difficulties applying for social benefits, 
and rural Roma are discouraged by local officials from claiming land to 
which they are entitled under the law disbanding agricultural 
collectives. Many Roma and other observers made credible allegations 
that the quality of education offered to Romani children is inferior to 
that afforded most other students. For example, the country has 34 all-
Roma schools; according to one estimate, only one-half of all students 
at these schools attend class regularly and only about 10 percent 
successfully graduate. The Government has been largely unsuccessful in 
attracting and keeping many Romani children in school. Many Romani 
children arrive relatively unprepared for schooling; many of them are 
not proficient in the Bulgarian language. Poverty has led to widespread 
school truancy as many children in Romani ghettos cannot afford shoes 
or basic school supplies and instead turn to begging, prostitution, and 
petty crime on the streets. Lack of effective government infrastructure 
and programs and economic and social factors thus combine to deprive 
increasing numbers of Romani youths of an education and a better 
future. Early indications are that some recent initiatives undertaken 
by the Government and by Romani NGO's are achieving some small 
successes in mitigating these problems, for example by providing free 
lunches and subsidizing textbook and tuition costs.
    Workplace discrimination against minorities continued to be a 
problem, especially for Roma. Employers justify such discrimination on 
the basis that most Roma have only elementary training and little 
education.
    Previously it had been common for ethnic Turkish and Romani 
conscripts to be shunted into military construction battalions during 
compulsory military service. This practice raised serious concerns both 
of discrimination and forced labor, particularly since the units 
sometimes accepted commercial construction contracts in addition to 
military construction projects. However, late in the year, the 
Government carried through on its commitment to abolish the 
construction battalions and eliminated this problem. There are only a 
few ethnic Turkish, Pomak, and Romani officers in the military, and an 
insignificant number of high-ranking officers of the Muslim faith.
    Ethnic Turkish politicians maintain that, although their 
community's popularly-elected representation in the National Assembly 
is roughly commensurate with its size, ethnic Turks are 
underrepresented significantly in appointed positions in the state 
administration.
    Several thousand persons, mainly in the southwest, identify 
themselves as ethnic Macedonians, most for historical and geographic 
reasons. Members of the two organizations that purport to defend their 
interests, OMO-Ilinden and TMO-Ilinden, are believed to number in the 
hundreds (see Section 2.b.). The Government does not recognize 
Macedonians as a distinct ethnic group, and the group is not enumerated 
in official government statistics.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of all workers to form or join trade unions of their own choice, 
and this right apparently was exercised freely. Estimates of the 
unionized share of the work force range from 30 to 50 percent. This 
share continues to shrink as large firms lay off workers, and most new 
positions appear in small, nonunionized businesses.
    The two largest trade union confederations are the Confederation of 
Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria (CITUB) and Podkrepa, which 
together represent the overwhelming majority of organized workers. The 
Government does not control the CITUB, the successor to the trade union 
controlled by the former Communist regime. Podkrepa, an independent 
confederation created in 1989, was one of the earliest opposition 
forces but is no longer a member of the UDF, formerly the main 
opposition party, now in the Government. Following legislative changes 
in 1998, which mandated a census of the labor force and created minimum 
qualifications for labor union recognition, none of the other, much 
smaller labor organizations which previously had been represented in 
the National Tripartite Coordination Council were able to qualify. 
Other labor organizations retain the prospect of future recognition if 
they succeed in attracting more members and expanding their 
institutional structures.
    Doctors, dentists, and some unions expressed dissatisfaction with a 
new union structure that they claim the Government imposed upon them in 
1998, an action which some maintain violates an ILO convention.
    The 1992 Labor Code recognizes the right to strike when other means 
of conflict resolution have been exhausted, but ``political strikes'' 
are forbidden. Workers in essential services (primarily the military 
and the police) also are subject to a blanket prohibition against 
striking, although such workers on occasion held an ``effective 
strike'' in which they stop or slow their activities for 1 or 2 hours.
    On most occasions, the Government generally does not interfere with 
legal labor strikes, and several work stoppages took place.
    On May 27, thousands of workers from the metalworking, machine 
building, and arms industries marched through Sofia to protest factory 
closures and the falling standard of living. In December workers from 
the VMZ arms plant in Sopot blocked the road between Sofia and Bourgas 
to protest wage arrears and management's plans to lay off one-third of 
its workers.
    The Podkrepa labor union has complained that an amendment to a 1990 
law, passed in March 1998, facilitated the Government's ability to 
declare a strike illegal. Under this new amendment, workers no longer 
have the right to appeal when a strike is declared illegal. Podkrepa 
maintains that this provision is unconstitutional and violates an ILO 
convention.
    The Labor Code's prohibitions against antiunion discrimination 
include a 6-month period for redress against dismissal as a form of 
retribution. However, there is no mechanism other than the courts for 
resolving complaints, and the burden of proof in such a case rests 
entirely on the employee.
    No restrictions limit affiliation or contact with international 
labor organizations, and unions actively exercise this right.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
institutes collective bargaining, which was practiced nationally, 
regionally, and on the local level. The legal prohibition against 
striking for key public sector employees weakens their bargaining 
position; however, these groups were able to influence negotiations by 
staging protests and engaging in other pressure tactics without going 
on strike. Labor unions have complained that while the legal structure 
for collective bargaining was adequate, many employers failed to 
bargain in good faith or to adhere to agreements that were concluded. 
Labor observers viewed the Government's enforcement of labor contracts 
as inadequate.
    In several instances an employer was found guilty of antiunion 
discrimination, but the employers appealed the decisions. The backlog 
of cases in the legal system delayed further action, effectively 
postponing, perhaps indefinitely, redress of workers' grievances.
    The same obligation of collective bargaining and adherence to labor 
standards prevails in the six export processing zones, and unions may 
organize workers in these areas.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of 
forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). There also have 
been other reports of such practices. In 1997 the BHC issued a report 
on the use of forced child labor to make articles for sale at the 
Slavovitsa Boys' Reform School. An investigation by the Ministry of 
Education into this practice is under way. Many observers had argued 
that the previous practice of shunting minority and conscientious 
objector military draftees into work units that often carried out 
commercial construction and maintenance projects was a form of 
compulsory labor; however, the Government abolished these construction 
battalions late in the year (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age for employment at 16 
years; the minimum age for dangerous work is set at 18. Employers and 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (MLSP) are responsible for 
enforcing these provisions. Child labor laws are enforced well in the 
formal sector, but some observers believe that children increasingly 
are exploited in certain industries (especially small family-owned 
shops, family farms, construction, and periodical sales) and by 
organized crime (notably for prostitution and distribution of 
narcotics). According to a survey conducted by the MLSP in 1998, more 
than 50,000 children under the age of 16 are believed to be employed 
illegally in the country. Dr. Zhelyasko Hristov, president of the CITUB 
labor union, estimated the total number of illegally employed children 
as at least twice that number. In April the first-ever fine was imposed 
on an employer of illegal child labor. Underage employment in the 
informal and agricultural sectors is believed to be increasing as 
collective farms are broken up and the private sector continues to 
grow. In addition, children are known to work on family-owned tobacco 
farms, and local NGO's reported children working on nonfamily-owned 
farms for meager monetary or in-kind wages (e.g., food).
    Forced and bonded labor by children also is forbidden by law; 
however, trafficking in young girls for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a problem, and there also have been other reports of 
its use (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national monthly minimum 
wage is approximately $37 (Lev 67), which is not enough to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Nonpayment of wages 
and wage payments in arrears continue to be a problem with certain 
employers, although the Government has declared the amelioration of 
this problem a top priority. The Constitution stipulates the right to 
social security and welfare aid assistance for the temporarily 
unemployed, although in practice such assistance is often late.
    The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours with at 
least one 24-hour rest period per week. The MLSP is responsible for 
enforcing both the minimum wage and the standard workweek. Enforcement 
generally is effective in the state sector (although there are reports 
that state-run enterprises fall into arrears on salary payments to 
their employees if the firms incur losses) but is weaker in the 
emerging private sector.
    A national labor safety program exists, with standards established 
by the Labor Code. The Constitution states that employees are entitled 
to healthy and nonhazardous working conditions. The MLSP is responsible 
for enforcing these provisions. Conditions in many cases worsened due 
to budget stringencies and a growing private sector that labor 
inspectors do not yet supervise effectively. Protective clothing is 
often absent from hazardous areas (goggles for welders, helmets for 
construction workers, etc.), since employers often imply that payment 
for such measures would have to be deducted from the overall budget 
used to pay workers' wages. The overall standard of living of workers 
stabilized in 1998 after suffering a severe downturn during the 
economic crisis of late 1996 and early 1997. The pervasive economic 
crisis and imminent, long-overdue privatizations continue to create a 
heightened fear of unemployment, leading to a reluctance on the part of 
workers to pursue wage and safety demands. In a positive sign, new 
legislation passed in during the year mandated that employers set up 
joint employer/labor health and safety committees to monitor workplace 
conditions. These committees are starting to be organized at many 
workplaces. The effectiveness of these committees is not yet apparent.
    Under the Labor Code, employees have the right to remove themselves 
from work situations that present a serious or immediate danger to life 
or health without jeopardizing their continued employment. However, in 
practice refusal to work in situations with relatively high accident 
rates or associated chronic health problems would result in the loss of 
employment for many workers.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--In 1997 the Government enacted a law 
against trafficking in women; however, trafficking in women and girls 
is a serious problem. A 1997 amendment to the Penal Code on trafficking 
in women introduced longer prison sentences (to existing kidnaping 
penalties already in force) in those cases where the victim is under 18 
years of age, is offered to another person for sexual abuse, or is 
trafficked abroad for sexual abuse. However, no suspected traffickers 
have been brought to trial, possibly because victims are afraid to 
confront their former criminal controllers when there are no 
government-sponsored programs to assist or protect victims of 
trafficking. Some judges and prosecutors also report that they feared 
reprisals from organized crime figures. The Government created two 
police units specifically to address the problem of trafficking in 
persons. One is part of the border police and the other is in the 
Ministry of Interior's organized crime fighting agency. High-level 
Ministry of Interior officials cooperated closely with foreign 
governments and the International Organization for Migration to support 
a research project and information campaign to combat trafficking.
    La Strada, a Netherlands-based NGO, reports that Bulgarian women 
constitute one of the largest groups of victims of forced prostitution 
in Western and Central Europe. Approximately 10,000 Bulgarian women 
currently may be involved in international trafficking operations. This 
is a very lucrative business for Bulgarian criminal organizations, and 
there have been unconfirmed reports of local or police involvement in 
trafficking in some areas. Victims of trafficking range from those who 
were duped into the belief that they would have good and respectable 
employment, to those who expected to work as prostitutes but were 
unprepared for the degree of violence and exploitation to which they 
would be subjected. A factor contributing to the high number of 
trafficking victims from the country is the high unemployment rate 
among young women who face limited opportunities in a relatively 
patriarchal society. Furthermore, because it may be very difficult for 
young women to obtain visas to work in Western Europe, false job 
agencies that promise to simplify the process can be very successful in 
luring trafficking victims. The process of transforming girls into 
prostitutes generally takes place before they even leave the country. 
The women typically are taken to a large town, isolated, beaten, and 
subjected to severe physical and psychological torture. Some 
trafficking victims from countries to the east are kept in Bulgaria for 
several weeks where they are subjected to psychological and physical 
abuse to make them more submissive before they are shipped to their 
destination points. Once the women leave the country, their identity 
documents are taken away, and they find themselves forced to work as 
prostitutes in cities across Europe. Victims report that traffickers 
took away their passports and visas, forced them to stay illegally in 
countries, and made them more vulnerable to prosecution in foreign 
countries. The women may be required to pay back heavy financial debts 
to the agency that helped them depart the country, leaving them in 
virtual indentured servitude. Traffickers punish women severely for 
acts of disobedience. Some victims have returned to the country with 
numbers branded into their skin. Traffickers also use threats against 
the women's families and family reputations to ensure obedience. 
According to some reports, some 3,500 women are trafficked to Poland, 
thousands to the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, while others are 
trafficked to Germany, Belgium, Canada, Serbia-Montenegro, Romania, 
Hungary, FYROM, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. The northeast and 
southwest border regions are where most trafficking occurs, since women 
are sent more easily to former Socialist countries with less strict 
visa requirements. In 1998 Polish authorities deported 44 women, who 
were working as prostitutes, most from Bulgaria. In Poland there is a 
growing market for young girls, as young as 12 or 13 years old, due to 
the perception that younger prostitutes are less likely to have 
sexually transmitted diseases. Commonly girls are given 15 condoms at 
the start of the day and told to make use of all of them before 
returning. At a rate of $10 (40 PLN) per sexual encounter, the girls 
are expected to bring back $150 (600 PLN). If they do not, they are 
beaten and sent out again the next day. Women reportedly have been 
trafficked into Bulgaria from the former Soviet Union and FYROM, also 
for forced prostitution. The country is also a transit point for 
traffickers bringing women to Greece.
    The AA reported 59 cases of trafficking in women during the year.
    Technical and bureaucratic obstacles hamper governmental assistance 
to female victims of violence. Many victims of trafficking and forced 
prostitution are too young to have worked previously; the lack of 
previous work experience disqualifies them from receiving social 
security assistance. If they are runaways with no registered address to 
which they can return, they are ineligible for humanitarian assistance. 
Victims are not encouraged to file complaints, as there is no mechanism 
in place to protect witnesses. Furthermore, societal attitudes and 
prevailing moral stigmas tend to ensure that their situation is either 
unmentioned or criticized. There is one NGO-sponsored 24-hour hot line 
for women in crisis, including victims of trafficking, with trained 
volunteers as well as professional therapists to counsel victims. The 
NGO also coordinates with government agencies and other NGO's to find 
assistance for trafficking victims.
    During the year the Government showed encouraging signs of taking 
this problem more seriously by confronting it in a multiagency effort, 
but this campaign remained in its early stages at year's end.
                                 ______
                                 

                                CROATIA

    The Republic of Croatia is in principle a constitutional 
parliamentary democracy, with a powerful presidency. President Franjo 
Tudjman was reelected in 1997 to a second 5-year term in an election 
that observers considered ``fundamentally flawed.'' President Tudjman 
and the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) had maintained power 
since independence in 1991 by using the party's majority position to 
deny opposition parties the ability to compete on free and equal terms 
in elections. The HDZ agreed in November to hold new parliamentary 
elections in January 2000. President Tudjman died in December, and 
Parliament Speaker Vlatko Pavletic was named acting President until 
presidential elections, which were scheduled to be held by February 
2000. The President serves as head of state and commander of the armed 
forces, chairs the influential National Defense and Security Council, 
nominates the Prime Minister who leads the Government, and approves 
certain appointments in local and regional government. During the year, 
the extensive constitutional powers of the presidency, the blurring of 
the roles and functions of the HDZ party with those of the government 
and the presidency, HDZ control of television and the continuing 
concentration of power within the one-party central Government combined 
to make the country's nominally democratic system in reality 
authoritarian. However, on January 3, 2000 the ruling HDZ party lost 
generally well-conducted parliamentary elections to an opposition 
coalition. The judiciary is nominally independent; however, it suffers 
from political influence and bureaucratic inefficiency.
    The Ministry of Interior oversees the civilian national police, and 
the Ministry of Defense oversees the military and military police. The 
national police have primary responsibility for internal security but, 
in times of disorder, the Government may call on the army to provide 
security. The civilian authorities generally maintain effective control 
of the professional security forces, although the police sometimes 
committed serious human rights abuses.
    The transition to a market-based, free enterprise economy is 
proceeding slowly. While agriculture is mostly in private hands and the 
number of small enterprises is increasing, industry and media 
enterprises are largely either still controlled by the State or 
deliberately were transferred in nontransparent, noncompetitive 
processes to individuals sympathetic to the ruling party. Unemployment 
remained high at 19 percent, and much higher in the areas affected by 
the war, and the standard of living for most of the population has yet 
to recover to prewar levels. The economy showed underlying weakness 
throughout the year in most industrial sectors, particularly in 
banking, which continued to be characterized by very low liquidity and 
serious losses due to bad loans, which in turn have caused bank 
closures, squeezing hundreds of thousands of depositors, employees, and 
small entrepreneurs.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although 
improvement was noted in certain areas, serious problems continued in 
others. The Government's conduct of the flawed 1995 elections seriously 
limited citizens' right to change their government peacefully, although 
it agreed to hold parliamentary elections in January 2000 according to 
provisions of the Constitution. Police occasionally beat persons. The 
Government did not always respect due process provisions for arrest and 
detention. Lengthy pretrial detention is a problem, especially for 
ethnic Serbs indicted for war crimes. The judicial system is subject to 
political influence, and the court system suffers from such a severe 
backlog of cases that the right of citizens to address their concerns 
in court is impaired seriously. Cases of interest to the ruling party 
are processed expeditiously, while others languish in court, further 
calling into question the independence of the judiciary. The courts 
sometimes deny citizens fair trials. The Government at times infringed 
on citizens' privacy rights.
    The Government restricted press freedom, using the courts and 
administrative bodies selectively to shut down or restrain newspapers, 
radio, and television stations critical of the Government or simply 
outside of its control. A new telecommunications law, passed in June, 
in part addressed the concerns of independent radio and television 
broadcasters, however the HDZ party was to retain considerable 
influence over the administrative councils and the government-owned 
radio and television broadcaster for several years. Parliament failed 
to pass legislation governing the conduct of state-owned television and 
radio, resulting in campaign coverage for parliamentary elections held 
in January 2000 that blatantly favored the ruling HDZ party. Government 
intimidation including libel charges induced self-censorship by 
journalists; some 900 criminal and civil cases against journalists were 
ongoing, with legal costs for defendants mounting. There were incidents 
of overt censorship of the electronic media. The Government at times 
restricted freedom of assembly and circumscribed freedom of association 
with a law that prohibited groups from forming unless expressly 
authorized to do so by means of an intrusive registration process, 
although there were no reports that the Government used this law to 
hinder any organization during the year. The Government used the 
manipulation of laws, harassment, economic pressure, and its almost 
total control of the electronic media to control the political process. 
The Government's record of cooperation with international human rights 
and monitoring organizations was mixed: It cooperated with some 
requests from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) but refused to comply with others, including the 
ICTY's search for evidence on alleged crimes committed during the 
Croatian military operations ``Flash'' and ``Storm'' in 1995, and its 
request to conduct a field investigation in the country. The 
implementation of government programs promulgated in 1998 for the 
return to the country of refugee citizens (mostly ethnic Serbs) and the 
restitution of their homes proceeded very slowly in many areas because 
of local government intransigence, unhelpful influence at the national 
level, and bureaucratic and legal confusion.
    Violence and discrimination against women remained problems. The 
Government discriminates against Muslims. Ethnic minorities, 
particularly Serbs as well as Roma, faced continued serious 
discrimination. Government commitments to foster reconciliation among 
ethnic groups have not been met. While some progress was made, ethnic 
tensions in the formerly occupied areas reignited during the year. 
Abuses including ethnic-motivated harassment, assaults, and murders 
continued to occur. Police performance was generally satisfactory, but 
in many cases where the victim was an ethnic Serb, the police either 
did not investigate thoroughly or failed to take effective action 
against the criminal activity. There were continued departures of 
ethnic Serb citizens from the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia). Poor 
economic conditions were a key reason for these departures and the 
Government did very little to encourage economic development in the 
region. Moreover, the Government not only failed to take steps to 
ensure a peaceful reintegration of the area, it often stoked tensions 
over exhumations of missing persons and housing for returnees, thereby 
compounding the region's problems. Housing and employment regulations 
were administered in a manner biased against ethnic Serbs. There were 
occasional instances of trafficking in women through the country.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government officials.
    There were three ethnically motivated killings of ethnic Serbs 
during the year (see Section 5).
    Of the many major crimes committed by both sides during the 
conflict, the Government has been much more vigorous in the prosecution 
of those committed by ethnic Serbs than those committed by ethnic 
Croats. It has been only reluctantly cooperative regarding possible war 
crimes associated with the Croatian military operations ``Flash'' and 
``Storm'' in 1995. In April the Croatian Helsinki Committee released a 
report stating that at least 410 Serb civilians died during the August 
1995 operation ``Storm.'' A September report issued by the Government 
indicated that criminal charges have been brought in 3,978 cases 
associated with ``Flash'' and ``Storm.'' However, this number has not 
been confirmed independently by the ICTY, only 13 of these cases 
resulted in substantial prison sentences, and none of those convicted 
were senior officers. In September the Government refused to submit to 
the jurisdiction of the ICTY regarding these operations unless the ICTY 
were to convene a special chamber to rule on the issue. In August one 
(of two) ICTY indictees was transferred to the Hague. The extradition 
of the second indictee still was pending at year's end due to his poor 
health (see Section 4). In the Danubian region, five ethnic Serbs were 
convicted in May of war crimes in the ``Sodolovci'' case on very weak 
evidence; however, the Supreme Court reversed their convictions in 
November. Croatian military and paramilitary members involved in 
murders in Pakracka Poljana in 1991 were acquitted or sentenced to time 
served (see Section 1.e.).
    Progress was made on the exhumation and identification of bodies at 
a number of sites in the Danubian region. Throughout the country, the 
bodies of 3,129 victims have been exhumed from mass and individual 
graves since the war (see Section 1.b.).
    Dinko Sakic, commander of Croatia's Jasenovac concentration camp in 
1944, was convicted in October of crimes against humanity and sentenced 
to 20 years' imprisonment, the maximum sentence. Sakic was extradited 
from Argentina in 1998.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    Government figures in December showed that 1,658 persons (mostly 
ethnic Croats) still were missing in cases unresolved from the 1991-95 
military conflict. However, this number does not reflect an additional 
approximately 900 persons (mostly ethnic Serbs) believed to be missing 
from 1995, which were reported to the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) or to international organizations. There 
has been significant progress on the recovery and identification of the 
remains of ethnic Croats; however, efforts to identify persons reported 
missing after mid-1995 (primarily ethnic Serbs) were hampered by 
political and bureaucratic obstacles. Progress was made on the 
exhumation and identification of bodies at a number of sites in the 
Danubian region (eastern Slavonia), including a well in Vukovar where 
10 female bodies were located in August and a site in Ilok where 30 
bodies were recovered in September. Throughout the country, 3,129 
victims have been exhumed from mass and individual graves since the 
war, 81 percent of whom have been identified, and 53 percent of whom 
were civilians. At a March conference with government officials from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY, the Government agreed to set up a 
subcommission on missing persons for the Danubian region and to hold 
regular meetings with FRY officials on missing persons. In December the 
Danubian subcommission finally became operational. There were no 
subsequent bilateral meetings with FRY officials after March in part 
due to the disruption caused by the NATO campaign in Kosovo.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, maltreatment, or cruel 
or degrading punishment; and there were occasional credible reports 
that police beat persons and that these cases were not always 
investigated properly.
    According to press reports in August, ethnic Croatian police 
officers in the Baranja region beat Roma. According to a Roma rights 
nongovernmental organization (NGO), in one incident an ethnic Croatian 
police officer allegedly beat a Rom and threatened him at gunpoint. The 
Rom reportedly filed a complaint against the officer.
    In April during tense contract negotiations with Croatian 
railroads' management, the vice president of the Locomotive Engineers 
Union reportedly was beaten severely with metal bars by unknown 
assailants (see Section 6.a.).
    According to press reports, in June an opposition Socialist 
Worker's Party head reported that unidentified assailants hit him in 
the head with a gun, for which he was hospitalized. According to the 
individual, this was the fourth or fifth such attack he suffered in the 
previous 12 months.
    Ethnic minorities reportedly were beaten by unknown assailants in 
the Danubian region (see Section 5). According to press reports, 
unknown persons threw bombs at Romani houses in Vardarci. Roma 
allegedly reported the incidents to police, but no suspects were found.
    Full control of the police in the Danubian region reverted to the 
Government in 1998, and the role of police monitoring was assumed by 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The 
OSCE reported that overall police performance was satisfactory. Leaders 
of the ethnic Serb community observed that the police generally 
conducted themselves well, and that in the Danubian region it was the 
judiciary that was more often responsible for failures in the legal 
system. Lack of police training and occasionally fear by police to 
carry out their duties were ongoing problems. In some cases, 
particularly where the victim of a crime was an ethnic Serb, police 
investigations were not thoroughly conducted. In the Danubian region 
monitors noted that police occasionally called ethnic Serbs to police 
stations for ``voluntary informative talks,'' which amounted to brief 
warrantless detentions intended to harass Serb citizens.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. Jails are 
crowded, but not excessively so, and family visits and access to 
counsel are generally available, albeit not consistently at all phases 
of the criminal proceedings (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
contains the provision to protect the legal rights of all accused 
persons, but the Government does not always respect due process 
provisions for arrest and detention. Police normally obtain arrest 
warrants by presenting evidence of probable cause to an investigative 
magistrate. Police may carry out arrests without a warrant if they 
believe a suspect might flee, destroy evidence, or commit other crimes. 
Such cases are not uncommon. The police then have 24 hours in which to 
justify their decision before a magistrate. Inspectors working under 
the auspices of the Ministry of Finance (the so-called ``financial 
police'') do not require a warrant in order to enter premises and 
examine records, actions that can lead to the unilateral shutdown of 
the organization in question in advance of any due process (see Section 
2.a.).
    Detainees must be given access to an attorney of their choice 
within 24 hours of their arrest; if they have none and are charged with 
a crime for which the sentence is over 10 years' imprisonment, the 
investigative magistrate appoints the defense counsel. The 
investigative magistrate must, within 48 hours of the arrest, decide 
whether sufficient cause exists to hold a person in custody pending 
further investigation. Investigative detention usually lasts from a few 
days to a few weeks, but the Supreme Court may extend the deadline (for 
a total period of not more than 6 months) in exceptional cases. Once 
the investigation is complete, detainees are released on their own 
recognizance pending trial, unless the crime is a serious offense, the 
accused are considered a public danger, or the court believes that they 
may flee.
    However, persons held under investigation sometimes were denied the 
right to have an attorney present during all parts of the investigative 
stage or appeal of investigative detention. During the year, suspects 
were allowed greater access to attorneys during the investigative 
stage, and fewer complaints were noted. In practice detainees generally 
are bound over for investigation unless it is clear that no case exists 
against them. There have been several cases of lengthy pretrial 
detention, including individuals who are awaiting the prosecutor's 
appeal of their acquittal. While there are provisions for posting bail 
after charges are brought, the practice is not common. The 
International Committee of the Red Cross in September counted 72 ethnic 
Serbs in detention for acts related to the conflicts in 1991-95; of 
these only 37 had received final convictions, while the rest were in 
various stages of their judicial processes.
    The arrest in June of former intelligence official Miroslav 
Separovic appeared to be politically motivated; Separovic allegedly 
leaked state secrets to the press that resulted in a newspaper article 
on politically motivated fixing of soccer matches by intelligence 
agents. The charges against Separovic were dropped in August (see 
Section 2.a.).
    The Government's application of the 1996 amnesty act for rebel 
Serbs remained problematic. Confusion arose from the fact that the 
Government initially issued a list of 13,575 persons who were given 
amnesty from indictments for rebellion during the military conflict, 
absent the appearance of new and credible evidence of war crimes, as 
well as a list of 25 individuals who were indicted for war crimes. 
During the year, the Government issued at least 91 new war crimes 
indictments, both individual and collective, for ethnic Serbs whose 
names appear on the amnesty list, claiming that they were based upon 
new and credible evidence. However, international monitors questioned 
the credibility of the evidence and the transparency of the process. In 
several cases, charges were reworded so that offenses that were 
eligible for amnesty were reinstated either as war crimes or common 
crimes. These indictments were issued without previously agreed-upon 
notification to the ICTY. In March the Government claimed that the list 
of persons amnestied had grown to 18,314; however, the identities of 
the 4,739 additions to the list were not announced. These events 
created great uncertainty among ethnic Serbs, because some who wished 
to return to the country were unwilling to do so until they knew that 
they would not be arrested, and others who believed themselves 
amnestied later were arrested.
    In separate cases in April and July, Serb police officers in Borovo 
Selo and in Ilok (both in the Danubian region) were arrested for war 
crimes dating to 1991 and 1993 respectively, despite the fact that both 
previously were cleared for police duty by the Ministry of Interior. 
The Government indicated that there was new evidence justifying their 
arrests. In September both still were detained pending trial. In 
addition, in at least five other cases, ethnic Serb police officers in 
the region fled to the FRY when they learned that they were the subject 
of investigations. NGO's noted that even a small number of such 
apparently political cases created serious uncertainty among the 700 
Serb police officers in the region. The appeal of Milos Horvat 
(sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for genocide in 1997 based on what 
international monitors described as questionable standards of evidence) 
was heard by the Supreme Court in December 1998, 18 months after it was 
filed. In a June decision, the Supreme Court rejected Horvat's appeal 
of his conviction and also rejected the prosecutor's appeal of the 5-
year sentence as too short.
    The Constitution prohibits the exile of citizens. In 1998 the 
Government established procedures by which Croatian Serb refugees who 
fled the country in 1995 might regulate their citizenship status, 
obtain citizenship documentation, return to Croatia, and reclaim their 
property. Implementation of these procedures is moving forward; 
however, progress has been slow and uneven (see Section 2.d.). During 
the year, 8,625 persons who were refugees in the FRY and Bosnia-
Herzegovina were able to return to Croatia. Government figures indicate 
that overall since the conflict, of approximately 250,000 ethnic Serbs 
who fled their homes, 33,000 have returned from abroad and 27,000 have 
returned to their homes after being displaced within the country. An 
October survey by the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
estimated that the actual number of Serb returnees may be much higher 
than these government figures indicate. In a positive development, the 
Government opened a full-time consulate in Banja Luka, Bosnia-
Herzegovina to facilitate documentation for citizens in Bosnia. The 
UNHCR and NGO's reported that the Croatian Embassy in Belgrade 
experienced lengthy delays in providing citizenship and travel 
documents to citizens (overwhelmingly ethnic Serbs) wishing to return 
to Croatia. Ethnic Serbs within Croatia requiring documentation also 
report persistent difficulties and delays, and contradictory 
requirements by local officials charged with issuing documents.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is nominally 
independent; however, it suffers from political influence. In practice 
bureaucratic inefficiency mars the system; the court system has a 
backlog of over 1 million cases.
    The judicial system consists of municipal and district courts, the 
Administrative Court, and the Supreme Court. The independent 
Constitutional Court both determines the constitutionality of laws, 
governmental acts, and elections and serves as the court of final 
appeal for individual cases. A parallel commercial court system 
adjudicates commercial and contractual disputes. The State Judicial 
Council (consisting of a president and 14 members) is a body 
independent of both the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice charged 
with both the appointment and discipline, including removal, of judges, 
court presidents, and public prosecutors. The upper house of Parliament 
nominates persons for membership on the Council, and the lower house 
elects the members for 8-year terms. The 11 judges of the 
Constitutional Court are elected for 8-year terms in the same manner, 
while all other judges are appointed for life.
    Judges are prohibited by the Constitution from being members of any 
political party. Nonetheless, the HDZ party wielded considerable 
influence over the judiciary, and critics charged that the State 
Judicial Council (whose members were appointed by the HDZ-dominated 
Parliament) was a political tool of the executive branch. While the 
Council is authorized to act independently in the appointment and 
review of judges, it occasionally has defied Constitutional Court 
rulings. Moreover, the terms of 8 of the 11 Constitutional Court 
justices expired in December, and the HDZ reached an agreement with the 
opposition parties to replace them with judges selected for their 
political loyalties rather than professional merit. For example, 
hardline HDZ supporter Vice Vukojevic who is known for his nationalist 
rhetoric was appointed to the Constitutional Court in December. Several 
prominent lawsuits to annul the new appointments to the Court on 
technical grounds were rejected. Observers believe that this agreement 
could yield a new court that is less independent and less qualified 
than the previous court. The outgoing president of the Constitutional 
Court publicly criticized the process by which the new court judges 
were selected and noted that none of those chosen were career judges.
    The severe shortage of judges prevalent in recent years was 
reduced. However, a greater problem was that many of the newly 
appointed judges were inexperienced and did not consistently apply the 
rule of law. While the ruling HDZ party may not have intervened 
directly in judicial deliberations, the newly hired judges were 
appointed by, and often were sympathetic to, the HDZ. Judges at times 
made decisions in a nontransparent manner seemingly at odds with the 
evidence or the law. The judicial system suffers from a massive 
backlog, estimated at 750,000 to more than 1 million cases, some dating 
back 30 years or more. Cases involving average citizens may drag on for 
years, while criminal libel suits or other cases affecting high-level 
government officials are heard within weeks under ``urgent 
proceedings'' (see Section 2.a.). According to the president of the 
Association of Croatian Judges, the Government failed to provide the 
financial means necessary for the regular operation of the courts. The 
case backlogs in Zagreb, Rijeka, and Split are compounded by government 
cutbacks on telephone, gas, water, and electricity throughout the 
country.
    Although the Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial 
and a variety of due process rights in the courts, the courts sometimes 
denied citizens fair trials. Local authorities often refused to 
implement court decisions. For example, little or no progress was made 
in numerous cases of illegal evictions in which the legal owner had a 
positive court decision, yet was unable to gain access to his property. 
Judicial decisions overwhelmingly favored ethnic Croats in property 
claims involving returning refugees and displaced persons. 
Approximately 22 percent of all claims submitted to a court were 
decided in favor of a non-Croat claimant. In those cases in which the 
court ruled in favor of a non-Croat, only a handful of judicial orders 
for the eviction of a Croat occupant of a Serb-owned home have ever 
been carried out by the police (see Section 1.f.). Many of these cases 
involve either current or former members of the Croatian military or 
police forces, and local authorities refuse to act against them on 
behalf of the rightful owner. The only recourse for the defendant is to 
return to court to demand implementation of the first decision, a time-
consuming and costly procedure that still may not result in 
implementation. Despite an April Constitutional Court ruling 
overturning a Zagreb city decree that had restricted public protests in 
the city, local officials continued to enforce the decree until a new 
law was passed in October (see Section 2.b.). Cases in the Danubian 
region (Eastern Slavonia) in which the plaintiff was an ethnic Croat 
were heard and decided in a matter of days or weeks, and judicial 
orders were carried out expeditiously, sometimes at the expense of the 
legal rights of Serbs. However, cases in which the plaintiff was an 
ethnic Serb often dragged on for months or years.
    The Government continued to apply questionable legal standards in 
the implementation of the general amnesty adopted in 1996. There was 
credible evidence that crimes for which persons should have received 
amnesty were recategorized as either common crimes or war crimes (see 
Section 1.d.).
    In May two cases starkly highlighted the contrasting treatment of 
ethnic Serb and ethnic Croat war crimes defendants. The county court in 
Osijek in the Danubian region convicted five ethnic Serbs (the 
``Sodolovci group'') of crimes against civilian populations for 
participating in artillery attacks against civilian targets in 1991 and 
1992 and sentenced them to terms of imprisonment ranging from 8 to 15 
years. The indictments were for a generalized series of attacks, and 
the evidence did not conclusively connect the defendants to the 
attacks. The case focused on the fact that the defendants were members 
of a unit known to have been active in the area in the given time 
period. During the course of the trial Justice Minister Zvonimir 
Separovic visited the Osijek county court, discussed ``current legal 
issues'' with the president of the court, Petar Klajic, and other 
judges, and made public statements asserting that the court system 
would not be subject to foreign pressure. Only 2 days after Separovic's 
visit, the court handed down its verdict. The verdict was criticized 
sharply in the ethnic Serb community. In November the Supreme Court 
overturned the verdicts and freed the defendants. Also in May, six 
ethnic Croats were released in the ``Pakracka Poljana'' case (four were 
acquitted and two convicted of minor offenses and sentenced to time 
served) for crimes against Serbs in Western Slavonia in 1991. This was 
the first major war crimes case brought against ethnic Croats for 
actions against Serbs. The judgements were reached despite a 1997 
newspaper interview by defendant Miroslav Bajramovic in which he 
personally admitted to killing 70 Serbs in Pakracka Poljana and also 
implicated other defendants as well as Tomislav Mercep, a well-known 
hardline political figure who was never charged. Although Bajramovic's 
alleged crimes were well-known to the Government, charges were brought 
against him only in response to public criticism over the newspaper 
interview. The interview was not introduced as evidence during the 
trial, nor was any real effort made to obtain evidence or secure 
witness testimony to support the charges.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--At times the Government infringed on these rights. The 
Constitution declares the home inviolable. Only a court may issue a 
search warrant, which must state the justification for the search. 
Police may enter a home without a warrant or the owner's consent only 
if necessary to enforce an arrest warrant, apprehend a suspect, or 
prevent serious danger to life or property. While the authorities 
generally complied with these norms, there were notable exceptions in 
which the Government did not respect private property in practice. 
Despite developing a mechanism by which property could, in theory, be 
restored to the original owner, the Government failed to implement this 
program vigorously. Furthermore, there are no provisions for those 
individuals, primarily citizens of Serb ethnicity, who lost tenancy 
rights to their dwellings during the war to return to their previous 
homes.
    There were many press reports and claims by a number of prominent 
figures that authorities authorized an extensive campaign of 
wiretapping against the independent media, opposition political 
figures, and others (see Section 2.a.). Leaks indicated the use of 
wiretapping by government intelligence services. In February the weekly 
Nacional reportedly filed charges against head of the Office for the 
Protection of the Constitutional Order and/or the Minister of Interior 
Ivan Penic for wiretapping and illegal surveillance activities of its 
journalists. An opposition Member of Parliament who was another alleged 
target of surveillance called for the President's intervention in the 
matter, the resignation of Interior Minister Penic, and the creation of 
a commission to investigate the work of the intelligence services. 
Penic reported that the Ministry of Interior began an investigation 
into these allegations of illegal surveillance activities. In December 
after claims that the intelligence services had bugged the offices or 
telephone of acting President and Speaker of the Parliament Vlatko 
Pavletic, a parliamentary commission concluded that this was not the 
case. However, Paveletic called for a curtailment of the conditions 
under which the intelligence services legally may use wiretaps. Later 
that month former Croatian Intelligence Service Director Miroslav 
Separovic published the names of more public figures who he claims were 
monitored illegally by the intelligence services at the request of HDZ 
hardliners. The list includes opposition members as well as HDZ 
members.
    Despite a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling that several elements of 
the Law on the Temporary Takeover of Specified Property (LTTP) were 
unconstitutional, the vast majority of Serb property owners who fled 
homes that were later occupied by ethnic Croats remained unable to 
access their property. A 1998 program for the return of refugees and 
displaced persons, which included mechanisms for property restitution 
and reconstruction, was implemented very slowly and only a handful of 
cases of property restitution were recorded by year's end, as both 
national and local authorities declined to take steps to displace 
temporary occupants in favor of the original owners, as stipulated in 
the return program. Further, only a handful of claims by ethnic Serbs 
for reconstruction have been considered. Despite orders from the 
national Government, local authorities (including local housing 
commissions) often did not take steps to regulate permits authorizing 
or revoking occupancy rights or to initiate lawsuits against 
individuals who refused to vacate occupied premises, a situation that 
remained largely unchanged throughout the year. Numerous returning 
ethnic Serb displaced persons and refugees continued to remain shut out 
of their homes, although in many cases the occupier's house had been 
reconstructed and there was no impediment to his return. In general in 
such cases, the Government failed to furnish reconstructed houses with 
basic utilities. Housing commissions were often purposefully 
dysfunctional, failed to resolve housing cases, and ignored judicial 
decisions. In Knin the housing commission resolved less than one dozen 
property disputes and allowed a 500-case backlog to accumulate. One of 
the very few cases of ``multiple occupancy'' (in which a family 
occupies more than one home, thus preventing rightful homeowners from 
returning) that was resolved during the year occurred in the Sisak area 
where an ethnic Croat kept his dog in the otherwise empty home of an 
ethnic Serb. Local authorities refused to evict the dog until July, 
after U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and other 
Western diplomats personally raised the issue with the highest levels 
of the Government. Cases of disregard for the Government's return 
program and its legal provisions were common.
    Throughout the year, the OSCE and local human rights organizations 
reported forcible evictions of ethnic Serbs from Croat-owned homes 
without receiving alternative accommodations on an almost weekly basis. 
Police response was mixed, due in part to conflicting instructions from 
higher authorities. Despite direct intervention from senior government 
officials to halt the evictions and clarify police instructions, 
homeowners were allowed to harass occupants until they were, in effect, 
forced to leave. In many cases, the actions of local political 
officials in the Danubian region called into question their 
impartiality. The housing commissions in the Danubian region (where 
temporary occupants were overwhelmingly ethnic Serb) were more active 
and effective in returning property to the original homeowners than 
were housing commissions in other regions (where the temporary 
occupants were primarily ethnic Croats). In Beli Manistir, OSCE 
officials and an NGO noted that an unofficial housing commission, 
headed by the deputy mayor and supported by the local police, 
improperly evicted several ethnic Serbs. Materials to repair and 
reconstruct war-damaged housing were being distributed in a manner that 
discriminated against Serbs, and villages where Serbs were a majority 
were being reconstructed at a slower pace than Croat-majority villages, 
despite the adoption in 1998 of a reconstruction program which aimed to 
ensure nondiscriminatory provision of such assistance.
    An ongoing problem was the continued occupation of homes belonging 
to Croatian Serbs by refugees from neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
the FRY, as well as ``priority category'' ethnic Croat citizens, i.e., 
active duty or former members of the military, widows, and orphans. 
Ethnic Croats wishing to return to the Danubian region also were unable 
to return to homes occupied by Serbs. Many Serb returnees were unable 
to move into looted and devastated homes that the Government defined as 
habitable. Of the total 7,123 applications for repossession of property 
recorded by the government Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees 
(ODPR) at the end of August, less than one-fourth were listed as 
returned to their owners.
    No progress was made to resolve the thousands of cases of citizens 
(mostly ethnic Serbs) who, due to their absence for more than 6 months 
during the war, lost their occupancy rights. Ethnic Serbs were affected 
disproportionately because no mechanism existed by which they could 
return to the country in order to claim their property or because they 
had lived in the occupied parts of the country and missed the chance to 
purchase their previous apartments.
    There were no reports that the Ministry of Defense arbitrarily 
revoked the tenancy rights of individuals who had lived in their 
apartments for decades. Split resident Hasim Begovic fully recovered 
his apartment late in the year.
    Incidents of grenade attacks against property and arson related to 
housing disputes were reported during the year (see Section 5).
    The Constitution provides for the secrecy and safety of personal 
data, and this provision generally was respected. Unlike previous 
years, there were no further reports during the year that requests made 
by ethnic Serbs to return to their original homes in the formerly 
occupied areas were used by individuals to vandalize or in some cases 
destroy the property in order to prevent the Serbs from returning. 
There were persistent reports to international organizations, although 
fewer in number than in 1998, that local housing commissions allowed 
authorizations for temporary accommodation to be transferred among 
temporary users, thus keeping a residence occupied even after the 
original owner's intention to return was known.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of thought and expression, specifically including freedom of 
the press and other media, speech, and public expression, as well as 
the free establishment of institutions of public communication; 
however, the Government restricted these rights in practice. The 
Government controls or influences much of the print media, controls or 
influences most of the electronic media (in particular, television), 
and influences and manipulates the judiciary. All this, combined with 
the Government's continued harassment--through job loss or banishment 
from the airwaves, overt censorship, intimidation, and criminal 
prosecution--of those journalists who criticized the ruling HDZ party, 
stifled many of these freedoms in practice. The Government maintained 
an unofficial campaign of harassment of the independent media 
throughout the year, and more than 300 criminal and 600 civil 
prosecutions of journalists are ongoing, many brought by government 
officials or their close relatives or associates. The law gives the 
public prosecutor the right to appeal an acquittal, thereby potentially 
exposing journalists to double jeopardy. There continued to be reports 
of government wiretapping of some independent journalists (see Section 
1.f.). The new telecommunications law, passed on June 30, created 
opportunities for independent media, most notably by allowing local 
independent radio and television broadcasters to ``network,'' or 
jointly produce and broadcast national programming, for 5 hours per day 
to compete with state-run television. However, the Government continued 
to control and manipulate the regulatory framework and the licensing of 
radio and television. In particular, the ruling party retained the 
ability to select the members of the managing council and the Council 
for Radio and Television for 3- to 5-year terms, and these members are 
to set prices and grant concessions through procedures that are still 
arbitrary and nontransparent.
    Despite continued domestic and international protest, the 
Government took no steps to revise articles of the Penal Code that 
authorize the criminal prosecution of journalists who publish ``state 
secrets'' or insult the honor or dignity of the President, the Prime 
Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, or the Chief justices of either 
the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court. Individuals may 
criticize the Government, although not always without reprisal. On May 
6, a Zagreb court indicted four employees of Zagrebacka Banka for 
leaking confidential bank documents to the press in 1998. The court 
also indicted the reporter who wrote the article, which contained 
details about the undisclosed bank accounts of Ankica Tudjman, the wife 
of the President. There continued to be over 900 libel lawsuits against 
journalists and publishers, the majority continuing from previous 
years, filed by both government officials and private parties. The HDZ-
sponsored laws, both criminal and civil, that permitted these suits 
were adopted in recent years amid criticism that they were overly 
broad. The HDZ has taken no action to amend or modify the laws. While 
defendants sometimes prevailed in such suits, the libel laws remained 
problematic because defending such cases represented a significant and 
ongoing financial and personal hardship for them. The Zagreb county 
court once again acquitted Davor Butkovic, editor of the weekly Globus, 
of criminal liability in March, ending his legal battle, which included 
a Government appeal of an earlier acquittal in 1998, leading to a 
``double jeopardy'' trial for the weekly.
    There are currently some 70 lawsuits (20 criminal cases and 50 
civil cases) filed against the publishers of the independent satirical 
weekly Feral Tribune, with potential damages exceeding $2 million (14 
million kuna) and an unspecified amount of legal and court costs 
involved.
    The ruling party and businesspersons with close ties to it 
continued to maintain a virtual monopoly on printing and distribution 
of magazines and newspapers. Acute financial difficulties stemming from 
poor overall economic conditions created ongoing difficulties for the 
media. The distributor Tisak reached the point of insolvency, failing 
to pay publications, particularly independent publications, thus 
threatening their financial stability. The Tisak debt to independent 
weekly Nacional alone was over $500,000 (nearly 4 million kuna). A 
government bailout plan had not been implemented at year's end. The 
slow pace of the judicial process (see Section 1.e.) makes it extremely 
difficult for these publications to seek timely redress of their 
payment difficulties in the courts. Journals and publications also 
complained that they had little control over where their publications 
were sent, with large quantities at times being sent to remote 
villages, leaving the bigger, urban markets undersupplied.
    In July the editor in chief of the Nacional stated that the 
independent print media, including Nacional, were under attack from the 
Government, which aimed to marginalize or eliminate independent media 
in the period prior to the parliamentary elections. Government 
harassment of Nacional intensified after the weekly ran a June article 
alleging that the Government rigged the Croatian soccer championship on 
orders from President Tudjman. The Ministry of Interior then launched 
an investigation of Nacional employees suspected of publishing a 
``state secret'' and ordered police searches of Nacional offices and 
the homes of editor in chief Ivo Pukanic and his parents. In June 
authorities arrested Nacional's editor for his role in publishing 
alleged state secrets. On June 9, authorities arrested former Croatian 
Intelligence Service Director Miroslav Separovic for allegedly leaking 
``state secrets'' about the soccer matches; authorities dropped the 
charges against Separovic in August (see Section 1.d.). Pukanic also 
was subjected to public death threats from the national soccer team's 
coach as a result of the soccer expose.
    Police surveillance of journalists reportedly continued, with 
Nacional claiming that its journalists were under constant surveillance 
and that both their home and office telephones were tapped (see Section 
1.f.).
    On February 25, two unknown assailants beat a reporter and a 
photographer from the independent daily Jutarnji List. The two 
journalists had been taking photographs of a new house under 
construction that belonged to Assistant Defense Minister General 
Marinko Kresic for which allegedly he did not have a permit. The 
authorities arrested two suspects, and a military police spokesman 
denied that the attackers could have been members of that force.
    The ruling HDZ party's control of the national electronic media 
continued to be pervasive and blatant. The HRT is the only national 
network and is the main source of news for 88 percent of the 
population. It broadcasts on three national television and radio 
channels. Technically under the control of Parliament, the HRT was, in 
practice, run by the ruling HDZ Party. The Government controlled the 
state network through the HRT Council which, like the 
Telecommunications Council, also was dominated by the HDZ. The HRT 
Council directly supervised operations and editorial content of state-
run radio and television, effectively restricting access by opposition 
parties to criticize government policies (see Section 3). During the 
year, the growing realization that the HDZ might lose the upcoming 
parliamentary elections, fueled by polls showing the HDZ trailing, 
caused HDZ hardliners to consolidate their grip on the HRT. HRT 
coverage of the election campaign often was biased in favor of the HDZ 
party, but it improved noticeably over previous elections. A new HRT 
council was named in February, with a chairman who was a member of the 
HDZ party presidency, a new editor in chief who was a member of the HDZ 
main committee, and two new assistants who were HDZ hardliners.
    In August the HRT announced that the news program One Plus One, 
which was subject to government censorship since mid-1998, would be 
cancelled. HRT also cancelled the respected programs of Ivo Loncar and 
Mirjana Rakic, the latter to be replaced with a progovernment 
commentator. The HRT took the program off the air on January 19 for a 
program it planned to broadcast which allegedly would incite ``social 
disorder and violence'' (the program included a pensioner's statement 
that an opposition party leader should be hung, among other things). 
The Telecommunications Council awarded the license for a fourth 
national channel to Nova TV whose owners are identified closely with 
the HDZ party. During the year, the much anticipated reform of the HRT 
law did not occur. This legislation would be a key step for reform of 
electronic media and overall democratization. The electronic media's 
HDZ bias continued to be a concern, although inflammatory language in 
the media that was designed to exacerbate ethnic tensions has decreased 
in recent years.
    Both public and private radio and television stations coexist. The 
June Telecommunications Law permitted ``networking'' by independent 
broadcasters to achieve national coverage. Revenue collection also is 
skewed greatly in favor of the HRT, which receives subsidies from 
government taxes on television (accounting for some two-thirds of the 
HRT's gross annual revenues), as well as some 80 percent of advertising 
revenue. These subsidies create an unfair advantage for the HRT over 
any independent television station that tries to compete, since the 
independents' ability to purchase programming, etc., is far less than 
that of the HRT. Similar problems exist in radio broadcasting. The 
enforcement arm of the Ministry of Finance, the financial police, often 
has been used by the Telecommunications Council to shut down stations 
deemed too critical of the Government, but there were fewer reports of 
such problems during the year. Journalists who sought reform of the HRT 
from within routinely were silenced and in many cases taken off the air 
while still on the HRT payroll.
    Government censorship also influenced the independent media. On 
January 29, the Ministry of Traffic, Communications, and Maritime 
Affairs shut down Adriatic Television (ATV), a Split-based county-
licensed television station. The official reason was that ATV had not 
paid its annual licensing fee of approximately $35,000 (217,000 kuna). 
However, opposition leaders and independent media observers speculate 
that the station was closed because opposition Croatian Social Liberal 
Party leader Drazen Budisa was scheduled to appear on a local program, 
titled, ``Censorship.'' The National Association of Independent 
Television Stations and Forum 21 (an association of independent 
broadcast journalists) protested the decision and noted that while 
nonpayment is a legal basis for shutting down a station, the decision 
was unfair since the economic crisis and high licensing fees were 
destroying the independent electronic media. In February the editor in 
chief and his deputy of a local radio station in Varazdin were fired by 
the station's owners, functionaries of the HDZ party, after an 
interview with a Western diplomat was broadcast. In addition, on the 
day that an independent television station in Split planned to air a 
program with an appearance by an opposition politician, it was pulled 
off the air for nonpayment of its annual licensing fees. The station's 
director, an HDZ member, later cancelled the program.
    Foreign newspapers and journals were available in larger urban 
areas throughout the country, although their high cost (about three 
times the price of local newspapers) made them expensive for most 
persons.
    While academic freedom generally is respected, scholars reported 
that they were reluctant to speak out on political issues. Some 
scientists state that the government exerted subtle pressure on them 
through its control of research funds. In June the Dean of the Faculty 
of Philosophy at the University of Zagreb banned a panel discussion 
organized by a student group on the escalation of violence in the 
country, ostensibly because the panel discussants were not members of 
the academic community and because current political issues were not to 
be discussed at the university because its autonomy must be preserved. 
The Dean stated that such events would continue to be banned in the 
future.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly; however, the Government at 
times exercised arbitrary control to restrict this right during the 
year, although there were fewer incidents of such reports. The 
Government restricted this right by denying some groups access to 
Zagreb's main square and other gathering places. The lack of a clear 
policy to regulate such events and address questions of security and 
inconvenience, and the fact that HDZ party rallies and other public 
events have been staged regularly at these sites in the past, combined 
to make the government actions appear partisan and nontransparent. A 
new law on assembly that passed in October was only slightly less 
restrictive, since it permitted assembly for registered demonstrations 
at approved locations but did not make transparent the process for 
approving or denying such registration. However, this law was not 
applied in a way that noticeably favored the HDZ Party nor were those 
critical of the Government singled out for denial of permission to 
assemble, particularly in the period before the January 2000 
parliamentary elections.
    Numerous rallies and demonstrations took place throughout the 
country during the year, many of which were led by workers protesting 
poor social conditions and pay. On February 16, some 2,000 workers 
marched in Zagreb. When the group spontaneously decided to march to the 
square in front of the parliament building, where demonstrations are 
prohibited, they were met by some 200 police officers. Several police 
officers were injured, one seriously, in the ensuing scuffle. On March 
31, the Constitutional Court overturned the law on peaceful assembly 
that had granted local governments the authority to decide the location 
of public gatherings. Public gatherings still must be approved in 
advance, but may only be restricted for security reasons, as decided by 
the Ministry of Interior. However, local officials continued to enforce 
the law, and denied access to strategic places in the city. In April 
shortly after the Constitutional Court's ruling, Zagreb authorities 
charged a prominent union leader with a misdemeanor for organizing a 
protest in front of a government building. On June 8, textile workers 
from Duga Resa were blocked from protesting in Zagreb by a large cordon 
of policemen brought into the city from all over the country. 
Approximately 500 police blocked the protesters' passage through side 
streets to prevent them from reaching the main government square.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association; however, 
legislation adopted in 1997 increased the Government's ability to 
restrict this right, although there were no reports that the Government 
used this law to hinder any organization during the year. The 1997 Law 
on Associations gives the Government broad powers to prevent the 
founding of an association and to monitor all aspects of an association 
once founded. There were no reports of the Government abusing this law 
against associations or NGO's during the year, but several NGO's 
observed that the mere process of registering is an intrusive and 
unnecessary form of governmental oversight. All associations of at 
least 10 persons must register their activities. An association's 
activities may be suspended administratively based on only a ``well-
founded'' suspicion that the group's activities contravene the 
Constitution or the law. Until such time as the association proves 
itself innocent in a court of law, the Government can keep it closed 
indefinitely and dispose of its assets. The reregistration process is 
proceeding only slowly, and many local and international NGO's faced 
bureaucratic obstacles. According to the law, in the absence of any 
formal notification to the contrary, an NGO is to consider itself 
reregistered. However, without written confirmation of registration 
from the Ministry of Administration, NGO's face significant obstacles 
in their day-to-day functioning. Reports of harassment by the 
``financial police'' (Finance Ministry officials who do not require a 
warrant in order to enter premises and examine records which can lead 
to the unilateral shutdown of the organization in question in advance 
of any due process) were fewer than in the past. In Osijek a human 
rights NGO was audited after its director took a new position with 
another NGO, for which President Tudjman had publicly expressed 
animosity. In a positive development, the Government established an 
office for NGO's that disbursed funding of approximately $1 million (7 
million kuna).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
conscience and religion and free public profession of religious 
conviction, and the Government respects these rights in practice. No 
formal restrictions are imposed on religious groups, and all religious 
communities are free to conduct public services and to open and run 
social and charitable institutions. Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox 
Christianity, and Islam are major faiths, and there is a small Jewish 
community.
    Croatian Protestants from a number of denominations and foreign 
clergy and missionaries actively practice and proselytize.
    While there is no official state religion, approximately 85 percent 
of the population are Catholic, and the dividing line between the Roman 
Catholic Church and the State often had been blurred in the past. The 
ruling HDZ party periodically attempted to identify itself more closely 
with the Catholic Church. However, the Church more frequently sought an 
independent role for itself on political issues and was at times openly 
critical of the prevailing political climate. However, the Church has 
taken advantage of HDZ support to work actively to strengthen its 
influence elsewhere, such as in public schools. The head of the 
Catholic Church, Archbishop Josip Bozanic, was active in publicly 
promoting reconciliation and the return of refugees. In March the 
Archbishop met with Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and 
in May he made a strong public challenge to the Government during his 
homily at a Statehood Day Mass attended by President Tudjman. In 
November the Croatian Catholic Bishops' Conference issued a statement 
calling on the faithful to participate in the December parliamentary 
elections and to overcome the ``old, intolerant one-party mentality''.
    Religion and ethnicity are closely intertwined in society, but the 
majority of incidents of discrimination are motivated by ethnicity 
rather than religion (see Section 5). There were persistent reports of 
vandalism to Serb Orthodox cemeteries. The Ministry of Defense employed 
19 Catholic priests to tend to Catholics in the military, but employed 
no Orthodox Christian or Muslim clergy. The Government requires that 
religious training be provided in schools, although attendance is 
optional. Schools are allowed to offer classes in minority religions if 
they fill the necessary quota of minority students. However, lack of 
resources, minority students, and qualified teachers generally impeded 
catechism in minority faiths, so the Catholic catechism was the one 
predominately offered. According to numerous reports, although not 
obligatory, students felt pressured to attend religious training. In a 
positive development in September, the Government instructed public 
schools that reached the minimum quota of Muslim students to sign work 
contracts with Muslim instructors. In the past, Muslim teachers were 
not paid by the Government while Catholic teachers were. Jewish 
officials noted that basic information provided to students about 
Judaism is inaccurate, and their offers to improve the material went 
unheeded. There were several cases in which individual missionaries had 
difficulty in obtaining missionary visas, but it was unclear whether 
this was due to religious discrimination or bureaucratic inefficiency 
and failure by missionaries to fulfill all of the necessary 
requirements. Missionaries do not operate registered schools, but the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints provides free English 
lessons, often followed by religious instruction. The Muslim community 
has a secondary school in Zagreb; however, the Ministry of Education 
refuses to recognize the diploma from this school. Although in recent 
years the Government had discriminated against a particular group of 
Muslims in the issuance of citizenship documents, the Government began 
granting citizenship to them during the year. In the area of Topusko 
(in the region formerly occupied by rebel Serbs) most cases have been 
resolved of the approximately 2,500 Muslims who for several years were 
unable to obtain citizenship because their period of residency was 
interrupted by the military conflict.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution generally provides for 
these rights, with certain restrictions. All persons must register 
their residence with the local authorities. Under exceptional 
circumstances, the Government legally may restrict the right to enter 
or leave the country if necessary to protect the ``legal order, health, 
rights, or freedoms of others.''
    While there are no reports that the Government revoked citizenship 
for political reasons, the failure to act expeditiously to verify the 
citizenship of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs who fled the 
country after the military actions in 1995 is an ongoing and serious 
concern. The Government in 1998 adopted procedures by which these 
individuals could confirm their citizenship and return to Croatia; 
however, the effects of this step were minimized by continued slow and 
uneven implementation. The Joint Working Group was superceded in 1998 
by the Returns Coordination Committee, which was not very active during 
the year, although observers believe that it could prove useful in 
facilitating returns. There were no reports of cases during the year of 
deportation proceedings against male members of mixed marriages 
involving Muslims. In a positive step, in July the Government opened a 
full-time consulate in Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina and expanded 
consular operations in Belgrade, Serbia to process citizenship 
applications which are being filed at the rate of approximately 500 per 
week. While the wait time in Belgrade for a decision on an application 
improved somewhat late in the year, it was still as long as 3 months in 
some cases.
    A significant number of internally displaced persons remain, 
although not all of these persons are under the Government's direct 
care. While the government reported in September some 77,000 persons 
(50,000 internally displaced and 27,000 refugees, mostly from Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the FRY) with refugee or displaced person status, this 
number does not reflect fully an additional 140,000 former refugees who 
have become citizens of Croatia.
    International monitors and NGO's assess that the rate of ethnic 
Serb departures from the Danubian region was somewhat less than in past 
years. However, monitors had difficulty tracking the departures because 
in January the Government stopped sharing relevant data. The ethnic 
Serb population in the region fell from a prewar number of 70,000 to 
about 50,000 at year's end. Approximately 60,000 persons displaced by 
the conflict fled to the Danubian region from other areas of the 
country, but most of these have since returned home or moved to the 
FRY. About 3,000 displaced persons remain in the region. An estimated 
40,000 persons in the region have emigrated because of poor economic 
conditions combined with discrimination directed at ethnic Serbs. The 
number of Croatian Serbs emigrating to the United Kingdom surged to 
several hundred per month by mid-year, many of whom were assessed to be 
economic migrants. Apparently concerned that its citizens could lose 
visa-exempt travel privileges in Europe, the Government attempted to 
disrupt the emigration. In addition to continuing to issue only one-
time travel documents rather than passports to refugees returning from 
the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were persistent reports of 
harassment of departing Serbs by officials at Zagreb airport, including 
delaying passengers until they missed their flights. In November the 
United Kingdom imposed a visa requirement on Croatians entering that 
country. Ethnically motivated incidents directed at ethnic Serbs 
included verbal and legal harassment, forcible evictions, beatings, and 
three murders. During the year in the Danubian region, international 
monitors recorded 1,017 cases of ethnically motivated intimidations and 
housing disputes. This figure included approximately 61 physical 
assaults (see section 5). Within the region, half of all reported 
incidents were reported in the area of Vukovar alone. The village of 
Berak (on the outskirts of Vukovar) was the scene of numerous incidents 
against Serbs during the year, especially after Croat returnees began 
demonstrating in May over the issue of missing persons. In the Danubian 
region, where ethnic Serbs were exempted from military service, there 
were occasional reports that local officials refused to issue passports 
to ethnic Serbs unless they could provide evidence of their military 
service.
    Official government policy was that all citizens were free to 
return to their homes of origin throughout the country. However, in 
practice ethnic Serbs who departed during the military conflict and 
have since returned faced open discrimination and numerous bureaucratic 
obstacles in order to regain their property and the financial and 
health benefits to which all returnees are entitled under the law. In 
September, the OSCE reported that ethnic Serb refugees were generally 
able to return to the country but generally were not able to repossess 
their property. Half of all property repossession cases have been in 
the Danubian region where the Government's return program has been 
implemented selectively and where the majority of property claimants 
were ethnic Croats returning from other areas of the country. Incidents 
of beatings and even arson and bombing attacks against Serbs were 
reported, albeit less frequently than in the previous year (see 
Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.f., and 5). Discrimination towards ethnic Serbs 
was apparent at all levels of the return process. During the year, over 
70 percent of returns by internally displaced persons were to the 
Danubian region, and these returnees were overwhelmingly ethnic Croats. 
In December the Law on Expelled Persons and Refugees was amended so 
that some of its discriminatory measures were removed. However, earlier 
in the year the Government enacted an interpretation of the law that 
favored temporary occupiers of property over refugees wishing to return 
to their property. In addition, the Government failed to act to 
eliminate language in the Law on Areas of Special State Concern and the 
Law on Reconstruction that discriminates against ethnic Serbs, despite 
a commitment to change these laws by September 1998.
    The OSCE assessed that while the organized return process worked 
well, persons returning outside this process were not always treated 
fairly. Systems established between the Government Office for Displaced 
Persons and Refugees (ODPR) and the UNHCR worked well. The ODPR 
processed an average of over 450 return applications per week and 
closely coordinated with the UNHCR to receive returnees (overwhelmingly 
ethnic Serbs) from the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the 
Government did not provide benefits and entitlements consistently in a 
timely manner to returnees. Of particular concern were the growing 
number of persons intending to return whose cases were deferred because 
their prewar homes were occupied by settlers or had been destroyed. The 
Government did not encourage actively the return of citizens who did 
not have arrangements for alternative accommodation.
    There were persistent reports that humanitarian and reconstruction 
assistance was not distributed fairly by government agencies. The 
Government allowed free access to all displaced persons by domestic and 
international humanitarian organizations and permitted them to provide 
assistance. However, the Government at times accused international 
organizations of bias in providing assistance only to ethnic Serb 
returnees.
    The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organizations assisting refugees. Although the Government has not yet 
passed legislation to implement the provisions of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 
the Government formed a working group with the UNHCR to develop such 
legislation in 1999. The ODPR reported that the Government granted 
first asylum to 29,000 persons from the various parts of the former 
Yugoslavia as of September and that it was supporting financially 
another 100,000 displaced persons (not counting displaced ethnic Serbs 
in the Danubian region). Faced with the refugee crisis in Kosovo, the 
Government, in consultation with the international community, agreed to 
accept up to 5,000 Kosovar refugees and had begun to do so when the 
crisis ended. However, the UNHCR reported one instance in which a 
Kosovar Albanian was refouled to the FRY where he was mistreated by 
authorities. The Government later acknowledged its mishandling of the 
case. On April 11 border guards refused entry to 18 Kosovar Albanian 
asylum seekers on the grounds that they lacked the proper 
documentation, and there were other reports of Kosovar Albanians being 
expelled to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Government's conduct of the flawed 1995 elections seriously 
limited the right of citizens to change their government. All citizens 
over 18 years of age have the right to vote by secret ballot. The 
President, elected for 5 years, exercises substantial power, authority, 
and influence but is limited constitutionally to two terms. Parliament 
comprises the (lower) House of Representatives and the (upper) House of 
Counties. During the year, the HDZ held a majority in both houses, and 
often the role of the HDZ as a political party was blurred with the 
role of the Government. The HDZ continued to wield and expand its 
direct and indirect control over many aspects of public life including 
television and the press, banking, privatization, and the economy. 
However, on January 3, 2000 the ruling HDZ party lost parliamentary 
elections to an opposition coalition. In December President Tudjman, 
who was serving his second 5-year term, died in office. Tudjman was 
reelected President in June 1997 in an election judged to be 
``fundamentally flawed'' and ``free but not fair'' by the OSCE. 
Elections to replace him were scheduled by February 7, 2000. During the 
year, the President's extensive powers, the HDZ's dominance, the 
Government's influence over the judiciary, and its control of the media 
combined to make the country's nominally democratic system in reality 
authoritarian.
    The Government made some progress in addressing issues raised by 
the OSCE and other international organizations that have documented the 
flaws in the electoral system and criticized the 1997 presidential 
elections. The electoral law was based primarily on the compromise 
worked out in negotiations in May between the six largest opposition 
parties and the ruling HDZ party, although the final law reflected some 
changes made by the HDZ. Electoral laws previously had infringed 
directly on the right of citizens to change their government. The new 
electoral law passed by Parliament in October reduced the number of 
seats reserved for diaspora voters (some 2 percent of the population) 
from a fixed quota of 12 seats in Parliament (or some 10 percent of 
seats) to a nonfixed quota, which assigns diaspora voters a number of 
seats proportional to their share of the total electorate. In the 1995 
elections, 90 percent of diaspora voters voted for the ruling HDZ. 
However, the law reduced the number of seats in Parliament reserved for 
the Serb minority. In addition, the Citizenship Law and electoral 
legislation grants citizenship, and thereby the franchise, based purely 
on ethnic grounds to ethnic Croats abroad with no genuine link to the 
country. Meanwhile the Government failed to ensure that Croatian Serbs, 
who fled in 1995 and who wish to assume the responsibilities of 
Croatian citizenship, were able to document their Croatian citizenship 
in order to vote and ultimately to return. The new election law also 
made provisions for independent monitoring by NGO's, the establishment 
of multiparty election commissions, and the elimination of separate, 
higher thresholds for coalitions.
    In addition to the Government's interpretation and implementation 
of laws to suit the ruling party's agenda, the Government used its 
control of the electronic media to control the political process. 
Despite the May agreement to transform public radio and television into 
truly free and independent media, the June telecommunications law made 
only minor changes and the HDZ retained control over Croatian State 
Radio and Television throughout the year. Senior HDZ members were 
members of the board of directors of the state television network. 
Their influence not only restricted the ability of opposition parties 
to criticize government policies and activities, but limited the 
opposition's ability to fully engage the Government and the public in 
an open political dialog (see Section 2.a.).
    Although there were no legal restrictions on participation by women 
or minorities in the political process, they are underrepresented in 
government and politics. There were only small numbers of women in 
Parliament, the executive branch, and the courts. In the Parliament 
that was dissolved in November, 4 of 68 upper house members and 11 of 
127 lower house members were women.
    The election law required minority representation in Parliament, 
with proportional representation for any minority that made up more 
than 8 percent of the population. No minority met that criterion. 
However, representation for the Serb minority was based on government 
estimates of the number of Serbs who fled the country between 1991 and 
1995 and the assumption that they would not return. There were three 
lower house seats allocated to the Serb minority, and two Serb members 
were appointed to the upper house. However, the election law passed by 
the HDZ-dominated Parliament in October reduced the number of seats 
reserved for minorities in the Parliament from seven to five and of 
these, reduced the number of seats reserved for ethnic Serbs from three 
to one (less than 1 percent of the seats in the lower house), despite 
the fact that ethnic Serbs constitute approximately 6 percent of the 
country's population. Of the four remaining seats, one is reserved for 
the Italian minority, one for the Hungarian minority, one for the Czech 
and Slovak community, and one for the combined Russian, Jewish, German, 
Austrian, and Ukrainian minorities. There were no Muslim 
representatives in Parliament despite the fact that in the most recent 
census (1991) the country's 40,000 Muslims were the second largest 
minority after the Serbs, and the new election law did not reserve any 
minority seats for Muslims. Amendments to the Constitution passed by 
the HDZ-dominated Parliament in 1997 and adopted in 1998 excluded 
Muslims as a recognized minority (see Section 5).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups throughout the country were able to work to 
prevent abuses and bring their concerns to the attention of local and 
central authorities, as well as to the attention of domestic and 
international media. The government-appointed Ombudsman met 
periodically with human rights representatives; the response of other 
ministries varied. Human rights groups reported that, while they may 
have received responses to specific cases, the Government generally 
failed to remedy the underlying institutional problems that were the 
root cause of many of the cases. For example, numerous NGO's repeatedly 
raised the issue of the government's failure to issue instructions to 
ministries and local authorities to implement the Law on Convalidation 
adopted in October 1997 (which would allow documents issued in the 
formerly occupied areas to be recognized or ``convalidated'' by 
government offices--see Section 5). In a positive development, a number 
of NGO's, the largest being Citizens Organized to Monitor Elections 
(GONG) and Voice 99 (Glas 99), were active in organizing preelection 
informational campaigns.
    Under the law, it is difficult for NGO's to solicit contributions 
or donations to support their work. This is due in part to the fact 
that there is no tax benefit to donors. The NGO also must pay tax on 
contributions classified as income. Thus, many human rights groups rely 
on international donations and government funding to continue their 
work. Another problem is the public perception of human rights 
organizations. Senior government officials promoted the view that any 
criticism of the State or the ruling party was disloyal, engendering 
suspicion of NGO's among the general population.
    International organizations, including the European Community 
Monitoring Mission (ECMM), the OSCE, and the UNHCR among others, 
operated freely in Croatia, and there were no reported instances of 
monitors being denied visas or the ability to move freely around the 
country. However, in the spring and summer there were a series of 
burglaries at offices of the OSCE, the UNHCR, and the Norwegian Refugee 
Council offices throughout the country, during which computers were 
stolen. In August the UNHCR and the OSCE requested an investigation 
amid press reports that government intelligence services may have 
conducted the burglaries. At year's end, the Government had not 
responded to this request and no arrests had been made. Officials of 
international organizations noted that the burglaries had a chilling 
effect on all international and nongovernmental organizations. While 
international organizations reported an overall satisfactory level of 
cooperation with officials in Zagreb, they also noted a lack of follow 
through on central government commitments by local authorities. OSCE 
police monitors operated in the Danubian region, monitoring the 
performance of the multiethnic police force. While cooperation 
generally was satisfactory, there were several incidents in which local 
police refused monitors' requests to review or fully investigate cases. 
As with local NGO's, the Government generally failed to respond 
substantively to international NGO reports of human rights abuses and 
tended to treat any specific case brought to its attention as an 
isolated incident.
    Although the Government in general cooperated with international 
organizations and NGO's, especially in the spring and summer, these 
organizations again found themselves targets of criticism in the state-
controlled press claiming that they were discriminating against Croats 
and in favor of ethnic Serbs in the distribution of humanitarian 
assistance. Some government officials, both at the national and local 
levels, fueled this negative attitude toward international 
organizations and NGO's with unhelpful statements calling for the 
Government to react strongly to what was viewed as inappropriate 
meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. In September the 
president of a human rights organization in Zagreb received a 
threatening letter allegedly from members of the Croatian Party of 
Rights (HSP), after the organization had criticized the HSP for 
fomenting ethnic tensions. The Ministry of Interior referred the case 
to the police for investigation. There were no results of the 
investigation available at year's end.
    The government-appointed Ombudsman addressed cases brought to his 
attention by the international community and local NGO's. However, the 
office continued to be weak, due to the small size of its staff and the 
Ombudsman's lack of legal authority to rectify problems directly. The 
Ombudsman was occasionally helpful in the analysis of legislation 
deemed to be detrimental to human rights causes. While the Government 
was perhaps somewhat more responsive to the Ombudsman than to NGO's, 
the overall response by the Government to the underlying problems 
raised by the Ombudsman remained unsatisfactory.
    Committees in the Parliament and in the Government were tasked 
specifically with human and minority rights issues. Both met 
periodically throughout the year to discuss topics and legislation 
within their purview; however, neither played an active role in 
promoting human rights during the year. The government committee failed 
to meet with a leading human rights NGO despite a previous agreement to 
do so.
    The Government's record of cooperation with the ICTY was mixed 
during the year. In July a newspaper published the minutes of an 
October 1998 meeting of the government office for cooperation with 
ICTY, which revealed high-level discussions of a government strategy to 
obstruct the work of the ICTY. While the Government tried to minimize 
the importance of the minutes, calling them ``merely internal 
discussions,'' the ICTY Chief Prosecutor noted that they perfectly 
described the Government's actual behavior. In August the President of 
ICTY reported the country's noncooperation to the U.N. Security 
Council. In November the Tribunal's Chief Prosecutor reported to the 
U.N. on Croatia's noncooperation. A few days later the Government 
refused an ICTY request to provide support and cooperation for a 
proposed field investigation in the country. The investigation was 
postponed. In a positive development, the Government transferred ICTY 
indictee Vinko Martinovic (also known as ``Stela'') as well as some 
requested documents to The Hague in August, albeit under pressure from 
the international community. However, at year's end the extradition of 
Mladen Naletilic (also known as ``Tuta'') had not been carried out due 
to Naletilic's poor health. ICTY requested the extradition of both 
Martinovic and Naletilic in December 1998. The Government failed to 
comply with a number of ICTY evidentiary requests, some dating to 1996. 
The Government has been particularly uncooperative in cases involving 
possible war crimes committed by Croats, and it has resisted ICTY 
requests for information regarding possible war crimes committed during 
and subsequent to operations ``Flash'' and ``Storm'' in 1995. Moreover, 
government officials welcomed persons who had been indicted by the ICTY 
for war crimes. In May Justice Minister Separovic headed a delegation 
which met Zlatko Aleksovski, an ethnic Croat convicted by the ICTY for 
crimes against prisoners of war, upon his return to the country. In 
September military officers participated in a ceremony in Siroki 
Brijeg, Bosnia-Herzegovina that included ICTY indictees among those 
being honored.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution specifies that individuals shall enjoy all rights 
and freedoms, regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, 
education, social status, or other attributes. It adds that members of 
all national groups and minorities shall have equal rights. While the 
majority of these rights are observed in practice, serious deficiencies 
continued with regard to equality among various national/racial/ethnic 
groups, particularly Serbs and Roma. The Constitution provides for 
special ``wartime measures'' in case of need, but states that 
restrictions shall be appropriate to the nature of the danger and may 
not result in the inequality of citizenship with respect to race, 
color, sex, language, religion, or national or social origin.
    Women.--Although the Government collected only limited statistics 
on the problem, informed observers believed that violence against 
women, including spousal abuse, remained common. One NGO that operated 
a hot line and support services for women assessed that spousal abuse 
continued to be a large and unrecognized problem. Alcohol abuse and 
poor economic circumstances for veterans of the military conflict were 
cited as contributing factors. In June a government commission on 
equality indicated to NGO's that it would recommend that the Government 
track statistics on violence against women; however, at year's end it 
had not yet done so.
    Amendments to the Penal Code which went into effect in 1998 removed 
violence perpetrated within the family (except against children) from 
the categories of crimes to be prosecuted automatically by the state 
attorney. The victim now must file a request to prosecute, thereby 
severely curtailing efforts by health care workers and police to act on 
suspected cases of violence in the home. In May the Constitutional 
Court upheld the constitutionality of this procedure. The nonpartisan 
Parliamentary Women's Caucus promised to seek amendments of these laws, 
but at year's end had not yet done so.
    Based on anecdotal evidence, it is likely that some women were 
trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    Sexual harassment is a violation of the penal code section on abuse 
of position, but is not specifically included in the employment law. 
NGO's reported that in practice, women generally did not resort to the 
penal code for relief for fear of losing their jobs. In a positive 
development, the labor union of the Pliva pharmaceutical company signed 
a collective agreement that specifically forbids sexual harassment.
    The law does not discriminate by gender. However, in practice women 
generally hold lower paying positions in the work force. Government 
statistics from previous years showed that, while women constituted 
roughly 50 percent of the work force, they occupied few jobs at senior 
levels, even in areas such as education and administration where they 
were a clear majority of the workers. Considerable anecdotal evidence 
has suggested that women hold by far the preponderance of low-level 
clerical and shopkeeping positions, as well as primary and secondary 
school teaching jobs. Women reportedly are often among the first to be 
fired or laid off. NGO's and labor organizations reported a practice in 
which women received short-term work contracts renewable every 3 to 6 
months, creating a climate of job insecurity for them. While men 
occasionally suffered from this practice, it was disproportionately 
used against women to dissuade them from taking maternity leave. 
Legislation was passed during the year limiting the use of short-term 
work contracts to a maximum of 3 years.
    While there is no national organization devoted solely to the 
protection of women's rights, many small, independent groups were 
active in the capital and larger cities. One of the most active was 
B.a.B.e. (``Be Active, Be Emancipated'').
    Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children. 
Education is mandatory through age 14. Schools provide free meals for 
children, subsidized daycare facilities are available in most 
communities even for infants, medical care for children is free, and 
the Labor Code authorizes 1 full year of maternity leave and 3 years' 
leave for women with twins or more than two children.
    The majority of students continue their education to the age of 18, 
with Roma being the only group reporting any notable exception. The 
Government blamed the problems of Roma largely on linguistic and 
cultural differences that make their integration in schools difficult. 
Romani children face some discrimination and problems, due largely to 
these cultural and linguistic barriers at school. The Government's 
commitments to children suffered from less funding than in the past, as 
other priorities took a larger portion of government resources.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People With Disabilities.--No legislation mandates access to 
buildings or government services for people with disabilities, and 
access to such facilities is often difficult. While people with 
disabilities face no openly discriminatory measures, job opportunities 
generally are limited. Special education also is limited and poorly 
funded.
    Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity were closely related, 
and religion frequently was used to identify and single out non-Croats 
for discriminatory practices (see Section 2.c.). This close 
identification of religion with ethnicity caused religious institutions 
to be targets of violence. There were persistent reports throughout the 
country of the damage and defacement of Serbian (Orthodox) cemeteries 
with an estimated six such incidents in the Danubian region in November 
and December alone. In August attackers with stones broke windows at 
the home of Mufti Sevko Omerbasic, the head of the Islamic community in 
the country. In September one person was detained as the investigation 
continued.
    In Cakovec the memorial plaque at the site of the synagogue 
destroyed during the Hungarian occupation in World War II was 
desecrated in the first week of August. The plaque later was rehung. 
The police were searching for the perpetrators but have detained no 
suspects. The Jewish community in Cakovec was decimated during World 
War II and the synagogue was torn down.
    The Government announced in March that it planned to restore a 
memorial at Jasenovac to the victims killed at that concentration camp 
during World War II. Retreating Serb forces destroyed the memorial and 
looted the camp museum in 1995. Premier Zlatko Matesa announced during 
his visit to the camp in March that the restoration of the memorial was 
part of the Government's ``policy of reconciliation.''
    In October the Parliament approved the appointment to the 
Constitutional Court of hardliner Vice Vukojevic, who is known for 
leading a parliamentary commission established in 1991 to determine the 
number of persons killed in concentration camps run by the country's 
Fascist Ustasha during World War II. Vukojevic's commission provided 
very low estimates of the number of Croatians, including Jews, killed 
in all Croatian concentration camps; these estimates contradict all 
credible scholarship on the subject. The commission's report was 
criticized by the President of the Parliament, the press, and the 
director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Jerusalem. Faced with such 
criticism, the lower house of Parliament decided to return the report 
to the commission to be ``completed.''
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Constitutionally, ethnic 
minorities enjoy the same protection as other self-identified ethnic 
and religious groups; however, in practice a pattern of open and severe 
discrimination continues against ethnic Serbs and, at times, other 
minorities in a wide number of areas, including the administration of 
justice, employment, housing, and freedom of movement. The Government 
often maintained a double standard of treatment based on ethnicity. 
Members of minority groups in principle have equal constitutional 
protections with Croat citizens, and their ethnic rights are provided 
for in the preamble to the Constitution. However, the Government's 
definition of what constitutes a minority group is discriminatory. In 
1998 the Parliament decided to omit Muslims, Albanians, and Slovenes 
from those minorities listed in the Constitution on the grounds that 
they are not considered indigenous groups. Muslims are currently the 
second largest minority group in the country after Serbs, and some 
observers argue that their elimination from the Constitution may deny 
them rights stipulated in the (albeit partially suspended) 
Constitutional Law on the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or 
Minorities. Government committees established in 1997 to promote 
reconciliation and trust between Croats and Serbs were not effective. 
The OSCE assessed that there was a lack of political will to carry out 
the program, and that its organizational structures were either 
inoperative or nonexistent.
    There were three ethnically motivated killings, which were 
symptomatic of ethnic tensions in the formerly occupied areas that 
discouraged persons from returning to areas where they would be a 
minority. In May in Marinci in the Danubian region a 59-year-old Serb 
resident was shot and killed by a Croat who maintained that he had 
fired in self-defense. The suspect was released on bail. At year's end 
an indictment had been issued in the case but no trial date was set. In 
August a 39-year-old Serb resident of Berak in the Danubian region was 
beaten to death reportedly by a gang of Croats. Local police arrested 
one suspect, who was in custody and indicted at year's end, but no 
trial date was set in the case. In November in Tenja in the Danubian 
region, a 60-year-old ethnic Serb resident was shot to death by a local 
Croat who was arrested soon thereafter. According to international 
monitors, both the police and the judiciary worked effectively on the 
case. On December 29, the suspect pled guilty to the crime and was 
sentenced to 10 years in prison. The OSCE assessed that a surge of 
violence in Berak, which included anti-Serb protests in May, an attack 
on a Serb police officer, and numerous instances of harassment, caused 
two-thirds of the village's Serb families to flee. In August anti-Serb 
demonstrations occurred in nearby Sotin. Both the Sotin demonstrations 
and the protests in Berak were motivated by the desire to pressure 
Serbs to provide information about ethnic Croats missing since the war. 
The Government not only failed to take concerted action to reduce these 
tensions, but Justice Minister Zvonimir Separovic stoked an already 
tense climate during two visits to the region when he called for vigils 
to continue.
    Intimidation and violence against Serbs continued in the Danubian 
region during the year, especially in the spring, in Borovo, Beli 
Manistir, Cakovci, Sotin, and Mirkovci. In August a human rights NGO 
wrote to the Prime Minister about the atmosphere of increasing fear 
among Serb returnees in Knin in the southern region of the country. 
Incidents included destruction of crops and physical assaults, 
including the case of a 75-year-old woman who watched as her Bosnian 
Croat neighbors slaughtered her livestock with a chainsaw and the 
unsolved October arson of 10 haystacks that belonged to ethnic Serb 
returnees. The Helsinki Committee noted that the mayor of Knin failed 
to intervene to prevent such incidents. The mayor in April stated that 
Serb returns must be halted until all Croat war veterans could obtain 
housing, a plan that would violate Croatia's refugee return act. While 
the number of Serb returnees to the Knin area doubled to approximately 
7,000 during the year, only a handful were able to return to their own 
homes, because the local housing commissions did not evict Bosnian 
Croats occupying their property.
    The Constitution provides the legal basis and rights for education 
in the languages of national minorities and communities. The well-
documented pattern of the discriminatory application of laws and 
administrative regulations was also evident in education. For example, 
in textbooks the history of the former Yugoslavia has been omitted in 
favor of a more nationalistic Croat interpretation, and new textbooks 
have tended to use derogatory adjectives in reference to minorities. In 
addition, apart from the Danubian region, there are still very few 
classes for Serb pupils that follow the approved Serbian school 
program. Serb students countrywide continued to use materials and 
follow the curriculum of the Croat students.
    The Law on Citizenship distinguishes between those who have a claim 
to Croatian ethnicity and those who do not. The ``Croatian people'' are 
eligible to become citizens of the country, even if they were not 
citizens of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia, as long as they 
submit a written statement that they consider themselves Croatian 
citizens. Non-ethnic Croats must satisfy more stringent requirements 
through naturalization in order to obtain citizenship, even if they 
were previously lawful residents of Croatia in the former Yugoslavia 
(see section 1.d.). This double standard led to discrimination in other 
areas, in particular the right to vote (see section 3). While an 
application is pending, the applicant is denied rights such as social 
allowances, including medical care, pensions, free education, and 
employment in the civil service. Denials were frequently based on 
Article 26 of the Citizenship Law (which stipulates that citizenship 
can be denied to persons otherwise qualified for reasons of national 
interest) and Article 8 (which requires that a person's actions 
demonstrate that they are ``attached to the legal system and customs of 
Croatia'' and that they have maintained a permanent residence on the 
territory of Croatia for the 5 years preceding the application for 
citizenship). Persons returning under the Government's return program 
without citizenship status were denied returnee status and associated 
social benefits. These denials frequently were based on laws 
stipulating that citizenship can be denied for reasons of national 
interest and that a person's actions must demonstrate ``attachment to 
the legal system and customs of Croatia'' and that the person must have 
resided in the country for the 5 years preceding the application.
    Unemployment among Serbs has been significantly higher than the 
national average (see Section 6.b.).
    Committees established in 1997 to promote reconciliation between 
Croats and Serbs failed to initiate and carry out concrete programs 
that would contribute significantly to the peaceful reintegration of 
populations. Anto Djapic of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) mounted 
an aggressive campaign using ultranationalist rhetoric against the 
return of ethnic Serbs and cooperation with the ICTY war crimes 
tribunal. In inflammatory speeches given wide coverage in the state-
controlled press, Djapic suggested that the HSP would organize 
``intervention'' squads against ethnic Serb returnees and would charge 
Serb politicians with war crimes. There was no strong government effort 
to criticize or distance itself from these statements.
    Property destruction and other forms of harassment often arose from 
disputes between home occupiers of one ethnicity and returning 
homeowners of another. OSCE monitors reported a decrease in the number 
of ethnically motivated incidents over previous years, but verbal and 
legal harassment, forcible evictions, and assaults occurred regularly 
(see Section 2.d.). During the year in the Danubian region, 
international monitors recorded 1,017 cases of ethnically motivated 
intimidations and housing disputes. This figure included approximately 
61 physical assaults and several incidents of grenade throwing onto 
property. In cases throughout the country, regardless of ethnicity, 
incidents of looting by the person occupying a home upon his or her 
departure were common. Police responses were often inadequate due to 
conflicting instructions on how to handle disputes over housing. The 
bias of some local officials and the inability of police to rectify the 
problems underlying the harassment caused many incidents to go 
unreported.
    Despite the adoption in October 1997 of legislation that would 
allow the recognition of legal and administrative documents issued by 
the rebel Serb para-state, this legislation was not put into practice 
because several ministries failed to adopt implementing instructions. 
For example, ethnic Serbs who lived in the occupied regions must have 
applied for welfare benefits within 1 year of the law's passage. 
However, 1 year later many Serbs who had fled were still unable to 
return to Croatia and thus unable to apply. In August one NGO providing 
legal assistance had files on 9,000 unresolved convalidation cases in 
Osijek alone. Without the convalidation conferred by the law, citizens 
(almost exclusively ethnic Serbs) were unable to resolve a wide range 
of problems including pensions, disability insurance, unemployment 
benefits, the recognition of births, deaths, and marriages, and even 
confirmation of time served in prison. This made resumption of a normal 
life almost impossible for this group (see Section 4). Serb property 
owners displaced by the Law on the Temporary Takeover of Specified 
Property in favor of ethnic Croat refugees remained unable to access 
their property, despite the 1998 program for returns, which mandated 
multi-ethnic ``housing commissions'' to implement property restitution. 
A lack of alternative housing in many areas and the lack of political 
will to evict ethnic Croat occupiers without alternative housing in 
favor of Serb homeowners resulted in only a handful of restituted 
properties outside of the Danubian region (see Section 1.f.).
    Although in recent years the Government had discriminated against a 
particular group of Muslims in the issuance of citizenship documents, 
the Government began granting citizenship to them during the year (see 
Section 2.d.).
    The situation of other minority groups--Slovaks, Czechs, Italians, 
and Hungarians--did not reflect discrimination to the same extent as 
that of the Serb community. There were NGO and press reports of 
incidents of police officers beating Roma. According to press reports 
in August, ethnic Croatian police officers in the Baranja region beat 
Roma. In one incident an ethnic Croatian police officer allegedly beat 
a Rom and threatened him at gunpoint. The Rom reportedly filed a 
complaint against the officer with no known result. In another incident 
police officers reportedly assaulted two Roma, whom they had caught 
fishing illegally. Roma continued to face discrimination and failure by 
the Government to respond to their complaints. In September a human 
rights NGO reported that the persecution of Roma in the Danubian region 
increased over the past 2 years. Incidents cited included assaults, 
harassment, and destruction of homes by ethnic Croats who blame the 
Roma for remaining in the region while it was under Serbian occupation. 
Before the war, 10,000 Roma lived in the region, but only 1,500 remain 
with thousands fleeing to the FRY since the Government regained control 
of the area in 1998. According to a Roma rights NGO, in the village of 
Popovac in the Danubian region where some 30 families lived before the 
war, only 3 remain after numerous incidents of violence and 
intimidation, including at attack on a Romani police officer in 1998. 
There are persistent reports of police intimidation.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers are entitled to form or 
join unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. There is 
an active labor movement with one major and four minor national labor 
federations and independent associations of both blue- and white-collar 
members. Approximately 64 percent of workers are members of unions of 
one type or another. In general unions are independent of the 
government and political parties.
    The law prohibits retaliation against strikers participating in 
legal strikes. Workers only may strike at the end of a contract or in 
specific circumstances mentioned in the contract. More importantly, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that workers may not strike for nonpayment of 
wages, a continuing problem that is likely to grow if the economy sinks 
deeper into recession. The only recourse in the event of nonpayment is 
to go to court--a process that may take several years.
    When negotiating a new contract, workers are required to go through 
mediation before they can strike. Labor and management choose the 
mediator together. If they cannot agree, the Labor Law calls for a 
tripartite commission of labor, business, and government 
representatives to appoint one. However, nearly 4 years after this law 
became effective, the tripartite commission still had not established 
the required list of mediators, and union requests for their 
appointment have gone unanswered. In fact the commission has not met 
for over 1 year. In practice, both unions and managers often ignore the 
mediation process and deal directly with each other when a conflict 
arises. Arbitration is never mandatory but can be used only if both 
sides agree. Only after submitting to mediation and formally filing a 
statement that negotiations are at an impasse is a strike legal. If a 
strike is found to be illegal, any participant can be dismissed, and 
the union held liable for damages, although no strikes were found to be 
illegal during the year.
    The right to strike is provided for in the Constitution with these 
limitations and with additional limits on members of the armed forces, 
police, government administration, and public services. Strikes 
occurred fairly frequently and increasingly without government 
sanction. A September strike at a food processor near Vukovar over 
unpaid wages and unfulfilled government promises brought Serbs and 
Croats together, a rare instance of ethnic cooperation in the Danubian 
region. Authorities continued to refuse to permit demonstrations in 
Zagreb's main square or the square in front of Parliament. On February 
16, some 2,000 workers marched in Zagreb, protesting the bankruptcy of 
the Diona retail food chain. When the group spontaneously decided to 
march to the square in front of the parliament building, where 
demonstrations are prohibited, they were met by some 200 police 
officers. Several police officers were injured, one seriously, in the 
ensuing scuffle (see Section 2.b.). On December 2, more than 1,000 
employees of the Nama department store chain protested in Zagreb to 
demand payment of back wages. Government officials had announced on 
December 1 that the Croatian Privatization Fund only had enough money 
to pay half of the amount due to some 2,000 employees of the Nama 
chain.
    After more than 5 years of negotiations, representatives of the 
five Croatian trade union confederations signed an agreement in July 
dividing Communist-era trade union office space. A 1998 law, however, 
transferred title of all union property to the government until an 
agreement among the unions can be approved by parliament. Union leaders 
in May contended that land registers demonstrate a government plan to 
confiscate the property permanently. The unions appealed to the 
International Labor Organization (ILO); in September a decision was 
still pending.
    Unions may affiliate freely internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is protected by law and practiced freely. The Labor Code 
governs collective bargaining contracts, protection for striking 
workers, and legal limitations on the ability of employers to conduct 
``lockouts'' during labor disputes.
    The transition to private enterprise and a free market economy kept 
labor unions under pressure at the same time that they were making 
progress towards establishing themselves as genuine trade unions, 
representative of their members rather than the Government. General 
unemployment remained the most significant hurdle, hovering at about 19 
percent for most of the year. However, in some war-affected areas the 
figure was as high as 80 to 90 percent. Over 100,000 workers (10 
percent of the workforce) failed to receive their salaries on time. 
When salary payments are not made, payments into the social welfare 
system lag as well, thereby denying workers health coverage.
    The Labor Code directly deals with antiunion discrimination issues. 
It expressly allows unions to challenge firings in court. However, 
according to persistent reports, ethnicity was used as grounds for 
dismissal. An individual's ability to rectify a grievance is severely 
limited by the already overburdened court system, where cases languish 
for months or years before they are resolved (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government occasionally employs coercion or other questionable 
methods to induce striking employees to return to work. For example, 
the management of Croatian railroads routinely interviews workers, 
often with a policeman present, about their intentions before, during, 
and after short-term strikes that are frequently called by the railway 
union. In April during tense contract negotiations with Croatian 
railroads' management, the vice president of the Locomotive Engineers 
Union was beaten severely with metal bars by unknown assailants. In 
June when the Tourism and Catering Trade Union initiated a strike at 
two tourist companies over mismanagement and nonpayment of wages, 
Minister of Tourism Herak warned the union's president that she would 
be slandered publicly if the strikes continued.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there generally were no 
reports of these practices; however, there were occasional instances of 
women trafficked through the country for the purpose of forced 
prostitution (see Section 6.f.). While legislation does not explicitly 
cover children, the constitutional ban provides blanket coverage in 
this area, and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively. 
The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is the agency charged with 
enforcing the ban on coerced or forced labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for the employment of children is 15 
years, and it is enforced by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare. 
Under the Constitution, the provisions of which the Government 
enforces, children may not be employed before reaching the legally 
determined age and are not allowed to perform work that is harmful to 
their health or morality. There is no reported pattern of abuse of 
child labor. Workers under the age of 18 are entitled to special 
protection at work and are prohibited from heavy manual labor and night 
shifts. Education is free, universal, and mandatory up to the age of 
14. Children generally finish secondary school at a minimum, and a high 
proportion go on to university. The broad constitutional prohibition 
against forced or compulsory labor encompasses the case of children, 
and there were no reports of its use.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In March the government signed a 
collective bargaining agreement establishing a minimum wage of about 
$211 (1,500 kuna) per month. While the initial document was signed on 
behalf of only a portion of the work force, the Government extended the 
agreement to cover all full-time workers nationwide. The Government 
Bureau of Statistics estimated that the average net monthly wage was 
approximately $425 (3,039 kuna), which is not sufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    National regulations provide for a 42-hour workweek including a 30-
minute daily break, a 24-hour rest period during the week, and a 
minimum of 18 days of paid vacation leave annually. Workers receive 
time-and-a-half pay for any hours worked beyond 42. Most unions, 
however, have negotiated a 40-hour workweek.
    Health and safety standards are set by the government and are 
enforced by the Ministry of Health. In practice industries are not 
diligent in meeting standards for worker protection. It is common, for 
example, to find workers without hardhats at construction sites and 
equipment with safety devices removed. Workers can in theory remove 
themselves from hazardous conditions at work. Workers would have 
recourse to the courts in a situation where they felt that they had 
been wrongfully dismissed for doing so.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Laws can be used to prosecute 
traffickers in persons, and trafficking in persons was not a 
significant problem during the year. There is little information 
available on trafficking, although U.N. officials tracking the issue 
regionally indicate that Croatia is a lesser source, transit, and 
destination country for some women trafficked to other parts of Europe 
for forced prostitution. International police monitors did not report 
any individual cases of trafficking in persons during the year. 
However, there were reports of women trafficked through Bosnia-
Herzegovina to Croatia, where they remain to work as prostitutes or are 
trafficked on to other destinations. One NGO reported six cases of 
trafficking during the year.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 CYPRUS

    Prior to 1974, Cyprus experienced a long period of intercommunal 
strife between its Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. In response 
the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) began peacekeeping 
operations in March 1964. The island has been divided since the Turkish 
military intervention of 1974, following a coup d'etat directed from 
Greece. Since 1974 the southern part of the island has been under the 
control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The northern part 
is ruled by a Turkish Cypriot administration. In 1983 that 
administration proclaimed itself the ``Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus'' (``TRNC''), which is recognized only by Turkey. The two parts 
are separated by a buffer zone patrolled by the UNFICYP. A substantial 
number of Turkish troops remain on the island. In both the government-
controlled area and in the Turkish Cypriot community democratic 
principles generally are respected. Glafcos Clerides was reelected 
president of the Republic of Cyprus in February 1998; in 1995 Turkish 
Cypriots reelected Rauf Denktash as their leader. The judiciary is 
independent in both communities.
    Police in the government-controlled area and in the Turkish Cypriot 
community are responsible for law enforcement. Police forces operating 
in the government-controlled area are under civilian control, while 
military authorities direct Turkish Cypriot police forces. In general 
the police forces of both sides respect the rule of law, but instances 
of police abuse of power continued.
    Both Cypriot economies operate on the basis of free market 
principles, although in each community there are significant 
administrative controls. The government-controlled part of the island 
has a robust, service-oriented economy, with a declining manufacturing 
base and a small agricultural sector. Tourism and trade generate 21 
percent of gross domestic product and employ 27 percent of the labor 
force. In 1998 per capita income was approximately $13,600, inflation 
was 2.2 percent, and unemployment was 3.3 percent. Growth in 1998 rose 
to 5 percent, compared with 2.3 percent in 1997. The Turkish Cypriot 
economy, which is handicapped significantly by an economic embargo by 
the Greek Cypriots, relies heavily on subsidies from Turkey and is 
burdened by an overly large public sector. It, too, is basically 
service-oriented but has a relatively smaller tourism and trade base--
accounting for 16 percent of gross domestic product and employing 10 
percent of the work force--and a larger agricultural sector. In 1998 
per capita income in the north was approximately $4,000, and inflation 
was 66 percent. The economy in the north grew 5.3 percent in 1998 
compared with 3.8 percent in 1997.
    The Government of the Republic of Cyprus generally respected 
citizens' human rights; however, instances of police brutality 
continued to be a problem.
    The Turkish Cypriot authorities generally respected human rights; 
however, police abuse of suspects' and detainees' rights continued to 
be a problem. The authorities also continued to restrict freedom of 
movement. Since December 1997, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have 
banned most bicommunal contacts between Turkish Cypriots and Greek 
Cypriots, including previously frequent meetings in Nicosia's buffer 
zone. They sometimes attempted to prevent Turkish Cypriots from 
travelling to bicommunal meetings off the island as well. In 1998 
Turkish Cypriot officials also instituted a new, higher fee system for 
``visas'' at the main Nicosia checkpoint, making it more expensive for 
both sides to cross the buffer zone. The Turkish Cypriot authorities 
have taken some steps to improve the conditions of Greek Cypriots and 
Maronites living in the territory under their control, but the 
treatment of these groups still falls short of Turkish Cypriot 
obligations under the Vienna III Agreement of 1975.
    Violence against women and trafficking in women for forced 
prostitution remained problems in both areas.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    Turkish Cypriot authorities still have not conducted a credible 
investigation of the 1996 murder of a prominent leftist Turkish Cypriot 
journalist, Kutlu Adali, who wrote articles critical of Turkey's role 
in the north and particularly on the role of the Turkish military and 
of policies that allowed large numbers of Turkish workers into the 
north.
    In 1996 Turkish Cypriot civilian police killed a Greek Cypriot 
demonstrator who entered the U.N. buffer zone, and the police 
participated in the beating death of another. Again, there has not been 
any significant investigation by Turkish Cypriot authorities of the 
killings. The family of one of the deceased filed a case against Turkey 
in the European Court of Human Rights, which declared the case 
admissible in June.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Both the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the 
basic law governing the Turkish Cypriot community specifically prohibit 
torture, the law in both communities prohibits such practices, and the 
authorities generally respect these provisions in practice; however, 
there continue to be instances of Cypriot police brutality against 
suspects in detention, mostly involving non-Cypriots. One officer is on 
trial in connection with the October 1998 beating of illegal immigrant 
detainees by members of a special police unit (see Section 2.d.).
    Official action still is pending against the Cypriot police 
involved in a 1995 case of torture of a suspected Turkish Cypriot drug 
smuggler, Erkan Egmez. Egmez was released and returned to the north. He 
filed a complaint against the Cypriot Government with the European 
Commission of Human Rights, and the Commission ruled it admissible in 
1998.
    The Commission also agreed in January 1998 to investigate 
complaints by nine Turkish Cypriots that Greek Cypriot police 
mistreated them in 1994 and expelled them to the north. The 
complainants allege that they were threatened with death if they 
returned to the south and that Greek Cypriot police were responsible 
for the death of one complainant's son, who returned to the south later 
in 1994. The Cypriot Government denies all of the charges; the 
Commission took oral evidence in the case in Nicosia in September 1998.
    In all of its cases, the Commission's admissibility ruling makes no 
judgment on the merits of the individual case.
    While there were no public allegations of police brutality in the 
Turkish Cypriot community, there were credible reports of pervasive 
police abuse of power and routine harsh physical treatment of detainees 
(see Section 1.d.).
    Prison conditions in general meet or exceed minimum international 
standards. Persons incarcerated in jails in the south on minor charges 
reportedly are mixed with more hardened, violent criminals.
    The Cypriot government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities permit 
prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Republic of Cyprus 
police respect laws providing for freedom from arbitrary arrest and 
detention. Judicially issued arrest warrants are required. No one may 
be detained for more than a day without referral of the case to the 
courts for extension of the period of detention. Most periods of 
investigative detention do not exceed 8 to 10 days before formal 
charges are filed. Attorneys generally have access to detainees; bail 
is permitted. The Government of Cyprus claims the right to deport 
foreign nationals for reasons of public interest whether or not they 
have been charged with or convicted of a crime.
    Some abuses of power occur at the hands of the Turkish Cypriot 
police, generally at the time of arrest. Suspects often are not 
permitted to have their lawyers present when testimony is being taken, 
a right provided under the Turkish Cypriot basic law. Suspects who 
demand the presence of a lawyer are threatened routinely with stiffer 
charges or even physically intimidated. A high percentage of 
convictions in the Turkish Cypriot community are obtained with 
confessions made during initial police interrogation under these 
conditions. According to credible reports, the police also routinely 
abuse their authority to hold persons up to 24 hours before having to 
go before a judge. Police officers use this tactic against persons 
believed to have behaved in a manner deemed insulting to the officer. 
The suspects then are released within 24 hours without charges having 
been filed.
    Exile is prohibited specifically by the Constitution and by the 
basic law governing the Turkish Cypriot community and is not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is legally 
independent of executive or military influence in both communities, and 
it is independent in practice.
    On both sides, most criminal and civil cases begin in district 
courts, from which appeals are made to Supreme Courts. No special 
courts exist for security or political offenses.
    Cyprus inherited many elements of its legal system from the United 
Kingdom, including the presumption of innocence, the right to due 
process, and the right of appeal. Throughout Cyprus, a fair public 
trial is provided for in law and accorded in practice. Defendants have 
the right to be present at their trials, to be represented by counsel 
(at government expense for those who cannot afford one), to confront 
witnesses, and to present evidence in their own defense.
    On the Turkish Cypriot side, civilians deemed to have violated 
military zones or military regulations are subject to trial in a 
military court. These courts consist of one military and two civilian 
judges and a civilian prosecutor. Members of the Turkish Cypriot bar 
have complained that civilian judges tend to defer to their military 
colleagues in such hearings.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Both the Cyprus Constitution and the basic law 
governing the Turkish Cypriot community include provisions protecting 
the individual against arbitrary interference by the authorities, and a 
judicial warrant is required for a police official to enter a private 
residence. Although authorities on both sides generally respected these 
provisions in practice, police on both sides on occasion have subjected 
members of the other community resident in their area to surveillance 
(see Section 5).
    The Turkish Cypriot authorities restrict the ability of Greek 
Cypriots and Maronites living in the north to change their housing at 
will (see Section 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of speech and of the press 
are provided for by law, and these rights are respected in practice 
throughout the island. The proliferation of party and independent 
newspapers and periodicals in both communities enables ideas and 
arguments to circulate freely. Opposition papers frequently criticize 
the authorities. Several private television and radio stations in the 
Greek Cypriot community compete effectively with the government-
controlled stations. Since 1997 seven private radio stations have 
operated in the Turkish Cypriot community, in addition to two smaller, 
university-run stations, and four private television stations. 
International broadcasts are available without interference throughout 
the island, including telecasts from Turkey and Greece.
    In 1998 Turkish Cypriot officials filed a number of court actions 
against newspapers and journalists, alleging that certain articles 
``damaged the prestige of the state.'' Five complaints against one 
newspaper were consolidated into one action, and a trial was held. In 
December the court ruled that the newspaper was liable and fined it 
approximately $215,000 (120 billion Turkish lira). The same newspaper 
also faces charges for a 1998 story alleging that Turkish Cypriot 
soldiers assaulted a Turkish Cypriot family after a dispute over 
housing.
    Intermittent restrictions were imposed on the ability of some 
journalists to cross the buffer zone to cover news events. The Cypriot 
Government denied entry to the south for visiting Turkish journalists 
who arrived in Cyprus through ports of entry in the north; in 
retaliation, Turkish Cypriot authorities sometimes required Greek 
Cypriot journalists to purchase a ``visa'' to enter the north, which 
the journalists refused to do. Current Turkish Cypriot policy, while 
applied inconsistently, is to permit Greek Cypriot journalists 
travelling as a group to cover events in the north without paying a 
crossing fee, but not to allow Greek journalists unless they pay the 
fee. Individual Greek Cypriot journalists usually also must pay the 
fees.
    Academic freedom generally is respected throughout the island.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The freedom to 
hold meetings, associate, and organize is protected by law, and the 
Government respects these rights in practice.
    Although Turkish Cypriot authorities also generally respected these 
rights, they imposed restrictions on bicommunal meetings (see Section 
2.d.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion generally is 
respected. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus recognizes five 
religions that are exempt from taxes and receive government subsidies. 
Other religions may register routinely as nonprofit organizations and 
receive tax exemptions, but not subsidies. In the Turkish Cypriot area, 
no religion is recognized in the basic law, but Islamic institutions 
receive tax exemptions and subsidies through the Wakf religious trust; 
no other church receives exemptions or subsidies. Although missionaries 
have the legal right to proselytize in both communities, missionary 
activities are monitored closely by the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church 
and by both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities.
    Turkish Cypriots residing in the southern part of the island and 
non-Muslims in the north are allowed to practice their religions. 
Restrictions on the right of Greek Cypriots resident in the north to 
visit Apostolos Andreas monastery were eased in 1998. They now may 
visit the monastery without restriction. Maronites may not visit 
certain religious sites in the north located in military zones. 
Armenians may not visit any religious sites in the north. A Greek 
Cypriot request to replace a retiring Orthodox priest in the north has 
been pending for more than 2 years.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
enjoy freedom of movement within their respective areas. Both 
authorities respect the right to travel abroad and to emigrate. Turkish 
Cypriots have difficulty traveling to most countries because travel 
documents issued by the ``Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'' are 
recognized only by Turkey. Most Turkish Cypriots use Turkish travel 
documents instead.
    The Republic of Cyprus authorities discourage travel to the 
northern part of the island. They permit only day travel by tourists to 
the north, sometimes arbitrarily refuse permission to non-Cypriots to 
cross to the north, and pressure foreigners working in Cyprus not to 
cross to the north. They have declared that it is illegal to enter 
Cyprus except at authorized entry points in the south, effectively 
barring entry into the government-controlled area by foreigners who 
have entered Cyprus from the north. Following the 1994 murder of the 
director of a Greek Cypriot association supporting Kurds in Turkey, the 
Greek Cypriot authorities placed significantly tighter controls on the 
movement of Turkish Cypriots to the south. Institutions and individuals 
sponsoring visits of Turkish Cypriots to the government-controlled area 
must notify the police in advance and provide them with an exact 
itinerary.
    Turkish Cypriot authorities generally allow visits to the north by 
persons who initially enter Cyprus in the south, but they have denied 
entry to persons of Turkish Cypriot origin who enter Cyprus in the 
south. Previously, visitors of Greek Cypriot or Armenian origin, or 
even persons having Greek or Armenian names, faced considerable 
difficulties entering the north. In 1995 the Turkish Cypriot 
authorities instituted a policy under which foreign nationals of Greek 
Cypriot origin would be permitted to visit the Turkish Cypriot-
controlled area. However, implementation of the procedures remains 
inconsistent.
    In 1998 the Turkish Cypriot leadership instituted a system of 
``visa'' fees at the main Nicosia checkpoint. In addition to requiring 
substantially higher fees (approximately $24 [15 pounds sterling] for 
Greeks and Greek Cypriots, and $6.50 [4 pounds sterling] for Turkish 
Cypriots travelling to the south), the plan requires Greeks and Greek 
Cypriots to obtain a formal ``TRNC visa'' to visit the north. Maronites 
pay a lesser fee--$6.50 (4 pounds sterling) per visit if over age 18, 
or $48 (30 pounds sterling) for an annual family pass. Greek Cypriots, 
Maronites, and other non-Turkish Cypriots permanently residing in the 
north can obtain a monthly crossing permit for approximately $16 (10 
pounds sterling). The new system initially reduced overall crossings, 
especially for Maronites visiting from the south, for whom travel 
previously had been free. However, the number of Maronites crossing 
from the south increased in 1999. Requests to cross into the north must 
be submitted 48 hours in advance.
    Following an agreement in 1997 on reciprocal visits to religious 
sites, a number of visits occurred during the year. The Cypriot 
Government permitted over 1,200 Turkish Cypriots to make a pilgrimage 
to a Moslem shrine in the south in March, and allowed another 1,300 to 
travel in June. In April a group of approximately 1,300 Greek Cypriots 
visited the Apostolos Andreas monastery in the north. In August almost 
1,000 Greek Cypriots traveled to the monastery, and in November another 
group of 1,700 visited as well.
    In 1996 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled 11 to 6 
that Turkey committed a continuing violation of the rights of a Greek 
Cypriot woman by preventing her from going to her property located in 
north Cyprus. The ruling reaffirmed the validity of property deeds 
issued prior to 1974. The Court also found in this case that ``it was 
obvious from the large number of troops engaged in active duties in 
northern Cyprus that the Turkish army exercised effective overall 
control there. In the circumstances of the case, this entailed Turkey's 
responsibility for the policies and actions of the `TRNC.' '' In July 
1998 the Court ordered Turkey to pay the woman approximately $915,000 
in damages and costs by October 28, 1998. The Turkish Government stated 
that it cannot implement the Court's decision, which it contends is a 
political decision, and argued that the land in question is not Turkish 
but is part of the ``Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.'' The Council 
of Europe (COE) during 1999 continued to call on the Turkish Government 
to comply with the Court's decision. In October the COE Committee of 
Ministers' Deputies voted to deplore Turkey's lack of compliance. A 
number of similar cases have been filed with the ECHR.
    Turkish Cypriot authorities in the past had approved most 
applications for Turkish Cypriots to participate in bicommunal meetings 
in the U.N.-controlled buffer zone, but on December 27, 1997, they 
suspended Turkish Cypriot participation in these meetings, pending a 
reevaluation of bicommunal activities. The ``suspension'' soon became 
an effective Turkish Cypriot ban on bicommunal contacts on Cyprus. 
Whereas in 1997 thousands of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots 
participated in bicommunal events, in which mixed groups met to discuss 
such topics as the environment, family violence, management techniques, 
business operations, and legal questions, the Turkish Cypriot ban 
halted almost all of those contacts. In addition to the ending of 
bicommunal events in the buffer zone, Turkish Cypriots may not visit 
the south for bicommunal contacts and Greek Cypriots may not visit the 
north for such contacts (unless they purchase a Turkish Cypriot 
``visa''). Turkish Cypriot authorities also attempted to interfere with 
some bicommunal events taking place outside Cyprus by prohibiting civil 
servants from participating. Enforcement of the policy has been 
inconsistent, with some public officials permitted to attend off-island 
bicommunal events. Private citizens have been allowed to travel to off-
island bicommunal events.
    Restrictions on the approximately 600 Greek Cypriots and Maronites 
living in the north were eased in recent years. Turkish Cypriot 
authorities usually grant the applications of Greek Cypriot residents 
in the north to visit the government-controlled area. The limit on 
visits to the south was extended in 1998 from 15 days per month to a 
total of 6 months per year. The applicants must return within the 
designated period or risk losing their right to return and to keep 
their property, although this rule rarely is enforced in practice. 
Turkish Cypriot authorities also eliminated the previous monthly limit 
on visits by close family relatives of Greek Cypriots resident in the 
north (it was once per month until 1996 and twice per month 
thereafter). A limit on overnight stays also was dropped. Greek 
Cypriots visiting from the south still may not travel in the north in 
their personal vehicles but must use taxis or buses and pay the 
crossing fee.
    Similar restrictions exist for visits by Maronite residents of the 
north to the government-controlled area, but they are applied much more 
loosely than restrictions on Greek Cypriots, and Maronite travel is 
relatively free. However, Maronite residents also must pay the required 
crossing fees.
    While in the past Turkish Cypriot authorities permitted school 
holiday and weekend visits to the north only by children under the ages 
of 16 (male) and 18 (female), the age limits for Maronite students and 
female Greek Cypriot students were lifted entirely in 1998. Male Greek 
Cypriot students still may visit the north only until age 16, since 
they are eligible for Greek Cypriot military service at age 17 and 
therefore are considered to be possible Greek Cypriot soldiers by the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities. Students pay a lower fee to cross the 
buffer zone, approximately $3.00 (2 pounds Sterling).
    According to regulations announced in October 1998, the Turkish 
Cypriot authorities no longer require Greek Cypriots or Maronites 
residing in the north to obtain police permits for internal travel in 
the north. They may use private vehicles registered and insured in the 
north. Implementation of the new policy has been inconsistent but 
appears to be improving.
    Although asylum legislation remains pending in the legislature, the 
Government of Cyprus regularly grants de facto first asylum. However, 
in 1998 and 1999 there were several instances in which groups of 
illegal immigrants attempting to reach Western Europe instead landed on 
Cyprus after their overcrowded vessels encountered problems at sea. The 
largest such group numbered over 100 persons, all of whom applied for 
political asylum after arriving in June 1998. After several months of 
detention in a hotel, during which representatives of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) interviewed the immigrants, only 23 
were granted asylum, and a large group was transferred to a jail. Most 
of those who did not receive asylum were deported against their will in 
late 1998 and early 1999. Prior to that, in October 1998, a special 
police unit was filmed by local television cameras kicking and beating 
the detainees with batons, while stopping a protest during which the 
detainees burned their bedding. An examination of the immigrants, 
mostly Africans, by a forensic pathologist revealed that most were 
injured, some seriously. The Attorney General ordered investigations 
into both incidents, and charges were brought against the officer in 
charge. His trial on charges of dereliction of duty opened in September 
and continued at year's end.
    With the increasing number of illegal immigrants finding their way 
to Cyprus in small boats, the Government of Cyprus is receiving a 
growing number of asylum appications: 300 to 400 per year. These cases 
are referred to the local UNHCR office for evaluation. If applicants 
meet the criteria for refugee status, they are permitted to remain and 
are given temporary work permits. However, applicants generally are not 
granted permanent resettlement rights: The Government claims that it 
already has enough responsibilities in caring for those displaced after 
the 1974 Turkish intervention. Applicants are permitted to remain until 
resettlement in another country can be arranged. In both the north and 
the south, authorities cooperated with U.N. refugee authorities. The 
UNHCR is developing improved procedures for dealing with asylum seekers 
in the north, and is aware of two such cases in the north during the 
year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Multiparty political systems exist throughout Cyprus. Under the 
Republic's Constitution, political parties compete for popular support 
actively and without restriction. Suffrage is universal, and elections 
are held by secret ballot. Elections for the office of president are 
held every 5 years; in February 1998 President Clerides won reelection 
to a 5-year term. Elections for members of the House of Representatives 
are held every 5 years or less.
    The Turkish Cypriots living in northern Cyprus elect a leader and a 
representative body every 5 years or less; in December 1998 they chose 
a new ``National Assembly.'' In 1995 Turkish Cypriot voters elected 
Rauf Denktash as their leader in elections deemed by observers to be 
free and fair.
    Under the 1960 Constitution, voting took place on a communal basis. 
Therefore, since the breakdown in 1963 of bicommunal governing 
arrangements, and since the 1974 de facto partition of the island, 
Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area are barred 
from voting there, although they may travel to the north to vote in 
elections. Similarly, Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north 
are barred by law from participating in Turkish Cypriot elections. They 
are eligible to vote in Greek Cypriot elections but must travel to the 
south to exercise that right. They also may choose their own village 
officials, but those elected are not recognized by the Government of 
Cyprus.
    In both communities, women face no legal obstacles to participating 
in the political process. While clearly underrepresented in government, 
they hold some cabinet-level, judicial, and other senior positions. In 
the House of Representatives, women hold 4 of 56 seats; in the 
``National Assembly'' in the north, women hold 4 of 50 seats.
    In addition to their normal voting rights, the small Maronite, 
Armenian, and Latin (Roman Catholic) communities also elect special 
nonvoting representatives from their respective communities.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Organizations in both parts of the island consider themselves human 
rights groups; however, they generally are concerned with alleged 
violations of the rights of their community's members by the other 
community. Groups with a broad human rights mission include 
organizations promoting awareness of domestic violence and others 
concerned with alleged police brutality.
    No restrictions prevent the formation of human rights groups. 
Representatives of international human rights organizations have access 
throughout the island.
    The United Nations, through the autonomous tripartite (United 
Nations, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot) Committee on Missing Persons 
in Cyprus (CMP), is attempting to resolve the missing persons dilemma 
that remained from the intercommunal violence beginning in 1963-64 and 
the events of July 1974 and afterwards. The CMP has made little 
progress. However, in November the CMP met formally for the first time 
since early 1996 and agreed in principle to resume investigations in 
2000. In July 1997 the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
communities agreed to collect and share information on missing persons 
by the end of September 1997, outside of the CMP process. The 
information finally was exchanged in January 1998. Further progress has 
been delayed due to Turkish Cypriot reluctance to proceed without a 
full accounting first of who may have been killed in internal Greek 
Cypriot fighting in July 1974 prior to the landing of Turkish forces on 
Cyprus. In June and July the Government of Cyprus conducted exhumations 
of gravesites in the south that may contain the remains of persons 
missing since 1974. One previously unidentified Greek Cypriot has been 
identified through DNA testing; DNA testing continues on additional 
remains.
    A report by the European Commission of Human Rights, released in 
September, held Turkey responsible for violations of human rights in 
Cyprus stemming from the 1974 Turkish military intervention. The result 
of a complaint by the Government of Cyprus, the report rejected the 
Turkish argument that the ``TRNC'' is an independent state and instead 
ruled that it is ``a subordinate local administration of Turkey 
operating in northern Cyprus.'' Turkey was held responsible for 
continuing human rights violations against Greek Cypriots missing since 
1974, and their surviving relatives, and for violations concerning the 
homes and properties of displaced Greek Cypriots from 1974, as well as 
for violations of the rights of Greek Cypriots still living in north 
Cyprus. The report was to be referred to the European Court of Human 
Rights for a binding decision, a process that may take several years.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Legislation in both communities provides for protection against 
discrimination based on sex, religion, or national, racial, or ethnic 
origin. While each community generally respects such laws, significant 
problems remain with the treatment of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites 
living in the north and, to a lesser extent, with the treatment of 
Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area.
    Women.--Spousal abuse in the Greek Cypriot community is receiving 
increasing attention, and the problem is believed to be significant. A 
1994 law aimed at making spousal abuse easier to report and prosecute 
initially had little effect because key provisions were unfunded and 
unimplemented. Progress was made in implementation during the year, 
with all cases reported to the police being referred to the courts and 
measures taken to ensure that such cases are treated as serious 
criminal charges, not simply as family disputes. Many suspected cases 
of domestic violence still do not reach the courts, largely because of 
family pressure and the wife's economic dependence on her husband. An 
organization formed to address the domestic abuse problem reported 747 
cases during the year, compared with 718 cases in 1998, with 83.6 
percent of the reported victims women, 12.9 percent children, and 3.5 
percent men. A shelter for battered women opened in late 1998. Very few 
cases tried in the courts result in convictions. Little public 
discussion of domestic violence occurs in the Turkish Cypriot 
community, although a report issued by the ``Women's Research Center'' 
described such violence as common. A women's shelter opened in 1994. 
Domestic violence cases are rare in the Turkish Cypriot legal system, 
since they often are considered a ``family matter.''
    Republic of Cyprus law forbids forced prostitution. However, 
credible reports continue that women, generally East Asian or Eastern 
European night club performers, are trafficked and forced into 
prostitution in both communities (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    The Greek Cypriot press frequently reported on the mistreatment of 
some maids and other foreign workers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
    Throughout Cyprus women generally have the same legal status as 
men. In a significant step, Greek Cypriot women married to foreign 
husbands for the first time were given the right to transmit 
citizenship to their children automatically in new legislation passed 
in December 1998. Previously they were required to apply for Cypriot 
citizenship for their children, while Greek Cypriot men could transmit 
citizenship to their children automatically.
    In July 1998, a Turkish Cypriot law on marriage and divorce went 
into effect, which provided for more equal treatment of husbands and 
wives. Under the law, the man no longer is considered legally the head 
of the family and does not have the exclusive right to decide the 
family's place of residence. The wife may retain her surname but must 
add the husband's surname. Turkish Cypriot women may now marry non-
Moslem men. In cases of divorce, the court decides on a fair 
distribution of the family's assets, with each partner assured a 
minimum of 30 percent. In dividing assets, the judge must take into 
account which partner is receiving custody of the children and provide 
sufficient means to support them.
    Legal provisions in both communities requiring equal pay for men 
and women performing the same job are enforced effectively at the white 
collar level, but Turkish Cypriot women employed in the agricultural 
and textile sectors routinely are paid less than their male 
counterparts.
    Children.--Both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities 
demonstrate a strong commitment to children's welfare. There is no 
difference in the health care and educational opportunities available 
to boys and girls. Free education through age 15 is compulsory in both 
communities.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--In Cyprus generally, disabled persons do 
not appear to be discriminated against in education or the provision of 
state services. In the Greek Cypriot community, disabled persons who 
apply for a public sector position are entitled to preference if they 
are deemed able to perform the required duties and their qualifications 
equal those of other applicants. Legislation also mandates that new 
public building and tourist facilities provide access for the disabled, 
although little has been done to enforce this law. In the Turkish 
Cypriot community, regulations require businesses to employ 1 disabled 
person for every 25 positions they fill, although enforcement is 
inconsistent. While awareness of the issue is increasing, the Turkish 
Cypriot community has not yet enacted legislation to mandate access for 
the disabled to public buildings and other facilities.
    Religious Minorities.--Greek Cypriots living in the north report 
that unused Orthodox churches continue to be vandalized. Turkish 
Cypriots complain that unused mosques in the south have been treated 
similarly. A previously unknown Greek Cypriot nationalist organization 
claimed responsibility for an arson attack on a mosque in the south in 
August. Damage was light, and the authorities pledged to repair the 
damage and increase protection of Muslim sites. No one has been 
arrested for the attack.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Both the Government of Cyprus 
and the Turkish Cypriot administration have constitutional or legal 
bars against discrimination. The basic agreement covering treatment of 
Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north and Turkish Cypriots 
living in the south remains the 1975 Vienna III Agreement. This 
agreement provides for voluntary transfer of populations, free and 
unhindered access by the UNFICYP to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living 
in the north and Turkish Cypriots living in the south, and facilities 
for education, medical care, and religious worship.
    Some of the approximately 300 Turkish Cypriots living in the 
government-controlled area face difficulties in obtaining 
identification cards and other government documents, especially if they 
were born after 1974. Turkish Cypriots also appear to be subjected to 
surveillance by the Greek Cypriot police. However, they make few formal 
complaints to the UNFICYP. A number of Turkish Cypriots who worked in 
the government-controlled area but did not live there lost their jobs 
following the 1996 killing of two Greek Cypriots in the buffer zone. 
The Cyprus Government, which stated that it could not ensure the safety 
of the Turkish Cypriot workers, provided 6 months of unemployment 
benefits to those living in the mixed Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot 
village of Pyla, but no one has been rehired.
    UNFICYP access to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north 
remains limited. Despite recent improvements in living conditions for 
Greek Cypriots and Maronites, no Greek-language educational facilities 
for Greek Cypriot or Maronite children in the north exist beyond the 
elementary level. Parents thus are forced in many instances to choose 
between keeping their children with them or sending them to the south 
for further education (in which case Turkish Cypriot authorities no 
longer allow them to return permanently to the north). All textbooks 
sent from the south to the Greek Cypriot schools must be screened by 
Turkish Cypriot authorities, causing lengthy delays and shortages of 
up-to-date texts. Both Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north 
are unable to change their housing at will. Although the Vienna III 
Agreement provides for medical care by a doctor from the Greek Cypriot 
community, only care by a doctor registered with Turkish Cypriot 
authorities is permitted. Additional telephones have been installed for 
Greek Cypriots living in the north, although they, like Turkish 
Cypriots, must pay higher, ``international'' fees to call the south.
    In May a Maronite house in the village of Asomatos was demolished 
by the Turkish military. Military officials indicated that the action 
was an error and promised to rebuild the house. However, it had not yet 
been rebuilt by year's end. Maronites still lack some public services 
available in most other Turkish Cypriot areas.
    In 1998 Turkish Cypriot authorities announced that they were 
reviewing legislation banning Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north 
from bequeathing real property to heirs residing in the south. Such 
property would no longer be seized by the Turkish Cypriot authorities 
but would be taken into temporary custody pending probate of the will. 
Implementation of this policy has been slow, and it is not yet possible 
to determine its future effectiveness.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except for members of 
the police and military forces, have the legal right to form and join 
trade unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. In the 
government-controlled area, police officers also have the right to join 
associations that have the right to bargain collectively, although not 
to strike. More than 70 percent of the Greek Cypriot work force belong 
to independent trade unions. Approximately 50 to 60 percent of Turkish 
Cypriot private sector workers, and all public sector workers, belong 
to labor unions.
    In the Turkish Cypriot community, union officials allege that 
various firms have been successful in establishing ``company'' 
organizations and then applying pressure on workers to join these 
unions. Officials of independent labor unions also have accused the 
Turkish Cypriot authorities of creating rival public sector unions to 
weaken the independent unions. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) had not yet acted on these complaints by year's end.
    In both communities, trade unions freely and regularly take stands 
on public policy issues affecting workers and maintain their 
independence from the authorities. Two of the major trade unions, one 
in each community, are affiliated closely with political parties. Both 
of the other major unions are independent.
    All workers have the right to strike, and several strikes occurred. 
However, in the northern part of the island, a 1978 court ruling gives 
employers an unrestricted right to hire replacement workers in the 
event of a strike, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the right to 
strike. Authorities of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities have the power to curtail strikes in what they deem to be 
``essential services,'' although this power rarely is used.
    Unions in both parts of Cyprus are able to affiliate with 
international trade union organizations, although Greek Cypriot unions 
sometimes object to the recognition of Turkish Cypriot unions formed 
after 1963.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Trade unions 
and confederations by law are free to organize and bargain collectively 
throughout Cyprus. This right is observed in practice in the 
government-controlled area, and most wages and benefits are set by 
freely negotiated collective agreements. However, Greek Cypriot 
collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable. In instances when 
such agreements are believed to have been infringed, the Ministry of 
Labor is requested to investigate the claim. If the Ministry is unable 
to resolve the dispute, the union may call a strike to support its 
demands.
    In the Turkish Cypriot community, where inflation exceeded 60 
percent during the year, wage levels are reviewed several times a year 
for both the private sector and public sector workers, and a 
corresponding cost-of-living raise is established. A special commission 
composed of five representatives each from organized labor, employers, 
and the authorities conducts the review. Union leaders contend that 
private sector employers are able to discourage union activity because 
the enforcement of labor and occupational safety regulations is 
sporadic, and penalties for antiunion practices are minimal. As in the 
Greek Cypriot community, parties to a dispute may request mediation by 
the authorities.
    Small export processing zones exist in the port of Larnaca and in 
Famagusta, but the laws governing working conditions and actual 
practice are the same as those outside the zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and 
this prohibition generally is observed. However, there were credible 
reports that foreign women were forced into prostitution (see Sections 
5 and 6.f.). Foreign maids and illegal foreign workers allegedly are 
subject to the nonpayment of wages and the threat of deportation (see 
Section 6.e.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--In both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, 
the minimum age for the employment of children in an ``industrial 
undertaking'' is 16 years of age. Turkish Cypriots may be employed in 
apprentice positions at the age of 15. There are labor inspectors in 
both communities. However, in family-run shops it is common to see 
younger children working after school, and according to press reports, 
children as young as 11 or 12 years of age work in orchards during 
their school holidays in the Turkish Cypriot community. Laws prohibit 
forced and bonded child labor, and these laws are enforced effectively 
in both communities (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legislated minimum wage in 
the Greek Cypriot community, which is reviewed every year, is 
approximately $470 (257 Cyprus pounds) per month for shop assistants, 
practical nurses, clerks, hairdressers, and nursery assistants (rising 
to $509 [278 Cyprus pounds] after 6 months' employment). This amount is 
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. All other occupations are covered under collective bargaining 
agreements between trade unions and employers within the same economic 
sector, and the wages set in these agreements are significantly higher 
than the legislated minimum wage. The legislated minimum wage in the 
Turkish Cypriot area, while subject to frequent review because of high 
inflation, was approximately $256 (138 Cyprus pounds) per month as of 
September. This amount is insufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. Unskilled workers typically earn about 
$380 (205 Cyprus pounds) per month, which is barely adequate to support 
a family.
    In the Greek Cypriot community, the standard workweek in the 
private sector averages 39 hours for white-collar workers and 38 hours 
for blue-collar workers. In the public sector, it is 38 hours during 
the winter and 35 hours in the summer. In the Turkish Cypriot 
community, the standard workweek is 40 hours in the winter and 35 hours 
in the summer. Labor inspectors effectively enforce these laws.
    Reports on the mistreatment of maids and other foreign workers are 
frequent in the Greek Cypriot press. These reports usually involve 
allegations that maids, often from East or South Asia, were treated 
inhumanely by their employers or fired without cause in violation of 
their contracts. Many women do not complain to authorities, fearing 
retribution from their employers. Those who do file charges run the 
risk of being fired and then deported.
    A significant percentage of the labor force in the north consists 
of illegal workers, mostly from Turkey. According to some estimates, 
such illegal workers constitute as much as 25 percent of the total work 
force. There are frequent allegations that these workers are subject to 
mistreatment, including nonpayment of wages and threats of deportation.
    In recent years, steps were taken to improve health and safety 
standards in the workplace in the government-controlled area. In 1997 a 
law took effect that harmonized health and safety standards with those 
in the European Union (EU). The law incorporates EU principles and 
standards for health and safety in the workplace and complies fully 
with the 1981 ILO Convention on occupational health and safety. A 
second 1997 law requires employers to provide insurance liability 
coverage for work-related injuries.
    Occupational safety and health regulations are administered 
sporadically at best in the Turkish Cypriot area. In both areas, 
factory inspectors process complaints and inspect business in order to 
ensure that occupational safety laws are observed. Workers in the 
government-controlled area can remove themselves from dangerous work 
conditions without risking loss of employment. Turkish Cypriot workers 
who file complaints do not receive satisfactory legal protection and 
may face dismissal.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--New legislation that would make 
trafficking a felony was under consideration in the Cypriot legislature 
at year's end; it would also provide for support for victims. A new law 
also was under consideration at year's end in the Turkish Cypriot 
``National Assembly'' that would regulate the hiring of women in 
nightclubs but would not prohibit trafficking. A holdover from British 
preindependence law currently makes it illegal in both communities to 
procure a woman for prostitution, although the crime is only a 
misdemeanor. Corruption among law enforcement and immigration personnel 
has been the primary obstacle to effective policing in both 
communities.
    During the year, credible reports continued that women were 
trafficked into both communities for the purpose of prostitution. 
Agents in Eastern Europe recruited young women for prostitution in the 
Greek Cypriot community. The women entered either illegally after 
authorities were bribed or on temporary 3-month work permits. They then 
sometimes were forced to surrender their passports or forced to stay 
beyond the period of their work permits and in some cases were not paid 
their full salaries. The authorities arrested nightclub operators for 
profiting from prostitution, and the Government made some effort to 
protect women who bring complaints against employers by allowing them 
to remain to press charges or facilitate their return home. However, 
many of the women are reluctant to press charges, fearing retaliation 
by employers or deportation. A similar pattern exists of recruiting and 
hiring of East European women to work in nightclubs in the Turkish 
Cypriot community, and reports persist of restrictions on nightclub 
workers, such as confiscation of their passports by employers.
                                 ______
                                 

                             CZECH REPUBLIC

    The Czech Republic is a constitutional parliamentary democracy with 
a bicameral Parliament. Following elections in June 1998, Prime 
Minister Milos Zeman formed a minority Government comprising almost 
exclusively members of his left-of-center Social Democratic Party. The 
Parliament elects the President for a 5-year term. President Vaclav 
Havel was reelected in January 1998 by a narrow margin and remains an 
internationally recognized advocate of human rights and social justice. 
Although the country essentially has completed the reform of political 
structures initiated after the 1989 ``Velvet Revolution,'' some 
institutions are still in a state of transformation. The judiciary is 
independent legally but is hampered by structural and procedural 
deficiencies and a lack of resources.
    The Ministry of the Interior oversees the police. The civilian 
internal security service, known as the Security and Information 
Service (BIS), is independent of ministry control but reports to 
Parliament and the Prime Minister's office. Police and BIS authorities 
generally observe constitutional and legal protection of individual 
rights in carrying out their responsibilities. However, some members of 
the police committed human rights abuses.
    The economy is market-based, with over two-thirds of gross domestic 
product (GDP) produced by the private sector. The economy recently has 
contracted as the transition to a full market economy stalled because 
of unfinished structural reforms, including industrial restructuring, 
privatization, modernization of the commercial code, and transparency 
in decisionmaking. The sharpest recession in the country's history 
occurred in 1998 when the economy contracted by 2.7 percent. Inflation 
has been brought down sharply in recent years, while unemployment 
reached 8 percent and was expected to reach double-digit levels by 2000 
as long overdue industrial restructuring was implemented. The work 
force is employed primarily in industry, retail trade, and 
construction. Leading exports are machinery and transport equipment, 
and intermediate manufactured products. GDP per capita in 1998 reached 
approximately $5,500.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, problems remain in several areas. Occasional police violence 
remains a problem. Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials 
are problems, due to a lack of resources for the judicial system. There 
is some violence and discrimination against women. Discrimination and 
sporadic skinhead violence against the Romani community remain 
problems. Trafficking in women and children is a problem. In January 
the Government formed a Human Rights Council, headed by the 
Commissioner for Human Rights, to advise the Government on human rights 
issues and prepare legislative proposals for improving human rights in 
the country.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    In February police launched an investigation into the 1945 murder 
of 30 Sudeten Germans in Tocov, a small town outside of Karlovy Vary. 
In November police ended the investigation after they were unable to 
find any persons who could confirm the testimony of German witnesses or 
who could remember the names of those Czechs who allegedly carried out 
the murders.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and there were no 
reports of such practices; however, police occasionally use excessive 
force and abuse their authority. In April the Czech Helsinki Committee 
released a report that documented widespread police violence.
    Police were criticized for a forcible intervention on May 1, when 
they pushed approximately 300 anarchists away from a demonstration 
route planned by an equally large group of skinheads. Although the 
skinhead rally was registered legally with city authorities and the 
anarchist demonstration was not, some human rights activist leaders and 
commentators questioned the action as a form of police protection for 
neo-Nazis. In June police were criticized for failing to control 
demonstrators at the ``Global Street Party,'' a demonstration of some 
5,000 anarchists and radical environmentalists, when fringe groups 
deviated from the planned route and attacked a television station, 
restaurant franchises, and a Western embassy building.
    The police force has been restructured significantly, and many new 
officers have been recruited since the 1989 revolution. Nevertheless, 
public approval ratings for police remain low, and corruption remains a 
problem. During the year, 345 members of the national police force were 
charged with criminal offenses, half of which were committed off duty. 
These include cases of police corruption, which can and do result in 
prosecutions. The most common offense cited was policemen fining 
motorists for traffic offenses and then keeping the money. The April 
Czech Helsinki Committee report also documented corruption and 
discrimination against women during recruitment of officers (see 
Section 5). Police sometimes failed to take sufficient action in cases 
of threats or attacks against Roma.
    In March authorities charged a police officer in Ostrov for making 
racial insults against a group of Roma. The same officer was sentenced 
to a 1-year suspended sentence for wearing a swastika in public in 
1998. However, he was suspended from the police force only after he 
made racial insults.
    The investigation of a special police unit alleged to have used 
excessive force to contain a group of anarchists and radical 
environmentalists rioting in downtown Prague in 1998 is ongoing. In 
November an official from the police force's investigative office said 
that up to four officers could face charges of abuse of power and 
unwarranted use of force in connection with the incident.
    The case of a Brno city police officer charged with using excessive 
force to break up a late night party outside a theater in 1995 still 
was awaiting a formal court decision at year's end. In the meantime, 
the officer continues to serve on the police force but faces suspension 
or other internal disciplinary action if convicted.
    The trial of three Communist-era investigators charged with 
torturing political prisoners in the 1950's is currently before the 
District Court in Uherske Hradiste. In May two former police officials 
were sentenced to 3\1/2\ and 3 years for their part in the police 
intervention against demonstrators on November 17, 1989; they appealed 
the decision, which still was pending at year's end.
    The Office for the Documentation and Investigation of the Crimes of 
Communism (UDV--see Section 1.e.) continued to investigate cases of 
torture and misconduct from the Communist era.
    Skinhead violence against Roma and other minorities remained a 
problem (see Section 5).
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There is 
overcrowding in some prisons; as of August the prison system was at 118 
percent of capacity. As of December, there were 23,054 prisoners in the 
country. There are 9,890 prison guards, or 1 guard for every 4 
prisoners. Attorney and family visits are permitted. The authorities 
follow these guidelines in practice.
    The Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law forbids 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this 
prohibition in practice. Police may hold persons without charge for up 
to 48 hours, during which time they have the right to counsel. The lack 
of experienced police investigators and qualified judges, together with 
a still evolving legal environment, have contributed to a backlog of 
court cases. The Ministry of Justice estimates that 400 judges are 
needed to fill vacant positions. Pretrial detention may last legally as 
long as 4 years for cases considered ``exceptionally grave'' under the 
Criminal Code. Pretrial detention for most crimes may last as long as 2 
or 3 years, with mandatory judicial review intervals beginning at the 
end of the first 6 months of detention. If the court does not approve 
continued detention during a judicial review, the suspect must be 
released. In practice few pretrial detainees are held for longer than 2 
years. The law does not allow bail for certain serious crimes. A 
suspect may petition the appropriate investigating authorities at any 
time for release from detention. The average length of pretrial 
detention is now 5 months and 21 days. At year's end, the number of 
pre-trial detainees was 6,919, about one-third of the total prison 
population.
    The law prohibits exile, and the Government observes this 
prohibition in practice.
    Since 1993 local courts and foreign police have expelled to 
Slovakia ``Slovaks'' without proper citizenship or residency papers. 
Some of these expulsions involve ``Slovak'' Roma who have never been in 
Slovakia. By the first half of 1997 (latest available statistics) a 
total of 851 ``Slovaks'' had been expelled administratively or 
judicially by the authorities. A February 1998 presidential amnesty 
(which was expected to affect three-quarters of all expulsion sentences 
issued between January 1, 1993 and February 2, 1998) granted amnesty to 
those receiving expulsion sentences for crimes in which the punishment 
is less than 5 years' imprisonment. However, according to one 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) that follows this issue, some courts 
have not implemented this amnesty. Courts have not imposed expulsion 
sentences since the implementation of a new citizenship law, which 
allows ``Slovaks'' and others to legalize their status.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and it is impartial and independent in practice. 
Judges are not fired or transferred for political reasons. The 
Judiciary is hampered by structural and procedural deficiencies and a 
lack of resources.
    The court system consists of district, regional, and high courts. 
The Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal. In addition, the 
separate Constitutional Court has final authority for cases concerning 
the constitutionality of legislation.
    The law stipulates that persons charged with criminal offenses are 
entitled to fair and open public trials. They have the right to be 
informed of their legal rights and of the charges against them, to 
consult with counsel, and to present a defense. The state provides 
lawyers for indigent defendants in criminal and some civil cases 
through the Bar Association. All defendants enjoy a presumption of 
innocence and have the right to refuse to testify against themselves. 
They may appeal any judgments decided against them. The authorities 
observe these rights in practice.
    The 1991 lustration law, passed to prevent Communist-era 
collaborators from enjoying senior government responsibilities, 
continues to bar many former Communist Party officials, members of the 
people's militia, and suspected secret police collaborators from 
holding a wide range of elective and appointive offices for 5 years, 
including appointive positions in state-owned companies, academia, and 
the media. In 1995 Parliament extended this legal constraint to the 
year 2000, overriding a veto by President Havel. Some private employers 
also have required applicants to produce lustration certificates 
proving noncollaboration. By August the special government office 
handling lustration requests processed approximately 6,000 lustration 
certificates at the request of individuals, bringing the total since 
1991 to 366,000. During the year, some 2.7 percent of applicants did 
not receive confirmation of a clear record because of suspected 
collaboration, a slightly lower percentage than the overall average of 
3.2 percent since 1991. Those who did not receive confirmation of a 
clear record may file a civil suit against the Interior Ministry for a 
charge similar to slander. In the period from mid-October 1996 to 
September 1997, 31 such suits were filed. Of these 31 suits, about half 
of those decided to date were ``fully successful,'' and another quarter 
were ``partially successful,'' although more recent data are not 
available.
    Defenders of the lustration law argue that individuals who 
systematically destroyed the lives of others in order to gain 
advantages for themselves within the Communist system should not be 
entrusted with high state responsibilities. However, the law has been 
criticized for violating human rights principles prohibiting 
discrimination in employment and assigning collective guilt. It also 
has been criticized because the screening process is based on the 
records of the Communist secret police, which many believe are 
incomplete or unreliable. Citizens unjustly accused of collaboration 
may suffer diminished career prospects and damaged personal 
reputations. The 1997 Agenda 2000 report by the European Union notes 
the law's continuing existence with some concern.
    Some actions taken by state authorities and the Communist Party 
during the 1948-1989 Communist regime are being investigated as 
criminal acts under a 1993 law by a government office (UDV) established 
for this purpose. The UDV was established in 1995 and is an independent 
part of the Czech Police Office of Investigations. The UDV is empowered 
to launch and conduct prosecutions and propose filing suits to state 
attorney's offices. In investigations of 2,116 cases under its 
jurisdiction, it has recommended action against 79 individuals, with 49 
ending in criminal charges. Sentences were handed down in eight cases. 
By year's end, charges were dropped in 320 of the pending cases for 
various reasons, including lack of evidence, amnesty, or death of the 
accused. In addition, three cases had reached the trial phase and are 
to be decided in the next few months. The UDV also is working with 
Charles University to prepare ``moral trials'' to discuss crimes whose 
offenders cannot be punished due to their death or the expired statute 
of limitations on the cases. It targets primarily cases of: Torture 
(see Section 1.c.); border shootings; treason connected with the 1968 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; state persecution of opponents 
of the Communist regime; and investigation of Czech authorities who 
negligently allowed exposure of citizens to hazardous waste after the 
nuclear accident in Chernobyl. Although the statute of limitations for 
many of the Communist-era crimes under investigation by the UDV was set 
to expire in 2000, Parliament voted in December to suspend the statue 
of limitations for serious crimes committed during the Communist regime 
and enabled the UDV to continue investigating these cases. In late 
August, a prosecutor for the UDV asked the Prosecutor General to indict 
former Communist officials Milos Jakes and Jozef Lenart. The two were 
to be charged with high treason for attending a meeting at the Soviet 
Embassy in Prague on the day after the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion and 
for discussing the creation of a new ``workers' and farmers' '' 
government; they were not indicted by year's end. In December the 
Supreme Court ruled that a criminal case against a Communist-era judge 
should be reopened. A district court ruled earlier that Pavel Vitek, 
who was one of the judges in a show trial against seven persons who 
were accused falsely of murdering Communist officials in 1951, could 
not be tried for his role in the case because the statute of 
limitations had expired. However, the Supreme Court ruled that Vitek 
could be tried for aiding and abetting murder.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Electronic surveillance, the tapping of telephones, 
and the interception of mail require a court order; government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions in practice, and 
violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
    In February and March armed police in Rokycany conducted several 
searches without warrants of Romani homes, after local Romani activists 
sent a letter to the mayor protesting racial discrimination. The house 
of the son of prominent Roma rights activist Ondrej Gina also was 
searched. The Roma filed complaints against the police for these 
searches. In November Rokycany authorities charged Gina with inciting 
racial hatred and damaging the city's reputation (see Section 2.a.).
    On December 27, former Health Minister Ivan David alleged that a 
bugging device was installed in his office a few months prior to his 
resignation on December, although he produced no evidence to 
substantiate his claim.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and of the press, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. Individuals can and do speak out on political issues and 
freely criticize the Government and public figures. A wide variety of 
newspapers, magazines, and journals, owned by a variety of Czech and 
foreign investors, are published without government interference. The 
press and broadcast media continue to operate under outdated and 
insufficient laws, which are now in the process of being replaced by 
legislation conforming to European Union norms. A Communist-era law 
against ``defamation of the Republic'' was revoked in 1997.
    The electronic media are independent. There are 3 national 
television stations, 1 public and 2 private, and more than 60 private 
radio stations in addition to Czech Public Radio. The leading 
television channel, Nova, is privately owned, although a widely 
publicized dispute about the channel's ownership and alleged fraud and 
serious commercial misconduct by the license holder is now the subject 
of international arbitration. Citizens also have access to foreign 
broadcasts via satellite, cable, and the Internet.
    A nine-member Television and Radio Council has limited regulatory 
responsibility for policymaking and answers to the parliamentary media 
committee, which exercises broad oversight of the Council and must 
approve its members. The Council can issue and revoke radio and 
television licenses and monitors programming. The Council was 
criticized widely during the year for its lack of initiative and 
ineffective action in addressing a high profile ownership dispute at 
the country's largest private television channel.
    In April Amnesty International placed the country on its blacklist 
of countries that violate freedom of speech and expression because of 
the criminal arrest of reporter Zdenek Zukal in 1998. Zukal faces three 
charges of criminal libel for reporting that police had provided false 
information in their investigation of high-level corruption in Olomouc. 
Zukal had been charged originally with slander for publishing documents 
he knew--or should have known--to be forgeries. Local authorities later 
changed the charge to false accusation 1 day before a planned 
presidential pardon; the new charges still were pending at year's end.
    In November the mayor and city council of Rokycany formally pressed 
charges against the prominent national Romani leader Ondrej Gina for 
remarks that he allegedly published about the mayor and the city on an 
Internet site about alleged discrimination against Roma. Local police 
concluded that these remarks constituted a criminal act and turned the 
case over to the state prosecutor for action. The major and city 
council argued that Gina's remarks were malicious enough to constitute 
``defamation of the Czech nation'' and ``harm to the reputation of the 
city of Rokycany at home and abroad.'' The charges against Gina include 
slander, assault on a public office, and inciting racial discord. The 
case was still pending at year's end.
    Earlier in the year, Rokycany police conducted a search without a 
warrant of the home of Gina's son, after Gina sent a letter to the 
mayor protesting racial discrimination (see Section 1.f.).
    On June 23, a Prague court prohibited Tomas Kebza, deputy chairman 
of the rightwing Republican Youth Party and editor of the weekly 
Republika, from publishing for 10 years for his two articles that 
contained anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi views and that were aimed at 
suppressing the rights of other citizens (see Section 5).
    In May the Government approved a press bill, which was criticized 
strongly by media experts. The most controversial provision, which 
would require the press to present responses from persons or parties 
who believe that their reputations have been sullied by media reports, 
even if the information was correct, was later removed. Opponents of 
the measure maintained that this provision would create an unfair 
burden on the press and represented an unwise regulation of free 
expression. In December the amended version of the bill was approved by 
the lower house of Parliament but returned to the Senate for further 
changes. Those modifications are still pending. International NGO's and 
the Council of Europe, which criticized the legislation, are to 
continue monitoring this process closely.
    In May the Parliament passed a freedom of information act that was 
to take effect on January 1, 2000. The law provides for freedom of 
access to information under the control of state and local authorities 
as well as other institutions affecting the rights of citizens.
    The law provides for academic freedom but forbids activities by 
established political parties at universities.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of persons to assemble peacefully, and the 
Government respects this right in practice, although it may restrict 
assemblies that promote hatred and intolerance, advocate suppression of 
individual or political rights, or otherwise would jeopardize the 
safety of the participants. Police generally do not interfere with 
spontaneous, peaceful demonstrations for which organizers lack a 
permit. Police arrested some skinheads at a May 1 rally (see Section 
5).
    The law forbids political party activity at universities (see 
Section 2.a.).
    The Constitution provides for the right of persons to associate 
freely and to form political parties, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. Either the Government or the President may submit a 
proposal to the Supreme Court calling for a political party to be 
disbanded; during the year the Supreme Court cancelled the 
registrations of six parties that existed only on paper. The 
cancellations, part of a policy begun by the 1998 interim government to 
maintain an active registry, were mere formalities, as the 
organizations in question had ceased to exist in practice. 
Organizations, associations, foundations, and political parties are 
required to register with local officials or at the Interior Ministry, 
but there is no evidence that this registration is either coercive or 
withheld arbitrarily. Prime Minister Zeman has called periodically for 
the Interior Ministry to reexamine or cancel the official registrations 
of skinhead organizations and others propagating racial hatred or 
fascism, but no action has been taken to date.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice. The State 
subsidizes all religions that are registered officially with the 
Ministry of Culture. There are 21 state-recognized religions. To 
register a church must have at least 10,000 adult members permanently 
residing in the country. For any churches that the World Council of 
Churches already has recognized, only 500 adult members permanently 
residing in the country are necessary. Churches registered prior to 
1991 are not required to meet these conditions. The Jewish community, 
which numbers only a few thousand, constitutes one such exception. One 
group, the Unification Church (UC), was denied registration in January 
when the Department of Churches determined that it had obtained the 
required proof of membership by fraud; the UC is contesting the 
decision in court. Unregistered religious groups, such as the small 
Muslim minority, may not own community property legally, although they 
are otherwise free to assemble and worship in the manner of their 
choice. Their members can and do issue publications without 
interference.
    Missionaries for various religious groups, including the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and Jehovah's Witnesses, are present 
in the country and proselytize without hindrance. In March and May 
respectively, the Government established two church-state commissions 
to improve church-state relations. One is a ``political'' commission 
with the presence of all parties currently in Parliament, and the 
second is a ``specialist'' commission composed of experts including 
lawyers, economists, and church representatives. The commissions advise 
the Government on church-state relations, the status of churches and 
methods of their financing, and church-related property questions.
    A court in Jicin stripped a woman who was a former member of 
Jehovah's Witnesses of guardianship of her 6-year-old daughter, for 
allegedly not taking her daughter to the doctor but instead to 
Jehovah's Witnesses meetings and for preventing her from socializing 
with other children. The court granted custody to the father and 
allowed the mother to see her daughter for only 6 hours per month. 
Further details about the case and the role of the mother's former 
religious affiliation in the court's decision are not available.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement 
to travel domestically and abroad, as well as for emigration and 
repatriation, and the Government respects these provisions in practice. 
Czechs who emigrated during the period of Communist rule frequently 
return to visit or live. A law passed in September permits such persons 
to regain Czech citizenship without having to relinquish a foreign 
citizenship that they acquired during that time. Citizenship is not 
revoked for political reasons.
    The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status 
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A legal and institutional framework is 
in place for the processing of refugees and asylees, although the 
current law is under revision to close a few gaps. The Government 
provides first asylum and cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. The Czech Republic is both a transit and destination country 
for migrants. The Government fully funds an integration program to 
assist those granted refugee status in locating housing and receiving 
other social assistance. A reception center, three camps, and six 
integration centers are provided for recognized refugees. As of August, 
the Government granted citizenship to 3,200 former citizens of Slovakia 
and 564 former citizens of other countries; however, the new 
citizenship law passed in September is expected to enable thousands 
more ``Slovaks'' to become citizens (see Section 5). In April the 
Government established temporary protection status for Kosovar Albanian 
refugees and opened 7 humanitarian centers to house 825 refugees 
relocated from overcrowded camps in Albania and the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia. According to estimates by the UNHCR, there were 
between 2,000 and 3,000 more unregistered Kosovar Albanians in the 
country who were staying in hotels along the border with Germany and 
were waiting to be smuggled into that country. By fall most of these 
refugees returned to Kosovo at their own request.
    In the last 8 years, 21,824 asylum applications were filed, of 
which 1,857 received formal refugee status for resettlement. As of 
December 1, 62 persons had received refugee status out of a total of 
6,489 applications. A total of 17,877 foreigners have requested asylum 
in the country since 1990, and 1,817 (approximately 10 percent) 
qualified for asylum status. Citizens from Afghanistan, the former 
Yugoslavia, India, Sri Lanka, and Iraq submitted the most asylum 
requests during the year. In addition, migrants from economically 
disadvantaged countries in Central and Eastern Europe often enter the 
country to take up illegal residency or in transit to the West. In 1998 
border police had prevented a record 44,000 illegal entry attempts, 
which more than doubled the average of the preceding 3 years. During 
the first half of the year, 15,400 illegal migrants were stopped at the 
borders, many of whom were citizens of the former Yugoslavia.
    A growing concern is the smuggling of large groups of refugees and 
economic migrants into and across the country, which lacks specific 
laws criminalizing alien smuggling. Organized rings promoting illegal 
employment abroad operate with impunity, freely advertising their 
services in dozens of local papers and on the Internet. In spite of 
existing legislative gaps, the police are taking action against large-
scale trafficking rings under organized crime statutes. The authorities 
are working with neighboring countries to tighten border controls. In 
December Parliament passed new legislation on residence and visas. The 
new law restricts considerably previous rules for change of status and 
extension of stay and requires visas in advance for everyone but 
tourists. In January military observation patrols were instigated along 
the Czech-Slovak border to enhance police efforts. In June a record 91 
illegal migrants were caught crossing the Czech-Slovak border on foot. 
An organized crime investigation involving Czech-German police in April 
broke up an international ring believed to have smuggled thousands of 
persons over the past 5 years. Police arrested 43 suspects, and an 
additional 9 were arrested in Germany. Illegal migrant groups in these 
cases were composed primarily of persons from Ukraine, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, and Sri Lanka, many of whom claimed 
asylum in the Czech Republic. There were no reports of the forced 
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government by democratic means, and citizens exercise this right in 
practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis 
of universal suffrage. Citizens above the age of 18 are eligible to 
vote by secret ballot in nationwide and local elections. Opposition 
groups, including political parties, function openly and participate 
without hindrance in the political process. Citizens may join political 
organizations or vote for the political party of their choice without 
government interference. Some persons, predominantly Roma, who were 
enfranchised citizens under the former Czechoslovakia, were unable to 
obtain Czech citizenship at the time of the split with Slovakia, 
despite birth or long residency in the Czech Republic. They lacked 
voting and other rights due to restrictions under the existing 
citizenship laws. However, the new citizenship law passed in September 
is expected to remedy the situation for thousands of such persons (see 
Section 5).
    The Government of Prime Minister Milos Zeman took office in August 
1998. The Government consists almost exclusively of members of the 
Prime Minister's left-of-center Social Democratic party, the first 
nonrightist government since 1989. In addition to the largest 
opposition party, (former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' Civil Democratic 
Party), which has agreed to tolerate and support the Government, the 
opposition consists of the Communist Party and a coalition of four 
small center-right parties. The Constitution mandates elections to 
Parliament at least every 4 years, based on proportional representation 
in eight large electoral districts. To enter Parliament, a party must 
obtain 5 percent of the votes cast in the election. The President is 
elected by Parliament and serves a 5-year term. The President has 
limited constitutional powers but may use a suspense veto to return 
legislation to Parliament, which then can override that veto by a 
simple majority.
    There are no restrictions, in law or in practice, on women's 
participation in politics; however, they are underrepresented, and 
relatively few women hold high public office. None of the 16 cabinet 
ministers in the Government at year's end were women. The 200-member 
Chamber of Deputies has only 29 female deputies, including 1 deputy 
speaker. There are 9 female senators in the 81-member Senate. The 
President of the Senate, elected in December 1998, is a woman.
    No seats are reserved in either house for ethnic minorities. 
Slovaks, of whom there are an estimated 300,000, are almost all 
"Czechoslovaks" who elected to live in the Czech Republic after the 
split. For the most part, these Slovaks define their interests in the 
context of Czech politics, not along ethnic lines; there is no Slovak 
party in Parliament.
    Most of the estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Roma have not been fully 
integrated into Czech political life (see Section 5). Roma themselves 
have been unable to unite behind a program or set of goals to advance 
their interests within the democratic structures of the country. Few 
Roma serve in local government structures, although some have been 
appointed to advisory positions in government ministries. There is 
currently one representative of Romani background in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups operate without government restriction, and 
government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their 
views. The best-known human rights groups are the Czech Helsinki 
Committee and the Tolerance Foundation (an umbrella organization); 
there are also many single-issue groups.
    On July 8, Parliament passed the final legislation needed to create 
a $14 million (500 million Czech crowns) endowment to be used by 39 
NGO's that work on issues of social welfare, health, culture, 
education, human rights protection, and the environment.
    In September 1998, U.N. Human Rights Commission expert Petr Uhl was 
appointed to a newly created position as Commissioner for Human Rights. 
The Human Rights Commissioner serves as head of the government 
Committee for Nationalities and of the Interministerial Commission for 
Romani Community Affairs, established in 1997 (see Section 5). In 
January a Council for Human Rights was established with 10 
representatives of government ministries and 10 human rights activists. 
The Council for Human Rights was created to advise the Government on 
human rights issues and propose legislation to improve the observation 
of human rights in the country.
    In December the Parliament passed legislation mandating the 
establishment of the office of the ombudsman, which was to be created 
in 2000. The legislation provides for Parliament to select an ombudsman 
for a 6-year term from a pool of candidates nominated by the President 
and the Senate.
    In each house of Parliament there is a petition committee for human 
rights and nationalities, which includes a subcommittee for 
nationalities. A government-sponsored Council for Nationalities advises 
the Cabinet on minority affairs. In this body, Slovaks and Roma have 
three representatives each; Poles and Germans, two each; and Hungarians 
and Ukrainians, one each. There is also a government commission staffed 
by members of the NGO and journalist communities that monitors 
interethnic violence.
    Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for the equality of citizens and 
prohibits discrimination. Health care, education, retirement, and other 
social services generally are provided without regard to race, sex, 
religion, disability, or social status. In practice Roma face 
discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and housing.
    Women.--The actual extent of violence against women is unknown; 
however, some studies by experts indicate that it likely is common. 
Public debate about it is rare, despite the efforts of womens' groups 
to focus public attention on the problem. In late 1998, the Government 
introduced a comprehensive awareness and prevention program designed to 
address issues of trafficking, abuse, and violence against women. ROSA, 
an NGO that helps women in trouble, estimates that 1 in 10 women in 
domestic situations suffer from emotional or physical abuse, and that 
30 percent of the abusers are university educated. The press 
occasionally reported on the problem of violence against women and 
trafficking in prostitutes. A 1998 research study conducted by Prague's 
Sexological Institute indicated that 13 percent of women are forced 
into sexual intercourse under threat of violence. Spouses or partners 
are responsible for 51 percent of rapes, with an additional 37 percent 
of the attacks committed by men known to the victims. Only 12 percent 
of rape victims are attacked by complete strangers. According to police 
statistics, there were 675 rapes reported countrywide in 1998, although 
researchers at the Institute estimate that only 3.3 percent of rape 
victims report the crime to the police. Approximately 80 percent of 
criminal rape cases are solved. Gender studies experts reported that 
women were ashamed to report rape or speak about it, and that the 
police were not equipped to help, either by attitude or training. 
However, to improve police responsiveness and prosecution efforts, the 
Ministry of Interior started training officers in protocols for 
investigating family violence and sexual crime cases in 1998.
    According to Elektra, a help center for abused women, rape victims 
can seek psychological help through any help line or crisis center. 
Crisis centers that help rape victims include White Circle of Safety, 
an association for crime victims that provides free psychiatric and 
legal help, and Riaps, a help line that counsels persons who experience 
any kind of trauma. A total of 54 state supported shelters with 771 
beds accept women who have been raped or abused in most major cities 
and towns, and local NGO's provide medical and social assistance to 
women. According to NGO's, the situation has improved in recent years, 
but there still are not enough shelter spaces to meet the demand.
    Legislation does not address spousal abuse specifically; however, 
the Criminal Code covers other forms of domestic violence. An attack is 
considered criminal if the victim's condition warrants medical 
treatment (incapacity to work) for 7 or more days. If medical treatment 
lasts less than 7 days, the attack is classified as a misdemeanor and 
punished by a fine not exceeding approximately $100 (3,000 Czech 
crowns--approximately one-fourth of the average monthly wage). Repeated 
misdemeanor attacks do not impose stricter sanctions on the abuser. The 
police are training specialist personnel to deal with domestic 
violence; however, they do not yet engage in regular contact with 
welfare and medical services. However, in 1998 the Police Academy and 
secondary police schools introduced, into both the introductory and 
continuing education curriculums, instructional material to improve the 
identification and investigation of domestic violence and sexual abuse 
cases and to sensitize police to the treatment of victims.
    Forced prostitution (pimping) is illegal; prostitution is not, 
although local communities have the right to regulate it and enforce 
restrictions. The Interior Ministry estimates that up to 25,000 persons 
currently earn a living from the sex industry. Prostitution and erotic 
businesses are particularly prevalent in the border regions with 
Germany and Austria, where international vehicular traffic is heaviest. 
Trafficking in prostitutes is forbidden by law, and trafficking in 
women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    The media rarely mention the issue of sexual harassment. There are 
no legal definitions or laws prohibiting sexual harassment.
    The Czech language has no standard term to express ``sexual 
harassment.'' One NGO monitoring this problem reported that the lack of 
sensitivity on this issue does not mean that sexual harassment does not 
exist; rather, some inappropriate or offensive behaviors may be too 
common for comment. In a 1995 study by the Sociology Institute, 43 
percent of women reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment 
in the workplace during their career. A study by the Defense Ministry 
in 1996 found that nearly half of female soldiers experienced 
harassment on duty. The concerns of women's groups over workplace 
sexual harassment often are ignored or dismissed. However, during the 
year a university student became the first woman in the country to win 
a sexual harassment suit.
    Women are equal under the law and in principle receive the same pay 
for the same job. Women represent roughly half of the labor force, 
though they are employed disproportionately in professions where the 
median salary is relatively low. Women's median wages lag behind those 
of men by roughly 25 percent, although the gap is narrowing. Women 
enjoy equal property, inheritance, and other rights with men. The 
unemployment rate for women now exceeds that for men by more than one-
third, and a disproportionately small number of women hold senior 
positions. In April the Czech Helsinki Committee released a report 
documenting police discrimination against women during recruitment of 
officers.
    A 1991 employment law bans discrimination on the basis of sex; 
however, in practice employers remain free to consider sex, age, or 
even attractiveness when making hiring decisions, since this does not 
necessarily constitute ``discrimination'' under current legal 
interpretation. Employers often use openly such factors as age, sex, 
and lifestyle in their employment solicitations.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
welfare through its programs for health care, compulsory education 
through age 15 (through age 14 in special schools), and basic 
nutrition. Girls and boys enjoy equal access to health care and 
education at all levels.
    Child abuse and trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.) 
continued to receive press attention during the year. In February a 
British former disc jockey and three other foreigners went on trial on 
charges of pedophilia. If convicted, they face up to 8 years in prison 
or up to 15 years if the court finds exacerbating circumstances. A 
March press report indicated that Central Europe is becoming more 
popular as a destination for pedophiles due to its convenient location 
and low risk of sexually transmitted disease. Some experts estimate 
that the number of visits to the country, primarily by West Europeans, 
for the purpose of abusing children has increased 20 percent since 
1997. Dissemination of child pornography, whether by print, video, CD-
rom, or the Internet is a criminal act. These laws are enforced; in 
January police in Decin brought charges against a man who placed an 
advertisement on the Internet offering child pornography on CD-rom. He 
was convicted and sentenced to 1 year in prison. Court convictions 
against persons guilty of child sex abuse are reported routinely in the 
media.
    Since 1990 the number of reported cases of child abuse roughly 
doubled; this increase appears to be the result of increased awareness 
of the problem and more effective police training and action. Laws 
criminalize family violence, physical restraint, sexual activity, and 
other abuse of a minor. A Children's Crisis Center was established in 
1995 and is 70 percent state supported. The Fund for Endangered 
Children estimates that the total number of children suffering from 
physical, psychological and sexual abuse is 20,000 to 40,000, but only 
about one-tenth of such cases are registered by the police. About 50 
children die each year as a result of abuse and violence within the 
family. According to NGO's, there are approximately 10,000 children 
living in institutional settings and 4,000 foster families supported by 
the Government and various NGO's.
    Romani children often are relegated to ``special schools'' for the 
mentally disabled and socially maladjusted. Both a government program 
and various private initiatives exist to prepare Romani children for 
mainstream schools. In June the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC) 
filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court on behalf of 12 Romani 
families in Ostrava, alleging that the disproportionate number of 
Romani children in special schools constitutes de facto racial 
segregation throughout the educational system.
    People with Disabilities.--The disabled suffer disproportionately 
from unemployment, and the physically disabled experience difficulty in 
obtaining access to buildings and public transport. Access to education 
can be a problem, due to the lack of barrier-free access to public 
schools, although there is at least one barrier-free school in each 
district. Although access is improving, many buildings and public 
transportation remain inaccessible to those in wheelchairs. In Prague 
19 metro stations (nearly 50 percent of the total) and 2 bus lines are 
now accessible by the disabled. A 1994 Economic Ministry regulation 
requires architects to ensure adequate access for the disabled in all 
new building projects, as well as in older buildings undergoing 
restoration. This regulation is applied in practice. However, the 
Government has not mandated access for the disabled to other buildings. 
Businesses in which 60 percent or more of the employees are disabled 
qualify for special tax breaks. Numerous NGO's support social 
assistance programs to diminish the disadvantages faced by the 
disabled. For example, as of June Nadace Charty 77 had contributed more 
than $44,000 (1.5 million Czech crowns) to institutions and individuals 
to purchase rehabilitative aids and special fittings for wheelchairs 
not covered by insurance. These NGO's report that, although problems 
persist, the situation of the disabled is receiving more attention and 
is vastly improved from only a few years ago. The integration of the 
disabled into society has not been the subject of significant policy or 
public debate.
    Religious Minorities.--On June 23, a Prague court prohibited Tomas 
Kebza, deputy chairman of the rightwing Republican Youth Party and 
editor of the weekly Republika, from publishing for 10 years for two 
articles that contained anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi views and that were 
aimed at suppressing the rights of other citizens (see Section 2.a.).
    On November 1, Minister of Interior Vaclav Grulich reported that 
the Ministry sent letters to two extremist organizations warning them 
that they were violating human rights. The Patriotic Front and the 
National Alliance had 30 days to respond to the Ministry in writing. 
The two organizations held a demonstration in Prague on October 28, at 
which the National Alliance leader told those gathered that the 
Holocaust was `'an invention.''
    On December 20, in a display on the struggles of the extremist 
rightwing Republican Party that was hung in front of the local party 
headquarters in Decin, photographs of President Havel, Prime Minister 
Zeman, Civic Democratic Party leader Klaus, and Freedom Union chairman 
Jan Ruml were labeled ``Jewish Free Masons and Murderers of the Czech 
Nation.'' The exhibit also included a list of ``Jews and Jewish Half-
Breeds'' in politics that included the names of Havel, Zeman, and 
Klaus. The list was removed a few days later.
    In March one young man in Trutnov was sentenced to 18 months in 
prison for his role in the 1998 desecration of 41 tombstones in a 
Jewish cemetery. The courts sentenced three other youths arrested in 
connection with the same incident to suspended sentences of 18 months. 
In February police in Plzen arrested 12 leaders, producers, and 
distributors of racist, Fascist, and anti-Semitic materials. Police 
confirmed the existence of over 20 underground magazines with small 
circulations propagating fascism, racism, and anti-Semitism.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--After ethnic Slovaks, the 
largest minority is the Romani population, officially estimated to 
number between 200,000 and 250,000. Roma live throughout the country 
but are concentrated in the industrial towns along the northern border, 
where many eastern Slovak Roma were encouraged to settle in the homes 
of Sudeten Germans transferred to the West more than 40 years ago.
    Roma suffer disproportionately from poverty, unemployment, 
interethnic violence, discrimination, illiteracy, and disease. They are 
subject to popular prejudice, as is affirmed repeatedly by public 
opinion polls. Nearly one-quarter of the respondents in a February 
opinion poll admitted to racial intolerance, while 16 percent said that 
they were intolerant of other nationalities. A court case charging 
editors of a Republican Party magazine (leaders of this extreme 
rightwing party espouse virulently anti-German and anti-Romani 
policies) with publishing offensive statements against Roma was filed 
with a Prague district court in January 1998 and was still before the 
court at year's end.
    The State funds television and radio programs for Roma on public 
stations and also supports Romani press publications. There is one 
full-time Romani anchorman on Czech Television. During the year, more 
and better information on Romani issues was becoming available in the 
mainstream press and other sources. To improve media reporting on 
Romani issues, a Romani journalism course was established in the 
College of Publicity, and the first graduates finished in February. 
There has been a Department of Romani Language Studies at Charles 
University in Prague since 1991, and additional university-level Romani 
language study programs exist in Usti nad Labem and Brno.
    However, efforts by NGO's and individuals in the health and 
education fields to improve living conditions for the Roma have had 
only minimal impact, sometimes due to the attitudes or intransigence of 
local authorities. Romani leaders themselves have had limited success 
in organizing their local communities, which often are disunited and 
where many are reluctant to foster contacts with the majority.
    Members of skinhead organizations and their sympathizers most often 
perpetrate interethnic violence. Roma are the most likely targets of 
such crimes, although other ``dark-skinned'' individuals come under the 
same attacks. During the first 6 months of the year, 238 persons were 
charged with ``racially motivated'' crimes. An estimated 5,000 to 6,000 
skinheads are active in the country. The Documentation Center for Human 
Rights recorded 1,500 racially-motivated attacks over the past 8 years, 
in which nearly 30 persons died. In 1998 police recorded a total of 138 
``racially motivated crimes,'' nearly half of which were committed by 
juveniles. However, police and courts sometimes are reluctant to 
classify crimes against Roma as racially motivated, and the actual 
figures likely are higher.
    In January six skinheads were charged with committing a racially 
motivated attack in 1998 on a 63-year-old disabled Romani man at the 
Havlickuv Brod railway station.
    On July 17, a group of skinheads attacked a 27-year-old Rom in a 
bar in Jesenik with pool cues, pool balls, and other objects, as they 
shouted racial epithets at him. Police charged six persons involved in 
the attack with defamation of race and disturbing the peace. According 
to a local Romani NGO, there were more than 10 racially motivated 
attacks in Jesenik during the year, but the police did not investigate 
most of them.
    On August 4, three skinheads attacked Jana Chalupova and Jakub 
Polak in a restaurant near the district court of Karvina, where Polak 
was representing the family of a Rom who was killed by skinheads in 
1998. Chalupova is the head of public relations for the President's 
administration.
    On August 27, some 30 skinheads attacked several Romani homes in a 
village near Jaromerice nad Rokytnou, which resulted in injuries to 2 
Roma and damage to several cars and houses. The raid lasted 
approximately 1 hour, and the skinheads threw bricks and stones at the 
Roma. The police launched an investigation into the attack and charged 
12 persons with rioting, property damage, and violence, although they 
were not charged with racially motivated crimes.
    On November 20, some 30 skinheads attacked between 60 and 70 Roma 
in a restaurant in Ceske Budejovice; 6 persons were injured. Police 
subsequently charged 23 skinheads with racially motivated violence; 
they now face sentences of up to 3 years in prison.
    On January 11, a court charged a 21-year-old student from Plzen 
with disseminating Fascist propaganda. The student had created an 
Internet web site with Fascist symbols and a photograph of a youth 
giving the Hitler salute. The student was convicted of promoting racial 
discord and unlawful limitation of the rights and freedoms of other 
citizens.
    On February 20, police in Holoubkov detained six members of 
Sturmpionier-Battalion 43, a new paramilitary group that vowed to honor 
the legacy of the Nazi Wehrmacht.
    Police continued to investigate a November 1998 incident that 
occurred in the city of Hodonin, during which a group of skinheads 
brutally attacked an elderly American citizen for apparently defending 
a young Rom whom the skinheads were harassing while dining in the same 
restaurant. After exchanging words with the man, the skinheads waited 
for him outside, and after a short chase, attacked him and left him 
seriously injured and unconscious on the ground. The incident was 
captured by the security cameras of a nearby gasoline station. Charges 
later were filed against the main attacker, and the local district 
court is scheduled to hear the matter in early 2000.
    In February the High Court in Prague confirmed the sentences of two 
men involved in the 1997 racially motivated murder of Romani mother 
Helena Bihariova; in 1998 one received 8\1/2\ years in prison for 
murder, and the second received 15 months for breach of the peace, 
after his sentence was reduced from 6\1/2\ years. Also in February, the 
Justice Minister filed a complaint against the High Court for annulling 
the convictions, on technical grounds, of three skinheads found guilty 
in a retrial in 1998 of murdering Tibor Danihel in 1995. Authorities 
detained 11 suspects for terrorizing Romani residents in Domazlice in 
1997. A court later acquitted 10 of the suspects, while the remaining 
suspect was convicted of disturbing the peace (he later was pardoned 
during a general presidential amnesty and is now free.)
    In January a district court in Prague acquitted Miroslav Sladek, 
the leader of the extreme rightwing Republican Party, of charges of 
inciting racial and ethnic hatred, on the grounds that his statements 
are protected by freedom of speech provisions in the law. His party 
espouses virulently anti-Roma and anti-foreigner policies.
    In February a court sentenced former mayor and current city council 
member of Obrnice Jan Hrabak to 6 weeks in jail or a fine of $850 
(30,000 Czech crowns) for using racial epithets against a Rom in 1998.
    There was no progress in the case of the 1998 death of Milan Lacko; 
the court's 1998 verdict was not appealed during the year, and the case 
appears to be closed. However, the skinheads convicted for attacking 
Lacko now are facing additional charges for appearing at the trial 
wearing swastikas and for making racial jokes and insults to the media 
and members of the victim's family in the courthouse. The case is 
scheduled to be decided in early 2000.
    Prime Minister Zeman consistently called for the cancellation of 
the official registration of groups sympathetic to the skinhead 
movement, but no action has been taken to date. A February police raid 
in Plzen led to the arrest of 12 skinhead leaders, distributors, and 
producers of Nazi materials. The raid also netted piles of Fascist and 
racist materials, including membership lists, indicating that the group 
was part of a large, well-organized movement with ties to the United 
Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary, and Slovenia. Those arrested were charged 
with dissemination of Fascist propaganda, an offense with a maximum 
penalty of 8 years in prison. The raid was executed prior to a planned 
skinhead rally in Line, near Plzen, and forced the cancellation of the 
event. The case did not go to trial by year's end. On May 1, hundreds 
of skinheads held a rally on a small island in Prague, and police 
arrested a few dozen of the skinheads. Government officials criticized 
city officials for permitting the rally. Also in May, police carried 
out a series of raids on racist and rightwing extremist groups. Police 
interrogated some 100 persons and arrested 1 person on charges that 
included promoting a group that seeks to suppress human rights and 
freedoms.
    There were also occasional Roma-instigated assaults on local law 
enforcement personnel during the year. In January two Romani men from 
Bilina were sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment with a 2-year 
probation, and 12 months' imprisonment with a 5-year probation for 
physical assault on police officers. Local Romani organizations 
generally criticized these attacks and offered their assistance in the 
investigations. In November three Roma who assaulted policemen in Usti 
nad Labem in 1998 were sentenced to 16 months in jail for a racially 
motivated crime.
    Racial and ethnic tensions and discrimination in society were the 
subject of increased media attention during the year. Even when federal 
authorities have spoken out on these issues, local attitudes often have 
proven impervious to change. In June the local city council in Usti nad 
Labem voted to proceed with its long-delayed decision to construct a 6-
foot high, 195-foot long wall between a primarily Romani apartment 
complex and its residents' neighbors across the street. Authorities 
modified the plan to include a children's playground and repave the 
street, but the Government again criticized the construction of the 
wall as a symbol of segregation and approved a plan to refer the matter 
to Parliament should the city council proceed with its plan. In August 
the city announced that it was proceeding immediately with 
construction, but the district government ordered the construction 
stopped, citing discrepancies in the building permit. In October the 
city ignored this and proceeded with construction. The wall was built 
overnight on October 13, with about 80 police officers present to 
prevent any violence. Mayor Ladislav Hruska described the wall as a 
``symbol of law and order.'' On October 18, the Government appointed 
Deputy Minister of Interior Pavel Zarecky as its special mediator to 
resolve the issue of the wall. In November the Government negotiated 
the removal of the wall after it agreed to give the city government 
$85,000 (3 million Czech crowns) to improve social conditions in the 
town. However, the city council announced that it would use a portion 
of the money to buy up the houses of Czech neighbors who refused to 
live next to the Roma. ``Now it will be a real ghetto,'' commented 
Timor Bada, a local Roma activist.
    The Government has been wrestling over plans to remove a pig farm 
in Lety from the site of a World War II Romani concentration camp and 
build a memorial in its place. A team headed by the Human Rights 
Commissioner officially recommended the farm's removal and a public 
collection to finance it, but the Government in April decided against 
taking action due to budgetary constraints. A January public opinion 
poll showed that 11 percent of respondents were willing to participate 
in financing the Lety project, and less than one-quarter of those 
polled were aware that Roma were persecuted under the Nazi regime. Some 
Romani organizations and the Czech Helsinki Committee protested the 
Government's decision and in May began an international boycott of 
Czech pork organized by the Romani National Congress. On May 18, the 
Government agreed to spend $28,600 (1 million Czech crowns) on 
improvements to the monument in Lety. During World War II, 327 Roma, 
including 241 children, died in the camp. The pig farm was built on the 
site in 1974.
    Roma wishing to integrate face practical difficulties in the areas 
of employment and education. A government-commissioned report estimated 
unemployment among Roma at 70 percent, with many unemployed Roma 
subsisting on government support or earnings from illegal activities. 
Some employers refuse to hire Roma and ask local labor offices not to 
send Romani applicants for advertised positions. Many Roma are 
qualified only for low-paying jobs as manual laborers, since very few 
complete secondary education. A higher than average share of the Romani 
population applies for partial or full disability pensions due to the 
occurrence of advanced-stage malignant diseases resulting from the 
neglect of preventive health practices or the lack of available medical 
care in areas with above-average Romani populations. In April the Human 
Rights Commissioner unveiled a 12-point proposal to combat 
discrimination and ``give advantage to Romani firms in placing public 
orders.'' The proposal was being considered by the Government at year's 
end.
    The integration of Romani children into mainstream schools 
frequently is impeded by language and cultural barriers. Official 
estimates indicate that less than 20 percent of the Romani population 
completed the ninth grade, and less than 5 percent completed high 
school. A significant number of Romani children are transferred at an 
early age to ``special schools'' for the mentally disabled and socially 
maladjusted. According to unofficial government estimates, Romani 
children make up 60 percent or more of pupils placed in these special 
schools, although Roma constitute less than 3 percent of the 
population. Some Romani parents do not send their children to school 
regularly due to a fear of violence, the expense of books and supplies, 
or the lack of a strong cultural emphasis on education among some Roma. 
In June 12 Romani families filed suit in the Constitutional Court to 
protest the ``de facto segregation'' of Romani children into special 
schools. The lawsuit requested the establishment of a compensatory 
educational fund, an end to racial segregation within 3 years, and the 
development of an educational reform plan. However, the Constitutional 
Court rejected the complaint in November and stated that it did not 
have the power to order the Ministry of Education to create programs to 
end racial discrimination. The Ministry of Education later took steps 
independently to implement some of the recommended changes. In December 
the Parliament approved legislation allowing qualified Romani students, 
previously relegated to the special schools, to return to attend 
mainstream secondary or upper-level public schools. The legislation was 
drafted by Parliament's sole Romani representative and constituted a 
significant step in opening access to higher education to the Romani 
minority.
    In 1993 the Government created the framework for a number of year-
long programs (so-called zero grades) to prepare disadvantaged youths 
for their first year in school. Many districts with high concentrations 
of Roma participate in the program, which is funded solely by local 
authorities. Nearly 90 zero grades were open during the year, and 
another educational initiative continued placing Romani ``assistant 
teachers'' into the primary and special school system. Their function 
is to help teachers communicate with Romani pupils and encourage 
cooperation between schools and Romani parents. There are now 62 Romani 
assistant teachers in the school system. Some districts tracking local 
Romani students report that up to 70 percent of the children who attend 
zero-grade training successfully enter and remain in mainstream 
schools. During the year, the Education Ministry began using joint 
Romani-Czech language textbooks in 60 elementary schools to help 
overcome the barrier in the early school years between Romani children 
and non-Romani speaking teachers. Local NGO's support additional 
studies and private initiatives to prepare Romani children for 
mainstream schools. Some Roma refuse to cooperate with compulsory 
vaccinations for children or are refused treatment by general 
practitioners who have full quotas of subsidized patients. In 1998 the 
Labor Ministry created and filled 58 district-level positions (out of 
81 districts nationwide) with ``Roma advisors'' or ``Roma assistants'' 
to advise local authorities on Romani issues. Eventually 20 Roma were 
placed in the 58 available positions, and many have made a significant 
contribution to their community. However, some Romani leaders, while 
conceding the difficulties in finding educationally qualified or 
trained Romani applicants to fill these positions, expressed regret 
that only a third eventually were filled by Roma.
    Roma also face discrimination in housing and other areas of 
everyday life. Despite constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, a 
civil law framework to implement these provisions has not been 
incorporated into specific offenses under the Criminal Code. Some 
restaurants, pubs, and other venues refuse service to Roma and post 
signs prohibiting their entry. In July 2 discos in Plzen denied entry 
to 5 Romani students, prompting a boycott of the clubs by over 600 
students at West Bohemia University. The club owners eventually 
apologized. In some cases, local authorities intervened to have such 
signs removed, although in a 1998 retrial a Rokycany pub owner was 
acquitted of refusing to serve Romani patrons in 1996. The state 
attorney appealed the verdict, and the case was heard during the year; 
a decision is expected in early 2000. In October the Hotel Imperial in 
Ostrava agreed to pay an out-of-court settlement of $715 (25,000 Czech 
crowns) to three Roma who it refused to serve in 1998. In October press 
reports revealed that certain unemployment offices regularly mark the 
records of persons who appear to be Roma with the letter ``R.'' The 
findings of a subsequent government inquiry into the matter suggested 
that the problem was not as widespread as originally reported; however, 
authorities still took steps to prevent this practice in the future, 
including updated instructions and clarification of existing policy 
from the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs regarding the 
administration of databases and personal records, and more frequent 
audits by Ministry officials at the regional employment offices. 
Moreover, press accounts during the year revealed that Czech Airlines 
marked the names of persons believed to be Roma with the letter, ``G,'' 
for ``gypsy,'' supposedly to alert authorities in the United Kingdom 
about potential asylum seekers. Officials in the United Kingdom denied 
ever requesting such information from the airline. The practice 
reportedly was discontinued at mid-year.
    In June approximately 100 residents of the town of Krnov signed a 
petition against Roma, complaining that they are noisy on the street, 
listen to loud music, make messes, and spoil the neighborhood. In 
August residents of the Horni Kosovo district in Jihlava also were 
collecting signatures for an anti-Roma petition, and there were reports 
of a similar petition drive in Znojmo in the spring.
    Beginning in 1997, when over 1,200 Roma submitted applications for 
refugee status in Canada and the United Kingdom, Romani families have 
continued to emigrate. At the end of 1998, 70 percent of the applicants 
(737) in Canada were granted asylum. An additional 171 asylum seekers 
applied in 1998. The numbers applying to the United Kingdom have 
increased substantially in spite of the fact that most of these 
requests are denied. By year's end, Romani applicants had filed over 
1,790 requests for asylum, a record. Because this number represents 
only those requests filed by the ``head of the household'' (one 
application per family), the actual number of Romani asylum seekers for 
the year is estimated to be between 6,000 and 7,000. Roma from the 
Czech Republic also filed record numbers of asylum applications in 
Finland and Belgium. Human Rights Commissioner Uhl noted that an 
estimated 10,000 Czech Roma have emigrated in the last 3 years. In July 
a four-person Romani family reportedly was granted asylum in France.
    The Government and some local municipalities began implementing 
programs designed to deal with drug addiction and crime prevention in 
the Romani community during the year. Since these programs still are at 
different stages of implementation, their initial effectiveness is 
uncertain.
    The Interministerial Commission for Romani Community Affairs was 
created in 1997 to analyze government measures proposed by individual 
ministries, to collect information and to inform the Romani community 
about government activities, to allocate grants to supplementary 
programs for the Romani community, and to deal with issues covering 
housing, education, and discrimination. In December 1998, the 
Commission was expanded to include 12 government representatives and 12 
Romani representatives, as well as the Commissioner for Human Rights 
and his deputy. The revamped Commission has taken an increasingly 
active role in resolving disputes between Romani communities and their 
non-Romani neighbors in towns such as Usti nad Labem and Rokycany, as 
well as promoting positive initiatives. Other government initiatives 
have included the organization of a team of specialized ``Romani-
inspectors,'' who are authorized to penalize shop and restaurant owners 
who refuse service to Roma, and increased training and seminar activity 
to promote understanding and tolerance. There also was an active effort 
underway during the year to identify, train, and recruit qualified Roma 
to serve in law enforcement. The national police academy introduced a 
course in Romani language and culture, which was designed to facilitate 
police officers' improved communication and response to the Romani 
communities in their precincts.
    In February the Cabinet submitted to Parliament a draft law to 
allow former Czechoslovak citizens who have lived in the country since 
1993 to claim citizenship by simple declaration. This bill was created 
to remedy the de facto stateless situation of some Czech Roma, who were 
estimated to number between 10,000 and 20,000 persons. The bill passed 
both houses of Parliament and was signed into law on September 23. The 
law also regularizes the status of children in foster care who lacked 
citizenship or permanent residency status. However, the law only 
provides for citizenship for those who have resided primarily in the 
country since 1993. Certain persons who went abroad for extended 
periods, including some asylum seekers and those expelled from the 
country by authorities, may face added difficulty in filing for 
citizenship under the new law. Nor does the law provide benefits to 
those who were denied citizenship and benefits between 1993 and 1999.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the 
right to form and join unions of their own choice without prior 
authorization, and the Government respects this right in practice. 
Union membership continued to decline during the year.
    Most workers are members of unions affiliated with the Czech-
Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions (CMKOS). The CMKOS is a democratically 
oriented, republic-wide umbrella organization for branch unions. It is 
not affiliated with any political party and carefully maintains its 
independence.
    Workers have the right to strike, except for those whose role in 
public order or public safety is deemed crucial. The law requires that 
labor disputes be subject first to mediation and that strikes take 
place only after mediation efforts fail.
    During the year, there were strikes in the transportation and 
equipment manufacturing sectors, as well as a significant coal miners' 
strike in which a large group of workers refused to leave the mines 
until their demands for new wage and job security negotiations were 
met. The miners stayed underground in protest for 2 days before the 
issue was resolved. There were also several demonstrations in front of 
Parliament and government headquarters protesting the growing problem 
of nonpayment of wages by some large manufacturing firms.
    Unions are free to form or join federations and confederations and 
affiliate with and participate in international bodies. This freedom 
was exercised fully.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for collective bargaining, which generally is carried out by 
unions and employers on a company basis. The scope for collective 
bargaining is more limited in the government sector, where wages are 
regulated by law.
    There are 11 free trade zones. Their workers have and practice the 
same right to organize and bargain collectively as other workers in the 
country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and 
it generally is not used; however, trafficking in women and children 
for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code stipulates a minimum working age of 15 
years, although children who completed courses at special schools 
(schools for the mentally disabled and socially maladjusted) may work 
at the age of 14. These prohibitions are enforced in practice. The law 
prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government 
effectively enforces this prohibition (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets minimum wage 
standards. In July the Government increased the minimum wage from 
approximately $108 (3,250 Czech crowns) per month to $115 (3,600 Czech 
crowns), the second raise in 6 months. The monthly average is 
approximately $375 (11,600 Czech crowns) per month. Average net wages 
are 2.1 times as high as official sustenance costs. The minimum wage 
provides a sparse standard of living for a worker and family, although 
allowances are available to families with children. Retraining efforts, 
carried out by district labor offices, seek to provide labor mobility 
for those at the lower end of the wage scale. The enforcement of 
minimum wage standards was not an issue during the year.
    The law mandates a standard workweek of 42\1/2\hours. It also 
requires paid rest of at least 30 minutes during the standard 8- to 
8\1/2\hour workday, as well as annual leave of 3 to 4 weeks. Overtime 
ordered by the employer may not exceed 150 hours per year or 8 hours 
per week as a standard practice, although the local employment office 
may permit overtime above this limit. The Labor Ministry enforces 
standards for working hours, rest periods, and annual leave.
    Government, unions, and employers promote worker safety and health, 
but conditions in some sectors of heavy industry are problematic, 
especially those awaiting privatization. Industrial accident rates are 
not unusually high. The Office of Labor Safety is responsible for 
enforcement of health and safety standards. Workers have the right to 
refuse work endangering their life or health without risk of loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific laws prohibit trafficking in 
women and children, and trafficking in women and girls for the purpose 
of forced prostitution is a problem. Law enforcement officials report 
that the Czech Republic is both a transit and destination country for 
traffickers in women from farther east. Organizing prostitution or 
pandering also is illegal and punishable by a prison term of up to 8 
years, with a term of up to 12 years if the victim is under the age of 
15. (Adults can be prosecuted for engaging in sexual activity with a 
minor under the age of 15.) There have been numerous convictions of 
traffickers as a result of proactive investigative efforts on the part 
of law enforcement officers. The Czech Police Organized Crime Division 
includes a Unit on Trafficking in Persons, established in 1995, which 
cooperates with other nations to enforce these laws.
    A May raid in Chomutov led to the arrest of 4 gang members and the 
release of 27 Ukrainian women who had been forced into prostitution by 
the gang. A March raid in Spain broke up an international ring that 
trafficked Czech and Slovak women into prostitution.
    The full extent of trafficking in children is unknown; however, 
convictions of child sex offenders are reported routinely in the media. 
For example, the conviction of a British national for pedophilia was 
covered widely during the year, as were the cases of several German 
citizens who were detained in cities near the Czech-German border and 
who reportedly had traveled regularly to the country for the purpose of 
soliciting sexual activity from adolescents (particularly young Roma). 
Following these incidents, police personnel took measures to prevent 
this type of ``sexual tourism'' more effectively. Police enhanced 
patrols in high-risk areas, enforced curfew-type policies more 
actively, and raised public awareness of the issue through the media.
                                 ______
                                 

                                DENMARK

    Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democratic 
rule. Queen Margrethe II is Head of State. The Cabinet, accountable to 
the unicameral Parliament (Folketing), leads the Government. A Social 
Democrat-led minority coalition remains in power following a narrow 
election victory in 1998. The judiciary is independent.
    The national police have sole responsibility for internal security. 
The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security 
forces.
    Denmark has an advanced, market-based industrial economy. One-half 
of the work force is employed in the public sector. The key industries 
are food processing and metalworking. A broad range of industrial goods 
is exported. The economy provides residents with a high standard of 
living.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with 
instances of individual abuse. Trafficking in women is a problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c.Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no 
reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this 
prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The judicial system consists of a series of local and regional 
courts, with the Supreme Court at the apex.
    The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent 
judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
the press, and the Government respects this right in practice. An 
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a democratic political 
system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press, including 
academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice. It also 
provides for an official state religion, the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, which is subsidized by the Government. The Evangelical Lutheran 
faith is taught in public schools, but students may withdraw from 
religious classes with parental consent. The government does not 
require that religious groups be licensed, but the state's permission 
is required for religious ceremonies, for example, weddings, that have 
civil validity.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The law provides for the granting of refugee or asylum status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum and provided 
it to approximately 2,300 persons in the first 6 months of 1999, and to 
approximately 5,700 persons in 1998. There were no reports of the 
forced expulsion of refugees to a country where they feared persecution 
or of those having a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The law provides citizens with the right to change their government 
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through 
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage.
    The territories of Greenland (whose population is primarily Inuit) 
and the Faroe Islands (whose inhabitants have their own Norse language) 
have elected democratically home rule governments with powers 
encompassing all matters except foreign affairs, monetary affairs, and 
national security. Greenlanders and Faroese are Danish citizens with 
the same rights as those in the rest of the Kingdom. Each territory 
elects two representatives to the Folketing.
    Women are active in government and politics at both the local and 
national levels. In the current Government, 7 of 20 Government 
ministers are women, as are 67 of the Parliament's 179 members. Aside 
from two parliamentarians of mixed ancestry (both from Greenland), 
ethnic minorities are not represented in the Government, although they 
are represented in local politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are cooperative and responsive to 
their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Government's operations and extensive public services do not 
discriminate on the basis of any of these factors. The law prohibits 
discrimination on the basis of sex, and the Government enforces it 
effectively. Discrimination on the basis of race is covered by two 
laws, which prohibit racial slander and denial of access to public 
places on the basis of race. The rights of indigenous people are 
protected carefully.
    Women.--An umbrella nongovernmental organization reports that in 
1998, women's crisis shelters were contacted approximately 9,000 times, 
compared with 9,961 times in 1997. A total of 1,934 women stayed at 
shelters during 1998, compared with 1,623 women in 1997. There were 150 
reported rapes in the first 6 months of 1999, compared with 418 in 
1998.
    The law requires equal pay for equal work, but some wage inequality 
still exists. The law prohibits job discrimination on the basis of sex 
and provides recourse, such as access to the Equal Status Council, for 
those so affected. Women hold positions of authority throughout 
society, although they are underrepresented at the top of the business 
world. Women's rights groups effectively lobby the Government in their 
areas of concern, such as wage disparities and parental leave.
    The problem of trafficking in women for the purpose of 
prostitution, particularly from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, 
remained a focus of government concern during the year (see Section 
6.f.).
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The Ministries of Social Affairs, Justice, 
and Education oversee implementation of programs for children.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. In 1997 the 
Folketing passed legislation that banned the physical punishment of 
children by adults, including their parents.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. Building regulations require special facilities for the 
disabled in public buildings built or renovated after 1977 and in older 
buildings that come into public use. The Government enforces these 
provisions in practice.
    Indigenous People.--The law protects the rights of the inhabitants 
of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Greenland's legal system seeks to 
accommodate Inuit customs. Accordingly, it provides for the use of lay 
persons as judges and sentences most prisoners to holding centers 
(rather than to prisons) where they are encouraged to work, hunt, or 
fish during the day. Education in Greenland is provided to the native 
population in both the Inuit and Danish languages.
    In August the High Court ruled that the government unjustly 
resettled Greenland Inuits in 1953 in order to accommodate the 
expansion of a U.S. Air Force base in northwest Greenland. The Court 
ordered the Government to pay compensation to the displaced 
Greenlanders and their descendants. The compensation is substantially 
less than the defendants sued for, and the case was under appeal to the 
Supreme Court at year's end. In September the office of Prime Minister 
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen issued a joint declaration with the home rule 
chairman of Greenland apologizing for the way the decision on the 
resettlement was reached and the manner in which it was carried out.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The inflow of ethnically and 
racially diverse refugees and immigrants provoked a degree of tension 
between Danes and immigrants (mostly Iranians, Palestinians, 
Pakistanis, and Sri Lankans until late 1992; refugees are now 
overwhelmingly from Somalia or the former Yugoslavia). In response to 
publicity concerning the involvement of foreigners in street crime and 
allegations of social welfare fraud committed by refugees, Parliament 
passed tighter immigration laws in June 1998, which took effect on 
January 1. Family reunification is now more difficult, and immigrants 
and refugees can no longer acquire permanent residence by living in the 
country for 18 months; rather they must now reside for 3 years and 
demonstrate that they have integrated into society. Additionally, they 
receive a special integration allowance that is 20 percent lower than 
the social benefits that a citizen receives. Critics claim that this 
provision violates the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees.
    Incidents of racial discrimination and racially motivated violence 
occur but are rare. The Government effectively investigates and deals 
with cases of racially motivated violence.
    In November Copenhagen experienced some of its worst rioting in 
years. The rioters were protesting a High Court decision to expel a 23-
year-old Turkish citizen. Although not a Danish citizen, the individual 
grew up and has close family in Denmark, including a wife and child. 
The Court ordered the expulsion for life to take effect immediately 
after a 3-year jail term for armed robbery.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law states that all workers, 
including military personnel and the police, may form or join unions of 
their choosing. Approximately 80 percent of wage earners belong to 
unions that are independent of the Government and political parties. 
All unions except those representing civil servants or the military 
have the right to strike.
    Unions may affiliate freely with international organizations, and 
they do so actively.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers and 
employers acknowledge each other's right to organize. Collective 
bargaining is protected by law and is widespread in practice. The law 
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union members 
and organizers, and there are mechanisms to resolve disputes. Employers 
found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to reinstate 
workers fired for union activities. In the private sector, salaries, 
benefits, and working conditions are agreed upon in biennial or 
triennial negotiations between the various employers' associations and 
their union counterparts. If the negotiations fail, a national 
conciliation board mediates, and its proposal is voted on by management 
and labor. If the proposal is rejected, the Government may force a 
legislated solution on the parties (usually based upon the mediators' 
proposal). The agreements, in turn, are used as guidelines throughout 
the public as well as the private sector. In the public sector, 
collective bargaining is conducted between the employees' unions and a 
government group, led by the Finance Ministry.
    Labor relations in Greenland are conducted in the same manner as in 
Denmark. Greenland's courts are the first recourse in disputes, but 
Danish mediation services or the Danish Labor Court also may be used.
    There is no umbrella labor organization in the Faroes, but 
individual unions engage in periodic collective bargaining with 
employers. Disputes are settled by mediation.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or bonded 
labor, by adults or children is prohibited by law, and this prohibition 
is enforced effectively by the Government.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for full-time employment is 15 years. A 
1996 change in the work environment law tightened employment rules for 
those under 18 years of age and set a minimum of 13 years of age for 
any type of work. The law is enforced by the Danish Working Environment 
Service (DWES), an autonomous arm of the Ministry of Labor. Export 
industries do not use child labor. Forced and bonded child labor is 
prohibited and does not occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No national minimum wage is 
mandated legally, but national labor agreements effectively set a wage 
floor. The lowest wage paid is currently about $12 (80 kroner) per 
hour, which is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. The law provides for 5 weeks of paid vacation per 
year. A 37-hour workweek is the norm, established by contract, not by 
law. However, the law requires at least 11 hours between the end of one 
work period and the start of the next.
    The law also prescribes conditions of work, including safety and 
health; the duties of employers, supervisors, and employees; work 
performance; rest periods and days off; and medical examinations. The 
DWES ensures compliance with labor legislation. Workers may remove 
themselves from hazardous situations or weapons production without 
jeopardizing their employment rights, and legal protections cover 
workers who file complaints about unsafe or unhealthy conditions.
    Similar conditions of work are found in Greenland and the Faroes, 
except that the workweek is 40 hours. As in Denmark, the workweek is 
established by contract, not by law.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--In January the Ministry of Justice 
asked the State Attorney to evaluate the need for new laws against the 
import and exploitation of women.
    The problem of trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution 
remained a focus of government concern during the year. Of particular 
concern is the importation of women from Eastern Europe and Southeast 
Asia who, lured by the prospect of higher wages and a better life, find 
themselves forced into a life of prostitution by individuals, suspected 
of being part of organized crime, who brought them into the country. No 
concrete statistics are available as to how many women are involved in 
prostitution. The Minister of Justice's plans, announced in 1998, to 
convene a commission in March 1999 to look into the problem were 
dropped without explanation.
                                 ______
                                 

                                ESTONIA

    Estonia is a parliamentary democracy. With its statehood widely 
recognized as continuous for more than 70 years, Estonia regained its 
independence in 1991 after 50 years of Soviet occupation. The 
Constitution, adopted by referendum in 1992, established a 101-member 
unicameral legislature (State Assembly), a prime minister as Head of 
Government, and a president as Head of State. The judiciary is 
independent.
    Efforts to develop and strengthen a Western-type police force 
committed to procedures and safeguards appropriate to a democratic 
society are proceeding, with police leadership actively working to 
professionalize the force. The police, who are ethnically mixed, are 
subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Corrections personnel 
are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice. The security service, 
called Security Police, is subordinate to the Interior Ministry but 
also reports to the Prime Minister. Police and corrections personnel 
continued to commit human rights abuses.
    Estonia has a market economy. Reflecting the extent of post-1992 
reforms, the Government started accession negotiations with the 
European Union. Services, especially financial and tourism, are growing 
in importance compared to historically more prominent light industry 
and food production. The privatization of firms, including small, 
medium, and large-scale enterprises, is virtually complete. The 
Government is working on privatizing the remaining state-owned 
infrastructure enterprises. The growth of the economy has slowed, with 
an estimated increase of gross domestic product (GDP) of about 0.4 
percent in 1999. Although prices continue to rise, incomes are rising 
faster than inflation. Per capita GDP is about $3,677 per year. Two-
thirds of exports (textiles, food products, wood, and timber products) 
now are directed to Western markets. Unemployment remained fairly low 
overall (unofficially about 8 percent), but it was significantly higher 
in rural areas.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
and the large noncitizen community; however, problems remained in some 
areas. The major human rights abuses continued to be mistreatment of 
prisoners and detainees and the use of excessive force by the police. 
Prison conditions are poor. The deadline for noncitizens to file for 
permanent residency expired in 1996, after being extended twice. An 
undetermined number of noncitizens still have not filed for residency. 
By mid-year 18,000 of 19,000 noncitizen former Soviet military 
personnel had received temporary residence permits. Processing of 
applications for alien passports continued. By year's end, most 
applicants for alien passports had received them. The Government 
continued to issue temporary travel documents and to accept officially 
invalid former Soviet internal passports for identification in 
emergency situations, such as registering births and deaths.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    In 1998, President Lennart Meri created an international commission 
for research into crimes against humanity perpetrated in the country 
from 1940-91. The commission began work in January and held three 
formal meetings during the year. In November the Commission authorized 
sending an investigator to study materials in the Russian and German 
archives addressing this era.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices; however, there continued 
to be credible reports that police used excessive force and verbal 
abuse during the arrest and questioning of suspects. Punishment cells 
(``kartsers'') continued to be used, in contravention of international 
standards.
    Prison conditions remained poor, although there were some 
improvements. A lack of funds and trained staff continued to be a 
serious problem. Overcrowding in the antiquated Tallinn Central Prison 
persisted. The percentage of prisoners suffering from tuberculosis was 
much higher than in the general population. The Government has 
refurbished some prison buildings. Modest gains were made in hiring new 
prison staff and retaining existing personnel. Work and study 
opportunities for prisoners increased slightly as the Government 
implemented new programs. The Government is considering new regulations 
that would reduce significantly the number of persons incarcerated and 
thereby alleviate overcrowding. During the year, 341 prisoners had been 
released in the calendar year under the Government's early release 
program for prisoners. Unlike previous years, there were no reports of 
prisoners killed by other prisoners.
    The Government has drafted but not yet implemented a multiyear plan 
to refurbish and restructure all the country's prisons and to close the 
Tallinn Central Prison.
    The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and 
laws forbid arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government 
generally observes these prohibitions. Under the Constitution, warrants 
issued by a court are required to make arrests. Detainees must be 
informed promptly of the grounds for the arrest and given immediate 
access to legal counsel. If a person cannot afford counsel, the State 
will provide one. A person may be held for 48 hours without formally 
being charged; further detention requires a court order. A person may 
be held in pretrial detention for 2 months; this term may be extended 
to a total of 12 months by court order. Police rarely violate these 
limits. As of year's end, 1,392 of the 4,528 persons held in prisons 
were awaiting trial.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution establishes an 
independent judicial branch, and the judiciary is independent in 
practice. The judiciary operates through a three-tier court system: 
rural and city courts; district courts; and the State Court (which 
functions as a supreme court). The district and state courts are also 
courts for ``constitutional supervision.'' At the rural and city 
levels, court decisions are made by a majority vote with a judge and 
two lay members sitting in judgment. All judges and lay judges must be 
citizens. The President nominates and the State Assembly confirms the 
Chief Justice of the State Court. The Chief Justice nominates State 
Court judges who are subject to confirmation by the State Assembly. He 
also nominates the district, city, and rural court judges who are then 
appointed by the President. Judges are appointed for life.
    The role of the Chancellor of Justice and the ombudsman have been 
combined under legislation passed by Parliament in February. Parliament 
rejected a proposal for an independent ombudsman. The ombudsman is to 
handle complaints by private citizens against state institutions; the 
Chancellor has started such work.
    The Constitution provides that court proceedings shall be public. 
Closed sessions may be held only for specific reasons, such as the 
protection of state or business secrets, and in cases concerning 
minors. The Constitution further provides that defendants may present 
witnesses and evidence as well as confront and cross-examine 
prosecution witnesses. Defendants have access to prosecution evidence 
and enjoy a presumption of innocence.
    The Government continued to overhaul the country's criminal and 
civil procedural codes. An interim Criminal Code that went into effect 
in 1992 basically revised the Soviet Criminal Code by eliminating, for 
example, political and economic crimes. The Code of Criminal Procedure 
was adopted in 1994.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law requires a search warrant for the search and 
seizure of property. During the investigative stage, warrants are 
issued by the prosecutor upon a showing of probable cause. Once a case 
has gone to court, warrants are issued by the court. The Constitution 
provides for secrecy of the mail, telegrams, telephones, and other 
means of communication. Police must obtain a court order to intercept a 
person's communications. Illegally obtained evidence is not admissible 
in court.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government respects 
constitutional provisions providing for freedom of speech and of the 
press. The media routinely carry out probing and thorough investigative 
reporting. Foreign newspapers and magazines are widely available. All 
newsprint, printing, and distribution facilities are private companies. 
There are four major national Estonian language and two Russian 
language dailies, in addition to important weeklies. In a widely 
reported 1997 case, a well-known journalist was tried and convicted for 
insulting the spouse of a prominent politician in a newspaper interview 
and received a fine. All levels of the judiciary upheld the sentence. 
The European Court of Human Rights agreed in 1998 to hear the case, and 
it was still pending at year's end.
    The Law on Language prohibits the use of any foreign language on 
all public signs, advertisements, and notices, including election 
posters. The prohibition on campaign posters written in other than 
Estonian resulted in protests by one political party.
    State and public broadcast media, including one nationwide 
television channel (Estonian Television/ETV), continued to receive 
large government subsidies. Although the State once assured that these 
subsidies would continue, some officials called during the year for the 
combination of ETV and Estonian radio, along with a simultaneous 
reduction in their budgets by 50 percent. In 1998 Estonian Television 
(ETV) agreed not to broadcast commercials in return for annual 
subsidies from the commercial television stations; however, early in 
the year the agreement collapsed and state television again began to 
carry commercials, placing it in competition with commercial channels 
for advertising revenue.
    The Estonian Broadcasting Council fired the general director of 
ETV, Toomas Lepp, on December 13 stating that Lepp was discharged 
because of management failures, financial difficulties at ETV, and 
Lepp's ``undisciplined'' behavior. Lepp said that his discharge had 
political motivation and was illegal, and he said that he would protest 
to the Arbitration Board. At year's end, the issue was unresolved.
    There are several major independent television and radio stations. 
Several Russian-language programs, mostly produced in Estonia, are 
broadcast over state and private television channels. The Government 
played a key role in encouraging Russian language programs on state 
television. These Russian programs include highly professional talk 
shows and comprehensive news broadcasts. However, government budget 
cuts initiated during the year reduced the budget of ETV's Russian-
language department by 30 to 40 percent, reducing the department's 
ability to create self-produced programs. Russian state television and 
Ostankino programs are widely available via cable.
    The country still lacks a law on freedom of information. The 
governmental expert committee has worked out a draft law, but it has 
become an object of criticism. Neither journalists nor parliamentarians 
agree with the draft law. At year's end, Parliament had not passed the 
freedom of information bill.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to assemble freely, but noncitizens are 
prohibited from joining political parties, although they may form 
social groups. Permits for all public gatherings must be obtained 3 
weeks prior to the date of the gathering. The authorities have wide 
discretion to prohibit such gatherings on public safety grounds but 
seldom do so. There were no reports of government interference in mass 
gatherings or political rallies.
    The Constitution provides for the right of free association, and 
the Government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    The 1993 Law on Churches and Religious Organizations requires all 
religious organizations to have at least 12 members and to be 
registered with the Interior Ministry and the Board of Religion. 
Leaders of religious organizations must be citizens with at least 5 
years' residence in the country.
    The majority of citizens are nominally Lutheran, but following 
deep-seated tradition there is wide tolerance of other denominations 
and religions. Persons of varying ethnic backgrounds profess Orthodoxy, 
including communities of the descendants of Russian Old Believers who 
found refuge in Estonia in the 17th century. The Estonian Apostolic 
Orthodox Church (EAOC), independent since 1919, subordinate to 
Constantinople since 1923, and exiled under the Soviet occupation, 
reregistered under its 1935 statute in August 1993. Since then, a group 
of ethnic Estonian and Russian parishes preferring to remain under the 
authority of the Russian Orthodox Church structure imposed during the 
Soviet occupation has insisted that it should have claim to the EAOC 
name. Representatives of the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates 
agreed in May that the Moscow Patriarchate would register under a new 
name. In June the State and the Moscow Patriarchate reached a tentative 
agreement over the use of Nevski Cathedral and Kuremae Monastery. The 
Moscow Patriarchate agreed to allow the monastery to be registered as 
state property, after which the State would either donate or rent the 
property back to the Moscow Patriarchate. Throughout the dispute, free 
worship has occurred in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law permits free movement within the 
country, and it is honored in practice. The law also provides for the 
right of foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation for citizens. 
Passports serve as identification but do not have to be carried at all 
times. There are no exit visas.
    In 1993 Parliament enacted a Law on Aliens that defines an alien as 
a person who is not a citizen of Estonia, that is, a citizen of another 
country or a stateless person. The majority of noncitizens are ethnic 
Russians. The law provided a 1-year period during which noncitizens who 
came to Estonia prior to July 1, 1990, and were permanent residents of 
the former Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, could apply for 
temporary residence permits. They also could apply for permanent 
residence at the same time. Following delays and confusion in 
implementation as well as criticism by international human rights 
observers, the application deadline was extended by a year, until July 
12, 1995. By that date the vast majority of aliens--327,737 of the 
estimated 370,000--had filed applications. The Government extended the 
registration period until April 30, 1996. An indeterminate number of 
noncitizens--estimates ranged from 20,000 to 50,000--still had not 
registered. In 1997 the Government began a campaign to register this 
group of aliens, pledging not to take any measures against them. By 
September 1998, some 2,000 had come forward. In 1997 the Government 
proposed and Parliament approved an amendment to the aliens law that 
allowed those who had applied for residence by July 12, 1995, to change 
temporary residence permits to permanent ones. This law was implemented 
in September 1998, 2 years earlier than the original act envisioned.
    There were complaints about the slow pace with which the Government 
was processing residence applications for some 19,000 Russian military 
pensioners. The process was complicated by the lack of Russian-provided 
passports in which to affix the permits. An estimated 35 percent of the 
first group of military pensioners missed the deadline to present their 
passports for residence permits. Technically, the Citizenship and 
Migration Board could move to have them deported. However, by mid-year 
no recommendations to deport any persons had been made. The Government 
is moving on a case-by-case basis to solve the outstanding issues. By 
September, out of some 19,000 persons who applied, the Government 
issued 17,000 temporary residence permits to retired Russian 
servicemen. Approximately 2,200 retired Russian servicemen have 
submitted applications to extend their residency. The Government 
refused residence to 22 former members of the Soviet military forces.
    No restrictions are placed on the right of noncitizens to foreign 
travel, emigration, or repatriation, although some noncitizens complain 
of delays in obtaining travel documents. The Government began issuing 
temporary travel documents valid for a single departure and reentry 
into the country to resident aliens in 1994. To accommodate the entry 
visa requirements of other countries, the validity period of the 
document was extended in 1994 from 6 months to 2 years. In late 1994, 
the Government began issuing alien passports, which are issued to 
resident aliens not in possession of any other valid travel document. 
Such aliens included: (1) persons who are designated as stateless; (2) 
foreign citizens who lack the opportunity to obtain travel documents 
from their country of origin or from another state; (3) persons who 
file for Estonian citizenship and pass the language examination if 
required; and (4) aliens who are permanently departing Estonia. The 
Government plans to expand the classes of noncitizens eligible for 
alien passports. It already has approved their issuance to noncitizens 
intending to study abroad and has agreed to issue them to former 
military personnel who cannot or do not want to take out Russian 
citizenship. By year's end, approximately 216,000 persons had applied 
for alien passports and 190,190 passports had been issued.
    The Government deported a relatively small number of illegal 
aliens, usually those caught in criminal acts. By September 18 illegal 
aliens were held as internees, pending deportation or a court order 
granting them residence. Internees are held in a wing of a regular 
prison. In July Finland and Estonia entered into a cooperation 
agreement to construct a new facility for illegal aliens and asylum 
seekers in East Viru county.
    In 1997 Parliament passed a refugee law that brought domestic 
legislation into conformity with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and also in 1997 amended 
several social security acts to provide refugees with social benefits 
identical to those of citizens. In February Parliament passed 
amendments to the refugee law that delegated authority from the 
Government to the Citizenship and Migration Board, clarified the 
refusal of refugee status, and established a state registry for asylum. 
In accordance with one of the articles contained in these amendments, 
starting on October 1 temporary residence permits could be granted to 
persons whose applications for a residence permit are based on an 
international agreement. The program began as scheduled, and as of 
October 13, 43 persons had applied for asylum of whom 33 still were 
waiting for a reply. All 10 of the applications that had been processed 
were turned down by the Citizenship and Migration Board on the grounds 
that the applicants did not fulfill the criteria for refugee status as 
defined in the 1951 U.N. Convention.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government. In March free 
and fair elections to the Parliament were held. The new Government is a 
coalition of the Pro Patria, Moderate, and Reform Parties. Among the 
deputies are four ethnic Russians. Indirect presidential elections were 
held in 1996. When the Parliament failed to muster the required two-
thirds majority to elect the President, an Electoral Assembly 
consisting of Members of Parliament and representatives of local 
governments convened and reelected the incumbent, Lennart Meri.
    Local elections were held in October. According to legislation, 
resident noncitizens and those who have lived permanently in the area 
for at least 5 years preceding the election can vote but cannot run for 
office. The local elections were free and fair. All candidates had 
certified that they knew Estonian sufficiently to be able to function 
in local government.
    The 1992 Citizenship Law readopted the 1938 Citizenship Law. 
According to that law, anyone born after 1940 to a citizen parent is a 
citizen by birth. The parent does not have to be an ethnic Estonian. 
The Government estimates that under this provision some 80,000 persons 
not ethnically Estonian have obtained citizenship. The law included 
requirements for naturalization, such as a 2-year residency 
requirement, to be followed by a 1-year waiting period, as well as 
knowledge of the Estonian language. According to Max van der Stoel, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High 
Commissioner on National Minorities, over 200,000 persons experienced a 
reduction in status to that of resident alien. Citizenship is provided 
to those who were citizens in 1940 and their descendants, not to those 
who moved to Estonia during occupation (resident aliens).
    In 1995 Parliament adopted a Citizenship Law revising the 1992 law 
and combining into one statute provisions regarding citizenship that 
were scattered among several pieces of legislation. It extended the 
residency requirement for naturalization from 2 to 5 years and added a 
requirement for knowledge of the Constitution and the Citizenship Law. 
Persons who had taken up legal residence in the country prior to July 
1, 1990, are exempt from the 5-year legal residence and 1-year waiting 
period requirements. The law allows the Government to waive the 
language requirement but not the civic knowledge requirement for 
applicants who have Estonian language elementary or higher education, 
or who have performed valuable service to Estonia. In December 1998, 
Parliament approved legislation that amended the citizenship law to 
grant citizenship to stateless children born after February 26, 1992 to 
legally resident stateless parents (upon the parents' or guardians' 
application). The President proclaimed the law in December 1998, and it 
went into effect on July 12. As of September 2, parents had applied for 
citizenship for 34 such children.
    On October 1, the Government dropped the immigration quota on the 
issuance of residence permits to those noncitizens who settled in the 
country prior to July 1, 1990, and who have not departed the country 
subsequently.
    By law the following classes of persons are ineligible for 
naturalization: those filing on the basis of false data or documents; 
those not abiding by the constitutional system or not fulfilling the 
laws; those who have acted against the State and its security; those 
who have committed crimes and have been punished with a sentence of 
more than 1 year or who have been repeatedly brought to justice for 
felonies; those who work or have worked in the intelligence or security 
services of a foreign state; or those who have served as career 
soldiers in the armed forces of a foreign state, including those 
discharged into the reserves or retired. (The latter includes spouses 
who have come to Estonia in connection with the service member's 
assignment to a posting, the reserves, or retirement.) A provision of 
the law allows for the granting of citizenship to a foreign military 
retiree who has been married to a native citizen for 5 years.
    Between 1992 and August 1, 108,383 persons received citizenship 
through naturalization. The vast majority of these persons, 87,712, 
were naturalized by the end of 1996. In 1997 the Russian embassy 
reported that some 120,000 persons had obtained Russian citizenship; 
however, the Embassy declined to supply the Government with a list. The 
number of Russian citizens may be lower since the Russian Embassy does 
not appear to keep records of those who die or leave the country. The 
Government reported that by August 1 it had issued 144,631 residence 
permits to foreign nationals. As of August, the Government also had 
issued 35,816 permanent and 16,180 temporary residence permits.
    While some officials in the Russian Government and in the local 
Russian community continued to criticize the citizenship law as 
discriminatory, the OSCE as well as numerous international fact-finding 
organizations, including the Finnish Helsinki Committee, confirm that 
the Citizenship Law conforms to international standards.
    Bureaucratic delays and the Estonian language requirement are also 
cited as disincentives for securing citizenship. The Government has 
established language-training centers, but there is a lack of qualified 
teachers, financial resources, and training materials. Some allege that 
the examination process, which 75 to 90 percent pass, is arbitrary.
    There are no legal impediments to women's participation in 
government or politics. However, women are underrepresented in 
government and politics. There are 18 women among the 101 members of 
Parliament. Two ministers are women. There are four ethnic Russian 
deputies in Parliament. At year's end, the law was amended to place 
language requirements on Members of Parliament; Russian speakers 
protested.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not restrict the formation or functioning of 
human rights organizations. In response to allegations of poor 
treatment of ethnic minorities, the President established a Human 
Rights Institute, which first convened in 1992. The purpose of the 
Institute is to monitor human rights in the country and to provide 
information to the international community. It investigates reports of 
human rights violations, such as allegations of police abuse and 
inhuman treatment of detainees. In 1997 the Institute established an 
information center in the heavily ethnic Russian town of Kohtla-Jarve. 
In addition because of tensions surrounding the adoption of the 
Elections Law and the Aliens Law in 1993, the President established a 
roundtable composed of representatives of Parliament, the Union of 
Estonian Nationalities, and the Russian speaking population's 
Representative Assembly. An analogous but independent roundtable meets 
in the county of East Virumaa. In addition with initial funding from 
the Danish government, a nongovernmental legal information center in 
Tallinn provides free legal assistance to individuals--citizen and 
noncitizen alike--seeking advice on human rights-related issues.
    Because of repeated Russian allegations of human rights violations 
among the noncitizen population, both the OSCE mission in Estonia and 
the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities have declared that 
they could not find a pattern of human rights violations or abuses in 
the country. The Government in 1998 addressed two outstanding 
recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, 
by simplifying the civic knowledge portion of the naturalization 
process and passing legislation to grant automatic citizenship to 
children born after February 26, 1992 to resident stateless persons 
upon parental application. There are also at least 10 nongovernmental 
organizations devoted to developing and implementing local programs to 
assist the integration of non-Estonians into society.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, disability, language, social status, or for any other reason. 
The Government reports that no court cases charging discrimination have 
been filed. Two court cases begun in 1998 are pending but have not come 
to trial, regarding allegations of racial hatred fomented by a leader 
of a Russian military pensioners' group in northeast Estonia. The 
pensioners' leader organized an unauthorized assembly in the city of 
Sillamae and claimed that the human rights of the Russian pensioners in 
the region were abused by the Government. There are no regulations on 
how deaf or blind persons are to take the language or citizenship 
tests.
    Women.--Violence against women, including spousal abuse, was the 
subject of increasing discussion and media coverage. According to 
women's groups and law enforcement officials, family violence is not 
pervasive. Rape and attempted rape occur relatively infrequently. 
During the year, there were reports of 50 rapes and 3 attempted rapes, 
compared with 53 rapes and 14 attempted rapes for 1998. However, 
studies show that 40 percent of crime in the country goes unreported, 
including domestic violence. Even when the police are called, the 
abused spouse often declines to press charges.
    Both the Center of Women Citizens and a roundtable of women's 
organizations were established in 1998. Women have the same legal 
rights as men and legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work. 
Nevertheless, although women's average educational level was higher 
than that of men, their average pay was lower, and the trend did not 
seem to be improving. There continue to be female- and male-dominated 
professions. Women constitute slightly more than half of the work 
force. They also carry major household responsibilities.
    Children.--The Government's strong commitment to education is 
evidenced by the high priority that it gives to building and 
refurbishing schools. The Government provides free medical care for 
children and subsidizes school meals. In 1992 the Government adopted a 
Law on Child Protection patterned after the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child.
    There is no societal pattern of child abuse, but a 1995 research 
project conducted by the nongovernmental Estonian Union for Child 
Welfare on children and violence at home found that a significant 
proportion of children had experienced at least occasional violence at 
home, in schools, or in youth gangs. In the first 7 months of the year, 
police registered 10 cases of sexual abuse--7 female victims and 3 male 
victims. In the same time period, there were 54 cases of procurement 
for prostitution of victims younger than age 16. Also in the first 7 
months of the year, there were no rape cases in which the victim was 
younger than 14.
    People with Disabilities.--While the Constitution contains 
provisions to protect disabled persons against discrimination, and both 
the State and some private organizations provide them with financial 
assistance, little has been done to enable the disabled to participate 
normally in public life. There is no public access law, but some effort 
to accommodate the disabled is evident in the inclusion of ramps at 
curbs on new urban sidewalk construction. Public transportation firms 
have acquired some vehicles that are accessible to the disabled, as 
have some taxi companies. There are no regulations on how deaf or blind 
persons are to take the language or citizenship tests.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The OSCE mission in Estonia, 
established in 1993, continued to promote stability, dialog, and 
understanding among communities. The President's Roundtable, also 
established in 1993, is composed of Members of Parliament, 
representatives of the Union of Estonian Nationalities, and the 
Representative Assembly of the Russian Community; it continued to work 
toward finding practical solutions to problems of noncitizens. The 
analogous but independent roundtable that met in the northeastern part 
of the country (see Section 4) worked on similar issues.
    The Law on Cultural Autonomy for citizens belonging to minority 
groups went into effect in 1993. The tradition of protection for 
cultural autonomy dates from a 1925 law. Some noncitizens termed the 
law discriminatory, since it restricts cultural autonomy only to 
citizens. The Government replied that noncitizens can participate fully 
in ethnic organizations and that the law includes subsidies for 
cultural organizations.
    The population is slightly less than 1.5 million. Ethnic Russians 
total approximately 29 percent, and nonethnic Estonians total 
approximately 37 percent. During the years of the country's forced 
annexation by the Soviet Union, large numbers of non-Estonians, 
predominantly ethnic Russians, were encouraged to migrate to Estonia to 
work as laborers and administrators. These immigrants and their 
descendants now compose approximately one-third of the total 
population; about 40 percent of them were born in Estonia. 
Approximately 8 percent of the population of the pre-1940 Republic was 
ethnic Russian.
    Some noncitizens, especially Russians, continued to allege job, 
salary, and housing discrimination because of Estonian language 
requirements. Russian government officials and parliamentarians echoed 
these charges in a variety of forums. In March 1998, the Government 
accepted a Russian Government proposal to establish a high-level 
commission to examine all aspects of bilateral relations. One of the 
subgroups of the commission would examine the humanitarian aspects of 
the Russian minority in Estonia and possibly of the Estonian minority 
in Russia. By year's end, the commission had been established, but it 
had not met.
    Other than for land ownership, the 1993 Law does not distinguish 
between citizens and noncitizens for purposes of business or property 
ownership. A 1996 law on land ownership further liberalized land 
ownership by foreigners; such ownership now is restricted only in 
certain strategic areas. All legal residents of Estonia may participate 
equally in the privatization of state-owned housing.
    Estonian language requirements for those employed in the civil 
service went into effect in 1993. As originally passed, the Law on 
Public Service required state employees to be proficient in Estonian by 
the end of 1995. In December 1995, Parliament amended the Law on Public 
Service to allow noncitizen local and national government employees 
without adequate Estonian to continue working until February 1, 1997. 
No noncitizens were to be hired after January 1, 1996. This amendment 
reflected the Government's awareness that in some sectors, the number 
of employees with inadequate Estonian remained high. On February 9, the 
Parliament again amended the Law on Language, requiring that all public 
servants, service personnel, and sole proprietors must be able to use 
the Estonian language. While the Government is to establish regulations 
pertaining to and describing the level of proficiency, the actual 
proficiency is to be determined through examination. Non-Estonian 
citizens who have obtained at least primary education proficiency in 
the language are exempted from the requirement to pass a language 
examination. On July 27, the Government issued the implementation 
decree for the amendments to the language law regarding public sector 
employees as well as those employed in the medical profession. The 
implementing decree for private sector workers was expected in October, 
but it was not issued by year's end.
    In May 1997, 3 policemen were dismissed for not knowing sufficient 
Estonian; earlier in 1997, 11 policemen were dismissed for not filing 
for Estonian citizenship by the established deadline. Also in 1997, 
five prosecutors and two judges were dismissed for presenting forged 
certificates regarding their knowledge of Estonian; two have been 
restored to their positions; criminal charges against one judge were 
dropped. At the end of 1998, a total of 300 police officers had been 
dismissed because of their poor command of Estonian and failure to 
acquire citizenship, and they have not been rehired.
    The language office liberally grants extensions to persons who can 
explain their failure to meet the requisite competence level in 4 
years. Estonian language training is available; however, some claim 
that it is too costly. Some Russian representatives have asked for free 
language training. They have charged also that the language requirement 
for citizenship is too difficult. There has been a proposal to make the 
language requirement less rigorous. The examination fee for either 
language test--for employment or citizenship--is 15 percent of the 
monthly minimum wage, although it is waived for the unemployed.
    Legislation and a government decision provide that, in districts 
where more than one-half of the population speak a language other than 
Estonian, the inhabitants are entitled to receive official information 
in that language.
    All residents, whether or not they are citizens, can complain 
directly to the State Court about alleged violations of human or 
constitutional rights. The State Court justices review each case and 
have decided in favor of complainants. All decisions are in Estonian 
but if a complaint is received in a language other than Estonian 
(usually Russian) the court provides a complimentary translation.
    Two court cases begun in 1998 are pending but have not come to 
trial; they concern allegations of racial hatred fomented by a leader 
of a Russian military pensioners' group in northeast Estonia.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to form and join a union or employee association. The Central 
Organization of Estonian Trade Unions (EAKL) came into being as a 
wholly voluntary and purely Estonian organization in 1990 to replace 
the Estonian branch of the official Soviet labor confederation, the 
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The EAKL has 65,000 members. 
Another trade union, the Organization of Employee Unions, split from 
the EAKL in 1993 and has 45,000 members. A central union of food 
processing and rural workers was established in 1997. About one-third 
of the country's labor force belongs to one of the three labor 
federations.
    The right to strike is legal, and unions are independent of the 
Government and political parties. The Constitution and statutes 
prohibit retribution against strikers. There was a strike by metal 
workers in Viljandi during the year.
    Unions may join federations freely and affiliate internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While Estonian 
workers have the legally acquired right to bargain collectively, 
collective bargaining is still in its infancy. According to EAKL 
leaders, few collective bargaining agreements have been concluded 
between management and workers of a specific enterprise. However, the 
EAKL has concluded framework agreements with producer associations, 
which provide the basis for specific labor agreements, including the 
setting of the minimum wage. The EAKL also was involved with developing 
the country's post-Soviet era Labor Code covering employment contracts, 
vacation, and occupational safety. The Labor Code prohibits antiunion 
discrimination, and employees have the right to go to court to enforce 
their rights. In 1993 laws covering collective bargaining, collective 
dispute resolution, and shop stewards were enacted.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor although it does not specifically 
prohibit forced and bonded labor by children (see Section 6.d.). The 
Labor Inspections Office effectively enforces this prohibition.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution forbids forced or bonded labor. The 
Government ratified the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, 
which bans forced child labor. The statutory minimum age for employment 
is 16 years. Minors 13 to 15 years of age may work provided they have 
the written permission of a parent or guardian and the local labor 
inspector. The work may not endanger the minor's health or be 
considered immoral, cannot interfere with studies, and must be included 
on a Government-prepared list. Government authorities effectively 
enforce minimum age laws through inspections. There were no reports of 
forced or bonded labor by children in enterprises (see Section 6.c.); 
however, there were instances of families forcing their children to 
engage in peddling or begging.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government, after 
consultations with the EAKL and the Central Producers Union, sets the 
minimum wage. The monthly minimum wage is $86 (1,250 Estonian crowns). 
The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a worker and family with 
a decent standard of living. About 5 to 6 percent of the work force 
receive the minimum wage. The average monthly wage in the second 
quarter was about $310.
    The standard workweek is 40 hours, and there is a mandatory 24-hour 
rest period. According to EAKL sources, legal occupational health and 
safety standards are satisfactory, but they are extremely difficult to 
achieve in practice. The National Labor Inspection Board is responsible 
for enforcement of these standards, but it has not been very effective 
to date. In addition the labor unions have occupational health and 
safety experts who assist workers to bring employers in compliance with 
legal standards. Workers have the right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, the existing criminal codes regarding kidnaping 
and extortion are used to address this problem. There were reports of 
trafficking of women during the year, including a case where women were 
transported to serve in the sex industry in Germany.
                                 17ESTON
                                 IA____
                                 

                                FINLAND

    Finland is a constitutional republic with an elected head of state 
(President), a Parliament, a head of government (Prime Minister), and 
an independent judiciary.
    The security apparatus is controlled effectively by elected 
officials and supervised by the courts.
    Finland has a mixed economy, primarily and extensively market 
based.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. The Government is taking serious 
steps to address the problem of violence against women.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
observes this prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme 
Administrative Court, and the lower courts. The President appoints 
Supreme Court justices, who in turn appoint the lower court judges.
    The law provides for the right to fair public trial, and the 
judiciary vigorously enforces this right. Local courts may conduct a 
trial behind closed doors in juvenile, matrimonial, and guardianship 
cases, or when publicity would offend morality or endanger the security 
of the state. In national security cases, the judge may withhold from 
the public any or all information pertaining to charges, verdicts, and 
sentences. The law provides for sanctions against violators of such 
restrictions.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices. Government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
the press, and the Government respects this right in practice. An 
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic 
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press, 
including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. 
Nontraditional religious groups freely profess and propagate their 
beliefs. Such groups are eligible for some tax relief (e.g., they may 
receive tax-free donations), provided they are registered with the 
Government as religious communities. Some 87 percent of the population 
belongs to two state churches, the Lutheran and the Orthodox. All 
citizens belonging to one of these state churches pay, as part of their 
income tax, a church tax. These church taxes are used to defray the 
costs of running the state churches. Those who do not want to pay the 
tax must notify the tax office.
    Such groups as Jehovah's Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints have been active in Finland for decades. In 
December 1998, the Ministry of Education turned down the application of 
the Finnish Association of Scientologists to be registered as a 
religious community. This was the first time that an applicant had been 
denied church status. The Scientologists' application was pending for 
nearly 3 years while the Government awaited additional information that 
it had requested from the Association. The Association acknowledged 
that it had not responded to the Government's request. The Education 
Ministry's decision can be appealed to the Supreme Administrative 
Court. The Scientologists have not yet done so, but they have indicated 
that they may begin the process anew and reapply for recognition as a 
church.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. 
Approved refugees and asylum seekers are processed directly for 
residence. The issue of the provision of first asylum has never arisen. 
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a valid 
claim to refugee status.
    In 1998 1,272 persons applied for asylum, up from 973 in 1997. 
During 1998 the Directorate of Immigration processed 866 asylum 
applications. It granted asylum to 7 persons and residence permits to 
372 persons and rejected the applications of 240 persons. Also in 1998, 
247 asylum seekers withdrew their applications. In 1999 from January 1 
to July 31, 1,851 asylum applications were submitted. Government 
officials attribute this increase in the number of asylum applicants to 
the fighting in Kosovo and to the sudden arrival in the country of 
Romani asylum seekers from Slovakia during June and July. In July the 
Government imposed a visa regime on Slovak citizens; the requirement 
was lifted in November. Most of the Roma subsequently withdrew their 
applications after the Government denied the applications of several 
hundred initial applicants on the grounds that most had first transited 
Hungary, the Czech Republic, or Sweden en route to Finland.
    In 1997 the Government issued guidelines aimed at creating a more 
coherent immigration and refugee policy rather than dealing with 
immigration and asylum matters on a case-by-case basis. A revised 
aliens' code went into effect on May 1 that makes it easier to obtain 
asylum and facilitates family reunification. On May 1, a law 
establishing procedures for receiving asylum seekers, as well as 
promoting the integration of immigrants into society, also went into 
effect (also see Section 5).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    Women are fairly well represented in Government. There are 74 women 
in the 200-member Parliament, and 8 in the 18-member Cabinet. The 
Foreign Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament are women. In 1995 
Parliament passed quota legislation for all state committees, 
commissions, and appointed municipal bodies, requiring a minimum of 40 
percent membership from each sex.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive 
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, age, 
origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, or disability, and the 
Government effectively enforces these provisions.
    Women.--Police statistics for 1998 record 2,708 cases of domestic 
violence, 208 more than the previous year. Of the victims, 2,182 were 
women and 526 were men. A total of 463 cases of rape were reported to 
the police in 1998, compared with 468 in 1997. During the period from 
January to September 1999, 424 cases of rape were reported. During the 
1988-97 period, an average of 395 cases of rape were reported each 
year. Government experts report that as many as half of all rape cases 
may go unreported.
    The annual number of calls to the police relating to domestic 
violence is not centrally compiled but is estimated at 10,000 to 
12,000. Shelter officials state that the figure represents less than 
half of the number of actual incidents. Most of the persons seeking 
shelter are women between 25 and 35 years of age, either married or in 
a common-law relationship. Nearly one-third are immigrants.
    The law provides for stringent penalties for violence against 
women; the police and the courts vigorously enforce this provision.
    The Union of Shelter Homes as well as the municipalities maintain 
homes all over the country for female, male, adult, and child victims 
of violence. The total number of shelters is around 55. Many of the 
people served by the shelters are women with small children fleeing 
abusive husbands. Increasing numbers of elderly persons--the parents of 
abusive (usually male) offspring--have sought safety in the shelters. 
Generally the conditions that cause both young and old to avail 
themselves of the shelters are alcohol-related. Studies show that the 
opening of a shelter in an area brings cases of family violence into 
the open. The concept of family violence includes negligence in care, 
psychological violence, and economic abuse. The Union of Shelter Homes 
introduced a special program to alert persons from other cultures to 
the possibilities of getting help from the authorities in a society 
where they lack a natural support network.
    A study published in 1998 indicated that the typical victim of 
family violence is a young woman between 18 and 24 years of age who is 
married or is living in a common-law relationship. The study concluded 
that every fifth married woman or woman involved in a common-law 
relationship has suffered from violent behavior at the hands of her 
partner. The study also concludes that as many as 40 percent of all 
women over the age of 15 have experienced some form of family violence. 
(The study considers psychological and verbal abuse as ``violence.'')
    The government-established Council for Equality coordinates and 
sponsors legislation to meet the needs of women as workers, mothers, 
widows, or retirees.
    The Constitution calls for the promotion of equality of the sexes 
in social activities and working life, the latter particularly in the 
determination of remuneration. In 1985 the Parliament passed a more 
detailed comprehensive equal rights law that mandates equal treatment 
for women in the workplace, including equal pay for ``comparable'' 
jobs. In practice comparable worth has not been implemented because of 
the difficulty of establishing criteria, but the Government, employers, 
unions, and others continue to work on implementation plans. Women's 
average earnings are 81 percent of those of men, and women still tend 
to be segregated in lower paying occupations. While women individually 
have attained leadership positions in the private and public sectors, 
there are disproportionately fewer women in top management jobs. 
Industry and finance, the labor movement, and some Government 
ministries remain male dominated. Some 60 percent of physicians are 
women. Women serve in the military. The Government's Equality Ombudsman 
monitors compliance with regulations against sexual discrimination. Of 
the 78 complaints processed by the Ombudsman between January 1 and June 
30, 17 cases were established as violations of the law.
    In 1997 the Government began a special program to promote women's 
equality during the period from 1997 to 1999. This program consists of 
30 projects, one of which focuses on violence against women and 
domestic violence. The project against violence offers support, 
nationwide, to women in need and to men who wish to combat their own 
tendencies to resort to violence. This project is regarded as the most 
significant component of the women's equality program, in that it has 
helped break the taboo about the subject.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. There is no pattern of societal abuse of 
children, and the national consensus supporting children's rights is 
enshrined in law.
    People with Disabilities.--Although since the 1970's the law has 
required that new public buildings be accessible to people with 
physical disabilities, many older buildings remain inaccessible. No 
such law applies to public transportation, but each municipality 
subsidizes measures to improve accessibility to vehicles. Local 
governments maintain a free transport service that guarantees 18 free 
trips per month for a disabled person. The deaf and the mute are 
provided interpretation services ranging from 120 to 240 hours 
annually. The Government provides subsidized public housing to the 
severely disabled.
    Indigenous People.--Sami (Lapps), who constitute less than 0.1 
percent of the population, benefit from legal provisions protecting 
minority rights and customs. Sami language and culture are supported in 
the Constitution and financially by the Government. The Sami receive 
subsidies to enable them to continue their traditional lifestyle, which 
revolves around reindeer herding. Sami have full political and civil 
rights and are able to participate in decisions affecting their 
economic and cultural interests.
    In 1998 the President issued instructions on implementing a 
European Union directive on the use of minority and regional languages. 
The directive's purpose is to ensure that the use of minority languages 
is permitted in school, the media, dealings with administrative and 
judicial authorities, economic and commercial life, and cultural 
activities. The Sami language belongs to the category of a minority 
language used regionally.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In recent years, concern has 
arisen about increasing expressions of racist and xenophobic behavior. 
The Government is trying to address this problem through an in-depth, 
ongoing study of attitudes toward different ethnic groups. The 
government study examines discrimination in working life, looks into 
popular attitudes toward foreigners, and charts the attitudes of those 
authorities involved in immigration affairs--the police, teachers, 
social workers, border guards, and employment office personnel. The 
popular attitudes survey found that half of those interviewed 
acknowledged some feelings of xenophobia or prejudice.
    Two government-sponsored legislative initiatives are aimed at 
improving the situation of noncitizens. On May 1, a law promoting the 
integration of immigrants into society and establishing procedures for 
receiving asylum seekers went into effect. A revised aliens' code also 
went into effect on May 1 (see Section 2.d.). In addition to these 
legislative initiatives, the Government in 1997 issued policy 
guidelines for promoting tolerance and combating racism.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
rights of trade unions to organize, to assemble peacefully, and to 
strike, and the Government respects these provisions. About 87 percent 
of the work force is organized. All unions are independent of the 
Government and political parties. The law grants public sector 
employees the right to strike, with some exceptions for the provision 
of essential services. In the first half of the year there were 28 
strikes, only 1 of which was not a wildcat strike.
    Trade unions freely affiliate with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective 
bargaining agreements usually are based on income policy agreements 
between employee and employer central organizations and the Government. 
The law protects workers against antiunion discrimination. Complaint 
resolution is governed by collective bargaining agreements as well as 
labor law, both of which are adequately enforced.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and this prohibition is observed 
in practice. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and 
adults, and such practices do not exist. The Government enforces this 
prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see 
Section 6.c.). Youths under 16 years of age cannot work more than 6 
hours a day or at night, and education is compulsory for children from 
7 to 16 years of age. The Labor Ministry enforces child labor 
regulations. There are virtually no complaints of the exploitation of 
children in the work force.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated minimum 
wage, but the law requires all employers--including nonunionized ones--
to meet the minimum wages agreed to in collective bargaining agreements 
in the respective industrial sector. These minimum wages generally 
afford a decent standard of living for workers and their families.
    The legal workweek consists of 5 days not exceeding 40 hours. 
Employees working shifts or during the weekend are entitled to a 24-
hour rest period during the week. The law is enforced effectively as a 
minimum, and many workers enjoy even stronger benefits through 
effectively enforced collective bargaining agreements.
    The Government sets occupational health and safety standards, and 
the Labor Ministry effectively enforces them. Workers can refuse 
dangerous work situations without risk of penalty.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not explicitly prohibit 
trafficking in persons, but existing statutes concerning procuring and 
illegal aliens can be used in such cases.
    Finland is becoming a destination country for trafficked women, 
according to an OSCE report.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 FRANCE

    France is a constitutional democracy with a directly elected 
president and National Assembly and an independent judiciary.
    The law enforcement and internal security apparatus consists of the 
Gendarmerie, the national police, and municipal police forces in major 
cities, all of which are under effective civilian control. Members of 
those police forces committed some human rights abuses.
    The highly developed, diversified, and primarily market-based 
economy provides residents with a high standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide a means of dealing with 
individual instances of abuse. There were instances of unwarranted use 
of lethal force and the abuse of detainees, particularly foreigners, by 
law enforcement officers. Long delays in bringing cases to trial and 
lengthy pretrial detention are problems. Violence and threats against 
ethnic and religious minorities continued to decline. The Government 
has taken important steps to deal with violence against women and 
children. Women continue to face wage discrimination.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government officials.
    Law enforcement officers have used excessive force--particularly 
directed against immigrants--resulting in deaths, although there is no 
evidence of a pattern of such abuses.
    In January a judge initiated an investigation into the November 20, 
1998 death of 26-year-old Mohammed Ali Saoud in Toulon. Saoud, who had 
a history of mental illness, died following police intervention in a 
violent domestic disturbance. After a struggle, the police succeeded in 
physically restraining him. Saoud lost consciousness and the police 
called a medic, but the medic could not revive him. An autopsy 
determined that Saoud died from a fractured skull. The police had fired 
rubber bullets at Saoud to subdue him, and Saoud's mother said that the 
police kicked and hit him while he was on the ground. The judicial 
investigation was opened in response to requests by Saoud's family and 
the Human Rights League, a French nongovernmental organization (NGO). 
The investigation continued at year's end.
    An investigating judge is considering manslaughter charges against 
the police officer who shot and killed 17-year-old Habib Mohamed while 
he attempted to steal a car on December 13, 1998 in Toulouse. After 
being shot, Mohamed allegedly staggered away and later was found dead 
by a passerby. The police officers involved reportedly failed to follow 
Mohamed or to follow required procedures to report that their weapons 
were fired.
    In August the judge investigating the December 1997 fatal shooting 
of 16-year-old Abdel-Kader Bouziane changed her investigation of one of 
the police officers involved from manslaughter to murder. A second 
police officer remains under investigation for manslaughter. The police 
claimed self-defense when they fired at Bouziane's car as it approached 
them head-on, shooting him when he attempted to break through a 
roadblock near Fontainbleau. Ballistics experts stated that the shots 
were fired after Bouziane's vehicle passed through the roadblock.
    On December 10, the Court of Assizes in the department of Rhone 
convicted the police officer who fired the fatal shot in the December 
1997 shooting in Lyon of Fabrice Fernandez of manslaughter, and 
sentenced him to 12 years in prison. In March the chambre d'accusation 
(the prosecuting chamber of the criminal court) had confirmed an 
investigative judge's 1998 decision to increase the charge to murder. 
The officer had been removed from the police force in January 1998.
    In October 1997, the public prosecutor declined to bring charges 
against the gendarmes who killed two homeless men who were robbing a 
store in Machecoul (Loire-Atlantique). The public prosecutor decided 
that the gendarmes had not used excessive force and an investigating 
judge agreed.
    In December 1997, the appeals court in Aix-en-Provence overturned 
the decision that the border police officer who shot and killed 8-year-
old Serbian refugee Todor Bogdanovic in 1995 acted in self-defense. 
Border police were accused of using excessive force in attempting to 
halt a convoy of refugees that ran a border checkpoint. The case was 
passed on to the Court of Assizes on a charge of manslaughter, and the 
officer was acquitted in December 1998.
    In November 1997, the gendarme who shot and killed Franck Moret was 
released by the correctional court in Valence, prompting the family of 
the deceased to appeal the judgment. In July 1998, the appeals court 
overturned the decision of the correctional court and sentenced the 
officer to an 18-month suspended prison term. The officer has appealed 
the court's decision.
    On September 23, 1998, the Court of Cassation refused the appeal of 
a ruling that no grounds for prosecution existed, by the family of 
Ibrahim Sy, a Senegalese youth who was shot and killed by a gendarme in 
1994.
    An administrative inquiry was opened into the 1991 death of 18-
year-old Aissa Ihich, who allegedly was beaten by police officers and 
subsequently died of an asthmatic attack because he allegedly was 
refused medication. In June the chambre d'accusation decided that three 
police officers and one doctor involved in the case should be tried 
before a correctional court.
    In May the Court of Cassation sent a new report to the Prime 
Minister, which described the Government's involvement in the case of 
the Algerians who were beaten, shot, and thrown into the Seine river 
during a 1961 protest in Paris. The report, based on a detailed review 
of the judiciary archives, concluded that 48 Algerians died on the 
night of October 17, 1961. In May 1998, the Interior Ministry had 
concluded that it was likely that ``dozens'' of persons had died; 
government authorities at the time of the incident had stated that only 
three persons were killed. In May Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's office 
announced that government archives on the incident would be opened to 
historians; at year's end, both the national archives and the archives 
of the city of Paris were open to the public.
    In May the authorities arrested Corsican nationalists Didier 
Maranelli, Alain Ferrandi, Pierre Alessandri, and Marcel Istria for the 
February 1998 killing of Corsican Prefet Claude Erignac. According to 
press reports, only Istria has denied any participation in the killing. 
Yvan Colonna, who is presumed to have fired the shots that killed 
Erignac, was still at large at year's end, and was believed to be 
hiding somewhere on the island. The investigation continued at year's 
end.
    On September 15, a court convicted 21 persons and sentenced them to 
between 6 months and 10 years in prison; the defendants were members of 
a network that provided logistical support in Paris, Lyon, and Lille 
for a group which in 1998 a court found to be responsible for a 1995 
wave of bombings in Paris that killed 8 persons and injured over 170 
others.
    There were no developments in the case of two Iranian nationals 
suspected of killing Reza Mazoulman, an Iranian deputy education 
minister under the Shah, in Paris in 1996. The investigation continued 
at year's end.
    On March 10, a special Court of Assizes issued guilty verdicts and 
imposed life sentences on six Libyan nationals (including the brother-
in-law of Libyan dictator Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi), who were tried in 
absentia for the 1989 bombing of UTA flight 772. According to press 
reports in July, Libya paid approximately $33 million (211 million 
francs) to France to compensate the families of the 170 persons killed.
    On May 20, German national Hans-Joachim Klein, who was arrested in 
September 1998 for murder and attempted murder in a 1975 hostage taking 
at OPEC headquarters in Vienna, was extradited to Germany.
    In June a court rejected the appeal by Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, 
a.k.a. ``Carlos the Jackal,'' of a December 1997 conviction in which he 
had received a life sentence for a 1975 murder in Paris of two French 
secret agents and their informer. On January 15, the chambre 
d'accusation of the Paris Court of Appeal decided not to prosecute him 
for a 1974 bombing of a Paris drugstore which killed 2 persons and 
wounded 34 others. However, in mid-December the Court of Cassation set 
aside the Court of Appeal's decision and reopened the case.
    On May 19, a Paris court acquitted Bob Denard, a 70-year-old 
soldier of fortune, and Dominique Malacrino of charges that they killed 
President Ahmed Abdallah of the Comoros in 1989.
    On September 1, an investigating judge decided that Nazi war 
criminal Alois Brunner should be tried in absentia on charges of crimes 
against humanity. Brunner previously was sentenced to death in absentia 
by a French military court in 1954, but vanished and was believed to 
have been living in Syria. According to press reports, in 1992 the 
Damascus publication Lettre d'Orient announced that Brunner had died, 
but Syrian authorities and Brunner's ex-wife and daughter refused to 
confirm or deny the report. The chambre d'accusation is to review the 
investigating judge's decision to determine whether Brunner should be 
tried by the Court of Assizes.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearance.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities 
punish officials who employ them. However, there were credible reports 
that law enforcement officers used excessive force, particularly 
against immigrants. Isolated instances of police abuse occurred, but 
there is no evidence of a pattern.
    On July 28, the European Court of Human Rights decided unanimously 
that France violated two articles of the European Convention on Human 
Rights in the case of Ahmed Selmouni, a Moroccan-Dutch drug smuggling 
suspect, who was arrested in November 1991. France was found guilty of 
violating Article 3, the prohibition against torture, and Article 6, 
the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. Selmouni had been 
arrested without incident by police officers in Paris, but he was 
beaten numerous times during his subsequent detention. The public 
prosecutor in France began an investigation of the police officers in 
February 1992. In December 1992, Selmouni was convicted of various drug 
charges, and he is serving a 13-year prison term. In February 1993, 
Selmouni lodged his own complaint against the police officers and asked 
to join the prosecutor's proceedings as a civil party. These 
proceedings resulted in the conviction of five police officers in March 
on various charges of assault. The officers' original sentences ranged 
from 3 to 4 years and were reduced on appeal in July to range between 
10 and 18 months. Four of the police officers had their reduced 
sentences completely suspended. Only the supervisory officer, whose 
sentence was reduced from 4 years to 18 months (with 15 months 
suspended), actually served any time in prison. The officers remained 
in their positions with the police force until the commencement of 
their trial in February. The supervisory officer is not required to 
return to prison because he already had served the unsuspended portion 
of his sentence (3 months) during provisional detention. The European 
Court of Human Rights ruled that the over 6-year delay in the 
processing of Selmouni's complaint (some aspects of which are still 
being considered by the French courts) violated his right to a hearing 
within a reasonable time. The court also ruled that the physical abuse 
of Selmouni was ``inflicted intentionally for the purpose of making him 
confess to the crime which he had been suspected of committing.'' It 
caused ``severe pain and suffering and had been particularly serious 
and cruel.'' The court concluded that ``such conduct had to be regarded 
as acts of torture.''
    The United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed concern in July 
1997 about the number and gravity of allegations of mistreatment of 
detainees by law enforcement officials and the unnecessary use of force 
and firearms which resulted in a number of deaths. According to the 
Committee, such mistreatment was more often prevalent in cases of 
foreign detainees. The Committee also cited lengthy proceedings 
involving law enforcement officers and investigations of alleged human 
rights violations by law enforcement officials that ``lacked vigor'' as 
potential problems. Additionally, the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT), an organ of the Council of Europe, in a 
June 1998 report criticized the National Police forces of Paris, 
Marseille, and Montpellier for the mistreatment and poor conditions of 
detainees in police stations. Most of the complaints came from persons 
of North African or African origin.
    The Government is in the process of instituting certain judicial 
and administrative reforms that address mistreatment of detainees by 
law enforcement officials. One such reform currently being debated in 
the Parliament, known as the ``presumption of innocence'' bill, would 
require a senior judge, rather than an investigating judge, to review 
decisions on pretrial detention. In addition, under the bill most 
detainees would have the right to see their lawyer 1 hour after being 
detained by the police (as compared with 20 hours under the current 
law). A second reform, also being debated in the Parliament, is the 
creation of a national commission on security ethics to oversee the 
actions of police officials and to investigate complaints of police 
abuse from witnesses or victims.
    In April an unauthorized beach restaurant was burned, reportedly by 
members of a secret antiterrorist police unit. The event led to the 
dismissal and arrest of the prefet for Corsica, Bernard Bonnet, under 
whose authority the unit operated. Bonnet was incarcerated briefly and 
then released. A judicial investigation of the unit's activities, and 
Bonnet's role in its direction, continued at year's end.
    An administrative investigation into a March 1997 incident in which 
riot police beat a few dozen persons demonstrating against the National 
Front (FN) in Marseille continued at year's end. To keep the anti-FN 
demonstrators away from their FN counterparts, the police, according to 
eyewitnesses, allegedly used excessive force by beating demonstrators 
and using tear gas grenades.
    On July 2, the authorities arrested Mauritanian army Captain Ely 
Ould Dah in Montpellier, where he was attending a training course at a 
French army college. The arrest was in response to accusations by two 
Mauritanian refugees living in France, who alleged that Dah is 
responsible for torture inflicted upon them when they were soldiers in 
Mauritania in 1990 and 1991 and were suspected of taking part in an 
attempted coup d'etat against Mauritanian President Maaouya Ould Taya. 
Dah was arrested pursuant to a complaint filed by the International 
Federation of Human Rights Leagues and the French League of Human 
Rights under the International Convention Against Torture. The 
authorities detained him for questioning; the Montpellier Court of 
Appeal released him on September 29, but required that he remain in the 
country. The investigation continued at year's end.
    There were numerous bombings in Corsica throughout the year. Many 
of these attacks were not politically motivated; however, several 
attacks were made against symbols of the French state (such as police 
stations, customs offices, and tax offices) or against financial 
institutions that Corsican separatists view as harmful to the economic 
interests of Corsicans. Such attacks usually occurred when offices were 
closed, and there were no deaths or injuries reported during the year.
    Prison conditions generally exceed minimum international standards. 
However, public debate continued on the adequacy of prison conditions. 
Some observers continued to criticize prisons for not providing inmates 
with adequate light, sleeping space, blankets, meals, outdoor exercise, 
and medical care. There were 201 deaths of persons in custody in 1998, 
including 118 suicides. (There were 203 deaths of persons in custody in 
1997 and 125 suicides). The 1998 report of the French international NGO 
International Observer of Prisons (IOP) noted that despite the 
implementation of preventive policies at 11 sites, suicide continued to 
be the leading cause of death of imprisoned inmates. Other deaths 
resulted from poor medical care and supervision of prison personnel. 
The report also criticized incidents of brutality, particularly against 
prisoners of African origin, by prison officials--incidents that 
resulted in the number of disciplinary sanctions against surveillance 
personnel increasing threefold.
    In Grasse during the night of December 31, 1997, seven inebriated 
prison guards severely beat eight inmates of African origin, of whom 
three were minors, strangling one. In June a correctional Court 
convicted three of the prison guards, and gave them each a 3-month 
suspended sentence.
    The Government is in the process of considering a draft code of 
ethics for prison guards and is forming a working group, to be chaired 
by the head of the Court of Cassation, to make recommendations for 
additional administrative oversight of the actions of prison officials. 
Observers have criticized the current oversight mechanism as being 
ineffective because there is no external administrative oversight 
outside of the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for both 
prison administration and the discipline of prison officials.
    In its 1998 report reflecting conditions in 1996, the CPT found 
that police holding cells did not satisfactorily accommodate prisoners' 
needs. For example, police prison cells frequently had inadequate 
natural light, sleeping space, and blankets. In addition, prisoners 
received inadequate meals, outdoor exercise and medical care, according 
to the CPT. In July the Government announced plans to improve prison 
conditions by renovating five existing prisons and building six new 
ones.
    In an attempt to reduce prison overcrowding, a December 1997 law 
called for experimentation with the ``electronic bracelet'' in 1998 for 
inmates serving less than a 1-year sentence or for those finishing 
their sentences. The IOP report also highlighted a increase in the 
number of minors incarcerated in 1997.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes these 
prohibitions.
    The judicial system has been criticized by credible sources for its 
inability to process suspects quickly. Some suspects spend many years 
in prison before a trial even starts. According to the Prison 
Administration, as of January 1, 20,610 of the 53,055 persons held in 
jails and prisons were awaiting trial. A system of bail exists.
    As part of heightened security concerns during the visit of Iranian 
President Mohammad Khatami to Paris at the end of October, police 
briefly detained and then released several dozen Iranian activists, 
including members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, which had been 
responsible for previous violent incidents in France.
    The six resident non-French Muslims detained in 1994 by police on 
suspicion of supporting Algerian terrorists are believed to have been 
tried in the ``Chalabi network'' case in October 1998, or released.
    The law prohibits exile, and it does not occur.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    There is a system of local courts, 35 regional courts of appeal, 
and the highest criminal court, the Court of Cassation, which considers 
appeals on procedural grounds only.
    The judicial system has been criticized by credible sources for its 
inability to process suspects quickly (see Section 1.d.).
    On December 14, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that 
France violated Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in 
the case of Faouzi Khalfaoui. Khalfaoui was required to present himself 
to be taken into custody by law enforcement officials the day before 
consideration of his case by the Court of Cassation if he wished that 
court to consider his appeal. The European Court of Human Rights ruled 
that such a procedure violated Khalfaoui's right to a fair trial.
    In case of serious crimes, investigating judges detain suspects for 
questioning and direct the criminal investigation that occurs before a 
case is tried. In some cases this procedure has resulted in lengthy 
detentions of suspects before they are tried. The chambre d'accusation 
reviews the investigating judge's investigation to determine whether 
the charge established by the investigating judge is appropriate. The 
Court of Assizes investigates and decides cases involving the most 
serious offenses.
    On January 22, the Paris Court of Appeal confirmed the sentences of 
those convicted in the October 1998 ``Chalabi network'' trial. 
According to press reports, the sentences of the 3 main defendants were 
reduced to 8 years from the 10 years requested by the prosecutor. 
Fifty-one of the 138 defendants were acquitted of the charge of 
criminal conspiracy. However, 20 of those 51 were sentenced for related 
offenses. A total of 31 persons were acquitted of all offenses. 
Attorneys for the accused, as well as the NGO League of Human Rights, 
continued to criticize the fairness of the proceedings due to the 
``circus'' atmosphere of the mass trial. In addition, on November 9, 
the European Court of Human Rights ruled that France violated the human 
rights of one of the defendants, Ismail Deboubb, due to his lengthy 
pretrial detention. Although Deboubb ultimately was convicted and 
sentenced to 6 years in prison, he spent over 4 years in detention 
before being tried. The European Court of Human Rights found that he 
was not tried within a reasonable time, in accordance with the European 
Convention on Human Rights.
    In September 1998, Omar Raddad, the Moroccan gardener accused and 
convicted of brutally killing his employer in 1994, was released from 
prison on conditional terms after having served 4 years and several 
months of his 18-year sentence, which was reduced by President Jacques 
Chirac in 1996. Raddad and his attorneys continued to insist that the 
court in Nice denied him an adequate and fair trial. According to 
Raddad's attorney, immigration officials expelled a key witness for his 
defense because the witness did not have proper residence papers. 
Raddad's attorney submitted a motion for a retrial in January, which 
was pending at year's end.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
    In April 1998, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin called for an 
individual examination of each wiretapping case deemed inappropriate by 
the National Commission for the Regulation of Wiretapping (NCRWT). 
According to press reports, the judge investigating the matter nearly 
had completed his case-by-case investigation by year's end, and is 
expected to submit his findings to the public prosecutor's office in 
early 2000. According to the most recent report compiled by the NCRWT, 
the number of wiretaps by police authorities remained constant in 1998. 
The limit on the number of wiretaps established by the Prime Minister 
in 1997 did not change during the year, and according to the NCRWT, the 
actual number of wire taps during 1998 was below that limit. 
Wiretapping is legally recognized as a right of the government, but its 
improper use during former President Francois Mitterrand's tenure led 
to Jospin's action.
    Debate continues over whether Muslim girls have the right to wear 
headscarves in public schools (see Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    On January 21, the European Court of Human Rights decided that that 
France had violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (on freedom of expression) in the case of publishing director 
Roger Fressoz and journalist Claude Roire of the newspaper Le Canard 
Enchaine. The September 27, 1989 issue of the newspaper carried an 
article written by Roire with reproductions of incriminating tax forms 
belonging to Jacques Calvet, chairman of Peugeot motor company. The 
public prosecutor brought charges of theft, breach of professional 
confidence, and handling of unlawfully obtained goods against Roire and 
Fressoz. Clavet joined the proceeding as a civil party and claimed 
damages. The Minister for Budget also joined the proceeding as a party 
and added further allegations of unlawful removal of government 
documents and breach of professional confidence. On June 17, 1992, the 
Paris criminal court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the 
tax forms had been sent to Roire in an anonymous envelope and that the 
source could not be determined. In March 1993, the Court of Appeals 
reversed the criminal court's decision, finding that the defendants 
knowingly handled documents that were the result of a breach of 
professional confidence. In April 1995, the Court of Cassation 
dismissed the defendants' appeal. Fressoz and Roire took the case to 
the European Court of Human Rights, and on January 21 the court ruled 
that their actions were protected by the freedom of expression 
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights, and that the 
decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Court of Cassation 
constituted a breach of the Government's obligation to abide by the 
Convention. The court ordered the Government to pay Fressoz and Roire 
approximately $1,670 (10,001 francs) in monetary damages and 
approximately $10,000 (60,000 francs) for costs and expenses.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for the separation of 
church and state and for freedom of religion, and the Government 
generally respects this right in practice. However, the Government took 
some actions during the year that affected religious minorities that it 
describes as ``sects.''
    Religious groups may register as ``associations cultuelles'' 
(associations of worship) or as ``associations culturelles'' (cultural 
associations); religious groups normally register in both of these 
categories. Associations in these two categories are subject to certain 
management and financial disclosure requirements. An association of 
worship is exempt from taxes, but can organize only religious 
activities; it may not operate a school, print publications, or employ 
a board president. A cultural association is a type of for-profit 
association whose goal is to promote the culture of a certain group; 
although not exempt from taxes, it may receive government subsidies for 
its cultural and educational operations (such as schools). Religious 
groups must apply with the local prefecture to be recognized as an 
association of worship and therefore receive tax-exempt status under a 
1905 statute. The prefecture, upon reviewing the documentation supplied 
regarding the association's purpose for existence, then can grant that 
status. However, the prefecture can decide to review a group's status 
if the association receives a large donation or legacy that comes to 
the attention of the tax authorities. If the prefecture determines that 
the association is not in fact in conformity with the 1905 law, its 
status can be changed, and it can be required to pay a 60 percent tax 
rate on present and past donations.
    For historical reasons, contrary to practice in the rest of the 
country, the Jewish, Lutheran, Reformed (Protestant), and Roman 
Catholic religions in three departments of Alsace and Lorraine enjoy 
special legal status. Adherents of these four religions may choose to 
have a portion of their income tax allocated to their church in a 
system administered by the central Government.
    The State subsidizes private schools, including those that are 
church affiliated. Central or local governments also own and provide 
upkeep for other religious buildings constructed before 1905, the date 
of the law separating church and state.
    Some religious minorities have experienced problems with the 
wearing of special religious clothing. For example, debate continues 
over whether denying some Muslim girls the right to wear headscarves in 
public schools constitutes a violation of the right to practice their 
religion, and there has been no definitive national decision on the 
issue. In 1989 the highest administrative court, the Conseil d'Etat, 
ruled that the ``ostentatious'' wearing of these headscarves violated a 
law prohibiting proselytizing in schools. In 1994 the Ministry of 
Education issued a directive that prohibits the wearing of 
``ostentatious political and religious symbols'' in schools; however, 
the directive does not specify the ``symbols'' in question, leaving 
school administrators considerable authority to do so. In 1995 the 
Conseil d'Etat affirmed that simply wearing a headscarf does not 
provide grounds for exclusion from school and subsequently struck down 
some decisions to expel girls for wearing headscarves. On June 18, the 
Government Commissioner recommended that the administrative court 
repeal its October 1998 expulsion decision regarding a girl less than 
10 years of age who refused to remove her headscarf. The Government 
Commissioner stated that no threat to public order was posed and that 
the school administrator was incompetent to make the definitive 
decision.
    According to the press reports, in January teachers at a junior 
high school in Normandy refused to teach Muslim students with 
headscarves. Also that month, the press reported that Interior Minister 
Jean Pierre Chevenement said that headscarves often mark women as 
inferior to men, and make their integration into French society more 
difficult. In September the Government upheld a decision to expel two 
Muslim girls from their junior high school after they wore scarves in 
class. In October the Conseil d'Etat reaffirmed a ban on headscarves in 
public schools.
    The Government's response to some minority groups that it views as 
``sects'' or ``cults'' has been to continue to encourage public 
caution. In 1995 after the release of poisonous gas in the Tokyo, 
Japan, subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult, the National Assembly formed a 
parliamentary commission, also known as the Gest or the Guyard 
Commission, to study so-called ``sects.'' In 1996 the Commission issued 
a report that defined sects as groups that place inordinate importance 
on finances; cause a rupture between adherents and their families; are 
responsible for physical as well as psychological attacks on members; 
recruit children; profess ``anti-social'' ideas; disturb public order; 
have ``judiciary problems;'' and/or attempt to infiltrate organs of the 
State. Government officials have stated that ``sects'' are 
``associations whose structure is ideological and totalitarian and 
whose behavior seriously oppresses fundamental liberties as well as 
social equilibrium.'' (These attributes are in addition to specific 
criminal behavior prohibited by law.) The Commission's report 
identified 173 groups as sects, including Jehovah's Witnesses and the 
Church of Scientology. The report was prepared without the benefit of 
full and complete hearings regarding the groups identified on the list. 
Groups were not told why they were placed on the list, and, because the 
document exists as a commission report to the National Assembly, there 
is no mechanism for changing or amending the list short of a new 
National Assembly commission inquiry and report.
    The ensuing publicity contributed to an atmosphere of intolerance 
and bias against minority religions. Some religious groups reported 
that their members suffered increased intolerance after having been 
identified on the list. A number of individuals who belong to groups on 
the list continued to report discrimination during the year--for 
example, the loss of a job or the denial of a bank loan--which they 
believe occurred because of their affiliation with a ``sect.'' In a 
November 1998 report, the International Helsinki Federation criticized 
the identification of the 173 groups, which it stated ``resulted in 
media reports libeling minority religions, the circulation of rumors 
and false information, and incitement of religious intolerance.'' The 
Commission's findings also led to calls for legislative action to 
restrict the activities of sects, which the Government rejected on 
grounds of religious freedom. Instead, the Justice Ministry issued a 
directive to all government entities to be vigilant against possible 
abuses by sects, and all government offices were instructed to monitor 
potentially abusive sect activities.
    In 1996 the Government created an interministerial working group on 
sects (known as the Observatory on Sects) to analyze the phenomenon of 
sects and to develop proposals for dealing with them. The working 
group's final report in 1996 made several proposals, including the 
granting of legal standing to organizations that oppose sects; a 
modification of the law requiring associations to divulge information 
regarding the sources and management of their finances related to their 
effort to obtain tax-exempt status; a limit on the allocation of public 
campaign funds in order to limit public financial support for small 
fringe groups; the creation of a representative in each prefecture to 
provide information on sects to local officials; the creation of a 
permanent commission at the European Union level to reinforce 
international cooperation in controlling sect activities; and measures 
to restrict group members' entry into professional training programs.
    In October 1998, the Government issued a new decree disbanding the 
Observatory on Sects and creating an ``Interministerial Mission to 
Battle Against Sects'' (mission interministerielle de lutte contre les 
sectes). Although the decree instructs the commission to ``analyze the 
phenomenon of sects,'' it does not define what is meant by the term 
``sect,'' or how sects differ from religions. The Interministerial 
Mission also is charged with serving as a coordinator of periodic 
interministerial meetings, at which government officials are to 
exchange information and coordinate their actions against sects.
    The Interministerial Mission continued to carry out its mandate 
during the year. However, publication of the Mission's 1999 report was 
delayed. According to press reports, this delay was due to government 
reservations about the content of the report, which reportedly 
advocated new legislation aimed at abolishing a number of so-called 
``dangerous sects.'' The Prime Minister's office, as well as some 
prominent government figures, publicly opposed such measures, citing 
concerns about the constitutional provision for ``freedom of 
conscience.''
    In December 1998, the National Assembly debated and passed a 
proposal that would allow two specific antisect groups, both classified 
as ``public utilities,'' to become parties to court actions involving 
sects. During the year the Senate passed a version of the same bill; 
the proposed legislation was sent back to the National Assembly for 
further consideration.
    In December 1998, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular urging 
state prosecutors to cooperate with the Interministerial Mission in 
bringing actions against sects.
    Also in December 1998, the National Assembly created a new 
parliamentary commission to study the way that sects are financed. On 
June 18, the Commission released its report, based on questionnaires 
sent to groups listed as ``sects'' in the 1995 Gest Commission report. 
The questionnaires, which were sent out in March, requested detailed 
information about the finances of these groups, including donations, 
investments, financial activities, and other sources of income. The 
report focused on multinational groups, especially Jehovah's Witnesses 
and Scientologists. The stated basis of concern was that these groups 
may use excessive or dishonest means to obtain donations, which then 
are transferred out of the country and beyond the reach of French tax 
authorities. The report also raised questions about volunteers, who 
should be compensated under the law for providing free labor to ``for 
profit'' organizations.
    Some observers are concerned about the scrutiny with which tax 
authorities have examined the financial records of some religious 
groups. The Government currently does not recognize Jehovah's Witnesses 
or the Church of Scientology as qualifying religious associations for 
tax purposes, and therefore subjects them to a 60 percent tax on all 
funds they receive.
    In January 1996, the tax authorities began an audit of the French 
Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, and in May 1998, the tax 
authorities formally assessed the 60 percent tax against donations 
received by Jehovah's Witnesses from September 1992 through August 
1996. In June 1998, tax authorities began proceedings to collect the 
assessed tax, including steps to place a lien on the property of the 
National Consistory of Jehovah's Witnesses. The total amount claimed 
(including taxes, penalties, and interest) is over $50 million (300 
million francs). According to the International Helsinki Federation's 
1998 report, Jehovah's Witnesses ``have been singled out for close 
scrutiny.'' The tax proceedings continued at year's end.
    The authorities previously took similar action against the Church 
of Scientology. Tax claims asserted in 1994-95 against several 
Scientology churches forced them into bankruptcy. In the case of the 
Paris church the Ministry of Finance refused to grant the church 
authorization to import funds to pay the claimed taxes even though the 
church offered to pay the total amount of all taxes assessed, a 
percentage of which would have come from outside the country. 
Subsequently, in December 1997, the Government filed legal action for 
the claimed amount against the former officers of the Paris church and 
against the Church of Scientology International (a California nonprofit 
organization). The hearing in this legal action was deferred pending a 
decision regarding a 1998 administrative claim filed with the Conseil 
d'Etat by the Paris church that the Minister of Finance acted 
improperly in refusing to allow the church to import funds to pay the 
assessed taxes. In January the Conseil d'Etat requested the advice of 
the European Court of Justice, and was awaiting a response at year's 
end.
    In July 1997, a Court of Appeals in Lyon recognized Scientology as 
a religion in its opinion in the conviction of Jean-Jacques Mazier, a 
former leader of the Scientologists, for contributing to the 1988 
suicide of a church member. In response the Minister of the Interior 
stated that the court had exceeded its authority and that the 
Government does not recognize Scientology as a religion. The Government 
appealed the Court of Appeals decision, but on June 30, the Court of 
Cassation rejected the Government's appeal, but the Court stated that 
it lacked the authority to decide if Scientology was a religion.
    There have been a number of court cases against the Church of 
Scientololgy, which generally involved former members who sue the 
Church for fraud, and sometimes for the practice of medicine without a 
license. A September case in the Marseilles Correctional Court received 
wide media attention after judicial officials admitted that 3\1/2\ tons 
of documents pertaining to the case had been destroyed by mistake. In 
November the court found a former local leader of the Church of 
Scientology and four other Church employees guilty of fraud for 
swindling money from former members. The court sentenced the local 
leader to 2 years in prison, of which 18 months were suspended and the 
remaining 6 months served prior to sentencing, and a fine of 
approximately $16,700 (100,000 francs). The other four members received 
suspended sentences; charges against two other persons were dropped.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The law includes provisions for the grant of refugee/asylee status 
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1998 the Government 
began implementing a new law that addresses both asylum requests and 
illegal aliens. The Government provides first asylum. During the year, 
the Government accepted approximately 6,500 persons from Kosovo; these 
persons were not allowed to file asylum applications, and are expected 
to return to Kosovo. In 1998 the Government received 22,375 requests 
for asylum and issued 4,342 refugee certificates (a document issued to 
successful asylum applicants). The Government generally cooperates with 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. There were no reports of the 
forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in 
politics or government, but they remain significantly underrepresented 
in public offices, especially at the national level. Eleven of 28 
cabinet members, 5.9 percent of senators, and 10.9 percent of deputies 
in the National Assembly are women. The European Union Parliament 
includes a larger French female presence--40 percent of the country's 
elected representatives are female. To increase women's participation, 
some parties have established quotas for them on electoral lists or in 
party management. The President and the Prime Minister continued 
discussions on modernizing the country's political institutions, 
including measures to encourage a greater number of women in political, 
social, and public positions.
    On June 28, a joint session of both the Senate and the National 
Assembly approved a constitutional amendment on the principle of 
``equal access of men and women to electoral mandates and elective 
functions.''
    The citizens of the ``collective territory'' of Mayotte and the 
territories of French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and New Caledonia 
determine their legal and political relationships to France by means of 
referendums, and they elect deputies and senators to the French 
Parliament, along with the overseas departments.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of local and international human rights 
organizations operate freely, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally 
cooperative and responsive to their views. The National Consultative 
Commission on Human Rights (NCCHR)--which has nongovernmental as well 
as government members--also monitors complaints and advises the 
Government on policies and legislation. It is an independent body in 
the Office of the Prime Minister.
    In December 1998, the Parliamentary Commission released its final 
report on government actions in Rwanda during the genocide of 1994. The 
Commission was convened in response to press allegations that France 
supplied arms to the Hutu-dominated Rwandan army forces, which used 
them in the genocide committed against Tutsis in violation of the May 
1994 U.N. Security Council embargo forbidding such sales. The report 
was critical of France's overall involvement in Rwanda, but it cleared 
the Government of any direct implication in the 1994 genocide.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Statutes ban discrimination based on race, religion, sex, ethnic 
background, or political opinion, and the Government effectively 
enforces them.
    Women.--The Penal Code prohibits rape and spousal abuse, and law 
enforcement authorities vigorously enforce these laws; however, 
violence against women remains a problem. The Ministry of Interior has 
reported that in 1998 there were 7,828 rapes and 12,809 instances of 
other criminal sexual assault. The Government sponsors and funds 
programs for women who are victims of violence, including shelters, 
counseling, and hot lines. Numerous private associations also assist 
abused women.
    Trafficking in women occurs (see Section 6.f.). Prostitution is 
legal; acting as a pimp is not. A government agency, the Central Office 
on the Treatment of Human Beings (OCRTEH), deals with trafficking in 
women, prostitution, and pimping.
    The law requires that women receive equal pay for equal work, but 
this requirement is often not the reality. Reports by various 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations indicate that men 
continue to earn more than women, and unemployment rates continue to be 
higher for women than for men. For example, a report released on 
September 2 by National Assembly Deputy Catherine Genisson indicates 
that in the 5,000 largest French firms, the average difference in 
salary between men and women is 27 percent. A study prepared for the 
Ministry of Employment, which was made public on August 11, indicates 
that in March 1998 (the month the study was completed) the unemployment 
rate for women was 14 percent versus 11 percent for men.
    The law prohibits sex-based job discrimination and sexual 
harassment in the workplace. Thus far these laws have encountered 
difficulties in implementation. Women's rights groups criticize the 
scope of the law as narrow and the fines and compensatory damages as 
often modest. For example, the law limits sexual harassment claims to 
circumstances where there is a supervisor-subordinate relationship but 
fails to address harassment by colleagues or a hostile work 
environment.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The Ministry for Family Affairs oversees 
implementation of the Government's programs for children.
    There are strict laws against child abuse, particularly when 
committed by a parent or guardian. In 1998 there were approximately 
19,000 reported cases of mistreatment (physical violence, sexual abuse, 
mental cruelty, or severe negligence) of children. Of these cases, 
approximately 5,000 involved reports of sexual abuse. Special sections 
of the national police and judiciary are charged with handling these 
cases. The Government provides counseling, financial aid, foster homes, 
and orphanages, depending on the extent of the problem. Various 
associations also help minors seek justice in cases of mistreatment by 
parents.
    Some immigrants from countries where female genital mutilation 
(FGM) is customary subject their children to this practice, which is 
widely condemned by international health experts as damaging to both 
physical and psychological health. Authorities prosecute FGM cases 
under the provisions of the Penal Code, which states that acts of 
violence towards children that result in mutilation shall be tried in 
the highest criminal court. Since 1993 the Government and private 
associations have undertaken a campaign to inform immigrants that FGM 
is contrary to the law and would be prosecuted.
    On February 17, a Paris court sentenced a Malian woman, Hawa Greou, 
to 8 years in prison for performing FGM on 48 girls between the ages of 
1 month and 10 years. The jury also convicted 27 parents, who received 
suspended sentences ranging from 3 to 5 years' imprisonment. Most were 
from Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. The case attracted 
significant public attention because it was brought by a victim, 
Mariatou Koita, age 23, who told a judge in 1995 that Greou performed 
FGM on her and her sisters when they were children.
    In the fall, high school students again conducted demonstrations 
for better schools and more teachers; the demonstrations were not as 
extensive as those in 1998.
    People With Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. A 1991 law requires new public buildings to be 
accessible to the physically disabled, but most older buildings and 
public transportation are not accessible.
    Religious Minorities.--According to the annual NCCHR report on 
racism and xenophobia, released in the spring, the downward trend since 
1992 continues in the number of threats or attacks against Jews. There 
were a total of 81 threats and 1 act of violence in 1998 compared with 
85 threats and 3 acts of violence in 1997.
    On October 21, the Court of Cassation upheld a Bordeaux court's 
1998 conviction of Maurice Papon for his actions as secretary general 
of the Prefecture of Gironde from 1942 to 1944. Papon was found guilty 
of complicity in committing crimes against humanity for his role in the 
deportation of hundreds of Jews to Nazi concentration camps during the 
World War II German occupation. The Bordeaux court had sentenced him to 
10 years' imprisonment; however, he had not been detained because he 
had appealed to the Court of Cassation, and just before that court's 
ruling, Papon fled from his home. His failure to appear resulted in an 
automatic rejection of his appeal. On October 22, he was arrested in 
Switzerland and returned to France; he was in prison at year's end. 
According to press reports, his lawyer intends to take the case to the 
European Court of Human Rights.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Anti-immigrant sentiments 
sparked incidents including occasional attacks on members of the large 
Arab/Muslim and black African communities. The annual NCCHR report 
noted a continuing decrease in the number of reported incidents of 
racist violence and threats--84 threats were reported in 1998, a 
decrease from 121 in 1997. The number of reported incidents of racist 
violence increased to eight in 1998 from five in 1997. There were no 
deaths due to racist violence in 1998, compared with one death in 1997.
    The Government strongly condemns such actions and attacks and has 
strict antidefamation laws. Government programs attempt to combat 
racism and anti-Semitism by promoting public awareness and bringing 
together local officials, police, and citizen groups. There are also 
antiracist educational programs in some public school systems.
    The annual NCCHR report expressed concern about a possible trend 
toward increased tolerance by the public for racist propaganda and 
racial speech. The Commission suggested that the Government take action 
to strengthen the law to address the problem of racist propaganda and 
speech, and that public political figures take every opportunity to 
speak out strongly against racism.
    According to the 1998 public opinion poll reported in the annual 
NCCHR report, 10 percent of those polled admitted to being ``rather 
racist,'' 28 percent admitted to being ``a little racist,'' 24 percent 
said they were ``not very racist,'' 36 percent said they were ``not at 
all racist,'' and 2 percent had no response.
    The Ministry of Labor estimated that in 1998 approximately 5,300 
persons between the ages of 16 and 18 and 5,500 persons between the 
ages of 13 and 16 applied for French nationality under the new law that 
went into effect on September 1, 1998. The Government's High Council on 
Integration reported that 13,764 persons between the ages of 16 and 18, 
and 11,781 persons between the ages of 13 and 16 applied during the 
first half of 1999.
    Romani asylum seekers often remain in the country after their 
claims have been denied. They do not have official papers, which limits 
their access to health care and education. They often live in crowded 
conditions without proper sanitary facilities. According to an NGO 
report, on July 19, police expelled approximately 100 Romanian Roma 
from a camp near Paris. Also according to NGO reports, on August 12, a 
mayor in Tonnoy ordered a roughly 3-foot ditch dug along the front and 
side of one Romani camp. The law allows Roma to use public land for up 
to 8 days, and makes the local authorities responsible for providing 
water and sanitation.
    The Administrative Court in Nantes continued to consider the June 
1998 appeal of Moroccan national Khaddouj Tahir at year's end. In 
November 1997, Tahir was refused naturalization because she wore a 
hejab veil during her final interview. Naturalization officials stated 
that ``her garments showed a refusal to integrate into the French 
community.'' According to the law, applicants for naturalization must 
demonstrate their assimilation into French society as well as their 
loyalty to the French nation.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom 
of association for all workers. Trade unions exercise significant 
economic and political influence, although less than 10 percent of the 
work force is unionized. Unions have legally mandated roles (as do 
employers) in the administration of social institutions, including 
social security (health care and most retirement systems), the 
unemployment insurance system, labor courts, and the Economic and 
Social Council, a constitutionally mandated consultative body.
    Unions are independent of the Government, and most are not aligned 
with any political party. However, many of the leaders of the General 
Confederation of Labor and its unions belong to the Communist Party.
    Workers, including civil servants, are free to strike except when a 
strike threatens public safety. One-fourth of all salaried employees 
work for the Government. The number of workdays lost to strike action 
in the private sector remained at or near postwar lows until the end of 
the year, when the number of strikes increased. Most of the widely 
publicized national strikes or protests occurred in the public sector 
or affected state-owned companies, and were called principally over 
implementation of the 35-hour workweek, salaries, privatization or 
reorganization plans, and working conditions (of which hours, staffing, 
and personal security were the primary issues). Teachers and health 
care workers mounted several strikes and protests over pay, personnel 
levels, and government efforts to reform the health and educational 
systems. Public transportation workers in Paris and other cities struck 
repeatedly in support of demands related to the implementation of a 35-
hour workweek or the deployment of additional security personnel to 
deal with violence directed at transportation personnel. Railway 
workers also mounted strikes in support of demands related to the 35-
hour workweek. Firemen and rescue workers throughout the country 
mounted sporadic strikes to support demands to reclassify their work as 
dangerous and thus allow them to retire early. In September violent 
demonstrations broke out in the overseas territory of Guadeloupe 
following the arrest of a union official for attacking police and 
threatening the life of another union official. In the French Caribbean 
island of Martinique, steadily deteriorating relations between 
employers and unions led to a wave of strikes that culminated in worker 
disruption of activities at the main harbor and airport in October.
    The law prohibits retaliation against strikers, strike leaders, and 
union members, and the Government effectively enforces this provision.
    Unions can freely join federations and confederations, including 
international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers, 
including those in the three small export processing zones, have the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. The law strictly prohibits 
antiunion discrimination; employers found guilty of such activity are 
required to correct it, including the reinstatement of workers fired 
for union activities.
    A 1982 law requires at least annual bargaining in the public and 
private sector on wages, hours, and working conditions at both plant 
and industry levels but does not require that negotiations result in a 
signed contract. In case of an impasse, government mediators may impose 
solutions that are binding unless formally rejected by either side 
within a week. If no new agreement can be reached, the contract from 
the previous year remains valid. Over 90 percent of the private sector 
work force are covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated 
at national or local levels. Trilateral consultations (unions, 
management, and government) also take place on such subjects as the 
minimum wage, the duration of the legal workweek, temporary work, 
social security, and unemployment benefits. Labor tribunals, composed 
of worker and employer representatives, are available to resolve 
complaints.
    The law requires businesses with more than 50 employees to 
establish a works council, through which workers are consulted on 
training, working conditions, profit sharing, and similar issues. Works 
councils, which are open to both union and nonunion employees, are 
elected every 2 years.
    The Constitution's provisions for trade union rights extend to the 
country's overseas departments and territories.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and 
the Government effectively enforces this provision.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--With a few exceptions for those enrolled in certain 
apprenticeship programs or working in the entertainment industry, 
children under the age of 16 may not be employed. Generally, work 
considered arduous or work between the hours of 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. may 
not be performed by minors under age 18. Laws prohibiting child 
employment are enforced effectively through periodic checks by labor 
inspectors, who have the authority to take employers to court for 
noncompliance with the law. The law prohibits forced or bonded child 
labor, and the Government effectively enforces this prohibition (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The administratively determined 
minimum wage, revised whenever the cost-of-living index rises 2 
percentage points, is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living 
for a worker and family. The hourly wage was changed to $6.57 (40.72 
francs) as of July 1. The legal workweek is 39 hours, with a minimum 
break of 24 hours per week. Overtime work is restricted to 9 hours per 
week.
    In December Parliament adopted a law establishing the principles 
that would guide implementation of a reduction of the legal workweek to 
35 hours, starting in 2000, for firms with more than 20 employees. 
Firms with less than 20 employees are expected to have until January 
2002 to adjust to the new law.
    The Ministry of Labor has overall responsibility for policing 
occupational health and safety laws. Standards are high and effectively 
enforced. The law requires each enterprise with 50 or more employees to 
establish an occupational health and safety committee. Over 75 percent 
of all enterprises, covering more than 75 percent of all employees, 
have fully functioning health and safety committees. Workers have the 
right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations.
    f. Trafficking in persons.--The law prohibits the trafficking of 
persons. The Penal Code prohibits facilitating prostitution by another 
person, and associated activities, including acting as an intermediary 
for persons who prostitute themselves. Penalties are significantly 
higher if a minor is involved, or if the activity is accompanied by 
violence. The Government enforces these laws vigorously. However, 
trafficking in women occurs.
    France is primarily a transit point for trafficked women rather 
than a source or destination. The Office for the Repression of 
Trafficking in Humans (OCRTEH), located within the Ministry of the 
Interior, reported that in 1998 the authorities dismantled 16 
international trafficking rings, and charged 518 persons with 
trafficking or pimping. According to OCRTEH, nearly a third of female 
victims of trafficking were foreigners, and the number of minors who 
were victims remained constant from 1996 to 1998. Law enforcement 
authorities believe that women transiting France come primarily from 
Eastern Europe and go to Africa or South America.
                                 ______
                                 

                                GEORGIA

    Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. 
Multiparty parliamentary elections followed a military coup in 1992 
that ousted the elected government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and brought 
Eduard Shevardnadze to power as head of a provisional government. The 
civil war and separatist wars that followed weakened greatly central 
government authority, not only in separatist Abkhazia and Ossetia, but 
also in other areas of the country, and the extent of central authority 
and control remain in question. The 1995 Constitution provides for an 
executive branch that reports to the President and a legislature. In 
1995 Eduard Shevardnadze was elected President, and a parliament was 
selected in elections described by international observers as generally 
consistent with democratic norms, except in the autonomous region of 
Ajara. Local elections were held for the first time in November 1998. 
Parliamentary elections were held on October 31, which the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) characterized as a ``step 
toward Georgia's compliance with OSCE commitments''. The President 
appoints ministers with the consent of the Parliament. The Constitution 
provides for an independent judiciary; however, it is subject to 
executive pressure.
    Internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that erupted in 
the early 1990's are still unresolved. Cease-fires are in effect in 
both areas, although sporadic incidents of violence occur in Abkhazia. 
These conflicts, together with problems created by roughly 283,000 
internally displaced persons (IDP's), pose a significant threat to 
national stability. In 1993 Abkhaz separatists won control of Abkhazia, 
and most ethnic Georgians--a large plurality of the population--were 
expelled or fled the region. In 1994 Russian peacekeeping forces 
representing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) deployed in 
the conflict area with the agreement of the Government and the Abkhaz 
separatists. The Georgian and Abkhaz sides have yet to conclude an 
agreement on the return of IDP's to the Gali region. A limited number 
have returned on their own. As a result of fighting in May 1998, almost 
all of the 53,000 Georgian IDP's who had returned to the Gali region of 
Abkhazia fled again. Approximately 17,000 Georgian IDP's returned to 
the Gali region for the harvest during the year, and many are expected 
to remain. A Russian peacekeeping force also has been in South Ossetia 
since 1992. Repatriation to South Ossetia has been slow. The Government 
has no effective control over Abkhazia or much of South Ossetia. Almost 
no IDP's have returned to other parts of Abkhazia, although ethnic 
Svans continue to inhabit the Kodori River valley, part of the former 
Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic that remains under nominal government 
control.
    The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI) and Procuracy have primary 
responsibility for law enforcement, and the Ministry of State Security 
(MSS, formerly the KGB) plays a significant role in internal security. 
In times of internal disorder, the Government may call on the MOI or 
the army. Elected civilian authorities do not maintain adequate control 
over the law enforcement and security forces. Members of the security 
forces committed serious human rights abuses, although the number 
decreased slightly from the previous year.
    The Government made efforts to develop a market-based economy. 
Agriculture represents approximately 30 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Per capita GDP in 1998 was estimated to be $3,330. The 
World Bank estimated that 11 percent of the population were under the 
poverty level. The economy grew during the year, although at a much 
lower rate than in the previous year. Monetary policy continued to be 
tight and the exchange rate was relatively stable. However, there was a 
growing fiscal deficit, as revenue collection continued to be very low. 
Government salaries and pensions were still in arrears. Key exports are 
manganese, wine, mineral water, and agricultural products.
    The Government's human rights record was uneven and serious 
problems remain in some areas. Police and security forces continued to 
torture, beat, and otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees, force 
confessions, and fabricate or plant evidence. Several deaths in custody 
were blamed on security force abuse or prison conditions. Local human 
rights groups reported that these abuses declined again during the 
year, continuing a trend begun in 1998; however Human Rights Watch 
reported no substantial improvement. Authorities allegedly continued to 
use arbitrary arrest and detention. Corruption was pervasive. Although 
prison conditions remain inhuman and life threatening, most government 
promises of reforms remain unfulfilled. The Ministry of Justice gained 
formal jurisdiction over the prison system from the Ministry of 
Interior; however the MOI retains a significant role in prison staff 
and investigations. Senior government officials acknowledged serious 
human rights problems, especially those linked to law enforcement 
agencies, and sought international advice and assistance on needed 
reforms. However, while structural reforms designed to improve respect 
for human rights were passed by Parliament, law enforcement agencies 
were slow to adapt their practices to democratic norms, and impunity 
remains a problem.
    A new Criminal Code was passed in June. The Criminal Procedures 
Code, passed in November 1997, underwent substantial amendment in the 
spring in response to complaints by security forces, and their previous 
powers--which involved abuse of prisoner rights--essentially were 
restored. Prolonged pretrial detention remains a problem. The judiciary 
is subject to pressure and corruption and does not always ensure due 
process; judicial reform efforts have been aimed at creating a more 
independent judiciary. There were lengthy delays in trials; however, 
there were some improvements in the judiciary during the year. As a 
result of the Law on Common Courts, many corrupt and incompetent judges 
were removed from the bench and replaced by judges who passed a 
qualifying exam and vetting process. Law enforcement agencies and other 
government bodies illegally interfered with citizens' right to privacy. 
The press generally was free, but there were instances of government 
constraint on some press freedoms. The Government limited freedom of 
assembly for supporters of the political movement founded by former 
Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and security forces continued to 
disperse some peaceful rallies violently. Government officials and 
politicians infringed upon freedom of religion. Violence and 
discrimination against women are problems.
    Georgia's accession to the Council of Europe in April led to new 
legislation giving the Ministry of Justice jurisdiction over the prison 
system from the Ministry of the Interior, although the latter will 
continue to staff the facilities.
    Increased citizen awareness of civil rights and democratic values 
and the continued evolution of civil society provided an increasingly 
effective check on the excesses of law enforcement agencies. The number 
of independent nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued to 
increase, as did their ability to speak out for, and defend the rights 
of, individual citizens. However, international observers noted that 
most of this growth is concentrated in Tbilisi and that the regions 
still have weak NGO communities. Criticism from the press and the NGO 
community played an important role in reducing the incidence of 
prisoner abuse.
    There was little information available on the human rights 
situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to limited access to these 
regions.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government agents.
    The Government stated that 57 prisoners died in prison and 9 
prisoners died in pretrial detention during the year. Human rights 
NGO's and press allege physical abuse, torture, and inhuman prison or 
pretrial detention conditions contributed to deaths in pretrial 
detention. The authorities attributed the majority of these deaths to 
illness. Authorities also attributed nine such deaths to suicide, 
including that of Ivane Kolbaya, who on March 22 fell to his death from 
a fifth floor window of the Ministry of Interior while being questioned 
about his alleged involvement in a theft. An international human rights 
NGO brought this case to the Government's attention, as well as four 
others, including the 1998 death of Gulchora Dursunova and the 1997 
deaths of Akaki Iacobashvili and Eka Tavartkiladze. In May the National 
Security Council requested that the Procuracy determine the legality of 
the decisions made in these cases and the Procuracy upheld all the 
decisions. However, the Procuracy was continuing to investigate 
Kolbaya's death at year's end. On December 4, Zaza Tsitsilashvili 
allegedly threw himself to his death from the sixth floor of the 
Ministry of Interior. The case is under investigation. Family members, 
however, say his corpse showed evidence of being beaten.
    Killings were committed by elements on either side of the 
separatist conflict in Abkhazia, including by partisan groups and by 
Abkhaz separatists. The partisan groups in the past have received 
government support and training; however, the Government claims that it 
can no longer control the partisans. The number of incidents decreased 
from the previous year. Killings and other abuses on either side of the 
conflict are not being investigated, prosecuted or punished.
    Nuzgar Levasha, Deputy Energy Minister in Gamsakhurdia's government 
was found apparently beaten to death following a peaceful demonstration 
in December 1998. Levasha's death was investigated and deemed a suicide 
by the authorities.
    b. Disappearance.--On September 28, Manana Gamsakhurdia, the wife 
of the former president, alleged that she was kidnaped by three men a 
few days earlier. She returned unharmed. NGO sources claimed that she 
was escorted from the city to prevent an anticipated demonstration. No 
investigation has taken place.
    In mid-October, gunmen, apparently with criminal motives, seized 
six U.N. observers and their translator as they were delivering aid in 
Abkhazia; they were released a few days later.
    On September 8, a prisoner exchange took place in which the Abkhaz 
returned 10 Georgians, including 9 fisherman abducted off the coast of 
Abkhazia on April 3, in exchange for 3 Abkhaz militiamen and 1 resident 
citizen of Abkhazia.
    Georgian and Abkhaz commissions on missing persons reported that 
the fate of over 1,000 Georgians and several hundred Abkhaz who 
disappeared as a result of the war in Abkhazia still is unknown. No 
progress was made in determining their whereabouts. The International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) cooperated in the effort through its 
Red Cross message system. Georgian partisan groups active in Abkhazia 
periodically took hostages, usually to exchange for captured 
compatriots. The Government has claimed consistently that it was unable 
to control them and asserted that the partisans in reality are bandits 
numbering no more than 20 to 30 individuals.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however, 
members of the security forces continued to torture, beat, and abuse 
prisoners and detainees, usually to extract confessions. According to a 
local human rights group, there was again a slight decline in the 
incidence of such abuse. This group attributed the reduction to a more 
open society, increased intolerance of police misconduct, greater 
public awareness of civil rights, and increased pressure from the 
international community. However, one prominent human rights 
organization claims the authorities are simply better at hiding their 
abuse. Serious abuses and police misconduct continue and corruption and 
criminality, such as the fabrication or planting of evidence, remain 
problems.
    The most serious incidents of abuse occur in the investigative 
stage of pretrial detention when suspects are interrogated by police. 
According to human rights observers, those who suffer such abuse are 
held routinely for lengthy periods in pretrial detention to give their 
injuries time to heal (see Section 1.e.).
    Police misconduct was worse outside of Tbilisi, where awareness of 
laws and citizens' rights is lower and human rights NGO's are less 
active.
    Impunity remains a problem. Although in the past a number of 
policemen were arrested or disciplined for physical abuse, none were 
arrested during the year. Recent changes to the Criminal Procedures 
Code weakened a detainee's ability to substantiate claims of such 
abuses (see Section 1.e.). Accountability tended to occur only in 
extreme cases, such as those resulting in death, and even then it is 
rare (see Section 1.a.). For example, in January 1998, Giga Shukashvili 
was detained in the Gldani district police station where allegedly he 
was beaten severely and coerced into signing false testimony about a 
theft. The following day, he was transferred to the main police 
department of Tbilisi and placed in a room with six or more inmates. He 
claims that these persons were police informers who allegedly beat him 
over the course of 18 days. Although the Procuracy continues to 
investigate his case, Shukashvili stated that he was detained again in 
May in an attempt to intimidate him into withdrawing his complaint.
    Domestic human rights advocates reported that the use of torture, 
such as electric shock, to extract confessions diminished somewhat. 
However Human Rights Watch reported that mistreatment and physical 
abuse of detainees continued to be rampant.
    In the past, security forces have tortured some defendants in 
politically sensitive cases, such as members of the former Gamsakhurdia 
government and members of the paramilitary Mkhedrioni (see Section 
1.e.). Local human rights observers reported that abuse most commonly 
occurred in two pretrial detention facilities, Isolator 5 in Tbilisi 
and the pretrial facility in Kutaisi. Isolator 5, in the basement of 
the Ministry of the Interior headquarters, was the facility in which 
detainees suspected of a serious crime or whose cases had political 
overtones were incarcerated. According to local human rights observers, 
despite calls by senior law enforcement officials for investigators to 
show restraint, many persons who were detained in Isolator 5 afterwards 
reported that they were beaten or otherwise abused. Often the threat of 
incarceration in this facility was sufficient to induce a confession. 
In contrast to those arrested in connection with the 1995 assassination 
attempt on President Shevardnadze, those arrested on May 22 for 
plotting against the Government and those arrested for the 1998 
assassination attempt against President Shevardnadze reportedly were 
not mistreated. None of the suspects reported any severe physical 
torture being employed during the investigation. Human rights observers 
also noted that the Procuracy collected evidence in addition to 
confessions for use in the court proceedings. The families and state-
appointed advocates of the defendants had limited access to them.
    Government officials acknowledged that members of the security 
forces in the past beat and abused prisoners and detainees on a routine 
basis. Government officials continued to claim that a lack of proper 
training, poor supervision of investigators and guards, and lack of 
equipment often resulted in abuse. For example investigators in the 
past were trained to obtain confessions rather than use physical 
evidence to assemble a case. After law enforcement agencies expressed 
concern that the safeguards contained in the new Criminal Procedures 
Code (see Section 1.e.) would make it difficult for them to combat 
crime, amendments to the code in May and June reinstated many of their 
powers.
    International and local human rights observers expressed concern 
that corruption is related to the number of police officers nationwide. 
Although the Government officially employed only approximately 35,000 
policemen, these observers estimated that in reality the numbers 
employed may have reached 80,000. The Government was unable to pay the 
salaries for the police force. Consequently, police solicited bribes 
from the general population, especially motorists. The period between 
an arrest and a bail hearing was another opportunity for solicitation. 
Police reportedly approached the suspect's family and offered to drop 
charges in exchange for a bribe.
    Members of Parliament's Committee on Human Rights and Ethnic 
Relations and local human rights groups independently investigated 
claims of abuse. Despite fear of retaliation, there was a 100 percent 
increase in claims filed; however, fear prevented many from filing 
claims and not all claimants followed their claims all the way through 
to trial. The National Security Council's human rights advisor also had 
a mandate to investigate claims of abuse. In 1995 the Constitution 
mandated a Human Rights Defender, or ombudsman. The first ombudsman 
took office in November 1997, but resigned in August to run for 
Parliament. During his tenure, the ombudsman focused his attention on 
social and economic rights and was not active in defending individuals 
from abuse by law enforcement agencies (see Section 4). No replacement 
has been named.
    Members of the security forces beat members of religious minorities 
(see Section 2.c.).
    Prison authorities admitted that conditions are inhuman and life 
threatening in many facilities. They blamed inadequate cell space, 
medicine, and food on a lack of resources. The President pardoned 1,500 
prisoners in April and 1,700 in October as a means of alleviating 
overcrowding. Observers still consider the prisons overcrowded. The 
lack of proper sanitation, exercise, medical care, and food posed a 
serious threat to the life and health of prisoners.
    The prison mortality rate reportedly was high; however, human 
rights NGO's claim that authorities kept the rates artificially low by 
releasing prisoners who are terminally ill. Additionally, monitors said 
that deaths of prisoners without families usually went uncounted. Most 
of the deaths during the year were attributed officially to medical 
causes, usually tuberculosis. In one case, a prisoner reportedly 
weighing just 66 pounds was released from a Rustavi prison; he died 
within 3 days. Officials determined the cause of illness and death to 
be tuberculosis. According to the ICRC, tuberculosis is widespread in 
the prison system. In recognition of this fact, the ICRC continued a 
joint program with the authorities begun in 1997 to reduce the 
incidence of the disease. However, torture and physical abuse of 
prisoners also played a role in such deaths in custody.
    Government plans announced in 1995 to build new prison facilities 
remained unfulfilled.
    In accordance with requirements stipulated by the Council of 
Europe, the Parliament passed a new law on prisons on July 22 that 
transferred responsibility for the prisons from the Ministry of 
Interior to the Ministry of Justice. The law was to take effect January 
1, 2000. While many human rights observers were optimistic that the 
division of responsibilities will improve conditions, they also had 
serious concerns. Although the Ministry of Justice is to be responsible 
for overall administration of the prison system, an amendment permits 
the Ministry of Interior's personnel to continue to staff the 
facilities. Other legislation also permits the Ministry to conduct 
operative investigations among inmates to gather evidence for trials 
without judicial approval. Local and international human rights 
observers claimed that such investigations often employ torture.
    The ICRC had full access to detention facilities, including those 
in Abkhazia, in accordance with its customary procedures, which include 
meetings with detainees without the presence of third-party observers 
and regular repetition of visits. The OSCE mission, whose mandate 
includes prison visits, reported bureaucratic delays but no serious 
problems in obtaining access to visit prisoners and detainees. However, 
local human rights groups reported that they still encountered 
obstacles in visiting detainees, especially in cases with political 
overtones. In April a local NGO signed an agreement with the Government 
granting access to pretrial detention facilities; however, by year's 
end it had not received such access.
    The conflict in the neighboring Russian region of Chechnya affected 
the situation in Georgia. For example, in August Russian warplanes 
strayed across the border and dropped cluster bombs on the Georgian 
village of Zemo Omalo, wounding three persons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
includes provisions to protect citizens against arbitrary arrest and 
detention; however, authorities frequently violated these provisions. 
The Constitution provides for a 9-month period of maximum pretrial 
detention, mandated court approval of detention after 72 hours, and 
restrictions on the role of the prosecutor (see Section 1.e.). The 
Soviet Criminal Code was amended to implement these constitutional 
safeguards and was superseded in 1997 by the Criminal Procedures Code. 
These amendments were generally, although not always, observed, as 
prosecutors continued to maintain undue influence over criminal 
procedures. A new Criminal Code was enacted in June.
    Judges issue warrants and detention orders, and suspects must be 
charged within 3 days. Pretrial investigatory detention is limited to 9 
months in accordance with the Constitution, instead of 18 months as 
allowed by the old Soviet code. Judges may extend pretrial detention by 
3-month intervals up to 9 months. Human rights NGO's stated that the 
amendments to the old Soviet code made the pretrial detention period 
less arbitrary. Despite the reduction of the limit from 18 to 9 months, 
there was a slight increase in the number of individuals in pretrial 
detention. As of October 15, there were 8,529 prisoners serving 
sentences, and 2,137 held in pretrial detention.
    A new Criminal Procedures Code, along with other legislation to 
implement constitutional protections and restrict the powers of the 
Procuracy and the police, was passed by Parliament in 1997, but 
implementation was delayed until May (see Section 1.e.). Following 
enactment of the new Criminal Code in June, the Criminal Procedures 
Code was amended substantially in July. A number of amendments sought 
to harmonize the Criminal Procedures Code with the new Criminal Code. 
However, many human rights monitors were concerned that several 
amendments adversely affected due process. Before these amendments were 
enacted, a defendant could complain directly to the court prior to a 
trial regarding abusive actions committed by the police or the 
Procuracy during a criminal investigation and could request a forensic 
medical examination. Now a defendant can file a complaint of abusive 
investigation only with the Procuracy.
    According to observers, including the OSCE and the Association of 
Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, police continued 
frequently to treat individuals in their custody with brutality; 
however, correct legal procedures were observed more often. Police 
often failed to inform detainees of their rights and prevented access 
to family members and lawyers. Authorities often held prisoners who 
were tortured and abused in pretrial detention for lengthy periods in 
order to give their injuries time to heal (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
    There were no cases of forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary often does 
not exercise full independence. In the past the courts often were 
subject to pressure and corruption and did not always ensure due 
process. It is still unclear whether judicial reform altered the 
deference judicial authorities frequently showed the executive branch, 
particularly at lower levels of the court system. Investigators 
routinely plant or fabricate evidence and extort confessions in direct 
violation of the Constitution. Judges generally are reluctant to 
exclude evidence obtained illegally over the objection of the 
Procuracy. Local human rights observers also report widespread judicial 
incompetence and corruption, including the payment of bribes to 
investigators, prosecutors, and judges, which also leads to denial of 
justice. However, several trial attorneys and local NGO's in Tbilisi 
reported that some cases were being handled in a fairer and more 
expeditious manner than in 1998. However, progress outside of Tbilisi 
was not as marked. Caseloads increased and judges' salaries, despite a 
pay raise, remained inadequate. Pressure from extensive family and clan 
networks was extensive.
    The 1997 Law on the Courts was designed to enhance judicial 
independence. Under this law, the country established a three tier 
court system. Implementation of the law was slow and was completed only 
during the year. At the lowest level are district courts, which hear 
routine criminal and civil cases. At the next level are regional courts 
of appeal, which serve as appellate courts for the district courts; 
they started functioning in May. The regional courts also try major 
criminal and civil cases, review cases, and either confirm verdicts or 
return cases to the lower courts for retrial. It was envisioned that 
the Supreme Court, the highest level, which in the absence of regional 
courts tried major cases, eventually would act exclusively as a higher 
appellate court. However, the Supreme Court remains the court of first 
instance for capital crimes and appeals from the Central Election 
Commission.
    The separate Constitutional Court was created in 1996. Its mandate 
includes arbitrating constitutional disputes between the branches of 
government and ruling on individual claims of human rights violations. 
The Court chose to interpret this latter function narrowly, agreeing to 
rule only on cases in which the complainant alleged that the violation 
was sanctioned by law. The Court only considers one case at a time. 
Since its inception in September 1996, 118 cases have been filed with 
the court. Of these cases, 82 were heard, and decisions were reached in 
approximately 50 percent of the cases, while the remaining 50 percent 
were dismissed. The Court's rulings demonstrated judicial independence.
    Administration of the court system was transferred from the 
Ministry of Justice to the Council of Justice in 1997. The Council has 
12 members, 4 selected from within each branch of government. The law 
established a three-part testing procedure for current and prospective 
judges to be administered by the Council. The testing procedure was 
designed to reduce judicial incompetence and corruption. The 
Constitutional Court ruled in November 1998 that sitting judges could 
not be removed, thereby hampering the Government's attempts at judicial 
reform. The Parliament responded with a law stating that judges' terms 
would not be renewed beyond 2001 if they did not take and pass the 
examination, thereby observing the decision of the Constitutional 
Court, yet forcing the judges to qualify themselves through 
examination.
    The first judges' examination was administered in March 1998. A 
total of five examinations were administered as of year's end and some 
250 judges passed. Only 13 judges passed the last examination in 
September. A total of 176 judges passed both the exam and the vetting 
process and replaced judges who had not.
    Supreme Court justices also were required to take the examination, 
but resisted the requirement, arguing that it was an infringement on 
judicial independence and that, since they were confirmed by 
Parliament, they already are subject to public scrutiny and review. The 
Court's new Chief Justice, the former Minister of Justice, appointed 12 
new justices, 10 of whom had passed the judicial exams.
    According to the Constitution, a detainee is presumed innocent and 
has the right to a public trial. A detainee has the right to demand 
immediate access to a lawyer and to refuse to make a statement in the 
absence of counsel. The detaining officer must inform the detainee of 
his rights and must notify the detainee's family of his location as 
soon as possible. These rights mark a significant departure from legal 
practice of the Soviet era; however, they are not fully observed in 
practice. Defense attorneys often have difficulty obtaining permission 
from investigators to visit clients. Investigators seldom inform 
individuals of their rights. There were lengthy delays in trials. 
During the year, the Tbilisi City Council decided to initiate a project 
with a local NGO that would create a system by which lawyers would be 
placed in Tbilisi police stations to advise detainees of their rights 
without charge. However, another organization brought suit to halt the 
implementation of the project. The suit was thrown out, and the project 
was being implemented by year's end, although intermittently due to 
lack of funding. However, participating lawyers complained that there 
was low public awareness of the program and that local police 
authorities were limiting their access to detainees. For example, one 
lawyer witnessed police beating a detainee; when she began to question 
the police, she was pushed out of the room. When representatives from 
NGO's and the Government arrived at the station, the police chief 
denied that any beating had occurred. While the district prosecutor 
promised to investigate the case, there had been no investigation by 
year's end. The Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and National 
Minorities also created a card listing a citizen's rights in case of 
arrest. By year's end, it distributed 25,000 or 31,000 printed cards to 
students, NGO's, and visitors to the Committee.
    The legislation required to implement constitutional protections 
was passed by Parliament in 1997. The implementing legislation included 
the Criminal Procedures Code and the Law on the Procuracy. These laws 
were designed to create a legal system with adversarial trials by 
reducing the powers of the Procuracy, increasing the rights of defense 
attorneys, and enhancing the independence and authority of the 
judiciary. However, the amendments to the Criminal Procedures Code 
adopted this summer weakened many of these provisions. Under Soviet 
law, prosecutors were vested with powers greater than those of judges 
and defense attorneys. Prosecutors continued to direct criminal 
investigations, supervise some judicial functions, and represent the 
State in trials. Trials were not conducted in an adversarial manner. 
Most criminal trials continued to follow the Soviet model and, in many 
cases, prosecutors continued to wield disproportionate influence over 
outcomes.
    The Soviet system of state-employed criminal defense attorneys 
began to break down in 1998. Individuals who could afford to pay were 
able to obtain the attorney of their choice in both criminal and civil 
cases. In instances where defendants were unable to afford legal 
counsel, attorneys were assigned to a case upon the recommendation of 
the Procurator's Office by the Office of Legal Assistance, a part of 
the state-controlled Bar Association. In certain cases, defendants were 
pressured to accept a state-appointed attorney. The Procuracy not only 
had control over state-appointed lawyers, it also determined whether a 
defendant's request to change lawyers was granted.
    International and local human rights groups agreed that there were 
political prisoners but disagree about the number, giving estimates 
ranging from 10 to 200. A number of these individuals--members of the 
Mkhedrioni, Gamsakhurdia supporters, and state security personnel--
committed criminal acts and were tried and sentenced on criminal 
grounds, although they may have had political objectives. According to 
some local observers, there are some Gamsakhurdia supporters who never 
took up arms and should be considered political prisoners. Several, 
including Valter Shurgaia, Zviad Dzidziguri, and Zaur Kobalia, were 
still in prison at year's end. These individuals--political leaders of 
Gamsakhurdia's movement--were tried and convicted on poorly 
substantiated charges of treason, banditry, and illegal possession of 
weapons. They are serving sentences ranging from 7 to 12 years. 
President Shevardnadze pardoned about 10 political prisoners during the 
year, including former National Guard commander Tengiz Kitovani and 
Nicholas Kvezereli. The latter was convicted, along with Jaba 
Ioseliani, of the 1995 assassination attempt on the President. Two 
others who were imprisoned for attempting to assassinate Shevardnadze 
also were released. The 1998 trial of Ioseliani, the head of the 
Mkhedrioni, and 14 other alleged conspirators in the 1995 assassination 
attempt on President Shevardnadze was characterized by the same 
violations found in other recent trials with political overtones. The 
Government consistently violated due process both during the 
investigation and the trial. Torture, use of forced confessions, 
fabricated or planted evidence, denial of legal counsel, and expulsion 
of defendants from the courtroom took place. Ten of the defendants 
claimed to have been beaten or tortured and coerced to confess during 
the investigative stage of the case. According to local human rights 
groups, four of the defendants were tortured seriously, including 
former Security Service Captain Guram Papukashvili. Despite the claims 
of torture, the judge in the case allowed the confessions to be entered 
as evidence. The court-appointed physician who inspected the defendants 
claimed that too much time had passed to establish whether the 
defendants had been tortured. The alleged conspirators were held in 
pretrial detention for 27 months before the trial began, well in excess 
of even the Soviet legal limit. According to local human rights groups, 
the delay was meant to give their injuries time to heal, reportedly a 
common practice on the part of the law enforcement agencies (see 
Section 1.c.). There were increasing calls domestically for President 
Shevardnadze to issue a general amnesty for those convicted for their 
actions, including acts involving violence, during the period of civil 
war and social chaos from 1991 to 1995.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution forbids the tapping of telephones and 
other forms of interference in an individual's private life without 
court approval or legal necessity. However, in practice law enforcement 
agencies and other government bodies, especially the Ministry of 
Communications, monitored private telephone conversations without 
obtaining court orders. The Government stated that state security 
police and state tax authorities sometimes entered homes and places of 
work without prior legal sanction in emergency cases as permitted by 
the Criminal Procedures Code. Police regularly stopped and searched 
vehicles without probable cause to extort bribes (see Section 1.c.). 
The high level of unregulated police misconduct and corruption 
undermined public confidence in Government, especially the law 
enforcement agencies.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the 1991 
press law provide for freedom of the press and new laws further support 
this freedom; however, although the independent press was increasingly 
active, the Government constrained some press freedoms. According to 
journalists, security and law enforcement authorities attempted to 
intimidate the press through public comments and private admonitions. 
The new Administrative Code enacted in June contains a freedom of 
information section that provides for public access to government 
meetings and documents. Journalists lacked effective legal protection, 
a circumstance that hindered investigative journalism. The Civil Code 
and other legislation make it a crime to insult the honor and dignity 
of an individual and place the burden of proof on the accused.
    Some 200 independent newspapers are in circulation. The press 
increasingly served as a check on government, frequently criticizing 
the performance of high-level officials. Increasingly, independent 
newspapers have been replacing the government-controlled press as the 
population's source of information; the leading independent daily 
newspaper, ``Alia,'' has a national circulation nearly 20 percent 
higher than the government-controlled daily. However, observers report 
that this seems to be mostly a Tbilisi-based phenomenon and that 
independent newspapers continue to struggle in the regions. Several 
newspapers are serious and reputable sources of information. High 
printing costs and general poverty, especially in the countryside, 
limited the circulation of most newspapers to a few hundred or a few 
thousand. The Government finances and controls one newspaper (which 
also appears in 
Russian-, Azeri- and Armenian-language versions) and a radio and 
television network with a national audience; they reflect official 
viewpoints.
    Most persons continued to get their news from television. The 
Government's monopoly on broadcast news was broken when Rustavi-2, a 
member of the independent television network TNG, emerged in 1998 as an 
important alternative to state television after successfully resisting 
2 years of government attempts to shut it down. In addition to Rustavi-
2, there are seven independent television stations in Tbilisi. An 
international NGO that works with the press estimated that there were 
up to 30 regional television stations. While these stations were 
ostensibly independent, the lack of advertising often forced them to 
depend on local government officials for support. Some regions, such as 
Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kutaisi, had a relatively independent press. 
Rustavi-2 had a network of 15 stations, 5 of which broadcast Rustavi-
2's evening news program daily. Independent newspapers and television 
stations continued to be harassed by state tax authorities. Stations 
continued to practice self-censorship, especially in regions where 
local government is strong.
    The trial of two journalists from the independent newspaper Orioni 
who reported in April 1998 allegations of homosexuality and sexual 
harassment in the armed forces was postponed indefinitely in 1998. At 
that time, government and military officials reportedly responded by 
threatening the reporters with arrest, demanding the names of sources, 
and filing a civil lawsuit that charged defamation. One of the two 
journalists, Amiran Meskheli, was detained for allegedly having evaded 
military service. He subsequently was conscripted and assigned to the 
unit on which he had reported. Human rights monitors considered this 
action a transparent attempt at intimidation and filed a lawsuit to 
overturn his conscription. Meskheli remained out on bail at year's end.
    In May 1998, the independent newspaper Kavkasioni published 
allegations of graft and misconduct by the Abkhaz government-in-exile, 
a quasi-official body that claims to be the genuine government of 
Abkhazia and to speak for refugees from Abkhazia. In July 1998, two 
members of the Abkhaz government-in-exile filed a defamation suit 
against Kavkasioni. The newspaper's appeal against an adverse 1998 
decision by the court had not been heard by year's end.
    Academic freedom is respected widely.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to peaceful assembly without prior permission 
from the authorities; however, both the national Government and local 
governments restricted the right in practice. A 1997 law on freedom of 
assembly requires political parties and other organizations to give 
prior notice and obtain permission from local authorities if they 
intend to assemble on a public thoroughfare. Members of the local NGO 
community believe that the law violates the Constitution and sought to 
have it overturned by the Constitutional Court. However the Court 
refused to hear the case, explaining that a test case must be brought 
before it in order for it to consider the challenge, e.g., an 
individual must prove that he has been harmed by this law. Most permits 
for assembly are granted without arbitrary restriction or 
discrimination, although this is not the case for Zviadists, supporters 
of former President Gamsakhurdia. Extreme Zviadists never have accepted 
any successor to the Gamsakhurdia Government as legitimate and 
frequently held demonstrations demanding that the present Government 
resign. The Government viewed the frequent public rallies of the 
Zviadists as a threat because of the publicity they generated for 
themselves and against the Government. The police broke up one of their 
rallies held in May. A hunger strike involving several hundred people 
and conducted in the shell of Gamsakhurdia's burnt-out villa in Tbilisi 
since mid-June was not disturbed and continued at year's end.
    Leila Tsomaia and Tamila Nikoldaze, Zviadists who were arrested, 
tried, convicted, and incarcerated on charges of civil disorder for 
attempting to stage a rally in front of Tbilisi University in 1997, 
were pardoned and released from prison in March.
    Over the course of the year, the police broke up rallies or 
gatherings held by various evangelical Protestants or watched while 
others disrupted the rallies. Local authorities several times denied 
permission to Jehovah's Witnesses to conduct open-air rallies (see 
Section 2.c.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respected this right in practice. Authorities granted 
permits for registration of associations without arbitrary restriction 
or discrimination.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion and the Government generally respected this right in practice. 
However, local police and security officials harassed foreign 
missionaries and, in some localities, several evangelical Christian 
organizations.
    The Constitution recognizes the special role of the Georgian 
Orthodox Church in the country's history without further defining it, 
but also stipulates the independence of the Church from the State. The 
Georgian Orthodox Church has lobbied Parliament and the Government for 
laws that would grant it special status and restrict the activities of 
missionaries from ``nontraditional'' religions. Various draft laws, 
some modeled on the Russian law on religion, have been rejected by 
Parliament.
    Certain members of the Georgian Orthodox Church and the public see 
Protestant evangelical groups as a threat to the Church and Georgian 
cultural values, a perception that some politicians played upon during 
the election campaign. Local police and security officials at times 
harassed foreign missionaries and non-Georgian Orthodox congregations 
or did not intervene when others harassed them. For example, on May 29, 
the police violently broke up a public prayer meeting of the Assembly 
of God in the Gldani district of Tbilisi, beating a number of members, 
pushing a 60-year-old woman to the ground and screaming threats of 
murder. Prior to the subsequent civil trial, Ministry of Interior 
officials repeatedly harassed the pastor and his adherents. At the 
trial on August 16, the judge ruled that the police had not violated 
the individuals' constitutional rights. The group filed an appeal and 
incurred further harassment from law enforcement authorities. On August 
29, a riot allegedly instigated by the police broke out at one of the 
organization's churches. Some members were beaten and the police 
confiscated some members' documents, forcing the victims to retrieve 
them at the police station.
    According to press reports, public services by four evangelical 
Protestant congregations in Tbilisi were brought to a halt in August as 
a result of hostility from the police and radical Orthodox activists. 
The churches have not been able to resume public services, because the 
police confiscated the documentation they needed to rent appropriate 
premises, although they continue to hold small-scale services in 
private apartments. The police raided three Tbilisi meeting places in 
late August, halting services then in progress at two of them. Only two 
Protestant churches, the Baptist Church, and the World of Life, 
continue to hold services in Tbilisi.
    Local police chiefs in Gori and Kaspi tried to prevent Jehovah's 
Witnesses from conducting open air meetings in Gori and Kaspi in May 
and June. However, the meetings took place, in one case because a large 
crowd already had gathered, and in the other because of the 
intervention by a central government official.
    Customs and security officials impounded six tons of religious 
materials being imported by Jehovah's Witnesses on April 23. The 
materials, some damaged, were not released until early July and then 
only after the intervention of the National Security Council official 
responsible for human rights. Representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses 
traveled to where the materials were impounded with a letter 
authorizing their release in hand. However, local officials and a 
gathering of demonstrators, including a Georgian Orthodox priest, 
prevented the release. The representatives returned to Tbilisi. The 
central Government retrieved the materials and brought them to Tbilisi. 
On October 17, a Jehovah's Witnesses worship service in the Gldani 
section of Tbilisi with 120 parishioners was attacked violently by 
members of a religious sect. The Gldani police refused to intervene. 
Sixteen persons were injured in the attack. On December 25, the case 
was forwarded to the Gldani prosecutor's office for criminal charges.
    A nationalist Member of Parliament brought a civil suit in late 
April to ban Jehovah's Witnesses, arguing that the organization is 
anti-Orthodox, antistate, and antinational. Appeals by the Jehovah's 
Witnesses to an appellate court and then to the Supreme Court 
contending that the suit is groundless were refused. The Supreme Court 
stated that the lower court first must hear the case. On November 29, 
the lower court judge remanded the issue to an academic study group to 
study the literature of Jehovah's Witnesses. An opinion from the group 
was expected in early 2000.
    Two textbooks were refused licenses due to the disapproval of the 
Georgian Orthodox Church. By law all school textbooks must be approved 
by the Ministry of Education, in consultation with various ministries 
and the office of the Patriarch. In one case, the office of the 
Patriarch vetoed the textbook, and the Ministry of Education therefore 
refused to grant the license. In the other, the Ministry of Education 
granted the license, but a committee of concerned Orthodox parents, 
which the office of the Patriarch publicly acknowledged was its 
creation, successfully sued the Ministry of Education to rescind the 
license.
    The Catholic Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church have been 
unable to secure the return of churches closed during the Soviet 
period, many of which later were given to the Georgian Orthodox Church. 
A prominent Armenian church in Tbilisi remained closed. The Armenian 
Apostolic Church, the Catholic Church, and Protestant denominations 
have had difficulty obtaining permission to construct new churches, 
reportedly in part as a result of pressure from the Georgian Orthodox 
Church. However, a new Catholic church opened during the year. The tax 
code grants tax exemptions only for the Orthodox Church and not for any 
other religion.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution, the 1993 Law on 
Migration, and other legislation generally provide for these rights 
and, with some exceptions, the Government generally respected them in 
practice. Registration of an individual's place of residence no longer 
was required, nor were internal passports. Old Soviet passports bearing 
``propiskas'' (proof of legal residence in a particular locality) were 
accepted as proof of identity because passports and identification 
cards are expensive and difficult for many members of the electorate to 
obtain, especially in poorer and more remote rural areas.
    In principle the Government respected the right of repatriation; 
however, approximately 275,000 Akhiskha or Meskhetians (primarily 
Muslims) who were expelled from southern Georgia to Central Asia by 
Stalin in the 1940's still faced both official and public opposition to 
their return, as many were concerned that the Meskhetians' return to 
the Samtske-Javakheti region would upset the ethnic balance in this 
mostly ethnic-Armenian populated region. Many of the Meskhetians were 
expelled a second time from Central Asia when the Soviet Union broke 
up.
    In 1996 President Shevardnadze issued a decree authorizing the 
return of 1,000 Meskhetians per year for 5 years. The decree has never 
been implemented, and to date only a few hundred Meskhetians have 
returned in recent years, none as a result of the decree; all came as 
illegal immigrants. The Government has provided housing for most of 
them, but because they were to be the subject of a separate law, not 
yet passed, they were deprived early in 1998 of their refugee status 
and, consequently, of their housing subsidy. Many now live without any 
regularized status.
    In December 1997, Parliament passed a law entitled, ``Recognizing 
Georgian Citizens as Political Victims and Social Protection of the 
Repressed.'' This law, intended to rehabilitate victims of the Soviet 
era, specifically excluded the Meskhetians, whom it identified as the 
subject of a separate law, not yet drafted. Observers believed that the 
Parliament would adopt such a law in 1999; however, they failed to do 
so.
    On March 14, a presidential decree was issued to address the 
Meskhetian issue. It established a State Commission on the Repatriation 
and Rehabilitation of the Population Deported from Southern Georgia. In 
connection with its accession to the Council of Europe on April 27, the 
Government undertook to begin the process of Meskhetian repatriation 
within 3 years. In July the Government announced that it had granted 
citizenship to 36 Meskhetians.
    The 1994 quadripartite agreement between Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia, 
and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on repatriation in 
Abkhazia called for the free, safe, and dignified return of displaced 
persons (IDP's) and refugees to their homes. The Abkhaz separatist 
regime prevented virtually any official repatriation and unilaterally 
abrogated the agreement in late 1994. From 1994 to May 1998, an 
estimated 53,000 of the 283,000 IDP's and refugees from Abkhazia 
returned spontaneously, most to the southern part of the Gali district. 
In May 1998, the unstable security situation in Gali deteriorated into 
open warfare between the Abkhaz militia and Georgian partisans and MOI 
troops. The partisans were routed and, in the aftermath, almost all of 
the Georgian returnees fled once again as their homes were burned and 
looted by the Abkhaz.
    In January the Abkhaz separatists unilaterally invited IDP's to 
return to Gali starting March 1, but did so in the absence of measures 
acceptable to the Georgian Government for ensuring their safe return 
and security. The move did not affect significantly the return of IDP's 
to Gali, who continued to travel back and forth to Gali to tend their 
property. An estimated 17,000 IDP's returned to Gali after their 
expulsion in May 1998.
    The 1992 ethnic conflict in South Ossetia also created tens of 
thousands of IDP's and refugees. Ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia 
fled to Georgia proper and Ossetians from South Ossetia and other 
Georgian regions largely fled to Russia. In 1997 UNHCR began a program 
to return IDP's and refugees to their homes. Both sides created 
obstacles that slowed the return. There were about 24,000 Ossetian 
refugees living in North Ossetia. To date about 370 Ossetian families 
from Russia have returned, the majority to South Ossetia. The South 
Ossetian separatists continued to obstruct the repatriation of ethnic 
Georgians to South Ossetia, although approximately 170 families 
returned. For political reasons, South Ossetia continued to press for 
the return of all Ossetian refugees to South Ossetia rather than to 
their original homes in other Georgian regions. In 1997 the Government 
publicly recognized the right of Ossetian refugees to return to their 
homes in Georgia but took little action to facilitate their return. 
Persistent opposition by Georgian authorities, especially at the local 
level, over the return of illegally occupied homes has prevented the 
organized return of Ossetian refugees to Georgia proper. In the 
reporting period, approximately 53 Ossetian refugee and IDP families 
returned to South Ossetia proper.
    Following the outbreak of hostilities in Chechnya in September, the 
country accepted 5,161 registered refugees from that region as of 
year's end. Most were women and children.
    The Government acceded to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, there is no 
effective law concerning the settlement of refugees or the granting of 
political asylum, including first asylum. Parliament passed an asylum 
law in March 1998, but it is not fully consistent with international 
standards as set out in the U.N. Convention.
    According to the UNHCR, only two asylum cases were processed by the 
Government during the year, none in 1998 and one in 1997.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution and the 1995 parliamentary and presidential 
election laws provide citizens with the right peacefully to change 
their government, and citizens exercised this right in elections in 
1992, 1995, and in the fall. A democratically elected president and 
parliament govern most of the country.
    Parliamentary elections were held on October 31. Thirteen electoral 
blocs and 34 political parties fielded candidates for 150 proportional 
and 75 majoritarian seats. The Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG), 
chaired by President Shevardnadze, won an outright majority. 
International observers judged the elections throughout the country to 
be generally fair; however, a number of irregularities were noted, 
including restrictions on freedom of movement, which on occasion 
prevented political parties and observers from exercising their rights. 
A second round was held on November 14, which OSCE observers described 
as well conducted in some districts but marred with irregularities in 
others. The OSCE cited in particular intimidation of members of 
precinct election commissions and instances of ballot stuffing in 
Tbilisi, Abasha, and Chkhorotsku. In the Autonomous Republic of Ajara, 
dominated by Ajaran Supreme Chairman Aslan Abashidze, fraud was 
widespread. There was no voting in these elections in the separatist 
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which remain outside government 
control. Ten members of parliament from Abkhazia elected in 1992 had 
their terms extended.
    The local governments elected in November 1998 were expected to 
have more authority over how local government is run, but inadequate 
funding, corruption, and the absence of legislative guidelines made it 
difficult for them to exercise authority. The opposition criticized the 
Government and the ruling CUG for retaining the power to appoint the 
mayors of the largest cities and regional chairmen, who were not always 
from the area they serve.
    The division of power between the central and local governments 
remained a key issue in the country's transition to democracy. The 
degree of actual autonomy to be exercised by the ``Autonomous Ajaran 
Republic'' was at the center of this debate during the year. Ajara's 
postindependence relationship to the rest of the country still was 
undefined and, in matters such as elections, Ajara's authorities 
claimed that regional laws took precedence over national laws. The 
Revival Party, the dominant political party in Ajara led by Aslan 
Abashidze, the President of the Autonomous Ajaran Republic, boycotted 
the national Parliament for much of the year in a dispute with the CUG 
over the degree of autonomy in Ajara. It took part in the October 31 
parliamentary elections as the major opponent to Shevardnadze's CUG. 
The Government was reluctant to challenge interference in the local 
electoral process by the Ajaran authorities because it sought to avoid 
encouraging threats of separatism in this ethnically Georgian, but 
historically Muslim, region.
    The Ajaran government, along with much of the opposition, alleged 
that widespread fraud occurred in the 1995 presidential and 
parliamentary elections. Serious violations were noted in Ajara in 
these elections as well. Ajara did not allow international or domestic 
observation of its local elections held in 1996. It criticized as 
undemocratic the Government's refusal to allow directly elected local 
officials and announced that local officials in Ajara would be elected 
directly. In the November 1998 local elections, the mayor of Batumi was 
elected by a direct vote, in contrast to the other major cities of 
Georgia. In the October parliamentary elections, international and 
domestic observers reported various forms of intimidation and abuses in 
Ajara, as well as outright fraud.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however, 
women's NGO's took an active role in the parliamentary election season, 
engaging candidates in discussions about issues of concern to their 
memberships. In the 235-seat Parliament, women were represented poorly 
both in the 1995 and October 31 cycles, with only 17 and 16 women being 
elected respectively. Under the current administration elected in 1995, 
only two women held ministerial posts. Representation of national 
minorities decreased in the new Parliament from 16 members to 13 
members; there were 6 ethnic Armenian representatives and 4 ethnic 
Azeris in the new Parliament. Women constituted over half the members 
of political parties in the October elections. Armenians in 1995 
constituted 11 percent of the population as a whole, with some 
concentration in Samtskhe-Javakheti, while Azeris made up 3.8 percent 
of the population, with concentration in the Marneuli district.
    ``Presidential elections'' were held in Abkhazia on October 3. 
International organizations, including the U.N. and the OSCE declared 
them illegal. Georgian authorities criticized them as having no legal 
basis, as they had the Abkhaz local elections of March 1998, on the 
basis that a majority of the population has been expelled from the 
region.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government generally respected the right of local and 
international organizations to monitor human rights but continued to 
restrict the access of local human rights groups to some prisoners (see 
Section 1.c.).
    There were a number of increasingly credible local organizations 
that monitor human rights. Those local human rights groups that are 
extensions of partisan political groups have little credibility or 
influence. Local human rights NGO's report that the Government was more 
responsive over the year. They continued to view the Parliamentary 
Committee on Human Rights as the most objective of the Government's 
human rights bodies. The National Security Council's Human Rights 
Adviser facilitated the positive resolution of some human rights 
matters, including those of Jehovah's Witnesses.
    The constitutionally mandated Office of Public Human Rights 
Defender, or ombudsman, was created in 1995. The first ombudsman, a 
former head of the State Revenue Service and a former MOI official, was 
appointed to the position in November 1997. He disappointed both local 
and international human rights groups. He resigned in August to run in 
the parliamentary elections for an opposition party. While in office he 
chose to focus the office's attention on social and economic issues, 
especially the status of the country's refugees, rather than on 
defending political and civil rights, according to local human rights 
groups. Local human rights groups claimed that the ombudsman's agenda 
was dictated to him by the executive branch. They charge that the 
ombudsman has legal standing with the Constitutional Court and could 
have brought individual violations of human rights to the court for 
consideration. However, he did not choose to do so, and the NGO 
community now is seeking this status for itself in order to gain access 
to detention centers, which they currently are being denied. NGO's can, 
and did, bring suits to courts of the first instance on behalf of 
persons whose rights have been abused. As of year's end, no new 
ombudsman had been appointed.
    In 1997 the UNHCR and the OSCE mission established a joint human 
rights office in Sukhumi, Abkhazia to investigate security incidents 
and human rights abuses. The office, which has operated sporadically 
because of fluctuating security conditions, provides periodic findings, 
reports, and recommendations. Its influence appears to be marginal.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution recognizes the equality of all citizens without 
regard to race, language, sex, religion, skin color, political views, 
national, ethnic, or social affiliation, origin, social status, land 
ownership, or place of residence. The Government generally respected 
these rights. The Constitution provides for Georgian as the state 
language. As a practical matter, the approximately 400,000 Armenians 
and 300,000 Azeris prefer to communicate in their own languages or in 
Russian, while the Abkhaz, Ossetian, and Russian communities prefer to 
use Russian. None are impeded from doing so. Both Georgian and Russian 
are used for interethnic communication.
    Women.--According to a poll conducted in 1998 by the NGO Women for 
Democracy, younger women reported that spousal abuse occurs with some 
frequency and, as it is a social taboo to go to the police or otherwise 
to raise the problem outside the family, it is reported or punished 
only rarely. Spousal abuse is reportedly one of the leading causes for 
divorce. Police did not always investigate reports of rape. A local 
NGO, with the help of an international NGO, opened a shelter for abused 
women in the spring of 1998. The Government established a hot line for 
abused women, but provided no other services. There are no laws that 
specifically criminalize spousal abuse or violence against women. 
Sexual harassment was reportedly a problem in the workplace and was not 
investigated.
    Kidnappings of women for the purpose of marriage sometimes occurred 
in rural areas, although the practice was declining. If an eager or 
spurned suitor holds his intended fiance as a hostage for more than 24 
hours, her family considers her to be no longer suitable for marriage 
except to her kidnaper. If she consents to marriage, the incident is 
considered part of a traditional courtship ritual; if not, future 
marriage may become problematic. In such cases, the woman occasionally 
is raped.
    The Civil Code gives women and men equal inheritance rights.A 
number of women's NGO's, including the women's group of the Georgian 
Young Lawyer's Association and Women for Democracy, promote women's 
rights. NGO's supported last year's poll of women conducted by Women 
for Democracy, which found a gap between the perceptions of older and 
younger women. Older women tended to view their place in traditional 
society as an honored one, but younger women were less sanguine. They 
reported that although there were no real barriers to a professional 
life or to a good education, discrimination and harassment in the 
workplace were problems. Younger women also reported that the economic 
balance had shifted in their favor, as many traditionally male jobs 
disappeared due to the depressed economy. Women's access to the labor 
market was improving but remained primarily confined, particularly for 
older women, to low-paying and low-skilled positions, often without 
regard to high professional and academic qualifications. A study 
released in 1999 reported that women were paid 78 percent of men's 
wages in the public sector and 67 percent of men's wages in the private 
sector. Reportedly, men were given preference in promotions. While some 
efforts have been made within specific programs, the Government had no 
active efforts focused on women's issues.
    Children.--Government services for children were extremely limited. 
The 1995 Health Reform Act withdrew free health care for children over 
the age of 3 years. While education is officially free, many parents 
were unable to afford books and school supplies, and most parents have 
to pay for their children's education.
    There was no societal pattern of abuse of children, but difficult 
economic conditions broke up some families and increased the number of 
street children. The private voluntary organization, Child and 
Environment, noted a significant rise in homeless children following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. It estimated that there were 
currently more than 2,500 street children in Tbilisi due to the 
inability of orphanages and the Government to provide support. The 
organization opened a shelter in 1997. The Ministry of Education opened 
a second shelter in July 1998. However, even together, the two shelters 
can accommodate only a small number of the street children. Outside of 
Tbilisi, even in areas of acute need such as Kutaisi, Zugdidi, and 
Batumi, no such facilities or services existed. The children 
increasingly survive by turning to criminal activity, narcotics, and 
prostitution. Despite a cultural tradition of protecting children, the 
Government took little official action to assist street children due to 
a lack of resources.
    The lack of resources negatively affected orphanages as well. In 
all orphanages, children received inadequate food, clothing, education, 
and medical care; facilities lacked heat, water, and electricity. The 
adult staff was paid poorly and had many months of unpaid wages. The 
staff often diverted money and supplies provided to the orphanages for 
its own use.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no legislated or otherwise 
mandated provision requiring accessibility for the disabled. The Law on 
Labor has a section that includes the provision of special discounts 
and favorable social policies for those with disabilities, especially 
disabled veterans.
    Many of the state facilities for the disabled that operated in the 
Soviet period were closed because of lack of government funding. Most 
disabled persons are supported by family members or by international 
humanitarian donations.
    Religious Minorities.--The Georgian Orthodox Church argued that 
foreign Christian missionaries should confine their activities to non-
Christian areas. Foreign missionaries continued to report some 
incidents of harassment in rural areas and small towns on the part of 
Orthodox priests and their supporters, local police, and security 
officials (see Section 2.c.).
    There was no pattern of anti-Semitism. Jewish leaders attributed 
isolated acts of anti-Semitism, including the publication of anti-
Semitic newspaper articles and the destruction of Jewish communal 
property, to general instability and disorder. Sixty gravestones at the 
Jewish cemetery in Tbilisi were destroyed in December, 1998. No 
suspects were identified. The case was suspended for lack of evidence.
    The Jewish community experienced delays in the return of property 
confiscated during Soviet rule. A court ordered a former synagogue, 
rented from the Government by a theater group, to be returned to the 
Jewish community in 1997. The theater group refused to comply and 
started a publicity campaign with anti-Semitic overtones to justify its 
continued occupation of the building. In December 1997, President 
Shevardnadze promised Jewish leaders that the synagogue would be 
returned before the celebration of 2600 years of Jewish settlement in 
Georgia, September 9, 1998. However, the President's order was not 
enforced and the building remained in the hands of the theater group. 
According to an NGO report, the district court ruled again on February 
25 that the synagogue building must be returned to the Jewish community 
and ordered the city to find other premises and provide compensation 
for the theater company. However, the case was appealed and as of the 
end of the year had not been heard. The building was not returned by 
year's end.
    On October 17, a Jehovah's Witnesses worship service in the Gldani 
section of Tbilisi with 120 parishioners was attacked violently by 
members of a religious sect. The Gldani police refused to intervene. 
Sixteen persons were injured in the attack. On December 25, the case 
was forwarded to the Gldani prosecutor's office for criminal charges.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally 
respected the rights of members of ethnic minorities in nonconflict 
areas but limited self-government and played a weaker role in ethnic 
Armenian and Azeri areas (see Section 3). The Government reportedly 
provided less funding for schools in these areas than in other parts of 
the country. Instruction in non-Georgian languages was permitted.
    Lack of knowledge of Georgian limited educational and professional 
opportunities for minorities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1997 Law on 
Trade Unions provide for the right of citizens to form and join trade 
unions. The Law on Collective Agreements was passed in 1997.
    The principal trade union is the Amalgamated Trade Unions of 
Georgia (ATUG). The ATUG is the successor to the official union that 
existed during the Soviet period. The union broke from the central 
Soviet labor union in 1989. Its present structure was established in 
1992, after the union had resisted efforts first by the Gamsakhurdia 
government and later by the State Council to bring the union under 
government control. The ATUG consists of 33 sectoral unions. 
Representatives to the ATUG congress elected its leadership indirectly 
for a period of 5 years in 1995.
    The organization officially claims 850,000 members but acknowledges 
that the number of active, dues-paying members is considerably lower. 
The union has no affiliation with the Government and receives no 
government funding. During the year, the union saw its primary role as 
defending the economic and social interests of workers, a departure 
from its Soviet predecessor, which was essentially an administrative 
body concerned with property and finance rather than with worker 
rights. The ATUG supported public sector strikes by teachers, medical 
service employees, and energy sector workers. In each case, the issue 
was unpaid wages. On December 23, the ATUG led a demonstration in front 
of the State Chancellery, demanding that back wages and pensions be 
paid. The State Minister met with leaders and promised to meet with 
unions again in January to resolve the problem.
    On January 31, President Shevardnadze signed a decree ordering all 
governmental agencies to consult and negotiate with unions. By year's 
end no ministry had honored this decree.
    However, over the past two years, the ATUG has been engaged in a 
battle to reacquire union property first from the Government and then 
from the courts. 
In 1991-92, the then-acting president of the trade union, Joseph 
Katsitadze, transferred two trade union properties to the Government, 
which transferred them to the Ministry of Defense. On July 15, 1998, 
the Constitutional Court ruled that the ATUG was the legal owner of the 
properties and should get them back. However by year's end, the ATUG 
still had not regained possession of either property.
    On March 10, the Mtatsminda district court transferred ownership of 
all ATUG property to the newly formed Free Trade Union of Georgia. 
Katsitadze, the former acting president of the ATUG in 1991-92, 
organized and headed this union. The court upheld his claim that the 
ATUG was an illegitimate successor of the Soviet-era Confederation of 
Independent Trade Unions of Georgia. The ATUG appealed the decision. On 
November 30, the Supreme Court threw out the decision of the Mtatsminda 
court on procedural grounds. The case was remanded to the regional 
court to be retried.
    In 1998 the ATUG brought suit against the Interior Ministry for 
illegally firing 220 employees in the MOI's visa office. The suit was 
to be decided on a case-by-case basis. As of year's end the Supreme 
Court ruled that one female employee was to be reinstated, but the MOI 
refused to do so.
    There are no legal prohibitions against affiliation and 
participation in international organizations. The ATUG worked closely 
with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right To Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution and the Law on Trade Unions allow workers to organize and 
bargain collectively, and this right is respected. The law prohibits 
discrimination by employers against union members. Employers may be 
prosecuted for antiunion discrimination and be made to reinstate 
employees and pay back wages. The Ministry of Labor investigated 
complaints but was not staffed to conduct effective investigations.
    In the spring and fall, the Free Trade Union of Teachers of Georgia 
conducted a number of successful actions for the payment of back wages 
in Kutaisi.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor and provides for sanctions against 
violators, and there were no reports of its use except for trafficking 
in women for the purpose of prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The 
Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by children and there were 
no reports of its use.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--According to current legislation, the minimum age for 
employment of children is 16 years; however, in exceptional cases, the 
minimum age can be 14 years. The Ministry of Labor enforced these laws, 
and generally they were respected. The Government prohibits forced and 
bonded labor by children and enforced this prohibition effectively (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The state minimum wage was 
raised in the fall to $10.80 (20 lari) a month. There is no state-
mandated minimum wage for private sector workers. The minimum wage is 
not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. In general, salaries and pensions were insufficient to meet 
basic minimum needs for a worker and family.
    The law provides for a 41-hour workweek and for a weekly 24-hour 
rest period. The government workweek often was shortened during the 
winter due to the continuing energy crisis. The Labor Code permits 
higher wages for hazardous work and permits a worker in such fields to 
refuse duties that could endanger life without risking loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws concerning 
trafficking in women.
    Information on trafficking is difficult to obtain. Georgia is both 
a source and a transit country for trafficking in women. Often Russian 
women come to Georgia, get a Georgian passport and then are sent 
primarily to Greece or Turkey.
                                 ______
                                 

                                GERMANY

    The Federal Republic of Germany is a constitutional parliamentary 
democracy; citizens periodically choose their representatives in free 
and fair multiparty elections. The head of the Federal Government, the 
Chancellor, is elected by the Bundestag, the first chamber of 
Parliament. The powers of the Chancellor and of the Parliament are set 
forth in the Basic Law (Constitution). The 16 states enjoy significant 
autonomy, especially as concerns law enforcement and the courts, 
education, the environment, and social assistance. The judiciary is 
independent.
    Law enforcement is primarily a responsibility of state governments, 
and the police are organized at the state level. The jurisdiction of 
the Federal Criminal Office is limited to counterterrorism, 
international organized crime, especially narcotics trafficking, 
weapons smuggling, and currency counterfeiting. Police forces in 
general are well trained, disciplined, and mindful of citizens' rights, 
although there were instances of police abuse.
    A well-developed industrial economy provides citizens with a high 
standard of living.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with 
instances of individual abuse. However, instances of police abuse 
continued, especially involving foreigners. Societal violence and 
harassment directed at foreign residents continued. However, crimes 
against foreign residents continued to decline, decreasing by 25 
percent in the first 10 months of the year, compared with the same 
period of 1998. Anti-Semitic incidents also continued to decline, by 27 
percent during the first 9 months of the year, compared to the same 
period in 1998. The Government is taking serious steps to address the 
problem of violence against women and children. Women continue to face 
some wage discrimination in the private sector, as do members of 
minorities and foreigners. Trafficking in women and girls is a serious 
problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government officials.
    An investigation is ongoing in the case of Aamir Ageeb, a Sudanese 
asylum seeker, who died on May 28 during a deportation flight while in 
the custody of Federal Border Police. The Border Police apparently 
handcuffed the man, put a helmet on his head, and forced his head 
downward during takeoff because he was resisting deportation violently. 
After Ageeb stopped struggling, officers pulled him upright, removed 
the helmet, and noticed that he was not breathing; doctors on board 
were unable to revive him.
    In September authorities in Austria located two members of the Red 
Army Faction, Horst Ludwig Meyer and Andrea Klump, who were wanted for 
the 1986 murder of Siemens manager Karl Heinz Beckurts, the 1989 attack 
on Deutsche Bank President Alfred Herrhausen, and other terrorist acts. 
On September 15, Austrian authorities detained Klump and shot and 
killed Meyer during the arrest attempt. Klump is likely to be 
extradited to Germany.
    On September 1, Michael Steinau and Bernhard Falk, members of a 
leftwing terrorist organization, the Anti-Imperialist Cell (AIZ), were 
convicted on four charges of attempted murder and sentenced in 
connection with a series of 1995 bombing attacks against the homes of 
German politicians and the Peruvian Honorary Consulate in Duesseldorf. 
Falk was sentenced to 13 years and Steinau to 9 years. The two men also 
are suspected in the 1994 attacks against the Christian Democratic 
Union and Free Democratic Party offices.
    The trial of Yasser Mohammed Shraydi, Ali Chanaa (alias Alba), his 
former wife, Verena Helga Chanaa (a German national), and his wife's 
sister, Andrea Haeusler (also a German), in the case of the April 1986 
bombing of the Berlin discotheque La Belle, which began in 1997, is not 
expected to reach a verdict for at least 2 years. The attack killed 1 
Turkish citizen and 2 U.S. citizens and injured 230 persons. The trial 
continued at year's end.
    German courts continued to try individuals involved in the shooting 
deaths of East Germans who attempted to flee to West Germany before the 
fall of the Berlin Wall. In December the Federal Court of Justice 
rejected former East German Politburo member Egon Krenz's appeal; he 
was sentenced to 6\1/2\ years in prison for his role in East Germany's 
shoot-to-kill policy at the East-West German border. Krenz appealed to 
the Federal Constitutional Court, where the case remained at year's 
end. His appeal before the European Court for Human Rights also is 
still pending. Also convicted with Krenz and sentenced to three years 
in prison were Gunter Schabowski and Gunter Kleiber. Schabowski is 
serving his sentence while Kleiber was granted a suspension of his 
incarceration due to ill health.
    Alfons Gotzfried, an ethnic German who immigrated to Germany from 
Kazahkstan in 1991, was accused of being an accessory in the murder of 
70,000 persons, mostly Jews, at the Majdanek Concentration Camp during 
World War II. Gotzfried admitted after the war that he took part in the 
mass shooting of 500 Jews at the camp. Although he was convicted for 
National Socialist crimes and was sentenced to 25 years of hard labor 
in the Soviet Union, he faced trial and possible reimprisonment in 
Germany since he was not convicted in a German court and since there 
was no treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the former 
Soviet Union covering such crimes. In May Gotzfried was tried, 
convicted, and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment by a court in 
Stuttgart. However, he was not required to serve his prison sentence 
because of his advanced age (he is in his late 80's) and because he 
served time in a Soviet gulag for the same crime.
    German courts have tried several alleged war criminals to ease the 
caseload of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in The Hague, including a Duesseldorf court's sentencing of 
Maksim Sokolovic in November, and a Bavarian state court's sentencing 
of Djurdadj Kusljic in December for crimes committed in Bosnia in 1992 
(see Section 4).
    In February an Algerian asylum seeker died after he reportedly was 
attacked and chased by skinheads in Guben (see Section 5).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities 
generally respect these prohibitions; however, there continue to be 
instances of excessive use of force by the police, especially against 
foreigners. Amnesty International published a report in July that found 
that police treatment of foreigners in custody showed ``a clear pattern 
of abuse.'' The Council of Europe issued a report in May on 
mistreatment of foreigners at the Frankfurt am Main airport, following 
allegations of authorities' excessive use of force during enforcement 
of removal orders. Based on medical reports, the report confirmed that 
in February 1998 an Iranian suffered injury during removal, although 
the Government could not verify that the injury was a result of his 
treatment by border police. The alien reported that border police 
officers punched and kicked him and squeezed his genitals while he was 
handcuffed.
    He reported that after he was placed on an airplane and attempted 
to escape, border guards beat him again. A complaint was filed against 
the officers involved, and in September the case was dropped since the 
charges could not be substantiated. The Iranian was deported in 
December 1998 after an appeal was upheld. The report cites two other 
cases of alleged abuse at the airport. In July 1997 border guards 
allegedly beat a Turkish citizen while handcuffed, and in June 1997 
border guards allegedly beat a Turkish citizen while in handcuffs and 
shackles prior to his deportation. During 1997 and the first half of 
1998 eight investigations were launched against border guards at the 
airport for alleged physical abuse of foreigners while performing their 
official duties.
    The Government prosecutes police who mistreat persons in custody. 
For example, in May 1998, a Frankfurt (Oder) Brandenburg court 
sentenced 3 police officers from Bernau for physically mistreating 
Vietnamese detainees in 11 cases between the summer of 1993 and the 
summer of 1994. In addition, the three police officers were suspended 
from duty in 1994 after initial charges were filed and subsequently 
were banned from any future work as police officers. A fourth officer 
had to pay a fine of $3,330 (DM 5,400) for failing to stop the 
mistreatment of the detainees. The Attorney General's office appealed 
the sentence for being insufficient. The case was pending at year's 
end.
    A bomb exploded on March 9 at the Saarbruecken Community College 
where there was a controversial exhibit documenting military atrocities 
during World War II; it caused no injuries but damage was estimated at 
over $1 million (DM 1.89 million) (see Section 5).
    Some protests by Kurds in February after the detention of Abdullah 
Ocalan turned violent, resulting in police injuries (see Section 2.b.).
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Basic Law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this 
prohibition. A person can be arrested only on the basis of an arrest 
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, unless the person is 
caught in the act of committing a crime, or the police have strong 
reason to believe that the person intends to commit a crime. Any person 
detained by police must be brought before a judge and charged by the 
day after the arrest. The court then must issue an arrest warrant 
stating the grounds for detention or order the person's release. Police 
often detain known or suspected right and leftwing radicals for brief 
periods when the police believe such individuals intend to participate 
in illegal or unauthorized demonstrations. For example, in August 
police detained about 25 persons suspected of heading for illegal 
rallies to mark the 11th anniversary of the death of Rudolf Hess (see 
Section 5). The rules governing this type of detention are different in 
each state, with authorized periods of detention ranging from 1 to 14 
days, provided judicial concurrence is given within 24 hours of initial 
apprehension.
    If there is evidence that a suspect might flee the country, police 
may detain that person for up to 24 hours pending a formal charge. The 
right of free access to legal counsel has been restricted only in the 
cases of terrorists suspected of having used contacts with lawyers to 
continue terrorist activity while in prison. Only judges may decide on 
the validity of any deprivation of liberty. Bail exists but seldom is 
employed; the usual practice is to release detainees unless there is 
clear danger of flight outside the country.
    The Basic Law prohibits exile, and the Government does not use 
forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Basic Law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The court system is highly developed and provides full legal 
protection and numerous possibilities for judicial review. Ordinary 
courts have jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters. There are four 
levels of such courts (local courts, regional courts, higher regional 
courts, and the Federal Court of Justice), with appeals possible from 
lower to higher levels. In addition, there are four types of 
specialized courts: Administrative, labor, social, and fiscal. These 
courts also exist on different levels, with the possibility for appeal 
to the next higher level.
    Separate from these five branches of jurisdiction is the Federal 
Constitutional Court, which is not only the country's supreme court but 
an organ of the Constitution with special functions defined in the 
Basic Law. Among other things, it reviews laws to ensure their 
compatibility with the Constitution and adjudicates disputes between 
constitutional organs on questions of competencies. It also has 
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims based on the infringement of a 
person's basic constitutional rights by a public authority.
    The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial 
process, although court proceedings are sometimes delayed due to ever 
increasing caseloads.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, of 
Correspondence.--The Basic Law prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
    In September a teacher in Lower Saxony was barred from wearing a 
headscarf in the classroom. In July 1998, the authorities supported the 
decision of the Stuttgart school district not to hire a Muslim woman 
for a teaching position in a public school because she wore a 
traditional headscarf. The case was pending at year's end (see Section 
2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Basic Law provides for freedom 
of the press, and the Government respects this right in practice. An 
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic 
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press, 
including academic freedom. Propaganda of Nazi and other proscribed 
organizations, as well as statements endorsing nazism, are illegal.
    The authorities seek to block what they consider dangerous material 
on the Internet. The Teleservices Law of 1997 bans access to prohibited 
material (for example, child pornography and Nazi propaganda). The 
law's implications regarding the possible liability of Internet service 
are not yet clear. In May 1998, a Munich court sentenced the former 
head of Compuserve's German operations to 2 years' probation and fined 
him $60,000 (DM 100,000) for distributing pornographic materials on the 
Internet. In November a Munich appeals court overturned the conviction. 
The court found that the accused was not in a position to shut down 
incriminated newsgroups permanently and therefore could not be charged 
with complicity in the distribution of illegal materials. However, the 
law still holds managers liable if they do not take sufficient action 
against prohibited Internet content.
    In June French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen was found guilty of 
inciting hatred--a criminal offense--at a public appearance in Munich 
in 1997 for referring to the gas chambers as a detail in history. Le 
Pen was fined several thousand marks. He did not appeal. In September a 
French appeals court confirmed the Munich verdict. In November 
Frederick Toben, a German-born Australian Holocaust revisionist, was 
sentenced to 10 months in prison (7 months already served were applied 
to that sentence) for denying the Holocaust or that Nazis killed 
millions of Jews. He was released from a Mannheim prison after posting 
a bond. Toben is the director of the Adelaide Institute, which 
questions the reality and scope of the Holocaust.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. Permits must be obtained for open-air public rallies and 
marches. Authorities can, and occasionally do, deny such permits due to 
concern for public safety or to prevent outlawed organizations from 
holding public assemblies. For example, rallies and marches by neo-
Nazis and rightwing radicals commemorating the death of Nazi official 
Rudolf Hess are banned routinely.
    After the detention of Abdullah Ocalan, Kurdish sympathizers staged 
massive and at times violent protests in at least 10 cities on February 
16. Authorities reported clashes with protesters in Duesseldorf, 
Leipzig, Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Hamburg, resulting in 
police injuries. Protesters stormed and occupied many diplomatic 
buildings, and police officers made numerous arrests. Israeli security 
personnel shot and killed four Kurds who were storming the Israeli 
Consulate General in Berlin (see Section 5).
    The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. The Basic Law permits the banning of 
organizations whose activities are found to be illegal or opposed to 
the liberal democratic order as established by the Basic Law. A party 
that has participated in an election can be outlawed only by the 
Federal Constitutional Court. Other organizations may be banned by the 
federal or state governments; legal recourse against such decisions is 
possible. A 1950's ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court outlawed 
a neo-Nazi and a Communist party. A number of other organizations that 
authorities generally classify as rightwing or leftwing, foreign 
extremist, or criminal, are banned. State governments may outlaw only 
organizations that are active solely within their state, with 
activities crossing state boundaries coming under federal jurisdiction. 
Although authorities banned a number of organizations in 1998, no 
further organizations were banned during the year. In addition, several 
hundred organizations were under observation by the federal and state 
Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (OPC). The OPC's are 
charged with examining possible threats to the democratic system; they 
have no law enforcement powers, and OPC monitoring by law may not 
interfere with the organizations' continued activities.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Basic Law (Constitution) provides for 
religious freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice. 
Most religious organizations are treated as nonprofit associations and 
therefore enjoy tax-exempt status. In order to grant this status, 
state-level authorities must find that the organization operates on a 
nonprofit basis and contributes socially, spiritually, or materially to 
society.
    Church and state are separate, although historically a special 
partnership exists between the State and those religious communities 
that have the status of a ``corporation under public law.'' If they 
fulfill certain requirements, including an assurance of permanency, 
minimum size of the organization, and an indispensable loyalty to the 
State, organizations may request that they be granted ``public law 
corporation'' status, which, among other things, entitles them to levy 
taxes on their members that are collected by the State for the church. 
All public law corporations do not avail themselves of this privilege. 
The decision to grant public law corporation status is made at the 
state level. The Berlin state government has denied Jehovah's Witnesses 
public law corporation status. State governments also subsidize various 
institutions affiliated with such public law corporations, such as 
church-run schools and hospitals. State subsidies also are provided to 
some religious organizations for historical and cultural reasons.
    Many religions and denominations have been granted public law 
corporation status. Among them are the Lutheran and Catholic Churches 
and Judaism, as well as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, Seventh-Day Adventists, Mennonites, Baptists, Methodists, 
Christian Scientists, and the Salvation Army. Jehovah's Witnesses are 
appealing to the Constitutional Court an April 1993 decision of the 
Berlin state government that had denied the church public law 
corporation status. In 1997 the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin 
upheld the Berlin state government's decision. The Court concluded that 
the group did not offer the ``indispensable loyalty'' towards the 
democratic state ``essential for lasting cooperation'' because, for 
example, it forbade its members from participating in public elections. 
The group does enjoy the basic tax-exempt status afforded to most 
religious organizations.
    In September the Lower Saxony ministry of education barred a 
teacher in Lower Saxony from wearing a headscarf in the classroom. She 
filed suit against the ruling. The case continued at year's end. In 
July 1998, the Baden-Wuerttemberg minister of education supported the 
decision of the Stuttgart school district not to hire a Muslim woman 
for a teaching position in a public school because she wore a 
traditional headscarf. The minister took the position that the scarf 
was a political symbol of female submission rather than a religious 
practice prescribed by Islam. The minister permitted the woman to 
conduct the practice teaching required for her degree, but argued that 
allowing a teacher to wear a headscarf on the job would violate the 
religious and political neutrality legally required of all civil 
servants, including teachers. She is now a teacher at a Berlin public 
school for Muslims, where she is allowed to wear a headscarf. The case 
was pending at year's end (see Section 1.f.).
    The Church of Scientology remained under scrutiny by both federal 
and state officials who contend that it is not a religion but an 
economic enterprise. According to representatives of the Church of 
Scientology, while the public debate over the Church's status and 
operations has diminished somewhat in intensity compared to previous 
years, instances of governmental bias and discrimination remain. 
Authorities sometimes sought to deregister Scientology organizations 
previously registered as nonprofit associations and require them to 
register as commercial enterprises. In 1997 the Federal Administrative 
Court in Berlin declared that a registered nonprofit association, 
religious or otherwise, could engage in entrepreneurial activities as 
long as these were only supplementary and collateral to its nonprofit 
goals, and sent an appeal concerning the deregistration of a 
Scientology organization in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg back to a 
lower level for further review. In December the Stuttgart 
administrative court ruled that Baden-Wuerttemberg could not deregister 
the Church of Scientology as an ideological nonprofit organization, 
stating that Scientology's activities could not be classified as 
commercial if such activities were used to accomplish the 
organization's ideological purposes. In August the city of Munich 
revoked the nonprofit status of the local Scientology organization. In 
June the Munich administrative court rejected an appeal by the Church 
of Scientology and upheld the November 1995 decision by the city of 
Munich to deprive the Scientology-affiliated Celebrity Center Munich of 
its status as a nonprofit organization. The city had argued that the 
center allegedly was brainwashing and financially exploiting its 
members. However, the court ruled that the only relevant point was 
whether the purpose of the center was to make money. During a March 
visit to the country by a lawyer for the Church of Scientology, 
officials in the Foreign Ministry refused to engage in a dialog with 
the Church and decided not to meet with the attorney. According to 
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Charge of the 
German Embassy in a western country met with a Scientology 
representative in 1996, but no tangible progress resulted from the 
meeting. Therefore government officials concluded that it was not 
worthwhile to meet with Scientology representatives again, since they 
do not believe that the Church has changed those practices that the 
Government finds unacceptable. Moreover, federal government officials 
believe that this issue is primarily one for the states to handle.
    Some government officials allege that Scientology's goals and 
methods are antidemocratic and call for further restrictions on 
Scientology-affiliated organizations and individuals. For example, 
during a March meeting with a lawyer representing the Church of 
Scientology and members of the working group on Scientology in the 
Hamburg interior ministry, Hamburg state officials expressed their 
belief that the Church is a criminal organization with a totalitarian 
ideology. In 1997 authorities of the federal and state OPC's placed 
Scientology under observation for 1 year because of concerns raised by 
some offices that there were indications that Scientology may pose a 
threat to democracy. Under the observation decision, OPC officials seek 
to collect information, mostly from written materials and firsthand 
accounts, to assess whether a ``threat'' exists. More intrusive methods 
would be subject to legal checks and would require evidence of 
involvement in treasonous or terrorist activity. Federal OPC 
authorities stated that no requests had been made to employ more 
intrusive methods, nor were any such requests envisioned. In 1998 
federal and state OPC's agreed to continue the observation of 
Scientology. One state, Schleswig-Holstein, did not agree to implement 
such observation, since its constitution does not permit such activity. 
Observation by state OPC's, with the exception of Schleswig-Holstein, 
continued at year's end. No criminal charges have been brought against 
Scientology by the Government. Scientology filed a suit in Berlin to 
enjoin the Berlin Interior Ministry from the alleged practice of 
bribing members of Scientology to ``spy'' on other members. The case 
continued at year's end.
    Most major political parties continued to exclude Scientologists 
from membership, arguing that Scientology is not a religion but a for-
profit organization whose goals and principles are antidemocratic and 
thus incompatible with those of the political parties. However, there 
has been only one known instance of enforcement of this ban.
    In June 1998, the commission established in 1996 to investigate 
``so-called sects and psycho-groups,'' including Scientology, presented 
its final report to Parliament. The report concluded that these groups 
did not pose a threat to society and state; however, it called upon the 
Government to introduce legislation for consumer protection in the 
``psycho-market'' and highlighted the need for the Government to inform 
the public about dangers to health and property posed by psycho-cults 
and groups. Particular emphasis was placed on Scientology because it 
allegedly pursued policies of ``misinformation and intimidation'' of 
its critics, according to the report. The report did not classify 
Scientology as a religion, but as a profit-oriented psycho-group with 
totalitarian internal structures and undemocratic goals. The commission 
contended that there were concrete indications that Scientology was a 
political extremist organization, and recommended to Parliament that 
observation of Scientology continue. The report also recommended that 
because of its derogatory connotation the term ``sect'' should be 
avoided, and that instead the designation ``new religious and 
ideological communities and psycho-groups'' be used.
    The interministerial group of mid-level federal and state officials 
that exchanges information on Scientology-related issues continued its 
periodic meetings. The group published no report or policy compendium 
during the year and remains purely consultative in purpose.
    Between 1996 and 1998 a number of states published pamphlets 
warning of alleged dangers posed by so-called sects and ideological 
groups, including the Church of Scientology. The brochures are provided 
to the public free of charge. The Bavarian interior ministry provides 
two brochures, released in 1998, warning against the Church of 
Scientology. ``The Scientology System'' and ``Scientology: An Anti-
Constitutional Movement'' warned about alleged hard-sell methods by the 
Church and asserted that Scientology was striving for world power. The 
Bavarian interior minister asserted that the Church even was ordering 
the commission of criminal acts and compared its psychological methods 
to those of the former East German secret police. The Hamburg OPC 
published ``The Intelligence Service of the Scientology Organization,'' 
which outlines its claim that Scientology tried to infiltrate 
governments, offices, and companies, and that the Church spies on its 
opponents, defames them, and ``destroys'' them. The government of 
Schleswig-Holstein published brochures detailing initiatives directed 
against such groups, including Scientology, as well as what it sees as 
the legal basis for public action against these groups. Lower Saxony's 
Office of Youth Protection booklet on such groups describes Scientology 
as a multinational combine rather than a religion and claims that 
Scientology has a rigid hierarchy and that it severely punishes its 
members if they violate its codes; and Mecklenburg Vorpommern also 
publishes a booklet describing various groups, among them Scientology.
    Scientologists continued to report discrimination, alleging both 
government-condoned and societal harassment because of their church 
affiliation. A number of state and local government offices share 
information on individuals suspected of being Scientologists. ``Sect-
filters,'' statements by individuals that they are not affiliated with 
Scientology and which, in practice, are not applied to members of other 
groups, are used by some state, local, and federal agencies, businesses 
(including major international corporations), and other organizations 
to discriminate against Scientologists in business and social dealings. 
The Federal Ministry of Economics imposed the use of sect filters on 
companies bidding for contracts to provide training courses. Some state 
governments also screen companies bidding contracts relating to 
training and the handling and processing of personal data. The Federal 
Property Office has barred the sale of some federal real estate to 
Scientologists, noting that the Federal Finance Ministry has urged that 
such sales be avoided, if possible. Scientologists assert that business 
firms whose owners or executives are Scientologists, as well as artists 
who are church members, faced boycotts and discrimination, sometimes 
with state and local government approval. Other church members reported 
employment difficulties, and, in the state of Bavaria, applicants for 
state civil service positions must complete questionnaires detailing 
any relationship they may have to Scientology. The questionnaire 
specifically states that the failure to complete the form will result 
in the employment application not being considered. Bavaria identified 
some state employees as Scientologists and required them to complete 
the questionnaire. Some of those employees refused and filed complaints 
with the Labor and Administrative Courts. The cases are pending. 
However, according to Bavarian and federal officials, no one in Bavaria 
lost a job, was denied employment, or suffered any infringement of 
rights by public officials or entities solely because of association 
with Scientology. Bavarian officials also contended that a 
Scientologist was teaching in a Munich public school and that another 
Scientologist was a member of the Bavarian Ministry of Culture. During 
the year, Hamburg city officials expressed public concern about 
Microsoft Windows 2000, because one of its software functions was 
developed by a company whose chief executive officer is a 
Scientologist. The Bavarian interior ministry warned against 
overreacting to such concerns.
    In a well-publicized court case, a higher social court in 
Rheinland-Pfalz ruled in January that a Scientologist was allowed to 
run her au pair agency, for which the state labor ministry had refused 
to renew her license in 1994, solely based on her Scientology 
membership. The judge ruled that the question of a person's reliability 
hinges on the person herself and not on her membership in the Church of 
Scientology. The ruling is under appeal by the state labor office. No 
damages had yet been awarded by year's end.
    Scientologists continued to take grievances to the courts. Legal 
rulings have been mixed. In recent years, some individuals who had been 
fired because they were Scientologists took their employers to court 
for ``unfair dismissal.'' Several reached out of court settlements with 
employers.
    Scientology held exhibitions in Munich, Stuttgart, and Hamburg to 
explain the Church to citizens. Although Scientologists reported that 
the exhibitions were a success, Scientology encountered serious 
difficulties in renting space in major hotels and convention centers. 
In some cases reservations were cancelled because hotels said that they 
feared a loss of business if they allowed Scientology to rent 
exhibition space.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to move anywhere 
within the country, to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to repatriate, 
without restrictions that violate human rights.
    For ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
the Basic Law provides both for citizenship immediately upon 
application and for legal residence without restrictions. Through 1999 
other persons could apply for citizenship (and with it the right of 
unrestricted residence) if they met certain requirements, including 
legal residence for at least 10 years (5 if married to a German), 
renunciation of all other citizenships, and a basic command of the 
language. Authorities may use discretion in granting naturalization to 
persons who have resided in the country for 10 years; however, a new 
provision is to be enacted on January 1, 2000 granting persons who have 
resided in the country 8 years the right to naturalization upon 
application. Long-term legal residents often opt not to apply; they 
receive the same social benefits as do citizens, and after 10 years of 
legal residency they are entitled to permanent residence.
    The Basic Law and subsequent legislation provide for the right of 
foreign victims of political persecution to attain asylum and 
resettlement. The Government cooperates with the office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees.
    During the year asylum applications dropped to their lowest level 
since the amendment of the asylum law in 1993, when the criteria for 
granting asylum were tightened. There were 95,113 applications for 
asylum (down 3.6 percent from 1998). The acceptance rate was 3 percent, 
and 4.5 percent were granted a limited suspension of deportation 
orders.
    Persons coming directly from any country that officials designate 
as a ``safe country of origin'' cannot normally claim political asylum 
but may request an administrative review of their applications while in 
Germany. Persons entering via a ``safe third country''--any country in 
the European Union or adhering to the Refugee Convention--are also 
ineligible for asylum.
    The law limits legal recourse against denials of asylum 
applications. Critics argue that few countries can assuredly be 
designated as ``safe third countries'' and that the law unjustly fails 
to allow applicants to rebut such designations. While the law permits 
appeals against designations of ``safe countries of origin,'' critics 
protest that the 48-hour period allotted for hearings is too brief. 
However, the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the 
amendments in 1996.
    During the first half of the year, more foreigners arrived in the 
country than departed: 319,608 arrivals (up 16 percent over 1998) 
compared to 235,918 departures (down 19 percent).
    State authorities continued to repatriate Bosnian refugees, unless 
they qualified for an extension of stay on certain humanitarian 
grounds. Some national officials, the UNHCR, and domestic refugee 
support organizations have cautioned that the refugees' place of origin 
and ethnicity should be given careful consideration in the 
implementation of returns. During the year, certain states (Bavaria) 
resumed the deportation of refugees from the Republika Srpska region of 
Bosnia on the grounds that conditions there had improved. The Bavarian 
interior ministry also gave local offices for foreigners discretion to 
deny resident permits to refugees ``suspected'' of abusing repatriation 
programs to other countries. Munich city officials began requiring 
refugees claiming to be victims of torture or violence to provide some 
proof of their claims in order to remain in the country. Since 1992 
320,000 Bosnian refugees lived in Germany under ``temporary 
protection'' (first asylum), and another 25,000 applied for asylum. 
During the year, an estimated 21,000 refugees returned to Bosnia 
voluntarily (compared with 92,000 during the same period in 1998). 
According to unofficial estimates, approximately 65,000 Bosnian 
refugees remained in the country at year's end. Among those are an 
estimated 20,000 who are considered to be unable to return, due 
primarily to their traumatized state. However, even those refugees who 
left Germany ``voluntarily'' were subjected to tremendous pressure. If 
they did not leave on their own they could have been deported, 
permanently excluded from reentering the country, and had all their 
property confiscated, excluding clothing and suitcases. The 
overwhelming majority of Bosnians legally residing in the country have 
limited residence permits with no enforceable right to have these 
permits extended. Once their residence permits expire, foreigners are 
liable to arrest and incarceration for up to 6 weeks pending a final 
decision regarding deportation. The Federal Government pays Bosnian 
refugees who choose to leave the country between $765 and $2,550 (DM 
1,350 and DM 4,500) to aid in travel and resettlement costs. Many 
states provide additional resettlement funds.
    With the increase in tensions in Kosovo, German states ceased the 
deportation of Kosovar Albanians in September 1998 but began 
deportations again in November 1999. In April the Government stopped 
processing asylum applications from Kosovar Albanians, effectively 
granting them a temporary stay in the country. Authorities began 
processing applications again in October. The Federal Government 
evacuated from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over 14,720 
Kosovar Albanian refugees to Germany during the spring. A total of 
9,600 of these refugees voluntarily returned to Kosovo. The rest remain 
in asylum and refugee centers. An additional 15,000 war refugees from 
Kosovo who came to Germany through their own means were granted 
temporary protection, and there are a total of 180,000 Kosovar 
Albanians in the country. In November authorities began deportations of 
Kosovar Albanians, especially those serving prison sentences for 
criminal convictions. In November the Annual Conference of Federal and 
State Interior Ministers agreed to begin the return of ``considerable'' 
numbers of Kosovar Albanians in spring 2000.
    An investigation is ongoing into the death of a Sudanese asylum 
seeker who died during a deportation flight while in the custody of 
Federal Border Police (see Section 1.a.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Basic Law provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections. The government is elected 
on the basis of universal suffrage and secret balloting. Members of the 
Parliament's first chamber, the Bundestag, are elected from a mixture 
of direct-constituency and party-list candidates. The second chamber, 
the Bundesrat, is composed of delegations from state governments.
    The law entitles women to participate fully in political life, and 
a growing number are prominent in the Government and the parties. 
Slightly under 31 percent of the members of the Federal Parliament are 
female. Women occupy 5 of 15 Federal Cabinet positions. On the Federal 
Constitutional Court, 5 of the 16 judges are women, including the Chief 
Justice. All of the parties have undertaken to enlist more women. The 
Greens/Alliance 90 Party requires that women constitute half of the 
party's elected officials; both party cochairpersons are female, as are 
57.5 percent of the party's federal parliamentary caucus members. The 
Social Democrats have a 40-percent quota for women on all party 
committees and governing bodies. The Christian Democrats require that 
30 percent of the first ballot candidates for party positions be women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive 
to their views.
    German courts have tried several alleged war criminals to ease the 
caseload of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia 
in The Hague. In November a Duesseldorf court sentenced Maksim 
Sokolovic, a Bosnian Serb and resident of Germany, to 9 years in prison 
for crimes committed in Bosnia in 1992. In December a Bavarian state 
court sentenced Djurdadj Kusljic to life in prison after he was 
convicted for the murder of six Muslims in Bosnia in 1992 (see Section 
1.a.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits denial of access to housing, health care, or 
education on the basis of race, religion, disability, sex, ethnic 
background, political opinion, or citizenship. The Government enforces 
the law effectively.
    Women.--While violence against women occurs and almost certainly is 
underreported, it is prohibited by laws that are enforced effectively. 
Societal attitudes toward such violence are strongly negative, and 
legal and medical recourse is available. Police statistics on rape, 
including attempted rape, showed a 19 percent increase to 7,914 cases 
in 1998 from 6,636 cases in 1997. However, in 1998 for the first time 
statistics on spousal rape, which is illegal, were included in these 
figures, making comparisons with previous years difficult.
    The Government conducted campaigns in the schools and through 
church groups to bring public attention to the existence of such 
violence and proposed steps to counter it. The Federal Government has 
supported numerous pilot projects throughout the country. There are, 
for example, 387 ``women's houses'', including 116 in the East, where 
victims of violence and their children can seek shelter, counseling, 
and legal and police protection.
    Trafficking in women and forced prostitution also are forbidden by 
law; however, trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem (see 
Section 6.f.). In recent years, the Federal Ministry for Women and 
Youth commissioned a number of studies to gain information on violence 
against women, sexual harassment, and other matters, producing, for 
example, a special report on violence against women in 1995. More 
recently, the Ministry's public information poster campaign to combat 
violence against women and discriminatory behavior has been highly 
visible in schools, official buildings, and public spaces.
    Union contracts typically identify categories of employment in 
which participants are to be paid less than 100 percent of the wage of 
a skilled laborer covered by the same contract. Women are 
disproportionately represented in these lower-wage scale occupations.
    In June the Government adopted a national platform of action, 
``Women and Occupation,'' which called for regulations to promote the 
equality of women and men in the workplace, including equal opportunity 
plans with binding quotas for women in employment and vocational 
training within the jurisdiction of the federal administration; greater 
representation of women in political advisory councils, in which women 
now make up 12.7 percent of representatives; a mandatory government 
report on the development of earnings and the economic situation of 
women during every legislative period; measures to promote vocational 
training of women in information technology and engineering 
professions; and the promotion of female entrepreneurs through 
government grants and participation in regional projects earmarked for 
women.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. Public education is provided and is 
mandatory through the age of 16.
    The Government recognizes that violence against children is a 
problem requiring its attention. Police figures indicate that there 
were 16,596 cases of sexual abuse of children in 1998, a 1.7 percent 
decrease from 16,888 in 1997. Officials believe that the number of 
unreported cases may be much higher. The Child and Youth Protection Law 
stresses the need for preventive measures, and the Government has taken 
account of this in stepping up its counseling and other assistance.
    The Criminal Code was amended in 1993 and in December 1997 to 
further protect children against pornography and sexual abuse. For 
possession of child pornography, the maximum sentence is 1 year's 
imprisonment; the sentence for distribution is 5 years. The 1993 
amendment made the sexual abuse of children by German citizens abroad 
punishable even if the action is not illegal in the child's own 
country.
    People With Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against the 
disabled in employment, education, or in the provision of other state 
services. The law mandates several special services for disabled 
persons, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice. The 
disabled are entitled to assistance to avert, eliminate, or alleviate 
the consequences of their disabilities and to secure employment 
commensurate with their abilities. The Government offers vocational 
training and grants for employers who hire the disabled. The severely 
disabled may be granted special benefits, such as tax breaks, free 
public transport, special parking facilities, and exemption from radio 
and television fees.
    The Federal Government set guidelines for the attainment of 
``barrier-free'' public buildings and for modifications of streets and 
pedestrian traffic walks to accommodate the disabled. All 16 states 
have incorporated the federal guidelines into their building codes, and 
98 percent of federal public buildings follow the guidelines for a 
``barrier-free environment.''
    Religious Minorities.--Anti-Semitic acts continued to decline, 
decreasing 28 percent, with 433 incidents reported in the first 9 
months of 1999, compared with 552 in the same period in 1998. These 
incidents included, in part, 314 cases of the distribution of anti-
Semitic materials or the display of symbols of banned organizations, 27 
cases of desecration of cemeteries, and 12 cases of bodily injury. For 
example, on October 4, the Berlin Jewish cemetery was desecrated; 103 
headstones were overturned and 25 headstones were broken. The attack 
was the single largest act of desecration since the end of World War 
II. However, police did not classify the act as an ``anti-Semitic act'' 
since no swastikas or anti-Semitic tracts were found in the cemetery. 
On October 4, swastikas were painted on the Bertolt Brecht memorial in 
downtown Berlin. On October 5, swastikas were found painted on the 
Holocaust memorial at the Putlitz Bridge in Moabit. The overwhelming 
majority of the perpetrators of anti-Semitic acts were frustrated, 
largely apolitical youths and a small core of rightwing extremists.
    In June French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen was found guilty of 
inciting hatred in 1997 for referring to the gas chambers as a detail 
in history, and in November Australian Holocaust revisionist Frederick 
Toben was sentenced to 10 months in prison for slander and for 
insulting the memory of the deceased (see Section 2.a.).
    During the year the International Commission on Holocaust-Era 
Insurance Claims worked to establish a plan for European insurance 
companies to pay Holocaust-era life insurance claims. The companies had 
refused to pay many legitimate claims during and after World War II. In 
August the Commission announced agreement on payment of claims at the 
rate of approximately 10 times the face value of policies. A claims 
process was expected to begin on January 31, 2000. Representatives of 
claimants appear to be satisfied with the proposed solution to this 
long outstanding issue, although some details of the program remain 
undecided.
    Scientologists continued to report instances of societal 
discrimination (see Section 2.c.).
    There was no progress during the year in the investigation of the 
1998 bombing of the grave of Heinz Galinski, chairman of the Jewish 
Community of Berlin until his death in 1992.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The number of antiforeigner 
crimes continued to decline, decreasing 25.6 percent in the first 10 
months of the year, compared with the same period in 1998. However, 
skinhead attacks on foreigners increased in the eastern part of the 
country during the year. Also, in March the Government announced that 
rightwing extremism was on the rise and reaching more persons through 
the use of the Internet and skinhead rock groups whose songs have 
racist lyrics. There were a total of 1,193 xenophobic crimes reported 
in the first 10 months of the year, compared with 1,498 such crimes 
during the same period in 1998. Of these, 256 were violent attacks, 
including 231 cases of attacks on persons and 25 cases of arson. Among 
the total number of xenophobic crimes reported were 278 cases of the 
distribution of materials or the display of symbols of banned 
organizations. The percentage of such crimes was significantly higher 
in the eastern states. As in previous years, most of these offenses 
were directed against foreign residents.
    Perpetrators of antiforeigner violence were predominantly young, 
male, and low in socioeconomic status; they often committed such acts 
spontaneously and while inebriated. Some offenders were rightwing 
extremists, such as neo-Nazis and ``skinheads.'' However, many could 
best be described as rightwing-oriented, having loose, if any, 
practical or ideological ties to extremist groups. Other perpetrators 
were apolitical. The Federal OPC reported that 53,600 persons belonged 
to far-right organizations in 1998, an increase of 14 percent from 
48,400 in 1997, including 8,200 persons described as violent, an 
increase from 7,600 in 1997.
    In February Farid Guendoul, an Algerian asylum seeker, died after 
he reportedly was attacked and chased by skinheads in the eastern town 
of Guben. Guendoul was at a disco with friends when a group of neo-Nazi 
skinheads arrived and an altercation broke out. Guendoul and his 
friends fled the disco but the neo-Nazis pursued them in cars. Guendoul 
threw himself through a glass door of an apartment building to escape 
the skinheads who were yelling, ``Foreigners out!'' Guendoul bled to 
death. When police officers arrived on the scene, they arrested 
Guendoul's African friend and held him for 8 hours before realizing 
their mistake. Swastikas were painted next to the door where Guendoul 
died, 2 days after the incident. Authorities arrested 11 neo-Nazis on 
charges of manslaughter and breach of the peace. Their trial began in 
June and continued at year's end. In 1998 there were 93 racist attacks 
in the state of Brandenburg, where Guben is located, including several 
attacks that led to severe injury.
    Some state governments, particularly in eastern Germany, 
established special commissions to deal with incidents of antiforeigner 
violence.
    The federal and state governments were committed firmly to 
combating and preventing rightwing violence and continued to search for 
more effective law enforcement measures, as well as measures aimed at 
the societal roots of extremist crimes. Police in the eastern states 
continued to move toward reaching standards of effectiveness 
characteristic of police in the rest of Germany and demonstrated 
greater coordination in preventing illegal rightwing and neo-Nazi 
activities.
    On March 9, a bomb exploded at the Saarbruecken Community College, 
where a controversial exhibit documenting German military atrocities 
during World War II was being displayed. There were no injuries 
reported, but damages were estimated at $1 million (DM 1.89 million). 
The exhibit had been the focus of criticism by veterans' groups and 
rightwing extremists who believe that it portrays all servicemen as 
coconspirators in Nazi war crimes. Rightwing protests, often violent, 
frequently have surrounded the traveling exhibit since its opening 
several years ago. However, the exhibit was withdrawn after a number of 
photographs were proven not to depict German soldiers (see Section 
1.c.).
    On January 31, police arrested 10 extreme rightists in Berlin after 
authorities broke up a party commemorating the 66th anniversary of 
Adolf Hitler's accession to power. According to the authorities, those 
who were arrested had illegal neo-Nazi paraphernalia. During the raid 
on what police described as a ``conspiratorial music event'' that was 
attended by approximately 300 extreme rightists, three police officers 
were injured.
    In November 1998, the Magdeburg memorial to Roma and Sinti murdered 
during the Nazi era was desecrated, only 2 days after it was unveiled.
    Isolated attacks targeting Turkish establishments and individuals 
occurred. Although some attacks were linked to rightwing perpetrators, 
most were attributed to intra-Turkish political or private disputes, 
but none were directly attributable to the Kurdistan Workers' Party 
(PKK). Several trials of PKK members were nevertheless under way.
    Following the arrest in March of Turkish PKK leader Abdullah 
Ocalan, a group of Kurdish protesters tried to storm the Israeli 
Consulate General in Berlin. Israeli guards shot and killed three 
Kurds, and a fourth died later of his injuries (see Section 2.b.). 
Jewish and Kurdish leaders in Germany worked together with Berlin 
police to investigate the incident.
    Resident foreigners and minority groups continued to voice credible 
concerns about societal and job-related discrimination. Unemployment 
affects foreigners disproportionately, though this in part is due to 
the sometimes inadequate language skills or nontransferable 
professional qualifications of the job seekers. The Federal Government 
and all states have established permanent commissions to assist 
foreigners in their dealings with government and society.
    In January border guards refused entry to two groups of Czech and 
Slovak Roma because they did not have the required amount of money per 
day, $29 (DM 50), for entry. However the majority of persons crossing 
the border allegedly were not required to prove that they had the 
required sum. The Federal Border Police state that, in view of the visa 
free transits prevailing at this border, persons not in possession of 
bank or credit cards routinely are required to show they that have the 
minimum necessary financial means for their intended stay.
    In September the rightwing German People's Union (DVU) won 5.3 
percent of the vote in the Brandenburg state election. It is now 
represented in the eastern states of Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt, 
where it won 13 percent in April 1998. These victories triggered a 
debate about whether eastern Germany was susceptible to extremist 
views. However, it appeared that support for the party came primarily 
from protest voters who were frustrated with the mainstream parties' 
inability to deal with the issues of crime and unemployment. The DVU 
lost elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and in Thueringen. The 
overwhelming majority (62 percent) of rightwing extremists now live in 
eastern Germany although only one-fifth of the overall population 
resides there. Of the approximately 8,200 rightwing extremists who are 
classified as ``prone to violence'' (according to federal statistics), 
47 percent live in the East.
    In 1997 the Government pledged to protect and foster the languages 
and cultures of the national and ethnic minorities that have lived 
traditionally in Germany (e.g., Sorbs, Danes, Roma, Sinti, and 
Frisians). In July 1998, the Saxony state government passed a law to 
protect the Sorb minority, and the Hesse government recognized Romani 
as a minority language.
    Although the Government has recognized the Sinti and Roma as an 
official ``national minority'' since 1995, the Federal Interior 
Ministry and individual states have thus far resisted including Romani 
among the languages to be protected and cultivated under the European 
Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. During the year, the Hesse 
government had indicated its willingness to meet the obligations of the 
Charter to protect Romani, although the other states have not yet 
followed suit. According to the Chairman of the Central Council of 
German Sinti and Roma, the Sinti/Romani minority is the only one of the 
national minorities recognized by the Government that does not have any 
unique legal protection, political privilege, or reserved 
representation in certain public institutions. According to the 
chairman, opinion polls indicated that 60 percent of Germans opposed 
protected status for Sinti and Roma, and public statements of 
government officials and the media continued to perpetuate prejudice 
against Sinti and Roma.
    The state of Saxony passed a new law in July to protect the Slavic 
Sorb minority. The law grants Sorb status to the broadest possible 
spectrum of residents living near the Polish border. The law, together 
with the recently negotiated agreement between Saxony and Brandenburg, 
also ensures the Sorb community a steady flow of state financing for 
educational and cultural activities through the newly established 
Foundation for the Sorb Nation. Saxony and Brandenburg contribute $4.23 
million (DM 8 million) each annually to the foundation, and the Federal 
Government contributes $8.47 million (DM 16 million). At the time of 
the agreement it was expected that the federal contribution would be 
lowered to $4.23 million (DM 8 million) by 2007.
    In May Parliament approved a new citizenship law that allows 
children born to legal foreign residents to become citizens. Children 
can retain both their parents' nationality and a German passport until 
the age of 23, when they must choose one or the other. The law also 
decreases the period of residence in the country required for foreign 
residents to earn the right to naturalization from 15 years to 8 years. 
The law was approved by the Bundesrat and was scheduled to go into 
effect on January 1, 2000. The law was the subject of considerable 
public debate.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The right to associate freely, choose 
representatives, determine programs and policies to represent workers' 
interests, and publicize views is recognized and freely exercised. Some 
32.1 percent of the total eligible labor force belong to unions. The 
German Trade Union Federation (DGB) represents 81.4 percent of 
organized workers.
    The Basic Law provides for the right to strike, except for civil 
servants (including teachers) and personnel in sensitive positions, 
such as members of the armed forces. In the past, the International 
Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized the Government's definition of 
``essential services'' as overly broad. The ILO was responding to 
complaints about sanctions imposed on teachers who struck in the state 
of Hesse in 1989 and, earlier, the replacement of striking postal 
workers by civil servants. In neither case did permanent job loss 
result. The ILO continued to seek clarifications from the Government on 
policies and laws governing the labor rights of civil servants.
    Compared with previous years, strike activity declined further in 
1998. Only 4,000 workers participated in strikes, and only 16,000 work 
days were lost. There were no notable strikes during the year.
    The DGB participates in various international and European trade 
union organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Basic Law 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, and this 
right is widely exercised. Due to a well-developed system of autonomous 
contract negotiations, mediation is uncommon. Basic wages and working 
conditions are negotiated at the industry level and then are adapted, 
through local collective bargaining, to particular enterprises.
    However, some firms in eastern Germany have refused to join 
employer associations, or have withdrawn from them and then bargained 
independently with workers. Likewise, some large firms in western 
Germany withdrew at least part of their work force from the 
jurisdiction of employer associations, complaining of rigidities in the 
industrywide, multicompany negotiating system. However, they have not 
refused to bargain as individual enterprises. The law mandates a system 
of works councils and worker membership on supervisory boards, and thus 
workers participate in the management of the enterprises in which they 
work. The law thoroughly protects workers against antiunion 
discrimination.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Basic Law 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced or bonded child 
labor, and there were no reports that it occurred, apart from 
trafficking in women and forced prostitution.
    A number of lawsuits have been filed by former slave and forced 
laborers seeking compensation for their suffering during the Nazi era. 
In February corporations pledged to create a compensation fund for 
those persons used as forced and slave labor during World War II. On 
December 17, the Government, representatives of seven interested 
nations whose nationals had been subjected to slave and forced labor, 
class action lawyers, and a number of German companies agreed that the 
Government and the corporations would pay $5.2 billion (DM 10 billion) 
to a foundation. Once established, the foundation is to make payments 
to Nazi-era public and private sector forced and slave laborers as well 
as to all those who suffered at the hands of German companies during 
this period. In addition, a portion of this amount is to be used to 
establish a future fund to support Holocaust remembrance, education, 
international understanding, and the interests of heirs and survivors 
of Nazi injustice. Further negotiations are to be conducted in 2000 to 
determine the allocation of the funds among various classes of 
claimants. At the earliest, it was expected that payments could be made 
in late 2000.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Federal law generally prohibits the employment of children 
under the age of 15, with a few exceptions: those 13 or 14 years of age 
may do farm work for up to 3 hours per day or may deliver newspapers 
for up to 2 hours per day; and those 3 to 14 years of age may take part 
in cultural performances, albeit under stringent curbs on the kinds of 
activity, number of hours, and time of day. The Federal Labor Ministry 
effectively enforces the law through its Factory Inspection Bureau.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated or 
administratively determined minimum wage. Wages and salaries are set 
either by collective bargaining agreements between unions and employer 
federations or by individual contracts. Covering about 90 percent of 
all wage- and salary-earners, these agreements set minimum pay rates 
and are legally enforceable. These minimums provide an adequate 
standard of living for workers and their families. The number of hours 
of work per week is regulated by contracts that directly or indirectly 
affect 80 percent of the working population. The average workweek for 
industrial workers is 36 hours in western Germany and about 39 hours in 
the eastern states.
    Federal regulations limit the workweek to a maximum of 48 hours. 
Provisions for overtime, holiday, and weekend pay vary depending upon 
collective bargaining agreements.
    Foreign workers are protected by law and generally receive 
treatment equal to that of German workers. However, foreigners who are 
employed illegally, particularly in the construction industry in 
Berlin, are especially susceptible to substandard wages. Wage 
discrimination also affects legal foreign workers to some extent. For 
example, seasonal workers from Eastern Europe who come to Germany on 
temporary work contracts often receive wages below normal German 
standards. Furthermore, workers from other European Union countries 
sometimes are employed at the same wages that they would receive in 
their home country, even if the corresponding German worker would 
receive a higher wage.
    An extensive set of laws and regulations on occupational safety and 
health incorporates a growing body of European Union standards. These 
provide for the right to refuse to perform dangerous or unhealthy work 
without jeopardizing employment. A comprehensive system of worker 
insurance carriers enforces safety requirements in the workplace. The 
Labor Ministry and its counterparts in the states effectively enforce 
occupational safety and health standards through a network of 
government organs, including the Federal Institute for Work Safety. At 
the local level, professional and trade associations--self-governing 
public corporations with delegates both from the employers and from the 
unions--oversee worker safety.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and forced 
prostitution are forbidden by law; however, trafficking in women and 
girls is a serious problem. The laws against trafficking in women were 
modified in 1992 and 1998 to deal more effectively with problems 
stemming from the opening of Germany's eastern borders; trafficking in 
persons is punishable by up to 10 years in prison. Germany is a 
destination and transit country for trafficked women. Estimates vary 
considerably on the number of women and girls trafficked to and through 
the country, ranging between 2,000 and 20,000 per year. Most 
trafficking victims are women and girls between the ages of 16 and 25 
who are forced to work as prostitutes. According to police statistics, 
less than one-half of one percent of trafficking victims are men or 
boys. Of the women trafficked to the country through fake employment 
offers, arranged marriages, fraud, and coercive measures, 80 percent 
come from eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union, 
primarily from Poland, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. The other 20 
percent of trafficking victims come from Southeast Asia, Africa, and 
Latin America. The Federal Ministry for Families, the Elderly, Women, 
and Youth heads an Interagency Working Group to coordinate the efforts 
of state and federal agencies to combat trafficking and to aid victims 
of trafficking. According to statistics from the Federal Criminal 
Office, authorities initiated criminal proceedings or charges of 
trafficking in persons against 751 persons in 1998. The Federal 
Ministry for Families, the Elderly, Women, and Youth has lobbied states 
successfully to provide victims of trafficking who have been detained 
by police 4 weeks to leave the country, rather than face immediate 
deportation. The 4-week grace period allows the victims time to decide 
whether to cooperate with police on investigations of those suspected 
of trafficking. Those who cooperate, although they are very few in 
number, are granted a temporary stay for at least part of the 
proceedings and may be eligible for witness protection, although there 
is no formal nationwide program to protect such witnesses. In three 
cases during recent years, the children of women in the witness 
protection program were brought to the country to prevent possible 
retaliation against them due to the mother's testimony. However, 
protection ends once the case is concluded. Trafficking victims who 
cannot afford to pay for their return tickets home may be eligible for 
state and federal funds for transportation and some pocket money. The 
Government funds the publication of a brochure that provides 
information on residency and work requirements, counseling centers for 
women, health care, warnings about trafficking, and information for 
sex-industry workers that is printed in 13 languages and distributed by 
NGO's and German Consulates abroad. State authorities provide funding 
for NGO's to counsel and care for victims of trafficking. For example, 
the city of Berlin provides about $260,000 (DM 500,000) annually for 
two NGO's that care for and counsel trafficked women. The city provides 
an additional $155,000 (DM 300,000) annually to women's shelters for 
trafficked women in the city. The Federal Government provided about $1 
million (DM 1.95 million) between 1997 and 2000 to fund six counseling 
centers for women from Central and Eastern Europe.
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                                 GREECE

    Greece is a constitutional republic and multiparty parliamentary 
democracy in which citizens choose their representatives in free and 
fair elections. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) holds the 
majority of parliamentary seats, and its leader, Constantine Simitis, 
has been Prime Minister since 1996. The New Democracy Party is the main 
opposition party. The judiciary is independent.
    The national police and security services are responsible for 
internal security. Civilian authorities maintain effective control of 
all security forces. The police and security services are subject to a 
broad variety of restraints. Some members of the police and security 
forces nevertheless committed human rights abuses.
    Greece has a market economy with a large public sector that 
accounts for some 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Residents 
enjoy a relatively advanced standard of living. Structural adjustment 
funds from the European Union (EU) account for approximately 4 percent 
of the country's GDP.
    The Government respected the human rights of most citizens; 
however, problems remained in some areas, although there was some 
progress in others. Security force personnel sometimes abused suspects, 
residents, and illegal aliens. The Government continued to take 
corrective action to relieve severe overcrowding and harsh living 
conditions in some prisons. Police sweeps resulted in the temporary 
detention of immigrants under often squalid conditions. There are legal 
limits on the freedom of association of ethnic minorities. Religious 
leaders acknowledged further general improvement in government 
tolerance, but some restrictions on freedom of religion persisted: 
police continued to detain members of non-Orthodox religions for 
proselytizing. Alternative service for conscientious objectors now is 
available, although under conditions more onerous than those 
experienced by military draftees. The Government sometimes placed human 
rights monitors, including foreign diplomats, non-Orthodox religious 
groups, and minority groups under surveillance. Violence against women 
and trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution are 
problems. Discrimination against ethnic minorities remained a problem, 
although at a lower level than the previous year. The Government 
formally recognizes only the Muslim minority specified in the 1923 
Treaty of Lausanne.
    Although it reaffirmed individuals' right of self-identification, 
the Government still refuses to acknowledge formally the existence of 
non-Muslim groups, principally the Slavophones, under the term 
``minority.'' As a result, some individuals who define themselves as 
members of a minority find it difficult to express their identity 
freely and to maintain their culture, although problems in this area 
decreased somewhat during the year.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government 
officials.
    The case of a Romani man killed by police in Partheni, 
Thessaloniki, in 1998 was not resolved by year's end. A trial of the 
policemen involved was pending 18 months later.
    The 1998 case of a foreign student killed by a policeman is pending 
before a police disciplinary board. The accused police officer was 
charged with intentional homicide, and a trial was pending at year's 
end.
    There was no resolution of the cases of seven doctors accused of 
manslaughter in 1998 in connection with the case of an alleged hostage-
taker in an Athens hospital or of a policeman who in 1996 shot and 
killed a Romani man at a roadblock in Livadia.
    In April a woman was killed by a bomb at the Athens 
Intercontinental Hotel.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically forbids torture, and a 1984 
law (which has never been invoked) makes the use of torture an offense 
punishable by a sentence of 3 years' to life imprisonment; however, 
security force personnel occasionally abused suspects during arrest and 
interrogations and abused resident and illegal aliens. The police also 
abused Roma (see Section 5).
    In August a man on Rhodes accused three policemen of beating him 
while in custody. The three accused officers were charged and await a 
trial hearing.
    The 1998 case of three policemen who allegedly beat two Romani 
teenagers was pending trial at year's end (see Section 5). The 1996 
case of five police officers who beat an Iraklion man remains pending.
    Immigrants--mostly Albanian citizens--accused the security forces 
of physical, verbal, and other mistreatment (including the confiscation 
and destruction of their documents), particularly during police sweeps 
in May, June, and July to apprehend illegal immigrants. The detainees 
were held in squalid conditions. In June an Albanian citizen required 6 
days of hospitalization after police reportedly beat him in Athens. The 
man's identity papers reportedly were confiscated. Also in June, an 
Albanian citizen reported that the police beat him badly, and that they 
also shouted ethnic and religious epithets at him, while another 
alleged that the police shot him in his apartment. At year's end, these 
cases were still under investigation by the Government.
    Numerous anarchist and terrorist groups attacked a wide spectrum of 
targets, mostly commercial property, during the year, primarily to 
protest the NATO action in Kosovo. The firebombing of vehicles, drive-
by shootings of buildings, and bombings at commercial establishments, 
mostly late at night, were widespread. A foreign company's office and a 
consulate in Thessaloniki were the targets of attempted bombings, as 
were the residences of the Dutch and German Ambassadors in Athens.
    In October the Ministry of Public Order opened a Bureau of Internal 
Affairs to investigate cases of police misbehavior.
    Conditions in some prisons remained harsh due to substantial 
overcrowding and outdated facilities. As of September, the Ministry of 
Justice reported that the total prison population was 7,511 (of whom 
3,388 were foreigners), while the total capacity of the prison system 
was 4,542.
    Non-EU illegal aliens awaiting deportation at the Drapetsona police 
detention center in Piraeus staged several hunger strikes to protest 
what was described by a human rights organization as a ``lack of 
adequate exercise, lack of natural daylight, insufficient toilet and 
bathing facilities, severely limited access to medical treatment, and 
no access to social services.'' Poor conditions also were reported at 
the two other detention centers for illegal aliens.
    The Ministry of Justice continued its program to improve prison 
conditions and expand capacity. A new center for the rehabilitation of 
narcotics addicts opened late in the year and admitted its first 100 
inmates. The center is designed to house 350 inmates and is to 
cooperate with an organization for combating narcotics (OKANA) to 
provide detoxification and rehabilitation for inmates.
    The Government is inconsistent in permitting prison visits by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
requires judicial warrants for all arrests, except during the actual 
commission of a crime, and the law prohibits arbitrary arrest orders; 
the authorities respected these provisions in practice. The police must 
by law bring persons who are arrested on the basis of a warrant or 
while committing a crime before an examining magistrate within 24 
hours. The magistrate must issue a detention warrant or order the 
release of the detainee within 3 days, unless special circumstances 
require a 2-day extension of this time limit.
    Defendants brought to court before the end of the day following the 
commission of a charged offense may be tried immediately, under an 
``expedited procedure.'' Although legal safeguards, including 
representation by counsel, apply in speedy procedure cases, the short 
period of time may inhibit defendants' ability to present an adequate 
defense. Defendants may ask for a delay to provide time to prepare 
their defense, but the court is not obliged to grant it. The expedited 
procedure was used in less than 10 percent of misdemeanor cases; it 
does not apply in felony cases.
    The effective maximum duration of pretrial detention is 18 months 
for felonies and 9 months for misdemeanors. Defense lawyers assert that 
pretrial detention is exceedingly long and overused by judges. A panel 
of judges may grant release pending trial, with or without bail. 
Pretrial detainees made up 31 percent of those incarcerated, 
contributing to overcrowding, according to government sources. A person 
convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment or 
less may, at the court's discretion, pay a fine instead of being 
imprisoned.
    In the early summer, the police conducted large-scale sweeps and 
temporarily detained large numbers of foreigners under often squalid 
conditions while determining their residence status (see Section 5).
    Exile is unconstitutional, and no cases have been reported since 
the restoration of democracy in 1974. In a significant step, the 
Government in 1998 repealed Article 19 of the Citizenship Code, which 
permitted it to revoke the citizenship of Greek citizens of non-Greek 
ethnic origin who traveled outside Greece. Between 1955 and 1998, 
according to then-Minister of Interior Papadopolous, some 60,000 
citizens had lost their citizenship under the old law. The new law was 
not applied retroactively. About 400 individuals who had lost their 
citizenship in the past under Article 19 continued to reside in Greece. 
Following the repeal of Article 19, most of these individuals were 
issued identification documents characterizing them as stateless, but 
they were permitted to apply to reacquire Greek citizenship. Most of 
these 400 persons had not had their applications adjudicated by year's 
end (also see Section 2.d.).
    Article 20 of the Citizenship Code, which permits the Government to 
strip citizenship from those who ``commit acts contrary to the 
interests of Greece for the benefit of a foreign state,'' remained in 
force. In the past, this article affected Greek citizens abroad who 
asserted a ``Macedonian'' ethnicity. There were no reports of Article 
20 being invoked by the Government during the year (also see Section 
2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
independence of the judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
    The judicial system includes three levels of civil courts, (first 
instance, appeals, and supreme) and three levels of criminal courts 
(first instance--divided into misdemeanor and felony divisions, 
appeals, and supreme), appointed judges, and an examining magistrate 
system, with trials by judicial panels.
    The Constitution provides for public trials, unless the court 
decides that privacy is required to protect victims and witnesses or 
the cases involve national security matters. Defendants enjoy a 
presumption of innocence, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the right to present evidence and call witnesses, the right of 
access to the prosecution's evidence, the right to cross-examine 
witnesses, and the right to counsel. Lawyers are provided to defendants 
who are not able to afford legal counsel only in felony cases. Both the 
prosecution and the defense may appeal.
    Defendants who do not speak Greek have the right to a court-
appointed interpreter. The low fees paid for such work often result in 
poor translation. Foreign defendants who depend on these interpreters 
frequently complain that they do not understand the proceedings of 
their trials. A non-Greek-speaking Albanian defendant reportedly 
received a 12-year prison sentence in a trial in which he had no 
interpreter; the case was under appeal at year's end.
    The legal system does not discriminate on the basis of sex, 
religion, or nationality, with some exceptions: The Ministry of 
Education and Religious Affairs may base its decision on ``house of 
prayer'' permit applications on the opinion of the local Orthodox 
bishop (see Section 2.c.); nonethnic Greek citizens are prohibited 
legally from settling in a large ``supervised zone'' near the frontier 
(although this prohibition is not enforced in practice); and a 1939 law 
(also not enforced in practice) prohibits the functioning of private 
schools in buildings owned by non-Orthodox religious foundations.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits invasion of privacy and 
searches without warrants, and the law permits the monitoring of 
personal communications only under strict judicial controls; however, 
these safeguards do not appear to be effective. The security services 
continued to monitor human rights groups (see Section 4), non-Orthodox 
religious groups, minority group representatives, and foreign diplomats 
who met with such individuals. Human rights activists reported 
suspicious openings and diversions of mail. As far as is known, the 
Government took no steps to stop such practices or to prosecute those 
involved.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respected these rights in practice. Legal restrictions on free speech 
nevertheless remain in force.
    Articles of the Penal Code that can be used to restrict free speech 
and the press include Article 141, which forbids exposing the friendly 
relations of the Greek state with foreign states to danger of 
disturbance; Article 191, which prohibits spreading false information 
and rumors liable to create concern and fear among citizens and cause 
disturbances in the country's international relations and inciting 
citizens to rivalry and division, leading to disturbance of the peace; 
and Article 192, which prohibits inciting citizens to acts of violence 
or to disturbing the peace through disharmony among them. Those 
convicted in the past were allowed to convert their convictions into a 
fine of approximately $14 (5,000 drachmae) per day.
    In a 1997 case, two journalists were convicted of publishing 
classified government documents; their convictions were under appeal at 
the Supreme Court at year's end.
    In May an editor in Kozani was given on appeal a 5-month suspended 
sentence and a fine for insulting the prefect-elect in a 1998 article. 
A court of first instance had previously sentenced the editor to longer 
jail time and a higher fine. In January another editor, Yannis Tzoumas, 
was acquitted on appeal of defaming a government minister, and his 4-
month prison sentence was voided.
    On matters other than the question of ethnic minorities, there is a 
tradition of outspoken public discourse and a vigorous free press. 
Satirical and opposition newspapers routinely attack the highest state 
authorities. Members of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities 
freely publish periodicals and other publications, often in their 
native language. The Constitution allows for seizure (though not prior 
restraint), by order of the public prosecutor, of publications that 
insult the President, offend religious beliefs, contain obscene 
articles, advocate violent overthrow of the political system, or 
disclose military and defense information. However, seizures have been 
rare; none occurred during the year.
    A dictionary published in 1998 generated several lawsuits from 
individuals who found certain definitions offensive. A court in 
Thessaloniki ordered the removal of one definition from future editions 
of the dictionary and threatened the author with a fine and 
imprisonment if he did not comply. In December 1998, the Supreme Court 
overturned the lower court's decision, ruling that the definitions were 
not offensive and could not be banned.
    The Constitution provides that the state exercise ``immediate 
control'' over radio and television. Once the state monopoly on radio 
and television ended in 1989, numerous private stations began 
operations in an essentially unregulated market while the Government 
sought to draft and implement legislation on licensing and frequency 
allocations. The National Radio and Television Council (NRTC) has a 
decisive role in radio licensing but has only an advisory role in 
television licensing, where the Ministry of Press and Mass Media has 
final authority.
    A 1995 law, not yet fully implemented, established ownership and 
technical frequency limits on electronic media; the Government and 
media outlets disputed application procedures and frequency 
allocations. In December the Government introduced draft legislation 
designed to legalize stations operating with pending applications; with 
more applicants than available frequency spectrum, not all stations 
will gain licenses. The Government occasionally shuts stations for 
violating intellectual property rights or interfering with civil 
aviation, military, and law enforcement transmissions. In December 
Channel Station 2000, an Evangelical radio station, was shut down. The 
station's owners stated that the closure was because of religious 
content (although other non-Orthodox stations continue to operate 
unhindered), whereas the Government asserted that the station's 
broadcasts sporadically interfered with military channels. State-run 
stations tend to emphasize the Government's views but also report 
objectively on other parties' programs and positions. Private radio and 
television stations operate independently of any government control 
over their reporting. Turkish-language television programs are widely 
available via satellite in Thrace.
    The case of the television station Antenna was resolved against it. 
Antenna was appealing a $350,000 (100 million drachmas) fine imposed by 
the NRTC in 1997 for allegedly contributing to the suicide of a man 
after his exposure on one of its shows.
    The case of Radio Isik, a Turkish-language station in Komotini, 
charged with operating without a license in 1994 and 1995, was pending 
at year's end. The 1998 conviction of Abdulhalim Dede, the Muslim owner 
of Radio Isik for illegal construction of a new radio antenna intended 
to extend the range of the station, was upheld on appeal in June. The 
court reduced the sentence from 8 to 2 months in jail but suspended 
enforcement pending Dede's appeal to the Supreme Court.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. Police permits are issued routinely for public 
demonstrations, and there were no reports that the permit requirement 
was abused.
    In January 30,000 demonstrators protested against proposed 
government education reforms, at times violently (see Section 5). In 
the spring several thousand demonstrators threw stones and gasoline 
bombs at the police to protest NATO actions in Kosovo.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association, which the 
Government respected; however, legal restrictions on the titles of 
associations remain involving ethnic minorities (see Section 5).
    Government authorities legally recognize the existence of the 
Muslim minority, but not other groups officially as ``minorities.'' 
However, the 1990 Copenhagen document of the then-Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, to which the Government is a 
signatory, asserts that ``to belong to a national minority is a matter 
of a person's individual choice.'' The Government affirmed an 
individual, but not a collective, right of self-identification during 
the year.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes the Eastern 
Orthodox Church of Christ (Greek Orthodoxy) as the prevailing religion; 
it also provides for the right of all citizens to practice the religion 
of their choice. The Government respects this right; however, non-
Orthodox groups sometimes face administrative obstacles or legal 
restrictions on religious practice. The Constitution prohibits 
proselytizing and stipulates that non-Orthodox rites of worship may not 
disturb public order or offend moral principles.
    The Orthodox Church wields significant political and economic 
influence. The Ministry of Education and Religion supervises the 
Church, and the Government provides some financial support by, for 
example, paying the salaries of clergy, subsidizing their religious 
training, and financing the construction and maintenance of Orthodox 
Church buildings.
    The Orthodox Church is the only religion considered by law to be a 
``legal person of public law.'' Other religions are considered ``legal 
persons of private law.'' In practice a primary distinction is that 
establishment of other religions' ``houses of prayer'' is regulated by 
the general provisions of the Civil Code regarding corporations. For 
example non-Orthodox churches cannot, as religious entities, own 
property; the property must belong to a specifically created legal 
entity rather than to the church itself. In practice this places an 
additional legal and administrative burden on non-Orthodox religious 
community organizations, although in most cases this process has been 
handled routinely.
    Two laws from the 1930's require recognized or ``known'' religious 
groups to obtain house of prayer permits from the Ministry of Education 
and Religion in order to open houses of worship. By law the Ministry 
may base its decision to issue permits on the opinion of the local 
Orthodox bishop. No formal mechanism exists to gain recognition as a 
known religion, but Ministry officials state that they no longer obtain 
the opinion of the local Orthodox bishop when considering house of 
prayer permit applications, that no completed applications were refused 
during 1999, and that none were pending at year's end. A tax bill 
passed in 1997 created three new taxes on churches and other nonprofit 
organizations. Leaders of some non-Orthodox religious groups claimed 
that all taxes on religious organizations were discriminatory, even 
those that the Orthodox Church has to pay, since the Government 
subsidizes the Orthodox Church while other groups are self-supporting.
    Approximately 94 to 97 percent of the country's 10 million citizens 
are Greek Orthodox. With the exception of the Muslim community (some of 
whose rights, privileges, and government obligations thereto are 
covered by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne), the Government does not keep 
statistics on the size of religious groups within Greece. Ethnic Greeks 
account for a sizeable percentage of most non-Orthodox religions. The 
balance of the population is composed of Muslims (officially estimated 
at 96,000); Protestants, including evangelicals (who state they are 
approximately 30,000), Jehovah's Witnesses (50,000), Latter-Day Saints 
(Mormons), Anglicans, Baptists, and nondenominational Christians; 
Catholics (approximately 50,000); Jews (approximately 5,000); and 
Scientologists (approximately 7,000). Approximately 300 members of the 
Baha'i Faith are scattered throughout the country. The majority are 
Greek citizens of non-Greek ethnicity.
    The privileges and legal prerogatives granted to the Greek Orthodox 
Church are not extended routinely to other recognized religions. The 
non-Greek Orthodox churches must make separate and lengthy applications 
to government authorities on such matters as arranging appointments to 
meet with Ministry of Education and Religion officials and gaining 
permission to move places of worship to larger facilities. In contrast 
Greek Orthodox officials have an institutionalized link between the 
church hierarchy and the Ministry that handles administrative matters.
    The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which is still in force, gives Muslims 
in Western Thrace the right to maintain social and charitable 
organizations (``wakfs'') and provides for the function of muftis to 
render religious and some civil services.
    The Muslim population, concentrated in Western Thrace with small 
communities in Rhodes, Kos, and Athens, is composed mainly of ethnic 
Turks but also includes Pomaks and Roma. Mosques operate freely in 
Western Thrace and on the islands of Rhodes and Kos.
    Differences remain within the Muslim community and between segments 
of the community and the Government over the means of selection of 
muftis (Islamic judges and religious leaders with limited civic 
responsibilities). Under a 1990 presidential decree, which was codified 
in a 1991 law, the Government appointed two muftis and one assistant 
mufti, all resident in Thrace. The appointments (effective in 1991) 
were based on the recommendations of a committee of Muslim notables 
selected by the Government. The Government argued that it must appoint 
the muftis because, in addition to their religious duties, they perform 
judicial functions in many civil and domestic matters under Muslim 
religious law, for which the State pays them.
    Some Muslims accept the authority of the two officially appointed 
muftis; other Muslims, backed by Turkey, have ``elected'' two different 
muftis to serve their communities (although there is no established 
procedure or practice for ``election''). Three times in 1998, the 
Government convicted one of the elected muftis for usurping the 
authority of the official mufti; he has appealed. Earlier convictions 
(11 over 4 years) against the same individual were upheld on appeal. 
All of the respective sentences remain suspended pending appeal. The 
other elected mufti, who was convicted in 1991 of usurping the 
authority of the official mufti, appealed to the European Court of 
Human Rights. In December the Court ruled that the conviction violated 
his freedom of religion and self-expression, but it avoided the 
question of his legal status as mufti.
    Controversy between the Muslim community and the Government also 
continues over the management and self-government of the wakfs (Muslim 
charitable organizations) regarding the appointment of officials as 
well as the degree and type of administrative control. A 1980 law 
placed the administration of the wakfs in the hands of the appointed 
muftis and their representatives. In response to objections from some 
Muslims that this arrangement weakened the financial autonomy of the 
wakfs and violated the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, a 1996 
presidential decree put the wakfs under the administration of a 
committee for 3 years as an interim measure pending the resolution of 
outstanding problems. The committee remains in place although the 
decree expired in April.
    Muslim activists complained that the Government regularly lodges 
tax liens against the wakfs although they are in theory tax-free 
religious foundations. Legislation to create a national land and 
property registry passed in 1996 and upon coming into full effect in 
1999 requires the wakfs, as with all property holders, to register all 
of their property with the Government. The legislation permits the 
Government to seize any property that owners are not able to document; 
there are built-in reporting and appeals procedures. To date the 
Government has not sought to enforce either the liens or the 
registration requirement.
    Protestant groups constitute the second largest religious group 
after the Greek Orthodox Church. Some groups, such as the evangelicals 
and Jehovah's Witnesses, consist almost entirely of ethnic Greeks. 
Other groups, such as the Latter-Day Saints and Anglicans, consist of 
an approximately equal number of ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks. Non-
Greek citizen clergy reported difficulty renewing their visas during 
the period covered by this report, but these visas eventually were 
renewed. As part of new obligations under the Schengen Treaty and the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, all non-European Union citizens face a more 
restrictive visa and residence regime than they did in the past.
    Although Jehovah's Witnesses are recognized as a ``known'' 
religion, they continued to face some harassment in the form of 
arbitrary identity checks (although reduced from 1998), difficulties in 
burying their dead, and local officials' resistance to their 
construction of churches (which in most cases was resolved quickly and 
favorably). In January a European Court of Human Rights case was 
resolved when the Government admitted surveillance of an adherent and 
promised that it would never conduct surveillance of Jehovah's 
Witnesses again.
    In previous years the armed forces consistently refused to exempt 
Jehovah's Witnesses' clergy from mandatory military service. In 1998 a 
law providing an alternative form of mandatory national service for 
conscientious objectors took effect. All clergy now are exempt from any 
service. The law provides that conscientious objectors may work in 
state hospitals or municipal services for 36 months. Conscientious 
objector groups generally characterized the legislation as a positive 
first step but criticized the 36-month alternative service term, which 
is double the regular 18-month period of military service. In one case, 
an application was submitted late and the applicant was instructed to 
appear for mandatory military service. The applicant appealed this 
decision; the results of the appeal are pending.
    Jehovah's Witnesses also noted two recent cases in which custody of 
a child was awarded to a Greek Orthodox parent, in part due to the fact 
that the other parent was a member of Jehovah's Witnesses. In September 
1998, an Athens court awarded custody of a child to its father; media 
reporting stated that because blood transfusions were prohibited by 
Jehovah's Witnesses, should the child need one, the mother might object 
and thus endanger the child's health.
    Evangelical parishes are located throughout Greece. Members of 
missionary faiths report difficulties due to antiproselytizing laws. 
Church officials express concern that antiproselytizing laws remain on 
the books, although such laws no longer hinder their ministering to the 
poor and to children.
    According to leaders of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints, the Church has approximately 300 local adherents, about half of 
whom are of Greek ethnicity. About 60 foreign missionaries arrive each 
year for 2-year terms. Church leaders report that their permanent 
members (nonmissionaries) do not encounter discriminatory treatment. 
However, the police occasionally detained Mormons and Jehovah's 
Witnesses after receiving complaints that individuals were engaged in 
proselytizing. According to Mormon leaders, police detain their 
missionaries at least once every 2 weeks. The missionaries always are 
released the same day without being charged. In most cases, these 
Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses were held for several hours at a police 
station and then released with no charges filed. Many reported that 
they were not allowed to call their lawyers and that they were verbally 
abused by police officers for their religious beliefs. In 1998 the 
European Court of Human Rights found the Government in violation of the 
European Convention on Human Rights for convicting Protestants of 
proselytizing in past cases. There were no proselytizing-related court 
cases during the year.
    Scientologists, most of whom are located in the Athens area, 
practice their faith through the Center for Applied Psychology (KEFE), 
a registered nonprofit philosophical organization. According to the 
president of the KEFE, the group chose to register as a philosophical 
organization because legal counsel advised that the Government would 
not recognize Scientology as a religion. In a step toward gaining 
recognition as a religion, Scientologists applied for a House of Prayer 
permit in October 1998. The application was pending at the Ministry of 
Education at year's end.
    A 1995 police search of Scientology headquarters revealed a file of 
press clippings on Greek opposition to Scientology. The file was 
confiscated and 15 KEFE board members subsequently were charged with 
``unprovoked factual insult.'' In May an Athens court acquitted the 15 
Scientology board members of the charges.
    The Bishop of Athens heads the Roman Catholic Holy Synod. CARITAS, 
an order of nuns providing charity services, and the Missionaries of 
Charity (Mother Teresa's order) also operate in the country. Legal 
recognition of the Catholic archdiocese of Athens, earlier denied, was 
granted in July.
    The Jewish community numbers approximately 5,000 adherents; the 
majority are of Greek ethnicity and live in the Athens region. A local 
government official opposed the rededication of a synagogue in Hania, 
Crete, that was closed during World War II. The synagogue will also 
serve as a cultural center. Central government and Greek Orthodox 
officials attended the rededication in October.
    Religious instruction in Orthodoxy in public primary and secondary 
schools is mandatory for all Greek Orthodox students. Non-Orthodox 
students are exempt from this requirement. However, Jehovah's Witnesses 
have reported some instances of discrimination related to attendance at 
religious education classes or other celebrations of religious or 
nationalistic character.
    The Government took no action to implement or repeal a 1991 law 
mandating that citizens declare their religion on new standardized 
identity cards based on EU standards, which could be used for internal 
EU travel. Current identity cards contain a space for religion that may 
be left blank.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution calls for freedom of 
movement within and outside the country and the right to return; 
however, Muslim leaders asserted that Muslims face administrative 
obstacles regarding their voter registration when seeking to change 
their legal residence within or to the region of Thrace.
    A section of the Citizenship Code, Article 20, permits the 
Government to strip citizenship from those who ``commit acts contrary 
to the interests of Greece for the benefit of a foreign state.'' While 
the law as written applies equally to all Greeks regardless of ethnic 
background, to date it has been enforced, in all but one case, only 
against citizens who identified themselves as members of the 
``Macedonian'' minority. The Government has not revealed the number of 
Article 20 cases that it pursued. There were no reports of such cases 
during the year. Dual citizens who are stripped of Greek citizenship 
under Article 20 sometimes are prevented from entering the country 
using the passport of their second nationality.
    The Government offers asylum under the terms of the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. It 
cooperates with the local office of the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR). In June a presidential decree took effect that 
significantly expanded the rights of asylum seekers and brought the law 
into compliance with UNHCR minimum standards on asylum procedures.
    Individuals recognized as refugees under the terms of the U.N. 
convention are eligible for the residence and work permits that are 
necessary to settle permanently. In the first 9 months of 1999, 1,130 
individuals submitted applications for refugee status; 99 individuals 
were recognized as refugees. Of those refused refugee status, 286 were 
granted temporary residence on humanitarian grounds until return to 
their countries becomes possible.
    Reports indicated that the Government at times deported asylum 
seekers back to their country of origin before they could submit formal 
applications for asylum. In December 1998, the UNHCR criticized the 
lack of a coherent, functioning asylum process and the fact that the 
Government continued to deport forcibly some potential asylum seekers 
back to their country of origin (or to the country from which they 
entered Greece) before they could submit formal applications for 
asylum. After a 1998 increase, such cases dropped in 1999 as the 
Government more effectively patrolled the country's sea and land 
borders.
    The Government usually does not recognize the concept of first 
asylum.
    Anecdotal evidence suggests that hundreds of individuals from 
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran enter Greece illegally each year; only a small 
percentage eventually apply for official refugee status. Some of those 
who do not apply remain illegally, often living in government camps 
where conditions vary from adequate to very poor. Others proceed to 
Western Europe, often applying for asylum there. The Government usually 
does not seek out such individuals for deportation; since Greece and 
Turkey do not have a readmission agreement, the Government finds it 
practically impossible to deport individuals who enter Greece from 
Turkey.
    Albanian immigrants compose over three-fifths of the alien 
population. Deportations of both illegal and legal immigrants, abusive 
treatment by police, and inconsistencies and inequities in the way 
employers provide wages and benefits were common. In the early summer, 
the police conducted large-scale sweeps of neighborhoods populated by 
immigrants, temporarily detaining large numbers of individuals under 
often squalid conditions while determining their residence status (see 
Section 5).
    In the last half of 1998, between 300 and 600 Iraqi Kurds set up 
camp in a square in central Athens, claiming that the Government was 
not providing them adequate assistance. In February the police moved 
the Kurds to an abandoned military base outside the city. All but 17 of 
the Kurds fled the base and disappeared. They are presumed to be 
scattered throughout the Athens area. None has returned to the square.
    Through April 15, the Organization for the Employment of Human 
Resources (OAED), a government agency, reported that 201,235 illegal 
aliens, out of an estimated population of 700,000, applied for legal 
status or a ``green card.'' The new program was designed to regularize 
the residency status of illegal, often ``economic,'' immigrants. The 
green card serves as a residence permit and allows the immigrants to 
live and work in the country for a limited period of time. The OAED 
estimated that there would be a total of 235,000 illegal aliens 
applying for the green card by year's end; 80 percent of the green 
cards issued so far are of 1-year duration. A new application is 
required to extend the card for an additional year. Holders of a 
``white card'' may reside and work legally on a short-term basis while 
meeting the other requirements necessary to obtain a green card. Press 
reports cite the obstacles of a complex bureaucracy and the 
unwillingness of employers to pay social security contributions as 
primary reasons for the limited ability of white card holders to 
advance to the green card application process. The OAED estimated that 
out of a total of 386,000 white card holders in 1998, 186,000 simply 
dropped out of the green card application process. Legislation provides 
for the green card program to remain in effect until the end of 2001. 
Press reports estimated that it would take 3 years just to process the 
applications already submitted.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Greece is a multiparty democracy whose Constitution provides for 
full political rights for all citizens and for the peaceful change of 
governments and of the Constitution. The Government headed by Prime 
Minister Constantine Simitis of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement 
(PASOK) won in free and fair elections in September 1996. Parliament 
elects the President for a 5-year term. Voting is mandatory for those 
over age 18, but there are many conditions that allow citizens not to 
vote, and penalties are not applied in practice. Members of the 
unicameral 300-seat Parliament are elected to maximum 4-year terms by 
secret ballot. Opposition parties function freely and have broad access 
to the media.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although no 
legal restrictions hinder their participation. Women held 2 ministerial 
positions in the Government and only 1 of 29 subministerial positions. 
Of the 300 members of Parliament, 17 were women.
    While the Government generally respects citizens' political rights, 
there are occasionally charges that it limits the right of some 
individuals to speak publicly and associate freely on the basis of 
their self-proclaimed ethnic identity, thus impinging on the political 
rights of such persons. However, in the 1996 parliamentary elections, 
three Muslim deputies were elected in Thrace, one each from PASOK, New 
Democracy, and the Coalition of the Left. Romani representatives report 
that local authorities sometimes deprive Roma of the right to vote by 
refusing to register them. However, Romani activists also report that 
some municipalities encourage Roma to register. Municipalities can 
refuse to register Roma who do not fulfill basic residency 
requirements, which many Roma have trouble meeting.
    In 1996 the Government transferred responsibility for oversight of 
all rights provided to the Muslim minority under the Treaty of Lausanne 
(including education, zoning, administration of the wakfs, and trade) 
from elected local governors to a government-appointed regional 
administrative official, the periferiarch of Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace. Some minority members charged that the transfer reduced their 
ability to use the democratic process to influence decisions that 
affect them. The Government stated that it made the change because the 
central authorities could administer Greece's treaty obligations more 
effectively.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government allows domestic human rights organizations to 
operate, but cooperation with them varies. In principle it does not 
prohibit foreign diplomats from meeting with officials and other 
citizens, including critics of official policy. However, the security 
services on occasion monitor contacts of human rights groups, including 
listening in on conversations held between those groups and human 
rights investigators and diplomats and questioning contacts (see 
Section 1.f.). Monitors view this as a form of intimidation that deters 
others from meeting with investigators.
    A government ombudsman's office, which opened in 1998, by the end 
of August received 855 complaints directly related to human rights 
issues, of which 462 were processed. Human rights cases constituted 20 
percent of all cases, an increase from 12 percent in 1998.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality before the law irrespective 
of nationality, race, language, religious or political belief; however, 
government respect for these rights in practice was uneven.
    The Government formally recognizes only the ``Muslim minority'' 
specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, although it stated publicly 
in August that members of that minority could identify themselves 
individually as belonging to different ethnic groups. However, the 
Government failed to acknowledge formally the existence of non-Muslim 
ethnic groups, principally Slavophones, under the term ``minority.'' As 
a result, some individuals who define themselves as members of a 
minority find it difficult to express their identity freely and to 
maintain their culture.
    Women.--Violence against women and trafficking in women are growing 
problems. The incidence of violence against women reported to the 
authorities is low; however, Athens' Equality Secretariat, which 
operates the only shelter for battered women in Athens, believes that 
the actual incidence is ``high.'' According to press and academic 
estimates, there were approximately 4,500 cases of rape in 1999. 
Reportedly only 6 to 10 percent of the victims contact the police, and 
only a small fraction of the cases reaches trial. Conviction rates on 
rape charges are low for first time accused, but sentences are harsh 
for repeat offenders.
    The General Secretariat for Equality of the Sexes (GSES), an 
independent government agency, asserts that police tend to discourage 
women from pursuing domestic violence charges and instead undertake 
reconciliation efforts, although they are neither qualified for nor 
charged with this task. The GSES also claims that the courts are 
lenient when dealing with domestic violence cases. The GSES, in 
cooperation with Ministry of Public Order, conducted three training 
courses during the year for police personnel on how to treat domestic 
violence victims.
    Facilities for battered women and their children exist but often 
are staffed inadequately to handle cases properly. A government shelter 
(the only residential facility for battered women and their children) 
provides relevant services in Athens, including legal and psychological 
advice. Battered women also can go to state hospitals and regional 
health centers. Late in the year, the GSES opened a new facility in 
Pireaus and announced plans to open two other facilities in 
Thessaloniki and Epirus soon. There is still no emergency telephone hot 
line for abused women to call for help. A joint committee composed of 
the GSES, the Ministry of Public Order, the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, and the Ministry of Justice was established during the year to 
focus on women's issues.
    Prostitution is legal. Prostitutes must register at the local 
police station and carry a medical card that is updated every 2 weeks. 
While the number of Greek women entering the profession has declined 
steadily over the years, according to the police and academic sources, 
trafficking in women for prostitution, mostly from the former Soviet 
republics, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, has increased sharply in 
recent years (see Section 6.f.). It is estimated that there are 
approximately 20,000 prostitutes.
    While national data on arrests of prostitutes is not available, 
police and media reports estimate that 1,500 women were arrested for 
prostitution during the year, about 5 times the number for the same 
period in 1998. Most are foreigners who were apprehended for 
noncompliance with legal requirements. Media reports implicated several 
police officers as participants in prostitution rings. The local press 
alleged on a number of occasions that policemen sometimes accepted 
bribes from traffickers or pimps or forced illegal immigrants to have 
sex with them and then channelled them into prostitution rings. The 
vice squad unit of the police was disbanded temporarily in part as a 
result of these allegations.
    Trade unions report that lawsuits for sexual harassment are very 
rare: according to the unions, only four women have filed such charges 
in the past 3 years. In all four cases, the courts reportedly imposed 
very lenient civil sentences. The General Confederation of Greek 
Workers (GSEE) women's section reports that sexual harassment is a 
widespread phenomenon, but that women are discouraged from filing 
charges against perpetrators by family members and coworkers.
    Women enjoy broad constitutional and legal protections, including 
equal pay for equal work. The National Statistical Service's most 
recent data (the second quarter of 1998) show that women's salaries in 
manufacturing were 70.8 percent of those of men in comparable 
positions; in retail sales, women's salaries were 88 percent of those 
of men in comparable positions.
    Although there are still relatively few women in senior positions, 
in recent years women entered traditionally male-dominated occupations 
such as the legal and medical professions in larger numbers. However, 
women still face discrimination when they are considered for promotions 
in both the public and private sectors. According to the women's 
section of the GSEE, 58.6 percent of the country's long-term unemployed 
are women, while women constitute only 38 percent of the work force. 
Women also are underrepresented in labor union decisionmaking centers. 
To ameliorate the situation, the GSES established two regional 
employment offices for women in Thessaloniki and Patras and plans to 
open three more offices.
    Children.--The Government is committed to providing adequate basic 
health and education services for children. Education is compulsory 
through the ninth grade and free through university.
    In January thousands of high school students, their teachers, and 
trade union supporters demonstrated to protest a government education 
reform that would require the students to take exams more frequently 
and in more subjects to gain admission to college, academic standards 
that had been applied in the past. More than 30,000 protesters blocked 
streets in Athens and hurled firebombs at buildings and the police. The 
student protests started in November 1998 and continued during the 
first 2 months of 1999; they diminished after that. The students also 
occupied and refused to leave some schools.
    Several government organizations have responsibility for children's 
issues. The National Welfare Organization, which has a nationwide 
network of offices, is active in the field of child protection. 
Legislation in 1998 combined the National Welfare Organization with two 
similar entities early in 1999 to provide better services. The services 
of the new single organization were regionalized to provide greater 
access to child welfare services and funding prioritized according to 
regional needs.
    Penal law prohibits the mistreatment of children and sets penalties 
for violators, while welfare legislation provides for preventive and 
treatment programs for abused children and for children deprived of a 
family environment; it also seeks to ensure the availability of 
alternative family care or institutional placement.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. No national data 
exist on the incidence of child abuse; authorities other than police 
are not required to report such cases. Past sampling--although without 
verified, up-to-date statistics--suggest problems with child and sexual 
abuse. In a 10-year clinical study of 200 cases of abused children, the 
Institute of Child Health (ICH) reports that 59.5 percent involved 
physical abuse, 20 percent involved neglect, and 21 percent involved 
children who were not abused at the time but had a history of abuse. 
(The study did not cover victims of sexual abuse.) An ICH prevalence 
study of child sexual abuse among 740 university students revealed an 
incidence rate of 7 percent among boys and 17 percent among girls prior 
to age 18. Societal abuse of children in the form of pornography and 
child labor is rare. Child prostitution is a growing phenomenon, 
particularly in some parts of immigrant communities of central Athens. 
Child health specialists say that some social groups, such as Roma and 
illegal immigrants, are underserved.
    Children's rights advocacy groups claim that the protection of 
high-risk children in state residential care centers is inadequate and 
of low quality. They cite lack of coordination between welfare services 
and the courts, inadequate funding of the welfare system, and poor 
staffing of residential care centers as systemic weaknesses in the 
treatment of child abuse. To address this problem, two municipal 
shelters for battered children opened in Athens during the year. Child 
health specialists note that the number of children in residential care 
facilities is decreasing, while the number in foster care is rising.
    In recent years, the number of street children who panhandle or 
peddle at city intersections on behalf of adult family members or for 
criminal gangs increased. According to the Ministry of Public Order, 78 
percent of these children are Albanian, 12 percent are from other 
Balkan countries, and 10 percent are Romani. Early in the year, the 
Government implemented measures to combat this phenomenon. The measures 
included the institutional placement of children up to 12 years old, 
therapeutic consultations with their families, and the deportation of 
juveniles 12 to 17 years old. The measures had visible results for only 
a very short period. It is widely believed that even those who were 
deported managed to return eventually.
    People with Disabilities.--Legislation mandates the hiring of 
disabled persons in public and private enterprises that employ more 
than 50 persons. However, the law reportedly is enforced poorly, 
particularly in the private sector. The law states that disabled 
persons should number 3 percent of staff in private enterprises. In the 
civil service, 5 percent of administrative staff and 80 percent of 
telephone operator positions are reserved for disabled persons. Recent 
legislation mandates the hiring of disabled persons in
the public sector from a priority list. The disabled are exempt from 
the civil service exam. Persons with disabilities have been appointed 
to important positions in the civil service.
    The Construction Code mandates physical access for disabled persons 
to private and public buildings, but this law, too, is enforced poorly. 
A 1997 survey showed that over 60 percent of public buildings are not 
accessible to persons with mobility problems. Ramps and special curbs 
for the disabled have been constructed on some Athens streets and at 
some public buildings, and sound signals have been installed at some 
city street crossings. Since 1993 the Government has been replacing old 
city buses with new ones with stairs specially designed for the 
disabled. The new Athens subway lines were designed to provide full 
access for the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Non-Orthodox citizens have complained of 
being treated with suspicion or told that they were not truly Greek 
when they revealed their religious affiliation. Non-Orthodox citizens 
have claimed that they face career limits within the military and the 
civil service due to their religions. In the military, generally only 
members of the Greek Orthodox faith become officers, leading some 
members of other faiths to declare themselves Orthodox. Only two Muslim 
officers have advanced to the rank of reserve officer.
    Claims of discriminatory denial of Muslim applications for business 
licenses, tractor ownership, or property construction have diminished 
greatly in recent years, and there were no reports of such claims 
during the year (see Section 5-National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities).
    Members of minority faiths have reported incidents of societal 
discrimination, such as local bishops warning parishioners not to visit 
clergy or members of minority faiths and neighbors requesting that the 
police arrest missionaries for proselytizing.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--An increase in xenophobia 
paralleled an increase in the number of of non-Greeks living and 
working in the country.
    Antiforeigner sentiment is directed mainly at Albanians (who make 
up over three-fifths of the alien population). Deportations of both 
illegal and legal immigrants, abusive treatment by police, and 
inconsistencies and inequities in the way employers issue wages and 
benefits are common. In the early summer, the police conducted large-
scale sweeps of neighborhoods populated by immigrants and members of 
ethnic minorities, temporarily detaining large numbers of individuals 
under often squalid conditions while determining their residence 
status. Landlords in Athens and other parts of the country routinely 
refuse to rent to Albanians, even to that country's diplomats. 
Following the September Athens earthquake, legal permanent residents 
(holders of green cards) were not issued earthquake allowances and were 
told to wait, despite having all the proper documentation from civil 
engineers regarding the damage to their housing.
    There are communities that identify themselves as Turks, Pomaks, 
Vlachs, Roma, Arvanites (Orthodox Christians who speak a dialect of 
Albanian), and ``Macedonians'' or ``Slavomacedonians.'' Most are 
integrated fully into society. The Government formally recognizes only 
the ``Muslim minority'' specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, 
applying the term to several different ethnic communities. Most of the 
Muslim minority (officially estimated to number 96,000) is ethnically 
Turkish or Turcophone and lives in Western Thrace. The Muslim minority 
also includes Pomaks and Roma. Many Greek Muslims, including Pomaks, 
identify themselves as Turks and say that the Muslim minority as a 
whole has a Turkish cultural consciousness. While use of the terms 
``Tourkos'' and ``Tourkikos'' (``Turk'' and ``Turkish'') is prohibited 
in titles of organizations, individuals legally may call themselves 
``Tourkos.'' To most Greeks, the words ``Tourkos'' and ``Tourkikos'' 
connote Turkish identity or loyalties, and many object to their use by 
Greek citizens of Turkish origin. The 8-month prison sentence of a 
dozen Muslim teachers, convicted in 1996 for using the name ``Turkish 
Teachers of Western Thrace'' in a union document, remained suspended 
pending appeal. In March an appeals court upheld a 1986 trial court 
decision ordering the closure of the ``Turkish Union of Xanthi'' 
because of the use of the word ``Turkish'' in the organization's name.
    The Treaty of Lausanne provides that the Muslim minority has the 
right to Turkish-language education, with a reciprocal entitlement for 
the Greek minority in Istanbul (now reduced to about 3,000). Western 
Thrace has both Koranic and secular Turkish-language schools. 
Government disputes with Turkey over teachers and textbooks caused the 
secular schools serious problems in obtaining faculty and teaching 
materials in sufficient number and quality. Under a 1952 educational 
protocol, Greece and Turkey may exchange annually 35 teachers on a 
reciprocal basis for service in Istanbul and Western Thrace. Due to the 
dwindling needs of the small and aging Greek population in Istanbul, in 
recent years the Greek side limited the exchanges to 16 teachers per 
country. Complaints from Muslim leaders that Greek bureaucratic 
barriers prevented the Turkish teachers from working in Thrace 
decreased during the year.
    The Government approved 19 Turkish textbooks for use in the secular 
Turkish-language schools. Under a 1960 bilateral protocol, Turkey 
should provide copies of the approved texts for use in the schools of 
Western Thrace. However, the books did not arrive in time for the 
beginning of the fall 1999 semester. In January and March, appeals 
courts in Thrace acquitted and dismissed cases against Muslim parents 
convicted between 1992 and 1994 of destroying government-edited, 
Turkish-language textbooks provided to their children in violation, 
according to the parents, of the 1960 protocol.
    In Western Thrace over 8,000 Muslim children attended Turkish-
language primary schools. An additional 150 attended 2 bilingual middle 
schools with a religious curriculum. Approximately 700 attended 
Turkish-language secondary schools, and approximately 1,300 attended 
Greek-language secondary schools. Many Muslims reportedly went to high 
school in Turkey due to the limited number of places in the Turkish-
language secondary schools, which are assigned by lottery. In 1999 the 
Government instituted an EU-funded program for teaching Greek as a 
second language to Muslim children, primarily in the Greek-language 
schools, to improve their academic performance and chance of obtaining 
postsecondary education in Greece.
    Government incentives encourage Muslim and Christian educators to 
reside and teach in isolated villages. However in August in education 
reform legislation the Government cancelled the program of incentives 
for Christian educators teaching temporarily in minority schools. 
Teachers Union representatives complained that the move would 
discourage Christians from seeking temporary teaching positions in 
minority schools. The law permits the Minister of Education to give 
special consideration to Muslims for admission to universities and 
technical institutes. Universities and technical institutes are 
required to create a certain number of places for Muslim students each 
year; 376 spaces were available in 1999. Under this law, 123 Muslim 
students entered Greek universities and technical institutes during the 
year. Approximately 1,700 other Muslim students entered via the 
national examination process open to all Greeks and were attending 
universities and technical schools.
    The rate of employment of Muslims in the public sector and in 
state-owned industries and corporations is much lower than the Muslim 
percentage of the population. In Xanthi and Komotini, while Muslims 
hold seats on the prefectural and town councils, no Muslims are regular 
employees of the prefecture. Muslims in Western Thrace claim that they 
are hired only for lower level, part-time work. The Government says 
that a lack of fluency in written and spoken Greek and the need for 
university degrees for high-level positions limit the number of Muslims 
eligible for government jobs.
    Public offices in Thrace do their business in Greek; the courts 
provide interpreters as needed. The office of the nomarch (governor) in 
Rodopi prefecture, where many ethnic Turks live, has Turkish-language 
interpreters available.
    Claims of the discriminatory denial of Muslim applications for 
business licenses, tractor ownership, or property construction 
diminished greatly in recent years, and there were no reports of such 
claims during the year. However, the provision of basic public services 
(electricity, water, and telephones) in Muslim villages lagged behind 
that of non-Muslim areas but continued to improve during the year.
    Other than in one multicultural elementary education ``pilot 
school,'' the Government does not provide instruction in Greek as a 
second language to Turcophone children in the Athens area. Muslim 
parents report that their children are unable to succeed in school as a 
result of this policy. The Government maintains that Muslims outside 
Thrace are not covered by the Treaty of Lausanne and therefore do not 
enjoy those rights provided by the treaty.
    Muslim leaders also asserted that the Government routinely 
withholds permission from Muslims seeking to change their legal 
residence, which determines where they vote, from rural to urban 
communities within Western Thrace or from elsewhere in Greece to 
Thrace. They said that permission to change legal residency from 
Western Thrace to elsewhere in Greece was granted readily, and charged 
that the practice was part of a government policy to encourage Muslim 
emigration from the region and to prevent the urban concentration of 
Muslims in Thrace.
    The Government refuses to acknowledge formally the existence and 
``minority'' status of ethnic groups, principally Slavophones, other 
than the Muslim minority specified in the Treaty of Lausanne. As a 
result some individuals who define themselves as members of a minority 
find it difficult to express their identity freely and to maintain 
their culture. Northern Greece is home to an indeterminate number 
(estimates range widely, from under 10,000 to 50,000 or more) of 
citizens who are descended from Slavophones. Some still speak a Slavic 
dialect, particularly in Florina province. A small number of them 
identify themselves as belonging to a distinct ethnic group, which they 
call ``Macedonian,'' and assert their right to minority status. (These 
self-described ethnic ``Macedonians'' are hereafter referred to as 
``Macedonians.'') Their assertions generate strong objections among the 
2.2 million ethnically and linguistically Greek inhabitants of the 
northern Greek region of Macedonia, who use the same term to identify 
themselves. The Government refuses to recognize the Slavic dialect as 
``Macedonian'' and denies that it is a language distinct from 
Bulgarian. Members of the minority assert that the Government pursues a 
policy designed to discourage use of their dialect. Greek sensitivity 
on this issue stems from concern that members of the ``Macedonian'' 
minority may have separatist aspirations. Greece's dispute with the 
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over that country's name 
heightened this sensitivity. Complaints of government harassment and 
intimidation directed against these persons decreased significantly.
    In July three Muslim Members of Parliament and a number of Greek 
human rights organizations issued a letter calling on the Government to 
recognize legally the right of self-identification for members of all 
minorities, including the Muslim and ``Macedonian'' minorities. Senior 
government officials in August reaffirmed an individual, but not a 
collective, right of self-identification. The Government continued to 
maintain officially that the only ``minority'' in Greece is the Muslim 
minority specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
    The General Secretariat for Adult Education (GSAE), a government 
agency, estimates the total Romani population to be 150,000 to 200,000. 
Nonofficial sources estimate the total at 250,000 to 300,000. Most of 
the Roma in Western Thrace are Muslims; elsewhere the majority are 
Greek Orthodox. Many Roma are settled permanently, mainly in the Athens 
area. Others are either mobile, working mainly as agricultural 
laborers, peddlers, and musicians throughout the country or live in 
camps. The GSAE reports that the number of Roma who move around the 
country is decreasing gradually as families settle mainly into slums 
and camps around major cities. There are approximately 70 Romani camps 
with a total camp population between 100,000 and 120,000 persons.
    Roma frequently face discrimination in employment and in housing, 
particularly when attempting to rent accommodations. They experience 
police abuse more frequently than some other groups. There was no 
progress in the case of two policemen who shot and killed a Rom in 
April 1998 in Partheni who refused to stop his car for inspection. The 
trial of a policeman accused of beating two Romani teenagers in 
Mesolonghi in May 1998 had yet to begin by year's end.
    Romani representatives report that some local authorities refuse to 
register Roma as residents in their municipalities. Until registered 
with a municipality, no citizen can vote or exercise other civic rights 
such as obtaining an official marriage, commercial, or driver's 
license, or contributing to social security.
    Most Roma camps have no running water or electricity, much less 
garbage disposal or sewage treatment. Many exist under the harassment 
and threat of eviction by local authorities. For example a camp of some 
60 Roma just north of Athens was declared illegal several times by 
local authorities despite the families' presence there for 10 to 30 
years.
    The Ministry of Defense allocated land and houses at a former army 
camp in Gonou for the Roma of Evosmos, Thessaloniki, to occupy for the 
next 5 years. (The 3,500 Roma were evicted in 1998 from their home of 
some 30 years and then evicted from 4 other sites in the following 15 
days.) However, necessary renovations to the camp had not yet been made 
by year's end. Human rights monitors charge that the Government delayed 
renovating the camp in reaction to the protests of neighboring 
residents who do not want the Roma in their vicinity.
    In February the deputy mayor of Aspropyrgos led a group of local 
officials in bulldozing and burning the camp of a neighboring 
settlement of approximately 100 Roma who had settled on a resident's 
private property. Reportedly, 3 days before the incident, the same 
local government official ordered the Roma's water supply cut off.
    Government policy is to encourage the integration of Roma. The 
Prime Minister has designated a member of his staff to coordinate the 
efforts of all government ministries having a role in their 
integration. Poverty, illiteracy, and social prejudice nevertheless 
continue to plague large parts of the Romani population; these problems 
are most severe among the Roma who are mobile or who live in slums. 
Although the GSAE conducts education and training programs for them, 
the illiteracy rate among Roma is estimated at 80 percent. The Ministry 
of Education established a system of identity cards designed to permit 
students to change schools easily as their parents move and is 
developing a system of satellite schools for Romani settlements.
    The integration of Roma into social security systems is quite low. 
It is estimated that 90 percent of Roma are not insured by the public 
social security systems, since they are unable or unwilling to make the 
required contributions. Like other qualified citizens, indigent Roma 
are entitled to free health care. However, their access to health care 
at times is hindered by the fact that their encampments are located far 
from public health facilities.
    The Ministry of Health and Welfare continued work on projects to 
address the chronic problems of the Roma community. The projects 
include training courses for civil servants, policemen, and teachers to 
``increase sensitivity to the problems of the Roma,'' the development 
of teaching materials for Roma children, and the establishment of youth 
centers in areas close to Roma communities. The Ministry already has 
established six such centers.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the law provide 
for the right of association. All workers, with the exception of the 
military, have the right to form or join unions. Police have the right 
to form unions but not to strike.
    Approximately 26 percent of workers (nearly 650,000 persons) are 
organized in unions. Unions receive most of their funding from a 
Ministry of Labor organization, the Workers' Hearth, which distributes 
mandatory contributions from employees and employers. Workers, 
employers, and the state are represented in equal numbers on the board 
of directors of the Workers' Hearth. Approximately 10 public sector 
unions have dues-withholding provisions in their contracts, in addition 
to receiving Workers' Hearth subsidies.
    Over 4,000 unions are grouped into regional and sectoral 
federations and 2 umbrella confederations, 1 for civil servants and 1, 
the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), for private sector 
employees. The GSEE and the Civil Servants' Confederation (ADEDY) 
announced in 1998 that they would merge in 2000. Unions are highly 
politicized, and there are party-affiliated factions within the labor 
confederations, but day-to-day operations are not controlled by 
political parties or the Government. There are no restrictions on who 
may serve as a union official.
    Legal restrictions on strikes include a mandatory period of notice, 
which is 4 days for public utilities and 24 hours for the private 
sector. Legislation mandates a skeleton staff during strikes affecting 
public services, such as electricity, transportation, communications, 
and banking. Public utility companies, state-owned banks, the postal 
service, Olympic Airways, and the railroads also are required to 
maintain a skeleton staff during strikes.
    The courts have the power to declare strikes illegal, although such 
decisions seldom are enforced. However, unions complain that this 
judicial power serves as a deterrent to some of their members from 
participating in strikes. The courts declared some strikes illegal 
during the year for reasons such as failure of the union to give 
adequate advance notice of the strike or the addition of demands by the 
union during the course of the strike. However, no striking workers 
were prosecuted.
    Fewer strikes took place during the year than ever before, and 
those that occurred were fairly brief and nondisruptive. Strikes by 
public sector employees, including mass transport employees, lasted 
between 1 and 5 days and primarily concerned securing timely pay 
increases and providing greater job security.
    Unions are free to join international associations and maintain a 
variety of international affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Legislation 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively in the 
private sector and in public corporations. These rights are respected 
in practice. There are no restrictions on collective bargaining for 
private sector employees.
    In 1997 and 1998 civil servants were accorded the right to organize 
and bargain collectively with the Ministry of Public Administration. 
The civil servants confederation conducted official negotiations with 
the Ministry of Interior for the first time in 1999.
    In response to union complaints that most labor disputes ended in 
compulsory arbitration, legislative remedies were enacted in 1989 
providing for mediation procedures, with compulsory arbitration as a 
last resort. Legislation in 1992 established a National Mediation, 
Reconciliation, and Arbitration Organization and applies to the private 
sector and public corporations (the military and civil service 
excluded).
    Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. The Labor Inspectorate or a 
court investigates complaints of discrimination against union members 
or organizers. Court rulings have mandated the reinstatement of 
improperly fired union organizers. Three free trade zones operate 
according to EU regulations. The labor laws apply equally in these 
zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits all forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children, and the Ministry of Justice enforces this prohibition; 
however, women and girls are trafficked into the country for the 
purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The Government may 
declare the ``civil mobilization'' of workers in the event of danger to 
national security, life, property, or the social and economic life of 
the country. The International labor Organization (ILO) Committee of 
Experts has criticized this power as violating the standards of ILO 
Convention 29 on forced labor. The Government did not resort to civil 
mobilization during the year.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment in the industrial sector is 
15 years, with higher limits for certain activities. The minimum age is 
12 years in family businesses, theaters, and the cinema. These age 
limits are enforced by occasional Labor Inspectorate spot checks and 
generally are observed. However, families engaged in agriculture, food 
service, and merchandising often have younger family members assisting 
them, at least part time. The Constitution contains a blanket 
prohibition of compulsory labor. Although no specific legislation 
explicitly prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, such 
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Collective bargaining between 
the GSEE and the Employers' Association determines a nationwide minimum 
wage. The Ministry of Labor routinely ratifies this minimum wage, which 
has the force of law and applies to all workers. The minimum wage of 
$21.30 (6,700 drachma) daily and $476.90 (149,730 drachma) monthly, 
effective July 1, is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living 
for a worker and family. The maximum legal workweek is 40 hours in the 
private sector and 37\1/2\ hours in the public sector. The law provides 
for at least one 24-hour rest period per week, mandates paid vacation 
of 1 month per year, and sets limits on overtime.
    Legislation provides for minimum standards of occupational health 
and safety. Although the GSEE has characterized health and safety 
legislation as satisfactory, it charged that enforcement, the 
responsibility of the Labor Inspectorate, was inadequate. Recent 
legislation places the Labor Inspectorate under a central authority in 
compliance with ILO Convention 81. Workers do not have the legal right 
to remove themselves from situations that they believe endanger their 
health. However, they do have the right to lodge a confidential 
complaint with the Labor Inspectorate. Inspectors have the right to 
close down machinery or a process for a period of up to 5 days if they 
see safety or health hazards that they believe represent an imminent 
danger to the workers.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically 
criminalize trafficking in persons, but other statutes in the Penal 
Code are used to prosecute such cases. Arrests and court cases for 
prostitution by unlicensed foreign women, and cases against their 
traffickers, reportedly have increased.
    Trafficking in women for prostitution in Greece has increased 
sharply in recent years. While the Government is stiffening its border 
controls, in part because of the EU Schengen Agreement requirements, 
there are fissures through which many women are brought into the 
country from neighboring Bulgaria, Albania, or the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia.
    According to a Panteion University study, 75 percent of foreign 
female prostitutes are not told why they are being brought to Greece. 
Some women arrive as ``tourists'' or illegal immigrants who seek work 
and are lured into prostitution by club owners who threaten them with 
deportation. Some women are kidnaped from their homes by their fellow 
countrymen and smuggled into Greece where they are ``sold'' to local 
pimps. The victims of this practice are often minors. Frequently, 
connections exist between illegal prostitution and other criminal 
activities.
                                   ____
                                 

                                HUNGARY

    Hungary is a parliamentary democracy with a freely elected 
legislative assembly. Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the leader of the 
FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party, heads a coalition Government formed after 
elections in May 1998 by FIDESZ, the Independent Smallholders' Party, 
and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The Government respects the 
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary.
    The internal and external security services report directly to a 
minister without portfolio, and the police report to the Interior 
Minister. There continued to be credible reports of police abuses, 
although their frequency has declined compared with previous years.
    Through its macroeconomic policies and extensive privatization, the 
Government demonstrated its commitment to the transition to a market 
economy. The private sector generates about 80 percent of gross 
domestic product. Services, trade, and government employ about 45.5 
percent of the labor force. The proportion of the labor force involved 
in industry is almost 53 percent. Major exports include manufactured 
goods (39 percent) and machinery and transport equipment (50 percent). 
An estimated 25 percent of the population live in poverty, with elderly 
pensioners, dependent housewives and children, and Roma most affected. 
Romani leaders and civic organizations claim that socioeconomic 
conditions for the Romani minority have worsened since the change of 
regime in 1989.
    The Government generally respected the human rights and civil 
liberties of its citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. 
Although the authorities addressed problems in specific cases, police 
continued to use excessive force against suspects. Police also harassed 
and abused both Roma and foreign nationals. In practice the authorities 
do not always ensure due process in all cases. Prosecutors and judges 
may impose what amounts to unlimited pretrial detention, although the 
Government expanded legal provisions for the right to fair trial. 
Unlike in 1998, there were no reports that police entered private 
residences without warrants to check foreigners' identification.
    The electronic media are a mix of state-owned and privately owned 
radio and television, with private stations dominating audience share 
by a wide, and ever-widening, margin. The Government publicly declared 
its intention to ``balance'' the media, in order to encourage more 
extensive attention to the conservative values and themes that the 
Government promotes. Many members of the governing coalition believe 
that liberal, opposition-leaning journalists are overrepresented in the 
state-owned media. The center-right coalition used its influence over 
personnel and advertising decisions to attempt to alter the content of 
some news programs broadcast on state media. This led to complaints by 
opposition politicians of unfair media treatment. Spousal abuse of 
women, sexual harassment, and discrimination in the job market remain 
serious problems. Steps were implemented to improve the rights of women 
and persons with disabilities. Anti-Semitic and racist attacks 
persisted, but the numbers have been declining over the past several 
years. Societal discrimination against Roma remains a serious problem. 
Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    Trials began in a number of cases of men charged with crimes 
against humanity for shooting into crowds of demonstrators with machine 
gun fire and for throwing hand grenades, all at the time of the 1956 
Revolution. The defendants were tried in 1993. At the time, they were 
charged with murder, but acquitted because the 15-year statute of 
limitations for such a charge had passed. The new trial became possible 
after the Supreme Court overturned the previous verdicts in June, 
stating that these cases should be tried as war crimes, which have no 
time limit. In these cases, the issue before the courts is whether each 
specific individual is guilty of a war crime, an argument that can be 
made because a civil war was in progress at the time, and all 
defendants were members of the border guards, police, or military.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other such practices. No 
known incidents of torture occurred; however, there is an ongoing 
investigation into the allegation--made by a confessed mass murderer--
that his confession was obtained under torture. Police abuses 
continued, including use of excessive force, beatings of suspects, and 
harassment. Police also continued to harass and physically abuse Roma 
and foreign nationals. In 1998 2,296 reports of police abuse were 
filed. Of these complaints, only 312 resulted in court cases. In 845 
cases, no investigation occurred. Many of the cases that did make it 
into the court system are still underway, so no accurate data on 
convictions are available. Historically, 10 to 15 percent of such cases 
result in conviction. Punishments include fines, probation, and the 
imposition of suspended sentences. In 1997 the Budapest central 
district court sentenced four police officers to 1 to 2\1/2\ years in 
prison for the exceptionally severe beating of a detainee under 
interrogation. The appeals court suspended the sentences, and three out 
of the four officers continue to serve as police officers. According to 
a report by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, persons detained by 
police complain of abuse, but very few file official complaints because 
they do not expect positive results and fear that the complaint may 
affect their cases adversely. Some sources attribute the rise in 
numbers of reports of police abuse to a growing willingness to seek 
official redress in these instances. The Romani minority community and 
dark-skinned foreigners are the most common victims of police abuse, 
with Roma bearing the brunt. After a nationally broadcast news program, 
carried on a privately owned channel, reported in March on police 
brutality in Hajduhadhaz, police arrested and beat a Rom who was 
interviewed on the program. Two other Roma who also appeared in the 
program went into hiding out of fear of further retaliation. In June 
the Ministry of Interior admitted that Hajduhadhaz had the highest 
level of reported police violence in the country and that half of the 
town's police force was under investigation for allegations of abuse. A 
Roma rights organization reported that in Budapest in June, three 
police officers beat and kicked a Romani university student as he 
walked through a park. When the man told the officers that he would 
report their abuse, they beat him further. The Rom filed a lawsuit 
against the officers involved. Despite such occurrences, the Ombudsman 
for Minority Affairs believes that the situation is, at worst, 
remaining constant, and possibly is marginally better.
    The police and Interior Ministry are working to change the police's 
authoritarian image, and human rights organizations report that police 
generally are more cooperative with outside monitoring of police 
behavior. However, these efforts are hampered by low salaries and a 
lack of physical resources. A 1997 study by the ombudsman's office, 
which investigates constitutional violations in the public sector, 
condemned police corruption but noted that it was unsurprising that it 
existed, given police officers' low pay and poor working conditions. 
The ombudsman found that working conditions in the vast majority of 
police offices were unsuitable.
    Police frequently harass foreign residents, although the former 
practice of charging questionable fines for traffic violations to earn 
petty cash appears to have ceased, as the law regarding collection of 
fines has changed. There were no reports of this kind of activity 
during the year. At times, police showed indifference towards 
foreigners who have been victims of street crime.
    Prisons are overcrowded but meet minimum international standards. 
The population of prisons and detention centers as of September was 
15,153, or 151 percent of capacity. (This is an increase of almost 
1,000 prisoners from the end of 1998.) A further increase in prison 
population is expected due to a 1998 change in the law that altered the 
meaning of a ``life sentence.'' Previously, this was interpreted as 15 
to 25 years; the new law extends the sentence to 20 to 30 years, with 
an allowance for an actual sentence of life in prison, on the second 
occasion of receiving such a sentence. The average age of prisoners is 
now under 30. Between 70 and 80 percent of prisoners earn wages while 
in prison, either from work performed in prison, or from work-release 
programs. Some programs allow prisoners to spend weekends at home. A 
recent change in philosophy led to more efforts to rehabilitate 
criminals for their eventual return to normal life. According to 
officials, the general health of prisoners declined in the last few 
years. The chief ombudsman issued a report on prison conditions and 
facilities in 1997 that is expected to lead to the closure of the 
Veszprem prison as soon as a new facility is built. The report also 
included a survey among prisoners about alleged abuse, which concluded 
that abuse by prison personnel was not a problem.
    The Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police must inform 
suspects upon arrest of the charges against them but may hold them for 
a maximum of 72 hours before filing charges. The law requires that all 
suspects be allowed access to counsel prior to questioning and 
throughout all subsequent proceedings. The authorities must provide 
counsel for juveniles, the indigent, and the mentally disabled. 
Credible reports suggest that police do not always allow access to 
counsel, particularly for minor crimes. Bail is to be available for 
citizens as well when a new Criminal Code enters into force in January 
2000. It is currently available to foreigners, but rarely is used.
    The Police Act permits police to hold suspects in public security 
detention (PSD) in cases in which the suspect has no identity papers; 
in which blood or urine tests must be performed to determine blood 
alcohol content; or if the suspect continues to commit a misdemeanor 
offense in spite of prior warning. Suspects may be held in PSD for up 
to 24 hours. Such detainees are not always informed of the charges 
against them, because such periods of ``short'' detention are not 
defined as ``criminal detention'' and so are not considered to be 
covered by the Criminal Code.
    Pretrial detention, based on a warrant issued by a judge, is 
initially limited to 1 year while criminal investigations are in 
progress; it may be extended indefinitely on the prosecutor's motion 
(provided the judge concurs). According to the new Criminal Procedure 
Law, pretrial detention is to be limited to a maximum of 3 years, after 
which the case expires automatically if formal charges are not brought. 
The lack of a bail system gives tremendous leeway to the judge. In 1996 
the average length of pretrial detention was 3 to 6 months, although 
nearly 10 percent of detainees were held for periods ranging from 8 to 
12 months (most recent figures available). In addition, foreigners 
usually are held until their trial since they are considered likely to 
flee the country. Roma allege that they are kept in pretrial detention 
longer and more frequently than non-Roma (see Section 1.e.). The law 
provides for compensation when a detainee is released for lack of 
evidence, but the procedure rarely is exercised since detainees must 
undertake a complicated legal procedure to pursue their claims. The 
Minister of Justice, on behalf of the State, decides on compensation. 
The amount depends on the case and can cover the costs of the trial, 
attorney's fees, lost wages, and some other miscellaneous sums.
    The law does not provide for exile, and it is not employed.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair, although 
sometimes slow, process.
    Under the Constitution, the courts are responsible for the 
administration of justice, with the Supreme Court exercising control 
over the operations and judicial procedure of all the courts. There are 
three levels of courts. Original jurisdiction in most matters rests 
with the local courts. Appeals of their rulings may be made to the 
county courts or to the Budapest municipal court, which have original 
jurisdiction in other matters. The highest level of appeal is the 
Supreme Court, whose decisions on constitutional issues are binding. In 
the case of military trials, appeals also may be addressed to the 
Supreme Court. A fourth level of courts is to be created when the new 
Criminal Procedure Law goes into effect in January 2000. A new court of 
appeal is to be inserted between the metropolitan/county court and the 
Supreme Court. Established initially in Budapest, Szeged, and Pecs, 
these courts are designed to alleviate the current backlog of court 
cases and permit lower courts to hear simple cases. Critics of the new 
system charge that it would instead slow court procedures and increase 
costs. Although passed and signed by Parliament, the Government delayed 
indefinitely the implementation of the new level of courts, citing 
budgetary constraints. In the fall, Parliament decided to open only one 
of these courts in Budapest after January 2002. A National Judicial 
Council (NJC) was established in 1997 to nominate judicial appointees 
and oversee the judicial budget process. The NJC will also oversee the 
implementation of the fourth level of courts.
    The Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing the 
constitutionality of laws and statutes brought before it. Citizens may 
appeal directly to the Constitutional Court if they believe that their 
constitutional rights have been violated. Parliament elects the Court's 
members for 9-year terms, which may be renewed, although this never has 
happened. The retirement age of the Constitutional Court judges is 70 
years. Parliament debated lifting the retirement age of judges but made 
no decision. No judge or member of the Supreme or Constitutional Courts 
may belong to a political party or engage in political activity.
    The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and the authorities 
respected this right in practice. Counsel is appointed for indigent 
clients, but public defenders are paid poorly--less than $5 (1,000 Huf) 
for the first hour of the trial and less than $2.50 (500 Huf) for each 
additional hour--and do not give indigent defendants priority; lawyers 
often meet such clients for the first time at trial.
    In selected cases judges may agree to a closed trial to protect the 
accused or the crime victim, such as in some rape cases. In October 
1998, the victim protection office was established in the Ministry of 
the Interior. Under the new Criminal Procedure Law, witnesses (and in 
some cases, victims, judges, and translators) are to be protected by 
having their personal data kept closed, in a separate location from the 
case files. For specially protected witnesses, court appearances are 
unnecessary; they are to be questioned personally by the judge. In July 
Parliament passed a resolution calling for a new victim protection 
plan, which would provide new identities and homes for victims. A bill 
must be submitted by December 31, 2001. There is no jury system; hence 
judges are the final arbiters. Under the new Criminal Procedure Law, 
prosecutors are to have greater influence over their cases. Plea 
bargaining, which is known as a ``trial waiver,'' is now available to 
prosecutors.
    Defendants are entitled to counsel during all phases of criminal 
proceedings and are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Judicial 
proceedings are generally investigative rather than adversarial in 
nature. The public defender system provides generally substandard 
service. (There is no public defender's office, as such; private 
attorneys may or may not choose to serve in this capacity. Since public 
defenders are paid only for the hours spent in trial, little to no 
preparation is done and lawyers often meet their clients for the first 
time at the trial.)
    Military trials follow civil law and may be closed if national 
security or moral grounds so justify. In all cases, sentencing must 
take place publicly.
    Many human rights and Romani organizations claim that Roma receive 
less than equal treatment in the judicial process. Specifically, they 
allege that Roma are kept in pretrial detention more often and for 
longer periods of time than non-Roma. This allegation is credible in 
light of general discrimination against Roma; however, there is no 
statistical evidence because identifying the ethnicity of offenders is 
not allowed under the data protection law. Since the majority of Roma 
fall into the lowest economic strata, they also suffer from the lack of 
good legal counsel and from unenthusiastic representation.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law provides that the prosecutor's office may 
issue search warrants. Police must carry out house searches in the 
presence of two witnesses and must prepare a written inventory of items 
removed from the premises. Wiretapping, which may be done for national 
security reasons and for legitimate criminal investigations, requires a 
court's permission. These provisions appear to be observed in practice. 
During the year, there were no publicized reports that police entered 
private residences without warrants to check foreigners' 
identification.
    In August 1998, Prime Minister Orban stated that FIDESZ politicians 
and their families were the targets of illegal secret surveillance in 
1997. Orban claimed that the investigators, whose identity he did not 
reveal, sought damaging information to use in the spring 1998 
elections. Opposition (former government) leaders vigorously denied the 
accusations. Parliament formed a committee to investigate the matter, 
and this committee has met several times with no conclusive result. All 
that has been established is that a businesswoman with close ties to 
the Socialist Party asked a parliamentary guard to surveil a FIDESZ 
Member of Parliament who had attacked her in a speech in Parliament. 
The committee's investigation is ongoing.
section 2. respect for civil liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects this right 
in practice. However, during the year the FIDESZ-led coalition 
Government actively attempted to counterbalance what it considers a 
leftwing bias in news coverage through its influence on personnel 
decisions within the state-owned media. Nonetheless, a wide variety of 
views and opinions is available among the highly competitive print and 
broadcast media.
    After the transition from communism, the majority of print media 
outlets were purchased by foreign publishing companies. In addition, 
numerous new publications made the local print market much more 
competitive. Political opposition sources claim that this competition 
was utilized by the coalition in its attempt to ``balance'' the print 
media, some elements of which the Government views as too liberal and 
anticoalition. Advertisements from state-owned companies and financial 
institutions were awarded to progovernment papers, which also tend to 
receive better access to government sources.
    Parliament passed a media law in 1995 creating institutions 
designed to foster a free and independent electronic media. The law 
provided for the creation of nationwide commercial television and radio 
and was intended to insulate the remaining public service media from 
government control. The National Television and Radio Board (ORTT), the 
regulatory agency created by the 1995 Media Law, has continued to 
monitor news broadcasts for equal treatment of all political parties. 
Several commercial stations were warned publicly by the ORTT during the 
year for giving more time to one party over others.
    The state broadcast media began the process of laying off 
journalists and administrative personnel to reduce their huge payrolls. 
Opposition figures accuse them of firing journalists with opposition 
views and retaining those who favor the coalition.
    Academic freedom generally is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There are 
essentially no restrictions on peaceful public gatherings. In general 
the Government does not require permits for assembly except when a 
public gathering is to take place near sensitive installations, such as 
military facilities, embassies, or key government buildings. Police 
sometimes may alter or revoke permits, but there is no evidence that 
they abuse this right.
    Any 10 or more persons may form an association, provided that it 
does not commit criminal offenses or disturb the rights of others. 
Associations with charters and elected officers must register with the 
courts.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and members of all faiths are allowed to practice their 
religion freely. There are 79 officially recognized religions. There is 
no preferred religion, although not all religions receive state 
support. State support is in the form of funds negotiated each year 
between the Ministry of Cultural Heritage and the Finance Ministry. In 
1998 the four major, or ``historical,'' religions (Catholic, Calvinist, 
Lutheran, and Jewish) received $14.2 million (3.2 billion Huf) in 
government support. A 1996 law allows citizens to donate 1 percent of 
their taxes to any religion, and a 1997 law extended this option by 
allowing citizens to donate 1 percent to any religion and 1 percent to 
a civil organization or public institution. In 1998 500,000 persons 
(about 5 percent of the population) used this provision to donate $4.3 
million (1 billion Huf) to religions. In 1997 the Government signed a 
treaty with the Vatican to return church property confiscated by the 
Communist regime; the treaty also provided for a minimum state payment 
(separate from the annual negotiated support) of $7.8 million (1.7 
billion Huf). Similar compacts were signed with the country's three 
other historical religions in 1998. The Jewish community receives $2.6 
million (608 million Huf) and the Calvinist and Lutheran Churches each 
are entitled to $4.3 million (1 billion Huf). Religious schools receive 
support per child in the same way that state schools do. Religious 
orders and schools have regained some property confiscated by the 
Communist regime.
    In 1997 Parliament established the Jewish Heritage Public 
Foundation to provide restitution in the form of life pensions to 
17,800 Holocaust survivors born before May 9, 1945. An additional 2,040 
persons are to receive pensions automatically when they reach 60 years 
of age. In a 1998 agreement with the Jewish community on confiscated 
properties, the Government made a compensatory payment of $2.6 million 
(608 million Huf) and returned nine properties.
    Several synagogues have been built since World War II, generally 
replacing older demolished synagogues. The first completely new 
synagogue built since the war was constructed in 1998 at a Jewish 
summer camp in Szarvas.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on the 
movement of citizens within or outside the country, including on the 
rights of emigration and repatriation. However, local authorities have 
in some cases tried to expel Roma from towns or have taken advantage of 
situations (eviction for nonpayment of bills or condemnation of Roma 
homes) to relocate and concentrate Romani populations, in effect 
creating ghettos. The Government may delay but not deny emigration for 
those who have significant court-assessed debts or who possess state 
secrets. Those with about $40,000 (over 10 million Huf) in public debt 
may be denied travel documents. The Government requires that foreigners 
from countries that do not have a visa waiver agreement with Hungary 
obtain exit visas each time they leave the country, although blanket 
permission sometimes is available.
    A total of 5,688 refugees from the former Yugoslavia are registered 
in Hungary. Most are in private housing, with only 500 housed in 3 
refugee camps, or ``reception centers,'' run by the Office of Migration 
and Refugee Affairs (ORMA). In addition to these three government-owned 
camps, two additional temporary camps are used through contracts with 
the nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) that run them. They have been 
operating since 1991 and 1993, largely as a result of the influx of 
refugees fleeing the various conflicts and incidents of ethnic 
cleansing to the south. The Government estimates that there are as many 
as 60,000 immigrants (the vast majority from Romania) living in the 
country in unregistered status, although the local office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) believes that this 
figure is too high.
    The Government provides first asylum and cooperates with the local 
office of the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations assisting 
refugees. The number of persons who received refugee status increased 
from 594 in 1998 (with 2,566 cases pending at year's end) to 1,307 in 
the first 8 months of the year, with 4,249 cases pending. (These 
figures include both those who were granted refugee status and those 
who were ``authorized to stay.'') Of 5,002 applications submitted in 
1998 (7,118 persons), 1,077 were Afghan (with an additional 989 Afghans 
caught entering the country illegally), and 3,306 were from the former 
Yugoslavia. While the high number of Afghan refugees is not unusual, 
the significant increase in Yugoslav applicants corresponds with the 
onset of the most recent series of crises in Kosovo. In the months 
following the cessation of hostilities, many of these applications were 
withdrawn, and ORMA authorities believe that many more refugees simply 
have gone home. In March 1998, a new law went into effect that lifted 
Hungary's geopolitical reservation to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government now 
adheres completely to the provisions of this Convention. Under the old 
law, the Government only handled claims from European asylum seekers, 
and the UNHCR handled all other claims. The increase in caseload 
resulting from this change and from events in Kosovo and the resulting 
NATO action placed a tremendous strain on the ORMA's resources, leading 
to the high number of pending cases and increasing the processing time 
per application. Prospective refugees who seek only to transit to 
Western Europe are encouraged to return to their countries of 
departure. There were approximately 1,700 asylum seekers located in 4 
reception centers as of October 1. The Government has been criticized 
by NGO's and Western countries for inhuman conditions in detention 
facilities and the arbitrary application of asylum procedures. In 
February the Parliament's human rights Ombudsman criticized the 
conditions in border facilities as ``uncivilized and intolerable.'' In 
response to this criticism, the Government agreed to close the worst 
facilities; there is an ongoing project to refurbish the border guards' 
community shelters. Of the eight currently in operation, three have 
been fully refurbished and reopened, and one is expected to reopen 
early in 2000. The conditions in these facilities are not good. The 
country, which has been dealing with refugee issues on a large scale 
for only the past 10 years, has borne a great deal of the refugee 
burden resulting from the Kosovo crisis, and the Government has sought 
to work with NGO's to improve conditions.
    Aliens caught trying to cross the border illegally may apply for 
refugee status or are housed temporarily at one of eight border guard 
facilities throughout the country pending deportation. At any time 
there are between 500 to 600 people in the facilities. Overall, 4,539 
illegal aliens were apprehended in the first 8 months of the year. 
While police seek the timely deportation of detainees who do not 
qualify for refugee status, a shortage of funds and the detainees' lack 
of property or documentation, such as passports, often result in 
lengthy stays. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to 
a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens age 18 and over have the right to change their government 
through national elections held at least every 4 years. Members of 
Parliament are elected through a complex voting procedure for 
individuals and party lists. The FIDESZ--Hungarian Democratic Civic 
Party heads the coalition with the Smallholders' Party and the 
Hungarian Democratic Forum (the latter two parties formed the 
government coalition between 1990 and 1994 with the Christian 
Democrats, one segment of which later merged with FIDESZ.) The 
opposition includes the extreme rightwing Hungarian Justice and Life 
Party and two leftwing parties, the Hungarian Socialist Party and the 
Free Democrats.
    No legal impediments hinder women's participation in government or 
the political process, although they are underrepresented in relation 
to their percentage of the population; only 33 of 386 parliamentary 
representatives are women, and 1 woman serves in the Cabinet. Few women 
occupy other leadership positions in the Government or political 
parties. Despite the lack of ensured minority representation, there are 
several Members of Parliament, including one ethnic German and one 
ethnic Slovak, who are members of ethnic minorities; however, none 
specifically represents their respective minority populations. There 
are no Romani Members of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Numerous human rights organizations operate without government 
restriction or interference. Many NGO's report that the Government is 
generally responsive to their requests for information. An increasing 
number of NGO's are involved in the law-making process. However, 
individual police units and prosecutors reportedly are uncooperative at 
times, particularly in cases involving Roma or police abuses. There is 
also a 21-member parliamentary Committee for Human, Minority, and 
Religious rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for individual rights, equality, and 
protection against discrimination; however, in practice discrimination 
still exists, particularly against Roma. This is due to widespread 
prejudice, lack of positive reporting, and lack of opportunity for 
advancement.
    Women.--Spousal abuse is believed to be common, but the vast 
majority of such abuse is not reported, and victims who step forward 
often receive little help from authorities. While there are laws 
against rape, often it is unreported for cultural reasons. Police 
attitudes towards victims of sexual abuse are often reportedly 
unsympathetic, particularly if the victim was acquainted with her 
abuser. New laws passed in 1997 recognize rape within marriage and 
increase the penalties for other sex crimes. Women's rights 
organizations claim that 1 woman in 10 is a victim of spousal abuse and 
that societal attitudes towards spousal abuse are ``archaic.'' In the 
first 8 months of the year there were 2,871 reports of crimes against 
family, youth, and sexual morality; there were 4,589 such crimes 
reported in 1998. In the first 8 months of 1999 women were the victims 
of 67,598 crimes; there were 106,211 such crimes in 1998.
    The law does not prohibit sexual harassment in the work place. A 
1995 report prepared under the auspices of the U.N. to evaluate 
compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women termed sexual harassment in the workplace as ``virtually 
epidemic.'' Women's groups report that there is little support for 
efforts to criminalize sexual harassment and that harassment is 
tolerated by women who fear unemployment more than harassment. In the 
first case of its kind, a woman won a sex discrimination suit against a 
potential employer for sex discrimination after the employer advertised 
for men only.
    Legally, women have the same rights as men, including identical 
inheritance and property rights. While there is no overt discrimination 
against women, the number of women in middle or upper managerial 
positions in business and government remains low, although the number 
of women in the police and the military has risen significantly over 
the past several years, with significant increase in 1999. Women are 
heavily represented in the judiciary and in the medical and teaching 
professions. A Women's Representative office was established in the 
Ministry of Social and Family Affairs to address women's issues more 
effectively.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights. 
Education is mandatory through 16 years of age, and employment is 
illegal below the age of 15. There is no societal pattern of child 
abuse, although NGO's report that neglect and abuse are common in state 
care facilities. In 1998 children were the victims of 8,769 crimes. In 
the first 8 months of 1999, children were the victims of 5,566 reported 
crimes.
    People with Disabilities.--Government sources estimate that between 
600,000 and 1 million persons (6 to 10 percent of the population) are 
disabled. A law that was passed in 1998 requires that all public 
buildings be made accessible to the disabled within 10 years. A Council 
for the Disabled was established in January, under the chairmanship of 
the Minister of Social and Family Affairs. The Council is to serve as 
an advisory board to the Government. At present services for the 
disabled are limited, and most buildings are not wheelchair accessible. 
A 1997 decree requires all companies that employ over 20 persons to 
reserve 5 percent of their jobs for the physically or mentally 
disabled, with fines of up to 75 percent of the average monthly salary 
for noncompliance.
    Religious Minorities.--In July two skinhead members of the Arrow 
Cross Movement admitted to defacing 15 graves in a Jewish cemetery in 
Szombathely. The skinheads painted anti-Semitic graffiti on gravestones 
shortly before a Holocaust commemoration was to take place on July 3 in 
the cemetery. The desecration was criticized sharply by President 
Goncz. On November 10, a municipal court found the two youths guilty 
and sentenced one skinhead to 1 year in prison, which was commuted to 3 
years' probation, while the second skinhead was sentenced to 8 months 
in prison, which was commuted to 2 years' probation.
    In August the ``Protocols of the Elder of Zion,'' a notorious anti-
Semitic forgery, was published and available for purchase in a 
Hungarian translation for the first time since World War II. The Jewish 
community in Nagykoros filed a complaint against the publication with 
the Prosecutor General. The publication also was criticized by the 
Calvinist Church and the Catholic Church, which expressed concern over 
the increasing problem of lack of ``respect and tolerance'' toward 
various religious communities. On August 13, the Ministry of National 
Cultural Heritage criticized any defamation of religion and announced 
that it supported a call by the Confederation of Hungarian Jewish 
Communities (MAZSIHISZ) for the publication of a scholarly work in the 
country addressing the book's false claims. The Ministry of Culture 
later sponsored a lecture and reception to introduce that book.
    In November MAZSIHISZ asked the Cabinet to take action against 
``Fascist, racist, and anti-Semitic'' outbreaks that were a source of 
public concern. The organization objected to the planned rehabilitation 
of the country's World War II Prime Minister Laszlo Bardossy, the 
desecration of Jewish cemeteries, and the publication of anti-Semitic 
books. MAZSIHISZ argued that the law should be changed to prohibit the 
denial of the Holocaust. In response to the concerns of the Jewish 
Community, Orban tasked an official in the Ministry of Culture to 
oversee issues of concern to the Jewish community.
    MAZSIHISZ and international Jewish organizations criticized as 
unfair a 1998 decision by the Government to provide $128 (30,000 HUF) 
each to the heirs of Holocaust victims. In February the president of 
MAZSIHISZ said that hundreds of Holocaust survivors were returning 
compensation payments to the Government, protesting that the small 
amounts were an insult. Previous awards to the heirs of victims 
distributed by the Communist regime were $4,255 (1 million Huf). The 
Orban Government provided the 30,000 Huf figure as a line item in the 
Fiscal Year 1999 budget, stating that this amount was all that could be 
paid out without budget imbalances. Opposition parties were seeking to 
hold a special parliamentary session on this and other issues, but the 
Government was opposed to resolving the issue in this manner. Although 
the figure of $128 was accepted originally by the leaders of the Jewish 
Community who had negotiated with the Government, it generally is 
agreed that the amount is too small, and it is a matter of ongoing 
renegotiation. A case is pending against Enrem Kemal arising from two 
inflammatory anti-Semitic speeches he made in 1997. Kamal's trial has 
been postponed several times since 1997. The trial began in November 
and continued at year's end.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The 1993 Law on National and 
Ethnic Minorities' Rights recognizes individuals' minority rights, as 
well as establishes the concept of collective rights of ethnic 
minorities, and states that it is their inalienable collective right to 
preserve their ethnic identity. The law also permits associations, 
movements, and political parties of an ethnic or national character and 
mandates the unrestricted use of ethnic languages. For an ethnic group 
to be recognized as such it has to have at least 100 years' presence in 
the country, and its members have to be citizens. On this basis, 
minority status is granted specifically to 13 national or ethnic groups 
(among which Roma are by far the most numerous). Other groups may 
petition the Chairman of Parliament for inclusion if they believe that 
they fulfill the requirements.
    The law considers the establishment of local minority self-
governments a precondition for the enforcement of the rights of ethnic 
minorities. For this reason, local minority self-government elections, 
in conjunction with local government elections, have been held since 
1994. Any of the 13 minorities can set up a minority self-government if 
at least 50 valid votes are cast in settlements with fewer than 10,000 
inhabitants and if at least 100 votes are cast in larger settlements. 
Since ethnicity is not registered officially, voting on minority self-
governments is not limited to the minorities themselves; all the voters 
receive a minority ballot in addition to the local government ballot. 
The elected local minority self-governments can elect their national 
minority self-governments; all 13 minorities have formed national self-
governments.
    This model of minority self-government has been criticized mainly 
on two grounds: first, several minority representatives have objected 
to the fact that members of the majority can vote for minority 
candidates and thus influence minority politics. However, no 
alternative has been outlined yet since all parties rejected the idea 
of registering members of minorities. Second, critics call for an 
increase in the competence of the minority self-governments and 
considerably more financial resources for them. However, this would 
require modification of the law, which is not expected in the near 
future.
    There were 770 Romani minority self-governments elected in the 
local elections in October 1998, a significant increase over the 477 
elected self-governments in the first minority elections held in 1994. 
The new self-governments began operating in January. Of the 477 elected 
in 1994, 396 still are functioning; the discrepancy reflected the 
number that ceased functioning between 1994 and 1998 due to a lack of 
funds. All of the Romani self-governments elected in 1998 were still 
operating. With some funding from the central budget and some 
logistical support from local governments, these bodies seek to 
influence and oversee matters affecting minorities. The Romani minority 
poses a special challenge for the system of national minority self-
governments. In contrast to other minorities for whom the preservation 
of their identity and culture is the basic goal, the Roma also have to 
contend with the fact that they generally belong to the lowest socio-
economic strata of Hungarian society. Ethnicity and poverty coincide 
with Roma; therefore, the Romani self-governments are faced with the 
task of improving the lives of their constituents with no additional 
resources. The concept of minority self-governments is in itself new, 
and policies still are evolving.
    In 1995 Parliament appointed an Ombudsman--currently an ethnic 
German--specifically charged with defending minority rights.
    Roma constitute at least 5 percent of the population, with some 
estimates going as high as 9 percent. In view of the higher birth rate 
among Roma, compared with the general decline in the Hungarian 
population, this percentage is likely to remain constant or grow. This 
fact causes concern among a substantial portion of the majority 
population. Germans, the second largest minority group, constitute 
about 2 percent of the population. Smaller communities of Slovaks, 
Croats, Romanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Greeks, Serbs, Slovenes, 
Armenians, Ruthenians, and Bulgarians are recognized as ethnic 
minorities. A new census is to be conducted in 2000. Ethnicity and 
religion are only optional questions, so this may or may not provide a 
more accurate estimate of the actual numbers of the minority 
populations.
    Education is available to varying degrees in almost all minority 
languages. There are minority-language print media, and the state-run 
radio broadcasts 2-hour daily programs in the mother tongue of major 
nationalities, i.e., Romani, Slovak, Romanian, German, Croatian, and 
Serbian. State-run television carries a 30-minute program for the 
larger minority groups, complemented by 5-minute weekly news bulletins.
    Conditions of life for the Romani community are significantly worse 
than among the general population. Roma suffer from discrimination and 
racist attacks and are considerably less educated, with lower than 
average incomes and life expectancy. The unemployment rate for Roma is 
estimated to be 70 percent, over seven times the national average. With 
unemployment benefits exhausted and social services stretched thin, 
Roma often confront desperate situations. The Government plans to 
reduce the limit on unemployment benefits from 1 year to 9 months, 
which will affect the Romani community disproportionately, with its 
high unemployment rate, and exacerbate the poverty of this large 
segment of society. This is likely in turn to reinforce negative 
stereotypes of Roma as poor, shiftless, and a social burden.
    Roma continue to suffer widespread discrimination in education, 
housing, and access to public institutions, including restaurants and 
pubs. Roma and other civic organizations highlighted the practice of 
placing Roma children in remedial education programs designed for 
children with mental disabilities or low academic performance, 
resulting in a form of de facto segregation. Although the children 
could be returned to the regular school system, only a small percentage 
return. On September 6, the Minister of Education and the parliamentary 
Ombudsman for Minority Rights announced at a press conference that 
there is segregation in the country's educational system. The statement 
followed the publication of a report by the Ombudsman's office that 
found that the high proportion of Romani children in ``special 
schools'' for the mentally disabled was a sign of prejudice and a 
failure of the public education system. Schools for Roma are more 
crowded, more poorly equipped, and in markedly poorer condition than 
those attended by non-Roma. Only 1.5 percent of the Romani community 
graduate from high school, while 0.001 percent graduate from college or 
university. There are programs aimed at increasing these numbers (the 
Romaversitas program supports Romani students finishing degrees in 
institutions of higher education, and there is a Department of Roma 
Studies in the Teachers' Training College in Pecs). Nonetheless, the 
impact has yet to be significant. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee 
found that there are 132 segregated schools throughout the country. The 
Government contests these claims of human rights organizations and 
states that the Romani schools are designed to provide intensive help 
for disadvantaged children. An interministerial committee was 
established in the fall and is led by the Minister of Justice. This 
committee was tasked with assigning Romani affairs desk officers in 
each ministry. There is currently such a desk officer in the Ministry 
of Education, who is himself a Rom.
    In what is considered a landmark case, in July 1998 a court ordered 
a bar owner in the city of Pecs to pay a $750 fine and take out a 
newspaper advertisement apologizing for refusing to serve a Rom.
    Local officials have in some cases taken advantage of rules 
prohibiting overcrowded, unsafe, or unsanitary housing, or have 
punished nonpayment of utility bills by evicting Roma families, among 
others, from residences without providing alternative housing as the 
law requires. The Government sponsors programs both to preserve Romani 
languages and cultural heritage and to assist social and economic 
assimilation. Oversight and budgetary control of the Coordination 
Council for Roma Affairs and the Office of National Ethnic Minorities 
were shifted from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of 
Justice. In July the Government published an action plan designed to 
improve living conditions in Romani communities, with specific focus on 
public health, education, and work training. However, the plan provides 
no additional funds; rather, it redistributes already inadequate 
resources.
    Widespread popular prejudice against Roma continues. Police 
commonly abuse them (see Section 1.c.). Foreigners of color reported 
harassment by police and at border control checkpoints. The Martin 
Luther King Organization (MLKO), which documents assaults on nonwhites, 
reports a gradual decrease in the number of such incidents over the 
past several years, with three such cases in the first 9 months of the 
year. However, MLKO sources believe that many cases go unreported.
    In 1997 changes to the Penal Code made it easier to enforce and 
stiffen penalties for hate crimes committed on the basis of the 
victim's ethnicity, race, or nationality.
    On February 14, hundreds of neo-Nazis battled police in a bar in 
Budapest after an international gathering of skinheads on February 13 
commemorating the end of the 1944-45 siege of Budapest. After a clash 
that began when neo-Nazis attacked police officers on routine patrol, 
eight police officers were injured and 34 protesters were taken into 
custody. Authorities expelled 26 of the foreign neo-Nazis from the 
country, and police arrested 8 skinheads (including 2 Hungarian 
citizens). On February 25, a court found six of the neo-Nazis guilty of 
a ``group attack'' and declared them personae non grata.
    On August 29, a group of approximately 30 persons attacked a Romani 
family in a village near Nyiregyhaza. The attackers beat male members 
of the family, eight of whom were treated in the hospital for injuries. 
Local police reported that they interrogated two suspects in the case.
    On October 17, a group of skinheads attacked two Roma at a pub in 
Kakucs. One Rom suffered serious injuries as a result of the beating. 
Local police began an investigation in the case, but no results were 
reported by year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor Code recognizes the 
right of unions to organize and bargain collectively and permits trade 
union pluralism. Workers have the right to associate freely, choose 
representatives, publish journals, and openly promote members' 
interests and views. With the exception of military personnel and 
police officers, they also have the right to strike. Under a separate 
1992 law, public servants may negotiate working conditions, but the 
final decision on increasing salaries rests with Parliament.
    The largest labor union organization is the National Confederation 
of Hungarian Trade Unions, the successor to the former monolithic 
Communist union, with over 735,000 members. The Democratic League of 
Independent Unions and the Federation of Workers' Councils have 
approximately 100,000 and 56,000 members, respectively.
    On January 4, the Free Union of Railway Workers (one of three major 
unions of railway workers) went on strike over a dispute about wage 
increases, after the other two unions had signed a contract. The 
striking workers returned to work on January 8, after a labor court 
ruled that the strike was illegal. The decision was overturned a few 
months later by a court of second instance, which ruled that the union 
did not have to pay damages.
    There are no restrictions on trade union contacts with 
international organizations, and unions have developed a wide range of 
ties with European and international trade union bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code 
permits collective bargaining at the enterprise and industry level, 
although the practice is not widespread and is discouraged actively in 
the growing private sector. Labor organizations appear willing to 
cooperate with one another, and this is particularly evident in their 
relationship in forums such as the National Labor Affairs Council 
(OMT), which succeeded the Interest Reconciliation Council in April and 
which provides a forum for tripartite consultation among 
representatives from management, employees, and the Government. The OMT 
discusses issues such as wage increases and the setting of the minimum 
wage, which is negotiated centrally within the OMT in order to control 
inflation. Individual trade unions and management may negotiate higher 
wages at the plant level. The new Government disbanded the Ministry of 
Labor and split its work between the Ministry of Economy (covering 
policy issues) and the newly created Ministry of Social and Family 
Affairs (covering employment issues and responsible for drafting labor-
related legislation). Employers are prohibited from discriminating 
against unions and their organizers. The Ministry of Social and Family 
Affairs enforces this provision.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and 
the Ministry of Social and Family Affairs enforces this prohibition.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see 
Section 6.c.). The Labor Code forbids labor by children under the age 
of 15 and regulates labor conditions for minors (14 to 16 years of 
age), including prohibitions on night shifts, hard physical labor, and 
guaranteed overtime payments. The National Labor Center enforces these 
regulations in practice, and there does not appear to be any 
significant abuse of this statute. Education is compulsory through age 
16. Roma are far more likely than non-Roma to stop attending school 
before age 16. The Government converted the family allowance into a 
school attendance allowance in September. This measure was intended to 
``force'' children to go to school, but some Romani NGO's fear that 
this may be another form of discrimination against Roma, many of whom 
live in small villages with no high schools within manageable distance. 
Furthermore, the extreme poverty of many Roma makes it difficult for 
them to clothe their children appropriately for school. Taking away the 
family allowance is thus seen by Roma as punishment for not doing 
something they cannot afford, while it is seen by the Government as a 
way to provide incentives for greater commitment to education among 
Roma and as an effort to end a cycle of poverty in which impoverished 
Roma bring up large and illiterate families, whose members themselves 
later may become public burdens.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The OMT establishes the legal 
minimum wage, which is subsequently implemented by Ministry of Social 
and Family Affairs decree. The minimum wage, $95 (22,500 Huf) per 
month, is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. This is only 35 percent of the average wage. Many 
workers supplement their primary employment with second jobs, and there 
are reports that many citizens, while officially earning the minimum 
wage, actually make more. Reporting the minimum wage is a way for both 
employer and employee to avoid paying higher taxes.
    The Labor Code specifies various conditions of employment, 
including termination procedures, severance pay, maternity leave, trade 
union consultation rights in some management decisions, annual and sick 
leave entitlement, and labor conflict resolution procedures. Under the 
Code, the official workday is set at 8 hours; however, it may vary 
depending upon the nature of the industry. A 24-hour rest period is 
required during any 7-day period.
    Labor courts and the Ministry of Social and Family Affairs enforce 
occupational safety standards set by the Government, but specific 
safety conditions generally are not consonant with internationally 
accepted standards. The enforcement of occupational safety standards is 
not always effective in part due to the limited resources that the 
Ministry of Social and Family Affairs and the Ministry of Economics are 
able to commit to enforcement. In theory, workers have the right to 
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to 
continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the country was once primarily 
a source for women and children trafficked for the purpose of forced 
prostitution, it increasingly is a transit and destination point as 
well. The penalty for trafficking is between 1 and 5 years in prison; 
however, if an organized trafficking ring is involved, the sentence can 
be doubled. A recent amendment to the alien law provides for immediate 
expulsion from the country of foreign traffickers. The Government has 
concluded agreements with 10 European countries to facilitate improved 
police cooperation to combat organized crime and trafficking in 
persons. However, prosecution of traffickers is difficult since there 
is no legislation to protect victims. Parliament passed a resolution in 
July that called for a victim protection plan; however, the plan was 
not implemented at year's end, nor was it aimed primarily at victims of 
trafficking. Branches of a new Victim Protection Office, which provide 
psychological support services and legal advocacy for victims, 
safeguard their rights, and attempt to minimize the trauma of trials, 
began operating in a few towns in the fall. This office does not deal 
exclusively or even primarily with victims of trafficking. Many of the 
victims of trafficking are brought to the country by organized crime 
syndicates, either for work in Budapest's thriving sex industry or for 
transit to Western Europe or North America. Russian-speaking organized 
crime syndicates are active in trafficking women primarily from Ukraine 
and other countries of the former Soviet Union to the European Union 
via Hungary.
    The International Organization for Migration launched a program 
funded by the European Union to raise awareness of the problem of 
trafficking and to educate potential victims in November.
                                 ______
                                 

                                ICELAND

    Iceland is a constitutional republic and a parliamentary democracy 
in which citizens periodically choose their representatives in free and 
fair multiparty elections. The judiciary is independent.
    Elected officials control the police force, which scrupulously 
observes and enforces the laws that ensure protection of human rights.
    Iceland has a mixed, open economy that provides residents with a 
high standard of living. The leading exports, fish and other marine 
products, account for almost 70 percent of export revenues. An 
abundance of cheap hydroelectric power provides a comparative advantage 
for the main manufacturing activity--aluminum smelting. Aluminum is the 
second leading export. Growth was expected to exceed 5 percent in 1999.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. Human rights monitors expressed 
concern about the Government's frequent use of solitary confinement for 
remand prisoners. The Government is taking steps to deal with violence 
against women. Some societal discrimination against women persists, 
especially in the area of equal pay. Instances of suspected trafficking 
in women were reported.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment are prohibited by law and do not occur.
    Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
    In a February report, the European Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture (CPT) expressed concern during its visit to the main prison 
(Litla Hraun) in Reykjavik in 1998 that nearly all detainees still were 
being placed in solitary confinement while their cases were under 
investigation. While the average duration of solitary confinement was 
between 2 and 3 weeks, the CPT noted that in some cases, solitary 
confinement lasted up to 3 months. While in solitary confinement, 
prisoners cannot leave their cells, except for short periods of time to 
exercise alone or to use the showers, and are not allowed to listen to 
the radio, watch television, or receive visitors other than their 
lawyers and prison officials. In November the supervising doctor at 
Litla Hraun wrote to prison authorities, warning that the mental health 
of several prisoners awaiting trial on drug trafficking charges could 
be in danger due to the extended time that they were expected to spend 
in solitary confinement.
    In a preliminary response to the CPT report on September 30, the 
Government argued that solitary confinement was absolutely necessary in 
some circumstances to keep suspects from tampering with witnesses, 
destroying evidence, or hindering the investigation. On the other hand, 
it conceded that ``in the vast majority of cases'' incarceration alone 
was sufficient to protect the integrity of witnesses and evidence. 
However, the Prison and Probation Administration's own statistics show 
that solitary confinement was the rule rather than the exception during 
the first 9 months of the year: More than 90 percent of the 87 persons 
taken into custody were put into solitary confinement at least 
initially.
    With the closing of the Sudumuli remand prison in 1996, the 
Government passed a law in 1998 that allows pretrial detainees to be 
incarcerated with the general prison population. Some human rights 
monitors claim that this law is inconsistent with the country's 
obligations under the European Human Rights Convention and European 
prison rules issued by the Council of Europe. Construction of a new 
prison in Reykjavik is planned for these detainees.
    Juveniles who are 15 years of age or older can be sentenced to 
prison terms, but the vast majority of juvenile offenders are given 
probation or suspended sentences, or agree to attend a treatment 
program instead of going to jail. In the rare instances when juvenile 
offenders are incarcerated, they must be confined with the general 
adult prison population due to the lack of a separate detention 
facility for juveniles. In its February report, the CPT stated that it 
was ``very concerned'' about the current situation and recommended that 
the Government take ``immediate steps . . . to ensure that juvenile 
prisoners are held separately from adults.''
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government 
observes this prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution and law provide 
for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this 
provision in practice.
    There are two levels of courts. The Ministry of Justice administers 
the district courts, while the Supreme Court guards its independence 
and fairness by administering itself. All judges, at all levels, serve 
for life.
    The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial 
process. Juries are not used, but multijudge panels are common, 
especially in the appeals process. Depending on the seriousness of the 
charges, a panel can include from three to five judges. Defendants are 
presumed innocent. They are provided access to legal counsel of their 
own choosing with sufficient time to prepare their defense. For 
defendants unable to pay attorneys' fees, the State assumes the cost. 
Defendants have the right to be present at their trial, to confront 
witnesses, and to participate otherwise in the proceedings. No groups 
are barred from testifying, and all testimony is 
treated alike. Trials are public and are conducted fairly, with no 
official intimidation. Defendants have the right to appeal.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the 
Government generally respect these prohibitions. Violations are subject 
to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Although the official state religion is 
Lutheranism, the Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. The salaries of Lutheran 
ministers are paid by the state. Citizens 16 years of age and above are 
presumed to be members of the state church and are required to support 
the church by paying a tax, unless they designate another religious 
denomination to receive their tax payment. The religion tax payment of 
persons who choose not to belong to any specific, organized religious 
group goes to the University of Iceland. Religious instruction in 
Christianity is required in the public schools, although students may 
be exempted.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    Although neither the Constitution nor the law include provisions 
for granting refugee or asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, in 
practice the Government adjudicates cases in accordance with their 
principles. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross, and 
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were no 
reports of the forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to 
refugee status. In view of the country's geographic isolation and the 
lack of direct transportation from any traditional source of refugees, 
the question of first asylum rarely arises. However, the Government 
reported that 13 individuals arrived during the year and requested 
asylum. None was found to qualify for refugee status (several cases 
were still under review), but some were granted temporary entry on 
humanitarian grounds. Some human rights monitors criticized the arrest 
and prolonged detention of a Kurdish asylum-seeker, but the Directorate 
of Immigration, which has responsibility for processing applications 
for asylum, stated that it had no choice but to turn the individual 
over to the police for investigation because he had no identity or 
travel documents and refused to cooperate with the authorities.
    The Directorate of Immigration, which traditionally was a part of 
the national police force, became an independent agency on October 1. 
The Directorate is responsible for issuing passports, visas, and 
residence permits and for processing applications for asylum, while the 
police and customs now have responsibility for manning passport control 
points for those coming into and going out of the country. However, the 
police and customs are required to consult with the Directorate of 
Immigration about individuals arriving without valid visas or passports 
before refusing them entry. Human rights monitors say that it appears 
that some of the individuals who were refused entry upon arrival at the 
international airport during the year were not afforded their legal 
right to appeal their denial of admission.
    In addition to accepting 20 to 25 UNHCR-designated ``quota'' 
refugees, the Government admitted 72 Kosovar refugees into the country 
during the year. Local government authorities in the towns where 
refugees settle take a strong interest in helping them adapt to their 
new environment. The Icelandic Red Cross, in cooperation with the 
Refugee Council of the Ministry of Social Affairs, developed a support 
family program, whereby at least three Icelandic families are enlisted 
to assist each refugee or refugee family. The refugees immediately are 
granted work permits and assisted in finding jobs. For the first year, 
they also are given free housing, utilities, and health care and 
receive a stipend so that they can participate in a special half-day 
Icelandic language course every day that is designed especially for 
them. Refugees generally are successful in assimilating into society, 
but their children drop out of school earlier than children of 
citizens.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. The most recent elections to the Althingi 
(unicameral Parliament) were held in May.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, but no legal 
or practical impediments hinder their participation. Of the 12 
government ministers, 4 are women, and women hold 23 of the 63 seats in 
Parliament. The Women's List (WL), an activist feminist political party 
whose establishment in 1983 led to a significant increase in the number 
of female parliamentarians, joined an electoral alliance with other 
left-leaning parties in the May elections. The WL plans to merge 
eventually with the other left-leaning political parties to form a 
single entity to challenge the more conservative parties. Women's 
issues have moved into the mainstream of political debate, and all of 
the major political parties now have at least one woman in a prominent 
leadership position.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and 
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The country's ethnically homogenous population is strongly 
egalitarian and opposed to discrimination based on any of these 
factors. The law and practice generally reflect this attitude. However, 
concern is voiced that the rapidly increasing number of foreigners 
being brought into the country to meet the labor shortage in fish 
processing and other less desirable occupations could lead to future 
problems, especially in the event of an economic downturn. Some 14,000 
people of foreign origin now live in the country (approximately 2 
percent of the population). During the last half of the year, the 
Directorate of Immigration was issuing new residence and work permits 
at the rate of more than 200 per month. Many of these ``temporary'' 
workers come from Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union, and the Directorate of Immigration expects most of them to seek 
to remain permanently rather than return to their countries of origin.
    Women.--Violence against women continued to be a matter of concern. 
A public women's shelter offers counseling and protection to victims of 
domestic violence and their children. Approximately 400 women and 150 
children came to the shelter during the year, 100 of whom sought 
shelter while the rest asked for counseling or information. At a rape 
trauma center, 400 women and children seek assistance annually. Both 
facilities are financed by national and municipal governments, as well 
as by private contributors. The Reykjavik City Hospital emergency ward 
has a special staff to care for rape victims. It reports approximately 
100 visits per year associated with incidents of sexual abuse.
    A police program to train officers in correct interrogation 
procedures in rape and sexual abuse cases appears to be addressing 
prior concerns that police indifference and hostility to female victims 
did not assure proper attention and consideration for victims of such 
abuses.
    Many victims nevertheless decline to press charges, and even more 
forgo trial, fearing publicity in this small, tightly knit society. 
With an increasing number of interracial marriages, mostly involving 
Icelandic men and Asian women, there is concern that these new Asian 
immigrants are not assimilating well into local society. Concern that 
these women might be vulnerable to mistreatment led the city of 
Reykjavik to begin offering them emergency accommodation and 
assistance, which includes information on legal rights, language 
training, and an introduction to Icelandic society and norms.
    There were indications that some women were trafficked to work as 
striptease dancers or prostitutes against their will (see Section 
6.f.).
    In the labor market, the rate of participation by women is high. In 
part this reflects the country's comprehensive system of subsidized day 
care, which makes it affordable and convenient for women to work 
outside the home. Despite laws that require equal pay for equal work, a 
sizeable pay gap continues to exist between men and women. A survey by 
a union in Reykjavik showed that women, on average, earned 30 percent 
less than men. A 12 percent difference in pay is attributable to the 
fact that men work 4.2 more hours per week than women, but the rest of 
the gap is unexplained.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights through its well-funded systems of public education 
and medical care. School attendance is compulsory through the age of 
15. About 85 percent of students continue to upper secondary education, 
which is financed completely by the state. The Government provides free 
prenatal and infant medical care, as well as heavily subsidized 
children's care. In 1994 the government created the Office of the 
Children's Ombudsman in the Prime Minister's Office, with a mandate to 
protect children's rights, interests, and welfare by, among other 
things, exerting influence on legislation, government decisions, and 
public attitudes.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
    In an effort to improve the rate of prosecution of child sexual 
abuse and lessen the trauma to the child, the Government in 1998 
established the Children's Assessment Center. The objective of the 
Center is to create a safe and secure environment where child victims 
feel more comfortable talking about what happened to them and are not 
subjected to multiple interviews. The Center brings together police, 
prosecutors, judges, doctors, and counselors, as well as officials from 
the Child Protection Agency of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Prior to 
the establishment of the Center, barely half of the cases dealt with by 
the Child Protection Agency were sent to the police for investigation, 
just a third went to the prosecutor, and only 10 percent ever went to 
trial. Now some 75 percent of cases are sent to the police for 
investigation, and the authorities anticipate a corresponding increase 
in the percentage of cases being prosecuted and sent to trial.
    People with Disabilities.--Disabled individuals are not subject to 
discrimination in employment, education, or the provision of other 
state services. A 1992 law calls for the disabled to have the right to 
``all common national and municipal services'' and provides that they 
be given assistance to ``make it possible for them to live and work in 
normal society with others.'' The law also provides that the disabled 
should receive preference for a government job when they are equally 
qualified, or more qualified, than regular applicants. Building 
regulations updated in 1998 call for public buildings to be accessible. 
However, the country's main association for the disabled complains that 
the provisions related to building access often are ignored because 
there is no penalty for noncompliance. Access to new buildings tends to 
be good, while efforts to make old buildings more accessible have 
lagged.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers make extensive use of the 
right provided by the Constitution to establish organizations, draw up 
their own constitutions and rules, choose their own leaders and 
policies, and publicize their views. The resulting organizations are 
controlled neither by the Government nor by any single political party. 
Unions take active part in Nordic, European, and other international 
trade union bodies. With the exception of limited categories of workers 
in the public sector whose services are essential to public health or 
safety, unions have had and used the right to strike for many years. 
Approximately 80 percent of all eligible workers belong to unions. No 
strikes occurred during the year, but there were a handful of work 
stoppages.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Union 
membership is not impeded in law or practice. Employers are required to 
withhold union dues (1 percent of gross pay) from the pay of all 
employees, whether they are members of the union or not. This is 
because union dues help support, among other things, an illness fund to 
which everyone is entitled.
    The various trade unions and management organizations periodically 
negotiate collective bargaining agreements that set specific terms for 
workers' pay, hours, and other conditions. The current 3-year 
collective bargaining agreements expire in February 2000. In recent 
years, the Government has played almost no role in the private-sector 
collective bargaining process, other than generally to encourage wage 
restraint that would help to limit inflation.
    Labor courts effectively adjudicate disputes over contracts and 
over the rights provided for in the 1938 Act on Trade Unions and 
Industrial Disputes, which prohibits antiunion discrimination. By law 
employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to 
reinstate workers fired for union activities. In practice the charges 
are difficult to prove.
    In 1996 the Parliament passed legislation updating the labor laws 
and bringing them into compliance with the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
    There are no export processing or other special economic zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is prohibited by law and does not occur; however, some women 
reportedly were coerced to work as striptease dancers or prostitutes 
(see Section 6.f.), and work permit practices could leave workers 
vulnerable to abuse by employers (see Section 6.e.). The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this 
prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and 
the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 
6.c.). The law requires children to attend school until the age of 16 
and prohibits the employment of younger children in factories, on 
ships, or in other places that are hazardous or require hard labor. 
This prohibition is observed in practice. Children 14 or 15 years old 
may be employed part time or during school vacations in light, 
nonhazardous work. Their work-hours must not exceed the ordinary work-
hours of adults in the same occupation. The Occupational Safety and 
Health Administration enforces child labor regulations.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No minimum wage is mandated 
legislatively, but the minimum wages negotiated in the various 
collective bargaining agreements apply automatically to all employees 
in those occupations, whether they are union members or not. Union 
membership is so extensive and effective that labor contracts afford 
even the lowest paid workers a sufficient income for a decent standard 
of living for themselves and their families.
    Workers are protected by laws that effectively provide for their 
health and safety as well as for unemployment insurance, paid 
vacations, pensions, and reasonable working conditions and hours. The 
standard legal workweek is 40 hours. Work exceeding 8 hours in a 
workday must be compensated as overtime. Workers are entitled to 10 
hours of rest within each 24-hour period and to a day off every week. 
Under defined special circumstances, the 10-hour rest period can be 
reduced to 8, and the day off can be postponed by a week, in which case 
the worker has a right to 2 additional hours off in the following week.
    Health and safety standards are set by the Althingi and 
administered and enforced by the Ministry of Social Affairs through its 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which can close down 
workplaces until safety and health standards are met. Workers have a 
collective, not an individual, right to refuse to work in a place that 
does not meet the criteria of occupational safety and health. Firing 
workers who report unsafe or unhealthy conditions is illegal.
    However, in the case of newly arrived foreign workers or refugees 
(i.e., those who have been in the country for less than 3 years), human 
rights monitors expressed concern that the Government's practice of 
issuing the applicable work permit to the employer rather than to the 
individual concerned could leave the worker vulnerable to abuse by the 
employer.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically 
criminalize trafficking in persons; however, a number of provisions in 
the Penal Code can be used to prosecute such cases.
    Trafficking in women is suspected in connection with the growing 
number of foreign women who enter the country to work in striptease 
clubs. With the recent opening of several new striptease clubs (there 
are now 11 clubs altogether), the police expressed concern about the 
500 women who entered the country during the year to work in these 
establishments. It is suspected that some of the women--especially 
those from Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union--were 
coerced to work as striptease dancers or prostitutes against their 
will.
    Regulation of these clubs has been lacking, in part because 
striptease dancers can enter the country and perform without a work 
permit for up to a month under an exemption given for ``artists.'' The 
Government plans to close this legal loophole.
    By year's end, there had been no arrests in connection with these 
activities.
                                 ______
                                 

                                IRELAND

    Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a long tradition of 
orderly transfer of power. The government consists of an executive 
branch headed by a prime minister, a legislative branch with a 
bicameral parliament, a directly elected president, and an independent 
judiciary.
    The national police (Garda Siochana) are under the effective 
civilian control of the Minister of Justice and have primary 
responsibility for internal security. Since the police are an unarmed 
force, the army acts in their support when necessary--the latter under 
the effective civilian control of the Minster of Defense. Ireland's 
principal internal security concern has been to prevent the spillover 
of terrorist violence from Northern Ireland. With the signing of the 
Belfast Peace Agreement on April 14, 1998, virtually all parties in 
Northern Ireland acknowledged the goals of democracy, peace, and 
reconciliation. All paramilitary groups, on both sides of the border, 
have declared permanent cease-fires, with the exception of the 
Continuity Irish Republican Army. There have been allegations that 
members of the police committed some human rights abuses.
    Ireland has an open, market-based economy that is highly dependent 
on international trade. It is a large net recipient of funds from the 
European Union (EU) designed to address imbalances in economic 
activity. Strong economic growth over the past few years lowered 
unemployment to 6.5 percent, the lowest in 30 years. The proportion of 
the population in ``consistent poverty'' declined from 15 percent in 
1994 to 10 percent in 1997, according to a local research organization.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens. Human rights problems arise primarily from: Instances of 
abuse by the police; prison overcrowding and substandard facilities; 
the continuation of special arrest and detention authority and the 
nonjury court; the occasional censorship of films, books, and 
periodicals; violence and discrimination against women; the abuse of 
children; and discrimination against asylum seekers and Travellers (an 
itinerant ethnic community).
    As stipulated in the Belfast Peace Agreement, the Government 
published draft legislation in July to establish an independent human 
rights commission in 2000, which is to cooperate with a parallel 
commission already created in Northern Ireland. The human rights 
commissions are to provide information and promote awareness of human 
rights, comment on human rights draft legislation referred to them by 
the legislatures, make recommendations to the governments on the 
adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, and initiate court 
proceedings or provide assistance to individuals doing so.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    During the year, the authorities pursued the investigation of the 
August 1998 car-bombing in Omagh, Northern Ireland, that killed 29 
people and injured 200. The Garda in the Republic of Ireland and the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland cooperated to make 
16 arrests of whom 15 were later released without charge. In February 
Colm Murphy was arrested by the Garda and arraigned at the Special 
Criminal Court under the auspices of the Offenses Against the State Act 
(see Section1.d. and 1.e.). Murphy was charged with conspiracy to cause 
anexplosion and membership in an illegal organization and at year's end 
was out on bail awaiting trial.
    In May the Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains, a joint 
body made up of representatives from the Republic and Northern Ireland, 
began efforts to locate the remains of nine people, termed the 
``disappeared,'' abducted and killed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
in the 1970's. Pursuant to joint Irish and British legislation granting 
limited immunity to IRA members involved in these acts, information was 
given to the Commission by the IRA on the location of the nine bodies. 
On May 28, the remains of Eamon Molloy were recovered in a County Louth 
graveyard and on June 29, the remains of Brian McKinney and John 
McClory were found in County Monaghan. After formal identification by 
the authorities, all three bodies were returned to their families. 
Efforts to find the other six persons who disappeared were 
unsuccessful, and further recovery operations by the Commission were 
suspended pending fresh information from the IRA.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and officials generally 
did not employ them.
    While the mistreatment of persons in police custody is not 
widespread, detainees filed a number of cases claiming damages for 
injuries sustained while in police custody. The authorities have not 
yet taken action in the case of two persons held in connection with the 
murder of a police officer in 1996. The pair alleged that they were 
severely beaten while in police custody and appeared in court with 
physical injuries consistent with their allegations (see Section 4).
    Human rights organizations have called for the establishment of an 
independent ombudsman or authority to investigate complaints against 
the police. It would replace the current statutory board, the Garda 
Siochana (Police) Complaints Board, through which the Garda authorities 
investigate alleged misconduct by their peers. In 1998 the Board 
received 1,400 complaints, an increase from 1,291 complaints in 1997, 
including charges of criminal behavior (mistreatment or abuse). Through 
a review process conducted in accordance with the 1986 Garda Siochana 
(Complaints) Act, the Director of Public Prosecutions directed that 
members of the Garda Siochana should be prosecuted in nine of these 
complaints.
    Ireland has a low incarceration rate (77 inmates per 100,000 
population), and the prison regime is generally liberal. However, the 
physical infrastructure of many prisons is barely adequate: A number of 
facilities suffer from chronic overcrowding, requiring doubling-up in 
many single-person cells. Many of the existing prisons are very old, 
and many cells do not have toilets or running water. There are no 
adequate hospitals on prison grounds; mental health services for 
prisoners also are inadequate. Although the new Cloverhill remand 
Prison opened in June and the new Mountjoy Women's Prison opened in 
September, by year's end both facilities still were unable to accept 
inmates because of construction defects. These new facilities are 
designed to accommodate a further 1,200 prisoners and thereby help 
reduce overcrowding.
    Prisoners with complaints of mistreatment by prison officials or 
negligence of health and safety due to prison conditions have ready 
access to the courts for redress. However, according to the Justice 
Department, no allegations of mistreatment of prisoners were leveled 
against the Prison Service during the year, and no similar claims were 
left outstanding from previous years. The Government continued to 
arrest and incarcerate at Portlaoise prison persons involved in 
paramilitary activity. Conditions for these inmates are the same, if 
not better, than those for the general prison population.
    Domestic and international human rights monitors are permitted to 
visit prisons without reservation. The Council of Europe's Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) visited prisons in 1998. The CPT's report was under 
consideration by the Cabinet, along with the Government's response.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
stipulates that no person shall be deprived of personal liberty without 
due process under the law; however, special arrest and detention 
authority continued. A detainee has the right to petition the High 
Court, which is required to order release unless it can be shown that 
the person is being detained in accordance with the law. The 1984 
Criminal Justice Act provides for an initial period of detention of 6 
hours, with an extension of another 6 hours when a police officer of 
the rank of superintendent or above so directs, in cases in which there 
are grounds for believing that such detention is necessary for the 
proper investigation of an offense. Another extension of 8 hours 
overnight is possible, to allow a detainee to sleep.
    In cases covered by the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act, the 
initial period of detention without charge is 24 hours on the direction 
of a police superintendent; detention can be extended another 24 hours. 
This act allows police to arrest and detain for questioning anyone 
suspected of committing a ``scheduled offense,'' i.e., one involving 
firearms, explosives, or membership in an unlawful organization. 
Although the stated purpose of the act is to ``prevent actions and 
conduct calculated to undermine public order and the authority of the 
state,'' it is not restricted to subversive offenses. Therefore, the 
police have broad arrest and detention powers in any case involving 
firearms. However, under the terms of the decommissioning law enacted 
in 1997 in support of the Northern Ireland peace process, proceedings 
may not be instituted against persons in relation to any offense that 
may be committed in the course of decommissioning illegally held arms 
in accordance with an approved arms decommissioning scheme.
    The act also provides for the indefinite detention, or internment, 
without trial of any person who is engaged in activities that are 
``prejudicial to the preservation of public peace and order or to the 
security of the state.'' While this power has not been invoked since 
the late 1950's, the government could do so by simply issuing a 
proclamation.
    An amendment to the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act was enacted 
in the wake of the Omagh bombing in 1998. The new legislation allows 
police to detain suspects in certain crimes, usually involving serious 
offenses with firearms or explosives, for 48 hours, with a possible 24-
hour extension if approved by a judge.
    The legislation also curtails the right of silence. Under the 
amendment, if the accused was informed of the consequences of remaining 
silent to questions regarding his whereabouts, associations, or 
actions, then the accused's silence may be used as corroboration of 
guilt. The accused person's failure to defend against accusations of 
membership in an illicit organization also may be used as corroboration 
of guilt. However, the accused cannot be convicted based solely on his 
refusal to speak.
    Membership in or leadership of an illicit organization carries a 
possible life sentence under the new amendment (illegal organizations 
are defined by the 1939 Offenses Act). The word of a police 
superintendent can be used as corroboration of membership. Collecting 
information to aid in a serious offense carries a penalty of up to 10 
years' imprisonment or a fine.
    Withholding information that could prevent a ``serious'' offense or 
that could aid in the apprehension or conviction of a perpetrator also 
is illegal, with a penalty of up to 5 years' imprisonment and a fine. 
Certain provisions of the 1998 amendment to the Offenses Against the 
State Act are to expire in June 2000 without specific parliamentary 
reauthorization. In May a special independent committee was formed to 
review the collective Offenses Against the State Act legislation for 
any conflict with certain principles, including legal or human rights 
principles. The committee is scheduled to report its recommendations to 
the Government in the first half of 2000.
    The 1996 Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act permits detention 
without charge for up to 7 days in cases involving drug trafficking. 
However, to hold a suspected drug trafficker for more than 48 hours the 
police must seek a judge's approval.
    Following approval in 1996 of a referendum calling for stricter 
bail laws, legislation was enacted in 1997 that allows a court to 
refuse bail to a person charged with a serious offense where it is 
considered reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of another 
serious offense. A schedule of serious offenses is contained in the 
bill; the offense must be one that carries a penalty of 5 years' 
imprisonment or more. However, as of October, the Justice Minister had 
not yet signed a statutory order that would allow the courts to 
implement the law's provisions. The lack of accommodations for 
prisoners was cited as the reason for the delay.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The judicial system includes a district court with 23 districts, a 
circuit court with 8 circuits, the High Court, the Court of Criminal 
Appeal, and the Supreme Court. The President appoints judges on the 
advice of the Government.
    The Director of Public Prosecutions, a state official with 
independent status, prosecutes criminal cases. Jury trial is the norm. 
The accused generally may choose an attorney. For indigent defendants, 
the state assumes the cost of counsel.
    However, the Constitution explicitly allows ``special courts'' to 
be created when ``ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the 
effective administration of justice and the preservation of public 
peace and order.'' In 1972, under the 1939 Offenses Against the State 
Act, the government set up a nonjury ``Special Criminal Court'' (SCC) 
to try ``scheduled offenses'' (see Section 1.d.). Largely a reaction to 
the spillover of paramilitary violence from Northern Ireland, the SCC 
was justified over the years as addressing the problem of jury 
intimidation in cases involving defendants with suspected paramilitary 
links. The continued need for the SCC is being kept under review by the 
government.
    During 1998 the SCC indicted 37 persons and held 21 trials, 
compared with 26 indictments and 14 trials in 1997. In addition to 
``scheduled offenses,'' the Director of Public Prosecutions can have 
any nonscheduled offense tried by the SCC if he believes that the 
ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration 
of justice and the preservation of public peace and order and so 
certifies in writing.
    In lieu of a jury, the SCC always sits as a three-judge panel. Its 
verdicts are by majority vote. Rules of evidence are essentially the 
same as in regular courts, except that the sworn statement of a police 
chief superintendent identifying the accused as a member of an illegal 
organization is accepted as prima facie evidence. Sessions of the SCC 
are usually public, but the judge may exclude certain persons other 
than journalists. Appeals of SCC decisions are allowed in certain 
circumstances.
    Under the terms of the Belfast Agreement, releases continue of 
those imprisoned for crimes related to the terrorist campaign in 
Northern Ireland. Prisoners belonging to organizations that have 
declared permanent cease-fires and who have committed themselves to 
work through peaceful, democratic means are the only ones qualified for 
this program. All releases are expected to be completed by May 2000.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Supreme Court affirmed that, although not 
specifically provided for in the Constitution, the inviolability of 
personal privacy, family, and home must be respected in law and 
practice. This ruling is fully honored by the government.
    In 1996 the High Court upheld a referendum that removed the ban on 
divorce. The government enacted implementing legislation allowing 
courts to grant divorces under certain circumstances.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides 
individuals with the right to ``express freely their convictions and 
opinions.'' However, freedom of the press is subject to the 
qualification that it not ``undermine public order or morality or the 
authority of the state.'' Publication or utterance of ``blasphemous, 
seditious, or indecent matter'' is prohibited. While the press in 
practice operates freely, the 1961 Defamation Act (which puts the onus 
on newspapers and periodicals accused of libel to prove that defamatory 
words are true) and the 1963 Official Secrets Act (which gives the 
State wide scope to prosecute unauthorized disclosures of sensitive 
government information) are believed to result in some self-censorship.
    Broadcasting remains mostly state controlled, but private sector 
broadcasting is growing. There are 21 independent radio stations and an 
independent television station. However, expanded access to cable and 
satellite television is lessening dramatically the relative influence 
of state-controlled broadcasting. The Broadcasting Complaints 
Commission oversees standards and investigates complaints about 
programming. The 1960 Broadcasting Act empowers the government to 
prohibit the state-owned radio and television network from broadcasting 
any matter that is ``likely to promote or incite to crime or which 
would tend to undermine the authority of the state.'' It was on this 
basis that the government banned Sinn Fein (the legal political front 
of the Irish Republican Army) from the airwaves from 1971 to 1994.
    Films and videos must be screened and classified by the Office of 
the Film Censor before they can be shown or sold. Distributors pay fees 
to finance the censor's office. Under the 1923 Censorship of Films Act, 
the censor has the authority to cut or ban any film that is ``indecent, 
obscene or blasphemous'' or which tends to ``inculcate principles 
contrary to public morality or subversive of public morality.'' As of 
October, no theatrical films were banned during the year, but 162 
videos were banned, mainly because of their pornographic content. 
Decisions of the censor can be appealed to a nine-member appeal board 
within 3 months, but neither the censor nor the appeal board is 
required to hear arguments or evidence in public or to state the 
reasons for its decisions.
    Books and periodicals are also subject to censorship. The 1946 
Censorship of Publications Act calls for a five-member board to examine 
publications referred to it by the customs service or a member of the 
general public. It also can examine books (but not periodicals) on its 
own initiative. The board can prohibit the sale of any publication that 
it judges to be indecent or obscene. As of October, the board had not 
banned any books but had banned eight periodicals including the popular 
mainstream In Dublin magazine, not for editorial content but for 
advertisements for ``massage parlors,'' which were regarded by the 
board as solicitations for prostitution. The action caused considerable 
controversy and widespread debate. The ban is currently under challenge 
in the courts. In 1998 the board banned 15 books and 10 periodicals, 
compared with 10 books and 89 periodicals in 1997, and 63 books and 43 
periodicals in 1996.
    On July 29, Brian Meehan, an ``enforcer'' for a drug-smuggling gang 
was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Veronica Guerin in 
1996. Guerin was a journalist who reported on narcotics and organized 
crime issues and whose murder was seen as an attempt by criminal 
elements to silence press coverage of their activities. The incident 
shocked public opinion and led to the adoption of new legislation to 
combat narcotics-related crime. Paul Ward was also convicted in 
connection with the case in November 1998; John Gilligan is awaiting 
extradition from the United Kingdom on the same charge; three other men 
have been sentenced on lesser charges related to the Guerin case.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides citizens with the right to ``assemble peaceably and without 
arms'' and to form associations and unions; however, it also allows the 
State to ``prevent or control meetings'' that are calculated to cause a 
breach of the peace or to be a danger or nuisance to the general 
public. Under the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act, it is unlawful 
to hold any public meeting on behalf of, or in support of, an illegal 
organization. Although the government prosecutes and incarcerates 
persons for mere membership in a terrorist organization, it allows 
meetings and assemblies by some groups that are associated with illegal 
terrorist organizations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the government does not hamper the teaching or practice 
of any faith. Even though overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, Ireland has no 
state religion. However, most primary and secondary schools are 
denominational, and their boards of management are partially controlled 
by the Catholic Church. The Government provides equal funding to the 
schools of different religious denominations. Although religious 
instruction is an integral part of the curriculum, parents may exempt 
their children from such instruction. There is no discrimination 
against nontraditional religious groups.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There is complete freedom of movement 
within the country, as well as freedom to engage in foreign travel, 
emigration, and repatriation.
    The government enacted a new refugee law in 1996, but it has been 
implemented only partially and is currently under review. The law put 
into effect the 1990 Dublin Convention, harmonizing European Union 
asylum procedures, and it also makes provision for program refugees 
(those invited by the state to apply for asylum; in 1999 mostly 
Kosovars). The law also expressly forbids the forced return of persons 
to a country where they fear persecution.
    The Government grants refugee or asylee status in accordance with 
the provision of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and it cooperates with office of the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The government drew up 
specific administrative procedures for implementation of the Convention 
in consultation with the UNHCR. In 1992 the Supreme Court ruled that 
these procedures were binding on the Minister of Justice. However, as 
the number of asylum seekers increased (from only 31 in 1990 to 4,446 
as of October 1999), these administrative procedures proved inadequate. 
In particular there are complaints of long delays and a lack of 
transparency in decisions concerning refugee status. Over 7,000 asylum 
cases await government action. In 1998 the Department of Justice 
upgraded its asylum division by increasing its staff and moving it into 
a larger building with more services for asylum seekers. In October the 
Government announced that it would join the EURODAC Convention with 
other EU member states. The EURODAC Convention limits an asylum seeker 
to filing one application throughout the EU, rather than filing 
multiple applications in different countries and requires the 
fingerprinting of asylum seekers, a step already taken unilaterally by 
the authorities.The Government provided first asylum in 400 cases by 
October. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution. The increase in the number of 
asylum seekers, as well as allegations of racism in dealing with them 
and the issue of whether they should be allowed to work, continued to 
fuel public debate on immigration (see Section 5).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitutional requirement that parliamentary elections be held 
at least every 7 years always has been met. Suffrage is universal for 
citizens over the age of 18, and balloting is secret. Several political 
parties have seats in the bicameral Parliament. Members of the Dail 
(House of Representatives)--the chamber that carries out the main 
legislative functions--are popularly elected; in the Seanad (Senate), 
most members are elected by vocational and university groups, and the 
others are appointed by the Prime Minister. The President is popularly 
elected for a 7-year term and is limited to 2 terms. An appointed 
Council of State serves as an advisory body to the President.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Although the 
President is a woman, only 21 of the 166 deputies in the Dail and 11 of 
the 60 senators are women. Of the 15 government ministers, 3 are women, 
as are 2 of the 17 junior ministers. Three women sit on the 20-member 
High Court; only 1 of the 8 Supreme Court judges is a woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate 
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally 
cooperative and responsive to their views. However, allegations of 
mistreatment made by two suspects held in connection with the murder of 
a police officer in 1996 were the source of concern on the part of the 
Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL), the principal domestic human 
rights group. The ICCL indicated in a report issued jointly with 
British-Irish Rights Watch in 1997 that its efforts to investigate 
these allegations did not receive the cooperation of the police. The 
ICCL report said that ``this incident raises serious questions about 
the attitude of the Garda (police) authorities toward bona fide human 
rights organizations investigating allegations of human rights abuses 
in the Republic of Ireland.'' The ICCL report requested that the 
Government set up a ``fully independent inquiry, headed by a judge and 
with high court powers to summon and question witnesses, to investigate 
the treatment of persons arrested in Limerick following Garda McCabe's 
murder.'' The ICCL reported no further progress or action by the 
authorities on this case in 1999 and recommended that all future police 
interrogations or interviews be videotaped to avoid similar incidents.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution, as amended, forbids state promotion of one 
religion over another and discrimination on the grounds of religion, 
profession, belief, or status. However, until recently few laws 
implemented these provisions of the Constitution. In 1998 an amended 
Employment Equality Act was passed that outlaws discrimination in 
relation to employment on the basis of nine distinct discriminatory 
grounds: Gender, marital status, family status, sexual orientation, 
religious belief, age, disability, race, and membership in the 
Traveller community.
    Women.--A 1997 government task force on violence against women 
concluded that the problem, in particular domestic violence, is 
widespread and that many women believe that existing services are 
incapable of responding to their needs. The task force found that many 
women believe that the legal system minimizes the seriousness of crimes 
committed against them, fails to dispense justice, and makes them feel 
at fault for what happened. The task force cited a need to compile more 
accurate and comprehensive statistics on the nature and extent of the 
problem and issued a series of recommendations that are under 
government review.
    According to the Dublin Rape Crisis Center, the level of reported 
rapes continues to rise. The Center received 7,500 calls between July 
1998 and June 1999 (a 5 percent increase over the same period in the 
previous year) and concluded that there was disquieting evidence that 
rape and sexual assaults--by their very number and frequency--were 
dulling the response of the public at large. For the 1998-99 period, 
the Center estimated that 28 percent of rape and child sexual abuse 
victims reported the crime to police and that 7 percent of these cases 
resulted in convictions, with 68 percent of cases still pending. Recent 
rape victims and victims raped by a stranger were more likely to have 
reported the rape to police. A 1990 act criminalized rape within 
marriage and provided for free legal advice to the victim. There are 23 
women's shelters in the country, funded in part by the government.
    Discrimination against women in the workplace is unlawful, but 
inequalities persist regarding pay and promotions in both the public 
and the private sectors. Women hold about 43 percent of public sector 
jobs but are underrepresented in senior management positions. A 
government report, issued in October, found that at least 50 percent of 
state-sponsored bodies have no guidelines for dealing with sexual 
harassment and no policy on equal opportunity. The 1974 Anti-
Discrimination (Pay) Act, the 1977 Employment Equality Act, and the 
amended 1998 Employment Equality Act provide for protection and redress 
against discrimination based on gender and marital status. The Equality 
Authority, which officially replaced the Employment Equality Agency in 
October, monitors their implementation. According to 1998 statistics, 
women's earnings have increased more rapidly than men's since 1985, 
albeit from a lower starting point. The weekly earnings of women in 
industry still averaged only 65 percent of those of men in 1998.
    In May a report by the Combat Poverty Agency, based on data from a 
1994 national household survey, found that the number of women below 
the poverty line (defined as 50 percent of the median household income) 
increased both for single women and single mothers between 1987 and 
1994.
    Working women often are hampered by the lack of adequate childcare 
facilities. The 1994 Maternity Protection Act provides a woman 14 weeks 
of paid maternity leave and the right to return to her job. In 1998 a 
new Parental Leave Act entered into effect, which allows a child's 
mother and father each to take 14 weeks of unpaid leave to care for a 
child under the age of 5. Although each parent has a separate 
entitlement to parental leave, the leave is not transferable, i.e., the 
mother cannot take the father's leave or vice versa. Parental leave 
does not affect a mother's right to maternity leave.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and health care. Under the 1991 Child Care Act, education is 
compulsory for children from 6 to 15 years of age. The act places a 
statutory duty on government health boards to identify and help 
children who are not receiving adequate care, and it gives the police 
increased powers to remove children from the family when there is an 
immediate and serious risk to their health or welfare. The Minister of 
State (junior minister) for Health has special responsibility for 
children's policy, including monitoring the implementation of the Child 
Care Act by the eight regional health boards. The 1987 Status of 
Children Act provided for equal rights for children in all legal 
proceedings.
    The sexual abuse of children continued to receive significant media 
attention. The Dublin Rape Crisis Center reported that 55 percent of 
contacts with its crisis line involved adults disclosing child sexual 
abuse during their youth. The Child Trafficking and Pornography Act, 
which was passed in 1998, strengthens and updates measures to protect 
children from sexual exploitation, including any exchange of 
information on the Internet that implies a child is available for sex.
    In May Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern made a public 
apology on behalf of the Government and citizens to the victims of 
child abuse for a ``collective failure to intervene, to detect their 
pain and to come to their rescue.'' The Government also announced the 
creation of a special commission to investigate the subject and a $5.4 
million (4 million Irish pounds) fund to provide professional 
counseling for victims.
    People with Disabilities.--The government Commission on the Status 
of People with Disabilities issued a report in 1996, following a 3-year 
study, with 402 recommendations. The Commission estimated that 10 
percent of the population have a disability. Under the 1998 Employment 
Equality Act, it is unlawful to discriminate against anyone on the 
basis of disability in relation to employment. The 1991 Building 
Regulations Act established minimum criteria to ensure access for 
people with disabilities to all public and private buildings 
constructed or significantly altered after 1992, but enforcement is 
uneven. A National Disability Authority (NDA) began operations in 
November with a budget of $2.7 million (2 million Irish pounds). The 
NDA is to set disability standards, monitor the implementation of these 
standards, and engage in research and the formulation of disability 
policy.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 25,000 nomadic 
persons regard themselves as a distinct ethnic group called 
``Travellers,'' roughly analogous to the Roma of continental Europe. 
The ``travelling'' community has its own history, culture, and 
language. The Travellers' emphasis on self-employment and the extended 
family distinguishes them from the rest of society.
    Travellers regularly are denied access to premises, goods, 
facilities, and services; many restaurants and pubs, for example, will 
not serve them. Despite national school rules that provide that no 
child may be refused admission on account of social position, 
Travellers frequently experience difficulties in enrolling their 
children in school. Sometimes they are segregated into all-Traveller 
classes. According to 1998 government statistics, of 4,978 Traveller 
families, approximately 1,191 live on roadsides or on temporary sites 
without toilets, electricity, or washing facilities. Many Travellers 
are dependent on social welfare for survival and are unable to 
participate in the mainstream economy because of discrimination and a 
lack of education.
    The 1998 Employment Equality Act outlaws job discrimination against 
Travellers. A 1993 task force on the travelling community produced a 
comprehensive report in 1995 on various aspects of Travellers' lives, 
including education, work, accommodation, health, and discrimination. A 
monitoring committee is overseeing implementation of the 
recommendations of the report, some of which have resulted in the 
formation of special committees in the Departments of Education, 
Environment, and Health to examine Traveller difficulties in these 
areas.
    A 1998 law, entitled the Housing (Traveller Accommodation) Act--
recommended by the 1995 task force--obliges local elected officials to 
draw up and implement Traveller accommodation plans on a 5-year basis 
and requires Traveller input in the process. In the event of a failure 
to agree on a draft plan, county and city managers are responsible for 
their adoption and implementation. According to traveller groups, the 
act was implemented with mixed results during its first year.
    The increasing numbers of asylum seekers, some of whom were 
migrating for economic reasons, and the influx of Kosovar refugees 
continued to spark public debate over how open society is to new 
immigrants and triggered isolated racist incidents. A 1997 EU poll 
found that 55 percent of Irish citizens considered themselves racist.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The right to join a union is provided 
for by law, as is the right to refrain from joining. About 48 percent 
of workers in the private and public sectors are members of unions. 
Police and military personnel are prohibited from striking, but they 
may form associations to represent themselves in matters of pay, 
working conditions, and general welfare. The right to strike is freely 
exercised in both the public and private sectors. The 1990 Industrial 
Relations Act prohibits retribution against strikers and union leaders; 
the Government effectively enforces this provision through the 
Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment. In October 27,500 
unionized nurses held the largest strike in the country's history in a 
dispute with the Government over pay and promotion schemes. At one 
point during the 9-day industrial action, 10,000 nurses marched on the 
Dail (Parliament) to voice their grievances. In early November, the 
strike was resolved with the nurses' approval of a $170 million (125 
million Irish pound) settlement package awarding monetary allowances to 
certain nurses and creating new senior nursing staff positions. In 1998 
the number of workdays lost by strikes decreased significantly from 
1997, although the number of industrial disputes increased marginally.
    The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) represents 64 unions in 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The ICTU is independent 
of the government and political parties.
    Unions may freely form or join federations or confederations and 
affiliate with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions 
have full freedom to organize and to engage in collective bargaining. 
The 1974 Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act and the 1977 Employment Equality 
Act make the Employment Equality Agency, now the Equality Authority, 
responsible for oversight of allegations of antiunion discrimination. 
If the Authority is unable to effect resolution, the dispute goes 
before the Labor Court, which consists of one representative each for 
the employer and the union, plus an independent chairperson. The 1977 
Unfair Dismissals Act provides for various forms of relief in cases 
where employers are found guilty of antiunion discrimination, including 
the reinstatement of workers fired for union activities.
    Most terms and conditions of employment are determined through 
collective bargaining, in the context of a national economic pact 
negotiated every 3 years by the ``social partners,'' i.e., unions, 
employers, farmers, and the government. In November official 
negotiations began on a successor to the 3-year ``Partnership 2000'' 
agreement negotiated among the social partners in 1996, which is 
scheduled to expire in the first half of 2000.
    The 1990 Industrial Relations Act established the Labor Relations 
Commission, which provides advice and conciliation services in 
industrial disputes. The Commission may refer unresolved disputes to 
the Labor Court, which may recommend terms of settlement and may set up 
joint employer-union committees to regulate conditions of employment 
and minimum wages in a specific trade or industry.
    The export processing zone at Shannon Airport has the same labor 
laws as the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced and bonded 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and 
does not occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--By law children are required to attend school through the 
age of 15. Under the terms of the 1997 Protection of Young Persons Act, 
employers may not employ those under the age of 16 in a regular full-
time job. Employers may hire 14- or 15-year-olds for light work on 
school holidays, as part of an approved work experience or educational 
program, or on a part-time basis during the school year (for children 
over the age of 15 only). The act gives effect to international rules 
on the protection of young workers drawn up by the International Labor 
Organization and the EU; it sets rest intervals and maximum working 
hours, prohibits the employment of 18-year-olds for late night work, 
and requires employers to keep specified records for their workers who 
are under 18 years of age. The law prohibits forced and bonded child 
labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no general minimum wage 
law. A 1997 government- commissioned study recommended that a national 
minimum wage be established at a rate of approximately $6.00 (4.40 
Irish pounds), which at the time equaled two-thirds of the median 
industrial wage. The minimum wage is to be adopted in April 2000. 
However, the Government has not yet indicated how this wage is to be 
calculated, and controversy has arisen between employers and unions 
over the issue. Currently several minimum rates of pay apply to 
specific industrial sectors, mainly those with lower-than-average 
wages. Although the lowest of these minimum wages is not sufficient to 
provide a decent standard of living for a family of four, low-income 
families are entitled to additional benefits such as subsidized housing 
and children's allowances.
    The standard workweek is 39 hours. Working hours in the industrial 
sector are limited to 9 hours per day and 48 hours per week. Overtime 
work is limited to 2 hours per day, 12 hours per week, and 240 hours in 
a year. The Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment is 
responsible for enforcing four basic laws dealing with occupational 
safety that provide adequate and comprehensive coverage. No significant 
complaints arose from either labor or management regarding enforcement 
of these laws. Recent regulations provide that employees who find 
themselves in situations that present a ``serious, imminent and 
unavoidable risk'' may leave without the employer being able to take 
disciplinary action.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 ITALY

    Italy is a longstanding, multiparty parliamentary democracy. 
Executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers, headed by 
the president of the council (the Prime Minister). The Head of State 
(President of the Republic) nominates the Prime Minister after 
consulting with leaders of all political forces in Parliament. The 
current Parliament was elected in free and democratic elections in 
April 1996. The judiciary is independent, but critics complain that 
some judges are politicized.
    The armed forces are under the control of the Minister of Defense. 
Four separate police forces report to different ministerial or local 
authorities. Under exceptional circumstances, the Government may call 
on the army to provide security in the form of guard duty in certain 
locations, allowing the Carabinieri (military police under the control 
of the Minister of Interior) and local police to perform other duties. 
For several years, the army supported the police in Sicily and in the 
province of Naples, areas with high levels of organized crime. The army 
left Naples at the end of 1997 and Sicily in 1998 but was redeployed to 
both during the year. There were a number of credible reports that some 
local police and Carabinieri officers committed some abuses.
    Italy has an advanced, industrialized market economy, and the 
standard of living is high. Small and midsized companies employ from 70 
to 80 percent of the work force. Major products include machinery, 
textiles, apparel, transportation equipment, and food and agricultural 
products. The Government owns a substantial number of enterprises in 
finance, communications, industry, transportation, and services, but 
privatization is moving forward at a measured pace.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and the judiciary generally provide effective means of 
dealing with instances of individual abuse; however, there were 
problems in some areas. There were reports of police abuse of 
detainees; such accusations are investigated by the judiciary. Prisons 
continue to be overcrowded, and the pace of justice remains slow. 
Lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. The Government has taken steps 
to combat violence against women and child abuse. Societal 
discrimination against women and discrimination and sporadic violence 
against immigrants and other foreigners continue to be problems. Child 
labor persists in the underground economy but is investigated actively; 
a special Carabinieri unit in the Labor Inspectorate was created in 
July 1997 to augment investigative capabilities. Trafficking in women 
and girls to Italy for prostitution and forced labor is a growing 
problem. Trafficking to the country in children also is a problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government 
officials.
    On May 20, Massimo D'Antona, a senior adviser to Italy's labor 
minister, was shot and killed outside his home in Rome. The terrorist 
movement known as the Red Brigades has been linked to the killing. In a 
28-page document, they singled out D'Antona because he was a notably 
moderate negotiator with the trade unions and a man of the center-left. 
The document claimed that ``his neo-corporatist policy shares the aims 
of the imperialist bourgeoisie.''
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and cruel or degrading 
punishment; however, there were reports of isolated incidents in which 
police abused detainees. Amnesty International (AI), the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), the United Nations Committee Against 
Torture, and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture regularly assess 
the country's judicial and prison system. According to a report issued 
by AI in May, there are numerous allegations of deliberately used 
excessive violence against individuals detained in connection with 
common criminal offenses or in the course of identity checks. 
Allegations of mistreatment relate to the time of arrest and first 24 
hours in custody and concern both citizens and foreigners, with an 
increasing number of women appearing as alleged victims. A high 
proportion of the allegations received by AI concern foreign nationals, 
with many from Africa, as well as Roma. In May, the United Nations 
Committee Against Torture examined Italy's third periodic report on its 
implementation of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The committee noted 
positive steps taken, but also noted that further action was needed, 
such as ending ``censor checks'' on correspondence addressed to 
international investigating bodies by prisoners and improving human 
rights training for military personnel. AI has made mention that, 
although authorities routinely investigate complaints of mistreatment 
in detention, some of the investigations lack thoroughness.
    In December 1998, an all-party group of more than 64 Members of 
Parliament submitted a bill to criminalize torture, as defined in 
article 1 of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and to set up a special 
fund for victims of acts of torture. In the same month, the association 
Antigone, which is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that promotes 
the rights and guarantees of detainees, monitors the prison system, and 
works closely with the European Commission for Prevention of Torture, 
promoted a bill to introduce an ``ombudsman for inmates.'' In January, 
Antigone created an ad hoc system to monitor the conditions of 
detention in prisons. A final report is expected by March 2000. The 
association is monitoring some ten leading cases involving allegations 
of mistreatment and torture that occurred during the year.
    In 1998, a Somali witness who had been heard by the commission 
investigating human rights abuses committed during the 1992-93 U.N. 
peacekeeping operations in Somalia, was arrested and charged as a 
suspect in the 1993 murder of Italian journalist Ilaria Alpi. In July, 
he was released due to lack of evidence.
    Despite the construction of new prison facilities and judicial 
reforms that provided for alternative penalties (such as house arrest 
or semi-liberty for those sentenced to less than three years' 
imprisonment), the country's prison population of some 52,000 continued 
to exceed planned capacity by approximately 15 percent. The Government 
recognized that continued prison overcrowding contributes to poor 
sanitation and strains the capacity of prison medical systems. While 
the percentage of prisoners addicted to illegal drugs (approximately 29 
percent) remained constant from 1997 to 1998, the number of HIV 
positive inmates dropped from 13.6 to 10 percent in that period. 
However, the percentage of AIDS sufferers among HIV positive groups 
rose from 5.8 percent to 7.6 percent. A June law decreed that, as of 
January 2000, responsibility for inmate health would be shifted from 
the Ministry of Justice to the National Health Service, whose higher 
standards are expected to provide better prevention and care, 
especially for imprisoned drug addicts and those suffering from AIDS. 
In a further effort to combat the negative effects of AIDS on the 
prison population, parliament passed a law in July prohibiting the 
preventive detention or imprisonment of anyone suffering from AIDS or 
other serious illnesses for which treatment in prison would be 
inadequate. Those accused or judged guilty of crimes are now to be 
given a form of house arrest, which may involve treatment at a hospital 
or other care facility. In 1998, there were 51 suicides in the 
country's prisons.
    The Government permits the independent monitoring of prison 
conditions by parliamentarians, local human rights groups, the media, 
and other organizations.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Detainees are allowed 
prompt and regular access to lawyers of their choosing (although 
occasional lapses in this general rule have been alleged) and to family 
members. If detainees are indigent, the State provides a lawyer. Within 
24 hours of being detained, the examining magistrate must decide 
whether there is enough evidence to proceed to an arrest. The 
investigating judge then has 48 hours in which to confirm the arrest 
and recommend whether the case goes to trial. In exceptional 
circumstances, usually in cases of organized crime figures, where there 
is danger that attorneys may attempt to tamper with evidence, the 
investigating judge may take up to 5 days to interrogate the accused 
before the accused is allowed to contact an attorney. The U.N. Human 
Rights Committee, the treaty monitoring body for the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), recommended that this 
5-day period be reduced and that all detainees have access to legal 
advice immediately upon arrest. Notwithstanding the procedural rules 
and protections that exist, abuses can occur. In March, the Justice 
Minister apologized to an illiterate Somali woman, Abade Khalil Mudhir 
(also known as Sharifa), who was arrested in Milan in May 1998 and 
accused of trafficking children (two minors were traveling with her), 
deprived of her children, and kept in prison until December 1998. She 
was released when evidence was found proving her innocence.
    Preventive detention can be imposed only as a last resort, or if 
there is clear and convincing evidence of a serious offense, such as 
crimes involving the Mafia, or those related to drugs, arms, or 
subversion. In these cases, a maximum of 2 years of preliminary 
investigation is permitted. Except in extraordinary situations, 
preventive custody is not permitted for pregnant women, single parents 
of children under 3 years of age, persons over 70 years of age, or 
those who are seriously ill. Preventive custody can be imposed only for 
crimes punishable by a maximum sentence of not less than 4 years.
    Magistrates' interrogations of persons in custody must be recorded 
on audio tape or video tape to be admissible in judicial proceedings. 
Prosecutors are required to include all evidence favorable to the 
accused in requests for preventive detention. The defense may present 
any favorable evidence directly to the court.
    There is no provision for bail, but judges may grant provisional 
liberty to suspects awaiting trial. As a safeguard against unjustified 
detention, panels of judges (liberty tribunals) review cases of persons 
awaiting trial and rule whether continued detention is warranted. 
However, in view of the three-level court system (see Section 1.e.), 
those persons in preventive detention do not include just those 
awaiting trial; many such detainees are awaiting the outcome of a first 
or second appeal. The Constitution and the law provide for restitution 
in cases of unjust detention.
    The law prohibits punishment by internal exile or exile abroad.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process.
    There are three levels of courts, the lowest of which used to 
consist of three subdivisions: the Praetor Court (offenses punishable 
by monetary fines or less than 4 years' imprisonment), the Court of 
Assizes (offenses punishable by more than 24 years' imprisonment), and 
the Tribunal Court (offenses that fall between the jurisdiction of the 
Praetor and Assizes Courts). The second level involves two appeals 
courts, one for civil cases and one for penal cases. Decisions of the 
Court of Appeals can be appealed to the highest court, the Court of 
Cassation (Supreme Court) in Rome, but only for reasons related to 
correct application of the law, not issues of facts. A law approved in 
1998 provided for merging the Praetor and Assizes Courts, 
decriminalizing certain provisions in existing law, and other reforms 
to restructure and expedite the judicial process. The measure's civil 
provisions were implemented in June; changes in criminal proceedings 
were to take force on January 2, 2000.
    The law provides for trials to be fair and public, and the 
authorities observe these provisions. The law grants defendants the 
presumption of innocence. Defendants have access to an attorney 
sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense and can confront 
witnesses. All government-held evidence is normally made available to 
defendants and their attorneys. Defendants can appeal verdicts to the 
highest appellate court.
    Cumbersome procedures slow the pace of justice. The National 
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) reported that the average duration of 
lower court trials (civil cases) was 3 years and 4 months. The length 
of trials varies by region; those in the north are shorter than those 
in the south. A 1998 UNHRC report noted that provisions of the ICCPR 
concerning promptness of trials were not always respected, citing the 
case of 10 police officers charged in 1990 in connection with the 1985 
death of a man following severe mistreatment in a police station. Since 
1990 the case has been tried, appealed, and retried several times. In 
1997 the Court of Cassation ordered another retrial, and the case is 
still open. In July, the European Court of Human Rights again 
criticized Italy for four cases of lengthy civil trials lasting from 5 
to 13 years. Italy had to pay defendants' expenses and damages. 
However, in the same month the Council of Europe decided to postpone 
decisions concerning the status of the judiciary, following the Justice 
Minister's request to give the ongoing restructuring process time to 
adjust.
    Since 1991 public prosecutors have conducted sweeping 
investigations of corruption among the political and economic elites, 
and in the judiciary. However, critics complain that some investigating 
magistrates are influenced by political or other interests in choosing 
targets of inquiry, or fail to show adequate respect for the rights of 
suspects. Those making these charges point to judicial processes 
brought against former Prime Ministers Giulio Andreotti and Silvio 
Berlusconi. Two separate trials, in which prosecutors relied heavily on 
testimony by Mafia witnesses (``pentiti'') ended in acquittals for 
Andreotti. Further charges by prosecutors who had previously brought 
cases against Berlusconi for tax fraud, corruption, and ``cooking the 
books'' of his various enterprises drew an angry retort, as Berlusconi 
accused them of being ``the armed wing of the left.'' The July 1998 
UNHRC report noted that lengthy preventive detention (which in certain 
serious offenses is permitted for up to 2 years) may constitute a 
violation of the right to a presumption of innocence and the principle 
of a prompt and fair trial. However, an April 1998 decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the 31-month preventive 
detention of a person accused of collusion with an organized crime 
organization was lawful.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law safeguards the privacy of the home, and the 
authorities respect this provision. Searches and electronic monitoring 
may be carried out only under judicial warrant and in carefully defined 
circumstances. Violations are subject to legal sanctions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and the press, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
does not restrict the right of peaceful assembly, including protests 
against government policies, except in cases where national security or 
public safety is at risk. Permits are not required for meetings, but 
organizers of public demonstrations must notify the police in advance. 
Professional associations organize and operate freely. While allowing 
general freedom of association, the Constitution and law prohibit 
clandestine associations, those that pursue political aims through 
force, that incite racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, or that 
advocate fascism.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
Government subsidizes several religions through tax revenue collection. 
Taxpayers who choose to do so can donate a percentage of their income 
tax payment to the Roman Catholic, Adventist, Waldensian, Baptist, and 
Lutheran churches, the Assembly of God or the Jewish community. Other 
religious groups, including Buddhists and Muslims, have initiated the 
procedures necessary to obtain this benefit.
    Nontraditional religious groups are free to practice their beliefs 
and proselytize, provided that they respect public order and general 
moral standards. In August 1997 the Court of Cassation annulled a lower 
court decision that Scientology was not a religion, finding that the 
lower court was not competent to rule on what constitutes a religion. 
The Court of Cassation found further that the issue of whether 
Scientology constitutes a religion must be readdressed by another court 
of appeal, in accordance with criteria established by the 
Constitutional Court.
    There is no state religion, but Roman Catholicism is the dominant 
one, in the sense that most citizens were born and raised under 
Catholic principles, which form part of their culture. Roman Catholic 
religious instruction is offered in public schools as an optional 
subject. Students who do not opt to attend can elect to take an 
alternative course or, in some schools, have a free class period. A 
1929 agreement between the Catholic Church and Italy, which was revised 
in 1984, accords the Church certain privileges. For example, the Church 
can select Catholic religion teachers, whose earnings are paid by the 
State. This privilege has led to charges of unconstitutional 
discrimination. For example, in February a teacher of religion was 
fired by the Curia of Florence for being pregnant while unmarried.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and the Law provide for 
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. Citizens 
who leave are ensured the right to return. The Constitution forbids 
deprivation of citizenship for political reasons. Parliament has not 
yet repealed the XIII transitory provision of the 1946 constitution, 
which forbids male heirs of the former king, Umberto I of Savoy, from 
entering Italy. For this reason, on December 13 royal descendant 
Vittorio Emanuele IV filed a suit in the European Court of Human Rights 
in Strasbourg challenging the validity of this constitutional bar.
    Political asylum is obtained according to the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees. Amnesty International has noted 
that Italy still lacks a specific law on political asylum, but one is 
pending before Parliament. The immigration law passed in February 1998 
levied high fines and penalties for land, air, and sea carriers that 
board passengers without documentation. In 1998, 7,674 persons applied 
for asylum, of whom 1,045 were found eligible.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations assisting refugees. It 
provides first asylum to refugees fleeing hostilities or natural 
disasters. Such refugees are granted temporary residence permits, which 
must be renewed periodically and do not ensure future permanent 
residence.
    According to Caritas, an organization associated with the Catholic 
Church's Episcopal Commission, as of November some 24,000 immigrants 
``for humanitarian reasons'' held a work permit. Also as of November, 
the number of refugees and asylum seekers (including minors) was about 
7,700. In the wake of hostilities in Kosovo, Italy agreed to provide 
temporary protected status to as many as 10,000 Kosovars who had sought 
refuge in Macedonia. Italy airlifted almost 6,000 Kosovars to an 
inactive military base in Sicily. Most were returned home after 
hostilities ceased in June, while a small minority was to be resettled 
in other countries. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, some 
7,000 ethnic Roma entered Italy, of whom 3,500 were granted temporary 
protected status before the interior minister rescinded this provision. 
The remaining 3,500 Roma are being considered for political asylum on a 
case by case basis. However, additional Roma continued to arrive in 
southern Italy from the Balkans. In February the Government rescinded 
an earlier decree granting humanitarian protection to Somali 
immigrants.
    The Commission on Foreigners in Italy estimates that hundreds of 
thousands of persons live in the country in irregular status. Caritas 
sets the number of irregular foreigners (as of December 1998) at 
320,000.
    After his arrival in Italy in November 1998, Kurdish Workers' Party 
(PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan filed a request for political asylum. 
Ocalan left Italy in January, but his asylum request remained active 
and was processed through normal judicial channels. In October a court 
in Rome granted Ocalan political asylum.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of any person having 
a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    There are no restrictions on women's participation in government 
and politics; however, they remain under represented. Women hold 6 of 
25 cabinet positions, 24 of 325 Senate seats, and 69 of 630 seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies. A new association for women, EMILY Italia, was 
founded recently to promote increased participation of women in 
politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and 
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex (except 
with regard to hazardous work), religion, ethnic background, or 
political opinion, and provides some protection against discrimination 
based on disability, language, or social status. However, societal 
discrimination persists to some degree.
    Women.--Violence against women remains a problem. A 1998 ISTAT 
survey (the first one nationwide) reported that at least 9.4 million 
women between the ages of 14 and 59 had experienced some form of sexual 
violence during their lives. Media reports of violence against women 
are common. In its annual report on violence against women, the NGO 
Telefono Rosa stated that 55.5 percent of the cases reported nationally 
included physical violence, which is an increase of 9.5 percent over 
the previous 2 years. An investigation conducted by the Rome police and 
Telefono Rosa reported 6,522 cases of domestic violence against women 
in Rome in 1997.
    Legislation to protect women from physical abuse, including by 
family members, was updated and strengthened in 1996. The revised law 
makes the prosecution of perpetrators of violence against women easier 
and shields women who have been objects of attack from publicity. The 
law treats spousal rape the same as any other rape. Law enforcement and 
judicial authorities are not reluctant to bring perpetrators of 
violence against women to justice, but victims sometimes do not press 
charges due to fear, shame, or ignorance of the law. The Telefono Rosa 
report noted that the entry of more women into the police force has 
contributed greatly to increased cooperation by female victims of 
violence. The Government provides a hot line through which abused women 
can obtain legal, medical, and other assistance. Women's associations 
also maintain several shelters for battered women.
    In 1996 a Basilicata court convicted a 40-year-old driving 
instructor of raping an 18-year-old student. An appeals court upheld 
this conviction in March 1998. In February the Court of Cassation 
(which rules on questions of law, not merit) annulled the appeals court 
decision, ruling that since it was physically impossible to remove 
tight jeans from a woman without her consent, the defendant could not 
be convicted of ``rape.'' The Court's ruling attracted widespread press 
comment and criticism. Several female Members of Parliament wore jeans 
to the Chamber, as a visible symbol of protest.
    Telefono Rosa reported that sexual harassment in the workplace 
decreased in 1997 and concluded that ad hoc provisions against sexual 
harassment in national labor contracts worked as a deterrent in both 
the public and private sectors. Nevertheless, at least 728,000 women 
report having been victims of workplace harassment at least once in 
their lives; 236,000 experienced this problem in the last 3 years.
    Trafficking in illegal immigrant women and girls for prostitution 
and forced labor is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Women enjoy legal equality with men in marriage, property, and 
inheritance rights. Males and females enjoy equal access and treatment 
with regard to education, health, and other government services. Many 
NGO's actively and effectively promote women's rights. Most are 
affiliated with labor unions or political parties.
    A number of government offices work to ensure women's rights. The 
Ministry for Equal Opportunity is headed by a woman. In addition, there 
is an equal opportunity commission in the office of the Prime Minister. 
The Labor Ministry has a similar commission that focused on women's 
rights and discrimination in the workplace, as well as equal 
opportunity counselors who deal with this problem at the national, 
regional, and provincial government levels. However, many counselors 
have limited resources with which to work.
    In February, the European Union directive regulating night work for 
women was incorporated into the law, thus amending the 1977 law that 
had prohibited night shifts for women. Liberal maternity leave, 
introduced to benefit women, adds to the cost of employing them, with 
the result that employers sometimes find it advantageous to hire men 
instead.
    According to research conducted by the CGIL Labor Institute, 
women's salaries are 20 percent lower than men's for comparable work. 
They are underrepresented in many fields, such as management and the 
professions. According to data released by the Minister of Interior, 
only 10 percent of the Ministry's work force consists of women. The 
National Council for Economy and Labor (CNEL) reports that in 1998, 3 
percent of executives in large firms were women, a figure that rose to 
5 percent in mid-size firms and 8 percent in small firms. Employed 
women are more likely to have a high school diploma (34.7 percent) than 
employed men (28.5 percent). The comparable figures for a university 
degree are 13.8 percent for women and 9.4 percent for men. The number 
of firms created by women has increased 103 percent in 12 years, for a 
total of 9.1 million firms. Although women's participation in the work 
force is increasing more rapidly than men's, unemployment figures show 
that women still are lagging. In 1999 male unemployment was 9.6 
percent, while female unemployment was 16.8 percent. Youth unemployment 
(ages 15 to 24) was 30.2 percent for men (53.5 in the south) and 39.0 
percent for women (66.9 in the south).
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare. As of academic year 1999-2000, schooling 
is compulsory for children from age 7 to age 18; those unable (or 
unwilling) to follow the academic curriculum may shift to vocational 
training at age 15. This reform is intended to reverse the middle and 
secondary school dropout rate, which has been high.
    Abuse of children is recognized as a societal problem. Social 
workers counsel abused children and are authorized to take action to 
protect them. The NGO Telefono Azzurro maintains two toll-free hot 
lines for reporting incidents of child abuse. Research conducted on 
behalf of the Government by a private institute estimated that the 
number of minors involved in cases of violence (including prostitution) 
was 10,000 to 12,000. There were 1,880 to 2,500 minors who worked as 
street prostitutes, of whom 1,500 to 2,300 were trafficked illegal 
immigrants (predominantly Albanians, and some Nigerians), many of whom 
were forced into prostitution. An estimated 90 percent of violence 
against minors is committed within their own families.
    In August 1998, Parliament passed a law to combat pedophilia, child 
pornography, the possession of pornographic material involving 
children, sex tourism involving minors, and trafficking in children 
(see also Section 6.f.).
    People With Disabilities.--The law forbids discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of state 
services. The law requires enterprises with more than 35 employees to 
hire the disabled to staff 15 percent of their work force, directs that 
public buildings be made accessible to persons with disabilities, and 
stipulates a number of specific rights for the disabled. Compliance 
with these requirements, however, is still incomplete.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Immigrants and other foreigners 
face societal discrimination. Some are subjected to physical attack. 
Roma encounter difficulties in finding places to reside. Sedentary Roma 
have more success in receiving equal treatment in the workplace and in 
the housing market. Nomadic Roma tend to live in camps and to have more 
difficulty in these areas. Based on EU figures, a local NGO estimates 
that there are approximately 100,000 Roma in the country (0.2 percent 
of the population). Data from the municipality of Rome refer to some 
5,000 Roma in the city, housed in 35 camps. Neonatal mortality in Roma 
camps is four times higher than the national average. Immigrant Roma, 
predominantly from states of the former Yugoslavia, often are precluded 
from obtaining residence or work permits because they do not possess 
valid identity documents from their country of origin, and can be 
deported. With no legal source of income available, they often turn to 
begging or petty crime. The interests of Roma and other immigrants are 
represented by over 130 NGO's, such as Caritas; however, these have 
funding difficulties. In March, the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) urged the Government to 
strengthen its efforts for preventing and prosecuting incidents of 
racial intolerance and discrimination against some foreigners and Roma, 
as well as of bad treatment of foreigners and Roma in detention.
    According to the NGO Racism Survey, in 1997 there were 668 cases of 
racial discrimination, violence, and intolerance. On June 21, an angry 
mob attacked four Roma camps in Naples and torched their caravans after 
a traffic accident that involved a Roma driver and severely wounded two 
girls, relatives of a local organized crime boss.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right to 
establish trade unions, join unions, and carry out union activities in 
the workplace. Some 40 percent of the workforce is organized. Trade 
unions are free of government controls and no longer have formal ties 
with political parties. The right to strike is embodied in the 
Constitution and is frequently exercised. A 1990 law restricts strikes 
affecting essential public services such as transport, sanitation, and 
health. Nonetheless, during a year in which the overall number of work-
hours lost to labor disputes was relatively low, strikes occurred in 
several public service sectors, especially air and ground 
transportation.
    Unions associate freely with international trade union 
organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain 
collectively, and these rights are respected in practice. By custom, 
although not by law, national collective bargaining agreements apply to 
all workers, regardless of union affiliation. The law prohibits 
discrimination by employers against union members and organizers. It 
requires employers that have more than 15 employees and who are found 
guilty of antiunion discrimination to reinstate any workers affected. 
In firms with less than 15 workers, an employer must provide the 
grounds for firing a union employee in writing. If a judge deems the 
grounds spurious, he can order the employer to reinstate or compensate 
the worker.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and 
generally it does not occur; however, some illegal immigrants and 
children were forced into prostitution (see Section 5), and trafficking 
in illegal immigrant women for prostitution and forced labor, as well 
as trafficking in illegal immigrant children, are problems (see Section 
6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law forbids the employment of children under age 15 
(with some limited exceptions). There also are specific restrictions on 
employment in hazardous or unhealthful occupations for men under age 
18, and women under age 21. The enforcement of minimum age laws is 
difficult in the extensive underground economy. Estimates of the number 
of child laborers differ, ranging from 30,000 to 300,000 (the most 
probable figure may be in the area of 50,000). Most of these cases 
involve immigrants, but instances involving Italian children also have 
been reported. Illegal immigrant child laborers from Northern Africa, 
the Philippines, Albania, and especially China have entered in record 
numbers every year since 1989, and the influx from China is rising. 
According to the Carabinieri, an estimated 30,000 illegal Chinese work 
in sweatshop conditions near Florence, with many minor children working 
alongside the rest of their families to produce scarves, purses, and 
imitations of various brand name products. Many of these factories are 
run by an emerging Chinese mafia in Italy, and are equipped with escape 
tunnels to thwart labor inspectors.
    Following the U.N.-sponsored Oslo International Conference in 
November 1997, the Government, employers associations, and unions 
signed a charter in April that included: the extension of compulsory 
education; better enforcement of school attendance regulations; 
programs to reduce the number of school dropouts; more prompt 
assistance to families in financial difficulty; further restrictions on 
exceptions to the minimum age law; and cancellation of all economic or 
administrative incentives for companies found to make use of child 
labor, including abroad. The Prime Minister's office provided a toll-
free telephone number to report incidents of child labor. The footwear 
and textile industries have established a code of conduct that 
prohibits the use of child labor in their international as well as 
national activities, applicable to subcontractors as well. For the 
first time, a child labor clause was attached to the national labor 
contract in the health sector, whereby the parties committed themselves 
not to use surgical tools produced by child labor. The law forbids 
forced or bonded labor involving children, and the Government generally 
enforces this prohibition effectively; however, some illegal immigrant 
children were forced into prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.c.), and 
some of them were trafficked (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages are not set by 
law, but rather by collective bargaining agreements. These specify 
minimum standards to which individual employment contracts must 
conform. When an employer and a union fail to reach an agreement, 
courts may step in to determine fair wages on the basis of practice in 
comparable activities or agreements.
    A 1997 law reduced the legal workweek from 48 hours to 40. Most 
collective agreements provide for a 36- to 38-hour workweek. The 
average contractual workweek is 39 hours but is actually less in many 
industries. Overtime work may not exceed 2 hours per day or an average 
of 12 hours per week.
    The law sets basic health and safety standards and guidelines for 
compensation for on-the-job injuries. For most practical purposes, 
European Union directives on health and safety also have been 
incorporated into the law. Labor inspectors are from the public health 
service or from the Ministry of Labor. They are few in number, given 
the scope of their responsibilities. Courts impose fines and sometimes 
prison terms for violation of health and safety laws. In 1998 some 60 
percent of Rome construction sites were cited for safety violations. 
Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work 
situations without jeopardizing their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and girls for 
prostitution and forced labor to Italy is a growing problem. With few 
exceptions, this crime is perpetrated on vulnerable, illegal 
immigrants. The women and girls, usually from Albania, Nigeria, and 
Eastern Europe, are reluctant to contact the police for assistance. 
According to a 1997 Caritas report, the number of foreign women 
involved in prostitution then was around 25,000, a figure that has 
increased due to developments in Kosovo. According to the Ministry of 
Equal Opportunity, the number of foreign women estimated to be involved 
in prostitution varies between 30,000 and 35,000. Of these, Parsec (a 
social research institution) estimates that 1,000 to 1,500 were 
trafficked forcibly. In December 1997, police broke up a Milan ring 
that was holding auctions in which women abducted from the countries of 
the former Soviet Union were put on blocks, partially naked, and sold 
at an average price of just under $1,000.
    A February 1998 immigration law provided women involved in 
prostitution with an avenue of escape by granting temporary residence/
work permits to those who turn in their exploiters. However, 
regulations implementing this law were not finalized until the summer. 
The legislation permits a temporary stay for victimized women. During 
this time, victims are provided with shelter, benefits, and services 
such as counseling and medical assistance, in cooperation with NGO's. 
They also may be permitted to work or study. If the victim agrees to 
cooperate with law enforcement and judicial authorities, the residence 
permit and services are extended for the length of the criminal 
proceedings. As a result of these and related policies, significant 
increases in witness testimony and successful prosecution of 
traffickers have been reported.
    In August 1998, a law was passed to combat abuses against children, 
including trafficking in children.
                                 ______
                                 

                               KAZAKHSTAN

    The Constitution of Kazakhstan concentrates power in the 
presidency. President Nursultan Nazarbayev is the dominant political 
figure. The Constitution, adopted in 1995 in a referendum marred by 
irregularities, permits the President to legislate by decree and 
dominate the legislature and judiciary; it cannot be changed or amended 
without the President's consent. In January President Nazarbayev was 
elected to a new 7-year term in an election that fell far short of 
international standards. Previous presidential elections originally 
scheduled for 1996 did not take place, as President Nazarbayev's term 
in office was extended in a separate 1995 referendum, also marred by 
irregularities. Parliamentary elections held in October were an 
improvement on the presidential election but still fell short of 
international standards. Under the 1995 Constitution, Parliament's 
powers are more limited than previously. However, Members of Parliament 
(M.P.'s) have the right to introduce legislation and some bills 
introduced by M.P.'s have become laws. The judiciary remained under the 
control of the President and the executive branch. The lack of an 
independent judiciary made it difficult to root out corruption, which 
was pervasive throughout the Government.
    The Committee for National Security (the KNB, successor to the KGB) 
is responsible for national security, law enforcement activities on the 
national level, and counterintelligence. It also oversees the external 
intelligence service, Barlau. The KNB reports directly to the 
President. A new organization, the Agency on the Protection of State 
Secrets was established in May and, while not officially part of the 
Government, reportedly is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is subordinate to the KNB, 
supervises the criminal police, who are poorly paid and widely believed 
to be corrupt. Both the KNB and the Interior Ministry Police (MVD) 
monitored Government opponents, the opposition press, human rights 
activists, and some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), who claimed 
that KNB and MVD officials pressured them to limit activities 
objectionable to the Government. The KNB continued efforts to improve 
its public image by focusing on fighting Government corruption, 
religious extremism, terrorism, and organized crime. Members of the 
security forces committed human rights abuses.
    Kazakhstan is rich in natural resources, chiefly petroleum and 
minerals. The Government has made significant progress toward a market-
based economy since independence. After 2 consecutive years of economic 
growth (1.1 percent in 1996 and 1.5 percent in 1997) the economy 
declined by 2.5 percent in 1998. The Government responded to the 
effects of the Russian financial crisis by floating the tenge in April, 
effectively devaluing it 60 percent by October. With the fall of the 
tenge, inflation reached 12.6 percent for the first 8 months of the 
year, compared with 1.9 percent for the same period in 1998. The 
average annual wage was approximately $1,000 (down from $1,500 in 
1998). The agricultural sector has been slow to privatize. The 
Government has privatized successfully small- and medium-sized firms 
and most large-scale industrial complexes. However, living standards 
for the majority of the population continue to decline. According to 
several surveys, in 1998 approximately 35 percent of citizens lived 
below the government-defined poverty line of $35 per month, up from 33 
percent the previous year.
    The Government's human rights record was poor, and serious problems 
remain in several areas. The Government severely limited citizens' 
right to change their government. The Government barred two opposition 
politicians from competing in the January presidential elections on 
administrative grounds and harassed opposition candidates in the fall 
parliamentary elections. Democratic institutions remain weak. The 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) declined to 
send observers for the Presidential elections, citing flawed election 
preparations. The OSCE sent a full observation mission for the 
parliamentary elections after the Government made some reforms to its 
electoral law and regulations, but concluded that the elections fell 
short of the Government's commitments as an OSCE member. In both 
elections, the Government used an electoral law provision to prohibit 
some government opponents from running because they previously had been 
found guilty of political offenses such as publicly insulting the 
President and participating in unauthorized public meetings and 
demonstrations. The Government harassed its opponents and appeared 
complicit in at least four assaults on perceived opponents during the 
presidential campaign. There were reports of official bias and 
harassment, but not of violence, during the parliamentary campaign.
    The legal structure, including the Constitution adopted in 1995, 
does not fully safeguard human rights. Members of the security forces 
committed a number of extrajudicial killings, and tortured, beat, or 
otherwise abused detainees. Prison conditions remained harsh. The 
Government used arbitrary arrest and detention, particularly during the 
period prior to the January presidential election, and prolonged 
detention is a problem. The judiciary remains under the control of the 
President and the executive branch, and corruption is deeply rooted. A 
political prisoner, Labor Movement leader Madel Ismailov, was released 
in February after serving 1 year in prison for insulting the President. 
He attempted to run for Parliament in October but under an April 1998 
provision of the election law was disqualified because of his 
conviction. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
    The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press. A 
July press law placed media issues under the direct control of the 
Minister of Information and Social Accord. The Government harassed much 
of the opposition media, and government efforts to restrain the 
independent media continued, as some opposition newspapers and other 
media outlets were ordered to close, forced to sell to progovernment 
interests, or brought under pressure by regulatory authorities. The 
Government reportedly pressured media not to cover the opposition 
during the presidential campaign, and, to a lesser extent, during the 
parliamentary campaign. Vague new state secret and media laws, as well 
as a similarly vague 1998 national security law, increased pressure on 
the media to practice self-censorship. The Government continues to own 
and control printing and distribution facilities and to subsidize 
publications. Academic freedom is not respected. The Government imposes 
significant restrictions on freedom of assembly. Some organizers of 
unsanctioned demonstrations were arrested and fined or imprisoned. The 
Government imposes significant restrictions on freedom of association, 
and complicated and controversial registration requirements hindered 
organizations and political parties. The Government sometimes harasses 
those it regards as religious extremists. Domestic violence against 
women remained a problem. There was discrimination against women, the 
disabled, and ethnic minorities. The Government discriminated in favor 
of ethnic Kazakhs. The Government limited worker rights; it tried to 
limit the influence of independent trade unions, both directly and 
through its support for state-sponsored unions, and members of 
independent trade unions were harassed. Workers continued to protest 
chronic nonpayment of wages. Child labor persists in agricultural 
areas. There was anecdotal evidence of trafficking in women.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    According to press reports, a criminal case was brought against a 
police sergeant in Makhtaaralsk (Shymkent oblast) for the beating death 
of 24-year-old man, Nurzhan Saparov, who was in custody following his 
arrest for disturbing the peace. At year's end, reportedly four police 
officers were awaiting trial charged with responsibility for his death.
    Reports indicate that deaths caused by military hazing persist, and 
there is no indication that the numbers of deaths declined during the 
year. However, there are some reports that military personnel engaging 
in hazing have been prosecuted.
    There has been no government action in the 1998 death by beating of 
Yalkynzhan Yakupov whose body was found hanging in the Chunja District 
police station. There have been no arrests or known government 
investigation in the case of a young man killed while in detention in 
Almaty in January 1997.
    In 1998, 1,290 inmates, more than 1 percent of all prisoners, died 
from disease, mostly tuberculosis, aggravated by harsh prison 
conditions and inadequate medical treatment (see Section 1.c.). No 
figures for deaths in prison were available for 1999.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution states that ``no one must be subject to 
torture, violence or other treatment and punishment that is cruel or 
humiliating to human dignity;'' however, police tortured, beat, and 
otherwise abused detainees sometimes in order to obtain confessions, 
and beat protesters. In May and August, the Government publicly 
acknowledged and criticized police use of torture. In the first half of 
the year, prosecutors brought 20 criminal cases against police officers 
for physically abusing detainees, but human rights observers believe 
that these cases cover only a small fraction of the incidents of police 
abuse of detainees. Human rights observers report that detainees 
sometimes are choked, handcuffed to radiators, or have plastic bags 
placed over their heads to force them to divulge information. Training 
standards and pay for police are very low and individual law 
enforcement officials often are supervised poorly.
    Members of an Islamic group from Taraz alleged that the authorities 
beat 70 group members, including 12 minors, who were detained for 
participation in a private religious retreat in July. The beatings 
reportedly left one minor with a broken nose and an adult detainee with 
broken ribs (see Section 2.c.). In April police in Aralsk reportedly 
beat a group of female hunger strikers who were blocking a railway line 
to protest nonpayment for 3 years of family social benefits. Three were 
hospitalized as a result of the beatings which were reported in the 
media on April 21-22. On November 28, in Almaty, two unidentified men 
assaulted opposition activist Andrei Grishin, who published a newspaper 
article critical of a new museum dedicated to President Nazarbayev 
shortly before the incident. The attack apparently was politically 
motivated. Law enforcement authorities and anonymous telephone callers 
reportedly warned Grishin several times before the assault to stop his 
political activities. The assailants, who reportedly told Grishin that 
he deserved the attack, cut off Grishin's hair, doused him with oil 
paint, and left him unconscious. They did not rob him. No arrests were 
made in the case by year's end. Opposition activist Aleksei Martinov 
was detained on suspicion of theft of computer parts and was 
hospitalized on December 12 after suffering head injuries from a 
beating he received while in police detention in Almaty. Martinov filed 
a complaint alleging that the police beat him and was released 
following his hospitalization.
    During the campaign prior to the January 10 presidential election, 
several perceived government opponents were assaulted. The attacks 
appeared to be politically motivated and, in at least some cases, 
sanctioned by the Government (see Section 3). The authorities made no 
arrests. There were no reports of such attacks prior to the autumn 
parliamentary elections.
    Army personnel subjected conscripts to brutal hazing, including 
beatings and verbal abuse. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff 
reported 17 cases of death due to mistreatment as of mid-1998, a 50 
percent decline over the same period in 1997. Reportedly the Government 
has taken action occasionally against officials charged with abuses, 
levying administrative sanctions such as fines for those found guilty. 
The Army launched an aggressive campaign to punish violators of a new 
antihazing policy in 1998, but at year's end anecdotal accounts 
suggested that hazing had worsened, and there were no official reports 
on the problem.
    There were claims that authorities committed persons to mental 
institutions for political purposes. In May a professor at the Eurasian 
University in Astana, Armial Tasymbekov, was committed to a mental 
hospital for public drunkenness. He claimed that his incarceration was 
motivated politically because KNB officials interrogated him shortly 
before his incarceration on the suspicion that he incited his students 
to criticize the President in leaflets and graffiti. Tasymbekov was 
released later in May and died in August.
    Prison conditions remained harsh due to inadequate resources. 
According to the Interior Ministry during the year there were 
approximately 85,000 prisoners in facilities designed to hold 60,000. 
Local human rights observers agreed with these figures. On February 26, 
prisoners at a prison in Atyrau reportedly protested mistreatment by 
cutting open their stomachs; however, none died. Press reports in March 
indicated that five teenagers in a juvenile detention facility in 
Almaty cut open their veins to draw attention to harsh treatment.
    Overcrowding, inadequate prison diet, and a lack of medical 
supplies and personnel contributed to the spread of tuberculosis and 
other major diseases. Human rights observers reported that 14,000 
prisoners, or about 16 percent of all prisoners, suffered from 
tuberculosis. These figures do not differ significantly from official 
figures. In September 1998, the official Russian-language newspaper 
reported that 12,600 prisoners suffered from tuberculosis. A human 
rights NGO reported that the total number of tuberculosis cases 
declined by 30 percent during the year as a consequence of improved 
treatment, humanitarian aid, and amnesties. In 1997 the Government also 
acknowledged that AIDS is becoming a concern. Prison guards, who are 
poorly paid, steal food and medicines intended for prisoners. Violent 
crime among prisoners is common.
    In July the Government passed the first amnesty law since 1996. It 
applied to nonviolent offenders who committed crimes as juveniles, had 
certain kinds of veteran's status, were seriously ill, or had specified 
family responsibilities. According to parliamentary sources, the 
objective of the law was to release over 21,000 prisoners within 6 
months of its passage. However, Interior Ministry sources said that 
only about 15,000 prisoners actually would receive amnesty. The law 
also was intended to clear the convictions of approximately 22,000 
persons who received suspended sentences and to reduce the sentences of 
approximately 7,700 inmates. By year's end, the Interior Ministry 
reported that over 15,000 prisoners were released under the amnesty 
law, 2,100 of whom suffered from tuberculosis.
    Prisoners are allowed one 4-hour visit every 3 months, but 
additional visits may be granted in emergency situations. Some 
prisoners are eligible for 3-day visits with close relatives once every 
6 months. Juveniles are kept in separate facilities.
    Human rights monitors wishing to visit prisons must receive 
authorization from the MVD (Interior Ministry). The Government 
cooperated with the OSCE in a program to improve prison conditions. 
Although the Government sometimes created obstacles for those who 
requested access to prisons, the local NGO International Bureau for 
Human Rights (IBHR) reported that its representatives regularly 
received authorization. The IBHR visited men's prisons in addition to 
women's and juveniles' prisons during the year. Two international 
NGO's, the Dutch Interchurch Aid and Penal Reform International (PRI), 
accompanied IBHR on prison visits in Pavlodar during the year. PRI also 
visited prisons for juveniles and women in Almaty.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government used 
minor infractions of the law, frequently related to unsanctioned 
assembly, or manufactured charges to arrest and detain government 
opponents arbitrarily, in particular during the period prior to the 
presidential election in January. Under the election law, convictions 
on such charges allowed the Government to exclude government opponents 
from running for president or other public office (see Section 3). In 
October 1998, less than a week after the Government called for early 
presidential elections, an Almaty court summoned five leading 
government opponents with less than 24-hour notice on charges of 
participating in a meeting of an unregistered organization called For 
Fair Elections. All five--Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Dos Kushim, Irina 
Savostina, Petr Svoik, and Mels Yeleusizov--were convicted. Svoik and 
Yeleusizov served 3-day jail sentences. The others paid fines. In May a 
court in Kostenai fined Communist Party and Pokoleniye (Generation) 
Pensioners Movement activist Vladimir Chernyshev for participating in 
an unsanctioned rally. He and a group of pensioners had gathered at a 
monument to Lenin to commemorate Lenin's birthday (see Section 3). In 
September at the request of the Prosecutor General, authorities in 
Russia detained Kazhegeldin, the leader of the opposition Republican 
People's Party (RNPK), in connection with a corruption investigation. 
Following protests from international human rights groups and 
Kazakhstani opposition figures, the Prosecutor General dropped his 
extradition request, and the Russian authorities released Kazhegeldin 
(see Section 3). On December 9, the KNB detained three individuals, 
RNPK members, who worked as bodyguards for Kazhegeldin on charges of 
possession of illegal weapons and narcotics. At year's end, two of the 
three, Pyotr Afanasenko and Satzhan Ibrayev, remained in custody but 
had not been charged. The third bodyguard, Vladimir Ruchkin, was 
released after 4 days in detention. All three were former KNB employees 
who had first served as Kazhegeldin's bodyguards when Kazhegeldin was 
Prime Minister. Human Rights and opposition figures alleged that the 
detentions were politically motivated. The Government also arbitrarily 
arrested, detained, fined, and sometimes imprisoned demonstrators (see 
Section 2.b.).
    The law sanctions pretrial detention. According to the 
Constitution, police may hold a detainee for 72 hours before bringing 
charges. The Criminal Code allows continued detention for up to 12 
months with the approval of the General Prosecutor of the Republic. 
Lower-ranking prosecutors may approve interim extensions of detention. 
In practice police routinely hold detainees, with the sanction of a 
prosecutor, for weeks or even months without bringing charges, and 
prolonged detention is a serious problem. The General Prosecutor's 
office acknowledged that law enforcement authorities kept more than 
7,000 persons in custody longer than legally allowed in 1998. 
Additionally, short (3-hour) and long (72-hour) detentions for 
``suspicion'' are used widely.
    A bail system exists, but, according to the General Prosecutor's 
Office, only 28 out of the 26,598 persons detained in the first 8 
months of the year were released on bail.
    According to the Constitution, every person detained, arrested, or 
accused of committing a crime has the right to the assistance of a 
defense lawyer from the moment of detention, arrest, or accusation. 
This right generally is respected in practice. Human rights activists 
allege that members of the security forces have pressured prisoners to 
refuse the assistance of an attorney, sometimes resulting in a delay 
before the accused sees a lawyer. The Government's reluctance to 
provide a lawyer is partly attributed to a shortage of funds to pay 
court-appointed lawyers to which defendants are entitled. Detainees 
also may appeal the legality of detention or arrest to the prosecutor 
before trial, but in practice most persons refrain from making an 
appeal due to fear that they may be punished for doing so. If the 
defendant cannot afford an attorney, the Constitution provides that the 
State must provide one free of charge. Human rights organizations 
allege that many prisoners are unaware of this provision of the law. 
Although some lawyers are reluctant to defend clients unpopular with 
the Government, there were no reports of attorneys being sanctioned by 
the Government for their decisions to defend particular clients.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does 
not use it.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Government interference and 
pressure compromised the court system's independence throughout the 
year--a situation codified in the Constitution's establishment of a 
judiciary fully under the control of the President and the executive 
branch.
    There are three levels in the court system: local; oblast 
(provincial); and the Supreme Court. According to the Constitution, the 
President proposes to the upper house of Parliament (the Senate) 
nominees for the Supreme Court. (Nominees are recommended by the 
Supreme Judicial Council, a body that the President chaired until 
March. Under constitutional amendments passed in 1998, a presidential 
appointee replaced the President as chairperson. Commission members 
also include the chairperson of the Constitutional Council, the 
chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General, the Minister 
of Justice, senators, judges, and other persons appointed by the 
President). The President appoints oblast judges (nominated by the 
Supreme Judicial Council) and local level judges from a list presented 
by the Ministry of Justice. The list is based on recommendations from 
the Qualification Collegium of Justice, an institution made up of 
deputies from the lower house of Parliament (the Majilis), judges, 
public prosecutors, and others appointed by the President.
    According to legislation passed in December 1996, judges are 
appointed for life, although in practice this means until mandatory 
retirement at age 65. The 1995 Constitution abolished the 
Constitutional Court and established a Constitutional Council. The 
President directly appoints three of its seven members, including the 
chairman. The Council rules on election and referendum challenges, 
interprets the Constitution, and determines the constitutionality of 
laws adopted by Parliament. Under the Constitution, citizens no longer 
have the right to appeal directly to a court about the 
constitutionality of a government action; this appeal is now the sole 
prerogative of the courts. The Constitution states that ``if a court 
finds that a law or other regulatory legal act subject to application 
undermined the rights and liberties of an individual and a citizen, it 
shall suspend legal proceedings and address the Constitutional Council 
with a proposal to declare the law unconstitutional.'' However, it does 
not grant citizens the right to approach the courts on a constitutional 
issue.
    Local courts try less serious crimes, such as petty theft and 
vandalism. Oblast courts handle more serious crimes, such as murder, 
grand theft, and organized criminal activities. The oblast courts also 
may handle cases in rural areas where no local courts are organized. 
Judgments of the local courts may be appealed to the oblast-level 
courts, while those of the oblast courts may be appealed to the Supreme 
Court. There is also a military court. Although they do not currently 
exist, specialized and extraordinary courts also can be created--for 
example, economic, taxation, family, juvenile, and administrative 
courts--which would have the status of oblast and local courts.
    The Constitution and the law establish the necessary procedures for 
a fair trial. Trials are public, with the exception of instances in 
which an open hearing could result in state secrets being divulged, or 
when the private life or personal family concerns of a citizen must be 
protected.
    According to the Constitution, defendants have the right to be 
present, the right to counsel (at public expense if needed), and the 
right to be heard in court and call witnesses for the defense. 
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, are protected from self-
incrimination, and have the right to appeal a decision to a higher 
court. Legal proceedings are to be conducted in the state language, 
Kazakh, although Russian also may be used officially in the courts. 
Proceedings also may be held in the language of the majority of the 
population in a particular area.
    In most cases, these rights are respected. However, cases involving 
government opponents frequently are closed. Courthouse guards did not 
allow the public to observe the 1998 trial of five government opponents 
on charges of attending a meeting of an unregistered organization (see 
Section 1.d.). The 1998 trial of Labor Movement leader Madel Ismailov 
for insulting the honor and dignity of the President was closed to the 
public and press.
    The problem of corruption is evident at every stage and level of 
the judicial process. Judges are poorly paid; the Government has not 
made a vigorous effort to root out corruption in the judiciary. 
According to press reports, judicial positions can be purchased. 
Anecdotal evidence stemming from individual cases suggests that judges 
solicit bribes from participants in trials and rule accordingly.
    In May 1996, the Government instituted a procedure that required 
recertification of all judges. Completed in 1998, the process was 
intended to ensure that judges are familiar with current law. The 
recertification resulted in a significant turnover of personnel, 
particularly at the lower levels. Although the recertification process 
addressed a legitimate need to improve judicial competence, it was used 
in some cases by local governments to remove individual judges for 
political reasons. In March the rector of the State Judicial University 
alleged that 40 percent of sitting judges were recertified only because 
they received copies of the recertification exam prior to taking it. 
There was no official response to this accusation.
    The new Criminal Code took effect in 1998. Although human rights 
organizations considered the new criminal code a step forward, they 
raised a number of concerns regarding the code's effect on individual 
political and civic rights. The new code extends the maximum term of 
imprisonment from 15 to 30 years and gives judges and law enforcement 
officials more flexibility in determining appropriate charges. 
Previously, after a certain number of civil code violations, a 
defendant automatically would be charged with a criminal offense. The 
new code also eliminated a number of legal holdovers from the Soviet 
period, including public condemnation as a punishment, enforcement of 
restrictive passport regulations, and prosecution for vagrancy or a 
parasitic way of life.
    The Government held one political prisoner who was released in 
February upon completion of his 1-year sentence. In 1998 an Almaty 
district court sentenced Labor Movement leader Madel Ismailov for 
insulting the honor and dignity of President Nazarbayev, a 
constitutional offense, during a November 1997 political rally in 
Almaty. Ismailov reportedly called President Nazarbayev ``a 
scoundrel.'' Ismailov was convicted of the most serious form of 
insulting--using the mass media to insult the honor and dignity of the 
President--because an independent television station had recorded 
Ismailov's offending remark. Ismailov, a resident of Almaty, served his 
sentence in a prison in the north Kazakhstan oblast. In an appeal to 
the General Prosecutor, lawyers for Ismailov contended that his 
imprisonment in the north Kazakhstan oblast violated the Criminal 
Executive Code, which stipulates that ``Persons sentenced to 
imprisonment should serve out their terms in prisons located on the 
territory of the oblast where they lived before their arrest or where 
they were sentenced.'' The General Prosecutor took no action on the 
appeal prior to Ismailov's release. Ismailov attempted to register as a 
candidate for the October parliamentary elections, but was barred under 
amendments made to the election decree in April 1998 because of his 
criminal conviction (see Section 3).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Despite constitutional protections, the Government 
infringed on these rights. The Constitution provides that citizens have 
the right to ``confidentiality of personal deposits and savings, 
correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph and other 
messages.'' Limitation of this right is allowed ``only in cases and 
according to procedures directly established by law.'' However, the KNB 
and Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the concurrence of the General 
Prosecutor's office, can and do interfere arbitrarily with privacy, 
family, home, and correspondence. The law requires the police, who 
remain part of the internal security structure, to obtain a search 
warrant from a prosecutor before conducting a search, but they 
sometimes search without a warrant. The KNB has the right to monitor 
telephone calls and mail, but under the law it must inform the General 
Prosecutor's office within 24 hours of such activity. Some human rights 
observers complained that the Government monitored their movements and 
telephone calls (see Section 4). A foreign NGO working to promote 
democracy alleged that someone apparently tampered with its e-mail in 
November. Also in November, opposition figures alleged that the 
Government temporarily closed off direct access through local Internet 
service providers to the Eurasia web site, which featured material 
critical of the Government. However, they provided no evidence. On 
November 25, the Prime Minister signed an order creating a single, 
state-run billing center for all telecommunications services. Although 
the order called for the center to open on January 1, 2000, it did not 
appear at year's end that the center would be ready before the 
deadline. The Government presented the creation of the center as an 
attempt to ensure that all telecommunications traffic was being taxed 
properly. NGO's, opposition figures, and other private citizens 
expressed concerns that the Government would use the center to enhance 
its monitoring of telecommunications traffic and to control the 
availability of information on the Internet. Government officials 
denied that this was their intent.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the July 
press and media law provide for freedom of speech and of the press; 
however, the Government restricted these rights in practice. The new 
media law places media issues under the control of the Minister of 
Information and Social Accord, and the Government closed or otherwise 
harassed much of the independent media. Many journalists practiced 
self-censorship. A vaguely written law on national security passed in 
1998 gave the Prosecutor General the authority to suspend the activity 
of news media that undermine national security.
    The new media law reaffirms the constitutional provision for free 
speech and prohibits censorship; however, the law's vague language 
gives the Government broad discretion to restrict media freedom and 
thereby promotes media self-censorship. For example the law prohibits 
the mass media from ``undermining state security'' or advocating 
``class, social, race, national, or religious superiority'' or ``a cult 
of cruelty and violence.'' Under the law, owners, editors, 
distributors, and journalists can be held responsible for violations. 
The law also requires all media to register with the Government, but it 
does not set forth an appeals process if registration is denied.
    During the January campaign presidential election, many members of 
the independent media reported government pressure not to cover 
opposition candidates. Newspapers that tried to cover the opposition 
had their print runs seized or delayed, or their access to printing 
houses denied. Most media outlets were allowed to cover the full range 
of candidates in the October parliamentary elections, but local 
officials frequently pressured them to limit coverage of the 
opposition.
    The Government continued to own and control most printing and 
distribution facilities and to subsidize periodicals, including many 
that supposedly were independent. The potential for government control 
and the widespread belief that the Government was cracking down on 
independent media resulted in widespread media self-censorship. The key 
subject considered ``off limits'' by journalists was personal criticism 
of the President and his family. In November after television news 
programs from Russia began reporting that Swiss authorities froze bank 
accounts allegedly belonging to the President, the Government blocked 
retransmission of Russian television stations for several days. 
However, The Globe, a small-circulation Russian-English bilingual 
newspaper based in Almaty, published a story about the Swiss bank 
accounts with no apparent repercussions. The press generally was 
permitted to criticize government decisions, official corruption, and 
the powerlessness of the Parliament.
    The authorities frequently pressured two avowed opposition 
newspapers, Twenty-First Century (XXI Vek) and Soldat (formerly Dat). 
Issues of these newspapers sometimes were seized from street vendors. 
Printing houses, sometimes acknowledging government pressure, 
frequently declined to publish the newspapers. In September, 3 weeks 
before the parliamentary elections, a local Almaty court froze the bank 
account of Twenty-First Century, leaving it unable to pay its vendors 
and employees. The court action was based on a lawsuit brought by a 
company reportedly controlled by a son-in-law of President Nazarbayev. 
Twenty-First Century lost the lawsuit in November, and at year's end 
had not paid the judgment.
    The Government closed Dat, then the only Kazakh-language opposition 
newspaper, in 1998. The newspaper reappeared early in the year in two 
new versions, one of which, Soldat, clearly identified itself as an 
opposition newspaper. Kazakhstani printing houses, reportedly under 
pressure from the authorities, refused to publish Soldat. In September 
two issues of Soldat published in Russia were seized by the customs 
police who reportedly claimed that the newspaper needed to pay 
additional fees and produce health certificates attesting that the 
imported newspapers were free of tuberculosis. The authorities 
ultimately released the newspapers after they were outdated, and Soldat 
continues to publish.
    In Semipalatinsk the tax police harassed the Irtysh newspaper, 
which regularly included in its own print run an insert from the 
Fahrenheit 451 opposition newspaper. Fahrenheit 451 was unable to 
publish on its own because the authorities denied it access to state 
publishing houses and pressured the few private ones to refuse to do so 
as well. Fahrenheit 451 stopped appearing 1 month before the October 
parliamentary election.
    The independent newspaper Nachnyem S'ponedelnika, which specializes 
in investigative stories about government corruption, was on the verge 
of closure at year's end due to defamation lawsuits and government 
harassment.
    After suffering harassment during 1998, including threats of death 
and violence directed against staff members, the newspaper Center lost 
many of its advertisers and ceased publication at the end of 1998. The 
Government took no apparent action following the assault on Dec 8, 1998 
against a visiting German journalist that was regarded as possibly 
politically motivated. Criminal charges were brought in October 1998 
against Petr Svoik for his newspaper article about relations between 
ethnic Russians and Kazakhs. The case was ``suspended indefinitely,'' 
but has never been dismissed officially.
    The Communist Party's national newspaper, which was closed by the 
Government in 1997, has not been permitted to resume publication.
    About 80 percent of newspapers are subject to direct government 
control. The Government runs the newspapers that appear most 
frequently, five times a week. There are also a large number of 
newspapers that are produced by government ministries, for example, 
Kazakhstan Science, which is published by the Ministry of Science. Many 
newspapers receive a government subsidy, including about 90 percent of 
Kazakh-language newspapers, although most of these would call 
themselves independents. Therefore, including newspapers that receive 
subsidies, about 80 percent of newspapers are government-influenced. 
Each major population center has at least one independent weekly 
newspaper. There are 11 major independent newspapers in Almaty.
    According to credible observers in the independent press and human 
rights community, the Government and its proxies continued to 
consolidate media ownership. One of President Nazarbayev's sons-in-law, 
Rakhat Aliyev, and his associates reportedly gained control of the 
Karavan media group, which includes the largest nongovernment newspaper 
in the country, Karavan, as well as KTK television and radio, and the 
Franklin Press publishing house. Aliyev is the senior KNB official in 
Almaty oblast. The Karavan group reportedly had changed hands several 
times since June 1998, when, according to credible media and human 
rights observers, the tax authorities coerced the owners of the 
independent Karavan media group into selling the group to business 
interests closely associated with the President. Aliyev was the head of 
the tax police at the time. In late August, it was reported that the 
KTK purchased NTK television and was preparing to reorganize the two 
into one company. The two stations continued broadcasting separately, 
but NTK ended its nightly news program in December.
    Newspapers largely or entirely stopped attempting to print outside 
the country during the year. However, opposition newspapers or 
newspapers that encounter official disapproval as a consequence of 
specific stories encounter difficulty gaining access to local printing 
presses.
    The Government controls nearly all broadcast transmission 
facilities. There are 45 independent television and radio stations (17 
television stations, 15 radio stations and 13 combined television and 
radio stations). Eleven of these are in Almaty. There are only two 
government-owned, combined radio and television companies; however, 
they represent five channels and are the only stations that can 
broadcast nationwide. Regional governments own several frequencies; 
however, independent broadcasters have arranged with local 
administrations to use the majority of these. An Association of 
Independent Electronic Media of Central Asia (ANESMI) exists, but it is 
fractured and weak.
    There were no reports, as in the previous year, that the Government 
threatened not to renew broadcast licenses of out-of-favor independent 
stations. There were also no frequency auctions; many members of the 
independent media and human rights activists believed that the 
Government used the auctions in the past to harass and even eliminate 
independent media. The Government continued its discussion of a 50 
percent Kazakh language content in broadcasting, and threats of 
selective enforcement of this requirement remain a problem. However, 
there were no reports during the year of the Government closing 
stations or failing to renew their licenses if they were not in 
conformity with the 50 percent rule, despite government threats in 1998 
to do so.
    There was no further action by the Prosecutor General concerning 
the legality of the frequencies auction in 1997. Nor was there any 
response from the Prime Minister to the Prosecutor's request for a 
ruling on the law guiding the auctions. There was no law passed on the 
tender procedures during the year.
    During the campaign for the January presidential election, many 
members of the independent media reported government pressure not to 
cover opposition candidates. Media coverage of the campaign for the 
October parliamentary elections was extensive and featured all 
candidates. A nationally televised 2\1/2\ hour live debate on Khabar 
state television featured representatives of the nine registered 
parties that were participating in the party-list section of the vote. 
Despite these improvements over the presidential election, independent 
media around the country reported official pressure to give the 
majority of their parliamentary election coverage to the 
propresidential Otan party. They also reported that government 
authorities told them to limit coverage and to focus on negative news 
about the RNPK and Azamat opposition parties, as well as the Orleu 
opposition movement. Some television editors claimed that they were 
told categorically not to cover certain opposition candidates. Azamat 
claimed that state television and radio denied its candidates the free 
air time normally available to all candidates. An RNPK candidate, 
Twenty-First Century newspaper editor Bigeldy Gabdullin, charged 
correctly that his free broadcast was not shown in his home 
constituency of Talgar.
    The Constitution provides for the protection of the dignity of the 
President and the law against insulting the President and other 
officials remained on the books. Labor Movement leader Madel Ismailov 
served 1 year in prison for violating the law (see Section 1.e.). 
Several laws control advertising in the mass media. One law restricts 
alcohol and tobacco advertising on television. The new media law 
prohibited violence and all ``pornography'' from television broadcasts. 
Another law restricts advertising in each issue of a newspaper to 20 
percent of the total material. The Minister of Justice and the Minister 
of Information have interpreted this law as restricting paid articles, 
but not commercial advertisements.
    A new law on state secrets entered into force in March. It 
criminalized the unauthorized disclosure of a wide range of 
information, much of which was vaguely defined and left to the 
interpretation of government authorities. The list of state secrets 
enumerated in the law included all information about the health and 
private life of the President and his family. Also defined as state 
secrets were basic economic information such as the volumes and 
scientific characteristics of national mineral reserves and the amount 
of government debt owed to foreign creditors.
    In December the Government announced that beginning in 2000, the 
Billing and Telecommunications Tariff Center would restrict Internet 
access to government service providers (see Section 1.f.).
    Academic freedom is circumscribed. As is the case for journalists, 
academics cannot violate certain taboos, such as criticizing the 
President and his family. There were widespread credible reports that 
universities and schools coerced faculty, students, and the parents of 
schoolchildren to sign nominating petitions for the reelection campaign 
of President Nazarbayev. There were similar widespread reports that 
educational administrators also coerced faculty into joining the 
propresidential Otan party. During the campaign for the presidential 
election in January, the Al-Farabi national university in Almaty forced 
Yelena Nikitenko, an adviser to opposition presidential candidate 
Akezhan Kazhegeldin, to resign from the faculty because of her outside 
political activities (see Section 3). In May a professor at the 
Eurasian University in Astana, Armial Tasymbekov, was committed to a 
mental hospital for public drunkenness. He claimed that his 
incarceration was motivated politically because KNB officials 
interrogated him shortly before his incarceration on the suspicion that 
he incited his students to criticize the President in leaflets and 
graffiti. Tasymbekov was released later in May and died in August (see 
Section 1.c.). Course topics and content generally are subject to 
approval by the university administration.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for peaceful assembly; however, the Government and the law 
impose significant restrictions. The 1998 law on national security 
defined as a threat to national security ``unsanctioned gatherings, 
public meetings, marches, demonstrations, illegal picketing, and 
strikes'' that upset social and political stability.
    According to the law, organizations must apply to the local 
authorities for a permit to hold a demonstration or public meeting at 
least 10 days in advance, or the activity is considered illegal. In 
some cases, local officials routinely issued necessary permits. 
However, human rights activists complained that complicated procedures 
and the 10-day notification period made it difficult for all groups to 
organize public meetings and demonstrations. They reported that local 
authorities, especially those outside of the capital, turned down the 
majority of applications submitted or refused to allow rallies to take 
place in central locations. An April 1998 amendment to the election 
decree that bars candidates for public office who have been convicted 
within the preceding year of administrative offenses was used against 
leading government opponents who participated in unsanctioned meetings 
and demonstrations (see Section 3).
    There were numerous peaceful, unsanctioned demonstrations by 
workers and pensioners protesting difficult economic conditions and the 
nonpayment of wages and pensions. For the most part, law enforcement 
authorities did not interfere in the demonstrations, and no action was 
taken against the individuals who participated. However, pensioners 
were arrested occasionally at the peaceful, monthly pensioners' 
demonstration in front of the city hall in Almaty.
    There were also cases in which the Government arrested, detained, 
fined, and sometimes imprisoned the participants and organizers of 
unsanctioned rallies. In September Almaty police arrested about a dozen 
persons who gathered in front of the Russian embassy to protest the 
detention in Moscow of opposition leader Akezhan Kazhegeldin (see 
Section 3). Two of the protesters were sentenced to 10 and 5 days in 
jail; the rest were fined or received warnings. In May a court in 
Kostenai fined Communist Party and Pokoleniye Pensioners Movement 
activist Vladimir Chernyshev for participating in an unsanctioned 
rally. Chernyshev gathered with a group of pensioners to lay flowers at 
a monument to Lenin on Lenin's birthday (see Sections 1.d. and 3). In 
April police in Aralsk reportedly beat a group of female hunger 
strikers who were protesting nonpayment for 3 years of family social 
benefits; the women were blocking a railway line. Three were 
hospitalized as a result of the beatings.
    The authorities regularly blocked access to conference halls rented 
by opposition political parties, candidates, and related groups. A 
meeting of political opposition groups was disrupted on October 27 when 
participants could not gain access to the auditorium that they rented 
at the Academy of Sciences in Almaty. The activists organized the 
meeting to protest alleged government manipulation of the October 
parliamentary elections and to establish a new unified opposition 
front, the Forum of Democratic Forces. The group succeeded in holding 
its meeting after moving participants to one of three other locations 
that it rented secretly in anticipation of blocked access to its 
announced meeting place. On April 10, the new opposition movement Orleu 
(Progress) could not gain access to the labor union hall that it rented 
for its founding congress in Almaty. Firemen sealed the hall a day 
earlier because of purported building code violations. There were 
credible allegations that the office of the mayor of Almaty instigated 
the fire department action for political reasons.
    Madel Ismailov, convicted in September 1997 of ``active 
participation in or organization of public disorder'' and sentenced to 
1 year of ``corrective labor,'' lost both of his appeals against the 
judgment. However, as he was in prison for a year after a conviction 
for insulting the President and had no salary during that period, the 
corrective labor penalty (which means that a portion of salary is 
garnished) was not imposed.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government and the law impose significant restrictions on this right. 
Organizations that conduct public activities, hold public meetings, 
participate in conferences, or have bank accounts must register 
annually with the Government. Registration on the local level requires 
a minimum of 10 members and on the national level, a minimum of 10 
members in at least 7 of the 14 oblasts. In addition a registration fee 
is required, which many groups consider a deterrent to registration.
    Many groups had difficulties trying to register with local 
officials. The new association called For Fair Elections was registered 
on March 1, more than 5 months after filing its registration 
application. The law requires the Ministry of Justice to act on 
registration applications within 15 days of filing. Five leading 
government opponents who participated in the group's October 1998 
meeting in Almaty were convicted of participating in a meeting of an 
unregistered organization (see Section 3). The organization Russian 
Community (Russkaia Obshchina) demonstrated in August to protest 
authorities' 2-year denial of national registration, which rendered its 
members ineligible to serve as observers at polling stations. The 
Government subsequently registered the organization, permitting it to 
observe the parliamentary elections.
    The Constitution prohibits political parties established on a 
religious basis. The Government has refused to register ethnic-based 
political parties on the grounds that their activities could spark 
ethnic violence. The Constitution bans ``public associations''--
including political parties--whose ``goals or actions are directed at a 
violent change of the constitutional system, violation of the integrity 
of the republic, undermining of the security of the state (and), 
fanning of social, racial, national, religious, class, and tribal 
enmity.'' Nonetheless, unregistered parties and movements hold meetings 
and publish newspapers. All of the major religious and ethnic groups 
have independently functioning cultural centers.
    To participate in elections, a political party must register with 
the Government. The Government registered 10 parties to participate in 
the parliamentary elections in October, including several associated 
with government opponents. Under current law, a party must submit a 
list of at least 3,000 members from a minimum of 7 oblasts and the 
cities of Almaty and Astana. The list must provide personal information 
about members, including date and place of birth, address, and place of 
employment. For many citizens, submitting such personal data to the 
Government is reminiscent of the tactics of the former Soviet KGB and 
inhibits them from joining parties. The nationalist Alash Party and the 
Social Democratic Party have refused to register on the principle that 
they should not have to submit personal information about their members 
to the Government. Under the law, members of unregistered parties may 
run for elected office as individuals, but not as party members.
    In December 1998, leading government opponents headed by former 
Prime Minister and disqualified presidential candidate Akezhan 
Kazhegeldin began efforts to form the new Republican People's Party. 
The group held its first congress in Moscow to avoid government 
harassment directed at Kazhegeldin and other members of the opposition 
prior to the January presidential election (see Section 3). According 
to conference organizers, authorities at the Moscow hotel where the 
congress was to have been held denied the group access to conference 
facilities on the eve of the meeting. Organizers said that 
approximately 10 other Moscow hotels subsequently refused to allow the 
group to use conference facilities before organizers found a suitable 
location. Organizers of the congress credibly alleged that Kazakhstani 
authorities used influence with Russian officials to try to disrupt the 
congress. The party was registered by the Government prior to the 
parliamentary elections in October and several of its members became 
candidates in individual races. The other candidates running against 
the President in the January presidential election and against 
government-favored candidates in the October parliamentary elections 
complained that local officials throughout the country refused to allow 
them to rent public halls for political meetings.
    The Constitution prohibits foreign political parties and foreign 
trade unions from operating. In addition the Constitution prohibits the 
financing of political parties and trade unions by foreign legal 
entities and citizens, foreign states, and international organizations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the various denominations worship largely without 
government interference; however, the Government sometimes harasses 
Islamic and Christian groups whose members it regards as religious 
extremists. The Constitution defines the country as a ``secular'' 
state. It also requires foreign religious associations to carry out 
their activities, including the appointment of the heads of religious 
associations, ``in coordination with appropriate state institutions.'' 
However, in general the Government does not interfere with the 
appointment of religious leaders or the activities of foreign religious 
associations.
    Religious organizations, including churches, must register with the 
Ministry of Justice in order to receive legal status. Without 
registration religious organizations cannot buy or rent real property, 
hire employees, obtain visas for foreign missionaries, or engage in any 
other legal transactions. Although religious organizations, unlike 
other nongovernmental entities, are entitled legally to carry out their 
work without government registration, in practice many local officials 
insist that they register. Registration requires an application 
submitted by at least 10 local citizens and is usually a quick and 
simple process. Some religious groups out of favor with the Government 
encounter difficulties registering in certain jurisdictions. These 
groups include Jehovah's Witnesses and some Korean Protestant groups, 
as well as Muslim and Russian Orthodox groups independent of the Mufti 
or Orthodox archbishop (the national leaders of Islam and Russian 
Orthodoxy). Foreign missionaries require state accreditation. There 
were no reports that the Government prohibited the activities of any 
religious group whose registration application it turned down.
    Foreign missionary activity is authorized under law, but only when 
missionaries are accredited by the state. In practice many missionaries 
operate without accreditation. Although legally entitled to register 
religious organizations, foreign missionaries generally find that they 
must list local citizens as founders in order to register their 
organizations.
    Some foreign missionaries, whose presence is not welcomed by some 
Muslim and Orthodox citizens, have complained of occasional harassment 
by low-level government officials. In particular evangelical 
Protestants working in schools, hospitals, and other social service 
institutions have alleged government hostility toward their efforts to 
proselytize.
    A potential deterioration in the right to religious freedom was 
averted at least temporarily when the Government withdrew restrictive 
draft amendments to the national law on religion in March. The draft 
changes would have imposed burdensome new registration requirements on 
religious organizations and otherwise tightened government control of 
religion. One provision would have required religious groups that seek 
registration to submit certification from locally elected officials 
that they were already active for 10 years in the jurisdiction in which 
they sought registration. Other provisions would have required 
religious organizations that seek registration to submit information 
about their creeds and practices, including attitudes toward family and 
marriage, education, and members' health. Vaguely written provisions 
would have given local officials broad authority to refuse or cancel 
the registration of religious organizations deemed a threat to public 
order or state security. The Government withdrew the draft legislation 
after minority religious groups, human rights advocates, and foreign 
observers objected to it.
    Government officials frequently expressed concerns about the 
potential spread of religious extremism. They pointed especially to the 
risk of political Islam spreading north from Afghanistan, Iran, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other states. In September the 
National Security Council, which is chaired by the President, created a 
commission to develop policies to combat religious extremism. In June 
the chief of the KNB named the fight against religious extremism as a 
top priority of the internal intelligence service.
    On July 14, a group of more than 100 armed special forces and 
police raided a camp outside Taraz where a Muslim group was holding a 
private religious study retreat. The authorities detained 70 group 
members, including, reportedly, a 6-year-old and 11 other minors. Group 
members alleged that the authorities beat all 70 detainees in jail. One 
minor reportedly suffered a broken nose; another detainee reportedly 
suffered broken ribs. Although some government officials publicly 
alleged that the group was terrorist, not religious, in nature, the 
authorities uncovered no weapons or politically subversive literature 
at the camp. All 70 detainees were freed by September. Only one group 
leader was charged with a crime (promoting the activities of an 
unregistered organization), but he was released under the August 
amnesty law (see Section 1.c.).
    In September police closed an Islamic school in Karasu village, 
near Almaty. The authorities alleged that a Pakistani teacher at the 
school was promoting religious extremism and that students were being 
kept forcibly at the school. The school was allowed to reopen, but it 
was closed again in October.
    A campaign by the KNB and the national prosecutor's office to 
identify religious extremists led to the arrest and conviction in May 
of one alleged Muslim extremist in Atyrau. According to press reports, 
Askar Sekerbayev received a 6-month suspended sentence and a fine for 
``founding or participating in the activities of an illegal public 
organization.'' Sekerbayev reportedly belonged to the Muslim Zhamagat 
organization, which, the Government alleged, advocated violence.
    In March officials from the national prosecutor's office, in at 
least one case accompanied by the KNB, raided the offices of six 
legally registered communities of Jehovah's Witnesses in Almaty and 
Zhambyl oblasts. In at least one case, the officials reportedly 
demanded copies of church correspondence, minutes of religious 
meetings, and other documentation. In all the cases, prosecutors 
summoned church leaders and required them to provide information about 
the organization's aims, religious practices, views on medical 
treatment and military service, and other questions. The Government 
took no further actions against the organization or its membership 
after the raids were publicized.
    On May 19, the public prosecutor's office in Almalinskiy district 
of Almaty petitioned a city court to ban the Charismatic Evangelic 
Church of Christ. The petition was based on the alleged irregularities 
in the group's registration, its foreign pastor's legal status, and 
alleged violations of the law on family and marriage by the pastor. The 
city court dismissed the case on June 17. The prosecutor's office 
appealed the decision but lost the appeal.
    The Government often invited the national leaders of the two 
largest religions, Islam and Russian Orthodoxy, to participate jointly 
in state events. Such appearances by the Islamic Mufti and the Orthodox 
Archbishop, often in the presence of the President, were intended to 
promote religious and ethnic harmony. Some members of other faiths, 
including Muslims and Orthodox Christians not affiliated with the Mufti 
or Archbishop, criticized the Government's inclusion of the Mufti and 
Archbishop in state events as official favoritism and a violation of 
the constitutional separation of church and state.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right 
to emigrate and the right of repatriation; both are respected in 
practice. The law on national security prohibits persons who had access 
to state secrets through their work from taking up permanent residence 
abroad for 5 years after leaving government service. Citizens have the 
right to change their citizenship, but are not permitted to hold dual 
citizenship.
    According to the Constitution, everyone who is legally present on 
the territory of the country has the right to move freely on its 
territory and freely choose a place of residence except in cases 
stipulated by law. This provision formally abolished the ``propiska'' 
system of residence permits, a holdover from the Soviet era, and 
replaced it with a system of registration. However, in practice, 
citizens still are required to register in order to prove legal 
residence and obtain city services. Registration in most of the country 
generally was routine, but it was difficult to register in Almaty due 
to its relative affluence and local officials' fears of overcrowding. 
The Government can refuse to register a citizen, just as it did under 
the propiska system, in order to limit the number of persons who can 
move to a certain city or area.
    There were a few reports of government efforts to restrict the 
movement of foreigners around the country. There were no further 
reports of foreigners being detained for wandering into not clearly 
marked restricted areas. Likewise, there were no further reports by 
foreigners that they were denied access or required to pay exorbitant 
entry fees to ostensibly free national parks. The authorities refused 
to approve the assignment of foreign aid workers to towns considered 
``sensitive.'' Internal visas are no longer required for foreigners 
traveling outside Almaty.
    An exit visa is required for citizens who wish to travel abroad, 
although refusals are rare. There have been reports of some officials 
demanding bribes for exit visas. It is usually necessary to meet a 
number of bureaucratic requirements before the exit visa is issued. For 
example close relatives with a claim to support from the applicant must 
give their concurrence. Intending emigrants also must obtain evidence 
that they have no outstanding financial obligations. Foreigners must 
have exit visas, although they receive them routinely as part of their 
entry visa. Foreigners who overstay their original visa, or who did not 
receive an exit visa as part of their original visa, must get an exit 
visa from the immigration authorities before leaving. Foreigners 
staying at least 3 days in the country, regardless of whether they are 
staying 3 days in any individual city, must register with the local 
visa registry office. Many have complained that the process is 
bureaucratically cumbersome. Immigration authorities refused to allow 
foreigners without proof of registration to leave the country.
    The Government accords special treatment to ethnic Kazakhs and 
their families who fled during Stalin's era and wish to return. Kazakhs 
in this category are entitled, in principle, to citizenship and many 
other privileges. Anyone else, including ethnic Kazakhs who are not 
considered refugees from the Stalin era, such as the descendants of 
Kazakhs who moved to Mongolia during the previous century, must apply 
for permission to return. However, it is the stated policy of the 
Government to encourage and assist all ethnic Kazakhs living outside 
the country to return, if they so desire.
    The Government usually cooperates with the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations 
in assisting refugees. In January the Government ratified the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol; 
however, the Government did not pass implementing legislation for the 
Refugee Convention by year's end. In February the Government returned 
to Chinese authorities three ethnic Uyghurs from China without giving 
them an opportunity to request asylum, as provided for in the Refugee 
Convention. The UNHCR, human rights observers, and Uyghur activists 
believed that the three--Ilyas Zordun, Ali Khudaberdi, and Khamit 
Maimat--would have requested asylum if given the opportunity. According 
to Amnesty International, ``wanted'' posters in China indicated that 
Maimat was sought for ``separatist'' activities. The UNHCR and human 
rights groups sought access unsuccessfully to the three Uyghurs during 
the 6 months that they were held in isolated detention in Almaty. 
Following their return to China, Zordun, Khudaberdi, and Maimat 
reportedly were executed. In other cases, the Government allowed the 
UNHCR access to detained foreigners.
    Following the passage of a 1997 migration law and creation of the 
Agency for Migration and Demography, the Government began in 1998 to 
register asylum seekers and to determine their status in consultation 
with the UNHCR. Ethnic Kazakh migrants are automatically eligible for 
citizenship, although the Government has granted citizenship to only 
10,000 of the 180,000 Kazakh migrants. Migrants from other Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS) countries are not considered to be refugees 
as they may travel and settle freely in any CIS country. The Government 
has not allowed refugees without passports to register and has 
restricted registration largely to refugees from Afghanistan. All non-
CIS citizens are considered to be intending immigrants. However, in 
practice, the Government is tolerant in its treatment of local refugee 
populations. Only the President can grant political asylum; he is known 
to have done so only once since independence in 1991.
    The UNHCR estimated that there were approximately 10,000 refugees 
in the country (about 6,000 from Tajikistan, 3,000 from Afghanistan, 
and 1,000 from other countries, including an increasing number of 
Chechens from Russia). By October the Government registered 
approximately 1,200 asylum seekers and accorded refugee status to about 
two-thirds of them. The Government continues to give priority to the 
return of ethnic Kazakhs in order to increase the percentage of Kazakhs 
in the overall population and to offset the large-scale emigration of 
ethnic Russians and Germans. Since independence approximately 180,000 
ethnic Kazakhs, mostly from other CIS countries, Iran, Afghanistan, 
Mongolia, Turkey, China, and Saudi Arabia have immigrated. The 
Government struggled to find resources for integration programs for 
these immigrants, some of whom lived in squalid settings. The problem 
of integrating the Kazakh migrants was compounded by the inability of 
more than 90 percent of them to obtain the Kazakhstani citizenship to 
which theoretically they are entitled by law. Without citizenship, the 
migrants are not allowed to own property, open businesses, or conduct 
other legal transactions.
    Agreements between Kazakhstan and Russia that established broad 
legal rights for the citizens of one country living on the territory of 
the other and provided for expeditious naturalization for citizens of 
one country who moved to the other entered into force in 1997.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for a democratic government; however, in 
practice the Government severely limited the right of citizens to 
change their government. The Constitution concentrates power in the 
presidency, granting the President considerable control over the 
legislature, judiciary, and local government. The Constitution cannot 
be modified or amended without the consent of the President. In 1995 
President Nazarbayev extended his term of office to 2000 by referendum 
without a contested presidential election (which, according to the 
Constitution then in force, should have been held in 1996).
    The President appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet. He has the power to dismiss Parliament and to rule by decree 
should he so choose. He appoints judges and senior court officials and 
appoints all regional governors. The President also directly appoints 
the chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the members 
of the Commission.
    President Nazarbayev won a new term in office on January 10 in an 
election held nearly 2 years earlier than previously scheduled. The 
previous October, the President and the Parliament had passed in 1 day, 
without any prior public notice, a series of 19 constitutional 
amendments that enabled them 1 day later to call the early presidential 
election. Among other changes, the constitutional amendments extended 
the presidential term of office from 5 to 7 years and lifted the 65-
year age limit on government service. (President Nazarbayev will be 65 
before the end of his 7-year presidential term that began in January.) 
The constitutional amendments also extended the terms of Members of 
Parliament from 4 to 5 years for the lower house (Majilis), and from 4 
to 6 years for the Senate. Government opponents and international 
observers criticized the short-notice call of early elections because 
it did not leave enough time for the Government to implement promised 
electoral reforms and for intending candidates to organize effective 
campaigns.
    The Government imposed onerous requirements on candidates hoping to 
qualify for the presidential ballot. Candidates were required to submit 
petitions with approximately 170,000 signatures collected in equal 
proportions from at least 11 of the country's 14 regions. They also 
were required to pass a Kazakh-language test and to make a 
nonrefundable payment of 1,000 times the minimum monthly wage 
(approximately $30,000), although an equal sum was then provided to 
each registered candidate for campaign expenses. Although three 
candidates, in addition to President Nazarbayev, qualified for the 
ballot, two of them, Senator Engels Gabassov and Customs Committee 
Chairman Gani Kasymov, were known as supporters of the President and 
widely believed to be running at government behest.
    In October 1998, less than a week after the early presidential 
election was called, the Government resorted to a provision of the 
presidential decree on elections, passed in May 1998, that prohibited 
persons convicted of administrative offenses from running for public 
office within 1 year of their conviction. A district court in Almaty 
summoned on less than 24 hours' notice 5 leading government opponents--
former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, former Social Democratic 
Party leader Dos Kushim, Pokoleniye Pensioners Movement leader Irina 
Savostina, Azamat movement co-chairman Petr Svoik, and Tabigat 
Ecological Movement leader Mels Yeleusizov--to face charges of 
participating in the October 1998 meeting of an unregistered 
organization called For Fair Elections (see Section 2.b.). The court 
convicted all five. Despite the judgment against him, Kazhegeldin, the 
strongest opposition candidate, applied for registration as a candidate 
in the presidential election. The presidentially appointed CEC 
disqualified his candidacy under the provision of the presidential 
decree on elections that then served as the election law. The Supreme 
Court upheld the disqualification. The CEC also used the election law 
provision to disqualify the presidential candidacy of Amantai Asylbek, 
leader of the Attan antinuclear testing movement, because of the 3-day 
jail sentence he received in February 1998 for participating in an 
unsanctioned demonstration.
    The Government harassed the opposition throughout the presidential 
election campaign. According to credible reports, government agents 
repeatedly pressured managers of conference facilities to deny access 
at the last moment to government opponents who had arranged to use the 
facilities for meetings and press conferences. When opposition meetings 
and press conferences did take place, electricity at the facilities was 
often interrupted. Government attempts to disrupt opposition meetings 
appeared to have extended beyond national borders when management of a 
Moscow hotel withdrew permission at the last moment for a December 1998 
opposition congress (see Section 2.b.). Communist Party leader 
Serykbolsyn Abdildin, the only candidate from the ranks of the 
preelection opposition who qualified for the presidential ballot, 
publicly complained that local officials loyal to the President impeded 
his attempts to hold campaign rallies and meetings.
    Unsolved assaults on Kazhegeldin and two of his advisers appeared 
to have been politically motivated and, government critics alleged, 
sanctioned by the Government. In October 1998, two gunshots of unknown 
origin were fired near Kazhegeldin on the eve of the press conference 
at which he announced his presidential candidacy. Unknown assailants 
beat his press spokesman, Amirzhan Kosanov, and one of his public 
relations advisers, Yelena Nikitenko (see Section 1.c.). Several days 
before the attack, officials of the Al-Farabi national university in 
Almaty forced Nikitenko to resign from the faculty because of her 
political work. Government officials alleged that the Kazhegeldin 
campaign staged all three attacks. Following the announcement of 
Kazhegeldin's candidacy, the then first deputy chairman of the KNB held 
an unprecedented press conference at which he made admittedly 
unsubstantiated allegations of financial malfeasance against 
Kazhegeldin. The tax authorities brought an action against Kazhegeldin 
during the campaign and, according to credible reports, threatened 
actions against other government opponents. At a news conference, 
Kazhegeldin supporters showed videotape of police repeatedly pulling 
over Kazhegeldin's car for unspecified ``inspections.'' Kazhegeldin 
also claimed that border control officials at the Almaty airport tried 
to prevent him and his family from taking a flight out of the country. 
An attack on a Kazakhstani employee of a foreign embassy also appeared 
to be motivated politically and, human rights observers believe, 
sanctioned by the Government. In December 1998, three men beat the 
employee outside his apartment as the employee returned home. The 
employee suffered a cracked rib, some internal injuries, and required 
stitches to close wounds near both eyes. The attackers made no attempt 
to take the employee's money or other valuables. The absence of robbery 
as a motive and the fact that the employee's responsibilities included 
assisting embassy officers in contacts with political opposition and 
human rights figures suggested that the attack was motivated 
politically. At year's end, the authorities had made no arrests in any 
of these cases.
    The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of 
the OSCE announced in December 1998 that it would not meet the 
Government's request to send a presidential election observation 
mission. In its public explanation, the ODIHR cited concerns about the 
exclusion of two opposition candidates, unequal access to the media, 
and coerced support for President Nazarbayev. The ODIHR sent a small 
election assessment team to report to the OSCE on the full election 
process. The assessment team concluded that the presidential election 
fell ``far short'' of Kazakhstan's commitments as an OSCE participating 
state. It cited, in particular, the exclusion of candidates as an 
``infringement on rights of citizens to seek public office;'' the short 
duration of the election campaign; obstacles to free assembly and 
association; the use of government resources to support President 
Nazarbayev's campaign; unequal access to the media; and the flawed 
presidential decree that served as the election law.
    A newly elected bicameral legislature took office in December. The 
lower house (Majilis), consisting of 77 members, was elected directly 
in October. Under amendments to the Constitution passed in 1998, 
membership in the newly elected Majilis included 10 new seats assigned 
proportionally to political parties based on the percentage of votes 
they received nationally (with a minimum vote threshold of 7 percent). 
As before the other 67 seats were attributed by single mandate 
districts. The upper house (the Senate) consists of 39 members, 32 of 
whom are elected indirectly by members of oblast and city parliaments; 
the President appoints the remaining 7 senators. (The number of Senate 
seats was reduced from 42 in accordance with the Government's 1997 
decision to reduce the number of oblasts from 19 to 14.) Elections were 
held in September for 16 Senate seats. The new election law, passed in 
May, requires candidates for both houses to meet minimum age and 
education requirements and to pay a nonrefundable registration fee of 
25 times the minimum monthly wage (approximately $500--7,000 tenge). 
This fee represented a 75 percent decrease over previous registration 
fees, which opposition figures, human rights monitors, and the OSCE/
ODIHR considered a barrier to participation. The election law does not 
require Majilis candidates to collect a certain number of signatures in 
order to be placed on the ballot; however, Senate candidates must 
obtain signatures from 10 percent of the members of the local 
assemblies in their oblasts in order to be placed on the ballot. 
Political parties wishing to compete for the 10 proportionally 
allocated seats in the Majilis must be registered nationally and in 
two-thirds of the principal administrative jurisdictions (the 14 
oblasts, plus the former and new capital cities, Almaty and Astana). 
The Constitution mandates that participation in elections is voluntary. 
One of the constitutional amendments passed in October 1998 rescinded 
the requirement that at least 50 percent of eligible voters participate 
in order to make an election valid. Experts had cited the old 
requirement as one of the causes of fraud and vote inflation in past 
elections.
    The legislature cannot exercise oversight over the executive 
branch. However, the Parliament has asserted itself with regard to the 
budget, for example, in June it rejected budget austerity measures 
proposed by the Government. The austerity measures subsequently passed 
automatically after the Prime Minister called for and won a confidence 
vote in Parliament. (The rules for votes of confidence give the 
Government a significant advantage in disputes over legislation with 
Parliament. Under the Constitution, a law that is the subject of a 
confidence vote automatically passes unless two-thirds of the full 
membership of each chamber vote ``no confidence.'' Even when Parliament 
votes no confidence, the President has the constitutional option to 
dissolve Parliament.) Should Parliament fail to pass within 30 days an 
``urgent'' bill brought by the President, the President may issue the 
bill by decree. While the President has broad powers to dissolve 
Parliament, Parliament can remove the President only for disability or 
high treason, and only with the consent of the Constitutional Council, 
which largely is controlled by the President.
    Although the President has the right to legislate by decree, he 
respected the parliamentary procedures laid out in the Constitution. In 
June shortly before the Parliament was to adjourn for the summer, 
President Nazarbayev asked the Parliament to accord him full 
legislative authority in order to pass what he considered pressing 
legislation. The President withdrew his request when Parliament agreed 
to remain in session in July and take action during that month on 30 
pieces of legislation deemed ``urgent'' by the President.
    In 1998 the President vetoed a bill which would have established an 
independent auditing agency. The bill was reintroduced by Parliament, 
passed, and signed into law by the President in November 1998.
    The introduction of 10 new parliamentary seats distributed by 
party-list vote enhanced the role of political parties, which, with the 
exception of the Communists, were previously very weak. The Communist 
Party and three propresidential parties--Otan (Fatherland), the Civic 
Party, and the Agrarian Party--divided the 10 new party-list seats in 
the October parliamentary election. No candidate nominated by a non-
Communist opposition party won a seat in the new Parliament. One member 
of the opposition RNPK won a seat after running as an independent 
candidate. The RNPK withdrew its party-list slate after two of its 
candidates, Akezhan Kazhegeldin and Madel Ismailov, were declared 
ineligible. About one-half of the candidates who won ran as 
independents. Many of them were former government officials with strong 
presumed sympathy for progovernment parties.
    Most activities of Parliament remained outside public view. In June 
Parliament barred the press and other outsiders from observing the vote 
of confidence in the Government. Final totals in the parliamentary vote 
of confidence were made public, but not the votes of individual 
members. The Parliament invited nongovernmental representatives to 
observe at least four meetings. Many draft bills were held closely and 
published in the press only after passage and signature by the 
President. Constituent relations were virtually nonexistent.
    Although an improvement over the January presidential election, 
parliamentary elections held in September (for the Senate) and in 
October (for the Majilis) were marred by election law deficiencies, 
executive branch interference in the electoral process, and a lack of 
government openness about vote tabulations. There was strong evidence 
of government manipulation of results in some cases. The OSCE mission 
sent to observe the elections concluded that the elections were ``a 
tentative step'' toward democracy but ``fell short of (Kazakhstan's) 
OSCE commitments.'' The OSCE also expressed concern that parliamentary 
runoff races were conducted just 2 weeks after first-round voting, 
which left no time for the CEC and the courts to act on hundreds of 
complaints filed about the conduct of first-round voting and the 
campaign.
    A new election law, passed by Parliament in May and amended in 
June, replaced a presidential decree that had served as the election 
law. It lowered candidate registration fees by 75 percent, but failed 
to correct other deficiencies of the decree it replaced. The new law 
maintained a system of electoral commissions subject to regional and 
local government authorities, who appoint commission members. It failed 
to incorporate suggestions for creating a more open vote tabulation 
process. It also maintained provisions that bar candidates convicted of 
administrative offenses from running for office for 1 year.
    The CEC issued regulations to ameliorate some of these deficiencies 
in time for the parliamentary elections, but the effects were limited. 
For example the CEC filled vacant seats on electoral commissions by 
lottery among all registered political parties. However, the 
initiative, affected only 25 percent of commissions and was limited to 
one seat per commission, which usually consist of seven members. 
Regulations that clarified the rights of election observers 
significantly improved the ability of observers to monitor vote counts 
at the precinct level. However, observers could not, in the end, use 
the information they obtained to corroborate official results. As of 
year's end, the CEC released comprehensive precinct- and district-level 
vote tallies for only 1 of 67 single-mandate districts, despite 
repeated requests from the OSCE and other observers. With the exception 
of the one district for which comprehensive results were released, the 
CEC did not issue by year's end the order of finish or final totals for 
Majilis candidates who neither won nor qualified for a run-off.
    In response to international and domestic criticism of the 
exclusion of candidates from the January presidential election, the 
Government in June removed attendance at a meeting of an unregistered 
organization from the list of administrative offenses. However, more 
than 40 other administrative offenses that potentially could disqualify 
candidates for public office remained on the books. Among these 
offenses were participation in unsanctioned demonstrations or rallies, 
an offense that the Government often has used to charge its opponents 
(see Section 2.b.). The Government presented rescission of the 
administrative offense as a measure to enable the five opposition 
leaders convicted of participating in the For Fair Elections meeting to 
run for Parliament. Two of the five successfully registered as 
candidates. However, the CEC declined to register Akezhan Kazhegeldin 
due to a December 1998 administrative conviction for contempt of court. 
The conviction arose from Kazhegeldin's failure to respond in person to 
the For Fair Elections charge. (Kazhegeldin argued at the time that he 
met the law's requirements by sending his attorney.) The chairperson of 
the CEC publicly encouraged Kazhegeldin to seek the overturn of his 
contempt of court conviction 1 week before the registration deadline 
for the parliamentary elections. A successful appeal by Kazhegeldin 
would have made him eligible, according to the CEC, to run in the 
parliamentary election. Kazhegeldin subsequently wrote to the Supreme 
Court requesting that it overturn his contempt conviction, but the 
Court ruled that his letter did not constitute a proper legal appeal.
    Within a day of the CEC exclusion of Kazhegeldin's candidacy, 
Russian authorities detained Kazhegeldin in Moscow at the request of 
the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan. The Government requested 
extradition of Kazhegeldin, who was living in exile, in connection with 
allegations that he had laundered illicit funds received while serving 
as Prime Minister from 1994-97. The investigation of Kazhegeldin, while 
possibly grounded in facts, appeared motivated politically. Following 
protests from international human rights groups, the Prosecutor General 
dropped his extradition request, and the Russian authorities released 
Kazhegeldin.
    The CEC barred the parliamentary candidacy of Madel Ismailov 
because of his February 1998 criminal conviction for insulting the 
President (see Section 1.e.). Ismailov had sought to register as a 
candidate on the RNPK party list. The election law precludes candidates 
convicted of criminal offenses from running for office for 3 years 
following their convictions.
    A flawed provision in the electoral law was used to disqualify 
another RNPK candidate, deputy party chairman Gaziz Aldamzharov, after 
he apparently received a majority of votes in an election in Atyrau. 
The CEC annulled the second round of the Atyrau election, as well as 
two other second-round elections, but gave no specific official reason. 
The electoral law precludes all candidates who participated in an 
invalidated election from running in a make-up election, regardless of 
who was responsible for the violations that led to invalidating the 
election. The CEC interpreted this provision to exclude from the 3 
rerun elections all of the approximately 500 candidates who ran 
unsuccessfully for any Majilis seat in October. Although the CEC did 
not announce the specific reason for invalidating the Atyrau election, 
the CEC chairperson said in a television interview that district and 
precinct electoral officials in Atyrau refused to certify protocols 
after a series of disturbances that the chairperson attributed to the 
``opposition.'' These disturbances included alleged bomb threats, 
alleged falsification of ballots, and the incursion into one polling 
station of four masked men who opened and overturned ballot boxes. 
Given widespread expectations that Aldamzharov would receive a majority 
of votes in Atyrau, unsubstantiated CEC allegations that the 
"opposition" disrupted voting in Atyrau appeared contrived.
    There were widespread, documented allegations that regional and 
local executive authorities (akims) interfered with the parliamentary 
elections during the campaign and in the voting process. In one case, 
the chief election commissioner for the Ili district (Almaty oblast) 
resigned because, he alleged, the district akim ordered him to deliver 
a victory for the akim's favored candidate. The commissioner, like most 
election officials a government employee, offered to resign from his 
full-time government job in addition to his electoral responsibilities. 
A significant number of complaints filed in several regions indicated 
that akimats and, through them, other employers threatened supporters 
of opposition candidates with job loss. In one such case, the akimat of 
the capital city, Astana, allegedly threatened to fire more than 20 
government employees for their support of a nonfavored candidate. There 
were also reports that tax inspectors and the KNB intimidated 
opposition candidates, their supporters, and the independent media. 
Akimats used government personnel and other resources, including office 
space, to campaign for ``favored'' candidates and to distribute 
campaign literature for the propresidential Otan party. On first- and 
second-round voting days, international and domestic observers found 
akimat representatives ``supervising'' the work of putatively 
independent precinct electoral commissions in numerous locations 
throughout the country.
    The failure of the CEC to release most precinct- and district-level 
vote tallies undermined the credibility of election results. Evidence 
of official vote tampering in several districts exacerbated this 
problem. The OSCE observation mission obtained copies of flagrantly 
falsified protocols (reports of official results). OSCE observers found 
multiple vote protocols prepared in one Almaty polling station. OSCE 
and domestic observers reported that precinct officials frequently did 
not use official protocol forms to record results in the presence of 
observers or filled out the official forms in pencil. District election 
officials, especially in first round elections, generally refused to 
allow observers to witness the tabulation of results from various 
polling stations. Observers' access to district vote tabulations 
improved in the second round of voting after the CEC issued new 
instructions for preparing protocols and instructed district officials 
to cooperate with observers. Nevertheless, the district election 
commission in Atyrau refused initially to allow OSCE observers into the 
district commission office. District officials ultimately allowed the 
observers into their office but subsequently recommended that they 
leave because the commission ``could not assure the (observers') 
safety.''
    The Constitution significantly constrains the independence of the 
judiciary. A Constitutional Council replaced the Constitutional Court 
in August 1995 when the new Constitution was adopted. The President 
appoints three of its seven members, including the chairman. A two-
thirds majority of the Council is required to overrule a presidential 
veto. All judges are appointed directly by the President.
    According to the Constitution, the President selects governors of 
oblasts (the ``akims''), based on the recommendation of the Prime 
Minister; they serve at the discretion of the President, who may annul 
their decisions.
    All adult citizens (at least 18 years of age) have the right to 
vote. Membership in political parties or trade unions is forbidden to 
members of the armed forces, employees of national security and law 
enforcement organizations, and judges.
    There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women and 
minorities in politics, but the persistence of traditional attitudes 
means that few women hold high office or play active parts in political 
life, and in general, women are underrepresented severely in 
government. At the end of the year, no women held ministerial 
portfolios, though one had ministerial rank and several deputy 
ministers were women. There were no female provincial governors 
(akims). Of 39 Senate members, 5 are women; of 77 Majilis members, 8 
are women.
    Although minority ethnic groups are represented in the Government, 
Kazakhs hold the majority of leadership positions. Nearly half the 
population are non-Kazakhs according to the national census completed 
this year. Non-Kazakhs hold 1 of 3 positions as vice premier and head 2 
of 14 government ministries. Non-Kazakhs also are underrepresented in 
the Majilis and the Senate. In the new Parliament, 8 of 47 current 
members of the Senate are non-Kazakhs, and 20 of 77 members of the 
Majilis are non-Kazakhs.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Almaty Helsinki Commission and the Kazakhstan International 
Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (formerly the Kazakhstan-
American Bureau on Human Rights) are the most active of a small number 
of local human rights organizations. They cooperate on human rights and 
legal reform issues. Although these groups operated largely without 
government interference, limited financial means hampered their ability 
to monitor and report human rights violations. In November a fire 
destroyed the main office and all the archives of the Bureau for Human 
Rights in Almaty. The Almaty fire department concluded that arson was 
the probable cause of the fire and referred the case to prosecutors, 
who brought no charges before the end of the year. Some human rights 
observers complained that the Government monitored their movements and 
telephone calls.
    The Civil Code requires NGO's to register with the Government, and 
most NGO's are registered; however, some continue to operate without 
legal standing. Although some government officials made an effort to 
work with domestic and foreign NGO's, others persisted in asserting 
that foreign NGO's promote instability. Some NGO's chose not to 
register because they objected to the requirement of registration in 
principle or because they did not have the money to pay the 
registration fee. Others believe that they were not eligible to 
register because they promoted the interests of one ethnic group or 
religion and are considered by some to violate the constitutional ban 
on inciting social, racial, national, religious, class, and tribal 
enmity. The new Criminal Code that took effect in 1998 criminalized the 
activity of NGO's that are not registered. In 1998 five leading 
opposition figures were convicted for participating in a meeting of an 
unregistered NGO, the For Fair Elections group (see Sections 1.d., 
2.b., and 3).
    The Government permitted international and foreign NGO's dealing 
with human rights issues to visit the country and meet with local human 
rights groups as well as government officials. The International Labor 
Organization, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies, and the UNHCR have permanent offices in the 
country. The OSCE, of which Kazakhstan is a member, opened an office in 
Almaty in January. The Constitution forbids ``the financing of 
political parties and trade unions by foreign legal entities and 
citizens, foreign states and international organizations.'' In January 
1998, the Confederation of Free Trade Unions and its leader, Leonid 
Solomin, were charged for the second time within a year with violating 
these provisions. However, during the year, the Government dropped all 
charges in both cases.
    The Presidential Commission on Human Rights is a consultative body. 
It prepares annual reports to the President that can be released to the 
public only with the President's consent. For the first and only time 
the Commission made public its annual report to the President by 
publishing an expurgated version of its report for 1997 at the end of 
1998. The report focused almost exclusively on ``economic and social 
rights,'' for example, the right to a decent standard of living. It 
concluded that the country consistently abides by human rights 
principles and suggested that those who blame the Government for social 
problems should realize that individual well-being ultimately is the 
responsibility of the individual. The Commission reached out to 
independent human rights organizations but made little progress in 
establishing itself as an ombudsman. In general the Government tended 
to deny or ignore charges of specific human rights abuses that were 
levied by human rights monitors and individual citizens. In its report 
to the President for 1997, the Commission charged that many domestic 
NGO's are oriented towards developed countries' standards and do not 
realize that progress towards a market economy and civil society is a 
slow, gradual process. It said that NGO's sympathetic to ``left-wing 
radicals'' have nothing constructive to offer.
    The Presidential Commission on Human Rights and OSCE cohosted a 
roundtable discussion on the draft religion law in March.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that ``everyone is equal before law and 
court. No one may be subjected to any discrimination for reasons of 
origin, social position, occupation, property status, sex, race, 
nationality, language, attitude to religion, convictions, place of 
residence, or any other circumstances.'' However, the Government does 
not enforce this provision effectively on a consistent basis. The 
Government has favored ethnic Kazakhs in government employment and, 
according to many citizens, in the process of privatizing state 
enterprises.
    Women.--According to human rights groups, there is considerable 
domestic violence against women. A local NGO, the Feminist League, 
estimates that hundreds of thousands of women are the victims of 
spousal abuse. The Interior Ministry reported that family members or 
domestic partners were responsible for about one-third of the nearly 
8,500 crimes against women registered in the first half of the year. 
During the same period, 81 women were murdered by family members. 
Police often are reluctant to intervene in domestic disputes, 
considering them to be the family's business, unless they believe that 
the abuse is life threatening. The maximum sentence for wife beating is 
3 years, but few such cases are prosecuted. A new government commission 
on women and family drew attention to the issue of domestic violence. 
Law enforcement authorities reported that 288 persons were convicted of 
rape in the first 8 months of the year, although the total number of 
reported rapes was unavailable. Under the Criminal Procedure Code, 
prosecutors can initiate a rape case, absent aggravating circumstances 
such as gang rape, only upon the application of the victim. There were 
unconfirmed reports that prosecutors sometimes interpreted this 
provision to require rape victims to pay for forensic testing, pay the 
expenses of prosecution, and personally prosecute rape cases 
themselves. The punishment for rape can range from 3 to 15 years. There 
is very little coverage of rape in the press, and rapes often go 
unreported. There is no law specifically against spousal rape, which is 
proscribed under general rape laws.
    There was anecdotal evidence of trafficking in women (see Section 
6.f.).
    There is no legal discrimination against women, but traditional 
cultural practices limit their role in everyday society and in owning 
and managing businesses or real property. The President and other 
members of the Government speak in favor of women's rights, and 
official state policy (adopted in 1997) states that constitutional 
prohibitions on sex discrimination must be supported by effective 
government measures. Women are underrepresented severely in higher 
positions in state enterprises and overrepresented in low-paying and 
some menial jobs. Women have unrestricted access to higher education. 
Approximately 30 women's rights organizations are registered, including 
the Feminist League, Women of the East, the Almaty Women's Information 
Center, and the Businesswomen's Association.
    Children.--The Government is committed in principle to children's 
rights, but as in many other areas, budget stringencies and other 
priorities severely limit its effectiveness in dealing with children's 
issues. Education is mandatory through the 11th grade, although 
students may begin technical training after the 9th grade. There is no 
societal pattern of abuse against children. Rural children normally 
work during harvests (see Section 6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--Citizens with disabilities are entitled 
by law to assistance from the State. There is no legal discrimination 
against the disabled, but in practice, employers do not give them equal 
consideration. There are laws mandating the provision of accessibility 
to public buildings and commercial establishments for the disabled, but 
the Government does not enforce these laws. Disabled persons are a low 
priority for the Government. Mentally ill and mentally retarded 
citizens can be committed to institutions run by the State. These 
institutions are poorly run and inadequately funded. The NGO, 
Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights, confirmed its 
previous observation that the Government provides almost no care for 
the mentally ill and mentally retarded due to a lack of funds.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to results of the 
1999 census, the population of about 16 million consists of 
approximately 50 percent Kazakhs and 33 percent ethnic Slavs (Russians, 
Ukrainians, Belarusians, and others) with many other ethnic groups 
represented. At year's end, details of the census had not been 
released, but there has been no public criticism of the announced 
ethnic breakdown of the population.
    The Government continued to discriminate in favor of ethnic Kazakhs 
in government employment, where ethnic Kazakhs predominate, as well as 
in education, housing, and other areas. However, the Government has 
continued to back away from its ``Kazakhification'' campaign of the 
first year of independence (1991-1992). President Nazarbayev has 
emphasized publicly that all nationalities are welcome, but many non-
Kazakhs are anxious about what they perceive as expanding preferences 
for ethnic Kazakhs. Many ethnic Kazakhs believe that such preferences 
are needed to reverse 200 years of discrimination.
    Most of the population speaks Russian; only about one-half of 
ethnic Kazakhs speak Kazakh fluently. According to the Constitution, 
the Kazakh language is the state language. The Constitution states that 
the Russian language is used officially on a basis equal with that of 
the Kazakh language in organizations and bodies of local self-
administration. Some ethnic Russians believe that Russian should be 
designated as a second state language. The Government is encouraging 
more education of children in the Kazakh language, but it has done 
little to provide Kazakh-language education for adults. A 1997 language 
law intended to strengthen the use of Kazakh without infringing on the 
rights of citizens to use other languages has not been funded 
sufficiently to make Kazakh-language education universal. In 1997 the 
Parliament committed itself to compile a list of positions requiring 
Kazakh-language fluency but never did so; the Parliament is not working 
on such a list.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code 
provide for basic worker rights, including the right to organize and 
the right to strike; however, the Government at times infringed on 
worker rights. Activist unions came under government pressure for 
holding unsanctioned demonstrations and marches. The courts dissolved 
two unions in 1998 for violating laws against unauthorized 
demonstrations, marches, and rallies.
    In December the President signed into law a new Labor Code, 
effective January 1, 2000. Among many other revisions, the new law 
provides for individual contracts between an employer and each 
employee, but allows ``optional'' collective labor contracts. It also 
allows unions to represent an employee in labor disputes, but an 
employee may choose other representation. However, during the year the 
previous Labor Code remained in force.
    Most workers remained members of state-sponsored trade unions 
established during the Soviet period, when membership was obligatory. 
At most enterprises, the state-sponsored unions continued to deduct 1 
percent of each worker's wage as dues. The state unions under the 
Communist system were, and for the most part still are, organs of the 
Government and work with management to enforce labor discipline and to 
discourage workers from forming or joining independent unions.
    The law gives workers the right to join or form unions of their 
choosing and to stop the automatic dues deductions for the state 
unions. The Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTUK, formerly the 
Independent Trade Union Center of Kazakhstan) claims membership of 
about 250,000; however, the actual number of independent trade union 
members is estimated to be much lower. The state-sponsored Federation 
of Trade Unions claims 4 million members; however, the figure is 
regarded as too high. To obtain legal status, an independent union must 
apply for registration with the local judicial authority at the oblast 
level and with the Ministry of Justice. Registration is generally 
lengthy, difficult, and expensive. The decision to register a union 
appears to be arbitrary, with no published criteria. No unions were 
registered or denied registration during the year. The two major 
independent trade union confederations are registered. Judicial 
authorities and the Ministry of Justice have the authority to cancel a 
union's registration, as a provincial court did in Kentau in 1998.
    The law does not provide mechanisms to protect workers who join 
independent unions from threats or harassment by enterprise management 
or state-run unions. Members of independent unions have been dismissed, 
transferred to lower paying or lower status jobs, threatened, and 
intimidated. According to independent union leaders, state unions work 
closely with management to ensure that independent trade union members 
are the first fired in times of economic downturn.
    Unions and individual workers exercised their right to strike 
during the year, primarily to protest the nonpayment of wages and in an 
attempt to recover back wages owed to workers. Nonpayment of wages 
continued to be the priority issue for workers. According to the law, 
workers may exercise the right to strike only if a labor dispute has 
not been resolved by means of existing conciliation procedures. In 
addition the law requires that employers be notified that a strike is 
to occur no less than 15 days before its commencement. There were 
numerous strikes throughout the country to protest the nonpayment of 
wages. In May and June, approximately 60 employees of the Shymkent 
phosphor plant conducted a 33-day hunger strike over nonpayment of 
wages. The south Kazakhstan oblast akim authorized strikers to picket 
in front of his office. One striker reportedly received his full back 
pay and others received partial payment. The strike ended after 33 days 
when police removed the strikers. Employees of the 
Karagandashakhtastroy company in Karaganda reportedly conducted a 
hunger strike in April to protest nonpayment of their wages.
    Two unions dissolved by court order in 1998 for ``systematically 
and flagrantly'' violating laws against unauthorized demonstrations, 
marches, and rallies could not legally reconstitute. The unions 
represented workers at the Archpolimetal metallurgical plant in Kentau, 
who had conducted various actions for several years to protest chronic 
nonpayment of wages. Dissolution of the well-known unions led 
independent labor leaders to call in 1998 for formation of a new 
political party to represent workers interests, but no party was 
created. The leader of one of the Kentau unions reported that he had to 
leave Kentau because local law enforcement and KNB authorities harassed 
him and his family. Several candidates representing government-
sponsored labor unions were elected in the October parliamentary 
elections.
    As a result of their inability to pay salaries, many enterprises 
continued to pay wages in scrip rather than in cash, a practice at odds 
with International Labor Organization Convention 95 on the protection 
of wages other than in the legal currency without the express consent 
of the workers. Enterprise directors claimed that the enterprises were 
not being paid in cash by their traditional trading partners in other 
parts of the former Soviet Union, which also were experiencing cash 
flow difficulties as a result of the general economic crisis. The scrip 
often was not accepted at stores or was accepted only at devalued 
levels.
    Independent unions complain about a provision in the Constitution 
that forbids the financing of trade unions by foreign legal entities 
and citizens, foreign states, and international organizations. Since 
independence in 1991, independent trade unions have received financial 
assistance from the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI). Most 
of this assistance ended in 1996 when funding was reduced and FTUI now 
provides no funding. Independent trade unions have sought new means of 
support; some associations of trade unions were able to receive 
financing from foreign sources by registering as ``public 
organizations'' rather than labor unions.
    By law unions freely may join federations or confederations and 
affiliate with international bodies. Most independent trade unions 
belong to the CFTUK, headquartered in Astana. The Independent Miners 
Federation of Kazakhstan and the State Miners' Union of Karaganda are 
members of the Miners' International Federation. Unions belonging to 
the CFTUK are not members of international federations but are able to 
maintain contacts with foreign trade union federations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There are 
significant limits on the right to organize and bargain collectively. 
Collective bargaining rights are not spelled out in the law, although 
in some instances unions successfully negotiated agreements with 
management. If a union's demands are not acceptable to management, it 
may present those demands to an arbitration commission composed of 
management, union officials, and independent technical experts. Unions 
routinely appealed to arbitration commissions.
    A new labor law passed in November reduced the role of unions by 
allowing employers the right to negotiate labor contracts with 
individual employees. Previously, the terms of contracts were set by 
law and collective bargaining agreements. The new law also gave 
employers the right to fire an employee without the consent of the 
employee's union.
    There is no legal protection against antiunion discrimination. 
There are no export processing zones. Several free economic zones enjoy 
all the privileges of export processing zones, as well as other tax 
privileges and abatements, but labor conditions there appear to be no 
different than elsewhere in the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor except ``at the sentence of the court or in the 
conditions of a state of emergency or martial law,'' and it is 
generally not known to occur; however, in the north some persons still 
were required to provide labor or the use of privately owned equipment 
with no, or very low, compensation to help gather the annual grain 
harvest.
    The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded 
labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. A child under 
age 16 may work only with the permission of the local administration 
and the trade union in the enterprise in which the child would work. 
Such permission rarely is granted. Although the Constitution does not 
prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children, there were 
no reports of such practices (see Section 6.c.). Abuse of child labor 
is generally not a problem; however, child labor is used routinely in 
agricultural areas, especially during harvest season.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1997 the Government resumed 
setting a minimum wage. The minimum monthly wage was approximately $20 
(2,680 tenge) during the last quarter of the year. This amount does not 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family and fell 
far short of the minimum subsistence amount for one person as 
calculated in 1998 by the Kazakhstan Institute of Nutrition.
    The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours, although most enterprises 
maintained a 40-hour workweek, with at least a 24-hour rest period. The 
Constitution provides that labor agreements stipulate the length of 
working time, vacation days, holidays, and paid annual leave for each 
worker.
    Although the Constitution provides for the right to ``safe and 
hygienic working conditions,'' working and safety conditions in the 
industrial sector are substandard. Safety consciousness is low. Workers 
in factories usually do not wear protective clothing, such as goggles 
and hard hats, and work in conditions of poor visibility and 
ventilation. Management largely ignores regulations concerning 
occupational health and safety, which are enforced by the Ministry of 
Labor and the state-sponsored unions. Workers, including miners, have 
no legal right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations 
without jeopardy to continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons. Women's rights groups and the International Organization 
for Migration report anecdotal evidence of trafficking in women from 
the country. In May participants in an OSCE Women in Politics workshop 
in Almaty identified trafficking, along with inequality and the 
situation of rural women, as issues of critical importance to women in 
the country. No observers have tried to quantify the extent of 
trafficking, and the Government has no programs to target trafficking 
in women.
                                 ______
                                 

                            KYRGYZ REPUBLIC

    The Kyrgyz Republic became an independent state in 1991. Although 
the 1993 Constitution defines the form of government as a democratic 
republic, President Askar Akayev dominates the Government. Akayev was 
reelected in 1995 in an open, multicandidate presidential election, 
which was marred, however, by the deregistration of three rival 
candidates immediately prior to the vote. Also in 1995, a two-chamber 
Parliament was elected for a 5-year term. The Constitution was amended 
by referendum in 1996 to strengthen substantially the presidency and 
define the role of Parliament. However, the 1996 referendum was marred 
by serious irregularities. In October 1998, the Government held a 
constitutional referendum that, among other things, reformed the 
structure of the Parliament and the national budget process. The 
referendum passed by over 90 percent, but again there were a number of 
serious irregularities. Elections were held in October 1999 for local 
governing councils. The process was flawed but represented an 
improvement over the 1998 referendum. Although Parliament has become 
increasingly active, and on occasion has blocked presidential 
initiatives, it still does not check the power of the President 
effectively. The judiciary is dominated by the executive branch.
    Law enforcement responsibilities are divided among the Ministry on 
Internal Affairs (MVD) for general crime, the Ministry of National 
Security (MNB) for state-level crime, and the procurator's office for 
both types of crime. Both the MVD and the MNB deal with corruption and 
organized crime. These ministries inherited their infrastructure from 
their Soviet predecessors. Both appear to be under the general control 
of the Government and generally conform their actions to the law. 
Border guards are under the full control of the Government. On January 
1, the Government assumed responsibility for border control, ending an 
agreement with the Russian Federation, whose troops had manned the 
border with China. Final withdrawal of Russian border guards occurred 
in August, although approximately 160 Russian advisors remain in the 
country. Some members of the police committed human rights abuses.
    The Kyrgyz Republic is a poor, mountainous country with a rough 
balance of agricultural and industrial production. Cotton, tobacco, and 
sugar are the primary agricultural exports. The country also exports 
hydroelectric power, antimony, mercury, and uranium. The Government has 
carried out progressive market reforms. The economy worsened steadily 
during the year, and inflation is estimated at over 40 percent. The 
U.N. estimates that 55 percent of the population are below the poverty 
line. The country faces an external debt of $1.5 billion. Industrial 
production remains significantly below preindependence levels. The 
level of hardship for pensioners, unemployed workers, and government 
workers with salary arrearages continues to be very high. The average 
annual salary is $100 (4,200 som). Foreign assistance plays a 
significant role in the country's budget.
    The Government's human rights record was generally uneven and poor 
in some areas. The Government limits citizens' ability to change their 
government. There were credible reports of police abuse and brutality. 
Prison conditions are very poor, and there were cases of arbitrary 
arrest and detention. Executive domination of the judiciary limited 
citizens' right to due process, although the judiciary is undergoing 
reform. Government supervision of ``village elders' courts'' that it 
sanctions outside the regular judicial structure remains uneven, but 
abuses such as stoning abated. The Government at times infringes on 
freedom of speech and of the press. Authorities at times pressure 
journalists who criticize individual members of the Government. The 
Government did not use libel laws against the press; however, the 
Government uses bureaucratic means to harass and pressure the 
independent media and opposition. The Government at times inhibited 
freedom of assembly and association; there were serious problems with 
political parties' rights to free assembly. The Government deregistered 
the Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights (KCHR) prior to the October 1998 
referendum and prohibited subsequent attempts at reregistration. 
However, the Government finally reregistered the KHCR in August, and 
the group now operates freely. The Government at times infringed on 
freedom of religion. Societal discrimination against women persists. 
Violence against women is a problem that authorities often ignore, and 
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution 
also is a persistent problem. Child abuse is a problem, and there is a 
growing number of street children. Discrimination against ethnic 
minorities and child labor persisted.
    Armed insurgents in the country's southern areas along the Tajik-
Kyrgyz border took both Kyrgyz and foreign citizens hostage in the 
fall.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    There were no further developments in the January 1998 beating 
death by police of Muratbek Sulaimanov.
    There were no further developments in the February 1998 beating and 
killing by burial alive of Sergei Skromnov by police in the Lenin 
region of Bishkek.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances due to action by the Government or domestic groups.
    In August several hundred armed ethnic Uzbeks entered the southern 
Osh province from Tajikistan and took a number of hostages, including 
several government officials and four Japanese geologists. There were 
military engagements between the Government and the insurgents, who 
identified themselves as members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 
an organization opposed to the present Uzbekistan Government. At least 
one of the hostages died in captivity. The last of the hostages was 
released on October 25. Negotiations with the insurgents led to the 
eventual release of all remaining Kyrgz and foreign hostages, the last 
of whom was released on October 25.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there 
were some credible reports that police used violence against detained 
suspects in order to obtain confessions while the suspects in criminal 
cases were in pretrial detention. In September police officers 
reportedly beat a farmer while trying to recover an unpaid debt; the 
farmer remained in jail at year's end.
    Police patrols are supervised poorly, are not always paid promptly, 
and sometimes commit crimes. Supervision of conditions for pretrial 
detainees is poor, and abuses sometimes occur. Police sometimes used 
ill-defined charges to arrest persons (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
    In the past, local elders' courts have exceeded their authority by 
trying major crimes, using torture to extract confessions or even 
levying capital punishment. However, abuses such as stoning and death 
sentences have abated, and there were no reports of such action during 
the year (see Section 1.e.).
    Prison conditions (including overcrowding, food shortages, and lack 
of heat and other necessities) are very poor, due to limited budget 
resources. Those detained by the MNB rather than the MVD are kept in an 
MNB facility; after conviction, they go to a regular prison. The 1994 
Criminal Procedure Code is based on the Soviet-era Criminal Procedure 
Code and established the right for attorney-client visits of unlimited 
number and duration. In practice, however, an attorney must obtain 
official permission for every visit. Prison visits by family members 
are at the discretion of the investigator during the investigation 
phase. After conviction family members may visit regularly.
    In principle nonfamily visitors seldom are permitted. However, some 
citizens, including local human rights activists, claim that they 
usually can obtain official permission for a visit through personal 
connections.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Judicial system 
continues to operate, in many cases, under Soviet laws and procedures, 
and authorities generally respect these provisions in practice; 
however, there were a few cases of arbitrary arrest and detention. The 
procurator's office determines who may be detained, arrested, and 
prosecuted. The MNB, the MVD, and the General Procurator carry out 
investigations. Since 1990 persons arrested or charged with crimes have 
the right to a defense counsel, who is required to visit the accused 
within the first 3 days of incarceration. However, sometimes the 
accused first sees the defense counsel only at the trial.
    The Criminal Code permits the procurator to detain suspects for 72 
hours before releasing them or charging them with a crime. The 
procurator must issue an arrest warrant before a person can be 
detained. If a suspect is charged, the procurator must advise defense 
counsel immediately. The accused usually remains in detention while the 
procurator investigates and prepares the case for trial. The procurator 
has discretion to keep the accused in pretrial detention for up to 1 
year, but there are conditions for provisional release before trial. 
After 1 year, the procurator must release the accused or ask Parliament 
to extend the period of detention. Since independence, there have been 
no known instances in which Parliament has been asked to extend a 
detention.
    The MNB monitored the Uighur community (a Turkic people native to 
western China) closely. In the past they arrested Uighurs on ill-
defined charges, including false documents and concealed weapons 
charges (see Section 2.d.).
    In the summer, police fined two parliamentary deputies who were 
discussing politics with citizens in a public place and charged them 
with holding an illegal gathering (see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 3).
    Three deputies in the National Assembly were arrested in June on 
charges ranging from embezzlement to assaulting a tax inspector. Many 
of the charges were at least 2 years old. Several parliamentarians made 
statements criticizing the arrests. While it was not clear that these 
charges were politically motivated, there have been other cases against 
deputies that were.
    In September police systematically rounded up hundreds of ethnic 
Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Afghans in the cities of Jala-Abad and Bishkek on 
the pretext of passport checks, holding them in custody for up to 2 
days.
    The Government does not employ forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, despite extensive reforms in the court 
system and a large body of new law, court operations have not become 
independent of the executive branch, which continues to dominate the 
judiciary.
    Cases originate in local courts; they may move to appeals courts on 
the district or regional level and finally to the Supreme Court. 
Separate courts of arbitration handle civil disputes, and traditional 
elders' courts handle low-level crime in rural areas.
    The procurator brings cases to court and tries them before a judge 
and two people's assessors (pensioners or citizens chosen from labor 
collectives).The accused and the defense counsel have access to all 
evidence gathered by the procurator. They attend all proceedings, which 
are generally public, and are allowed to question witnesses and present 
evidence. All members of the court have equal rights. Anyone in the 
courtroom may question witnesses. Witnesses do not always recapitulate 
their evidence in court; instead they affirm or deny their statements 
in the procurator's files.
    The court compares the facts as presented by the procurator and the 
defense, and in most cases makes its decision after receiving all 
available information in each case. The court may render one of three 
decisions: innocent; guilty; or indeterminate, that is, the case is 
returned to the procurator for further investigation. In 1996 the 
Constitutional Court ruled that only the defense has the right of 
appeal. The decision of a court to return a case to the procurator for 
further investigation may not be appealed, and accused persons are 
returned to the procurator's custody, where they may remain under 
detention.
    The law allows only government attorneys to represent defendants in 
criminal cases, while private attorneys are prohibited in criminal 
court. Often, the attorneys are seen to skew cases toward the 
Government's interests, and there are complaints that detainees did not 
have the right to a fair trial.
    The procurator, not the judge, is in charge of criminal 
proceedings. Thus the courts are widely perceived as a rubber stamp for 
the procurator and for high-ranking government officials and not as the 
protectors of citizens' rights. In addition very low judges' salaries 
have led to a well-grounded view among lawyers and citizens that all 
but a very few scrupulously honest judges are open to bribes.
    Local elders' courts are found in almost every oblast and region. 
They exercise their authority by trying petty crimes, such as robbery, 
hooliganism, or theft. In the past, local elders' courts have exceeded 
their authority by trying major crimes, using torture to extract 
confessions or even levying capital punishment. However, abuses such as 
stoning and death sentences have abated, and there were no reports of 
such action during the year. Local elders' courts are under the 
supervision of the procurator's office, but they may not receive close 
oversight due to the fact that many such courts are located in remote 
regions, which makes monitoring difficult.
    The Government has introduced several judicial reform measures, 
including a proposal to establish an independent judicial budget, 
creation of judicial judgment enforcement procedures, and independent 
judicial training. Generally accepted international practices, 
including the presumption of the innocence of the accused, have been 
introduced. Judges do not hold positions for life. As provided in the 
Constitution, terms for judges range from 15 years for Constitutional 
Court judges to 3 years for first-term local judges. In 1993 a new 
system of court administration was introduced, and sitting judges are 
being tested on their knowledge of the law and new civil codes. The 
first round of testing was completed in the fall of 1996; the next was 
carried out during the fall when new judicial appointments were made. 
If judges fail these tests, they may be disqualified from holding 
office. The process appears to have increased judicial professionalism, 
and a number of judges have been removed due to poor performance on the 
exams. Some removals appear to have been subjective, but most lawyers 
and judges consider the system to be a fair measure of competence.
    The appointment of ethnic Kyrgyz to key positions in the judicial 
system has led to charges by non-Kyrgyz that the system is arbitrary 
and unfair and that the courts treat Kyrgyz more leniently than members 
of other groups. Although systematic discrimination is not clearly 
evident, allegations that it exists are credible in some cases. There 
are also complaints by Uzbeks, and even by ethnic Kyrgyz, that the 
southern portion of the country is underrepresented in the judiciary.
    Economic crimes such as tax evasion, embezzlement, and theft of 
government property, including that of electric power, are common. 
Prosecution for these crimes is relatively rare and sometimes appears 
to be directed at opponents of the Government. Legislators in the past 
have used their parliamentary immunity to avoid being brought to court. 
However, the October 1998 referendum included an amendment that limited 
immunity to official acts only. In June three Members of Parliament 
(M.P.'s) were arrested in or near the parliament building for 
misappropriation of state property, abuse of power, and tax evasion 
(see Section 1.d.). The three were awaiting trial at year's end.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits unlawful entry into a home 
against the wishes of the occupant and states that a person's private 
life, privacy of correspondence, and telephonic and telegraphic 
communications are protected. The law and procedures require the 
General Procurator's approval for wiretaps, searches of homes, 
interception of mail, and similar acts. A change in the law in 1995 
weakened these protections by allowing the procurator to give approval 
for searches over the telephone; thus no written proof exists to verify 
that the search was approved. Furthermore, in certain cases, law 
enforcement officers first may carry out a search and then get approval 
within 24 hours. If approval is not given, any evidence seized is 
inadmissible in court.
    Organizaitonal structures responsible for violations during the 
Soviet era have remained largely in place; however, there were no 
reports of violations of citizens' privacy. There were concerns by 
citizens active in politics or human rights issues that the privacy of 
their communications was violated, but evidence to that effect is not 
available.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for certain 
freedoms of speech and of the press; however, the Government at times 
infringed on these rights. In July police in Naryn oblast fined two 
parliamentary deputies for discussing politics informally with citizens 
in a public place; the deputies were charged with holding an illegal 
gathering (see Sections 1.d., 2.b., and 3).
    The 1992 law on the mass media provides for freedom of speech and 
the mass media, and outlines registration procedures. It identifies 
prohibited material: Government and commercial secrets; material 
advocating war, violence, or intolerance toward ethnic or religious 
groups; desecration of national norms, ethics, and symbols, such as the 
national seal, flag, or anthem; pornography; and encroachment on the 
honor and dignity of a person. Two laws related to the media, On 
Guarantees and Free Access to Information and On the Protection of the 
Professional Activities of Journalists, were adopted in December 1997.
    The Government did not close any newspapers or electronic media 
during the year, nor were any journalists arrested or imprisoned as a 
direct result of journalistic activities, although several faced civil 
``honor and dignity'' charges in court cases brought by 
parliamentarians or other public figures.
    All media must register with the Ministry of Justice and wait for 
ministry approval before beginning to operate. The media law states 
that the registration process requires 1 month. During the year, there 
were no reports concerning media organizations that could not register 
in a timely manner.
    Libel is a criminal, not a civil, action. The Government attempted 
at the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 to amend the Criminal Code 
to remove libel; however, its efforts were defeated in Parliament by an 
overwhelming majority. As a result of the October 1998 referendum, the 
Constitution now includes language that precludes Parliament from 
passing laws that infringe on free speech. As of year's end, there had 
been no implementing legislation for this amendment.
    There are approximately 40 to 50 independent newspapers and 
magazines, including some with local, not national, standing. There are 
also several hours daily of independent television and radio 
broadcasting. However, state television, radio, and government 
newspapers receive government subsidies, which permit the Government to 
influence media coverage. Additionally, the State's printing house, 
Uchkun, is the only newspaper publisher in the country.
    During the first half of 1998, all television and radio stations 
were to be registered (licenses) with the newly established National 
Agency for Communications (NAC) or reregistered if they had a 
registration with the NAC's predecessor, the Committee on Frequencies, 
which was under the direction of the Prime Minister. The NAC requires 
extensive paperwork for registration, including copies of documents on 
education and training received by the staff and specifications of the 
equipment used.
    Many independent television and radio stations have received 
licenses. Among them were Pyramid, Independent Bishkek Television, 
(NBT), Vostochnaya Strana (VOSST), Asia Center, Open Channel, and 
Europa Plus. The registration fee ranges from approximately $100 to 
$150 (4,000 to 6,000 soms). Licenses issued are valid for 3 to 7 years 
(the duration of validity was determined by the NAC based on its 
evaluation of a company's viability). Other independent television and 
radio companies are in the process; of reregistration, including Osh 
Television, Mezon Television, Radio Almaz stations in Bishkek and Osh, 
and several others successfully registered during the year.
    There are two television stations in Osh that broadcast in Uzbek: 
Osh Television (some programs) and Mezon Television (all programs). The 
latter was founded by the Mezon Uzbek Ethnic Center to serve the needs 
of the large Uzbek population of Osh. Although Osh television has a 
license to broadcast, a dispute continues over which channel it can 
use; the NAC attempted to require the station to change its frequency 
by year's end. The Association of Journalists lobbied against this 
change, indicating that it was unfair as no other broadcaster had to 
change frequencies, was not justified technically, and was a financial 
hardship to Osh television. The Government granted a reprieve allowing 
the station to continue broadcasting on its current frequency until 
June 2000.
    Licensing has been complicated for nongovernment broadcasters. In 
August 1998, the NAC notified licensees of a new government regulation 
providing that those holding licenses pay for all expenses connected 
with carrying out supervisory functions under the license agreements. 
Additionally, since mid-August 1998, the nongovernment electronic media 
began receiving standard notices from the NAC, signed by its director 
Orozaly Kaiykov, stating that the obligation to broadcast in the state 
language was not being fulfilled and that broadcasters were relying 
mainly on foreign music and programming. Despite an extended series of 
meetings in 1998 between the NAC and media officials, these issues, 
which the media view as a form of censorship, were not resolved. The 
NAC did not press the point beyond the Kaiykov declaration throughout 
the year.
    In August the popular independent daily newspaper Vecherny Bishkek 
faced closure stemming from allegations that the newspaper's owner, 
Aleksander Kim, was guilty of tax evasion. Kim stated that the multiple 
inspections began after the newspaper carried interviews with several 
opposition politicians, including potential candidates in the 2000 
presidential elections. Although the Government clearly used the tax 
issue to pressure Kim, the matter was complicated by a dispute within 
the newspaper for control. The militia and the tax authorities harassed 
Kim and his staff, but at year's end the newspaper continued to 
publish. The efforts of the Government to investigate the newspaper on 
charges of tax evasion and to probe the legitimacy of the purchase of 
the newspaper's building are continuing.
    On the night of April 24, state security officers raided the new 
offices of the independent Kyrgyz language newspaper Asaba and erased 
all of its computer files. After an investigation, MNB claimed that the 
erased files were due to a compute virus, not a break-in. In August 
1998, Asaba was evicted from its offices after renting space there for 
32 years, and the MVD took over the building.
    In March the newspaper Utro Bishkeka lost a defamation of character 
lawsuit to three deputies of the Parliament, and was forced to pay a 
total of approximately $1,700 (60,000 soms). In April the newspaper Res 
Publica was found guilty of defamation of character in a private suit 
brought by the president of the State Television and Radio Corporation 
and fined approximately $6,5000 (230,000 soms).
    The Morals Commission, a presidentially appointed body of newspaper 
editors, university rectors, religious leaders, and public figures, was 
tasked in 1998 with reviewing the print and broadcast media as well as 
videos and other activity to determine whether their content was 
pornographic or violent in nature. Upon finding that an item was 
pornographic, the Commission was charged with requesting legal action 
to be taken against organizations and individuals violating its 
``decency precepts.'' In September 1998, the Morals Commission 
suspended three newspapers, Kartama-Digest, Limon, and Pajshamba. There 
were indications that the suspensions were motivated politically. Since 
the suspensions, only Limon has continued to publish, under an 
agreement that it will eliminate its pornographic content; however, 
this action was reduced drastically its circulation and economic 
viability. Although the Morals Commission was closed by presidential 
decree in January, a criminal case against Limon still is pending.
    In December 1998, Parliament passed a law on advertising that 
limits the amount of advertising to 20 percent in print media and to 25 
percent in broadcast media. This legislation may affect the revenue of 
the independent media.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides citizens with the right to assemble freely; however, while the 
Government generally respects this right, officials, including those at 
local levels, sometimes use regulations that require registration of 
rallies and demonstrations to inhibit the exercise of this right. The 
law requires official written permission for holding assemblies, 
rallies, and demonstrations.
    Permits are required for public marches and gatherings but are 
routinely available. Rallies and demonstrations are held regularly in 
front of the Government Building and in other places. Throughout the 
year, several peaceful protests were held outside the President's 
office. Those demonstrating included pensioners, political and human 
rights activists, and ethnic groups living in the country such as 
Uighurs and Kurds.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association; however, 
while the Government generally respects this right, at times local 
authorities have inhibited it in practice. In June and July, local 
authorities in both Issyk Kul and Naryn oblasts disallowed several 
public meetings for representatives of the People's Party of Kyrgyzstan 
(see Seciton 3). Naryn oblast police arrested and fined parliamentary 
deputies who were discussing politics informally with citizens in a 
public place. They were charged with holding an illegal gathering (also 
see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 3.).
    The 1991 Law on Public Organizations, which includes labor unions, 
political parties, and cultural associations, requires registration of 
these organizations with the Ministry of Justice. Excessive caution by 
some officials is a contributing element for the delay some 
organizations experience in registering. Ultimately, all organizations 
have been able to register, with the exception of an Uighur 
organization with the stated goal of creating an independent Uighur 
state in northwest China. The organization did not renew its attempt to 
register during the year.
    In June Parliament passed a new law on nongovernmental 
organizations. This law separates NGO's from political parties, labor 
organizations, and religious organizations, and lowers the required 
number of members for registration. It also provides a tax exemption 
for grant recipients. The President signed this law into effect as of 
year's end.
    In October 1998, the Ministry of Justice revoked the registration 
of the KHRC on the grounds that its registration application contained 
falsified documents. The revocation came while the chairman of the KHRC 
was lobbying against the October referendum to change the Constitution 
to privatize land and limit parliamentarians immunity in criminal 
cases. Subsequently, the KHRC was invited to reregister, but its 
chairman declined to do so at that time. In February the KHRC attempted 
to reregister but was denied due to alleged irregularities in its 
application. A few days later, another organization with the same name 
and headed by Sardarbek Botaliyev, an adversary of the KHRC's leader, 
Ramazan Dyryldayev, was registered by the Ministry of Justice. On June 
11, a court administrator and a militia captain demanded that all KHCR 
office equipment and furniture be transferred to the new organization. 
However, in August the Government reregistered the original KHRC, and 
the group now operates freely.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution and the law provide for 
freedom of religion and the right of all citizens to choose and 
practice their own religion; however, the Government at times infringes 
on these rights. The Government does not support any one religion and 
expressly forbids the teaching of religion (or atheism) in public 
schools.
    In 1996 the Government created a State Commission on Religious 
Affairs, officially in order to promote religious tolerance, protect 
freedom of conscience, and oversee laws on religion. The Commission 
quickly became active and has overseen the registration of over 300 
religious institutions, of which 210 are Christina denominations. In 
1997 the President signed a decree that required all religious 
organizations to register with the Commission. Under the new 
regulations, each congregation must register separately. As previously, 
if a group wishes to own property, open bank accounts, and otherwise 
engage in contractual activities, it must become a legal entity by 
registering with the Ministry of Justice. In practice the Ministry has 
never registered a religious organization without prior registration by 
the Commission. There were no known instances during the year of the 
Commission refusing attempts by religious groups to register, although 
registration has been slow on occasion.
    In June law enforcement officials broke up a Baptist service in 
Kyzyl Kiya, in the south. Several of the participants had crossed the 
border illegally from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and subsequently were 
returned to their countries. The religious commission stated that the 
religious group had not been registered, although it had been invited 
to do so several times, and that it was not associated with other 
Baptist churches, all of which have been registered.
    Religious leaders note with concern that the Commission frequently 
uses the term ``national security'' in its statements. For example the 
Commission has expressed some concern about the destabilizing presence 
of Reverend Moon's Unification Church. The Unification Church currently 
is not active in the country, but it has a presence through the charity 
organization of Reverend Moon's wife. Religious leaders also worry that 
traditional religious groups could use references to ``preserving 
interconfessional accord'' to prevent smaller churches from 
registering. Both Christians and Muslims have expressed concern about 
the State's apparent intention to play a more intrusive role in 
religion. Ethnic Kyrgyz Christian congregations appear to face special 
barriers, as do some Muslim congregations with foreign support. A small 
Jewish congregation meets in Bishkek without a rabbi. The group also 
organizes informal cultural studies and humanitarian services, chiefly 
food assistance for the community's elderly.
    A Roman Catholic Church in Bishkek functions unhindered. The 
Seventh-Day Adventist Church operates six churches in Bishkek, as well 
as several elsewhere in the country, without apparent hindrance.
    Muslim leaders complain that the Commission on Religious Affairs 
makes decisions about religious events without consulting them. The 
Government considers radical Islam, whose followers it labels 
``Wahhabis,'' a threat to the country's stability. In late 1997 and 
throughout 1998, the Government intensified its campaign against 
orthodox Islamic believers. Anti-Wahhabi activities apparently abated 
during the year.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--In general government policy allows free 
travel within and outside the country; however, certain Soviet-era 
policies continue to complicate internal migration, resettlement, and 
travel abroad. Under the Soviet-era law still in force, citizens need 
official government permission (a ``propiska'') to work and settle in a 
particular area of the country. Strictly speaking, the propiska affords 
the right to reside in a given city or region. In addition home and 
apartment owners legally can sell their property only to buyers with 
such permission. In practice many employers traditionally have refused 
to provide employment to any applicant residing illegally. However, 
this law has not been enforced recently. Persons now move within the 
country, purchase homes, and sell businesses without hindrance.
    There is no law on emigration. Administrative procedures permit 
movement of persons; however, citizens who apply for passports must 
present a letter of invitation from the country they intend to visit or 
to which they intend to immigrate. In August a presidential decree 
stated that exit visa requirements would be abolished by October 1 and 
the law was implemented fully by year's end. Citizens can now travel 
abroad without an exit visa; however, some travelers may still be 
required to present a letter of invitation to validate their passport 
for international travel for their first trip abroad. After validation 
of the passport, travel is unrestricted. A Soviet-era law prohibits 
emigration within 5 years of working with ``state secrets.'' No one is 
believed to have been barred from emigration under this statute during 
the year.
    Emigrants are not prevented from returning to the country, and 
there is reportedly a small but steady flow of returnees.
    The armed militants who crossed the border into southern Kyrgyzstan 
from Tajikistan, caused an estimated 5,000 Kyrqyz citizens to flee from 
their homes and left them internally displaced. All returned to their 
homes after the fighting ended.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations 
in assisting refugees.
    The issue of first asylum did not arise during the year.
    As of June, there were 13,240 refugees in the country. Of these 693 
were from Afghanistan, and the remainder were from Tajikistan. Of the 
latter, about 80 percent were ethnic Kyrgyz, mostly from the Tajik 
cities of Murgab and Jirgital.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries 
where they feared persecution or expulsion of those having valid claim 
to refugee status. During the year, there were no forced repatriation 
of Uighurs. The UNHCR assisted approximately 2,500 Tajik refugees to 
return to Tajikistan during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, but in practice citizens' ability to do so is 
limited.
    The Constitution mandates presidential elections every 5 years. 
There is a two-term limit. The President was reelected to a second term 
in 1995 in a multicandidate election marred by irregularities. 
Parliamentary elections also are held every 5 years. In 1995 citizens 
elected a new Parliament in elections marred by irregularities. In 1996 
a referendum was held that amended the Constitution to redistribute 
power within the Government. The referendum violated the Constitution 
in force at the time and the Law on Referendums. Voter apathy was high 
and turnout was low. The results were reminiscent of the Soviet era, 
with a reported turnout of 98 percent. Ballot stuffing was rampant, and 
family voting apparently was widespread.
    The October 1998 constitutional referendum on land privatization, 
the structure of the Parliament, and the budget process also was marred 
by serious irregularities. The Government's claim that 96 percent of 
voters participated in the referendum was not in accord with 
participation rates witnessed by local and international observers. 
Observers also noted the persistent problem of family voting. The 
Government designed the ballot so that voters had to vote either in 
favor of all five amendments or against all five. This procedure 
created a dilemma for voters who were opposed to the provision for the 
privatization of land, which was very unpopular, but favored the other 
four, less controversial amendments. The referendum further enhanced 
the power of the executive at the expense of the legislature.
    The amendments approved in the 1996 referendum strengthened the 
formal power of the President and his advisers, who dominate the 
Government. The Parliament and the judiciary tend to be subordinate to 
the executive branch but show increasing signs of independence, such as 
the overriding of presidential vetoes by Parliament. In comparison with 
1996, when the Parliament passed 66 laws, it passed 158 laws in 1997 
(of which the President signed only 143), and 159 laws in 1998, all of 
which the President signed. In 1999 Parliament adopted 184 laws, of 
which the President signed 160. Parliament overrode a presidential veto 
when the President refused to sign an amendment to the election code 
which did not shorten the minimum registration period of time that 
political parties must be registered in order to participate in 
elections from 1 year to 6 months. In December 1997, Parliament delayed 
passage of the 1998 budget bill until reaching a compromise with the 
executive branch. The Parliament also delayed approval of the 1999 
budget until reaching a compromise with the Government. The 
overwhelming majority of local government officials are still appointed 
by the President, but the first elections for local legislative bodies 
were held on October 17. The elections were flawed but were an 
improvement over the 1998 referendum.
    In January 1998, President Akayev named two M.P.'s to executive 
positions. Both members continued to serve as deputies after they had 
assumed their new positions, which is a violation of the Constitution. 
However, one of them eventually left his executive position, and the 
other resigned from Parliament.
    Political parties remain weak. There are 27 registered political 
parties. None of the winners of parliamentary by-elections in 1997 or 
1998 had a party affiliation, and parties nominated very few 
candidates. Of the M.P.'s, fewer than half (46 of 105) claim party 
affiliation. There are 12 parties represented in Parliament, but voting 
seldom proceeds along strict party lines.
    In June and July, local authorities in both Issyk Kul and Naryn 
oblasts disallowed several public meetings for representatives of the 
People's Party of Kyrgyzstan, one of the largest opposition parties. 
The officials set up roadblocks at the entrance to Karakol and did not 
permit the party representatives access to the city. Later, government 
authorities cited a law that requires 10 days' notice for public 
meetings. At year's end, the People's Party was considering an appeal. 
In Naryn oblast, two parliamentary deputies discussing politics 
informally with citizens in a public place were brought to court and 
charged with holding an illegal gathering; subsequently, they were 
fined (also see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 2.b.). In the summer, 
President Akayev pressed to reduce the minimum registration period to 
allow political parties to participate in elections from 1 year to 6 
months. Parliament declined to adopt his proposal. Parliament also 
passed a bill in October allowing all parties that have undergone the 
minimum registration period to participate in the February 2000 
parliamentary elections.
    Women and most ethnic minorities are underrepresented in government 
and politics. Only 3 of 105 parliamentary deputies are women. The only 
senior female executive branch official is the Minister of Justice. The 
Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court also is a woman. A woman's 
group has been formed to recruit, advise, and campaign for female 
candidates in the next parliamentary elections. Russians and Uzbeks are 
underrepresented in government positions, although Boris Silayev, an 
ethnic Russian, is currently the First Deputy Prime Minister.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups generally operated without 
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on 
human rights cases, and government officials sometimes were responsive 
to their views. However, the Government deregistered the KHRC (an 
active organization that began protest activity during the campaign 
prior to the October 1998 referendum), immediately before the 
referendum (see Section 2.b.). After international protests, the KHRC 
was reregistered on August 19.
    Activists sometimes allege that harassment originates within 
government circles.
    The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
opened an office in Bishkek in January, and the Government generally 
supports its activities.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for the rights and freedom of individuals 
and prohibits discrimination, including on the basis of language. The 
Government expresses a strong commitment to protecting the rights of 
members of all ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, as well as 
those of women, but in practice has a mixed record.
    Women.--Research conducted in 1996 on violence against women showed 
a noticeable increase in such incidents since independence. Activists 
note that rape is becoming more common. It is not clear if the 
incidence of rape or just the reporting of such attacks is becoming 
more common, but authorities often ignore such attacks. Government 
statistics indicate that annually there are 400 to 450 crimes against 
women, but many crimes never are reported due to psychological 
pressures, cultural restrictions, and apathy by law enforcement 
officials. The Government has not devised a program to deal with this 
problem, and the number of shelters of battered women is not increasing 
to meet the need. One shelter of relatively long standing in Tokmok 
still is searching for appropriate funding or a sponsor. The Umut 
(Hope) Center opened in January 1997 to provide basic protection as 
well as psychological, legal, and medical counseling for battered women 
and girls. For example during the 3 years of its activity, the Umut 
Center has organized biweekly discussions and training for women to 
advise and counsel them about their rights. It provides 10 days of 
emergency shelter, clothing, and meals for battered women as well as 
employment counseling and legal services. In 1998 the director 
attributed the rise in the number of women visiting the shelter to the 
country's severe economic crisis, which has led to increased violence 
against women; 62 percent of women visiting the shelter are unemployed. 
Among those in the shelter, 92 percent are unemployed. Umut has 
received grants from the Soros Foundation and other foreign sources 
during the year.
    In June 1997, the NGO Tendesh opened a crisis center in Naryn with 
a hot line to support women affected by violence. It provides 
psychological, legal, and medical assistance. Another center (Sezim) 
opened in April 1998 in Bishkek with a staff of lawyers, psychologists, 
and doctors, and operates a crisis hot line for the public. Staff 
members conduct training, debates, and seminars on women's rights and 
family planning.
    Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a growing problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    The law gives equal status to women, and they are well represented 
in the work force, in the professions, and in institutions of higher 
learning. Women are prominent in law, medicine, accounting, and 
banking. They also play an active role in the rapidly growing 
nongovernment sector. Nonetheless, recently deteriorating economic 
conditions have had a severe effect on women, who are more likely than 
men to lose their jobs. It is estimated that women account for 60 
percent of the unemployed. Women with children under the age of 16 
account for 67 percent of unemployed women. Women make up the majority 
of pensioners, who have felt the negative effects of the country's 
economic downturn as inflation has eroded pensions, which often are 
paid late. Women's groups express general concern about the situation 
of rural women. There are approximately 100 women's advocacy NGOs 
operating in the country with 20 located in rural areas. With the end 
of communism, traditional attitudes toward women are reasserting 
themselves strongly in the countryside, where women are relegated to 
the role of wife and mother, and educational opportunities are 
curtailed. Data indicate that women are becoming less healthy, more 
abused, less represented in government, less able to work outside the 
home, and less able to dispose of their earnings independently.
    Family law prohibits divorce during pregnancy and while a child is 
younger than 1 year. A special expert counsel under the State 
Commission on Family, Women, and Youth Issues reviewed all legislation 
for a gender perspective and submitted its recommendations to 
Parliament. The findings demonstrate that while women's rights are 
supported by legislation, the principle of women's equality is not 
always observed.
    The women's advocacy NGO community is becoming increasingly 
organized. As a result of conferences held in 1999 an appeal was sent 
to the Government, Parliament, journalists, NGO's, and international 
organizations in support of women's rights.
    Children.--The socioeconomic situation does not effectively ensure 
decent living conditions for all children. Basic needs for shelter, 
food, and clothing seldom are met. After independence vaccine-
preventable diseases such as diphtheria, polio, and measles reemerged. 
A range of serious nutrition-related problems affects a large number of 
children, especially in rural areas. Traditional social safety measures 
are now inadequate to cope with the social pressures that affect 
families, and in major cities, children regularly are observed begging 
or selling cigarettes. There are increasing reports of abandonment due 
to parents' lack of resources to care for children.
    Education is compulsory for the first 9 years, and the country has 
a 97 percent literacy rate. However, the educational system has 
suffered material and financial hardships, and conditions continue to 
deteriorate due to an acute shortage of budgetary and material 
resources.
    Human rights groups and the Kyrgyz Children's Fund (KCF) monitor 
the condition of children. Human rights groups note that children who 
are arrested usually are denied lawyers. Police often do not notify 
parents of the arrest, and neither parents nor lawyers generally are 
present during questioning, despite laws to the contrary. Children 
often are intimidated into signing confessions, and sometimes are 
placed in cells with adult criminals to frighten them.
    The KCF is concerned about the growing number of street children, 
many of whom have left home because of abusive or alcoholic parents. 
Although numbers are hard to estimate, a 1-day sweep in 1997 through 
Bishkek led to a count of 700 children of school age working during 
school hours. Such sweeps are conducted two to three times each year 
and about 30 to 70 children are found to be working. Similar conditions 
also exist in other urban centers, as well as in the countryside. The 
KCF has opened two shelters, one in Bishkek (for approximately 30 
children) and one in Osh, to provide food, clothing, and schooling to 
such children. The Ak Zhol (Bon Voyage) center founded by a Dutch 
organization and UNICEF in 1996 was closed in August 1998, due to a 
lack of funds.
    The forced marriage of underage girls has become more common, and 
the authorities often ignore this practice. Cultural traditions and 
social structures discourage victims from going to the authorities.
    Children in rural areas commonly are called upon to pick crops as 
needed on their family farms.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government passed the Law on Social 
Protection of Invalids in 1991 and adopted amendments in October 1998. 
The amendments provide for convenient access to public transportation 
and parking for the disabled; subsidies for mass media sources that 
make their services available to the hearing or visually impaired; and 
free plots of land to construct a home.
    Social facilities for the mentally disabled are strained severely, 
as budgets have fallen and workloads remain heavy. In one program 
facilitated by foreign volunteers, local high school students have 
begun to visit special institutions, such as those for the mentally 
disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are reported complaints 
of discrimination in the treatment of citizens who are not ethnic 
Kyrgyz. The most recent statistical data reflect the following ethnic 
percentages: 61.2 percent are Kyrgyz; 14.9 percent are Russians; 14.4 
percent are Uzbeks; 1.1 percent are Tatars; 0.3 percent are Germans; 
and others are 8.1 percent. Members of the minorities allege 
discrimination in hiring, promotion, and housing. They complain that 
government officials at all levels favor ethnic Kyrgyz.
    Russian-speaking Kyrgyz citizens (those who do not speak Kyrgyz) 
also allege that a ceiling exists in government employment that 
precludes their promotion beyond a certain level. The representation of 
ethnic Kyrgyz at senior and intermediate levels of government is 
disproportionately high, giving credence to perceptions that career 
opportunities in government are limited for those who are not ethnic 
Kyrgyz. There also were complaints about discrimination against non-
Kyrgyz in the judicial system (see Section 1.e.).
    The Constitution designated Kyrgyz as the state language, but it 
provides for preservation and equal and free development of Russian and 
other languages used in the country. In 1996 Russian also was declared, 
by presidential decree, an ``official'' language for some purposes. 
However, lawyers and other officials noted that no legislation referred 
to official languages, so the status of Russian was no clearer than 
previously. However, increasingly Kyrgyz is replacing Russian, and the 
Government has announced that by 2002 all government documents are to 
be in Kyrgyz. In 1997 a draft law declaring Russian an official 
language was declared constitutional by the Constitutional Court. 
However, to date, the law has been stymied in Parliament. Nevertheless, 
as a result of these efforts to improve the status of Russian, as well 
as difficult economic conditions in Russia, Russian emigration has 
declined significantly, with some ethnic Russians returning. University 
education is carried out largely in Russian (although Kyrgyz 
instruction is available in some departments in some universities, 
where textbooks are available), so that Russian-language capability 
remains an important skill for those who wish to pursue higher 
learning.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor Law provides for the 
right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions, and there is 
no evidence that the Government has tried to obstruct the formation of 
independent unions. The Federation of Trade unions of the Kyrgyz 
Republic, the successor to the formal official union, remains the only 
trade union umbrella organization in the country, although unions are 
not required to belong to it. The Federation forms one part of a 
bilateral commission, along with the Cabinet. Each year the two parties 
sign an agreement on ``cooperation.'' There is one small independent 
union, the Union of Entrepreneurs and Small Business Workers, whose 
membership reached approximately 80,000. Precise numbers for the 
Federation's membership are not available, but it is significantly 
larger than other unions.
    The Federation has been critical of government policies, especially 
privatization, and their effect on working class living standards. The 
Federation still regards itself as being in a process of transition, 
during which it is adjusting its relations with the Government, with 
other unions in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and with 
other foreign unions. Growing numbers of smaller unions are not 
affiliated with the umbrella organization.
    The law calls for practices consistent with international 
standards.
    While the right to strike is not codified, strikes are not 
prohibited. There were no retaliatory actions against strikers, nor 
were there instances of abuse generally directed at unions or 
individual workers. There were small strikes of short duration by 
teachers and bus drivers.
    The law permits unions to form and join federations and to 
affiliate with international trade union bodies. Since independent 
unions are still in their infancy, no meaningful affiliation with 
international trade union bodies has taken place.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
recognizes the right of unions to negotiate for better wages and 
conditions. Although overall union structure and practice are changing 
only slowly from those of the Soviet era, there is growing evidence of 
active union participation in state-owned and privatized enterprises. 
The Government sets the minimum wage, and then each employer sets its 
own wage level.
    The law protects union members from antiunion discrimination, and 
there were no recorded instances of discrimination against anyone 
because of union activities.
    There are Free Economic Zones (FEZ's) that can be used as export 
processing zones. The minimum wage law does not apply to the 
approximately 3,000 workers in ordinary FEZ's.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law forbids 
forced or compulsory labor, as well as forced or bonded labor by 
children, and generally it does not occur; however, women and girls are 
trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 18 years. Students are 
allowed to work up to 6 hours per day in summer or in part-time jobs 
from the age of 16. The law prohibits the use of child labor (under the 
age of 16); the Ministry of Education monitors enforcement. However, 
families frequently call upon their children to work to help support 
the family, and many children work as beggars and street vendors (see 
Section 5). Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited and 
generally does not occur; however, girls are trafficked for the purpose 
of forced prostitution (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government mandates a 
national minimum wage at a level theoretically sufficient to assure a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. The legal minimum 
wage is about $2.50 (100 soms) per month. In practice this wage is 
considered insufficient to ensure a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family, and therefore industries and employers set the 
actual minimum wage as a multiple of the national minimum wage. The 
Federation is responsible for enforcing all labor laws, including the 
law on minimum wages. Minimum wage regulations largely are observed. 
However, enforcement of labor laws is nonexistent in the growing 
underground economy. Market forces help wages in the unofficial sector 
to keep pace with official wage scales.
    The standard workweek is 41 hours, usually within a 5-day week. For 
state-owned industries, there is a mandated 24-hour rest period in the 
workweek.
    Safety and health conditions in factories are poor. Despite the 
recent improvement in economic growth, the previous deterioration in 
enforcement of existing regulations continued to hamper investment to 
improve health and safety standards. A 1992 law established 
occupational health and safety standards, as well as enforcement 
procedures. Besides government inspection teams, trade unions are 
assigned active roles in assuring compliance with these measures, but 
the previous economic deterioration in the country has made the 
compliance record of businesses uneven. Workers have the legal right to 
remove themselves from unsafe working conditions, and workers who 
choose not to work in an unsafe environment may find employment 
elsewhere. In practice refusal to work in situations with relatively 
high accident rates or associated chronic health problems could result 
in loss of employment, but only if informal methods of resolution 
failed.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and girls, mostly 
to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a growing problem. Several media articles have raised 
public awareness. The Ministry of Tourism and Sports monitors all 
reported cases of trafficking in women. However, there are reports that 
officials may receive bribes in exchange for forged travel documents 
for the women. Russian border guards operating on the Tajik borders 
also allegedly were complicit in trafficking.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 LATVIA

    Latvia is a parliamentary democracy, which regained its 
independence in 1991 after more than 50 years of occupation by the 
Soviet Union. The Prime Minister, as chief executive, and the Cabinet 
are responsible for government operations. The President, as Head of 
State, is elected by the Parliament (Saeima). The Saeima elected Vaira 
Vike-Freiberga to a 4-year term in June. The October 1998 elections for 
the 100-seat Parliament and the national referendum for amending the 
Citizenship Law to meet European standards were free and fair. The 
judiciary is independent but not well-trained, efficient, or free from 
corruption.
    The security apparatus consists of: The national police and other 
services, such as the Special Immigration Police and the Border Guards, 
who are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior; municipal police under 
local government control; the military Counterintelligence Service and 
a protective service under the Ministry of Defense; and the National 
Guard, an element of the national armed forces, which also assists in 
police activities. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective 
control of the security forces. The Constitution Protection Bureau 
(SAB) is responsible for coordinating intelligence activities. However, 
Interior Ministry forces, municipal police, and intelligence personnel 
sometimes acted independently of central government authority. Some 
members of the security forces, including police and other Interior 
Ministry personnel, committed human rights abuses.
    The economy is oriented toward the private sector. Almost all 
agricultural land is farmed privately. Three large enterprises 
(shipping, telecommunications, and energy) are schedule to be 
privatized, but had not been by year's end. The currency remained 
stable and traded freely; unemployment was 10 percent, up from 8.6 
percent in 1998; and annual inflation was 1.9 percent, down from 2.8 
percent in 1998. Per capita gross domestic product was approximately 
$2,612, continuing its increase that began in 1996.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
and the large resident noncitizen community; however, problems remained 
in certain areas. An inebriated policeman killed two persons. Members 
of the security forces, including the police and other Interior 
Ministry personnel, sometimes used excessive force; police and prison 
officers beat and mistreated detainees and inmates. In most instances, 
the Government took disciplinary measures against those responsible. 
Prison conditions remained poor. The inefficient judiciary did not 
always ensure the fair administration of justice. Women are 
discriminated against in the workplace. Domestic violence, trafficking 
in women (including minors), and child prostitution and abuse, are 
significant problems.
    In March the National Rights Office (NHRO) established an advisory 
council, which includes representatives from human rights 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). In April NHRO director Olafs 
Bruvers survived a vote of no confidence in the Saeima but the office 
continues to suffer from poor funding and a lackluster image. In July 
newly elected President Vike-Freiberga returned the proposed new 
language law to the Parliament for additional review, citing the law's 
inconsistency with the country's international obligations. The revised 
law, which met these standards, was passed on December 9.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There we no reports 
of political killings.
    In March a member of the security police shot and killed two 
persons and injured three other persons during a bar fight in Jelgava. 
In October he was sentenced to 20 years in prison; he appealed to the 
Supreme Court, and at year's end, the appeal was pending (see Section 
1.c.).
    On April 20, a regional court convicted two soldiers based in 
Aluksne of manslaughter after they beat a local resident to death 
during a street brawl in August 1998. One soldier received a 3-year 
prison sentence and the other a 1-year sentence. Three others 
subsequently received lesser sentences. An additional four soldiers 
were disciplined administratively and fined by the armed forces.
    In 1997 unknown assailants shot and killed Janis Riba, the leader 
of the ultranationalist group Aizargi. Riba's followers claimed that 
the killing was politically motivated; others speculated that rivals 
within the ultranationalist movement committed the murder. A police 
investigation continued at year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there were 
credible reports that police and prison personnel beat and mistreated 
prison inmates.
    Several incidents were reported in which police officers shot 
civilians, including one incident in Jelgava in March when an officer 
under the influence of alcohol killed two persons and wounded three 
others in a bar (see Section 1.a.). Criminal charges were filed against 
the police officer. No military hazing incidents were reported during 
the year.
    Prison conditions remained poor, although human rights groups noted 
some improvements during the year. Prison cells often are overcrowded 
severely. Inadequate sanitation facilities, persistent shortages of 
blankets and medical care, and insufficient lighting and ventilation 
are common problems, as is the shortage of resources in general. 
Detainees complain that they are subject to physical and psychological 
intimidation by prison guards. Most jails badly need renovation. The 
Government has taken some steps to upgrade certain facilities. Ministry 
of Interior personnel stated that prisoners accused of crimes spend an 
average of 1 year in prison before trial, but many have been there much 
longer. Human rights groups are alarmed by the increasing number of 
drug-resistant tuberculosis cases in the prisons, and the government 
has received assistance from several foreign organizations to address 
this problem. the government also has stated its intention to continue 
renovations as rapidly as its limited finances allow and has embarked 
on a program to upgrade the prison guard force by replacing the 
draftees who now perform such duties with full-time professional 
guards. As of January 2000, the prisons are scheduled to be 
administered by the Justice Ministry.
    In conjunction with the Soros Foundation and the NHRO, the Ministry 
of Interior continued its programs for educating police officers in 
human rights matters. In June a local NGO established a free legal 
advisory service for prisoners and others who believe that they were 
victims of police abuse (see Section 4).
    Detention facilities for asylum seekers improved with the opening 
of Mucinieki center in November 1998 (see Section 2.d.).
    The situation for some imprisoned children, who are not always 
separated from adults, remained poor. Children as young as 14 years of 
age were kept in unsanitary conditions, and suffered from diseases and 
deprivation. Both boys and girls are subject to violence and possible 
sexual abuse. Educational facilities are poor or nonexistent.
    The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law requires the 
prosecutor's office to make a formal decision whether to charge or 
release a detainee within 72 hours after arrest. Charges must be filed 
within 10 days of arrest. There were no known instances of arbitrary 
arrest. The responsibility for issuing arrest warrants was transferred 
from prosecutors to the courts in 1994. No detainee may be held for 
more than 18 months without the prosecutor presenting the case to the 
defendant and the court. Detainees have the right to have an attorney 
present at any time. These rights are subject to judicial review but 
only at the time of trial. There were credible reports that these 
rights are not always respected in practice, especially outside of 
Riga.
    The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of its 
use.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this 
provision in practice. However, the courts must rely on the Ministry of 
Justice for administrative support, and the judiciary is not well 
trained, efficient, or free from corruption.
    The Supreme Court does not have a clearly established right to rule 
on the constitutionality of legislation or its conformity with the 
country's international obligations; however, in 1997 a constitutional 
court was set up to fulfill these functions. The seven-judge panel is 
authorized to hear cases at the request of state institutions (the 
President, Cabinet, Prosecutor, Supreme Court, local governments, or 
one-third of Saeima members) but not of individuals or courts. A 
project is currently underway to expand the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court to include referrals from lower courts.
    The Government continues to reform the judicial system. In 1995 it 
completed the establishment of regional courts to hear appeals of lower 
court decisions. For more serious criminal cases, two lay assessors 
join the professional judge on the bench. Corruption in the judicial 
system reportedly is widespread. In 1997 the judges appointed to 
preside over the trial of the president of the collapsed Bank Baltija, 
Aleksander Lavent, resigned from the case, citing alleged political 
pressure from the Government. The accusation came after the judges 
released Lavent to house arrest following a heart attack that he 
suffered in the courtroom on the first day of the trial. In December 
1998, the courts determined that Lavent had recovered his health, and 
he was returned from house arrest to prison. The trial of Lavent and 
his alleged accomplices resumed briefly in the fall, but it was 
suspended again at year's end.
    Most judges have inadequate judicial training, and the court system 
is too weak to enforce many of its decisions. A major difficulty in 
enforcing court decisions is the lack of an effective bailiff or 
sheriff system. In April a new criminal law went into force, which 
allows for more availability of alternative punishments, including 
community service.
    Court decisions are not published systemically, nor is there a 
centralized index for those that are published. Trials may be closed if 
state secrets might be revealed or to protect the interests of minors. 
All defendants have the right to hire an attorney, and the State will 
lend funds to destitute defendants for this purpose. Defendants have 
the right to read all charges, confront all witnesses, and may offer 
witnesses and evidence to support their case. They may also make 
multiple appeals of adverse verdicts.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law requires that law enforcement authorities have 
a judicial warrant in order to intercept citizens' mail, telephone 
calls, or other forms of communication. The laws protecting privacy 
apply to citizens and noncitizens equally. There were no credible 
reports of the unsanctioned taping of the telephone conversations of 
public officials.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice. The 1991 Press Law prohibits 
censorship of the press or other mass media. Most newspapers and 
magazines are privately owned. Newspapers in both Latvian and Russian 
publish a wide range of criticism and political viewpoints.
    A large number of independent television and radio outlets 
broadcast in both Russian and Latvian, and the number of people 
receiving satellite television broadcasts continued to increase.
    The Law on the Media, revised in October 1998, contains a number of 
restrictive provisions regulating the content and language of 
broadcasts. No less than 51 percent of television broadcasts must be of 
European origin, of which 40 percent should be in the Latvian language. 
However, these provisions are not always implemented. In addition 
foreign investment may not exceed 20 percent of the capital in 
electronic media organizations.
    On November 9, the Riga District Court announced guilty verdicts 
against 10 former Soviet soldiers from the special forces unit OMON who 
participated in attacks on government buildings and the headquarters of 
Latvian Television in 1991. Seven of the men received suspended 
sentences of between 1 and 4 years and probation of up to 3 years; the 
other three were not sentenced. Five other former OMON officers have 
been charged; they are presumed to be in Russia and are expected to be 
tried in absentia.
    There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for peaceful assembly, and the authorities may not prohibit 
public gatherings; however, organizers of demonstrations must provide 
advance notice to local authorities, who may change the time and place 
of public gatherings for such reasons as fear of public disorder. In 
January 1997, the Saeima passed legislation on public demonstrations 
that requires protesters to remain specified distances from foreign 
missions, the Saeima, the Prosecutor's office, and certain other public 
institutions. While the law purports to imitate Western European 
statutes, independent human rights organizations in Latvia find its 
provisions contradictory and confusing. Numerous public meetings and 
political demonstrations took place without government interference, 
including a reunion of the Latvian Legion (veterans of the German army 
in World War II), commemorations of the Red Army victory in World War 
II, protests against the proposed language law by Russians celebrating 
the 200th anniversary of the birth of Pushkin, trade union marches 
against the new pension law, and demonstrations in front of NATO 
embassies against NATO actions in Kosovo.
    The Constitution provides for the right to associate in public 
organizations; however, the Law on Registering Public Organizations 
bars the registration of Communist, Nazi, or other organizations whose 
activities would contravene the Constitution. On March 11, the 
Parliament rejected a proposal by a parliamentary group that would have 
allowed noncitizens who are permanent residents of the country to form 
political parties. However, noncitizens can join and form political 
parties, but there must be at least 200 citizens in the party and at 
least half of the total membership must be citizens. More than 40 
political parties are officially registered. Noncitizens are prohibited 
from forming political organizations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
Although the Government does not require the registration of religious 
groups, the 1995 Law on Religious Organizations accords religious 
organizations certain rights and privileges only if they register. 
Under this law, the Justice Ministry has registered over 1,000 
religious congregations, including congregations of the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, whose previous lack of official 
registration had created difficulties in obtaining visas and residence 
status. Any citizen or permanent resident included in the inhabitant's 
register may register a religion. However, asylum seekers, foreign 
embassy staff, and those in the country temporarily or in special 
status cannot register a religious organization. Churches denied 
registration include the Latvian Free Orthodox Church, the Church of 
Christian Scientists, and the Rock of Salvation Church.
    Foreign evangelists and missionaries are permitted to hold meetings 
and to proselytize, but the law stipulates that only domestic religious 
organizations may invite them to carry out such activities. Foreign 
religious denominations have criticized this provision.
    The Law on Education stipulates that religious education may be 
provided to students in public schools on a voluntary basis only by 
representatives of Evangelical Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Old Believer, 
Jewish, Baptist, and Orthodox religious organizations. Students at 
state-supported national minority schools may also receive education in 
the religion ``characteristic of the national minority.'' Other 
denominations may provide religious education in private schools only.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no obstacles to freedom of 
movement within the country, departure from it, or repatriation of 
citizens. Latvia has readmitted noncitizens who claimed refugee status 
in a foreign country, or who voluntarily abandoned their permanent 
residence, and then decided to return to the country to live and work. 
Noncitizens who left the country as refugees based on Soviet-era 
persecution have no difficulty returning on foreign refugee travel 
documents for business reasons or for family visits. The Government 
also extends protections to noncitizen residents who travel abroad.
    The 1995 Law on the Status of Former Soviet Citizens stipulates 
that registered permanent resident noncitizens enjoy the rights to 
establish and change residences, travel abroad, and return to the 
country. Noncitizens can be granted amnesty. However, certain rights 
are denied to noncitizens. Noncitizens are prohibited from working as 
private detectives, armed guards, or certified attorneys. Noncitizens 
may own land in urban areas without undue complications but in rural 
areas only under complex procedures. The law also provides for the 
issuance of a noncitizen travel document verifying these rights. In 
April 1997 the CID began issuing a more secure aliens' passport to 
noncitizens. The slow pace in issuing aliens' passports led to public 
protests in March 1998, after which the Government took steps to sped 
the process. The CID was renamed the Citizenship and Migration Affairs 
Office and was reorganized in an effort to make it more streamlined and 
efficient. The NHRO and other human rights groups have noted its 
improved performance. The Government also completed the gradual phasing 
out of former Soviet external passports, which are no longer valid for 
travel to and from Latvia as of December 31, 1998.
    As of September 1, 11 asylum seekers were housed at the Mucinieki 
refugee center. At the Olaine detention center, which does not house 
asylum seekers, 23 aliens await a determination of their immigration 
status. An additional 33 persons, mostly criminal aliens, are housed at 
the Gaizina center. Twenty of these persons staged a hunger strike in 
April 10 to protest the poor living conditions. The situation at 
Gaizina remains of concern. The Government is attempting to move this 
center to better facilities.
    The Government works closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refuges, and the law on Asylum Seekers and Refuges complies with all 
provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Special immigration police and border 
guards units are to help prescreen asylum requests. Decisions from the 
Citizens and Migration Affairs Office can be appealed to an asylum 
appeals board in the Ministry of Justice.
    The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise during the 
year and never has arisen.
    According to statistics provided by the immigration police during 
the year, 1,541 aliens were detained for questioning. Of those, 222 
were deported and 122 departed voluntarily. The Government has 
approached Russia and Belarus about concluding refugee readmission 
agreements, the lack of which poses a major barrier to effective 
control of the eastern border. However, at year's end, the arrangements 
had not been concluded.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government. There were free 
and fair elections for Parliament in 1998, and in June the Parliament 
elected a national president. In the 1998 election, candidates from 6 
of the 21 participating parties, representing a broad political 
spectrum, won Saeima seats, and 72 percent of eligible voters 
participated. Concurrently, 68 percent of the electorate participated. 
Concurrently, 68 percent of the electorate participated in a popular 
referendum on revising the Citizenship Law.
    The election law prohibits persons who remained active in the 
Communist Party or various other pro-Soviet organizations after January 
13, 1991, or who worked for such institutions as the KGB from seeking 
elected office. It also let stand provisions preventing noncitizens 
from voting in local elections.
    On December 15, the Supreme Court upheld a regional court decision 
that the extreme Russian nationalist of the Equal Rights movement and 
Riga city council deputy Tatyana Zhdanok was not eligible to run for 
public office due to her Communist past. the Riga City Council annulled 
her election, but Zhdanok said that she would appeal the decisions and 
accused the prosecutor's office of fabricating evidence that she was 
engaged actively in the Communist Party after January 13, 1991.
    In June the Parliament fulfilled its constitutional responsibility 
to elect an individual to serve as president. The Saeima chose Vaira 
Vike-Freiberga freely in a secret ballot.
    Following the restoration of independence in 1991, citizenship was 
accorded immediately only to those persons who were citizens of the 
independent Latvian Republic in 1940 and their direct descendants. 
After independence the status of approximately 670,000 persons changed 
from citizens of the Soviet Union to noncitizen residents in Latvia. 
Owing to the Russification policy pursued during the Soviet era, ethnic 
Latvians constitute 56 percent of a total population of 2.5 million, 
and 78 percent of citizens. Ethnic Latvians do not constitute a 
majority in seven of the eight largest cities. Citizens of other ethnic 
origins number approximately 400,000, of which almost 300,000 are 
Russian.
    The 1998 Latvian Citizenship Law includes a Latvian language and 
residence requirement for those seeking to naturalize, as well as 
personnel. the law requires applicants for citizenship to renounce 
previous non-Latvian citizenship, to have knowledge of the Constitution 
and Latvian history, and to pledge allegiance to Latvia. At present, 
according to Naturalization Board figures, nearly 95 percent of 
applicants pass the citizenship tests on the first attempt.
    In addition the October 1998 referendum brought the law into 
compliance with Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) standards. Children of noncitizens born after August 1992 are 
entitled to citizenship upon application.
    International observers, including the resident OSCE mission, 
credit the Government with establishing a competent and professional 
Naturalization Board with offices throughout the country to implement 
the law. In the estimation of the NHRO, the OSCE, and various NGO's, 
the Board has sought to apply the law fairly. Since the removal of the 
restrictive naturalization ``windows'' in November 1998, the number of 
citizenship applicants has increased significantly. Nearly as many 
persons applied for citizenship from late 1998 to October as in the 
previous 3 years combined. According to the Naturalization Board, 
13,031 noncitizens submitted naturalization applications in the past 11 
months. In contrast 13,814 persons applied for citizenship between 
January 1995 and November 1998. Overall, 19,728 of the country's 
640,000 noncitizens have naturalized since the process began in 1995. 
The Naturalization Board still is processing another 7,000 
applications. More than 66 percent of applicants are women; 21 percent 
of all applicants are in their forties.
    International experts, government officials, and domestic human 
rights monitors agreed that Latvia must continue to place high priority 
on and devote sufficient resources to implementing the citizenship law 
in a fair and impartial manner, as well as seek ways to expedite 
naturalization and promote social integration. Working with the 
European Union and the U.N. Development Program, the Government also 
has implemented a long-term nationwide Latvian Language teaching 
program for adults and children in non-Latvian schools.
    There are no ethnic restrictions on political participation. 
Nonethnic Latvians, including ethnic Russians and the First Roma deputy 
in the Saeima, serve in various elected bodies. Noncitizen residents 
(the majority of whom are ethnic Russians) may not vote in local or 
national elections. Women still generally are underrepresented in 
government and politics. There are 20 women in the 100-member Saeima. 
One woman is a member of the Cabinet of Ministers. For the first time, 
the President of the country is female.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A growing number of NGO's devoted to research and advocacy on human 
rights issues, including prison conditions and women's and children's 
rights, operate without government restriction. Several organizations 
deal with issues of concern to local noncitizens and other nonethnic 
Latvians, presenting them to the courts and the press.
    The Government demonstrated a willingness to engage in dialog with 
NGO's working on human rights issues. The Government continued to 
implement its national program for the protection and promotion of 
human rights, which was adopted in 1995 based on the recommendations of 
key international organizations. A resident OSCE mission continued to 
operate with a mandate to ``address citizenship issues and other 
related matters.''
    The NHRO remained an independent institution with a mandate to 
promote human rights, provide information on human rights, inquire into 
individual complaints, and initiate its own investigate into alleged 
violations. However, its reputation has been tarnished badly by 
infighting between its permanent director, Olafs Bruvers, and members 
of his staff; by charges from international institutions, including its 
primary funder, the U.N. Development Program, that the Office has 
become inefficient and politicized; and by calls from international 
critics and domestic policymakers, including the Prime Minister and 
Foreign Minister, that Bruvers step down. In April Bruvers survived a 
vote of no confidence in the Saiema.
    In June a foreign-funded local NGO received a grant to begin to 
operate a legal assistance center for those complaining of human rights 
abuses. The staff visits prisons and provides free legal counseling and 
representation to those who seek assistance in cases of police abuse 
(see Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    According to the 1922 Constitution, all citizens are equal under 
the law. In October 1998, the Saeima passed amendments to the 
Constitution, granting constitutional protections to fundamental human 
rights. The amendments supersede provisions of the 1991 Constitutional 
Law, which had served in the interim, and contain constitutional 
provisions for the exercise of the freedoms of speech, religion, 
association, the press, and other basic liberties. The amendments also 
provide protections from discrimination regardless of race, sex, 
religion, language, or disability. Only citizens can vote or hold 
government office. There are some restrictions on land purchases by 
noncitizens.
    Women.--Despite legal protections, international observers and 
human rights groups are growing increasingly concerned about problems 
facing women. Although no overall statistics are available, sources 
indicate that domestic violence against women, often connected with 
alcohol abuse, is a significant and underreported problem. Women who 
are victims of abuse often seem to be uninformed about their rights and 
reluctant to seek redress through the justice system. Human rights 
groups assert that the legal system, including the courts, tends to 
downplay the seriousness of domestic violence and that the police are 
sometimes reluctant to make arrests in such cases.
    There are no shelters designed specifically for battered or abused 
women. There is one shelter in Riga where homeless women with children 
may reside for up to 2 months. Likewise, there are no specific rape or 
assault hot lines; however, there are two crisis hot lines managed by 
NGO's.
    Police do not compile figures for domestic violence as a distinct 
category. Instead, episodes are placed under more general categories 
such as assault or battery. However, police figures on rape show a 
decrease in rape cases over the past 3 years. During the year, 69 cases 
were reported.
    Both adult and child prostitution are widespread, often linked to 
organized crime, and abetted by economic problems. Prostitution in Riga 
is increasing, and trafficking in women for prostitution abroad also is 
increasing (see Section 6.f). Although there is no official estimate of 
the number of prostitutes, unofficial figures suggest that 10,000 to 
15,000 persons work as prostitutes. The NHRO reports that adult 
prostitutes have no legal protections. Engaging in prostitution is 
technically against the law; however, generally neither the prostitutes 
nor their clients are prosecuted. There are no state institutions to 
assist prostitutes. However, the private Latvian Center for Gender 
Problems provides medical help and social support for prostitutes.
    Sexual harassment of women in the workplace is reportedly common. 
Cultural factors tend to discourage women from coming forth publicly 
with complaints of abuse.
    Women possess the same legal rights as men. The Labor Code 
prohibits women from performing ``hard jobs or jobs having unhealthy 
conditions,'' which are specified in a list agreed upon between the 
Cabinet and labor unions. Moreover, the code bans employment 
discrimination. In reality women frequently face hiring and pay 
discrimination, especially in the emerging private sector. According to 
the Central Statistics Bureau, the number of women in the lower income 
brackets exceeds that of men by 75 percent, while men outnumber women 
two to one in upper income levels. It is not unusual to see employment 
advertising that specifically seeks men. Women apparently have not 
brought any discrimination suits before the courts. The Ministry of 
Welfare has designated a one-person office with responsibility for 
gender issues.
    Women's advocacy groups are growing in size and number. They are 
involved in finding employment for women, lobbying for increased social 
benefits, assisting victims of domestic abuse,and opposing the hazing 
of military recruits.
    Children.--In June 1998, the Government adopted the Law on the 
Rights of the Child. In March the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the 
first annual National Program for the Improvement of the Situation of 
Children. The program included state funds for implementation. In 
December the Cabinet adopted the National Program for Preventing Sexual 
Violence Against Children for 2000-04. The National Center for the 
Protection of the Rights of the Child will supervise its 
implementation.
    Evidence suggests that abandonment and child abuse, including 
sexual abuse, are relatively widespread, as is child prostitution. An 
estimated 12 to 15 percent of prostitutes are considered juveniles, 
that is, between the ages of 8 and 18. Although in theory the 
Constitution and the Law on the Rights of the Child protect children, 
these rights only are enforced sporadically in the case of child 
prostitutes. Schooling is mandatory and free through the ninth grade, 
that is, between the ages of 7 and 16. Despite the existence of laws on 
mandatory education, truancy is widespread and growing. A few 
children's advocacy groups are active, particularly in lobbying for 
legislation to protect children's rights and for increased welfare 
payments for children.
    The Law on the Right of the Child and the constitutional provisions 
on children are based on Western European models and provide various 
protections, including health care and legal protections against 
physical abuse. However, resources are not adequate to enforce 
observance of these provisions.
    Although legislation has long provided for the establishment of 
special institutions for the rehabilitation and vocational training of 
juvenile offenders, the Government has made only sporadic efforts to 
reduce the number of juveniles who are housed in adult prison 
facilities, but who have committed relatively minor offenses.
    There is no societal problem of abuse of children. Law enforcement 
authorities have won court suits to remove children from abusive 
parents and secured convictions in child molestation cases.
    Trafficking in young girls for forced prostitution abroad is 
increasing (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--Part Two of the Constitution protects 
the disabled against discrimination; the 1992 Law on the Medical and 
Social Protection of Disabled provides for their right of access to 
public facilities. Provisions in the Labor Law and other laws protect 
the disabled from bias in the workplace and from job discrimination. In 
June 1998, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a framework document 
entitled ``Equal Opportunity for Everyone.'' The document is designed 
to coordinate the efforts of all branches of government in assisting 
the disabled. The Government supports special schools for disabled 
persons. It does not enforce uniformly a 1993 law requiring buildings 
to be accessible to wheelchairs, and most building are not. However, 
some larger cities, including Riga and Ventspils, have undertaken an 
extensive wheelchair ramp building program at intersections.
    Religious Minorities.--There was no progress reported in 
apprehending the perpetrators of the 1995 bombing of a Riga synagogue. 
In April 1998, another bomb exploded at the synagogue, causing 
considerable property damage. Then President Ulmanis, the Prime 
Minister, and others condemned the bombing and enlisted the assistance 
of foreign experts in the investigation. The Government also fired the 
State Police chief and other ranking police and Ministry of Interior 
officers for failing to protect the synagogue. In June 1998, two youths 
were arrested for painting anti-Semitic slogans on a wall opposite the 
synagogue. The youths were charged with hooliganism, but the Prosecutor 
returned the case to the police for further investigation, which 
remained pending at year's end. In 1998 there also were incidents in 
Liepaja and other locations in which Jewish monuments were defaced. In 
April an explosive device left at the Jewish Holocaust memorial at 
Rumbula just outside the city of Riga caused minor damage. Police have 
not yet identified the culprits.
    In 1998 a politician belonging to Latvia's largest nationalist 
party, For Fatherland and Freedom, republished a Nazi era, anti-Semitic 
book, ``The Horrible Year.'' (The book also appeared for sale in the 
party's bookstores in Riga, although party leaders claimed that they 
had not authorized its sale there.) The Government criticized the 
contents of the book and its reissuance and called on the State 
Prosecutor's office to investigate whether the book's publication 
violated the law. It subsequently was determined that technically it 
did not. Nevertheless, the leadership of For Fatherland and Freedom 
expelled the publisher of the book from the party.
    In July then President Guntis Ulmanis convened the first meeting of 
the Latvian Historical Commission. Historians from five western 
countries attended. The Commission established four task forces to 
study key historical developments of World War II and the postwar 
period. These are: the Holocaust; the first Soviet occupation; the Nazi 
occupation, excluding the Holocaust; and the second Soviet occupation. 
Mechanisms are being established for historians to hold seminars with 
Latvian history teachers to improve teaching at the secondary level 
about the Holocaust.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Of the country's more than 2.5 
million inhabitants, approximately 1.1 million persons are of non-
Latvian ethnicity, including more than 765,000 ethnic Russians, 100,000 
ethnic Belarusians, almost 70,000 ethnic Ukrainians, and more than 
60,000 ethnic Poles. More than 70 percent of Latvia's inhabitants are 
citizens, including nearly 400,000 persons who belong to national or 
ethnic minorities. There are approximately 687,000 noncitizens, of 
which an estimated 65 percent are Russian; 12 percent, Belarusian; 9 
percent, Ukrainian; and smaller percentages of Poles, Lithuanians, 
Jews, Roma, Germans, Tatars, Estonians, and Armenians.
    The law provides for the basic human rights of noncitizens. It 
provides noncitizens who have been permanent residents continuously 
since July 1, 1992 with the rights to change residence, leave and 
return, and invite close relatives to join them for the purpose of 
family reunification. The law also provides for the issuance of travel 
documents reflecting these rights. It also requires the registration of 
noncitizens regardless of their housing status, helping to resolve 
cases of persons previously unregistered because they lived in former 
Soviet military or dormitory housing. The country's housing patterns 
now are based on private, rather than communal, ownership of property; 
no new cases involving this provision of the law were reported during 
the year. However, the Government has maintained the Soviet-era 
practice of requiring the holder's ethnicity to be printed in the 
passport. Groups such as Roma and Belarusians have complained that, 
because the passport is a basic form of identification in the country, 
this requirement has opened them to various forms of discrimination 
based on ethnicity.
    In May 1998, the Cabinet of Ministers amended the regulations that 
distinguished between citizens and noncitizens in calculating social 
benefits. Various laws still prohibit the employment of noncitizens in 
certain categories. These include restrictions on noncitizen employment 
as armed guards, private detectives, and certified attorneys. The NHRO 
found most of these practices to be consistent with the international 
standards and practices that allow a state to limit government 
employment, political participation, and some property rights to those 
persons who are citizens.
    On July 8, the Saeima passed revisions to the Language Law. The 
most controversial points in the Language Law, which did not meet 
international standards, were articles requiring that all public events 
be held in Latvian and that all billboards and signs in public places 
be displayed in Latvian only. President Vike-Freiberga sent the law 
back to the Saeima for revision on July 14. The revised law, which met 
international standards, was passed on December 9. OSCE experts worked 
closely with the Saeima on revisions to the Language Law that would 
bring it to international standards.
    Some ethnic Russians also have complained of discrimination 
resulting from the property laws, which allow individual noncitizens to 
own rural land only under complicated procedures. Moreover, noncitizens 
were given fewer privatization certificates (which can be used to 
purchase shares of stock and to privatize apartments and land) than 
were citizens. However, the law allows land ownership by companies in 
which noncitizens own shares. The local Russian media and the Russian 
Government also voiced concern about acts of vandalism against Soviet 
army war memorials and cemeteries. There was no progress in the 
investigation of the April 1998 bomb near the Russian Embassy or the 
anti-Russian statements published by the For Fatherland and Freedom 
party. In July 1998, the police arrested Vilis Linins, the chief 
ideologue of the ultranationalist ``Thundercross'' organization, which 
was suspected of terrorist attacks against Soviet memorials and other 
targets. Linins was charged with sabotage and illegal possession of 
explosives and was awaiting trial at year's end. The two persons killed 
in the blast were the bombers. The ``Thundercross'' organization no 
longer exists.
    For the time being, the Government has agreed to continue using 
Russian as the language of instruction in public schools where the 
pupils are primarily Russian speakers. It also supports schools in 
eight other minority languages. However, under the revised Education 
Law, the Government has begun to implement a bilingual education 
program at the elementary school level. The goal of this program is to 
facilitate the eventual transition to Latvian language secondary 
schools by the year 2004. Although all non-Latvian-speaking students in 
public schools are supposed to learn Latvian and to study a minimum 
number of subjects in Latvian, there are shortages of qualified 
teachers.
    Most state-funded university education is in Latvian, and incoming 
students whose native language is not Latvian must pass a Latvian 
language entrance examination. However, there are several private 
institutions offering higher education in Russian.
    Throughout the year, the Board of Naturalization sponsored a ``town 
meeting'' process to discuss the Government's proposed action plan for 
social integration, presented by the Integration Council, composed of 
representatives of the country's various ethnic groups. The revised 
plan was approved by the Government in December. The report is 
scheduled to be followed by specific programs to promote social 
integration, including extensive language training programs.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Law on Trade Unions mandates that 
workers, except for the uniformed military, have the right to form and 
join labor unions of their own choosing. Union membership is currently 
about 30 percent of the work force. Free elections for union leadership 
are held every 4 years. In general the trade union movement is 
undeveloped and still in transition from the Socialist to the free 
market model.
    The law does not limit the right to strike. There were several 
protests by trade unions during the year, including a major protest 
against the pension reform, which was attended by over 2,000 persons. 
The trade unions organized the collection of signatures for the planned 
referendum on the pension law. The remaining state-owned enterprises 
(shipping, energy, and telecommunications) have not faced strikes, wage 
payment arrears, or any major labor problems in recent years. Almost 
all other businesses now are owned privately. The law bans dismissal of 
employees who have invoked the right to strike. There have been no 
reported cases of such dismissals.
    Unions are free to affiliate internationally and have established 
contacts with European labor unions and international labor union 
organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions 
have the right to bargain collectively and are largely free of 
government interference in their negotiations with employers. The law 
prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers. However, 
some emerging private sector businesses threaten to fire union members. 
These businesses usually provide better salaries and benefits than are 
available elsewhere. The Government's ability to protect the right to 
organize in the private sector is weak.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and it generally is 
not practiced. Inspectors from the Ministry of Welfare's State Labor 
Inspection Board or Inspectorate enforce this ban. However, trafficking 
in women (including minors) for prostitution abroad is increasing (see 
Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The statutory minimum age for employment of children is 15 
years, although children between the ages of 13 and 15 years may work 
in certain jobs outside of school hours. The law restricts employment 
of those under the age of 18; for example, by banning night shift or 
overtime work. Children are required to attend school until age 16. 
Schooling is free until age 18. State authorities are lax in their 
enforcement of child labor and school attendance laws. There generally 
is no evidence of forced or bonded labor involving children, which is 
prohibited by law (see Section 6.c.); however, trafficking in young 
girls for prostitution abroad is increasing (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government raised the 
monthly minimum wage to about $86 (50 Lats), far below the amount that 
trade union officials describe as the bare minimum for survival. The 
Labor Code provides for a mandatory 40-hour maximum workweek with at 
least one 42-hour rest period weekly, 4 weeks of annual vacation, and a 
program of assistance to working mothers with small children. The laws 
establish minimum occupational health and safety standards for the 
workplace, but these standards frequently are ignored. Workers have the 
legal right to remove themselves from hazardous work situations, but 
these standards also frequently are ignored in practice.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are no specific laws 
prohibiting trafficking in persons, the Government uses laws against 
prostitution, pornography, and illegal transport of persons across 
borders to fight such abuses.
    There were instances of trafficking in women for purposes of forced 
prostitution. Prostitution is increasing in Riga, and there is evidence 
that trafficking in women (including minors) for prostitution abroad 
also is increasing. The country is primarily a source or transit 
country rather than a destination. On May 18, representatives from 
youth health centers met at the Nongovernmental Organization Center in 
Riga to discuss problems related to sexual abuse and trafficking. The 
Government participates in the Council of Baltic Sea States task force 
on organized crime, which is addressing the trafficking of persons.
                                 ______
                                 

                             LIECHTENSTEIN

    The Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy and 
a parliamentary democracy. The reigning Prince is the head of state; 
all legislation enacted by the popularly elected Parliament (Landtag) 
must have his concurrence. The Parliament elects and the Prince 
appoints the members of the Government and of the independent 
judiciary.
    The Interior Ministry effectively oversees the regular and 
auxiliary police forces. There is no standing military force.
    Liechtenstein has a prosperous, highly industrialized, free-
enterprise economy with a vital service sector. It participates in a 
customs union with Switzerland and uses the Swiss franc as its national 
currency. A member of the European Economic Area (EEA), its 32,000 
citizens enjoy a very high standard of living. Unemployment was only 
1.7 percent during the year.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. The Government is working to 
eliminate societal discrimination against women.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel punishment, and 
there were no reports of the use of such methods.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities honor 
these provisions. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must bring 
suspects before an examining magistrate, who must either file formal 
charges or order release. The law grants suspects the right to legal 
counsel of their own choosing, at no cost if they are indigent. Release 
on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the examining 
magistrate has reason to believe the suspects are a danger to society 
or will not appear for trial.
    There is no provision for exile, and it does not occur.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary. The judicial system has three tiers: Lower 
court, high court, and Supreme Court. In addition an Administrative 
Court hears appeals against government decisions. Also, the State Court 
protects the rights accorded by the Constitution, decides on conflicts 
of jurisdiction between the law courts and the administrative 
authorities, and acts as a disciplinary court for members of the 
Government.
    The Constitution provides for public trials and judicial appeal, 
and the authorities respect these provisions.
    The Constitution authorizes the Prince to alter criminal sentences 
or pardon offenders. However, if the offender is a member of the 
Government and is sentenced for a crime in connection with official 
duties, the Prince can take such action only if the Parliament requests 
it.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for personal liberty and for 
the inviolability of the home, postal correspondence, and telephone 
conversations. No violations were reported. Police need a judicial 
warrant to search private property.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--An independent press, an effective 
judiciary, and a democratic political system combine to ensure freedom 
of speech and of the press. Two daily newspapers are published, each 
representing the interests of one of the two major political parties, 
as is one weekly newsmagazine. One state and one private television 
station broadcast, along with a private radio station, and residents 
freely receive radio and television broadcasts from neighboring 
countries. An information bulletin is also issued by the third party 
(Freie Liste) represented in Parliament.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly and association, and the authorities 
do not interfere with these rights in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government does not hamper the teaching or practice 
of any faith. The relationship between the Government and the Catholic 
Church currently is being redefined, and a new agreement is scheduled 
for 2002. The Government contributes to the Catholic Church, as well as 
to other denominations. The finances of the Catholic Church are 
integrated directly into the budgets of the national and local 
governments. Catholic or Protestant religious education is compulsory 
in all schools, but the authorities routinely grant exemptions for 
children whose parents request them.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have unrestricted freedom to 
travel in the country, to emigrate, and to return.
    The Government cooperates with the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees.
    The Government provides first asylum, but the country's lack of an 
airport or international train station means that it receives few 
requests. However, since passage of an asylum law in 1998, the number 
of requests increased. Those persons who enter from Austria without 
permission still are returned to Austrian authorities in accordance 
with a bilateral agreement.
    In view of the situation in Kosovo, in April the Government decided 
that children under age 20 and spouses of guest workers from Kosovo 
could enter the country on request. By September the Government granted 
temporary protective status to 426 Kosovar refugees. In September the 
Government set May 31, 2000, as the deadline for their repatriation. In 
coordination with the Swiss Federal Office for Refugee Matters, the 
Government grants financial and material aid to those who return to 
Kosovo voluntarily; by September 210 refugees already indicated their 
willingness to return.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary 
democracy. The monarchy is hereditary in the male line. The 25-member 
unicameral legislature is elected every 4 years. Suffrage is universal 
for adults over age 20, and balloting is secret. Political parties 
operate freely. Citizens regularly vote on initiatives and referenda.
    Women are underrepresented in politics and government, although 
since gaining the right to vote in 1984, a growing number have been 
active in politics. A woman, the Foreign Minister, is one of the five 
members of the Cabinet, and another is a Member of Parliament. Women 
serve on the executive committees of the major parties. In June women's 
organizations, political parties, and the Government's Bureau for the 
Promotion of Equal Rights for Women and Men held a convention to 
promote the greater participation by women in politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    International and domestic human rights groups operate without 
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on 
human rights cases. Government officials are cooperative and responsive 
to their views.
    The sole local human rights organization, Justitia et Pax, is an 
informal group of about 10 persons who monitor prison conditions and 
assist foreign workers with immigration matters.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex, 
language, or social status, and the authorities respect these 
provisions. The law also prohibits public incitement to violence or 
public agitation or insult directed against a race, people, ethnic 
group, or state.
    Women.--Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) estimate that one in 
five women is a victim of physical or psychological violence. There is 
one shelter, which in 1998 provided refuge for 19 women, only 5 of whom 
were citizens, and 24 children. Annual government financing for the 
shelter is about $170,000 (250,000 Swiss francs). The law prohibits all 
forms of domestic violence, and the Government vigorously enforces the 
law.
    NGO's assume that as in neighboring countries trafficking in women 
occurs, but no specific cases have been documented (see Section 6.f.).
    Societal discrimination still limits opportunities for women in 
fields traditionally dominated by men. On the aggregate level, men earn 
more than women. However, it is unclear if this fact represents overt 
discrimination. In accordance with a 1992 constitutional amendment 
mandating equality for women, Parliament amended a significant number 
of laws to provide for equality of treatment. Among other things, 
Parliament revised the citizenship law, the employment law, the law on 
labor conditions, the tax law, and the divorce law. The process of 
amending laws is almost complete. In March Parliament also passed a new 
law on equal opportunity for women and men. The new law is designed to 
eliminate discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace and to 
create conditions that allow both women and men to combine work and 
family. In April the Government approved an action plan to promote 
equal opportunity and to create conditions that allow both men and 
women to combine work and family. Measures include: Raising public 
awareness about the new law; improving programs and infrastructure for 
traditional and single-parent families, such as affordable housing and 
childcare; promoting educational and career opportunities for women; 
and raising recognition for work in the home to the same level as for 
work outside the home.
    Three women's rights groups are active. Their chief concerns are 
public affairs, information, legal counseling, lobbying, and other 
political activities.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The Government provides compulsory, free, 
and universal primary school education for children of both sexes for 9 
years, normally until the age of 16.
    The Government supports programs to protect the rights of children 
and matches contributions made to the four NGO's monitoring children's 
rights. A children and youth service belonging to the Office for Social 
Services oversees the implementation of government-supported programs 
for children.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
    People with Disabilities.--Although the law does not expressly 
prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities, complaints of 
such discrimination may be pursued in the courts. Amendments to the law 
on insurance for the disabled, which were intended to improve the 
economic situation of disabled persons, came into force in 1997.
    The Government requires that buildings and government services be 
made accessible for people with disabilities, but in general they are 
not, particularly old buildings.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In its 1998 security report, 
the Government confirmed the existence of a small number of rightwing 
extremists, consisting of about 20 skinheads between the ages of 20 and 
30, and about as many followers of a slightly younger age. A government 
survey of 700 youths conducted during the year indicated that 
approximately 20 percent of youths expressed ambivalence toward or 
sympathy for extremist views, while 4 percent were actual supporters. 
Incidents of violence increased during the year, according to the 
survey.
    In September the Government presented measures to Parliament 
designed to curtail racial prejudice and discrimination against 
foreigners. The proposed law would make it a punishable crime to 
produce or distribute racist propaganda, deny the Holocaust, engage in 
racist or religious discrimination, deny services to a particular 
group, and support racist organizations financially. Violations would 
be punishable with a maximum 2-year prison sentence; repeat offenders 
could be sentenced to 3-years' imprisonment.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers, including foreigners, 
are free to associate, join unions of their choice, and select their 
own union representatives. Due to the country's small size and 
population, only one trade union operates, representing about 13 
percent of the work force. However, the sole trade union looks after 
the interests of nonmembers as well. It is a member of the World 
Confederation of Labor but is represented on an ad hoc basis by a Swiss 
union.
    Workers have the right to strike except in certain essential 
services. No strikes were reported during the year. The law does not 
provide specific protection for strikers. Employers may dismiss 
employees for refusing to work; such dismissals may be contested. In 
1997 the Government incorporated European Economic Area guidelines into 
its domestic labor law. These guidelines require that, among other 
things, employers consult in cases of projected mass dismissals and 
submit employment contracts in written form.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively. 
However, collective bargaining agreements are generally adapted from 
ones negotiated by Swiss employers and unions.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of violations. 
Except by implication, the law does not specifically forbid forced and 
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur. 
NGO's assume that trafficking in women occurs, but there were no 
reports of specific cases (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Government does not specifically prohibit forced and 
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur 
(see Section 6.c.). The law generally prohibits the employment of 
children under 16 years of age. However, exceptions may be made, for 
the limited employment of youths at least age 14 and for those who 
leave school after completing their 9 years of compulsory education. 
Children ages 14 and older may be employed in light duties for not more 
than 9 hours a week during the school year and 15 hours a week at other 
times.
    Inspections are adequate. No employers have been fined or 
imprisoned for violations of the law. The Government devotes adequate 
resources and oversight to child labor policies. The Department for 
Worker Safety of the Office of the National Economy effectively 
supervises compliance with the law.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage. The Government estimates that the number of working poor 
increased slightly in recent years, from a base of 7.9 percent in 1994. 
The law sets the maximum workweek at 45 hours for white-collar workers 
and employees of industrial firms and sales personnel, and 48 hours for 
all other workers. With few exceptions, Sunday work is not allowed. 
Workers over age 20 receive at least 4 weeks of vacation; younger ones, 
at least 5 weeks.
    The law sets occupational health and safety standards, and the 
Department for Worker Safety of the Office of the National Economy 
effectively enforces these provisions. The law provides for a hearing 
in cases in which workers remove themselves from dangerous situations.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons.
    NGO's assume that as in neighboring countries trafficking in women 
occurs, but no specific cases have been documented.
                                 ______
                                 

                               LITHUANIA

    Lithuania is a parliamentary democracy, having regained its 
independence in 1990 after more than 50 years of forced annexation by 
the Soviet Union. The Constitution, adopted by referendum in 1992, 
established a 141-member unicameral legislature, the Seimas; a directly 
elected president, who functions as Head of State; and a government 
formed by a prime minister and other ministers, appointed by the 
President and approved by the Seimas. The Government exercises 
authority with the approval of the Seimas and the President. The 
Conservatives prevailed in the 1996 parliamentary elections, followed 
by the Christian Democrats. The two parties formed a coalition 
government (the first in Lithuania's history). In February 1998, 
independent candidate Valdas Adamkus was elected President by a narrow 
margin. Following the resignation of Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius 
in May, the Seimas endorsed the 14-member Cabinet of Prime Minister 
Rolandas Paksas, a member of the ruling Conservative Party, to carry 
out the amended program of the Government. Paksas resigned in October 
due to his opposition to a government oil privatization contract. Prime 
Minister Andrius Kubilius was sworn into office in November. The 
judiciary is independent.
    A unified national police force under the jurisdiction of the 
Interior Ministry is responsible for law enforcement. The State 
Security Department is responsible for internal security and reports to 
Parliament and the President. The police committed a number of human 
rights abuses.
    Since independence Lithuania has made steady progress in developing 
a market economy. Over 40 percent of state property, in addition to 
most housing and small businesses, has been privatized. Trade is 
diversifying and expanding both to the West and the East. The largest 
number of workers are employed in agriculture (21 percent). Major 
exports include textile and knitwear products, timber and furniture, 
electronic goods, food, and chemical and petroleum products. In July 
the Government reported a new low for deflation of 0.5 percent. Per 
capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998 was $2,876. During the 
first quarter of the year, real GDP reportedly fell by 5.7 percent, and 
unemployment increased to 7.4 percent.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, problems remain in some areas. Police on occasion beat 
detainees and abuse detention laws. The Government is making some 
progress in bringing police corruption under control. Prison conditions 
remain poor, and prolonged detention in a small number of cases is 
still a problem. State media continue to be subject to political 
interests. Violence and discrimination against women and child abuse 
are serious problems. There were a number of anti-Semitic incidents 
during the year. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of 
forced prostitution is a problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    In September 1998, the President formed the International 
Commission to Investigate the Crimes of Nazi and Soviet Occupation 
Regimes in Lithuania. The Commission includes historians, human rights 
representatives, representatives of international Jewish organizations, 
and lawyers from Lithuania and a number of foreign countries. The 
Government allotted $37,500 (150,000 Litas) to establish a full-time 
working secretariat for the Commission. The secretariat was formed by 
October and the first research group of the Commission began to work in 
December.
    In August a court found six persons guilty of complicity in the 
January 1991 coup attempt. The defendants were former leaders and 
officials of the Lithuanian Communist Party and were sentenced to 
prison terms of from 3 to 12 years for crimes including premediatated 
acts of murder and inflicting serious bodily harm. Defense lawyers 
appealed the verdict, but at year end the courts had not considered the 
appeal.
    Formal charges have been brought against alleged war criminals 
Aleksandras Lileikis and Kazys Gimzauskas. After being stripped of his 
U.S. citizenship in May 1996 for concealing his World War II 
activities, Lileikis returned to Lithuania. He is accused of acts of 
genocide committed when he headed the security police of the Vilnius 
district under Nazi control. Gimzauskas, who had served as Lileikis's 
deputy, returned to Lithuania in 1993. After his appointment in 
February 1997, Prosecutor General Kazys Pednycia actively investigated 
the case and prepared to prosecute Lileikis by the end of June 1997. 
However, the law stipulates that the accused has a right to a fair, 
public trial and that the trial cannot proceed if the defendant's 
health precludes his or her appearance in court. In February when a 
panel of doctors found that both defendants physically were unable to 
stand trial, the court stopped their trials indefinitely. On June 29, 
the Prosecutor General's Office of Special Investigations filed 
genocide charges against Vincas Valkavickas, who returned to Lithuania 
in June. The Prosecutor's Office also brought charges against Petras 
Bernotavicius. In July the prosecutor launched a criminal investigation 
into the activities of Kazys Ciurinskas. The prosecutor also 
investigated Antanas Gudelis, an Australian citizen. In July the 
General Prosecutor's Office also appealed to the public for more 
information on persons under investigation for genocide.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    There is a growing problem of women being forced or sold into 
prostitution by organized crime figures. Their families often believe 
that they have disappeared or have been kidnapped (see Section 6.f.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically forbids torture, and there 
were no reports of its use; however, police sometimes beat or otherwise 
physically mistreat detainees. The local press reported that incidents 
of police brutality are becoming more common. In many instances, the 
victims reportedly are reluctant to bring charges against police 
officers due to fear of reprisals. According to the Ministry of 
Interior, during the first 6 months of the year, four police officers 
were charged with abuse of power and one officer was sentenced. In 1998 
four officers were charged and three were sentenced for the same crime.
    The Interior Ministry states that district police inspectors are 
the most negligent in the force. To strengthen the integrity of the 
police, the Inspectorate General of the Interior Ministry was given 
administrative autonomy in May 1997. In March the Inspectorate General 
was reorganized into an office of the Inspector General, and some 
functions of the Inspectorate were delegated to the internal 
investigations division at the police department. The Inspector General 
cannot investigate abuses on his own authority but can act only on the 
order of the Minister.
    In the past, noncommissioned military personnel committed human 
rights abuses, despite efforts to quash hazing--a practice inherited 
from the former Soviet armed forces. As living conditions improve for 
military personnel, there has been a significant reduction in human 
rights violations committed by noncommissioned officers, and during the 
year there were no reports of such abuse. During the first half of the 
year, six criminal case were brought against conscripts and officers 
for systematic degrading treatment (one case) and breach of discipline 
involving violence (five cases). According to the Ministry of National 
Defense, most trauma inflicted on conscripts is psychological rather 
than physical. The Ministry believes that a lack of professionalism 
among noncommissioned officers--rather than ethnic, regional, or social 
factors--is a primary factor in cases of hazing, and it is working 
actively to improve the skills and judgment of such officers. In May 
the Seimas approved the new disciplinary statute of the armed forces, 
and the military police formed by the law of October 1998 is charged 
with maintaining discipline in the armed forces. The disciplinary 
statute provides procedures for investigation of disciplinary offences, 
assures the right to appeal, and lists the types of punishments.
    Prison conditions are poor. Due to limited resources, most prisons 
are overcrowded and poorly maintained. One local human rights group 
claims that the administration of prison institutions does not do 
enough to prevent violence among prisoners. The country is attempting 
to reform its prison system with international assistance and the 
Seimas is reviewing a new criminal code; however, progress has been 
very slow. As of November, new hygiene norms came into effect to 
establish the required space for each convict as well as to assure 
healthy and safe conditions. On the recommendation of the Seimas 
Ombudsman, some detention facilities were closed temporarily due to 
unsatisfactory conditions. The Seimas allotted the prisons department 
$30.7 million (123 million Litas) for 14 correctional institutions. As 
of July, there were 12,291 prisoners (550 women, 201 juveniles) and 
1,887 detainees (98 women, 159 juveniles).
    Human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisons. A human 
rights monitor of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly 
visited the country in July and expressed surprise that the country had 
failed to make any progress in reforming its penal system in the past 
year and a half.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides that no person may be arbitrarily arrested or detained; 
however, there were instances of prolonged detention. Police may detain 
a person for up to 48 hours based upon reliable evidence of criminal 
activity. Under a law passed in June 1998, a judge also must approve 
the detention. At the end of that period, police must decide whether to 
make a formal arrest, and a magistrate must approve an arrest warrant. 
The authorities have 10 days to present supporting evidence. Once a 
suspect is charged formally, prosecutors may keep the suspect under 
investigative arrest for up to 2 months before taking the suspect to 
court. In exceptional cases, investigative arrest may be extended by a 
further 6 to 9 months with the written approval of the Prosecutor 
General. The Constitution provides for the right to an attorney from 
the moment of detention.
    In an effort to cope with the rise in violent organized crime in 
1993, Parliament passed the Preventive Detention Law pertaining to 
persons suspected of being violent criminals. The law was passed as a 
temporary measure and was repealed in June 1997. The effect of the law 
was to give prosecutors and investigators additional time to conduct an 
investigation and file formal criminal charges against the detainee. 
The Law on the Prevention of Organized Crime, passed in July 1, 1997, 
allows for the application of preventive measures on a person who by 
his actions might ``restrict the rights and freedoms of other persons, 
creates conditions for the emergence and development of social and 
economic preconditions of organized crime, or poses a threat to public 
security.'' The Government is addressing concerns that periods of 
detention were excessive.
    There is no provision for exile, nor is it practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the judiciary is independent in practice.
    The Constitution and the 1994 Law on Courts established a four-tier 
court system: the Supreme Court; the Court of Appeals; district courts; 
and local courts. The local courts are tribunals of first instance for 
all cases that are not assigned to some other court by law. The Supreme 
Court's Senate of Judges, consisting of the Supreme Court chairman, the 
division chairmen, and other members of the Supreme Court, rules on the 
decisions by domestic courts that violate the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Constitution also established the Constitutional 
Court and allowed for specialized courts for administrative, labor, 
family, and other purposes.
    The administrative courts began functioning on May 1. The main 
function of administrative courts is to investigate the legality and 
validity of administrative acts and conflicts in the sphere of public 
administration and taxation. The creation of administrative courts 
completes the national court reform, a process that started in 1995. 
The Ministry of Justice is moving towards a system of specialization of 
judges in district and local courts according to the types of cases.
    New criminal and civil codes, and codes of civil and criminal 
procedure are being drafted. The Government planned to submit the 
drafts of three codes to the Seimas for consideration in the fall; 
however, by year's end they had not been approved. The main drafting 
principle was compliance with the requirements of the European 
Convention on Basic Human Rights and Freedoms, taking into account the 
jurisprudence of the European Human Rights Commission and European 
Court of Human Rights.
    The Constitutional Court, at the request of the President, members 
of the Seimas, the Government, or the judiciary, reviews the 
constitutionality of laws and other legal acts, as well as that of 
actions by the President and the Cabinet. The Constitutional Court's 
authority to issue the final word on subjects within its jurisdiction 
is unquestioned; it is the country's ultimate legal authority with no 
further appeal of its rulings.
    The Law on Commercial Arbitration, adopted in April 1996, provided 
for the establishment of arbitration institutions and the abolition of 
the economic court (abolished in 1998). The law provides for private 
dispute resolution by an arbitrage tribunal, either organized by a 
permanent arbitrage institution or by the parties themselves.
    The Prosecutor General exercises an oversight responsibility 
through a network of district and local prosecutors who work with 
police investigators--employed by the Ministry of the Interior--in 
preparing the prosecution's evidence for the courts.
    The Constitution provides defendants with the right to counsel. In 
practice the right to legal counsel is abridged by the shortage of 
trained advocates, who find it difficult to cope with the burgeoning 
numbers of criminal cases brought before the courts. Outside observers 
have recommended the establishment of a public defender system to 
regularize procedures for provision of legal assistance to indigent 
persons charged in criminal cases. By law defense advocates have access 
to government evidence and may present evidence and witnesses. The 
courts and law enforcement agencies generally honor routine, written 
requests for evidence.
    Government rehabilitation of over 50,000 persons charged with anti-
Soviet crimes during the Stalin era led to reports in 1991 that some 
persons who allegedly were involved with crimes against humanity during 
the Nazi occupation had benefited from this rehabilitation. A special 
judicial procedure was established in 1997 to examine each case in 
which an individual or organization raised an objection that a 
rehabilitated person may have committed a crime against humanity. 
During the year, the Supreme Court overturned the rehabilitations of 32 
persons.
    Parliamentarian Audrius Butkevicius, former Minister of National 
Defense, was arrested in October 1997 and charged with several counts 
of corruption. According to the Lithuanian Human Rights Association, 
the case was based on false information from the State Security 
Department. Butkevicius's pretrial detention was prolonged without the 
decision of a judge. The parliamentary Ombudsman said that there were 
many similar cases and confirmed that the authorities had violated the 
law. Typically, he wrote, judges and prosecutors wrongly interpret the 
law to mean that pretrial detention would be expanded automatically 
when a case was submitted to a court of law. On November 18, 1998, 
Butkevicius received a 5\1/2\-year prison sentence, a fine of $12,500 
(50,000 Litas), and confiscation of half of his property. On May 12, 
the Supreme Court rejected Butkevicius's appeal. Butkevicius's lawyers 
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, and in September the 
Court agreed to review the case; but it had not been resolved by year's 
end.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy, 
and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The 
authorities do not engage in indiscriminate or widespread monitoring of 
the correspondence or communications of citizens. However, with the 
written authorization of a prosecutor or judge, police and the security 
service may engage in surveillance and monitoring activities on grounds 
of national security. Except in cases of hot pursuit or the danger of 
disappearance of evidence, police must obtain a search warrant signed 
by a prosecutor before they may enter private premises.
    However, it is widely assumed that law enforcement agencies have 
increased the use of a range of surveillance methods to cope with the 
expansion of organized crime. There is some question as to the legal 
basis for this police surveillance, but there are no known legal 
challenges to such surveillance.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice.
    Prior restraint over either print or broadcast media and 
restrictions on disclosure are prohibited, unless the Government 
determines that national security is involved. The Parliament adopted a 
media law in 1996 that introduced an element of self-regulation but 
postponed a difficult decision on advertising of tobacco products. 
Under the 1996 law, the media created a special ethics commission and 
an ombudsman to check libel cases and other complaints. This ombudsman 
was later established by the Seimas.
    The independent print media are flourishing, including a wide range 
of newspapers and magazines. Radio and television are a mix of state 
and private stations. State television and radio are in the process of 
being transformed into public television, independent financially from 
the Government.
    There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the rights of peaceful assembly and association, and the 
Government respects them in practice.
    The Communist Party of Lithuania and other organizations associated 
with the Soviet regime continue to be banned.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government generally respects this provision in 
practice. The Law on Religious Communities and Associations was passed 
in 1995. It grants religious communities, associations, and centers 
property rights to prayer houses, homes, and other buildings. Article 5 
of this law mentions nine religious communities that have been declared 
"traditional" by the law and therefore are eligible for governmental 
assistance: Latin Rite Catholics; Greek Rite Catholics; Evangelical 
Lutherans; Evangelical Reformers; Orthodox; Old Believers; Jews; Sunni 
Muslims; and Karaites. Additionally this year the Hasidic Chabad 
Lubavich community was recognized as a traditional religious group and 
was granted the status of a traditional religious community. All other 
foreign religious workers must obtain work permits, and they face 
difficult bureaucratic requirements to obtain residence permits from 
officials who regard them as representatives of cults and sects. These 
religious workers complain of unofficial harassment. There are no 
restrictions on the activities of other religious communities.
    There is no law for the return of communal property and no action 
to develop such a law. Although the Justice Ministry prepared 
legislation to liberalize the restitution of property to religious 
institutions, at year's end, no parliamentary action was taken. The 
Catholic community has been more successful in having property returned 
than the Jewish community; an agreement between Jewish community 
leaders and the WJRO signed in 1995 has never been implemented. 
However, some religious property including 26 synagogues has been 
returned to the Jewish community.
    The law provides for the restitution of private property to 
citizens, but the deadline for filing claims has passed. A number of 
successful claims have been made, and others still are pending. Lack of 
funds for compensation and protracted bureaucratic obstacles are the 
primary problems preventing the return of private property. The 
Government has taken no action on the problem of heirless (community) 
property and has no plans to do so.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Under the law, citizens and permanent 
residents are permitted free movement within the country and the right 
to return to the country, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. There are no restrictions on foreign travel.
    In 1997 the Law on Refugee Status came into effect, allowing for 
the first formal grant of refugee status to qualified applicants, in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 1998 Law on Legal 
State of Aliens came into effect on July 1.
    There is a registration center for migrants and asylum seekers in 
the town of Pabrade, where 77 illegal immigrants were registered by 
year's end. With fewer refugees in residence, during the year the 
center was able to redirect funds towards improving living conditions. 
A modern, well-equipped refugee reception center for asylum seekers 
opened in 1997 in the town of Rukla. By August it had approximately 160 
residents and is intended to help integrate into society those persons 
granted refugee status. As of August, of 2,272 refugees initially 
settled at the Pabrade center since 1997, over 1,905 eventually were 
deported.
    Lithuania continued its efforts to stop illegal migrants by 
negotiating readmission agreements with Russia and Belarus, the two 
countries used by most migrants to reach Lithuania. No progress has 
been made in negotiating readmission agreements and border agreements 
still have not been ratified. The Government cooperates with the office 
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of 
first asylum did not arise during the year. There were no reports of 
the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. Of 141 seats in the Seimas, 71 are elected directly 
and 70 are elected through proportional representation. Only those 
parties that receive more than 5 percent of the total ballots (or 7 
percent for coalitions) are allowed representation in the Parliament.
    While there are no legal restrictions on women's participation in 
politics or government, they are underrepresented in political 
leadership positions. There were 24 female parliamentarians out of 137 
members (with 4 seats vacant); there is 1 female minister in the 15-
member Cabinet. The Cabinet also includes one Jew, four Poles and one 
Russian.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Most government authorities cooperate with local nongovernmental 
organizations and actively encourage visits by international and 
nongovernmental human rights groups. A key exception in the past was 
the Ministry of Interior, which continually refused to release 
information on police brutality and statistics on corruption-related 
incidents. The Ministry has improved its willingness to share 
information on police brutality and statistics on corruption-related 
incidents; however, it has done little in releasing statistics or 
producing public reports. The Association for the Defense of Human 
Rights in Lithuania is an umbrella organization for several small human 
rights groups, all of which operate without government restriction.
    In 1994 the Government established the Department of International 
and Human Rights within the Ministry of Justice, which monitors law and 
legal practice to determine whether these are in accord with 
Lithuania's international obligations.
Section 5. Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, disability, or ethnic background; however, discrimination 
against women in employment and other areas persists.
    Women.--Abuse of women at home is reportedly common, especially in 
connection with alcohol abuse by husbands, but institutional mechanisms 
for coping with this problem only slowly are being formed. A women's 
shelter funded in part with Norwegian assistance is now in operation. 
According to one sociological survey published in 1997, 20 percent of 
women reported experiencing an attempted rape, while another 33 percent 
reported having been beaten at least once in their lives. During the 
first 6 months of the year, 108 rapes were reported. Official 
statistics on the incidence of abuse of women in the home are not filed 
separately from other categories of assault. Persons convicted of rape 
generally receive sentences of from 3 to 5 years in prison.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for men and women; 
however, women continue to face discrimination. Official policy 
specifies equal pay for equal work. The Law of Realization on Equal 
Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men came into effect on March 1. 
The Office of the Ombudsman for Equal Opportunities of Women and Men 
was established May, and the Seimas appointed lawyer Ausra Burneikiene 
as Ombudsman. The Ombudsman's office is an independent public 
organization, accountable to the Seimas, which oversees the 
implementation of the law and investigates complaints concerning 
violations of gender discrimination and sexual harassment. Generally, 
men and women receive the same pay for comparable work, but women are 
underrepresented significantly in some professions and in the 
managerial sector as a whole. Women are underrepresented in businesses. 
Significant inequalities in society based on gender continue, and there 
are still very conservative views about the role of women. During the 
year, the Ministry of Education and Science abolished preferential 
university entrance criteria for men and women. During the year, the 
Equal Opportunities Ombudsman also closely followed admission 
examinations to high schools. The Ombudsman received no complaints 
based on gender discrimination.
    Children.--The Ministries of Social Security and of the Interior 
share official responsibility for the protection of children's rights 
and welfare. By the end of April, the Minister of Justice appointed 85 
judges in the district courts for hearings in juvenile criminal cases 
and cases related to children's rights (adoption and paternity 
matters). Starting in 1994, the Children's Rights Service of the 
Ministry of Social Security (also known as the Children's Rights 
Protection Council) began to take on many of the functions formerly 
handled by the Interior Ministry and its subordinate police officers 
throughout the country, thereby focusing more attention on the social 
welfare needs of children. This service registers and cares for 
children in abusive and dysfunctional families, and had registered 
34,379 children in 1998.
    Child abuse is a problem. Child abuse in connection with alcohol 
abuse by parents is a serious problem. The prevalence of authoritarian 
values in family upbringing has discouraged more active measures 
against child abuse; however, the press has reported increases in 
cruelty to children, including sexual abuse, intentional starvation, 
beatings, and murder. Authorities reported that two children were 
killed by their parents in 1998; however, the media widely reported on 
five cases during the year. However, no department or organization 
collects information on child abuse. Moreover, there are no specific 
criminal codes for child pornography, sexual abuse, or sex tourism. 
There is one rehabilitation center in the country for children who have 
been abused sexually.
    The Penal Code provides for terms of from 1 to 4 years' 
imprisonment for exploiting children in the production of pornography. 
One case was brought during the year; however, there was no result in 
the case by year's end. Penalties for violence and cruel behavior 
against underage persons were made stricter during the year, providing 
for imprisonment terms of from 1 to 2 years. Trafficking in girls for 
the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--The 1991 Law on Integrating Disabled 
People provides for a broad category of rights and public benefits to 
which disabled people are entitled legally. Legal provisions for access 
to buildings for the disabiled are in place but are not widely 
enforced; the vast majority of public buildings remain inaccessible to 
the disabled.
    More than 350,000 disabled persons live in the country--10,000 of 
them children. During 1998 Parliament allotted approximately $35 
million (140 million Litas) for persons with disabilities, including 
$20 million (80 million Litas) for institutions caring for such 
persons, $6.8 million (27.3 million Litas) for various specific 
programs, and $5.8 million (23.4 million Litas) for orthopedic 
assistance programs. A project in Kaunas to build an apartment building 
for persons with disabilities has not been completed due to a lack of 
funds and to the fact that the pending privatization of the state 
institution that was to have supervised the project is still not 
complete. A center for deaf children and a program for children with 
special orthopedic problems have been created.
    Religious Minorities.--Jewish community leaders expressed their 
concern regarding desecration of several cemeteries and the Holocaust 
Memorial at Paneriai. Although authorities responded promptly in such 
cases, no witnesses were found and no charges were brought. A certain 
level of anti-Semitic sentiment persists in the country. For example on 
the eve of Hitler's birthday, a flag with a swastika was raised at the 
center of Klaipeda port and Nazi graffiti appeared on a wall of a 
Jewish community building. The mayor of the city said that anti-Semitic 
attacks by pro-Fascist youths could not be tolerated and appealed to 
the State Security Department for action; however, the perpetrators 
were not apprehended. The Penal Code provides for a sentence of 
imprisonment from 2 to 10 years for incitement of racial or national 
hatred or incitement of violence against foreigners. However, the 
Ministry of Justice has no statistics on how many cases, if any, were 
brought under this provision of the law.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Minority ethnic groups--
including Russians, Poles, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Tatars, and 
Karaites--make up roughly 20 percent of the country's citizens.
    Many non-ethnic Lithuanian public sector employees were required to 
attain a functional knowledge of Lithuanian within several years, 
although the authorities have been granting liberal extensions of the 
time frame in which this competence is to be achieved. As of August, 
314 persons took a language test for acquiring citizenship and 298 
persons passed the test successfully. During the first half of the 
year, 354 persons were naturalized (compared with 550 in 1998). There 
is no documented evidence of job dismissals based on the language law. 
The authorities have indicated that the intent of the law is to apply 
moral incentives to learn Lithuanian as the official language of the 
State; they have asserted that no one would be dismissed solely because 
of an inability to meet the language requirements.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1991 Law on 
Trade Unions recognize the right of workers and employees to form and 
join trade unions. The Law on Trade Unions formally extends this right 
to employees of the police and the armed forces, although the 
Collective Agreements Law of 1991 does not allow collective bargaining 
by government employees involved in law enforcement and security 
related work.
    In 1990 the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Union's All-Union 
Central Council of Trade Unions, including 23 of 25 trade unions, 
renamed itself the Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTU) and began 
asserting increased independence from its Soviet parent organization. 
In 1993 the CFTU joined eight other unions that also had been part of 
the All-Union Central Council to form the Lithuanian Trade Union Center 
(LTUC).
    The Lithuanian Workers' Union (LWU) was formed in 1990 as an 
alternative to the CFTU. Unlike the CFTU/LTUC, the LWU was an early 
supporter of Lithuanian independence from the Soviet Union and actively 
sought Western free trade union contacts. The LWU claims a dues-paying 
membership of 78,000 organized in 35 regional groupings.
    The Law on Trade Unions and the Constitution provide for the right 
to strike, although public officials providing essential services may 
not do so. There were no major strikes during the year.
    There are no restrictions on unions affiliating with international 
trade unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Collective 
Agreements Law provides for collective bargaining and the right of 
unions to organize employees, although several provisions reportedly 
hinder the establishment of new union organizations. Probably as a 
result of the discrediting of labor unions during Soviet period, only 
10 percent of enterprises have trade unions. Collective negotiations 
regarding labor relations, including wages, are not very widespread. 
Workers often present their own case against their employer. 
Negotiations are more common in enterprises that have trade unions.
    According to the law, unions, in order to be registered, must have 
at least 30 founding members in large enterprises or have a membership 
of one-fifth of all employees in small enterprises. Difficulties 
commonly arise in state enterprises in which employees are represented 
by more than one union. LWU officials charge that managers in some 
state enterprises discriminate against LWU organizers and have on 
occasion dismissed employees in retribution for their trade union 
activities. The LWU also charges that the judicial system is slow to 
respond to LWU grievances regarding dismissals from work. LWU 
representatives claim that state managers sometimes prefer the CFTU/
LTUC over LWU unions as collective bargaining partners.
    In general trade union spokesmen say that managers often determine 
wages without regard to trade union preferences, except in larger 
factories with well-organized trade unions. The Government issues 
periodic decrees that serve as guidelines for state enterprise 
management in setting wage scales. The LWU and the LTUC engage in 
direct collective bargaining over wages at the workplace level. Wage 
decisions increasingly are being made at the enterprise level, although 
government ministries still retain some control over this sphere in 
state-owned enterprises. The LWU reports that it supplements its 
bargaining efforts with active lobbying in government ministries that 
own enterprises.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
specifically prohibits forced labor by all, including children, and 
this prohibition generally is observed in practice; however, 
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution 
is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment of children without 
parental consent is 16 years; with the written consent of parents, it 
is 14 years. Complaints about infringement of child labor regulations 
generally are referred to local prosecutors who investigate the charges 
and take legal action to stop violations. Child labor problems appear 
to be rare.
    The Constitution specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children, and this prohibition generally is observed in practice; 
however, girls are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution 
(see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides for 
every person's right to receive just payment for work.
    As of December, the legal minimum wage was $107.50 (430 Litas) per 
month. The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living 
for a worker and family. The average wage in the public sector is $280 
(1,122 Litas) per month, compared with $215 (861 Litas) in 1997. The 
Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Social Security periodically 
adjust the minimum wage. Every 3 months these government bodies must 
submit their minimum wage proposals to the Seimas, which has the right 
to approve or revise the minimum wage level. Enforcement of the minimum 
wage is almost nonexistent, in part because the Government does not 
want to exacerbate unemployment.
    The 40-hour workweek is standard, with a provision for at least one 
24-hour rest period. For a majority of the population, living standards 
remain low. The poorest households spend 70 percent of their income on 
food, compared with 36 percent in wealthier households.
    The Constitution provides that workers have the right to safe and 
healthy working conditions. The State Labor Inspection Service, which 
the law established, is charged with implementing the Labor Safety Law, 
which went into effect in 1993. In the first half of the year, the 
Labor Inspection Service received more than 2,000 complaints, of which 
more than half were confirmed to be true; 95 percent of complaints 
involve abuses of labor laws, while only 5 percent deal with working 
conditions. The largest abuses include illegal employment (working 
without a written contract), not paying wages for more than several 
months, and time off.
    The 1993 Labor Safety Law sets out the rights of workers facing 
hazardous conditions and provides legal protection for workers who file 
complaints about such conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of 
forced prostitution was a problem. In July 1998, the Seimas passed the 
Law on the Amendment to the Penal Code, which provides for criminal 
liability for persons who engage in trafficking in persons for purposes 
of sexual abuse.
    The country is a source, transit point, and destination for 
trafficking in women. Women from Belarus, Russia (Kalingrad District), 
Latvia, and the Lithuanian countryside are trafficked to major cities. 
Some are trafficked further to Western Europe and elsewhere. Germany, 
Israel, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria are major destinations, 
based on the figures of women subsequently deported from these 
countries to Lithuania.
    A number of women, some underage, have been enticed or forced into 
prostitution and sold abroad by organized crime figures. Many are lured 
by deceptive offers of seemingly innocent jobs as household helpers, 
bar dancers, or waitresses. Women also are tricked into prostitution 
through false marriage advertisements. Their families often are unaware 
of their predicament and believe that they have disappeared or been 
kidnaped. However, it is difficult to determine what percentage were 
enticed or coerced and how many departed voluntarily. Reportedly, 70 
percent of those returned to Lithuania as deportees said that they knew 
what type of work they were going to undertake.
    There were three cases involving trafficking in persons brought 
during the year. In November the Klapeida port police arrested four 
persons suspected of trafficking in women. Criminal charges were 
brought based on the accounts offered by witnesses. At year's end, 
there had been no court hearing. Law enforcement officials complain 
that victims of such crimes do not approach the police or they refuse 
to provide information about the circumstances of trafficking and sale. 
There are no specific government assistance programs for victims of 
trafficking; however, the police offer to provide protection for 
witnesses. The media report extensively on trafficking in persons. A 
local NGO, Missing Persons' Families Support Center, received a grant 
from a foreign government during the year to implement an awareness 
campaign on trafficking in persons.
                                 ______
                                 

                               LUXEMBOURG

    Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy with a democratic, 
parliamentary form of government. The role of the Grand Duke is mainly 
ceremonial and administrative. The Prime Minister is the leader of the 
dominant party in the popularly elected Parliament. The Council of 
State, whose members are appointed by the Grand Duke, serves as an 
advisory body to the Parliament. The judiciary is independent.
    The government effectively controls the security apparatus, which 
consists of the police and gendarmerie.
    Luxembourg has a prosperous market economy with active industrial 
and service sectors. The standard of living and the level of social 
benefits are high.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with 
individual instances of abuse.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no 
reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. The 
Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes 
these prohibitions.
    Judicial warrants are required by law for arrests except in cases 
of hot pursuit. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must lodge 
charges and bring suspects before a judge. Suspects are given immediate 
access to an attorney, at government expense for indigents. The 
presiding judge may order release on bail.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government respects this 
prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The independent judiciary is headed by the Supreme Court, whose 
members are appointed by the Grand Duke. Defendants are presumed 
innocent. They have the right to public trials and are free to cross-
examine witnesses and to present evidence. Either the defendant or the 
prosecutor can appeal a ruling; an appeal results in a completely new 
judicial procedure, with the possibility that a sentence may be 
increased or decreased.
    In response to a 1995 decision by the European Court of Human 
Rights, the government established an administrative court system to 
review citizen challenges to legislation.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice.
    In August the newly formed coalition Government promised 
legislation to reform an 1869 press law that requires journalists to 
reveal confidential sources. This commitment follows a 1998 case in 
which police searched the offices of a journalist who published a story 
alleging corruption on the part of the Interior Minister, but who 
declined to reveal his source. The stated goal of the new legislation 
is to find an appropriate balance between protecting journalists' 
sources and avoiding abuses. The 1869 law also is being challenged 
before the European Court of Human Rights.
    Print media are privately owned. Television broadcasting rights, 
previously held exclusively by the privately owned national radio and 
television company, were extended in 1997 to a regional cable 
television company. The Government issues licenses to private radio 
stations. Radio and television broadcasts from neighboring countries 
are freely available.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is 
no state religion, but the State pays the salaries of Roman Catholic, 
Protestant, and Jewish clergy, and several local governments maintain 
sectarian religious facilities. Two additional religious institutions--
the Anglican Church and an Islamic congregation--requested government 
funding and were awaiting a decision by the Department of Religion at 
year's end.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and 
provides first asylum. The law provides for the granting of refugee or 
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not 
expel those having a valid claim to refugee status, and there were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution.
    The Government received 2,930 requests for refugee status and 2,255 
requests for asylum through the end of November. This represents a 
significant increase over the 1,709 total requests for refugee and 
asylum status that were received in 1998. During the year, 4,548 
refugees were in the country, the vast majority from the former 
Yugoslavia. The Government began to apply the 1993 Dublin Convention 
and in November repatriated 36 refugees to Italy, their country of 
entry into the European Union (EU). The Government committed itself not 
to repatriate refugees to their country of origin during the winter and 
to provide financial and administrative assistance to the returning 
refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Luxembourg is a multiparty democracy. Suffrage is universal for 
citizens 18 years of age and above, and balloting is secret. National 
parliamentary elections are held every 5 years.
    Women are active in political life. Of 60 members of Parliament, 10 
are women, as are 4 members of the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups operate without government restriction. 
Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits racial, sexual, or social discrimination, and the 
Government enforces these provisions. Blatant societal discrimination 
occurs only rarely.
    Women.--In 1998 women's shelters provided refuge to 421 women and 
453 children. Women's organizations report that the increase over 1997 
levels was almost entirely due to refugees from the former Yugoslavia. 
Information offices set up to respond to women in distress reported 
receiving a total of 4,752 telephone calls in 1998. Neither society nor 
the government is tolerant of violence against women, and the 
government prosecutes persons accused of such crimes. The government 
funds organizations providing shelter, counseling, and hot lines.
    Women enjoy the same property rights as men. In the absence of a 
prenuptial agreement, property is divided equally upon the dissolution 
of a marriage.
    The law mandates equal pay for equal work, and the Ministry for the 
Promotion of Women has a mandate to encourage a climate of equal 
treatment and opportunity. However, according to government reports, 
women are paid from 9 to 25 percent less than men for comparable work, 
depending on the profession. The differences are least in the highest 
paid professions and more substantial at lower salary levels. To date 
there have been no work-related discrimination lawsuits in the courts. 
Women constitute 38 percent of the work force.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The law mandates school attendance from the 
ages of 4 to 16. Schooling is free through the secondary level, and the 
Government provides some financial assistance for postsecondary 
education.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. A physicians' 
organization estimates that approximately 200 cases of child abuse are 
treated in hospitals each year that result in legal proceedings. This 
group is working to reform judicial procedures to permit videotaped 
testimony in court proceedings and the testimony of child 
psychiatrists, as well as the coordination of hospital records in child 
abuse cases. In May the Government set up a hot line for young persons 
in distress; by the end of the year it had received 183 calls.
    In May the Government passed a comprehensive new law dealing with 
the sexual exploitation of children. The law increases penalties for 
adults who traffick in children, facilitate child prostitution, or 
exploit children through pornography. The law also extends the 
country's criminal jurisdiction over citizens and residents who engage 
in such activities abroad. No such trafficking was reported during the 
year.
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against 
people with disabilities in employment, education, and the provision of 
other state services. The law does not directly mandate accessibility 
for the disabled, but the government pays subsidies to builders to 
construct ``disabled-friendly'' structures. Despite government 
incentives, only a modest proportion of buildings and public 
transportation are modified to accommodate people with disabilities.
    The Government helps disabled persons obtain employment and 
professional education. Businesses and enterprises with at least 25 
employees by law must fill a quota for hiring disabled workers and must 
pay them prevailing wages. The quotas are fixed according to the total 
number of employees; employers who do not fulfill them are subject to 
sizable monthly fines. The Government provides subsidies and tax breaks 
for employers who hire the disabled. There have been no known 
complaints of noncompliance with the disability laws.
    Despite strong legal protections, the Government acknowledged that 
laws establishing quotas for businesses that employ over 25 persons are 
not applied or enforced consistently, and there is a particular problem 
in the case of persons with mental disabilities. The Government is 
reviewing the effectiveness of the disability legislation, particularly 
the provisions that establish quotas. To attempt to remedy the problems 
of the mentally disabled, the Government established a pilot program 
through which it supports a private organization that owns and runs a 
children's amusement park. This park employs persons with mental 
disabilities, whose salaries are paid entirely by the Government.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although noncitizens constitute 
approximately 35 percent of the total population, antiforeign incidents 
are infrequent. Resident citizens of EU member states have the right to 
vote and run in municipal elections. In May the Parliament enacted 
legislation to allow noncitizen EU nationals to be employed in certain 
public sector jobs. The Government promotes the integration of 
foreigners in society by providing support to private organizations for 
educational campaigns, cultural fairs, and publications.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers have the right to 
associate freely and choose their representatives. About 57 percent of 
the working population belong to a trade union. Membership is not 
mandatory. Unions operate free of governmental interference. The two 
largest labor federations are linked to, but organized independently 
of, major political parties. The law prohibits discrimination against 
strike leaders, and a labor tribunal deals with complaints.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for 
government employees such as the police, armed forces personnel, and 
hospital workers providing essential services. Legal strikes may occur 
only after a lengthy conciliation procedure between the parties. The 
Government's National Conciliation Office must certify that 
conciliation efforts have ended for a strike to be legal.
    On January 19-20, employees of the state railroad company, CFL, 
went on strike to oppose pension reform proposals announced by the 
Government. No illegal strikes took place during the year.
    Unions maintain unrestricted contact with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for and protects collective bargaining, which is conducted in 
periodic negotiations between centralized organizations of unions and 
employers. Enterprises having 15 or more employees must have worker 
representatives to conduct collective bargaining. Enterprises with over 
150 employees must form joint works councils composed of equal numbers 
of management and employee representatives. In enterprises with more 
than 1,000 employees, one-third of the membership of the supervisory 
boards of directors must be employee representatives.
    The law provides for adjudication of employment-related complaints 
and authorizes labor tribunals to deal with them. A tribunal can fine 
an employer found guilty of antiunion discrimination, but it cannot 
require the employer to reinstate a worker fired for union activities.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor by children and adults, and it is not known 
to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age 
of 16 and requires all children to remain in school until the age of 
16. Apprentices who are 16 years old must attend school in addition to 
their job training. The Government prohibits forced and bonded child 
labor and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    Workers under the age of 18 have additional legal protection, 
including limits on overtime and the number of hours that can be worked 
continuously. The Ministries of Labor and Education effectively monitor 
the enforcement of child labor and education laws.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law provides for minimum 
wage rates that vary according to the worker's age and number of 
dependents. The minimum wage for a single worker over the age of 18 is 
$7.32 (278 francs) per hour. Supporting a family is difficult on the 
minimum wage, but most employees earn more than the minimum.
    The law mandates a maximum workweek of 40 hours. Premium pay is 
required for overtime or unusual hours. Employment on Sunday is 
permitted in continuous-process industries (steel, glass, and 
chemicals) and for certain maintenance and security personnel; other 
industries have requested permission for Sunday work, which the 
government grants on a case-by-case basis. Work on Sunday, allowed for 
some retail employees, must be entirely voluntary and compensated at 
double the normal wage; employees must be given compensatory time off 
on another day, equal to the number of hours worked on Sunday. The law 
requires rest breaks for shift workers and limits all workers to a 
maximum of 10 hours per day including overtime. All workers receive at 
least 5 weeks of paid vacation yearly, in addition to paid holidays.
    The law mandates a safe working environment. An inspection system 
provides severe penalties for infractions. The Labor Inspectorate of 
the Ministry of Labor and the Accident Insurance Agency of the Social 
Security Ministry carry out their inspections effectively.
    No laws or regulations specifically guarantee workers the right to 
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to 
continued employment, but every worker has the right to ask the Labor 
Inspectorate to make a determination, and the Inspectorate usually does 
so expeditiously.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--In May the Government passed a law that 
criminalizes trafficking in persons and increases the penalties for 
adults who traffick in children.
    In March the Minister of Justice told Parliament that the 
Government was unaware of any trafficking rings operating in the 
country. His statement followed allegations by two prominent 
politicians--including Luxembourg's European Commissioner, Viviane 
Reding--that the country serves as a transit point for trafficking in 
women. According to the authorities, no arrests or prosecutions were 
made for trafficking in persons during the year. Moreover, local 
agencies assisting women in distress knew of no clear-cut cases of 
trafficking in women.
                                 ______
                                 

                 FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

    The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which became independent 
following the breakup of Yugoslavia, is a parliamentary democracy led 
by a coalition government. It has a popularly elected president. In 
multiparty parliamentary elections held in October and November 1998, 
opposition parties defeated parties of the governing coalition in 
voting that international observers concluded was conducted fairly and 
reflected the will of the electorate. International observers 
considered the conduct of the first round of voting for president on 
October 31, 1999 to be satisfactory; however, there were allegations of 
fraud and ballot stuffing in the second round on November 14, and the 
Supreme Court ordered a rerun in most of the country's ethnic Albanian 
polling stations, which was conducted on December 5. That final round 
also was marred by irregularities; however, international observers 
concluded that these likely did not affect the final outcome, and 
resulted in the election of President Boris Trajkovski. The judiciary 
is generally independent.
    The Ministry of Interior oversees the uniformed police, criminal 
police, border police, and the state intelligence service. Municipal 
police chiefs are responsible to the Ministry of Interior, not to 
municipal leaders. The Ministry is under the control of a civilian 
minister; a parliamentary commission oversees operations. The Ministry 
of Defense shares with the border police responsibility for border 
security. Some members of the police occasionally committed human 
rights abuses.
    The economy is in transition from Yugoslav-style communism to a 
market-based system. Most firms are privatized, big money-losing 
enterprises are being restructured, and inflation has been held below 4 
percent in recent years. The economy improved substantially after the 
lifting of the Greek embargo and the suspension of sanctions against 
Serbia, both in 1995, before which the gross domestic product had 
fallen an estimated 50 percent. Growth resumed slowly in 1996 and 
continued at about a 5 percent rate until the outbreak of the Kosovo 
crisis in the spring of 1999. The crisis cut many firms off from 
customers in Serbia and made the transportation of goods to and from 
other parts of Europe more difficult and expensive. The overall 
economic effects of the Kosovo crisis are not yet clear, but the 
initial impact on the economy was quite negative. Unemployment is high; 
the gray economy is large. Some workers receive their pay weeks or 
months late.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Police on 
occasion abused suspects and prisoners, in particular Roma and refugees 
from Kosovo. Arbitrary arrest and detention are problems. The 
Government is working to end the practice of police compelling citizens 
to appear for questioning, pursuant to a 1997 law; however, incidents 
involving the use of such practices still occur. Another 1997 law 
imposes some limitations on religious practices. Societal 
discrimination against minorities, including Roma, ethnic Albanians, 
ethnic Turks, and ethnic Serbs, is a problem. Ethnic minorities 
continued to make progress in securing more representation in state 
institutions, although ethnic Macedonians still hold a 
disproportionately high number of positions. Violence and 
discrimination against women remain problems; trafficking in women and 
girls for prostitution is also a problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings. During a December 
1998 police raid on the home of an ethnic Albanian suspect believed to 
have stockpiled illegal arms, the suspect's father was killed by police 
gunfire. A government inquiry cleared the police of any wrongdoing, but 
the incident remained controversial. In November according to press 
reports Czech police detained on drug charges a Macedonian citizen who 
also was being questioned in connection with the 1995 assassination 
attempt against then-President Kiro Gligorov, which resulted in two 
other deaths and a number of injuries. There were no further 
developments in the Government's inquiries into police actions during 
1997 demonstrations in which three persons died.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances attributed to government agents.
    According to Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a Kosovar refugee at 
the Stenkovec I camp disappeared from the camp in June. CRS camp 
administrators believe that the refugee had served as a policeman in 
Kosovo, and that the Kosovo Liberation Army or other persons from 
Kosovo were responsible for his disappearance.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such treatment and punishment; 
however, police occasionally used excessive force during the 
apprehension of criminal suspects, and they occasionally abused 
prisoners, especially members of ethnic minorities. In September and 
October 1998, six individuals suspected of arms smuggling were 
arrested, and family members complained of cruel treatment of the 
suspects. The individuals were tried and convicted early in the year, 
in a trial that was monitored closely by international observers and 
reportedly was conducted fairly.
    There are credible reports of occasional police violence against 
Roma, including beatings during arrest and while in detention. Roma 
rights organizations also complain of police harassment of Roma and 
accuse the police of reinforcing patterns of societal discrimination by 
consistently siding with ethnic Macedonian citizens in any disputes 
involving Roma.
    Human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) received reports 
of police beatings and harassment of Kosovar refugees, particularly 
those refugees not living in camps. There were reports that refugees 
were beaten when crossing the border or traveling throughout the 
country (see Section 2.d.). On May 10, Kosovar Albanian refugees in a 
camp held a protest in response to an incident in which they believed 
that police officers beat two refugees without provocation, although 
international camp administrators on the scene did not confirm the 
protesters' version of the original incident. On June 25, special 
police officers entered the Stenkovec I camp and detained three 
refugees suspected of participating in the disappearance of another 
camp resident (see Section 1.b.). According to CRS officials, after the 
three were transported to a police station, they were interrogated and 
roughed-up before being released.
    According to Amnesty International, police officers frequently 
stopped Kosovar refugees and questioned them in an intimidating manner 
about their reasons for leaving Kosovo.
    Ethnic Albanian Kosovars in the country were involved in a number 
of anti-Roma incidents, at least one of which required the intervention 
of the police to help rescue a group of Roma from a mob in a refugee 
camp (see Section 5). According to press reports, in August eight 
ethnic Albanians beat two of their Romani neighbors in Radusa, after an 
incident in which an ethnic Albanian shouted epithets at Romani 
children. The ethnic Albanians threatened the Roma and told them to 
move away from the village. The Roma fled but returned 2 weeks later 
after local police promised to protect the family and to charge their 
assailants.
    On May 19, a small bomb exploded in an ethnic Albanian neighborhood 
in Skopje, which wounded two persons. The authorities did not announce 
any suspects in the case.
    During the December 5 rerun of the second round of voting in 
presidential elections, police intervened 23 times to stop skirmishes 
among voters (see Section 3). According to the Ministry of Interior, at 
least 9 persons were injured, and authorities filed charges against 14 
persons.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and 
the Human Rights Ombudsman. The Government agreed to allow the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons under 
procedures which the ICRC finds acceptable, but has not yet agreed to 
commit to those procedures in a binding, written agreement with the 
ICRC.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The Constitution states that a person must be 
arraigned in court within 24 hours of arrest. The maximum length of 
pretrial detention was increased in 1998 from 90 to 180 days by 
constitutional amendment. The accused is entitled to contact a lawyer 
at the time of arrest and to have a lawyer present during police and 
court proceedings. According to human rights observers and criminal 
defense attorneys, police sometimes violate the 24-hour time period 
within which a suspect must be arraigned and deny immediate access to 
an attorney. Although the law requires warrants for arrests, this 
provision frequently is ignored, and it is not uncommon for a warrant 
to be issued some time after an arrest.
    The Government has not yet ended completely the practice of police 
compelling citizens to appear at police stations through an 
``invitation'' for ``informative talks.'' Although a law on criminal 
procedures was passed in 1997 that states that police cannot force 
citizens to appear for these sessions without presentation of a court 
order, the practice continued to be applied on occasion. Roma rights 
organizations accuse the police of arbitrarily arresting and detaining 
Roma, and there are credible reports of such police actions.
    The police initiated a series of raids on businesses in the summer, 
seized records, and briefly detained some 20 enterprise directors and 
officers to question them on charges of corruption and failure to pay 
taxes. Almost all of the individuals who were questioned or whose 
offices were raided were connected to opposition political parties, and 
the raids were widely viewed as having been politically motivated. The 
Government publicly defended itself against media criticism of its 
actions by releasing information on the alleged crimes under 
investigation, but by year's end no charges were brought against the 
subjects of the raids. A similar police raid in December against the 
director of a company involved in a dispute with the Government 
resulted in another media outcry and the suspension by the Ministry of 
Interior of the local chief of police who conducted the operation.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice, although the court system is still developing and is 
sometimes inefficient and slow.
    The court system is three tiered and comprises municipal courts, 
district courts, and a Supreme Court. A Constitutional Court deals with 
matters of constitutional interpretation.
    The Constitutional Court has a mandate to protect the human rights 
of citizens but has not taken action in any case in this area. In 
addition the Constitution provides for a public attorney to protect the 
constitutional and legal rights of citizens when violated by bodies of 
state administration and other agencies with public mandates. The 
Office of the People's Ombudsman was created and became functional in 
1997 (see Section 4).
    Trials are presided over by judges appointed by the Republican 
Judicial Council (an independent agency) and confirmed by Parliament. 
The judges are assisted by two members of the community who serve 
essentially as consulting jurors, although the judge has the final 
word. Court hearings and the rendering of verdicts are open to the 
public except in some cases, such as those involving minors and those 
in which the personal safety of the defendant is concerned. Trials 
cannot be televised, pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code, although 
the court can in certain cases authorize the presence of television and 
film cameras.
    Four ethnic Albanian municipal officers who were jailed for crimes 
related to events in Gostivar and Tetovo in 1997 considered themselves 
political prisoners. However, all four were freed early in the year as 
part of a wider grant of amnesty by the new Government. Most 
international observers believe that the amnesty was aimed specifically 
at release of the four officials. The group, which included the mayors 
of Tetovo and Gostivar, had been jailed for failure to obey a 
Constitutional Court order to remove Albanian flags from municipal 
buildings; rioting had followed their arrests.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and 
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice.
    Several daily newspapers are published in Skopje, as well as 
numerous weekly or periodical political and other publications. Most 
towns and municipalities have local newspapers. Government-subsidized 
newspapers in the Albanian and Turkish languages are published and 
distributed nationally by the leading news publishing house. The 
Government subsidizes some other newspapers and magazines. The process 
of granting media subsidies is not transparent, leading to charges of 
political bias in government support for the independent media. Several 
privately owned publications have a wide distribution throughout the 
country, and some are considered to be oriented toward opposition 
political parties. The media that remain partially state-owned are 
government oriented but report opposition press conferences and 
statements and in general provide coverage of the major opposition 
parties. The leading newspaper publisher is still partially government 
owned and controls one of only two modern, high-speed printing 
facilities in the country, as well as many newspaper kiosks. Following 
the parliamentary elections in late 1998, influence over this publisher 
passed to the new Government. International monitors noted that the 
media provided generally unbiased coverage of the full spectrum of 
political debate. However, several media outlets were criticized for 
their clear bias in favor of one political party.
    Distributors of foreign newspapers and magazines must obtain the 
permission of the Ministry of Interior. All such requests during the 
year were approved. Foreign newspapers, including those from 
neighboring countries, are available throughout the country.
    A 1998 case involving an assault on a journalist, the editor of a 
large circulation opposition-oriented weekly magazine, remains 
unsolved.
    State-run Macedonian radio and television is in countrywide 
competition with two private television stations and one private radio 
station that are licensed to broadcast nationally. The state broadcast 
media also face the competition of dozens of small independent local 
radio and television stations throughout the country. The Broadcast 
Council issues licenses to broadcasters, in a process that 
international observers consider generally meets international norms. 
License fees collected from private broadcasters are supposed to help 
subsidize the state-run system, but collections are inconsistent.
    Individuals and opposition political groups may criticize the 
Government publicly without reprisal. However, in January state radio 
commentator Gorica Popova was demoted after she expressed her personal 
view in a radio broadcast about several foreign guests whom the 
Government invited to the country in order to honor a controversial 
interwar hero. The media do not appear to practice self-censorship due 
to fear of government reprisal. The Government does not censor books 
and other publications, nor does it censor films.
    The Government respects academic freedom. Because higher education 
is not available in the Albanian language (except for teacher 
training), some ethnic Albanians claim that they do not have complete 
academic freedom. They want to see the currently unauthorized Albanian-
language Tetovo University gain legal status so that they can study in 
their mother tongue at the university level (see Section 5).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects 
this right in practice. Advance notification of large meetings is 
optional; political and protest rallies occur regularly without major 
incident. Religious gatherings, if they occur outside of specific 
religious facilities, must be approved in advance by the Ministry of 
Interior and can only be convened by registered religious groups (see 
also Section 2.c.).
    Three ethnic Albanian rally organizers arrested in 1998 for 
inciting racial and ethnic hatred were released soon after their 
arrest, and no further legal action was taken against them.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right in practice. Political parties 
and organizations are required to register with a court. More than 40 
political parties are registered, including ethnically based parties of 
Albanians, Turks, Serbs, and Roma.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
The 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Groups limits some aspects of 
religious practice; however, the law does not appear to be enforced 
consistently. While only the Macedonian Orthodox Church is mentioned by 
name in the Constitution, it does not enjoy official status.
    The 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Groups designates the 
Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic community, and the Roman 
Catholic Church as ``religious communities,'' while all other religions 
are designated ``religious groups.'' However, despite the difference in 
designation, there is no legal difference between the two categories.
    The law places some limitations on religious practices. For 
example, only a citizen may found a religious group. The law also 
stipulates that anyone carrying out religious work be registered with 
the Government's Commission on Religious Communities and Groups.
    The Government requires that religious groups be registered. The 
1997 Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups contained a 
number of specific requirements for the registration of religious 
groups that were struck down by the Constitutional Court during the 
year. Consequently, there was considerable confusion over which 
procedures still applied, and several foreign religious bodies 
experienced delays in their efforts to register. During the year, the 
Government acted to make the remaining requirements more transparent, 
but the process remained slow and cumbersome. At least one 
international Protestant church was granted legal registration, and 
several others are at some stage of the process. One Islamic group 
withdrew its 1998 application for registration but continues to operate 
openly without taking further steps toward legal registration. The 
Government has not taken any enforcement actions against the group. In 
1998 the Government rejected the application for registration of 
another Islamic group headquartered in another country. An Islamic Roma 
group applied for registration in 1998, and the Government rejected its 
application on technical grounds. The group resubmitted its 
application, and the Government granted the group legal registration. 
The total number of registered religious groups and communities is 19.
    Religious gatherings, if they occur outside of specific religious 
facilities, must be approved in advance by the Ministry of Interior and 
can only be convened by registered religious groups.
    The refusal of the Serbian Orthodox Church to recognize the self-
proclaimed Macedonian Orthodox Church has led to difficulties for 
ethnic Serbs who wish to worship in their own church. On several 
occasions in 1998 the Government refused Serbian Orthodox priests 
permission to enter the country because of the recognition issue. Due 
in part to the intervening Kosovo crisis, no Serbian Orthodox priests 
attempted to enter Macedonia for religious purposes during the year. In 
December a delegation from the Macedonian Orthodox Church traveled to 
Istanbul to consult with Orthodox leaders on ways to end the impasse 
with the Serbian Orthodox Church.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are permitted free movement 
within the country as well as the right to leave and return. These 
rights may be restricted for security, public health, and safety 
reasons, but are respected fully in practice.
    Citizenship in the old Yugoslav system was national, but all 
records and processing were at the level of the individual republics, 
so some residents at the time of independence had Yugoslav citizenship 
that became citizenship in other newly independent former republics. 
For about the first year of independence, beginning with the adoption 
of the Constitution in November 1991, any Yugoslav citizen who had 
legal residence (of any duration) in the republic could acquire 
citizenship by simple application. The Law on Citizenship adopted in 
November 1992 established new procedures for conferring citizenship, 
and under its transitional provisions citizenship was granted 
essentially automatically to any legal resident who applied before 
November 1993. Despite this 2-year window of opportunity for residents 
to become citizens by simple application, several thousand residents 
did not regularize their status before November 1993. Some of these 
persons, and others who arrived in the country later, have complained 
that the provisions of the Law on Citizenship that followed the 
transition period are too restrictive and have prevented them from 
obtaining citizenship. For example, after the transition period the law 
required applicants for naturalization to have 15 years of residency. 
The law also affects many Roma who wish to become citizens, 
particularly with regard to difficulties they encountered in 
establishing residence and meeting requirements of a regular income. 
During the year, the 15-year residence requirement was lowered to 10 
years, in conformity with the Council of Europe Convention on 
Citizenship; the new residency requirements are to become effective 
within about 1 year, following the passage of enabling legislation. New 
procedures instituted in 1998 have made the citizenship application 
process considerably more transparent; the Macedonian Helsinki 
Committee has full access to all files, and the office within the 
Ministry of Interior that processes the cases works closely with the 
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Skopje.
    Ethnic Albanians constitute a disproportionately high number of 
emigrants, due to stronger familial ties outside the country and 
longstanding economic relationships in other countries.
    The Kosovo crisis created an enormous refugee movement into the 
country between late March and mid-summer and severely strained the 
country's ability to provide asylum. Prior to the start of the NATO air 
campaign, approximately 15,000 Kosovar refugees had been allowed to 
enter the country quietly as ``tourists'' and reside in local 
communities. This pretense that there were no refugees in the country 
was undermined by the arrival of an additional 335,000 or more ethnic 
Albanian Kosovars in the weeks following the start of the air campaign. 
This total represented about one-sixth of the county's own population 
and quickly overwhelmed the Government's ability to deal effectively 
with immigration controls, border security, or humanitarian support. 
The refugees also created strong political strains between the 
country's ethnic Macedonian majority and its ethnic Albanian minority. 
Ethnic Albanian Macedonians were motivated strongly to provide 
immediate asylum to all ethnic Albanians fleeing Kosovo. However, as 
long as the outcome of the crisis remained in doubt, many ethnic 
Macedonians feared that the refugees might be stranded outside of 
Kosovo--significantly and perhaps permanently altering the country's 
ethnic balance. Despite these apprehensions and domestic political 
tensions, the Government generally responded well to the refugee 
crisis, and met its international obligations regarding the provision 
of asylum. Occasionally the accumulated political and resource 
pressures on the Government resulted in severe restrictions on the 
reception of new waves of arriving refugees. Reports that authorities 
forced some Kosovar Albanians back into Kosovo could not be confirmed. 
The Government on several occasions closed the border crossing points 
for hours at a time and often did not staff crossing points with 
sufficient personnel to keep new arrivals moving quickly to safety. At 
times the Government slowed down the processing of refugees and refused 
to admit ethnic Albanians who lacked passports. In one incident, border 
police turned back a train carrying dozens of refugees because they 
reportedly lacked ``proper documentation.'' International relief 
officials publicly said that the Government's actions endangered lives 
by processing refugees too slowly. The worst episode was at the 
beginning of the crisis, when the initial wave of refugees arrived at 
the Blace border crossing point in late March; tens of thousands of 
refugees piled up at the border in an unhealthy, filthy, and severely 
overcrowded area, while the Government and the international community 
rushed to build camps to absorb them. Media and NGO reports of deaths 
among refugees at Blace vary widely. Medicins sans Frontieres, the one 
international medical aid organization that was allowed continuous 
presence among the Blace refugees from the beginning of the crisis, 
confirmed three deaths and heard credible but unverified accounts of up 
to another eight deaths. In its efforts to clear the Blace border 
crossing point at the end of the first week of April, the Government 
arranged with the Government of Albania for the transfer of 
approximately 15,000 refugees by bus to Albania. However, the transfer 
was not coordinated with the UNHCR and created much controversy because 
of international observers' doubts that it had been voluntary in all 
cases. In early April, almost 2,000 refugees were bussed out of Blace 
to the Skopje airport and flown to camps in Turkey in a humanitarian 
airlift that the Government did not coordinate with the UNHCR. The 
Government generally worked closely with the UNHCR, NATO, other 
governments, and with NGO's to establish and operate camps to shelter 
and support the refugees properly. However, at first the UNHCR and 
international NGO's were denied access to refugees at the border 
crossing area (see Section 4). Once camps were established, there were 
several incidents of friction between refugees and the Macedonian 
police who were assigned to secure and protect the camps. Some camp 
residents complained that the police used excessive or unnecessary 
force on occasion, although international camp managers generally 
reported police behavior to be acceptable. According to human rights 
NGO's, there were incidents of police beating, harassment, 
interrogation, and intimidation of refugees. These abuses most often 
affected refugees not living in the camps and refugees who were 
crossing the border or traveling throughout the country (see Section 
1.c.). On May 10, Kosovar Albanian refugees in a camp held a protest in 
response to an incident in which they believed that police officers 
beat two refugees without provocation, although international camp 
administrators on the scene did not support the protesters' version of 
the original incident. On June 25, special police officers entered the 
Stenkovec I camp and detained three refugees suspected of participating 
in the disappearance of another camp resident. According to CRS 
officials, after the three were transported to a police station, they 
were interrogated and roughed up before being released.
    Most refugees returned to Kosovo following the cessation of 
fighting. Approximately 8,000 remained in the country at year's end, 
and the Government believes that there may be about an equal number of 
unregistered refugees. The last refugee camp closed at the end of the 
year, and all registered refugees were living either with host families 
or in collective centers. The Government is working with the UNHCR and 
other organizations to resolve and resettle these remaining refugee 
cases. Government officials admitted some 2,000 new Romani refugees 
fleeing Kosovo in August and September. However, in late September 
officials denied entry to some 300 Roma at the border. By the end of 
September, the Government reversed its decision and admitted another 
461 Roma. Romani refugees staying in camps protested camp conditions 
several times in August and September and refused to cooperate with 
Albanian-language interpreters.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. The country's third parliamentary elections were 
held in October and November 1998 and resulted in an opposition victory 
and a peaceful change of government. The unicameral Parliament governs 
the country. The Prime Minister, as head of government, is selected by 
the party or coalition that can produce a majority in the Parliament. 
He and the other ministers may not be Members of Parliament. The Prime 
Minister is formally appointed by the President, who is head of state, 
Chairman of the Security Council, and commander in chief of the armed 
forces.
    The Government was accused by opposition leaders and the media of 
harassing members of the opposition prior to the October presidential 
elections. In the summer, police initiated a series of raids on 
businesses and charged some 20 enterprise directors with corruption and 
failure to pay taxes. Almost all of the enterprise directors singled 
out for this treatment belong to an opposition party (see Section 
1.d.).
    On October 31, the first round of balloting in the presidential 
election was held. There were six candidates on the ballot, who 
represented every major political party, including both ethnic Albanian 
parties. International observers reported that the conduct of the first 
round was satisfactory, and the candidates who received the most votes 
advanced to the second round. The ruling VMRO (Internal Macedonian 
Revolutionary Organization) candidate Trajkovski gained the majority of 
the votes cast in round two on November 14, but the opposition SDSM 
(Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia) candidate claimed fraud and 
appealed the results. International observers agreed that 
irregularities occurred in some areas, and the Supreme Court ruled that 
round two should be rerun in 230 polling precincts, all of which are 
predominantly ethnic Albanian. The voting held on December 5 was as 
flawed as the previous round, according to international monitors, who 
reported numerous incidents of ballot stuffing and other problems in 
some polling stations. Trajkovski again gained the majority of votes 
cast, and the SDSM filed a list of complaints of irregularities. 
Claiming that the Government was incapable of conducting a fair vote in 
the contested precincts, the SDSM later withdrew those complaints and 
did not press for another repeat of the voting. President Trajkovski 
was sworn into office on December 15.
    Although no formal restrictions exist on the participation of women 
in politics and government, they are severely underrepresented in these 
areas. The Government has two female ministers and two female vice 
presidents with the rank of minister. In the Parliament, 9 of 120 
members are women, an increase from only 4 women in the previous 
Parliament. In Muslim communities, especially among more traditional 
ethnic Albanians, some women are in effect not enfranchised, due to the 
practice of family/proxy voting, through which men vote on behalf of 
the women in their families (see Section 5).
    A number of political parties represent the interests of 
minorities, including ethnic Albanians, ethnic Turks, ethnic Serbs, and 
Roma. Two ethnic Albanian parties and the Roma party have members in 
the Parliament; the ruling government coalition includes one of the two 
major ethnic Albanian parties, as well as the Romani party. The 
Parliament includes 25 ethnic Albanian members, 1 Macedonian Muslim, 1 
Rom, and an indeterminate, small number of Vlachs. Minorities 
nonetheless maintain that political structures continue to be biased 
against them. Partly to address these concerns, the electoral law 
includes elements of proportional representation. A total of 35 of the 
120 parliamentary members are chosen on the basis of proportionality, 
while the other 85 members are elected in single-member districts. Some 
ethnic Albanians and Roma complain that discrimination against them in 
citizenship decisions effectively disenfranchises them (also see 
Section 2.d.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government generally is responsive to the concerns of human 
rights groups. Human rights groups and ethnic community representatives 
meet freely with foreign representatives without government 
interference. Several independent forums for human rights exist and 
operate freely, but their activities have not been prominent. In 1998 
and 1999 one such forum, with the support of the human rights 
ombudsman, widely distributed an information card for citizens on basic 
human rights; another group provided similar cards to all police 
officers, outlining citizens' rights.
    The office of the ombudsman, established in 1997, has yet to be 
called upon by the citizenry in any significant way. Most complaints 
filed with the office do not relate to human rights issues.
    The Government allows independent missions by foreign observers. 
The Kosovo crisis led many international NGO's to establish new offices 
in the country, staffed by scores of international workers; many of 
these organizations have a strong interest in human rights issues. The 
Government has been generally cooperative in its dealings with these 
and other international organizations concerning such issues. However, 
when the country first was flooded with Kosovar refugees in late March 
and early April, the Government initially insisted that all aid be 
distributed by local NGO's, particularly the Macedonian Red Cross, 
which lacked sufficient resources to perform the task adequately. For 
days the UNHCR and most nonmedical international NGO's were denied full 
access to refugees at the border crossing; this needlessly complicated 
the provision of assistance and resulted in additional delays in 
providing food, water, and shelter. Also, the UNHCR was denied access 
to the Radusa camp until April 10 (see Section 2.d.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens 
regardless of their sex, race, color of skin, national or social 
origin, political or religious beliefs, property, or social status. 
However, societal discrimination against ethnic minorities and the 
protection of women's rights remain problems.
    Women.--Violence against women, especially in the family setting, 
is common. Criminal procedures are available to victims of rape, 
including limited legal recourse in the case of marital rape. Cultural 
norms discourage the reporting of such violence, and criminal charges 
on grounds of domestic violence are very rare. Public concern about 
violence against women is not evident in the media, although some 
women's groups are working to raise awareness of the issue. Shelters 
for victims of spousal abuse are operated by NGO's. A hot line remains 
open but has limited hours.
    Trafficking in women and girls for prostitution and pornography is 
a problem (see Section 6.f.). Traffickers have recruited women from 
other countries, especially Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine, to work as 
prostitutes in several towns.
    Sexual harassment of women in the workplace is a problem, but no 
statistics are available to indicate its scope. Maternity benefits are 
good, with 9-months' paid maternity leave. Women also retain the right 
to return to their jobs for 2 years after giving birth.
    The Constitution provides that women possess the same legal rights 
as men. Macedonian society, in both the Muslim and Christian 
communities, is strongly patriarchal, and the advancement of women into 
nontraditional roles is limited. Women are underrepresented severely in 
the higher levels of the private sector, although some professional 
women are prominent. Women from some parts of the ethnic Albanian 
community do not have equal opportunities for employment and education, 
primarily due to traditional and religious constraints on their full 
participation in society. In Muslim communities, especially among more 
traditional ethnic Albanians, some women are in effect not 
enfranchised, due to the practice of family/proxy voting, through which 
men vote on behalf of the women in their families (see Section 3).
    Women's advocacy groups include the Humanitarian Association for 
the Emancipation, Solidarity, and Equality of Women; the Union of 
Associations of Macedonian Women; and the League of Albanian Women.
    Children.--The Government is committed to the rights and welfare of 
children but in some areas is limited by resource constraints. 
Education is compulsory through the eighth grade, or to the age of 15 
or 16. At both the primary and secondary levels, girls in some ethnic 
Albanian communities are underrepresented in schools. The Government 
encourages ethnic minority students, especially girls, to enroll in 
secondary schools. Medical care for children is adequate but is 
hampered by the generally difficult economic circumstances of the 
country and by the weak national medical system.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
    People With Disabilities.--Social programs to meet the needs of the 
disabled exist to the extent that government resources allow. 
Discrimination on the basis of disability is forbidden by law. No laws 
or regulations mandate accessibility for disabled persons.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of 2.2 million 
is composed of a variety of national and ethnic groups, mainly 
Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs, and Vlachs. All citizens 
are equal under the law. The Constitution provides for the protection 
of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of 
minorities, including state support for education in minority languages 
through secondary school and the official use of ethnic minority 
languages in areas where ethnic minorities make up a majority of the 
population.
    Ethnic tensions and prejudices are present in society. The 
Government is committed to a policy of peaceful integration of all 
ethnic groups into society but faces political resistance and continued 
popular prejudices regarding the means to achieve this goal (hiring 
quotas, affirmative action in school admissions, education in minority 
languages, etc.).
    Representatives of the ethnic Albanian community, by far the 
largest minority group with 23 percent of the population according to 
government statistics, are the most vocal in charging discrimination. 
The underrepresentation of ethnic Albanians in the military and police 
is a major grievance in the community. Despite government efforts to 
recruit more ethnic Albanians, the police force remains overwhelmingly 
Slavic Macedonian, even in areas where the ethnic Albanian population 
is large. Members of ethnic minorities constitute 8.7 percent of the 
law enforcement officers of the Ministry of the Interior; in the 
primarily ethnic Albanian cities of Tetovo and Gostivar the respective 
figures are 17 percent and 12 percent. To raise the percentage of 
ethnic minority police officers, the Government for several years has 
set a recruiting quota of 22 percent for enrolling minority students at 
the police secondary school. Attrition has kept the graduating classes 
from retaining that percentage of ethnic minorities.
    The military continues efforts to recruit and retain minority 
officers and cadets. The military is composed mostly of short-service 
conscripts, drawn from all ethnic groups. The proportion of ethnic 
Albanians in the ranks is estimated to be about 25 percent, but the 
proportion is significantly lower in the officer corps. Of junior 
officers, about 9 percent are from ethnic minorities, while about 15 
percent of cadets at the military academy are from ethnic minorities. 
Ethnic Albanians constitute about 8 percent of Ministry of Defense 
civilian employees. The Deputy Minister of Defense and one of a total 
of eight general officers are ethnic Albanians.
    The Constitution provides for primary and secondary education in 
the languages of the ethnic minorities. Primary education is available 
in Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, and Serbian. Albanian-language 
education is a crucial issue for the ethnic Albanian community; it is 
seen as vital for preserving Albanian heritage and culture. Almost all 
ethnic Albanian children receive 8 years of education in Albanian-
language schools. The number of ethnic minority students who receive 
secondary education in their mother tongues is increasing, and was 
about 15 percent during the year, up from 14 percent the previous 
school year. Still, only about half of ethnic minority students go on 
to high school, partly because of the lack of available classes in 
minority languages at the secondary level and partly because the 
traditional nature of parts of Albanian society leads many families in 
rural areas to see no need to educate their children, particularly 
girls, beyond the eighth grade.
    At the university level, ethnic minorities are underrepresented, 
but there has been much progress in increasing the number of ethnic 
minority applicants and students since independence in 1991. There are 
eased admission requirements for minorities at the universities in 
Skopje and Bitola for up to 23 percent of entering places, although the 
quota has not always been filled. In 1991 there were 302 ethnic 
minority students attending university; in 1998 there were 1,073. The 
latter figure represents about 16 percent of all university students. 
Most university education is conducted in the Macedonian language; 
there is Albanian-language university education only for students at 
Skopje University's teacher training faculty, for students studying to 
be teachers at Albanian-language primary and secondary schools. An 
obstacle to increasing university attendance of ethnic Albanians and 
Roma, especially for girls, is their low but slowly increasing 
enrollment in secondary education.
    Demands for the legalization of an unofficial Albanian-language 
university in Tetovo continue. In 1995 the issue led to a violent clash 
between demonstrators and police, during which 1 ethnic Albanian 
demonstrator was killed and about 30 persons were injured. Since then 
the Government tacitly has allowed the university--which it considers 
to be illegal--to function without giving it any official recognition. 
In the 1998 parliamentary elections the issue of Albanian-language 
university education was debated constructively, but the question has 
not retained a high profile recently, due in part to the Kosovo crisis. 
At year's end, the Prime Minister announced that the Government had 
approved a plan to be implemented in 2000 to extend further the use of 
the Albanian language in higher education.
    The new Government met one major demand of the ethnic Albanian 
community by agreeing to change the 15 year residence requirement for 
naturalization to 10 years (see Section 2.d.). Enabling legislation is 
being processed to complete that change. The new Government has 
continued previous governments' positions that reject demands for 
legalizing use of the Albanian language in dealings with the central 
Government and in the Parliament and for allowing official use of the 
Albanian flag.
    Ethnic Turks, who make up about 4 percent of the population, also 
complain of governmental, societal, and cultural discrimination. Their 
main complaints center on Turkish-language education and media. One 
continuing dispute has been over the desire of parents who consider 
themselves Turkish to educate their children in Turkish despite the 
fact that they do not speak Turkish at home. The Education Ministry 
refuses to provide Turkish-language education for them, noting that the 
Constitution provides for education in the mother tongues of 
minorities, not in foreign languages. Some parents have hired teachers 
of their own, although this kind of private education is not authorized 
legally.
    Ethnic Serbs, who constitute about 2 percent of the population, 
also complain about discrimination and their inability to worship 
freely in the Serbian Orthodox Church.
    The normally quiet relations between Roma and other citizens were 
strained during the year as a result of dislocations of Roma caused by 
the Kosovo crisis. According to the 1994 census, there were 43,700 Roma 
in the country (2.2 percent of the population). Romani leaders claim 
that the 1994 census seriously undercounted the actual number of Roma. 
There were incidents of police and societal violence against Roma (see 
Section 1.c.). Ethnic Albanian Kosovars in the country were involved in 
a number of anti-Roma incidents, at least one of which in June required 
the intervention of the police to help rescue a group of Roma from a 
mob in a refugee camp. About 6,000 Roma fled Kosovo and took up 
residence in the country. They left not only because of the direct 
dangers of the conflict, but also because of the hostility of ethnic 
Albanian Kosovars, who widely consider the Roma to have supported the 
Serbs and to have committed theft and other crimes against ethnic 
Albanians during the crisis. The new Roma arrivals initially were 
sheltered in a refugee camp (about 2,000 persons) and under host family 
arrangements (about 4,000) that were underwritten by the international 
relief community. By year's end, all of the Romani refugees were 
staying with host families or in collective centers. The presence of 
these Romani refugees is not popular among ethnic Albanians, who 
largely share the view of the ethnic Albanian Kosovars concerning both 
Roma and Serbs. Ethnic Macedonians also express irritation at the new 
arrivals, many of whom settled in Skopje, and some of whom established 
themselves at busy traffic intersections to beg, wash car windows, or 
sell small items. The Macedonian Roma already tended to occupy the 
lowest economic rung of society, and the new arrivals added to the 
ranks of the very poor. Optional Romani-language education has been 
offered at several primary schools since 1996, but there has been 
limited demand and no pressure for a more extensive curriculum. 
According to Romani community leaders, up to 10 percent of Romani 
children never enroll in school, and of those who do, 50 percent drop 
out by the fifth grade, and only 35 to 40 percent finish the eighth 
grade. There is some Romani-language broadcasting.
    In July the Government repealed a law that banned Bulgarian 
language books. The law had been used in previous years also to ban 
some books from Albania.
    There are also a number of ethnic Macedonian Muslims and Bosnian 
Muslims in the country. Some ethnic Macedonian Muslims contend that 
they are identified too closely with ethnic Albanians, most of whom are 
also Muslim, and with whose policies the ethnic Macedonian Muslims 
often disagree.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to form trade unions, but this right is restricted for members of 
the military, police, and civil service. Independent trade unions have 
been allowed to organize since 1992, when an Association of Independent 
and Autonomous Unions was formed. However, there is still a national 
trade union. The Confederation of Trade Unions of Macedonia is the 
successor organization to the old Communist labor confederation. It 
maintains the assets of the old unions and is the Government's main 
negotiating partner, along with the Chamber of the Economy, on labor 
issues. While its officers may tend to oppose strikes because of the 
legacy of the past, they appear to be genuinely independent of the 
Government and committed to the interests of the workers they 
represent.
    The total number of strikes during the year was approximately 150, 
which included many protest work stoppages of a few hours or less. The 
reasons for the strikes included demands for overdue pay, workers' 
objections to government changes in management personnel at some state-
owned entities, and objection to various decisions related to 
privatization. Strikes were generally small and confined to company 
grounds, although in September striking workers at a government-owned 
smelting plant blocked a major highway for several hours, protesting 
government plans to close the plant if a private purchaser or partner 
could not be found. Most strikes were calm and well organized and 
passed without serious incident.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 
Constitution implicitly recognizes employees' right to bargain 
collectively, a concept that nonetheless is still in its infancy. 
Legislation in this area has yet to be passed by Parliament.
    An export processing zone is being developed with the advice and 
financial support of Taiwan. No date has been set for the beginning of 
operations.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Legal prohibitions 
against forced labor, including that performed by children, are 
observed in practice.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The constitutional minimum age for employment is 15 years. 
Children legally may not work nights or more than 40 hours per week. 
Education is compulsory through grade eight, or to the ages of 14 or 
15. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for 
enforcing laws regulating the employment of children. The law prohibits 
forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this 
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The average monthly wage in June 
was about $164 (9,532 denars). The minimum wage is by law two-thirds of 
the average wage; however, it was not sufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. By comparison an average 
month's worth of food for a family of four in 1998 cost $184 (9,566 
denars). This economic situation meant that few workers could support a 
family on their wages alone. Many households are dual-income, and many 
persons take on additional work, often in the gray market.
    Yugoslavia had extensive laws concerning acceptable conditions of 
work, including an official 42-hour workweek with a minimum 24-hour 
rest period and generous vacation and sick leave benefits. The 
Government adopted many of these provisions, including the workweek and 
rest period. However, high unemployment and the fragile condition of 
the economy led many employees to accept work conditions that do not 
comply with the law. Small retail businesses in particular often 
require employees to work far beyond the legal limits.
    The Constitution provides for safe working conditions, temporary 
disability compensation, and leave benefits. Although laws and 
regulations on worker safety remain from the Yugoslav era, they are not 
enforced strictly. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is 
responsible for enforcing regulations pertaining to working conditions.
    Under the law, if workers have safety concerns, employers are 
obliged to address dangerous situations. Should an employer fail to do 
so, employees are entitled legally to leave the dangerous situation 
without losing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking for the purpose of 
prostitution is prohibited specifically by law. However, trafficking in 
women and girls for prostitution and pornography is a problem. The 
country is a source, transit, and destination point for trafficking in 
persons. Trafficking in persons for the purpose of illegal immigration 
is not prohibited specifically by law but is covered by immigration 
regulations. Traffickers have recruited women from other countries, 
especially Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine, to work as prostitutes in 
several towns. Women are trafficked through the country on their way to 
West European countries, especially Italy. There are no reliable 
estimates of the number of victims of trafficking in the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 MALTA

    Malta is a constitutional republic and parliamentary democracy. The 
chief of state (President) appoints as the head of government (Prime 
Minister) the leader of the party that gains a plurality of seats in 
the quinquennial elections for the unicameral legislature. The 
judiciary is independent.
    A civilian commissioner, under the effective supervision of the 
Government, commands the police.
    The economy is a mixture of state-owned and private industry, with 
tourism and light manufacturing as the largest sectors, and it provides 
residents with a moderate to high standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with instances of individual abuse. An independent judiciary upholds 
the Constitution's protections for individual rights and freedoms. 
Domestic violence is a problem, and societal discrimination against 
women persists, but the Government has taken steps to address both 
issues.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits inhuman or degrading punishment 
or treatment. There were no reports that officials employ them.
    Prison conditions meet minimal international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the 
law provide for freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and 
the Government observes this prohibition. The police may arrest a 
person for questioning on the basis of reasonable suspicion but within 
48 hours must either release the suspect or lodge charges. Arrested 
persons have no right to legal counsel during this 48-hour period. 
Persons incarcerated pending trial are granted access to counsel. Bail 
normally is granted.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent of 
the executive and legislative branches. The Chief Justice and 16 judges 
are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister; 
judges serve until the age of 65, and magistrates serve until the age 
of 60.
    The highest court, the Constitutional Court, interprets the 
Constitution and has original jurisdiction for cases involving human 
rights violations and allegations relating to electoral corruption 
charges. The two courts of appeal hear appeals from the civil court, 
court of magistrates, special tribunals, and from the criminal court, 
respectively. The criminal court, composed of a judge and nine jurors, 
hears criminal cases. The civil court first hall hears civil and 
commercial cases that exceed the magistrates' jurisdiction; the civil 
court second hall offers voluntary jurisdiction in civil matters. The 
court of magistrates has jurisdiction for civil claims of less than 
$1,000 (400 Maltese liri) and for lesser criminal offenses. The 
juvenile court hears cases involving persons under 16 years of age.
    The Constitution requires a fair public trial before an impartial 
court. Defendants have the right to counsel of their choice or, if they 
cannot pay the cost, to court-appointed counsel at public expense. 
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. They may confront 
witnesses, present evidence, and have the right of appeal.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution protects the privacy of the home and 
prohibits electronic surveillance. The Government respects these 
provisions. Police officers with the rank of inspector and above may 
issue search warrants based on perceived reasonable grounds for 
suspicion of wrongdoing. Reportedly only the Home Affairs Minister and 
the Prime Minister may issue warrants for telephone tapping, and then 
only in drug-related cases.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. However, the 1987 Foreign Interference Act bans 
foreign participation in local politics during the period leading up to 
elections. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    Diverse views are expressed in four daily newspapers, six weeklies, 
and five Sunday editions. A total of 6 television stations, a 
commercial cable network, and 18 radio stations function freely.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The 
state-supported religion is Roman Catholicism. The Government and the 
Catholic Church participate in a foundation that finances Catholic 
schools. The Church transferred nonpastoral land to this foundation as 
part of the 1991 Ecclesiastical Entities Act. Students in government 
schools may decline instruction in Catholicism.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not arbitrarily 
restrict movement within the country, foreign travel, or emigration. A 
court order may prohibit the departure from the country of anyone who 
is the subject of a formal complaint alleging nonfulfillment of a legal 
obligation, such as the nonpayment of a debt or nonsupport of an 
estranged spouse.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Since 1992 it has granted 
temporary refugee status and protection to over 1,000 persons. The 
Government admitted 107 Kosovar refugees from May until their August 
return to Kosovo. At year's end, the UNHCR considered 164 immigrants to 
be refugees and another 214 to be applicants. The Government grants 
temporary protective status to such persons pending their resettlement 
in third countries; it normally does not grant permanent refugee status 
to anyone or accept anyone for resettlement. A proposed law introduced 
in December would expand access to social services and employment for 
recognized refugees. The authorities expel or repatriate persons they 
deem to be economic migrants. However, the Government did not force the 
return of any persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens exercise this right in multiparty elections held every 5 
years by secret ballot on the basis of universal suffrage for those 18 
years of age or over. In the 1998 election, 96 percent of the 
electorate voted.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the 
September 1998 elections, six women were elected to Parliament, three 
in each party, and one received a ministerial post. The Government has 
taken steps to include more women in civil service and other government 
positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Various human rights groups and persons operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and 
responsive to their views
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and law prohibit discrimination related to race, 
place of origin, political opinion, color, creed, or sex. The 
Government respects this prohibition. Alleged victims of discrimination 
may apply directly to the Constitutional Court for relief, although few 
have done so recently.
    Women.--No widespread pattern of family violence against women is 
apparent, but continuing reports of such incidents make plain that the 
problem exists. During the first 9 months of 1999, 263 cases of 
domestic violence were reported, and 11 cases of rape were reported to 
the police. A special police unit and several voluntary organizations 
provide support to victims of domestic violence. For women who are 
threatened or physically abused, the Government also maintains an 
emergency fund and subsidizes shelter beds. During the year 111 women 
used the shelters.
    The Government set up a hot line in 1996 to assist victims of abuse 
through counseling and through referrals to legal assistance and 
shelters. A committee was set up during 1998 to review existing family 
legislation and propose amendments dealing with domestic violence. Its 
proposals are being considered by the Ministry of Social Policy.
    Prostitution is a serious offense under the law, and heavy 
penalties are reserved for organizers. Rape and violent indecent 
assault carry sentences of up to 10 years. The law treats spousal rape 
the same as any other rape. Divorce and abortion are not legal.
    The Constitution provides that all citizens have access, on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, to housing, employment, and education. While 
women constitute a growing portion of the work force, they are 
underrepresented in management. Cultural and traditional employment 
patterns often direct them either into traditional ``women's jobs'' 
(such as sales clerk, secretary, bank teller, teacher, or nurse) or 
into better paying jobs in family-owned businesses or select 
professions (i.e., academia or medicine). Therefore, women generally 
earn less than their male counterparts, and many leave employment upon 
marriage.
    Women's issues are handled by the Department of Women's Rights 
under the Minister of Social Policy. The Minister is a prominent member 
of the Government who is also Deputy Prime Minister and the Nationalist 
Party's deputy leader. Legislation enacted in 1993 granted women 
equality in matters of family law, and a 1991 constitutional amendment 
committed the government to promote equal rights for all persons 
regardless of sex. The Government has taken steps to ensure that 
legislation is gender neutral to the degree possible. Redress in the 
courts for sexual discrimination is available. The Government's policy 
on gender abandoned the concept of introducing gender-based quotas in 
the civil service. An internal study and a proposal to increase the 
representation of women in the public sector is under consideration by 
the Commonwealth Secretariat.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and health care. It provides compulsory, free, and universal 
education and free health care for children through age 16. The 
Government voices concern for children's rights and welfare but 
addresses those concerns within family law. The Government plans to 
adjust the law, as necessary, in view of its signature of the European 
Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights in February.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. The number of 
reported cases of child abuse has grown as public awareness has 
increased, but it is not clear whether the number of incidents actually 
has increased. For the first 9 months of 1999, 545 cases of child abuse 
were reported.
    People with Disabilities.--The law provides for rights for the 
disabled. The 1969 Employment of Disabled Persons Act led to greater 
employment of disabled persons in government agencies. The 1992 
Structures Act requires accessibility to public buildings for people 
with physical disabilities. Overall government and private sector 
efforts to advance the status of disabled persons are uneven. As of 
2000, private development project plans must include access for the 
disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 2,000 men of 
Algerian or Tunisian origin are married to Maltese women. This 
community has a mosque and a separate school; an application is pending 
with the Government for a dedicated cemetery.
    Owners of some bars and discos reportedly discourage or prohibit 
darker skinned persons from entering.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to associate 
freely and to strike, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. Only noncivilian personnel of the armed forces and police are 
prohibited from striking. There are 35 registered trade unions, 
representing about 50 percent of the work force. Although all unions 
are independent of political parties, the largest, the General Workers' 
Union, is generally regarded as having close informal ties with the 
Labor Party.
    Under the Industrial Relations Act of 1976, the responsible 
minister may refer labor disputes either to the Industrial Tribunal (a 
government-appointed body consisting of representatives of government, 
employers, and employee groups) or to binding arbitration. The 
International Labor Organization Committee of Experts objects to a 
provision of the act that permits compulsory arbitration to be held at 
the request of only one of the parties, but neither unions nor 
employers appear to object to this provision. In practice a striking 
union can ignore an unfavorable decision of the Tribunal by continuing 
the strike on other grounds. Three disputes were referred to the 
Tribunal during the year.
    There is no prohibition on unions affiliating internationally.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are 
free, in law and practice, to organize and bargain collectively. Unions 
and employers meet annually with government representatives to work out 
a comprehensive agreement regulating industrial relations and income 
policy.
    Under the Industrial Relations Act, an employer may not take action 
against any employee for participation or membership in a trade union. 
Complaints may be pursued through a court of law, through the 
Industrial Tribunal, or through the Commission Against Injustices (a 
government-appointed body composed of representatives of the government 
and the opposition); but most disputes are resolved directly between 
the parties. Workers fired solely for union activities must be 
reinstated.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
bans forced labor, and it does not occur.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and 
enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and 
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.). The law 
prohibits the employment of children younger than the age of 16. This 
injunction is generally respected, but some underage children are 
employed during summer months, especially as domestics, restaurant 
kitchen help, or vendors. The Department of Labor enforces the law 
effectively, but it is lenient in cases of summer employment of 
underage youths in businesses run by their families.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The weekly legal minimum wage is 
$108 (43.25 Maltese liri) for persons under age 17; $111 (44.47 Maltese 
liri) for 17-year-olds; and $118 (47.38 Maltese liri) for persons age 
18 and over. Additionally, a mandatory bonus of $10.58 (4.23 Maltese 
liri) per week is paid. This minimum wage structure provides a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family with the addition of 
government subsidies for housing, health care, and free education. Wage 
Councils, composed of representatives of government, business, and 
unions, regulate work-hours; for most sectors the standard is 40 hours 
per week, but in some trades it is 43 or 45 hours per week.
    Government regulations prescribe a daily rest period, which is 
normally 1 hour. The law mandates an annual paid vacation of 4 
workweeks plus 4 workdays. The Department of Labor effectively enforces 
these requirements.
    Enforcement of the 1994 Occupational Health and Safety (Promotion) 
Act is uneven, and industrial accidents remain frequent. Workers may 
remove themselves from unsafe working conditions without jeopardy to 
their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically prohibits 
trafficking in persons, although traffickers may be prosecuted under 
the Immigration Act for unlawful entry or unregulated status.
    There were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from 
the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                MOLDOVA

    Moldova gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and 
in 1994 adopted a constitution that provides for a multiparty 
representative government with power divided among a president, 
cabinet, parliament, and judiciary. President Petru Lucinschi began his 
4-year term in 1997. Prime Minister Ion Sturza began his term in March 
and led a proreform coalition government until he was dismissed by a 
vote of no confidence on November 9. The Communist Party, with 40 
members of Parliament, along with 9 centrist and 9 far-right 
independent members of Parliament approved a new government led by 
Dumitru Braghis on December 21. Three center and center-right parties 
hold the remaining 44 seats in Parliament. International observers 
considered the 1996 presidential and 1998 parliamentary elections to be 
free and fair, but authorities in the separatist Transnistrian region 
interfered with citizens' ability to vote. The Constitution provides 
for an independent judiciary; while the executive branch has exerted 
undue influence on the judiciary, there were indications during the 
year that judicial independence was increasing.
    The country remains divided, with mostly Slavic separatists 
controlling the Transnistrian region along the Ukrainian border. This 
separatist regime has entered into negotiations with the national 
Government on the possibility of a special status for the region. 
Progress in resolving the ongoing conflict has been blocked by the 
separatists' continuing demands for ``statehood'' and recognition of 
the country as a confederation of two equal states. The Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Russian Federation, 
and Ukraine act as mediators. The two sides generally have observed the 
cease-fire of 1992, which ended armed conflict between them, but other 
agreements to normalize relations often have not been honored. A 
Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, enjoys local autonomy in the 
southern part of the country. The Gagauz elected a new governor 
(bashkan) and 35 deputies to their popular assembly in free and fair 
elections in September.
    The Ministry of Internal Affairs has responsibility for the police. 
The Ministry of National Security controls other security organs, 
including the border guards. The Constitution assigns to Parliament the 
authority to investigate the activities of these ministries to ensure 
that they comply with existing legislation. Some members of the 
security forces committed a number of human rights abuses.
    The country continued to make progress in economic reform. 
International observers viewed the Governments of former Prime Minister 
Sturza and Prime Minister Braghis as strongly proreform. The economy is 
largely based on agriculture. Citizens and foreigners can buy and sell 
land at market prices. However, foreigners cannot buy agricultural 
land, nor can agricultural land be resold for a period of 5 years. Over 
800 of approximately 1,000 large collective farms have applied for the 
Government's land privatization program. To date approximately 250,000 
landowners have received title to almost 800,000 plots of land. The 
leading exports are foodstuffs, wine, tobacco, clothing, and footwear. 
The gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated officially at about $444 
per capita but may be considerably underestimated because of 
underreporting for tax purposes. The officially reported median salary 
is $24 per month. According to government statistics about 80 percent 
of the population lives below the poverty level and 10 percent of the 
rural population has a per capita income of less than one-quarter of 
that level. A majority of citizens cannot afford to buy fish, meat, 
milk and other dairy products on a regular basis. The GDP decreased by 
8.6 percent in 1998 and was projected to decline by 5 percent in 1999. 
A program privatizing state-owned enterprises and real estate based on 
vouchers issued to all citizens is complete. The exchange rate suffered 
two sharp drops early in the year as a result of the 1998 Russian 
economic crisis but remained stable for most of the year. The average 
monthly inflation rate was about 3 percent. The country has 
considerable foreign debt. The economic situation is worse in 
Transnistria.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, there were problems in some areas. The police occasionally 
beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners. Prison conditions 
remain harsh, with attempts to improve them hampered by lack of 
funding. While the executive branch has exerted undue influence on the 
judiciary, there were indications during the year that judicial 
independence was increasing. It is widely believed that security forces 
monitor political figures, use unauthorized wiretaps, and at times 
conduct illegal searches. The Constitution potentially limits the 
activities of the press, political parties, and religious groups. 
Journalists practice self-censorship. The law also imposes restrictions 
on some religious groups. Societal discrimination and violence against 
women persist. Trafficking in women and girls is a significant problem. 
Addressing a minority concern, the Constitution allows parents the 
right to choose the language of education for their children.
    The Transnistrian authorities continue to be responsible for 
abuses, including questionable detentions, harassment of independent 
media, restrictions on freedom of religion, and discrimination against 
Romanian/Moldovan speakers.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of politically motivated killings either in Moldova or its 
separatist region.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there were credible 
reports that police sometimes beat and abuse prisoners or suspects.
    A businessman alleged that his brother was kidnaped by the police 
for 3 days in July. The police reportedly tortured him, then released 
him after charging him with drunkenness and resisting arrest. The 
businessman also charged that this was a case of racketeering and 
involved persons from the prosecutor's office as well as the police. 
The Prosecutor's Office announced in mid-December that physical assault 
charges were pending against three police officers, but at year's end, 
there was no investigation into the racketeering charges.
    On June 23, violent clashes took place between police and members 
of the General Federation of Trade Unions protesting wage arrears in 
Chisinau's central square. Authorities reportedly arrested 13 
protesters, 2 of whom required hospitalization (see Section 6.a.).
    Conditions in most prisons remain harsh, with serious overcrowding. 
Cell sizes do not meet local legal requirements or minimum 
international standards. Conditions are especially harsh in prisons 
used to hold persons awaiting trial or sentencing. These prisons suffer 
from overcrowding, bad ventilation, and a lack of recreational and 
rehabilitation facilities. Conditions for those serving sentences are 
only marginally better. The incidence of malnutrition and disease, 
especially tuberculosis, is high in all facilities. Abuse of prisoners 
by other prisoners or by jailers themselves, ostensibly for 
disciplinary reasons, has been reduced by the dismissal or retirement 
of some of the worst offending guards; however, the practice likely 
continues at diminished levels. The Ministry of Justice administers the 
prison system. Attempts to improve prison conditions are frustrated by 
a lack of financing.
    Human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisons.
    Requests by human rights monitors to inspect prisons in 
Transnistria have been refused.
    After questionable trials, four ethnic Moldovans are serving 
sentences in Transnistria for alleged terrorism-related crimes (see 
Section 1.e.). At the end of July, one of the four sent a letter to the 
press claiming to be on his 77th day of a hunger strike and alleging a 
number of abuses by the Transnistrian authorities. A member of the OSCE 
mission visited the prisoner in mid-July and observed that he did not 
appear to be in imminent danger. At year's end, he still was claiming 
to be on a hunger strike. The wives of all four complained that they 
were not able to visit in December, although they were allowed to send 
food. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited these 
prisoners in 1992 and 1993 in Tiraspol but later was denied visitation. 
The ICRC was negotiating with Transnistrian officials at year's end to 
visit these prisoners with an international medical team.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The former Soviet Code 
on Penal Procedure remains in force with some amendments, and 
authorities respect its provisions. Prosecutors issue arrest warrants. 
Under the Constitution, a suspect may be detained without charge for 24 
hours. The suspect normally is allowed family visits during this 
period. The 24-hour time limit is not always respected, especially if a 
person is arrested late on a Friday or on a weekend. If charged, a 
suspect may be released pending trial. There is no system of bail, but 
in some cases, in order to arrange release, a friend or relative may 
give a written pledge that the accused would appear for trial. Suspects 
accused of violent or serious crimes generally are not released before 
trial. The Constitution permits pretrial arrest for an initial period 
of 30 days, which may be extended up to 6 months. In exceptional cases, 
Parliament may approve extension of pretrial detention on an individual 
basis of up to 12 months. The accused has the right under the 
Constitution to a hearing before a court regarding the legality of his 
arrest. According to figures provided by the Ministry of Justice at 
year's end, of a prison population of 9,449, 2,839 persons were held in 
confinement awaiting trial (these statistics do not include persons 
held in Transnistria).
    According to the Constitution, a detained person must be informed 
immediately of the reason for his arrest and must be made aware of the 
charges ``as quickly as possible.'' The accused has the right to a 
defense attorney throughout the entire process, and the attorney must 
be present when the charges are brought. Many lawyers point out that 
access to a lawyer generally is granted only after a person has been 
detained for 24 hours. If the defendant cannot afford an attorney, the 
State requires the local bar association to provide one. Because the 
State is unable to pay ongoing legal fees, defendants often do not have 
adequate legal representation.
    The Transnistrian authorities have imposed a state of emergency 
that allows law enforcement officials to detain suspects for up to 30 
days, reportedly without access to an attorney. There were no reports 
that Transnistrian authorities used this provision during the year.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; while the executive branch has exerted undue 
influence on the judiciary, there were indications during the year that 
judicial independence was increasing. Many observers believe that 
arrears in salary payments also make it difficult for judges to remain 
independent from outside influences and free from corruption. Since 
1997 prosecutors have the right to open and close investigations 
without bringing the matter before a court, which gives them 
considerable influence over the judicial process. The Constitution 
provides that the President, on the nomination of the Superior Court of 
Magistrates, appoints judges for an initial period of 5 years. They may 
be reappointed for a subsequent 10 years, after which they serve until 
retirement age. This provision for judicial tenure is designed to 
increase judicial independence.
    The judiciary consists of lower courts of the first instance, five 
appellate courts (tribunals), a Higher Court of Appeals, a Supreme 
Court, and a Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court supervises and 
reviews the activities of the lower courts and serves as a final court 
of appeal.
    By law defendants in criminal cases are presumed innocent. In 
practice prosecutors' recommendations still carry considerable weight 
and limit the defendant's actual presumption of innocence. Trials 
generally are open to the public. Defendants have the right to attend 
proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence. Defense 
attorneys are able to review the evidence against their clients when 
preparing cases. The accused enjoys a right to appeal to a higher 
court. Because of a lack of funding for adequate facilities and 
personnel, there is a large backlog of cases at the tribunal and Higher 
Appeals Court levels. Court decisions involving the restitution of 
salary or a position are not always implemented.
    To date no pattern of discrimination has emerged in the judicial 
system. The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to have 
an interpreter both at the trial and in reviewing the documents of the 
case. If the majority of the participants agree, trials may take place 
in Russian or another acceptable language instead of Romanian/Moldovan.
    There continue to be credible reports that local prosecutors and 
judges extort bribes for reducing charges or sentences. In January a 
judge in the Chisinau economic court was arrested for allegedly 
accepting a bribe to reduce a fine against a firm. He was convicted and 
sentenced to 10 years in prison. Prosecutors occasionally use 
bureaucratic maneuvers to restrict lawyers' access to clients.
    The Constitutional Court showed signs of increasing independence 
during the year. It reviewed 139 cases, almost twice its caseload of 71 
for 1998. The Court found unconstitutional 21 laws, 8 parliamentary 
decisions and regulations, and 24 government acts. The Court took a 
decisive step towards independence when it ruled in November that only 
Parliament, not the President, could amend the Constitution with a 
referendum.
    There were no reports of political prisoners outside Transnistria.
    In Transnistria, four ethnic Moldovans, members of the ``Ilascu 
Group,'' (one of whom, Ilie Ilascu, is an elected member of the 
Moldovan Parliament but has never been able to take his seat) remain in 
prison following their conviction in 1993 for allegedly killing two 
separatist officials. International human rights groups raised serious 
questions about the fairness of the trial; local organizations alleged 
that the Moldovans were prosecuted solely because of their membership 
in the Christian Democratic Popular Front, a Moldovan political party 
that favors unification with Romania. Family members have been allowed 
access. The OSCE was permitted to visit one of the prisoners in July. 
In July the European Court of Human Rights began examining Ilascu's 
case and in November ordered the Government to file a response by 
February 2000. International organizations pressured the Transnistrian 
authorities to retry the ``Ilascu Group;'' in July the Transnistrians 
issued a moratorium on capital punishment, which in effect suspended 
implementation of Ilascu's death sentence.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Prosecutors issue search warrants. In some instances 
searches are conducted without warrants. Courts do not exclude evidence 
that was obtained illegally. There is no judicial review of search 
warrants. The Constitution specifies that searches must be carried out 
``in accordance with the law'' but does not specify the consequences if 
the law is not respected. It also forbids searches at night, except in 
the case of flagrant crime.
    It is widely believed that security agencies continue to use 
electronic monitoring of residences and telephones without proper 
authorization. By law the prosecutor's office must authorize wiretaps 
and may do so only if a criminal investigation is under way. In 
practice the prosecutor's office lacks the ability to control the 
security organizations and police and prevent them from using wiretaps 
illegally.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the law 
provide for freedom of speech and of the press, although with some 
restrictions. The Government does not abridge freedom of speech, and 
the print media express a wide variety of political views and 
commentary. National and city governments subsidize a number of 
newspapers, but political parties and professional organizations, 
including trade unions, also publish newspapers. Most newspapers have a 
circulation of less than 5,000.
    Although the number of media outlets that are not owned and 
operated publicly by the State or a political party is growing, most of 
these ``independent'' media are still in the service of a political 
movement, commercial interest, or foreign country, and secure large 
subsidies from these sources. There are several independent radio 
stations, including a religious one, with some rebroadcasting from 
Romania and Russia. There are three independent television stations in 
the Chisinau area and one in the city of Balti. The Government owns and 
operates several radio stations and a television channel that covers 
most of the country. A number of local governments, including Gagauzia, 
operate television and radio stations. The Association of Electronic 
Press was founded in September. The Association of Independent Press 
was founded in July 1997.
    The Constitution restricts press freedoms, forbidding ``disputing 
or defaming the State and the people'' and political parties that 
``militate'' against the country's sovereignty, independence, and 
territorial integrity. These restrictions lack implementing legislation 
and are not invoked. The civil code includes an article that allows 
public figures to sue for defamation without distinguishing between 
their private and public persons. Criticism of public figures has 
resulted in a number of lawsuits, and as a consequence, journalists 
practice self-censorship. In cases where suits have been filed against 
journalists and media organs, the plaintiffs usually lose. There is no 
freedom of information legislation, and journalists and ordinary 
citizens often have difficulty obtaining information from government 
organizations.
    The Government does not restrict foreign publications. However, 
Western publications do not circulate widely since they are very 
expensive by local standards. Russian newspapers are available, and 
some publish a special Moldovan weekly supplement. The country receives 
television and radio broadcasts from Romania and Russia. A small number 
of cable subscribers receive a variety of foreign cable television 
programs.
    Of the two major newspapers in Transnistria, one is controlled by 
the regional authorities and the other by the Tiraspol city government. 
There are also independent newspapers in Tiraspol and the northern 
Transnistrian city of Ribnitsa. The latter two criticize the regime 
from time to time and have been harassed by the separatist authorities. 
Other print media in Transnistria do not have large circulations and 
appear only on a weekly or monthly basis. Nonetheless, some of them 
also criticize local authorities. The one independent television 
station is trying to enlarge its broadcast radius, but currently it is 
producing less than 10 hours of programming per week. Resistance to 
this move comes from the local official Transnistrian television 
station, which previously had enjoyed a virtual monopoly of advertising 
revenues. Most Moldovan newspapers do not circulate in Transnistria. 
Circulation of all print media in Transnistria is hampered by the 
closed nature of society. The independent newspaper in Tiraspol 
effectively was shut down from January to August through repeated 
confiscations by the Transnistrian authorities. Authorities did not 
present search warrants or court orders for these confiscations. After 
a number of legal proceedings in which Transnistrian courts ruled the 
interventions illegal and fined the Ministry of State Security and 
intervention by the OSCE, the newspaper began to publish again in 
August, although with a sharply limited circulation and under a 
modified name. The repeated confiscations of the newspaper created 
serious financial difficulties for its editors. The Ribnitsa newspaper 
almost was put out of business by two costly libel suits by local 
officials.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and authorities respect 
this right in practice. Mayors' offices issue permits for 
demonstrations; they may consult the national government if a 
demonstration is likely to be extremely large. A protest in June turned 
violent, with 13 persons arrested and 2 reportedly hospitalized. The 
Minister of Internal Affairs stated that the protest threatened public 
order.
    The Constitution states that citizens are free to form parties and 
other social and political organizations, and authorities respect this 
right in practice. Private organizations, including political parties, 
are required to register, but applications are approved routinely. The 
Constitution forbids parties that ``militate against the sovereignty, 
independence, and territorial integrity of Moldova.'' A total of 26 
parties have met the requirement of the October 1998 law for 5,000 
members and are registered officially.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government generally permits the free 
practice of religion; however, a 1992 law on religion that codifies 
religious freedoms contains restrictions that could--and in some 
instances did--inhibit the activities of some religious groups. The law 
provides for freedom of religious practice, including each person's 
right to profess his religion in any form. It also protects the 
confidentiality of the confessional, allows denominations to establish 
associations and foundations, and states that the Government may not 
interfere in the religious activities of denominations. The procedures 
for registering a religious organization are the same for all groups. 
The Salvation Army registered in October 1998, after having been denied 
registration in 1996 on technical grounds. Jehovah's Witnesses were 
unable to register in Tiraspol in 1997 and have not attempted to 
register subsequently.
    The law on religion as amended to legalize proselytizing--in 
principle bringing the legislation in line with the European Convention 
on Human Rights--went into effect in June. However, the law on religion 
explicitly forbids ``abusive proselytizing.'' Abusive is defined as 
``an attempt to influence someone's religious faith through violence or 
abuse of authority.'' Although some Protestant groups were concerned 
that the previous prohibition on proselytizing could inhibit their 
activities, the Government has not taken legal action against 
individuals for proselytizing.
    Although Eastern Orthodoxy is not designated in the law on religion 
as the official religion, it continued to be a strong religious force 
and exerted significant influence. In 1992 a number of priests broke 
away from the Moldovan Orthodox Church, which is subordinate to the 
Moscow Patriarchate, in order to form the Bessarabian Orthodox Church. 
The Bessarabian Orthodox Church, which sees itself as the legal and 
canonical successor to the pre-World War II Romanian Orthodox Church in 
Bessarabia (the part of Moldova between the Dniester and Prut Rivers), 
subordinated itself to the Bucharest Patriarchate of the Romanian 
Orthodox Church. The Government consistently has refused to register 
the Bessarabian Church, citing unresolved property claims and stating 
that the Bessarabian Church is a ``schismatic movement.'' The issue has 
political overtones, since it raises the question whether the Orthodox 
Church should be united and oriented toward Moscow or divided with a 
branch oriented toward Bucharest. In 1997 the Supreme Court overturned 
an appeals court decision affirming the right of the Bessarabian Church 
to be registered. However, the Supreme Court's decision was based on a 
procedural issue, rather than on the merits of the case. The 
Bessarabian Church appealed the case to the European Court in 1998. In 
March a Council of Europe Monitoring Committee Report noted that the 
nonregistration of the Church was one of the Government's failures in 
honoring its commitments to the Council. Then-Prime Minister Sturza 
announced in September that it had been a mistake not to register the 
Bessarabian Church, and that his Government was ready to reconsider the 
issue.
    In May a group of about 500 Orthodox Christians led by 4 to 6 
priests attacked a small group of Baptists in the village of Mingir, 
injuring 3 persons, and partially destroying a Baptist church that was 
under construction. The Baptists claimed that the village mayor was the 
leader of the group and was involved personally in the injuries and 
destruction, a charge the mayor denied. Someone in the crowd threw 
stones and hit a Baptist member who tried to photograph the incident. 
The Government is investigating the case, but there were no 
developments at year's end. A spokesman for the Orthodox Church 
reportedly expressed regret for the act of violence but blamed it on 
``abusive proselytizing by the Baptist Church.'' The Baptists also 
claimed that they had been denied construction permits wrongfully in 
some villages (also see Section 5).
    In January 1998, authorities in Transnistria cancelled the 
registration of Jehovah's Witnesses. Repeated attempts by Jehovah's 
Witnesses to reregister have been denied or delayed. Transnistrian 
officials burned a number of shipments of religious tracts based on the 
fact that the group was not registered properly. According to local 
leaders of Jehovah's Witnesses, several members were questioned by 
local state security officers but always have been released within 1 
hour.
    The Church of the Living God has been denied registration in five 
towns in Transnistria. Baptist leaders have complained that they are 
not allowed to distribute religious literature or organize public 
meetings in Transnistria.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel 
within the country, and there are no closed areas. Citizens generally 
are able to travel freely; however, there are some restrictions on 
emigration. Close relatives with a claim to support from the applicant 
must give their concurrence. The Government also may deny permission to 
emigrate if the applicant had access to state secrets. However, such 
cases are very rare, and none were reported during the year.
    Travel between Transnistria and the rest of the country is not 
prevented. There are regularly scheduled buses and trains. However, the 
separatist authorities often stop and search incoming and outgoing 
vehicles. The Moldovan Government in May established fixed and mobile 
``fiscal posts'' to control smuggling of untaxed goods from 
Transnistria.
    Moldova is not a party to the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government 
has no processing procedures for potential refugees resident in the 
country. The issue of providing first asylum has never arisen formally. 
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared prosecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have voted in multiparty presidential and parliamentary 
elections since December 1996. International observers considered the 
elections to be free and fair, but Transnistrian authorities have 
interfered with citizens' ability to vote in all these elections. These 
elections represent further progress in the transition to a democracy.
    The Constitution adopted in 1994 provides for the division of power 
among the popularly elected President, the Cabinet, the Parliament, and 
the judiciary. The President, as Head of State, in consultation with 
the Parliament, appoints the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, who 
functions as the head of government. However, a minister can be 
dismissed only with the assent of the Prime Minister. Some observers 
believe that the Constitution does not define adequately how executive 
powers are to be shared between the President and the Prime Minister. 
The President called a May referendum to create a stronger presidency. 
Based on a positive response, the President proposed an initiative to 
revise portions of the Constitution in August, and it was under public 
discussion. The proposal would create a ``presidential republic'' with 
more power in the hands of the chief executive. Two groups of 
parliamentarians presented alternative constitutional amendments to 
create a ``parliamentary republic.'' This controversial issue was part 
of the November government crisis.
    The Constitution states that citizens are free to form parties and 
other social-political organizations. However, a controversial article 
states that those organizations that are ``engaged in fighting against 
political pluralism,'' the ``principles of the rule of law,'' or ``the 
sovereignty and independence or territorial integrity'' of the country 
are ``unconstitutional.'' Small parties that favor unification with 
neighboring Romania have charged that this provision is intended to 
impede their political activities.
    A new law on administrative and territorial reform went into effect 
in January and reduced the number of administrative districts from 42 
to 12. These new districts included the municipality of Chisinau, the 
Gagauz autonomous region, and the Transnistrian region. Citizens voted 
for mayors and newly created district and municipal councils in May 
elections.
    Twenty-three parties and a number of independent candidates 
participated in the campaign (see Section 2.b.). Although the parties 
in Parliament won most of the posts, a leftist party, not in 
Parliament, gained several positions in the north, and independents 
were elected throughout the country. Transnistrian authorities did not 
allow citizens to vote in their region. The Gagauz did not participate 
in the May elections but held separate elections in September for 
governor (bashkan) and 35 deputies to its popular assembly. Besides 
electing a new governor, the Gagauz region also elected 26 newcomers to 
the popular assembly.
    In 1991 separatist elements, assisted by uniformed Russian military 
forces in the area and led by supporters of the 1991 coup attempt in 
Moscow, declared a ``Dniester Republic'' in the area of the country 
that is located between the Dniester River and Ukraine. Fighting flared 
briefly in 1992 but ended after Russian forces intervened, and a truce 
has held since. Russian, Ukrainian, and OSCE mediators have attempted 
to encourage the two sides to reach a settlement that preserves 
Moldovan sovereignty and independence while granting a measure of 
autonomy to Transnistria. In 1997 the Transnistrian authorities signed 
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government that encompasses 
these objectives. However, since then further negotiations have been 
inconclusive, and there was no significant progress towards a 
settlement by year's end.
    There are no restrictions in law or practice on the participation 
of women or minorities in political life. However, women generally are 
underrepresented in leading positions both in government and political 
parties. Women hold only 8 of 101 parliamentary seats. All female 
parliamentarians formed a ``club'' in September to unite efforts to 
improve the social condition of women and children. The Association of 
Moldovan Women, a social-political organization, competed in the 1998 
parliamentary elections but was unable to gain parliamentary 
representation. Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Gagauz minorities 
are represented in Parliament, with deputies elected from nationwide 
party lists rather than local districts. Debate takes place in either 
the Romanian/Moldovan or Russian language, with translation provided.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several local human rights groups exist. The local Helsinki Watch 
Organization maintains contacts with international human rights 
organizations, as does the Helsinki Citizens Assembly. Human rights 
groups operate without government interference.
    Citizens may appeal to the European Court in Strasbourg if they 
believe that their rights have been violated or that Moldovan laws are 
not in accordance with the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, most citizens are 
unaware of the convention and their rights to legal remedies in 
general.
    Parliament passed the Law on Parliamentary Advocates in October 
1997, which created three positions of parliamentary advocates 
(ombudsmen) and established an independent center for human rights. 
Parliament appointed the three advocates, with equal rights and 
responsibilities, in February 1998 for a 5-year term. Parliamentary 
advocates are empowered to examine claims of human rights violations, 
advise Parliament on human rights issues, and have the right to appeal 
to the Constitutional Court for review of legislation. The advocates 
oversee the operation of the center, which opened in April 1998 with 
the support of the U.N. Development Program. Of the approximately 1,000 
complaints handled by the center in its first year, the majority 
involved economic issues or were otherwise outside the competency of 
the center.
    The Government has supported the work of the OSCE, which has had a 
mission in the country since 1993 to assist in efforts to bring about a 
resolution of the separatist conflict. The OSCE participates in the 
Joint Control Commission--composed of Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, and 
Transnistrian members--which reviews violations of the cease-fire 
agreement. The mission generally enjoys access to the ``security zone'' 
along the river dividing the separatist-controlled territory from the 
rest of the country.
    The Government has cooperated with the ICRC in the past, permitting 
visits to prisoners from the 1992 conflict (since released). The 
Transnistrian separatist authorities previously have not allowed the 
ICRC access to the four members of the original ``Ilascu Group'' who 
have remained in prison since 1993. Transnistrian authorities in August 
agreed in principle to allow the ICRC to visit the Ilascu Group, though 
details of the visit had not been finalized at year's end. The OSCE 
visited one of the prisoners in July (see Section 1.e.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that persons are equal before the law 
regardless of race, sex, disability, religion, or social origin. There 
are remedies for violations, such as orders for redress of grievances, 
but these are not always enforced.
    Women.--Spousal violence is known to occur, although there are no 
reliable statistics on the problem. A prominent women's rights advocate 
asserts that one-half of women are victims of domestic violence. The 
Government supports educational efforts, usually undertaken with 
foreign assistance, to increase public awareness of this problem and to 
train public officials and law enforcement officials in how to address 
domestic violence. Women abused by their husbands have the right to 
press charges; husbands convicted of such abuse may receive prison 
sentences (typically up to 6 months). The First Lady and the mayor of 
Chisinau initiated a project in October to open a women's shelter in 
Chisinau. The city donated a former kindergarten to a private 
organization to operate the shelter, and a member of Parliament was 
named as executive director of the organization. A private organization 
operates a confidential service to provide support to abused spouses, 
including a hot line for battered women. According to knowledgeable 
sources, women generally do not appeal to police or the courts for 
protection against abusive spouses because they are embarrassed to do 
so and are not convinced that the authorities would react positively, 
as the police generally do not consider spousal abuse a serious crime. 
Through September the Ministry of Internal Affairs recorded 150 cases 
of rape or attempted rape, a slight decrease from the same period in 
1998. Women's groups believe that the numbers of rapes and incidents of 
spousal abuse are underreported.
    Trafficking in women is a very serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
    The law provides that women shall be equal to men. However, 
according to statistics, women have been affected disproportionately by 
growing unemployment. By law women are paid the same as men for the 
same work, although they still are victimized by societal 
discrimination. There are a significant number of female managers in 
the public sector and in banking. The president of the country's 
largest bank is a woman.
    Children.--There is extensive legislation designed to protect 
children, including extended paid maternity leave and government 
supplementary payments for families with many children. Ten years of 
basic education are compulsory, followed by either technical school or 
further study leading to higher education. The health system devotes 
extensive resources to child care. Although child abuse does occur 
occasionally, no special problems came to light during the year. There 
are no statistics on child abuse. Child support programs suffered from 
inadequate funding.
    Homeless children live in the streets of Chisinau and other large 
urban areas, although current reliable information on the number is not 
available. Estimates were as high as 1,000 in 1998. Trafficking in 
girls is a very serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--There is no legal discrimination against 
persons with disabilities. However, there are no laws providing for 
access to buildings, and there are few government resources devoted to 
training persons with disabilities. The Government does provide tax 
advantages to charitable groups that assist the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Tension between Eastern Orthodox supporters 
and Protestant groups continued. In May a group of about 500 Orthodox 
Christians and from 4 to 6 priests attacked a small group of Baptists 
in the village of Mingir, injuring 3 persons and partially destroying a 
Baptist church that was under construction. The Baptists allege that 
the same priests were instigators of a number of other conflicts in the 
region (also see Section 2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population is about 4.3 
million, of which 65 percent are ethnic Moldovans. Ukrainians (14 
percent) and Russians (13 percent) are the two largest minorities. A 
Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, lives primarily in the southern 
regions of the country. The Gagauz are largely Russian-speaking and 
represent about 3.5 percent of the population. Official statistics put 
the Roma population at 11,600, although estimates from the OSCE and 
Roma nongovernmental organizations range from 50,000 to 200,000.
    The 1990 citizenship law offered an equal opportunity to all 
persons residing in the country at the time of independence to adopt 
Moldovan citizenship. The OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights described the law as very liberal. The law permits dual 
citizenship on the basis of a bilateral agreement, but no such 
agreements are in effect.
    Implementation of language testing by 1994, which was called for in 
the 1989 language law, has not yet begun. According to the law, a 
citizen should be able to choose which language to use in dealing with 
government officials or commercial entities. Officials are obligated to 
know Russian and Romanian/Moldovan ``to the degree necessary to fulfill 
their professional obligations.'' Since many Russian speakers do not 
speak Romanian/Moldovan (while educated Moldovans speak both 
languages), they argued for a delay in the implementation of the law in 
order to permit more time to learn the language. Parliament has 
postponed implementation indefinitely. Addressing a minority concern, 
the Constitution provides parents with the right to choose the language 
of instruction for their children.
    In October the Parliament approved the Government's decision to 
grant ``district'' status to Taraclia, a region in the south with a 64 
percent ethnic Bulgarian majority. The vote reversed the results of the 
territorial-administrative reform begun in January, which had 
eliminated Taraclia's district status and subsumed it under a region 
where Bulgarians would no longer constitute a majority. Voters in the 
Taraclia district approved a referendum in January not to be included 
in the larger district, with 88 percent of eligible voters 
participating and 92 percent voting in favor of the referendum.
    However, in the separatist Transnistrian region discrimination 
against Romanian/Moldovan speakers continued. State schools are 
required to use the Cyrillic alphabet when teaching Romanian. Many 
teachers, parents, and students objected to the use of the Cyrillic 
script to teach Romanian. They believe that it disadvantages pupils who 
wish to pursue higher education opportunities in the rest of the 
country or Romania. (Cyrillic script was used to write the Romanian 
language in Moldova until 1989, since ``Moldovan,'' as it was then 
called, was decreed officially during the Soviet era to be a different 
language from Romanian, which is written in the Latin alphabet. The 
1989 language law reinstituted the use of the Latin script.) As a 
result of an agreement between the Government and the separatist 
authorities, eight schools in the separatist region obtained permission 
in 1996 to use the Latin alphabet, with salaries and textbooks to be 
supplied by the Moldovan Ministry of Education. These schools are 
considered private schools by the local authorities. They must pay rent 
for their facilities and meet local curriculum requirements, building 
codes, and safety standards. The Government has no budgetary provisions 
for the high rents asked for these facilities. As a result, classes 
were held in local homes or run in shifts in the few available 
buildings.
    After delaying its opening and threatening to keep it closed, the 
separatist authorities allowed the Romanian Language School (Latin 
alphabet) in Tiraspol to open in September without restriction from the 
authorities. The school is running three to four shifts per day to 
accommodate the number of students.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1990 Soviet law on trade unions 
enacted by Moldova's then-Supreme Soviet remains in effect and provides 
for independent trade unions. Laws passed in 1989 and 1991, which give 
citizens the right to form all kinds of social organizations, also 
provide a legal basis for the formation of independent unions. The 1994 
Constitution states that any employee may found a union or join a union 
that defends workers' interests. However, there have been no known 
successful attempts to establish alternate trade union structures 
independent of the successor to the previous official organizations 
that were part of the Soviet trade union system.
    The successor organization is the General Federation of Trade 
Unions (GFTU). The GFTU's continuing role in managing the state 
insurance system and its retention of former official union 
headquarters and vacation facilities provide an inherent advantage over 
any newcomers who might wish to form a union. However, its industrial 
or branch unions are becoming more independent entities; they maintain 
that their membership in the GFTU is voluntary and that they can 
withdraw if they wish. Virtually all employed adults are members of a 
union.
    Government workers do not have the right to strike, nor do those in 
essential services such as health care and energy. Other unions may 
strike if two-thirds of the members vote for a strike in a secret 
ballot. There were several labor actions for payment of wage arrears, 
including a number of strikes by teachers, health care workers, and 
spouses of police officers in various parts of the country. In June 
violent clashes occurred between members of the GFTU protesting wage 
arrears and police officers in Chisinau, resulting in the arrest of 13 
protesters, including 2 who were hospitalized (see Section 1.c.). The 
government avoided more serious strikes when it pledged regular 
payments of salaries and pensions after a July meeting with the GFTU. 
The Government made some salary and pension payments but was unable to 
eliminate all arrears by year's end.
    Unions may affiliate and maintain contacts with international 
organizations. The GFTU became a member of the International 
Confederation of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law, which 
is based on former Soviet legislation, provides for collective 
bargaining rights. However, wages are set through a tripartite 
negotiation process involving government, management, and unions. The 
three parties meet and negotiate national minimum wages for all 
categories of workers. Then, each branch union representing a 
particular industry negotiates with management and the government 
ministries responsible for that industry. They may set wages higher 
than the minimum set on the national level and often do, especially if 
the industry in question is more profitable than average. Finally, on 
the enterprise level, union and management representatives negotiate 
directly on wages. Again, they may set wages higher than negotiators on 
the industry level.
    There were no reports of actions taken against union members for 
union activities. The 1990 Soviet law on trade unions provides that 
union leaders may not be fired from their jobs while in leadership 
positions or for a period after they leave those positions. There were 
no reports of such firings this year.
    There are not export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced and compulsory labor, and it generally is not known to 
occur; however, trafficking in women is a very serious problem (see 
Section 6.f.). The Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded 
labor by children, and there were no reports that it occurred, except 
for instances of trafficking in girls (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for unrestricted employment is 18 years. 
Employment of those between the ages of 16 and 18 is permitted under 
special conditions, including shorter workdays, no night shifts, and 
longer vacations. The Ministry of Labor, Social Protection, and the 
Family is primarily responsible for enforcing these restrictions and 
the Ministry of Health also has a role. Child labor is not used in 
industry, although children living in rural areas often assist in the 
agricultural sector. Ten years of education are compulsory. The 
Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, 
and there were no reports that it occurred, except in instances of 
trafficking in girls (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legal minimum monthly 
wage of $1.64 (18 Moldovan lei), but this is used primarily as a basis 
for calculating pensions, scholarships, and fines. The average monthly 
wage of approximately $27 (300 Moldovan lei) does not provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. The lowest wages are in the 
agricultural sector, where the monthly average is approximately $11 
(120 Moldovan lei). Due to severe budgetary constraints, the Government 
and enterprises often do not meet payrolls for employees. The 
Constitution sets the maximum workweek at 40 hours, and the Labor Code 
provides for at least 1 day off per week.
    The State is required to set and check safety standards in the 
workplace. The unions within the GFTU also have inspection personnel 
who have a right to stop work in the factory or fine the enterprise if 
safety standards are not met. Further, workers have the right to refuse 
to work, but they may continue to draw their salaries if working 
conditions represent a serious threat to their health. However, in 
practice the depressed economic situation has led enterprises to 
economize on safety equipment and generally to show less concern for 
worker safety issues. Workers often do not know their rights in this 
area.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although no statistics are available, 
trafficking in women and girls is a very serious problem, especially to 
Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Israel. Moldova is a source country for 
women and girls. Women and girls reportedly are trafficked to Italy and 
Greece through Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, and Albania. There is no law 
prohibiting trafficking and it cannot be prosecuted under other 
statutes. The Government lacks legislation and the means to halt 
traffickers, who technically commit no crimes within the country. The 
large profits of the trafficking industry allow traffickers to exploit 
opportunities for the corruption of officials.
    Women and girls accept job offers in other countries, ostensibly as 
dancers, models, nannies, or housekeepers. Then traffickers take their 
passports, require them to ``repay'' a sizeable sum, and force them 
into sexual bondage.
    The Ministry of Internal Affairs announced in December that is had 
uncovered a network trafficking children between Moldova and 
Uzbekistan. According to the Ministry, 18 children, most of them under 
1 year of age, were sold in Tashkent during 1998 and 1999 and the 
average price for the children was between $2,000 and $3,000. The 
Ministry of National Security stopped a similar ring that was 
trafficking children between Moldova and Israel in 1995. Apart from a 
documentary shown on state television on the problem, the Government 
has taken few steps to prevent the trafficking of women. Several 
nongovernmental organizations made efforts, with foreign assistance, to 
combat the problem through information campaigns and job training for 
women. A local NGO has started a project to create a program in public 
schools that would educate young women about the dangers of 
prostitution and to establish a hot line for those in need of advice. 
The NGO also is organizing seminars to train law enforcement officials, 
social workers, and journalists on how to handle the problem of 
trafficking.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 MONACO

    Monaco is a constitutional monarchy in which the sovereign Prince 
plays a leading role in governing the country. The Prince appoints the 
four-member Government, headed by a Minister of State chosen by the 
Prince from a list of candidates proposed by France. The other three 
members are Counselors for the Interior (who is usually French), for 
Public Works and Social Affairs, and for Finance and the Economy. Each 
is responsible to the Prince. Legislative power is shared between the 
Prince and the popularly elected 18-member National Council. There are 
in addition three consultative bodies, whose members are appointed by 
the Prince: The 7-member Crown Council; the 12-member Council of State; 
and the 30-member Economic Council, which includes representatives of 
employers and trade unions.
    In addition to the national police force, the ``Carabiniers du 
Prince'' carry out security functions. Government officials control 
both forces.
    The principal economic activities are services and banking, light 
manufacturing, and tourism.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. The Constitution distinguishes 
between those rights that are provided for all residents and those that 
apply only to the approximately 5,000 residents who hold Monegasque 
nationality. The latter enjoy free education, financial assistance in 
case of unemployment or illness, and the right to vote and hold 
elective office. Women traditionally have played a less active role 
than men in public life, but this is changing; women currently hold 
both elective and appointive offices.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them. Prison conditions meet or 
exceed minimum international standards, and the Government permits 
visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution bars 
arbitrary arrest. Arrest warrants are required, except when a suspect 
is arrested while committing an offense. The police must bring 
detainees before a judge within 24 hours to be informed of the charges 
against them and of their rights under the law. Most detainees are 
released without bail, but the investigating magistrate may order 
detention on grounds that the suspect might either flee or interfere 
with the investigation of the case. The magistrate may extend the 
initial 2-month detention for additional 2-month periods indefinitely. 
The magistrate may permit family members to see detainees.
    The Government does not exile its own nationals forcibly. However, 
sometimes it expels non-Monegasque nationals who are in violation of 
residency laws or who have committed minor offenses, such as disorderly 
conduct.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the 1962 Constitution, the 
Prince delegated his judicial powers to an independent judiciary. The 
law provides for a fair, public trial, and the authorities respect 
these provisions. The defendant has the right to be present and the 
right to counsel, at public expense if necessary. As under French law, 
a three-judge tribunal considers the evidence collected by the 
investigating magistrate and hears the arguments made by the 
prosecuting and defense attorneys. The defendant enjoys a presumption 
of innocence and the right of appeal.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the individual's right 
of privacy in personal and family life, at home, and in correspondence, 
and the Government respects these rights in practice.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of expression is provided 
for by the Constitution, and the authorities respect this right in 
practice. However, the Monegasque Penal Code prohibits public 
denunciations of the ruling family, a provision that the media respect 
in practice. Several periodicals are published. Foreign newspapers and 
magazines circulate freely, including French journals that specifically 
cover news in the Principality. Foreign radio and television are 
received without restriction. Stations that broadcast from the 
Principality operate in accordance with French and Italian regulations.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides citizens with the rights of peaceful assembly and association. 
Outdoor meetings require police authorization, which is not withheld 
for political or arbitrary reasons. Formal associations must be 
registered and authorized by the government.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Roman Catholicism is the state religion. 
The law provides for the free practice of all religions, and the 
Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Residents move freely within the country 
and across its open borders with France. Monegasque nationals enjoy the 
rights of emigration and repatriation. They can be deprived of their 
nationality only for specified acts, including naturalization in a 
foreign state. Only the Prince can grant or restore Monegasque 
nationality, but he is obliged by the Constitution to consult the Crown 
Council on each case before deciding.
    The government implements the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In light of its bilateral 
arrangements with France, the government does not grant political 
asylum or refugee status unless the request also meets French criteria 
for such cases. The number of cases is very small. There were no 
reports of forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to refugee 
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government.
    Authority to change the government and to initiate laws rests with 
the Prince. The 1962 Constitution cannot be suspended, but it can be 
revised by common agreement between the Prince and the elected National 
Council. The Prince plays an active role in government. He names the 
Minister of State (in effect, the Prime Minister) from a list of names 
proposed by the French government. He names as well the three 
Counselors of Government (of whom the one responsible for the interior 
is usually a French national). Together the four constitute the 
government. Each is responsible to the Prince.
    Only the Prince may initiate legislation, but the 18-member 
National Council may propose legislation to the government. All 
legislation and the adoption of the budget require the Council's 
assent. Elections for National Council members, which are held every 5 
years, are based on universal adult suffrage and secret balloting. Both 
political parties currently are represented on the Council. There is 
one independent member.
    The Constitution provides for three consultative bodies. The seven-
member Crown Council (composed exclusively of Monegasque nationals) 
must be consulted by the Prince on certain questions of national 
importance. He may choose to consult it on other matters as well. The 
12-member Council of State advises the Prince on proposed legislation 
and regulations. The 30-member Economic Council advises the government 
on social, financial, and economic questions. One-third of its members 
come from the trade union movement, and one-third from the employers' 
federation.
    Women are active in public service. The Mayor of Monaco, one member 
of the Crown Council, four members of the National Council, and four 
members of the Economic Council are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    While the Government imposes no impediments to the establishment or 
operation of local groups devoted to monitoring human rights, no such 
groups have been formed. Outside groups have not sought to investigate 
human rights conditions.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides that all Monegasque nationals are equal 
before the law. It differentiates between rights that are accorded 
nationals (including preference in employment, free education, and 
assistance to the ill or unemployed) and those accorded all residents 
(e.g., freedom of religion and inviolability of the home).
    Women.--Reported instances of violence against women are rare. 
Marital violence is strictly prohibited, and any woman who is a victim 
may bring criminal charges against her husband. Women are fairly well 
represented in the professions; they are less well represented in 
business. The law governing transmission of citizenship provides for 
equality of treatment between men and women who are Monegasque by 
birth. However, women who acquire Monegasque citizenship by 
naturalization cannot transmit it to their children, whereas 
naturalized male citizens can.
    Children.--The government is fully committed to the protection of 
children's rights and welfare and has well-funded public education and 
health care programs. There is no societal pattern of abuse of 
children.
    People with Disabilities.--The government mandated that public 
buildings provide access for the disabled, and this has been largely 
accomplished.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers are free to form unions, but 
fewer than 10 percent of workers are unionized, and relatively few of 
these reside in the Principality. Unions are independent of both the 
government and the Monegasque political parties. The Monegasque 
Confederation of Unions is not affiliated with any larger labor 
organization but is free to join international bodies.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike in conformity 
with relevant legislation. However, government workers may not strike. 
Strikes are rare. The first strike in several years occurred in 1996, 
when the Monegasque Confederation of Unions organized a 1-day work 
stoppage by bank, transportation, and factory employees.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the free exercise of union activity. Agreements on working 
conditions are negotiated between organizations representing employers 
in a given sector of the economy and the respective union. Antiunion 
discrimination is prohibited. Union representatives can be fired only 
with the agreement of a commission that includes two members from the 
employers' association and two from the labor movement. Allegations 
that an employee was fired for union activity may be brought before the 
Labor Court, which can order redress, such as the payment of damages 
with interest.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Such practices, 
involving either adults or children, are prohibited by the 
Constitution, and they are not known to occur among adults or children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years; those 
employing children under that age can be punished under criminal law. 
Special restrictions apply to the hiring, work times, and other 
conditions of workers 16 to 18 years old. The Constitution prohibits 
forced and bonded child labor, and the government enforces this 
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for full-
time work is the French minimum wage plus 5 percent, i.e., currently 
approximately $6.90 (42.76 French francs) per hour. The 5 percent 
adjustment is intended to compensate for the travel costs of the three-
quarters of the workforce who commute daily from France into the 
Principality. The minimum wage is adequate to provide a decent living 
for a worker and family. Most workers receive more than the minimum. 
The legal workweek is 39 hours. Health and safety standards are fixed 
by law and government decree. These standards are enforced by health 
and safety committees in the workplace and by the government Labor 
Inspector.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                            THE NETHERLANDS

    The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary 
legislative system. Executive authority is exercised by the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet representing the governing political parties 
(traditionally a coalition of at least two major parties). The 
bicameral Parliament is elected through free and fair elections. The 
judiciary is independent.
    Regional police forces are primarily responsible for maintaining 
internal security. The police, the royal constabulary, and 
investigative organizations concerned with internal and external 
security effectively are under civilian authority.
    The market-based economy is export oriented and features a mixture 
of industry, services, and agriculture. Key industries include 
chemicals, oil refining, natural gas, machinery, and electronics. The 
agricultural sector produces fruit, vegetables, flowers, meat, and 
dairy products. Living standards and the level of social benefits are 
high. Unemployment is 3-percent; however, long-term unemployment, 
particularly among ethnic minorities, remains a problem.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. Problems include violence and 
discrimination against women, child abuse, trafficking in women and 
children, and discrimination against minorities. The Government is 
taking steps to deal with all of these problems.
    Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, which are two autonomous 
regions of the kingdom, also feature parliamentary systems and full 
constitutional protection of human rights. In practice respect for 
human rights in these islands generally is little different from that 
in the European Netherlands. The two Caribbean Governments have taken 
measures to address past reports of police brutality, but the islands' 
prison conditions remain substandard.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them.
    Following a visit to the country, the Council of Europe's Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CPT) published a report in 1998 that noted that it did not 
find any torture and few incidents in which officials did not treat 
arrested or detained persons correctly. The CPT made a positive 
assessment of the facilities at most police stations and at detention, 
secure psychiatric, and asylum centers. However, in March the 
Government rejected the CPT's recommendation that detainees at one 
maximum security prison be allowed better access to medical and 
recreational facilities, since the prison houses serious offenders who 
previously have escaped.
    The Government took steps in the fall to facilitate the filing of 
complaints about police behavior, to create uniform complaint 
procedures, and to ensure that complaints are assessed by an 
independent committee.
    A government-funded police professionalization program, as well as 
the establishment of a grievance committee, have contributed 
significantly to countering incidents of police brutality in both the 
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. No new incidents were reported, nor 
have there been any allegations of torture.
    Prison conditions in the Netherlands meet minimum international 
standards, and the Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    In other reports, the CPT has urged the Governments of the 
Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba to improve the 
``inhuman'' conditions in Curacao's Koraal Specht prison and in cell 
blocks at the police stations on the islands of St. Maarten, Bonaire, 
and Aruba. The CPT's criticism focused on overcrowding, extremely poor 
sanitary conditions, poor food, and insufficient ventilation. The 
Committee also criticized widespread corruption and the mistreatment of 
prisoners by guards at Koraal Specht. The CPT's most recent report 
criticized the absence of any major improvement in conditions at the 
Koraal Specht prison.
    The Dutch Government repeatedly offered financial assistance to the 
Government of the Netherlands Antilles for the construction of a new 
juvenile wing, a maximum security facility, and other improvements at 
Koraal Specht. The Government also sent experts on prison organization 
and the training of guards. While acknowledging that more work needs to 
be done, Koraal Specht prison officials point to progress in improving 
conditions (prisoners now have mattresses, hygiene and food have 
improved, and construction has begun on a small new wing to relieve 
overcrowding). At the request of the Antillean Government, the CPT 
again visited Koraal Specht in January. In March it issued another 
critical report, which called for early improvements. On March 19, the 
Dutch Government concluded an agreement with the Antillean Government 
on the prison complex's renovation within 3 years. In September the 
Antillean Government contracted for the construction of a new facility 
at the prison complex that is expected to be ready by July 2000. The 
Dutch Government is prepared to contribute financially to the prison's 
renovation.
    The Governments of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba allow access 
by nongovernmental organizations to prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this 
prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code. A pyramidal 
system of cantonal, district, and appellate courts handles both 
criminal and civil cases. The Supreme Court acts as the highest 
appellate court and ensures the uniform interpretation of the law. In 
criminal trials, the law provides for a presumption of innocence and 
the right to public trial, to counsel (virtually free for low income 
persons), and to appeal. The law provides for the right to a fair 
trial, and the independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. State 
subsidies are provided to religious organizations that maintain 
educational facilities.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the 
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were no reports 
of the forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to refugee 
status. The Government does not provide first asylum as such, but most 
asylum seekers (88 percent in 1998), except those who obviously came 
from a ``safe country of origin'' or stayed for some time in a ``safe 
third country,'' are permitted to apply for resident status. Some of 
those (about 19 percent in 1998) whose applications eventually are 
denied nonetheless are permitted to stay temporarily on humanitarian 
grounds or as long as their country of origin is considered unsafe.
    The focus of the Government's asylum policy is to protect genuine 
refugees while excluding economic refugees and illegal immigrants. In 
the early 1990's, the government adopted several measures to curb the 
relatively high influx of asylum seekers. This policy initially 
resulted in the desired decrease, but as other countries adopted even 
stricter laws, the influx rose again to 45,217 in 1998, a 31 percent 
increase over 1997. A new series of harsher rules adopted in 1998 aims 
to discourage economic refugees at all stages of the asylum process, by 
means of a stricter intake, accelerated processing of asylum requests, 
limited appeal procedures, and a denial of social assistance to asylum 
seekers who are screened out.
    The Justice Ministry estimates on the basis of interviews with 
applicants that two-thirds of asylum seekers came to the country 
through alien smuggling organizations.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    No restrictions in law or in practice hinder the participation of 
women and minorities in government and politics. Women are nevertheless 
underrepresented in politics: A total of 54 of the 150 members of the 
second chamber of Parliament are women, as are 4 of the 15 cabinet 
ministers. However, the two Deputy Prime Ministers are women. The 
Government pursues an active policy to promote the participation of 
women in politics and public administration.
    Although a minority, women also hold positions in the parliaments 
and cabinets of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Human rights groups operate without government restriction, 
investigating and publishing their findings. Government officials are 
very cooperative and responsive to their views.
    In view of its longstanding tradition of hosting international 
legal tribunals, the Government facilitated the trial of two Libyans 
accused of the bombing of PanAm flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which 
killed 270 persons. By agreement among the parties, the Government 
provided Camp Zeist to the United Kingdom as an extraterritorial venue 
for the trial, which began in April and is being conducted under 
Scottish law.
    The Netherlands also hosts the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia and the headquarters for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution bans discrimination on the basis of any of these 
factors or on sexual orientation or political preference. The 
Government generally is effective in enforcing these provisions. Under 
the Equal Treatment Act, complainants may take offenders to court under 
civil law.
    Women.--A 1998 study reported that about 211,000 women are victims 
of violence by their former and present partners each year; about 
50,000 of these are subjected to severe violence. In addition to the 
personal suffering, this form of violence against women costs society 
about $175 million (332 million guilders) per year in hospitalization 
and absence from work.
    The Government supports programs to reduce and prevent violence 
against women. Battered women find refuge in a network of 48 
government-subsidized women's shelters offering the services of social 
workers and psychologists. In addition battered women who leave their 
domestic partners become eligible for social benefits, which include an 
adequate basic subsidy as well as an allowance for dependent children. 
Nongovernmental organizations also advise and assist women who are 
victims of sexual assault. Since 1991 marital rape has been a crime and 
carries the same penalty as nonmarital rape. Spousal abuse carries a 
one-third higher penalty than ordinary battery.
    In addition to helping victims of sexual abuse, the Government has 
pursued an active prevention campaign through commercials and awareness 
training of educators. A recent evaluation showed that, on average, 
two-thirds of the population was positively influenced by the campaign.
    Prostitution is legal, and since October the law no longer treats 
``organizing the prostitution of somebody else'' as a crime when done 
with the consent of the prostitute. However, any form of forced 
prostitution remains punishable. All brothels now require licenses 
issued by local governments with strict conditions to be observed by 
brothel owners. The Government's assumption is that by decriminalizing 
prostitution, licensing brothel operators, and improving working 
conditions and health care for prostitutes, while at the same time 
prohibiting the employment of minors and illegal immigrants, 
prostitution would be less susceptible to criminal organizations 
trafficking in women and children. An additional advantage is that the 
licensing system would make prostitution more transparent and easier 
for the police to monitor. Between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals are 
employed in prostitution. It is estimated that half of all prostitutes 
originate from non-European Union countries and are residing illegally 
in the country. Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced 
prostitution remains a problem, which the Government is giving priority 
to fighting (see Section 6.f.).
    The law requires employers to take measures to protect workers from 
sexual harassment; research shows that about 245,000 women, or 6.6 
percent of the female working population, are confronted with sexual 
intimidation in the work place each year. The Government funds an 
ongoing publicity campaign to increase awareness of the problem. As the 
largest employer, it has taken measures to counter harassment among 
civil servants, for example, in the police force.
    Women increasingly are entering the job market, but traditional 
cultural factors and inadequate day care facilities tend to discourage 
them--especially women with young children--from working. The 
participation of women in the labor market increased significantly in 
the last 25 years, from 34 percent of the working-age female population 
in the mid-1970's to 54 percent in 1999. This percentage is expected to 
rise further. However, about 42 percent of women hold part-time jobs. 
In 1998 the government established favorable conditions for part-time 
employment by adopting a law that prohibits employers from treating 
part-time workers differently from those in full-time jobs.
    Women often are underemployed and have less chance of promotion 
than their male colleagues. They often hold lower level positions than 
men, mostly because of their part-time status. According to the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the difference in earnings 
between men and women remains at 24 percent. Some women nevertheless 
are making steady progress by moving into professional and high-
visibility jobs.
    In 1988 the Government started affirmative action programs for 
women. Collective labor agreements usually include one or more 
provisions to strengthen the position of women. Legislation mandates 
equal pay for equal work, prohibits dismissal because of marriage, 
pregnancy, or motherhood, and provides the basis for equality in other 
employment-related areas. A legislatively mandated Equal Treatment 
Commission actively pursues complaints of discrimination in these areas 
as well as allegations of pay discrimination.
    The social welfare and national health systems provide considerable 
assistance to working women with families. Women are eligible for 16 
weeks of maternity leave with full pay. The Parental Leave Law that 
requires employers to allow new mothers and fathers to work 20 hours a 
week for up to 6 months was made more flexible in 1997. The new law 
allows parents to take (unpaid) full-time leave during 3 months and to 
extend the leave over a period longer than 6 months to care for 
children up to 8 years old. Persons working fewer than 20 hours per 
week also will be entitled to parental leave.
    Children.--The Government works to ensure the well-being of 
children through numerous well-funded health, education, and public 
information programs. The Council for the Protection of Children, 
operated through the Ministry of Justice, enforces child support 
orders, investigates cases of child abuse, and recommends remedies 
ranging from counseling to withdrawal of parental rights. In addition 
the Government has set up a popular hot line for children and a network 
of pediatricians who track suspected cases of child abuse on a 
confidential basis. There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    An estimated 50,000 children are victims of child abuse each year, 
although only approximately 15,000 formal reports of child abuse are 
registered. As a result of abuse, 40 children died in 1998. The U.N. 
Commission on Childrens' Rights recently questioned the Government 
about its performance in this area. In particular the United Nations 
questioned the long waiting list for assistance to abused children. 
Approximately 7,000 abused children are on the waiting list.
    International sex tourism involving the abuse of minor children is 
prosecutable. Since 1996 several Dutch citizens have been tried and 
convicted for the abuse of minors in other countries. The age of 
consent is 16. The prosecution of adults for sex with minors between 
the ages of 12 and 16 only occurs when a complaint is filed by an 
interested party. The new prostitution bill imposes heavier penalties 
on prostitution activities involving minors. The maximum sentence will 
be raised from 1 to 6 years.
    Trafficking in female African youths for the purpose of 
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    The maximum penalty for child pornography was raised in 1996 from 3 
months' to 4 years' imprisonment, 6 years in the event of financial 
gain, and the maximum fine was more than tripled. New legislation 
allows for provisional arrest, house searches, and criminal financial 
investigations. Moreover the authorities no longer must prove that a 
person possesses child pornography for the purpose of distribution or 
public display. The Supreme Court ruled that the mere possession of 
child pornography is sufficient cause for prosecution. For the first 
time, in 1998 a suspect was convicted and sentenced solely on this 
ground.
    The discovery of a major child pornography case in July resulted in 
stricter enforcement of antichild abuse legislation and the allocation 
of additional resources to enforcement efforts. It also underscored the 
absence of appropriate legislation to fight the dissemination of child 
pornography over the Internet. The Government believes that 
international cooperation is required to deal effectively with the 
latter problem but nevertheless began a national offensive against 
child pornography on the Internet. The police now are monitoring the 
Internet in a large, year-long pilot project, and four suspected 
pornographers were arrested in late 1998.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. Local governments increasingly mandate access to public 
buildings for the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--There were a number of complaints about 
anti-Semitism on Internet sites set up by Dutch citizens.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The integration of racial and 
ethnic minorities into the social and cultural mainstream remains a 
difficult problem.
    The Government pursues an active campaign aimed at increasing 
public awareness of racism and discrimination. The Constitution 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and nationality and 
allows those who claim that they have been discriminated against to 
take alleged offenders to court under civil law. In 1997 the 
prosecution norms for discrimination were tightened. Penalties were 
raised for discrimination by political parties, companies, and 
institutions, because organizational discrimination was considered more 
dangerous than discrimination by individuals. The police were required 
to report any complaint of discrimination meticulously. Any policeman 
guilty of discrimination now risks disciplinary measures as well as 
criminal legal proceedings. According to the latest statistics, in 
1997, 112 persons or organizations were tried on discrimination 
charges. These included 37 labor disputes, 20 cases of defamation, and 
11 consumer disputes.
    Racially motivated incidents ranged from racist pamphlets and 
painted slogans to bomb threats, harassment, physical abuse, and 
destruction of property. However, no officially recorded incidents of a 
life-threatening nature were directed against ethnic minorities. The 
National Bureau to Fight Racial Discrimination was founded in July. 
This Bureau is to collect nationwide statistics on incidents of 
discrimination. Local antidiscrimination bureaus previously collected 
such data, but their registration methods differed and the resulting 
data were incomplete. Due to startup problems, the National Bureau had 
not yet produced new data; however, incomplete data suggest a further 
increase in complaints. The Equal Opportunities Committee also reported 
an increase in complaints about discrimination. These increases were 
attributed to wider knowledge of the complaints process, as well as to 
changes in societal attitudes.
    Immigrant groups face some discrimination in housing and 
employment. These groups, concentrated in the larger cities, suffer 
from a high rate of unemployment. The Government has been working for 
several years with employers' groups and unions to reduce minority 
unemployment levels to the national average. As a result of these 
efforts, in recent years the rate of job creation among ethnic 
minorities was higher than among the general population. Unemployment 
among ethnic minorities nevertheless is still about three times as high 
as within the native population.
    The 1998 Act on the Stimulation of Labor Participation by Ethnic 
Minorities is intended to increase job opportunities for ethnic 
minorities. It requires employers with a work force of over 35 people 
to register their non-Dutch employees. Employers are to strive for a 
composition of their work force that reflects the regional working 
population. They must submit their annual social action plans, 
including recruitment targets, to the regional labor bureaus. The Labor 
Inspectorate oversees implementation of the law.
    The privately run Discrimination on the Internet Registration 
Center recorded 121 complaints in 1998 about discriminatory statements, 
racial discrimination, or anti-Semitism on the Internet. Most 
statements were removed voluntarily by the authors at the Center's 
request. In one case, the Center requested that criminal proceedings be 
initiated; such a request is still under review in 20 other cases. In 
July two rightwing extremists were convicted for incitement to hatred 
and discrimination on the Internet. This was the first time that 
discrimination on the Internet resulted in a conviction.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Membership in labor unions is open to 
all workers including armed forces personnel, the police, and civil 
service employees. Workers are entitled to form or join unions of their 
own choosing without prior government authorization, and unions are 
free to affiliate with national trade union federations. This right is 
exercised freely.
    Unions are free of control by the Government and political parties. 
Union members may and do participate in political activities.
    All workers have the right to strike, except for most civil 
servants who have other institutionalized means of protection and 
redress. Industrial relations are very harmonious, and strikes are 
infrequent. In 1998 some 33 labor days per 1,000 workers were lost, 
mostly over union demands for higher pay and a 36-hour workweek. There 
is no retribution against striking workers.
    About 28 percent of the work force is unionized, but union-
negotiated collective bargaining agreements are usually extended to 
cover about three-quarters of the work force. The white-collar unions' 
membership is the fastest growing.
    The four union federations are active internationally, without 
restriction.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively is recognized and well established. 
Discrimination against workers because of union membership is illegal 
and does not occur.
    Collective bargaining agreements are negotiated in the framework of 
the ``Social Partnership'' developed between trade unions and private 
employers. Representatives of the main union federations, employers' 
organizations, and the government meet each autumn to discuss labor 
issues, including wage levels and their relation to the state of the 
economy and to international competition. The discussions lead to a 
central accord with social as well as economic goals for the coming 
year. Under this umbrella agreement, unions and employers in various 
sectors negotiate sectoral agreements, which the government usually 
extends to all companies in the sector.
    Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. Union federations and 
employers' organizations are represented, along with independent 
experts, on the Social and Economic Council. The Council is the major 
advisory board for the government on policies and legislation regarding 
national and international social and economic matters.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by the 
Constitution and generally does not occur; however, trafficking in 
women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem 
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and 
this prohibition is enforced effectively (see Section 6.c.). The 
minimum age for employment is 16 years, and for full-time work it is 
conditioned on completion of the mandatory 10 years of schooling. Those 
still in school at the age of 16 may not work more than 8 hours per 
week. Persons under the age of 18 are prohibited by law from working at 
night, overtime, or in areas dangerous to their physical or mental 
well-being. Anyone working more than 4.5 hours per day is entitled to a 
30-minute break. The laws are effectively enforced by the tripartite 
Labor Commission, which monitors hiring practices and conducts 
inspections.
    The Government takes a leading role in the international campaign 
against child labor in developing countries. The main labor federation, 
together with the U.N. Children's Fund and several nongovernmental 
organizations, also started a campaign against the sale of products 
suspected of being made through child labor and for a ``trademark'' for 
clothing made without child labor.
    Holiday work and after-school jobs are tied to very strict rules, 
which are set in the work-time act, the Child Labor Regulation (for 
young people under 16 years), and the Working Conditions Decree. 
Observance of the rules is overseen by the Social Ministry's Labor 
Inspection office. Although child labor is banned, an increasing number 
of children work for pay during holidays. The parents of such children 
are to be reported officially by labor inspectors, and the Public 
Prosecutor may decide to prosecute the parents for violating the ban on 
child labor. In 1997 some 20 employers were cited for employing 
children under age 13 to do holiday work.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage for adults is 
established by law and can be adjusted every 6 months to changes in the 
cost-of-living index. Over the last few years, the statutory minimum 
wage has been pegged to the average wage in collective labor contracts. 
The gross minimum wage is about $1,172 (2,345 guilders) per month. For 
workers earning the minimum wage, employers currently pay $3,750 a year 
(6,000 guilders) in premiums for social security benefits, which 
includes medical insurance. Only 3 percent of workers earn the minimum 
wage because collective bargaining agreements, which normally are 
extended across a sector, usually set a minimum wage well above the 
legislated minimum. The Government, unions, and employers have taken 
measures to increase the number of minimum wage jobs and to decrease 
employers' social payments in order to lower the cost of hiring new 
workers and to create more jobs, especially for the long-term 
unemployed.
    A reduced minimum wage applies to young people under the age of 
23--one of the demographic groups with the highest rate of 
unemployment--intended to provide incentives for their employment. This 
wage ranges from 34.5 percent of the adult minimum wage for workers 16 
years of age to 85 percent for those 22 years of age. The legislated 
minimum wage and social benefits available to all minimum wage earners 
provide an adequate standard of living for workers and their families.
    Although the law establishes a 40-hour workweek, the average 
workweek for those with full-time jobs is 37.5 hours. This workweek is 
the result of agreements reached in collective bargaining on shorter 
workweeks, often in conjunction with more flexible working hours. This 
combination makes it possible to adapt shorter working hours to the 
specific situation in a particular business or branch of industry.
    Working conditions, including comprehensive occupational safety and 
health standards set by law and regulations, are monitored actively by 
the tripartite Labor Commission. Enforcement is effective. Workers may 
refuse to continue working at a hazardous work site. The Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs also monitors standards through its Labor 
Inspectorate.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The maximum sentence for trafficking in 
persons is 6 years. In cases involving minors, severe physical 
violence, or organized trafficking, the maximum sentence is 10 years. 
Article 250 of the Criminal Code prohibits trafficking in persons, 
which is defined as bringing another person into prostitution by means 
of force or another act of violence; or by abusing authority ensuing 
from an actual relationship, circumstance, or by misrepresentation; or 
by undertaking any action that the perpetrator knows, or could 
reasonably suspect, may bring another into prostitution.
    The country is a major destination for trafficked women. An 
estimated 20,000 persons per year are trafficked into the country, 
according to government officials. In July 44 persons were arrested in 
connection with a large trafficking network that used the Netherlands 
as a transit point between Italy and Scandinavia. In August four more 
persons were arrested in an unrelated case involving the trafficking of 
women from Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and Romania for prostitution in a 
border region; a number of other networks were dismantled in border 
regions during the first half of the year. Some 230 persons were 
arrested for trafficking in 1998, compared with 139 in 1997 and 89 in 
1996.
    The Government has an active policy to combat trafficking in 
persons. High-priority government measures include a more aggressive 
prosecution policy as well as closer international cooperation. A 
number of police forces have established special units to deal with the 
problem. The Government distinguishes between alien smuggling and 
trafficking in persons.
    According to the Justice Ministry, some 20,000 to 30,000 persons 
work in prostitution, about half of them from non-EU countries who are 
residing illegally in the country. The Dutch Foundation Against 
Trafficking in Women estimates that each year between 2,500 and 3,000 
women and girls are brought into the country for the purpose of 
prostitution, primarily from Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Far East.
    In 1998 a ruling was obtained under the Aliens Law to prevent 
illegal residents, who may have become victims of trafficking, from 
being expelled before investigations are completed. A victim is allowed 
time (3 months) to consider pressing charges. Victims who do so are 
allowed to stay in the country until the judicial process is completed. 
During this period, the victim receives legal, financial, and 
psychological assistance. In special circumstances, a residence permit 
is granted on humanitarian grounds. After completion of the judicial 
process, illegal prostitutes returning to their native countries are 
eligible for temporary financial assistance.
    African women make up a sizeable portion of the estimated 15,000 
foreign women working as prostitutes in the country. According to the 
authorities, the most widely used ploy for African women is the 
fraudulent use of special asylum procedures for minors, who are 
virtually ensured entry. Although most such women are not actually 
under age 18, all claim to be. In the absence of any identification, 
these claims at least initially are accepted. Once at the open-door 
asylum center, they settle down for a few days before disappearing only 
to turn up later as prostitutes in the country or elsewhere in Europe.
    Traffickers use tried and tested techniques on these African women, 
such as threatening their families back home and indebtedness (they 
begin at brothels owing their employers their purchase price of $20,000 
to $30,000). Recent reports that traffickers also exploit their 
traditional religious and spiritual beliefs and use ``Voodoo'' measures 
as a method of control are questioned by one academic study.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 NORWAY

    Norway is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy 
with King Harald V as the Head of State. It is governed by a prime 
minister, cabinet, and a 165-seat Storting (Parliament) that is elected 
every 4 years and cannot be dissolved. The judiciary is independent.
    The national police have primary responsibility for internal 
security, but in times of crisis, such as internal disorder or natural 
catastrophe, the police may call on the armed forces for assistance. In 
such circumstances, the armed forces are always under police authority. 
The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security 
forces.
    Norway is an advanced industrial state with a mixed economy 
combining private and public ownership that provides a high standard of 
living for residents. The key industries are oil and gas, metals, 
engineering, shipbuilding, fishing, and manufacturing (including fish 
processing equipment). The leading exports are oil and gas, 
manufactured goods, fish, and metals. During the year, 79 percent of 
workers were in the service sector (including public service), and 14 
percent were in the manufacturing sector.
    The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens, and 
the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with 
individual instances of abuse. Violence against women and abuse of 
children are problems.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    In January prosecutors dismissed the case against former Mossad 
agent Mike Harari for the killing of Moroccan citizen Achmed Bouchikhi 
at Lillehammer in July 1973. Under orders to kill suspected Palestine 
Liberation Organization agent Ali Hassan Salameh, Mike Harari and his 
Mossad group mistook Bouchikhi for Salameh and killed the wrong man. 
State Attorney Lasse Quigstad said that the case was dismissed due to 
lack of evidence.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were 
no reports that officials employed them.
    The practice of indefinite imprisonment (often in the form of 
solitary confinement) of suspects during the investigation of criminal 
cases has been criticized repeatedly, most recently in September, by 
the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture. 
Depending on the nature of the alleged crime, the police presently can 
hold suspects in solitary confinement even prior to charges being 
filed, subject to varying degrees of restrictions on communications and 
visits. In response to this criticism, the Ministry of Justice 
commissioned two working groups to study how to speed up the judicial 
process in order to avoid long-term solitary confinement. These groups 
are to report their recommendations by June 2000. In addition the 
Attorney General recently introduced new restrictions on the use of 
solitary confinement for pretrial detainees.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes 
this prohibition.
    European human rights organizations criticized the Government's use 
of indefinite solitary confinement for pretrial detainees (see Section 
1.c.). The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government observes 
this prohibition in practice.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The court system consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court 
Appellate Court (committee), superior courts, county courts for 
criminal cases, magistrate courts for civil cases, and claims courts. 
Special courts include the Impeachment Court (made up of 
parliamentarians), the Labor Court, Trusteeship Courts, Fishery Courts, 
and land ownership severance courts.
    All courts, which date to laws passed in the 11th century, meet 
internationally accepted standards for fair trials, including providing 
counsel to the indigent. The law provides for the right to a fair 
trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Both the Constitution and the law prohibit such 
practices, government authorities generally respect these prohibitions, 
and violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
    The state church is the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway, 
which is supported financially by the State, and to which 93 percent of 
the population nominally belong. The Constitution requires that the 
King and one-half of the Cabinet belong to this church. The 
relationship between the church and the State is increasingly debated 
by the public. The Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act 
permits prospective employers to ask applicants for employment in 
private or religious schools, or in day care centers, whether they 
respect Christian beliefs and principles.
    In July the Government suspended two priests in the Church of 
Norway and asked the courts for approval legally to terminate their 
priesthood due to insubordination and disloyalty. The priests openly 
had refused to accept religious and spiritual guidance from their 
bishop, with whom they were in disagreement on a number of social 
issues (such as gay rights). Some church and lay leaders questioned the 
state Church's decision to ask government prosecutors to pursue this 
case, rather than handle it less formally through ``church 
discipline.'' The Alta district court had not issued a ruling in this 
case by year's end.
    Other denominations operate freely. A religious community is 
required to register with the Government only if it desires state 
support, which is provided to all registered denominations on a 
proportional basis in accordance with membership. In 1995 the 
Parliament introduced the subject ``religious knowledge and education 
in ethics'' into the national school system. The class teaches the 
ethical values of Christianity, as well as Christian beliefs and the 
main features of Christianity. All children must attend this mandatory 
class; there are no exceptions for children of other faiths. 
Organizations for atheists as well as Moslem communities have contested 
the legality of forced religious teaching, but the Oslo city court 
twice has ruled against their arguments. The case was appealed to a 
higher court and is expected to ultimately go to the Supreme Court. 
Workers belonging to minority denominations are allowed leave for their 
religious holidays.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Government grants refugee or asylee status in 
accordance with the the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
    During the year, the Government granted asylum to 181 persons, 
temporary collective residency permits to 7,957 Kosovars, individual 
residency permits to 2,609 persons, and asylum as U.N. quota refugees 
to 1,480 persons. Immigration authorities rejected 3,300 asylum 
applications. In addition 1,542 persons received residency status 
through a family reunification program. In July the Government 
implemented a mandatory visa requirement for all Slovak citizens due to 
an influx of 130 Slovak Roma claiming refuge in the country; the 
authorities do not believe that the situation in Slovakia calls for 
such protection of the Roma. The Government lifted the mandatory visa 
requirement for a short period in November, before reimposing it in 
December.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of those having a 
valid claim to refugee status or of persons being forcibly returned to 
countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The law provides citizens with the right to change their Government 
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through 
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage.
    No restrictions in law or practice hinder the participation of 
women in government or in politics generally. A female Prime Minister 
served for 9 of 10 years between 1986 and 1996. The current Prime 
Minister appointed women to lead 9 of the 18 ministries. Women hold 60 
of the 165 seats in Parliament (36.4 percent), chair 4 of 12 standing 
committees in Parliament, and lead 3 of the 6 main political parties. A 
woman heads the Parliament.
    In addition to participating freely in the national political 
process in 1997, Norwegian Sami (formerly known as Lapps) elected their 
own constituent assembly, the Sameting, for the third time. Under the 
law establishing the 39-seat body, it is a consultative group which 
meets regularly to deal with ``all matters which in [its] opinion are 
of special importance to the Sami people.'' In practice the Sameting 
has been most interested in protecting the group's language and 
cultural rights and in influencing decisions on resources and lands 
where Sami are a majority.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive 
to their views.
    When the Government took office in 1997, the Prime Minister 
appointed a Minister of Development, Cooperation, and Human Rights. 
Based on previous human rights reports, in December the Government 
presented a White Paper/Action Plan to the Parliament on human rights 
in Norway and internationally. The White Paper identifies human rights 
violations both in Norway and abroad and proposes how the Government 
would work to improve its own human rights record as well as assist 
other countries in improving theirs. The report lists 16 areas for 
special attention domestically, including the practice of indefinite 
detention of suspects in criminal cases (often in solitary 
confinement). The White Paper presently is being processed by the 
Parliament, which is expected to revise and vote on it by June 2000. 
None of the measures in the plan would be implemented until after 
Parliamentary approval.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, disability, language, or social status, and the Government 
enforces this prohibition in practice.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. In 1997 there were 
approximately 30,000 contacts by telephone by women with crisis action 
centers and 4,360 overnight stays by women at shelters. The police 
believe that increases in reported rapes and domestic abuse in recent 
years have been largely due to greater willingness among women to 
report these crimes. The police vigorously investigate and prosecute 
such crimes. They also instituted special programs to prevent rape and 
domestic violence and to counsel victims. Public and private 
organizations run several shelters that give battered women an 
alternative to returning to a violent domestic situation.
    The rights of women are protected under the 1978 Equal Rights Law 
and other regulations. According to that law, ``women and men engaged 
in the same activity shall have equal wages for work of equal value.'' 
An Equal Rights Council monitors enforcement of the law, and an Equal 
Rights Ombudsman processes complaints of sexual discrimination. In 1997 
there were 101 written complaints and 485 telephone complaints to the 
gender equality Ombudsman. Women filed 50 percent of the complaints, 
men 18 percent, and organizations 32 percent.
    In 1995 the Parliament adopted a harassment amendment to the 
Working Environment Act, which states that ``employees shall not be 
subjected to harassment or other unseemly behavior.''
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of 
education and medical care. The Government provides education for 
children through the postsecondary level. There is no difference in the 
treatment of girls and boys in education or health care services. An 
independent Children's Ombudsman Office, within the Ministry of 
Children and Families, assures the protection of children in law and in 
practice.
    Due to abuse or neglect of various degrees, 23,500 children (2.1 
percent of children up to the age of 17) were assisted by welfare 
services in 1998. The level of assistance ranged from protective 
custody, extra financial help, or simply guidance and support for their 
parents.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. The law mandates access to buildings for people with 
disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice.
    Indigenous People.--Apart from a tiny Finnish population in the 
northeast, the indigenous Sami constituted the only significant 
minority group until the influx of immigrants during the 1970's. In 
recent years, the Government has taken steps to protect Sami cultural 
rights by providing Sami language instruction at schools in their 
areas, radio and television programs broadcast or subtitled in Sami, 
and subsidies for newspapers and books oriented toward the Sami. In a 
rare political statement in October at the opening of the third Sami 
Parliament, King Harald V publicly apologized to the Sami people for 
repression under Norwegian rule. In 1997 the Government created the 
position of Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Local Government and 
Regional Affairs to deal specifically with Sami issues. In 1997 the 
portfolio of Deputy Minister Johanne Gaup (herself of Sami origin) was 
extended to include issues pertaining to other minorities and 
immigrants.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the 
right to associate freely and to strike. The Government changed its 
wage negotiating process in 1996, shifting negotiations from the 
national to the local and company level. There were 36 strikes in 1998 
at the national, regional, local, and company levels, involving 27,000 
workers. All strikes were settled through negotiations or compulsory 
arbitration.
    The Government has the right, with the approval of the Parliament, 
to invoke compulsory arbitration under certain circumstances. The 
Government came under increasing criticism in 1995 for resorting to 
compulsory arbitration too quickly during strikes. In addition this 
procedure, which was also invoked several times in the 1980's, 
particularly in the oil industry, was criticized repeatedly by the 
Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization, which 
argued that the situations were not a sufficient threat to public 
health and safety to justify invoking compulsory arbitration. The 
Supreme Court is reviewing a case that will allow it to rule on whether 
the national process in this regard violates the country's 
international commitments.
    With membership totaling about 60 percent of the work force, unions 
play an important role in political and economic life and are consulted 
by the Government on important economic and social problems. Although 
the largest trade union federation is associated with the Labor Party, 
all unions and labor federations are free of party and government 
control. Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate 
internationally. They maintain strong ties with such international 
bodies as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All workers, 
including government employees and military personnel, exercise the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining is 
widespread, with most wage earners covered by negotiated settlements, 
either directly or through understandings which extend the contract 
terms to workers outside of the main labor federation and the 
employers' bargaining group. Any complaint of antiunion discrimination 
would be dealt with by the Labor Court, but there have been none in 
recent years.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor is 
prohibited by law and does not exist. The Government prohibits forced 
and bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it 
occurred. The Directorate of Labor Inspections (DLI) ensures 
compliance. Domestics, children, or foreign workers are not required to 
remain in situations amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Children 13 to 18 years of age may be employed part time 
in light work that will not adversely affect their health, development, 
or schooling. Minimum age rules are observed in practice and enforced 
by the DLI. Education is compulsory for 9 years. School is mandatory 
until the 10th grade; most children stay in school at least until the 
age of 18. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by 
children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Normal working hours are 
mandated by law and limited to 37\1/2\ hours per week. The law also 
provides for 25 working days of paid leave per year (31 days for those 
over age 60). A 28-hour rest period is mandated legally on weekends and 
holidays. There is no specified minimum wage, but wages normally fall 
within a national scale negotiated by labor, employers, and the 
government. Average income, not including extensive social benefits, is 
adequate to provide a worker and family with a decent living.
    The 1977 Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act provides 
for safe and physically acceptable working conditions for all employed 
persons. Specific standards are set by the DLI in consultation with 
nongovernmental experts. According to the act, environment committees 
composed of management, workers, and health personnel must be 
established in all enterprises with 50 or more workers, and safety 
delegates must be elected in all organizations. Workers have the right 
to remove themselves from situations that endanger their health. The 
DLI ensures effective compliance with labor legislation and standards.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically criminalizes 
trafficking in persons, but existing labor and immigration statutes may 
be used in such cases.
    Norway is becoming a destination country for trafficked women, 
according to an OSCE report.
                                   ____
                                 

                                 POLAND

    Poland is a parliamentary democracy based on a multiparty political 
system and free and fair elections. Executive power is shared by the 
Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, and, to a lesser extent, the 
President. The Parliament is bicameral (Senate and Sejm). The 
Government, elected in October 1997, is a two-party coalition composed 
of center-right Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)--itself a broad 
coalition anchored by the Solidarity labor union--and its junior 
partner, the centrist Freedom Union (UW), also with origins in 
Solidarity. The judiciary is independent but inefficient.
    The internal security forces and the armed forces are subject to 
effective civilian control by the Government. Since 1996 the civilian 
Minister of Defense has had clear command and control authority over 
the military chief of the general staff as well as oversight of 
military intelligence. This element of civilian control was reinforced 
further by a recent restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and 
general staff undertaken as part of the country's entry into NATO. 
Civilian participation in the Ministry of Defense has been broadened by 
a competitive hiring process that mandates civilian control of selected 
positions.
    The country has made a successful transition to a free market 
economy. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed to less than 4 
percent during the year. This was in part due to slow growth in the 
country's export markets, Europe and Russia. Inflation has been reduced 
steadily, from double-digits in 1997 to 8.6 percent in 1998 and about 
9.8 percent in 1999. Unemployment at the end of 1998 was in single 
digits for the first time since the transition from communism began but 
increased again to about 13 percent in 1999. Since 1989 most small and 
medium-sized state-owned enterprises have been privatized, and the 
current Government has launched privatizations of major state-owned 
enterprises such as the insurance, telephone, airline, power 
generation, petroleum refining, steel, coal, and banks. Significant 
reforms are underway in other sectors as well, including pensions, 
health, decentralization of government, and education. Still to be 
addressed are the agriculture sector, a major part of the economy 
(employing more than 25 percent of the labor force), and lagging 
development in rural areas.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, problems remain in some areas. Prison conditions are generally 
poor. A cumbersome legal process, poor administration, and an 
inadequate budget hamper the court system. Court decisions frequently 
are not implemented, particularly those of the administrative courts, 
and simple civil cases can take as long as 2 or 3 years. As a result, 
public confidence in the judicial system is lacking. Many poorly paid 
prosecutors and judges have left public service for more lucrative 
employment. The threat of organized crime has provoked legislative 
responses that raise questions regarding the right to privacy. The 
Government maintains a large number of wiretaps without outside review.
    There are some marginal restrictions in law and in practice on 
freedom of speech and of the press. With few exceptions, the new 
Criminal Code provides protection for journalists' sources. Spousal 
abuse continues to affect many women. Women continue to experience 
serious discrimination in the labor market and are subject to various 
legal inequities as a consequence of paternalistic laws. Child 
prostitution is a problem. There were incidents of desecrations of 
graves in Jewish cemeteries, and anti-Semitic graffiti was sprayed on a 
Jewish community center. There is some societal discrimination and 
violence against ethnic minorities. The Government has worked 
constructively toward resolving issues of concern to the Jewish 
community. Although the right to organize unions and bargain 
collectively largely was observed, some employers violated worker 
rights provided for by law, particularly in the growing private sector. 
Trafficking in women and children in, to, and from the country is a 
problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    In January 1998 a police officer was charged with the beating death 
of 13-year-old Przemek Czaja following a basketball game in the Baltic 
Coast city of Slupsk. The boy's death, caused when local police charged 
a group of sports fans, touched off 4 nights of riots and caused scores 
of additional injuries. The officer was sentenced in May to 6 years in 
prison. Appeals have been filed in the case.
    A police officer indicted in connection with the shooting deaths of 
two unarmed civilians and the wounding of another in Brodno, a suburb 
of Warsaw, continues to await trial. The officer was suspended from the 
police force and was charged with excessive use of force. The trial was 
scheduled to begin in October.
    In April 1998, a provincial court in Lublin sentenced the former 
Lomazy police chief to 15 years in prison in connection with the 1997 
shooting death of a 19-year-old man who was held for police 
questioning. This ruling subsequently was overturned in the appeals 
court, and a new trial began in September in the local district court.
    Trials related to extrajudicial killings during the Communist 
period continued during the year. A new trial began in a Katowice 
appeals court in October in the case of 22 riot policemen accused of 
killing miners during the Communist martial law era after a 1998 
appeals court decision annulled their acquittals. On September 28, the 
decision of a district court was upheld in the case of the appeal of 
two officers convicted in 1997 of the 1983 Communist era beating death 
of Grzegorz Przemyk. One officer was sentenced to 2 years in prison for 
participating in the beating, and the other officer was found not 
guilty of attempting to destroy the file in the case. In November the 
Supreme Court ordered a new trial for former Communist leader Wojciech 
Jaruzelski and nine other officials who allegedly ordered police to 
shoot workers during the 1970 riots in Gdansk. The Court ruled that the 
trial that began in the Gdansk provincial court should be started over 
in the Warsaw district court. No new trial date was set. On December 9, 
lawyers representing miners submitted a motion requesting the retrial 
of former Communist Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak for his role in 
the pacification of the Wujek mine, but a Katowice district court did 
not rule on the motion by year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Criminal Code prohibits torture, and there were no 
reported incidents of it; however, on several occasions during the year 
police used force to disperse protesters who became violent or to break 
up illegal roadblocks (see Section 2.b.).
    In June 1998, a Gdansk court indicted 11 riot policemen for their 
participation in the October 1997 beating of soccer fans attending a 
match in the town of Gdynia. The officers' activities, which took place 
before, during, and after the match, both at the stadium and at a 
nearby bar, were captured on videotape. A civil case against the 
officers, launched by the father of one of the teenage victims, also is 
pending. Both civil and criminal cases stemming from the incident were 
pending at year's end.
    There was no progress during the year on the appeal filed after an 
Olsztyn court granted the appeal of two Szczytno police officers in 
December 1998 who had been found guilty of beating two men detained in 
September 1996.
    In the case of three police officers in Bytom who were arrested and 
charged with the rape of seven underage detainees in 1994, one officer 
was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months in prison, while the other two 
received 3-year sentences.
    Prison conditions are still generally poor, according to reports by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Many facilities are old, in 
disrepair, and overcrowded. According to a July 1998 report by the 
National Penitentiary Authority, the prison system is in urgent need of 
additional funding. Of 156 detention facilities, 100 require 
considerable renovation. At the same time, the National Penitentiary 
Authority's annual budget continued to fall; it has declined by 
approximately 34 percent since 1991. The Ombudsman for Human Rights 
complained about the safety of prisoners, noting that inmates are often 
the victims of violent attacks by other prisoners. Civil litigation 
against the prison administration in the 1996 case of an 18-year-old 
mentally retarded boy who was beaten and sodomized by fellow inmates is 
to be considered by the Bydgoszcz district court in February 2000. The 
Ombudsman also has suggested that the prison population be reduced, 
including by decriminalizing certain offenses, pointing out that the 
ratio of prisoners to rehabilitation officers is very poor.
    The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes 
this prohibition. Courts rather than prosecutors issue arrest warrants. 
The law allows a 48-hour detention period before authorities are 
required to bring a defendant before a court and an additional 24 hours 
for the court to decide whether to issue a pretrial detention order. 
During this period, access to a lawyer normally is limited. Once a 
prosecutor presents the legal basis for a formal investigation, the law 
provides for access to counsel. Detainees may be held in pretrial 
detention for up to 3 months and may challenge the legality of an 
arrest through appeal to the district court. A court may extend this 
pretrial confinement period every 3 months for up to 18 months until 
the trial date. Bail is available, and most detainees are released on 
bail pending trial.
    The Government does not employ forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. However, the judiciary remains inefficient and lacks 
resources and public confidence.
    The Government is restructuring the court system in order to 
streamline and accelerate the legal process. At present there is a 
four-tiered court and prosecutorial structure. The courts consist of 
regional, provincial, and appellate divisions, as well as a Supreme 
Court. These tiers are subdivided further into five parts: Military, 
civil, criminal, labor, and family. Regional courts are courts of first 
instance, while appellate courts are charged solely with appeals. 
Provincial courts have a dual responsibility, handling appeals from 
regional courts while enjoying original jurisdiction for the most 
serious types of offenses. Appellate courts handle appeals tried at the 
provincial level, and the Supreme Court handles appeals only about 
questions of law. The prosecutorial system mirrors the court structure 
with national, provincial, appellate, and regional offices.
    Judges are nominated by the National Judicial Council and appointed 
by the President. They are appointed for life and can be reassigned but 
not dismissed, except by a court decision. The Constitutional Tribunal 
rules on the constitutionality of legislation. In October 
Constitutional Tribunal decisions became final and binding, after a 2-
year interim period following the entry into force of the new 
Constitution during which a two-thirds majority in the Sejm could 
overrule its decisions.
    The court system is cumbersome, poorly administered, overstaffed, 
and underfunded. There are numerous inefficiencies, most notably the 
fact that many districts have more criminal judges than prosecutors. 
These factors contribute to a lack of public confidence. Many effective 
judges and prosecutors have left public service for the more lucrative 
private sector. Court decisions frequently are not implemented. 
Bailiffs normally ensure the execution of civil verdicts such as damage 
payments and evictions. However, according to some observers, they are 
underpaid, subject to intimidation and bribery, and have a mixed record 
of implementing court decisions. Civil and administrative rulings 
against public institutions such as hospitals often cannot be enforced 
due to a lack of funds. Simple civil cases can take as long as 2 to 3 
years before resolution, and the pretrial waiting time in criminal 
cases can be several months. The backlog and the costs of legal action 
appear to deter many citizens from using the justice system at all, 
particularly in civil matters such as divorce. The long wait for 
routine court decisions in commercial matters is an incentive for 
bribery and corruption.
    All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. At the 
end of a trial the court renders its decision orally and then has 7 
days to prepare a written decision. A defendant has the right to appeal 
within 14 days of the written decision. Appeals may be made on the 
basis of new evidence or procedural irregularities.
    Criminal cases are tried in regional and provincial courts by a 
panel consisting of a professional judge and two lay assessors. The 
seriousness of the offense determines which is the court of first 
instance. Once formal charges are filed, the defendant is allowed to 
study the charges and consult with an attorney, who is provided at 
public expense if necessary. Once the defendant is prepared, a trial 
date is set. Defendants are required to be present during trial and may 
present evidence and confront witnesses in their own defense. Since 
1995 prosecutors have had the authority to grant witnesses anonymity at 
trial if they express fear of retribution from the defendant. This law, 
designed to help combat organized crime, impairs defendants' right to 
confront their accusers. In 1996 reforms were made that provide for a 
two-level appeal process in most civil and criminal matters; 
previously, citizens enjoyed access only to a one-step appeal process.
    Trials are normally public. However, the courts reserve the right 
to close a trial to the public in some circumstances, such as divorce 
cases, trials in which state secrets may be disclosed, or cases whose 
content might offend ``public morality.'' The courts rarely invoke this 
prerogative.
    The new Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure went into 
effect in September 1998. However, a March 1998 ruling by the European 
Court of Human Rights already may necessitate changes. The Court 
unanimously ruled that a provincial appellate court's examination of 
the verdict in the presence of the prosecutor, but not the defendant or 
his representative, infringed on the European Convention on Human 
Rights provisions concerning fair trial.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of 
correspondence; however, the Government maintains, without outside 
review, a large number of wiretaps. There is no legislation that 
provides for the general right to privacy. However, a 1998 law 
prohibits the collection of information about a person's ethnic origin, 
religious convictions, health condition, political views, or membership 
in religious, political, or trade union organizations. The law allows 
for certain exceptions, specifically, the gathering of information 
without a person's permission by courts, hospitals, or organizations if 
the information pertains to their members. All exceptions are subject 
to some restrictions. A few continuing practices (such as a requirement 
to fill out ``creed'' or ``nationality'' items in some questionnaires) 
became illegal, effective April 30. Violators of these provisions are 
subject to imprisonment for up to 3 years.
    In response to the growing threat of organized crime and money 
laundering, Parliament permitted the police and intelligence services 
to monitor private correspondence and to use wiretaps and electronic 
monitoring devices in cases involving serious crimes, narcotics, money 
laundering, or illegal arms sales. Under the Criminal Code, the 
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior, both political 
appointees, must authorize these investigative methods. In emergency 
cases, the police may initiate an investigation that utilizes wiretaps 
or the opening of private correspondence at the same time that they 
seek permission from the ministers. Estimates on the number of 
wiretapping devices installed annually at the request of the police 
vary widely; however, a high-ranking public prosecutor in 1998 put the 
number at 4,000. After interventions by the human rights Ombudsman, the 
Prosecutor General curtailed the number of warrants for wiretapping. 
Levels are now reportedly back at pre-1998 levels, over 4,000.
    Parliamentarians and human rights groups expressed concern about 
the lack of control over this type of surveillance. There is no 
independent judicial review of surveillance activities, nor is there 
any control over how the information derived from these investigations 
is used. A growing number of agencies have access to wiretap 
information, and the Police Code allows electronic surveillance to be 
used for the prevention of crime as well as for investigative purposes. 
As is the case under the Criminal Code, police must obtain permission 
from the Ministers of Justice and Interior before initiating wiretap 
procedures.
    In September 1997, the special Sejm Committee on Security Services 
announced that the Office of State Protection (UOP) ``may have'' acted 
illegally against rightwing politicians in 1993, allegedly carrying out 
activities such as the forging of documents in order to discredit 
rightwing parliamentary candidates. After further investigation, the 
Warsaw prosecutor's office announced in August that it was 
discontinuing the investigation, having concluded that the UOP had not 
violated the law. In October one of the alleged victims in the case 
announced that he would appeal the discontinuation of the case.
    The law forbids arbitrary forced entry into homes. Search warrants 
issued by a prosecutor are required in order to enter private 
residences. In emergency cases, when a prosecutor is not immediately 
available, police may enter a residence with the approval of the local 
police commander. In the most urgent cases, in which there is no time 
to consult with the police commander, police may enter a private 
residence after showing their official identification. There were no 
reports that police abused search warrant procedures.
    A law on ``lustration'' or vetting went into effect in November 
1998. The law is designed to expose former government officials and 
parliamentarians who collaborated with the Communist-era secret police, 
and it bans from office for 10 years those caught lying about their 
past. The law requires officials to provide sworn affidavits concerning 
their possible cooperation with the secret police; a public interest 
spokesman then verifies the affidavits and brings suspected cases of 
misrepresentation before the lustration court, a special three-judge 
panel created during the year whose decisions may be appealed. The law 
was judged constitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal, but human 
rights groups and some opposition politicians have expressed concern 
that the procedures may be unfair, in view of the likelihood that 
records were subject to loss or tampering. Critics of the law have 
charged that lustration has created a ``witch-hunt'' atmosphere in 
which leaks of the names of potential investigative targets and 
protracted investigations have destroyed the principle of the 
presumption of innocence and violated the ``moral rights'' of the 
accused.
    In June 1998, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled unconstitutional a 
1997 draft law envisioning the possible removal from service of judges 
proven to have violated judicial independence by issuing unjust 
verdicts between 1944 and 1989 at the request of the Communist 
authorities. Disciplinary proceedings against the judges in question 
were to be initiated by the Minister of Justice, the presidents of the 
appellate or regional courts, the National Judiciary Council, or 
individuals who felt wronged by court verdicts. In December 1998, the 
Sejm addressed the issue that concerned the Constitutional Tribunal and 
adopted amendments to the law requiring that procedures against accused 
judges be initiated before December 31, 2002. The law went into effect 
in January.
    Men are not permitted to marry without parental permission until 
the age of 21, whereas women may marry at the age of 18 (see Section 
5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects this 
right; however, there are some marginal restrictions in law and 
practice. Nonetheless, the press is vigorous and independent.
    The new Criminal Code states that an individual who ``publicly 
insults or humiliates a constitutional institution of the Republic of 
Poland'' is subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to 2 years, while 
an individual who insults a public functionary is subject to a fine or 
imprisonment of up to 1 year. In December the trial began in Elblag in 
the case of Andrzej Lepper, who was accused of insulting Prime Minister 
Jerzy Buzek and state officials in January. Prosecutors charge that 
during a road blockade in Nowy Dwor Gdanski, Lepper called Buzek's 
cabinet a ``government of national betrayal, a government of 
dilettantes, traitors to Poland.'' He is said to have called the Prime 
Minister and another political leader ``bandits and criminals.'' 
President Aleksander Kwasniewski's case against Zycie for accusing him 
of contacts with Russian spies was ongoing at year's end. This 
provision of the Criminal Code also can be used by individual citizens 
and businesses ``to protect their good name.'' In March 1998, Network 
Twenty One, which sells Amway products, and seven of its employees used 
the provision to prevent the broadcast, showing, or copying of a 1-hour 
documentary critical of the company and its practices. When Public 
Television Channel One announced plans to broadcast the film, Network 
Twenty One took the matter to court and won a temporary restraining 
order. Many leading journalists and media figures criticized the 
court's decision as a form of censorship. Since that time, the 
controversy has led to several different cases. Although a regional 
court in Lodz acquitted the filmmakers of Network Twenty One's charges, 
several complicating factors are still at issue in ongoing litigation 
and appeals. The documentary will not be broadcast until all current 
litigation on the matter is concluded.
    In Szczecin the Bryza housing company brought suit against the 
weekly Nowy Kurier, due to a series of articles involving the firm's 
business practices. Bryza charged the newspaper with defaming its 
``good name'' and asked the court to prohibit the newspaper from 
printing critical articles on the company or gathering any information 
on it. A Szczecin district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on 
both of these points in July. Several other cases decided during the 
year follow the precedent set in the Bryza case.
    The case against talk show host Wojciech Cejrowski, charged with 
publicly insulting President Kwasniewski, was postponed several times 
before being decided against the defendant April 1998. It since has 
been appealed and still was pending decision at year's end. Also 
pending was a 1995 case against presidential candidate Leszek Bubel for 
violating a section of the Penal Code that prohibits acts that 
``publicly insult, ridicule, and deride the Polish nation, the Polish 
Republic, its political system, or its principal organs.'' Bubel had 
claimed publicly that a former head of the presidential Chancellery 
protected a group of criminals.
    In January the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the case in 
which a Polish court had convicted a journalist of verbally insulting 
two municipal guards in 1992. The Court ruled that the verdict in the 
case did not constitute a breach of Article 10 of the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
    There was no progress during the year in the ongoing investigation 
into the case of Mikolaj Siwicki for publishing an allegedly hate-
mongering book that could damage the nation's interests.
    The new Criminal Code also stipulates that offending religious 
sentiment through public speech is punishable by a fine or a 3-year 
prison term. In 1995 a provincial court charged presidential candidate 
Leszek Bubel with violating this article by publishing a pamphlet 
containing anti-Semitic ``humor.'' A verdict still is pending. In July 
the Warsaw district court revoked the 1998 decision of prosecutors not 
to start proceedings against the leftist newspaper Trybuna for 
insulting Pope John Paul II in one of its articles. In 1997 Tadeusz 
Rydzyk and All-Polish Youth director Roman Giertych, both acting on 
behalf of the Council for the Coordination of the Defense of the 
Dignity of Poland and Poles, originally filed charges against Trybuna 
for its alleged insults of the Pope. Rydzyk and Giertych were offended 
particularly by the characterization of the Pope as a ``boorish 
vicar,'' by the reference to one of his statements as ``dirty and 
mumbling,'' and by the suggestion that he used his position to make 
slanderous statements. In April 1998, the Warsaw prosecutor's office 
decided to drop the case. Subsequently some 1,500 persons appealed to 
the Warsaw district court to reopen the case.
    The State Secrets Act allows for the prosecution of citizens who 
publish or otherwise betray state secrets. Human rights groups 
criticize this law, since it restricts the right of free speech of 
private citizens.
    The new Criminal Code regulates the protection of journalistic 
sources. The code grants news sources absolute protection, except in 
cases involving national security, murder, and terrorist acts. Pursuant 
to the law, statutory provisions are applied retroactively if their 
terms are beneficial to the accused. Journalists who refused to divulge 
sources prior to the new code's enactment also can avoid sanctions by 
invoking ``journalistic privilege.''
    There is no restriction on the establishment of private newspapers 
or distribution of journals; private newspapers and magazines flourish. 
There was no progress in the ongoing privatization of RUCH, a national 
network of newspaper kiosks.
    The National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council (KRRiTV) has 
broad powers in monitoring and regulating programming on radio and 
television, allocating broadcasting frequencies and licenses, and 
apportioning subscription revenues to public media. In order to 
encourage the KRRiTV's apolitical character, the nine KRRiTV members 
are obliged legally to suspend any membership in political parties or 
public associations. However, they are chosen for their political 
allegiances and nominated by the Sejm, the Senate, and the President 
following political bargaining, thus raising potentially serious 
questions about the independence of broadcasting oversight from 
political influence. In the fall, the program director of the 
Television Information Agency resigned and charged that he was put 
under political pressure by the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). He claimed 
that supporters of the PSL on his staff were giving disproportionate 
coverage to the party's activities.
    The broadcasting law stipulates that programs should not promote 
activities that are illegal or against state policy, morality, or the 
common good. The law, whose constitutionality has been confirmed by the 
Constitutional Tribunal, requires that all broadcasts ``respect the 
religious feelings of the audiences and in particular respect the 
Christian system of values.'' This provision never has been used as a 
means of censorship, although the restrictions theoretically could be 
used as such.
    Private television broadcasters operate on frequencies selected by 
the Ministry of Communications and auctioned by the KRRiTV. The first 
auction in 1994 gave Polsat Corporation and some smaller local and 
religious stations licenses to broadcast, while additional licenses 
were granted to TVN and Nasza Telewizja in 1997. Private radio 
flourishes on the local, regional, and national levels alongside public 
radio.
    The Government owns 2 of the 3 most widely viewed television 
channels and 17 regional stations, as well as 5 national radio 
networks. PAP, the national wire service, was privatized partially in 
December 1997, and a five-member supervisory board is preparing the 
service for full privatization. Although public television remains the 
major source of news and information, satellite television and private 
cable services (domestic and foreign) are widely available. Cable 
services carry the main public channels, Polsat, local and regional 
stations, and a variety of foreign stations.
    The law on radio and television requires public television to 
provide direct media access to the main state institutions, including 
the presidency, ``to make presentations or explanations of public 
policy.'' The President and the Prime Minister have complained 
occasionally of the other's abuse of the access privilege. Both public 
and private radio and television provide coverage of all ranges of 
political opinion.
    Books expressing a wide range of political and social viewpoints 
are widely available, as are foreign periodicals and other publications 
from abroad.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. Permits are not necessary for public meetings but are 
required for public demonstrations; demonstration organizers must 
obtain these permits from local authorities if the demonstration might 
block a public road. For large demonstrations, organizers also are 
required to inform the local police of the time and place of their 
activities and their planned route. Every gathering must have a 
chairperson who is required to open the demonstration, preside over it, 
and close it. In several instances there were clashes between police 
and demonstrators during the year. Some of these involved roadblocks 
set up by farmers to protest the Government's agricultural policies. In 
some cases when police moved in to disperse the roadblocks, conflict 
ensued. For example, in August between 50 and 123 policemen and between 
5 and 20 civilians were injured in the town of Bartoszyce when police 
forcibly removed an illegal roadblock set up by protesting farmers. Two 
of the most controversial confrontations between police and 
demonstrators occurred during the summer, when in June 50 policemen and 
4 trade unionists were injured in clashes in front of the National 
Defense Ministry building and when in August police used rubber bullets 
to disperse farmers who were occupying the provincial administrative 
office building in Olsztyn (see Section 1.c.).
    Beginning on January 22, as many as 8,000 farmers raised roadblocks 
at more than 100 locations around the country to protest the 
Government's failure to improve the country's agricultural sector. On 
January 25, violent clashes occurred in Lubliniec, where police used 
water cannons and tear gas to break up the roadblock but retreated 
after the farmers shot streams of liquid manure at the officers. In 
Nowy Dwor Gdanski there were injuries among both police officers and 
protesting farmers after the police used water cannons to disperse the 
farmers, and the farmers responded with gasoline bombs. On February 8, 
after 2 weeks of disruptive farmers' protests, the Government and three 
agricultural unions reached a preliminary agreement on government steps 
to address short-term problems in the agricultural sector. However, the 
small radical farmers' union, Samoobrona, rejected the agreement and 
called for farmers to continue blocking roads. On February 8 and 9, 
police officers cleared the fewer than 10 remaining roadblocks. At one 
roadblock outside of Warsaw, police reportedly used rubber bullets, 
tear gas, and a water cannon to disperse protesters, injuring two 
police officers and one farmer.
    In May farmers again set up roadblocks at some 90 locations 
throughout the country to protest agricultural policies. Police 
officers used force in eight locations to clear the protesters from the 
roads. Violent clashes occurred in Nowy Dwor Gdanski, where several 
protesters and police officers were hospitalized. The protests ended 
after the Government signed an agreement with the farmers on minimum 
state prices for grain.
    In June about 50 policemen, 4 trade unionists from the Lucznik arms 
factory in Radom, and 1 photographer were injured in clashes in front 
of the National Defense Ministry building. Some 500 police officers 
used water cannons and rubber bullets to pacify about 800 demonstrating 
workers when they started to remove barriers guarding the entrance to 
the building and began to throw paving stones, heavy screws, and eggs 
at police. The Nasz Dziennik photographer was hit in the eye with a 
rubber bullet and as result had to have the eye removed. An 
investigative commission set up by the Ministry of the Interior later 
ruled that the force used by police was justified and in accordance 
with the law. The commission's report found that 4 police officers 
fired a total of 42 shots with rubber bullets, and it advised that 
regulations governing the use of rubber bullets be made more precise. 
There are no provisions that regulate the distance from which police 
may fire rubber bullets at persons.
    In August approximately 400 farmers occupied the provincial 
administrative office building in Olsztyn. The farmers, who were armed 
with wooden boards and chains, barricaded the front door of the 
building, while the regional governor locked himself in his office. The 
farmers became violent, and conflict erupted when police moved in to 
remove them by force. Some 13 police officers and 6 farmers were 
injured during the clash. In initial statements and press reports 
police insisted that they had used only batons to disperse the 
protesters, but later the fact emerged that they had fired rubber 
bullets as well.
    On August 19, police used batons, tear gas, a water cannon, and 
rubber bullets to break up an illegal roadblock by farmers in 
Bartoszyce. The farmers, who were protesting against the Government's 
agricultural policies, refused to cooperate with police and became 
violent when police attempted to disperse them. Police were hit by 
paving stones thrown from the crowd of bystanders as the officers used 
batons, a water cannon, and tear gas to disperse the rioting farmers. 
Police finally used rubber bullets to restore peace. Some 83 police 
officers and a dozen civilians were injured during the clash. 
Prosecutors opened an investigation into the incident.
    In July 1998, a parade to be held as part of the first gay pride 
festival was called off after Warsaw municipal authorities denied 
approval, arguing that it was not a cultural event. Gay rights 
activists view the denial as discrimination.
    The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government 
generally respects this right in practice. Private associations need 
government approval to organize and must register with their district 
court. The procedure essentially requires the organization to sign a 
declaration that commits it to abide by the law. However, in practice 
the procedure is complicated and may be subject to the discretion of 
the judge in charge.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Citizens 
enjoy the freedom to practice any faith they choose. Religious groups 
may organize, select, and train personnel, solicit and receive 
contributions, publish, and engage in consultations without government 
interference. There are 14 religious groups in the country whose 
relationship with the State is governed by specific legislation and 140 
other religious communities. The legislation outlines the internal 
structure of the religious groups, their activities, and procedures for 
property restitution. There are no government restrictions on 
establishing and maintaining places of worship. More than 95 percent of 
Poles are Roman Catholic, but Eastern Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and 
much smaller Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim congregations meet freely. 
Although the Constitution provides for the separation of church and 
state, a crucifix hangs in both the upper and lower houses of 
Parliament. State-run radio broadcasts Catholic Mass on Sundays, and 
the Catholic Church is authorized to relicense radio and television 
stations to operate on frequencies assigned to the Church, the only 
body outside the KRRiTV allowed to do so.
    Religious communities may register with the Government, but they 
are not required to do so and may function freely without registration.
    Although the Constitution gives parents the right to bring up their 
children in compliance with their own religious and philosophical 
beliefs, religious education classes continue to be taught in the 
public schools at public expense. While children are supposed to have 
the choice between religious instruction and ethics, the Ombudsman's 
office states that in most schools ethics courses are not offered due 
to financial constraints. Catholic Church representatives are employed 
to teach religious classes in the schools. Such classes constitute the 
vast majority of all religious education classes offered, since the 
population of the country is approximately 95 percent Catholic. 
However, parents can request religious classes in any of the religions 
legally registered, including Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish 
religious instruction. Such non-Catholic religious instruction exists 
in practice, although it is not common, and the Ministry of Education 
pays the instructors. Priests receive salaries from the state budget 
for teaching religion in public schools.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although the Constitution does not 
address freedom of movement, the Government does not restrict internal 
or foreign travel. Citizens who leave the country have no trouble 
returning. There are no restrictions on emigration.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. There were no reports of the forced repatriation of persons 
with a valid claim to refugee status. Foreigners recognized as refugees 
under the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol are granted full refugee status and permission to 
remain permanently. According to UNHCR figures, 2,864 individuals 
applied for refugee status during the year. Of the total number of 
applications awaiting decision (including applications carried over 
from 1998), 46 were approved, 2,404 were rejected, and 762 were 
otherwise discontinued.
    A law on immigration signed by the President in 1997 took effect in 
December of that year. Human rights organizations generally view the 
Aliens Act as positive. The law gives all prospective refugees access 
to a procedure for adjudicating refugee status and establishes an 
independent board to which prospective refugees can appeal negative 
status decisions by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This board has 
been fully operational since January, and refugee advocates noted that 
it serves as an impartial and independent adjudicator of appeals. The 
law does not recognize the concept of first asylum or any other form of 
temporary protection.
    A 1998 Helsinki Foundation Report, drafted after extensive 
monitoring of eight of the country's major border crossings, provided a 
generally favorable assessment of the country's treatment of refugees. 
While critical of the general unavailability of interpreters and 
informational leaflets printed in different languages, the report 
points out that border officials were acquainted with the contents of 
the aliens law, particularly those provisions relating to the 
application for refugee status, and were well prepared for their 
duties. During the year, the Government cooperated with the UNHCR and 
the Polish NGO Caritas in a new program monitoring portions of the 
country's eastern and western borders from offices in Bialystok and 
Zgorzelec. The UNHCR reports that the Government has been cooperative 
as the offices monitor relevant issues such as tracking asylum seekers.
    Although some observers had criticized the authorities for using 
deportation centers in place of refugee centers (when the latter are 
full), as well as for long delays in the initial review of refugee 
status applications, the Government no longer uses deportation centers 
as refugee centers, and the UNHCR received no complaints about the 
Government's handling of refugee processing.
    In April 1998, responsibility for the administration of the program 
that helps refugees integrate into society was transferred from the 
Office for Migration and Refugee Affairs at the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs to the Department of Social Assistance at the Ministry of 
Labor. The Ministry of Labor, in turn, passed responsibility for the 
program's implementation to authorities at the local level but 
initially failed to provide local officials with the information or 
personnel resources necessary to carry out the task effectively. 
Advocates for refugees complained that as a result of the transfer, the 
program ground to a halt in 1998 and left many recently recognized 
refugees without even the basic necessities of daily life. The 
Government cooperated with the UNHCR in the latter half of 1998 and in 
1999 to become better informed about possible solutions to the 
situation, by taking part in visitors' programs in which government 
officials traveled to Western countries to study different integration 
techniques. The results are inconclusive thus far.
    The UNHCR expressed concern during the year over the fate of 
unaccompanied children seeking asylum in the country. It urged that 
procedures and practices concerning the appointment and maintenance of 
supervisors and guardians for minors be improved.
    In June 1998, the Warsaw High Administrative Court ruled in favor 
of a petitioner who was denied refugee status in January of the same 
year. The Ministry of Internal Affairs had refused the petitioner's 
application on the grounds that it had not been submitted ``upon'' 
crossing the border (as required under Article 37 of the Aliens Act), 
but 2 days later. The High Court declared this original ruling invalid, 
noting that the article fails to define a specific time period and that 
neither the Aliens Act nor the administrative code concerning the 
documentation of aliens addresses the legal consequences of failing to 
submit a refugee status application at the border. This ruling turned 
out to be less far-reaching than advocates for refugees had hoped, and 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs refused some subsequent cases on the 
same grounds in 1998 and 1999. However, in September the Court issued 
an oral decision that observers believe may compel the Ministry to 
accept a broader definition of the time limits involved in the 
application process.
    The UNHCR noted that the Government handled the Kosovo refugee 
crisis very effectively. It accepted 1,048 refugees, paid for their 
support, and housed them primarily in former dormitories and hostels. 
Although refugee advocates noted a slow start by the Government in 
mobilizing supplies, it rapidly increased aid and coordinated necessary 
equipment. Although there is no humanitarian status law that allows 
refugees to remain in the country in temporary protective status, the 
UNHCR noted the Government's flexibility in finding alternative visa 
solutions. Refugees were given 1-year temporary-resident visas 
entitling them to work legally while in the country.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right and ability to change their government 
peacefully. This right is provided for in the Constitution and exists 
in practice. Poland is a multiparty democracy in which all citizens 18 
years of age and older have the right to vote and to cast secret 
ballots. A permanent, democratic constitution entered into force in 
1997.
    Executive power is divided between the President and a government 
chosen by the Sejm, or lower house of Parliament. There is also an 
upper house (the Senate). The Constitution provides for parliamentary 
elections at least every 4 years. The President, elected for 5 years, 
has the right, in certain very limited cases and after seeking the 
opinion of the Speakers of the Sejm and the Senate, to shorten the 
Sejm's term of office. Whenever the Sejm's term of office is shortened, 
the Senate's term automatically is shortened as well. Parliament may 
impeach the President.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Only 13 
percent of parliamentarians are women, while 2 of the 23 cabinet 
ministers are women. The Speaker of the Senate is the only female 
parliamentary leader, and none of the leaders of the nation's largest 
political parties are women.
    Two members of the German minority party are Members of Parliament. 
The electoral law exempts ethnic minority parties from the requirement 
to win 5 percent of the vote nationwide in order to qualify for seats 
in individual districts.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and 
responsive to their views.
    The Helsinki Foundation, a major NGO, conducts human rights 
investigations without government interference. Members of the 
Foundation report that the Government displays a generally positive and 
helpful attitude towards human rights investigations. However, some 
domestic NGO's believe that a hostile regulatory climate is developing 
in parts of the government bureaucracy.
    The Office of the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection (the 
Ombudsman), established in 1987, is the Government's watchdog for human 
rights. The Ombudsman's office is an effective, independent body with 
broad authority to investigate alleged violations of civil rights and 
liberties. The Ombudsman registers each reported case and files 
grievances, where appropriate, with the relevant government office. He 
has no legislative authority and is sworn to act apolitically. The 
Government cooperates with his office.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that ``no one shall be discriminated 
against in political, social, or economic life for any reason 
whatsoever.'' The Government attempts to ensure that these provisions 
are observed; however, violence and societal discrimination against 
women and ethnic minorities persist.
    Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. Women's 
rights advocates report that unofficial statistics are similar to those 
of previous years, though there are no recent comprehensive surveys. In 
1996 some 9 percent of women polled by the Public Opinion Research 
Center admitted to being beaten repeatedly by their husbands. Women's 
organizations assert that the number of women suffering from domestic 
abuse is probably much higher. They explain that battered women usually 
refuse to admit abuse even to themselves. Violence against women 
remains hidden, surrounded by taboos and accompanied by shame and 
guilt, particularly in small towns and villages. Government and police 
statistics do not differentiate between male and female victims of 
violence. Police intervene in cases of domestic violence, and husbands 
can be convicted for beating their wives. In 1998 the police in 
cooperation with the State Agency for Solving Alcoholic Problems 
introduced the so-called ``blue card,'' a record-keeping system 
designed to better document incidents of spousal abuse. Sentences for 
abuse of family members range from 3 months to 5 years, or from 2 to 10 
years if the victim attempts suicide as a result of the abuse. However, 
statistics suggest that a large majority of convictions result in 
suspended sentences. According to NGO's the courts often treat domestic 
violence as a minor crime, pronounce lenient verdicts, or dismiss 
cases. A seminar on combating violence against women organized by the 
Women's Rights Center in March came to a similar conclusion on the 
topic. Former victims of violence participating in the seminar 
complained about investigations that dragged on for several months 
(although this is a common complaint for nearly all types of court 
cases), as well as about procedures that were intimidating, unfamiliar, 
and unfriendly. According to the latest Women's Rights Center report, 
there has been significant progress in awareness of the issue of 
violence against women. It has become more visible in the media, and an 
increasing number of NGO's are addressing the problem. The U.N. 
Development Program currently is developing a program in cooperation 
with the Government's Plenipoteniary for Family Affairs to prevent 
family violence by opening centers to assist families with violence 
problems and training people working with victims of family violence. 
However, the Women's Rights Center criticized the program and argued 
that it will fail to empower women who are victims of domestic 
violence.
    The law has no provision for restraining orders to protect battered 
women against further abuse. For example, in divorce cases courts 
frequently grant a divorce but do not issue a property settlement, 
sending the woman back to live with the abusive husband. This problem 
is exacerbated by a lack of alternative housing in the country. Women's 
advocacy groups also have complained about the small number of state-
supported shelters for battered women.
    According to police statistics, the frequency of rape is 
decreasing. During the year, there were 2,029 cases reported, compared 
with 2,174 in 1998 and 2,250 in 1997. NGO's report that women often are 
unwilling to report the crime, so these figures are likely deceiving. 
NGO's estimate that the number of actual rapes is ten times higher than 
reported statistics suggest.
    Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Public discussion of the problem of sexual harassment is relatively 
new, but women increasingly are talking about the problem and speaking 
out against it. According to statistics released by the Public Opinion 
Research Center in June, 28 percent of women admitted to being 
harassed. While laws specifically addressing sexual harassment do not 
exist, social awareness is increasing, as are mechanisms with the 
potential to deal with the problem. For example, the new Criminal Code 
states that persons who take advantage of a position of power in a 
relationship to gain sexual gratification may be sentenced to up to 3 
years in prison. According to a Supreme Court advisory opinion, such a 
relationship can occur between employers and employees, between 
supervisors and subordinates, or between teachers and students. 
However, this provision can be used only when sexual harassment occurs 
between a supervisor and an individual in a subordinate position. It 
may not be used when harassment occurs between persons of equal rank.
    The Constitution provides for equal rights regardless of sex and 
grants women equal rights with men in all areas of family, political, 
social, and economic life, including equal compensation for work of 
similar value. However, in practice women frequently are paid less for 
equivalent work, mainly hold lower level positions, are discharged more 
quickly, and are less likely to be promoted than men. According to the 
1998 government statistical bulletin, men have a higher employment rate 
(59 percent) than women (39 percent), and women have a higher 
unemployment rate (12 percent) than men (9 percent). Despite a 
generally higher level of education, women earn on average 30 percent 
less than men. In August the U.N. Human Rights Commission expressed its 
concern about the situation and agreed that women are discriminated 
against in the labor market.
    Women are employed in a wide variety of professions and 
occupations, and a number of women occupy high positions in government 
and in the private sector. Although clauses in social insurance law had 
limited child sick care benefits only to women, since June, both men 
and women have the right to child sick care. The new pension law passed 
in late 1998 did not change the mandatory earlier retirement for women 
at age 60 (65 for men). As a result women get about 60 percent of the 
average pension that men receive. The law does not address equality in 
hiring practices (there are no legal penalties for discriminatory 
behavior in this area), and advertisements for jobs frequently indicate 
a gender preference. Although women have access to a number of 
previously forbidden careers since the Labor Code was modified in 1996, 
they still are prevented from working underground or in jobs that 
require heavy lifting. In March the Parliament failed to approve the 
proposed law on equal status that would have remedied some of these 
inequalities. Apart from the Constitution there is no other legal 
provision for equal rights for women.
    The Ombudsman for Human Rights monitors the rights of women within 
the broader context of human rights. Observers note that the broad 
scope of the office's mandate dilutes its ability to function as an 
effective advocate of women's issues. Within the Cabinet, in 1997 the 
government Plenipotentiary for Family Affairs replaced the government 
Plenipotentiary for Women and the Family, a change that many women's 
rights groups perceived as an example of discrimination. There are 
several women's rights NGO's. Among the most notable are the Polish 
Foundation for Women and Family Planning and the Women's Rights Center. 
These groups are active advocates of gender equality and advance their 
goals through research, monitoring, and publishing. There are several 
church-sponsored women's advocacy organizations, but their cooperation 
with other women's NGO's is limited.
    As of January 1, women have the same right as men to transmit 
citizenship to their foreign-born spouses.
    Children.--The Constitution extends some state protection to the 
family and children and provides for the appointment of an ombudsman 
for children's rights. However, an ombudsman had not been appointed, 
since Parliament passed legislation that was awaiting the President's 
signature at year's end. Education is mandatory until age 18, and 
public schools are free of charge. The Government sponsors some health 
programs targeted specifically at children, including a vaccination 
program and periodic checkups conducted in the schools. However, in 
reality budget shortfalls prevent complete implementation of these 
programs. There are no procedures in schools to protect children from 
abuse by teachers; in fact, the teachers' work code provides legal 
immunity from prosecution for the use of corporal punishment in 
classrooms.
    There were reports in 1998 that prostitution among 12- and 13-year-
olds was increasing. Violence against children is illegal. A provision 
of the new Criminal Code threatens those who physically or 
psychologically abuse a juvenile with a prison sentence of 3 months to 
5 years. If the victim attempts suicide the sentence is increased, as 
it is if the perpetrator is found to have acted with extreme cruelty. 
Abuse rarely is reported, and convictions for child abuse are even more 
rare. There is no societal pattern of abuse of children; however, 
trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    Young men and women are treated unequally in terms of the age of 
majority. Men and women reach majority at the age of 18 under the Civil 
Code. However, a young woman can reach majority at the age of 16 if she 
has entered into marriage with the consent of her parents and the 
guardianship court. In addition, men are not permitted to marry without 
parental consent until the age of 21, whereas women may do so at the 
age of 18. Lawmakers' rationale for this difference in treatment is the 
assumption that it is better that men entering compulsory military 
service not be encumbered with families.
    People with Disabilities.--There were approximately 5 million 
disabled persons in 1996, and the number is expected to reach 6 million 
by the year 2010. In 1995 the Central Bureau of Statistics (GUS) 
reported that 17 percent of disabled persons able to work are 
unemployed. Advocacy groups claim that the percentage is much higher. 
GUS data from 1997 indicate that 57 percent of the disabled have no 
more than an elementary school education, compared with 30 percent of 
those without disabilities and that only 3.5 percent have a university 
education, compared with 7.7 percent of the nondisabled.
    The Constitution provides for aid to disabled persons ``to ensure 
their subsistence, professional training, and social communication,'' 
and a number of laws protect the rights of the disabled. However, 
implementation falls short of rights set forth in the legislation. 
Public buildings and transportation generally are not accessible to the 
disabled. Current law provides only that buildings ``should be 
accessible.''
    The law creates a state fund for the rehabilitation of the disabled 
that derives its assets from a tax on employers of over 50 persons, 
unless 6 percent of the employer's work force are disabled persons. 
While the fund has adequate resources, its management has encountered 
difficulties, including frequent changes in leadership. According to 
press reports, the fund has 4,000 grant applications pending. In 
addition, the fund by law cannot be used to assist disabled children, 
that is, persons under 16 years of age.
    A 1996 law allows individuals from certain disability groups to 
take up gainful employment without the risk of losing their disability 
benefits. Previously, disabled individuals from those groups lost their 
benefits once they began to work.
    Religious Minorities.--Current law places Protestant, Catholic, 
Orthodox, and Jewish communities on the same legal footing, and the 
Government attempted to address the problems that minority religious 
groups face. Among the most important of these problems is the issue of 
restitution. These laws allow for the return of churches and 
synagogues, cemeteries, and community headquarters, as well as 
buildings that were used for other religious, educational, or 
charitable activities. The laws included time limits for filing claims; 
in several cases the deadlines have expired, and no additional claims 
may be filed. However, restitution commissions (composed of 
representatives of the government and the religious community) are 
continuing to adjudicate previously filed claims. The Government 
established four separate commissions to process the claims of the 
Catholic, Lutheran, and Orthodox Churches, and the Jewish community. A 
fifth commission to handle the claims of other religious groups was not 
yet active at year's end.
    The time limit for applications by the Catholic Church expired in 
December 1991. As of the summer, 2,285 of the 3,038 claims filed by the 
Church had been concluded, with 1,028 claims settled by agreement 
between the Church and the party in possession of the property (usually 
the national or a local government), 834 properties were returned 
through decision of the Commission on Property Restitution, which rules 
on disputed claims, 412 claims were rejected, and 11 cases were likely 
to go to court. Claims by the local Jewish community (whose deadline 
for filing claims under the 1997 law governing relations with the 
Government expires in 2002) are being filed slowly. Only some 418 
claims had been filed by the end of November, mainly because the 
country's Jewish community lacks the information and financial 
resources to prepare claims more quickly. Of the 379 claims for which 
procedures had begun, the commission on property restitution considered 
264; 78 cases were closed; and in 55 cases, ownership was transferred 
to Jewish communities, who also have received some $650,000 (2.5 
million PLN) in compensation for properties that could not be returned. 
In other cases the commission directed the parties to reach a 
settlement or submit new documentation. As of early 1999, Lutheran 
claims for 1,200 properties had resulted in 288 cases being closed with 
the return of the properties in question (the deadline for filing such 
claims was July 1996). Some 75 of the 189 properties claimed by the 
Orthodox Church have been returned (the deadline for filing such claims 
was August 1993).
    However, laws on religious property do not address the private 
property of any group. In September the Government's council of 
Ministers approved a draft reprivatization law. The original draft, 
which would permit former Polish citizens no longer living in the 
country to file claims for property they or their families owned, was 
amended by a Sejm committee in December to require claimants to possess 
current Polish citizenship and to have resided in the country for the 
past 5 years. These changes effectively would make it impossible to 
address the claims of many Poles and Jews living abroad. The Government 
remains opposed to the committee's changes and is to seek approval of 
the bill's original version when the issue is considered by the full 
Sejm.
    Anti-Semitic feelings persist among certain sectors of the 
population, occasionally manifesting themselves in acts of vandalism 
and physical or verbal abuse. However, it is not always clear that 
vandalism of graves is anti-Semitic in nature. Police note that every 
year there are numerous incidents of vandalism at Catholic cemeteries. 
For example, in March vandals desecrated graves at a Catholic cemetery 
in Bytom, in some cases uprooting stone cross gravestones and 
transplanting them upside down. Moreover, surveys in recent years show 
a continuing decline in anti-Semitic sentiment, and avowedly anti-
Semitic candidates fare very poorly in elections.
    In March 1998, a controversy arose over the ``Pope's Cross,'' 
located on the grounds of a former Carmelite convent in Oswiecim 
adjacent to the Auschwitz concentration camp museum. The cross 
originally adorned the altar at a mass conducted by Pope John Paul II 
near Birkenau in 1979 and was erected at the site of the Carmelite 
mission in 1989. After the Plenipotentiary for Relations with the 
Jewish Diaspora announced in 1998 that the cross would be removed, as 
disrespectful of the Jewish legacy at Auschwitz, a large group of 
government and nongovernment leaders went on record as opposing the 
removal of the cross. Two radical rightwing groups also emerged that 
opposed the plan. Throughout 1998 and the first half of 1999, radical 
nationalist anti-Semites erected dozens of additional crosses outside 
Auschwitz, despite the opposition of the country's bishops. In May the 
Parliament passed a government-sponsored law to protect the sites of 
all the former camps in the country. The Government consulted with 
international Jewish groups in preparing the law, which gave the 
Government the power it needed to resolve the issue of the ``new 
crosses.'' After the arrest of the self-proclaimed leader of one of the 
groups for possessing explosives and making public threats in late May, 
local authorities removed the crosses--except for the ``Pope's 
Cross''--to a nearby Franciscan monastery, under the supervision of the 
local Bishop. Later they sealed off the site to prevent the erection of 
additional crosses. On November 8, the Oswiecim district court ruled in 
favor of the Ministry of Treasury's suit to regain legal possession of 
the gravel pit adjacent to the former Auschwitz concentration camp, 
where the new crosses had been erected.
    In January vandals damaged or destroyed 57 gravestones in the 
Jewish cemetery in Krakow. Vandals had attacked the same cemetery in 
October 1998. After the first incident police officers increased their 
patrols of the cemetery. Police promised additional, special protection 
after the second incident to prevent further attacks. In May the 
cemetery was vandalized again when unidentified perpetrators overturned 
30 gravestones and set fire to the main door of the preburial house. 
However, the chairman of the local Jewish community called this an act 
of hooliganism, not anti-Semitism, since in the weeks preceding the 
attack vandals had smashed gravestones and otherwise damaged two nearby 
Catholic cemeteries. The chairman also noted the cooperation of the 
Krakow city police with the Jewish community to improve the security of 
the cemetery. In June the cemetery was attacked yet again when vandals 
painted crosses on several tombstones and on the preburial house. This 
incident appears to have been motivated by anti-Semitism, since members 
of the Jewish community received telephone calls linking the graffiti 
to the recent removal of crosses that were placed near the 
concentration camp at Auschwitz.
    In July unknown vandals sprayed swastikas and anti-Semitic graffiti 
on the Jewish community headquarters in Bielsko-Biala. According to the 
mayor of Bielsko-Biala, city police officers were ordered to guard the 
building after the attack and an investigation was opened into the 
case; however, there were no results by year's end. Anti-Semitic 
graffiti was painted on several monuments in the Tarnow Jewish cemetery 
in August. In September vandals attacked several tombs in the Warsaw 
Jewish cemetery, leaving satanic graffiti and damaging a number of 
monuments. The vandalism immediately was criticized by the chief of the 
Prime Minister's Chancery.
    Investigations continued in the May 1998 desecration of graves in 
the Warsaw Jewish cemetery and the July 1998 vandalism of a plaque 
commemorating Jewish Holocaust victims in Rzeszow. No charges have been 
filed to date, and the Rzeszow case is still under investigation. In 
the case of the 1997 beating of a 14-year-old Jewish boy in Gdansk, the 
defendant received a 4-year suspended sentence. The attack may have 
been linked to a sermon by controversial Gdansk priest Henryk Jankowski 
warning against the presence of Jews in the Government.
    The publication of a booklet by an Opole University professor 
Dariusz Ratajczak denying the Holocaust triggered severe public 
criticism in March and April. The booklet was self-published (a total 
of 230 copies), and as soon as it became aware of the publication, the 
University banned its distribution on school property, criticized its 
contents, and suspended the professor pending further disciplinary 
action. Ratajczak's trial began on November 16 on charges of violating 
the law on the preservation of national memory, which took effect on 
January 1, for disseminating the Auschwitz lie. On December 7, the 
Opole district court acquitted him and ruled that the ``social threat'' 
posed by the book was low, given the low number of copies, and that in 
the book's second edition and in Ratajczak's public appearances he 
criticized the revisionist views of historians who deny the Holocaust.
    In April during the 11th March of the Living from Auschwitz to 
Birkenau to honor victims of the Holocaust, several hundred Poles 
joined about 2,000 marchers from Israel and other countries. This was 
the largest participation of Polish citizens in the event to date. 
Government officials participating in the march included approximately 
12 Members of Parliament, the province's governor, and Oswiecim's mayor 
and city council chairman. Polish school children, Boy Scouts, the 
Polish-Israeli Friendship Society, and the Jewish Students Association 
in Poland also participated in the march.
    There is some public concern about the growth of groups perceived 
to be ``sects'' and the influence of nonmainstream religious groups, 
especially in the wake of press reports of the deaths of a few young 
persons in circumstances suggesting cult activity.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The law provides for the 
educational rights of ethnic minorities, including the right to be 
taught in their own language. However, controversy has arisen over the 
publishing of Lithuanian textbooks. In February 1998, the Lithuanian 
Ambassador to Poland, Antanas Valionis, complained to Polish Minister 
of Education Miroslaw Handke that since 1991, 172 editions of textbooks 
in Polish had been published in Lithuania while only 4 textbooks in 
Lithuanian had been published in Poland since 1989. Valionis also noted 
that during 1997 Lithuania, despite significantly more modest financial 
resources, published 27 different textbooks for the 20,000 Polish 
pupils in Lithuania, while Poland published only 3 for Lithuanian 
pupils in Poland. There are approximately 800 ethnic Lithuanian 
students in 18 schools of various levels ranging from preschool to high 
school and vocational school. Some controversy continued during the 
year, but the two Governments continue to negotiate on issues related 
to minorities in their respective countries.
    The Romani community, numbering around 40,000, faced 
disproportionately high unemployment and was hit harder by economic 
changes and restructuring than were ethnic Poles, according to its 
leaders. The national Government does not discriminate overtly against 
Roma; however, some local officials have been known to discriminate by 
not providing services in a timely manner or at all. Some schools have 
experimented with separate special classes for Romani children, stating 
that because of economic disadvantage, language barriers, and parental 
illiteracy, Romani children are behind their non-Romani counterparts 
when starting school. There have been occasional incidents of skinheads 
clashing with Roma. In response to what its leaders felt was a 
threatening atmosphere around them, a Roma community near Tarnow 
announced in July that it planned to form ``self-defense units'' within 
the community. At year's end, nothing had come of the plan.
    In the 1998 case of a 14-year-old Romani girl from Bytom who was 
injured when a skinhead threw a Molotov cocktail into the apartment 
where she was sleeping, a suspect is awaiting trial.
    The small Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities occasionally 
experience petty harassment and discrimination. Individuals of African, 
Asian, or Arab descent continue to experience verbal abuse or other 
types of aggression, including physical abuse. In March a student of 
South Asian origin studying in Katowice reported that he had been 
assaulted by three skinheads who called him ``czarny'' (``black'' in 
Polish) and ``nigger'' while pushing him around. In June a student of 
Korean descent was assaulted from behind and knocked unconscious in 
Krakow in what he considered to be a racially motivated attack.
    In December the Government announced plans for television channels 
nationwide to broadcast a public service announcement propagating 
friendly attitudes toward refugees and foreigners in the country. A 
well known Polish actor was featured in the project.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides that all civilian 
workers, including military employees, police, and frontier guards have 
the right to establish and join trade unions of their own choosing. The 
law sets minimum size requirements for establishing a trade union: 10 
persons may form a local union, and 30 may establish a national union. 
Unions, including interbranch national unions and national interbranch 
federations, must be registered with the courts. A court decision 
refusing registration may be appealed to an appeals court. In 1999 the 
number of officially registered national-level unions remained at about 
360, about the same as in 1998. No precise data exist on work force 
unionization, although the trend continues to be downward. Recent 
studies suggest that only some 13 percent of workers belong to a union. 
As a rule, newly established small- and medium-sized firms were 
nonunion, while union activity in most cases carried over into 
privatized (former state-owned) enterprises. The Independent 
Selfgoverning Trade Union (NSZZ) Solidarity has a verified regular 
dues-paying membership of about 1 million. Small spin-offs from 
mainstream Solidarity include the rival factions Solidarity '80, August 
'80, and the Christian Trade Union Solidarity (Popieluszko). There are 
no reliable estimates of their membership.
    The other principal national unions are those affiliated with the 
All-Poland Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ), the formerly Communist-aligned 
confederation established in 1984 as the sole legal alternative to 
then-outlawed NSZZ Solidarity, and its teachers' affiliate, the Polish 
Union of Teachers (ZNP). The OPZZ reports that its membership has 
dropped by more than 50 percent in recent years to about 3 million, but 
this figure is unverified, and independent sociological surveys suggest 
that its regular dues-paying membership is considerably less than 
Solidarity's; a recent survey found that Solidarity represents some 6.3 
percent of all Polish workers while the OPZZ represents only 3.6 
percent, (one estimate put OPZZ membership at roughly 700,000 to 
800,000 workers). According to a study by the State Labor Inspectorate, 
out of some 27,000 local union organizations, Solidarity had 13,500 
organizations, the OPZZ had 11,000 organizations, and Solidarity '80 
had 770 organizations.
    The law on collective bargaining, in force since 1994, does not 
require union membership figures to be verified or based on dues-paying 
members in order for unions to be considered ``representative'' 
negotiating partners for management and government. Solidarity 
protested some unions' (largely OPZZ affiliates) participation in 
negotiations with the Government on the grounds that their membership 
figures remain unproved.
    Most trade unions were active in politics at all levels. Scores of 
union activists were parliamentarians, and several became senior 
government officials. Solidarity plays a key role in political life. 
With 62 deputies, 27 senators, dozens of ministers, governors, and 
other senior national and local officials, the union serves as the 
backbone of the ruling AWS coalition. The OPZZ has 42 deputies, about 
one-quarter of the opposition Democratic Left Alliance caucus.
    Unions have the right to strike except in ``essential services.'' 
However, labor leaders complain that the 1991 Act on Collective Dispute 
Resolution prescribes an overly lengthy process before a strike may be 
called. Employers consider the law too lenient, since it allows only 
one-quarter of the work force to vote to call a strike. As a result, as 
many as 60 to 90 percent of strikes called in recent years have been 
technically ``illegal'' because one or both of the sides did not follow 
each step exactly as required by law. Labor courts act slowly on 
deciding the legality of strikes, while sanctions against unions for 
calling illegal strikes, or against employers for provoking them, are 
minimal. Arbitration is not obligatory and depends on the agreement of 
disputing parties. Unions allege that laws prohibiting retribution 
against strikers are not enforced consistently, and that fines imposed 
as punishment are so minimal that they are ineffective sanctions to 
illegal activity. Workers who strike in accordance with the law retain 
their right to social insurance but not to pay. However, if a court 
rules a strike ``illegal,'' workers may lose social benefits, and 
organizers are liable for damages and may face civil charges and fines. 
The social partners (unions, employers, and the Government) continued 
to work out ambiguities in dispute resolution mechanisms in the new 
Labor Code, which went into effect in 1996, and which represented a 
major overhaul of Communist-era labor regulations.
    The number of strikes in the first 6 months of the year remained 
relatively low and dropped to 25 from 31 in the same time period in 
1998. However, significant work stoppages, hunger strikes, and 
demonstrations, some violent, took place in the mining, health, 
armaments, and agricultural sectors at various times throughout the 
year. In February the All-Poland Doctors' Trade Union, which claims to 
represent 70 percent of health care workers, launched a 10-day 
nationwide strike to protest low spending on health care. The union 
promised to continue providing emergency, oncological, pediatric, 
gynecological, and maternity care during the strike. On November 19, 
between 20 and 50 percent of teachers participated in a protest against 
low wages and low funding for education.
    Unions have the right to join labor federations and confederations 
and to affiliate with international labor organizations. Independent 
labor leaders reported that these rights were observed in practice. 
Solidarity is a full member of the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions, the World Confederation of Labor, and the European Trade 
Union Confederation.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1991 Law on 
Trade Unions created a favorable environment for trade union activity. 
However, labor leaders report that the 1991 law has not prevented 
employers from discriminating against workers who attempt to organize 
or join unions, particularly in the growing private sector. The law 
also has not prevented employer harassment of union members for labor 
activity.
    The 1991 law provides for parties to take disputes first to labor 
courts, then to the Prosecutor General, and, in the last resort, to the 
Supreme Court. In a typical year, Solidarity takes several thousand 
cases to labor courts, several hundred to the Prosecutor General, and 
dozens to the Supreme Court for resolution. In an overwhelming majority 
of these cases, the courts ordered employers to correct practices or 
reinstate dismissed workers or unions to reimburse employers for 
activity found to be illegal. However, penalties are minimal and are 
not an effective deterrent.
    Enterprise-level collective bargaining over wages and working 
conditions increasingly characterized the labor relations system. Labor 
and management are adapting their relationship to the demands of a 
market economy, but experience in modern labor relations is still in 
its early stages. Many enterprises rolled over agreements concluded in 
earlier years.
    Since its formation in early 1994, the Tripartite Commission 
(unions, employers, Government), currently chaired by Labor Minister 
Longin Komolowski, has become the main forum that determines national-
level wage and benefit increases in such politically sensitive areas as 
the so-called budget sector (health, education, and public employees), 
while rendering opinions on pension indexation, energy pricing, and 
other important aspects of social policy. The Commission serves as an 
important forum in which the social partners air differences, discuss 
grievances, and often negotiate agreements before problems erupt into 
social conflict.
    Many disputes arose because of the weakness of the employer side of 
the union/employer/Government triangle. Key state sector employers 
(largely in heavy industry and the budget sector) still were unable to 
negotiate independently with organized labor without the extensive 
involvement of central government ministries to which they are 
subordinate, although the Government repeatedly stated that its 
intention was not to be drawn into labor disputes. This weakness 
complicated and politicized the Government's labor relations system. 
Claiming that the Government was refusing seriously to discuss labor 
issues with it, the OPZZ suspended participation in the Commission in 
April.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor 
does not exist, except for prisoners convicted of criminal offenses, 
and otherwise is prohibited by law, including that performed by 
children. There were no reports of forced or compulsory labor by 
children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law contains strict legal prescriptions about the 
conditions in which children may work. The Labor Code forbids the 
employment of persons under the age of 15. Those between the ages of 15 
and 18 may be employed only if they have completed primary school and 
if the proposed employment constitutes vocational training and is not 
harmful to their health. The age requirement rises to 18 years if a 
particular job might pose a health danger.
    Child labor is not a problem, although the State Labor Inspectorate 
reported that increasing numbers of minors now work, and that many 
employers violate labor rules in employing them (by underpaying 
workers, paying them late, etc.). Inspectors found violations on stud 
farms, in restaurants, and, in some instances, in small private sector 
businesses and factories.
    The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government 
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor, the 
unions, and employers' organizations negotiate a revised national 
minimum wage every 3 months. The minimum monthly wage in state-owned 
enterprises is approximately $162.50 (650 PLN), which constitutes no 
real increase over the 1998 amount. This amount was insufficient to 
provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living in view of 
rising prices. A large percentage of construction workers and seasonal 
agricultural laborers from the former Soviet Union earn less than the 
minimum wage. The large size of the informal economy and the small 
number of state labor inspectors make enforcement of the minimum wage 
very difficult. As long as unemployment remains high, workers often 
agree to inferior working conditions and lower pay in order to find or 
keep their jobs.
    The standard legal workweek is 42 hours, which allows 6- or 7-hour 
days, including at least one 24-hour rest period. The law requires 
overtime payment for hours in excess of the standard workweek.
    The Labor Code defines minimum conditions for the protection of 
workers' health and safety. Provisions are strict and extensive, and 
trade unions have the right to stop production or extract a worker from 
dangerous working conditions without jeopardy to the worker's continued 
employment. However, enforcement is a major problem, because the Labor 
Inspectorate is unable to monitor the state sector sufficiently, much 
less the private sector, where a growing percentage of accidents take 
place. In addition, there is a lack of clarity concerning which 
government or legislative body has responsibility for enforcing the 
law.
    In the 41,286 work-related accidents reported during the first 6 
months of the year, 226 individuals were killed and 589 seriously 
injured. The Government's Central Statistical Office reported that most 
accidents were in the public sector, while most serious accidents were 
in the private sector, where proportionally more deaths also occurred. 
Solidarity contends that the problem lies not in the law, which 
establishes safe standards, but in enforcement, because employer 
sanctions for illegal behavior are minimal. Standards for exposure to 
chemicals, dust, and noise are exceeded routinely. Workers may remove 
themselves from dangerous working conditions without losing their jobs, 
but there were reports that fears of such loss prompted some to stay on 
the job.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and children is 
illegal, and several specific provisions in the Criminal Code address 
this problem; however, it is a problem. The law prohibits forcing 
individuals into prostitution, trafficking in human beings, and 
pimping. Those convicted of trafficking in women or children face a 
prison term of between 3 and 10 years. The Criminal Code also mandates 
a sentence of 1 to 10 years for anyone convicted of luring others into 
prostitution abroad. However, incidents of trafficking to and through 
the country are on the rise, and the country is a source, destination, 
and transit point for traffickers. According to police statistics, 
there were 70 cases (18 of trafficking and 52 of luring women into 
prostitution abroad) reported in the country in 1998. These cases 
involved a total of approximately 200 women of Polish and other 
nationalities. Authorities believe the actual number of Polish women 
trafficked abroad over the last few years to be much higher. Unofficial 
estimates suggest that over 20,000 Polish women were trafficked abroad 
in the last few years. Prosecutions are rare because most victims are 
hesitant to turn to the authorities due to shame and fear of reprisals. 
Polish women are trafficked to Western Europe, particularly Germany, 
Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and Spain, and to Israel. Poland also is 
serving more frequently as a destination and transit country for women 
trafficked from the east, particularly Romania, Bulgaria, and the 
former Soviet Union. Women from these countries often are forced into 
prostitution in Poland, then many are sent on to Western Europe and 
Israel. There is increasing ``1-day'' or ``weekend'' trafficking along 
the border of Poland with Germany, in which traffickers transport women 
and children across the border for forced prostitution and then return 
them to the origin or transit country. According to unofficial 
estimates, approximately 3,000 foreign women ``work'' as prostitutes in 
Poland, in most cases under the control of international criminal 
networks. The NGO La Strada estimates that 3,500 Bulgarian women were 
trafficked into Poland and currently are forced to work as prostitutes. 
In 1998 authorities deported 44 women, most from Bulgaria, who were 
working as prostitutes. There is a growing market for young girls, as 
young as 12 or 13 years old, due to the perception that younger 
prostitutes are less likely to have sexually transmitted diseases. Most 
victims come from backgrounds that are characterized by poverty and 
lack of opportunity. Traffickers also range from individuals working 
for their own profit, to organized crime groups, which treat women as 
one of a diversified group of commodities. Once the women and girls are 
brought to Poland, traffickers take away their passports and force them 
into prostitution to work off their debts and earn back their travel 
documents. Women and girls who resist are raped, beaten, or confined 
with minimal food and water until they comply. According to the NGO La 
Strada, in some cases girls have been killed for resisting traffickers' 
demands. Recently official awareness of this issue has increased, and 
while prosecution remains rare, at least one case in recent years 
resulted in the trafficker receiving the maximum sentence. However, 
there are no government assistance programs or shelters to assist 
victims of trafficking. NGO's have reported cases in which trafficked 
persons upon return to the country were interrogated, fined, or even 
jailed for using false documents or leaving the country illegally.
    In May the Department of Justice organized an international 
symposium on trafficking in women and children in Legionowo. Government 
officials and NGO representatives from Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia 
met to discuss ways to address this growing problem.
                                 ______
                                 

                                PORTUGAL

    The Portuguese Republic is a constitutional democracy with a 
President, a Prime Minister, a Parliament freely elected by secret 
ballot in multiparty elections, and an independent judiciary.
    Internal security is primarily the responsibility of the Ministries 
of Justice and Internal Administration. Security forces are controlled 
by, and responsive to, the government. They occasionally committed 
human rights abuses.
    Portugal has a market-based economy. An increasing proportion of 
the labor force is employed in services, while employment in 
agriculture continues to decline and has been static or declining 
slightly in the industrial sector.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, there were problems in a few areas. Credible reports continued 
that security personnel occasionally beat detainees. Prison conditions 
remained poor. There are lengthy delays in trials. Violence against 
women, trafficking in women, discrimination against Roma, and child 
labor are problems.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    The inspector general of internal administration (IGAI), the 
inspecting authority for the police forces, worked with Amnesty 
International (AI) in its 1998 investigations into the excessive use of 
force by the police (see Section 1.c.).
    An inmate reportedly died as a result of beatings by prison guards 
in Vale de Judeus in 1997 (see Section 1.c.).
    IGAI also cooperated in the ongoing investigation into the death of 
Olivio Almada, whose body was found in the Tagus River in Lisbon in 
October 1996. Almada was last seen in the company of three police 
officers, but the police had no record of his arrest. An investigation 
resulted in no criminal charges against the officers concerned, but 
disciplinary proceedings then began because the initial investigation 
determined that Almada had been detained illegally.
    Three PSP officers were convicted on criminal charges related to 
the death in custody in 1996 of Carlos Areujo. The officers appealed 
the verdict, and their case remains in the appeals process. 
Disciplinary proceedings against the officers were deferred until after 
the criminal case is resolved.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, and the use of evidence obtained under torture 
in criminal proceedings; however, credible but infrequent reports 
continued that police and prison guards beat and otherwise abused 
detainees, particularly non-Europeans.
    In late 1997, two police officers were accused of having violated 
sexually a female drug addict in 1994. The supervisors of the officers 
initially delayed the opening of an investigation, but in December 1997 
the divisional commander in Lisbon suspended the officers and ordered 
an investigation, which was still in progress at year's end.
    In April Amnesty International released a report covering the last 
6 months of 1998, which noted the mistreatment of prisoners and 
excessive use of force by the police. In September 1997, Marcelino 
Soares, a 17-year-old inmate at the Caxias prison, reportedly was 
beaten and confined to an isolation cell for 3 days by guards for 
complaining that prison authorities had blocked visits by his brother. 
Allegations of beatings also were made against guards at the Vale de 
Judeus prison; such beatings reportedly caused the death of inmate 
Francisco Antonio Cordeiro in September 1997. Internal inquiries into 
these two cases proved inconclusive and were closed; criminal inquiries 
continue in the Soares case.
    AI also brought to the IGAI's attention allegations that a Sintra 
police officer used electroshock torture. The subsequent investigation 
found that the allegations against the officer were true, and also 
established the complicity of two other officers. Separation was 
recommended for one of the officers by a preliminary inquiry, and 
deliberations of the police disciplinary council continue. The two 
other officers were suspended from duty. A criminal inquiry was also in 
progress.
    Justice Ministry investigators confirmed that the gendarmerie, the 
Republican National Guard (GNR), used excessive force against 
protestors during a demonstration by farmers in Ourique in September. 
Allegations of police misconduct during a January street festival in 
Lisbon were under investigation.
    Prison conditions continue to be poor; overcrowding continues to be 
the main problem. Health issues are also of increasing concern. In 
February the health services director of the Bureau of Prisons reported 
that 7 out of every 10 convicts entering the prison system were 
infected with AIDS, Hepatitis B, or Hepatitis C. An estimated 20 
percent of the prison population is infected with AIDS. Tuberculosis is 
also on the rise. Prison health services, with staffing at 1970's 
levels in vastly different conditions, have difficulty coping with the 
current situation.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. 
Human rights organizations reported no difficulties in gaining access 
to inmates at detention facilities.
    An independent ombudsman, chosen by the Parliament, investigates 
complaints of mistreatment by the police and prison authorities. IGAI 
also conducts internal investigations in cases of alleged mistreatment. 
Police officers receive training in human rights and proper 
investigative procedure. However, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) 
have been critical of the slow pace of police investigations in general 
and internal investigations by the police in particular.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides protection against arbitrary arrest and detention, and the 
Government respects its provisions in practice.
    Under the law, an investigating judge determines whether an 
arrested person should be detained, released on bail, or released 
outright. A person may not be held more than 48 hours without appearing 
before an investigating judge. Investigative detention is limited to a 
maximum of 6 months for each suspected crime. If a formal charge has 
not been filed within that period, the detainee must be released. In 
cases of serious crimes, for example, murder or armed robbery, or of 
more than one suspect, investigative detention may last for up to 2 
years and may be extended by a judge to 3 years in extraordinary 
circumstances. A suspect in investigative detention must be brought to 
trial within 18 months of being charged formally. If a suspect is not 
in detention, there is no specified period for going to trial. A 
detainee has access to lawyers; the state assumes the cost if 
necessary.
    Exile is illegal and is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and 
impartial.
    The court system, laid out in the Constitution, consists of a 
Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court of Justice, and judicial courts 
of first and second instance. There is also a Supreme Court of 
Administration, which deals with administrative and tax disputes, and 
which is supported by lower administrative courts. An audit court is in 
the Ministry of Finance.
    All trials are public except those that may offend the dignity of 
the victim, such as in cases of sexual abuse of children. The accused 
is presumed innocent. In trials for serious crimes, a panel of three 
judges presides. For lesser crimes, a single judge presides. At the 
request of the accused, a jury may be used in trials for major crimes; 
in practice, requests for jury trials are extremely rare.
    The judicial system provides citizens with a fair legal process. 
However, it has been much criticized for a large backlog of pending 
trials resulting from inefficient functioning of the courts. Frequent 
criticism of this backlog nonetheless did not result in any specific 
actions by the Government during the year. The extremely slow pace of 
the judicial system was cited as contributing to a violation of Article 
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in a March report from the 
European Court of Human Rights.
    In March 1998, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the 
Ministry of Justice to pay a fine to the plaintiff in a civil case in 
the town of Torres Vedras. The case involved a real estate company 
trying to regain its operating authority after a declaration of 
insolvency. The case was delayed for 6 years. This was the second time 
such a judgment was made against the judicial system.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution forbids such practices, and the 
Government respects these provisions in practice. Violations are 
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of speech and the press is 
provided for in the Constitution, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the authorities generally respect these 
provisions.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects these rights in practice. The 
Roman Catholic Church is the dominant religion; it receives tax 
exemptions and other privileges unavailable to other denominations. 
Although the overwhelming majority of citizens are Roman Catholic, 
other religions practice freely.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and laws provide for 
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    The law provides for granting refugee or asylee status in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates 
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. Persons who qualify as refugees 
are entitled to residence permits. There were no reports of the forced 
expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee status. However, the 
Government almost never rules that an asylum seeker has a ``valid'' 
claim. A new law attempts to distinguish among political, humanitarian, 
and temporary refugees, but the Government continues to maintain that 
the majority are economic refugees using Portugal as a gateway to the 
other European Union ``Schengen'' Countries. The Government took in 
approximately 2,000 refugees from Kosovo during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections on the basis of universal 
suffrage. Portugal is a multiparty parliamentary democracy.
    Women and minorities have full political rights and participate 
actively in political life. However, they are underrepresented in 
government and politics. Women head the Ministries of Health and of 
Environment. There are 46 female members in the 230-member Parliament. 
Race is rarely an issue in politics; persons of minority origin have 
achieved prominence in politics. Some persons advocate laws mandating 
female quotas on political party lists, but such legislation has not 
been passed. Some political parties nevertheless adopted their own 
internal quotas.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of local and international groups operate freely, 
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases. 
Government officials generally are cooperative, although most groups 
complain of slow investigations or remedial actions.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution forbids discrimination based on ancestry, sex, 
language, origin, religion, political or ideological convictions, 
education, economic situation, or social condition, and the Government 
enforces these prohibitions.
    Women.--Domestic and other violence against women is reportedly a 
common but hidden problem for which few seek legal recourse. In 1996 
(latest statistics available), charges were filed in 136 rape cases and 
2,329 cases of other violence against women. The law provides for 
criminal penalties in cases of violence by a spouse, and the judicial 
system shows no apparent reluctance to prosecute suspects accused of 
abusing women. Changes to the Penal Code in 1998 granted prosecutors 
the ability to file charges independent of the victim when prosecution 
is judged ``in the victim's interest.'' Traditional societal attitudes 
discourage many battered women from recourse to the judicial system.
    A toll-free hot line for victims of domestic violence has operated 
since November 1998, from 9 a.m. to midnight 7 days a week. In its 
first 6 months of operation, approximately 64 percent of the calls 
related to acts of physical violence, while 30 percent related to 
psychological concerns. The majority of callers (66 percent) were 
themselves victims. Women between the ages of 25 and 35 accounted for 
about 29 percent of the calls, while about 31 percent were women 
between the ages of 35 and 45. Although calls came from all over the 
country, the vast majority came from the large urban centers of Lisbon 
and Porto.
    Parliament addressed the issue of domestic violence several times 
during the year. A system of ``safe houses'' for victims of domestic 
violence was created. Educational campaigns for the public and 
specialized training for the police were strengthened. The creation of 
domestic violence units in the police, and of a new domestic violence 
category in the Attorney General's report on crime, were mandated. 
Perpetrators of domestic violence now can be barred from contact with 
their victims, and in extreme cases, the police can order the immediate 
expulsion of a perpetrator from the victim's dwelling. The law also 
calls for the development of new programs to teach anger management to 
the perpetrators of domestic violence and to assist victims with the 
professional development necessary to live independent lives.
    Trafficking in women for the purposes of forced prostitution 
continues to be problem (see Section 6.f.). Prostitution is linked 
closely to other types of organized crime, especially international 
narcotics trafficking. Specific legislation prohibits forced 
prostitution and trafficking in human beings. The Nest, an NGO, 
operates economic and social recovery programs for prostitutes.
    The Civil Code provides for full legal equality for women. Sexual 
harassment, a problem that continues to gain public attention, is 
covered in the Penal Code as a sex crime, but only if perpetrated by a 
superior and in the workplace. As in the case of violence, socially 
ingrained attitudes discourage many women from taking advantage of the 
legal protection available.
    The Commission on Equality in the Workplace and in Employment, made 
up of representatives of the government, employers' organizations, and 
labor unions, is empowered to examine, but not adjudicate, complaints 
of sexual harassment but receives few. It does review numerous 
complaints of discrimination by employers against pregnant workers and 
new mothers, who are protected by law.
    Women increasingly are represented in university student bodies, 
business, science, and the professions. A gap remains between male and 
female salaries. Women earn the majority of university degrees.
    Children.--A 9-year period of education is compulsory. A study by 
the European Commission indicated that only 50 percent of children 
receive preschool education. To counter this problem, the Ministry of 
Education instituted a pilot project on early childhood education in 
the Algarve region in 1997. This program proved successful. More 
teachers were hired, new schools were constructed in remote areas, and 
the law now calls for attendance at preschool before entry into the 
first grade. However, there is a serious gap between spaces available 
in preschools and the number of children seeking admission, especially 
in the case of private institutions. During the 1998-99 school year 
207,109 children attended preschool. It is estimated that that number 
increased to 220,000 for the current (1999-2000) school year).
    The National Children's Rights Commission is charged with 
implementing the principles of the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. The Commission operates under the aegis of the 
High Commissioner for the Promotion of Equality and of the Family and 
includes representatives from the Ministries of Justice, Health, 
Education, and Solidarity, as well as from leading NGO's. The quasi-
independent Institute for the Support of Children organized a network 
of 48 NGO's dedicated to helping at-risk youth. The University of 
Minho's Institute for the Study of Children is a research center 
dedicated solely to the study of children's issues. The Institute for 
the Support of Children organizes public awareness programs, serves as 
an information clearinghouse for NGO's working on childrens' issues, 
and promotes legislation protecting children's rights. It provides 
telephone and in-person counseling, intervention, and prevention 
services in cases of child abuse and neglect. It also operates services 
assisting the at-risk youth known as ``criancas da rua''--``street 
kids.''
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children, although child 
labor remains a problem (see Section 6.d.).
    Following the uncovering of a pedophile ring in Madeira in 1997, 
the Parliament passed a law in 1998 that enlarged the definition of 
pedophilia to include the consumers of child pornography as well as the 
producers.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or the provision of other 
state services. Their access to public facilities is mandated by 
legislation, which generally is complied with. However, no such 
legislation covers private businesses or other facilities.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The principal minority groups 
are immigrants, legal and illegal, from Portugal's former African 
colonies. There is also a resident Romani population of approximately 
40,000 persons, who are the subject of some discrimination.
    In March the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination conducted a periodic review of the Government's 
obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In its report, the Committee 
expressed concern about racial discrimination and xenophobia in the 
country, including violence against blacks, Roma, immigrants, and 
foreigners--frequently perpetrated by skinheads. While acknowledging 
efforts by the Government to combat such acts, the Committee urged that 
the law be extended to prohibit all racist groups.
    The law permits victims and antiracism associations to participate 
in race-related criminal trials by lodging criminal complaints, 
retaining their own lawyers, and calling witnesses. In August the 
Parliament approved a new set of antiracism laws, reiterating 
antidiscrimination sections in the Constitution and the Penal Code. The 
new laws prohibit and penalize racial discrimination in housing, 
business, and health services. They also provided for the creation of a 
new Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination to work 
alongside the high commissioner for immigration and ethnic minorities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers in both the private and 
public sectors have the right to associate freely and to establish 
committees in the workplace to defend their interests. The Constitution 
provides for the right to establish unions by profession or industry. 
Trade union associations have the right to participate in the 
preparation of labor legislation. Strikes are permitted by the 
Constitution for any reason, including political causes; they are 
common and generally are resolved through direct negotiations. The 
authorities respect all provisions of the law on labor's rights.
    Two principal labor federations exist. No restrictions limit the 
formation of additional labor federations. Unions function without 
hindrance by the Government and are associated closely with political 
parties.
    There are no restrictions on the ability of unions to join 
federations or of federations to affiliate with international labor 
bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions are free 
to organize without interference by the Government or by employers. 
Collective bargaining is provided for in the Constitution and is 
practiced extensively in the public and private sectors.
    Collective bargaining disputes usually are resolved through 
negotiation. However, should a long strike occur in an essential sector 
such as health, energy, or transportation, the Government may order the 
strikers back to work for a specific period. The Government rarely has 
invoked this power, in part because most strikes last only 1 to 3 days, 
but the law was invoked in one transport strike in 1998. The law 
requires a ``minimum level of service'' to be provided during strikes 
in essential sectors, but this requirement is applied infrequently. 
When it is applied, minimum levels of service are established by 
agreement between the Government and the striking unions, although 
unions have complained, including to the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), that the minimum levels were set too high. When 
collective bargaining fails, the Government may appoint a mediator at 
the request of either management or labor.
    The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and the authorities 
enforce this prohibition in practice. The General Directorate of Labor 
promptly examines complaints.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor, 
including by children, is prohibited and generally does not occur. 
Specific legislation prohibits trafficking in persons; however, 
trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum working age is 16 years. There are instances 
of child labor, but the overall incidence is small and is concentrated 
geographically and sectorally. The greatest problems are reported in 
Braga, Porto, and Aveiro and tend to occur in the clothing, footwear, 
construction, and hotel industries. The Government prohibits forced and 
bonded child labor and enforces this prohibition effectively (see 
Section 6.c.).
    The Government has worked actively to eliminate child labor and 
created a multiagency body, the National Commission to Combat Child 
Labor (CNCTI) in 1996 to coordinate those efforts. In 1997 the CNTCI 
expanded its efforts by enhancing cooperation with NGO's, establishing 
regional commissions and local intervention teams, and expanding its 
public education campaign. The Ministry of Education also has increased 
its budget allocated to alternative education plans for students in 
danger of dropping out of school.
    The Commission is joined in its efforts by two NGO's, the National 
Confederation of Action on Child Labor (CNASTI) and the Institute of 
Support for Children (IAC). With the assistance of regional 
commissions, the CNCTI works through local intervention teams on public 
awareness measures to prevent child labor and on a case-by-case basis 
with school dropouts and with minors found to be working.
    In a first-of-its-kind study, conducted in conjunction with the ILO 
in October 1998, the Government polled 26,500 families, with separate 
questionnaires for parents and children, to try to measure the 
incidence of child labor. According to this survey, as many as 20,000 
to 40,000 children under the age of 16 may be engaged in some form of 
labor. The majority of these cases consist of daily chores on family 
farms, which do not prevent school attendance. However, the study 
estimates that as many as 11,000 children may be working for nonfamily 
employers, a figure that represents 0.2 percent of the labor force. 
More studies are planned.
    The key enforcement mechanisms of labor laws falls to labor 
inspectors, and the number of cases has fallen significantly over the 
past several years as a result of these government efforts and a move 
towards a higher technology industrial base (with a corresponding need 
for higher skilled labor). The number of child labor cases detected by 
the inspectors fell from 341 to 167 over the last 4 years. Additional 
reductions may require fundamental social changes. Government officials 
are concerned that child labor continues in the home, where inspections 
are prohibited without a search warrant. Also, child labor among 
migrant agricultural workers appears to be facilitated by parents who 
are paid for every box of produce picked. These conditions make it 
difficult to root out child labor through increased enforcement alone; 
the authorities believe that public education measures also are needed 
over the longer term.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage legislation covers 
full-time workers as well as rural workers and domestic employees ages 
18 years and over. For 1999 the monthly minimum wage was approximately 
$326 (61,300 escudos). Along with widespread rent controls, basic food 
and utility subsidies, and phased implementation of an assured minimum 
income, the minimum wage affords a basic standard of living for a 
worker and family. According to the latest figures available (October 
1997), the average monthly wage was $777 (136,300 escudos). With 
respect to income distribution, average wages ranged from a high of 
$2,316 (405,300 escudos) per month for managers to $587 (102,700 
escudos) per month for manual laborers. Only 9.2 percent of the work 
force received the minimum wage.
    Employees generally receive 14 months' pay for 11 months' work: the 
extra 3 months' pay are for a Christmas bonus, a vacation subsidy, and 
22 days of annual leave. The maximum legal workday is 8 hours, and the 
maximum workweek is 40 hours. There is a maximum of 2 hours of paid 
overtime per day and 200 hours of overtime per year, with a minimum of 
12 hours between workdays. The Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security monitors compliance through its regional inspectors.
    Employers legally are responsible for accidents at work and are 
required by law to carry accident insurance. An existing body of 
legislation regulates safety and health, but labor unions continue to 
argue for stiffer laws. The General Directorate of Hygiene and Labor 
Security develops safety standards in harmony with European Union 
standards, and the General Labor Inspectorate is responsible for their 
enforcement. However, the Inspectorate lacks sufficient funds and 
inspectors to combat the problem of work accidents effectively. A 
relatively large proportion of accidents occurs in the construction 
industry. Poor environmental controls in textile production also cause 
considerable concern.
    While the ability of workers to remove themselves from situations 
where these hazards exist is limited, it is difficult to fire workers 
for any reason. Workers injured on the job rarely initiate lawsuits.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific legislation prohibits 
trafficking in persons. Under the Penal Code, trafficking in persons is 
punishable by 2 to 8 years' imprisonment.
    However, trafficking in women for the purpose of forced 
prostitution continues to be a problem. International trafficking rings 
take Portuguese women abroad, often to Spain, and bring foreign women 
to Portugal. The Portuguese women involved tend to be from poorer areas 
and are often, but not always, drug users. Women from Brazil and from 
Lusophone Africa also are involved, as are women from non-Lusophone 
countries such as Senegal.
    Russian Mafia organizations are present in the country in 
increasing numbers, largely as the networks behind the trafficking in 
Eastern European women. One such network reprotedly sells Moldovan and 
Ukrainian women for the equivalent of around $4,000 each. The 
authorities broke up one such ring during the year that was headed by a 
nuclear scientist from the former Soviet Union.
                                 ______
                                 

                                ROMANIA

    Romania is a Constitutional democracy with a multiparty, bicameral 
parliamentary system. Prime Minister Radu Vasile is the Head of 
Government, and President Emil Constantinescu, who was elected 
directly, is the Head of State. The judiciary is a separate branch of 
the Government; however, in practice the executive branch exercises 
influence over the judiciary, although there were signs of increasing 
judicial independence during the year.
    Several different security forces are responsible for preserving 
law and order and protecting against external threats. The laws that 
established these organizations are somewhat vague, and their security 
responsibilities overlap. All security and intelligence organizations 
operate under the authority of civilian leadership. The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs supervises the national police, which have primary 
responsibility for security, and the border guards. Some police 
officers committed serious human rights abuses.
    Romania is a middle-income developing country in transition from a 
centrally planned economy to a market economy. The private sector 
accounted for about 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 
employed 56.6 percent of the work force, primarily in agriculture and 
services. Although privatization is under way government ownership 
remains dominant in heavy industry. From 1997-98, 2,571 companies were 
privatized; 3,626 were included on the privatization list for 1999, and 
about half of those were privatized by year's end. The economy grew 
slowly before a contraction of 6.6 percent in 1997. GDP per capita in 
1998 was about $1,682. GDP for the first half of 1999 was down 3 
percent compared with the same period in 1998. Exports rose 4.2 percent 
from 1996 to 1997 and dropped in 1998 1.6 percent from 1997. Inflation 
decreased from 151.4 percent in 1997 to 40.6 percent in 1998. The 
inflation rate for 1999 was approximately 56 percent. Official 
statistics significantly understated economic activity because of the 
size of the informal economy.
    The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens; 
however, several serious problems remained. Some police officers 
continued to beat detainees; and in several cases such beatings 
reportedly led to deaths. The Government investigated police officers 
suspected of abuse and in some cases indicted those accused of criminal 
activities in military courts. However, investigations of police abuses 
are generally lengthy and inconclusive and rarely result in prosecution 
or punishment. While some progress has been made in reforming the 
police, cases of inhuman and degrading treatment continue to be 
reported. The Government promised important modifications to the 
Criminal Code, but no such changes were made by year's end. The 
Government improved the poor living conditions in prisons and 
implemented vocational training programs; however, overcrowding remains 
a serious problem. The judiciary remains subject to executive branch 
influence, although there were signs of increasing influence during the 
year. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious 
problems. There is a large number of impoverished and apparently 
homeless children in large cities. Societal harassment of religious 
minorities still remains a problem and religious groups not officially 
recognized by the Government sometimes complain that they receive 
discriminatory treatment from the authorities. Discrimination against 
Roma continued. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of 
forced prostitution was a problem.
    The Ombudsman's Office, which was established in 1997, consolidated 
its activities and is now fully operational with a staff of 70 persons. 
The Office registered 4,372 complaints by year's end, up from 2,985 in 
1998 and 1,168 in 1997. The Ombudsman's role is not fully clear to the 
public yet. Many complaints were rejected because they related to 
problems with the judiciary and not the administration.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--APADOR-CH, a 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the International 
Helsinki Federation, reported several cases of police brutality and 
beatings, including several leading to death.
    On September 24, Aurel Uluiteanu of Barcanesti, County Iialomita, 
was taken to the Urziceni court because several villagers had accused 
him of disturbing the public order. Uluiteanu succeeded in escaping 
from the court and returned home. The following morning the deputy 
chief of police went to Uluiteanu's house, found him hiding, and led 
him to the police station. In the afternoon, Uluiteanu's parents were 
informed that their son had died at the police station. Uluiteanus's 
father later found out that the deputy police chief and several young 
men in the village had ``turned the police station into a pub'' on 
September 25 and tortured and beaten his son to death. The case is 
under investigation; meanwhile, a policeman and a civilian involved in 
the case were arrested.
    On September 9, a police officer took Cristian-Venus Dumitrescu and 
his sister, Gianina, from their home in Craiova and drove to the Dolj 
county police inspectorate. The police officer did not show them any 
document to justify the arrest. At the station, the police told 
Dumitrescu that he was charged with having robbed a Korean citizen in 
complicity with three other young men. Dumitrescu's sister said that 
she saw her brother several hours after he was interrogated and that he 
was very red in the face. He told his sister that he was threatened 
with 15 years in jail and that if he could no longer take what was 
happening to him, he would commit suicide. Later in the day, he 
complained to his girlfriend that he was kicked in the liver; his face 
also was swollen. En route to the police lockup, followed by his 
alleged accomplices, Dumitrescu threw himself out of a third floor 
window onto the paved alley below, resulting in his death. The police 
did nothing to prevent this event. The case is under investigation.
    On July 23, the police in Bucharest shot and killed Sevastian 
Apostol, a Rom who was trying to flee a bar where he had a serious 
conflict with the owner and other clients. While in the getaway taxi, 
police shot at the car and killed Apostol, shooting him in the back. 
The case is under investigation.
    In its 1999 annual report, Amnesty International cited numerous 
reports of torture and mistreatment. In one case, a man died of 
suspicious circumstances, apparently as a result of mistreatment. In 
August, Elinoiu Toader was assaulted by a police officer in front of a 
store in Nereju, Vrancea county. The officer then reportedly instructed 
the storeowner to take Toader behind the building and to beat him all 
over his body. The following morning, Toader died in his sister's 
house. In the course of the investigation, a witness allegedly was 
beaten to induce him to sign a statement that Toader had died as a 
result of alcohol abuse. At least two other witnesses were similarly 
threatened. An autopsy stated that Toader had suffered three fractured 
ribs.
    A Bucharest newspaper reported that a police officer shot and 
killed an unarmed Rom on October 27, during a police raid on a group of 
cigarette smugglers.
    In 1996 Gabried Carabuelea died after 3 days in police custody, 
during which he reportedly was beaten severely. After initially ruling 
that there were no grounds for an indictment of the police, the 
military prosecutor's office reopened its investigation; however, in 
March the prosecutor's office dropped the case based on allegedly 
insufficient evidence.
    According to the Government, the chief of police in Valcele was 
indicted in June for the illegal use of his weapon in the 1996 killing 
of Mircea-Muresul Mosor, a Rom from Comani who was shot and killed 
while in police custody. A lower court found the police officer not 
guilty, but the prosecutor's office appealed the verdict in May; the 
superior court's decision was pending at year's end. The military 
prosecutor's office during the year reopened the investigation into the 
case of Istvan Kiss, an ethnic Hungarian allegedly beaten to death by 
police in 1995. In June the prosecutor's office found the death to be 
accidental and did not file charges.
    In several earlier cases of deaths in custody or deaths reportedly 
due to police brutality, investigations and trials still are dragging 
on, years later.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or 
degrading punishment or treatment, and these prohibitions generally 
were respected in practice; however, there were credible reports that 
police beat detainees and improperly used firearms.
    APADOR-CH, an NGO affiliated with the International Helsinki 
Federation, reported several cases of police brutality and beatings, 
including several leading to death (see Section 1.a.).
    In its 1999 annual report, Amnesty International cited numerous 
reports of torture and mistreatment, including one case that resulted 
in death. Also, in seeking to cover up the death of Elinoiu Toader, a 
witness allegedly was beaten to induce him to sign a statement that 
Toader had died as a result of alcohol abuse. At least two other 
witnesses were similarly threatened (see Section 1.a.).
    Roma NGO's claimed that police used excessive force against them. 
In one case such force reportedly resulted in death (see Section 1.a.).
    On April 30, Constantin Buzatu of Craiova reportedly was assaulted 
by a number of individuals, all but one of whom were plainclothes 
policemen. Buzatu's efforts to lodge a complaint were rejected, and he 
was told that he could bring a civil complaint against the one 
assailant who was not a police officer.
    In April 1998, a policeman with whom he had refused to share a pool 
game beat Nicolae Iloaie of Tandareni. Iloaiei was hospitalized for 90 
days. When he asked for a certified medical report for the forensic 
laboratory, the physician in charge refused to issue it. The case is 
under investigation. In August 1998, Fitzeg Sebastian, a student at the 
Catholic Theological College in Bucharest and his older friend were 
arrested as burglars while inquiring in an unfamiliar neighborhood 
about a distant relative. The boys were not informed of their rights 
nor allowed to explain their presence in the neighborhood. They were 
taken to the police precinct where they were beaten and forced to give 
a statement. The case was closed after the police reached a financial 
settlement with the family. In May 1998, Marian Ciulei from Brasov was 
shot in the leg by a policeman while he was running from a 
confrontation in a discotheque. The case is under investigation.
    In April 1998, the Government responded to the 1997 report of the 
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Special Rapporteur received 
allegations of torture and mistreatment of detainees by the police. The 
Government in its response promised in 1998 to make modifications to 
the Criminal Code and to detention regulations, but no such 
modifications had been made by year's end.
    Judicial cases involving military personnel and the police are 
tried in military courts. Local and international human rights groups 
criticize this system, claiming that the military prosecutor's 
investigations are unnecessarily lengthy and often purposefully 
inconclusive, and that some military prosecutors sometimes block proper 
investigation of alleged police abuses. The Government declined to 
provide updated information on cases of alleged police abuse from 1998 
and 1997.
    The prison system is improving slowly as efforts increase to bring 
prisons in line with minimum international standards. The 1999 prison 
budget increased 24 percent over 1998; however, a supplementary $160 (3 
million lei) request in the 1999 budget for prison administration was 
rejected by Parliament. There are now 33 detention institutions. 
Nevertheless, overcrowding remained a serious problem. As of June, in 
the units subordinated to the Directorate General of Prisons 
Administration there were 53,125 persons, almost 20,000 over the legal 
capacity of 33,272 persons. A modern penitentiary opened in January in 
Bucuresti-Rahova that houses 1,400 inmates. Each eight-person cell is 
equipped with a shower, toilet, and two basins. Medical facilities were 
modernized in some prisons, and inmates were allowed to exercise 
outside their cells.
    In May a law providing for alternative sentences for minor offenses 
went into effect. The law provides for community service instead of a 
prison sentence and is aimed at reducing the prison population.
    Human rights organizations continued to report the abuse of 
prisoners by other prisoners and prison authorities. Prisons continued 
to use the ``cell boss'' system, in which some prisoners are designated 
to be in semiofficial charge of other prisoners. However, prison guards 
wore firearms only when guarding prisoners working outside the prison, 
correspondence was no longer opened routinely, and inmates had the 
right to telephone calls. Prison authorities introduced some vocational 
training programs to assist inmates' future integration into society. A 
probation pilot program financed by the Open Society Foundation opened 
in Iasi at the end of 1998 to provide such assistance to minors and 
other young first offenders. Two additional probation centers began 
operations during the year in Gaesti and Tichilesti.
    The Government permitted visits by human rights monitors, and 
several NGO's made such visits.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law forbids the 
detention of anyone for more than 24 hours without an arrest warrant 
from a prosecutor, who may order detention for up to 30 days, and 
authorities generally respect this provision in practice. Detention can 
be extended past the 30-day limit only by a court ruling. Detainees 
have the right to apply for bail and may ask for a hearing before a 
judge. Such a request must be granted within 24 hours.
    Police often do not inform citizens of their rights. The law 
requires the authorities to inform arrestees of the charges against 
them and of their right to an attorney at all stages of the legal 
process. Police must notify defendants of this right in a language they 
understand before obtaining a statement. However, the prosecutor's 
office may delay action on a request for a lawyer for up to 5 days from 
the date of arrest.
    Under the law, minors detained by police and placed under guard in 
a center for the protection of minors are considered by judicial 
authorities to be in detention or under arrest if their age is more 
than 16, or, if aged between 14 and 16, they have consciously committed 
a crime. However, since the Penal Code does not apply to minors in 
these centers until their cases are referred to a prosecutor, police 
are permitted to question them without restriction and may hold those 
suspected of criminal offenses for up to 30 days in such centers. This 
law appears to be in conflict with the Constitution, and both Amnesty 
International and local human rights groups have called on the 
Government to change it.
    According to APADOR-CH, the Interior Ministry issued new 
instructions on detention in August that would, among other things, 
provide for the confidentiality of discussions between detainees and 
their lawyers.
    There were no political detainees during the year.
    Exile was not used as a means of punishment.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the terms of a 1992 law, the 
judicial branch is independent of other government branches; however, 
it remains subject to influence by the executive branch, but there were 
increasing signs of judicial independence during the year. Although 
members of the Senior Council of Magistrates, which controls the 
selection, promotion, transfer and sanctioning of judges, are appointed 
by Parliament from a list provided by the courts and prosecutorial 
offices represented on the council, the Justice Minister may avoid the 
appointment of members he does not want by simply keeping them off the 
agenda.
    The 1992 law reestablished a four-tier legal system, including 
appellate courts, which had ceased to exist under Communist rule. 
Defendants have final recourse to the Supreme Court or, for 
constitutional matters, to the Constitutional Court. The 1992 law that 
reorganized the judicial system divided the Prosecutor General's office 
into 16 local offices (paralleling the appeals court structure) and 
established an office at the Supreme Court; the law also curtailed 
certain powers of the Prosecutor General, including the right to 
overturn court decisions and bypass appeals courts by going directly to 
the Supreme Court.
    The law provides for fair public trial and the presumption of 
innocence. The Penal Code requires that an attorney be appointed for a 
defendant who cannot afford legal representation or is otherwise unable 
to select counsel. In practice, the local bar association provides 
attorneys to the indigent and is compensated by the Ministry of 
Justice. Either a plaintiff or a defendant may appeal. These provisions 
of the law are respected in practice. The law provides that confessions 
extracted as a result of police brutality may be withdrawn by the 
accused when brought before the court.
    In a notable case in January, a criminal appeals court ruled 
against miners' union leader Miron Cozma and overturned the 
Government's implicit deal to protect Cozma from prosecution for his 
role in a miner's strike.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--During the year there were no reported instances of 
interference with individual citizens' right to privacy.
    The Constitution provides for protection against the search of a 
residence without a warrant, but this protection is subordinate to 
``national security or public order.'' The 1992 National Security Law 
defines national security very broadly and lists as threats not only 
crimes such as terrorism, treason, espionage, assassination, and armed 
insurrection but also totalitarian, racist, and anti-Semitic actions or 
attempts to change the existing national borders. Security officials 
may enter residences without proper authorization from a prosecutor if 
they deem a threat to national security ``imminent.''
    The Constitution states that the privacy of legal means of 
communication is inviolable; thus, the Romanian Intelligence Service 
(SRI) is prohibited legally from engaging in political acts (for 
example, wiretapping on behalf of the Government for political 
reasons). However, the law allows the security services to monitor 
communications on national security grounds after obtaining 
authorization. The law requires the SRI to obtain a warrant from the 
``public prosecutor specially appointed by the General Public 
Prosecutor'' in order to carry out intelligence activities involving 
``threats to national security.'' It may engage legally in a wide 
variety of operations to determine if a situation meets the legal 
definition of a threat to national security, or to prevent a crime.
    Legislation that would permit citizens access to secret police 
files kept by the Communist government was passed by the lower chamber 
of Parliament in early October. Under the law, any Romanian or foreign 
citizen who had Romanian citizenship after 1945 is entitled to access 
his file. As subsequently resolved by the mediation committee, 
Securitate files (the Communist-era secret police) are to remain in 
custody of the intelligence service (SRI), which is to decide whether 
to grant access to files based upon the justification given by the 
requester. The bill was passed by the Senate and signed into law by 
President Constantinescu in the fall.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides 
for freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, it limits the 
bounds of free expression by prohibiting ``defamation of the country'' 
and ``offense to authority;'' the Government respected the 
constitutional provisions in practice.
    An amended Penal Code passed by Parliament in 1996 rectified many 
of the shortcomings of the former, Communist-era code. However, the new 
version is criticized by human rights organizations and professional 
journalists for retaining jail terms for those convicted of libel or 
slander, including journalists. Despite official promises that jail 
terms would be removed from penalties for libel and calumny, Parliament 
has yet to amend the relevant sections of the Penal Code. Consequently, 
Articles 205 and 206 concerning libel and calumny and Articles 237 and 
238 concerning offense to authority and defamation of character are 
still in force.
    Many libel suits continued to be brought against journalists under 
these provisions. In January a Bucharest court suspended a jail 
sentence passed on two journalists from the independent daily Monitorul 
de Iasi by a lower court in Iasi in 1998. However, the Bucharest court 
upheld the hefty ``moral damages'' awarded to the plaintiffs, to be 
paid by the Monitorul group. The General Prosecutor appealed the 
sentence with the Supreme Court. In a separate case in late September, 
the European Court of Human Rights made a groundbreaking ruling in 
favor of a journalist convicted to a suspended jail sentence for 
calumny in 1994. The European Human Rights Court found that the 
decisions of the Romanian court violated Article 10 of the Human Rights 
Convention concerning freedom of speech. Domestic media supported the 
ruling and defined it as precedent-setting for the many libel and 
calumny suits.
    The Government failed to rescind the prohibitions on ``defamation 
of the nation'' and ``defamation of public officials'' used to harass 
and punish journalists who report governmental or bureaucratic 
corruption. Several journalists were arrested and tried during the year 
for reporting on corruption by local government officials. Journalists 
who were investigating corruption cases were also targets of violence. 
Marian Tudor, a journalist for the Journalul de Constanta, was attacked 
and thrown from a moving train on September 23 as he was traveling to 
deliver to the printer the draft of an article that described an 
illicit business deal. The assailants took the draft.
    Independent media continued to grow in an increasingly competitive 
market. Several hundred daily and weekly newspapers are published. 
Several private television stations broadcast nationwide, with the 
largest reaching approximately 20 percent of the rural and 80 percent 
of the urban market. There are 72 private television stations and 162 
private radio stations. Approximately 2.8 million households were wired 
for cable, giving significant portions of the population access to both 
private and foreign broadcasts. While Romanian State Television (RTV) 
and Radio Romania remained at year's end the only national broadcasters 
capable of reaching the bulk of the rural population, independent 
stations continued to enlarge their coverage throughout the country by 
over-the-air, cable, and satellite transmissions. In mid-July the 
National Audiovisual Council (CAN) awarded a French media group a 
license for a private radio nationwide broadcasting operation. If 
established, such an operation would break Radio Romania's monopoly as 
the only national radio station.
    The 1994 law establishing a Parliament-appointed Board of Directors 
for RTV was implemented in June 1995.
    Foreign news publications may be imported and distributed freely, 
but high costs, relative to domestic publications, limit their 
circulation.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected that 
right in practice. The law on public assembly provides for the right of 
citizens to assemble peacefully while unarmed, but states that meetings 
must not interfere with other economic or social activities and may not 
be held near locations such as hospitals, airports, or military 
installations. Organizers of demonstrations must inform local 
authorities and police before the event. Authorities may forbid a 
public gathering by notifying the organizers in writing within 48 hours 
of receipt of the request. The law prohibits the organization of, or 
participation in, a counterdemonstration held at the same time as a 
scheduled public gathering.
    The law forbids public gatherings to espouse Communist, racist, or 
Fascist ideologies or to commit actions contrary to public order or 
national security. Unauthorized demonstrations or other violations are 
punished by imprisonment and fines.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. Political parties gain 
legal status if they have at least 10,000 members. (The minimum 
membership required was increased in 1996 in order to reduce the number 
of small parties.) Associations may be granted legal status with proof 
of only 20 founding members and over 200 supporting members.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious 
freedom, and the Government generally does not impede the observance of 
religious belief. However, several denominations continued to make 
credible allegations that low-level government officials and Romanian 
Orthodox clergy impeded their efforts at proselytizing. The press 
reported several instances when adherents of minority religions were 
prevented by others from practicing their faith, and local law 
enforcement authorities did not protect them. Members of religious 
communities not officially recognized by the Government during the year 
again accused government officials of harassment--allegations denied by 
the Government. Proselytizing that involves denigrating recognized 
churches is perceived as provocative.
    Under the provisions of a 1948 decree, the Government recognizes 14 
religions; only the clergy of these recognized religions are eligible 
to receive state financial support. The number of adherents each 
religion had in the last census determines the proportion of the budget 
each recognized religion receives. Representatives of minority 
religious groups dispute the 1992 census results, claiming that census 
takers in some cases argued with citizens over their religious 
affiliation or simply assigned an affiliation in some cases even 
without inquiring about religious affiliation.
    The Romanian Orthodox Church, to which approximately 86 percent of 
the population nominally adhere, predominates. The official 
registration of religious associations is extremely slow because of 
bureaucratic delays; in this regard, smaller religious groups have 
criticized the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs for its 
obstructionist tactics in favor of the Romanian Orthodox Church. 
Members of some religious minorities complain that the revised law on 
cults, if enacted, would not recognize their status as religious 
groups.
    The Government requires religious groups to register and 
establishes the criteria for registration. In order to be recognized as 
a religion, groups must register with the State Secretariat for 
Religious Affairs and present a list with the names, age, identity card 
numbers, addresses, and signatures of their followers. The State 
Secretary of Religions and the President must approve all registration 
applications. Representatives of religious groups that sought to 
register after 1990 allege that the registration process is arbitrary, 
changeable, and unduly influenced by the Romanian Orthodox Church. 
Applicants assert that they do not receive clear instructions 
concerning the requirements and allege that often the time frame in 
which a decision on their application has to be made is not respected 
by the State Secretary of Religions.
    The Government registers religious groups that it does not 
recognize as ``independent religions'' either as religious and 
charitable foundations or as cultural associations.
    In July an Orthodox priest in Bihor obtained from the superior 
court in Bihor an order to stop the construction of a Baptist church, 
claiming that its proximity to an Orthodox cemetery was ``hurting the 
faithful's traditional Orthodox feelings.''
    The Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, or Greek Catholic 
Church, which suffered discrimination in years past from the Romanian 
Orthodox Church and the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, made 
progress in 1998 in recovering some of its former properties. Little 
progress was made with regard to the restitution of church properties 
during 1999. The Greek Catholic Church was disbanded by the Communists 
in 1948 and forced to merge with the Romanian Orthodox Church. The 
latter received most of its properties, including over 2,000 churches 
and other facilities. Since 1990 Greek Catholics have recovered a 
number of their churches. However, in Bixad, Satu Mare county, despite 
a government decision of 1992, the Greek Catholic Church in August 
could not take possession of the buildings which belonged to a Greek 
Catholic monastery because of opposition by local residents led by 
Orthodox priests. A similar incident took place in July in Sercaia, 
Brasov county, when Greek Catholics were driven out of a Greek Catholic 
church, usually kept locked by the Orthodox Church, by Orthodox priests 
aided by local police. In Ardud, Satu Mare county, where the Orthodox 
priest and a large number of believers had switched to the Greek 
Catholic Church, Orthodox officials did not allow Greek Catholics to 
enter the church despite a protocol providing for joint use of the 
facility and two court rulings upholding their right to use the church. 
The congregation was holding services in the open air from August until 
year's end.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places no restrictions on 
travel within the country, except for certain small areas reserved for 
military purposes. Citizens who wish to change their place of work or 
residence do not face any official barriers. The law stipulates that 
citizens have the right to travel abroad freely, to emigrate, and to 
return. In practice, citizens freely exercise these rights.
    The 1996 refugee law implemented the provisions of the 1951 United 
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 
Protocol. This legislation established a refugee office in the Interior 
Ministry to receive, process, and house asylum seekers. 807 
applications for asylum were received in the first 6 months of the 
year.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations. In mid-1998, the 
Interior ministry and the Labor Ministry began funding programs to 
assist asylum seekers and refugees. Financial support provided by the 
Government (reimbursable loans for a period of 6 to 9 months) is 
minimal, usually not enough to cover basic needs. The Government 
provides temporary accommodation in only a few locations; more 
facilities are to open as funds are made available. Programs for 
integrating refugees into society are developing slowly. An increasing 
number of transiting illegal migrants regard the country as a 
springboard to the West.
    There were no reports during the year of the forced return of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
Government through periodic and free elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
    In the wake of the 1996 democratic general elections, the 
Government coalition formed by the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR) 
and the Union of Social Democrats (USD) joined forces with the 
Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR). These parties, along with 
a number of smaller constituent parties, make up the governing 
coalition.
    No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in 
government or politics, but societal attitudes are a significant 
impediment, and women are underrepresented significantly in government 
and politics. Women hold only 5.9 percent of the seats in Parliament. 
There is one female cabinet member.
    The Constitution and electoral legislation grant each recognized 
ethnic minority one representative in the Chamber of Deputies, provided 
that the minority's political organization obtains at least 5 percent 
of the average number of valid votes needed to elect a deputy outright 
(1,784 votes in the 1996 elections). Organizations representing 15 
minority groups elected deputies under this provision in 1996. Ethnic 
Hungarians, represented by the UDMR, obtained parliamentary 
representation through the normal electoral process. Roma are 
underrepresented in Parliament because of low Roma voter turnout and 
internal divisions that worked against the consolidation of votes for 
one candidate, organization, or party. They have not increased their 
Parliamentary representation beyond the one seat provided through the 
Constitution and electoral legislation.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Domestic human rights monitoring groups include the Romanian 
Helsinki Committee (APADOR-CH), the independent Romanian Society for 
Human Rights (SIRDO), the League for the Defense of Human Rights 
(LADO), the Romanian Institute for Human Rights, and several issue-
specific groups such as the Young Generation of Roma and the Center for 
Crisis Intervention and Study, also a Romani NGO. Other groups, such as 
political parties and trade unions, continued to maintain sections 
monitoring the observance of human rights. These groups, as well as 
international human rights organizations, functioned freely without 
government interference.
    The Government cooperates with local and international monitoring 
groups, although some offices are slow to respond to inquiries. Local 
human rights monitoring agencies have found it difficult to obtain 
statistics concerning police abuses. The General Inspectorate of 
Police, which is responsible for investigating such abuses, responds 
unevenly to inquiries from monitors. Often victims are reluctant to 
come forward, and the Government does not promote transparency in this 
regard.
    With the aim of protecting citizens against abuses or capricious 
acts of public officers, the Ombudsman's office envisioned under the 
1991 Constitution was instituted by law in March 1997, and its first 
appointee, Paul Mitroi, took office in June 1997. However, due to a 
lack of office space, the office began working at normal capacity only 
at the beginning of 1998; by the end of August 1999, it had received 
over 2,000 complaints. The office is registering these complaints and 
is obliged by law to provide an initial response within a year of the 
date they were recorded. It deals not just with human rights but with 
all facets of citizens' interaction with the Government.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, nationality, 
ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion and political 
allegiance, wealth, or social background. However, in practice the 
Government does not enforce these provisions effectively, and women, 
Roma, and other minorities are subject to various forms of extralegal 
discrimination. Homosexuals reportedly have been the victims of police 
brutality.
    Women.--Violence against women, including rape, continued to be a 
serious problem. Both human and women's rights groups credibly reported 
that domestic violence is common, and a September report by the U.N. 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) emphasized that violence against women in the 
workplace is not uncommon as their subordinate position exposes them to 
greater risk. According to UNICEF, the country has an average of 108 
sexual incidents per 1,000 women and 41 assaults per 1,000 women. Under 
a government pilot project begun in 1997, a shelter for victims of 
domestic violence opened in Bucharest in 1997. The shelter can 
accommodate only four persons. It received 490 calls for help during 
1998 on a hot line, and registered 230 walk-in victims. Prosecution of 
rape is difficult because it requires both a medical certificate and a 
witness, and a rapist can avoid punishment if he marries the victim. 
There is no specific legislation dealing with spousal abuse or rape, 
and successful prosecution of spousal rape is almost impossible. Police 
are often reluctant to intervene in instances of domestic violence.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution 
continues to be a growing problem. Several domestic prostitution rings 
are active (see Section 6.f.).
    The Constitution grants women and men equal rights. However, in 
practice the Government does not enforce these provisions, nor do the 
authorities focus attention or resources on women's issues.
    Few resources are available for women who experience economic 
discrimination. Despite existing laws and educational equality, women 
have a higher rate of unemployment than men, occupy few influential 
positions in the private sector, and earn lower than average wages. In 
1996 the Government created a department in the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Protection to advance women's concerns and family policies. This 
department organizes programs for women, proposes new laws, monitors 
legislation for sexual bias, targets resources to train women for 
skilled professions, and addresses the problems of single mothers, 
especially in rural areas. In 1998 this department organized with the 
U.N. Development Program a series of conferences on ``promoting gender 
politics.'' An ombudsman was created within the department for child, 
woman and family protection in 1998, but the total budget for women's 
programs for the year was less than $75,000 (1.4 billion lei).
    Children.--The Government administers health care and public 
education programs for children, despite scarce domestic resources. 
International agencies and NGO's supplement government programs in 
these areas. However, living conditions in all child care institutions 
very seriously deteriorated during the year for financial and 
administrative reasons. Inspectors who visited institutions and 
identified humanitarian needs at the request of the European Union 
Commission reported that while conditions were not equally bad in all 
institutions, the general situation in the summer could only be 
described as unacceptable in terms of basic infrastructure as well as 
hygiene, medical care, nutrition, and general assistance. According to 
official statistics, there were 33,000 orphans in state institutions, 
and the number of institutionalized children reportedly has increased 
by 20 percent since 1989.
    There was no perceptible societal pattern of abuse against 
children. Nevertheless, large numbers of impoverished and apparently 
homeless, but not necessarily orphaned, children were seen on the 
streets of the larger cities. The Government does not have statistics 
defining the scope of the problem. NGO's working with children remained 
particularly concerned about the number of minors detained in jail and 
prison. These NGO's continued to seek alternative solutions, such as 
parole for juveniles. Because time served while awaiting trial counts 
as part of the prison sentence but does not count towards time to be 
served in a juvenile detention center, some minors actually requested 
prison sentences.
    The sexual exploitation of children continued to attract press 
attention, and the police staged a few high-publicity arrests of 
foreign pedophiles. Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced 
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). Other issues, such as 
adequate legislation to protect children, received less attention. The 
law does not outlaw pedophilia expressly. Instead, pedophiles are 
charged with rape, corporal harm, and sexual corruption.
    People With Disabilities.--Difficult economic conditions and 
serious budgetary constraints contributed to very difficult living 
conditions for those with physical or mental disabilities. Many 
disabled persons cannot make use of government-provided transportation 
discounts because public transport does not have facilitated access. 
The law does not mandate accessibility for the disabled to buildings 
and public transportation. According to official statistics, there were 
98,000 disabled children living in state institutions.
    Religious Minorities.--Most mainstream politicians publicly have 
criticized anti- Semitism, racism, and xenophobia. However, the fringe 
press continued to publish anti-Semitic harangues. The Romanian 
Orthodox Church has attacked the ``aggressive proselytism'' of 
Protestant and neo-Protestant groups.
    In October a court sentence, Mihai Bogdan Antonescu, editor of the 
weekly Atac la persoana, to a 2-year suspended sentence for publishing 
articles that were intended to spread intolerance toward Jews.
    On September 13, Romanian Television reported that unknown 
perpetrators recently desecrated two tombstones in the Galati Jewish 
cemetery. In early November, vandals destroyed more than 50 tombstones 
in 2 Jewish cemeteries in Transylvania.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Department for the 
Protection of National Minorities has the responsibility to monitor the 
specific problems of persons belonging to ethnic minorities, to 
establish contacts with minority groups, to submit proposals for draft 
legislation and administrative measures, to maintain permanent links 
with local authorities, and to investigate complaints.
    Ethnic Hungarians, numbering more than 1.6 million, constitute the 
largest and most vocal minority, and their UDMR party holds 36 seats in 
the Parliament. Many of the issues addressed in the Romanian-Hungarian 
treaty of 1996 were implemented. Progress was made on economic issues, 
high-level visits, and infrastructure improvements such as border 
crossings. A government decree on Hungarian-language minority education 
was enacted and went into force in 1999. The decree permits students in 
state-funded primary and secondary schools to be taught in their own 
language, with the exception of secondary school courses on the history 
and geography of Romania.
    The Romani population, officially estimated by the Government at 
approximately 400,000, is estimated by the European Commission to 
number between 1.1 and 1.5 million. No cases of ethnically-motivated 
violence against Roma people were reported. However, Romani groups 
complain of routine police brutality, prejudice, and racial harassment 
at the local level. Although those who were involved in 1993 incidents 
in Hadareni, in which three Romani persons died in a house burning, 
were sentenced to terms in prison in 1998, the court rulings have not 
become final as yet because of appeals. The Romanian daily Ziua 
reported on September 7 that the Office for the Fund for Social 
Security and Health in Iasi banned from the Iasi county hospital Roma 
who cannot afford to pay for their medical treatment and cannot prove 
that they have medical insurance provided by the State. An NGO, Liga 
Pro Europa, sent a letter expressing concern to the Department for the 
Protection of National Minorities on September 2. In response, the 
Department opened an investigation on October 7 and requested the 
Ministry of Health to do the same. As of November 29, the ban on Roma 
had not been withdrawn. Some steps have been taken toward establishing 
an institutional framework to improve the conditions of the Roma, but 
in practice little progress has been made. The Department for the 
Protection of National Minorities and a working group of Roma 
associations set up by the Roma community signed an agreement for 
drafting a strategy for the protection of the Roma minority. Meanwhile, 
the Romani population continues to be subject to societal 
discrimination.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers except public employees 
have the right to associate freely, engage in collective bargaining, 
and form and join labor unions without previous authorization. 
Limitations on the right to strike apply only to industries that the 
Government considers critical to the public interest and to other 
public employees. No workers may be forced to join or withdraw from a 
union, and union officials who resign from elected positions and return 
to the regular work force are protected against employer retaliation. 
The majority of workers are members of about 18 nationwide trade union 
confederations and smaller independent trade unions.
    Union members complain that unions must submit their grievances to 
government-sponsored conciliation before initiating a strike, and they 
are frustrated with the courts' propensity to declare illegal the 
majority of strikes on which they have been asked to rule. Past studies 
indicated that the labor legislation adopted in 1991 falls short of 
International Labor Organization (ILO) standards in several areas, 
including the free election of union representatives, binding 
arbitration, and the financial liability of strike organizers. Although 
the 1991 legislation supports collective bargaining as an institution, 
the contracts that result are not always enforceable in a consistent 
manner. Unions representing a wide range of economic sectors carried 
out strikes during the year, often protesting wage levels that did not 
keep pace with the rate of inflation. While most of these strikes ended 
with government promises to improve wages and working conditions, union 
leaders complain that these agreements frequently are not implemented. 
In January striking coal miners from the Jiu Valley launched a march on 
Bucharest to protest mine closures. Due to previous violent miners' 
demonstrations the Government denied them permission to march to 
Bucharest. Defying the government decision, the miners continued on and 
attacked law enforcement officials. However, the Government succeeded 
in restoring order, and the perpetrators of the violence were arrested 
and tried.
    The Government has not followed up on a 1995 ILO recommendation to 
the previous Government to rescind all measures taken against suspended 
union leaders involved in a 1993 strike by railway locomotive 
engineers. Only 2 of the 10 engineers fired in 1993 were offered their 
old jobs back; most of the others were offered retirement pensions. The 
union leaders, who defied a supreme court ruling to suspend the strike 
for 170 days, were fired by the national railway company when the 
strike ended.
    The law stipulates that labor unions should be free from government 
or political party control, a provision that the Government has honored 
in practice. Unions are free to engage in political activity and have 
done so.
    Labor unions may form or join federations and affiliate with 
international bodies. The National Confederation of Trade Unions-Fratia 
and the National Union Bloc are affiliated with the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the European Trade Union 
Confederation. The Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions of Romania 
is affiliated with the World Labor Confederation. Representatives of 
foreign and international organizations freely visit and advise 
domestic trade unionists.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have 
the legal right to bargain collectively, but collective bargaining 
efforts are complicated by continued state control of most industrial 
enterprises and the absence of independent management representatives. 
Basic wage scales for employees of state-owned enterprises are 
established through collective bargaining with the Government (see 
Section 6.e.).
    Antiunion discrimination is prohibited by law.
    Labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country, 
including in the four free trade zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection generally 
enforces this prohibition; however, trafficking in women and girls for 
the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years, but children 
as young as the ages of 14 or 15 may work with the consent of their 
parents or guardians, although only ``according to their physical 
development, aptitude, and knowledge.'' Working children under the age 
of 16 have the right to continue their education, and the law obliges 
employers to assist in this regard. The Ministry of Labor and Social 
Protection has the authority to impose fines and close sections of 
factories to ensure compliance with the law, which it enforces 
effectively. The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded child labor, 
and the Government generally enforces this provision; however, 
trafficking in girls is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f. ).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Most wage rates are established 
through collective bargaining at the enterprise level. However, they 
are based on minimum wages for specific economic sectors and categories 
of workers that the Government sets after negotiations with industry 
representatives and the labor confederations. Minimum wage rates 
generally are observed and enforced. Again during the year, the minimum 
monthly wage, an equivalent of about $60.00 (1.1. million lei), did not 
keep pace with inflation and did not provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. Prices for utility services such as 
water and heating have risen dramatically. However, basic foodstuffs 
and pharmaceutical products are still subject to price ceilings. 
Housing is no longer subsidized.
    The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours or 5 
days, with overtime to be paid for weekend or holiday work or work in 
excess of 40 hours. It also includes a requirement for a 24-hour rest 
period in the workweek, although most workers receive 2 days off. Paid 
holidays range from 18 to 24 days annually, depending on the employee's 
length of service. The law requires employers to pay additional 
benefits and allowances to workers engaged in particularly dangerous or 
difficult occupations.
    Some labor organizations lobby for healthier, safer working 
conditions on behalf of their members. However, neither the Government 
nor industry, which is still mostly state owned, has the resources 
necessary to improve significantly health and safety conditions in the 
workplace. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has established 
safety standards for most industries and is responsible for enforcing 
them. However, it lacks sufficient trained personnel for inspection and 
enforcement, and employers often ignore its recommendations. Although 
they have the right to refuse dangerous work assignments, workers 
seldom invoke it in practice, appearing to value increased pay over a 
safe work environment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women is an 
underreported but persistent problem. The law is vague and outdated and 
does not address trafficking directly. Those involved in trafficking 
may be prosecuted for such offenses as prostitution and procurement, 
falsifying documents, assisting individuals to cross borders illegally, 
blackmail, forced labor, or illegal deprivation of freedom.
    Romania is both a source and a transit country for trafficked women 
and girls. The full extent of the problem is not known, since neither 
the Government nor NGO's maintain statistics on this issue. The only 
official data are for the number of individuals prosecuted for 
prostitution and procurement. The number has been increasing since 
1997, but this phenomenon seems to be due to an increased awareness of 
the problem among law enforcement officials rather than an increase in 
the activities themselves. NGO's that work with women's issues agree 
that several thousand women are trafficked to other countries each 
year. International Organization for Migration representatives in 
Bucharest report that they process two cases a month involving women 
trafficked to other countries who wish to return home. No separate 
statistics exist for children trafficked to other countries.
    It is estimated that there are between 20,000 to 22,000 illegal 
immigrants, and that part of this total is a result of illegal 
trafficking. According to official statistics, 28 groups who tried to 
illegally transit the country were discovered in 1998. Women reportedly 
were trafficked to Turkey, the Netherlands, and other West European 
countries, as well as other former Communist countries, like Poland. In 
1997 the Government of Turkey deported some 7,000 Romanian women. 
Authorities in the Netherlands broke up a trafficking ring late in the 
year that victimized some women from Romania.
    In May police in Braila reportedly summoned women suspected of 
traveling to Turkey to engage in prostitution and threatened them with 
arrest and public exposure of their activities if they refused to 
surrender their passports. Police then confiscated their passports, and 
prevented the women from leaving the country. Several domestic 
prostitution rings are active.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 RUSSIA

    Politically, economically, and socially, Russia continues to be a 
state in transition. While constitutional structures are well defined 
and democratic in conception, democratic institution building continues 
to face serious challenges, often due to significant limitations on the 
State's financial resources. The 1993 Constitution establishes a 
government with three branches and checks and balances, although it 
provides for a strong executive. The executive branch consists of an 
elected president and a government headed by a prime minister. There is 
a bicameral legislature (Federal Assembly), consisting of the State 
Duma and the Federation Council, and a judicial branch. Both the 
President and the legislature were selected in competitive elections 
judged to be largely free and fair, with a broad range of political 
parties and movements contesting offices. President Boris Yeltsin was 
elected in 1996, and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin took office in 
August. A more centrist-leaning Duma was elected on December 19 in 
elections that were judged by international observers to be largely 
free and fair, although preelection manipulation of the media was a 
problem. On December 31, President Yeltsin resigned and Prime Minister 
Putin became Acting President. A presidential election is scheduled for 
March 2000. The judiciary, although still seriously impaired by a lack 
of resources and corruption, has shown signs of limited independence.
    The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security 
Service (FSB), the Procuracy, and the Federal Tax Police are 
responsible for law enforcement at all levels of government throughout 
the Russian Federation. The FSB has broad law enforcement functions, 
including fighting crime and corruption, in addition to its core 
responsibilities of security, counterintelligence, and 
counterterrorism. The FSB operates with only limited oversight by the 
Procuracy and the courts. The military's primary mission is national 
defense, although it has been employed in local, internal conflicts for 
which it was prepared inadequately, and is available to control civil 
disturbances. More recently, internal security threats in parts of the 
Russian Federation have been dealt with by militarized elements of the 
security services. These same organizations are tasked with domestic 
law enforcement. Many members of the security forces, particularly 
within the internal affairs apparatus, continued to commit human rights 
abuses.
    The economy has performed better than expected following the August 
1998 financial crisis and the sharp devaluation of the ruble. 
Industrial production reached its 1997 level again in March and 
continues to grow. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth for the year was 
estimated at 1.5 percent, substantially higher than previously 
expected. At year's end, GDP was estimated at $75 billion (1.84 
trillion rubles) for the first 6 months of the year. GDP per capita for 
the first 6 months of the year was $85 (2,086 rubles) per month. The 
inflation rate for the first 11 months of the year was 34.8 percent and 
was not expected to exceed 40 percent by year's end. Growth in 
industrial production is aided by high world prices for commodities 
such as oil, gas, and nickel. The ruble's devaluation also has given 
domestic producers a significant cost advantage over imported goods. 
However, greatly reduced domestic demand limits the scope of economic 
recovery. Real incomes shrank significantly during the year, and wage 
arrears continued to increase. Average wages were $66 (1,717 rubles) 
per month in October 1999, compared with $68 (1,123 rubles) per month 
in October 1998. Real consumer spending is still 11 percent below the 
1997 average. Lack of investment also inhibits sustained economic 
growth. Although the ruble devaluation in August and September 1998 
made Russian assets inexpensive, foreign investment has not increased. 
Domestic investment is being funded mainly from retained earnings. The 
ailing banking system also hampers domestic investment. The 1998 crash 
reduced the total assets in commercial banks by 52 percent. The public 
is wary of the private banking system, preferring to keep its money in 
state-owned Sberbank, where deposits have grown by 50 percent. The 
government statistics office estimates that the informal economy--
barter and hidden commercial activity designed to avoid heavy tax and 
regulatory burdens--accounts for 24 percent of GDP. However, other 
authoritative sources believe it to be much higher. Corruption 
continues to be a dominant, negative factor in the development of 
commercial relations. Official unemployment was 11.7 percent in 
October, but actual unemployment was estimated at approximately 23 
percent, with significant regional variation.
    The Government's human rights record remained uneven, and worsened 
in some areas. Government forces killed numerous civilians through the 
use of indiscriminate force in Chechnya, and security officials' 
beatings resulted in numerous deaths. There were credible reports--and 
government officials admitted--that law enforcement and correctional 
officials tortured and severely beat detainees and inmates, and 
government forces reportedly raped civilians following the battle for 
the Chechen town of Alkhan-Yurt. Prison conditions continue to be 
extremely harsh and frequently are life threatening. According to human 
rights groups, between 10,000 and 20,000 detainees and prison inmates 
die in penitentiary facilities annually, some from beatings, but most 
as a result of overcrowding, inferior sanitary conditions, disease, and 
lack of medical care. The Government has made little progress in 
combating abuses committed by soldiers, including ``dedovshchina'' 
(violent hazing of new recruits). Military justice systems consistent 
with democratic practices remain largely underdeveloped. During the 
year, the military procuracy reported decreases in the number of 
reported crimes and hazing incidents. Existing laws on military courts, 
military service, and the rights of service members often contradict 
the Constitution, federal laws, and presidential decrees, elevating 
arbitrary judgments of unit commanders over the rule of law. There were 
reports of military officers and units sending soldiers to the front 
lines in Chechnya as punishment instead of using the military justice 
system. Such incidents reportedly were being investigated by military 
procurators.
    Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems. Police and other 
security forces in various parts of the country continued their 
practice of targeting citizens from the Caucasus and darker-skinned 
persons in general for arbitrary searches and detention on the pretext 
of fighting crime and enforcing residential registration requirements. 
Police corruption also remains a problem. Lengthy pretrial detention 
remained a serious problem. Institutions such as the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs have begun to educate officers about safeguarding 
human rights during law enforcement activities through training 
provided by other countries, but remain largely unreformed and have not 
yet adopted practices fully consistent with standards of law 
enforcement in a democratic society. While the President and the 
Government have supported human rights and democratic practice in 
statements and policy initiatives, they have not institutionalized the 
rule of law required to protect them. Most abuses occur at lower 
levels, but government officials do not investigate the majority of 
cases of abuse and rarely dismiss or discipline the perpetrators.
    The Government made little progress in the implementation of 
constitutional provisions for due process, fair and timely trial, and 
humane punishment. In addition, the judiciary often was subject to 
manipulation by central and local political authorities and was plagued 
by large case backlogs and trial delays. However, there were 
indications that the law is becoming an increasingly important tool for 
those seeking to protect human rights. Nonetheless, serious problems 
remain. For example, the case of Aleksandr Nikitin, a retired Soviet 
Navy captain and environmental reporter, continued to be characterized 
by serious violations of due process, and there are credible charges 
that the FSB's case against him was politically motivated. St. 
Petersburg judge Sergey Golets found Nikitin not guilty on charges of 
treason and espionage in December after the FSB for the eighth time 
filed espionage charges against Nikitin in July.
    Authorities continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights. 
Government technical regulations that require Internet service 
providers to invest in equipment that enables the FSB to monitor 
Internet traffic caused serious concern. While the Government generally 
respected freedom of the press, significant systemic problems 
persisted, and there were continued reports of government pressure on 
the media. Private media, which flourished through the first half of 
1998, came under increasing stress in the months after the August 1998 
financial crisis. Faced with major financial difficulties, many media 
organizations saw their already tenuous autonomy erode during the year. 
Federal, regional, and local governments continued to exert pressure on 
journalists by: Selectively denying access to information (including, 
for example, statistics theoretically available to the public) and 
filming opportunities; demanding the right to approve certain stories 
prior to publication; prohibiting the tape recording of public trials 
and hearings; withholding financial support from government media 
operations that exercised independent editorial judgment; attempting to 
unduly influence the appointment of senior editors at regional and 
local newspapers and broadcast media organizations; and removing 
reporters from their jobs and bringing libel suits against them. 
Foreign and Russian journalists were frequent victims of kidnapings for 
ransom by criminals in Chechnya and throughout the northern Caucasus.
    The Federal Government took steps to mitigate the potentially 
discriminatory effects of the 1997 religion law, and religious 
organizations, despite the severe limitations of the beleaguered 
judicial system, are winning some important court cases. By July 
religious groups reported that they were reregistering their local 
organizations successfully, although problems persisted in some 
regions. However, there are numerous reports that religious 
organizations either were denied registration or experienced long 
delays in reregistration, as local authorities sought to obstruct the 
activities of religious groups. On November 23, the Constitutional 
Court upheld the provision of the 1997 religion law that requires 
religious organizations to prove 15 years of existence in the country 
in order to be registered. However, the Court also ruled that religious 
organizations that were registered before the passage of the 1997 
religion law are not required to prove 15 years' existence in the 
country in order to be registered. Religious organizations and human 
rights experts have suggested repeatedly that the law be amended to 
extend the period for reregistration, to prevent a scenario in which a 
large number of religious organizations are left unregistered and 
therefore legally vulnerable to closure by court order after year's 
end. No extension was implemented as of December 31.
    While the Federal Government promised to implement measures to 
discourage local authorities from attempting to close unregistered 
religious organizations, critics of the law fear that at least some 
religious organizations may be forced to close. Discriminatory 
practices at the local level are attributable to the increased 
decentralization of power, as well as to government inaction and 
discriminatory attitudes that are held widely in society. In addition, 
some regional governments have passed laws and decrees since 1994 that 
restrict the activities of minority religious groups, some of which 
have been subject to harassment as a result. Societal discrimination, 
harassment, and violence against members of religious minorities 
remained a problem. Although there were improvements in some areas, 
there were continued reports of religious violence in the Northern 
Caucasus and several serious anti-Semitic incidents.
    Despite constitutional protections for citizens' freedom of 
movement, the Government places some limits on this right, and some 
regional and local authorities (most notably the city of Moscow) 
restrict movement through residence registration mechanisms. These 
restrictions, though successfully challenged in court, remain largely 
in force and are tolerated by the Federal Government. The presence of 
these restrictions, which increased following terrorist bombings in 
September, demonstrated the continued obstacles to the enforcement of 
judicial rulings. In September Moscow authorities expelled some 500 
residents of the Caucasus from the city.
    Government human rights institutions are still weak and lack 
independence but are becoming more active. Although Human Rights 
Ombudsman Oleg Mironov was not known previously for expertise in human 
rights, he has taken an increasingly active and public role in 
promoting human rights, speaking out on the religion law, the rights of 
psychiatric patients, and electoral rights. Mironov has established an 
office with 150 staff members, who are responsible for investigating 
human rights complaints and promoting human rights education. Activists 
report that the Presidential Human Rights Commission, chaired by 
Vladimir Kartashkin, was relatively inactive during the year. With few 
exceptions, human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) 
documented and reported on human rights violations without governmental 
interference or sanctions. However, some local officials harassed human 
rights monitors and, in some cases, arrested them. Violence against 
women, trafficking in women and young girls, and abuse of children 
remain problems, as does discrimination against women and religious and 
ethnic minorities. There are some limits on worker rights, and there 
were reports of instances of forced labor.
    Chechen separatists also committed abuses, including the killing of 
civilians.
    The 1997 Khasavyurt Accord established an uneasy peace in Chechnya 
following the 1994-96 conflict. However, on August 8, the status quo 
was broken when armed groups from Chechnya carried out an insurgent 
raid on neighboring Dagestan. Deadly terrorist bombings throughout 
Russia, allegedly the work of Chechens, were cited by the Government 
along with insurgent attacks in Dagestan as justification to launch a 
brutal assault on Chechnya to reassert federal control. Russian troops 
launched a full-scale attack on Chechen separatists in Chechnya 
starting in September, shelling cities, killing numerous civilians, and 
displacing hundreds of thousands of persons.
    On February 3, Chechen republic president Maskhadov announced the 
suspension of constitutional law and declared a state of Islamic 
Shari'a law in the region. According to press reports, a shura 
(council) of prominent figures came into being on February 10 to help 
oversee Shari'a law. In the process, the Maskhadov government stripped 
the region's legislature of most of its responsibilities and abolished 
the region's vice presidency.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed political killings by agents of the Government; however, an 
undetermined number--between 10,000 and 20,000--of detainees and prison 
inmates died, some from beatings by security officials, but most due to 
harsh conditions in detention (see Section 1.c.).
    During the conflict in Chechnya in the fall, the military used 
indiscriminate force against areas containing significant civilian 
populations, resulting in numerous deaths (see Section 1.g.). On 
November 25, drunken soldiers opened fire on a Chechen kiosk and killed 
one woman, Larisa Titiyeva, and injured two others. Authorities in both 
the army and the Interior Ministry together with local authorities were 
investigating the case at year's end.
    In December human rights NGO's and some pro-Moscow Chechen 
authorities alleged that government forces carried out extrajudicial 
killings in the village of Alkhan-Yurt in Chechnya. According to these 
allegations, government forces engaged in a looting spree in Alkhan-
Yurt after they captured the village from Chechen fighters in early 
December. According to some accounts, government troops killed between 
19 and 41 civilians through mid-December. The Ministry of Defense at 
first denied that there were extrajudicial killings in Alkhan-Yurt but 
later announced that the Chief Military Procurator's office was 
investigating the incident (see Section 1.g.).
    Human rights NGO's and press organizations reported that up to 40 
Ingushetiya-bound internally displaced persons (IDP's) were killed in a 
convoy attack on December 3 near Goity, southwest of Groznyy. Survivors 
of the incident reported that the assailants, who were masked, wore 
Russian armed forces uniforms. Some survivors claimed that the 
assailants were government troops. However, government officials 
publicly denied such suggestions and claimed that Chechen fighters 
carried out the attack as a provocation. At least one government 
official claimed that the site of the convoy attack was not under 
federal government control at that time.
    According to unconfirmed press reports, police in the Nogai okrug 
killed two Nogais (see Section 5).
    A number of government officials were murdered. Some of these 
killings appear to have been politically motivated, while the majority 
were linked to private financial or commercial dealings. A number of 
law enforcement officials also were killed as a result of their 
attempts to stem crime.
    On April 9, in St. Petersburg local Liberal Democratic Party of 
Russia (LDPR) leader Gennadiy Tuganov was murdered near his home on the 
Griboyedova channel embankment. While the LDPR considered the killing 
to be a political murder, many observers believed that it was business-
related.
    On October 20, St. Petersburg legislative assembly deputy Viktor 
Novoselov was killed when a bomb was detonated on top of his car. 
Novoselov's driver also was injured as a result of the bombing. Press 
sources speculated that the murder was politically motivated since 
Novoselov was set to testify at a hearing later that day about the date 
of gubernatorial elections, and his testimony might have proved 
embarrassing to St. Petersburg administration officials.
    In December prior to the Duma elections, a campaign worker for 
former St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak was killed by unknown 
assailants.
    According to an international labor organization report, on January 
27 unknown assailants murdered Gennady Borisov, a leader of the Vnukovo 
Airlines Technical and Ground Personnel Union, at the entrance to his 
apartment. Earlier that month, Borisov and other labor activists began 
picketing the airline headquarters to protest their not being paid for 
4 months. Borisov also reportedly was monitoring alleged illegal 
practices involving the company's shares (see Section 6.a.).
    Politically related violence at times resulted in death and 
injuries. For example, in April and May the republic of Karachayevo-
Cherkesiya (in the northern Caucasus) held its first presidential 
elections in post-Soviet history. The campaign period and elections 
were filled with incidents of violence aimed at the major candidates, 
as well as a high number of election irregularities that strongly 
suggested electoral fraud. The ensuing victory of Vladimir Semenev, 
which was upheld by local authorities, renewed the protests that now 
threaten the republic's territorial integrity. On September 7, eight 
persons were wounded and one died as a result of injuries during 
clashes between supporters of Semenev and his rival Cherkessk mayor 
Stanislav Derev (see Sections 1.c., 3, and 5).
    On November 23, the supreme court of Kalmykiya found Sergey Vaskin 
and Vladimir Shanukov guilty of the June 1998 murder of Kalmykiya 
newspaper editor Larisa Yudina. Both men were sentenced to 21 years in 
prison. A third man, Sergey Lipin, received a lesser sentence for 
concealing information about the crime. The trial began in July. 
Yudina's murder was widely believed to be regional government 
retribution for her news stories investigating high-level corruption in 
the republic and criticizing Kalmykiya president Kirsan Ilyumzhinov 
(see Section 2.a.). In his August 16 Duma confirmation hearing, Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin testified that the FSB continues to investigate 
who may have ordered the killing.
    In July 1998, the Ministry of the Interior announced that four 
hired killers who were apprehended in the Kyrgyz Republic had confessed 
to the August 1997 killing of St. Petersburg deputy mayor Mikhail 
Manevich. Media reports at the time of Manevich's murder suggested that 
Manevich, who was chairman of the city property committee, was killed 
by individuals whose financial interests were threatened by his 
property privatization program. The person or persons who ordered the 
murder have not been identified. The FSB has expressed confidence in 
its ability to solve Manevich's murder, but former St. Petersburg mayor 
Anatoliy Sobchak said that he no longer believed that the murder would 
be solved.
    In January authorities arrested a sixth person from the Ministry of 
Defense, Deputy Chief of the Special Paratroopers' Detachment Major 
Konstantin Mirziayev, in connection with the 1994 murder of journalist 
Dmitriy Kholodov. In July Kommersant Daily reported that the Procurator 
General charged three officers of the airborne troops, one former 
officer, and another man in the case. A trial is expected in military 
court in the spring 2000.
    No one has been charged yet in the November 1998 murder of State 
Duma Deputy Galina Starovoytova, who was murdered in what press reports 
characterized as a professional killing. Press reports at the time of 
the murder suggested that Starovoytova was killed to prevent her from 
revealing information on official corruption. Duma Deputy Yuliy Rybakov 
sent an official inquiry to the FSB, which replied that a politically-
motivated murder is still the main scenario that it is investigating.
    There has been no progress in the investigation of the 1995 murder 
of Russian Public Television (ORT) Director Vladislav Listyev. However, 
ITAR-TASS reported in March that investigators believe that his murder 
may have been connected with the division of the ORT's advertising 
market.
    Reports of violence continue in the Northern Caucasus. On February 
20, an explosion in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, killed one 
person and narrowly missed a group of Russian soldiers. On March 21, a 
bomb in downtown Groznyy killed one person and injured eight others in 
an apparent attempt to kill Chechen president Maskhadov. According to 
press reports, the bombing was the fourth attempt to kill Maskhadov 
since he became president in 1997. Chechen officials later claimed that 
the bombing was aimed, in conjunction with the Gennadiy Shpigun 
kidnaping, at destabilizing the political environment and discrediting 
the government (see Section 1.b.).
    On March 19, an explosion in the central marketplace of the North 
Ossetian regional capital of Vladikavkaz killed at least 53 persons and 
injured about 100 more. Russian media reports attributed the explosion 
to a bomb. President Yeltsin and North Ossetian president Aleksandr 
Dzasokhov both criticized the explosion as an attempt to destabilize 
the republic and the Northern Caucasus region as a whole. President 
Yeltsin sent then-Interior Minister Sergey Stepashin to Vladikavkaz and 
ordered then-Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to launch an 
investigation into the bombing.
    Since the Vladikavkaz marketplace bombing, a wave of similar 
attacks unsettled the situation in North Ossetia. In May three bombs in 
the Sputnik military housing compound killed 4 persons and injured 15. 
On June 3, an antitank mine killed one person and injured two others 
near the Baku-Novorossisk oil pipeline.
    On May 23, gunmen injured Danilbek Tamkaev, an adviser to Chechen 
president Maskhadov, and killed his brother when they shot at his car 
in Groznyy. On May 25, a bomb hit the car of Chechen mufti Akhmad-hadji 
Kadyrov in Groznyy and killed five of his bodyguards.
    On August 31, an explosion at the Manezh shopping center in Moscow 
resulted in the death of 1 person and injuries to 40 more. On September 
4, a powerful car bomb exploded on a military base in Buynaksk, a town 
in central Dagestan. The bomb was detonated near a military housing 
facility, and as many as 64 persons were killed and 145 were injured. 
Most of the victims were family members of officers serving in the 
region. On September 9, an explosion leveled an apartment complex in 
Moscow and killed 94 persons. Early in the morning of September 13, a 
bomb blast destroyed an apartment building in Moscow, killing at least 
118 persons. On September 14, authorities arrested two men in 
connection with the bombing and were seeking another three suspects. In 
the following week, authorities detained more than two dozen suspects, 
detained illegal residents and aliens, and confiscated over 6 tons of 
explosives, drugs, and weapons. Government officials implied that 
Chechnya-based Islamic extremist groups were responsible for the 
bombings but have not presented any evidence or pressed charges against 
any individuals by year's end. Human rights activists argued that the 
authorities detained and discriminated against persons from the 
Caucasus in conducting their investigation (see Sections 1.d. and 5). 
On November 3, Moscow police reported that they had filed charges 
against a suspect in the bombings who they believed was loyal to 
militants in Chechnya.
    Religious figures also were kidnaped, tortured, and killed during 
the year (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., and 5).
    In January Chechen field commander Salman Raduev told reporters 
that he had ordered the April 1997 railway bombing in Pyatigorsk that 
killed 2 persons and injured 20, but that the 2 Chechen women on trial 
in Stavropol for the bombing were not those responsible and had 
confessed only after being tortured by authorities. An FSB spokesman 
denied these claims.
    On February 24, the Supreme Court countermanded the decision of a 
Moscow oblast court in the 1995 murder and kidnaping of legislator 
Sergey Skorochkin. The Supreme Court returned the case to the Moscow 
court for a new trial. In November 1998, a jury found four suspects not 
guilty and two others guilty only of kidnaping. In December 1998, the 
Moscow oblast procurator's office appealed the Moscow oblast court 
sentence.
    On April 20, the Moscow Military Court began hearing the case 
against Valeriy Radchikov, former chair of the Russian Fund of Invalids 
of the War in Afghanistan, and 2 alleged accomplices, in the November 
1996 Kotlyakovo cemetery bombing that left 14 persons dead and about 30 
wounded. At the hearing the two accomplices recanted their previous 
testimony against Radchikov, which they said had been made under 
pressure from the police and the procuracy. When the Court questioned 
Radchikov, he claimed that an investigator from the Procurator 
General's office had pressured him to incriminate former Prime Minister 
Viktor Chernomyrdin, former presidential administration head Anatoliy 
Chubays, and former federation council chairman Vladimir Shumeyko.
    There has been no resolution to the December 1998 beheading of four 
foreign telecommunications workers, whom kidnapers had been holding 
hostage in Chechnya for 2 months (see Section 1.b.). Chechnya's deputy 
procurator general told Interfax in March that his office had finished 
an investigation of the case, arrested four unnamed suspects, and 
passed their cases to the republic's supreme Shari'a court. He also 
claimed that another four unnamed suspects in the case already had been 
sentenced to death. For his part, then-Interior Minister Stepashin 
charged in a January interview that Arbi Barayev--a prominent Chechen 
warlord--was involved in the case.
    Meanwhile, no formal charges have been filed in the investigation 
into the December 1996 attack on the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC) compound in Novyy Atagi, Chechnya, during which six ICRC 
workers were killed and one was wounded.
    There were no developments in the 1998 murder of St. Petersburg 
city official Yevgeniy Agarev, although the investigation into the case 
reportedly continues. There were no developments in the 1998 murders of 
Deputy Representative of the Russian Federation to the Chechen republic 
Akmal Saidov, Dagestani mufti Said-Mukhamed Abubakarov, or Chechen 
official Shadid Bargishev, the 1996 murder of U.S. businessman Paul 
Tatum, or in the 1990 murder of Orthodox priest Aleksandr Men.
    Chechen separatists killed a number of civilians (see Section 
1.g.). There were credible Russian press reports that Chechen 
separatists tortured and killed a number of civilians (see Section 
1.c).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of government involvement 
in cases of politically motivated disappearances. Kidnaping frequently 
is used by criminal groups in the Northern Caucasus, some of which may 
have links to elements of the former insurgent forces. The main 
motivation behind such cases apparently is ransom, although some cases 
have political or religious overtones (see Section 5). Many of the 
hostages were being held in Chechnya. The Chechen interior ministry's 
chief of staff said in August that the ministry registered 76 kidnaping 
cases in the first half of the year but added that the real number of 
cases was higher. Otherwise, there were no reports of disappearance as 
a precursor to a political killing, although a number of persons 
remained missing at year's end.
    On February 23, Chechen president Maskhadov's adviser on relations 
with ethnic Russians, himself a Russian, was kidnaped in Groznyy.
    On March 5, unknown assailants abducted Major-General Gennadiy 
Shpigun--the Interior Ministry's special envoy to Chechnya--from his 
airplane at Groznyy airport. Although the motives behind Shpigun's 
kidnaping are unclear, Russian press reports indicate that his role in 
the 1994-96 Chechen war earned him much local animosity. Although 
Chechen law enforcement officials later claimed to have issued arrest 
warrants for six unnamed assailants, Shpigun remains missing.
    U.S. missionary and university instructor Herbert Gregg was 
kidnaped in the Dagestan capital of Makhachkala in November 1998. The 
kidnapers tortured Gregg and cut off one of his fingers during his 
captivity in order to extort ransom (see Section 5). In January 
Dagestani law enforcement officials told the Russian press that they 
had arrested four unnamed suspects in connection with the Gregg case. 
Russian and Ingush interior ministry troops later freed Gregg on June 
29. Other religious figures also were kidnaped (see Sections 1.a. and 
5).
    Geraldo Cruz Ribero, a New Zealander and ICRC medical 
administrator, was kidnaped in the Kabardino-Balkariya capital of 
Nalchik on May 15. Russian and Ingush interior ministry forces freed 
Ribero late in July. A Russian Interior Ministry official told 
reporters that his counterparts had arrested four persons--three 
Chechens and a resident of Kabardino-Balkariya--in connection with the 
kidnaping.
    According to press reports, in December authorities arrested 
Salavdi Abdurazakov, a Chechen who is suspected of organizing the 1997 
kidnaping of five Russian television journalists in Chechnya. 
Abdurazakov reportedly was sent to Moscow immediately for judicial 
proceedings.
    Chechen authorities frequently have claimed that they are fighting 
kidnapers actively. New Chechen laws call for jail terms or public 
executions of kidnapers.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, violence, and other 
brutal or humiliating treatment or punishment; however, there are 
credible reports that law enforcement personnel regularly use torture 
to coerce confessions from suspects, and that the Government does not 
hold most of them accountable for these actions. For the most part, the 
Government does not hold perpetrators accountable for these actions. 
There are also a few claims of abuse of psychiatry by authorities. 
Institutions such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs have begun to 
educate officers about safeguarding human rights during law enforcement 
activities through training provided by other countries but remain 
largely unreformed and have not yet adopted practices fully consistent 
with law enforcement in a democratic society.
    Prisoners' rights groups, as well as other human rights groups, 
have documented numerous cases in which law enforcement and 
correctional officials tortured and beat detainees and suspects. An 
Amnesty International researcher has described the practice of torture 
as ``widespread.'' Numerous press reports indicate that the police 
frequently strike persons based on little or no provocation or use 
excessive force to subdue those whom they arrest. Observers noted that 
persons attempting to vandalize a foreign consulate in St. Petersburg 
on two separate occasions in March and May were beaten severely with 
fists, feet, and nightsticks by police. Reports by refugees, NGO's, and 
the press suggest a pattern of beatings, arrests, and extortion by 
police against persons with dark skin, or who appeared to be from the 
Caucasus, Central Asia, and Africa (see Sections 2.d. and 5). Police 
also have used excessive force in dealing with demonstrators. In 
September after terrorist bombings in Moscow, law enforcement officers 
detained and beat persons from the Caucasus. Police also increasingly 
targeted defense lawyers for harassment, including beatings and 
arrests, and intimidated witnesses (see Section 1.e.). Police plant 
drugs and other false evidence as pretexts for arrests, arrest and 
detain persons based on their political views and religious beliefs, 
and conduct illegal searches of homes (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 
2.c.). Police extort money from suspects, their friends, and their 
relatives (see Section 1.d.). Government forces in Chechnya killed 
numerous persons and injured many others. In one incident in November, 
government troops opened fire on doctors and other medical staff at a 
psychiatric hospital, injuring three persons (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.g.). According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped 
civilian women in Chechnya in December in the village of Alkhan-Yurt 
and in other villages.
    In October Ministry of Justice troops stormed the Vyborgskyi paper 
mill in Leningrad oblast and opened fire on workers who had barricaded 
themselves in the factory's administration building. The workers were 
protesting the mill's new foreign ownership. Minister of Justice Yuriy 
Chayka admitted to the Duma later that month that the troops' actions 
were ``lawful in form, but digressed from the law in content'' (see 
Section 6.c.).
    According to Human Rights Watch's (HRW) report on torture in Russia 
released in November, torture by police officers usually occurs within 
the first few hours or days of arrest and usually takes one of four 
forms: Beatings with fists, batons, or other objects; asphyxiation 
using gas masks or bags (sometimes filled with mace); electric shocks; 
or suspension of body parts (e.g. suspending a victim from the wrists, 
which are tied together behind the back). Allegations of torture are 
difficult to substantiate because of lack of access to medical 
professionals, and because the techniques used often leave few or no 
permanent physical traces. The HRW research appears to support the 
conclusions reached in Amnesty International's 1997 report on torture. 
Amnesty International also reported the use of ``press-camera,'' a 
system whereby violent prisoners are coopted by guards and used to 
control or punish other prisoners. The coopted prisoners are permitted 
to torture prisoners (sometimes to gain confessions) or deal with 
``difficult'' prisoners. The ``crucifixion of Christ'' involves the 
victim being secured in a spread-eagle position to either a metal cot 
or prison bars, to which powerful electric shocks are applied. These 
allegations have been corroborated by other credible sources.
    Torture is forbidden by Article 21 of the Constitution; however, 
since ``torture'' has never been defined in a subsequent law or the 
Criminal Code, it is difficult to charge perpetrators. Police only can 
be accused of ``exceeding'' granted authority, a far milder violation 
of the Criminal Code.
    Research conducted by HRW indicates that the country's justice 
system encourages police to resort to torture and hampers an adequate 
defense of the accused. Law enforcement organs are expected to meet an 
unreasonably high 80 percent target rate for solving crimes, despite 
the loss of experienced officers and underfunding since the breakup of 
the Soviet Union. The official rate for crimes solved in 1998 was 74.4 
percent; experts consider a 30 to 40 percent rate to be consistent with 
democratic practices and international standards for due process.
    Sergey Pashin, a judge in a Moscow appeals court, has stated 
repeatedly that in the cases that come before him, confessions often 
have been beaten out of suspects. He also charged that ``witnesses'' 
often have been beaten to force them into testifying, when in fact they 
may have no knowledge of the case. As Pashin told the press in the 
fall, he estimates that out of 1,200 official torture complaints 
received in the country annually, only 20 criminal investigations are 
opened, and only 3 or 4 go to trial. In a letter to then-Minister of 
Internal Affairs Stepashin in the fall of 1998, Human Rights Ombudsman 
Mironov reported that 50 percent of prisoners with whom he spoke 
claimed to have been tortured. In April 1998, the Permanent Human 
Rights Chamber, an advisory presidential committee, concluded that 
torture was ``common'' among representatives of the Ministry of 
Interior, and that it was ``widespread and systematic,'' especially in 
the pretrial stages of law enforcement. Yakov Pister, head of the 
administration of the Procurator General's office, testified to the 
Chamber that the Criminal Code has no definition of torture, and that 
no statistics were gathered on the use of torture. He blamed police 
reliance on torture as a means of gathering evidence on a lack of 
professional training. HRW researchers confirm that no centralized 
information on torture is available in the country, and that regional 
human rights groups are able to document cases in some regions but not 
others.
    HRW noted that the quality of criminal investigations is low and 
that they can drag out endlessly. Assuming that they are aware of their 
rights under the law, defendants often are not granted access to 
defense attorneys or to medical treatment. Pretrial detention 
conditions are so miserable that defendants sometimes confess simply to 
be moved to relatively easier prison conditions. Retractions of 
extorted confessions usually are ignored. The accused can spend many 
months or even years in pretrial detention because the current criminal 
procedure code allows judges to send cases back for investigation an 
unlimited number of times.
    Caucasus Press reported on June 22 that authorities beat and 
arrested 14 Azerbaijani citizens in Moscow in June. The newspaper 
Express reported that day that some 34 Azerbaijanis were beaten and 
arrested as a part of a police search for 6 prisoners who escaped from 
an Irkutsk penal colony.
    The Moscow Times reported on September 1, that the local 
procurator's office has been unaccountably slow to resume investigation 
of the case of Aleksey Mikheyev, who jumped out of a third-story window 
to escape torture by Nizhniy Novgorod police in September 1998. 
Mikheyev, now paralyzed from the waist down as a result of his fall, 
said that he was tortured repeatedly with electric shocks. He was 
forced to confess to the murder and rape of a young woman (who turned 
up 2 days after the torture occurred); police also attempted to extract 
confessions to five other unsolved murders.
    In April 1998, Olga Smirnova testified before the Human Rights 
Chamber of the President's Political Consultative Council that she had 
been raped and beaten over the course of a 10-day detention in 1994 at 
a Moscow police station. Police were trying to force her to testify as 
a witness in a criminal case of which she had no knowledge. She said 
that she tried three times to file a complaint with the district 
procurator's office, but that her complaint was rejected each time. 
Valeriy Abramkin of the Moscow Center for Promotion of Criminal Justice 
Reform (MCPCJR) said that the Moscow procurator's office finally 
ordered an investigation into the case, but as of the end of 1998 it 
had not been completed. Although the MCPCJR continues to follow this 
case, no new information was available as of September 1.
    Under the Operation Clean Hands program, created in 1995, MVD 
officials continued to work to combat police crime. By the end of 1998, 
more than 34,000 citizen complaints had been lodged against police 
officers. Over 2,100 cases have been initiated against police 
personnel. Of that number, 922 were group crimes and 127 included 
civilian perpetrators.
    Various abuses against military servicemen, including but not 
limited to the practice of ``dedovshchina'' (the violent, sometimes 
fatal, hazing of new junior military recruits for the armed services, 
MVD, and border guards), continued during the year. Press reports 
citing serving and former military personnel, the Military Procurator's 
Office, and NGO's monitoring conditions in the military indicate that 
this mistreatment often includes extortion of money or material goods 
in the face of the threat of increased hazing or actual beatings. Press 
reports also indicate that this type of mistreatment has resulted in 
permanent injuries and deaths among servicemen. Soldiers often do not 
report hazing to either unit officers or military procurators due to 
fear of reprisals, since officers in some cases reportedly tolerate or 
even encourage such hazing as a means of controlling their units. There 
are also reports that officers in some cases use beatings to discipline 
soldiers whom they find to be ``inattentive to their duties.''
    According to the Central Military Procuracy, there were 818 
reported cases of military commanders assaulting their subordinates in 
1998, an increase of 100 percent over the previous year. In July the 
Main Military Procurator's Office (MMPO) reported a 40 percent increase 
in bribe-taking in the first half of the year, compared with the same 
period for 1998, while abuse of military position or authority 
increased by 23 percent. Half of such cases involved physical violence. 
In general, incidents of brawling increased roughly 23 percent and 
hooliganism, or disorderly conduct, increased 17 percent. However, the 
MMPO also recorded a 14 percent drop in reported crimes during the 
year, and a 10 percent decrease in reports of hazing. In part, the 
reductions were attributed to a reported decline of roughly 30 percent 
in military service evasion. Offenses against military service declined 
about 28 percent, and premeditated murder dropped 22 percent. 
Specifically noted were some 20 criminal investigations aimed at 
general officers and admirals on charges of graft. The MMPO also 
reported that it opened over 14,000 investigations of allegations of 
abuse of office during the year, 11,000 of which went to trial.
    Both the Soldiers' Mothers Committee and the MPPO also have noted 
an increase in the number of reports about ``non-statutory relations'' 
in which officers or sergeants physically assault or demean their 
subordinates. This tendency commonly is attributed to stressful 
conditions throughout the military and to the widespread placement of 
inexperienced reserve officers, on active duty for 2 years, in primary 
troop leadership positions. In 1998 every second draftee expressed 
concern that his life, health, or sanity would be threatened during the 
period of military service by such incidents.
    In the navy, investigations reportedly uncovered about 20 incidents 
of nonstatutory treatment of sailors since the beginning of the year, 
just on the aircraft carrier cruiser ``Admiral Kuznetsov.'' Similar 
activity, including the theft of military hardware and weapons by 
sailors seeking to escape hazing, reportedly was uncovered on the heavy 
nuclear cruiser (and flagship) ``Petr Velikiy.''
    Other reported abuses of military personnel included the practice 
by officers and sergeants of ``selling'' soldiers, most often linked to 
units in the Northern Caucasus Military District. The 10-year-old 
Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Servicemen and Their 
Families has worked actively throughout the Northern Caucasus region, 
successfully rescuing 42 ethnic Bashkiri conscripts who were sold by 
NCO's and officers, but has been reluctant to act on behalf of ethnic 
Russian captives or soldiers from other ethnic groups. One person 
reportedly was held for 7 years. The Committee also reports that in 
many instances, the army apparently was not even aware officially that 
these men had been abducted from their units. There were also reports 
of military officers and units sending soldiers to the front lines in 
Chechnya as punishment instead of using the military justice system. 
Such incidents reportedly were being investigated by military 
procurators (see Section 1.e.).
    There were similar incidents in the armed forces of the Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. In June 44 ministry soldiers in the Far East went 
absent without leave after enduring repeated systematic abuse and 
beatings not only by senior servicemen, but by officers as well. 
Military investigators determined that 20 of these soldiers had 
injuries of varying severity and also found that over 50 conscripts 
from the same small garrison had illnesses caused by neglected 
injuries. Among those implicated were the unit commander, chief of 
staff, the deputy commander for personnel, the deputy commander for 
supply, and the unit's medical officer.
    The MMPO continues to cooperate with the Soldiers' Mothers 
Committee to investigate allegations of abuse and recently established 
telephone and postal ``hot lines'' to receive reports directly from 
soldiers. Nonetheless, the Soldiers' Mothers Committee believes that 
the majority of hazing incidents and assaults are not reported, due to 
fear of reprisals, indifference of commanders, and deliberate efforts 
to cover up such activity.
    According to the armed forces' Medical Service, approximately 45 
percent of those committing or attempting suicide were driven to it by 
either physical abuse or the often inhuman conditions of military 
service. Nonpayment of wages was also a factor, particularly in cases 
of suicide among officers. The Mothers' Rights Foundation and the 
Soldiers' Mothers Committee believe that many of those who reportedly 
committed suicide were driven to do so by violent hazing or abuse. The 
Soldiers' Mothers Committee believes that the vast majority of hazing 
incidents are never reported. In incidents brought to the attention of 
the military or civilian authorities, the Soldiers' Mothers Committee 
reported in 1997 that in 60 percent of the cases there was an official 
finding that abuse had taken place, and that some disciplinary action 
was taken as a result.
    The deteriorating quality of the armed forces, cited as the main 
reason for the breakdown in discipline, is aggravated by negligence of 
selection committees during the conscription process. In one Moscow-
region unit cited by the Soldiers' Mothers Committee, 46 percent of the 
newly arrived conscripts had physical or psychological health problems, 
which should have exempted them from military service. The rise in the 
number of draftees unfit for military service also allegedly is 
contributing to crime within the armed forces. Draft evasion is common, 
including the reported ``purchase'' of unwarranted medical deferments 
by potential conscripts otherwise ineligible for one of the many 
categories of legal deferment. The Military Procuracy continued its 
antidraft evasion efforts and cracked down on conscription abuses 
during the year. In January and February, these efforts resulted in the 
detention of 1,633 servicemen absent without leave. Those who turn 
themselves in voluntarily and have a ``good reason'' for being absent 
without leave are given reduced sentences, with the assistance of the 
military procurator's office.
    Degrading and substandard living conditions persist throughout the 
military, principally due to insufficient funding. As of April, the 
number of armed forces personnel without housing was 93,400, and a 
further 43,200 need housing on military bases.
    Despite the acknowledged seriousness of the problem, the military 
leadership has made only superficial efforts to implement substantive 
reforms in training, education, and administration programs within 
units to combat abuse, at least in part due to lack of funding and the 
leadership's preoccupation with urgent reorganizational issues and the 
fighting in Chechnya.
    There is still no law providing for the constitutional right to 
alternative civilian service, and the proposal for all-volunteer armed 
forces has been put off indefinitely, in the face of the current 
economic crisis and the Government's inability to sufficiently raise 
military pay. Although some regional authorities are attempting to 
introduce alternative service programs, national legislation necessary 
to implement the constitutional right to alternative service has yet to 
be passed by the Duma. Without such legislation there is no legal basis 
for any current alternative service program, beyond the constitutional 
language itself. As a result, the courts often rule against the 
individual based upon the legal requirements relating to military 
service.
    The systematic abuse of psychiatry as a form of punishment during 
the Soviet-era has ended. However, human rights groups charge that 
psychiatric hospitals continue to conceal their archives and their 
practices. Further, authorities apparently occasionally still abuse the 
practice of psychiatry for other purposes: In St. Petersburg, six 
members of Sentuar, a local Scientologist organization, were 
hospitalized forcibly in June for a 3-week psychiatric evaluation. The 
Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with several human 
rights organizations, has criticized the use of psychiatry in 
``deprogramming'' victims of ``totalitarian sects.'' In such cases, 
authorities use pseudo-psychological and spiritual techniques to 
``treat'' persons who had been members of new religious groups (see 
Section 2.c.).
    Yuriy Savenko, Head of the Independent Psychiatric Association of 
Russia (originally formed during the Soviet era when psychiatric 
hospitals were used to punish dissidents), told Time magazine in 1998 
that military, police, and state security agencies often use internal, 
closed-door tribunals to deal with whistle-blowers by sending them to 
psychiatric institutions. He said that ``more and more'' policemen and 
military and intelligence officers sought out his organization after 
they had been labeled mentally ill.
    There were credible Russian press reports that Chechen separatists 
tortured a number of civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
    Politically motivated violence also occurred. In October according 
to the St. Petersburg police two activists from Stepashin's campaign to 
the State Duma were assaulted in connection with their electoral 
activities. Their injuries did not require hospitalization (see Section 
3).
    On August 3, in Yekaterinburg, the apartment of independent 
television company Channel Four Plus President Igor Mishin was 
destroyed by a bomb. Mishin, who was not in the apartment at the time 
of the explosion, reportedly had rejected requests by gubernatorial 
candidates to ``alter the company's position'' in their favor, instead 
maintaining an independent posture in covering the elections. No 
arrests were made in this incident by year's end (see Section 2.a.).
    On February 2, a bomb seriously injured a paratrooper in Dagestan. 
On April 24, a bomb exploded outside a building housing two Western 
consulates in Yekaterinburg. While no one was injured, the building was 
damaged severely. On June 22, a bomb exploded near the Ministry of 
Interior in Moscow. On June 28, an antipersonnel mine injured 11 
persons in Vladikavkaz.
    After the Karachayevo-Cherkesiya supreme court ruled the results of 
the May 16 presidential election valid, supporters of Cherkessk mayor 
Stanislav Derev (who had received 20 percent of the vote) attacked the 
jeep of former commander in chief of ground forces Vladimir Semenev 
(who had received more than 70 percent of the vote). On the night of 
September 8-9, three explosions, reportedly grenades, went off near the 
homes of Semenev supporters. On the night of September 14-15, after 
ethnic Karachay president Semenev was inaugurated, two Karachay-owned 
cafes were bombed. On October 11, an aide to President Semenev was 
injured seriously during an attempted murder, but it cannot be 
confirmed whether this attack was politically motivated (see Sections 
1.a., 3, and 5).
    Ingush president Ruslan Aushev issued an official protest early in 
July on behalf of ethnic Ingush refugees trying to return to the 
Prigorodnyy district of North Ossetia. Up to 70,000 Ingush refugees 
fled the Prigorodnyy and Vladikavkaz areas in 1992, when interethnic 
fighting broke out between Ossetian and Ingush inhabitants. According 
to Russian media reports, just over 10,000 of the refugees have been 
able to return so far. According to a June report by the Ingush branch 
of the Memorial human rights group, ethnic Ingush refugees have faced 
systematic harassment while trying to return to the Prigorodnyy 
district (see Section 2.d.).
    Incidents of societal violence apparently based on religious belief 
also occurred. For example, according to press reports, in August 
between 10 and 15 youths burst into a Moscow Hare Krishna temple, 
beating followers and giving at least 1 person a head laceration severe 
enough to require hospitalization. In May two bombs exploded near a 
Moscow synagogue, and in July the director of a Jewish cultural center 
was stabbed (see Section 5). An unexploded bomb was discovered in 
another Moscow synagogue in July. Religious figures also were kidnaped, 
tortured, and killed in the Northern Caucasus (see Sections 1.a. and 
5).
    Prison conditions are extremely harsh and frequently life 
threatening. The penitentiary system is administered centrally from 
Moscow by the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice, the 
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of 
Education all maintain penitentiary facilities.
    Conditions for detainees and prisoners in most government 
facilities remain extremely harsh, particularly in pretrial detention 
facilities (SIZO's) where overcrowding is rampant and the authorities 
frequently employ physical abuse and torture to coerce confessions. 
Most detainees face extremely harsh and even life-threatening 
conditions. Russian news agencies reported in June 1998 that Procurator 
General Yuriy Skuratov had written to then-Minister of Interior 
Stepashin that human rights are ``systematically and massively 
violated'' in the nation's prisons. According to the MCPCJR, the 1998 
economic crisis worsened underfunding for prisons. Some prison 
directors have been forced to find unusual solutions in order to feed 
their inmates, such as using prison labor to run small businesses.
    According to the 1995 law On the Detention of Those Suspected or 
Accused of Committing Crimes, inmates must be provided with adequate 
space, food, and medical attention. Although most of the law's 
provisions went into effect at the end of 1996, the authorities were 
not able to ensure compliance, due in part to lack of funds, most 
judges' failure to use the option of bail, and a very large prison 
population.
    The country's penal institutions remain extremely overcrowded. 
According to the MCPCJR's analysis of government statistics during the 
year, the total number of persons held by the penitentiary system in 
May was 1,038,000, up from 1,009,863 in January 1998. The number of 
detainees in the 191 pretrial detention centers went up from 275,000 in 
January of 1999 to 285,600 over the first 4 months of the year. 
According to May data, 731,400 convicts are held in correctional labor 
colonies (ITK's). The January 1999 MCPCJR analysis showed that pretrial 
detention centers are overcrowded on the average 2.3 times over 
capacity, i.e., 2.3 persons are being held in space designed for 1. On 
average SIZO detainees have 5.2 square feet per person, compared with 
12 square feet per person required by law. (Statutory space 
requirements for other penal facilities range from 6 to 15 square 
feet.) In May 85,000 persons had no personal sleeping spots in SIZO's. 
In one example, a Volgograd SIZO accommodated 4,800 detainees in a 
space designed for 1,500, averaging 1.2 square feet per person in 
communal cells. Similarly, in 1998 a SIZO in the Urals held 8,000 
persons in facilities designed for 3,500. According to 1998 data, in 
``Kresty,'' St. Petersburg's largest SIZO, 5 to 15 prisoners were held 
in cells that were built 100 years ago to hold 1 prisoner. The 
situation is less severe in ITK's. As of January, ITK's were only 1.1 
times over planned capacity, and correctional labor colonies for 
prisoners serving life sentences were only 1.05 times over capacity. 
Special facilities exclusively for women are filled to 1.5 times of 
capacity, according to a study financed by Penal Reform International. 
In 1998 the occupancy rate for the overall penitentiary system was 112 
percent. As of January, there were 39,800 women held in correctional 
labor colonies, according to the MCPCJR.
    Under such conditions, prisoners sleep in shifts, and there is 
little, if any, room to move within the cell. In most pretrial 
detention centers and prisons, there is no ventilation system. Poor 
ventilation is thought to contribute to cardiac problems and lowered 
resistance to disease. Cells are stiflingly hot in summer (up to 40 
degrees centigrade, or 104 degrees Fahrenheit, according to the MCPCJR) 
and dangerously cold in winter. Prisoners report that matches cannot be 
lit in many SIZO cells during the summer because of a lack of oxygen.
    Health, nutrition, and sanitation standards in penal facilities 
remain low due to a lack of funding. Head lice, scabies, and various 
skin diseases are prevalent. This situation was aggravated by the 
country's economic crisis and resulting budgetary problems. The MCPCJR 
reported that in the first half of 1998, actual government budget 
disbursement for food for prisoners was $23 (142 rubles) per prisoner 
per month. This amount represented 63 percent of the Government's 
guideline of $36 (225 rubles) per prisoner per month. After the August 
1998 financial crisis, this sum shrank to $0.88 (22 rubles) per 
prisoner per month, and some regions received no money at all in August 
and November 1998. Prisoners and detainees typically rely on families 
to provide them with extra food.
    According to statistics provided by the MCPCJR, the 1998 planned 
federal budget allocated $1.25 billion (at the precrisis exchange rate, 
or 7.8 billion rubles), or 61 percent of what was required by the penal 
system. Only $983 million (at the precrisis exchange rate, or 5.9 
billion rubles), or 46 percent of required funding actually was 
granted. Even if the budgeted allocations for 1999 were disbursed in 
full, they only would provide 60 percent of the amount needed for 
maintenance of penal institutions. Many penal institutions also 
supplement significantly their budget allocations with income from 
prison labor. In many cases, prisoners produce much of their own food. 
Increased funding appears very unlikely.
    According to the MCPCJR, conditions in penal facilities vary among 
the regions. Some regions offer assistance in the form of food, 
clothing, and medicine. The Saratov oblast administration, concerned 
with the tuberculosis crisis in facilities located there, fully funded 
the tuberculosis-related medicinal needs of prisoners, according to the 
MCPCJR. Other support is offered by NGO's and religious groups.
    Inmates in the prison system suffer from inadequate medical care. 
In March the Human Rights Chamber again stated that over 10,000 
prisoners and detainees die each year. In August 1998, Yuriy 
Shcherbanenko, a senior official of the Procurator General's office, 
told colleagues at a conference that the level of medical services in 
prisons was far below international standards and even elementary 
sanitary norms. Every year 10,000 persons die in prisons, he said. 
Common causes of death in prisons include typhoid, cardiovascular 
diseases, and tuberculosis.
    Detention facilities have infection rates of tuberculosis far 
higher in than the population at large. Tuberculosis in the general 
population and especially in prisons is considered by health and human 
rights experts to be not only a national, but an international, health 
threat. In June 1998, the Government's main sanitary doctor, Gennadiy 
Onishchenko, told journalists that tuberculosis rates in the prisons 
were five times the national average. The MCPCJR reports that as of 
January, 92,000 detainees had tuberculosis in the active form. Each 
year an estimated 35,400 prisoners contract tuberculosis. Due to a 
shortage of space in specialized tuberculosis care facilities, about 
2,000 infected inmates live among healthy prisoners. Another 15,000 are 
kept in isolated sections of regular penal institutions. HIV/AIDS 
infection rates also are a source of concern. The MCPCJR reported that 
as of January, 2,300 prisoners (compared with 2,000 in September 1998) 
were infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. Space shortages do 
not allow for separate facilities for prisoners with AIDS. Then-Justice 
Minister Pavel Krasheninnikov said in October 1998 that the number of 
HIV-infected inmates increased 500 percent since September 1997.
    The tuberculosis epidemic in prisons became particularly urgent in 
mid-1998, when doctors drew attention to the presence of a new 
multidrug resistant form of tuberculosis, known as MDR-TB, in the 
country. They said that the strain was concentrated primarily among 
prison inmates. As of March, approximately 20,000 prisoners with 
tuberculosis were infected with a multidrug-resistant strain. In 1998 
Doctors without Borders, Medical Emergency Relief International, and 
the Public Health Institute of New York sent a joint letter to 
President Yeltsin warning that the country had become ``an 
international incubator of a new illness.'' Alexander Goldfarb, 
director of the Soros Foundation's anti-tuberculosis program in the 
country, stated in August 1998 that in recent years the supply of anti-
tuberculosis drugs seldom met more than 20 to 25 percent of prison 
requirements. Prison personnel often administered incorrect dosages of 
medicine, encouraging the development of drug-resistant strains of 
tuberculosis. Currently about 12 percent of tuberculosis infected 
inmates have a multidrug resistant strain that is especially difficult 
to cure.
    Statistics on the number of detainees and prisoners who were killed 
or died and on the number of law enforcement and prison personnel 
disciplined for use of excessive force are not released publicly. While 
reliable figures are extremely difficult to establish, Russian human 
rights groups have in the past estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000 
detainees and prison inmates die each year in penitentiary facilities. 
Some die due to beatings, but most as a result of overcrowding, poor 
sanitary conditions, or lack of medical care. The Ministry of Internal 
Affairs does not break down its statistics to specify how many of the 
21,000 personnel dismissed were punished for abusing detainees or 
convicts. The Procuracy General receives approximately 1,000 complaints 
of torture per year. The HRW 1999 report on torture quotes a procuracy 
official as saying that this figure ``does not reflect the number of 
such incidents.'' The press often reports on innocent individuals 
mistreated, injured, or killed in various SIZO's; some of the reported 
cases include habitual abuse by the same officers.
    Violence among inmates, including beatings and rape, is common. 
There are elaborate inmate-enforced caste systems in which informers, 
homosexuals, rapists, rape victims, child molesters, and others are to 
be ``untouchable'' and treated very harshly, with little or no 
protection from the prison authorities.
    There are five basic forms of custody in the criminal justice 
system: Police detention centers, pretrial detention (SIZO's), 
correctional labor colonies (ITK's), prisons designated for those who 
violate ITK rules, and educational labor colonies (VTK's). 
Responsibility for operating the country's penal facilities falls under 
the Ministry of Justice's Main Directorate for Execution of Sentences 
(GUIN). Conditions in police station detention centers vary 
considerably but as a rule are harsh. In most cases, detainees are not 
fed and have no bedding, sleeping place, running water, or toilet.
    Suspects awaiting completion of criminal investigation, trial, 
sentencing, or appeal are confined in pretrial facilities (SIZO's). The 
GUIN has 178 SIZO's. Convicts on occasion are imprisoned in SIZO's 
because there is no transport to take them elsewhere. Conditions in 
SIZO's remain extremely harsh; they fall far short of minimum 
international standards and pose a serious threat to life and health. 
Cells are overcrowded and prisoners must sleep in shifts due to 
insufficient numbers of beds.
    The 1997 Amnesty International Report on Torture in Russia noted 
that ``torture and ill-treatment occur at all stages of detention and 
imprisonment,'' but most often was reported in pretrial detention. 
These conditions have not improved. In February 1998, then-Justice 
Minister Stepashin admitted that ``the pretrial detention centers are 
the most serious problem'' in the prison system. Vyacheslav Budnov, the 
Interior Ministry official in charge of prisons was quoted in 1998 as 
saying that ``this is a Russian paradox.'' Persons incarcerated in 
detention centers ``have not gone to trial, but they are living in 
worse conditions than those already sentenced.''
    Correctional labor colonies (ITK's) hold the bulk of the nation's 
convicts. According to January statistics of the MCPCJR, there are 
719,500 convicts (of whom 39,800 are female) incarcerated in the ITK's. 
According to the MCPCJR, conditions in the ITK's are better than in 
SIZO's and prisons only to the extent that there is fresh air. In the 
122 timber correctional colonies, where hardened criminals serve their 
time, beatings, torture, and rape by guards are common.
    The country's ``prisons''--distinct from the labor colonies or 
ITK's--are actually penitentiary institutions for those who repeatedly 
violate the relatively lax rules in effect in ITK's. Conditions in many 
prisons are extremely harsh. Although they are not as crowded as 
SIZO's, guards reportedly severely discipline prisoners to break down 
resistance. Prisoners sometimes are humiliated, beaten, and starved.
    Educational labor colonies for juveniles (VTK's) are facilities for 
juveniles from 14 to 20 years of age. The MCPCJR's January statistics 
indicate that there are 20,000 persons in the 63 educational colonies. 
Conditions in VTK's are significantly better than in ITK's, but 
juveniles in VTK's and juvenile SIZO cells suffer from beatings, 
torture, and rape. The MCPCJR reports that such facilities have a poor 
psychological atmosphere and lack educational and vocational training 
opportunities. Many of the juveniles are from orphanages, have no 
outside support, and are unaware of their rights.
    The President's Commission for Prison Reform monitors prison 
conditions and has prepared recommendations and legislation for reform. 
None of these efforts has led to any demonstrable progress.
    The formal transfer of responsibility for managing the MVD's prison 
facilities to the Ministry of Justice on September 1, 1998 fulfilled 
one of Russia's obligations as a member of the Council of Europe. 
Neither government officials nor human rights activists expected this 
transfer to improve conditions in the near future, but, as the Moscow 
office of Human Rights Watch noted, the transfer was an improvement 
because it took the prisons ``out of the hands of those whose main 
concern is to have good statistics on the number convicted.'' MVD 
official Vyacheslav Bubnov reportedly estimated that it would take at 
least 7 to 10 years before conditions approached European standards. 
Bubnov estimated that transfer of control to the Ministry of Justice 
would provide 20 percent of the solution to improving conditions at 
prisons, but that the rest was dependent on increased funding. In view 
of the Government's serious budgetary problems, increased funding 
appeared unlikely.
    In recognition of the inhuman conditions present in detention 
facilities, on June 18, the State Duma passed an amnesty bill intended 
to free an estimated 94,000 prisoners in the course of 6 months, 
beginning on June 22. The amnesty was intended to grant freedom to 
prisoners held for minor crimes and for first-time offenders, 
specifically veterans of military service in defense of the Motherland, 
pregnant women, women with children, invalids, tuberculosis-infected 
prisoners, minors, and senior citizens. In order to qualify for 
amnesty, prisoners in most categories must be serving sentences of 5 
years or less. The amnesty also included persons recently sentenced and 
tried. Prison activists and prison officials said that they did not 
expect that the amnesty would resolve fully the ongoing prison 
overcrowding crisis. The numbers of prisoners increased by 42,000 in 
just the first 4 months of the year; therefore, even a 94,000-person 
decrease would not alter the overall numbers. Moreover, some persons 
believe that the amnesty conditions are too demanding; the newspaper 
Noviye Izvestiya cited estimates by the GUIN that only 35,000 prisoners 
actually qualify for the amnesty. Human Rights Watch pointed out that 
without a change in the policy of the Procurator's Office of placing 
persons in detention and arresting them for minor crimes, in view of 
the time needed to obtain a court hearing there would not be any major 
improvement in the prison situation.
    At a March 19 joint hearing at the Human Rights Chamber of the 
President's Political Consultative Council, the Ministry of Justice, 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Court, and the Procuracy 
General developed a plan to address the ``critical'' state of the 
national penal system. The proposals forwarded to the Government and 
the State Duma included provisions such as another amnesty and changes 
in the Criminal Code, which could yield a prison population decrease of 
400,000 over 1 year.
    Prison reform activists, prison experts, independent observers, and 
Duma deputies agree that the country's Criminal Code is at the root of 
the penal system problems. According to Valeriy Borshchev, the country 
has the largest percentage of its population in jail in the world. The 
1999 MCPCJR report states that for every 100,000 persons in the 
country, 760 are imprisoned.
    According to the MCPCJR, Aleksandr Zubkov, Deputy Director of GUIN 
in the Ministry of Justice, stated that the only way to reduce the 
prison population is to change the Criminal Code. The Criminal Code is 
too severe and allows unjustifiably wide use of custody as a measure of 
restraint (as opposed to bail or release on the prisoner's own 
recognizance). According to a MCPCJR report during the year, Sergey 
Vitsin, deputy chairman of the Presidential Council on Judicial and 
Legal Reform commented that the Criminal Code does not distinguish 
between petty theft and larger-scale thefts and robberies. In an 
example cited by the MCPCJR during the year, one person was sentenced 
to 3\1/2\ years in prison for stealing three chickens and 2 kilograms 
of meat.
    Theft is the leading reason for incarceration and detention in the 
country. The director of the Pskov SIZO reported according to a 1999 
MCPCJR report that 53 percent of his detainees are charged with theft. 
As an example, he told of a 16-year-old who had already spent 2 months 
in a Pskov SIZO simply for stealing some margarine, pasta, and bread. 
The MCPCJR reports that of the 21,000 minors incarcerated in the 
country, 52 percent are charged with theft and similar petty crimes.
    Custody is used systematically as the only means of restraint. The 
MCPCJR called for more use of alternatives to custody, such as bail and 
house arrest. Moreover, the MCPCJR reported that detainees spend too 
long in pretrial detention, in many cases as long as 3 years or more. 
The Ministry of Justice concurs with the MCPCJR that limits must be 
placed on time in detention awaiting trial.
    Moscow-based human rights groups make frequent visits to the 
prisons in the Moscow area, but they have neither the resources nor a 
national network to investigate conditions in all 89 regions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain problems. The Constitution provides that the arrest, 
taking into custody, and detention of persons suspected of crimes are 
permitted only by judicial decision. However, the Constitution's 
transitional provisions specify that these provisions do not take 
effect until a new criminal procedure code is adopted. The new Criminal 
Code that was passed in 1995 went into effect at the beginning of 1997. 
Under the 1997 code the maximum sentence for all offenses increased 
from 15 years to 30 years. Criminal proceedings continue to be governed 
both by the new 1997 Criminal Code and the Soviet Criminal Procedure 
Code, adopted in 1960.
    There are credible reports from throughout the country that police 
detain persons without observing mandated procedures and fail to issue 
proper protocols of arrest or for confiscated property. Moscow city law 
enforcement authorities frequently detained persons unlawfully for 
alleged violations of registration requirements, especially in response 
to the terrorist bombings in September, when authorities detained some 
2,000 persons and deported more than 500, according to NGO's. Police 
officers reportedly planted drugs or ammunition on some of these 
persons as a pretext for arrest (see Section 2.d.). Local authorities 
throughout the country detain members of religious minority groups, 
especially the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, for brief 
periods of time, although formal charges seldom are filed (see Section 
2.c.).
    In the absence of measures to implement the procedural safeguards 
contained in the Constitution, suspects often were subjected to uneven 
and arbitrary treatment by officials acting under the current Criminal 
Procedure Code and presidential decrees. The code gives procurators 
authority to issue an order of detention without a judge's 
authorization and, if police believe that the suspect has committed a 
crime or is a danger to others, to detain him for up to 48 hours 
without a warrant.
    The Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code provide that 
detainees are entitled to have a lawyer present from the time of 
detention, during questioning following detention, and throughout 
investigation up to and including the formal filing of charges. This 
procedure generally is followed in practice. The MCPCJR reports that 
detainees are given the opportunity to have access to a lawyer in 
accordance with their rights. However, the Center notes that the high 
cost of legal fees and the poor quality of court-appointed public 
defenders for those lacking the funds to engage counsel effectively 
deny the majority of suspects competent legal representation. As a 
result, many prisoners do not exercise this right because they believe 
it useless.
    For example, Articles 47-49 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide 
that in certain cases the court, investigator, or procurator is to 
provide the suspect with an advocate free of charge if the suspect 
cannot afford one. A president of a collegium of advocates must appoint 
a lawyer within 24 hours after receiving such a request. However, 
lawyers (advocates) try to avoid these cases since the Government does 
not in fact reimburse them for this work as it is supposed to do. As a 
result, in many cases indigent defendants receive little or no 
assistance during the investigation stage of the case, and such in-
court assistance as they do receive may be rendered by poorly trained 
lawyers. Sometimes the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning 
cannot be exercised even when the suspect can afford to pay for a 
lawyer. Human rights NGO's report that in many cases investigators deny 
access to a lawyer by various means, including restrictions on the time 
when the suspect can see his lawyer (which may mean that the lawyer has 
to wait in line for days to get a meeting with the client).
    A 1997 presidential decree allows police to detain persons 
suspected of ties to organized crime for up to 10 days without bringing 
charges. The law overturned two previous presidential decrees (of 1994 
and 1996) that allowed detention for up to 30 days. The 1997 decree 
also instructed the Government to submit to the Duma a draft federal 
law on preventing vagrancy and social rehabilitation of the homeless. 
However, according to Duma and NGO sources there is not yet any such 
law under consideration.
    The Criminal Procedure Code specifies that only 2 months should 
elapse between the date an investigation is initiated and the date the 
file is transferred to the procurator so that the procurator can file 
formal charges against the suspect in court. However, investigations 
seldom are completed that quickly. Some suspects spend 18 months or 
longer in detention under harsh conditions in a SIZO while the criminal 
investigation is conducted. The MCPCJR reports terms of pretrial 
detention extending up to 3 years, with the average ranging from 7 to 
10 months. However, in some extreme cases the MCPCJR reports detention 
periods of up to 5 years due to financial constraints and poor 
investigative and court work.
    The Code provides that a prosecutor may extend the period of 
criminal investigation to 6 months in ``complex'' cases. If more time 
is required in ``exceptional'' cases, the Procurator General personally 
can extend the period up to 18 months. Extensions of the investigation 
period often are issued without explanation to the detainee. Until the 
investigation is completed, the suspect is under the jurisdiction of 
the Procurator's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There is 
no procedure for a suspect to plead guilty during the investigative 
period, although if a suspect informs the investigator that he is 
guilty, the period of the investigation usually is shorter than if he 
maintains his innocence. Suspects frequently fear exercising their 
right to request judicial review of their detention due to fear of 
angering the investigating officer.
    There also were credible reports that persons have been detained 
far in excess of the permissible periods for administrative offenses, 
in some cases so that police officials could extort money from friends 
or relatives. The situation has improved somewhat since the issuance of 
a presidential decree in 1997 that annulled a previous decree that had 
allowed for 30-day detentions. However, the practice of detaining 
individuals in excess of permissible periods is still not uncommon, and 
this often is done for the purpose of extorting money.
    The use of bail is rare, even if suspects are not flight risks or 
have not been charged with violent crimes. This aggravates overcrowding 
in pretrial detention and, due to delays in bringing cases to trial, 
results in many suspects remaining in pretrial detention for longer 
than the maximum penalty they might face if convicted.
    Delays also plague the trial stage. Although the Criminal Procedure 
Code requires court proceedings to begin no more than 14 days after the 
judge issues an order designating the location of the trial, congestion 
in the court system frequently leads to long postponements. Some 
suspects actually serve the equivalent of their sentences while 
awaiting trial. Judges often do not dismiss cases involving improper 
investigations or indictments, particularly if the procurator's case 
has political support or the case is controversial. Instead, such cases 
often are returned to the procurator for further investigation.
    Some authorities have taken advantage of the system's procedural 
weaknesses to arrest persons on false pretexts for expressing views 
critical of the Government. Human rights advocates in the regions have 
been charged with libel, contempt of court, or interference in judicial 
procedures in cases with distinct political overtones. Others have been 
charged with other offenses and held either in excess of normal periods 
of detention or for offenses that do not require detention at all (see 
Section 4).
    Under the 1993 Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on 
Legal Assistance in Civil, Family, and Criminal Affairs, persons with 
outstanding warrants can be detained for periods of up to 1 month while 
the Procurator General investigates the nature of outstanding charges 
against the detainee. This system is reinforced informally but 
effectively by collegial links among senior law enforcement and 
security officials in the various republics of the former Soviet Union. 
Human rights groups allege that this network is employed to detain 
opposition figures from the other former Soviet republics without 
actual legal grounds.
    In August Vladivostok environmental scientist Vladimir Soifer filed 
a complaint in Vladivostok municipal court alleging that in early July 
the FSB confiscated a large number of documents from his apartment, 
which was not covered by its warrant and not documented in the FSB's 
official record of the search (see Section 2.a.).
    Authorities detained or arrested a number of other environmental 
activists during the year. In October Vladimir Slivyak, director of the 
antinuclear organization Eco-Defense, announced at a press conference 
that Moscow police detained and questioned him for a few hours in 
September about his possible involvement in the August bombing of the 
Manezh shopping center in Moscow. One of Slivyak's coworkers reportedly 
had been framed on charges of drug possession. Natalya Minonova of 
Chelyabinsk also was detained and questioned by police officers in 
September as she and four other activists were on their way to city 
hall to deliver a letter protesting the potential import of spent 
nuclear fuel into the country. Authorities charged all five with 
hooliganism. Reportedly authorities told another activist in Voronezh 
to report to the police station for an ``informal conversation'' on the 
topic of an antinuclear camp near the Novo-Voronezh nuclear power plant 
and threatened him with drug possession charges if he failed to appear. 
In November disarmament researcher Igor Sutyagin of the USA Canada 
Institute was detained on suspicion of espionage. No information about 
the specific charges was made public.
    Based on this series of cases and the Nikitin and Pasko cases from 
previous years, environmentalists both in the country and abroad 
criticize the FSB for its active campaign of harassment, especially of 
environmental activists critical of past government abuses.
    St. Petersburg judge Sergey Golets ruled on December 29 that 
Aleksandr Nikitin, an environmentalist and retired Soviet Navy captain, 
was not guilty of charges of espionage and treason. Although 
prosecutors are expected to appeal the decision, legal observers 
believe that the legal foundations of the ruling were sound and believe 
that it may provide an important precedent in combating abuses by the 
FSB.
    Nikitin's case was characterized by serious violations of due 
process. There were credible charges that his detention was politically 
motivated. The FSB detained Nikitin in St. Petersburg in February 1996 
on suspicion of espionage and revealing state secrets, crimes 
punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Nikitin had been working with 
Bellona, a Norwegian environmental NGO, on the publication of a report 
detailing the hazards posed by nuclear waste generated by the Northern 
Fleet, in which Nikitin had served. In December 1996, Nikitin was 
released from pretrial detention but was restricted to the St. 
Petersburg city limits.
    Indictments cited classified decrees that were made available to 
Nikitin's defense team only at the beginning of the trial, which 
finally commenced in October 1998, nearly 3 years after Nikitin's 
detention. On October 29, 1998, the judge in the case returned the 
indictment to the prosecution for further investigation, as there was 
insufficient evidence to support the charges. Although Nikitin's 
defense claimed a qualified victory, this did not constitute an 
acquittal. The FSB was given another opportunity to solidify its case 
against Nikitin. On February 2, the Supreme Court upheld the St. 
Petersburg court's October 1998 decision to return the case to the FSB 
for further investigation. An eighth indictment filed against Nikitin 
in July is almost identical to the previous seven, according to 
Nikitin's lawyer. The trial against Nikitin resumed on November 23 in 
St. Petersburg. In his December 29 ruling, Judge Golets argued that the 
secret decrees used to charge Nikitin violated every citizen's right to 
access to the law and therefore was not binding under the Constitution. 
Moreover, according to the ruling, investigators failed to adhere to 
the Criminal Code during the investigation and violated Nikitin's 
constitutional rights.
    In July after 20 months in pretrial detention, military journalist 
and active-duty officer in the Pacific Fleet Grigoriy Pasko was 
sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for misuse of office but immediately 
was released under the prisoner amnesty. Pasko originally was charged 
with treason and espionage after conducting freelance reporting on 
radioactive contamination and passing to Japanese media a videotape of 
Russian Pacific Fleet sailors dumping radioactive waste in the Sea of 
Japan. Both Pasko and the military procurator intend to appeal the 
decision to the Supreme Court, and Pasko announced on July 22 his 
intention to appeal his case to the European Court of Human Rights. 
Nikitin's defense attorney said that Pasko's conviction is legally 
dubious, as the charge is based on a military code of conduct that 
technically has not been in force since 1990, although the military 
continues to enforce it internally. The trial was marked by a number of 
irregularities, including the judge's decision to remove one of Pasko's 
defense attorneys for contempt of court. Also a key witness recanted 
his earlier testimony, which he said had been made under pressure from 
investigators. As of year's end, Pasko resides in Moscow, unable to 
work as a journalist for Russian media in either the Far East or 
Moscow. The Committee to Protect Journalists and the Glasnost Defense 
Fund observed that, while the verdict was better news than expected, 
the case is still a powerful disincentive to investigative reporting.
    In September press reports described Moscow authorities' use of the 
mass detentions of persons who appeared to be from the Caucasus as part 
of ``Operation Whirlwind,'' the authorities' program to stem terrorism 
in response to the September bombings in Moscow (see Sections 1.a. and 
5).
    No new cases of arrest of human rights activists were documented 
during the year, although the Moscow Helsinki group stated that three 
human rights monitors participating in its regional reporting program 
were harassed (also see Section 4). No progress was reported during the 
year in the case of Yuriy Shadrin of Omsk, who was arrested in November 
1996 on several unrelated charges. Released on December 31, 1996, 
Shadrin remains subject to arrest and trial. The same is true for Yuriy 
Padalko of Irkutsk, who was arrested in 1992 on what Human Rights Watch 
called ``presumably trumped-up charges of libel, hooliganism, and other 
offenses.''
    Larisa Kharchenko, a housing adviser to former St. Petersburg mayor 
Anatoliy Sobchak, was detained in July 1997 in connection with a 
corruption case involving the former mayor. She was held incommunicado 
for 17 days and then charged with bribery and abuse of office. Her 
lawyer contended that the authorities do not have a case against her 
and that she was kept in jail and deprived of medical care in order to 
force her to testify against Sobchak. Kharchenko was released in mid-
December 1997 but was instructed to stay in St. Petersburg pending 
further developments in her case. Doctors determined that, along with 
other medical complications, she had suffered a stroke while detained 
and classified her as legally disabled. No trial date was set for 
Kharchenko in 1998 or 1999. According to Sobchak, Kharchenko has left 
the country.
    St. Petersburg authorities arbitrarily detained Scientologists for 
psychiatric evaluation (see Section 2.c.).
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and there are signs of limited independence; 
however, the judiciary does not yet act as an effective counterweight 
to other branches of government. The development of an independent 
judiciary continued. A 1996 law separated the courts of general 
jurisdiction from the Ministry of Justice and placed them under a 
separate agency, the Judicial Department, which is under the 
supervision of the Supreme Court. Although not entirely functional, the 
Department has assumed primary administrative and financial 
responsibilities for court management previously held by the Ministry 
of Justice. Reformers who sought to create the Department felt that the 
Ministry was not zealous enough in defending the interests of the 
judiciary, especially on budget matters. In the 1998 and 1999 budgets, 
the Department was funded independently of the Ministry. Judges remain 
subject to some influence from the executive, military, and security 
forces, especially in high profile or political cases. The judiciary 
still lacks sufficient resources and is subject to corruption.
    The judiciary is divided into three branches: The courts of general 
jurisdiction, subordinated to the Supreme Court; the arbitration court 
system, under the High Court of Arbitration; and the Constitutional 
Court. Civil and criminal cases are tried in courts of primary 
jurisdiction, courts of appeals, and higher courts. The general court 
system's lowest level is the municipal court, which serves each city or 
rural district and hears over 90 percent of all civil and criminal 
cases. The next level of courts of general jurisdiction are the 
regional courts. At the highest level is the Supreme Court. Decisions 
of the lower trial courts can be appealed only to the immediately 
superior court unless a constitutional issue is involved. The 
arbitration court system consists of both city or regional courts as 
well as appellate circuit courts subordinated to the High Court of 
Arbitration. A 1998 federal law provides for new judicial officers--
justices of the peace, or magistrates--several thousand of whom are 
expected to begin serving in 2000. This new category of judicial 
officer is to be elected or appointed at the regional level. It is not 
yet clear whether justices of the peace are to form separate courts or 
to serve directly under the courts of first instance. Magistrates are 
to consider administrative and criminal cases, for which the maximum 
sentence does not exceed 2 years, and civil cases whose claims do not 
exceed a certain sum of money.
    Low salaries and scant prestige make it difficult to attract 
talented new judges and contribute to the vulnerability of existing 
judges to bribery and corruption. Judges have received some incremental 
salary increases aimed at improving the quality of judges and raising 
the retention rate. Although judges' pay has improved, working 
conditions remain poor, and support personnel continue to be underpaid.
    In its 1998 budget the Government called for cutting spending on 
the court system by 26 percent. This was despite appeals by the 
Federation Council (upper house of Parliament) and leading judges, as 
well as presidential orders issued in July 1998, which had instructed 
the Government to make the ``normal functioning of the judicial 
system'' a priority. In response, the Supreme Court launched a legal 
challenge to the budget cuts with the Constitutional Court. On July 17, 
1998, the Constitutional Court struck down the article in the 1998 
budget that authorized the Government to reduce spending on the 
judicial system. The Court cited Article 124 of the Constitution, which 
stipulates that the federal budget must provide for the ``complete and 
independent'' functioning of the judiciary. Despite this decision, 
courts were not funded fully in the current fiscal year. However, the 
Duma and Federation Council passed and President Yeltsin signed by 
February the Law on the Financing of the Courts, which makes receipt of 
the judiciary's budget independent of the Ministry of Finance.
    Cuts in the judicial system's budget raised concerns over the 
permanence of gains made in recent years in judicial independence. For 
example, according to the Constitution, courts should be financed only 
by the Federal Government. But because of federal budget cuts, district 
courts often seek additional funds from their local governments, 
leaving them more vulnerable to pressure from local politicians. A 1997 
survey of 250 judges, conducted by the University of Toronto, found 
that about half were receiving financial aid from local governments. 
Many courts now lack adequate funding to cover such basic expenses as 
electricity, telephone charges, and postage. Because of unpaid debts, 
many courts lost their telephone and electricity service. Without money 
to mail subpoenas, courts often are forced to hold trials without key 
witnesses. A human rights organization reported that in Bryansk in 
November and December 1998 all courts closed and put signs on the doors 
saying that the closure was due to lack of funds. These and other kinds 
of disruptions in the work of courts are common throughout the country.
    Progress was made during the year to improve the financing of the 
court system. In February a federal law on the financing of the courts 
of general jurisdiction provided for a mechanism to ensure that the 
courts received money allocated to them in the budget. The Council of 
Judges of the Russian Federation noted that as of October 1, the courts 
received 100 percent of the amount allocated to that date, compared to 
the only 47 percent of the budgeted amount that the courts received 
during the same period in 1998. Moreover, the 2000 budget is to 
increase funding for the judicial system and to fund it entirely out of 
the federal budget, so that courts are no longer dependent on local or 
regional authorities for funding.
    Judges are subject to physical intimidation and bribery. Judges 
have been murdered in Moscow, Irkutsk, and Yekaterinburg, although 
there were no reports of judges who were murdered during the year. As 
judges generally bear responsibility both for reaching a verdict and 
handing down a sentence, they are logical targets for intimidation. In 
January 1998, then-Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed a decree that 
allowed judges to apply for permission to carry firearms. Many judges 
reportedly took advantage of the decree. In July chair of the 
Primorskiy kray arbitration court Tatyana Loktionova announced that 
Primorskiy kray governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko had been interfering in 
the court's activities. She reported that she and her colleagues feared 
for their personal safety. The governor has blamed the court for 
bankrupting the region's enterprises and destroying its economy and 
persuaded then-Prime Minister Putin to authorize an internal 
investigation of the arbitration court for possible illegal conduct.
    In October then-Prime Minister Putin signed a decree providing for 
the establishment of the new Academy of Justice, the country's first 
judicial branch training organization.
    The Criminal Code provides for the court to appoint a lawyer if the 
suspect cannot afford one. The Society for the Guardianship of 
Penitentiary Institutions often is called upon by judges to provide 
legal assistance for suspects facing charges and trial without any 
representation. This society operates primarily in Moscow, although it 
uses its connections throughout the country to appeal to legal 
professionals to represent the indigent. However, in many cases the 
indigent receive little legal assistance, because funds are lacking to 
pay for trial attorneys for them, and public defenders are poorly 
trained.
    Because the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning often is 
not exercised (see Section 1.d.), many defendants recant testimony 
given in pretrial questioning, stating that they were denied access to 
a lawyer or that they were coerced into giving false confessions or 
statements. Nevertheless, human rights monitors have documented cases 
in which convictions were obtained on the basis of testimony that the 
defendant recanted in court, even in the absence of other proof of 
guilt.
    In March the Supreme Court found Articles 218 and 220 of the 
Criminal Procedure Code unconstitutional. This finding permits defense 
attorneys to appeal the actions of the procuracy and investigative 
officials to a court, even during pretrial stages of criminal 
proceedings. The unconstitutional articles had restricted the 
conditions for pretrial appeals of the procuracy's actions and allowed 
appeals only to a supervising procurator, not a court.
    In the 80 regions where adversarial jury trials have not yet been 
introduced, criminal procedures are weighted heavily in favor of the 
prosecutor. The judge or panel of judges conducts the trial by asking 
questions based on a prior review of the evidence. Reports indicate 
that in practice, the constitutionally mandated presumption of 
innocence often is disregarded. Judges are known to return poorly 
developed cases to the prosecution for additional investigation rather 
than risk confrontation with powerful prosecutors. Moreover, in certain 
cases the Criminal Procedure Code allows them to do so with no 
limitation on the number of times the case can be investigated. The 
Constitutional Court partly addressed this issue in an April 20 
decision and held that part of the article of the Code providing for 
this practice was unconstitutional. This practice of repeatedly 
returning cases for further investigation greatly increases the time 
that defendants spend in SIZO's (see Section 1.c.).
    Adversarial jury trials, at the option of the accused in cases 
where there is a risk of a criminal penalty of 15 years or more, were 
introduced in 1993 and 1994 in nine regions, encompassing 23 percent of 
the population. In February the Constitutional Court held that in order 
for the death penalty to be applied, the accused must be given a trial 
by jury. The Court expressly stated that the death penalty could not be 
imposed anywhere until trial by jury was available everywhere. Since 
jury trials currently are provided in only nine regions, and funds to 
expand them throughout the country still are lacking, the decision in 
effect makes nearly impossible the legal imposition of the death 
penalty in the country. Despite plans to expand jury trials to 12 new 
regions, as of December the Department of Judicial Reforms of the State 
Legal Administration of the President failed to do so due to lack of 
funds. In December 1998, press reports indicated that the Ryazan 
governor and Ryazan duma chairman reported to the Supreme Court and the 
Presidential Administration that they had suspended the practice of 
trial by jury primarily due to the high cost of such trials. The trials 
reportedly cost the region between $2,400 and $3,900 (50,000 and 80,000 
rubles) per year. A council of local judges appealed to the Procurator 
General and the Federation Council to overturn the decision of the 
Ryazan authorities.
    The Ministry of Justice reports that 538 cases involving 772 
persons were tried by jury in 1998. Of these, 165 resulted in 
acquittals. Defense attorneys, defendants, and the general public 
reportedly favor jury trials and the more adversarial approach to 
criminal justice. Prosecutors and law enforcement officials continue to 
prefer trial by judges and the inquisitorial system.
    The heads of several lawyers' associations reported during the year 
that defense lawyers increasingly were the target of police harassment, 
including beatings and arrests. Dmitriy Baranov, vice president of the 
Association of Lawyers of Russia, in an interview with the newspaper 
MK-Yug (the southern edition of Moskovskiy Komsomolets) said that 
during the last year or two, defense lawyers were increasingly targets 
of police harassment. For example, in Rostov he said that there were a 
number of attempts to coerce lawyers into giving testimony against 
their clients. Professional associations at both the local and federal 
levels report that such abuses are increasing throughout the country. 
They charge that police are trying both to intimidate defense attorneys 
and to cover up their own criminal activities.
    There also were instances in which the right to due process and a 
fair trial were violated. For example, the arrest, detention, and 
September 1998 trial of Krasnodar human rights activist Vasiliy Chaykin 
was marked by numerous serious legal procedural violations. Chaykin was 
denied access to a lawyer of his choice for 1 month after his arrest. 
The rape charges against Chaykin rested on the testimony of nine young 
women, five of whom recanted the statements that they made to 
investigators, saying that they had been coerced by the investigating 
officer. The judge reportedly did not allow the court secretary to 
record these charges of police intimidation. Instead he threatened the 
young women with criminal action for giving false testimony; finally, 
all witnesses agreed to confirm their previous statements. Protests by 
the defense attorney about these procedures were ignored and not 
recorded by the court secretary. During the trial, Chaykin requested 
medical help, but the judge rejected his plea, and Chaykin suffered a 
heart attack several days later. The trial was postponed until Chaykin 
recovers. Chaykin was released on April 17 but remains restricted to 
his city of residence. As of year's end, there were no reports of 
developments in this case.
    There were reports of military officers and units sending soldiers 
to the front lines in Chechnya as punishment instead of using the 
military justice system. Such incidents reportedly were being 
investigated by military procurators (see Section 1.e).
    There was no reported progress in the 1997 case of the beating of 
defense attorney Oleg Kolesnikov.
    On February 3, Chechen president Maskhadov declared Shari'a 
(Islamic law) to be in effect in the republic of Chechnya. Maskhadov 
signed several decrees stipulating that all local legislation be 
brought into line with the Koran and Shari'a regulations. Maskhadov 
ordered the Chechen legislature and the Council of Muftis to draft a 
Shari'a constitution within 1 month's time (also see Section 2.c.). 
Maskhadov's action apparently was a political response to pressure from 
Islamist rivals.
    Authorities in Chechnya continued their efforts to establish a new 
criminal code based on the Islamic Shari'a code. Although the code has 
not been enacted formally, elements of Shari'a law already have been 
cited in court decisions, and Shari'a punishments reportedly have been 
imposed.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Authorities continued to infringe on citizen's privacy 
rights. The Constitution states that officials can enter a private 
residence only in cases prescribed by federal law or on the basis of a 
judicial decision. It permits the Government to monitor correspondence, 
telephone conversations, and other means of communication only with 
judicial permission. It prohibits the collection, storage, utilization, 
and dissemination of information about a person's private life without 
his consent. Legislation to implement these provisions was passed as 
part of the country's new criminal code, which provides for criminal 
penalties. However, problems still remain, and no one has ever been 
convicted of violating those safeguards. In 1995 legislation was passed 
that gave broad authority for the FSB to utilize domestic surveillance 
and to conduct searches of private residences, with only limited 
oversight by the courts and the procuracy. These measures remain in 
force. There were reports of electronic surveillance by government 
officials and others. Moscow police reportedly entered residences 
without warrants during checks for illegal residents of the city (see 
Section 2.d.). Vladivostok environmental scientist Vladimir Soifer 
reported that the FSB confiscated personal correspondence, not covered 
by the warrant, during a July search of his apartment.
    A senior official told a newspaper in November 1997 that the 
problem of abuse by governmental agencies was aggravated because the 
list of government agencies authorized to carry out wiretaps and 
undercover operations has been expanded and now includes, for example, 
tax authorities. He also noted that while the law provides that the 
Prosecutor General's office must authorize wiretaps and other 
undercover operations by state agencies, it does not allow 
prosecutorial oversight once those operations have begun.
    Internet experts and right-to-privacy advocates say that 
interagency technical regulations called SORM-2 (SORM is the Russian 
acronym for System for Operational Investigative Measures), which were 
issued by the Ministry of Communications, the FSB, the Federal Agency 
of Government Communications and Information, and other agencies, 
present a serious threat to privacy rights and violate the Civil Code, 
the Constitution, and international norms. SORM-2 is an amendment to 
SORM telecommunications regulations. The original SORM, issued in 1995, 
granted security services the power to monitor all telecommunications 
transmissions for investigative purposes. The original SORM required a 
warrant to carry out such monitoring, in accordance with the 
Constitution and other provisions of the law. SORM-2 extends to the FSB 
the same kind of monitoring power over Internet communication as it did 
for telecommunication, but without ensuring judicial oversight.
    Internet service providers are required to install, at their own 
expense, a device that routes all Internet traffic to an FSB terminal. 
Those providers that do not comply with the requirements face either 
loss of their licenses or denial of their license renewal. While SORM-2 
framers claim that the regulation does not violate the Constitution or 
the Civil Code because it still requires a court order, right to 
privacy advocates say that there is no mechanism to ensure that a 
warrant is obtained before the FSB accesses private information. There 
appears to be no mechanism to prevent unauthorized FSB access to 
Internet traffic without a warrant.
    The first Internet service provider charged with refusing to comply 
with SORM-2, Bayard-Slavia Communications, and the St. Petersburg human 
rights organization Citizens' Watch filed complaints with the Volgograd 
procuracy in July. In enforcing SORM-2, the Volgograd FSB required 
providers to provide the FSB with a list of their subscribers and 
further information upon request. The Volgograd FSB charged Bayard-
Slavia three times during the year with noncompliance. Bayard-Slavia 
Communications has demanded reversal of administrative noncompliance 
charges against it and confirmed its readiness to provide the required 
assistance to the FSB if a court orders it to do so. Citizens' Watch 
demanded the reversal of the Ministry of Communications order requiring 
SORM-2 compliance. Both complaints request that the FSB comply with the 
Constitution and the Civil Code.
    Allegations continue to circulate that officers in the special 
services, including authorities at the highest levels of the MVD and 
the FSB, have used their services' power to gather ``kompromat'' 
(compromising materials) on political and public figures as political 
insurance and to remove rivals. Similarly, persons in these agencies, 
both active and retired, have been accused of working with commercial 
or criminal organizations for the same purpose.
    There are credible reports that regional branches of the FSB 
continue to exert pressure on citizens employed by Western firms and 
organizations, often with the goal of coercing them into becoming 
informants.
    Government forces in Chechnya looted valuables and foodstuffs from 
houses in regions that they controlled (see Section 1.g.).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--The indiscriminate use of force by government 
forces in the conflict with separatist elements in Chechnya resulted in 
widespread civilian casualties and the displacement of up to 200,000 
persons, the vast majority of whom sought refuge in Ingushetiya.
    Estimates vary of the total number of civilian casualties caused by 
bombs and artillery used by government forces. The number of civilian 
casualties cannot be verified, and figures vary widely from several 
hundred to several thousand. Government officials argue that they are 
employing ``high precision'' tactics against separatist and terrorist 
targets in Chechnya. However, a wide range of reporting indicates that 
government forces are relying mainly on unguided rockets and other low 
precision weapons.
    In September and early October, government forces launched air and 
artillery attacks against numerous Chechen villages along the 
republic's eastern border with Dagestan in the territory controlled by 
Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev. Basayev led attacks in Dagestan 
in July and August and was believed to have retreated to this region in 
Chechnya. Villagers living in the region under attack claimed that they 
were not supporters of Basayev.
    Attempts by government forces to gain control over Chechnya's 
capital, Groznyy, were characterized by indiscriminate use of air power 
and artillery, which destroyed numerous residential and civilian 
buildings. Up to 140,000 Russian military and security personnel in the 
Northern Caucasus region were involved in the current conflict in 
Chechnya, far more than during the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya. On 
September 24, government aircraft reportedly bombed a bus with refugees 
near Samashki, resulting in the deaths of eight persons. Human Rights 
Watch confirmed that on September 27, Russian aircraft allegedly bombed 
a school and residential areas in Staraya Sunzha, a suburb of Groznyy, 
killing 7 civilians and wounding another 20, including schoolchildren. 
Human Rights Watch confirmed an attack by Russian airplanes on Urus-
Martan, 15 miles south of Groznyy, on October 3, which resulted in the 
deaths of 27 civilians. On October 5, a government tank fired on a bus 
near Chervlyonnaya, reportedly killing some 28 civilians. According to 
NGO reports, on October 7, government troops attacked the village of 
Elistanzhi, killing some 48 civilians. On October 21, explosions killed 
scores of civilians in Groznyy's downtown market and a local hospital.
    Western press organizations reported at least 60 civilian deaths 
and 200 persons injured, although Chechen government officials claimed 
that at least 118 persons died and more than 400 were injured. Russian 
officials offered contradictory explanations for the explosions; some 
denied any government complicity and blamed Chechen separatists. 
However, Ministry of Defense officials claimed on October 22 that 
special forces units had attacked a weapons market, but without using 
artillery or air power. The ICRC reported that two-thirds of Groznyy's 
150,000 residents fled the city as a result of the military campaign. 
On October 27, government forces subjected Groznyy to the heaviest 
attacks up to that point as government aircraft bombed the city and 
killed dozens of Chechens. Chechen defense officials claimed that 116 
persons were killed in the attacks that day. Also on October 27, 
government forces shelled the village of Samashki, killing at least 5 
persons and injuring dozens. On November 1, government troops that had 
taken positions in a psychiatric hospital near Samashki overnight 
opened fire on the doctors and other medical staff who reported to work 
that morning, resulting in injuries to three staff members. Troops 
prevented hospital staff from returning to care for their patients for 
several days, and the condition of the hospital's patients remains 
unknown. On November 16, government troops surrounded and shelled two 
large towns near Groznyy, Achkhoy-Martan, and Argun. The attacks 
prompted criticism from international human rights organizations for 
indiscriminate attacks against civilian settlements.
    According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped civilian 
women in Chechnya in December in the village of Alkhan-Yurt and in 
other villages.
    Early in December, government forces airdropped a series of 
leaflets over Groznyy that warned civilian residents and rebel fighters 
to leave the city. In one leaflet directed at Chechen fighters, the 
command of the Combined Group of Federal Forces in the Northern 
Caucasus warned that any persons remaining in Groznyy after December 12 
would be destroyed by air and artillery strikes. Amid international 
criticism of the leaflets, government officials later qualified the 
leaflets' language and denied that they had imposed an ultimatum on the 
city's inhabitants.
    According to human rights NGO's, Government troops looted all 
valuables and foodstuffs from homes in regions that they controlled, 
particularly Sernovodsk, Ermolovskiy, and in the Naurskiy district. 
Refugees returning to their homes in Chechnya in late November 
discovered that they had been stripped by government soldiers.
    On October 29, a government aircraft bombed a convoy of five 
vehicles with ICRC markings, according to ICRC officials. The bombing 
occurred at Shami-Yurt, west of Groznyy, and resulted in the deaths of 
at least 25 civilians and injuries to some 70 persons.
    Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen, representing the European 
Union Presidency, carried out a humanitarian fact finding visit to 
Ingushetiya on October 30. In late November, U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees Sadako Ogata visited Chechnya and Ingushetiya. Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek, Chairman in Office for the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), visited the 
region, as agreed to by the Government at the OSCE summit in November. 
However, Vollebaek was not able to travel to Russian-controlled 
territory of northern Chechnya.
    International organizations estimate that the internally displaced 
population as a result of the conflict fluctuated between 170,000 and 
240,000, as individuals continued to cross back into Chechnya to check 
on their property or shop in markets. Reliable information on the 
number and status of displaced persons within Chechnya was especially 
difficult to obtain, due to heavy fighting and limited outside access 
to the region. As of early November, as many as 170,000 were estimated 
to be displaced within Chechnya and without access to humanitarian 
assistance.
    At various points during the conflict authorities restricted the 
movement of internally displaced persons (IDP's) fleeing Chechnya. In 
late October human rights groups reported that IDP's from Chechnya were 
not being permitted to move from Ingushetiya to North Ossetia. 
According to some reports by NGO's, border guards were permitting only 
ethnic Russians to cross into Ingushetiya. According to the Russian 
press, some displaced persons were being transported by bus back to 
parts of Chechnya that were under Russian government control. On 
November 3, government forces opened a crossing on the Chechnya-
Ingushetiya border and allowed approximately 3,500 persons to enter. As 
many as 40,000 refugees had been stranded for more than 1 week at the 
border, where reportedly a line of refugees stretched almost 12 miles. 
Refugees at the border had been living in the open, often without 
access to food or water. Government forces were not allowing anyone, 
including medical personnel, access to refugees in the line waiting to 
cross into Ingushetiya, and several refugees died while waiting to 
cross, reportedly due to heart failure (also see Section 2.d.). Russian 
border guards and police officers on the border between Chechnya and 
North Ossetia reportedly required Chechen refugees to pay money to 
enter North Ossetia, at one crossing point demanding $40 (1,000 rubles) 
for men and $20 (500 rubles) for women. According to the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, the authorities prevented medical 
supplies for Chechen hospitals from entering Chechnya.
    Russian media coverage of events in Chechnya was limited and 
uneven. Journalists and editors appeared to be exercising self-
censorship and avoiding subjects embarrassing to the Government (see 
Section 2.a.). Since the war resumed, federal authorities--both 
military and civilian--limited journalists' access to war zones and 
confiscated reports and equipment, citing threats to the safety of 
reporters. Since November additional accreditation--besides the usual 
Foreign Ministry accreditation--is required for entry to the region. In 
some cases, foreign journalists publicly complained that military 
officials in the northern Caucasus region made it excessively difficult 
for them to receive local press accreditation.
    Chechen separatists also committed abuses. According to unconfirmed 
reports, separatists killed civilians who would not assist them, used 
civilians as human shields, forced civilians to dig fortifications, and 
prevented refugees from fleeing Chechnya. In particular, Russian 
officials reported in December that they had unearthed evidence of mass 
killings by Chechen fighters in Naurskiy raion. Government officials 
and some local residents claimed that the fighters singled out Russian-
speaking residents for execution in October, just after the resumption 
of government ground combat operations in Chechnya. In addition, human 
rights NGO's reported that Chechen fighters on November 28 fired upon 
unarmed civilians who were trying to maintain a neutral zone in Gekhi, 
southwest of Groznyy. According to local residents, at least five 
civilians were wounded in the attack.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, while the Government 
generally respects these provisions, reports of government pressure on 
the media continue, particularly when coverage deals with corruption or 
criticizes a political official. Federal, regional, and local 
governments continued to exert pressure on journalists by: Selectively 
denying access to information (including, for example, statistics 
theoretically available to the public) and filming opportunities; 
demanding the right to ``clear'' certain stories prior to publication; 
prohibiting the tape recording of public trials and hearings; 
withholding financial support from government media operations that 
exercised independent editorial judgment; attempting to influence 
unduly the appointment of senior editors at regional and local 
newspapers and broadcast media organizations; removing reporters from 
their jobs; and bringing libel suits against journalists. Private 
media, which flourished through the first half of 1998, came under 
increasing stress in the months after the August 17, 1998 financial 
crisis. Faced with major financial difficulties, many media 
organizations saw their autonomy further erode during the year.
    The Glasnost Defense Foundation (GDF), an NGO that tracks 
violations of the rights of journalists in the countries of the former 
Soviet Union, estimates that some 300 lawsuits and other legal actions 
were brought by government agencies against journalists and 
journalistic organizations during the year, the majority of them in 
response to unfavorable coverage of government policy or operations. In 
most of these cases, a government body or an individual (often with 
links to a figure in power) accused journalists of damaging its (or his 
or her) ``reputation and honor.'' For example, then-Deputy Prime 
Minister Yuriy Maslyukov announced publicly in March that he was 
seeking an investigation by the Procurator General of Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta for articles suggesting that he and his staff embezzled $130 
million (approximately 3 billion rubles). As in 1998, judges rarely 
found for the journalists; in the majority of cases, the Government 
succeeded in either intimidating or punishing the journalist. 
Typically, judges seemed unwilling to challenge powerful federal and 
local officials. Stiff fines for journalists were a common result of 
these proceedings; jail terms occasionally were handed down, as well. 
Such rulings served to reinforce the already significant tendency 
toward self-censorship. Not infrequently, journalists were attacked 
physically; at least 10 persons died under circumstances that were 
presumed to be related in some way to their work as journalists. In 
1998 the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) came to regard 
journalism as the country's ``most dangerous profession.'' Based on the 
record of violations of the rights of journalists during the year, the 
situation did not improve.
    The financial dependence of most major media organizations on the 
Government, or one or more of several major financial-industrial 
groups, continued during the year to undermine editorial independence 
and journalistic integrity in both the print and broadcast media. The 
concentration of ownership of major media organizations--already a 
serious threat to editorial independence in 1998--increased during the 
year, as the weakest players were forced out of the market, leaving 
only the largest media empires (including media outlets owned by the 
federal, regional, and local governments) intact and in control of key 
media. In particular, government structures, banking interests, and the 
energy giants Lukoil and Gazprom continued to dominate the Moscow media 
market even as they extended their influence into the regions. The 
protracted effects of the 1998 financial crisis exacerbated this 
problem during the year, weakening the financial positions of most news 
organizations, thereby increasing their dependence on financial 
sponsors and, in some cases, the federal and regional governments. As a 
result, the media's autonomy and concomitant ability to act as a 
watchdog was diminished.
    According to the National Press Institute (NPI), a nonprofit 
organization dedicated to the development and maintenance of a free 
press, private newspapers faced intense pressure from major financial 
groups in Moscow and from dominant local business interests to 
influence their editorial content.
    In key respects, private media organizations across the country 
remained dependent on the Government during the year. According to the 
GDF, some 90 percent of media organizations continued to rely on state-
controlled concerns for paper, printing, or distribution. Moreover, 
journalists continued to depend on local authorities for accreditation 
to major news events. Reports of both favoritism toward reporters 
associated (or aligned) with the local administration and denial of 
access to journalists representing independent media organizations were 
widespread. The GDF reports that officials continued to manipulate a 
variety of ``instruments of leverage'' (including manipulating the 
price of printing at state-controlled publishing houses) in an effort 
to apply pressure on private media rivals, noting that, as in 1998, 
this practice was more common outside the Moscow area than in the 
capital itself. For example, in May the chief of staff of Saratov's 
duma threatened to prevent reporters whose stories allegedly insulted 
the honor of duma members and staff from covering duma sessions. In 
September 1998, Saratov governor Dmitriy Ayatskov signed a special 
order stripping journalists of their accreditation if they repeatedly 
``distort'' information. In July the editor of Severniy Kurer, the only 
independent newspaper in Karelia, was threatened with physical violence 
if he refused to transfer his shares in the newspaper to local 
entrepreneurs who are reportedly sympathetic to the republic's 
administration. Other newspaper staff have come under similar pressure 
to sell their shares to this grouping, which already controls over one-
third of the publication's shares.
    Independent and semiindependent television stations continued to 
develop, and the number of small private radio stations, mostly in the 
large cities, continued to increase. However, television companies 
faced government economic pressure similar to that experienced by the 
print media. Many stations were forced to rely on the State (in 
particular, regional committees for the management of state property) 
for access to the airwaves and office space.
    Private print and broadcast media, like other enterprises, were 
vulnerable to unpredictable changes in the policy and practice of tax 
collection. (Tax avoidance is extremely widespread both among 
commercial enterprises and individuals.) In July top editors of the 
Media-Most outlets, which include Independent Television (NTV), Ekho 
Moskvy, Segodnya, and Itogi, publicly accused senior officials in the 
Yeltsin administration of singling out their organizations for 
``punitive'' tax inspections in an effort to ``muzzle the free press.'' 
The editors, as well as many in the journalistic community, argued that 
publications and broadcast operations that reported on the Government 
more sympathetically were not targeted for such inspections. The 
Presidential Administration has denied repeatedly these allegations. 
The disruption of the tax inspections notwithstanding, none of the 
Media-Most organizations were forced to shut down; each continues to 
operate today and to criticize the Government. The GDF and other media 
NGO's have documented independently many other similar cases across the 
country.
    The private media continue to face more direct challenges from the 
Government as well. The Government owns 150 of the 550 television 
stations in the country and 18 percent of the 12,000 registered 
newspapers and periodicals. The State owns or controls Russian Public 
Television (ORT) and Russian Television and Radio (RTR) (two of the 
three national television stations), radio stations Mayak and Radio 
Rossii, newspapers Rossiyskaya Gazeta and Parlamentskaya Gazeta, and 
news agencies ITAR-TASS and RIA-Novosti. At the regional and local 
levels, governments operated a much higher percentage of media outlets 
than in Moscow; in many cities and towns across the country, 
government-run media organizations were the only major source of news 
and information, according to the GDF. Thus in a large number of media 
markets, citizens effectively received information only from 
unchallenged government sources. Officials from the Union of 
Journalists reported in April that local authorities around the country 
were reorganizing the editorial boards of various publications, 
allegedly to make them conform to civil code regulations. However, 
after the reorganization the boards are governed by the law on state 
employees and not the law on the mass media. In the opinion of the 
Union of Journalists, this change makes journalists function as mere 
mouthpieces of their editorial boards and circumscribes the 
publications' editorial freedom.
    On July 6, President Yeltsin signed a decree abolishing the 
existing State Press Committee and the Federal Service for Television 
and Radio and establishing the Ministry of Press, Television, Radio 
Broadcasting, and Mass Communications. The head of the new ministry, 
Mikhail Lesin (the former deputy chairman of the Russian State 
Television and Radio Company), answers directly to the President. The 
decree stipulated that the Ministry's main tasks are to be ``the 
development and implementation of a state policy toward the mass 
media.'' The Ministry also assumed authority over the registration of 
mass media organizations, the regulation of the production and 
distribution of audio and video products, and the regulation of radio 
and television broadcast frequencies. The decree also suggested that 
television stations with nationwide broadcasting licenses may have to 
reapply to retain them--a provision seen by many observers as designed 
to influence the stations' policies on the eve of the Duma and 
presidential elections. This is the second major structural change in 
as many years designed to strengthen the hand of the Federal Government 
over the mass media; in 1998 the Government established the All-Russia 
Television and Radio Company (VGTRK), whose head also answers to the 
President. The creation of the VGTRK was part of the Government's 
effort to strengthen its control over the state media--and to a certain 
extent, to increase its leverage over other, private broadcast 
organizations--by consolidating its central and local television and 
radio companies into an enlarged and potentially more powerful holding 
company. In 1998 the VGTRK began to manage the sites that transmit the 
broadcasts of private television channels.
    In August after a number of television stations showed footage of 
Chechen leaders in their reports on the conflict in Dagestan, the 
Ministry warned the companies against ``giving air time to Chechen 
field commanders,'' stating that this ``violates Article 4 of the Law 
of the Russian Federation on the Mass Media'' (which forbids the 
inciting of racial violence or hatred). Days earlier, a city-owned 
station in St. Petersburg was issued an almost identical warning for 
airing anti-Semitic material (see Section 5). Later that month, 
Minister Lesin issued another stern warning to the ORT in connection 
with a news report by the station that allegedly displayed ``flagrant 
disrespect for the flag of the Russian Federation'' and allegedly 
contained ``disrespectful comments about the Russian President.'' 
Minister Lesin informed the station that ``such violations might lead 
to the revocation of the station's broadcasting license.'' In late 
August, the Ministry again warned the ORT that it could lose its 
broadcasting license, after the ORT broadcast a story about a mass 
demonstration in St. Petersburg by supporters of the Union of Right 
Forces. In February the newspaper Vremya MN reported that the State 
Committee for Publishing advised local authorities to withhold tax 
privileges and apply financial pressure to local newspapers that 
promote political extremism. According to the newspaper the local 
definition of political extremism may vary widely between regions.
    On more than one occasion, senior government officials, including 
in one case President Yeltsin, voiced ``expectations'' or 
``suggestions'' to media representatives and government officials that 
clearly were intended to change the way the media operated. After 
fighting in Dagestan and Chechnya broke out again in the fall, 
journalists apparently practiced self-censorship and provided few 
graphic descriptions of the killings and other abuses committed by 
Russian troops. Late in December, NTV broadcast limited coverage of 
alleged massacres by government forces in Chechnya, including video 
footage that showed military trucks loaded with items which government 
forces had looted. Despite officials' statements that such coverage was 
unpatriotic, the broadcast and print media continued to provide some 
information of the war in Chechnya from unofficial sources.
    Local governments also applied pressure on media based within their 
jurisdictions in the period prior to the December Duma elections. In 
August fire authorities carried out a surprise inspection of the 
physical plant of the Moscow-based newspaper, Kommersant Daily. The 
authorities charged the newspaper with failure to comply with local 
fire safety standards and closed the newspaper down for a day. 
Kommersant executives appealed directly to Prime Minister Putin for 
relief. The Prime Minister intervened on Kommersant's behalf, stating 
that he would not allow ``communal regulation of the media,'' and the 
newspaper resumed publishing. Immediately after the shutdown, 
Kommersant's publishers filed a lawsuit in the Moscow arbitration court 
to recover the losses that the paper incurred due to the forced 
stoppage. The Court has not yet ruled on this suit. Days later, in a 
similar case, Moscow authorities warned editors at another Moscow-based 
newspaper, Noviye Izvestiya, that unless the newspaper adhered to 
heating system regulations, the municipal government would ``take 
action.'' To date the paper continues to publish without disruption.
    In August the procurator in Omsk had the private television 
transmitter belonging to the station STV-3 impounded after the station 
aired accusations of financial impropriety against the deputy 
procurator. The procurator's office stripped STV-3 reporters of their 
accreditation, conducted an investigation that concluded the 
accusations had no merit, and charged those responsible for the story 
with slander. After these steps the STV-3 continued to air stories 
against the Omsk administration, and the station's transmitter finally 
was impounded.
    In November vice chairman of the Media-Most conglomerate Igor 
Malashenko argued in an interview that the Presidential Administration 
was trying to use economic means to close down the NTV during the 
parliamentary election campaign. On October 29, state-owned 
Vneshekonombank sued the NTV's holding company for immediate payment of 
a $42 million loan. On November 2 and 3, Vneshekonombank had 39 Media-
Most bank accounts in 8 banks frozen. Media-Most then agreed to pay 
back the loan in full.
    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty noted in a 1998 report on the 
Russian media that the mayor of Moscow, Yuriy Luzhkov, could exert 
pressure on distribution companies, on paper suppliers, or on the 
corporate parents of ``any media enterprise deemed to be 
objectionable,'' and that Luzhkov had used his power ``to ensure a 
largely compliant press in his hometown.''
    During the year, there were many instances in which authorities 
disregarded and challenged the right of journalists to investigate and 
publish stories. In early 1998, President Yeltsin signed a decree, On 
the List of Information that Constitutes a State Secret, widening the 
scope of privileged information that legally could be withheld from the 
public. Information pertaining to the development, production, storage, 
and disposal of nuclear ammunition, for example, was included 
explicitly in the language of the decree, with the result that it has 
now become much more difficult--in fact illegal--for citizens residing 
near disposal sites to publicize through the media the increased health 
risks and environmental degradation. According to this decree, 
information on the preparation and conclusion of international 
treaties, as well as information in certain economic categories, falls 
within the domain of state secrets.
    In efforts to control the media, local authorities often passed 
laws and issued orders in apparent violation of the Constitution and 
federal laws. In April the legislative assembly of the Perm region 
passed a law making state subsidies to local media organizations 
conditional on ``the amount of news space or broadcast time provided by 
the organization for disseminating government information.'' In May 
local officials in the Belgorod region refused to register an 
independent newspaper, Zvezda, on the basis of an order signed by the 
head of the regional administration, Vladimir Gerasimenko, instructing 
the administration's information directorate ``to act on behalf of the 
administration as the publisher of the region's newspapers.'' According 
to Zvezda's editor in chief, Alla Kaverina, the order clearly violates 
mass media law; she reported the case to the GDF, but the issue remains 
unresolved to date.
    Government censorship remained a significant problem during the 
year. In May in the central Russian city of Kirov, Valeriy Fokin, the 
press secretary of the regional governor, demanded that the local 
television station, Channel 9, stop the production of a program 
containing criticism of the local duma. Fokin recommended that the 
program's writer, Aleksandr Bulakh, ``change the focus'' of the program 
and remove any criticism of local authorities. Feeling ``powerless'' to 
resist, Bulakh revised the program according to the specifications of 
the local administration. In a similar case in June, authorities in the 
city of Voronezh denied accreditation to a local version of the Moscow-
based Novaya Gazeta. Galina Shatunova of the Voronezh city 
administration stated publicly that the decision was a result of the 
newspaper's ``incorrect coverage of the work of the administration.'' 
At a human rights conference held in St. Petersburg in November, Yuriy 
Vdovin of the NGO Citizen's Watch charged that the FSB has played a 
role in censorship. He claimed that there have been cases in which 
journalists were not able to publish certain items due to the presence 
of an FSB ``helper'' in the controlling apparatus of the organization.
    In June Svetlana Yanyushkina, editor in chief of MK Samara (a 4-
page supplement to Moskovskiy Komsomolets in Samara), was forced from 
her position after she published a series of unflattering articles on 
the expansion of the activities of the financial-industrial group 
Sibirskiy Alyuminiy. According to journalists in the region, Sibirskiy 
Alyuminiy coowner Oleg Deripaska complained about the coverage to the 
local administration, arguing that the articles ``damaged the 
interests'' of the group. Samara governor Konstantin Titov reportedly 
then conveyed his ``displeasure'' to one of the senior managers of the 
paper. Officially, Yanyushina then ``offered to resign of her own 
volition,'' but journalists familiar with the case insist that she had 
no choice in the matter. No further investigation ensued. By the end of 
August, Yanyushkina had found work at a television station in Samara.
    Journalists publishing critical information about local governments 
and influential businesses, as well as investigative journalists 
writing about crime and other sensitive issues, continued to be 
subjected to threats of physical violence, beatings, and murder (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    A number of independent media NGO's have characterized beatings of 
journalists as ``routine,'' noting that those who pursued investigative 
stories on corruption and organized crime found themselves at greatest 
risk. The press and media NGO's reported 10 killings of journalists, 
presumed to be related to the journalistic work of the victims, and 
dozens of other bodily assaults on journalists. As was the case in the 
12 murders in 1998, police seldom found the perpetrators of crimes 
against journalists.
    On February 13, Viktor Chertkov, a correspondent at the Yantarniy 
kray newspaper in Kaliningrad, was beaten severely in the entrance of 
his apartment building by a group of unidentified men; the assailants 
also took drafts of the articles he was carrying at the time of the 
attack. Chertkov's colleagues linked the incident to his reporting. The 
same newspaper reported two other attacks against journalists in 
Kaliningrad. On July 1, two persons forced Oleg Altovskiy, a host of 
the television program City, into an entryway of an apartment building, 
took his camera and tapes, and threatened to kill him because he had 
``gone too far in his reports.'' On the same day, Vladimir Sazonov, a 
political observer at Kaliningrad's Kaskad newspaper, was hospitalized 
with severe head injuries after being attacked. Police investigations 
produced no results in either case. The assailants remain at large.
    On March 1, in the southern city of Rostov-on-Don, two persons who 
introduced themselves as ``employees of the police press service'' 
visited the home of army journalist Aleksandr Tolmachev and offered him 
materials on the subject of corruption in the ranks of senior officials 
of the Northern Caucasus Military District. When Tolmachev went outside 
to meet the pair, the visitors brutally beat him with iron bars. The 
investigative journalist, who probes crimes by high-ranking army 
officers, survived a similar attack in 1995. The Rostov-on-Don police 
still are investigating the case but have not yet made any arrests.
    On March 26, in Yekaterinburg several men attacked Eduard 
Khudyakov, a journalist who was working for a local television network. 
Khudyakov, who sustained severe knife wounds, believes that the attempt 
on his life was related directly to his professional activity as a 
journalist. The police launched an investigation and offered a reward 
of approximately $10,000 (250,000 rubles) for information leading to 
the arrest of the perpetrators. In the same city on April 6, someone 
set fire to a vehicle belonging to a local independent television 
company, ATN. The culprit broke the window and threw a bottle filled 
with flammable liquid into the car. To date, the police have made no 
arrests.
    In Yekaterinburg masked armed men entered the offices of MK-Ural 
and seized all copies of its April 1 edition, which included an 
interview with a candidate for the Sverdlovsk duma who was a victim of 
a contract killing on March 30. In the interview the candidate, who was 
an outspoken opponent of the Uralmash crime group, revealed the name of 
a man who previously had tried to have him killed.
    On April 1, in the eastern Siberian city of Yakutsk, Sergey 
Sarkisov, a photographer at the local newspaper Yakutiya, was 
approached by an unidentified man who told Sarkisov to open his camera 
and expose the film in it. Sarkisov refused to do so. Later, on the way 
to his office, he was attacked by three persons. The assailants took 
his camera and ruined the film. No one was arrested in connection with 
the attack. In a similar case, on April 2, Mikhail Vyalov, a 
photographer working for a local newspaper in the city of Ulyanovsk, 
reportedly was beaten by employees of the local FSB as he was trying to 
take photos of members of a criminal group who were being apprehended 
by the FSB. The FSB denied that the beating took place, alleging 
instead that the journalist had ``fallen'' when the FSB was ``checking 
his documents.''
    On April 5, in Makhachkala, Dagestan, Elmira Kazhayeva, a reporter 
working for the newspaper Youth of Dagestan, received anonymous 
telephone threats in response to an article she authored exposing 
numerous violations of campaign rules on the part of Dagestan duma 
deputy Ruslan Ibragimbekov. Kazhayeva earlier had received threats 
after the publication of stories on other topics as well.
    On May 13, Andrey Lependin, a sports reporter with the newspaper 
Voronezhskiy Kuryer, was beaten near his apartment building by three 
persons. Prior to the assault, the three first had asked Lependin his 
name. Lependin's colleagues link the attack to his reporting about the 
financial deals of the Fakel sports club. Valeriy Neneko, the head of 
the club, had called the newspaper to complain about the publications. 
Later, he reportedly said that if necessary, he would ``communicate 
with Lependin in a different way.''
    On May 31, after the publication of a series of articles on the 
illegal privatization of Sochi's beach resorts, Novaya Gazeta 
investigative reporter Sergey Zolovkin learned of a ``contract'' on his 
life and that of his daughter. Concerned that local officials had links 
to the mafia group that had put out the contract on his life, Zolovkin 
asked his head office in Moscow to raise the issue with then-Minister 
of the Interior Vladimir Rushaylo. The Ministry reportedly opened an 
investigation.
    On June 30, Yuriy Stepanov, the managing director of the 
independent radio station Lemma, was beaten severely outside his home 
in Vladivostok. The attack came after the station broadcast an 
interview in which a majority shareholder in shipping company 
Vostoktransflot alleged that Primorskiy kray Governor Yevgeniy 
Nazdratenko had embezzled from the company. On July 6, unknown persons 
forced Stepanov's daughter into a car and threatened her with bodily 
harm unless her father changed the station's policy of offering to 
broadcast the views of anyone who wanted to do so.
    On August 3, in Yekaterinburg, the apartment of independent 
television company Channel Four Plus President Igor Mishin was 
destroyed by a bomb. Mishin, who was not in the apartment at the time 
of the explosion, reportedly had rejected requests by gubernatorial 
candidates to ``alter the company's position'' in their favor, instead 
of maintaining an independent posture in covering the elections. The 
police had made no arrests by year's end.
    On August 9, in St. Petersburg, Aleksandr Borisoglebskiy, a well-
known journalist and one of the founders of the 600 Seconds daily 
broadcast popular during perestroyka times, was assaulted by bodyguards 
at the residence of Damir Shadayev, a rich businessman and 
gubernatorial candidate in Leningrad oblast. Borisoglebskiy's cameraman 
Vladimir Mishin was assaulted as well. The two journalists approached 
Shadayev's residence but did not trespass on his property. In September 
Borisoglebskiy was murdered during a fact-finding trip to the Vyborg 
pulp and paper plant. In August workers at the plant had protested 
attempts by the owners of the plant to replace the management team.
    In August Sergey Zhabinskiy, a reporter in Achinsk in Krasnoyarsk 
kray, discovered a grenade under his car that was set to explode once 
the car was set in motion. He had been receiving death threats since a 
story of his that criticized the Achinsk alumina plant appeared on 
local television.
    On August 30, the editor in chief of the Novosibirsk newspaper 
Vesti, Lyubov Loboda, was knifed to death. She had established and 
edited the nonpolitical weekly since 1996. An official investigation 
was launched under the special supervision of the head of the regional 
police authority. At present, investigators have not linked her death 
to her work as a journalist, but to date, no other motive has been put 
forward. Loboda had received threats at her office before.
    There was no progress made in the investigation of the beating 
death of Anatoliy Levin-Utkin, deputy editor of Yuridichesky Petersburg 
Segodnya, in August 1998.
    Journalists maintained and strengthened associations to defend 
their rights and monitor governmental abuse.
    The country's Northern Caucasus continued to be a dangerous region 
for Russian journalists. On May 14, in Karachayevo-Cherkesiya a large 
group confronted a film crew of the Respublika television company. The 
group demanded the videotape footage of a report that the crew had 
produced on the recent republic-wide election; the footage contained 
evidence of violations of federal election law and explicit verbal 
threats against journalists issued by local officials. Members of the 
group severely beat the journalists and destroyed their equipment; they 
also took the videotape. In a similar incident in May, supporters of 
Vladimir Semenev, one of the candidates in the elections, abducted a 
camera crew and seized video material from journalists of Stavropol 
state television. After long negotiations, the journalists were freed 
on the condition that they ``not film again.'' And on May 29, in the 
same region, unknown arsonists set fire to the home of Anna Belskaya, 
the editor of the official daily, Den Respubliki. According to 
Belskaya's colleagues, the attack was occasioned by the newspaper's 
independent commentary on the ongoing political battles in the 
republic.
    On August 27, five armed men attacked a television center that was 
under construction in Nazran in Ingushetiya. The men took one security 
official hostage until Ingush police officers freed him. Four of the 
assailants escaped and one of was killed reportedly when a grenade he 
was carrying exploded.
    In the period before the Russian military operations in the 
Northern Caucasus intensified, violations of journalists' rights in 
Chechnya were at a lower level than their 1997 peak, due in part to the 
withdrawal of most news organizations from the region. Kidnapings and 
threats against journalists by Chechen rebels were frequent. The 
Maskhadov government continued to take actions against opposition 
television stations. In addition, Maskhadov imposed a ban in February 
on Russian television programming deemed as not conforming to Shari'a 
norms. Since the war resumed, federal authorities--both military and 
civilian--limited journalists' access to war zones and confiscated 
reports and equipment, citing threats to the safety of reporters. Since 
November additional accreditation--besides the usual Foreign Ministry 
accreditation--is required for entry to the region. In some cases, 
foreign journalists publicly complained that military officials in the 
northern Caucasus region made it excessively difficult for them to 
receive local press accreditation.
    The FSB interfered with citizens' right to privacy by monitoring 
use of the Internet (see Section 1.f.).
    Although the Government generally respects academic freedom, the 
case of environmental researcher Vladimir Soifer constitutes an 
apparent violation of academic freedom. On July 3, the FSB seized 
documents, including personal correspondence, from the Vladivostok 
office of Soifer, a prominent physicist who researches marine 
radioactive contamination. The search was conducted after the 
cancellation of government funds for his research and of his security 
clearance for access to his laboratory in March. Soifer filed a 
complaint with a Vladivostok procurator, alleging that the FSB failed 
to list in its protocol the items that its forces took from his 
apartment, such as his external passport. Further, Soifer alleged that 
the FSB confiscated personal correspondence, unrelated to his research, 
without a warrant. As of September 1, Soifer still was unable to 
continue his research and remains in Moscow. The GDF and Human Rights 
Watch see this case as part of a larger pattern of harassment of 
environmentalists by authorities, which includes the Pasko and Nikitin 
cases (see Section 1.d.), and the Moscow directorate of justice's 
refusal to register Aleksey Yablokov's ``Ecology and Human Rights'' 
organization (see Section 2.b.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides citizens with the right to assemble freely, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. Organizations must obtain permits in 
order to hold public meetings. The application process must begin 
between 5 and 10 days before the scheduled event. Citizens freely and 
actively protested government decisions and actions. Permits to 
demonstrate were granted readily to both opponents and supporters of 
the Government.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. Public organizations must 
register their bylaws and the names of their leaders with the Ministry 
of Justice. In 1995 a registration law was passed specifying that 
organizations had until June 1999 to reregister. When the deadline 
expired on July 1, some human rights activists expressed deep concern 
that an estimated 10,000 NGO's would be vulnerable to possible 
``liquidation'' (closure by court order) by local authorities who were 
hostile to human rights or opposition political activity. In a move 
which human rights activists marked as a potentially serious blow to 
freedom of association, in November the Federation Council rejected a 
bill that was passed by the Duma to extend the reregistration deadline 
by 1 year. To date the Ministry of Justice maintains that there were 
not a large number of liquidations, as a result of the passing 
deadline. NGO's currently are studying the situation and attempting to 
track the number of organizations affected by the deadline. It was 
difficult to assess the scope of the problem due to the large number of 
registered NGO's that exist only on paper, as well as the large number 
of active but unregistered organizations. Ministry of Justice officials 
stated publicly, and a few NGO's agreed, that 4 years was sufficient 
time for most organizations to reregister, and that obtaining new 
registration generally was not difficult. However, there were several 
high profile cases in which well-known activists or organizations were 
refused reregistration--such as Sergey Grigoriants' Glasnost Foundation 
and environmentalist Aleksey Yablokov's Ecology and Human Rights 
association--by regional departments of justice on grounds that these 
organizations called illegal and discriminatory.
    According to press reports, in January a district court in 
Bashkortostan banned the Tatar Public Center for allegedly calling for 
the secession of a Tatar region from the republic and for the ouster of 
republic president Murtaza Rakhimov. The Center's director contends 
that it only asked voters not to choose Rakhimov in the 1998 elections, 
and that it protested a draft language law that did not designate Tatar 
as an official language in the republic (see Section 5).
    According to press reports, on July 15, the Ministry of Justice's 
regional office in Krasnodar kray denied the registration of the 
Association for the Protection of Human Rights on the grounds that the 
organization's goal of participating in elections violates the law. The 
group, which analyzes whether regional legislation conforms with 
federal and international law, had been operating in the region for 5 
years.
    On August 16, the Moscow City Court upheld the ruling of a 
municipal court and the Moscow Directorate of Justice to deny 
registration to Ecology and Human Rights, an association led by the 
country's leading environmental activist, Aleksey Yablokov. The court's 
decision echoed the Directorate of Justice's view that protection of 
the environment is the responsibility of the Government and that 
``interference of community entities in the activities of the organs of 
state authority and its officials is not permitted.'' The organization 
is seeking legal assistance in order to seek a solution. Observers have 
linked this development to the prosecution of environmental reporters 
Pasko and Nikitin (see Section 1.d.), and to FSB harassment of 
environmental researcher Vladimir Soifer (see Section 2.a.).
    In September Dagestan's parliament passed legislation that outlawed 
``Wahhabi'' groups and other organizations it considered extremist. 
During the year, federal and Dagestani authorities stepped up their 
pressure on what they label as the republic's ``Wahhabi'' Muslim 
community. After an incursion on August 7 by Chechen-backed Islamist 
guerrillas, Dagestan president Magomedali Magomedov declared that his 
government would take a harder line against ``Wahhabism'' (see Section 
2.c).
    In addition to submitting their bylaws and the names of their 
leaders, political parties must present 5,000 signatures and pay a fee 
to register. The Constitution and the Law on Elections ban the 
participation in elections of organizations that profess 
anticonstitutional themes or activities.
    On March 30, President Yeltsin signed the law On the Basic 
Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens to Participate 
in a Referendum (Voting Rights Act) and the federal law on public 
associations. These laws stipulate that associations must have charters 
that state specifically an intention to participate in elections, and 
that they must be registered with the Ministry of Justice 1 year prior 
to elections.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, although the Constitution also provides for the equality of 
all religions before the law and the separation of church and state, in 
practice the Government does not always respect the provision for 
equality of religions.
    In December 1990, the Soviet Government adopted a law on religious 
freedom designed to put all religions on an equal basis. (After the 
breakup of the Soviet Union, this law became part of the Russian 
Federation's legal code.) The 1990 law forbade government interference 
in religion and established simple registration procedures for 
religious groups. Registration of religious groups was not required; 
however, by registering groups obtained a number of advantages, for 
example, the ability to establish official places of worship or benefit 
from tax exemptions.
    During the early and mid-1990's, many sectors of society, 
particularly nationalists and many members of the Russian Orthodox 
Church, were disturbed by a sharp increase in the activities of well-
financed foreign missionaries. Many advocated limiting the activities 
of what they termed ``nontraditional'' religious groups and what 
sometimes were called ``dangerous'' or ``totalitarian'' sects.
    In October 1997, the Duma enacted a new, restrictive, and 
potentially discriminatory law on religion, which raised questions 
about the Government's commitment to international agreements honoring 
freedom of religion. Passage of the law prompted concern in the 
international community, because for the first time since the breakup 
of the Soviet Union, the Government had adopted legislation that could 
abridge fundamental human rights. This law replaced the progressive 
1990 religion law that had helped facilitate a revival of religious 
activity.
    The new law ostensibly targeted so-called ``totalitarian sects'' or 
dangerous religious cults. However, the intent of some of the law's 
sponsors appears to have been to discriminate against members of 
foreign and less well-established religions by making it difficult for 
them to manifest their beliefs through organized religious 
institutions.
    The critics of the law believe that the basic assumption behind the 
law is that religious groups must prove their innocence and their 
legitimacy before gaining the advantages of state recognition. Russian 
government officials, including President Yeltsin and then-Prime 
Minister Chernomyrdin, pledged that the law on religion would not 
result in any erosion of religious freedom in the country. Officials in 
the Presidential Administration and the Cabinet of Ministers have 
echoed and clarified these commitments during 1998 and the first half 
of 1999. They have taken a flexible approach to implementation of some 
of the law's most negative aspects and have shown some willingness to 
intervene with local authorities in defense of religious rights.
    The 1997 law on religion is very complex, with many ambiguous and 
contradictory provisions. On its face, the law creates various 
categories of religious communities with differing levels of legal 
status and privileges. The law distinguishes between religious 
``groups'' and ``organizations,'' two mutually exclusive registration 
categories, and creates two categories of organizations: ``regional'' 
and ``centralized.'' A religious ``group'' is a congregation of 
worshipers that does not have the legal status of a juridical person, 
meaning that it cannot open a bank account, own property, issue 
invitations to foreign guests, publish literature, or conduct worship 
services in prisons and state-owned hospitals, among other things. 
Groups are permitted to rent public spaces and hold services. Moreover, 
the law does not purport to abridge the rights of individual members of 
``groups.'' For example, a member of a religious group could buy 
property for the group's use, invite personal guests to engage in 
religious instruction, and import religious material. However, in this 
case, the group would not enjoy tax benefits and other rights extended 
to religious organizations, such as proselytizing.
    The law's most controversial provisions are those that limit the 
rights, activities, and status of religious groups existing in the 
country for less than 15 years. Groups that can prove their existence 
in the country for 15 years have the right to obtain the status of 
``local religious organizations.'' Similarly, congregations that had 
existed for 15 years when the new law was enacted also are eligible for 
registration as an organization. Organizations, both local and 
centralized, are considered juridical persons, enjoy tax exemptions, 
and are permitted to proselytize, establish religious schools, host 
foreign religious workers, and publish literature.
    Under the 1997 religion law, representative offices of foreign 
religious organizations are required to register with state 
authorities. They are barred from conducting liturgical services and 
other religious activity unless they have acquired the status of a 
group or organization. Although the law officially requires all foreign 
religious organizations to register, in practice foreign religious 
representatives' offices (those not registered under Russian law) have 
opened without registering or have been accredited to a registered 
Russian religious organization. However, these representative offices 
cannot carry out religious activities and do not have the status of a 
religious organization.
    A ``centralized religious organization'' can be founded by a 
confession that has 3 functioning ``local organizations'' (each of 
which must have at least 10 members who are Russian citizens) in 
different regions. A centralized organization apparently has the right 
to establish affiliated local organizations without adhering to the 15-
year rule. In implementing this provision, the Government has extended 
this definition to include a ``registered centralized managing 
center.'' Centralized organizations also have been accorded the right 
to organize affiliated local organizations, which themselves do not 
comply with the 15-year rule.
    Critics of the law have claimed that it violates the Constitution's 
provision of equality before the law of all confessions. In particular, 
many religious groups criticized the law's requirement that religious 
groups exist for 15 years before they can qualify for ``organization'' 
status. Also, many groups feared the consequences of the law's 
provisions limiting the actions of foreign religious missionaries. 
Representatives of some religions, such as the Church of Jesus Christ 
of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) and some Pentecostal and charismatic 
Christian groups, have said that their activities in the country could 
be halted under the law. The law furnishes regional officials with an 
instrument that has been interpreted and used by officials at the local 
level to restrict the activities of religious minorities.
    Human rights activists welcomed a March open letter to the 
President and Duma by Human Rights Plenipotentiary Oleg Mironov, in 
which he criticized the 1997 religion law and recommended changes to 
bring it into accordance with the Constitution and international norms 
for religious freedom. (Mironov's office is a government entity created 
by the Parliament in 1997 that is dedicated to investigating complaints 
of human rights abuses--see Section 4.)
    Between February 12 and June 3, 1998, the Government issued three 
sets of regulations governing implementation of the new law. While 
providing procedural guidelines for registration, the regulations 
failed to clarify many key definitional points in the law.
    In practice the registration process--which involves simultaneous 
registration at both the federal and local levels--has proven for a 
number of confessions to be onerous and requires considerable time, 
effort, and legal expense. International and well-funded Russian 
religious organizations, in particular, began the reregistration 
process soon after publication of the regulations governing 
reregistration. Russian Pentecostal groups, which have a solid and 
growing network of churches throughout the country, sought guidance 
from the Ministry of Justice on reregistration as early as November 
1997. One of the larger organizations, the Russian Unified Fellowship 
of Christians of the Evangelical Faith (which traces its origins back 
to the early 1900's) reregistered as a centralized religious 
organization by late March 1998. It has since incorporated many 
smaller, newer Pentecostal groups within its structure.
    According to Ministry of Justice figures, by year's end, 
approximately 80 percent or 320 out of 400 religious organizations were 
reregistered on the federal level, representing 40 percent of the total 
number requiring reregistration. At year's end, the Ministry estimated 
that about half of the 16,850 religious organizations still were not 
reregistered on the local level.
    The Government is attempting to address mounting concerns that a 
large number of religious organizations may remain unregistered when 
the deadline passes at year's end and be left vulnerable to attempts by 
local authorities to restrict their activities. In June the Ministry of 
Justice sent to the regional directorates of justice a recommendation 
that local religious organizations be reregistered. Another development 
may help religious organizations indirectly: on August 2, a 
presidential decree was signed which, among other things, clarified the 
relationship between the federal Ministry and the regional directorates 
of justice, stating that the directorates are ``territorial organs of 
the Ministry of Justice.'' Observers and officials view this decree as 
a means to help bring insubordinate directorates more in line with 
federal policies, although it is unclear what effect this decree had in 
practice.
    The Duma failed to pass before year's end an amendment to the 1997 
religion law that would extend the deadline for registration of 
religious organizations by 1 year. It was unclear whether this 
development, which leaves approximately half of the total 16,850 
organizations exposed to ``liquidation'' (closure by court order), 
would result in closures. Duma officials and representatives of the 
Ministry of Justice state that the amendment is to be voted on in late 
March 2000. On December 31, Deputy Minister of Justice Yevgeniy 
Sidorenko reported to the press that the Ministry of Justice sent to 
the regional directorates of justice a recommendation that they refrain 
from initiating legal proceedings to liquidate any organizations.
    As of August, several religious groups report that local 
registrations have gone more smoothly, following a June Ministry of 
Justice recommendation to regional directorates of justice that local 
religious organizations be reregistered. Jehovah's Witnesses reported 
on September 1 that the group had registered 188 local organizations in 
53 regions and hoped to register a total of 500 by year's end 
(Jehovah's Witnesses report a total of 1,000 congregations in Russia, 
not all of which require registration). Late in August, the Unification 
Church stated that it had registered five local religious 
organizations.
    The delay in reregistration is due in part to the slow pace at 
which the federal Ministry of Justice has disseminated the regulations 
and guidelines to local authorities and understaffing both at the 
Ministry of Justice and at local levels. In many instances the Ministry 
of Justice has asked for additional information and has demanded 
changes in the organizational structure and by-laws of some groups to 
ensure that they are in conformance with the law. Also, smaller, 
minority confessions sometimes feared the registration process, while 
others started the process late because they needed to agree internally 
on how to register their organizations in conformance with the law. Of 
89 regions, 30 have laws and decrees on religion that violate the 
Constitution by restricting the activities of religious groups; 
presumably they would have to be changed. In the meantime, many local 
religious organizations continue to try to seek means of affiliating 
themselves with centralized organizations or confessions that can meet 
the 15-year rule and provide a protective legal cover. However, some 
individual local churches and religious orders, citing their 
theological and administrative independence, are reluctant to make 
themselves part of a larger organization. Under the new system, such 
religious communities face considerable legal disadvantages.
    President Yeltsin and other high-ranking officials have stated 
consistently that the law would be applied in a liberal, tolerant 
manner, thereby preserving religious freedom and the equality of 
confessions. They insist that no mainstream religion already operating 
in the country would see its activities curtailed as a result of the 
new law. The full effect of the law on minority confessions or 
religions considered nontraditional is not expected to be clear until 
after December 31 (the deadline before which organizations registered 
under the old law are required to obtain new registration). To date no 
religious organization has ceased operations as a result of the law. 
Presidential administration officials have established consultative 
mechanisms to facilitate government interaction with religious 
communities and to monitor application of the law on religion. However, 
a federal government agency in the case of at least one religion has 
been responsible for significant restrictions on the activities of a 
church. In some areas, foreign Roman Catholic religious workers must 
return to their home countries every 3 months in order to renew their 
visas, unlike other foreign workers who can apply for multiple-entry 
visas or extend their stays.
    Despite the Federal Government's efforts to implement the law 
liberally and to provide assurances that religious freedom would be 
observed, restrictions continued at the local level. The vagueness of 
the law and regulations, the contradictions between federal and local 
law, and varying interpretations furnish regional officials with a 
pretext to restrict the activities of religious minorities. 
Discriminatory practices at the local level are attributable to the 
increased decentralization of power and the relatively greater 
vulnerability of local governments to lobbying by majority religions, 
as well as to government inaction and discriminatory attitudes that are 
widely held in society.
    For example, the Moscow directorate of justice continues to refuse 
registration to Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow, despite the precedent 
set by the Ministry of Justice's April 30 decision to reregister 
Jehovah's Witnesses on the federal level. The directorate has refused 
three applications for local registration by Moscow Jehovah's Witnesses 
for unclear reasons. Although there is no legal basis to do so, the 
directorate may be refusing registration pending resolution of the 
outstanding civil case against Moscow Jehovah's Witnesses.
    At least one religious organization, the ``Society of Jesus'' 
(Jesuits), has had difficulty registering at the federal level because 
its structure does not fit assumptions underpinning the law's 
provisions.
    The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints successfully has 
registered 20 local religious organizations but continues to encounter 
some problems. After some initial trouble concerning registration of 
missionaries residing in the cities of Tolyatti and Novokuybyshevsk in 
the Samara region, by November the Church was able to agree with the 
Samara directorate of justice to establish registered local 
organizations in these cities in order to allow Mormon missionaries to 
reside there legally.
    During the year the directorate of justice in Chelyabinsk rejected 
the local registration application of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints several times, based on the alleged incompatibility 
of church activities with federal law.
    Even without registration, the Church continued to hold regular 
services without incident, although its missionaries have suspended 
their door-to-door canvassing and other outreach activities. If the 
Church remains unregistered, its missionaries would be forced to leave 
the country when their visas expire in December. The directorate of 
justice also has rejected the registration applications of the Baptist, 
Adventist, and Pentecostal churches in Chelyabinsk on similar grounds.
    Since mid-1998 the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has 
been attempting unsuccessfully to be registered locally in Kazan in 
Tatarstan. At year's end, the Church's most recent application for 
registration was being reviewed according to regulations set out in 
Tatarstan's new religion law that was adopted on August 28. Church 
representatives argue that because their most recent application 
predated the new law by 2 months, it should not be considered under the 
new law. Moreover, the Church argues that the republic ministry of 
justice's previous cancellation of the Church's registration in 
February also was illegal under the 1997 federal religion law, because 
a court order is required to liquidate an organization. Tatar 
authorities failed to address these complaints adequately by year's 
end.
    Although it can be a slow and costly process for religious groups, 
the judicial system has provided an appeal process for religious 
organizations threatened with loss of registered status or 
``liquidation'' as a religious organization under Article 14 of the 
1997 religion law. Some local churches initially denied local 
registration have been registered following successful lawsuits, as in 
the case of the Evangelical Lutheran Mission in Khakasiya in November 
1998, when the federal Supreme Court overturned the verdict of the 
Khakasiya supreme court. In February the supreme court of Khakasiya 
rejected the regional procurator's request to nullify the registration 
of the Evangelical Lutheran Mission; the procurator plans to appeal the 
case. In 1998 a local procuracy opened a civil case against the Word of 
Life Pentecostal Church in the Far Eastern city of Magadan under 
Article 14 of the 1997 religion law, accusing the Church of using cult 
practices to manipulate its members. After a lengthy delay, a Magadan 
municipal court finally dismissed the case in May due to insufficient 
evidence, a decision that was upheld in June by the Magadan oblast 
court. However, the Church fears that the same procuracy soon may try 
to open a criminal case. The Word of Life Church also won a court 
battle for reregistration in March. A church member employed by the 
Government who was threatened with the loss of her job late in 1998 was 
still at her post as of June. Church officials report that two other 
church members were fired because of their religion, but such 
allegations are difficult to prove. Also, tax investigations on two 
separate charges continue. Church members reported that negative 
stories about them repeatedly appeared in the local state-controlled 
press, with no mention of their court victories. Despite these 
difficulties, the Word of Life Pentecostal Church continues its normal 
activities.
    Since 1994 30 of 89 regional governments have passed restrictive 
laws and decrees intended to restrict the activities of religious 
groups. At the time the 1997 religion law was under discussion, its 
proponents argued that it was necessary in order to deal with the many 
restrictive local laws. The Federal Government has not challenged 
effectively the unconstitutionality of these restrictions, although the 
Presidential Administration sent warnings to 30 regions regarding the 
unconstitutionality of local laws. Critics contend that the Federal 
Government should be more active in reversing discriminatory actions 
taken at the local level and, when necessary, reprimanding the 
officials at fault. Also according to critics, the federal authorities 
need to take action to ensure that regional and local legislation or 
other actions do not contradict constitutional provisions protecting 
religious freedom. There were reports that some local and municipal 
governments prevented religious groups from using venues, such as 
cinemas, suitable for large gatherings. In many areas of the country, 
government-owned facilities are the only available venues. As a result, 
in some instances denominations that do not have their own property 
effectively have been denied the opportunity to practice their faith in 
large groups. For example, late in April the Moscow northern district 
administration gathered theater and assembly hall managers and ordered 
them to refuse to lease their facilities to Jehovah's Witnesses. In 
August Jehovah's Witnesses nearly were forced to cancel a convention 
for 15,000 Witnesses at Moscow's Olympic Stadium, reportedly because 
stadium management was under pressure from the Moscow city 
administration. The weekend convention also was disrupted briefly by a 
telephone bomb threat, but no device was found. Moscow police concluded 
that the call was a prank, and did not open a criminal investigation. 
The Open Christianity private ecumenical school was evicted from its 
premises in St. Petersburg in March after a protracted battle with city 
officials about rights to the building, registration of the school, and 
the school's taxes. However, it is not clear that the school's 
religious orientation was at the root of city administration actions 
against it, and local government officials tried to relocate the school 
to an alternative site. In the summer of 1998, local officials in 
Rostov-on-Don cancelled a rental agreement permitting the Shield of 
Faith Pentecostal Church to sponsor a Jesus Festival concert in a 
sports complex. The chairman of the city's Department of Cossacks and 
Religion refused to permit the event. In June 1998, Canadian evangelist 
Viktor Hamm of the Billy Graham Evangelical Association cancelled an 
outdoor preaching event in Voronezh after city authorities denied the 
local sponsors of the event, the Evangelical Christian-Baptists, 
permission to hold the event. In August 1998, according to unconfirmed 
reports from religious press sources, authorities in Kasplya, in 
Smolensk oblast, closed a Sunday school and prohibited worship services 
by the Evangelical Christian-Baptists. In September 1998, city 
authorities required a cinema to cancel its rental agreement with the 
Shield of Faith congregation. Also in September 1998, the director of 
the Moscow Technical College ordered guards not to admit an 
unregistered Baptist congregation onto the premises it had rented. The 
action allegedly stemmed from an intervention by the Federal Security 
Service (FSB), according to unconfirmed reports from religious press 
sources.
    Some local executive authorities continued to cite the new law or 
local laws to obstruct religious groups' activities or to rescind their 
existing local registrations. In late 1998, according to the United 
Church, its St. Petersburg branch was denied local registration after a 
federal court in St. Petersburg started proceedings against the Church.
    Reports of harassment and punishment for religious belief or 
activity continued. Despite legal registration, members of some 
religions, including Protestant groups, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, continue to face 
discrimination in their ability to rent premises and conduct group 
activities. For example, in March local militia troops broke up 
services of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in 
Chelyabinsk and interrogated seven missionaries. In April regional 
officials forbade the Church from holding services on Easter Sunday and 
threatened the church leader with arrest if he assembled his 
congregation that day. Nonetheless, the Church held its Easter Sunday 
services without incident. Mormon missionaries throughout Russia 
frequently are detained for brief periods or asked by local police to 
cease their activities, regardless of whether they were actually in 
violation of local statutes on picketing (see Section 1.d.). In July 
1998, according to unconfirmed reports from religious press sources, 
the mayor of Novokuznetsk in Siberia barred Gideons from distributing 
New Testaments in schools, although their charter, approved by the 
Government, states that they may do so. In August and September 1998, 
local authorities and agents from the FSB reportedly harassed, 
repeatedly interrogated, and threatened with imprisonment a U.S. 
missionary from the Baptist Mid-Missions. FSB agents warned members of 
the autonomous Baptist Church affiliated with Baptist Mid-Missions to 
stop attending services, according to the Keston News Service.
    The country's first judicial proceeding to suspend the operations 
of an existing religious organization at the local level continues, as 
Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow fight to avoid legal ``liquidation'' 
under Article 14 of the 1997 religion law. Based on a complaint from 
the Committee to Save Youth from Totalitarian Cults (a group that 
reportedly has ties to the Russian Orthodox Church), a Moscow municipal 
procurator is seeking ``liquidation'' (i.e., termination of the 
organization as a legal entity) of the Moscow Jehovah's Witnesses 
organization under Article 14 of the 1997 religion law for its alleged 
antisocial, antifamily character. In March the trial was suspended 
pending review of the case by a panel of court-appointed religious 
experts. On June 28, the Moscow city court upheld the decision of the 
Golovinskiy municipal court to appoint an expert panel. The expert 
panel is reviewing the case but is expected to render a split 
recommendation. Meanwhile, Jehovah's Witnesses are preparing a Supreme 
Court appeal.
    In March in St. Petersburg, Nataliya Ilyina, the mother of a young 
mentally disabled woman, brought a second lawsuit against Jehovah's 
Witnesses in St. Petersburg's Frunzenskiy municipal court. Ilyina 
alleges that the Church psychologically damaged her daughter, 
Yekaterina Ilyina. Jehovah's Witnesses lawyer Artur Leontyev said that 
he believes that the anticult group Committee for Family and 
Personality and also self-described ``sectomania'' expert and Moscow 
psychiatrist Fedor Kondratyev are behind the case. The Committee for 
Family and Personality filed a lawsuit against the Church in 1997 on 
the same grounds, but the Frunzenskiy court ruled in April 1998 that 
the Church had not in any way harmed Yekaterina Ilyina, whose mental 
disability existed well before she began attending services.
    The Khakasiya and Yaroslavl cases form the basis of the 
constitutional challenge to the law on religion, filed with the 
Constitutional Court in May 1998 by the NGO, the Institute for Religion 
and Law. The petition challenges the constitutionality of the law's 15-
year requirement and its limitations on the rights and activities of 
confessions that do not meet that requirement. The Constitutional Court 
accepted the case for review in November 1998. On November 23, the 
Constitutional Court upheld the provision of the religion law that 
requires religious organizations to prove 15 years of existence in the 
country in order to be registered. However, the Court also ruled that 
religious organizations that were registered before the passage of the 
1997 religion law are not required to prove 15 years' existence in the 
country in order to be registered. The Court also upheld the right of 
the Government to place certain limits on the activity of religious 
groups in the interests of national security.
    Human rights activists contend that only 15 percent of actual 
violations of religious freedom are reported. According to various 
sources, most citizens, especially those living in the regions, are 
still skeptical about the protection of religious freedom and are 
reluctant to assert their rights due to fear of retaliation. Federal 
authorities did not take sufficient action to reverse discriminatory 
actions taken at the local level, or to discipline those officials 
responsible. Federal authorities and Moscow human rights activists 
often have limited information about what is happening in the regions.
    The Vanino Baptist Church and its pastor, Dan Pollard, since March 
1998 have fought a lengthy legal battle over registration in the Far 
Eastern region of Khabarovsk and obtaining the necessary permits for 
Pollard, or his temporary replacement Arthur Bristol, to remain in the 
country. Khabarovsk authorities maintained that the Baptist Church did 
not meet the 1997 religion law's requirement of over 15 years of 
existence and therefore could not be a sponsoring religious 
organization. To facilitate reregistration of the Vanino Baptist Church 
under the 1997 law, the Vanino Baptist Church and its lawyer negotiated 
an agreement to join the Russian Baptist Union. However, the Church's 
funding problems, as well as doctrinal differences, ultimately 
precluded this arrangement. In May Pollard was refused a visa to return 
to the country. Bristol left in September 1998, reportedly due to 
harassment, surveillance, and threats.
    The Moscow procurator general and approximately 70 members of the 
FSB, Federal Tax Police, and local police raided two locations of the 
Church of Scientology in Moscow on February 25. According to church 
officials, the authorities confiscated documents, including tax records 
and priest-penitent privileged counseling records. The raids continued 
over 3 days. The tax police say that they are investigating possible 
tax evasion and other financial irregularities. Although there were 
earlier press reports that two church members were beaten, Western 
diplomats received no confirmation of this incident. On October 6, a 
Moscow district court revoked the operating license of a social center 
affiliated with the Church of Scientology because mistakes were made 
allegedly in the center's license application materials in 1993. 
Officials for the center acknowledge the mistake, but insist that it 
was corrected a few years ago; they intend to appeal the decision. The 
ruling was made under the law on social organizations (not the 1997 
religion law) and does not appear to affect directly the functioning of 
the Church of Scientology. However, church officials believe that the 
ruling is part of a broader attack on the Church and its activities. 
The Church of Scientology is seeking to reregister both its social 
organization and its religious organization.
    According to press reports, in April the Stavropol procuracy 
expelled eight foreign citizens for spreading Islamic fundamentalism, 
which it labeled ``Wahhabism.'' Most of the expellees reportedly were 
from Syria.
    Property disputes are some of the most frequent complaints cited by 
religious groups. For the most part synagogues, churches, and mosques 
have been returned to communities to be used for religious services. 
The Federal Government has met the requirements of the 1993 
presidential decree on communal property restitution, and the decree 
continues to guide the ongoing process. According to statistics from 
the Ministry of State Property, over 2,000 federally owned properties 
have been returned to religious communities since 1989. However, 
jurisdiction in most cases is at the regional level, and there is no 
centralized source of information on these cases. One Ministry of 
Culture official responsible for restitution of religious historical 
monuments estimated early in the year that over 3,600 transfers of 
religious buildings had occurred at the regional level, and that 
approximately 30 percent of property designated for return has been 
transferred back to its original owners at both the federal and 
regional levels. Nonetheless, there continue to be reports of religious 
property that has not been returned. For example, the Church of the 
Immaculate Conception in Ryazan still has not been returned to the 
local Catholic community. The Moscow Patriarchate has claimed and taken 
possession of properties owned by other branches of Orthodoxy and, in 
certain cases, property of other religions. In some property disputes, 
religious buildings have been ``privatized,'' and there are long delays 
in finding new locations for the current occupants, as required by law. 
Local authorities often refuse to get involved in property disputes, 
which they contend are between private organizations. Even where state 
or municipal authorities still have undisputed control of properties, a 
number of religious communities continue to meet significant obstacles 
when they request the return of religious buildings or when they seek 
to acquire land and necessary building permits for new religious 
structures. Since February local authorities in Omsk have not responded 
to the Mormons' request to lease land, although local church leaders 
were continuing their efforts to locate a site.
    Some Protestant faiths have suggested that the Russian Orthodox 
Church influences the Government regarding land allocated for churches 
of other sects. The Jewish community, which has met with some success 
on communal property restitution, faces the same obstacles as other 
religious communities and has concerns about the return of Torah 
scrolls, many of which are in state museum collections.
    In its preamble (which government officials insist has no legal 
standing), the 1997 religion law recognizes the ``special contribution 
of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and 
development of Russia's spirituality and culture.'' It accords 
``respect'' to Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and certain 
other religions as an inseparable part of the country's historical 
heritage. Russian Orthodoxy is considered in conservative nationalist 
circles as the de facto official religion of the country. Many Russians 
firmly believe that at least nominal adherence to the Russian Orthodox 
Church is at the heart of what it means to be Russian.
    The Russian Orthodox Church was involved actively in drafting the 
1997 law on religion. It has made special arrangements with government 
agencies to conduct religious education and to provide spiritual 
counseling to Russian military service members. These arrangements do 
not appear to be available to other religions. (In particular, Muslim 
religious leaders have complained that they are not permitted to 
minister to Muslim military service members.) The head of the Moscow 
Patriarchate, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, participates in 
most high-level official events and appears to have direct access to 
and influence with officials of the executive branch. The traditional 
view that Russian soil is an exclusively ``Orthodox domain'' leads to 
frequent criticism and intolerance of foreign religious groups that 
proselytize in the country. Many Orthodox Church officials condemn such 
``sheep stealing'' when practiced by other Christian churches. Even 
well-established foreign religious organizations have been 
characterized by the Orthodox leadership as ``dangerous and destructive 
sects.''
    The Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with 
several human rights organizations, has criticized the use of 
psychiatry in ``deprogramming'' victims of ``totalitarian sects.'' In 
such cases, authorities use pseudo-psychological and spiritual 
techniques to ``treat'' persons who had been members of new religious 
groups (see Section 1.c.).
    St. Petersburg authorities arbitrarily detained six Scientologists 
for psychiatric evaluation. In January in St. Petersburg, Vladimir 
Tretyak, leader of Sentuar (the local branch of the Church of 
Scientology), was accused by St. Petersburg chief psychiatrist Larisa 
Rubina of inflicting psychological damage on his coreligionists. 
Beginning June 17, six members of Sentuar--Mikhail Dvorkin, Igor 
Zakrayev, Irina Shamarina, Svetlana Kruglova, Svetlana Pastushenkova 
and Lyudmila Urzhumtseva--were hospitalized forcibly and underwent 3 
weeks of criminal psychiatric investigation by order of Boris Larionov, 
procurator of the Vyborgskiy administrative district of St. Petersburg. 
In televised remarks, Rubina reported their July 8 release and declared 
the six mentally competent. Rubina referred to the six as ``the 
accused'', despite the fact they were only witnesses in the criminal 
case against Tretyak.
    Although Jews and Muslims continue to encounter prejudice and 
societal discrimination (see Section 5), they generally have not been 
inhibited by the authorities in the free practice of their religion. 
Other religions, including Buddhism and Shamanism, are practiced in 
specific localities where they are rooted in local traditions.
    Following anti-Semitic remarks made by Communist Party leaders in 
late 1998, President Yeltsin has spoken out repeatedly against anti-
Semitic and extremist attitudes. The Presidential Administration, the 
Government, and, in particular, the Russian media reacted immediately 
to the Communist Party's expressions of anti-Semitism. Communist Party 
leaders accused the press of conducting a smear campaign and threatened 
retribution. A December 16, 1998 presidential statement delivered to 
the Duma declared that ``any attempt to insult ethnic groups, to limit 
the rights of citizens on the basis of origin, will be stopped in 
accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Russian 
Federation.'' On December 30, 1998, Yeltsin ordered cabinet officials 
responsible for law enforcement issues to prepare a comprehensive 
federal program against political and religious extremism by March 1.
    On February 20, during a speech to the ``Movement for the Support 
of the Army'' in Novocherkassk, Duma Deputy and retired General Albert 
Makashov made anti-Semitic remarks, following his notable anti-Semitic 
statements in the second half of 1998. He reportedly made the comment, 
among others, that ``We will be anti-Semites and must be victorious.'' 
Following the speech, the Rostov regional procurator refused to take 
action against Makashov.
    During a March meeting with a delegation from the Anti-Defamation 
League, then-Prime Minister Primakov publicly promised strong 
government action and new legislation to combat anti-Semitism and 
extremism, including new draft legislation. Later that month the 
Procurator General announced that he would press a criminal case 
against Makashov for his repeated openly anti-Semitic public remarks. 
However, Makashov cannot be prosecuted unless the Duma votes to lift 
his parliamentary immunity. In April the Ministry of Justice concluded 
that the Communist Party itself did not violate the law, since the 
statements of its members did not reflect the objectives of the party.
    The Federal Government states that it has moved forward on its 
promised initiatives against extremism and anti-Semitism. In November 
1998, the Duma adopted a resolution against public statements damaging 
to interethnic relations in the country. In March the Government 
presented to the Duma a draft law on combating political extremism and 
also is drafting a law on national extremism, although by year's end 
the Duma did not pass the law. The Duma is considering a draft law 
forbidding ``Nazi symbols and literature.'' Separately, the Procurator 
General sent to regional procurators in January instructions to cut off 
distribution of any literature or printed material depicting Nazi 
symbols, and a letter describing the Moscow city procurator's 
experience in combating political extremism. The Government also states 
that, in implementing the presidential decree on extremism, it 
conducted interagency consultations, beginning in June and continuing 
on a quarterly basis, which involve the presidential administration, 
the judiciary, law enforcement organs, and experts from outside the 
Government. A government review of the implementation of existing laws 
against acts of national, racial, and religious hatred revealed that 25 
criminal investigations were conducted in 1998, and that in 1999 10 
were opened by June. Also, the Moscow city duma adopted a law 
forbidding the distribution and display of Nazi symbols in May, and the 
Moscow regional duma passed similar legislation in June. However, on 
September 2 the Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper reported that Moscow 
oblast governor Anatoliy Tyazhlov refused to sign the law, saying that 
the draft law not only threatened artistic and academic freedom of 
expression, but also freedom of religion, as swastikas are displayed by 
some religious groups. Regional duma members are working to redraft the 
law.
    Another prominent public figure who regularly engaged in anti-
Semitic remarks was Krasnodar region governor Nikolay Kondratenko. The 
governor's public speeches in the region often contain crude anti-
Semitic remarks and stereotypes and blame Jews and alleged Jewish 
conspiracies for the country's problems. For example, Kondratenko has 
said that the essence of Russian history is the Russian battle against 
Jewish domination. He has blamed ``Zionists'' for the war in Chechnya, 
for the destruction of the Communist Party, for attacks on the Russian 
Orthodox Church, and for introducing homosexuality in the country. In 
addition, there have been credible reports that Kondratenko has urged 
the firing of Jewish public employees in the region.
    A report issued in October 1997 by the human rights group Memorial 
criticized Krasnodar government officials for ``encouraging radical 
nationalist groups,'' including the Cossacks, and ``indirectly inciting 
them to violence'' against ethnic minority groups in the area. Local 
government authorities have sanctioned patrols by Cossack paramilitary 
groups in the name of law enforcement. Such groups are not publicly 
accountable, and their activities have resulted in abuses (see Section 
5).
    After his 1996 election, Kondratenko adopted a new regional charter 
that declares Krasnodar kray the ``place of residence for the (ethnic) 
Russian people.'' He appointed Cossack ``hetman'' Vladimir Gromov as 
deputy governor of the region. In April 1997, Kondratenko and Gromov 
issued a resolution making Cossack groups subordinate to the regional 
government instead of to the State, according to the Center for Human 
Rights Advocacy (see Section 5). The Center reported that President 
Yeltsin suspended this resolution in September 1997 on the grounds that 
it was unconstitutional.
    Federal and Dagestani authorities stepped up their pressure on what 
they label as the republic's ``Wahhabi'' Muslim community. After an 
incursion on August 7 by Chechen-backed Islamist guerrillas, Dagestan 
president Magomedali Magomedov declared that his government would take 
a harder line against ``Wahhabism.'' In September Dagestan's parliament 
passed legislation that outlawed ``Wahhabi'' groups and other 
organizations it considered extremist (see Section 2.b.). The Keston 
News Service reports that government and religious officials in several 
Dagestani districts have wrecked conservative Islamic mosques, 
suppressed religious broadcasts, and harassed local conservative 
Islamic communities. According to press reports, federal and Dagestani 
forces have followed up their initial counterinsurgency efforts with 
attacks on Muslim villages that they consider to be ``Wahhabi'' and 
that refuse to register their communities and turn in their weapons.
    On February 3, Chechen president Maskhadov declared Shari'a 
(Islamic law) to be in effect in the republic of Chechnya. Maskhadov 
signed several decrees stipulating that all local legislation be 
brought into line with the Koran and Shari'a regulations. Maskhadov 
ordered the Chechen legislature and the Council of Muftis to draft a 
Shari'a constitution within 1 month's time. The legislature also was 
stripped of its legislative functions and on February 10 was replaced 
with a 34-member shura that has responsibility for ``consulting'' with 
the republic's president. The Shura includes several prominent 
opposition leaders. According to one expert, the Shura created in 
Chechnya is not a traditional Muslim shura run by religious men, but 
instead is a council of military men. Maskhadov's action apparently was 
a political response to pressure from Islamist rivals (see Sections 
1.e. and 3).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with 
the right to choose their place of residence freely; however, some 
regional governments continue to restrict this right through 
residential registration rules that closely resemble the Soviet-era 
``propiska'' (pass) regulations. Although the rules, which came into 
effect at the beginning of 1996, were touted as a notification device 
rather than a control system, their application has produced many of 
the same results as the propiska system.
    Although citizens are free to travel within the country, the 
Government also imposes registration requirements on domestic travel. 
All adults are issued internal passports, which they must carry while 
traveling and use to register with local authorities for visits of more 
than 3 days (in Moscow it is 24 hours). However, travelers not staying 
in hotels usually ignore this requirement.
    Citizens must register to live and work in a specific area within 7 
days of moving there. Russian citizens changing residence within the 
country, as well as citizens of former Soviet republics who decide to 
move to Russia, often face enormous difficulties or simply are not 
permitted to register in some cities. The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and refugee rights NGO's have cited 
Stavropol, Krasnodar, Moscow, and St. Petersburg as being the least 
open to migrants. The UNHCR reports that the cost of registration is no 
longer prohibitive. Permanent registration costs only $0.30 (8 rubles). 
Temporary registration is available for periods ranging from 45 days to 
6 months and costs $0.16 (4 rubles and 18 kopeks) regardless of the 
length of stay.
    While federal law provides for education for all children in the 
country, regional authorities frequently deny access to schools to the 
children of unregistered persons, asylum seekers, and migrants because 
they lack residential registration. Similarly, while the Moscow 
procurator's office has upheld the right of migrants to receive 
publicly available medical care, unregistered persons, migrants, and 
asylum seekers frequently are denied these services.
    The Government and residents of Moscow and other large cities 
defend registration as necessary in order to control crime, to keep 
crowded urban areas from attracting even more inhabitants, and to gain 
revenue.
    The city of Moscow frequently is cited by NGO's for violating the 
rights of nonresidents and ethnic minorities, as well as the rights of 
those legitimately seeking asylum.
    Mayor Luzhkov has been quoted in the past as calling for the 
expulsion from Moscow of Chechens and other persons from the Caucasus. 
Moscow police, particularly special duty OMON units, conduct frequent 
document checks, particularly of persons who are dark-skinned or who 
appear to be from the Caucasus or elsewhere. Such checks on many 
occasions have involved police entering residences without warrants. 
There are many credible reports that police have fined unregistered 
persons in excess of legal requirements and have not provided proper 
documentation of the fine. According to Human Rights Watch, it is not 
unusual for darker-skinned persons to be stopped at random and for 
officers to solicit bribes from those without residence permits.
    Mayor Luzhkov signed a resolution in 1996 ordering the deportation 
of all unregistered persons living in Moscow back to the place where 
they last were registered to live. Estimates on the number of 
unregistered persons living in Moscow range from 300,000 to 1.5 million 
(Moscow has 8.7 million registered residents.) Moscow city authorities 
have released no figures on the number of individuals who have departed 
``voluntarily'' from Moscow but readily admit that some 20,000 to 
25,000 annually are deported against their will. This procedure 
consists of being taken to special shelters, checked for criminal 
records, then escorted 100 to 150 kilometers out of town. The 
authorities complain that these deportations are only temporary 
measures because deportees steadily find their way back to Moscow. At 
year's end, the resolution was still in effect, and the practice, which 
police reportedly use to extort money, continues.
    In connection with the bomb explosions in August and September, 
which Moscow officials attributed to terrorists from the Northern 
Caucasus, Mayor Luzhkov issued an ordinance on September 13 requiring 
all temporary residents in Moscow since January 1 to reregister within 
3 days with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Reportedly 74,000 
temporary residents sought reregistration, of whom approximately 15,500 
persons were refused. In order to reregister, residents had to 
demonstrate a legitimate place of work, payment of city taxes, and a 
legal place of residence. Moscow authorities also restricted the 
arrival of new residents to the city and increased road checks and 
checks in train stations and marketplaces for these new arrivals. Law 
enforcement officials conducted searches of 26,500 apartments, 180 
hotels, 415 guest houses, and 548 nightclubs and cafes. Human rights 
NGO's claim that authorities detained some 2,000 persons and expelled 
some 500 from Moscow (See Section 1.d.).
    In August the press reported the story of an amputee named Yuriy 
Polyakov, who, along with 14 other homeless men, was rounded up by 
Moscow police and dropped off outside the city limits at the town dump. 
One homeless man died as he tried to return to Moscow. Polyakov, who 
has no legs, attempted to drag himself to the nearest train station and 
was later hospitalized with infected leg stumps. A municipal procurator 
and the police reportedly are reviewing the incident to determine 
whether charges should be pressed against the officers involved. 
Doctors Without Borders blamed the incident on Luzhkov's 1996 
resolution.
    Similar complaints were made in St. Petersburg during the year. 
NGO's estimate that the number of homeless persons in St. Petersburg is 
anywhere from 12,000 to 3 times that number. The city offers few 
services and little support for the homeless, although a 70-bed shelter 
is planned. Press reports have claimed since the summer of 1998 that 
city police, acting on orders from governor Yakovlev, have been 
rounding up homeless persons from train stations, taking them outside 
the city limits, and abandoning them in remote, forested areas.
    According to press reports, in Krasnoyarsk law enforcement 
officials began stricter enforcement of passport and visa regulation 
after violence broke out between two Azerbaijani groups in April. The 
authorities detained some 400 persons, and of the group, 40 were 
arrested for violations of passport regulations. The Moscow Helskinki 
Group's (MHG) human rights report, which was published in September, 
highlighted restrictions placed by the authorities on Meskheti Turks. 
During 1989-90 some 90,000 Meskhetians were forced by ethnic conflicts 
to leave the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan. An estimated 60,000 
Meskhetians remain in the Russian Federation. More than 13,000 of them 
settled in Krasnodar kray, and approximately 700 settled in the 
Kabardino-Balkarian republic. Authorities in both regions have denied 
the Meskhetians recognition of their Russian Federation citizenship. 
According to the provisions of the Constitution, all Meskhetians who 
were residing in the country at the time of the collapse of the Soviet 
Union are entitled to citizenship. In violation of the Constitution, 
authorities in Krasnodar kray and the Karbardino-Balkarian republic 
deny the Meskhetians the right to register, and this denial deprives 
them of all rights of citizenship. According to press reports, the 
13,000 Meskhetian Turks living in Krasnodar, like other ethnic 
minorities, are subject to special registration restrictions, for 
example, having to register as a ``guest'' every 45 days at a cost of 
$12 (180 rubles) or to pay a $27 (400 ruble) fine every time that they 
are stopped by local police officers and Cossack irregulars. According 
to the MHG, in May 1998 Krasnodar kray authorities initiated an attempt 
to compel Meskhetians to emigrate to Turkey. By September 1998, it was 
believed that almost 90 families left the region for Turkey.
    In February 1998, the Constitutional Court again addressed the 
issue, declaring unconstitutional the most restrictive aspects of the 
propiska system. It ruled that a city may only ``certify the act of the 
free expression of the will of a citizen'' to live there. The city 
could not ``grant permission'' or limit where persons choose to live, 
nor could it dictate how long a person could live in a particular 
place. However, Moscow mayor Luzhkov stated in a March 1998 television 
interview that he was refusing to implement the Court's decision. He 
announced that he had instructed the city's police to continue to 
enforce the old registration regulations.
    Luzhkov's actions were clearly illegal, as the Constitution states 
that the Constitutional Court's rulings are final and mandatory for all 
state officials. In July 1998, the Supreme Court made a ruling that 
repealed both temporary and permanent residence permits. Nevertheless, 
Moscow city authorities have made clear their intention to oppose the 
ruling and, by the end of 1998, seemed to have persuaded the Federal 
Government that Moscow merits an exception to such decrees. The federal 
authorities have demonstrated little enthusiasm for enforcing the court 
rulings. However, the Moscow city regulations have had little if any 
impact on the numbers of such persons in Moscow.
    Despite constitutional rulings, many local governments have been 
resistant and continue to enact regulations that introduce additional 
registration requirements. For example, the city of Moscow has shown a 
high level of inventiveness in circumventing Constitutional Court 
rulings. Following a February 2, 1998 ruling, the city enacted rules 
that would not allow officials to refuse citizen registration. However, 
the new rules retain a feature that ties registration to the size of 
housing and requires the consent of all those registered in an 
apartment or house. Basically, as during the Soviet period, only 
members of the owner's family can move in. Without consent the 
application would not be considered complete. It would not be refused, 
nor would it be accepted. Other large cities facing high population 
influx and migrant pressures retain similar restrictive regimes.
    The Constitution provides all citizens with the right to emigrate. 
The Government imposes nominal emigration taxes, fees, and duties. On 
average, it takes 3 months to process a passport application, although 
it can take much longer if documentation is needed from elsewhere in 
the former Soviet Union.
    Some liberal principles regarding emigration procedures were 
codified formally in the August 1996 law on exit from and entry into 
the country. This law abolished the old Soviet requirement that, in 
order to emigrate, citizens must receive a stamp permitting ``permanent 
residence abroad'' (PMZh)--essentially a propiska for those living 
outside the country. The law required the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
through its Office of Visas and Registration (OVIR), to establish 
regulations for eliminating this practice within 6 months of the 
passage of the law. However, as of September, implementation of the law 
(which was to go into effect early in 1997) is still incomplete: 
according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), border 
guards continue to require a PMZh-like stamp of all emigrants, and the 
passport control agency OVIR continues to issue it.
    Another feature of the law is the codification of the legal grounds 
for denying foreign travel documents to citizens who had access to 
state secrets. Under the new law, access to such classified material 
can occur only with the consent of the citizen, established in the form 
of a written contract that states that the signatory understands that 
he has been given access to state secrets and that his ability to 
travel abroad may be restricted. The law envisions a maximum period of 
delay under normal circumstances of 5 years, and it grants the 
interagency Commission on Secrecy the right to add an additional 5-year 
term to the period of delay if the Commission finds that a person had 
access to particularly sensitive materials. This latter provision has 
raised serious concerns among human rights advocates who monitor 
arbitrary and excessive powers on the part of the Government to 
restrict foreign travel. However, there were no reports that the 
provision was applied in a restrictive manner.
    If a citizen had access to classified material, police and FSB 
clearances are necessary to receive an external passport. Persons 
denied travel documents on secrecy grounds can appeal the decision to 
an interagency commission chaired by the First Deputy Foreign Minister 
(until his promotion in September 1998 to Foreign Minister, this was 
Igor Ivanov--hence the commission commonly is referred to as ``the 
Ivanov Commission''). The Ivanov Commission cannot rule on whether the 
material should or should not be classified, but it can rule on the 
legality of travel restrictions imposed and on whether or not the 
traveler actually had access to materials requiring a travel 
restriction. Since it was established in 1994, the Ivanov Commission 
has granted travel permission to approximately 90 percent of 
appellants.
    Other grounds for denial of the right to travel abroad are military 
conscription or assignment to civilian alternative service (although in 
fact the Duma has failed to pass legislation implementing the 
constitutionally provided right to civilian alternative service), being 
under investigation for or serving a sentence for a crime, evasion of a 
court-ordered obligation, or providing false information on a passport 
application. The requirement that citizens satisfy obligations to 
immediate relatives, such as material support for parents, has been 
eliminated except for court-ordered obligations, such as alimony 
payments. In May the Ministry of Foreign Affairs annulled the passport 
of former Procurator General Skuratov for technical reasons, according 
to press reports. During the year, Skuratov was engaged in an extended 
battle with the Presidential Administration over allegations of 
corruption in the administration. According to officials in the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs visa department, legislation on 
restricting the right to leave the country does not apply to Skuratov 
because he is only a witness and was not formally charged or arrested 
himself.
    Emigrants who have resettled permanently abroad have been able to 
visit or repatriate without hindrance. However, visiting emigrants who 
departed without first obtaining a PMZh stamp have been stopped at the 
border and prevented from departing the country (though they may enter 
without difficulty), as they could present neither a nonimmigrant visa 
to another country nor evidence of permission to reside legally abroad.
    The Supreme Court in August 1998 overturned two Soviet-era 
regulations that limited the movement of foreigners within the country. 
The Court stated that foreigners no longer have to notify police before 
traveling to another part of the country. In addition, the Court ruled 
that organizations and private citizens no longer have to report the 
visits of traveling foreigners. However, the Court left standing the 
threat of deportations for foreigners who violate registration 
regulations. Starting in October 1998, the Foreign Ministry no longer 
required that Russian visas list the cities that foreigners are allowed 
to visit, and this change has been implemented in practice. President 
Yeltsin had signed a decree in 1997 that permitted foreigners to move 
freely around the country regardless of which cities were listed on 
their visas. However, a few local officials continued to enforce the 
visa limitation, sometimes denying entrance to foreigners--including 
missionaries--they considered undesirable. The Federal Government at 
times intervenes in cases of local noncompliance but only on a case-by-
case basis.
    Ingush president Ruslan Aushev issued an official protest early in 
July on behalf of ethnic Ingush refugees trying to return to the 
Prigorodnyy district of North Ossetia. Up to 70,000 Ingush refugees 
fled the Prigorodnyy and Vladikavkaz areas in 1992, when inter-ethnic 
fighting broke out between Ossetian and Ingush inhabitants. According 
to Russian media reports, just over 10,000 of the refugees have been 
able to return so far. According to a June report by the Ingush branch 
of the human rights group Memorial, ethnic Ingush refugees have faced 
systematic harassment while trying to return to the Prigorodnyy 
district (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government's indiscriminate use of force in Chechnya resulted 
in a very large number of internally displaced persons. Up to 200,000 
persons were displaced, the vast majority of whom sought refuge in 
Ingushetiya (see Section 1.g.). By year's end, the Government with the 
assistance of international organizations appeared to have provided for 
most of the basic needs of internally displaced persons in Ingushetiya.
    At various points during the conflict in Chechnya during the fall, 
authorities restricted the movement of refugees fleeing Chechnya. In 
late October human rights groups reported that IDP's from Chechnya were 
not being permitted to move from Ingushetiya to North Ossetia. 
According to the Russian press, some displaced persons were being 
transported by bus back to parts of Chechnya that were under Russian 
government control. On November 3, Russian forces opened a crossing on 
the Chechnya-Ingushetiya border and allowed approximately 3,500 persons 
to enter. Thousands of refugees had been stranded for more than 1 week 
at the border, where reportedly a line of refugees stretched almost 12 
miles. Refugees at the border had been living in the open, often 
without access to food or water (see Section 1.g.).
    Human rights NGO's and press organizations reported in mid-December 
that federal and republic authorities were pressuring refugees to 
return from Ingushetiya to Chechnya. According to these reports, 
government officials singled out persons from Chechen towns and 
districts that were designated as ``safe'' by the Government. According 
to some accounts, refugee camp administrators announced that persons 
from these areas would no longer receive food rations. Human rights NGO 
observers and refugees reported that government authorities without 
warning moved up to 40 train wagons that were housing refugees from the 
Sputnik camp in Ingushetiya to the Chechen town of Sernovodsk on 
December 17 and 18. After international criticism of these actions, 
government officials publicly said that they would not pressure or 
compel refugees to return to Chechnya. At the same time, authorities 
consistently announced their determination to repatriate all refugees 
back to Chechnya as soon as possible.
    The Government cooperates to a limited extent with the UNHCR and 
the IOM. Both organizations assist the Government in developing a 
humane migration management system; this includes effective and fair 
refugee status determination procedures. As of July 31, the UNHCR had 
registered 36,000 asylum seekers who originated from outside the 
territories of the former Soviet Union (1,163 were registered in the 
period from January 1 to July 31). The UNHCR estimates that only 13,000 
of these are active cases, i.e., persons still seeking asylum or 
receiving UNHCR assistance. The remainder either have integrated into 
Russian society, left the country, or have been resettled or 
repatriated.
    According to the UNHCR, as of the end of October, the Government 
had granted since 1993 refugee status to only 491 persons from outside 
the former Soviet Union (including the Baltic states); all but 17 of 
those individuals were from Afghanistan. By contrast, the comparable 
figure for former citizens of the Soviet Union (mainly ethnic Russians) 
who were granted refugee status by the Federal Migration Service (FMS) 
is 98,188. The Government acts more expeditiously for the latter group 
and applies a more lenient standard.
    In July 1997, President Yeltsin signed the federal law Concerning 
Changes and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation Concerning 
Refugees. This law offers substantially fewer benefits to refugees than 
the original 1993 law it replaced. The earlier law's fairly generous 
commitments of integration and social assistance for refugees had been 
cited by some observers as discouraging the FMS, which has few 
resources to meet this obligation, from adjudicating the cases of 
asylum seekers. With the passage of the new law, the FMS had been 
expected to expedite its procedures for adjudicating asylum claims. 
However, this did not occur. In the first 8 months of the year, the FMS 
recognized 68 asylum seekers from countries outside the former Soviet 
Union; all but 2 of these persons were from Afghanistan. The UNHCR 
reported that the FMS still was declining to grant refugee status to 
qualified individuals, based on its decision that such persons were not 
refugees. However, the FMS decision making process is considered to be 
flawed by many NGO's, and UNHCR officials consider many of those 
refused to be in fact refugees.
    Despite some progress by the regional branches of the FMS in 
adjudicating nonformer Soviet Union asylum claims, there are still 
major concerns about the ability and willingness of the Moscow office 
to process asylum seekers from outside the former Soviet Union. Human 
rights organizations claim that this lack of progress is part of 
intentional efforts by the authorities to rid the city of foreign 
asylum seekers. Local legislation in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov, 
and other major population centers prohibits the settlement of refugees 
within these cities.
    According to the NGO Civil Assistance Committee, involuntarily 
displaced persons and asylum seekers suffer the greatest difficulties 
in cities with restrictive registration regulations. Their migrant 
registration documents generally are not recognized by the MVD 
officials who control registration. They often are subject to 
harassment, unauthorized detention, and the payment of bribes.
    There were unconfirmed reports that the FMS has attempted to have 
asylum seekers unwittingly sign an ``application form'', supposedly to 
extend the validity of their registration documents but which instead 
renounces their claims for asylum in the country.
    A large number of workers and students from Africa and Asia, who 
came to work or study in accordance with treaties between their 
countries and the former Soviet Union, remain in the country. The 
Government has not deported them but encourages their return home. 
Their numbers have increased in recent years due to the recent arrival 
of persons seeking refugee status.
    The UNHCR and Amnesty International are working with the FMS and 
border officials to ensure that interviews of potential refugees are 
conducted in a timely fashion, that the UNHCR is allowed access to 
potential refugees in airport transit lounges, and that deportations of 
potential refugees are delayed until cases are adjudicated. Part of the 
problem is widespread ignorance of refugee law. To remedy this problem, 
FMS officials, lawyers, and judges also are participating in training 
sponsored by the UNHCR, the European Union's Technical Assistance for 
the Commonwealth of Independent States program, and the Council of 
Europe. However, according to the UNHCR, the Government lacks the 
political will to grant refugee status and provide a durable solution 
for asylum seekers.
    The situation of asylum seekers and refugees at Moscow's 
Sheremetyevo-2 Airport continues to be of major concern to the UNHCR. 
Improperly documented passengers are deported systematically, including 
persons who demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution in their 
countries of origin. If a passenger announces that he or she wants 
asylum, Aeroflot gives out telephone numbers for the FMS and the UNHCR, 
but these numbers are not posted publicly anywhere in the transit zone. 
Despite repeated UNHCR recommendations, there are also no signs in the 
transit area to advise asylum seekers about the refugee status 
determination process at the airport. Undocumented travelers are not 
allowed to leave the transit zone and often are returned to the carrier 
on which they entered the country. Legally bound to provide food and 
emergency medical care for undocumented travelers, the airline returns 
them to their point of departure as quickly as possible. (Airlines are 
fined if an undocumented passenger is admitted to Russia, but not if 
returned to the country of origin.) Human rights organizations allege 
that Aeroflot deports hundreds of asylum seekers. Until December 1998, 
the FMS Point of Immigration Control (PIC), whose officials are 
responsible for processing requests for refugee status, was located 
outside of the transit zone, where asylum seekers were unable to reach 
it. The PIC now has a fully-equipped office inside the transit zone, 
which UNHCR staff also are permitted to use.
    The PIC interviews almost exclusively persons referred to it by the 
UNHCR. According to the UNHCR, the process is not fair or effective; as 
of the end of 1998, the PIC had not yet rendered any decisions in favor 
of asylum seekers. As of late 1998, 82 percent of asylum seekers who 
managed to contact the UNHCR were deported before the FMS made a 
determination of refugee status. The actual number of deportees is 
presumed to be higher, as many asylum seekers did not have an 
opportunity to contact either the FMS or the UNHCR.
    Treatment of asylum seekers in the transit zone can be harsh. The 
UNHCR has received reports of physical and verbal abuse of transit 
passengers by police officers and Aeroflot employees. Authorities 
rarely release passengers from the transit zone, unless there is a 
medical emergency. The UNHCR documented one case in early 1998 in which 
a woman and a baby, who nearly died, were hospitalized after their 
second month spent sleeping on the floor of the poorly-heated transit 
zone. The UNHCR was prohibited access to the transit hotel until May 
1997 and was allowed only one subsequent visit. The UNHCR reports that 
up to 28 passengers are detained in 9 rooms behind an iron door and 
barred windows. The average stay in the transit hotel is 2 weeks.
    In 1998 and 1999, the UNHCR continued to have occasional problems 
obtaining access to visit asylum seekers in the airport's transit zone, 
and, with the exception of two visits, was denied regular access to the 
transit hotel. Access to transit hotel passengers often is granted to 
the UNHCR only hours before deportation, which does not give the UNHCR 
or the FMS an adequate opportunity to assess the case.
    Armenians evacuated from Baku in the wake of late 1980's ethnic 
violence are recognized as refugees, although their credentials require 
annual renewal. The vast majority of those evacuated either have 
emigrated from Russia or found some way to live in the country. 
However, a group of about 1,400 to 2,000 still are housed in the 
``temporary quarters'' assigned after the evacuation, usually in Moscow 
hotels or workers' dormitories in the greater Moscow area. They are 
unable to return to Azerbaijan and are not accepted by Armenia. Since 
they lack residency permits for Moscow, they cannot apply legally for 
work and effectively are denied the ability to register their children 
for public schooling. They have been invited to apply for Russian 
citizenship, which would entitle them to the benefits accorded to 
Russian forced migrants, but representatives of the community have 
stated that they do not believe such a step would improve their 
situation materially (although such a step would allow them to 
establish legal residence, seek work, and apply for benefits such as 
foreign travel passports). They also have rejected offers of relocation 
to other regions of the country, because they allege that the 
alternative residences that they are offered frequently are not 
habitable, still are occupied by others, or simply do not exist. Their 
situation remains precarious as the formerly state-owned hotels in 
which many reside are privatized and the new owners exert financial and 
other pressure on them to depart. A number of eviction orders already 
have been served in such cases. The courts are required legally to 
appoint a new residence, but have been uneven in meeting this 
requirement. According to Human Rights Watch, on August 24, 
representatives of the Baku Armenian community met with FMS Director 
Vladimir Kalamanov, who promised that they would be issued residence 
permits and apartments within 3 months. Activists and refugees were 
unanimously skeptical of this promise. In an August 31 follow-up 
meeting, the FMS agreed to explore housing options with the mayor's 
office.
    The Constitution states that the Russian Federation does not permit 
the extradition to other states of persons who would be persecuted 
there for their political beliefs or for actions (or inaction) that are 
not considered a crime in the Russian Federation. However, according to 
press reports and the UNHCR, in December the Government deported seven 
North Korean refugees to China, in an apparent violation of the Refugee 
Convention. The Government of China reportedly returned the seven to 
North Korea. Moreover, in the past there were instances in which 
opposition figures were deported to countries of the former Soviet 
Union to face charges that were political in nature. Under the 1993 
Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Legal Assistance in 
Civil, Family, and Criminal Affairs, persons with outstanding warrants 
can be detained for periods of up to 1 month while the Procurator 
General investigates the nature of outstanding charges against the 
detainee. This system is reinforced informally but effectively by 
collegial links among senior law enforcement and security officials in 
the various republics of the former Soviet Union. Human rights groups 
allege that this network is employed to detain opposition figures from 
the other former Soviet republics without actual legal grounds.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
    The Federal Assembly is composed of two chambers. The lower 
chamber, the State Duma, consists of 450 deputies, half elected in 
single-mandate constituencies, half by party lists. Approximately 26 
political parties and movements participated in the December 19 Duma 
elections. The upper chamber, the Federation Council, has 178 members--
the 89 chief executives of regional administrations and the 89 
chairpersons of regional legislatures, all of whom are elected. 
Regional parliamentary speakers are elected popularly to their seats, 
then elected to the speakership by their colleagues. The Constitution 
provides the President and the Prime Minister with substantial powers, 
which they used to dominate most areas of administration and day-to-day 
policy making and to limit the independence of the judicial branch. 
However, the opposition of a majority in the Duma has checked 
administration initiatives in a number of areas, including basic 
changes in property ownership and legal reform.
    A democratic election for the President of the Russian Federation 
took place in 1996 for the first time in the history of Russia as an 
independent state. President Yeltsin was reelected in a generally free 
and fair election. Presidential elections are scheduled for March 2000, 
as a result of President Yeltsin's December 31 resignation.
    On March 30, President Yeltsin signed the law On the Basic 
Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens to Participate 
in a Referendum (Voting Rights Act) and the federal law on public 
associations. These amendments clarify which political public 
associations may participate in elections; add restrictions on 
preferential media coverage, donations, and financial or material 
support from foreign entities for campaign-related activities; 
introduce measures to reduce the number of noncompetitive political 
parties and candidates on the ballot, such as financial deposits and 
other financial penalties, alongside signature-collection provisions; 
increase the level of information available to voters about candidates' 
financial and criminal history; introduce provisions allowing 
multicandidate constituencies; and add other provisions affecting 
federal-level and regional-level elections and referendums. Despite 
stricter rules regarding financing and reporting, the new law did not 
diminish the importance of money in the December Duma elections.
    Changes to the Voting Rights Act affect legislation on both the 
federal and regional levels of the Russian Federation. The regionally 
oriented Federation Council continued to express its dislike for the 
level of detail in the law, but its veto was overridden by the State 
Duma in September 1997. In June 1998, the Constitutional Court ruled 
against a complaint brought by the Federation Council that alleged that 
the Voting Rights Act contradicts the Federal Constitution by not 
allowing the regions the right to adapt electoral procedures unique to 
their situations. The Constitutional Court also is expected to rule on 
Voting Rights Act provisions that pertain to holding referendums, which 
may compel lawmakers to reconsider the law.
    Human Rights Ombudsman Mironov's office set up a working group to 
monitor electoral rights violations as the Central Electoral Commission 
prepared for the December Duma elections. In August Mironov called for 
legislation to increase the transparency of elections funding.
    In elections that were judged by international observers largely to 
be free and fair, a more centrist-leaning Duma was elected on December 
19. According to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), the Communist 
Party won 24.3 percent of the federal party list votes, the Unity 
movement aligned with the Presidential Administration won 23.3 percent, 
Fatherland-All-Russia won 13.3 percent, the Union of Right Forces 
aligned with the Presidential Administration won 8.5 percent, Vladimir 
Zhirinovskiy's bloc won 5.8 percent, and the Yabloko party won 5.9 
percent of the vote. Many observers pointed to problems with biased 
media coverage of the election campaign. Paid political advertising in 
newspapers often is disguised as legitimate news stories. Campaigns pay 
under the table for stories favorable to their candidate, which allows 
the campaigns to bypass limits on campaign spending. In the fall, media 
outlets linked to the Presidential Administration launched an effective 
``media war'' against the Fatherland-All-Russia (OVR) party led by 
Moscow Mayor Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Primakov. The ORT and 
the RTR news programs were filled with negative stories about the OVR, 
which by late October resulted in lower popular support for the OVR and 
Luzhkov, according to opinion polls. The rival NTV network broadcast 
frequent counterattacks against the Presidential Administration. In 
late November, the Bashkortostan duma moved to block Sunday evening 
news analysis programs broadcast by the ORT and the RTR due to their 
strong bias in favor of the Presidential Administration. However, 
Bashkortostan president Murtaza Rakhimov met a few days later with 
Prime Minister Putin and agreed to resume broadcasting the news 
programs (see Section 2.a.).
    The campaign was marred by instances of anti-Semitic rhetoric. In 
an August 2 debate between Leningrad oblast legislative assembly 
candidates in St. Petersburg, Vasily Terenyev, chairman of the anti-
Communist Pro-Workers' Party, blamed ``Zionists'' for the loss of the 
Soviet Union's former republics and current secessionist tendencies, 
and Aleksandr Vtulkin, chairman of the local Russian National Unity 
branch, argued that ``Jewish bureaucrats'' in St. Petersburg would 
destroy the Leningrad oblast economy if the two entities were 
reintegrated.
    In early October, the CEC disqualified two of the top three 
candidates on the party list of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal 
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) for failing to list all the vehicles 
and property they own. This action voided the entire LDPR list and made 
it ineligible to participate in the Duma elections. However, later that 
month Zhirinovskiy formed a new party bloc with two minor parties in 
order to qualify to compete in the elections, and the new party list 
did not include some of the most controversial LDPR candidates. On 
November 13, a Moscow district court invalidated the registration of 
the Spas, a party bloc led by Russian National Unity leader Aleksandr 
Barkashov. The court based its decision on a Ministry of Justice review 
of the Spas's registration materials, which found inaccuracies and 
false statements.
    Elections to local and regional offices continue to be marred in 
some cases by interference from federal authorities and less than 
democratic practices by incumbent governors. For example, April-May 
presidential elections in the republic of Karachayevo-Cherkesiya (in 
the Northern Caucasus) sparked intense controversy. In the region's 
first presidential elections in post-Soviet history, former commander 
in chief of ground forces and ethnic Karachay Vladimir Semenev received 
18 percent in the first round of voting and between 75 and 80 percent 
in the second round. Stanislav Derev, an ethnic Cherkesiyan and the 
expected winner, received 40 percent in the first round but less than 
20 percent in the second round. According to press reports, voting 
irregularities that primarily affected ethnic Cherkesiyans prevented up 
to one-third of the electorate from casting their ballots in the second 
round. The local electoral commission reported that it received 1,527 
complaints of voting irregularities. The Russian press reported several 
arson and grenade attacks against staff members of both candidates 
before the run-off elections. The Karachayevo-Cherkesiya supreme court 
ruled on August 27 that the election results were valid, sparking 
public protests in the region's capital of Cherkessk, which now 
threaten the region's territorial integrity. As a result of clashes on 
September 4 between supporters of the rival leaders, eight persons were 
wounded and one died later as a result of injuries. On September 14, 
president Vladimir Semenev was inaugurated despite massive protests in 
previous weeks. On October 22, the Supreme Court found the second round 
election results to be valid (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
    Another seriously flawed election was held in Dagestan on March 7. 
Although the law requires republic and local officials to take a leave 
of absence from their jobs while campaigning for a seat in the 
legislature, two-thirds of the over 400 candidates in Dagestan's 
legislative election violated that law. The legislature they sought to 
replace included 35 members who were convicted criminals and 5 who are 
under investigation. The campaign finance laws in Dagestan also were 
circumvented by many candidates who felt that the legal spending limits 
were too low (approximately $200, or 5,200 rubles). Candidates paved 
roads and fixed apartment building entryways with personal funds but 
were not disqualified. Candidates also avoided spending limits by 
failing to label widely distributed campaign materials. Most opposition 
candidates were denied registration for the elections. Although two 
candidates were able to win registration by appealing to the local 
courts, many candidates were told that the signatures in support of 
their candidacy were forged.
    There were reports of politically motivated violence elsewhere the 
country. In St. Petersburg on July 22, LDPR supporter Viktor Yashin was 
robbed. According to Yashin, the robbers took from his car a suitcase 
with lists of voters' signatures for Yuriy Kuznetsov, a gubernatorial 
candidate in Leningrad oblast. Kuznetsov is also a member of the LDPR 
and a state duma deputy. The electoral commission of Leningrad oblast 
registered Kuznetsov as a gubernatorial candidate on August 13. 
Anatoliy Yezhelev, former president of the St. Petersburg Union of 
Journalists, was assaulted on June 15 in Vsevolozhsk. Yezhelev, age 64, 
spent 3 weeks in the hospital. Both Yezhelev and police authorities 
link the assault with Yezhelev's participation in the electoral 
campaign of Vadim Gustov, one of the two most popular gubernatorial 
candidates in Leningrad oblast. Currently Yezhelev continues his work 
in the electoral headquarters of Vadim Gustov. In early October, two 
activists for Sergey Stepashin's campaign were assaulted, although they 
did not require hospitalization. In mid-December a campaign worker for 
former St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak was assaulted and killed.
    On February 3, Chechen Republic president Maskhadov suspended 
constitutional law and declared a state of Islamic Shari'a law in the 
region. According to press reports, a shura (council) of prominent 
figures came into being on February 10 to help oversee Shari'a law. In 
the process, the Maskhadov government stripped the region's legislature 
of most of its responsibilities and abolished the region's vice 
presidency. On February 10, the legislature was replaced with a 34-
member shura that has responsibility for ``consulting'' with the 
republic's president. The Shura includes several prominent opposition 
leaders. According to one expert, the Shura created in Chechnya is not 
a traditional Muslim shura run by religious men, but instead is a 
council of military men. However, on July 12 the Chechen government 
announced the formation of a national council to include president 
Maskhadov and his rival field commanders. The statement did not explain 
the council's role or specify its relationship to the Shura, to which 
Maskhadov and his rivals also belong and which has never met. Also in 
July, Chechen officials criticized remarks that Russian authorities 
made asserting that Duma elections would be held in Chechnya. Chechen 
officials contended that the republic would not participate in the 
December Duma elections.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the 
December elections, 32 female deputies were elected to the 450-member 
Duma, a decrease from the 46 female deputies in the Duma elected in 
1995.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Many domestic and international human rights groups operate freely. 
Most groups investigated and publicly commented on human rights issues, 
generally doing so without government interference or restrictions. 
However, some local officials harassed human rights monitors, going so 
far as to arrest and convict them (see Section 1.d.). In 1998 Human 
Rights Watch repeatedly criticized the Procurator General's response to 
these incidents. With a few notable exceptions, human rights monitors 
have worked mostly unhindered by authorities in recent years. No new 
cases of arrests or harassment of human rights activists by authorities 
were reported in the first half of the year. Several NGO's are 
headquartered in Moscow and have branches throughout the country. Some 
of the more prominent human rights organizations are the Moscow Center 
for Prison Reform, the Society for the Guardianship of Penitentiary 
Institutions, the Glasnost Public and Defense Funds, Memorial, the 
Moscow Research Center for Human Rights, the Soldiers' Mothers' 
Committee, the Mothers' Rights Foundation, and the Moscow Helsinki 
Group. Several of these groups are recognized by government and 
legislative officials for their expertise in certain fields, and such 
groups participate (with varying degrees of success) in the process of 
drafting legislation and decrees, such as the draft law on community 
monitoring of prison conditions, which passed its first Duma reading in 
June. Also, the prominent human rights organization, Memorial, was 
expected to play a significant role in elections monitoring.
    Various types of regionally-based human rights groups are being 
established. Socioeconomic rights groups are the most numerous and 
monitor issues such as unpaid wages and benefits. There are fewer 
civil-political rights groups, but according to Memorial these are 
growing in number. These groups include ``generalist'' organizations 
that cover the range of human rights issues and ``specialist'' 
organizations that cover only one issue. Public legal centers have been 
formed, due to the critical lack of legal advice that is available to 
the general public. These centers usually are run on a part-time basis 
by lawyers who, while they cannot afford to offer trial counsel or 
actual legal work, offer advice at no cost on legal rights and recourse 
under the law. Resources for human rights work have become even scarcer 
after 1998 financial crisis, threatening the work of activists.
    Regional groups, which generally receive little if any 
international support or attention, reported that local authorities 
have obstructed their work and that law enforcement officers have begun 
criminal investigations based on fabricated charges against certain 
regional human rights groups' leaders (see Section 1.d.). With these 
exceptions, criticism of the Federal Government and regional 
authorities usually is permitted without hindrance. The threshold 
appears to be criticism of a specific political leader in the region 
(usually the governor or a senior law enforcement official). Regional 
human rights advocates have been charged with such offenses as libel, 
contempt of court, and interference in judicial proceedings, along with 
other crimes, in cases with distinct political overtones (see Section 
1.d.). Local human rights groups have far fewer opportunities to 
interact with legislators in developing legislation than their Moscow 
counterparts; some are excluded from the process entirely by local 
authorities.
    The importation of copies of the NGO report ``Russia's Northern 
Fleet: Sources of Radioactive Contamination,'' authored in part by 
former naval Captain Aleksandr Nikitin (see Section 1.d.), still is 
blocked by the FSB. Although the Bellona Foundation received some 
reports from St. Petersburg and Moscow that users had difficulty 
accessing the Foundation's website, it appears that Russian, English, 
and Norwegian versions of the 1996 report on the contamination by the 
Northern Fleet are accessible through Russian internet service 
providers. Bellona Foundation employees no longer experience 
difficulties when applying for visas to enter the country.
    Because of the risk of kidnaping and other criminal attacks (see 
Section 1.b.), NGO's largely have withdrawn from Chechnya since the 
murder of six ICRC personnel in 1996. Chechen authorities generally 
have discouraged NGO's from returning to Chechnya, although the motive 
for such discouragement appears to be based more on security concerns 
than unwillingness to submit to nongovernmental human rights 
monitoring.
    The Government's human rights institutions lack independence but 
appear to be making serious efforts to promote human rights. The 
President's Human Rights Commission, now composed primarily of 
government officials (unlike the 1993-96 commission under Sergey 
Kovalev, which included a large number of human rights activists), 
appeared largely inactive during the year. Some human rights groups 
continued to complain that the Commission's focus has changed from 
advocacy of human rights to defending the Government's policy and that 
the Commission has failed to engage well-established human rights 
NGO's. Commission chair Vladimir Kartashkin has indicated to the press 
that his role is mainly consultative and investigatory, without powers 
of enforcement. Although the Commission examined and was often critical 
of the Government on various issues during the year, its work does not 
appear to have delivered concrete results. On the other hand, the 
office of the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman appears to be 
working actively to develop its authority and public profile, which may 
enable it to promote human rights effectively. Implementing a March 
1997 law establishing the position of a human rights ombudsman, after a 
lengthy delay, the Duma selected Communist Duma Deputy Oleg Mironov on 
May 22, 1998, who in accordance with the law resigned from both the 
Party and the Duma after the vote. During the year, Ombudsman Mironov 
worked diligently to become an increasingly high-profile government 
spokesman on human rights issues, despite earlier criticism by human 
rights activists due to his lack of human rights expertise. Although in 
1998 his comments to the press tended to focus on violations of 
socioeconomic rights, such as wage arrears, he has criticized publicly 
anti-Semitic incidents, called for government protection against 
``racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism,'' criticized violence and 
religious intolerance in Dagestan, and called for strengthened 
legislation on campaign funding. In a March open letter, Mironov 
proposed amendments to the 1997 religion law to bring it into 
compliance with international norms for religious freedom. Mironov's 
office has grown to over 150 employees and has several specialized 
sections responsible for investigating complaints of human rights 
abuses. Based on information available at this time, the effectiveness 
of Mironov's office in assisting individual victims cannot be assessed 
accurately. However, Mironov continues to expand the scope of his 
activities, attempting to promote broader compliance with international 
human rights standards. During the summer, Mironov established a 
department of human rights education within his office. The staff of 
six, headed by Anatoliy Azarov (a former director of the Moscow School 
of Human Rights), is planning to develop guidelines and materials for 
teaching human rights to the public. The office reportedly has plans to 
establish a section on religious freedom. In August Mironov announced a 
new annual prize for recognition of outstanding contributions in the 
field of human rights, the recipient of which would be selected by a 
commission composed of established human rights activists, academics, 
scientists, and government officials. Mironov's office also has set up 
a working group to monitor violations of electoral rights.
    In 1996 President Yeltsin signed a decree entitled, On Certain 
Measures of State Support for the Human Rights Movement in the Russian 
Federation, which called for a high degree of coordination between 
federal structures and the human rights community. Specific measures 
laid out in the decree included the creation of three entities: An 
interregional human rights center to coordinate human rights 
activities; a human rights training center; and a center to publish 
human rights literature. In addition, regional administrations were 
instructed to establish bodies analogous to the federal Human Rights 
Commission. Progress on establishing the bodies has been slow, and 
there were some reversals during the year. In direct contravention of 
the 1996 presidential decree, new governors elected in Pskov, Irkutsk, 
and Chelyabinsk abolished the commissions that had been working 
effectively in their regions. By September 1998, there were 58 
commissions, compared with 66 in 1997. Of those, only 8 to 10 are 
working effectively, according to the Moscow Helsinki Group, compared 
with 12 effective commissions in 1997.
    In 1996 President Yeltsin established by decree a Political 
Consultative Council (PCC) with 12 standing chambers to assist in the 
creation of a legal framework for economic and political reforms. It 
includes a human rights chamber, headed by Duma Deputy Valeriy 
Borshchev, and a legal chamber, headed by Boris Zolotukhin, a former 
Duma Deputy. The PCC meets monthly. The Human Rights Chamber includes 
representatives of the various Duma factions as well as 10 members of 
the human rights NGO community. The Chamber has held hearings on issues 
such as conditions in the nation's prisons, the situation of refugees, 
and freedom of conscience. The Chamber's hearings on a variety of areas 
involving human rights have given greater public exposure to such 
problems. However, human rights organizations criticize the Government 
for being unresponsive to the Chamber's recommendations. NGO's point 
out that the Chamber itself has not been responsible for any 
significant human rights improvements or legislation.
    Citizens also can file appeals to the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations. The 
ECHR only can consider cases based on events that occurred after 
Russia's May 5, 1998 accession to the Council of Europe. Complainants 
first must exhaust all appeals in Russian courts before they can turn 
to the European Court. Human Rights Ombudsman Mironov announced in June 
that the Government submitted a list of three candidates for the 
Russian judge in Strasbourg. The new judge was elected in September. 
Various sources reported that the ECHR has received at least 2,000 
complaints from Russians, none of which have been scheduled for a 
hearing because of the absence of a Russian judge. However, observers 
familiar with human rights law point out that a large percentage of 
these cases are expected to be rejected because the plaintiffs have not 
yet exhausted all their legal options in Russia.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, 
religion, language, social status, or other circumstances. However, 
both official and societal discrimination still exist.
    There were credible reports that homosexuals were attacked or 
killed because of their sexual orientation. According to the editor of 
a magazine for gays, most gays are reluctant to report crimes against 
them to the police because they expect at best indifference or at worst 
harassment. Although the press rarely reports crimes against gays, in 
one rare exception, an August Kommersant Daily article referred without 
providing details to the murder of seven gay men in Chelyabinsk in 
1998.
    Women.--Domestic violence remains a major problem, as victims 
rarely have recourse to protection from the authorities. Police 
frequently are reluctant or even unwilling to involve themselves in 
what they see as purely domestic disputes. Many women are deterred from 
reporting such crimes because of this and because the housing system 
makes it difficult either to find housing outside the family dwelling 
or to expel an abusive spouse, even after a final divorce action. The 
underlying problem that remains is that much of society, including some 
leaders in the human rights community, do not acknowledge domestic 
violence as a problem or do not believe it to be an area for concern 
outside the family.
    According to a December 1997 Human Rights Watch report, the 
Government reported that almost 11,000 women reported rape or attempted 
rape in 1996. In September 1998, a Human Rights Watch Europe researcher 
for women's rights estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of rapes are 
reported to police. Human Rights Watch further reported that Yekaterina 
Lakhova, President Yeltsin's then-adviser on women's issues, estimated 
in 1997 that 14,000 women are killed by husbands or family members each 
year. However, Human Rights Watch notes that these statistics 
underestimate the extent of the problem, due to underreporting of these 
crimes by victims. In 1996 the MVD estimated that 80 percent of violent 
crimes occurred in the home.
    There is a general lack of understanding of this issue in the legal 
community and there is no legal definition of domestic violence. Some 
forms of battering are addressed in the new Criminal Code but are 
defined too narrowly to apply to most cases. There is also a lack of 
national political will to consider these issues seriously. Thus far 
more than four dozen renditions of a national civil law to address 
domestic violence have failed to make any progress through the Duma.
    Hospitals and members of the medical profession provide assistance 
to women who have been assaulted. However, some doctors are reluctant 
to ascertain the details of a sexual assault, fearing that they may be 
required to spend long periods in court. While noting that the 
Government had begun to address the seriousness of the problem of 
violence against women, the 1997 Human Rights Watch report criticized 
the Government for failing to afford victims of violence ``the 
protection of the law.'' The report also criticized law enforcement 
officials for not ensuring effectively that incidents of violence 
against women are investigated and prosecuted and for sometimes 
obstructing their investigation and prosecution. The report further 
noted that the discrepancy ``between the law as written and the law as 
applied'' demonstrated the Government's ``failure to fulfill its 
international human rights obligations.'' The report also criticized 
the Duma for its ``seriously flawed'' drafting of a law on family 
violence. It noted that many women's groups had faced considerable 
difficulty in gaining access to and commenting on drafts of the law. At 
year's end, there were about 40 women's crisis centers in the country, 
all founded within the last few years, and their number is growing.
    In October 1998, the Government cosponsored an international 
conference on domestic violence against women, the first conference on 
this subject in the country. Conference participants discussed the root 
causes of domestic violence and cooperation among NGO's, academics, and 
government officials to address the problem.
    Particularly because of lack of adequate employment opportunities, 
a significant number of women are victims of international trafficking 
for sexual exploitation. Reliable statistics on the number of women 
involved are difficult to obtain (see Section 6.f.).
    Despite serious problems and difficulties in addressing these 
issues, many effective projects are underway. Crisis centers have 
formed an association in order to coordinate their efforts better. They 
have chosen Marina Pisklakova, the Director of the crisis center ANNA, 
as President. The association held its first national conference on 
September 23-25 in Moscow. Due to successful collaboration for the 
October 1998 joint conference in Moscow, nongovernmental work in the 
area is recognized and supported by several government entities.
    Women have reported sexual harassment in the workplace, and 
anecdotal information suggests that many potential employers seek 
female employees who are receptive to sexual relations. The phrase, 
``without complexes,'' is used occasionally in job advertisements. Some 
firms ask applicants for employment to complete a form including the 
abbreviation ``VBO,'' a Russian abbreviation for ``possibility of close 
relations,'' to which the applicant is expected to reply ``yes'' or 
``no.''
    There is credible evidence that women encounter considerable 
discrimination in employment. At a 1996 Duma-sponsored roundtable, 
representatives of 53 women's associations appealed to the Duma to 
improve the legal status of women by creating a council to assess all 
draft legislation to ensure that it provides for equal opportunities 
for women and men. In their appeal to the Duma, the women's 
associations' representatives raised their concerns that women form a 
disproportionately high percentage of the officially registered 
unemployed, that women are discriminated against in hiring and firing, 
that the differences between the salaries of men and women had 
increased sharply, and that few women attain senior positions. 
Conditions have not improved significantly since the hearings were 
held.
    Human Rights Watch in a December 1996 report accused the Government 
of participating in discriminatory actions against women, contending 
that the Government seldom enforces employment laws concerning women. 
Employers prefer to hire men, thereby saving on maternity and child 
care costs and avoiding the perceived unreliability that accompanies 
the hiring of women with small children. In 1996 a change in the Labor 
Code prohibited women between the ages of 15 and 49 from being hired 
for jobs that are considered to be harmful to their health, including 
working on the night shift. Many of these jobs pay more, allow early 
retirement, or both. Women continue to report cases in which they are 
paid less for the same work that male colleagues perform. There has 
been no other recent substantial research in this area. Human Rights 
watch notes that the situation for working women may have worsened 
after the 1998 financial crisis, as women were more likely to be fired 
first.
    Job advertisements often specify sex and age groups, and sometimes 
physical appearance as well. Government statistics for 1997 showed that 
women earn between 69 and 81 percent of men's salaries in 5 of the 10 
fields examined, but between 95 to 105 percent of men's salaries in the 
remaining 5 sectors. However, these figures do not provide a complete 
picture of the problem. Women's average incomes generally are estimated 
to be significantly below average male incomes. Professions dominated 
by women are much lower paid than those dominated by men. Moscow human 
resources managers privately admit that discrimination against women in 
hiring is common. Unemployment, at 11.7 percent of the work force in 
October, also disproportionately affects women.
    In July Ingush president Ruslan Aushev issued a decree permitting 
men in the republic to have up to four wives. According to Aushev, the 
decision came in response to the republic's demographic situation, and 
he appealed to the Duma to make the necessary changes in the family 
code.
    Children.--The Constitution assigns the Government some 
responsibility for safeguarding the rights of children. The State 
endeavors to provide, within its limited means, for the welfare of 
children. While federal law provides for education for all children in 
the country, regional authorities frequently deny access to schools to 
the children of unregistered persons, asylum seekers, and migrants 
because they lack residential registration (see Section 2.d.).
    A new family code regulating children's rights and marriage and 
divorce issues came into effect in 1996. Although the President has 
stated that government policies to improve the situation of children 
were a top priority, progress has been slow. Many Moscow charitable 
organizations have established productive relations with the city 
government to address the needs of disabled children, as well as other 
vulnerable groups.
    The position of many children has deteriorated since the collapse 
of communism because of falling living standards, an increase in the 
number of broken homes, and domestic violence. According to press 
reports, 40 percent of all children live below the poverty line. In 
1995 Duma Deputy Mariya Gaydash stated that 2 million children under 14 
years of age suffer from physical or mental abuse, with as many as 
200,000 dying each year from injuries received at home, usually from 
parental abuse or neglect. About 50,000 children run away from home 
each year, Gaydash asserted, and 2,000 commit suicide. Children on the 
street often become dependent on illegal narcotics. To combat the 
growing number of children being abducted, police organizations are 
establishing programs to protect children.
    In August 1998, a group of prominent Russians signed an appeal 
calling on the President to take ``energetic measures'' to help the 
country's homeless children. According to the Ministry of the Interior, 
there were approximately 1 million homeless children on the streets. 
The Duma estimated this number to be between 2 and 4 million. Oleg 
Zykov, Head of the No to Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Foundation, 
estimates that there are about 15,000 street children in Moscow alone. 
Other sources suggest that there are as many as 60,000 street children 
in the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Many of these children have 
come from the regions, only to be sent back to where they came from by 
city police. One shelter director complained that young girls from 
Chechnya also were returned there, despite the danger to them. Homeless 
children often engage in criminal activities, receive no education, and 
are vulnerable to drug and alcohol abuse. Some young girls who find 
themselves on the street turn to a life of prostitution in order to 
survive.
    An estimated 50,000 children run away from their homes each year. 
Boris Altshuler, director of the Rights of the Child Program at the 
Moscow Human Rights Research Center, said that the main reasons 
children run away are family violence, financial problems, or social 
problems such as drug or alcohol abuse by one or both of the parents. 
In Moscow approximately 6,000 children per year are brought to the 
Center of Temporary Isolation of Minor Delinquents (COVINA). These 
children stay in COVINA for no more than 30 days. During this period, 
the child's guardian is located and his or her case is to be 
investigated. However, in 90 to 95 percent of these cases, the police 
simply return the child to the family or to the institution from which 
the child ran away. Altshuler told of a 9-year-old boy who escaped from 
his stepfather's beatings 28 times, only to be taken by police to 
COVINA and then returned to his stepfather. Many officials see domestic 
problems as private and prefer not to interfere.
    In St. Petersburg local and international NGO's provide a variety 
of services for the homeless. In particular Medecins du Monde (MDM) 
supports homeless children with a ``social hotel'' and a medical/social 
consultation center that provides medical help, vaccines, and referrals 
to hospitals and orphanages. The MDM also organizes specialized 
training seminars for medical and social professionals and city 
officials engaged in work with homeless youth.
    As the former Soviet Union opened to the international community, 
attention has focused on the status of orphans and the disabled, who 
had been removed from mainstream society and isolated within state 
institutions. The segregation of these populations had multiple 
repercussions. A complex and cumbersome system was developed to manage 
their life-long institutionalization. Three different ministries 
(Education, Health, and Labor and Social Development) assumed 
responsibility for different age groups and categories of orphans. 
Rather than focus on the needs of the child, the system revolves around 
the institution itself. Child welfare is easily lost within the 
bureaucracy; little clear recourse exists in instances of abuse by the 
system. Human rights activists allege that children in state 
institutions are provided for poorly (often because funds are lacking), 
and in some cases are abused physically by staff.
    While there are no comprehensive studies of the effects of the 
orphanage system, its costs, and the extent of its problems, several 
reports have compiled important information. There is a groundswell of 
opinion calling for reform to the child protection system today. Dozens 
of NGO's and several professional organizations are trying to improve 
the system. Regional governments in certain oblasts have undertaken 
reforms.
    The available data from a 1997 report from the Ministry of Labor 
and Social Development, which is cited often, indicate that there are 
approximately 600,000 children registered as orphans in the country. Of 
these children, 10 percent are orphans with no parents and 90 percent 
are ``social orphans,'' who have at least one living parent who has 
given up the child to the State for a variety of reasons. Between 1993 
and 1997, the number of registered orphans increased by 30 percent and 
the number residing in institutions by 35 percent. Concurrently, the 
number of children in foster families increased by 46 percent (most 
children are related to the members of their foster families). However, 
the number adopted has remained fairly consistent, with an overall 
increase of only 2 percent.
    Although comprehensive statistics are not available, the prospects 
of those who are disabled physically or mentally are extremely bleak. 
The label of ``imbetsil'' or idiot, which signifies ``uneducable,'' is 
almost always irrevocable. The most likely future is a lifetime in 
state institutions. Even the label of ``debil,'' or lightly retarded, 
follows a person throughout his or her life on official documents, 
creating barriers to employment and housing after graduation from state 
institutions. One study conducted by the Rights of the Child program of 
the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights, found that, on graduation 
from a state institution for the lightly retarded at age 18, 30 percent 
of orphans became vagrants, 10 percent became involved in crime, and 10 
percent committed suicide. Even for those orphans classified as 
``normal,'' life after institutionalization poses serious problems, as 
they may lack the necessary social, educational, and vocational skills 
to function in society.
    Human Rights Watch released in December 1998, ``Abandoned to the 
State,'' a highly critical report that documented the dismal conditions 
that persist in many, although not all, orphanages. According to the 
report, children emerge from the orphanage system undereducated, 
physically underdeveloped, inadequately socialized, and unprepared for 
life outside an institution. Boris Altshuler, of the Rights of the 
Child Program, has said that these problems are caused less by funding 
shortages or malfeasance than by inherent defects in the state 
orphanage system.
    The existing system provides little oversight and no formal 
recourse for orphans who have been misdiagnosed as mentally ill or 
retarded, abused, or neglected. Facilities to which such children are 
remanded frequently use unprescribed narcotics to keep children under 
control. Altshuler has called for the establishment of an ombudsman for 
the rights of children with the power to enter and inspect children's 
facilities at any time of day or night without advance notification. 
Since 1998 the Ministry of Labor and Social Development has been 
working with the U.N. Children's Fund on a pilot program to establish 
regional children's rights ombudsmen. According to the Ministry and the 
Rights of the Child NGO, there are now ombudsmen in the cities of 
Yekaterinburg and St. Petersburg, in the regions of Novgorod, Kaluga, 
and Volgograd, and there are plans to establish new ombudsmen in two 
other regions.
    Trafficking in children and young girls is a problem, but there are 
no reliable estimates of its scope (see Section 6.f.).
    People With Disabilities.--The Constitution does not address 
directly the issue of discrimination against disabled persons. Although 
laws exist that prohibit discrimination, the Government has not 
enforced them. The meager resources that the Government can devote to 
assisting disabled persons are provided to veterans of World War II and 
other military conflicts. Special institutions exist for children with 
various disabilities, but do not serve their needs adequately. The 
Government does not mandate special access to buildings for the 
disabled. The NGO, Society for the Defense of Invalids, is working to 
broaden public awareness and understanding of issues concerning the 
disabled.
    A 1995 law established a requirement that firms with over 30 
employees either reserve 3 percent of their positions for persons with 
disabilities or contribute to a government fund to create job 
opportunities for the disabled. The law also removed language defining 
an ``invalid'' as a person unable to work. However, the Government has 
not implemented this law. Some persons with disabilities have found 
work within factories run by the All-Russian Society for the Disabled, 
but the majority are unable to find work and frequently are discouraged 
from working rather than subsisting on social benefits.
    The December 1998 Human Rights Watch report ``Abandoned to the 
State,'' documented the dismal conditions which persist in many 
orphanages. The report contains especially dramatic photographs of 
severely emaciated children in special state orphanages for the 
disabled. Being disabled is still a serious social stigma in the 
country, an attitude that profoundly influences how institutionalized 
children are treated. Many physically or mentally disabled children are 
considered ineducable, even those with only minor birth defects. 
According to the report, many disabled children are confined to beds 
around the clock or to rooms that are lit, heated, and furnished 
inadequately. The children are given only minimal care by low-paid 
unskilled workers with no training in the care of the disabled.
    Indigenous People.--Until its abolition by presidential decree on 
September 22, 1998 (as part of a larger cabinet restructuring), the 
Moscow-based State Committee for the Development of the North was 
charged with representing and advocating the interests of indigenous 
people. With only a small staff, its influence was limited. The 
Committee's functions were transferred to the new Ministry for Regional 
Affairs and Nationalities, which is directed by the presidential decree 
to take ``into account the need for singling out the most important 
issues of northern territories'' as one of its priorities. On March 6, 
the Duma approved a bill on indigenous ethnic communities, providing 
them with support, permitting the creation of self-government bodies, 
and permitting them to seek compensation if economic development 
threatens their lands. Yeltsin signed the law in April. In some areas, 
local communities have organized to study and make recommendations 
regarding the preservation of the culture of indigenous people. People 
such as the Buryats in Siberia; the Tatar and Bashkiri in the Urals; 
the people of the North, including the Enver, Tafarli, and Chukchi; and 
others have worked actively to preserve and defend their cultures, as 
well as the economic resources of their regions. In this context, some 
groups in the far eastern part of the country have criticized the 
Federal Government for not developing an overall concept for the 
development of indigenous people. Most believe that they are treated 
equally with ethnic Russians, although some groups believe that they 
are not represented or are underrepresented in regional governments. 
According to unconfirmed press reports, in May approximately 1,000 
Nogais in Stavropol met and called for the resignation of the regional 
and educational administration in the Nogai okrug, after a police 
officer reportedly killed two Nogais; no further details were available 
about this incident. According to the chairman of the executive of 
Birlik, the interregional association of Nogais, Nogais in the 
Neftekumsk region reportedly do not enjoy the same rights as other 
ethnic groups, and there are no Nogais in the region's administration 
or in any law enforcement agencies. According to unconfirmed press 
reports, in Karelia Karelians and Vepsians are calling for laws in the 
republic to ensure that minorities have sufficient representation in 
the republic and local governments. Local Karelian and Vepsian leaders 
reportedly blame local authorities for not taking sufficient action to 
protect local languages and culture. The principal problems for 
indigenous people center on distribution of necessary supplies and 
services, particularly in the winter months for those who live in the 
far north.
    Religious Minorities.--There were many instances of violence in the 
Northern Caucasus, some of which had religious motivations. The RIA 
news agency and Keston News Service reported in April that Abuzar 
Sumbulatov, Chechnya's leading religious affairs official and a 
specialist in Islamic law, was kidnaped from his home in Groznyy. No 
ransom was demanded and Sumbulatov is presumed dead. The reasons for 
the kidnaping are unknown but Keston News service noted that 
Sumbulatov, a Muslim, was known for promoting religious tolerance. 
Sumbulatov criticized the Moscow Government for attacking Chechen 
cultural heritage by destroying university archives, but also accused 
former Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev's government of deliberately 
allowing attacks on Chechnya's ethnic Russians. Sumbulatov's abduction 
coincided with several kidnapings of Russian Orthodox and Baptist 
clergy in Chechnya and its bordering areas in 1998 and 1999 which, 
according to the Keston News Service, suggests that Christians are 
being targeted specifically. One kidnaped Baptist pastor later was 
found beheaded in March, and another is feared dead. ITAR-TASS reported 
in July that Father Zachary, the dean of the Archangel Michael Church, 
and two church workers were kidnaped in Groznyy. In March three Russian 
Orthodox priests also were kidnaped, two in Chechnya and one in 
Ingushetiya, and one later was released. A U.S. missionary was kidnaped 
in Dagestan in late 1998 and was released by his abductors in June, 
after being tortured in order to extort ransom (see Section 1.b.). The 
Russian Baptist Union advised its members in 1998 to leave Chechnya.
    Muslims, who constitute approximately 10 percent of the population, 
continue to encounter societal discrimination and antagonism in some 
areas where they are a minority. In February Murmansk residents 
protested the construction of a mosque with a prominent minaret at a 
highly visible site.
    As foreign or so-called ``nontraditional'' religions in the country 
continue to grow, many Russians continue to feel hostility toward these 
``foreign sects,'' perhaps influenced by negative reports in the mass 
media and public criticism by Russian Orthodox Church officials and 
other influential figures. These sentiments appear to have sparked 
occasional harassment and even physical attacks. For example, according 
to press reports, in August between 10 and 15 youths burst into a 
Moscow Hare Krishna temple, beat followers and gave at least one person 
a head laceration severe enough to require hospitalization (see Section 
1.c.). In Altay in March leaders of local organizations signed a 
petition protesting the construction of a Roman Catholic cathedral on 
Lake Teletskoye and accusing Catholic missionaries of engaging in 
brainwashing. The head of the Altay republican government has pledged 
to prevent the construction of a Catholic church in the region. In 
April in Chernyakhovsk in the Kaliningrad region, an Adventist pastor 
and his wife filed a criminal complaint against the sons of an 
influential Orthodox priest after the sons disrupted an Adventist 
meeting, beat the pastor's wife, and ripped her clothing in March. 
According to the Institute of Religion and Law, the attacker 
apologized, and the case eventually was settled out of court. Mormons 
and Pentecostals have reported instances in which they may have been 
followed, harassed, and, in at least one case, physically struck. On 
August 21, an anonymous bomb threat led to the evacuation of 15,000 
persons attending a Jehovah's Witnesses convention in Moscow's Olympic 
Stadium. There are believed to be more cases of such harassment than 
are reported. In several instances during the year, local press outlets 
accused Scientologists, Mormons, and Jehovah's Witnesses of espionage, 
brainwashing, and other activities that they believed to be harmful to 
citizens. A political commentator for the ORT network alleged in a 
November broadcast that Moscow Mayor Luzhkov is a Scientologist, as 
part of his station's effort to reduce Luzhkov's party's chances in the 
December Duma elections (see Section 3).
    In February Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksiy II called for the 
continuation of the struggle against foreign religions, which he 
believed were threatening the spiritual health of the nation. 
Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, head of the Russian 
Orthodox Church's Department of External Relations, has stated 
repeatedly that existing international human rights standards are 
``exclusively Western and liberal.'' In an August discussion on 
religious tolerance, a representative of the Moscow Patriarchate echoed 
this view, asserting that such norms are based on Western standards, 
which do not take into account Eastern tradition. In March the Moscow 
Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church stated that it considers 
the Church of Scientology to be a dangerous sect that can have a 
negative impact on individuals and families. A spokesman for the 
Patriarchate said that it wanted the activities of the Church of 
Scientology to be scrutinized by the appropriate legal entities. These 
comments came immediately after Moscow police raided the offices of the 
Church of Scientology (see Section 2.c.). In February Russian Orthodox 
Metropolitan Kirill criticized Jehovah's Witnesses for their practice 
of proselytizing and accused the group of resorting to manipulation and 
psychological pressure. Metropolitan Kirill's comments came during the 
course of the civil trial against Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow.
    Occasionally, opposition to the dissemination of information came 
from religious groups. From time to time, the Russian Orthodox Church 
has criticized the press for what it called ``anti-church 
publications,'' but stopped short of imposing any church sanctions 
against particular authors or editors. However, the Church appealed to 
authors of what it considered inaccurate accounts of church history to 
``realize the sinfulness of their evil deeds.''
    Religious groups frequently complain of discriminatory stories in 
the local press. While the scope of the problem is difficult to gauge, 
newspapers have published sensational or biased articles criticizing 
nontraditional religions.
    Following large-scale emigration over the last two decades, between 
600,000 and 700,000 Jews remain in the country (0.5 percent of the 
total population). While Jewish emigration rates are significantly 
lower than in the Soviet period, the number of Jews emigrating to 
Israel for economic reasons as well as fear of persecution increased 
approximately 70 percent from January 1998 to January 1999. The vast 
majority of Jews--80 percent--live in Moscow or St. Petersburg. Jews 
continue to encounter societal discrimination, and government 
authorities have been criticized for insufficient action to counter it. 
In August the Ministry of Press, Television, Radio Broadcasting, and 
Mass Communications issued a warning to a city-owned television station 
in St. Petersburg for airing anti-Semitic material in violation of the 
mass media law's prohibition on inciting racial violence or hatred (see 
Section 2.a.). In August St. Petersburg Commissioner for Human Rights 
Mikhail Chulaki publicly criticized the program that broadcast the 
anti-Semitic material.
    Until recently, there was little evidence to suggest that increased 
anti-Semitic rhetoric has led to increased violence, but observers in 
the country and abroad are watching closely to see if these most recent 
events are part of a sustained pattern of intensified anti-Semitism 
(see Section 2.c.). There were several reports of major crimes or acts 
of intimidation linked to anti-Semitic groups or motives during the 
year. The interior of the Jewish synagogue in Novosibirsk was ransacked 
and largely destroyed by vandals in March. The vandals painted 
graffiti, including the swastika-like symbols and initials of the 
ultranationalist Russian National Unity (RNE) organization, on the 
interior walls of the synagogue. It was not clear whether the RNE was 
responsible for the incident. Neither city nor regional government 
officials spoke out against the attack, and no arrests were made in the 
case. In May a synagogue in Birobydzhan (the Jewish autonomous region) 
reportedly was vandalized by hooligans on two occasions. Also, on May 
1, two bombs exploded simultaneously near the Marina Roshcha Synagogue 
and the Moscow Choral Synagogue in Moscow. Federal authorities are 
unsure whether the attacks were motivated by anti-Semitism, but Jewish 
leaders are convinced that they were. Then-Interior Minister Stepashin 
announced the next day that the Ministry had formed a joint team with 
the FSB to investigate the two bombings. No progress has been reported 
in investigations of the May 13, 1998 bombing of the Marina Roshcha 
synagogue, which caused extensive property damage and slightly injured 
several workers at an adjacent construction site but no congregants.
    There were several serious anti-Semitic incidents beginning with 
the July 13 stabbing of Jewish Cultural Center director Leopold 
Kaymovskiy at the Moscow Choral Synagogue. Kaymovskiy's attacker, 20-
year-old Nikita Krivchun, said that he acted alone but that he 
considers Jews ``evil.'' Krivchun was charged with attempted murder for 
reasons of national, racial, or religious hatred. On July 25, a bomb 
was found in the Bolshaya Bronnaya Lubavitcher synagogue. The bomb was 
removed by synagogue workers and later detonated by the FSB, causing 
some damage to the synagogue. Moscow Mayor Luzhkov criticized the 
bombing and attended a July 29 service at the synagogue. The FSB is 
investigating the bomb as a terrorist act. Vandals desecrated six 
Jewish graves in Tomsk on August 2. On August 2, President Yeltsin told 
visiting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak that the Government would 
prosecute anti-Semitic crimes and proposed Israeli-Russian cooperation 
on combating anti-Semitism.
    The ultranationalist and anti-Semitic RNE paramilitary 
organization, led by Aleksandr Barkashov, appeared to extend its 
presence beyond its stronghold in the south during 1998. Although 
reliable figures on its membership are not available, the RNE claims a 
membership of 100,000 in 64 federation chapters, but press reports 
estimate its membership at 12,000, and it is registered officially in 
22 regions. According to various pollsters, the radical movement 
appears to have won some degree of national name recognition and may 
enjoy the support of up to 3 percent of the population. According to 
press accounts, in Kostroma and Vladimir the RNE has representatives in 
regional governments; Tver and Samara oblasts provide resources for RNE 
youth groups; and in Voronezh RNE members patrol the streets with local 
militias. According to press sources, joint street patrols failed in 
Kostroma and Yekatarinburg, where RNE members turned them into 
opportunities for petty crime, causing local authorities to cancel the 
programs. RNE ``uniformed'' members were increasingly visible during 
1998 at political and cultural public gatherings, but their day-to-day 
visibility on the streets and in public areas of Moscow had not been as 
obvious. However, on January 31 approximately 150 RNE members marched 
in Moscow to protest Mayor Luzhkov's ban on holding an RNE congress in 
the city in December 1998. The march received a great deal of media 
coverage. After the ban on its congress in Moscow, the RNE staged 
smaller meetings in 10 other cities, the largest with 300 participants 
in Stavropol, according to press reports in March. In Borovichiy the 
RNE and another local Fascist group, Mertvaya Voda, were active 
according to local Jewish leaders, and desecrated Jewish graves, mailed 
death threats to Jews, and hung anti-Semitic posters. The local 
Borovichiy duma passed a decree in December 1998 prohibiting RNE 
activities and the distribution of its propaganda, and in March 1999 
city and law enforcement officials formed a commission to counteract 
the RNE's activities and propaganda. In April officials from the 
Borovichiy city administration invited the Harold Light Center, a 
Jewish NGO, to present a 2-day seminar on combating anti-Semitism and 
extremism.
    The increased visibility of the RNE and other extremists across the 
country prompted government efforts to address the problem of extremism 
more forcefully. Moscow authorities banned the RNE from convening a 
congress in December 1998, citing the RNE's lack of credentials as a 
legally registered public organization at the time. (The Ministry of 
Justice twice had denied the RNE's registration.) The RNE subsequently 
managed to register but was then stripped of its registration by a 
Moscow court in April. However, some observers called the municipal 
procuracy's case weak and motivated only by the desire of city 
authorities to ban the organization.
    Anti-Semitic themes continued to figure prominently in hundreds of 
extremist publications, and some politicians made anti-Semitic remarks. 
Jewish groups believe that the Communist Party of the Russian 
Federation (KPRF) uses anti-Semitism as a political tool to build 
populist support. In October and December 1998, KPRF Duma members 
Makashov and Ilyukhin made anti-Semitic remarks and called for quotas 
limiting the number of Jews in public office. Communist Duma members 
blocked a November 4, 1998 Duma motion to censure anti-Semitic remarks 
(see Section 2.c.). Some Russian Jews believe that these public 
statements may have contributed to increased societal anti-Semitism.
    Jewish NGO's claimed that anti-Semitic themes were a factor in 
December 6, 1998 legislative assembly elections. A December 17, 1998 
article in Novyy Petersburg by Yuriy Shutov, a deputy of the 
legislative assembly currently in prison awaiting trial on seven counts 
of homicide, stated that Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, the leader of the Yabloko 
party, was Jewish. Lvov said that anti-Semitic graffiti all around the 
city also were used to smear Yabloko candidate Aleksandr Druz. At an 
August 4 roundtable in St. Petersburg, candidates for Leningrad 
oblast's legislative assembly publicly used anti-Semitic rhetoric to 
argue their positions (see Section 3).
    A prominent public figure who regularly used anti-Semitic remarks 
was Krasnodar region governor Nikolay Kondratenko (see Section 2.c.). A 
report issued in October 1997 by the human rights group Memorial 
criticized Krasnodar government officials for ``encouraging radical 
nationalist groups,'' including the Cossacks, and ``indirectly inciting 
them to violence'' against ethnic minority groups in the area. Local 
government authorities have approved patrols by Cossack paramilitary 
groups in the name of law enforcement. Such groups are not accountable 
publicly, and their activities have resulted in human rights abuses. 
For example, in July 1998 Cossacks detained and whipped an Adventist 
distributing Bibles in a public park in Anapa in the Krasnodar region. 
The Cossacks refused to return the 60 Bibles that they had confiscated 
from him. In May Cossacks in Anapa beat a man connected with a Catholic 
church in their efforts to stop construction of a new Catholic chapel. 
The man was hospitalized as a result of the beating. A local priest had 
received a threatening letter signed by the leader of a local Cossack 
organization demanding that construction of the chapel cease. The 
church had all the necessary permits from local authorities to build 
the chapel.
    After his 1996 election, Kondratenko appointed Cossack ``hetman'' 
Vladimir Gromov as deputy governor of the region. In April 1997, 
Kondratenko and Gromov issued a resolution making Cossack groups 
subordinate to the regional government instead of to the State, 
according to the Center for Human Rights Advocacy. According to the 
statements of the radical Cossack chieftain Ivan Bezguliy, reported in 
the media, he has 44,000 Cossacks at his disposal, ostensibly to 
enforce law and order. Estimates of the total number of Cossacks in 
Krasnodar are as high as 300,000. The Cossacks' tactics appear designed 
to brutalize and intimidate the area's ethnic minorities and to bring 
about the group's stated goal of cleansing the area of all nonslavic 
Russians.
    In July 1998, the presidential Human Rights Commission issued an 
official statement that warned that the legalization of the activity of 
extremists on the part of a number of local authorities and law-
enforcement agencies under the pretext of ``providing assistance in 
restoring law and order'' and in ``the patriotic indoctrination of 
youth,'' had become a ``new and dangerous phenomenon.'' This comment 
apparently referred to, among other things, the use by authorities in 
the Kuban area of the south of Cossack paramilitary units to assist law 
enforcement authorities.
    In December 1998, the Ministry of Justice launched an investigation 
into the reported distribution of anti-Semitic leaflets in Krasnodar 
that called on the population to destroy the homes of Jews. The extent 
or effectiveness of federal investigations of racial or ethnic 
provocations in Krasnodar is thus far unknown. According to press 
reports, in June Cossacks in Stavropol threatened to take over law 
enforcement functions since they lacked faith in the Government's 
ability to protect its citizens after four policemen were killed.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In July 1998, the presidential 
Human Rights Commission issued an official statement noting that ``the 
increase in the threat of fascism'' was ``taking on visible and ominous 
features,'' and that incitement of national, racial, and religious 
enmity was ``taking on an increasingly organized nature.'' It noted the 
increasing number of extremist groups that advocated racial supremacy 
and ``national xenophobia,'' and commented that such groups were moving 
with increasing frequency from combat training (under the guise of 
sports training) to ``acts of direct terror, hoodlum attacks on persons 
of `unwelcome' nationality, the desecration of cemeteries, and 
explosions of monuments.'' The statement followed a number of well-
publicized incidents that spring, including several racially motivated 
attacks on members of minorities, particularly Asians and Africans. 
Attacks generally appeared to be random, inspired by racial hatred, and 
carried out by private individuals or small groups, some of whom were 
known to local law enforcement authorities for their racial intolerance 
or criminal records.
    Roma and persons from the Caucasus and Central Asia face widespread 
societal discrimination, which often is reflected in official attitudes 
and actions. There were reports of police beatings, harassment, and 
soliciting bribes of persons with dark skin, or who appeared to be from 
the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Africa. In addition, since 1993, 
discrimination against persons from the Caucasus and Central Asia 
increased concurrently with new measures at both the federal and local 
levels to combat crime. Law enforcement authorities targeted persons 
with dark complexions for harassment, arrest, and deportation from 
urban centers, particularly after the bombings in September in Moscow, 
when authorities detained some 2,000 persons and deported more than 
500, according to NGO's (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.d.). In Moscow 
such persons--including refugees from Africa, persons with dark skin, 
or persons who appeared to be from the Northern Caucasus--are subjected 
to far more frequent document checks than others and frequently are 
detained or fined in excess of permissible penalties, often without 
formal documents recording the infraction being drawn up and presented 
by police. Reports also suggest a pattern, at least tacitly supported 
by city authorities, of extortion and beatings by law enforcement 
officials.
    On August 11, Ivan Sydoruk, procurator of St. Petersburg, charged 
Denis Usov, a local journalist, with extremist nationalist activities. 
The charges were based on the views expressed in Usov's article in the 
suburban newspaper Rodnoye Kolpino, in which he called for the 
population of the Kolpino suburb to ``get rid of blacks'' (persons from 
the Caucasus usually are called ``black people''). The article was 
published in the summer of 1997. The Kolpino procurator's office 
pressed charges against Usov then, but the issue was closed because 
Usov managed to prove to the investigator that in the article he meant 
black cockroaches, not black people. Sydoruk reopened the issue; 
however, according to press reports, Usov plans to insist on a public 
trial in order to attract public attention to his views. (Usov also is 
a member of Kolpino's municipal council.)
    During the year, members of ethnic or racial minorities were the 
victims of beatings, extortion, and harassment by ``skinheads'' and 
members of other racist and extremist groups. However, arrests seldom 
are made in most such attacks, many of which have been reported by 
human rights organizations. Many victims, particularly refugees who 
lack residence documents recognized by the police, choose not to report 
such attacks and report indifference on the part of police. In May 
1998, several young white men assaulted a black foreigner at an outdoor 
market in Moscow. One of the attackers was charged with hooliganism and 
investigated on the more serious charge of inciting racial hatred. In 
March he was convicted on the charge of hooliganism and sentenced to 3 
years in prison, but he was released in September under a prisoner 
amnesty.
    In Stavropol kray, the local branch of Aleksandr Barkashov's neo-
Nazi RNE and a parallel organization called Russian Knight claim 
support from local leaders, members of the armed services, and law 
enforcement officials. The stated goal of the organizations is to 
develop Russian youth to establish ``Russian order,'' a vision of a 
great Russia with Orthodox values, a goal for which they claim to be 
ready to shed blood. The group runs kindergartens in Stavropol and 
trains youths of various ages. The group reportedly has several hundred 
followers in the kray and claims to have 64 branches throughout the 
country and 100,000 members.
    The RNE was named by the Presidential Commission on Countering 
Political Extremism, created in October 1997, as one of the first two 
extremist groups it would investigate. However, in making the 
announcement, then-Justice Minister Stepashin, chairman of the 
Commission, added that the RNE no longer existed officially, since it 
had lost a court case in December 1997 to renew its registration with 
the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice twice had denied the 
RNE's registration. The RNE subsequently managed to register but then 
was stripped of its registration by a Moscow court in April. However, 
some observers called the municipal prosecutor's case weak and 
motivated only by the desire of city authorities to ban the 
organization. The RNE still is active as an unofficial organization.
    On January 30, members of the National Bolshevik Party, headed by 
right-wing author Eduard Limonov, disrupted a congress of the Russia's 
Democratic Choice political organization with chants of ``Stalin-
Beriya-Gulag'' and Nazi salutes. Members of the two parties engaged in 
a fistfight, according to the Russian press.
    In August after a number of television stations showed footage of 
Chechen leaders in their reports on the conflict in Dagestan, the 
Ministry of Press, Television, Radio Broadcasting, and Mass 
Communications warned the companies against ``giving air time to 
Chechen field commanders,'' stating that those actions violate Article 
4 of the media law, which forbids incitement of societal violence or 
hatred (see Section 2.c.). Human rights activists in St. Petersburg 
protested local media broadcasts on the city-owned station that called 
for ethnic cleansing and referred to residents of the Caucasus as 
``needing extermination.''
    The Government reported that in 1998 authorities investigated 25 
criminal cases on charges of incitement to national, racial or 
religious hatred. As of July, 10 cases have been opened, and courts 
have ruled on 9 of them.
    Chechen internally displaced persons (IDP's) and the Civic 
Assistance Committee for migrants reported that Chechens face great 
difficulty in finding lodging in Moscow and frequently are forced to 
pay at least twice the usual rent for an apartment. The St. Petersburg 
Times in April reported that a similar pattern of discrimination exists 
against persons from the Caucasus in St. Petersburg. Although the 
housing law forbids discrimination, according to human rights lawyer 
Yuriy Shmidt, the chances of a would-be tenant winning a lawsuit are 
low because there is no legal precedent.
    In February the republican legislature in Bashkortostan passed a 
law naming Bashkiri and Russian as its two official languages, but 
excluded Tatar. There are more Tatars than Bashkir in the republic, and 
Tatars constitute 30 percent of the republic's population. The 
legislature of the republic of Tatarstan appealed to the Bashkortostan 
legislature to include the language, but the appeal was rejected. On 
January 21, some 20 Tatars protested a draft version of the language 
law outside the republican legislature, and authorities arrested 7 of 
the protesters.
Section 6.Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the 
right to form and join trade unions, but practical limitations on the 
exercise of this right arise from governmental policy and the dominant 
position of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia 
(FNPR), the successor organization to the Communist trade unions. 
Although the best estimates are that approximately 63 percent of the 
work force are unionized, and approximately 8 percent of union members 
belong to independent unions, there are no authoritative data on union 
membership. There was no mandatory reregistration of union members 
following the Soviet era, during which all workers were registered as 
trade union members. Since the onset of the wage arrears crisis, 
workers have been unable to transfer dues to their chosen trade union 
structures. The Government did not carry out its threat to decertify 
the Free Miners' Union (NPG) following that union's protest activities 
in July 1998.
    The FNPR claims to represent 80 per cent of all workers, largely 
dominates the union movement, and thus still provides a practical 
constraint on the right to freedom of association. The FNPR inherited 
the bulk of the property of its predecessors, including office and 
recreational property. The majority of its income comes from sources 
other than dues, such as rental income and fees for member services. 
Its unions frequently include management as part of the bargaining 
unit. The FNPR and other trade union federations act independently on 
the national political level, but FNPR unions sometimes are affiliated 
closely with local political structures. Political parties often act in 
parallel with unions, for example, in calling for a national day of 
protest.
    Benefits of membership vary depending on union affiliation and 
generally discourage the formation of new unions. Various benefits are 
provided by the Social Insurance Fund. By arbitrarily deciding who 
receives benefits, such as child subsidies and vacations, based on the 
politics or affiliation of union members of the federation, FNPR unions 
enjoy a privileged position with regard to distribution of state funds 
at the municipal, oblast, and federal levels. For example, families 
normally would pay 60 percent of the cost of summer camp for children, 
while FNPR members would pay only 20 percent.
    Court decisions have limited the right of association. In 1998 the 
Russian Trade Union of Locomotive Engineers declared its intention to 
strike. The Ministry of Railroads filed a court case to have the 
planned strike declared illegal. The prosecutor demanded that the court 
declare the union's constitution illegal, as it specifically limited 
trade union membership to workers and excluded management, in alleged 
violation of the International Labor Organization's (ILO) convention on 
freedom of association. The court ruled that the union had to change 
its constitution to allow managers to join the union. Despite an 
official document from the ILO that supported the union's position, the 
court has yet to overturn its original ruling.
    Plant management and FNPR local unions often work together to 
destroy new unions. For instance, the new union Solidarity united 900 
of the 2,500 workers at the Samara ball-bearing factory. At the end of 
1998, the factory changed hands, and a new director joined forces with 
the FNPR against Solidarity, which had grown at the expense of the FNPR 
union. Briefings in the director's office included daily updates from 
shop floor managers as to the number of employees who had left 
Solidarity and rejoined the FNPR local. The incentives for leaving 
Solidarity were considerable--avoidance of the threat of dismissal and 
possible receipt of a ``cash bonus'' (in the form of a credit, since 
there was almost no cash available). In 2 months Solidarity lost 200 
members due to this campaign.
    All civic organizations founded before 1994 were required to 
reregister with the Ministry of Justice. The registration procedure for 
other NGO's requires that the local departments of justice check all 
articles of charter documents, but for unions, the procedure simply 
involves ``notification'' and submission of documents. However, 
Department of Justice officials have extended their authority far 
beyond the letter of the law and have canceled the registration of a 
large number of unions. For example, after submission of documents for 
registration, the Sverdlovsk oblast department of justice required that 
all founders gather at the department of justice and resign the 
founding documents. In another case, despite having filed the proper 
forms, the Russian Trade Union of Locomotive Brigades, which has 
enjoyed all-Russian status (a term of informal recognition throughout 
the country) for more than 5 years, was refused registration in July on 
the grounds that local unions were not documented properly. In the 
opinion of independent lawyers, these actions contradict the laws 
governing union registration and are a direct and illegal attempt to 
discourage labor activism.
    Court rulings have established the principle that nonpayment of 
wages--by far the predominant grievance--is an individual dispute and 
cannot be addressed collectively by unions. As a result, a collective 
action based on nonpayment of wages is not recognized as a strike, and 
individuals are not protected by the labor law's protection against 
being fired for participation. Prior to 1999, collective actions were 
considered strikes if they concerned violations of a collective 
bargaining agreement that specified the time frame for wage payments. 
Court decisions throughout the year came to reflect the view that even 
these actions did not concern a collective dispute. This ruling called 
into question the value of a collective agreement.
    As part of bargaining, the right to strike is difficult to 
exercise. Most strikes are considered technically illegal, because the 
procedures for disputes are exceedingly complex and require 
coordination of information from both sides, even before courts are 
involved. Strikes may be reviewed by a civil court to establish their 
legality. The civil court has the right to order the confiscation of 
union property to settle damages and losses to an employer if a strike 
is found to be illegal. As a result, an increasing number of strikes 
are organized by strike committees, rather than unions. Reprisals for 
strikes are common, although strictly prohibited by law. Union leaders 
have been followed by the security services, detained for questioning 
by police, and subjected to heavy fines, losses of bonuses, and 
demotions. Following a strike by dock workers at the Kaliningrad port 
over management's refusal to negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement in October 1997, all union members were ``transferred'' to 
other brigades that were the last to receive work orders. In order to 
move back to a working brigade, workers simply had to resign from the 
union. In October the union won a court decision against these 
transfers.
    In 1995 transportation unions had complained that, because 
transportation can be considered an essential service that must be 
provided under law, their right to strike was denied. The 
Constitutional Court agreed and found that banning industrywide strikes 
is unconstitutional, and that each needs to be considered on a case-by-
case basis. However, a subsequent 1995 federal law on collective labor 
dispute resolution banned railway strikes. After successful 
negotiations with the air traffic controllers' union to avoid a strike, 
the Government drafted a regulation that became law in July to ban all 
strikes in the air traffic sector.
    During the year, there were no prolonged strikes like those that 
occurred in recent years. As the Government began to pay salaries and 
pensions systematically, the grievance of nonpayment of wages, which 
had motivated strikes in previous years, grew less prevalent. According 
to official statistics, during the first 11 months of the year there 
was a decrease in the number of strikes compared to the same period in 
1998. In November some 5,700 workers were on strike at 341 
organizations, while in November 1998, some 65,500 workers were on 
strike at some 2,135 organizations. In January a national teachers' 
strike received considerable publicity and was noteworthy in comparison 
to the few minor work slowdowns and stoppages that were scattered in 
other sectors.
    According to an international labor organization report, on January 
27 unknown assailants murdered Gennady Borisov, a leader of the Vnukovo 
Airlines Technical and Ground Personnel Union, at the entrance to his 
apartment. Earlier that month, Borisov and other labor activists began 
picketing the airline headquarters to protest their not being paid for 
4 months. Borisov also reportedly was monitoring alleged illegal 
practices involving the company's shares (see Section 1.a.).
    In October Ministry of Justice troops stormed the Vyborgskyi paper 
mill in Leningrad oblast and opened fire on workers who had barricaded 
themselves in the factory's administration building. The workers were 
protesting the mill's new foreign ownership. Minister of Justice Yuriy 
Chayka admitted to the Duma later that month that the troops' actions 
were ``lawful in form, but digressed from the law in content'' (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Unions may freely form federations and affiliate with international 
bodies.
    b. The Right to Bargain Collectively.--The law provides for the 
right of collective bargaining, but this right is not always protected. 
The law requires employers to respond to a trade union's initiative and 
negotiate with the union; however, the law does not require management 
to sign the agreement, even after both sides have signed protocols 
approving a draft text. As a result, the right to conclude a collective 
agreement is often not protected. In addition, employers often ignore 
the requirement to negotiate and refuse to come to the bargaining 
table. Various employers successfully refused to negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements, particularly for unions not affiliated with the 
FNPR. Despite a legal requirement to do so, management also frequently 
refuses to provide the financial information demanded by trade unions. 
The Ministry of Labor indicates that 5.4 percent of enterprises have 
officially registered collective bargaining agreements. It is not 
obligatory to register collective agreements, and it is very likely 
that there are far more collective agreements than those actually 
registered. According to the Ministry of Labor, during the year the 
most common causes for strikes, not counting actions over wage arrears, 
were the refusal of employers to negotiate or conclude a collective 
agreement and the refusal to recognize the union and enter into 
negotiations.
    A gap in the law, which fails to establish the employer's legal 
identity, often makes collective agreements ineffective. Lack of clear 
identification of the employer has complicated and delayed tripartite 
tariff agreements at the municipal, regional, national, and industrial 
levels and has brought their legal validity into question. For example, 
in the air traffic controllers' struggle to negotiate a national 
compensation agreement, it was unclear who was the employer--the 
Federation Aviation Service or the Government Aviation Corporation. As 
a result, negotiations dragged out for 2 years, and the Government only 
clarified the identity of the employer when faced with a proposed 
strike. Even after an agreement is signed, employers often claim that 
the ``employer representative'' had not been authorized to represent 
the factory involved.
    There are no export processing zones. Worker rights in the special 
economic zones/free trade zones are covered fully by the Labor Code.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor by adults and children; however, 
there were some reports of its use. Soldiers regularly are sent to work 
on farms to gather food for their units. There are documented cases of 
soldiers being sent by their superior officers to perform work for 
private citizens or organizations. There were reports of officers and 
sergeants ``selling'' soldiers (see Section 1.c.). Such labor also may 
violate military regulations. There were no reports of forced or bonded 
labor by children.
    According to credible reports in the national media, there are 
significant numbers of foreign workers from countries of the former 
Soviet Union who are forced to work free or almost free because their 
passports are held by firms that brought them into the country. Similar 
reports describe North Koreans brought in to work in the construction 
and timber industries in the Russian Far East, with salaries remitted 
to their Government.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits regular employment for children 
under the age of 16 and also regulates the working conditions of 
children under the age of 18, including banning dangerous, nighttime, 
and overtime work. Children may, under certain specific conditions, 
work in apprenticeship or internship programs at the ages of 14 and 15. 
While in some instances children can be found selling goods on street 
corners, accepted social prohibitions against the employment of 
children and the availability of adult workers at low wage rates 
combine to prevent widespread abuse of child labor legislation. 
Homeless children are at risk for exploitation in prostitution or 
criminal activities. Other children are used by their parents to lend 
credence to their poverty when begging. The mayor of Moscow in August 
1998 issued a decree that required enterprises with more than 15 
employees either to hire a young intern or disabled person or to 
contribute about $59 (1,400 rubles, or the average monthly wage of a 
metallurgical worker) per month to the Employment Fund. The absence of 
a program to implement the decree encourages the hiring of fictitious 
employees to avoid contributing to the Fund. The Government prohibits 
forced and bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it 
occurred (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly minimum wage of 
$3.33 (83 rubles) is well below the living wage of $38 (950 rubles) per 
month, and is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. In August 37.7 percent of the population had incomes 
below this survival minimum, compared with 21.8 percent 1 year earlier. 
However, most workers receive several times the monthly minimum, and 
the minimum wage is essentially an accounting reference for calculating 
university stipends, pensions, civil service wages, and social 
benefits. It is not a number used for real salaries. Enterprises often 
use this number to avoid taxation by reporting the number of employees 
paid at the minimum wage instead of reporting actual salaries. Various 
sources estimate that from 50 to 70 percent of the working population 
have extra jobs, the incomes from which are not reported. In addition, 
much of the population continues to reside in low-rent or subsidized 
housing and receives various social services from enterprises or 
municipalities. Dependence on such subsidies, in conjunction with the 
residency registration system--illegal but widely practiced--generally 
prevents relocation to find work.
    The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours, with 
at least one 24-hour rest period. The law requires premium pay for 
overtime work or work on holidays. Workers have complained of being 
required to work well beyond the normal week, that is, 10- to 12-hour 
days, of abrogations of negotiated labor agreements, and of forced 
transfers. Because of the financial crisis, workers often go without 
pay for the normal workweek but are offered cash for overtime work, 
which they accept in order to survive.
    Nonpayment of wages continues to be the most widespread abuse of 
the Labor Code. Wage arrears, which were generally between 3 and 9 
months, especially affected workers in the education, medicine, 
industry, and energy/coal sectors. Although government salary debt 
virtually has been eliminated, the salary debts of enterprise workers 
continue to be a problem. Payments to government workers have not been 
indexed to account for devaluation of the ruble, and their current 
value is about one-quarter of their value when earned. The loss of 
purchasing power explains the steady increase of the portion of the 
population whose incomes are below the survival minimum. Many 
enterprises were forcing employees to take wages in barter, sometimes 
in goods with limited appeal. The vast majority of government workers 
continue to receive less than the survival level.
    Although a small but increasing percentage (perhaps 6 percent) of 
workers owed back wages seek relief through the court system, this has 
proved to be a lengthy process. Courts often are willing to rule in 
favor of employees, but the collection of back wages is difficult. 
Courts often insist that cases be filed individually, in contradiction 
to the law on trade unions, thereby undercutting union attempts to 
include the entire membership in one case. This insistence also makes 
the process lengthier and more difficult for the affected workers and 
exposes them to possible retaliation. It is widespread practice to 
remove the names of workers who win judgments for back wages, but have 
not yet received the wages, from the list of those who can buy food on 
credit from the company store. At least one appeals court has ruled in 
favor of employees who demanded indexation of back wage payments.
    The problem of wage arrears is aggravated by limitations on labor 
mobility. For various reasons, many workers are not able to move to 
other areas of the country in search of work. Many say that they are 
constrained economically: Their savings were destroyed by the rampant 
inflation of the early 1990's; they have not been paid for periods of 5 
to 9 months; and their freedom to move in search of new employment is 
limited further by the system of residency permits (see Section 2.d.). 
These workers effectively are tied to enterprises that can give them 
only credits at the company cafeteria and grocery and the hope of 
future salary payments. The knowledge that workers cannot easily move 
across regions and find employment has made managers in some one-
factory towns reluctant to lay off workers. Also, due to the inability 
of the local Employment Agency to provide benefits or to absorb laid-
off employees from one factory towns, local governors and mayors often 
overturn the enterprises' decisions to lay off workers who are not 
really working. Other factors, such as the availability of subsidized 
housing and cultural ties to locations, also inhibited the movement of 
workers. By decriminalizing the nonpayment of wages and by maintaining 
the system of residency permits, the Government has restricted even 
further the mobility of labor. Approximately 4 million workers were 
considered ``underemployed'' due to involuntary leave or curtailed 
hours.
    The law establishes minimal conditions for workplace safety and 
worker health, but these standards are not enforced, as the 
Government's efforts in this area did not increase during the year. 
Workers wear little protective equipment in factories, enterprises 
store hazardous materials in open areas, and smoking is permitted near 
containers of flammable substances. As economic activity continued to 
decline during the year, funds were not available for safety and health 
in the workplace. The pressure for survival displaced concern for 
safety. For example, trade union sources have reported that it has 
become commonplace for miners to remove the supports from mineshafts 
and sell them for scrap metal. Doctors' unions admitted to various 
international agencies that health and safety equipment provided to the 
hospitals was sold to patients' families, due to the wage arrears 
crisis and the fact that even when doctors and nurses are paid on time, 
their salaries are below the survival level. A worker at the Uralmash 
Machine Building Factory had 6 months of wage arrears and had to work a 
second job. When he fainted on the job, doctors associated his loss of 
consciousness and consequent injury with malnutrition and exhaustion 
from working at his second job. However, union leaders state that if 
work were conducted only in accordance with health and safety 
regulations, 70 percent of all work would stop.
    Workers were still at high levels of risk of industrial accidents 
or death. Reliable, recent statistics on accident and death rates for 
workers were not available.
    The Labor Code establishes workers' right to remove themselves from 
hazardous or life-threatening work situations without endangering their 
continued employment and entitlements to such compensations as shorter 
hours, increased vacations, extra pay, and pension benefits for working 
under such conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and young girls is 
a problem, but there are no reliable estimates of its scope (also see 
Section 5).
    Particularly because of a lack of adequate employment 
opportunities, a significant number of women are victims of 
international trafficking for sexual exploitation. Reliable statistics 
on the number of women involved are difficult to obtain. NGO's allege 
that Russian organized crime increasingly is involved in trafficking in 
women and children, but reliable data are not available. Often, women 
respond to advertisements promising well-paying jobs abroad, where they 
are forced into prostitution. The Global Survival Network, an 
international NGO, completed a comprehensive 2-year study of 
trafficking in the former Soviet Union in 1997. The study concluded 
that most women being trafficked are unwitting participants who respond 
to advertisements while searching for legitimate work. Some government 
officials and law enforcement agencies acknowledge that a trafficking 
problem exists. However, the belief that women are aware of the risks 
involved is still pervasive. NGO's charge that exploited women commonly 
are refused help by Russian consular officials abroad. Women reportedly 
are trafficked to European Union countries, the Middle East, and the 
U.S.
    According to credible reports in the national media, there are 
significant numbers of foreign workers from countries of the former 
Soviet Union who are forced to work free or almost free because their 
passports are held by firms which brought them into the country (also 
see Section 1.c.).
    There were also reports of officers and sergeants ``selling'' 
soldiers (see Section 1.c.).
                                 ______
                                 

                               SAN MARINO

    San Marino is a democratic, multiparty republic. The popularly 
elected Parliament (the Great and General Council--GGC) selects two of 
its members to serve as the Captains Regent (co-Heads of State). They 
preside over meetings of the GGC and of the Cabinet (Congress of 
State), which has 10 other members (Secretaries of State), also 
selected by the GGC. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has 
some of the prerogatives of a prime minister. The Government respects 
the law's provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
    Elected officials effectively control the centralized police 
organization (the Civil Police) and the two military corps (the 
Gendarmerie and the Guardie di Rocca).
    The principal economic activities are tourism, farming, light 
manufacturing, and banking. In addition to revenue from taxes and 
customs, the government also derives revenue from the sale of coins and 
postage stamps to collectors throughout the world and from an annual 
budget subsidy provided by the Italian government under the terms of 
the Basic Treaty with Italy.
    The legal system extensively provides for human rights, and the 
authorities respect them in practice. Although the Parliament and the 
Government have demonstrated strong commitment to the protection of 
human rights, some laws discriminate against women, particularly with 
regard to the transmission of citizenship.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no 
reports that officials employed them.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes 
these prohibitions.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process. The judicial system requires that the country's lower 
court judges be non-Sammarinese citizens, with a view to assuring 
impartiality.
    A local conciliation judge handles cases of minor importance. Other 
cases are handled by the non-Sammarinese judges who serve under 
contract to the government. The final court of review is the Council of 
Twelve, a group of judges chosen for 6-year terms (four replaced every 
2 years) from among the members of the GGC.
    The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent 
judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices. Government 
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to 
effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in 
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion, 
and the Government respects this right in practice.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the Office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations. 
Although it does not formally offer asylum to refugees, the government 
has given a few individuals de facto asylum by permitting them to 
reside and work in the country. The issue of the provision of first 
asylum did not arise during the year; nor were there any reports of the 
forced repatriation of refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage.
    Women who wish to participate in government or politics face no 
impediments. In 1974 the first female member was elected to the GGC. 
Since then, women have served on the Council as Secretary of State for 
Internal Affairs and as Captain Regent. All women's branches of the 
political parties have been integrated into the mainstream party 
organizations, where women hold important positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no domestic human rights organizations, although the 
Government does not impede their formation. The Government has declared 
itself open to outsiders' investigations of alleged abuses, but there 
have been no known requests.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination based on race, religion, 
disability, language, or social status, and the authorities respect 
these provisions. The law also prohibits some forms of discrimination 
based on sex, but vestiges of legal as well as societal discrimination 
against women remain.
    Women.--The law provides for the protection of women from violence, 
and occurrences of such violence, including spousal abuse, are rare.
    Several laws provide specifically for the equality of women in the 
workplace and elsewhere. In practice there is no discrimination in pay 
or working conditions. All careers are open to women, including careers 
in the military and police as well as the highest public offices.
    However, one law discriminates against women by stipulating that a 
woman who marries a foreigner cannot transmit citizenship to her 
husband or children, but that a man who marries a foreigner can do so 
to both his wife and their children. In a September 12 referendum, the 
electorate by a very narrow margin failed to confirm a change to the 
law that was approved by Parliament on June 16. The proposed law would 
have provided for the transmission of Sammarinese citizenship by women, 
but it was narrowly defeated despite support by all political parties. 
The Government plans to present a new bill supporting women's equal 
rights in transmitting citizenship in the near future.
    The referendum also failed to confirm a provision that would revoke 
the citizenship of women who acquired citizenship through marriage 
after 5 years of divorce if they no longer reside in the country. This 
provision was included in the proposed law after the Government had 
noted that several young Eastern European women recently had married 
significantly older citizens, presumably with the aim of acquiring 
citizenship.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public education 
and medical care. No differences are apparent in the treatment of girls 
and boys in educational or health care, nor is there any societal 
pattern of abuse directed against children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against 
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. A 1992 law established guidelines for easier access to 
public buildings, but its implementation is incomplete.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--By law all workers (except the armed 
forces but including the police) are free to form and join unions. A 
1961 law sets the conditions for establishment of a union. Unions 
freely may form domestic federations or join international labor 
federations.
    Union members constitute about half of the country's work force 
(which numbers about 10,300 Sammarinese citizens plus 4,000 Italians 
from the country's total population of about 25,000 persons).
    Trade unions are independent of the government and the political 
parties, but they have close informal ties with the parties, which 
exercise strong influence on them.
    Workers in all nonmilitary occupations have the right to strike. No 
general strikes occurred in at least the last 9 years. However, during 
this period some brief sector-wide and company strikes took place.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law gives 
collective bargaining agreements the force of law and prohibits 
antiunion discrimination by employers. Effective mechanisms exist to 
resolve complaints. Negotiations are conducted freely, often in the 
presence of government officials (usually from the Labor and Industry 
Departments) by invitation from both the unions and the employers' 
association. For the last several years, all complaints have been 
resolved amicably by a ``conciliatory committee'' composed of labor 
union and business association representatives and government 
officials.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor, including by children, and the Government 
enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and 
the Government enforces this prohibition (see Section 6.c.). The 
minimum working age and compulsory education age ceiling is 16 years. 
The Ministry of Labor and Cooperation permits no exceptions. Most 
students continue in school until age 18.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Since January 1, the legal 
minimum wage has been approximately $1,200 (2.16 million lira) per 
month, which affords a decent living for a worker and family. Wages 
were generally higher than the minimum.
    The law sets the workweek at 36 hours in public administration and 
37\1/2\ hours in industry and private business, with 24 hours of rest 
per week for workers in either category.
    The law stipulates safety and health standards, and the judicial 
system monitors them. Most workplaces implement the standards 
effectively, but there are some exceptions, notably in the construction 
industry.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                           SERBIA-MONTENEGRO

    Serbia-Montenegro is dominated by Slobodan Milosevic, who continues 
to control the country through his role as President of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and more importantly, as President of the 
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)--a dual arrangement proscribed by the 
federal Constitution--and his domination of other formal and informal 
institutions. Although the SPS lacks majorities in both the Federal and 
Serbian Parliaments, it controls governing coalitions and holds the key 
administrative positions. Since federal authority is exercised 
effectively only over the Republic of Serbia, and even there, not in 
Kosovo, the human rights situations in Montenegro and Kosovo are dealt 
with in separate annexes following this report. The Milosevic regime 
effectively controls the judiciary and respects the country's legal 
framework only when it suits the regime's immediate political 
interests.
    Serbia abolished, in all but name, the political autonomy of Kosovo 
and Vojvodina in 1990; all significant decisionmaking since that time 
until 1999 had been centralized under the Milosevic regime in Belgrade. 
Starting in 1998, republic authorities in Montenegro clearly began to 
increase their efforts to assert their authority incrementally in 
Montenegro. Milosevic's control over Kosovo ceased in June 1999, when 
it came under the authority of the United Nations Interim 
Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Milosevic regime's 
oppressive policies toward Kosovo's ethnic Albanians quashed any 
prospect of interethnic cooperation and subsequently led to a full-
fledged separatist insurgency that erupted in early 1998. In response 
the regime undertook a brutal police and military crackdown against the 
separatist insurgents and civilian population in Kosovo. After talks in 
February and March 1999 in Rambouillet failed to resolve the matter 
diplomatically, Serbian forces continued a full-fledged campaign of 
ethnic cleansing against civilians and forced 850,000 Kosovar Albanians 
to flee the province, and hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians 
were internally displaced. NATO forces began an air campaign against 
the Serbian forces and regime on March 24. The NATO campaign succeeded, 
forcing Milosevic to withdraw his troops from Kosovo in early June and 
allowing refugees and displaced persons to return to Kosovo.
    The international community does not recognize the FRY--Serbia-
Montenegro--as the sole successor state to the former Yugoslavia. 
Accordingly, the ``FRY'' still is not permitted to take the Yugoslavia 
seat in the U.N. or to participate the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or other international organizations and 
financial organizations.
    As a key element of his hold on power, President Milosevic 
effectively controls the Serbian police, a heavily armed force of some 
100,000 officers that is responsible for internal security. Milosevic 
effectively has destroyed the constitutional role of the Supreme 
Defense Council, essentially establishing himself as commander-in-chief 
of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), which also was employed in the brutal 
campaign prosecuted against the citizens of Kosovo. Serbian police and 
military forces committed numerous serious and systematic human rights 
abuses, especially in Kosovo.
    Economic performance was anemic as a result of general inefficiency 
in the economy, corruption, and continued resistance to reform and 
privatization, the imposition of strengthened international sanctions 
in response to the situation in Kosovo, the country's increased pariah 
status following the conflict, its continued exclusion from 
international financial institutions, and the damage inflicted on 
infrastructure during the conflict with the international community. 
Unemployment and underemployment remained high, reaching at least 60 
percent, since the Government was unable or unwilling to introduce 
necessary restructuring measures. The Government failed to implement 
needed sweeping economic reforms, including privatization, which could 
help the economy but also could undermine the regime's crony system.
    The Government's poor human rights record worsened significantly, 
and there were serious problems in many areas. In practice citizens 
cannot exercise the right to change their government. Serbian police 
were responsible for numerous serious abuses, including extrajudicial 
killings, disappearances, torture, brutal beatings, rape, arbitrary 
arrest and detention in Kosovo. Impunity for those who commit human 
rights abuses remains a serious problem. The judicial system is not 
independent of the Government, suffers from corruption, and does not 
ensure fair trials. The authorities infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights. The Government severely restricted freedom of speech and of the 
press, and used overbearing police intimidation and economic pressure 
to control tightly the independent press and media. Most journalists 
practice self-censorship. The Government restricted freedom of assembly 
and association. While under the Constitution citizens have a right to 
stage peaceful demonstrations, in practice police seriously beat scores 
of democratic opposition protesters throughout the republic of Serbia, 
sending many to hospitals. The Government infringed on freedom of 
worship by minority religions and restricted freedom of movement. The 
Milosevic regime has used its continued domination of Parliament and 
the media to enact legislation to manipulate the electoral process. The 
most recent electoral manipulation by the regime was in the Serbian 
parliamentary and presidential elections in the fall of 1997. The 
Federal and Serbian Governments' record of cooperation with 
international human rights and monitoring organizations was poor. The 
Government routinely hindered the activities of human rights groups. 
The Federal Government remained uncooperative with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): it failed to meet 
its obligations under numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions to 
comply fully with the Tribunal's orders, failed to issue visas to allow 
ICTY investigators into Kosovo and the rest of Serbia, and failed to 
transfer or facilitate the surrender to the Tribunal of persons on 
Serbian territory indicted for war crimes or other crimes against 
humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Instead, the Milosevic 
regime openly harbored indicted war criminals--three of whom the 
Government openly acknowledged were present on Serbian territory--and 
publicly rejected the Tribunal's jurisdiction over events in Kosovo. In 
May Milosevic and four top lieutenants were indicted by the ICTY in 
connection with the regime's brutal campaign against the citizens of 
Kosovo. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious 
problems. Discrimination and violence against ethnic Albanians, 
Muslims, Roma, and other religious and ethnic minorities worsened 
during the year. Police repression continued to be directed against 
ethnic minorities and police committed the most widespread and worst 
abuses against Kosovo's 90 percent ethnic Albanian population. Police 
repression also was directed against Muslims in the Sandzak region and 
other citizens who protested against the Government. The regime limits 
unions not affiliated with the Government in their attempts to advance 
worker rights. There was some child labor and the country served as a 
transit point for trafficking in women and girls.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political violence, 
including thousands of killings by police, became a significant problem 
in the first 6 months of the year as a result of the conflict in Kosovo 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.g. in Kosovo annex). In addition instances of 
apparently politically motivated killings occurred in central Serbia. 
In April Slavko Curuvija, the publisher of the independent Belgrade-
based tabloid, Dnevni Telegraf and the news biweekly Evropljanin was 
murdered outside his apartment by unidentified assailants. On October 
3, a suspicious accident occurred involving a car transporting 
prominent Serbian opposition politician Vuk Draskovic. Draskovic's 
Serbian Renewal Movement claimed credibly that the incident was an 
attempt on his life by the regime. Although Draskovic sustained only 
minor injuries, Draskovic's brother-in-law Veselin Boskovic, director 
of the Belgrade Directorate for Construction, and three of Draskovic's 
bodyguards died in the crash.
    VJ troops in Montenegro committed extrajudicial killings (see 
Section 1.a. in Montenegro annex).
    According to an international human rights NGO, at least five 
persons died from abuse in prison during 1998 in Serbia. The number of 
deaths from prison abuse during the year was probably significantly 
higher.
    The Federal Government, in contravention of repeated U.N. Security 
Council resolutions, denied investigators from the ICTY access to any 
part of Kosovo during the first 6 months of the year and prevented them 
from undertaking a thorough and independent investigation into 
atrocities committed in Kosovo during 1998 and the first half of 1999, 
which fall under the Tribunal's jurisdiction (see Section 4).
    In November a Serb police car hit a land mine near the Serbian side 
of the border with Kosovo, resulting in three deaths and leaving six 
persons injured. In the border region near Kursumlija since June, there 
were 16 attacks attributed to Kosovo Liberation Army members (KLA) or 
ethnic Albanians, who killed 6 persons (including the 3 policemen) and 
wounded 7 others.
    b. Disappearance.--There were reports of thousands of 
disappearances of individuals from Kosovo during the first six months 
of the year (see Section 1.b. of Kosovo annex). Thousands of Kosovar 
Albanians reportedly were incarcerated in prisons in Central Serbia 
during and following the conflict in Kosovo. Federal and Serbian 
government authorities have not cooperated fully with efforts to 
account for the missing or allowed the International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) or other international organizations access to many 
detention facilities, but have released some prisoners in return for 
cash payments from relatives. However, the ICRC was allowed to visit 
more than 1,600 prisoners.
    VJ troops in Montenegro abducted Kosovar refugees (see Section 1.b. 
in Montenegro annex).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of 
punishment; however, Serbian security authorities regularly and 
systematically used torture, beatings in detention, and other forms of 
abuse against citizens, especially the ethnic Albanian population in 
Kosovo during the first 6 months of the year. Serb security forces 
engaged in rape of Albanian women in Kosovo (see Section 1.c. of Kosovo 
annex). Aside from the brutal conduct of security forces against the 
Albanian Kosovar community, the worst police brutality takes place 
during the 3 to 4 day period of incommunicado detention allowed by law. 
At least five men died in custody in 1998--all individuals who were in 
good health prior to their detention by Serbian police, according to 
international human rights groups. It is likely that the number of 
deaths in custody during the year was much higher. Evidence of torture 
in detention is widespread.
    In the first half of the year, in addition to and prior to the 
regime's brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing, ethnic Albanians 
continued to suffer at the hands of security forces conducting searches 
for weapons, ammunition, and explosives. The police, without following 
proper legal procedures, frequently extracted ``confessions'' during 
interrogations that routinely include the beating of suspects' feet, 
hands, genital areas, and sometimes heads. The police use their fists, 
nightsticks, and occasionally electric shocks. Apparently confident 
that there would be no reprisals, and in an attempt to intimidate the 
wider community, police often beat persons in front of their families. 
There has been virtually no prosecution of those responsible. According 
to various sources, while Kosovo remained under Serbian control, ethnic 
Albanians frequently were too terrified to ask police to follow proper 
legal procedures--such as having them provide written notice of witness 
interrogation. In some cases, Serbian police also used threats and 
violence against family members of suspects and held them as hostages 
(see Section 1.c. of Kosovo annex).
    On July 6, police beat and used tear gas on some 2,000 protesters 
who assembled at a police station in Leskovac to call for Milosevic's 
resignation and the release of a local television broadcaster, Ivan 
Novkovic. Novkovic was detained for broadcasting allegations of 
corruption against a regional official and for urging protests that 
occurred on July 6 and drew some 20,000 participants (see Section 
2.b.). According to media reports on July 8, Leskovac district governor 
Zivojin Stefanovic threatened a human rights activist with a gun, and 
police detained the activist's brother, who had organized the 
demonstrations (see Section 1.d.).
    On September 29, riot police in Belgrade used batons and water 
cannons to disperse some 30,000 demonstrators who were calling for 
greater democracy in the country. Dozens of demonstrators, and several 
journalists were injured. Reportedly cameramen for international news 
agencies were beaten and their cameras were destroyed. After 8 days of 
peaceful protests, police used force after demonstrators started 
marching toward the Dedinje district, where Milosevic's residence and 
office are located. According to the Interior Ministry, ``hooligans'' 
attacked police officers with bricks, stones, and sticks and injured 
five officers. Police subsequently arrested several members of the 
opposition Social Democratic Party in their Belgrade offices, along 
with other activists (see Section 2.b.).
    On September 30, Belgrade police again used force against 
antigovernment protesters. According to press reports, some 50,000 
persons demonstrated, and police beat protesters and injured some 30 
persons, including a 7-year-old girl, as they tried to disperse the 
crowd. According to an official government statement, ``hooligans'' 
attacked police officers with stones, bricks, and glass bottles, and 
police arrested some 21 persons.
    On October 13, police officers in Belgrade rushed into a crowd of 
demonstrators and beat three persons, including a photographer for a 
foreign news agency. According to press reports, police officers beat a 
few other persons when a small scuffle broke out.
    On October 14, riot police beat some 10 protestors in Nis, who had 
gathered along a street in Nis along which buses full of SPS supporters 
were to pass. The SPS supporters came to Nis to listen to Serbian 
President Milutinovic, who was reopening a bridge that was damaged by 
NATO air strikes. Reportedly one protestor was taken away in an 
ambulance.
    On October 13, some 30 young men attacked antigovernment protestors 
in Belgrade and injured at least 5 of them. Some 100 protesters had 
gathered in front of a Belgrade hotel, when a few cars stopped, and 
young men jumped out of the cars and started beating and kicking the 
protesters.
    On October 17, a leader of the opposition Democratic Party in 
Valjevo reported that a bomb exploded on the balcony of his home and 
damaged the entrance to the house.
    Prior to the conflict with NATO, prison conditions met minimum 
international standards. Nevertheless, according to human rights 
monitors based in Belgrade, prison conditions are deteriorating, in 
part due to declining state resources. There were few confirmed reports 
of the abuse of prisoners once they were sentenced and serving time. 
The vast majority of cases of torture occur before detainees are 
charged with offenses or during the period between the filing of 
charges and the commencement of the trial.
    Although the Government generally had permitted prison visits by 
human rights monitors with sporadic access often subject to the whim of 
local officials, access was poor for much of the year, although it 
improved slightly after the conflict. On several occasions, outside 
monitors, including representatives of the ICRC, were denied access to 
individuals reportedly held by Serbian police, especially draft evaders 
and Kosovar Albanians--perhaps several thousand--whom retreating 
security forces transferred from Kosovo after hostilities ceased. 
However, the ICRC had no access to or information about persons 
detained in military detention facilities at year's end. The Government 
acknowledged that it held as many as 1,900 Kosovar Albanians in Serbian 
jails, most of whom were transferred there from Kosovo in early June 
before NATO's arrival in the province. The 1,900 ethnic Albanians, some 
200 of whom were released by year's end, were being held in 13 
facilities, and all of them were visited by the ICRC at least once 
during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police use of arbitrary 
arrest and detention was concentrated primarily in Kosovo and, to a 
lesser degree, in Sandzak. Serbian police often apply certain laws only 
against ethnic minorities and used force with relative impunity. 
Sandzak Muslims as well as Kosovo Albanians were subjected to trumped 
up or exaggerated charges, ranging from unlawful possession of firearms 
to willfully undermining the country's territorial integrity (see 
Section 1.d. of Kosovo annex).
    Laws regarding conspiracy, threats to the integrity of the 
Government, and state secrets are so vague as to allow easy abuse by 
the regime. Two Australian aid workers for Care International and a 
local employee were charged with spying in April. Following their 
convictions and after serving part of their sentences, the Australians 
were released in the fall and the local employee was released in 
December. The case was widely regarded as an attempt by the Government 
to coerce the Government of Australia to withdraw its support for the 
NATO bombing campaign.
    Federal statutes permit the police to detain criminal suspects 
without a warrant and hold them incommunicado for up to 3 days without 
charging them or granting them access to an attorney. Serbian law 
separately provides for a 24-hour detention period. The police often 
combine the two for a total 4-day detention period. After this period, 
police must turn over a suspect to an investigative judge, who may 
order a 30-day extension and, under certain legal procedures, 
subsequent extensions of investigative detention up to 6 months.
    Defense lawyers and human rights workers complained of excessive 
delays by Serbian authorities in filing formal charges and opening 
investigations. The ability of defense attorneys to challenge the legal 
basis of their clients' detention often was hampered further by 
difficulties in gaining access to detainees or acquiring copies of 
official indictments and decisions to remand defendants into custody. 
In some cases, judges prevented defense attorneys from reading the 
court file. Investigative judges in Serbia often delegated their 
responsibility for carrying out investigations to the police or members 
of the state security service and rarely questioned their accounts of 
the investigation--even when it was obvious that confessions were 
coerced from the accused. Results of such sham investigations then were 
used in court to convict defendants on trumped up charges.
    Dozens of foreign journalists who were reporting on the beginning 
of NATO airstrikes in March were detained by authorities, had their 
operations shut down, and were deported (see Section 2.a.).
    In July local television broadcaster Ivan Novkovic was detained in 
Leskovac for broadcasting allegations of corruption involving a 
district official and encouraging citizen protests which occurred on 
July 6 and drew some 20,000 participants (see Section 2.b.). Pavic 
Obradovic, the brother of Social Democracy leader Vuk Obradovic, was 
detained briefly in connection with the protest.
    On July 1 police in Novi Sad arrested four members of the 
opposition League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina. The four were 
distributing leaflets calling on residents to participate in a 
demonstration in Uzice on July 2.
    On July 1, the Office of the Military Prosecutor issued a warrant 
for the arrest of Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic for not 
responding to the draft call during the Kosovo conflict. Djindjic 
instead went into hiding in Montenegro. In early July Djindjic returned 
to Belgrade, and in August military prosecutors dropped the draft 
evasion charges against him. Also in July, a military court in Uzice 
sentenced Goran Vesic, a Democratic Party activist and Belgrade city 
councilman, to 2 years in prison for evading the draft and for high 
treason. Vesic denied that he had received a draft notice.
    On July 8, following several days of protests against the 
government in Leskovac, police detained one of the protest's organizers 
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). On July 15, a Leskovac court continued 
proceedings against nine participants in an antigovernment protest. The 
nine were charged with allegedly damaging the home of a pro-Milosevic 
official during a recent demonstration.
    After police used force against antigovernment protesters in 
Belgrade on September 29, police detained several members of the Social 
Democratic Party, including Pavic Obradovic, as well as other 
opposition activist (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    In December police arrested Teki Bokoshi, an ethnic Albanian 
defense attorney, who is defending many Kosovar Albanians detained in 
Serbian prisons. Bokoshi was arrested as he was traveling back to 
Belgrade after visiting clients in Sremska Mitrovica.
    VJ troops in Montenegro detained Kosovar refugees and journalists 
(see Section 1.d. in Montenegro annex).
    An estimated 1,900 to as many as 7,000 prisoners from Kosovo still 
are detained in prisons in Serbia. Following the conflict, the ICRC, 
the only international organization with access to Serbian prisons, was 
able to secure the release of 166 Kosovar Albanian prisoners on June 27 
and 54 prisoners on October 4.
    Exile is not permitted legally, and no instances of its use are 
known to have occurred. However, the authorities attempted to 
ethnically cleanse Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian population in the mass 
expulsion of citizens during the spring campaign, during which 
authorities confiscated the identity documents of citizens who fled the 
province to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and 
Albania. Also, the practical effect of police repression in Kosovo and 
Sandzak has been to accentuate political instability, which in turn has 
limited economic opportunity. As a result, many ethnic Albanians and 
Bosniak Muslims went abroad to escape persecution even before the 
outbreak of hostilities. In only a few cases could direct links to 
police actions be identified.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice, Federal and Serbian courts 
largely are controlled by the Government and rarely challenge the will 
of the state security apparatus. Judicial corruption is also 
widespread. While judges are elected for fixed terms, they may be 
subjected to governmental pressure. Serbian authorities frequently deny 
fair public trial to non-Serbs and persons whom they believe oppose the 
regime. The fraud that followed the November 1996 municipal elections 
was perpetrated mainly through the regime's misuse of the judicial 
system.
    The court system comprises local, district, and supreme courts at 
the republic level, as well as a Federal Court and Federal 
Constitutional Court to which republic supreme court decisions, 
depending on the subject, may be appealed. There is also a military 
court system. According to the Federal Constitution, the Federal 
Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and 
regulations and relies on the constituent republic authorities to 
enforce its rulings.
    The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia remains in force. Considerable confusion and room for 
abuse remain in the legal system because the 1990 Constitution of 
Serbia has not yet been brought into conformity with the 1992 
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under federal law, 
defendants have the right to be present at their trial and to have an 
attorney represent them, at public expense if needed. The courts also 
must provide interpreters. The presiding judge decides what is read 
into the record of the proceedings. Either the defendant or the 
prosecutor has the right to appeal the verdict.
    Although generally respected in form, defense lawyers, especially 
those representing minority clients, have filed numerous complaints 
about flagrant breaches of standard procedure, which they believed 
undermined their clients' rights. Even when individual judges admitted 
that the lawyers were correct, the courts ignored or dismissed the 
complaints.
    The Government continues to pursue cases previously brought against 
targeted minority groups under the Yugoslav Criminal Code for 
jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the country and for 
conspiring or forming a group with intent to commit subversive 
activities--that is, undermining the ``constitutional order.'' Most of 
the cases involved alleged violations under the Federal Penal Code's 
Article 136 related to ``association to conduct enemy activity, or 
Article 125 concerning ``terrorism.'' There is no clear estimate as to 
how many persons remain imprisoned on these charges (see Section 1.d.). 
Among the most prominent is the case of Dr. Flora Brovina of Pristina, 
who was transferred from Kosovo to Nis in early July, tried and 
convicted on such charges, and in December sentenced to 12 years of 
incarceration.
    Generally, the evidence in such cases was inadequate, and the 
defendants largely were denied timely access to their attorneys. In 
Kosovo in the first 6 months of the year, Serb judges in the municipal 
and district court system reportedly lacked impartiality in trying 
ethnic Albanian defendants and much evidence appeared to have been 
obtained by authorities through forced confessions of defendants under 
duress (see Section 1.e. of Kosovo annex).
    Many legal scholars have expressed concern over the Act on Lawyers, 
passed in July 1998, which they believe restricted the freedoms of 
lawyers and interfered with the independence of lawyers in their 
dealings with clients. They believed that the law gives too much 
authority to the lawyers' chambers--both at the republic and federal 
levels--which the Helsinki Committee alleges would enable the regime to 
exercise stricter control over the profession. According to a Serbian 
Constitutional Court judge, the law also enabled the regime to 
interfere with the lawyer-client relationship, which, even during the 
Communist era, was upheld to a greater degree.
    Ukshin Hoti, leader of UNIKOMB, a political party that advocates 
Kosovo's unification with Albania, was in detention for the entire 
year. Hoti was in a Nis jail and was reportedly in poor health. His 
lawyers have been denied access to him since February 1998. Hoti was 
serving a 4-year sentence in a prison in Nis and was to be released on 
May 17. However, the Pristina-based Council for Human Rights was unable 
to locate Hoti as of July.
    Since 1998 republic-level judges no longer have mandates for life 
and are required to seek office periodically through election. This 
process involves obtaining Justice Ministry approval for each judge's 
candidacy. Local observers fear that the provision in effect makes 
judges functionaries of the regime, easily removed if they do not 
cooperate.
    The Government continues to hold some ethnic Albanians as political 
prisoners, with estimates ranging from 1,900 to 7,000.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. 
Federal law gives republic ministries of the interior sole control over 
the decision to monitor potential criminal activities, a power that 
routinely is abused. It is widely believed that authorities monitor 
opposition and dissident activity, eavesdrop on conversations, read 
mail, and wiretap telephones. Access to international e-mail has been 
granted exclusively to one server, a company controlled by an associate 
of President Milosevic's. Although illegal under provisions of federal 
and Serbian law, the federal post office registers all mail from 
abroad, ostensibly to protect mail carriers from charges of theft.
    Although the law includes restrictions on searches, officials often 
ignored them. In Kosovo, prior to the establishment of U.N. authority 
over the province, and in Sandzak, Serbian police systematically 
subjected ethnic Albanians and Muslims to random searches of their 
homes, vehicles, shops, and offices. Police explained their actions by 
asserting that they were searching for weapons. The police carried out 
scores of such raids on homes, including in areas not affected by the 
fighting. Police used threats and violence against family members of 
suspects (see Section 1.c.).
    Serbian security forces systematically destroyed entire villages in 
Kosovo by burning and shelling houses, contaminating water wells, and 
killing livestock (see Section 1.g. of Kosovo annex).
    A government law requiring universal military service is enforced 
only sporadically; it was not enforced vigorously during the year. The 
informal practice of the military has been not to call up ethnic 
Albanians. However, in Montenegro VJ troops forcibly conscripted youths 
(see Section 1.f. of Montenegro annex). Of approximately 100,000 draft 
evaders living abroad at the start of the year to avoid punishment, 40 
percent were estimated to be ethnic Albanian. This number in part 
reflects the large number of conscription-age men in the FRY's Albanian 
community. Leaders of Kosovo's Albanian and Sandzak's Muslim 
communities maintained that when forced compliance of these groups with 
universal military service did occur, it was an attempt to induce young 
men to flee the country. According to an amnesty bill passed in 1996, 
up to 12,000 young men for whom criminal prosecution for draft evasion 
already had started were granted amnesty. Others who did not fall into 
this category were told that if they returned to the FRY their cases 
would be reviewed on a ``case-by-case'' basis, a policy that has not 
inspired confidence among offenders. A law passed in October 1998 
stated that draft dodgers who did not report for military service would 
forfeit their right to inheritance. In many cases FRY officials have 
refused to issue proper travel documents to children born to asylum 
seekers (see Section 2.d.).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--The conflict in Kosovo placed civilian populations 
on both sides of the ethnic divide in an unusually vulnerable position. 
The excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian police forces 
and the Yugoslav Army resulted in widespread civilian casualties, and 
the mass forced displacement of up to 1.3 million persons (see Section 
1.g. in Kosovo annex).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--Federal law provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Serbian and Federal 
Governments severely restricted this right in practice. During the 
year, the Milosevic regime continued its unprecedented repression of 
these freedoms that it began in 1998.
    The regime cracked down on the independent media. On April 11, 
Slavko Curuvija, the publisher of Dnevi Telegraf, was shot and killed 
by unidentified gunmen outside his apartment building (see Section 
1.a.). He had been harassed numerous times by Serbian authorities 
during the preceding months; his newspaper had been fined in March, and 
he had been sentenced to 5 months in jail for refusing to pay the fine, 
although he was still waiting for the results of his appeal at the time 
of his murder. Several days before his murder, a commentary that was 
broadcast on state television attacked Curuvija and accused him of 
supporting NATO's bombing of Serbia. The newspaper was closed down 
following Curuvija's death.
    The federal and Serbian authorities' efforts at intimidation also 
spread to Montenegro, where Miodrag Perovic, head of the independent 
weekly Monitor and Antenna M Radio, went into hiding in April to avoid 
capture by the VJ. Radio Free Montenegro head Nebojsa Redzic also went 
into hiding in May. The army had issued warrants for both men's 
arrests.
    On September 29, police in Belgrade beat and injured several 
journalists who were reporting on antigovernment protests. Cameramen 
for international news agencies were beaten and their cameras were 
destroyed. Dozens of foreign journalists who were reporting on the 
beginning of NATO airstrikes in March were detained by authorities, had 
their operations shut down, and were deported.
    In July police in Cacak confiscated a tape recording made by a 
correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The journalist was 
covering opposition activities in the town.
    The Serbian Government issued a decree in October 1998 that 
effectively allowed press censorship. The decree reflected a 
recognition of the threat to the regime of the free flow of information 
and ideas on issues related to the situation in Kosovo and the 
possibility--at that time--of a conflict with NATO. In October 1998, it 
later passed a new information law, which incorporated many of the 
decree's strict provisions and left the country's independent media 
severely constrained. Under the law, private citizens or organizations 
can bring suit against media outlets for printing materials not 
sufficiently patriotic, or ``against the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, and independence of the country.'' Media outlets also can 
be fined for publishing items of a personal nature without the consent 
of the individual concerned (an apparent reference to political 
cartoons). The rebroadcast of foreign news programs, including from the 
British Broadcasting Corporation and the Voice of America, was banned. 
Media outlets whose practices do not conform to the new law may be 
subjected to exorbitant fines, which must be paid within a 24-hour 
period. For example, Radio Pancevo was fined the dinar equivalent of 
nearly $40,000 for ``use of state owned frequencies'' in July. The 
station was known for its factual, if cautious, reporting on the war in 
Kosovo. In March authorities fined the newspapers Glas Javnosti, Danas, 
and Blic a total of some $45,000 (Din 770,000) for publishing a 
statement by the Belgrade city ``shadow government'' which accused the 
city's cultural secretary of responsibility for a decline in the city's 
cultural institutions. On September 11, a court fined Cacanski Glas 
$13,500 (Din 350,000) on criminal charges for an article which reported 
the charges made by opposition leader Vuk Draskovic against a local 
financial official. The official concerned earlier won some $22,600 in 
damages in a civil suit against Cacanski Glas.
    In June, the FRY Parliament passed an amendment to the Law on the 
Yugoslav Army that granted the Minister of Defense ``broad powers'' 
over information and telecommunications for ``the needs of defense.'' 
The amendment relaxed somewhat the level of control over the media, but 
nevertheless envisioned the Government's ability to sanction media that 
do not serve ``the needs of reconstruction.'' During the ``State of 
War,'' the Serbian Information Ministry and a special military Office 
for Information and Morale sought to control editorial content and 
commentary by providing the media with regular guidance that included 
``approved adjectives'' and terms for use in the printed media. Special 
censors were deployed to printing houses to ensure compliance with 
guidance.
    In January authorities took control of the only regular economic 
publication in Serbia, Ekonomska Politika, by installing a government-
approved editor and announcing that it would be a part of the Borba 
publishing house. To protest the takeover, 11 of the 15 staff members 
of the magazine left and launched a new economic weekly.
    Television and radio stations, including the independent city radio 
in Nis and STV Negotin, remained shut down during the year, as a result 
of the regime's manipulation of confusing regulations governing 
frequency allocations. Radio Contact in Pristina was shut down through 
June while Kosovo was still under Serbian government administration. 
The deliberate vagueness of the relevant laws often is utilized to 
penalize independent electronic media outlets. Radio and television 
stations are harassed bureaucratically according to their political 
orientations. Instead of obtaining long-term licenses to broadcast, 
stations receive only 1-year temporary licenses, if they receive a 
license at all. The bureaucratic procedures are so difficult that 
stations frequently cannot fulfill all of the requirements--leaving 
them at the mercy of the regime. For example, under current law, to 
obtain a license to broadcast, a station must obtain the approval of a 
government ``construction inspector'' for its office space. However, to 
obtain a construction inspector's approval, a station needs a broadcast 
license. In June VK Radio in Kikinda was closed down twice in 3 days. 
Serbian police gave a number of implausible explanations for the 
closures.
    In addition to license issuance problems, those stations that do 
obtain licenses are forced to pay exorbitantly high fees, the 
nonpayment of which is enforced selectively by Serbian authorities to 
close down those stations that do not adhere to the Government's line. 
In January in the city of Cacak, which is controlled by an opposition 
mayor and city council, TV Cacak was shut down, even though the station 
operators claimed that they had paid for all licenses and fees. There 
is speculation that authorities closed the station because it was 
rebroadcasting satellite programming from Montenegro, which was funded 
by European Union (EU) countries. However, an attempt to confiscate the 
station's equipment was thwarted by an angry group of Cacak residents. 
The station resumed operations in the fall.
    Although there were some independent television and radio stations 
operating throughout the country, their broadcasts typically could not 
be received beyond the major cities. The only network covering the 
entire country is the Serbian State Television and Radio Network RTS. 
An estimated one-third of the population of Serbia only receives RTS, 
the official voice of President Milosevic. When the NATO campaign 
started in March, the Milosevic regime took additional steps to close 
down any remaining independent stations that refused to fall in line 
with progovernment programming. B92, the main source of independent 
news in Belgrade since its founding in 1989, was shut down in late 
March. Police detained B92 editor in chief Veran Matic for questioning 
and confiscated some of the station's broadcasting equipment. It went 
back on the air on April 13, but under new, pro-Milosevic management. 
As a result, the entire staff walked out and worked in subsequent 
months to establish a new radio station. The new station (renamed B292 
since the government-backed B92 still was operating) now broadcasts out 
of Studio B, which is run by the opposition party controlled city 
government of Belgrade. Prior to the start of the NATO bombing campaign 
in March, the general manager of Soko TV in Soko Banja was sentenced to 
12 months in jail for displaying a B92 logo on the station's door. Novi 
Sad Radio 021 was shut down in April.
    According to independent media sources, most journalists practice 
self-censorship in an effort to avoid a violation under the media law. 
Journalists had been informed that printing anything that was not 
true--even an advertisement or a death announcement--could be punished 
under the information law. One independent newspaper reported in 1998 
that it was publishing half as many articles as usual out of fear of 
punishment. The weekly Zrenjanin decided not to report public 
statements after it was sued in 1998 for publishing false statements 
made at a press conference, since such comments cannot be verified 
easily.
    In January Dejan Anastasijevic, a well-respected journalist for the 
independent weekly Vreme, was brought into a preliminary hearing in a 
criminal court. His crime was allegedly ``misinforming'' the public in 
a March 1998 article about the Likosane Massacre in Kosovo.
    In July a court issued orders for two journalists for Dnevi 
Telegraf to report to jail to begin their 5-month sentences for a 
December 1998 article they wrote which linked a Serbian deputy prime 
minister to a murder. The two originally had been sentenced in March.
    Throughout the year, Serbian police systematically intimidated 
printing houses to prevent them from printing independent newspapers. 
According to the editor of the independent newspaper Glas Javnosti, 
authorities shut down the newspaper in the fall after it printed a 
pamphlet entitled, ``Changes,'' which was distributed at antigovernment 
protests in Belgrade which began on September 21. The newspaper was 
published again on October 4, after a 2-day ban by authorities. 
However, the authorities' harassment of the independent newspaper 
continued with an investigation by the state financial police. The 
Ministry of Information also sued publisher Slavoljub Kacarevic of ABC 
Grafika (which publishes Glas Javnosti) for printing the pamphlet 
without the Ministry's permission.
    VJ troops in Montenegro sought to restrict press freedom (see 
Section 2.a. in Montenegro annex).
    Montenegrin newspaper publishers not friendly to the Belgrade 
regime frequently had their newspapers removed from trains and buses 
entering Serbia (see Section 2.d.).
    In May 1998, the Serbian Parliament passed the new Universities 
Law. It severely curtails academic freedom by allowing the Government 
to appoint rectors and governing boards and hire and fire deans of 
faculties. Deans in turn can hire and fire professors--in effect taking 
away tenure and promoting regime loyalists inside the universities. The 
law also discourages political activism among students, who were a 
mainstay of the antigovernment protests of 1996-97. According to the 
Belgrade Center for Human Rights, some 22 professors were fired and 30 
were suspended after the law went into effect for refusing to sign new 
contracts. In January unknown persons sent threatening letters and made 
death threats to six student activists and one professor at Belgrade 
University. The students took part in a series of student protests that 
took place in 1996 and evidently prompted the crackdown by the 
Government. In July the Serbian Ministry of Education began prohibiting 
students from Montenegro from enrolling at Belgrade University, where 
they traditionally have gone for higher education. Instead, the 
university began to give preference for admission to Serb soldiers 
returning from Kosovo and their families.
    On November 9, police used forced to disperse an antigovernment 
demonstration organized by the student opposition movement Otpor in 
Belgrade and injured some 50 demonstrators.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Federal and 
republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association; however, the Serbian and Federal Governments restrict 
this right. The Government imposed a state of war on the republic at 
the start of the conflict in March and lifted it on June 26. However, 
an edict prohibiting gatherings and demonstrations remained in force 
and was applied stringently by the security forces.
    Serb refugees from Kosovo demonstrated in Belgrade on June 21. 
Authorities sentenced two leaders of the demonstration to 30 days in 
jail. Authorities detained four opposition activists in Novi Sad on 
July 2 for handing out leaflets advertising an antigovernment rally. 
The activists were part of the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina, 
who were planning a demonstration as part of a series of anti-Milosevic 
rallies that week. Police in Uzice banned an antigovernment 
demonstration on July 6 and used force to prevent the erection of a 
sound system. However, demonstrators overwhelmed the police and 
succeeded in setting up speakers. On July 6, police beat and used tear 
gas on some 2,000 protesters who had assembled at a police station in 
Leskovac to call for Milosevic's resignation and the release of a local 
television broadcaster, Ivan Novkovic. Novkovic was detained and 
sentenced to 30 days' imprisonment for broadcasting allegations of 
corruption against a local official and inciting rebellion in 
connection with his urging citizen protests that resulted a July 6 
rally with some 20,000 participants. Police in Cacak banned an 
opposition demonstration that was planned for July 29 and claimed that 
the organizers did not provide the proper paperwork; the organizers 
went ahead with the demonstration anyway.
    After the conflict in Kosovo ended, democratic opposition groups 
became more vocal and organized a series of demonstrations in major 
cities throughout Serbia. Fueled by discontent over Serbia's defeat in 
the Kosovo conflict, the Alliance for Change, a coalition of democratic 
opposition parties, organized rallies demanding elections and 
Milosevic's resignation. The first major rally was held on August 19 in 
Belgrade, with 100,000 participants. In September additional rallies 
were held, which continued for weeks. Security forces were deployed to 
numerous locations and reportedly used force to disperse the crowds and 
block the demonstrators' advance, especially during the September 29, 
September 30, and October 13 demonstrations (see Section 1.c.). There 
were also reports of police openly beating correspondents attempting to 
cover the demonstrations. Police arrested 21 protestors on September 
30. Police in Nis also beat antigovernment protesters on October 14. 
Police also blocked the path of protestors in Belgrade on October 4 and 
October 6. The Federal and republic level Constitutions provide for 
freedom of association; however, the Serbian and Federal Governments 
restricted this right. Prior to the most recent Serbian elections, in 
the fall of 1997, officials blocked the Coalition Sandzak leader, Dr. 
Rasim Ljajic, from forming an alliance with the Kosovo-based Democratic 
Reform Party of Muslims, a move that protected regime candidates from 
additional competition.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law in both the FRY and Serbia 
provides for freedom of religion; however, in practice both the 
Government and the legal system provide very little protection for the 
religious rights of minority groups.
    There is no state religion, but the Milosevic regime gives 
preferential treatment, including access to state-run television for 
major religious events, to the Serbian Orthodox Church to which the 
majority of Serbs belong. The regime subjected religious communities in 
Kosovo to harassment (see Section 2.c. in Kosovo annex).
    Tensions between the Church elders and the Milosevic regime 
intensified during the year, as religious leaders such as Bishop 
Artemije repeatedly opposed Serbian government policies and called for 
reconciliation with ethnic Albanians. In early June, the Holy Synod of 
Bishops called for the resignation of President Milosevic and his 
Government, while at the same time asking for the protection of Serb 
citizens and holy sites in Kosovo. In late June, Patriarch Pavle 
criticized the Government and its actions even further, saying that its 
policies were criminal.
    A new piece of republic legislation to regulate the actions of 
religious communities is reported to be under consideration, but it has 
not yet been published. The Minister of Religious Affairs Milovan 
Radovanic was quoted as saying, ``through its agencies the State needs 
to prevent the activity of destructive and totalitarian religious 
sects, diverse psycho-organizations, commercial cults, and other 
organizations with asocial influence on the society and family.'' 
Observers believe that this law could provide the pretext of legitimacy 
for the regime to impose even harsher restrictions on the practice of 
other religions besides the Serbian Orthodox Church.
    Police repression continued to be directed against ethnic and 
religious minorities, and police committed the most widespread and 
worst abuses against Kosovo's 90 percent ethnic Albanian population. 
Police repression also was directed against Muslims in the Sandzak 
region. Refugees reported that mosques and religious sites were 
attacked or destroyed by Serbian forces in at least 21 villages and 
towns in Kosovo in the spring. Religious sites also served as shelter 
for ethnic Albanians during the conflict. On March 28, 200 ethnic 
Albanians who had sought sanctuary in the Albanian Catholic Church of 
Pec were removed and forced by MUP forces to leave town (see Section 
2.c. in Kosovo annex).
    The Serbian Government made no progress in the restitution of 
property that belonged to the Jewish community, despite President 
Milosevic's promises to resolve the disputes. The Orthodox and Catholic 
Churches have had similar difficulties with the restitution of their 
property.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement; however, the Federal and Serbian Governments restrict this 
right in practice. The FRY Government makes passports available to most 
citizens; however, the authorities have barred FRY citizens from 
reentering the country. The Milosevic regime continued to restrict the 
right of Kosovar Albanians in the first 6 months of the year, and of 
Sandzak Muslims, to travel by holding up the issuance or renewal of 
passports for an unusually long period of time. It also reserves the 
option of prosecuting individuals charged previously with violating 
exit visa requirements (see Section 2.d. in Kosovo annex).
    Citizens reported difficulties at borders and the occasional 
confiscation of their passports. Ethnic Albanians, Sandzak Muslims, and 
Vojvodina Croats frequently complained of harassment at border 
crossings. Sandzak Muslims were detained routinely on their arrival at 
local airports. There were reports in March that authorities prevented 
several buses of Sandzak Muslims seeking refuge in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina from leaving the country. Sandzak Muslims who crossed the 
border with Bosnia and Herzegovina by car reported that they had to pay 
approximately $165 (DM 300) to border guards in order to be permitted 
to leave the country. Starting in March police at bus stations and 
borders prevented men between the ages of 16 and 50 from leaving the 
country since they were subject to military service. There were 
numerous reports that border guards confiscated foreign currency or 
passports from travelers, as well as occasional complaints of physical 
mistreatment. The authorities generally allowed political opposition 
leaders to leave the country and return. FRY embassies overseas 
generally are considered to apply a double standard in issuing 
passports to their citizens; ethnic Serbs have a much easier time 
obtaining passports than members of ethnic minorities.
    VJ troops in Montenegro restricted freedom of movement (see Section 
2.d. in Montenegro annex).
    Many inhabitants of Serbia-Montenegro who were born in other parts 
of the former Yugoslavia, as well as large numbers of refugees, have 
not been able to establish their citizenship in the FRY, leaving them 
in a stateless limbo.
    The FRY Government has been very slow to issue passports to 
refugees. This is a particular problem for asylum-seeking parents. For 
example, German authorities issue such children born in Germany a 
document certifying their birth. FRY officials in Germany refuse to 
issue passports to such children. When these asylum seekers who have 
been refused in Germany return to the FRY with their children, the 
children travel on the basis of this document. FRY authorities take the 
paper at the port of entry and issue a receipt for it. Then the 
children have no documentation in a country where documentation is a 
basic requirement. In January 1997, a new citizenship law entered into 
force, which, when fully implemented, is expected to affect adversely 
the rights of many inhabitants, including those born in other parts of 
the former Yugoslavia, refugees, and citizens who migrated to other 
countries to work or seek asylum.
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia noted in 1997 
that the new law would give the Ministry of Interior almost complete 
control over the granting of citizenship. The Government served notice 
that it plans to limit severely the granting of citizenship to refugees 
from the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. The Government also plans to 
revise the eligibility status of a large number of persons; refugees 
who have been granted citizenship since 1992 may stand to lose their 
FRY citizenship if they have acquired the citizenship of a former 
Yugoslav republic.
    Observers in the Sandzak region also noted that Muslim residents 
who were forced to flee to Bosnia from Sandzak in 1992 and 1993 may not 
be permitted to return to Serbia, particularly if they obtained Bosnian 
passports in the interim. In violation of the Dayton Accords, Muslims 
from Sandzak frequently have been harassed on attempting to reenter 
Serbia after visits to Sarajevo or elsewhere in the Federation entity 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
    As part of its campaign to undermine the reform government in 
Montenegro, the Milosevic regime also implemented a commercial blockade 
against the FRY's junior republic, a direct violation of the FRY 
Constitution's protection of the free flow of goods. Businesses 
frequently had their goods confiscated without cause by Serbian police. 
Newspaper publishers not friendly to the regime frequently had their 
papers removed from trains and buses entering Serbia (see Section 
2.a.).
    The FRY Government cooperated to a large extent with the Office of 
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assisting 
(predominantly Serb) refugees who fled to the FRY from neighboring 
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
    The Government generally cooperates with the UNHCR. There were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Federal and Serbian Constitutions provide for this right; however, 
in practice citizens in Serbia are prevented from exercising it by the 
Milosevic regime's domination of the mass media and manipulation of the 
electoral process. Through its control of the purse strings of the 
Serbian republic, the regime sought to undermine the effectiveness of 
the opposition leadership of most major cities.
    The most recent Serbian elections, held in the fall of 1997, were 
flawed seriously. According to a 1998 study by the Belgrade-based 
Center for Free Elections and Democracy, both rounds of the Serbian 
presidential elections in September and December 1997 involved 
widespread fraud. In the latter campaign, the Center estimated that 
500,000 votes were stolen to give the victory for the Serbian 
presidency to Milosevic ally Milan Milutinovic. Several disaffected SRS 
members charged in the fall of 1998 that the Milosevic regime had 
extracted mandates from the Radical Party of Serbia in exchange for 
giving the Radical Party a role in the Government.
    Earlier, in July 1997, the regime gerrymandered electoral districts 
to smooth the way for candidates in the ruling coalition, expanding the 
number of districts in Serbia from 9 to 29. Most opposition politicians 
charged that changes in the election law, including the redrawing of 
districts, were designed specifically to favor the ruling party. The 
redistricting was one factor that compelled a number of opposition 
parties to boycott the last Serbian elections.
    A key figure in the fraud that followed the November 1996 municipal 
elections, which was perpetrated mainly through the regime's misuse of 
the judicial system, was the president of the First Belgrade Municipal 
Court Dragoljub Jankovic, who currently is serving as the Serbian 
Justice Minister. Despite the Montenegrin Government's legal rights 
under the FRY Constitution, federal authorities under Milosevic's 
control by year's end had not recognized the 20 Montenegrin members 
delegated to the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly by the 
Montenegrin Parliament. The Montenegrins in the federal body, including 
the speaker of the upper house, were not changed to reflect the results 
of Montenegrin elections. Moreover, in violation of past practice, in 
which Montenegrin republic authorities had played a major role in 
identifying the federal prime minister, in 1998 Milosevic installed 
Momir Bulatovic as Federal Prime Minister and ignored the Montenegrin 
Government's wish to have some voice in who was picked for this key 
position in the Federal power structure.
    No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government 
and politics, and women are active in political organizations; however, 
they are underrepresented greatly in party and government offices, 
holding less than 10 percent of ministerial-level positions in the 
Serbian and Federal Governments. An exception is the controversial Mira 
Markovic, wife of Federal President Milosevic. She is the leading force 
in the neo-Communist Yugoslav Left Party (JUL), through which she 
exerts extraordinary and disproportionate influence on policy makers.
    No legal restrictions affect the role of minorities in government 
and politics, but they are underrepresented, and ethnic Serbs and 
Montenegrins dominate the country's political leadership. Few members 
of other ethnic groups play any role at the top levels of government or 
the state-run economy. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo refused to take part 
in the electoral process at the Serbian republic and federal level, 
including most recently in Serbian elections in 1997. They have 
virtually no representation in the Serbian republic and FRY government 
structures.
    Ethnic Albanians' refusal to participate in FRY and Serbian 
elections had the practical effect of increasing the political 
influence of President Milosevic and his supporters.
    Ultranationalist parties, including Milosevic's coalition partner 
the Radical Party of Serbia, also took advantage of the ethnic Albanian 
boycott to garner representation beyond their numbers.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government formally maintains that it has no objection to 
international organizations conducting human rights investigations on 
its territory. However, the Serbian regime routinely hindered the 
activities of and regularly rejected the findings of human rights 
groups. With some exceptions, the Milosevic Government's Federal 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs systematically denied visas to 
international nongovernmental human rights organizations.
    A number of independent human rights organizations operate in the 
country, researching and gathering information on abuses, and 
publicizing such cases. The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center and 
Center for Antiwar Action researches human rights abuses throughout the 
country and, on occasion, elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The 
Belgrade-based Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia publishes 
studies on human rights issues and cooperates with the Pristina-based 
Helsinki Committee in monitoring human rights abuses in Kosovo. In 
Kosovo the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) 
collects and collates data on human rights abuses and publishes 
newsletters. A number of reliable international human rights monitors 
reported that one worker of the CDHRF was missing at year's end, and 
that all the organization's workers were harassed routinely and 
severely, and were distrusted by Serbian authorities during the first 6 
months of the year (see Section 4 in Kosovo annex). In the Sandzak 
region, two committees monitor abuses against the local Muslim 
population and produce comprehensive reports. Most of these 
organizations offer advice and help to victims of abuse.
    Local human rights monitors (Serbs as well as members of ethnic 
minorities) and NGO's worked under difficult circumstances.
    Prior to the commencement of hostilities, a number of independent 
human rights organizations operated in the FRY, including in Kosovo, 
researching and gathering information on abuses, and publicizing such 
cases. The Pristina-based Helsinki Committee was active in monitoring 
human rights abuses in Kosovo and cooperated with similar organizations 
based in Belgrade.
    NGO's reported blockages to the delivery of humanitarian 
commodities to and throughout Kosovo prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities with the international community in March. The Mother 
Teresa Society, a local humanitarian aid NGO, reported consistent 
harassment and detention of its staff while Serbian authorities 
administered the province.
    ICRC officials complained in 1998 of difficulties in securing 
access to detainees. However, by year's end ICRC officials reported 
that access to detainees improved and the organization was able to 
facilitate the return to Kosovo of some 200 ethnic Albanian prisoners 
who had been removed from Kosovo after hostilities ceased (see Section 
1.d.).
    During Serbian government administration of Kosovo, several NGO's 
and international organizations reported that they were experiencing 
unacceptable delays of up to a month or more in obtaining Serbian 
government approval of visas for international humanitarian aid workers 
for Kosovo.
    In October 1998, the Government agreed to the establishment of the 
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). By the start of the year, the 
KVM had expanded to several hundred international verifiers, including 
human rights personnel, who verified civilian aspects of implementation 
of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1199. However, when the 
situation in Kosovo further deteriorated in early spring, the KVM 
pulled its verifiers out of the province on March 19. Subsequently, as 
many as 20 former OSCE KVM local employees were arrested by Pristina 
police at the start of the conflict (see Section 4 in Kosovo annex).
    As a signatory of the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro is obliged to cooperate fully 
with the ICTY by turning over to the Tribunal the persons on its 
territory, who were indicted for war crimes or other crimes against 
humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Nevertheless, the 
Milosevic regime repeatedly has ignored the ICTY's orders to transfer 
indicted war criminals known to be living in Serbia, in open defiance 
of the U.N. Security Council, which created the Tribunal. Not only is 
Milosevic himself an indicted war criminal as a result of events in 
Kosovo, but in the 6 years since the Tribunal was established, the 
Milosevic regime has yet to transfer one Serbian or Bosnian Serb under 
indictment to the Hague. Some of those indicted live openly in Serbia, 
and others travel freely in and out of Serbia. It is widely believed 
that Ratko Mladic, indicted by the Tribunal in 1995 for his command and 
responsible role in crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the 
Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws and customs of war 
committed during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, continues to 
travel in and out of the country.
    In addition to the continued violation of its obligations under 
repeated U.N. Security Council resolutions and its commitments under 
the Dayton Accords, the Milosevic regime's brutal crackdown in Kosovo 
prompted calls for the ICTY to conduct investigations into alleged 
atrocities committed there. The ICTY's jurisdiction is delineated 
clearly under UNSCR 827 of 1993 and many subsequent resolutions. 
Nevertheless, the Government also has rejected publicly the Tribunal's 
mandate in Kosovo and obstructed all efforts by the ICTY to investigate 
allegations of crimes in Kosovo. The Milosevic regime remained 
uncooperative, claiming that the violence in Kosovo does not constitute 
an ``armed conflict.''
    The Milosevic Government's Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
denied entry visas to investigators from the ICTY who wished to conduct 
impartial investigations into allegations of atrocities committed by 
Serbian forces and Albanian paramilitary groups in Kosovo.
    As a result of their actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, on 
May 26 the ICTY formally indicted as war criminals President Milosevic 
and four other senior officials, including Serbian President Milan 
Milutinovic, FRY Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Chief of Staff 
of the Yugoslav Army Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serbian Minister of 
Internal Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    While federal and republic-level laws provide for equal rights for 
all citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or social 
status, and prohibit discrimination against women, in reality the legal 
system provides little protection to such groups.
    Women.--The traditionally high level of domestic violence 
persisted. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family 
violence have inadequate resources and are limited in their activity by 
social pressure to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of 
spousal abuse ever file complaints with the authorities. The Center for 
Autonomous Women's Rights in Belgrade offers a rape and spousal abuse 
hot line, as well as sponsors a number of self-help groups. The Center 
also offered help to refugee women (mostly Serb), many of whom 
experienced extreme abuse or rape during the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia. Similar initiatives exist in Kosovo.
    The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for 
trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Women do not enjoy status equal to men, and relatively few women 
obtain upper level management positions in commerce. Traditional 
patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women should be 
subservient to the male members of their family, have long subjected 
women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly among 
minority communities, women are little more than serfs without the 
ability to exercise their right to control property and children. 
However, women legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work and are 
granted maternity leave for 1 year, with an additional 6 months 
available. Women are active in political and human rights 
organizations. Women's rights groups continue to operate with little or 
no official acknowledgment.
    Children.--The State attempts to meet the health and educational 
needs of children. The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory 
schooling. Economic distress has spilled over into both the educational 
system and the health care system, adversely affecting children.
    Prior to the conflict in Kosovo, the division of Kosovo into 
unofficial parallel Serb and Albanian administrative systems resulted 
in Serb and ethnic Albanian elementary age children being taught in 
separate areas of divided schools, or attending classes in shifts. 
Older ethnic Albanian children were attending school in private homes. 
The quality of education thus was uneven before the conflict started, 
and the tension and division of society in general was replicated to 
the detriment of the children.
    In late 1998, international observers reported multiple incidents 
of police being stationed near schools in Kosovo. Albanian villagers 
had claimed that they were intimidated by the police presence and that 
consequently children would not return to those schools. Such incidents 
continued until hostilities escalated in March, effectively disrupting 
the parallel educational system. Ethnic minorities in some cases fear 
Serb state-run medical facilities, which results in a low rate of 
immunization and a reluctance to seek timely medical attention (see 
Section 5 of Kosovo annex).
    The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for 
trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.).
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People With Disabilities.--Facilities for persons with disabilities 
are inadequate, but the Government made some effort to address the 
problem. The law prohibits discrimination against persons with 
disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. The law mandates access to new official buildings, and 
the Government enforces these provisions in practice.
    Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are so closely 
intertwined as to be inseparable. Serious discrimination against, and 
harassment of, religious minorities continued, especially in Kosovo and 
Serbian Sandzak (see Section 5 of Kosovo annex). There were several 
reported incidents of violence against the Catholic minority in 
Vojvodina, largely made up of ethnic Hungarians and a smaller Croat 
community.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and 
Muslims in central Serbia continued to be driven from their homes, 
often forcibly, or fired from their jobs on the basis of religion or 
ethnicity. Other ethnic minorities, including ethnic Hungarians in 
Vojvodina, also allege discrimination. Vojvodina Croats reported no 
progress during the year on their demand for separate curriculums in 
the schools or programs in the media in the Croatian language. However, 
an hour was set aside for programs in Croatian on the local radio 
station, Radio Subotica. Vojvodina Hungarians reported that the 
Government was eroding the principle of minority language education 
during the year, by banning foreign books and moving Hungarian schools 
far from the Hungarian population.
    The Romani population generally is tolerated, and there is no 
official discrimination. Roma have the right to vote, and there are two 
small Romani parties in Serbia. However, prejudice against Roma is 
widespread. Local authorities often ignore or condone societal 
intimidation of the Romani community. Skinheads and police occasionally 
violently attacked Roma (see Section 1.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and 
police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Unions 
are either official (government affiliated) or independent. The total 
labor force is approximately 2.3 million. The government-controlled 
Alliance of Independent Labor Unions (Samostalni Sindikati) claims 1.8 
million members but probably numbers closer to 1 million in reality. 
The largest independent union is the United Branch Independent Labor 
Unions (Nezavisnost), which has about 170,000 members. Most other 
independent unions are sector specific, for example, the Independent 
Union of Bank Employees (12,000 members). Due to the poor state of the 
economy, over one-half of union workers are on long-term mandatory 
leave from their firms pending increases in production. The independent 
unions, while active in recruiting new members, have not yet reached 
the size needed to enable countrywide strikes. The independent unions 
also claim that the Government prevents effective recruiting through a 
number of tactics, which include preventing the busing of workers to 
strikes, threatening the job security of members, and failing to grant 
visas to foreign visitors who support independent unions. Some foreign 
union organizers managed to secure visas during the year after long 
delays.
    The largely splintered approach of the independent unions left them 
little to show in terms of increased wages or improved working 
conditions. The Nezavisnost union gained new members as a result of its 
well-organized and tough bargaining positions during strikes of 
teachers and health workers in 1998 but did not lead any strikes in 
1999 and focused instead on political action campaigns aimed at raising 
workers' political awareness. The official union lost credibility with 
some of its members because it ultimately accommodated the Government's 
position on these strikes.
    The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains 
constrained.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While this 
right is provided for under law, collective bargaining remains at a 
rudimentary level of development. Individual unions tend to be very 
narrow and pragmatic in their aims, unable to join with unions in other 
sectors to bargain for common purposes. The history of trade unionism 
in the country has centered not on bargaining for the collective needs 
of all workers but rather for the specific needs of a given group of 
workers. Thus, coal workers, teachers, health workers, and electric 
power industry employees have been ineffective in finding common 
denominators (e.g., job security protection, minimum safety standards, 
universal workers' benefits, etc.) on which to negotiate. The overall 
result is a highly fragmented labor structure composed of workers who 
relate to the needs of their individual union but rarely to those of 
other workers. Additionally, job security fears, which stem from the 
high rate of unemployment, limited workers' militancy.
    The Government still is seeking to develop free trade zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor, 
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and 
generally is not known to occur; however, the country served as a 
source, transit, and destination point for trafficking in women and 
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years, although in 
villages and farming communities it is not unusual to find younger 
children at work assisting their families. Moreover, children can be 
found in a variety of unofficial ``retail'' jobs, typically washing car 
windows or selling small items such as cigarettes, although this 
practice apparently is somewhat less widespread, since adults lacking 
other options for employment have taken many of these jobs. With an 
actual unemployment rate (registered unemployed plus redundant workers 
who show up at the workplace but perform only minimal work) in excess 
of 60 percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal 
sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is 
prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur, apart from girls 
trafficked through, from, and to the country for the purpose of forced 
prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Large government enterprises, 
including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies 
generally observe minimum wage standards. The monthly minimum wage is 
approximately $15 (Din 250 to 500). However, this figure is roughly 
comparable to unemployment benefits and (at least theoretically) is 
paid to workers who have been placed in a mandatory leave status. The 
actual minimum wage is at the low end of the range of average net 
salaries, $50 (Din 700 to 1,200). The minimum wage is insufficient to 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The cost 
of food and utilities alone for a family of four is estimated to be 
$120 (Din 2,150) per month. Private enterprises use the minimum wage as 
a guide but tend to pay somewhat higher average wages.
    Reports of sweatshops operating in the country are rare, although 
some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor 
conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little 
meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
    Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the 
enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations, 
focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In light of the 
competition for employment, and the high degree of government control 
over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work 
situations without risking the loss of their employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is little information available 
on trafficking, although Serbia is a source, transit, and destination 
country for women and girls trafficked to other parts of Europe for 
forced prostitution. There are laws that could be used to prosecute 
traffickers, although apparently there is little government interest in 
addressing the problem. Belgrade was becoming a transit point, and to a 
lesser extent, a destination point for trafficking in women and girls. 
Reportedly women from Russia and Ukraine are trafficked to the country. 
There were also reports that women were trafficked through the country 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they either stayed and were forced to work 
as prostitutes or were trafficked on to other countries.

                                 KOSOVO

    Serbia abolished the political autonomy of Kosovo in 1990, and all 
significant decisionmaking since that time until June was centralized 
under Milosevic in Belgrade. Kosovo, came under the authority of the 
United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in June 
following the NATO campaign in Kosovo, which began on March 24. U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 1244 upheld FRY sovereignty over Kosovo, 
but it also called for ``substantial autonomy and meaningful self-
administration for Kosovo.'' Although the peace settlement respects FRY 
territorial integrity, the Milosevic regime had no authority in the 
province after June 10. Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the Special 
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, became the chief 
administrator of UNMIK. Within UNMIK, the OSCE was given the 
responsibility for institution-building, democracy-building, and human 
rights. At year's end, there were also two other local ethnic Albanian 
established shadow governments operating in Kosovo, neither of which 
were recognized by the U.N. The leader of the ``provisional 
government'' and former political head of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
was Hashim Thaqi; Dr. Ibrahim Rugova headed the Democratic League of 
Kosovo (LDK) and was named the ``President'' of the self-proclaimed 
``Republic of Kosova'' after shadow elections in 1991. The LDK also 
dominated the unofficial parliament. Plans for UNMIK-sponsored 
elections were being developed at year's end. The laws of the FRY and 
the republic of Serbia initially were in effect, but because the local 
population did not recognize the legitimacy of the laws, UNMIK 
temporarily adopted the 1989 code. UNMIK was working with local judges 
to develop a new legal code. UNMIK created and operates an independent 
judiciary, which is experiencing delays due to difficulties finding 
proper staff and establishing facilities.
    Until June police and military forces under Milosevic maintained 
internal security. Beginning in mid-June, troops from all 19 NATO 
countries plus 16 non-NATO countries that make up the Kosovo Force 
(KFOR), the peacekeeping force in charge of maintaining internal 
security and defense against external threats in the province. The 
45,000-member force also assists UNMIK's multinational civilian police 
corps in its role as uniformed and criminal police. By year's end, 
approximately 1,900 of the 4,718 UNMIK police officers authorized for 
the task were serving in the province. Half of KFOR's available 
manpower is committed to protecting the public, including protecting 
ethnic minorities, and some KFOR troops are devoted primarily to border 
monitoring activities. Public safety is also a key task for KFOR. On 
September 6, the Kosovo Police Academy, run by the OSCE, began training 
a class of local police officers in Vucitrn. On September 19, KFOR 
helped to establish the Kosovo Protection Corps, a multiethnic civil 
emergency service agency that includes a significant number of former 
KLA members. The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the 
security forces.
    The economy was in poor condition even before the NATO airstrikes, 
because of mismanagement by federal and Serbian authorities, which had 
seized control of all major economic assets. Armed conflict in the 
province in the first 6 months of the year resulted in massive 
destruction of property, including economic enterprises. According to 
various sources, unemployment among the predominately ethnic Albanian 
population was estimated at between 40 and 75 percent, and much higher 
among the Serb and Romani minorities. The instability of the region, 
coupled with the destruction of property records and a weak legal and 
regulatory framework, created an uncertain investment climate, which 
has deterred investors from injecting much needed capital into the 
province. International organizations are establishing programs to 
improve the infrastructure and to make the weak economy more viable. 
The economy before the conflict had a substantial agrarian sector, 
which continues to support a large percentage of the population. Key 
industries before the conflict were mining, metallurgy, and related 
manufacturing enterprises. Agricultural production and food processing 
are also important. Leading exports were energy, refined metals, and 
agricultural products. Remittances from relatives abroad and foreign 
aid are important sources of national income. A gray economy, which is 
widely believed to be involved in illicit activities, also was 
significant. While no gross domestic product estimates are available, 
the population has a low standard of living.
    In the first 6 months of the year, the Serbian Government's 
extremely poor human rights record in the province worsened 
significantly, and there were serious problems in many areas. In 
practice citizens could not exercise the right to change their 
government. Serbian police were responsible for numerous serious 
abuses, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture, 
brutal beatings, rape, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Impunity for 
those who committed human rights abuses remained a serious problem. The 
judicial system was not independent of the Government, suffered from 
corruption, and did not ensure fair trials. The authorities infringed 
on citizens' privacy rights. The Government severely restricted freedom 
of speech and of the press, and used overbearing police intimidation 
and economic pressure to control tightly the independent press and 
media. Most journalists practiced self-censorship. The Government 
infringed on freedom of worship by minority religions and restricted 
freedom of movement. The Milosevic regime used its continued domination 
of Parliament and the media to enact legislation to manipulate the 
electoral process. Ethnic Albanians chose not to participate in 
government institutions, and in practice authorities excluded them from 
participating in government institutions. The Federal and Serbian 
Governments' record of cooperation with international human rights and 
monitoring organizations was poor. The Government routinely hindered 
the activities of human rights groups. The Federal Government remained 
uncooperative with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Violence and discrimination against women remained 
serious problems. Discrimination and violence against ethnic Albanians, 
Muslims, and religious and ethnic minorities worsened during the first 
6 months of the year. Police repression continued to be directed 
against ethnic minorities, and police committed the most widespread and 
worst abuses against Kosovo's 90 percent ethnic Albanian population. 
The regime limited unions not affiliated with the Government in their 
attempts to advance worker rights. There was some child labor and the 
province served as a transit point for trafficking in women and girls.
    In the last half of the year, UNMIK adhered to international human 
rights standards in its operations; however, some problems remained due 
to lingering interethnic tension. Lengthy pretrial detention was a 
problem, as were long delays in trials due to difficulties finding 
proper staff and establishing facilities. The judiciary was subject to 
outside influence. Violence and discrimination against women remained 
serious problems. Societal violence and discrimination against ethnic 
Serbs and Roma worsened significantly during the last 6 months of the 
year. Over 300 civilians were killed and over 1,000 cases of arson 
reported, beginning in June. Societal discrimination also targeted 
Roma, in retaliation for the group's alleged collusion with Serbs in 
the period before and during the war. An estimated 100,000 Serbs and 
Roma left the province, fleeing for elsewhere in Serbia or to other 
countries. Trafficking in women and girls was a serious problem.
    There were reports that former and active KLA members committed 
abuses even after the withdrawal of the VJ in June, including killings, 
disappearances, torture, rape, and arbitrary detention.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political violence, 
including killings by police, was a common occurrence during the first 
6 months of the year as a result of the conflict in Kosovo (see Section 
1.g.). Serbian forces killed up to 10,000 mostly male ethnic Albanians, 
often in brutal fashion. Reports by international observers of the 
atrocities committed by Serbian forces prompted an international 
response in the form of NATO airstrikes beginning on March 24. 
According to a report released by the OSCE in December, the Serbian 
security forces' massive assault on the Kosovo Albanian population was 
of such a scale as to ``appear directed by strategy not breakdown in 
command and control.''
    On January 15, Ministry of Interior police officers killed 45 
ethnic Albanian civilians in Racak. According to the OSCE KVM, the 
killings occurred in such a way that they could not be attributed to 
Serbian security forces' efforts to bring KLA insurgents under control. 
Neither the federal nor the Serbian authorities brought charges against 
the Ministry of Interior (MUP) police officers involved in the 
massacres, and Serbian officials claimed that the ethnic Albanians had 
``died in combat.''
    Starting in mid-January, the OSCE KVM reported regular cases of 
killings of ethnic Albanians taking place, mostly in the rural areas of 
the province until mid-March, when Serbian forces reportedly 
intensified their campaign to include more densely populated areas like 
Pristina and Mitrovica. Refugees provided accounts of summary 
executions and mass graves at about 500 sites throughout the province. 
According to the OSCE, the majority of killings that occurred after 
NATO airstrikes began in March were carried out by a mixture of VJ 
troops, police officers, and paramilitaries, sometimes in cooperation 
with armed Serb civilians. Reports indicate that a common practice 
employed by Serb forces was to order unarmed ethnic Albanian men to run 
away and then to shoot them; in this way, the murders could be 
portrayed as collateral casualties of military operations. Survivors 
reported that Serbian forces burned bodies exhumed from mass graves in 
an apparent attempt to destroy forensic evidence of war crimes (see 
Section 1.b.).
    There were numerous deaths in custody in the first 6 months of the 
year. For example, on March 8 a Serbian traffic policeman stopped the 
car of a 20-year-old ethnic Albanian man in Pristina, forcibly removed 
the young man from his car, and took him to Police Station Number 92. 
Serbian police officers informed the young man's relatives that he 
would be released in a few hours; however the man's father who was 
waiting at the police station learned the next day that his son's body 
had been found with 33 bullet wounds in Kosovo Polje. An eyewitness 
reported seeing the young man's car with numerous bullet holes parked 
near Police Station Number 92.
    In addition to random executions, Serbian authorities appear to 
have targeted Kosovar intellectuals, professionals, and leaders. In 
January Enver Maloku, the head of the LDK's Kosovo Information Center, 
was shot outside his home by three unknown assailants who immediately 
fled the scene. In May Fehmi Agani, who was a lead negotiator for the 
ethnic Albanian delegation at Rambouillet, was taken into custody by 
Serbian police. Although there are conflicting reports as to the 
precise circumstances of his death, it generally is agreed that he was 
killed by Serb security forces. The state-run Tanjug news agency blamed 
the death on KLA extremists, claiming that they wanted to prevent 
additional negotiations between the regime and the Kosovar Albanians. 
Few in the international community believe this version, and many have 
called for an international investigation into the murder.
    Virtually no town or settlement escaped the effects of Milosevic's 
campaign of ethnic cleansing, with reports of dozens, if not hundreds 
of civilians being murdered in each town.
    Serbian forces killed as many as 500 ethnic Albanians in Bela Crkva 
by March 28. This included some 46 unarmed ethnic Albanians, 8 men over 
the age of 60, and a 13-year-old boy, who were killed by Serbian forces 
on March 25. On that date, Serbian forces started shelling the village, 
separated the men from the women and children fleeing the village, 
forced the men to strip and walk into a river, where they were shot in 
the back. Some 16 men survived by hiding in the cold river for several 
hours amidst the corpses. On March 28, Serbian forces forced ethnic 
Albanians in Kosovo Polje into their homes and then threw hand grenades 
inside; civilians also were burned alive in their homes. In Djakovica 
Kosovar Albanians were warned to leave by March 29. Of those remaining, 
over 300 ethnic Albanians were executed. Some 270 Kosovar Albanians in 
Izbica were killed beginning in mid-March, with their bodies, which 
reportedly bore signs of torture, then burned. In late March, in the 
adjacent villages of Velika Krusa and Mala Krusa, 150 to 160 ethnic 
Albanian men who had gathered near a mosque after being removed from 
their homes and separated from their families, were shot and then 
burned, in an apparent attempt to conceal evidence. On March 30, the 
village of Orlate was set on fire after Serb forces executed 200 of the 
ethnic Albanian men there. In Pusto Selo Serbian forces executed 106 
men on March 31. On April 17, Serbian forces attacked the village of 
Staro Cikatovo and killed 23 ethnic Albanian men from the Morina 
family; another 4 men were missing and presumed dead. Witnesses claimed 
that Serbian forces also killed dozens of ethnic Albanian detainees at 
the mine in Staro Cikatovo. Also on April 17, a single Serb police 
officer or paramilitary member forced at least 47 persons from the 
ethnic Albanian Muqolli family into one room and shot them. The exact 
number who died is unknown, although at least 23 children under the age 
of 15 were killed. On April 27, Serbian forces separated at least 100 
ethnic Albanian men between the ages of 16 and 60 from a refugee convoy 
passing through Meja and killed them. In early May, refugees arriving 
from Studime described their relatives being killed, with their eyes 
gouged out and their noses cut off.
    On February 21, the president of the Mother Teresa Society branch 
in General Jankovic and his son were killed in front of their house by 
unknown assailants.
    The FRY, in contravention of repeated U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, denied investigators from the ICTY access to any part of 
Kosovo in the first 6 months of the year, preventing them from 
undertaking a thorough and independent investigation into these and 
other atrocities under the Tribunal's jurisdiction that were committed 
in the province in 1998-99 (see Section 4).
    An unknown number of persons died from abuse in prison during the 
first 6 months of the year (see Section 1.c.).
    There were reports of many extrajudicial killings by members of the 
KLA, including of so-called ethnic Albanian ``collaborators'' and Serb 
civilians.
    KROR and UNMIK detained some individuals suspected of war crimes in 
Kosovo. At year's end, UNMIK was considering setting up a special 
tribunal in the province with international judges to try certain war 
crimes.
    Following the VJ withdrawal in June, UNMIK estimates that an 
average of 20 to 30 murders took place each week, down from a high of 
114 murders per week in early June. By late November, according to 
UNMIK, relatively few murders took place each week. In the 6-week 
period of June 12 through July 26, NATO reported that 198 murders took 
place. By mid-November, 379 persons had been murdered since NATO's 
arrival, including 135 Serbs and 145 ethnic Albanians. Many of the 
murders were ethnically motivated, both by Albanians killing Serbs, and 
Serbs killing Albanians; however, there were also many criminally and 
other non-ethnically motivated murders. Unconfirmed reports described 
uniformed KLA members, as well as non-uniformed individuals claiming to 
be acting in the name of the KLA, carrying out these killings.
    On June 19, three ethnic Serb men in Belo Polje, near Pec, were 
shot point blank in the head. Witnesses reported that 10 uniformed KLA 
members entered the village in the early evening and executed the 3 
men. One other Serb was injured and taken to a hospital. Ethnic 
Albanian villagers claimed that the men had belonged to a paramilitary 
Serb gang responsible for burning ethnic Albanian homes in the village. 
However, Serb residents denied the charges.
    In another high profile instance of continuing ethnic violence 
after the U.N. assumed responsibility for administering Kosovo, 14 
Serbs were found murdered on July 23 in a field near their village of 
Malo Gracko, in the Lipljan municipality. They had been shot at close 
range. KFOR detained four suspects the following week.
    On June 24, KFOR found the bodies of three Serbs in the economics 
department at Pristina University. A professor, guard, and cafeteria 
manager all had been beaten badly.
    There were reports on June 25 of the deaths of several elderly 
Serbs in their homes.
    On June 29, unknown persons killed four Serb civilians near 
Rahovec.
    On July 27, one man and one woman were killed in Zitinje when their 
car was hit by gunfire.
    On September 25, ethnic Albanians attacked a trailer carrying 12 
Serbs near Kamenica, which left 1 person dead and 4 persons injured.
    On September 28, two grenades exploded in a Serb market area in 
Bresje. Three elderly Serbs were killed instantly, while 46 others 
suffered minor or critical injuries. KFOR arrested two ethnic Albanians 
suspected of the crime. The incident resulted in both Serbs and ethnic 
Albanians staging demonstrations and roadblocks, which impeded 
transportation lines until KFOR disbanded the groups. (See Section 
2.b.)
    On October 11, Valentin Krumov, a Bulgarian national assigned to 
UNMIK was beaten and shot in the head in a pedestrian area by angry 
ethnic Albanians. Krumov, accompanied by two fellow U.N. staff members, 
was followed by a group of five or six teenaged Albanians, before he 
was asked for the time. When Krumov responded in Serbian, the group 
proceeded to beat and kick him. Finally a shot was fired at Krumov's 
head, killing him instantly. The U.N. investigated the incident but had 
not made any arrests by year's end.
    On October 16, one man was killed and one woman was wounded in a 
drive-by shooting in Pristina, while under the protection of UNMIK 
police. Witnesses reported seeing two unidentified gunmen in a vehicle 
not bearing license plates fire the shots. The woman was hospitalized 
in critical condition with a bullet lodged in her back. Both victims 
were Serbs.
    On November 29 during ethnic Albanian celebrations of the Albanian 
National Day in Pristina, a crowd blocked the car of three Serb 
civilians, set it on fire, and beat the Serbs as they escaped from the 
vehicle while hundreds of bystanders watched. Someone in the crowd shot 
and killed the 62-year-old Serb man. His 78-year-old mother-in-law was 
in a coma, had all of her ribs on her left side broken, and her lung 
and spleen ruptured; his 50-year-old wife suffered a broken arm, 
dislocated shoulder, five broken ribs, punctured lungs, and a 
concussion. UNMIK had one person in custody in connection with this 
attack at year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were unconfirmed reports of hundreds of 
disappearances before the start of NATO airstrikes in March. During the 
airstrikes, that number rose into the thousands, as military-aged 
ethnic Albanian men were separated from women and children and taken to 
unknown destinations. Serb forces kidnaped and raped numerous women 
(see Section 1.c.).
    Following the NATO campaign in Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR gained access 
to the province and began a systematic process of locating, 
identifying, and exhuming the hundreds of mass graves thought to exist 
there. The ICTY, which has received reports of some 11,000 killed, had 
identified a total of 529 sites by October and exhumed a total of 2,108 
bodies at one-third of the mass grave sites, including one on the 
outskirts of Pristina, containing up to 200 bodies, one containing 150 
bodies in Drenica in April, and one found in early July in Nogavac, 
with 130 corpses in it. Other mass gravesites were found recently 
emptied of their contents. Witnesses reported that some villagers were 
forced to dig up remains from mass graves and then rebury them in 
individual graves, while other corpses were burned, in order to destroy 
evidence of mass executions. Moving bodies from mass graves to 
individual graves has impeded the location of execution sites and 
hampered the ability of forensic investigators to discriminate between 
``regular'' graves and graves containing massacre victims. In April 
Serbian forces killed ethnic Albanian civilians in a field near Izbica. 
After the killings, local ethnic Albanians buried the victims in 
individual graves. In early June, Serbian forces during their retreat 
from the province destroyed the graves of their victims. According to 
ethnic Albanian reports, Serbian forces in Lipljan, probably in early 
May, exhumed the bodies of ethnic Albanians who had been killed on 
April 18. After moving the bodies to a building in the village, Serbian 
forces reportedly ordered the surviving family members to rebury them 
in individual graves. Serbian forces exhumed the bodies of at least 50 
ethnic Albanians in Glogovac and transported the bodies to the nearby 
village of Cikatovo on May 15, according to refugee reports. The bodies 
then were reburied in individual graves. Ethnic Albanians reported in 
mid-June that Serbian police excavated bodies from a mass grave in 
Kacanik and moved them to a local cemetery. Residents indicated that 
the bodies might be those persons who were killed by Serbian police in 
early April.
    UNMIK authorities developed a systematic method of identifying, 
exhuming, and cataloging the hundreds of mass gravesites discovered in 
the province after the war. These graves contain thousands of bodies of 
ethnic Albanian civilians who were reported missing and presumed dead 
in 1998 and the first half of the year. Serbian security forces were 
responsible for those disappearances.
    A number of reliable international human rights monitors reported 
that one worker of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and 
Freedoms was missing at year's end (see Section 4).
    Dozens of persons were reported missing in the weeks following the 
war. It is likely that many were victims of retaliatory acts committed 
by ethnic Albanians. The Serbian Orthodox Church reported that 30 Serbs 
disappeared from the Pec area since mid-June, and one Serbian Orthodox 
priest was abducted by the KLA. On June 29, 19 Serbs were reported 
missing from the Serb part of Orahovac.
    The fate of hundreds of Serbs and Montenegrins reported missing and 
presumed to have been abducted by the KLA or other ethnic Albanian 
insurgent fighters was still unknown at year's end. Several Serbs 
reported cases of family members--mostly civilians--taken hostage by 
separatist fighters and not heard from again, including many reportedly 
taken after fighting between police and insurgent forces in the first 6 
months of the year. Many of those missing are believed to have been 
killed.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of 
punishment; however, Serbian security forces regularly and 
systematically used torture, beatings in detention, and other forms of 
abuse against the ethnic Albanian population in the first 6 months of 
the year. In that period, the VJ, MUP, and paramilitary groups combined 
to carry out a pattern of abuse that involved intimidation, harassment, 
assault, pillage, and shellings. Ethnic Albanians were told to leave 
their villages under threat of death, often loaded onto buses or trains 
with their travel papers confiscated, and sent to the border, where a 
new round of assault, rape, and robbery would take place. Serb security 
forces raped ethnic Albanian women and girls. There were police 
roundups of ethnic Albanians charged by Serbian authorities with 
supporting terrorism. Within the criminal justice system, the worst 
police brutality took place during the 3- to 4-day period of 
incommunicado detention allowed by law. At least five Albanian males 
died in custody during 1998 and the number of deaths in custody during 
the first 6 months of the year is believed to be significantly higher. 
Evidence of torture in detention is widespread.
    Refugee accounts describe incidents of torture that included 
maiming, mutilation of the dead, electric shock, throat cutting, eye 
gouging, beating on the genitals, cutting off of the breasts, nose, 
fingers, hands, and feet, and carving Serbian nationalist symbols onto 
parts of the body. The refugees also told of the dead being mutilated.
    The U.N. Population Fund reports that a large number of ethnic 
Albanian women were subjected to illegal confinement, rape, and other 
forms of torture in the first 6 months of the year. Organized and 
individual rape of ethnic Albanian women by Serbian forces was 
widespread in the first half of the year. Kidnapings and mass rapes 
occurred in Djakovica, Pec, and Drenica, where soldiers rounded up 
groups of 5 to 30 women in trucks and took them to unknown places. In 
Pec the Hotel Karagac was used as a mass rape site, while in Djakovica, 
an army camp was used. Numerous ethnic Albanians claim that during 
raids by Serbian forces on their villages, young women were gang raped 
in homes and on the sides of roads. There were also reports of Serbian 
forces removing young women and girls from refugee convoys and raping 
them. Women were raped by soldiers for periods of time ranging from 
hours to days, with victims bearing lacerations on their chests, arms, 
and legs. There were reports of Serbian forces raping ethnic Albanian 
women and girls in front of family members, and ethnic Albanian men who 
interfered or women who tried to escape were killed.
    During one incident of a mass rape in Berlenitz, while some women 
and girls were being raped, other pregnant women had their stomachs cut 
open with knives, with the fetuses then being skewered by the soldiers' 
knives. Young boys present had their throats slit after their ears and 
noses were cut off.
    Police assaulted, intimidated, harassed, and extorted money from 
ethnic Albanians during the first 6 months of the year (see Section 
2.d.).
    Ethnic Albanians continued to suffer at the hands of security 
forces conducting searches for weapons, ammunition, and explosives 
early in the year. The police, without following proper legal 
procedures, frequently extracted ``confessions'' during interrogations 
that routinely included the beating of suspects' feet, hands, genital 
areas, or heads. The police used their fists, nightsticks, and 
occasionally electric shocks. Apparently confident that there would be 
no reprisals, and in an attempt to intimidate the wider community, 
police often beat persons in front of their families. There was 
virtually no prosecution by Serbian authorities of those responsible, 
despite a public commitment from the President of the Government of 
Serbia in 1998 to do so and despite repeated demands from the 
international community calling on the Milosevic regime to cooperate in 
the investigation and prosecution of those responsible. According to 
various sources, ethnic Albanians were frequently too terrified to ask 
police to follow proper legal procedures--such as having them provide 
written notice of witness interrogation. In some cases, Serbian police 
also used threats and violence against family members of suspects and 
held them as hostages. Local human rights monitors reported that 
Serbian police threatened and intimidated doctors working in the 
province to prevent them from treating KLA members. According to ethnic 
Albanian and foreign observers, the worst abuses against ethnic 
Albanians took place not in big towns but in rural enclaves--a pattern 
which, according to many observers, increased separatist sentiment and 
provided the basis for the strong support for the KLA in these areas.
    NGO's reported police searches of NGO vehicles. Harassment, 
detention, and violence against aid workers also were reported during 
the first 6 months of the year. A number of reliable international 
human rights monitors reported that all of the Council for the Defense 
of Human Rights and Freedoms workers were harassed routinely and 
severely by Serbian authorities in the first 6 months of the year (see 
Section 4).
    In a country where many of the adult males are armed, the Serbian 
Government and police, especially prior to the outbreak of hostilities 
with NATO in late March, continued to enforce selectively the laws 
regulating the possession and registration of firearms so as to harass 
and intimidate ethnic minorities, particularly ethnic Albanians. The 
most frequent justification given for searches of homes and arrests was 
the illegal possession of weapons. Observers allege that in Kosovo the 
police used the pretext of searching for weapons when in fact they also 
were searching for hard currency. During the period of Serbian 
administration of Kosovo, it was reported that local police authorities 
more easily approved the registration of legal weapons for Serbs in the 
province and frequently deliberately ignored Serbs' possession of 
illegal weapons. In fact, the Serbian police in some cases reportedly 
actively promoted the arming of local Serb civilians.
    In Cirez 20,000 ethnic Albanians reportedly were used as human 
shields against NATO bombings. In Klina 500 civilians were used as 
shields in fighting against KLA forces on March 28. In early April, as 
many as 700 men were used as human shields in Orahovac, where they were 
forced to stand in front of tanks with their hands tied behind their 
backs.
    The Yugoslav Constitution expressly prohibits torture or inhuman 
treatment by the Government, and UNMIK sought to enforce this provision 
during the latter half of the year; however, after the introduction of 
U.N. authority in the province in June, there continued to be frequent 
reports of civilians attacking and abusing members of another 
ethnicity.
    According to Human Rights Watch, after the withdrawal of Serbian 
forces, KLA members tortured ethnic Serbs, ethnic Albanians suspected 
of collaborating with the Serb authorities, and Roma, including 
beatings of elderly ethnic Serbs. KFOR found a torture chamber in a KLA 
dormitory in late August, which contained weapons, ammunition, 
explosives, and booby traps.
    According to Human Rights Watch, uniformed KLA members participated 
in an unspecified number of rapes and murders of Serb and Romani women, 
but there is not sufficient evidence to substantiate allegations that 
the ethnic Albanian leadership planned such attacks.
    There were reports in the second half of the year of KLA self-
appointed local administrators restricting the political rights of 
other parties in regions of Kosovo. KLA representatives allegedly 
threatened, harassed, and beat LDK members in Prizren and Gnjilane. In 
early August, the local LDK office in Gnjilane also was ransacked and 
some of its representatives were detained and harassed.
    On June 15 a Serbian paramilitary member leaving Gjilan threw a 
grenade from his car at a group of ethnic Albanian civilians; 13 were 
injured including several children.
    On September 25, ethnic Albanians attacked a trailer carrying 12 
Serbs near Kamenica, which left 1 person dead and 4 persons injured. On 
the same day, a Serb couple was pulled from their vehicle in the 
western part of the province and beaten by an ethnic Albanian.
    Prison conditions meet international standards. However, prison 
conditions have deteriorated in recent years. There were few confirmed 
reports of abuse of prisoners by Serbian authorities once they were 
sentenced and serving time. The vast majority of cases of torture 
occurred before detainees were charged with offenses or during the 
period between the filing of charges and the commencement of the trial.
    Prior to hostilities, the Serbian Government generally permitted 
prison visits by human rights monitors, although access was poor, 
sporadic, and subject to the whim of local officials. On several 
occasions, outside monitors, including representatives of the ICRC, 
were denied access to individuals held by Serbian police. UNMIK and 
KFOR permitted prison visits by human rights monitors in the second 
half of the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--In the first 6 months of 
the year, Serbian police used arbitrary arrest and detention. Serbian 
police often applied certain laws only against ethnic minorities and 
used force with impunity. Ethnic Albanians were subjected to trumped up 
or exaggerated charges, ranging from unlawful possession of firearms to 
willfully undermining the country's territorial integrity. According to 
Serbian Ministry of Justice statistics, the authorities were in the 
process of charging or trying approximately 1,500 persons for 
activities related to the Kosovo conflict at the end of 1998. Serbian 
authorities still have between 1,900 and 7,000 persons, mostly ethnic 
Albanians, in prison in Serbia for activities related to the Kosovo 
conflict, and many of these persons likely still were being charged or 
tried at year's end.
    Federal and Serbian laws regarding conspiracy, threats to the 
integrity of the Government, and state secrets were so vague as to 
allow easy abuse by the Milosevic regime.
    In the first 6 months of the year, federal statutes permitted the 
police to detain criminal suspects without a warrant and hold them 
incommunicado for up to 3 days without charging them or granting them 
access to an attorney. Serbian law separately provided for a 24-hour 
detention period. The police often combined the two for a total 4-day 
detention period. After this period, police had to turn a suspect over 
to an investigative judge, who could order a 30-day extension and, 
under certain legal procedures, subsequent extensions of investigative 
detention up to 6 months. Serbian police often detained and beat 
persons without ever charging them officially and routinely held 
suspects well beyond the 3-day statutory period. Bail rarely was 
granted.
    Serb Police used arbitrary arrest and detention in the province. In 
the first half of the year, Serbian authorities shifted from a system 
used before the conflict, of bringing inflated charges against ethnic 
Albanian individuals as an excuse to detain them, to systematically and 
forcibly separating masses of military-aged men from their families. 
Mass detention sites were established throughout the province, with at 
least 25,000 prisoners detained in them in the spring. Refugees 
reported in April that Serbian forces used the Ferro-Nickel factory in 
Glogovac as a detention center for a large number of ethnic Albanians. 
According to refugees, a cement factory in General Jankovic also was 
used temporarily as a detention center for ethnic Albanians. The 
detainees reportedly were released in late April. From May 21 to early 
June, some 2,000 Kosovar Albanian men entered Albania after being 
detained by Serbian forces for 3 weeks in a prison in Smrekovnica near 
Srbica. Serbian authorities apparently were looking for KLA members and 
sympathizers among the prisoners. While detaining the men, the Serbian 
authorities forced them to dig trenches and physically abused many of 
them. After interrogations, the detainees were loaded on buses and 
driven to Zhure, from where they walked to the border with Albania. 
Conditions at these detention sites were poor. Witness reports describe 
daily regimens of beatings, overcrowded facilities, little food, no 
exercise; and in some cases, persons had to sleep on concrete floors.
    When the situation in Kosovo deteriorated and the OSCE KVM pulled 
its verifiers out of the province on March 19, as many as 20 former 
OSCE KVM local employees were arrested by Pristina police at the start 
of the conflict (see Section 4).
    Prior to the conflict that commenced in March, defense lawyers and 
human rights workers complained of excessive delays by Serbian 
authorities in filing formal charges and opening investigations. The 
ability of defense attorneys to challenge the legal basis of their 
clients' detention often was hampered further by difficulties in 
gaining access to detainees or acquiring copies of official indictments 
and decisions to remand defendants into custody. In some cases, judges 
prevented defense attorneys from reading the court file. Investigative 
judges often delegated their responsibility for carrying out 
investigations to the police or members of the state security service 
and rarely questioned their accounts of the investigation--even when it 
was obvious that confessions were coerced from the accused. Results of 
such sham investigations were then used in court to convict defendants 
on trumped up charges.
    After it assumed authority in Kosovo, UNMIK introduced Regulation 
1999/2 on August 12. That action permitted law enforcement authorities 
to detain a suspect for up to 12 hours, and to ``temporarily remove a 
person from a location, or prevent access by a person to a location, to 
prevent a threat to public peace and order.'' This regulation was 
deemed necessary to control the wave of violence (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.).
    Since June UNMIK and KFOR detained hundreds of persons suspected of 
committing ethnically motivated violent crimes and arson. All suspects 
were held in a temporary detention facility as they waited for their 
cases to be reviewed by one of several mobile judicial units, which 
decided whether the detainee was to be released or whether his case 
would go to trial. By the end of October, 13 criminal trials were 
completed, and hundreds of pretrial detention hearings were held, but 
the authorities still were working to establish a complete court system 
(see Section 1.e.). At the end of October, 210 persons were in KFOR 
detention, and 20 to 30 others were arrested and were being detained by 
UNMIK police.
    As concern grew over the status of prisoners still being held in 
Serbia, on September 21 UNMIK created an autonomous commission on 
prisoners and detainees, under the auspices of the UNHCR, to 
investigate and advocate for prisoners and missing persons. This 
commission also established a system for death certificates.
    There were reports of KLA abductions and detainings during the year 
of journalists, Serbs, and political opponents. On June 18, KFOR troops 
released some 15 persons who were held by the KLA in the police station 
in Prizren. The victims reported that KLA members beat them (see 
Section 1.c.). In early August, the local LDK office in Gnjilane also 
was ransacked and some of its representatives were detained and 
harassed.
    Exile is not permitted legally, and no instances of specific 
individuals forced out of the country on the basis of a legal process 
are known to have occurred. However, the practical effect of police 
repression was to accentuate political instability, which in turn 
limited economic opportunity. As a result, over the years, many ethnic 
Albanians went abroad to escape persecution, although only in a few 
cases could direct links to police actions be identified.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice, in the first 6 months of 
the year Federal and Serbian courts largely were controlled by the 
Government and rarely challenged the will of the state security 
apparatus. Judicial corruption was also widespread. While judges were 
elected for fixed terms, they were subjected to governmental pressure. 
Serbian authorities frequently denied fair public trials to non-Serbs 
and to persons whom they believed opposed the regime.
    The court system in the first half of the year consisted of local, 
district, and supreme courts at the republic level, as well as the 
Federal Court and Federal Constitutional Court, to which republic 
supreme court decisions, depending on the subject, could be appealed. 
There was also a military court system. According to the Federal 
Constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled on the 
constitutionality of laws and regulations and relied on the constituent 
republic authorities to enforce its rulings.
    The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia remained in force in the first 6 months of the year. 
Considerable confusion and room for abuse remained in the legal system 
because the 1990 Constitution of Serbia had not yet been brought into 
conformity with the 1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia. Under federal law, defendants had the right to be present 
at their trial and to have an attorney represent them, at public 
expense if needed. The courts also had to provide interpreters. The 
presiding judge decided what was read into the record of the 
proceedings. Either the defendant or the prosecutor could appeal the 
verdict.
    Although generally respected in form, during the period of Serbian 
administration, defense lawyers in Kosovo filed numerous complaints in 
the first half of the year about flagrant breaches of standard 
procedure, which they believed undermined their clients' rights. Even 
when individual judges admitted that the lawyers were correct, the 
courts ignored or dismissed the complaints.
    The Government continued to pursue cases previously brought against 
targeted minority groups under the Yugoslav Criminal Code for 
jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the country and for 
conspiring or forming a group with intent to commit subversive 
activities--that is, undermining the ``constitutional order.'' Numerous 
questionable trials took place during the period of Serbian 
administration. Over 90 percent of the cases involved alleged 
violations under the Federal Penal Code of Article 136 related to 
``association to conduct enemy activity,'' or Article 125 concerning 
``terrorism.'' A number of these persons were being tried in absentia. 
According to the Ministry of Justice, at the end of 1998 some 1,500 
Kosovo Albanians were being charged or tried for crimes related to the 
Kosovo conflict. Serbian authorities still have between 1,900 and 7,000 
persons, mostly ethnic Albanians, in prison in Serbia for activities 
related to the Kosovo conflict, and many of these persons probably 
still were being charged or tried at year's end (see Section 1.d.). The 
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights was monitoring 
the cases of 1,350 prisoners in the Pec and Prizren regional courts 
during the first few months of the year.
    Generally, the evidence in these cases was inadequate according to 
international organizations and human rights monitors, and the 
defendants largely were denied timely access to their attorneys. 
According to international civilian verifiers from the OSCE KVM office 
in Pec, some 80 laymen worked in the district and municipal courts as 
judges, of whom the vast majority were former police officers. Although 
there were two courtrooms in the court building, many trials were held 
in the offices of the judges on the upper floors where no members of 
the public were present. International human rights monitors observed a 
lack of impartiality by Serb judges in the municipal and district court 
system in the province. They also noted the absence of legal counsel 
for the defense, the absence of witnesses or experts during 
proceedings, and a failure to provide medical care during proceedings 
to defendants obviously in need of immediate attention. Continuing a 
common pattern of abuse, independent observers reported that several 
defendants met their defense attorneys for the first time only after 
the investigative judge already concluded the crucial investigation 
stage, while other defendants had defense counsel assigned after they 
entered the courtroom. Much evidence appeared to have been obtained by 
authorities through forced confessions of defendants under duress. 
Other evidence was kept from defense attorneys until just before the 
trial. Other international observers monitoring the trials of alleged 
terrorists in Pristina complained of irregularities in the process 
involving evidentiary standards, the nonuse of native languages, and 
the failure to respect the presumption of innocence.
    Many legal scholars expressed concern over the Act on Lawyers, 
passed in July 1998, which they believed restricted the freedoms of 
lawyers and interfered with the independence of lawyers in their 
dealings with clients. They believed that the law gave too much 
authority to the lawyers' chambers--both at the republic and federal 
levels--which the Helsinki Committee alleged would enable the regime to 
exercise stricter control over the profession. According to a Serbian 
Constitutional Court judge, the law also enabled the regime to 
interfere with the lawyer-client relationship, which, even during the 
Communist era, was upheld to a greater degree.
    UNMIK installed an emergency legal system to prosecute suspected 
criminals in response to the vacuum that existed when Serbian military 
and police left the province in June. On June 28, by Emergency Decree, 
UNMIK appointed seven members to the Joint Advisory Council for 
Legislative Matters (JAC), which is composed of three members 
representing U.N. organizations, two ethnic Albanians, one Serb, and 
one Muslim. The JAC's function is to review and comment upon 
applications for candidates to serve in an independent, multiethnic 
judiciary. On July 30, 9 judges, including 2 judges in absentia were 
sworn in, and another 10 judges and prosecutors were appointed on July 
10. By late October, 48 judges and prosecutors were appointed, and at 
the end of December UNMIK appointed 300 more judges and prosecutors, 
who are expected to be sworn in in early 2000. In September UNMIK 
established a Technical Advisory Commission, consisting of Kosovar and 
international experts to advise it on the structure and administration 
of the judiciary and prosecution service in the province. A joint 
Kosovar-U.N. Advisory Judicial Commission also was established in 
September to advise the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General on matters relating to the appointment of judges and 
prosecutors.
    The judiciary's task was to try eventually the hundreds of persons 
detained by KFOR and UNMIK for murder, looting, and a variety of other 
crimes since June, based upon the ``laws applicable in the territory of 
Kosovo prior to March 24, 1999'' insofar as they do not conflict with 
internationally recognized standards and other UNMIK regulations. 
Ethnic Albanian jurists were reluctant to apply what they considered 
discriminatory Serbian legal codes. On December 12, UNMIK adopted 
Regulation 199/24, which changed applicable law to the law in force in 
Kosovo on March 22, 1989. The JAC was working on a new Criminal and 
Criminal Procedures Code and consulted with the Council of Europe on 
early drafts. At year's end, these codes were being translated.
    Two mobile judicial units were formed to conduct pretrial hearings 
and investigations and began operations in July. Each unit consists of 
two prosecutors, one judge, three secretaries, and two defense lawyers, 
to defend those unable to provide for their own counsel. The mobile 
unit has the authority to release a suspect or to request that the 
judge begin an investigation and hold the suspect until trial.
    While every effort was made to move detainees through the system, 
the sheer numbers of cases and limited resources available resulted in 
long delays before cases could be reviewed. A perpetual logjam exists 
in reviewing cases, and to date, few cases actually have gone to trial. 
Some individuals remain in prolonged detention without being indicted. 
At the end of October, 210 persons were in KFOR detention, and another 
20 to 30 individuals were detained by UNMIK police.
    Furthermore, there were credible reports that the judiciary was 
subject to outside pressure and intimidation, resulting in ethnic 
Albanian judges releasing or seeking to release ethnic Albanians 
charged with serious crimes, including crimes against Serbs, even if 
those individuals had been caught in the act of committing the crime by 
KFOR or U.N. security personnel. In early August, two Serb members of 
the judiciary were attacked, and additional measures had to be taken to 
provide for their safety. By October all seven Serb prosecutors and 
judges either resigned or fled the province, due to fear for their 
personal safety, complaints of discrimination, or lack of sufficient 
compensation.
    The Serbian Government continues to hold many, perhaps thousands 
of, ethnic Albanians as political prisoners in Serbia.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights 
in the first 6 months of the year. Federal law gave republic ministries 
of the interior sole control over the decision to monitor potential 
criminal activities, a power that was abused routinely. It is widely 
believed that authorities monitored opposition and dissident activity, 
eavesdropped on conversations, read mail, and wiretapped telephones. 
Although illegal under provisions of federal and Serbian law, the 
federal post office registered all mail from abroad, ostensibly to 
protect mail carriers from charges of theft.
    Although the law included restrictions on searches, Serbian 
officials often ignored them in the first half of the year. Serbian 
police systematically subjected ethnic Albanians to random searches of 
their homes, vehicles, shops, and offices, asserting that they were 
searching for weapons. According to the Kosovo Council for the Defense 
of Human Rights and Freedoms, the police carried out scores of raids on 
homes, including in areas not affected by the fighting. Police used 
threats and violence against family members of suspects.
    In the first 6 months of the year, Serbian security forces 
systematically destroyed entire villages by burning and shelling 
houses, contaminating water wells, and killing livestock (see Section 
1.g.). In the second half of March as the airstrikes began, ethnic 
cleansing dramatically accelerated in Kosovo. On March 25, Serbian 
forces burned 200 to 600 homes in Djakovica alone and destroyed the 
rest of the old city the following day. More than 90 percent of all 
ethnic Albanians were expelled from their homes in the province. The 
UNHCR estimates that hundreds of thousands of persons remained 
internally displaced within the province during the conflict, while 
approximately 850,000 persons fled to neighboring areas including 
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, and Montenegro.
    Starting in March, Serbian authorities conducted a campaign of 
forced population movement on a massive scale. Ethnic Albanian refugees 
and IDP's consistently reported being expelled from their homes by 
Serbian forces at gunpoint, in contrast to the fighting during 1998, 
when the bulk of the IDP's and refugees fled to escape the crossfire or 
to avoid reprisals by Serbian security forces. Many victims were herded 
onto trains and other organized transport and expelled from the 
province. In addition, Serbian forces expelled the majority of Kosovar 
Albanians from urban areas such as Djakovica. Refugees and IDP's 
reported that those forced to remain behind were used as human shields.
    A government law requiring universal military service was enforced 
by Serbian authorities only sporadically and not vigorously in the 
first 6 months of the year. The informal practice of the military was 
not to call up ethnic Albanians. Of approximately 100,000 draft evaders 
living abroad to avoid punishment in 1998, 40 percent were estimated to 
be ethnic Albanian. This number in part reflected the large number of 
conscription-age men in the FRY's Albanian community. Leaders of 
Kosovo's Albanian and Sandzak's Muslim communities maintained that 
forced compliance of these ethnic groups with universal military 
service was an attempt to induce young men to flee the country. 
According to an amnesty bill passed in 1996, up to 12,000 young men for 
whom criminal prosecution for draft evasion already had started were 
granted amnesty. Others who did not fall into this category were told 
that if they returned to the FRY their cases would be reviewed on a 
``case by case'' basis, a policy that has not inspired confidence among 
offenders. Another law passed in 1998 stated that draft dodgers who did 
not report for military service would forfeit their right to 
inheritance.
    In a related development, under a 1996 agreement with Germany, 
ethnic Albanian refugees repatriated to the FRY were not supposed to be 
prosecuted for fleeing the draft. However, according to the 
Humanitarian Law Center, many returning ethnic Albanians faced 
irregular procedures on returning to the FRY. The Center reported many 
misdeeds by authorities against asylum seekers who returned, including 
physical abuse, threats of imprisonment, deportation, confiscation of 
identification cards, and a requirement that persons report to their 
local police stations on a daily basis. Returning ethnic Albanians were 
detained routinely on their arrival at local airports. In many cases 
FRY officials have refused to issue proper travel documents to children 
born to asylum seekers.
    Since the province came under the authority of UNMIK in June, the 
law prohibited such practices, authorities generally respected these 
prohibitions, and violations by authorities were subject to effective 
legal sanction. However, in the months following the war, abuses were 
committed frequently by ethnic Albanian civilians and members of the 
KLA. There were frequent reports of men wearing KLA uniforms, or 
claiming to be acting in the name of the KLA, entering the private 
homes of Serb residents and subjecting them to harassment and 
intimidation. Many Serbs left of their own accord along with departing 
Serb security forces. There were credible reports that such men also 
sought to expropriate property of fellow ethnic Albanians in the name 
of the KLA. An estimated 164,000 Serbs and an unknown number of Roma 
left the province, many of whom were compelled to flee by the 
harassment and intimidation. According to field research conducted by a 
Roma NGO in early July, all of the Romani communities it visited had 
less than half of their preconflict Roma population. Civilians were 
also responsible for the random destruction and arson of private 
property.
    Respect for property rights proved to be problematic. Many property 
records were lost, casting doubt over how current occupants of vacated 
properties could remain where they were living, and how owners could 
rightfully reclaim their property. UNMIK created a housing and property 
directorate that redrafted regulations to laws that previously 
discriminated against ethnic Albanians. The directorate also 
established a system of permits that would allow squatters to remain in 
housing temporarily through the winter, until the rightful owners could 
be located.
    The UNHCR reported that 50,000 to 90,000 homes in the 2,000 
villages of the province were damaged severely or uninhabitable. The 
damage is worse in the Western section of the province, with Pec having 
lost 40 to 45 percent of its housing. In Djakovica and Mitrovica, the 
losses are around 30 percent. In the province overall, some 40 percent 
of the schools were destroyed or damaged severely.
    Since the end of the conflict, many Serb- and Roma-owned homes were 
looted and then burned. Some of the most serious looting and arson 
occurred in the districts of Lipljan, Klina, Pec, Istok, and Djakovica. 
In Vitomirica by late June Serb houses were looted and burned, while 
houses that had ``Albanian house'' written on a wall were left 
untouched. Ethnic Albanian returnees occupied some Serb houses. 
Especially on the weekend of June 19 and 20, unidentified persons set 
fire to Serb-owned homes and looted their properties throughout the 
province. KFOR arrested 10 ethnic Albanians near Prizren, suspected of 
arson in several Serb villages (see Section 5).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--The conflict in Kosovo placed civilian populations 
on both sides of the ethnic divide in an unusually vulnerable position. 
The excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian police and the 
VJ resulted in widespread civilian casualties and the mass forced 
displacement of up to 1.3 million persons, both within and outside the 
province.
    NATO allies, responding to President Milosevic's abuses, stepped up 
pressure on the regime in the fall of 1998. In the face of the threat 
of NATO air raids, President Milosevic agreed to steps aimed at 
mitigating the humanitarian disaster unfolding in the province. He 
undertook an obligation to comply fully with the terms of UNSCR 1199 
(adopted in September 1998), which included demands that the FRY cease 
all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population, 
order the withdrawal of security forces used for civilian repression, 
cooperate with the ICTY, and allow full and unimpeded access for all 
international humanitarian aid organizations to Kosovo, including the 
UNHCR and the ICRC. President Milosevic also agreed to allow a NATO air 
verification mission to verify compliance with UNSCR 1199 from the air 
and to allow 2,000 unarmed civilian ``verifiers'' of the OSCE KVM to 
verify compliance on the ground in Kosovo. Agreements establishing 
these missions were signed separately by the FRY, with NATO and the 
OSCE respectively, in October 1998. In subsequent meetings with NATO 
representatives, President Milosevic agreed to specific limits on 
Serbian police and the Yugoslav army presence in Kosovo.
    It soon became apparent that Milosevic had no intention of 
complying fully with these agreements. International diplomatic 
observers witnessed Serbian armed forces purposefully destroying 
civilian property: police systematically looted, trashed, and burned 
villages and shot livestock with the intention of depopulating certain 
regions, especially the villages near the border with Albania. 
International diplomatic observers and members of intergovernmental 
organizations witnessed Serbian security forces torching and 
vandalizing homes of ethnic Albanians after fighting between police 
forces and insurgents already had ceased in those villages. Over 1,200 
residential areas, including over 500 villages, were burned after late 
March, and 300 villages burned in the month of April 1999 alone. Most 
Serb homes and stores remained intact during the conflict and Serb 
civilians in many towns painted a Cyrillic ``S'' on their doors so that 
Serbian forces would not attack their homes by mistake. Many 
settlements were destroyed totally in an apparent attempt to ensure 
that the ethnic Albanian population could not return. Serbian forces 
reportedly burned all houses that previously had been rented by the 
OSCE in Vucitrn, Stimlje, and Kosovska Mitrovica. Other NGO's reported 
that areas that were occupied by Serbian security forces were at high 
risk for well water contamination. The security forces used the wells 
for waste disposal (i.e., garbage, animal remains, and other 
contaminants) when they departed. Numerous credible incidents were 
reported in which civilians were seized from intercity buses and held 
hostage by both Serbian security forces and Albanian insurgents. 
According to the UNHCR, approximately 850,000 persons fled to 
neighboring countries and hundreds of thousands were internally 
displaced (IDP's) within the country.
    Starting in March, Serbian authorities conducted an ethnic 
cleansing campaign of forced population movement on a massive scale. 
Ethnic Albanian refugees and IDP's consistently reported being expelled 
from their homes by Serbian forces at gunpoint, in contrast to the 
fighting of 1998, when the bulk of the IDP's and refugees fled to 
escape the crossfire or to avoid reprisals by Serbian security forces. 
Many victims were herded onto trains and other organized transport and 
expelled from the province. In addition, Serbian forces expelled the 
majority of Kosovar Albanians from urban areas such as Djakovica. 
Refugees and IDP's reported that those forced to remain behind were 
used as human shields.
    Serbian forces compelled ethnic Albanians to accompany Serbian 
military convoys and shield facilities throughout the province. 
Beginning in mid-April, Serbian forces used ethnic Albanian men from 
refugee columns and forced them to form a buffer zone around Serbian 
convoys. Numerous ethnic Albanians claimed to have witnessed and 
participated in this activity on the roads between Pec, Djakovica, and 
Kosovksa Mitrovica. In at least one instance--Korisa--Serbian forces 
intentionally positioned ethnic Albanians at sites that they believed 
were targets for NATO airstrikes. In other instances, according to 
unconfirmed reports, ethnic Albanians were kept concealed within NATO 
target areas to generate civilian casualties that could be blamed on 
NATO. Ethnic Albanian reports claimed that Serbian forces compelled 
Kosovar Albanian men to wear Serbian military uniforms, likely so that 
they would appear to be Serbs to NATO and KLA surveillance.
    Serbian forces also disguised themselves as NGO workers to prevent 
targeting from NATO aircraft. Refugees claimed that on May 6, Serbian 
forces dressed in white hats and jackets with Red Cross and Red 
Crescent logos moved with convoys of IDP's between Djakovica and 
Brekovac. In order to conceal their military cargo, Serbian forces 
covered their wagons with plastic tarpaulins taken from NGO's.
    In contrast to 1998, when Serbian security forces attacked small 
villages, in the first 6 months of the year Yugoslav army units and 
armed civilians joined the police in systematically expelling ethnic 
Albanians at gunpoint from both villages and the larger towns of the 
province. Many of the places targeted had not been the scenes of 
previous fighting or KLA activity. Serbian authorities forced many 
refugees to sign disclaimers saying that they were leaving the province 
of their own free will. There were numerous reports that Serbian forces 
confiscated identity and property documents, including passports, land 
titles, automobile license plates, and identity cards, as ethnic 
Albanians were forced out of villages or as they crossed the borders 
into Albania or FYROM. Physicians for Human Rights reports that nearly 
60 percent of respondents to its survey observed Serbian forces 
removing or destroying personal identification documents. Victims also 
reported that the Serbian forces confiscated their personal belongings 
and documentation, including national identity papers, and told them to 
take a last look at their surroundings, because they would never return 
to the province.
    Serbian forces systematically attacked ethnic Albanian physicians, 
patients, and medical facilities. Violations of medical neutrality by 
Serbian forces include killings, torture, detention, imprisonment, and 
forced disappearances of Kosovar physicians. In March and April, 
Serbian health care providers, police, and military expelled ethnic 
Albanian patients and health care providers from health facilities as 
protective cover for military activities. The NGO Physicians for Human 
Rights received reports of the destruction of at least 100 medical 
clinics, pharmacies, and hospitals.
    In addition to the terror tactics employed by Serbian security 
forces against the ethnic Albanian civilian population of Kosovo, 
credible sources indicated that the Milosevic regime sought to block 
some shipments of food into the province prior to the outbreak of 
hostilities with the international community. When presented with a 
list allegedly prepared by Belgrade authorities of products to be 
stopped from entering the province, Serbian police in the province did 
not deny the operation but stated that it was part of a countrywide 
campaign to stop ``tax avoidance.'' At the same time, the Milosevic 
regime compiled at best an uneven record of cooperation and hostility 
toward nongovernmental organizations that sought to deliver 
humanitarian shipments to the needy in the province. Such shipments 
also were intended for IDP's forcibly displaced by the Serbian police 
campaign of shelling, looting, and burning ethnic Albanians' homes 
after the mid-1998 fighting had concluded.
    As a result of the conflict that occurred in the spring, certain 
rural areas of the province still are filled with unexploded land 
mines. The U.N. Mine Action Coordination Center in Pristina announced 
in September that 40 persons had died and 232 others were injured by 
accidental explosions of cluster bombs or land mines since the end of 
the conflict in June. This was thought to be a conservative estimate, 
since many incidents went unrecorded, especially if the victim died 
instantly or was treated at a hospital and released.
    Separatist fighters and KLA members set up roadblocks and denied 
passage to Serbs, including civilians attempting to get to and from 
work. Separatist fighters harassed Serbian journalists and took some 
hostage. In addition to credible cases in which so-called 
``collaborators'' were killed, some ethnic Albanians employed by state-
owned enterprises were threatened.
    Despite the presence of UNMIK and KFOR, numerous clashes between 
Kosovars and Serbs continued into the fall, occasionally involving KFOR 
troops. On August 16, nine mortar rounds were fired from the 
countryside around the Serb village of Klokot. Two Serbs were killed 
instantly, while five other people were wounded. There were also mortar 
attacks on August 10 and 12 on the same village, however no casualties 
resulted from the earlier incidents. A mortar attack against the 
Serbian village of Donja Budriga took place on September 8, in which 
two Serbs were killed and four others injured.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The law provides for freedom 
of speech and of the press; however, in the first 6 months of the year 
the Federal and Serbian Governments severely restricted this right in 
practice.
    The Serbian Government issued a decree in October 1998 that 
effectively allowed press censorship. The decree reflected a 
recognition of the threat to the regime of the free flow of information 
and ideas on issues related to the situation in Kosovo and the 
possibility--at that time--of a conflict with NATO. In October 1998, it 
passed a new information law, which incorporated many of the decree's 
strict provisions and left the country's independent media severely 
constrained. Under the law, private citizens or organizations could 
bring suit against media outlets for printing materials not 
sufficiently patriotic, or ``against the territorial integrity, 
sovereignty, and independence of the country.'' Media outlets also 
could be fined for publishing items of a personal nature without the 
consent of the individual concerned (an apparent reference to political 
cartoons). The rebroadcast of foreign news programs, including from the 
British Broadcasting Corporation and the Voice of America, was banned. 
Media outlets whose practices did not conform to the new law could be 
subjected to exorbitant fines, which must be paid within a 24-hour 
period.
    In March authorities imposed the maximum fine of $100,000 (Din 1.6 
million) on the Gazete Shqiptare, a Kosovar weekly newspaper and 
ordered the Koha Ditore publishing house to stop printing the weekly. 
Authorities also froze the newspaper's bank accounts, confiscated all 
current issues, and ordered vendors to stop selling the publication. 
The staff of the newspaper announced that it would ignore these actions 
and continue to publish outside the province. In March authorities also 
fined Kosovo Sot $50,000 (Din 800,000) and its publisher and editor 
each another $25,000 (Din 400,000), for publishing a new year's 
calendar that included pictures of KLA members. Authorities froze 
Kosovo Sot's bank accounts, forced it to suspend operations, seized its 
current issues, and warned vendors to stop selling the newspaper.
    Radio Contact opened in May 1998; however, it was able to broadcast 
only for 2 weeks before Serbian authorities shut it down and 
confiscated its equipment. The deliberate vagueness of the relevant 
laws often was utilized to penalize independent electronic media 
outlets. Radio and television stations were harassed bureaucratically 
according to their political orientations. Instead of obtaining long-
term licenses to broadcast, stations received only 1-year temporary 
licenses, if they received a license at all. The bureaucratic 
procedures were so difficult that stations frequently could not fulfill 
all of the requirements, which left them at the mercy of the regime. 
For example, under then current law, to obtain a license to broadcast, 
a station had to obtain the approval of a government ``construction 
inspector'' for its office space; however, to obtain a construction 
inspector's approval, a station needed a broadcast license.
    In addition to license issuance problems, those stations that did 
obtain licenses were forced to pay exorbitantly high fees, the 
nonpayment of which was enforced selectively by Serbian authorities to 
close down those stations that did not adhere to the Government's line.
    According to independent media sources, in the first 6 months of 
the year, most journalists practiced self-censorship in an effort to 
avoid a violation under the media law. Journalists had been informed 
that printing anything that was not true--even an advertisement or a 
death announcement--could be punished under the information law. One 
independent newspaper reported in 1998 that it was publishing half as 
many articles as usual, in view of the need to check extensively the 
facts in every article.
    During the first 6 months of the year, Serbian forces killed, 
detained, and beat journalists (see Section 1.a.). For example, in 
early May Serbian police arrested Cerkin Ibishi, a journalist for the 
newspaper Relindja, in Mitrovica. He was held in two prisons, including 
Smerkovnica prison near Mitrovica, before he was released at the end of 
May and fled to Albania. Also in May, Halil Matoshi, a journalist for 
the weekly Zeri, was taken by Serbian security forces and jailed in 
Lipjan. He was removed to a prison in Serbia proper by withdrawing 
Serbian forces in June and had not been released by year's end.
    In December 1998, Serbia's Ministry of Information issued 
threatening letters to five Albanian-language newspapers and magazines 
in the province to the effect that they were in violation of the new 
public information law. Shortly thereafter, the newspaper Bujku 
effectively was closed down. Editors from Koha Ditore, the leading 
Albanian-language daily, Zeri, an intellectual Albanian weekly, and 
Kosovo Sot, a new Albanian daily, reported that threats against the 
Albanian language media, which began with warning letters from the 
Serbian Ministry of Information, were escalating. Pressure on the 
Albanian-language press became so intense in late February that no 
Albanian-language newspapers were in circulation by the outbreak of the 
conflict in March. On the first night of the NATO bombing campaign, the 
premises of Koha Ditore were destroyed by Serbian forces and a night 
watchman was killed. The printing press of the daily Kosovo Sot was 
destroyed soon thereafter.
    Many of the members of the Kosovar Albanian press attempted to work 
in exile during the war. Beginning in January, Radio Contact, Radio 21, 
and Koha Ditore Radio all broadcast for approximately 15 minutes per 
day through a satellite link provided by the British Broadcasting 
Company. During the conflict, Koha Ditore, Kosovo Sot, and Rilindja 
restarted their publishing activities in FYROM. However, when they 
returned to the province, they found that their offices and facilities 
had been destroyed. Serbian authorities had demolished the major 
printing houses before the war, and NATO systematically bombed the main 
radio-television transmitter that the government-affiliated station, 
Radio Television Pristina (RTP), had been using.
    UNMIK found it difficult to create a free media environment in a 
region that had suffered from 9 years of oppression under the previous 
regime and also from the destruction of war. Following the conflict, 
UNMIK gained control of the broadcasting towers and frequencies, and 
the OSCE established a Department for Media Affairs. The department is 
responsible for promoting transparency, openness, fact-based reporting, 
and providing a broad spectrum of political institutions access to the 
media, as well as access to information for all ethnic groups. One 
division of the Media Affairs Department is to serve as a Media 
Regulatory Commission for the full range of media in the province. The 
media division still was searching for staff to carry out the 
regulatory aspect of promoting a free media at year's end. An 
Independent Media Council also is to be created to advise and assist 
the OSCE in creating a free media environment. Finally, an 
international appellate body is to be appointed to review decisions 
made by the Media Regulatory Commission. The appellate body also is to 
have the function of drafting laws and regulations and presenting them 
to provincially elected lawmaking bodies.
    Newspapers resumed publishing, and by year's end, there were five 
daily newspapers and two weeklies with broad circulation. While 
flourishing, the print media often acted irresponsibly, including 
publishing inflammatory articles which could incite violence against 
political personalities, as well as articles providing names and 
addresses of ethnic Albanians who allegedly collaborated with the 
Serbian authorities.
    KosovaPress, a news agency in Pristina that bills itself as a 
``state agency,'' issued a commentary on October 2, which targeted two 
leading independent Kosovar Albanian journalists. The author accused 
Veton Surroi and Baton Haxhiu, who had urged ethnic Albanians to 
exercise tolerance toward Serbs, of being Serbian spies, said that they 
``should not have a place in free Kosovo,'' and demanded that they be 
sent to the ICTY in the Hague. The news agency distanced itself from 
the journalist who wrote the commentary, but it did not issue a 
retraction.
    The only Serb newspaper in Kosovo, Jedinstvo, had its offices 
occupied by Kosovar Albanians in August, and UNMIK advised the 
newspaper to suspend printing issues due to the security threat. 
Jedinstvo now is published in northern Kosovo and is distributed in 
Serbian enclaves. It has two editorial boards, one in Belgrade, Serbia 
and another in Zvecan, Kosovo.
    In June Radio 21 finally obtained a broadcast license to expand 
beyond the Internet, where it previously was confined by the Serbian 
regime. It became the first independent Albanian-language electronic 
media outlet in the province. A number of private smaller stations also 
began operations in both Serbian and Albanian.
    Radio Pristina became operational on July 28, broadcasting daily 
90-minute segments in Albanian, Serbian, and Turkish. The radio station 
has a multiethnic staff, with 12 ethnic Albanian, 6 ethnic Serb, and 6 
ethnic Turkish journalists. There are also five ethnic Albanians and 
two Serbs serving as technicians. Radio Contact also broadcasts in 
Albanian, Turkish, and Bosnian and employs a multiethnic staff.
    The OSCE Media Division made progress in reconstructing and 
erecting new radio, television, and telecommunication towers for use by 
RTP and other independent stations. One tower became fully functional 
at the end of October. RTP is to be a province-wide public broadcasting 
service protected from political domination.
    Djakovica, a local ethnic Albanian radio station, was able to 
resume broadcasting in June; Serbian authorities had closed it down 9 
years ago.
    In the first 6 months of the year, the Federal and Serbian 
Governments did not respect academic freedom. UNMIK made efforts to 
reestablish schools in the province in the second half of the year 
under the principle of complete academic freedom. However, given the 
massive destruction of schools during the conflict (some 75 percent 
were damaged) and current scarce resources, the pace of rebuilding a 
school system for the province was slow.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Federal and 
republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association; however, the Serbian and Federal Governments 
restricted this right in the first 6 months of the year. Since June 
UNMIK generally respected this right in practice.
    There were cases in the last half of the year in which KFOR troops 
were called in to break up various blockades and standoffs orchestrated 
by members of both Serb and Albanian ethnic groups. Beginning July 7 
and lasting for several days, ethnic Albanians took part in a major 
demonstration near the bridge that divides Mitrovica between the 
northern Serb-inhabited sector and the southern ethnic Albanian sector. 
A group of 5,000 ethnic Albanians crossed from the southern side to the 
northern side on October 15, to protest a KFOR policy limiting ethnic 
Albanian access to the Serb sector. This policy was adopted originally 
to protect Serbs residing in the area from ethnic Albanian retaliation.
    On August 23, tractors manned by hundreds of ethnic Albanians 
formed a blockade of vehicles to prevent Russian peacekeeping troops 
from moving into Orahovac. Resentment toward Russians for their support 
of the Serbian and Federal Governments during the conflict contributed 
to higher levels of tension in Orahovac, where more than 1,000 persons 
were killed during the conflict. The area is known to have the highest 
concentration of identified mass graves, as well as the largest number 
of war crimes suspects still residing in the province. Reports of 
persons in Orahovac being shot and burned alive in their houses were 
widespread during the conflict.
    On September 28, two grenades exploded in a Serb market area in 
Bresje (see Section 1.a.). Three elderly Serbs were killed instantly 
while 46 others suffered from minor and critical injuries. KFOR 
arrested two ethnic Albanians suspected of the crime. Hours after the 
attack, a Serb group retaliated by blocking a road leading from 
Pristina to Pec in western Kosovo, forcing authorities to create a 
detour around Kosovo Polje to maintain the flow of commercial and 
humanitarian traffic. Ethnic Albanians in turn responded by forming 
their own blockade on the same road and also on the railroad tracks in 
Kosovo Polje. KFOR forcibly removed all three blockades in the early 
morning hours of October 5. The routes reopened, and KFOR positioned 
troops along the route to maintain order.
    The Federal and republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of 
association; however, the Serbian and Federal Governments restricted 
this right in the first 6 months of the year.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law in both the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbia provides for freedom of religion; however, 
in practice both the Government and the legal system provided very 
little protection for the religious rights of minority groups in the 
first 6 months of the year.
    There was no state religion, but in the first 6 months of the year 
the Milosevic regime gave preferential treatment, including access to 
state-run television for major religious events, to the Serbian 
Orthodox Church to which the majority of Serbs belong. The regime 
subjected religious communities in the province to harassment. Refugees 
reported that mosques and religious sites were attacked or destroyed by 
Serbian forces in at least 21 villages and towns in the spring. 
Religious sites also served as shelter for ethnic Albanians during the 
conflict. On March 28, 200 ethnic Albanians who had sought sanctuary in 
the Albanian Catholic Church of Pec were removed and forced by MUP 
forces to leave town.
    UNMIK respects the right to freedom of religion. In light of 
societal violence against properties owned by the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, UNMIK authorities took extra steps in the months following the 
conflict to ensure that members of all religious groups could worship 
safely. KFOR deployed security contingents at religious sites 
throughout the province to protect them from further destruction, as 
had occurred immediately after KFOR's intervention in June.
    However, reflecting the severity of security concerns, Bishop 
Artemije, the leading cleric of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, 
declared soon after KFOR entered the province that the city of Prizren 
was no longer safe and announced that he, 9 priests, and 200 Serb 
civilians would leave for Pristina. Approximately 60 Serb families from 
Pristina already had taken refuge with Artemije in a monastery outside 
the city.
    On June 17, Patriarch Pavle, the leader of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, said in a radio address that he would move temporarily to the 
historic center of the Church at Pec and appealed to Serbs in the 
province not to leave.
    As of December, Serbian Archbishop Artemije reported that more than 
80 Orthodox churches had been destroyed, damaged, or desecrated. 
Serbian Orthodox priests also were intimidated. One priest was abducted 
by the KLA and two other priests in Pristina decided to move to the 
Gracanica monastery for safety (see Section 1.b.). Fearing that the 
monastery's parish house would be confiscated by KLA, the Church 
offered it to the UNHCR to use for relief purposes.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement; however, the Federal and Serbian Governments restricted this 
right in practice in the first 6 months of the year. Federal and 
Serbian authorities frequently barred FRY citizens from reentering the 
country. The Milosevic regime continued to restrict the right of ethnic 
Albanians to travel by holding up the issuance or renewal of passports 
for an unusually long period of time and reserved the option of 
prosecuting individuals charged previously with violating exit visa 
requirements. Serbian authorities also sometimes called in ethnic 
Albanians for interrogation by state security officers before passports 
were renewed. Serbian authorities stopped ethnic Albanian men at 
various checkpoints in areas where KLA activity was thought to be 
concentrated. In the early months of the year, such men were subjected 
to random assaults, intimidation, and harassment. Ethnic Albanians also 
reported being accused of a number of violations, including speeding 
and lack of proper documentation, after which police would demand 
payment before they would allow them to proceed. There were also 
reports of police confiscating travel documents at checkpoints, thereby 
making freedom of movement impossible within the province.
    Starting in March, Serbian authorities conducted a campaign of 
forced population movement on a massive scale. Ethnic Albanian refugees 
and IDP's consistently reported being expelled from their homes by 
Serbian forces at gunpoint, in contrast to the fighting of 1998, when 
the bulk of the IDP's and refugees fled to escape the crossfire or to 
avoid reprisals by Serbian security forces. Many victims were herded 
onto trains and other organized transport and expelled from the 
province. In addition, Serbian forces expelled the majority of Kosovar 
Albanians from urban areas such as Djakovica. Refugees and IDP's 
reported that those forced to remain behind were used as human shields.
    Citizens reported difficulties at borders and the occasional 
confiscation of their passports. Ethnic Albanians frequently complained 
of harassment at border crossings. There were numerous reports that 
border guards confiscated foreign currency or passports from travelers, 
as well as occasional complaints of physical mistreatment. The 
authorities generally allowed political opposition leaders to leave the 
country and return. FRY embassies overseas generally were considered to 
apply a double standard in issuing passports to their citizens; ethnic 
Serbs had a much easier time obtaining passports than members of ethnic 
minorities.
    Many inhabitants of Serbia-Montenegro who were born in other parts 
of the former Yugoslavia, as well as large numbers of refugees, were 
not able to establish their citizenship in the FRY, leaving them in a 
stateless limbo.
    The FRY Government was very slow to issue passports to refugees. 
This was a particular problem for asylum-seeking parents. For example, 
German authorities issued such children born in Germany a document 
certifying their birth. FRY officials in Germany refused to issue 
passports to such children. When these asylum seekers who have been 
refused in Germany returned to the FRY with their children, the 
children traveled on the basis of this document. FRY authorities took 
the paper at the port of entry and issued a receipt for it. Then the 
children had no documentation in a country where documentation was a 
basic requirement. In January 1997 a new citizenship law entered into 
force, which, when fully implemented, was expected to affect adversely 
the rights of many inhabitants, including those born in other parts of 
the former Yugoslavia, refugees, and citizens who migrated to other 
countries to work or seek asylum.
    After Milosevic withdrew his troops from the province in June, the 
UNHCR oversaw the return of some 700,000 Kosovar refugees from 
surrounding regions and other countries. Since then, problems with 
sufficient housing, property records, and education for the returning 
ethnic Albanians remain unresolved.
    In Kosovska Mitrovica there were restrictions on freedom of 
movement in the second half of the year. Following the withdrawal of 
Serbian security forces from the province, many ethnic Serbs from 
throughout Kosovo fled to Mitrovica and occupied homes, including those 
belonging to ethnic Albanians, in the northern part of that town. 
Ethnic Albanians seeking to go back to their homes in the north were 
subject to violence and intimidation by ethnic Serbs, who feared the 
return of the ethnic Albanian residents would jeopardize their 
security. KFOR did not have sufficient resources to guarantee 
protection of ethnic Albanians wishing to return to their homes in 
north Mitrovica. Some 2,000 ethnic Albanians who continue to live in 
north Mitrovica are subject to harassment when they travel throughout 
the city or send their children to Albanian-language schools in the 
southern part of the city. Ethnic Albanian medical personnel and 
patients were forced to leave the major hospital in north Mitrovica, 
and ethnic Albanians are not able to attend classes in a campus of 
Pristina University located in the northern part of the town. Persons 
who cross the Ibar river from south Mitrovica into the north part of 
the town are monitored by ethnic Serbs stationed near the bridges, who 
are able quickly to call upon other ethnic Serbs to discourage unwanted 
visitors. In early November, two female ethnic Albanian police 
trainees, along with their U.N. International Police escorts, were 
attacked by ethnic Serbs after crossing into north Mitrovica to respond 
to a call.
    Since ethnic Albanians still hold FRY passports, those wishing to 
leave Kosovo again after their repatriation experienced some difficulty 
in doing so. Their passports were either invalid or not recognized by 
other countries as a result of the conflict. Therefore, UNMIK began 
issuing temporary travel documents permitting citizens of the province 
to travel until a more permanent solution is created.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Federal and the Serbian Constitutions provide for this right, 
but in practice Kosovar Albanians expressed frustration with the 
province's status within Serbia through a boycott of the political 
system and did not attempt to effect the Government through the 
electoral process. The most recent Serbian elections, held in the fall 
of 1997, were flawed seriously. Starting in June, the OSCE began 
developing an environment that would allow for new political parties to 
become more active, with equal access and representation in the media. 
Preparations are being made for municipal elections, which are likely 
to be held in September 2000, at the earliest. Work is scheduled to 
begin by early spring 2000 on a civil register, which is to be used to 
create a voter register.
    No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government 
and politics; however, in the first 6 months of the year, they were 
underrepresented greatly in party and government offices. In the first 
6 months of the year, women held less than 10 percent of ministerial-
level positions in the Serbian and Federal Governments. In the province 
before the conflict, a woman led 1 wing of the Social Democratic Party 
of Kosovo, and the LDK had 3 women in its 12-member presidency. 
However, according to ethnic Albanian women's groups, those women were 
exceptional in their political participation, and few women enter 
politics in the province because of a lack of interest, money, and 
family support.
    No legal restrictions affected the role of minorities in government 
and politics in the first 6 months of the year; however, ethnic Serbs 
and Montenegrins dominated the country's political leadership. Few 
members of other ethnic groups played any role at the top levels of 
government or the state-run economy. After 1990 ethnic Albanians 
refused to take part in the electoral process at any level, including 
the Serbian republic and federal levels. They had virtually no 
representation in the Serbian republic and FRY government structures.
    Ethnic Albanians' refusal to participate in FRY and Serbian 
elections had the practical effect of increasing the political 
influence of President Milosevic and his supporters. Ultranationalist 
parties, including Milosevic's coalition partner the Radical Party of 
Serbia, also had taken advantage of the ethnic Albanian boycott to 
garner representation beyond their numbers.
    The Kosovo Transitional Council, and advisory council set up by 
UNMIK, had twelve members, including representatives of the Serb, 
Turkish, and Bosnian minorities. There were no female members. The 
Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Affairs had one female member.
    There were reports in the second half of the year of KLA self-
appointed local administrators restricting the political rights of 
other parties in regions of Kosovo. KLA representatives allegedly 
threatened, harassed, and beat LDK members in Prizren and Gnjilane. In 
early August, the local LDK office in Gnjilane also was ransacked and 
some of its representatives were detained and harassed. In November an 
LDK activist in Srbica was killed in what the LDK and some UNMIK 
officials believe was a politically motivated murder. The LDK has 
complained that KLA-appointed local authorities have removed school 
principals and other local officials sympathetic to the LDK.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government of Serbia formally maintained that it had no 
objection to international organizations conducting human rights 
investigations on its territory. However, during the period of its 
administration of Kosovo, the Serbian regime routinely hindered the 
activities of human rights groups and regularly rejected their 
findings.
    Local human rights monitors (Serbs as well as members of ethnic 
minorities) and NGO's worked under difficult circumstances during the 
first 6 months of the year. A number of reliable international human 
rights monitors reported that one worker of the CDHRF was missing at 
year's end, and that all of the organization's workers were harassed 
routinely and severely by Serbian authorities in the first 6 months of 
the year.
    NGO's reported several blockages by federal and Serbian authorities 
to the delivery of humanitarian commodities in the province, as well as 
police searches of NGO vehicles. Harassment, detention, and violence 
against aid workers also were reported during the first 6 months of the 
year. On February 21, the president of the Mother Teresa Society branch 
in the town of General Jankovic and his son were killed in front of 
their house by unknown assailants (see Section 1.a.). The next day, in 
a separate incident, a Medicens Sans Frontiers vehicle was attacked on 
the road between Pristina and Lipjan by a civilian with a rifle. Verbal 
harassment ensued before the vehicle was allowed to proceed along the 
road. Societal violence contributed to the precarious environment in 
which aid workers carried out their duties. On August 15, an anonymous 
NGO reported that one of its staff members was the object of a failed 
kidnaping attempt. A U.N. worker of Bulgarian nationality was killed by 
an angry group of ethnic Albanian teenagers on October 11. Valentin 
Krumov reportedly was beaten and shot, when he informed an ethnic 
Albanian of the time using the Serbian language (see Section 1.a.).
    The Milosevic regime denied visas to international nongovernmental 
human rights organizations and to investigators from the ICTY, who 
wished to conduct impartial investigations into allegations of 
atrocities committed by Serbian forces and ethnic Albanian paramilitary 
groups in the province. In October 1998, the Government agreed to the 
establishment of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). By the 
start of the year, the KVM had expanded to several hundred 
international verifiers, including human rights personnel, who verified 
civilian aspects of implementation of UNSCR 1199. However, when the 
situation in Kosovo further deteriorated, the KVM pulled its verifiers 
out of the province on March 19. Subsequently, as many as 20 former 
OSCE KVM local employees were arrested by Pristina police at the start 
of the conflict.
    Prior to the conclusion of hostilities, a number of independent 
human rights organizations did operate in the FRY, including in Kosovo, 
researching and gathering information on abuses, and publicizing such 
cases. The Pristina-based Helsinki Committee was active in monitoring 
human rights abuses in the province and cooperated with similar 
organizations based in Belgrade. The Council for the Defense of Human 
Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) also collected data on human rights abuses 
and published newsletters.
    ICRC officials complained in the first half of the year of 
difficulties in securing access to detainees. Serbian authorities, 
during their administration of Kosovo, failed to allow access to ICTY 
investigators to the province, preventing the ICTY from carrying out 
independent and objective investigations into crimes within the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction. As a signatory to the 1995 Dayton Accords that 
ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro is obliged 
to cooperate fully with the ICTY by turning over to the Tribunal the 
persons on its territory who were indicted for war crimes and other 
crimes against humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The 
Milosevic regime's brutal crackdown in the province prompted calls for 
the ICTY to conduct investigations into alleged atrocities committed 
there; and the ICTY subsequently indicted Milosevic and four top 
lieutenants for their role in the crackdown. The ICTY's jurisdiction 
also is delineated clearly under UNSCR 827 of 1993 and many subsequent 
resolutions. The regime so far has been uncooperative, claiming that 
the violence in the province does not constitute an ``armed conflict.''
    In the last half of the year, UNMIK and the OSCE actively 
encouraged the development of civil society, including domestically 
based NGO's. Due to the humanitarian crisis that developed after the 
war, numerous international organizations set up operations in the 
province to provide relief for the thousands of returning ethnic 
Albanian refugees, as well as to assist with administration itself. The 
UNHCR, UNICEF, the ICRC, Catholic Relief Services, and other 
organizations are instrumental in aiding UNMIK authorities with 
providing much needed services.
    Human rights monitors including the OSCE, the UNHCR, and the 
Helsinki Committee were active in documenting abuses that occurred in 
the second half of the year.
    UNMIK cooperates with the ICTY, and ICTY investigators made 
numerous trips to the province since the end of the conflict in June to 
investigate alleged war crimes committed there in 1998 and 1999.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    While Federal and republic laws provide for equal rights for all 
citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or social 
status, and prohibit discrimination against women, in reality the legal 
system provided little protection to such groups in the first 6 months 
of the year. Following the end of the conflict in June, KFOR and UNMIK 
were not able to prevent societal violence against Serbs and Roma 
effectively.
    Women.--The traditionally high level of domestic violence 
persisted. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family 
violence have inadequate resources and are limited in their activity by 
social pressure to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of 
spousal abuse ever file complaints with the authorities. However, 
tradition prevents much discussion of the topic of rape among 
Albanians, since the act is seen as dishonoring the entire family. 
According to the Center for the Protection of Women and Children in 
Pristina, rape is not recognized as a crime in Albanian society, making 
the subject even more secretive.
    The situation for ethnic Albanian women in the province worsened 
throughout the first 6 months of the year. Refugee accounts indicate 
that systematic and organized rapes took place in Djakovica and Pec; 
women were raped by Serbian soldiers in full view of their own 
families. The general reluctance to discuss such matters meant that 
many more cases likely were not reported.
    There were incidents of rape reported throughout the province after 
the end of the war. These cases were sporadic and largely attributed to 
the acts of ethnic retaliation and general disorder that were common 
throughout the province. According to Human Rights Watch, uniformed KLA 
members participated in an unspecified number of rapes and murders of 
Serb and Romani women, but there is not sufficient evidence to 
substantiate allegations that the ethnic Albanian leadership planned 
such attacks.
    The province served as a source and transit point for trafficking 
in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.)
    Women do not enjoy status equal to men, and relatively few women 
obtain upper level management positions in commerce. Traditional 
patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women should be 
subservient to the male members of their family, have long subjected 
women to discrimination. In some rural areas, women often are little 
more than serfs without the ability to exercise their right to control 
property and children. However, in the first 6 months of the year women 
legally were entitled to equal pay for equal work and were granted 
maternity leave for 1 year, with an additional 6 months available. 
Under UNMIK administration, women are entitled to the same protections, 
insofar as they do not conflict with internationally recognized 
standards. The lack of job opportunities for women in the province has 
reinforced the traditional culture in which women remain at home.
    Previously the cost of an education in Kosovo--fees for enrollment 
in the parallel system, transportation, clothes, and school supplies--
made families reluctant to send girls to school since the prospect of 
future employment was slim.
    Women are active in political and human rights organizations. 
Women's rights groups continued to operate early in the year with 
little or no official acknowledgement, but the conflict destroyed the 
province's network of NGO's.
    Since UNMIK's establishment in June, the UNHCR established the 
Kosovo Women's Initiative (KWI), modeled after the Bosnia Women's 
Initiative. The KWI was created to fund and organize efforts related to 
promoting women's issues among larger existing groups, which would in 
turn encourage participation by smaller local organizations. The KWI 
actively sought programs that addressed work in rural communities and 
with rural ethnic Albanian migrants in the urban areas. Three large 
umbrella organizations are part of the KWI: Oxfam, the Danish Refugee 
Council, and Maltesers, a German NGO. Proposals for funding from 
smaller international and domestic NGO's specializing in reproductive 
health, skills training, and income-generating activities also were 
reviewed and accepted.
    The Women's Forum was the largest previously existing women's 
organization in the province and is known to be the women's arm of the 
LDK. Although the group undertakes many humanitarian projects, 
beneficiaries of such aid generally have been limited to ethnic 
Albanians.
    Children.--The State attempts to meet the health and educational 
needs of children. The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory 
schooling. Early in the year, the continued division of the province 
into unofficial parallel Serb and Albanian administrative systems 
resulted in Serb and ethnic Albanian elementary age children being 
taught in separate areas of divided schools, or attending classes in 
shifts. Older ethnic Albanian children were attending school in private 
homes. The quality of education thus was uneven before the conflict 
started, and the tension and division of society in general was 
replicated to the detriment of the children. During the first 6 months 
of the year, the conflict and the Serb ethnic cleansing campaign 
interrupted education. Since the end of the conflict, schools have 
reopened; however, extensive damage to buildings, lack of educational 
materials, and persistent electric power problems hindered their 
functioning.
    In 1998 the U.N. Children's Fund estimated that between 55,000 and 
60,000 Albanian children were not in school in the Albanian parallel 
educational system because schools were not functioning in Decane, 
Klina, Glogovac, Srbica, and Djakovica. Such figures likely were much 
higher in the first half of 1999. In late 1998, international observers 
reported multiple incidents of police being stationed near schools in 
the province. Albanian villagers claimed that they were intimidated by 
the police presence and that consequently children would not return to 
those schools.
    Education for most Kosovar citizens during the first 6 months of 
the year was interrupted by the conflict and Serb ethnic cleansing 
campaign. Since the end of the conflict, schools have reopened under 
UNMIK administration, in collaboration with local authorities. 
Extensive damage to many schools, lack of educational materials, and 
persistent electric power problems hindered the full functioning of 
many schools in the last six months of the year.
    The status of education rights has been in flux since the end of 
the war in June. UNMIK maintains that all children of all ethnic groups 
should receive free and universal education, although the process of 
reconstruction of schools was slow in the second half of the year. An 
estimated 75 percent of schools were damaged in the province during the 
conflict. Schools in Pristina reopened in early September and all other 
schools in the province reopened on November 1, with efforts made to 
ensure that minority students could attend classes safely. UNMIK 
provided security for the openings; however, no Serbs allowed their 
children to enroll in schools in Pristina. An exception to the general 
goal of minority integration was in Mitrovica, where allowing Serb 
children to attend school was postponed due to the unstable security 
situation there (see Section 2.d.). Furthermore, the education system 
controlled by the shadow government does not provide for Serbian 
language instruction.
    Economic problems also affected the health care system, adversely 
affecting children. The health situation for children remained 
particularly poor in the province. Humanitarian aid officials blamed 
the high rate of infant and childhood mortality, as well as increasing 
epidemics of preventable diseases, primarily on poverty that led to 
malnutrition and poor hygiene and to the deterioration of public 
sanitation. During the period of Serb administration, ethnic Albanians 
in some cases feared Serb state-run medical facilities, which resulted 
in a low rate of immunization and a reluctance to seek timely medical 
attention. According to the Center for Protection of Women and Children 
in Pristina, 63 percent of IDP's in the province were children.
    The province served as a source and transit point for trafficking 
in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People With Disabilities.--Facilities for persons with disabilities 
are inadequate. The law prohibits discrimination against persons with 
disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision of other 
state services. The law mandates access to new official buildings, and 
the Federal and Serbian Government enforced these provisions in 
practice in the first 6 months of the year.
    Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity in the province are 
so closely intertwined as to be inseparable. Serious discrimination 
against, and harassment of, ethnic minorities was common in the 
province, and the conflict raised ethnic tensions elsewhere in the 
country with implications for religious intolerance.
    Although UNMIK took extra steps in the months following the end of 
the conflict in June to ensure that members of all religious groups 
could worship safely, Bishop Artemije, the leading cleric of the 
Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, declared that the city of Prizren 
was no longer safe and announced that he, 9 priests, and 200 Serb 
civilians would leave for Pristina. Approximately 60 Serb families from 
Pristina already had taken refuge with Artemije in a monastery outside 
the city.
    On June 17, Patriarch Pavle, the leader of the Serbian Orthodox 
Church, said in a radio address that he would move temporarily to the 
historic center of the Church at Pec and appealed to Serbs in the 
province not to leave.
    As of December, Serbian Archbishop Artemije reported that more than 
80 Orthodox churches had been destroyed, damaged, or desecrated. The 
monasteries in Vucitrn and Musutiste were destroyed. Serbian Orthodox 
priests also were intimidated. The KLA abducted one priest, and two 
other priests in Pristina decided to move to the Gracanica monastery 
for safety (see Section 1.b.). Fearing that the monastery's parish 
house would be confiscated by KLA, the Church offered it to the UNHCR 
to use for relief purposes.
    The small Albanian Roman Catholic community, largely centered in 
the southern and western part of Kosovo, has complained that KLA 
members or others acting in the name of the KLA have harassed Catholics 
and hindered religious activities on the pretense that Catholics 
collaborated with the Serbs during the conflict.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In the first 6 months of the 
year, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians and Muslims in the 
province continued to be driven from their homes and fired from their 
jobs on the basis of religion or ethnicity (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 
and 1.g.).
    In the second half of the year in previously Serb-dominated areas, 
Albanians harassed and intimidated Serbs into leaving (see Sections 
1.a. and 1.c.). According to Human Rights Watch, uniformed KLA members 
participated in an unspecified number of rapes and murders of Serb and 
Romani women during the summer, but there is not sufficient evidence to 
substantiate allegations that the ethnic Albanian leadership planned 
such attacks. In some communities, the situation became so grave that 
KFOR had to provide 24-hour protection to Serbs residing in those 
areas.
    Particularly sensitive locations include Djakovica and Kosovo 
Polje, where large numbers of Roma resided. In addition, Mitrovica 
continued to be partitioned between Serbs and ethnic Albanians; and 
Serbs still were concentrated only in the northern section of Orahovac.
    Despite the presence of UNMIK and KFOR, numerous clashes between 
Kosovars and Serbs continued into the fall, occasionally involving KFOR 
troops, including a mortar attack on August 16 near the Serb village of 
Klokot which killed two Serbs and injured five others (see Section 
1.g.).
    A series of clashes between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Mitrovica 
occurred beginning September 9, in which Serbs fired upon a group of 
Albanians who had returned to the area to check on their houses. One 
civilian was killed, and at least 10 French KFOR and civilian police 
personnel were injured, as well as over 50 Serb and ethnic Albanian 
civilians.
    On October 11, Valentin Krumov, a Bulgarian national assigned to 
UNMIK was beaten and shot in the head in a pedestrian area by angry 
ethnic Albanians. Krumov, accompanied by two fellow U.N. staff members, 
was followed by a group of five or six teenage Albanians, before he was 
asked for the time. When Krumov responded in Serbian, the group 
proceeded to beat and kick him. Finally a shot was fired to Krumov's 
head, killing him instantly. The U.N. investigated the incident but had 
not made any arrests by year's end.
    The Romani population generally was tolerated and there was no 
official discrimination in the first half of the year. However, 
prejudice against Roma was widespread and increased among the ethnic 
Albanian population during the conflict and in the last half of the 
year. Incidents of societal violence against Roma increased sharply. As 
of mid-July, some 3,000 Roma, who had experienced difficulty finding 
refuge within the province, fled to a Romani settlement at Konic in 
Montenegro. A total of 8,000 Roma fled to various sites in Montenegro. 
Roma organizations reported that a total of 100,000 had fled the 
province during the conflict but had been recorded by international 
NGO's as Kosovar Albanians.
    Many Roma who feared for their safety gathered in Kosovo Polje 
after the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the province in June. The 
Romani community moved from its makeshift, overcrowded, and unsanitary 
settlement at a Kosovo Polje school on July 21 to a new camp in Obilic. 
The UNHCR organized the move. A community that had numbered over 5,000 
at one point, dwindled down to 1,500 at the prospect of an unpopular 
move. Roma leaders feared for the safety of the community at the new 
camp. Despite KFOR escorts accompanying them during the move, the 
refugees were harassed while traveling to the new camp outside of town. 
Ethnic Albanian children reportedly threw stones at the IDP's, and once 
there, there was a verbal altercation between the Roma and neighboring 
ethnic Albanians. The tent city at Obilic is now closed, and those of 
its inhabitants who did not go to FYROM or back to their home villages 
now live in a renovated, more secure collective dwelling in the village 
of Plementina, near Obilic. Some 8,000 Roma are there.
    A community that once numbered 100,000 to 150,000 in the province 
before the conflict has been reduced sharply. Most Roma have fled to 
neighboring countries, by some estimates 10,000 Roma remaining in 
Kosovo at year's end.
    Serbs displaced from Croatia by the earlier conflict there and 
resettled in Kosovo appealed to the UNHCR for protection in July, 
although most seemed already to have fled the province at that point.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and 
police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. In the 
first 6 months of the year, unions were either official (government 
affiliated) or independent. The government-controlled Alliance of 
Independent Labor Unions (Samostalni Sindikati) was the largest union, 
and the largest independent union is the United Branch Independent 
Labor Unions (Nezavisnost). Most other independent unions were sector 
specific, for example, the Independent Union of Bank Employees. Due to 
the poor state of the economy, over one-half of union workers were on 
long-term mandatory leave from their firms pending increases in 
production. The independent unions, while active in recruiting new 
members, have not yet reached the size needed to enable countrywide 
strikes. The independent unions also claimed that the Government 
prevented effective recruiting through a number of tactics, which 
included preventing the busing of workers to strikes, threatening the 
job security of members, and failing to grant visas to foreign visitors 
who support independent unions. Some foreign union organizers managed 
to secure visas during the year after long delays.
    The largely splintered approach of the independent unions left them 
little to show in terms of increased wages or improved working 
conditions. The trade union organizations that existed in the province 
in the first 6 months of the year did little to protect the rights of 
ethnic Albanian workers and often served as mechanisms for 
discrimination against them.
    In the second half of the year, UNMIK began actively promoting the 
formation of labor organizations to further the rights of workers.
    Since the war, labor organizations that include ethnic Albanians 
once again have begun to appear. The dominant organization, the 
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo, is in the process 
of reconstructing itself. Founded in 1990, the confederation initially 
included 24 independent unions with approximately 250,000 members. 
However, under the Milosevic regime, Serbian authorities regularly 
harassed its members, and during the war, its president was killed and 
union records were destroyed. The current president is working with the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) to establish a Solidarity Center 
office in Pristina.
    The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains 
constrained, although there are no legal impediments to their doing so.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While this 
right is provided for under law, collective bargaining remained at a 
rudimentary level of development. In the first 6 months of the year, 
individual unions tended to be very narrow and pragmatic in their aims, 
unable to join with unions in other sectors to bargain for common 
purposes. The history of trade unionism in the country had centered not 
on bargaining for the collective needs of all workers but rather for 
the specific needs of a given group of workers. Thus, coal workers, 
teachers, health workers, and electric power industry employees had 
been ineffective in finding common denominators (e.g., job security 
protection, minimum safety standards, universal workers' benefits, 
etc.) on which to negotiate. The overall result was a highly fragmented 
labor structure composed of workers who relate to the needs of their 
individual union but rarely to those of other workers. Additionally, 
job security fears, which stem from the high rate of unemployment, 
limited workers' militancy.
    Since the end of the conflict in June, given the poor state of the 
economy and the high unemployment rate, wages barely are paid on time, 
let alone subject to negotiation by labor organizations. In time, once 
the economy becomes more robust, it is the goal of UNMIK to provide 
mechanisms for labor to organize and bargain collectively.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor, 
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and 
generally is not known to occur; however, the province served as a 
source and transit point for trafficking in women and girls for the 
purpose of forced prostitution.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years, although in 
villages and farming communities it is not unusual to find younger 
children at work assisting their families. Moreover, children can be 
found in a variety of unofficial ``retail'' jobs, typically washing car 
windows or selling small items such as cigarettes. With an actual 
unemployment rate (registered unemployed plus redundant workers who 
show up at the workplace but perform only minimal work) in excess of 60 
percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal 
sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is 
prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur, apart from girls 
trafficked from and through the province for the purpose of forced 
prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In the first 6 months of the 
year, large government enterprises, including all the major banks, 
industrial, and trading companies generally observed minimum wage 
standards. The monthly minimum wage was approximately $20 to $40 (Din 
250 to 500). However, this figure was roughly comparable to 
unemployment benefits and (at least theoretically) is paid to workers 
who have been placed in a mandatory leave status. The actual minimum 
wage was at the low end of the range of average net salaries, $85 to 
$106 (Din 700 to 1,200). The minimum wage was insufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. The cost of food and 
utilities alone for a family of four was estimated to be $230 (Din 
2,150) per month. Private enterprises used the minimum wage as a guide 
but tended to pay somewhat higher average wages.
    Since the end of the conflict in the province in June, there was no 
effective minimum wage rate, as Albanians refused to recognize the FRY/
Serbian legal code. The average wage was not sufficient to provide a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family.
    Reports of sweatshops operating in the country are rare, although 
some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor 
conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little 
meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
    Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the 
enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations, 
focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In light of the 
competition for employment, and the high degree of government control 
over the economy, workers were not free to leave hazardous work 
situations without risking the loss of their employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is little information available 
on trafficking, although the province is a source and transit point for 
women and girls trafficked to other parts of Europe for forced 
prostitution. Laws can be used to prosecute traffickers. In April 
relief agencies warned that criminal gangs were trying to abduct young 
girls from the province and traffick them to Italy and Greece for 
forced prostitution. According to one survey, some 37 percent of women 
in refugee camps in Kosovo acknowledged being approached by 
traffickers. At OSCE meetings in September and October in Vienna, 
participants called for the problem of trafficking to be addressed 
quickly in Kosovo, before organized criminal elements became well 
established there.

                               MONTENEGRO

    Montenegro, despite its status as sister republic to Serbia within 
the FRY, continued to make strides in its democratization process. 
Montenegro is now a multiparty, multiethnic, parliamentary democracy 
under the leadership of President Milo Djukanovic, who was elected in 
November 1997. International elections monitors judged those elections 
to be free and fair, as were the parliamentary elections in May 1998 in 
which Djukanovic's reform coalition won control of the Republican 
Assembly (the republic's parliament). At the start of the year, 
Montenegro already had established a large degree of de facto 
independence from federal authorities, but events during the year 
effectively steered the government further away from the federal 
control of Milosevic's regime in Belgrade, which the Montenegrin 
authorities do not recognize as legitimate. The Government submitted a 
proposal on August 5 that would give republic authorities control over 
the army on its soil and the right to establish a separate currency. 
The government respects the constitutional provisions for an 
independent judiciary in practice.
    The republic police, under the authority of the Ministry of the 
Interior, has primary responsibility for internal security. However, 
the Yugoslav Second Army, which has federal jurisdiction in the 
republic and is under federal authority, and whose ranks increased from 
12,000 to 40,000 during the war, made repeated attempts to usurp 
control over the civilian police and the justice system. During the 
conflict in Kosovo, the Federal Government declared martial law and 
also demanded that the republic police be placed under military 
command, a request that the Djukanovic government rejected. The 
republic never recognized officially or implemented the state of war 
declared by the FRY administration in March.
    The economy is in transition from a Communist system to a market-
based system. The republic's tourism-dominated economy suffered as a 
result of the NATO air campaign against Serbia. Although Montenegrin 
sites were largely unscathed, tourist activity fell sharply. The 
government conservatively estimated that during the year the economy 
contracted by 13.8 percent, tourism fell by some $60 million (100 
million DM), while industry declined by some $75 million (120 million 
DM). The federal navy blockaded shipping through the Port of Bar during 
the war but reopened the port on May 10. While exempted from some 
Western sanctions, the republic was still the object of EU sanctions 
until October. Sanctions imposed by Serbia continued at year's end. 
Unemployment rose significantly to at least 35.8 percent, the 
government faced unexpected budgetary shortfalls, and the government 
appealed for new foreign investment. GDP per capita is estimated at 
$937 for the year.
    The republic government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were some reports of abuses committed by 
federal VJ troops stationed in the republic. VJ troops committed 
extrajudicial killings, abducted Kosovar refugees, detained Kosovar 
refugees and journalists, and sought to restrict press freedom. VJ 
troops forcibly conscripted youths and restricted freedom of movement. 
Violence and discrimination against women and minorities continued to 
be a problem. Throughout the year, there were also reports of 
harassment and intimidation of Muslims in the Sandzak region of the 
republic. The republic was the destination for an estimated 70,000 
IDP's from Kosovo, in addition to some 35,000 refugees still resident 
in the republic as a result of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
which together severely taxed the government's resources and 
willingness to provide these refugees with sufficient social and 
physical protection.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by the government. 
However, on April 19, in a drunken rampage VJ reservists under FRY 
command killed eight persons, including local citizens and refugees 
from Kosovo, in the village of Kaludjerski Laz in Rozaje municipality. 
As a result, ethnic Albanian and Muslim local residents, as well as 
Kosovar refugees, left the area. The republic police force increased 
its manpower there to 1,500 men, effectively defusing the situation.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances by republic authorities. However, on May 15, the VJ 
separated 20 men from a convoy of seven busses filled with Kosovar 
Albanian refugees, which the VJ prevented from crossing the border from 
Montenegro into Albania. The men were released several days later.
    c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of 
punishment, and there were no reports of such practices being carried 
out by the republic government; however, there were frequent reports 
that the federal VJ created a climate of intimidation and instability 
through its actions. On June 9, government officials submitted a list 
of 151 criminal charges against reservists in the VJ for offenses 
including unruly behavior, attacking republic police, endangering the 
environment, theft, and unlawful detention (see Section 1.d.). The 
chief prosecutor for the VJ did not act on the charges.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards.
    The Government generally permits prison visits by human rights 
monitors, including the ICRC.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government observes these 
prohibitions; however, there were reports that federal VJ troops 
arbitrarily detained Kosovar refugees and foreign journalists. During 
the conflict, VJ troops stationed in the republic detained dozens of 
Kosovar refugees accused of being members of the KLA in a military 
prison in Spuz, near Podgorica. During the summer, following the 
cessation of hostilities, those held were released after the 
Montenegrin government petitioned for their release. The VJ detained 
international journalists for periods lasting from several hours to 
several days on a regular basis (see Section 2.a.). In April the 
military court in Podgorica issued arrest warrants for Deputy Prime 
Minister Novak Kilibarda and Minister of Justice Dragon Soc for 
allegedly not responding to their draft summons (see Section 1.f). On 
June 10, Croatian journalist Antun Masle escaped from a hospital in 
Podgorica, where he was held on charges of espionage for several weeks.
    Forced exile is prohibited and is not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process. 
However, there is a backlog of cases, the system suffers from a lack of 
resources, and minor corruption remains a problem.
    The court system consists of local, district, and supreme courts at 
the republic level. There is also a military court system under the 
control of federal authorities.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an 
independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, and government 
authorities generally respect these prohibitions. However, during the 
conflict in Kosovo, the FRY Government attempted to draft Montenegrin 
citizens into the VJ for service in Kosovo. These notices largely were 
ignored and even were protested by the Montenegrin populace. As a 
consequence, there were reports that VJ troops broke into houses of 
young Montenegrin men and forcibly conscripted them. However, such 
efforts were largely ineffective since some 14,000 Montenegrins ignored 
the conscription orders and under the law were permitted to remain at 
liberty pending judicial action. The military courts also issued arrest 
warrants for draft resisters in Podgorica, including Minister of 
Justice Dragon Soc and Deputy Prime Minister Novak Kilibarda in April. 
However, no action was taken to arrest these government officials by 
year's end.
    To counteract the draft, the government implemented an ``obligatory 
working duty,'' which possible recruits could cite as a reason why they 
could not enter into military service. Others simply ignored draft 
notices and risked being called before a military tribunal. The 
republic government also defied VJ draft orders; the republic police 
refused to hold resisters in jail and granted them amnesty. The 
drafting campaign yielded little results by mid-May, and the VJ eased 
its efforts in the republic. In November the Montenegrin assembly 
passed a law granting amnesty to persons who evaded the draft from June 
1998 to June 1999. Some 14,000 persons are expected to receive amnesty 
as a result of the legislation.
    On April 18, VJ troops in Rozaje searched the houses of ethnic 
Albanians looking for arms.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the republic government 
generally respected this right in practice, despite repeated VJ 
attempts to interfere. During the year, the Government continued to 
take steps to encourage a freer press by allocating more frequencies to 
independent radio stations and reducing the fees charged to them. TV 
Elmag, a privately owned television station, 14 municipal radio 
stations and 19 private radio broadcasting organizations began or 
continued operations during the year. During the war, Montenegrin 
authorities and media outlets resisted pressure from the Milosevic 
regime and military authorities to stop rebroadcasting Western news 
programming; however, in apparent response to the pressure authorities 
cut back the nearly continuous rebroadcast of Western newscasts. 
Montenegrin authorities resisted VJ demands to take over control of 
government television towers. After the war, rebroadcasts of Western 
programs continued without restriction.
    The Montenegrin government directly impeded free speech in one 
instance, on October 20, when it ordered the radio station Radio Free 
Montenegro to stop transmitting, because it had not reached an 
agreement on broadcasting location and frequency with the Economic 
Ministry. However, the editor of the station claimed that this move was 
a political decision by President Djukanovic to stifle proindependence 
views. Authorities permitted the station to broadcast again on November 
15.
    The VJ also pressured publishers not to print materials that it 
judged to have a negative influence on the war effort. Uniformed and 
armed VJ members met with publishers to complain about stories and 
broadcasts they found objectionable. TV Elmag, a local news station, 
had its frequency reestablished in April. The official reason given for 
the temporary reduction in TV Elmag's frequency was its failure to pay 
its operating fees for 2 months.
    Two independent journalists, Nebojsa Redzic, of Radio Free 
Montenegro, and Miodrag Perovic, owner of the Podgorica Monitor, fled 
the republic in April and May, after being accused by the VJ of 
``impeding the fight against the enemy.'' They were unable to return 
safely until the war was over.
    The VJ detained international journalists on a regular basis. On 
June 10, Croatian journalist Antun Masle escaped from a hospital in 
Podgorica, where he had been held on charges of espionage for several 
weeks. In April the VJ briefly detained two French journalists on 
espionage charges.
    On October 2, Ranko Basanovic, a reporter for Dan, was attacked by 
unknown assailants outside the newspaper's editorial offices. He was 
injured in the head and kidneys. Dan is widely regarded as a mouthpiece 
for Yugoslav Federal Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic, who is President 
Djukonovic's strongest political rival in Montenegro.
    Books expressing a wide range of political and social viewpoints 
are available, as are foreign periodicals and other publications from 
abroad. However, the supply is limited due to the economic situation 
and the relatively small demand.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the 
government respects this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion, 
and the government generally respects this right in practice. Reports 
of harassment in the Muslim populated Sandzak region indicate that it 
was carried out mostly by the VJ.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The republic Constitution provides for 
freedom of movement; and the government respects this right in 
practice; however, federal authorities operating in the republic often 
interfered with this right. On May 15, the VJ prevented seven busses 
filled with Kosovar Albanian refugees from crossing the border from 
Montenegro into Albania. The VJ separated 20 men from the convoy and 
detained them temporarily.
    On May 16, the VJ established three checkpoints on the border 
between Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, at Ilijino Brdo, 
Vracenovic, and Scepan Polje, to prevent military recruits and 
reservists from leaving the country, to impede Montenegrin trade, and 
to interfere with the delivery of NGO medical supplies. Border 
crossings usually are controlled by republic police, and this action 
was seen as yet another instance of the federal regime's interference 
in the republic and abuse of power. The checkpoints were removed after 
the war.
    The government cooperated with the UNHCR in assisting IDP's from 
Kosovo. The republic government accepted approximately 70,000 IDP's 
(well over 10 percent of the republic's population) from Kosovo before 
and during the armed conflict there. The international community 
contributed financial support to the IDP's in the republic through the 
UNHCR and other intergovernmental and nongovernmental humanitarian 
organizations. The IDP's largely were confined to camps along the 
border, since the border areas contained the largest number of ethnic 
Albanian residents of Montenegro who were willing to offer assistance. 
Ethnic Albanian children initially were denied access to schools. 
However, by year's end, the Government was working with international 
organizations on a plan to begin enrolling IDP children.
    There was no official mechanism by which refugees or foreign 
nationals could establish residency. A new citizenship law was passed 
in late October and is in the process of being implemented. The new 
law, while stringent in its requirements, provides a legal and 
equitable means for persons to acquire Montenegrin citizenship.
    The government did not return forcibly IDP's to Kosovo, assisted 
with repatriation only after the conflict was over, and did so under 
U.N. supervision. There were no reports of the forced return of persons 
to a country where they feared persecution during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Montenegrin Constitution provides citizens with the right to 
change their government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in 
practice with respect to republic institutions, but not with federal-
level institutions. President Djukanovic became in 1998 the first 
president popularly elected in free and fair elections. The republic 
government invited the OSCE to observe both the presidential elections 
in 1997 and the parliamentary elections in 1998. Both elections were 
judged to be free and fair. The government enjoys the support of a 
multiethnic coalition in the republic assembly.
    President Milosevic dominates the FRY political system and was 
widely believed to be attempting to consolidate institutional power at 
the federal level at the expense of the republics as a result of his 
move in 1997 from the Serbian republic-level presidency to the federal 
presidency. This move precipitated tensions with authorities in 
Montenegro, who were intent on protecting the republic's authority for 
self-government. By manipulating power within the Federation based on 
the comparative size of the Serbian and Montenegrin populations and 
economies, President Milosevic has been able to circumscribe the 
Montenegrin government's and citizenry's capacity for independent 
action and ability to influence the Federal Government. In the months 
following the crisis in Kosovo, growing dissatisfaction in the republic 
prompted President Djukanovic and members of his administration to call 
for a review of the republic's role in the Federation. Concern over 
possible coup attempts that might be orchestrated by the Milosevic 
regime against the elected government in Podgorica led the republic 
government to demand more control and greater distance from the Serb 
dominated FRY regime.
    In August Djukanovic called for the current federation structure to 
be revised into a confederation, and for the federal governing bodies 
to be dissolved. Djukanovic also threatened that he would hold a 
popular referendum on independence, if the republic's needs were not 
addressed.
    Despite the Montenegrin government's legal rights under the FRY 
Constitution, federal authorities under Milosevic's control throughout 
the year continued not to recognize the 20 Montenegrin members 
delegated to the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly by the 
Montenegrin Parliament. The Montenegrins in the federal body, including 
the Speaker of the upper house, were not changed to reflect the results 
of 1998 Montenegrin parliamentary elections. Moreover, in violation of 
past practice, Milosevic installed Momir Bulatovic as Federal Prime 
Minister and ignored the Montenegrin Government's wish to have some 
voice in who was picked for this key position in the federal power 
structure. Milosevic's antidemocratic control over federal courts was 
demonstrated when the Federal Constitutional Court ruled against the 
Montenegrin government late in the year in disallowing the Montenegrin 
Authorities' attempt to select all 20 Montenegrin representatives to 
the Federal Assembly's Chamber of the Republics. The ruling was a 
complete reversal of a 1994 decision, which allowed Milosevic's ruling 
coalition in Serbia at the time to name all 20 Serbian representatives 
to the upper chamber while he was the President of the Serbian 
republic.
    No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government 
and politics; however, they are underrepresented greatly in party and 
government offices. There are no female ministers in the government, 
but there are five deputy ministers and three members of parliament.
    No legal restrictions affect the role of minorities in government 
and politics, but they are underrepresented, and ethnic Montenegrins 
and Serbs dominate the republic's political leadership. Ethnic 
Albanians participate in the political process, and their parties, 
candidates, and voters participated to a large degree in the last 
elections. The area of the republic primarily inhabited by ethnic 
Albanians was established as a separate voting district in the 1998 
parliamentary elections and, in proportion to the region's population, 
five representatives were elected to the Parliament from the district. 
Ethnic Albanian parties captured two of the seats, with the multiethnic 
program of the pro-Djukanovic Coalition capturing the other three 
seats. Several ministerial and deputy ministerial positions in the 
coalition government are held by ethnic Albanians and Muslims.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate 
without government restriction, and republic officials generally are 
cooperative and responsive to their views. Local NGO's include the 
Montenegrin Helsinki Committee, the Center for Democracy and Human 
Rights, and S.O.S., a support group for abused women and children. In 
addition, several international organizations work with the UNHCR, the 
ICRC, and the Montenegrin Government to deal with the humanitarian 
situation that developed along the border with Kosovo. The republic 
government also invited the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission to set up 
an office in Podgorica. The Montenegrin government pledged in July to 
cooperate with the ICTY and apprehend persons indicted for war crimes 
found in the republic. In November justice minister Soc confirmed that 
authorities had detained Veselin Vlahovic, who is wanted for war crimes 
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian officials announced that 
they planned to seek Vlahovic's extradition and try him in Sarajevo, as 
permitted by the ICTY.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    While federal and republic laws provide for equal rights for all 
citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, or social status, and 
prohibit discrimination against women, in reality the legal system has 
made little progress in providing protection to such groups.
    Women.--The traditionally high level of domestic violence 
persisted. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family 
violence have inadequate resources and are limited in their activity by 
social pressure to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of 
spousal abuse ever file complaints with the authorities. Tradition 
prevents much discussion of the topic of rape among ethnic Albanians, 
since the act is seen as dishonoring the entire family.
    The country served as a transit point for trafficking in women and 
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    Women do not enjoy status equal to men in the republic, and few 
women hold upper level management positions in government or commerce. 
Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women 
should be subservient to the male members of their family, have long 
subjected women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly 
among minority communities, women are little more than serfs without 
the ability to exercise their right to control property and children. 
However, women legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work and 
between 1 year and 18 months of maternity leave. Women are active in 
human rights and women's organizations.
    Children.--The government attempts to meet the health and 
educational needs of children, but insufficient resources at times 
impede this goal. The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory 
schooling. When IDP's began arriving from Kosovo in 1998, the republic 
government initially refused to extend this educational benefit to 
Kosovar Albanians. However, after having consulted with and received 
promises of assistance from international organizations, the government 
announced late in the year that displaced children soon also would be 
allowed to attend school. Although ethnic Albanian children have access 
to instruction in their native tongue, the government came under 
criticism for not also developing a curriculum in which ethnic 
Albanians could learn about their own culture and history.
    The country served as a transit point for trafficking in girls for 
the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--Facilities for the disabled are 
inadequate. The law prohibits discrimination against the disabled in 
employment, education, or in the provision of state services. The law 
mandates access to new official buildings, and the government enforces 
these provisions in practice.
    Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are so closely 
intertwined as to be inseparable. Discrimination exists on a societal 
level, but reports of harassment in the Muslim populated Sandzak region 
were concentrated primarily in the spring, during the conflict with 
NATO and the deployment of the VJ into the region. Incidents generally 
were limited to verbal and physical harassment.
    Prompted at least in part by an increasing drive for political 
independence, an autocephalic Orthodox Church was established in 
Montenegro in the late 1980's. The Church, which has not been 
recognized by any existing Orthodox community either within or outside 
the country, has claimed holdings of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 
Montenegro. The Serbian Orthodox Church remains the most widespread 
faith in Montenegro and has rejected the property claims. The 
Montenegrin Orthodox Church currently holds services in secular 
buildings or outdoors. Although there is no official contact between 
the competing Churches, authorities have balanced the two Churches 
without provoking conflict. However, violence broke out late in the 
year when on November 21 Serbian Orthodox Father Dragan Stanisic 
reportedly hit Montenegrin Orthodox Metropolitan Mihajlo in the face 
during a confrontation on a road near Cetinje. According to press 
reports, Father Stanisic's followers then attacked Metropolitan 
Mihajlo's car, although Stanisic denies that the incident ever 
occurred. Approximately 250 persons demonstrated against the incident 
in Cetinje, and authorities called up riot police and reinforcements to 
prevent further incidents. Seventh-Day Adventists and Jehovah's 
Witnesses are officially registered religions in the republic. However, 
their followers report that their efforts to build and renovate church 
buildings have been impaired by persons they believe to be loyal to the 
local Serbian Orthodox Church.
    Ethnic Minorities.--In January the government began a pilot program 
in ethnic Albanian communities, which devolved extensive authority, 
including taxation, to locally elected officials. An Albanian 
Democratic Union member also was appointed to the post of Minister of 
Minorities to ensure that equal representation and opportunities would 
exist for all ethnic groups. However, societal discrimination against 
minorities exists. Throughout the year, there were also reports of 
harassment and intimidation against Muslims in the Sandzak region, as 
well as harassment of Kosovar refugees carried out by the VJ during the 
spring (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f).
    The Romani population is tolerated, and there is no official 
discrimination. However, prejudice against Roma is widespread. Local 
authorities often ignore or condone societal intimidation of the Romani 
community. Skinheads occasionally violently attacked Roma (see Section 
1.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and 
police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Both 
official, government-affiliated unions and independent unions exist. 
Because the independent labor movement largely is fragmented and access 
to international labor organizations is limited, there have been little 
tangible results in the form of improved conditions and higher wages. 
Another factor impeding the collective bargaining power of the workers 
was the poor condition of the economy, in which high unemployment gave 
the employers the upper hand in setting wages and work conditions, as 
workers competed for whatever jobs existed.
    Unions may affiliate with international labor organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--This right is 
provided for under law, but collective bargaining remains at a 
rudimentary level of development. Instead of attempting to make 
progress on the collective needs of all workers, negotiations generally 
center on advancing the needs of a specific group of workers. Job 
security fears prevail, as a result of the high unemployment rate, and 
these fears limit the groups' militancy.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor, 
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and 
generally is not known to occur; however, the republic served as a 
transit point for trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of 
forced prostitution.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The official minimum age for employment is 16 years, 
although in farming communities, it is not unusual to find younger 
children assisting their families. Moreover, children can be found in a 
variety of unofficial ``retail'' jobs, typically washing car windows or 
selling small items such as cigarettes. The high unemployment rate, 
exacerbated by the conflict in Kosovo, ensures that there is little 
demand for child labor in the formal sector. Forced and bonded labor by 
children is prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur, 
apart from girls trafficked through the republic for the purpose of 
forced prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Large government enterprises, 
including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies 
generally observe the minimum wage standard, which is approximately $20 
to $40 (Din 250 to 500). However, this figure is comparable to 
unemployment benefits or wages paid to those on mandatory leave. The 
actual minimum wage for workers in active status is closer to $85 to 
$106 (Din 700 to 1,200). Although firms actually pay slightly higher 
than these wages, this amount is insufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family. The cost of food and 
utilities alone for a family of four is estimated to be $230 (Din 
2,150) per month.
    The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little meaning in an 
economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
    Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the 
enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations, 
focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In view of the 
competition for employment, and the high degree of government control 
over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work 
situations without risking the loss of their employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically forbids 
trafficking in persons. There is little information available on 
trafficking, although the republic is a source for women and girls 
trafficked to other parts of Europe for forced prostitution. Recently 
six women who were victims of trafficking were returned to Ukraine.
                                 ______
                                 

                            SLOVAK REPUBLIC

    The Slovak Republic became an independent state in 1993, following 
the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Its 
Constitution provides for a multiparty, multiethnic parliamentary 
democracy, including separation of powers. The first direct 
presidential elections were held in May and were declared fair and free 
by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Prime 
Minister Mikulas Dzurinda took office after parliamentary elections in 
the fall of 1998. Slovakia chose to carry over the entire body of CSFR 
domestic legislation and international treaty obligations, which still 
are being renewed or updated. The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, some critics allege that the Ministry 
of Justice's logistical and personnel authority allows it to exert some 
influence on the judicial system.
    The national police, which fall under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Interior, are the primary law enforcement agency. In 
addition to domestic law enforcement, they also have responsibility for 
border security. The Slovak Information Service (SIS), an independent 
organization reporting directly to the Prime Minister, is responsible 
for all civilian security and intelligence activities. A parliamentary 
commission composed of legislators from ruling and opposition parties 
oversees the SIS. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective 
control of the security forces. Police committed some human rights 
abuses.
    Slovakia continued to make progress in the transition from a 
command-based to a market-based economy, with more than 85 percent of 
gross domestic product (GDP) now generated by the private sector. The 
economy is largely industrial, with only 7 percent of GDP generated by 
agricultural production. Major exports are iron and steel products, 
audio and video equipment, machinery and transport equipment, plastic 
materials, paper products, apparel, petroleum products, and organic 
chemicals. GDP growth slowed from 4.4 percent at the end of 1998 to 1.8 
percent in the third quarter of the year, partly in response to 
government austerity measures adopted in January and May to deal with a 
chronic current account deficit. Inflation increased to 14.2 percent 
for the year, largely due to increases in regulated prices. The slowing 
in growth and high current account deficits are largely the result of a 
failure under the previous government to implement structural reforms, 
such as financial sector privatization and industrial restructuring. 
Real GDP per capita was approximately $3,800 at the end of 1998, the 
last date for which statistics are available, providing most of the 
population with an adequate standard of living. Unemployment was more 
than 18 percent, reaching almost 35 percent in some areas. A 
disproportionate number of unemployed are Roma, who face exceptional 
difficulties in finding and holding jobs, partly as a result of 
discrimination.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the human rights situation improved during the year; 
however, problems remained in some areas. There was one possible 
extrajudicial killing by police, and police on occasion beat and abuse 
Roma. Authorities on occasion infringed on citizens' privacy rights; 
however, the practice of using the SIS under the former government to 
conduct surveillance of many political figures, journalists, and their 
spouses has been eliminated. The absence of government intimidation 
removed the pressure on journalists to practice self-censorship. Media 
monitors report that government politicization of the state-owned 
electronic media has been nearly eliminated; however members of the 
press reported that some figures close to the Government pressured 
state-owned Slovak Television (STV) to report government activities 
positively. Discrimination and violence against women remain problems. 
Abuse of children and discrimination against the disabled are problems. 
Roma faced societal discrimination, and the police sometimes failed to 
provide adequate protection against attacks on them by skinheads or to 
investigate such cases vigorously. Skinhead attacks on Roma increased 
during the year. Some anti-Semitic incidents occurred, and limited 
societal discrimination against the Hungarian minority persists, mainly 
in regions where only small numbers of the ethnic Hungarian minority 
reside. There were instances of trafficking in women and girls.
    During the year, the Dzurinda Government corrected some abuses of 
the previous government, initiated investigations into some serious 
crimes, and created the position of special government commissioner for 
Roma issues in the Office of Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights and 
Minorities. Deputy Prime Minister Pal Csaky continued the dialog that 
he had opened with religious and ethnic minorities late in 1998 but 
came under increasing criticism for concentrating on the problems of 
the ethnic Hungarian minority rather than the Roma minority. The 
Parliament also created a special Parliamentary Advisory Committee for 
Roma Issues in February and in July passed a minority language law.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government officials. However, a 
police officer allegedly shot a 21-year-old Rom while he was being 
interrogated for allegedly stealing a bicycle in Poprad in the north 
central region of the country in August. The case is currently under 
investigation, and the police officer involved was suspended during the 
investigation. The Commissioner for Romani Affairs, Vincent Danihel, 
complained in August that he was not satisfied with the police 
officer's explanation of the death, i.e., that the Rom had shot himself 
with the gun of the officer who was questioning him. Danihel pointed 
out that if the explanation were true, the officer violated regulations 
by interrogating the Rom alone with a gun accessible to him.
    There was no progress during the year in the investigation of the 
1996 death of Robert Remias. There has been widespread press 
speculation that elements of the security services were involved in the 
death.
    In January Jan Ducky, the former Economy Minister under the 
previous Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and head of the national gas 
distribution monopoly, was killed in the lobby of his apartment 
building. Meciar's party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS), believes that the killing was the result of political 
intolerance. The authorities filed charges against Ducky a week prior 
to his killing for financial mismanagement and illegal property 
transfers while at the gas monopoly. Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner 
stated that Ducky may have been killed to prevent his testimony on the 
Meciar government's reported financial misdeeds. Authorities arrested a 
Ukrainian citizen on charges of murder in the case by year's end.
    On November 16, Minister of Justice Jan Carnogursky established a 
department for the documentation of crimes committed by the Communist 
regime. The department is to conduct interviews and gather evidence on 
the regime's acts of violence and persecution against its citizens.
    Skinhead violence against Roma increased during the year but did 
not lead to any confirmed cases of death, unlike the previous year.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, police 
on occasion beat Roma. In January police officers reportedly raided a 
Roma settlement in Kosice, injuring 16 Roma, including women. In 
October during a raid on a Romani community in Zehra, police allegedly 
used excessive force as they detained nine Roma on charges of 
hooliganism. During the incident, police shot a 13-year-old Romani boy 
with a plastic bullet, and he was hospitalized as a result of his 
injury. An investigation is under way. Police reportedly use pressure 
and threats to discourage Roma from pressing charges of police 
brutality (see Section 1.e.).
    Credible sources say that the police sometimes tolerate violence 
against Roma by not investigating attacks against them in a timely and 
thorough manner (see Sections 1.e. and 5). Some police also infringe on 
the rights of Roma to social benefits and housing (see Section 2.d.). 
Roma in Vrable continue to lodge complaints against local law 
enforcement officer Roman Frajka for allegedly attacking teenage Romani 
boys. To date there have been no official charges brought against him.
    Residents of Asian origin complain that police fail to investigate 
skinhead attacks against them as well.
    Interior Minister Pittner released a report in January attesting to 
the SIS's influence over the Ministry of Interior under Meciar, 
especially over the investigative and criminal police sections.
    The 1995 case of the violent abduction of the former President's 
son, Michal Kovac Jr., to Austria, during which he was tortured, 
remains unsolved. The new Government actively reinvestigated the case 
in which former SIS personnel are alleged to be implicated. On February 
26, the police arrested two former high-ranking officers of the SIS. On 
February 25, the Parliament lifted parliamentary immunity from former 
Interior Minister Gustav Krajci, enabling his formal prosecution for 
his involvement in thwarting the referendum on NATO entry and direct 
presidential elections. On April 9, Parliament lifted immunity from 
former SIS head Ivan Lexa in five of the seven cases in which he 
allegedly was implicated, and subsequently he was placed in preliminary 
detention. However, he was released later on the decision of a regional 
court, and the Constitutional Court concurred that amnesties granted to 
Krajci and a second official involved in the case, Jaroslav Svechota, 
by former Prime Minister Meciar largely could shield them from 
prosecution. Lexa also had been charged with obstruction of justice in 
connection with the investigation of bombs that were set off at an 
opposition rally in 1997, and his prosecution continued at year's end.
    Skinhead violence against Roma and other minorities remained a 
problem (see Section 5).
    Unknown assailants attacked a labor union official in October (see 
Section 6.a.).
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes 
these prohibitions.
    A person accused or suspected of a crime must be given a hearing 
within 24 hours and either set free or remanded by the court. During 
this time, the detainee has the right to an attorney. If remanded by a 
court, the accused is entitled to an additional hearing within 24 
hours, at which the judge either sets the accused free or issues a 
substantive written order placing the accused in custody. Investigative 
detention may last up to 2 months and may be extended. The total length 
of pretrial detention may not exceed 1 year, unless the Supreme Court 
extends it, after determining that the person constitutes a serious 
danger to society.
    Pretrial detainees constituted roughly 25 percent of the total 
prison population, and the average pretrial detention period was 7.2 
months. The law allows family visits and provides for a court-paid 
attorney if needed. A system of bail exists. Noncitizens may be 
detained for up to 30 days for the purposes of identification. 
Detainees have the right to see an attorney immediately and should be 
notified of this right; however, one nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
reports that not all detainees are notified of their rights.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government observes this 
prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for 
courts that are independent, impartial, and separate from the other 
branches of government; however, some critics allege that the 
dependence of judges upon the Ministry of Justice for logistical 
support, the granting of leave requests, and other services undermines 
their independent status. Also, the Ministry of Justice can demote 
presidents and vice presidents of the courts for any reason, although 
they remain judges, and it has done so. Although not specified in 
legislation, in practice the Association of Judges now nominates 
presidents of courts, and the Ministry of Justice to date has accepted 
all of the nominations. This practice increases the independence of the 
judicial branch.
    The court system consists of local and regional courts, with the 
Supreme Court as the highest court of appeal except for constitutional 
questions. There is a separate Constitutional Court--with no ties to 
the Ministry of Justice--that considers constitutional issues. In 
addition there is a separate military court system, the decisions of 
which may be appealed to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional 
Court. Under the Constitution, the President appoints Constitutional 
Court judges to 7-year terms based upon parliamentary nominations. 
Parliament elects other judges, based on recommendations from the 
Ministry of Justice, and can remove them for misconduct.
    Persons charged with criminal offenses are entitled to fair and 
open public trials. They have the right to be informed of the charges 
against them and of their legal rights, to retain and consult with 
counsel sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense, and to confront 
witnesses. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and have the 
right to refuse to testify against themselves. They may appeal any 
judgment against them. Human rights monitors continued to charge that 
police are reluctant to take the testimony of witnesses to skinhead 
attacks on Roma (also see Sections 1.c. and 5). Furthermore, they 
reported that police used the device of countercharges or threats of 
countercharges to pressure Roma victims of police brutality to drop 
their complaints. Human rights monitors reported that medical doctors 
and investigators cooperated with police by refusing to describe 
accurately the injuries involved, and that lawyers often were reluctant 
to represent Roma in such situations, for fear that this would have a 
negative effect on their practice.
    In November Chairman of the Constitutional Court Milan Cic 
announced that politicians were pressuring the Constitutional Court in 
the case of former Deputy Head of the SIS Jaroslav Svechota. Cic 
complained that some political leaders expected the Court to rule in 
accordance with their written ``recommendations,'' which could threaten 
the Court's independence. Svechota's case before the Court concerns 
amnesty issued by the previous government. When the Court ruled in his 
favor, the prosecution of individuals involved in the Kovac Jr. case 
was halted (see Section 1.c.).
    Credible sources claim that it is increasingly difficult for 
citizens who are not economically advantaged to obtain noncriminal 
legal representation. Therefore it is becoming more difficult for some 
who may have had their rights infringed upon to take further action. 
According to one NGO leader, even the Chamber of Advocates, the 
professional organization that approves bar appointments and serves as 
an advocate for lawyers, encouraged its members to avoid accepting 
clients who could be considered disadvantaged.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law provides for these rights, but the authorities 
sometimes infringed upon them. The Criminal Code requires police to 
obtain a judicial search warrant in order to enter a home. The court 
may issue such a warrant only if there is a well-founded suspicion that 
important evidence or persons accused of criminal activity are present 
inside, or if there is some other important reason. Police must present 
the warrant before conducting the house search or within 24 hours after 
the search.
    Roma activists have alleged that police have upon occasion entered 
their premises without a search warrant.
    The 1993 police law regulates wiretapping and mail surveillance for 
the purposes of criminal investigation, which may be conducted on the 
order of a judge or prosecutor only in cases of extraordinarily serious 
premeditated crimes or crimes involving international treaty 
obligations. Although it is clear that the SIS no longer participates 
in illegal activities on the scale that it did under the previous 
government, some Romani activists allege that their telephones were 
tapped and that they have been placed under surveillance, particularly 
when large numbers of Roma applied for political asylum in Finland and 
Norway during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice. The print media are free and 
uncensored, and unlike the previous year, individuals now report that 
they feel able to criticize the Government without fear of reprisal.
    Newspapers and magazines regularly publish a wide range of opinions 
and news articles. The politicization of state-owned broadcast media, 
which was a significant problem under the previous government, no 
longer is evident. There were no reported cases of journalists being 
intimidated or threatened in attempts to influence their reporting. 
However, the press reported a number of allegations that individuals 
associated with the current Government pressured state-owned Slovak 
Television (STV) to favor government interests in political reporting. 
In August Democratic Party (DS) Vice Chairman Peter Zajac said that the 
DS was ``concerned with attempts by some politicians to interfere with 
the public character of Slovak Television.'' There were other reports 
that government supporters influenced STV management to block perceived 
criticism.
    The potential for political interference exists because STV is 
reliant on government funds. However, STV officials assert that 
government officials do not threaten retaliation if the STV does not 
report the news to the Government's liking.
    Shortly after the May presidential elections, the NGO Memo, which 
had monitored election coverage, issued a report indicating that the 
STV and TV Markiza both had given a disproportionate amount of 
broadcast time to the winning candidate, Rudolf Schuster, who was 
supported by the Government. According to Memo, TV Markiza's coverage 
of other candidates was largely negative. The Slovak Council for Radio 
and Television Broadcasting fined TV Markiza and required it to 
broadcast a notice that it had violated the law. In November the 
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Broadcasting Council to fine 
TV Markiza more than $23,000 (1 million SK) for broadcasting a speech 
by Prime Minister Dzurinda in the 48-hour period prior to the 
presidential election, when campaigning is prohibited (see Section 3).
    On February 26, 26 journalists from the STV were fired by the new 
STV management due to their alleged biased reporting on behalf of 
former Prime Minister Meciar during his term in office. These 
journalists claim that they were fired due to their political beliefs 
and have pursued their case with human rights advocates. However, a 
number of these groups did not take up their case, because they do not 
believe that the journalists were fired for political reasons.
    The Government did not use libel laws to suppress criticism of 
political or other leaders. In June former President Kovac won a libel 
suit against former editor in chief of the opposition Slovenska 
Republika, Jan Smolec, for publishing several false statements and 
slanderous articles that were aimed at damaging Kovac's personal and 
professional reputation. However, Slovenska Republika paid only 
approximately $7,500 (SK 300,000) of the $12,500 (SK 500,000) that it 
is required to pay in damages. The Government does not use tax laws or 
allocations of newsprint or advertising revenue to suppress criticism 
of political and other leaders or the expression of viewpoints not 
favored by the Government.
    In June authorities charged Slovenska Republika editor in chief 
Jaroslav Reznik with violating the press law by publishing state 
secrets. In January Reznik had published an article about 
reorganization of the SIS, which included the names of the new SIS 
division directors. The crime is punishable by up to 3 years in prison 
or a ban on publishing. However, the case was closed after Reznik 
argued that the daily newspaper SME published the list before Slovenska 
Republika.
    Three boards appointed by majority vote of Parliament supervise 
radio and television broadcasting. The Slovak Television Council and 
the Slovak Radio Council establish broadcasting policy for state-owned 
television and radio. The Slovak Council for Radio and Television 
Broadcasting issues broadcast licenses and administers advertising laws 
and some other regulations. The Radio and Television Council has made 
significant progress in fostering the spread of private broadcasting, 
for which it has issued 27 radio and 78 television and cable television 
licenses. TV Markiza, a private company with a signal covering two-
thirds of the country, is the most watched station.
    The Government does not censor books, films, or plays or limit 
access to the Internet.
    Money has been reallocated to minority groups for the publication 
of minority language newspapers.
    The law provides for academic freedom, and the Dzurinda Government 
took steps to reverse the restrictions on academic freedom that existed 
under the previous government. The Government no longer intervenes in 
the administration and funding of institutions of higher education, nor 
does it approve all professors' appointments. Many of the school 
administrators who were appointed based solely on political favoritism 
during the previous regime have been replaced. The practice of 
diverting money from the older, then pro-opposition, universities 
largely has been reversed. However, the use of bribery by some students 
to increase their chances for acceptance into some more prestigious 
faculties is widely believed to result in unequal access for 
economically disadvantaged students.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. 
Registration is not required, but under existing law, only registered 
churches and religious organizations have the explicit right to conduct 
public worship services and other activities, although no specific 
religions or practices are banned or discouraged by the authorities in 
practice. In order to register as a church, a religious organization 
must collect the signatures of 20,000 persons with long term residency 
in the country. The State provides financial benefits, including 
subsidies for clergy and office expenses, only to the 15 registered 
churches and religious organizations.
    On February 1, police arrested two former high officials in the SIS 
for involvement in the 1995 effort to discredit the chairman of the 
Slovak Bishops Conference. Allegedly the SIS framed the Bishop for 
selling religious art for personal gain. If convicted, former Chief of 
the SIS Counterintelligence Unit Jaroslav Svechota and Deputy Director 
of the Surveillance Unit Robert Beno would face sentences of between 5 
and 12 years in jail.
    By law churches and religious organizations could apply for the 
return of their property that had been confiscated by the Communist 
government; the deadline for these claims was December 31, 1994. The 
property was returned by the State, by municipalities, by state legal 
entities, and under certain conditions even by private persons. The 
main obstacles to the resolution of outstanding restitution claims are 
the Government's lack of financial resources, due to its austerity 
program, and bureaucratic resistance on the part of those entities 
required to vacate restitutable properties. While the Orthodox Church 
reported that six of the seven properties on which it had filed claims 
already had been returned, the Catholic Church and the Federation of 
Jewish Communities (FJC) reported lower rates of success.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
    According to a legal rights NGO, although the law requires state 
administrators to register all citizens, some local police officers 
refused to give a registration stamp to Romani citizens, which prevents 
them from receiving social benefits and housing. In March a Roma rights 
NGO filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights in 
Strasbourg against city councils in Nagov and Rokytovce for passing 
regulations in 1997 prohibiting Roma from moving to the town and 
threatening to expel them. In April the two cities repealed the 
regulations in response to government pressure (see Section 5).
    The law includes provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates 
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian 
organizations in assisting refugees. During the year, 1,320 persons 
applied for asylum. Of these cases and cases held over from previous 
years, 2 were granted citizenship, 27 were accepted as refugees, 176 
claims were rejected, 1,034 persons terminated their cases, and the 349 
cases were pending at year's end. Authorities granted 205 persons from 
Kosovo temporary protection during the year.
    There were no reports of the forced expulsion of those having a 
valid claim to refugee status; however, some refugee claimants had 
difficulty in gaining access to initial processing.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government 
through the periodic free election of their national representatives. 
Citizens over the age of 18 are eligible to vote, and voting is by 
secret ballot. The Constitution reserves certain powers to the 
President as Chief of State (directly elected by the citizens), but 
executive power rests with the Prime Minister. Legislative power is 
vested in the National Council of the Slovak Republic (Parliament). The 
country was without a president for over 1 year until June 12, when 
Rudolf Schuster was inaugurated as the country's first directly elected 
president. On January 14, Parliament amended the Constitution to allow 
for direct elections of the President, who previously had been elected 
by the Parliament. Until Schuster's inauguration, the majority of the 
President's powers were delegated to the Prime Minister, and the rest 
to the Speaker of Parliament, in accordance with the Constitution.
    The two-round direct presidential elections were held in May. OSCE 
observers monitored the elections and found them free of fraud. Voter 
turnout was 75 percent.
    Domestic and international observers and the media monitoring NGO 
Memo criticized Prime Minister Dzurinda for a speech he gave on 
national television after the moratorium on campaigning had begun, 2 
days before the elections. During this speech he encouraged citizens to 
visit the polls and make the democratic choice, which was seen by many 
as a call for citizens to vote for Schuster. The Radio and Television 
Broadcasting Council fined TV Markiza for broadcasting the speech and 
required it to broadcast a notice that it had violated the law (see 
Section 2.a.).
    On March 1, authorities charged former Minister of Interior Gustav 
Krajci with abuse of power and forgery of ballots in the 1997 
referendum on direct presidential elections. As Deputy Chairman of the 
Central Election Commission, Krajci allegedly deleted from the 
referendum ballot the question on holding direct elections for 
president and marked the new ballot with the Commission's official 
stamp, without notifying the Commission of the change.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 2 
female ministers, 1 of the 9 Constitutional Court judges appointed in 
November is a woman, and women hold 21 seats in the 150-member 
Parliament.
    The large ethnic Hungarian minority, whose coalition gained 15 
seats in Parliament in the September 1998 elections, is well 
represented in Parliament and the government. One ethnic Hungarian sits 
on the Constitutional Court. Roma are not represented in Parliament, 
but a Rom holds the newly created position of Government Commissioner 
for Roma Issues.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate 
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their 
findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally are 
cooperative and responsive to their views. A 1996 law, requiring NGO's 
and foundations to reregister and have substantial financial resources 
in order to operate, eliminated some foundations, primarily dormant 
groups. However, no organization was denied registration or faced any 
other major problem in continuing to operate. The impact of another law 
setting limits on allowable administrative expenses has not created 
significant problems. Many NGO representatives believed that the 
previous Meciar government was hostile to NGO's. In contrast, the 
Dzurinda Government appointed many NGO representatives to government 
positions. However, some NGO leaders allege that the current Government 
at times is unresponsive to their requests.
    In November 1998, the Government created the position of Deputy 
Prime Minister for Human and Minority Rights. The new Deputy Prime 
Minister, Pal Csaky, a member of the Party of the Hungarian Coalition, 
immediately opened a dialog with religious and minority groups. 
However, Minister Csaky has come under increasing criticism from the 
Romani community for spending the majority of his time dealing with 
issues concerning Hungarians. Many Roma leaders have called for his 
resignation in response to what they claim is his unwillingness and 
inability to address Roma problems.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination and provides for the equality of 
all citizens. However, enforcement is uneven, with different minority 
groups reporting that their members often receive no government 
assistance with complaints about discrimination. Health care, 
education, retirement benefits, and other social services are provided 
regardless of race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social 
status.
    Women.--Violence, particularly sexual violence against women, 
remains a serious and underreported problem. According to Ministry of 
Interior statistics, both domestic and public violence against women 
has been increasing: 1,000 cases of public violence were registered in 
1997, compared with 276 in 1985. Domestic violence in 1997 included 
2,656 cases, compared with 1,874 in 1995 when statistics first were 
kept. One NGO's regional research showed that 38 to 40 percent of women 
were victims of domestic violence. Police estimate that two-thirds of 
female rape victims fail to report their cases. Police treat spousal 
abuse, other violence against women, and child abuse in the same way as 
other criminal offenses; sections in the Criminal Code specifically 
address rape, sexual abuse, and trafficking in women.
    Legislation has not yet recognized and specified the term domestic 
violence. There is one consulting center for abused women in the 
country. There is no shelter for battered women, but several NGO's 
continue to advocate the idea strongly. However, there is a family 
shelter for victims of child and spousal abuse. In the view of some 
NGO's, the lack of relevant data on domestic violence is used by police 
authorities to downplay the extent of domestic violence.
    As a result of amendments to the Criminal Code that took effect in 
1994, prostitution is not illegal. However, the code prohibits 
activities related to prostitution, such as renting apartments for 
conducting prostitution, spreading sexually transmitted diseases, or 
trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution. Trafficking in 
women is a problem, and the Government views it with concern (see 
Section 6.f.).
    Women are equal under the law. They have the same property, 
inheritance, and other legal rights as men. However, discrimination 
against women remained a problem. According to sociological studies, 
women receive approximately 85 percent of men's wages for similar work. 
However, the definition of similar work is not defined precisely. For 
example, women may have fewer years' experience on the job due to time 
spent out of the work force raising a family.
    In December 1997, the Gender Center for Equal Treatment of Men and 
Women was founded. The Center is an independent NGO that cooperates 
with the U.N. Development Program and the Government. The Government's 
Coordinating Committee for Women's Affairs (including NGO's) drafted a 
national action plan for women that was adopted by the Government in 
September 1997. The plan presents a thorough analysis of the situation 
of women and proposes specific measures to resolve existing problems in 
the next decade, including reducing violence against women, protecting 
women's health, and reducing women's economic disadvantages. In 
contrast to the past, a number of organizations emerged in the past 10 
years promoting women's issues and interests.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
rights and welfare through its system of public education and medical 
care. The Ministry of Labor oversees implementation of the Government's 
programs for children. The Constitution, the law on education, the 
Labor Code, and the system of assistance payments to families with 
children each provide in part for children's rights. Education is 
compulsory for 9 years, or until the age of 15.
    Abuse of children remains a problem and is underreported. Experts 
from various state institutions dealing with child abuse claim that 
there are significant discrepancies between official figures on child 
violence and the actual situation. A recent survey of over 7,000 
children conducted by an NGO offering resources to abused children 
indicated that 12 percent of children are victims of sexual abuse, 
while 20 percent are victims of physical abuse. According to available 
police statistics, child beating and sexual abuse are on the rise. 
NGO's expect this trend to continue and worsen as the economic 
situation declines. In 1997 there were 1,083 reported cases of crimes 
against children. Among the most frequent crimes committed against 
children are: Nonpayment of child support, sexual violence, and 
beatings.
    Youth criminality has increased as well. Children under the age of 
15 reportedly committed 226 crimes in 1990. In 1998 this number rose to 
4,980. Juveniles (15 to 18 years of age) committed 5,191 crimes in 
1998. According to the Ministry of Justice, 3,027 juveniles were 
convicted of crimes during 1998. Child prostitution is not addressed 
specifically in the Criminal Code, but is covered by more general 
provisions in the law. The Penal Code was amended on September 1 to 
include a provision outlawing child pornography.
    The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), several NGO's, and other 
institutions dealing with children's issues have called for amendments 
to the law on families, particularly the part on relations between 
parents and children. UNICEF also has recommended creation of an 
ombudsman's office that would defend children's rights. There are two 
regional emergency hot line numbers for abused children and one 
counseling help line.
    Existing legislation appears to place emphasis on parents over 
children's rights. Current legislation allows parents to place their 
child in a state-run institution for abandoned children, and as long as 
contact is maintained once every 6 months, the child remains in the 
custody of the parents and cannot be adopted.
    NGO leaders claim that existing legislation protects aggressors 
before victims. If a husband or wife is guilty of child and/or spousal 
abuse it is often the victim who is forced to leave the family home. 
Furthermore, if children who are victims of physical or sexual abuse 
seek assistance or treatment, their parents must be informed.
    People with Disabilities.--The Constitution and implementing 
legislation provide for health protection and special working 
conditions for mentally and physically disabled persons, including 
special protection in employment relations and special assistance in 
training. A 1994 decree provides incentives to employers who create a 
``sheltered'' workplace (i.e., a certain percentage of jobs set aside 
for the disabled). The law also prohibits discrimination against 
physically disabled individuals in employment, education, and the 
provision of other state services. Nevertheless, experts report 
discrimination in the accessibility of premises and access to education 
(especially higher education). Although not specifically required by 
law, another 1994 government decree mandates accessibility for new 
building construction. The decree provides for sanctions but lacks a 
mechanism to enforce them. A spokeswoman for an NGO dealing with the 
disabled said in 1997 that due to pressure from a number of NGO's, 
accessibility has been improving--particularly regarding new 
construction. NGO's complained that other legislation, including the 
provision of jobs for the disabled, while on the books, often is 
ignored.
    Religious Minorities.--Despite an order by former Prime Minister 
Meciar to withdraw a controversial history book entitled the ``History 
of Slovakia and the Slovaks'' by Milan Durica, it remains available in 
schools. The book has been widely criticized by religious groups and 
the Slovak Academy of Sciences for gross inaccuracies and distortions, 
particularly in its portrayal of wartime Slovakia and the deportation 
of Jews and Roma.
    Despite protests by the FJC, Slovak National Party members and the 
official Slovak cultural organization Matica Slovenska continued their 
efforts to revise the history of the pro-Nazi wartime Slovak state and 
to rehabilitate its leader Jozef Tiso. On March 14, a marginal 
nationalist party, Slovak National Unity (SNU), held a rally to 
commemorate the 60th anniversary of the wartime Slovak state. The rally 
was attended by approximately 300 persons, including a number of 
skinheads. The police kept the event under tight control to prevent any 
violence. Chairman of the SNU Stanislav Panis in his tribute to Tiso 
appealed to the Government to make March 14 an official national 
holiday. Anti-Fascist and anti-Tiso protesters concurrently held a 
counterdemonstration on another Bratislava square. The Young Democratic 
Left organizers criticized Tiso's regime, racism, and extremism.
    On March 14, the Dzurinda Government released a statement in which 
it underlined that the current republic is not a successor of the 
wartime Slovak state, which was totalitarian and antidemocratic. The 
statement added that the Government considers the 1944 Slovak National 
Uprising against the wartime Tiso state one of the most significant 
events in putting the country back on the democratic track, and that 
the Government is committed to fight against any expression of 
intolerance, racism, nationalism, and xenophobia. However, the Slovak 
National Party also issued a statement in which it said that the 
anniversary of the wartime Slovak state marked ``the most important 
step in the modern history of the Slovak nation.''
    The official Slovak cultural organization Matica Slovenska and the 
Confederation of Political Prisoners commemorated the 1939-1945 Slovak 
state at a meeting in which they emphasized the significance of March 
14 as a symbol of Slovak statehood. Unlike previous years, prominent 
government officials did not attend.
    On July 17, the FJC in Slovakia expressed its concern over the 
desecration of the monument to Holocaust victims located in the old 
city in Bratislava. Unknown culprits smashed and broke the marble base 
of the monument. There are no suspects in the case.
    In May 1998, the Supreme Court upheld a prior verdict that the 
publisher of Zmena weekly had to publish an apology to the honorary 
chairman of the FJC for abusing his person and offending his religious 
feelings. The apology still was not published by year's end.
    On November 3, Parliament passed legislation compensating Slovak 
citizens who were deported to German controlled concentration camps 
during World War II on the basis of their nationality, race, or 
religion. For each month of deportation, those eligible are to receive 
a cash sum of $75 (SK 3,000), plus a $.75 (SK 30) addition to their 
monthly pension. Direct heirs of deceased victims, who at the time of 
deportation were minors, are entitled to a lump sum of up to 
approximately $2,500 (SK 100,000). The legislation disqualifies the 
nearly 700 Slovak Jewish survivors from southern Slovakia, which was 
under Hungarian control during World War II, because they received 
compensation from the Hungarian Government.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides 
minorities with the right to develop their own culture, receive 
information and education in their mother tongue, and participate in 
decisionmaking in matters affecting them. The Government continued to 
provide funding for cultural, educational, broadcasting, and publishing 
activities for the major ethnic minorities, but at greatly reduced 
levels. However, there is no comprehensive law against discrimination.
    The largest minority is the ethnic Hungarian minority. It is 
concentrated primarily in southern Slovakia, with a population 
registered at 567,756 (150,000 of whom are thought to be Roma who speak 
Hungarian and choose to declare themselves as ethnic Hungarian). Most 
ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Slovaks living in mixed areas continued to 
coexist peacefully, but in recent years there have been occasional 
expressions of anti-Hungarian sentiments by Slovak nationalists. In 
1998 the Government and the Government of Hungary signed an 
implementation agreement for their 1996 bilateral treaty, which called 
for the establishment of commissions to deal with the treatment of 
ethnic minorities, and the commissions were established on February 8.
    On July 11, Parliament passed a minority language law providing for 
the use of minority languages in official activities, and President 
Schuster signed the law on July 20. According to the law, in places 
where a minority group constitutes at least 20 percent of the 
population, the minority language can be used in contacts with 
government officials. The law was deemed acceptable by the OSCE High 
Commissioner on National Minorities and the European Union. The law was 
passed by a vote of 70 to 18 in Parliament. However, all members of the 
Hungarian coalition voted against the law because they felt that it did 
not ensure that the provisions in the new law would take precedence 
over the existing state language law. Furthermore, the Hungarian 
minority felt that a more comprehensive law was necessary, and that 
this law did not protect the use of Hungarian in cultural and 
educational activities.
    The Parliament created a special Parliamentary Advisory Committee 
for Roma Issues in February.
    On March 5, at a rally held by the opposition Slovak National Party 
(SNS) and HZDS, SNS chairman and mayor of Zilina Jan Slota appealed to 
participants to resist Hungarian irredentism and chauvinistic policies 
and accused the Government of giving over 444,600 acres of land to the 
Hungarians. He also uttered inflammatory remarks about Roma, whom he 
accused of ``stealing, robbing, and looting.'' There was a motion in 
Parliament to strip Slota of his parliamentary immunity in order to 
prosecute him for making such public statements, but the motion did not 
pass.
    During a November 9 ceremony at the grave of Hungarian national 
hero Gyorgy Lahner in the village of Necpaly, SNS deputy chairman 
Vitazoslav Moric and several other SNS members interrupted the 
proceedings by singing Slovak nationalist songs and shouted insults at 
participants. The Hungarian Ambassador to Slovakia was in attendance at 
the ceremony.
    On January 13, Parliament amended three laws to permit bilingual 
recordkeeping at schools with Hungarian or other minority language 
instruction. As a result of these changes, the Ministry of Education 
was able to order some 55,000 bilingual report cards for elementary and 
high schools that were planned for distribution at midterm in the 
semester. The Ministry ordered report cards in both Hungarian/Slovak 
and Ukrainian/Slovak versions.
    Roma constitute the second largest ethnic minority, estimated to 
number up to 300,000 citizens, although the Government officially 
reports 89,434 Roma. Police on occasion beat Roma, and in one case 
during the year allegedly shot a Rom during questioning at the police 
station (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). They suffer disproportionately 
from high levels of poverty and unemployment. Credible reports by human 
rights monitors indicated that Roma continued to suffer from 
discrimination in employment, housing, schooling, and the 
administration of state services. Discrimination is most severe in the 
eastern part of the country, where unemployment is higher and the 
Romani population is larger.
    Among Roma living in settlements in the east, the unemployment rate 
is nearly 100 percent. In urban areas in the east, incidents of Roma 
being denied admission to certain hotels, restaurants, and swimming 
facilities are widely reported. According to press reports, 
unemployment offices identify Roma in their records by placing an ``R'' 
next to their name in the register. The General Director of the 
National Labor Bureau ordered an end to this practice after complaints 
from human rights organizations and the head of the Department for 
Human Rights and Minorities. Romani children disproportionately are 
placed in special schools for the mentally retarded in many cases due 
to their insufficient knowledge of the Slovak language. On August 18, 
the Government increased the budget for the office of Special 
Government Commissioner for Roma Issues Vincent Danihel. It also 
allocated about $375,000 (approximately 15 million SK) for special 
projects aimed at improving the situation of Roma, including 
``Headstart'' programs for Roma in 10 schools; training for Roma and 
non-Roma mayors, local government officials, and police officers; 
publication of two Romani textbooks in Slovak, Hungarian, and the 
Romani language; public television programs to educate the public about 
the Romani minority; support for the Kosice Roma secondary art school; 
and support for regional Roma cultural centers, social advisory bodies, 
and health care programs. On September 28, the Cabinet approved a new 
program, ``The Strategy of the Slovak Republic for the Solution of the 
Problems of the Roma Minority,'' for addressing issues of the Romani 
minority. While many Romani leaders and experts on Roma issues believe 
that the strategy is a positive step, they also criticized it for 
lacking specific proposals, being formulated with limited input from 
Roma, and not allocating sufficient resources.
    During the year, approximately 4,680 Slovak citizens applied for 
asylum in West European countries. In July over 1,600 Roma applied for 
political asylum in Finland, followed by smaller migrations to Norway, 
Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria for the 
same purpose. This resulted in July in the Finnish and Norwegian 
Governments imposing 4-month suspensions of their visa waiver 
agreements with Slovakia, which elapsed by year's end. On November 30, 
Denmark also imposed a temporary entry visa requirement, to be lifted 
after the wave of Romani immigrants decreased. By year's end there were 
no official reports that any of these asylum cases had been adjudicated 
successfully. Many Romani families who return after applying for asylum 
in West European countries were not able to return to their apartments 
because they owed city authorities back rent. These families then were 
housed in temporary quarters provided through the social benefits 
system. The children of these families faced difficulties in enrolling 
in school because they did not have permanent addresses. Romani 
activists believe that as a result of these ongoing housing and 
education problems, these families were likely to leave the country 
again and apply for asylum in another country.
    A Rom, Marion Bily, was elected mayor of Petrova in the November 
1998 local elections. However, immediately after the elections non-Roma 
members of the city council initiated a petition and gathered enough 
signatures to call new elections. Bily was prevented from taking 
office, and the former mayor remained in office until new elections 
were held. These elections were held in late September, and Bily was 
not reelected.
    President Schuster commented during a trip to Berlin on November 29 
that Roma are ``profiting from state help but are neither willing nor 
capable of assuming responsibility for the improvement of their own 
situation.'' Miroslav Lacko from the Office for the Protection of 
Romani Rights criticized the President's statements.
    Skinhead violence against Roma was a serious problem, and human 
rights monitors reported that police remain reluctant to take action. 
Police also beat Roma and infringe on their rights to social benefits 
and housing (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). According to the Office of 
Legal Protection (KPO), there were more attacks on Roma during the year 
compared to 1998, and these cases received more media attention. 
However, the authorities tended to tolerate such attacks and accepted 
them as ``normal.'' In almost no case did the police categorize the 
incidents as racially motivated. In fact, a Banska Bystrica court ruled 
in May that a crime that was committed by a skinhead against a Rom 
could not be racially motivated since they are of the same race.
    On June 11, a Romani student waiting for a bus in Banska Bystrica 
was attacked by skinheads. After passersby did little to assist him, he 
was admitted to the hospital for medical treatment for his injuries. He 
filed a complaint against the perpetrators, and the judge of the 
district court classified the case as infliction of bodily harm rather 
than a racially motivated assault. The Rom appealed the decision to a 
regional court, which confirmed the district court's ruling. The Rom 
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, but no decision was made in 
the case by year's end.
    In June a group of Romani citizens including a 6-year-old child 
were visiting a restaurant in Kamenec pod Vtacnikom. A group of 
skinheads attacked the Roma with large sticks. The owner of the 
restaurant refused to allow them to telephone the police while the 
skinheads were still present but did allow them to use the telephone 
after they left. The police initiated an investigation into the case, 
but there was no further progress by year's end.
    On July 12, a Romani citizen was attacked by three men with large 
sticks in Ziar nad Hronom and suffered a brain concussion, which 
required him to be hospitalized for 21 days. The three men then 
attempted unsuccessfully to break into a Roma apartment and broke all 
of the windows. The men were charged with rioting and creating physical 
harm, but the crime was not classified as racially motivated.
    On May 7, 1998, 16-year-old Rom Branislav Baranyi was attacked and 
beaten by a non-Romani adult in Lucenec while attempting to intervene 
in a fight between his Romani friend and an intoxicated non-Romani 
adult. Branislav Baranyi suffered a concussion and lost three teeth as 
a result of the attack. On May 7, 1998, Baranyi's father filed a 
complaint against the alleged attacker, but a policeman reportedly 
refused to issue a confirmation of the complaint. He then filed a 
complaint with the prosecutor's office in Lucenec, which passed it on 
to the regional office. On August 28, 1998, that same regional office 
charged Branislav Baranyi with disorderly conduct and attacking the 
non-Roma who allegedly had initiated the fight. Before the first 
hearing, the lawyer representing Baranyi lodged a formal objection 
against the regional court in Banska Bystrica, based on the fact that 
one of the judges was a relative of one of the defendants. The 
objection was sustained and the case against Baranyi was transferred to 
a municipal court in Zvolen. No further information was available in 
the case at year's end.
    In December a 21-year-old Rom was beaten by two skinheads in Car. 
Immediately following the incident several Roma retaliated and attacked 
the skinheads in a local pub instead of going to the police; they 
claimed that the police had been unresponsive to their complaints in 
the past.
    In September in Kosice skinheads reportedly distributed racist 
materials to the mailboxes of Romani families, and racist materials 
also were distributed in Trebisov.
    There was no progress during the year in a number of cases of 
violence against Roma in 1998.
    In March a Romani human rights NGO filed a complaint in the 
European Court of Human Rights against regulations passed in 1997 
preventing Roma from entering or residing in Nagov and Rokytovce, after 
attempts to overturn the decrees in Slovak courts failed. In April the 
two cities repealed the regulations in response to government pressure 
(see Section 2.d.). Starting in late 1998, authorities in Jelsava 
refused to grant residence permits to Roma who bought homes with the 
intention of moving there. However, in early 1999, the mayor of Jelsava 
issued the residence permits. A public opinion poll conducted in 
November found that only some 2 percent of those polled would accept 
Roma as neighbors, while some 87 percent said that they would dislike 
having Romani neighbors. A December poll indicated that some 60 percent 
of those polled would support measures that would segregate the Romani 
population.
    On June 6, a British citizen of Indian origin was assaulted by 
skinheads in Bratislava. He was hospitalized with serious injuries. The 
results of the investigation are pending.
    On July 21, two British citizens of Asian origin were assaulted by 
skinheads at a Bratislava pub. They escaped without serious injuries.
    On July 26, one Chinese diplomat and another Chinese citizen were 
attacked by a group of eight skinheads in Bratislava. One of the 
victims required hospitalization for a brain concussion and head and 
chest injuries. On August 20, authorities charged three skinheads in 
the attack, one with assault and a racially motivated crime, the other 
two with hooliganism. The three face prison sentences ranging from 6 
months to 3 years. Reportedly one of the skinheads is the son of a 
high-ranking police officer in Bratislava.
    On October 10, four assailants attacked a 39-year-old Vietnamese 
man at the train station in Prievidza. The victim sought medical 
treatment for injuries to his face and head. Police were investigating 
the incident, although there were no witnesses.
    During the most recent census (1991), 14,000 citizens registered 
themselves as Ukrainians, and 17,000 registered themselves as 
Ruthenians. However, the statistical office does not differentiate 
between Ruthenian and Ukrainian and records 32,747 persons in the 
Ruthenian/Ukrainian ethnic group. The current Government also considers 
the Ruthenian and Ukrainian minorities as a single group. However, 
about 50,000 persons listed Ruthenian as their native language in the 
1991 census. Ruthenians disagree that they are Ukrainians, and that 
their language is only a Ukrainian dialect. In September 1998, Slovak 
State Radio started broadcasting a long-promised daily regional program 
for the Ruthenian minority in Presov. However, after the 1998 
parliamentary elections this broadcasting was discontinued, and the 
broadcast is now in Ukrainian. However, there is a television broadcast 
in Ruthenian on STV, which is aired once every 2 months. In addition, 
the Ruthenian minority receives state funding to publish a biweekly 
newspaper in Ukrainian. A representative of the Ruthenian Revival 
Organization stated that Ruthenian language instruction is provided in 
two schools in the northeast. There is an Institute for Minority 
Languages at Presov University in the northeast. Two instructors at the 
Institute teach Ruthenian culture and language.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to form and join unions, except in the armed forces. 
Approximately 45 percent of the work force is unionized. Most unions 
are independent of the Government and political parties but lobby those 
entities in order to gain support for union positions on key labor 
issues.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and there are no 
restrictions on this right. The National Statistical Office officially 
reported no strikes during the year.
    However, an increasing number of strike alerts and unofficial 
strikes were reported during the year. Many of these actions 
anticipated layoffs or protested the nonpayment or partial payment of 
salaries due to restructuring of the company or insolvency.
    On September 25, the Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ) sponsored 
an antigovernment demonstration that was attended by approximately 
40,000 labor sympathizers to protest the Government's failure to meet 
its 20 demands.
    On November 9, the KOZ blocked major intersections in five cities 
to protest the Government's failure to increase wages and reduce taxes 
and unemployment.
    On December 8, the KOZ held a protest in response to the 
Government's draft budget for 2000.
    Local unions also held strike alerts. On November 10, workers held 
a 15-minute warning strike at PPS Detva Holding to protest a planned 
layoff of 500 employees. On November 18, almost 60 percent of schools 
joined a 1-hour strike alert sponsored by the Education Union to 
protest the Government's failure to fulfill its promises in education 
policy.
    There were no instances of retribution against strikers or labor 
leaders. However, on October 22, unknown assailants attacked textile 
union vice president Otto Kremer. Labor leaders alleged that the attack 
was retribution for his assisting workers at the Pratex Cadca factory 
in the northwest region of the country in recovering unpaid wages. 
Relevant legislation on collective bargaining prohibits the dismissal 
of workers legally participating in strikes. However, according to this 
law, a strike is legal and official only if it is for the purpose of 
collective bargaining; if it is announced in advance; and if a list of 
strike participants is provided. If the strike is not considered to be 
official, strikers are not ensured protection.
    Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and 
to affiliate with and participate in international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for collective bargaining. Following the September 1998 
parliamentary election the KOZ decided to reenter tripartite 
negotiations with employers and the Government. However, unions have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Government, claiming that it has not 
included them in important decisionmaking and does not give adequate 
attention to their demands. The KOZ held a public demonstration on 
September 25 and threatened a general strike if the Government 
continued to be unresponsive to its demands.
    The law on citizens' associations prohibits discrimination by 
employers against union members and organizers. Complaints may be 
resolved either in collective negotiations or in court. If a court 
rules that an employer dismissed a worker for union activities or for 
any reason other than certain grounds for dismissal listed in the Labor 
Code, the employer must reinstate the worker. There were no reports of 
abuses targeted against unions or workers.
    The 1996 Customs Act regulates free customs zones and customs 
warehouses. Firms operating in such zones must comply with the Labor 
Code; to date there have been no reports of special involvement by the 
trade unions. No special legislation governs labor relations in free 
trade zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Both the 
Constitution and the employment act prohibit forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, and generally there were 
no reports of violations; however, trafficking in women and girls for 
the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The 
Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Family, as well as district and 
local labor offices, have responsibility for enforcement.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law sets the minimum employment age at 15 years. 
Children must remain in school for 9 years, or until the age of 15, 
although it is not enforced strictly, particularly for the Romani 
minority. Workers under the age of 16 may not work more than 33 hours 
per week; may not be compensated on a piecework basis; may not work 
overtime or night shifts; and may not work underground or in specified 
conditions deemed dangerous to their health or safety. Special 
conditions and protections, though somewhat less stringent, apply to 
young workers up to the age of 18. The Ministry of Labor enforces this 
legislation. There were no reports of violations. The law and the 
Constitution prohibit forced and bonded child labor, and the Government 
generally enforces these prohibitions effectively; however, trafficking 
in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage in 1999 was $86 
(SK 3,600) per month. Even when combined with special allowances paid 
to families with children it did not provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. The Ministry of Labor is responsible 
for enforcing the minimum wage. No violations were reported. The 
standard workweek mandated by the Labor Code is 42.5 hours, although 
collective bargaining agreements have achieved reductions in some cases 
(most often to 40 hours). For state enterprises the law requires 
overtime pay up to a maximum of 8 hours per week, and 150 hours per 
year, and provides 5 weeks of annual leave. Private enterprises can 
compensate their employees for more hours of overtime than stipulated 
by the law. There is no specifically mandated 24-hour rest period 
during the workweek. The trade unions, the Ministry of Labor, and local 
employment offices monitor observance of these laws, and the 
authorities effectively enforce them.
    The Labor Code establishes health and safety standards that the 
Office of Labor Safety effectively enforces. For hazardous employment, 
workers undergo medical screening under the supervision of a physician. 
They have the right to refuse to work in situations that endanger their 
health and safety and may file complaints against employers in such 
situations. Employees working under conditions endangering their health 
and safety for a certain period of time are entitled to paid 
``relaxation'' leave in addition to their standard leave.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically prohibits 
trafficking in persons; however, there were instances of trafficking in 
women and girls. The country is a source country, a transit country, 
and a destination country for such victims of trafficking. According to 
the Ministry of Interior, there have been 11 documented cases of Slovak 
women being forced into prostitution in other countries or foreign 
women being forced into prostitution in Slovakia. The problem receives 
very little public attention, and therefore it is likely that there are 
more cases than those that are documented.
    A new report issued by the Ministry of Interior's report on 
trafficking states that the country is only a transit country for 
persons being trafficked mainly to Austria, the Czech Republic, and 
Germany for the purpose of forced prostitution. There were four 
prosecuted cases of forced prostitution in 1998 and nine cases in 1999. 
There were also reports of Slovak women being trafficked to Western 
Europe with promises of work as models, waitresses, and au pairs. Their 
passports were allegedly confiscated, and they were allegedly forced to 
work in adult entertainment clubs or as prostitutes. According to the 
report, 3 cases of trafficking were prosecuted in 1998 and 11 in 1999.
    Some women from Russia and Ukraine reportedly are trafficked 
through the country on their way to countries such as Turkey, Greece, 
Italy, Germany, and Serbia, where they are forced to work as 
prostitutes. According to a report on trafficking in women issued by 
the Swedish National Criminal Investigation Department in March, women 
from Slovakia work in Sweden as prostitutes. In four 1998 court cases 
involving women trafficked to Sweden, some women came from Slovakia, 
among other countries. Although previously Slovakia was primarily a 
source country, increasingly women from less prosperous eastern 
countries (including the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania, 
and Bulgaria) find themselves trafficked through and to Slovakia.
                                 ______
                                 

                                SLOVENIA

    Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional republic. 
Power is shared between a directly elected president, a prime minister, 
and a bicameral legislature. Since Slovenia's independence with the 
breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, free, fair, and open elections have 
characterized the political system. In 1997 elections were held to 
elect both a president and representatives to Parliament's upper house. 
The Government respects constitutional provisions for an independent 
judiciary in practice.
    The police are under the effective civilian control of the Ministry 
of the Interior. By law the armed forces do not exercise civil police 
functions.
    The country has made steady progress toward developing a market 
economy. As of 1998, ``social property'' no longer exists, although 
sales of the remaining large state holdings have not occurred as 
rapidly as planned. Trade has been diversified toward the West and the 
growing markets of Central and Eastern Europe. Manufacturing accounts 
for most employment, with machinery and other manufactured products 
constituting the major exports. Labor force surveys put unemployment at 
7.5 percent, but registration for unemployment assistance was 14.5 
percent. Inflation was 7.9 percent in 1998, while real gross national 
product grew 3.9 percent. The currency is stable, fully convertible, 
and backed by substantial reserves. The economy provides citizens with 
a good standard of living.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of 
dealing with individual instances of abuse. An ombudsman deals with 
human rights problems, including citizenship cases. Some 5,000 to 
10,000 non-Slovene (former Yugoslav) residents had been without legal 
status since independence in 1991, some due to the Government's slow 
processing of their original applications, and others because they had 
never applied. However, in August the Government passed legislation 
that offered legal permanent resident status to such persons. These 
minorities reported some discrimination.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman treatment 
as well as ``humiliating punishment or treatment,'' and there were no 
reports of such treatment.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards and were not 
the subject of complaint by any human rights organization.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and 
the media.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest or deprivation of liberty, and the 
Government respects these provisions in practice.
    The authorities must advise detainees in writing within 24 hours, 
in their own language, of the reasons for the arrest. Until charges are 
brought, detention may last up to 6 months; once charges are brought, 
detention may be prolonged for a maximum of 2 years. Some 26 percent of 
the average prison population of 1,100 inmates are in pretrial 
detention at any given time. The law also provides safeguards against 
self-incrimination. These rights and limitations are respected in 
practice.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice.
    The judicial system comprises district courts, regional courts, a 
court of appeals, an administrative court, and the Supreme Court. A 
nine-member Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of 
legislation. Judges, elected by the State Assembly (Parliament) on the 
nomination of the Judicial Council, are constitutionally independent 
and serve indefinitely, subject to an age limit. The Judicial Council 
is composed of six sitting judges elected by their peers and five 
presidential nominees elected by the Parliament.
    The Constitution provides in great detail for the right to a fair 
trial, including provisions for: Equality before the law, presumption 
of innocence, due process, open court proceedings, the right of appeal, 
and a prohibition against double jeopardy. Defendants by law have the 
right to counsel, without cost if need be. These rights are respected 
in practice, although the judicial system is so burdened that justice 
is frequently protracted. In some instances, criminal cases have 
reportedly taken 2 to 5 years to come to trial. The problem is not 
widespread, and defendants are released on bail except in the most 
serious criminal cases.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of 
privacy, ``personal data rights,'' and the inviolability of the home, 
mail, and other means of communication. These rights and protections 
are respected in practice, and violations are subject to effective 
legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of thought, speech, public association, the press, and other 
forms of public communication and expression. Lingering self-censorship 
and some indirect political pressures continue to influence the media.
    The press is now a vigorous institution emerging from its more 
restricted past. The major media do not represent a broad range of 
political or ethnic interests, although there is an Italian-language 
television channel as well as a newspaper available to the ethnic 
Italian minority who live on the Adriatic Coast. Hungarian radio 
programming is common in the northeast where there are approximately 
8,500 ethnic Hungarians. Bosnian refugees and the Albanian community 
have newsletters in their own languages.
    Four major daily and several weekly newspapers are published. The 
major print media are supported through private investment and 
advertising, although the national broadcaster, RTV Slovenia, enjoys 
government subsidies, as do cultural publications and book publishing. 
Seven local television channels are available, four of which are 
independent private stations. Numerous foreign broadcasts are available 
via satellite and cable. All major towns have radio stations and cable 
television. Numerous business and academic publications are available. 
Foreign newspapers, magazines, and journals are widely available.
    In theory and practice, the media enjoy full journalistic freedom. 
However, for over 40 years the country was ruled by an authoritarian 
Communist political system, and reporting about domestic politics may 
be influenced to some degree by self-censorship and indirect political 
pressures.
    The election law requires the media to offer free space and time to 
political parties at election time. Television networks routinely give 
public figures and opinion makers from across the political spectrum 
access via a broad range of public service programming.
    The Constitution provides for autonomy and freedom for universities 
and other institutions of higher education. There are two universities; 
each has numerous affiliated research and study institutions. Academic 
freedom is respected, and centers of higher education are lively and 
intellectually stimulating.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the rights of peaceful assembly, association, and 
participation in public meetings, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. These rights can be restricted only by an act of 
Parliament in circumstances involving national security, public safety, 
or protection against infectious diseases.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. No person 
can be compelled to admit his religious or other beliefs. There are few 
formal requirements for recognition as a religion by the Government. 
Religious groups, including foreign missionaries, must register with 
the Ministry of the Interior. Registration entitles such groups to 
value added tax rebates on a quarterly basis. All groups in the country 
report equal access to registration and tax rebate status. Foreign 
missionaries (including a Mormon mission) and religious groups 
(including Hare Krishna, Scientology, and Unification organizations) 
operate without hindrance.
    The appropriate role for religious instruction in the schools 
continues to be an issue of debate. The Constitution states that 
parents are entitled ``to give their children a moral and religious 
upbringing. . .'' Before 1945 religion was much more prominent in the 
schools, but now only those schools supported by religious bodies teach 
religion.
    The Roman Catholic Church was a major property holder in the 
Kingdom of Yugoslavia before World War II. After the war, much church 
property--church buildings and support buildings, residences, 
businesses, and forests--was confiscated and nationalized by the 
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After Slovenian independence 
in 1991, Parliament passed legislation calling for denationalization 
(restitution or compensation) within a fixed period. However, a 
subsequent change of government in 1992 led to a virtual standstill in 
denationalization proceedings for several years. As of June, only one-
third of all cases had been adjudicated at the initial administrative 
level, although these represent about half of all nationalized and 
confiscated property.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides that each 
person has the right to freedom of movement, to choice of place of 
residence, to leave the country freely, and to return. Limitations on 
these rights may be made only by statute and only where necessary in 
criminal cases, to control infectious disease, or in wartime. In 
practice citizens travel widely and often.
    The Constitution provides for a right of political asylum for 
foreigners and stateless persons ``who are persecuted for their stand 
on human rights and fundamental freedoms.'' The Government cooperates 
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other 
humanitarian organization in assisting refugees. The Government 
provides first asylum (or ``temporary protection'') to refugees but on 
a very limited basis in recent years. There were no reports that the 
Government forcibly returned any refugees against their will to a 
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides that elections should be held at least 
every 4 years. Citizens have the right to change their government, 
voting by secret ballot on the basis of universal suffrage. Slovenia 
has a mixed parliamentary and presidential system. The President 
proposes a candidate to the legislature for confirmation as Prime 
Minister, after consultations with the leaders of the political parties 
in the Parliament.
    No restrictions hinder the participation of women or minorities in 
politics. However, women are underrepresented in politics. Of the 90 
Members of Parliament, 8 are women, while 1 of 19 cabinet ministers is 
a woman. The Prime Minister's Office has an active agency for 
monitoring and promoting the participation by women in public life.
    The Constitution stipulates that the Italian and Hungarian ethnic 
communities each are entitled to at least one representative in the 
Parliament, regardless of their population.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Independent human rights monitoring groups promote respect for 
human rights and freedoms and freely investigate complaints about 
violations. The Government places no obstacles in the way of 
investigations by international or local human rights groups.
    An independent ombudsman appointed by Parliament deals with human 
rights problems, including so-called ``economic rights.'' The incumbent 
is regarded as fair, but he lacks the power to enforce his opinions. In 
addition Parliament has been criticized as a major factor in the slow 
progress of property restitution (``denationalization''), casting doubt 
on the ombudsman's ability to alter the pace of the process. The 
ombudsman criticized the Government for the slow pace of legal and 
administrative proceedings, in criminal and civil, as well as in 
denationalization cases.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality before the law, and the 
Government observed this provision in practice. According to the 1991 
census, the population is approximately 2 million, of whom 1.7 million 
are ethnic Slovenes and the remainder are persons of 23 other 
nationalities. There were some 50,000 Croats, 48,000 Serbs, 27,000 
Muslims, 8,500 Hungarians, and 3,000 Italians.
    The Constitution provides special rights for the ``autochthonous 
Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities,'' including the right to use 
their own national symbols, enjoy bilingual education, and benefit from 
other privileges. It also provides for special status and rights for 
the small Romani community, which are observed in practice.
    Women.--The awareness of spousal abuse and violence against women 
is on the rise. In 1998 83 men were charged with rape. Although 1,559 
persons were charged with inflicting some degree of bodily harm in 
1998, no breakdown of victims by sex is available. In 1998 10,021 
misdemeanor charges of ``endangering safety in a private place'' were 
filed. Although no breakdown of victims is available by sex for 1998, 
records from previous years indicate that at least 40 percent, or 
approximately 4,000 cases, involved domestic disputes where women were 
threatened. Three shelters are available for battered women, which are 
partially funded by the State. The shelters operate at capacity (about 
40 beds combined) and turn away numerous women every year. In cases of 
reported spousal abuse or violence, the police actively intervene, and 
criminal charges are filed.
    Equal rights for women are a matter of state policy. There is no 
official discrimination against women or minorities in housing, jobs, 
education, or other walks of life. Under the Constitution, marriage is 
based on the equality of both spouses. The Constitution stipulates that 
the state shall protect the family, motherhood, and fatherhood.
    In rural areas, women, even those employed outside the home, bear a 
disproportionate share of household work and family care because of a 
generally conservative social tradition. However, women frequently are 
encountered in business and in government executive departments.
    Equal pay for equal work for men and women is the norm. Although 
both sexes have the same average period of unemployment, women still 
are found more often in lower paying jobs. On average women's earnings 
are 85 percent of those of men.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
welfare through its system of public education and health care. Free 
public education is provided through age 15.
    The Constitution stipulates that children ``enjoy human rights and 
fundamental freedoms consistent with their age and level of maturity.'' 
Moreover, special protection from exploitation and maltreatment is 
provided by statute. Social workers visit schools regularly to monitor 
for any incidents of mistreatment or abuse of children.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--The disabled are not discriminated 
against, and the Government has taken steps to facilitate access to 
social and economic opportunities. In practice modifications of public 
and private structures to ease access by the handicapped continue 
slowly but steadily.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Minorities make up about 12 
percent of the population; most are nationals of the former Yugoslavia. 
Ethnic minorities face a complex reality. ``Autochthonous'' groups in 
general are provided special rights and protection by the Constitution. 
Three of these groups--Italians, Hungarians, and Roma--are singled out 
in the Constitution for special treatment, and the first two are 
assigned representation in Parliament. Other ``autochthonous'' groups 
include some 500 ethnic Germans and under 100 Jews.
    However, ``new minorities''--ethnic Serbs, Croats, Kosovar 
Albanians, and non-autochthonous Roma from Kosovo and Albania--are 
unprotected by special provisions of the Constitution and face some 
societal and governmental discrimination. Many of these 5,000 to 10,000 
non-Slovene citizens of the former Yugoslavia migrated internally to 
Slovenia during the decades leading up to independence because of the 
economic opportunities. Most opted not to take up Slovene citizenship 
during a 6-month window in 1991-92 and have been living in the country 
as essentially stateless persons since then, while others were without 
residence status because of slow processing of their applications by 
the Government. In August Parliament passed legislation that addressed 
the problem of these persons by offering them permanent resident 
status; a 6-week window for applications closed at year's end.
    The Roma are best characterized as a set of groups rather than as 
one community. Some have lived in the country for hundreds of years, 
while others are very recent migrants. A lack of cohesion prevented the 
Romani communities from taking advantage of their special 
constitutional status, although the Government also failed to fully 
implement the special legislation on Romani status called for in 
Article 65 of the Constitution.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution stipulates that 
trade unions, their operation, and their membership shall be free and 
provides for the right to strike. Virtually all workers, except police 
and military personnel, are eligible to form and join labor 
organizations. In 1993 the Parliament for the first time passed 
legislation restricting strikes by some public sector employees. 
However, after government budget-cutting, some public sector 
professionals (judges, doctors, and educators) became increasingly 
active on the labor front.
    Labor has two main groupings, with constituent branches throughout 
the country. A third, much smaller, regional labor union operates on 
the Adriatic coast. Unions are formally and actually independent of the 
Government and political parties, but individual union members hold 
positions in the legislature. The Constitution provides that the state 
shall be responsible for ``the creation of opportunities for employment 
and for work.''
    There are no restrictions on unions joining or forming federations 
and affiliating with like-minded international union organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The economy is 
in transition from the former Communist system, which included some 
private ownership of enterprises along with state-controlled and 
``socially owned'' enterprises. In the transition to a fully market-
based economy, the collective bargaining process is undergoing change. 
Formerly, the old Yugoslav Government had a dominant role in setting 
the minimum wage and conditions of work. The Government still exercises 
this role to an extent, although in the private sector wages and 
working conditions are agreed annually in a general collective 
agreement between the ``social partners.'' The labor unions and the 
Chamber of Economy. There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
    Export processing zones exist in Koper, Maribor, and Nova Gorica. 
Worker rights in these zones are the same as in the rest of the 
country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children, and 
there were no reports of forced labor by adults or children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Children must 
remain in school until through the age of 15. During the harvest or for 
other farm chores, younger children do work. In general, urban 
employers respect the age limits. The law prohibits forced and bonded 
labor by children, and there were no reports of its use (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is $325 (59,150 
tolars) per month, which provides a decent standard of living for the 
average worker and family. The workweek is 40 hours. In general 
businesses provide acceptable conditions of work for their employees. 
Occupational health and safety standards are set and enforced by 
special commissions controlled by the Ministries of Health and Labor. 
Workers have the right to remove themselves from unsafe conditions 
without jeopardizing their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in persons.--The law on ``enslavement'' prescribes 
criminal prosecution for a person who ``brings another person into 
slavery or a similar condition, or keeps another person in such a 
condition, or buys, sells or delivers another person to a third party'' 
or brokers such a deal. Sentences for enslavement convictions range 
from 1 to 10 years' imprisonment. Persons also can be prosecuted for 
pimping or pandering ``by force, threat or deception,'' the penalty for 
which ranges from 3 months' to 5 years' imprisonment or, in cases 
involving minors or forced prostitution, 1 to 10 years' imprisonment.
    There were no prosecutions for trafficking in persons in 1998; in 
1997, three persons were successfully prosecuted.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 SPAIN

    Spain is a democracy with a constitutional monarch. The Parliament 
consists of two chambers, the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. Jose 
Maria Aznar of the Popular Party (PP) became Prime Minister, with the 
title President of the Government, when his party won national 
elections in 1996. New elections are scheduled for March 12, 2000. The 
Government respects the constitutional provisions for an independent 
judiciary in practice.
    There are three levels of security forces. The National Police are 
responsible for nationwide investigations, security in urban areas, 
traffic control, and hostage rescue. The Civil Guard polices rural 
areas and controls borders and highways. Autonomous police forces have 
taken over many of the duties of the Civil Guard in Galicia, Catalunya, 
and the Basque country. The security forces are under the effective 
control of the Government. The security forces also maintain 
anticorruption units. Some members of the security forces committed 
human rights abuses.
    The economy is market based, with primary reliance on private 
enterprise. Although a number of public sector enterprises remain in 
key areas, the Government's policy has been to privatize as many of 
them as possible. The economy grew during the third quarter at a 3.7 
percent annual rate. Inflation at year's end was 2.9 percent, due 
primarily to higher energy costs. Unemployment in the third quarter was 
15.45 percent, continuing its downward trend.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas, including cases 
of police brutality, lengthy pretrial detention, and delays in trials. 
The Government investigates allegations of human rights abuses by the 
security forces and punishes those found guilty of such abuses; 
however, investigations are often lengthy and punishments light. 
Violence and discrimination against women were problems. Incidents of 
racism and rightwing violence against minorities and discrimination 
against Roma were also problems. There were instances of forced labor 
and child labor. Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced 
prostitution was a problem.
    Throughout the year there were ongoing judicial proceedings related 
to the involvement of former government officials in the Antiterrorist 
Liberation Groups (government-sponsored death squads known by their 
acronym, GAL), which killed 27 persons between 1983 and 1987, including 
10 persons with no connection to the Basque terrorist group, ETA, the 
ostensible target of the GAL.
    ETA announced in late November that it would end its self-declared 
14-month-old cease-fire and warned that armed attacks could resume 
quickly. Low level street violence, threats, and intimidation continued 
in the Basque country. No one died during the year as a result of these 
acts. Ongoing arrests by Spanish and French authorities of ETA 
terrorists did not precipitate a return to the type of deadly violence 
and kidnapings characteristic of ETA's actions before the cease-fire.
    In June elections, several ETA terrorists were elected to 
provincial parliaments in the Basque country and the regional 
parliament in neighboring Navarra, all on the ticket of Euskal 
Herritarrok (EH), the legal political wing of ETA, also known as Herri 
Batasuna (HB).
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    No developments were reported in the following cases from past 
years: The March 1997 case of a Moroccan boy who allegedly was shot in 
the back by a Civil Guard officer; the appeal of police officer Antonio 
Barrioneuvo's conviction in the 1996 killing of Portuguese citizen 
Manual Abreu Silva; the deaths of eight prison inmates under suspicious 
circumstances in 1996-97 (see Section 1.c.); and the mid-1980's cases 
of alleged killings by security forces of Roman Onaederra, Mikel 
Zabaltza, Robert Caplanne, and a tramp and two drug addicts
    On March 10, Judge Jose Luis Gonzalez Armengol sentenced Jose Luis 
Morcillo Pinillos to prison for his role in the November 20, 1984, GAL 
killing of Santiago Brouard, a member of HB. On March 12, three others 
were ordered jailed for allegedly collaborating in the murder: Julian 
Sancristobal (former State Security Director), Jose Amedo (former 
Police Commissioner), and Rafael Masa (former Lieutenant Colonel in the 
Civil Guard). They were accused of having planned and financed the 
operation with state funds. Masa had just been allowed to return to the 
Civil Guard after he had been expelled for 4 years for his role in the 
Linaza torture case, which was opened in 1981. Sancristobal and Masa 
were released on July 23 after each posted bond in the amount of 
$66,670 (10 million pesetas).
    The appeals remain pending of former Interior Minister Jose 
Barrionuevo and former Secretary of State Security Rafael Vera for 
their convictions in connection with the kidnaping of French citizen 
Segundo Marey in 1983.
    Amedo also was set free in July, due to his decision to cooperate 
with the investigations into the Marey and Brouard GAL cases. In a July 
confession, Amedo reportedly described a December 1983 meeting at which 
the decision to kill Brouard was made. The meeting allegedly took place 
near the site where Marey was being held and was attended by several 
police and antiterrorism officials, including Sancristobal, Mohand 
Talbi (a GAL mercenary), Francisco Alvarez (a former commander of an 
antiterrorist unit), and Miguel Planchuelo (former Chief of Police of 
Bilbao). Amedo also allegedly said that Sancristobal and Talbi kidnaped 
Marey. On July 28, Judge Armengol issued a preliminary indictment 
charging that Sancristobal paid Pinillos $33,333 (5 million pesetas) 
from Ministry of Interior funds to carry out Brouard's killing.
    On August 2, Judge Baltazar Garzon set September hearing dates for 
Amedo, Alvarez, and Sancristobal, as well as former Chief of Operations 
in the CESID (national intelligence agency) Juan Alberto Perote and 
former policeman Michel Dominguez. They have to enter pleas with regard 
to the 1985 killings in France of four Basques in the Monbar case. On 
September 25, 1985, Lucien Mattei and Pierre Frugoli (French 
mercenaries hired by the GAL), shot and killed Agustin Irazustabarrena, 
Ignacio Asteasuinzarra, Sabino Etxaide, and Jose Maria Etxaniz in a bar 
in Bayona, France, which was frequented by Basque nationals. Frugoli 
and Mattei were convicted and sentenced in France for their 
participation in the crime.
    On March 17, Miguel Brescia Guillen went on trial, accused of 
driving the truck in the GAL case in which Christian Matxicotte (a 
French pastor) and Catherine Brion were killed on February 17, 1986, in 
the southern French town of Bidarraya. The prosecutor is requesting 
that the National High Court sentence Guillen to 66 years' imprisonment 
for his role in this crime. On September 13, 1994, Guillen allegedly 
collected $200,000 (30 million pesetas)--from whom is not clear--to 
keep quiet and not implicate others. Witnesses at his trial testified 
that Guillen spoke of his involvement in this case and one other to 
them on numerous occasions.
    Several organizations are dedicated to the needs and concerns of 
victims of terrorism, among them the Association of Terrorism Victims 
(AVT). This organization was founded in 1981 and currently serves 1,300 
families by providing legal and psychological counseling, publishing a 
monthly magazine, and carrying out various other activities. Government 
funding consists of $40,000 (6 million pesetas), provided annually by 
the Ministry of Defense.
    A bill to compensate ETA victims and their families was passed into 
law on September 16. Entitled ``Law of Solidarity with the Victims of 
Terrorism,'' the law recognizes the suffering and sacrifice of ETA's 
victims as well as of those of the GAL. The total amount of 
compensation is expected to be approximately $333 million (50 billion 
pesetas), to be paid by the State. The amount of compensation is to be 
determined by the gravity of the injury suffered. Relatives of a 
deceased victim are to receive around $153,333 (23 million pesetas). 
Victims who became invalids are to receive $433,333 (65 million 
pesetas).
    The Spanish extradition request for former Chilean dictator Augusto 
Pinochet remained under judicial review in the United Kingdom. Judge 
Baltazar Garzon sought to try Pinochet for his involvement in the 
disappearance of 600 Spaniards under Chilean and Argentinian 
dictatorships in the 1970's and 1980's. In November Garzon issued an 
international arrest warrant for former Argentine junta Generals 
Leopoldo Galtieri and Jorge Videla, Admiral Emilio Massera, and 95 
lower ranking military officers. The indictments are in connection with 
human rights abuses that took place during Argentina's 1976-83 ``dirty 
war,'' when over 15,000 persons were killed or disappeared.
    On December 2, indigenous Guatemalan leader Rigoberta Menchu filed 
a criminal suit in a Spanish court against eight former military and 
civilian leaders for human rights abuses committed during the internal 
conflict. The suit alleges that the defendants, including retired 
General Efrain Rios Montt, former President and retired General 
Fernando Lucas Garcia, former de facto President Oscar Humberto Mejia 
Victores, and others were responsible for ``crimes against humanity,'' 
including genocide, torture, and terrorism. The suit cites three cases: 
The 1980 assault on the Spanish Embassy in which over 30 persons died, 
the killing of Menchu's mother and her two siblings, and the killing of 
4 Spanish priests over the course of the conflict. On December 18, 
Spanish Judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco accepted Menchu's suit. Attorneys 
for Mejia Victores later filed criminal charges in Guatemala against 
Menchu, accusing her of treason, violating the Constitution, and 
failing to report a crime (for filing charges in Spanish court.)
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    On March 11, a local policeman in Olot (Catalunya) was arrested 
after confessing to the November 1992 kidnaping of pharmacist Maria 
Angels Feliu. Feliu was held for ransom for 492 days. Civil Guard 
investigators believe that corrupt police, one of whom died in 1997, 
may have been involved. The Civil Guard cited its investigation as 
proof that the police were not above the law. A total of three persons 
have been jailed in connection with the case, and the Civil Guard 
believes that as many as nine persons may have been involved.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits such acts; however, suspects charged 
with terrorism routinely assert that they have been abused during 
detention, and other detainees sometimes make similar charges. The 
Government investigates allegations of torture and also permits outside 
parties to investigate them. In April Amnesty International wrote to 
the Minister of the Interior to reiterate its concerns about 
allegations of torture and mistreatment during incommunicado detention.
    On March 4, the newspaper El Pais reported that a prosecutor in 
Barcelona had asked for a year in prison and 2\1/2\ years' suspension 
for two policemen after they undressed a suspect in the police station 
and submitted him to humiliating treatment on April 29, 1998. The 
police claimed that it was a legitimate body cavity search. No 
developments were reported in the November 1998 case of two policemen 
in Melilla who were charged with raping a Moroccan girl.
    No progress was apparent in the complaint filed against the police 
in the beating of Ivan Gonzalez in September 1997. The National Court 
of Vizcaya found the three policemen charged with raping Brazilian 
tourist Rita Margarete in August 1995 not guilty, and this decision was 
confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court. On June 22, Interior Minister 
Jaime Mayor Oreja assured the Congress of Deputies that the police were 
investigating all possibilities. He admitted that there was a 
possibility that the police were covering up facts in the case.
    No developments were reported in the trial that began in November 
1998 of six members of the Civil Guard who were accused of torturing 
three suspected ETA members in 1992.
    There were several developments in the case of Kepa Urra, a member 
of ETA who accused three members of the Civil Guard of torture in 1992. 
The three were convicted by the National High Court of Vizcaya in 
November 1997. On appeal to the Supreme Court, their prison sentences 
were reduced from 4 years to 1 year. However, the Court did not alter 
the 6-year suspension from the Civil Guard to which the lower court 
also had sentenced them. A suspension of this length usually means 
automatic expulsion from the Civil Guard. One of the convicted Civil 
Guard members, Manuel Sanchez Corbi, meanwhile was selected for 
promotion, despite the fact that one of the conditions for promotion is 
that a candidate not have a conviction for a deliberate criminal act. 
On July 23, the Council of Ministers partially pardoned all three Civil 
Guard members. Corbi, Jose Maria de las Cuevas, and Antonio Lozano 
Garcia are to be allowed to continue working for the Civil Guard. The 
Council reduced their suspensions from 6 years to 1 month and a day. On 
August 3, the pardon was published in the State's Official Bulletin, 
and the Ministry of the Interior confirmed that once Corbi's suspension 
expires, he is to be promoted to the rank of captain.
    On February 20, seven police officers in Madrid were found guilty 
of illegally detaining, humiliating, and torturing a family in 1990. 
The two principal offenders were sentenced to 6 months in jail and were 
suspended from the police force for 7 years. The other officers were 
given lesser jail sentences, but all were suspended for 6 to 7 years, 
including the officer who ordered the family released in an attempt to 
cover up the crimes. The officers were also ordered to pay the victims 
thousands of dollars in compensation.
    In one of the most notorious GAL cases, on July 29 the national 
High Court denied the appeals of Enrique Dorado and Felipe Bayo, who 
were accused of torturing and kidnaping Jose Antonio Lasa and Jose 
Ignacio Zabala. Both remain in custody, pending their appeal to the 
Supreme Court.
    The Basque terrorist group ETA announced on November 28 that its 
self-imposed cease-fire, declared in September 1998, effectively would 
be ended as of December 3. At least two subsequent attempts by ETA to 
carry out attacks were frustrated. The first occurred shortly before 
Christmas when the authorities discovered two vans, each containing 
approximately 2,200 pounds of explosives, with timers attached. The 
intended target or targets of the van bombs was unknown. The police and 
the press continued to report ETA youth criminal activity during the 
year, including the use of Molotov cocktails to set fire to homes, 
businesses, cars, and political party offices in a continuing campaign 
of intimidation in the Basque country. Between ETA's September, 1998, 
cease-fire declaration and the end of July, 220 violent actions were 
undertaken by organizations believed to be associated with ETA in the 
Basque and Navarra regions. Official records also indicate that during 
the same timeframe, 119 threats were made against public officials, 
judges, policemen, prosecutors, and businessmen. No deaths were 
reported from these actions or threats. In March the widow of a PP 
councilman previously killed by ETA received a package bomb in the 
mail. She thought that the package was suspicious and therefore sought 
help from the authorities, who disarmed the device.
    In April a bomb damaged the basilica in the Valley of the Fallen 
tomb where General Francisco Franco is buried. The police said that a 
small Marxist group called October First Anti-Fascist Resistance Group 
claimed responsibility for the bast.
    Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
    In March 1998 the General Council of Judicial Power announced the 
opening of an investigation into 31 cases of alleged abuse and 
negligence by prison officials in 1996 and 1997. The investigating 
committee promised to scrutinize in particular eight inmate deaths 
ostensibly caused by mismanagement and negligence, including the 
failure by prison officials to give prompt medical attention to a 
prisoner who suffered from chronic heart problems and the suicide of an 
inmate whose treatment for drug addiction was interrupted by his 
transfer to a prison lacking drug counseling facilities. Another death 
under investigation is that of a San Sebastian inmate whose official 
cause of death is listed as a barbiturate overdose despite the presence 
of lesions on the back, neck, and thighs of his body and the refusal of 
the doctors who conducted the autopsy to certify a drug overdose as the 
cause of death.
    Basque activists continued to demand that all imprisoned ETA 
terrorists be moved to prisons in the Basque region or the adjacent 
autonomous region, Navarra. This demand was supported by two nonbinding 
resolutions in the Parliament, one in late 1998 and the other early in 
the year. On September 7, the Government announced that, despite ETA's 
indefinite cancellation of its talks with the Government, the 
Government would move 105 ETA prisoners to prisons in or nearer the 
Basque country. Since the announcement by ETA of its unilateral truce 
on September 16, 1998, 180 Basque prisoners, including ETA terrorists 
and members of HB, ETA's political party, were released from jails. 
Another 135 have been moved to prisons nearer to their homes. A total 
of 85 ETA prisoners currently are held in prisons in the Basque 
country. The total number of ETA prisoners has declined from 535 to 
405, although 50 new prisoners were added since the cease-fire.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors, 
including the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of 
Torture.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities respect 
these provisions in practice.
    A suspect may not be held for more than 72 hours without a hearing 
except in cases involving terrorism, in which case the Penal Code 
permits holding a suspect an additional 2 days without a hearing and 
the possibility of incommunicado detention, provided that a judge 
authorizes such action. Some powerful voices are calling for these 
provisions of the Penal Code to be modified. The press reported in July 
that in a speech Judge Baltazar Garzon, best known for his involvement 
in the case of General Pinochet, called for the reform of detention 
procedures, especially with regard to suspected terrorists. Garzon 
believes that the provisions of the code allowing suspected terrorists 
to be detained for 72 hours incommunicado and an additional 48 hours 
prior to appearing before a judge are too harsh.
    At times pretrial detention can be lengthy. By law suspects may not 
be confined for more than 2 years before being brought to trial, unless 
a further delay is authorized by a judge, who may extend pretrial 
custody to 4 years. In practice pretrial custody is usually less than 1 
year. However, criticism is heard in legal circles that some judges use 
``preventive custody'' as a form of anticipatory sentencing.
    The law on aliens permits detention of a person for up to 40 days 
prior to deportation but specifies that it must not take place in a 
prison-like setting.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government respects this 
provision in practice.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the judiciary is independent in practice.
    The judicial structure consists of local, provincial, regional, and 
national courts with the Supreme Court at its apex. The Constitutional 
Court has the authority to return a case to the court in which it was 
adjudicated if it can be determined that constitutional rights were 
violated during the course of the proceedings. The National High Court 
handles crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking. The European 
Court of Human Rights is the final arbiter in cases concerning human 
rights.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial, and 
the authorities respect this right in practice. There is a nine-person 
jury system.
    Defendants have the right to be represented by an attorney (at 
state expense for the indigent). They are released on bail unless the 
court believes that they may flee or be a threat to public safety. 
Following conviction, defendants may appeal to the next highest court.
    The law calls for an expeditious judicial hearing following arrest. 
However, the AVT and others have criticized delays in the judicial 
process, which can result at times in lengthy pretrial detention (see 
Section 1.d.), and delays in trials. In cases of petty crime, suspects 
released on bail sometimes wait up to 5 years for trial.
    Human rights groups such as the Association Against Torture and 
members of the press complain that many persons convicted of offenses 
constituting violations of human rights avoided sentencing by 
prolonging the appeals process and that sentences for persons convicted 
of such offenses are unduly light. According to Amnesty International, 
custodial sentences of less than 1 year and a day customarily are not 
served in such cases.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the privacy of the home 
and correspondence. Under the Criminal Code, government authorities 
must obtain court approval before searching private property, 
wiretapping, or interfering with private correspondence. The 
antiterrorist law gives discretionary authority to the Minister of the 
Interior to act prior to obtaining court approval in ``cases of 
emergency.''
    In 1998 national intelligence agency (CESID) wiretaps were 
discovered at the Vitoria headquarters of the pro-ETA political party 
HB. The scandal forced the provincial CESID directors in Vizcaya, 
Alava, and Pamplona to resign and compelled the Minister of Defense to 
develop a plan to establish greater judicial oversight of CESID 
operations.
    On March 9, seven members of CESID were put on trial for illegally 
tapping mobile phones of public officials and private citizens between 
1984 and 1990. The two principal defendents were former Director of 
CESID, Emilio Alonso Manglano, and former Chief of Operations Colonel 
Juan Alberto Perote. Four of the five other defendents are employed 
still by CESID. Government ministers, congressmen, businessmen, 
journalists, and the King were among the victims of these wiretaps. 
Perote blamed Jose Manuel Navarro Benavente, former Chief of the 
electronic surveillance section of CESID, who died in a traffic 
accident 2 months before the trial. The trial ended in May with the 
conviction of both Manglano and Perote. Both were sentenced to 6 months 
in prison for their role in the wiretapping scandal, but neither is 
expected to actually serve time. Both are appealing their convictions 
to the Supreme Court.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
provisions in practice. Opposition viewpoints, both from political 
parties and nonpartisan organizations, are aired freely and widely 
reflected in the media.
    The regional government of Cataluyna did not renew the broadcasting 
licenses of three Catholic radio stations, claiming that their renewal 
applications did not take seriously the Catalan language element. The 
stations had never in the past had problems with their license 
renewals. The Church announced in May that it would take the regional 
government to court over the issue.
    The pro-ETA political party Herri Batasuna continued to criticize 
the 1997 conviction of 23 members of its National Committee for 
collaboration with an armed band as a violation of its members' freedom 
of speech. Each of the convicted HB officials was sentenced to 7 years' 
imprisonment and a $3,733 (560,000 pesetas) fine in connection with 
their decision to distribute a videotape made by ETA during HB's 1996 
election campaign. One of the prisoners, Jon Cruz Idigoras, was freed 
in May due to poor health, and in July, three others had their penal 
grade reduced. On July 20, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of 
HB/EH's motion to free the rest of the former HB National Committee 
members. In its ruling, the Court argued that the punishment specified 
in the Penal Code for collaboration with an armed band is 
disproportionately harsh relative to the crime and is therefore 
unconstitutional. Within hours of the Court's decision, the remaining 
HB National Committee members were freed.
    The pro-ETA newspaper Egin and its affiliated radio station (Egin 
Irratia) have been closed since July 1998. Gara--another pro-ETA 
newspaper--has since emerged. The investigation into Egin's alleged 
subordination of its editorial line and hiring practices to ETA's 
command and the use of coded classified ads to coordinate ETA strategy 
is still ongoing. In a preliminary ruling issued on July 27, the 
National High Court ruled that Egin and its affiliated radio station 
could remain closed only until September 1. The Court argued that 
present circumstances did not dictate the continued closure of Egin. On 
August 6, Judge Baltazar Garzon decided to allow Egin and its 
affiliated radio station to reopen as of October but maintained 
judicial control over the various financial enterprises from which Egin 
gets its funding.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is 
no state religion, although Catholicism is the predominant religion and 
receives some government funding. Jews, Muslims, and Protestants have 
official status, and receive some support from the Government. Other 
recognized religions, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons, are 
covered by constitutional protections but receive no assistance. 
Religions not officially recognized as such are treated as cultural 
associations. Religious courses are offered in public schools but are 
not mandatory.
    There are some allegations that the Government discriminates 
against non-Catholic religions, principally by not providing all 
privileges accorded to the Catholic Church to other churches.
    In May Parliament approved a nonbinding resolution calling on the 
Government to reinforce measures against the activity of destructive 
``sects.'' A 1989 law on sects already had authorized the police to 
investigate their activities, and a special unit was created for that 
purpose. The resolution was preceded by press accounts of a death under 
unusual circumstances of a member of Jehovah's Witnesses and the arrest 
of the leader of a group called The Orientation in April.
    Also in April, a Helsinki Human Rights Federation report criticized 
the Government for discrimination against ``new religions.''
    The regional government of Cataluyna refused to renew three local 
radio broadcasting licenses of the Catholic Church (see Section 2.a.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel within and 
outside the country, to emigrate, and to repatriate, and the Government 
respects these rights in practice.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations, including the 
Spanish Committee for Assistance to Refugees (CEAR), in assisting 
refugees and asylum seekers. Under a 1994 law, asylum requests are 
adjudicated in a two-stage process with the Office of Asylum and 
Refugees (OAR) making an initial decision on the admissibility of the 
application for processing. An interagency committee called the 
Interministerial Committee for Asylum and Refuge (CIAR) examines the 
applications admitted for processing. The CIAR includes representatives 
from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Labor, Foreign Affairs, and a 
nonvoting member of the UNHCR. The decision of the CIAR in each case 
must be approved by the Minister of the Interior.
    The 1994 law eliminated the distinction between asylum status and 
refugee status. This distinction was eliminated to prevent applicants 
from drawing out judicial proceedings by applying first for refugee 
status and then for asylum, if the former was denied.
    The UNHCR advises the authorities throughout the process. 
Applicants for asylum have the right to have their applications sent 
immediately to the local office of the UNHCR. The authorities are not 
bound by the judgment of the UNHCR in individual cases, but they often 
reevaluate decisions with which the UNHCR does not agree. Appeals of 
rejection at either stage may be made to the National High Court, and 
appeals of the National High Court's decisions may be made to the 
Supreme Court.
    Asylum requests may be made from outside as well as within the 
country. From outside anyone can request asylum from a Spanish 
diplomatic or consular representative. Illegal immigrants are permitted 
to apply for asylum. Those who lack visas or permission to enter may 
apply at the border or port of entry. The applicant in such cases may 
be detained until a decision is made regarding the admissibility for 
processing of the application. In cases of persons who apply inside the 
country, this decision must be reached within 2 months, but in cases of 
persons who apply at a port of entry this period is reduced to 72 
hours. The period for filing an appeal in such cases is 24 hours. The 
Ombudsman (see Section 4) has challenged the legality of this form of 
detention before the Constitutional Court, and a final decision is 
pending. The Court has issued a preliminary decision in which it ruled 
that this form of detention does not deprive the detainee of his 
liberty. This provisional decision allowed the Government to continue 
to detain applicants without modifications to its detention procedures.
    Applicants have the right under law to free legal assistance 
regardless of where they are when they apply for asylum. This 
assistance is available from the first step in the process through any 
appeals of unfavorable decisions. The applicant also has the right to 
the assistance of translators and interpreters, and the OAR admits 
documents in any language without requiring an official translation.
    A total of 6,764 persons requested asylum in 1998 (latest figures 
available), a 36 percent increase over the number who requested asylum 
in 1997. Of the total number of applicants, 2,794 were admitted for 
first screening, and 3,780 were denied further proceedings as a result 
of the first review of their application. Only 206 persons were 
accorded permanent refugee status, and 491 were admitted for 
humanitarian reasons. The CIAR proposed that 236 persons be accorded 
permanent refugee status and 758 be allowed to stay for humanitarian 
reasons. There has been a steady drop in the number of those granted 
asylum in the past 5 years, since 1,287 applicants were granted asylum 
in 1993.
    The Ombudsman expressed his concern over the high percentage of 
applications not admitted for processing (68.5 percent in 1997 and 56.6 
percent in 1998). However, many persons apply with falsified documents 
and are rejected early in the process. Many such applicants come from 
politically stable but economically impoverished countries.
    The Government's practice of substituting temporary admittance for 
humanitarian reasons for granting asylum also has been criticized. The 
former status includes some restrictions on access to the labor market 
and welfare payments, although it does grant the applicant residency 
and work permits. Another concern is that in some cases individuals 
whose asylum requests were turned down may have been expelled while 
their appeals were still in progress, although no statistics are 
available. The law allows the applicant a 15 day grace period in which 
to leave the country if refugee status is denied. Within that time 
frame, the applicant may appeal the decision, and the court of appeal 
has the authority to prevent the initiation of expulsion procedures, 
which normally begin after the 15th day.
    There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country 
where they feared persecution.
    The country continues to face a wave of illegal immigrants, mostly 
coming from North Africa. Illegal immigrants generally seek entrance 
through Spain's two enclaves on the north African coast, Ceuta and 
Melilla, as well as through attempted crossings by boat from the 
African continent to either peninsular Spain proper or the Canary 
Islands. Authorities say that under ``normal'' circumstances, they 
intercept no more than 30 percent of those who enter coming across the 
Straits of Gibraltar. In response the Government is resorting to a mix 
of tighter border controls, liberalized treatment for those who already 
have established themselves in society, and increased international 
coordination.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Spain is a multiparty democracy with open elections in which all 
citizens 18 years of age and over have the right to vote by secret 
ballot. At all levels of government, elections are held at least every 
4 years. In the 1996 national elections, the Popular Party ended 13 
years of Socialist (PSOE) rule, and Jose Maria Aznar became Prime 
Minister. National elections are due to be held again on March 12, 
2000.
    Governmental power is shared between the central government and 17 
regional ``autonomous communities.'' Local nationalist parties give 
political expression to regional linguistic and cultural identities.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although 
they are increasing their participation in the political process. Four 
female cabinet ministers were in the current Government, but two of 
them left during the year when they were promoted to higher profile 
positions in the European Union and the Senate. They were replaced by 
men, leaving only two female ministers in the 19-member Cabinet.
    The number of female candidates for the national Parliament 
increased in the 1996 national elections. Although the President of the 
256-member Senate is a woman, only slightly over 10 percent of the 
Senate's current members are women. The 350-member Congress of Deputies 
has 72 female representatives (22 percent of the total). In the 1999 
European Parliament elections, both the PP and PSOE placed women at the 
top of their lists. On the PSOE list, 50 percent of the candidates were 
women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A number of nongovernmental human rights groups, including the 
Human Rights Association of Spain in Madrid and the Human Rights 
Institute of Cataluyna in Barcelona, operate freely without government 
interference. The Government cooperates readily with international 
organizations, international nongovernmental human rights groups, and 
independent national groups investigating allegations of human rights 
abuses.
    The Constitution provides for an Ombudsman, called the ``People's 
Defender,'' who as part of his duties actively investigates complaints 
of human rights abuses by the authorities. The Ombudsman operates 
independently from any party or government ministry, must be elected 
every 5 years by a three-fifths majority of the Congress of Deputies, 
and is immune from prosecution. He has complete access to government 
institutions and to all documents other than those classified for 
national security reasons.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens. In 
1995 the Parliament modified the Penal Code to make it a crime to 
``incite, publicize, or otherwise promote abuse or discrimination of 
people or groups'' because of race, ethnicity, nationality, ideology, 
or religious beliefs. The Ombudsman received approximately 24,000 
complaints in 1998, an increase of 6,000 compared with 1997. The 
majority of the complaints pertained to education and social services, 
although some pertained to discrimination, domestic violence, and 
mistreatment by law enforcement agencies.
    Women.--Sexual abuse, violence, and harassment of women in the 
workplace continued to be problems. During the first 8 months of the 
year, 27 women died at the hands of their husbands or former husbands, 
according to the Government. Most of these deaths occurred during legal 
separation proceedings. During the same period, 15,495 women filed 
complaints against their husbands or partners. However, experts believe 
that only 10 percent of violent acts against women are reported to the 
authorities. Abused women filed 19,621 complaints in 1998, 3,000 more 
than in 1997. The Women's Institute, which is part of the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs, consulted with 104,856 women concerning 
domestic violence and legal aid in 1998 compared with 86,893 in 1997. 
Some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) estimate that from 600,000 
to 800,000 cases of domestic abuse occur each year.
    In 1998 the Government unveiled a 3-year, $60 million (9 billion 
pesetas) ``Plan Against Domestic Violence.'' The plan criminalizes the 
violation of restraining orders and the infliction of psychological 
violence and calls for a quadrupling of the number of offices that 
assist victims and an expansion of medical and legal services. Other 
provisions of the plan include: The development of public awareness 
campaigns in the media and in the schools; the establishment of a 
domestic abuse database to streamline judicial investigations; 
increased access of victims to public housing; and greater linkage 
between medical, police, legal, and counseling services in order to 
promote an integrated approach to treating victims. Women's rights' 
advocates, while acknowledging that the plan incorporated many of their 
demands, expressed disappointment with several of its omissions. The 
Federation of Separated and Divorced Women criticized the plan as 
lacking in specifics, particularly its public sensitization campaigns. 
According to the Federation, the plan's key shortcoming is that it 
fails to make the issuance of a restraining order automatic upon filing 
a complaint. Currently, a restraining order is issued only after a 
guilty verdict. To date, the Government has invested over $15.2 million 
(2.288 billion pesetas) in the plan. Since the plan was approved, 9 
special services units and 54 Civil Guard units staffed by 110 women 
have been created to assist battered women. There are special sections 
in the police department to deal with violence against women, which are 
staffed by trained female officers, and there are approximately 25 
shelters for battered women. There are 54 official centers in all for 
mistreated women. A toll-free hot line advises women where to go for 
government shelter or other aid if mistreated. Also under the plan, 
during the year, 9,500 state security officers, judges, social workers, 
and educators attended 300 courses offered by the Government on human 
rights with a particular focus on battered women.
    In November 1998, Amalia Gomez (General Secretary for Social 
Affairs, in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs) and Concepcion 
Dancausa (Director of the Women's Institute, also in the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs) launched a campaign to sensitize the general 
public to the problem of domestic violence. The Women's Institute 
financed the campaign with $146,666 (22 million pesetas). The NGO 
Confederation of Neighborhood Associations (CAVE) is spearheading the 
campaign. This organization is composed of over 3,000 various 
neighborhood associations that aim to make women aware of how to combat 
domestic violence. In addition the Civil Guard, National Police, and 
CAVE signed an agreement to hire 10,000 women to staff centers where 
battered women can seek advice.
    On February 23, the Parliament approved the text of a law that 
would allow for an ``immediate'' divorce upon conviction of a husband 
for domestic violence. The socially conservative political parties (PP 
and nationalist parties) tended to favor this bill. Womens' groups and 
the more left-of-center political parties (PSOE and NI) opposed the 
bill, due to concern that a woman's right to divorce her abusive 
husband would be dependent on an inefficient legal system that often 
takes years to complete a single criminal proceeding.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution, primarily 
from Latin America and Eastern Europe, appears to be growing (see 
Section 6.f.).
    A 1989 law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, but very 
few cases have been brought to trial under this law. Meanwhile the 
number of women in the labor market is increasing steadily. The 
Government recognizes the difficulties faced by women in the work 
place. According to a decree approved by the Government in October 
1998, employers no longer have to pay social security benefits to 
someone filling in for a worker on leave either for maternity, adopting 
children, or in other similar circumstances. Previously, companies 
hired substitutes for only 10 percent of workers on maternity leave. 
The Government hopes to raise this figure to 25 percent. A ministerial 
order to increase women's presence in sectors in which they currently 
are underrepresented provides a 2 year reprieve from paying social 
security taxes to employers who hire women in these sectors. The 1999 
National Employment Action Plan gives priority to battered women who 
search for employment.
    The Minister of Social Affairs reports that women constitute 43 
percent of the work force. However, according to the Taxation Agency 
(Agencia Tributaria) and its 1997 report ``Employment, Salaries and 
Pensions'' completed by the Institution of Fiscal Studies, women hold 
only 18 percent of better paying positions. The female unemployment 
rate, at about 30 percent, is roughly double the male unemployment 
rate. Women outnumber men in the legal, journalistic, and health care 
professions but still play minor roles in many other fields.
    Discrimination in the workplace and in hiring practices persists. A 
1998 study of 100 labor union contracts revealed that 38 contracts 
failed to use gender-neutral language, 22 employed gender-specific job 
titles resulting in the imposition of discriminatory wage differentials 
(i.e., the salary of a male secretary, ``secretario,'' is 13 percent 
higher than that of a ``secretaria'' in one food processing industry 
contract), and only 17 addressed the problem of sexual harassment. 
While the law mandates equal pay for equal work, a 1997 report by the 
Economic and Social Affairs Council shows that women's salaries still 
remain 27 percent lower than those of their male counterparts. The 
Council states that women are more apt to have temporary contracts and 
part-time employment than men. The National Association of Rural Women 
and Families (ANFAR) reported in 1995 that 80 percent of rural women 
are not employed formally but instead aid their husbands in farming or 
fishing. ANFAR reported that these women lack titles to family 
enterprises and do not receive the same social security benefits as the 
male head of household. Official unemployment statistics show that the 
rate for men was 16 percent and for women was 28 percent in 1997.
    In 1998 the Parliament unanimously approved a nonbinding resolution 
urging the Government to calculate the value of nonrenumerated work 
performed each year and include this value in an adjunct Gross Domestic 
Product account. This would include domestic and volunteer work as well 
as unpaid work in family businesses and farming operations, the 
majority of it done by women.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
welfare through well-funded and easily accessed programs of education 
and health care. Education is compulsory until age 16 and free until 
age 18. The Constitution obligates both the State and parents to 
protect children, whether or not born in wedlock. The Ministries of 
Health and Social Affairs are responsible for the welfare of children 
and have created numerous programs to aid needy children. Numerous 
NGO's exist to further children's rights. For example the school help 
program for the protection of children has a team of experts who work 
with educators to help identify abused or abandoned children in the 
classroom.
    The 1995 Law of the Child gives legal rights of testimony to minors 
in child abuse cases; it also obliges all citizens to act on cases of 
suspected child abuse and, for the first time, sets out rules regarding 
foreign adoptions. Under the Penal Code, children under the age of 18 
are not considered responsible for their actions and cannot be sent to 
prison.
    A new law extended parental leave for fathers from 4 to 10 weeks.
    A 1996 penitentiary law lowered the maximum age that a child can 
remain with an incarcerated mother from 6 to 3 years. When the children 
reach their third birthday, they are sent to live with relatives or are 
placed in an institution. Some prisons have special units for mothers 
with children under age 3. They usually include a kindergarten, 
psychological support, and ways for children to get out of prison 
regularly. Family groups with children under the age of 3 can now stay 
together in cases where both parents are convicts.
    People With Disabilities.--The Constitution calls for the State to 
provide for the adequate treatment and care of the disabled, ensuring 
that they are not deprived of the basic rights that apply to all 
citizens. The law aims to ensure fair access to public employment, 
prevent disability, and facilitate access to public facilities and 
transportation. The national law serves as a guide for regional laws; 
however, levels of assistance and accessibility differ from region to 
region and have not improved in many areas.
    The 1996 Penal Code continues to allow parents or legal 
representatives of a mentally disabled person to petition a judge to 
obtain permission for the sterilization of that person. In 1994 the 
Constitutional Court held that sterilization of the mentally infirm 
does not constitute a violation of the Constitution. In practice many 
courts have authorized such surgery. Religious groups continue to 
protest this ruling.
    The labor market reform laws of 1997 and 1998 worked out between 
the Government, labor, and management provided for incentives to hire 
individuals from groups underrepresented in the work force, such as the 
disabled. In the 1998 agreement, the Government agreed to partially 
subsidize the costs of hiring the disabled for part-time work.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Public opinion surveys indicate 
the continued presence of racism and xenophobia, which result in 
discrimination against minorities. In a survey of 13- to 19-year-old 
Madrid students conducted in 1998 by the University Complutense in 
Madrid, 48 percent admitted to having anti-immigrant feelings, 51 
percent blamed immigrants for increased drug use and crime, and 52 
percent thought that immigrants took jobs away from Spaniards. 
According to the survey, 14 percent would favor expelling immigrants, 
and 11 percent would vote for an ultranationalist political leader 
similar to Jean-Marie Le Pen in France. However, another study claims 
that 65 percent of citizens do not believe that immigrants cause 
unemployment among Spaniards to be higher than it would be were the 
immigrants not present. The same number opposes discrimination and 
xenophobia and favors the integration of immigrants into society.
    On January 25, the Council of Europe cited a resurgence in 
nationalism, sometimes violent, which manifested itself in intolerance 
towards Roma, Africans, and Arabs. The Council recommended that the 
Government modify the Constitution to better provide for the equality 
of minority groups.
    Roma continue to suffer discrimination in jobs, schools, and 
housing. The Ombudsman's Office issued a manifesto in March that called 
for the end of prejudice and discrimination against Roma. According to 
a report issued by the NGO Gypsy Presence, the largest Roma-rights NGO, 
as many as 1 million Roma may live in the country. The organization 
estimates that half of this population is under 16 years of age and 
two-thirds are under the age of 25. The report states that one-third of 
Roma families are not economically self-sufficient. Romani activists 
attribute the high incidence of Romani informal sector employment in 
agriculture and peddling (an estimated 75 to 80 percent) to 
discrimination and historical marginalization. Although the Madrid High 
Court of Justice struck down a city ordinance prohibiting peddling, 
Gypsy Presence reports that local authorities continue to find ways to 
enforce the ban. According to the organization, several other 
municipalities have enacted similar statutes, and this has been 
detrimental to the economic welfare of many Roma. Romani women suffer 
even more acute difficulties when seeking employment, since employers 
are reluctant to hire women from ethnic groups with high birth rates.
    A 1998 study found that only 35 percent of Romani children are 
fully integrated into the educational system. Approximately 60 percent 
of Romani children do not complete primary school, and only very few 
progress to middle school and beyond. According to a Gypsy Presence 
report, one-fifth of teachers describe themselves as anti-Roma, and 
one-fourth of students say that they would like to see Roma expelled 
from school. Truancy and dropout rates among Roma are very high, and 
Romani parents, over 80 percent of whom are functionally illiterate, 
often do not see the value of an education or are unaware of the 
educational opportunities for their children.
    An unofficial government tendency to prioritize non-Romani squatter 
resettlement over Romani resettlement has led to an increasing 
proportion of Roma in shantytowns; Roma went from constituting 55 
percent of the shantytown population in 1975 to constituting 95 percent 
of the squatter population in 1990.
    In Madrid various encampments of recently arrived Roma occupy 
abandoned industrial areas. Some of these tent communities house up to 
200 families. On February 17, the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
criticized the lack of schooling for 200 children living in a camp in 
Malmea in the Fuencarral district of Madrid, which housed 350 Romanian 
immigrants. In March the municipal government responded to UNICEF's 
criticisms by providing shower facilities, vaccinations, and a plan to 
educate the children of the camp. However, on July 8, local authorities 
bulldozed the camp and relocated the inhabitants temporarily to a camp 
in Camino de San Roque, near a national highway. The authorities 
decided to resettle these immigrants in four camps. Critics charge that 
the camps are not suitable, since one is located in an abandoned 
railyard, two are near an incinerator, and the other is near a toxic 
waste processing plant. However, two of the camps already constructed 
had shower facilities, electricity, lavatories, and kitchen facilities. 
The authorities decided that the camps would be gated, and all 
residents would have to carry identity cards to enter. These steps were 
taken to ensure that no immigrants join the original group resettled 
from Malmea. After 3 months in the new camps, local social services 
personnel planned to assess how well the Roma had integrated themselves 
into society. Those who succeeded sufficiently at integrating would be 
resettled into apartment blocks; the rest would be sent back to 
Romania. The political party Izquierda Unida (IU), NGO's, and the 
European Parliamentarian Rosa Diez of the PSOE criticized the camps. 
Diaz asked the European Union's Council of Ministers to look into the 
matter. In August 200 of the 350 recently arrived Roma left the San 
Roque camp and relocated to Valencia, Alicante, and Barcelona, thereby 
losing their right to be resettled.
    A shooting incident in the village of Albaladejo in early May 
illustrated the problems that even economically successful Roma can 
face. According to an NGO, the victim in the case was Juan Jose Garcia 
Garcia, who at one time was accused of drug dealing and assaulting 
Civil Guards but was acquitted of both charges. However, Civil Guards 
continued to harass him, often stopping him for identity checks or not 
wearing a seatbelt. In 1996 the mayor of Albaladejo, Juan Angel Rodado 
Rubio, tried to close down Garcia's horse stable, claiming that it did 
not comply with sanitary standards. A subsequent veterinary inspection 
showed that the stable was operating in accordance with the law. 
According to Gypsy Presence, after being refused service at a bar, 
Garcia arranged to meet an employee of the bar, who later appeared at 
the appointed place with a another man, shot Garcia, and left him for 
dead. Garcia was able to contact his wife by cellular phone, and help 
arrived in time to save him. He has not yet recovered fully from his 
wounds. After the two assailants were apprehended, the residents of 
Albaladejo turned out in force to protest their incarceration and 
petition for their release. The mayor often led the demonstrations. In 
late June, the Provincial Court of Villanueva de los Infantes, which is 
responsible for the case, freed the two accused after they posted bond 
in the amount of $3,333 and $2,666 (500,000 and 400,000 pesetas 
respectively). Garcia and his family left Albaladejo.
    Quasi-organized rightwing youth groups (called ``skinheads'' by the 
press) continued to commit violent acts throughout the year, 
terrorizing minorities. According to a report by the NGO Movement 
Against Intolerance, which the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
helped prepare, the number of persons involved in ultrarightist groups 
has more than quintupled since 1995: at least 10,400 citizens are known 
to be involved in such groups, and the actual number could be as high 
as 20,800.
    An NGO urged the Government to halt neo-Nazi activites in the 
formerly deserted village of Los Pedriches in the southeast. Foreign 
neo-Nazis were said to be organizing camps in the village. The 
authorities were monitoring the situation closely.
    In July there were antiimmigrant demonstrations in Ca n'Anglada, a 
predominantly immigrant neighborhood in Terrasa, a suburb of Barcelona. 
Maghrebi immigrants were attacked by skinheads, themselves the 
descendents of immigrants from the less developed south of Spain in the 
1950's and 1960's. These earlier migrants successfully integrated 
themselves into Catalan society, something they claim that the 
Maghrebis have failed to do. The inhabitants of Terrasa complain that 
the Maghrebi immigrants sexually harass their daughters and women. 
However, officials of the Catalan regional government stated that no 
complaints of sexual harassment or rape have been filed against members 
of the Moroccan community. In the worst of the incidents, a Moroccan 
youth was stabbed on July 14. He was taken to the hospital and listed 
in critical condition upon arrival. During a television interview, one 
skinhead called for Maghrebi immigrants to be killed and openly 
displayed a knife. The police detained 11 skinheads. In a July 20 
statement, national government spokesperson Josep Pique characterized 
the occurrences in Terrasa as extremely worrying and called for 
tolerance.
    In two other high profile cases, a mosque was set on fire in 
Gerona, as was a building in Banolas that housed approximately 20 
immigrants from Senegal and The Gambia. Both incidents took place on 
July 19. The fire in Banolas was the third such suspicious incident in 
that month. A local store and another apartment block previously were 
set on fire. In a separate incident, three immigrants were hurt when a 
fire was set at their house in Gerona. To date the police have not 
detained any suspects in these cases.
    A language or dialect other than Castillian Spanish is used in 6 of 
the 17 autonomous communities. The Constitution stipulates that 
citizens have ``the duty to know'' Castillian, which is the ``official 
language of the state,'' but it adds that other languages also can be 
official under regional statutes and that the ``different language 
variations of Spain are a cultural heritage which shall . . . be 
protected.''
    The Law of the Catalan Language, approved by the Catalan regional 
legislature (Generalitat) in 1998, stipulates the use of Catalan as the 
official language in local government and administrative offices, 
regional courts, publicly owned corporations, and private companies 
subsidized by the Catalan regional government. Spanish-speaking 
citizens are provided with the right to be dealt with by public 
officials in Spanish. The legislation also establishes minimum quotas 
for Catalan-language radio and television programming. Many activists 
in Catalunya's Spanish-speaking community criticized the law for 
discriminating against Spanish-speaking citizens and imposing 
``linguistic hegemony'' on a diverse population. Lawsuits regarding 
specific applications of this law are pending in various courts. Both 
Galicia and Valencia have laws stating the duty of the Government to 
``promote'' their regional languages in schools and at official 
functions.
    The debate continued over the extent to which the Basque language 
(Euskera) should be promoted. The Union of Basque-Speaking Lawyers, 
affiliated with the pro-ETA HB political party, intensified its 
campaign against the use of translation services in trials of Basque-
speaking citizens.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except those in the 
military services, judges, magistrates, and prosecutors, are entitled 
to form or join unions of their own choosing.
    Under the Constitution, trade unions are free to choose their 
representatives, determine their policies, represent their members' 
interests, and strike. They are not restricted or harassed by the 
Government and are independent of political parties. A strike in 
nonessential services is legal if its sponsors give 5 days' notice. Any 
striking union must respect minimum service requirements negotiated 
with the respective employer. The right to strike was interpreted by 
the Constitutional Court to include general strikes called to protest 
government policy. There were 632 strikes in 1998, a decrease of 53 
from 1997. The number of striking workers in 1998 was 680,500, an 
increase of 29,900 on the previous year. The number of workdays lost to 
strikes in 1998 was 1,280,900, a decrease of 555,900 on the previous 
year.
    Unions are free to form or join federations and affiliate with 
international bodies and do so without hindrance.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1980 statute 
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Trade 
union and collective bargaining rights were extended in 1986 to all 
workers in the public sector except military personnel. Public sector 
collective bargaining in 1990 was broadened to include salaries and 
employment levels, but the Government retained the right to set these 
if negotiations failed. Collective bargaining agreements are widespread 
in both the public and private sectors; in the latter they cover 60 
percent of workers, notwithstanding that only about 15 percent of 
workers are actually union members.
    The law prohibits discrimination by employers against trade union 
members and organizers. Discrimination cases have priority in the labor 
courts. The law gives unions a role in controlling temporary work 
contracts to prevent the abuse of such contracts and of termination 
actions. Unions nonetheless contend that employers discriminate in many 
cases by refusing to renew the temporary contracts of workers engaging 
in union organizing.
    More than one-third of all employees are under temporary contracts.
    Labor regulations and practices in free trade zones and export 
processing zones are the same as in the rest of the country. Union 
membership in these zones is reportedly higher than the average 
throughout the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited, and the law 
is enforced effectively; however, there were instances of trafficking 
in women who were forced into prostitution (see Section 6.f.). In July 
the Madrid police detained three Chinese restaurant owners for 
employing eight undocumented workers and forcing them to work in slave-
like conditions. Press reports on July 25 referred to undocumented 
workers in shoe factories in Valverde. According to the reports, just 
under 10 percent of the workers in some of Valverde's 50 shoe factories 
are hired in accordance with the law. The reports added that some 
workers earn as little as 67 cents (100 pesetas) per hour. Pedro Lazo, 
one of the factory owners, admitted that between 10 and 20 percent of 
the firms in Valverde use illegal hiring practices.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment 
of Children.--The statutory minimum age for the employment of children 
is 16 years. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is primarily 
responsible for enforcement. The minimum age is enforced effectively in 
major industries and in the service sector. It is more difficult to 
enforce on small farms and in family-owned businesses, where some child 
labor persists. Legislation prohibiting child labor is enforced 
effectively in the special economic zones. The law also prohibits the 
employment of persons under the age of 18 at night, for overtime work, 
or in sectors considered hazardous. The law prohibits forced or 
compulsory labor by children, and it is enforced effectively (see 
Section 6.c.).
    In August 1998 the U.N. Children's Fund called for an investigation 
into child labor on tomato farms in Badajoz. According to Red Cross 
personnel providing assistance to migrant farm workers there, over 200 
children under the age of 16, the majority Portuguese citizens, worked 
10-hour days and earned less than $14 (2,000 pesetas) per day. Many of 
the children were less than 10 years old.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage was set in 
December 1999 for 2000 and is $14.16 (2,356 pesetas) per day or $424.80 
(70,680 pesetas) per month. This represents a 2 percent increase 
compared with 1999. The legal minimum wage for workers over 18 years of 
age is considered sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for 
a worker and family. The rate is revised every year in line with the 
consumer price index and is enforced effectively by the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs.
    The law sets a 40-hour workweek with an unbroken rest period of 36 
hours after each 40 hours worked. Workers enjoy 12 paid holidays a year 
and a month's paid vacation.
    Government mechanisms exist for enforcing working conditions and 
occupational health and safety rules, but bureaucratic procedures are 
cumbersome and inefficient. Safety and health legislation is being 
revised to conform to European Union (EU) directives. The Law to 
Prevent Labor Risks was passed in 1995 as the foundation for the 
completion of the rest of the EU directives. The National Institute of 
Safety and Health in the Ministry of Labor and Social Security has 
technical responsibility for developing labor standards, but the 
Inspectorate of Labor has responsibility for enforcing the legislation 
through judicial action when infractions are found. Workers have firm 
legal protection for filing complaints about hazardous conditions, but 
easily replaced temporary workers may be reluctant to use this 
protection due to fear of losing their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law provides for sentences of up to 
3 years' imprisonment and a fine for trafficking in persons.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution, 
primarily from Latin America and Eastern Europe, appears to be growing. 
At least three such rings were broken up during the year. One ring was 
run by Russians and Azerbaijanis and involved trafficking women from 
Eastern Europe. Another, which police in Castilla-La Mancha broke up in 
mid-July, brought women to the country from Africa, Europe, and South 
America. In August police in Andalucia detained 51 persons and broke up 
a ring that trafficked women from Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. In all 
these cases, women were promised jobs and given the necessary documents 
to enter the country. Upon arrival their documents were seized, and 
they were taken to alternative clubs and forced to have up to 10 sexual 
encounters per day.
    Most women apprehended in raids are Latin Americans who entered the 
country legally as tourists (most from countries whose citizens do not 
require visas), but who began working as prostitutes instead. Profits 
in the sex industry are 10 times higher than those in other occupations 
commonly filled by migrants (waitresses, maids, etc.). Nonetheless, 
officials concede that significant numbers of women are trafficked to 
Spain by eastern European Mafia groups that ruthlessly exploit their 
victims. A Chinese gang, which forced migrants to submit to abortions, 
was apprehended. Media attention to the issue of international 
trafficking in women has encouraged NGO's and others to demand 
protection for victims. A draft law, which would provide permanent 
residency and social benefits for victims of trafficking and other 
undocumented migrants who provide testimony against their oppressors, 
has sparked controversy. Press accounts state that authorities detained 
163 pimps and freed 865 foreigners from abusive situations in the first 
half of the year. The half-year figures surpass the totals for all of 
1998. However, they fall far short of reaching the estimated 20,000 
foreign women whom authorities suspect are involved in the sex 
industry.
    The region around Barcelona is one of the prime destinations for 
trafficked women. Most of them work in truck stops or private clubs. A 
total of 1,387 such places are registered by Catalan authorities, and 
at least an equal number operate without formal permits.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 SWEDEN

    Sweden is a constitutional monarchy and a multiparty parliamentary 
democracy. The King is Chief of State. The Cabinet, headed by the Prime 
Minister, exercises executive authority. The judiciary is independent.
    The Government effectively controls the police, all security 
organizations, and the armed forces.
    Sweden has an advanced industrial economy, mainly market based, and 
a high standard of living, with extensive social welfare services.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing 
with individual instances of abuse. The Government has longstanding 
programs to deal with violence against women and abuse of children and 
took steps against trafficking in women. Neo-Nazi violence increased 
during the year.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by the government.
    A trade union official was killed and his office building burned 
down in October after he exposed a colleague as a neo-Nazi (see Section 
5).
    Two policemen were killed by self-confessed neo-Nazis during a bank 
robbery in May (see Section 5).
    Due to a lack of new evidence, the director of the Public 
Prosecution Authority halted the investigation into a 1995 case in 
which a man died in police custody. After a disagreement over the post-
mortem findings, the Prosecutor General requested the opinion of the 
National Board of Health and Welfare, which was pending at year's end. 
The case remains under review by the Prosecutor General. 
Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) remain very interested in the 
case.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits these abuses, and the authorities 
generally respect such prohibitions. Complaints of the excessive use of 
force by the police are infrequent. Thorough investigations have 
produced no evidence of a systemic problem. Typically, police officers 
found guilty of abuse are suspended or otherwise disciplined.
    After a September clash between police and demonstrators, 10 
complaints of use of excessive force were lodged against the police. 
Protesters did not obtain a permit for the demonstration, and the 
police arrested 243 persons--mostly youths--after bottles and rocks 
were thrown.
    In 1998 four policemen were fired after being found guilty of 
committing crimes at work (mostly the use of excessive force). Between 
January 1997 and June 1998, 12 cases of excessive use of force resulted 
in disciplinary or criminal sanctions against police.
    The police suspect that neo-Nazis were responsible for the June 
bombing of the car of a journalist who reported on neo-Nazi activity 
(see Section 5).
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the 
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arrests are by warrant. 
The police must lodge charges within 6 hours against persons detained 
for disturbing the public order or considered dangerous, and within 12 
hours against those detained on other grounds. The law requires 
arraignment within 48 hours. The time between arrest and the first 
court hearing may be extended to 96 hours for detainees considered 
dangerous, likely to destroy evidence, or likely to flee. In cases 
involving more than one individual and in the case of foreigners, 
courts can and do order continued detention for 2 weeks at a time while 
police are investigating. Such detentions can be protracted, 
particularly in drug cases. Other than such dangerous suspects, 
detainees routinely are released pending trial. Bail as such does not 
exist. If a person files for bankruptcy and refuses to cooperate with 
the official investigation, a court may order detention for up to 3 
months, with judicial review every 2 weeks.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    The court system is composed of three levels of courts: district 
courts, a court of appeals, and a Supreme court. All criminal and civil 
cases are heard first in district court regardless of the severity of 
the alleged crime.
    The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an 
independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law limits home searches to investigations of 
major crimes punishable by at least 2 years' imprisonment. The 
authorities respect this provision. Normally the police must obtain 
court approval for a search or a wiretap. However, a senior police 
official may approve a search if time is a critical factor or the case 
involves a threat to life. A parliamentary committee each year reviews 
all electronic monitoring. An April Ministry of Justice report on the 
use of wiretapping is under review by the Government. Since only one 
request for a wiretap has been denied in recent years, NGO's argue that 
there is insufficient judicial oversight of this procedure.
    In 1997 journalistic investigations focused attention on the 
country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization. The majority of 
persons sterilized were disabled either mentally or physically. Such 
operations were known for years to have taken place under pre-World War 
II legislation, most of them without force. It initially was reported 
that between 1934 and 1976, 62,888 forced sterilizations were carried 
out, 95 percent of them on women. In 1999 a government-appointed 
commission concluded that approximately 10,000 to 15,000 of these 
sterilizations were forced. The commission was to give priority to the 
question of damages to victims and also look into the possible 
existence of other categories of victims. The commission concluded its 
inquiry in May, and Parliament decided that month to pay damages of 
approximately $21,000 (175,000 krona) to each victim. Those compensated 
earlier with $6,000 (50,000 krona) are to receive the additional 
$15,000 (125,000 krona) without having to apply. Since the 1980's, the 
Government received 130 claims for compensation; it provided 
compensation in 17 instances, noting formal errors committed in these 
cases. Each of the 17 persons compensated received approximately $6,000 
(50,000 krona). Ministers expressed regret and astonishment over the 
practice and how long it continued.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects these 
provisions in practice. Most newspapers and periodicals are privately 
owned. The Government subsidizes daily newspapers, regardless of 
political affiliation. Broadcasters operate under a state concession. 
Until a few years ago, the State had a monopoly over ground-based 
broadcasting, but a variety of commercial television channels (one 
ground-based and several via satellite or cable) and several commercial 
radio stations now exist.
    The Government may censor publications containing national security 
information. A quasi-governmental body excises extremely graphic 
violence from films, television programs, and videos.
    Criticism of child pornography is widespread, and the debate on the 
legality of ownership of pornographic material continued. A new law 
criminalizing the possession and handling of child pornography came 
into effect on January 1, 1999. It also is illegal to publish or 
distribute such material. The Queen remains a strong and popular 
advocate of children's rights and an active opponent of child 
pornography.
    The police suspect that neo-Nazis were responsible for the June 
bombing of the car of a journalist who reported on neo-Nazi activity 
(see Section 5).
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respects 
this right in practice. Police require a permit for public 
demonstrations. The authorities routinely grant such permits, with rare 
exceptions to prevent clashes between antagonistic groups or due to 
insufficient police resources to adequately patrol an event.
    In an isolated incident, police refused an Amnesty International 
request to demonstrate outside an embassy in July. Authorities cited 
insufficient police resources as a justification for refusing the 
request.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government respects this right in practice. A debate began during the 
year over the possible criminalization of neo-Nazi organizations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government does not hamper the practice or teaching 
of any faith.
    The country has maintained a state (Lutheran) church for several 
hundred years, supported by a general ``church tax'' (although the 
Government routinely grants exemptions). However, in 1995 the Church of 
Sweden and the Government agreed to a formal separation, effective in 
2000, but the Church still is to receive some state support.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for free movement 
within, from, and to the country for citizens, and the Government 
respects these rights in practice.
    The law and regulations incorporate the precepts in the 1951 U.N. 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. 
They are also consistent with the European Union's (EU) Dublin 
Convention. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees; it also provides first asylum. In keeping with international 
agreements, the Government now reviews applications for asylum more 
thoroughly than before. The number of applications for asylum or 
residence permits increased in 1998 to 12,844 (from 9,623 in 1997). 
Applicants included 3,843 Iraqi citizens, 3,466 citizens of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (95 percent of whom were Kosovar Albanians), and 
1,331 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through July 6,046 persons sought 
asylum. The Government approved 7,066 applications in 1998; of these 
4,980 were for humanitarian reasons. Nearly 11 percent of the country's 
population is foreign born.
    The Government carries out expeditious returns of asylum seekers 
from EU countries or from countries with which there are reciprocal 
return agreements. In many cases asylum seekers were deported within 72 
hours of arrival, and NGO's were critical of their lack of access to 
legal counsel. To remedy this the Government is experimenting with 
pilot programs at selected border crossings to provide expeditious 
legal assistance. Most of these are cases of persons who passed through 
or have asylum determinations pending in other EU countries. 
Applications can remain under consideration for long periods of time 
with applicants in uncertain status. Because of the appeals process in 
the courts, cases can extend for several years. These cases are few in 
number.
    The principal complaint of NGO's is that the country lacks a 
transparent process for making decisions in asylum cases. They maintain 
that the asylum procedures lack rules to guide the conduct of 
authorities to ensure legal protection for asylum seekers. The 
procedures accord great discretion to individuals in decisionmaking 
positions. According to the NGO's, the decisionmakers use arbitrary, 
unspecified, and inconsistent criteria. NGO's are particularly critical 
of the unclear burden of proof and the lack of an appeals process to an 
independent court.
    In 1998 the U.N. Committee Against Torture found merit in four 
complaints against the Government for seeking to return asylum seekers 
to countries where they faced risk of torture. In all of the cases the 
asylum seekers eventually were granted permanent residence on other 
grounds. The Government conducted a review of the safety of countries 
that are considered safe third countries. NGO's also raised the issue 
of insufficient protection for returnees to countries without a 
reciprocal return agreement. While these countries provide safe asylum, 
they are often reluctant to accept asylum seekers deported from 
European countries. Despite the Government's review, late in the year 
the authorities ordered the deportation of two Iranian asylum seekers 
to Tehran. The deportation was halted after the U.N. Committee Against 
Torture decided to review both cases to determine if the individuals 
would face torture if returned to Tehran.
    Between April and August, 3,752 Kosovar Albanian refugees were 
granted temporary residence permits, initially valid for 11 months. By 
September 1,000 of the refugees had returned to Kosovo. Sweden has 
accepted over 100,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia. The 
Government provides grants to Bosnians to travel to their homeland in 
order to determine if they wish to be repatriated. It also provides 
financial incentives for returnees, but there is no forced 
repatriation. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to 
a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. Citizens exercised this right most recently in 
September 1998. Elections to the 349-member unicameral Parliament are 
held every 4 years. Noncitizen residents have the right to participate 
in local (city and county) elections.
    Women participate actively in the political process and Government. 
They constitute 43.6 percent of the Parliament and 55 percent of the 
Cabinet. The governing Social Democratic Party largely kept its pledge 
to place women in half of all political appointments at all levels.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several private organizations actively monitor issues such as the 
impact of social legislation, anti-immigrant or racist activities, and 
the condition of the indigenous Sami population. The official ombudsmen 
publicize abuses of state authority and may initiate actions to rectify 
such abuses. Government agencies are in close contact with a variety of 
local and international groups working in the country and abroad to 
improve human rights observance.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, and 
the Government respects this provision.
    Women.--There were 20,516 reported cases of assault against women 
(excluding rape) in 1998, compared with 19,093 in 1997. Most involved 
spousal abuse. In three-quarters of the assaults, the perpetrator was 
an acquaintance of the victim. Reported abuse against women occurs 
disproportionately in immigrant communities. On average 33 murders of 
women and girls are reported each year, half of them by men closely 
related to the victim. The number of reported rapes of persons over age 
15 was 1,386 in 1998, compared with 1,050 in 1997. The law does not 
differentiate between spousal and nonspousal rape.
    Trafficking in women from Russia and the Baltics for purposes of 
forced prostitution increased in recent years (see Section 6.f.). The 
purchase or attempted purchase of sexual services was made illegal as 
of January 1.
    The Government has longstanding programs to deal with violence 
against women. The law provides complainants protection from contact 
with their abusers, if so desired. In some cases, the authorities help 
women obtain new identities and homes. Since 1994 the Government has 
provided electronic alarms or bodyguards for women in extreme danger of 
assault. Both national and local governments provide monetary support 
to volunteer groups that provide shelter and other assistance to abused 
women. The authorities strive to apprehend and prosecute abusers. 
Typically, the sentence for abuse is a prison term or psychiatric 
treatment. However, women complain about short sentences and the early 
release of offenders.
    The law prohibits sexual harassment. During 1998 the law was 
amended to specify clearly employer responsibility to prevent and--if 
applicable--to investigate sexual harassment in the workplace and to 
formulate and post a specific policy and guidelines for the workplace. 
Employers who do not investigate and intervene against harassment at 
work can be obliged to pay damages to the victim. As with other forms 
of discrimination, women and men may take complaints to the courts or 
to their unions. To combat gender discrimination in the longer term, 
the equal opportunities act requires all employers, both in the public 
and private sector, actively to promote equal opportunities for women 
and men in the workplace. Employers with a minimum of 10 employees must 
prepare an annual equal opportunities plan.
    Under the country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization, 
thousands of persons were sterilized forcibly between 1934 and 1976. 
The majority of those sterilized were disabled either mentally or 
physically, and 95 percent were women. In May Parliament decided to pay 
damages in such cases (see Section 1.f.).
    The Government actively promotes heightened awareness of the need 
for gender equality by supporting conferences and seminars for 
employers in the private and public sectors. The Government believes 
that it implemented the recommendations from the 1995 U.N. Women's 
Conference in Beijing through changes in the law and new legislation. A 
law entered into force on January 1 that prohibits buying or even 
soliciting sexual services; convictions are subject to fines or prison 
terms of up to 6 months.
    The law requires employers to treat men and women alike in hiring, 
promotion, and pay, including equal pay for comparable work. According 
to Statistics Sweden, women's salaries were 83 percent of men's 
salaries in 1997. Considering differences in age, education, and 
occupational groups between men and women, the adjusted result is on 
average 93 percent of men's salaries. (A 1998 U.N. Development Program 
study reported that women's salaries averaged about 78 percent of men's 
salaries.) The equal opportunities ombudsman, a public official, 
investigates complaints of gender discrimination in the labor market. 
Women and men also may pursue complaints through the courts. A third 
option, and by far the most common, involves settling allegations using 
the employee's labor union as mediator. In 1998 74 women and 17 men 
registered gender discrimination cases with the equal opportunities 
ombudsman. In 1998 three cases were taken to court. In the past, many 
of these cases involved salary discrimination. In 1998 20 cases were 
settled by mediation, 31 were withdrawn, and 35 were dropped. The 
remainder are pending.
    All employers with more than 10 employees must prepare an annual 
equality plan, including a survey of pay differences between male and 
female employees. The equal opportunities ombudsman reviews these 
plans.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public 
education and medical care. The Government provides compulsory, free, 
and universal primary school education for children for 9 years. It 
also provides free medical and dental care for all children up to the 
age of 16 (19 for dental care). Parents receive some $1,000 per year 
for each child under 16 years of age. An official children's ombudsman 
monitors the Governments' programs.
    The Government allocates funds to private organizations concerned 
with children's rights. An NGO, Children's Rights in Society, offers 
counseling to troubled youngsters. The Government remains active 
internationally in efforts to prevent child abuse.
    Although the physical abuse of children appears relatively 
uncommon, the public and authorities remain concerned by consistent 
data indicating an increase over the past several years. The number of 
reported cases for children under the age of 15 rose to 5,642 in 1998, 
up from 5,263 in 1997. The number of reported cases of sexual abuse of 
children under the age of 15 was 2,756 in 1998 and 2,412 in 1997. The 
U.N. Children's Committee criticized the Government, stating that it 
provides less protection for the children of immigrant and 
disadvantaged groups.
    The law prohibits parents or other caretakers from abusing children 
mentally or physically in any way. Parents, teachers, and other adults 
are subject to prosecution if they physically punish a child, including 
slapping or spanking. Children have the right to report such abuses to 
the police. The authorities respect these laws, and the usual sentence 
is a fine combined with counseling and monitoring by social workers. 
However, if the situation warrants, authorities may remove children 
from the home and place them in foster care. Foster parents virtually 
never receive permission to adopt long-term foster children, even in 
cases where the parents are seen as unfit or seek no contact with the 
child. Critics charge that this policy places the rights of biological 
parents over the needs of children for security in permanent family 
situations.
    Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health, is illegal, as is preparing and conspiring to 
perform such mutilations. Sentences can vary between 2 and 4 years' 
imprisonment. The failure to report such mutilation is also illegal 
under current laws. No cases have been reported under this law.
    People with Disabilities.--With one exception, there are no 
specific laws prohibiting discrimination against persons with 
disabilities, and considerable efforts are made to ensure that the 
disabled enjoy equal opportunities. A new act that prohibits 
discrimination against disabled persons in the workplace came into 
force in May. Since 1994 the country has had an ombudsman for 
disability issues. The Government provides disabled persons with 
assistance aimed at allowing them to live as normal a life as possible, 
preferably outside an institutional setting. This support may include a 
personal assistant for the severely disabled, plus improvement of the 
workplace's accessibility to wheelchairs. Government assistance also 
encompasses services such as home care or group living. Regulations for 
new buildings require full accessibility, but the Government has no 
such requirement for existing public buildings. Many buildings and some 
public transportation remain inaccessible. Deaf children have the right 
to education in sign language. The parents of disabled children and 
disabled workers under the age of 65 receive financial assistance every 
7 years to buy a car adapted to the person's disability.
    Under the country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization, 
thousands of persons were sterilized forcibly between 1934 and 1976. 
The majority of those sterilized were disabled either mentally or 
physically (see Section 1.f.). In May Parliament decided to pay damages 
in such cases.
    Indigenous People.--The country counts at least 17,000 Sami 
(formerly known as Lapps) among its 8.85 million inhabitants (Sami 
organizations place that number somewhat higher, 25,000 to 30,000). In 
1994 Sweden was the last of the Nordic countries to allow formation of 
a Sametinget, or Sami Parliament, as an advisory body to the 
Government. Under the current Government, Sami issues fall under the 
Ministry of Agriculture.
    The Sami continue a protracted struggle for recognition as an 
indigenous people under a variety of international agreements, such as 
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169. Historically, 
the government resisted granting the Sami such rights. For example Sami 
children had no right to education in their native language until the 
provision of such education to immigrant group children under a 1977 
law forced the Government to grant Sami at least equal treatment. As a 
result of such education, northern Sami dialects have enjoyed a recent 
renaissance. However, Sami dialects in the southern portions of 
traditional Sami lands now may have too few native speakers to survive 
as living languages. In 1997 the Government initiated an inquiry into 
whether the country could ratify ILO Convention 169. The inquiry was 
published in May and concluded that the country could ratify the 
convention, but that this should not be done until a number of steps 
relating to Sami land rights are taken.
    In 1994 the Government removed from the Sami the right to control 
hunting and fishing activities on Sami village lands, permitting 
instead totally unlimited hunting and fishing activity on all 
government property. Sami leaders continued to protest this change 
during the year.
    Some Sami state that they face discrimination in housing and 
employment on an individual basis, particularly in the southern 
mountain regions.
    Religious Minorities.--The Government is taking proactive steps to 
combat anti-Semitism by increasing awareness of Nazi crimes and the 
Holocaust. Under its living history project, the Government provides 
educational material on the Holocaust to schoolchildren and families 
throughout the country. The media are also active in publicizing and 
condemning neo-Nazi activity.
    The only anti-Semitic incident of note during the year involved an 
assault by neo-Nazi teenagers on a Jewish musical conductor in July. 
The teenagers involved were tried and incarcerated.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 11 percent of 
Sweden's population is foreign born. ``Skinhead'' and neo-Nazi related 
violence increased during the year. Three known neo-Nazis were arrested 
in connection with the May shooting death of two police officers during 
the course of a bank robbery. A trade union official was killed in 
October after exposing a colleague as a neo-Nazi. Police strongly 
suspect neo-Nazi perpetrators in the June bombing of the car of a 
freelance journalist who had written extensively on neo-Nazi activity 
in the country.
    These incidents led to a strong public reaction in favor of a 
tougher stance against these groups. The four largest daily newspapers 
mounted a campaign to discredit them by publishing the names and photos 
of 62 neo-Nazis and featuring editorials against their activities.
    Neo-Nazi activity in the past rarely was lethal or appeared well 
organized and was directed mostly at immigrants. Since 1994 persons 
arrested and charged for racially motivated attacks received relatively 
harsh sentences. Although the Government does not compile national 
statistics on such acts, in recent years there have been approximately 
100 violent incidents with racist overtones annually. However, cases 
during 1999 were notable for the fact that they targeted white, native, 
non-Jewish citizens.
    Most estimates place the number of active neo-Nazis at fewer than 
2,000, and there appears to be little popular support for their 
activities or sentiments. Many citizens doubt whether such youth 
actually embrace neo-Nazi ideology, and the Government supports 
activities by volunteer groups working against racism. The Government 
investigates and prosecutes race-related crimes, although in many 
clashes between Swedish and immigrant youth gangs, authorities judge 
both sides to be at fault. Neo-Nazi groups operate legally, but serious 
discussion is taking place about outlawing such groups. The Supreme 
Court has ruled that it can be illegal to wear xenophobic symbols or 
racist paraphernalia. Rightwing groups, which have and exercise the 
right to demonstrate, are not permitted to display signs and banners 
with provocative symbols at their rallies.
    The ombudsman for racial discrimination reported in August that 
racial discrimination in the workplace is increasing. The report stated 
that 21 percent of persons interviewed claim to have experienced racial 
or ethnic discrimination in hiring practices.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The work force is approximately 80 
percent unionized. Career military personnel, police officers, and 
civilian government officials, as well as private sector workers in 
both manufacturing and service industries, are organized. Most business 
owners belong to counterpart employer organizations.
    Unions and employer organizations operate independently of the 
Government and political parties (although the largest federation of 
unions has always been linked with the largest political party, the 
Social Democrats). The law protects the freedom of workers to associate 
and to strike, as well as for employers to organize and to conduct 
lockouts. Within limits protecting the public's immediate health and 
security, public employees also enjoy the right to strike. These laws 
are fully respected and are not challenged.
    Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies. They 
are affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation among others.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Management-
labor cooperation tends to be excellent and nonconfrontational. Labor 
and management, each represented by a national organization by sector 
(for example retailers and engineering industries), negotiate framework 
agreements every 2 to 3 years. More detailed company-level agreements 
put such framework agreements into effect at the local level. New 
framework agreements were signed during 1998 with most valid until 
2001. In contrast with the recent past, most agreements with labor 
unions now provide for a degree of individualized pay, including merit 
bonuses.
    The law provides both workers and employers with effective 
mechanisms for resolving complaints. The vast majority of complaints 
are resolved informally. The law protects union officials and members 
from dismissal or reprisals for official union activities. In some 
instances, unions even demand collective agreements regardless of the 
views and union status of employees. The Government is studying ways to 
strengthen the system of public mediation. Very few strikes took place 
during 1998--four legal and seven illegal--lasting half a day to a few 
days and involving few individuals.
    Agreement was reached in 1997 between 12 employer associations and 
8 unions representing 800,000 manufacturing employees on steps to 
prevent strikes and lockouts, such as requiring serious wage 
negotiations to start 3 months before a collective agreement expires 
and appointing a mediator if an agreement has not been reached after 2 
months. As a result of this agreement, wages increased during 1997 by 
2.5 to 3 percent following negotiations. This cooperation continued in 
1998 and led to wage increases of approximately 3.7 percent.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, and the authorities effectively enforce 
this ban. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and 
the Government enforces this prohibition effectively.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Compulsory 9-year education ends at age 16, and the law 
permits full-time employment at that age under the supervision of local 
authorities. Employees under age 18 may work only during the daytime 
and under supervision. During summer and other vacation periods, 
children as young as 13 years may work part time or in ``light'' work 
with parental permission. Union representatives, police, and public 
prosecutors effectively enforce this restriction. The law prohibits 
forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this 
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage law. Wages are set by collective bargaining contracts, which 
nonunion establishments usually observe as well. Even the lowest paid 
workers can maintain a decent standard of living for themselves and 
their families through substantial benefits (such as housing or day 
care support) provided by social welfare entitlement programs. However, 
cutbacks in these programs have made it harder for some workers to make 
ends meet, particularly low-paid single women with children.
    The standard workweek is 40 hours or less. Both the law and 
collective bargaining agreements regulate overtime and rest periods. 
For workers not covered by a labor agreement, the law stipulates a 
limit for overtime at 200 hours a year, although exceptions may be 
granted for key employees with union approval; some collective 
bargaining agreements put the limit at 150 hours. The law requires a 
rest period after 5 hours of work but does not stipulate a minimum 
duration; in practice it is usually 30 minutes. The law also provides 
all employees with a minimum of 5 weeks of paid annual leave; labor 
contracts often provide more, particularly for higher ranking private 
sector employees and older public service workers. In 1997 the 
Government passed a new labor law making it easier for employers to 
hire workers for limited periods, as well as empowering local unions to 
agree to exceptions to last-in, first-out laws.
    Currently the focus of concern regarding health and safety is on 
the psychosocial aspect. Occupational health and safety rules are set 
by a government-appointed board and monitored by trained union 
stewards, safety ombudsmen, and, occasionally, government inspectors. 
These standards are very high, making workplaces both safe and healthy. 
Safety ombudsmen have the authority to stop unsafe activity immediately 
and to call in an inspector. An individual also has the right to halt 
work in dangerous situations in order to consult a supervisor or safety 
representative.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit such 
trafficking, although traffickers are prosecuted under other statutes. 
A March report by the authorities set out a baseline on the extent of 
trafficking in 1998 after a survey of local police and the courts. A 
total of 5 traffickers and 12 women were involved in 4 court cases 
during 1998. Only one case was completed with a conviction. In all four 
cases, the traffickers were resident immigrants. The women involved 
came from Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The 
women are typically recruited by their countrymen who advertise in 
their local newspapers for work as cleaners or babysitters. Other women 
were ``purchased'' from traffickers and brought into the country. The 
report noted that considerable additional information available to the 
police suggests that the problem of trafficking is more widespread than 
the four court cases indicate
    A 1998 study by the Foundation Women's Forum (FWF) indicated that 
there are very few organizations in the EU that monitor trafficking, 
but that those opposed to prostitution recognize the need for greater 
efforts. The FWF applied for an EU grant to work further on this 
problem.
                                 ______
                                 

                              SWITZERLAND

    Switzerland is a constitutional democracy with a federal structure. 
The bicameral Parliament elects the seven members of the Federal 
Council, the highest executive body, whose presidency rotates annually. 
Because of the nation's linguistic and religious diversity, the Swiss 
political system emphasizes local and national political consensus and 
grants considerable autonomy to individual cantons. Voters approved a 
new constitution in April. The judiciary is independent.
    The armed forces are a civilian-controlled militia based on 
universal military service for able-bodied males. There is virtually no 
standing army apart from training cadres and a few essential 
headquarters staff. Police duties are primarily a responsibility of the 
individual cantons, which have their own distinct police forces that 
are kept under effective control. The National Police Authority has a 
coordinating role and relies on the cantons for actual law enforcement. 
There were allegations of occasional abuses by police.
    Switzerland has a highly developed free enterprise, industrial, and 
service economy strongly dependent on international trade. The standard 
of living is very high.
    The Government generally respects human rights, and the law and 
judiciary provide effective means of dealing with individual instances 
of abuse. There continue to be allegations by nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) of occasional police harassment directed against 
foreigners, particularly asylum seekers, including arbitrary detention. 
The Government is continuing to take serious steps to address violence 
against women. Trafficking in women for forced prostitution increased. 
Some laws still tend to discriminate against women. There continue to 
be reports of verbal abuse against foreigners by private citizens.
    The new Constitution approved by voters in April provided for new 
protection for citizens' rights, including the principle of equal 
opportunity for the disabled and the right to strike.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    Human rights groups strongly criticized police for the death of 27-
year-old Palestinian Khaled Abuzarifeh, who died while being extradited 
in March. He was in the custody of three police officers who were 
escorting him to a plane for forced repatriation. The causes of his 
death are still unknown. NGO's consider current investigations of the 
case to be insufficiently independent.
    On May 1, a military court convicted a former Rwandan mayor for 
crimes committed during the 1994 genocide, including murder (taking 
part in the massacre of Tutsis), attempted murder, incitement to 
murder, and war crimes. Fulgence Niyonteze, the former mayor of the 
town of Mushubati, sought asylum in Switzerland in 1994 and was 
arrested in 1996. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution proscribes such practices, and there were 
no reports of violations. There were allegations by NGO's and some 
individuals of occasional police harassment of foreigners, particularly 
asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.).
    In January the Geneva Prosecutor General dismissed a criminal 
complaint lodged against Geneva police by Nigerian human rights 
activist Clement Nwankwo. He had accused the police of assaulting him 
on the street and subjecting him to degrading treatment in a police 
station following his arrest in 1997. While acknowledging that Nwankwo 
had been a victim of abuse of power, the Prosecutor General concluded 
that disciplinary sanctions imposed on three officers following an 
administrative inquiry were sufficient punishment. In 1998 the Supreme 
Court rejected Nwankwo's final appeal against his conviction for 
resisting the police at the time of the arrest, thus putting an end to 
all judicial proceedings. Nwankwo received no compensation, and the 
disciplinary actions against the three police officers were dropped 
without explanation. In October 1998, Nwankwo lodged a petition against 
Switzerland with the European Commission of Human Rights, claiming 
violation of two articles of the European Convention for the Protection 
of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms.
    Swiss NGO's believe that the Nwankwo case underscores overall 
problems with police treatment of foreigners, especially asylum seekers 
in Geneva and perhaps elsewhere. The cantonal government took measures 
in response to the incident, including launching an administrative 
inquiry into the conduct of the three police officers involved. The 
police successfully appealed the reprimand and warning that were 
imposed as a result of the inquiry. In 1998 the NGO Association for the 
Prevention of Torture organized a special seminar for police officers 
in Geneva. The Federal Government and the Canton of Geneva are expected 
to finance publication of a special brochure aimed at increasing 
respect for and awareness of the rights of all persons in custody. The 
brochure is to be distributed throughout the country.
    In 1997 following its examination of Switzerland's third periodic 
report, the U.N. Committee Against Torture expressed concern about 
``frequent allegations of ill-treatment'' inflicted in the course of 
arrests and police custody and a lack of independent mechanisms in the 
cantons to provide certain legal protections such as the possibility, 
``especially for foreigners,'' to contact their family or a lawyer in 
case of arrest and to be examined by an independent doctor on entering 
police custody, after each interrogation, and before being brought 
before an investigating magistrate or being released. The Committee 
recommended the introduction of mechanisms to receive complaints of 
mistreatment by police officers against suspects and for the 
harmonization of the 26 different cantonal codes of penal procedure, 
``particularly with regard to the granting of fundamental guarantees in 
the course of police custody.'' In addition the Committee recommended 
that the authorities pay ``the greatest possible attention'' to the 
handling of cases of violence attributed to police officers in order to 
ensure the opening of investigations and, in proven cases, the 
imposition of possible sanctions. Responding to committee 
recommendations, in 1998 a team of experts appointed by the Federal 
Office of Justice presented a preliminary study identifying possible 
characteristics of a future federal-level code of penal procedures that 
would replace the cantonal codes. The study recommends granting 
fundamental protections to detainees in police custody, including the 
introduction of a legal right to inform relatives or third parties of 
their arrest. However, the committee did not recommend a provision for 
access to a lawyer from the time of arrest. The Federal Office of 
Justice is expected to issue a draft code in 2001.
    Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, although 
some NGO's complain of prison overcrowding. The Government has taken 
measures to improve prison conditions and address overcrowding.
    Brazilian national Luis Felipe Lourenco had been living illegally 
in the country and was arrested in 1998 by police in Geneva on charges 
of theft of a credit card. He allegedly was beaten by prison guards 
while in custody. The guards reportedly waited 2 hours before 
transporting Lourenco to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a 
perforated lung and damage to his spinal cord. The Brazilian Embassy 
reportedly asked the authorities to look into the incident. Inquiries 
are ongoing, but there has been no official report. Amnesty 
International criticized the police for brutality in its 1999 annual 
report. Lourenco claims to be partially paralyzed as a result of the 
injuries that he suffered at the hands of prison guards. The prison 
administration claimed that Lourenco's injuries were incurred when he 
threw himself against a door.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The legal prohibitions 
on arbitrary arrest and detention are respected fully at all levels of 
government. The cantons are responsible for handling most criminal 
matters, and their procedures vary somewhat from canton to canton. In 
general a suspect may not be held longer than 48 hours without a 
warrant of arrest issued by an investigative magistrate. However, 
asylum seekers and foreigners without valid documents may be held for 
up to 96 hours without an arrest warrant. Some NGO's alleged that the 
authorities arbitrarily detained asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.). A 
suspect has the right to choose and contact an attorney as soon as the 
warrant is issued; the State provides free counsel for indigents in 
most situations. Investigations are generally prompt, even if in some 
cases investigative detention may exceed the length of sentence. 
Release on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the 
magistrate believes the person is dangerous or will not appear for 
trial. Any lengthy detention is subject to review by higher judicial 
authorities. In 1998 about one-third of all prisoners were in pretrial 
detention, and the average length of such detention was 1 week.
    The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government does not use it.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient 
judicial process.
    All courts of first instance are local or cantonal courts. Citizens 
have the right to appeal to a higher instance court and ultimately to 
the Federal Court.
    Minor cases are tried by a single judge, difficult cases by a panel 
of judges, and murder (or other serious cases) by a public jury. Trials 
usually are held expeditiously. The Constitution provides for public 
trials in which the defendant's rights are fully respected, including 
the right to challenge and to present witnesses or evidence.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Cantonal laws regulate police entry into private 
premises. These regulations differ widely from canton to canton, but 
all prohibit such practices without a warrant. All government 
authorities respect these provisions, and violations are subject to 
effective legal sanction.
    Journalistic reports of pre-1970's instances of forced 
sterilization of women led parliamentarians in 1997 to ask the Federal 
Council to write a report on the practice as well as the legal, 
medical, historical, and social policy background of forced 
sterilization, in view of a projected tutelage law that is to include 
regulations concerning sterilization of mentally disabled persons. 
Parliament decided against issuing such a report. Forced sterilization 
was not ordered by the Federal Government. However, one cantonal 
government adopted such a law in 1928, which was abrogated in the 
1970's. Women's organizations apparently made no public statements 
about the reports.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these 
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a 
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of 
speech and of the press, including academic freedom. The authorities 
may legally restrict these freedoms for groups deemed to be a threat to 
the State, but no groups were restricted during the year. In addition, 
an article of the Penal Code criminalizes racist or anti-Semitic 
expression, whether in public speech or in printed material.
    Parliamentary immunity protects parliamentarians from prosecution 
for acts that relate to their government position. However, the legal 
commission of the Council of States has proposed its abolishment 
following an incident in which a national councilor, Rudolf Keller, 
made anti-Semitic remarks and could not be prosecuted for breaking the 
antiracism law because of his parliamentary immunity.
    The nationwide broadcast media are government-funded but possess 
editorial autonomy. Private and foreign broadcast media operate freely.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in 
practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for complete 
freedom of religion, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. There is no single state church, but all cantons support at 
least one of the three traditional denominations--Roman Catholic, Old 
Catholic, or Protestant--with public funds. In all cantons, an 
individual may choose not to contribute to church funding. However, in 
some cantons, private companies are unable to avoid payment of the 
church tax. A religious organization must register with the Government 
in order to receive tax-exempt status. There have been no reports of a 
religious group applying for the ``church taxation'' status that the 
traditional three denominations enjoy.
    Foreign missionaries must obtain a ``religious worker'' visa to 
work in the country. Requirements include proof that the foreigner 
would not displace a citizen from doing the job, that the foreigner 
would be financially supported by the host organization, and that the 
country of origin of religious workers also grants visas to Swiss 
religious workers.
    Religion is taught in public schools. The doctrine presented 
depends on which religion predominates in the particular state. 
However, those of different faiths are free to attend classes for their 
own creeds during the class period. Atheists also are allowed to be 
excused from the classes. Parents also may send their children to 
private (parochial) schools or teach their children at home.
    Due to increasing public concern over certain groups, especially 
Scientology, the Government in 1997 asked an advisory commission to 
examine Scientology. The commission published its findings in 1998. 
According to the report, there is no basis at present for special 
monitoring of Scientology, since it does not represent any direct or 
immediate threat to the security of the country. However, the report 
stated that Scientology had characteristics of a totalitarian 
organization and had its own intelligence network. The commission also 
warned of the significant financial burden imposed on Scientology 
members and recommended reexamining the issue at a later date.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Under the Constitution and the law, 
citizens are free to travel in or outside the country, to emigrate, and 
to repatriate. Non-Swiss convicted of crimes may receive sentences that 
include denial of reentry for a specific period following completion of 
a prison sentence.
    Switzerland traditionally has been a haven for refugees, but public 
concern over the exceptionally high number of asylum seekers entering 
the country in the wake of the Balkan war generated pressure on the 
Government to tighten its policy regarding their acceptance. In the 
first half of the year, 18,000 Kosovar Albanians sought asylum, raising 
the number of refugees from the former Yugoslavia to 65,000.
    In a June referendum, voters approved a revision of the asylum law 
that had been passed by Parliament in 1998. The revised legislation 
includes collective admission for victims of violence and authorizes 
the Federal Council to grant them temporary protective status. It also 
simplifies and accelerates the process of applying for asylum. At the 
same time, the law is designed to curtail misuse of the asylum 
regulations and to enable more rapid repatriation of uncooperative 
refugees or those who enter the country without identity papers. The 
Government may refuse to process the application of an asylum seeker 
who cannot credibly justify not having identity papers. In such a case 
the applicant must submit an appeal to reactivate consideration of the 
application within 24 hours. NGO's contend that such a short time span 
does not constitute an effective remedy and therefore violates the 
European Convention on Human Rights.
    Some human rights organizations have charged the authorities with 
abuses in connection with the implementation of a 1995 law aimed at 
asylum seekers or foreigners living illegally in Switzerland who are 
suspected of disturbing the public order or avoiding repatriation. In 
particular, these groups have alleged instances of abuse by police, 
including arbitrary detention as well as denial of access to 
established asylum procedures at the country's two main airports. They 
also charge that police officers use the law to detain or harass asylum 
seekers who were not suspected of having disturbed public order. Under 
the law, police actions are subject to judicial oversight and the 
Federal Court has overturned many cases in which it believed that there 
was insufficient regard for the rights of asylum seekers and 
foreigners. While NGO's claim that the situation with regard to 
arbitrary detention has improved, they contend that the denial of 
access to asylum procedures at the two airports is increasing.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in 
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum. The Federal 
Office for Refugees estimated that in July the total number of asylum 
applicants and temporary residents living in the country was 110,000. 
Some 20,000 applications (64 percent more than for the same period in 
1998) were submitted by June alone, according to the Federal Office for 
Refugees. Refugees whose applications are rejected are allowed to stay 
temporarily, if their home country is experiencing war or insurrection. 
The Government denies having forced persons to return to countries 
where they have a well-founded fear of persecution and insists that 
each case is examined carefully. However, NGO's including the well-
known Augenauf organization have accused the Government of sometimes 
expelling rejected asylum seekers even though conditions in their 
native country remain unfavorable.
    In December the Government apologized for its asylum policy during 
World War II, in which thousands of Jewish refugees were refused entry 
to the country (see Section 5).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully (at local, cantonal, and federal levels), and 
citizens exercise this right in practice through periodic, free, and 
fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. In addition 
initiative and referendum procedures provide unusually intense popular 
involvement in the legislative process. On April 18, voters approved a 
new Constitution.
    Women were disenfranchised until 1971 at the federal level, but 
since then their participation in politics has continued to expand. In 
December 1998, Parliament elected Ruth Dreifuss as the first female 
President. Women occupy 55 of the 246 seats in the Parliament, 2 of 7 
seats in the Federal Council (Cabinet), roughly one-fourth of the seats 
in the cantonal government executive bodies, and one-fifth of the seats 
in the communal executives. However, in 1995 and 1996 voters rejected 
two local initiatives designed to reserve a fixed percentage of 
elective seats for women. In 1997 the Federal Court declared invalid 
another local initiative with the same purpose. A vote on an initiative 
to mandate equal gender representation in all federal institutions is 
scheduled to take place in 2000.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A large number of international and domestic human rights groups 
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing 
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are 
cooperative and generally responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, religion, language, or social status. The Government 
generally enforces these prohibitions effectively, although a few laws 
tend to discriminate against women. The new Constitution includes 
provisions for equal rights for the disabled and for minorities.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. According to a 
government-funded study on domestic violence, one-fifth of all women 
suffer in their lifetimes at least once from physical or sexual 
violence, and about 40 percent suffer from psychological or verbal 
abuse.
    The law prohibits wife beating and similar offenses. Spousal rape 
is a crime in the Penal Code. Victims of violence can obtain help, 
counseling, and legal assistance from specialized agencies or from 
nearly a dozen hot lines sponsored privately or by local, cantonal, and 
national authorities. Cantonal police have specially trained units to 
deal with violence against women, and victims legally are entitled to 
be heard exclusively by female police officers and judges. An estimated 
680 women and 730 children took refuge in 14 women's shelters across 
the country during 1998. Those in charge of the shelters estimate that 
nearly as many were denied access due to a lack of space and limited 
funding.
    The difficulty in gathering information about the number of 
prosecuted, convicted, or punished spouse abusers stems in part from 
the fact that legal cases are handled by each canton and data are often 
not up-to-date. According to 1998 police criminal statistics, 320 men 
were investigated for rape offenses; in 1997, the last year for which 
data are available, 92 men were sentenced for rape.
    The Federation of Women's Organizations and numerous other women's 
NGO's have heightened public awareness of the problem of violence 
against women. In 1998 two government-supported women's organizations 
that fight for equal gender rights jointly conducted the first national 
campaign against violence in relationships. This campaign received 
extensive media coverage.
    Prostitution is legal; however, working without a valid work permit 
is illegal. The Penal Code criminalizes sexual exploitation and 
trafficking in women; however, trafficking in women is a problem (see 
Section 6.f).
    Although the Constitution prohibits all types of discrimination, 
and a 1981 amendment provides equal rights, equal treatment, and 
equivalent wages for men and women, a few laws still tend to 
discriminate against women. In 1996 a new federal law on equal 
opportunity for women and men came into force. The law includes a 
general prohibition on gender-based discrimination and incorporates the 
principle of ``equal wages for equal work.'' The law also includes 
provisions aimed at eliminating sexual harassment and facilitating 
access to legal remedies for those who claim discrimination or 
harassment. The Supreme Court has ruled that in a divorce settlement 
the primary wage earner must be left with sufficient income to remain 
above the poverty level. Since the man is the primary wage earner in 
most marriages, when the income is too low to support both parties it 
is usually the wife who must go on welfare.
    The Federal Office for Equal Opportunities for Men and Women and 
the Federal Commission on Women work to eliminate all forms of direct 
and indirect discrimination. As a follow-up to the Fourth World 
Conference on Women, held in 1995 in Beijing, China, in June a federal 
level interdepartmental working group issued an action plan that 
outlined strategic goals and measures to improve the situation of 
women. These include measures in the areas of education, health, 
violence against women, the workplace, human rights, the media, and the 
environment. For example, the plan calls for financial support for 
child care facilities at colleges and universities to enable a larger 
number of women to obtain a higher education; continued education and 
support for specialists in the area of addiction prevention for women; 
and ongoing analysis and data collection on the issue of wage 
differences between men and women.
    On average women earn 20 to 30 percent less than men. Researchers 
have found that discriminatory behavior by employers accounts for 40 
percent of the overall wage gap between men and women. Women also are 
promoted less often than men. Individual cases of denial of equal pay 
for equal work are subject to the new law. In 1996, the most recent 
year for which data are available, 27.7 percent of the women between 
the ages of 15 and 61 were not in the work force; of those in the work 
force, only 46 percent worked full-time. Women hold over 80 percent of 
all part-time jobs.
    Press reports of pre-1970's instances of forced sterilization of 
women remained a matter of concern (see Section 1.f.).
    The law prohibits women from working during the first 8 weeks after 
the birth of a child. The law does not provide for compensation; 
however, 72 percent of working women have negotiated maternity benefits 
with their employers. In June voters rejected a proposal in a 
referendum for 14 weeks of paid maternity leave at 80 percent of their 
salary for working women. The Parliament had passed legislation in 
December 1998 providing maternity insurance--as mandated by the 
Constitution--after 50 years of deliberation. Hundreds of persons 
demonstrated to protest the vote. President Ruth Dreifuss said that the 
defeat reflected a combination of fear of adding a new social benefit 
and indifference to the plight of new mothers, especially low-income 
mothers. However, many of the working women who have negotiated 
maternity benefits with their employers receive benefits beyond those 
in the proposed law.
    In its 1998 review of the Government's 1996 Report on the 
Implementation of the U.N. Covenant for Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights, the U.N. Committee for Human Rights criticized continuing 
discrimination against women in Switzerland. The Committee noted that 
despite the existence of legislation against discrimination, de facto 
discrimination against women and ethnic minorities continues to exist 
in various areas. This is especially true in the labor market, where a 
disproportionate number of women and minorities occupy lower paid and 
part-time jobs. As a result, women suffer from poverty more often than 
men. The Committee also expressed concern about the level of domestic 
violence against women, which authors of a Government study estimate at 
over 100,000 cases per year.
    Children.--Despite the fact that the Government has no special 
program for children and that there is no special governmental office 
for children's matters, the Government demonstrates its strong 
commitment to children's rights and welfare through a well-funded 
public education system and medical care.
    The federal and cantonal governments, as well as about 80 NGO's 
that defend children's rights, have devoted considerable attention in 
recent years to child abuse, especially sexual abuse. For convicted 
perpetrators of the latter, the law provides for imprisonment of up to 
15 years. In 1997 amendments to the federal Penal Code came into effect 
that provide for an increase in the statute of limitations in cases of 
child abuse from 5 to 10 years. In severe cases of sexual abuse, the 
statute is to begin to take effect only when the victim turns 18. There 
is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    To combat child pornography on the Internet, the Federal Office for 
Police provides an Internet monitoring service on its worldwide web 
page. Individuals who find pornographic material involving children are 
asked to contact the Federal Office via electronic mail. According to 
the Penal Code, the production, possession, distribution, or showing of 
hard pornography are punishable with fines or prison sentences. Any 
pornography involving children falls into this category. In March an 
NGO published the first compilation of cases of child pornography and 
prostitution in the country. The study cited 60 cases. Most of the 
victims were girls between 13 and 17 years of age.
    With respect to child abuse abroad, the law provides for 
prosecution only if the act is considered a crime in the country in 
which it took place. Experts have proposed making such acts punishable 
in Switzerland regardless of where the crime took place, but there was 
no legislative action on the problem during the year.
    Parliament's ratification of the U.N. Convention on Children's 
Rights included five reservations, the most important of which 
concerned children of migrant seasonal workers who are not 
automatically permitted to join their parents. Children of foreigners 
working as migrant laborers are only permitted to visit on tourist 
visas for a period of 3 months at a time. After 3 months, they must 
return to their homeland for 1 month. The Government is reexamining the 
necessity of these reservations and is expected to include its 
conclusions in its next report to the Committee on Children's Rights, 
which is due in 2000.
    People with Disabilities.--There are strong legal prohibitions 
against discrimination directed at disabled persons in employment, 
education, and the provision of other state services. Advocates for the 
disabled have called for new measures to ensure greater protection for 
their rights, including easier access to buildings and public 
transportation. However, the Government has not mandated that buildings 
or transportation facilities be made accessible. In 1996 a Member of 
Parliament proposed legislation to amend the Constitution to provide 
equality of opportunity for the disabled. In April voters approved a 
new Constitution, which contains an article that provides for equal 
opportunities for the disabled.
    In a June referendum, voters defeated a proposal to abolish pension 
benefits to the partially disabled.
    A 1995 law exempts disabled men from the tax imposed on those who 
have not fulfilled their military duty.
    Religious Minorities.--In response to the issue of Holocaust era 
assets, the Government and private sector initiated a series of 
measures designed to shed light on the past, provide assistance to 
Holocaust victims, and address claims to dormant accounts in Swiss 
banks. The Independent Commission of Experts under Professor Jean-
Francois Bergier, charged with examining the country's wartime history 
and its role as a financial center, issued its report in December and 
found that there are more than 24,000 documented rejections of asylum 
seekers during the World War II period, including a large number of 
Jewish refugees, who were refused asylum even after authorities were 
aware of the dangers they faced from the Nazis. The Federal Council 
issued a statement repeating its previous apology for policy errors 
made during World War II and stating that its asylum policy ``was 
marred by errors, omissions, and compromises.'' Also in December, the 
Independent Committee of Eminent Persons under Paul Volcker released 
its report on ``dormant accounts of victims of Nazi persecution in 
Swiss banks.'' The report represents the culmination of a 3-year 
investigation into the fate of victims' accounts. The Volcker report 
recommended that the Swiss Federal Banking Commission publish about 
26,000 account holder names, based on their probable or possible 
identity as Holocaust victims. The report also made recommendations on 
the means of resolving claims by victims of Nazi persecution or their 
heirs, and the appropriate treatment of dormant accounts in the future. 
The Swiss Special Fund for Needy Holocaust Victims received 
approximately $190 million (SFR 273 million) in contributions from the 
private sector and the Swiss National Bank. By September the Fund had 
allocated but not yet distributed 92 percent of the initial 
contribution to Holocaust survivors in Israel, Australia, Germany, 
Latin America, and Eastern Europe. On March 31, the Government's World 
War II task force became the Switzerland-World War II Office; the 
office remains engaged in supporting progress on resolving Holocaust 
assets issues. A $1.25 billion settlement of the class action lawsuit 
filed in the United States against Swiss banks was announced in August 
1998, and formally completed in January. A New York court is expected 
to receive a final proposed plan of allocation and distribution by the 
end of April 2000. A judge is to consider the plan and any comments at 
a hearing scheduled for May 30, 2000.
    In March the Swiss National Bank released a report that stated that 
its officials ignored warnings that they were buying looted Nazi gold. 
The bank has contributed approximately $70 million (SFR 110 million) to 
the Swiss Special Fund for Needy Holocaust Victims.
    Two Swiss insurance companies participate in the ongoing efforts by 
the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims to 
establish a formula and just sum for compensating Holocaust victims or 
their families for policies they held.
    The Federal Council unsuccessfully sought legislation during the 
year to establish a solidarity fund, which would assist victims of 
human rights violations, including those who suffered in the Holocaust. 
It would create the fund through the sale of gold reserves recently 
declared ``excess.'' However, the proposal is controversial among some 
groups in parliament.
    In the context of the discussions over Nazi gold and Holocaust era 
assets, anti-Semitic slurs reportedly still remain a problem. 
Government officials, including the President, have spoken frequently 
and publicly against anti-Semitism. From 1995 when the law was enacted 
to April, the cantons have reported 41 convictions for violating the 
antiracism law to the Federal Department of Justice. Sentences for 
convictions under the antiracism law included cases of several months' 
conditional prison terms and a $3,378 (SFR 5000) fine. The Human Rights 
Watch Organization Augenauf was among the NGO's that expressed concern 
over the continued existence of anti-Semitic sentiment.
    In November 1998, the Federal Commission against Racism released a 
report on anti-Semitism in the country, which expressed concern that 
the recent controversy over the country's role during World War II had 
to some extent opened the door to expressions of latent anti-Semitism. 
At the same time, the Commission described the emergence of strong 
public opposition to anti-Semitism, and credited the Federal Council 
with taking a ``decisive stand'' against anti-Semitism. The Commission 
also proposed various public and private measures to combat anti-
Semitism and encourage greater tolerance and understanding. In its 
initial response to the report, the Federal Council pledged to 
facilitate implementation of the Commission's recommendations. In 
December the creation of a center for tolerance in Bern was announced 
officially. The center is to develop school curriculum materials 
designed to teach historical lessons, show the possible manifestations 
of racism and xenophobia, and promote tolerance.
    The parliamentary immunity of a national councilor who made anti-
Semitic remarks led to a proposal that such immunity be abolished (see 
Section 2.a).
    In the country's highest court refused a Church of Scientology 
appeal to strike down a municipal law that barred persons from 
approaching others on the street using ``deceptive or dishonest 
methods.'' The court ruled that a Basel law, prompted by efforts to 
curb Scientology, involved an intervention in religious freedom, but 
did not infringe on it.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to NGO statistics, 
there were 73 reported attacks against foreigners/minorities in the 
first 7 months of the year, compared with 70 for the first half of 
1998. These figures include instances of verbal and written 
``attacks'', which are much more common than physical assaults. 
Investigations of these attacks are conducted effectively and lead, in 
most cases, to the arrest of the persons responsible. Persons convicted 
of racist crimes are commonly sentenced to from 3 days' to 3 years' 
imprisonment with a fine of up to approximately $27,000 (SFR 40,000).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers, including foreigners, 
have the freedom to associate freely, to join unions of their choice, 
and to select their own representatives. The Government does not hamper 
the exercise of these rights. About one-quarter of the work force is 
unionized.
    The right to strike is legally recognized and freely exercised, but 
a unique labor peace under an informal agreement between unions and 
employers--in existence since the 1930's--has meant fewer than 10 
strikes per year since 1975. The new Constitution provides specific 
protection for the right to strike. There were no significant strikes 
during the year.
    Unions are independent of the Government and political parties, and 
laws prohibit retribution against strikers or their leaders. Unions can 
associate freely with international organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--By law workers 
have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the law 
protects them from acts of antiunion discrimination. The Government 
fully respects these provisions. Periodic negotiations between employer 
and worker organizations determine wages and settle other labor issues 
at the local, or infrequently, at the industry sector level. Nonunion 
firms generally adopt the terms and conditions fixed in the unions' 
collective bargaining.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Although there is no 
specific constitutional or statutory ban on forced or compulsory labor 
in general, and on child labor in particular, such practices generally 
are not known to occur; however, trafficking in women for forced 
prostitution increased.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 15 years, 
and children are in school up to this age. Children over 13 years of 
age may be employed in light duties for not more than 9 hours per week 
during the school year and 15 hours otherwise. The employment of youths 
between the ages of 15 and 20 is strictly regulated; they cannot work 
at night, on Sundays, or in hazardous or dangerous conditions. The 
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs effectively enforces the law on 
working conditions.
    The Government does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded 
labor by children, although such prohibitions are implicitly included 
in the Labor Act. Such forms of labor are not believed to occur (see 
Section 6.c.).
    Government officials inspect companies that employ children after 
having received complaints. Every year a few employers are fined or 
receive conditional imprisonment for violations of the law.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage. The lowest wages fixed in collective bargaining are generally 
adequate to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. However, in January the Swiss Association of Trade Unions 
released a study that found that 60,000 full-time workers (or 3.4 
percent) fall below the poverty line, defined as earning less than 
approximately $15,500 (SFR 22,900), which is half of the median wage.
    The 1964 Labor Act established a maximum 45-hour workweek for blue- 
and white-collar workers in industry, services, and retail trades, and 
a 50-hour workweek for all other workers. The law prescribes a rest 
period during the workweek. Overtime is limited by law to 260 hours 
annually for those working 45 hours per week and to 220 hours annually 
for those working 50 hours per week.
    The law protects legal and illegal foreign workers. However, 
illegal foreign workers are not covered by mandatory health insurance 
in case of illness or accident. Wage discrimination against foreign 
workers is not permitted.
    The Labor Act and the Federal Code of Obligations contain extensive 
regulations to protect worker health and safety. There have been no 
reports of lapses in the enforcement of these regulations, but the 
degree to which enforcement is effective is unclear. In 1998 voters 
approved a new labor law designed to increase flexibility in the 
workplace and to remove restrictions on women working at night. A 
worker may leave a dangerous assignment without penalty.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code criminalizes sexual 
exploitation and trafficking in persons. According to September press 
reports, police officials are concerned over a growing number of 
foreign women subject to abuse in sex trafficking rings. In the past, 
victims came from Thailand, parts of Africa, or South America; recently 
an increasing number of women come from Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, and 
other states of the former Soviet Union. Many victims are forced to 
work in salons or clubs to pay for the cost of their travel and forged 
documents, and find themselves in a state of dependency. Traffickers 
sometimes seize victims' passports. Generally the victims do not read, 
write, or speak the country's languages, and are afraid to seek help 
from the authorities.
    Since 1905 the Government has had an office to combat trafficking 
of girls for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. Over the 
years this office has evolved to include all forms of trafficking in 
persons. The Federal Office for Police has a human trafficking office 
as part of the criminal intelligence unit. In 1998 the Government 
institutionalized the exchange of information on trafficking in persons 
with NGO's. The Department of Foreign Affairs recently launched 
programs intend to combat trafficking from Eastern Europe. In order to 
confront modern forms of trafficking in women, especially via the 
Internet, the federal police have increased the number of their agents. 
In 1997 four persons were convicted of trafficking in women and 13 were 
convicted of sexual exploitation; and in 1997-98 police uncovered a 
large Thai trafficking organization. Its leader was arrested, tried, 
and convicted.
    Prostitution is legal; however, working without a valid work permit 
is illegal. Women arrested for illegal prostitution are deported 
rapidly. There is no witness protection program for victims, and many 
victims are afraid to cooperate with police. The federal police are 
working with cantonal authorities to encourage them to provide delayed 
deportation and counseling to victims, in order to encourage them to 
testify. In March the Government introduced new visa requirements for 
applicants in four South American countries--Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, 
and Bolivia. The Office for Equality between Men and Women has a 
program to educate visa applicants in their native countries about the 
dangers of falling victim to traffickers and their common methods.
                                 ______
                                 

                               TAJIKISTAN

    Tajikistan is ruled by an authoritarian regime that has established 
some nominally democratic institutions. President Emomali Rahmonov and 
a clique of fellow natives of the Kulyab region continued to dominate 
the Government; however, Rahmonov's narrow base of support limited his 
control of the entire territory of the country. Rahmonov won reelection 
as President in November elections that were flawed seriously and were 
neither free nor fair. As part of the peace accords that ended the 
civil war, members of the opposition took approximately one-third of 
the high level positions in the Government. Although the Constitution 
was adopted in 1994 and amended in September, political decisionmaking 
normally takes the form of power plays among the various factions 
formerly on one side or the other during the civil war that now make up 
the Government. The legacy of civil war continued to affect the 
Government, which was faced with problems of demobilizing and 
reintegrating former opposition troops and maintaining law and order as 
rival armed factions competed for power. The Constitution provides for 
an independent judiciary; however, it is not independent in practice.
    The Ministries of Interior, Security, and Defense share 
responsibility for internal security, although the Government actually 
relies on a handful of commanders who use their forces almost as 
private armies. Some regions of the country remained effectively 
outside the Government's control, and government control in other areas 
existed only by day, or at the sufferance of local opposition 
commanders. The soldiers of some of these commanders are involved in 
crime and corruption. The Russian Army's 201st Motorized Rifle 
Division, part of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
peacekeeping force established in 1993, remained in the country and 
continued to have a major influence on political developments. Some 
members of the government security forces and government-aligned 
militias committed serious human rights abuses.
    The economy is a state-controlled system making a difficult 
transition to a market-based one. Most of the work force is engaged in 
agriculture, part of which remains collectivized. Government revenue 
remains highly dependent on state-controlled cotton production. The 
small industrial sector is dominated by aluminum production (another 
critical source of government revenue), although most Soviet-era 
factories operate at a minimal level, if at all. Small-scale 
privatization is over 60 percent complete, but medium- to large-scale 
privatization still is stalled. Many, but not all, wages and pensions 
are being paid. The country is poor, with a per capita gross national 
product of approximately $182 according to government sources; other 
estimates are lower. The failure of the Soviet economic system has been 
accompanied by a rise in narcotics trafficking and other forms of 
corruption. This development has led to clear disparities of income 
between the vast majority of the population and a small number of 
former progovernment and opposition warlords, who control most of the 
criminal sectors of the economy.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor, and the 
Government continued to commit serious abuses. The Government limits 
citizens' right to change their government and prevented free and fair 
elections. The November presidential elections were flawed seriously. 
Some members of the security forces were responsible for killings and 
tortured, beat, and frequently abused detainees. These forces were also 
responsible for threats, extortion, looting, and abuse of civilians. 
Certain battalions of nominally government forces operated quasi-
independently under their leaders. Impunity remains a problem and the 
Government prosecuted few of the persons who committed these abuses. 
Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. The Government 
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as arresting 
persons for political reasons. Lengthy pretrial detention remained a 
problem. Basic problems of rule of law persist. There are often long 
delays before trials, and the judiciary is subject to political and 
paramilitary pressure. The authorities infringed on citizens' right to 
privacy.
    The Government continued to restrict severely freedom of speech and 
of the press, and essentially controls the electronic media. The 
Government denies opposition access to state-run radio and television; 
however, opposition newspapers begun in 1998 continued to publish, and 
a number of small television stations were operated by nongovernmental 
organizations. Journalists practice self-censorship. The Government 
restricts freedom of assembly and association by exercising strict 
control over political organizations; it banned two opposition parties 
and prevented another from being registered. The Government prevented 
all but one opposition candidate from registering for the presidential 
election. There are some limits on freedom of religion, and there are 
some restrictions on freedom of movement. The Government still has not 
established a human rights ombudsman position, despite a 1996 pledge to 
do so. Violence against women is a problem, as is discrimination 
against women, the disabled, and religious and ethnic minorities. Child 
labor is a problem. There were some instances of forced labor, 
including by children. Trafficking in women is a problem.
    Some former opposition troops committed serious abuses, including 
killings and abductions. There were credible reports that opposition 
units threatened, extorted, and abused the civilian population.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were a number 
of extrajudicial killings; however, it was difficult to estimate the 
number or to attribute responsibility in many cases. Some killings were 
committed by competing government forces for varying motives, both 
political and economic.
    Harsh prison conditions and lack of food and adequate medical 
treatment resulted in a significant number of deaths of prisoners while 
in custody (see Section 1.c.).
    A number of local officials, businessmen, and professional figures 
were killed during the year, for a variety of political, economic, and 
ethnic reasons. Tolib Boboev, an official of the banned opposition 
Party of Popular Unity, was killed by masked gunmen while visiting the 
home of his son on January 2. Socialist Party leader and parliamentary 
human rights commission chairman Safarali Kenjaev was shot and killed 
by unidentified gunmen outside his home in Dushanbe on March 30; two 
bodyguards and his driver also were killed. At the time of his death, 
it was widely speculated that Kenjaev planned to run in the 
presidential elections. Ministry of Interior press center chief 
Jumakhona Khotami also was shot and killed near Dushanbe (see Section 
2.a.). In addition a number of high-ranking figures associated with 
various competing paramilitary factions were killed. In most cases, 
suspects have not been identified. The competence of the investigations 
and their independence from official interference was questioned. A 
number of apparent murders essentially were concealed, with official 
news noting only that the individual died.
    A major serving with the Russian border guards was shot and killed 
in Dushanbe on November 25. In October and November, two senior Tajik 
military officials were murdered.
    Both the Government and the opposition used land mines during the 
civil war. Some unmarked mine fields in the Karetegin Valley probably 
killed innocent civilians. The Government also has laid numerous 
minefields along the border with Afghanistan, although the primary 
victims are believed to be border infiltrators. Some killings were 
committed by former opposition forces, and others by independent 
warlords answering to neither the Government nor the opposition.
    In the case of the 1998 killings of four United Nations personnel 
in the Karateqin Valley, the Government tried and convicted three 
individuals arrested for the killings in late 1998, and executed them 
early in the year.
    In January warlord Ravshan Gafurov confessed to the shooting of 
leading opposition and former journalist figure Otakhon Lafiti on 
September 22, 1998; Gafurov also confessed to 25 other murders. In 
December the Government announced the name of the individual who 
murdered prominent academician Muhammad Osimi in 1996 and said that he 
had fled the country.
    There were no developments in the 1997 killings of several Russian 
servicemen, or in the 1996 murder of the Mufti of Tajikistan.
    b. Disappearance.--There were a number of disappearances during the 
year. The taking of hostages for revenge or for bargaining purposes 
remained a common occurrence. Political pressure and a lack of 
professional resources hamper police efforts to investigate 
disappearances.
    The 5-year-old nephew of opposition presidential candidate Davlat 
Usmon was kidnaped from his parents' home several days before the 
presidential election; he was recovered unharmed on the outskirts of 
Dushanbe a day later.
    Forces aligned with the opposition were involved closely with the 
Uzbek militants who took Japanese and Kyrgyz nationals hostage in 
Kyrgystan, then brought them into Tajikistan, where eventually they 
were released.
    There were no developments in the 1996 disappearance of Zafar 
Rahmonov, the opposition cochairman of the Joint Commission on Cease-
fire Observation.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, the Government uses it 
in practice. Security officials, particularly those in the Ministry of 
Interior, regularly beat detainees in custody and use systematic 
beatings to extort confessions. There were credible allegations that 
security forces illegally detained, mistreated, and beat members of 
opposition parties or their relatives (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.). 
Impunity remains a serious problem, and the Government prosecuted few 
of the persons who committed these abuses. However, several security 
officials were convicted of abuses in Kurghanteppa during the year.
    The Government has acknowledged that the security forces were 
corrupted by criminal elements and that most citizens chose to keep 
silent in the face of official mistreatment rather than risk 
retaliation by the police. In the southern region of Shaartuz, the 
Tajik Border Forces (TBF) control much of the drug trade, and the local 
population has made numerous complaints of harassment and human rights 
abuses committed by the TBF.
    In November two individuals identifying themselves as Ministry of 
Interior officials apprehended former Kabul University professor 
Nurshahi Shahkur, an Afghan national living in Dushanbe. They took him 
to the Ministry of Interior building, where they tortured and beat him 
in an apparent extortion attempt. A doctor later certified that Shahkur 
was tortured, and the Afghan Embassy in Dushanbe raised the issue with 
the Government. In December three masked men attacked Mukhiddin 
Idizoda, deputy editor of the opposition newspaper Nadzhot (see Section 
2.a.).
    There were a number of shootings, bombings, and terrorist attacks 
that resulted in nonlethal injuries and serious property damage. A 
number of civilians were injured in fighting between rival paramilitary 
factions that broke out repeatedly in Dushanbe, often in crowded areas 
such as the Green Bazaar. An October bomb blast in Dushanbe's central 
department store, the TsUM, injured three persons.
    Prison conditions remain harsh and life threatening. Prisons 
generally are overcrowded, unsanitary, and disease-ridden, producing 
serious threats to many prisoners' health. This problem reflects in 
part the self-funded status of most prisons, under which before 1992 
prisoners grew much of their own food or made goods for sale. The 
general collapse of governmental programs and of the economy also meant 
the virtual disappearance of these programs. Some food production has 
resumed, but it is still inadequate. Some prisoners die of hunger. 
Family members are allowed access to prisoners only after a guilty 
verdict, in accordance with the law.
    There was no official action against government forces for the 
deaths of 26 prisoners when they retook Khojand prison in 1997. 
Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, the brother of a political opponent of the 
President, was arrested in May 1997 on narcotics charges that appear 
fabricated and sentenced to death in 1998. Despite appeals for clemency 
based on a diagnosis of terminal cancer, Abdullojonov remained in 
prison and claimed to have been denied proper medical treatment. 
Government sources say that he was executed early on in the year, 
although other sources maintain that he simply died in prison of 
cancer.
    The Government has invariably denied requests by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to make prison visits in a manner 
consistent with the ICRC's standard modalities.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued 
to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. The Criminal Code has not 
been amended significantly since independence, and it therefore retains 
many of the defects inherited from Soviet times. The Government claims 
that revision of the Criminal Code is a high priority, but due to the 
size and complexity of the code, the small parliamentary staff, and 
limited time in session for the Majlisi Oli (parliament), progress has 
been slow. There is no projected completion date, and there has been no 
indication of progress toward a comprehensive revision of the Criminal 
Code. However, during the year, the law was changed to increase 
punishment for crimes such as rape, theft, and illegal drug use. The 
system allows for lengthy pretrial detention and provides few checks on 
the power of procurators and police to arrest persons. Public order, 
which broke down during the civil war, has yet to be restored fully, 
and the virtual immunity from prosecution of armed militia groups has 
eroded further the integrity of the legal system.
    Police legally may detain persons without a warrant for a period of 
72 hours, and the procurator's office may do so for a period of 10 days 
after which the accused must be charged officially. At that point, the 
Criminal Code permits pretrial detention for up to 15 months. The first 
3 months of detention are at the discretion of the local procurator, 
the second 3 months must be approved at the regional level, and the 
Procurator General must sanction the remaining time in detention. The 
Criminal Code maintains that all investigations must be completed 1 
month before the 15-month maximum in order to allow the defense time to 
examine government evidence. There is no requirement for judicial 
approval or for a preliminary judicial hearing on the charge or 
detention. In criminal cases, detainees may be released and restricted 
to their place of residence pending trial. Once a case is entered for 
trial, the law states that it must be brought before a judge within 28 
days. However, it is common for cases to be delayed for many months 
before trial begins. There is no provision for bail, and lengthy 
pretrial detention is a problem.
    The Government made politically motivated arrests, and there are 
credible allegations of dozens of cases of illegal government detention 
of members of opposition political parties or their relatives. In most 
cases, the security officers, principally personnel from the Ministry 
of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Security, do not obtain arrest 
warrants and do not bring charges. Those released sometimes claimed 
that they were mistreated and beaten during detention (also see Section 
1.c.).
    Opposition sources maintain that security forces detained dozens of 
persons unlawfully without charge. Since the law precludes visits to 
persons in pretrial detention, it is not possible to assess these 
allegations. There could be as many as several hundred political 
detainees, but the absence of ICRC or other access to these persons 
makes any estimate uncertain.
    Militia troops detained Abdurahman Karimov, chairman of the Party 
of Justice-Seekers, in October, holding him incommunicado for 10 days 
before finally releasing him.
    In response to a May 4 appeal by the Commission for National 
Reconciliation, President Rakhmonov charged senior government officials 
with drafting a decree on terminating criminal proceedings against 
opposition fighters and granted amnesty to those already sentenced for 
their actions during the civil war. Human Rights Watch reported that by 
December, the Government had granted amnesty to approximately 5,000 
United Tajik Opposition (UTO) fighters.
    Border Force units routinely take family members of deserters 
hostage and hold them until the deserters return to duty.
    The Constitution states that no one can be exiled without a legal 
basis; no laws have been passed so far setting out any legal basis for 
exile. There were no reports of forced exile. Some opponents of the 
Government are in self-imposed exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1994 Constitution states that 
judges are independent and subordinate only to the Constitution and the 
law, and prohibits interference in their activities; however, in 
practice the political leadership and, in many instances, armed 
paramilitary groups directly influence judicial officials at all 
levels. Under the Constitution, the President has the right, with 
confirmation by the Parliament, both to appoint and to dismiss judges 
and prosecutors. Judges at the local, regional, and republic level are 
for the most part poorly trained and lack understanding of the concept 
of an independent judiciary. Bribery of prosecutors and judges appears 
to be a common practice.
    The court system, largely unmodified from the Soviet period, 
includes city, district, regional, and national levels, with a parallel 
military court system. Higher courts serve as appellate courts for the 
lower ones. The Constitution establishes additional courts, including 
the Constitutional Court, which began to function in 1997.
    According to the law, trials are public, except in cases involving 
national security or the protection of minors. The court appoints an 
attorney for those who do not have one. Defendants may choose their own 
attorney but may not necessarily choose among court-appointed 
defenders. In practice arrested persons often are denied prompt, and in 
some cases any, access to an attorney.
    There was no information during the year concerning Bahrom Sodirov, 
who was charged in the February 1997 kidnaping of the Minister of 
Security, 5 UNMOT personnel, and 11 others. Sodirov was arrested soon 
after the hostages were released. His trial from which observers were 
barred, was suspended in late 1997 and has not resumed.
    The procurator's office is responsible for conducting all 
investigations of alleged criminal conduct. According to the law, both 
defendant and counsel have the right to review all government evidence, 
to confront witnesses, and to present evidence and testimony. No groups 
are barred from testifying, and all testimony theoretically is given 
equal weight, regardless of the ethnicity or gender of the witness. 
Ministry of Justice officials maintain that defendants benefit from the 
presumption of innocence, despite the unmodified Soviet legal statute, 
whichpresumes the guilt of all persons brought to trial. In practice, 
bringing charges tends to suggest guilt to most citizens.
    The Government holds political prisoners, including opposition 
party activists, although estimates of the number of prisoners vary 
widely. The Government and the Tajik opposition exchanged multiple 
lists of prisoners of war and political prisoners for exchange as a 
result of the 1997 inter-Tajik talks in Moscow. By November the 
Government had released all UTO prisoners, with the exception of six 
individuals, named on lists submitted by the UTO, of whom the 
Government claimed no knowledge. The Government accepted the UTO's 1998 
claim that it released all POW's that it held.
    Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, whose arrest and unfair trial in 1997 were 
politically motivated, remained a political prisoner until his 
mysterious death early in the year (see Section 1.c.).
    On December 28, a court in the city of Khujand imposed death 
sentences on two participants in the failed November 1998 coup headed 
by former army colonel Mahmud Khudoberdiev. A further 25 Khudoberdiev 
supporters received prison sentences ranging from 9 to 21 years. The 
trial was closed to the public and held without publicity.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the 
home and prohibits interference with correspondence, telephone 
conversations, and postal and communication rights, except ``in cases 
prescribed by law;'' however, the authorities continued to infringe on 
citizens' right to privacy. Except for some special circumstances, 
police may not enter and search a private home without the approval of 
the procurator. When they do enter and search without prior approval, 
they must then inform the procurator within 24 hours. Police also are 
permitted to enter and search homes without permission if they have 
compelling reason to believe that a delay in obtaining a warrant would 
impair national security. There is no independent judicial review of 
police searches conducted without a warrant.
    Government forces beat and arrested the relatives of members of 
opposition parties (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Security forces also 
detained relatives of deserters in order to compel deserters to return 
to duty (see Section 1.d.).
    In some cases, the security services apparently prevented members 
of banned political parties from finding employment; others were fired 
or demoted when they refused to join the ruling party (see Section 3).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely 
restricts this right in practice. Journalists, broadcasters, and 
individual citizens who disagree with government policies cannot speak 
freely or critically. The Government exercises control over the media 
both overtly through legislation and less obviously through such 
mechanisms as ``friendly advice'' to reporters on what news should not 
be covered. The Government also controlled the printing presses and the 
supply of newsprint and broadcasting facilities, and subsidizes 
virtually all publications and productions. Editors fearful of 
reprisals exercise careful self-censorship. .
    The number of local newspapers is increasing, but only a handful of 
them attempt to cover serious news. Several are organs of political 
parties or blocs. The Government exerted pressure on newspapers 
critical of it, particularly the newspaper Jumbesh, which published the 
views of the UTO and other opposition parties. The Government printing 
press has refused to print this newspaper since mid-October.
    The two opposition newspapers that began publication in 1998, 
Mujahed (Voice of the Mujahad) and Muzhda (Good News) are no longer 
published. Najot, the new official paper of the Islamic Renaissance 
Party, began weekly publication in October.
    On July 4, Ministry of Interior press center chief Jumankhon Hotami 
was shot and killed near Dushanbe, according to family members, who 
also said that on at least one occasion he had fallen out of favor with 
members of the Government for going too far into his research on the 
drug trade, which resulted in the temporary suspension of his 
television program on the subject (see Section 1.a.). Three armed, 
masked men attacked Mukhiddin Idizoda, deputy editor of the opposition 
newspaper Nadzhot, near his home on December 27. The newspaper is 
funded by the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party (see Section 1.c.). 
Sergei Sitkovskii, a Russian national working for the newspaper 
Tojikiston, was killed in a car accident in September. He was preparing 
an article on narcotics trafficking at the time and papers were removed 
from his person at the scene of the accident. The Government has stated 
that the case is closed.
    According to a November Human Rights Watch report, no independent 
radio stations have licenses to operate, and the newspapers of most 
opposition political parties are unable to publish. Independent 
television stations continued to experience administrative and legal 
harassment, and access to the state-run media by opposition politicians 
is virtually nonexistent. There is one government-run television 
network; its several local stations cover regional and local issues 
from an official point of view. There are 36 nongovernmental television 
stations, not all of which are operating at any one time and only a 
handful of which can be considered genuinely independent. Some have 
independent studio facilities and do not have to use official studios. 
To obtain licenses, independent television stations must work through 
two government agencies, the Ministry of Communications and the State 
Committee on Radio and Television. At every stage of the very time 
consuming bureaucratic process, there are high official and unofficial 
fees. The news agency Asia-Plus continued to wait for the broadcasting 
license for which it had applied earlier, but at year's end, it had not 
received a license.
    Access to the Internet is limited, in part, by state control. A 
single company holds a government-granted monopoly on Internet access 
services. As a result of its high fees and limited capacity, access to 
information over the Internet is out of reach for most citizens.
    Academic expression is limited principally by the complete reliance 
of scientific institutes upon government funding, and in practical 
terms by the need to find alternate employment to generate sufficient 
income, leaving little time for academic writing.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government 
restricts this right in practice and exercises strict control over 
organizations and activities of a political nature. Nonpolitical 
associations, such as trade unions, are allowed to meet. Registered 
organizations must apply for a permit from the local executive 
committee in order to organize legally any public assembly or 
demonstration. Sometimes this right is honored, but the Government 
subsequently has been known to take reprisals against organizers. 
Because fear of reprisal is so widespread, public assemblies or 
demonstrations of a political nature were rare during the year.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice by exercising strict 
control over organizations and activities of a political nature. 
Although freedom of association is permitted for nonpolitical 
associations (including trade unions), this right is circumscribed 
further by the requirement in the law on nongovernmental associations 
that all organizations first must register with the Ministry of 
Justice. This process often is slowed by the requirement to submit 
documents in both Russian and Tajik. The Ministry of Justice's 
verification of the text inevitably delays the granting of 
registration. Once registered, an organization may apply for a permit 
to hold a public assembly or demonstration.
    There are six political parties registered with the Government. The 
Party of Popular Unity was banned in December 1998, and the Agrarian 
Party was banned in April; the Government refused its request to 
reregister in October. The Party of Economic and Political Revival of 
Tajikistan was banned in March because of insufficient membership. The 
Party of Justice and Progress has not been banned, but the Government 
denied it registration. Several months after lifting the ban on the 
Democratic Party (Almaty platform), the Government banned the 
Democratic Party (Tehran platform), ostensibly on the grounds of 
insufficient membership.
    In May 1998, the Parliament passed a law prohibiting the creation 
of political parties with a religious orientation. The opposition UTO, 
international organizations, and foreign governments strongly 
criticized the law for violating the spirit and the letter of the 1997 
peace agreement. In June 1998, President Rahmonov established a Special 
Conciliation Commission to resolve the dispute, which proposed 
compromise language for the law, banning political parties from 
receiving support from religious institutions. A new version of the law 
including the compromise language was passed in November 1998. 
Subsequently, parties of religious character are permitted to register; 
however, only one such party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, has done 
so.
    The leadership of opposition parties reported threats and 
harassment of party members by the authorities. In some cases, members 
of banned political parties were unable to find employment, apparently 
at the direction of security services; others were fired or demoted 
when they refused to join the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan, 
the ruling party (see Section 1.f.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
however, there are some exceptions. According to the Law on Freedom of 
Faith, the Committee on Religious Affairs under the Council of 
Ministers registers religious communities and monitors the activities 
of the various religious establishments. While the official reason 
given to justify registration is to ensure that religious groups act in 
accordance with the law, the practical purpose is to ensure that they 
do not become overly political. President Rahmonov has defended 
secularism aggressively and occasionally criticized Islam as a 
political threat. In 1997 the Government subordinated the Council of 
the Islamic Center to the Committee on Religious Affairs; however, the 
observant Muslim community apparently did not object to this step.
    Although unregistered, recently organized religious communities, 
such as Baha,i and Hare Krishna groups function with no 
apparent formal restriction.
    In May 1998, Parliament passed a law prohibiting the creation of 
political parties with a religious orientation. The UTO, the largest 
component of which is the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), along with 
international organizations and foreign governments, strongly 
criticized the law for violating the June 1997 peace agreement, which 
included a government commitment to lift the ban on member parties of 
the UTO. Subsequently, the amendments to the Constitution approved by 
the September referendum authorized political parties with a religious 
orientation.
    Aside from the registration requirement, there are few official 
constraints on religious practice, but government officials sometimes 
issue extrajudicial restrictions. For example, the mayor of Dushanbe 
prohibited mosques from using microphones for the five-times-daily call 
to prayer. There are also reports that some local officials have 
forbidden members of the Islamic Revival Party from speaking in mosques 
in their region. However, this restriction is more a reflection of 
political rather than religious differences. In Isfara, following 
allegations that a private Arabic language school was hosting a 
suspected Uzbek terrorist, the authorities imposed restrictions on 
private Arabic language schools (to include restrictions on private 
Islamic instruction). These restrictions appear to be based on 
political concerns, but the effect on private religious instruction is 
also clear.
    The Government imposed restrictions on the number of pilgrims 
allowed to go on the Hajj in 1998. Individuals were not permitted to 
travel in a personal vehicle; persons were required to travel by 
government-owned transportation, primarily buses. There were regional 
quotas on the number of pilgrims, which led to corruption as places 
were sold. Comparable restrictions continued during the year.
    Missionaries are not restricted legally and proselytize openly; 
however, the Government's fear of Islamic terrorists prompts it to 
restrict visas for Muslim missionaries.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights; however, the Government imposes some restrictions on them.
    The Government has stipulated that both citizens and foreigners are 
prohibited from traveling within a 15-mile zone along the republic's 
borders with China and Afghanistan without permission from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs. This restriction is not always enforced along the 
western part of the border with Afghanistan, but a special visa 
generally is required for travelers, including international workers 
and diplomats, to Gorno-Badakhshan. Travel to border areas in the 
southwest is not restricted significantly, except occasionally at the 
border, which is closed intermittently by one side or the other.
    The Ministry of Security inhibits freedom of travel by requiring 
citizens who wish to travel abroad to obtain an exit visa. This process 
sometimes includes lengthy interviews. The Ministry of Security 
sometimes withholds or delays exit visas when it believes that other 
ministries or NGO's are infringing upon its jurisdiction and have not 
adhered to its formalities for foreign travel.
    Residents of Dushanbe and those travelers who wish to remain longer 
than 3 days are supposed to register with central authorities, and 
regulations require registration at the local Ministry of Interior 
office upon arrival and departure from a city. However, these 
regulations largely are ignored in practice. There are no legal 
restrictions on changing residence or workplace.
    There is no law on emigration. Persons who wish to migrate within 
the former Soviet Union notify the Ministry of Interior of their 
departure. Persons who wish to emigrate beyond the borders of the 
former Soviet Union must receive the approval of the relevant country's 
embassy in order to obtain their passport. Persons who settle abroad 
are required to inform the Tajikistan embassy or Tajikistan interests 
section of the nearest Russian embassy or consulate.
    Persons who wish to return to Tajikistan after having emigrated may 
do so freely by submitting their applications to the Tajikistan embassy 
or Tajikistan interests section of the nearest Russian embassy or 
consulate. The Government adjudicates requests on a case-by-case basis. 
There is no indication that persons, other than those who fled 
Tajikistan for political reasons after the civil war, are not permitted 
to return freely. Some persons currently active with the Tajik 
opposition, whose travel documents expired, at times have had 
difficulty obtaining new documents permitting them to return.
    A number of persons remained internally displaced as a result of 
the civil war, but their total number was difficult to estimate. The 
UNHCR no longer has estimates on the number of internally displaced 
persons (IDP's). These persons live throughout the country and are not 
concentrated in a single geographic area. The Government provides 
protection and modest assistance, and it actively cooperates with 
international organizations to resettle them. Resettlement is 
voluntary; IDP's are not returned forcibly to dangerous conditions.
    The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum to persons who 
have entered the country seeking protection, in accordance with U.N. 
refugee criteria.
    Under the 1994 refugee law, a person granted refugee status is 
provided with the right to work and to move freely throughout the 
country. The Central Department of Refugee Affairs under the Ministry 
of Labor has responsibility for the registration of refugees.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. 
The Government provides first asylum (and provided it to 1,766 Afghans 
and 5 Iraqis from the beginning of the year until the fall). However, 
the U.N. does not have statistics on the number of refugees remaining 
in the country after receiving asylum because the majority of such 
persons use the country as a transit point en route to Western Europe. 
There were unverifiable reports of the forced return of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution: part of a large group of Uzbeks 
(comprising a guerilla force loyal to militant Islamist Juma Namangani 
and approximately 1,000 dependent family members) reportedly was sent 
in buses back to Uzbekistan. Later, the Government allowed the 
remainder of Namangani's forces and their dependents to cross the 
border into Afghanistan. On August 27, the chairman of the security 
council, Amirkul Azimov, announced that all the Uzbek citizens living 
in the Karategin valley had left the country.
    The Central Department of Refugee Affairs (CDR), under the Ministry 
of Labor, handles the registration of Afghan refugees in accordance 
with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
Tajikistan's 1994 Law on Refugees. An unresolved problem stems from the 
unofficial government policy of denying official status to Afghan 
spouses of returning Tajik refugees. The UNHCR has aided their 
admission to the country (avoiding their being jailed as illegal 
immigrants); however, their legal status remains uncertain. There were 
no cases during the year.
    Following the signing of the 1997 peace accords, all Tajik refugees 
from northern Afghanistan who wished to return, as well as thousands 
from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), returned to 
Tajikistan. There was incremental progress during the year in returning 
occupied houses to their original UTO fighter owners. However, problems 
remain, but they are almost entirely in the Khatlon region.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their 
government; however, the Government limits the right of citizens to 
change their government peacefully and freely. In practice President 
Rahmonov's Government remained dominated by a clique from the Kulyab 
region, although 30 percent of government positions (including the post 
of first deputy prime minister) were allocated to members of the UTO in 
accordance with the 1997 peace agreement. Although the peace accords 
called for parliamentary elections in 1998, the Commission for National 
Reconciliation has not yet completed necessary preliminary work, and 
the elections have not yet been held. Some opposition party activists 
remain either jailed or in self-exile abroad.
    Members of the current Majlisi Oli took office in 1995 after 
elections marked by numerous irregularities, such as voter intimidation 
and ballot-box stuffing. The Majlisi Oli is not considered a truly 
independent parliament, although a number of its members nevertheless 
belong to parties or groups that oppose the Government vigorously on 
specific issues.
    The results of a September referendum on amendments to the 
Constitution likely reflected overall public opinion accurately. The 
amendments concerned extending the length of the presidential term from 
5 to 7 years; permitting political parties with religious orientation; 
and replacing a part-time, unicameral parliament with one that was 
full-time and professional. The Government announced that 91.55 percent 
of the electorate voted and that 71.79 percent approved the amendments. 
However, the conduct of the referendum was flawed in numerous ways. 
Observers noted voters casting ballots for others not present, there 
was a lack of ballot secrecy, and there were cases of unprofessional 
conduct on the part of polling station staff. Eyewitnesses reported 
that voter turnout was substantially lower than official statistics 
indicated, and perhaps did not reach 50 percent.
    The Government's handling of preparations for the November 
presidential elections cast doubt on the possibility that there could 
be a peaceful transfer of power through genuinely free and fair 
elections. Candidates had to contend with a cumbersome registration 
process requiring them to obtain large numbers of signatures during a 
short period of time. Only President Rahmonov, who used his political 
apparatus throughout the country for this purpose, probably ahead of 
time, was able to do so by the deadline. Prospective opposition 
candidates complained that local, progovernment administrators 
prevented them from gathering signatures. Days before the election, an 
apparently arbitrary Supreme Court decision allowed one of the three 
aspiring opposition candidates, Economics and Foreign Economic 
Relations Minister Davlat Usmon of the Islamic Renaissance Party, to 
register. Although Davlat announced that he would boycott the election 
unless the other two opposition figures also were allowed to run, the 
Central Election Commission included his name on the ballot. Davlat 
told journalists in Dushanbe on November 7 that he believed the outcome 
of the election was rigged and that only 20 to 30 percent of voters had 
participated. President Rahmonov enjoyed a virtual monopoly over mass 
media access, and there were obvious irregularities in the operation of 
polling places, such as multiple voting by pro-Rahmonov supporters. The 
Government claimed that 98 percent of the electorate voted and that 96 
percent of those voting supported Rahmonov; the claim lacked 
credibility.
    On December 3, government and opposition representatives on the 
Commission for National Reconciliation reached agreement on the number 
of deputies to be elected to each chamber of the new parliament; the 
lower chamber is to consist of 63 deputies and the upper chamber is to 
have 33 senators.
    There are no formal barriers to women's participation in the 
electoral process; however, they are underrepresented in government and 
politics. Since the removal of Soviet-era quotas the number of female 
deputies has declined. At year's end, there were five female deputies 
in the Parliament, one female deputy serving as deputy prime minister, 
one female deputy chairman of the Parliament, one female minister, and 
several female deputy ministers.
    While ethnic Uzbeks make up some 25 percent of the total 
population, they are underrepresented in the political system. 
President Rahmonov's Government actively has sought to keep ethnic 
Uzbek leaders, such as Colonel Mahmud Khudoberdiev, out of political 
life.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government's record on dealing with international and 
nongovernmental investigation of alleged human rights abuses was mixed. 
Fear of persecution by government or paramilitary elements tended to 
discourage citizens from forming their own human rights organizations, 
although the Government did not block the registration of local NGO's 
dealing with human rights; several such organizations exist. The 
Government did not prevent actively citizens or government officials 
from participating in international and local seminars sponsored by the 
OSCE, the ICRC, United Nations agencies, NGO's, and foreign governments 
on such topics as the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and 
international humanitarian law. Discussion at such seminars, including 
those held in Tajikistan, at times was critical of the Government.
    The international human rights group Human Rights Watch/Helsinki 
operates without government restriction, investigating and publishing 
its findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally 
cooperative in dealing with the organization; however, they are not 
responsive to its views.
    Although the Government agreed in 1998 to establish a national 
human rights institution and ombudsman position with OSCE financial 
support, it decided in 1996 to establish such functions itself. 
However, thus far no institution or ombudsman position has been 
established.
    Within the Parliament, the Committee on Legislation and Human 
Rights is charged with monitoring human rights violations; however, 
like the rest of the Parliament, it is not independent in practice.
    The OSCE mission in Dushanbe continues to monitor human rights 
issues with the help of its several field offices. However, these field 
offices experienced varying levels of cooperation with local 
authorities. The OSCE opened field offices in Gharm and Khojand 
following Government permission to do so and now has five field offices 
in the country. The Government continued to refuse the ICRC 
unconditional access to prisons in accordance with standard ICRC 
modalities, despite letters received in the past from senior government 
officials that such access would be forthcoming and further efforts by 
the ICRC during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for the rights and freedoms of every 
person regardless of nationality, race, sex, language, religious 
beliefs, political persuasion, social status, knowledge, and property. 
It also explicitly states that men and women have the same rights. 
However, in practice there is discrimination as a result of cultural 
traditions and the lingering hostilities from the 1992 civil war.
    Women.--Wife beating is a common problem. In both urban and rural 
areas, many cases of wife beating go unreported and many of those cases 
reported are not investigated. There is a widespread reluctance to 
discuss the issue or provide assistance to women in abusive situations. 
In addition abduction of young women, who are raped or forced to marry 
their abductors, is widely reported.
    The Criminal Code prohibits rape; however, it is widely believed 
that most cases are unreported, and the problem is believed to be 
growing, particularly in urban areas. The threat of rape often is used 
to coerce women. There are no special police units for handling these 
cases. One rape crisis center was established by a local NGO in 
Dushanbe in 1993. The situation is exacerbated by a general decline in 
public order, so that in many cities, including Dushanbe, women 
exercise particular care in their movement, especially at night.
    The law prohibits keeping brothels, procuring, making, or selling 
pornography, infecting another person with a venereal disease, and 
sexual exploitation of women; however, prostitutes operate openly at 
night in certain urban areas.
    There are credible reports of trafficking in women (see Section 
6.f.).
    There have been reports of physical harassment of women by 
conservative Muslims in rural areas for not wearing traditional attire.
    According to the law, women have equal rights with men. Articles in 
the Criminal Code protect women's rights in marriage and family 
matters. Girls often are pressured to marry men that they do not choose 
themselves, and illegal polygamy is increasingly common.
    Traditionally there has been a high level of female participation 
in the work force and in institutes of higher learning. There is no 
formal discrimination against women in employment, education, or 
housing, and in urban areas women can be found employed throughout 
government, academic institutes, and enterprises. Some women hold the 
same jobs as men, although not in equal numbers. Women officially 
receive the equal pay for equal work, but this regulation is not always 
the case in practice. However, divorce rates in urban areas are 
comparatively high, and women tend to carry the burden of child-rearing 
and household management, whether married or divorced. In rural areas, 
women tend to marry younger, have larger families, and receive less 
university education than women in cities. In rural and traditional 
areas, women receive less education in general, often leaving school 
after the eighth year. Due to the prevalence of large families, women 
in rural areas are also much less likely to work outside the home. 
Inheritance laws do not discriminate against women; however, in 
practice, inheritances may pass disproportionately to sons.
    Children.--The Government's lack of financial resources left it 
unable to fulfill its extensive commitments to children's rights and 
welfare, and the government social security network for child welfare 
appeared to continue to deteriorate. Women are provided 3 years of 
maternity leave and monthly subsidies for each child; health care is 
free. Education is compulsory until age 16; however, the law is not 
enforced. Public education is intended to be free; however, a lack of 
resources has caused the public school system to deteriorate to the 
point at which it barely functions. Parents who can afford to do so 
send their children to private schools (a number of which have been 
founded since the end of the Soviet period), or join together in groups 
that hire teachers to give their children lessons for a fee. Public 
education is intended to be universal; however, a significant number of 
school-age children--possibly as high as 20 or 25 percent in some 
areas--work instead of attending school. The old Soviet practice, which 
is now illegal, of closing high schools at cotton harvest time and 
putting the students to work in the field continues in some areas.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--The 1992 Law on Social Protection of 
Invalids stipulates the right of the disabled to employment and 
adequate medical care. However, in practice the Government does not 
require employers to provide physical access for the disabled. 
Financial constraints and the absence of basic technology to assist the 
disabled result, in practice, in high unemployment and widespread 
discrimination. There is no law mandating accessibility for the 
disabled. There are facilities for the mentally disabled; however, 
funding is limited and the facilities are in poor condition. Several 
international NGO's provide limited assistance to persons with 
disabilities.
    Religious Minorities.--Baha'i and Hare Krishna groups experience 
only limited prejudice. A prominent 88-year-old member of Dushanbe's 
Baha'i community was killed in his home in September. Members of the 
Baha'i community believe that he was killed because of his religion, 
since none of his personal possessions were taken from the murder 
scene. Police made no arrests, although militant Islamists aligned with 
Iran are considered likely perpetrators.
    Some Muslim leaders occasionally have expressed concern that 
minority religious groups undermine national unity.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Uzbeks make up 
approximately a quarter of the population but are substantially 
underrepresented in official positions. The number of Uzbek language 
newspapers, television broadcasts, and schools has declined 
significantly since 1992. With the exception of the trilingual (Tajik/
Uzbek/Russian) school structure, the Uzbek language has no official 
status. Although the Government permits a daily Uzbek radio broadcast, 
broadcast time is dominated by Tajik and Russian language programs. A 
weekly television broadcast in Uzbek ceased in August.
    In practice Russian is the language of interethnic communication 
and widely used in government. Ethnic Russians and related Russian 
speakers, for example, Ukrainians, make up less than 2 percent of the 
population. While the Government repeatedly has expressed its desire 
for the ethnic Russian and Slavic population to remain, economic 
conditions provide little incentive for them to do so, and some local 
Russians and other Slavs perceive an increase in negative social 
attitudes toward them. A Slavic university and a Russian high school 
operate in Dushanbe with Russian as the language of instruction, but 
also include Tajik and Uzbek students. An agreement ratified by the 
Russian Duma in December 1996 allows for dual Russian and Tajik 
citizenship.
    Tensions persist between ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks in some areas; 
government officials have organized meetings at the local level to 
resolve conflicts; however, the authorities apparently have not 
arrested or prosecuted suspects in murders of ethnic Uzbeks in July 
1998. Since the signing of the peace treaty in 1997, there have been 
multiple murders of ethnic Uzbeks in the Panj district. As a result of 
these attacks, some ethnic Uzbek families have moved to other locations 
in the district where Uzbeks predominate or to neighboring CIS 
countries.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Law on Social Organization and 
the Law on Trade Union Rights and Guarantees both provide all citizens 
with the right of association, including the right to form and join 
associations without prior authorization, to organize territorially, 
and to form and join federations.
    The Federation of Trade Unions, a docile holdover from the Soviet 
era, remains the dominant labor organization, although it has since 
shed its subordination to the Communist Party. The Federation consists 
of 20 professional trade unions and claims 1.5 million members, 
virtually all nonagricultural workers. The separate, independent Trade 
Union of Non-State Enterprises has registered unions in over 3,000 
small and medium-sized enterprises, totaling about 37,000 employees 
(according to 1998 figures). Many of the enterprises in which these two 
organizations are nominally present are not functioning because of the 
general economic depression, and the membership of both has declined as 
a result. The Council of Ministers formally consults both organizations 
during the drafting of social welfare and worker rights legislation.
    The Law on Tariff Agreements and Social Partnerships mandates 
arbitration before a union legally may call a strike. Depending on the 
scale of the labor disagreement, arbitration can take place at the 
company, sector, or governmental level. In the event that arbitration 
fails, unions have the right to strike, but both labor unions have 
disavowed publicly the utility of strikes in a period of deepening 
economic crisis and high unemployment and have espoused compromise 
between management and workers.
    There were no official, union-sanctioned strikes, nor were there 
any wildcat strikes (which last occurred in 1996).
    The law provides citizens but not unions with the right to 
affiliate freely with international organizations, including 
international labor organizations. It does not prohibit unions from 
affiliating with international organizations; however, there are no 
unions with international affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively is codified in the Law on Trade Union 
Rights and Guarantees, the Law on Social Partnerships and Collective 
Contracts, and the Law on Labor Protection. Employees, members of the 
trade union, and management participate in collective bargaining at the 
company level. Negotiations involving an industrial sector include 
officials from the relevant ministry and members of the union's 
steering committee for that particular sector. As the economic 
situation worsens, it is becoming increasingly difficult for 
enterprises to engage in effective collective bargaining.
    The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, the use of sanctions to 
dissuade union membership, and the firing of a worker solely for union 
activity. Any complaints of discrimination against a labor union or 
labor union activist are considered first by a local labor union 
committee and, if necessary, raised to the level of the Supreme Court 
and investigated by the Ministry of Justice. The law compels an 
employer found guilty of firingan employee based on union activity to 
reinstate the employee.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor, except in cases defined in the law; however, it 
persists in some cases. No labor laws have been passed since the 
adoption of the Constitution in 1994. Neither the Law on Labor 
Protection nor the Law on Employment, both predating the present 
Constitution, specifically prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The 
Soviet practice of compelling students to pick cotton was banned 
officially in 1989; however, high school students in some regions still 
are sent to the fields to pick cotton, particularly in the Leninabad 
area, sometimes with compensation. Residents of state or collective 
farms still may be required to pick cotton, although wages usually are 
not paid and these institutions no longer provide the services they 
once did.
    The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by 
children; however, apart from traditional participation by children in 
family agricultural or home craftsman work, such practices are not 
known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--According to labor laws, the minimum age for the 
employment of children is 16, the age at which children also may leave 
school legally. With the concurrence of the local trade union, 
employment may begin at the age of 15. By law workers under the age of 
18 may work no more than 6 hours a day and 36 hours per week. However, 
children as young as 7 years of age can perform household-based labor 
and participate in agricultural work, which is classified as family 
assistance. Many children under 10 years of age work in the bazaars or 
sell newspapers or consumables on the street. Trade unions are 
responsible for reporting any violations in the employment of minors. 
Cases not resolved between the union and the employer may be brought 
before the Procurator General, who may investigate and charge the 
manager of the enterprise with violations of the Labor Code.
    The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and such 
practices generally do not occur, apart from family-based work (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The President, on the advice of 
the Ministry of Labor and in consultation with trade unions, sets the 
minimum monthly wage. The nominal minimum wage per month (effective in 
January) was approximately $1.50 (2,000 Tajik rubles). This rate fell 
far short of providing a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. The Government recognizes this problem and has retained certain 
subsidies for workers and their families at the minimum wage. Although 
the Government adopted a wage indexation law in 1993 and inflation has 
been high, the law has not been implemented.
    Although slightly improved, the economy remained extremely weak 
during the year, with a majority of industrial operations standing 
idle. As factories and enterprises either remained closed or were shut 
down, workers were laid off or furloughed for extended periods.
    Some establishments, both governmental and private, compensated 
their employees in kind with food commodities or with the products 
produced by the enterprise. The employee could then sell or barter 
those products in local private markets.
    The legal workweek for adults (over age 18) is 40 hours. Overtime 
payment is mandated by law, with the first 2 hours of overtime to be 
paid at 1\1/2\ times the normal rate and the rest of the overtime hours 
at double time.
    The Government has established occupational health and safety 
standards, but these fall far below accepted international norms, and 
the Government does not enforce them in practice. The enforcement of 
work standards is the responsibility of the State Technical Supervision 
Committee under the Council of Ministers. While new statistics were not 
available, it is virtually certain, given the continuing economic 
decline, that 1993 statistics, which reported that over one-fifth of 
the population worked in substandard conditions, greatly underreported 
the number working in those conditions. Workers can leave their jobs 
with 2 months' notice, but, given the bleak employment situation, few 
choose to do so. The Law on Labor Protection provides that workers can 
remove themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons. There are credible reports of trafficking in women, 
particularly among groups involved in the narcotics trade with 
Afghanistan (see Section 5). Although such trafficking is illegal, the 
Government has taken no significant action against it.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 TURKEY

    Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty Parliament, 
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which elects the President. In 
1993 it elected Suleyman Demirel President for a 7-year term. After 
April parliamentary elections, Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party 
(DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) led by Devlet Bahceli, and 
former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz's Motherland Party (ANAP) formed a 
new Government in June with Ecevit as Prime Minister. The military 
exercises substantial, but indirect, influence over government policy 
and actions--and politics--in the belief that it is the constitutional 
protector of the State. The Government generally respects the 
Constitution's provisions for an independent judiciary; however, 
various officials acknowledge the need for legislative changes to 
strengthen its independence.
    For over 15 years, the Government has engaged in armed conflict 
with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose goal originally 
was the formation of a separate state of Kurdistan in southeastern 
Turkey. A state of emergency, declared in 1987, continues in five 
southeastern provinces that faced substantial PKK terrorist violence. 
The Parliament in November lifted the state of emergency in Siirt 
province. The level of violence decreased substantially compared with 
the previous year. The state of emergency region's governor has 
authority over the provincial governors in the five provinces, and six 
adjacent ones including Siirt, for security matters. Under the state of 
emergency, this regional governor may exercise certain quasi-martial 
law powers, including imposing restrictions on the press, removing from 
the area persons whose activities are deemed detrimental to public 
order, and ordering village evacuations. The state of emergency decree 
was renewed in five provinces (Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Sirnak, Tunceli, 
and Van) for 4 months in November.
    The Turkish National Police (TNP) have primary responsibility for 
security in urban areas, while the Jandarma (gendarmerie) carry out 
this function in the countryside. The armed forces, in support of the 
police and particularly the Jandarma, carry out operations against the 
PKK in the state of emergency region, thereby serving an internal 
security function. These operations declined in number as the terrorist 
threat ebbed. Although civilian and military authorities remain 
publicly committed to the rule of law and respect for human rights, 
members of the security forces, including police ``special teams,'' 
other TNP personnel, village guards, and Jandarma committed serious 
human rights abuses.
    The Government passed a series of long-awaited economic structural 
and fiscal reforms. These developments bolstered the Government's 
launch of a 3-year disinflationary program designed to rectify income 
disparities. The export-oriented market economy contracted during the 
year, due to the disinflationary program, the aftermath of the Russian 
financial crisis of 1998, a slump in tourism revenues, and the impact 
of the August 17 earthquake. A slight recovery was apparent by year's 
end. Trade in manufactured goods, predominantly oriented toward the 
European Union, remained resilient overall. Textiles, iron, and steel 
continued to lead exports, but electronics, autos, and processed foods 
featured more prominently. The Government made substantial progress 
toward international pipeline agreements to ship Caspian Basin oil and 
gas to world markets through the Caucasus and Turkey. Inflation was 
slightly higher than in 1998, and income disparities between the top 
and bottom population segments grew. Corruption in public procurement 
continued to be a focus of public attention.
    Serious human rights abuses continued; however, the Ecevit 
Government adopted measures designed to improve human rights and some 
officials participated in a broad public debate on democracy and human 
rights. Extrajudicial killings continued, including deaths due to 
excessive force and deaths in detention due to torture. There were few 
reports of mystery killings and disappearances of political activists; 
however, the authorities failed to adequately investigate past 
disappearances. Torture, beatings, and other abuses by security forces 
remained widespread, at times resulting in deaths. Police and Jandarma 
often employed torture and abused detainees during incommunicado 
detention and interrogation. The lack of universal and immediate access 
to an attorney and long detention periods for those held for political 
crimes are major factors in the commission of torture by police and 
other security forces. With the decrease in operations and detentions 
in the southeast, there were fewer reported cases of abuse; however, 
the proportion of cases in which abuse occurred remained at high 
levels.
    The rarity of convictions and the light sentences imposed on police 
and other security officials for killings and torture continued to 
foster a climate of impunity that remained the single largest obstacle 
to reducing torture and prisoner abuse. Investigations and trials of 
officials suspected of abuses continued to be protracted and 
inconclusive. Important cases dating back several years continued 
without resolution, including: Appeals in the cases of police officers 
charged with the 1996 death of journalist Metin Goktepe, 10 police 
officers from Manisa charged with torturing 16 persons in 1995, and 
action against police and security personnel charged with beating to 
death 10 prisoners during a prison disturbance in Diyarbakir in 1996.
    Prison conditions remained poor. In September armed clashes between 
prisoners and prison officials resulted in the killing of 10 prisoners. 
The police and Jandarma continued to use arbitrary arrest and 
detention. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trials continued to 
be problems. Prosecutions brought by the Government in State Security 
Courts (SSC's) reflect the legal structure, which protects state 
interests over individual rights. The Government infringed on citizens' 
privacy rights.
    Limits on freedom of speech and of the press remained a serious 
problem. Authorities banned or confiscated numerous publications and 
raided newspaper offices, encouraging self-censorship on reporting on 
the southeast. Security forces at times beat journalists. Police and 
the courts continued to limit freedom of expression by using 
restrictions in the 1982 Constitution and several laws, including the 
1991 Anti-Terror Law (disseminating separatist propaganda), Article 159 
of the Criminal Code (concerning insults to Parliament, the army, 
Republic, or judiciary), Article 160 (insulting the Turkish Republic), 
Article 169 (aiding an illegal organization), Article 312 (incitement 
to racial, ethnic or religious enmity), the Law to Protect Ataturk, and 
Article 16 of the Press Law. Parliament during the year passed two new 
laws, on combating criminal organizations and on prosecuting civil 
servants, that contain provisions allowing prosecutions for certain 
types of speech. Parliament in August also passed a law suspending for 
3 years the sentences of writers and journalists convicted of crimes 
involving freedom of expression through the media. By the end of the 
year, at least 25 journalists, authors, or political party officials 
who had published articles were released, and as many as hundreds more 
had their trials halted. However, they are subject to reimprisonment if 
they commit a similar crime within a 3-year period. The Committee to 
Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that at least 18 journalists 
nevertheless remained imprisoned at year's end compared with 25 in 
1998. Human rights observers and some released writers criticized the 
suspension of sentences law because it did not apply to crimes 
committed through speech and because the conditions for the suspension 
amount to censorship.
    Some members of the country's political elite, bureaucracy, 
military, and judiciary claim that the state is threatened by both 
``reactionaries'' (Islamists) and ``separatists'' (Kurdish 
nationalists) and continued to call for concrete steps--many involving 
potential curbs on freedom of expression--to meet these threats. 
Prosecutors, courts, and the police continued to take actions against 
those accused of challenging the secular nature or unity of the state, 
generally on the basis of the constitutional restrictions on freedom of 
expression. Government pressure on the legal but pro-Kurdish People's 
Democracy Party (HADEP) continued. The authorities detained 47 HADEP 
members who led a hunger strike after PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's 
November 1998 flight from Syria. Party leaders allege that many were 
tortured or beaten; all were released after several months' detention. 
HADEP politicians asserted that, especially before the April elections, 
they were the object of arbitrary arrests and harassment designed to 
hurt their election chances. Following the elections and a drop in PKK 
terrorist violence in the summer, government pressure on HADEP eased 
somewhat, although some HADEP officials still faced harassment, court 
cases, and hostility from some security officials. In December police 
raided HADEP party offices in seven provinces.
    The National Security Council, a powerful, constitutionally 
mandated advisory body to the Government composed of equal numbers of 
senior military officers and civilian ministers, continued to urge the 
Government to offer no concessions in the fight against the perceived 
threat of radical Islam, described the armed forces as the 
constitutionally mandated ``fist'' protecting secularism, and accused 
Islamist media of extremism and undermining the State. However, 
following the killing of a prominent secular journalist in October, the 
military and political leadership resisted calls to crack down on 
Islamists. Istanbul mayor and prominent Islamist political leader Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan was released after serving 4\1/2\ months of a 10-month 
sentence for a 1998 conviction on charges of promoting religious enmity 
and threatening the unity of the state. He is banned permanently from 
politics.
    Both the HADEP and the Islamist Fazilet parties, whose predecessors 
had been closed, were the subjects of closure cases during the year for 
alleged anticonstitutional activities. Both cases were pending at 
year's end, and elected officials of both parties remained in office in 
full exercise of their functions. The moderate pro-Kurdish Democratic 
Mass Party (DKP) was closed in February. Amendments passed by 
Parliament in August make it more difficult to prove allegations of 
anticonstitutional activities and close political parties.
    The state of emergency governor, courts, police, and the state 
broadcasting oversight body denied the Kurdish population, the largest 
single ethnic group in the southeast, use of its language in election 
campaigning, education, broadcasting, and in some cultural activities, 
such as weddings. Printed material in Kurdish is legal. However, the 
police continue to interfere with the distribution of some newspapers, 
and the governor of the emergency region banned some Kurdish-language 
newspapers in that mainly Kurdish-speaking area. Kurdish music 
recordings are widely available, but bans on certain songs and singers 
persist. Radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish are illegal and in 
practice rarely occur, with the exception of a station that is widely 
believed to be broadcast from a military base. Some radio stations, 
especially in the southeast, play Kurdish music. The Government's 
broadcast monitoring agency mostly tolerates this practice but has 
closed down some stations for playing politically oriented, banned 
Kurdish music.
    The police and Jandarma continued to limit freedom of assembly and 
association. The police harassed, beat, abused, and detained a large 
number of demonstrators. For example the Saturday Mothers, who held 
weekly vigils in Istanbul for more than 3 years to protest the 
disappearances of their relatives, discontinued their gatherings in 
March in the face of ongoing police harassment, abuse, and detention of 
the group's members.
    The Government continued to impose some restrictions on religious 
minorities and at times imposed some limits on freedom of movement. The 
Government continued to harass, intimidate, indict, and imprison human 
rights monitors, journalists, and lawyers for ideas that they expressed 
in public forums. The Diyarbakir branch of the leading human rights 
nongovernmental organization (NGO), the Human Rights Association (HRA), 
remained closed; other NGO branches have been closed, temporarily or 
indefinitely, especially in the southeast. Former HRA president Akin 
Birdal was jailed in June on charges of inciting hatred and enmity in 
nonviolent statements he made about the Kurdish problem and torture, 
but in late September was released for 6 months on medical grounds. In 
December the Ankara State Security Court sentenced 10 persons, 
including a former Jandarma sergeant, and acquitted 6 others in the 
1998 attempted murder of Birdal. There were some signs of a growing 
tolerance for human rights monitors, journalists, and lawyers: State 
Minister Irtemcelik and President Demirel met with NGO's, and the 
office of the HRA in Van reopened in October after being closed for 5 
years.
    Spousal abuse remains a serious problem, and discrimination against 
women persisted. Some abuse of children, discrimination against 
religious and ethnic minorities, and child labor remained serious 
problems. There are some restrictions on worker rights. Trafficking in 
women and girls to Turkey for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem.
    The situation in the southeast remained a serious concern. The 
Government has long denied the Kurdish population, located largely in 
the southeast, basic political, cultural, and linguistic rights. Past 
cases of extrajudicial killings went unsolved, and the police and 
Jandarma tortured civilians. The state of emergency authority abridged 
freedom of expression and put pressure on HADEP. The number of 
villagers forcibly evacuated from their homes since the conflict began 
is estimated credibly to be approximately 560,000.
    In February the Government captured PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. In 
June he was tried in a State Security Court on the charge of treason 
through trying to separate part of the country from government control 
(i.e., sedition) and sentenced to death. His sentence was upheld in 
November, and the case is pending before the European Court of Human 
Rights. Human rights observers, including the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (UNHCHR), raised several due process concerns in the 
Ocalan case, including his initial 9 to 10 days of incommunicado 
detention, the limited access of Ocalan's lawyers to private 
consultations with their client and to written material included in the 
prosecution's case, and the harassment and threats directed toward 
Ocalan's lawyers. After his capture and trial, Ocalan called for PKK 
members to leave Turkey and commit themselves to a peaceful resolution 
of the Kurdish problem.
    The new Ecevit Government adopted a series of initiatives during 
the year designed to improve human rights conditions. They included: 
Removing military judges from the State Security Courts; increasing 
maximum, although not minimum, sentences for torture or for falsifying 
a medical record to hide torture; calling for prosecutors to make 
unscheduled inspections of detention sites; making it more difficult to 
close political parties; suspending for 3 years the sentences or court 
cases of dozens of journalists and writers, provided they do not commit 
a similar offense; imposing a time limit on supervisors to decide 
whether civil servants, including security forces, can be prosecuted; 
and allowing prosecutors to begin immediately collecting evidence of 
alleged abuse by security officials.
    Senior judicial figures, the President, other politicians, and 
private citizens participated in a wide-ranging public debate on 
amending the 1982, postmilitary coup-era Constitution in order to allow 
greater individual liberties. Due to major developments in the fight 
against PKK terrorism, public discussion of options for dealing with 
the Kurdish problem became more vigorous than ever. In October the 
State Minister for Human Rights convened a broad roundtable discussion 
with NGO's, professional associations, and parliamentary bodies.
    The State Minister for Human Rights, who is also the coordinator 
for the High Council for Human Rights, and the Minister of Justice led 
the Government's effort to implement legislative and administrative 
reforms. The armed forces continued to emphasize human rights in 
training for its officers and noncommissioned officers. Human rights 
groups attributed a general reduction in human rights violations by 
military personnel to this effort. Human rights education in primary 
schools is mandatory; it is an elective in high schools.
    The PKK continued to commit abuses as part of its violent 15-year 
campaign against the Government and civilians, mostly Kurds. In the 
first half of the year, PKK terrorists committed random killings and 
attacks throughout Turkey to protest Ocalan's capture. Terrorist acts 
attributed to the PKK included a suicide bomb attack in Adana in July, 
which injured 17 persons, and an Istanbul department store bombing in 
March that killed 13 persons. Although there was a brief resurgence of 
PKK terrorist acts following the June sentencing of PKK leader Ocalan 
to death, a lower rate of PKK terrorist acts was recorded during the 
summer and fall than in the previous year. In recent years military 
pressure significantly reduced the PKK's effectiveness, and some PKK 
members--though not all--are heeding Ocalan's call for an end to the 
armed struggle and PKK withdrawal from Turkey. Violence declined to the 
point where the public's freedom to travel at night is no longer 
restricted in parts of the southeast.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Credible reports of 
political and extrajudicial killings by government authorities 
continued, although accurate figures were unavailable. The Human Rights 
Foundation (HRF) Documentation Center reported a number of deaths of 
detainees under suspicious circumstances, many as an apparent result of 
torture. There were at least 12 deaths in detention during the year, 
according to human rights organizations and press reports. In March 
trade unionist Suleyman Yeter died while in custody at the Istanbul 
security directorate political police center. According to the HRF, the 
official autopsy report states that he died ``because of pressure on 
the neck'' and that there were bone fractures and bruises. Yeter was a 
plaintiff in an ongoing trial of eight police officers who allegedly 
had tortured and raped detainees in 1997. In August two Van police 
officers allegedly kicked a 14-year-old street vendor to death; the 
autopsy revealed swelling around the child's brain and liver consistent 
with battery. No court case has been opened against the officers. Other 
cases in which security forces apparently committed extrajudicial 
killings include the death of an alleged narcotics trafficker under 
suspicious circumstances while in detention in Istanbul in September; 
the death in March, allegedly from torture, of villager Salih 
Karaaslan, near Sirnak; the alleged torture death of Alpaslan Yelden in 
Izmir in July, for which a police inspector was suspended pending 
investigation (and another inspector who testified in the case had been 
under suspension for a previous torture violation); and the death of a 
16-year-old ordinary male prisoner, whose relatives said had resisted 
rape by prison guards. More than a dozen civilians were shot to death 
either after not heeding a ``stop warning'' during arrest or commission 
of a crime or in accidental shootings by police, Jandarma, and in four 
cases by the military. More than 40 persons--mainly children or 
military personnel--were killed by mines in the southeast. The courts 
undertook investigations of most alleged extrajudicial killings; only a 
few yielded concrete results.
    Human rights monitors credibly reported that government forces used 
excessive force, sometimes resulting in deaths, during some raids on 
criminals or alleged terrorist and militant safe houses. A house raid 
in August in Izmir left three persons dead. In October the police in 
Adana entered the wrong apartment during a raid and shot occupant Murat 
Bektas to death in front of his wife and son. The police were unable to 
substantiate their charge that the man was armed. In January the 
Constitutional Court annulled for a year part of the 1996 Provincial 
Authority law allowing security officers to ``fire directly and without 
hesitation'' at persons who ignore a warning to stop. The Court's 
judgment requires that a new provision be passed within a year.
    In September Jandarma killed 10 prisoners and seriously injured 
many others in Ankara's Central Prison during a clash following 
attempts by prison administrators to search and transfer some prisoners 
(see Section 1.c.).
    In the 12 deaths in detention reported by human rights 
organizations and media reports during the year, 3 cases led to arrests 
or trials of police or other law enforcement personnel. The number of 
arrests and prosecutions in such cases remained low compared to the 
incidents of deaths in detention, and convictions remained rare. 
Punishments, when handed down, were generally minimal. Jurisdictional 
questions, efforts by the police leadership to protect officers, 
prosecutors' failure to investigate and bring charges, and the failure 
of courts to hand down appropriate sentences were all obstacles to 
resolving the problem of apparent security force impunity for such 
deaths.
    In cases of extrajudicial killings by police, Jandarma or prison 
guards, at least 30 trials were begun during the year or continued from 
previous years, some relating to events back to 1991.
    No investigation has been opened into the 1998 death in custody of 
18-year-old HADEP member Hamit Cakar, who allegedly was beaten to death 
by Diyarbakir police during a raid on HADEP offices. An initial autopsy 
noted bruises on Cakar's body and blood in his lungs, consistent with 
battery. In January seven police officers charged in the 1998 death of 
an accused burglar in police custody in Gaziantep were released on bail 
and continue on active duty.
    According to the Turkish National Police (TNP), no one is to be 
prosecuted in the case of the death in custody in 1997 of university 
student Burhanett Akdogu. According to the TNP, Akdogu committed 
suicide. Two State Security Court prosecutors agreed and found in June 
that there was no need for prosecution.
    In May the Afyon Penal Court convicted six policemen and sentenced 
them to 7\1/2\ years' imprisonment for ``unintentional murder/
manslaughter'' in the case of journalist Metin Goktepe, who was killed 
in 1996. It acquitted five others. The Goktepe family appealed the 
verdict and is pursuing a civil court case. Before the final trial 
session, families and friends of Goktepe attempted an unauthorized 
march to the court. The police blocked the demonstration, and rocks 
were thrown at the police, who then used their batons to drive the 
crowds back to their buses. Several persons were hurt, including 
Goktepe's mother and three police officers. Goktepe, a correspondent 
for the left-wing newspaper, Evrensel, died from wounds inflicted while 
in detention in Istanbul in 1996. Police initially denied that he was 
detained, then later said that he died from a fall. Following large 
public demonstrations and parliamentary criticism over the 
circumstances of his death, an investigation led to the arrest of 48 
officers. In 1997 the courts decided to try separately 11 of the police 
officers for premeditated murder; 5 were convicted of manslaughter in 
1998, while the remaining 6 were acquitted. However, the Court of 
Appeals subsequently overturned both the convictions and the acquittals 
and sent the case back to the Afyon court. The other 37 officers, who 
were charged with excessive use of force in controlling the 
demonstration, were acquitted due to lack of evidence, because the 
court could not determine which police officers may have beaten 
detainees and which did not. The detainees have asked for an appeal, 
but no court date has been set.
    The trial of 29 Jandarma soldiers and 36 antiterror police officers 
charged with manslaughter in the 1996 beating deaths of 10 prisoners 
while quelling a prison disturbance in Diyarbakir continued throughout 
the year. A separate case against prison officials exists; for this 
case, indictments (for excessive use of force) were based only on 
identifications by wounded prisoners of who injured them. Two-thirds of 
the indictments were dismissed, since the slain prisoners could not 
identify their own killers.
    The trial continued of 20 police officers who used lethal force 
during 1995 incidents that led to the deaths of 19 people in Gazi, 
Istanbul; one police officer is under arrest in the case. The trial 
continued in Istanbul of policeman Abdullah Bozkurt for the 1994 
shooting and killing of Vedat Han Gulsenoglu. A suspect was arrested in 
1998 for the 1993 killing of journalist Ugur Mumcu. The suspect's court 
case is proceeding. In the 1995 killing of Sinan Demirtas, one police 
officer was convicted and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment and seven 
others were acquitted in November 1998. There were no developments in 
the 1994 killing of Faik Candan and the 1992 killing of Yucel Ozen.
    In June six Aydin police officers, including the deputy security 
director and the antiterrorism department director, were convicted of 
torturing student Baki Erdogan to death in police custody in 1993, 
given 5\1/2\-year sentences, and barred from public service for life. 
The ruling came during a retrial of the case, after an appellate court 
in December 1998 had overturned the original convictions.
    In December the Istanbul Penal Court found five antiterror police 
guilty of the death of five persons during a 1993 raid on a coffee 
house. The court sentenced them to death but then used a variety of 
provisions of the Penal Code to reduce the sentence to 3 years, 10 
months, and 20 days in prison.
    The European Court of Human Rights in May found that Turkey had 
violated the right to life of an individual who was killed in a 1990 
security force operation in Siirt province and that the state had 
failed to undertake an effective investigation of the case. In July the 
Court also found that Turkey had violated an individual's right to life 
and right to an effective remedy by failing to conduct an effective 
investigation into his 1993 murder but did not conclude that the man 
had been killed by security forces or with their connivance.
    In the southeast, mystery killings, especially politically 
motivated killings in which the assailant's identity is unknown, 
decreased significantly since 1995 and remained at relatively low 
levels during 1999; exact statistics are unavailable. There were no 
reported mystery killings of high-profile, pro-Kurdish figures in the 
southeast, and few reported killings of pro-Kurdish politicians, 
journalists, or lawyers. The HRA reports a nationwide total of 212 
unsolved killings, including killings for apolitical reasons or 
attributed to terrorism. In August two Sirnak village guards were found 
with multiple bullet wounds, cigarette burns, and broken necks and 
limbs. The victims' relatives said that the bodies were found in an 
area where security forces were operating and alleged that the two were 
killed on orders of the local Jandarma. In September a HADEP official 
in Adana was shot and killed by two unidentified assailants; while the 
motive was unclear, HADEP does not believe that there is a political 
connection. In October a prominent secular journalist was killed by a 
bomb in front of his home in Ankara, presumably by a terrorist 
organization.
    The PKK continued to commit politically motivated killings, 
primarily in rural southeast Anatolia. Victims included soldiers, state 
officials such as Jandarma, state-paid paramilitary village guards and 
family members, young villagers who refused to be recruited, and PKK 
guerrillas-turned-informants. According to the Government, during the 
year 220 security officials and 118 civilians died in terrorist 
incidents, and 961 PKK members were killed by security forces (see 
Section 1.g.). These figures show a decline from 1998, when 243 
soldiers and Jandarma, 10 police officers, 114 village guards, and 132 
civilians were killed.
    The PKK has not murdered any teachers since 1996. Bomb attacks 
attributed to the PKK in the first half of the year took the lives of 
dozens of persons; one such attack occurred in a crowded shopping area 
in Istanbul in March and killed 13 civilians. Although there was a 
brief resurgence of PKK terrorist acts following the June sentencing of 
PKK leader Ocalan to death, a lower rate of PKK terrorist acts was 
recorded during the summer and fall than in the previous year.
    Turkish Hizbullah, an Islamist terrorist group (not related to 
Lebanese Hizballah), continued to target civilians in the southeast and 
may be responsible for many mystery killings, including prominent 
Islamist feminist Konca Kuris. The Government attributed 17 murders 
during the year to Hizbullah. Some human rights monitors in the 
southeast accused the Government of arming and supporting the group in 
the 1980's to target the PKK and its sympathizers. It now generally is 
believed that Hizbullah has operated autonomously since the mid-1990's.
    Far-left armed groups, such as Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol/DHKP-C) 
and the Turkish Workers and Peasants' Liberation Army (TIKKO), 
continued to commit acts of terrorism. In June two DHKP-C militants 
were killed in a shoot-out with police while attempting to launch a 
rocket attack in Istanbul. One of the militants was identified as being 
responsible for previous attacks and several police deaths.
    b. Disappearance.--Accurate statistics on the disappearance of 
those previously under detention, or seen being taken into custody by 
security forces or law enforcement officials, are hard to confirm. 
However, the HRF notes that the number of such disappearances increased 
slightly to 36 in 1999, compared with 29 in 1998 and 66 in 1997. In 
September Aydin Esmer disappeared as he was returning to his home in 
Kulp, Diyarbakir province, from Kizilagac village in Mus province, 
according to Amnesty International (AI). AI noted that a military 
operation took place in the area the same day. Esmer had been detained 
and allegedly tortured at the Kulp Jandarma station several times since 
1993. In November Omer Cinar disappeared after leaving his workplace in 
the Gunesli district of Istanbul; the authorities told his family that 
he was not in custody, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).
    There have been no developments in the 1998 disappearances from 
Izmir of editors Neslihan Uslu, Hasan Aydogan, Metin Andac, and Mehmet 
Mandal. Neither the 1997 disappearances of Ilyas Eren and 73-year-old 
Fikri Ozgen, allegedly taken into custody by plainclothes police, nor 
the 1996 case in which at least five bodies were found near Baharli, 
were resolved. However, according to the HRA, Burhan Aktas, who 
disappeared in 1997, was determined to be living in Germany.
    The European Court of Human Rights in July ruled against Turkey in 
the case of Ahmet Cakici, who disappeared in 1993 after being taken 
into custody by security forces and tortured during an unacknowledged 
detention. The Court found that Turkey had violated Cakici's right to 
life, subjected him to torture, and deprived him of his rights to 
liberty and to an effective remedy, the latter by failing to conduct an 
effective investigation.
    In the face of persistent police harassment and abuse, the 
``Saturday Mothers'' stopped meeting publicly in March (see Section 
2.b.). The group, primarily women, had gathered for several years to 
protest the disappearance of their relatives.
    The Government made efforts to investigate and explain some 
reported cases of disappearance. The Ministry of Interior operates the 
Bureau for the Investigation of Missing Persons, which is open 24 hours 
a day. During the year 59 applications were filed seeking information 
on missing persons. Of these, seven persons were located, an additional 
two were determined to be in prison, and two were found dead. Most 
families of persons who disappeared hold the Government and security 
forces responsible and consequently avoid contact with the government 
office. AI criticizes the Bureau's findings for falling short of the 
thorough and impartial investigations required in accordance with 
international standards. The Ankara police operate a telephone number 
through which the public can obtain information about detainees, gun 
registration, and other police-related matters.
    The U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 
reporting on its September 1998 visit, noted that the total number of 
disappearance cases was relatively low, and had decreased since 1994. 
The report cautioned that its assessment did not exclude the 
possibility of security force involvement, and it urged the Government 
to improve the practices of its security forces. The report noted that 
most disappearances followed arrests in homes and detentions that were 
denied by authorities and that some disappearances occurred during 
raids conducted by Jandarma or village guards. The report recommended 
that the Government fully implement measures to address promptly 
allegations concerning disappearances, reduce the number of 
disappearances, and eliminate impunity. In particular it recommended 
amending regulations concerning pretrial and incommunicado detention in 
cases referred to the State Security Courts in order to ensure the 
right of all detainees to have prompt access to their families and 
lawyers.
    The PKK has made a practice of kidnaping young men or threatening 
their families as part of its recruiting effort. These activities and 
abductions by PKK terrorists of local villagers and state officials 
were becoming less frequent as the PKK's capabilities in the southeast 
were reduced by ongoing government military pressure and calls by its 
captured leader Ocalan for the PKK to withdraw from its former 
operating areas in Turkey.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, the security 
forces continue to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse persons 
regularly. Despite the Government's cooperation with unscheduled 
foreign inspection teams, public pledges by successive governments to 
end the practice, and new government initiatives designed to address 
the problem, torture continues to be widespread.
    Human rights attorneys and physicians who treat victims of torture 
say that most persons detained for or suspected of political crimes 
usually suffer some torture at the hands of police and Jandarma during 
periods of incommunicado detention before they are brought before a 
court; ordinary criminal suspects also report frequent torture and 
mistreatment by police. The HRF estimates the number of credible 
applications for torture at its five national treatment centers to be 
approximately 700 in 1999, compared with 673 in 1998. They believe that 
these numbers underrepresent the actual number of persons tortured 
while in detention or prison. Human rights advocates believe that 
thousands of detainees were tortured during the year in the southeast, 
where the problem is particularly serious, but that only 5 to 20 
percent report torture because they fear retaliation or believe that 
complaints are futile. Although the percentage of detainees subjected 
to torture remained about the same as in 1998, several advocates 
reported a reduction in the number of torture victims in the southeast 
during the year. They attribute the decrease to fewer detentions; 
reduced PKK violence, which has eased treatment by security officials; 
better-educated security officers; and increased concern about the 
problem from many sources. The reductions do not appear to be uniform 
throughout the region. Human rights monitors report no improvement in 
some provinces, while others note a decrease around cities but not in 
more rural areas of the province. All report that torture remains 
widespread in the southeast.
    Human rights monitors report that because the arresting officer is 
responsible for interrogating the suspect, some officers may resort to 
torture to obtain a confession that would justify the arrest. They say 
that police who resort to such practices generally beat detainees for 
ordinary crimes who do not confess and stop if they cannot get a 
confession. However, when beatings of suspects detained under the Anti-
Terror Law do not produce information and confessions, interrogators 
shift to electric shock, cold water from high-pressure hoses, and other 
methods. Observers say that security officials often use the torture of 
political detainees simply to express anger and to intimidate the 
detainees.
    Human rights monitors say that security officials increasingly use 
methods that do not leave physical traces, such as beating with 
weighted bags instead of clubs or fists. Commonly employed methods of 
torture reported by the HRF's treatment centers include: Systematic 
beatings; stripping and blindfolding; exposure to extreme cold or high-
pressure cold water hoses; electric shocks; beatings on the soles of 
the feet (falaka) and genitalia; hanging by the arms; food and sleep 
deprivation; heavy weights hung on the body; water dripped onto the 
head; burns; hanging sandbags on the neck; near-suffocation by placing 
bags over the head; vaginal and anal rape with truncheons and, in some 
instances, gun barrels; squeezing and twisting of testicles; and other 
forms of sexual abuse. In some cases, multiple torture methods (e.g., 
hanging and electric shocks) are employed at the same time. Female 
detainees often face sexual humiliation and, less frequently, more 
severe forms of sexual torture. After being forced to strip in front of 
male security officers, female detainees often are touched, insulted, 
and threatened with rape. Other methods used are forced prolonged 
standing, isolation, loud music, witnessing or hearing torture, being 
driven to the countryside for a mock execution, threats to detainees or 
their family members, and insults.
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture conducted investigations at 
the invitation of the Government in late 1998. He reported that while 
torture was practiced systematically and on a widespread scale through 
the mid-1990's, there were ``notable improvements'' since 1997. These 
improvements were due in his opinion to shorter periods of 
incommunicado detention and less brutal torture methods used in some 
places, such as less use of falaka, electric shocks, and rape, possibly 
connected with shorter periods of detention in 1997 and 1998. However, 
he noted that torture and abuse still are practiced by law enforcement 
officials--pervasively in numerous places around the country--but that 
the Government was committed to improving its record and bringing its 
law enforcement and administration of justice up to international 
standards. He found that long periods of incommunicado detention and a 
climate of impunity among law enforcement officials--two elements under 
the Government's control--continued to contribute to the use of 
torture.
    Allegations of torture throughout the country continued during the 
year, but mostly in the southeast. In October Dr. Zeki Uzun, a 
gynecologist who volunteers with the HRF Izmir Treatment and 
Rehabilitation Center, was taken into custody during a raid on his 
private clinic by antiterror police. Uzun allegedly was subjected to 
beatings, near suffocation, death threats, and other methods of torture 
during his 6 days in custody. Although the Medical Association provided 
an alternative medical report establishing that torture was inflicted 
on Uzun, the official medical report provided after his detention 
stated that he was not subjected to torture. According to the HRF, the 
official medical report was given to Uzun without a medical 
examination. Uzun is accused of supporting and providing treatment to 
members of terrorist organizations. In public statements, the HRF and 
the Izmir Chamber of Doctors asserted that Uzun's reports documenting 
torture were the reason for his arrest and torture. They also said that 
the police inspected and took patient records from his office.
    In October nine persons, two under the age of 18, were detained for 
``distributing aid material without permission'' in the region 
devastated by the recent earthquake and allegedly tortured. In June 
many of approximately 50 villagers detained by Jandarma in Kahraman 
Maras province said that they were tortured, severely beaten, forced to 
eat human excrement, suspended by their arms tied behind their backs, 
and sprayed with pressurized water, according to AI. Charges were filed 
against 32 of the villagers for supporting the PKK and 1 was charged 
with PKK membership; 17 were released. In Sirnak 27 persons stated that 
they were tortured in July while detained after house raids; the doctor 
who substantiated their claims allegedly was threatened by Jandarma to 
give a report of ``good health'', even though some of the detainees had 
broken arms. Cevat Soysal, a high-ranking member of the PKK, was 
captured in July in Moldova. He claimed that he was subjected to 
electric shock, forced to lie naked on ice, sprayed with cold 
pressurized water, and deprived of sleep when brought to Turkey; he is 
seeking redress at the European Court of Human Rights. HADEP official 
Mazaffer Cinar was interrogated in incommunicado detention for 8 days 
at Siirt police headquarters on suspicion of supporting the PKK. 
According to HRW, he said that he was beaten, his testicles were 
pulled, he was suspended by his arms, he was hosed with cold 
pressurized water, and his wife was threatened with rape. Filiz Celik, 
charged with being a member of the PKK, reportedly was tortured in 
detention while pregnant; in July her baby was born dead in an Istanbul 
prison. In August 22-year-old Medine Oncel jumped out of a window 
rather than be taken into detention again by the antiterror police; her 
family claims that she was severely beaten and sexually abused during 
her 10-day stay at a detention center in November 1998. Oncel, along 
with numerous members of HADEP, was detained for participating in a 
hunger strike in support of Ocalan.
    Government officials admit that torture occurs, but deny that it is 
systematic. The Ecevit Government, which took office in June, made 
preventing acts of torture a priority. In August Parliament passed 
legislation lengthening sentences for those convicted of torture from 5 
to a maximum of 8 years; however, the measure did not increase minimum 
sentences. The Government in August adopted a program of seminars by 
NGO's and government institutions on human rights. The program targets 
all civil servants with law enforcement responsibilities, as well as 
social workers and primary and secondary school students. The 
Government was in regular dialog with the Council of Europe's Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and accepted unannounced visits by 
the CPT, most recently in February when it visited PKK leader Ocalan in 
prison.
    Regulations on detention and arrest procedures introduced in 
October 1998 were supplemented by a June directive from Prime Minister 
Ecevit against torture, which reminded security forces of the new code 
and called for public prosecutors to make unscheduled inspections of 
places of detention. The Prime Minister asked for reports every 3 
months on this process; these reports are not public. According to the 
Government, prosecutors have made more than a thousand visits to 
detention sites, resulting in investigations against 14 security 
officers and the opening of court cases against 6 of them. Provincial 
prosecutors began unannounced inspections of police stations in 
October. Although some provincial authorities said that the inspections 
uncovered no deficiencies, others admitted that they led to 
improvements in practices in some provinces. Some human rights 
observers question prosecutors' ability to influence police practices.
    Private attorneys and human rights monitors report uneven 
implementation of 1997 reforms granting immediate access by attorneys 
to those arrested for common crimes and access after 4 days of 
detention for those detained under the Anti-Terror Law. No immediate 
access to an attorney is provided for under the law for persons whose 
cases fall under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, such as 
persons charged with drug trafficking, smuggling, and crimes under the 
Anti-Terror law. The lack of early access to an attorney is a major 
factor in the occurrence of torture by police and security forces.
    State-employed doctors give all medical exams for detainees. The 
Government maintains that medical examinations occur once during 
detention and a second time before either arraignment or release. 
However, the examinations generally are exceedingly brief and informal, 
often lasting less than a minute. In some cases doctors were brought 
reports to sign, but no examinees. Former detainees assert that some 
medical examinations take place too long after the event to reveal any 
definitive evidence of torture. Lawyers contend that medical reports--
their only basis for filing a claim of torture--are not placed 
regularly in prisoners' files.
    Citing security reasons, members of security and police forces 
often stay in the examination room when physicians are examining 
detainees, resulting in the intimidation of both the detainee and the 
physician. According to the Medical Association and other human rights 
observers, the presence of a security officer--at times the one 
allegedly responsible for torture--can lead physicians to refrain from 
examining detainees, perform cursory examinations and not report 
findings, or report physical findings but not draw reasonable medical 
inferences that torture occurred. In one case during the year the 
courts accepted alternative medical reports from private doctors that 
contradicted official claims that torture did not occur.
    New legislation passed in August increased the jail sentences and 
fines for medical personnel who falsify reports to hide torture, those 
who knowingly use such reports, and those who coerce doctors into 
making them. The heaviest penalties are for those who supply false 
reports for money. In practice there are few such prosecutions.
    In June the Supreme Honor Board of the Medical Doctors Union 
suspended for a month the licenses of six doctors from the Tekirdag 
region near Istanbul after finding that they had falsified reports to 
conceal evidence of torture and allowed police officers to be present 
during examinations. In 1998 the nongovernmental Medical Association 
suspended the license of Dr. Nur Birgen, a government-employed forensic 
expert, for twice falsifying medical reports to hide evidence of 
torture. When another doctor appealed to Dr. Birgen's state employer to 
implement the suspension, the prosecutors opened a case against him for 
insulting Dr. Birgen. Dr. Cumhur Akpinar was acquitted in December of 
charges, filed in January, that he aided an illegal armed organization 
by preparing exaggerated forensic reports. In March Dr. Eda Guven was 
acquitted of abuse of duty after issuing medical reports documenting 
injuries sustained by two detainees interrogated in 1997 by Jandarma in 
Aydin province; her acquittal was upheld by the Court of Appeals in 
May.
    The investigation, prosecution, and punishment of members of the 
security forces for torture or other mistreatment is rare. According to 
the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture, very few allegations lead to 
prosecution, and few prosecutions lead to conviction. He reported that 
in Istanbul, for example, from 1996 to 1998 the chief public prosecutor 
brought 245 cases of torture or mistreatment by security forces, which 
resulted in only 15 convictions, with the longest sentence being 3 
years. Nationally, between 1995 and 1997, 313 police officers were 
prosecuted for torture; as of the end of 1998 there were no 
convictions, over half had been released, and the other cases were 
pending. Accused officers usually remain on duty pending a decision, 
which can take years.
    According to the Government, judicial action taken during the year 
against police charged with torture or mistreatment resulted in 34 
convictions, 164 acquittals, and 48 ongoing prosecutions. 
Administrative decisions determined that no trial was needed in 146 
other cases and that no cases needed to be opened against 55 other 
officers accused of abuse. During the year 708 police also were given 
administrative punishments, such as suspensions, for torture or 
mistreatment. In addition 11 Jandarma were prosecuted during the year, 
resulting in 3 convictions, 6 acquittals, and 2 ongoing trials. During 
the past 5 years, two military personnel have been prosecuted for 
torture; one was acquitted, and the trial of the other individual 
continued.
    The failure to enforce domestic and international bans on torture 
fosters a climate of official impunity that encourages the systematic 
abuse of detainees. Detainees state that prosecutors ignore their 
claims of abuse during interrogation; prosecutors often belittle such 
claims or contend that detainees injure themselves to accuse falsely 
the security forces.
    Legal, administrative, and bureaucratic barriers impede 
prosecutions and contribute to the low number of convictions for 
torture. The Government in December replaced an Ottoman-era civil 
servant prosecution law, which was widely viewed as an extrajudicial 
obstacle to prosecuting security officials for the abuse of power 
because it required prosecutors to obtain permission from special 
provincial administrative boards before initiating prosecutions against 
any public employee for actions while carrying out official duties. The 
boards were slow, dispersed accountability, and were perceived as not 
sufficiently transparent. The new law now authorizes prosecutors to 
begin collecting evidence immediately to substantiate claims of torture 
by security officials. It also establishes a 30-day deadline, with a 
possible 15-day extension, for a civil servant's supervisor to decide 
whether that employee can be prosecuted (or whether the employee is to 
be disciplined otherwise). However, the new law still protects civil 
servants, including police or prison guards, from direct prosecution 
unless their superiors grant permission to investigate them. This 
provision has been widely criticized. Many jurists, including the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and human rights observers 
said that the new law still falls short of the needed reform. The new 
law also allows prosecutors to open investigations against persons 
suspected of falsely accusing a civil servant based on ``enmity, hatred 
or slandering.'' This provision was used in December against a defense 
lawyer who stated that a medical record confirmed that security 
officials tortured his client (see Section 4).
    Under the Criminal Procedures Law, prosecutors may initiate 
investigations of police or Jandarma officers suspected of torturing or 
mistreating suspects. In cases where township security directors or 
Jandarma commanders are accused of torture, the prosecutor must obtain 
permission to initiate an investigation from the Ministry of Justice, 
because these officials are deemed to have a status equal to that of 
judges. Finally, in the state of emergency regions, any lawsuit 
directed at government authorities must be approved by the state of 
emergency governor. Approval is rare.
    In December the Iskenderun, Hatay, chief public prosecutor, citing 
lack of evidence, dropped charges against two Iskenderun antiterror 
police accused of sexually harassing, raping with a truncheon, and 
torturing two female high school students while they were in police 
custody in March. There were several medical reports issued in the 
highly publicized case, but only an informal medical assessment by two 
doctors indicated torture. The girls' attorneys said that they would 
appeal the decision.
    In Elazig the public prosecutor decided against indicting 30 
soldiers and warders for allegedly torturing a prisoner in 1998.
    The appeal by police officers of their 1-year suspended sentences 
for torturing Songul Yildiz in 1997 continues in Istanbul. However, her 
conviction on charges of PKK membership was overturned by the Court of 
Appeals; the Istanbul SSC is retrying her case. In the case of Hatun 
Temizalp, who alleged in a State Security Court that she was tortured 
in detention in 1997, the TNP antiterror department said that 
administrative investigations of the police found no cause for bringing 
charges.
    The Government provided additional information on the case of then 
2\1/2\-year-old Azat Tokmak, who the Istanbul Chamber of Doctors 
certified in April 1998 was tortured in 1996. The Fatih prosecutor's 
office, citing a medical report that found no indication of 
mistreatment when Azat was brought to an Istanbul nursery, decided in 
July 1998 that there was not sufficient evidence to pursue the case.
    A case began in April against 12 policemen accused of torturing 
``peace train'' detainees in 1997 (see Section 4).
    The following torture cases remained unresolved. In June the Court 
of Appeals General Council overturned the second acquittal verdict of 
10 policemen, including one police chief, charged with torturing 14 
teenagers in Manisa in 1995; they based this decision on another Court 
of Appeals decision. The appellate court again found that the students 
had exhibited evidence of physical and psychological torture while 
under detention. In November the Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor 
turned down the police officers' application for a review of that 
judgment, and the Supreme Court sent the case back for retrial. The 
Manisa court in December held a preliminary hearing in the retrial, but 
postponed the main hearing until February 2000 in order to record the 
testimonies of the police officers, who remain on active duty. 
Responding to a written question from Parliament, the Interior Minister 
in the summer defended the police officers accused in the case and said 
that the investigation at the time showed that they were ``flawless.'' 
At the same time, the students' own case continues in Izmir, after the 
Court of Appeals overturned the January 1997 convictions of 10 of the 
students on charges of belonging to an illegal leftist organization; 4 
other students originally were acquitted. The Medical Doctor's Union 
Central Council Supreme Honorary Board suspended 10 doctors from 
practicing for from 3 to 6 months, on the grounds that they had 
provided false medical reports on the Manisa victims.
    In February the Court of Appeals overturned the conviction and life 
sentence of Gulderen Baran who, along with four other individuals, was 
arrested in 1995 in Istanbul on charges of membership in a terrorist 
organization. Baran sustained serious physical damage to her arms while 
in police custody, and four police officers subsequently were charged 
for mistreatment. Two police officers were sentenced in 1997 to 10 
months in prison and a 2-month ban from public service. There were no 
known developments in the cases of the police officers.
    There were no developments in the cases of Kelekcier, Altinbas, 
Uzuner, and Kartal.
    Police regularly harass, beat, and abuse demonstrators (see Section 
2.b.). Police also harass, beat, and abuse journalists (see Section 
2.a.).
    Prison conditions remain poor. With some exceptions (i.e., for 
high-profile political prisoners, or those with gang connections) 
prisons remain plagued by overcrowding, underfunding, and very poor 
administration. Despite the existence of separate juvenile facilities, 
juveniles and adults sometimes are incarcerated together, and most 
prisons lack adequate medical care for routine treatment or even 
medical emergencies. Families often must supplement the poor quality 
food. Prisons are run on the ward system. In some cases, prisoners with 
similar ideological views are incarcerated together and indoctrinate 
and punish their own, resulting in gang and terrorist group domination 
of entire wards. Past efforts to introduce a restrictive cell system 
were criticized by prisoners, attorneys, and human rights groups alike, 
who view the ward system as a more humane form of incarceration.
    In September Jandarma killed 10 prisoners and seriously injured 
many others in Ankara's Central Prison during a clash following 
attempts by the administration to search and transfer some prisoners 
from a ward run by Dev-Sol and TIKKO adherents. Prisoners throughout 
the country briefly protested, holding hostages and refusing to be 
counted. Human rights lawyers alleged that forensic reports show that 
prisoners were shot at close range. In December inmates and security 
forces violently clashed in Metris Prison in Istanbul, after Jandarma 
tried to search and transfer some members of the Islamic Great East 
Raiders Front to another prison. Throughout the year, many small-scale 
hunger strikes broke out to protest prison conditions and poor 
treatment by guards at many institutions.
    Human rights observers estimate that at any given time, at least 
one-quarter of those in prison are awaiting trial or the outcome of 
their trial. The Parliament's Human Rights Commission completed a 
thorough review in 1998 of prison conditions throughout the country; 
however, before the report could be published the Commission's 
composition changed after the April elections. The Commission is 
reviewing its report, providing updated, comparative data, and plans to 
present it to Parliament.
    The Government permits prison visits by international 
organizations, such as the European Committee to Prevent Torture and 
the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, but only rarely allows such 
visits by members of local NGO's, except in their capacity as lawyers. 
It denied permission to some officials of foreign governments to visit 
prisons during the year.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention continued to be problems. To take a person into custody, a 
prosecutor must issue a detention order, except when suspects are 
caught committing a crime. The maximum detention period for those 
charged with individual common crimes is 24 hours, which may be 
extended by a judge to a maximum of 7 days; this period is longer for 
groups. In the state of emergency area, the use of a prosecutor's 
detention order is in practice extremely rare.
    Under the Criminal Code, those detained for individual common 
crimes are entitled to immediate access to an attorney and may meet and 
confer with an attorney at any time. In practice legal experts assert 
that the authorities do not always respect these provisions, and that 
most citizens do not exercise this right, either because they are 
unaware of it, or because they fear possibly antagonizing the 
authorities. The court consistently provides attorneys only to minors 
or deaf-mutes who cannot represent themselves. By law a detainee's next 
of kin must be notified as soon as possible after arrest. In criminal 
and civil cases this requirement is observed.
    In state security cases, the pretrial detention period without 
charge is longer, and the law provides for no immediate access by an 
attorney. The lack of early access by an attorney is a major factor in 
the continued use of torture by security forces. Persons detained for 
individual crimes under the Anti-Terror Law must be brought before a 
judge within 48 hours. Those charged with crimes of a collective, 
political, or conspiratorial nature may be detained for an initial 
period of 48 hours, extended for up to 4 days at a prosecutor's 
discretion and, with a judge's nearly automatic permission, for up to 7 
days in most of the country and up to 10 days in the southeastern 
provinces under the state of emergency. Attorneys are allowed access 
only after the first 4 days.
    Private attorneys and human rights monitors reported uneven 
implementation of these regulations, especially attorney access. AI 
asserts that lawyers rarely are permitted adequate access to their 
clients, even after the fourth day, although they may be allowed to 
exchange a few words during a brief interview in the presence of 
security officers. According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 
the secretive nature of arrests and detentions often leaves the 
detainee's lawyer and family members with no information about the 
detention, and police often refuse to disclose the place of detention 
or even the fact that the detainee is being held. The October 1998 
regulations on detention and arrest procedures exempt the authorities 
from the obligation to inform relatives in the case of state security 
detentions. In addition legal limits on detention periods at times are 
circumvented by subjecting a detainee to successive charges or 
falsifying detention records. The police maintain 24-hour detention 
monitoring bureaus that are required to record detentions on computers, 
but AI reports an increase in unregistered detentions since 1997. 
According to the HRA, in the state of emergency region the police 
detain, beat, and then release groups after the maximum period of 
detention in order to intimidate them.
    Once formally charged by the prosecutor, a detainee is arraigned by 
a judge and allowed to retain a lawyer. After arraignment the judge may 
release the accused upon receipt of an appropriate assurance, such as 
bail, or order him detained if the court determines that he is likely 
to flee the jurisdiction or destroy evidence. The decision concerning 
early access to counsel in such cases is left to the public prosecutor, 
who often denies access on the grounds that it would prejudice an 
ongoing investigation. Although the Constitution specifies the right of 
detainees to request speedy arraignment and trial, judges have ordered 
that some suspects be detained indefinitely, sometimes for years. Many 
such cases involve persons accused of violent crimes, but there are 
cases of those accused of nonviolent political crimes being kept in 
custody until the conclusion of their trials.
    On several occasions, the police beat and detained peaceful 
demonstrators (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). The police also beat and 
detained journalists (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.) and members of 
political parties (see Section 3). During a September protest over 
prison conditions, officers beat the chair of Istanbul's HRA branch 
(see Section 4). Authorities detained 47 HADEP members who led a hunger 
strike after Ocalan's November 1998 flight from Syria. Twenty men were 
detained in October when they joined women in a peaceful protest over 
the rule banning head coverings at universities (see Section 2.c.). 
During the November summit of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, police detained for several 
hours at least five young children and held them in police headquarters 
in contravention of the law, which requires that all detained children 
be transferred immediately to the prosecutor's office.
    The Government does not use forced external exile. It retains the 
authority to authorize internal exile (see Section 2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and in practice the general law courts generally 
act independently of the executive and legislative branches; however, 
various officials acknowledge the need for legislative changes to 
strengthen the judiciary's independence. The Constitution prohibits 
state authorities from issuing orders or recommendations concerning the 
exercise of judicial power; however, in practice the Government and 
National Security Council periodically issue announcements or 
directives about threats to the State, which could be interpreted as 
instructions to the judiciary. The High Council of Judges and 
Prosecutors, which is appointed by the President and includes the 
Minister of Justice, selects judges and prosecutors for the higher 
courts and is responsible for oversight of those in the lower courts. 
Some observers assert that the composition of the High Council 
undermines the independence of the judiciary, despite the 
Constitutional provision for security of tenure, because the High 
Council effectively controls the career paths of judges through 
appointments, transfers, promotions, and other matters, and its 
decisions are not subject to review. Various government and judicial 
officials during the year discussed the need to adopt legislative 
changes to strengthen the independence of the judiciary.
    The judicial system is composed of general law courts, military 
courts, the State Security Courts (SSC's), and a Constitutional Court, 
the nation's highest court. The High Court of Appeals hears appeals for 
criminal cases, including SSC's, while the Council of State hears 
appeals of administrative cases or those between government entities. 
Most cases are prosecuted in the general law courts, which include 
civil, administrative, and criminal courts. Public servants can be 
tried only after administrative approval from the governor or 
subgovernor, which are centrally appointed positions.
    The Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of laws, 
decrees, and parliamentary procedural rules and hears cases involving 
the banning of political parties. If impeached, ministers and prime 
ministers would be tried in the Constitutional Court as well. However, 
the Court may not consider ``decrees with the force of law'' issued 
under a state of emergency, martial law, or in time of war.
    Military courts, with their own appeals system, hear cases 
involving military law, members of the armed forces, and civilians who 
are accused of impugning the honor of the armed forces or undermining 
compliance with the draft. The editor in chief of the radical Islamist 
newspaper Akit, Murat Balibey, who was sentenced in July 1998 by a 
military court to 14 months imprisonment for ``insulting the military'' 
in a newspaper article, was released in September under the law 
allowing the suspension of sentences for journalists.
    SSC's sit in eight cities and try defendants accused of crimes such 
as terrorism, gang-related crimes, drug smuggling, membership in 
illegal organizations, and espousing or disseminating ideas prohibited 
by law, such as those ``damaging the indivisible unity of the state.'' 
These courts may hold closed hearings and may admit testimony obtained 
during police interrogation in the absence of counsel. During the year, 
the SSC's dealt mainly with cases under the Anti-Terror Law and section 
312 of the Criminal Code. Human rights observers cite prosecutions of 
leaders of the political Islamic movement, nonviolent political leaders 
associated with the Kurdish issue, and persons who criticize the 
Government's practices as evidence that the SSC's often serve a 
primarily political purpose.
    Until mid-1999, the SSC's were composed of panels of five members: 
Two civilian judges, one military judge, and two prosecutors. A 1998 
ruling by the European Court of Human Rights found that the presence of 
a military justice on the SSC's was inconsistent with relevant European 
conventions. In June the Government amended the Constitution and passed 
legislation to replace the military judge with a civilian judge. These 
courts may hold closed hearings and may admit testimony obtained during 
police interrogation in the absence of counsel. SSC verdicts may be 
appealed only to a specialized department of the High Court of Appeals 
dealing with crimes against state security.
    In February the Government brought PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to 
Turkey to stand trial for treason, as the creator of a separatist 
terrorist organization responsible for over 30,000 deaths. He stood 
trial in a special sitting of the Ankara State Security Court on the 
secure prison island of Imrali. Ocalan was held in incommunicado 
detention for 9 to 10 days before the trial. His lawyers were not 
allowed adequate access to private consultations with their client or 
to pertinent documents. They also complained that they were harassed 
and that police abused at least six of them after one court session, an 
allegation the police denied. The trial was the subject of 
unprecedented public attention, and foreign observers, including 
diplomats and some members of NGO's, were allowed to attend. Families 
of those killed by the PKK and their attorneys also attended. Ocalan 
was allowed to read uninterrupted and lengthy statements in his 
defense. In June Ocalan was sentenced to death. His sentence was upheld 
in November by the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals chief 
prosecutor in December refused to reconsider it. Carrying out the death 
sentence still requires action and approval by the Justice Ministry, 
the Council of Ministers, Parliament, and the President. After the 
appellate court ruling in November, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) asked the Government to take all necessary steps to ensure that 
the death penalty is not carried out before the Court is able to 
complete its judicial processes; Ocalan's case is pending before the 
ECHR.
    The trial of 25 Diyarbakir lawyers charged in 1993 and 1994 for 
aiding and abetting the PKK, and in a few cases with membership in a 
terrorist organization, continued at the Diyarbakir SSC. The 
defendants, 16 of whom complained of torture and mistreatment while 
held in incommunicado detention after their arrests, are free pending 
trial. Human rights monitors believe that their prosecution is intended 
to punish them for representing clients unpopular with the Government 
and for calling attention to human rights violations in the southeast.
    The law gives prosecutors far-reaching authority to supervise the 
police during an investigation. Prosecutors complain that they have few 
resources to do so, and many have begun to call for ``judicial police'' 
who could help investigate and gather evidence. Human rights observers 
and Ministry of Justice officials note that problems can arise from the 
fact that the police report to the Interior Ministry, not to the 
courts.
    Defense lawyers do not have equal status with prosecutors. In State 
Security Courts and for other charges, such as insulting the President 
or ``defaming Turkish citizenship,'' defense attorneys may be denied 
access to files that the state asserts deal with national intelligence 
or security matters. Attorneys defending controversial cases have been 
subject to spurious legal charges, such as accusations that they are 
couriers for clients who are alleged terrorists. Hasan Dogan, a 
respected Malatya attorney who frequently defends suspects in SSC 
cases, was acquitted in March of all 1997 charges by an informer that 
he was a member of the PKK or assisted the organization; however, the 
appeals court reversed his acquittal in December, and he awaits 
sentencing.
    Prosecutors are charged with determining which law has been broken 
and objectively presenting the facts to the court. There is no jury 
system; a judge or a panel of judges decides all cases. Trials for 
political crimes or torture frequently last for months or years, with 
one or two hearings scheduled each month. Proceedings against security 
officials often are delayed because officers do not submit promptly 
statements or attend trials. Illegally gathered evidence may be 
excluded by law. However, this rarely occurs and then only after a 
separate case determining the legality of the evidence is resolved. In 
practice a trial based on a confession allegedly coerced under torture 
may proceed and even conclude, before the court has established the 
merits of the torture allegations.
    By law the Bar Association must provide free counsel to indigents 
who make a request to the court, except for crimes falling under the 
scope of the SSC's. An Izmir Bar Association study showed that in 
practice, only a tiny percentage of defendants have lawyers. Bar 
associations in large cities, such as Istanbul, have attorneys on call 
24 hours a day. Costs are borne by the Association. Defense lawyers 
generally have access to the public prosecutor's files only after 
arraignment.
    In law and in practice, the legal system does not discriminate 
against minorities. Legal proceedings are conducted solely in Turkish 
with some interpreting available; however, some defendants whose native 
language is not Turkish may be disadvantaged seriously.
    Turkey recognizes the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human 
Rights. In 1999 Turkey lost all 18 cases in which it was a party, most 
of which pertained to free expression crimes that occurred in the early 
1990's, and was fined nearly $3 million (1.69 trillion lira).
    There is no reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners. 
The Government claims that alleged political prisoners are in fact 
security detainees, who were convicted of being members of, or 
assisting, the PKK or other terrorist organizations.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of a 
person's domicile and the privacy of correspondence and communication; 
however, at times the Government infringed on these rights. With some 
exceptions, government officials may enter a private residence or 
intercept or monitor private correspondence only after the issuance of 
a judicial warrant. These provisions generally are respected in 
practice outside the state of emergency region. If delay may cause harm 
to the case, prosecutors may authorize a search. Searches of private 
premises may not be carried out at night, unless the delay would be 
damaging to the case or the search is expected to result in the capture 
of a prisoner at large. Other exceptions include persons under special 
observation by the security directorate general, places anyone can 
enter at night, places where criminals gather, places where materials 
obtained through the commission of crimes are kept, gambling 
establishments, and brothels. A new law against gangs includes a 
provision allowing for wider legal wiretapping. The law states that a 
court order is needed to carry out a wiretap. However, in an emergency 
situation, a prosecutor can grant permission. The wiretap can last only 
3 months, with two possible extensions of 3 months each.
    In the provinces under emergency rule, the regional state of 
emergency governor empowers security authorities to search without a 
warrant residences or the premises of political parties, businesses, 
associations, or other organizations. The Bar Association maintains 
that it is not constitutional for security authorities in these 
provinces to search, hold, or seize without warrant persons or 
documents. Six provinces remain under ``adjacent province'' status, 
which authorizes the Jandarma to retain security responsibility for 
municipalities as well as rural areas and grants the provincial 
governor several extraordinary powers. Due to the improved security 
situation, the use of roadblocks in the southeast decreased.
    With the diminution of PKK terrorism, the formerly widespread 
practice of evacuating villages to prevent their giving aid to the PKK 
decreased substantially, although some village evacuations continued 
(see Section 1.g.).
    Some elements of society complain that a ban on the wearing of 
religious head coverings in government offices, other state-run 
facilities, and universities interfered with citizens' religious 
observance (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Since 1984 the PKK has waged a violent terrorist 
insurgency in southeast Turkey, directed against both security forces 
and civilians, mainly Kurds whom the PKK accuses of cooperating with 
the state. The police, the Jandarma, village guards, and the armed 
forces in turn have waged an intense campaign to suppress PKK 
terrorism, targeting active PKK units as well as persons they believe 
support or sympathize with the PKK. In the process, both government 
forces and PKK terrorists committed human rights abuses against each 
other and against noncombatants. According to President Demirel's year-
end address, since 1984, 25,139 PKK members, 5,882 security force 
members, and 5,424 civilians lost their lives in the fighting.
    In an effort to deny the PKK logistical support, the Jandarma 
during the year occasionally rationed food and other essentials in some 
rural areas in the emergency region. Security forces returned to 
evacuated villages and burned homes, to deny them to the PKK, and have 
shot livestock, burned forests and orchards, or denied villagers 
permission to harvest fields.
    With the waning of PKK activity in the southeast, security forces 
evacuated fewer villages than in previous years. The Government's 
stated purposes for the evacuations were to protect civilians or 
prevent PKK guerrillas from obtaining logistical support from the 
inhabitants. Villagers and other observers alleged that the security 
forces evacuated them for refusing to participate in the paramilitary 
village guard program.
    The exact number of persons forcibly displaced from villages in the 
southeast since 1984 is unknown. Human rights NGO's tend to attribute 
most rural-urban migration to evacuations, whereas some persons move to 
escape the violence or conflict-caused economic depression, or to 
pursue opportunities in western cities. Government statistics tend to 
minimize the number of persons who left against their will. Observers 
agree that 3,000 to 4,000 villages and hamlets have been depopulated. 
The Government reported that through 1999 the total number of those 
evacuated was 362,915 persons, from 3,236 villages and hamlets, of whom 
26,481 have been resettled with government assistance in 176 villages 
and hamlets. Another 61,987 have applied to return. A figure given by a 
former Member of Parliament from the region--560,000--appears to be the 
most credible estimate of those forcibly evacuated. However, observers 
in the region estimate that the total number of displaced persons is 
approximately 800,000, and a few NGO's put the number as high as 2 
million. A parliamentary committee investigated the situation in the 
southeast and concluded in 1998 that, among other things, the State was 
partly responsible for the displacements and that it had failed to 
adequately compensate villagers who had lost their homes and lands in 
the region. The European Court of Human Rights often ruled in favor of 
villagers who sued over forcible evacuations, and the Government 
continued to pay assessed damages. The major urban center of Diyarbakir 
has nearly tripled in size over 10 years, adding nearly 600,000 new 
residents. Regional officials report that flows of migrants nearly 
stopped during the year due to waning PKK activity in the countryside.
    Government programs to deal with and compensate the forcibly 
evacuated villagers remain inadequate, as is assistance to those who 
have resettled in urban areas. Many migrants continue to live in 
overcrowded, unhealthful conditions with little opportunity for 
employment. Local and provincial officials made some efforts to address 
the basic needs of migrants. In several provinces, officials provided 
looms for use by unemployed women. The Government then purchased the 
women's rugs for resale on the open market. The Government provides 
literacy, childcare, basic family health care, and vocational training 
classes for some displaced women.
    The Government noted that some displaced persons chose to resettle 
in urban areas and are receiving assistance there. There is a 
government-funded ``emergency support program'' to expedite 
resettlement in the southeast. The funds are used for rebuilding houses 
and roads, as well as for animal husbandry and beekeeping programs.
    Credible allegations were made that serious abuses by security 
forces during the course of operations against the PKK continued. The 
Government organizes, arms, and pays a civil defense force in the 
region known as the village guards. In principle local villagers' 
participation in this paramilitary militia is voluntary, but in 
practice they often have been caught between the two sides. If the 
villagers agree to serve, the PKK may target them and their villages. 
If the villagers refuse to participate, government security forces may 
forcibly evacuate their villages on security grounds or not allow them 
to return to their villages after evacuations. Village guards have a 
reputation for being the least trained and disciplined of the 
Government's security forces and have been accused repeatedly of drug 
trafficking, rape, corruption, theft, and human rights abuses. 
Inadequate oversight and compensation have contributed to this problem. 
There were credible allegations of Jandarma protecting village guards 
from prosecution for various crimes. In addition to the village guards, 
Jandarma and police ``special teams'' are viewed as those most 
responsible for abuses.
    The Government's state of emergency, renewed in Diyarbakir, 
Hakkari, Sirnak, Tunceli, and Van provinces for 4 months in November, 
imposes stringent security measures in those five southeastern 
provinces. The regional governor for the state of emergency may censor 
news, ban strikes or lockouts, and impose internal exile. The decree 
provides for doubling the sentences of those convicted of ``cooperating 
with separatists.'' Informants and convicted persons who cooperate with 
the State may receive rewards and reduced sentences. Only limited 
judicial review of the state of emergency governor's administrative 
decisions is permitted.
    In August Parliament passed legislation allowing members of 
terrorist organizations (and criminal gangs) to apply over a 6-month 
period for amnesty or reductions in sentences, as long as they provide 
useful information that helps lead to the dissolution of the 
organization. The number of persons who applied for the amnesty is 
estimated to be at least 500, most of whom already were in prison, 
although exact figures are not available. According to press reports, 
many of the applicants have obtained reductions in their sentences or 
release.
    Although schools remained open in most urban centers in the 
southeast, rapid migration led to severe overcrowding of city schools 
and chronic teacher shortages. In contrast to the national average of 
45 children per classroom, there are typically 60 to 90 children per 
classroom in eastern and southeastern provinces, and as many as 80 to 
100 in Diyarbakir. In the state of emergency region, 450 schools have 
been closed, although none were closed during the year. Past PKK 
policies, such as murdering village teachers, exacerbated the situation 
(see Section 1.a.). Although the Government continues to build boarding 
schools in the region's larger towns, these new schools have not filled 
the gap. Despite a longstanding tradition of boarding schools in the 
rural areas of the country, some ethnic Kurdish leaders expressed 
concern that the Government constructed boarding schools, rather than 
rebuild local schools, in order to accelerate the process of Kurdish 
assimilation.
    Turkish ground forces with air support conducted several operations 
during the year in northern Iraq against the PKK. The Turkish 
Government maintained that it targeted only PKK fighters in northern 
Iraq and that it respected the right of civilians in these operations. 
The Kurdistan Democratic Party cooperated with the Turkish Government 
in shutting down PKK facilities in northern Iraq. Local observers in 
northern Iraq, including NGO and other foreign humanitarian workers, 
reported no incidents of collateral damage or civilian casualties from 
these operations.
    The PKK suffered severe setbacks during the year, especially 
following the arrest, forced return to Turkey, and trial of its leader 
Abdullah Ocalan, and his subsequent death sentence. After his arrest 
and incarceration in February, the PKK carried out repeated suicide 
bomb attacks throughout the country; these included a suicide bomb 
attack in Adana in July, which injured 17 persons, and an Istanbul 
department store bombing that killed 13 persons. PKK attacks against 
civilians, military, and law enforcement personnel in the southeast 
continued but declined in number. There was a lower rate of PKK 
terrorist acts during the summer and fall than in the previous year. 
The PKK claimed that it was withdrawing from the conflict and would 
take a nonviolent path to political change. The evidence was not 
conclusive that a PKK withdrawal from Turkey had occurred; reports 
indicated that while some PKK members heeded Ocalan's call for an end 
to the armed struggle and PKK withdrawal from Turkey, others did not. 
The authorities disputed that a meaningful withdrawal was underway.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government continued 
to limit these freedoms. The Constitution leaves open the possibility 
of restrictions to these freedoms on the basis of national security-
related considerations, and the Criminal Code provides penalties for 
those who ``insult the President, the Parliament, and the Army.'' 
Numerous other provisions in various laws restrict freedom of 
expression to one degree or another: Those most frequently employed 
include Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (disseminating separatist 
propaganda) and Article 312 of the Criminal Code (incitement to racial 
or ethnic enmity). In addition prosecutors rely on Article 159 of the 
Criminal Code (concerning insults to Parliament, the army, Republic, or 
judiciary), Article 60 (insulting the Turkish Republic), Article 169 
(aiding an illegal terrorist organization), the law to protect Ataturk 
(no. 5816), and Article 16 of the Press Law to limit freedom of 
expression. The new law enacted to counter criminal organizations 
includes an article that permits the prosecution of journalists for 
``promoting'' the activities of criminal organizations, and the new 
civil servant prosecution law includes an article allowing prosecutions 
against those who falsely accuse public employees based on ``enmity, 
hatred or slandering.'' While prosecutors bring dozens of such cases to 
court each year, judges dismiss many charges brought under these laws.
    Domestic and foreign periodicals that provide a broad spectrum of 
views and opinions, including intense criticism of the Government, are 
widely available. While overall readership of the local press is not 
large for a country of 65 million inhabitants, the newspaper business 
is extremely competitive.
    Electronic media reach nearly every adult, and their influence, 
particularly that of television, is correspondingly great. According to 
the Government's Directorate General of Press and Information, in 
addition to the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation, 
there are 230 local, 15 regional, and 20 national private television 
stations, and 1,044 local, 108 regional, and 36 national radio 
stations. Other television and radio stations broadcast without an 
official license. The increasing availability of satellite dishes and 
cable television allows access to foreign broadcasts, including several 
Turkish-language private channels. Internet use is growing and faces no 
government restrictions; in fact, some banned newspapers can be 
accessed freely on the Internet. Government censorship of foreign 
periodicals is very rare.
    In September the Government passed legislation suspending for 3 
years the sentences of those convicted of freedom of expression crimes 
in the media, such as journalists, writers, and party officials who 
published articles. The Islamist opposition party Fazilet challenged 
the constitutionality of the law, because it did not apply to those who 
committed similar crimes through speech. Esber Yagmurdereli, for 
example, remained imprisoned because his conviction in 1998 was for a 
speech he gave at a 1991 HRA meeting. The law led to the release of 
over 25 persons, and the suspension of hundreds of trials. Charges are 
dropped if the journalist or writer does not commit the same crime 
again during the 3-year period; if a second offense is committed during 
this time, the suspension is revoked. Human rights advocates are 
concerned that the conditions for the suspension amount to censorship. 
Although the suspension of ongoing trials prevents new convictions, 
some journalists and writers objected to the fact that it also prevents 
possible acquittals, so they have no opportunity to clear their name or 
to fight bans imposed on their written work.
    The law makes it illegal for broadcasters to threaten the country's 
unity or national security and limits the private broadcast of 
television programs in languages other than Turkish. The High Board of 
Radio and Television (RTUK), created in 1994 to regulate private 
television and radio frequencies, monitors broadcasters and sanctions 
them if they are not in compliance with relevant laws. Parliament 
elects the RTUK members (divided between ruling and opposition parties) 
and provides its budget. Although nominally independent, the RTUK is 
subject to some political pressures.
    The RTUK penalizes private radio and television stations for the 
use of offensive language, libel, obscenity, instigating separatist 
propaganda, or broadcasting programs in Kurdish. Throughout the year, 
the RTUK penalized at least a dozen different television stations, 
usually by suspending their broadcasts for a day, for noncompliance 
with broadcast regulations. Channel 6, which criticized the 
Government's response to the devastating August 17 earthquake, was 
given a week's suspension on the grounds that its reports hurt 
confidence in, and fueled anger against, the State. This decision is 
under appeal, and the suspension had not yet occurred by year's end. 
RTUK decisions may be appealed to the provincial Administrative Court 
and then to the Council of State. The RTUK suspended a comparable 
number of radio broadcasters, for periods ranging from 1 day to 1 year, 
usually for violating laws prohibiting the broadcast of ``terrorist 
organization declarations.'' The radio station FOREKS was banned from 
broadcasting for 30 days for relaying a May British Broadcasting 
Corporation program on Kurdish issues. Reporters Sans Frontieres 
reported that 2,378 days of suspension were imposed on broadcasters 
during the year.
    Despite the Government's restrictions, the media criticize 
government leaders and policies daily. Lively debates on human rights 
and government policies were stimulated by several events, including 
Constitutional Court President Sezer's call in March for lifting 
restrictions on freedom of expression, including on language rights; 
Appeal Court President Selcuk's observation in September that the 
Constitution enjoyed ``almost zero'' legitimacy and should be replaced; 
the implications of the February capture of Ocalan for resolving the 
Kurdish issue; the Government's response to the August earthquake; and 
the European Union's designation of Turkey as a candidate member in 
December. Nevertheless, persons who write or speak out on highly 
sensitive topics, such as the role of religion in politics and society, 
the role of the military, some Kurdish issues, or the PKK, risk 
prosecution.
    Government Decree 430 gives the Interior Ministry, upon the request 
of the state of emergency regional governor, the authority to ban 
distribution of any news viewed as misrepresenting events in the 
region. In the event that a government warning is not obeyed, the 
decree provides for a 10-day suspension of operations for a first 
offense and 30 days for subsequent offenses. This and other pressures, 
such as RTUK suspensions, led to the self-censorship of news reporting 
on some issues. Some journalists say that there was less self-
censorship by reporters and editors on sensitive issues than in the 
previous year, and the nature of debate on such issues as the Kurdish 
question and changing the Constitution appeared to support this 
assessment.
    SSC prosecutors ordered the confiscation of numerous issues of 
leftist, Kurdish nationalist, and pro-PKK periodicals and banned 
several books on a range of topics. For example Nadire Mater's well-
received book based on interviews of soldiers who fought in the 
southeast was banned in June. In September the Government began a trial 
against Mater and her publisher on charges that they insulted the 
military with their book. Prosecutors closed numerous journals or 
suspended their operations during the year. For example the Istanbul 
SSC stopped the printing of Ozgur Gelecek for a month in June and 
confiscated an edition of the Islamist paper Akit for ``provoking 
enmity and hatred against the state'' in September. The police 
frequently raid offices of small leftist publications. The leftwing 
newspaper Evrensel was banned in January, and the pro-Kurdish Ozgur 
Bakis was banned in April, within the state of emergency region, 
although it was available elsewhere in the country and via the 
Internet. Distributors of Evrensel and Ozgur Bakis outside the state of 
emergency region claim regular harassment and the confiscation of their 
newspapers by the police. In April the governor of Siirt province 
closed the local weekly Guney for printing material offensive to the 
dignity of the State.
    In a highly publicized ruling in May, the Istanbul State Security 
Court sentenced Cumhuriyet columnist Oral Calislar to 13 months in jail 
for disseminating separatist propaganda in a book he wrote based on 
previously published interviews of Ocalan and Kemal Burkey, head of the 
Socialist Party of Kurdistan. Calislar planned to appeal. His sentence 
was suspended under the September law suspending sentences.
    Andrew Finkel, a contributor to several Western media outlets and a 
former columnist for Sabah, was charged in June with ``insulting the 
military'' for a 1998 article he wrote for Sabah. The charge stemmed 
from one line that contrasted the army with an ``army of occupation.'' 
Finkel's trial was suspended under the September law; Finkel publicly 
objected to being deprived of the opportunity to clear his name.
    An appellate court in December upheld the sentences against 9 
persons, including some students, who in 1996 unfurled banners in 
Parliament saying, ``No to Tuition.'' They were convicted of membership 
in an illegal organization and given sentences ranging from 10 months 
to 8 years.
    Journalists, including those from mainstream and Western media, 
were harassed periodically and subjected to police abuse while covering 
stories, particularly in the southeast. In February in Diyarbakir eight 
motorcycle police officers beat a cameraman for the mainstream NTV 
television station until he was unconscious. The police beat the 
cameraman and one other journalist with gun butts and ran over them 
with motorcycles. Earlier in the month a correspondent for Reuters was 
expelled from Diyarbakir. In April police in Istanbul beat with rifle 
butts three reporters from the daily Star, who were covering street 
skirmishes. In June police in Mardin province briefly detained a 
Turkish correspondent for several western media outlets. In September 
several police officers hit a photojournalist with the daily Radikal 
who was covering a banned demonstration in Istanbul. During the 
November review conference of the OSCE in Istanbul, several journalists 
working at leftist or pro-Kurdish publications were detained either 
from the premises of their publications or as they left the conference. 
Some of them alleged mistreatment at the hands of police.
    In December Hasan Guzel, head of the small Rebirth Party and an 
outspoken former Education Minister, began serving a 1-year sentence 
for inciting religious and ethnic enmity based on a controversial 1997 
speech.
    The Government continued to restrict the free expression of ideas 
by individuals sympathetic to some Islamist, leftist, and Kurdish 
nationalist or cultural viewpoints. HADEP political candidates were not 
allowed to enter certain areas of the state of emergency region during 
the election campaign, nor allowed to use Kurdish music.
    Abdurrahman Dilipak, a veteran columnist with the Islamist daily, 
Akit, faced multiple new charges during the year for articles 
criticizing the Government's policy, especially on religious head 
coverings and the alleged activities of a military group that 
reportedly monitors political Islam in Turkey.
    Former Chairman of the HRA Akin Birdal, jailed in June for free 
expression crimes, was released in September from prison for 6 months 
on medical grounds but faces other charges related to previous speeches 
(see Section 4). Erol Yarar, former chairman of the Islamist 
Businessmen's Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen 
(MUSIAD), was convicted in April of promoting racial, ethnic, and 
religious enmity (Article 312 of the Penal Code) for a speech he made 
in October 1997. His 1-year sentence and fine were suspended for 5 
years.
    Imprisoned since 1993, author Ismail Besikci was released in 
September under the law suspending the sentences of journalists. His 
79-year sentence on over 50 charges was based on his articles on 
Kurdish issues. He faced at least 50 more similar charges, some of 
which may be subject to suspension.
    Poet Yilmaz Odabasi, released from prison in September under the 
law suspending sentences, was sent back to prison in December for 
``insulting the court.'' During the hearing that led to his earlier 
imprisonment, he told the court ``I am ashamed to be in the same era 
and country as you.'' Since that statement was not made in the media, 
he cannot benefit from the suspension of sentences law again.
    Haluk Gerger served 10 months in prison in 1998 for an article 
published in the pro-Kurdish Ozgur Gundem and is now out of the country 
but faces imprisonment for two other convictions for similar articles. 
Can Yucel, sentenced to over 1 year's imprisonment for ``insulting the 
President,'' died in September. Editorial cartoonist Dogan Guzel was 
sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment in 1998 for insulting the state 
and armed forces but was released in September under the law suspending 
sentences.
    The 10-month sentences of Sanar Yurdatapan, a well-known musician 
and spokesman for freedom of expression, and two other members of a 
``peace working group,'' for insulting the military, were reversed by 
the Court of Appeals. Two other trials, based on articles Yurdatapan 
wrote about the military were suspended.
    Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan was released from prison in 
July after serving his 4\1/2\-month sentence for a speech he made in 
1997 that was deemed to have ``incited ethnic, racial, and religious 
enmity,'' based on Article 312 of the Penal Code. His sentence, which 
was reduced from 10 months, includes a lifetime ban from politics.
    Some HADEP members, including three religion experts, convicted of 
writing articles in a 1997 edition of the HADEP bulletin that incited 
``racial, ethnic, and religious enmity,'' were released under the law 
suspending sentences of journalists. Others remain in jail. Imprisoned 
former Democratic Party (DEP) Member of Parliament Leyla Zana's 
conviction on this charge was suspended under the same law, but she 
continues to serve a 15-year term for another conviction. Dozens of 
similar cases against former DEP Chairman Hatip Dicle (a fellow 
prisoner with Zana) for writing articles were suspended; however, he 
remains in prison serving terms for other convictions.
    Former political science professor Yalcin Kucuk, arrested in 1998 
when he returned from self-imposed exile, remains in jail on charges of 
belonging to an illegal organization; several cases against him 
continue. Many other convictions for crimes committed through 
publication were suspended under the September law, including the 
sentences of novelist Yasar Kemal, convicted in 1995, and 1,080 writers 
who supported him.
    Dogu Perincek, chairman of the Workers' Party, served 11 months in 
prison on a sentence for illegal possession of classified state 
documents, assisting a terrorist organization, and possession of 
unlicensed firearms. By law he had to resign his political position as 
chair of the Labor Party but was reelected during the year. He now 
faces two other convictions, a 1-year imprisonment for a 1994 speech 
delivered at the HRA general convention and a fine for slandering 
former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller. In December a prosecutor dropped 
charges against Perincek for ``assisting a terrorist organization.''
    Playwright Mehmet Vahi Yazar, who was sentenced in 1998 to 24 years 
in prison for ``insulting the military,'' was retried and his sentence 
was reduced to 11 years; the sentences of the four actors who performed 
his play were changed to 5 years, but they all were released in 
consideration of time served. The suspended sentence and fine imposed 
on a publisher and translator for Pencere Publishing who published a 
Turkish translation of a controversial German book were upheld. 
Journalist Ragip Duran was released in January after serving a sentence 
related to an article he wrote.
    A total of 114 intellectuals and human rights activists were 
sentenced in April to a year in prison each, on charges of ``separatist 
propaganda,'' for signing a 1993 declaration calling for a peaceful 
solution to the Kurdish conflict, according to the Anatolian and 
Reuters news agencies.
    Kurdish-language cassettes and publications are available 
commercially, although the periodic banning of particular cassettes or 
singers continued. Human rights monitors reported isolated cases of 
police detention of singers and others at weddings where Kurdish music 
was played. The Economist magazine reported that police detained Ali 
Aktas, a popular Kurdish folk singer, in September after he sang 
Kurdish songs at a concert to benefit earthquake victims. He was 
interrogated for 10 hours at Diyarbakir police headquarters and accused 
of singing political songs, which he denied. The Kurdish-language 
weekly Azadiya Welate still is banned in the state of emergency region, 
and some 10 other publications were available only on an infrequent 
basis. Potential customers are afraid to purchase Kurdish-language 
materials because the possession of such items may be interpreted as 
evidence of PKK sympathies. Kurdish-language broadcasts of news, 
commentary, or discussion are illegal throughout the country. Kurdish 
music is played on radio and television programs with certain 
restrictions. Which Kurdish songs can be played in the emergency zone 
and adjacent areas is regulated closely. The state of emergency 
regional governor frequently bans Kurdish recordings that may be played 
legally elsewhere in the country. Stations that play Kurdish songs not 
on the limited play list risk temporary bans or closure. Radio stations 
that mix small amounts of Kurdish songs into their predominantly 
Turkish broadcasting appear to face fewer problems. Kurdish music was 
banned from use in campaigning during the election period.
    Pro-PKK MED-TV was banned in the United Kingdom after pro-Ocalan 
terrorist incidents in Europe. Its successor, MEDYA-TV, broadcasts in 
Kurdish from Europe and can be received via satellite dish in the 
southeast. Another station, Kurdistan-TV, is based in northern Iraq and 
also can be received via satellite in the southeast.
    In July the European Court of Human Rights ruled on 13 cases 
dealing with freedom of expression cases in which the plaintiffs were 
jailed or fined for books, articles, or statements that they wrote or 
published on mainly Kurdish issues. The plaintiffs were convicted in 
those cases either for ``inciting ethnic hatred'' or ``disseminating 
propaganda against the indivisibility of the state'' or, in one case, 
for ``revealing the identity of officials responsible for combating 
terrorism.'' The Court found that the Government violated the 
applicants' right to freedom of expression in 11 of these 13 cases; 
denied applicants in 9 cases the right to have their cases heard by an 
independent and impartial tribunal because of the presence of military 
judges on the State Security Courts; and in 1 case violated the 
prohibition against no punishment without law. In a separate ruling in 
September, the ECHR found that the government violated a publisher's 
freedom of expression in 1989 when it convicted him of ``inciting 
ethnic hatred'' by publishing the second edition of a book entitled, 
``A Testimony to Life--Diary of a Death Under Torture.''
    A group of Turkish and Kurdish academics, politicians, and 
intellectuals (TOSAV) continued to hold discussions on the situation of 
the Kurds and possible solutions to Turkey's problems. Despite minor 
police attention, TOSAV explored explicitly nonviolent solutions within 
a democratic context. The authorities completed an inconclusive 
investigation of TOSAV for potential ``separatist'' connections and in 
March confiscated TOSAV's publication entitled ``Document of Mutual 
Understanding.''
    The Mesopotamian Cultural Center, a corporation established to 
promote Kurdish language and culture, continued limited operations 
despite a lack of official permission. Officials alleged that the 
organization is linked to the PKK. The group's centers in the southeast 
(Diyarbakir, Urfa, and Van) were shut down, while its centers elsewhere 
remained open but with very reduced activities.
    Although the Kurdish Culture and Research Foundation (Kurt-Kav) 
remained open, it was not allowed to resume Kurdish-language classes 
and remained under close police attention. Its current projects include 
scholarships for students to study Kurdish in Sweden and return to 
teach Kurdish in Turkey.
    Academic freedom otherwise generally is respected; however, there 
is believed to be some self-censorship on sensitive topics.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government often 
restricted this right in practice. The authorities may deny permission 
if they believe that a gathering is likely to disrupt public order. 
Significant prior notification of gatherings is required, and the 
authorities may restrict meetings to designated sites.
    In March the Saturday Mothers group decided to discontinue its 
weekly public gatherings in Istanbul due to police harassment and 
abuse. Since May 1995, the group, primarily women, held weekly vigils 
in which they read press announcements about relatives who inexplicably 
disappeared. Starting in August 1998 the police responded aggressively 
to each week's gathering by detaining and, on multiple occasions, 
beating participants. The group stated that such treatment continued 
through March. The police stated that the group demonstrated illegally 
for 3 years and that members of illegal organizations had infiltrated 
the gatherings (see Section 1.b.).
    Demonstrations over the right to wear Islamic-style head coverings 
while studying at state universities turned violent in May at Malatya's 
Inonu University; over 50 persons, including several police officers, 
were injured. Charges of attempting to change the constitutional order 
by force were brought against 51 persons; the maximum penalty is death. 
Their trial and those of 24 others in connection with the incident 
began in June (also see Section 2.c.).
    In March 2,474 participants in celebrations of the Kurdish holiday 
of Nevruz were detained in 11 provinces; the authorities announced 
ahead of time that most Nevruz celebrations would not be allowed. The 
HRA reported that approximately 200 persons were injured, including 
several police officers. In contrast to previous years, events on 
``World Peace Day'' (September 1) were low-key and largely peaceful, 
with minimal police interference.
    A week after the September killings of prisoners in Ankara prison, 
the police detained and beat a group trying to read a press statement 
in a public place in Istanbul. Among the detainees were the president 
of the HRF Istanbul branch and relatives of the dead prisoners. The 
next day, several dozen persons attempting to send telegrams to the 
President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Justice to protest the 
prison deaths were beaten and then detained briefly. Dr. Alp Ayan, a 
psychiatrist with the HRF Izmir Treatment and Rehabilitation Center, 
and Gunseli Kaya, who also works at the center, were among 68 persons 
being tried for ``holding an unauthorized demonstration'' for 
participating in the funeral procession of one of the prisoners killed 
in September. Ayan, Kaya, and 12 others were being held in detention 
pending their trials. Dr. Veli Lok, another representative of the Izmir 
HRF, made a statement in October that the purpose of the prosecutions 
of his colleagues might be to punish them for documenting torture and 
treating torture victims. He is being prosecuted under the Press Law 
for ``disclosing opinions about the decisions of remand by the 
courts.''
    In October ``Mothers for Peace'' delegations coming from 
Diyarbakir, Istanbul, Izmir, and Antalya were stopped by the police 
outside Ankara and turned back, according to the HRF.
    During the November OSCE summit in Istanbul, antiriot police beat, 
with truncheons and fists, and kicked 10 university students who 
attempted to read a press statement critical of the summit. One student 
told HRW that the beating grew worse on a minibus used to transport the 
detainees to the antiterror branch of the Besiktas police headquarters. 
The students are being prosecuted for holding an illegal demonstration. 
In a separate event during the summit, police forcibly dispersed a 
crowd that gathered to present a joint press statement prepared by 
human rights organizations and labor unions. Of 115 persons detained 
during the gathering and later released, 112 were charged with 
organizing and participating in an illegal demonstration.
    Six school children, between the ages of 12 and 14, went on trial 
in December in Istanbul for holding an ``unauthorized demonstration'' 
in 1998. The children held a sign that said ``We Want Teachers'' during 
a rally after no teachers came to school that day and previous days.
    In December police using truncheons forcibly dispersed a 
demonstration organized in Diyarbakir to mark the 51st anniversary of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Two days later police in 
Istanbul, Konya, Kocaeli, Urfa, Erzurum, Kirikkale, Samsun, and Bursa 
disrupted a ``human chain'' demonstration and detained as many as 300 
participants.
    The Security Administration in November issued a directive calling 
on police to keep the use of force in dispersing demonstrations to a 
minimum.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, but 
associations and foundations must submit their charters for government 
approval, a lengthy and cumbersome process. The European Court of Human 
Rights in December found that the Government violated the right to 
freedom of association of the former members of the Freedom and 
Democracy Party (OZDEP), which was dissolved in 1993 (see Section 3).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Turkey as a 
secular state and provides for freedom of belief, freedom of worship, 
and the private dissemination of religious ideas, and the Government 
generally observed these provisions in practice; however, it imposed 
some restrictions on religious minorities and on religious expression 
in government offices and state-run institutions, including 
universities.
    The Government oversees religious facilities and education through 
its Directorate of Religious Affairs (``Diyanet''). Religious 
officials, including imams, are civil servants, and the operation of 
the country's more than 70,000 mosques is regulated by the Directorate 
of Religious Affairs. Religious minorities, established under the 
Lausanne Treaty in 1923, and their affiliated churches, monasteries, 
and religious schools are regulated by a separate government agency, 
the Office of Foundations (Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu). The ``Vakiflar,'' 
an institution dating back to the Ottoman Empire, approves the 
operation of churches, monasteries, synagogues, schools, and charitable 
religious foundations, such as hospitals and orphanages.
    The population is about 99 percent Muslim, primarily Sunni. In 
addition to the country's Sunni majority, an estimated 12 million 
Alawis (an offshoot of Shi'a Islam) freely practice their faith and 
build ``Cem Houses'' (Alawi places of worship). Some Alawis allege 
discrimination in the form of failure to include any Alawi doctrines or 
beliefs in religious instruction classes. Alawis also charge that there 
is a Sunni bias in the Religious Affairs Directorate and claim that the 
Directorate tends to view the Alawis as a cultural rather than a 
religious group. However, some Sunni Islamic political activists charge 
that the secular state favors and is under the influence of the Alawis. 
The Government periodically allocates funds to the Alawi community as 
well as funding Sunni activities. However, there are no government-
salaried Alawi religious leaders, in contrast to Sunni religious 
leaders.
    The military and judiciary, with support from the country's secular 
elite, continued to wage a private and public campaign against Islamic 
fundamentalism, which they view as a threat to the secular republic 
(see Section 3).
    Tarikats (Sufi religious orders) and other mystical Sunni Islamic, 
quasi-religious, and social orders were banned in the 1920's but 
largely were tolerated until the 1997 call by the National Security 
Council for strict enforcement of the ban against Tarikats as part of 
its campaign against Islamic fundamentalism. In January five members of 
the Aczimendi Brotherhood were convicted and imprisoned for criticizing 
the secular state and advocating the imposition of Shari'a law. 
However, despite the expressions of concern by official bodies such as 
the National Security Council, prominent political and social leaders 
remain associated with Tarikats.
    Although the country is secular, religious and moral instruction in 
state primary and secondary schools is compulsory for Muslims. Upon 
written verification of their non-Muslim background, minorities 
considered by the Government to be covered by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty 
(Greek, Armenian, and Jewish) are exempted by law from Muslim religious 
instruction; they may hold their own classes. Syriac and other 
Christians whom the Government does not consider to be an official 
Lausanne Treaty minority are not exempted. Non-Muslim students who wish 
to attend such courses may do so with parental consent.
    In accordance with a 1997 law, which made 8 years of secular 
education compulsory, new enrollments in the first 8 years of the 
Islamic imam-Hatip schools (in existence since 1950) were stopped, 
although children already in those classes were allowed to finish their 
grades. The imam-Hatip schools were very popular among conservative and 
Islamist Turks as an alternative to secular public education. Under the 
law, students may pursue study at imam-Hatip high schools upon 
completion of 8 years in the secular public schools. Students who 
complete primary school may study the Koran in government-sponsored 
schools. The Government does not permit private Koran classes.
    By law religious services may take place only in designated places 
of worship. Non-Muslim religious services often take place in 
nondesignated places of worship. The Roman Catholic Church in Ankara, 
for example, is confined to diplomatic property but has not sought 
property to construct a church recently.
    Minority religions considered by the Government not to be 
recognized under the Lausanne Treaty may not acquire additional 
property for churches (beyond those predating the establishment of 
modern Turkey). Religions recognized by the Government under the 
Lausanne Treaty (Greek Orthodox, Armenian Christian, and Jewish) can 
regain lost property if there is a community need, but if they cannot 
maintain existing property, it may revert to the Vakiflar. Government 
authorities do not interfere in matters of doctrine pertaining to 
minority religions, nor do they restrict the publication or use of 
religious literature. While the Government does not recognize the 
ecumenical nature of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, it acknowledges him 
as head of the Turkish Greek Orthodox community and does not interfere 
with his travels or other ecumenical activities.
    Bureaucratic procedures and considerations relating to historic 
preservation at times have impeded repairs to religious facilities. 
Restoration or construction may be carried out in buildings and 
monuments considered to be ``ancient'' only with authorization of the 
Regional Board on the Protection of Cultural and National Wealth.
    In February 1998, the Syriac Christian community and government 
officials reached an understanding that the Syriacs could resume 
renovation of the Dayrul Umur monastery in Midyat in compliance with 
government standards for preservation of historical sites. Authorities 
had halted the renovation in 1997. In April the Syriac Christians 
received written government approval of their technical plans for the 
renovation, which was well under way at year's end.
    Under the law, religious buildings that become ``extinct'' (because 
of prolonged absence of clergy or lay persons to staff local religious 
councils or for lack of adherents) revert to government possession. 
Some non-Muslim minorities, particularly the Greek Orthodox community 
and, to a lesser extent, the Jewish community, the Armenian Orthodox 
community, and the shrinking Syriac Christian community have lost the 
use of houses of worship and other facilities. During the year an 
Armenian Church in Hatay province was deemed by authorities to be no 
longer in community use and is to revert to the Vakiflar. If such 
minorities can demonstrate a renewed community need, they may apply 
legally to recover such properties.
    The authorities monitor the activities of Eastern Orthodox Churches 
and their affiliated operations. The Ecumenical Patriarchate in 
Istanbul consistently expressed interest in reopening the seminary on 
the Island on Halki in the Sea of Marmara. The seminary has been closed 
since 1971 when the state nationalized most private institutions of 
higher learning. Under current restrictions, including a citizenship 
requirement, religious communities remain unable to train new clergy. 
However, coreligionists from outside the country have been permitted to 
assume leadership positions.
    There are no known estimates of the number and religious 
affiliation of foreign missionaries in the country. Many prosecutors 
regard proselytizing and religious activism on the part of evangelical 
Christians, and particularly Islamists, with suspicion, especially when 
such activities are deemed to have political overtones. No law 
explicitly prohibits proselytizing or religious conversions; however, 
religious groups that proselytize occasionally are subject to 
government restrictions or harassment. The police sometimes arrest 
proselytizers for disturbing the peace; courts usually dismiss such 
charges. If the proselytizers are foreigners, they may be deported, but 
generally they are able to reenter the country easily. In September 
members of a group of Protestant worshipers in Izmir were detained and 
released without charges for leading an unlicensed church service in a 
private apartment; a similar incident occurred in Istanbul in October.
    Some Turkish Christians state that they encounter harassment from 
authorities and society because they have converted to Christianity.
    Several human rights monitors and members of the Islamist Virtue 
Party (Fazilet) complained that the Government increasingly enforced a 
50-year-old ban on the wearing of religious head garments in government 
offices and other state-run facilities. Hundreds of women who wear head 
coverings have lost their jobs in the public sector as nurses and 
teachers. During the year 312 teachers, including 180 student teachers, 
lost their jobs for wearing head coverings. Women who wear head 
coverings also have been prohibited from registering for university 
courses since 1998, and 47 professors and university administrators 
were dismissed for wearing or supporting the wearing of head garments. 
The armed forces regularly dismiss individuals whose official files 
reflect participation in Islamist fundamentalist activities. Cases 
related to such dismissals are pending at the European Court of Human 
Rights.
    Hundreds of persons were detained or arrested for organizing 
protests at the beginning of the school year against the prohibition 
against wearing head coverings. For example a May demonstration 
protesting Inonu University's ban on headscarves drew thousands of 
protesters and turned violent, resulting in more than 200 arrests; 
several police officers were injured. In June 75 defendants went on 
trial in the Malatya SSC for protesting Inonu University's ban on 
headscarves: 51 defendants, including 4 women, faced the death penalty 
on charges of attempting to change the constitutional order by force; 
54 of the 75 defendants, including some who face the death penalty, are 
free pending the outcome of the trial. The charges stem from the May 
riots (see Section 2.b.).
    The case of Merve Kavakci, a newly elected Member of Parliament 
from the Fazilet Party who sought unsuccessfully to be sworn in to 
Parliament on May 2 wearing an Islamist-style headscarf, highlighted 
the continuing dispute over the ban on religious-style clothing in 
official settings. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, President Demirel, and 
the National Security Council criticized her actions as a challenge to 
the secular State. The mainstream press was also critical, but the 
Islamist-oriented media defended her actions. The personal controversy 
over Kavakci's right to wear a headscarf in Parliament became largely 
moot after Kavakci was stripped of Turkish citizenship for failing to 
notify authorities that she had acquired a foreign nationality. She 
subsequently lost her parliamentary privileges, although not her 
elective office since Parliament did not vote to remove her. At year's 
end the case remained open to legal review, and the general issue of 
headscarves in Parliament remains unresolved.
    In May the Government filed an indictment seeking the closure of 
the Islamist Fazilet Party (see Section 3).
    Although religious affiliation is listed on national identity 
cards, there is no official discrimination.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally enjoy freedom of 
movement domestically and the freedom to travel abroad; however, at 
times the Government limited some of these rights. The Constitution 
provides that a citizen's freedom to leave may be restricted only in 
the case of a national emergency, civic obligations (military service, 
for example), or criminal investigation or prosecution. As the security 
situation continues to improve in the southeast, security officials 
decreased use of roadblocks and vehicle and passenger searches.
    In October the Government did not allow a group of demonstrators to 
enter Ankara (see Section 2.b.).
    Although there has been no legal internal exile for 12 years, since 
1990 the state of emergency region's governor in the southeast has had 
the authority to ``remove from the region,'' for a period not to exceed 
the duration of the state of emergency (in place for 14 years), 
citizens under his administration whose activities ``give an impression 
that they are prone to disturb general security and public order.'' 
During the year, the governor transferred civil servants who were seen 
as a threat to security, civil servants engaged in union activities, 
and doctors reporting torture. In October, for example, 37 members of 
the teachers' union Egitim-Sen in Batman province reportedly were 
deported from the province on orders of the governor. The union's 
members in southeastern provinces frequently are alleged to be involved 
in subversive activities. The national chairman of HADEP was prevented 
from entering the emergency region during the party's preelection 
campaign season, and some other HADEP officials were prevented from 
entering certain villages.
    Turkey hosts an estimated 16 persons from Russia and 5 from the 
former Yugoslavia who are given residence permits on grounds of 
temporary refuge, with no resettlement provided by the Government. An 
additional estimated 1,671 persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina and 384 from 
Kosovo are granted a special temporary ``guest'' status. Because there 
are no visa requirements, thousands of Iranians remain in Turkey for 
extended periods.
    When Turkey ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which has the force of 
domestic law, it exercised the option of accepting the Convention's 
obligations only with respect to refugees from Europe. Although it has 
not lifted subsequently the geographic limit of its treaty obligation, 
since 1994 the Government grants temporary asylum to all those 
recognized as refugees. The government screens applicants for asylum 
and refers cases it considers bona fide to the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees. If the UNHCR believes that a non-European asylum-seeker 
meets refugee criteria, the case is submitted to other countries for 
resettlement. European refugees are given temporary residence permits, 
renewable until they achieve a permanent status.
    Furthermore, the UNHCR intervenes with government officials if it 
disagrees with their negative decisions about individual asylum claims. 
An appeal may be lodged within 15 days of a negative decision by the 
authorities. After the appeal procedure, rejected applicants are issued 
a deportation order that may be implemented after 15 days. There were 
6,605 asylum seekers during the year; the authorities rejected the 
asylum applications of some 809 persons.
    A regulation obliges asylum seekers to apply within 10 days 
(changed from 5 in early 1999) of arrival and submit proof of identity 
in order to be eligible. The time limit for registration in the 
Government's asylum program is implemented strictly and remains an 
obstacle to the full access of asylum seekers to refugee status 
determination procedures. During the year, no refugees were returned to 
a country where they feared persecution, compared with 15 in 1998 and 
continuing a steady decline since 1995; the number of asylum seekers 
returned decreased from 49 in 1998 to 46, according to the UNHCR. The 
obstacles inherent in the Government's asylum procedures lead to many 
refugees being considered as ``illegals.'' In 1998 the UNHCR considered 
that there were 83 refugees not registered with the Government; as of 
the end of 1999 there were approximately 80. The UNHCR and government 
authorities continue to work to resolve this problem and to find ways 
to allow such cases to qualify for the Government's asylum program.
    If they comply with the asylum regulation's requirements, asylum 
seekers are registered by the government and processed for eligibility 
determination. Since 1997 administrative courts have ruled that failure 
to submit an asylum claim within a fixed time limit could not be a 
reason not to address the application or grant asylum. The UNHCR has no 
information on discrimination by the Government on the basis of 
nationality. The UNHCR maintains a branch office in Ankara and field 
offices in Istanbul, Silopi, Van, and Agri.
    The mass influx of nearly 18,000 Kosovars during the year was 
deemed to come under the 1994 asylum regulation. The Government allowed 
Kosovars to enter the country freely and de facto has allowed them 
``first asylum''--to stay until they repatriate or resettle 
voluntarily. It established and operated a temporary refugee camp for 
about half of those who came. Almost all Kosovars left by the end of 
the year. The Government worked to prevent similar mass influxes from 
Iraq but allows some individuals and families to settle in or transit 
Turkey en route to permanent resettlement in Europe.
    The UNHCR held inconclusive talks with the Government aimed at 
improving reception for refugees at the Iraqi border, to ensure that 
those who cross the border have access to the asylum process. Beginning 
in September 1998, approximately 50 to 60 officials received UNHCR-
sponsored training in Antalya, Ankara, and Van, and some participants 
went on study trips to Canada and Spain. The UNHCR works with local 
partners such as the Turkish Red Crescent Society; the Association for 
Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants; and the Anatolian 
Development Foundation to integrate refugees into society.
    Turkey continues to be a transit and departure point for illegal 
migrants and asylum seekers of various nationalities en route to 
Europe, who travel in small groups utilizing land routes, boats and 
ships.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice. 
Turkey has a multiparty parliamentary system, in which national 
elections are held at least every 5 years, with mandatory universal 
suffrage for all citizens 18 years of age and over. More than 30 
political parties are active (most of them minuscule), 5 of which are 
represented in Parliament. Parliament elects the President as head of 
state every 7 years or when the incumbent becomes incapacitated or 
dies.
    In addition to these bodies, in accordance with the Constitution, 
the National Security Council (NSC), which includes both military and 
civilian government leaders, plays a significant role in shaping 
government policy.
    The Government neither coerces nor forbids membership in any 
political organization; however, the Chief Public Prosecutor may bring 
cases seeking the closure of political parties before the 
Constitutional Court, which may close them down for unconstitutional 
activities. The Chief Public Prosecutor opened cases to close two 
significant parties, Fazilet and HADEP, alleging that they were centers 
of illegal activities.
    In January the Government filed a motion with the Constitutional 
Court to close HADEP. The Chief Public Prosecutor accused HADEP of 
threatening the unity of the Turkish State, saying that it was 
controlled by the PKK. The closure could lead to the banning of some 
HADEP leaders from politics. The case was pending before the 
Constitutional Court at year's end. In August Parliament amended the 
political parties law to establish a higher standard of proof in such 
closure cases.
    Government pressure against HADEP continued. HADEP party officials 
claim that actions by the Government, in particular the state of 
emergency region governor, hindered HADEP rallies and activities in the 
period leading up to the April parliamentary elections and restricted 
HADEP's ability to reach its constituents. According to HADEP, the 
governor communicated his decision to cancel permission for a large 
rally in Diyarbakir 20 minutes before the rally was due to begin, 
leading to mass confusion and the detention of hundreds of supporters. 
HADEP's national chair was prevented from entering the mainly Kurdish 
state of emergency region during the election period, and some HADEP 
officials were barred from entering certain villages during that period 
(see also Section 2.d.). Following the elections and a drop in PKK 
terrorist violence in the summer, government pressure on HADEP eased 
somewhat: Some HADEP rallies were allowed to proceed without police 
interference, the HADEP national president was allowed to tour the 
southeast, HADEP mayors were allowed to perform their official duties 
without interference, and an Ankara State Security Court lifted 
restrictions on travel abroad against three HADEP mayors. However, some 
officials still faced harassment, court cases and hostility from some 
security officials. The year ended with police raids on HADEP offices 
in seven provinces. Some HADEP officials have been barred for years 
from international travel.
    The military and judiciary, with support from the country's secular 
elite, continued to wage a private and public campaign against Islamic 
fundamentalism, which they view as a threat to the secular republic. In 
June the National Security Council urged the new Government to offer no 
concessions in the fight against the perceived threat of radical Islam. 
The chief of the armed forces General Staff in September made a public 
statement criticizing Islamist media portrayals of the armed forces as 
hostile to religion and describing the armed forces as the 
constitutionally mandated ``fist'' protecting secularism.
    In May the Government filed an indictment seeking closure of the 
Islamist Fazilet Party for promoting antisecular activity and for 
representing the ideologies of the banned Refah Party. The indictment 
also calls for banning Fazilet's leaders from politics for 5 years and 
stripping its Members of Parliament of their seats. The case was 
pending before the Constitutional Court at year's end.
    Islamist leader Fethullah Gulen came under intense scrutiny and 
investigation for allegedly plotting to take over the Government after 
video recordings of a speech he gave were broadcast in June on 
television. Prominent Islamist political leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 
former mayor of Istanbul, was released from prison in July (see Section 
2.a.), although he remains banned from politics for life. In March an 
Ankara SSC prosecutor filed charges against a group of Islamist 
politicians, many of whom were members of the Refah Party, which was 
banned in 1998. They were charged with attempting to impose a 
``religious order'' in contravention of article 146.1 of the Penal Code 
(forcibly trying to change the constitutional order); the charges carry 
the death penalty. The case continued at year's end.
    The Democratic Mass Party (DKP) was closed in February by the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds that its party program, which 
defends Kurdish rights, included provisions ``against the indivisible 
integrity of the State.'' The case was brought by the Chief Public 
Prosecutor. Since the decision had not yet been published officially by 
year's end, party members were in legal limbo and could not form join 
another party.
    The European Court of Human Rights in December found that the 
Government had violated the right to freedom of association of the 
former members of the Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP), which was 
dissolved in 1993, less than a year after it was founded, on the 
grounds that its program sought to undermine the territorial integrity 
and secular nature of the State (see Section 2.b.).
    Reports continued of corruption and the abuse of power in the 
security forces, including ties with illegal organizations. The 
previous Yilmaz government publicly committed to investigate 
corruption; however, its failure to make tangible progress was 
criticized. Trials linked to these charges began in 1998, involving 
former Interior Minister Mehmet Agar and Member of Parliament Sedat 
Bucak, but were halted in April when both were elected to the new 
Parliament and gained automatic legal immunity (which had been lifted 
by the previous Parliament).
    There are no legal restrictions on political activity by women, the 
Constitution calls for equal political rights for men and women, and 
many women are active politically; however, women are underrepresented 
seriously in government and politics: there are only 22 women in the 
550-seat Parliament. There are no female ministers in Prime Minister 
Ecevit's 35-member cabinet and no female governors.
    There are no legal restrictions on political activity by 
minorities; however, some minorities are underrepresented in government 
and politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The nongovernmental Human Rights Association has branches 
nationwide and claims a membership of about 20,000 persons. In 1990 the 
HRA established the Human Rights Foundation, which operates torture 
rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul, Diyarbakir, and 
Adana and serves as a clearinghouse for human rights information. Other 
domestic NGO's include the Istanbul-based Helsinki Citizens Assembly, 
the Ankara-based Turkish Democracy Foundation, human rights centers at 
a number of universities, and Mazlum-Der, the Organization of Human 
Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples, which especially monitors 
Islamist issues.
    The HRA's Diyarbakir branch remains closed for the third successive 
year. The HRA's Mardin branch was ordered closed for 3 months in 
January and the Gaziantep branch for 3 months in July. Its branches in 
Bursa, Sanliurfa and Van reopened, and the HRA also opened three new 
offices. Authorities indefinitely closed Mazlum-Der's Sanliurfa and 
Malatya branches in January and May, respectively. The Mersin Migrants' 
Association (Goc-Der), which was shut down in 1998, remains closed.
    Despite the outreach of key government officials to the NGO 
community, human rights monitors, as well as lawyers and doctors 
involved in documenting human rights violations, continued to be 
harassed, particularly by security officials, for their legitimate 
activities. The Government used detention, prosecution, intimidation, 
harassment, and formal closure orders against human rights monitors. In 
June police raided the headquarters, branch offices, homes, and offices 
of the leadership of Mazlum-Der. According to Mazlum-Der, the searches 
were carried out under an Interior Ministry search warrant on the 
grounds that the NGO ``works against the republican regime.'' Its 
headquarters were searched again in August, and its bank accounts 
frozen, on the grounds that it was collecting aid illegally for 
earthquake victims.
    The harassment of lawyers involved in political cases in the 
southeast remained at approximately the same level as in 1998, but was 
substantially lower than in the mid-1990s, primarily because of the 
increased number of attorneys willing to defend politically sensitive 
cases and greater mutual support within the profession. Harassment by 
the security apparatus is less frequent and the methods used are less 
extreme. Several defense lawyers have noted that some judges and 
prosecutors are playing a positive role in trying to protect attorneys 
from harassment. However, attorneys still face criminal charges and 
other harassment, particularly if they defend clients accused of 
terrorism or illegal political activity, pursue torture cases, or seek 
prompt access to their clients (which police often view as 
interference).
    During the year, there were several cases in which attorneys were 
charged with various offenses (such as acting as couriers for members 
of illegal organizations or insulting government officials), detained, 
searched, or threatened. In Elazig a case was opened in December 
against an attorney after he publicly stated that a medical report 
showed that his client had been tortured by security officials. The 
case was opened under a provision of the new civil servants prosecution 
law, which prohibits making false accusations against public employees 
based on ``enmity, hatred or slandering.''
    After review, in September the Diyarbakir SSC repeated its previous 
decision to convict Dr. Seyfettin Kizilkan, the former president of the 
southeast Chamber of Doctors and director of Diyarbakir's largest state 
hospital, for ``assisting and sheltering an illegal organization'' 
after police allegedly found bomb materials and PKK documents in his 
home. Dr. Kizilkan and his associates maintain that the police planted 
the evidence; he remains free pending an appeal of the verdict. The 
case against Dr. Zeki Uzun, accused of aiding illegal organizations by 
providing medical reports and treatment, continued at year's end. Dr. 
Cumhur Akpinar was acquitted in December on similar charges (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Former HRA Chairman Akin Birdal was jailed in June on a conviction 
for inciting hatred and enmity in a 1996 public statement. In 
September, citing medical reasons stemming from injuries Birdal 
sustained during a May 1998 attempt on his life, the Government 
suspended Birdal's sentence for 6 months and released him for that 
period; however, Birdal faces many other charges. In February a Bursa 
penal court acquitted him of charges of ``insulting the army'' during a 
television appearance in 1997. In April the Court of Appeals upheld a 
guilty verdict against Birdal, but in December a prosecutor dropped 
charges against him for ``assisting a terrorist organization.'' In a 
separate ruling in December, the Diyarbakir SCC acquitted Birdal and 
several other HRA officials for ``disseminating separatist propaganda'' 
in connection with speeches they made in 1996. The SSC prosecutor 
appealed the verdict. Birdal still is required to serve 10 months for 
two other confirmed convictions.
    In December the Ankara SSC sentenced 10 persons and acquitted 6 
others in the attempted murder of Birdal. A former Jandarma sergeant, 
the presumed ringleader, and one other man accused of ordering and 
organizing the attack both received 19-year sentences. The two men who 
fired at Birdal received sentences of 19 and 12 years respectively, and 
two others received 19- and 10-year sentences for establishing a gang 
(the ``Turkish Vengeance Brigade'') to commit the crime. Two more 
persons, who were convicted of weapons charges and gang activities, 
received sentences of 9 years and 20 months respectively, while two 
others received 10-month suspended sentences.
    Police failed to protect HRA Chairman Husnu Ondul in November when 
he was attacked in his office by 30 to 40 members of a group known as 
the ``Families of the Martyrs,'' mainly relatives of soldiers who died 
in the conflict with the PKK. Ondul called out to police officers 
waiting outside the offices for help, but the officers replied that 
they would need permission from their superiors to intervene. An 
officer posted inside the HRA offices (since the attack on Birdal) said 
he telephoned for help but could not do anything against such a large 
crowd.
    The trial of 25 Diyarbakir lawyers entered its sixth year at the 
Diyarbakir SSC, with prosecutors in October calling for significant 
sentences against some of the defendants, who were charged in 1993-94 
with ``aiding and abetting the PKK'' and ``membership in an illegal 
terror organization.'' No credible evidence has been presented in 6 
years. Other allegations in the indictment include legal behavior such 
as filing a petition with the European Commission of Human Rights. 
Sixteen of the lawyers alleged that they were tortured while in 
incommunicado detention after their arrests. The lawyers are free 
pending trial. Human rights monitors believe that their prosecution is 
intended to punish them for representing clients unpopular with the 
Government and publicizing human rights violations in the southeast.
    All seven members of the Diyarbakir branch of the HRA were 
acquitted in May of charges that they aided the PKK. The trial, which 
began in 1995, focused mainly on the publication of the booklet 
``Emergency Situation--1992.''
    Legal proceedings against some of the organizers of the September 
1997 ``Musa Anter peace train'' ended in 1998, when the organizers were 
acquitted. A case against 12 policemen accused of torturing peace train 
detainees began in April.
    Representatives of diplomatic missions who wish to monitor human 
rights are free to speak with private citizens, groups, and government 
officials. Security police routinely place such official visitors in 
the southeast under visible surveillance in an effort to intimidate 
those they meet, although legitimate protection concerns were also an 
important consideration. Visiting foreign government officials and 
legislators were able to meet with human rights monitors. 
Representatives of international governmental organizations were able 
to visit Leyla Zana and Akin Birdal in prison, in accordance with 
Turkey's international obligations, although officials representing 
foreign governments were denied permission for such visits.
    The State Minister for Human Rights, as chair of the High Council 
for Human Rights, continued to investigate human rights abuses and to 
reach out to NGO and community leaders. The Council, composed of 
representatives from the Justice, Interior, Education, Health, and 
Foreign Affairs Ministries (along with representatives of the security 
forces), met regularly to review the human rights situation, advise the 
Government on steps for improvement, and draft appropriate legislation. 
In September State Minister for Human Rights Irtemcelik met with the 
head of the Human Rights Foundation and then organized a wider meeting 
in October with human rights groups, professional organizations, and 
the parliamentary bodies that make up the High Council.
    President Demirel met in December with human rights monitors from 
the southeast.
    Parliament established a Human Rights Commission in 1991 to oversee 
compliance with the human rights provisions of domestic law and 
international agreements, investigate alleged abuses, and prepare 
reports. Most recently the Commission undertook a review of prison 
conditions in light of the September riots (see Section 1.c.). The U.N. 
Special Rapporteur for Torture visited the country in late 1998 (see 
Section 1.c.).
    A report by the European Commission of Human Rights, released in 
September, held Turkey responsible for violations of human rights in 
Cyprus stemming from the 1974 Turkish military intervention. The 
Government of Turkey denied its responsibility. The report was to be 
referred to the European Court of Human Rights for a binding decision, 
a process that may take several years.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution proclaims Turkey to be a secular state, regards 
all citizens as equal, and prohibits discrimination on ethnic, 
religious, or racial grounds; however, discrimination remains a problem 
in several areas. The Government officially recognizes only Eastern 
Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, and Jewish adherents as minorities 
covered under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
    Women.--Spousal abuse is serious and widespread. According to the 
Family Research Institute in the Prime Minister's Office, beating in 
the home is one of the most frequent forms of violence against women. 
Despite 1998 legislation making spousal abuse illegal, the Institute 
continues to note complaints of beatings, threats, economic pressure, 
and sexual violence. In a survey of 12 provinces, physical abuse 
reportedly occurred in roughly 30 percent of families. There are 9 
shelters and 6 consultation centers for battered women; in addition, 
the Child Protection and Social Services Agency provides services to 
victims of domestic violence through its 19 social centers.
    Spousal abuse, although now illegal, still is considered an 
extremely private matter, involving societal notions of family honor. 
Few women go to the police, who in any case are reluctant to intervene 
in domestic disputes and frequently advise women to return to their 
husbands. Citizens of either sex may file civil or criminal charges for 
abuse but rarely do so.
    Laws and ingrained societal notions make it difficult to prosecute 
sexual assault or rape cases. ``Honor murders''--the killing by 
immediate family members of women who are suspected of being unchaste--
continue in rural areas, and among recent immigrants to cities, but may 
have declined due to greater public, especially media, attention. 
However, laws still exist that reduce the sentence for killings that 
are ``provoked,'' and because of further reductions for juvenile 
offenders, observers note that young male relatives often are 
designated to perform the killing.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    The Government issued a new regulation in late 1998, prohibiting 
the traditional practice of ``virginity testing,'' unless requested by 
a woman. The regulation appears to have led to a decrease in the 
practice but does not carry sanctions against the person conducting the 
testing.
    Some laws still discriminate against women. The Civil Code 
prohibits granting gender-based privileges or rights but retains some 
discriminatory provisions concerning marital rights and obligations. 
Because the husband is the legal head of household, he is authorized to 
choose the domicile and represents the conjugal unit. As parents, 
husband and wife exercise joint child rearing rights, but when they 
disagree, the husband's view often prevails. Women's groups have 
lobbied to change the Civil Code provision that the husband is the 
legal head of household. A single woman who gives birth to a child out 
of wedlock is not considered automatically to be the legal guardian of 
her child: a court decision may be required. Divorce law requires that 
the divorcing spouses divide their property according to property 
registered in each spouse's name. Because in most cases property is 
registered in the husband's name, this provision can create 
difficulties for women who wish to divorce. Under inheritance laws, a 
widow generally receives one-fourth of the estate, her children the 
rest.
    The literacy rate for women is 78 percent, compared with 94 percent 
for men, but in rural areas the rate can be as low as 50 percent for 
women. Men must serve in the army, and if they do not know how to read 
they are taught upon entry.
    Particularly in urban areas, women continue to improve their 
position, including in the professions, business, and the civil 
service; however, they continue to face discrimination to varying 
degrees. Women constitute nearly 50 percent of the work force but hold 
less than 10 percent of managerial-level positions. Women generally 
receive equal pay for equal work in the professions, business, and 
civil service jobs, although a large percentage of women employed in 
agriculture and in the trade, restaurant, and hotel sectors work as 
unpaid family help. Women may take the examination required to become 
governors or subgovernors; several have been appointed subgovernors.
    Independent women's groups and women's rights associations continue 
to increase in number, such as the Association to Support Women 
Candidates (Kader); ``The Flying Broom'' women's advocacy group; the 
Turkish Women's Union; and the Foundation for the Evaluation of Women's 
Labor. The concept of lobbying for women's rights, including greater 
elected representation, is gaining momentum. Women continue to be very 
active in ongoing debates between secularists and Islamists, especially 
with respect to the right to choose whether to wear religious head 
coverings in public places, such as government offices and 
universities.
    Children.--The Government is committed to furthering children's 
welfare and works to expand opportunities in education and health, 
including a further reduction in the infant mortality rate. The State 
Minister for Women's and Family Issues oversees implementation of the 
Government's programs for children.
    Government-provided education through the age of 14 or the eighth 
grade is compulsory. Traditional family values in rural areas place a 
greater emphasis on advanced education for sons than for daughters; the 
relatively new 8-year compulsory education requirement (implemented in 
1998) was expected to allow more girls to continue their education. In 
practice in rural Anatolia, the literacy rate for girls is very low, 
and many do not complete primary school. The literacy rate for boys, 
most of whom complete primary school, is higher. Some continue on to 
high school, for which they generally must travel or live away from 
home (see Section 1.g.).
    Although the law provides special safeguards for children in police 
custody, police officers and prosecutors frequently circumvent or 
ignore these provisions. The law stipulates that the state prosecutor 
or a designated assistant should carry out interrogations of minors and 
that minors must be provided with lawyers; however, in practice police 
and prosecutors often deny minors access to lawyers and fail to inform 
parents. Children and juveniles detained under the Anti-Terror Law also 
often are held for up to 4 days in incommunicado detention.
    Children have suffered greatly from the cycle of violence in the 
southeast. The migration--forced or voluntary--of many families, past 
terrorism against teachers, and school closings in the southeast have 
uprooted children and moved them to cities that are hard pressed to 
find the resources to provide basic, mandatory services such as 
schooling. Many cities in the southeast are operating schools on double 
shifts, with as many as 100 students per classroom (see Section 1.g.). 
The Government has built regional boarding schools to help combat this 
problem, but these are insufficient.
    Instances of child beating and abuse are reported more frequently 
than in previous years, according to women's groups. The increase 
likely is attributable to greater public awareness of the problem.
    Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--Few laws exist regarding accessibility 
to buildings and public transportation. Certain categories of employers 
are required to hire disabled persons as 2 percent of their employee 
pool, although there is no penalty for failure to comply.
    Religious Minorities.--Jews and numerous Christian denominations 
freely practice their religions and report little discrimination in 
daily life. However, some incidents still occur, and extremist groups 
or individuals target minority communities from time to time. Isolated 
incidents of desecration of Jewish and Greek Orthodox cemeteries were 
reported. No arrests have been made in the case of the 1998 arson 
attack on the Orthodox Museum at Saint Therapon or the December 1997 
bombing of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul.
    No laws prohibit religious conversion. Nonetheless, individuals 
contemplating conversion often face family and community pressures, and 
proselytizing remains socially unacceptable. Some members of religious 
minorities claim that they have limited career prospects in government 
or military service as a result of their religious affiliation.
    There are no non-Muslim senior officers in the military, according 
to a senior military official, because non-Muslims do not apply to 
attend the military academy and officers must be graduates.
    Many religious minority members, along with many in the secular 
political majority of Muslims, fear the possibility of rising Islamic 
extremism and the involvement of even moderate Islam in politics. 
Islamist journals frequently publish anti-Semitic material.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution does not 
recognize the Kurds as a national, racial, or ethnic minority, although 
they are in fact the country's largest ethnic and linguistic minority. 
There are no legal barriers to ethnic Kurds' participation in political 
and economic affairs, and many Members of Parliament and senior 
officials and professionals are Kurds; however, Kurds who publicly or 
politically assert their Kurdish identity or publicly espouse using 
Kurdish in the public domain, including a parliamentarian who listed 
``Kurdish'' as one of his foreign languages, risk public censure, 
harassment, or prosecution.
    Kurds who are long-term residents in industrialized cities in 
western Turkey were in many cases assimilated into the political, 
economic, and social life of the nation, and much intermarriage has 
occurred over many generations. Kurds currently migrating westward 
(including those displaced by the conflict in the southeast) bring with 
them their culture and village identity, but often little education and 
few skills.
    Since 1991 private spoken and printed communications in Kurdish are 
legal; however, the use of minority languages, including Kurdish, in 
television and radio broadcasts, by political parties, and in schools 
is restricted by a plethora of laws and even articles of the 
Constitution; these restrictions are invoked arbitrarily. Television 
and radio stations in the southeast occasionally play Kurdish music, 
although authorities have imposed restrictions on some songs. The State 
of Emergency regional governor frequently bans Kurdish recordings that 
may be played legally elsewhere in the country. Kurdish is widely 
spoken on the streets, especially in the largely Kurdish southeast, and 
Kurdish music recordings reportedly were widely available there despite 
some being banned. Materials dealing with Kurdish history, culture, and 
ethnic identity are available but continue to be subject to 
confiscation and prosecution under the ``indivisible unity of the 
state'' provisions of the Anti-Terror Law (see Section 2.a.). Such 
confiscations were rare during the year.
    The Government circumscribes the activities of organizations such 
as the Mesopotamian Cultural Center (MKM), a corporation with branches 
in several cities that was established to promote Kurdish language and 
culture (see Section 2.a.). There is police pressure against their 
activities, especially in the southeast, and local officials monitor 
and often interrupt their cultural events. MKM branches report that 
they were prevented from selling Kurdish-language music cassettes and 
warned against organizing cultural events.
    The Ministry of Education tightly controls the curriculum in 
schools (except foreign-language schools not part of the Turkish 
system). The small numbers of Greek-language students have little 
opportunity to continue their education in Turkey, and consequently 
many go to Greece, often never to return.
    The Romani population is extremely small, and no incidents of 
public or government harassment directed against them were reported. 
Extremist groups or individuals target minority communities from time 
to time.
    In October a pipe bomb exploded, causing damage to the Greek 
Minority High School in Istanbul.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers, except police and military 
personnel, have the right to associate freely and form representative 
unions. This right encompasses civil servants, including 
schoolteachers.
    The Constitution stipulates that no one shall be compelled to 
become or remain a member of, or withdraw from, a labor union. The law 
states that unions and confederations may be founded without prior 
authorization based on a petition to the governor of the province of 
the prospective union's headquarters. Unions are independent of the 
government and political parties. They must obtain official permission 
to hold meetings or rallies and must allow police to attend their 
conventions and record the proceedings. The Constitution requires 
candidates for union office to have worked 10 years in the industry 
represented by the union. The Supreme Court in 1998 banned the DISK-
affiliated union in the leather sector, Deri-Is, because it violated 
this article in the Constitution and prohibited it from appealing to a 
higher court. It applied to the European Court of Human Rights for 
redress. The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee on 
Freedom of Association has stated that this provision is extremely 
prejudicial to the interests of the trade unions and has urged that it 
be repealed.
    Just over 13 percent of the total civilian labor force (15 years of 
age and above) is unionized. The labor force numbers around 23 million, 
with approximately 46 percent employed in agriculture. There are four 
confederations of labor unions: The Turkish Confederation of Workers 
Unions (Turk-Is); the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-
Is); the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DISK); and the 
National Confederation (Misk). There are also 3 public employees unions 
and 27 independent unions. Unions and their officers have a statutory 
right to express their views on issues directly affecting members' 
economic and social interests.
    Prosecutors may ask labor courts to order a trade union or 
confederation to suspend its activities or to go into liquidation for 
serious infractions, based on alleged violation of specific legal 
norms. However, the Government may not dissolve a union summarily.
    The constitutional right to strike is restricted. For example, the 
Constitution does not permit strikes among civil servants, workers 
engaged in the protection of life and property, and those in the mining 
and petroleum industries, sanitation services, national defense, and 
education. The right to strike is suspended for the first 10 years in 
the 9 free trade zones (see Section 6.b.).
    Collective bargaining is required before a strike. The law 
specifies the steps that a union must take before it may strike or 
before an employer may engage in a lockout. Nonbinding mediation is the 
last of those steps. A party that fails to comply with these steps 
forfeits its rights. Unions are forbidden to engage in secondary 
(solidarity), political, or general strikes, or in slowdowns. The 
employer may respond to a strike with a lockout but is prohibited from 
hiring strikebreakers or using administrative personnel to perform jobs 
normally done by strikers. Article 42 of Law 2822, governing collective 
bargaining, strikes, and lockouts, prohibits the employer from 
terminating workers who encourage or participate in a legal strike. In 
sectors in which strikes are prohibited, disputes are resolved through 
binding arbitration.
    The Government has the statutory power under Law 2822 to suspend 
strikes for 60 days for reasons of national security or public health 
and safety. Unions may petition the Council of State to lift such a 
suspension. If this appeal fails, and the parties and mediators still 
fail to resolve the dispute, the strike is subject to compulsory 
arbitration at the end of the 60-day period. The ILO's Committee of 
Experts and the Committee on the Application of Standards regard the 
Government's application of Law 2822 as too broad, and they have called 
on the Government to limit recourse to compulsory arbitration to 
essential services in the strict sense of the term. The Government 
asserts that the law does not contradict the Committees' principles.
    From January through November there were 2 strikes in the public 
sector involving 67 workers at 3 job sites and 32 strikes in the 
private sector involving 3,216 workers at 53 job sites. During the same 
period there were also 4 lockouts in the private sector involving 931 
workers.
    Workers and civil servants throughout the country answered a call 
by the Labor Platform and held a general strike in August to protest 
the draft social security bill and the constitutional amendment 
enabling international arbitration. Workers clashed with police when 
they tried to enter Ankara's main square. Some were injured slightly 
when police dispersed the crowd. A few workers were detained. 
Government officials criticized labor leaders for escalating tensions 
and accused them of misleading the public.
    After several meetings of the Economic and Social Council (ESK) at 
which top union leaders and government representatives failed to reach 
an agreement on the proposed change to the national retirement age 
(from 43 to 60 for men and from 38 to 58 for women), trade unions 
staged peaceful demonstrations in major cities on July 6 to protest 
government draft legislation on social security. The legislation passed 
in September, amid widespread protests by labor leaders.
    Textile firms avoided strike action by some 70,000 textile workers 
on January 12, when employers agreed to a 45 percent pay increase for 
the first half of 1999 and an additional 30 percent raise for the 
second half. However, 9,000 to 11,000 textile workers belonging to the 
DISK union struck for a day on January 12. The strike ended when DISK 
signed an agreement with employers containing the same wage increases.
    Some labor union members faced government limits on freedom of 
speech and assembly (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.), while some civil 
service organizations continued to demonstrate for the right to strike 
and for higher salaries. Legislation providing the right to strike for 
civil servants was introduced in the last parliamentary session but was 
not adopted. Civil servants currently have the right to organize and 
engage in collective bargaining.
    All defendants were acquitted in the trial, begun in 1996, against 
Turk-Is Chairmanship Council officials who were charged with violating 
the associations law when Turk-Is announced support for political 
parties during the 1995 election. No action has been taken in a second 
trial against Turk-Is officials charged with holding illegal 
demonstrations in 1995 to protest a deadlock in collective bargaining.
    With government approval, unions may and do form confederations and 
join international labor bodies, as long as these organizations are not 
hostile to Turkey, or to freedom of religion or belief. The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), of which 
Turk-Is had been an affiliate for years, approved DISK as an affiliate 
in 1992; Hak-Is became a member in 1997.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All industrial 
workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and most 
industrial and some public sector agricultural workers are organized. 
The law requires that, in order to become a bargaining agent, a union 
must represent not only 50 percent plus 1 of the employees at a given 
work site, but also 10 percent of all the workers in that particular 
industry. This 10 percent barrier has the effect of favoring 
established unions, particularly those affiliated with Turk-Is, the 
confederation that represents nearly 73 percent of organized labor.
    The Ministry of Labor reportedly manipulated membership figures to 
prevent unions from acquiring bargaining rights or to rescind such 
rights. The ICFTU reports that, as a result of the law, workers in many 
sectors of economic activity are not covered by a collective agreement.
    The ILO has called on Turkey to rescind this 10 percent rule, 
stating that it violates ILO Convention 98, which Turkey ratified in 
1952. However, both Turk-Is and the Turkish Employers' Organization 
favor retention of the 10 percent rule, since each confederation has an 
established membership area and does not want the status quo upset. In 
1994 the government informed the ILO Committee on the Application of 
Standards that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security proposed to 
remove the 10 percent numerical restriction and that it had 
communicated its proposal to the social partners. The ILO took note of 
the government's statement that it continued to study removal of this 
requirement despite objections from employer and worker organizations. 
However, since then the Government has taken no further action.
    The law on trade unions stipulates that an employer may not dismiss 
a labor union representative without rightful cause. The union member 
may appeal such a dismissal to the courts, and if the ruling is in the 
union member's favor, the employer must reinstate him and pay all back 
benefits and salary. These laws generally are applied in practice.
    The ILO has urged the Government to take the necessary measures to 
ensure that workers have effective protection against antiunion 
discrimination. Some private sector employers continued to try to 
eliminate unions. The DISK trade union confederation reports that since 
January 1996 some 40,000 trade union members were fired.
    The continuing state of emergency in the southeast has resulted in 
restrictions on labor organizations in five provinces. A law enacted in 
1984 provides for the establishment of free trade zones, which are 
intended to attract domestic and especially foreign investment and 
promote international trade. There are nine such zones operating in 
Mersin, Antalya, the Aegean region, Trabzon, Istanbul (2), Eastern 
Anatolia, Mardin, and Rize. Union organizing and collective bargaining 
are permitted in the zones. However, the right to strike is suspended 
for the first 10 years of operation of a particular business in the 
zone. In the meantime, labor disputes that cannot be settled by the 
parties are subject to compulsory arbitration. Workers inside the zones 
are paid in foreign exchange rather than Turkish currency, giving them 
a hedge against inflation.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
statutes prohibit compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children, and the Government generally enforces these provisions in 
practice; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of 
forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution and labor laws forbid the full-time 
employment of children younger than age 15, with the exception that 
those 13 and 14 years of age may engage in light, part-time work if 
enrolled in school or vocational training. The Constitution also 
prohibits children from engaging in physically demanding jobs such as 
underground mining and from working at night. The Ministry of Labor 
effectively enforces these laws only in large-scale industrial and 
service sector enterprises.
    Child labor is widespread. According to a September report 
published by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 8.5 percent of 
children between the ages of 6 and 14 years were engaged in some form 
of economic activity and 23.9 percent were engaged in domestic labor. 
Child labor is used most often in small-sized enterprises. According to 
official data, 87 percent of working children are employed by small-
sized enterprises having 1 to 9 workers, 7 percent work in medium-size 
enterprises (10 to 24 workers), and 6 percent are employed by large-
scale enterprises (more than 25 workers).
    In practice many children work because families need the 
supplementary income. An informal system provides work for young boys 
at low wages, for example, in auto repair shops. Girls rarely are seen 
working in public, but many are kept out of school to work in 
handicrafts, especially in rural areas. The bulk of child labor occurs 
in rural areas and often is associated with traditional family economic 
activity, such as farming or animal husbandry. It is common for entire 
families to work together to bring in the harvest.
    The gradual elimination of child labor is a national priority. The 
seventh 5-year development plan commits the Government to enact 
legislation to restrict further child labor and to adopt legislation to 
conform with relevant international conventions. The Government 
recognizes the serious problem of child labor and works with the ILO to 
document its extent and to determine solutions.
    The Ministry of Labor, the ILO's International Program on the 
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) government partner, actively has been 
combating child labor since 1992, when it established a child labor 
unit and trained Ministry of Labor inspectors specifically in child 
labor issues. In 1996 the government and the ILO signed an agreement to 
extend the IPEC program until December 2001.
    With the introduction in 1998 of the 8-year compulsory education 
program (previously, 5 years were compulsory), the Government expected 
the number of child workers to be reduced significantly, since children 
are required to attend school until age 14. Small enterprises prefer 
child labor because it is cheaper and provides practical training for 
the children, who subsequently are preferred for future employment in 
the same workplace. If children employed in these businesses are 
registered with a Ministry of National Education training center, they 
go to the center once a week for training, and the centers are obliged 
by law to inspect their workplaces. Currently there are 318 centers 
located in 80 cities. These centers provide apprenticeship training in 
86 occupations. Only 22.8 percent of working children take advantage of 
these schools.
    Labor inspectors only cover areas that are defined in the labor 
laws. Many children are working in areas that are not covered by labor 
laws, such as agriculture or the informal economy, and are therefore 
beyond the reach of the inspectorate.
    The Constitution prohibits compulsory labor, including that 
performed by children, and the laws generally are enforced; however, 
trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a 
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor is obliged 
legally to set minimum wages at least every 2 years through a minimum 
wage board, a tripartite government-industry-union body. In recent 
years, it has done so annually. However, during the year there were two 
adjustments: The nominal minimum wage was increased in January by 30 
percent and again in July by 20 percent, compared with an annual 
inflation rate of nearly 69 percent. Public workers who are part of 
collective labor agreements also received an inflation-indexed increase 
and a 5 percent prosperity rate increase. The monthly gross minimum 
wage rates, which became effective in August, were approximately $199 
(93.06 million lira) for workers over age 16, and $177 (79.56 million 
lira) for workers under 16.
    The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. It would be difficult for a single worker, and 
impossible for a family, to live on the minimum wage without support 
from other sources. Most workers earn considerably more. Workers 
covered by the Labor Law, who constitute about one-third of the total 
labor force, also receive a hot meal or a daily food allowance and 
other fringe benefits that, according to the Turkish Employers' 
Association, make basic wages alone account for only about 37.3 percent 
of total compensation.
    The Labor Law sets a 45-hour workweek, although most unions have 
bargained for fewer hours. The law prescribes a weekly rest day and 
limits the number of overtime hours to 3 a day for up to 90 days in a 
year. The Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor effectively 
enforces wage and hour provisions in the unionized industrial, service, 
and government sectors, which cover about 12 percent of workers.
    The law mandates occupational health and safety regulations, but in 
practice the Government does not carry out effective inspection and 
enforcement programs. Law 1475 allows for the shutdown of an operation 
if a five-person committee, which includes safety inspectors, employee, 
and employer representatives, determines that the operation endangers 
workers' lives. In practice financial constraints, limited safety 
awareness, carelessness, and fatalistic attitudes result in scant 
attention to occupational safety and health by workers and employers 
alike. The law sets out procedures under which workers may remove 
themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Government deals with the problem 
of trafficking in persons through laws relating to prostitution and 
illegal immigration. The Ministries of Justice and the Interior are 
responsible for the problem, and the police, especially the immigration 
and organized crime authorities, enforce antitrafficking laws. Under 
the Penal Code, it is illegal to abduct and detain a woman or child. 
However, this law relates more to the old custom of kidnaping a bride, 
in which punishment is suspended if adbuctor and abductee get married. 
A further provision prohibits enticement to prostitution; however, 
penalties are light (up to 2 year's imprisonment). A further article of 
the Penal Code makes it a crime to send a prostitute from one place to 
another by force or fraud. These laws are the only statutes relevant to 
trafficking in persons.
    Turkey is a major destination and transit country for trafficking 
in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution. The 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and domestic NGO's 
stated that most trafficked women in the country are from Albania, 
Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. Arrests (and in most cases, 
deportations) of nationals from Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine rose from 
6,700 in 1998 to approximately 11,000 in 1999. In 1997 alone, the 
country deported 7,000 Romanian women. African and Asian women use the 
country as a transit point to other countries in Europe.
    Organized crime groups appear to be the primary trafficking 
organizations. The Ministry of the Interior's organized crime 
department is responsible for combating trafficking problems. According 
to NGO's, victims of trafficking remain without assistance and the 
trafficking cycle continues. Many women and girls come to the country 
believing that they have legitimate work as models, entertainers, 
governesses, or translators. In some cases, girls from Romanian 
orphanages have been kidnaped. One NGO reported in the fall of 1998 
that there were three or four hotels in a single block in Istanbul 
where women were housed and allowed out only in a group under guard to 
go to work as prostitutes in private clubs. Other NGO's reported that 
some groups of women deported were robbed in Bulgaria and forced to 
work as prostitutes there. Some of the recruitment in source countries 
was done by former prostitutes, who appeared to the victims of 
trafficking to be recruiting for legitimate work.
    Once in the country, the trafficked women and girls are in debt 
bondage to their traffickers, who are members of the Mafia (mainly 
Russian). Women who attempt to escape often are beaten, gang-raped, or 
killed. Since 1997 there has been more transit activity through the 
country to Western Europe, perhaps stemming from the fact that the 
Government banned casinos that year. The Government addressed this 
problem with laws relating to illegal migration and unregistered 
prostitution; registered prostitution is legal.
    Reportedly there is almost no trafficking in Turkish women or 
girls. There were no reports of trafficking in children for the purpose 
of forced labor; legislation in this area addresses the issue (see 
Section 6.d.).
    At year's end, there was little interagency cooperation in dealing 
with the problem of trafficking. According to a leading women's NGO, 
Ka-Der, representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and 
Health, among other ministries and NGO's, met in October to discuss the 
issue of trafficking. The group was not formalized and did not meet 
again.
    The Government does not provide any formal protection, aid, or 
education to victims of trafficking. Since the women being trafficked 
are not usually from Turkey, preventive education is less applicable. 
The country has nine government-funded women's shelters for a 
population of 65 million people; there are no NGO-run women's shelters. 
The shelters are open to women regardless of citizenship.
    In 1998 and 1999, teams from Ukraine and Moldova filmed educational 
documentaries designed to discourage women and girls from coming to 
Turkey. The IOM reports that the teams received extensive cooperation 
from the authorities, especially from the police, and filmed graphic 
stories about the situation of female trafficking victims.
                                 ______
                                 

                              TURKMENISTAN

    Turkmenistan, a one-party state dominated by its president and his 
closest advisers, made little progress in moving from a Soviet-era 
authoritarian style of government to a democratic system. The flawed 
December parliamentary elections and the passage of a law exempting 
President Saparmurat Niyazov from term limits were further backward 
steps. Niyazov, head of the Turkmen Communist Party since 1985 (renamed 
the Democratic Party in 1992) and President of Turkmenistan since its 
independence in 1991, legally may remain in office until his death. 
Niyazov retained his monopoly on power, and the Democratic Party, the 
renamed Communist Party, retained its monopoly on power; the Government 
registered no parties during the year and continued to repress all 
opposition political activities. Emphasizing stability and gradual 
reform, official nation-building efforts focused on fostering Turkmen 
nationalism and the glorification of President Niyazov. The 50-member 
unicameral Parliament (Mejlis) has no genuinely independent authority, 
and in practice the President controls the judicial system.
    The Committee on National Security (KNB) has the responsibilities 
formerly held by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB); namely, 
to ensure that the regime remains in power through tight control of 
society and discouragement of dissent. The Ministry of Internal Affairs 
directs the criminal police, which works closely with the KNB on 
matters of national security. Both forces committed serious human 
rights abuses.
    Turkmenistan is largely a desert with cattle and sheep raising, 
intensive agriculture in irrigated areas, and huge oil and gas 
reserves. Its economy remains dependent on central planning mechanisms 
and state control, although the Government has taken a number of small 
steps to make the transition to a market economy. Agriculture, 
particularly cotton cultivation, accounts for nearly half of total 
employment. Gas, oil and gas derivatives, and cotton account for almost 
all of the country's export revenues. The Government is proceeding with 
negotiations on construction of a new gas export pipeline across the 
Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey, and also is 
considering shipments through Iran and Afghanistan.
    The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor. The 
Government continued to commit serious human rights abuses, and the 
authorities in particular severely restricted political and civil 
liberties. Citizens do not have the ability to change their government 
peacefully. One political prisoner died in custody under suspicious 
circumstances. Security forces continued to beat and otherwise mistreat 
suspects and prisoners, and prison conditions remained poor and unsafe. 
Both the criminal police and the KNB operate with relative impunity and 
abuse the rights of individuals as well as enforce the Government's 
policy of repressing political opposition. Arbitrary arrest and 
detention, prolonged pretrial detention, unfair trials, and 
interference with citizens' privacy remained problems. In January 
following a commitment by President Niyazov in May 1998, the Government 
released dissident Gulgeldi Annaniyazov. The Government severely 
restricts freedom of speech and does not permit freedom of the press. 
The Government completely controls the media, censoring all newspapers 
and rarely permitting independent criticism of government policy or 
officials. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and 
association. The Government imposes restrictions on nonregistered 
religious groups. The law on religion, amended most recently in 1996, 
reaffirmed a number of important religious freedoms but also tightened 
government control of religious groups. The requirement that religious 
organizations have at least 500 Turkmen citizens as members in a given 
locality to be registered legally has prevented all but Sunni Muslims 
and Russian Orthodox Christians from legally establishing themselves. 
The Government imposes some restrictions on freedom to travel abroad. 
Domestic violence against women is a problem, and women experience 
societal discrimination. The Government generally gave favored 
treatment to men over women and to ethnic Turkmen over minorities.
    In January the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) opened an office in Ashgabat.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--In September 
political prisoner and Russian citizen Khoshali Garayev was found 
hanged in his cell in the maximum security prison in Turkmenbashi. The 
Government has rejected requests from the Russian Government and 
international human rights organizations for an investigation into the 
suspicious nature of Garayev's death (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The 1992 Constitution makes torture or other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment illegal; however, there were widespread 
credible reports that security officials frequently beat criminal 
suspects and prisoners and often used force to obtain confessions. 
There were credible reports that political prisoners are singled out 
for cruel treatment. Security forces also used denial of medical 
treatment and food, verbal intimidation, and placement in unsanitary 
conditions to coerce confessions. Members of Jehovah's Witnesses 
reportedly were beaten while in police custody in September (see 
Section 2.c.).
    Prison conditions are poor, and prisons are unsanitary, 
overcrowded, and unsafe. Food is poor, and infectious diseases are 
rampant. Facilities for prisoner rehabilitation and recreation are 
extremely limited. Some prisoners have died due to overcrowding, 
untreated illnesses, and lack of adequate protection from the severe 
summer heat.
    In September a political prisoner was found hanged in his cell 
under suspicious circumstances (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.).
    The Government does not permit unrestricted independent monitoring 
of prison conditions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The Constitution states that citizens ``have 
the right to freedom of belief and the free expression thereof and also 
to obtain information unless it is a state, official, or commercial 
secret.'' However, in practice, those expressing views critical of or 
different from those of the Government have been arrested on false 
charges of committing common crimes (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
    In November the Government sentenced Parahat Yklimov, the brother 
of Sapar Yklimov, a former government official who lives outside the 
country, to 11 years' imprisonment for financial misconduct. Prior to 
his arrest, he reportedly had been warned that his brother should cease 
his political activities abroad. His family reportedly was told by 
internal security organizations that he would be released if his 
brother returned to the country.
    In November the Government arrested Ramil Galimov, a member of a 
Jehovah's Witness group in Kizyl-Arvat who has dual Russian-Turkmen 
citizenship. After imprisoning him for 2 weeks, the Government 
reportedly forced him to leave on a train for Russia but retained his 
Turkmen passport.
    The precise number of political detainees held at year's end was 
unknown. Pretrial detainees are held 6 to 8 months on the average. 
According to government sources, more than 22,000 persons were released 
from prison under presidential amnesties in January, February, and 
March (see Sections 1.e and 3). Among those amnestied during the year, 
the Government reportedly set free 700 jailed foreigners. Foreign 
diplomats received credible reports that prison officials requested 
bribes to implement releases under these amnesties.
    Forced exile was not known to have occurred during the year. In 
November President Niyazov announced plans to deport to remote areas 
any government officials who were found to have committed crimes. 
President Niyazov proposed that the officials, accompanied if they 
desired by their families, would work off their sentences in exile. 
Almost all prominent political opponents of the Government have chosen 
to move to either Russia, Sweden, Norway, or the Czech Republic for 
reasons of personal safety; none returned this year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for 
judicial independence; however, in practice, the judiciary is not 
independent. The President's power to select and dismiss judges 
subordinates the judiciary to the Presidency. The President appoints 
all judges for a term of 5 years. The appointments are without 
legislative review, except for the Chairman (Chief Justice) of the 
Supreme Court, and the President has the sole authority to remove 
appointees from the bench before the completion of their terms.
    The court system has not been reformed since the Soviet era. It 
consists of a Supreme Court, 6 provincial courts (including 1 for the 
city of Ashgabat only), and, at the lowest level, 61 district and city 
courts. A Supreme Economic Court hears cases involving disputes between 
state-owned enterprises and ministries, and, increasingly, commercial 
disputes. The Government abolished all military courts in 1997. 
Criminal offenses committed by members of the armed forces now are 
tried in civilian courts under the authority of the Office of the 
Prosecutor General.
    The law provides for the rights of due process for defendants, 
including a public trial, the right to a defense attorney, access to 
accusatory material, and the right to call witnesses to testify on 
behalf of the accused. In practice authorities often deny these rights, 
and there are no independent lawyers, with the exception of a few 
retired legal officials, available to represent defendants. When a 
person cannot afford the services of a lawyer, the court appoints one. 
A person may represent himself in court.
    Lower courts' decisions may be appealed, and the defendant may 
petition the President for clemency. The President released over 22,000 
inmates from prison in connection with general amnesties in January, 
February, and March (see Section 1.d. and 3.). In practice adherence to 
due process is not uniform, particularly in the lower courts in rural 
areas. Even when due process rights are observed, the authority of the 
government prosecutor vis-a-vis the defense attorney is so great that 
it is very difficult for the defendant to receive a fair trial. The 
Government denied foreign diplomats access to several supposedly open 
court proceedings.
    At year's end, the Government held at least two political prisoners 
(Mukhametkuli Aimuradov and Pirimguli Tanrykuliev). In January the 
Government released Gulgeldi Annaniyazov and Gurbanmuran Mammetnazarov 
as part of a general amnesty. They were the two remaining political 
prisoners held in connection with a July 12, 1995 demonstration over 
living conditions, in which several thousand persons participated. 
Annaniyazov was in grave physical condition in May 1998 and his release 
fulfilled an earlier commitment by President Niyazov for his release. 
Mammetnazarov had been sentenced to an additional 1 year in May 1998 
for possession of narcotics found in his prison cell. In September 
Russian citizen Khoshali Garayev, one of two persons convicted in 
secret before the Supreme Court in 1995 for antigovernment activities 
and planning terrorist actions against government officials, was 
discovered hanged in his cell at the maximum security prison in 
Turkmenbashi. The Government rejected all requests for an investigation 
into the circumstances surrounding Garayev's death. In December 1998, 
he and Mukhamedkuli Aimuradov were sentenced to additional concurrent 
terms of 18 years for allegedly attempting to escape from this prison.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of protection 
from arbitrary interference by the State in a citizen's personal life; 
however, government authorities violate this right. There are no legal 
means to regulate the conduct of surveillance by the state security 
apparatus, which regularly monitors the activities of opponents and 
critics of the Government. Security officials use physical 
surveillance, telephone tapping, electronic eavesdropping, and the 
recruitment of informers. Critics of the Government, and many other 
people, report credibly that their mail is intercepted before delivery.
    The Government no longer restricts citizens' ability to obtain 
foreign newspapers. A wide variety of Russian and Western newspapers 
are available.
    In the past, the authorities have dismissed children from school 
and removed adults from their jobs because of the political activities 
of relatives. Internal security organizations reportedly pressured 
relatives of a former government official who left the country to 
convince him to return (see Section 1.d.). The relatives of a democracy 
advocate convicted on charges of embezzlement lost a government job and 
access to the state-run university (see Section 2.b.). The authorities 
also threaten supporters of opposition political movements with loss of 
employment and homes (see Section 2.b.). During the year, the 
Government forced many citizens from their homes on short notice in 
order to make way for urban renewal and renovation projects. Some of 
those who built homes without formal government permission were not 
offered alternate accommodations despite their length of occupancy or 
degree of hardship. Citizens evicted from homes built with formal 
permission could claim compensation only if they posted a bond worth 15 
percent of the value of their destroyed home. Compensation generally 
fails to equal the value of the property taken.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to hold personal convictions and to express them freely; however, 
in practice, the Government severely restricts freedom of speech and 
does not permit freedom of the press. Criticism of the Government can 
lead to personal hardship, including loss of opportunities for 
advancement and employment.
    The Government completely controls radio and television; it funds 
almost all print media. The Government censors newspapers and uses 
Turkmen language newspapers to attack its critics abroad; the Committee 
for the Protection of State Secrets must approve prepublication 
galleys. The two nominally independent newspapers established in 1997 
under presidential decree, Adalat (Justice) and Galkynysh (Revival), 
are no longer even nominally independent. Russian-language newspapers 
from abroad are available by subscription, and some Russian and other 
foreign newspapers are also available in several Ashgabat hotels. 
Owners of satellite dishes have access to foreign television 
programming, and Internet access is available as well; however, 
satellite dishes and Internet access remain so expensive that they are 
out of reach for the average citizen.
    The tri-language daily Ashgabat has dropped its English and Russian 
sections in June and now is printed in Turkmen only. The Government 
also ended the publication of Golos Turkmenbashi, the Russian language 
daily in the city of Turkmenbashi, the city with the highest 
concentration of ethnic Russians in the country.
    In order to regulate printing and copying activities, the 
Government ordered in February 1998 that all publishing houses and 
printing and copying establishments obtain a license and register their 
equipment.
    The Government prohibits the media from reporting the views of 
opposition political leaders and critics, and it never allows even the 
mildest form of criticism of the President in print. Criticism of 
government officials sanctioned by the President is commonplace. The 
Government has subjected those responsible for critical foreign press 
items to threats and harassment.
    In January the Government arrested human rights and democracy 
advocate Vyacheslav Mamedov for remarks on a Russian radio broadcast 
attributed to him that were critical of the Government's treatment of 
ethnic Russians. Mamedov was released in February but remains under 
investigation, and his unregistered nongovernmental organization was 
shut down. In February the Government deported a Moscow-based human 
rights researcher, Aleksandr Petrov of Human Rights Watch, for 
distributing a human rights report critical of the Government; in March 
it detained and deported Russian writer Nikolai Mitrokhin, the coauthor 
of the report (see Section 4).
    On January 29, officers of the National Security Committee broke up 
an Ashgabat gathering of journalists at which participants were 
expected to announce the formation of an Independent Journalists' 
Association. The officers recorded the names of those in attendance and 
detained five organizers of the meeting.
    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent Yoshan Annakurbanov 
left the country in August 1998 while under investigation for allegedly 
attempting to smuggle ``military secrets'' out of the country and now 
lives abroad. In July the government-controlled press attacked him for 
his continued Radio Liberty reports critical of the Government. In 
December the Government seized his home and fired his relatives from 
their jobs at the state television and radio company.
    Intellectuals have reported that the security organs have 
instructed them to praise the President in their art and have warned 
them not to participate in receptions hosted by foreign diplomatic 
missions. The Minister of Culture attends rehearsals of all theater 
productions to ensure that they do not contain antigovernment or 
antipresidential content. The Ministry of Culture must approve plays 
before they open to the public.
    The Government also restricts academic freedom. It does not 
tolerate criticism of government policy or the President in academic 
circles, and it discourages research into areas it considers 
politically sensitive, such as comparative law, history, or ethnic 
relations. The government-controlled Union of Writers has in the past 
expelled members who have criticized government policy; libraries have 
removed their works.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
allows for peaceful assembly; however, the Government restricts this 
right in practice. It does not permit peaceful demonstrations organized 
by alleged critics and in 1995 dispersed the first peaceful protest 
rally in years (see Section 1.e.), and convicted a number of persons 
for their participation. Permits are required for public meetings and 
demonstrations. There were reports of spontaneous demonstrations, for 
example over bread prices, in the past, but there were no reports of 
demonstrations during the year.
    The Constitution allows for freedom of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice. Unregistered organizations 
with political agendas are not allowed to hold demonstrations or 
meetings. No political groups critical of government policy have been 
able to meet the requirements for registration. The Government uses 
laws on the registration of political parties to prevent the emergence 
of potential opposition groups. At present the only registered 
political party is the Democratic Party, the former Turkmen Communist 
Party.
    Social and cultural organizations without political aims are 
allowed to function, but often have difficulty registering. During the 
year, the Government reportedly registered only seven nongovernmental 
organizations, all of which involved sports clubs. Theoretically, 
citizens have the freedom to associate with whomever they please. 
However, the authorities have fired or threatened to fire supporters of 
opposition movements from their jobs, removed them from professional 
societies, and even threatened them with the loss of their homes. In 
addition some citizens with links to foreigners are subject to official 
intimidation. In July the Government arrested former parliamentarian 
and democracy advocate Pirimguli Tanrykuliev on charges of embezzlement 
after he discussed forming a new political party with Western 
diplomats. On August 14 the Government convicted him, sentenced him to 
8 years in prison, and stripped him of his medical credentials. Shortly 
before his arrest, his daughter lost her government job and his 
youngest son was removed from the list of those accepted into the 
state-run university.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion and does not establish a state religion; however, the 
Government imposes restrictions on some religious groups. Citizens are 
overwhelmingly Muslim, but Islam does not play a dominant role in 
society, in part due to 70 years of Soviet rule. The Government pays 
the salaries of Muslim clerics.
    There is no state religion, but a modest revival of Islam has 
occurred since independence. The Government has incorporated some 
aspects of Muslim tradition into its efforts to define a Turkmen 
identity, and it gives some financial and other support to the Council 
on Religious Affairs, which plays an intermediary role between the 
government bureaucracy and religious organizations rather than actively 
promoting interfaith dialog.
    While it affirms a number of important religious freedoms, the Law 
on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which was amended 
in 1995 and again in 1996, also provides for significant government 
control of religion. Religious congregations are required to register 
with the Government and must have at least 500 Turkmen citizens over 
the age of 18 as adherents to be registered. This requirement has 
prevented all but Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox Christians from 
setting up legal religious organizations. Moreover, the Government 
applies this 500-member standard on a local and regional basis. For 
example, a representative of a major Christian religious group was told 
in 1998 that the group would have to have 500 adherents in Ashgabat to 
be registered there, and another 500 in the city of Turkmenbashi to be 
registered there.
    This restriction also has caused problems for a number of minority 
religions, including the Baha'i Faith, which was registered by the 
Government in 1994 only to be deregistered in 1997 when the threshold 
was raised to 500 adherents. Members of the Baha'i Faith have been 
prevented from conducting services since 1997 and have been questioned 
by internal security representatives for holding private prayer 
meetings in their homes. The local Baha'i community in Ashgabat was 
able to open its center for 1 day in March to celebrate the Faith's 
Nowruz (spring) holiday. In January the Armenian community in 
Turkmenbashi applied to local authorities to use a church appropriated 
during the Soviet era as a cultural center pending registration as a 
religious organization; but at year's end, it has not yet received any 
reply. In May President Niyazov promised to permit registration of 
almost all religious groups by September but the Government took no 
action by year's end. No new religious groups were registered and, 
despite promises by senior officials, the Halk Maslahaty (People's 
Council) did not reduce the 500 person threshold.
    While protected by law, proselytizing by ``foreign'' (that is, 
other than Russian Orthodox or Sunni Muslim) religious groups can incur 
official displeasure. Government permission is required for any mass 
meetings or demonstrations for religious purposes. The Government also 
restricts the travel of clergy or members of religious groups to the 
country. Islamic religious literature is distributed through the 
mosques. Orthodox churches are permitted to offer religious literature. 
Unregistered religious groups face government harassment if they 
attempt to meet or distribute religious literature. Bibles shipped by 
the Seventh-Day Adventists in 1998 from neighboring Uzbekistan were 
confiscated at the border. According to the Brussels-based NGO Human 
Rights Without Frontiers, government authorities called in more than 
100 citizens for questioning during the first week of May, apparently 
in connection with a mounting crackdown against local Christians and 
churches. The citizens reportedly were interrogated about their 
contacts with various foreign-nationality Christians residing in the 
country.
    In June representatives of internal security organizations visited 
the Baha'i center in Ashgabat as part of the Government's attempt to 
control the activities of unregistered religious groups and warned its 
members not to distribute religious materials. In June, July and 
August, congregations of Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and 
Pentecostalists were harassed by government officials, who seized 
religious materials and instructed them to discontinue their 
activities, threatening them if they did not. In August Shageldi 
Atakov, a member of the Baptist faith, was sentenced to 4 years in 
prison and fined $12,000 (an astronomical sum considering average wages 
in the country amount to $30 a month) for an alleged illegal transfer 
of automobiles in 1994. Atakov denied the charges and claimed that he 
was being imprisoned because of his religious beliefs. Atakov 
reportedly was beaten severely by an officer while in prison.
    In September representatives of internal security organs, including 
the KNB, attempted to break up a peaceful meeting of the Seventh-Day 
Adventist congregation in Ashgabat. The congregation later paid a fine 
for meeting illegally. On November 13, a demolition team sent by the 
Ashgabat mayor's office began tearing down a recently completed 
Seventh-Day Adventist church. Two days earlier the pastor of the 
congregation had received written notice that demolition would begin 
after a week; the building's destruction was part of a Government plan 
for the neighborhood. In September local police and KNB officers in 
Geok-Depe arrested two members of Jehovah's Witnesses for discussing 
the Bible with fellow citizens. After 3 days of interrogation, which 
reportedly included beatings, the two were sentenced to 15 days' 
imprisonment. Upon their release, they were told to renounce their 
faith and warned not to tell human rights organizations about their 
treatment while under government custody. In December the Government 
reportedly deported one member of Jehovah's Witnesses to Russia. On 
December 17, police and KNB agents arrested three members of an 
unregistered Baptist congregation in Ashgabat, whom the Government then 
threatened to deport. Shageldy Atakov was incarcerated for his 
religious beliefs.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some restrictions 
on freedom of movement. The Government generally does not restrict 
movement within the country, although travel to southern border zones 
is controlled tightly. Citizens still carry internal passports. These 
documents are used primarily as a form of identification, rather than 
as a means of controlling movement. Residence permits are not required, 
although the place of residence is registered and noted in passports.
    The Government uses its power to issue passports and exit visas as 
a general means of restricting international travel. The Government 
does not allow its citizens to travel outside the country without 
official permission. Any citizen who wishes to visit a foreign country 
must obtain an exit visa, which can take up to 5 weeks to process. 
Although not new, this policy became more onerous in June when the 
country withdrew from the visa agreement of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. The official reason given by the Government for 
this action was to secure the country's borders against foreign 
criminal elements. Most citizens are permitted to emigrate without 
undue restriction.
    The government-funded Council of World Turkmen provides assistance 
to ethnic Turkmen abroad who wish to return to the country and apply 
for citizenship; however, the Government discourages immigration by 
ethnic Turkmen living in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries. 
Immigration of non-Turkmen from other areas of the former Soviet Union 
is discouraged by the unofficial policy of favoring employment of 
ethnic Turkmen.
    The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 1997 Law 
on Refugees establishes the procedure and conditions for recognizing 
refugee status and sets the legal, economic, and social rights of 
refugees. The country currently provides first asylum if the person is 
recognized under the mandate of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). The Government has granted refugee or asylee status to some 
ethnic Turkmen from Afghanistan and has allowed some Tajik refugees and 
migrants to reside in the country. The Government cooperates with the 
UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations that assist refugees. There 
were no confirmed reports of forced expulsion of those having a valid 
claim to refugee status. There have been unconfirmed reports of small 
numbers of refugees being forcibly returned by individual border 
guards. However, according to the UNHCR, there is no clear pattern of 
abuse or forced expulsion of refugees, with the exception of such low-
level harassment.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have no real ability to effect peaceful change in the 
Government and have little influence on government policy or 
decisionmaking. The 1992 Constitution declares Turkmenistan to be a 
secular democracy in the form of a presidential republic. It calls for 
the separation of powers between the various branches of government, 
but vests a disproportionate share of power in the Presidency. In 
practice President Niyazov's power is absolute, and the country remains 
a one-party state. Despite the appearance of decisionmaking by 
consensus, most decisions are made at the presidential level. In his 
address to the Halk Maslahaty in July 1998, President Niyazov called 
for local councils and village leaders to have greater power and 
authority to deal with local issues. However, in reality, even local 
leaders are selected and dismissed by the President. In December the 
Halk Maslahaty proposed and the newly elected Mejlis (Parliament) 
approved a law making an exception to the constitutionally mandated 
maximum of two 5-year terms for the President, but only for Niyazov, as 
the country's first president.
    In November 1998, the President announced a major letter-writing 
campaign in which any Turkmen citizen who had a complaint could write 
directly to him. As a result of this campaign, the President received 
almost 140,000 letters. The Government stated that most of the letters 
contained complaints about the criminal justice and prison systems. As 
a result of this campaign, the President released over 22,000 persons 
from prison (see Section 1.d and 1.e.).
    In the 1992 presidential election, the sole candidate was 
Saparmurat Niyazov, the incumbent and nominee of the Democratic Party. 
The Government announced the election barely a month before voting day, 
giving opposition groups insufficient time to organize and qualify to 
submit a candidate. A 1994 national referendum extended the President's 
term to 2002, obviating the need for the scheduled presidential 
election in 1997. According to the official results, 99.9 percent of 
those voting cast their ballots to extend his term. The policy of the 
Democratic Party, according to its leadership, is to implement the 
policy of the President. In August the Government changed the national 
oath to require that citizens swear personal allegiance to President 
Niyazov in particular, rather than just to the presidency as a general 
institution.
    The 50-member Mejlis routinely supports presidential decrees, and 
as yet has no genuine independence, although it has taken several 
measures to become a more professional body. For example it discusses 
and amends draft legislation, including key bills such as civil and 
criminal codes. In the 1994 Mejlis elections, no opposition 
participation was permitted. The Government claimed that 99.8 percent 
of all eligible voters participated. President Niyazov promised in 1998 
that the parliamentary elections scheduled for December for a 
reconstituted Mejlis would be ``free and fair'' and conducted on a 
``wide democratic basis.'' However, the elections held in December were 
seriously flawed. Although there were at least two candidates for each 
Mejlis seat, every candidate was selected by the Government, and there 
was virtually no open discussion of the issues. The Office for 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE declined 
to send an observation or limited assessment mission for the elections. 
In its public explanation, ODIHR cited serious concerns that the broad 
electoral framework in the country fell short of its OSCE commitments. 
The Government claimed that 98.9 percent of eligible voters 
participated. Diplomatic observers noted many empty polling stations, 
extensive use of mobile ballot boxes, and numerous instances of family 
voting.
    There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women or 
minorities in the political process; however, they are underrepresented 
in government and politics. Thirteen members of the newly elected 
Mejlis are women, although women constitute over 50 percent of the 
population. Women serve as the Deputy Chairman for Textiles and Foreign 
Trade, Minister of Textiles, Minister of Education, and Prosecutor 
General. No women serve as provincial governors. Minorities are 
represented in the Government, although preference is given to ethnic 
Turkmen. The Mejlis consists of 48 ethnic Turkmen, 1 ethnic Russian, 
and 1 ethnic Uzbek.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no local human rights monitoring groups, and government 
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association would 
preclude any effort to investigate and criticize publicly the 
Government's human rights policies. Several independent journalists 
based in Russia report on these issues in the Russian press and have 
contact with international human rights organizations. On numerous 
occasions in the past, the Government has warned its critics against 
speaking with visiting journalists or other foreigners wishing to 
discuss human rights issues. Early in the year, the Government deported 
two Moscow-based human rights researchers (see Section 2.a.).
    On January 6, President Niyazov signed a decree establishing a 
human rights commission that he heads. The commission oversees the work 
of law enforcement agencies, the military, and the judiciary, but it 
appears to have little real authority. The commission is subordinate to 
the National Institute for Democracy and Human Rights under the 
President, which completed its third year of operation in October. Its 
mandate is to support the democratization of the government and society 
and to monitor the protection of human rights. The Institute maintains 
four full-time staff members to receive and resolve citizen complaints 
of arbitrary action. Two-fifths of the approximately 2,500 complaints 
received by the institute during the year concerned abuses by law 
enforcement and security organizations, the judicial process, and 
judges. In general the Institute conducts a study of the complaint and 
returns its findings to the individual and the organizations involved. 
However, the Institute is not an independent body, and its ability to 
obtain redress is limited by government interests.
    In January the OSCE opened an office in Ashgabat.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights and freedoms for all, 
independent of one's nationality, origin, language, and religion. It 
further specifies equal rights before the law for both men and women. 
There is no legal basis for discrimination against women or religious 
or ethnic minorities. However, cultural traditions and the Government's 
policy of promoting Turkmen nationalism limit the employment and 
educational opportunities of women and nonethnic Turkmen.
    Women.--Anecdotal reports indicate that domestic violence against 
women is common, but no statistics are available. The subject is not 
discussed in society. There are no court cases available and no 
references to domestic violence in the media. One unofficial group to 
support battered women operates in Ashgabat.
    There were some reports of trafficking in women from the country to 
the Persian Gulf and Turkey (see Section 6.f.).
    Women are underrepresented in the upper levels of state-owned 
economic enterprises and are concentrated in the health care and 
education professions and in service industries. Women are restricted 
from working in some dangerous and environmentally unsafe jobs. Under 
the law, women enjoy the same inheritance and marriage rights as men. 
However, in traditional Turkmen society, the woman's primary role is as 
homemaker and mother, and family pressures often limit opportunities 
for women to enter careers outside the home and advance their 
education. Religious authorities, when proffering advice to practicing 
Muslims on matters concerning inheritance and property rights, often 
favor men over women.
    There is only one officially registered women's group, which is 
headed by the Deputy Chairperson of the Mejlis and dedicated in honor 
of the President's mother. The Government has no program specifically 
aimed at rectifying the disadvantaged position of women in society, as 
it does not acknowledge that women suffer discrimination.
    Children.--The Government's social umbrella covers the welfare 
needs of children. In September the Government cut the number of years 
of basic education from 10 to 9 years; however, children now in their 
eighth, ninth, or tenth year of education will be unaffected. There is 
little difference in the education provided to girls and boys. The 
Government has not taken effective steps to address the environmental 
and health problems that have resulted in a high rate of infant and 
maternal mortality.
    Class sizes in the country are increasing rapidly, facilities are 
deteriorating and funds for textbooks and supplies are decreasing. The 
Ministry of Education (MED) announced last spring that the number of 
students per class is to be raised from 30 to 45. Wages for teachers 
and administrators are in arrears in many districts; this, added to the 
fact that salaries are low, has caused some teachers to leave the field 
and seek jobs in the private sector, leaving classrooms overcrowded.
    Bribery has become a main component of the admission process at 
prestigious departments in universities. Although officially free, 
admission to many faculties at Turkmen State University in Ashgabat 
reportedly costs between $2,000 and $4,000. Paying bribes for good 
grades is also a common practice. Furthermore, MED has discouraged 
schools from having contacts with NGO's and international 
organizations.
    During the annual cotton harvest, some schools in agricultural 
areas are closed and children as young as 10 years of age work in the 
cotton fields for up to 2 months (see Section 6.d.). Other than this 
activity, there is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
    People with Disabilities.--Government subsidies and pensions are 
provided for those with disabilities, although the pensions are 
inadequate to maintain a decent standard of living. Those capable of 
working are generally provided with jobs under still-valid 
preindependence policies that virtually guarantee employment to all. 
According to existing legislation, facilities to allow access by the 
disabled must be included in new construction projects. However, 
compliance is inconsistent and most older buildings are not so 
equipped. Care for the mentally retarded and mentally ill is provided 
on the local level. Mentally retarded and mentally ill children are 
placed in boarding schools, with educational and future employment 
opportunities if their condition is mild. Adults with disabilities 
requiring institutionalization are kept primarily in ``psycho-
narcological'' hospitals in Geok-Depe, Bekrova, and Kakha and in theory 
provided with food, clothing, and medical care.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides for 
equal rights and freedoms for all citizens. Turkmen comprise 
approximately 77 percent of the population of about 4.7 million; 
Uzbeks, 9 percent; and Russians, 7 percent. There are smaller numbers 
of Kazakhs, Armenians, Azeris, and many other ethnic groups. Since 
independence, the country has not experienced ethnic turmoil.
    As part of its nation-building efforts, the Government has 
attempted to foster Turkmen national pride, in part through its 
language policy. The Constitution designates Turkmen as the official 
language, and it is a mandatory subject in school, although it is not 
necessarily the language of instruction.
    The Constitution also provides for the rights of speakers of other 
languages to use them. Russian remains in common usage in government 
and commerce. However, the President has criticized the widespread use 
of Russian. In accordance with his wishes, Russian language usage in 
newspapers was cut back sharply during the year. In June the Government 
switched one of the Russian language daily newspapers to Turkmen and 
reduced daily Russian news broadcasts on state-run television to 30 
minutes. In October the state radio ceased entirely its daily 15-minute 
Russian language news broadcast. Nonethnic Turkmen employees at 
government ministries reportedly were given until December to learn 
Turkmen. Non-Turkmen fear that the designation of Turkmen as the 
official language places their children at a disadvantage educationally 
and economically. They complain that some avenues for promotion and job 
advancement are no longer open to them. Only a handful of non-Turkmen 
occupy high-echelon jobs in the ministries, and there are reports that 
managerial positions were closed to non-Turkmen.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Turkmenistan has inherited the Soviet 
system of government-controlled trade unions. There are no legal 
guarantees entitling workers to form or join unions. The Colleagues 
Union is the only legal central trade union federation permitted, and 
it claims a membership of 1.3 million; its member unions are divided 
along both sectoral and regional lines. Unions may not form or join 
other federations.
    While no law specifically prohibits the establishment of 
independent unions, there are no such unions, and no attempts were made 
to register an independent trade union during the year.
    The law neither prohibits nor permits strikes and does not address 
the issue of retaliation against strikers. Strikes are extremely rare 
and no strikes were known to have occurred during the year.
    There is no information available on union affiliation with 
international unions. Turkmenistan joined the International Labor 
Organization in 1993.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law does 
not protect the right to collective bargaining. In practice in the 
state-dominated economy, the close association of both the trade union 
and the state-owned enterprise with the Government seriously limits 
workers' ability to bargain, and workers often go months without pay or 
receive their paychecks late.
    The Ministry of Economics and Finance prepares general guidelines 
for wages and sets wages in health care, culture, and some other areas. 
In other sectors, it allows for some leeway at the enterprise level, 
taking into account local factors. The Government determines specific 
wage and benefit packages for each factory or enterprise.
    The law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers 
against union members and organizers, and there are no mechanisms for 
resolving such complaints.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor; however, there were reports of trafficking in 
women (see Section 6.f.), and children work in cotton harvesting in 
rural areas (see Section 5). The Government prohibits forced and bonded 
labor by children and generally enforces this prohibition effectively, 
with the exception of cotton harvesting in rural areas (see Section 5).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 16 years; in 
a few heavy industries, it is 18 years. The law prohibits children 
between the ages of 16 and 18 years from working more than 6 hours per 
day (the normal workday is 8 hours).
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and 
generally enforces this prohibition effectively, with the exception of 
cotton harvesting in rural areas (see Section 6.c.). A 15-year-old 
child may work 4 to 6 hours per day but only with the permission of the 
trade union and parents. This permission rarely is granted. Violations 
of child labor laws occur in rural areas during the cotton harvesting 
season, when teenagers work in the fields and children as young as 10 
years of age sometimes help with the harvest.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage. In 
December the Government raised the average wage in the state sector to 
approximately $77 (400,000 manats) per month at the official rate. 
While the Government subsidizes the prices of many necessities and 
provides others free of charge, this wage falls short of the amount 
required to meet the needs of an average family. Most households are 
multigenerational, with several members receiving salaries, stipends, 
or pensions. Even so, many people lack the resources to maintain an 
adequate diet, and meat is a luxury for most citizens.
    The standard legal workweek is 40 hours with 2 days off. 
Individuals who work fewer hours during the week or are in certain 
high-level positions may also work on Saturdays.
    The country inherited from the Soviet era an economic system with 
substandard working conditions--one in which production took precedence 
over the health and safety of workers. Industrial workers often labor 
in unsafe environments and are not provided proper protective 
equipment. Some agricultural workers are subjected to environmental 
health hazards. The Government recognizes that these problems exist and 
has taken some steps to address them, but it has not set comprehensive 
standards for occupational health and safety. Workers do not always 
have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger 
their health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The International Office of Migration 
reports anecdotal evidence of trafficking in women from Turkmenistan, 
particularly to Turkey and Arab countries in the Persian Gulf. Although 
there does not appear to be a large-scale problem, no reliable 
statistics are available. The Government does not have programs in 
place to combat trafficking in persons; however, in November the 
Government and the International Organization on Migration hosted a 1-
day seminar on illegal migration during which trafficking in women was 
discussed in detail.
                                 ______
                                 

                                UKRAINE

    Ukraine is governed by a directly elected president and a 
unicameral parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), which is 
elected partially according to proportional representation and 
partially by direct constituency mandate. Incumbent President Leonid 
Kuchma was reelected after two rounds of voting on October 31 and 
November 14. While there were some irregularities during the election 
campaign and during the balloting, almost all observers agreed that the 
election results reflected the will of the electorate. Despite numerous 
flaws and irregularities, previous national elections in 1998 and 1994 
generally reflected the will of the electorate. The President appoints 
the Cabinet and controls government operations. Although the 
Constitution mandates an independent judiciary, the courts are funded 
through the Ministry of Justice, are subject to political interference 
and corruption, and are inefficient.
    The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs (which controls the various police forces), and the Ministry of 
Defense all have equal responsibility for internal security and report 
to the President through the Cabinet. The National Bureau of 
Investigation, established by presidential decree in 1997 but never 
fully funded, was abolished in a government reorganization in December. 
The armed forces largely have remained outside of politics. While 
civilian authorities generally maintain effective control of the 
security forces, institutional government corruption sometimes can lead 
to their improper use. The SBU and other government agencies have 
interfered indirectly in the political process through criminal 
investigations of politicians, journalists, and influential 
businessmen. Members of the security forces committed human rights 
abuses.
    Ukraine is making a difficult transition from a centrally planned 
to a market-based economy. The private sector has continued to grow and 
now represents a substantial portion of the economy. Nevertheless, the 
country remains in a serious economic crisis, due to the absence of the 
critical level of reform needed to generate sustained economic growth. 
Industrial output has suffered years of sharp decline. Reform, 
particularly in the agricultural sector, has stagnated; however, at 
year's end the President signed a far-reaching decree on agricultural 
reform. According to official statistics, about half the work force is 
employed formally in manufacturing, with the balance divided between 
services and agriculture; however, in reality many industrial 
enterprises have reduced or stopped production. Exports are diversified 
and include metals, chemicals, sugar, and semifinished goods. The 
annual per capita gross domestic product for 1999 was approximately 
$1,000. However, millions of employees go months without being paid, 
and most individuals derive a significant proportion of their income 
from the shadow economy. Annual inflation is expected to remain at the 
1998 level of about 20 percent. Investment remains at low levels, with 
many potential investors discouraged by rampant corruption, onerous 
taxation, and arbitrary licensing practices. Unemployment has affected 
women disproportionately. Wealth is concentrated among the political 
elite and directors of state-dominated sectors such as metals, oil, and 
gas.
    Ukraine's human rights record during the year was mixed; there was 
limited progress in some areas; however, serious problems persisted. 
Members of the military killed soldiers during violent hazing 
incidents, and there were some reports of possibly politically 
motivated killings. Police and prison officials regularly beat 
detainees and prisoners, and there were numerous instances of torture, 
sometimes resulting in death. The beating of conscripts in the army by 
fellow soldiers was common and sometimes resulted in death. Prison 
conditions are harsh and life threatening. There were instances of 
arbitrary arrest and detention. Lengthy pretrial detention in very poor 
conditions was common, and detainees often spent months in pretrial 
detention for violations that involved little or no prison time if 
convicted. Long delays in trials are a problem. The Government rarely 
punishes officials who commit abuses. The SBU, police, and Prosecutor's 
Office have drawn domestic and international criticism for their 
failure to take adequate action to curb institutional corruption and 
abuse in the Government. Many high-profile corruption cases have been 
dropped, ostensibly because of lack of incriminating evidence. Anti-
corruption legislation has been enforced selectively, mostly against 
government opponents and low-level officials. Political interference 
and corruption affect the judicial process. The judiciary is 
overburdened, inefficient, and lacks sufficient funding and staff. 
These factors undermine citizens' right to a fair trial. The criminal 
justice system has been slow to reform due to both lack of government 
effort and strained economic resources. The State continued to intrude 
in citizens' lives and infringe on their privacy rights. The Government 
partially limited and increasingly interfered with freedom of the press 
during the year, most notably in the run-up to the October presidential 
elections. Government authorities interfered in the election process 
and stepped up pressure on the media through tax inspections and other 
measures. The national broadcast media came under particular pressure. 
While the print media reflected the full political spectrum, there were 
tendencies toward self-censorship. There were some limits on freedom of 
assembly, and there were some instances of restrictions on freedom of 
association. Limitations on nonnative religious organizations 
constrained freedom of religion. The Government took steps to return to 
religious groups properties expropriated during the Soviet era. Some 
limits on freedom of movement, most notably the registration or 
``propiska'' system, remained. The Government took steps to support the 
return and resettlement of exiled Tatars in Crimea. The SBU monitored 
the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) during the 
election campaign. Violence against women and children; trafficking in 
women and girls; discrimination against women; societal anti-Semitism; 
and discrimination against religious, racial, and ethnic minorities are 
problems. The Government discourages some workers from organizing 
unions, and forced labor in the form of women and girls trafficked for 
sexual exploitation is a problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by government agents; however, the 
pervasiveness of corruption, connections between government officials 
and organized crime, and the political activities of organized crime 
figures often blurred the distinction between political and criminal 
acts. Politicians, politically connected businessmen, and journalists 
were victims of possibly politically motivated--and sometimes fatal--
attacks.
    No 1999 official statistics for contract killings are available, 
but some such killings may have been politically motivated. In February 
the manager of security forces for the independent television station 
STB was murdered in the stairwell of his apartment building in an 
apparent contract killing. In May chairman of the regional arbitration 
court Borys Vihrov and director of local television station Ant Igor 
Bondar were shot and killed in Odessa.
    Abuse of prisoners and detainees, and harsh prison conditions, 
sometimes led to death (see Section 1.c.). According to revised 
government statistics, in 1998 there were 1,901 deaths in prison and 
detention facilities, many due to harsh conditions. There were reports 
that police beat persons at alcohol corrective treatment centers, 
sometimes killing them (see Section 1.c.).
    Members of the military killed soldiers during violent hazing 
incidents (see Section 1.c.). According to a government official, in 
1998 10 to 12 military personnel were beaten to death, and a total of 
20 to 30 died as an indirect result of injuries sustained from hazing.
    The Government made no known progress in resolving a number of the 
high profile killings of past years. There was no progress in resolving 
the 1998 murders of former director of the National Bank Vadym Hetman; 
deputy head of the Crimean government Aleksandr Safontsev; the mayor of 
Shakhtersk; or the campaign manager of a Kiev mayoral candidate. Nor 
was there progress in resolving the 1997 murders of the governor of the 
Razoolnensky district; the Crimean deputy minister of tourism and 
resorts; prominent businessman Arkadiy Tabachnyk; or the bombing of the 
intensive care unit in Simferopol.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    The 1996 alleged kidnapping of the former speaker of the Crimean 
legislature was discovered by investigators to have been staged. The 
1994 disappearance of Myhailo Boichyshyn, a prominent leader of the 
Popular Movement of Ukraine party, remains unsolved.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police and 
prison officials regularly beat detainees and prisoners, and there were 
numerous reports of such abuse. Amnesty International (AI) and other 
human rights groups continued to receive regular reports that Berkut 
(special militia units or riot police) troops beat and tortured inmates 
as part of regular training exercises. The media report that police 
subject detainees to the ``swallow,'' in which the detainee is placed 
on his stomach and his feet are tied to his hands behind him, forcing 
his back to arch. Another abuse is the ``baby elephant,'' in which a 
gas mask is placed on the prisoner's head and the flow of oxygen slowly 
reduced. A human rights group from Cherkassy reported that in May a 
detainee died from injuries sustained during police torture using a 
method called the ``monument,'' in which a prisoner is suspended from 
his hands on a rope and beaten. Requesting an attorney often leads to a 
worse beating, and detainees may be beaten until they waive their right 
to one. There is no effective mechanism for registering complaints 
about mistreatment or for obtaining redress for such actions. Prisoners 
may address complaints to the Human Rights Ombudsman, and that office 
has received widespread reports of torture in pretrial detention. 
However, the Ombudsman has no enforcement authority, and the Government 
made little effort during the year to end such practices or to punish 
officials who committed or abetted such abuses. According to the Office 
of the Human Rights Ombudsman, most of the complaints that it received 
centered on human rights violations by law enforcement personnel. In 
July a human rights group complained that the Ombudsman failed to 
investigate whether special police units beat prisoners during regular 
exercises in jails. Instead, the Ombudsman forwarded the petition to 
the penal administration. On December 1, the Parliament passed an 
amendment to the Criminal Code that prescribes up to 15 years' 
imprisonment for torture.
    Police also abused Roma, particularly in the Transcarpathian 
region, and harassed and abused dark-skinned persons (see Section 5). 
Police also harassed journalists and refugees (see Sections 2.a. and 
2.d.).
    In April 1998, the Government created a penal department to oversee 
reform of the penal system and to serve as the administrative center of 
the penal system. The new department originally was placed under the 
oversight of the Ministry of Interior but was given the status of an 
independent government agency by presidential decree in March. However, 
human rights groups report that this change in status has not affected 
its practices. The Government failed to punish prison and police 
officials who committed or condoned violence against prisoners. Police 
corruption also remains a serious problem.
    Several politically active individuals were wounded in violent 
attacks. On October 2, leading presidential opposition candidate 
Natalia Vitrenko was lightly wounded (and others more seriously hurt) 
in a murder attempt when two grenades were thrown at her during a visit 
to Kryvyi Rih in the southeast. More than 30 persons were injured in 
the explosions, including members of Vitrenko's campaign staff, and 17 
were hospitalized, 2 of them with critical injuries. Local police 
detained two suspects, one of whom allegedly is linked to the local 
campaign headquarters of Socialist Party presidential candidate Moroz. 
In April senior official of the Kiev municipal government Mykola 
Pidmogylny was shot and wounded seriously outside his house. On August 
27, unknown assailants beat up Hennadiy Fomenko, head of Socialist 
Party leader Moroz's election headquarters in Luhansk oblast 
(province). The local police reported that they did not believe that 
the attack was motivated by politics. However, Moroz supporters alleged 
that the incident, which coincided with the visit of President Kuchma 
to Luhansk, was an attempt by the local government to intimidate the 
opposition. In October a Rada deputy for the Communist Party was beaten 
after attending a campaign event for Communist Party candidate Petro 
Symonenko in Donetsk, and a Symonenko campaign official was attacked 
and seriously wounded in Kiev, according to another Rada deputy. On 
November 23, Vinnytsia mayor and former parliamentarian and Vinnytsia 
oblast governor Dmytro Dvorkis was shot and wounded by unknown gunmen 
in Vinnytsia.
    Many members of the press were hurt in violent incidents throughout 
the year. In February Sergey Korenev, a cameraman for the independent 
television station STB, was attacked in Lviv by unknown assailants, who 
also stole his equipment and videotapes. On March 3, two masked 
individuals broke into the Kiev residence of Dmitro Dahno, the 
commercial director of STB, assaulted him and his wife, threatened them 
with a knife, and held them for more than 1 hour. The two men searched 
the apartment, apparently looking for documents, while ignoring money 
and other valuables. In June in Odesa unknown individuals beat Ihor 
Hrinstein, a journalist for the local Odesa television company Odesa-
Plus and host of its news program Oko. Hrinstein linked the beating to 
Oko's policy of criticizing local authorities and giving broadcast time 
to Rada deputies who oppose President Kuchma. Hrinstein is the latest 
of several Odesa journalists who have been beaten allegedly in 
connection with their reporting.
    In January the office of the Tatar Assembly Mejlis was firebombed 
in Simferopol. No suspects were identified, but Tatars blamed Russian 
chauvinists. On May 23, a bomb exploded in the office of local 
Communist Party leader Leonid Hrach in Simferopol, Crimea. The 
explosion did not result in any casualties. Hrach called the act a 
provocation intended to exacerbate tensions between leftists and 
Crimean Tatars, who had been picketing the government building in 
Simferopol. At a press conference in June Socialist Party leader Moroz 
reported that his party's headquarters in Dnipropetrovsk had been 
destroyed by fire. On August 14, during a meeting between presidential 
candidate and former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk and local residents 
who had lost their savings in pyramid schemes, the chief of the local 
police department ordered that the building be evacuated because of an 
anonymous bomb threat. No bomb was found and Marchuk accused the 
presidential administration of being behind the incident.
    There were continued reports of harsh conditions and violence 
against conscripts in the armed forces. Senior officers reportedly 
required malnourished recruits to beg for food or money. Senior 
conscripts often beat recruits, sometimes to death (also see Section 
1.a.). Punishment administered for committing or condoning such 
activities did not serve as an effective deterrent to the further 
practice of such abuses. Between 1991 and 1998, 450 soldiers were 
convicted of violent harassment of their colleagues; and approximately 
200 military personnel were prosecuted in 1998 for violent hazing (10 
to 12 conscripts were beaten to death and 20 to 30 died from injuries 
related to hazing). The press reported the conviction of three soldiers 
in late 1998 for violent hazing of their colleagues at the Defense 
Ministry Headquarters.
    Disputes between religious groups at times resulted in violence. 
For example, in April there was a violent scuffle between supporters of 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the entourage 
of Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev 
Patriarchate)--see Section 5.
    There was no improvement during the year in prison conditions, 
which are harsh, life-threatening, and do not meet minimum 
international standards. Prison officials intimidate and mistreat 
inmates. Due in part to the severe economic crisis, prisons and 
detention centers are severely overcrowded and lack adequate sanitation 
and medical facilities. At the request of the President, the Parliament 
endorsed in July a mass amnesty that released 40,000 inmates, due to 
overcrowding. Because the country lacks a well-developed system of 
suspended sentences, and the law does not differentiate between 
misdemeanors and felonies, at least one-third of inmates were convicted 
of only minor violations.
    Conditions in pretrial detention facilities routinely fail to meet 
minimum international standards. Inmates sometimes are held in 
investigative isolation for extended periods and subjected to 
intimidation and mistreatment by jail guards and other inmates. 
Overcrowding is common in these centers. For example, the pretrial 
detention center in Kiev, which was constructed to hold 2,850 persons, 
houses 3,500. According to official statistics, as of June, the prison 
population was 223,900 (including 42,600 persons in pretrial custody), 
twice that of 1992.
    According to official sources, information on the physical state of 
prison walls and fences as well as pretrial detention blocks is 
considered to be a state secret. However, the press reports freely 
about harsh prison conditions. In 1998 there were 1,901 deaths in 
prisons and detention facilities, which was more than 3 times the death 
rate of the general population. Poor sanitary conditions result in 
deaths from diseases such as tuberculosis and dysentery, and there are 
frequent incidents of murder by fellow inmates and suicide.
    Conditions in the Interior Ministry's Corrective Labor and 
Treatment Centers for Alcoholics (LTP's), where violent alcoholics are 
confined forcibly by court decision, differ little from those in 
prisons. Virtually no treatment is available. According to 1998 
statistics, 12 LTP's with some 3,800 inmates continued to operate. The 
Government has not lived up to its earlier commitment to hand the LTP's 
over to the Health Ministry. Police have the right to take forcibly any 
person appearing drunk in public to special sobering centers. Human 
rights groups report cases of police mistreatment, robbing, or beating 
of detainees, occasionally to death, at such centers. In August the 
Government issued a decree directing the closure of such centers by 
2000.
    The Government continued to allow prison visits by diplomatic 
representatives and human rights monitors; however, these groups 
reported that it had become more difficult to obtain access to prisons. 
Cases were reported in which prisoners were not permitted 
correspondence and family visits were allowed only once per year. 
Prisoners may complain to the Ombudsman about the conditions of 
detention, but human rights groups reported that inmates were punished 
for initiating complaints.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain problems. The law provides that authorities may detain 
a suspect for 3 days without a warrant, after which an arrest order 
must be issued. The Constitution stipulates that only courts may issue 
arrest warrants, but under its transitional provisions, the 
Prosecutor's Office retains the right to issue search and arrest 
warrants until 2001. The maximum period of detention after charges have 
been filed is 18 months, but the law does not limit the aggregate time 
of detention before and during a trial. The law permits citizens to 
contest an arrest in court or appeal to the prosecutor. The 
Constitution requires immediate notification of family members about an 
arrest, but this action often is not taken in practice.
    By law a trial must begin no later than 3 weeks after indictment, 
but this requirement rarely is met by the overburdened court system. 
Months may pass before a defendant finally is brought to trial, and the 
situation did not improve during the year. Complicated cases can take 
years to go to trial. Although the 1996 amendment to the Criminal 
Procedures Code provides for bail, it is used rarely. Restrictions on 
travel outside of a given area sometimes are employed. Accused persons 
usually are held without bail in pretrial detention for several months. 
As of June, there were 223,900 prisoners, 42,600 of whom were persons 
held without bail in pretrial detention. The Constitution provides 
compensation for unlawful or arbitrary arrest, detention, or 
conviction, but there are no known cases in which this provision was 
invoked. Reports indicate that this inaction is a result of lack of 
faith in the judiciary, rather than the absence of unlawful or 
arbitrary detentions.
    The law stipulates that a defense attorney be provided without 
charge to the indigent from the moment of detention or the filing of 
charges, whichever comes first. There are insufficient numbers of 
defense attorneys to protect suspects from unlawful, lengthy 
imprisonment under extremely poor conditions. Although the concept of 
providing attorneys from the state system remains in principle, public 
attorneys often refuse to defend indigents for the low government fee. 
While in custody, a suspect or a prisoner is allowed by law to talk 
with a lawyer in private; however, human rights groups report that the 
client-attorney privilege occasionally is denied by prison or 
investigative officials. To protect the defendant, each investigative 
file must contain a document signed by the defendant attesting that the 
charges against him, his right to an attorney, and his right not to 
give evidence against himself or his relatives have been explained to 
him. An appeals court may dismiss a conviction or order a new trial if 
this document is missing. As defendants increasingly became aware of 
their rights, they insisted on observance of these procedures. However, 
many persons still were unaware of these safeguards.
    The Government occasionally charges persons who are openly critical 
of the Government (usually opposition politicians or editors/
journalists from the opposition press) on criminal libel or tax evasion 
charges (see Section 2.a.). On January 15, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
officials arrested Volodymyr Yefremov, editor in chief of the 
Dnipropetrovsk oblast council newspaper Sobor and held him for 2 days. 
Yefremov was charged with abuse of office for alleged financial 
improprieties that reportedly came to light during a spot check on the 
newspaper's financial activities. Observers believe the arrest to have 
been politically motivated since the oblast council was headed by 
presidential rival Pavlo Lazarenko before he became prime minister, and 
Lazarenko was known to have contributed substantially to the 
newspaper's finances. On February 25, Peter Hois, the editor of the 
Uzhgorod newspaper Rio, was detained for 2 days for criminal libel in 
connection with statements that were never printed. The newspaper was 
to publish a statement by one of the newspaper's investors accusing 
various Rada deputies of abusing their positions. However, although 
Hois edited the original statement and deleted the specific names and 
accusations, the Prosecutor General still used the original text as the 
basis for Hois's arrest (see Section 2.a.).
    On May 19, police officers in Mukachevo detained some 70 persons, 
primarily Roma, in a local market for illegal trading. After being kept 
in an overcrowded police bus for approximately 1 hour, the detainees 
were forced to wash the police department automobiles and to perform 
yardwork around the police station, while they were abused verbally by 
police officers. The detainees were held for 2 days, and none of the 
Roma was charged formally with a crime. On May 24, 16 of the Roma filed 
complaints against the police officers. On July 7, five police officers 
in Mukachevo detained three Romani women in a market, after they did 
not produce their identification documents. The officers took the women 
to the police station, where they ordered them to clean the station and 
threatened to lock them in cells if they refused to cooperate. When a 
leader of a Romani NGO arrived at the station and demanded an 
explanation, the women were released. The women wrote letters 
complaining about their treatment to the regional director of the 
Ministry of Interior and the regional prosecutor general.
    In May three Baptist ministers were arrested in Kegichevka, as they 
were beginning a ``tent mission.''
    Police also arbitrarily detain persons for extensive document 
checks and vehicle inspections (see Section 1.f.).
    Official corruption is widespread. The Government apparently 
enforced anticorruption statutes selectively for political ends. While 
anticorruption statutes are applied increasingly against lower-level 
officials, such enforcement reportedly is lacking against high-level 
officials. A number of people arraigned on criminal and corruption 
charges claimed that they were victimized because of their support to 
the fugitive former prime minister and government opponent Pavlo 
Lazarenko. Former government officials Petro Shkudun, Mykola Syvulsky, 
and Vasyl Koval all claimed that their cases were politically motivated 
by their links to Lazarenko. As of October, the first two were out on 
bail, and the latter was in custody pending trial on corruption 
charges.
    In March four Uzbeks, two of them Uzbek oppositionists, were 
detained in Kiev and deported without a hearing to Uzbekistan, where 
they were convicted of terrorism and subversion and sentenced to 15 
years. They were denied access to an attorney (see Section 2.d.).
    The law does not provide for exile as a punishment, it does not 
exist in the law, and the Government does not use it.
    e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice, the judiciary is subject 
to considerable political interference from the executive branch and 
also suffers from corruption and inefficiency. The courts are funded 
through the Ministry of Justice, which allows the Government to 
influence the judicial process. The presidential administration also 
reportedly continues the old Soviet tradition of weighing in by 
telephone directly with justices.
    The establishment of an independent judicial system provided for in 
the Constitution still awaits the passage of implementing legislation. 
As a result, the judiciary continues to operate according to Soviet 
principles. Most judges and prosecutors were appointed during the 
Soviet era, and court officials are attuned closely to the Government's 
interests. The High Judicial Council, which approves the appointment of 
judges and disciplines judges, consists primarily of senior executive 
branch representatives including the Prosecutor General and the 
Chairman of the State Security Service. Human rights lawyers claim that 
the judiciary is not free from government influence, particularly at 
the regional and local levels. For example, court chairmen are 
appointed directly by the executive and wield considerable influence 
over the outcome of a case through case assignments, control of staff 
and promotions, and control of social benefits available to judges. 
Court chairmen reportedly deliberately overburden independent-minded 
judges with too many cases and then instigate disciplinary actions 
against them for not completing their casework. There are credible 
reports that court chairmen regularly followed executive instructions. 
The Ministry of Justice and court chairmen also control judges' 
housing. Judges whose rulings are not in accord with the executive 
branch are provided with apartments far from city centers or are 
ignored altogether when new apartments become available.
    The judiciary lacks sufficient staff and funds, which engenders 
inefficiency and corruption. The court system receives all its funding 
from the Ministry of Justice. Budgetary funds allocated by the 
Government in 1999 covered only half of the judiciary's requirements 
for the year. In June the Supreme Court challenged in the 
Constitutional Court the legality of the Government's practice of 
arbitrarily limiting the judiciary's budget. In its petition, the 
Supreme Court complained that the district courts received only 51 
percent of required funding, military courts 33 percent, and oblast 
courts 62 percent. In July the Constitutional Court ruled that the 
Government's practice of limiting the judiciary's budget was 
unconstitutional. This attempt by the Government to cut the judiciary's 
budget, and similar attempts in recent years, demonstrated clearly the 
dependence of the court system on the executive and the Government's 
willingness to make use of that dependence.
    The authority and independence of the judicial system also are 
undermined by the poor record of compliance with court decisions in 
civil cases. Provisions calling for criminal punishment for 
noncompliance with court decisions rarely are used. Compliance is 
particularly poor if the decision clashes with government interests. 
The Prosecutor General, Head of the Supreme Court, chairmen of regional 
courts, and the chairmen of the Kiev municipal court (or the deputies 
of these officials) can suspend court decisions, which leads to 
interference, manipulation, and corruption.
    Many local observers regard the Constitutional Court as the 
country's most independent judicial body. Human rights groups state 
that overall the Constitutional Court has maintained a balance of 
fairness, despite some indication in 1998 that it may have had a 
propresidential bias.
    The 1996 Constitution provides for a thorough restructuring of the 
court system, to be accomplished by 2001, including the introduction of 
appellate courts; however, pending the passage of the required enabling 
legislation on the law on the judiciary, the court system still is 
organized along Soviet lines, with the exception of the Constitutional 
Court.
    The court system consists of the Constitutional Court, general 
jurisdiction courts, and arbitration/commercial courts. General 
jurisdiction courts and arbitration courts are organized according to 
three levels: District courts; regional courts; and the Supreme Court 
and Supreme Arbitration Court. General jurisdiction courts are divided 
into criminal and civil sections. Military courts only hear cases 
involving military personnel.
    The Constitutional Court consists of 18 members, appointed for 9-
year terms in equal numbers by the President, the Parliament, and the 
Congress of Judges. It is the ultimate interpreter of legislation and 
the Constitution and determines the constitutionality of legislation, 
presidential edicts, cabinet acts, and acts of the Crimean Autonomous 
Republic. The President, at least 45 Members of Parliament, the Supreme 
Court, the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the Crimean legislature can 
request the Constitutional Court to hear a case. Citizens may apply to 
the Constitutional Court through the Human Rights Ombudsman, although 
in practice the Ombudsman has yet to exercise this right. In some 
limited cases, the Constitutional Court can interpret law for 
individual citizens, when the applying citizen provides compelling 
proof that a constitutional provision is violated, or that it is 
interpreted differently by different government bodies. However, of 
some 8,000 such petitions only 4 were accepted for review as of 
January.
    Under the current court system, cases are decided by judges who sit 
singly, occasionally with two public assessors (``lay judges'' or 
professional jurors with some legal training), or in groups of three 
for more serious cases. The Constitution provides for public, 
adversarial trials, including a judge, public assessors, state 
prosecutor, defense, and jury (when required by law). With some 
qualifications, these requirements are upheld in practice. However, 
implementing criminal procedure legislation establishing juries has not 
been adopted. Complicated cases can take years to go to trial. In the 
interim, defendants usually wait in pretrial detention. The 1996 
amendment to the Soviet-era Criminal Procedures Code provides for bail, 
but to date it has been used rarely (see Section 1.d.).
    Organized crime elements also are widely alleged to influence court 
decisions. The Justice Ministry reported that in 1997 135 judges were 
disciplined, 22 dismissed, and 5 prosecuted for bribery. No higher 
court judge has been disciplined to date. Criminal elements routinely 
use intimidation to induce victims and witnesses to withdraw or change 
their testimony. The law requires that a special police unit protect 
judges, witnesses, defendants, and their relatives. However, it has not 
yet been formed, and trial participants are vulnerable to pressure. 
There is a witness protection law, but it is in abeyance because of 
lack of funding.
    Prosecutors, like the courts, also are organized into offices at 
the rayon, oblast, and republic levels. They are responsible ultimately 
to the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the President and 
confirmed by the Parliament for a 5-year term. Regional and district 
prosecutors are appointed by the Prosecutor General.
    Although by law prosecutors and defense attorneys have equal 
status, in practice prosecutors are much more influential. The 
procuracy, in its pretrial investigative function, acts in effect as a 
grand jury. A prosecutor may initiate investigation through his own 
office or conduct investigations initiated by the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs or the SBU. Prosecutors also have the right to issue warrants 
without court approval and to suspend court decisions, thus effectively 
placing the procuracy above the courts in the legal hierarchy. In 
several cases the procuracy has used its judicial review powers to 
annul court decisions unfavorable to the presidential administration's 
economic or political interests and ordered the case reexamined by a 
different court. The office of the Prosecutor General practices 
selective prosecution and initiates investigations against the 
political or economic opponents of the President and his allies. The 
Prosecutor General ignores parliamentary and court requests for 
investigations into high-ranking persons if the accused is a 
presidential ally.
    The Constitution considerably curtails the prosecutor's authority, 
limiting it to prosecution, representing the public interest in court, 
oversight of investigations, and implementation of court decisions. 
However, in the absence of new criminal and criminal procedure codes to 
implement constitutional restrictions, the transitional provisions of 
the Constitution permit the prosecutor's office to conduct 
investigations and oversee general observance of the law. In November 
1997, the Constitutional Court interpreted the procuracy law, ruling 
that citizens can dispute prosecutors' decisions in court.
    The Constitution includes procedural provisions to ensure a fair 
trial, including the right of a suspect or witness to refuse to testify 
against himself or his relatives. However, pending passage of 
legislation to implement these constitutional provisions, a largely 
Soviet-era criminal justice system remains in place. While the 
defendant is presumed innocent, conviction rates have changed little 
since the Soviet era. Nearly all completed cases result in convictions.
    According to official statistics, in the first half of 1999, there 
were 114,600 convictions, between 36 and 39 percent of which resulted 
in prison sentences. A total of 494 defendants were acquitted, which is 
up 11 percent from the corresponding period last year. However, as 
judges frequently send cases unlikely to end in conviction back to the 
prosecutor for ``additional investigation'' (which usually leads to the 
dropping of the case), these statistics are somewhat misleading. 
Additionally, evidence indicates that suspects often bribe court 
officials to drop charges before cases go to trial, to lessen 
sentences, or to commute them.
    The Dnipropetrovsk trial of former government opponent Leopold 
Taburiansky, who spent several months in pretrial detention in 1996 for 
repeatedly holding unauthorized demonstrations on behalf of duped 
clients of pyramid schemes, has been suspended indefinitely. Human 
rights groups believe that this illustrates a pattern of government use 
of such suspended criminal cases against opponents or their close 
associates to silence critics.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. 
Although the Constitution requires that courts issue search warrants, 
this provision has not yet been implemented, and prosecutors continue 
to issue search warrants. The SBU may conduct intrusive surveillance 
and searches without a warrant, with the consent of the Prosecutor 
General, who nominally oversees this function of the SBU. However, the 
extent to which the Prosecutor General utilizes his authority to 
monitor SBU activities and to curb excesses by security officials is 
unknown. The Constitution provides citizens with the right to examine 
any dossier on them in possession of the SBU and to sue for physical 
and emotional damages incurred by an investigation. However, this right 
does not exist in practice, because the necessary implementing 
legislation has not been passed.
    Some remnants of Soviet control mechanisms persist. There are no 
probable cause statutes, and police officials and militia personnel 
have the right to stop persons and vehicles arbitrarily to initiate 
extensive document checks and vehicle inspections. Police may detain a 
person arbitrarily for up to 3 hours to verify identity. There have 
been reports that police sometimes abused this right. For example, 
police detained the local leader of the opposition Socialist Party in 
Cherkassy for an identity check to disrupt a local leftist 
demonstration in August.
    Journalists whose news reports are critical of the Government or 
who covered opposition politicians reported that frequently they were 
followed by SBU agents and that their telephones were wiretapped (see 
Section 2.a.).
    Under the current ``propiska'' registration system, all internal 
passports contain a stamp indicating residence and matrimonial status 
(see Section 2.d.). The Government has indicated its intent to 
eliminate the propiska system, but little progress has been made to 
date.
    The Law on Public Organizations prohibits members of the police, 
SBU, and armed forces from joining political parties. Prior to the 
March 1998 parliamentary elections, mass--perhaps coerced--enrollment 
of public sector and government employees augmented the ranks of 
progovernment parties, particularly the People's Democratic Party (see 
Section 2.b).
    There were no reported cases of political abuse of psychiatry; 
however, the press and human rights groups have reported several cases 
of abuse of psychiatry for economic reasons. Persons involved in 
property, inheritance, or divorce disputes were diagnosed wrongfully 
with schizophrenia and confined to psychiatric institutions. The 
disputes often entail the corruption of psychiatric experts and court 
officials. The country still uses Soviet classifications of mental 
illness and has no law on psychiatric practice. Persons diagnosed with 
mental illness may be confined and treated forcibly, declared not 
responsible for their actions, and stripped of their civil rights 
without being present at the hearings or notified of the ruling. A new 
law on psychiatry was stalled in Parliament after having been passed on 
first reading in 1998. In the meantime, the 1988 old Soviet psychiatric 
regulation remains in force (there are some 1.2 million registered 
psychiatric patients in the country). Within 3 days after forcible 
confinement to a hospital a patient must be examined by three doctors. 
Patients (including convicted prisoners) subsequently must be examined 
by the senior regional psychiatric commission within half a year. 
According to the Ukrainian Psychiatric Association, the Health Care 
Ministry has not always cooperated with human rights groups attempting 
to monitor abuse of psychiatry.
    A presidential decree issued in June required that all 
communication companies and Internet providers be licensed, and that 
their equipment be fitted for wiretapping (implicitly by the security 
services). However, this decree was blocked by Parliament in September 
(see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and a 1991 law 
provide for freedom of speech and of the press; however, in practice 
the Government partially limits freedom of the press through tax 
inspections, libel cases, subsidization, and intimidation of 
journalists that leads many to practice self-censorship. The Government 
owns or controls most of the national radio and television channels; 
however, there is a wide variety of newspapers and periodicals 
available, which espouse different political points of view, and 
individuals can and frequently do criticize the Government without 
reprisal. Government attempts to control the press are reported by the 
media.
    The print media, both independent and government-owned, demonstrate 
a tendency toward self-censorship on matters sensitive to the 
Government. Private newspapers have been established and are free to 
function on a purely commercial basis, although very few turn a profit. 
However, they are subject to various pressures, such as control of 
access to affordable state-subsidized newsprint; dependence on 
political patrons who may facilitate financial support from the State 
Press Support Fund; close scrutiny from government officials, 
especially at the local level; and politically motivated visits by tax 
inspectors. In 1997 the President issued a decree on support of the 
press that requires the Cabinet to draw up a list of publications 
needing government support, including those published by central and 
local governments, public organizations, associations, unions, 
educational institutions, and newspaper employees. The journalistic 
community believed that this decree was intended to control the press 
by supporting loyal members. The dependence of much of the press on 
government patronage has inhibited criticism particularly at the local 
level. The State Committee for Information Policy has warned some 
periodicals against fomenting ethnic tensions and conducting antistate 
propaganda and has applied to the Prosecutor's Office to open 
investigations into those newspapers. However, no newspapers are known 
to have been prosecuted as a result.
    The Committee on Protection of State Secrets enjoys broadly defined 
powers over all media. In 1997 the Cabinet adopted a regulation that 
further defined state secrets to include information on executions, the 
state of prisons, pretrial detention blocks, and centers for the 
forcible treatment of alcoholics. (The ``state of prisons'' refers to 
the physical state of the prison walls and fences, not prison 
conditions.) The press is able to report about harsh prison conditions 
without any inhibition. Journalists report that, in general, the 
Committee has not interfered with their activities (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government, both central and local, regularly targeted 
opposition newspapers with unannounced tax inspections or fire and 
building code inspections. Prior to the October 31 presidential 
election, the Government forced at least one opposition newspaper, 
Polytyka, to close. The June closure, following protracted litigation 
and government harassment for allegedly violating secrecy statutes, was 
Polytyka's fourth closure in 13 months. Between March and June the 
newspaper also was forced to change printing houses seven times. 
Government officials have initiated more than 20 criminal and civil 
libel cases against Polytyka's editor, Oleg Lyashko, asking for more 
than $40 million (220 million hryvnia) in damages. In one of two 
criminal libel cases pending against Lyashko for slandering the 
President and his staff, Lyashko was acquitted on December 23. The 
court stated that there was no evidence that a crime had been committed 
and that the preliminary investigation had been biased. However, on 
December 28 Prosecutor General Mikhaylo Potebenko announced the 
suspension of Lyashko's acquittal. The case reportedly was to be 
reconsidered in 2000. In September a deputy regional governor requested 
prosecution of the local Socialist Party newspaper Pravilny Vybor for 
the alleged defamation of the President and regional governor following 
publication of reports critical of the Government. In the summer, Lviv 
oblast authorities subjected the anti-Semitic newspaper Za Vilnu 
Ukrainu to tax inspections, fire inspections, eviction notices, the 
cutting of its telephone lines, and police harassment. The harassment 
began after the newspaper announced its support for presidential 
candidate and former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk. Den, another 
newspaper that supports Marchuk, was subjected to 25 tax inspections 
between January and July.
    Kievskiye Viedomosti suspended publication on February 21, citing 
lack of funds, after months of government pressure against it. The 
newspaper's accounts had been frozen since October 1998 for alleged 
lease contract violations. Kievskiye Viedomosti resumed publication on 
April 22 under new management. Presidential ally Hrihoriy Surkis bought 
the newspaper and replaced its editor.
    On June 1, the Parliament adopted a resolution on the media calling 
for investigations into all complaints of harassment of non-state media 
outlets by the Tax Inspectorate, the Prosecutor General's Office, or 
the presidential administration.
    Government officials also frequently use criminal libel cases or 
civil suits based on alleged damage to a ``person's honor and 
integrity'' to punish critics. Article 7 of the Civil Code allows 
anyone, including public officials, to sue for damages if circulated 
information is untrue or insults a person's honor or dignity. Article 
125 of the Criminal Code prescribes imprisonment of up to 3 years for 
libel. There is no distinction between private individuals and public 
officials (except for the President), nor is there a limit to the 
amount of damages that may be awarded. Consequently, any journalist who 
publishes an article critical of a public official risks being sued for 
damages. Additionally, the Prosecutor General can file criminal libel 
charges. According to Ministry of Justice statistics, 123 persons were 
convicted in 1998 for criminal libel. Of these, seven cases resulted in 
prison sentences. According to the Union of Journalists of Ukraine, 
journalists lose two of every three cases against them in the courts. 
Journalists complain that because the law does not limit damages, it 
can be used to drive opposition newspapers out of business.
    On occasion fines were so large that accounts were frozen and 
equipment confiscated by the Tax Inspectorate to enforce payment. It is 
clear that a large number of libel and personal dignity suits are 
motivated politically. Moreover, even when the actions of the Tax 
Inspectorate are overturned by subsequent court decisions, the damage 
to the newspapers' finances can be irreparable. Their accounts remain 
frozen until all appeals are completed. Independent newspapers face 
further financial pressure as they try to compete with propresidential 
newspapers, which are sold at a price significantly below cost. 
Newspapers aligned with the presidential administration reportedly 
often are financed by wealthy presidential allies. The threat of 
multiple lawsuits for large amounts of money also was used to pressure 
owners of opposition newspapers to sell their shares to their political 
opponents.
    On February 25, Peter Hois, the editor of the Uzhgorod newspaper 
Rio, was detained for 2 days for criminal libel in connection with 
statements that were never printed. The newspaper was to publish a 
statement accusing various Rada deputies of abusing their positions. 
However, Hois deleted the specific names and accusations, but the 
Prosecutor General used the original text as the basis for Hois's 
arrest (see Section 1.d.).
    Journalists sometimes were subjected to physical attack related to 
their professional activities. Some journalists reported threats of 
arrest or assaults when investigating crime and official corruption 
(see Section 1.c.). The intermeshing of organized crime and many public 
officials makes it difficult to assess whether these attacks and 
threats were motivated politically.
    Despite government pressure and media self-censorship, the variety 
of newspapers and periodicals on the market, each espousing the view of 
its respective sponsor, provides a variety of opinion. Foreign 
newspapers and periodicals circulate freely.
    The broadcast media, the primary source of news and information for 
most citizens, are either state-owned or, in the case of private 
stations, subject to pressure from the Government, which took steps 
during the year to strengthen its control over this sector. In 1998 the 
Government handed over state-owned broadcasting and transmission 
facilities from the Derzhteleradio (State Committee for Television and 
Radio) directly to the Information Ministry (later reorganized as the 
State Committee for Information Policy). The President and the 
Parliament each appoint half of the members of the National Council for 
Television and Radio Broadcasting, which issues licenses and allocates 
broadcasting time. However, as of October, President Kuchma had not 
named his half of the eight-member National Television and Radio 
Council. The Rada named its four members, but the President claimed 
that the vote was conducted with procedural irregularities. The 
inability of the Council to achieve a quorum provided the Government 
with virtually unchallenged control over media licensing prior to the 
presidential election.
    Other state agencies took advantage of the lack of a working 
Council to harass opposition stations. For example, the frequency of 
arbitrary tax inspections increased considerably without a working 
council. The State Electro-Communications Inspectorate increased the 
fees for broadcast frequencies tenfold in the early summer without the 
prior approval of the Council. Fee increases disproportionately affect 
independent stations, since state channels are permitted to ignore 
payment of their frequency fees. The law entitles private and foreign 
companies to obtain a license to establish and operate their own 
transmission facilities.
    Prior to the October 31 presidential election, the Government 
stepped up pressure on the broadcast media, using tax inspections and 
other measures, and forced at least five local television stations 
(four in the Crimea and one in Dnipropetrovsk) to close. Numerous 
sources charge that the administration has used government agencies, 
particularly the Tax Inspectorate, to pressure the opposition media and 
businesses supporting its political opponents. During the year, the 
independent television station STB, one of the more balanced and 
independent media outlets, faced increasing harassment by government 
entities and was threatened with closure if it did not cede financial 
and editorial control to presidential supporters. In February and March 
STB staff members suffered various attacks: A cameraman was beaten and 
his equipment and videotapes stolen; masked individuals assaulted the 
station's commercial director and his wife in his home; the president 
of the board of directors received telephone threats; and burglars 
robbed the home of the station's news director, stealing videotapes, 
computer disks, and documents (see Section 1.c.). In March 
Ukrcreditbank, which is controlled by an ally of President Kuchma, 
announced a lawsuit of approximately $1.3 million (5 million hryvnia) 
against STB for an expose the station ran on a factory privatization in 
which the bank played a role. On May 28 and June 7, the Ukrainian 
Frequency Supervision Agency ordered STB to discontinue the satellite 
uplink for broadcasting programming to its regional affiliates. STB 
ignored the order, which would have resulted in the loss of half of its 
viewers, since it did not believe that the order was legal. On August 
26, the State Tax Administration froze STB's bank accounts for failure 
to pay sufficient taxes. This action caused serious financial hardship 
for the station, and it was forced to cancel its political programming. 
As of October, STB had changed its programming to take a more pro-
Kuchma approach but continued to suffer from official pressure.
    On March 9, the Dnipropetrovsk oblast transmission center, acting 
on instructions from the regional directorate of the State Electronic 
Communications Inspection, ceased broadcasting Channel 11, one of the 
city's more popular local television stations. The center claimed that 
Channel 11 did not have proper documentation or appropriate permits. On 
orders from an oblast official, the broadcast antenna on the station's 
roof was removed and its journalists were told to vacate the station's 
premises, allegedly without a warrant. The station resumed broadcasting 
on March 18 after it was acquired by Viktor Pinchuk, a Rada deputy, 
unofficial presidential advisor, and owner of the country's largest and 
most influential daily, Fakty.
    On July 26, the State Electronic Communications Agency ordered a 
state-owned broadcast center to cease transmitting the signals of four 
independent Crimean television companies, including the popular Black 
Sea television station, reportedly because the broadcast center lacked 
the proper permits. The four stations believe that the move was 
intended to prevent coverage of opposition presidential candidates.
    The presidential campaign saw a marked imbalance in coverage of 
candidates on national television and radio channels (except the STB 
television channel). Opposition presidential candidates received very 
limited and often negative coverage at the national level. Opposition 
candidates had more success in obtaining access to smaller local and 
regional television channels. According to a Rada-sponsored media 
monitoring group, President Kuchma appeared on national television more 
than twice as often as any other candidate. On July 28, three leading 
contenders, Yevhen Marchuk, Oleksandr Moroz, and Oleksandr Tkachenko, 
publicly charged that their supporters had been harassed and 
intimidated and that media outlets had been closed to restrict coverage 
of their campaigns. Despite vehement protests from the Rada, in May the 
state-controlled National Television and Radio Company suspended live 
radio broadcasts of parliamentary sessions, which had been broadcast 
since 1990. (Of the 15 presidential candidates, 13 were Members of 
Parliament.) Radio broadcasts of Rada sessions resumed in early October 
on a small, private Kiev station.
    There is no known government censorship of books, film, or theater.
    While major universities are state owned, they operate for the most 
part under full autonomy. However, academic freedom is an 
underdeveloped and poorly understood concept. Nepotism and bribery 
reportedly are common during entrance exams and also influence the 
granting of degrees. Administrators of universities and academic and 
research institute directors possess the power to silence colleagues by 
denying them the ability to publish, withholding pay and housing 
benefits, or directly terminating them. This atmosphere tends to limit 
the spirit of free inquiry. Restrictions by the Communications Ministry 
on the mailing of scientific documents also have caused concern.
    The State Secrets Committee maintains offices for the protection of 
state secrets in state scientific and research institutes, including 
those not conducting any classified research. An April 1998 
presidential edict allows only government-designated contractors to 
provide Internet access at state institutions that have such censorship 
offices. Human rights groups fear that this may limit the freedom of 
information for universities and scientific research institutes. 
Another presidential decree in June required that all communication 
companies and Internet providers be licensed and that their equipment 
be fitted for wiretapping (implicitly by the security services). 
However, this decree was blocked by Parliament in September (see 
Section 1.f.).
    All private and religiously affiliated universities operate without 
any reported state interference or harassment.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
and law provide for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally 
respects this right in practice; however, there were some instances in 
which this right was restricted. The 1988 law on public assembly 
circumscribes freedom of assembly by stipulating that organizations 
must apply for permission to their respective local administration at 
least 10 days before a planned event or demonstration. The Criminal 
Code prescribes up to 6 months in prison, 1 year of corrective labor, 
or a fine for repeatedly staging unauthorized demonstrations. The 1996 
Constitution requires that demonstrators merely inform the authorities 
of a planned demonstration in advance; however, authorities insist that 
all demonstrations meet the restrictive requirements of the 1988 law. 
Under the 1988 law, demonstrators are prohibited from inciting violence 
or ethnic conflict and from calling for the violent overthrow of the 
constitutional order. In practice unlicensed demonstrations are common, 
and most but not all occur without police interference, including fines 
or detention; however, there were no reports of cases of interference 
during the year. In March the leader of a pro-Russian group in 
Dnipropetrovsk was jailed for 3 days for repeatedly holding 
unauthorized pro-Russian demonstrations.
    The Dnipropetrovsk trial of former government opponent Leopold 
Taburiansky, who spent several months in pretrial detention in 1996 for 
repeatedly holding unauthorized demonstrations on behalf of duped 
clients of pyramid schemes, has been suspended indefinitely. Human 
rights groups believe that this illustrates a pattern of government use 
of such suspended criminal cases against opponents or their close 
associates to silence critics. Communist groups complain that the 
authorities fail to punish Ukrainian nationalist groups who harass them 
during their demonstrations. Ukrainian nationalist groups in turn 
complain that the authorities do not protect them from harassment by 
Communist groups.
    The Constitution, law, and government regulations restrict freedom 
of association to varying degrees. These restrictions generally apply 
to organizations that are considered dangerous, such as those which 
advocate violence or racial and religious hatred, or which threaten the 
public order or health.
    A government requirement that a political party have 
representatives in at least half of the country's regions in order to 
register officially has limited the ability of Russian, Crimean, Tatar, 
and Romanian groups to organize (see Section 3).
    The Ministry of Justice, with the Prosecutor General's consent, has 
the authority to warn, fine, or suspend operations of political parties 
for illegal operations. Suspension can be for up to 3 months and can be 
extended for 6 months upon the Ministry's request.
    In 1998 the Constitutional Court invalidated the 1993 Crimean law 
on citizens' associations, thus outlawing regional Crimean parties. A 
1992 law on public organizations prohibits the State from financing or 
materially supporting political parties. According to this law, 
political parties may not receive funds from abroad or maintain 
accounts in foreign banks. The law prohibits police authorities, 
members of the SBU, and armed forces personnel from joining political 
parties.
    Prior to the 1998 parliamentary elections, mass--perhaps coerced--
enrollment of public sector and government employees augmented the 
ranks of progovernment parties, particularly the People's Democratic 
Party (see Section 1.f.).
    Freedom of association also is restricted through a strict 
registration requirement that lends itself to political manipulation 
and corruption; however, in practice such regulations seldom are 
employed to restrict this freedom. Groups must register with the 
Government to pursue almost any purpose. The Ministries of Internal 
Affairs, Justice, Economy, and Foreign Economic Relations, as well as 
the State Committees on Religion and Broadcasting and other government 
bodies have registration functions and used this power to limit freedom 
of association (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    For example, after almost a year of attempting to register as a 
national organization, a Luhansk-based group for the protection of gay 
rights finally succeeded in registering in November. According to group 
representatives, local officials indicated that the group was not 
registered because it was a gay rights group.
    Groups must be registered with the Government to engage in almost 
any activity, whether commercial, political, religious, or 
philanthropic. Unregistered groups are prohibited from opening bank 
accounts, acquiring property, or entering into contracts.
    The registration law gives the Government the right to inspect the 
activities of all registered groups. This law requires that a party 
specify all its activities in its charter, but the party is not 
required to notify authorities of all its meetings. A change in the 
group's charter necessitates reregistration.
    A registered group may not duplicate any function or service that 
the Government is expected to provide. For example, human rights 
lawyers who wish to represent prisoners are prohibited from 
establishing an association because the Government is required by the 
Constitution to provide lawyers for the accused. However, this 
requirement is not always enforced. In the mid-1990's, AI was refused 
registration under the pretext that human rights protection is the 
function of the State. It continued to apply and eventually was 
registered. Lack of registration has several important disadvantages. 
Unregistered groups are prohibited from having bank accounts, acquiring 
property, or entering into contracts.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution and the 1991 Law on 
Freedom of Conscience and Religion provide for separation of church and 
state and the right to practice the religion of one's choice; the 
Government generally respects these rights in practice, with the 
exception of some nonnative religions, which experienced difficulties 
registering, buying, or leasing property. The Government generally 
permits religious organizations to establish places of worship and to 
train clergy. The Government has continued to expedite allotment of 
land plots for construction of new houses of worship and to return 
religious buildings and sites to their former owners.
    Although the Government's protection of religious freedom had 
deteriorated for nonnative religious organizations (defined as all 
organizations other than Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Jewish) in 
recent years, nonnative religions reported less difficulty in obtaining 
visas and registering during the year. The Government does not 
discriminate against individual believers of nonnative religions, but 
their organizations faced ongoing difficulty in carrying out their 
activities during the year. However, through burdensome licensing 
requirements and informal means, local authorities restricted nonnative 
religions as well as Christian denominations other than Greek Catholic 
and Orthodox. The Government took steps to return to religious groups 
properties expropriated during the Soviet era.
    A 1993 amendment to the 1991 Law on the Freedom of Conscience and 
Religion restricts the activities of nonnative, foreign-based, 
religious organization. The amendment narrowly defines the permissible 
activities of members of the clergy, preachers, teachers, and other 
foreign citizen representatives of foreign-based religious 
organizations. They may preach, administer religious ordinances, or 
practice other canonical activities ``only in those religious 
organizations which invited them to Ukraine and with official approval 
of the governmental body that registered the statutes and the articles 
of the pertinent religious organization.'' Although the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-Day Saints had complained in 1998 that this 
restriction prevented the transfer of its missionaries between cities, 
during the year church leaders reported no difficulties in transferring 
missionaries between cities.
    All religious organizations are required by the 1991 religion law 
to register with the State Committee on Religious Affairs. If a group 
chooses to register as a national organization it must register with 
the central office of the State Committee for Religious Affairs, and 
each of its local groups must register with the local office of the 
State Committee in the region where they are located. Those groups that 
choose to register as local organizations must register only with the 
regional office of the State Committee. This status is necessary to own 
property or carry out many economic activities, such as publishing 
religious materials or opening bank accounts. This process is supposed 
to take not more than 1 month (or 3 months in cases in which either the 
central or regional Committee decides that an expert opinion is 
necessary to determine the legitimacy of a group applying for 
registration). However, this requirement often is not met. The regional 
offices also supervise the compliance of religious organizations with 
the provisions of the law. Some nonnative religious organizations 
credibly reported that, especially at the local or regional levels, 
officials of the State Committee refused to register their 
organizations for protracted periods, thus effectively delaying their 
activities and limiting freedom of association (see Section 2.b.). 
However, there were fewer reports than in prior years of nonnative 
religious groups experiencing such registration problems.
    Native religious organizations, especially the Orthodox church in 
the central, southern, and eastern regions of the country and the Greek 
Catholic Church in the west, exerted significant political influence at 
the local and regional levels and pressured local officials not to 
register nonnative religious organizations or to allow them to rent or 
purchase property. Each of the two dominant denominations, within their 
respective spheres of influence, also reportedly pressured local 
officials to restrict the activities of the other.
    The ongoing dispute among competing Orthodox Christian 
administrative bodies claiming to be ``the Ukrainian Orthodox Church'' 
remained deadlocked. The Government has been unable to stop 
disagreements between the Orthodox believers and Greek Catholics in the 
western part of the country, where the two communities are contentious 
and often engage in bitter disputes over church buildings and property 
in over 600 localities. The Kiev Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church 
complained of harassment by local authorities in the predominantly 
Russian-speaking eastern region of the country, while the Moscow 
Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church complained that local governments 
turned a blind eye to the appropriation of its churches in the 
Ukrainian-speaking western region. In April Patriarch Filaret of the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate and his followers were 
assaulted by supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate in Mariupol (see 
Section 5). A planned tour of the country by the Moscow Patriarchate 
was canceled at the request of President Kuchma due to security 
concerns.
    According to the State Committee for Religious Affairs, the 
transfer of most places of worship back to their original owners 
according to a 1992 decree on restitution was nearing completion at 
year's end. In 1996 and 1997, 105 buildings were returned; in 1998 92 
were returned; and in 1999 103 were returned. There still were about 
380 former houses of worship that were used for nonreligious purposes, 
but 275 of them were not claimed by religious groups. In the fourth 
quarter of the year, local authorities in the oblasts of 
Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpatia, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava, 
Sumy, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi, as well as in Sevastopol, returned 42 
former houses of worship to religious groups.
    Numerous Jewish congregations have negotiated successfully with 
local authorities for worship space. In 1996 a Kiev arbitration court 
decided in favor of transferring the title of the former Kiev Central 
Synagogue, which in Soviet times was used as a puppet theater, to a 
Chabad Hasidic congregation. By December 1997, the puppet theater had 
vacated the building, and in the spring of 1998 the building reopened 
once again as a synagogue. The decision set an important precedent for 
the judiciary's role in religious property restitution. According to 
Jewish community representatives, progress on restitution was frozen 
for the first few months of the year but resumed thereafter at a rate 
satisfactory to Jewish community leaders. For example, a synagogue was 
returned in Poltava oblast in the fourth quarter of the year.
    The pace of restitution of Christian churches has slowed in recent 
years, since the buildings that remain in state possession tend to be 
prime properties currently being used as museums, concert halls, or 
city halls. All religions have enjoyed equal opportunity to regain 
control over former community property. Problems in obtaining 
restitution result from inadequate legislation, bureaucratic inertia, 
and the difficulty of locating alternative quarters for current 
occupants. In February a presidential order instructed all local 
governments to complete the handover of former religious property 
whenever possible by the end of the year and banned privatization of 
religious communities' property. The Committee attributed delays in 
returning other properties to lack of funds and the difficulties 
involved in finding alternative space for current users.
    Nonetheless, a number of religious properties were returned to 
Christian churches during the year. Of the 42 houses of worship 
returned in the fourth quarter of the year, the Ukrainian Orthodox 
Church received 20 buildings. In particular the Assumption Monastery in 
Donetsk oblast received several structures. The Kiev Patriarchate 
received four churches, including one of national architectural 
importance in Berezhany, Ternopil oblast. Authorities transferred 16 
former cathedrals to the Greek Catholic Church and 4 to Roman Catholic 
parishes. A Lutheran church also was returned in Ternopil oblast.
    In May authorities arrested three Baptist ministers (see Section 
1.d.).
    The Government made significant efforts during the year to ensure 
that pilgrims of the Bratslav Hasidic sect were able to visit the tomb 
of their founding rabbi in the city of Uman on the occasion of the 
Jewish New Year.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and with some limits, the Government respects them in practice. 
However, the Government has not yet fulfilled its pledge to abolish 
mandatory registration--the ``propiska'' system--and to replace it with 
an informational residence register (see Section 1.f.). Regulations 
impose a nationwide requirement to register at the workplace and place 
of residence in order to be eligible for social benefits, thereby 
complicating freedom of movement by limiting access to certain social 
benefits to the place where one is registered. For example, persons who 
move to other regions for work in the private sector may be denied 
formal access to free medical care and other services provided by the 
State. Residence without registration carries a fine under the 
administrative code, but this provision rarely is enforced. Human 
rights groups reported an increasing number of cases of persons being 
stripped of their residence registration, evicted from their homes, and 
made homeless through criminal fraud or court error. Police also 
arbitrarily detain persons for extensive document checks and vehicle 
inspections (see Section 1.f.).
    An August 1998 regulation requiring foreigners to obtain special 
permits to visit areas within 18 to 30 miles of the border was 
rescinded in April. In September the governor in Donetsk oblast 
declared restrictions on foreign travel for directors of enterprises 
owing wage arrears; however, the restrictions have not been enforced.
    Citizens who wish to travel abroad are able to do so freely. Exit 
visas are required for citizens who intend to take up permanent 
residence in another country. There were no known cases of exit visas 
being denied during the year. The Government may deny passports to 
individuals in possession of state secrets, but denials may be 
appealed. A lapse in an Israeli-Ukrainian student exchange agreement 
during the year led to concerns about the ability of several hundred 
Ukrainian students to travel overseas for study in Israel. While 
negotiations continued between the Ukrainian and Israeli Governments 
over the renewal of the lapsed exchange agreement, the Ukrainian 
Government took steps to ensure that the students in question could 
travel to Israel.
    Citizenship law provides the right to citizenship for all 
individuals who were born or lived in the country before independence 
and to their descendants who lived outside the country as of November 
13, 1991. In order to be eligible, persons must not be citizens of 
other countries and must submit their application by the year 2000. 
Dual citizenship is not recognized. A 1997 amendment to the citizenship 
law also provides the right to citizenship for deported victims of 
political oppression, such as the Crimean Tatars. Refugees can acquire 
citizenship if they have lived legally in the country for 5 years and 
can communicate in the Ukrainian language. Since independence over 1.5 
million Ukrainians have returned to the country, while over 1 million 
persons, mostly ethnic Russians, have left the country.
    The Government has not supported a foreign-funded program to 
facilitate the travel to Ukraine of some emigrants who qualify for 
resettlement as refugees. Approximately 260,000 Crimean Tatars have 
returned from exile to Crimea, mainly from Central Asia. As of August, 
192,700 of them had acquired Ukrainian citizenship. Crimean Tatar 
leaders have complained that their community has not received adequate 
assistance in resettling and that an onerous process of acquiring 
citizenship has excluded many of them from participating in elections 
and from the right to take part in the privatization of land and state 
assets. However, the 1997 amendment to the citizenship law waives some 
of the usual residence and language requirements for returning 
deportees and expedites the acquisition of citizenship. The amendment 
facilitates the acquisition of citizenship by Crimean Tatars who were 
deported victims of political oppression. It allows deported persons, 
including Crimean Tatars, to acquire Ukrainian citizenship without a 
mandatory 5-year term of residence in the country and without Ukrainian 
language proficiency. On July 13, the Rada further amended the 
citizenship law to allow deported persons or their descendents living 
in the country for 5 years to acquire automatically Ukrainian 
citizenship without having to renounce any foreign citizenship they may 
possess. Previously Crimean Tatars had difficulty obtaining documents 
from Uzbekistan to confirm that they had relinquished their Uzbek 
citizenship.
    The 1993 Law on Refugees governs the treatment of refugees and 
entitles refugees to all the benefits accorded to citizens. The 
Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), and refugee status initially is given for a 3-month term and 
is subject to further extension. As of October, 3,500 persons (70 
percent of whom are Afghans) had been granted refugee status. A 
commitment has been made to award refugee status to all Afghans who 
arrived in the country before 1995. Under the new citizenship law, 
legally registered refugees can apply for citizenship after 5 years of 
permanent residence. Under the refugee law, refugees are entitled to 
material assistance. The Cabinet decided to start allocating funds in 
the 1999 national budget for payment of refugee pensions and small 
allowances for indigent refugees, plus transportation fare to a refugee 
center. In cooperation with the UNHCR in 1997, the Government 
established a refugee receiving center for 200 persons in Vinnytsya. 
The Government plans to open four other centers elsewhere; however, no 
additional center has as yet been opened.
    Instances of police harassment of certain categories of refugees 
appear to have diminished during the year.
    According to the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration, 
the Government has a first asylum policy. This means that persons who 
travel directly from their home country to Ukraine as refugees are 
assured refugee status. However, there were some problematic cases 
during the year. In March four Uzbeks, including two exiled Uzbek 
oppositionists, reportedly were arrested without a warrant, were denied 
counsel, and were deported forcibly to Uzbekistan without a hearing, 
despite protests by human rights groups. On August 18, a court in 
Uzbekistan sentenced the four to between 8 and 15 years in prison for 
insulting the president and conspiracy against the constitution, in all 
but one case. The four released a statement on August 17, in which they 
claimed that they had been tortured and forced to give false testimony.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the right and the ability to change the government 
peacefully. The Constitution provides universal suffrage for citizens 
at least 18 years of age, and for periodic elections every 4 years for 
the Parliament and every 5 years for the President. A presidential 
election was held on October 31 and November 14. Parliamentary 
elections took place in 1994 and in March 1998.
    Power is divided between the executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches. Although nominally independent, the judicial branch in 
practice is influenced heavily by the executive (see Section 1.e.). The 
President appoints the Prime Minister, who appoints the remainder of 
the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, as well as certain other appointments, 
such as the Prosecutor General, is subject to parliamentary approval. 
The Constitution grants the President limited power to pass binding 
decrees and directives that have the power of law.
    International observers noted violations of election day procedures 
in both the October 31 voting and the November 14 runoff in the 
presidential elections, with more numerous and serious violations 
occurring in the second round of voting. However the violations 
reportedly were not widespread or systematic. The most serious problems 
were imbalanced media coverage and the coordinated and inappropriate 
involvement of government officials in both rounds of the election on 
behalf of President Kuchma. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also was concerned over pressure exerted 
on voters in prisons, hospitals, and educational institutions on behalf 
of President Kuchma. A representative of the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe declared that the elections were ``far from fair 
and democratic.'' OSCE observers noted unauthorized persons, including 
SBU officers, present in polling stations, especially during the runoff 
election, and had reports of militia involvement in campaigning. After 
the first round of voting, three regional administrators were 
dismissed, allegedly for failing to produce sufficient votes for 
President Kuchma in their districts. After the second round of voting, 
President Kuchma dismissed two oblast governors and six raion 
(regional) heads in those regions were Kuchma received fewer votes than 
Communist Party rival Symonenko. Very high voter turnouts, particularly 
in western districts, aroused suspicion of ballot stuffing on President 
Kuchma's behalf in the second round of voting. However, observers 
concluded that it was unlikely that these problems significantly 
altered the final outcome of the election, in view of President 
Kuchma's 18-point margin of victory.
    In the preelection period, various forms of government pressure on 
the media served to limit the independence of the press (see Section 
2.a.). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe found that 
state media coverage of the presidential campaign was biased strongly 
in favor of President Kuchma. In the period prior to the October 31 
presidential election the Government allegedly used government 
agencies, especially the Tax Inspectorate, to disrupt or eliminate the 
businesses of political opponents prior to the elections. Presidential 
candidate Yevhen Marchuk reported that police ordered a meeting with 
voters evacuated in Luhansk in August citing an anonymous bomb threat 
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Other candidates reported difficulty 
renting meeting halls, closure of their local campaign offices by 
government officials, confiscation of campaign vehicles, and pressure 
on employees from directors of state-owned enterprises. Many opposition 
presidential candidates complained that the SBU overstepped its mandate 
and interfered in the campaign to the benefit of President Kuchma. 
These reports appear credible. There are confirmed reports that the SBU 
monitored NGO's engaged in nonpartisan political activity (see Sections 
1.f. and 4). In August several Rada deputies released what appeared to 
be a secret SBU document addressed to an aide to President Kuchma. The 
document was an analysis of which publications and television and radio 
stations supported which presidential candidate in Mykolayiv oblast. 
Supporters of opposition presidential candidates were beaten by unknown 
assailants and one local campaign headquarters was burned down (see 
Section 1.c.).
    Presidential candidate Oleksandr Moroz complained after the first 
round of voting about the presidential administration's dominance over 
the media and the illegal involvement of state officials in Kuchma's 
campaign. In response to this complaint, the Supreme Court declared on 
November 13 that it does not have the right to question the decision of 
the Central Election Committee or to declare an election null and void 
but that it could only order recounts in specific polling stations.
    Women are active in political life but hold a disproportionately 
small percentage of offices. Women hold 28 of the 450 seats in the 
Rada. Only two women hold ministerial posts. The 18-member 
Constitutional Court has 2 female members.
    Jews are well represented among the political elite and hold 
several parliamentary seats. Many Crimean Tatars are unable to 
participate fully in the political process, primarily due to 
citizenship problems (see Section 2.d.). The government requirement 
that a political party have representatives in at least half of the 
country's regions in order to register officially has limited the 
ability of Russian, Crimean Tatar, and Romanian minority groups to 
organize (see Section 2.b.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups 
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing 
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally 
are cooperative and responsive to their views. However, human rights 
groups reported more difficulties in investigating penal conditions, 
which are a significant human rights concern. There are confirmed 
reports that the SBU monitored NGO's engaged in nonpartisan political 
activity during the presidential election campaign (see Section 3).
    In January 1998, the President signed the law creating the 
Parliamentary Commissioner on Human Rights, which is a constitutionally 
mandated independent human rights ombudsman. Parliament elected the 
first Ombudsman in April 1998. The Human Rights Ombudsman serves a 5-
year term and, in principle, is invested by law with very broad powers. 
The extent of the Ombudsman's independence has not been established, 
and the Ombudsman's office has not yet released any reports.
    The law provides the Ombudsman with unrestricted and unannounced 
access to any public official, including the President; unrestricted 
access to any government installation; and oversight of implementation 
of human rights treaties and agreements to which the country is a 
party. However, the law provides no penalties for those who obstruct 
the Ombudsman's investigations, nor does it create sufficient 
enforcement authority for the Ombudsman. The law required the 
Government to submit amendments to existing laws to provide the legal 
framework for the operation of the Ombudsman's office. The Ombudsman's 
office itself drafted some 70 amendments to this effect, but those 
amendments had not been enacted at year's end. All citizens and current 
residents can address their concerns to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman 
also serves as the intermediary between citizens and the Constitutional 
Court, since citizens cannot address the Court directly. During the 
year, the Ombudsman made combating trafficking in persons a priority 
and personally traveled overseas to accompany women who were victims of 
trafficking back to the country (also see Section 6.f.).
    Citizens have the right to file appeals with the European Court of 
Human Rights in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations. 
According to one human rights expert, some 13,000 appeals were made to 
the Court in 1998 and some 200 cases were accepted by the Court for 
review.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, 
sex, and other grounds; however, due in part to the absence of an 
effective judicial system, the Government does not enforce these 
provisions effectively. The Government has not prosecuted anti-Semitic 
acts under the law forbidding the sowing of interethnic hatred.
    Women.--Violence against women is reportedly pervasive. While new 
statistics compiled by the U.N. Development Program show that the 
number of reported rapes and attempted rapes decreased during recent 
years, surveys indicate that the majority of rapes and other cases of 
physical abuse go unreported. Past surveys by women's groups indicated 
that between 10 and 15 percent of women had been raped, and over 25 
percent physically abused, in their lifetimes.
    The Criminal Code outlaws rape and ``forced sex with a materially 
dependent person,'' which may allow prosecution for spousal rape. 
Spousal abuse also is illegal, but authorities often pressure women not 
to press charges against their husbands. Separate statistics on 
prosecutions for wife beating or on average sentences are not 
available. In 1997, the last year for which statistics are available, 
1,510 criminal cases were opened for rape, 822 for sexual abuse, and 3 
for sexual compulsion. Information on convictions was not available.
    Violence against women does not receive extensive media coverage, 
despite the efforts of human rights groups to highlight the problem. 
Hot lines, shelters, and other practical support for victims of abuse 
are practically nonexistent, although there are some shelters run by 
private organizations. In 1998 Kiev municipal authorities opened the 
country's first state-funded women's center. The Government announced 
plans in 1998 to establish a network of shelters throughout the country 
but by year's end it had not yet begun to implement these plans.
    Ukraine is an important source country of girls and women 
trafficked to Central and Western Europe and the Middle East for sexual 
exploitation (see Section 6.f.). An April 1998 amendment to the 
Criminal Code imposes harsh penalties for--among other offenses--
trafficking in human beings, including for sexual exploitation and 
pornography; however, the effectiveness of this step has not yet been 
established. The authorities rarely prosecute men for engaging women in 
the rapidly growing sector of sexually exploitative work.
    Women's groups reported that there was widespread sexual harassment 
in the workplace, including coerced sex. Apart from the law that 
prohibits forced sex with a ``materially dependent person,'' which 
applies to employees, there are inadequate legal safeguards against 
harassment. In the only known case of prosecution for sexual harassment 
in the workplace, Pravda Ukrayiny editor Oleksandr Horobets was 
convicted in May of sexual harassment of a subordinate and sentenced to 
7 months' confinement. However, the fact that Horobets was the editor 
of an opposition newspaper calls into question the motives of the 
procuracy in prosecuting the case (see Section 2.a.).
    Labor laws establish the legal equality of men and women, including 
equal pay for equal work, a principle that generally is observed. 
However, the economic crisis has harmed women disproportionately. Women 
are much more likely to be laid off than men. Women constitute 
approximately 60 percent of the unemployed population, and as much as 
90 percent of newly unemployed persons. Industries that are dominated 
by female workers are also those industries with the lowest relative 
wages and the ones that are most likely to be affected by wage arrears 
problems.
    The Constitution and the Law on Protection of Motherhood and 
Childhood prohibit the employment of women in jobs that are hazardous 
to their health, such as those that involve heavy lifting. However, 
despite implementation of a government program to combat dangerous 
labor, these laws remain poorly enforced. The Ministry of Labor 
estimated that 15 percent of working women are employed at hazardous 
jobs. Furthermore, human rights groups maintained that management 
selectively conforms to the law only as necessary to lay off or fire 
female workers. Many women's rights advocates fear that the law may be 
used to bar women from the best paying blue-collar jobs. By law 
pregnant women and mothers with small children enjoy paid maternity 
leave until their children reach the age of 3. However, this benefit is 
a disincentive for employers to hire women for responsible or career 
track jobs.
    Few women attain top managerial positions in state and private 
industry. According to government statistics, 69.2 percent of the 
country's 213,000 state administration jobs are held by women, 
including 45.2 per cent of the managerial positions. However, of the 
highest ``first'' and ``second'' category offices, only 5.6 percent in 
central or local governments are filled by women. (These numbers do not 
include the ``power ministries''--the Ministries of Defense, Internal 
Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and the SBU, which have substantially more 
male employees at all levels.)
    Educational opportunities for women generally have been, and 
continue to be, equal to those enjoyed by men.
    Children.--The Government is committed publicly to the defense of 
children's rights, but the deep economic crisis severely limits its 
ability to ensure these rights. The low priority that both the public 
and the Government attach to children's rights is reflected in the 
absence of groups that aggressively promote children's rights. For 
example, the widely acknowledged problem of growing violence and crime 
in and outside schools, especially the notoriously violent vocational 
schools, largely is ignored by the public and the Government.
    Free, universal education is compulsory until the age of 15. 
However, the public education system has deteriorated as a result of 
government financial disarray. Teachers often go unpaid for months. 
Increasing numbers of children from poor families drop out of school, 
and illiteracy, which was previously very rare, has become a problem. 
Health care is provided equally to girls and boys, but economic 
problems have worsened the overall quality of the health care system.
    There were increased cases of homeless children, who usually fled 
poor orphanage or poor domestic conditions. Although statistics are 
unavailable, drug use and child prostitution among these children are 
widespread and received substantial media attention during the year. 
Several charity groups were formed to assist these children, but they 
have not been able to reduce the problem. In 1997 the All-Ukrainian 
Committee for Protection of Children released survey results that 
reveal that every fifth or sixth child of both sexes under age 18 
suffers from sexual harassment (including every third girl), and every 
tenth girl is raped.
    Deteriorating conditions in the state orphanages led the Government 
to encourage families to provide foster homes for orphans and to 
facilitate the establishment of private, government-supervised 
orphanages. Currently, there are 75 such orphanages with some 800 
children. Public concern over the fate of children adopted by 
foreigners led to a 1997 amendment to the adoption law, which provided 
for thorough examination of each case and follow-up monitoring of the 
children's well-being. To curb illegal adoption, an April 1998 
amendment to the Criminal Code prescribed up to 15 years' imprisonment 
for trafficking in children and illegal adoption (see Section 6.f.). 
However, there had been no known successful cases of its application by 
year's end.
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against 
the disabled, but the Government has done little to support programs 
targeted at increasing opportunities for the disabled. The law mandates 
access to buildings and other public facilities for the disabled, but 
it is enforced poorly.
    Religious Minorities.--On April 30, a violent scuffle took place in 
the southeastern city of Mariupol between supporters of the Ukrainian 
Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the entourage of Patriarch 
Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate). Filaret 
had come to Mariupol to consecrate a cross erected on the future site 
of a Kiev Patriarchate church. Although initial press reports indicated 
that Filaret was beaten severely and hospitalized, it later became 
known that he had escaped with only very minor injuries. The 
Patriarch's aide, Father Superior Dymytryi, and a local Kiev 
Patriarchate priest, Father Volodymyr, were taken to the hospital with 
concussions and minor injuries. Several members of the local Kiev 
Patriarchate parish also were beaten and taken to the hospital. At a 
press conference on May 6, Filaret showed videotape that confirmed much 
of his version of the April 30 events. It showed a group of Filaret's 
opponents pulling down a new cross installed at the construction site 
of the new church. At the conference he accused Donetsk regional 
authorities of complicity in the scuffle and of actively supporting the 
Moscow Patriarchate.
    Anti-Semitism exists on an individual and societal basis. However, 
the central Government generally discouraged it. Some ultranationalist 
groups and newspapers continued to publish and distribute anti-Semitic 
tracts regularly. Anti-Semitic publications also are imported from 
Russia and distributed without the necessary state license. 
Presidential candidate Yuriy Karmazin, who according to polls was 
supported by less than 1 percent of voters, complained during his 
candidacy of ``Jewish control of the media.'' However, during the year 
President Kuchma repeatedly and publicly spoke about the need for the 
peaceful coexistence of ethnic and religious groups. Also during the 
year, authorities opened a criminal case against the editor of the 
Lviv-based newspaper Idealist for fomenting interethnic hatred. 
Moreover, the Procuracy warned certain publications against publishing 
anti-Semitic material. Early in the year, the Shimon Dubnov Ukrainian 
Academy of Jewish History and Culture filed suit against the 
nationalist newspaper Vechirniy Kiev for publishing anti-Semitic 
diatribes about the Academy's collection of scholarly articles, 
``Judeophobia Against Ukraine,'' which was published in 1998. The case 
still was pending at year's end.
    Anti-Semitic incidents continue to occur but, according to local 
Jewish organizations, have declined in number over recent years and 
were concentrated in western regions of the country.
    During the year, there were no arrests made in the 1997 firebombing 
of the Kharkiv Israeli cultural center, nor have there been any 
prosecutions for the desecration of Jewish cemeteries in 1997.
    There were occasional statements by Ukrainian Orthodox Church 
officials (both Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates) denouncing the spread of 
nonnative religions and sharply criticizing their missionary 
activities. Evangelical Christian missionaries reported some instances 
of societal discrimination against members of their churches, such as 
salary cuts, layoffs, and public criticism for betraying ``native 
religions''.
    Native religious organizations, especially the Orthodox Church and 
the Greek Catholic Church, pressured local and regional officials not 
to register nonnative religious organizations or to allow them to rent 
or purchase property. Both these denominations also reportedly 
pressured officials to restrict the activities of the other (see 
Section 2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Frequent harassment of racial 
minorities is a problem. Police officials routinely detain dark-skinned 
persons for arbitrary document checks. In addition, there were 
increased reports of racially motivated violence against persons of 
African and Asian heritage. Representatives of these groups claimed 
that police officials routinely ignored, and sometimes abetted, 
violence against them.
    Roma face considerable societal discrimination. Opinion polls have 
shown that among all ethnic groups, the level of intolerance is highest 
toward Roma. In the Transcarpathian region in particular, Roma continue 
to be subject to violence and abuse by police (see Section 1.c.).
    The Constitution provides for the ``free development, use, and 
protection of the Russian language and other minority languages in 
Ukraine.'' This compromise builds on a 1991 law on national minorities, 
which played an instrumental role in preventing ethnic strife by 
allowing individual citizens to use their respective national languages 
in conducting personal business and by allowing minority groups to 
establish their own schools. Nonetheless, some pro-Russian 
organizations in eastern Ukraine complained about the increased use of 
Ukrainian in schools and in the media. They claim that their children 
are disadvantaged when taking academic entrance examinations, since all 
applicants are required to take a Ukrainian language test.
    In Crimea Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar minorities credibly complain 
of discrimination by the Russian majority and demand that Ukrainian and 
Tatar languages be given equal treatment to Russian. According to Tatar 
leaders, unemployment is as high as 50 percent in their community. In 
January the office of the Tatar Assembly Mejlis (the unofficial Tatar 
parliament) was firebombed in Simferopol. No suspects were identified, 
but Tatars blamed Russian chauvinists. On May 18, some 35,000 Tatars 
demonstrated in Simferopol on the 55th anniversary of Stalin's 
deportation of the Tatars to Central Asia for official recognition of 
the Mejlis, Tatar representation in the Crimean parliament, and 
official status for the Tatar language. That same day President Kuchma 
created a presidential Tatar Advisory Committee that includes all 
members of the Mejlis. Tatar protestors then erected a tent camp in 
front of the Crimean government building. On May 24, the Tatars took 
down their tents after Crimean prime minister Serhiy Kunitsyn agreed to 
their demands for the creation of a council to represent Tatar 
interests in the Crimean government, for the right of Tatars returning 
from Central Asia to own land, and for the creation of Tatar schools.
    While the Crimean government, pleading insufficient funds, did not 
assent to requests from the Crimean Tatar community for assistance in 
reestablishing its cultural heritage through Tatar language 
publications and educational institutions, the central Government is 
working with the UNHCR, OSCE, and the International Organization for 
Migration on support for the Crimean Tatar community.
    Of the 260,000 Crimean Tatars who have returned to the country from 
exile in Central Asia, some 67,000 still lack citizenship. Crimean 
Tatar leaders have complained that their community has not received 
adequate assistance in resettling, and that the onerous process of 
acquiring citizenship has excluded many of them from participating in 
elections and from the right to take part in the privatization of land 
and state assets (see Section 2.d.).
    Romanians are calling for university-level instruction in Romanian 
or the establishment of a Romanian technical college. There are 86 
Romanian-language schools in the Chernivtsi oblast.
    Rusyns (Ruthenians) are calling for status as an official ethnic 
group in the country. At a congress held in Uzhhorod on June 27, 
representatives of the Rusyn community called for Rusyn-language 
schools, a Rusyn-language department at Uzhhorod University, and for 
Rusyn to be included as one of the country's ethnic groups in the 2001 
census. According to Rusyn leaders, more than 700,000 Rusyns live in 
the country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to join trade unions to defend ``professional, social and 
economic interests.'' Under the Constitution, all trade unions have 
equal status, and no government permission is required to establish a 
trade union. The 1992 Law on Citizens' Organizations (which includes 
trade unions) stipulates noninterference by public authorities in the 
activities of these organizations, which have the right to establish 
and join federations on a voluntary basis. In principle all workers and 
civil servants (including members of the armed forces) are free to form 
unions. In practice the Government discourages certain categories of 
workers, for example, nuclear power plant employees, from doing so. A 
new trade union law designed to replace Soviet-era legislation was 
adopted by Parliament and signed into law by the President in 
September.
    The successor to the Soviet trade unions, known as the Federation 
of Trade Unions (FPU), has begun to work independently of the 
Government and has been vocal in advocating workers' right to strike. 
The FPU has supported the protests of miners and other professions over 
unpaid wages. However, as during the Soviet era, most FPU affiliates 
work closely with management. Following President Kuchma's 1998 
appointment of the head of the FPU-affiliated coal miners' union to be 
director of the national coal monopoly, the FPU ended support for 
striking miners. Enterprise managers are free to join the FPU. In 1997 
the FPU leadership created a political party, the All-Ukrainian Party 
of Workers, which is virtually indistinguishable from the FPU.
    Independent unions now provide an alternative to the official 
unions in many sectors of the economy. The Independent Miners' Union of 
Ukraine (NPGU), unions representing pilots, civil air traffic 
controllers, locomotive engineers, aviation ground crews, and other 
unions operate either independently or within one of three national 
confederations. While exact membership is unknown, estimates for 
independent union membership range from 100,000 to 300,000, while 
estimates for FPU-affiliated unions range from 17 to 23 million 
members. Independent unions have claimed unsuccessfully a share of the 
former Soviet trade unions' huge property and funds, especially the 
social insurance benefits fund, a Soviet-era legacy traditionally 
controlled by the official unions.
    Independent unions claimed that the new trade union law is more 
restrictive than the old Soviet legislation. To acquire national 
status, a union must have representation in more than half of the 14 
regions of Kiev, or at one-third of the enterprises in a regionally 
based sector, or have a majority of union members in the sector. 
National status and registration confer the right to acquire space, 
property, to maintain bank accounts, and to enter legally binding 
agreements. These new requirements are likely to make it difficult for 
miners and sailors to organize. Another contentious requirement is 
mandatory registration by the Justice Ministry. Registration determines 
participation of a union in the national collective bargaining 
agreement with the Government, as well as membership on the Social 
Insurance Fund Board (see Section 6.b.). Independent unions are 
concerned that the Justice Ministry could deny registration to unions 
seen as undesirable. Additionally, management no longer is obligated to 
provide free accommodation and telephone lines to unions. However, the 
law gives unions a say in labor safety and division of newly built 
housing.
    The Constitution provides for the right to strike ``to defend one's 
economic and social interests.'' The Constitution states that strikes 
must not jeopardize national security, public health, or the rights and 
liberties of others. The law does not extend the right to strike to 
members of the procuracy, judiciary, armed forces, security services, 
law enforcement agencies, and public servants. However, a 1998 Law on 
Labor Disputes Resolution extends the right to strike to employees of 
``continuing process plants,'' for example, metallurgical factories, 
provided that they give 15 days' advance notice of their intent to 
strike. The law prohibits strikes that jeopardize life or health, the 
environment, or that can hinder disaster, accident, or epidemic-related 
operations.
    The law does not prohibit specifically strikes based on political 
demands. The law prohibits strikes based on demands to change the 
constitutional order, state borders, or the administrative division of 
the country, as well as on demands that infringe on human rights. The 
Government has relied on the prosecutors and the courts to deal with 
strikes that it considered illegal. The law does not extend the 
immunity from discipline or dismissal to strikers who take part in 
strikes that later are declared illegal by the courts. A union that 
organizes an illegal strike is liable for strike-inflicted losses.
    In February 500 nuclear plant workers camped in tents outside the 
country's 5 nuclear power plants to protest their unpaid wages and to 
demand that the Government allocate more money to the nuclear power 
industry. At that point wage arrears for nuclear power plant employees 
totaled $42 million (150 million hryvnia), according to an atomic 
energy workers' union. The press reported on February 18 that six coal 
miners protesting wage arrears cut their wrists as a suicide threat in 
Lukansk oblast. In August the Independent Miners' Trade Union 
threatened to suspend coal supplies starting in September unless the 
Government began to pay back wages owed to miners. At that time some 
2,000 coal miners were on strike in the Donetsk region and hundreds of 
spouses and children of miners were protesting in Luhansk. Union 
leaders reported that wage arrears to miners totaled more than $435 
million (2 billion hryvnia) as of August.
    There are no official restrictions on the right of unions to 
affiliate with international trade union bodies. The NPGU is a member 
of the Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine, and General Workers' 
Union.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Law on 
Enterprises states that joint worker-management commissions should 
resolve issues concerning wages, working conditions, and the rights and 
duties of management at the enterprise level. Overlapping spheres of 
responsibility frequently impede the collective bargaining process. The 
Government, in agreement with trade unions, establishes wages in each 
industrial sector and invites all unions to participate in the 
negotiations. The Law on Labor Disputes Resolution, which came into 
force in March 1998, provides for the establishment of an arbitration 
service and a National Mediation and Reconciliation Service to mediate 
labor disputes. However, these services have not yet been established.
    The manner in which the collective bargaining law is applied 
prejudices the bargaining process against the independent unions and 
favors the official unions (affiliates of the FPU). Most workers never 
are informed that they are not obligated to join the official union. 
Renouncing membership in the official union and joining an independent 
union can be bureaucratically onerous and typically is discouraged by 
management. The collective bargaining law prohibits antiunion 
discrimination. Under the law, disputes should be resolved by the 
courts. There have been cases in which such disputes have not been 
settled in a fair and equitable manner.
    Under the new trade union law, an independent union also can be 
removed easily from the collective bargaining process at the enterprise 
level. Under the old law, if several unions at an enterprise failed to 
agree on joint representation, the bigger union (i.e., the FPU) 
represented labor in the bargaining process. The new law failed to 
repair this grievance.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
the Labor Code prohibit forced and compulsory labor, and it generally 
is not known to occur; however, the country is a major source of girls 
and women trafficked for sexual exploitation (see Section 6.f.). The 
Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by 
children; however, there were no reports of such practices, apart from 
victims of traffickers. The country is an important source of girls and 
women trafficked for sexual exploitation (see Section 6.f.).
    Human rights groups described as compulsory labor the common use of 
army conscripts and youths in the alternative service for refurbishing 
and building private houses for army and government officials. In 1998 
student groups protested against a presidential decree obliging college 
and university graduates, whose studies have been paid for by the 
Government, to work in the public sector at government-designated jobs 
for 3 years or to repay fully the cost of their education. Students 
described the decree as an anticonstitutional attempt to introduce 
compulsory labor, as the Constitution provides for free choice of job 
and one's agreement to work. The Government stated that the decree 
would cover only students who entered higher education institutions in 
1997 and thereafter. The extent of enforcement of the decree is 
unknown. However, human rights groups reported complaints from medical 
and law students that they had been forced to accept government-
assigned jobs for 3 years in repayment for the cost of their education 
or not receive their diplomas.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum employment age is 17; however, in certain 
nonhazardous industries enterprises may negotiate with the Government 
to hire employees between 14 and 17 years of age, with the consent of 
one parent. The Constitution provides for general secondary education. 
School attendance is compulsory to the age of 15, a regulation 
vigorously enforced by the Ministry of Education. However, since the 
Soviet era the number of dropouts has increased significantly, mostly 
because of rising poverty. The Criminal Code prescribes up to 5 years 
in prison for involving children in criminal activities, drinking, 
begging, prostitution, gambling, or other exploitation. The Government 
does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but 
there were no reports that it occurred, apart from victims of 
traffickers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage and 
pension is about $16.37 (73.7 hryvnia), and the officially reported 
average monthly wage is about $34.55 (155.5 hryvnia), which does not 
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Moreover, 
millions of persons go unpaid for many months because of shrinking 
budget revenue. As of October, the official poverty line is about 
$26.30 (118.3 hryvnia) per month, which does not correspond to the real 
subsistence level. It is estimated that some 50 percent of the 
population officially lives below that line, although the practice of 
underreporting sources of income is widespread. On September 17, the 
Rada adopted a new minimum old age pension of $12.22 (55 hryvnia), but 
the President vetoed it on October 1, stating that the budget could not 
fund such pensions.
    The Labor Code provides for a maximum 40-hour workweek, a 24-hour 
period of rest per week, and at least 24-days of paid vacation per 
year. Stagnation in some industries, for example, defense, 
significantly reduced the workweek for some categories of workers.
    The law contains occupational safety and health standards, but 
these frequently are ignored in practice. Lax safety standards and 
aging equipment caused many serious accidents, resulting in over 18,000 
persons injured and 913 killed in work-related accidents during the 
first half of the year. According to the Coal Mining Ministry, in the 
first half of the year there were 12 major mine accidents in which 
11,152 persons were injured. During the first 7 months of this year, 
190 miners were killed in mining accidents. In theory workers have a 
legal right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without 
jeopardizing continued employment. In reality, however, independent 
trade unionists reported that asserting this right would result in 
retaliation or perhaps dismissal by management.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The country is a major source country 
of women and girls trafficked to Central and Western Europe and the 
Middle East for sexual exploitation. The International Organization for 
Migration estimated in 1998 that 100,000 citizens had been trafficked 
abroad for this purpose since 1991. Italian officials estimate that at 
least 30,000 Ukrainian women are employed in Italy; and between 1991 
and 1997 Israeli authorities deported 1,500 Russian and Ukrainian women 
who had been trafficked there. The Parliament passed an amendment to 
the Criminal Code in April 1998 that imposes harsh penalties for--among 
other offenses--trafficking in human beings, including for sexual 
exploitation and pornography. Also, during the year the Government 
established special police units to investigate trafficking crimes. 
However, the effectiveness of these steps has not yet been established. 
In June the Human Rights Ombudsman established a National Coordinating 
Council for the Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings. The 
organization has yet to demonstrate its effectiveness. Trafficking is 
becoming a higher priority for law enforcement agencies, but these 
agencies often lack the financial and personnel resources to combat 
well established criminal organizations that run trafficking 
operations.
    The authorities do not prosecute routinely men for engaging women 
in the rapidly growing sector of sexually exploitative work. There were 
several recent cases of criminal prosecution on such charges; however, 
the sentences were not severe. In September two women were sentenced to 
5-year suspended sentences and fined about $150 (680 hryvnia) for 
trafficking women to brothels in the former Yugoslavia. A man in 
Kherson was given a suspended sentence and a fine for engaging women in 
prostitution in September. In March authorities in Sevastopol arrested 
three individuals on suspicion of selling some 200 young women and 
girls to be used as forced labor in night clubs or as prostitutes in 
Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. In August police in the Netherlands 
arrested a Ukrainian man along with three Dutch citizens for their role 
in a major network trafficking in women.
    The four were accused of forcing women from Eastern Europe and 
countries of the former Soviet Union to work in sex clubs in the 
southern part of the Netherlands. Some of the trafficked women were 
from Ukraine, according to authorities.
    NGO's claim that the local militia receives bribes in return for 
ignoring this problem. Moreover, some reports alleged that local public 
officials abetted or assisted organized criminal groups in trafficking 
women abroad.
    Women who are trafficked out of the country often are recruited by 
firms operating abroad and subsequently are taken out of the country 
with legal documentation. Once abroad the women find the work to be 
very different from what was represented to them initially.
    The Government, primarily due to lack of funds, is unable to assist 
victims effectively. Some NGO's, such as the domestic NGO La Strada, 
began offering some support services for victims of trafficking but 
also suffered from a shortage of funds. With foreign assistance, three 
regional trafficking prevention centers have been established in 
Donetsk, Lviv, and Dnipropetrovsk. The centers offer job-skill 
training, run telephone hot lines, and serve as referral centers for 
health, legal, and psychological counseling. La Strada hotlines served 
700 women from June 1998 through January.
    In August authorities in the Netherlands arrested a Ukrainian 
national and three Dutch nationals for trafficking women to sex clubs 
in the southern Netherlands from Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and Romania.
    In September the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a national program 
for the prevention of trafficking in women and children, involving 20 
ministries, local governments, international organizations, donors, and 
domestic and international NGO's. The program is to combat trafficking 
as well as to assist victims. However, severe budget restraints may 
limit the ability of the Government to implement the program 
effectively. The Ombudsman made trafficking a priority (see Section 4). 
The Ministry of Education approved a curriculum on trafficking 
prevention and awareness in all high schools.
    Public concern over the fate of children adopted by foreigners led 
to a 1997 amendment to the adoption law, which provided for thorough 
court examination of each case and follow-up monitoring of the 
children's well-being. To curb illegal adoption, an April 1998 
amendment to the Criminal Code prescribed up to 15 years' imprisonment 
for trafficking in children and illegal adoption. However, there have 
been no known successful cases of its application (see Section 5).
                                 ______
                                 

                             UNITED KINGDOM

    The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a 
longstanding constitutional monarchy with a democratic, parliamentary 
government. A lower legislative chamber (the House of Commons), the 
center of parliamentary power, is elected in periodic multiparty 
elections. An upper chamber (the House of Lords), with the power to 
revise and delay implementation of laws, is made up of hereditary and 
life peers and senior clergy of the established Church of England. In 
October, in the first stage of the Government's program to reform the 
upper chamber, the House of Lords agreed to remove all but 92 of its 
hereditary peers (life peers and clergy remain). The next step will be 
based on the recommendations of a royal commission, which is expected 
to issue its report in January 2000. There is an independent judiciary, 
but Parliament may overrule its decisions through legislation.
    Throughout the country, police forces are responsive to, and under 
the effective control of, civilian officials. Since 1996 the 
intelligence agency MI-5 has had the authority to act in support of 
other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of 
serious domestic crime. The police force in Northern Ireland has had a 
more complex and controversial role, due to the special and difficult 
circumstances in the region with respect to law and order. In some 
areas of Northern Ireland, because of the continuing threat of 
violence, army units operate to reinforce the Northern Ireland police 
force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Some members of the police 
force committed human rights abuses.
    A highly developed, diversified, market-based economy provides most 
residents with a high standard of living. Certain geographic areas, 
particularly older industrial areas including parts of Northern 
Ireland, suffer from higher than average unemployment rates. In 
addition, unemployment tends to be higher among some demographic 
groups, such as youth and racial minorities, and in Northern Ireland, 
among Catholics. The government provides comprehensive social welfare 
services, including a national health system, housing and family 
benefits, and heavily subsidized higher education.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its 
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. The police 
occasionally abused detainees. In February the inquiry into the death 
of black teenager Stephen Lawrence released its report, concluding that 
the investigation in the case--which led to the acquittal of five 
suspected attackers--was marred by a combination of professional 
incompetence and institutional racism by the London police. Prison 
overcrowding remains a problem, and the number of prison suicides rose 
to nearly a hundred. There are some limits on freedom of assembly and 
association related to the security situation in Northern Ireland. The 
Government continued to take steps to combat violence against women. 
Societal discrimination against women, nonwhite minorities, and the 
Traveller (nomadic) community are problems, as are child abuse and 
occasional societal violence against minorities. The Government took 
steps to improve worker rights.
    In Northern Ireland, political parties participated in a review of 
the Good Friday Agreement from September through November. Based on the 
results of this review, the parties nominated candidates to an 
Executive (Cabinet) for the elected Assembly on November 29, and 
Parliament devolved power to the new Assembly and Executive on December 
2. The power-sharing Executive included representatives from the four 
major political parties (two unionist and two nationalist/republican), 
although the two ministers from the conservative unionist Democratic 
Unionist Party boycotted meetings, including the inaugural meeting of 
the executive, because it included the republican Sinn Fein party. Part 
of the review involved specifying procedures for the decommissioning of 
paramilitary weapons under the aegis of the Independent International 
Commission for Decommissioning (IICD). Although both the Provisional 
Irish Republican Army and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) appointed 
interlocutors to the IICD, by year's end, apart from the token weapons 
handover by a loyalist splinter group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force 
(LVF) in December 1998, none of the major paramilitary organizations 
had verifiably decommissioned any weapons.
    The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (HRC) began operations 
on March 1 and concentrated its efforts on internal organization. 
Although human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) criticized 
the new body's lack of investigative powers, the Human Rights 
Commission received 114 applications for assistance and made an 
additional 66 informal inquiries. The Northern Ireland Fair Employment 
Commission, Equal Opportunities Commission, Commission for Racial 
Equality, and Disability Council were amalgamated into the Equality 
Commission in October. The Government's Northern Ireland Office 
appointed 21 members to the Commission in August.
    The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland 
(commonly referred to as the Patten Commission after its chairman, 
former Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten) called in its September report 
for a ``new beginning'' to policing in Northern Ireland. Notable 
recommendations include a reduction in the size of the force to a 
little over one-half of its current strength of 13,500; a change in 
name to the Police Service of Northern Ireland; a scheme to increase 
recruitment of Catholics to the force; and the introduction of a 
central Policing Board, which will include members from the political 
parties that make up the Executive of the Northern Ireland Assembly. 
The recommendations provoked strong criticism by the unionist 
community.
    A review of the structure, management, and funding of the criminal 
justice system in Northern Ireland continued during the year. A report 
from the Government originally was scheduled for release in October but 
subsequently was postponed until early 2000. Nationalists, especially 
republicans, criticized the delay.
    In support of the Good Friday Agreement, the Government continued 
during the year to release prisoners affiliated with paramilitary 
organizations that maintain a cease-fire. As of Dceember, 310 
paramilitary prisoners, including 157 republicans and 143 loyalists 
(and 10 ``others'') were paroled under the 1998 Northern Ireland 
(Sentences) Act, commonly referred to as the early release program. As 
of July 31, there were 14,631 British troops in Northern Ireland, the 
lowest level since the 1970's.
    Several paramilitary dissident groups in Northern Ireland engaged 
in acts of violence aimed at disrupting the peace process. However, the 
majority of the violence in Northern Ireland resulted from republican 
and loyalist paramilitary groups that continued to engage in 
``punishment'' attacks on victims who lived in areas under their 
influence. The Northern Ireland Office reported 73 shootings and 132 
assaults in paramilitary style attacks during the year, compared with 
72 shootings and 136 assaults recorded in 1998. Churches and religious 
organizations in Northern Ireland, both Catholic and Protestant, were 
the object of 72 sectarian attacks during the year.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        from:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings by the Government.
    The Police Complaints Authority (PCA), an independent watchdog 
organization, opened an inquiry into the death of Roger Sylvester, a 
black man who died in January after being restrained by police officers 
in north London under the Mental Health Act. He was taken to a hospital 
for assessment and suffered respiratory failure. A post mortem exam did 
not establish the cause of death.
    In October the police in London shot and killed Henry Stanley while 
he was walking home from a pub, when they mistook the table leg he was 
carrying for a sawed-off shotgun. Stanley's family is campaigning for a 
public inquiry into the incident instead of the internal police 
investigation being conducted.
    The Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority reported that 
deaths in police custody increased to 65 during the 12 months ending in 
March 1999, compared with 53 during the same period the previous year. 
The report states that 21 of the deaths occurred because of natural 
causes, 26 were due to alcohol or drugs, and 18 were suicides. The PCA 
supports the abolition of the offense of ``being drunk and incapable'' 
and recommends that drunks be dealt with by nurses and paramedics 
rather than by the police. According to the Home Office, the number of 
deaths in police custody in England and Wales during the calendar year 
was 68; in Scotland it was 6.
    There were a number of deaths in custody in prison due to suicide 
and natural causes (see Section 1.c.).
    In April a policemen was indicted for murder after the shooting 
while on duty of James Ashley. Ashley, who was unarmed, was shot and 
killed during a raid on his home in East Sussex in 1998.
    In April the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) concluded that the 
evidence was insufficient to prosecute the police officer who killed 
IRA member Dairmuid O'Neill, who was shot in a 1996 police raid during 
a counterterrorism operation in England.
    In October 1997, a policemen was acquitted of the murder of unarmed 
car thief David Ewin, whom he shot and killed at close range in 1995. 
This was the officer's third trial since the incident in 1995: One 
trial was aborted and the second jury was unable to agree on a verdict.
    The three police officers charged with manslaughter in the death of 
Richard O'Brien in 1994 were acquitted in July. An earlier inquest 
found that O'Brien was killed unlawfully by asphyxiation when he died 
following his arrest for being drunk and disorderly in 1994.
    The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is assisting the 
family of Jim McDonnell in pursuing a formal inquest into his death in 
1996 in Northern Ireland's Maghaberry Prison. Fellow prisoners charged 
that prison staff beat him.
    In August a government inquiry by Judge Gerald Butler into the 
handling of deaths in police custody highlighted failings of the Crown 
Prosecution Service. The inquiry scrutinized the separate cases of 
Shiji Lapite and Richard O'Brien, who both died in police custody after 
being arrested in 1994. Butler recommended that all decisions 
concerning death in custody cases should be made by a clearly 
identified senior person; decisions not to prosecute should be sent for 
reconsideration by senior Treasury counsel; and all cases be sent to 
central casework, the CPS department that specializes in complex cases. 
He urged the CPS to consider publishing its reasons when it decided not 
to prosecute police officers. The NGO Inquest, which campaigns for 
relatives of persons who die in custody, urged that a body completely 
independent of the police be set up to investigate complaints involving 
officers.
    In 1998 the Government established a new judicial inquiry into the 
events of January 30, 1972--``Bloody Sunday''--when 14 unarmed civil 
rights demonstrators in Londonderry were killed by British soldiers, 
but for which no member of the security forces ever was held 
accountable. The inquiry gathered testimony and evidence from victims, 
journalists, and government officials. However, controversy plagued the 
inquiry's proceedings, particularly over the issue of anonymity for the 
soldiers. The inquiry originally decided not to grant anonymity to 
soldiers testifying unless they could show that they were at risk of 
reprisal. However, a July 29 decision by the Court of Appeal upheld an 
earlier divisional court ruling that granted soldiers anonymity in the 
inquiry's proceedings. Preliminary hearings on procedural issues 
commenced on September 27; the formal hearings are scheduled for April 
2000.
    In April in 3 bombings in London, 3 persons were killed and over 
100 wounded. The attacks apparently were motivated by racism and 
homophobia. On April 17, a nail bomb exploded in south London, injuring 
over 30 persons at a busy street market in the ethnically diverse 
Brixton neighborhood. A week later another nail bomb injured several 
persons in the Brick Lane neighborhood of east London, which has a 
large Bangladeshi population. On April 30, a third nail bomb detonated 
in a central London gay bar, killing 3 persons and wounding over 70 
more. The police stated that all three attacks were believed to be 
linked and carried out by antiminority and homophobic rightwing 
extremists. David Copeland, a 22-year-old white engineer, was arrested 
on May 1 in a London suburb and subsequently charged with all three 
bombings. The police discounted earlier claims of responsibility made 
by two rightwing extremist groups, indicating that they believed that 
Copeland acted alone. Copeland's trial was pending at year's end.
    In February the inquiry into the 1993 death of black teenager 
Stephen Lawrence released its report, concluding that the investigation 
in the case--which led to the acquittal of five suspected attackers--
was marred by a combination of professional incompetence and 
institutional racism by the London police (see Section 5).
    Under the criteria of the 1998 Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act, 
the Government determined that the five main paramilitary groups were 
abiding by a cease-fire. The two major republican paramilitary groups 
observing a cease-fire are the Provisional Irish Republican Army and 
the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). On the loyalist side, the 
three groups maintaining a cease-fire include: The Ulster Defence 
Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF), the Ulster Volunteer 
Force (UVF), the Loyalist Volunteer Force. Despite the fact that these 
groups are considered to maintain a cease-fire, killing and wounding by 
both republican and loyalist groups in Northern Ireland continued. In 
addition, republican and loyalist splinter groups continued terrorist 
activities during the year.
    The Provisional IRA was widely blamed for four deaths during the 
year. On January 27, former IRA member turned informer Eamon Collins 
was found dead near his house in Newry, County Armagh. Also in Newry, 
two reputed drug dealers, Brendan ``Speedy'' Fegan, and Paul ``Bull'' 
Downey were found murdered on May 9 and June 13 respectively. A fourth 
man, Charles Bennett, was found dead in West Belfast on July 30. While 
the IRA never commented on these murders, media reports and the police 
attributed the crimes to them.
    Loyalist paramilitaries were blamed for the car bomb death of 
lawyer Rosemary Nelson on March 15. Nelson, a lawyer known for taking 
on high-profile civil rights cases, had claimed that as early as 1997 
the RUC made death threats against her. Cognizant of the controversy 
surrounding Nelson's case, within days of the murder the RUC invited 
the detective chief constable of Kent to oversee the murder inquiry and 
requested outside technical assistance. The RUC eventually appointed 
the Deputy Chief Constable of Norfolk Colin Port to take overall 
command of the investigation in April.
    A week after Nelson's death, a leaked report from the Independent 
Commission for Police Complaints (ICPC) about the RUC's own 1997 
investigation into Nelson's claims raised doubts about the RUC's 
impartiality. This report did not address the veracity of Nelson's 
original claims of death threats by the RUC. However, it did judge that 
the RUC's efforts to investigate those claims were inadequate. After 
learning of the ICPC's objections to the RUC's initial handling of the 
case in 1998, the chief constable of the RUC appointed an officer from 
the Metropolitan Police to take over the investigation in August 1998. 
The ICPC deemed this officer's subsequent investigation satisfactory 
and forwarded it to the director of public prosecutions. However, the 
appointment has not satisfied many nationalists, nor some outside 
groups.
    The RUC's central role in the murder inquiry and the circumstances 
surrounding Nelson's death prompted calls from the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the European 
Parliament, nationalist politicians, human rights groups, and the 
Northern Ireland Law Society for an independent inquiry into Nelson's 
murder. To date no arrests have been made.
    Although no group claimed responsibility, dissident loyalists were 
blamed for the shooting death of loyalist Frankie Curry on March 17 in 
the Shankill area of Belfast, as well as the pipe bomb murder of 
Portadown resident Elizabeth O'Neill on June 5.
    A total of 24 arrests were made in Ireland and Northern Ireland 
during 1999 in connection with the 1998 bombing in Omagh that killed 29 
persons--for which the Real IRA claimed responsibility--but only one 
person was charged with involvement in the bombing.
    Some unionist politicians and many human rights groups continue to 
call for an independent investigation into the December 1997 murder of 
Billy ``King Rat'' Wright, leader of the LVF, in the high security Maze 
Prison by members of the INLA. Wright's father insists that the murder 
``was state orchestrated and state sanctioned.'' The facts of the 
murder call into question the prison's security standards: the killers 
were housed in a separate wing of the prison but still were able to 
enter the area where Wright was incarcerated. The perpetrators had 
weapons smuggled to them and specific knowledge of Wright's movements.
    In March the suspect arrested for the 1997 murder of Robert Hamill 
in Portadown was acquitted for the killing but found guilty of a minor 
offense. Hamill's case received widespread attention because four RUC 
officers in a nearby vehicle did not act while Hamill was beaten to 
death by a mob. The trial judge expressed concerns about the inaction 
of the police but concluded that their early intervention could not 
have saved Hamill. Human rights groups argue that the RUC had 
intervened successfully in similar circumstances in the past. Moreover, 
they charge that the RUC's failure to intervene made identification and 
thus prosecution of the murderers more difficult.
    In June the RUC arrested William Stobie for involvement in the 1989 
murder of Patrick Finucane, a respected legal counsel. The arrest was a 
result of the third round of independent investigations by the Deputy 
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, John Stevens. In March the RUC 
chief constable had invited Stevens to initiate another investigation 
as a result of information about allegations of security force 
collusion in Finucane's murder originally presented to the Northern 
Ireland Office by a human rights organization. Human rights 
organizations are concerned that Stevens's two previous inquiries were 
not made public and continue to call for an investigation of evidence 
that they say supports charges of collusion in Finucane's murder 
between government officials and loyalist paramilitary groups.
    During his June court appearance, Stobie claimed that at the time 
of Finucane's death, he was an RUC informant and had warned the police 
of a ``hit'' by the UDA, although it is unclear whether or not he knew 
Finucane was the target. Stobie already was arrested once in 1991 on a 
weapons charge for which he was acquitted subsequently. Three other 
persons were arrested during the current inquiry, two of whom were 
released without charge, while the third was charged with minor 
offenses.
    In September the family of Peter McBride won a judicial review 
against the British Army board that allowed Scots Guards Jim Fisher and 
Mark Wright to rejoin their regiment. Fisher and Wright were convicted 
for the 1992 murder of Peter Mcbride and released from incarceration to 
rejoin their regiment in 1998. Because of the ruling, the British Army 
board now has to reconsider its decision to reinstate the soldiers.
    Coroners do not have the power to compel those suspected of 
involvement in extrajudicial killing to testify at inquests, and 
relatives of the deceased receive no advance disclosure of evidence. In 
Northern Ireland, coroners by law are permitted to inquire only into 
``how''--that is ``by what means''--the deceased died, rather than into 
the broad circumstances of death. Human rights groups argue that this 
narrow definition shields wrongdoers, including soldiers and police 
officers, and unnecessarily keeps family members from learning the 
truth of the circumstances regarding their relative's death.
    During the year, information provided by the IRA led to the 
discovery of the bodies of three persons who disappeared in the 1970's 
(see Section 1.b.).
    In July following the earlier agreement to convene a Scottish court 
in The Hague to try the Lockerbie bombing suspects, the Libyan 
Government accepted responsibility for the 1984 death of policewoman 
Yvonne Fletcher. Fletcher was killed by gunfire from inside the Libyan 
People's Bureau in London as she policed a demonstration outside the 
building. The Libyan Government paid compensation to Fletcher's family 
in November.
    In April Nazi war criminal Anthony Sawoniuk, age 78, was found 
guilty of murdering 18 Jews in 1942 in Domachevo, Belarus, and was 
given 2 life sentences. He was the first man to be prosecuted 
successfully under 1991 war crimes legislation.
    Former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet remained under house 
arrest. Spanish Judge Baltazar Garzon sought to extradite and try 
Pinochet for his involvement in the disappearance or torture of 600 
Spaniards under Chilean and Argentinian dictatorships in the 1970's and 
1980's. In March the Law Lords, the highest court, decided that 
Pinochet did not enjoy immunity from charges of international crimes of 
torture and conspiracy to torture committed after December 8, 1988, 
when the international torture convention became binding on Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and Chile. Pinochet's extradition hearing then began in 
September, and on October 8 a magistrate ruled that Pinochet could be 
extradited to Spain to stand trial on 35 charges of torture and 
conspiracy to torture. Pinochet appealed the magistrate's decision. In 
October the Chilean Government requested that the UK Government allow 
Pinochet to return to Chile because of his age and poor health. In 
response UK Home Secretary Jack Straw ordered an independent medical 
examination of Pinochet, which was pending, along with Pinochet's legal 
appeal, at year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    The Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains was established 
jointly by the British and Irish Governments in May for the purpose of 
facilitating the location of remains of victims of paramilitary 
violence. The commission obtained information from the IRA that led to 
the discovery in the Republic of Ireland of the remains of three 
persons (Eamon Molloy, Brian Mckinney, and John McClory) who 
disappeared in the mid-1970's. Information on the location of other 
remains proved inaccurate, and in September the commission decided to 
``pause'' searches for an additional 12 known persons who had 
disappeared to allow the IRA to ``re-examine'' possible sites.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment; however, police occasionally abused detainees. 
Human rights organizations report that such abuse, while not 
widespread, is a matter of serious concern. The NGO Inquest states that 
injuries and illnesses result more often from neglect or misdiagnosis 
than from physical attack, although incidents of police brutality have 
occurred (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Detainees who claim physical 
mistreatment have the right to an immediate medical examination. A 
trial judge must examine such a claim. Confessions obtained by abusive 
treatment are not admissible in court, and judges can exclude even 
voluntary confessions. However, human rights organizations claim that 
confessions obtained by abusive treatment regularly are found 
admissible in the Diplock courts in Northern Ireland.
    Complaints of sexual harassment and some criminal conduct within 
the London Metropolitan Police Service continued. Fewer than a hundred 
cases are under investigation, and police officials remain committed to 
rooting out abusive treatment and corruption.
    Although originally intended to replace the Independent Commission 
for Police Complaints as early as 1998, the Police ombudsman-designate 
was not appointed by the Northern Ireland Office until October and is 
not to assume authority over complaints against the police until 
September 2000. The police ombudsman is to investigate independently 
complaints in Northern Ireland filed against the police or referred to 
him by the RUC chief constable, the Police Authority of Northern 
Ireland, or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The ombudsman 
is to supervise automatically cases involving death or serious injury 
and may direct the chief constable and the Director of Public 
Prosecutions to bring charges against police officers.
    Unlike the ICPC, which must rely on the Complaints and Discipline 
Branch of the RUC to provide investigators, the ombudsman is to recruit 
an independent investigative staff.
    The ICPC reported that it received 2,301 complaints during the 
year. Of the 2,774 cases it completed during the year, 6 percent led to 
informal disciplinary action or formal criminal charges.
    In a series of public and private meetings throughout Northern 
Ireland, The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland 
(the Patten Commission) gathered testimony in order to evaluate the 
future of policing structures and arrangements in Northern Ireland. The 
Commission's goal was to recommend proposals that would ensure that the 
police service in Northern Ireland enjoys widespread support from the 
community as a whole. Both sides of the community generally recognized 
the qualifications of the members of the commission. The Commission 
published its recommendations on September 9. It calls for the RUC to 
be depoliticized and includes restoring some measure of local control 
of the police, increasing the number of Catholic officers (who now make 
up only 8 percent of the force), and significantly reducing the size of 
the force. Unionists reacted negatively to the prospect of substantive 
changes to the RUC, and many were particularly critical of Patten's 
recommendation to change the name and symbols of the force. On the 
other hand, human rights groups, while applauding his human rights-
based approach, pointed out that no mechanism was included in Patten's 
recommendations that would hold accountable any serving RUC officers 
who might have committed human rights abuses.
    The independent assessor of military complaints continued 
coordinating investigations into complaints of abuses committed by the 
army. During the year, 31 formal and 541 informal complaints were 
received, primarily for harassment or abuse. In his 1998 annual report, 
the independent assessor expressed concern that neither he nor the new 
police ombudsman had oversight over complaints about soldiers arresting 
terrorist suspects independently from the police.
    The independent commissioner for holding centers in Northern 
Ireland made irregular, unannounced visits to holding centers in order 
to observe interrogations and interview detainees. There were over 190 
visits to the Northern Ireland's 3 holding centers during the year by 
the commissioner and his deputy, compared with 176 each in 1998 and 
1997. The number of complaints, generally for verbal harassment or 
``technical assault,'' dropped substantially.
    The police in Northern Ireland continued to use plastic bullets to 
quell civil disturbances. However, given the relative quiescence of the 
summer marching season (see Section 2.d.), their actual use was 
negligible. The RUC reported that only 1 plastic bullet was fired 
during the first 2 weeks of July, compared with 837 in the same period 
in 1998 and 2,510 in 1997. The RUC reported that an additional five 
plastic bullets were fired at members of a crowd throwing firebombs at 
police patrols in Lurgan on August 14. In total the security forces 
fired 111 plastic bullets during the year, compared with 1,299 in 1998. 
According to RUC rules, plastic bullets should be aimed below the rib 
cage; nevertheless, medical studies confirmed that serious head and 
upper body injuries have resulted from plastic bullet use in the past.
    Plastic bullet use in Northern Ireland is criticized severely by 
human rights monitors, although the European Court of Human Rights 
ruled in 1984 that using them to quell serious riots did not contravene 
the European Convention on Human Rights. The U.N. Committee Against 
Torture, the European Parliament, Human Rights Watch, and other NGO's 
have called for a ban on their use. The Government considered 
alternatives but stated that most options were found to be either more 
dangerous or inaccurate. In July the Home Secretary approved guidelines 
recommended by the Association of Police Officers on the use of plastic 
bullets in public order situations. The guidelines did not eliminate 
the use of plastic bullets; but in a change from past practice in 
Northern Ireland where the RUC was permitted to use plastic bullets to 
defend property, preserve the peace, or prevent or detect crime, the 
new guidelines specified that plastic bullets were to be used only in 
cases of serious risk to life or injury. After conducting its own 
investigation, the Patten Commission also did not recommend the banning 
of plastic bullet use, although it encouraged the use of alternative 
crowd control measures.
    Human rights activists continued to call for the closure of all 
holding centers, including the Castlereagh Holding Center, because of 
persistent complaints of police impropriety in the interrogation 
process. (The independent commissioner for holding centers for Northern 
Ireland also has recommended the closing of the Castlereagh Holding 
Center because of the facility's poor physical state.) In January audio 
recording equipment was introduced to supplement the video recording 
equipment installed in 1998 for use during interrogation sessions in 
all three Northern Ireland holding centers. Human rights groups have 
criticized the fact that the video and audio recordings are not 
produced through one synchronized system and therefore have diminished 
value in verifying the content of a given interrogation session. In 
December the RUC announced the closure of the Castlereagh Holding 
Center effective at year's end. Both the Gough and Strand Road Holding 
Centers remained open.
    In August the Director of Public Prosecutions decided not to bring 
charges against any RUC officers involved in the case of David Adams, 
who was assaulted during his arrest and initial incarceration at the 
Castlereagh interrogation center in 1994. Adams later was sentenced to 
25 years for conspiracy to murder. In 1998 a Belfast court awarded 
Adams $48,000 (30,000 pounds) for exemplary damages. Following this 
court decision, an independent inquiry into Adams's treatment was 
initiated by the assistant chief constable of Strathclyde. On the basis 
of this report, the DPP declined to pursue charges against any of the 
officers involved.
    The police harassed Travellers and members of other minorities. In 
February black motorist Carl Josephs lost his suit against the West 
Midlands police for harassment. He was stopped 34 times in 2 years 
while driving. The jury found against him on the charge that officers 
had conspired against him, but he was awarded $2,600 (1,000 pounds) in 
damages for unlawful arrest. In April the Home Secretary ordered the 
police to recruit 8,000 officers from ethnic minorities within 10 
years. A December report by an academic researcher that was 
commissioned by the London Metropolitan Police revealed that Asians (in 
the UK the term usually refers to south Asians, mostly Indians and 
Pakistanis) are more likely to stopped and searched for drugs than 
whites or blacks. The report warned that the police risk alienating a 
generation of young Asians by misusing their stop and search powers.
    Through June 30, the armed forces registered a total of 61 internal 
harassment complaints. This number represents a significant decrease 
over past years. Of these 32 were for sexual harassment, 14 for racial 
harassment, and 15 for bullying or other harassment. A complaint 
procedure was implemented fully in 1997. Service personnel also have 
the right to submit complaints to employment tribunals. In March 1998 
the services entered into a 5-year partnership agreement with the 
Commission on Racial Equality (CRE) to promote racial equality 
practices.
    Both loyalist and republican paramilitary groups in Northern 
Ireland continued to intimidate or carry out ``punishment'' attacks on 
victims who lived in areas under paramilitary influence. The attacks 
often were carried out to settle scores within paramilitary groups and 
often, but not exclusively, targeted members who broke ranks. Such 
orders of expulsion and vigilante attacks also were targeted against 
those who engaged in so-called antisocial activities, such as drug 
dealing and carjacking. Paramilitary groups used these methods to 
maintain or extend their control and influence in their respective 
communities. The attackers beat their victims with iron pipes, baseball 
bats, sledgehammers, and spiked clubs and shot victims in the knees and 
legs. During the year, the RUC recorded a total of 206 casualties as a 
result of paramilitary style attacks. This includes 73 shootings (47 
loyalist, 26 republican) and 132 assaults (91 loyalist, 42 republican). 
Human rights groups say that these figures underreport the true number 
of casualties because many of the victims feel too intimidated to 
report paramilitary punishment attacks.
    Prison conditions generally met minimum international standards. In 
the chief inspector of prisons' annual report, published in April, 
overcrowding, the poor quality of local prisons, and prison maintenance 
were identified as continuing problems despite an increase in 
resources. The prison population in England and Wales decreased in July 
by 1.2 percent over the same period the previous year. The home 
detention curfew program, administered by the electronic monitoring 
unit of the Home Office, began operations on January 28, and as of 
August 11, 8,794 offenders availed themselves of it. The program is 
considered a success by the Prison Service, with fewer than 5 percent 
of offenders recalled to prison.
    The Prison Service reported 148 deaths of prisoners in England and 
Wales during the year, compared with 131 such deaths in 1998. Of these 
deaths, 91 were self-inflicted (83 in 1998) and 57 were due to natural 
causes (45 in 1998). The Scottish Prison Service reported 21 deaths in 
custody in 1999: 12 suicides and 9 from natural causes. The Prison 
Service implemented policy changes in an attempt to curb the number of 
prisoner suicides and continues to develop suicide prevention 
strategies. The NGO Prison Reform Trust endorsed the measures taken by 
the Prison Service.
    Human rights groups have been particularly critical of special 
security units (SSU's), which are used to hold prisoners deemed to pose 
an exceptional risk of escape. Citing small group isolation, the lack 
of adequate exercise, work, educational opportunities, and natural 
daylight, as well as strict enforcement of noncontact visits through a 
glass barrier, human rights groups have condemned SSU imprisonment as 
violating international standards. A 1996 government inquiry concluded 
that prolonged incarceration could lead to mental illness. The 
Government took steps during the year to address these concerns. 
According to the Prison Service, inmates in SSU'S now are provided with 
details of their cases and security category. Regular health checks 
have not revealed deterioration in the health of these prisoners. Once 
a prisoner is no longer classed as an ``exceptional risk,'' he is moved 
out of the SSU. According to the NGO Prison Reform Trust, while in 
theory prolonged incarceration could lead to mental illness, there were 
no current cases in which this had occurred. At year's end, nine 
prisoners remained in SSU's; none was imprisoned for Northern Ireland 
terrorist-related crimes.
    Separate and distinct prison regimes exist for Northern Ireland and 
Scotland, administered through the Northern Ireland office and the 
Scottish Office.
    The number of female prisoners continued to rise. According to an 
August Home Office report, women now commit 20 percent of all crime, 
and the number of women sent to prison doubled in the past 6 years. The 
Women's Policy Group of the Prison Service undertook a special review 
of the needs of mothers in prison and published its findings in July. 
Its lengthy list of recommendations was based on the premise that a 
mother and baby unit in prison would allow the mother-baby relationship 
to develop while safeguarding and promoting the child's welfare. In 
December the Prison Service announced that it was accepting the 
majority of the recommendations in full, resulting in new procedures 
governing admission to the units and published standards for their 
management. These changes are to come into effect in early 2000.
    Faced with a large increase in the number of asylum seekers, the 
Government housed approximately half of immigration detainees in 
regular prisons, where they normally are held separately from convicted 
prisoners and prisoners awaiting trial. According to human rights 
groups, 28 regular prisons house some immigration detainees. The chief 
inspector for prisons for England and Wales repeatedly has called upon 
the Home Office to establish specific guidelines for the treatment of 
asylum seekers in detention centers and prisons, as no such guidelines 
currently exist. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
other groups cite a lack of specialized skills among regular prison 
officials in dealing with immigration detainees. The UNHCR regularly 
visits detention centers and has excellent relations with the 
Government and detention center officials; however, it criticizes the 
Government's ``expectation of noncompliance'' by asylum seekers.
    The Prison Service stated that three prisoners were convicted in 
May of offenses related to the situation in Northern Ireland. The 
requests by all three for repatriation to the Republic of Ireland are 
under consideration. Since the prisoners committed their offenses after 
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, they are not covered by its 
provisions for the early release of prisoners.
    The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons and 
immigration detention centers.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The authorities can and 
often do make arrests or detain suspects without judicial warrants, 
especially in Northern Ireland, when they believe that they have 
reasonable cause to suspect wrongdoing. The 1994 Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act allows police officers to stop and search vehicles and 
pedestrians if a police officer of at least superintendent rank (or a 
chief inspector if no superintendent is available) ``reasonably 
believes'' it is expedient to do so to prevent acts of violence. The 
authorization is limited to a 24-hour period but is renewable under 
certain circumstances.
    The 1991 Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act (EPA) permits a 
soldier on duty, a member of the Royal Irish Regiment, or a police 
officer to arrest and detain for up to 4 hours ``a person who he has 
reasonable grounds to suspect is committing or is about to commit any 
offense.'' Provisions for indefinite internment without trial were 
eliminated in the 1998 reauthorization of the EPA.
    The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) allows 
the police to arrest without a warrant anywhere in the country persons 
they have reason to suspect of being involved in terrorism. The 
authorities may detain such persons (even those under the age of 18) 
for up to 48 hours without legal representation or judicial review. 
Suspects may be interrogated during this time, and confessions obtained 
may be used in subsequent court proceedings. Under the PTA, detainees 
are granted the right to have lawyers present during interrogation in 
England or Wales, but not in Northern Ireland. Detention without charge 
may be extended up to a further 5 days on the authority of the Home 
Secretary, or in Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State for Northern 
Ireland. Extensive PTA detention powers were held in breach of the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which led to a derogation by the 
government in 1988 (see Section 1.e.).
    The PTA is the most reviewed piece of legislation in the United 
Kingdom. It expires every 2 years and, due to the changing security 
situation, is amended or altered to account for those changes. 
Nevertheless, critics charge that the annual review is superficial and 
insist that the PTA should be repealed. In November the Government 
introduced a new Prevention of Terrorism Bill intended to replace the 
PTA and Northern Ireland emergency laws. It covers foreign-based as 
well as domestic groups and introduces a new and wider definition of 
terrorism that was criticized by some for being too broad. Debate on 
the bill is to continue in 2000.
    In England, Scotland, and Wales suspects arrested without warrants 
must be released within 24 hours (or 36 hours if a serious offense is 
involved) unless brought before a magistrates' court or arrested under 
PTA provisions. The court may authorize extension of detention by 36 
hours and on further application by another 24 hours, versus the 48-
hour scheme extant in Northern Ireland (see Section 1.e.).
    Defendants awaiting trial have a statutory right to bail unless 
there is a risk that they would abscond, commit an offense, interfere 
with witnesses, or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, or unless 
they were on bail when the alleged offense was committed. Defendants 
who are remanded in custody are protected by statutory custody time 
limits, which restrict the period for which they can be held while 
awaiting trial to a maximum of 182 days, unless the court grants an 
extension. At year's end, 24,622 defendants were awaiting trial, of 
whom 5,882 were in custody. Of those in custody, 4,973 had been 
awaiting trial for less than 24 weeks, while 188 had been waiting 
longer than 48 weeks. Fewer defendants were awaiting trial and fewer of 
those were in custody compared with 1998; the breakdown by time 
awaiting trial was virtually identical. The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act 
includes measures to reduce delays in criminal proceedings by 
introducing procedural reforms and further limiting the time allowed 
for the prosecution of cases.
    The law gives administrative detention power to immigration 
officers. There is no time limit to such detention and no right to have 
it reviewed by a court. At any given time, approximately 750 asylum 
seekers are detained (less than 1 percent of all asylum seekers). They 
are detained either in immigration detention centers or in regular 
prisons (where they are normally held separately from convicted 
prisoners and those awaiting trial). Occasionally they are held in 
police cells, if for no more than 48 hours and pending removal from the 
country or transfer to another accommodation (see Section 1.c.). At the 
end of June, 680 asylum detainees were being held.
    Approximately 16 percent of them had been held continuously for 
less than 1 month, 38 percent for 2 to 6 months, 23 percent for 6 to 12 
months, and 7 percent for more than 12 months. Unlike those accused of 
criminal offenses, asylum seekers are given no written statement about 
why they were detained, although the practice is to provide them with 
updates on the status of their claims and the time required for their 
adjudication. Asylum seekers do not have an automatic right to apply 
for bail, and bail application, which can be made to immigration 
appellate authorities, requires a relatively high level of surety. The 
Home Office states that detention is used only where there are good 
grounds to anticipate noncompliance with the terms of temporary 
admission and that the practice affects less than 1 percent of asylum 
seekers at any given time.
    The Government does not use exile (also see Section 2.d.).
    Paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland continued to 
threaten individuals and families to compel them to leave the province. 
It is difficult to get an accurate count of those who have left 
Northern Ireland under threat from a paramilitary group. Estimates of 
the number of people who fled into exile since the signing of the Good 
Friday Agreement range as high as 800. A local NGO that assists many of 
those under threat reported 314 cases through June. Of those cases, 71 
left the immediate area of threat, 38 left their city of residence, and 
29 left Northern Ireland. In 80 cases, further investigation revealed 
that no threat existed, and in 17 cases intervention by the agency 
lifted the threat. Over half of these persons were over the age of 25, 
and most were unemployed.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and 
provides citizens with a generally fair and efficient judicial process.
    There are several levels of courts. The vast majority of criminal 
cases are heard by magistrates' courts, which are managed by locally 
based committees. Their decisions may be appealed to the Crown Court, 
which also hears criminal cases requiring a jury trial, or to the High 
Court. Crown Court convictions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal, 
which may in turn refer cases involving points of law to the House of 
Lords. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (which consists of 
senior judges and is functionally distinct from the legislative arm) is 
the final court of appeal. The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC) 
operates as an additional appellate body to investigate suspected 
miscarriages of justice in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. It 
considers cases after the judicial appeals process is exhausted and 
where there is significant new evidence that casts doubt on the 
conviction. In Scotland similar appeals may be made to the Scottish 
Office.
    The law provides for a fair trial, and the authorities respect and 
enforce the law in this regard. Defendants enjoy a presumption of 
innocence until proven guilty, the right to question witnesses against 
them, and the right to appeal to successively higher courts.
    The 1998 Human Rights Act is to take effect in October 2000, 
bringing the European Convention on Human Rights into British law (see 
Section 4). Under this law all public bodies must act in a manner 
compatible with the convention. The law provides citizens with the 
right to take alleged violations of the convention into British courts. 
The United Kingdom derogated from Article 5(3) of the convention, 
dealing with prompt resolution of a case after arrest or detention. 
NGO's criticize the derogation, which also applies to the Human Rights 
Act.
    To date no one in Northern Ireland has been arrested or detained 
under the 1998 Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act. Under 
this legislation, the testimony of a senior police officer is 
considered prima facie evidence of a suspect's membership in a 
proscribed terrorist organization. The act also criminalizes a 
conspiracy in the United Kingdom to commit terrorist acts outside the 
country. The act also allows for the seizure of property of a person 
convicted of membership offenses under the act, if used in furtherance 
of the activities of the organization. Human rights organizations 
express concern that the act violates certain fundamental rights, such 
as the right to silence and the rights to freedom of expression and 
association.
    Under the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, judges have 
the power to instruct juries that they may draw an inference of guilt 
from a defendant's refusal to answer questions during interrogation or 
trial, although no conviction can be based solely on such an inference. 
Human rights groups and the U.N. Human Rights Committee sharply 
criticize this provision, which they consider an abrogation of the 
right against self-incrimination. A similar provision is in effect in 
Northern Ireland. Based on a 1996 European Court of Human Rights 
judgment, the 1999 Criminal Evidence (Nothern Ireland) Order codifies 
guidelines issued by the Attorney General that prohibited the drawing 
of inference from silence when a suspect is questioned before being 
permitted access to an attorney.
    Indigent defenders have the right to free counsel of their choice, 
with some exceptions. Criminal proceedings must be held in public 
except those in juvenile court and those involving public decency or 
security. In a trial under the Official Secrets Act, the judge may 
order the court closed, but sentencing must be public.
    In Northern Ireland, special ``emergency'' restrictions affect due 
process. Under the 1991 Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act 
(EPA), trials for certain terrorist-related offenses are tried 
automatically in ``Diplock courts'' without a jury unless they 
specifically are ``scheduled out'' to ordinary jury courts. Diplock 
courts were established to avoid cases being heard by juries that might 
make decisions along sectarian lines, as well as to protect jurors from 
intimidation by terrorists. If judges decide to convict, they must 
justify the decision in a document that becomes part of the court 
record. An appellate court may overturn the decision on either factual 
or legal grounds. Through March 25 persons had been tried in Diplock 
courts; 23 persons either pled or were found guilty. The Diplock courts 
have been widely criticized by human rights groups, as well as various 
U.N. committees. The 1998 EPA increased the number of scheduled 
offenses that may be assigned at the Attorney General's discretion, for 
trial by jury. This was expected to reduce the number of cases 
considered by Diplock courts, but given the overall decrease in the 
incidence of offenses, it is difficult to assess the impact of this 
change.
    The EPA does not exclude the use of uncorroborated confessions, 
which in Northern Ireland may, and have been, used as the sole basis 
for conviction. Additionally, the EPA permits the police to prevent any 
suspected terrorist from contacting legal counsel for up to 48 hours 
after arrest under certain circumstances, at the request of a police 
officer with the minimum rank of superintendent. After a detainee has 
asked to see a lawyer and has done so, this period is renewable in 
subsequent 48-hour periods until the detainee is charged or released. 
Human rights groups have criticized these provisions, arguing that a 
detainee is most likely to need counsel in the first few hours; lack of 
counsel during that time makes false or coerced confessions and the 
abuse of detainees more likely. According to the Northern Ireland 
Office, through September, 270 requests for access to lawyers were 
made, 19 of which were delayed.
    The 1996 Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act reduced defense 
lawyer's access to potential evidence held by the prosecution, 
including information as to how the evidence was collected. According 
to the Committee on the Administration of Justice, a local NGO, this 
practice may be contrary to U.N. guidelines on the role of prosecutors.
    Lawyers' groups in Northern Ireland and elsewhere expressed serious 
concern about threats of death and serious physical injury directed 
against defense lawyers by prison guards, relayed to them by their 
prisoner clients. Solicitors continue to lodge complaints against the 
RUC but say that little is done to address their complaints.
    In January the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Lawyers and Judges issued a followup to his 1998 report, calling upon 
the Government to conduct an independent and impartial investigation 
into the murder of solicitor Patrick Finucane. The U.N. Special 
Rapporteur also accused the RUC of ``complete indifference'' to 
allegations of lawyer harassment and reiterated his conclusion that 
there was prima facie evidence of military or RUC collusion in 
Finucane's murder (see Section 1.a.). In his January report to the U.N. 
Human Rights Commission, the U.N. Special Rapporteur expressed concerns 
about the RUC's impartiality in investigating Rosemary Nelson's murder 
and further stressed his recommendation for an independent inquiry into 
Patrick Finucane's murder.
    His previous 1998 report recommended that the government conduct 
independent and impartial investigations of all threats to legal 
counsel and, where there is a specific physical threat, that it provide 
the necessary protection, investigate the threat and bring the guilty 
party to justice. The Special Rapporteur also recommended that lawyers 
lodge formal complaints and that the RUC organize training seminars for 
police officers. Also according to the Special Rapporteur, the Bar 
Council and the Law Society should be more vocal in their defense of 
solicitors subject to harassment and intimidation and begin a dialog 
with the RUC on how best to address the problem.
    In response to the U.N. Special Rapporteur's report, the chief 
constable denied that the RUC was indifferent to the allegations of 
collusion. Upon receipt of the complaints mentioned in the report, he 
said that he approached the Law Society of Northern Ireland to open a 
channel of communication.
    A review of the structure, management, and funding of the criminal 
justice system in Northern Ireland continued through the year. A report 
from the Government was scheduled for release in October but was 
postponed until early 2000
    In support of the Good Friday Agreement, the Government continued 
during the year to release prisoners affiliated with paramilitary 
organizations that maintain a cease-fire. As of September, 292 
paramilitary prisoners, including 149 republicans and 133 loyalists 
(and 10 ``others'') were paroled under the 1998 Northern Ireland 
(Sentences) Act, commonly referred to as the early release program. As 
of July 31, there were 14,631 British troops in Northern Ireland, the 
lowest level since the 1970's.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Warrants normally are required for a police search of 
private premises; however, under the 1991 EPA members of the armed 
forces or the police in Northern Ireland may enter and search ``any 
premises for the purpose of arresting a person for an arrestable 
offense, but only if he or she has reasonable grounds for believing 
that the person being sought is on the premises.'' The Northern Ireland 
courts have interpreted the requirement for ``reasonable'' grounds 
broadly. The government compensates persons whose houses or property 
have been damaged during house searches.
    The fear of intercommunal violence has, over the years, led to a 
pattern of increasingly segregated communities in Northern Ireland. 
Protestant and Catholic families have moved away from mixed or border 
neighborhoods. This pattern continued despite the Good Friday 
Agreement's approval in referenda.
    In Northern Ireland, although paramilitary attacks on the homes and 
families of police and politicians decreased significantly, the 
security forces believe that paramilitary groups continue to conduct 
surveillance and target police and politicians.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Strongly held common-law 
tradition, an independent press, and a democratic political system 
combine to secure freedom of speech and of the press. Viewpoints 
critical of the government are well represented. The print media are 
dominated by a handful of national daily newspapers, all privately 
owned and independent (although often generally aligned with a 
political party). About half the electronic media are run by the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which is funded by the 
government but enjoys complete editorial independence. Corporations 
under renewable government license run the remainder.
    In April a leading BBC television personality, Jill Dando, was shot 
and killed in London. Dando anchored a program that helped track down 
leading criminals.
    In April the Independent Television Commission, which regulates 
broadcasters, permanently revoked the license of MED-TV, a pro-Kurdish 
station that broadcast programs ``which included inflammatory 
statements encouraging acts of violence in Turkey and elsewhere,'' 
according to the Commission.
    Press organizations and human rights groups continued to criticize 
the 1981 Contempt of Court Act, which allows courts to order a 
journalist to disclose a source if it is deemed to be in the interests 
of justice. The 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act also contains 
provisions that compel journalists to give evidence in cases where 
police can prove it is necessary to their investigation. The Official 
Secrets Act, another law cited by journalists as unduly restrictive, 
prohibits the defense that the information is already in the public 
domain or that its publication is in the public interest.
    A 1997 White Paper (a proposed policy paper drafted in preparation 
for legislation) on freedom of information asserted that the Government 
would introduce legislation that would allow widespread public access 
to official information and documents, require public organizations to 
regularly publicize data, and improve individual access to personal 
information. In May the Government published its draft freedom of 
information bill.
    Members of Parliament, NGO's, the press, and campaigners for 
freedom of information widely criticized the bill, primarily because of 
the number of blanket exemptions to the release of information. In July 
two select committee reports called for substantial improvements to the 
bill. During the second reading of the bill in the House of Commons in 
December, criticism of the bill continued.
    In connection with the Patrick Finucane investigation in Northern 
Ireland, local newspaper editor Ed Moloney was ordered by a Belfast 
court in August to turn over notes from a 1990 interview with William 
Stobie, who was charged in June with the murder of Finucane. Moloney 
refused and was facing charges of contempt of court and obstruction of 
justice. In October the High Court in Belfast quashed the lower court 
request. Human rights groups point out that the decision will be of 
little assistance to journalists in the future because the High Court 
ruled that Moloney's notes were not of material assistance to the 
investigation, not that Moloney, as a journalist, had a right to 
protect his sources.
    Academic freedom is respected.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for the right of peaceful assembly, but that right is limited routinely 
where it would impose a cost on public convenience.
    In Northern Ireland the annual ``marching season'' posed 
significant problems for the Government since the right of assembly 
conflicted with the concerns of local residents in some communities who 
perceived the marches as the celebration of Protestant ``triumphs'' in 
historical battles. The 1998 Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act 
transferred responsibility for ruling on disputed parades from the RUC 
to the newly established Parades Commission. Of the 3,200 parades held 
in 1999, the Parades Commission imposed route restrictions on 203; 38 
of those parades were related to the Drumcree situation.
    Although tensions were high during the period prior to the Drumcree 
parade in Portadown on July 4, the massive security presence, the use 
of parade marshals, and general restraint among the marchers allowed 
the parade to take place relatively peacefully. Most of the summer 
marching season was quiet, with the notable exception of the Apprentice 
Boys' Siege of Derry parade on August 14. During a smaller associated 
parade in Belfast, police struggled with protesters who refused to end 
a sitdown protest across the path of an Apprentice Boys march. Trouble 
continued later that day in Londonderry, when security forces and 
nationalist protesters clashed during a security operation designed to 
separate nationalist crowds and Protestant marchers. In the late 
evening, long after the parade had ended, several businesses in the 
center of the city were looted and burned.
    The law provides for freedom of association, but that right is 
limited. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Secretary of State 
for Northern Ireland may proscribe any organization that is involved 
in, promotes, or encourages terrorism connected to Northern Ireland. In 
March the Government banned two Northern Ireland Protestant 
paramilitary groups, the Orange Volunteers and the Red Hand Defenders, 
for their continuing involvement in sectarian violence. Membership in 
proscribed paramilitary groups is punishable by up to 10 years' 
imprisonment. Supporting paramilitary groups is also an imprisonable 
offense, as is wearing clothing that arouses a reasonable suspicion 
that the wearer belongs to or supports a proscribed organization. 
Although some human rights organizations do not object to the law, 
others argue that it violates fundamental rights of freedom of 
association and expression.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Governmental policy and general practice 
ensure freedom of religion for traditional and nontraditional 
worshippers. Despite the existence of state religions (the Anglican 
Church of England and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland), members of 
all faiths and denominations enjoy freedom of worship. The new Human 
Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion. Those who 
believe that their freedom to worship has been abrogated have the right 
to appeal to the courts for relief.
    The 1988 Education Reform Act requires that government schools hold 
a daily act of nondenominational Christian worship. A parental right of 
withdrawal exists for children who do not wish to participate, and 
safeguards exist for teachers who do not wish to participate in or 
conduct religious education. The act provides for alternative 
collective worship for other faiths. Teachers' organizations have 
called for government review of the act.
    Although not enforced, blasphemy with respect to Christian beliefs 
is still technically illegal. Several religious organizations, in 
association with the Commission for Racial Equality, are attempting to 
either abolish the law or expand it to protect all faiths.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy freedom of movement 
within the country and in foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation. 
In 1997 the Home Secretary revoked all exclusion orders preventing 
individuals linked to terrorism in Northern Ireland from traveling to 
Great Britain. When the Prevention of Terrorism Act was renewed in 
1998, it did not include provisions for exclusion orders. However, the 
Home Secretary has the power to activate other statutes implementing 
exclusion orders at any time.
    The Government cooperates closely with the UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. First asylum is 
provided under a temporary protection process started in 1992. The 
number of asylum seekers entering Britain rose on a monthly basis, and 
at year's end, 102,870 applications were outstanding, compared with 
64,770 applications outstanding a year earlier. Under the first asylum 
program, successful applicants are given 6 months' ``leave to enter the 
country'' on arrival. They then can apply for an automatic 3\1/2\-year 
extension of their stay and may apply for refugee status at any time. 
Such applications are considered in accordance with the criteria set 
out in the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 
Some asylum seekers are detained while the Government reviews their 
cases (see Section 1.d.); some are detained in regular prisons (see 
Section 1.c.).
    The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 broadened the right of 
appeal for failed asylum seekers, introduced provisions to deter 
abusive asylum applicants and illegal entrants, and imposed 
restrictions on persons subject to immigration control seeking 
employment, housing, and social security benefits. Of decisions taken 
on asylum applications during the first 6 months of 1999, 32 percent 
recognized the applicant as a refugee and granted asylum, and 7 percent 
granted ``exceptional leave to remain'' but refused asylum. The 
remainder were refused.
    In late 1998 the Government introduced a visa requirement for 
Slovak citizens in response to the large number of Slovak Roma who 
sought asylum. The Government maintains that the Roma are economic 
migrants, not true refugees. In October Prime Minister Blair wrote to 
Czech Republic Prime Minister Milos Zeman expressing concern at the 
large number of Roma from the Czech Republic seeking asylum in the 
country.
    Following its 1998 White Paper, the Government passed its 
Immigration and Asylum Bill in November to modernize and integrate the 
immigration and asylum system. Among other things, it is designed to 
streamline the right of appeal and create new support arrangements for 
asylum seekers, strengthen immigration law enforcement powers, and 
reform detention arrangements.
    There were no reports that persons were forced to return to 
countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    Citizens have the right to change their government and freely 
exercise that right. The government is formed on the basis of a 
majority of seats in the House of Commons, which are contested in 
elections held at least every 5 years.
    Participation in the political process is open to all persons and 
parties. All citizens 18 years of age and older may vote. As in the 
rest of the country, Northern Ireland has city and district councils, 
but with fewer powers. England and Wales also have county councils. The 
Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly opened on July 1. These 
devolved bodies assumed control over matters of regional importance 
such as education, health, and some economic matters. Foreign affairs 
and defense continue to be the responsibility of the central 
government. After a review of the Good Friday Agreement from September 
through November, power was devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly 
on December 2.
    The remaining UK Overseas Territories have an aggregate population 
of approximately 160,000. They enjoy varying degrees of self-government 
on the British model, with appointed governors.
    Women and minorities face no legal constraints on voting or holding 
office, but women are underrepresented in government and politics: they 
constitute 18 percent of the Members of the House of Commons and nearly 
16 percent of those in the House of Lords. A total of 27 Members of 
Parliament have identified themselves as being members of minority 
ethnic groups.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights issues and cases. Government officials are generally cooperative 
and responsive to their views.
    A number of international nongovernmental human rights 
organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, 
are based in the country. The Government cooperates fully with 
international inquiries into alleged violations of human rights.
    The 1998 Human Rights Act incorporated the provisions of the 
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. The main 
provisions of the act are to be implemented in October 2000, although 
some provisions already have taken effect. The act is to take effect 
first, in practice, in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Under the 
terms of the devolution legislation, the devolved institutions do not 
have the power to do anything that is incompatible with the 
convention's provisions.
    In January the Home Office created a human rights task force made 
up of representatives of the government and NGO's to coordinate 
publicity, guidance, and training in preparation for the act's 
implementation. Proceedings under the Human Rights Act can be brought 
only by victims of a breach of convention rights by a public authority. 
The human rights unit of the Home Office is developing and is to carry 
out human rights policy and legislation.
    The Government has not created a human rights commission but has 
not ruled out doing so in the future. According to the NGO, Article 19, 
the Human Rights Act's lack of provision for a commission or 
commissioner makes implementation difficult. In Northern Ireland a 
commission was established as an outcome of the peace process. While 
cases may still be taken to the European Court of Human Rights, all 
domestic remedies must be exhausted first.
Section 5. Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Race Relations Act of 1976 prohibits discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, nationality, or national or ethnic origin and 
outlaws incitement to racial hatred. These protections were extended to 
Northern Ireland in 1997. However, some groups continued to experience 
official and societal discrimination.
    Employment discrimination on the grounds of religious or political 
opinion was outlawed specifically in Northern Ireland by the Fair 
Employment Act. The Fair Employment and Treatment Order of 1998, which 
took effect in January, extends the prohibition on discrimination to 
goods, facilities, services, and premises. Discrimination on the basis 
of religion only is illegal in Great Britain when its effect is to 
discriminate against a member of a minority ethnic group. The 
government respects and enforces all antidiscrimination laws, which 
concentrate on employment and the supply of goods and services.
    The Northern Ireland Fair Employment Commission, Equal 
Opportunities Commission, Commission for Racial Equality, and 
Disability Council were amalgamated into the Equality Commission in 
October. The Northern Ireland Office appointed 21 members to the 
Commission in August.
    In April 3 persons were killed and over 100 wounded in 3 bombings 
in London. A man was arrested and charged with all three bombings, one 
of which was carried out in a central London gay bar on April 30 and 
apparently was motivated in part by homophobia (see Section 1.a.).
    In September a government report concluded that the fire service 
was institutionally racist, sexist, and homophobic. The report, carried 
out by the fire service inspectorate, found prejudice throughout the 
overwhelmingly white male service. The Home Office gave the fire chiefs 
18 months to implement the report's recommendations for stronger 
leadership and cultural changes in order to improve equality and 
fairness in the service.
    Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. In August 
a government report, ``Living Without Fear,'' indicated that one in 
four women experience domestic violence at some stage in their lives, 
that reported incidents of rape have more than tripled over the past 10 
years, that two women per week are killed by their current or former 
partners, and that women fear personal attack more than any other 
crime. Since the paramilitary cease-fires, reports of violence against 
women in Northern Ireland have increased.
    Surveys also indicate that domestic violence is the violent crime 
the least likely to be reported to the police. The law provides for 
injunctive relief, personal protection orders, and protective exclusion 
orders (similar to restraining orders) for women who are victims of 
violence. The Government provides shelters, counseling, and other 
assistance for battery or rape and offers free legal aid to battered 
women who are economically reliant on their abusers. The government 
actively prosecutes perpetrators of domestic violence. The 1997 
Protection from Harassment Act provides for prison sentences of up to 5 
years for convicted stalkers. Provisional figures indicate that the act 
has been effective in assisting some women in challenging violence.
    Also in ``Living Without Fear,'' the Government outlined its long-
term goals in eliminating violence against women, including plans to 
modernize legislation on sex offenses and reform the Offences Against 
the Person Act. The report summarizes government actions in protection, 
justice, prevention, and training. However, no legislative reforms were 
passed by year's end. The NGO, Change, welcomed the tone of the 
publication and its explicit references to violence against women as a 
crime, its plans for significant future research, and its 5-year 
commitment to making a real impact on women's lives.
    Criminal action for sexual harassment cases must be prosecuted 
under assault legislation since no law specifically prohibits sexual 
harassment. Women's groups have complained that civil suits concerning 
sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of gender sometimes 
take up to 3\1/2\ years to appear before an industrial tribunal.
    The law provides for equal opportunity between the sexes, but women 
experience some discrimination in practice. The 1975 Sex Discrimination 
Act, as amended in 1986, prohibits both direct and indirect 
discrimination in training, housing, and the provision of goods and 
services, as well as in employment. Women have equal rights regarding 
property and divorce. According to the Government's Equal Opportunities 
Commission (which supports persons who bring discrimination cases 
before industrial tribunals and courts and produces guidelines on good 
practice for employers), significant progress has been made towards 
equal opportunity for women since the Commission was established in 
1975. The introduction of the national minimum wage in April, effective 
in August, was an important change in the effort to equalize pay. 
However, according to the Commission, women working full time earn 
approximately 20 percent less than their male counterparts in similar 
positions. NGO's indicated that progress towards equality of pay for 
equal work was the single largest problem confronting women, citing 
only an 8 percent increase in relative pay in the past 25 years.
    In August the Government announced some maternity benefits reforms 
and provisions for unpaid parental leave that came into effect in 
December. A national child care strategy was set up to increase child 
care places, and in April the Government increased child benefits.
    Women's issues within the Government are represented at the cabinet 
level by the Minister for Women, who heads up the women's unit, which 
engages in dialog with women and advises the government but has no 
authority for direct action.
    Children.--The government demonstrates its strong commitment to 
children's rights and welfare through its systems of public education 
and medical care. The government provides free, compulsory education to 
age 16 and further education to age 18 if the student so desires.
    While there is no societal pattern of abuse directed against 
children, indications are, despite a lack of reliable data, that child 
abuse is nevertheless a problem. Since the paramilitary cease-fires, 
reports of violence against children in Northern Ireland have 
increased.
    Concern and publicity surrounding pedophiles is growing. As part of 
a government drive to protect the young from child abusers, previously 
secret registers of pedophiles are to be available to any employer who 
runs an organization where persons under age 18 could be at risk 
(schools, children's homes, or voluntary organizations). In addition 
suspected child abusers and convicted pedophiles are banned from 
working with children under the new Protection of Children Act, which 
was passed in July. Childcare organizations must consult a list before 
offering anyone a job, paid or otherwise, and it is illegal for them to 
hire anyone named on it.
    Various laws covering England and Wales stipulate that children 
have the right to apply for court orders, to give or withhold consent 
for medical treatment (for those capable of making an informed 
decision), to make complaints to the relevant local authority, to have 
their ethnic, linguistic, and religious background considered in 
decisions affecting them, to have reasonable contact with their 
families (usually applied in a circumstance where there was abuse), and 
in general to be consulted regarding their desires.
    In July the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act was enacted, 
creating the sentence of referral to a youth offender panel for first-
time young offenders who plead guilty and providing greater protection 
to vulnerable witnesses (children, the disabled, or the fearful).
    Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the police can arrest and 
detain children as young as 10 years old for up to 7 days.
    In December the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the human 
rights of two young boys had been violated by the intimidating nature 
of their 1993 trial in Crown Court. The boys were 10 years old when 
they murdered 2-year-old Jamie Bulger in 1993. The ruling will require 
sweeping changes in the way courts treat juveniles charged with murder 
or manslaughter and ends the role of the Home Secretary in setting 
minimum sentences for children.
    Several recent court cases involving incidents of spanking or 
hitting again have raised the issue of parents' right to hit, following 
a European Court of Human Rights ruling in 1998 that a 9-year-old boy's 
rights were violated by his stepfather's caning. The 1998 School 
Standards and Framework Act extended the ban on corporal punishment in 
state schools to private schools and nursery schools. Child welfare 
groups have called for the outlawing of all corporal punishment of 
children.
    People with Disabilities.--The 1995 People with Disabilities 
Discrimination Act outlaws discrimination against disabled persons in 
the provision of access to public facilities by employers of more than 
15 workers, service providers (apart from those providing education or 
running transport vehicles), and anyone selling or renting property. 
The 1993 Education Act imposes specific duties on local education 
authorities to make provision for the special educational needs of 
disabled children. The Disability Rights Commission (DRC) Act, passed 
in July, sets up a body whose functions include keeping the Disability 
Discrimination Act under review, assisting disabled people in bringing 
legal action, and promoting good practices among service providers. The 
DRC also has the power to conduct formal investigations.
    Rights Now, a consortium of over 70 disability organizations 
campaigning for laws to end discrimination on the grounds of 
disability, reported that employers were 6 times more likely to turn 
down a disabled person for a job than a nondisabled applicant with the 
same qualifications.
    Government regulations require that all new buildings meet the 
access requirements of all persons with impaired mobility. In 1992 the 
government promulgated similar regulations for sensory-impaired 
persons, and regulations require that all taxis be wheelchair 
accessible by 2000. However, while generally improved, access to many 
buildings remains inadequate. Many buildings and train stations are so 
old that they do not have elevators. According to the NGO Scope, 94 
percent of polling stations in the 1997 election had one or more 
disability access problems. As of September, stage two of the 1995 
Disability Discrimination Act came into effect, requiring that all 
businesses accommodate disabled customers. Adaptations must be 
``reasonable,'' bearing in mind the circumstances and size of the 
business. For example, a restaurant chain might be expected to print a 
braille version of its menu while a small neighborhood cafe might 
simply have a waiter read a menu aloud for a blind person.
    Religious Minorities.--According to the Community Security Trust, 
the number of anti-Semitic incidents in Britain during the year was 
412, compared with 385 in 1998. Public manifestations of anti-Semitism 
are confined largely to the political fringe, either far right or 
Islamist.
    A London Muslim cleric, Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, said in October 
that playwright Terence McNally is the subject of a death edict for his 
portrayal of Jesus as a homosexual in his play ``Corpus Christi.''
    Despite government efforts and the lowering of the overall 
unemployment rate in Northern Ireland, the unemployment rate for 
Catholic men persists at twice that of Protestant men.
    The 1989 Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act, as amended, aims 
to end even unintentional or indirect discrimination in the workplace, 
and a public tribunal adjudicates complaints. All public-sector 
employers and all private firms with over 10 workers must report 
annually to the Equality Commission on the religious composition of 
their work force and must review their employment practices at least 
once every 3 years. Noncompliance can bring criminal penalties and the 
loss of government contracts. Victims of employment discrimination may 
sue for damages. Although critics of the act asserted that its targets 
and timetables are too imprecise, most leaders of the Catholic 
community regard it as a positive step.
    While the active recruitment of Catholics by the Northern Ireland 
civil service produced rough proportionality in overall numbers, the 
service acknowledges that Catholics remain significantly 
underrepresented in its senior grades. Service-wide employment cutbacks 
thus far have hampered efforts to overcome the imbalance. Government 
efforts to increase the recruitment of Catholics into the RUC 
(currently 92 percent Protestant) and related security jobs in Northern 
Ireland have been hampered by IRA killings and death threats, as well 
as by widespread antipathy in the Catholic community to the security 
forces. Despite recruitment efforts, the percentage of Catholic 
officers in the police force has not changed significantly.
    During the summer marching season, arsonists attacked several 
Orange halls and Protestant churches around the province.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Despite legal prohibitions 
against race discrimination, persons of African and Afro-Caribbean, 
South Asian, or Middle Eastern origin and Travellers face occasional 
acts of societal violence and some discrimination. Incitement to racial 
hatred is a criminal offense punishable by a maximum of 2 years' 
imprisonment. The Government strictly enforces the laws and regulations 
in this area.
    In April 3 persons were killed and over 100 wounded in 3 bombings 
in London. A white man was arrested and charged with all three attacks, 
two of which were directed at ethnic minority neighborhoods (see 
Section 1.a.).
    The government-appointed but independent Commission for Racial 
Equality provides guidelines on good practice, supports persons taking 
court action under the Race Relations Act of 1976, and may initiate its 
own court action. After investigating a complaint, the CRE may issue a 
notice requiring that the discrimination be stopped. The CRE then 
monitors the response to its notice for 5 years.
    Repeated claims of police misconduct in the case of Stephen 
Lawrence, a black youth stabbed to death in south London in 1993, led 
to a 1998 inquiry into police actions during the investigation of 
Lawrence's murder. During the inquiry testimony, the London police 
admitted that there were serious flaws in the investigation, and they 
began to review and modify their methods of dealing with racially 
motivated crimes. The inquiry resulted in a widely noted report that 
was released in February. The report stated that the investigation was 
marred by fundamental errors, including a combination of professional 
incompetence, institutional racism, and a failure of leadership by 
senior officers. The sweeping report made 70 recommendations for 
changes in police practices.
    The report served as an acceptance of the many flaws and failures 
involved in the case. No one was charged with the crime. The five white 
males accused of the crime cannot be charged again due to ``double 
jeopardy'' laws. Debate continues over possible changes to certain 
aspects of these laws, another recommendation of the February report. 
After a yearlong review of the conduct of the Lawrence case, the Police 
Complaints Authority recommended that five detectives face disciplinary 
charges. Four of these officers already were retired when the PCA 
announced its findings. The only officer to face charges was found 
guilty of two counts of neglect of duty and verbally reprimanded.
    As a result of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, the police instituted 
new training and community relations programs and pledged to improve 
overall public confidence and service. The Home Secretary ordered 
Scotland Yard to review investigative procedures in all unsolved 
alleged racist murders in London. Other chief constables have 
recognized that institutional racism exists within their forces. The 
Stephen Lawrence inquiry encouraged debate on the existence and depth 
of racism in society and how to deal with it.
    A December report commissioned by the London Metropolitan Police 
showed that proportionately more blacks than whites are stopped and 
searched by police. Home Office figures showed that blacks were six 
times more likely to be stopped by police than whites. The report also 
highlighted increasing drug searches of young Asians (see Section 
1.c.).
    In January the police acknowledged that Michael Menson, a black 
musician found on fire in the street in 1997, was the victim of a 
racist attack. The Race and Violent Crime Task Force, established as a 
result of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, reopened the case, originally 
treated as a suicide, in December 1998. In December 1999, two men were 
convicted of killing Menson, and the ringleader was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. Police are pursuing formal complaints from the Menson 
family against the officers who initially investigated Menson's death.
    In June the Police Complaints Authority apologized to the Reel 
family for ``weaknesses and flaws'' in the original investigation into 
the death of Ricky Reel, a young Asian found drowned in the Thames 
River in 1997. The PCA report was not made public. His family believes 
that Reel was the victim of a racial attack and claimed that police 
failed to investigate the crime properly. The police launched a new 
investigation under the Race and Violent Crime Task Force. In August 
Reel's mother made a joint appeal with the police for information about 
two white men suspected of racially abusing Reel on the night he 
disappeared. In November an inquest jury rejected the original verdict 
of accidental death and returned an open verdict in the Reel case.
    Travellers, nomadic populations consisting of Roma, Irish, and 
``new'' Travellers, estimated to number some 100,000 persons, 
experience marginalization, educational discrimination, and police and 
societal harassment greater than that of the settled population, 
according to human rights groups. U.N. Committees on both the Rights of 
the Child and the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have expressed 
similar concerns. In August 1997 the Government passed the Race 
Relations (Northern Ireland) Order, which for the first time gave 
specific legal protection to minority ethnic groups there, including 
the Traveller community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form and 
join unions, and the Government respects this right in practice. A new 
Employment Relations Act--enacted by Parliament and signed into law in 
July--established the country's first procedures for statutory (as 
distinct from voluntary) union recognition.
    Unions are free of government control. The new Employment Relations 
Act affords significant new protection to union organizing efforts and, 
for the first time, confirms the statutory right to strike. The act 
sets minimum employment standards for the first time in labor law. It 
also abolished the posts of ``commissioner for the rights of trade 
union members'' and the ``commissioner for protection against unlawful 
industrial action.'' Created by previous governments, both offices were 
widely interpreted as politically motivated attempts to undermine the 
organized labor movement. However, much detail is left to implementing 
legislation (not expected to be completed before April 2000).
    Unions participate freely in international organizations
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is longstanding and widespread, covering about 35 percent of 
the work force. Under the new Employment Relations Act, labor-
management contracts are now enforceable in the courts.
    Under the new act, unions can now file a request for recognition, 
identifying the proposed bargaining unit, to a revamped Central 
Arbitration Committee (CAC). The act covers employers with more than 20 
workers and encompasses an estimated two-thirds of all workplaces.
    Once the CAC determines the appropriate bargaining unit, it 
assesses whether a union is likely to have majority support. If union 
members already make up a majority of the bargaining unit, the CAC can 
issue a declaration that the union is recognized for collective 
bargaining without a ballot. In those instances where the CAC orders a 
ballot (typically, when the majority of bargaining unit employees are 
not already union members), the employer must cooperate by providing a 
list of names and giving the union access to the workplace to campaign. 
Unions win recognition when a majority of those voting agree, including 
at least 40 percent of those in the bargaining unit.
    Although the act encourages voluntary agreements between employers 
and unions, the CAC can, if necessary, impose a legally binding 
procedure for bargaining about pay, hours, and holidays.
    Workers are protected against dismissal or other retaliation for 
campaigning or voting for or against recognition. Unions no longer are 
required to name their members when initiating a strike ballot, to 
minimize opportunities for retaliation. The bill also prohibits the 
compilation of lists of union members and labor activists for use by 
employers and employment agencies. This is aimed at ``blacklists,'' as 
operated in the past. Dismissed strikers are able to claim unfair 
dismissal if fired within 8 weeks of when an employee first undertook a 
legal strike.
    Union members are protected against ``being subject to any 
detriment'' due to union activity or membership. This protection goes 
further than the previous language of ``action short of dismissal taken 
against him as an individual.'' Heretofore, it was legal for employers 
to withhold fringe benefits otherwise available to nonunion employees.
    At the same time, the new act retains key policies implemented by 
previous governments, notably ballots and notice before strikes, 
abolition of the closed shop, secondary boycotts, and prohibition 
against mass picketing.
    There are no export processing zones. The new Employment Relations 
Act also extends its protection to contract and part-time workers in an 
attempt to close loopholes that previously allowed some employers to 
evade labor regulations. Foreign workers are protected to the full 
extent of the law.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited and is not 
practiced, although the ILO has raised questions about the situation in 
privatized prisons.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--School attendance until age 16 is compulsory. Children 
under age 16 are not permitted to work in an industrial enterprise 
except as part of an educational course. Forced and bonded child labor 
is prohibited, and the Government effectively enforces this prohibition 
(see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The country's first minimum wage 
went into effect on April 1 and benefited some 10 percent of the work 
force directly. It is $5.76 (3.60 pounds) for adults and $5.12 (3.20 
pounds) for youth. This does not provide a decent standard of living 
for most workers with families, but other elements of the welfare state 
fill the gap. In particular the working families' tax credit and 
disabled person's tax credit--both implemented on October 5, 1999--are 
designed to ensure a working family a weekly income of $320 (200 
pounds), which constitutes a living wage. It is estimated that some 1.5 
million of the poorest households benefit from the new minimum wage.
    The Government introduced a new working time directive in October 
1998 to bring domestic legislation into compliance with the European 
Union's 48-hour workweek. Implementing regulations still are being 
developed, with considerable public input.
    The Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974 stipulates that the 
health and safety of employees not be placed at risk. In practice the 
act is being updated and modified constantly. The Health and Safety 
Executive effectively enforces regulations on these matters and may 
initiate criminal proceedings in appropriate cases. Workers' 
representatives actively monitor enforcement of the act. Workers can 
remove themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--No laws specifically criminalize 
trafficking in persons. The police have had success in prosecuting 
traffickers under other laws, such as those against pimping and living 
off of immoral earnings. A Home Office review of sexual offenses laws, 
to be completed in June 2000, is considering whether there should be 
specific laws that address trafficking. Under the 1999 Immigration and 
Asylum Act, persons found importing illegal immigrants can be fined 
$3,600 (2,000 pounds).
    Trafficking in persons is a growing problem. A Home Office report 
on trafficking in women, expected to be issued in the spring of 2000, 
will address the problem. In February three Lithuanians were jailed for 
3 years on charges of living off of immoral earnings by controlling 
four prostitutes they brought from Lithuania. In October and December, 
members of a Chinese gang were found guilty of false imprisonment and 
conspiracy to blackmail for bringing about 500 persons from China and 
then making them effectively into slaves. This ended a series of trials 
dating back to June 1998, in which 19 gang members were jailed for a 
total of 200 years.
                                 ______
                                 

                               UZBEKISTAN

    Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights. The 
Constitution provides for a presidential system with separation of 
powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In 
practice President Islam Karimov and the centralized executive branch 
that serves him dominate political life. Chosen president in a 1991 
election that most observers considered neither free nor fair, Karimov 
had his stay in office extended to 2000 by a 1995 plebiscite. 
Parliament subsequently voted to make the extension part of Karimov's 
first term, thus making him eligible to run again in 2000. The 
executive branch dominates the Oliy Majlis (Parliament), which consists 
only of members of parties that support the President. Despite 
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary, the executive 
branch heavily influences the courts in both civil and criminal cases.
    There is effective civilian control over the military. The Ministry 
of Interior (MVD) controls the police. The police and other MVD forces 
are responsible for most normal police functions. The National Security 
Service (NSS)--the former KGB--deals with a broad range of national 
security questions, including corruption, organized crime, and 
narcotics. The police and the NSS committed numerous serious human 
rights abuses.
    The Government has stated that it is committed to a gradual 
transition to a free market economy. However, continuing restrictions 
on currency convertibility and other government measures to control 
economic activity have constrained economic growth and led 
international lending organizations to suspend or scale back credits. 
The economy is based primarily on agriculture and agricultural 
processing; the country is a major producer and exporter of cotton. It 
is also a major producer of gold and has substantial deposits of 
copper, strategic minerals, gas, and oil. The Government has made some 
progress in reducing inflation and the budget deficit, but government 
statistics understate both, while overstating economic growth. There 
are no reliable statistics on unemployment, which is believed to be 
high and growing. The Government is taking some modest steps to reduce 
the host of formal and informal barriers that constrain the nascent 
private sector.
    The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and the 
Government continued to commit numerous serious abuses.
    Citizens cannot exercise their right to change their government 
peacefully. The Government has not permitted the existence of an 
opposition party since 1993. Election laws restrict the possibility of 
any real opposition parties arising or mounting a campaign. Minor 
changes enacted in August to the presidential, parliamentary, and local 
election laws did not ensure that future elections would be free and 
fair.
    There were credible reports that security forces committed 
killings. Security force mistreatment resulted in the deaths of several 
citizens in custody. Police and NSS forces beat, tortured, and harassed 
persons. The security forces arbitrarily arrested or detained human 
rights activists, pious Muslims, and other citizens on false charges, 
frequently planting narcotics, weapons, or forbidden literature on 
them. Prison conditions are poor, and detention can be prolonged. 
Police and NSS forces infringed on citizens' privacy, including the use 
of illegal searches and wiretaps. Those responsible for documented 
abuses rarely are punished.
    After five terrorist bombs exploded near government targets in 
Tashkent on February 16, security forces launched a particularly wide-
ranging campaign of arrests and intimidation against all those whom the 
Government perceived as a threat. Among those arrested and tried were 
some persons with close links to avowed Islamist Uzbeks abroad who, the 
Government believes, were responsible for the bombings. However, other 
victims of the crackdown included members of the secular opposition, 
human rights activists, and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of overtly 
pious Muslims and members of Islamist political groups. While it is not 
possible to estimate the number of those arrested, observers believe 
that the scale surpasses any previous such action. Some human rights 
activists assert that tens of thousands of persons were arrested and 
remain in custody.
    The judiciary does not always ensure due process and often defers 
to the wishes of the executive branch. The Government severely limits 
freedom of speech and the press, and an atmosphere of repression 
stifles public criticism of the Government. Although the Constitution 
expressly prohibits it, press censorship continues, and the Government 
sharply restricts citizens' access to foreign media. A new decree 
requires all Internet service providers to route their connections 
through a government server. The primary purpose of this measure, 
according to the Government, is to prevent access to what the 
Government considers harmful information. The Government limits freedom 
of assembly and association. The Government continues to ban 
unauthorized public meetings and demonstrations. A new law improves the 
formal legal framework for the formation, registration, and operation 
of nongovernmental organizations; however, the Government also 
continues to deny registration to opposition political parties as well 
as to other groups that might be critical of the Government. For 
example the Ministry of Justice repeatedly has denied the application 
for registration of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) and 
the Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU) have 
repeatedly applied for registration, citing technical deficiencies. 
Unregistered opposition parties and movements may not operate freely or 
publish their views. The Government limits freedom of religion. The 
Government harassed and arrested hundreds of Islamic leaders and 
believers on questionable grounds, citing the threat of extremism. The 
Government tolerates the existence of minority religions but places 
strict limits on religious activities. Although the Government 
registered nearly 150 minority religious communities by year's end, 
several others were prevented from registering by local officials. 
There were cases in which university authorities expelled female 
students for wearing Islamic dress.
    The Government continues to voice rhetorical support for human 
rights, but does not ensure these rights in practice. Although the 
election, religion, and media laws contain elements that theoretically 
support human rights, in reality the Government does not respect such 
provisions. The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, which was formed 
in 1997, reports that it is assisting hundreds of citizens in 
redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve allegedly 
unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police. The 
ombudsman's office issued reports identifying the most serious types of 
violations of human rights by government officials; however, most of 
the successfully resolved cases appear relatively minor.
    Domestic violence against women is a problem, and despite a 
constitutional prohibition, there continues to be significant 
traditional societal discrimination against women. Trafficking in women 
and girls for the purposes of prostitution occurs.
    Workplace discrimination against some minorities persists. There 
are some limits on worker rights.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of political killings; however, security forces 
committed several killings. Security force mistreatment resulted in the 
deaths of several prisoners in custody.
    On June 25, a Human Rights Watch representative viewed the body of 
Farkhod Usmanov, who was arrested on June 14 for the possession of a 
leaflet from the Islamic political group Hezbut Tahrir (Party of 
Liberation). The bruises and other markings on the body suggested that 
Usmanov, son of a well-known imam, died from torture while in custody. 
Officials claimed that he died of heart failure. Akhmadhon Turakhanov 
died in custody on June 19, reportedly because prison authorities 
refused to treat his diabetes. Turakhanov was a member of the 
unregistered Birlik Democratic Movement and the unregistered 
Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan. Although 
Turakhanov was not religious, officials accused him of being an Islamic 
extremist and charged him with hooliganism and conspiracy against the 
constitutional order. There were unconfirmed but credible reports of at 
least 13 other deaths by torture or beating. In one case, a man from 
Nukus, Azim Khodjaev, allegedly was beaten to death at a then-secret 
prison in Karakalpakstan in mid-July because he would not reveal the 
whereabouts of his sons whom the police were seeking. According to 
witnesses in Nukus, his body was bruised and missing its fingernails. 
Authorities gave the cause of death as heart failure.
    Between August and early October, Uzbek security forces provided 
assistance to the Kyrgyz Government in dealing with an incursion into 
Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan by a group of armed ethnic Uzbek militants. 
As part of the operations against the militants, a number of air 
strikes were carried out against their positions in southern 
Kyrgyzstan. In the first of these on August 15, the Uzbek Government 
acknowledged that its air force had responded to a direct request from 
the Kyrgyz. This incident resulted in no casualties. A subsequent 
strike on August 29 reportedly caused the accidental deaths of up to 12 
noncombatants in a Kyrgyz village; however, the Uzbek Government never 
admitted responsibility for this incident, and its involvement remains 
unconfirmed.
    The Government conducted no further investigation of the death in 
custody on October 30, 1998, of outspoken Muslim cleric Qobil Muradov.
    There were no reported developments in the 1995 killing of Bokhtiar 
Yakubov, a witness linked to an opposition activist.
    On February 16, 5 bombs detonated in downtown Tashkent and killed 
16 persons. The perpetrators are believed to have been terrorist 
members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) or related groups. 
At year's end, the Government reported that it tried and convicted 128 
persons in connection with this attack; 11 were sentenced to death. The 
first trial of 22 suspects in June was open to journalists and 
international observers, but subsequent trials were closed and held in 
secret. In a March 30 bus hijacking, terrorists killed three law 
enforcement agents. In November four forest rangers and three police 
officers were killed by a group of IMU members that they encountered in 
a mountainous region near Tashkent. In the subsequent manhunt, 3 police 
special forces officers and 15 suspected insurgents were killed.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    It is now widely believed that Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, missing since 
March 5, 1998, fled the country to avoid arrest and was not abducted by 
security forces. There were no reported developments in the 1995 
disappearance of Imam Abduvali Mirzaev, the 1997 disappearance of his 
assistant, Nematjon Parpiev, or the 1992 disappearance of Aboullah 
Utaev, leader of the Uzbekistan chapter of the outlawed Islamic 
Renaissance Party (IRP). Most independent observers believe that the 
three missing Islamic activists are either dead or in NSS custody.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Although the law prohibits these practices, police 
routinely beat and otherwise mistreat detainees to obtain confessions. 
Both police and the NSS used beatings and harassment against citizens.
    Six citizens convicted for their links to the outlawed Erk 
Democratic Party and its leader Mohammed Solikh released a statement in 
August alleging that their captors tortured and beat them during 5 
months of incommunicado detention from late-February to mid-July, in 
order to force them to sign incriminating statements. Police methods 
included use of electric shocks, near suffocation, and beatings with 
rubber sticks and plastic bottles filled with water. One of the 
defendants, noted writer Mamadali Makhmudov, released a separate 
statement, saying that police threatened to rape his wife and daughters 
in his presence before killing him.
    Police detained, arrested, beat, and harassed members of various 
religious groups, including hundreds of Muslims and at least two groups 
of evangelical Christians (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    Police routinely planted false evidence on citizens to justify 
arrests or extort bribes (see Section 1.d.).
    Prison conditions are poor, and worse for male than for female 
prisoners. Due to limited resources, prison overcrowding is a problem. 
Human rights activists reported that the incarceration of 10 to 15 
people in cells designed for 4 is common. Tuberculosis and hepatitis 
are endemic in the prisons, making even short periods of incarceration 
potentially deadly. Reportedly there are severe shortages of food and 
medicines. Political and religious prisoners often are not allowed 
visitors or any other form of contact with family and friends. There is 
a new prison complex in a remote area of the Republic of Karakalpakstan 
near the city of Jaslik. The Government has allowed family visits to a 
single facility in that area that houses 250 prisoners. Although 
prisoners are treated well prior to visits by relatives, conditions at 
the facility are reported to be poor, and as many as 17 prisoners 
allegedly died from mistreatment since May. There are rumored to be 
additional prison facilities nearby housing a large but unknown number 
of inmates. It appears that most of the prisoners transferred to Jaslik 
were convicted for their participation in unauthorized Islamic groups. 
In August police prevented a Human Rights Watch representative who 
attempted to view the complex from entering the area. The Government 
operates labor camps, but little is known about them; however, 
conditions of incarceration have been reported to be less severe than 
in prisons.
    Akhmedin Turakhanov died in custody, reportedly due to prison 
authorities' refusal to treat his diabetes (see Section 1.a.).
    The Government does not permit prison visits by human rights 
monitors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces 
continued to arrest and detain individuals arbitrarily, without warrant 
or just cause. A Soviet-era detention law provides that police may hold 
a person suspected of committing a crime for up to 3 days. At the end 
of this period, the detained person must be declared officially a 
suspect, charged with a crime, or released. A person officially 
declared a suspect may be held for an additional 3 days before charges 
are filed. A prosecutor's order is required for arrests but not for 
detentions prior to the filing of charges. In practice these legal 
protections frequently are ignored. In some cases, police circumvent 
the rules by claiming that the detainee is being held as a potential 
witness and not as a suspect; there are no regulations concerning the 
length of time witnesses may be detained. A court date must be set 
within 15 days of arrest (or filing of charges) and the defendant may 
be detained during this period. A defendant may not have access to 
counsel while in detention but only after the first interview with an 
investigator. Once the trial date is set, detainees deemed not to be 
violent may be released on their own recognizance pending trial. No 
money need be posted as bond, but in such cases the accused usually 
must sign a pledge not to leave the city. In practice this procedure 
rarely is used. During the period between arrest and trial, defendants 
are almost always kept in pretrial detention, which has been known to 
last as long as 2 years.
    In ordinary criminal cases, the police generally are capable of 
identifying and arresting only those reasonably suspected of the crime. 
However, both the police and NSS are far less discriminating in cases 
involving perceived risks to national security. In the immediate 
aftermath of the February explosions in Tashkent, police arbitrarily 
detained hundreds of those whose religious or political inclinations 
made them suspect in the eyes of the security forces (also see Section 
2.c.). The majority of those detained were released after questioning 
and detention that lasted as long as 2 months. Prosecutors have brought 
charges against 128 persons in connection with the bombings, and at 
year's end 11 had been sentenced to death.
    Police routinely plant small amounts of narcotics, weapons, 
ammunition, or Islamic literature on citizens either to justify arrest 
or to extort bribes. The most frequent victims of this illegal practice 
are suspected members of nonofficial Islamic organizations such as 
Hezbut Tahrir. The first of numerous alleged Hezbut Tahrir members 
tried during the year was sentenced on May 14. The authorities 
convicted 11 of the 12 defendants--whose average age was 26--of 
possession of narcotics or weapons that their families claim were 
planted by the arresting officers. Most also were convicted of 
conspiracy against the constitutional order. They were sentenced to an 
average of 12 years in prison. Subsequent sentences against Hezbut 
Tahrir members were even harsher. The total numbers of those either 
tried and convicted or still in pretrial detention are unknown, but 
human rights activists contend that there are well over 1,000 and 
perhaps several thousand. Many of those in detention are political 
detainees. Police also allegedly have planted drugs on four persons in 
two Christian denominations in order to arrest them.
    In the crackdown after the bombings, it was common for police to 
arrest, hold, beat, and even try family members of the suspects that 
the police actually were seeking (also see Section 1.f.). There were 
numerous reports of individuals surrendering to police in order to save 
their families. Police detained the wife, mother, brother, uncle, and 
brother-in-law of missing Imam Abidkhon Nazarov within a month of the 
bombing. While Nazarov's mother was released after brief questioning, 
his wife was held for 10 days (ostensibly for resisting the police) and 
the three males ultimately were given prison terms. Nazarov's brother 
Umarkhon was sentenced in Namangan to 11 years in prison on May 20. On 
the same day, his brother-in-law Abdurashid Nasriddinov also was 
sentenced to 11 years and his uncle Akhmadali Salamov to 4 years. All 
allegedly possessed extremist religious literature. The men allegedly 
were beaten during pretrial detention and repeatedly asked the 
whereabouts of the imam. Similarly, the police arrested three brothers 
of exiled Democratic Opposition leader Mohammed Solikh (see Sections 
1.c. and 3).
    Police detained, arrested, beat, and harassed various religious 
groups (see Sections 1.c. and 2.c.).
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides 
for an independent judicial authority, the judicial branch takes its 
direction from the executive branch and has little independence in 
practice. Under the Constitution, the President appoints all judges for 
5-year terms. They may be removed for crimes or failure to fulfill 
their obligations. Power to remove judges rests with the President, 
except for Supreme Court judges, whose removal also must be confirmed 
by Parliament.
    The system of courts of general jurisdiction is divided into three 
tiers: district courts; regional courts; and the Supreme Court. In 
addition a Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing laws, 
decrees, and judicial decisions to ensure their compliance with the 
Constitution. Military courts handle all civil and criminal matters 
that occur within the military. There is a system of economic courts on 
the regional level that deals with economic cases between judicial 
legal entities.
    Decisions of district and regional courts of general jurisdiction 
may be appealed to the next level within 10 days of ruling. The 
Criminal Code has reduced the list of crimes punishable by death to 
murder, espionage, and treason, eliminating the economic crimes 
punishable by death in the former Soviet code. Officially, most court 
cases are open to the public but may be closed in exceptional cases, 
such as those involving state secrets, rape, or young defendants. 
However, except for the first trial in June, all trials of those 
suspected of involvement in the February 16 terrorist bombings were 
closed to international observers and the public on security grounds. 
In similar fashion, many trials of alleged Islamic extremists have been 
closed.
    State prosecutors, called ``procurators,'' play a decisive role in 
the criminal justice system. They order arrests, direct investigations, 
prepare criminal cases, and recommend sentences. If a judge's sentence 
does not agree with the prosecutor's recommendation, the prosecutor has 
a right to appeal the sentence to a higher court. (There is no 
protection against double jeopardy.) Judges whose decisions have been 
overturned on more than one occasion may be removed from office. 
Consequently, judges rarely defy the recommendations of prosecutors. As 
a result, defendants usually are found guilty.
    Uzbekistan still uses the Soviet practice of trial by a panel of 
three judges: one professional judge and two lay assessors who serve 5 
year terms and are selected from workers' collectives. The judge 
presides and directs the proceedings. However, in practice, judges 
often defer to the Government and its prosecutors on legal and other 
matters. Defendants have the right to attend the proceedings, confront 
witnesses, and present evidence. The State provides a lawyer without 
charge, but by law the accused also has the right to hire an attorney. 
In practice the right to an attorney often is violated and there are 
numerous examples of denial of the right to counsel. In a July 13 
trial, human rights activist Mahbuba Kasimova was denied the right to 
hire her own attorney. She was invited to a meeting with the judge that 
day only to discover when she arrived at the courthouse that she would 
be tried immediately. She requested to have her attorney present, but 
her request was denied; she was provided a court-appointed lawyer for 
the trial, which lasted only 3 hours before the judge sentenced her to 
5 years in prison (see Section 4). On appeal the judge rejected the 
argument that she had been denied right to counsel, ruling that the 
state-appointed lawyer had represented her. In addition Human Rights 
Watch reported that several families of those accused in connection 
with the February 16 bombings hired their own defense lawyers, but the 
lawyers were denied access to their clients, both before and during the 
trial.
    In practice most defense lawyers are unskilled at defending their 
clients. Courts often do not allow all defense witnesses to be heard, 
and written documents are given more weight than courtroom witnesses. 
In the first trial of those accused of involvement in the terrorist 
bombings, defense attorneys argued only that the defendants were sorry 
for their crimes and did not dispute the procurator's version of 
events.
    The Constitution provides a right of appeal to those convicted, but 
such proceedings usually are formalistic exercises that confirm the 
original conviction. For example the appeal of Mahbuba Kasimova on 
August 17 lasted only 45 minutes, and the judge did not permit 
testimony. Kasimova was not allowed to be present at the appeal.
    Authorities arrested and tried unfairly relatives of suspects and 
members of opposition groups (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
    In September HRSU released a list of 505 ``possible political 
prisoners,'' many of whom are political dissidents, human rights 
activists, or Hezbut Tahrir members who can be regarded as political 
prisoners. Many of them were associated with the Birlik or Erk 
opposition organizations in the early 1990's. Others were involved in 
independent Islamic activities. Many were convicted of nonpolitical 
offenses such as tax evasion, misappropriation of funds, or illegal 
possession of narcotics or firearms (also see Section 2.c.). It is 
widely believed that in the latter cases, arresting officers planted 
the incriminating material. The Government has rejected explicitly that 
any of the 162 individuals on an earlier HRSU list are political 
prisoners and denies that any prisoners held in the country can be 
classified as ``political.''
    Abdurauf Gafurov, an Islamic activist imprisoned since 1996, was 
scheduled for release in May 1998; however, his sentence was extended 
for an additional 3 years based on testimony from fellow prisoners. He 
was amnestied and released in 
October.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Authorities infringe on these rights. By law only a 
prosecutor may issue a search warrant or authorize electronic 
surveillance. There is no provision for a judicial review of such 
warrants. Security agencies routinely monitor telephone calls and 
employ surveillance and wiretaps in the cases of persons involved in 
opposition political activities.
    The religion law (see Section 2.c.) prohibits private teaching of 
religious principles. There have been reports of students being 
expelled from or harassed and forced to leave various universities and 
secondary schools for wearing traditional Islamic dress. Human Rights 
Watch issued a report in October 1999 describing 28 confirmed cases 
from 1997 and 1998. In addition a group of 15 female students from 
Fergana State University claimed that they were forced to leave school 
in March (see Section 2.c.). Police arrested a number of men who wore 
beards, a traditional sign of Islamic piety (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.c.).
    Police arrested, detained, and beat family members of suspects that 
they were seeking (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 2.c.).
    The Government does not allow general distribution of foreign 
newspapers and other publications. However, two or three conservative 
Russian newspapers and a variety of Russian tabloids and lifestyle 
publications are available. There is a modest selection of other 
foreign periodicals available in Tashkent's major hotels, and 
authorized groups can obtain foreign periodicals through subscription. 
Although publication of local editions of many foreign publications, 
including newspapers such as Izvestia and Pravda, remains suspended, 
Moscow editions of Izvestia, Pravda, and other Russian papers currently 
are sold in newstands. The authorities do not permit rebroadcast of 
Russian programming that is critical of the Government (see Section 
2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides 
for ``freedom of thought, speech, and convictions,'' the Government 
continues to limit these rights severely.
    A 1991 law against ``offending the honor and dignity of the 
President'' limits the ability to criticize the President. Ordinary 
citizens remain afraid to express views critical of the President and 
the Government in public. The 1998 mass media law formally provides for 
freedom of expression, protects the rights of journalists, and 
reiterates the constitutional ban on censorship. Nonetheless, several 
articles of the law, and the lack of due process provided for in their 
implementation, allow the Government to use the law to silence critics. 
One provision makes journalists responsible for the accuracy of the 
information contained in their news stories, potentially subjecting 
them to prosecution.
    Another law permits authorities to close media outlets without a 
court judgment. Yet another prohibits stories that incite religious 
confrontation and ethnic discord. Finally, the law prohibits the 
registration of organizations whose purposes include subverting or 
overthrowing the constitutional order (see Section 2.b.).
    All media outlets must be registered by a 17-member 
interdepartmental government commission. A media organization must 
provide information about intended content or programming, sources of 
funding, means of distribution, technical capabilities, founders, and 
sponsors. The media outlets registered by January 1 as required by law 
but paid higher annual fees and conformed to certain technical 
standards. Information remains very tightly controlled. Although the 
Constitution prohibits censorship, it is widely practiced and the 
Government tolerates little, if any, criticism of its actions. The last 
opposition newspaper to be published was that of the Erk Democratic 
Party, which has been banned within the country since 1993 but is 
published sporadically abroad.
    There are no private publishing houses, and government approval is 
required for all publications. Newspapers may not be printed without 
the approval of the Committee for the Control of State Secrets. All 
newspapers are printed by state-owned printing houses, which refuse to 
print any newspaper whose editor does not confirm that the Committee 
has cleared the issue a few hours before being submitted. Journalists 
who want to ensure that their work is published practice self-
censorship.
    The Uzbekistan Information Agency cooperates closely with the 
presidential staff to prepare and distribute all officially sanctioned 
news and information. Nearly all newspapers are government-owned and 
controlled; the key newspapers are organs of government ministries. 
Private persons and journalist collectives may not establish newspapers 
unless they meet the media law's standards for establishment of a 
``mass media organ,'' including founders acceptable to the Government. 
Two private newspapers (one in Samarkand and one in Tashkent) are 
permitted to operate without censorship. They have no editorial content 
and consist of advertising, horoscopes, and similar features.
    Limited numbers of foreign periodicals are available, but the 
Government does not allow the general distribution of foreign 
newspapers (see Section 1.f.).
    Four state-run channels that fully support the Government and its 
policies dominate television broadcasting. A cable television joint 
venture between the state broadcasting company and a foreign company 
broadcasts the Hong Kong-based Star television channels, including the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Deutsche Welle, and Cable News 
Network world news, to Tashkent and a few other locations. Access to 
cable television is beyond the financial ability of most citizens.
    There are between 30 and 40 privately owned local television 
stations and 3 privately owned radio stations. Generally, broadcasters 
practice self-censorship and enjoy some leeway in reporting critically 
on local government. Samarkand Independent Television, which operates 
four channels, is known for such reporting. However, it is clearly 
sensitive to political concerns from the Government and concentrates on 
nonpolitical news, yet it denies that it is censored formally.
    In late November, the Government denied the annual reregistration 
of two independent television stations and suspended their licenses. 
One, in Urgench, allegedly failed to take required security measures; 
the other, in Guliston, allegedly had substandard equipment. Officials 
claimed that there was no political element to these decisions and that 
registration would be reconsidered when the stations comply with the 
regulations. Foreign observers noted that these two stations are among 
the most independent of the commercial stations and interpreted the 
closings as a warning to other broadcasters not to upset the Government 
during the election season. The Urgench station, which now has filed a 
suit against the Government for damages, also had lost its registration 
temporarily in 1997, allegedly for technical violations of regulations. 
It was believed widely at the time that the real reason for the 1997 
closure was that the owner had been a member of the Erk political 
party.
    Enforcement of the registration and licensing requirements can be 
strict, and the Government's implementation of the media law does not 
function smoothly. Because the registration committee meets irregularly 
and because regulations require annual reregistration, up to one half 
of independent television stations have been forced to operate with 
expired licenses, meaning the Government could shut them down at any 
time. Owners reportedly believe that the Government intentionally 
delays registration in order to ensure that the stations broadcast 
nothing unfavorable.
    Private radio and television broadcasters formed an independent 
professional association in 1998 (ANESMI). The association resisted 
both generous incentives and heavy pressure from the Government to 
elect the Government's candidate as chairman. Government officials 
openly threatened members of the group and the opposition candidate who 
was elected. Since that time, the Government has denied arbitrarily the 
group's registration application on four occasions since its founding, 
twice during the year. Ministry of Justice officials reportedly advised 
the group privately that it never would be registered. The lack of 
registration effectively restricts ANESMI's ability to attract 
international funding and operate legally.
    Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America are not 
permitted to broadcast from within the country, despite the 
Government's 1992 contractual agreement to allow this activity. The 
Government allows both organizations to have correspondents in the 
country. The BBC world service was required to broadcast on a very low 
FM frequency that most radios would not be able to receive, and then 
only after the BBC agreed in June to self-censorship. It is permitted 
to broadcast only 2 hours per day: 1 hour in Uzbek 5 days per week; 30 
minutes in Uzbek the other 2 days; and 30 minutes in Russian 7 days per 
week.
    On February 5, the President signed a decree directing all Internet 
service providers to route their connections through a state-run 
server. The avowed main purpose of this directive was to prevent the 
transmission of what the State considers as harmful information, 
including material advocating or facilitating terrorism, material 
deemed hostile to the constitutional order, and pornography. By year's 
end, the Government had connected all but four providers, but did not 
yet possess the equipment and expertise necessary to complete 
implementation of the decree. Government officials said that they 
foresaw connecting the remaining providers and introducing content 
filtering during 2000.
    The Government has granted academic institutions a degree of 
autonomy, but freedom of expression still is limited. Most institutions 
are modernizing their curriculums, but find up-to-date textbooks too 
costly.
    According to press reports, the Ministry of the Interior announced 
on June 18 that police had detained a large number of Hezbut Takhrir 
leaflet distributors in Tashkent. The leaflets severely criticized 
President Karimov and propagated a Muslim teaching banned in the 
country. Other arrests of leaflet distributors occurred throughout the 
year. A group of 15 female students at Ferghana State University were 
harassed and ultimately forced to leave school over the issue of 
religious dress (see Sections 1.f. and 2.c.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly; however, it also states 
that the authorities have the right to suspend or ban rallies, 
meetings, and demonstrations on security grounds. In practice the 
Government restricted the right of peaceful assembly. The Government 
must approve demonstrations but does not grant permits to demonstrators 
routinely. In November a group of 30 to 40 veiled Moslem women gathered 
in front of the office of the Tashkent hokim (local governor) to 
protest the incarceration of their relatives. The police ordered them 
to disperse after refusing their request to meet with the hokim. Some 
members of the group report that they have been under intermittent 
surveillance since that time. A peaceful demonstration of approximately 
1,000 residents of Jizzak, that was held in May to protest an economic 
policy measure taken by local authorities, occurred without government 
interference.
    The Constitution provides for the right of freedom of association, 
but the Government limits the exercise of this right by refusing to 
register opposition political parties and movements. The Constitution 
places broad limitations on the types of groups that may form and 
requires that all organizations be registered formally with the 
Government in accordance with procedures prescribed by law. A 1996 
analysis by foreign legal observers concluded that, while the Law on 
Political Parties provides theoretical protections for minority parties 
and permits a wide range of fund raising, it also gives the Ministry of 
Justice broad powers to interfere with parties and to withhold 
financial and legal support to those opposed to the Government. There 
are no registered opposition parties (see Section 3).
    In the early 1990's, the Government repeatedly denied the attempts 
by the Birlik Movement and Erk Party to register. Harassment by 
security forces drove the leaders of these organizations into voluntary 
exile. These organizations made no attempt to register during the year, 
reportedly because their remaining adherents were afraid of government 
reprisals.
    Many of the activists not already imprisoned or exiled were victims 
of the latest wave of repression (see Section 3).
    The Constitution and a 1991 amendment to the law on political 
parties ban parties of a religious nature. Authorities cited these 
measures in denying registration to the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) 
in 1992. In the early 1990's, opposition activists announced the 
formation of the Adolat-True Path Party but never pursued formal 
registration, claiming that their members were afraid of government 
reprisals.
    The Law on Public Associations as well as the Law on Political 
Parties prohibits registration of organizations whose purpose includes 
subverting or overthrowing the constitutional order, as well as 
organizations whose names already are registered. In the past, 
officials have used the latter provision to block human rights NGO's 
and independent political parties from registering by creating another 
NGO or party with the identical name; however, the authorities did not 
take such action during the year.
    The Government has refused to register two of the major independent 
human rights organizations. The Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan 
(HRSU), a group with close ties to exiled opposition figures, has 
sought registration unsuccessfully since 1992. The Independent Human 
Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU), headed by longtime human 
rights activist Mikhail Ardzinov, held its founding convention and 
filed registration papers in 1997, but the Government has not yet 
formally approved or denied the application. In both cases, the 
Government claims that the registration applications were not made 
properly and need to be resubmitted. Neither the HRSU nor the IHROU 
resubmitted applications during the year; there was no indication that 
they would be registered. The Government's repeated refusals to 
register these organizations appear politically motivated. The 
Government has approved the registration of only one human rights NGO, 
the Committee for Protection of Individual Rights, which was formed 
with government support in 1996.
    The process for government registration of NGO's and other public 
associations is also difficult and time consuming, with many 
opportunities for obstruction. Although unregistered organizations 
often can disseminate literature, hold meetings, and use letterhead 
stationery without government interference, they do not exist legally 
and have no real access to the media or government.
    A law on nongovernmental, noncommercial organizations passed in 
April provides a relatively benign legal framework for their 
registration and functioning. In particular the requirements for 
registration are simpler than they had been under previous legislation. 
However, the law contains several vaguely worded provisions that, in 
practice, may result in arbitrary enforcement of decisions harmful to 
NGO's. The real effect of the law depends on the implementing 
regulations, which had not yet been promulgated by year's end.
    Nonpolitical associations and social organizations usually may 
register, although complicated rules and a cumbersome government 
bureaucracy often make the process difficult. Some evangelical churches 
(see Section 2.c.) found it difficult to obtain registration or 
reregistration.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion and for the principle of separation of religion and state; 
however, in practice, the Government only partially respects these 
rights. The Government perceives unofficial Islamic groups or mosques 
as extremist threats and outlaws them. During the year, the Government 
arrested hundreds of members of such groups and sentenced them to 
between 15 and 20 years in jail. The Government also restricts recently 
arrived religions that either the Government does not understand or 
that proselytize. However, the Government permits persons affiliated 
with mainstream religions, including approved Muslim groups, Jewish 
groups, the Russian Orthodox Church, and various other denominations, 
such as Catholics and Lutherans, to worship freely. Despite the 
principle of separation of church and state, the government-controlled 
Spiritual Directorate for Muslims (the Muftiate) funds some Islamic 
religious activities.
    In May 1998, the Parliament passed two laws that restrict religious 
activity. The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations 
provides for freedom of worship, freedom from religious persecution, 
separation of church and state, and the right to establish schools and 
train clergy. However, the law also restricts religious rights that are 
judged to be in conflict with national security, prohibits 
proselytizing, bans religious subjects in school curriculums, prohibits 
private teaching of religious principles, forbids the wearing of 
religious clothing in public by anyone other than clerics, and requires 
religious groups to obtain a license to publish or distribute 
materials. The law also requires that all religious groups and 
congregations register and provides strict criteria for their 
registration. In particular it stipulates that each group present a 
list of at least 100 Uzbek citizen members compared with the previous 
minimum of 10 to the local Ministries of Justice. This provision 
enables the Government to ban any group simply by denying its 
registration petition. Government officials designed the law to target 
Muslims worshiping outside the system of state-organized mosques. As of 
year's end, the Government registered 1,831 religious congregations and 
organizations, 1,664 of which were Moslem. An additional 335 
applications were denied, 323 of which were from Moslem groups.
    The number of officially sanctioned mosques is significantly 
increased from the 80 or so permitted during the Soviet era, but has 
decreased from the 4,000 that reportedly opened after the country 
gained independence.
    There were a variety of reasons that churches could not register. 
Some could not meet the requirement of having 100 Uzbek citizen 
members, while others could not afford the registration fees. The most 
frequent problem is determining a satisfactory legal address. In order 
to register, groups must report in their charter a valid juridical 
address, but local officials frequently contend that a building does 
not meet fire or building codes, has a disputed title, or other 
problems.
    A presidential commission created in August 1998 may grant 
exemptions to the Religious Law's strict requirements and register 
groups that have not been registered by local officials. Through 
November 1, the commission granted exemptions to 51 such groups, 
including congregations with fewer than 100 Uzbek members. However, no 
formal procedures or criteria have been established to bring a case 
before this commission. In August the Government registered 20 minority 
religious groups that had been having difficulty being registered by 
local officials.
    The second law passed in May 1998 consisted of a series of 
revisions to the criminal and civil codes, which stiffened the 
penalties for violating the religious law and other statutes on 
religious activities. It provided for punishments for activities such 
as organizing a banned religious group, persuading others to join such 
a group, and drawing minors into a religious organization without the 
permission of their parents. The Criminal Code was amended again in May 
with two changes that affected religious freedom. The changes draw a 
distinction between ``illegal'' groups (which are those not registered 
properly) and ``prohibited'' groups (which are banned). The first 
measure makes it a criminal offense punishable by up to 5 years in 
prison to organize an illegal religious group or to resume the 
activities of such a group (presumably after being denied registration 
or ordered to disband), or to participate in the activities of such a 
group (punishable by up to 3 years in prison. The second measure sets 
out stiff penalties up to 20 years in prison and confiscation of 
property for organizing or participating in the activities of religious 
extremist, fundamentalist, separatist, or other prohibited groups.
    Although authorities tolerate many Christian evangelical groups, 
government officials often harass those that openly try to convert 
Muslims to Christianity. Although the distribution of religious 
literature by duly registered central offices of religious 
organizations is legal, missionary activity and proselytizing is not, 
and the requirements for establishing such central offices are 
burdensome (only five have been registered to date). The Government is 
often intolerant of those groups that officials believe are cults; 
engage in missionary activity; or otherwise do not conform to the 
requirements of the religion law.
    Although authorities tolerate many Christian evangelical groups, 
the Government often harasses those that openly try to convert Muslims 
to Christianity. Some evangelical churches found it difficult to obtain 
registration and reregistration. Among those religious groups whose 
applications for legal registration have not been approved are a number 
of Jehovah's Witnesses congregations throughout the country, the 
International Protestant Church of Tashkent, a Baptist congregation in 
Urgench, the Full Gospel Pentecostal Church in Nukus, and Seventh-Day 
Adventist congregations in Akhangaran and Almalyk. Government officials 
stated that many of the unregistered groups could not meet the 
requirement of 100 Uzbek members. They added that Jehovah's Witnesses 
were denied because they proselytize and do not recognize secular 
authority, and that another unregistered group, the Reformed Baptists, 
simply refused to register.
    On the other hand, the Committee on Religious Affairs has approved 
the registration of 167 minority religious groups including 32 Russian 
Orthodox, 23 Baptist, 26 Pentecostal (``Full Gospel''), 10 Seventh-Day 
Adventist, 47 Korean Christian, 8 Jewish, 5 Bahai, 2 Jehovah's Witness 
and 2 Krishna Consciousness. Several of these congregations had fewer 
than the required 100 members but received exemptions from the 
requirement. The Roman Catholic Monsignor reports that his church has 
received permission to operate, but that formal registration was 
pending the resolution of some difficulties regarding documentation. 
Denis Podorozhny's Word of Faith Pentecostal Church near Tashkent, 
which lost its registration in 1998, was reregistered.
    On numerous occasions, the Government restricted the right to 
religious freedom through use of the religion law and other statutes. 
Police have often broken up meetings of unregistered groups. Pastors or 
group leaders can be subject to fines or even imprisoned.
    For example as many as 10 Jehovah's Witnesses congregations have 
been fined for illegal gatherings, dissemination of printed matter, or 
missionary activity. A judge of the city court of Karshi said on state 
television on March 28 and 30, that Jehovah's Witnesses was a dangerous 
sect bent on usurping government power. One member of Jehovah's 
Witnesses, Sergei Brazgin of Uchkuduk, was arrested on February 22, 
shortly after police broke up a Bible reading in his home. Police 
declared a Bible discussion in which he participated on February 14, to 
be an illegal activity. He was subsequently sentenced to 2 years in 
prison on three counts of illegal religious activity but released on 
August 20. Press reports indicate that a Christian was arrested in June 
after reportedly giving out several Christian tracts in the Karakalpak 
language at an airport. Reportedly, he was fined but not imprisoned.
    In March authorities in Nukus arrested Pastor Rashid Turibayev of 
the unregistered Karakalpak Full Gospel Christian Church and his 
associates, Farkhad Yangibayev and Yasif Tarashev. Police allegedly 
planted narcotics on them to justify the arrests. The court convicted 
all three on June 9. Turibayev was convicted of the narcotics charge as 
well as three counts of violating the religious law and sentenced to 15 
years in prison. His associates were sentenced to 10 years each for 
narcotics but were not charged with religious offenses. Turibayev 
previously had been sentenced to 2 years of hard labor in May 1997 for 
leading illegal church services, but subsequently he was amnestied and 
released. Na'il Asanov of the Bukhara Church of Christ was arrested in 
May after police allegedly planted narcotics on him. He was sentenced 
on June 30 to 5 years in prison. Pastor Ibrahim Yusupov of an 
unregistered Tashkent Christian church was sentenced on June 24 to 1 
year in prison for proselytizing.
    Central government officials, as well as many Christian leaders, 
view these and other incidents of harassment as isolated cases of local 
officials misapplying the law.
    On August 20, the President pardoned and ordered the release of 
Brazgin, Asanov, Yusupov, and Turibayev and his two colleagues.
    There were reports that since their release, certain church members 
continued to be harassed. Pastor Turibayev of the Karakalpak Full 
Gospel Christian Church is heading his church again. However, the 
Church is not yet registered and the prosecutor has threatened to 
confiscate it. Local militia summoned Turibayev twice at the end of 
September to question him further regarding his alleged possession of 
drugs. The militia also failed to return Turibayev's passport, claiming 
that it was lost. The lawyer for released Jehovah's Witnesses prisoner 
Sergei Brazgin reportedly said that after his release from prison, 
Brazgin remained under permanent pressure from the local police.
    On October 10, the police raided the annual harvest celebration at 
a Baptist Church in the city of Karshi (the church is one of several 
Baptist congregations that due to religious conviction had not 
attempted to register). The police detained and beat many of the 
participants. Authorities sentenced two of the group's organizers to 10 
days incarceration and were forced to pay fines. The Government 
investigated the incident and some officials acknowledge that the 
Karshi police acted improperly; however, no disciplinary action had 
been taken against the officers involved by year's end.
    The most serious abuses of the right to religious freedom were 
committed against Muslim believers. While tolerant of moderate Muslims, 
the Government seeks to control the Islamic hierarchy and is intolerant 
of Islamic groups that attempt to operate outside the state-controlled 
system. The Government seeks to control the content of imams' sermons, 
and the volume and substance of published Islamic materials. At the 
beginning of 1998, the Government ordered the removal of loudspeakers 
from mosques in order to prevent the public broadcasting of morning and 
evening calls to prayer. The Government closed several hundred 
nonauthorized mosques during 1998. Although the Government has not 
closed additional mosques, loudspeakers remain banned.
    The Government is determined to prevent the spread of ultra-
conservative or extremist varieties of Sunni Islam, which it labels 
``Wahhabbism'' and considers destabilizing. President Karimov 
frequently has declared the Government's intention to rid the country 
of Wahhabists and underground Islamic groups such as Hezbut Tahrir, 
which it views as extremist. The Government considers such groups as 
political and security threats and represses them severely. Hezbut 
Tahrir members admit that they desire an Islamic government but deny 
that they advocate violence. Dissident Islamic figures deny that they 
are extremists and claim that they are being persecuted for their 
unwillingness to support the Government. Speaking on state television 
on April 4, Interior Minister Zakirdjon Almatov said that young Uzbek 
men who have embraced radical Islam in certain countries abroad can 
avoid punishment if they voluntarily turn themselves in to authorities. 
Almatov added that any who fail to do so would be punished severely, 
and that their fathers also would be held legally responsible.
    The security forces have detained and harassed Muslim leaders for 
perceived acts of insubordination and independence. Islamic activist 
Abdurauf Gafurov, whose sentence was extended by 3 years in 1998, was 
finally released in October. In 1996 the government-appointed mufti 
fired a number of independent clerics and closed their mosques. The 
Andijon Friday mosque, where Imam Abduvali Mirzaev (see Section 1.b.) 
formerly preached, has been closed since mid 1995.
    A leading independent Muslim cleric, Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, has 
been missing since March 5, 1998, when dozens of police and security 
agents raided and searched his home. Although his family claims that 
the security services abducted him, the Government and many observers 
believe that he fled to avoid arrest.
    Since Imam Abidkhon Nazarov disappearance, the Government has 
persecuted his family harshly (see Section 1.d.). In February just 
after the terrorist bombing in Tashkent, authorities detained Nazarov's 
wife, Minnura Nasretdinova, for 10 days on charges of hooliganism. An 
associate of Nazarov's, Mukhtabar Akhmedova, was arrested and sentenced 
on March 4 to 10 days' imprisonment for assaulting an undercover police 
officer who had broken into her courtyard and confiscated her computer 
and other office equipment. In March Nazarov's brother, Umarkhon 
Nazarov, his uncle, Ahmadali Salomov, and his brother-in-law, 
Abdurashid Nasretdinov, were arrested and charged with planning a coup 
d'etat. On May 20, his brother Umarkhon was sentenced in Namangan to 11 
years in prison, and his uncle Akhmadali Salamov and brother-in-law 
Abdurashid Nasriddinov each were sentenced to 4 years in prison. Police 
reportedly planted Islamist literature on the Nazarov relatives in 
order to justify their arrest and beat them during interrogation. At 
present, all male members of Nazarov's close family are in prison. 
Human rights observers believe that their only real offense was being 
related to Nazarov.
    On January 8, a Tashkent court sentenced Oqihon Ziehanov and four 
other alleged ``Wahhabist'' associates of missing Imam Abidkhon Nazarov 
to between 2 to 12 years on a variety of charges including possession 
of narcotics and ammunition. Two of the defendants were convicted of 
conspiring to overthrow the constitutional order. The defendants 
claimed credibly that the police had planted the narcotics and 
ammunition and that the cases against them had been fabricated. In mid-
year four of the five defendants reportedly were transferred to the new 
prison facility near Jaslik, Karakalpakstan (see Section 1.c.).
    The arrest of Nazarov's relatives, the January conviction of 
Oquilhon Ziehanov and four other associates of Nazarov, and the 
December 1998 conviction of 15 alleged followers of Mirzaev were 
characteristic of the Government's campaign, waged through much of the 
1990's, to rid the country of so-called Wahabbists.'' Several human 
rights observers reported that prison officials confiscated all Korans 
and religious literature and banned prayer in the prisons.
    Several persons arrested for religious reasons apparently died from 
mistreatment in custody. On June 14, police arrested Farkhod Usmanov 
for possession of a Hezbut Tahrir leaflet. Usmanov apparently was 
beaten or tortured to death in custody. Usmanov was the son of former 
Iman Nosir-Kori Usmanov. According to Human Rights Watch, after holding 
him incommunicado for 11 days, officials returned his body, which 
showed bruises and injuries, to his family on June 25, claiming that he 
had died of heart failure.
    Akhmadhon Turahonov died in custody on June 19, reportedly because 
prison authorities refused to treat his diabetes. Thrahonov was a 
member of the Birlik Democratic Movement and a human rights activist, 
and was not religious. Officials nonetheless accused him of being a 
Wahhabist and charged him with hooliganism and conspiring to overthrow 
the Constitution. In addition to these three cases, there were 
unconfirmed reports of at least five other deaths by torture or 
beating.
    An outspoken Muslim cleric, Qobil Muradov, apparently was beaten to 
death in prison on October 30, 1998. His body showed severe bruising, 
his teeth were knocked out, and his collarbone and several ribs were 
broken. Officials alternately claimed that he had fallen accidentally 
from a wall and that other prisoners had beaten him. Like many persons 
whom the Government considers to be enemies he was arrested for 
possession of narcotics, which probably were planted on him by police. 
He had not been tried at the time of his death.
    According to press reports in June, Ministry of Interior police 
arrested several dozen persons in Tashkent for distributing Hezbut 
Tahrir leaflets allegedly ``propagating an extremist Muslim teaching'' 
that was banned.
    There were no reported developments in the 1995 disappearance of 
Imam Abduvali Kori Mirzaev; the 1997 disappearance of his assistant, 
Nematjon Parpiev; or the 1992 disappearance of Aboullah Utaev, leader 
of the outlawed Islamic Renaissance Party.
    The February Tashkent bombings prompted the Government to 
reinvigorate its campaign against Islamic fundamentalism. Although no 
group claimed responsibility for the bombings, the President blamed 
Islamic extremist groups. He said that up to 3,000 youths had been 
corrupted by studying Islam at foreign madrassas (Muslim religious 
schools), where they may have received terrorist training. He pledged 
to bring charges against these persons--and against their fathers--if 
they did not confess and repent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. By 
the end of April, the Government claimed, over 1,000 had taken 
advantage of this offer.
    As after the Namangan murders, from February to April, police 
detained, without due process, scores of those whose religious piety 
made them suspect in the eyes of the security services. The majority of 
those detained were released after questioning and detention that 
lasted as long as 2 months. On June 28, the Supreme Court sentenced six 
men to death for their role in the bombings. Prison sentences were 
handed out to 16 others.
    Beginning in April the Government launched a series of unannounced 
trials throughout the country of members of Hezbut Tahrir. Police 
allegedly planted narcotics and weapons on many of them in order to 
justify arrest (also see Section 1.c.). By year's end, the Government 
had arrested at least 1,500 and the number convicted was believed to 
exceed 1,000. The total number in pretrial detention is unknown but 
could be several hundred. Human rights activists contend that the 
number is over 1,000 (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Most defendants have 
acknowledged membership in the group but claim that they believe in 
peaceful change. Others appear not to be members of the group but to 
have been caught in the net because of their religious piety. While the 
Government has not charged that Hezbut Tahrir was involved in the 
bombings, group members usually are accused of acting to overthrow the 
constitutional order and of belonging to a prohibited religious 
organization. Police also allegedly planted drugs on various members of 
Christian denominations in order to arrest them.
    The Government does not consider this repression to be directed 
against religious freedom itself but instead against those who desire 
to overthrow the secular order. However, authorities are highly 
suspicious of those who are more pious than is the norm: frequent 
mosque attendees; bearded men; and veiled women. In practice this 
approach results in mistreatment of many devout Muslims for their 
religious beliefs.
    In 1999 Human Rights Watch compiled a list of 28 confirmed cases 
from 1997 and 1998 in which university and secondary school students 
have been expelled for wearing religious dress (see Section 1.f.). 
Several of these students from Tashkent's Oriental Studies Institute 
brought suit in civil court to be reinstated but were unsuccessful. A 
further group of 15 female students at Ferghana State University were 
harassed and ultimately forced to leave school in March.
    Synagogues function openly; Hebrew education (long banned under the 
Soviets), Jewish cultural events, and the publication of a community 
newspaper take place undisturbed.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for free 
movement within the country and across its borders, and the Government 
generally respected these rights. Citizens must have permission from 
local authorities in order to resettle in a new city. The Government 
rarely grants this permission to those who wish to move to Tashkent. 
The Government requires citizens to obtain exit visas for foreign 
travel, or emigration, but grants these permits routinely. All citizens 
have a right to a passport, and the Government does not restrict this 
right. The new passports serve as both internal identity cards and, 
when properly certified, as external passports. Every citizen must 
carry such a document when traveling inside or outside the country. 
Police occasionally confiscate these documents, severely restricting a 
person's right to travel.
    Movement within the country of foreigners with valid visas 
generally is unrestricted. However, visitors require special permission 
to travel to certain areas, such as Termez, on the Afghan border.
    Several Uzbek human rights activists were able to leave and reenter 
the country without encountering problems from the Government. However, 
in October the Government did not issue promptly an exit visa to human 
rights activist Tolib Yakubov, and prevented him from attending an OSCE 
Review Conference prior to the Istanbul Summit. Yakubov subsequently 
received a visa and left and reentered the country without difficulty. 
The Government also confiscated the passport of human rights activist 
Mikhail Ardzinov on June 25, restricting his freedom of movement within 
the country and preventing him from attending international 
conferences.
    The law on citizenship stipulates that citizens do not lose their 
citizenship if they reside overseas. However, since Uzbekistan does not 
provide for dual citizenship, those acquiring other citizenships lose 
Uzbek citizenship. If they return to the country as foreign citizens, 
they are subject to foreign visa regulations. In practice the burden is 
on returning individuals to prove to authorities that they have not 
acquired foreign citizenship while abroad. There were reports during 
the year that some ethnic Russians attempting to return after residing 
abroad were denied residence permits and new passports.
    There is no law concerning the rights of refugees and asylum 
seekers, and the Government does not recognize the right of first 
asylum. The Government does not adhere to the 1951 Convention Relating 
to the Protection of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government 
considers asylum seekers from Tajikistan and Afghanistan to be economic 
migrants, and such individuals are subject to harassment and bribe 
demands when seeking to regularize their status. They may be deported 
if their residency documents are not in order. However, the Government 
agreed in August that it would not force those who have received U.N. 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate refugee status to leave 
the country. Prior to that decision, the Supreme Court denied Afghan 
mandate refugee Mohammed Tahir permission to remain in the country. The 
UNHCR had acted as an advocate for Tahir in order to test refugee 
policy.
    The country hosts populations of ethnic Koreans, Meskhetian Turks, 
Germans, Greeks, and Crimean Tartars deported to Central Asia by Stalin 
during World War II. These groups enjoy the same rights as other 
citizens. Although they are free to return to their ancestral 
homelands, absorption problems in those countries have slowed that 
return. The UNHCR estimates that there are 30,000 Tajik and 8,000 
Afghan asylum seekers. The UNHCR completed reregistration of refugee 
cases in March and reported that there are now 852 mandate refugees and 
269 registered cases of asylum requests pending.
    According to the UNHCR there were 11 cases of forced repatriation 
(6 to Kazakhstan and 5 to the Kyrgyz Republic).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    While the Constitution provides for this right, in reality citizens 
cannot change their government through peaceful and democratic means. 
The Government severely represses opposition groups and individuals and 
applies strict limits on freedom of expression. No opposition groups 
participated in government or were allowed to function legally.
    The Government is highly centralized and is ruled by a strong 
presidency. President Karimov, formerly the first secretary of the 
Communist Party in Uzbekistan under Soviet rule, was elected in a 
limited multicandidate election in 1991. A 1995 Soviet-style referendum 
and subsequent parliamentary decision extended Karimov's term until 
2000. President Karimov and the executive branch retain control through 
sweeping decree powers, primary authority for drafting legislation, and 
control of virtually all government appointments, most aspects of the 
economy, and the security forces.
    Most government officials are members of the People's Democratic 
Party of Uzbekistan (PDP), formerly the Communist Party and still the 
country's largest party. However, the party as such does not appear to 
play a significant role in the Government, and the President resigned 
his chairmanship of the party in 1996. There are four other parties; 
however, these were created with government assistance and are loyal to 
President Karimov. All five parties participated in the December 
elections to the Oliy Majlis (Parliament), during which 93 percent of 
the electorate cast their vote. However, parties that competed in the 
parliamentary elections, as well as the numerous independent 
candidates, were congenial to the Government and did not represent a 
real choice for voters.
    Because the voters lacked a choice, the OSCE and many international 
observers concluded that the December legislative elections fell short 
of adherence to accepted standards of free and fair elections. Local 
and regional hokims (governors)--who are appointed by the president--
exerted a strong influence on the selection of candidates and the 
conduct of campaigns. Nearly half (110 out of 250) of those elected 
were not from party lists but were either hokims themselves or were 
nominated by the hokims' local assemblies. Only 16 of the 250 winning 
candidates had been nominated by citizens' initiative groups. These 
candidates generally were allowed on the ballot only if they were 
approved by the hokims.
    The Oliy Majlis is constitutionally the highest government body. In 
practice despite assistance efforts by international donors to upgrade 
its ability to draft laws independently, its main purpose is to confirm 
laws and other decisions drafted by the executive branch rather than to 
initiate legislation.
    New laws governing the conduct of parliamentary and presidential 
elections, as well as a law creating a Central Election Commission, 
came into effect in 1998. These laws, combined with the 1997 law on 
political parties, make it extremely difficult for opposition parties 
to come into being, to nominate candidates, and to campaign. The 
procedures to register a candidate are burdensome and the Central 
Election Commission has authority to deny registration. For example a 
presidential candidate is prohibited from campaigning before being 
registered, but must present a list of 150,000 signatures in order to 
be registered. The Central Election Commission must deny registration 
of presidential candidates who are found to ``harm the health and 
morality of the people.'' The consensus among independent observers, 
including national and local party leaders, as well as the business, 
religious, press, and NGO communities, indicates that the race for 
president was stacked in favor of incumbent President Karimov. The 1998 
statutes deleted a previous provision allowing recourse to the Supreme 
Court to candidates whose parties are denied registration. The Ministry 
of Justice has the right to suspend parties for up to 6 months without 
a court order.
    Citizens initiative groups of 100 members or more may nominate 
candidates to the Parliament by submitting signatures of at least 8 
percent of the voters in the electoral district. Other interest groups 
are forbidden from participating in campaigns and candidates may meet 
with voters only in forums organized by precinct election commissions. 
The 1998 laws repeal the right of parties to fund their candidates' 
campaigns directly. Instead, parties must turn over all campaign money 
to the Central Election Commission, which then distributes the funds 
equally among the candidates. Only the Central Election Commission may 
prepare and release presidential campaign posters. In August the 
Parliament enacted minor modifications to the election laws, but these 
have little practical effect.
    According to the Law on Political Parties, judges, public 
prosecutors, National Security Service officials, servicemen, foreign 
citizens, and stateless persons (among others) cannot join political 
parties. However, the law is less clear regarding membership in 
unregistered organizations. By law the Government prohibits formation 
of parties based on religion or nationality; those that oppose the 
sovereignty, integrity, and security of the country and the 
constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens; or those which promote 
war or social, national, or religious hostility; religious political 
organizations; and political organizations that seek to overthrow the 
Government, or sow national or racial hatred. Moreover, the Government 
has refused to register democratic political opposition organizations. 
Membership in unregistered political organizations is not forbidden 
officially, but membership in unregistered organizations with a 
prohibited goal or premise is forbidden.
    The Government continues to persecute members of unregistered, 
political opposition groups using methods such as, arbitrary arrest, 
conviction on falsified charges, surveillance, and loss of employment. 
The leaders of the two largest unregistered opposition groups in the 
country--Mohammed Solikh of the Erk Democratic Party and Abdurakhim 
Polat of the Birlik Democratic Movement--were forced into exile in the 
early 1990's. After the February bombings, persecution of members of 
these groups intensified. The Government repeatedly has accused Erk 
leader Solikh, who ran against Karimov for the presidency in 1992, of 
being a leader of the terrorist plot behind the bombings. On August 18, 
a Tashkent court convicted four Erk members and one Birlik member of 
conspiracy to overthrow the constitutional order, of membership in 
illegal organizations, and of insulting the President. The Erk members 
included noted writer Mamadali Makhmudov, Yusup Razimuradov, and two 
brothers of Mohhamed Solikh (Rashid and Muhammed Bekhjanov). The Birlik 
member, Kobil Diarov, was arrested in Kiev along with his acquaintance 
Nigmat Sharifov, who was not affiliated with any political organization 
but sentenced to 8 years in prison. Muhammed Bekhjanov was sentenced to 
15 years; Rashid Bekhjanov to 12 years; Mamadali Makhmudov to 14 years; 
Yusup Ruzimuradov to 15 years; and Kobil Diarov to 12 years. The 
Supreme Court upheld the Court's decision on appeal in November.
    Dozens of Erk and Birlik activists reported that after the bombings 
they were subjected to various forms of harassment: frequent 
surveillance; restrictions on movement; searches of their homes; 
lengthy police interrogations; and, occasionally, detentions. In July 
the son of Erk party secretary Atanazar Aripov was taken by police from 
in front of a Western embassy and detained for over 18 hours before 
being released.
    Traditionally, women participate much less than men in government 
and politics and they are underrepresented in these fields. Before the 
December elections, 21 of 250 deputies in the Parliament were women, 
and there are 17 in the new Parliament. In the Government prior to the 
December election, there were 2 women (both with the rank of deputy 
prime minister) among 28 members of the Cabinet; 1 was charged 
specifically with women's issues.
    There are 9 ethnic Russians (down from 14), 1 Korean, and 1 
Armenian elected to the current Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government restricts and harasses local nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) working on human rights and refuses to register 
the country's two main human rights organizations.
    Security forces continue to persecute human rights activists and 
the Government still refuses to register the country's two main human 
rights organizations. The chairman of the HRSU, Abdumannob Polat, lives 
in voluntary exile. Neither the IHROU nor the HRSU resubmitted 
applications to register during the year; there was no indication that 
they would be registered.
    On May 12, police arrested Ravshan Hamidov, a houseguest of Mahbuba 
Kasimova, a member of the IHROU and of the Birlik Democratic Movement. 
During their search of Hamidov's belongings in Kasimova's house, police 
allegedly planted narcotics, a grenade, and literature linking him to 
the Islom Lashkarlari religious extremist organization. Hamidov has 
family ties to leaders of Birlik. Immediately after the arrest, 
Ministry of the Interior officials interrogated Kasimova for several 
days. On one occasion, the investigators organized a citizens' assembly 
headed by the deputy hokim (mayor) of Tashkent, Shukrat Jalilov, at 
which she was accused falsely of supporting religious extremists and 
advocating the creation of an Islamic state. In front of relatives of 
victims of the February bombings, she was accused of moral complicity 
in the deaths of those victims. Ignoring the constitutionally mandated 
presumption of innocence, newspaper, television, and radio coverage of 
the event echoed the accusations.
    In a 3-hour trial on July 13, a Tashkent court convicted Kasimova 
of harboring a criminal, although her husband was the owner of the 
house and Hamidov had not yet been tried (and therefore technically 
could not be considered a criminal). The prosecutor argued that 
Kasimova should have known that Hamidov was wanted by police, although 
his arrest was not based on a previous arrest warrant but on the 
alleged discovery of contraband (see Section 1.e.). In July Kasimova 
was sentenced to 5 years in prison; on August 17, after a 45-minute 
appeal hearing, the judge confirmed the original sentence.
    On June 25, police detained IHROU head Mikhail Ardzinov for 
questioning. Ardzinov has alleged that the police beat him twice during 
the episode. Although the Government denies beating Ardzinov, a 
reliable medical expert confirmed that he was beaten severely. Police 
also ransacked Ardzinov's apartment, confiscating his passport, papers, 
and office equipment. At year's end, Ardzinov reported that the 
Government had not returned his property.
    On July 10, police took into custody IHROU member Ismail Adylov and 
held him incommunicado for 72 hours before confirming his whereabouts 
to his family. Police allegedly planted 100 Hezbut Tahrir leaflets 
among his effects to justify the arrest, although Adylov is known not 
to be religious. On September 29, a remote regional court sentenced 
Adylov, who has a kidney ailment, to 6 years in prison for allegedly 
possessing incriminating papers. Reporters and the defendant's family 
were not allowed to attend the 2-day trial; his appeal was denied on 
October 26.
    In September 1998, authorities arrested Muidin Kurbanov, a member 
of HRSU's Jizzak chapter. Police beat him repeatedly and questioned him 
about his organization and about Imam Obidhon Nazarov. On the basis of 
fabricated charges, a judged sentenced him, without a lawyer or 
prosecutor present, to 3 years in prison. In January Kurbanov was 
released from prison under a presidential decree; however, authorities 
in Jizzak continued to harass him and threatened to charge him with 
membership in the Islamic organization Hezbut Tahrir.
    One international human rights group, Human Rights Watch, has 
permission to operate in the country and has had an office in Tashkent 
since 1996. The group operates independently and has no affiliation 
with the Government.
    After years of opposition and delay, the Government registered one 
human rights NGO in 1996. The registered NGO, the Committee for 
Protection of the Rights of Individuals, was formed with the support of 
the Government, but has ties to opposition figures as well. Some 
sources affiliated with other groups have questioned its independence 
from the Government; it has had no recent success in investigating or 
correcting abuses.
    Since 1997 there has been a human rights ombudsman's office 
affiliated with the Parliament. The ombudsman may make recommendations 
to modify or uphold decisions of state agencies, but the 
recommendations are not binding. The ombudsman is prohibited from 
investigating disputes within the purview of courts. The ombudsman 
replaced the parliamentary human rights commissioner, who had 
insufficient trained staff to carry out in-depth investigations of 
human rights violations and did not vigorously pursue allegations 
against the police and security forces. The office of the ombudsman 
increased its staff and received authorization to open regional offices 
throughout the country. The ombudsman issues reports identifying the 
most serious types of violations of human rights by government 
officials. The office claims that it has assisted hundreds of citizens 
in redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve 
allegedly unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police 
and local officials. While most of the successfully resolved cases 
appear relatively minor, at least one during the year involved a 
capital crime. Ulugbek Usunov was convicted erroneously of murder in 
1998--after 20 months of pretrial detention. Since the prosecutor and 
judge handled the case poorly, an intervention by the ombudsman 
succeeded in getting the court decision reversed and Usunov released. 
During the year, the ombudsman met twice with a consultative committee 
of Uzbek officials and foreign observers.
    The National Human Rights Center of Uzbekistan, created by 
presidential decree in October 1996, has as its purpose to educate the 
population and government officials about the principles of human 
rights and democracy. The center's chief activity is to hold seminars 
and training, and it is not involved in human rights advocacy. The 
center has worked closely with international organizations such as the 
United Nations Development Program and the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
    The Government is willing to discuss human rights matters with 
organizations such as the OSCE, as well as with foreign embassies. The 
U.N. has not sent human rights commission members or special 
rapporteurs to the country. In 1996 the Government announced its 
willingness to hold an open dialog with international human rights 
NGO's, and held several high-level discussions with representatives of 
Human Rights Watch during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Both the Constitution and the 1992 law on citizenship prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, language, or social 
status; however, societal discrimination against women persists.
    Women.--Spousal abuse is common, but both local activists and the 
police say they have no statistics. At a September seminar on domestic 
violence, representatives of NGO's with crisis centers reported that 
the number of women seeking assistance is growing rapidly. Wife beating 
is considered a personal family affair rather than a criminal act, and 
thus such cases usually are handled by family members or elders within 
the community (mahalla) and rarely come to court.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution occurs, 
particularly to the Persian Gulf and Turkey (see Section 6.f.). 
Prostitution within the country is a growing problem stemming from the 
worsening economic situation.
    Due to tradition, women, particularly in rural areas, usually marry 
before age 20, bear many children, and confine their activities to 
within the family. In rural areas, women often find themselves working 
in the cotton fields during the harvest season. However, women are not 
impeded formally from seeking a role in the workplace. The barriers to 
equality for women are cultural, not legal, and women who open 
businesses or seek careers are not hindered legally.
    Although the law prohibits discrimination against women, 
traditional cultural and religious practices limit their role in 
everyday society. For these reasons, women are underrepresented 
severely in high-level positions. In 1995 President Karimov issued a 
decree on measures to increase the role of women in society, 
particularly extending their participation in state and social 
administration and coordinating the activities of ministries and social 
organizations as they relate to women's issues. In this connection, a 
deputy prime minister position was created in 1995 charged with 
furthering the role of women in society. The edict also created heads 
of women's affairs in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan, 
regions, cities, and districts. The Ministry of Finance was ordered to 
allocate the necessary funds to finance these new positions and working 
bodies, but the groups complained their budgets were not sufficient. 
Government-controlled women's committees were formed in most regions in 
1995, but most are underfunded and play only a minor role in improving 
the condition of women.
    The President declared 1999 to be the year of the woman. In April 
the Government promulgated a law extending additional rights to women; 
it reduced the workweek to 35 hours for female employees of the State 
and reduced the optional retirement age for women to 54 years (after 20 
years of employment). Government-sponsored activities also included a 
series of seminars, newspaper articles, public service announcements, 
and television programs that increased awareness of women's issues.
    Several dozen NGO's address the needs of women. The Businesswomen's 
Association in Tashkent, in addition to providing resources and 
information about developing small enterprises, operates a store that 
sells clothing and crafts. A center in Tashkent conducts seminars on 
sexual harassment, domestic violence, and the legal rights of women. 
Another center in Samarkand operates a crisis hot line and provides 
educational services on alcoholism, sexually transmitted diseases, and 
family counseling.
    Depressed because of their low social status, some women and girls 
resort to suicide by self-immolation. There are no reliable statistics 
on the extent of this problem, since most cases go unreported. However, 
representatives of women's groups have observed an increase in self-
immolation, which remains the most frequent form of suicide for women 
in desperate circumstances. After marriage many women or girls move 
into the husband's home, where they occupy the lowest rung on the 
family social ladder. A conflict with the husband or mother-in-law, who 
by tradition exercises complete control over the young bride, usually 
is the stimulus for suicide.
    A 1997 research study indicates that the number of women enrolling 
in higher education is diminishing; for example, women's enrollment in 
the finance and banking institute dropped from 65 percent in 1991 to 
about 25 percent in 1997. Cutbacks in government funding to 
universities and the need for families to fund a higher percentage of 
educational costs leaves many families in the position of being able to 
fund the education of only one child, either a son or a daughter. The 
report states that university faculty ``steer'' women into occupations 
traditionally performed by females and suggests that administrators may 
practice a policy of deliberately barring entrance to women in some 
fields.
    Children.--The Constitution provides for children's rights, stating 
that parents are obliged to support and care for their children until 
they reach majority at age 18. Traditional Uzbek values reinforce the 
cohesion of families; in most cases, several generations of a family 
live together. In theory the State provides free universal primary 
education and health care. In practice shortages and budget 
difficulties mean that some services must be paid privately. The State 
grants monetary allowances to families based on their number of 
children. The country has a very high birthrate; over one-half of the 
population is under the age of 15.
    Nine years of formal schooling are compulsory, and the average 
length of schooling is over 11 years. The U.N. Development Program 
reports that 100 percent of children complete secondary school.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Trafficking in 
girls for the purpose of prostitution occurs (see Section 6.f.).
    People with Disabilities.--One of the country's first laws, adopted 
only 2 months after independence in 1991, provided support for the 
disabled. This law was aimed at ensuring that the disabled have the 
same rights as other citizens. However, little effort is made to bring 
the disabled into the mainstream. The State cares for the mentally 
disabled in special homes. The Government has not mandated access to 
public places for the disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Government statistics dating 
from 1992 show that the population of approximately 23 million is about 
71 percent Uzbeks, 8 percent Russians, 5 percent Tajiks, 4 percent 
Tatars, and 3 percent Kazakhs, with many other ethnic groups 
represented. The statistics may underestimate the actual number of 
ethnic Tajiks. The figures also do not include many ethnic Tajiks whose 
mother tongue was Uzbek. Moreover, some Tajiks choose for a variety of 
reasons to declare themselves to be ethnic Uzbeks.
    Ethnic groups other than Uzbeks, particularly Russians frequently 
complain that job opportunities are limited for them. Senior positions 
in the government bureaucracy and business generally are reserved for 
ethnic Uzbeks, although there are numerous exceptions to this rule.
    The 1992 citizenship law does not impose language requirements for 
citizenship. Nonetheless, the language issue remains very sensitive. 
Uzbek has been declared the state language, and the Constitution 
requires that the President speak Uzbek. However, the language law 
provides for Russian as ``the language of interethnic communication.'' 
Russian is widely spoken in the main cities, and Tajik is widely spoken 
in Samarkand and Bukhara. The 1989 language law originally required 
that Uzbek would be the sole method of official communication by 1998, 
but subsequently was modified and now stipulates no specific date. The 
Government also is in the process of replacing the Cyrillic alphabet 
with the Latin alphabet. However, realizing the difficulties for Uzbeks 
and minorities alike, the Government has delayed the full transition to 
both the Uzbek and the Latin alphabet to 2005.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 law on unions specifically 
provides that all workers have the right voluntarily to form and join 
unions of their choice, and that trade unions themselves may 
voluntarily associate territorially or sectorally. Membership in trade 
unions is optional. The law also declares all unions independent of the 
State's administrative and economic bodies (except where provided for 
by law), and states that trade unions should develop their own 
charters, structure, and executive bodies and organize their own work.
    However, in practice the overall structure of trade unions has not 
changed significantly since the Soviet era. Independence has eliminated 
subordination to Moscow but has not altered the centralized trade union 
hierarchy, which remains dependent on the Government. No 
``alternative'' central union structures exist.
    A few new professional associations and interest groups have been 
organized, such as a union of entrepreneurs, a union of renters, and an 
association of private physicians and pharmacists. Registered 
professional associations for judges and lawyers formed in 1997; both 
organizations were quasi-governmental. An association of broadcasters 
formed in 1998 has failed to gain government registration (see Section 
2.b.). The main activity of all registered associations is professional 
development. They do not license members and have no formal role in 
advocating the interests of members in relation to the Government.
    According to the law, the Council of the Federation of Trade Unions 
(CFTU) has a consultative voice in the preparation of all legislation 
affecting workers and is entitled to draft laws on labor and social 
issues. Trade unions are described legally as organizations that defend 
the right to work and to protect jobs. They have lost their previous 
role in state planning and in the management of enterprises. The 
emphasis now is on the unions' responsibility for ``social protection'' 
and social justice--especially unemployment compensation, pensions, and 
worker retraining.
    The trade union law does not mention strikes or cite a right to 
strike. However, the law does give the unions oversight for both 
individual and collective labor disputes, which are defined as those 
involving alleged violations of labor laws, worker rights, or 
collective agreements.
    There were few reports of strikes. This circumstance likely 
reflects the absence of truly representative trade unions, as the 
standard of living fell and growing unemployment raised social 
tensions. The absence of labor activism also reflects the Communist 
legacy of docility in the face of authority. However, both union and 
government officials assert that the lack of strikes reflects general 
support for the Government's policies and common interest in social 
stability.
    The 1992 law on unions provides that unions may choose their own 
international affiliations; however, none have done so.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Trade unions 
may conclude agreements with enterprises. Privatization is still in its 
very early phase. As a result, there is no experience with negotiations 
that could be described as adversarial between unions and private 
employers. The State is still the major employer, and the state-
appointed union leaders do not view themselves as having conflicts of 
interest with the State.
    The Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Finance in consultation 
with the CFTU, set the wages for various categories of state employees. 
In the small private sector, management establishes wages or negotiates 
them with those who contract for employment.
    The law forbids discrimination against union members and their 
officers.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
specifically prohibits forced labor, except as legal punishment or as 
may be specified by law. The law does not specifically prohibit forced 
and bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to 
occur. However, large-scale compulsory mobilization of youth and 
students (by closing schools) to help with the cotton harvest 
continues. Student labor is paid poorly, and students sometimes must 
pay for their food. Adults, including teachers and passersby in 
automobiles and busses, similarly are forced into the harvest effort.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.-- The minimum working age is 16 years; 15-year-olds can 
receive state permission to work, but have a shorter workday. In rural 
areas, younger children and the elderly often help to harvest cotton 
and other crops (see Section 6.c.). The Labor Ministry has an 
inspection service, which is responsible for enforcing compliance with 
these and other regulations governing employment conditions, and 
enforces them effectively.
    The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by 
children, and such practices are not known to occur, except for 
compulsory mobilization for the cotton harvest (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor, in 
consultation with the CFTU, sets the minimum wage. As of September 1, 
it was about $10 (1,750 som) per month. The minimum wage is not 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. The standard workweek is set at 41 hours and requires a 24-hour 
rest period. Some factories apparently have reduced work hours in order 
to avoid layoffs. Overtime pay exists in theory but is not always paid.
    Pay arrearages of 3 to 6 months are not uncommon for workers in 
state-owned industries. The problem appears to be growing.
    The Labor Ministry establishes occupational health and safety 
standards in consultation with the unions. There is a health and safety 
inspectorate in the Ministry. The local press occasionally published 
complaints about the failure of unions and government authorities to do 
enough to promote worker safety. Although written regulations may 
provide adequate safeguards, workers in hazardous jobs often lack 
protective clothing and equipment. Workers can leave jobs that are 
hazardous without apparent jeopardy to continued employment; however, 
in practice, high rates of underemployment make this step difficult
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There no laws relating specifically to 
trafficking in persons. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose 
of prostitution occurs, particularly to the Persian Gulf and Turkey. 
However, there are no reliable statistics on this problem, and it does 
not seem to be carried out on a large scale (see Section 5).
    Anecdotal reports from NGO's indicate that the number of young 
women forced into prostitution abroad is growing. The Government has 
not acknowledged the problem publicly, but has taken some measures to 
combat it. According to NGO representatives, the police force in 
Samarkand formed a special unit on trafficking in women in 1998, but 
the unit's effectiveness is hampered by a lack of resources. Border 
guards at airports were directed to give more scrutiny to unaccompanied 
young women traveling to Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and South 
Korea; they are authorized to deny such women permission to leave the 
country. There is no government program to educate or assist potential 
victims; however, the State University for World Economy and Diplomacy 
sponsored a series of lectures on domestic violence and trafficking in 
women during the year.
                       NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                              ----------                              


                                ALGERIA

    President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in April to a 5-year 
term. Bouteflika spent most of the last 2 decades outside the country, 
but previously had served as Foreign Minister. The President is the 
constitutional head of state, appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister 
and cabinet ministers, and may dissolve the legislature. The military 
establishment strongly influences defense and foreign policy. 
Bouteflika was regarded throughout the election campaign as the 
candidate most favored by the dominant security establishment and the 
most likely winner. At the end of the campaign, the other six 
candidates withdrew, credibly charging massive fraud by the military, 
and Bouteflika was elected easily, although with a turnout as low as 30 
percent. In June 1997, Algeria held its first parliamentary elections 
since January 1992 and elected the first multiparty Parliament in 
Algerian history. The cancellation of the 1992 elections, which the 
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win, suspended the 
democratization process and a transition to a pluralistic republic, and 
escalated fighting, which still continues, between the security forces 
and armed insurgent groups seeking to overthrow the Government and 
impose an Islamic state. The presidential election campaigns during the 
year were marked by increased openness; however, international 
observers and political parties pointed out numerous problems with the 
conduct of the elections. A September 16 national referendum, which 
asked citizens whether they agreed with Bouteflika's peace plan (which 
includes an amnesty program for the extremists fighting to overthrow 
the Government), was free of charges of fraud, and Bouteflika's peace 
plan won a reported 98 percent majority, with a reported 85 percent 
turnout. Bouteflika is not affiliated formally with any political party 
but he has the parliamentary support of a four-party coalition for his 
peace plan. The Government does not always respect the independence of 
the judiciary.
    The Government's security apparatus is composed of the army, air 
force, navy, the national gendarmerie, the national police, communal 
guards (local police), and local self-defense forces. All of these 
elements are involved in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism 
operations and are under the control of the Government. The security 
forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
    The economy is slowly developing from a state-administered to a 
market-oriented system. The Government has implemented stabilization 
policies and structural reforms. However, privatization of state 
enterprises has just begun and there has been little progress on reform 
of the banking and housing construction sectors. The state-owned 
petroleum sector's output represented about a quarter of national 
income and about 96 percent of export earnings during the year. 
Noncompetitive and unprofitable state enterprises constitute the bulk 
of the non-hydrocarbon industrial sector. The agricultural sector, 
which produces grains, fruit, cattle, fibers, vegetables and poultry, 
makes up 10 to 12 percent of the economy. Algeria is a middle-income 
country; annual per capita income is approximately $1,600. Officially, 
about 30 percent of the working-age population is unemployed, and about 
70 percent of persons under the age of 30 cannot find adequate 
employment. Some earn a living from petty smuggling or street peddling
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there 
were improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. Citizens do 
not have the effective right to change their government peacefully. The 
security forces committed extrajudicial killings, routinely tortured or 
otherwise abused detainees, and arbitrarily arrested and detained, or 
held incommunicado, many individuals suspected of involvement with 
armed Islamist groups; however, there were no reports of new 
disappearances during the year in which the security forces were 
suspected. Security forces usually reach the sites of massacres too 
late to prevent or halt civilian casualties. Their failure to intervene 
in a timely manner led to claims that the security forces are 
indifferent to or complicit in the massacres. Prison conditions are 
poor. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trial delays are 
problems, although the practice of detention beyond the legal limit 
appears to be less frequent. Although the Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, executive branch decrees restrict some of the 
judiciary's authority. The authorities do not always respect 
defendants' rights to due process. Illegal searches and infringements 
on citizens' privacy rights also remained problems. There was no overt 
censorship of information; however, while the print media is relatively 
free, news media practiced self-censorship. Newspapers reported 
frequently on terrorist violence and on surrenders under the amnesty 
program, about which there was a wide range of views expressed in the 
media. The independent press commented openly and regularly on the 
presidential elections and other significant issues. In some cases, 
newspapers represented specific political and economic interests. 
Electronic media continued to express only government policy. The 
Government also continued to restrictfreedom of speech, press, 
assembly, association, and movement, although to a lesser degree than 
in previous years. During the April presidential election, the 
candidates who ultimately withdrew from the election credibly reported 
irregularities, such as government ballot-box stuffing through 
manipulation of military votes. During the 1997 legislative, municipal, 
and provincial elections, there were credible reports of 
irregularities, such as government harassment of opposition-party 
observers and fraud in vote-tally procedures. The Family Code limited 
women's civil rights, and societal discrimination and domestic violence 
against women remained serious problems. Child abuse is a problem. 
Amazigh ethnic, cultural, and linguistic rights continue to be an 
issue, although these concerns are represented by at least two 
political parties represented in Parliament. Child labor is a problem.
    Although the number of security incidents involving armed groups 
and terrorists decreased significantly and became more localized in the 
first several months of the year, compared with the same period in 
1998, these opposition forces committed numerous serious abuses and 
killed thousands of civilians. Furthermore, such abuses and killings 
increased in the second half of the year. Armed terrorists continued 
their widespread campaign of insurgency, targeting government officials 
and families of security-force members, as well as those whose 
lifestyles they considered to be in conflict with Islamic values. 
Increasingly the killing appeared to be related to opposition to the 
amnesty program. Several hundred terrorists have availed themselves of 
the amnesty program so far, and the armed groups have become smaller, 
but a hard-core opposition force remains.
    Armed groups killed numerous civilians, including infants, in 
massacres and with small bombs. Bombs left in cars, cafes, and markets 
killed and maimed persons indiscriminately. Some killings also were 
attributed to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. There were estimates 
that as many as 3,000 civilians, terrorists, and security force members 
died during the year in domestic turmoil. After his election, President 
Bouteflika acknowledged that a more accurate accounting of the number 
of persons killed during the past 8 years placed the total at about 
100,000. Armed terrorists particularly targeted women; there were 
numerous instances of kidnaping and rape.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government 
maintains that the security forces resort to lethal force only in the 
context of armed clashes with terrorists. The Government also contends 
that, as a matter of policy, disciplinary action is taken against 
soldiers or policemen who are guilty of violating human rights. Human 
Rights Watch and other groups claim that security forces failed to 
intervene in some situations to prevent or halt massacres of civilians.
    In December one person died of a heart attack the day after being 
beaten by police who had responded to a terrorist attack in the town of 
Dellys. The case received considerable print media attention, and the 
government-funded National Observatory for Human Rights (ONDH) 
investigated the incident. As a result, several police officers were 
arrested (see Section 1.c.).
    Progovernment militias also killed civilians during the year. There 
was at least one successful prosecution--of militia members who were 
involved in a revenge killing in Tizi Ouzou in the first half of the 
year. There were no other reported prosecutions of such cases.
    On November 22, prominent FIS leader Abdelkader Hachani, who had 
spoken out in favor of peace and reconciliation, was shot and killed in 
Algiers. On December 13, authorities arrested Fouad Boulemia, who had 
the murder weapon in his possession. At year's end, it was unclear who 
was responsible for the killing.
    Armed groups targeted both security-force members and civilians. In 
many cases terrorists randomly targeted civilians in an apparent 
attempt to create social disorder. Increasingly the killing of 
civilians appeared to be a result of opposition to President 
Bouteflika's amnesty program, and to facilitate the theft of goods 
needed by the armed groups. Terrorist tactics included the use of small 
bombs, and creating false roadblocks outside the cities by using stolen 
police uniforms, weapons, and equipment. Killings of civilians tended 
to be in smaller numbers per incident than in past years, although 
there were a few large-scale massacres. For example in early 
January,terrorists slashed the throats of 22 persons in the town of 
Oued Al-Aatchaane, 240 miles southwest of Algiers. Terrorists cut the 
throats of 34 villagers in three separate attacks on the night of 
January 31. Rebels cut the throats of 19 persons in El-Merdja, 9 in 
Saharidji, and 6 in Telassa, all in the western province of Chlef. Most 
of the victims were women and children. Armed men killed 12 persons in 
an overnight massacre southwest of Algiers in early February. In March 
members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) reportedly killed nine members 
of two families in Ain Defla, southwest of Algiers. In early April, 
rebels killed 22 government soldiers in an ambush near Blida. In mid-
April, rebels killed 10 civilians in Mascara province, 187 miles west 
of Algiers. On June 4, terrorists reportedly killed at least 19 members 
of the same family in Bou Hamitage. In mid-June, an armed group killed 
14 persons in a village south of Algiers. On August 15, terrorists 
stopped a bus in Beni Ounif and killed 29 passengers after stealing 
their belongings. On October 7, armed rebels slashed the throats of 8 
persons from the same family and kidnaped a teenage girl in the town of 
Douira, 25 miles west of Algiers. On November 16, terrorists killed 19 
persons in the province of Chlef. In mid-December, armed rebels killed 
11 soldiers and wounded 10 others in an attack on a military convoy. 
There was an increase in such attacks in December; that month coincided 
with the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, during which terrorists 
historically have increased their attacks. On December 25, militants 
opened fire on vehicles at a roadblock 50 miles west of Algiers, 
killing 28 persons. Terrorists also killed and injured numerous persons 
with bombs (see Section 1.g.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were credible reports of disappearances 
occurring over a period of several years, many of which involved the 
security forces; however, there were no such reports during the year. 
In September 1998, the Ministry of Interior established an office in 
each district to accept cases from resident families of those reported 
missing. However, credible sources state that those committees have not 
provided any useful information to the families of the disappeared. The 
Government's official human rights organization stated that by 
September, the Ministry of Interior had agreed to investigate 4,300 
cases, of which 300 had been closed, by providing families information 
about persons who had disappeared. However, there were no prosecutions 
of security-force personnel that stemmed from these cases. Families of 
the missing persons, defense attorneys, and local human rights groups 
insist that the Government could do more to solve the outstanding 
cases. The Government asserts that the majority of reported cases of 
disappearances involve either terrorists disguised as security forces 
or former armed Islamist supporters who went underground to avoid 
terrorists' reprisals.
    In March Amnesty International stated that more than 3,000 persons 
had disappeared since 1993 after being detained by security forces. AI 
stated that some died in custody from torture or were executed, but 
that many others reportedly were alive. Local nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) sources state that a few of the disappeared have 
been released from captivity by the security forces, but that there has 
been no public information about these cases, due to the fear of 
reprisal on the part of those released. Human rights activists assert 
that a number of the persons who disappeared still are alive in the 
hands of the security forces, but offer no evidence to support this 
assertion.
    Terrorist groups kidnaped hundreds of civilians, including family 
members of security-force members. The mutilated corpses of such 
victims were found later in some cases. However, in many instances the 
victims disappeared and the families were unable to obtain information 
about their fate. Armed Islamist groups kidnaped young women and kept 
them as sex slaves (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Both the Constitution and legislation ban torture and 
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, according to 
local human rights groups and defense lawyers, the police resort to 
torture when interrogating persons suspected of being involved with, or 
having sympathies for, armed insurgency groups. There were several 
credible reports of torture at the Algiers police facility, called 
Chateau Neuf.
    Police beatings of detainees continue to be a common practice. 
However, there were no reports that police applied electric shocks to 
sensitive body parts and sexually molested female prisoners, as had 
been reported in previous years. Many victims of torture hesitate to 
make public such allegations due to fear of government retaliation. 
Accusations of torture are made routinely by those accused of 
involvement in terrorist activities. The Interior Ministry and the ONDH 
have stated publicly that the Government would punish those persons who 
violated the law and practiced torture, but they have notrevealed 
whether any individuals accused of torture have ever been investigated 
or punished.
    In December a terrorist bomb killed and injured police in the town 
of Dellys. Within hours security forces rounded up and detained more 
than 100 persons of both sexes and a variety of ages. Police officers 
beat many of the detainees and threw them into the crater made by the 
terrorist bomb. One of the mistreated persons died of a heart attack 
the next day. A senior regional police commander ordered the police to 
stop these actions. In response to complaints from the mistreated 
persons, the authorities suspended several police officers from duty 
and opened criminal proceedings against them.
    There were no reports that security forces personnel were 
responsible for rapes during the year.
    Police used force against protesters in April, wounding several 
persons (see Section 2.b.).
    Armed terrorist groups committed numerous abuses, such as 
beheading, mutilating, disemboweling, and dismembering their victims, 
including infants, children, and pregnant women. These groups also used 
bombs that killed and injured persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.) 
These terrorists also committed dozens of rapes of female victims, many 
of whom were murdered thereafter. There were also frequent reports of 
other young women being abducted, raped for weeks at a time, and 
effectively held as sex slaves for the use of leaders and members of 
the group (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
    Prison conditions are poor, and prisons are very overcrowded. 
According to human rights activists, cells often contain several times 
the number of prisoners for which they originally were designed. 
Medical treatment for prisoners is available, but is severely limited. 
Prisoners also report a lack of food and reading material.
    In general the Government does not permit independent monitoring of 
prisons or detention centers. However, in October the Government 
allowed the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit 
prisons and open an office in Algiers. The ICRC did not visit military 
prisons or FIS leaders in prison or under house arrest.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the security forces 
continued to arrest arbitrarily and detain citizens. Human rights 
activists state that this practice diminished during the year. The 
Constitution stipulates that incommunicado detention in criminal cases 
prior to arraignment may not exceed 48 hours, after which the suspect 
must be charged or released. According to the 1992 Antiterrorist Law, 
the police may hold suspects in prearraignment detention for up to 12 
days; they also must inform suspects of the charges against them. In 
practice the security forces generally adhered to this 12-day limit 
during the year.
    The chairman of the Government's human rights body reported to the 
press in 1998 that it had proof that some detainees were held in a 
secret place of detention. In October the chairman claimed that he was 
misquoted, and several defense attorneys also stated that they doubted 
that such a place of detention exists.
    FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from prison in 1997, 
remains under house arrest and is allowed to receive visits only from 
members of his family (see Section 2.d.), although he made numerous 
press statements and conducted interviews while under house arrest. 
Jailed oppositionist and FIS vice president Ali Belhadj, who had been 
held incommunicado from 1992 until 1998, is allowed contact with 
members of his family, who speak to the press on his behalf.
    The 1992 Antiterrorist Law suspended the requirement that the 
police obtain warrants in order to make an arrest. During the year, the 
police made limited use of this law. However, according to defense 
attorneys, police who execute searches without a warrant routinely fail 
to identify themselves as police. Requests that they do so likely will 
result in abuse by the police. Unlike in 1998, there were no reports of 
the police arresting close relatives of suspected terrorists in order 
to force the suspects to surrender. Police and communal guards 
sometimes detain persons at checkpoints (see Section 2.d.).
    Prolonged pretrial detention was a problem. Persons accused of 
crimes sometimes did not receive expeditious trials. Hundreds of state 
enterprise officials who were arrested on charges of corruption in 1996 
remained in detention.
    Under the state of emergency, the Minister of Interior is 
authorized to detain suspects in special camps that are administered by 
the army. In 1995 the Government announced that it had closed the last 
camp and released the 641 prisoners there. There were subsequent 
allegations that the camp still existed and that some of the prisoners 
were rearrested later; however, local human rights activists and NGO's 
now state that they have no evidence that these camps continue to 
exist. They note that the Government continues to keep some former 
prisoners under surveillance and requires them to report periodically 
to police.
    Forced exile is not a legal form of punishment and is not known to 
be practiced. However, there are numerous cases of self-imposed exile 
involving former FIS members or individuals who maintain that they have 
been accused falsely of terrorism as punishment for openly criticizing 
government policies. One such case involves Ali Bensaad, a professor at 
the University of Constantine, who remains in exile in Germany after he 
was sentenced to death in absentia by the courts for allegedly being a 
party to a terrorist act.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, in practice the Government does not 
always respect the independence of the judicial system. In November 
President Bouteflika named a commission to review the functioning of 
the judiciary and to recommend ways to improve it.
    The judiciary is composed of the civil courts, which try 
misdemeanors and felonies, and the military courts, which have tried 
civilians for security and terrorism offenses. There is also a 
Constitutional Council that reviews the constitutionality of treaties, 
laws, and regulations. Although the Council is not part of the 
judiciary, it has the authority to nullify laws found unconstitutional. 
Regular criminal courts try those individuals accused of security-
related offenses, but there have been very few trials. Some observers 
had maintained that, as a result of the 1995 abolition of the special 
security courts, long-term detentions without trial had increased 
because security forces were reluctant to release suspects to ordinary 
criminal courts. However, long-term detention appeared to decrease 
somewhat during the year.
    According to the Constitution, defendants are presumed innocent 
until proven guilty. They have the right to confront their accusers and 
may appeal the conviction. Trials are public, and defendants have the 
right to legal counsel. However, the authorities do not always respect 
all legal provisions regarding defendants' rights, and continue to 
violate due process. Some lawyers do not accept cases of individuals 
accused of security-related offenses, due to fear of retribution from 
the security forces. Defense lawyers for members of the banned FIS have 
suffered harassment, death threats, and arrest.
    There are no credible estimates of the number of political 
prisoners; some estimate the number to be several thousand. An unknown 
number of persons who could be considered political prisoners were 
serving prison sentences because of their Islamist sympathies and 
membership in the FIS. There are credible estimates that the Government 
released 5,000 political prisoners after Bouteflika's election.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--Authorities frequently infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights. The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the home, 
but the state of emergency authorizes provincial governors to issue 
exceptional warrants at any time. Security forces entered residences 
without warrants. Security forces also deployed an extensive network of 
secret informers against both terrorist targets and political 
opponents. The Government monitors the telephones of, and sometimes 
disconnects service to, political opponents and journalists (see 
Sections 2.a. and 3).
    Armed terrorists occasionally entered private homes either to kill 
or kidnap residents or to steal weapons, valuables, or food. After 
massacres that took place in their villages, numerous civilians fled 
their homes. Armed terrorist groups consistently used threats of 
violence to extort money from businesses and families across the 
country.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law.--
Armed groups were responsible for numerous, indiscriminate, 
nonselective killings. Terrorists left bombs at several markets and 
other public places during the year, killing and injuring dozens of 
persons. In rural areas, terrorists continued to plant bombs and mines, 
which most often were targeted at security force personnel. For example 
in March terrorists exploded a bomb in Khemis Miliana, which killed 
four persons.
    In May a bomb exploded in Algiers, killing one person and injuring 
five others. Also in May, a bomb exploded near a movie theater in 
downtown Algiers, injuring 17 persons. In August a bomb exploded in a 
town 160 miles south of Algiers, killing 6 persons and injuring 61. On 
November 6, five military officers were killed and six others were 
wounded in an attack at a cafe in Boumerdes province. There was an 
increase in such attacks in December; that month coincided with the 
Islamic holy month of Ramadan, during which terrorists historically 
have increased their attacks. In December a terrorist bomb killed and 
injured police in the town of Dellys (see Section 1.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech; however, the Government restricts this right in 
practice. A 1990 law specifies that freedom of speech must respect 
``individual dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and the 
national defense.'' The state of emergency decree gave the Government 
broad authority to restrict these freedoms and to take legal action 
against what it considered to be threats to the State or public order. 
However, the Government did not strictly enforce these regulations, and 
the independent press reported regularly on security matters without 
penalty. Reporting by government-controlled press organs frequently 
included deflated numbers of civilians and government forces killed, 
inflated terrorist casualty counts, and inflated terrorist surrenders 
under the amnesty program. These discrepancies were noted frequently in 
independent newspapers. No restrictions on journalists were lifted 
during the year as a result of Parliament's review in 1998 of a 1997 
government directive.
    In March 1994, the Government issued an interministerial decree 
that independent newspapers could print security information only from 
official government bulletins carried by the government-controlled 
Algerian Press Service (APS). Compliance with the government directive 
varied among independent newspapers, but the trend toward increased 
openness about security-force losses continued during the year, and the 
Government continued to provide the press with more information than in 
the past about the security situation. Journalists deliberately did not 
report on current possible abuses by security forces to avoid 
difficulties with the Government, although there was significant 
coverage of NGO activity aimed at publicizing such abuses committed in 
the past. The Ministry of Health continued to forbid medical personnel 
from speaking to journalists. The Government's definition of security 
information often extended beyond purely military matters to encompass 
broader political affairs. In 1995 FIS officials who had been freed 
from detention in 1994 received direct orders from the Justice Ministry 
to make no further public statements. This ban remains in force. In 
general, journalists exercised self-censorship by not publishing 
criticism of specific senior military officials.
    There were no reports during the year that the Government put 
journalists under ``judicial control.'' In previous years, the 
Government used this practice to harass journalists who wrote offending 
articles by requiring the journalists to check in regularly with the 
local police and preventing them from leaving the country. According to 
a Europe-based NGO that specializes in press freedom, the Government 
did not harass journalists under criminal defamation statutes during 
the year, as had been its practice in the past.
    There were no newspapers allied with Islamist political parties in 
print, due to government pressure; however, legal Islamist political 
parties have access to the existing independent press, in which they 
express their opinions freely.
    The Government maintains an effective monopoly over printing 
companies and newsprint imports. There was no abuse of this power to 
halt newspaper publications during the year, and at least one new 
newspaper started publication.
    The Government continued to exercise pressure on the independent 
press through the state-owned advertising company, which was created in 
1996. All state-owned companies that wish to place an advertisement in 
a newspaper must submit the item to the advertising company, which then 
decides in which newspapers to place it. In an economy in which state 
companies' output and government services still represent approximately 
two-thirds of national income, government-provided advertising 
constitutes a significant source of advertising revenue for the 
country's newspapers. Advertising companies tend to provide significant 
amounts of advertising to publications with a strong anti-Islamist 
editorial line and to withhold advertising from newspapers on political 
grounds, even if such newspapers have large readerships or offer cheap 
advertising rates.
    President Bouteflika stated in November that the media should 
ultimately be at the service of the State. Radio and televisionremained 
under government control, with coverage biased in favor of the 
Government's policies and its party, the National Democratic Rally 
(RND). Parliamentary debates are televised live. Satellite-dish 
antennas are widespread, and millions of citizens have access to 
European and Middle Eastern broadcasting.
    Many artists, intellectuals, and university educators fled the 
country after widespread violence began in 1992; however, some began to 
return in significant numbers during the year, at least for visits. 
There was a growing number of academic seminars and colloquiums, which 
occurred without governmental interference. The Government occasionally 
interfered in seminars that were political or economic in content (see 
Section 2.b.). University workers and students staged several strikes 
over low salaries, inadequate housing, and large classes (see Section 
6.a.).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of assembly; however, the 1992 Emergency Law and 
government practice sharply curtail it. Citizens and organizations must 
obtain a permit from the appointed local governor before holding public 
meetings. The Government canceled at least one public rally sponsored 
by a group affiliated with an opposition political party. The 
Government banned street protests on the eve of President Bouteflika's 
swearing-in ceremony and, on April 16, police used force in central 
Algiers and in two other cities against protesters demonstrating 
against Bouteflika's election. Police used batons and charged 
protesters. Police wounded at least 20 persons in Algiers, and 
suppressed similar demonstrations in Tizi Ouzou and Bajaia. The 
Government occasionally interfered with formal NGO meetings during the 
year. In July it prevented a meeting on human rights, and denied entry 
into the country of one of the meeting's participants. Various groups 
held meetings and seminars without licenses, in which government 
officials participated. Other unlicensed groups continued to be active, 
including groups dedicated to the cause of the disappeared, who also 
continued to hold regular demonstrations outside government buildings.
    The Constitution provides for the right of association, but the 
1992 Emergency Law and government practice severely restrict it. The 
Interior Ministry must approve all political parties before they may be 
established (see Section 3). The Interior Ministry licenses all 
nongovernmental associations and regards all associations as illegal 
unless they have licenses. It may deny a license to, or dissolve, any 
group regarded as a threat to the existing political order. After the 
Government suspended the parliamentary election in 1992, it banned the 
FIS as a political party, and the social and charitable groups 
associated with it. Membership in the FIS remains illegal, although at 
least one former FIS leader announced publicly that he intended to form 
a cultural youth group.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares Islam to be the 
state religion but prohibits discrimination based on religious belief, 
and the Government generally respects this right in practice. Islam is 
the only legal religion, and the law limits the practice of other 
faiths; however, the Government follows a de facto policy of tolerance 
by not inquiring into the religious practices of individuals.
    The law prohibits public assembly for purposes of practicing a 
faith other than Islam. However, there are Roman Catholic churches, 
including a cathedral in Algiers, which is the seat of the Archbishop, 
that conduct services without government interference. In 1994 the size 
of the Jewish community diminished significantly, and its synagogue has 
since been abandoned. There are only a few smaller churches and other 
places of worship; non-Muslims usually congregate in private homes for 
religious services.
    Because Islam is the state religion, the country's education system 
is structured to benefit Muslims. Education is free to all citizens 
below the age of 16, and the study of Islam is a strict requirement in 
the public schools, which are regulated by the Ministry of Education 
and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Private primary and secondary 
schools are not permitted to operate.
    The Government appoints preachers to mosques and gives general 
guidance on sermons. The Government monitors activities in mosques for 
possible security-related offenses. The Ministry of Religious Affairs 
provides some financial support to mosques and has limited control over 
the training of imams.
    Conversions from Islam to other religions are rare. Because of 
safety concerns and potential legal and social problems, Muslim 
converts practice their new faith clandestinely. The Shari'a (Islamic 
law)-based Family Code prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-
Muslims, although this regulation is not alwaysenforced. The code does 
not restrict Muslim men from marrying non-Muslim women.
    Non-Islamic proselytizing is illegal, and the Government restricts 
the importation of non-Islamic literature for widespread distribution. 
Personal copies of the major works of other religions, such as the 
Bible, may be brought into the country. Occasionally, such works are 
sold in local bookstores in Algiers. However, many vendors refuse to 
sell these works due to fear of reprisal by Islamic extremists, and, to 
a lesser extent, because of government policy. The Government also 
prohibits the dissemination of any literature that portrays violence as 
a legitimate precept of Islam.
    Under both Shari'a and Algerian law, children born to a Muslim 
father are Muslim, regardless of the mother's religion. Islam does not 
allow conversion to other faiths at any age.
    In 1994 the Armed Islamic Group declared its intention to eliminate 
Jews, Christian, and polytheists from Algeria. The GIA has not yet 
retracted that declaration and, as a result, the mainly foreign 
Christian community tends to curtail its public activities.
    The country's 8-year civil conflict has pitted self-proclaimed 
radical Muslims against moderate Muslims. Approximately 100,000 
civilians, terrorists, and security forces have been killed during the 
past 8 years. Extremist self-proclaimed Islamists have issued public 
threats against all ``infidels'' in the country, both foreigners and 
citizens, and have killed both Muslims and non-Muslims, including 
missionaries. During the year, terrorists continued attacks against the 
Government, moderate Muslims, and secular civilians. The majority of 
the country's terrorist groups do not, as a rule, differentiate between 
religious and political killings (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of domestic 
and foreign travel, and freedom to emigrate; however, the Government at 
times restricts these rights. In the spring, the Government allowed 
travel abroad by representatives of organizations pursuing information 
on relatives who allegedly ``disappeared'' due to the actions of the 
security forces. These organizations were hosted by human rights NGO's 
and held public discussions on those who disappeared. There were no 
reports of the Government placing journalists under ``judicial 
control,'' as had been the case in the past (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government does not allow foreign travel by senior officials 
from the banned FIS. FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from 
prison in 1997, remains under house arrest (see Section 1.d.). The 
Government also does not permit young men who are eligible for the 
draft and who have not yet completed their military service to leave 
the country if they do not have special authorization; this 
authorization may be granted to students and to those individuals with 
special family circumstances. The Family Code does not permit married 
females under 19 years of age to travel abroad without their husband's 
permission. The code also prohibits unmarried females below the age of 
19 or males below the age of 18 to travel abroad without their father's 
permission.
    Under the state of emergency, the Interior Minister and the 
provincial governors may deny residency in certain districts to persons 
regarded as threats to public order. The Government also restricts 
travel into four southern provinces, where much of the hydrocarbon 
industry and many foreign workers are located, in order to enhance 
security in those areas.
    The police and the communal guards operate checkpoints throughout 
the country. They routinely stop vehicles to inspect identification 
papers and to search for evidence of terrorist activity. They sometimes 
detain persons at these checkpoints.
    Armed groups intercept citizens at roadblocks, using stolen police 
uniforms and equipment in various regions to rob them of their cash and 
vehicles. According to press reports, armed groups sometimes killed 
groups of civilian passengers at these roadblocks.
    The Constitution provides for the right of political asylum, and 
the Government occasionally grants asylum. The Government cooperates 
with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. It 
also provided first asylum. For example, it cooperates with the UNHCR 
on programs to help refugee Sahrawis, the former residents of the 
Western Sahara who left that territory after Morocco took control of it 
in the 1970's. The Government also has worked with international 
organizations that help the Tuaregs, a nomadic people of southern 
Algeria and neighboring countries. Therewere no reports of the forced 
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the effective ability to change their 
government peacefully. The strong prerogatives of the executive branch, 
supported by the entrenched power of the military and the bureaucracy, 
prevent citizens from exercising this right. The withdrawal of six 
presidential candidates amidst credible charges of fraud, and the 
election of President Bouteflika highlighted the continued dominance of 
the military elite in the process of selecting political leadership.
    President Bouteflika was elected in an April 15 presidential 
election, but the election was seriously flawed by the withdrawal 1 day 
before of all the other candidates, who charged that the military 
already had begun to implement plans to produce a fraudulent Bouteflika 
victory. Until those allegations surfaced, the campaign had been 
conducted fairly, with all candidates widely covered in both state-
owned and private media. The conduct of the campaign--although 
regulated as to the use of languages other than Arabic, and as to the 
timing, location and duration of meeting--was free, and all candidates 
traveled extensively throughout the country. One potential candidate 
was denied the ability to run because the Electoral Commission 
determined that he could not prove that he had participated in 
Algeria's war of independence against France, a legal requirement for 
candidates for President. With the withdrawal of the other candidates 
and the absence of foreign observers, it was impossible to make an 
accurate determination of turnout for the election, but it was 
apparently as low as 30 percent; the Government claimed a 60 percent 
turnout.
    Under the Constitution, the President has the authority to rule by 
decree in special circumstances. The President subsequently must submit 
to the Parliament for approval decrees issued while the Parliament was 
not in session. The Parliament has a popularly elected lower chamber, 
the National Popular Assembly (APN), and an upper chamber, the National 
Council, two-thirds of whose members are elected by municipal and 
provincial councils. The President appoints the remaining one-third of 
the National Council's members. Legislation must have the approval of 
three-quarters of both the upper and lower chambers' members. Laws must 
originate in the lower chamber.
    In June 1997, Algeria held its first elections to the APN since 
elections were canceled in January 1992, and elected the first 
multiparty Parliament in the country's history. Candidates representing 
39 political parties participated, along with several independent 
candidates. Under a system of proportional representation, the 
government party, the National Democratic Rally, won 154 seats, 
followed by the Islamist party Movement for the Society of Peace (MSP), 
with 69 seats, the National Liberation Front (FLN), with 64 seats, the 
Islamist party An-Nahdah, with 34 seats, the Amazigh (Berber)-based 
Socialist Forces Front, with 20 seats, and the Amazigh-based Rally for 
Culture and Democracy, with 19 seats. Independent candidates won 11 
seats, the Workers Party won 4 seats, and 3 other small parties won a 
combined total of 5 seats. In their final report, neutral observers 
stated that, of 1,258 (of the country's 35,000) voting stations that 
they assessed, 1,169 were satisfactory, 95 were problematic, and 11 
were unsatisfactory. In November 1997, the provincial election 
commissions announced the results of their adjudication of the appeals 
filed by various political parties. The RND lost some seats but 
remained the overall victor in the Assembly elections.
    In 1997 the appointed previous legislature, the National Transition 
Council (CNT), changed the law that regulates political parties. Under 
the controversial law, parties require official approval from the 
Interior Ministry before they may be established. To obtain approval, a 
party must have 25 founders from across the country, whose names must 
be registered with the Interior Ministry. A party headed by one of the 
six presidential candidates who withdrew from the April elections 
registered in September. No party may seek to utilize religion, or 
Amazigh or Arab heritage, for political purposes. The law also bans 
political party ties to nonpolitical associations and regulates party 
financing and reporting requirements.
    The more than 30 existing political parties represent a wide 
spectrum of viewpoints and engage in activities that range from holding 
rallies to printing newspapers. The Government continues to ban the FIS 
as a political party (see Section 2.b.). With the exception of the 
Government's party, the RND, the political parties sometimes encounter 
difficulties when dealing with local officials, who hinder their 
organizational efforts. The Government monitors private telephone 
communications, and sometimes disconnects telephone service to 
political opponents for extended periods (see Section 1.f.). Opposition 
parties have very limited access to state-controlledtelevision and 
radio, although the independent press publicizes their views.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. The new 
Cabinet, named December 24, has no female members; the previous 
government included two women. Eleven of the 380 members of the lower 
house of Parliament are women. About 25 percent of judges are women, a 
percentage that has been growing in recent years. In September 
President Bouteflika appointed the first-ever female provincial 
governor. A woman heads a workers' party, and all the major political 
parties except one had women's divisions headed by women.
    The Amazighs, an ethnic minority centered in the Kabylie region, 
participate freely and actively in the political process. Two major 
opposition parties originated in the Amazigh-populated region of the 
country: The Socialist Forces Front and the Rally for Culture and 
Democracy. These two parties represent Amazigh political and cultural 
concerns in the Parliament and media. The two Amazigh-based parties 
were required to conform with the 1997 changes to the Electoral Law 
that stipulate that political parties must have 25 founders from across 
the country.
    The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, do not play an important 
role in politics, due to their small numbers, estimated in the tens of 
thousands, and their nomadic existence.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The most active independent human rights group is the Algerian 
League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), an independent 
organization that has members throughout the country. The LADDH is not 
allowed access to the authorities or to prisons beyond the normal 
consultations allowed between a lawyer and a client. The less active 
Algerian League for Human Rights (LADH) is an independent organization 
based in Constantine. The LADH has members throughout the country who 
follow individual cases. Human rights groups report occasional 
harassment by government authorities in the form of obvious 
surveillance and cutting off of telephone service.
    There is an Amnesty International chapter in the country, but it 
does not work on cases in Algeria. In November President Bouteflika 
publicly invited Amnesty International and other human rights NGO's to 
visit the country.
    The National Observatory for Human Rights was established by the 
Government in 1992 to report human rights violations to the 
authorities. It prepares an annual report with recommendations to the 
Government.
    The Government has a national ombudsman, who reports annually to 
the President (see Section 5).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on birth, race, 
sex, belief, or any other personal or social condition. A national 
ombudsman receives individual complaints and presents an annual report 
to the President. Provincial representatives are designated to accept 
individual grievances and to make them known to the authorities. Most 
such complaints concerned bureaucratic unresponsiveness and lack of 
jobs and housing. Women continue to face legal and social 
discrimination.
    Women.--Women's rights advocates assert that spousal abuse is 
common, but there are no reliable studies regarding its extent. Spousal 
abuse is more frequent in rural than urban areas, especially among 
less-educated persons. There are no specific laws against spousal rape. 
Rape is illegal, and in principle a spouse could be charged under the 
law. However, there are strong societal pressures against a woman 
seeking legal redress against her spouse for rape, and there are no 
reports of the law being applied in such cases. Battered women must 
obtain medical certification of the physical effects of an assault 
before they lodge a complaint with the police. However, because of 
societal pressures, women frequently are reluctant to endure this 
process. There are no adequate facilities offering safe haven for 
abused women. Women's rights groups have experienced difficulty in 
drawing attention to spousal abuse as an important social problem, 
largely due to societal attitudes. There are several rape crisis 
centers run by women's groups, but they have few resources. In August 
1998, the Government released figures that indicated that the 
whereabouts of 319 women remain unknown and that there were 24 reports 
by women of rape. Most human rights groups believe that the actual 
number is much higher. There is a rape crisis center that specializes 
in caring for women who are victims of rape by terrorists.
    Some aspects of the law, and many traditional social practices, 
discriminate against women. The 1984 Family Code, based in large part 
on Shari'a, treats women as minors under the legal guardianship of a 
husband or male relative. For example, a woman must obtain a father's 
approval to marry. Divorce is difficult for a wife to obtain except in 
cases of abandonment or the husband's conviction for a serious crime. 
Husbands generally obtain the right to the family's home in the case of 
divorce. Custody of the children normally goes to the mother, but she 
cannot enroll them in a particular school or take them out of the 
country without the father's authorization.
    The Family Code also affirms the Islamic practice of allowing a man 
to marry up to four wives, although this rarely occurs. A wife may sue 
for divorce if her husband does not inform her of his intent to marry 
another woman prior to the marriage. Only males are able to confer 
citizenship on their children. Muslim women are prohibited from 
marrying non-Muslims; Muslim men may marry non-Muslim women (see 
Section 2.c.).
    Women suffer from discrimination in inheritance claims; in 
accordance with Shari'a, women are entitled to a smaller portion of an 
estate than are male children or a deceased husband's brothers. Females 
under 19 years of age cannot travel abroad without their husbands' or 
fathers' permission (see Section 2.d.). However, women may take out 
business loans and are the sole custodians of their dowries. Legally, 
if not always in practice, women have exclusive control over any income 
that they earn themselves, or assets that they bring into a marriage.
    While social pressure against women pursuing higher education or a 
career exists throughout the country, it is much stronger in rural 
areas than in major urban areas. Women constitute only 8 percent of the 
work force. Nonetheless, women may own businesses, enter into 
contracts, and pursue opportunities in government, medicine, law, 
education, the media, and the armed forces. Although the 1990 Labor Law 
bans sexual discrimination in the workplace, the leaders of women's 
organizations report that violations are commonplace. Labor Ministry 
inspectors do little to enforce the law.
    There are numerous small women's rights groups. Their main goals 
are to foster women's economic welfare and to amend aspects of the 
Family Code, although no such amendments have been enacted. During the 
year, Islamic extremists often specifically targeted women. There were 
numerous instances of women being killed and mutilated in massacres. As 
many as 80 percent of the victims of massacres were women and children. 
Armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnaped young women and kept them as 
sex slaves for group leaders and members (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 
1.c., 6.c., and 6.f.).
    Children.--The Government is committed in principle to protecting 
children's human rights. It provides free education for children 6 to 
15 years of age, and free medical care for all citizens--albeit in 
often rudimentary facilities. The Ministry of Youth and Sports has 
programs for children, but these face serious funding problems. Legal 
experts maintain that the Penal and Family Codes do not offer children 
sufficient protection. Hospitals treat numerous child abuse cases every 
year, but many cases go unreported.
    Child abuse is a problem. Laws against child abuse have not led to 
notable numbers of prosecutions against offenders. NGO's that 
specialize in care of children cite an increase in domestic violence 
aimed at children, which they attribute to the ``culture of violence'' 
developed during the years since 1992 and the social dislocations 
caused by the movement of rural families to the cities to escape 
terrorist violence. Those NGO's have educational programs aimed at 
reducing the level of violence, but lack funding.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate 
accessibility to buildings or government services for the disabled. 
Public enterprises, in downsizing the work force, generally ignore a 
law that requires that they reserve 1 percent of their jobs for the 
disabled. Social security provides for payments for orthopedic 
equipment, and some nongovernmental organizations receive limited 
government financial support. The Government also attempts to finance 
specialized training, but this initiative remains rudimentary.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--TheAmazighs are an ethnic 
minority, centered in the Kabylie region. Amazigh nationalists have 
sought to maintain their own cultural and linguistic identity while the 
Government's Arabization program continues. The law requires that 
Arabic be the official language and requires, under penalty of fines, 
that all official government business be conducted in Arabic. The law 
also requires that Arabic be used for all broadcasts on national 
television and radios for dubbing or subtitling all non-Arabic films, 
for medical prescriptions, and for communications equipment. In 
September President Bouteflika stated that the Amazigh language would 
never be an official language. As part of the National Charter signed 
in 1996, the Government and several major political parties agreed that 
the Amazigh culture and language were major political components of the 
country's identity.
    There are professorships in Amazigh culture at the University of 
Tizi Ouzou. The government-owned national television station broadcasts 
a brief nightly news program in the Amazigh language. Amazighs hold 
influential positions in government, the army, business, and 
journalism.
    The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, live an isolated, nomadic 
existence and are relatively few in number.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to establish 
trade unions of their choice. About two-thirds of the labor force 
belong to unions. There is an umbrella labor confederation, the General 
Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and its affiliated entities, which 
dates from the era of a single political party. The UGTA encompasses 
national syndicates that are specialized by sector. There are also some 
autonomous unions, such as syndicates for Air Algeria pilots (SPLA), 
airport technicians (SNTMA), and teachers (CNEX).
    Workers are required to obtain government approval to establish a 
union. The 1990 Law on Labor Unions requires the Labor Ministry to 
approve a union application within 30 days. The Autonomous Syndicates 
Confederation (CSA) has attempted since early 1996 to organize the 
autonomous syndicates, but without success. The application that the 
CSA filed with the Labor Ministry still was pending at year's end, 
although the CSA continues to function without official status. The law 
prohibits unions from associating with political parties and also 
prohibits unions from receiving funds from foreign sources. The courts 
are empowered to dissolve unions that engage in illegal activities. The 
labor union organized by the banned FIS, the Islamic Syndicate of 
Workers (SIT), was dissolved in 1992 because it had no license.
    Under the state of emergency, the Government is empowered to 
require workers in both the public and private sectors to stay at their 
jobs in the event of an unauthorized or illegal strike. According to 
the 1990 Law on Industrial Relations, workers may strike only after 14 
days of mandatory conciliation, mediation, or arbitration. The law 
states that arbitration decisions are binding on both parties. If no 
agreement is reached in arbitration, the workers may strike legally 
after they vote by secret ballot to do so. A minimum level of public 
services must be maintained during public sector service strikes.
    On several occasions during the year and at several university 
campuses in the capital and other cities, university workers and 
students went on strike to protest low salaries, inadequate housing, 
and large classes. These strikes sometimes ended with minor concessions 
by the Government. In August the national airline workers also went on 
strike for higher wages.
    Unions may form and join federations or confederations, affiliate 
with international labor bodies, and develop relations with foreign 
labor groups. For example, the UGTA has contacts with French unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for collective bargaining for all unions, and the Government 
permits this right in practice. The law prohibits discrimination by 
employers against union members and organizers, and provides mechanisms 
for resolving trade union complaints of antiunion practices by 
employers. It also permits unions to recruit members at the workplace.
    The Government has established an export processing zone in Jijel.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is incompatible with the Constitution's provisions on individual 
rights. The Penal Code prohibits compulsory labor, including by 
children, and the Government generally enforces the ban effectively. 
Armedterrorist groups reportedly kidnap young women and keep them as 
sex slaves (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Inspectors 
from the Ministry of Labor enforce the minimum employment age by making 
periodic or unannounced inspection visits to public-sector enterprises. 
They do not enforce the law effectively in the agricultural or private 
sectors. Economic necessity compels many children to resort to informal 
employment, such as street vending. The Government prohibits forced and 
bonded labor by children and generally enforces this prohibition (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law defines the overall 
framework for acceptable conditions of work but leaves specific 
agreements on wages, hours, and conditions of employment to the 
discretion of employers in consultation with employees. The Government 
fixes by decree a monthly minimum wage for all sectors; however, this 
is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker 
and family. The minimum wage is $90 (6,000 dinars) per month. Ministry 
of Labor inspectors are responsible for ensuring compliance with the 
minimum wage regulation; however, their enforcement is inconsistent.
    The standard workweek is 40 hours. There are well-developed 
occupation and health regulations codified in a 1991 decree, but 
government inspectors do not enforce these regulations effectively. 
There were no reports of workers being dismissed for removing 
themselves from hazardous working conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons.
    Armed terrorist groups frequently kidnaped young women, raped them 
for weeks at a time, and kept them as sex slaves for group leaders and 
other members (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, and 6.c.).
                                 ______
                                 

                                BAHRAIN

    Bahrain is a hereditary emirate with few democratic institutions 
and no political parties. The Al-Khalifa extended family has ruled 
Bahrain since the late 18th century and dominates all facets of its 
society and government. The Constitution confirms the Amir as 
hereditary ruler. The current Amir, Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa, 
succeeded his father, Shaikh Isa Bin Salman Al-Khalifa, who died on 
March 6. Shaikh Hamad governs the country with the assistance of his 
uncle as Prime Minister, his son as Crown Prince, and an appointed 
cabinet of ministers. In 1975 the Government suspended some provisions 
of the 1973 Constitution, including those articles relating to the 
National Assembly, which was disbanded and never reconstituted. 
Citizens belong to the Shi'a and Sunni sects of Islam, with the Shi'a 
constituting over two-thirds of the indigenous population. However, 
Sunnis predominate politically and economically because the ruling 
family is Sunni and is supported by the armed forces, the security 
services, and powerful Sunni and Shi'a merchant families. The political 
situation was calm during the year; there were incidents of political 
unrest in 1998, but there has not been significant unrest since 1996. 
There are few judicial checks on the actions of the Amir and his 
Government, and the courts are subject to government pressure.
    The Ministry of Interior is responsible for public security. It 
controls the public security force (police) and the extensive security 
service, which are responsible for maintaining internal order. The 
Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is responsible for defending against 
external threats. It did not play a role in internal security during 
the year. Security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
    Bahrain has a mixed economy with government domination of many 
basic industries, including the important oil and aluminum sectors. 
Possessing limited oil and gas reserves, the Government is working to 
diversify its economic base, concentrating on light manufacturing and 
the services sectors, particularly banking, financial services, and 
consulting. The Government has used its modest oil revenues to build a 
highly advanced transportation and telecommunications infrastructure. 
Economic growth is highly dependent on global oil prices, but the 
economy remains stable. The Government encouraged private national and 
international investment and moved to privatize some of its state-run 
industries. Bahrain is a regional financial and business center. 
Tourism, particularly via thecauseway linking Bahrain to Saudi Arabia, 
is also a significant source of income. Citizens enjoy a high standard 
of living.
    There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human 
rights record; however, the situation improved measurably during the 
year. The Government continued to deny citizens the right to change 
their government; however, the political situation improved due to the 
sharp decrease in political and civil unrest, and an effort by the new 
Amir to develop relations with the Shi'a community. Unlike the previous 
year, there were no extrajudicial killings by security forces; however 
security forces continued to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse 
prisoners. Impunity remains a problem; there were no known instances of 
any security forces personnel being punished for human rights abuses 
committed either during the year or in any previous year. The 
Government continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, 
incommunicado and prolonged detention, and involuntary exile; however, 
one of the new Amir's first official acts was to pardon or release over 
400 prisoners and detainees, and exiles. In November and December the 
Amir pardoned a combined total of approximately 400 prisoners and 
detainees, some of whom had been detained for political reasons. The 
judiciary remains subject to government pressure, and there are limits 
on the right to a fair public trial, especially in the security court. 
The Government continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights. The 
Government imposed some restrictions on freedom of speech and of the 
press and restricted freedom of assembly and association. The 
Government also imposes some limits on freedom of religion and 
movement. Violence against women and discrimination based on sex, 
religion, and ethnicity remain problems. The Government restricts 
worker rights, and there were instances of forced labor.
    The new Amir took some steps to improve the treatment of the Shi'a 
population. For example in December the Amir stated that all citizens 
are ``equal before the law'' and allowed Shi'a to apply for jobs in the 
BDF and the Ministry of the Interior for the first time in 4 years. In 
early July, the Amir pardoned Shi'a spiritual leader Abdul Amir Al-
Jamri, who had been in prison since 1996. The Amir also allowed greater 
access by members of international human rights groups during the year, 
including visits by Middle East Watch, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty 
International.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    There were no investigations or prosecutions of any security forces 
personnel for alleged extrajudicial killings committed in 1998 or 
earlier years.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment are prohibited by law; however there are credible reports 
that prisoners often are beaten, both on the soles of their feet and 
about the face and head, burned with cigarettes, forced to endure long 
periods without sleep, and in some cases subjected to electrical 
shocks. The Government has difficulty in rebutting allegations of 
torture and of other cruel, inhuman, or degrading practices because it 
permits incommunicado detention and detention without trial. There were 
no known instances of officials being punished for human rights abuses 
committed either during the year or in any previous year.
    Opposition and human rights groups allege that the security forces 
sometimes threaten female detainees with rape and inflict other forms 
of sexual abuse and harassment on them while they are in custody. These 
allegations are difficult to confirm or deny.
    Prisons generally meet minimum international standards. Local 
defense attorneys report that their clients continued to receive 
improved care and treatment. In addition the release of hundreds of 
detainees from jail, perhaps as many as 788, (seeSection 1.d.) and the 
reduced number of arrests during the year, eased overcrowding. At the 
Government's invitation, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) continued the series of visits to prisons that it started in 
late 1996.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The Constitution states that ``no person shall 
be arrested, detained, imprisoned, searched or compelled to reside in a 
specified place * * * except in accordance with the provisions of the 
law and under the supervision of the judicial authorities.'' However, 
in practice, in matters regarding arrest, detention, or exile, the 1974 
State Security Act takes precedence. Under the State Security Act, 
persons may be detained for up to 3 years without trial for engaging in 
activities or making statements regarded as a threat to the broadly 
defined concepts of national harmony and security, and the Government 
continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. The scope of the 
State Security Act extends to any case involving arson, explosions, or 
attacks on persons at their place of employment or because of the 
nature of their work. Detainees have the right to appeal such 
detentions after a period of 3 months and, if the appeal is denied, 
every 6 months thereafter from the date of the original detention.
    Government security forces used the State Security Act during the 
year to detain persons deemed to be engaging in antigovernment 
activities, including persons who attempted to exercise their rights of 
free speech, assembly, and association, or other rights. Activities 
that also may lead to detention, questioning, warning, or arrest by the 
security forces include: Membership in illegal organizations or those 
deemed subversive; painting antigovernment slogans on walls; joining 
antigovernment demonstrations (see Section 2.b.); possessing or 
circulating antigovernment writings; preaching sermons considered by 
the Government to have an antigovernment political tone; and harboring 
or associating with persons who committed such acts. However, there was 
greater tolerance of certain activities during the year, and the number 
of persons detained was less than in 1998.
    In addition to overseeing the security service and police, the 
Ministry of Interior also controls the Office of the Public Prosecutor, 
whose officers initially determine whether sufficient evidence exists 
to continue to hold a prisoner in investigative detention. The Ministry 
is responsible for all aspects of prison administration. In the early 
stages of detention, prisoners and their attorneys have no recourse to 
any authority outside the Ministry of Interior. The authorities rarely 
permit visits to inmates who are incarcerated for security-related 
offenses and such prisoners may be held incommunicado for months, or 
sometimes years. However, prisoners detained for criminal offenses 
generally may receive visits from family members, usually once a month.
    At the beginning of the year, security forces were estimated to 
have held over 1,300 persons in detention for security-related 
offenses. During the year, some were arrested, released, and then 
arrested again. At year's end, the total number of persons detained was 
substantially reduced; however, as many as 1,000 persons still remained 
in detention. During the year, the Government pardoned as many as 400 
persons detained in connection with antigovernment activities. One of 
the new Amir's first official acts was to pardon or release over 400 
detainees, prisoners, and exiles. In November the Amir pardoned an 
additional 200 prisoners and detainees, some of whom had been detained 
for political reasons. In December the Amir pardoned another group of 
195; the Government publicly stated in December that the Amir pardoned 
788 prisoners and detainees since his accession in March.
    Abdul Amir Al-Jamri, a prominent Shi'a cleric, longtime opposition 
activist, and one of the original 14 signers of the 1994 petition to 
the Amir calling for the restoration of the National Assembly, was 
convicted and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment on July 7 after 
having been detained since January 1996, but he was pardoned by the 
Amir on July 8. Several other Shi'a clerics who were associated with 
Al-Jamri and were arrested at the same time, Abdul Wahab Hussein, 
Hassan Mushaimaa, Hassan Sultan, and Haji Hassan Jarallah, remain in 
jail. One of the clerics arrested with Al-Jamri died in detention in 
1997; the Government stated that he died of natural causes.
    Abdul Jahil Abdula Khadim, a shop owner, remained in detention at 
year's end. He was detained in 1998 after a young man who worked in his 
store died from police mistreatment. Most of theyoung men detained in 
July and October following antigovernment demonstrations reportedly 
were released.
    While the authorities reserve the right to use exile and the 
revocation of citizenship to punish individuals convicted or suspected 
of antigovernment activity, there were no reports of exile orders 
issued during the year. In the past, the Government has revoked the 
citizenship of persons that it considered to be security threats. The 
Government considers such persons to have forfeited their nationality 
under the Citizenship Act of 1963 because they accepted foreign 
citizenship or passports, or engaged in antigovernment activities 
abroad. Bahraini emigre groups and their local contacts have challenged 
this practice, arguing that the Government's revocation of citizenship 
without due process violates the Constitution. The Amir pardoned 32 
exiles during the year. According to the emigre groups, as many as 450 
citizens continue to live in exile. This total includes both those 
prohibited from returning to Bahrain and their family members who live 
abroad with them voluntarily.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the courts are subject to government 
pressure regarding sentencing and appeals.
    The civil and criminal legal system consists of a complex mix of 
courts, based on diverse legal sources including Sunni and Shi'a 
Shari'a (Islamic law), tribal law, and other civil codes and 
regulations. The 1974 State Security Act created a separate, closed 
security court system, which has jurisdiction in cases of alleged 
antigovernment activity.
    The Bahrain Defense Force maintains a separate court system for 
military personnel accused of offenses under the Military Code of 
Justice. Military courts do not review cases involving civilian, 
criminal, or security offenses.
    Defense attorneys are appointed by the Ministry of Justice and 
Islamic Affairs. Some attorneys and family members involved in 
politically sensitive criminal cases complain that the Government 
interferes with court proceedings to influence the outcome or to 
prevent judgments from being carried out. There are also periodic 
allegations of corruption in the judicial system.
    In past cases, the Amir, the Prime Minister, and other senior 
government officials have lost civil cases brought against them by 
private citizens; however, the court-ordered judgments are not always 
implemented expeditiously. Members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family are 
well represented in the judiciary and generally do not excuse 
themselves from cases involving the interests of the Government.
    A person arrested may be tried in an ordinary criminal court or, if 
recommended by the prosecution, in the Security Court. Ordinary civil 
or criminal trial procedures provide for an open trial, the right to 
counsel (with legal aid available when necessary), and the right to 
appeal. Criminal court proceedings generally do not appear to 
discriminate against women, children, or minority groups. However, 
there is credible evidence that persons accused of antigovernment 
crimes and tried in the criminal courts were denied fair trials. Those 
accused are not permitted to speak with an attorney until their 
appearance before the judge at the preliminary hearing. Trials in the 
criminal courts for antigovernment activities are held in secret.
    Security cases are tried in secret by judges on the Supreme Court 
of Appeals, sitting as the Security Court. Family members usually are 
not permitted in the court until the final verdict is rendered. 
Procedures in the security courts do not provide for even the most 
basic safeguards. The Security Court is exempt from adhering to the 
procedural protections of the Penal Code. Defendants may be represented 
by counsel, but they seldom see their attorneys before the actual day 
of arraignment. Convictions may be based solely on confessions and 
police evidence or testimony that may be introduced in secret. The 
defense cannot review the evidence against the defendant prior to trial 
proceedings. Defense lawyers complain that they rarely are given 
sufficient time to find witnesses. There is no right to judicial review 
of the legality of arrests. There is no judicial appeal of a State 
Security Court verdict, but the defendant may request clemency from the 
Amir. The Security Court tried one individual, Abdul Amir Al-Jamri, 
during the year.
    The number of political prisoners is difficult to determine because 
the Government does not release data on security cases; however, the 
total is believed to be less than 100. Such cases are not tried in open 
court, and visits to prisoners convicted of security offenses are 
restricted strictly. The Government denies that there are any political 
prisoners and claims that all inmates incarcerated for committing 
security offenses were convicted properly of subversive acts such as 
espionage, espousing or committing violence, or belonging to terrorist 
organizations.
    In accordance with tradition, the Government releases and grants 
amnesty to some prisoners, including individuals imprisoned for 
political activities, on major holidays. The Government reported that 
the Amir pardoned over 788 prisoners and detainees since his accession 
in March, although it was uncertain how many of these were political 
prisoners rather than common criminals (see Section 1.d.). The 
prisoners were expected to be released in small groups over the course 
of several months.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--During the year, the Government infringed on citizens' 
right to privacy, using illegal searches and arbitrary arrests as 
tactics to control political unrest, although reports of such 
violations of citizens' rights to privacy continued to decline. Under 
the State Security Law, the Ministry of Interior is empowered to 
authorize entry into private premises without specific judicial 
intervention. Telephone calls and personal correspondence are subject 
to monitoring. Police informer networks are extensive and 
sophisticated.
    There were reports that security forces entered private homes 
without warrants and took into custody residents who were suspected of 
either participating in, or having information regarding, 
antigovernment activities. While conducting these raids, security 
forces confiscated, damaged, or destroyed personal property for which 
owners were not compensated by the Government. Security forces also set 
up checkpoints at the entrances to villages, requiring vehicle searches 
and proof of identity from anyone seeking to enter or exit. Whenever 
possible the Government jams, either in whole or in part, foreign 
broadcasts that carry antigovernment programming or commentary. A 
government-controlled proxy prohibits user access to Internet sites 
considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the 
right ``to express and propagate'' opinions; however, citizens are not 
in practice free to express their public opposition to the Government 
in speech or writing, although there was some improvement during the 
year. Press criticism of ruling family personalities and of government 
policy regarding certain sensitive subjects--such as sectarian unrest 
and the dispute with Qatar over the Hawar islands--is strictly 
prohibited. However, after the new Amir assumed power on March 6, the 
Government allowed the press somewhat greater latitude. The Amir stated 
in his December 16 National Day speech that the press and public have a 
duty to question the Government about developments in the country. Some 
sensitive issues, such as criticizing the services offered by the 
Ministries of Interior and Defense and discussing the state budget, 
which were forbidden in the past, are now being addressed in the local 
press. In July and August, the local press published two comments 
criticizing the Ministry of Interior's policy toward the ``bidoon,'' 
(the indigenous stateless population of mostly Persian-origin Shi'a 
upon whom the Government has not conferred citizenship or the right to 
hold passports). In August columnists criticized the Ministry of 
Finance for not informing the public of the effect of the increase in 
oil prices on the State's budget and national income.
    Local press coverage and commentary on international issues is 
open, and discussion of local economic and commercial issues also is 
relatively unrestricted. Many individuals express critical opinions 
openly on domestic political and social issues in private settings but 
do not do so to leading government officials or in public forums.
    The Information Ministry exercises extensive control over all local 
media. Newspapers are owned privately, but they routinely exercise 
self-censorship of stories on sensitive topics. The Government does not 
condone unfavorable coverage of its domesticpolicies by the 
international media and occasionally has revoked the press credentials 
of offending journalists. Because the Ministry controls foreign 
journalists' residence permits, unfavorable coverage could lead to 
deportation. However, there were no reports that the Government revoked 
press credentials during the year. The Government generally afforded 
foreign journalists access to the country and did not limit their 
contacts.
    The State owns and operates all radio and television stations. 
Radio and television broadcasts in Arabic and Farsi from neighboring 
countries and Egypt can be received without interference. However, 
international news services, including the Associated Press, United 
Press International, and Agence France Presse, sometimes complain about 
press restrictions. The Cable News Network is available on a 24-hour 
basis by subscription, and the British Broadcasting Corporation World 
News Service is carried on a local channel 24 hours a day free of 
charge. However, the Government generally jams, wholly or partially, 
foreign broadcasts that carry antigovernment programming or commentary 
(see Section 1.f.).
    Most senior government officials, ruling family members, and major 
hotels use satellite dishes to receive international broadcasts, as do 
well-to-do private citizens. Access to satellite dishes and the 
importation or installation of dishes no longer require prior 
government approval (see Section 3).
    Access to the Internet is provided through the National Telephone 
Company (BATELCO). A government-controlled proxy prohibits user access 
to sites considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic; e-mail access 
to information is unimpeded, although it may be subject to monitoring 
(see Section 1.f.).
    Although there are no formal regulations limiting academic freedom, 
in practice academics try to avoid contentious political issues. 
University hiring and admissions policies appear to favor Sunnis and 
others who are assumed to support the Government rather than focusing 
on professional experience and academic qualifications; however, there 
was some improvement in hiring qualified individuals in a 
nondiscriminatory manner during the year.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Despite the 
Constitution's provision for the right of free assembly, the Government 
prohibits all public political demonstrations and meetings and controls 
religious gatherings that may take on political overtones. Permits are 
required for most other public gatherings, and permission is not 
granted routinely. Unauthorized public gatherings of more than five 
persons are prohibited by law. The Government monitors gatherings that 
might take on a political tone and frequently disperses such meetings.
    The Constitution provides for the right of free association; 
however, the Government restricts this right. The Government prohibits 
political parties and organizations. Some professional societies and 
social and sports clubs traditionally have served as forums for 
discreet political discussion, but they are restricted by law from 
engaging in political activity. Only the Bahraini Bar Association is 
exempt from the regulations that require that the constitutions of all 
associations include a commitment to refrain from political activity. 
The Bar Association successfully had argued that a lawyer's 
professional duties may require certain political actions, such as 
interpreting legislation or participating in a politically sensitive 
trial. In January 1998, after the Bar Association sponsored a lecture 
in which prodemocracy speakers publicly attacked the Government, the 
Government told current board members that they would not be allowed to 
stand for reelection. Although the decision has not been reversed, the 
Bar Association continues to operate without hindrance. Other organized 
discussions and meetings no longer are discouraged actively.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The population is overwhelmingly Muslim, 
and the Constitution states that Islam is the official religion; 
however, while the Constitution also provides for freedom of religion, 
the Government does not tolerate political dissent from religious 
groups or leaders, and subjects both Sunni and Shi'a Muslims to 
governmental control and monitoring. Shi'a constitute over two-thirds 
of the indigenous population. Most world religions are represented in 
the country, and their followers generally practice their faith 
privately without interference from the Government. Christians and 
other non-Muslims including Jews,Hindus, and Baha'is practice their 
religion freely, maintain their own places of worship, and display the 
symbols of their religion. There are no registration requirements for 
religious organizations.
    Bibles and other Christian publications are displayed and sold 
openly in local bookstores that also sell Islamic and other religious 
literature. Some small groups worship in their homes. Notable 
dignitaries from virtually every religion and denomination visit the 
country and frequently meet with the Government and civic leaders. 
Religious tracts of all branches of Islam, cassettes of sermons 
delivered by Muslim preachers from other countries, and publications of 
other religions are readily available.
    However, proselytizing by non-Muslims is discouraged, anti-Islamic 
writings are prohibited, and conversions from Islam to other religions, 
while not illegal, are not tolerated well by society.
    Both Sunni and Shi'a Muslims are subject to governmental control 
and monitoring. During the year, there were no reports that the 
Government closed any mosques or Ma'tams (Shi'a community centers) as 
it did the previous year to prevent religious leaders from delivering 
political speeches.
    The High Council for Islamic Affairs is charged with the review and 
approval of all clerical appointments within both the Sunni and Shi'a 
communities and maintains program oversight for all citizens studying 
religion abroad. Public religious events, most notably the large annual 
commemorative marches by Shi'a, are permitted but are monitored closely 
by the Government. There are no restrictions on the number of citizens 
permitted to make pilgrimages to Shi'a shrines and holy sites in Iran, 
Iraq, and Syria. However, due to conditions in Iraq, very few citizens 
make pilgrimages there. Stateless residents who do not possess Bahraini 
passports often have difficulties arranging travel to religious sites 
abroad. The Government monitors travel to Iran and scrutinizes 
carefully those who choose to pursue religious study there.
    The new Amir took some steps to improve the treatment of the Shi'a 
population. For example in June the Amir stated that all citizens are 
``equal before the law'' and allowed Shi'a to apply for jobs in the BDF 
and the Ministry of the Interior for the first time in 4 years. In 
early July, the Amir pardoned Shi'a spiritual leader Abdul Amir Al-
Jamri, who had been in prison since 1996. Several other clerics 
associated with Al-Jamri remain in jail (see Section 1.d.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some limits on 
these rights. Citizens are free to move within the country and change 
their place of residence or work. However, passports may be denied on 
political grounds. Approximately 3 percent of the indigenous 
population, the ``bidoon,'' or stateless persons, mostly Persian-origin 
Shi'a, do not have passports and cannot obtain them readily, although 
they may be given travel documents as Bahraini residents (see Section 
5). The Government occasionally grants citizenship to resident non-
Bahrainis who are Sunni Muslims, mostly from the Arabian Peninsula and 
Egypt.
    Citizens living abroad who are suspected of political or criminal 
offenses may face arrest and trial upon return to the country. Under 
the 1963 Citizenship Law, the Government may reject applications to 
obtain or renew passports for reasonable cause, but the applicant has 
the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil Court. The 
Government also has issued temporary passports, valid for one trip a 
year, to individuals whose travel it wishes to control or whose claim 
to Bahraini nationality is questionable. A noncitizen resident, 
including a bidoon of Iranian origin, also may obtain a Bahraini 
laissez-passer (travel documents), usually valid for 2 years and 
renewable at Bahraini embassies overseas. The holder of a laissez-
passer also requires a visa to reenter the country.
    Although the Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Refugees to the maximum extent possible, it has not formulated a 
formal policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum. The 
Government usually does not accept refugees due to its small size and 
limited resources. However, in practice refugees who arrive are not 
repatriated to countries from which they have fled. Many Iranian 
emigres who fled Iran after the Iranian revolution have been granted 
permission to remain in the country, but they have not been granted 
citizenship.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right peacefully to change their 
government or their political system, and the Government controls 
political activity. Since the dissolution of the National Assembly in 
1975, there have been no formal democratic political institutions. The 
Prime Minister makes all appointments to the Cabinet. All other 
government positions are filled by the relevant ministries. About one-
third of the cabinet ministers are Shi'a Muslim, although they do not 
hold security-related offices. The Government appeared to be more open 
to criticism during the year; however, it continues to view most 
substantive reform as a threat to stability and has taken only halting 
steps to expand political participation. The ordinary citizen may 
attempt to influence government decisions through submission of 
personal written petitions and informal contact with senior officials, 
including appeals to the Amir, the Prime Minister, and other officials 
at their regularly scheduled public audiences, called majlises.
    In 1992 the Amir established by decree a Consultative Council 
(Majlis Al-Shura). Its 40 members are divided between Sunni and Shi'a 
(21 Shi'a, 19 Sunni) and are appointed by the Amir. They are selected 
to represent major constituent groups, including representatives from 
the business, labor, professional, and religious communities. There are 
no members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family or religious extremists in 
the Majlis. In addition to legislation submitted for its review by the 
Cabinet, the Majlis may initiate debate independently on nonpolitical 
issues. The Majlis also may summon cabinet ministers to answer 
questions, but its recommendations are not binding on the Government. 
The Majlis held its seventh session from October 1998 to May, and began 
a new session on October 6.
    During the year, the Majlis debated a number of contentious social 
and economic issues, including unemployment, privatization, child care, 
and education reform, and drafted proposals on these and other subjects 
for government consideration. According to the Speaker of the Majlis, 
the Government responded favorably to all but one of the Majlis's 
recommendations by incorporating them into legislation or by taking 
other appropriate actions.
    Women are underrepresented greatly in government and politics; 
there are no women in the Majlis or at the ministerial levels of 
Government. The majority of women who choose to work in government are 
in a support capacity, and only a few have attained senior positions 
within their respective ministries or agencies.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no local human rights organizations. Because of the 
restrictions on freedom of association and expression, any independent, 
domestically based investigation or public criticism of the 
Government's human rights policies faces major obstacles. Several 
political opposition movements in exile report on the human rights 
situation. These include the Damascus-based Committee for the Defense 
of Human Rights in Bahrain, the London-based Bahrain Freedom Movement, 
the Beirut-based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, and the 
Copenhagen-based Bahrain Human Rights Organization. These groups are 
composed of small numbers of emigres living in self-imposed exile and 
reportedly receive funding from sources hostile to the Government.
    The Government maintains that it is not opposed to visits by bona 
fide human rights organizations. During the year, the Government 
allowed increased access by international human rights organizations. 
During the year, Middle East Watch and Human Rights Watch 
representatives visited the country, and in June the Government 
received a delegation from Amnesty International, which issued a brief 
statement that noted that it was invited by the Government but was not 
allowed to meet with all persons to whom it requested access. In 1996 
the Government invited the ICRC to undertake visits to the country's 
prisons. The visits continued throughout the year and, while the ICRC 
has maintained its usual standards of confidentiality regarding its 
findings, credible reports indicate that conditions throughout the 
penal system have improved.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality, equal opportunity, and the 
right to medical care, welfare, education, property, capital, and work 
for all citizens. However, in practice these rights are protected 
unevenly, depending on the individual's social status, ethnicity, or 
sex.
    Women.--Violence against women occurs, but incidents usually are 
kept within the family. In general there is little public attention to, 
or discussion of, the problem. During the year, a few articles appeared 
in the local press discussing violence against women and the need for 
laws to defend women who are abused. No government policies explicitly 
address violence against women. Women's groups and health care 
professionals state that spouse abuse is common, particularly in poorer 
communities. There are very few known instances of women seeking legal 
redress for violence. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the courts are 
not receptive to such cases.
    It is not uncommon for foreign women working as domestic workers to 
be beaten or sexually abused. Numerous cases have been reported to 
local embassies and the police. However, most victims are too 
intimidated to sue their employers. Courts reportedly have allowed 
victims who do appear to sue for damages, return home, or both.
    Shari'a governs the legal rights of women. Specific rights vary 
according to Shi'a or Sunni interpretations of Islamic law, as 
determined by the individual's faith, or by the court in which various 
contracts, including marriage, have been made.
    While both Shi'a and Sunni women have the right to initiate a 
divorce, religious courts may refuse the request. Although local 
religious courts may grant a divorce to Shi'a women in routine cases, 
occasionally Shi'a women seeking divorce under unusual circumstances 
must travel abroad to seek a higher ranking opinion than that available 
in the country. Women of either branch may own and inherit property and 
may represent themselves in all public and legal matters. In the 
absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit all property. In 
contrast, Sunni women--in the absence of a direct male heir--inherit 
only a portion as governed by Shari'a; the balance is divided among 
brothers, uncles, and male cousins of the deceased.
    In divorce cases, the courts routinely grant Shi'a and Sunni women 
custody of daughters under the age of 9 and sons under age 7, although 
custody usually reverts to the father once the children reach those 
ages. In all circumstances except mental incapacitation, the father, 
regardless of custody, retains the right to make certain legal 
decisions for his children, such as guardianship of any property 
belonging to the child, until the child reaches legal age. A noncitizen 
woman automatically loses custody of her children if she divorces their 
citizen father.
    Women may obtain passports and leave the country without the 
permission of the male head of the household. Women are free to work 
outside the home, to drive cars without escorts, and to wear the 
clothing of their choice. Women increasingly have taken jobs previously 
reserved for men. The Labor Law does not discriminate against women; 
however, in practice, there is discrimination in the workplace, 
including inequality of wages and denial of opportunity for 
advancement. Women constitute over 20 percent of the work force. The 
Government has encouraged the hiring of women, enacted special laws to 
promote female entry into the work force, and is a leading employer of 
women. The Labor Law does not recognize the concept of equal pay for 
equal work, and women frequently are paid less than men. Generally, 
women work outside the home during the years between secondary school 
or university and marriage. Some women complain that admissions 
policies at the National University are aimed at increasing the number 
of male students at the expense of qualified female applicants, 
especially Shi'a women. Nevertheless, women make up the majority of 
students at the country's universities.
    There are women's organizations that seek to improve the status of 
women under both civil and Islamic law. Some women have expressed the 
view that, despite their participation in the work force, women's 
rights are not advancing significantly and that much of the lack of 
progress is due to the influence of Islamic religious traditionalists. 
However, other women desire a return to more traditional values and 
support calls for a return to traditional Islamic patterns of social 
behavior.
    Children.--The Government often has stated its commitment to the 
protection of children's rights and welfare within the social and 
religious framework of this traditional society. It generally honors 
this commitment through enforcement of its civil and criminal laws and 
extensive social welfare network. Public education for children below 
the age of 15 is free. While the Constitution provides for compulsory 
education at the primary levels, authorities do not enforce attendance. 
Limited medical services for infants and preadolescents are provided 
free of charge.
    The social status of children is shaped by tradition and religion 
to a greater extent than by civil law. Child abuse is rare, as is 
public discussion of it; the preference of the authorities always has 
been to leave such matters within the purview of the family or 
religious groups. The authorities actively enforce the laws against 
prostitution, including child prostitution, procuring, and pimping. 
Violators are dealt with harshly and can be imprisoned, or, if a 
noncitizen, deported. In some cases, authorities reportedly return 
children arrested for prostitution and other nonpolitical crimes to 
their families rather than prosecute them, especially for first 
offenses. There were no reports of child prostitution during the year. 
Some legal experts have called on the Government to establish a 
separate juvenile court. However, other citizens insist that the 
protection of children is a religious, not a secular, function and 
oppose greater government involvement. Independent and 
quasigovernmental organizations such as the Bahraini Society for the 
Protection of Children and the Mother and Child Welfare Society play an 
active part in protecting children by providing counseling, legal 
assistance, advice, and, in some cases, shelter and financial support 
to distressed children and families.
    In 1998 there were numerous arrests and detentions of juveniles 
during the year in connection with the political unrest. These children 
generally were released without charges within several days of their 
arrests. However, those juveniles charged with security offenses 
received the same treatment as adult prisoners, that is, incommunicado 
detention and trial before a State Security Court. There were very few 
reports of arrests and detentions of juveniles during the year, and 
these persons were released.
    People with Disabilities.--The law protects the rights of the 
disabled and a variety of governmental, quasigovernmental, and 
religious institutions are mandated to support and protect disabled 
persons. The regional (Arabian Gulf) Center for the Treatment of the 
Blind is headquartered in Bahrain, and a similar Center for the 
Education of Deaf Children was established in 1994. Society tends to 
view the disabled as special cases in need of protection rather than as 
fully functioning members of society. Nonetheless, the Government is 
required by law to provide vocational training for disabled persons who 
wish to work and maintains a list of certified, trained disabled 
persons. The Labor Law of 1976 also requires that any employer of over 
100 persons must engage at least 2 percent of its employees from the 
Government's list of disabled workers; however, this commitment cannot 
be verified. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs works actively to 
place the disabled in public sector jobs, such as in the public 
telephone exchanges. The Government's housing regulations require that 
access be provided to disabled persons. Greater emphasis has been given 
in recent years to public building design that incorporates access for 
the disabled; however, the law does not mandate access to buildings for 
persons with disabilities.
    Religious Minorities.--Although there are notable exceptions, the 
Sunni Muslim minority enjoys a favored status. Sunnis receive 
preference for employment in sensitive government positions and in the 
managerial ranks of the civil service. While the defense and internal 
security forces are predominantly Sunni, Shi'a citizens now are allowed 
to hold posts in these forces; however, they do not hold significant 
positions. In the private sector, Shi'a citizens tend to be employed in 
lower paid, less skilled jobs.
    Educational, social, and municipal services in most Shi'a 
neighborhoods, particularly in rural villages, are inferior to those 
found in Sunni urban communities. In an effort to remedy societal 
discrimination, the Government has built numerous subsidized housing 
complexes open to all citizens on the basisof financial need. In order 
to ease both the housing shortage and strains on the national budget, 
in 1997 the Government revised its policy in order to permit lending 
institutions to finance mortgages on apartment units.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--A group of approximately 9,000 
to 15,000 persons, mostly Shi'a of Persian-origin, but including some 
Christians, are stateless. Commonly known as bidoon, they enjoy less 
than full citizenship under the 1963 Citizenship Act. Many are second- 
or third-generation residents whose ancestors emigrated from Iran. 
Although they no longer claim Iranian citizenship, most have not been 
granted Bahraini citizenship. Without citizenship these individuals 
officially are unable to buy land, start a business, or obtain 
government loans, although in practice many do. The law does not 
address the citizenship rights of persons who were not registered with 
the authorities prior to 1959, which creates a legal problem for such 
persons and their descendants and results in economic and other 
hardships. The Government maintains that many of those who claim to be 
bidoon are actually citizens of Iran or other Gulf states who have 
chosen voluntarily not to renew their foreign passports. Bidoon and 
citizens who speak Farsi rather than Arabic as their first language 
also face significant social and economic obstacles, including 
difficulty finding employment.
    The Amir stated in his December 16 national day speech that he was 
committed to giving citizenship to ``every qualified person.'' There 
were reports that several bidoon families received citizenship after 
waiting 20 years.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The partially suspended 1973 
Constitution recognizes the right of workers to organize; however, 
independent trade unions do not exist. The Constitution provides for 
``freedom to form associations and trade unions on national bases and 
for lawful objectives and by peaceful means,'' in accordance with the 
law, and states that ``no person shall be compelled to join or remain 
in any association or union.''
    In response to labor unrest in the mid-1950's, 1965, and 1974, the 
Government passed a series of labor regulations, which allow the 
formation of elected workers' committees in larger companies. Worker 
representation is based on a system of Joint Labor-Management 
Committees (JLC's) established by ministerial decree. Three JLC's were 
created in 1998, bringing the total to 19.
    The JLC's are composed of equal numbers of appointed management 
representatives and worker representatives elected from and by company 
employees. Each committee is chaired alternately by the management and 
worker representative. The selection of worker representatives appears 
to be fair. Under the law, the Ministry of Interior may exclude worker 
candidates with criminal records or those deemed a threat to national 
security, but the Government has not taken such action in recent years.
    The elected labor representatives of the JLC's select the 11 
members of the General Committee of Bahrain workers (GCBW) established 
by law in 1983, which oversees and coordinates the work of the JLC's. 
The Committee also hears complaints from Bahraini and foreign workers 
and assists them in bringing their complaints to the attention of the 
Ministry of Labor or the courts. In 1998 elections were held for 3-year 
terms for representatives to the GCBW. Workers from a variety of 
occupations were elected to the body, including Sunni and Shi'a 
Muslims, foreign workers, and one woman. These elections, which were by 
secret ballot, appeared to be free and fair.
    Although the Government and company management are not represented 
on the GCBW, the Ministry of Labor closely monitors the body's 
activities. It approves the GCBW's rules and the distribution of the 
GCBW's funds. The JLC-GCBW system represents nearly 70 percent of the 
island's indigenous industrial workers, although both the Government 
and labor representatives readily admit that nonindustrial workers and 
foreign workers clearly are underrepresented in the system. The 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs supports the formation of JLC's in 
all public and private sector companies that employ more than 200 
workers.
    Although foreign workers constitute 67 percent of the work force, 
they are underrepresented in the GCBW. Foreign workers participate in 
the JLC elections, and five foreign workerscurrently serve on JLC's. 
However, none sits on the board of the GCBW. It is a long-term goal of 
both the Government and the GCBW to replace foreign workers with 
citizens throughout all sectors of the economy and to create new jobs 
for citizens seeking employment.
    The Labor Law is silent on the right to strike, and there were no 
strikes during the year. Actions perceived to be detrimental to the 
``existing relationship'' between employers and employees or to the 
economic health of the State are forbidden by the 1974 Security Act. 
There were no recent examples of major strikes, but walkouts and other 
job actions have been known to occur in the past without governmental 
intervention and with positive results for the workers.
    Internationally affiliated trade unions do not exist. The GCBW 
represents workers in the Arab Labor Organization, but does not belong 
to any international trade union organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--As in the case 
of strikes, the Labor Law neither grants nor denies workers the right 
to organize and bargain collectively outside the JLC system. While the 
JLC's are empowered to discuss labor disputes, organize workers' 
services, and discuss wages, working conditions, and productivity, 
workers have no independent, recognized vehicle for representing their 
interests on these or other labor-related issues. Minimum wage rates 
for public sector employees are established by Council of Ministers' 
decrees. Private businesses generally follow the Government's lead in 
establishing their wage rates.
    There are two export processing zones. Labor law and practice are 
the same in these zones as in the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is prohibited by law; however, in practice the labor laws apply 
for the most part only to citizens, and abuses occur, particularly in 
the cases of domestic workers and those working illegally. The law also 
prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government enforces 
this prohibition effectively.
    In some cases, foreign workers arrive in the country under the 
sponsorship of an employer and then switch jobs, while continuing to 
pay a fee to their original sponsor. The Government has announced its 
intention to stop this illegal practice, which makes it difficult to 
monitor and control the employment conditions of domestic and other 
workers; however, it took no substantive action during the year.
    Labor Law amendments passed in 1993 stiffened the penalties for job 
switching to include jail sentences of up to 6 months for the sponsor 
of every illegally sponsored worker. In such cases, the workers 
involved are likely to be deported as illegal immigrants after the case 
is concluded. During the summer and fall of 1998, the Government 
conducted an amnesty program under which undocumented foreign workers 
were permitted either to legalize their status or leave the country 
without penalty. As many as 38,000 workers opted to participate in the 
amnesty program; there was no amnesty in 1999.
    The sponsorship system leads to other abuses as well. There are 
numerous reports that employers withhold salaries from their foreign 
workers for months, even years, at a time, and may refuse to grant them 
the necessary permission to leave the country. The Government and the 
courts generally work to rectify those abuses brought to their 
attention, but the fear of deportation or employer retaliation prevents 
many foreign workers from making complaints to the authorities.
    Labor Laws do not apply to domestic servants. There are credible 
reports that domestic servants, especially women, sometimes are forced 
to work 12- or 16-hour days, given little time off, and are subjected 
to verbal and physical abuse.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 14 years of age. 
Juveniles between the ages of 14 and 16 may not be employed in 
hazardous conditions or at night and may not work more than 6 hours per 
day or on a piecemeal basis. Child labor laws are enforced effectively 
by Ministry of Labor inspectors in the industrial sector; child labor 
outside that sector is monitored less well, but it is not believed to 
be significant outside family operated businesses, and even in that 
sector it is not very widespread.Some children work in the market areas 
as car-washers and porters. While the Constitution calls for compulsory 
education at the primary levels, authorities do not enforce attendance 
(see Section 5). The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and 
the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage scales, set by 
government decree, exist for public sector employees and generally 
afford a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The minimum 
wage for the public sector is $278.25 (105 dinars) a month. Wages in 
the private sector are determined on a contract basis. For foreign 
workers, employers consider benefits such as annual trips home and 
housing and education bonuses as part of the salary.
    The Labor Law, enforced by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs, mandates acceptable conditions of work for all adult workers, 
including adequate standards regarding hours of work (maximum 48 hours 
per week) and occupational safety and health. The Ministry enforces the 
law with periodic inspections and fines routinely imposed on violators. 
The press often performs an ombudsman function on labor problems, 
reporting job disputes and the results of labor cases brought before 
the courts. Once a complaint has been lodged by a worker, the Ministry 
of Labor opens an investigation and often takes remedial action. The 
Fourth High Court has jurisdiction over cases involving alleged 
violations of the Labor Law.
    Complaints brought before the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs 
that cannot be settled through arbitration must, by law, be referred to 
the court within 15 days. In practice most employers prefer to settle 
such disputes through arbitration, particularly since the court and 
labor law generally are considered to favor the employee.
    The Labor Law specifically favors citizens over foreign workers and 
Arab foreigners over other foreign workers in hiring and firing. 
Because employers include housing and other allowances in their salary 
scales, foreign workers legally can be paid lower regular wages than 
their citizen counterparts, although they sometimes receive the same or 
a greater total compensation package because of home leave and holiday 
allowances. Western foreign workers and citizen workers are paid 
comparable wages, with total compensation packages often significantly 
greater for the former. Women are entitled to 60 days of paid maternity 
leave and nursing periods during the day. However, women generally are 
paid less than men.
    In 1993 the Government strengthened the Labor Law by decree of the 
Amir, announcing that significant fines and jail sentences would be 
imposed upon private-sector employers who fail to pay legal wages. This 
law applies equally to employers of citizens and foreign workers and is 
intended to reduce abuses against foreign workers who sometimes have 
been denied legal salaries (see Section 6.c.). The law provides equal 
protection to citizen and foreign workers, but all foreign workers 
still require sponsorship by citizens or locally based institutions and 
companies. According to representatives of several embassies with large 
numbers of workers in the country, the Government generally is 
responsive to embassy requests to investigate foreign guest worker 
complaints about unpaid wages and mistreatment. However, foreign 
workers, particularly those from developing countries, often are 
unwilling to report abuses for fear of losing residence rights and 
having to return to their native countries. Sponsors are able to cancel 
the residence permit of any person under their sponsorship and thereby 
block them for 1 year from obtaining entry or residence visas from 
another sponsor, although the sponsor may be subject to sanctions for 
wrongful dismissal. Foreign women who work as domestic workers often 
are beaten or sexually abused (see Section 5).
    Under the Labor Law, workers have the right to remove themselves 
from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, 
or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 EGYPT

    According to its Constitution, Egypt is a social democracy in which 
Islam is the state religion. The National Democratic Party (NDP), which 
has governed since its establishment in 1978, has used its entrenched 
position to dominate national politics, and it maintains an overriding 
majority in the popularly elected People's Assembly and the partially 
elected Shura (Consultative) Council. President Hosni Mubarak was 
reelected unopposed to a fourth 6-year term in a national referendum 
held in September. The Cabinet and the country's 26 governors are 
appointed by the President and may be dismissed by him at his 
discretion. The judiciary is independent; however, there is no 
appellate process for verdicts issued by the military or State Security 
Emergency courts.
    There are several security services in the Ministry of Interior, 
two of which are involved primarily in combating terrorism: The State 
Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), which conducts investigations 
and interrogates detainees; and the Central Security Force (CSF), which 
enforces curfews and bans on public demonstrations, and conducts 
paramilitary operations against terrorists. The President is the 
commander-in-chief of the military; the military is a primary 
stabilizing factor within society but generally does not involve itself 
in internal issues. The use of violence by security forces in the 
campaign against suspected terrorists appeared more limited than in 
previous years. The security forces committed numerous serious human 
rights abuses.
    Egypt is in transition from a government-controlled economy to a 
free market system. The Government continued its privatization program, 
although key sectors of the economy remain under government control. 
Agriculture remains the largest employer and is almost entirely in 
private hands. The tourism sector generates the largest amount of 
foreign currency. Petroleum exports, Suez Canal revenues, and 
remittances from approximately 2 million Egyptians working abroad are 
the other principal sources of foreign currency. These income sources 
are vulnerable to external shocks. Over the past decade, the Government 
has enacted significant economic reforms, which have reduced the budget 
deficit, stabilized the exchange rate, reduced inflation and interest 
rates significantly, and built up substantial reserves. However, export 
growth has lagged behind the growth in imports, which has resulted in 
an increase in the merchandise trade deficit to $12 billion for the 
year 1998-99.
    Several government policies enacted during the year, including 
restrictive trade decrees and foreign exchange rationing, led observers 
to question whether the Government can sustain its current exchange 
rate policy and interest rates. President Mubarak reshuffled the 
Cabinet in October to address these problems and to institute more 
coherent economic policies and accelerated reforms. Continued progress 
in economic development depends primarily upon implementation of a wide 
range of structural reforms. The per capita gross domestic product 
(GDP) is about $1,100 per year. Official statistics place 34.4 percent 
of wage earners in the agricultural sector, and knowledgeable observers 
estimate that perhaps 3 to 5 percent of those engage in subsistence 
farming. The annual population increase is 2.1 percent. Adult literacy 
rates are 63 percent for males and 34 percent for females.
    The Government continued to commit numerous serious human rights 
abuses, although its record again improved somewhat over the previous 
year, mainly due to a decrease in terrorist activity by Islamic 
extremists. The ruling NDP dominates the political scene to such an 
extent that citizens do not have a meaningful ability to change their 
government.
    The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981, continues 
to restrict many basic rights. The security forces continued to arrest 
and detain suspected members of terrorist groups. In fighting the 
terrorists, the security forces continued to mistreat and torture 
prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, hold detainees in 
prolonged pretrial detention, and occasionally engage in mass arrests. 
In actions unrelated to the antiterrorist campaign, local police 
killed, tortured, and otherwise abused both criminal suspects and other 
persons. The Government took disciplinary action against police 
officers accused of abusing detainees, including prosecution of several 
offenders, but it did not pursue most cases or seek adequate 
punishments. In August the public prosecutor reopened and expanded an 
investigation into police brutality and torture that took place during 
a 1998 police investigation of a double murder in the largely Coptic 
village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate.
    Prison conditions remain poor. The Ministry of Interior released 
more than 1,000 political detainees, bringing the total number of 
detainees released since 1998 to more than 6,000. The use of military 
courts to try civilians continued to infringe on a defendant's right to 
a fair trial before an independentjudiciary. During the year, the 
Government referred 3 cases involving 148 civilian defendants to the 
military court system. Twenty of these defendants are leaders of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. They were arrested in October on charges of illegal 
political activity. Most observers believe that the Government is 
seeking to block Muslim Brotherhood participation in the elections to 
professional syndicates and the People's Assembly. The Government used 
the Emergency Law to infringe on citizens' privacy rights. Although 
citizens generally express themselves freely, the Government partially 
restricts freedom of the press. The Government significantly restricts 
freedom of assembly and association. The Government places restrictions 
on freedom of religion. Despite difficulties due to an inadequate legal 
framework and periodic government harassment, a number of local human 
rights groups are active. Although the Government does not recognize 
them legally, it allows these groups to operate openly.
    Domestic violence against women is a problem. Although the 
Government enforces the 1996 decree banning the practice of female 
genital mutilation (FGM), many families persist in subjecting their 
daughters to the traditional practice. Women and Christians face 
discrimination based on tradition and some aspects of the law. 
Terrorist violence against Christians has been a problem in recent 
years. There were no reports of terrorist attacks against Christians 
during the year; however, a Christian priest in Mahalla and a Christian 
priest in Dairout were attacked by individual extremists. Child labor 
remains widespread despite government efforts to eradicate it. Abuse by 
employers continues, and the Government does not enforce the law 
effectively. The Government limits workers' rights.
    In contrast to the previous year, and for the first time in 10 
years, there were no reports of terrorist incidents.

                        respect for human rights

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings; however, police committed extrajudicial 
killings, and such killings also may have occurred in certain 
antiterrorist operations.
    In August The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) 
reported the deaths of five criminal suspects in police custody during 
the year: Ahmad Mahmoud Mohamed Tammam, Hany Kamal Shawky, Said Sayyed 
Abd Al-Aal, Hamdy Ahmad Mohamed Ahmad Askar, and Amr Salim Mohamed (see 
Section 1.c.). The Ministry of Interior responded to the EOHR's inquiry 
about these cases, and noted that the Public Prosecutor charged a 
security official with premeditated murder in one instance (see Section 
1.c.).
    The London-based Islamic Observation Center reported that Mahmoud 
Agami Muhalhel Muawad died on October 21 in Damanhour prison as a 
result of poor conditions. Muawad's older brother, Sayyed Agami 
Muhalhel Muawad, was convicted in absentia in April by a military court 
and sentenced to 10 years in prison for membership in the terrorist 
group, the ``Jihad Group of Egypt'' (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). The 
press reported the following deaths due to police torture: Ahmad 
Mahmoud Ali Abdallah, who died on November 1 as a result of torture in 
a Cairo police station; Sharif Abd Al-Galil Sharaf, who died on 
December 2 after being detained and tortured in a police station in the 
governorate of Sharkiya; and Mohamed Ahmad Ibrahim, who died after 
being detained in a police station in Alexandria late in the year (see 
Section 1.c.).
    During the year, the public prosecution referred to court the case 
of five security officials accused of premeditated murder in the 1998 
death in detention of Waheed Al-Sayyid Ahmad. A court date was not set 
by year's end. The public prosecution took no action on the case of 
Gamal Mohammed Abdallah Mustafa, who died as a result of police torture 
in 1998. The public prosecution took no action on the case of a 
businessman who died in 1997 in the governorate of Galoubiya, 
reportedly as a result of police torture (see Section 1.c.).
    In antiterrorist campaigns, security forces killed four members of 
the ``Islamic Group of Egypt'' (IG), including Farid Salim Abdel Qader 
Kidwani, who was the leader of the IG's military wing. The security 
forces reportedly raided an IG hideout in Giza on September 7. The four 
IG members were killed in an exchange of gunfire. On August 1, a 
resident of Assiyut governorate shot and killed a member of the 
security forces. The gunman subsequently was shot and killed by 
security forces. Although there were some reports that this exchange 
was a terrorist incident, local observers attribute the incident to a 
dispute over cattle theft. There were no reports of killings 
ofrelatives of suspected extremists by security forces in apparent 
vendettas.
    According to press reports, in October a State Security Emergency 
court began the trial of four members of a terrorist group from the 
upper (southern) Egyptian city of Dairout who were accused of murder 
and attempted murder of policemen and Christians in the early 1990's. 
The trial was postponed until December, then later postponed again 
until February 2000. There was no information available about the 
identities of the defendants and the specific charges against them (see 
Sections 1.e. and 5.).
    According to reports released by the Land Center for Human Rights, 
during the year, 64 persons died and 324 were wounded in land disputes, 
including conflicts over demarcation lines, water rights, and cattle 
theft. The Land Center also reported 265 arrests related to land 
disputes. These incidents took place in rural areas, primarily in upper 
(southern) Egypt.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    The Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners reported 
six new cases of persons who disappeared between 1989 and 1998. The 
Center learned that 3 of the 19 persons reported missing in 1998 are in 
prison. The EOHR continues to investigate 30 previously reported 
disappearances. The EOHR has provided these names to the U.N. Committee 
on Disappearances, but the Government reportedly has denied any 
involvement in these cases.
    On February 22, an appeals court in Cairo ordered the Ministry of 
Interior to pay Bahaa Al-Amary, the wife of former Libyan Foreign 
Minister Mansur Kikhiya, $30,000 (100,000 Egyptian pounds). Kikhiya's 
family sued the Government following reports that he had been kidnaped 
from Cairo by Libyan agents, taken to Libya, and executed there in 
1994. The court awarded the sum as compensation for the Ministry of 
Interior's inability to protect a foreign dignitary on Egyptian soil. 
The Ministry of Interior appealed the decision to the Court of 
Cassation. The case is pending.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the infliction of ``physical or 
moral harm'' upon persons who have been arrested or detained; however, 
torture and abuse of detainees by police, security personnel, and 
prison guards is common.
    Under the Penal Code, torture of a defendant or giving orders to 
torture are felonies punishable by temporary hard labor or 3 to 10 
years' imprisonment. If the defendant dies, the crime is one of 
intentional murder punishable by a life sentence at hard labor. Arrest 
without due cause, threatening death, or using physical torture is 
punishable by temporary hard labor. The use of cruelty against persons 
by relying on one's position is punishable by imprisonment of no more 
than 1 year or a fine of no more than $65 (125 Egyptian pounds). 
Victims may bring a criminal or civil action for compensation against 
the responsible government agency. There is no statute of limitations 
in such cases.
    Despite these legal safeguards, there were numerous credible 
reports, including statements by government officials, that security 
forces tortured and mistreated citizens. Reports of torture and 
mistreatment at police stations remain frequent. According to a 
newspaper interview published in June, Interior Minister Habib Al-Adly 
said that human rights were ``an important component of state 
practices,'' and that he was seeking ``to restore the necessary level 
of security discipline.'' He stated that it was necessary to restore 
the confidence of citizens in the ``competence'' of the security 
services, and to restore ``the positive relationship'' between citizens 
and the security services. In August it was reported in the press that 
the Public Prosecutor instructed his subordinates to avoid the use of 
physical or psychological violence during the interrogation of 
suspects.
    However, while the Government has investigated torture complaints 
in criminal cases and punished some offending officers, the punishments 
do not conform with the seriousness of the offense. Government 
officials have stated that administrative punishments can be severe 
enough to prevent further career advancement, and that some police 
officers have chosen to face criminal charges instead. The Government 
has stated that it would not disclose further details of 
individualcases of police abuse for fear of harming the morale of law 
enforcement officers involved in counterterrorism operations.
    Human rights groups believe that the SSIS continues to employ 
torture. Torture takes place in SSIS offices, including its 
headquarters in Cairo, and at Central Security Force camps. Torture 
victims usually are taken to an SSIS office where they are handcuffed, 
blindfolded, and questioned about their associations, religious 
beliefs, and political views. Torture is used to extract information, 
coerce the victims to end their antigovernment activities, and deter 
others from such activities.
    Egyptian human rights groups and victims reported a number of 
torture methods that are employed by state security personnel and the 
police. Detainees frequently are stripped; hung by their wrists with 
their feet just touching the floor or forced to stand for prolonged 
periods; doused with hot or cold water; beaten; forced to stand 
outdoors in cold weather; and subjected to electrical shocks. Some 
victims, including female detainees, report that they have been 
threatened with rape.
    While the law requires security authorities to keep written records 
of detained citizens, human rights groups report that such records 
often are not available, not found, or that the police deny any 
knowledge of the detainee when inquiries are made about specific cases, 
effectively blocking the investigation of torture complaints.
    In January the Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners 
released a report called ``The Price of Dignity: Torture in Egypt is a 
Judicial Reality.'' The report presents a random sample of 190 cases of 
torture from the period 1982 to 1997. All of the cases involve a 
civilian defendant who successfully sued the Ministry of Interior for 
compensation for torture inflicted by state security forces or police 
during detention. For the 190 sample cases cited, the Interior Ministry 
was ordered to pay a total of $260,000 (877,000 Egyptian pounds) in 
awards ranging from $150 (500 Egyptian pounds) to $10,300 (35,000 
Egyptian pounds).
    In August the EOHR reported that five criminal suspects died during 
the year while in police custody, and provided eyewitness accounts of 
police torture of these persons. According to the EOHR, Hamdy Ahmad 
Mohamed Askar died on February 16 in Al-Mansoura general hospital, 
where he had been transferred following detention at a police station 
in Mansoura Governorate. Said Sayyed Abd Al-Aal died on April 17 in a 
police station in Giza. Hany Kamal Shawky died on April 21 in a police 
station in Cairo. Amr Salim Mohamed died on July 17 in a police station 
in the governorate of Galoubiya. Ahmad Mahmoud Mohamed Tammam died on 
July 21 in a police station in Giza.
    In response to the EOHR's inquiry about these cases, the Ministry 
of Interior stated that Askar had been transferred to the hospital 
because of respiratory problems, and noted that the forensics evidence 
conflicts with eyewitness accounts of Askar's treatment. According to 
the Ministry, Abd Al-Aal died from circulatory failure in a hospital. 
The Ministry reported that the Public Prosecutor charged a security 
official in Cairo with premeditated murder following the death of 
Shawky. The Ministry stated that a forensic report indicated that 
Mohamed died from pleural effusion and circulatory failure, and noted 
that Mohamed's father said that his son was suffering from pneumonia.
    The Islamic Observation Center, based in London, reported that 
Mahmoud Agami Muhalhel Muawad died on October 21 in Damanhour prison 
``as a result of the deteriorating conditions of Egyptian prisons.'' 
Muawad was the younger brother of Sayyed Agami Muhalhel Muawad, who was 
convicted in absentia in April by a military court and sentenced to 10 
years in prison for membership in the terrorist group the Islamic Jihad 
of Egypt (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). The press reported that Ahmad 
Mahmoud Ali Abdallah was arrested on October 30 and died on November 1 
at the Rod Al-Farag police station in Cairo from torture. Abdallah's 
family claimed that the police forced them to bury his body, which 
revealed evidence of torture. In December the press reported that 16-
year-old Mohamed Ahmad Ibrahim died after police tortured him in the 
Al-Raml police station in Alexandria. Ibrahim's family complained to 
the office of the public prosecutor about bruises on their son's body. 
The press also reported that police in Minya Al-Kamh in the governorate 
of Sharikiya tortured to death Sharif Abd Al-Galil Sharaf. Sharif 
reportedly was arrested on November 13 and beaten so badly that he fell 
into a coma. He was taken to a hospital where he died on December 2.
    In May the Public Prosecutor in Sohag announced that the medical 
evidence did not support allegations of police torture and mistreatment 
of 15 suspects from the village of Al-Kush in the governorate of Sohag 
in 1998 (see Sections 2.a., 2.c., and 4). The Sohag Public Prosecutor 
dismissed the charges against thepolice officers. The 15 suspects were 
detained during a 1998 murder investigation and subsequently filed an 
official complaint. There was no evidence to substantiate a newspaper 
report that the Government compensated the four implicated officers, 
and the minister of Interior denied the report. The officers were 
transferred during the investigation and have not been reassigned to 
Al-Kush. In August the newly appointed national Public Prosecutor 
reopened and expanded the investigation of police conduct in Al-Kush. 
According to the EOHR and other groups, during the incident, the police 
detained hundreds of citizens, including relatives of suspects, women, 
and children. Local observers reported that police tortured and 
mistreated dozens of these detainees. The public prosecution is 
interviewing 989 Al-Kush residents about the incident.
    During the year the public prosecution referred to court the case 
of five security officials accused of premeditated murder in the 1998 
death of Waheed Al-Sayyid Ahmad, who allegedly died as a result of 
police torture. A court date was not set by year's end. The public 
prosecution took no action on the case of Gamal Mohammed Abdallah 
Mustafa, who died as a result of police torture in 1998. The public 
prosecution took no action on the case of a businessman who died in 
1997 in the governorate of Galoubiya, reportedly as a result of police 
torture. The public prosecution continued to investigate the torture of 
Mohammed Badr Al-Din Gomah in 1996 by 13 members of the Alexandria 
police force. The appeal of a 1-year sentence of a police officer 
convicted of engaging in torture in 1994 is pending.
    A December 31 dispute escalated into violent exchanges between 
Christians and Muslims in the south (see Section 5.).
    Prison conditions remain poor. Government authorities reported the 
renovation or construction of 14 prisons during the past 5 years. 
Nonetheless, human rights groups report that overcrowding and unhealthy 
conditions continue. Cells are poorly ventilated, food is inadequate in 
quantity and nutritional value, drinking water often is polluted, and 
medical services are insufficient. These conditions contribute to the 
spread of disease and epidemics. The use of torture and mistreatment in 
prisons continues to be common.
    In August the Public Prosecutor ordered his subordinates to visit 
prisons under their jurisdiction randomly at least once a month. He 
also instructed them to inspect prison records and to investigate 
complaints raised by prisoners. Inspections began after the 
announcement.
    Relatives and lawyers often are unable to obtain access to prisons 
for visits. Prisons in Abu Zaabal, Tora, and Al-Fayoum remain closed to 
visits. In response to 10 separate cases filed by the Human Rights 
Center for the Assistance of Prisoners, an administrative court issued 
10 rulings on December 14, directing the Interior Ministry to open the 
Tora prison to visits. The Center has filed 33 additional cases within 
the past 2 years requesting visits to other closed prisons. These cases 
are pending before the court. However, human rights groups report that 
visits have been refused at several prisons. At others restrictions 
have been placed on visits to prisoners incarcerated for political or 
terrorist crimes, limiting the number of visits allowed each prisoner, 
and the total number of visitors allowed in the prison at any one time.
    In principle human rights monitors are allowed to visit prisoners 
in their capacity as legal counsel; however, in practice they often 
face considerable bureaucratic obstacles that prevent them from meeting 
with prisoners. The Government does not permit the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--As part of the 
Government's antiterrorist campaign, security forces conducted mass 
arrests and detained hundreds of individuals without charge. Police 
also at times arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Under the 
provisions of the Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981, 
the police may obtain an arrest warrant from the Ministry of Interior 
upon showing that an individual poses a danger to security and public 
order. This procedure nullifies the constitutional requirement of 
showing that an individual likely has committed a specific crime to 
obtain a warrant from a judge or prosecutor.
    The Emergency Law allows authorities to detain an individual 
without charge. After 30 days, a detainee has the right to demand a 
court hearing to challenge the legality of the detention order and may 
resubmit his motion for a hearing at 1-month intervals thereafter. 
There is no maximum limit to the length of detention if the judge 
continues to uphold the legality of the detention order, or if the 
detainee fails to exercise his right to a hearing.
    In addition to the Emergency Law, the Penal Code also gives the 
State broad detention powers. Under the Penal Code, prosecutors must 
bring charges within 48 hours or release the suspect. However, they may 
detain a suspect for a maximum of 6 months, pending investigation. 
Arrests under the Penal Code occur openly and with warrants issued by a 
district prosecutor or judge. There is a system of bail. The Penal Code 
contains several provisions to combat extremist violence. These 
provisions broadly define terrorism to include the acts of ``spreading 
panic'' and ``obstructing the work of authorities.''
    During the year, security forces and police arrested at least 249 
persons allegedly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist 
opposition organization. In August security forces arrested about 2 
dozen students at Cairo and Zagazig Universities who were suspected of 
Muslim Brotherhood membership. The EOHR alleged that the security 
forces harass politically affiliated students at the beginning of each 
academic year (see Section 2.a.). In October and November, security 
forces arrested 26 alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the 
Delta region and 8 in Minya. Four more suspected members were arrested 
in Qena in December. An unknown number of Muslim Brotherhood members 
who were arrested during the year reportedly were released later.
    On October 20, security forces arrested and detained 20 
professional leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and accused them of 
membership in an illegal group and incitement against the Government. 
The Government referred the case to the military courts. The first 
hearing was held on December 25 and the next was scheduled for January 
12, 2000. The arrests and trial before the military courts coincided 
with preparations for elections to the boards of professional 
syndicates and to the People's Assembly (see Section 1.e.).
    In January Mahmoud Mohamed was arrested and detained for more than 
30 days by security forces after he sent a telegram to President 
Mubarak asserting that he would not support Mubarak in the presidential 
referendum held in September. After the media publicized the story, 
Mubarak ordered Mohamed's release.
    In March six members of the Tagammu opposition party were arrested 
by security forces, following a meeting in Cairo, for possessing 
pamphlets that criticized the draft labor law. Three of the six were 
released immediately; the other three were questioned and released 
after they paid bail (see Sections 2.a. and 6.a.). Also in March, Fathy 
Abu Al-Ezz was detained briefly for publishing an article in a company 
newspaper that explained why he would not vote for President Mubarak 
(see Section 2.a.). In October state security forces arrested Fathy Al-
Masri and detained him for over 15 days for possessing a pamphlet that 
criticized the prohibition of medical services in a nonemergency 
situation by a hide tanning company. He was released in November (see 
Sections 2.a. and 6.e.).
    There were a few unconfirmed reports that several converts to 
Christianity were subjected to harassment by the security services, 
including temporary detention (see Section 2.c.).
    Human rights groups reported that hundreds, and according to one 
report, thousands, of persons detained under the Emergency Law have 
been incarcerated for several years without charge. The courts have 
ordered the release of several of these detainees, but prison officials 
reportedly have ignored the orders. The Ministry of Interior frequently 
reissues detention orders to return detainees to prison. In April the 
Ministry of Interior reported that it had released 1,200 political 
detainees described as ``repentant extremists.'' This group included 
persons who had served their sentences but had remained in detention, 
and persons who had never been charged or tried. The release brought 
the total number of detainees released in the past 2 years to more than 
6,000. Following the releases, revised prison population estimates 
indicate that there are 10,000 prisoners who are registered and serving 
sentences and approximately 12,000 political detainees.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent; 
however, cases involving national security or terrorism may be handled 
by military or State Security Emergency courts, in which constitutional 
protections may not be observed. The Constitution provides for the 
independence and immunity of judges and forbids interference by other 
authorities in the exercise of their judicial functions. The President 
appoints all judges upon recommendation of the Higher Judicial Council, 
a constitutional body composed of senior judges and chaired by the 
president of the Court of Cassation. The Council regulates judicial 
promotions and transfers. In the last few years, the Government has 
addedlectures on human rights and other social issues to its training 
courses for prosecutors and judges.
    There are three levels of regular criminal courts: Primary courts, 
appeals courts, and the Court of Cassation, which represents the final 
stage of criminal appeal.
    The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic tradition; hence, 
there are no juries. Misdemeanors that are punishable by imprisonment 
are heard at the first level by one judge and at the second level by 
three judges. Felonies that are punishable by imprisonment or execution 
are heard in criminal court by three judges. Appeals of rulings are 
heard by the Court of Cassation.
    A lawyer is appointed at the court's expense if the defendant does 
not have one. The appointment of lawyers is based on a roster chosen by 
the bar association; however, expenses are incurred by the State. Any 
denial of this right is grounds for appeal of the ruling. However, 
detainees in certain high security prisons alleged that they were 
denied access to counsel or that such access was delayed until trial, 
thus denying counsel the time to prepare an adequate defense. A woman's 
testimony is equal to that of a man's in court. There is no legal 
prohibition against a woman serving as a judge, although in practice no 
women serve as judges (see Section 5).
    Defense lawyers generally agree that the regular judiciary respects 
the rights of the accused and exercises its independence. In the past, 
criminal court judges have dismissed cases in which confessions were 
obtained by coercion. However, while the judiciary generally is 
credited with conducting fair trials, under the Emergency Law, cases 
involving terrorism and national security may be tried in military or 
State Security Emergency courts, in which the accused do not receive 
all the constitutional protections of the civilian judicial system.
    In 1992 following a rise in extremist violence, the Government 
began trying cases of persons accused of terrorism and membership in 
terrorist groups before military tribunals. In 1993 the Supreme 
Constitutional Court ruled that the President may invoke the Emergency 
Law to refer any crime to a military court. This use of military and 
State Security Emergency courts under the Emergency Law has deprived 
hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right to be 
tried by a civilian judge.
    The Government defends the use of military courts as necessary in 
terrorism cases, maintaining that trials in the civilian courts are 
protracted and that civilian judges and their families are vulnerable 
to terrorist threats. Some civilian judges have confirmed their fear of 
trying high visibility terrorism cases because of possible reprisal. 
The Government claims that civilian defendants receive fair trials in 
the military courts and enjoy the same rights as defendants in civilian 
courts.
    However, the military courts do not ensure civilian defendants due 
process before an independent tribunal. While military judges are 
lawyers, they are also military officers appointed by the Minister of 
Defense and subject to military discipline. They are not as independent 
or as qualified as civilian judges in applying the civilian Penal Code. 
There is no appellate process for verdicts issued by military courts; 
instead, verdicts are subject to a review by other military judges and 
confirmation by the President, who in practice usually delegates the 
review function to a senior military officer. Defense attorneys have 
complained that they have not been given sufficient time to prepare 
defenses and that judges tend to rush cases involving a large number of 
defendants.
    During the year, the Government referred three groups of civilian 
defendants to the military courts. A military court tried 107 suspected 
members of the Jihad group in Egypt. Of these defendants, known as the 
``Returnees from Albania,'' 60 were tried in absentia. On April 18 the 
court sentenced nine defendants to death; all nine were tried in 
absentia and are believed to reside outside of Egypt. The court also 
sentenced 11 to life imprisonment at hard labor and 67 to prison 
sentences ranging from 1 to 15 years. The court acquitted 20 
defendants. In the second case, a military court tried 21 suspected 
members of the Islamic Group in Egypt. On June 17, the court sentenced 
1 defendant to life imprisonment, and 19 defendants to prison sentences 
ranging from 5 to 25 years. One defendant was acquitted. On October 27, 
the state security prosecutor announced that a third case involving 20 
professional leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood would be referred to a 
military court. The Muslim Brotherhood leaders were arrested on October 
20 and charged with belonging to an illegal group. The first hearing 
was held on December 25 and the next was scheduled for January 12, 
2000. The arrests and trial before the military courts coincided with 
preparations for elections to the boards ofprofessional syndicates and 
to the People's Assembly (see Section 1.d.).
    The State Security Emergency courts share jurisdiction with 
military courts over crimes affecting national security. The President 
appoints judges to these courts from the civilian judiciary upon the 
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and, if he chooses to appoint 
military judges, the Minister of Defense. Sentences are subject to 
confirmation by the President but may not be appealed. The President 
may alter or annul a decision of a State Security Emergency court, 
including a decision to release a defendant.
    On March 8, the State Security Emergency courts issued judgments in 
2 cases involving 26 defendants who were charged with terrorist acts. 
One case involved 24 members of the Islamic Group; the second involved 
2 members of the group known as ``Redeemed from Hell.'' A third trial, 
involving 14 Islamic Group members before a State Security Emergency 
court, began in July, resumed December 17, then was postponed until 
February 2000. According to press reports, in October a State Security 
Emergency court began the trial of four members of a terrorist group 
from the upper (southern) city of Dairout who were accused of murder 
and attempted murder of policemen and Christians in the early 1990's. 
The trial was postponed until December, then again until February 28, 
2000. There was no information available about the identities of the 
defendants and the specific charges against them (see Sections 1.a. and 
5).
    There are no reliable statistics on the numbers of political 
prisoners, but the total may approach 100; observers estimate that the 
number of political detainees may be in the thousands (see Section 
1.d.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity and secrecy 
of homes, correspondence, telephone calls, and other means of 
communication; however, the Government used the Emergency Law to 
infringe on these rights. Police must obtain warrants before 
undertaking searches and wiretaps. Courts have dismissed cases in which 
warrants were issued without sufficient cause. Police officers who 
conduct searches without proper warrants are subject to criminal 
penalties, although penalties seldom are imposed. However, the 
Emergency Law abridges the constitutional provisions regarding the 
right to privacy. The Emergency Law empowers the Government to place 
wiretaps, intercept mail, and search persons or places without 
warrants. Security agencies frequently place political activists, 
suspected subversives, journalists, foreigners, and writers under 
surveillance, screen their correspondence (especially international 
mail), search them and their homes, and confiscate personal property.
    The Ministry of Interior has the authority to stop specific issues 
of foreign-published newspapers from entering the country on the 
grounds of protecting public order; it exercises this authority 
sporadically (also see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government partially 
restricts these rights. Citizens openly speak their views on a wide 
range of political and social issues, including vigorous criticism of 
the Government.
    The Government owns stock in the three largest daily newspapers, 
and the President appoints their editors-in-chief. Although these 
newspapers generally follow the government line, they frequently 
criticize government policies. The Government also enjoys a monopoly on 
the printing and distribution of newspapers, including those of the 
opposition parties. The Government used its monopolistic control of 
newsprint to limit the output of opposition publications. The newspaper 
Al-Dustur, which in 1998 lost its government permission to print, 
ceased to exist.
    Opposition political parties publish their own newspapers but 
receive a subsidy from the Government and, in some cases, subsidies 
from foreign interests as well. Most newspapers are weeklies, with the 
exception of the dailies Al-Wafd, Al-Araby, and Al-Ahrar, and the 
semiweekly of the Islamist-oriented Socialist Labor Party, Al-Shaab. 
All have small circulations. Opposition newspapers frequently publish 
criticism of the Government. They also give greater prominence to human 
rights abuses than the state-run newspapers. All party newspapers are 
required by law to reflect the platform of their party. In September 
the Government rejected a request by the Arab Egypt Socialist 
opposition party to reissue the party newspaper, Misr.The Government 
cited the party's failure to publish the newspaper continuously.
    The Constitution restricts ownership of newspapers to public or 
private legal entities, corporate bodies, and political parties. There 
are numerous restrictions on legal entities that seek to establish 
their own newspapers, including a maximum of 10 percent on individual 
ownership. In January 1998, the People's Assembly approved a law that 
requires newspapers managed by joint stock companies to obtain the 
approval of the Prime Minister prior to publishing. Given government 
restrictions, a joint stock company is the only feasible incorporation 
option for publishers. In February the Government revoked the license 
of the newspaper Sawt Al-Umma, citing the publisher's violations of 
joint stock company regulations. In July a publisher contested before 
an administrative court the Prime Minister's refusal to act on his 
request for approval of a joint stock company formed to publish the 
newspaper Al-Karama. Also in July, a higher court upheld a lower 
court's decision to withdraw a license from the publisher of Al-Siyasa, 
ruling that the publisher is a limited liability company, not a joint 
stock company.
    The Press Law, the Publications Law, and the Penal Code govern 
press issues. The Penal Code stipulate fines or imprisonment for 
criticism of the President, members of the Government, and foreign 
heads of state. The Supreme Constitutional Court agreed in November 
1998 to review the constitutionality of those articles of the Penal 
Code that specify imprisonment as a penalty for journalists convicted 
of libel. The case is pending. In October the Public Prosecutor charged 
editor Mohamed Hassan Al-Banna and journalist Fouad Fawaz of the weekly 
newspaper Al-Khamis with insulting Libya's leader, Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi. 
A court date has not yet been set.
    Because of the difficulties in obtaining a license in Egypt, 
several publishers of newspapers and magazines developed for the 
Egyptian market have obtained a foreign license. Most of these 
publications are printed in the free trade zone. Those newspapers and 
magazines published under a foreign license may be distributed with 
government permission. However, the Department of Censorship in the 
Ministry of Information has the authority to censor or halt 
distribution of publications printed in the free trade zone under a 
foreign license. During the year, the Ministry censored several 
articles of the English-language weekly, the Middle East Times. The 
Government continues to refuse to grant a visa to the weekly's 
publisher, Thomas Cromwell, but cited reasons unrelated to his position 
as a journalist for the action. The Ministry also prohibited 
distribution of one edition of the English-language biweekly, the Cairo 
Times. During the year the Center for Human Rights and Legal Assistance 
organized a legal challenge to the constitutionality of the Information 
Ministry's censorship of these publications. The Supreme Constitutional 
Court has agreed to hear the case, but had not yet set a court date by 
year's end.
    The Press and Publication Laws ostensibly provide protection 
against malicious rumor-mongering and unsubstantiated reporting. 
Financial penalties were increased substantially in 1996 when relevant 
provisions of the Penal Code were revised, but the judicial process 
remains long and costly, creating a bar to realistic legal recourse for 
those wrongly defamed. In recent years, opposition party newspapers 
have, within limits, published articles critical of the President and 
foreign heads of state without being charged or harassed. The 
Government continues to charge journalists with libel.
    In 1996 the People's Assembly approved a revised Press Law 
following criticism of a more restrictive revision that had been 
approved in 1995. The People's Assembly also revised certain articles 
in the Penal Code pertaining to libel and slander. In addition in 1997 
the supreme Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional Article 195 
of the Penal Code under which an editor in chief could have been 
considered criminally responsible for libel contained in any portion of 
the newspaper. The Court ruled that the correct standard of 
responsibility should be ``negligence.'' This lesser standard 
subsequently was applied by the courts.
    In August a criminal court convicted three journalists from the 
opposition daily newspaper Al-Shaab of libeling Youssef Wally, Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture. Editor in chief Magdy 
Hussein, reporter Salah Bedewi, and cartoonist Essam Hanafi were 
sentenced on August 14 to 2 years in prison and each fined $6,000 
(20,000 Egyptian pounds). A fourth Al-Shaab journalist, Adel Hussein, 
was convicted of libel and fined the same amount. On December 5, the 
Court of Cassation ordered a retrial of the case before a different 
circuit of the criminal court. The sentences against all four were 
suspended and, on December 6, the Public Prosecutor ordered the release 
of thethree detained defendants. The date for the new trial was not set 
by year's end.
    The courts acquitted seven journalists in six cases during the 
year. In three cases involving four journalists, the courts fined each 
$3,000 (10,000 Egyptian pounds). In September journalist Ashraf Ayoub 
of the Ahali weekly newspaper was sentenced in absentia for libel to 1 
year's imprisonment. Ayoub's defense is appealing the conviction.
    According to statistics compiled by the EOHR during the year, and 
covering the period from the enactment of the 1996 Press Law through 
July, the Public Prosecutor has referred 117 cases to a court of 
misdemeanors, 55 cases to a criminal court, and 3 cases to a military 
court. Of these, 52 are pending. Of those adjudicated, 4 resulted in 
prison sentences.
    On occasion, based on authority granted to him by law, the Public 
Prosecutor may issue a temporary ban on the publication of news 
pertaining to cases involving national security and order so as to 
protect the confidentiality of the cases. The length of the ban is 
based on the length of time required for the prosecution to prepare its 
case. In May the Public Prosecutor banned publication of news related 
to the case of an employee of the Ministry of Culture accused of 
embezzlement and corruption. The Public Prosecutor also temporarily 
banned news related to an investigation of vice among movie actresses.
    On April 7, the People's Assembly approved several restrictive 
amendments to the Law of Public Mobilization, which was enacted in 
1960. The amendments increase the penalties applicable to individuals 
who disclose information about the State during emergencies, including 
war and natural disasters. The new penalties include fines up to $1,700 
(6,000 Egyptian pounds) and prison sentences up to 3 years. The EOHR 
characterized the change as an additional obstacle to freedom of 
information.
    In 1998 the People's Assembly approved a law that prohibits current 
or former members of the police from publishing work-related 
information without prior permission from the Interior Minister.
    In March Fathy Abu Al-Ezz was detained by state security following 
publication in a company newsletter of an article written by Abu Al-Ezz 
that explained why he would not vote for President Mubarak in the 
presidential referendum held in September. He was released after paying 
bail in the amount of $60 (200 Egyptian pounds).
    In December 1998, a state security prosecutor charged EOHR 
secretary-general Hafez Abu Se'da and EOHR attorney Mustafa Zidane with 
violating Article 102 of the Penal Code, which relates to deliberate 
dissemination of false information or inflammatory propaganda that 
harms public security or public interests. The charges were based on an 
EOHR report that was critical of police conduct during a 1998 murder 
investigation in Sohag. Abu Se'da also was charged with accepting 
foreign funds without government permission. The state security 
prosecutor alleged that the EOHR had accepted $25,000 from the British 
Embassy in Cairo to publish the critical report. In fact, the money was 
provided by the British Embassy on behalf of the Human Rights Committee 
in the British House of Commons to support a women's legal aid project 
begun in 1995. The British Government had been supporting this EOHR 
project since 1996. On December 25 and 26, the state security 
prosecutor questioned EOHR chairman Abdel Aziz Mohamed about the 
organization's use of the British money. The outstanding charges 
against Abu Se'da and Zidane have not been dropped (see Sections 1.d., 
2.c., and 4).
    Various ministries legally are authorized to ban or confiscate 
books and other works of art upon obtaining a court order. The Islamic 
Research Center at Al-Azhar University has legal authority to censor, 
but not to confiscate, all publications dealing with the Koran and 
Islamic scriptural texts. In recent years the Center has passed 
judgment on the suitability of nonreligious books and artistic 
productions. During the year, the Center ruled in favor of distribution 
of the book ``My Father Adam: The Story of the Creation Between Legend 
and Reality,'' written by Abdel Sabour Shahine. However, an Islamist 
lawyer sued the Sheikh of Al-Azhar and several other senior Islamic 
figures in an effort to block publication of the book. The trial was 
set for January 20, 2000.
    The Ministry of Information owns and operates all domestic 
television and radio stations. The Government refuses to license 
private broadcast stations or to privatize the State's broadcast media. 
In addition to public television, the Government also offers several 
pay-for-view television channels. Government control and censorship of 
the broadcast media is significant.
    In 1995 an administrative court ruled that the sole authority to 
prohibit publication or distribution of books and other works of art 
resides with the Ministry of Culture. This decision invalidated a 1994 
advisory opinion by a judiciary council that had expanded Al-Azhar's 
censorship authority to include visual and audio artistic works. The 
same year, President Mubarak stated that the Government would not allow 
confiscation of books from the market without a court order, a position 
supported by the then-Mufti of the Republic, who is now the Grand Imam 
of Al-Azhar.
    There were no court-ordered confiscations during the year. An 
appeal to the Court of Cassation by author Ala'a Hamed is pending. 
Hamed previously was convicted for the alleged pornographic content of 
his book ``The Bed.''
    The Ministry of Interior regularly confiscates leaflets and other 
works by Muslim fundamentalists and other critics of the State. In 
March six members of the Tagammu opposition party were arrested by 
security forces following a meeting in Cairo to discuss opposition to 
draft labor legislation. They were charged with possessing publications 
that disturb public order and security. (They were carrying pamphlets 
criticizing the draft labor law.) Three of the six members were 
released immediately. The other three were questioned and released 
following payment of bail in the amount of $170 (500 Egyptian pounds) 
each (see Sections 1.d. and 6.b.). In October security forces detained 
Fathy Al-Masri for over 15 days for possession of a pamphlet called 
``The Right to Medical Services in a Nonemergency Situation.'' He was 
charged with possessing publications that disturb public order and 
security. Al-Masri was protesting the medical policy of a private 
company. He was released in November (see Sections 1.d. and 6.e.).
    The Ministry of Interior also has the authority, which it exercises 
sporadically, to stop specific issues of foreign-published newspapers 
from entering the country on the grounds of protecting public order 
(also see Section 1.f.). The Ministry of Defense may ban works about 
sensitive security issues. The Council of Ministers may order the 
banning of works that it deems offensive to public morals, detrimental 
to religion, or likely to cause a breach of the peace.
    Plays and films must pass Ministry of Culture censorship tests as 
scripts and as final productions. However, many plays and films that 
are highly critical of the Government and its policies are not 
censored. The Ministry of Culture also censors foreign films that are 
to be shown in theaters, but it is more lenient when the same films are 
released in video cassette format. Government censors ensure that 
foreign films made in Egypt portray the country in a favorable light. 
Censors review scripts before filming, are present during filming, and 
have the right to review the film before it is sent out of the country.
    An appeals court is scheduled to review in February 2000 the case 
against the film ``Birds of Darkness.'' The plaintiffs charge that it 
is insulting to lawyers. Two related cases against the movie were 
dropped in 1997.
    Moderate Muslims and secularist writers still are subject to legal 
action by Islamic extremists. Cairo University professor Nasr Abu Zeid 
and his wife continue to live abroad following the 1996 Court of 
Cassation ruling that affirmed lower-court judgments that Abu Zeid is 
an apostate because of his controversial interpretation of Koranic 
teachings. However, the Supreme Constitutional Court agreed in 1998 to 
review the constitutionality of the 1996 ruling. No court date had been 
set by year's end. The definition of appropriate books for class use, 
library use, or sale in the university bookstore continued to be 
debated at the American University of Cairo.
    The Government does not restrict directly academic freedom at 
universities. However, some university professors claim that the 
Government tightened its control over universities in 1994 by a law 
authorizing university presidents to appoint the deans of the various 
faculties. Under the previous law, faculty deans were elected by their 
peers. The Government has justified the measure as a means to combat 
Islamist influence on campus. The EOHR alleged that security forces 
harass politically affiliated students at the beginning of each 
academic year.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
significantly restricts freedom of assembly. Under a 1923 law, citizens 
must obtain approval from the Ministry of Interior before holding 
public meetings, rallies, and protest marches. The Interior Ministry 
selectively obstructs meetings scheduled to be held on private property 
and university campuses (also see Section 4).
    During the year the Government prohibited the Cairo Institute for 
Human Rights from holding a conference on the subject ofhuman rights in 
the Arab world. The Government also prohibited the Association for the 
Independence of the Judiciary from holding a conference on the subject 
of the future of the judiciary in the Arab world (see Section 4).
    The Government significantly restricts freedom of association. In 
June the Government approved a new law pertaining to the formation, 
function, and funding of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and 
private foundations. On November 28, the Minister of Social Affairs 
issued the executive regulations to the law, and asserted that the 
regulations reflect the Government's commitment to support civil 
society. The regulations, which are to govern implementation of the 
law, specify a wide range of permissible NGO activities, including in 
the area of human rights. They also facilitate registration of NGO's 
and the receipt of financial donations. However, critics charge that 
the law and regulations place unduly burdensome restrictions on NGO's. 
Observers claim that it is too soon to assess the implementation of the 
law and its impact on NGO's.
    Since 1985 the Government has refused to license the Egyptian 
Organization for Human Rights and the Arab Organization for Human 
Rights (AOHR) on grounds that they are political organizations. 
Nevertheless, in general both continue to operate openly (see Section 
4). Following approval of the new NGO law, the Government stated that 
it would award a license to the EOHR. By year's end, the EOHR had not 
applied for status as an NGO under the new law. Under 1993 legislation 
on professional syndicates, an association must elect its governing 
board by at least 50 percent of its general membership. Failing a 
quorum, a second election must be held in which at least 30 percent of 
the membership votes for the board. If such a quorum is impossible, the 
judiciary may appoint a caretaker board until new elections can be set. 
The law was adopted to prevent well-organized minorities, specifically 
Islamists, from capturing or retaining the leadership of professional 
syndicates. Members of these syndicates have reported that Islamists 
have used irregular electoral techniques such as physically blocking 
polling places and limiting or changing the location of polling sites. 
In October the Court of Cassation upheld an earlier court decision to 
lift the government sequestration of the bar syndicate.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
belief and the practice of religious rites; however, the Government 
places clear restrictions on this right. Most Egyptians are Sunni 
Muslims. Approximately 10 percent of the population, numbering more 
than 6 million persons, belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church. There are 
other small Christian denominations, as well as a Jewish community that 
numbers approximately 200 persons. For the most part, members of the 
non-Muslim minority worship without harassment and maintain links with 
coreligionists abroad.
    Under the Constitution, Islam is the official state religion and 
primary source of legislation. Accordingly, religious practices that 
conflict with Islamic law are prohibited. In most matters of family 
law, including marriage, divorce, alimony, and child custody, 
Christians are subject to canon law. In cases of family law disputes 
involving a marriage between a Christian woman and a Muslim man, 
Islamic law applies. The children of such marriages must be raised as 
Muslims. Muslim women are prohibited from marrying Christian men.
    While neither the Constitution nor the Civil and Penal Codes 
prohibit proselytizing, Christians who proselytize have been arrested 
on charges of violating Article 98f of the Penal Code, which prohibits 
citizens from ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or inciting 
sectarian strife. There were no such reports during the year; however, 
one Christian who was engaged in proselytizing activities was detained 
briefly by state security forces. Some Christians complained that the 
Government is lax in protecting Christian lives and property (see 
Section 5).
    There are no legal restrictions on the conversion of non-Muslims to 
Islam. However, Muslims may face legal problems if they convert to 
another faith. In the past, authorities have charged a few Muslim 
converts to Christianity under article 98f of the Penal Code. There 
were no reports of such arrests during the year; however, there were a 
few unconfirmed reports that several converts to Christianity were 
subjected to harassment by the security services, including temporary 
detention.
    In other cases involving conversion from Islam to Christianity, 
authorities have charged converts with violating laws prohibiting the 
falsification of documents. In such instances, converts, who fear 
government harassment if they officially register the change from Islam 
to Christianity, have altered their identification cards and other 
official documentsthemselves to reflect their new religious 
affiliation. There were no confirmed reports of individuals detained or 
charged under these laws during the year. In 1997 human rights activist 
Mamdouh Naklah filed suit seeking removal of the religious affiliation 
category from identification cards. The court referred the case to the 
state commissioner's office, which has not yet issued an opinion.
    An 1856 Ottoman decree still in force requires non-Muslims to 
obtain what is now a presidential decree to build a place of worship. 
In addition, Interior Ministry regulations issued in 1934 specify a set 
of 10 conditions that the Government must consider prior to issuance of 
a presidential decree permitting construction of a church. These 
conditions include the location of the proposed site, the religious 
composition of the surrounding community, and the proximity of other 
churches. The Ottoman decree also requires the President to approve 
permits for the repair of church facilities. In response to strong 
criticism of the decree, President Mubarak in 1998 delegated to 
governors the authority to approve permits for the repair of church 
facilities. In December the President acted again and issued a new 
decree that made the repair of all places of worship subject to a 1976 
civil construction code. This decree, which superseded the decree 
issued in 1998, is significant because it places churches and mosques 
on equal footing before the law, and in intended to facilitate church 
repairs. However, notwithstanding these initiatives, the approval 
process for church construction and repair remains time-consuming and 
insufficiently responsive to the wishes of the Christian community. 
Although President Mubarak has approved all requests for permits that 
have been presented to him (reportedly a total of more than 250 during 
his 18-year tenure), Christians maintain that the Interior Ministry 
delays--in some instances indefinitely--submission to the President of 
their requests. They also maintain that security forces have blocked 
them from utilizing permits that have been issued.
    During the 1990's, the Government increased the number of building 
permits issued to Christian communities to an average of more than 20 
per year, compared with an average of 5 permits issued annually in the 
1980's. During the year, the Government approved 39 permits for church-
related construction, including 2 permits for the construction of a new 
church, 34 permits for churches previously constructed without 
authorization, and 3 permits for the construction of additional church 
facilities. The Government reported that governors issued more than 200 
permits for church-related repair during the year. However, the 
Government was unable to provide a breakdown by governorate; unofficial 
reports from the governorates vary. In January 1996, human rights 
activist Mamdouh Naklah filed suit challenging the constitutionality of 
the Ottoman decree. In 1998 an administrative court referred Naklah's 
case to a state body of legal experts. This decision was considered a 
setback, as the body is not required to issue an opinion expeditiously 
and its opinions are not binding. The body had not issued an opinion in 
the case by year's end. As a result of these restrictions, some 
communities use private buildings and apartments for religious 
services.
    In 1952 the Government seized approximately 1,500 acres of land 
from the Coptic Orthodox Church and transferred title to the Ministry 
of Awqaf, which is responsible for administering religious trusts. In 
1996 Awqaf Minister Hamdy Zaqzouq established a committee to address 
the issue. Based on the committee's recommendations, more than 800 
acres have been returned to the Church since 1996. The committee 
continues to study the return of the remaining disputed property.
    The Government continued its efforts to extend legal controls to 
all mosques, which by law must be licensed. The Government appoints and 
pays the salaries of the imams who officiate in mosques, and proposes 
themes for and monitors sermons. In September the Awqaf minister 
announced that the Government now controls 46,000 mosques and 12,000 
zawaya (``corner'' mosques, or mosques located within a multipurpose 
building). In an effort to combat Islamic extremists, the Government 
has announced its intention to bring all unauthorized mosques under its 
control by 2000. There are an estimated 70,000 mosques.
    In July a state security court in Alexandria convicted 14 persons 
of heresy against Islam. The lead defendant, Mohamed Ibrahim Mahfouz, 
was sentenced to 5 years in prison for claiming that he speaks directly 
to God and is at times transformed into God or the Prophet Mohamed. 
Seven of his followers were sentenced to 3 years in prison. Six of his 
followers were sentenced to 1 year in prison. Five other defendants 
were acquitted.
    On November 11, the state security prosecutor arrested 50 persons 
in Cairo suspected of heresy against Islam. On November 15, the state 
security prosecutor released 30 of the detainees and is investigating 
charges of heresy against Islam andinsulting Islam against the 
remaining 20. The lead defendant, a woman named Manal Wahid Mana'a, is 
accused of attempting to establish a new Islamic sect. She claims that 
the Prophet Mohamed speaks to her.
    In August the Public Prosecutor reopened and expanded an 
investigation into police torture of mostly Christian detainees that 
took place during a 1998 police investigation of a double murder in the 
largely Coptic village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate. The trial of 
Shayboub William Arsal, the man accused of murdering two Al-Kush 
residents in August 1998, began during the year. A court conducted 
hearings on the case on December 4 and 6. The next hearing was 
scheduled for January 2000. Related charges of witness tampering raised 
by the public prosecution in 1998 against Bishop Wisa and Arch-Priest 
Antonius have not been dropped.
    In 1960 Baha'i institutions and community activities were banned by 
presidential decree and all community properties, including Baha'i 
centers, libraries, and cemeteries, were confiscated. The ban on Baha'i 
institutions has never been rescinded.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens and foreigners are free to 
travel within Egypt except in certain military areas. Males who have 
not completed compulsory military service may not travel abroad or 
emigrate, although this restriction may be deferred or bypassed. 
Unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their 
fathers to obtain passports and travel; married women require the same 
permission from their husbands. Citizens who leave the country have the 
right to return.
    The Constitution provides for the grant of political asylum and 
prohibits the extradition of political refugees. There were no reports 
of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared 
persecution. Egypt grants first asylum for humanitarian reasons or in 
the event of internal turmoil in neighboring countries. The Government 
cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR). Asylum seekers generally are screened by UNHCR 
representatives, whose recommendations regarding settlement are 
forwarded to the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs for final 
determination. The Government permits accepted refugees to live and 
work in Egypt, but not to acquire citizenship, except in rare cases. 
During the year, the Government accepted approximately 6,400 persons, 
including more than 2,500 Somalis and 2,400 Sudanese. Although there is 
no pattern of abuse of refugees, the Government temporarily detained 
during random security sweeps some refugees who earlier had been 
accorded protection status. Following intervention by the UNHCR, the 
refugees were released.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The ruling National Democratic Party dominates the 454-seat 
People's Assembly, the Shura Council, local governments, the mass 
media, labor, the large public sector, and controls the licensing of 
new political parties, newspapers, and private organizations to such an 
extent that, as a practical matter, citizens do not have a meaningful 
ability to change their government.
    In September President Hosni Mubarak was elected unopposed to a 
fourth 6-year term in a national referendum. According to official 
results he received 94 percent of the vote. The referendum followed the 
constitutionally-mandated nomination by the People's Assembly. Under 
the Constitution, the electorate is not presented with a choice among 
competing presidential candidates.
    More than 100 losing candidates in the fall 1995 legislative 
elections filed complaints in the administrative courts, alleging 
ballot-rigging and other irregularities. The courts agreed with most of 
these claims. Although the judiciary has the authority to determine 
whether or not irregularities took place, it does not have the 
authority to remove an elected member of the People's Assembly, a right 
that the Assembly claims solely for itself, citing the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty. The Assembly did not call for any new by-
elections in response to the courts' judgments.
    The People's Assembly debates government proposals, and members 
exercise their authority to call cabinet ministers to explain policy. 
The executive initiates almost all legislation. Nevertheless, the 
Assembly maintains the authority to challenge or restrain the executive 
in the areas of economic and social policy, but it may not modify the 
budget except with the Government's approval. The Assembly exercises 
limited influence in the areas of security and foreign policy, and 
retains littleoversight of the Interior Ministry's use of Emergency Law 
powers. Many executive branch initiatives and policies are carried out 
by regulation through ministerial decree without legislative oversight. 
The military budget is prepared by the executive and not debated 
publicly. Roll-call votes in the Assembly are rare. Votes generally are 
reported in aggregate terms of yeas and nays, and thus constituents 
have no independent method of checking a member's voting record.
    The Shura Council, the upper chamber of Parliament, has 264 
members. Two-thirds of the members are elected popularly and one-third 
are appointed by the President. One half of the Shura seats are up for 
reelection or reappointment every 3 years. In 1998 the NDP won all 88 
seats up for election. One Coptic Christian, from Alexandria, won a 
seat. The President made 47 appointments (including an additional 3 
over the 44 open seats to replace deceased members). Those appointed 
included nine women, eight Coptic Christians, and two members of 
opposition parties.
    There are 13 recognized opposition parties. The law empowers the 
Government to bring felony charges against those who form a party 
without a license. New parties must be approved by the Parties 
Committee, a semiofficial body that includes a substantial majority of 
members from the ruling NDP and some members from among the independent 
and opposition parties. Decisions of the Parties Committee may be 
appealed to the civil courts. During the year the Committee refused the 
applications of three parties. These rejected parties filed an appeal 
of the Committee's decision. Three other applications are pending 
before the committee. During the year, a court rejected six of eight 
pending appeals by parties whose applications previously were denied, 
including the appeal of the Egyptian Wasat party. Two appeals still are 
pending.
    According to the law, which prohibits political parties based on 
religion, the Muslim Brotherhood is an illegal political organization. 
Muslim Brothers are known publicly and openly speak their views, 
although they do not explicitly identify themselves as members of the 
organization. They remain subject to government pressure (see Section 
1.d.). Some have served in the Assembly as independents or as members 
of other recognized parties.
    Women and minorities are underrepresented in government and 
politics. The Constitution reserves 10 Assembly seats for presidential 
appointees, which the President traditionally has used to assure 
representation for women and Coptic Christians. Five women but no Copts 
were elected in 1995; of the 10 presidential appointments, 6 were Copts 
and 4 were women. The ruling NDP nominated no Coptic candidates in the 
1995 parliamentary elections. Two women and 2 Copts serve among the 32 
ministers in the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government has refused to license local human rights groups as 
private entities under Law 32 of 1964 (see Section 2.b.). Since the 
EOHR's establishment in 1986, the Government has refused to license the 
organization on the grounds that it is a political organization and 
duplicates the activities of an existing, although moribund, human 
rights group. However, in June the Government approved a controversial 
new law pertaining to the formation, functioning, and funding of 
nongovernmental organizations and private foundations (see Section 
2.b.). In November the Minister of Social Affairs issued executive 
regulations to the new law. These regulations, which are to guide 
implementation of the new law, explicitly cite human rights as a 
permissible NGO activity. However, critics charge that the law and 
regulations place unduly burdensome restrictions on NGO's. The 
Government also announced its intention to license the EOHR; however, 
the EOHR did not apply for status as an NGO under the new law by year's 
end.
    On December 25 and 26, the state security prosecutor questioned 
EOHR chairman Abdel Aziz Mohamed about charges brought by the state 
security prosecutor in 1998, following the EOHR's publication of a 
report critical of police conduct in the village of Al-Kush in Sohag 
governorate (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 2.b.). The charges included 
allegations that Abu Se'da accepted foreign funds without government 
permission. The state security prosecutor alleged that the EOHR had 
accepted $25,000 from the British Embassy in Cairo to publish the 
critical report. In fact, the money was provided by the British Embassy 
on behalf of the Human Rights Committee in the British House of Commons 
to support a women's legal aid project begun in 1995. The British 
Government had been supporting this EOHR project since 1996. The state 
security prosecutor has not dropped the outstanding charges against Abu 
Se'da and EOHR attorney Mustafa Zidane.
    The AOHR, the EOHR's parent organization, has a longstanding 
request for registration as a foreign organization with the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The Ministry has not approved the request thus far, 
stating that the issue is dependent on the outcome of efforts within 
the league of Arab states to establish a human rights body.
    Despite years of nonrecognition, the EOHR and other groups 
sometimes obtain the cooperation of government officials. The 
Government allows EOHR field workers to visit prisons in their capacity 
as legal counsel, to call on some government officials, and to receive 
funding from foreign human rights organizations. However, many local 
and international human rights activists have concluded that government 
restrictions on NGO activities have inhibited significantly reporting 
on human rights abuses.
    During the year the Government prohibited the Cairo Institute for 
Human Rights from holding a conference on the subject of human rights 
in the Arab world. The Government also prohibited the Association for 
the Independence of the Judiciary from holding a conference on the 
subject of the future of the judiciary in the Arab world. On occasion, 
human rights organizations have found requests for conference space 
turned down for ``security reasons'' or reservations later canceled for 
``maintenance reasons.'' Other human rights organizations registered as 
corporations to avoid the obstacles posed by Law 32 (see Section 2.b.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality of the sexes and equal 
treatment of non-Muslims; however, aspects of the law and many 
traditional practices discriminate against women and Christians.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women is a significant problem 
and is reflected in press accounts of specific incidents. According to 
a national study conducted in 1995 as part of a comprehensive 
demographic and health survey, one of every three women who have ever 
been married has been beaten at least once during marriage. Among those 
who have been beaten, less than half have ever sought help. Smaller, 
independent studies confirm that wife-beating is common. In general, 
neighbors and extended family members intervene to limit incidents of 
domestic violence. Due to the value attached to privacy in the 
country's traditional society, abuse within the family rarely is 
discussed publicly. Spousal abuse is grounds for a divorce, but the law 
requires the plaintiff to produce eyewitnesses, a difficult condition 
to meet. Several NGO's offer counseling, legal aid, and other services 
to women who are victims of domestic violence. These activists believe 
that in general the police and the judiciary consider the ``integrity 
of the family'' more important than the well-being of the woman. The 
Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs runs more than 150 family 
counseling bureaus nationwide, which provide legal and medical 
services.
    The punishment for rape ranges from 3 years in prison to life 
imprisonment at hard labor, and the Government prosecutes rapists. If a 
rapist is convicted of abducting his victim, he is subject to 
execution; however, there were no reports of the execution of rapists. 
During the year, the Government abolished an article of the Penal Code 
that permitted a rapist to be absolved of criminal charges if he 
married his victim. However, marital rape is not illegal. Although 
reliable statistics regarding rape are not available, activists believe 
that it is not uncommon, despite strong social disapproval. When 
``honor killings'' (a man murdering a female relative for her perceived 
lack of chastity) occur, perpetrators generally receive lighter 
punishments than those convicted in other cases of murder.
    Prostitution and sex tourism are illegal, but known to occur.
    The law provides for equality of the sexes; however, aspects of the 
law and many traditional practices discriminate against women. By law, 
unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their 
fathers to obtain passports and to travel; married women of any age 
require the same permission from their husbands (see Section 2.d.). 
Only males may confer citizenship. In rare cases, this means that 
children who are born to Egyptian mothers and stateless fathers are 
themselves stateless. A woman's testimony is equal to that of a man's 
in the courts. There is no legal prohibition against a woman serving as 
a judge, although in practice no women serve as judges. The Court of 
Cassation agreed to hear in January 2000 the case of attorney Fatma 
Lashin, who is challenging the Government's refusal to appoint her as a 
public prosecutor. (To become a judge, one must first serve as a public 
prosecutor.)
    Laws affecting marriage and personal status generally correspond to 
an individual's religion. A 1979 liberalization of the Family Status 
Law, which strengthened a Muslim woman's rights to divorce and child 
custody, was repealed in 1985 after the Supreme Constitutional Court 
ruled that the use of a presidential decree to implement the law was 
unjustified.
    Under Islamic law, non-Muslim males must convert to Islam to marry 
Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to marry Muslim 
men. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's 
inheritance, while Christian widows of Muslims have no inheritance 
rights. A sole female heir receives half her parents' estate; the 
balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir inherits 
all his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs face strong social 
pressure to provide for all family members who require assistance; 
however, this assistance is not always provided.
    Women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law, 
academia, the arts, and, to a lesser degree, business. Labor laws 
provide for equal rates of pay for equal work for men and women in the 
public sector. According to government figures, women constitute 17 
percent of private business owners and occupy 25 percent of the 
managerial positions in the four major national banks. Social pressure 
against women pursuing a career is strong, and some women's rights 
advocates say that a resurgent Islamic fundamentalist trend limits 
further gains. Women's rights advocates also point to other 
discriminatory traditional or cultural attitudes and practices such as 
female genital mutilation and the traditional male relative's role in 
enforcing chastity and chaste sexual conduct.
    A number of active women's rights groups work in diverse areas, 
including reforming family law, educating women on their legal rights, 
promoting literacy, and combating FGM.
    Children.--The Government remains committed to the protection of 
children's welfare within the limits of its budgetary resources. Many 
of the resources for children's welfare are provided by international 
donors, especially in the field of child immunization. Child labor is 
widespread, despite the Government's commitment to eradicate it (see 
Section 6.d.).
    The Government provides public education, which is compulsory for 
the first 8 academic years (typically until the age of 15). The 
Government treats boys and girls equally at all levels of education.
    The Government enacted a Child Law in 1996. The law provides for 
privileges, protection, and care for children in general. Six of the 
law's 144 articles set advantageous rules for working children (see 
Section 6.d.). Other provisions include: A requirement for employers to 
set up or contract with a child care center if they employ more than 
100 women; the right of rehabilitation for disabled children; a 
prohibition on sentencing defendants between the ages of 16 and 18 to 
capital punishment, hard labor for life, or temporary hard labor; and a 
prohibition on placing defendants under the age of 15 in preventive 
custody, although the prosecution may order that they be lodged in an 
``observation house'' and be summoned upon request.
    The Government remains committed to eradicating the practice of 
female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by international 
health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health. 
Despite strong government and community efforts to eradicate FGM, 
government and private sources agree that it is common. Traditional and 
family pressures remain strong; a study conducted in 1995 places the 
percentage of women who have ever been married who have undergone FGM 
at 97 percent. In February the Population Council released the results 
of a 1997 survey of Egyptian adolescents, which found that 86 percent 
of girls between the ages of 13 and 19 had undergone FGM. FGM generally 
is performed on girls between the ages of 7 and 10, with equal 
prevalence among Muslims and Christians.
    The Court of Cassation issued a decision in 1997 that upheld the 
legality of the decree banning FGM issued in 1996 by the Minister of 
Health and Population Planning. In addition to enforcing the decree, 
the Government supports a range of efforts to educate the public. A 
discussion of FGM and its dangers has been added to the curriculum of 
the school system. The Government broadcasts television programs 
criticizing the practice. Government ministers are outspoken in 
advising citizens to cease the practice, and senior religious leaders 
also support efforts to stop it. The Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the most 
senior Islamic figure in the country, and the leader of the Coptic 
Christian community, Pope Shenouda, have stated repeatedly that FGM is 
not required by religious doctrine.However, illiteracy impedes some 
women from distinguishing between the deep-rooted tradition of FGM and 
religious practices. A number of NGO's also work actively to educate 
the public about the health hazards of the practice.
    People With Disabilities.--There are approximately 5.7 million 
disabled persons, of whom 1.5 million are disabled severely. The 
Government makes serious efforts to address their rights. It works 
closely with U.N. agencies and other international aid donors to design 
job-training programs for the disabled. The Government also seeks to 
increase the public's awareness of the capabilities of the disabled in 
television programming, the print media, and in educational material in 
public schools.
    By law, all businesses must designate 5 percent of their jobs for 
the disabled, who are exempt from normal literacy requirements. 
Although there is no legislation mandating access to public 
accommodations and transportation, the disabled may ride government-
owned mass transit buses without charge, are given priority in 
obtaining telephones, and receive reductions on customs duties for 
private vehicles.
    Religious Minorities.--The Constitution provides for equal public 
rights and duties without discrimination due to religion or creed. For 
the most part, these constitutional protections are upheld by the 
Government. However, discrimination against Christians exists. There 
are no Christians serving as governors, university presidents, and 
deans. There are few Christians in the upper ranks of the security 
services and armed forces. Although there was improvement in a few 
areas, government discriminatory practices include: Suspected 
statistical underrepresentation of the size of the Christian 
population; bias against Christianity and Coptic history in the 
educational curricula; limited or biased coverage of Christian subjects 
in the media; failure to admit Christians into public university 
training programs for Arabic language teachers (because the curriculum 
involves study of the Koran); discrimination against Christians in the 
public sector; and discrimination against Christians in staff 
appointments to public universities.
    The approximately 6 million Coptic Christians have been the objects 
of occasional violent assaults by the Islamic Group and other 
terrorists. However, there were no reports of terrorist attacks against 
Christians during the year. In incidents unrelated to terrorism, a 
Christian priest in Mahalla and a Christian priest in Dairout were 
attacked by individual extremists in August and September, 
respectively. The assailant in the first incident was charged with 
attempted murder and the case was referred to a criminal court. No 
trial date was set by year's end. The assailant in the Dairout case was 
determined to be mentally unstable and remains in custody. The 
Government provided the priests with medical care. The Public 
Prosecutor charged Ahmad Fergally Ahmad Nasir and Ibrhaim Fergally 
Ahmad Nasir with premeditated murder after the Nasir brothers shot and 
killed a monk on September 2 in Assiyut governorate following a land 
dispute. The monk was affiliated with a monastery that rents thousands 
of acres of agricultural land to local tenants; the Nasir brothers were 
tenants on the land. The Public Prosecutor appealed the September 21 
verdict of a criminal court that ruled that the Nasir brothers were 
guilty of an ``attack leading to death'' and sentenced them to 7 years 
in prison. The Public Prosecutor is seeking a conviction for 
premeditated murder. The case is pending before an appeals court. A 
December 31 dispute between a Christian shop owner and a Muslim 
customer in the village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate escalated into 
violent exchanges between Christians and Muslims (see Section 1.c.).
    According to press reports, in October a State Security Emergency 
court began the trial of four members of a terrorist group from the 
upper (southern) city of Dairout accused of murder and attempted murder 
of policemen and Christians in the early 1990's. The trial was 
postponed until December, then later postponed again until February 
2000. There was no information available about the identities of the 
defendants and the specific charges against them by year's end (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.e.).
    Some Christians have alleged that the Government is lax in 
protecting Christian lives and property. Security forces arrest 
extremists who perpetrate violence against Christians, but some members 
of the Christian community do not believe that the Government is 
sufficiently vigorous in its efforts to prevent attacks. They also 
maintain that the Government does little to correct nonviolent forms of 
discrimination, including its own.
    There were reports of forced conversions of Coptic girls to Islam. 
Reports of such cases are disputed and often includeinflammatory 
allegations and categorical denials of kidnaping and rape. Observers, 
including human rights groups, find it extremely difficult to determine 
whether compulsion was used, as most cases involve a Coptic girl who 
converts to Islam when she marries a Muslim boy. According to the 
Government, in such cases the girl must meet with her family, with her 
priest, and with the head of her church before she is allowed to 
convert. However, there are credible reports of government harassment 
of Christian families that attempt to regain custody of their 
daughters, and of the failure of the authorities to uphold the law 
(which states that a marriage of a girl under the age of 16 is 
prohibited, and between the ages of 16 and 21 is illegal, without the 
approval and presence of her guardian) in cases of marriage between an 
underage Christian girl and a Muslim boy.
    There is no legal requirement for a Christian girl or woman to 
convert to Islam in order to marry a Muslim. If a Christian woman 
marries a Muslim man, she is excommunicated by the Coptic Church. 
Ignorance of the law and social pressure, including the centrality of 
marriage to a woman's identity, often affect her decision. Family 
conflict and financial pressure also are cited as factors. In addition 
conversion is a means of circumventing the legal prohibition on 
marriage between the ages of 16 and 21 without the approval and 
presence of the girl's guardian. Most Christian families would object 
to a daughter's wish to marry a Muslim. If a Christian girl converts to 
Islam, her family loses guardianship, which transfers to a Muslim 
custodian, who is likely to grant approval. The law is silent on the 
matter of the acceptable age of conversion.
    Anti-Semitism in the Egyptian press is found in both the government 
press and in the press of the opposition parties. The Government has 
criticized anti-Semitism and advised journalists and cartoonists to 
avoid anti-Semitism. There have been no violent anti-Semitic incidents 
in recent years directed at the tiny Jewish community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers may join trade unions but are 
not required to do so. A union local, or workers' committee, may be 
formed if 50 employees express a desire to organize. Most union 
members, about 27 per cent of the labor force, are employed by state-
owned enterprises. The law stipulates that ``high administrative'' 
officials in government and the public sector may not join unions.
    There are 23 trade unions, all required to belong to the Egyptian 
Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the sole legally recognized labor 
federation. The International Labor Organization's Committee of Experts 
repeatedly has emphasized that a law that requires all trade unions to 
belong to a single federation infringes on freedom of association. The 
Government has shown no sign that it intends to accept the 
establishment of more than one federation. The ETUF leadership asserts 
that it actively promotes worker interests and that there is no need 
for another federation. ETUF officials have close relations with the 
NDP, and some are members of the People's Assembly or the Shura 
Council. They speak vigorously on behalf of worker concerns, but public 
confrontations between the ETUF and the Government are rare. Disputes 
more often are resolved by consensus behind closed doors.
    The labor laws do not provide adequately for the rights to strike 
and to engage in collective bargaining. Even though the right to strike 
is not provided, strikes occur. The Government considers strikes a form 
of public disturbance and therefore illegal.
    In March six members of the Tagammu opposition party were arrested 
by state security forces following a meeting in Cairo to discuss 
opposition to draft labor legislation. They were charged with 
``possessing publications that disturb public order and security'' for 
carrying pamphlets that criticized the draft labor law. Three of the 
six were released immediately. The other three were questioned and 
released following payment of bail in the amount of $170 (500 Egyptian 
pounds) each (see Section 1.d. and 2.a.)
    An increasing number of strikes took place in the public sector and 
at privatized companies during the year, mainly over issues of wage 
cuts and dismissals. From the period January to October, 28 strikes 
occurred. Most of the strikes took place in Alexandria, Cairo, and the 
delta (northern Egypt), the country's industrial centers. Most of the 
strikes occurred in public-sector companies and lasted for 1 day. Each 
strike involved hundreds of workers, and in several instances more than 
a thousand workers were involved. Ten strikes occurred in January 
alone. Bonuses and incentives tied to the previous year's production 
typically are disbursed in January, and failure todisburse the bonuses 
often leads to a strike. ETUF or government officials successfully 
mediated most of the strikes.
    Some unions within the ETUF are affiliated with international trade 
union organizations. Others are in the process of becoming affiliated.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Under the law, 
unions may negotiate work contracts with public sector enterprises if 
the latter agree to such negotiations, but unions otherwise lack 
collective bargaining power in the state sector. Under current 
circumstances, collective bargaining does not exist in any meaningful 
sense because the Government sets wages, benefits, and job 
classifications by law.
    Firms in the private sector generally do not adhere to such 
government-mandated standards. Although they are required to observe 
some government practices, such as the minimum wage, social security 
insurance, and official holidays, they often do not adhere to 
government practice in non-binding matters, including award of the 
annual Labor Day bonus.
    Labor law and practice are the same in Egypt's six export 
processing zones (EPZ's) as in the rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor; however, the Criminal Code authorizes sentences 
of hard labor for some crimes. Although the law does not prohibit 
specifically forced and bonded labor by children, such practices are 
not known to occur (see Section 6.d.). Domestic and foreign workers 
generally are not subject to coerced or bonded labor. During the year 
the Government successfully resolved one sensationalized incident of 
forced domestic labor involving a foreign resident employer.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Under the 1996 Child Law (see Section 5), the minimum age 
for employment is 14 in nonagricultural work. Provincial governors, 
with the approval of the Minister of Education, may authorize seasonal 
work for children between the ages of 12 and 14, provided that duties 
are not hazardous and do not interfere with schooling. Preemployment 
training for children under the age of 12 is prohibited. It is 
prohibited for children to work for more than 6 hours a day. One or 
more breaks totaling at least 1 hour must be included. Children are not 
to work overtime, during their weekly day off, between 8 p.m. and 7 
a.m., or for more than 4 hours continuously. Education is compulsory, 
free, and universal for the first 8 academic years (typically until the 
age of 15).
    In general the Government does not devote adequate resources and 
oversight to child labor policies. Statistical information on the 
number of working children is difficult to obtain and often out of 
date. A comprehensive study prepared by the Government's statistical 
agency in 1988 indicated that 1.309 million children between the ages 
of 6 and 14 are employed. In November the Minister of Social Affairs 
reportedly stated that 1 million children participate in agricultural 
labor. Government studies also indicate that the concentration of 
working children is higher in rural than urban areas. Nearly 78 percent 
of working children are in the agricultural sector. However, children 
also work as domestics, as apprentices in auto repair and craft shops, 
in heavier industries such as construction, in brick-making and 
textiles, and as workers in tanneries and carpet-making factories. 
While local trade unions report that the Ministry of Labor adequately 
enforces the labor laws in state-owned enterprises, enforcement in the 
private sector, especially in family-owned enterprises, is lax. Many of 
these children are abused and overworked by their employers, and the 
restrictions in the Child Law have not improved conditions due to lax 
enforcement on the part of the Government. There are no records of 
cases in which an employer was fined or imprisoned.
    Although the law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded 
labor by children, such practices are not known to occur (see Section 
6.c.).
    e. Acceptable conditions of work.--For Government and public sector 
employees, the minimum wage is approximately $34 (about 116 Egyptian 
pounds) a month for a 6-day, 42-hour workweek. The minimum wage, which 
is set by the Government and applied nationwide, is enforced 
effectively by the Ministry of Administrative Development. The minimum 
wage does not provide for a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family; however, base pay commonly is supplemented by a complex system 
of fringe benefits and bonuses that may double or triple a worker's 
take-home pay. The minimum wage also isbinding legally on the private 
sector, and larger private companies generally observe the requirement 
and pay bonuses as well. Smaller firms do not always pay the minimum 
wage or bonuses.
    The Ministry of Labor sets worker health and safety standards, 
which also apply in the export processing zones; however, enforcement 
and inspections are uneven. In October state security forces arrested 
Fathy Al-Masri and detained him for 15 days for possessing a pamphlet 
entitled ``The Right to Medical Services.'' The pamphlet was prepared 
in response to an administrative bulletin announcing a prohibition on 
nonmedical emergency services issued by the General Director for 
Medical Services for the Al-Nasr hide tanning company (see Sections 
1.d. and 2.a.).
    The law prohibits employers from maintaining hazardous working 
conditions, and workers have the right to remove themselves from 
hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits prostitution and sex 
tourism.
    There were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from 
the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 IRAN *

    The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a 
populist revolution toppled the Pahlavi monarchy. The Constitution 
ratified after the revolution by popular referendum established a 
theocratic republic and declared as its purpose the establishment of 
institutions and a society based on Islamic principles and norms. The 
Government is dominated by Shi'a Muslim clergy. The Head of State, 
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution 
and has direct control of the armed forces, internal security forces, 
and the judiciary. Mohammad Khatami was elected to a 4-year term as 
President in a popular vote in February 1997. A popularly elected 270-
seat (to be increased by 20 seats in 2000) unicameral Islamic 
Consultative Assembly, or Majles, develops and passes legislation. All 
legislation passed by the Majles is reviewed for adherence to Islamic 
and constitutional principles by a Council of Guardians, which consists 
of six clerical members, who are appointed by the Supreme Leader, and 
six lay jurists, who are appointed by the head of the judiciary and 
approved by the Majles. The Constitution provides the Council of 
Guardians with the power to screen and disqualify candidates for 
elective offices based on an ill-defined set of requirements, including 
the candidates' ideological beliefs. The judiciary is subject to 
government and religious influence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * The United States does not have an embassy in Iran. This report 
draws heavily on non-U.S. Government sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Several agencies share responsibility for internal security, 
including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of 
Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force that was 
established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known 
as Basijis, and gangs of thugs, known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers 
of the Party of God), who often are aligned with specific members of 
the leadership, act as vigilantes, and are released into the streets to 
intimidate and threaten physically demonstrators, journalists, and 
individuals suspected of counter-revolutionary activities. Both regular 
and paramilitary security forces committed numerous, serious human 
rights abuses.
    Iran has a mixed economy that is heavily dependent on export 
earnings from the country's extensive petroleum reserves. The 
Constitution mandates that all large-scale industry, including 
petroleum, minerals, banking, foreign exchange, insurance, power 
generation, communications, aviation, and road and rail transport, are 
to be owned publicly and administered by thestate. Large charitable 
foundations called bonyads, most with strong connections to the 
Government, control the extensive properties and businesses 
expropriated from the former Shah and figures associated with his 
regime. The bonyads exercise considerable influence in the economy, but 
do not account publicly for revenue and pay no taxes. Basic foodstuffs 
and energy costs are subsidized heavily by the Government. Oil exports 
account for nearly 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings. Private 
property is respected; however, economic performance is affected 
adversely by government mismanagement and corruption, although 
performance improved somewhat during the year due to the worldwide 
increase in oil prices. Unemployment was estimated to be at least 25 
percent, and inflation was an estimated 25 percent.
    The Government's human rights record remained poor; although 
efforts within society to make the Government accountable for its human 
rights policies intensified, serious problems remain. The Government 
restricts citizens' right to change their government. Systematic abuses 
include extrajudicial killings and summary executions; disappearances; 
widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment, reportedly 
including rape; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and 
detention, and prolonged and incommunicado detention. Perpetrators 
often committed such abuses with impunity. The Government in May 
prosecuted a senior police official for torture, reportedly for the 
first time since the revolution; however, he was cleared of most 
charges and resumed his duties. The judiciary suffers from government 
and religious influence, and does not ensure that citizens receive due 
process or fair trials. The Government uses the judiciary to stifle 
dissent and obstruct progress on human rights. The Government infringes 
on citizens' privacy rights, and restricts freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and association. The Government closed numerous reform-
oriented publications during the year and brought charges against 
prominent political figures and members of the clergy for expressing 
ideas viewed as contrary to the ruling orthodoxy. However, the Ministry 
of Culture and Islamic Guidance blunted these efforts by continuing to 
issue licenses for the establishment of newspapers and magazines, many 
of which challenged openly government policies and individual members 
of the leadership. The Government restricts freedom of religion. 
Religious minorities, particularly Baha'is, continued to suffer 
repression by conservative elements of the judiciary and security 
establishment. Thirteen Jews in the cities of Shiraz and Isfahan were 
arrested in February and March on suspicion of espionage on behalf of 
Israel, an offense punishable by death. The Government failed to abide 
by internationally recognized standards of due process in the case. The 
Government restricts freedom of movement. There were reports early in 
the year that mobs attacked and killed numerous Afghan refugees. The 
selection of candidates for elections effectively is controlled by the 
Government. Intense political struggle continued during the year 
between a broad popular movement that favored greater liberalization in 
government policies, particularly in the area of human rights, and 
certain hard-line elements in the government and society, which view 
such reforms as a threat to the survival of the Islamic republic. In 
many cases, this struggle is played out within the Government itself, 
with reformists and hardliners squaring off in divisive internal 
debates. Government agents were implicated in the murders in late 1998 
of several prominent political dissidents.
    The Government restricts the work of human rights groups and 
continues to deny entry to the country to the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights Special Representative for Human Rights in Iran. Violence 
against women occurs, and women face legal and societal discrimination. 
The Government discriminates against religious and ethnic minorities 
and restricts important workers' rights. Child labor persists. 
Vigilante groups, with strong ties to certain members of the 
Government, enforce their interpretation of appropriate social behavior 
through intimidation and violence.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government was 
responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings. Human rights groups 
reported that security forces killed at least 20 persons while 
violently suppressing demonstrations by Kurds that occurred in the wake 
of the February arrest of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader 
AbdullahOcalan in Turkey (see Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 5). Human Rights 
Watch reported at least four student deaths on July 8, when government-
sanctioned agitators attacked a student dormitory during protests in 
Tehran (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
    Citizens continued to be tried and sentenced to death in the 
absence of sufficient procedural safeguards. In 1992 the domestic press 
stopped reporting most executions; however, executions continue in 
substantial numbers, according to U.N. and other reporting. The U.N. 
Special Representative cited an estimated 138 executions from January 
through mid-August, most of which were reported in the media. The 
Government has not cooperated in providing the Special Representative 
with a precise number of executions carried out in Iran. Exiles and 
human rights monitors allege that many of those executed for criminal 
offenses, such as narcotics trafficking, are actually political 
dissidents. Supporters of outlawed political organizations, such as the 
Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, are believed to make up a large number 
of those executed each year. A November 1995 law criminalized dissent 
and applied the death penalty to offenses such as ``attempts against 
the security of the State, outrage against high-ranking Iranian 
officials, and insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against 
the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.'' U.N. representatives, 
including the U.N. Special Representative on Human Rights in Iran, and 
independent human rights organizations, continue to note the absence of 
procedural safeguards in criminal trials. Harsh punishments are carried 
out, including stoning and flogging (see Section 1.c.). Article 102 of 
the Islamic Penal Code details the methods authorities should follow 
when conducting a stoning: ``the stoning of an adulterer or adulteress 
shall be carried out while each is placed in a hole and covered with 
soil, he up to his waist and she up to a line above her breasts.'' 
According to press accounts, a man was stoned to death in April in the 
town of Babol, which borders the Caspian Sea. He was alleged to have 
killed three of his own sons. Prior to the stoning, he received 60 
lashes. The first stone was cast by the judge who sentenced him to 
death. The law also allows for the relatives of murder victims to take 
part in the execution of the killer.
    The Government's investigation into the murder of several prominent 
Iranian dissidents and intellectuals in late 1998 continued throughout 
the year. The case involved the murders, over a 2-month period from 
October to December 1998, of prominent political activists Darioush and 
Parvaneh Forouhar and writers Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Pouandeh. 
Political activist Pirouz Davani disappeared in the same time period 
and has never been found (see Section 1.b.). In February after several 
senior figures of the leadership blamed the disappearances and murders 
on ``foreign hands,'' it was revealed that active-duty agents of the 
Ministry of Intelligence had carried out the killings. Minister of 
Intelligence Qorban Ali Dori-Najafabadi and several of his senior 
deputies resigned their posts following these revelations.
    Supervision for the case was placed in the hands of the Military 
Prosecutor's office. In June the Prosecutor's Office released an 
initial report on the investigation, identifying a cell from within the 
Ministry of Intelligence led by four ``main agents'' as responsible for 
the murders. The leader among the agents reportedly was a former Deputy 
Minister of Intelligence, Saeed Emami, who, the government stated, had 
committed suicide in prison by drinking a toxic hair removal solution 
several days prior to release of the government's June report. The 
report also indicated that 23 persons had been arrested in association 
with the murders and that a further 33 were summoned for interrogation. 
The Government released no names beyond the four main suspects and none 
of the suspects that it claimed to have arrested had faced trial for 
their alleged involvement by year's end.
    Frustration over the slow pace of the murder investigation and 
doubt about the government's willingness to follow the case to its 
conclusion were frequent topics of criticism of the Government 
throughout the year, particularly by those advocating greater adherence 
to the rule of law by the Government. Reform-oriented journalists and 
prominent cultural figures declared publicly their demands for a full 
accounting in the case and speculated that responsibility for ordering 
the murders lay much higher within the Government than with the four 
agents. Such speculation in the newspaper Salaam led, in part, to its 
closure in July by the Government, which set off student demonstrations 
that became widespread street riots (see section 2.b.). The U.N. 
Special Representative, in his September report, urged the Government 
to hasten the investigation, noting that the rule oflaw, declared to be 
an objective of President Khatami's administration, required no less.
    One organization reported eight deaths of evangelical Christians at 
the hands of the authorities in the past 10 years (see Section 2.c.). 
Late in the year, an investigative reporter alleged that officials 
within the Intelligence Ministry were responsible for the murders of 
three prominent evangelical ministers in 1994, a crime for which three 
female members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization had been convicted 
(see Section 2.c.).
    Numerous Sunni clerics have been murdered in recent years, some 
allegedly by government agents (see Section 2.c.).
    The Government announced in September 1998 that it would take no 
action to threaten the life of British author Salman Rushdie, or anyone 
associated with his work, ``The Satanic Verses.'' The announcement came 
during discussions with the United Kingdom regarding the restoration of 
full diplomatic relations. Several revolutionary foundations and a 
number of Majles deputies within Iran repudiated the Government's 
pledge and emphasized the ``irrevocability'' of the fatwa, or religious 
ruling, by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, calling for Rushdie's murder. 
The 15 Khordad Foundation raised the bounty it earlier had established 
for the murder of Rushdie.
    The Istanbul Court of Appeal upheld in 1998 the conviction of an 
Iranian national for complicity in the 1996 murder of Zahra Rajabi and 
Ali Moradi, who were both associated with the National Council of 
Resistance (NCR), an exile group that has claimed responsibility for 
several terrorist attacks within Iran. The U.N. Special Representative 
reported in 1998 that Italian security authorities continued their 
investigation into the 1993 killing in Rome of Mohammad Hossein Naghdi, 
the NCR's representative in Italy.
    b. Disappearance.--No reliable information is available on the 
number of disappearances. In the period immediately following arrest, 
many detainees are held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and 
family members.
    Pirouz Davani, a political activist who disappeared in late 1998 
along with several other prominent intellectuals and dissidents who 
later were found murdered, remains unaccounted for and is believed to 
have been killed for his political beliefs and activism.
    A Christian group reported that between 15 and 23 Iranian 
Christians disappeared between November 1997 and November 1998 (see 
Section 2.c.). Those who disappeared reportedly were Muslim converts to 
Christianity whose baptisms had been discovered by the authorities. The 
group that reported the figure believes that most or all of those who 
disappeared were killed.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however, 
there are numerous, credible reports that security forces and prison 
personnel continue to torture detainees and prisoners. Some prison 
facilities, including Tehran's Evin prison, are notorious for the cruel 
and prolonged acts of torture inflicted upon political opponents of the 
Government. Common methods include suspension for long periods in 
contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and, 
most frequently, severe and repeated beatings with cables or other 
instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. Prisoners also 
have reported beatings about the ears, inducing partial or complete 
deafness, and punching in the eyes, leading to partial or complete 
blindness.
    Stoning and flogging are prescribed expressly by the Islamic Penal 
Code as appropriate punishment for adultery (see Section 1.a.).
    Security forces forcefully suppressed demonstrations by Kurds in 
the wake of the February arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey 
(see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and 5).
    On July 8, the Government and other individuals acting with the 
consent of the authorities, used excessive force in attacking a 
dormitory during student protests in Tehran, includingreportedly 
throwing students from windows. Approximately 300 students were injured 
in the incident (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 2.b.).
    A trial was opened in May against Brigadier General Gholam-reza 
Naqdi, a senior Tehran police official, and several associates, who 
were accused of using torture to coerce confessions during the 1998 
trial of former mayor of Tehran Gholam Hossein Kharbaschi. It 
reportedly was the first prosecution of a government official for 
torture since the 1979 revolution. The charges were based on the 
accusations of numerous Tehran municipality officials and district 
mayors that authorities had used torture to coerce admissions of guilt 
and statements that implicated the former mayor. The trial of Naqdi was 
conducted in closed session before a military court. Naqdi was cleared 
of most charges and resumed his duties with the Tehran police force.
    In June the official government news agency reported a meeting of 
the Islamic Human Rights Committee to discuss measures for the 
prevention of torture. There was no known public report on the results 
of that meeting. In August President Khatami was quoted in public 
remarks as criticizing the use of torture. He defended the rights of 
prisoners as a legitimate concern based on ``Islam and human 
conscience.''
    Prison conditions are harsh. Some prisoners are held in solitary 
confinement or denied adequate food or medical care in order to force 
confessions. Female prisoners reportedly have been raped or otherwise 
tortured while in detention. Prison guards reportedly intimidate family 
members of detainees and torture detainees in the presence of family 
members. The U.N. Special Representative reported receiving numerous 
reports of prisoner overcrowding and unrest. He cited a reported figure 
of only 8.2 square feet (2.5 square) of space available for each 
prisoner.
    The Government does not permit visits to imprisoned dissidents by 
human rights monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, these practices 
remain common. There is reportedly no legal time limit on incommunicado 
detention, nor any judicial means to determine the legality of 
detention. Suspects may be held for questioning in jails or in local 
Revolutionary Guard offices. Although reliable statistics are not 
available, international observers believe that between scores and 
hundreds of citizens are imprisoned for their political beliefs.
    The security forces often do not inform family members of a 
prisoner's welfare and location. Prisoners also may be denied visits by 
family members and legal counsel. In addition, families of executed 
prisoners do not always receive notification of the prisoner's death. 
Those who do receive such information reportedly have been forced on 
occasion to pay the Government to retrieve the body of their relative.
    In February and March, 13 Jews were arrested by security forces in 
the cities of Isfahan and Shiraz. Among the group were several 
prominent rabbis, teachers of Hebrew, and their students, one a 16-
year-old boy. By year's end, judicial authorities had not clarified the 
charges against the detainees or allowed them access to defense 
counsel. The delay in clarification of charges appeared to violate 
Article 32 of the Constitution, which states in part that in cases of 
arrest ``charges with the reasons for accusation must, without delay, 
be communicated and explained to the accused in writing, and a 
provisional dossier must be forwarded to the competent judicial 
authorities within a maximum of 24 hours so that the preliminaries to 
the trial can be completed as swiftly as possible.'' The investigation 
reportedly has centered around charges of espionage on behalf of 
Israel, an offense punishable by death. Governments around the world 
criticized the arrests and called for the safe treatment of the 
detainees, who have been allowed only sporadic family visits and 
deliveries of kosher food (see Section 2.c.).
    As many as 1,500 students were detained in the wake of student 
protests on July 8, and subsequent riots (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 
2.b.).
    Numerous publishers, editors and journalists either were detained, 
jailed, fined, or prohibited from publishing theirwritings during the 
year (see Section 2.a.). The Government appeared to follow a policy of 
intimidation, based on such tactics, toward members of the media that 
it considers to pose a threat to the current system of Islamic 
government.
    Adherents of the Baha'i Faith continue to face arbitrary arrest and 
detention. The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a 
small number of Baha'is in detention at any given time. According to 
the U.N. Special Representative and Baha'i groups, at least 12 Baha'is 
are in prisons, including 5 who were convicted of either apostasy or 
``actions against God'' and sentenced to death. In March the four 
remaining detainees from the 1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute of 
Higher Learning were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging 
from 3 to 10 years (see Section 2.c.).
    The Government enforced house arrest and other measures to restrict 
the movements and ability to communicate of several senior religious 
leaders whose views on political and governance issues are at variance 
with the ruling orthodoxy. Several of these figures dispute the 
legitimacy and position of the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali 
Khamenei. The clerics include Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan Tabataei-Qomi, 
who has been under house arrest in Mashad for more than 14 years; 
Ayatollah Mohammad Shirazi, who remains under house arrest in Qom; and 
Ayatollah Ya'asub al-Din Rastgari, who has been under house arrest in 
Qom since late 1996. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the former 
designated successor of the late Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini, 
and an outspoken critic of the current Supreme Leader, remains under 
house arrest and heightened police surveillance (see Section 2.a.). The 
followers of these and other dissident clerics, many of them junior 
clerics and students, reportedly have been detained in recent years and 
tortured by government authorities.
    Throughout the year, Iran and Iraq exchanged prisoners of war 
(POW's) and the remains of deceased fighters from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq 
war, adding to the large number of Iraqi POW's returned by Iran in 
1998. However, a final settlement of this issue between the two 
governments was not achieved, despite predictions by Iranian government 
officials in late 1998. A June 1998 press report described joint Iran-
Iraq search operations to identify the remains of those missing in 
action.
    The Government does not use forced exile, but many dissidents and 
ethnic and religious minorities leave the country due to a perception 
of threat from the Government.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The court system is not 
independent and is subject to government and religious influence. It 
serves as the principal vehicle of the State to restrict freedom and 
reform in the society.
    There are several different court systems. The two most active are 
the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses, 
and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, which were established in 1979 to 
try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic Republic, 
including threats to internal or external security, narcotics crimes, 
economic crimes (including hoarding and overpricing), and official 
corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged transgressions 
within the clerical establishment, and a military court investigates 
crimes committed in connection with military or security duties by 
members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards. A press 
court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers in the 
media. The Supreme Court has limited authority to review cases.
    The judicial system has been designed to conform, where possible, 
to an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic 
sources. Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a 
cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi resigned 
as the head of the judiciary in August and was replaced by Ayatollah 
Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi. The head of the Supreme Court and Prosecutor 
General also must be clerics.
    Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survive in the 
civil and criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right to a 
public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of 
appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury 
system in the civil and criminal courts. If a situation is not 
addressed by statutes enacted after the 1979 revolution, the Government 
advises judges to give precedence to their own knowledge and 
interpretation of Islamiclaw, rather than rely on statutes enacted 
during the Shah's regime.
    Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, where crimes against national 
security and other principal offenses are heard, are notorious for 
their disregard of international standards of fairness. Revolutionary 
Court judges act as prosecutor and judge in the same case, and judges 
are chosen for their ideological commitment to the system. Pretrial 
detention often is prolonged and defendants lack access to attorneys. 
Indictments often lack clarity and include undefined offenses such as 
``antirevolutionary behavior,'' ``moral corruption,'' and ``siding with 
global arrogance.'' Defendants do not have the right to confront their 
accusers. Secret or summary trials of 5 minutes are not unknown. Others 
are show trials that are intended merely to emphasize a coerced public 
confession. In 1992 the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded 
that ``the chronic abuses associated with the Islamic Revolutionary 
Courts are so numerous and so entrenched as to be beyond reform.'' The 
Government has undertaken no major reform of the Revolutionary Court 
system since that report.
    The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system was a 
subject of wide debate throughout the year. The clerical courts, which 
were established in 1987 to investigate offenses and crimes that are 
committed by clerics, are overseen directly by the Supreme Leader, are 
not provided for in the Constitution, and operate outside the domain of 
the judiciary. In particular critics alleged that the clerical courts 
were used to prosecute certain clerics for expressing controversial 
ideas and for participating in activities outside the area of religion, 
including journalism. In November former Interior Minister and Vice 
President Abdollah Nouri was sentenced by a branch of the SCC to a 5-
year prison term for allegedly publishing ``anti-Islamic articles, 
insulting government officials, promoting friendly relations with the 
United States,'' and providing illegal publicity to dissident cleric 
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in the pages of Khordad, a newspaper 
that was established by Nouri in late 1998 and closed at the time of 
his arrest. Nouri used the public trial to attack the legitimacy of the 
SCC (see Section 2.a.).
    In April a branch of the SCC convicted Hojjatoleslam Mohsen 
Kadivar, a Shi'a cleric and popular seminary lecturer, to 18 months in 
prison for ``dissemination of lies and confusing public opinion'' in a 
series of broadcast interviews and newspaper articles. Kadivar 
advocated political reform and greater intellectual freedom and 
criticized the misuse of religion to maintain power. In an interview 
published in a newspaper, Kadivar criticized certain government 
officials for turning criticism against them into alleged crimes 
against the State. He also observed that such leaders ``mistake 
themselves with Islam, with national interests, or with the interests 
of the system, and in this way believe that they should be immune from 
criticism.'' He also allegedly criticized former Supreme Leader 
Ayatollah Khomeini and demonstrated support for dissident cleric 
Ayatollah Montazeri. Kadivar's trial was not open to the public.
    In July the SCC banned the daily newspaper Salaam and indicted its 
publisher, Mohammad Mousavi Khoeniha, on charges of ``violating Islamic 
principles,'' ``endangering national security,'' and ``disturbing 
public opinion.'' Khoeniha, a cleric, later was sentenced to a 5-year 
jail term. The charges involved the publication by Salaam of documents 
related to the unsolved murders of dissident intellectuals in late 
1998, which indicated a possible connection to senior officials in the 
plotting of the murders. The closure of the newspaper led to peaceful 
protests by students at Tehran University that later grew into 
widespread rioting after aggressive countermeasures were taken by 
security forces (see Section 2.b.).
    It is difficult for many women to obtain legal redress. A woman's 
testimony is worth only half that of a man's, making it difficult for a 
woman to prove a case against a male defendant.
    The Government frequently charges members of religious minorities 
with crimes such as ``confronting the regime'' and apostasy, and 
conducts trials in these cases in the same manner as is reserved for 
threats to national security. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who resigned as 
head of the judiciary in August, stated in 1996 that Baha'i Faith was 
an espionage organization. Trials against Baha'is have reflected this 
view (see Section 2.c.).
    Independent legal scholar and member of the Islamic clergy 
Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was convicted by the SCC in 
1998 for his outspoken criticism of the treatment of women under the 
law, was released from prison in early in the year; however, the 
Government banned him from performing any clerical duties for 5 years. 
Human Rights groups outside Iran noted reports that Saidzadeh's 1998 
sentence also included a prohibition on publishing. He has ceased 
authoring a monthly column on legal issues, many focusing on the rights 
of women, since the time of his detention.
    In December authorities rearrested former Deputy Prime Minister and 
longtime political dissident Abbas Amir-Entezam after an interview with 
him was published in an Iranian newspaper. Amir-Entezam has spent much 
of the past 20 years in and out of prison since being arrested on 
charges of collaboration with the United States following the seizure 
of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by revolutionary militants in 1979. In 
his original trial, Amir-Entezam was denied defense counsel and access 
to the allegedly incriminating evidence that was used against him 
gathered from the overtaken U.S. Embassy. Since then he has appealed 
for a fair and public trial, which has been denied him. He has been a 
frequent victim of torture in prison; he suffered a ruptured eardrum 
due to repeated beatings, and kidney failure resulting from denial of 
access to toilet facilities, and an untreated prostate condition. He 
reports having been taken on numerous occasions before a firing squad, 
told to prepare for death, only to be allowed to live.
    No estimates are available on the number of political prisoners. 
However, the Government often arrests, convicts, and sentences persons 
on questionable criminal charges, including drug trafficking, when 
their actual ``offenses'' are political.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that ``reputation, life, 
property, (and) dwelling(s)'' are protected from trespass except as 
``provided by law;'' however, the Government infringes on these rights. 
Security forces monitor the social activities of citizens, enter homes 
and offices, monitor telephone conversations, and open mail without 
court authorization.
    Organizations such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah, a movement of hard-
line vigilantes who seek to enforce their vision of appropriate 
revolutionary comportment upon the society, harass, beat, and 
intimidate those who demonstrate publicly for reform or who do not 
observe dress codes or other modes of correct revolutionary conduct. 
This includes women whose clothing does not cover the hair and all of 
the body except the hands and face, or those who wear makeup or nail 
polish. Ansar-e Hezbollah gangs also have been used to destroy 
newspaper offices and printing presses, intimidate dissident clerics, 
and disrupt peaceful gatherings (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). Ansar-e 
Hezbollah cells are organized throughout the country and linked to 
individual members of the country's leadership.
    Vigilante violence includes attacking young persons believed too 
``un-Islamic'' in their dress or activities, invading private homes, 
abusing unmarried couples, and disrupting concerts or other forms of 
popular entertainment. Authorities occasionally enter homes to remove 
television satellite dishes, or to disrupt private gatherings where 
unmarried men and women socialize, or where alcohol, mixed dancing, or 
other forbidden activities are offered or take place. Enforcement 
appears to be arbitrary, varying widely with the political climate and 
the individuals involved. Authorities reportedly are vulnerable to 
bribes in some of these circumstances.
    In 1998 security forces conducted a nationwide raid of more than 
500 homes and offices owned or occupied by Baha'is suspected of having 
connections to the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning (see Section 
2.c.). During the raids, instructional materials, office equipment, and 
other items of personal property were confiscated. The effort 
apparently was designed to disrupt the operation of the Institute, 
which serves as the only alternative source of higher education for 
most Baha'is, who are denied entry to the state-controlled university 
system.
    Prison guards intimidated family members of detainees (see Section 
1.c.). Iranian opposition figures living abroad reported harassment of 
their relatives in Iran.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, except when published ideas are ``contrary to 
Islamic principles, or are detrimental to public rights;'' however, the 
Government restricts freedom of speech and of the press in practice. 
Since the election of President Khatami, the independent press, 
especially newspapers and magazines, has played an increasingly 
important role in providing a forum for an intense debate regarding 
reform in the society. However, basic legal safeguards for freedom of 
expression are lacking, and the independent press has been subjected to 
arbitrary enforcement measures by elements of the Government, notably 
the judiciary, which see in such debates a threat to their own hold on 
power.
    Newspapers and magazines represent a wide variety of political and 
social perspectives, some allied with particular figures within the 
Government. Many subjects of discussion are tolerated, including 
criticism of certain government policies. However, the 1995 Press Law 
prohibits the publishing of a broad and ill-defined category of 
subjects, including material ``insulting Islam and its sanctities'' or 
``promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic 
Republic.'' Generally prohibited topics include fault-finding comment 
on the personality and achievements of the late Leader of the 
Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini; direct criticism of the current Supreme 
Leader; assailing the principle of velayat-e faqih, or rule by a 
supreme religious leader; questioning the tenets of certain Islamic 
legal principles; sensitive or classified material affecting national 
security; promotion of the views of certain dissident clerics, 
including Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri; and promotion of rights or 
autonomy of ethnic minorities.
    Oversight of the press is carried out in accordance with a press 
law that was enacted in 1995. The law established the Press Supervisory 
Board, which is composed of the Minister of Islamic Culture and 
Guidance, a Supreme Court judge, a Member of Parliament, and a 
university professor who is appointed by the Minister of Islamic 
Culture and Guidance. The Board is responsible for issuing press 
licenses and for examining complaints filed against publications or 
individual journalists, editors, and publishers. In certain cases, the 
Press Supervisory Board may refer complaints to the courts for further 
action, including closure. The Press Court hears such complaints. Its 
hearings are conducted in public and feature the presence of a jury 
that is composed of clerics, government officials, and editors of 
government-controlled newspapers. The jury is empowered to recommend to 
the presiding judge the guilt or innocence of defendants and the 
severity of any penalty to be imposed, although these recommendations 
are not binding legally. In at least two cases during the year (against 
the newspapers Jame-eh Salem and Adineh), recommendations made by Press 
Court juries for relatively lenient penalties were disregarded by the 
presiding judge in favor of harsher measures, including closure. 
Perhaps because the judgments of the Press Courts have not been viewed 
as sufficiently strict by some government officials, alleged violations 
of the Press Law increasingly were referred to the Revolutionary and 
Special Clerical Courts, in which defendants enjoy fewer legal 
safeguards (see Section 1.e.).
    Two notable amendments to the 1995 Press Law were circulated in the 
Parliament during the year. The first would curtail severely the 
current freedoms held by the independent press, including by making 
individual journalists--and not their publishers--personally liable for 
violations of the Press Law, and by requiring the directors of 
publications to reveal to the Government their sources for the articles 
they publish. The amendment was opposed by Minister of Culture and 
Islamic Guidance Ataollah Mohajerani during parliamentary debate. It 
requires further parliamentary examination before implementation. In 
August another amendment apparently directed at the independent press 
was proposed, which would define a new class of ``political offenses,'' 
including the ``exchange of information with foreign embassies, 
diplomatic representatives, media, and political parties, that may be 
determined to put national interests in jeopardy.'' This amendment was 
submitted to the Cabinet for further discussion, and reportedly remains 
pending there. The U.N. Special Representative noted in his October 
report that ``passage of these two pieces of new legislation, both 
apparently opposed by those most concerned, would constitute a major 
defeat for the right of free expression.''
    Public officials frequently levy complaints against journalists, 
editors, and publishers, and even rival publications. Thepractice of 
complaining about the writings of journalists crosses ideological 
lines. Offending writers are subject to trial, with fines, suspension 
from journalistic activities, and imprisonment all common punishments 
on findings of guilt for offenses ranging from ``fabrication'' to 
``propaganda against the State'' to ``insulting the leadership of the 
Islamic Republic.''
    Police raid newspaper offices, and Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs attack 
the offices of liberal publications and bookstores without interference 
from the police or prosecution by the courts.
    The country's record on freedom of expression was mixed during the 
year. It remained the central issue of the struggle between hard liners 
and political reformers in society. The Government continued its policy 
of issuing licenses for new publications, many of which engaged in open 
criticism of certain government policies. However, opponents of such 
openness continued their assault, begun in 1998, on the relative 
freedom enjoyed by the independent press since the election of 
President Khatami. In March then-head of the judiciary Mohammad Yazdi 
addressed reform-oriented journalists and the issue of press freedom in 
a Friday prayer sermon broadcast throughout the country, stating that 
there ``is no freedom for you to write and say anything you like. Our 
people do not want such freedom if it is against the tenets of Islam. 
Do not come out tomorrow and ask why you were not warned in advance. Do 
not cry out when we arrest someone.''
    As an example of the division within the various branches of the 
Government on this issue, the Majles conducted impeachment hearings in 
April against Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Ataollah 
Mohajerani. Mohajerani is viewed as a major force within the Government 
for greater press and academic freedom. Among the charges brought 
against Mohajerani were that his Ministry had failed to prevent the 
publishing of material that ``insulted Islamic sanctities,'' and that 
``propagated corruption and obscenity.'' However, the hearing was 
viewed as a more general attack on the policy of press liberalization 
at the Ministry during Mohajerani's tenure. The motion failed by a vote 
of 135-121 and Mohajerani continued in his position.
    Numerous publications were banned or suspended during the year. The 
U.N. Special Representative reported 40 complaints against publications 
in the period from January to August. Many of the leading publications 
that represented the views of the reform movement were ordered closed 
during the year, including Salaam, Rah-e No, Jame'eh Salem, Iran-e 
Farda, Adineh, Neshat, and Khordad. In March the magazine Zan (Woman) 
was ordered closed by a Revolutionary Court for publishing part of a 
New Year's greeting to the citizenry from the former Empress, Fara 
Pahlavi, who is living in exile, and for printing a cartoon satirizing 
an aspect of Shari'a (Islamic law) that is currently in effect, under 
which the ``blood money'' that is paid to the family of a murdered 
woman equals half that paid to the family of a murdered man.
    Several individual editors and publishers were arrested and fined 
for alleged violations of the Press Law. At the same time, the 
Government continued to issue licenses for the creation of such 
publications. In one such case, a leading reformist daily, Neshat, was 
ordered closed in September, and its editor, Mashallah Shamsolvaezin, 
was arrested on charges concerning the publication in Neshat of an 
article that called for the abolition of the death penalty. However, 
his arrest was not carried out by the authorities until November, and 
in the intervening period, Shamsolvaezin obtained a new license and 
oversaw the creation and publication of a new daily newspaper, Asr-e 
Azadegan, which assumed the same reform orientation that had 
characterized Neshat.
    The Government monitors carefully the statements and views of 
Iran's senior religious leaders to prevent disruptive dissent within 
the clerical ranks. In November 1997, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, 
a cleric formerly designated as the successor to Iran's late Spiritual 
Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, called into question the authority of the 
current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, criticizing his increasing 
intervention in government policy. The comments sparked attacks by 
Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs on Montazeri's residence and a Koranic school in 
Qom run by Montazeri. The promotion of Montazeri's views were among the 
charges brought against clerics Mohsen Kadivar and Abdollah Nouri at 
hearings of the Special Clerical Court during the year.
    The press reported throughout the year that several persons were 
jailed for expressing support for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. In October 
it was reported that Akbar Tajik-Saeeki, identified as the prayer 
leader at a Tehran mosque, was jailed by the SpecialCourt for the 
Clergy for signing a petition that protested the continued detention of 
Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. Support for Montazeri was also one of the 
charges included in the wide-ranging indictment of former Interior 
Minister Abdollah Nouri (see Section 1.e.).
    The 134 signatories of the 1994 Declaration of Iranian Writers, 
which declared a collective intent to work for the removal of barriers 
to freedom of thought and expression, remain at risk. In July the 
Association of International Writers, known by its acronym PEN, 
released a statement noting that authorities had never solved the 
murders of signatories Ahmad Mirallai, Ghafar Hosseini, Ahmad Modhtari, 
Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh, Ebrahim Zalzadeh, and Darioush and Parvaneh 
Forouhar, nor the disappearance in late 1998 of Pirouz Davani. PEN had 
reported in October 1998 that Declaration signatories Mohammad 
Pouyandeh, Mohammad Mokhtari, Houshang Golshiri, Kazem Kardevani, and 
Mansour Koushan were questioned by a Revolutionary Court in connection 
with their attempts to convene a meeting of the Iran Writer's 
Association. Mokhtari and Pouyandeh subsequently were murdered, while 
signatory Mansour Koushan reportedly fled to Norway.
    The Government directly controls and maintains a monopoly over all 
television and radio broadcasting facilities; programming reflects the 
Government's political and socio-religious ideology. Because newspapers 
and other print media have a limited circulation outside large cities, 
radio and television serve as the principal news source for many 
citizens. Satellite dishes that receive foreign television broadcasts 
are forbidden; however, many citizens, particularly the wealthy, own 
them. In May the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance stated in 
public remarks that the Government might support an easing of the 
satellite ban. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei, who makes the ultimate 
determination on issues that involve radio and television broadcasting, 
quickly criticized any potential change as amounting to ``surrender'' 
to Western culture, effectively ending any further debate of the idea.
    The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance is charged with 
screening books prior to publication to ensure that they do not contain 
offensive material. However, some books and pamphlets critical of the 
Government are published without reprisal. The Ministry inspects 
foreign printed materials prior to their release on the market.
    Legal scholar Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was 
convicted by the SCC in 1998 for his outspoken criticism of the 
treatment women under the law, was released from prison early in year; 
however, the Government banned him from performing any clerical duties 
for 5 years and prohibited him from publishing (see Section 1.e.).
    The Government effectively censors Iranian-made films, since it is 
the main source of funding for Iranian film producers, who must submit 
scripts and film proposals to government officials in advance of 
funding approval. However, such government restrictions appear to have 
eased since the election of President Khatami.
    President Khatami announced in September 1998 that the Government 
would take no action to threaten the life of British author Salman 
Rushdie, or anyone associated with his work ``The Satanic Verses.'' 
However, his remarks were repudiated by other parties, including the 15 
Khordad Foundation, which claims to have financed a bounty for the 
murder of Rushdie (see Section 1.a.).
    Academic censorship persists. In his 1996 interim report, the U.N. 
Special Representative noted the existence of a campaign to bring about 
the ``Islamization of the universities,'' which appeared to be a 
movement to purge persons alleged to ``fight against the sanctities of 
the Islamic system.'' Government informers who monitor classroom 
material reportedly are common on university campuses. Admission to 
universities is politicized; all applicants must pass ``character 
tests'' in which officials screen out applicants critical of the 
Government's ideology. To obtain tenure, professors must cooperate with 
government authorities over a period of years. Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs 
disrupt lectures and appearances by academics whose views do not 
conform with their own. In October a newspaper announced that a post-
graduate philosophy course taught by Professor Abdolkarim Soroush at 
Tehran University was canceled due to threats to set fire to the 
classroom by unidentified persons.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
permits assemblies and marches ``provided they do not violate the 
principles of Islam;'' however, in practice the Government restricts 
freedom of assembly and closely monitors gatherings to ensure that they 
do not constitute uncontrolled antigovernment protest. Such gatherings 
include public entertainment and lectures, student gatherings, labor 
protests, funeral processions, and Friday prayer gatherings. A 
significant factor for groups in deciding whether to hold a public 
gathering is whether it would be opposed by the quasi-official Ansar-e 
Hezbollah, which uses violence and intimidation to disperse such 
assemblies.
    The Government forcefully suppressed demonstrations by Kurds in the 
wake of the February arrest of PKK leader Abudullah Ocalan in Turkey. 
Security forces reportedly killed 20 persons and made several hundred 
arrests (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
    On July 8, students at Tehran University who were protesting 
proposed legislation by the Majles that would limit press freedoms and 
the Government's closure of a prominent reform-oriented newspaper, were 
attacked by elements of the security forces and Ansar-e Hezbollah 
thugs. Police forces reportedly looked on and allowed repeated attacks 
against the students and their dormitory. Human Rights Watch reported 
that, according to witnesses, at least 4 students were killed in the 
assault on the dormitory, 300 were wounded, and 400 were taken into 
detention. The demonstrations continued to grow in subsequent days to 
include many nonstudents. Looting, vandalism, and large-scale rioting 
began and spread to cities outside Tehran. Student groups attempted to 
distance their organizations from these later acts, which they blamed 
on government-sanctioned agitators. The Government intervened to stop 
the rioting and announced a July 14 counter-demonstration of regime 
loyalists and off-duty government workers, many of whom were bussed in 
from other cities for the demonstration.
    In the aftermath of these events, the Government took action 
against members of the security forces for their violent assault on the 
student dormitory, and against student leaders, demonstrators, and 
political activists, whom it blamed for inciting illegal behavior. In 
August the commander of the security forces, General Hedayat Lotfian, 
was summoned before the Parliament to explain the role of his officers 
in the dormitory raid. He reportedly announced that 98 officers were 
arrested for their actions. In September the head of the Tehran 
Revolutionary Court, Hojatoleslam Gholamhossein Rahbarpour, was quoted 
as saying that 1,500 students were arrested during the riots, 500 were 
released immediately after questioning, 800 were released later, and 
formal investigations were undertaken against the remaining 200. He 
also announced that four student leaders were sentenced to death by a 
Revolutionary Court for their role in the demonstrations. He gave no 
details of the court proceedings against the four, which apparently 
were conducted in secret.
    The Government arrested the leaders of the Iran Nations Party in 
the aftermath of the July demonstrations. The party is a secular 
nationalist movement that predates the revolution and is viewed as a 
threat by certain elements of the Government. The party was accused of 
inciting rioters and of encouraging disparaging slogans against 
``sacred values.'' The former head of the Iran Nations Party, Darioush 
Forouhar, was murdered along with his wife in late 1998 by agents of 
the Iranian intelligence service (see Section 1.a.).
    The Government limits freedom of association. The Constitution 
provides for the establishment of political parties, professional 
associations, Islamic religious groups, and recognized religious 
minorities, provided that such groups do not violate the principles of 
``freedom, sovereignty, and national unity,'' or question Islam as the 
basis of the Islamic Republic. President Khatami has repeatedly 
declared as a major goal the development of civil society. A newspaper 
reported in June that the Article Ten Commission, a government body 
responsible for reviewing applications for the establishment of 
political parties, guilds, societies, and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's), released figures indicating that as of April, ``85 political, 
115 specialized, and 26 religious minority organizations and 
associations'' were active in the country.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricts freedom of 
religion. The Constitution declares that the ``official religion of 
Iran is Islam and thesect followed is that of Ja'fari (Twelver) 
Shi'ism,'' and that this principle is ``eternally immutable.'' It also 
states that ``other Islamic denominations are to be accorded full 
respect,'' and recognizes Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews (Iran's 
pre-Islamic religions) as the only ``protected religious minorities.'' 
Religions not specifically protected under the Constitution do not 
enjoy freedom of religion. This situation most directly affects the 
nearly 350,000 followers of the Baha'i Faith, who effectively enjoy no 
legal rights.
    The central feature of the country's Islamic republican system is 
rule by a ``religious jurisconsult.'' Its senior leadership, including 
the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, the President, the head of the 
Judiciary, and the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly 
(Parliament), is composed principally of Shi'a clergymen.
    Religious activity is monitored closely by the Ministry of 
Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Adherents of recognized religious 
minorities are not required to register individually with the 
Government, although their community, religious, and cultural 
organizations, as well as schools and public events are monitored 
closely. Baha'is are not recognized by the Government as a legitimate 
religious group; rather, they are considered an outlawed political 
organization. Registration of Baha'i adherents is a police function. 
Evangelical Christian groups are pressured by government authorities to 
compile and hand over membership lists for their congregations. 
Evangelicals have resisted this demand. Non-Muslim owners of grocery 
shops are required to indicate their religious affiliation on the front 
of their shops.
    The population is approximately 99 percent Muslim, of which 89 
percent are Shi'a and 10 percent are Sunni (mostly Turkmen, Arab, 
Baluch, and Kurd living in the southwest, southeast, and northwest). 
Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish communities compose less 
than 1 percent of the population. Sufi Brotherhoods are popular, but 
there are no reliable figures available to judge their true size.
    The U.N. Special Representative for Human Rights in Iran noted in 
his September 1998 report frequent assertions that religious minorities 
are, by law and practice, barred from being elected to a representative 
body (except to the seats in the Majles reserved for minorities, as 
provided for in Article 64 of the Constitution) and from holding senior 
government or military positions. Members of religious minorities are 
allowed to vote, but they may not run for President. All religious 
minorities suffer varying degrees of officially sanctioned 
discrimination, particularly in the areas of employment, education, and 
housing (see Section 5).
    The Government allows recognized religious minorities to conduct 
religious education of their adherents. This includes separate, and 
privately funded Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian schools. These 
schools are supervised by the Ministry of Education, which imposes 
certain curriculum requirements. With few exceptions, the directors of 
these private schools must be Muslim. Attendance at these schools is 
not mandatory for recognized religious minorities. All textbooks used 
in course work must be approved for use by the Ministry of Education, 
including religious texts. Religious texts in non-Persian languages 
require approval by the authorities for use. This requirement imposes 
sometimes significant translation expenses on minority communities. 
Recognized religious minorities may provide religious instruction in 
non-Persian languages but often come under pressure from the 
authorities when conducting such instruction in Persian. In particular, 
evangelical Christian and Jewish communities have suffered harassment 
and arrest by authorities for the printing of materials or delivery of 
sermons in Persian.
    Recognized religious minorities are allowed by the Government to 
establish community centers and certain cultural, social, sports or 
charitable associations which they finance themselves. This does not 
apply to the Baha'i community which, since 1983, has been denied the 
right to assemble officially or to maintain administrative 
institutions. Because the Baha'i Faith has no clergy, the denial of the 
right to form such institutions and elect officers has threatened its 
existence in Iran.
    University applicants are required to pass an examination in 
Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive instruction 
in Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious 
minorities to higher education. Applicants for publicsector employment 
similarly are screened for their knowledge of Islam.
    Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system, 
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits, and incurring 
heavier punishments than Muslims. Muslim men are free to marry non-
Muslim women, but the opposite does not apply. Marriages between Muslim 
women and non-Muslim men are not recognized.
    The Government is highly suspicious of any proselytizing of Muslims 
by non-Muslims and can be harsh in its response, in particular against 
Baha'is and evangelical Christians. The Government regards the Baha'i 
community, whose faith originally derives from a strand of Islam, as a 
``misguided'' or ``wayward'' sect. The Government has fueled anti-
Baha'i and anti-Jewish sentiment in the country for political purposes.
    The Government does not ensure the right of citizens to change or 
replace their religious faith. Apostasy, specifically conversion from 
Islam, can be punishable by death.
    Although Sunni Muslims are accorded full respect under the terms of 
the Constitution, some Sunni groups claim discrimination on the part of 
the Government. In particular, Sunnis cite the lack of a Sunni mosque 
in Tehran and claim that authorities refuse to authorize construction 
of a Sunni place of worship in the capital. Numerous Sunni clerics have 
been murdered in recent years, some allegedly by agents of the regime. 
For example, Human Rights Watch reported in 1998 the killing of Sunni 
prayer leader Molavi Imam Bakhsh Narouie in the province of Sistan va-
Baluchistan in the southeast. This led to protests from the local 
community, which believed that government authorities were involved in 
the murder.
    There were no reports of heightened repression by the authorities 
of Sufi religious practices during the year, as had been reported by 
Sufi organizations outside the country in previous years.
    The largest non-Muslim minority is the Baha'i Faith, estimated at 
nearly 350,000 adherents throughout the country. The Baha'i Faith 
originated in Iran during the 1840's as a reformist movement within 
Shi'a Islam. Initially it attracted a wide following among Shi'a 
clergy. The political and religious authorities of that time joined to 
suppress the movement, and since then the hostility of the Shi'a clergy 
to the Baha'i Faith has remained intense. Baha'is are considered 
apostates because of their claim to a valid religious revelation 
subsequent to that of the Prophet Mohammed. The Baha'i Faith is defined 
by the Government as a political sect historically linked to the Shah's 
regime and, therefore, as counterrevolutionary, and characterized by 
its espionage activities for the benefit of foreign entities, 
particularly Israel. Historically at risk in Iran, Bahai's often have 
suffered increased levels of persecution during times of political 
ferment. Baha'is also faced discrimination under the Shah.
    Baha'is may not teach or practice their faith or maintain links 
with coreligionists abroad. The fact that the Baha'i world headquarters 
is situated in what is now the state of Israel (established by the 
founder of the Baha'i Faith in the 19th century in what was then 
Ottoman-controlled Palestine) exposes Baha'is to government charges of 
``espionage on behalf of Zionism,'' in particular when Bahai's are 
caught communicating with or addressing monetary contributions to the 
Baha'i Faith headquarters.
    Broad restrictions on Baha'is appear to be geared to destroying 
them as a community. They repeatedly have been offered relief from 
persecution in exchange for recanting their faith. Baha'i marriages are 
not recognized by the Government, leaving Baha'i women open to charges 
of prostitution. Children of Baha'i marriages are not recognized as 
legitimate and, therefore, are denied inheritance rights. Baha'i sacred 
and historical properties have been confiscated systematically. Baha'is 
are not allowed to bury and honor their dead in keeping with their 
religious tradition, while many historic Baha'i gravesites have been 
confiscated, and in some cases, desecrated or destroyed. In October 
1998, three Baha'is were arrested in Damavand, a city north of Tehran, 
on the grounds that they had buried their dead without government 
authorization.
    Ruhollah Rowhani, a Baha'i, was executed in July 1998 after having 
served 9 months in solitary confinement on a charge of apostasy, which 
arose from his allegedly having converted aMuslim woman to the Baha'i 
Faith. The woman concerned held that her mother was a Baha'i and she 
herself had been raised a Baha'i. Mr. Rowhani was not accorded a public 
trial, and no sentence was announced prior to his execution.
    Two other Baha'is, Sirus Zabihi-Moghaddam and Hadayat Kashefi-
Najafabadi, were tried alongside Rowhani and later sentenced to death 
by a revolutionary court in Mashad for the exercise of their faith. 
Unofficial reports received by Baha'i groups outside the country in 
March indicated that the death sentences against Zabihi-Moghaddam and 
Kashefi-Najafabadi had been lifted. The two remain in prison and there 
is no confirmation of a new sentence.
    Baha'i group meetings and religious education, which often take 
place in private homes and offices, are curtailed severely. Public and 
private universities continue to deny admittance to Baha'i students, a 
particularly demoralizing blow to a community that traditionally has 
placed a high value on education. Denial of access to higher education 
appears aimed at the eventual impoverishment of the Baha'i community.
    In September 1998, authorities began a nationwide operation to 
disrupt the activities of the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning, also 
known as the ``Open University,'' which was established by the Baha'i 
community shortly after the revolution to offer opportunities in higher 
education to Baha'i students who had been denied access to the 
country's high schools and universities. The Institute employed Baha'i 
faculty and professors, many of whom had been dismissed from teaching 
positions by the Government as a result of their faith, and conducted 
classes in homes or offices owned or rented by Baha'is. In the assault, 
which took place in at least 14 different cities, 36 faculty members 
were arrested, and a variety of personal property, including books, 
papers, and furniture, either were destroyed or confiscated. Government 
interrogators sought to force the detained faculty members to sign 
statements acknowledging that the Open University now was defunct and 
pledging not to collaborate with it in the future. Baha'is outside the 
country report that none of the 36 detainees would sign the document. 
All but four of the 36 subsequently were released.
    In March Dr. Sina Hakiman, Farzad Khajeh Sharifabadi, Habibullah 
Ferdosian Najafabadi, and Ziaullah Mirzapanah, the four remaining 
detainees from the September 1998 raid, were convicted under Article 
498 of the Penal Code and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 
10 years. In the court verdict, the four were accused of having 
establishing a ``secret organization'' engaged in ``attracting youth, 
teaching against Islam, and teaching against the regime of the Islamic 
Republic.'' According to Baha'i groups outside Iran, the four were 
science instructors. In October Baha'i groups outside the country 
reported that all four were released from prison. There was no 
explanation for the release.
    The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a small 
number of Baha'is in arbitrary detention, some at risk of execution, at 
any given time. There were at least 12 Baha'is reported to be under 
arrest for practicing their faith at year's end, 5 under sentence of 
death.
    Baha'is regularly are denied compensation for injury or criminal 
victimization. Government authorities claim that only Muslim plaintiffs 
are eligible for compensation in these circumstances. Baha'is are 
prohibited from government employment (see Section 5).
    In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence of a 
government policy directive on the Baha'is. According to the directive, 
the Supreme Revolutionary Council instructed government agencies to 
block the progress and development of the Baha'i community, expel 
Baha'i students from universities, cut the Baha'is' links with groups 
outside Iran, restrict the employment of Baha'is, and deny Baha'is 
``positions of influence,'' including those in education. The 
Government claims that the directive is a forgery. However, it appears 
to be an accurate reflection of current government practice.
    In his 1996 report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance recommended 
``that the ban on the Baha'i organization should be lifted to enable it 
to organize itself freely through its administrative institutions, 
which are vital in the absence of a clergy, so that it can engage fully 
in its religious activities.'' In response to the Special Rapporteur's 
concernswith regard to the lack of official recognition of the Baha'i 
Faith, government officials stated that Baha'is ``are not a religious 
minority, but a political organization that was associated with the 
Shah's regime, is against the Iranian Revolution, and engages in 
espionage activities.'' The Government asserted to the Special 
Representative that, as individuals, all Baha'is were entitled to their 
beliefs and protected under other articles of the Constitution as 
Iranian citizens.
    The Christian community is estimated at approximately 117,000 
according to government figures. Of these the majority are ethnic 
Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans. Protestant denominations and 
evangelical churches also are active, although nonethnically based 
groups report a greater degree of restrictions on their activities.
    Authorities have become particularly vigilant in recent years in 
curbing what is perceived as increasing proselytizing activities by 
evangelical Christians, whose services are conducted in Persian. 
Conversion of a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion can be considered 
apostasy. Government officials have reacted to this perceived activity 
by closing evangelical churches and arresting converts. Members of 
evangelical congregations are required to carry membership cards, 
photocopies of which must be provided to the authorities. Worshipers 
are subject to identity checks by authorities posted outside 
congregation centers. Meetings for evangelical services have been 
restricted by the authorities to Sundays, and church officials have 
been ordered to inform the Ministry of Information and Islamic Guidance 
before admitting new members to their congregations.
    Evangelical church leaders are subject to pressure from authorities 
to sign pledges committing them not to evangelize Muslims or to allow 
Muslims to attend church services. Evangelical communities in Iran 
report a heightened sense of fear from authorities in the period since 
the murders of three prominent Iranian evangelical ministers in 1994, 
Reverends Tatavous Michaelian, Mehdi Dibaj, and Haik Hovsepian Mehr. 
Three female members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization were 
convicted for the murders of the three ministers; however, many 
observers believe that authorities played a role in the killings. Late 
in the year, a prominent investigative journalist raised new questions 
about the guilt of the three women convicted of the 1994 murders, 
alleging that the real murderers may have been officials within the 
Intelligence Ministry linked to the deaths of several prominent 
dissidents in late 1998 (see Section 1.a.).
    One organization reported 8 deaths of evangelical Christians at the 
hands of authorities in the past 10 years, and between 15 and 23 
disappearances in the year between November 1997 and November 1998.
    Oppression of evangelical Christians continued during the year. 
Christian groups reported instances of government harassment of 
churchgoers in Tehran, in particular against worshipers at the Assembly 
of God congregation in the capital. Instances of harassment cited 
included conspicuous monitoring outside Christian premises by 
Revolutionary Guards to discourage Muslims or converts from entering 
church premises and demands for presentation of identity papers of 
worshipers inside. Iranian Christians International (ICI) detailed the 
cases of Alireza and Mahboobeh Mahmoudian, converts to Christianity and 
lay leaders of the Saint Simon the Zealot Osgofi Church in Shiraz, who 
were forced to leave the country permanently in June 1998 after 
continued harassment by the authorities. The ICI reported that Alireza 
Mahmoudian had lost his job because of his conversion and had been 
beaten repeatedly by Basiji and Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs on the orders 
of government officials from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance. His 
wife, Mahboobeh, also had been the subject of intimidation, principally 
through frequent and aggressive interrogation by government officials.
    Estimates of the size of the Iranian Jewish community vary from 
25,000 to 40,000. These figures represent a substantial reduction from 
the estimated 75,000 to 80,000 Jews who resided in the country prior to 
the 1979 Revolution.
    While Jews are a recognized religious minority, allegations of 
official discrimination are frequent. The Government's anti-Israel 
policies, coupled with a perception among radicalized Muslim elements 
in Iran that Jewish citizens support Zionism and the State of Israel, 
create a threatening atmosphere for the small Jewish community. Jewish 
leaders reportedly are reluctantto draw attention to official 
mistreatment of their community due to fear of government reprisal.
    Some outside Jewish groups cite an increase in anti-Semitic 
propaganda in the official and semi-official media as adding to the 
pressure felt by the Jewish community. One example cited is the 
periodic publication of the anti-Semitic and fictitious Protocols of 
the Elders of Zion, both by the Government and by periodicals 
associated with hard-line elements of the regime. In 1986 the Iranian 
Embassy in London was reported to have published and distributed the 
Protocols in English. The Protocols also were published in serial form 
in the country in 1994 and again in January. On the latter occasion 
they were published in Sobh, a conservative monthly publication 
reportedly aligned with the security services.
    There appears to be little restriction or interference with 
religious practice or education, but Jews were eased out of government 
positions after 1979. Jews are permitted to obtain passports and to 
travel outside the country; however, with the exception of certain 
business travelers, they are required by the authorities to obtain 
government clearance (and pay additional fees) before each trip abroad. 
The Government appears concerned about the emigration of Jews and 
permission generally is not granted for all members of a Jewish family 
to travel outside the country at the same time.
    In February and March, 13 Jews were arrested in the cities of 
Shiraz and Isfahan. Among the group were several prominent rabbis, 
teachers of Hebrew, and their students. The charges centered on alleged 
acts of espionage on behalf of Israel, an offense punishable by death. 
The Government claimed that several non-Jews also were arrested as part 
of the same operation. The judicial authorities did not reveal any 
evidence to support the continued detention of the 13 Jews, and no 
indictments were made. Governments around the world criticized the 
arrests and called for the safe treatment of the detainees, who were 
allowed only sporadic family visits and deliveries of kosher food. 
Credible bases for the charges appeared weak, but may relate to the 
reported occasional business travel of several of the detainees between 
Iran and Israel. Attempts by relatives and Jewish community leaders to 
gain clarification of the charges and assurances of due process were 
not successful. Jews in Iran reportedly are reluctant to protest or 
speak out publicly on the matter due to fear of government reprisal. 
None of the detainees were granted access to counsel, after nearly a 
year in jail.
    Human Rights Watch reported the death in May 1998 of Jewish 
businessman Ruhollah Kakhodah-Zadeh, who was hanged in prison without a 
public charge or legal proceeding. Reports indicate that Kakhodah-Zadeh 
may have been killed for assisting Jews to emigrate. As an accountant, 
Kakhoda-Zadeh had provided power-of-attorney services for Jews 
departing the country.
    The Government restricts the movement of several senior religious 
leaders, some of whom have been under house arrest for years (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.d.), and often charges members of religious 
minorities with crimes such as drug offenses, ``confronting the 
regime,'' and apostasy (see Section 1.e.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some restrictions 
on these rights. Citizens may travel to any part of the country, 
although there have been restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas during 
times of occasional heavy fighting. Road blocks and security checks are 
common on routes between major cities. Citizens may change their place 
of residence without obtaining official permission. The Government 
requires exit permits (a validation stamp placed in the traveler's 
passport) for draft-age males and citizens who are politically suspect. 
Some citizens, particularly those whose skills are in short supply and 
who were educated at government expense, must post bonds to obtain exit 
permits. The Government restricts the movement of certain religious 
minorities and of several religious leaders (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.c.).
    Citizens returning from abroad sometimes are subject to search and 
extensive questioning by government authorities for evidence of 
antiregime activities abroad. Cassette tapes, printed material, and 
personal correspondence and photographs are subject to confiscation.
    The Government permits Jews to travel abroad, but often denies them 
the multiple-exit permits normally issued to other citizens. The 
Government normally does not permit all members of a Jewish family to 
travel abroad at the same time. Baha'is often experience difficulty 
getting passports. Women must obtain the permission of their husband, 
father, or other living male relative in order to obtain a passport. 
Married women must receive written permission from their husbands 
before embarking on a trip outside the country.
    The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in 
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government generally cooperates 
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. Although the 
Government generally provides first asylum, the Government increased 
pressure on some refugees to return to their home countries, 
particularly as the economy has worsened.
    The country hosts a large refugee population. The Government and 
the UNHCR estimate that there are approximately 1.4 million Afghan 
refugees in the country. Of this total, about 21,200 are accommodated 
in refugee camps administered by the Government. The rest subsist on 
itinerant labor, often moving from place to place within the country. 
The UNHCR reported that from 1992 through August 1998, 568,671 Afghans 
were repatriated voluntarily to Afghanistan with the assistance of the 
UNHCR. The same report also estimated that within the same period, an 
estimated 1 million Afghans in Iran returned independently to their 
country. There were reports in late 1998 and early in the year of a 
surge in the numbers of Afghans forcibly repatriated to their country 
by government officials and military personnel. Reasons cited were a 
worsening economic situation and anger over the murders in August 1998 
of nine Iranian diplomats and journalists stationed at the Iranian 
Consulate in the Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif. There also were reports 
during this period of civilian mob attacks against groups of Afghan 
refugees, which resulted in numerous deaths. Afghan refugees who do not 
reside in official refugee camps increasingly are denied basic services 
from the State, including health services, education for their 
children, and housing. Refugee groups report that Afghans live in 
extreme poverty in groups of makeshift communities on the outskirts of 
villages.
    The UNHCR estimates that there are about 580,000 Iraqi Kurdish and 
Arab refugees in the country. Many of these Iraqi refugees originally 
were expelled by Iraq at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war because of 
their suspected Iranian origin. In many of these cases, both the Iraqi 
and Iranian Governments dispute their citizenship, rendering many of 
them, in effect, stateless. Other Iraqi refugees arrived following 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
    Although the Government claims to host more than 30,000 refugees of 
other nationalities, including Tajiks, Bosnians, Azeris, Eritreans, 
Somalis, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, it has provided no information 
about them or allowed the UNHCR or other organizations access to them.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The right of citizens to change their government is restricted. The 
Supreme Leader, the recognized Head of State, is selected for a life 
term by the Assembly of Experts. The Supreme Leader may also be removed 
by the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly itself is restricted to 
clerics, who serve an 8-year term and are chosen by popular vote from a 
list approved by the Government. There is no separation of state and 
religion, and clerics dominate the Government. The Government represses 
any attempts to separate state and religion, or to alter the State's 
existing theocratic foundation. The selection of candidates for 
elections effectively is controlled by the Government.
    The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed of 
six Islamic clergymen and six lay members who review all laws for 
consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution. The Council also 
screens political candidates for ideological, political, and religious 
suitability. It accepts only candidates who support a theocratic state; 
clerics who disagree with government policies also have been 
disqualified.
    Regularly scheduled elections are held for the President, members 
of the Majles, and the Assembly of Experts. Mohammad Khatami, a former 
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance who was impeached in 1992 by 
the Majles for ``liberalism'' and``negligence,'' was elected President 
in May 1997. The Interior Ministry estimated that over 90 percent of 
the eligible population voted in that election. During the campaign, 
there was considerable government intervention and censorship. For 
example, the Council of Guardians reviewed 238 candidates, including a 
woman, but allowed only 4 individuals to run. Three were clerics; all 
were men. Khatami won nearly 70 percent of the vote, with his greatest 
support coming from the middle class, youth, minorities, and women. The 
election results were not disputed, and the Government did not appear 
to have engaged in fraud.
    The Government in 1997 nullified results from the 1996 Majles 
elections in several districts, including Malayer, Astara, and Isfahan.
    Elections were held in the fall of 1998 for the 86-member Assembly 
of Experts. The Council of Guardians disqualified numerous candidates, 
which led to criticism from many observers that the Government 
improperly predetermined the election results.
    In February elections for nationwide local councils were held for 
the first time since the 1979 revolution. Government figures indicated 
that roughly 280,000 candidates competed for 130,000 council seats 
across the nation. Women were elected to seats in numerous districts. 
The Councils do not appear to have been granted the autonomy or 
authority that would make them effective or meaningful local 
institutions; doing so could be viewed as a threat to the control of 
the central Government.
    Vigorous parliamentary debates take place on various issues. Most 
deputies are associated with powerful political and religious 
officials, but often vote independently and shift from one faction to 
another.
    Women are underrepresented in government. They hold 13 of 270 
Majles seats. There are no female cabinet members. In 1997 President 
Khatami appointed the first female vice president (for environmental 
protection) since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Masoumeh Ebtekar, 
following his inauguration. Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance 
Ataollah Mohajerani appointed a second woman to a senior post, Azam 
Nouri, when he chose her in 1997 as his Deputy Minister for Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs. President Khatami appointed a woman to serve as 
Presidential Adviser for Women's Affairs.
    Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians elect deputies to specially 
reserved Majles seats. However, the UN Special Representative noted in 
his September report frequent assertions that religious minorities are, 
by law and practice, barred from being elected to a representative body 
(except to the seats in the Majles reserved for minorities), and from 
holding senior government or military positions. Religious minorities 
are allowed to vote, but they may not run for president.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government continued to restrict the work of local human rights 
groups. The Government denies the universality of human rights and has 
stated that human rights issues should be viewed in the context of a 
country's ``culture and beliefs.''
    Various professional groups representing writers, journalists, 
photographers, and others attempt to monitor government restrictions in 
their field and harassment and intimidation against individual members 
of their professions. However, their ability to meet, organize, and 
effect change is curtailed severely by the Government.
    International human rights NGO's such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) 
and Amnesty International, are not permitted to establish offices or 
conduct regular investigative visits to Iran. Human Rights Watch 
reported that it was able to send its researcher, an Iranian national, 
to Iran during the year, but that other HRW staff members and 
representatives of other human rights NGO's were denied visas.
    The ICRC and the UNHCR both operate in the country. However, the 
Government did not allow the U.N. Special Representative for Human 
Rights in Iran to visit the country during the year. He was last 
allowed entry into Iran to gather information for his yearly report in 
1996. However, the Special Representativecorresponded with government 
officials during the year, and received several replies to his 
correspondence.
    Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was established in 1995 
under the authority of the head of the judiciary, who sits on its board 
as an observer. In 1996 the Government established a human rights 
committee in the Majles. Most observers believe that these bodies lack 
independence. The U.N. Special Representative published statistics 
provided by the IHRC indicating that in the period from March 1998 to 
March 1999, 1,051 files were opened on the basis of complaints received 
by the organization. Of those the highest number of complaints were 
related to the judiciary. Of a total of some 3,000 currently active 
files, approximately 1,000 were related to women and women's issues. 
The Special Representative urged that the statistics in the reports of 
the IHRC be broken down further and that positive trends and best 
practices be publicized, and that a national action plan for human 
rights be developed.
    In January a newspaper quoted Mohammad Zia'i Far, secretary of the 
IHRC, as calling for greater information from government authorities 
regarding the government's investigation into the murders of prominent 
dissidents and intellectuals in late 1998 (see section 1.a.). The press 
also reported that the IHRC sought permission from the Special Court 
for the Clergy to visit imprisoned cleric Mohsen Kadivar in Evin Prison 
in March (see Section 1.e.). The request reportedly was never answered. 
In 1998 Ziaei-Far reportedly complained about the use by police of 
``special detention centers'' to conduct coercive interrogations of 
detainees (see Section 1.c.) and acknowledged widespread human rights 
violations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    In general the Government does not discriminate on the basis of 
race, disability, language, or social status. The Government does 
discriminate on the basis of religion and sex.
    Women.--Although reported cases of spousal abuse and violence 
against women occur, the statistics on such reports are not available 
publicly. Abuse in the family is considered a private matter and seldom 
is discussed publicly. In May the President's Advisor on Women's 
Affairs was quoted in the press as stating that ``one cannot claim that 
violence against women does not take place in Iran.'' The Special 
Representative noted in his September report the ongoing development by 
the Government of a ``National Action Plan'' to address violence 
against women, which reportedly is to include ``legal and judicial 
measures, a public information campaign, establishment of a women's 
police college, and an organization for defending women in peril as 
well as victims of violence.'' There was no indication when this plan 
would be complete.
    Women have access to primary and advanced education; however, 
social and legal constraints tend to limit their professional 
opportunities. Women are represented in many fields of the work force, 
and the Government has not prevented women from entering many 
traditionally male-dominated fields, including medicine, dentistry, 
journalism and agriculture. Women's entry into these and other fields 
was necessitated by the by loss of male lives in the 1980-88 war 
between Iran and Iraq. However, many women choose not to work outside 
the home. A 1985 law enacted by the Government instituted 3 months of 
paid maternity leave, and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing 
mothers to feed their babies. Pension benefits for women were 
established under the same law, which also decreed that companies 
hiring women should provide day-care facilities for young children of 
female employees.
    The State enforces gender segregation in most public spaces, and 
prohibits women mixing openly with unmarried men or men not related to 
them. Women must ride in a reserved section on public buses and enter 
public buildings, universities, and airports through separate 
entrances. Women are prohibited from attending male sporting events, 
although this restriction does not appear to be enforced universally. 
While the enforcement of a conservative Islamic dress codes has varied 
with the political climate since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 
1989, what women wear in public is not entirely a matter of personal 
choice. Women are subject to harassment by the authorities if their 
dress or behavior is considered inappropriate, and may be sentenced to 
flogging or imprisonment for such violations. The law prohibits the 
publication of pictures of uncovered women inthe print media, including 
pictures of foreign women. There are penalties for failure to observe 
Islamic dress codes at work (see Section 6.a.).
    Discrimination against women is reinforced by law through 
provisions of the Islamic Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those 
sections dealing with family and property law. Shortly after the 1979 
revolution, the Government repealed the Family Protection Law, a 
hallmark bill that was adopted in 1967, which gave women increased 
rights in the home and workplace, and replaced it with a legal system 
based largely on Shari'a practices. In 1998 the Majles approved a bill 
that mandated segregation of the sexes in the provision of medical 
care. The bill provided for women to be treated only by female 
physicians and men by male physicians and raised questions about the 
quality of care that women could receive under such a regime, 
considering the current imbalance between the number of trained and 
licensed male and female physicians and specialists.
    The minimum legal age of marriage for women is 9, although marriage 
at that age is rare. All women, no matter the age, must have the 
permission of their father or a living male relative in order to get 
married. The law allows for the practice of Siqeh, or temporary 
marriage, a Shi'a custom in which a woman or a girl can become the wife 
of a married or single Muslim male after a simple and brief religious 
ceremony. The Siqeh marriage can last for a night or as little as 30 
minutes. The bond is not recorded on identification documents, and, 
according to Islamic law, men may have as many Siqeh wives as they 
wish. Such wives are not granted rights associated with traditional 
marriage.
    The Penal Code includes provisions that mandate the stoning of 
women and men convicted of adultery (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.). Under 
legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to divorce, and 
regulations promulgated in 1984 substantially broadened the grounds on 
which a woman may seek a divorce. However, a husband is not required to 
cite a reason for divorcing his wife. In 1986 the Government issued a 
12-point ``contract'' to serve as a model for marriage and divorce, 
which limits the privileges accorded to men by custom and traditional 
interpretations of Islamic law. The model contract also recognized a 
divorced woman's right to a share in the property that couples acquire 
during their marriage and to increased alimony rights. Women who 
remarry are forced to give up to the child's father custody of children 
from earlier marriages. In 1998 the Majles passed a law that granted 
custody of minor children to the mother in certain divorce cases in 
which the father is proven unfit to care for the child (the measure was 
enacted because of the complaints of mothers who had lost custody of 
their children to former husbands with drug addictions and criminal 
records.) Muslim women may not marry non-Muslim men. The testimony of a 
woman is worth only half that of a man in court (see Section 1.e.). A 
married woman must obtain the written consent of her husband before 
traveling outside the country (see Section 2.d.).
    Children.--Most children have access to education through the 12th 
grade (it is compulsory to age 11), and to some form of health care. 
There is no known pattern of child abuse.
    People With Disabilities.--There is no available information 
regarding whether the Government has legislated or otherwise mandated 
accessibility for the disabled. However, the Cable News Network 
reported in 1996 on the harsh conditions in an institution for retarded 
children who had been abandoned by their parents. Film clips showed 
children tied or chained to their beds, in filthy conditions, and 
without appropriate care. It is not known to what extent this 
represents the typical treatment of the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Members of all religious minorities suffer 
varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly 
in the areas of employment, education, and housing. Applicants for 
public-sector employment are screened for their adherence to Islam. The 
law stipulates penalties for government workers who do not observe 
``Islam's principles and rules.'' Religious minorities cannot serve in 
the army, the judiciary, and the security services. Article 144 of the 
Constitution states that ``the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
must be an Islamic army,'' whichis ``committed to an Islamic 
ideology,'' and must ``recruit into its service individuals who have 
faith in the objectives of the Islamic Revolution and are devoted to 
the cause of achieving its goals.'' Muslims who convert to Christianity 
also suffer discrimination. Apostasy, or conversion from Islam to 
another religion, is punishable by death.
    The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha'i minorities suffer 
varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly 
in the areas of employment, education, and public accommodations (see 
Section 2.d.). For example, members of religious minorities are 
generally barred from becoming school principals. Muslims who convert 
to Christianity also suffer discrimination. Apostasy, or conversion 
from Islam to another religion, may be punishable by death.
    University applicants are required to pass an examination in 
Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive instruction 
in Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious 
minorities to higher education. Applicants for public sector employment 
similarly are screened for their adherence to Islam.
    Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system, 
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits, and incurring 
heavier punishments than Muslims.
    Sunni Muslims encounter religious discrimination at the local 
level, as do practitioners of the Sufi tradition. Muslims who convert 
to Christianity also suffer discrimination.
    Jewish groups outside Iran noted that the arrest of 13 Jewish 
individuals in February and March coincided with an increase in anti-
Semitic propaganda in newspapers and journals associated with hard-line 
elements of the Government (see Section 2.c.). They also note that the 
Shirazi Jewish community, one of the oldest remaining Jewish 
communities outside Israel, had been under close observation by 
government authorities prior to the arrests and had been warned by the 
authorities against certain activities, such as the publication in 
Persian of scriptures and guidelines for the treatment of kosher foods.
    In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative Reported the existence of a 
government policy directive to block the progress of Baha'is (see 
Section 2.c.).
    Properties belonging to the Baha'i community as a whole, such as 
places of worship and graveyards, were confiscated by the Government in 
the years after the 1979 revolution and, in some cases, defiled. 
Baha'is are prevented from enrolling in universities. Other Government 
restrictions have eased; Baha'is currently may obtain ration booklets 
and send their children to public elementary and secondary schools. 
Thousands of Baha'is who were dismissed from government jobs in the 
early 1980's receive no unemployment benefits and have been required to 
repay the Government for salaries or pensions received from the first 
day of employment. Those unable to do so face prison sentences (see 
Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Kurds seek greater autonomy 
from the central Government and continue to suffer from government 
discrimination. The Kurds' status as Sunni Muslims serves as an 
aggravating factor in their relations with the Shi'a-dominated 
government. These tensions predate the Islamic revolution. Kurds often 
are suspected of harboring separatist or foreign sympathies by 
government authorities. These suspicions have led to sporadic outbreaks 
of fighting between the government and Kurdish groups. Human Rights 
Watch reported in September 1997 that in the wake of the Gulf War and 
the creation of an autonomous Kurdish zone in northern Iraq, Iranian 
authorities increased their military presence in Kurdish areas of Iran, 
which often led to human rights abuses against Kurds. Abuses included 
destruction of villages, forced migrations, and widespread mining of 
Kurdish property. In 1994 Iranian government agents killed Dr. Abdul 
Rahman Gassemlou, a representative of the Kurdish Democratic Party of 
Iran in Vienna.
    In the wake of the February arrest of Kurdish Workers Party leader 
Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey, Iranian Kurds demonstrated in numerous 
cities in Iranian Kurdistan. In several instances, security forces 
suppressed the demonstrations by force. Human rights groups reported at 
least 20 deaths in the violence and several hundred arrests (see 
Sections 1.a.,1.c., and 2.b.).
    Azeris are well integrated into the Government and society, but 
complain of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. The Government 
traditionally has viewed Azeri nationalism as threatening, particularly 
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of an 
independent Azerbaijan.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code grants workers the 
right to establish unions; however, the Government does not allow 
independent unions to exist. A national organization known as the 
Worker's House, founded in 1982, is the sole authorized national labor 
organization. It serves primarily as a conduit for the Government to 
exert control over workers. The leadership of the Worker's House 
coordinates activities with Islamic labor councils, which are made up 
of representatives of the workers and one representative of management 
in industrial, agricultural, and service organizations of more than 35 
employees. These councils also function as instruments of government 
control, although they frequently have been able to block layoffs and 
dismissals.
    In 1991 the Government published a new Labor Code that allowed 
employers and employees to establish guilds. The guilds issue 
vocational licenses and help members find jobs.
    The Government does not tolerate any strike deemed to be at odds 
with its economic and labor policies. In 1993 the Parliament passed a 
law that prohibits strikes by government workers. It also prohibits 
government workers from having contacts with foreigners and stipulates 
penalties for failure to observe Islamic dress codes and principles at 
work. Nevertheless, strikes occur, and apparently in increasing numbers 
as the economy has worsened. A European-based labor organization that 
follows Iranian labor issues reported 181 protests and strikes by 
workers in the period from March 1998 to March 1999. These reportedly 
included strikes and protests by oil, textile, electrical 
manufacturing, and metal workers, and by the unemployed.
    Newspapers reported in May an ``unauthorized rally'' by thousands 
of workers over the Government's labor policies and the poor economy. 
Instances of late or partial pay for government workers are reportedly 
common.
    There are no known affiliations with international labor 
organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers do not 
have the right to organize independently and negotiate collective 
bargaining agreements. No information is available on mechanisms used 
to set wages. It is not known whether labor legislation and practice in 
the export processing zones differ from the law and practice in the 
rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Penal Code 
provides that the Government may require any person who does not have 
work to take suitable employment; however, this does not appear to be 
enforced regularly. This provision has been criticized frequently by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) as contravening ILO 
Convention 29 on forced labor. There is no information available on the 
Government's policy on forced and bonded labor by children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Labor Law prohibits employment of minors under 15 
years of age and places special restrictions on the employment of 
minors under age 18. Education is compulsory until age 11. The law 
permits children to work in agriculture, domestic service, and some 
small businesses. By law women and minors may not be employed in hard 
labor or, in general, night work. Information on the extent to which 
these regulations are enforced is not available. There is no 
information available on the Government's policy on forced and bonded 
labor by children (see Section 6.c.). A 1985 law provides for 3 months 
of paid maternity leave, and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing 
mothers to feed their babies.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code empowers the 
Supreme Labor Council to establish annual minimum wage levels for each 
industrial sector and region. It is not known if the minimum wages are 
adjusted annually or enforced. The Labor Code stipulates that the 
minimum wage should be sufficient to meet the living expenses of a 
family and should take inflation into account. Under current poor 
economic conditions, many middle-class citizens must work two or even 
three jobs to support their families. The daily minimum wage was raised 
in March 1997 to $2.80 (8,500 rials). This wage apparently is not 
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family. Information on the share of the working population covered by 
minimum wage legislation is not available.
    The Labor Code establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours maximum, 
with 1 weekly rest day, normally Fridays, and at least 12 days of paid 
annual leave and several paid public holidays.
    According to the Labor Code, a Supreme Safety Council, chaired by 
the Labor Minister or his representative, is responsible for promoting 
workplace safety and health. The Council reportedly has issued 28 
safety directives, and oversees the activities of 3,000 safety 
committees established in enterprises employing more than 10 persons. 
Labor organizations outside Iran allege that hazardous work 
environments are common in Iran, and result in thousands of worker 
deaths per year. It is not known how well the Ministry's inspectors 
enforce regulations. It is not known whether workers may remove 
themselves from hazardous situations without risking the loss of 
employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons 
were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 IRAQ *

    Political power in Iraq lies exclusively in a repressive one-party 
apparatus dominated by Saddam Hussein and members of his extended 
family. The provisional Constitution of 1968 stipulates that the Arab 
Ba'th Socialist Party governs Iraq through the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC), which exercises both executive and legislative 
authority. President Saddam Hussein, who is also Prime Minister, 
Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary General of the Regional Command of 
the Ba'th Party, wields decisive power. Saddam Hussein and his regime 
continued to refer to an October 1995 nondemocratic ``referendum'' on 
his presidency, in which he received 99.96 percent of the vote. This 
``referendum'' included neither secret ballots nor opposing candidates, 
and many credible reports indicated that voters feared possible 
reprisal for a negative vote. Ethnically and linguistically, the Iraqi 
population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrians, Yazidis, and 
Armenians. Historically, the religious mix is likewise varied: Shi'a 
and Sunni Muslims (both Arab and Kurdish), Christians (including 
Chaldeans and Assyrians), and Jews (most of whom have emigrated). Civil 
uprisings have occurred in recent years, especially in the north and 
the south. The Government has reacted against those who oppose it--or 
even question it--with extreme repression. The judiciary is not 
independent, and the President may override any court decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * The United States does not have diplomatic representation in 
Iraq. This report draws to a large extent on non-U.S. Government 
sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Government's security apparatus includes militias attached to 
the President, the Ba'th Party, and the Interior Ministry. The security 
forces play a central role in maintaining the environment of 
intimidation and fear on which government power rests. Security forces 
committed widespread, serious, and systematic human rights abuses.
    The Government owns all major industries and controls most of the 
highly centralized economy, which is based largely on oil production. 
The economy was damaged by the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, and Iraq has 
been under U.N. sanctions since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. As a 
result, the economy has been stagnant. Sanctions ban all exports, 
except for oil sales under U.N. Security Council Resolution 986 and 
subsequent resolutions (the ``oil-for-food'' program). Under the 
program, Iraq also is permitted, under U.N. control, to import food, 
medicine, and other humanitarian goods for essential civilian needs, as 
wellas spare parts for the oil sector. The Government continued to 
interfere with the international community's provision of humanitarian 
assistance to the populace by placing a higher priority on importing 
industrial items and expensive, sophisticated medical equipment, rather 
than basic food and medicine, by diverting goods to benefit the regime, 
and by restricting the work of U.N. personnel and relief workers. The 
Security Council passed resolution 1284 in December which, among other 
things, permits Iraq to export as much oil as required to meet 
humanitarian needs under the U.N. oil-for-food program.
    The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor. 
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The 
Government continued to execute summarily perceived political opponents 
and leaders in the Shi'a religious community. Reports suggest that 
persons were executed merely because of their association with an 
opposition group or as part of a continuing effort to reduce prison 
populations. The Government continued to be responsible for 
disappearances and to kill and torture persons suspected of--or related 
to persons suspected of--economic crimes, military desertion, and a 
variety of other activities. Iraqi military operations continued to 
target Shi'a Arabs living in the southern marshes. Security forces 
routinely tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise abused detainees. Prison 
conditions are poor. The authorities routinely used arbitrary arrest 
and detention, prolonged detention, and incommunicado detention, and 
continued to deny citizens the basic right to due process. The 
judiciary is not independent. The Government continued to infringe on 
citizens' privacy rights. The Government has made use of civilians, 
including small children, as ``human shields'' against military 
attacks.
    The Government severely restricts freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, association, religion, and movement. The U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights Special Rapporteur for Iraq, Max van der Stoel, who 
resigned in October, confirmed in his February and October reports that 
these freedoms do not exist, except in some parts of the north under 
the control of Kurdish factions. Human rights abuses remain difficult 
to document because of the Government's efforts to conceal the facts, 
including its prohibition on the establishment of independent human 
rights organizations, its persistent refusal to grant visits to human 
rights monitors, and its continued restrictions designed to prevent 
dissent. Denied entry to Iraq, the Special Rapporteur based his reports 
on the Government's human rights abuses on interviews with recent 
emigres from Iraq, interviews with opposition groups and others that 
have contacts inside Iraq, and on published reports. The Special 
Rapporteur concluded that the political and legal orders were ``not 
compatible with respect for human rights,'' and that it entailed 
``systematic and systemic violations throughout the country, affecting 
virtually the whole population.'' Violence and discrimination against 
women are common. The Government neglects the health and nutritional 
needs of children, and discriminates against religious minorities and 
ethnic groups. The Government restricts worker rights, child labor 
persists, and there were instances of forced labor.
    Kurdish groups committed abuses against civilians in the north.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government 
committed numerous political and other extrajudicial killings. The 
Government has a long record of executing perceived opponents. The U.N. 
Special Rapporteur, the international media, and other groups all 
report a heightened number of summary executions in Iraq since 1997, 
assertions that are supported in detail by several sources in Iraq. The 
Special Rapporteur has stated that ``the country is run through 
extrajudicial measures.'' The list of offenses requiring a mandatory 
death penalty has grown substantially in recent years and now includes 
anything that could be characterized as ``sabotaging the national 
economy,'' including forgery, as well as smuggling cars, spare parts, 
material, heavy equipment, and machinery. The Special Rapporteur also 
noted that membership in certain political parties is punishable by 
death, that there is a pervasive fear of death for any act or 
expression of dissent, and that there are recurrent reports of the use 
of the death penalty for such offenses as ``insulting'' the President 
or the Ba'th Party. ``The mere suggestion that someone is not a 
supporter of the President carries the prospect of the deathpenalty,'' 
the Special Rapporteur stated. Government killings occurred with total 
impunity and without due process.
    The regime periodically eliminated large numbers of political 
detainees en masse. During the year, the Special Rapporteur continued 
to receive reports referring to a ``prison cleansing'' execution 
campaign taking place in Abu Ghraib and Radwaniyah prisons. Opposition 
groups alleged that all political prisoners with sentences of more than 
15 to 20 years were subject to summary execution. Opposition groups, 
including the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
(SCIRI), the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the Iraqi National Congress 
(INC), and others with a network inside the country provided detailed 
accounts of summary executions, including the names of hundreds of 
persons killed.
    In mid-January, Saddam Hussein's son Qusay Hussein ordered the 
execution of three senior military officers. According to Shi'a 
opposition sources, 27 members of the Fedayeen Saddam were executed in 
January. Authorities delivered the bodies to the families on the 
festival of Eid Al-Fitr (the end of the holy month of Ramadan). On 
February 23, officers suspected of plotting a coup were executed. 
Amnesty International reported that seven high-ranking officers who 
commanded Iraqi forces during the Gulf War were executed in March. 
Scores of persons also were tortured, then summarily executed, on 
suspicion of participating in demonstrations in Basra on March 17. The 
executions reportedly were carried out under the direct supervision of 
senior government authorities, including Ali Hassan Al-Majid, Ahmed 
Ibrahim Hamash, and Abdul Baqi Al-Saadoon. Authorities executed a 70-
year-old blind man and seven of his eight sons early in the year after 
announcing that the eighth son, who had fled the country, was suspected 
in the 1996 attempt on the life of Uday Hussein, Saddam Hussein's 
oldest son. Another suspect and the suspect's father also were arrested 
and executed. The families of those executed were required to recover 
the bodies one-by-one over a 10-day period. The houses of those 
executed were demolished several days later (see Section 1.f.). In 
April 58 political prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib Prison, and an 
additional 26 were killed there in August. In August security forces 
executed five young men from areas of Kirkuk where antiregime leaflets 
were distributed (see Section 1.d.). The Center for Human Rights of the 
Iraqi Communist Party reported the September execution of 11 political 
dissidents held since the March 1991 uprising following the Gulf War. 
On October 12, 123 prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib prison. Of 
that number, 19 were held and executed due to their political beliefs. 
The remaining 104 were executed for common crimes. A senior retired 
officer and two other serving officers reportedly were executed on 
November 22 on charges of treason and conspiracy. Retired Major General 
Abd Al-Karim Al-Hamadani was said to have criticized the central 
Government for the country's involvement in the war with Iran and 
invasion of Kuwait. No information was disclosed concerning the 
accusations against Lieutenant Colonel Falah Hamdan Al-Dulaymi and 
Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Battah Al-Dulaymi. The Iraqi Communist Party 
reported in December that 40 military officers were executed by firing 
squad on the orders of Ali Hassan Al-Majid (often referred to as 
``Chemical Ali'' for his role in the chemical weapon mass murder of 
Kurds in the 1980's). Sources inside Iraq reported in March that 93 
prisoners had been executed at Radhwaniyah prison in November 1998. A 
further 96 political detainees, including 22 military officers, plus an 
additional 23 prisoners charged with common crimes such as theft, were 
executed at Abu Ghraib prison in December 1998.
    The Government's motive for so many summary executions--estimated 
to be between 2,500 and 3,000 since 1997--is not known, although 
intimidation of the population and reduction of prison populations 
often are reported. There are persistent reports that Uday Hussein has 
remained active in carrying out extrajudicial killings. As in previous 
years, there were numerous credible reports that the regime continued 
to execute persons thought to be involved in plotting against Saddam 
Hussein or the Ba'th Party. These executions included high-ranking 
civilian, military, and tribal leaders. For example, five Republican 
Guard officers accused of preparing to kill Qusay Hussein reportedly 
were executed in November. Colonel Ibrahim Jasim, Lieutenant Colonel 
Abd Al-Sattar Khalaf, Captain Ali Husayn, Captain Dauwd Muhammad, and 
Captain Umar Abd Al-Razzaq Al-Baydi were killed by a firing squad on 
November 29. A sixth alleged coconspirator, retired General Muhammad 
Qasim, reportedly committed suicide by drinking poison.
    The Special Rapporteur received detailed information concerning 
what he has called ``political killings,'' described as thepreplanned 
killings of individuals carried out by government agents. Following the 
1998 killings of two internationally respected religious scholars, 
Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Mirza Ali Al-Gharawi, age 68, and Ayatollah 
Sheikh Murtada Al-Burujerdi, age 69, the Special Rapporteur expressed 
his concern in a letter to the Government that the murders might be 
part of a systematic attack by Iraqi officials on the independent 
leadership of Shi'a Muslims in Iraq. The Government did not respond and 
the attacks continued. On January 6, Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir 
Hussain Al-Najafi and members of his seminary were attacked while 
performing religious duties. A grenade thrown at them killed three 
persons. Although wounded, Al-Najafi survived the attack.
    On February 19, for the third time in less than 12 months, another 
leading Shi'a cleric and two of his sons were killed. Ayatollah 
Mohammad Sadeq Al-Sadr and his sons, Hojjatue Al-Islam Al-Sayyid 
Mostafa Al-Sadr and Al-Sayyid Mu'ammai Al-Sadr, were shot in a car as 
they left a prayer session (see Section 2.g.). Al-Sadr's death was 
widely attributed to the Government because he was killed immediately 
after leading Friday prayers, despite an order not to do so issued by 
the Central Euphrates Region Military Governor and Revolutionary 
Command Council member Mohammad Hamza Al-Zubeidi. Shortly before he was 
killed, the Ayatollah spoke against government restrictions on 
religious freedom. He also had been interrogated by the security 
services on several occasions.
    Several weeks later, the Government executed 12 persons who were 
allegedly responsible for the deaths of the clerics. One of those 
executed, after purportedly having confessed to the February murder of 
Al-Sadr, reportedly had been in detention since the end of December 
1998. According to a report submitted to the Special Rapporteur in 
September, another of Al-Sadr's sons, Sayyid Muqtada Al-Sadr, was 
arrested later in the year along with a large number of theological 
students who had studied under the Ayatollah. Nineteen followers of Al-
Sadr reportedly were executed toward the end of the year, including 
Sheikh Muhammad Al-Numani, Friday imam Sheikh Abd-Al-Razzaq Al-Rabi'i, 
assistant Friday imam Kazim Al-Safi, and students from a religious 
seminary in Al-Najaf.
    In October the regime reportedly executed novelist Hamad Al-
Moukhtar at Abu Ghraib prison after he spent several months in jail. A 
group of exiled dissident writers, including poet Sa'adi Youssef and 
literary critic Yassin Al-Nassir, said Moukhtar was arrested after he 
held a funeral for Al-Sadr.
    Another killing believed to be politically motivated included that 
of Intelligence Chief Rafa Daham Mujawwal Al-Tikriti, Saddam Hussein's 
second cousin and the former Iraqi ambassador to Turkey. Rafa died 
October 11, 3 days after he was removed from his post. Government 
explanations for his death included both that he had died in a car 
crash and that he had suffered a heart attack. Some opposition sources 
said Rafa was killed for failing to protect information about Iraq's 
military deals with Russia, although others asserted that Rafa's 
reputed rivalry with Uday Hussein was a factor that led to his death.
    The Government apparently revived its prior use of thallium 
poisoning as a means of killing political opponents. Although not 
widely used in recent years, the use of slow-acting poisons such as 
thallium (a radioactive substance that can be dissolved in drinking 
water) was a preferred method of political killing in the late 1980's 
and early 1990's. Observers attributed the August 29 death of Iraq's 
chief architect Husam Bahnam Khuduri and the August attempted murder of 
Salahadeen University president Hamed Idris to political plots. Khuduri 
had extensive knowledge about the construction of Saddam's palaces, 
tunnels, and bunkers. While the official obituary did not state a cause 
of death, acquaintances reported that Khuduri showed signs of being 
under the effect of slow-acting poison during the days before he died. 
Similarly, Salahadeen University president Idris, long active in human 
rights circles, also developed signs of the effects of a slow-acting 
poison in August. Laboratory tests conducted outside Iraq confirmed the 
presence of thallium in his system. Because the attempted murder of 
Idris occurred outside of central government control in northern Iraq, 
he was able to obtain medical attention, and he survived. Other 
suspected thallium-poisoning cases include those of former Security 
director Abd Al-Rahman Ahmad Al-Duri, who reportedly was dying of 
thallium poisoning in December, and former Security director Taha Al-
Ahbabi (Al-Duri's successor), who died mysteriously in 1998.
    Construction engineer Hasin Aslan was tortured to death in December 
due to suspicion that he tried to smuggle palace tunnelplans out of the 
country, according to a report by the Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
    Reports of death due to poor prison conditions continued (see 
Section 1.c.). Many persons who were displaced forcibly still live in 
tent camps under harsh conditions, which results in many deaths (see 
Sections 2.d. and 5).
    As in previous years, the regime continued to deny the widespread 
killings of Kurds in northern Iraq during the ``Anfal'' Campaign of 
1988 (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). Both the Special Rapporteur and 
Human Rights Watch have concluded that the Government's policies 
against the Kurds raise issues of crimes against humanity and 
violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention.
    Political killings and terrorist actions continued in northern 
Iraq. For example, Farhat Farag, a Kurdish political activist in the 
Revolutionary Communist Party, was killed in front of his home in 
Sulaymaniyah on October 17. Abdullah Mushir Panhani, a member of the 
Iranian Communist Party Komala, was abducted and shot on October 22, 
and his body was left on the streets of Irbil. An attempt on the life 
of Sulaymaniyah University professor Suhayb Amin Hawzheen failed in 
December. The perpetrators were unknown at year's end.
    Many Assyrian groups reported a series of bombings in Irbil in 
December 1998, and in January and December. On December 15, a bomb 
killed 60-year-old Habib Yousif Dekhoka in front of his store (see 
Sections 1.g. and 5).
    On June 19, the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA) reported 
that the partially decomposed body of Helena Aloun Sawa, a 21-year-old 
Assyrian woman missing since early May, was discovered by a shepherd in 
a shallow grave near Dohuk dam. Her family reportedly suspected that 
she was raped. Sawa was a housekeeper for Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) Political Bureau member Izzeddin Al-Barwari. Reporting that the 
KDP offered no assistance in searching for Sawa and that Al-Barwari had 
intimidated the family into not pursuing an investigation, AINA 
concluded that the murder ``resembles a well-established pattern'' of 
complicity by Kurdish authorities in attacks against Assyrian 
Christians in northern Iraq. It reported that Sawa had been coerced 
into working for Al-Barwari to restore to her family a KDP pension that 
had been suspended arbitrarily. The pension had been awarded because of 
the recognition of Sawa's father as a KDP martyr after he was killed in 
the uprising against the Iraqi regime in 1991.
    However, on June 21, a spokesperson for the Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) announced that the Dohuk police Homicide Division and 
the Dohuk General Security Department were investigating the Sawa 
murder. A subsequent KRG statement indicated that there did not appear 
to be a ``political or racial'' motive. The KRG noted that the Al-
Barwari family had reported last seeing Sawa when she left Dohuk on her 
way to a vacation at her family village in the Nerwa O Rakan area, and 
that Al-Barwari had been in Damascus, Syria at the time. Nevertheless, 
Al-Barwari was suspended from official KDP duties pending the 
conclusion of the investigation. At the end of June, KDP President 
Massoud Barzani decided to appoint a three-member commission to further 
investigate the killing. No results of that investigation were reported 
by year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--The Special Rapporteur continued to receive 
reports of widespread disappearances. In some cases, individuals have 
disappeared while in government custody. For example, the status of six 
members of the Assyrian community of Baghdad, arrested in October 1996, 
is unknown. Hundreds still are missing in the aftermath of the brief 
Iraqi military occupation of Irbil in August 1996. Many of these 
persons may have been killed surreptitiously late in 1997 and 
throughout 1998, in the reported ``prison-cleansing'' campaign (see 
Section 1.a.). Thirty-three members of the Yazidi community of Mosul, 
who were arrested in July 1996, still are unaccounted for. Sources 
inside the country reported the existence of special prison wards that 
hold individuals whose whereabouts, status, and fate may not be not be 
inquired into (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government continued to ignore the more than 15,000 cases 
conveyed to it in 1994 and 1995 by the United Nations, as well as 
requests from the Governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the 
whereabouts of those missing from Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait, 
and from Iran on the whereabouts of prisoners of war that Iraq captured 
in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.
    The United Nations has documented over 16,000 cases of persons who 
have disappeared. According to the Special Rapporteur, there continued 
to be a high number of disappearances reported to the United Nations. 
The majority of the 16,496 cases known to the Special Rapporteur are 
persons of Kurdish origin who disappeared during the 1988 Anfal 
Campaign. He estimated that the total number of Kurds who disappeared 
during that period could reach the tens of thousands. Human Rights 
Watch estimates the total at between 70,000 and 150,000, and Amnesty 
International at more than 100,000. The second largest group of cases 
known to the Special Rapporteur consist of Shi'a Muslims, who were 
reported to have disappeared in the late 1970's and early 1980's as 
their families were expelled to Iran due to their alleged Persian 
ancestry.
    In a 1997 report, Amnesty International documented the repeated 
failure by the Government to respond to requests for information about 
persons who have disappeared. The report detailed unresolved cases 
dating from the early 1980's through the mid-1990's, particularly the 
disappearances of Aziz Al-Sayyid Jassem, Sayyid Muhammad Sadeq Muhammad 
Ridha Al-Qazwini, Mazin Abd Al-Munim Al-Samarra'i, the six Al-Hashimi 
brothers, the four Al-Sheibani brothers, and numerous persons of 
Iranian descent or of the Shi'a branch of Islam. The report concludes 
that few of these victims became targets of the regime for any crime; 
rather, they were arrested and held as ``hostages'' in order to force a 
relative, who may have escaped abroad, to surrender. Others were 
arrested due to their family link to a political opponent or simply due 
to their ethnic origin (also see Section 1.f.).
    The Special Rapporteur and several human rights groups continued to 
request that the Government provide information about the 1991 arrest 
of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdul Qasim Al-Khoei and 108 of his 
associates. The Ayatollah died while under house arrest in Al-Najaf. 
Other individuals who were arrested with him have not been accounted 
for, and the Government refuses to respond to queries regarding their 
status. Similarly, Amnesty International identified a number of 
Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr's aides who were arrested in the weeks prior to 
his killing in February (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 1.g.). Their 
whereabouts remain unknown. In its November report, Amnesty 
International identifies eight aides of Al-Sadr who disappeared.
    The Government failed to return, or account for, a large number of 
Kuwaiti citizens and citizens of other countries who were detained 
during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Government officials, including 
military leaders known to have been among the last to see the persons 
who disappeared during the occupation, have refused to respond to the 
hundreds of outstanding inquiries about the missing. Of 609 cases of 
missing Kuwaiti citizens under review by the Trilateral Commission on 
Gulf War Missing, only 3 have been resolved. The Government denies 
having any knowledge of the others and claims that any relevant records 
were lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Iran reports that 5,000 
Iranian prisoners from the Iran-Iraq War are unaccounted for by Iraq.
    In addition to the tens of thousands of reported disappearances, 
human rights groups reported during the year that the Government 
continued to hold thousands of other Iraqis in incommunicado detention 
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, the security 
services routinely and systematically tortured detainees. According to 
former prisoners, torture techniques included branding, electric shocks 
administered to the genitals and other areas, beating, pulling out of 
fingernails, burning with hot irons, suspension from rotating ceiling 
fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs, denial of 
food and water, extended solitary confinement in dark and extremely 
small compartments, and threats to rape or otherwise harm family 
members and relatives. Evidence of such torture often was apparent when 
security forces returned the bodies of mutilated torture victims to 
their families. There are persistent reports that the families are made 
to pay for the costs of the execution. Iraqi refugees who arrive in 
Europe often reported instances of torture to receiving governments, 
and displayed scars and mutilations to substantiate their claims. 
Amnesty International noted that Iraqi authorities have failed to 
investigate these reports.
    The Special Rapporteur continued to receive reports that arrested 
persons routinely are subjected to mistreatment, including prolonged 
interrogations accompanied by torture, beatings, and various 
deprivations. For some years, the Special Rapporteur has expressed 
concern about cruel and unusual punishments prescribed by the law, 
including amputations and brandings. The Special Rapporteur received a 
report that six members of a commando unit that was accused of looting 
had their hands amputated by order of Uday Hussein in August 1998. An 
army deserter who also was involved in the alleged banditry was ordered 
to be punished in the same manner.
    The Special Rapporteur, human rights organizations, and opposition 
groups continued to receive reports of women who suffered from severe 
psychological trauma after being raped while in custody. The security 
forces allegedly raped women who were captured during the Anfal 
Campaign and during the occupation of Kuwait. The Government has never 
acknowledged these reports, conducted any investigation, or taken 
action against those who committed the rapes.
    A former Iraqi international soccer player stated in August that he 
and his teammates had been tortured on Uday Hussein's orders for not 
winning matches. Sharar Haydar Mohamad Al-Hadithi, who played for Iraq 
in international tournaments including in the 1988 Seoul Olympics, said 
that he was subjected to beatings on the soles of his feet, dragged 
shirtless through a gravel pit, then made to jump into sewage to cause 
infection. He also was subjected to sleep deprivation and beatings 
during periods of detention in the infamous Al-Radwaniya prison. His 
claims of brutality were supported by Uday Hussein's former private 
secretary and press spokesman Abbas Janabi who described watching 
members of the national soccer team being forced to kick a concrete 
ball on the grounds of Al-Radwaniya prison after they failed to qualify 
for the 1994 World Cup.
    KDP forces reportedly entered Assyrian villages on different 
occasions and beat villagers (see Section 2.d.). Assyrian groups 
reported several instances of mob violence by Muslims against 
Christians in the north in recent years (see Section 5).
    Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding is a serious problem. In 
May 1998, Labor and Social Affairs Minister Abdul Hamid Aziz Sabah 
stated in an interview that ``the prisons are filled to five times 
their capacity and the situation is serious.'' Sabah was dismissed from 
his post after the interview, and the government-owned daily newspaper 
Babel reiterated the Government's longstanding claim that it holds 
virtually no prisoners. It is unclear to what extent the mass 
executions committed pursuant to the ``prison cleansing'' campaign have 
reduced overcrowding (see Section 1.a.).
    Certain prisons are notorious for routine mistreatment of 
prisoners. Abu Ghraib prison, west of Baghdad, may hold as many as 
15,000 persons, many of whom reportedly are subjected to torture. Al-
Rashidiya prison, on the Tigris River north of Taji, reportedly has 
torture chambers. The Al-Shamma'iya prison, located in east Baghdad, 
holds the mentally ill and reportedly is the site of both torture and 
disappearances. The Al-Radwaniyah detention center is a former 
prisoner-of-war facility near Baghdad and reportedly the site of 
torture as well as mass executions (see Section 1.a.). This prison was 
the principal detention center for persons arrested following the civil 
uprisings of 1991. Human Rights Watch and others have estimated that 
Radwaniyah has held more than 5,000 detainees. A multistory underground 
detention and torture center reportedly was built under the general 
military hospital building close to the Al-Rashid military camp on the 
outskirts of Baghdad. The Center for Human Rights of the Iraqi 
Communist Party stated that the complex includes torture and execution 
chambers. A section reportedly is reserved for prisoners in a 
``frozen'' state: that is, those whose status, fate, or whereabouts may 
not be inquired into.
    Hundreds of Fayli (Shi'a) Kurds and other citizens of Iranian 
origin, who had disappeared in the early 1980's during the Iran-Iraq 
war, reportedly are being held incommunicado at the Abu Ghraib prison. 
According to a report received by the Special Rapporteur in 1998, these 
persons have been detained for close to 2 decades in extremely harsh 
conditions without specific charges or trials. The report states that 
many of these detainees had been used as experimental subjects in 
Iraq's outlawed chemical and biological weapons programs.
    Reports of deaths due to poor conditions in prisons and detention 
facilities also continued during the year. According to the U.N. 
Special Rapporteur, many prisoners in Amarah province were reportedly 
near death because of lack of adequate food and health care.
    The Government does not permit visits by human rights monitors.
    Iraqi Kurdish regional officials reported that prisons in the three 
northern provinces were open to the International Committee for the Red 
Cross (ICRC) and other international monitors. Regular and consistent 
improvement in conditions were observed on their weekly prison visits, 
ICRC officials stated. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) reported that they had reached agreement for 
the mutual release of political prisoners; however, no such release 
occurred.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the 
Legal Code explicitly prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention; however, 
the authorities routinely engaged in these practices. The Special 
Rapporteur continued to receive reports of widespread arbitrary arrest 
and detention, often for long periods of time, without access to a 
lawyer or the courts. As indicated in the November Amnesty 
International report entitled ``Iraq: Victims of Systematic 
Repression,'' many thousands of persons have been arrested arbitrarily 
in recent years because of suspected opposition activities or because 
they are related to persons sought by the authorities. Those arrested 
often are taken away by plainclothes security agents who offer no 
explanation or produce no warrant to the person or family members (see 
Section 1.f.). No legal representation or access by an arrested 
person's family is permitted. In most cases, family members do not know 
the whereabouts of those detained and do not make inquiries due to fear 
of reprisal. Many persons are taken away in front of family members who 
hear nothing further until days, months, or years later, when they are 
told to pick up the often-mutilated corpse of their loved one. There 
were also reports of the widespread practice of holding family members 
and close associates responsible for the alleged actions of others (see 
Sections 1.d. and 1.f.).
    Mass arbitrary arrest and detention often occurs in areas where 
antigovernment leaflets have been distributed. For example, on August 
14, following the August 12 distribution of antiregime leaflets by 
unknown persons in several districts of Kirkuk, security forces raided 
homes in the area and took away the young men in the families. Three 
days later, five of those detained were executed and their bodies were 
returned to their families.
    Other arrests have no apparent basis. For example, on July 28, 
Ahlam Khadom Rammahi, a housewife who left Iraq in 1982, traveled from 
London using her British passport to visit her mother, whom she had not 
seen since 1982 and who was ill. Authorities arrested Rammahi on August 
5. No reason was stated for the arrest, nor were her family members 
told of her whereabouts. Amnesty International reported that Ahlam was 
released September 7 as a result of international pressure. She managed 
to rejoin her family in the United Kingdom thereafter. According to 
international human rights groups, numerous foreigners arrested 
arbitrarily in previous years also remain in detention.
    Following assaults by the Government on the Shi'a residents of the 
Al-Thawra district in Baghdad, more than 600 residents reportedly were 
arrested in security sweeps (see Section 1.g.).
    In September Uday Hussein reportedly jailed four members of the 
Iraqi National Students Union for not carrying out his orders to take 
action against students known for their criticism of the situation in 
the country (see Sections 2.a. and 6.a.).
    The Government reportedly continued to target the Shi'a Muslim 
community for arbitrary arrest and other abuses. In the weeks preceding 
the February 19 killing of Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr and two of his sons, 
many of Al-Sadr's aides were arrested and their whereabouts remain 
unknown (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). Hundreds more reportedly were 
arrested and the houses of many demolished in the weeks following the 
killing (see Section 1.g.). According to a report submitted to the 
Special Rapporteur in September, the later arrests included Sayyid 
Muqtada Al-Sadr, surviving son of Ayatollah Al-Sadr. Amnesty 
International reported that those arrested prior to the killing 
included: Sheikh Awus Al-Khafaji, Sheikh As'ad Al-Nassiri, Sheikh Ahmad 
Al-Nassiri, Sheikh Al-Sayyid Adnan Al-Safi, Sheikh Ala Al-Baghdadi, 
Sheikh 'Aqil Al-Mussawi, Sheikh Tahsin Al-Abbudi, and Sayyid Hazem Al-
A'raji.
    In the large-scale assaults against Shi'a reported by several 
sources throughout the year (see Section 1.g.), many thousands of 
persons reportedly were arrested arbitrarily. The Human Rights 
Organization in Iraq (HROI) reported that 1093 persons were arrested in 
Basrah in June alone (see Section 1.g.). The Government also continued 
the forced internal relocation of Shi'a populations from the south to 
the north, and other minority groups such as Kurds, Assyrians and 
Turkomen, to Kurdish-controlled territory in the north (see Sections 
1.f., 2.d., and 5). Thousands of Gulf War refugees who sought haven in 
Baghdad were relocated forcibly to their home provinces (see Sections 
1.f. and 2.d.).
    Although no statistics are available, observers estimate the number 
of political detainees to be in the tens of thousands, some of whom 
have been held for decades.
    The Government announced in June a general amnesty for Iraqis who 
had left the country illegally or were exiled officially for a 
specified time, but failed to return after the period of exile expired 
(see Section 2.d.). No Iraqis are known to have returned to the country 
based upon this amnesty. An estimated 1 to 2 million self-exiled 
citizens are fearful of returning to Iraq.
    2e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent, 
and there is no check on the President's power to override any court 
decision. The Special Rapporteur and international human rights groups 
all observed during the year that the repressive nature of the 
political and legal systems precludes application of the rule of law. 
Numerous laws lend themselves to continued repression, and the 
Government uses extrajudicial methods to extract confessions or coerce 
cooperation with the regime.
    There are two parallel judicial systems: The regular courts, which 
try common criminal offenses, and the special security courts, which 
generally try national security cases but also maytry criminal cases. 
In addition to the Court of Appeal, there is the Court of Cassation, 
which is the highest court.
    Special security courts have jurisdiction in all cases involving 
espionage and treason, peaceful political dissent, smuggling, currency 
exchange violations, and drug trafficking. According to the Special 
Rapporteur and other sources, military officers or civil servants with 
no legal training head these tribunals, which hear cases in secret. 
Authorities often hold defendants incommunicado and do not permit 
contact with lawyers. The courts admit confessions extracted by 
torture, which often serve as the basis for conviction. Many cases 
appear to end in summary execution, although defendants may appeal to 
the President for clemency. Saddam Hussein may grant clemency in any 
case that suits his political goals. There are no Shari'a (Islamic law) 
courts as such. Regular courts are empowered to administer Islamic law 
in cases involving personal status, such as divorce and inheritance.
    Procedures in the regular courts theoretically provide for many 
protections. However, the regime often assigns to the security courts 
cases which, on their merits, would appear to fall under the 
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Trials in the regular courts are 
public, and defendants are entitled to counsel, at government expense 
in the case of indigents. Defense lawyers have the right to review the 
charges and evidence brought against their clients. There is no jury 
system; panels of three judges try cases. Defendants have the right to 
appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of Cassation.
    The Government shields certain groups from prosecution for alleged 
crimes. For example, a 1990 decree grants immunity to men who commit 
``honor crimes,'' that is, kill female family members for a perceived 
lack of chastity (see Section 5). A 1992 decree grants immunity from 
prosecution to members of the Ba'th Party and security forces who kill 
anyone while in pursuit of army deserters. Unconfirmed but widespread 
reports indicate that this decree has been applied to prevent trials or 
punishment of government officials.
    The personal whim of Saddam Hussein or one of his sons supersedes 
any legal proceedings. For example, according to a November Amnesty 
International report, Uday Hussein had a security guard's right hand 
cut off in front of other staff members at the National Olympic 
Committee's headquarters in 1996. The guard was accused when some 
sports equipment was missing from a warehouse while he was on duty 
outside the building. The amputation was carried out without a trial. 
When the equipment was located in another warehouse 3 weeks later, Uday 
Hussein reportedly ordered that the guard be compensated with $300 
(500,000 dinars).
    Because the Government rarely acknowledges arrests or 
imprisonments, and families are afraid to talk about arrests, it is 
difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners. Many of the 
tens of thousands of persons who disappeared or were killed in recent 
years originally were held as political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government frequently infringed on citizens' 
constitutional right to privacy, particularly in cases allegedly 
involving national security. The law defines security offenses so 
broadly that authorities effectively are exempt from the legal 
requirement to obtain search warrants, and searches without warrants 
are commonplace. The regime routinely ignored constitutional provisions 
designed to protect the confidentiality of mail, telegraphic 
correspondence, and telephone conversations. The Government 
periodically jammed news broadcasts from outside the country, including 
those of opposition groups. The security services and the Ba'th Party 
maintain pervasive networks of informers to deter dissident activity 
and instill fear in the public.
    Interior Minister Muhammad Zamam Abdul Razzak announced on November 
28 that more than 4,000 families (approximately 24,000 individuals) 
that sought refuge in Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War, were expelled 
from the city, and that more expulsions were likely. Most of those 
expelled had come to Baghdad from the governates of Wasit (in the 
east), Maysan and Dhi Qar (in the south), and Al-Qadisiyah (in the 
center of the country).
    In Kirkuk the regime periodically sealed off entire districts and 
conducted day-long, house-to-house searches, evidently aspart of its 
``Arabization'' campaign to harass and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkomen 
from the region (see Sections 2.d. and 5). Government officials also 
take hostage children from families of minority groups to intimidate 
their families into leaving their home regions (see Sections 1.d., 
2.d., and 5).
    The authorities systematically hold family members and close 
associates responsible for the alleged actions of others (see Sections 
1.a., 1.b., 1.d., and 1.g.) For example, Amnesty International reported 
that plainclothes security forces abducted 70-year-old lawyer Ibrahim 
Amin Al-'Azzawi from his home on March 23, reportedly in connection 
with the detention of his son-in-law, Riyadh Baqer Al-Hilli, who was 
taken away the evening before on suspicion of involvement with 
antigovernment activities. Ibrahim was executed on July 11, despite 
reports that he was not involved with opposition activity.
    As part of its policy, the authorities demolished the houses and 
detained and executed family members of Shi'a who protested government 
actions (see Section 1.g.).
    Early in the year, a 70-year-old blind man and seven of his eight 
sons were executed after the eighth son fled the country (see Section 
1.a.).
    The Special Rapporteur noted that ``guilt by association'' is 
facilitated by administrative requirements imposed on relatives of 
deserters or other perceived opponents of the regime. For example, 
relatives who do not report deserters may lose their ration cards for 
purchasing government-controlled food supplies, be evicted from their 
residences, or face the arrest of other family members. Relatives often 
even do not inquire about the whereabouts of arrested family members 
due to fear of being arrested themselves. Conscripts are required to 
secure a guarantor to sign a document stating that the named conscript 
would not desert military service and that the guarantor would accept 
personal responsibility if the conscript deserted. The Supreme Council 
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October and December 
that authorities denied food ration cards to families that failed to 
send their young sons to the ``Lion Cubs of Saddam'' compulsory 
weapons-training camps (see Section 5).
    In the fall, the Special Security Office reportedly increased 
efforts to intimidate the relatives of opposition members. Relatives of 
citizens outside the country who were suspected of sympathizing with 
the opposition were forced to call the suspected opposition members to 
warn them against participating in the October Iraqi National Congress 
assembly in New York. The London Sunday Telegraph reported in August 
that the 21-year-old daughter of London-based defector and former 
Republican Guard commander General Mohammed Ali Ghani was arrested in 
Baghdad and was being held to coerce Ghani to kill senior opposition 
leader Ayad Alawi, who was also in London. Iraqi agents reportedly 
threatened to torture Ghani's daughter if he failed to comply. Ghani 
attempted suicide, but survived. He later distanced himself from 
opposition circles, the newspaper reported.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law In 
Internal Conflicts.--As in previous years, the armed forces conducted 
deliberate artillery attacks against Shi'a civilians and large-scale 
burning operations in the southern marshes. In 1991 and 1992, the Gulf 
War allies imposed ``no-fly zones'' over northern and southern Iraq 
respectively. The no-fly zones continued to deter aerial attacks 
against the marsh dwellers in southern Iraq and the residents of 
northern Iraq, limiting the Government to ground-based assaults.
    Military operations against Shi'a civilians, particularly in 
southern Iraq, continued throughout the year. Sheikh Awas, imam of the 
Nasiriyah city mosque, was arrested on January 14, according to a 
report from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. 
When Awas did not appear to lead Friday prayers the next day, his 
deputy went to the Nasiriyah security directorate to plead for Awas's 
release. Soon afterward, hundreds of Shi'a congregation members marched 
on the security directorate to demand Awas's release. Security forces 
allegedly opened fire on the unarmed crowd with automatic weapons and 
hand grenades. Five persons were killed, 11 wounded, and 300 arrested.
    Following the February 19 killing of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq Al-
Sadr and his sons (see Section 1.a.), there were widespreadreports of 
military assaults on protesters in areas of Baghdad heavily populated 
by Shi'a, and in cities with a Shi'a majority such as Karbala, 
Nasiriyah, Najaf, and Basra, in which hundreds of persons were killed. 
While a funeral for Al-Sadr was prohibited, spontaneous gatherings of 
mourners took place in the days after his death. Novelist Hamad Al-
Moukhtar reportedly was executed after several months in prison 
following his detention for holding a funeral for Al-Sadr (see Section 
1.a.). Government security forces used excessive force in breaking up 
these illegal gatherings. For example, in the impoverished Shi'a 
district of Al-Thawra in Baghdad, a crowd of tens of thousands was 
attacked by government security forces using automatic weapons and 
armored vehicles, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 25 
mourners (although estimates ranged up to 400) including, according to 
one report, the imam of the Al-Thawra mosque. Fifty persons reportedly 
were wounded seriously and about 250 persons were arrested, including 
15 religious scholars. In a related incident, 22 persons reportedly 
were killed in the Shu'la district of Baghdad. Afterwards, more than 
600 Shi'a residents of Al-Thawra reportedly were arrested arbitrarily 
in security sweeps (see Section 1.d.).
    Outside Baghdad ``illegal'' assemblies of Shi'a took place in most 
of the major cities of the south in reaction to the Al-Sadr killing, 
according to many Shi'a sources. Ali Hassan Al-Majid, the military 
``supergovernor'' for southern Iraq, reportedly declared martial law 
throughout the region. On February 20, 22 persons reportedly were 
killed in the Suq As-Shuyukh area of Nasiriyah when security forces 
attempted to disperse mourners from three mosques who gathered in the 
marketplace. When the crowds could not be forced to disperse, the army 
reportedly surrounded the city and shelled its center, which killed 17 
more persons. Shi'a sources reported that 10 to 20 armored personnel 
carriers then entered the city, sealed off the marketplace, and caused 
a stampede within the crowd, which resulted in further injuries and 
deaths.
    Other Shi'a sources report that on the same day, the city of Najaf 
was surrounded by government troops. The news of Al-Sadr's death and 
government suppression of mourning activities incited demonstrations in 
Karbala and Basra. Several Shi'a sources report that in Amara, Sheikh 
Ali As-Sahalani, the imam of the Majar Al-Kabir mosque, was shot and 
killed along with other mourners; the enraged crowd then reportedly 
seized control of the city for a short period of time. Nine 
demonstrators reportedly were executed in Ramadi. The chief Shi'a 
clerics of Basra and Nasiriyah reportedly were arrested to prevent them 
from leading religious gatherings.
    The Iraqi Communist Party and other Shi'a groups reported large-
scale protests in Basra in March when Government authorities sought to 
prevent Shi'a gatherings by forbidding Friday prayer gatherings. 
According to these reports, security forces under Ali Hassan Al-Majid 
attacked the marchers, which resulted in many deaths and detentions, 
including 70 persons who were detained in the Abu Sakhair region of 
Basra, 100 in the Hayaniyh district, 40 in the Dor Ad-Dubat area, 85 in 
the Jumhuriya district, and an unspecified number in the Khamasiya 
district. A large number of those detained reportedly were executed 
summarily under the direct supervision of senior government officials, 
including Al-Majid and Basra governor Ahmed Ibrahim Hamash. Opposition 
sources reported that Al-Majid ordered the execution of 180 persons on 
March 21 and 56 persons on March 23. The Special Rapporteur reported 
that many of those executed were buried in a mass grave in Buresiyya 
district, about 12 miles from Basra. As part of its policy, the 
authorities demolished the houses and detained the family members of 
protesters (see Section 1.f.).
    In Najaf 15 persons reportedly were wounded and hundreds arrested 
in early April while they commemorated the 40-day anniversary of Al-
Sadr's death; such a commemoration is a traditional Islamic religious 
observance. On April 16, dozens of unarmed protesters (some reports 
indicate hundreds) allegedly were killed in street gatherings in the 
Al-Thawra district of Baghdad after the Security Services prohibited 
Shi'a worshipers from attending Friday prayers. After the closure 
announcement, a large unarmed crowd reportedly gathered at the entrance 
of the Hikmat mosque in the Jawadir section of Thawra, which was 
guarded by Ba'th party members. At the same time, a smaller group--in 
which some individuals were armed--gathered in the Sharkat neighborhood 
nearby. When shooting began between security forces and the Sharkat 
group around noon, the Ba'th Party members fired on the unarmed group 
at the Hikmat mosque. The SCIRI reports that regime forces later opened 
fire atanother crowd that had formed outside the Abbas Mosque near the 
Al-Thawra Children's Hospital. Thousands of Shi'a men reportedly were 
arrested in security sweeps in Basra that month.
    From May 19 to May 27, the Al-Fatah Al-Mubaeen forces of the 
Special Republican Guards and the Ba'th Party militia under the command 
of Aziz Salih Al-Noman, reportedly conducted operations in the Jazirah 
region of Kut, Amarah, and Nasiriyah provinces. The local resistance 
forces reported that it repelled the attack. On June 5, the village of 
Al-Maeil in Meisah province reportedly was attacked and 15 houses were 
destroyed. The HROI reported that 1,093 persons were arrested in June 
in Basra alone.
    Numerous opposition sources reported that tanks from the Hammourabi 
Republican Guards Division attacked the towns of Rumaitha and Khudur in 
late June and well into July, after residents protested the systematic 
maldistribution of food and medicine to the detriment of the Shi'a. The 
military cut off the water and electricity supplies and surrounded the 
town. Fourteen villagers were killed, over a hundred were arrested, and 
40 homes reportedly were destroyed. According to the SCIRI, 160 homes 
in the Abul Khaseeb district near Basra were destroyed. The Government 
also returned the bodies of executed family members who were arrested 
in the March protests in Basra. In some instances, all the male 
children from a family reportedly were arrested and killed, even though 
not all took part in the protests. Authorities razed 160 homes in the 
village of Al-Masha following tribal assaults against security forces. 
The security forces came under attack when they attempted to arrest 
persons they believed were involved in the Basra uprisings. In 
September authorities reportedly conducted a large-scale campaign of 
arrests in and around Baghdad and other cities following attacks on 
party officials and the appearance of antiregime slogans written on 
walls of schools and official institutions. Reports of government 
assaults on cities continued throughout the year.
    The practice of the security services to force large numbers of 
Shi'a inhabitants of the southern marshes to relocate to major southern 
cities and to areas along the Iranian border probably is connected to 
the destruction of villages. Special Rapporteur van der Stoel described 
this practice in his February report, and added that many other persons 
were transferred to detention centers and prisons in central Iraq, 
primarily in Baghdad.
    The military also continued its water-diversion and other projects 
in the south. Observers gave little credence to the Government's claim 
that the drainage is part of a land reclamation plan to increase the 
acreage of arable land and spur agricultural production. Hundreds of 
square miles have been burned in military operations. The U.N. Special 
Rapporteur has noted the serious detrimental impact that draining the 
marshes has had on the culture of the Shi'a marsh Arabs. The SCIRI 
claims to have captured government documents that detail the 
destructive intent of the water-diversion program and its connection to 
``strategic security operations,'' economic blockade, and ``withdrawal 
of food supply agencies.''
    In addition the regime's diversion of supplies in the south limited 
the Shi'a population's access to food, medicine, drinking water, and 
transportation. According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur and opposition 
sources, thousands of persons in Nasiriyah and Basra provinces were 
denied rations that should have been supplied under the U.N. oil-for-
food program. In these provinces and in Amarah province, access to food 
allegedly is used to reward regime supporters and silence opponents. 
Shi'a groups report that, due to this policy, the humanitarian 
condition of Shi'a in the south continued to suffer despite a 
significant expansion of the oil-for-food program.
    The Government continued to ``Arabize'' certain Kurdish areas, such 
as the urban centers of Kirkuk and Mosul, through the forced movement 
of local residents from their homes and villages and their replacement 
by Arabs from outside the area (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
    Landmines in the north, mostly planted by the Government before 
1991, continued to kill and maim civilians. Many of the mines were laid 
during the Iran-Iraq War; however, the army failed to clear them before 
it abandoned the area. The mines appear to have been planted 
haphazardly in civilian areas. Landmines are also a problem along the 
Iraq-Iran border throughout central and southern Iraq. There is no 
information on civilian casualties or the efforts, if any, to clear old 
mine fields in areas under the central Government's control. According 
to reports by theU.N. Office of Project Services, the Mines Advisory 
Group, and Norwegian Peoples Aid, over 3,000 persons have been killed 
in the three northern governates since the 1991 uprising. The Special 
Rapporteur repeatedly has reminded the Government of its obligation 
under the Land Mines Protocol to protect civilians from the effects of 
mines. Various nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued efforts 
to remove land mines from the area and increase awareness of the mine 
problem among local residents. In December 1998, the Government 
declared that mine-clearing activity was subversive and ordered NGO 
workers performing such activity to leave Iraq. On April 26, a New 
Zealander working for the U.N. mine-clearing program in the north was 
shot and killed by an unknown assailant who first asked for water and 
then fired three times at close range.
    After the 1991 Gulf War, victims and eyewitnesses described war 
crimes perpetrated by the Iraqi regime--deliberate killing, torture, 
rape, pillage, hostage-taking, and associated acts--as directly related 
to the Gulf War. Many governments continue to urge the U.N. Security 
Council to establish an international commission to study evidence of a 
broader range of war crimes, as well as crimes against humanity and 
possible genocide. Human Rights Watch and other organizations have 
worked with various governments to bring a genocide case at the 
International Court of Justice against the Government for its conduct 
of the Anfal campaign against the Kurds in 1988.
    The regime continued its intermittent shelling of villages in the 
Kurdish administered north. Some deaths were reported.
    No hostilities were reported between the two major Iraqi Kurdish 
parties in de facto control of northern Iraq. During the year, the KDP 
reportedly imposed a blockade on Assyrian villages, and later entered 
the villages and beat villagers (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). The 
Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan agreed 
in September 1998 to unify their administrations. Little progress was 
made toward implementing the 1998 agreement.
    Many Assyrian groups reported a series of bombings in December 
1998, and January and December 1999. Assyrian groups criticized the 
investigation into these crimes by the Kurdish authorities (see 
Sections 1.a. and 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press ``in compliance with the 
revolutionary, national, and progressive trend;'' however, in practice 
the Government does not permit freedom of speech and of the press to 
exist, and does not tolerate political dissent in areas under its 
control. The Special Rapporteur stated that the Government had 
``effectively eliminated'' the freedoms of thought, expression, 
association, and assembly, and that citizens lived ``in a climate of 
fear'' in which whatever they said or did, particularly in the area of 
politics, involved ``the risk of arrest and interrogation by the police 
or military intelligence.'' He noted that ``the mere suggestion that 
someone is not a supporter of the President carries the prospect of the 
death penalty.''
    The Government and the Ba'th Party own all print and broadcast 
media, and operate them as propaganda outlets. They generally do not 
report opposing points of view that are expressed, either domestically 
or abroad. A Freedom House report rated Iraqi press freedom at 98 out 
of a possible 100 points with 0 being the most free and 100 being the 
most controlled. Several statutes and decrees suppress freedom of 
speech and of the press, including: Revolutionary Command Council 
Decree Number 840 of 1986, which penalizes free expression and 
stipulates the death penalty for anyone insulting the President or 
other high government officials; Section 214 of the Penal Code, which 
prohibits singing a song likely to cause civil strife; and the 1968 
Press Act, which prohibits the writing of articles on 12 specific 
subjects, including those detrimental to the President, the 
Revolutionary Command Council, and the Ba'th Party.
    According to the Special Rapporteur, journalists are under regular 
pressure to join the Ba'th party and must follow the recommendations of 
the Iraqi Union of Journalists, headed by Uday Hussein. According to 
Iraqi sources, Uday Hussein dismissed hundreds of union members who had 
not praised Saddam Hussein and the regime sufficiently or often enough 
(see Section6.a.). At the same time, the value of awards granted to 
writers who praised Saddam Hussein increased. According to a September 
report, Uday Hussein jailed at least four leaders of the Iraqi National 
Students Union for not carrying out his orders to take action against 
students known for their criticism of the situation in the country (see 
Sections 1.d. and 6.a.). Also in September, journalist and Baghdad 
University professor Hachem Hasan was arrested after declining an 
appointment as editor of one of Uday Hussein's publications (see 
Section 1.d.). The Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontieres sent a letter 
of appeal to Uday Hussein; however, Hasan's fate and whereabouts remain 
unknown.
    The Ministry of Culture and Information periodically holds meetings 
at which general guidelines for the press are provided. Foreign 
journalists must work from offices located within the ministry building 
and are accompanied everywhere they go by ministry officers, who 
reportedly restrict their movements and make it impossible for them to 
interact freely with citizens. Many Western news services are 
represented in Baghdad by bureaucrats who are based in the Ministry of 
Information and Culture.
    Books may be published only with the authorization of the Ministry 
of Culture and Information. The Ministry of Education often sends 
textbooks with proregime propaganda to Kurdish regions; the Kurds 
routinely remove propaganda items from the books. In October 1997, the 
Minister of Education stated that he had ``warned these cliques that we 
hold them responsible'' for altering the books.
    The Government regularly jammed foreign news broadcasts (see 
Section 1.f.). Satellite dishes and fax machines are banned, although 
some restrictions reportedly were lifted toward the end of the year. 
The penalty for possessing a satellite dish reportedly was an 
indefinite term of imprisonment in solitary confinement and 
confiscation of all household effects. However, in mid-November the 
Government announced that ownership of satellite dishes would be 
permitted and that certain accredited journalists would be permitted to 
use fax machines.
    In northern Iraq, many independent newspapers have appeared over 
the past 7 years, as have opposition radio and television broadcasts. 
The absence of central authority permits significant freedom of 
expression, including criticism of the regional Iraqi Kurdish 
authorities; however, most journalists are influenced or controlled by 
various political organizations. Although the rival Kurdish parties in 
northern Iraq, the PUK and KDP, state that full press freedom is 
allowed in areas under their respective control, in practice neither 
effectively permits distribution of the opposing group's newspapers and 
other literature.
    The Government does not respect academic freedom and exercises 
strict control over academic publications. University staff are hired 
and fired depending on their support for the Government.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts 
this right in practice. Except in Kurdish-controlled northern areas, 
citizens legally may not assemble other than to express support for the 
regime. The Government regularly orchestrates crowds to demonstrate 
support for the regime and its policies through financial incentives 
for those who participate and threats of violence against those who do 
not. Widespread military and paramilitary attacks on persons who 
violated restrictions on peaceful assembly were reported throughout the 
year (see Section 1.g.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice. The Government controls 
the establishment of political parties, regulates their internal 
affairs, and monitors their activities. The political magazine Alef-Be, 
which is published by the Ministry of Culture and Information, reported 
in December that two political groups would not be permitted to form 
parties because they had an insufficient number of members. The 
magazine reprinted conditions necessary to establish political parties, 
which include the requirement in a 1991 law that a political group must 
have at least 150 members over the age of 25. A new law also stipulates 
that new parties must ``take pride'' in the 1958 and 1968 revolutions, 
which created the republic and brought the ruling Ba'th party to power. 
Several parties are outlawed specifically, and membership in them is a 
capital offense. A1974 law prescribes the death penalty for anyone 
``infiltrating'' the Ba'th Party.
    In contrast, in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, numerous 
political parties and social and cultural organizations exist.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion; however, the Government severely restricts this right in 
practice. Islam is the official state religion. The Government's 
registration requirements for religious organizations are unknown.
    The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs monitors places of 
worship, appoints the clergy, approves the building and repair of all 
places of worship, and approves the publication of all religious 
literature.
    According to conservative estimates, over 95 percent of the 
population is Muslim. The (predominantly Arab) Shi'a Muslims constitute 
a 60 to 65 percent majority, while Sunni Muslims make up 30 to 35 
percent (approximately 18 to 20 percent are Sunni Kurds, 12 to 15 
percent are Sunni Arabs, and the rest are Sunni Turkomans). The 
remaining approximately 5 percent consist of Christians (Assyrians, 
Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenians), Yazidis, and a small number 
of Jews.
    New political parties must be based in Baghdad and are prohibited 
from having any ethnic or religious character. The Government does not 
recognize political organizations that have been formed by Shi'a 
Muslims or Assyrian Christians. These groups continued to attract 
support despite their illegal status. There are religious 
qualifications for government office; candidates for the National 
Assembly, for example, ``must believe in God.''
    Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs 
traditionally have dominated economic and political life. Arabs holding 
Sunni religious beliefs are at a distinct advantage in all areas of 
secular life, including civil, political, military, and economic. Shi'a 
and Sunni Arabs are not distinct ethnically. Shi'a Arabs have supported 
an independent Iraq alongside Sunni Arabs since the 1920 Revolt, many 
joined the Ba'th Party, and Shi'a formed the core of the Iraqi Army in 
the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.
    The Government has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of 
murder, summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the 
religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim 
population, and has sought to undermine the identity of minority 
Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and Yazidi groups.
    Despite supposed legal protection of religious equality, the regime 
has repressed severely the Shi'a clergy and those who follow the Shi'a 
faith. Forces from the Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), General 
Security (Amn Al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos 
(Fedayeen Saddam), and the Ba'th Party have murdered senior Shi'a 
clerics, desecrated Shi'a mosques and holy sites (particularly in the 
aftermath of the 1991 civil uprising), arrested tens of thousands of 
Shi'a, interfered with Shi'a religious education, and prevented Shi'a 
adherents from performing their religious rites. Security agents 
reportedly are stationed at all the major Shi'a mosques and shrines and 
search, harass, and arbitrarily arrest worshipers.
    The following government restrictions on religious rights remained 
in effect during the year: Restrictions and outright bans on communal 
Friday prayer by Shi'a; restrictions on the loaning of books by Shi'a 
mosque libraries; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a programs on 
government-controlled radio or television; a ban on the publication of 
Shi'a books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on funeral 
processions other than those organized by the Government; a ban on 
other Shi'a funeral observances such as gatherings for Koran reading; 
and the prohibition of certain processions and public meetings that 
commemorate Shi'a holy days. Shi'a groups report that they captured 
documents from the security services during the 1991 uprising, which 
listed thousands of forbidden Shi'a religious writings. Security forces 
reportedly still were encamped in the shrine to Imam Ali at Al-Najaf, 
one of Shi'a Islam's holiest sites, and at the former Shi'a theological 
school in Al-Najaf; they have been there since 1991.
    In June several Shi'a opposition groups reported that the 
Government instituted a new program in the predominantly Shi'a 
districts of Baghdad that used food ration cards to restrict where 
individuals could pray. The ration cards, part of the U.N. oil-for-food 
program, reportedly are checked when the bearer enters a mosque and are 
printed with a notice of severe penalties for those who attempt to pray 
at an unauthorized location. Shi'a sources outside the country who 
reported this new policy believe that it is aimed not only at 
preventing unauthorized religious gatherings of Shi'a, but at stopping 
Shi'a adherents from attending Friday prayers in Sunni mosques, which 
many pious Shi'a have turned to since the closure of their own mosques.
    Shi'a groups reported numerous instances of religious scholars 
being subjected to arrest, assault, and harassment in 1998 and during 
the year, particularly in the internationally renowned Shi'a academic 
center of Najaf. This followed years of government manipulation of the 
Najaf theological schools. Amnesty International reported that the 
Government systematically deported tens of thousands of Shi'a (both 
Arabs and Kurds) to Iran in the late 1970's and early 1980's, on the 
basis that they were of Persian descent. According to Shi'a sources, 
religious scholars and Shi'a merchants who supported the schools 
financially were prime targets for deportation. In the 1980's, during 
the Iran-Iraq war, it was widely reported that the Government expelled 
and denied visas to thousands of foreign scholars who wished to study 
at Najaf. After the 1991 popular uprising, the Government relaxed some 
restrictions on Shi'a attending the schools, perhaps hoping that this 
would deflect popular revulsion over arrests and executions of 
religious leaders. Instead, the revival of the schools appears greatly 
to have exceeded the Government's expectations, and has helped to bring 
traditional Shi'a piety into even greater contrast with the abuses of 
the regime. This led to an increased government crackdown on the Shi'a 
religious establishment, including the requirement that speeches by 
imams in mosques be based upon government-provided material that 
attacked fundamentalist trends. A campaign of arrests in Mosul against 
fundamentalist trends was reported in September.
    The apparently systematic campaign by the Government to eliminate 
the senior Shi'a religious leadership through murder, summary execution 
and disappearances continued during the year, including the February 19 
murder of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Sadiq As-Sadr, the country's 
senior Shi'a religious leader (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
    The security forces have used the symbolism of religious holidays 
to underscore the impunity with which they operate. For example, in 
January, 27 members of the elite Fedayeen Saddam security forces 
reportedly were executed in Amara for conspiring with the Shi'a-based 
opposition forces. Their bodies reportedly were delivered to their 
families on Eid Al-Fitr, one of the most important holidays of the 
Islamic year (see Section 1.a.).
    The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with 
religious pilgrimages, both of Iraqi Muslims who wish to make the Hajj 
to Mecca and Medina and of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims who 
travel to holy sites in Iraq.
    The Government has used Iraqi pilgrims who wish to make the Hajj to 
Mecca--a religious duty of all Muslims who can undertake it--as pawns 
in a test of wills with the United Nations. In 1998 the U.N. Sanctions 
Committee offered to distribute vouchers for travel and expenses to 
pilgrims making the Hajj, but the Government rejected this offer. The 
Sanctions Committee offered to disburse funds to cover Hajj-related 
expenses through a neutral third party. The Government again rejected 
the opportunity. In both years the Government insisted that these funds 
would be accepted only if they were paid in cash to the Iraqi central 
bank in violation of U.N. sanctions. As a result, in both 1998 and 
1999, no Iraqi pilgrims were able to take advantage of the available 
funds. According to press reports, only 4,000 Iraqi pilgrims made the 
Hajj in 1999, despite the availability of 22,000 spaces for Iraqis.
    During the year, the Government flew several planeloads of elderly 
Hajj pilgrims to Saudi Arabia without advance notification. Simple 
approval procedures established by the U.N. Sanctions Committee allow 
flights for religious and humanitarian purposes to originate from and 
return to Iraq, provided that advance notification is given to regional 
air controllers and coalition military aircraft about such a flight. 
The Government chose to ignore these safety procedures, and sent the 
Hajj flights without any notification.
    Twice each year--on the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram 
and 40 days later in the month of Safar--Shi'a pilgrims from throughout 
Iraq and around the world travel to the Iraqi city of Karbala to 
commemorate the death there centuries ago of the Imam Hussein. The 
Government for several decades has interfered with these ``Ashura'' 
commemorations by preventing processions on foot into the city. In both 
1998 and during the year, violent incidents were reported between Iraqi 
pilgrims on one side and Ba'th party members and security forces 
enforcing the ban on the other.
    In past years, the Government has denied visas to many foreign 
pilgrims for the Ashura. During the year, it attempted to profit from 
the pilgrimages. Shi'a pilgrims reported being charged $900 for bus 
passage and food from Damascus to Karbala, a trip that would normally 
cost about $150. The Government reportedly had added a $600 surcharge 
for foreign pilgrims in addition to the $100 visa fee and a requirement 
to exchange $50 into Iraqi dinars.
    The Special Rapporteur and others reported that the Government has 
engaged in various abuses against the country's 350,000 Assyrian and 
Chaldean Christians, especially in terms of forced movements from 
northern areas (see Section 2.d.) and repression of political rights. 
Most Assyrians live in the northern governates, and the Government 
often has suspected them of ``collaborating'' with Iraqi Kurds. In the 
north, Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. 
Military forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 
Anfal Campaign and reportedly tortured and executed many Assyrians. 
Both major Kurdish political parties have indicated that the Government 
occasionally targets Assyrians, as well as ethnic Kurds and Turkmen, in 
expulsions from Kirkuk, where it is attempting to Arabize the city (see 
Section 2.d.).
    The Constitution does not provide for a Yazidi identity. Many 
Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some 
would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct 
from Muslim Kurds. However, the Government, without any historical 
basis, has defined the Yazidis as Arabs. There is evidence that the 
Government has compelled this reidentification to encourage Yazidis to 
join in domestic military action against Iraqi Muslim Kurds. Captured 
government documents included in the 1998 Human Rights Watch report 
``Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in its Own Words,'' 
describe special all-Yazidi military detachments formed during the 
1988-89 Anfal campaign to ``pursue and attack'' Muslim Kurds. However, 
the Government does not hesitate to impose the same repressive measures 
on Yazidis as on other groups. For example, 33 members of the Yazidi 
community of Mosul, arrested in July 1996, still are unaccounted for 
(see Section 2.b.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts movement within 
the country of citizens and foreigners. Persons who enter sensitive 
border areas and numerous designated security zones are subject to 
arrest. Police checkpoints are common on major roads and highways.
    The Government requires citizens to obtain specific government 
authorization and expensive exit visas for foreign travel. Citizens may 
not make more than two trips abroad annually. Before traveling abroad, 
citizens are required to post collateral, which is refundable only upon 
their return. There are restrictions on the amount of currency that may 
be taken out of the country. Women are not permitted to travel outside 
the country alone; male relatives must escort them (see Section 5). 
Prior to December, each student who wished to travel abroad was 
required to provide a guarantor who would be liable if the student 
failed to return. In December authorities banned all travel for 
students (including those in grade school), canceled spring and summer 
holidays, and enrolled students in compulsory military training and 
weapons-use courses.
    In what appeared to be an effort to lure Iraqis living abroad back 
to the country, government radio announced in June an amnesty for Iraqi 
teachers who left the country illegally after the Gulf War. Shortly 
thereafter the Revolutionary Command Council decreed a general amnesty 
for all Iraqis who either had left the country illegally or who had 
failed to return after being exiled and the period of exile had expired 
(see Section 1.d.). The decree stated that ``charges of illegal 
departure, forging official documents towards this purpose, and 
disrupting public duties that were pressed before the issuance of 
thisdecree shall be dropped effective immediately.'' In October Justice 
Minster Shabib Al-Maliki announced that authorities may seize assets 
belonging to Iraqis living outside the country who did not return in 
response to the amnesty decree. A special ministerial committee was 
formed to track and monitor Iraqis inside the country who received 
money from relatives abroad.
    A new travel law that took effect in November placed additional 
penalties on citizens who attempt to leave the country illegally. Under 
the law, a prison term of up to 10 years and ``confiscation of movable 
and immovable property'' is to be imposed on anyone who attempts to 
leave illegally. Similar penalties face anyone found to encourage or 
assist persons banned from travel, including health care professionals, 
engineers, and university professors.
    The Government restricts foreign travel by journalists, authors, 
and all employees of the Information ministry. Security authorities 
interrogate all media employees, journalists, and writers who travel 
outside the country.
    In September journalist and Baghdad University professor Hachem 
Hasan was arrested at the crossing point on the boarder with Jordan as 
he attempted to leave the country after declining Uday Hussein's 
appointment of him as editor of one of Uday Hussein's publications. 
Hassan was charged with using a forged passport to flee abroad, 
although he reportedly had a valid passport. His fate is unknown.
    Three Ba'th party officials reportedly were arrested on November 4, 
and their homes were ransacked by security forces. Opposition sources 
said that the three were arrested for planning to leave the country 
with their families, although the Government alleged that the officials 
were in possession of television satellite dishes. The penalty for such 
possession is severe (see Section 2.a.).
    The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with 
religious pilgrimages, both of Iraqi Muslims who wish to make the Hajj 
to Mecca and Medina and of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims to holy 
sites in Iraq (see Section 2.c.).
    Foreign spouses of citizens who have resided in Iraq for 5 years (1 
year for spouses of government employees) are required to apply for 
naturalization as Iraqi citizens. Many foreigners thus become subject 
to travel restrictions. The penalties for noncompliance include, but 
are not limited to, loss of the spouse's job, a substantial financial 
penalty, and repayment of any governmental educational expenses. The 
Government prevents many citizens who also hold citizenship in another 
country, especially the children of Iraqi fathers and foreign-born 
mothers, from visiting the country of their other nationality.
    The U.N. Secretary General estimates that there are more than half 
a million internally displaced persons remaining in the three northern 
provinces (Irbil, Dohuk, and Suleymaniyah), most of whom fled 
government-controlled areas in early 1991 during the uprising that 
followed the Gulf War. As reported by the Special Rapporteur, the 
Government continued its ``Arabization'' policy by discriminating 
against and forcibly relocating the non-Arab population, including 
Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians living in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, and 
other districts. Most observers view the policy as an attempt to 
decrease the proportion of non-Arab citizens in the oil-rich Kirkuk 
region, and thereby secure Arab demographic control of the area. 
Kurdish grade school teachers and low-ranking civil servants are 
reassigned systematically outside of Kirkuk province, which has been 
renamed Al-Ta'mim (``Nationalization''). The Revolutionary Command 
Council has mandated that new housing and employment be created for 
more than 300,000 Arab residents who have been resettled in Kirkuk, 
while new construction or renovation of Kurd owned property reportedly 
is prohibited. Non-Arabs are not permitted to sell their homes, except 
to Arabs, nor register or inherit property.
    As part of the Arabization process, the Government continued to 
deport Kurdish and Turkomen families. Regional Kurdish authorities 
report that between January and November, 362 families (a total of 
2,166 individuals) were deported from Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, and 
other areas, and expelled to Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. They 
calculate that since 1991, a total of 15,620 households (92,740 
persons) have been displaced. Those expelled are not permitted to 
return. The Special Rapporteur reported that citizens who provide 
employment, food or shelter to returning or newly arriving Kurdsare 
subject to arrest. In order to encourage departure and prevent 
displaced persons from returning, the Government reportedly has mined 
the area around Kirkuk, and has declared it a military and security 
zone. Roads into the area are fortified with military checkpoints.
    Those being deported are required to sign a ``request,'' which 
includes the phrase ``I signed this form of my own free will.'' The 
procedure followed by security forces to evict and deport non-Arab 
citizens is described by Amnesty International in its November report. 
Citing a government decree, Amnesty International reported that the 
expulsion process includes the confiscation of all family property and 
food ration cards issued under the UN oil-for-food program, and the 
detention of one family member to ensure a lack of resistance. Once in 
northern Iraq, the majority are resettled in camps with basic supplies 
such as tents, blankets, and food that is supplied by the PUK, KDP, and 
U.N. agencies.
    The Government has undertaken a so-called ``Nationality Correction 
Campaign'' as part of the process of Arabization. Some deportees are 
permitted to remain in their homes if they relinquish their Kurdish or 
Turkomen identity and register themselves as Arab.
    The Government denies that it expels non-Arab families.
    According to the Special Rapporteur, security forces continued to 
relocate Shi'a inhabitants of the southern marshes to major southern 
cities. Many have been transferred to detention centers and prisons in 
central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad, or even to northern cities like 
Kirkuk, as part of the Government's attempt to ``Arabize'' 
traditionally non-Arab areas (see section 5).
    In November, the Government reportedly expelled from Baghdad 
approximately 24,000 persons who had sought refuge in the city after 
the 1991 Gulf war (see Section 1.f.).
    The Government does not provide first asylum or respect the rights 
of refugees. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees remain abroad. Apart 
from those suspected of sympathizing with Iran, most fled after the 
Government's suppression of the civil uprising of 1991; others are 
Kurds who fled the Anfal Campaign of 1988. Of the 1.5 million refugees 
who fled following the 1991 uprisings, the great majority, particularly 
Kurds, have repatriated themselves to northern Iraq in areas where the 
allied coalition has prohibited overflights by Iraqi aircraft.
    The KDP and PUK reiterated their September 1998 agreement to begin 
returning to their rightful homes the many thousands of persons that 
each had expelled as a result of intra-Kurdish fighting in the three 
northern provinces; however, no effort to implement the agreement was 
begun during the year.
    Approximately 12,000 Turkish Kurds who have fled civil strife in 
southeastern Turkey remain in northern areas controlled by the central 
Government. The UNHCR is treating these displaced persons as refugees 
until it reaches an official determination of their status.
    According to AINA reports, on August 25, the KDP imposed a blockade 
on eight Assyrian villages in the Nahla area east of Aqra. ICRC 
monitors in northern Iraq reportedly intervened on the villages' 
behalf, and the blockade was lifted. During the night of August 27, KDP 
forces reportedly reentered the village of Kash Kawa, rounded up the 
villagers, and publicly beat two of them. The KDP allegedly suspected a 
connection between the village and the Kurdistan Workers Party, with 
whom the KDP often has fought. AINA reported a similar night raid by a 
dozen members of the KDP forces on the village of Belmat on September 
10. The KDP media quoted village leaders and the mayor of Aqra, denying 
that any such blockade or village raids occurred. The ICRC confirmed 
that it intervened with the KDP after receiving an Assyrian request and 
that the KDP withdrew from the villages thereafter. AINA reported that 
armed KDP members entered Assyrian Patriotic Party (APP) headquarters 
in Dohuk on October 21 and forced its closure. APP offices were allowed 
to reopen 4 days later.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Although 
the Government has taken steps to increase theperception of democracy, 
the political process still was controlled firmly by the State. The 
1995 ``referendum'' on Saddam Hussein's presidency was not free and was 
dismissed as a sham by most international observers. It included 
neither voter privacy nor opposing candidates, and many credible 
reports indicated that voters feared possible reprisal for a negative 
vote. A total of 500 persons reportedly were arrested in Karbala, 
Baghdad, and Ramadi provinces for casting negative ballots, and a 
member of the intelligence services reportedly was executed for 
refusing to vote for the President.
    Various media began publishing reports on a multiparty system after 
Saddam Hussein instructed officials in October to consider the 
formation of new political parties, a state council, and a new 
constitution. A Ministry of Culture and Information magazine reported 
in December that the two groups that attempted to form a party were 
refused for having an insufficient number of members (see Section 
2.b.).
    There are strict qualifications for electoral candidates; by law 
the candidates for the National Assembly must be over 25 years old and 
``believe in God, the principles of the July 17-30 revolution, and 
socialism.'' Out of the 250 seats, 160 deputies reportedly belong to 
the Ba'th Party, 60 are independent, and 30 are appointed by Saddam 
Hussein to represent the northern provinces. According to the Special 
Rapporteur, the Ba'th Party allegedly instructed a number of its 
members to run as nominally ``independent'' candidates.
    Full political participation at the national level is confined to 
members of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, who are estimated to 
constitute about 8 percent of the population. The political system is 
dominated by the Party, which governs through the Revolutionary Command 
Council (RCC). The council is headed by President Saddam Hussein. 
However, the RCC exercises both executive and legislative authority. 
The RCC overshadows the National Assembly, which is completely 
subordinate to it and the executive branch.
    The President wields decisive power over all instruments of 
government. Almost all important officials are either members of Saddam 
Hussein's family or are family allies from his home town of Tikrit.
    Opposition political organizations are illegal and severely 
suppressed. Membership in certain political parties is punishable by 
death (see Section 2.b.). In 1991 the RCC adopted a law that 
theoretically authorized the creation of political parties other than 
the Ba'th Party. However, in practice the law is used to prohibit 
parties that do not support Saddam Hussein and the Government. New 
parties must be based in Baghdad and are prohibited from having any 
ethnic or religious character.
    The Government does not recognize the various political groupings 
and parties that have been formed by Shi'a Muslims, as well as Kurdish, 
Assyrian, Turkomen, and other Iraqi communities. These political groups 
continued to attract support despite their illegal status.
    Women and minorities are underrepresented in government and 
politics. The law provides for the election of women and minorities to 
the National Assembly; however, they have only token representation.
    In northern Iraq, all central government functions have been 
performed by local administrators, mainly Kurds, since the Government 
withdrew its military forces and civilian administrative personnel from 
the area after the 1991 uprising. A regional parliament and local 
government administrators were elected in 1992. This parliament last 
met in May 1995. The two major Kurdish parties in de facto control of 
northern Iraq, the KDP and the PUK, battled one another from 1994 
through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to unify their separate 
administrations and to hold new elections in July. The cease-fire held 
throughout the year; however, reunification measures were not 
implemented and no election was held.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not permit the establishment of independent 
human rights organizations. Citizens have established several human 
rights groups abroad and in northern areas not undergovernment control. 
Monitors from foreign and international human rights groups are not 
allowed in the country.
    The Government operates an official human rights group that 
routinely denies allegations of abuses.
    The Government harassed and intimidated relief workers and U.N. 
personnel throughout the country, maintained a threat to arrest or kill 
relief workers in the north, and staged protests against U.N. offices 
in the capital (see Sections 1.g. and 2.a.).
    As in previous years, the Government did not allow the U.N. Special 
Rapporteur to visit Iraq, nor did it respond to his requests for 
information. The Government continued to defy various calls from U.N. 
bodies to allow the Special Rapporteur to visit the southern marshes 
and other regions.
    In April and again in November, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
criticized the ``systematic, widespread, and extremely grave violations 
of human rights'' by the Government, which resulted in ``all-pervasive 
repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and 
widespread terror.''
    For the seventh consecutive year, the Commission called on the U.N. 
Secretary General to send human rights monitors to ``help in the 
independent verification of reports on the human rights situation in 
Iraq.'' The U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities made a similar request. The Government 
continued to ignore these calls for the entry of monitors.
    The Special Rapporteur nonetheless was able to gather more 
evidence, in part due to interviews with current and past government 
officials, which shed new light on the systemic nature of human rights 
violations. He dispatched members of his staff to Kuwait, Jordan, and 
other locations to interview victims of government human rights abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution and the legal system provide for some rights for 
women, children, and minorities; however, in practice the Government 
systematically violates these rights.
    Women.--Domestic violence against women occurs but little is known 
about its extent. Such abuse customarily is addressed within the 
tightly knit family structure. There is no public discussion of the 
subject, and no statistics are published. Spousal violence constitutes 
grounds for divorce and criminal charges; however, suits brought on 
these charges are believed to be rare. Men who kill female family 
members for ``immoral deeds'' may receive immunity from prosecution for 
such ``honor crimes'' under a 1990 law (see Section 1.e.).
    The Special Rapporteur has noted that there is an unusually high 
percentage of women in the Kurdish areas, purportedly caused by the 
disappearances of tens of thousands of Kurdish men during the Anfal 
Campaign. The Special Rapporteur has reported that the widows, 
daughters, and mothers of the Anfal Campaign victims are dependent 
economically on their relatives or villages because they may not 
inherit the property or assets of their missing family members.
    Evidence concerning the Anfal Campaign indicates that the 
Government killed many women and children, including infants, by firing 
squads and in chemical attacks.
    The Government claims that it is committed to equality for women, 
who make up about 20 percent of the work force. It has enacted laws to 
protect women from exploitation in the workplace and from sexual 
harassment; to permit women to join the regular army, Popular Army, and 
police forces; and to equalize women's rights in divorce, land 
ownership, taxation, and suffrage. It is difficult to determine to what 
extent these protections are afforded in practice. However, reports 
indicate that the application of these laws has declined as Iraq's 
political and economic crisis persists. Women are not allowed to travel 
outside the country alone (see Section 2.d.).
    Children.--The Government claims that it has enacted laws to 
require education for girls. No information is available on whether the 
Government has enacted specific legislation to promote the welfare of 
children. However, the Special Rapporteur and several human rights 
groups have collected a substantial body of evidence pointing to the 
Government's continuing disregard for the rights and welfare of 
children. The evidence may include government officials taking children 
from minority groups hostage in order to intimidate their families to 
leave cities and regions where the regime wishes to create a Sunni Arab 
majority (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.).
    The Government's failure to comply with relevant U.N. Security 
Council resolutions has led to a continuation of economic sanctions. 
There were widespread reports that food and medicine that should have 
been made available for the general public were stockpiled in 
warehouses. The executive director of the U.N. office in charge of the 
oil-for-food program confirmed such reports at a press conference in 
May. He stated that of the $570 million worth of medicines and medical 
supplies that had arrived in Iraq through the oil-for-food program in 
the previous 2 years, only 48 percent had been distributed to clinics, 
hospitals, and pharmacies. The Government management of the oil-for-
food program did not take into account the special requirements of 
children between the ages of 1 and 5, despite the U.N. Secretary 
General's specific injunction that the Government modify its 
implementation procedures to address the needs of this vulnerable 
group. On August 12, the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) issued the 
results of the first surveys of child and maternal mortality in Iraq 
that have been conducted since 1991. The surveys were carried out 
between February and May in cooperation with the Government in the 
southern and central regions, and in cooperation with the local Kurdish 
authorities in the north. The surveys revealed that in the south and 
center, home to 85 percent of the population, children under 5 years 
old are dying at more than twice the rate that they were a decade ago. 
In contrast mortality rates for children under 5 years old in the 
nongovernment-controlled north dropped in the period from 1994 to 1999. 
The Special Rapporteur criticized the Government for ``letting innocent 
people suffer while [it] maneuvered to get sanctions lifted.'' Had the 
Government not waited 5 years to adopt the oil-for-food program in 
1996, he stated in October, ``millions of innocent people would have 
avoided serious and prolonged suffering.''
    Government authorities failed to take advantage of available 
resources for the benefit of the country's citizens, and used some 
resources to enrich themselves at the expense of vulnerable sectors of 
the population. For example, on August 11, the Kuwaiti coast guard 
seized a shipment that was leaving Iraq carrying, among other items, 75 
cartons of infant powder and 25 cartons of infant feeding bottles. The 
captain of the boat confessed that he previously had committed six 
similar violations.
    For the sixth year, the Government held 3-week training courses in 
weapons use, hand-to-hand fighting, rappelling from helicopters, and 
infantry tactics for children from 10 to 15 years of age. Camps for 
these ``Saddam Cubs'' operated throughout the country. Senior military 
officers who supervised the course noted that the children held up 
under the ``physical and psychological strain'' of tough training for 
as long as 14 hours each day. Sources in the Iraqi opposition report 
that the army found it difficult to recruit enough children to fill all 
of the slots in the program. Families reportedly were threatened with 
the loss of their food ration cards if they refused to enroll their 
children in the grueling course. The Supreme Council for the Islamic 
Revolution in Iraq reported in October that authorities were denying 
food ration cards to families that failed to send their young sons to 
Saddam Cubs compulsory weapons-training camps. Similarly, authorities 
reportedly withheld school examination results to students unless they 
registered in the Feddayin Saddam organization.
    People with Disabilities.--No information is available on the 
Government's policy towards the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Iraq's cultural, religious, and linguistic 
diversity is not reflected in the country's political and economic 
structure.Various segments of the Sunni Arab community, which itself 
constitutes a minority of the population, effectively have controlled 
the Government since independence in 1932. Shi'a Arabs, the religious 
majority of the population, have long been economically, politically, 
and socially disadvantaged. Like the Sunni Kurds and other ethnic and 
religious groups in the north, the Shi'a Arabs of the south have been 
targeted for particular discrimination and abuse.
    Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by 
Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Arabs are denied equal 
access to employment, education, and physical security. Non-Arabs are 
not permitted to sell their homes except to Arabs, nor to register or 
inherit property. The Government continued to relocate forcibly the 
non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians living in 
Kirkuk, Sinjar, and other districts (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
    Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct 
ethnic group as well as the descendants of some of the earliest 
Christian communities. These communities speak a distinct language 
(Syriac), preserve important traditions of Christianity in the east, 
and have a rich cultural and historical heritage that they trace back 
over 2,000 years. Although these groups do not define themselves as 
Arabs, the Government, without any historical basis, defines Assyrians 
and Chaldeans as such, evidently to encourage them to identify with the 
Sunni-Arab dominated regime.
    The Government does not permit education in languages other than 
Arabic and Kurdish. Public instruction in Syriac, which was announced 
under a 1972 decree, has never been implemented. Thus, in areas under 
government control, Assyrian and Chaldean children are not permitted to 
attend classes in Syriac. In areas of northern Iraq under Iraqi Kurdish 
control, classes in Syriac have been permitted since the 1991 uprising 
against the Government. By October 1998, the first groups of students 
were ready to begin secondary school in Syriac in the north; however, 
some Assyrian sources reported that regional Iraqi Kurdish authorities 
refused to allow the classes to begin. Details of this practice (for 
example, the number of students prepared to start secondary courses in 
Syriac and the towns where they were located) were not available, and 
Kurdish regional authorities denied that they engaged in such a 
practice. There were no reports of elementary school instruction in 
Syriac being hindered in northern Iraq. In November the Kurdistan 
Observer reported that the central Government had warned the 
administration in the Kurdish region against allowing Turkmen, 
Assyrian, or Yazidi minority schools.
    Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by 
Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years. Assyrians 
continue to fear attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party, a Turkish-
based terrorist organization that operates against indigenous Kurds in 
northern Iraq. The Christians often feel caught in the middle of intra-
Kurdish fighting. In December 1997, six Assyrians died in an attack 
near Dohuk by the PKK. Some Assyrian villagers have reported being 
pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as part of a campaign 
by indigenous Kurdish forces to deny the PKK access to possible food 
supplies.
    Many Assyrian groups reported a series of bombings in Irbil in late 
1998 and early and late 1999. On December 9, 1998, Nasreen Shaba and 
her 3-year-old daughter Larsa Toma were killed when a bomb exploded on 
the doorstep of their home in the Terawa section of the city. Later the 
same month, bombs exploded at the front door of Salman Toma Khoshaba in 
the Al-Iskan area and in front of a convent in the Al-Mal'ab area. On 
January 6, a bomb exploded at the door of Father Zomaya Yusip in the 
7th-of-Nisan area. No one was killed in these three subsequent 
incidents. On December 15, a bomb killed 60-year-old Habib Yousif 
Dekhoka in front of his store in Irbil after several months of threats 
and one prior attempt. Although the bombings have not been linked to 
any particular faction or group, Assyrians believe that they are part 
of a terror campaign designed to intimidate them into leaving northern 
Iraq. The Assyrian Democratic Movement, the Assyrian Patriotic Party, 
and other groups have criticized the investigation into these incidents 
conducted by the Kurdistan Regional Government. There were no reported 
arrests by year's end.
    In June the Assyrian National News Agency reported a ``well-
established pattern'' of complicity by Kurdish authorities in attacks 
against Assyrian Christians in northern Iraq (see Section 1.a.).
    Citizens considered by the Government to be of Iranian origin must 
carry special identification and often are precluded from desirable 
employment. Over the years, the Government has deported hundreds of 
thousands of citizens of Iranian origin.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions independent of 
government control do not exist. The Trade Union Organization Law of 
1987 established the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions (IGFTU), 
a government-dominated trade union structure, as the sole legal trade 
federation. The IGFTU is linked to the Ba'th Party, which uses it to 
promote party principles and policies among union members.
    Workers in private and mixed enterprises, but not public employees 
or workers in state enterprises, have the right to join local union 
committees. The committees are affiliated with individual trade unions, 
which in turn belong to the IGFTU.
    In September Uday Hussein reportedly dismissed hundreds of members 
of the Iraqi Union of Journalists for not praising Saddam Hussein and 
the regime sufficiently (see Section 2.a.). Also in September, Uday 
Hussein reportedly jailed at least four leaders of the Iraqi National 
Students Union for failing to carry out his orders to take action 
against students known for their criticism of the situation in the 
country (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    The 1987 Labor Law restricts the right to strike. No strike has 
been reported over the past 2 decades. According to the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the severe restrictions on the 
right to strike include penal sanctions.
    The IGFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of 
Arab Trade Unions and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation 
of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries for public sector 
workers (the majority of the employed) are set by the Government. Wages 
in the much smaller private sector are set by employers or negotiated 
individually with workers. Government workers frequently are shifted 
from one job and work location to another to prevent them from forming 
close associations with other workers. The Labor Code does not protect 
workers from antiunion discrimination, a failure that has been 
criticized repeatedly by the Committee of Experts of the International 
Labor Organization (ILO).
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor 
theoretically is prohibited by law; however, the Penal Code mandates 
prison sentences, including compulsory labor, for civil servants and 
employees of state enterprises accused of breaches of labor 
``discipline,'' including resigning from a job. According to the ILO, 
foreign workers in Iraq have been prevented from terminating their 
employment to return to their native countries because of government-
imposed penal sanctions on persons who do so. There is no information 
available on forced and bonded labor by children.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The employment of children under age 14 is prohibited, 
except in small-scale family enterprises. Children reportedly are 
encouraged increasingly to work in order to support their families 
because of the country's harsh economic conditions. The law stipulates 
that employees between the ages of 14 and 18 work fewer hours per week 
than adults. Each year the Government enrolls children as young as 10 
years of age in a paramilitary training program (see Section 5). There 
is no information available on forced and bonded labor by children (see 
Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no information 
available on minimum wages.
    Theoretically, most workers in urban areas work a 6-day, 48-hour 
workweek. Hours for government employees are set by the head of each 
ministry. Working hours for agricultural workers vary according to 
individual employer-employee agreements. Occupational safety programs 
are in effect in state-run enterprises. Inspectors theoretically 
inspect private establishments, but enforcement varies widely. There is 
no information on workers' ability to remove themselves from work 
situations that endanger their health or safety, or on those who 
complain about such conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There was no information available on 
whether trafficking in persons is prohibited, or whether it occurs.
                                 ______
                                 

                  ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

    Israel \1\ is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty system 
and free elections. There is no constitution; a series of ``basic 
laws'' provide for fundamental rights. The legislature, or Knesset, has 
the power to dissolve the Government and limit the authority of the 
executive branch. Labor and One Israel party leader Ehud Barak was 
elected Prime Minister in May and took office in July at the head of a 
broad centrist coalition Government. The judiciary is independent, but 
in the past, frequently has acquiesced with the Government's position 
in security cases; however during the year it ruled against the 
Government in several major security-related cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The human rights situation in the occupied territories is 
discussed in the annex appended to this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been in a state of war with 
most of its Arab neighbors. It concluded a peace treaty with Egypt in 
1979, with Jordan in 1994, and a series of agreements with the 
Palestinians beginning in 1993. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel 
occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan 
Heights. The international community does not recognize Israel's 
sovereignty over any part of the occupied territories. Throughout its 
existence, Israel has experienced numerous terrorist attacks.
    An historic process of reconciliation between Israel and its 
neighbors began with the Madrid Conference in 1991 and continued with 
the September 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of 
Principles (DOP). In September 1995, Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Interim Agreement on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, which provided for the election and 
establishment of a Palestinian self-governing authority, transfer of 
civil authority, Israeli redeployment from major Palestinian population 
centers in the West Bank, security arrangements, and cooperation in a 
variety of areas. In January 1997, Israel and the PLO concluded the 
Hebron Agreement, which established security arrangements for the 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian-populated areas of 
Hebron, and set out a road map for mutual implementation of other 
Interim Agreement commitments. In October 1998, Israel and the PLO 
signed the Wye River Memorandum, which, among other things, called for 
the continuation of the process of Israeli further redeployments in the 
West Bank. The implementation of the Wye River Memorandumwas frozen by 
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's Government in December 1998. 
Following Ehud Barak's election as Prime Minister, and the formation of 
a broad, centrist, coalition Government, Israel and the PLO signed the 
Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on September 4. The Sharm el-Sheikh 
Memorandum laid out a comprehensive roadmap for the implementation of 
Israel's further redeployments in the West Bank, the release of 
Palestinian prisoners, and the resumption of permanent status 
negotiations.
    Internal security is the responsibility of the General Security 
Service (GSS--also known as Shin Bet, or Shabak), which is under the 
authority of the Prime Minister's office. The police are under the 
authority of the Minister of Internal Security. The Israel Defense 
Forces (IDF) are under the authority of a civilian Minister of Defense. 
The IDF includes a significant portion of the adult population on 
active duty or reserve status and plays a role in maintaining internal 
security. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset 
reviews the activities of the IDF and the GSS.
    Israel has an advanced industrial economy, and citizens enjoy a 
high standard of living, with a per capita income of $17,000. 
Unemployment among citizens rose to 9.1 percent by year's end, but was 
substantially higher in the country's peripheral regions and among 
lower-skilled workers. Along with rapid economic growth in recent 
years, there has been an increase in income inequality. The 
longstanding gap in levels of income between Jewish and non-Jewish 
citizens continues. Regional income disparities appear to be growing, 
with unemployment in some areas reaching more than double the national 
average. A heavy reliance on foreign workers, principally from Asia and 
Eastern Europe, is a source of social problems. Such workers generally 
are employed in agriculture and the construction industry and 
constitute about 10 percent of the labor force. Since the 
implementation of an economic stabilization plan in 1985, Israel has 
moved gradually to reduce state intervention in the economy. The 
Government has been committed to market-oriented structural reforms, 
especially deregulation and rapid privatization of the economy. Despite 
the Government's continued dominant role in the economy, individuals 
generally are free to invest in private interests and own property. The 
Government owns and manages 77 percent of the country's land area, and 
as a matter of policy it does not sell land. The Jewish National Fund 
(JNF), an organization established in 1897 for the purchase and 
management of land for the Jewish people, owns 8 percent of the 
country's land area, including a considerable amount transferred 
directly from the Government, and manages another 8 percent on behalf 
of the Government. The JNF's statute prohibits the sale or lease of 
land to non-Jews, although exceptions sometimes are made. Foreigners 
and citizens of all religions are allowed freely to purchase or lease 
land in the remaining 7 percent of Israel.
    The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens, 
and the law and judiciary provide citizens with means of dealing with 
individual instances of abuse. Israel's main human rights problems have 
arisen from its policies and practices in the occupied territories, and 
from its fight against terrorism. The redeployment of the IDF from 
major Palestinian population areas in the West Bank in December 1995, 
and its previous withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, reduced 
significantly the scope of these problems. Moreover, the overall human 
rights situation continued to improve during the year, in part due to 
the lack of major terrorist attacks, which reduced the overall level of 
tension as well as the number of security-related arrests. Israeli 
security forces abused Palestinians suspected of security offenses. 
However, a landmark decision by the High Court of Justice in September 
prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices, including violent 
shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, sleep deprivation 
for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme 
temperatures. Following the ruling, there were no credible reports of 
such abuse by the security forces. However, the Government continued to 
detain without charge Palestinians, some of them for lengthy periods, 
although the number decreased significantly during the year. Detention 
and prison conditions, particularly for Palestinian security detainees 
held in Israel, improved, but do not meet minimum international 
standards in some cases. In September the Government acknowledged that 
it trains, debriefs, and pays the salaries of the Lebanese 
administrators and staff of the Al-Khiam prison in Israel's self-
declared ``security zone'' in southern Lebanon where guards allegedly 
committed abuses. Under the terms of the September Sharm el-Sheikh 
Memorandum, the Government released 350 Palestinian security prisoners.
    In previous years, the Government responded to terrorist and 
security incidents by periodically detaining hundreds of Palestinians 
without charge and tightening existing restrictionson the movement of 
persons (and sometimes goods) across borders with the West Bank and 
Gaza and between PA-controlled areas inside the West Bank (i.e., 
closure, which has been in effect to varying extents since 1993). The 
overall improvement in the security situation led to a significant 
reduction in such arrests and there were fewer prolonged security-
related closures. However, the Government imposed closure on Hebron 
after settlers were shot and injured in separate shooting attacks in 
January and August.
    The Government took few tangible steps to address violence and 
discrimination against women, although several court cases have set 
important precedents regarding certain types of discrimination. The 
Government made little headway in reducing institutionalized legal and 
societal discrimination against Israel's Christian, Muslim, and Druze 
citizens, who constitute just over 20 percent of the population, but do 
not share fully the rights provided to, and obligations imposed on, the 
country's Jewish citizens. As part of their efforts to address the 
problem, some government officials publicly acknowledged significant 
discrimination against Israel's non-Jewish citizens; however, no 
specific steps were taken by year's end.
    Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--One Palestinian, 
Sadi Sager, died in custody during the year (see Section 1.c.).
    During the year, one Israeli was killed and over 52 were wounded in 
terrorist attacks carried out by Palestinian groups or individuals 
seeking to halt the Middle East Peace Process.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Laws and administrative regulations prohibit the physical 
abuse of detainees; however, security forces abused, and in some cases, 
tortured Palestinians suspected of security offenses, and lawyers for 
security prisoners continued to file numerous challenges to the use of 
torture. However, a landmark decision by the High Court of Justice in 
September prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices, 
including violent shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, 
sleep deprivation for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure 
to extreme temperatures. Following the ruling, there were no credible 
reports of such abuse by the security forces. The High Court 
categorically rejected the Government's contention that these practices 
were ``moderate physical pressure,'' and therefore permissible under 
the law, though the Court left open the possibility that such practices 
might be acceptable if specifically authorized by new legislation.
    Prior to the High Court's decision, laws and administrative 
regulations prohibiting the physical abuse of detainees were not 
enforced in security cases. The head of the GSS was empowered by 
government regulation to authorize security officers to use ``moderate 
physical and psychological pressure'' (which includes violent shaking) 
while interrogating detainees. These practices often led to excesses 
(see Section 1.c. of the annex).
    In 1996 the Government presented draft legislation to define the 
basis for and limits of GSS activities. This legislation was rejected 
by the Knesset's Law and Constitution Committee in 1998 because it gave 
the GSS too broad a role in ``preserving democracy.'' That proposed 
legislation made no reference to the use of physical pressure in 
interrogations. Following the High Court's decision in September, some 
government officials called for the passage of legislation that would 
authorize the use of the methods banned by the court. At year's end, no 
action appeared likely. In November the Attorney General issued revised 
guidelines that denied blanket immunity from prosecution for 
interrogators. These guidelines left open the possibility that the 
State might decline to prosecute interrogators who used prohibited 
methods in cases of extreme urgency.
    Conditions vary in incarceration facilities in Israel and the 
occupied territories, which are administered by the Israeli Prison 
Service (IPS), the IDF, or the national police. IPS prisons, which 
generally house Israeli citizens convicted of common crimes, usually 
meet minimum international standards. In general, IPS inmates are not 
subject to physical abuse by guards, food is adequate, and prisoners 
receive basic necessities. Inmates receive mail, have television sets 
in their cells, and receive regular visits. Prisoners receive wages for 
prison work and benefits for good behavior. Many IPS prisons have drug 
treatment, educational, and recreational programs. The IPS has 
established an investigatory committee to look into charges of violence 
by guards against inmates.
    Since the closure in 1995 of the main IDF detention camps in the 
occupied territories, all security detainees (i.e., those detained and 
held without charge by security forces) from the occupied territories 
who are held for more than a few days are transferred to facilities 
within Israel. During the year, security detainees usually were held in 
IDF camps in Israel, but also in IPS facilities and in special sections 
of police detention facilities. Prisoners incarcerated for security 
reasons are subject to a different regimen, even in IPS facilities. 
They often are denied certain privileges given to prisoners convicted 
on criminal charges. Security detainees include some minors. Detention 
camps administered by the IDF are limited to male Palestinian detainees 
and are guarded by armed soldiers. The total number of Palestinian 
prisoners and administrative detainees held by Israel, approximately 
2,233 at the beginning of the year, fell to 1,354 by year's end. The 
number of administrative detainees (held without charge or trial) 
varied between 77 and 16 during the year, and stood at 18 at year's 
end. One of these detainees has been held without charge or trial since 
1994. Under the terms of the September Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the 
Government released 350 Palestinian security prisoners.
    In September terrorists placed bombs in neighborhoods in Haifa and 
Tiberias causing minimal civilian injuries and killing the 
perpetrators. In November a bombing in Netanya injured 33 persons.
    In June a demonstration against the demolition of an Israeli Arab-
owned house in Lod led to a confrontation between protesters and 
police, who reacted with excessive force. Between 8 and 20 persons were 
injured, including Arab Israeli Member of Knesset, Azmi Bishara, who 
was hospitalized briefly after being hit in the shoulder by a rubber 
bullet (see Section 2.b.). There were no further incidents of this kind 
during the year.
    Conditions in IDF detention camps have been criticized repeatedly 
over the years. Conditions at the Russian Compound, which houses a 
combination of security and common prisoners and detainees in 
Jerusalem, were criticized in 1997 as ``not fit to serve as lock-up'' 
by High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak. Conditions in other 
IDF facilities have improved in some respects. For example, inmates are 
given more time for exercise outside their cells. Nevertheless, 
recreational facilities remain minimal, and there are strict 
limitations on family visits to detainees. Visits were prevented during 
closures of the borders with Gaza and the West Bank.
    Conditions at some national police detention facilities can fall 
below minimum international standards. Such facilities are intended to 
hold criminal detainees prior to trial but often become de facto 
prisons. Those held include some security detainees and some persons 
who have been convicted and sentenced. Inmates in the national police 
detention facilities often are not accorded the same rights as 
prisoners in the IPS. Moreover, conditions are worse in the separate 
facilities for security detainees maintained both in police facilities 
and in IPS prisons.
    In 1996 the Government began a reform program for the country's 
detention facilities. Thus far, improvements in prison conditions have 
been limited in scope. Continued problems include dilapidation and 
overcrowding, which was aggravated by the closure of IDF detention 
facilities in the occupied territories in 1995. New legislation that 
took effect during 1997 provided for the right to live in conditions 
that would not harm the health or dignity of the detainee, access to 
adequate health care, the right to a bed for each detainee, and access 
to exercise and fresh air on a daily basis. The Government took steps 
towards implementing this legislation during the year, though problems 
remain.
    Children's rights groups have expressed particular concern over the 
separate sections of holding facilities set aside for thedetention of 
children. Overcrowding, poor physical conditions, lack of social 
workers, and denial of visits by parents are among the key problems. In 
addition to some Israeli minors held in criminal cases, there are 
juveniles among Palestinian detainees. Children's rights activists have 
recommended the construction of a separate detention facility for 
children.
    One Palestinian, Sadi Sager, died in custody after having been 
detained with neither charges nor trial for three months; human rights 
organizations alleged that the 21-year-old was denied proper medical 
care for a pre-existing heart condition, which was exacerbated by poor 
prison conditions (see Section 1.c.). All incarceration facilities are 
monitored by various branches of the Government, by members of the 
Knesset, by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and by 
human rights groups. While monitoring is judged to be effective 
overall, in some instances human rights groups were denied timely 
access to specific detainees, usually Palestinians held without charge 
or trial for alleged security offenses (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
    In September the Government acknowledged that it trains, debriefs, 
and pays the salaries of the Lebanese administrators and staff of the 
Al-Khiam prison in Israel's self-declared ``security zone'' in southern 
Lebanon where guards allegedly committed abuses.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest of citizens, and the Government generally observes 
this prohibition. Defendants are considered innocent until proven 
guilty and have the right to writs of habeas corpus and other 
procedural safeguards. However, a 1979 law permits detention without 
charge or trial, which is used in security cases. The Minister of 
Defense may issue a detention order for a maximum of 1 year. Within 24 
hours of issuance, detainees must appear before a district judge who 
may confirm, shorten, or overturn the order. If the order is confirmed, 
an automatic review takes place after 3 months. Detention orders were 
confirmed in all cases during the year. Detainees have the right to be 
represented by counsel and to appeal detention orders to the High Court 
of Justice; however, the security forces may delay notification of 
counsel with the consent of a judge. According to human rights groups 
and legal experts, there were cases in which a judge denied the 
Government's request to delay notification of counsel. At detention 
hearings, the security forces may withhold evidence from defense 
lawyers on security grounds. The Government also may seek to renew 
administrative detention orders. However, the security services must 
``show cause'' for continued detention, and, in some instances, 
individuals were released because the standard could not be met.
    In felony cases, a district court judge may postpone for 48 hours 
the notification of arrest to the detainee's attorney. The postponement 
may be extended to 7 days by the Minister of Defense on national 
security grounds or by the police inspector general to conduct an 
investigation. Moreover, a judge may postpone notification for up to 15 
days in national security cases.
    New legislation took effect in 1997 that more narrowly defined the 
grounds for pretrial detention and reduced to 24 hours the length of 
time a person may be held without charge. Children's rights activists 
have recommended separate legislation to define when and how a child 
may be arrested and how long children may be detained.
    Most of the protections afforded by law are not extended to 
Palestinian detainees, who fall under the jurisdiction of military law 
even if they are detained in Israel. With IDF redeployment in the West 
Bank, detention centers there were closed in 1995. As a result, all 
Palestinian detainees held for longer than 1 or 2 days are incarcerated 
in Israel (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
    At year's end, the Government held 1,354 Palestinians in custody. 
Those held were a mixture of common prisoners, administrative 
detainees, and security detainees. The Government continues to deny the 
ICRC access to two Lebanese citizens, Sheikh Mustafa Dirani (held 
without charge since 1994) and Sheikh Obeid (held without charge since 
1989). The High Court of Justice ruled in May 1998 that the Government 
is entitled to continue holding them for use in a possible exchange of 
hostages to obtain the return of an Israeli who still may be held by 
hostile forces. The High Court's ruling stressed that national security 
needs take precedence over the detainees' individual rights under 
Israeli and international law. At year's end, the Government detained 
16other Lebanese citizens; eleven have completed prison sentences of up 
to 10 years but still are being held without charge.
    Six Iraqis, held since they attempted to enter Israel illegally 
from Jordan, were released from detention by order of the High Court in 
November (though their movement was restricted to a kibbutz, which 
agreed to be responsible for their conduct).
    The law prohibits forced exile of citizens, and the Government does 
not use it.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision. 
However, in the past, the judiciary routinely acquiesced to the 
Government's position in security cases. The landmark High Court of 
Justice ruling in September (see Section 1.c.) marked a major change in 
this practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and 
efficient judicial process.
    The judicial system is composed of civil, military, religious, 
labor relations, and administrative courts, with the High Court of 
Justice as the ultimate judicial authority. The High Court of Justice 
is both a court of first instance (in cases involving government 
action) and an appellate court (when it sits as the Supreme Court).
    The law provides for the right to a hearing with representation by 
counsel, and authorities observe this right in practice. A planned 
regional and national system of public defenders operated by the 
Ministry of Justice was inaugurated in 1996 with the opening of a Tel 
Aviv office, although that office has suffered serious budget 
shortages. A substantial percentage of criminal cases are tried with no 
legal representation for the defendant.
    All nonsecurity trials are public except those in which the 
interests of the parties are deemed best served by privacy. Cases 
involving national security may be tried in either military or civil 
courts and may be partly or wholly closed to the public. The Attorney 
General determines the venue in such cases. The prosecution must 
justify closing the proceedings to the public. Adult defendants have 
the right to be represented by counsel even in closed proceedings but 
may be denied access to some evidence on security grounds. Under the 
law, convictions may not be based on any evidence denied to the 
defense. In addition, convictions may not be based solely on a 
confession by the accused, although in practice security prisoners have 
been sentenced on the basis of the coerced confessions of both 
themselves and others.
    The legal system often imposes far stiffer punishments on 
Christian, Muslim, and Druze persons than on Jewish citizens. For 
example, human rights advocates claim that Palestinians and Arab 
Israelis convicted of murder usually receive life sentences, while 
Jewish Israelis often receive significantly shorter sentences. To the 
extent that Palestinians are tried in Israeli courts, they receive 
harsher punishments than Jewish Israelis.
    There were no reports of political prisoners during the year.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Privacy of the individual and the home generally are 
protected by law; however, authorities interfere with mail and monitor 
telephone conversations. In criminal cases, the law permits wiretapping 
under court order; in security cases, the order must be issued by the 
Ministry of Defense. Under emergency regulations, authorities may open 
and destroy mail on security grounds.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Violence continued in northern Israel, related to 
attacks in southern Lebanon. According to various reports, an estimated 
50 Hizballah guerrillas, 13 Israeli soldiers, 27 Lebanese civilians, 
and 2 Israeli civilians were killed in south Lebanon and northern 
Israel during the year, as Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian guerrillas 
on one hand, and Israeli forces and the SLA on the other, engaged in 
attacks. For example, on June 22 Hizballah launched rocket attacks 
against northern Israel in retaliation for IDF shelling of a Lebanese 
village, killing 2 Israeli civilians. Israeli forces conducted repeated 
air strikes and artillery barrages on Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian 
guerrilla targets. Israeli forces also sometimes targeted civilian 
infrastructure inside Lebanon. On June 24, 9 Lebanese were killed and 
50 to 80 wounded in Israeli air raids, which alsotargeted civilian 
infrastructure, including electric power transformer stations and power 
lines in the Beirut area, Baalbek, and Bint Jubayl, and bridges along 
the main coastal highway at Damour, Sidon, and Tyre.
    In south Lebanon, there is an average of two or three attacks daily 
against IDF/SLA military positions and a similar number of IDF or SLA 
counterattacks.
    The Israeli-Lebanese Monitoring Group continued to deal with 
violations of the April 1996 understanding between Israel, Lebanon, and 
Syria, which precludes the targeting of civilians or the use of 
civilian-populated areas from which to launch attacks.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of 
the press, and the Government generally respects this right in 
practice. The law authorizes the Government to censor any material 
reported from Israel or the occupied territories regarded as sensitive 
on national security grounds. A censorship agreement signed in 1996 
between the Government and media representatives continued the trend of 
liberalization of the Government's censorship regime. The agreement 
provides that military censorship is to be applied only in cases 
involving national security issues that have a near certainty of 
harming the country's defense interests, and it now applies to all 
media organizations in Israel, including all newspapers. All media 
organizations can appeal the censor's decision to the High Court of 
Justice. Moreover, a clause abolishes the authority of the censor to 
shut down a newspaper for a censorship violation and eliminates the 
ability of the office of the censor to appeal a decision against it. 
News printed or broadcast abroad may be reported without censorship, 
which permits the media to run censored stories that have appeared in 
foreign sources.
    Emergency regulations prohibit anyone from expressing support for 
illegal organizations. On occasion in the past, the Government has 
prosecuted persons for speaking or writing on behalf of terrorist 
groups. No such cases were filed during the year, and there were public 
discussions about the scrapping of emergency regulations.
    Individuals, groups, and the press freely address public issues and 
criticize government officials and policies. Laws prohibit hate speech 
and incitement to violence; however, the Attorney General has concluded 
that such speech, for the most part, is nearly impossible to prosecute 
successfully. Nevertheless, during the year, police vigorously 
investigated individuals under anti-incitement codes.
    All newspapers are privately owned and managed. Newspaper licenses 
are valid only for Israel; separate licenses are required to distribute 
publications in areas in the occupied territories still under Israel's 
authority. Nineteen daily newspapers are published in Israel. There are 
about 90 weekly local newspapers and more than 250 periodical 
publications.
    Directed by a government appointee, the quasi-independent Israel 
Broadcast Authority (IBA) controls television Channel 1 and Kol Israel 
(The Voice of Israel) radio, both major sources of news and 
information. Privately-owned Channel 2 Television, the first commercial 
television channel, is operated by three franchise companies. There are 
13 private radio outlets. The Second Television and Radio Authority, a 
public body, supervises both Channel 2 and the country's 14 privately 
owned regional radio stations. Five cable television companies operate 
under franchises granted by government councils. The cable systems 
carry both domestic and international television networks, including 
some from Europe and countries throughout the Arab world.
    In May the Government set up a task force to attempt to close down 
the estimated 150 pirate radio stations operating out of Israel and the 
West Bank.
    Many international publications are available.
    The Government respects academic freedom.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for the right of assembly, and the Government generally respects this 
provision in practice.
    In June a demonstration against the demolition of an Israeli Arab-
owned house in Lod led to a confrontation between protesters and 
police, who reacted with excessive force. Between 8 and 20 persons were 
injured, including Arab Israeli Member of Knesset, Azmi Bishara, who 
was hospitalized briefly after being hit in the shoulder by a rubber 
bullet (see Section 1.c.). There were no further incidents of this kind 
during the year.
    The law provides for the right of association, and the Government 
generally respects this provision in practice. After the Hebron 
massacre in 1994, the Cabinet invoked the 1948 Ordinance for the 
Prevention of Terror to ban the ultranationalist Kach and Kahane Chai 
organizations, a ban that remains in effect. The decision provides for 
imprisonment for anyone belonging to, or expressing support for, either 
organization.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion, 
and the Government generally respects this right. Approximately 80 
percent of citizens are Jewish. Muslims, Christians, Druze, and members 
of other religions make up the remaining 20 percent. Each recognized 
religious community has legal authority over its members in matters of 
marriage and divorce. Secular courts have primacy over questions of 
inheritance, but parties, by mutual agreement, may bring cases to 
religious courts. Jewish and Druze families may ask for some family 
status matters, such as alimony and child custody in divorces, to be 
adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts. 
Christians only may ask that child custody and child support be 
adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts. 
Muslims have no recourse to civil courts in family-status matters. 
Legislation passed in 1996 allows the rabbinical courts to sanction 
either party who is not willing to grant a divorce.
    Many Jews object to the Orthodox Jewish religious authorities' 
exclusive control over Jewish marriage, divorce, and burial. These 
authorities do not recognize marriages or conversions to Judaism 
performed in Israel by Conservative or Reform rabbis. These issues have 
been a source of serious controversy within society, particularly in 
recent years, as thousands of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet 
Union have brought with them family members not recognized as Jewish by 
Orthodox authorities.
    Many Jews who wish to be married in secular or non-Orthodox 
religious ceremonies do so abroad. The Ministry of Interior recognizes 
such marriages.
    During the year, the High Court issued two important rulings on 
religious issues. Until a January High Court ruling, Reform and 
Conservative rabbis could not hold seats on the powerful municipal 
religious councils. In January the High Court ordered the Haifa and 
Jerusalem Religious Councils to meet with their Conservative and Reform 
members. In February the High Court ordered the Knesset to legislate a 
solution to a suit challenging military draft exemptions for yeshiva 
students. Large peaceful demonstrations followed the rulings.
    The Government provides proportionally greater financial support to 
institutions in the Jewish sector compared with those in the non-Jewish 
sector, i.e., Muslim, Christian, and Druze. In 1998 the High Court of 
Justice ruled that the budget allocation constituted ``prima facie 
discrimination'' but that the plaintiff's petition did not provide 
adequate information about the religious needs of the various 
communities. The Court refused to intervene in the budgetary process on 
the grounds that such action would invade the proper sphere of the 
legislature.
    Missionaries are allowed to proselytize, although the Church of 
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints voluntarily refrains from 
proselytizing under an agreement with the Government. A 1977 anti-
proselytizing law prohibits anyone from offering or receiving material 
benefits as an inducement to conversion; however, there have been no 
reports of its enforcement.
    Bills that would have further restricted proselytizing were 
introduced and passed their preliminary readings in 1997 and 1998 with 
the support of some government ministers; however, no further action 
was taken before the dissolution of the Knesset following the May 
elections. They are not expected to be enacted if reintroduced in the 
Knesset. Christian and other evangelical groups assert that the draft 
bills were discriminatory and served to intimidate Christian groups.
    Evangelical Christian and other religious groups complained that 
the police have been slow to investigate incidents of harassment, 
threats, and vandalism directed against their meetings, churches, and 
other facilities apparently by two ultraorthodox groups knownas Yad 
L'achim and Lev L'achim. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses assert that 
police did not adequately investigate a series of violent attacks on 
their members and facilities; members of this religious group filed 
over 75 complaints with police during the year for incidents ranging 
from assault to verbal harassment. The police have increased their 
level of attention to these matters during the latter half of the year, 
and there was a marked decline in the number of incidents. Nonetheless, 
despite the large number of outstanding complaints, many accompanied by 
considerable details concerning the identity of the alleged attackers, 
there were no arrests or indictments of the perpetrators.
    On July 20, the Baptist House Center in Jerusalem was vandalized by 
unknown assailants who spread tar on the front and along the sides of 
the building, as well as defacing the entrance to the sanctuary.
    The Government has recognized Jewish holy places under the 1967 
Protection of Holy Sites Law. The Government states that it also 
protects the holy sites of other faiths, and that it has provided funds 
for some holy sites of other faiths.
    A 1995 High Court of Justice ruling allows small numbers of Jews 
under police escort to pray on the Temple Mount, which is the location 
of two Muslim holy places and also the site of the First and Second 
Jewish temples.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and 
the Government respects them in practice for citizens, except with 
regard to military or security zones or in instances where citizens may 
be confined by administrative order to their neighborhoods or villages. 
The Government continued to restrict the movements of two Jewish 
settlers living in the occupied territories who belonged to extremist 
Kach or Kahane Chai groups, through the use of administrative orders 
issued by the IDF central command (see Section 2.d. of the annex).
    Citizens are free to travel abroad and to emigrate, provided they 
have no outstanding military obligations and are not restricted by 
administrative order. During the year, the Government generally 
continued to permit Muslim citizens to make the Hajj. However, for 
security reasons, the Government imposes some restrictions on its 
Muslim citizens who perform the Hajj, including requiring that they be 
over the age of 30. The Government does not allow persons to return if 
they leave the country without formal permission. The Government 
justifies these restrictions on the grounds that Saudi Arabia remains 
officially at war with Israel and that travel to Saudi Arabia therefore 
is considered subject to security considerations.
    Christian, Muslim, or Druze women who have married men from Arab 
states or the West Bank or Gaza have complained about losing their 
Israeli citizenship and right to reenter Israel.
    The Government welcomes Jewish immigrants, their families, and 
Jewish refugees, on whom it confers automatic citizenship and residence 
rights under the Law of Return. This law does not apply to non-Jews or 
to persons of Jewish descent who have converted to another faith. Other 
than the Law of Return and the family reunification statutes, which 
mainly apply to non-Jews who fled Israel in 1948-49, Israel has no 
immigration law that provides for immigration to the country, or for 
political asylum or refugee status. The law does allow individuals to 
live in Israel as permanent residents.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations 
in assisting refugees. The Government does not provide asylum to 
refugees from states with which Israel remains in a state of war. The 
issue of first asylum did not arise during the year. There were no 
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they fear 
persecution. Six Iraqis were released from detention by order of the 
High Court in November (see Section 1.d.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The law provides citizens with the right to change their government 
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through 
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal 
suffrage for adult citizens. The last national elections were held in 
May.
    Israel is a parliamentary democracy with an active multiparty 
system in which a wide range of political views are represented. 
Relatively small parties, including those whose primary support is 
among Israeli Arabs, regularly win seats in the Knesset. Elections are 
by secret ballot.
    While there are no legal impediments to the participation of women 
and minorities in government, they are underrepresented. Women hold 15 
of 120 Knesset seats, compared with 9 female members in the previous 
Knesset. There are 11 Arabs and 2 Druze in the Knesset; most represent 
parties deriving their support largely or entirely from the Arab 
community. Of the Knesset's 12 committees, 2 (including the Committee 
on the Status of Women) are chaired by a woman. There are two women in 
the Cabinet, and one Arab Deputy Minister. Three women, and one Arab 
serve on the 14-member High Court of Justice.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government 
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human 
rights cases. Government officials generally cooperate with 
investigations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex or marital 
status. The law also prohibits discrimination by both government and 
nongovernmental entities on the basis of race, religion, political 
beliefs, and age. Local human rights groups are concerned that these 
laws often are not enforced, either as a result of institutionalized 
discrimination, or because resources for implementing those laws, or 
mechanisms for their enforcement, sometimes are lacking.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. There continued to be 
action, both in and out of government, to reduce violence against women 
in Jewish and Arab communities. The Government has allocated minimal 
funds for a special campaign to combat such violence. Groups that focus 
on domestic violence include a committee established by the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs that includes Jewish and Arab nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO's) as well as government representatives, and a 
coalition of human rights organizations. Approximately 17 women were 
killed by their husbands or other male relatives during the year. 
According to the most recent estimates, some 200,000 women suffer from 
domestic violence each year, and some 7 percent of these are abused on 
a regular basis. According to press reports that appeared in 1998, an 
estimated 60,000 women were assaulted sexually or abused in 1997. Only 
a small percentage of victims complained to the police. An estimated 60 
percent of victims were age 18 or under.
    Arab human rights advocates also have formed a coalition to raise 
public awareness of so-called family ``honor killings,'' a term 
commonly used for the murder of a female by a male relative for alleged 
misconduct. At least 3 of the 17 women killed during the year by male 
relatives were killed in family ``honor'' cases.
    The Government supports 10 shelters for battered women, including 1 
exclusively for Christian, Muslim, and Druze women and 1 for both non-
Jewish and Jewish women. Women's rights advocates consider this number 
inadequate.
    According to the 1991 Domestic Violence Law, a district or 
magistrate court may prohibit access by violent family members to their 
property. Women's groups cooperate with legal and social service 
institutions to provide women's rights education. While sentences 
handed down to men convicted of rape have increased in recent years, 
women's rights activists argue that the penalties are not sufficiently 
harsh.
    Civil rights groups also expressed concern about the occurrence of 
physical attacks by religious Jews, particularly in Jerusalem, against 
women whom they consider to be dressed immodestly in public. On July 
20, several women were attacked by religious Jews in Jerusalem; police 
arrested three persons in connection with this assault.
    Prostitution per se is not illegal; however, the operation of 
brothels and organized sex enterprises is outlawed. Trafficking in 
women is a significant problem (see Section 6.f.). Women's advocacy 
groups report that women routinely receive lower wagesfor comparable 
work, are promoted less often, and have fewer career opportunities than 
their male counterparts. Despite 1996 legislation that provides for 
class action suits and requires employers to provide equal pay for 
equal work, including important side benefits and allowances, women's 
rights advocates charged that deep gaps remained.
    Legislation in 1993, reinforced by a 1994 ruling of the High Court 
of Justice, has increased the percentage of women on the boards of two-
thirds of government-owned companies. However, their numbers remain low 
overall. One study reported that in 1996 women made up more than 30 
percent of the boards in only 39 of 118 government-owned companies.
    The adjudication of personal status law in the areas of marriage 
and divorce is left to religious courts, where Jewish and Muslim women 
are subject to restrictive interpretations of their rights (see Section 
2.c.). Under personal status law, a Jewish woman is not allowed to 
initiate divorce proceedings without her husband's consent; 
consequently there are hundreds of so-called ``agunot'' in the country 
who cannot remarry or have legitimate children because their husbands 
either have disappeared or refused to grant a divorce.
    Legislation passed in 1995 broadened the civil sanctions made 
available to rabbinical courts in cases where a wife has ample grounds 
for divorce--such as abuse--but the husband refuses to agree. However, 
in some cases rabbinical courts have failed to invoke these sanctions. 
In addition, there have been cases in which a wife has failed to agree 
to a divorce, but a husband has been allowed to remarry; this 
permission is not given to wives. Such imbalances have been used by 
husbands to extort concessions from their wives in return for agreeing 
to a divorce. Rabbinical courts also may exercise jurisdiction over and 
issue sanctions against Jewish non-Israeli persons present in Israel.
    Religious law can be even more restrictive for Muslims: some 
Islamic law courts have held that Muslim women may not request a 
divorce, but that women may be forced to consent if a divorce is 
granted to a man.
    Jewish women are subject to the military draft, but have been 
barred from combat positions. In response to a High Court of Justice 
ruling, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) since 1996 has permitted women to 
enter pilot training. At year's end, two women had completed initial 
training and were progressing through the IAF advanced flight training 
program. This would qualify women for combat aviation positions. A 
recent IAF ruling allows female flight surgeons to participate in 
combat rescue missions. In addition, the IAF permitted women to begin 
serving as flight mechanics for combat helicopter patrols in November.
    Children.--The Government is committed to the rights and welfare of 
children. However, in practice resources sometimes are insufficient, 
particularly with respect to low-income families. Education is 
compulsory to age 15, or until the child reaches the 10th grade, 
whichever comes first. Government ministries, children's rights groups, 
and members of the legislature often cooperate on children's rights 
issues. The Government provides an extensive health care program for 
children. There is a broad network of mother and child clinics, which 
provide prenatal care as well as postnatal follow-up.
    The Government has legislated against sexual, physical, and 
psychological abuse of children and has mandated comprehensive 
reporting requirements. Although there has been a sharp increase in 
reported cases of child abuse in recent years, activists believe that 
this is largely due to increased awareness of the issue rather than a 
growing pattern of abuse. There are five shelters for children at risk. 
The Ministry of Justice formed a committee with police and NGO 
representatives that is attempting to assess the scope of child 
prostitution. Children's rights activists estimate that there may be 
several hundred prostitutes among the nation's children, and they warn 
that the phenomenon is unlikely to be eradicated until the social 
problems that give rise to it--including child abuse and schools that 
give up too readily on dropouts--are addressed.
    NGO's in the field of children's welfare concentrate their efforts 
on public education, on promoting the concept of children's rights as 
citizens, on improving legal representation for minors, and on 
combating the problems of poverty, which are most notable for the 
Bedouin children of the south. There has been concern about the 
children of the country's growing population of foreign workers, many 
of whom reside in the country illegally. Children of such families, 
believed to number in thethousands, exist in a legal and social limbo, 
without access to schools or adequate health services.
    Privately funded children's rights information centers have been 
established in some communities, and the Government assists in funding 
additional centers in other cities.
    People With Disabilities.--The Government provides a range of 
benefits, including income maintenance, housing subsidies, and 
transportation support for disabled persons, who constitute about 10 
percent of the population. Existing antidiscrimination laws do not 
prohibit discrimination based on disability, and these citizens 
continue to encounter difficulties in areas such as employment and 
housing. A law requiring access for the disabled to public buildings is 
not widely enforced. There is no law providing for access to public 
transportation for the disabled. A 1996 law extended disability 
assistance for deaf children from the age of 14 to maturity. An 
extended strike/demonstration this year led to a significant increase 
in government spending in support of the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Tensions between secular and religious 
elements of Israeli society continued to grow during the year. The non-
Orthodox Jewish community in particular has complained of 
discrimination and intolerance (see Section 2.c.).
    Evangelical Christian and other religious groups also suffered 
verbal abuse, assaults, and vandalism apparently by two ultraorthodox 
Jewish groups known as Yad L'achim and Lev L'achim (see Section 2.c.). 
In civic areas where religion is a determining criterion, such as the 
religious courts and centers of education, non-Jewish institutions 
routinely receive less state support than their Jewish counterparts. 
The status of a number of Christian organizations with representation 
in Israel heretofore has been defined by a collection of ad hoc 
arrangements with various government agencies. Several of these 
organizations seek to negotiate with the Government in an attempt to 
formalize their status.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government does not provide 
Israeli Arabs, who constitute 20 percent of the population, with the 
same quality of education, housing, employment, and social services as 
Jews. In addition, government spending is proportionally far lower in 
predominantly Arab areas than in Jewish areas. As part of their efforts 
to address the problem, some government officials publicly acknowledged 
significant discrimination against Israel's non-Jewish citizens. The 
Government appointed an Arab citizen to the board of the Israel Land 
Authority in November. This marks the first representation of non-Jews 
on this body. Israeli-Arab organizations have challenged the 1996 
``Master Plan for the Northern Areas of Israel,'' which listed as 
priority goals increasing the Galilee's Jewish population and blocking 
the territorial contiguity of Arab villages and towns, on the grounds 
that it discriminates against Arab citizens; the current Government 
continues to use this document for planning in the Galilee.
    Relative to their numbers, Israeli Arabs are underrepresented in 
the student bodies and faculties of most universities and in higher 
level professional and business ranks. Well-educated Arabs often are 
unable to find jobs commensurate with their level of education. Arab 
Ph.D.'s suffer the greatest problems in this regard. A small number of 
Israeli Arabs have risen to responsible positions in the civil service, 
generally in the Arab departments of government ministries. In 1994 a 
civil service commission began a 3-year affirmative action program to 
expand that number, but it had only modest results. Arab citizens 
comprise only 6.2 percent of the civil service and less than one 
percent of the positions in the four senior-most civil service grades. 
The Government has allocated only very limited resources to enforce 
landmark 1995 legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment. 
Several ministers publicly called for increased Arab representation in 
the civil service in August, as well as for the reduction of employment 
discrimination in the private sector. In June an Israeli contractor was 
denied permission to hire four Bedouin workers. The contractor was 
instructed to hire foreign workers who received the required permits 
within an hour. Late in the year, after publicity revealed that El Al, 
the Israeli national airline, employed no Arab Israeli cabin crew 
members, in spite of numerous applications, the airline hired its first 
Arab Israeli flight attendant and committed to hiring more.
    In practice, Israeli Arabs are not allowed to work in companies 
with defense contracts or in security-related fields. The Israeli Druze 
and Circassian communities are subject to the military draft, and 
although some have refused to serve, the overwhelming majority accepts 
service willingly. Some Bedouin and other Arab citizens who are not 
subject to the draft serve voluntarily. Those who do not serve in the 
army have less access than other Israelis to those social and economic 
benefits for which military service is a prerequisite or an advantage, 
such as housing, new-household subsidies, and government or security-
related industrial employment. Under a 1994 government policy decision, 
the social security child allowance for parents who did not serve in 
the military and did not attend a yeshiva (including Arabs) was 
increased to equal the allowance of those who had done so.
    Israeli Arab groups allege that many employers use the prerequisite 
of military service to avoid hiring non-Jews. For example, in 1997 a 
Haifa employment agency ran ads seeking Arabic-speaking telephone 
operators and listed military service as a prerequisite. An Israeli 
Arab group noted that there was no clear justification for this 
requirement, and it threatened to file a civil suit under a law 
prohibiting employment discrimination, and defining requirements 
unrelated to actual work as discriminatory. The employment agency 
eventually agreed to change the advertisement and run it again.
    The Government has yet to fulfill its commitment to resolve the 
legal status of unrecognized Arab villages. Eight villages have been 
recognized officially since 1994, but nearly 100 more, of varying size 
and with a total population of nearly 70,000 persons, remain in limbo. 
Such villages have none of the infrastructure, such as electricity, 
water, and sewers, provided to recognized communities. Private efforts 
have supplied some unrecognized villages with water, and the courts 
have ordered the provision of limited health and education services. Of 
the eight villages that have been recognized, the Government has yet to 
actually update the regional master plans or provide infrastructure 
such as water and electricity. In 1998 the High Court of Justice 
ordered the Ministry of Education to provide electricity to schools in 
several unrecognized villages in the Negev.
    Arab children make up about a quarter of the public school 
population, but government resources for them are less than 
proportionate to those for Jewish children. Many schools in Arab 
communities are dilapidated and overcrowded, lack special education 
services and counselors, have poor libraries, and have no sports 
facilities. Arab groups also note that the public school curriculum 
stresses the country's Jewish culture and heritage.
    Israeli-Arab students also are not eligible to participate in a 
special education program to provide academic assistance to students 
from disadvantaged backgrounds. A petition was filed with the High 
Court of Justice in May 1997 charging that the Ministry of Education's 
refusal to provide this program to Israeli-Arab students was 
discriminatory. The Attorney General's office agreed that the policy 
constituted impermissible discrimination but asked for 5 years to 
expand the program to Israeli-Arab students. The petitioners rejected 
this proposal as being too slow. The court held hearings on the case 
twice during 1998.
    Unresolved problems of many years' standing also include claims by 
Arab groups that land expropriation for public use has affected the 
Arab community disproportionately; that Arabs have been allowed too 
little input in planning decisions that affect their schools and 
municipalities; that mosques and cemeteries belonging to the Islamic 
Waqf (religious endowment) have been expropriated unjustly for public 
use; and that successive governments have blocked the return to their 
homes of persons displaced in the early years of the country's history. 
The Government has yet to agree with the pre-1948 residents of the 
northern villages of Bir Am and Ikrit, and their descendants, regarding 
their long-time demand to be allowed to rebuild their houses; in the 
meantime, permission has been given to Jewish settlements to increase 
their land holdings in the disputed areas.
    In 1991 the Government launched Operation Solomon, which airlifted 
14,000 Ethiopian immigrants to Israel. Due to language and educational 
barriers and cultural differences, many immigrants have had a difficult 
time adjusting to life in their new home and many immigrants from 
Ethiopia currently live in poverty. There were occasional reports of 
societaldiscrimination during the year; however, there were far fewer 
reports than in previous years.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers may join and establish labor 
organizations freely. Most unions belong to Histadrut (the General 
Federation of Labor in Israel), or to a much smaller rival federation, 
the Histadrut Haovdim Haleumit (National Federation of Labor). These 
organizations are independent of the Government. Histadrut members 
democratically elect national and local officers, and officials of its 
affiliated women's organization Na'amat, from political party lists of 
those already in the union. Plant or enterprise committee members are 
elected individually.
    During the year, the Histadrut administration continued its drastic 
reshaping of the labor federation, including further reductions in 
staff and services, as Histadrut shifted its concentration to those 
areas directly related to employment. At year's end, membership--which 
once reached 1.65 million persons--stood at about 650,000.
    The right to strike is exercised regularly. Unions must provide 15 
days' notice prior to a strike unless otherwise specified in the 
collective bargaining agreement. However, unauthorized strikes occur. 
Strike leaders--even those organizing illegal strikes--are protected by 
law. If essential public services are affected, the Government may 
appeal to labor courts for back-to-work orders while the parties 
continue negotiations. There were a number of strikes in both the 
public and private sectors during the year by employees protesting the 
effects of privatization. Worker dismissals and the terms of severance 
arrangements were often the central issues of dispute.
    Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip who work in Israel 
may not join Israeli trade unions or organize their own unions in 
Israel. Palestinian trade unions in the occupied territories are not 
permitted to conduct activities in Israel (see Section 6.a. of the 
annex). However, nonresident workers in the organized sector are 
entitled to the protection of Histadrut work contracts and grievance 
procedures. They may join, vote for, and be elected to shop-level 
workers' committees if their numbers in individual establishments 
exceed a minimum threshold. Palestinian participation in such 
committees is minimal.
    Labor laws apply to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and to the 
Syrian Druze living on the Golan Heights.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Israeli workers 
fully exercise their legal rights to organize and bargain collectively. 
While there is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion 
discrimination, the law against discrimination could be cited to 
contest discrimination based on union membership. No antiunion 
discrimination has been reported.
    Nonresident workers may not organize their own unions or engage in 
collective bargaining, but they are entitled to be represented by the 
bargaining agent and protected by collective bargaining agreements. 
They do not pay union membership fees, but are required to pay a 1 
percent agency fee, which entitles them to union protection by 
Histadrut's collective bargaining agreements. The Ministry of Labor may 
extend collective bargaining agreements to nonunionized workplaces in 
the same industrial sector. The Ministry of Labor also oversees 
personal contracts in the unorganized sectors of the economy.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor, specifically including child forced labor, 
and neither citizens nor nonresident Palestinians working in Israel 
generally are subject to this practice; however, women are trafficked 
for the purpose of prostitution, including forced prostitution (see 
Section 6.f.). Civil rights groups charge that unscrupulous employers 
often take advantage of illegal workers' lack of status to hold them in 
conditions amounting to involuntary servitude (see Section 6.e.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Children who have attained the age of 15 years, and who 
are liable to compulsory education under the Compulsory Education Law, 
may not be employed unless they work as apprentices under the 
Apprenticeship Law. Notwithstanding these provisions, children who are 
at least 14 years old may be employed during official school holidays. 
Employment of those 16 to 18 years of age is restricted to ensure time 
for rest and education.
    There are no reliable data on illegal child workers. They are 
concentrated among Israel's Arab population and its most recent Jewish 
immigrants. Illegal employment is found primarily in urban, light-
industrial areas. Children's rights groups have called for more 
vigorous enforcement of child labor laws, combined with a parallel 
effort to deal with the causes of illegal child labor. The Government 
specifically prohibits forced child labor, and it generally does not 
occur (see Section 6.f.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Legislation in 1987 established 
a minimum wage at 45 percent of the average wage, calculated 
periodically and adjusted for cost of living increases. At year's end, 
the minimum wage was about $700 (roughly 2,800 new Israeli shekels) per 
month. The minimum wage often is supplemented by special allowances and 
is generally sufficient to provide a worker and family with a decent 
standard of living. Union officials have expressed concern over 
enforcement of minimum wage regulations, particularly with respect to 
employers of illegal nonresident workers, who sometimes pay less than 
the minimum wage.
    By law the maximum hours of work at regular pay are 47 hours a 
week, 8 hours per day, and 7 hours on the day before the weekly rest, 
which must be at least 36 consecutive hours and include the Sabbath. By 
national collective agreements, the private sector established a 
maximum 45-hour workweek in 1988. The public sector moved to a 5-day, 
42\1/2\ hour workweek in 1989, while the military adopted it in 1993.
    Employers must receive a government permit to hire nonresident 
workers from the occupied territories, certifying that no citizen is 
available for the job. All Palestinians from the occupied territories 
are employed on a daily basis and, unless they are employed on shift 
work, are not authorized to spend the night in Israel. At the end of 
1998, the Government was considering a change in this provision to 
allow Palestinian workers to remain overnight for a week at a time. 
Palestinians without valid work permits are subject to arrest.
    Nonresident workers are paid through the Employment Service of the 
Ministry of Labor, which disburses wages and benefits collected from 
employers. The Ministry deducts a 1 percent union fee and the workers' 
required contributions to the National Insurance Institute (NII), the 
agency that administers the Israeli social security system, 
unemployment benefits, and other benefits. Despite these deductions, 
Palestinian workers are not eligible for all NII benefits. They 
continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel and the 
bankruptcy of a worker's employer. They do not have access to 
unemployment insurance, general disability payments, low-income 
supplements, or child allotments. By contrast, Israeli settlers in the 
occupied territories who work in Israel have the same benefits as other 
Israeli workers. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has long 
criticized this inequality in entitlements. The Government agreed to 
transfer the NII fees collected from Palestinian workers to the 
Palestinian Authority, which is to assume responsibility for all the 
pensions and social benefits of Palestinians working in Israel. 
Implementation of this change is still under way.
    There was increased public debate over the role in the workplace 
and society of foreign workers, who are estimated to number 200,000 or 
more, perhaps half of them undocumented and employed illegally. The 
majority of such workers come from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, 
and most are employed in the construction and agricultural sectors. The 
law does not allow such workers citizenship or permanent residence. As 
a result, they and their families live in a legal and social limbo. 
Government deportations of such workers take place without benefit of 
due process.
    Along with union representatives, the Labor Inspection Service 
enforces labor, health, and safety standards in the workplace, although 
resource constraints affect overall enforcement. Legislation protects 
the employment rights of safety delegateselected or appointed by the 
workers. In cooperation with management, these delegates are 
responsible for safety and health in the workplace.
    Workers do not have the legal right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment. 
However, collective bargaining agreements provide some workers with 
recourse through the work site labor committee. Any worker may 
challenge unsafe work practices through government oversight and legal 
agencies.
    6.f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women for the purpose 
of prostitution has become a significant problem in recent years. 
According to a study by the Israel Women's Network, every year hundreds 
of women from the former Soviet Union are brought to Israel by well-
organized mafia networks and forced through violence and threats to 
work illegally as prostitutes.
    There are no laws against trafficking in persons. Prostitution per 
se is not illegal; however, the operation of brothels and organized sex 
enterprises is outlawed. According to press reports, brothels are 
ubiquitous despite being illegal, and police officials estimate that 
there are 25,000 paid sexual transactions every day.

                        THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

    (including areas subject to the jurisdiction of the palestinian 
                               authority)
    Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East 
Jerusalem during the 1967 War. The West Bank and Gaza Strip now are 
administered to varying extents by Israel and the Palestinian Authority 
(PA). Pursuant to the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the September 
1995 Interim Agreement, Israel transferred most responsibilities for 
civil government in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank to the 
PA, while retaining responsibility in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for 
external security; foreign relations; the overall security of Israelis, 
including public order in the Israeli settlements; and certain other 
matters. Negotiations to address the permanent status issues including 
Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees, water, and other matters 
convened for an initial session in May 1996, lapsed for several years, 
and resumed late in the year pursuant to the September Sharm el-Sheikh 
Memorandum.
    Pursuant to the agreements signed between the PLO and Israel, the 
PA by 1996 had full or partial control over most major Palestinian 
population centers in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. In 1998 and during 
the year, Israel implemented further redeployments, in partial 
fulfillment of its obligations under the Interim Agreement, the Wye 
River Memorandum, and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum.
    Israel and the Palestinian Authority have varying degrees of 
control and jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel 
continues to control certain civil functions and is responsible for all 
security in portions of the occupied territories categorized as Area C, 
which includes the Israeli settlements. In areas known as Area B, the 
PA has jurisdiction over civil affairs and shares security 
responsibilities with Israel. The PA has control over civil affairs and 
security in Area A. The PA also has jurisdiction over some civil 
affairs in Area C. Accordingly, this report discusses the policies and 
practices of both the Israeli Government and the PA in the areas where 
they exercise jurisdiction and control.
    Israel continues to exercise civil authority in some areas of the 
West Bank through the Israeli Ministry of Defense's Office of 
Coordination and Liaison, known by the Hebrew acronym MATAK,which 
replaced the now defunct Civil Administration (CIVAD). The 
approximately 170,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip are subject to Israeli law and are treated better by Israeli 
authorities than are Palestinians. The body of law governing 
Palestinians in the Israeli-controlled portions of the territories 
derives from Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, and Egyptian law, and 
Israeli military orders. Laws and regulations promulgated by the PA 
also are in force. The international community considers Israel's 
authority in the occupied territories to be subject to the Hague 
Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the 
Protection of Civilians in Time of War. The Israeli Government 
considers the Hague Regulations applicable and states that it observes 
the Geneva Convention's humanitarian provisions.
    In January 1996, Palestinians chose their first popularly elected 
Government in democratic elections, which generally were well-
conducted. The 88-member Council and the Chairman of the Executive 
Authority were elected. The PA also has a cabinet of 30 ministers. PA 
Chairman Yasir Arafat continues to dominate the affairs of government 
and to make major decisions. Most senior government positions in the PA 
are held by individuals who are members of, or loyal to, Arafat's Fatah 
faction of the PLO. The Council meets regularly and discusses a range 
of issues significant to the Palestinian people and the development of 
an open, democratic society in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Political 
commentators and members of the Council complain that it does not have 
sufficient influence on policy or the behavior of the executive. The PA 
judiciary is subject to executive influence.
    Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consist of 
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); the General Security Service (GSS or 
Shin Bet); the Israeli National Police (INP); and the paramilitary 
border police. Israeli military courts try Palestinians accused of 
committing security crimes in Israeli-controlled areas. Members of the 
Israeli security forces committed human rights abuses.
    The Palestinian Police Force (PPF) was established in May 1994 and 
includes the Palestinian Public Security Force; the Palestinian Civil 
Police; the Preventive Security Force (PSF); the General Intelligence 
Service, or Mukhabarat; the Palestinian Presidential Security Force; 
emergency services and rescue; and the Palestinian Coastal Police. 
Other quasi-military security organizations, such as the military 
intelligence organization, also exercise de facto law enforcement 
powers. Palestinian police are responsible for security and law 
enforcement for Palestinians and other non-Israelis in PA-controlled 
areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli settlers in the occupied 
territories are not subject to PA security force jurisdiction. Members 
of the PA security forces committed human rights abuses.
    The economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is small, poorly 
developed, and highly dependent on Israel. The economy relies on 
agriculture, services, and to a lesser extent, light manufacturing. 
Israel restricts the movement of persons and products into Israel and 
Jerusalem from the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, since 1993 Israel 
has applied ``closures,'' or enhanced restrictions, on the movement of 
persons and products for lengthy periods following terrorist attacks. 
Israel enforced its closure policy less stringently than it did in 
1998. Palestinians and their vehicles require permits to cross from the 
West Bank or Gaza into Israel and Jerusalem. Many West Bank and Gaza 
workers are employed at day jobs in Israel and Jerusalem, making their 
employment vulnerable to disruption. On occasion, Israel imposes a 
tightened version of closure in the wake of terrorist incidents, and 
when it believes that there is an increased likelihood of terrorist 
attacks or unrest in the occupied territories. Comprehensive, tightened 
closures also were instituted during major Israeli holidays. During 
these times, Israel cancels all travel permits and prevents 
Palestinians--even those with valid work permits--from entering Israel 
or Jerusalem. Israel imposed 15 days of tightened, comprehensive 
closure during the year; this represents a decrease in comprehensive 
closure days compared with the previous year. In past years, in 
response to changes in the security environment, the Israeli Government 
also periodically prohibited most travel between certain towns and 
villages within the West Bank (an ``internal'' closure), hampering the 
flow of goods and persons; however, this did not occur during the year. 
Palestinians who travel between some cities in the West Bank must pass 
through Israeli-controlled checkpoints where they sometimes are 
subjected to verbal and physical harassment by Israeli security 
personnel.
    Both Israel and the PA were responsible for serious human rights 
abuses; however, while there were several marked improvements in 
Israel's human rights record in the occupied territories, the PA's 
human rights record worsened in several areas. Israelisecurity forces 
committed a number of human rights abuses during the year. Several 
Palestinians were killed in violent confrontations with Israeli 
security units, who at times used live ammunition against Palestinian 
demonstrators and shot at demonstrators or individuals 
indiscriminately. Israeli security forces abused Palestinians suspected 
of security offenses. However, a landmark decision by the Israeli High 
Court of Justice in September prohibited the use of a variety of 
abusive practices, including violent shaking, painful shackling in 
contorted positions, sleep deprivation for extended periods of time, 
and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures. Following the ruling, 
there were no credible reports of such abuse by the security forces. 
Prison conditions are poor, and Israeli authorities arbitrarily arrest 
and detain persons. Prolonged detention, limits on due process, and 
infringements on privacy rights remained problems. Israeli authorities 
placed some limits on freedom of assembly and movement.
    PA security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses 
during the year. PA security officials committed abuse, and in some 
cases torture, against prisoners and detainees. Palestinian security 
forces killed three persons in violent confrontations. PA security 
forces used excessive force, and in some cases, live ammunition against 
Palestinian demonstrators and shot at demonstrators and individuals 
indiscriminately. Two other Palestinians died in PA custody. PA police 
officials claim that Ramadam Abu Shahin died in June after being 
accidentally shot during interrogation. Muhammad Ahmed Shreiteh died in 
PA police custody in Hebron. Family members alleged that he was 
tortured while in custody; the PA did not perform an autopsy or 
investigate his death. Due largely to the decrease in terrorist attacks 
during the year, PA security forces made fewer arrests than in previous 
years; however, there continue to be credible accounts of torture and 
abuse of prisoners and detainees. PA prison conditions are very poor. 
PA security forces arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and prolonged 
detention is a problem.
    Lack of due process is a problem. The courts are inefficient, lack 
staff and resources, and do not ensure fair and expeditious trials. The 
PA executive and security services frequently ignore or fail to carry 
out court decisions. Lack of due process is a serious problem in the 
PA's state security courts. PA security forces infringed on citizens' 
right to privacy. Although the PA claims to respect its citizens' right 
to express themselves freely, it limited freedom of speech and of the 
press. The PA continued to harass, detain, and abuse journalists. PA 
harassment led many Palestinian commentators, reporters, and critics to 
practice self-censorship. The PA placed some limits on freedom of 
assembly and association. Violence against women and ``honor killings'' 
persist. Societal discrimination against women and the disabled is a 
problem. Child labor is a problem.
    During the year, one Palestinian died in an attack perpetrated by 
Israelis, while Israeli civilians, including settlers, harass and 
attack Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In general, 
settlers are not prosecuted for these acts and rarely serve prison 
sentences when convicted of a crime against Palestinians.
    Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continued to harass, 
abuse, and attack Israelis, especially settlers. Extremist Palestinian 
groups and individuals, including the militant Islamic Resistance 
Movement (HAMAS) and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), continued their 
efforts to undermine the authority of the PA and halt progress in the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process by wounding Israelis in 3 attacks in 
the occupied territories and Israel.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the 
Israeli security forces killed three Palestinians at military 
checkpoints and roadblocks inside the occupied territories. In these 
cases, Israeli authorities stated that the individuals were shot after 
failing to obey orders to halt. Palestinians dispute these accounts and 
charge that Israeli soldiers used excessive and unnecessary force.
    On June 3, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Alla Yusef Mahmud Abu 
Sharkh at the Samu checkpoint near Hebron while he allegedly was trying 
to avoid stopping at the checkpoint.
    On October 1, Khader Shaleh 'Afaneh Badwan was shot and killed by 
Israeli police personnel in Jerusalem while trying to escapepolice in a 
stolen car. Palestinian bystanders claim that police shot Badwan after 
he already had surrendered; Israeli police personnel say that they are 
investigating the incident.
    On October 25, an IDF soldier shot and killed Musa Faiz Helail, a 
souvenir vendor, at Rachel's Tomb, a Jewish religious site in 
Bethlehem. The IDF soldier said that he shot Helail because he was 
attempting to stab him. Palestinian bystanders dispute this claim and 
assert that Helail did not try to harm the soldier.
    Israeli security units also shot and killed three Palestinians who 
they state were engaged in acts of terrorism. On January 13, Israeli 
undercover police shot and killed a suspected Palestinian terrorist in 
a shootout south of Hebron in which an Israeli policeman also died. A 
Palestinian and an Israeli policeman also were wounded in the 
confrontation. In December Israeli security forces shot and killed two 
members of HAMAS in a Beit Awa shootout.
    During the year, violent clashes between Palestinian demonstrators 
and Israeli security forces resulted in two Palestinian deaths and a 
number of wounded. IDF regulations permit the use of both rubber-coated 
metal bullets and live ammunition only when a soldier's life is in 
immediate danger, to halt fleeing suspects, to disperse a violent 
demonstration, or to fire on an ``individual unlawfully carrying 
firearms.'' According to policy, soldiers should direct fire at the 
legs only and may fire at a fleeing suspect only if they believe that a 
serious felony has occurred and they have exhausted other means to 
apprehend the suspect. It is forbidden to open fire in the direction of 
children or women, even in cases of severe public disorder, unless 
there is an immediate and obvious danger to a soldier's life. Israeli 
soldiers and police sometimes used live ammunition or rubber-coated 
metal bullets, which can be lethal, in situations other than when their 
lives were in danger and sometimes shot suspects in the upper body and 
head.
    On January 6, Israeli soldiers in Hebron shot and killed Bader 
Qawasmeh with live ammunition during a curfew in the Israeli-controlled 
section of the town. IDF soldiers say that they shot Qawasmeh by 
accident and that they believed that the toy gun he was playing with 
was real.
    On January 26, Israeli policemen shot and killed Zaki Nur Al-Din 
`Ubayd during a clash between soldiers and Palestinians who were 
protesting the demolition of a house in an East Jerusalem neighborhood. 
`Ubayd reportedly was shot in the upper body with a rubber-coated metal 
bullet.
    In May Mahmud Abu Hajar, 18, died from gunshot wounds sustained in 
March 1994. Israeli soldiers had shot Hajar in the head during a 
confrontation and he had been in a coma since that time.
    One Palestinian security detainee died in an Israeli prison after 
suffering a heart attack (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the Israel 
report).
    Palestinian security forces shot and killed three Palestinians 
during confrontations this year. On March 10, Palestinian security 
forces shot and killed Ala Jumaa Al-hams, age 17, and Khamis Mahmoud 
Salama, age 17, during riots in the Gaza Strip; Palestinians were 
protesting the fact that the PA security court sentenced one security 
official to death and two others to long prison terms for killing 
another PA security official (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.). Human rights 
organizations charged that PA security forces used excessive force. 
Palestinian security forces wounded between 40 and 70 other Palestinian 
demonstrators during confrontations the following day (see Section 
1.c.).
    During the year, two Palestinians died in PA custody. On June 27, 
23-year-old Ramadan Abu Shahin of Nablus was shot and killed while 
being interrogated by Palestinian police at a police station in the 
West Bank town of Anabta; Abu Shahin was arrested at a PA roadblock 
because he was riding in a stolen car. PA officials say that in the 
course of their interrogation, Abu Shahin began pushing a police 
officer, who pushed him back while holding an AK-47 assault rifle. 
According to PA officials, the rifle accidentally went off, killing 
Shahin (see Section 1.c.). In December a PA military court found the 
police officer guilty of murder and sentenced him to 8 years in prison.
    On October 4, 33-year-old Muhammad Ahmad Shreiteh died in PA 
custody in Hebron. According to prison officials, he died of a heart 
attack; however, family members alleged to one human rights 
organization that he was tortured while in PA police custody. The PA 
did not perform an autopsy and PA officials did not respond to human 
rights organizations' queries about the death (see Section 1.c.).
    On February 26, Colonel Ahmad Atiyah Abu-Mustafa of Gaza was 
executed after the PA's state security court convicted him of raping a 
young boy. Human rights groups criticized the court's decision for 
ignoring due process (see Section 1.e.).
    On February 11, Dr. Naeelah Hamdan Aied Garaeen was stabbed to 
death near the Old City of Jerusalem, possibly by an unidentified 
``serial stabber'' who had killed a number of Palestinians in Jerusalem 
over the past few years. Later that same day, an unidentified 
Palestinian stabbed an Israeli bank guard in East Jerusalem, possibly 
in retaliation (see Section 1.c.).
    During the year, the Palestinian Authority's state security court 
sentenced Jamil Munir Jadallah to life in prison for killing two 
Israelis in 1998. His lawyer complained that he had not had sufficient 
time to prepare his case.
    On January 13, one undercover Israeli border policeman was killed 
and one was wounded in a shootout near Hebron with members of the 
radical HAMAS group. One HAMAS terrorist was killed and one was wounded 
in the confrontation.
    In July an Israeli military court sentenced Salem Sarsour, a member 
of HAMAS to three consecutive life terms in prison for the 1998 killing 
of an elderly rabbi and for wounding dozens of soldiers and civilians 
in two grenade attacks.
    b. Disappearance.--Two Palestinians who disappeared under 
suspicious circumstances in 1997 remained unaccounted for during the 
year. Shafiq Abdul Wahhab, a suspected land dealer, disappeared in 1997 
and his whereabouts remain unknown. The PA established a committee in 
1997 to investigate his disappearance but has failed to locate him. 
Taysir Hmiadan Ziyadi, a Palestinian who married an Israeli woman in 
1992 and received an Israeli identification card in 1996, disappeared 
in July 1997 during a trip to the Gaza Strip. His whereabouts remain 
unknown.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Israeli laws and administrative regulations prohibit the 
physical abuse of detainees; however, Israeli security forces abused, 
and in some cases tortured, Palestinians suspected of security 
offenses, and lawyers for security prisoners continued to file numerous 
challenges of the use of torture. However, a landmark decision by the 
Israeli High Court of Justice in September prohibited the use of a 
variety of abusive practices, including violent shaking, painful 
shackling in contorted positions, sleep deprivation for extended 
periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures. 
Following the ruling, there were no credible reports of such abuses by 
security forces. The High Court categorically rejected the Israeli 
Government's contention that these practices were ``moderate physical 
pressure,'' and therefore permissible under the law, though the Court 
left open the possibility that such practices might be acceptable if 
specifically authorized by new legislation.
    Prior to the High Court's decision, Israeli laws and administrative 
regulations prohibiting the physical abuse of detainees were not 
enforced in security cases (see Section 1.c. of the Israel report). The 
head of the GSS was empowered by government regulation to authorize 
security officers to use ``moderate physical and psychological 
pressure'' (which includes violent shaking) while interrogating 
detainees. These practices often led to excesses.
    Most convictions in security cases before Israeli courts are based 
on confessions. A detainee may not have contact with a lawyer until 
after interrogation, a process that may last days or weeks. The 
Government does not allow International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) 
representatives access to detainees until the 14th day of detention. 
This prolonged incommunicado detention contributes to the likelihood of 
abuse. Detainees sometimes claim in court that their confessions are 
coerced, but judges rarely exclude such confessions. It is likely that 
some Palestinian detainees fail to make complaints either from fear of 
retribution or because they assume that such complaints would be 
ignored. During the year, there were no known cases in which a 
confession was thrown out because of improper means of investigation or 
interrogation.
    Israeli authorities also sometimes treat Palestinians in an abusive 
manner at checkpoints, subjecting them to verbal and physical 
harassment.
    Israeli soldiers killed and wounded several Palestinians at 
checkpoints (see Section l.a.).
    Israeli security forces shot and injured over a dozen Palestinians 
during confrontations. In March Israeli soldiers shot and wounded two 
Palestinians in Nablus who were protesting the uprooting of Palestinian 
olive trees.
    On April 10, Israeli security forces shot and wounded two Gazan 
fisherman; the security forces charged that they were fishing in a 
prohibited zone and disobeyed orders to stop their boat.
    In June Israeli security forces shot and wounded 15 Palestinians in 
the West Bank and 2 in the Gaza Strip during the ``days of rage'' 
demonstrations protesting Israeli settlement activity in the occupied 
territories (see Section 2.b.).
    In July IDF soldiers shot and wounded nine Palestinians who stoned 
an Israeli military outpost in the Gaza Strip.
    On November 20, Israeli soldiers shot and wounded 10 Palestinians 
in the West Bank during a protest organized by the Fatah Youth 
Organization to call for the release of Palestinian prisoners (see 
Section 2.b.).
    The PA does not prohibit by law the use of torture or force against 
detainees. Human rights monitors report that PA security forces were 
responsible for torture and widespread abuse of Palestinian detainees. 
Such abuse generally took place after arrest and during interrogation. 
In 1995 the Gaza civil police commander issued to police officers in 
the West Bank and Gaza a directive forbidding torture during 
interrogation and directing the security forces to observe the rights 
of all detainees. However, the directive does not have the force of 
law; Palestinian security officers have not been issued formal 
guidelines on the proper conduct of interrogations. The PA lacks 
adequate equipment to collect and use evidence, and convictions are 
based largely on confessions. The high premium put on confessions 
heightens the possibility of abuse.
    PA security officials abuse prisoners by threatening, hooding, 
beating, and tying detainees in painful positions, forcing them to 
stand for long periods of time, depriving them of sleep and food, and 
burning detainees with cigarettes and hot instruments. Palestinians 
also alleged that they had been violently shaken while in PA custody. 
International human rights monitoring groups have documented widespread 
arbitrary and abusive conduct by the PA. Human rights groups say that 
use of torture is widespread and not restricted to those persons 
detained on security charges. Human rights groups state that those 
Palestinians who are suspected of belonging to radical Islamic groups 
are more likely to be treated poorly. In August Sami Naufal, a leader 
of the Islamic National Salvation Front, was arrested and detained for 
a week. He reportedly was beaten, denied sleep, held in painful and 
awkward positions, and beaten on the feet. In March General 
Intelligence forces arrested, detained, and physically abused a 15-
year-old boy after his father escaped from prison (see Section 1.d.).
    During the year, two Palestinians died in PA custody. In one case, 
family members claim that the prisoner died after being tortured (see 
Section l.a.). Despite its promises to do so, the PA has failed to 
publicize the results of its investigations or to release the findings 
of its investigations to diplomats or human rights organizations.
    In March Palestinian security forces wounded 40 to 70 Palestinian 
demonstrators during riots in the Gaza Strip (see Sections 1.a. and 
2.b.).
    During the year, there were several allegations that corrupt PA 
security officials abused their authority and detained persons in order 
to extort money from them and their families (see Sections 1.d. and 
1.e.).
    In November two signatories of a petition that accused the PA of 
corruption and failing to win significant gains from the peace process 
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.) were attacked. One of the signatories was 
attacked and wounded by unidentified assailants and the other was 
beaten by members of the General Intelligence Organization. The 
director of a human rights organization who signed a statement 
supporting the petition was subsequently hit on the head with a stone 
by unknown assailants.
    Israeli settlers harass and threaten Palestinians in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. Human rights groups received several dozen reports 
during the year that Israeli settlers in the West Bank beat 
Palestinians and destroyed the property of Palestinians living or 
farming near Israeli settlements. For example, in December unidentified 
assailants threw a carpenter's file out of a building owned by 
settlers; the file pierced the skull of Hamad Diyis as he walked by. In 
general, settlers are not prosecuted for these crimes and rarely serve 
prison sentences even when convicted of a crime.
    Palestinians continued to harass, abuse, and attack Israelis, 
especially settlers. While overall harassment of Israeli civilians by 
Palestinians was lower than in previous years, several Israelis were 
injured when Palestinians stoned Israeli cars in the West Bank and 
Gaza. During the year, members of extremist Palestinian groups attacked 
and wounded several Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including 
shooting at Israeli motorists.
    On January 4, an unidentified Palestinian shot at a bus carrying 
school teachers from the Kiryat Arba settlement to Hebron, wounding two 
women.
    In January some Palestinians threw two firebombs at an Israeli 
police station to protest government approval of the construction of 
housing units for Jews in a Palestinian-populated Jerusalem 
neighborhood.
    On February 11, a Palestinian man stabbed and wounded an Israeli 
bank guard in East Jerusalem, possibly in retaliation for the killing 
of a Palestinian earlier in the day (see Section 1.a.).
    On August 3, two Jewish settlers were shot and wounded in Hebron by 
an unidentified Palestinian.
    On October 30, an unidentified Palestinian gunman near the West 
Bank village of Tarqumiyah shot at a bus transporting Israeli tourists, 
injuring five persons, including children.
    Prison conditions in Israeli facilities are poor. Facilities are 
overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate. 
Palestinians inmates held strikes and protests in support of a number 
of causes and to protest prison conditions throughout the year. 
Palestinians in Israeli prisons also held several strikes to protest 
detention without trial, limits on visits by family members or lawyers, 
and abuse by prison officials. In some Israeli prisons, authorities now 
allow Palestinian prisoners to shower every day, whereas in the past 
they were only allowed to bathe once every several days.
    One Palestinian prisoner died in Israeli custody during the year 
due to a heart attack (see Section 1.a. and Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of 
the Israel report).
    Israel permits independent monitoring of prison conditions, 
although human rights groups and diplomats sometimes encounter 
difficulties gaining access to specific detainees.
    Prison conditions in PA facilities continue to be very poor. In 
many cases, facilities are overcrowded, and very old, dilapidated, and 
neglected. Food and clothing for prisoners is inadequate and must be 
supplemented by donations from families and humanitarian groups. 
Palestinian inmates held periodic strikes and protests throughout the 
year in support of a number of causes and to protest prison conditions 
and the practice of administrative detention. In some PA prisons, an 
effort is made to house religious prisoners together. Male and female 
inmates are housed separately.
    During the year, two Palestinians died in PA custody (see Section 
1.a.).
    The PA permits independent monitoring of its prisons, although 
human rights groups and lawyers encountered difficulties arranging 
visits or gaining access to specific detainees. Human rights 
organizations say that their ability to visit PA jails and detention 
centers varies depending on which security organization controls the 
facility. Human rights organizations say that the police, Preventive 
Security Force, and Mukhabarat were generally cooperative in allowing 
them to inspect facilities and visit prisoners and detainees. However, 
they said that the Military Intelligence Organization was less 
responsive to such requests. Human rights monitors say that prison 
authorities are sometimes capricious in permitting them access to PA 
lock-ups and they rarely are permitted to see inmates while they are 
under interrogation. In June human rights groups complained that the 
Gaza police commander temporarily banned them from visiting clients in 
PA prisons.
    Pursuant to an agreement signed in September 1996, the ICRC 
conducts prison visits but can be denied access to a detainee for 14 
days. If abuses occur, they frequently happen during this 2-week 
period.
    Some PA security organizations, including the General Intelligence 
Organization in the West Bank and the police, have appointed officials 
to act as liaisons with human rights groups. These officers claim that 
they meet with human rights organizations and members of the diplomatic 
community to discuss human rights cases.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Israeli authorities 
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. Any Israeli policeman or border 
guard may arrest without warrant a person who has committed, or is 
suspected of having committed, a criminal or security offense in the 
occupied territories, except for areas under exclusive PA control.
    Israeli soldiers also may arrest without warrant Palestinians and 
hold them for questioning for the same reasons. Most of these arbitrary 
arrests and detentions are for alleged security offenses. Persons 
arrested for common crimes usually are provided with a statement of 
charges and access to an attorney and may apply for bail. However, 
these procedures sometimes are delayed.
    Israeli authorities have issued special summonses for security 
offenses; however, there were no reports that this occurred during the 
year. Israeli military order 1369 stipulates a 7-year prison term for 
anyone who does not respond to a special summons delivered to a family 
member or posted in the MATAK office nearest the suspect's home 
address. There were no reports during the year that anyone was 
convicted of failing to respond to a summons. Bail rarely is available 
to those arrested for security offenses. Although Israeli law does not 
allow Israelis under the age of 16 to be tried as adults, Israeli 
courts treat Palestinians over the age of 12 as adults. Defense for 
Children International (DCI) reported that 220 Palestinian minors were 
arrested and detained in Israeli prisons during the year, and that at 
year's end, there were 75 minors in Israeli prisons.
    Israeli authorities may hold persons in custody without a warrant 
for 96 hours; they must be released unless a warrant is issued. 
Prearraignment detention can last up to 11 days for Palestinians 
arrested in the occupied territories and up to 8 days for minors and 
those accused of less serious offenses. Authorities must obtain a court 
order for longer administrative detentions--up to 6-months from the 
date of arrest. At hearings to extend detention for interrogation 
purposes, detainees are entitled to be represented by counsel, although 
the defense attorney often is not allowed to see or hear the evidence 
against his client. Detainees either are released at the end of the 
court-ordered detention or sent to administrative detention if they are 
not indicted. If there is an indictment, a judge may order indefinite 
detention until the end of the trial. Israeli regulations permit 
detainees to be held in isolation during interrogation. Detainees have 
the right to appeal continued detention.
    Although a detainee generally has the right to consult with a 
lawyer as soon as possible, in security cases authorities may delay 
access to counsel for up to 15 days. Higher-ranking officials or judges 
may extend this period. Access to counsel is denied routinely while a 
suspect is being interrogated, which sometimes can last several weeks. 
Authorities must inform detainees of their right to an attorney and 
whether there are any orders prohibiting such contact.
    A number of factors hamper contacts by Palestinians in Israeli 
prison and detention facilities with their lawyers, families, and human 
rights organizations. The Israeli Government routinely transfers 
Palestinians arrested in Israeli-controlled areas of the occupied 
territories to facilities in Israel, especially the prison in Ashkelon 
and the military detention center in Megiddo, near Afula. Israeli 
authorities have been known to schedule appointments between attorneys 
and their detained clients, only to move the clients to another prison 
prior to the meetings. Authorities reportedly use such tactics to delay 
lawyer-client meetings for as long as 90 days. Palestinian lawyers also 
have trouble traveling to see their clients during Israeli-imposed 
closures. Israel requires Palestinian attorneys to acquire permits to 
enter Israel to see their clients held in prisons there. Human rights 
groups say that Palestinian lawyers from the Gaza Strip have a harder 
time obtaining these permits than their West Bank counterparts and that 
they are denied entry into Israel more frequently than WestBank 
lawyers. Relatives of Palestinian prisoners also complain that 
sometimes they only learn that visitation rights are canceled when they 
arrive at the prison following a trip of many hours from the occupied 
territories.
    Family access to Palestinian prisoners improved during the year. 
Nevertheless, male family members between 16 and 40 years of age, and 
any family members with security records, are still barred from 
visiting relatives in facilities in Israel. The ICRC reported that it 
was easier than in previous years for families to visit inmates in 
Israeli jails and detention centers in part because Israel imposed 
fewer days of ``tightened closure'' on the occupied territories.
    Israeli authorities claim that they attempt to post notification of 
arrest within 48 hours. Nevertheless, Palestinian suspects often are 
kept incommunicado for longer than 48 hours. Even if an arrest becomes 
known, it is often difficult to get information on where a detainee is 
being held or whether he has access to an attorney. Palestinians 
generally locate detained family members through their own efforts. 
Palestinians can check with a local ICRC office to determine whether it 
has information on the whereabouts of a family member. A senior officer 
may delay for up to 12 days notification of arrest to immediate family 
members and attorneys. A military commander may appeal to a judge to 
extend this period in security cases for an unlimited time.
    Evidence used at hearings for administrative detentions is secret 
and unavailable to the detainee or his attorney. During hearings to 
appeal detention orders, the detainee and defense lawyer are required 
to leave the courtroom when secret evidence is presented. Israeli 
authorities maintain that they are unable to present evidence in open 
court because doing so would compromise the method of acquiring the 
evidence. In July 1998, the High Court of Justice ruled that judges, 
rather than military officials, can renew administrative detention 
orders beyond a 6-month period. Detainees may appeal detention orders, 
or the renewal of a detention order, before a military judge, but their 
chances for success are very limited. During the year, some succeeded 
in persuading the courts to shorten their detentions.
    The overall number of Palestinian prisoners and administrative 
detainees in Israeli jails fell for the third straight year.
    Human rights organizations attribute this drop to the continuing 
absence of major terrorist attacks; in the past, Israeli officials 
arrested hundreds of Palestinians suspected of terrorist links after 
major terrorist attacks. In addition, Israel released 350 Palestinian 
security prisoners pursuant to its obligations under the Sharm el-
Sheikh Memorandum. At year's end, 1,354 Palestinian prisoners and 
detainees were incarcerated in Israeli prisons, military detention 
centers, and holding centers, a decrease from 1,634 in 1998. According 
to the Government, 18 Palestinians were in administrative detention at 
year's end, compared with 83 at the end of 1998. Several have been held 
for more than 1 year.
    Many Palestinians under administrative detention during the past 3 
years have had their detention orders renewed repeatedly without 
meaningful chance of appeal. In July the Israeli Government released 
the longest-serving Palestinian from administrative detention. Usama 
Barham, a West Bank Palestinian, was arrested in September 1993 for his 
affiliation with the terrorist Palestine Islamic Jihad organization and 
had been held in continuous administrative detention. His release 
followed an intense effort by human rights organizations and Israeli 
activists.
    PA security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The 
PA does not have a uniform law on administrative detention, and 
security officials do not always adhere to the existing laws in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Laws applicable in Gaza, which do not apply 
to the West Bank, stipulate that detainees held without charge be 
released within 48 hours. These laws allow the Attorney General to 
extend the detention period to a maximum of 90 days during 
investigations. Human rights organizations and the PA Ministry of 
Justice assert that PA security officials do not always adhere to this 
regulation. Prevailing law in the West Bank allows a suspect to be 
detained for 24 hours before being charged. The Attorney General may 
extend the detention period.
    The PA Chairman, Yasir Arafat, has not signed the Basic Law and 
other laws passed by the Palestinian Council (PC) since 1996, which 
were designed to limit executive branch abuses and to delineate 
safeguards for citizens. This lack of safeguards has contributed to the 
tendency of PA security forces to refuse to carry out High Court orders 
to release detainees.
    In some cases, the High Court of Justice ordered the release of 
prisoners detained for years without trial, and PA security forces 
released the prisoners several months or a year later. In November 
1997, the High Court ordered the release of HAMAS activist Mahmud 
Muslah; Muslah remained in detention at year's end. In February the 
High Court ordered the release of Wa'el Farraj, who has been detained 
without charges since 1996; Farraj remained in detention at year's end.
    PA security forces illegally held 14-year-old Yasser Allan Wahidi 
in detention for 53 days before releasing him on January 17.
    According to the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens 
Rights, the High Court ordered approximately 60 detainees released 
during the year. Of these, only a handful were released from jail. 
Human rights groups estimate that the PA has held approximately 150 
prisoners for more than a year without charge, and that the total 
number of Palestinians in PA jails reached 842 by year's end.
    In January nearly 70 detainees in the PA-run Jneid Prison staged a 
hunger strike to protest being held for an extended period of time 
without charge or trial. In February hundreds of Palestinians held 
demonstrations in Nablus, Hebron, and Gaza to demand the release of 
administrative detainees in PA prison facilities (see Section 2.b.).
    Palestinian security forces sometimes detained or placed under 
house arrest the relatives of alleged security criminals. On March 2, 
the General Intelligence Forces arrested and detained for 20 days 15-
year-old Bilal Yehya Al-Ghoul after his father, held for terrorist 
activity, escaped from a Gaza prison. The minor reported that he was 
subjected to abuse and torture during his detention (see Section 1.c.).
    Lawyers and PA judicial officials acknowledge that, in 
contravention of the law, PA security services sometimes arrest and 
detain persons without informing judicial officials. During the year, 
there were allegations that PA security officials in Gaza arrested and 
detained Palestinians in order to extort money from them and their 
families. A Gazan gold merchant, accused of fraud and tax evasion, was 
detained by security officials without trial for weeks and finally 
released only after he paid a large ``fine'' that was levied by a state 
security court (see Section 1.e.).
    PA authorities generally permit prisoners to receive visits from 
family members, attorneys, and human rights monitors, except for 
prisoners held for alleged security offenses. PA security officials do 
not always permit lawyers to see their clients. In principle detainees 
may notify their families of their arrest, but this is not always 
permitted.
    Human rights organizations report that lawyers sometimes were 
denied access to their clients during the year. The Society for the 
Protection of Human Rights and the Environment (LAW) and the 
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) reported that they were 
denied access to clients detained in Gaza prisons because of their 
reports about human rights violations committed by PA officials against 
detainees (see Section 4).
    PA security services have overlapping or unclear mandates that 
often complicate the protection of human rights. Under existing law in 
the West Bank, only the PA's civil police force is authorized to make 
arrests. In practice all security forces are known to detain persons at 
various times. The operating procedures and regulations for the conduct 
of PA security personnel in the various services still are not well 
developed and have not yet been made fully available to the public.
    There are many detention facilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
administered by the overlapping PA security services, a situation that 
complicates the ability of families, lawyers, and even the Ministry of 
Justice to track detainees' whereabouts. Security services, including 
Preventive Security, General Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and 
the Coast Guard have their own interrogation and detention facilities. 
In general these services do not, or only sporadically, inform families 
of a relative's arrest. Most PA security officers remain ignorant of 
proper arrest, detention, and interrogation procedures, as well as 
basic human rights standards. Human rights groups continue to provide 
basic human rights training to PA security services. During the year, 
human rights groups provided training to representatives of all the PA 
security services, including the PA Military Intelligence Service. 
During the year, at least 250 PA security officials participated in 
human rights courses, bringing the total number of security officials 
who have graduated from human rights courses to more than 1,550since 
the PA's establishment in 1994, according to human rights groups.
    PA security forces continued to harass and arbitrarily arrest and 
detain journalists, political activists, and human rights advocates, 
who criticized the PA and its policies. A number of journalists were 
arrested and detained and newspapers and television stations were shut 
down for expressing views or covering topics unacceptable to the 
Palestinian Authority (see Section 2.a.).
    In November PA security forces arrested eight persons and placed 
two under house arrest who were signatories of a petition that accused 
the PA of corruption and failing to win significant gains from the 
peace process. The PA did not arrest the nine members of the 
Palestinian Council who also signed the petition and enjoyed 
parliamentary immunity (see Section 2.a.). On December 19, the PA 
released six of the signatories; however, 2 remained in detention at 
year's end.
    Neither the Israeli Government nor the PA forcibly deported any 
Palestinians from the occupied territories during the year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Israeli law provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision. 
However, in the past, the Israeli judiciary routinely acquiesced to the 
Government's position in security cases. The landmark Israeli High 
Court ruling in September (see Section 1.c.) marked a major change in 
this practice. Palestinians accused by Israel of security offenses in 
Israeli-controlled areas of the occupied territories are tried in 
Israeli military courts. Security offenses are defined broadly and may 
include charges of political activity, such as membership in outlawed 
organizations. Charges are brought by military prosecutors. Serious 
charges are tried before three-judge panels; lesser offenses are tried 
before one judge. Defendants have the right to counsel and to appeal 
verdicts to the Court of Military Appeals, which may accept appeals 
based on the law applied in the case, the sentence, or both. The right 
of appeal does not apply in all cases and sometimes requires court 
permission. The Israeli military courts rarely acquit Palestinians of 
security offenses, but sentences sometimes are reduced on appeal.
    Trials sometimes are delayed for several reasons: Witnesses, 
including Israeli military or police officers, do not appear; the 
defendant is not brought to court; files are lost; or attorneys fail to 
appear, sometimes because they have not been informed of the trial date 
or because of travel restrictions on Palestinian lawyers. These delays 
add pressure on defendants to plead guilty to minor offenses; if they 
do, an ``expedited'' trial may be held, in which a charge sheet is 
drawn up within 48 hours and a court hearing scheduled within days.
    By law most Israeli military trials are public, although access is 
limited. Diplomats are allowed to attend military court proceedings 
involving foreign citizens, but there have been delays in gaining 
admission. Most convictions in military courts are based on 
confessions. Evidence that is not available to the defendant or his 
attorney may be used in court to convict persons of security offenses. 
There is frequently no testimony provided by Palestinian witnesses 
either for or against Palestinians on trial. Israeli authorities 
maintain that this is due to the refusal of Palestinians to cooperate 
with the authorities. Physical and psychological pressures and reduced 
sentences for those who confess can induce security detainees to sign 
confessions. Confessions usually are given in Arabic but translated 
into Hebrew for the record because, authorities maintain, many Israeli 
court personnel speak Arabic but few read it. Palestinian detainees 
seldom read Hebrew and therefore often sign confessions that they 
cannot read.
    Crowded facilities and poor arrangements for attorney-client 
consultations in prisons hinder legal defense efforts. Appointments to 
see clients are difficult to arrange, and prison authorities often fail 
to produce clients for scheduled appointments.
    Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip accused of 
security and ordinary criminal offenses are tried under Israeli law in 
the nearest Israeli district court. Civilian judges preside, and the 
standards of due process and admissibility of evidence are governed by 
the laws of Israel, not military orders. Settlers convicted in Israeli 
courts of crimes against Palestinians regularly receive lighter 
punishment than Palestinians convicted in Israeli courts of similar 
crimes against either Israelis or other Palestinians.
    There were no reports that the Israeli Government held political 
prisoners.
    The PA courts are inefficient, lack staff and resources, and as a 
result often do not ensure fair and expeditious trials, and the PA 
executive and security services frequently ignore or fail to carry out 
court decisions.
    The PA inherited a court system based on structures and legal codes 
predating the 1967 Israeli occupation. In the civil court system, cases 
initially are tried in courts of first instance. There are two appeals 
courts, one located in Gaza City and the other in Ramallah, which 
handle appeals from the lower courts. The appeals courts also function 
as the Palestinian High Court. The decisions of the High Court are not 
always respected by the executive or enforced by the Palestinian 
security agencies. In 1995 the PA established state security courts in 
Gaza and the West Bank to try cases involving security issues. Three 
military judges preside over each court. A senior police official heads 
the state security court in Jericho, and three judges preside over it. 
There is no right of appeal, but the PA Chairman reviews the court's 
findings and he may confirm or reject the decision. The PA Ministry of 
Justice has no jurisdiction over the state security courts, which are 
subordinate only to the Chairman.
    One death sentence was carried out in February (see Section 1.a.), 
but serious questions were raised about lack of due process in the 
case. In February a Palestinian Colonel was executed after the PA's 
state security court convicted him of raping a young boy. Human rights 
groups criticized the decision; they complained that the trial lasted 
for less than two hours, the defendant did not have sufficient time to 
prepare his defense, there was no appeals process, and the charges were 
ill-defined. They also charged that the court had based its decision on 
public opinion and popular pressure rather than the dictates of law. 
Other Palestinians convicted by the state security courts received 
sentences ranging from several years in prison to life in jail with 
hard labor.
    In November Khalid Al-Qidreh was appointed Prosecutor General of 
the state security courts. Human rights organizations criticized the 
appointment, saying that it helped institutionalize the controversial 
court system. They also criticized Al-Qidreh's appointment because he 
had been dismissed as PA Attorney General in 1997 because of 
allegations of corruption.
    The Gaza legal code derives from British Mandate law, Egyptian law, 
and PA directives and laws. Pre-1967 Jordanian law applies in PA-
controlled areas of the West Bank. Bodies of law in the Gaza Strip and 
West Bank have been modified substantially by Israeli military orders. 
According to the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement, 
Israeli military decrees issued during the occupation theoretically 
remain valid in both areas and are subject to review pursuant to 
specific procedure. The PA states that it is undertaking efforts to 
unify the Gaza and West Bank legal codes, but it has made little 
progress. Human rights advocates claim that the PA's judiciary does not 
operate consistently.
    The court system in general is recovering from years of neglect; 
many of the problems predate PA jurisdiction. Judges and staff are 
underpaid and overworked and suffer from a lack of skills and training. 
Court procedures and record keeping are archaic and chaotic. The 
delivery of justice is often slow and uneven. The ability of the courts 
to enforce decisions is extremely weak, and there is administrative 
confusion in the appeals process. A heavy caseload exacerbates these 
systemic problems.
    The PA Ministry of Justice appoints all civil judges for 10-year 
terms. The Attorney General, an appointed official, reports to the 
Minister of Justice and supervises judicial operations in both the Gaza 
Strip and West Bank. In June Zuhair Sourani was appointed Attorney 
General and Radwan Al-Agha was appointed Chief Justice. Both positions 
had been vacant for over a year. In September, Arafat decreed that the 
Chief Justice had the authority to appoint all judges in the West Bank. 
Human rights organizations and judicial officials criticized the 
decision, saying it contravened existing law, which stipulated that a 
judicial council was responsible for appointing judges. West Bank 
judges held a short-lived strike to protest Arafat's decision.
    In November Abd Al Latif Abd Al Fattah, who was convicted of 
complicity in the torture death of a Palestinian detainee, was 
appointed as a public prosecutor. In 1998 a PA military court had 
convicted Abd Al Fattah, then the head of the Mukhabarat's 
interrogation section in Jericho, of ``negligence'' for failing to 
provide timely medical care to Walid Qawasmi, who died inMukhabarat 
custody. While in detention, Qawasmi, who was detained for ``security 
reasons'', suffered a blow to the head that caused a cerebral 
hemorrhage and death. Human rights groups viewed the appointment as a 
sign of the PA's lack of commitment to fostering rule of law in the 
occupied territories. Fourteen human rights organizations petitioned 
Arafat to rescind the appointment. In December Abd Al Fattah reportedly 
was reassigned to the office of the Prosecutor General of the state 
security courts.
    Human rights organizations say the PA's state security courts fail 
to afford defendants due process. The PA usually ignores the legal 
limits on the length of prearraignment detention of detainees suspected 
of security offenses. Defendants often are brought to court without 
knowledge of the charges against them or sufficient time to prepare a 
defense. They typically are represented by court-appointed lawyers, who 
often are not qualified. Court sessions often take place on short 
notice in the middle of the night and without lawyers present. In some 
instances, security courts try cases, issue verdicts, and impose 
sentences in a single session lasting a few hours.
    In March a state security court sentenced a security official to 
death for killing another security official. Human rights groups 
criticized the proceedings because the accused had inadequate legal 
representation, the judges were incompetent, and the court ignored 
exculpatory evidence. The sentence was not carried out.
    During the year, the state security courts adjudicated cases that 
fell far outside the scope of the courts' original mandate. In addition 
to ``security'' cases, the courts have on occasion dealt with tax cases 
and economic crimes, such as smuggling. In January PA Chairman Arafat 
ratified a state security court decision that found a Gazan, Hisham 
Rabah Al-Hitu, guilty of tax irregularities. The court sentenced Al-
Hitu to 7 years imprisonment with hard labor, ordered him to pay a fine 
of $1.25 million (5 million NIS) to the PA treasury for ``sabotaging 
the national economy,'' and to forfeit his family estate. The 
Palestinian Independent Commission for citizens' rights criticized the 
referral of tax irregularities cases to the state security courts as a 
``flagrant encroachment on the mandate and jurisdiction of the regular 
judiciary.'' A Gazan gold merchant, accused of fraud and tax evasion, 
was detained by security officials without trial for weeks and finally 
released only after he paid a large ``fine'' that was levied by a state 
security court (see Section 1.d.).
    Several prominent Gazan businessmen agreed to pay ``fines'' or 
``taxes'' to the PA Ministry of Finance reportedly due to fear of being 
tried and convicted in a state security court.
    There were no reports during the year that persons were convicted 
for their political beliefs. In 1997 the PA Attorney General 
acknowledged that the PA held at least 100 political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Israeli military authorities in areas of the West Bank 
under their control may enter private Palestinian homes and 
institutions without a warrant on security grounds when authorized by 
an officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel or above. In conducting 
searches, the IDF has forced entry and sometimes has beaten occupants 
and destroyed property. Israeli authorities say that forced entry may 
occur lawfully only when incident to an arrest and when entry is 
resisted. Authorities say that beatings and arbitrary destruction of 
property during searches are punishable violations of military 
regulations, and that compensation is due to victims in such cases. The 
Israeli Government states that it does not keep consolidated 
information on the claims against the Ministry of Defense for damages 
resulting from IDF actions.
    Israeli authorities did not demolish any Palestinian residences for 
security reasons during the year; it demolished one in 1998 and eight 
in 1997. Israeli security forces may demolish or seal the home (owned 
or rented) of a Palestinian suspected of terrorism without trial; 
however, they did not do so during the year. The decision to seal or 
demolish a Palestinian's house is made by several high-level Israeli 
officials, including the coordinator of the MATAK (formerly CIVAD) and 
the Defense Minister. Residents of houses ordered demolished have 48 
hours to appeal to the area commander; a final appeal may be made to 
the Israeli High Court. A successful appeal generally results in the 
conversion of a demolition order to sealing. After a house is 
demolished military authorities prohibit the owner from rebuilding or 
removing the rubble. Israelis suspected ofterrorism are subject to 
Israeli law and do not face the threat of home demolition.
    In the Gaza Strip and PA-controlled areas of the West Bank, the PA 
requires the Attorney General to issue warrants for entry and searches 
of private property. These requirements frequently are ignored by 
Palestinian security services. PA police searched homes without the 
consent of their owners. In some cases, police forcibly entered 
premises and destroyed property.
    In July and October the PA attempted to ban Gazan workers from 
working in Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. The PA claimed that 
Palestinian workers should not be allowed to expand Jewish settlements 
in Gaza and imposed a strike on Gazan day laborers. The PA stopped 
short of using force to prevent workers from entering the settlements; 
however, some laborers reported that they feared retribution by the 
authorities (see Section 2.d.).
    PA security forces sometimes detained or placed under house arrest 
the relatives of alleged security criminals (see Section 1.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Israeli Government generally 
respects freedom of speech in the occupied territories but prohibits 
public expressions of support for Islamic extremist groups, such as 
HAMAS and other groups dedicated to the destruction of Israel. 
Continuing a policy it began in 1994, the Israeli Government did not 
enforce its prohibition on the display of Palestinian political 
symbols, such as flags, national colors, and graffiti, acts that are 
still punishable by fines or imprisonment.
    Overall, Israeli censorship of specific press pieces continued to 
be low. Israeli authorities monitor the Arabic press based in Jerusalem 
for security-related issues. Military censors review Arabic 
publications for material related to the public order and security of 
Israel. Reports by foreign journalists also are subject to review by 
Israeli military censors for security issues, and the satellite feed 
used by many foreign journalists is monitored.
    Israel often closes areas to journalists when it has imposed a 
curfew or closure. Israeli authorities have denied entry permits to 
Palestinian journalists traveling to their place of work in Jerusalem 
during closures of the territories.
    The IDF requires a permit for publications sold in the occupied 
territories still under its control. Publications may be censored or 
banned for content deemed anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli. Possession of 
banned materials is punishable by a fine and imprisonment. During the 
year, Israel refused to allow publications, including newspapers, into 
the Gaza Strip on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, when Israel 
tightened its closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
    The PA limited freedom of speech and of the press, although it 
professes to tolerate varying political views and criticism. In a 
number of instances during the year, the PA took steps to limit free 
expression, particularly in regards to human rights issues and 
allegations of corruption. Press freedom in PA controlled areas is 
subject to a 1995 press law that does not adequately protect the press. 
PA security services further stifle the independence of the press by 
shutting down media outlets, banning publication or broadcast of 
material, and periodically harassing or detaining media members (see 
Section 1.d.). Palestinian commentators and human rights groups say 
that as a result, the practice of self-censorship by journalists is 
widespread.
    In November PA security forces arrested eight persons and placed 
two under house arrest for signing a petition that accused the PA of 
corruption and failing to win significant gains from the peace process. 
The PA did not arrest the nine members of the Palestinian Council who 
also signed the petition and enjoyed parliamentary immunity. In 
December the PA released six of the signatories from detention; 
however, two remained in detention at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
    In May the PA detained three editors of the Islamist Al-Risaleh 
newspaper after it published an article on police corruption. One of 
the editors, Ghazi Hamad, had been arrested earlier and held for 
several days for writing an article about alleged PA mistreatment of a 
Palestinian detainee.
    In July PA police officials in Ramallah twice summoned Maher Alami, 
a West Bank journalist to inform him that his newspaperarticles that 
were critical of the PA had angered the PA Chairman.
    On August 5, PA officials arrested and detained human rights 
activist and commentator Iyad Sarraj after he published a newspaper 
article criticizing the PA's treatment of human rights organizations. 
He later was released, but PA authorities temporarily confiscated his 
passport.
    In September police personnel arrested and held for several days 
four journalists after they reported unflattering stories about PA 
police officers. Human rights organizations charged that police 
personnel lacked the proper arrest warrants and that the arrests 
threatened freedom of the press.
    In December the Palestinian Authority called the economics editor 
of Al-Quds newspaper in for questioning following the publication of a 
front-page article criticizing the PA Monetary Authority's takeover of 
the Palestine International Bank. The editor was released after 
questioning; however, the newspaper then published an article 
retracting some of its criticisms from the previous day.
    On April 26, the PA closed the Amal television station in Hebron 
for nearly 3 weeks after it broadcast a controversial program on Islam. 
On May 17, PA officials closed the Al-Ru'ah television station in 
Bethlehem indefinitely after it aired a program that security officials 
said could cause tensions between Christians and Muslims.
    On September 15, members of the Preventive Security Force (PSF) in 
Ramallah arrested television talk-show host Maher Adisouki shortly 
after he allowed a caller on his television program to criticize the 
PA's failure to persuade Israel to free all Palestinian prisoners held 
in Israeli jails. The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human 
Rights and the Environment complained that the arrest warrant was not 
executed properly. Adisouki was held in PSF custody for 20 days. He 
alleged that during his incarceration he was forced to stand for 
several days with a dirty rag over his eyes and that he was beaten and 
threatened. PSF officials say that Adisouki was detained for security 
reasons, not because of the views expressed on his program, and they 
deny that he was mistreated.
    Israeli-imposed closures, while less restrictive than in previous 
years, nevertheless disrupted the operations of West Bank and Gaza 
universities, colleges, and schools during the year. Students and staff 
had difficulty traveling to educational institutions in cities and 
towns closed or put under curfew by Israeli authorities.
    Prior to November, Gaza students routinely were denied travel 
permits to attend West Bank universities. However, the November opening 
of the southern safe passage route between Gaza and the West Bank 
afforded Gazan students greater ability to pursue their education at 
West Bank educational institutions.
    The PA has authority over all levels of education in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip and it controls the budgets of all public colleges. The 
PA did not interfere with education in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
during the year.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Israeli 
Government places some limits on freedom of assembly. Israeli military 
orders ban public gatherings of ten or more persons without a permit. 
Since the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles, Israel has 
relaxed enforcement of this rule except in cases of Palestinian 
demonstrations against land seizures or settlement expansions.
    Israeli security forces killed two Palestinian demonstrators and 
wounded about 2 dozen during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In 
June Israeli security forces shot and wounded 15 Palestinians in the 
West Bank and 2 in the Gaza Strip during the ``days of rage'' 
demonstrations protesting Israeli settlement activity in the occupied 
territories (see Section 2.b.). On November 20 Israeli soldiers shot 
and wounded 10 Palestinians at a protest organized by Fatah Youth in 
Ramallah (see Section 1.c.).
    On May 27, Israeli security officials detained and later released 
Palestinian protesters participating in a demonstration against the 
construction of housing for Jews in a Palestinian neighborhood in East 
Jerusalem.
    The PA imposes some formal limits on freedom of assembly; however, 
while it requires permits for rallies, demonstrations, and large 
cultural events, these permits rarely are denied. InGaza police 
approval is required for ``political'' meetings at several specific 
large meeting halls. Written permission also is required for buses to 
transport passengers to attend political meetings. In West Bank cities, 
the PA requires permits for outdoor rallies and demonstrations and 
prohibits calls for violence, a display of arms, and racist slogans, 
although this is not always enforced.
    In February hundreds of Palestinians held demonstrations in Nablus, 
Hebron, and Gaza to demand the release of administrative detainees in 
PA prison facilities (see Section 1.d.). In March hundreds of 
Palestinians protested the Palestinian court's decision to sentence one 
Palestinian security official to death and two to long prison terms for 
the killing of another Palestinian security official. Palestinian 
police shot and killed two protesters during the demonstrations (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.e.).
    Private Palestinian organizations are required to register with the 
Israeli authorities in areas under Israeli control, though some operate 
without licenses. The authorities permit Palestinian charitable, 
community, professional, and self-help organizations to operate unless 
Israeli authorities view their activities as a security problem. In 
previous years, Israeli authorities have forced some Palestinian 
organizations in East Jerusalem to close because of alleged links to 
the PA.
    The PA reportedly placed some limits on freedom of association. 
There were periodic complaints during the year from Palestinian 
political parties, social and professional groups, and other NGO's that 
the PA tried to limit their ability to act autonomously (see Section 
4).
    In March 1996 Yasir Arafat outlawed the armed wings of several 
Palestinian political groups, including Islamic opposition groups. 
While it is not illegal to belong to the non-military components of 
Islamic opposition groups, during times of heightened security concern 
the Authority has harassed and even detained members of the political 
parts of these organizations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Israeli law provides for freedom of 
worship, and the Government generally respects this right in practice; 
it does not ban any group on religious grounds. It permits all faiths 
to operate schools and institutions. Religious publications are subject 
to the Publications Laws.
    No PA law protects religious freedom; however, the PA generally 
respects freedom of religion. In past years, there have been 
allegations that several converts from Islam to Christianity at times 
are subject to societal discrimination and harassment by PA officials. 
The PA states that it investigates such complaints, but it has not 
shared or publicized the results of these investigations with any 
outside party. However, there was no pattern of PA discrimination and 
harassment against Christians (see Section 5).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories, Foreign 
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Israeli Government places 
limits on freedom of movement. Israel requires that all West Bank and 
Gaza residents obtain permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem. However, 
Israel often denies applicants permits with no explanation, and does 
not allow effective means of appeal. In the past, Palestinian officials 
with VIP passes, including PA cabinet officials and members of the 
Palestinian Council, were subjected to long delays and searches at 
Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank, even though they were traveling 
on special passes issued by Israel; however, there were no reports that 
this occurred during the year. In general Palestinians in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip find it difficult to obtain permits to work, visit, 
study, or obtain medical care in Israel. Palestinian residents of 
Jerusalem sometimes are prohibited by Israeli officials from entering 
PA-controlled areas of the West Bank, and they require written permits 
from Israel to travel to the Gaza Strip. Prior to the November opening 
of the safe passage route, residents of the Gaza Strip rarely were able 
to obtain permission to travel to the West Bank, or residents of the 
West Bank to enter the Gaza Strip; this was even true of residents of 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip who regularly received permission to enter 
Israel. Israeli authorities permit only a small number of Gazans to 
bring vehicles into Israel and sometimes do not permit West Bank 
vehicles to enter Jerusalem or Israel. It is also difficult for 
Palestinians married to Jerusalem residents, but not themselves 
Jerusalem residents, to obtain permission to live there. A Palestinian 
with a West Bank identification card, for example, must apply to the 
Israeli Government for permission to live with his or her Jerusalem 
resident spouse in Jerusalem. The IsraeliGovernment occasionally issues 
limited-duration permits and also issues a limited number of Jerusalem 
identification cards as part of its Family Reunification Program. 
Except for senior PA officials, and those using the safe passage to the 
West Bank, Palestinians of all ages crossing between the Gaza Strip and 
Israel are not permitted to travel by car across the main checkpoint. 
Instead, they must travel along a narrow walkway almost a mile long. 
Israelis moving into and out of the Gaza Strip are permitted to use 
their cars.
    In November Israel and the PA implemented arrangements in the 1995 
Interim Agreement to establish a safe passage route across Israel 
between the Gaza Strip and the southern West Bank. Negotiations are 
ongoing regarding the establishment of a safe passage route between the 
Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank. The safe passage route 
facilitates the movement of Palestinians between the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip to work, study, and visit, and alleviates some of the 
problems associated with freedom of movement for Palestinians. However, 
some Palestinian human rights groups criticized the safe passage 
agreement because they believe it maintains certain limits on freedom 
of movement. As of the end of November, a total of 15,000 Palestinians 
received approval to use the safe passage route and 2,900 applicants 
were refused permits to use the route.
    Israel continues to apply its policy, begun in 1993, of closure of 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following terrorist attacks; however, 
Israel eased its closure policy during the year. On occasion Israel 
also imposed a tightened version of closure in the wake of terrorist 
incidents and when it believed that there was increased likelihood of 
terrorist attacks or unrest in the occupied territories. During these 
times, Israel tends to cancel all travel permits and prevents 
Palestinians, even those with valid work permits, from entering Israel 
or Jerusalem. In the past, tightened closures severely hampered the 
flow of food, medicine, students, doctors, and patients into and out of 
the occupied territories, and seriously disrupted commercial activity. 
Israel imposed tightened closures before Israeli holidays, when 
officials claimed that an increased potential for terrorist attacks 
against Israelis existed, after security incidents in the occupied 
territories, and in anticipation of Palestinian unrest. In the past, 
Israel also imposed ``internal'' closures, which prohibited 
Palestinians from traveling between West Bank towns and villages; 
however, there were no ``internal'' closures during the year. Israel 
imposed tightened overall closure for a total of 15 days during the 
year. Even in the absence of internal closures, Palestinians who travel 
between some cities in the West Bank must pass through Israeli-
controlled checkpoints where they sometimes are subjected to verbal and 
physical harassment by Israeli security personnel.
    Israel imposed a closure on Hebron for a number of days after 
settlers were shot and injured in separate shooting attacks in January 
and August (see Section 1.c.). In both instances it placed the Israeli-
controlled section of the downtown under curfew, confining large 
numbers of Palestinians to their homes while Israelis were generally 
free to move about. Following a terrorist attack in January that 
wounded two Israeli settlers, Israel placed checkpoints on major roads 
leading into Hebron and prevented Palestinians from moving in or out of 
the city. This closure and accompanying curfew imposed on residents in 
the Israeli-controlled section of the downtown area lasted for 7 days 
and interfered with Palestinians' ability to attend school, travel, and 
conduct business.
    Israel also imposed a closure on the West Bank and Gaza for 
security reasons prior to and during several Jewish holidays during the 
year.
    For 4 days in June and July, Israeli security forces prevented 
Palestinian officials from passing through checkpoints on the outskirts 
of Nablus in response to PA officials' refusal to allow Israeli 
settlers access to the yeshiva at Joseph's tomb, a site holy to both 
Jews and Muslims.
    During part of the year, the IDF prevented Palestinians from 
walking on part of Shuhada Road in Hebron, while allowing Israeli 
settlers access to this road; however, in November this road was opened 
to Palestinians.
    In September 1998 Israel began implementing a ``continuous 
employment program'' that allows selected Palestinian workers who have 
been approved by the Ministry of Defense and who are married, are over 
28 years old, and have worked in Israel a long time, to enter Israel to 
work in the event of a tightened closure. Under this program, these 
workers can renew their entry permits within a few days, rather than 
within the several days to weeks that previously was the case.
    The Israeli Government continued to restrict the movements of two 
Jewish settlers living in the occupied territories who belonged to the 
extremist Kach or Kahane Chai groups, through the use of administrative 
orders issued by the IDF central command.
    The Israeli Government requires all Palestinian residents in areas 
under its control to obtain permits for foreign travel and has 
restricted the travel of some political activists. Bridge-crossing 
permits to Jordan may be obtained at post offices without a screening 
process. However, some East Jerusalem Palestinians hesitate to travel 
due to fear of losing their residency permits. Palestinian males 
between the ages of 16 and 25 who cross into Jordan must remain outside 
the occupied territories for 9 months. Restrictions on residence, 
reentry, and family reunification only apply to Palestinian residents 
of the occupied territories.
    Palestinians who live in the part of Jerusalem that was occupied 
during the 1967 War generally do not accept Israeli citizenship. They 
are, therefore, issued a residence permit or Jerusalem identification 
card by the Israeli Government. Israel applies the 1952 Law of 
Permanent Residency and its 1974 amendments to Jerusalem identification 
card holders. This law stipulates that a Jerusalem resident loses the 
right of residence if the resident leaves Israeli territory for more 
than 7 years, acquires the nationality of another country, or acquires 
permanent residence in another country. Such persons are permitted to 
return only as tourists and sometimes are denied entry. The Israeli 
Government does not apply these same restrictions to Israeli citizens.
    Invoking the 1952 law as legal justification, the Israeli Interior 
Ministry has stripped residency rights from hundreds of East Jerusalem 
Palestinians. In recent years, the pace of revocations increased as the 
Ministry applied restricted policies, including a ``center of life'' 
test to determine whether Palestinians were eligible to retain their 
identification cards. The Ministry's policy has been the subject of 
numerous lawsuits, including one considered by the High Court of 
Justice during the year. In October the newly appointed Minister of 
Interior, Natan Sharansky, announced that the Ministry would no longer 
apply the ``center of life'' criteria used previously to revoke the 
residency rights of East Jerusalem Palestinians. There reportedly were 
no identification card revocations after October. During the year, 
there were 394 revocations compared with 788 revocations in 1998.
    Israeli authorities also place restrictions on family 
reunification. Most Palestinians who were abroad before or during the 
1967 War, or who have lost their residence permits for other reasons, 
are not permitted to reside permanently with their families in 
Jerusalem or the occupied territories. Foreign-born spouses and 
children of Palestinian residents also experience difficulty in 
obtaining permission to reside with their family members. However, at 
the beginning of the year the Israeli Government raised the quota for 
family reunification applications from 1,200 to 2,400 in the West Bank.
    Israeli security authorities single out young (often unmarried) 
Palestinian males for more stringent restrictions than other 
Palestinians, citing them as more likely to be security risks. They 
generally are prohibited from working in Israel.
    The PA issues passports and identification cards for Palestinians 
residing in the West Bank and Gaza. Bearers of Palestinian passports do 
not need special exit permits from the PA, but when leaving through Ben 
Gurion Airport they do require permits in order to transit Israel to 
reach the airport.
    Palestinians who hold Jerusalem identification cards, issued by the 
Israeli Government, must obtain travel documents from the Israeli 
Government to travel abroad. Human rights groups report that 
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem often do not apply for Israeli 
travel documents because they fear that their application might prompt 
a reexamination of their residency status and lead to the revocation of 
their identity cards. On request, the Jordanian Government also issues 
travel documents to West Bank Palestinians, including those resident in 
formerly Jordanian-controlled East Jerusalem. Palestinians who wish to 
travel to Jordan must leave their Israeli identification documents with 
Israeli authorities at the Allenby Bridge. There is also a requirement 
that Jerusalem Palestinians have a special permit to cross the Allenby 
Bridge, available for $40 (125 NIS) from the Ministry of Interior. 
Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip are 
not allowed to cross between Israel and Jordan at the Sheikh Hussein or 
Arava crossings.
    Palestinians who reside in the West Bank or Gaza are required by 
Israel to exit and enter with a Palestinian passport. When Israel 
tightened its closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the year, 
the Government at times restricted the entry and departure of 
Palestinians, even those with passports from other countries.
    In July and October, the PA attempted to ban Gazan workers from 
working in Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. The PA claimed that 
Palestinian workers should not be allowed to expand Jewish settlements 
in Gaza and imposed a strike on Gazan day laborers. The PA stopped 
short of using force to prevent workers from entering the settlement; 
however, some laborers reportedly feared retribution by the authorities 
(see Section 1.f.).
    The issues of refugees and borders are matters to be discussed 
between Israel and the PA in permanent status negotiations.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Palestinian residents of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem 
chose their first popularly-elected government in 1996. They elected an 
88-member Council and the Ra'ees (President or Chairman) of the 
Executive Authority of the Council. Yasir Arafat won almost 89 percent 
of the vote in a two-person race for Chairman. Some 700 candidates ran 
for Council seats. Council members were elected in multimember 
electoral districts. As many as 35 of the elected members were 
independent candidates or critics of Arafat and his Fatah faction. 
International observers concluded that the election could reasonably be 
regarded as an accurate expression of the will of the voters, despite 
some irregularities. During the year, the Council debated numerous 
draft laws and resolutions. Some members of the Council complained of 
its relative lack of power in relation to the executive branch of 
government.
    Municipal elections were tentatively scheduled to be held in June; 
however, they did not take place.
    Most Palestinians in Jerusalem do not recognize the jurisdiction of 
the Municipality of Jerusalem. Only a very small percentage of 
Jerusalem's Palestinian population vote in the municipal council 
elections. No Palestinian resident of Jerusalem sits on the City 
Council.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 5 
women in the 88-member Council, and 1 woman serves in a ministerial-
level position.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Many local groups--Israeli, Palestinian, and international--
monitored the Israeli Government's human rights practices. The Israeli 
Government cooperates with human rights organizations; officials 
normally agree to meet with human rights monitors. The Israeli 
Government permits human rights groups to publish and hold press 
conferences. There were no reports during the year that the Israeli 
Government harassed human rights workers.
    Local human rights groups, most of which are Palestinian, as well 
as several international human rights organizations, monitored the PA's 
human rights practices. The PA generally cooperates with these 
organizations and PA officials usually meet with their representatives. 
Several Palestinian human rights organizations work behind the scenes 
with the PA to overcome abusive practices in certain areas. They also 
publish criticism if they believe that the PA is not responding 
adequately to private entreaties. Human rights groups state that the PA 
is generally cooperative when dealing with certain kinds of human 
rights issues; however, human rights organizations reported that they 
sometimes were denied access to detainees in Palestinian prisons during 
the year. LAW and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) 
reported that they were denied access to clients detained in Gaza 
prisons because of their reports on the violations of the human rights 
of detainees (see Section 1.d.).
    Other human rights groups, including the ICRC and the Palestinian 
Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights, visited PA prisons and 
detention centers on a regular basis. However, PA officials are said to 
be less responsive to queries on the PA's policies towards and 
treatment of members of Islamist opposition groups.
    During the year, Palestinian nongovernmental organizations 
repeatedly called on the PA to ratify a law passed by the Palestinian 
Council (PC) in December 1998, which would governthe NGO's activities 
and their relations with the PA. Ratification of the law was held up 
due to the PA's attempts to replace the Ministry of Justice with the 
Ministry of Interior as the agency responsible for the administration 
of NGO's. At year's end, passage of the law appeared imminent.
    The ICRC operates in the PA areas under the terms of a memorandum 
of understanding signed in September 1996 between the ICRC and the PLO. 
The memorandum accords the ICRC access to all detainees held by the PA 
and allows regular inspections of prison conditions. In accordance with 
the agreement, the ICRC conducted routine visits of PA-run prison 
facilities and to PA-held prisoners throughout the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Under the complex mixture of laws and regulations that apply to the 
occupied territories, Palestinians are disadvantaged under Israeli law 
and practices compared with the treatment received by Israeli settlers. 
This includes discrimination in residency, land use, and access to 
health and social services.
    Women.--The problems of rape, domestic violence, and violence 
related to ``family honor'' have gained greater attention in the 
Palestinian community, but public discussion generally remains muted. 
Victims often are encouraged by relatives to remain quiet and are 
themselves punished or blamed for the ``shame'' that has been brought 
upon them and their families. In 1988 a 14-year-old girl who was raped 
subsequently was beaten to death by her uncle and brother to 
``protect'' family honor. The girl's brother was awaiting trial on 
murder charges. Women's groups seek to educate women on these problems, 
but women's rights advocates claim that few resources are available to 
shelter the victims of violence because women's shelters are not 
accepted culturally in Palestinian society. They also maintain that 
society has not been receptive to providing counseling or outreach 
services to victims of problems that these advocates see as more 
widespread than is acknowledged. According to women's groups, there are 
no reliable data on the incidence of violence against women. Spousal 
abuse, sexual abuse, and ``honor killings'' occur, but societal 
pressures prevent most incidents from being reported and most cases are 
handled within the families concerned, usually by male family members. 
In prior years, leaders of HAMAS threatened and tried to intimidate 
Palestinian women who were involved in programs aimed at empowering 
women and helping abused women; there were no reports that this 
occurred during the year.
    Palestinian women in both the Israeli- and PA-controlled areas of 
the occupied territories endure various forms of social prejudice and 
repression within their own society. Because of early marriage, girls 
frequently do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. Cultural 
restrictions sometimes prevent women from attending colleges and 
universities. While there is an active women's movement in the West 
Bank, attention has shifted only recently from nationalist aspirations 
to issues that greatly affect women, such as domestic violence, equal 
access to education and employment, and laws concerning marriage and 
inheritance.
    A growing number of Palestinian women work outside the home, where 
they tend to encounter discrimination. There are no special laws 
providing for women's rights in the workplace. Women are 
underrepresented in most aspects of professional life. Despite the fact 
that there is a small group of women who are prominent in politics, 
medicine, law, teaching, and NGO's, women for the most part are 
underrepresented seriously in the decisionmaking positions in these 
fields.
    Personal status law for Palestinians is based on religious law. For 
Muslim Palestinians, personal status law is derived from Shari'a 
(Islamic law) and ecclesiastical courts rule on personal status issues 
for Christians. In the West Bank and Gaza, Shari'a pertaining to women 
is part of the Jordanian Status Law of 1976, which includes inheritance 
and marriage laws. Under the law, women inherit less than male members 
of the family do. The marriage law allows men to take more than one 
wife, although few do so. Women are permitted to make ``stipulations'' 
in the marriage contract to protect them against divorce and questions 
of child custody. However, only an estimated 1 percent of women take 
advantage of this section of the law, leaving most women at a 
disadvantage when it comes to divorce or child custody.
    Children.--The Israeli Government's permit policies also affect 
Palestinian schools. In June the Israeli Government issued a stop-
workorder to an Area C Palestinian school that was trying to build new 
bathrooms for its 600 students; the school had no usable facilities. In 
this case, Palestinian school officials did not apply for a building 
permit because they believed that they would not receive one. During 
the year, there were ongoing negotiations about the Hope Flowers school 
in Bethlehem. Parts of the school, including the kitchen, were built 
without a permit and the Israeli Government issued orders to demolish 
these parts. However, due to the high profile of the case, the 
Government did not demolish any parts of the school by year's end.
    The PA requires compulsory education up to 12 years of age. 
However, early marriage frequently prevents girls from completing the 
mandatory level of schooling. Currently British Mandate, Jordanian, and 
military laws, from which West Bank and Gaza law is derived, offer 
protection to children under the Labor and Penal Codes. Existing laws 
designed to protect children, such as a law that sets the minimum 
employment age, are not always enforced. While there is no juvenile 
court system, judges specializing in children's cases generally sit for 
juvenile offenders. In cases where the child is the victim, judges have 
the discretion to remove the child from a situation deemed harmful. 
However, the system is not advanced in the protection afforded 
children.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children among 
Palestinians.
    People With Disabilities.--There is no mandated accessibility to 
public facilities in the occupied territories under either Israeli or 
Palestinian authority. Approximately 130,000 Palestinians in the West 
Bank and Gaza are disabled. Some Palestinian institutions care for and 
train disabled persons; however, their efforts are chronically 
underfunded. Many Palestinians with disabilities are segregated and 
isolated from Palestinian society; they are discriminated against in 
most spheres, including education, employment, transportation, and 
access to public buildings and facilities.
    Religious Minorities.--There are periodic allegations that a small 
number of Muslim converts to Christianity in the Palestinian community 
sometimes are subject to societal discrimination and harassment by PA 
officials. The PA states that it investigates such complaints, but it 
has not shared or publicized the results of these investigations with 
any outside party. However, there was no pattern of PA discrimination 
and harassment against Christians (see Section 2.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Labor affairs in the West Bank came 
under Palestinian responsibility with the signing of the Interim 
Agreement in September 1995. Until a new law being drafted by PA 
authorities comes into effect, labor affairs in the West Bank are 
governed by Jordanian Law 21 of 1965, as amended by Israeli military 
orders, and in Gaza by PA decisions. The law permits workers to 
establish and join unions without government authorization. The earlier 
Israeli stipulation that all proposed West Bank unions apply for a 
permit no longer is enforced. Israeli authorities previously have 
licensed about 35 of the estimated 185 union branches now in existence. 
Following a process to consolidate trade unions in the West Bank, there 
are now 12 trade unions there.
    Palestinian workers in Jerusalem are governed by Israeli labor law. 
They are free to establish their own unions. Although the Government 
restricts Jerusalem unions from joining West Bank trade union 
federations, this restriction has not been enforced. Palestinian 
workers in Jerusalem may belong simultaneously to unions affiliated 
with West Bank federations and the Israeli Histadrut Labor Federation.
    West Bank unions are not affiliated with the Israeli Histadrut 
Federation. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who work in Israel 
or Jerusalem are not full members of Histadrut, but they are required 
to contribute 1 percent of their wages to Histadrut. Negotiations 
between Histadrut and West Bank union officials to return half of this 
fee to the Palestinian Union Federation were completed in 1996, but 
funds have yet to be transferred.
    Palestinians who work in Israel are required to contribute to the 
National Insurance Institute (NII), which provides unemployment 
insurance and other benefits. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza 
are eligible for some, but not all, NII benefits. According to the 
Interim Agreement, Palestinians working in Israel and Jerusalem 
continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel, the bankruptcy 
of a worker's employer, and allowances for maternity leave. The Israeli 
Government has transferred the NII fees collected from West Bank and 
Gazan workers to the PA, which is to assume responsibility for their 
pensions and social benefits.
    There are outstanding cases of Palestinian workers who have 
attempted to sue their Israeli employers for non-payment of wages but 
are unable to travel to the relevant courts because they are unable to 
receive the proper permits.
    The great majority of West Bank unions belong to the Palestinian 
General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU). The PGFTU was involved in 
the completion of the negotiations with Histadrut regarding workers' 
fees. The reorganization of unions under the PGFTU is intended to 
enable the West Bank and Gaza unions to better represent the union 
members' interests; the reorganization had not yet been finalized at 
year's end.
    An estimated 88,000 workers in the West Bank are members of the 
PGFTU, the largest union bloc, which consists of 12 trade unions in the 
West Bank and 8 in Gaza. The organization has 43,455 members in Gaza. 
The PGFTU estimates actual organized membership, i.e., dues-paying 
members, at about 30 percent of all Palestinian workers.
    No unions were dissolved by administrative or legislative action 
during the year. Palestinian unions that seek to strike must submit to 
arbitration by the PA Ministry of Labor. If the union disagrees with 
the final arbitration and strikes, a tribunal of senior judges 
appointed by the PA decides what, if any, disciplinary action is to be 
taken. There are no laws in the territories that specifically protect 
the rights of striking workers. In practice, such workers have little 
or no protection from an employer's retribution.
    The PGFTU has applied for membership in the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A majority of 
workers in the occupied territories are self-employed or unpaid family 
helpers in agriculture or commerce. Only 35 percent of employment in 
the territories consists of wage jobs, most with the United Nations 
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the PA, or in municipalities. 
Collective bargaining is protected. Labor disputes are adjudicated by 
committees of three to five members in businesses employing more than 
20 workers.
    Existing laws and regulations do not offer real protection against 
antiunion discrimination.
    One industrial zone is in operation in the Gaza Strip and others in 
the West Bank are being developed.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--PA law does not 
prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor, including by 
children, but there were no reports of such practices during the year 
(see Section 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum working age in the West Bank and Gaza is 14 
years. Most observers agree that a significant number of Palestinian 
children under the age of 16 years work. Many children under the age of 
12 are engaged in some work activities. Most of this employment is 
believed to involve work on family farms, in family shops, or as urban 
street venders. Some employment of children also is reported to occur 
in small manufacturing enterprises, such as shoe and textile factories. 
The law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor by 
children, but there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
    The PA's capacity to enforce existing laws is limited. It has only 
40 labor inspectors to inspect an estimated 65,000 enterprises. The 
International Labor Organization and UNICEFare working with the PA to 
study the nature and extent of the problem and to develop the capacity 
to enforce and update child labor laws.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is currently no minimum 
wage in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. The average wage for full-time 
workers appears to provide a worker and family with a decent standard 
of living.
    In the West Bank, the normal workweek is 48 hours in most areas; in 
Gaza the workweek is 45 hours for day laborers and 40 hours for 
salaried employees. There is no effective enforcement of maximum 
workweek laws.
    The PA Ministry of Labor is responsible for inspecting work places 
and enforcing safety standards in the West Bank and Gaza. The Ministry 
of Labor states that new factories and work places meet international 
health and safety standards but that older ones fail to meet minimum 
standards. In October a fire in an unlicensed workshop in Hebron where 
cigarette lighters were being assembled killed 14 workers, all of them 
young women. The fire illustrated the prevalence of sweatshops in the 
PA and unregulated labor practices. There is no specific legal 
protection afforded workers that allows them to remove themselves from 
an unhealthy or unsafe work setting without risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
in, to, or from the occupied territories.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 JORDAN

    The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy that 
was ruled by King Hussein bin Talal from 1952 until his death in 
February. On February 7, King Hussein's eldest son, Crown Prince 
Abdullah bin Hussein, acceded to the throne. The Constitution 
concentrates a high degree of executive and legislative authority in 
the King, who determines domestic and foreign policy. In the King's 
absence, a regent, whose authority is outlined in the Constitution, 
assumes many of these responsibilities. The Prime Minister and other 
members of the Cabinet are appointed by the King and manage the daily 
affairs of government. The Parliament consists of the 40-member Senate, 
appointed by the King, and the 80-member Chamber of Deputies, which is 
elected every 4 years. The lower house asserts itself only 
intermittently on domestic and foreign policy issues. The 1997 
parliamentary elections were marred by reports of registration 
irregularities, fraud, and restrictions on the press and on campaign 
materials. According to the Constitution, the judiciary is independent 
of other branches of government; however, in practice it is susceptible 
to political pressure and interference by the executive.
    General police functions are the responsibility of the Public 
Security Directorate (PSD). The PSD, the General Intelligence 
Directorate (GID), and the military share responsibility for 
maintaining internal security and have authority to monitor the 
activities of persons believed to be security threats. The security 
forces continue to commit human rights abuses.
    Jordan has a mixed economy, with significant but declining 
government participation in industry, transportation, and 
communications. The country has few natural resources and relies 
heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from citizens working 
abroad. The economy continues to suffer from chronically high 
unemployment. As part of its reenergized economic reform program, the 
Government has removed subsidies on several staple goods, lifted price 
controls on others, and streamlined government budget practices. Price 
controls remain on bread, pharmaceuticals, and a small number of other 
staple items. In mid-year, the sales tax was increased from 10 percent 
to 13 percent. Wages remained stagnant and continued to erode the 
purchasing power of most citizens. Exporters have not yet found 
adequate replacement markets for those lost as a result of U.N. 
sanctions against Iraq. Additional trade with Iraq under the ``oil for 
food'' resolution has not affected the economy significantly. High 
expectations that significant markets woulddevelop in the West Bank, 
Gaza, and Israel following the 1994 signing of the Jordan-Israel peace 
treaty have not been realized. Per capita gross domestic product in 
1998 was approximately $1,553.
    There continued to be significant problems in the Government's 
human rights record. Citizens do not have the right to change their 
government, although they may participate in the political system 
through political parties and parliamentary elections. Other human 
rights problems include police abuse and mistreatment of detainees; 
allegations of torture; arbitrary arrest and detention; lack of 
accountability within the security services; prolonged detention 
without charge; lack of due process of law and interference in the 
judicial process; infringements on citizens' privacy rights; harassment 
of members of opposition political parties and the press; and 
significant restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and 
association. The 1998 Press and Publications Law placed major 
restrictions on the ability of journalists and publications to function 
and report freely; however, the 1999 Press and Publications Law, which 
became effective on October 16, reduced these restrictions somewhat. 
The Government imposes some limits on freedom of religion, and there is 
official and societal discrimination against adherents of the Baha'i 
Faith. Early in the year, the evangelical Christian community reported 
an increased incidence of governmental harassment. There are some 
restrictions on freedom of movement. Violence against women, 
restrictions on women's rights, and societal discrimination against 
women are problems. The law still allows for reduced punishments for 
violent ``honor crimes'' against women for alleged immoral acts. Child 
abuse remains a problem, and discrimination against Palestinians 
persists. Abuse of foreign servants is a problem.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government 
officials.
    In May Mahmoud Rashid Qasem Mohammed Ishtayeh died in a hospital 
while in police custody. In August his family claimed that he died of 
injuries suffered in a beating; however, prison officials maintained 
that Ishtayeh died of natural causes. Human rights sources were unable 
to uncover any evidence to support the family's claims or refute the 
Government's position.
    The security services continue to be reluctant to conduct 
transparent investigations into allegations of wrongful deaths that 
occurred in previous years during police detention.
    There was no further investigation of the March 1998 incidents in 
which Masaeed tribesmen were killed by security forces. There were no 
new developments in the killing of Mohammad Al-Khattub, who was shot 
during an altercation between demonstrators and security forces in 
February 1998. A subsequent government investigation stated that Al-
Khattub was killed by demonstrators; however, the media cited alleged 
witness accounts that he had been shot by security forces while 
fleeing.
    There were no developments in the investigation of the police 
officers involved in the alleged wrongful deaths of Ismail Suleiman 
Ajarmeh, who died in February 1998; Samer Muhammad Ziyad, who died in 
June 1997; Younis Mahmoud Abu Dawlah, who died in December 1996; or 
Mahmoud Khalifah, who died in June 1995. All four men died while in 
government custody.
    Women continued to be victims of ``honor killings'' (see Section 
5).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearance.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Although the law provides prisoners with the right to 
humane treatment, the police and security forces sometimes abuse 
detainees physically and verbally during detention and interrogation 
and allegedly use torture as well. Allegations of torture are difficult 
to verify because security officials frequently deny detainees timely 
access to lawyers. The most frequently alleged methods of torture are 
sleep deprivation, beatings, and extended solitary confinement. 
Defendants in high-profile cases before the State Security Court have 
claimed to have been subjected to physical and psychological abuse 
while in detention. Government officials deny allegations of torture 
and abuse.
    Approximately 40 cases of beatings while in police custody were 
reported to the Arab Organization for Human Rights. There are believed 
to be many more incidents that were not documented.
    Periodic detentions of foreign workers continue and allegations of 
overcrowded cells and physical abuse by guards persist.
    Filipino and other foreign workers who were arrested at their homes 
in September and October 1998 subsequently were released. Senior 
government officials publicly took responsibility for the incidents; 
however, no action was taken against the members of the security forces 
who were involved.
    Prisons and local police detention facilities are Spartan, and on 
the whole are severely overcrowded and understaffed.
    Prisoners detained on national security grounds often are kept in 
separate prisons maintained by the GID. Conditions in GID facilities 
are significantly better than general police detention facilities.
    With some exceptions, the ICRC is permitted unrestricted access to 
prisoners and prison facilities, including GID facilities and the 
recently reopened Al-Jafr prison. However, from late December 1998 
through March 8, the ICRC suspended visits to facilities where security 
detainees were being held because the authorities refused to give the 
ICRC access to one specific detainee. Local human rights monitors are 
allowed to visit prisons, but complain that they are required to go 
through a lengthy and difficult procedure with the authorities to 
obtain permission for such visits.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The security forces 
arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. Under the Constitution, 
citizens are subject to arrest, trial, and punishment for the 
defamation of heads of state, dissemination of ``false or exaggerated 
information outside the country that attacks state dignity,'' or 
defamation of public officials.
    The Criminal Code requires that legal authorities file formal 
charges within 10 days of an arrest. However, the courts routinely 
grant requests from prosecutors for 15-day extensions as provided by 
law. This practice generally extends pretrial detention for protracted 
periods of time. In cases involving state security, the authorities 
frequently hold defendants in lengthy pretrial detention, do not 
provide defendants with the written charges against them, and do not 
allow defendants to meet with their lawyers until shortly before trial. 
Defendants before the State Security Court usually meet with their 
attorneys only 1 or 2 days before their trial.
    The Government detains persons, including journalists, for varying 
amounts of time for what appear to be political reasons (see Section 
2.a.). Human rights sources reported that more than 300 persons were 
detained for security reasons throughout the year. This number likely 
underestimates the total number of detainees.
    In January a student at the Jordan Evangelical Theological Seminary 
(JETS) was jailed for 2 weeks and then deported to Egypt. In February a 
Sudanese national was jailed for 17 days and then deported to Sudan. In 
April a church worker for Campus Crusade for Christ was detained for 5 
days and questioned about his religious activities (see Section 2.c.).
    On his arrival at Amman's Queen Alia International Airport on May 
17, Mohammed Nizami was arrested and charged with ``lese majeste,'' or 
slandering the King, stemming from his purported comments on an 
Internet ``chat'' site critical of the Government. He was incarcerated 
for 18 days and his passport was confiscated. He was released on 
$10,000 (7,000 dinars) bail and departed the country without standing 
trial (see Section 2.a.).
    Upon arrival at Queen Alia International Airport on September 22, 
two leaders of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Khaled Mishal 
and Ibrahim Ghosheh, were detained along with four of their bodyguards 
(all six are Jordanian citizens). The bodyguards subsequently were 
released. Mishal and Ghosheh were held for 1 month and then expelled 
along with two other HAMAS leaders, Izzat Rishuq and Sami Khater (see 
Sections 2.b. and 2.d.).
    The Government uses the threat of detention to intimidate 
journalists into practicing self-censorship (see Section 2.a.). 
Typically, a journalist who has criticized a government official or 
policy is detained for 5 to 10 days. While in detention, the journalist 
may experience abuse (see Section 2.a.). Charges rarely are filed. 
Convictions are rare, but proceedings may last several years, with 
defendants required to appear in court regularly, only to be informed 
that another in a series of continuances has been issued in their case.
    In June journalist Shaker Al-Jawhari was summoned to GID 
headquarters and then detained overnight. While detained he was 
questioned about his political writings, which were critical of the 
Government (see Section 2.a.).
    In July journalist Senan Shaqdih was detained for 2 weeks, during 
which time he was subjected to psychological abuse. He was accused of 
publishing items harmful to Jordan's ties with a neighboring country. 
He finally was released in August by order of King Abdullah (see 
Section 2.a.).
    In August editor Abdul Karim Al-Barghouti was detained pending 
investigation of the allegation that he slandered Prime Minister 
Rawabdeh's son. He was released on bail 4 days later. After his 
release, he reported having been treated well (see Section 2.a.).
    In September Azzam Yunis, the editor in chief of the independent 
newspaper Al-Arab Al-Yawm, was arrested in connection with the 
publication of articles by Shiekh Abdul Mun'em Abu Zant, a pro-HAMAS 
Islamist and former legislator, and was released on bail the same day.
    Laith Shubaylat, who was sentenced in 1998 to 9 months in prison 
for inciting riots but refused a pardon claiming that he was not 
guilty, was released from prison in October 1998.
    There was no further information on Basil Abu Ghoshe, a 21-year-old 
man who continued to be detained despite having completed his sentence 
in 1998, ostensibly for his own protection against threats from a rival 
tribe.
    The security services detained approximately 65 persons, described 
in the press as ``Islamists,'' during the year; this figure includes 15 
persons arrested in December. These detentions were related to 
allegations of involvement in terrorist or strictly political 
activities.
    The Government does not use forced exile routinely; however, 
Jordanian HAMAS leaders Khaled Mishal, Ibrahim Ghosheh, Izzat Rishuq, 
and Sami Khater were expelled in October (see Sections 2.b. and 2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
independence of the judiciary; however, the judiciary is subject to 
pressure from the executive branch. A judge's appointment to, 
advancement within, and dismissal from the judiciary are determined by 
a committee whose members are appointed by the King. The Ministry of 
Justice has great influence over a judge's career and often subverts 
the judicial system in favor of the executive branch. There have been 
numerous allegations that judges have been ``reassigned'' temporarily 
to another court or judicial district in order to remove them from a 
particular proceeding. In one instance in 1998, in order to avoid a 
trial before the regular court of appeals, the Minister of Justice 
allegedly formed a special appeals court panel to try several counts 
against to an influential member of society who had been charged with 
the sale of children to foreign adoptive parents. In February 1998, 
Judge Farouk Al-Kilani was forced to retire from the Supreme Court. 
Kilani alleged that he was asked to step down because of his 
involvement in the High Court of Justice's decision that rejected the 
legality of the May 1997 amendments to the Press and Publications Law. 
(The Court ruled that the amendments had been approved in an 
unconstitutional manner on an emergency basis.) Judges also complain of 
unlawful telephone surveillance.
    The judicial system consists of several types of courts. Most 
criminal cases are tried in civilian courts, which include the appeals 
courts, the Court of Cassation, and the Supreme Court. Cases involving 
sedition, armed insurrection, financial crimes, drug trafficking, and 
offenses against the royal family are tried in the State Security 
Court. In 1997 the Parliament passed amendments to the law governing 
the State Security Court that effectively extended its mandate 
indefinitely. The amendments had been rejected earlier by the lower 
house's judicial committee as ``undemocratic'' and contrary to the 
principle of judicial independence. Shari'a (Islamic) courts have 
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce among Muslims and inheritance 
cases involving both Muslims and non-Muslims (see Section 5).
    Most trials in the civilian courts are open. Defendants are 
entitled to legal counsel, may challenge witnesses, and have the right 
to appeal. Defendants facing the death penalty or life imprisonment 
must be represented by legal counsel. Public defenders are provided if 
the defendant in such cases cannotafford to hire legal counsel. Shari'a 
regards the testimony of one man to be equal to the testimony of two 
women. This technically applies only in religious courts but, in the 
past, has been imposed in civil courts as well, regardless of religion.
    The State Security Court consists of a panel of three judges who 
may be either civilians or military officers. Sessions frequently are 
closed to the public. Defendants tried in the State Security Court 
often are held in pretrial detention without access to lawyers, 
although they are visited by representatives of the ICRC. In the State 
Security Court, judges have inquired into allegations that defendants 
were tortured and have allowed the testimony of physicians regarding 
these allegations. The Court of Cassation has ruled that the State 
Security Court cannot issue a death sentence on the basis of a 
confession obtained as a result of torture. Defendants in the State 
Security Court have the right to appeal their sentences to the Court of 
Cassation, which is authorized to review issues of both fact and law. 
Appeals are automatic for cases involving the death penalty.
    In the past, defense attorneys have challenged the appointment of 
military judges to the State Security Court to try civilian cases as 
contrary to the concept of an independent judiciary. Military judges 
appear to receive adequate training in civil law and procedure, and 
State Security Court decisions are subject to review by the Court of 
Cassation.
    In the past, the press routinely has carried details of cases tried 
before the State Security Court. However, provisions of the 1998 Press 
and Publication Law prohibit press coverage of any case that is under 
investigation without explicit permission from the authorities. The 
1999 Press and Publications Law, which became effective on October 16, 
now allows journalists to cover court proceedings ``unless the court 
rules otherwise;'' however, this change in the law still has not been 
tested.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution requires that security forces obtain 
a warrant from the Prosecutor General or a judge before conducting 
searches or otherwise interfering with these rights, and the security 
services generally respect these constitutional restrictions; however, 
in security cases, the authorities sometimes--in violation of the law--
obtain warrants retroactively or obtain preapproved warrants. Security 
officers monitor telephone conversations and Internet communication, 
read correspondence, and engage in surveillance of persons who are 
considered to pose a threat to the Government or national security. The 
law permits these practices if the Government obtains a court order. 
Judges complain of unlawful telephone surveillance (see Section 1.e.).
    In May Mohammed Nizami was arrested for remarks about the Jordanian 
Government made in an Internet chat room (see Section 1.d. and 2.a.). 
Unlike the previous year, the Government did not block the entry of 
foreign publications (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government imposes 
some restrictions on these rights.
    The 1998 Press and Publications Law, combined with the 1998 Press 
Association Law, impose stringent restrictions on the operation of 
newspapers. The Government also intimidates journalists to encourage 
self-censorship. Private citizens may be prosecuted for slandering the 
royal family, the Government, or foreign leaders, and for sowing 
sedition. Citizens generally do not hesitate to criticize the 
Government openly, but are more circumspect in regard to the King and 
the royal family.
    The Press Association Law limits the practice of journalism to 
Jordan Press Association (JPA) members, potentially excluding dozens of 
practicing journalists from the profession. No publishers or 
journalists have been cited for violating the law. However, in August 
Prime Minister Abdur-Ra'uf Rawabdeh issued an order directing 
government offices to cooperate only with JPA members. In October the 
JPA voted to expel three of its members, who had traveled to Israel, 
for participation in ``normalization'' activities. Such an expulsion 
would have prevented these journalists from practicing their 
profession. However, the decision was never conveyed formally and, 
therefore, was never binding. In November the three men signed 
statements in which they asserted that they saw the fight against 
normalization with Israel as necessary, and the JPA dropped the matter.
    The 1998 Press and Publications Law granted the Government wide 
discretionary powers to issue fines, withdraw licenses, and order 
shutdowns to control the editorial content of newspapers. The law 
prohibited reporting on criminal cases at any stage of the 
investigation into any case or crime without prior authorization from 
the public prosecutor. Details of court proceedings may not be 
published without a court's permission. Violations of this section of 
the Press and Publications Law entailed a fine of between $7,000 and 
$14,000 (5,000 and 10,000 dinars). The publication of a newspaper or 
periodical without a license entails the same fine. However, the 1999 
Press and Publications Law, which became effective on October 16, 
allows journalists to cover court proceedings ``unless the court rules 
otherwise'' and reduces the prescribed fine to between $700 and $1,400 
(500 to 1,000 dinars) (see Section 1.e.).
    It was illegal under the 1998 Press and Publications Law to publish 
news, opinion, information, reports, caricatures, or photos that 
disparage the King or the royal family, pertain to the armed forces or 
security services, harm national unity, disparage religion, offend an 
individual or harm his reputation, disparage the heads of friendly 
states, harm the country's relations with other nations, promote 
perversion or lead to moral corruption, shake confidence in the 
national currency, or feature false news or rumors. However, amendments 
that became effective on October 16 removed these specific prohibitions 
from the Press and Publications Law. Criminal law still places 
significant restrictions on what can be published.
    The 1998 Press and Publications Law also provided that those who 
seek to obtain a newspaper license must show proof of capital of 
$700,000 (500,000 dinars) for a daily newspaper, $140,000 (100,000 
dinars) for most other publications, and $7,000 (5,000 dinars) for 
specialized publications. The editor in chief of a newspaper was 
required under the law to be a citizen and to have 8 years of 
experience as a full-time journalist. However, the 1999 Press and 
Publications Law reduced these requirements by half.
    Persons accused of violating the Press and Publications Law are 
tried in a special court for press and copyright cases. Journalists 
also are prosecuted for criminal and security violations in connection 
with their work. Although a substantial number of cases are dismissed 
before trial, many other cases linger for years. The Government 
routinely uses detention and prosecution or the threat of prosecution 
to intimidate journalists and to encourage self-censorship (see Section 
1.d.).
    The Penal Code authorizes the State to take action against any 
person who incites violence, defames heads of state, disseminates 
``false or exaggerated information outside the country that attacks 
state dignity,'' or defames a public official.
    In June journalist Shaker Al-Jawhari was summoned to GID 
headquarters and then detained overnight. While there, he was 
questioned about his political writings, which were critical of the 
Government (see Section 1.d.).
    In July journalist Senan Shaqdih was detained for 2 weeks, during 
which he was subjected to psychological abuse. He was accused of 
publishing items harmful to Jordan's ties with a neighboring country. 
He finally was released by order of King Abdullah in August (see 
Section 1.d.).
    For a 4-week period starting on July 17, the official government 
news agency, Petra, refused to provide news to the Arabic language 
daily, Al-Arab Al-Yawm, charging its staff with ``unethical 
reporting.''
    In August editor Abdul Karim Al-Barghouti was detained pending 
investigation of charges of slandering Prime Minister Rawabdeh's son. 
He was released on bail 4 days later. After his release, he reported 
having been treated well (see Section 1.d.).
    In September Azzam Yunis, the editor in chief of the independent 
newspaper Al-Arab Al-Yawm, was arrested in connection with the 
publication of articles by Sheikh Abdul Mun'em Abu Zant, a pro-Hamas 
Islamist and former legislator, and was released on bail the same day.
    Radio and television news broadcasts are more restricted than the 
print media. The Government is the sole broadcaster of radio and 
television programs. The Government has commercial agreements with the 
British Broadcasting Corporation, the London-based Middle East 
Broadcasting Center, and Radio Monte Carlo that allows it to simulcast 
regional programs using local radio transmitters. Jordan Television 
(JTV) reports only the Government's position on controversial matters. 
International satellite television and Israeli and Syrian television 
broadcasts are available and unrestricted.
    In May Mohammed Nizami was arrested and charged with ``lese 
majeste,'' or slandering the King for allegedly making critical remarks 
about the Government in an Internet chat room (see Sections 1.d. and 
1.f.).
    Unlike the previous year, the Government did not block the entry of 
foreign publications (see Section 1.f.).
    In a high profile case, Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh was demoted in July 
from his position as head of the Center for Strategic Studies at Jordan 
University, apparently as a result of his outspoken political views.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
restricts freedom of assembly. Citizens must obtain permits for public 
gatherings. The Government granted almost no permits for demonstrations 
during the year and denies permits for public protests and rallies that 
it determines pose a threat to security.
    The Government restricts freedom of association. The Government 
requires but routinely grants approval for conferences, workshops, and 
seminars.
    The Government routinely licenses political parties and other 
associations. There are currently 23 licensed political parties. 
Membership in an unlicensed political party is illegal. The Government 
may deny licenses to parties that it decides do not meet a list of 
political and other criteria contained in the Political Parties Law. 
The High Court of Justice may dissolve a party if it violates the 
Constitution or the Political Parties Law.
    Upon arrival at Queen Alia International Airport on September 22, 
two leaders of HAMAS, Khaled Mishal and Ibrahim Ghosheh, were detained 
along with four of their bodyguards (all six are Jordanian citizens). 
The bodyguards subsequently were released. Mishal and Ghosheh were held 
for 1 month and then expelled, along with two other HAMAS leaders, 
Izzat Rishuq and Sami Khater (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the 
safeguarding of ``all forms of worship and religious rites in 
accordance with the customs observed in the Kingdom, unless such is 
inconsistent with public order or morality;'' however, the Government 
imposes some restrictions on freedom of religion. Citizens may not 
always practice the religion of their choice. According to the 
Constitution, Islam is the state religion.
    Islamic institutions are managed by the Ministry of Religious 
Affairs and Trusts, which appoints imams and subsidizes certain 
activities sponsored by mosques. Religious institutions, such as 
churches that wish to receive official government recognition, must 
apply to the Prime Ministry for registration. The Protestant 
denominations registered as ``societies'' come under the jurisdiction 
of one of the recognized Protestant churches for purposes of family 
law, such as divorce and child custody. The Government does not 
recognize a number of religions.
    Over 90 percent of the population are Sunni Muslim, and 
approximately 6 percent are Christian. The Government does not 
recognize religious faiths other than the three main monotheistic 
religions: Islam; Christianity; and Judaism. In addition not all 
Christian denominations have been accorded official government 
recognition. Officially recognized denominations include the Greek 
Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Melkite), Armenian Orthodox, 
Maronite Catholic, and the Assyrian, Anglican, Lutheran, Seventh-Day 
Adventist, United Pentecostal, and Presbyterian Churches. Other 
churches, including the Baptist Church, the Free Evangelical Church, 
the Church of the Nazarene, the Assembly of God, and the Christian 
Missionary Alliance, are registered with the Ministry of Justice as 
``societies'' but not as churches. There are also small numbers of 
Shi'a and Druze, as well as adherents of the Baha'i Faith.
    The Government does not interfere with public worship by the 
country's Christian minority. However, although the majority of 
Christians are allowed to practice freely, some activities, such as 
proselytizing or encouraging conversion to the Christian faith--both 
considered legally incompatible with Islam--are prohibited. Christians 
are subject to aspects of Shari'a (Islamic law) that designate how 
inheritances are distributed.
    The Government does not recognize Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church 
of Christ, or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, but each 
of these denominations is allowed to conduct religious services and 
activities without interference.
    The Government does not recognize the Baha'i Faith as a religion 
but does not prohibit the practice of the faith. However, Baha'is face 
both official and societal discrimination. The Government does not 
record the bearer's religion on national identity cards issued to 
Baha'is, nor does it register property belonging to the Baha'i 
community. Adherents of the Baha'i Faith are considered as Muslims for 
purposes of family and inheritance law. Unlike Christian denominations, 
the Baha'i community does not have its own court to adjudicate personal 
status and family matters. Baha'i personal status matters are heard in 
Shari'a courts.
    Non-Jordanian Christian missionaries operate in the country but are 
subject to restrictions. Christian missionaries may not proselytize 
Muslims. In late 1998 and early 1999, foreign Christian mission groups 
in the country complained of increased bureaucratic difficulties, 
including refusal by the Government to renew residence permits. One 
couple affiliated with the Anglican Church was accused of converting a 
Muslim minor to Christianity and ordered to leave the country. The 
couple stated that the minor in question had been attending their 
church for several months before they met him.
    The Jordan Evangelical Theological Seminary (JETS), a Christian 
training school for pastors and missionaries, applied in August 1998 
for a permit to purchase land on which to construct a seminary and 
campus. In April permission was granted to purchase the land on the 
condition that JETS register and receive accreditation from the 
Ministry of Education. Pending such registration, authorities suspended 
renewal of the residence permits of all of the seminary's foreign 
students (who come from 14 foreign countries), and 2 members of the 
faculty. As a result of their association with the JETS, noncitizen 
Arab Muslim students have been deported or asked to leave the country. 
For his participation in the school, Iraqi national Hakim Ismael was 
jailed in December 1998 for approximately 2 weeks in a cell with 30 to 
40 other inmates, many of whom had been accused of common crimes. 
Following his incarceration, Ismael was released and advised to leave 
the country. In January another JETS student, Mahoud Ali Mabrouk, was 
jailed for 2 weeks and then deported to Egypt (see Section 1.d.). In 
February a Sudanese national, Alaa El Din Ali, was jailed for 17 days 
and then deported to the Sudan (see Section 1.d.).
    In November 1998, the authorities ordered the closure of the 
regional office of ICI, an educational branch of the U.S.-based 
Assemblies of God churches, for an alleged violation of the health 
code. Although an Amman court later found the citation to have no basis 
in law, the ICI regional director was nevertheless ordered to vacate 
the premises, from which Christian literature was distributed. In 
February 1999, the ICI regional director, a 9-year resident in the 
country, reapplied for a residence permit as an Assemblies of God 
missionary but his application initially was denied; no reason was 
given for the denial. The missionary's residence permit later was 
issued in May.
    In April a church worker with Campus Crusade for Christ (or Life 
Agape) was detained on the campus of the University of Jordan while 
leading a Bible study session for a small group of students. He was 
taken to a GID detention center where he was held for 3 days, 
questioned about his religious activities, and told to provide the 
names of individuals who had attended religious events with him. He was 
denied an opportunity to contact his family. After 3 days, he was 
transferred to a detention facility in Amman and held in a small cell 
with 40 other detainees, who all shared one toilet. The religious 
worker was released 2 days later after signing a statement that he 
would cease his ``controversial'' religious activities. He has since 
been barred from entering the university's campus.
    The Government notes individuals' religions (except for Baha'is) on 
the national identity card and ``family book'' (a national registration 
record issued to the head of every family that serves as proof of 
citizenship) of all citizens.
    The Constitution provides that congregations have the right to 
establish schools for the education of their own members ``provided 
that they comply with the general provisions of the law and be subject 
to the control of government in matters relating to their curricula and 
orientation.''
    Shari'a is applied in all matters relating to family law involving 
Muslims or the children of a Muslim father, and all citizens, including 
non-Muslims, are subject to Islamic legal provisions regarding 
inheritance. All minor children of a male citizen who converts to Islam 
are automatically considered to be Muslim. Adult children of a male 
Christian who has converted to Islam become ineligible to inherit from 
their father if they do not themselves convert to Islam. In cases where 
a Muslim converts to Christianity, the act is not recognized legally by 
the authorities, and the subject continues to be treated as a Muslim in 
matters of family and property law, and the minorchildren of a male 
Muslim who converts to Christianity continue to be treated as Muslims 
under the law.
    The law prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing Muslims. 
Conversion to the Muslim faith by Christians is allowed; however, a 
Muslim may not convert to another religion. Muslims who convert to 
other faiths complain of social and government discrimination. The 
Government does not recognize fully the legality of such conversions. 
Under Shari'a converts are regarded as apostates and legally may be 
denied their property and other rights. However, this principle is not 
applied. Converts from Islam do not fall under the jurisdiction of 
their new religion's laws in matters of personal status and still are 
considered Muslims under Shari'a, although the reverse is not true. 
Shari'a prescribes a punishment of death for conversion; however, there 
is no equivalent statute under national law.
    The Political Parties Law prohibits houses of worship from being 
used for political party activity. The law was designed primarily to 
prevent Islamist parliamentarians from preaching in mosques.
    Religious instruction is mandatory for all Muslim students in 
public schools. Christian and Baha'i students are not required to 
attend courses in Islam.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for the right of 
citizens to travel freely abroad and within the country except in 
designated military areas; however, there are some restrictions on 
freedom of movement. The law requires that all women, including foreign 
women married to citizens, obtain written permission from a male 
guardian--usually their father or husband--to apply for a Jordanian 
passport. Authorities enforce requests from fathers to prevent their 
children from departing the country, even when the children are 
traveling with their mothers.
    Jordanians with full citizenship receive passports that are valid 
for 5 years. Most Palestinians living in Jordan are citizens and 
receive passports that are valid for 5 years. However, approximately 
150,000 Palestinian residents--most refugees or children of refugees 
who arrived from Gaza after 1967--do not qualify for citizenship. They 
receive 2-year passports valid for travel only. (In the period 
following the country's administrative and legal disengagement from the 
West Bank in 1988, Palestinians residing in the West Bank received 2-
year passports valid for travel only, instead of 5-year Jordanian 
passports.) In 1995 King Hussein announced that West Bank residents 
without other travel documentation again would be eligible to receive 
5-year passports. However, the Government has stressed that these 
passports are for travel only and do not connote citizenship, which 
only can be shown by presenting one's ``national number,'' a civil 
registration number accorded at birth or upon naturalization to persons 
holding citizenship. The national number is recorded on national 
identity cards and in family registration books, which are issued only 
to citizens.
    Following a successful lawsuit in 1997 by a West Bank resident who, 
prior to 1988, had held a Jordanian passport (the authorities had 
refused to issue the plaintiff a new passport), the authorities began 
to issue 5-year Jordanian passports to those who are deemed to be 
noncitizens of Palestinian origin. However, such residents do not enjoy 
the rights of citizens because they have no national number. All 
Palestinians must obtain permits from the Ministry of the Interior for 
travel between Jordan and the Israeli-occupied territories. Such 
permission is granted routinely.
    The Constitution specifically prohibits the deportation of 
citizens. However, the Government expelled four leaders of HAMAS, 
Khaled Mishal, Ibrahim Ghosheh, Izzat Rishuq, and Sami Khater, all four 
of whom are citizens (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
    There is no law or statute that provides for the granting of 
refugee status to asylum seekers. The Government generally cooperates 
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The 
UNHCR must resettle refugees in other countries. However, in April 
1998, the Ministry of Interior signed a memorandum of understanding 
with the UNHCR concerning the status and treatment of refugees. Under 
the agreement, the Government admits asylum seekers, including those 
who have entered the country clandestinely, and respects the UNHCR's 
eligibility determinations under the refugee definitions set forth in 
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 
1967 Protocol. The agreement provides protection against the forcible 
return of refugees from the country, and recognizes the legal 
definition of a refugee as set forth in the U.N. Convention. Since 1996 
the UNHCR has held regular seminars to train law enforcement officials 
in international refugee law, including specialized courses 
forpolicewomen. The Government provides first asylum. According to 
UNHCR figures, 48,588 persons have sought asylum through the UNHCR, and 
in approximately 6,000 cases (approximately 14 percent), applicants 
have been accorded refugee status.
    The Government estimates that over 180,000 Iraqis reside in the 
country. Since 1991 thousands of Iraqis have applied for refugee status 
and received legal and material assistance from the UNHCR. During the 
year, 8,633 persons applied for, and 1,174 were accorded, refugee 
status. The UNHCR also received applications for refugee status during 
the year from Sudanese, Syrian, and Libyan asylum seekers.
    For one school year (1998-99), Iraqi children were permitted to 
enroll in school regardless of their status. However, for the 1999-00 
school year, the Government reverted to its previous policy of denying 
Iraqi children admittance to school unless they were residents of the 
country or recognized as refugees by the UNHCR.
    Over 1.5 million Palestinian refugees are registered in Jordan with 
the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). The 
UNRWA counts another 800,000 Palestinians as either displaced persons 
from the 1967 war, arrivals following the 1967 war, or returnees from 
the Gulf between 1990 and 1991.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the ability to change their government. The 
King has sole discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet, to dissolve Parliament, and to establish 
public policy. Appointments made by the King to high government posts 
do not require legislative approval. Executive power is vested in the 
King (or, in his absence, in the Regent), who exercises his power 
through his ministers in accordance with the provisions of the 
Constitution.
    The Parliament is composed of the 40-member Senate, appointed by 
the King, and the popularly elected 80-member Chamber of Deputies. The 
Parliament is empowered by the Constitution to initiate legislation, 
and it can approve, reject, and amend legislation proposed by the 
Cabinet. A group of 10 senators or deputies may submit draft bills for 
consideration; however, in practice legislation is initiated and 
drafted by the Cabinet of Ministers and submitted by the Government to 
the Parliament for its consideration. Opposition Members of Parliament 
have complained that attempts by members of the lower house to initiate 
legislation receive no response from the Government. The King proposes 
and dismisses extraordinary sessions of Parliament and may postpone 
regular sessions for up to 60 days. By law if the Government amends or 
enacts a law when Parliament is not in session, it must submit the law 
to Parliament for consideration during the next session; however, this 
does not always occur.
    The Electoral Law and the distribution of parliamentary seats 
deliberately favor electorates in rural and southern Jordan, regions 
with populations known for their traditional, pro-Hashemite views.
    Over 500 candidates competed in the 1997 parliamentary elections, 
despite a boycott by Islamist and other parties. There were many 
reports of registration irregularities and fraud on the part of 
candidates. Restrictions on the press and on campaign materials also 
had a negative effect on the campaign, which elicited much debate over 
the fairness of the Electoral Law and its implementation. Voter turnout 
was significantly lower in most urban areas than in rural areas. 
Centrist candidates with ties to major tribes dominate the Parliament.
    The municipal elections in July featured the participation of the 
parties that had boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections; however, 
low voter turnout necessitated a second day of balloting. The process 
generally was regarded as free and fair.
    The so-called one-man, one-vote amendment to the Electoral Law was 
ratified by Parliament in 1997, nearly 4 years after it was first 
enacted by royal decree. The amendment allows voters to choose only one 
candidate in multiple-seat districts. In the largely tribal society, 
citizens tend to cast their first vote for family members, and any 
additional votes in accordance with their political leanings. As a 
result, the amendment in practice has tended to limit the chances of 
some nontribal candidates, including women, to be elected.
    Women have the right to vote, and women's groups encourage women to 
vote and to be active in the political process; however, they are 
underrepresented at the local and national level. There is one female 
minister. There are three female senators, but no women hold seats in 
the Chamber of Deputies.
    Of the 80 seats in the lower house, 9 are reserved for Christians, 
6 for Bedouins, and 3 for the Circassian or Chechen ethnic minorities.
    The Palestinian community, estimated to be slightly over half of 
the total population, is not represented proportionately in the 
Government and legislature. Only 7 of 24 ministers, 7 of 40 senators, 
and 11 of 80 lower house deputies are of Palestinian origin. The 
electoral system gives greater representation to areas that have a 
majority of inhabitants of non-Palestinian origin.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Domestic and international human rights groups investigate 
allegations of human rights abuses and publish and disseminate findings 
critical of government policy. However, the Press and Publications Law 
has restricted the publication of information about the military and 
security services, which, in effect, prevented the publication by 
domestic groups of reports alleging torture and other abuses committed 
by the security services. The 1999 amendments to the Press and 
Publications Law removed these specific restrictions, but restrictions 
still exist in the penal code.
    The local chapters of the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR) 
and the Jordanian Human Rights Organization (JHRO) are registered with 
the Government. The AOHR has drawn public attention to alleged human 
rights abuses and a range of other political issues and has pressed the 
Government to bring formal charges against political detainees or to 
release them promptly. It asserts that the Government responds to only 
about 10 percent of the complaints that it submits on behalf of 
individuals who allegedly were subjected to human rights violations by 
the authorities.
    The ICRC generally is permitted full and unrestricted access to 
detainees, including those held by the GID and the military 
intelligence directorate. However, for 2 months during the year, the 
ICRC was not allowed to visit one specific prisoner who was detained by 
the GID (see Section 1.c.). As a result, the ICRC suspended its visits 
to GID detention facilities during that period. After the GID relented, 
the ICRC resumed visits to GID detainees.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social status
    Although the law does not distinguish between citizens on the basis 
of race, women, minorities, and others are treated differently under 
the law and face discrimination in employment, housing, and other 
areas.
    Women.--Violence against women is common. Reported incidents of 
violence against women do not reflect the full extent of the problem. 
Medical experts acknowledge that spousal abuse occurs frequently. 
However, cultural norms discourage victims from seeking medical or 
legal help and frustrate an objective assessment of the extent of such 
abuse.
    Abused women have the right to file a complaint in court against 
their spouses for physical abuse but in practice familial and societal 
pressures discourage them from seeking legal remedies. Marital rape is 
not illegal. NGO's, such as the Jordanian Women's Union, which has a 
telephone hot line for victims of domestic violence, provide assistance 
in such matters. Wife beating is technically grounds for divorce, but 
the husband may seek to demonstrate that he has authority from the 
Koran to correct an irreligious or disobedient wife by striking her.
    The Criminal Code allows leniency for a person found guilty of 
committing a ``crime of honor,'' a euphemism that refers to a violent 
assault with intent to murder against a female by a male relative for 
alleged sexual misconduct. Law enforcement treatment of men accused of 
``honor crimes'' reflects widespread unwillingness to recognize the 
abuse involved or take action against the problem. Sixteen such murders 
were reported during the year in which the victims were shot, 
strangled, stabbed, bludgeoned, and run over with vehicles. Human 
rights monitors believe that many more such crimes were committed but 
not documented as honor crimes. Moreover, most crimes of honor are not 
reported by the press. The actual number of honor crimes is believed to 
be significantly higher. One forensic medical examiner estimated that 
25 percent of all murders committed in the country are honor crimes. 
The police regularly imprison women who are potential victims of honor 
crimes for their own protection. There were up to 50 women 
involuntarily detained in this form of ``protective custody'' during 
the year.
    According to Article 340 of the Penal Code, a ``crime of honor'' 
defense may be invoked by a defendant accused of murder who ``surprises 
his wife or any close female relative'' in an act of adultery or 
fornication, in which case the perpetrator of the ``honor crime'' is 
judged not guilty of murder. Although few defendants can meet the 
stringent requirements for a crime of honor defense, that is, the 
defendant personally must have witnessed the female victim engaging in 
sexual relations, most avoid trial for the crime of murder, being tried 
instead on the charge of manslaughter, and even those convicted of 
murder rarely spend more than 2 years in prison. (In contrast to honor 
crimes, the maximum penalty for first-degree murder is death, and the 
maximum penalty for second-degree murder is 15 years.) Such defenses 
commonly also rely on the male relative having acted in the ``heat of 
passion'' upon hearing of a female relative's alleged sexual 
transgression, usually without any investigation on the part of the 
assailant to determine the veracity of the allegation before committing 
the assault. Defenses in these cases fall under Article 98 of the Penal 
Code. Women may not invoke these defenses for murdering a male relative 
under the same circumstances, nor may they use them for killing men who 
attempt to rape, sexually harass, or otherwise threaten their 
``honor.''
    On February 6, Hussein Suleiman ran over his pregnant sister Malak 
Suleiman three times with his pickup truck. According to his own 
testimony, he wanted to make sure that his sister was dead so that he 
could ``cleanse his family honor.'' On July 27, he was sentenced to 1 
year in prison.
    On February 10, after providing bail for her release from prison, 
Maha Walid's father, brother, and uncle took her to the back yard of 
their home. They argued about her alleged ``immoral behavior.'' Her 
uncle then shot her in the head and handed the gun to her father, who 
shot her twice, fired the gun into the air, and shouted that he had 
``cleansed his honor.'' On July 12, the three men were sentenced to 5 
months each for the crime.
    In June one judge broke with tradition and refused to accept the 
``heat of passion'' defense in an honor crime case. The court sentenced 
Khalil Mohammad to 15 years in prison for the murder of his wife, 
rejecting his plea that he had killed her in a fit of fury, ``because 
he already knew about her behavior in the past and did not kill her.''
    In December the National Committee to Eliminate ``Crimes of Honor'' 
presented leaders of the upper and lower houses of the Parliament with 
a petition signed by 15,000 citizens demanding an end both to crimes of 
honor and the legislation that protects perpetrators of such crimes.
    The lower house rejected in November a government-supported 
amendment that would have eliminated Article 340; however, the Senate 
approved the same measure in December. The amendment was returned to 
the lower house for reconsideration. If the lower house again rejects 
the measure, the two houses would meet in joint session to settle the 
issue.
    Women experience legal discrimination in matters of pension and 
social security benefits, inheritance, divorce, and the value of court 
testimony. A woman's testimony is worth only half that of a man (see 
Section 1.e.). The Government provides men with more generous social 
security benefits than women. The Government continues pension payments 
of deceased male civil servants to their heirs but discontinues 
payments of deceased female civil servants.
    Under Shari'a female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's 
inheritance, and the non-Muslim widows of Muslim spouses have no 
inheritance rights. A sole female heir receives half of her parents' 
estate; the balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir 
inherits all his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs have the duty to 
provide for all family members who need assistance. Under Shari'a men 
are able to divorce their spouses more easily than women. Marriage and 
divorce matters for Christians are adjudicated by special courts for 
each denomination. Married women are ineligible for work in the 
diplomatic service, and, until recently, most women in the diplomatic 
corps automatically were assigned to administrative positions. There 
are five female judges in the country.
    The law requires a married woman to obtain her husband's permission 
to obtain a passport (see Section 2.d.). Married women do not have the 
legal right to transmit citizenship to their children. Furthermore, 
women may not petition for citizenship for their non-Jordanian 
husbands. The husbands themselves must apply for citizenship after 
fulfilling a requirement of 15 years continuous residence. Once the 
husbands have obtained citizenship, they may apply to transmit the 
citizenship to their children. However, in practice such an application 
may take years and, in many cases, citizenship ultimately still may be 
denied to the husband and children. Such children become stateless and 
lack the rights of citizen children, such as the right to attend school 
or seek othergovernment services. Civil law grants women equal pay for 
equal work, but in practice this law often is ignored.
    Social pressures discourage many women from pursuing professional 
careers. Nonetheless, women have employment opportunities in many 
professions, including engineering, medicine, education, and the law. 
Women constitute approximately 14 percent of the work force and 50 
percent of university students. Women's groups stress that the problem 
of discrimination is not only one of law, but also of women's lack of 
awareness of their rights or unwillingness to assert those rights. The 
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization reported in 1995 that women who 
work in agriculture average 15-hour days and earn less than men. The 
Jordanian chapter of the Business and Professional Women's Club gives 
seminars on women's rights and assists women in establishing small 
businesses. Members of the royal family work actively to improve the 
status of women.
    Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and 
welfare in the areas of education and health. However, government 
efforts in these areas are constrained by limited financial resources. 
Education is compulsory until age 15, but children who do not attend 
school or attend infrequently are not considered truant. The law 
prohibits corporal punishment in schools; however, such punishment is 
known to occur. For one school year (1998-99), Iraqi children were 
permitted to enroll in school regardless of their status. However, for 
the 1999-00 school year, the Government reverted to its previous policy 
of denying Iraqi children admittance to school unless they were 
residents of the country or recognized as refugees by the UNHCR (see 
Section 2.d.).
    The Government safeguards some children's rights, especially 
regarding child labor. Although the law prohibits children under the 
age of 16 from working, child vendors work the streets of Amman (see 
Section 6.d.). The Ministry of Social Development has a committee to 
address the problem and in some cases removes the children from the 
streets, returns them to their families or to juvenile centers, and may 
provide the families with a monthly stipend. However, the children 
often return to the streets. Declining economic conditions have caused 
the number of these ``street children'' to increase steadily over the 
last 10 years. Selling newspapers, tissues, small food items, or gum, 
these street vendors, along with the other children who pick through 
trash dumpsters to find recyclable cans to sell, are sometimes the sole 
source of income for their families.
    Although the problem is difficult to quantify, social and health 
workers believe that there is a significant incidence of child abuse in 
families, and that the incidence of child sexual abuse is significantly 
higher than reported. The law specifies punishment for abuses against 
children. Rape or sodomy of a child under 15 years of age carries the 
death penalty.
    Illegitimate children are entitled to the same rights under the law 
as legitimate children. However, in practice they suffer severe 
discrimination in a society that does not tolerate adultery. Most 
illegitimate children become wards of the State or live a meager 
existence on the fringes of society. In either case, their prospects 
for marriage and gainful employment are limited. Furthermore, 
illegitimate children who are not acknowledged legally by their fathers 
are considered stateless and are not given passports or identity 
numbers.
    People with Disabilities.--High unemployment in the general 
population restricts job opportunities for disabled persons, estimated 
by the Ministry of Social Development to number 100,000. Eighty percent 
of disabled citizens receive monetary assistance from the Government. 
The Government passed legislation in 1993 requiring future public 
buildings to accommodate the needs of the disabled and to retrofit 
existing public buildings, but implementation has been slow. Since 1993 
the Special Education Department of the Ministry of Social Development 
has enrolled approximately 10,000 mentally and physically disabled 
persons in public and private sector training courses. It has placed 
approximately 400 disabled persons in public and private sector jobs. 
The law requires that 2 percent of the available jobs be reserved for 
the physically disabled. Private organizations and members of the royal 
family actively promote programs to protect and advance the interests 
of the disabled.
    Indigenous People.--The country's indigenous people, nomadic 
Bedouin and East Bank town dwellers, traditionally have been the 
backbone of popular support for the Hashemite monarchy. As a result, 
they generally have enjoyed considerable influence within the political 
system. They are represented disproportionately in senior 
military,security, and civil service jobs. Nevertheless, many Bedouin 
in rural areas are severely disadvantaged economically.
    Religious Minorities.--In general Christians do not suffer 
discrimination. Christians hold government positions and are 
represented in the media and academia approximately in proportion to 
their presence in the general population, which is estimated at 6 
percent. Baha'is face some societal and official discrimination. Their 
faith is not recognized officially, and Baha'is are classified as 
Muslims on official documents, such as the national identity card. 
Christian and Baha'i children in public schools are not required to 
participate in Islamic religious instruction.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government granted 
citizenship to all Palestinians who fled to Jordan in the period after 
the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and to a large number of refugees and 
displaced persons who arrived as a result of the 1967 war. However, 
most refugees who fled Gaza after 1967 are not entitled to citizenship 
and are issued 2-year passports valid for travel only. In 1995 King 
Hussein announced that West Bank residents without other travel 
documentation would be eligible to receive 5-year Jordanian passports. 
However, the Government has stressed that these passports are for 
travel only and do not connote citizenship (see Section 2.d.). 
Palestinians residing in Jordan, who make up about 60 percent of the 
population, suffer discrimination in appointments to positions in the 
Government and the military, in admittance to public universities, and 
in the granting of university scholarships.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers in the private sector and in 
some state-owned companies have the right to establish and join unions. 
Unions must be registered to be considered legal. The law prohibits 
union membership for noncitizens. Over 30 percent of the work force are 
organized into 17 unions. Although union membership in the General 
Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU), the sole trade 
federation, is not mandatory, all unions belong to it. The Government 
subsidizes and audits the GFJTU's salaries and activities. Union 
officials are elected by secret ballot to 4-year terms. Although the 
Government cosponsors and approves the timing of these elections, it 
does not interfere in the choice of candidates.
    Labor laws mandate that workers must obtain permission from the 
Government in order to strike. Unions generally do not seek approval 
for a strike, but workers use the threat of a strike as a negotiating 
tactic. Strikes are prohibited if a labor dispute is under mediation or 
arbitration. If a settlement is not reached through mediation, the 
Ministry of Labor may refer the dispute to an industrial tribunal by 
agreement of both parties. The tribunal is an independent arbitration 
panel of judges appointed by the Ministry of Labor. The decisions of 
the panel are binding legally. If only one party agrees, the Ministry 
of Labor refers the dispute to the Council of Ministers and then to 
Parliament. Labor law prohibits employers from dismissing a worker 
during a labor dispute.
    In July in protest over a recent contract between the Pepsi-Cola 
Company and The Food Workers Union, 255 of Pepsi's approximately 1,200 
employees staged an illegal strike. The company issued two warnings to 
the workers and then dismissed them. After the Minister of Labor 
intervened, the company reinstated all but 115 of the employees and 
offered a severance package to the rest. After this agreement, the 
Ministry of Labor continued to urge the company to reinstate the 
remaining fired employees.
    In August the Jordan Cable and Wire Company laid off 20 of its 220 
workers. In protest 100 other employees staged an illegal strike. A 
week later the company fired an additional 72 employees from among the 
strikers. Also in August, following an intervention from the Ministry 
of Labor, the company reinstated the 72 strikers. In November the Labor 
Court ruled that the initial 20 layoffs were illegal and ordered the 
company to reinstate those employees. The company had not done so at 
year's end.
    The GFJTU belongs to the Arab Labor organization, the International 
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, and to the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have, 
and exercise, the right to bargain collectively. The Constitution 
prohibits antiunion discrimination, but the ICFTU claims that the 
Government does not protect adequately employees from antiunion 
discrimination and that the Governmenthas dismissed public-sector 
employees for political reasons. Workers may lodge complaints of 
antiunion discrimination with the Ministry of Labor, which is 
authorized to order the reinstatement of employees discharged for union 
activities. There were no complaints of antiunion discrimination lodged 
with the Ministry of Labor during the year.
    The national labor laws apply in the free trade zones in Aqaba and 
Zarqa. Private sector employees in these zones belong to one national 
union that covers both zones and have the right to bargain 
collectively.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
forbids compulsory labor except in a state of emergency such as war or 
natural disaster, and it generally is not practiced; however, foreign 
domestic servants often are subject to coercion and abuse, and in some 
cases work under conditions that amount to forced labor (see Section 
6.e.). The law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory 
labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Labor law forbids children under the age of 16 from 
working full time except as apprentices. At age 13, children may begin 
part-time training for up to 6 hours a day, with night work prohibited. 
Ministry of Labor inspectors have the authority to enforce laws on 
child labor, but in practice, enforcement often does not extend to 
small family businesses that employ underage children. Education is 
compulsory to age 15. Families in remote areas frequently keep school-
age children at home to work. Child vendors work on the streets of 
Amman (see Section 5). The law does not prohibit forced or compulsory 
labor by children specifically, but such practices are not known to 
occur (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--On October 2, the Government 
implemented a national minimum wage of $114 (80 dinars) per month for 
all workers except domestic servants and those in the agricultural 
sector. Workers earning the minimum wages find it difficult to provide 
a decent standard of living for their families. The Government 
estimates that the poverty level is at a monthly wage of about $125 (89 
dinars) per month for a family with 7.5 members. A study completed by 
the Ministry of Labor in July found that 18.7 percent of the population 
live at or below the poverty level; 1.5 percent live in ``abject'' 
poverty, defined by the Government as $58 (40.5 dinars) per month for a 
family with 7.5 members. The Government provides minimal, assistance to 
45,000 indigent families.
    The law prohibits most workers from working more than the customary 
48 hours per week. Hotel, restaurant, and cinema employees may work up 
to 54 hours per week. Workers may not work more than 16 hours in any 
continuous period or more than 60 hours of overtime per month. 
Employees are entitled to 1 day off per week.
    Labor law does not apply to domestic servants, who do not have a 
legal forum to address their labor grievances and have no standing to 
sue in court for nonpayment of wages. Abuse of domestic servants, most 
of whom are foreign, is widespread. Imprisonment of maids and illegal 
confiscation of travel documents by employers is common. Complaints of 
beatings, insufficient food, and rape generally are not reported to 
officials by victims, who fear losing their work permits and being 
returned to their country. Domestic servants generally are not given 
days off and frequently are called upon to work at any hour of the day 
or night.
    The law specifies a number of health and safety requirements for 
workers, including the presence of bathrooms, drinking water, and first 
aid equipment at work sites. The Ministry of Labor is authorized to 
enforce health and safety standards. The law does not require employers 
to report industrial accidents or occupational diseases to the Ministry 
of Labor. Workers do not have a statutory right to remove themselves 
from hazardous conditions without risking the loss of their jobs.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically 
prohibit trafficking in women, the practice is not known to occur. A 
1926 law specifically prohibits trafficking in children. There were no 
reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 KUWAIT

    Amir, or princes, from the Al-Sabah family have ruled Kuwait in 
consultation with prominent community figures for over 200 years. The 
Constitution, adopted in 1962 shortly after independence, provides for 
an elected national assembly. It also permits the Amir to suspend its 
articles during periods of martial law. The Amir twice suspended 
constitutional provisions, from 1976-81 from 1986-92, and ruled 
extraconstitutionally during these periods. The National Assembly 
resumed functioning after the 1992 elections. In May the Amir once 
again dissolved Parliament. However, in contrast to prior dissolutions, 
this act was followed by constitutionally mandated elections, which 
took place in July. The Constitution and law provide for a degree of 
judicial independence, but the Amir appoints all judges, and renewal of 
many judicial appointments is subject to government approval.
    The Ministry of Interior supervises the security apparatus, 
including the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Kuwait State 
Security (KSS), two agencies that, in addition to the regular police, 
investigate internal security-related offenses. Members of the security 
forces committed a number of human rights abuses.
    Richly endowed with oil, during the year the country's estimated 
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately $11,584. The 
decline in per capita GDP from previous years reflects a significant 
increase in resident foreign workers and lower oil revenues. The 
estimated 1998-99 budget deficit was $6.3 billion. Budget sources 
projected a $6.9 billion deficit for the current fiscal year prior to 
recent significant increases in world crude oil prices. Despite its 
stated emphasis on an open market, the Government continues to dominate 
the local economy through direct expenditures and government-owned 
companies and equities. The Government has initiated a program of 
disposing of its holdings of stock in private companies. According to 
government statistics, 92 percent of the indigenous work force is 
employed by the Government. Foreigners constitute 98 percent of the 
private sector work force.
    There continued to be problems in the Government's human rights 
record; while there were some improvements in a few areas, the 
situation worsened in others. Citizens cannot change their head of 
state. Although under the Constitution the National Assembly must 
approve the Amir's choice of Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir), 
this authority is limited; if the National Assembly rejects the Amir's 
nominee, the Amir then submits three names from which the assembly must 
choose the new Crown Prince. The Government bans formal political 
parties, and women do not have the right to vote or seek election to 
the National Assembly. On November 23, the Parliament vetoed on 
constitutional grounds the Amir's May decree, which sought to give 
women the right to vote, to seek election to the National Assembly 
beginning with the parliamentary election scheduled for 2003, and to 
hold cabinet office. On November 30, identical legislation that was 
introduced by Members of Parliament was defeated by a two-vote margin. 
A law promulgated in 1998 bans primaries previously conducted by 
religious sects and tribes. Some police and members of the security 
forces abuse detainees during interrogation. Prisons remain 
overcrowded; however, the Government began renovating existing 
facilities and building a new maximum security prison. The Amir 
commuted the sentences of 306 prisoners on February 25, Kuwait's 
national day, including those of the 8 remaining Jordanians, who were 
held as state security prisoners. The judiciary is subject to 
government influence, and foreign residents often claim that courts are 
biased in favor of citizens. The Government infringes on citizens' 
privacy rights in some areas. Security forces occasionally monitor the 
activities of individuals and their communications. Men must obtain 
government approval to marry foreign-born women. The Government uses 
informal censorship, and journalists practice self-censorship. The 
Government restricts freedom of assembly and association. The 
Government places some limits on freedom of religion and movement. The 
Government prevents the return of stateless persons who have strong 
ties to the country. Deportation orders may be issued by administrative 
order, and between 110 and 120 persons are estimated to be held in 
detention facilities, some for up to 3 to 6 months. In May the 
Government announced a crackdown on unlicensed branches of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). violence and discrimination 
against women are problems. Discrimination against noncitizens 
persists. The Government restricts some worker rights. The Labor Law 
does not protect domestic servants regardless of citizenship. Unskilled 
foreign workers suffer from the lack of a minimum wage in the private 
sector, from failure to enforce the Labor Law, and at times physical 
abuse; some work under conditions that, in effect, constitute 
indentured servitude.
    Although the Government has not found a solution to the human 
rights problems of the approximately 110,000 stateless personsresiding 
in Kuwait known as the ``bidoon,'' (the term means ``without'') in June 
it introduced a new program that would naturalize approximately 11,000 
bidoon and give permanent residency to the remainder; the program is 
scheduled to be completed by June 2000. While this program is a 
positive step, it still leaves the remaining 100,000 bidoon in a 
legally precarious position.
    Executive and legislative leaders continued to strengthen political 
institutions by resolving major disagreements within the framework of 
the Constitution and without recourse to extrajudicial measures.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    There were no developments in the investigations into the 
extrajudicial killings that occurred during the chaotic period after 
Kuwait's liberation from Iraqi occupation in February 1991.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    There have been no developments since 1994 in the cases of 
disappearance that occurred following the country's liberation in 1991. 
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Iraqi 
authorities have not yet accounted for 608 Kuwaitis and residents of 
Kuwait, including 8 women, who were taken prisoner during Iraq's 
occupation of Kuwait; 10 more missing prisoner of war cases were added 
by the ICRC during the year. The Government of Iraq has refused to 
comply with U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, which stipulates the 
release of the detainees. Iraq denies that it holds Kuwaiti detainees 
and in February ceased participating in ICRC-sponsored talks on their 
fate.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there 
continue to be credible reports that some police and members of the 
security forces abuse detainees during interrogation. Reported abuses 
include blindfolding, verbal threats, stepping on toes, and slaps and 
blows. Police and security forces were more likely to inflict such 
abuse on noncitizens, particularly citizens of other non-Gulf Arab 
nations and Asians, than on citizens.
    The Government states that it investigates all allegations of abuse 
and that it has punished at least some of the offenders. However, the 
Government does not make public either the findings of its 
investigations or what, if any, punishments are imposed. This omission 
creates a climate of impunity, which diminishes deterrence against 
abuse.
    Defendants have the right to present evidence in court that they 
have been mistreated during interrogation. However, the courts 
frequently dismiss abuse complaints because defendants are unable to 
substantiate their complaints with physical evidence. Members of the 
security forces routinely decline to reveal their identity during 
interrogation, a practice that further complicates confirmation of 
abuse.
    An estimated 7,000 unskilled Egyptian workers rioted in Kuwait City 
on October 30-31. Riot police used tear gas to disperse the crowd and 
made numerous arrests. There were no serious injuries; however, there 
were reports of isolated instances of the use of excessive force by 
police (see Section 6.e.).
    Prison conditions, including conditions for those held for security 
offenses, meet minimum international standards in terms of food, access 
to basic health care, scheduled family visits, cleanliness, and 
opportunities for work and exercise. Continuing problems include 
overcrowding and the lack of availability of specialized medical care. 
Approximately 1,300 persons are serving sentences or awaiting trial in 
the central prison. An estimated additional 250 prisoners are being 
held at the state security facility in Shuwaikh, which also operates as 
a deportation center.
    Following charges of corruption at the central prison in 1998, 
prison officials were punished and the senior prison official lost his 
position.
    The Ministry of Interior maintained oversight of central prison 
officials during the year, but there were no new charges of corruption.
    The Government reopened Talha prison in 1998, and it is now being 
used as a prison for persons convicted of civil crimes and those 
awaiting trial, some of whom subsequently are processed for 
administrative deportations. Since its reopening, Talha has not been 
criticized by human rights groups for prisoner mistreatment. The 
Government also began construction of a new maximum-security facility.
    The National Assembly's Human Rights Committee closely monitored 
prison conditions throughout the year, and the Government allowed the 
ICRC access to all detention facilities.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the 
Government occasionally arbitrarily arrests and detains persons. There 
also were incidents of prolonged detention.
    Police officers must obtain an arrest warrant from state 
prosecutors before making an arrest, although in misdemeanor cases the 
arresting officer may issue them. Security forces occasionally detain 
persons at checkpoints in Kuwait City (see Section 2.d.).
    Under the Penal Code, a suspect may not be held for more than 4 
days without charge. Security officers sometimes prevent families from 
visiting detainees during this confinement. After 4 days, prosecutors 
must either release the suspect or file charges. If charges are filed, 
prosecutors may remand a suspect to detention for an additional 21 
days. Prosecutors also may obtain court orders for further detention 
pending trial.
    Dr Ahmed Al-Baghdadi, a prominent professor and journalist, was 
detained in October for 2 weeks for an article that he published in 
1996. On October 18, Salafi Islamist Ahmed Al-Ali was detained for 1 
day for making inflammatory antiregime comments. In both cases, the 
charges were brought by private citizens and were handled in accordance 
with the law (see Section 2.a.).
    During the election campaign, five parliamentary candidates were 
arrested and charged with unlawful slander against the Government. One 
of the candidates was sentenced to 6 months in prison (see Sections 
2.a. and 3).
    In October police arrested up to 2,500 persons in connection with 
riots by foreign workers (see Section 6.e.).
    Of the estimated 2,100 persons serving sentences or pending trial 
at the security prison or the state security facility in Shuwaikh, 
approximately 170 are being held on security grounds.
    The Government may expel noncitizens (including bidoon, that is, 
stateless residents of Kuwait, some of whom are native born or long-
term residents), if it considers them security risks. The Government 
also may expel foreigners if they are unable to obtain or renew work or 
residency permits. Between 110 and 120 persons are estimated to be held 
in detention facilities, some of them pending deportation. Some of 
these detainees have been held for up to 3 to 6 months. Many 
deportation orders are issued administratively, without the benefit of 
a trial. However, the Government does not return deportees to their 
countries of origin forcibly, allowing those who object to remain in 
detention. This practice leads to prolonged detention of deportees, 
particularly Iraqis, who do not wish to return to their own countries. 
It also plays a role in the complex problem faced by bidoon deportees, 
who essentially remain in detention because their stateless condition 
makes the execution of the deportation order impossible.
    The Talha deportation center, which had been criticized in previous 
years by human rights groups, reopened in 1998. However, there were no 
allegations of the prolonged detention of deportees in the facility 
during the year.
    The law protects citizens from exile, and there were no reports of 
this practice.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution states that 
``judges shall not be subject to any authority;'' however, the Amir 
appoints all judges, and renewal of many judicial appointments is 
subject to government approval. Judges who are citizens have lifetime 
appointments, but the Government also employs many noncitizens as 
judges. These noncitizen judges work under 1- to 3-year renewable 
contracts, which undermines their independence. The Ministry of Justice 
may remove judges for cause, but it rarely does so. Foreignresidents 
involved in legal disputes with citizens frequently complain that the 
courts show a pro-Kuwaiti bias.
    The regular court system tries both civil and criminal cases. The 
Court of Cassation is the highest level of judicial appeal. Sunni and 
Shi'a Muslims have recourse to courts of their respective denominations 
for family law cases; however, there is no Shi'a appellate court. Shi'a 
cases are referred to the Sunni court on appeal.
    Defendants have the right to confront their accusers and appeal 
verdicts. The Amir has the constitutional power to pardon or commute 
all sentences. Defendants in felony cases are required by law to be 
represented in court by legal counsel, which the courts provide in 
criminal cases. In misdemeanor cases, defendants have the right to 
waive the presence of legal counsel, and the court is not required to 
provide counsel to indigent defendants.
    Both defendants and prosecutors may appeal court verdicts to the 
High Court of Appeal, which may rule on whether the law was applied 
properly as well as on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
Decisions of the High Court of Appeal may be presented to the Court of 
Cassation, which conducts a limited, formal review of cases to 
determine only whether the law was applied properly.
    In the regular court system there are no groups, including women, 
who are barred from testifying or whose testimony is given lesser 
weight. However, the Islamic courts, which have jurisdiction over 
family law, apply Shari'a (Islamic law), which states that the 
testimony of two women equals that of one man.
    There were no reports of political prisoners. The Government 
continues to incarcerate persons convicted of collaboration with Iraq 
during the occupation. By law such collaboration is a felony. Most of 
the persons convicted in the Martial Law Court in 1991 and the Special 
State Security Court, which was abolished in 1995, did not receive fair 
trials. In February the Amir freed the remaining eight Jordanians 
convicted previously by the martial law and state security courts. At 
year's end, 50 persons (29 Iraqis, 17 bidoon and 4 Palestinians) 
convicted by these now abolished courts remained in prison.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for individual privacy and 
sanctity of the home; however, the Government infringes on these rights 
in some areas. The police must obtain a warrant to search both public 
and private property unless they are in hot pursuit of a suspect 
fleeing the scene of a crime or if alcohol or illegal narcotics are 
suspected on the premises. The warrant may be obtained from the State 
Prosecutor or, in the case of private property, from a judge. In May an 
Amiri decree was issued that gives the police under warrant the right 
to conduct searches for illegal firearms by neighborhood. The National 
Assembly rejected the decree during its fall session; no similar 
legislation was introduced to take its place. The security forces 
occasionally monitor the activities of individuals and their 
communications.
    By law men must obtain government approval to marry foreign-born 
women. Although the Government may advise against marriage to a foreign 
national, there are no known cases of the Government refusing 
permission to marry. The Government advises women against marrying 
foreign nationals, and it forbids marriage between Muslim women and 
non-Muslim men.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, printing, and publishing ``in accordance with the 
conditions and manner specified by law,'' and, with a few exceptions, 
citizens are free to criticize the Government at public meetings and in 
the media; however, journalists practice self-censorship. Several laws 
empower the Government to impose restrictions on freedom of speech and 
the press. During the year, several court cases effectively weakened 
these laws by striking down punitive sentences that accompanied earlier 
convictions; however, the application of these laws persisted 
throughout the year. The Government, through the Ministry of 
Information, practices informal censorship by placing pressure on 
individual publishers and editors believed to have ``crossed the line'' 
in attacking government policies and discussing issues deemed offensive 
to Islam, tradition, or the interests of the State.
    During the election campaign, five parliamentary candidates were 
arrested and charged with unlawful slander against the Government. One 
of the candidates was sentenced to 6 months in prison (see Section 3).
    Newspapers are privately owned and free to publish on most social, 
economic, and political issues; they frequently criticize government 
policies and officials, including the Crown Prince. The only prohibited 
subjects are the Amir and attacks on Islam.
    The Government ended prepublication censorship in 1992, but 
journalists still censor themselves. The Press Law prohibits the 
publication of any direct criticism of the Amir, official government 
communications with other states, and material that serves to ``attack 
religions'' or ``incite people to commit crimes, creates hatred, or 
spreads dissension among the populace.''
    In order to begin publication of a newspaper, the publisher must 
obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Information. 
Publishers may lose their licenses if their publications do not appear 
for 6 months. This 6-month rule prevents publishers from publishing 
sporadically--it is not used to suspend or shut down existing 
newspapers. Individuals also must obtain permission from the Ministry 
of Information before publishing any printed material, including 
brochures and wall posters. The Government does not censor foreign 
journalists and permits them open access to the country.
    In January the Court of Appeals reduced an unusually strong 
sentence against the daily newspaper Al-Qabas, which had been accused 
of publishing an item that was deemed blasphemous and insulting to 
Islam. The appeals court issued a nominal fine to the Al-Qabas editor 
in chief and dismissed the 6-month jail term, to which he had been 
sentenced by a lower court. In a related case, the Court of Appeals 
also imposed a nominal fine while dismissing the jail sentence on a 
second journalist who had been charged for having criticized the office 
of the public prosecutor by alleging irregularities in its handling of 
an embezzlement case. The Constitutional Court rejected the Al-Qabas 
countersuit that the Press Law was unconstitutional, and the Court of 
Appeals did not rule on the constitutionality of the Press Law, holding 
that it has no jurisdiction in such cases.
    A journalist was held for several days for questioning by police in 
February following his return from Israel, where he had conducted 
interviews with several Israeli officials. Charges were not brought 
against the journalist and the case subsequently lapsed.
    In July the Kuwait reporting office of the Qatar based Al-Jazeerah 
satellite television station was reopened after a month's closure. The 
office initially was closed after a talk show broadcast that featured a 
telephone caller from another country who repeatedly made insulting 
comments about the Amir.
    The Government closed the daily newspaper Al-Seyassah on October 18 
for 5 days for publishing inflammatory comments made by Salafi Islamist 
Hamed Al-Ali. Al-Ali was detained for 1 day and then released on bail 
pending an investigation into his remarks (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government owns and controls the radio and television 
companies. The Government does not inhibit the purchase of satellite 
dishes, which are widely available. Citizens with such devices are free 
to watch a variety of programs, including those that broadcast from 
Israel and Iraq. Kuwaitis freely watched Al-Jazeera during the closure 
period of its local office.
    The Ministry of Information censors all books, films, videotapes, 
periodicals, and other imported publications deemed morally offensive. 
In 1998 the Ministry announced plans to censor the Internet; however, 
it indicated that the methods of enforcement and technical issues must 
still be worked out. The Ministry has censored political topics as well 
and does not grant licenses to magazines with a political focus. The 
General Organization of Printing and Publishing controls the printing, 
publishing, and distribution of informational materials.
    Dr. Ahred Al-Baghdadi, a prominent professor and journalist, was 
sentenced on October 4 to 4 weeks in prison for ``defaming the 
established beliefs and rites of the Islamic faith.'' Al-Baghadi was 
convicted for stating that ``the Prophet had failed in spreading the 
message of Islam in his early years in his home town of Makkad'' in an 
article published in 1996. Al-Baghdadi was convicted under a law that 
prohibits insults to Islam after charges against him were brought by a 
private citizen, as provided by the law. The Amir pardoned Al-Baghdadi 
after he served 2 weeks of his 4-week sentence (see Section 1.d.).
    On October 9, another professor and journalist, Dr. ShamlanAl-Issa 
was questioned by government authorities concerning an interview that 
he gave in September in which he refused to accept the implementation 
of Shari'a as the sole basis of law. Al-Issa also was charged by a 
private citizen with defaming Islam; however, the Government found no 
basis to the claim and the charges were dropped.
    There is no government censorship of university teaching, research, 
or publication. However, academics are subject to the same restraints 
as the media with regard to criticism of the Amir or Islam.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
affirms the right to assembly; however, the Government restricts this 
right in practice. Public gatherings must receive prior government 
approval, as must private gatherings of more than five persons that 
result in the issuance of a public statement. Political activity is 
confined to informal, family-based, almost exclusively male social 
gatherings known as diwaniyas. Practically every male adult, including 
the Amir, hosts or attends diwaniyas, at which every possible topic is 
discussed. The diwaniya contributes to the development of political 
consensus and official decisionmaking.
    The Constitution affirms the right of association; however, the 
Government restricts this right in practice. The Government bans 
political parties. Several informal blocs, acting much like parties, 
exist and were active during the July National Assembly elections. The 
Government has made no effort to constrain these groupings, which are 
organized on the basis of common ideological goals. Many may be 
categorized as ``opposition'' groups.
    All nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) must obtain a license 
from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The Government uses its 
power to license as a means of political control. The Ministry has 
registered 52 NGO's, including professional groups, a bar association, 
and scientific bodies. These groups receive government subsidies for 
their operating expenses. Their members must obtain permission from the 
Ministry before attending international conferences. However, since 
1985 the Ministry has issued only three licenses. The Ministry has 
disapproved other license requests on the grounds that previously 
established NGO's already provide services similar to those proposed by 
the petitioners (see Section 4).
    In May the Government announced a crackdown on unlicensed branches 
of NGO's, whose activities it previously had overlooked, including 
unlicensed branches of Islamic charities, and required that they cease 
operations by mid-September. The crackdown was taken in accordance with 
a 1993 decree that ordered unregistered NGO's to cease activities. 
Subsequently, the Council of Ministers announced that the Ministries of 
Social Affairs and Awqaf (religious affairs) would undertake a study to 
determine how best to organize existing NGO's and the fate of 
unlicensed NGO's; the 1993 decree has not been challenged legally.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion; although the 
Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the Government places 
some limits on this right. The Constitution also provides that the 
State protect the freedom to practice religion in accordance with 
established customs, ``provided that it does not conflict with public 
policy or morals.'' The Constitution states that Shari'a (Islamic law) 
is ``a main source of legislation.''
    The procedures for registration and licensing of religious groups 
are unclear. The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs has official 
responsibility for overseeing religious groups. Nevertheless, in 
reality officially recognized churches must deal with a variety of 
government entities, including the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor 
(for visas and residence permits for pastors and other staff) and the 
Kuwaiti Municipality (for building permits). While there reportedly is 
no official government ``list'' of recognized churches, seven Christian 
churches have at least some sort of official recognition that enables 
them to operate openly. These seven churches have open ``files'' at the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, allowing them to bring in the 
pastors and staff necessary to operate their churches. Further, by 
tradition three of the country's churches are recognized widely as 
enjoying ``full recognition'' by the Government and are allowed to 
operate compounds officially designated as churches: the Catholic 
Church (which includes two separate churches); the Anglican Church; and 
the National Evangelical Church of Kuwait (Protestant). The other four 
churches reportedly are allowed to operate openly, hire employees, 
invite religious speakers, etc. without interference from the 
Government, but their compounds are, according to government records, 
registered only as private homes. The churches themselves appear 
uncertain about the guidelines or procedures for recognition. Some have 
argued thatthese procedures purposely are kept vague by the Government 
to maintain the status quo. All other churches and religions have no 
legal status but are allowed to operate in private homes.
    The procedures for registration and licensing of religious groups 
also appear to be connected with government restrictions on NGO's, 
religious or otherwise. In 1993 all unlicensed organizations were 
ordered by the Council of Ministers to cease their activities, but this 
order has never been enforced. However, since that time, all but three 
applications by NGO's have been frozen. There were reports that in the 
last few years at least two groups have applied for permission to build 
their own churches, but the Government has not responded to their 
requests.
    There are many other Christian denominations in the country, with 
tens of thousands of members, which, while not recognized legally, are 
allowed to operate in private homes or in the facilities of recognized 
churches. Members of these congregations have reported that they are 
able to worship without government interference, provided that they do 
not disturb their neighbors and do not violate laws regarding assembly 
and proselytizing.
    Members of religions not sanctioned in the Koran, such as Hindus, 
Sikhs, Baha'is, and Buddhists, may not build places of worship but are 
allowed to worship privately in private homes without interference from 
the Government.
    Shi'a are free to conduct their traditional forms of worship 
without government interference. However, members of the Shi'a 
community claim that the Government has not approved the construction 
of Shi'a mosques in recent years.
    The Government prohibits missionaries from proselytizing among 
Muslims; however, they may serve non-Muslim congregations. The law 
prohibits organized religious education for religions other than Islam, 
although this law is not enforced rigidly. Informal religious 
instruction occurs inside private homes and on church compounds without 
government interference. However, there were reports that government 
``inspectors'' periodically visit public and private schools outside of 
church compounds to ensure that no religious teaching other than Islam 
takes place.
    The Government does not permit the establishment of non-Islamic 
publishing companies or training institutions for clergy. Nevertheless, 
several churches publish religious materials for use solely by their 
congregations. Further, some churches, in the privacy of their 
compounds, provide informal instruction to individuals interested in 
joining the clergy.
    A private company, the Book House Co., Ltd., is permitted to import 
significant amounts of Bibles and other religious materials for use 
solely among the congregations of the country's recognized Christian 
churches. The Book House Co. has an import license to bring in such 
materials, which also must be approved by government censors. There 
have been reports of private citizens having non-Islamic religious 
materials confiscated by customs officials upon arrival at the airport.
    Although there is a small community of Christian citizens, a law 
passed in 1980 prohibits the naturalization of non-Muslims. However, 
citizens who were Christians before 1980 (and children born to families 
of such citizens since that date), are allowed to transmit their 
citizenship to their children.
    According to the law, a non-Muslim male must convert to Islam when 
he marries a Muslim woman if the wedding is to be legal in Kuwait. A 
non-Muslim female does not have to convert to Islam to marry a Muslim 
male, but it is to her advantage to do so. Failure to convert may mean 
that, should the couple later divorce, the Muslim father would be 
granted custody of any children.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some limits on 
freedom of movement. Citizens have the right to travel freely within 
the country and to change their work place as desired. Unmarried women 
21 years old and over are free to obtain a passport and travel abroad 
at any time. However, married women who apply for passports must obtain 
their husbands' signature on the application form. Once she has a 
passport, a married woman does not need her husband's permission to 
travel, but he may prevent her departure from the country by placing a 
24-hour travel ban on her. He can do this by contacting the immigration 
authorities. After this 24-hour period, a court order is required if 
the husband still wishes to prevent his wife from leaving the country. 
All minor children must have their father's permission to travel 
outside of the country. Citizens are free to emigrate and to return. 
Security forces in Kuwait City occasionally set up checkpoints where 
they may detain individuals. The checkpoints are mainly forimmigration 
purposes and are used to apprehend undocumented aliens.
    The Government has the right to place a travel ban on any citizen 
or foreigner who has a legal case pending before the courts. The 
Government restricts the ability of members of NGO's to attend 
conferences abroad (see Section 2.b.).
    A serious problem exists in the case of the bidoon, stateless 
persons of mainly Iraqi or Iranian descent, who resided in Kuwait prior 
to the Iraqi invasion. Some bidoon have had residency ties to Kuwait 
for generations. Others entered the country during the oil boom years. 
There are an estimated 110,000 bidoon, down from a prewar level of 
220,000. The bidoon problem remains the subject of nearly continuous 
press commentary and political discussion. While many citizens count 
bidoon among their family members, a significant number believe that 
bidoon should not be eligible for citizenship and the benefits that it 
conveys. The Government maintains that many bidoon are concealing their 
true citizenship in order to remain in Kuwait, become citizens, and 
enjoy the generous benefits provided to citizens. The Government has 
made only limited progress towards solving the longstanding issue of 
the bidoon. In June the Government introduced a program to naturalize 
an estimated 11,000 bidoon. As part of this program, the remaining 
bidoon would be granted permanent residency status provided that they 
reveal their actual nationalities, although most claim to have no other 
nationality. The Government does not wish the return of the bidoon who 
departed the country during the 1990-91 Gulf War and frequently delays 
or denies issuing them entry visas. This policy imposes serious 
hardships, including family separations.
    Despite the highly publicized reconciliation with Yemen, Sudan, and 
Jordan, which supported Iraq during the war, the Government generally 
maintained its postwar policy of limiting the presence of persons from 
countries that supported Iraq, and there was no significant increase in 
the number of these countries' nationals living in the country. The 
number of such residents is now only about 10 percent of its prewar 
total. The Government instituted a policy in 1996 to route the 
residence permit renewals of these nationals through the State Security 
Service. While the rate of renewal denials has declined over the last 
year for these nationals, many, such as Palestinians and Iraqis, have 
no country to which they may return, or have fears of persecution upon 
return (see Section 5).
    While the Government permits the ICRC to verify if deportees object 
to returning to their countries of origin, it detains those with 
objections in the state security detention facility in Shuwaikh until 
they either change their mind or succeed in making alternative 
arrangements for travel to another country (see Section 1.d.).
    There is no legislation governing refugees, asylees, or first 
asylum, and no clear standard procedure for processing a person's claim 
to be a refugee. The Constitution prohibits the extradition of 
political refugees. The Government states that it does not deport 
anyone who claims a fear of persecution at home, but it often keeps 
such persons in detention rather than granting them permission to live 
and work in the country. The U.N. High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) 
maintains an office in the country and has access to refugees in 
detention. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens cannot change their head of state. Although under the 
Constitution the National Assembly must approve the Amir's choice of 
Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir), this authority is limited. If 
the Assembly rejects the Amir's nominee, the Amir then submits three 
names from which the Assembly must choose the new Crown Prince. Women 
and citizens naturalized for less than 20 years may not vote or seek 
election to the National Assembly. In November the Parliament vetoed 
the Amir's May decree on constitutional grounds. The decree had given 
women the right to vote, to seek election to the National Assembly 
beginning with the parliamentary election scheduled for 2003, and to 
hold cabinet office. Shortly thereafter, identical legislation was 
introduced by Members of Parliament. By a narrow two-vote margin, the 
bill was defeated. Members of parliament are prevented constitutionally 
from submitting similar legislation until the following session, which 
is scheduled to begin in October 2000. The Government may introduce 
similar or identical legislation at any point. Women's rights activists 
used the occasion of International Women's Day (March 8) to attempt to 
register as voters in two districts; they were unsuccessful. Members of 
the armed forces, police, and other uniformed personnel of the Ministry 
of Interior are prohibited from voting.
    Under the Constitution, the Amir holds executive power and shares 
legislative power with the National Assembly. The Prime Minister 
presides over a 16-member cabinet. In accordance with the practice of 
the ruling family (but not specifically the Constitution), the Prime 
Minister always has been the Crown Prince. The Constitution empowers 
the Amir to suspend its provisions and to rule by decree. The Amir 
dissolved the National Assembly from 1976-81, and in 1986 the Amir 
effectively dissolved the Assembly by suspending the constitutional 
provisions on the Assembly's election. The Assembly remained dissolved 
until 1992, when elections were held. Members serve 4-year terms, and 
National Assembly elections have been held on schedule. The elections 
have been conducted freely and fairly among the minority of citizens 
who are permitted to vote. Since the Government prohibits political 
parties, Assembly candidates must nominate themselves. Nonetheless, 
informal political groupings are active in the Assembly. The 
Constitution empowers the National Assembly to overturn any Amiri 
decrees made during the dissolution, and the Assembly has done so in 
some cases.
    In May the Amir dissolved the National Assembly in response to the 
political gridlock that emerged between Parliament and the Government. 
The Amir scheduled elections to take place 2 months later as specified 
in the Constitution; past dissolutions of the National Assembly (1976 
and 1981) were followed by extended periods of extraconstitutional rule 
without the required elections.
    Although the election campaign generally was free and fair, five 
parliamentary candidates were arrested and charged with unlawful 
slander against the Government. Four of those arrested received nominal 
fines, had their cases postponed, or were acquitted. While the 
candidates were not required to withdraw from the election, the fifth 
candidate withdrew, subsequently was convicted of the charges in July, 
and was sentenced to 6 months in prison (see Section 1.d.).
    In 1998 the National Assembly passed legislation that bans 
primaries previously conducted by religious sects and tribes. The 
National Assembly's objective in passing this legislation was to 
eliminate the process by which candidates were withdrawn from elections 
and votes concentrated on the remaining candidates from these groups.
    The Government attempted to enforce the ban on tribal primaries 
during the July elections. As a result, charges were filed against 
several hundred citizens. The Public Prosecutor also sought to lift the 
immunity of two newly elected Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) in order 
to charge them with violating the ban on tribal primaries. During its 
fall session, the National Assembly declined to lift the parliamentary 
immunity of the two charged M.P.'s.
    Women are disenfranchised and have little opportunity to influence 
government.
    Members of the Shi'a minority generally are underrepresented in 
high government positions. There is only one Shi'a member of the 
Cabinet, the Minister of Commerce. Six of 50 National Assembly members 
are Shi'a, as is the armed forces chief of staff.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government continued its practice of preventing the 
establishment of local human rights groups by not approving their 
requests for licenses (see Section 2.b.). It also continued to restrict 
the ability of NGO members to attend conferences abroad (see Sections 
2.b. and 2.d.). In May the Government announced a crackdown on 
unlicensed branches of NGO's (see Section 2.b.).
    Their members must obtain permission from the Ministry before 
attending international conferences. However, since 1985 the Ministry 
has issued only three licenses. The Ministry has disapproved other 
license requests on the grounds that previously established NGO's 
already provide services similar to those proposed by the petitioners 
(see Section 4).
    In May the Government announced a crackdown on unlicensed NGO's, 
whose activities it previously had overlooked, including unlicensed 
branches of Islamic charities, and required that they cease operations 
by mid-September.
    The Government permits international human rights organizations to 
visit the country and to establish offices. Several organizations 
conduct fieldwork and report excellent communication with and 
reasonable cooperation from the Government.
    The National Assembly has an active Human Rights Committee, which 
takes testimony from individuals about abuses,investigates prison 
conditions, and makes nonbinding recommendations for redress. Despite 
its designation as an advisory body, the Human Rights Committee has 
shown that, in practice, it is able to mobilize government agencies to 
address egregious human rights problems.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, national 
origin, language, or religion. However, laws and regulations 
discriminate in some cases against women and noncitizens, who face 
widespread social, economic, and legal discrimination.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. According to some 
local experts, domestic abuse of women occurs in an estimated 15 
percent of all marriages. Each of the country's 50 police stations 
receives approximately 1 to 2 complaints of spousal abuse each week, 
although this figure may be understated. Of the complaints received, 
approximately 60 percent involve spousal abuse of noncitizen women. The 
police and the courts generally seek to resolve family disputes 
informally and may ask the offending spouse to sign a statement 
affirming that he agrees to end the abuse. The police refer serious 
cases to the Psychiatric Department at the Ministry of Health. The 
courts have found husbands guilty of spousal abuse. There have been 
isolated instances of ``honor'' crimes; however, there is no provision 
in the Criminal Code that allows for leniency in such cases.
    Some employers physically abuse foreign women working as domestic 
servants, and there are continuing reports of rape of these women by 
male employers. The local press gives the problem considerable 
attention, and both the police and the courts have taken action against 
employers when presented with evidence of serious abuse. In August a 
Sri Lankan maid died after being beaten by her Kuwaiti employers. 
Police arrested her employers and after further investigation the case 
was sent to court for trial; action was still pending at year's end. In 
another case, a charge of murder was brought against a Kuwaiti woman 
who beat her Indian maid to death. The employer admitted to beating her 
maid in the past, but not to the point of injuring her. Foreign-born 
domestic employees have the right to sue their employers for abuse, but 
few do so due to both fear of deportation and fear that the judicial 
system is biased against them. The Government has designated a police 
station to investigate complaints and provide some shelter for runaway 
maids.
    Runaway servants often seek shelter at their country's embassy for 
either repatriation or a change in employers. At times during the year, 
the Philippine and Sri Lankan embassies each sheltered as many as 150 
women. Although most of these women sought shelter due to contractual 
or financial problems with their employers, many also alleged physical 
and sexual abuse. The Sri Lankan, Indian, and Philippine embassies all 
continue to report the steady occurrence of physical abuse and 
mistreatment involving domestic servants.
    Women experience legal and social discrimination. Women are denied 
the right to vote (see Section 3). Their testimony is not given equal 
weight to that of males in the Islamic courts (see Section 1.e.). 
Married women require their husbands' permission to obtain a passport 
(see Section 2.d.). By law only men are able to confer citizenship; 
therefore, children born to Kuwaiti mothers and stateless fathers are 
themselves stateless. The Government forbids marriage between Muslim 
women and non-Muslim men (see Section 1.f.). Inheritance is governed by 
Islamic law, which differs between Sunni and Shi'a. In the absence of a 
direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit all property while Sunni 
women inherit only a portion, with the balance divided among brothers, 
uncles, and male cousins of the deceased.
    Women traditionally are restrained from choosing certain roles in 
society, and the law restricts women from working in ``dangerous 
industries'' and trades ``harmful'' to health. However, almost all 
citizens work for the State in office jobs and women are allowed into 
most areas of the bureaucracy, including even oil well firefighting 
units. Educated women maintain that conservative religious trends limit 
career opportunities. Nonetheless, an estimated 33 percent of women of 
working age are employed. The law promises ``remuneration equal to that 
of a man provided she does the same work.'' This promise is respected 
in practice. Women work as doctors, engineers, lawyers, bankers, and 
professors. A few have been appointed to senior positions in the 
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Planning, the Foreign Ministry, 
and the state-owned Kuwaiti Petroleum Corporation. However, there are 
no female judges or prosecutors.
    In cases of divorce, the Government makes family entitlement 
payments to the divorced husband, who is expected by law and custom to 
provide for his children even though custody of minor children usually 
is given to the mother. The law discriminates against women married to 
foreign men. Such women are not entitled to government housing 
subsidies, which are available to male citizens. The law also requires 
women to pay residence fees for their husbands and does not recognize 
marriage as the basis for granting residency to foreign-born husbands. 
Instead, the law grants residency only if the husband is employed. By 
contrast Kuwaiti men married to foreign-born women do not have to pay 
residency fees for their spouses, and their spouses' right to residency 
derives from marriage.
    Polygyny is legal and is more common among tribal elements of the 
population. A husband is obliged to inform his first wife that he is 
taking a second wife. The husband is obligated to provide the first 
wife a separate household if that is her preference. It is the second 
wife's choice to get married. A first wife who objects to a second 
marriage can request a divorce, but the court's determination of 
divorce and child custody would be made on grounds other than the fact 
of the second marriage itself.
    There are several women's organizations that follow women's issues, 
among the most active of which are the Women's Socio-Cultural Society 
and the Women's Affairs Committee.
    Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children. 
Both boys and girls receive a free education to the university level. 
The Government provides free health care and a variety of other 
services to all children.
    Marriage of girls under the age of 17 is uncommon among the urban 
population, but remains a practice of the Bedouins in outlying areas.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no institutionalized 
discrimination against disabled persons in employment, education, or in 
the provision of state services. Legislation passed by the National 
Assembly in 1996 mandates accessibility for the disabled to all 
facilities frequented by the public, and provides an affirmative action 
employment program for the disabled. However, this law has not been 
implemented fully. The Government pays extensive benefits for disabled 
citizens, which cover transportation, housing, job training, and social 
welfare.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government's failure to 
improve the plight of the 110,000 bidoon remains a significant problem. 
The bidoon have been the objects of hostile government policy since the 
mid-1980's. Since 1985 the Government has eliminated the bidoon from 
the census rolls, discontinued their access to government jobs and free 
education, and sought to deport many bidoon. In 1993 the Government 
decreed that bidoon males no longer would be allowed to enlist in the 
military service. Those presently in the armed forces gradually are 
being replaced, although approximately 700 bidoon sons of citizen 
mothers were allowed to enlist during the year. The Government does not 
issue travel documents to bidoon routinely, and if bidoon travel 
abroad, they risk being barred from returning to the country unless 
they receive advance permission from the immigration authorities. 
Marriages pose special hardships because the offspring of male bidoon 
inherit the father's undetermined legal status.
    The Government introduced in June a program to naturalize an 
estimated 11,000 bidoon. The remaining bidoon (approximately 100,000) 
would be granted permanent residency status. Naturalization and 
assignment of permanent residency began with the onset of the program 
and are scheduled to be completed in June 2000. This program would 
confer citizenship on those persons who were accounted for in the 1965 
census but were over the age of 21 and whose parents naturalized, or 
who had a Kuwaiti mother and a non-Kuwaiti father who was absent. Those 
bidoon not accounted for by the 1965 census either personally or 
through a parent would be given civil identification cards and 
permanent residency that would grant them the right to work and to 
receive medical and educational benefits.
    The Government claims that it issues a residency visa and legal 
status to any bidoon who presents a passport, regardless of the country 
of issuance. This has led some bidoon to acquire passports from 
countries with which they have no affiliation, but which have liberal 
``economic citizenship'' programs, although this practice has declined 
sharply since 1997. There were no reports during the year that the 
Government denied residency visas to bidoon who obtained passports or 
that it unilaterallydecided the nationality of any stateless residents 
without a hearing.
    Since the end of the Gulf War, government policy has been targeted 
against workers from those nationalities whose leaders supported Iraq, 
especially Palestinians, Jordanians, and Yemenis. The Government has 
argued that during the Iraqi occupation, many of these workers' 
governments sided with the Iraqi forces. The Government has delayed or 
denied the issuance of work and residency permits to persons in these 
groups, and in many cases has hindered those workers who are permitted 
to reside in the country from sponsoring their families to join them. 
Many of these nationals also have resorted to the purchase of third 
country passports in order to gain entry to, or legalize their status 
in, the country. A government policy to route the residency visas of 
these nationals through the State Security Service had led to a sharp 
increase in renewal denials in the period immediately after the war 
(see Section 2.d.). During the year, diplomatic relations were restored 
with Yemen, Sudan, and Jordan; however, the Government generally 
maintained its postwar policy of limiting the presence of nationals 
from countries that supported Iraq, and there was no significant 
increase in the number of those countries' nationals living in the 
country (see Section 2.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right, but are not 
required, to join unions. Nonetheless, the Government restricts the 
right of association by prohibiting all workers from freely 
establishing trade unions. The law stipulates that workers may 
establish only one union in any occupational trade, and that the unions 
may establish only one federation. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO) long has criticized such restrictions.
    Approximately 50,000 persons (less than 5 percent) of a total work 
force estimated at 1,233,000 are organized in 14 unions, 12 of which 
are affiliated with the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF), the sole 
legal trade union federation. A proposed new labor law, which did not 
pass in 1998 and was the source of a KTUF complaint to the ILO that 
year, still had not been enacted by year's end. The KTUF took no 
further action during the year on its complaint. The Bank Worker's 
Union and the Kuwait Airways Workers Union, which consist of 
approximately 4,500 workers, are independent of the KTUF. The 
Government has shown no sign that it would accept the establishment of 
more than one legal trade union federation. The law stipulates that any 
new union must include at least 100 workers, of whom at least 15 must 
be citizens. Both the ILO and the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions have criticized this requirement because it discourages 
unions in sectors that employ few citizens, such as the construction 
industry and the domestic sector.
    The Government's pervasive oversight powers further erode union 
independence. The Government subsidizes as much as 90 percent of most 
union budgets, may inspect the financial records of any union, and 
prohibits any union from engaging in political or religious activities, 
which are defined vaguely. The law empowers the courts to dissolve any 
union for violating labor laws or for threatening ``public order and 
morals.'' Such a court decision may be appealed. The Amir also may 
dissolve a union by decree. By law the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labor is authorized to seize the assets of any dissolved union. The ILO 
has criticized this aspect of the law. Although no union has been 
dissolved, the law subordinates the legal existence of the unions to 
the power of the State.
    Approximately 1,027,000 foreign workers are employed in the 
country. They constitute over 80 percent of the work force but only 
about 10 percent of the unionized work force. The Labor Law 
discriminates against foreign workers by permitting them to join unions 
only after 5 years of residence, although the KTUF states that this 
requirement is not enforced and that foreigners may join unions 
regardless of their length of stay. In addition the law stipulates that 
foreigners may participate only as nonvoting members. Unlike union 
members who are citizens, foreign workers do not have the right to 
elect their leadership. The law requires that union officials must be 
citizens. The ILO has criticized the 5-year residency requirement and 
the denial of voting rights for foreign workers.
    The law limits the right to strike. It requires that all labor 
disputes must be referred to compulsory arbitration if labor and 
management cannot reach a solution (see Section 6.b.). The law does not 
have any provision ensuring strikers freedom from any legal or 
administrative action taken against them by the State. However, the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has proved responsive to sit-ins 
or protests by workers who face obvious wrongdoing by their employers.
    In July 1998, 300 Chinese workers struck in protest over delinquent 
payment of their salaries. A subsequent investigation revealed that the 
Chinese company had not forwarded payment to its employees. In 
negotiations held during the year, the Chinese Embassy and the Ministry 
of Social Affairs arranged for the employer to pay the workers' 
delinquent wages.
    Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The KTUF belongs to 
the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the formerly 
Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have 
the right to organize and bargain collectively, subject to certain 
restrictions (see Section 6.a.). These rights have been incorporated in 
the Labor Law and, according to all reports, have been respected in 
practice.
    The Labor Law provides for direct negotiations between employers 
and ``laborers or their representatives'' in the private sector. Most 
agreements are resolved in such negotiations; if not, either party may 
petition the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor for mediation. If 
mediation fails, the dispute is referred to a labor arbitration board 
composed of officials from the High Court of Appeals, the Attorney 
General's office, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.
    The Civil Service Law makes no provision for collective bargaining 
between government workers and their employer. Technically, wages and 
conditions of employment for civil service workers are established by 
the Government, but in practice, the Government sets the benefit scales 
after conducting informal meetings with officials from the civil 
service unions. Union officials resolve most issues at the working 
level and have regular access to other senior officials.
    The Labor Law prohibits antiunion discrimination. Any worker who 
alleges antiunion discrimination has the right to appeal to the 
judiciary. There were no reports of discrimination against employees 
based on their affiliation with a union. Employers found guilty of 
antiunion discrimination must reinstate workers fired for union 
activities.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced labor ``except in cases specified by law for national 
emergency and with just remuneration;'' however, some foreign workers 
are treated as indentured servants (see Section 6.e.). The Government 
does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but 
such practices are not known to occur.
    Foreign workers may not change their employment without permission 
from their original sponsors unless they have been in the country for 
over 2 years. Domestic servants particularly are vulnerable to abuses 
from this practice because they are not protected by the Labor Law. In 
many cases, employers exercise control over their servants by holding 
their passports, although the Government prohibits this practice and 
has acted to retrieve passports of maids involved in disputes.
    Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled South 
Asian workers, live much like indentured servants. They frequently face 
poor working conditions and some physical abuse (see Section 6.e.).
    Domestic servants who run away from their employers may be treated 
as criminals under the law. However, the authorities usually do not 
enforce this provision of the law. In some reported cases, employers 
illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to cover the costs 
involved in bringing them to Kuwait. There are also credible reports of 
widespread visa trading, a system by which sponsors agree to extend 
their sponsorship to workers outside of the country in exchange for a 
fee of $1,500 to $1,800. Middlemen, generally foreigners, use the 
promise of Kuwaiti sponsorship to attract workers from economically 
depressed countries, taking a commission and remitting the rest to the 
nominal Kuwaiti sponsor. Once in Kuwait, such workers are farmed out to 
the informal sector or find employment with parties that would 
otherwise be unable to sponsor them. However, foreign workers who are 
recruited with these traded visas not only face possible prosecution 
for being engaged in illegal employment (that is, working for an 
employer other than their sponsor) but also leave themselves extremely 
vulnerable to extortion by employers, sponsors, and middlemen. 
Government efforts to address such abuses have failed to achieve 
significant progress.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The legal minimum age is 18 years for all forms of work, 
both full- and part-time. Employers may obtain permits from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to employ juveniles between the 
ages of 14 and 18 in certain trades. Education is compulsory for 
children between the ages of 6 and 15. The Government does not prohibit 
forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known 
to occur (see Section 6.c.). Some small businessmen employ their 
children on a part-time basis, and there have been confirmed reports 
that some South Asian and Southeast Asian domestic servants are under 
age 18, but that they had falsified their ages in order to enter the 
country.
    Juveniles may work a maximum of 6 hours a day on the condition that 
they work no more than 4 consecutive hours followed by a 1-hour rest 
period.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Labor is responsible for enforcing all labor laws. An informal two-
tiered labor market ensures high wages for Kuwaiti employees, most of 
whom are in government white collar or business executive positions, 
while foreign workers, particularly unskilled laborers, receive 
substantially lower wages. There is no legal minimum wage in the 
private sector. In the public sector, the effective minimum wage is 
approximately $742 (226 dinars) a month for citizens and approximately 
$296 (90 dinars) a month for noncitizens. The public-sector minimum 
wage provides a decent standard of living for a worker and family. 
Wages of unskilled workers in the private sector do not always permit a 
decent standard of living for a worker and family. To be eligible to 
sponsor family members for residency, government workers must receive a 
minimum wage of $1,480 (450 dinars) a month, and private-sector workers 
must make at least $2,135 (650 dinars) a month.
    The Labor Law establishes general conditions of work for both the 
public and the private sectors, with the oil industry treated 
separately. The Civil Service Law also prescribes additional conditions 
for the public sector. The Labor Law limits the standard workweek to 48 
hours with 1 full day of rest per week, provides for a minimum of 14 
workdays of leave each year, and establishes a compensation schedule 
for industrial accidents. Domestic servants, who are excluded 
specifically from the private sector Labor Law, frequently work long 
hours, greatly in excess of 48 hours.
    The ILO has urged the Government to ensure the weekly 24-
consecutive-hour rest period to temporary workers employed for a period 
of less than 6 months and workers in enterprises employing fewer than 
five persons. The law pertaining to the oil industry provides for a 40-
hour workweek, 30 days of annual leave, and sick leave. Laws 
establishing work conditions are not applied uniformly to foreign 
workers.
    Employers often exploit workers' willingness to accept substandard 
conditions. Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled 
South Asian workers, live much like indentured servants, are unaware of 
their legal rights, and generally lack the means to pursue a legal 
remedy. They frequently face contractual disputes, poor working 
conditions, and some physical abuse (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Most are 
in debt to their employers before they arrive in the country and have 
little choice but to accept the employer's conditions, even if they 
contradict the contractual terms. It is not uncommon for wages to be 
withheld for a period of months. Many foreign workers are forced to 
live in ``housing camps,'' which generally are overcrowded and lack 
adequate cooking and bathroom facilities. The workers only are allowed 
off the camp compound on company transport or by permission of the 
employer. Foreign workers' ability to change their employment is 
limited, and, in some cases, employers' possession of foreign workers' 
passports allows them to exercise control over such employees (see 
Section 6.c.).
    The Labor Law discriminates against foreign workers by limiting 
their ability to join unions (see Section 6.a.). The KTUF administers 
an Expatriate Labor Office, which is authorized to investigate 
complaints of foreign laborers and provide them with free legal advice. 
However, these services are not utilized widely. Any foreign worker may 
submit a grievance to the labor office regardless of union status.
    In March approximately 300 Bangladeshi cleaners initiated a protest 
over unpaid wages and poor living conditions. The workers, who had not 
been paid for 8 months, filed a case against their employer with the 
Labor Court of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The case finally was 
resolved in August when the workers were repatriated to Bangladesh with 
4 months worth of back wages. The repatriations were financed out of 
the forfeited employer's deposit with the Ministry of Social Affairs. 
An estimated 7,000 unskilled Egyptian workers rioted in the Kleitan 
neighborhood of Kuwait City on October 30-31. The riot reportedly was 
sparked when an initial altercation between an Egyptian and a 
Bangladeshi was broken up by the police and only the Egyptian was 
arrested. The initial rioting was suppressed by Ministry of Interior 
riot police who used tear gas to disperse the crowd. However, rioting 
broke out again the following day, and the riot police backed by 
special forces sealed off the neighborhood and restored calm. The 
police made up to 2,500 arrests. Most of those arrested were released 
the following day. An estimated 20 individuals were detained for a 
longer period and subsequently 4 were charged. There were no serious 
injuries; however, there were reports of isolated instances of the use 
of excessive force.
    The Labor Law provides for employer-provided medical care and 
compensation to workers disabled by injury or disease due to job-
related causes. The law also requires that employers provide periodic 
medical examinations to workers exposed to environmental hazards on the 
job, such as chemicals and asbestos. The Government has issued 
occupational health and safety standards; however, compliance and 
enforcement appear poor, especially with respect to unskilled foreign 
laborers. To cut accident rates, the Government periodically inspects 
installations to raise awareness among workers and employers, and to 
ensure that they abide by the safety rules, control the pollution 
resulting from certain dangerous industries, train workers who use new 
machines in specialized institutes, and report violations. Workers have 
the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without 
jeopardy to their continued employment, and legal protection exists for 
workers who file complaints about such conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                LEBANON

    Lebanon is a parliamentary republic in which, based on the 
unwritten ``National Pact of 1943,'' the President is a Maronite 
Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the 
Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim. The Parliament consists of 128 
deputies, equally divided between Christian and Muslim representatives. 
President Emile Lahoud took office in November 1998 after an election 
heavily influenced by Syria. The judiciary is independent in principle 
but is subject to political pressure.
    Non-Lebanese military forces control much of the country. These 
include about 25,000 Syrian troops, a contingent of approximately 2,000 
Israeli Army regulars and 1,500 Israeli-supported militiamen in the 
south, and several armed Palestinian factions located in camps and 
subject to restrictions on their movements. All undermine the authority 
of the central Government and prevent the application of law in the 
patchwork of areas not under the Government's control. In 1991 the 
governments of Syria and Lebanon concluded a security agreement that 
provided a framework for security cooperation between their armed 
forces. However, an undetermined number of Syrian military intelligence 
personnel in Lebanon continue to conduct their activities independently 
of the agreement.
    In 1989 the Arab League brokered a peace settlement at Taif, Saudi 
Arabia, to end the civil war in Lebanon. According to the Taif Accord, 
Syrian troops were to be redeployed from their positions in Lebanon's 
coastal population areas to the Biqa' Valley, with full withdrawal 
contingent upon the fulfillment of other aspects of the Taif Accord and 
subsequent agreement by both the Lebanese and Syrian governments. 
Although the Syrian Government has refused to carry out this partial 
redeployment, strong Syrian influence over Lebanese politics and 
decisionmakers makes officials unwilling to press for a complete 
withdrawal, and no Lebanese government since the Taif Accord has 
requested formally the withdrawal of Syrian forces. The Government's 
relationship with Syria does not reflect the will of most Lebanese 
citizens.
    Israel exerts control in and near its self-proclaimed ``security 
zone'' in south Lebanon through direct military action and support for 
its surrogate, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). With the tacit support of 
the Government, the Iranian-backed Shi'a Muslim faction Hizballah, and, 
to a much lesser extent, the Lebanese Shi'a group Amal and some 
Palestinian guerrillas continue to be locked in a cycle of attack and 
counterattack with Israeli and SLA troops. Palestinian groups operate 
autonomously in refugee camps throughout the country. During the year, 
the Government continued to consolidate its authority in those parts of 
the country under its control and continued to take tentative steps to 
exert its authority in the Biqa' Valley and Beirut's southern suburbs. 
However, it did not attempt to reassert state control over the 
Palestinian camps or to disarm Hizballah and the SLA.
    The security forces consist of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), 
which may arrest and detain suspects on national security grounds; the 
Internal Security Forces (ISF), which enforce laws, conduct searches 
and arrests, and refer cases to the judiciary; and the State Security 
Apparatus and the Surete Generale, both of which collect information on 
groups deemed a possible threat to state security. The Surete Generale 
is responsible for the issuance of passports and residency permits, the 
screening and censoring of foreign periodicals, plays, documentaries, 
television programs, and movies, and the censoring of those parts that 
address national security issues and ``morale.'' The security forces 
committed serious human rights abuses.
    Before the 1975-90 hostilities, Lebanon was an important regional 
financial and commercial center. There is a market-based economy in 
which the majority of the private- sector work force is employed in the 
services sector, such as banking and commerce. There is a small 
industrial sector, based largely on clothing manufacture and food 
processing. The annual gross national product is estimated to be 
approximately $5,000 per capita. A reconstruction effort, begun in 
1992, is moving forward. Substantial remittances from abroad offset the 
trade deficit and resulted in a balance of payment surplus.
    The Government's overall human rights record was poor, and serious 
problems remain, although there were some improvements in a few areas. 
The right of citizens to change their Government remains restricted by 
the lack of government control over parts of the country, shortcomings 
in the electoral system, and Syrian influence. Although the 1996 
parliamentary elections represented a step forward, the electoral 
process was flawed, as the elections were not prepared or carried out 
impartially. Members of the security forces used excessive force and 
tortured and abused some detainees. Prison conditions remained poor. 
Government abuses also included the arbitrary arrest and detention of 
persons who opposed government policies. Lengthy pretrial detention and 
long delays in trials are problems, and the courts are subject to 
political pressure. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights, and continued surveillance of political activities during the 
year. The Government partially limited press freedom by continuing to 
restrict radio and television broadcasting in a discriminatory manner. 
Journalists practice self-censorship. The Government continued to 
restrict freedom of assembly, and imposes some limits on freedom of 
association. The Government imposes limits on freedom of movement. 
Violence and discrimination against women; abuse of children; 
discrimination against Palestinians; forced labor, including by 
children; child labor; and the mistreatment of foreign servants are 
problems.
    Artillery and aerial attacks by the various contending forces in 
parts of south Lebanon threaten life and property. These forces 
continue to commit abuses, including killings, bombings, and 
abductions. The SLA maintains a separate and arbitrary system of 
justice in the Israeli-controlled zone, which is independent of 
Lebanese central authority. During the year, SLA officials arbitrarily 
arrested, mistreated, and detained persons, and regularly expelled 
local residents from their homes in the zone. Palestinian groups in 
refugee camps maintain a separate, often arbitrary, system of justice 
for other Palestinians. Palestinians sometimes may appeal for legal 
recourse to Lebanese authorities, often through their agents in the 
camps. There were reports that members of the various groups that 
control the camps detained their Palestinian rivals and, in some 
instances, killed them.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or extrajudicial killings by government 
authorities during the year.
    The judicial system continues to suffer from a backlog of hearings 
into cases of death in custody, some as old as 5 years. These cases 
involve some individuals connected to political groups and some accused 
of criminal activity. There were no developments in the 1994 death of 
Tareq Hassaniyeh, whoallegedly was beaten to death by authorities in 
the Bayt Al-Din prison, nor in the 1994 death of Fawzi Al-Racy, who 
died while in the custody of the Ministry of Defense. The Government no 
longer is pursuing the cases.
    On June 8, unidentified gunmen shot and killed four judges at the 
Justice Palace in Sidon. The Government did not apprehend the 
perpetrators but believes that they belong to the outlawed Palestinian 
radical Islamic group ``Esbat Al-Ansar,'' which is led by fugitive 
Ahmad Abed Al-Karim Al-Sa'di (also known as Abu Mahjin). The gunmen 
were believed to be hiding in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ein Al-
Hilweh at year's end.
    In May an official of the Fatah faction of the Palestinian 
Liberation Organization (PLO), Amin Kayed, and his wife were killed in 
a drive-by shooting near Ein Al-Hilweh.
    In August the coordinator of the Islamic Militia Operation in south 
Lebanon, Ali Deeb, was killed in Sidon, in a roadside bomb explosion.
    A military tribunal sentenced Captain Camille Yared to 10 years in 
prison and 4 Lebanese Forces militiamen to death in absentia for 
carrying out a 1996 bus bombing in Syria, which killed 11 persons, as 
well as other bombings. The court also sentenced 13 other Lebanese 
Forces members to 7 years in prison. A court hearing in the appeal made 
by the accused is scheduled for February 20, 2000. In June a court 
sentenced former Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja' to life in prison, 
and three Lebanese Forces militiamen to death in absentia, for killing 
former Prime Minister Rashid Karami in 1987 (see Section 1.e.).
    A court hearing in the appeal made by the prosecutor's office 
regarding the 1976 killing of U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy, Embassy 
officer Robert Waring, and their driver, Zohair Moghrabi has not been 
scheduled following a court verdict declaring the suspect, Tawfiq 
Mohammad Farroukh, not guilty of murder for his role in the killings.
    There were no developments in the 1996 beating death of Akram 
Arbeed, who allegedly was attacked while accompanying a candidate in 
the 1996 parliamentary election. The case still is pending.
    An estimated 50 Islamic resistance guerrillas, 13 Israeli soldiers, 
27 Lebanese civilians, and 2 Israeli civilians were killed in south 
Lebanon during the year, as Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian guerrillas 
on the one hand, and Israeli forces and the SLA on the other, engaged 
in recurring violence. For example, on June 22, Hizballah launched 
rocket attacks against northern Israel, which killed two Israeli 
civilians, in retaliation for Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) shelling of 
a Lebanese village. Israeli forces conducted repeated air strikes and 
artillery barrages on Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian targets, 
including civilian infrastructure, inside Lebanon. For example, on June 
24, 9 Lebanese were killed and 50 to 80 wounded in Israeli air raids, 
which also targeted civilian infrastructure, including electric power 
transformer stations and power lines in the Beirut area, Baalbek, and 
Bint Jubayl, and bridges along the main coastal highway at Damour, 
Sidon, and Tyre.
    There were over 200 civilian injuries during the year, with most of 
the injuries involving minor wounds from shrapnel and broken glass. 
Citizens accounted for over 90 percent of the injured and Lebanese 
armed groups were responsible for some 23 percent of all injured 
civilians.
    In south Lebanon, there is an average of two or three attacks daily 
against IDF and SLA military positions with a similar number of IDF and 
SLA counterattacks.
    The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group continued to deal with alleged 
violations of the 1996 understanding between Israel and Hizballah not 
to target civilians or to launch attacks from civilian-populated areas.
    On October 3, one person was killed when a bomb exploded in a 
Maronite church in an eastern Beirut suburb. There were no arrests made 
in connection with the case by year's end.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances. The Government has taken no judicial action against 
groups known to be responsible for the kidnapings of thousands of 
persons during the war between 1975 and 1990. In August Prime Minister 
Hoss established a military commission to investigate the fate of all 
those who disappeared during the war.
    The whereabouts of Boutros Khawand, who allegedly was abducted by 
Syrian forces in 1992, remain unknown; he is presumed to be held in 
Syria (see Section 1.d.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Torture is not banned specifically by the Constitution, 
and there continued to be credible reports that security forces abused 
detainees and, in some instances, used torture. Human rights groups 
report that torture is a common practice. There also were credible 
reports that military intelligence officials used harsh interrogation 
procedures, including torture, on former members of the Lebanese 
Forces. Violent abuse usually occurs during the preliminary 
investigations that are conducted at police stations or military 
installations, where suspects are interrogated in the absence of an 
attorney.
    In early October at a Greenpeace demonstration in the town of 
Selaata, LAF soldiers fired shots over the heads of protesters and beat 
them with their rifle butts. President Lahoud criticized the soldiers' 
behavior and called for an investigation. The soldiers were reprimanded 
officially (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
    In June violent clashes broke out between the ISF and angry 
residents of Jnah (in the southern Beirut suburbs) after officials from 
the Ministry of Displaced Affairs attempted to enter the area to 
measure houses and buildings prior to their demolition. Twenty-four 
persons, including 4 ISF personnel, reportedly were injured.
    Abuses occurred in areas outside the state's authority, including 
the Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year that 
members of the various groups that control the camps detained their 
Palestinian rivals.
    In May Fatah official Jamal Dayekh lost both his legs in a booby-
trapped car explosion in Sidon.
    Prison conditions are poor and do not meet minimum international 
standards. The Ministry of Interior operates 18 prisons with a total 
capacity of 2,000 inmates. However, prisons are overcrowded, with a 
total population of nearly 5,000. Inmates lack heat, adequate toilet 
facilities, and proper medical care. The Government has not budgeted 
funds to overhaul the prison system. However, some efforts were made by 
other groups to improve conditions in Roumieh prison. For example, the 
Bar Association financed the renovation of two prison meeting rooms to 
allow lawyers to meet their clients in decent conditions and without 
having to obtain prior authorization. Inmates at Roumieh prison 
participated in vocational activities such as English-language courses 
and embroidery courses in order to provide them with skills upon 
release.
    The Surete Generale, which mans border posts, operates a detention 
facility. Hundreds of foreigners, mostly Egyptians and Sri Lankans, are 
detained there pending deportation. They reportedly are held in small, 
poorly ventilated cells.
    Former Lebanese forces leader Samir Ja'Ja', who is serving four 
life sentences for the murders of various political figures during and 
after the civil war, is kept in solitary confinement in a basement 
prison. He is permitted to exercise and receive occasional visits from 
his family and his lawyers. Government officials stated that his 
solitary confinement is necessary for his own protection.
    Local journalists and human rights organizations had access to 
certain prisons during the year. Access to those prisons controlled by 
the Ministry of Defense was not given.
    Hizballah detains and reportedly mistreats SLA members and 
suspected agents at unknown locations. The SLA operates its own 
detention facility, Al-Khiam prison, and there are frequent allegations 
of torture and mistreatment of detainees. Hizballah and the SLA 
occasionally release and exchange prisoners.
    Hizballah does not permit prison visits by human rights monitors. 
The SLA continued to allow representatives of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and family members of inmates to 
visit detainees at Al-Khiam prison.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government uses 
arbitrary arrest and detention. The law requires security forces to 
obtain warrants before making arrests; however, military prosecutors, 
who are responsible for cases involving the military as well as those 
involving espionage, treason, weapons possession, and draft evasion, 
make arrests without warrants. Arresting officers are required torefer 
a subject to a prosecutor within 24 hours of arrest, but frequently do 
not do so.
    The law requires the authorities to release suspects after 48 hours 
of arrest if no formal charges are brought against them. Some 
prosecutors flout this requirement and detain suspects for long periods 
in pretrial confinement without a court order. The law authorizes 
judges to remand suspects to incommunicado detention for 10 days with a 
possible extension for an additional 10 days. Bail is available only to 
those accused of petty crimes, not to those accused of felonies. 
Defendants have the right to legal counsel, but there is no state-
funded public defender's office. The Bar Association operates an office 
for those who cannot afford a lawyer, and the court panel has on many 
occasions asked the Bar Association to appoint lawyers for defendants.
    Security forces continued the practice of arbitrary arrest. 
Security forces detained and interrogated scores of citizens, 
predominately Christian supporters of ousted General Michel 'Awn, and 
of the jailed commander of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Ja'Ja'. These 
detentions and searches of homes took place without warrants, and 
detainees claim that they were not given access to lawyers. Most 
detainees were released after they were forced to sign documents 
stating they would abstain from politics.
    During the year, the Government launched an anticorruption drive. 
Several former senior government officials were arrested on charges of 
embezzlement, misuse of power, and bribery. They all were detained for 
prolonged periods of time, in violation of the law. Most of those 
arrested were released on bail or the charges were dropped. However, 
the Minister of Petroleum, who was arrested in March on charges of 
embezzlement, remains in detention and has yet to be indicted.
    On March 14, authorities detained students from the ``National Free 
Current,'' a group that supports 'Awn, for distributing antigovernment 
and anti-Syria leaflets (see Section 2.b.).
    There were no allegations during the year of the transfer of 
Lebanese citizens by Lebanese authorities to Syria. The number of 
Lebanese detainees remaining in Syria is uncertain; however, former 
President Elias Hrawi estimated that some 210 persons were in Syrian 
custody in 1996. Some 90 prisoners reportedly are still in Syrian 
jails. In 1997 Syria transferred 121 prisoners, most of whom had been 
held in Syrian jails since the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in 
1975, to the Lebanese authorities. Amnesty International (AI) reported 
that ``hundreds of Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians have been 
arbitrarily arrested, some over 2 decades ago, and remain in prolonged 
and often secret detention in Syria.'' According to AI, Syrian forces 
operating in Lebanon carried out searches, arrests, and detentions of 
Lebanese nationals outside of any legal framework.
    The authorities often detain without charge for short periods of 
time political opponents of the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Abuses 
occurred in areas outside the state's authority, including the 
Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year that 
members of the various groups that control the camps detained their 
Palestinian rivals.
    Local militias and non-Lebanese forces continued to conduct 
arbitrary arrests in areas outside central government control. The SLA 
detains an estimated 140 citizens and an undetermined number of 
Palestinians at Al-Khiam prison in the south, although the number 
changes daily as persons are detained and others are released. Sheikh 
Abbas Mohsen, who was abducted from his home in Kafr Kila in November 
1998, remains in detention in Al-Khiam prison.
    During the year, 95 prisoners were released from Al-Khiam prison. 
The remains of 16 prisoners also were released.
    Palestinian refugees are subject to arrest, detention, and 
harassment by state security forces, Syrian forces, various militias, 
and rival Palestinians.
    Israel holds 41 Lebanese citizens, including Sheikh Abed Al-Karim 
Obaid and Mustafa Dirani, figures associated with Hizballah.
    Exile as a form of punishment is not practiced regularly, although 
in 1991 the Government pardoned former army commander General Michel 
'Awn and two of his aides on the condition that they depart country and 
remain in exile for 5 years. 'Awn was accused of usurping power. He 
remains in France.
    Former President Amine Gemayel, who has lived in France for the 
past 10 years, has not been able to return to Lebanon and still resides 
in Paris. Gemayel planned to return to the country butwas warned by the 
Government through unofficial channels not to return.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent in 
principle, but is subject to political pressure. The Constitution 
provides for a constitutional council to supervise the 
constitutionality of laws and stipulates that judges shall be 
independent in the exercise of their duties; however, influential 
politicians and Syrian intelligence officers sometimes intervene to 
protect their supporters from prosecution.
    The judicial system is composed of the regular civilian courts; the 
Military Court, which tries cases involving military personnel and 
military-related issues; the Judicial Council, which tries national 
security offenses, and the tribunals of the various religious 
affiliations, which adjudicate family disputes, including marriage, 
inheritance, and personal status.
    The Judicial Council is a permanent tribunal of five senior judges 
that adjudicates threats to national security. On the recommendation of 
the Minister of Justice, the Cabinet decides whether to try a case 
before this tribunal. Verdicts from this tribunal are irrevocable and 
may not be appealed.
    The Ministry of Justice appoints judges according to a formula 
based on the religious affiliation of the prospective judge. A shortage 
of judges has impeded efforts to adjudicate cases backlogged during the 
years of internal conflicts. Trial delays also are caused by the 
Government's inability to conduct investigations in areas outside its 
control. Defendants have the right to examine evidence against them. 
The testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man.
    The trial of former Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja' was 
considered by the media and human rights groups to be fair. The 
Judicial Council sentenced Ja'Ja' to life in prison and three Lebanese 
Forces militiamen to death in absentia for assassinating former Prime 
Minister Rashid Karami in 1987. The court also sentenced LAF Brigadier 
General Khalil Matar to 10 years in prison for his involvement in the 
assassination. The trial was public and the defense had access to all 
files and documents. However, following the trial, the military 
prosecutor asked the Bar Association to lift the immunity of defense 
lawyer Karim Pakradouni. The Government accused Pakradouni of having 
contacts with Israel during the civil war. The Association refused the 
request, which it considered to be intimidation of Pakradoudni because 
of his role as defense counsel in the trial.
    On June 8, unidentified gunmen shot and killed four judges at the 
Justice Palace in Sidon (see Section 1.a.).
    In July the Government began trying some 220 SLA militiamen from 
the town of Jezzine who turned themselves over to the Government 
following the June SLA withdrawal from Jezzine. The militiamen have 
been tried on less serious charges than ``collaboration with the 
enemy,'' which carries the death penalty. The average sentence passed 
down by the military tribunal was 1 year. Human rights groups and 
international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) believe that the 
trials have been fair, procedurally correct, and open.
    Hizballah applies Islamic law in areas under its control. 
Palestinian groups in refugee camps operate an autonomous and arbitrary 
system of justice. The SLA maintains a separate and arbitrary system of 
justice.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--While the authorities generally show little interest 
in controlling the personal lives of citizens, they readily interfere 
with the privacy of persons regarded as foes of the Government. Laws 
require that prosecutors obtain warrants before entering houses except 
when the army is in hot pursuit of an armed attacker; however, in 
practice the law is not respected.
    The Government and Syrian intelligence services use informer 
networks and monitor telephones to gather information on their 
adversaries. The Army Intelligence service monitors the movements and 
activities of members of opposition groups (see Section 2.b). The 
Government concedes that telephone calls are monitored by security 
services, but claims that monitoring occurs only with the prior 
authorization of the competent judicial authorities. The joint 
parliamentary commission that was formed by the speaker in 1997 to 
investigate telephone wiretapping concluded its investigation in 1998, 
and itsfindings were made public in September. The report stated that 
the monitoring of cellular phone conversations most likely occurs, but 
did not confirm the practice.
    In September parliamentary hearings were held amid widespread 
public debate on the Government's use of electronic surveillance of the 
telephone lines of politicians and private citizens. The Speaker of 
Parliament, the Minister of Interior, and the Surete Generale Director 
General publicly acknowledged that government eavesdropping exists. 
Politicians and human rights advocates reported increasing and more 
overt government intelligence services' surveillance of political 
meetings and political activities across the religious and political 
spectrum. In October the Parliament passed a law that authorized 
surveillance in national security and law enforcement cases, but banned 
its use against ministers and parliamentary deputies.
    Militias and non-Lebanese forces operating outside the area of 
central government authority frequently have violated citizens' privacy 
rights. Various factions also use informer networks and monitor 
telephones to obtain information on their adversaries.
    On January 8, SLA forces reportedly expelled 25 members of the 
Nab'a family, including 16 children, from their home village of Shab'a, 
located in Israel's self-declared security zone. On May 4, SLA forces 
reportedly expelled three Lebanese citizens from the village of Bint 
Jubayl. The SLA also expelled two Lebanese women and four children from 
the Shab'a village on July 16.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of the press, but the Government partially limits this right in 
practice, particularly by intimidating journalists and broadcasters 
into practicing self-censorship. In 1998 the Government rescinded a 
total ban on satellite news but continued to ban live satellite 
broadcasts of political talk shows and to censor television broadcasts 
on a case-by-case basis.
    Lebanon has a long history of freedom of opinion, speech, and the 
press. Although there were repeated attempts to restrict these freedoms 
during the year, daily criticism of government policies and leaders 
continued. Dozens of newspapers and hundreds of periodicals are 
published throughout the country, financed by various local and foreign 
groups. While the press is normally independent, press content often 
reflects the opinions of these financial backers.
    The Government has several tools at its disposal to control freedom 
of expression. The Surete Generale is authorized to approve all foreign 
magazines and nonperiodical works including plays, books, and films 
before they are distributed in the market. The law prohibits attacks on 
the dignity of the Head of State or foreign leaders. The Government may 
prosecute offending journalists and publications in the Publications 
Court, a special court empowered to try such matters.
    Moreover, the 1991 security agreement between Lebanon and Syria 
contains a provision that effectively prohibits the publication of any 
information deemed harmful to the security of either state. In view of 
the risk of prosecution, Lebanese journalists censor themselves on 
matters related to Syria.
    During the year, the Government did not bring charges against any 
newspaper. President Lahoud publicly announced that under his tenure no 
charges would be brought against any journalist because of his writings 
or opinions. However, the Minister of Information banned a book 
entitled ``From Israel to Damascus,'' authored by Robert Hatem, who 
made detailed allegations about a former minister and ex-militia 
figure's activities during and after the civil war years.
    In early October at a Greenpeace demonstration in the town of 
Selaata, LAF soldiers fired shots over the heads of the protesters and 
beat them with their rifle butts. Journalists' cameras and film were 
confiscated. President Lahoud criticized the soldiers' behavior and 
called for an investigation. Those soldiers responsible for the abuse 
were reprimanded officially by their superiors (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.b.).
    A court hearing still is pending in the case of An-Nahar journalist 
Pierre Attallah, who was charged in absentia in June 1998 for defaming 
the judiciary and entering Israel.
    In September Marcel Khalife, a leading singer and songwriter, was 
accused with insulting Islam for incorporating lines from a poem based 
on verses from the Koran into a song he recorded in 1995. An indictment 
was issued charging the singer with blasphemy. Most political and 
religious leaders, with theexception of the Sunni Mufti, criticized 
this action. Khalife was acquitted of the charges on December 15.
    In October the Surete Generale informed Lebanese filmmaker Ronda 
Shahal Sabbag that 47 minutes would have to be cut from her 90-minute 
film, ``Civilisees,'' in order to gain government approval for 
screening to general audiences. The Government claimed that the 
offending passages contained inappropriate language and scenes that the 
censors deemed ``inflammatory'' against Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and 
Islam.
    The country has a strong tradition of academic freedom and a 
flourishing private educational system (a result of inadequate public 
schools and a preference for religious community affiliation). Students 
exercise the right to form campus associations, and the Government 
usually does not interfere with student groups.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the 
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, the Government restricts 
this right. Any group that wishes to organize a rally must obtain the 
prior approval of the Interior Ministry, which does not render 
decisions consistently. In December 1998, the Government lifted its 
long-standing decree banning all demonstrations. Various political 
factions such as Amal, Hizballah, 'Awnists, and supporters of former 
Prime Minister Hariri held several rallies.
    On March 14, students from the ``National Free Current,'' a group 
that supports exiled General Michel 'Awn, distributed antigovernment 
and anti-Syria leaflets. The authorities arrested 21 students and 
transported them to LAF interrogation centers. The 21 were released 
shortly thereafter, but two were referred to the military tribunal and 
charged with resisting the security forces. The military later 
considered the charge a civil offense and dropped the charges.
    In early October, at a Greenpeace demonstration in the town of 
Selaata, LAF soldiers fired shots over the heads of soldiers and beat 
them with rifle butts. President Lahoud criticized the soldiers' 
behavior and called for an investigation (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the 
Government generally respects this right and does not interfere with 
the establishment of private organizations; however, the law requires 
organizations to obtain from the Ministry of Interior a receipt, which 
is essentially a permit, and may be withheld by the Ministry.
    The Ministry of Interior scrutinizes requests to establish 
political movements or parties and to some extent monitors their 
activities. The army Intelligence Service monitors the movements and 
activities of members of opposition groups (see Section 1.f.).
    Neither Israel nor Syria allows groups considered openly hostile to 
operate in areas under their control.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The State 
is required to ensure the free exercise of all religious rites with the 
caveat that public order not be disturbed. The Constitution also 
provides that the personal status and religious interests of the 
population be respected. The Government permits recognized religions to 
exercise authority over matters pertaining to personal status such as 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance. There is no state religion; 
however, politics are based on the principle of religious 
representation, which has been applied to every conceivable aspect of 
public life.
    A group that seeks official recognition must submit its dogma and 
moral principles for government review to ensure that they do not 
contradict popular values and the Constitution. The group must ensure 
that the number of its adherents is sufficient to secure its 
continuity. Alternatively, religious groups may apply to obtain 
recognition through existing religious groups. Official recognition 
conveys certain benefits, such as tax-exempt status and the right to 
apply the religion's codes to personal status matters. The Government 
requires religious affiliation to be encoded on national identity 
cards.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice; 
however, there are some limitations. Travel to Israel is prohibited by 
law but commonly occurs via Israeli-occupied territory in southern 
Lebanon. Allmales between 18 and 21 years of age are subject to 
compulsory military service and are required to register at a 
recruitment office and obtain a travel authorization document before 
leaving the country. Husbands can block travel by their wives and minor 
children (see Section 5).
    The LAF and Syrian troops maintain checkpoints in areas under their 
control. In south Lebanon, the Lebanese Army, the Israeli Army, and the 
SLA maintain tight restrictions on the movement of people and goods in 
and out of Israel's self-declared security zone. In June the SLA 
conducted a redeployment and withdrew from some villages in the 
district of Jezzine. The Internal Security Forces deployed to the 
region and assumed responsibility for maintaining law and order in 
Jezzine. Citizens who wish to visit Jezzine are required to obtain a 
permit from army intelligence.
    There are no legal restrictions on the right of all citizens to 
return. However, many emigres are reluctant to return for a variety of 
political, economic, and social reasons. The Government has encouraged 
the return to their homes of over 600,000 persons displaced during the 
civil war. Although some persons have begun to reclaim homes abandoned 
or damaged during the war, the vast majority of displaced persons have 
not attempted to reclaim and rehabilitate their property. The 
resettlement process is slowed by tight budgetary constraints, 
shattered infrastructure, political feuds, the lack of schools and 
economic opportunities, and the fear that physical security is still 
incomplete in some parts of the country.
    Most non-Lebanese refugees are Palestinians. The U.N. Relief and 
Works Agency (UNRWA) reported that the number of Palestinian refugees 
in Lebanon registered with the UNRWA as of June was 370,144. This 
figure, which includes only the families of refugees who arrived in 
1948, is presumed to include many thousands who reside outside the 
country. Most experts estimate the actual number now in Lebanon to be 
fewer than 300,000.
    The Government issues laissez-passers (travel documents) to 
Palestinian refugees to enable them to travel and work abroad. In 
January the Government eased the tight travel restrictions that it 
previously had imposed on Palestinians resident in Lebanon and those 
entering from other countries by revoking a decision that had required 
all Palestinian refugees who hold Lebanese travel documents to obtain 
entry and exit visas when entering or leaving the country. However, in 
March the Government decided to stop issuing visitors' visas to 
Jordanian nationals who were born in Lebanon and are of Palestinian 
origin.
    There are no legal provisions for granting asylum or refugee status 
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not grant first 
asylum; however, the Government grants admission and temporary (6 
months) refuge to asylum seekers, but not permanent asylum. There are 
nearly 3,600 non-Palestinian refugees (mostly Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds) 
residing in Lebanon according to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR). There have been no known requests for asylum since 1975. The 
government cooperates with the offices of the UNHCR and the UNRWA. 
There were credible reports of the forced deportation of Iraqi 
refugees. The Surete Generale turned over the refugees to the Syrian 
authorities, who returned them to northern Iraq.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution states that citizens have the right to change 
their government in periodic free and fair elections; however, lack of 
government control over parts of the country, defects in the electoral 
process, and strong Syrian influence over Lebanese politics and 
decisionmakers significantly restrict this right. The 1996 
parliamentary elections represented a step forward, but the electoral 
process was flawed by serious shortcomings, because the elections were 
not prepared or carried out impartially. Government officials 
acknowledged some of the electoral shortcomings and pledged to correct 
them in future elections.
    According to the Constitution, elections for the Parliament must be 
held every 4 years. The Parliament, in turn, elects the President every 
6 years. The President and Parliament nominate the Prime Minister, who, 
with the President, chooses the Cabinet. According to the unwritten 
``National Pact of 1943,'' the President is a Maronite Christian, the 
Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker a Shi'a Muslim. Since 
the National Reconciliation Agreement reached in Taif, Saudi Arabia in 
1989, which revised the 6 to 5 ratio of Christian to Muslim seats in 
Parliament, there has been a 50-50 balance between Christian and Muslim 
Members of Parliament. The Taif Accord also increased the number of 
seats in Parliament, andtransferred some powers from the Maronite 
President to the Sunni Prime Minister and the religiously mixed 
Cabinet.
    In May and June 1998, the Government held the first elections at 
the local level since 1963. The elections were reasonably free and 
fair, and citizens were able to choose their own representatives at the 
local level. By-elections were held in May for those localities in 
which elections were not conducted in 1998.
    In October 1998, the Parliament elected a new President after 
amending the Constitution on a one-time basis to permit senior 
government officials, including the (then) commander of the army, to 
run for office. (The Constitution prohibits senior government officials 
from running for president unless they resign at least 2 years before 
the election. The amendment provided for a one-time exception to this 
provision.) There was substantial criticism of the Syrian role in 
influencing Lebanese political leaders in the selection of the 
presidential candidate; however, there was broad popular support for 
the new President, Emile Lahoud, who took office in November 1998.
    Women have the right to vote and there are no legal barriers to 
their participation in politics, although there are significant 
cultural barriers. Women are underrepresented in government and 
politics. No woman has ever held a cabinet position. Three women were 
elected to the 128-seat Parliament in 1996.
    Palestinian refugees have no political rights. An estimated 17 
Palestinian factions operate in Lebanon, generally organized around 
prominent individuals. Most Palestinians live in refugee camps 
controlled by one or more factions. The leaders of the refugees are not 
elected, but there are ``popular committees'' that meet regularly with 
the UNRWA and other visitors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Several local human rights groups operate freely without overt 
government restriction, including the Lebanese Association for Human 
Rights, the Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights--Lebanon, and 
the National Association for the Rights of the Disabled. Some of these 
groups have sought to publicize the detention in Syria of hundreds of 
Lebanese citizens, and took credit in part for the release of a number 
of Lebanese from Syrian jails during 1998 (see Section 1.d). The Bar 
Association and other private organizations regularly hold public 
events that include discussion of human rights issues. Some human 
rights groups have reported harassment and intimidation by government, 
Syrian, and militia forces.
    During the year, the Government was more willing than in the past 
to discuss human rights problems with foreign governments and NGO's. 
The Government has facilitated visits to the country by Amnesty 
International representatives to report on Israeli activities in south 
Lebanon. The Government permitted a Canadian NGO to provide books and 
other related materials to prisoners at the Roumieh detention facility 
(see Section 1.c).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution calls for ``social justice and equality of duties 
and rights among all citizens without prejudice or favoritism.'' In 
practice aspects of the law and traditional mores discriminate against 
women. Religious discrimination is built into the political system. 
During 1997 the Parliament approved a law giving preferences to the 
disabled for employment in government positions. Discrimination based 
on race, language, or social status is illegal and is not widespread 
among citizens; however, foreign domestic servants often are 
mistreated.
    Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The press reports 
cases of rape with increasing frequency, and cases reported are thought 
to be only a fraction of the actual number. There are no authoritative 
statistics on the extent of spousal abuse. Most experts agree that the 
problem affects a significant portion of the female population. In 
general battered or abused women do not talk about their suffering for 
fear of bringing shame upon their own families or accusations of 
misbehavior upon themselves. Doctors and social workers believe that 
most abused women do not seek medical help. The Government has no 
separate program to provide medical assistance to battered women. It 
provides legal assistance to victims of crimes who cannot afford it 
regardless of the gender of the victim. The Lebanese Association for 
Combating Violence Against Women, founded in 1994, has been active in 
lobbying to improve the socioeconomic condition of women and to reduce 
violence against women.
    Foreign domestic servants often are mistreated, abused, and even 
raped. Asian and African female workers have no legal recourse 
available to them because of their low status and isolation from 
society (see Section 6.e.).
    The legal system is discriminatory in its handling of ``crimes of 
honor.'' According to the Penal Code, a man who kills his wife or other 
female relative may receive a reduced sentence if he demonstrates that 
he committed the crime in response to a socially unacceptable sexual 
relationship conducted by the victim. However, beginning in 1991, the 
Government began to increase sentences on violent crimes in general and 
to seek punishment for men who commit crimes of honor. Instances of 
honor crimes are reported in the media.
    Women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law, 
academia, the arts, and to a lesser degree, business. However, social 
pressure against women pursuing careers is strong in some parts of 
society. Men sometimes exercise considerable control over female 
relatives, restricting their activities outside the home or their 
contact with friends and relatives. Women may own property but often 
cede control of it to male relatives for cultural reasons. In 1994 the 
Parliament removed a legal stipulation that a woman must obtain her 
husband's approval to open a business or engage in a trade. Husbands 
may block foreign travel by their wives (see Section 2.d.). The 
testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man (see Section 1.e.).
    Only men may confer citizenship on their spouses and children. 
Accordingly, children born to Lebanese mothers and foreign fathers are 
not eligible for Lebanese citizenship. Lebanese widows may confer 
citizenship on their minor children.
    Religious groups administer their own family and personal status 
laws. There are 18 recognized religious groups, each of which differs 
in its treatment of marriage, family property rights, and inheritance. 
Many of these laws discriminate against women. For example, Sunni 
inheritance law gives a son twice the share of a daughter. Although 
Muslim men may divorce easily, Muslim women may do so only with the 
concurrence of their husbands. There is no law that permits civil 
marriages, although such ceremonies performed outside of Lebanon are 
recognized by the State. Marriages may be performed only by religious 
authorities.
    Children.--The plight of children remains a serious concern; 
however, the Government has not allocated funds to protect them. 
Education is not compulsory and illiteracy rates have reached 37.5 
percent. Many children, particularly in rural areas, take jobs at a 
young age to help support their families. In lower income families, 
boys generally receive more education, while girls usually remain at 
home to perform housework.
    An undetermined number of children are neglected, abused, 
exploited, and even sold to adoption agents. Poor children often are 
compelled by their parents to seek employment, and often take jobs that 
put their safety at risk, including in industry, car mechanic shops, 
and carpentry. Because of their age, wages earned by these children are 
not in conformity with labor regulations. There are hundreds of 
abandoned children in the streets nationwide, some of whom survive by 
begging, others by working at low wages. The Government does not have a 
child protection law to remove children from abusive situations, nor do 
the NGO's have adequate legislative authority to litigate on behalf of 
minor children who are victims of abuse.
    Juvenile delinquency is on the rise; many delinquents wait in 
ordinary prisons for trial and remain there after sentencing. Although 
their number is very small, there is no adequate place to hold 
delinquent girls; therefore, they are held in the women's prison in 
Ba'abda. Limited financial resources have hindered efforts to build 
adequate facilities to rehabilitate delinquents. A prominent private 
citizen has agreed to provide land in Junieh to build a juvenile center 
for girls, and work is under way. There is also a project to build a 
modern juvenile detention facility in Ba'asir. The Government provided 
a 161,000 square foot plot and is working with U.N. agencies to arrange 
for financial assistance and expertise to construct the facility.
    There are neither child welfare programs nor government 
institutions to oversee the implementation of children's programs. The 
Committee for Children's Rights, formed in 1993 by prominent 
politicians and private citizens, has been lobbying for legislation to 
improve the condition of children. The Ministry of Health requires the 
establishment of health records for every child up to 18 years of age.
    People with Disabilities.--Over 100,000 persons sustained 
disabilities during the civil war. Care of the disabled generally is 
performed by families. Most efforts to secure education, independence, 
health, and shelter for the disabled are made by some 100 private 
organizations for the disabled. These organizations are relatively 
active, although poorly funded.
    The heavily damaged cities make few accommodations for the 
disabled. Building codes have no requirements for ease of access, 
although the Government in its rebuilding projects has constructed 
sidewalks in some parts of Beirut allowing access for the disabled. The 
private ``Solidere'' project for the reconstruction of downtown Beirut 
has self-imposed requirements for disabled access. This project is 
widely considered a model for future construction efforts around the 
country.
    Religious Minorities.--Discrimination based on religion is built 
into the system of government (see Section 3). The amended Constitution 
of 1990 embraces the principle of abolishing religious affiliation as a 
criterion for filling government positions, but few practical steps 
have been taken to accomplish this aim. One notable exception is the 
Lebanese Armed Forces, which, through universal conscription and an 
emphasis on professionalism, has reduced significantly the role of 
religious sectarianism in that organization. Each religious group has 
its own courts for family law matters, such as marriage, divorce, child 
custody, and inheritance.
    On October 3, one person was killed when a bomb exploded in a 
Maronite church in an eastern Beirut suburb (see Section 1.a.).
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the United 
Nations, an estimated 370,000 Palestinian refugees are registered in 
Lebanon (see Section 2.d.). Most Palestinian refugees live in 
overpopulated camps that have suffered repeated heavy damage as a 
result of fighting. The Government generally has prohibited the 
construction of permanent structures in the camps on the grounds that 
such construction encourages the notion of permanent refugee settlement 
in Lebanon. Refugees fear that in the future the Government may reduce 
the size of the camps or eliminate them completely.
    The Government officially ended its practice of denying work 
permits to Palestinians in 1991. However, in practice very few 
Palestinians receive work permits, and those who find work usually are 
directed into unskilled occupations. They and other foreigners may own 
a limited size plot of land but only after obtaining the approval of 
five different district offices. The law applies to all foreigners, but 
for political, cultural, and economic reasons it is applied in a manner 
disadvantageous to Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, Kurds. The 
Government does not provide health services to Palestinian refugees, 
who rely on the UNRWA and UNRWA-contracted hospitals.
    In recent years, Palestinian incomes have declined as the PLO 
closed many of its offices in Lebanon, which formerly employed as much 
as 50 percent of the Palestinian work force. Palestinian children 
reportedly have been forced to leave school at an early age because 
U.N. relief workers do not have sufficient funds for education 
programs. The U.N. estimates that 18 percent of street children are 
Palestinian. Drug addiction and crime reportedly are increasing in the 
camps, as is prostitution, although reliable statistics are not 
available. In August the Fatah faction of the PLO expanded its 
operations in the Ein Al-Hilweh refugee camp by opening security 
offices and hiring personnel to maintain order in the camps.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except government 
employees, may establish and join unions and have a legal right to 
strike. Worker representatives must be chosen from those employed 
within the bargaining unit. About 900,000 persons form the active labor 
force, 42 percent of whom are members of 160 labor unions and 
associations. Twenty-two of the unions, with about 200,000 workers, are 
represented in the General Confederation of Labor (GLC).
    In general the Government does not control or restrict unions, 
although union leaders allege credibly that the Government has tried, 
in the past, to interfere in elections for union officials.
    Palestinian refugees may organize their own unions, but, because of 
restrictions on their right to work, few Palestinians participate 
actively in trade unions.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international federations and 
confederations, and they maintain a variety of such affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of 
workers to organize and to bargain collectively exists in law and 
practice. Most worker groups engage in some form of collective 
bargaining with their employers. Stronger federations obtain 
significant gains for their members and on occasion have assisted 
nonunionized workers. There is no government mechanism to promote 
voluntary labor-management negotiations, and workers have no protection 
against antiunion discrimination. The Government's ban on 
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.) arguable diminishes unions' 
bargaining power.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is not 
prohibited by law. In the absence of a prohibition against it, children 
(see Section 5), foreign domestic servants, and other foreign workers 
(see Section 6.e) sometimes are forced to remain in situations 
amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1946 Labor Code stipulates that workers between the 
ages of 8 and 16 may not work more than 7 hours a day, with 1 hour for 
rest provided after 4 hours. In 1996 the Ministry of Labor amended this 
law to define workers under the age of 13 as child labor, in accordance 
with international obligations. Children also are prohibited from 
working between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. The code also prohibits 
certain types of mechanical work for children between the ages of 8 and 
13, and other types for those between the ages of 13 and 16. The Labor 
Ministry is responsible for enforcing these requirements, but the 
Ministry does not rigorously apply the law. Forced and bonded child 
labor is not prohibited and sometimes occurs (see Section 6.c.).
    Children between the ages of 10 and 14 constitute 0.6 percent of 
the labor force (5,936 children in total), according to the latest 
official figures. Most of these child laborers are Lebanese, but some 
are Syrian; they work predominantly in the industrial, craft, and 
metallurgical sectors. According to a U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) 
study, 60 percent of working children are below 13 years of age and 75 
percent earn wages below two-thirds of the minimum wage. Nearly 40 
percent of working children work 10 to 14 hours per day, and few 
receive social welfare benefits. In addition, approximately 52,000 
children between the ages of 15 and 19 are in the active labor force; 
they are not eligible for minimum wages until they reach the age of 21.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets a legal 
minimum wage, currently about $200 (300,000 Lebanese pounds) per month. 
The law is not enforced effectively in the private sector. In theory 
the courts could be called upon to enforce it, but in practice they are 
not. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. Trade unions actively attempt to ensure 
the payment of minimum wages in both the public sector and the large-
scale private sector.
    The Labor Law prescribes a standard 6-day workweek of 48 hours, 
with a 24-hour rest period per week. In practice workers in the 
industrial sector work an average of 35 hours a week and workers in 
other sectors work an average of 30 hours a week. Foreign domestic 
servants, mostly of Asian and African origin, often are mistreated, 
abused, and raped. The employment contract for a foreign worker is 
signed by a recruitment agency and the employer; workers rarely are a 
party to the contract or, if they are a party, do not know what the 
contract stipulates because it is written in Arabic. The passports of 
foreign domestic workers are confiscated by the recruitment agency or 
their employer when the workers arrive at the airport. Foreign domestic 
servants are not protected by labor laws. Domestic servants work almost 
18 hours per day and, in most cases, do not receive time off for 
vacations or holidays. There is no minimum wage for domestic servants; 
their average wage is about $100 (150,000 Lebanese pounds) per month. 
They have no entitlement to government financial assistance. Many 
workers leave their jobs--which is not against the law--but their 
employers often report them as thieves to the police in order to locate 
them and force them to return. For example, Nina Nilani Moutagala, a 
Sri Lankannational, reportedly chose to flee her employer's household 
when the opportunity arose because she had been abused and not paid her 
salary. She then was accused by her employer of theft. She was tried 
and acquitted on the grounds that she could not have left the house 
carrying 3 rugs, 6 vases, 4 paintings, 6 crystal chandeliers, and 20 
ashtrays, as claimed by her employer. Nonetheless, Nilani spent 3 
months in prison.
    The law includes specific occupational health and safety 
regulations. Labor regulations call on employers to take adequate 
precautions for employee safety. Enforcement, the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Labor, is uneven. Labor organizers report that workers do 
not have the right to remove themselves from hazardous conditions 
without jeopardizing their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; however, the Penal Code stipulates that ``any 
person who deprives another of freedom either by abduction or any other 
means shall be sentenced to temporary hard labor.'' If forced 
prostitution or forced rendering of sexual services occurs as a result 
of the abduction, the Penal Code stipulates that the abductor be 
sentenced to at least 1 year in prison. There were no reports that 
persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                LIBYA *

    The  Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a dictatorship 
that has been ruled by Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi (the ``Brother 
Leader and Guide of the Revolution'') since 1969, when he led a 
military coup to overthrow King Idris I. Borrowing from Islamic and 
pan-Arab ideas, Qadhafi created a political system that rejects 
democracy and political parties and purports to establish a ``third 
way'' superior to capitalism and communism. Libya's governing 
principles are derived predominantly from Qadhafi's ``Green Book.'' In 
theory Libya is ruled by the citizenry through a series of popular 
congresses, as laid out in the Constitutional Proclamation of 1969 and 
the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People of 
1977, but in practice Qadhafi and his inner circle control political 
power. Qadhafi is aided by extragovernmental organizations--the 
Revolutionary Committees and the Comrades Organization--that exercise 
control over most aspects of citizens' lives. The judiciary is not 
independent of the Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * The United States has no official presence in Lybia. Information 
on the human rights situation therefore is limited.
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    Libya maintains an extensive security apparatus, consisting of 
several elite military units, including Qadhafi's personal bodyguards, 
local Revolutionary Committees, and People's Committees, as well as the 
``Purification'' Committees, which were formed in 1996. The result is a 
multilayered, pervasive surveillance system that monitors and controls 
the activities of individuals. The various security forces committed 
numerous serious human rights abuses.
    The Government dominates the economy through complete control of 
the country's oil resources, which account for almost all export 
earnings and approximately 30 percent of the gross domestic product. 
Oil revenues constitute the principal source of foreign exchange. Much 
of the country's income has been lost to waste, corruption, and to 
attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction and acquire 
conventional weapons. Despite efforts to diversify the economy and 
encourage private sector participation, the economy continues to be 
constrained by a system of extensive controls and regulations covering 
prices, credit, trade, and foreign exchange. The Government's 
mismanagement of the economy has caused high levels of inflation, 
increased import prices, and hampered economic expansion, which has 
resulted in a decline in the standard of living for the majority of 
citizens in recent years.
    The Government's human rights record remains poor. Citizens do not 
have the right to change their government. Qadhafi has used 
extrajudicial killing and intimidation to control the opposition abroad 
and summary judicial proceedings to suppress it at home. Security 
forces torture prisoners during interrogations or for punishment. 
Prison conditions are poor. Security forces arbitrarily arrest and 
detain persons, and many prisoners are held incommunicado. Many 
political detainees are held for years without charge. The Government 
controls the judiciary, and citizens do not have the right to a fair 
public trial or to be represented by legal counsel. The Government 
infringes on citizens' privacy rights, and citizens do not have the 
right to be secure in their homes or persons, or to own private 
property. The Government restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly, 
association, and religion. The Government imposes some limits on 
freedom of movement. There were reports of mass expulsions of foreign 
workers and residents to neighboring countries in 1997. The Government 
prohibits the establishment of independent human rights organizations. 
Violence against women is a problem. Traditional attitudes and 
practices continue to discriminate against women, and female genital 
mutilation (FGM) still is practiced in remote areas of the country. The 
Government discriminates against and represses certain minorities and 
tribal groups. The Government continues to repress banned Islamic 
groups and exercises tight control over ethnic and tribal minorities, 
such as Amazighs (Berbers), Tuaregs, and Warfalla tribe members. The 
Government restricts basic worker rights, uses forced labor, and 
discriminates against foreign workers. There have been reports of 
slavery and trafficking in persons.
    Colonel Qadhafi publicly called for violence against opponents of 
his regime after violent clashes between Islamic activists and security 
forces in Benghazi in September 1995. Outbreaks of violence between 
government forces and Muslim militants had continued to plague eastern 
Libya since that time, but appeared to cease by year's end. The 
Government encouraged reconciliation with opposition groups during the 
year, and invited dissidents living abroad to return to Libya, 
promising that they would be safe. However, few opposition figures 
returned, and the sincerity of the Government's offer and the 
likelihood of reconciliation remain unclear.
    In April the Government surrendered the two men suspected of the 
1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland. As a result, U.N. 
sanctions against Libya were suspended.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Violent clashes 
between the security forces and militant Islamist opposition groups 
occurred less frequently during the year. In the past, the clashes were 
concentrated predominantly in the eastern region and resulted in an 
undetermined number of deaths. Since a 1996 prison mutiny in Benghazi 
and other attacks against the regime, the Government has maintained 
tightened security measures. In the years following the mutiny, the 
Government made hundreds of arrests, conducted military operations in 
the areas of insurrection, and killed a number of persons. However, 
there were no reports of such activities during the year.
    The Government uses summary judicial proceedings to suppress 
domestic dissent, and has used extrajudicial killings and intimidation 
to control the opposition abroad. Prior to 1994, there were reports 
that Libyan security forces hunted down and killed dissidents living 
abroad (see Sections 1.b. and 2.d.).
    A large number of offenses, including political offenses and 
``economic crimes,'' are punishable by death. A 1972 law mandates the 
death penalty for any person associated with a group opposed to the 
principles of the revolution, as well as for other acts such as 
treason, attempting to change the form of government by violence, and 
premeditated murder. The ``Green Book'' of 1988 states that ``the goal 
of the Libyan society is to abolish capital punishment;'' however, the 
Government has not acted to abolish the death penalty and its scope has 
increased. In 1996 a law went into effect that applies the death 
penalty to those who speculate in foreign currency, food, clothes, or 
housing during a state of war or blockade, and for crimes related to 
drugs and alcohol.
    In 1997 two civilians and six army officers were executed: The 
civilians by hanging and the army officers by firing squad; at least 
five others were given prison sentences, all convicted oncharges of 
being American spies, committing treason, cooperating with opposition 
organizations, and instigating violence to achieve political and social 
goals. The eight executed men were arrested with dozens of others in 
connection with a coup attempt by army units composed of Warfalla tribe 
members in October 1993. The men were convicted by the Supreme Military 
Court and reportedly did not have lawyers for their trial. The 
convicted persons allegedly were kept in secret locations and tortured 
throughout their incarceration to obtain confessions of criminal 
activity.
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary 
Executions noted in 1996 ``the apparent lack of respect for fair trial 
standards in trials leading to the imposition of capital punishment in 
Libya.''
    Until April Libya was subject to economic and diplomatic sanctions 
imposed by the U.N. Security Council in connection with the bombings of 
Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, which killed 259 persons on 
board and 11 persons on the ground, and the bombing of UTA flight 772 
over Chad in 1989, which killed 171 persons. These U.N. Security 
Council resolutions required that Libya fulfill the following 
conditions: Ensure the appearance in a U.S. or Scottish court of those 
charged in the Pam Am 103 case; cooperate with U.S., British, and 
French investigations into the Pan Am and UTA bombings; pay 
compensation; and renounce terrorism and support for terrorism. In 
April the Government surrendered the two men suspected of the Pan Am 
bombing, which prompted the suspension of U.N. sanctions against Libya. 
The suspects are to be tried under Scottish law before a Scottish court 
seated in the Netherlands.
    In March a French court convicted in absentia the six defendants in 
the UTA bombing and sentenced them to life in prison. In July the 
Government paid the French Government $31 million to compensate the 
victims' families.
    In late November, the Government paid compensation to the British 
Government for the 1984 killing of British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher 
outside the Libyan Embassy in London.
    In spite of the Government's violent repression of resistance, 
opposition groups continued to stage attacks on Qadhafi and his regime.
    b. Disappearance.--The Libyan regime in the past has abducted and 
killed dissidents in the country and abroad. Libyan dissident Mansour 
Kikhiya disappeared from Cairo, Egypt in 1993. There is credible 
information that following his abduction, Kikhiya was executed in Libya 
in early 1994. There have been no reports of such abductions or 
killings since 1994.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Security personnel reportedly torture prisoners during 
interrogations or for punishment. Government agents reportedly 
periodically detain and torture foreign workers, particularly those 
from sub-Saharan Africa. Reports of torture have been difficult to 
corroborate because many prisoners are held incommunicado.
    Methods of torture reportedly include: Chaining to a wall for 
hours, clubbing, applying electric shock, applying corkscrews to the 
back, pouring lemon juice in open wounds, breaking fingers and allowing 
the joints to heal without medical care, suffocating with plastic bags, 
deprivation of food and water, and beatings on the soles of the feet. 
The law calls for fines against any official using excessive force; 
however, there are no known cases of prosecution for torture or abuse.
    Prison conditions reportedly are poor. While there is insufficient 
information to make a clear determination on overall prison conditions, 
a mutiny in July 1996 at the Abu Salim prison was caused by inmates 
protesting poor conditions. The prisoners went on a hunger strike and 
captured guards to protest the lack of medical care, overcrowding, and 
inadequate hygiene and diet provided at the facility. Security units 
were dispatched to suppress the uprising; as many as 100 persons were 
killed by security forces.
    The Government does not permit prison visits by human rights 
monitors.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces 
arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. By law, the Government may hold 
detainees incommunicado for unlimited periods. It holds many political 
detainees incommunicado inunofficial detention centers controlled by 
members of the Revolutionary Committees. Hundreds of political 
detainees, many associated with banned Islamic groups, reportedly are 
held in prisons throughout the country (but mainly in the Abu Salim 
prison in Tripoli); many are held for years without charge. Hundreds of 
other detainees may have been held for periods too brief (3 to 4 
months) to permit confirmation by outside observers.
    Security forces in 1998 arrested suspected members and sympathizers 
of banned Islamic groups and monitored activities at mosques following 
the violent clashes in eastern Libya (see Section 1.a.). In June 1998, 
at least 100 professionals in Benghazi and several other major cities 
were arrested on suspicion of political opposition activities, 
specifically support of or sympathy for the Libyan Islamic Group, an 
underground Islamic movement that is not known to have used or 
advocated violence. Some practicing Muslims have shaved their beards to 
avoid harassment from security services. Qadhafi has criticized 
publicly Libyan ``mujaheddin'' (generally, conservative Islamic 
activists who fought with the Afghan resistance movement against Soviet 
forces) as threats to the regime.
    The 1994 Purge Law was established to fight financial corruption, 
black marketeering, drug trafficking, and atheism. It has been enforced 
by the ``Purification'' Committees since June 1996 (see Section 1.f.). 
Scores of businessmen, traders, and shop owners have been arrested 
arbitrarily on charges of corruption, dealing in foreign goods, and 
funding Islamic fundamentalist groups, and dozens of shops and firms 
have been closed. As part of the campaign to implement the Purge Law, 
the wealth of the middle class and affluent has been targeted as well.
    In March 1997, the Libyan General People's Congress approved a law 
that provides for the punishment of accomplices to crimes of 
``obstructing the people's power, instigating and practicing tribal 
fanaticism, possessing, trading in or smuggling unlicensed weapons, and 
damaging public and private institutions and property.'' The new law 
provides that ``any group, whether large or small,'' including towns, 
villages, local assemblies, tribes, or families, be punished in their 
entirety if they are accused by the General People's Congress of 
sympathizing, financing, aiding in any way, harboring, protecting, or 
refraining from identifying perpetrators of such crimes. Punishment 
under the Collective Punishment Law ranges from the denial of access to 
utilities (water, electricity, telephone), fuels, food supplies, 
official documents, and participation in local assemblies, to the 
termination of new economic projects and state subsidies.
    The Government does not impose exile as a form of punishment. The 
Government encouraged Libyan dissidents abroad to return to the country 
during the year, and promised to ensure their safety; however, few 
returned by year's end, and the sincerity of the Government's offer and 
the likelihood of reconciliation remain unclear. Prior to 1994, there 
were reports that security forces hunted down and killed dissidents 
living abroad (see Section 1.a.). Students studying abroad have been 
interrogated upon their return (see Section 2.d.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent 
of the Government.
    There are four levels of courts: Summary courts, which try petty 
offenses; the courts of first instance, which try more serious crimes; 
the courts of appeal; and the Supreme Court, which is the final 
appellate level.
    Special revolutionary courts were established in 1980 to try 
political offenses. Such trials often are held in secret or even in the 
absence of the accused. In other cases, the security forces have the 
power to pass sentences without trial, especially in cases involving 
political opposition. The U.N. Special Rapporteur noted in 1996 a lack 
of fairness in trials of capital cases (see Section 1.a.). In the past, 
Qadhafi has incited local cadres to take extrajudicial action against 
suspected opponents.
    The private practice of law is illegal; all lawyers must be members 
of the Secretariat of Justice.
    The Government holds a large number of political prisoners. Amnesty 
International estimates that there are hundreds of persons imprisoned 
for political reasons.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government does not respect the right to privacy. 
Security agencies often disregard the legal requirement to 
obtainwarrants before entering a private home. They also routinely 
monitor telephone calls.
    The security agencies and the Revolutionary Committees oversee an 
extensive network of informants. Libyan exiles have reported that 
family ties to suspected regime opponents may result in government 
harassment and detention. The Government may seize and destroy property 
belonging to ``enemies of the people'' or those who ``cooperate'' with 
foreign powers. In the past, citizens have reported that the Government 
warned members of the extended family of any regime opponent that they, 
too, risk the death penalty.
    The law passed by the General People's Congress in March 1997 
formally codified the Government's previous threats of punishment for 
families or communities that aid, abet, or do not inform the regime of 
criminals and oppositionists in their midst (see Section 1.d.).
    The 1994 Purge Law provides for the confiscation of private assets 
above a nominal amount, describing wealth in excess of such 
undetermined amounts as ``the fruits of exploitation or corruption.'' 
In 1996 the Government ordered the formation of hundreds of ``Purge'' 
or ``Purification'' Committees composed of young military officers and 
students. The Purification Committees reportedly seized some 
``excessive'' amounts of private wealth from members of the middle and 
affluent classes; the confiscated property was taken from the rich to 
be given to the poor, in an effort to appease the populace and to 
strengthen the Government's power and control over the country. The 
activities of the Purification Committees continued during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The authorities tolerate some 
difference of opinion in People's Committee meetings and at the General 
People's Congress; however, in general they severely limit freedom of 
speech. This is especially true with regard to criticism of Qadhafi or 
his regime. Infrequent criticism of political leaders and policies in 
the state-controlled media is interpreted as a government attempt to 
test public opinion or weaken a government figure who may be a 
potential challenger to Qadhafi.
    The regime restricts freedom of speech in several ways: By 
prohibiting all political activities not officially approved, by 
enacting laws so vague that many forms of speech or expression may be 
interpreted as illegal, and by operating a pervasive system of 
informants (see Section 1.f.) that creates an atmosphere of mistrust at 
all levels of society.
    The State owns and controls the media. There is a state-run daily 
newspaper, Al-Shams, with a circulation of 40,000. Local Revolutionary 
Committees publish several smaller newspapers. The official news 
agency, JANA, is the designated conduit for official views. The regime 
does not permit the publication of opinions contrary to government 
policy. Such foreign publications as Newsweek, Time, the International 
Herald Tribune, Express, and Jeune Afrique are available, but 
authorities routinely censor them and may prohibit their entry onto the 
market.
    Technology has made the Internet and satellite television widely 
available in Libya. According to numerous anecdotal reports, both are 
accessed easily in Tripoli.
    The Government restricts academic freedom. Professors and teachers 
who discuss politically sensitive topics face a risk of government 
reprisal.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Public assembly 
is permitted only with regime approval and in support of the regime's 
positions.
    Despite these restrictions, members of the Warfalla tribe staged 
several informal protests in 1995 to protest the regime's decision to 
carry out the death penalty against tribe members involved in the 1993 
coup attempt. The Government responded by arresting hundreds of tribe 
members and expelling others from the military and security forces. In 
January 1997, eight Warfalla tribe members arrested for involvement in 
the 1993 coup attempt were executed and at least five others were given 
prison sentences for allegedly being American spies (see Section 1.a.).
    The last display of public discontent and resentment towards the 
Government occurred when a riot broke out over a penalty called at a 
soccer match in Tripoli in 1996. The rare instance of public unrest 
began when a contentious goal was scored by the team that Qadhafi's 
sons supported and the referee called theplay in their favor. The 
spectators reportedly started chanting anti-Qadhafi slogans after the 
referee made the call and Qadhafi's sons and their bodyguards opened 
fire in the air, then on the crowd. The spectators panicked and 
stampeded out of the stadium and into the streets, where they stoned 
cars and chanted more anti-Qadhafi slogans. The Government officially 
admitted that 8 persons died and 39 were injured as a result of the 
soccer riots, but there were reports of up to 50 deaths caused by the 
gunfire and the stampede of the crowd.
    The Government limits the right of association; it grants such a 
right only to institutions affiliated with the regime. According to a 
1972 law, political activity found by the authorities to be treasonous 
is punishable by death. An offense may include any activity that is 
``opposed to the principles of the Revolution.''
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricts freedom of 
religion. The country is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. In an apparent 
effort to eliminate all alternative power bases, the regime has banned 
the once powerful Sanusiyya Islamic sect. In its place, Qadhafi 
established the Islamic Call Society (ICS), which is the outlet for 
state-approved religion, as well as a tool for exporting the Libyan 
revolution abroad. The ICS also is responsible for relations with other 
religions, including Christian churches in the country. In 1992 the 
Government announced that the ICS would be disbanded; however, its 
director still conducts activities, suggesting that the organization 
remains operational. Islamic groups whose beliefs and practices are at 
variance with the state-approved teaching of Islam are banned. Although 
most Islamic institutions are under state control, some mosques are 
endowed by prominent families; however, they generally follow the 
government-approved interpretation of Islam.
    According to recent reports, individuals are rarely harassed 
because of their religious practices. Members of some minority 
religions are allowed to conduct services. Christian churches operate 
openly and are tolerated by the authorities. The authorities reportedly 
have failed to honor a promise made in 1970 to provide the Anglican 
Church with alternative facilities when they took the property used by 
the Church. Since 1988 Anglicans have shared a villa with other 
Protestant denominations. Christians are restricted by the lack of 
churches; there is a government limit of one church per denomination 
per city. A resident Catholic bishop, aided by a small number of 
priests, operates two churches. In March 1997, the Vatican established 
diplomatic relations with Libya, stating that Libya had taken steps to 
protect freedom of religion. The Vatican hoped to be able to address 
more adequately the needs of the estimated 50,000 Christians in the 
country.
    d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government usually does not restrict 
the internal movement of citizens, but has imposed blockades on those 
cities and regions (primarily in the east) where antigovernment attacks 
or movements originate. In 1996 after the escape of some 400 
prisoners--during which residents purportedly harbored escapees--the 
town of Dirnah was sealed off by government troops and also had its 
water and electricity cut off.
    The Government requires citizens to obtain exit permits for travel 
abroad and limits their access to hard currency. A woman must have her 
husband's permission to travel abroad. Authorities routinely seize the 
passports of foreigners married to citizens upon their entry into the 
country.
    The right of return exists. The regime has called on students, many 
of whom receive a government subsidy, and others working abroad, to 
return to Libya on little or no notice. Students studying abroad have 
been interrogated upon their return. Prior to 1994, there were reports 
that Libyan security forces hunted down and killed dissidents living 
abroad (see Section 1.a.).
    The Government has expelled noncitizens arbitrarily (see Section 
6.e.). There were reports that in April 1998, the Government accused at 
least 10 Tunisians suspected of membership in, or support for, the 
Islamist group An-Nadha, which is banned in Tunisia for activities in 
opposition of the Tunisian Government, and forcibly returned them to 
Tunisia, where they reportedly were subjected to abuse. In 1995 the 
Government expelled approximately 1,000 Palestinian residents to signal 
its displeasure with the signing of the Interim Agreement between 
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestinians were 
forced to live in makeshift camps along the Egyptian border. The 
Government allowed the Palestinians living in the border camps to 
return to Libya, but over 200 Palestinians elected to remain, hoping to 
travel to the WestBank and Gaza or resettle in Egypt. The governments 
of Egypt and Israel refused to accept the Palestinians in 1996, leaving 
them stranded in the deteriorating and squalid conditions of the once 
temporary border encampments. They were removed forcibly from their 
encampments to another location in the country by police and military 
authorities in April 1997.
    The Government expelled 132 Algerians in November 1997 (see Section 
6.e.).
    The law does not include provisions for granting asylum, first 
asylum, or refugee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 
Protocol, and the Government does not grant such status. The U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that by July 1998, there 
were approximately 10,000 refugees of concern to the UNHCR in the 
country, including some 4,200 Palestinians, 3,543 Somalis, and smaller 
numbers of Eritreans, Sudanese, and Ethiopians. The Government 
officially contacted the UNHCR liaison officer in Tripoli in 1995 in an 
effort to facilitate the repatriation of Arab and African refugees to 
their countries of origin. In 1997 the UNHCR assisted in the 
repatriation of 886 Eritreans and 152 Ethiopians from Libya.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Major 
government decisions are controlled by Qadhafi, his close associates, 
and committees acting in his name. Political parties are banned. 
Qadhafi appoints military officers and official functionaries down to 
junior levels. Corruption and favoritism, partially based on tribal 
origin, are major problems that adversely affect government efficiency.
    In theory popular political participation is provided by the 
grassroots People's Committees, which send representatives annually to 
the national General People's Congress. In practice, the GPC is a 
rubber stamp that approves all recommendations made by Qadhafi.
    Qadhafi established the Revolutionary Committees in 1977. These 
bodies consist primarily of youths who guard against political 
deviation. Some Committees have engaged in show trials of regime 
opponents; in other cases, they have been implicated in the killing of 
opponents abroad. The Committees approve all candidates in elections 
for the GPC.
    There is no reliable information on the representation of women and 
minorities in the Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government prohibits the establishment of independent human 
rights organizations. Instead, it created the Libyan Arab Human Rights 
Committee in 1989. The Committee is not known to have published any 
reports.
    The regime has not responded substantively to appeals from Amnesty 
International on behalf of detainees. In 1994 the regime characterized 
Amnesty International as a tool of Western interests and dismissed its 
work as neocolonialist; its representatives last visited Libya in 1988.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on these factors; 
however, the Government does not enforce these prohibitions, 
particularly discrimination against women and tribal minorities.
    Women.--Although there is little detailed information on the extent 
of violence against women, it remains a problem. In general the 
intervention of neighbors and extended family members tends to limit 
the reporting of domestic violence. Abuse within the family rarely is 
discussed publicly, due to the value attached to privacy in society.
    The 1969 Constitutional Proclamation granted women total equality. 
Despite this legal provision, traditional attitudes and practices 
prevail and discrimination against women persists and keeps them from 
attaining the family or civil rights formally provided them. A woman 
must have her husband's permission to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
    Although their status is still not equal to that of men, most 
observers agree that, with the advent of oil wealth in the 1970's, the 
opportunity for women to make notable social progress has increased. 
Oil wealth, urbanization, development plans, education programs, and 
even the impetus behind Qadhafi's revolutionary government all have 
contributed to the creation of new employment opportunities for women. 
In recent years, a growing sense of individualism in some segments of 
society, especially among the educated young, has been noted. For 
example, many educated young couples prefer to set up their own 
households, rather than move in with their parents, and view polygyny 
with scorn. Since the 1970's, educational differences between men and 
women have narrowed.
    In general the emancipation of women is a generational phenomenon: 
Urban women under the age of 35 tend to have more ``modern'' attitudes 
toward life and have discarded the traditional veil; at the same time, 
older urban women tend to be more reluctant to give up the veil or the 
traditional attitudes towards family and employment. Moreover, a 
significant proportion of rural women still do not attend school and 
tend to instill in their children such traditional beliefs as women's 
subservient role in society.
    Employment gains by women also tend to be inhibited by lingering 
traditional restrictions that discourage women from playing an active 
role in the workplace, and by the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist 
values. Some observers have noted that even educated women tend to lack 
self-confidence and social awareness and seek only a limited degree of 
occupational and social participation with men.
    Children.--The Government subsidizes education (which is compulsory 
to age 15) and medical care, and has improved the welfare of children; 
however, declining revenues and general economic mismanagement have led 
to cutbacks, particularly in medical services. Some nomadic tribes 
located in remote areas still practice female genital mutilation (FGM) 
on young girls, a procedure that is widely condemned by international 
health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health.
    People with Disabilities.--No information is available on the 
Government's efforts to assist the disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Arabic-speaking Muslims of 
mixed Arab and Amazigh ancestry constitute 97 percent of the 
population. The principal non-Arab minorities are Amazighs and blacks. 
There are frequent allegations of discrimination based on tribal 
status, particularly against Amazighs in the interior and Tuaregs in 
the south. The Government has manipulated the tribes to maintain a grip 
on power by rewarding some tribes with money and government positions 
and repressing and jailing members of various other tribes. The 
Government also has attempted to keep the tribes fractured by pitting 
one against another.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Independent trade unions and 
professional associations are prohibited and workers do not have the 
right to form their own unions. The regime regards such structures as 
unacceptable ``intermediaries between the revolution and the working 
forces.'' However, workers may join the National Trade Unions' 
Federation, which was created in 1972 and is administered by the 
People's Committee system. The Government prohibits foreign workers 
from joining this union.
    The law does not provide workers with the right to strike. There 
have been no reports of strikes for years. In a 1992 speech, Qadhafi 
affirmed that workers have the right to strike, but added that strikes 
do not occur because the workers control their enterprises.
    The official trade union organization plays an active role in the 
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization 
of African Trade Union Unity. It exploits international trade union 
contacts to engage in propaganda efforts on behalf of the regime. The 
Arab Maghreb Trade Union Federation suspended the membership of Libya's 
trade union organization in 1993. The suspension followed reports that 
Qadhafi had replaced all union leaders, in some cases with loyal 
followers without union experience.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense because labor law 
requires that the Government must approve all agreements.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--In its 1995 report, 
the Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization's 
(ILO) stated that ``persons expressing certain political views or views 
ideologically opposed to the established political, social, or economic 
system may be punished with penalties of imprisonment,'' including ``an 
obligation to perform labor.'' The 1995 ILO report also noted that 
public employees may be sentenced to compulsory labor ``as a punishment 
for breaches of labor discipline or for participation in strikes, even 
in services whose interruption would not endanger the life, personal 
safety, or health of the whole or part of the population.'' The 
Government informed the ILO in 1996 that legislation was enacted to 
abolish these provisions and submitted a report to the ILO. The ILO did 
not comment on the report.
    There have been credible reports that the Government arbitrarily 
has forced some foreign workers into involuntary military service or 
has coerced them into performing subversive activities against their 
own countries. Libyans, despite the Penal Code's prohibition on 
slavery, have been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves, 
mainly southern Sudanese women and children, who were captured by 
Sudanese government troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan (see 
Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 18. 
Education is compulsory to age 15. There is no information available on 
the prevalence of child labor, or on forced or bonded labor by 
children.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The labor force is approximately 
1.2 million workers (including about 160,000 foreign workers) in a 
population of 5.2 million. Wages, particularly in the public sector, 
frequently are in arrears. A public wage freeze imposed in 1981 remains 
in effect and has eroded significantly real income. There is no 
information available regarding whether the average wage is sufficient 
to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living.
    The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours. The Labor Law defines the 
rights and duties of workers, including matters of compensation, 
pension rights, minimum rest periods, and working hours.
    The Labor Law does not accord equality of treatment to foreign 
workers. Foreign workers may reside in the country only for the 
duration of their work contracts, and may not send more than half of 
their earnings to their families in their home countries. They are 
subject to arbitrary pressures, such as changes in work rules and 
contracts, and have little option but to accept such changes or to 
depart the country. Foreign workers who are not under contract enjoy no 
protection.
    In 1997 the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights 
cited inadequate housing, threats of imprisonment to those accused of 
disobeying disciplinary rules, and accusations of causing a variety of 
societal problems as some of the problems in the Government's treatment 
of foreign laborers.
    The Government uses the threat of expulsion of foreign workers as 
leverage against countries whose foreign policies run counter to 
Libya's. The Government expelled approximately 1,000 Palestinian 
residents in late 1995 to signal its displeasure with the agreement 
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in 1996, 
the regime threatened to expel thousands of Palestinian workers for 
political and economic reasons (see Section 2.d.).
    Over 130 Algerians were expelled in 1997 (see Section 2.d.).
    Labor inspectors are assigned to inspect places of work for 
compliance with occupational health and safety standards. Certain 
industries, such as the petroleum sector, try to maintain standards set 
by foreign companies. There is no information on whether a worker can 
remove himself from an unhealthy or unsafe work situation without 
risking continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no information available 
regarding whether the law prohibits specifically trafficking in 
persons.
    There have been reports of trafficking in persons. Libyans have 
been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves, mainly southern 
Sudanese women and children, who were captured by Sudanese government 
troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan.
                                 ______
                                 

                                MOROCCO

    The Constitution of Morocco provides for a monarchy with a 
Parliament and an independent judiciary; however, ultimate authority 
rests with the King, who presides over the Council of Ministers, 
appoints all members of the Government, and may, at his discretion, 
terminate the tenure of any minister, dissolve the Parliament, call for 
new elections, and rule by decree. The late King Hassan II, who ruled 
for 38 years, was succeeded by his son, King Mohammed VI, on July 23. 
Since the constitutional reform of 1996, the bicameral legislature 
consists of a lower house, elected through universal suffrage, and an 
upper Chamber of Counselors, whose members are elected by various 
regional, local, and professional councils. The councils' members 
themselves are elected directly. The lower house of Parliament also may 
dissolve the Government through a vote of no confidence. In March 1998, 
King Hassan named a coalition government headed by opposition socialist 
leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi and composed largely of ministers drawn 
from opposition parties. Prime Minister Youssoufi's Government is the 
first government drawn primarily from opposition parties in decades, 
and also represents the first opportunity for a coalition of socialist, 
left-of-center, and nationalist parties to be included in the 
Government. The November 1997 parliamentary elections were held amid 
widespread, credible reports of vote buying by political parties and 
the Government, and excessive government interference. The fraud and 
government pressure tactics led most independent observers to conclude 
that the results of the election were heavily influenced, if not 
predetermined, by the Government. The judiciary historically has been 
subject to bribery and government influence; however, the Youssoufi 
Government is implementing a reform program to develop greater 
independence and impartiality.
    The security apparatus includes several overlapping police and 
paramilitary organizations. The Border Police, the National Security 
Police, and the Judicial Police are departments of the Ministry of 
Interior, while the Royal Gendarmerie reports to the Palace. Members of 
the security forces continued to commit a number of serious human 
rights abuses.
    Morocco has a mixed economy based largely on agriculture, fishing, 
light industry, phosphate mining, tourism, and remittances from 
citizens working abroad. Illegal cannabis production, much of which is 
destined for Europe, is also a significant economic activity. Economic 
growth is highly dependent on agricultural output, and has experienced 
wide fluctuations due to a series of debilitating droughts. According 
to the Government's statistics, gross domestic product (GDP) grew 6.7 
percent in 1998. Due to drought, government estimates for growth in 
1999 were 0.6 percent.
    There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human 
rights record; however, under the direction of the new King, the 
Government continued to improve its record in several areas. Citizens 
do not have the full right to change their government; however, King 
Hassan's appointment of an opposition coalition government for the 
first time in 1998 marked a significant step toward increased 
democratization. Some members of the security forces occasionally 
torture or otherwise abuse detainees and beat protesters, and, despite 
significant government efforts, prison conditions remain harsh. 
Authorities sometimes ignore legal provisions for due process during 
arrest and detention. The judiciary historically has been subject to 
corruption and Interior Ministry influence; however, the Government is 
implementing judicial reforms in order to increase the level of the 
judiciary's independence and impartiality. Despite continued 
improvement during the year, particularly with regard to easing media 
censorship, the Government continued to restrict freedom of speech and 
of the press regarding a few topics that the Government considers 
sensitive, and journalists still practice self-censorship on these 
topics. The Government limited freedom of assembly and association. In 
several incidents over the course of the year, police beat 
demonstrators. Moroccan human rights organizations alleged lack of due 
process in the trial of some demonstrators for their role in protests 
in the Western Sahara in late September and October. There were 
unlawful arrests and police abuse, including of persons in detention, 
associated with the protests, although most subsequently were released. 
The Government limited freedom of religion for non-Muslims. Although 
non-Muslim foreigners may practice their religions freely, missionaries 
who proselytize face expulsion, and converts from Islam to other 
religions continue to experience social ostracism. The Government at 
times restricts freedom of movement. Domestic violence and 
discrimination against women are common. Teenage prostitution is a 
problem in urban centers. Child labor also is a problem, and the 
Government has not acted to end the plight of young girls who work in 
exploitative and abusive domestic servitude. Amazighs (Berbers) face 
cultural marginalization, and continue to press the Government to 
preserve their language and culture. Unions are subject to government 
interference.
    However, there was further progress on some important human rights 
issues during the year. In March the Human Rights Minister announced 
that the Government's priority was to harmonize local laws on torture 
with international treaty obligations. In April the Youssoufi 
Government organized the first-ever conference on human rights in the 
Arab world. Soon after assuming the throne, King Mohammed VI stated his 
own commitment, along with that of the Youssoufi Government, to 
advancing respect for human rights, and established a new royal 
commission charged to indemnify former political prisoners and their 
families. The Minister for Human Rights pledged in May that the 
``excesses of the past'' would end. In August the Government announced 
a substantial reform advancing prisoner rights and protections, and it 
cleared a backlog of unenforced legal judgments during the year. In 
September Abraham Serfaty, who had been exiled since 1991, was allowed 
to return to Morocco. In November the King relieved of his duties 
Interior Minister Driss Basri, who was considered by most observers to 
have been the driving force behind years of abuse of citizens by police 
and security forces. One immediate effect of Basri's dismissal, most 
observers agree, was that the practice of press self-censorship has 
diminished considerably. While the Government began to make significant 
progress in resolving the fate of those citizens abducted from the 
1960's through the 1980's, human rights groups continue to call for 
full disclosure of all available information.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings. According to press reports in June, 
police in Berrechid arrested mint vendor Abdelaziz Warret, confiscated 
his merchandise, and beat him until he fainted. He died later at a 
hospital. When his family went to claim the body and to obtain a death 
certificate, doctors refused to issue one. No explanation was given for 
his arrest. In August a police officer and two military auxillaries 
were arrested in connection with the beating death of Farah Mohammed 
near the northern city of Oujda. Farah Mohammed was stopped by police 
authorities for questioning in connection with contraband trafficking 
of fuel across the Moroccan border withAlgeria. Eyewitnesses said that 
the police beat and kicked him into unconsciouness at the time he was 
detained. He died in police custody. Farah Mohammed's parents lodged an 
immediate complaint with gendarmerie authorities as soon as they 
learned of their son's death, which led to the immediate arrest of 
those police and military auxillary officers allegedly involved in the 
beating. The trial in the case was pending at year's end.
    Human rights groups allege that poor medical care in prisons 
results in unnecessary deaths; however, the Justice Ministry assigned 
more doctors to prisons and improved prison health facilities during 
the year. In addition the first-ever site visits by members of 
Parliament, the press, and human rights groups to inspect prison 
conditions took place during the year (see Section 1.c.).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no new cases of disappearance for the 
fourth consecutive year. While the forced disappearance of individuals 
who opposed the Government and its policies occurred over several 
decades, the Youssoufi Government, upon taking office, pledged that 
such policies would not recur, and that it would disclose as much 
information as possible on past cases. Many of those who disappeared 
were members of the military who were implicated in attempts to 
overthrow the Government in 1971 and 1972. Others were Sahrawis or 
Moroccans who challenged the Government's claim to the Western Sahara 
or other government policies. Many of those who disappeared were held 
in secret detention camps. While the Government in recent years quietly 
released several hundred persons who had disappeared, including about 
300 such detainees in June 1991, and although in October 1998 it issued 
an announcement on those who disappeared, to this day hundreds of 
Saharan and Moroccan families do not have any information about their 
missing relatives, many of whom disappeared over 20 years ago. No 
explanation for their incarceration has ever been provided. Local human 
rights monitors have concluded that many others died while at the 
notorious Tazmamart prison, which the Government since has closed. The 
Government has acknowledged 34 of these deaths and has provided death 
certificates to the families of all but 1 of the 34 who died.
    In an October 9, 1998 speech, King Hassan II directed that all 
human rights cases should be resolved ``within 6 months.'' On October 
15, 1998, the Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH) 
announced the release of information on 112 cases of disappearances. 
According to the Council, 56 of the 112 who disappeared were deceased; 
family members of 33 of the deceased received death certificates from 
the Government. The Council added that eight persons believed to have 
disappeared were alive and living abroad, and that four were alive and 
in Morocco. Of the remaining 44, the Council stated that it had no 
further information. Human rights groups and families pointed out 
discrepancies between their lists and those of the Government, asked 
the Government for more data about these cases, and demanded full 
explanations of the causes and circumstances of these deaths and 
disclosure of the identities of those responsible. Some family groups 
claim that the Government is not divulging details on at least 50 more 
cases. In November 1998, the Council began meetings in various 
provinces with groups representing families of persons who had 
disappeared in order to collect data on their grievances and to conduct 
further research into the fate of those who remain missing. On April 9, 
the Council announced that it would indemnify the 112 victims of 
politically motivated disappearances. Human rights NGO's disputed the 
Council's findings, claiming that they had compiled a list of over 600 
potential cases of such disappearances from the 1960's through the 
1980's. The NGO's called for the immediate release of all remaining 
political prisoners, disclosure of the fate of those whose cases the 
Council did not examine, delivery of the remains of the deceased to 
their families, compensation for victims and their families, and 
punishment for those responsible. The Moroccan Organization for Human 
Rights (OMDH) issued a similar communique on June 6. On August 6, King 
Mohammed VI established a new royal commission responsible for 
increasing the Government's efforts to resolve the issue of those who 
had disappeared and to reach an accommodation with former political 
prisoners and members of their families. The new commission met with 
some family members and local human rights organizations and began to 
draw up guidelines for the resolution of issues involving individuals 
who had disappeared. There were no developments in the disappearance of 
Abdullah Sherrouq, a student who reportedly was detained by security 
services on June 22, 1981. After 18 years, his family has been unable 
to learn anything of his whereabouts or his fate, despite appeals by 
Amnesty International (AI).
    Associations that seek information on those who have disappeared, 
including a group representing Tazmamart prison survivors, operate 
openly and freely, and call upon the Government for full disclosure of 
events surrounding cases thatdate back to the 1960's. Several front-
page articles in newspapers affiliated with parties in the governing 
coalition called at various times during the year for full disclosure 
on all outstanding cases of disappearance. The associations also call 
for compensation to families of those who have disappeared, death 
certificates and the return of the remains of those who died, and 
prosecution of responsible officials. The Government indicated that it 
would be more open about providing information in these past cases.
    The Government pays a monthly stipend of $550 (5,000 dirhams) to 28 
former prisoners who survived 18 to 20 years in solitary confinement 
under harsh conditions at Tazmamart prison in connection with the coup 
attempts in 1971 and 1972. After their release, the Government 
prohibited them from speaking out publicly about their detention. In 
exchange the Government gave the former prisoners assurances that it 
would help them find jobs and reintegrate them into society; however, 
none of them has obtained government assistance in this regard, and 
some complain of being denied voter cards and passports.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Government claims that the use of torture has been 
discontinued; however, some members of the security forces still 
occasionally torture or otherwise abuse detainees. The OMDH filed a 
complaint on behalf of some of those who were detained and abused by 
the police at the end of September, following several days of protests 
over a variety of social grievances in Laayoune in the Western Sahara 
(see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 1.f., and 2.b.). There is photographic and 
other evidence to substantiate claims that the police systematically 
beat some of the persons they had detained in connection with the 
protests. An investigation was opened into the charges; however, by 
year's end no police officials were charged in connection with the 
force used to break up the protests, nor for the beatings inflicted on 
some of those detained by the police. Some police officials allegedly 
responsible subsequently were transferred and the chief of police in 
Laayoune was relieved of his duties there.
    To commemorate the U.N. ``International Day for the Support of 
Torture Victims,'' the OMDH published a special newspaper in which it 
called on the Government to implement legislation that would 
criminalize the use of torture and would control the conditions under 
which detainees are kept in ``garde a vue'' detention and in prisons. 
The OMDH claimed that most cases of torture submitted to the justice 
system involved incidents that occurred in front of witnesses or in 
public areas. According to the OMDH, torture in detention largely 
continues to escape the notice of the judiciary. The OMDH noted that 
the implementation of judges' instructions on eliminating the use of 
torture has been ``exceedingly slow.'' While the OMDH admitted that the 
use of torture has diminished over the years, it claimed that it has 
not disappeared. The OMDH alleged in its report that those who commit 
such abuses ``do so with impunity in almost all cases.'' The NGO called 
on the Government to harmonize domestic law with its responsibilities 
under the U.N. Convention Against Torture, to ensure full independence 
for the judiciary, and to punish those who resort to torture.
    In April the French-language newspaper of the ruling Socialist 
Union of Popular Forces (USFP) party, Liberation, published ``An Open 
Letter to My Torturer'' by Salah El-Ouadie. The letter is a first-
person account of the torture that Ouadie suffered in detention from 
1974 until his release in 1984, when he was issued a royal pardon. 
Imprisoned because of his leftist activities, Ouadie addressed his 
letter to ``K.Y.,'' who was a police chief in Casablanca's Derb Moulay 
Cherif neighborhood. Ouadie related that he remembered the click of his 
torturer's heels, his cologne, his voice, as well as the fate of fellow 
victims who went mad or died. According to Ouadie, ``K.Y.'' held a 
position with the national police, and even represented Morocco in 1996 
at a U.N. conference on preventing torture, but was forced to retire by 
the Government late in the year.
    In incidents over the course of the year, police continued to use 
force to disperse several demonstrations by unemployed university 
graduates associated with the National Association of Unemployed 
Graduates (known by its French acronym, ANDC), and other groups to a 
lesser extent. In numerous incidents throughout the country, police 
beat demonstrators with batons in order to disperse them (see Sections 
1.d., 1.e., and 2.b.). From September 22 to 29 in the Western Saharan 
city of Laayoune, police used brutal force to dispel a series of 
demonstrations organized by students, unemployed graduates, miners, and 
former Sahrawhi political prisoners to protest a variety of social 
conditions and grievances. There were reliable reports of further 
police brutality in Laayoune over the weekend of October 30 to 31 (see 
Sections 1.d., 1.e., 1.f., and 2.b.).
    In March 1998, the Ministry of Justice and the prison 
administration implemented a law that makes autopsies routine for any 
death that occurs in detention, in order to allow allegations of 
torture to be disproved. The autopsies take place at the request of the 
family, human rights NGO's, or the state prosecutor, and at the order 
of a judge. The autopsies were used to disprove three cases that 
involved allegations of abuse in 1998.
    Prison conditions remain harsh; however, they have improved in 
recent years, due in part to reforms undertaken at the suggestion of 
the CCDH and the Minister of Justice. On August 25, the Government 
promulgated new regulations to implement recent legislation that was 
passed to reform the prison system. The new law contains 128 articles 
and replaces a royal decree that had governed the prison system since 
1915. Among the reforms in the new legislation are provisions mandating 
compensation for work performed by prisoners. Prisoners with ``good 
conduct'' records also are accorded the right to a furlough to visit 
family members during important holiday periods. The new law forbids 
the use of handcuffs, manacles, or other devices used for physical 
restraint, except as required to restrain violent prisoners and then 
only after consultation with prison medical authorities. Procedures 
were established to allow the prisons to be inspected by the press and 
human rights organizations, and members of both the press and human 
rights organizations visited prisons after the procedures were 
established in August. Visitors must receive authorization from the 
Director of the Prison Administration. Special provisions also accord 
women the right to keep their children with them in prison until the 
children reach the age of 2, or longer with special permission from the 
Ministry of Justice. The new law contains provisions that extend the 
function of the prison system beyond that of punishment and 
incarceration to include rehabilitation and preparation for a return to 
society.
    Nonetheless, credible reports indicate that harsh treatment and 
conditions continue, often as a result of chronic overcrowding. In 1997 
Oukacha Central Prison in Casablanca, which is designed for 5,000 
inmates, held 8,831. Human rights groups allege that poor medical care 
in prisons results in unnecessary deaths. To address this problem, the 
Government provided special funds in the 1998-99 budget for the 
renovation of prison facilities, and added doctors and health 
facilities to prisons during the year.
    In the first visit of its kind Members of Parliament visited Sale 
prison on February 10 to investigate prison conditions and allegations 
of overcrowding. Their visit followed that of the ``2M'' television 
station, which took an exclusive look at prisons in a broadcast in 
January. In February the Justice Minister told the French daily 
newspaper Le Figaro that ``the time had come for humanity and prison 
system reform,'' adding, ``imprisonment does not mean the end of the 
right to being respected.'' The Minister acknowledged that there were 
problems, noting that the prison system currently holds 50,000 inmates, 
despite being designed for 35,000, but added that ``advances have been 
considerable.'' In response to the Government's initiatives, the 
president of the OMDH observed that there was ``a change of mind-set,'' 
which has resulted in more transparency in the prison system.
    Although the Government generally did not permit prison visits by 
human rights monitors in the past, since the tenure of the Youssoufi 
Government began there has been close collaboration between the Justice 
Ministry and human rights groups on prison visits, which now are 
authorized explicitly by law. OMDH members visited prisons several 
times throughout 1998 and once in early 1999, and reported that they 
were well-received and permitted free and full access to gauge progress 
on government efforts to reduce overcrowding, improve medical care, and 
provide additional facilities to inmates.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Legal provisions for due 
process have been revised extensively in recent years, although reports 
indicate that authorities sometimes ignore them. Although police 
usually make arrests in public and during the day, they do not always 
identify themselves and do not always obtain warrants. Incommunicado 
(``garde-a-vue'') detention is limited to 48 hours, with one 24-hour 
extension allowed at the prosecutor's discretion. In state security 
cases, the ``garde-a-vue'' period is 96 hours; this also may be 
extended by the prosecutor. It is during this initial period, when 
defendants are denied access to counsel, that the accused is 
interrogated and abuse or torture is most likely to occur. Some members 
of the security forces, long accustomed to indefinite precharge access 
to detainees, continue to resist the new rules.
    Under 1991 changes to the law, the police are obliged to notify a 
person's next of kin of an arrest as soon as possible.However, lawyers 
are not always informed promptly of the date of arrest, and thus are 
not always able to monitor compliance with the ``garde-a-vue'' 
detention limits. While the law provides for a limited system of bail, 
it rarely is granted. However, defendants are sometimes released on 
their own recognizance. The law does not provide for habeas corpus or 
its equivalent. Under a separate code of military justice, military 
authorities may detain members of the military without warrants or 
public trial.
    Although accused persons generally are brought to trial within an 
initial period of 2 months, prosecutors may request up to five 
additional 2-month extensions of pretrial detention. Thus, an accused 
person may be kept in detention for up to 1 year.
    Moroccan human rights organizations made credible allegations that 
police authorities unlawfully entered the homes of some Moroccans 
during the late hours of October 30 to arrest and detain persons wanted 
by the authorities in connection with the protests in the city of 
Laayoune in the Western Sahara from September 22 to 29, and and again 
on October 30 and 31 (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., 1.f., and 2.b.).
    Islamist dissident Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine has remained under 
house arrest in Sale since 1989 for refusing to acknowledge the 
religious authority of the King (see sections 2.a., 2.c., and 2.d.).
    In September an incident involving striking egg-farm workers in the 
southern suburbs of Rabat led to 21 arrests. In that incident, the 
workers, who damaged farm machinery during their protest, were arrested 
after demanding better working conditions and higher wages. The owner 
of the farm, a former police commissioner, reportedly called in the 
security forces, who charged the strikers with destruction of property 
and interfering in the means of production. The 21 workers, 8 of whom 
were women, were fined $50 (500 dirhams) and sentenced to prison for 
terms ranging from 1 to 7 months (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). In 
another strike incident in October police broke up a strike by the 
Agadir coastal fishermen's union and arrested four members of the 
union's leadership, including the secretary general. The strike was 
called to demand social security benefits and higher wages. The four 
individuals were tried and, under a statute prohibiting the disruption 
of economic activity, found guilty, fined $500 (5000 dirhams), and 
sentenced to 1 year in prison (see Sections 2.a. and 6.a.).
    Several persons were arrested and sentenced during the year in 
connection with their roles in demonstrations that were forcibly 
disrupted by police (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
    There are no known instances of forced exile. Formerly exiled 
political dissident Abraham Serfaty returned to Morocco on September 
30. Prior to Serfaty's return, on May 4, police at Rabat airport 
blocked Serfaty's wife, Christine, a French national, from entering the 
country upon her arrival from Paris. The next day, the semiofficial 
newspaper Le Matin stated that she was a ``dangerous radical who 
propagated the idea of independence for the southern territories of 
Morocco.'' However, soon after King Mohammed VI took the throne, 
Serfaty, a member of the (now defunct) Communist Party and a supporter 
of Saharan independence, who was expelled from Morocco in 1991, was 
welcomed back.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; although the courts historically have been 
subject to extrajudicial pressures, including bribery and government 
influence, the Youssoufi Government is implementing a reform program to 
introduce independence and impartiality. During the year, the 
Government continued to implement reforms intended to increase judicial 
independence. The Justice Minister in April 1998 stated that judicial 
reform was his top priority, and addressed the issue of corruption by 
disbarring and disciplining a number of judges. With the encouragement 
of then-King Hassan and the broad support of the business community, 
the Minister also oversaw the creation of a system of commercial courts 
for business litigation to boost investor confidence. In March the 
Ministry of Justice began to implement a 5-year reform plan that 
emphasizes transparency, accountability, and professionalism as top 
priorities. During the year, the administrative courts frequently ruled 
against local governments that overstepped their authority.
    There are four levels in the common law court system: Communal and 
district courts, courts of first instance, the Appeals Court, and the 
Supreme Court. While in theory there is a single court system under the 
Ministry of Justice, other courts also operate, including: The Special 
Court of Justice, which handles cases of civil servants who are 
implicated in corruption; administrative courts, which deal with the 
decisions of thebureaucracy; commercial courts, which deal with 
business disputes; and the military tribunal, for cases involving 
military personnel and, on certain occasions, matters pertaining to 
state security (although state security cases also may fall within the 
jurisdiction of the regular court system).
    Although there is a single court system for most nonmilitary 
matters, family issues such as marriage, divorce, child support and 
custody, and inheritance are adjudicated by judges trained in Shari'a 
(Islamic law). Judges considering criminal cases or cases in nonfamily 
areas of civil law generally are trained in the French legal tradition. 
All judges trained in recent years are graduates of the National 
Institute for Judicial Studies, where they undergo 3 years of study 
heavily focused on human rights and the rule of law. It is not 
necessary to be a lawyer to become a judge, and the majority of judges 
are not lawyers.
    In general detainees are arraigned before a court of first 
instance. If the infraction is minor and not contested, the judge may 
order the defendant released or impose a light sentence. If an 
investigation is required, the judge may release defendants on their 
own recognizance. According to reliable sources, cases often are 
adjudicated on the basis of confessions, some of which are obtained 
under duress.
    The Justice Minister has stated that he would attempt to end petty 
corruption in the judiciary by increasing judges' salaries and ensuring 
punishment for bribe-takers, as well as attempt to end all informal and 
inappropriate influences on judicial decisionmaking in the court 
system. Nonetheless, the court system remains subject to extrajudicial 
pressures. Despite recent increases, salaries for both judges and their 
staffs remain modest; as a result, some observers allege that petty 
bribery remains a routine cost of court business. In some courts, 
especially in minor criminal cases, some observers allege that 
defendants or their families must pay bribes to court officers and 
judges to secure a favorable disposition.
    In August 1997, King Hassan, after a vacancy of 2 years, appointed 
a new Minister of Justice, who began to reduce the judiciary's 
relationship with the Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, judges 
continue to work closely with the Interior Ministry's local network of 
officials, or ``caids,'' who serve as members of the judicial police 
and often legally are charged with the responsibility of questioning 
criminal defendants. Caids frequently prepare the written summary of an 
arrest and subsequent interrogation. The summary is admissible in court 
as an element of the evidentiary process and can carry great weight 
with the judge. After the new Justice Minister's appointment, the 
Ministry of Justice began to reassert its authority and control over 
judges.
    The law does not distinguish political and security cases from 
common criminal cases. In serious state security cases, communications 
between the Ministry of Interior and the court are more direct. At the 
Government's discretion, such cases may be brought before a specially 
constituted military tribunal, which is subservient to other branches 
of the Government, especially the military and the Ministry of 
Interior.
    Aside from external pressures, the court system also is subject to 
resource constraints. Consequently, criminal defendants charged with 
less serious offenses often receive only a cursory hearing, with judges 
relying on police reports to render decisions. Although the Government 
provides an attorney at public expense for serious crimes (when the 
offense carries a maximum sentence of over 5 years), appointed 
attorneys often provide inadequate representation.
    In May the Justice Minister announced that over the past year the 
judicial system had enforced judgments in 60,000 out of 100,000 cases 
of civil litigation, which represented significant progress toward 
eliminating a persistent backlog.
    In December 1998, the OMDH issued a report that assessed the status 
of the judiciary. According to the OMDH, the Youssoufi administration 
took a series of steps to improve the court system, including rooting 
out high-level corruption, naming a new Director for Judicial 
Administration at the Justice Ministry, reactivating a Justice Ministry 
disciplinary body, publishing that body's deliberations and decisions, 
and organizing free and fair elections to that body. Nevertheless, the 
OMDH called for additional reforms, including changing laws to reduce 
the Justice Minister's right to suspend judges, revamping the Criminal 
Code (which the OMDH stated offers insufficient protection for a fair 
trial), strengthening the law on civil liberties, and compelling judges 
to place their assets in a blind trust. The OMDH also called on the 
State to punish those officials guilty of human rights abuses. Finally, 
the OMDH noted the lack of resources necessary for documentation 
tracking and for court facilities.
    The Government continued to hold a number of political prisoners, 
although 28 were released in 1998. Prior to the 1998 release, the OMDH 
estimated that there were some 60 political prisoners, of whom 50 were 
Islamists and the remainder were leftists. Among the 50 alleged 
Islamists were 16 members of the ``Group of 26.'' The Ministry of 
Interior claimed that there were 55 Islamists serving sentences for 
offenses that ranged from arms smuggling to participating in a bomb 
attack on a hotel in Marrakech. However, some of these prisoners remain 
in prison for having called for an Islamic state in 1983. International 
human rights groups' estimates of the number of persons in prison for 
advocating independence for the Western Sahara varies from none to 700.
    Of the 28 prisoners released in 1998, the AMDH acknowledged that 20 
were included on its list of political prisoners; the rest were 
Islamists who had committed crimes of murder or robbery, albeit with 
political motives. After the release of the 28 prisoners, the AMDH 
released a communique in which it noted the continued incarceration of 
16 persons whom it considered to be political prisoners. Amnesty 
International lists eight persons whom it considers to be political 
prisoners.
    A group of 14 men who called themselves Islamist political 
prisoners issued a communique from prison on June 13. The communique 
welcomed the decision to release the 28 political prisoners and to 
examine ways to redress the excesses of the past, but noted that the 
CCDH's call for a general amnesty for political prisoners did not 
benefit many of those who remained in prison. The prisoners called on 
the Government to ``implement, without restrictions or conditions, the 
CCDH's advisory opinion that calls for the immediate release of all 
political prisoners and the total and final end of political detention 
in Morocco.''
    During and following public demonstrations in Laayoune between 
September 22 and 29, more than 150 persons were detained by police 
authorities. Most were released within a matter of days; however, 26 
persons were tried on criminal charges for actions taken in connection 
with the protests and sentenced to imprisonment for periods ranging 
from 10 to 15 years. The OMDH claimed that the trial of these persons 
was unfair and insisted that the defendants were not provided adequate 
legal counsel for their defense. The OMDH also called the sentences 
excessive for charges that concerned little more than destruction of 
property during the course of the demonstrations (see Sections 1.f. and 
2.b.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that the home is inviolable 
and that no search or investigation may take place without a search 
warrant, and the law stipulates that a search warrant may be issued by 
a prosecutor on good cause; however, authorities sometimes ignore these 
provisions. During protests in Laayoune in the Western Sahara in 
September and October, police reportedly encouraged local thugs to 
break into, loot, and destroy private shops. Following the protests in 
October, police unlawfully entered homes to arrest persons associated 
with the demonstrations. Human rights NGO's claim that such police 
actions created a ``climate of fear'' in the city, forcing some 
families to flee the city or change residences nightly to avoid such 
police actions (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 2.a.).
    Government security services monitor certain persons and 
organizations, both foreign and Moroccan, and government informers 
monitor activities on university campuses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides 
for freedom of expression, the Government restricts press freedom 
regarding a few topics that the Government considers sensitive. 
However, newspapers and weeklies from across the political spectrum, 
from Socialist to nationalist to Islamist, publish freely.
    The Government owns the official press agency, Maghreb Arab Press, 
and the Arabic daily Al-Anbaa. The Government also supports two 
semiofficial dailies, the French-language Le Matin and the Arabic-
language Assahra. In addition the Government provides subsidies to the 
rest of the press through price supports for newsprint and office 
space. A 1958 decree grants the Government the authority to register 
and license domestic newspapers and journals. Authorities may use the 
licensing process to prevent the publication of materials that they 
believe cross the threshold of tolerable dissent. Offending 
publications may be declared a danger to state security, seized, the 
publisher's license suspended, and equipment destroyed. TheMinistry of 
Interior may control foreign publications by collecting ``banned'' 
publications after they have been distributed. In general the 
Government does not employ extreme measures, and there were no reports 
of the abuse of the Government's licensing authority during the year. 
However, the media regularly engages in self-censorship to avoid the 
Government's attention and possible sanctions.
    The Press Code empowers the Minister of Interior to confiscate 
publications that are judged offensive by the Government. Under the 
code, the Prime Minister may order the indefinite suspension of a 
publication. There were approximately 2,000 domestic and foreign 
newspapers, magazines, and journals in circulation. There were no 
confirmed cases of seizures of foreign or domestic newspapers or 
journals for the second year in a row. In general press articles 
containing unflattering material that routinely had been prevented from 
circulation in the past were allowed free circulation during the year.
    In June the Moroccan weekly Le Journal alleged that the Government 
ordered its printer to stop printing the newspaper because the 
newspaper decided to print interviews with several controversial 
political figures and because it called for the resignation of the 
Interior Minister. The printer denied that the Government gave such an 
order, explaining that the newspaper was denied the use of the printing 
press only because of its unpaid bills. After its failure to use its 
usual printer, Le Journal used French printers to continue publishing. 
It remains on sale throughout the country and continues to publish 
highly controversial and critical stories that previously would have 
resulted in its suspension.
    The Press Code empowers the Government to censor newspapers 
directly by ordering them not to report on specific items or events. In 
most past instances, government control of the media generally has been 
exercised through directives and ``guidance'' from the Ministry of 
Interior. Nonetheless, the Government generally tolerates satirical and 
often stinging editorials in the opposition parties' dailies. However, 
both law and tradition historically have prohibited criticism on three 
topics: The monarchy, Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara, and the 
sanctity of Islam. However, with respect to the Western Sahara, several 
leading journals published articles in late October and early November 
that were highly critical of past government administration of the 
territory.
    The Government controls Radio-Television Marocaine (RTM) 
broadcasts. Another major broadcaster is the French-backed Medi-1, 
which operates from Tangier and reaches throughout Morocco and North 
Africa. While nominally private and independent, Medi-1 practices self-
censorship, as do other media outlets. The Government owns the only 
television stations whose broadcasts can be received in most parts of 
the nation without decoders or satellite dish antennas. In 1996 the 
Government purchased a majority share in 2M, formerly the country's 
sole private station, which can be received in most urban areas. The 
ostensible reason for the Government's action was to save 2M from 
bankruptcy; the Government now owns 68 percent of 2M stock, and the 
Minister of Communication, by virtue of his position, has become the 
chairman of the board. A government-appointed committee monitors 
broadcasts. Privatization of these stations continued to be a major 
topic of political debate during the year, and the Government announced 
in 1998 that it was preparing a plan for 2M's resale to the private 
sector.
    In June a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reporter 
accredited to Morocco was denied entry when he attempted to return 
through the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, allegedly for failing to present 
any proof that he worked for the BBC. After providing sufficient proof, 
the reporter was permitted to enter the country. The reporter 
subsequently was informed on July 1 by the Ministry of Communication 
that his credentials as a journalist had been denied. However, he 
subsequently was accredited and continues to reside in Morocco and file 
stories. Bziz (also known as Ahmad Sanoussi), a popular humorist, has 
been prohibited from performing in Morocco for the past 12 years due to 
his satire of those in power; however, in November Bziz appeared in a 
government-sponsored television advertisement announcing the Royal 
Palace's second annual ``Solidarity Campaign Against Poverty.''
    Islamist dissident Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine has remained under 
house arrest in Sale since 1989 for refusing to acknowledge the 
religious authority of the monarchy (see Sections 1.d., 2.c., and 
2.d.). However, Yassine's books and articles are sold without 
restriction, and editorials calling for his release are published 
without impediment. Yassine's Justice and Charity Organization (JCO) 
has an active presence on university campuses and occasionally 
organizes protests of his continued house arrest. However, prominent 
members of the JCO are subject to constant surveillance and sometimes 
are unable to obtain passports and other necessary documents. On April 
13, AMDHcriticized the CCDH for not having addressed the Yassine case 
in its review of human rights in Morocco.
    Dish antennas are available at low cost on the market and permit 
free access to a wide variety of foreign broadcasts. Residents of the 
north are able to receive Spanish broadcasts with standard antennas. 
The Government does not impede the reception of foreign broadcasts or 
Internet access.
    The universities enjoy relative academic freedom in most areas, but 
are barred from open debate on the monarchy, the Western Sahara, and 
Islam. Government informers monitor campus activities (see Section 
1.f.) and rectors are approved by the Ministry of Interior.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the law also permits the 
Government to suppress even peaceful demonstrations and mass 
gatherings, and at times police forcibly prevented and disrupted 
gatherings during the year. Most conferences and demonstrations require 
the prior authorization of the Ministry of Interior, ostensibly for 
security reasons.
    Throughout the year, many meetings and marches occurred without 
government interference; however, police continued to use violent means 
to disperse unemployed demonstrators and to prevent several marches by 
members of the ANDC, affiliated groups, and, to a lesser extent, others 
groups. A court in Fes sentenced two members of the ANDC to 2-month 
sentences and $50 (500 dirhams) fines for organizing several ANDC 
rallies that authorities disrupted in Fes in January. Also in January, 
police blocked marches planned by blind unemployed graduates in Taounat 
(near Fes) and Meknes.
    Authorities denied permission for a planned February 6 march in 
Kenitra to protest U.N. policies toward Iraq. On February 14, 
authorities in Fes used force to disperse striking truckers. On 
February 15, police stopped blind unemployed graduates when they 
attempted to march from Istiqlal party headquarters to the Parliament. 
On March 8, security forces in El-Houceima used force to disperse a 
protest by unemployed graduates. Unemployed demonstrators camped in 
front of the Parliament for several weeks in the spring until 
authorities forced them to disperse in an April 24 nighttime operation. 
On May 16, a group of 1,000 persons demonstrated in front of 
Parliament, calling for the cancellation of instructions issued by the 
Ministry of Interior that barred political parties and NGO's from using 
government facilities for meetings. As police dispersed the crowd, 
clashes broke out with demonstrators. On May 20, ANDC members in 
Essaouira organized a march and sit-in at the municipal council 
building. Police used violent means to disperse the protesters, and 
numerous persons were injured. Police also used force against ANDC 
protesters in Beni Mellal on May 22, injuring numerous protesters and 
briefly detaining 14. On May 31, police used force to disperse a group 
of unemployed doctors and engineers who had been conducting a sit-in at 
the Parliament since May 27.
    In Tendrara on June 1, police arrested a group of 15 students who 
organized a peaceful protest to criticize the corruption of the 
president of a local rural commune, as well as to ask for a sewage 
system for the town. The 15 students all were released and none were 
tried. On June 1 and 11, unemployed blind students attempted to march 
on Parliament to demand jobs. Police intercepted them, beat them, put 
them in vans, and returned them to the bus station where they had been 
staging a sit-in during the previous 8 months. On June 20, police in 
Laayoune used force to disrupt a demonstration by 35 persons who were 
demanding work. Two persons were injured and two were arrested; the two 
arrested were released later.
    In September a strike involving egg-farm workers in the southern 
suburbs of Rabat resulted in 21 arrests. Striking workers, who damaged 
farm machinery during their protest, were arrested after demanding 
better working conditions and higher wages. The owner, a former police 
commissioner, is believed to have called in the security forces, who 
charged the strikers with destruction of property and interfering in 
the means of production. The 21 workers, 8 of whom were women, were 
fined $50 (500 dirhams) and sentenced to prison for terms ranging from 
1 to 7 months (see Sections 1.e and 6.a.). In October police broke up a 
strike by the Agadir coastal fishermen's union and arrested four 
members of the union's leadership, including the secretary general. The 
strike was called to demand social security benefits and higher wages. 
The four individuals were tried and, under a statute prohibiting the 
disruption of economic activity, were found guilty, fined $50 (500 
dirhams), and sentenced to 1 year in prison (see Sections 1.e. and 
6.a.).
    In what were clearly the worst instances of police excess during 
the year, police authorities in Laayoune used brutal force tobreak up 
demonstrations organized by students, unemployed graduates, miners, and 
former Sahrawi political prisoners between September 22 and September 
29. The incident began as a peaceful protest over a variety of social 
grievances. There were also credible reports that the Laayoune police 
encouraged local thugs in civilian dress to break into, loot, and 
destroy shops owned by local Sahrawi residents of the city. The thugs 
also reportedly were encouraged to attack local Sahrawi residents. Some 
who were detained were subjected to systematic beatings and other forms 
of physical coercion. Nearly 150 persons were detained during and just 
after the first round of protests in Laayoune in late September. Most 
of those detained were released; however, 26 persons were charged and 
sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison on charges of destruction of 
property during the protests.
    The Justice Minister defended the trial process and the sentences 
in a statement made on November 8, while he was in Laayoune as part of 
a royal commission appointed by Mohammed VI to oversee reforms in the 
administration of the territory. The official Moroccan press agency, 
MAP, quoted the Minister as saying, ``there has not been any violation 
of the law and the trial took place in a normal and sound way and was 
based on the confessions of the suspects, who participated in 
subversive acts, theft, looting, and violation of the sanctities of 
homes.'' By contrast the OMDH was highly critical of the trial. It 
stated that the suspects did not receive adequate legal representation 
and that the sentences were excessive. The OMDH also filed a complaint 
with the local judicial authorities on behalf of some of the persons 
who were taken into custody. The complaint alleged that the police 
tortured them in order to obtain confessions, and that they were denied 
due process.
    In the aftermath of the first round of protests in Laayoune, King 
Mohammed VI immediately replaced the governor of the province, relieved 
the local police chief of his duties, and dispatched military security 
forces to the city to help restore order. The local population welcomed 
the military security forces, in which it expressed confidence, as 
opposed to the police, which it held responsible for creating a 
``climate of fear'' in the city. The new royal commission was 
dispatched quickly to the city to explain to local residents proposed 
new measures to decentralize authority in the region, which would allow 
local residents more of a choice in their affairs, and a new election 
to choose members to a proposed new royal advisory council on the 
Western Sahara.
    Despite these prompt actions taken to restore confidence and order 
and to lessen tensions, renewed violence broke out on October 30 and 
continued into the next day. There were credible reports that police 
provoked the violence during the day. Order reportedly was not restored 
until the police were withdrawn from neighborhoods on October 31 and 
replaced by military security forces. There were further credible 
reports that during the late night and early morning hours of October 
30 and 31, police authorities unlawfully entered homes to arrest 
persons associated with the demonstrations in late September and 
earlier that day. Thirty-one persons reportedly were detained. Of 
these, 10 persons reportedly were released within 24 hours and the 
remainder released within the following 2-week period.
    Some members of the commission on the Western Sahara again were 
dispatched quickly to Laayoune; however, tensions again mounted in the 
city when one commission member, then-Interior Minister Basri, told 
local officials that the referendum on the territory's future, to be 
held under the auspices of the United Nations (and then scheduled to 
take place in the summer of 2000), likely would not occur before 2003. 
Following Basri's statement and the second round of excessive police 
actions in Laayoune in late October, King Mohammed VI dismissed Basri 
on November 9. There were no charges made and no investigation was 
initiated into the excessive use of force by the police by year's end, 
although the police chief was relieved of his duties and several other 
police officials were transferred out of the city.
    However, there also were numerous peaceful protests during the 
year. For example, unemployed demonstrators held a sit-in at the Rabat 
road terminal for 3 months without disruption in the spring. On April 
26, 3,000 ANDC members marched peacefully from the Parliament through 
the center of Rabat after observing a 2-hour sit-in on the steps of the 
Parliament. Security forces were present, but did not intervene. On May 
1, labor unions marched through Casablanca to commemorate May Day. On 
May 4, police peacefully dispersed ANDC protesters from Parliament. On 
November 4, students and unemployed graduates marched peacefully from 
the law faculty in Rabat to the Parliament to protest a variety of 
social grievances. A similar protest and 6-hour sit-in also occurred 
without police interference in Marrakech the previous day.
    In March the press reported on an alleged Ministry of Interior 
decision to ban all public meetings from government-owned facilities. 
Amid protests that such tactics constituted a flagrant violation of the 
freedom of expression, the AMDH and the League for the Defense of Human 
Rights (LMDH) issued on March 11, a communique that criticized the 
Ministry of Interior for its alleged actions. Later the same day, 
government spokesman Khalid Alioua stated that the Ministry's decision 
had been ``badly interpreted,'' and applied only to meetings in 
municipal council and administration buildings, not to the public halls 
that routinely are used by unions, parties, NGO's, and other groups. On 
April 14, in response to questions in Parliament, then-Interior 
Minister Basri maintained that his Ministry had sent to local 
authorities ``a telex for internal use following the unauthorized 
meeting of a group with an unknown affiliation within a university 
building on February 22.'' The Minister added that his goal was ``to 
protect campuses from antidemocratic political activism and to ensure 
the continuity of public services. Other than that, liberty is the 
rule.'' The order was revoked by the Prime Minister's office on 
November 5.
    After violent police suppression of demonstrations in Rabat in 
October 1998, Basri agreed in December 1998 to recognize officially the 
jobless demonstrators' association, the ANDC, whose request for 
recognition had been pending for 7 years. Basri also agreed to grant 
members of the group 5,000 taxi licenses. Members of the ANDC also were 
invited by the King to a national conference on unemployment in 
December 1998. In June the Ministers of Interior and Employment toured 
the regions to instruct walis and governors on how to take steps to 
reduce unemployment, and to listen to the needs of the unemployed. 
However, despite repeated meetings with the Ministers of Interior and 
Employment, the ANDC has not obtained official recognition and the 
promised taxi licenses have not been issued.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the 
Government limits this right in practice. Under a 1958 decree, which 
was amended substantially in 1973 to introduce restrictions on civil 
society organizations, persons wishing to create an organization must 
obtain the approval of the Ministry of Interior before holding 
meetings. In practice the Ministry uses this requirement to prevent 
persons suspected of advocating causes opposed by the Government from 
forming legal organizations. Historically, extreme Islamist and leftist 
groups have encountered the greatest difficulty in obtaining official 
approval. Although there are over 20 active Islamist groups, the 
Government has prohibited membership in two, the JCO and Jama'a 
Islamia, due to their perceived anti-monarchy rhetoric. Political 
parties also must be approved by the Ministry of Interior, which has 
used this power to control participation in the political process. 
However, individual Islamists are not barred from participating in 
recognized political parties. The last known instance in which a 
proposed political party failed to receive such approval was in 1996, 
when an Islamist group's application was not approved. The group 
instead was permitted to present candidates for the 1997 elections 
under the banner of an existing party. One Islamist party, the Party 
for Justice and Development (PJD--formerly the Popular Democratic 
Constitutional Movement), won nine seats in Parliament in the 1997 
elections. There was some progress during the year on increasing 
freedom of association, including the revocation by the Prime Minister 
of a directive that prohibited the use of public spaces for meetings by 
associations, political parties, and trade unions. The Prime Minister 
also eased requirements for obtaining authorization for meetings in 
public areas.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Although the Constitution provides for 
freedom of religion, until recently only Islam, Christianity, and 
Judaism were tolerated in practice; however, in 1996 a small foreign 
Hindu community received the right to perform cremations and to hold 
services. Other foreign communities enjoy similar religious privileges. 
However, Baha'is face restrictions on the practice of their faith.
    Islam is the official religion. Ninety-nine percent of citizens are 
Sunni Muslims, and the King bears the title ``Commander of the 
Faithful.'' The Jewish community of approximately 5,000 practices its 
faith freely and openly, as does the somewhat larger foreign Christian 
(Catholic and Protestant) community. The Baha'i community of 350 to 400 
persons has been forbidden to meet or participate in communal 
activities since 1983.
    The Government does not license or approve religions or religious 
organizations. The Government provides tax benefits, land and building 
grants, subsidies, and customs exemptions for imports necessary for the 
observance of the major religions.
    Islamic law and tradition call for strict punishment for any Muslim 
who converts to another faith. Citizens who convert toChristianity and 
other religions sometimes face social ostracism, and in the past a 
small number have faced short periods of questioning by the 
authorities. Although voluntary conversion is not a crime under the 
Criminal or Civil Codes, it remains a crime under religious law, and 
few citizens make such a distinction. Any attempt to induce a Muslim to 
convert is illegal. Foreign missionaries either limit their 
proselytizing to non-Muslims or conduct their work quietly. The 
Government cited the Penal Code prohibition on employing inducements in 
order to ``shake the faith'' of a Muslim or to convert him to another 
religion in most cases in which courts expel foreign missionaries.
    There were no confirmed reports during the year of cases of 
foreigners being denied entry into the country at the port of Tangier 
because they were carrying Christian materials. There were no confirmed 
reports that Christians were arrested or expelled for proselytizing or 
displaying non-Muslim religious items during the year, as occurred in 
1998.
    The Ministry of Islamic Affairs monitors Friday mosque sermons and 
the Koranic schools to ensure the teaching of approved doctrine. The 
authorities sometimes suppress the activities of Islamists, but 
generally tolerate activities limited to the propagation of Islam, 
education, and charity. Security forces commonly close mosques to the 
public shortly after Friday services to prevent the use of the premises 
for unauthorized political activity. The Government strictly controls 
authorization to construct new mosques. Most mosques are constructed 
using private funds.
    The Government provides funds for the teaching of Islam in public 
schools, and also provides funds for religious instruction to the 
parallel system of Jewish public schools. The Government has funded 
several efforts to study the cultural, artistic, literary and 
scientific heritage of Moroccan Jews. In May King Hassan II organized 
the first meeting of the ``World Union of Moroccan Jews'' in Marrakech.
    Since the time of the French protectorate (1912-1956), a small 
foreign Christian community has opened churches, orphanages, hospitals, 
and schools without any restriction or licensing requirement being 
imposed. Missionaries who conduct themselves in accordance with 
societal expectations largely are left unhindered. Those whose 
proselytizing activities become public face expulsion.
    In January a court in Fes convicted 11 men of violating the Penal 
Code provision that forbids eating or drinking in public during the 
Ramadan fast. The court levied small fines against the men, who 
publicly broke their fast the day before the Eid holiday. They did so 
to acknowledge publicly only Mecca's (as opposed to the Government's) 
authority in ending the fast.
    The Government permits the display and sale of Bibles in French, 
English, and Spanish, but confiscates Arabic-language Bibles and 
refuses licenses for their importation and sale, despite the absence of 
any law banning such books. Nevertheless, Arabic Bibles reportedly have 
been seen for sale in local bookstores.
    There were no reports during the year that the Government summoned 
members of the Baha'i Faith for questioning or denied them passports, 
as had occurred in previous years.
    There are two sets of laws and courts--one for Jews and one for 
Muslims--pertaining to marriage, inheritance, and family matters. The 
family law courts are run, depending on the law that applies, by 
rabbinical and Islamic authorities who are court officials. Parliament 
must authorize any changes to those laws. Non-Koranic sections of 
Muslim law on personal status are applied to non-Muslim and non-Jewish 
persons.
    Islamist dissident Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine has remained under 
house arrest in Sale since 1989 for refusing to acknowledge the 
religious authority of the King (see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 2.d.). In 
October 1998, the Government of Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssouffi 
stated that it intended to end Yassine's detention, and an appeal of 
Yassine's detention was expected to be heard before the Supreme Court. 
In April the Minister of Housing (and number two official in the Prime 
Minister's governing party) declared that Yassine's detention could not 
continue; however, the Government did not release Yassine from house 
arrest by year's end.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement; however, the Government restricts this right in certain 
areas. The gendarmerie maintains checkpoints throughout the country, at 
which drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations are verified for 
validity. Although checkpoints have been maintained in thesame places 
for years, the degree of inspections of motorists has relaxed, while 
the emphasis on inspecting trucks and buses continues. In addition 
while there are continuing allegations that gendarmes demand small 
bribes to clear vehicles, press reports indicate that gendarmes found 
guilty of such behavior are punished. In October 1998, the Gendarmerie 
Royale announced a campaign to combat such abuses within its ranks. On 
February 10, a court in Tangier sentenced two gendarmes to 1-year 
prison terms for corruption, complicity in smuggling, and aggravated 
assault. In the Moroccan-administered Western Sahara, movement is 
restricted in areas regarded as militarily sensitive.
    The Ministry of Interior restricts freedom to travel outside the 
country in certain circumstances. The OMDH and AMDH have compiled lists 
of individuals who reportedly have been denied passports or who have 
passports but are denied permission to travel. The OMDH lists 20 
persons, including Mostapha Farissi, a former political detainee. The 
AMDH's list includes 70 persons, many of whom are Islamists. In 
addition all civil servants and military personnel must obtain written 
permission from their ministries to leave the country. The spiritual 
leader of the Islamist JCO, Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine, has remained 
under house arrest in Sale since 1989 for refusing to acknowledge the 
religious authority of the monarchy (see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 
2.c.).
    Moroccans may not renounce their citizenship, but the King retains 
the power--rarely used--to revoke it. Tens of thousands of Moroccans 
hold more than one citizenship and travel on passports from two or more 
countries. While in Morocco, they are regarded as Moroccan citizens. 
Dual nationals sometimes complain of harassment by immigration 
inspectors.
    The Government welcomes voluntary repatriation of Jews who have 
emigrated. Moroccan Jewish emigres, including those with Israeli 
citizenship, freely visit Morocco. The Government also encourages the 
return of Sahrawis who have departed Morocco due to the conflict in the 
Western Sahara, provided that they recognize the Government's claim to 
the region. The Government does not permit Saharan nationalists who 
have been released from prison to live in the disputed territory.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. While Morocco has from time to time provided political asylum 
to individuals, the issue of first asylum has never arisen. There were 
no reports of forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee 
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change their Government
    Constitutional provisions establishing periodic free elections 
notwithstanding, citizens do not have the full right to change their 
government. The King, as head of state, appoints the Prime Minister, 
who is the titular head of government. Constitutional changes in 1992, 
retained in the Constitution of 1996, authorize the Prime Minister to 
nominate all government ministers, but the King has the power to 
replace any minister at will. The Parliament has the theoretical 
ability to effect change in the system of government. However, the 
Constitution may not be changed without the King's approval. The 
Ministry of Interior appoints the provincial governors and local caids 
(district administrative officials). Municipal and regional councils 
are elected.
    The Government of Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi is the 
first government formed from the political opposition since the late 
1950's, and his appointment by King Hassan marked a significant step 
toward increased democratization. With the support of the monarchy, 
Youssoufi, who was sentenced to death in absentia in the 1970's but 
subsequently received a royal pardon in 1980, has declared his 
intention to modernize the administrative and judicial structures and 
to liberalize the economic and political system. Of the 41 cabinet-
level posts in the new Government, only 4 posts were filled by 
holdovers from the former Government (Interior, Foreign Affairs, 
Justice, and Islamic Affairs), plus the Secretary General of the 
Government and the Minister-Delegate for Defense Administration. In 
November the King replaced one of the four holdovers, Interior Minister 
Driss Basri. In order to develop reforms, the King granted cabinet 
ministers a greater degree of responsibility for the management of 
their individual portfolios.
    Morocco created a bicameral legislature in 1997. Fourteen parties 
have members in Parliament, and seven are represented in the governing 
coalition. While opposition parties urged in 1996 and 1997 that all 
members of Parliament be elected directly by the citizenry, King Hassan 
II proposed in 1996 the creation of a bicameral legislature, whereby 
all members of the lower chamber would be elected directly by the 
citizenry and all members ofthe second chamber indirectly selected by 
popularly elected regional, municipal, and professional councils.
    In June 1997, Morocco held municipal council elections, followed by 
balloting for regional professional councils. In the wake of the June 
1997 elections, political parties accused each other of manipulation 
and vote-buying, and claimed government intervention on behalf of 
candidates. The Election Commission examined numerous petitions during 
the course of the electoral season in 1997 and recommended the reversal 
of over 60 municipal election results, including in Tangier, Khoribga, 
and Oujda, noted irregularities in four parliamentary races in 
Casablanca, Chefchaouen, and Fes, and called for the results to be set 
aside. The OMDH criticized the prominent role of the Interior Ministry 
in the June 1997 elections, as well as the numerous allegations of 
vote-buying, both by the Government and political parties, electoral 
list manipulation by the Government, and electoral card falsification.
    In August 1997, King Hassan II convoked a special session of 
Parliament to ratify two laws creating a bicameral assembly, and, in 
the same month, Parliament unanimously approved these laws, which 
created a 325-seat lower house to be filled by direct elections, and a 
270-seat upper house whose members would be elected by various directly 
elected professional and regional councils. There were widespread, 
credible allegations of vote-buying and government manipulation in the 
November 1997 legislative elections. The fraud and government pressure 
tactics led most independent observers to conclude that the election 
results were heavily influenced, if not predetermined, by the 
Government. All opposition parties criticized the Government, and some 
called for a boycott of Parliament. Two winners renounced their seats, 
alleging unsolicited government interference on their behalf. The 
Election Commission concurred that irregularities had occurred in two 
Casablanca cases and recommended that new elections be held in those 
districts; however, new elections were never scheduled. The Commission 
also examined other complaints and recommended new elections in 
Chefchaouen and Fes, which took place in 1998.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 2 
female secretaries of state in the 41-member Cabinet. There are 2 women 
among the 325 members of Parliament's Chamber of Deputies and 2 women 
in the 270-seat Chamber of Counselors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are three officially-recognized nongovernmental human rights 
groups: The Moroccan Human Rights Organization, the Moroccan League for 
the Defense of Human Rights, and the Moroccan Human Rights Association. 
A fourth group, the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDDH), 
was formed in 1992 by former AMDH members. The Government maintains 
close and collaborative relations with all of these groups.
    A new NGO, the National Observatory of Moroccan Prisons (ONPM), was 
formed in November for the purpose of improving treatment of prisoners. 
Created by lawyers, doctors, journalists, former inmates and 
entertainment personalities, the ONPM's specific goals are to 
facilitate the improvement of living conditions within prisons and to 
support penal reform efforts. The ONPM is attempting to enforce the 
minimum daily dietary allotment that it claims prisons repeatedly 
disregard.
    Amnesty International has local chapters in Rabat, Casablanca, and 
Marrakech. These chapters participate in AI international letter 
campaigns outside Morocco. The Government hosted a visit by AI 
secretary general Pierre Sane in June, during which Sane met with 
senior government officials and announced that AI would open a regional 
office in Morocco and would hold its International Congress in 
Marrakech in August. However, in June articles in the French and 
Moroccan press asserted that the Government had changed its stance on 
hosting the conference, allegedly because of fears that AI delegates 
would organize protests in Rabat against the human rights situation in 
the Western Sahara.
    Prime Minister Youssoufi chairs a human rights commission that 
reviews cases of past and present human rights issues. The commission 
is composed of members of the Government, including the Ministers of 
Justice, Human Rights, and Interior.
    The Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights, an advisory body to 
the King, counsels the palace on human rights issues, and was the 
organization charged by the King to resolve cases related to persons 
who had disappeared. The CCDH announced on January 27 that it would 
create five working groups to promote the protection of human rights. 
They included groups on penal law; prison conditions; communications 
with human rights NGO's;inhuman conditions of refugees in Polisario-
controlled camps in Tindouf, Algeria; and economic, social, and 
cultural rights.
    Human rights Minister Mohammed Aujjar announced in March that it 
was the Government's priority to ensure that local laws, particularly 
the Code for Public Liberties, be harmonized with the country's 
international obligations ``in conformity with the precepts of Islam.'' 
Aujjar added that the Government's legal reforms to bolster the 
freedoms of citizens would take place according to a ``5-year plan.'' 
For example, the 1935 law permitting the imprisonment of defaulters to 
settle their debts to public entities would be annulled.
    In April in Casablanca, the Government hosted an international 
conference on human rights in the Arab world. The conference, which 
included human rights NGO's from throughout the Arab world, examined 
the status of human rights in the Arab world and reaffirmed the 
universality of human rights principles. The Prime Minister addressed 
the gathering and reiterated the Government's commitment to human 
rights reforms.
    The U.N. Education and Science Council (UNESCO) organized a 
conference in February in Rabat on human rights education in the Arab 
world. Participants assessed ways to introduce human rights into school 
curricula in Arab nations and exchanged ideas on spreading the concept 
of human rights education throughout the Arab world. Several government 
ministers took part in the proceedings.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Although the Constitution states that all citizens are equal, non-
Muslims and women face discrimination in the law and traditional 
practice.
    Women.--Spousal violence is common. Although a battered wife has 
the right to complain to the police, as a practical matter, she would 
do so only if prepared to bring criminal charges. While physical abuse 
is a legal ground for divorce, a court only grants it if the woman is 
able to provide two witnesses to the abuse. Even medical certificates 
are not sufficient. If the court finds against the woman, she is 
returned to her husband's home. Consequently, few women report abuses 
to the authorities.
    The Criminal Code provides for severe punishment for men convicted 
of rape or sexually assaulting a woman or a girl. The defendants in 
such cases bear the burden of proving their innocence. However, sexual 
assaults often go unreported because of the stigma attached to the loss 
of virginity. While not provided for by law, victim's families may 
offer rapists the opportunity to marry their victims in order to 
preserve the honor of the family. The law is more lenient toward men 
with respect to crimes committed against their wives; for example, a 
light sentence may be accorded a man who murders his wife after 
catching her in the act of adultery.
    Women suffer various forms of legal and cultural discrimination. 
The civil law status of women is governed by the Moudouwana, or Code of 
Personal Status, which is based on the Malikite school of Islamic law. 
Although the Moudouwana was reformed in 1993, women's groups still 
complain of unequal treatment, particularly under the laws governing 
marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
    In order to marry, a woman generally is required to obtain the 
permission of her ``tuteur,'' or legal guardian, usually her father. 
Only in unusual circumstances may she act as her own ``tuteur.''
    It is far easier for a man to divorce his wife than for a woman to 
divorce her husband. Under Islamic law and tradition, rather than 
asking for a divorce, a man simply may repudiate his wife outside of 
court. Under the 1993 reforms to the Moudouwana, a woman's presence in 
court is required in order for her husband to divorce her, although 
women's groups report that this law frequently is ignored. However, 
human rights activists reported that, in a recent NGO-sponsored test, 
officials refused to order a divorce without the wife being present, 
despite offers of bribes. Nevertheless, women's groups complain that 
men resort to ruses to evade the new legal restrictions. The divorce 
may be finalized even over the woman's objections, although in such 
cases the court grants her unspecified allowance rights.
    A woman seeking a divorce has few practical alternatives. She may 
offer her husband money to agree to a divorce (known as a khol'a 
divorce). The husband must agree to the divorce and is allowed to 
specify the amount to be paid, without limit. According to women's 
groups, many men pressure their wives to pursue this kind of divorce. A 
woman also may file for a judicial divorce if her husband takes a 
second wife, if heabandons her, or if he physically abuses her. 
However, divorce procedures in these cases are lengthy and complicated. 
In November 1998 the Minister of Islamic Affairs proposed the 
institutionalization of additions to the basic marriage contract that 
would outline the rights and duties agreed upon between husband and 
wife, and permit legal recourse for the enforcement of the contract.
    Under the Criminal Code, women generally are accorded the same 
treatment as men, but this is not the case for family and estate law, 
which is based on the Moudouwana. Under the Moudouwana, women inherit 
only half as much as male heirs. Moreover, even where the law provides 
for equal status, cultural norms often prevent a woman from exercising 
those rights. For example, when a woman inherits property, male 
relatives may pressure her to relinquish her interest.
    While many well-educated women pursue careers in law, medicine, 
education, and government service, few make it to the top echelons of 
their professions. Women constitute approximately 35 percent of the 
work force, with the majority in the industrial, service, and teaching 
sectors. The Government reports that the illiteracy rate for women is 
67 percent (and 89 percent in rural areas), compared with 41 percent 
for men. Women in rural areas suffer the most from inequality. Rural 
women perform most difficult physical labor, and the literacy rate in 
the countryside is significantly lower for women than for men. Girls 
are much less likely to be sent to school than are boys, especially in 
rural areas where the quality of schooling is inferior to urban areas, 
and demands on girls' time for household chores often prevent school 
attendance. However, women who do earn secondary school diplomas have 
equal access to university education.
    According to a 1997 government survey, 76 NGO's work to advance 
women's rights and to promote women's issues. Among these are the 
Democratic Association of Moroccan Women, the Union for Women's Action, 
and the Moroccan Association for Women's Rights, which advocate 
enhanced political and civil rights, as well as numerous NGO's that 
provide shelters for battered women, teach women basic hygiene, family 
planning, and child care, and educate illiterate women.
    Children.--The law provides for compulsory education for children 
between the ages of 7 and 13; however, not all children between these 
ages attend school due to family decisions and shortfalls in government 
resources, and the Government does not enforce the law. The Government 
conducts an annual campaign to vaccinate children against childhood 
diseases.
    The Government has had difficulty addressing the problem of child 
labor (see Section 6.d.). Young girls in particular are exploited as 
domestic servants. Teenage prostitution in urban centers has been 
estimated in the tens of thousands by NGO activists. The clientelle 
comprises both foreign tourists and Moroccans. More young girls than 
boys are involved; however, young boys also work as prostitutes (see 
Section 6.f.). The practice of adoptive servitude, in which families 
adopt young rural girls and use them as domestic servants in their 
homes, is prevalent. Credible reports of physical and psychological 
abuse in such circumstances are widespread. Some orphanages have been 
charged as knowing accomplices in this practice; however, more often 
parents of rural girls ``contract'' their daughters to wealthier urban 
families and collect the salaries for their work as maids. Adoptive 
servitude is accepted socially, has only recently begun to attract 
public criticism, and is unregulated by the Government.
    Another problem facing orphans of both sexes is their lack of civil 
status. In general men are registered at local government offices; 
their wives and unmarried children are included in this registration, 
which confers civil status. Civil status is necessary to obtain a birth 
certificate, passport, or marriage license. If a father does not 
register his child, the child is without civil status and the benefits 
of citizenship. It is possible for an individual to self-register; 
however, the process is long and cumbersome. While any child, 
regardless of parentage, may be registered within a month of birth, a 
court order is required if registration does not take place in that 
time. Abandoned children sometimes receive kafala (state-sponsored 
care).
    Several NGO's, including the Bayti Association and the Moroccan 
League for the Protection of Children, work to improve legal protection 
for children and to help at-risk children. There are several shelters 
in the major cities that provide food and lodging for street children, 
while other NGO's work to reduce the exploitation of street children 
and to cure those street children with drug addictions.
    People with Disabilities.--A high incidence of disabling disease, 
especially polio, has resulted in a correspondingly high incidence of 
disabled persons. While the Ministry of Social Affairs endeavors to 
integrate the disabled into society, in practice this is left largely 
to private charities. However, even nonprofit special education 
programs are priced beyond the reach of most families. Typically, 
disabled persons are supported by their families; some survive by 
begging. The Government continued a pilot training program for the 
blind sponsored in part by a member of the royal family. There are no 
laws mandating physical changes to buildings to facilitate access by 
the disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution affirms, and 
the Government respects, the legal equality of all citizens. The 
official language is Arabic. Both French and Arabic are used in the 
news media and educational institutions. Science and technical courses 
are taught in French, thereby precluding the large, monolingual-Arabic-
speaking population from participation in these programs. Educational 
reforms in the past decade have stressed the use of Arabic in secondary 
schools. Failure to transform the university system similarly 
effectively has disqualified many students from higher education in 
lucrative fields. This especially is true among the poor, for whom 
French training is not always affordable.
    Some 60 percent of the population claim Amazigh (Berber) heritage. 
Amazigh cultural groups contend that Amazigh traditions and the Amazigh 
language (which consists of three dialects) are rapidly being lost. 
Their repeated requests to King Hassan II to permit the teaching of 
Amazigh languages in the schools led to a 1995 royal speech authorizing 
the necessary curriculum changes; however, such changes have not yet 
been implemented. Official media broadcast in the Amazigh language for 
limited periods each day.
    In 1996 a number of Amazigh associations issued a communique 
petitioning the Government to recognize their language as an official 
language and to acknowledge their culture as a part of Moroccan 
society. These associations claimed that the Government refuses to 
register births for children with traditional Amazigh names, 
discourages the public display of the Amazigh alphabet, limits the 
activities of Amazigh associations, and continues to Arabize the names 
of towns, villages, and geographic landmarks. The Government thus far 
has made no response to the petition, although Prime Minister Youssoufi 
acknowledged Amazigh culture as an integral part of Moroccan identity 
in a speech before Parliament in April 1998. A full page of a major 
national newspaper is devoted on a monthly basis to articles and poems 
on Amazigh culture, which are printed in the Amazigh language, although 
with Latin script.
    On January 29, for the first time ever, the Moroccan Association 
for Research and Cultural Exchanges (AMREC), the first Amazigh 
association founded in Morocco (in 1967), held its first public 
congress. According to the PPS party daily Bayane Al-Youm, AMREC 
previously was never able to hold its congress in public. In late 
January, Minister of Communication Larbi Messari announced that the 
Government would dedicate more hours of television and radio 
broadcasting time to news and programming in the Amazigh languages, 
which he recognized as part of the ``national heritage.'' In July in 
Nador, the Minister of Territorial Management (and number three 
official in the ruling USFP party) attended a conference on education 
in the Amazigh language. At the meeting, he underlined the necessity to 
begin a serious dialog on Amazigh identity, to expand studies of 
Amazigh language and culture, and to encourage civil society efforts to 
promote Amazigh identity. A professor in Casablanca backed down from 
plans to publish a Koran in the Amazigh language due to societal 
opposition.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Although workers are free to 
establish and join trade unions, the unions themselves are not 
completely free from government interference. Perhaps half a million of 
the country's 9 million workers are unionized in 17 trade union 
federations. Three federations dominate the labor scene: The Union 
Marocaine du Travail (UMT), the Confederation Democratique du Travail 
(CDT), and the Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM). The 
UMT has no political party affiliation. The CDT is affiliated with the 
ruling Socialist Union of Popular Forces of Prime Minister Youssoufi, 
and the UGTM with the Istiqlal party. It is widely believed that the 
Ministry of Interior has informants within the unions who monitor union 
activities and the election of officers. Sometimes union officers are 
subject to governmentpressure. Union leadership does not always uphold 
the rights of members to select their own leaders. There has been no 
case of the rank and file voting out its current leadership and 
replacing it with another.
    Workers have the right to strike and do so. Work stoppages normally 
are intended to advertise grievances and last 24 to 72 hours or less. 
There were a number of narrowly focused work stoppages during the year. 
A strike by Agadir coastal fisherman in the fall, in which they 
demanded higher wages and social security benefits, resulted in the 
trial and imprisonment for 1 year of the union's secretary general and 
three other members. An appellate court upheld the ruling (see Section 
1.e.). In September striking workers, including women, were jailed 
following a strike, during which property was destroyed, at an egg farm 
south of Rabat (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
    Unions may sue to have labor laws enforced, and employers may sue 
unions when they believe that unions have overstepped their authority.
    Unions belong to regional labor organizations and maintain ties 
with international trade union secretariats. The UMT is a member of the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively is implied in the constitutional 
provisions on the right to strike and the right to join organizations. 
Trade union federations compete among themselves to organize workers. 
Any group of eight workers may organize a union and a worker may change 
union affiliation easily. A work site may contain several independent 
locals or locals affiliated with more than one labor federation.
    In general the Government ensures the observance of labor laws in 
larger companies and in the public sector. In the informal economy, 
such as in the family workshops-dominated handicrafts sector, employers 
routinely ignore labor laws and regulations, and government inspectors 
lack the resources to monitor violations effectively.
    The laws governing collective bargaining are inadequate. Collective 
bargaining has been a longstanding tradition in some parts of the 
economy, such as the industrial sector, and is becoming more prevalent 
in the service sector, including banking, health, and the civil 
service. The wages and conditions of employment of unionized workers 
generally are set in discussions between employer and worker 
representatives. However, wages for the vast majority of workers are 
set unilaterally by employers.
    Employers wishing to dismiss workers are required by law to notify 
the provincial governor through the labor inspector's office. In cases 
where employers plan to replace dismissed workers, a government labor 
inspector provides replacements and mediates the cases of workers who 
protest their dismissal. Any worker who is dismissed for committing a 
serious infraction of work rules is entitled by law to a court hearing.
    There is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion discrimination. 
Employers commonly dismiss workers for union activities that are 
regarded as threatening to employer interests. The courts have the 
authority to reinstate such workers, but are unable to enforce rulings 
that compel employers to pay damages and back pay. Ministry of Labor 
inspectors serve as investigators and conciliators in labor disputes, 
but they are few in number and do not have the resources to investigate 
all cases. Unions have resorted increasingly to litigation to resolve 
labor disputes.
    Labor law reform is such a controversial issue that a draft revised 
labor code has remained under discussion in parliamentary committee for 
numerous years.
    Labor law applies equally to the small Tangier export zone. The 
proportion of unionized workers in the export zone is about the same as 
in the rest of the economy, roughly 5 percent.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is prohibited by royal decree, and when authorities become aware 
of instances of forced labor, courts enforce the decree; however, in 
practice the Government lacks the resources to inspect all places of 
employment to ensure that forced labor is not being used, and the 
practice persists.
    The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but 
does not enforce this prohibition effectively. The practice of adoptive 
servitude, in which families adopt young girls and use them as 
indentured domestic servants, is socially accepted,and the Government 
does not regulate it. Credible reports of physical abuse in such cases 
are widespread (see Sections 5, 6.d., and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Abuse of the child labor laws is common. The law prohibits 
the employment of any child under 12 years of age. Education is 
compulsory for children between the ages of 7 and 13 years, although 
not all children attend school. Special regulations cover the 
employment of children between the ages of 12 and 16. In practice 
children often are apprenticed before age 12, particularly in the 
informal handicraft industry. The use of minors is common in the small 
family-run workshops that produce rugs, ceramics, wood work, and 
leather goods. Children, particularly rural girls, also are employed 
informally as domestics and usually receive little or no wages. Safety 
and health conditions, as well as wages in businesses that employ 
children often are substandard. The law prohibits forced or bonded 
labor by children; however, the Government does not enforce the law 
effectively (see Section 6.c.). The practice of adoptive servitude is 
often characterized by physical abuse (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.). 
The Ministry of Education, in cooperation with the Ministry of Health 
and with the support of UNICEF, is pursuing a strategy to ensure basic 
education and health services for child workers.
    Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing child 
labor regulations, which generally are well observed in the 
industrialized, unionized sector of the economy. However, the 
inspectors are not authorized to monitor the conditions of domestic 
servants. The Government maintains that the informal handicrafts sector 
is difficult to monitor.
    The Government lacks the resources to enforce laws against child 
labor, and there is general acceptance of the presumption that, to 
properly learn traditional handicraft skills, it is necessary for 
children to start working at a young age. In addition many citizens 
claim that having children working to learn a craft is better than 
having them live on the streets, where they sometimes turn to juvenile 
delinquency, including prostitution and substance abuse.
    In July 1997, the Government announced a new voluntary labeling 
system for carpet exports to certify that no child labor was involved 
in production. The system is cosponsored by German rug importers. 
However, the Government does not monitor nonparticipating handicraft 
producers that violate child labor laws.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The June 1996 general strike led 
to negotiations among the Government, the Manufacturers' Association, 
and the labor confederations over increasing the minimum wage and 
improving health benefits, social benefits, and housing. In August 
1996, all three parties agreed to a 10 percent increase in the minimum 
wage retroactive to July 1, raising it to approximately $180 (1,800 
dirhams) per month in the industrialized sector and to approximately $9 
(90 dirhams) per day for agricultural workers. Neither figure provides 
a decent standard of living for a worker and family, even with 
government subsidies for food, diesel fuel, and public transportation. 
Unions continue to appeal unsuccessfully for a minimum wage of 
approximately $210 (2,100 dirhams). In many cases, several family 
members combine their income to support the family. Most workers in the 
industrial sector earn more than the minimum wage. They generally are 
paid between 13 and 16 months' salary, including bonuses, each year.
    The minimum wage is not enforced effectively in the informal and 
handicraft sectors, and even the Government pays less than the minimum 
wage to workers at the lowest civil service grades (approximately 8 
percent of government workers), although benefits are more generous, 
and include transportation, food and housing subsidies, free vacations, 
and other nonmonetary remuneration. To increase employment 
opportunities for recent graduates, the Government allows firms to hire 
them for a limited period through a subsidized program at less than the 
minimum wage.
    The law provides for a 48-hour maximum workweek with no more than 
10 hours worked in any single day, premium pay for overtime, paid 
public and annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and 
safety, including a prohibition on night work for women and minors. As 
with other labor regulations and laws, these are not observed 
universally.
    Occupational health and safety standards are rudimentary, except 
for a prohibition on the employment of women in certain dangerous 
occupations. Labor inspectors attempt to monitor working conditions and 
accidents, but lack sufficient resources.
    While workers in principle have the right to remove themselves from 
work situations that endanger health and safety without jeopardizing 
their continued employment, there were no reports of any instances in 
which a worker attempted to exercise this right.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; under the Penal Code, perpetrators are 
prosecuted either as scam artists, corrupters of minors, or persons who 
force others into prostitution.
    Forced prostitution is prevalent, particularly in cities with large 
numbers of tourists, as well as near towns with large military 
installations. In 1998 a case was reported in which a girl allegedly 
had been imprisoned for 5 years in a brothel in Hajeb until she escaped 
at age 19.
    Forced prostitution involving Moroccans also occurs abroad. Early 
in the year, a Moroccan woman who had been recruited to be a domestic 
servant in Saudi Arabia, escaped a prostitution ring there and informed 
police, which led to the arrest of her Moroccan handlers, an extended 
family group numbering about 40 persons. This same group of Moroccans 
had been involved in organizing similar such activities throughout the 
Persian Gulf region.
    Teenage prostitution in urban centers has been estimated in the 
tens of thousands by NGO activists. The clientelle comprises both 
foreign tourists and Moroccans. More young girls than boys are 
involved; however, young boys also work as prostitutes (see Section 5).
    The practice of adoptive servitude, in which families adopt young 
girls and use them as indentured servants, is prevalent and accepted 
socially, and the Government does not regulate it. Reports of physical 
and psychological abuse in such cases are widespread; reports of sexual 
abuse are less frequent. Some orphanages have been charges as knowing 
accomplices in this practice; however, more often, parents of rural 
girls ``contract'' their daughters to wealthier urban families and 
collect their salaries as maids (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
                                 ______
                                 

                             WESTERN SAHARA

    The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a 
dispute between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario Front, an 
organization seeking independence for the region. The Moroccan 
Government sent troops and settlers into the northern two-thirds of the 
Western Sahara after Spain withdrew from the area in 1975 and extended 
its administration over the southern province of Oued Ed Dahab after 
Mauritania renounced its claim in 1979. The Moroccan Government has 
undertaken a sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara 
as part of its long-term efforts to strengthen Moroccan claims to the 
territory.
    Since 1973 the Polisario Front has challenged the claims of Spain, 
Mauritania, and Morocco to the territory. Moroccan and Polisario forces 
fought intermittently from 1975 until the 1991 ceasefire and deployment 
to the area of a U.N. peacekeeping contingent, known by its French 
initials, MINURSO.
    In 1975 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory 
opinion on the status of the Western Sahara. The Court held that while 
some of the region's tribes had historical ties to Morocco, the ties 
were insufficient to establish ``any tie of territorial sovereignty'' 
between the Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. The Court added 
that it had not found ``legal ties'' that might affect the applicable 
U.N. General Assembly resolution regarding the decolonization of the 
territory, and, in particular, the principle of self-determination for 
its people. Most Sahrawis (as most persons living in the territory are 
called) live in the area controlled by Morocco, but there is a sizable 
refugee population near the border with Morocco, in Algeria, and, to a 
lesser extent, in Mauritania. The bulk of the Sahrawi population lives 
within the area delineated by a Moroccan-constructed berm, which 
encloses most of the territory.
    Efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to resolve the 
sovereignty question collapsed in 1984 when the OAU recognized the 
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, the civilian arm of the Polisario 
Front. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest.
    In 1988 Morocco and the Polisario Front accepted the U.N. plan for 
a referendum that would allow the Sahrawis to decide between 
integration with Morocco or independence for the territory. The 
referendum was scheduled for January 1992, but was postponed because 
the parties were unable to agree on a common list of eligible voters--
despite the previous acceptance by both parties of an updated version 
of the Spanish census of 1974 as the base for voter eligibility. A 
complicated formula for determining voter eligibility ultimately was 
devised, and in August 1994, MINURSO personnel began to hold 
identification sessions for voter applicants.
    The initial U.N voter identification effort ended in December 1995 
and, after several fruitless efforts to persuade the two parties to 
cooperate, the U.N. Security Council formally suspended the 
identification process in 1996. The United Nations and friendly 
governments continued to urge the two parties to seek a political 
solution to the conflict. In March 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan appointed former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as his 
personal envoy to examine possible approaches for a peaceful 
settlement. Baker visited the region, and negotiations between the 
Moroccan Government and the Polisario began in May 1997. In September 
1997, representatives of Morocco and the Polisario met in Houston in 
the United States and consented to a series of compromise agreements on 
the 1991 U.N. settlement plan to hold a referendum under U.N. auspices. 
According to the Houston Accords, the identification of potential 
voters, the referendum campaign, and the vote were to take place by 
December 1998; however, operational considerations have now delayed the 
scheduled referendum until July 2000.
    In August 1998, MINURSO completed identification of voters in all 
uncontested tribal groupings. In November 1998, the U.N. Secretary 
General visited the region to examine ways of achieving compromise on 
several contested elements of the settlement plan in order to move the 
referendum process forward. After his consultations, the Secretary 
General proposed a series of measures in December 1998 to both parties. 
The measures proposed were aimed at establishing procedures among the 
parties to allow MINURSO to begin the identification process of three 
``contested tribes.'' After agreement between the parties was reached 
on the contested tribes, MINURSO began the identification process of an 
additional 65,000 potential voters. The identification process of the 
three contested tribes was completed in December. Only 4 percent of the 
applicants in this phase of the identification process were deemed 
eligible to vote in the referendum. Roughly 80,000 appeals also have 
been registered by those who were deemed ineligible to vote after the 
first round of the identification process. MINURSO had not yet begun to 
adjudicate these appeals by year's end. Further appeals are expected 
following the completion of the identification process for the 
contested tribes.
    Since 1977 the Saharan provinces of Layounne, Smara, and Boujdour 
have participated in local elections that are organized and controlled 
by the Moroccan Government. The southern province of Oued Ed Dahab has 
participated in Moroccan- controlled elections since 1983. Sahrawis 
whose political views are aligned with the Moroccan Government fill all 
the seats allotted to the Western Sahara in the Moroccan Parliament.
    The civilian population living in the Western Sahara under Moroccan 
administration is subject to Moroccan law. U.N. observers and foreign 
human rights groups maintain that Sahrawis have difficulty obtaining 
Moroccan passports, that the Government monitors the political views of 
Sahrawis more closely than those of Moroccan citizens, and that the 
police and paramilitary authorities react especially harshly against 
those suspected of supporting independence and the Polisario Front. The 
Moroccan Government limits access to the territory, and international 
human rights organizations and impartial journalists sometimes have 
experienced difficulty in securing admission. After years of denying 
that Sahrawis were imprisoned in Morocco for Polisario-related military 
or political activity, the Government of Morocco released 300 such 
prisoners in 1991. Entire families and Sahrawis who had disappeared in 
the mid-1970's were among those released. The Government of Morocco has 
failed to conduct a public inquiry or to explain how and why those 
released spent up to 16 years in incommunicado detention without charge 
or trial.
    The former Sahrawi detainees have formed an informal association 
whose principal objective is to seek redress and compensation from the 
Government of Morocco for their detention. A delegation of this 
association met with various government officials, human rights 
organizations, members of the press, and diplomatic representatives in 
both Rabat and in Layounne during the year. They report that some 
progress has been made in gaining government recognition of their 
grievances.
    In Laayoune in late September, and, to a lesser extent, in late 
October, there was a series of peaceful public protests, sit-ins and 
demonstrations by groups of miners, students, unemployed graduates, and 
former Sahrawi prisoners who were seeking government redress regarding 
a variety of social issues ranging from subsidized transportation for 
the students to miners' demands for enforcement of a contract dispute 
with the government-owned phosphate company. The police used excessive 
violence to break up these protests. The police also encouraged gangs 
of local thugs to break into and vandalize the homes and places of 
business of some the city's Sahrawi residents. The police detained 
roughly 150 persons in connection with the demonstrations. Most were 
released within 2 weeks. However, 54 persons eventually were charged 
with various criminal offenses, and 46 eventually were sentenced to 
prison terms ranging from 2 months to 15 years. The Moroccan 
Organization for Human Rights (OMDH) released a report criticizing the 
violent police action and the judicial process, which resulted in 
prison terms for the 46 persons. Attorneys representing the 46 
convicted persons on appeal state that in no case did the prosecutors 
produce eyewitness testimony against any of the persons charged. The 
only evidence presented by the prosecutors was the police report of the 
arresting officers. The attorneys also state that in no case did the 
police make an arrest on the basis of a legitimate warrant. Searches 
also were conducted, sometimes in the middle of the night, without 
warrants. Some persons whose homes were searched were also beaten by 
police who came to arrest other members of the household. No official 
investigation was made into the police's conduct, and no police 
authorities were charged with any criminal or civil wrongdoing by 
year's end.
    After the first round of protests in late September, Morocco's new 
King, Mohammed VI, announced that he would revitalize the Royal Council 
on Saharan Affairs and ordered the Prime Minister to organize an 
election to select local representatives to the Council. The King also 
relieved of their duties the powerful governor of the territory and the 
chief of police. Following the second round of protests in late October 
and other events in Morocco itself, the King dismissed the country's 
powerful Interior Minister, Driss Basri, whom many Moroccan observers 
held responsible for the policy of overly strict governance in the 
territory that helped create the tensions and grievances that 
eventually led to the demonstrations in Layounne. The Government began 
to respond to the King's initiatives, and several ministerial 
delegations were sent to Layounne in October and November to assess the 
measures required to restore calm and build confidence between the 
authorities and the local population.
    A number of other Sahrawis remain imprisoned for peaceful protests 
supporting Saharan independence. There are credible reports that 10 
Sahrawis were arrested, beaten, and kept in seclusion by Moroccan 
authorities in May 1996 following demonstrations in several cities of 
the Western Sahara in support of Sahrawi independence. These 10 
demonstrators reportedly were sentenced to terms of imprisonment 
ranging from 18 months to 7 years.
    Kelthoum El-Ouanat and five other Sahrawis were released in May 
1996. El-Ouanat had been sentenced to a 20-year term after being 
arrested in October 1992 following a demonstration in Smara. Prior to 
her trial, she had been held in secret detention for up to 10 months, 
during which time she reportedly was beaten, tortured, and sexually 
abused. In June 1995, eight Sahrawi youths, arrested for demonstrating 
for Sahrawi independence the previous month, were given 20-year 
sentences. Then-King Hassan II later commuted these sentences to 1 
year, and the eight were released in July 1996, 14 months after having 
been taken into custody. The youths report that the Moroccan police 
continue to monitor them closely.
    The Polisario Front claims that the Moroccan Government continues 
to hold several hundred Sahrawis as political prisoners and 
approximately 300 prisoners of war (POW's). The Government of Morocco 
formally denies that any Sahrawi noncombatants remain in detention. A 
committee that represents former Sahrawi prisoners believes that the 
Government of Morocco no longer holds any of those Sahrawis who were 
detained illegally during the 1970's and 1980's. The committee based 
this determination on interviews with family members of individuals who 
had been detained during that period. In October 1996, Morocco released 
66 Sahrawi combatants who were flown to the Tindouf area of Algeria 
under International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) auspices. They 
were accompanied by foreign diplomats. The Government of Morocco claims 
that 30,000 Sahrawi refugees are detained against their will by the 
Polisario in camps around Tindouf. The Polisario denies this charge. 
According to credible reports, the number of refugees in Tindouf far 
exceeds 30,000, but the allegation that they wish to leave remains 
unsubstantiated.
    The ICRC reports that the Polisario now holds approximately 1,900 
Moroccan POW's. A group of 185 POW's was repatriated to Morocco in a 
humanitarian airlift conducted under ICRC auspices in November 1995. In 
April 1997, Polisario leaders offered to release 85 Moroccan POW's as a 
good will gesture during U.N. envoy Baker's first meetings in Tindouf, 
but Morocco and the Polisario could not agree on the conditions of 
their release. The Polisario offered to release 191 POW's in November. 
Credible sources indicate that the Government of Morocco is prepared to 
accept the return of these prisoners, many of whom have been in 
detention for more than 20 years. The U.N. settlement plan calls for 
the release of all POW's after the voter identification process is 
complete.
    There were no new cases of disappearance for the third consecutive 
year. While the forced disappearance of individuals who opposed the 
Government of Morocco and its policies occurred over several decades, 
the Government in 1998 pledged to ensure that such policies do not 
recur, and to disclose as much information as possible on past cases. 
Many of those who disappeared were Sahrawis or Moroccans who challenged 
the Government's claim to the Western Sahara or other government 
policies. Many of those who disappeared were held in secret detention 
camps. While the Government released about 300 such detainees in June 
1991, and in October 1998 issued an announcement on those who had 
disappeared, to this day hundreds of Sahrawi and Moroccan families do 
not have any information about their missing relatives, many of whom 
disappeared over 20 years ago (see Section 2.b. of the Morocco report).
    Freedom of movement within the Western Sahara is limited in 
militarily sensitive areas, both within the area controlled by the 
Government of Morocco and the area controlled by the Polisario. Both 
Moroccan and Polisario security forces sometimes subject travelers to 
arbitrary questioning. There were no reports of detention for prolonged 
periods during the year.
    There is little organized labor activity in the Western Sahara. The 
same labor laws that apply in Morocco are applied in the Moroccan-
controlled areas of the Western Sahara. Moroccan unions are present in 
the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara but are not active. The 15 
percent of the territory outside Moroccan control does not have any 
major population centers or economic activity beyond nomadic herding. 
The Polisario-sponsored labor union, the Sario Federation of Labor, is 
not active in the Western Sahara.
    A group of phosphate miners participated in the demonstrations in 
Layounne in late September and again in late October. They claim that 
the government-owned phosphate company has failed to respect a contract 
that had been negotiated between the Government of Morocco and former 
Spanish authorities in the territory when Spain withdrew from the 
territory and relinquished control of the mines to Morocco. The miners 
state that they had a series of meetings with officials of the 
government-owned phosphate company since the demonstrations in Layounne 
in late September but that no agreement was reached about enforcement 
of what they believe to be their contractually protected rights.
    There were no strikes, other job actions, or collective bargaining 
agreements during the year. Most union members are employees of the 
Moroccan Government or state-owned organizations. They are paid 85 
percent more than their counterparts outside the Western Sahara as an 
inducement to Moroccan citizens to live there. Workers in the Western 
Sahara are exempt from income and value-added taxes and receive 
subsidies on such commodities as flour, oil, sugar, fuel, and 
utilities.
    Moroccan law prohibits forced labor, which does not appear to exist 
in the Western Sahara.
    Regulations on the minimum age of employment are the same as in 
Morocco. Child labor appears to be less common than in Morocco, 
primarily because of the absence of industries most likely to employ 
children, such as rug knotting and garment making. A government work 
program for adults, the Promotion Nationale, provides families with 
enough income that children need not be hired out as domestic servants. 
Children in the few remaining nomadic groups presumably work as 
shepherds along with other group members.
    The minimum wage and maximum hours of work are the same as in 
Morocco. However, in practice workers in some fish processing plants 
may work as many as 12 hours per day, 6 days per week, well beyond the 
10-hour day, 48-hour week maximum stipulated in Moroccan law. 
Occupational health and safety standards are the same as those enforced 
in Morocco. They are rudimentary, except for a prohibition on the 
employment of women in dangerous occupations.
                                 ______
                                 

                                  OMAN

    The Sultanate of Oman is a monarchy that has been ruled by the Al 
Bu Sa'id family since the middle of the 18th century. It has no 
political parties or directly elected representative institutions. The 
current Sultan, Qaboos Bin Sa'id Al Sa'id, acceded to the throne in 
1970. Although the Sultan retains firm control over all important 
policy issues, he has brought tribal leaders--even those who took up 
arms against his family's rule--as well as other notables into the 
Government. In accordance with tradition and cultural norms, much 
decisionmaking is by consensus among these leaders. In 1991 the Sultan 
established the 59-seat Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-Shura, 
which replaced an older advisory body. The Government selects Council 
members from lists of nominees proposed by each of the 59 wilayats 
(regions). After the first national census in 1993, the Sultan expanded 
the membership of the new Council to 80 seats. In 1997 it was expanded 
further to 82 seats. The Council has no formal legislative powers but 
may question government ministers, even during unrehearsed televised 
hearings, and recommend changes to new laws on economic and social 
policy, which sometimes leads to amendments to proposed decrees. In 
December 1997, the Sultan appointed 41 persons as members of the new 
Council of State (Majlis Al-Dawla), which with the current Consultative 
Council forms the bicameral body known as the Majlis Oman (Council of 
Oman). In late 1996, the Sultan promulgated by decree the country's 
``Basic Charter'' (also known as the Basic Law), which provides for 
citizens' basic rights in writing for the first time. The courts are 
subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence.
    The internal and external security apparatus falls under the 
authority of the Ministry of Palace Office, which coordinates all 
intelligence and security policies. The Internal Security Service 
investigates all matters related to internal security. The Royal Oman 
Police, whose head also has cabinet status, performs regular police 
duties, provides security at airports, serves as the country's 
immigration agency, and maintains a small coast guard. There are 
credible reports that security forces occasionally abuse detainees.
    Since 1970 Oman has used its modest oil revenue to make impressive 
economic progress and improve public access to health care, education, 
and social services. The economy is mixed, with significant government 
participation in industry, transportation, and communications. The 
Government seeks to diversify the economy and stimulate private 
investment.
    The Government continues to restrict or deny important human 
rights. Human rights abuses include arbitrary arrest, mistreatment of 
detainees, prolonged detention without charge, and the denial of due 
process. The Government restricts freedom of expression and association 
and does not ensure full rights for workers and women. As a practical 
matter, citizens do not have the right to change their government.
    The 1996 Basic Charter provides for many basic human rights, such 
as an independent judiciary, and freedoms of association, speech, and 
the press. The Basic Charter states that the Government was to strive 
to issue all enabling laws within 2 years of November 1996. This has 
not occurred; only certain laws pertaining to the legal code for family 
and interpersonal relationships, to judicial reform, and to aspects of 
the Finance Ministry, had been enacted by year's end. It is expected 
that the implementation period may extend into 2000, and possibly 
beyond. There has been no public statement made by the Government 
noting the end of the 2-year period since issuance of the Basic Charter 
and proposing a new target date for implementation.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Security forces abuse some detainees, particularly during 
interrogation. The abuse does not appear to be systematic and often 
varies depending upon the social status of the victim, the official 
involved, and the location of the incident (for example, whether the 
abuse occurs in a rural or an urban area). Despite reported official 
efforts to prevent such abuse, incidents still occur. Security 
officials sometimes beat detainees but are often careful to conceal 
evidence of abuse by employing such tactics as restricting blows to 
less-visible areas of the body. Detainees sometimes are left in 
isolation with promises of release or improved treatment as a further 
means to elicit confessions or information. Although judges have the 
right to order investigations of allegations of mistreatment, there is 
no recent evidence that any officer has been punished for abusing 
detainees. The 1996 Basic Charter, yet to be implemented in this area, 
specifically prohibits ``physical or moral torture'' and stipulates 
that all confessions obtained by such methods are to be considered null 
and void. There were no reports of torture during the year.
    Prison conditions appear to meet minimum international standards. 
Access to some prisoners is severely restricted.
    The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The police may obtain 
warrants prior to making arrests but are not required by law to do so. 
However, the authorities must obtain court orders to hold suspects in 
pretrial detention--within 24 hours of arrest, the police are required 
to file charges or ask a magistrate judge to order continued detention. 
However, in practice the police do not always follow these procedures. 
Judges may order detentions for 14 days to allow investigation and may 
grant extensions if necessary. There is a system of bail. The 1996 
Basic Charter provides for certain legal and procedural rights for 
detainees; however, these provisions have yet to be implemented.
    Police handling of arrests and detentions constitutes incommunicado 
detention in some instances. The police do not always notify a 
detainee's family or, in the case of a foreign worker, the worker's 
sponsor, of the detention. Sometimes notification is made only just 
prior to the detainee's release. The authorities post the previous 
week's trial results (including the date of the trial, the name of the 
accused, the claim, and the sentence) near the magistrate court 
building in Muscat. The police do not always permit attorneys and 
family members to visit detainees. Judges occasionally intercede to 
ensure that security officials allow such visits.
    The Government does not practice exile as a form of punishment. The 
1996 Basic Charter prohibits exile; however, the provisions concerning 
exile have yet to be implemented.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1996 Basic Charter affirms the 
independence of the judiciary; however, the various courts are 
subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence. The Sultan 
appoints all judges, acts as a court of final appeal, and intercedes in 
cases of particular interest, especially in national security cases. 
However, there have been no reported instances in which the Sultan has 
overturned a decision of the magistrate courts or the commercial 
courts.
    The judiciary comprises the magistrate courts, which adjudicate 
misdemeanors and criminal matters; the Shari'a (Islamic law) courts, 
which adjudicate personal status cases such as divorce and inheritance, 
and which are administered by the Ministry of Justice; the commercial 
courts; the Labor Welfare Board; and the Rent Dispute Committee, which 
hears tenant-landlord disputes.
    The magistrate court system was established by royal decree in 1984 
to take over all criminal cases from the Shari'a courts; it is 
independent and its president reports directly to the Sultan. Regional 
courts of first instance handle misdemeanor cases, which are heard by 
individual judges. All felonies are adjudicated at the Central 
Magistrate Court in Muscat by a criminal panel made up of the President 
of the Magistrate Court and two judges. All rulings of the felony panel 
are final except for those in which the defendant is sentenced to 
death. Death sentences must be approved by the Sultan.
    The Criminal Appeals Panel also is presided over by the President 
of the Magistrate Court in Muscat, and includes the court's vice 
president and two judges. This panel hears appeals of rulings made by 
all courts of first instance. The role of public prosecutor in criminal 
cases is carried out by specially trained prosecutors from the Royal 
Oman Police (ROP), all of whom are trained as policemen as well as 
prosecutors. There are more than 40 ROP prosecutors assigned to ROP 
headquarters in Muscat.
    The Criminal Code does not specify the rights of the accused. There 
are no written rules of evidence, codified procedures for entering 
cases into the criminal system, or any legal provision for a public 
trial. Criminal procedures have developed by tradition and precedents 
in the magistrate courts. In criminal cases, the police provide 
defendants with the written charges against them; defendants are 
presumed innocent and have the right to present evidence and confront 
witnesses. The prosecution and the defense question witnesses through 
the judge, who is usually the only person to question witnesses in 
court. A detainee may hire an attorney but has no explicit right to be 
represented by counsel.
    The Government does not pay for the legal representation of 
indigents. However, the 1996 Basic Charter affirms both right to 
counsel and government-funded legal representation for indigents. These 
provisions have yet to be implemented. Judges often pronounce the 
verdict and sentence within 1 day after the completion of a trial. 
Defendants may appeal jail sentences longer than 3 months and fines 
over the equivalent of $1,300 to a three-judge panel. Defendants 
accused of national security offenses and serious felonies do not have 
the right of appeal.
    A State Security Court tries cases involving national security and 
criminal cases that the Government decides require expeditious or 
especially sensitive handling. Magistrate court judges have presided 
over trials in the State Security Court. Defendants tried by the 
Security Court are not permitted to have legal representation present. 
The timing and the location of the Court's proceedings are not 
disclosed publicly. The Court does not follow legal procedures as 
strictly as the magistrate courts, although prominent civilian jurists 
form the panel. The Sultan has exercised his powers of leniency, 
including in political cases.
    The Shari'a courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice, and 
apply Shari'a law as interpreted under the Ibadhi school of Islamic 
jurisprudence. Preliminary courts of first instance are located in each 
of the 59 wilayats, and are presided over by a single judge, or qadi. 
Appeals of the rulings of the courts of first instance involving prison 
sentences of 2 weeks or more or fines greater than $260 (100 rials) 
must be brought within 1 month before the Shari'a Court of Appeals in 
Muscat. Panels of three judges hear appeals cases. Court of Appeal 
rulings themselves may be appealed, within a 1-month period, to the 
Supreme Committee for Complaints, which is composed of four members, 
including the Minister of Justice and the Grand Mufti of the Sultanate.
    In May 1997, the Government promulgated into law the provisions of 
the 1996 Basic Charter pertaining to ``family law,'' i.e., law that 
falls under the purview of the Shari'a courts. The effect of this new 
law has been to regularize the nature of the cases and the range of 
corresponding judgments within the Shari'a court system.
    The Authority for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes (ASCD), 
better known as the commercial courts system, was established by royal 
decree in 1981 to decide all cases related to commercial matters. 
Subsequent decrees have empowered the commercial courts to decide labor 
disputes referred to it by government departments, commercial disputes 
to which the Government is a party, and arbitration cases involving 
private parties. The ASCD is financially and administratively 
independent of the Ministry of Justice and reports directly to the 
Minister of Commerce and Industry. The ASCD is made up of the Chairman, 
Deputy Chairman, a number of judges appointed by royal decree, and 
members of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Cases are heard 
in regional courts for suits involving not more than $26,000 (10,000 
rials).
    In late November, the Sultan issued several royal decrees to 
establish a law on judicial authority and to affirm the independence of 
the judiciary as called for in the 1996 Basic Charter. The decrees 
formally establish the judiciary as an independent, hierarchical system 
composed of a Supreme Court, an appeals court, primary courts (one 
located in each region), and, within the primary courts, divisional 
courts. Within each of the courts there are to be divisions to handle 
commercial, civil, penal, labor, taxation, general, and personal cases 
(the latter under Shari'a). The general prosecutor, which currently 
falls under the Royal Omani Police Chief Inspector, is to become an 
independent legal entity. Implementation of these decrees is expected 
to take place during 2000.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The police are not required by law to obtain search 
warrants. There is a widespread belief that the Government eavesdrops 
on both oral and written communications, and citizens are guarded in 
both areas. Citizens must obtain permission from the Ministry of 
Interior to marry foreigners, except nationals of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries. Such permission is not granted automatically. 
Delays or denial of permission have resulted in secret marriages within 
Oman. Marriages in foreign countries can lead to denial of entry into 
Oman of the foreign spouse and prevent a legitimate child from claiming 
citizenship rights.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law prohibits criticism of the 
Sultan in any form or medium. The authorities tolerate criticism of 
government officials and agencies, but such criticism rarely receives 
media coverage. The announced 1996 Basic Charter provides for freedom 
of opinion expressed in words, writing, or all other media within the 
limits of the law; however, these provisions have yet to be 
implemented.
    The 1984 Press and Publication Law authorizes the Government to 
censor all domestic and imported publications. Ministry of Information 
censors may act against any material regarded as politically, 
culturally, or sexually offensive. However, journalists and writers 
generally censor themselves to avoid government harassment. Editorials 
generally are consistent with the Government's views, although the 
authorities tolerate some criticism on foreign affairs issues. The 
Government discourages in-depth reporting on controversial domestic 
issues and seeks to influence privately owned dailies and periodicals 
by subsidizing their operating costs.
    In late 1997, the Government began to permit the entry onto the 
market of foreign newspapers and magazines containing reports or 
statements deemed critical of Oman, including articles critical of the 
Sultan. The lifting of the boycott against Israel in December 1994 
eliminated prohibitions on publications from or about Israel that 
otherwise meet censorship standards. However, in August the Ministry of 
Information stopped distribution of a London-based Arabic-language 
magazine that contained an interview with a representative of the 
Israeli trade mission in Oman. Customs officials sometimes confiscate 
video cassette tapes and erase offensive material despite the fact that 
there are no published guidelines on what is viewed as locally 
``offensive.'' The tapes may or may not be returned to their owners. 
Government censorship decisions are changed periodically without 
apparent reason. There is a general perception that the confiscation of 
books and tapes at the border from private individuals and restrictions 
on popularnovels have eased somewhat. However, it reportedly has become 
more difficult to obtain permission to distribute in the local market 
books that censors decide have factual errors about Oman (including 
outdated maps).
    The Government controls the local radio and television companies. 
They do not air any politically controversial material. The Government 
does not allow the establishment of privately owned radio and 
television companies. However, the availability of satellite dishes has 
made foreign broadcast information accessible to the public. The 
Government, through its national telecommunications company, provides 
full, uncensored Internet access to citizens and foreign residents.
    The appropriate government authority, such as Sultan Qaboos 
University, the police, or the relevant ministry must approve public 
cultural events, including plays, concerts, lectures, and seminars. 
Most organizations avoid controversial issues due to fear that the 
authorities may cancel their events. Academic freedom is restricted, 
particularly regarding controversial matters, including politics. 
Professors may be dismissed for going beyond acceptable boundaries.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law does not 
ensure freedom of assembly. All public gatherings require government 
sponsorship. The authorities do not always enforce this requirement, 
and gatherings sometimes take place without formal government approval. 
For example, in May 1998 students at a nursing college protesting 
widespread food poisoning within the school attempted to march down 
Muscat's primary highway to the Ministry of Health; security forces 
intercepted and dispersed the students without serious injury. 
Regulations implemented in 1994 restricting most types of public 
gatherings remain in effect. The 1996 Basic Charter provides for 
limited freedom of assembly, but these provisions have not yet been 
implemented.
    The law states that the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor must 
approve the establishment of all associations and their bylaws. 
However, some groups are allowed to function without formal 
registration. The Government uses the power to license associations to 
control the political environment. It does not license groups regarded 
as a threat to the predominant social or political views of the 
Sultanate. Formal registration of foreign associations is limited to a 
maximum of one association for any nationality. The 1996 Basic 
Charter's provisions in this area--not yet in effect--regulate the 
formation of associations.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion, which is 
affirmed by the 1996 Basic Charter. The 1996 Basic Charter provides 
that Shari'a is the basis for legislation and preserves the freedom to 
practice religious rites, in accordance with tradition, provided that 
such freedom does not breach public order. Discrimination against 
individuals on the basis of religion or sect is prohibited. 
Implementing decrees for the 1996 Basic Charter in this area have not 
yet been established.
    Most citizens are Ibadhi or Sunni Muslims, but there is also a 
minority of Shi'a Muslims. Non-Muslims are free to worship at churches 
and temples built on land donated by the Sultan. There are many 
Christian denominations, which utilize two plots of donated land on 
which two Catholic and two Protestant churches have been built. Hindu 
temples also exist on government-provided land. Land has been made 
available to Catholic and Protestant missions in Sohar and Salalah.
    The Government prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing Muslims. It 
also prohibits non-Muslim groups from publishing religious material, 
although material printed abroad may be brought into the country. 
Members of all religions and sects are free to maintain links with 
coreligionists abroad and undertake foreign travel for religious 
purposes. In the past, due to government restrictions on public 
gatherings, there had been a curtailment of non-Muslim religious 
celebrations. There have been no reports of such curtailments in recent 
years.
    The police monitor mosque sermons to ensure that the preachers do 
not discuss political topics and stay within the state-approved 
orthodoxy of Islam. The Government expects all imams to preach sermons 
within the parameters of standardized texts distributed monthly by the 
Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel 
by citizens within the country except to military areas. Foreigners, 
other than diplomats, must obtain a government pass to cross border 
points. To obtain a passport and depart the country, a woman must 
haveauthorization from her husband, father, or nearest male relative. 
However, a woman having an Omani identity card (which also must be 
authorized by a male relative) may travel to certain Gulf Cooperation 
Council countries without a passport.
    Until the promulgation of the Basic Charter, the Government did not 
have a policy on refugees or a tradition of harboring stateless or 
undocumented aliens. The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits the extradition 
of political refugees; however, this provision has not yet been 
implemented. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise 
during the year. Oman offered temporary refuge to several thousand 
Yemenis displaced by a civil war in 1994. They returned to Yemen after 
the war. Tight control over the entry of foreigners into the country 
effectively has screened out would-be refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Oman is an autocracy in which the Sultan retains the ultimate 
authority on all important foreign and domestic issues. The country has 
no formal democratic political institutions, and its citizens do not 
have the ability peacefully to change their leaders or the political 
system.
    The Sultan promulgated the country's first defacto written 
constitution, known as the Basic Charter, in November 1996. Although it 
has immediate force of law, most laws and regulations to implement its 
provisions have not yet been enacted; it is expected that this process 
may take until 2000 or beyond to be completed. The law does not provide 
for political parties or direct elections. Citizens have indirect 
access to senior officials through the traditional practice of 
petitioning their patrons, usually the local governor, or wali, for 
redress of grievances. Successful redress depends on the effectiveness 
of the patron's access to appropriate decisionmakers. The Sultan 
appoints the governors. The Sultan makes an annual 3-week tour of the 
country, accompanied by his ministers. The tour allows the Sultan to 
listen directly to his subjects' problems.
    In 1991 Sultan Qaboos established a Consultative Council, or Majlis 
Ash-Shura. In 1994 he expanded the number of Council seats to 80 from 
the original 59, a move that allocated 2 members for districts with a 
higher population. Due to the population increase from 1994 to 1997, 
the number of seats was further expanded to 82 for the 1997 elections. 
The Government selects the Council members from several nominees, both 
male and female, who are elected by prominent persons in each district. 
In the October 1997 elections, over 50,000 Omani men and women, 3 
percent of the total population, were eligible to nominate Council 
members in all districts throughout the country. These voters (or 
electors) had volunteered for the position, their police records were 
checked by the Government, and they were subject to government 
approval. If the Sultan decides not to appoint them, the nominees with 
the most votes do not win appointment to the Council. The Council has 
no formal legislative powers, which remain concentrated in the Sultan's 
hands. However, it serves as a conduit of information between the 
people and the government ministries. No serving government official is 
eligible to be a council member. The Council may question government 
ministers in public or in private, review all draft laws on social and 
economic policy, and recommend legislative changes to the Sultan, who 
makes the final decision. In December 1997, the Sultan announced the 
appointment of 41 persons to the new Majlis Al-Dawla (Council of 
State). The precise responsibilities of the Council of State and its 
relationship to the existing Consultative Council have yet to be 
clarified. The Council of State and the Consultative Council together 
form the Majlis Oman, or Council of Oman.
    The Sultan publicly has advocated a greater role for women in both 
the public and private sectors. In the 1997 elections, the Government 
selected two women from among the nominees to serve on the Consultative 
Council. In December 1997, the Sultan appointed 4 women to the 41-
member Majlis Al-Dawla. In 1999 the Sultan, for only the second time, 
appointed a woman to the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI) 
board.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government prohibits the establishment of human rights groups. 
The existing restrictions on the freedom of speech and association do 
not permit any activity or speech critical of the Government. There 
were no known requests by international human rights organizations to 
visit.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of 
sex, ethnic origin, race, religion, language, sect, place ofresidence, 
and social class. However, decrees to implement its provisions have not 
been promulgated. Institutional and cultural discrimination based on 
gender, race, religion, social status, and disability exists.
    Women.--There is no evidence of a pattern of spousal abuse although 
observers say that allegations of such abuse in the Shari'a courts are 
not uncommon. Definitive information is scant and difficult to collect. 
Doctors do not have a legal responsibility to report either spouse or 
child abuse cases to the courts. Battered women may file a complaint 
with the police but more often seek family intervention to protect them 
from violent domestic situations. Likewise, families seek to intervene 
to keep such problems out of public view. There have been reports that 
employers or male coworkers have sexually harassed foreign women 
employed in such positions as domestic servants and hospital nurses. 
Foreign women employed as domestic servants and garment workers have 
complained that their employers have withheld their salaries and that 
government officials have been unresponsive to their grievances, due to 
investigative procedures that disadvantage the victim. Individuals 
known to be abusing domestic servants are not always brought to account 
for their actions. In the past, several foreign women have had to ask 
their governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse.
    Most women live within the confines of their homes. They continue 
to face many forms of discrimination. Illiteracy among older women 
hampers their ability to own property, participate in the modern sector 
of the economy, or even inform themselves of their rights. Government 
officials frequently deny women land grants or housing loans and prefer 
to conduct business with a woman's husband or other male relative. 
Women require permission from a male relative to leave the country (see 
Section 2.b.).
    Some aspects of Islamic tradition also discriminate against women. 
Islamic law favors male heirs in adjudicating inheritance claims. Many 
women are reluctant to take an inheritance dispute to court for fear of 
alienating the family.
    However, since 1970 conditions for women have improved dramatically 
in several areas. Whereas in 1970 no schools existed for girls, the 
most recent figures available from the Ministry of Education report an 
enrollment rate nearing 90 percent for all girls eligible for 
elementary school. In the 1997-98 school year, female students 
constituted approximately 50 percent of the total number of students 
attending public schools. Women constitute roughly half of the 5,000 
students at Sultan Qaboos University. In November 600 women and 524 men 
received bachelor's degrees as members of the 10th graduating class, 
while 3 women and 14 men received master's degrees. The university has 
a quota system with the apparent goal of increasing the number of men 
studying certain specialties. Reportedly, women are being limited to 50 
percent of the seats in the medical department. Restriction on women 
studying engineering and archeology were lifted in September 1998. The 
quota system is expected to allow women to constitute a majority in 
some other departments.
    Women also have made gains in the work force. Some educated women 
have attained positions of authority in government, business, and the 
media. Approximately 30 percent of all civil servants are women; of 
these, 59 percent are citizens. In both the public and private sectors, 
women are entitled to maternity leave and equal pay for equal work. The 
government bureaucracy, the country's largest employer of women, 
observes such regulations, as do many private sector employers. Still, 
many educated women face job discrimination because prospective 
employers fear that they might resign to marry or raise families. 
Several female employees in the Government have complained that they 
have been denied promotion in favor of less capable men, although this 
varies by ministry. Unlike the case in previous years, when government 
grants for study abroad were limited almost exclusively to males, such 
grants are now awarded based on merit, and in 1999 were divided evenly 
between men and women.
    Within the Government, women's affairs are the responsibility of 
the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, and Vocational Training. The 
Ministry provides support for women's affairs through support for and 
funding of the Oman Women's Association (OWA) and local community 
development centers (LCDC's). The OWA consists of 23 chapters with an 
active membership of 3,000 women. Typical OWA activities include 
sponsoring health or sociological lectures, kindergarten services, and 
handicraft training programs. The OWA also provides an informal 
counseling and support role for women with divorce-related 
difficulties, girls forced to marry against their will, and women and 
girls suffering from domestic abuse. The main purpose of the 50 LCDC's 
located throughout the country is to encourage women to improve the 
quality of life for their families and to improvetheir contributions to 
the community. LCDC activities focus on health and sociology lectures, 
child care issues, and agricultural and traditional handicraft training 
programs.
    Children.--The Government has made the health, education, and 
general welfare of children a budgetary priority. Primary school 
education is free and universal but not compulsory. Most children 
attend school through secondary school, to age 18. No significant 
sectors or groups within the population are prevented from receiving an 
education. The infant mortality rate continues to decline, and 
comprehensive immunization rates have risen. There is no pattern of 
familial or other child abuse. Government officials have publicly 
called for greater awareness and prevention of child abuse. A few 
communities in the interior and in the Dhofar region still practice 
female genital mutilation (FGM). FGM is condemned widely by 
international health experts as damaging to both physical and 
psychological health. Experts believe that the number of such cases is 
small and declining annually. Oman ratified the U.N. Convention on the 
Rights of the Child in 1996 with reservations relating to freedom of 
children to choose a religion and government spending limits.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government has mandated parking 
spaces and some ramps for wheelchair access in private and government 
office buildings and shopping centers. Compliance is voluntary, yet 
widely observed. Students in wheelchairs have easy access to Sultan 
Qaboos University. The Government has established several 
rehabilitation centers for disabled children. Disabled persons, 
including the blind, work in government offices. While the Government 
now charges a small fee to citizens seeking government health care, the 
disabled generally are not charged for physical therapy and prosthetics 
support.
    Religious Minorities.--Some members of the Shi'a Muslim minority 
claim that they face discrimination in employment and educational 
opportunities. However, some members of this same community occupy 
prominent positions in both the private and public sectors.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens of east African origin 
complain that they frequently face job discrimination in both the 
public and private sectors. Some public institutions reportedly favor 
hiring members of one or another regional, tribal, or religious group. 
However, no group is banned from employment.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The current law stipulates that ``it 
is absolutely forbidden to provoke a strike for any reason.'' The 
Government has not yet promulgated a new labor law that was first 
drafted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in 1994. In the 
last quarter of 1996, the Consultative Council recommended some changes 
to the draft, but the Government has not yet issued the new law. 
Government officials have stated that the new labor law is to be 
consistent with international labor standards.
    Labor unrest is rare. There have not been any known job actions 
within the last 6 years.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The current law 
does not provide for the right to collective bargaining. However, it 
requires that employers of more than 50 workers form a joint labor-
management committee as a communication forum between the two groups. 
The implementation of this provision is uneven, and the effectiveness 
of these committees is questionable. In general the committees discuss 
such matters as the living conditions at company-provided housing. They 
are not authorized to discuss wages, hours, or conditions of 
employment. Such issues are specified in the work contracts signed 
individually by workers and employers and must be consistent with the 
guidelines of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.
    The current law defines conditions of employment for some citizens 
and foreign workers. It covers domestic servants and construction 
workers but not temporary workers or those with work contracts that 
expire within 3 months. Foreign workers constitute at least 50 percent 
of the work force and as much as 80 percent of the modern-sector work 
force.
    Work rules must be approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Labor and posted conspicuously in the workplace by employers of 10 or 
more workers. Similarly, any employer with 50 or more workers must 
establish a grievance procedure. Regardless of the size of the company, 
any employee, including foreign workers, may file a grievance with the 
Labor Welfare Board. Sometimes worker representatives file collective 
grievances, but most grievances are filed by individual workers. Lower 
paid workers use the procedure regularly. Plaintiffs and defendants in 
such cases may be represented by legal counsel.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1973 Labor Law 
prohibits forced or bonded labor by adults or children. Instances of 
forced or bonded child labor are unknown. Although the enabling laws 
have not yet been implemented, the 1996 Basic Charter affirms that 
forced or bonded labor for any person is prohibited. However, 
governmental investigative and enforcement mechanisms are lacking. 
Foreign workers sometimes find themselves in situations amounting to 
forced labor. In such cases, employers withhold letters of release 
(documents that release workers from employment contracts), which allow 
them to change employers. Without such a letter, a foreign worker must 
continue to work for his current employer or become technically 
unemployed, which is sufficient grounds for deportation. Many foreign 
workers are not aware of their right to take such disputes before the 
Labor Welfare Board. Others are reluctant to file complaints for fear 
of retribution from unscrupulous employers. In most cases, the Board 
releases the worker from service and awards compensation for time 
worked under compulsion. Employers face no other penalty than to 
reimburse the worker's back wages.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1973 Labor Law prohibits children under the age of 13 
from working. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor enforces this 
prohibition. However, in practice the enforcement often does not extend 
to some small family businesses that employ underage children, 
particularly in the agricultural and fisheries sectors. Children 
between 13 and 16 years of age may be employed but must obtain the 
Ministry's permission to work overtime, at night, on weekends or 
holidays, or perform strenuous labor. Child labor does not exist in any 
industry. Although primary school education is not compulsory, most 
children attend school to age 18.
    The law specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor by all 
persons (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Labor issues minimum wage guidelines for various categories of 
workers. In July 1998, the Government raised the minimum wage for Omani 
workers to about $260 (100 rials) per month, plus $52 (20 rials) for 
transportation and housing. Minimum wage guidelines do not apply to a 
variety of occupational categories, including small businesses that 
employ fewer than five persons, the self-employed, domestic servants, 
dependent family members working for a family firm, and some categories 
of manual labor. Many foreigners work in occupations that are exempt 
from the minimum wage law, and the Government is lax in enforcing 
minimum wage guidelines, where applicable, for foreign workers employed 
in menial jobs. However, highly skilled foreign workers frequently are 
paid more than their Omani counterparts.
    The minimum wage is sufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. The compensation for foreign manual 
laborers and clerks is sufficient to cover living expenses and to 
permit savings to be sent home.
    The private sector workweek is 40 to 45 hours and includes a rest 
period from Thursday afternoon through Friday. Government workers have 
a 35-hour workweek. While the law does not designate the number of days 
in a workweek, it requires at least one 24-hour rest period per week 
and mandates overtime pay for hours in excess of 48 per week. 
Government regulations on hours of employment are not always enforced. 
Employees who have worked extra hours without compensation may file a 
complaint before the Labor Welfare Board, but the Board's rulings are 
not binding.
    Every worker has the right to 15 days of annual leave during the 
first 3 years of employment and 30 days per year thereafter. Employers 
provide many foreign nationals, including domestic servants, with 
annual or biannual round-trip tickets to their countries of origin.
    All employers are required by law to provide first-aid facilities. 
Work sites with over 100 employees must have a nurse. Employees covered 
under the Labor Law may recover compensation for injury or illness 
sustained on the job through employer-provided medical insurance. The 
health and safety standard codes are enforced by inspectors from the 
Department of Health and Safety of the Directorate of Labor. As 
required by law, they make on-site inspections.
    There have been reports that employers or male coworkers have 
sexually harassed foreign females employed in such positions as 
domestic servants and hospital nurses. Foreign women employed as 
domestic servants and garment workers have complained that their 
employers have withheld their salaries and that government officials 
have been unresponsive to their grievances, due to investigative 
procedures that disadvantage the victim. Individuals known to be 
abusing foreign domestic servants are not always held accountable for 
their actions. In the past, several foreign women have had to ask their 
governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse.
    The law states that employers must not place their employees in 
situations involving dangerous work. However, the law does not 
specifically grant a worker the right to remove himself from dangerous 
work without jeopardy to his continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked 
in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 QATAR

    Qatar, an Arab state on the Persian Gulf, is a monarchy with no 
constitution or political parties. Qatar is governed by the ruling Al-
Thani family through its head, the Amir. The current Amir, Sheikh Hamad 
bin Khalifa Al-Thani, took power from his father in June 1995 with the 
support of leading branches of the Al-Thani family, and in consultation 
with other leading Qatari families. This transition of authority did 
not represent a change in the basic governing order. The Amir holds 
absolute power, the exercise of which is influenced by religious law, 
consultation with leading citizens, rule by consensus, and the right of 
any citizen to gain access to the Amir to appeal government decisions. 
The Amir generally legislates after consultation with leading citizens, 
an arrangement institutionalized in an appointed advisory council that 
assists the Amir in formulating policy. In March citizens were 
permitted to participate in the election of a national body, the 
Central Municipal Council, for the first time. The judiciary is 
nominally independent, but most judges hold their positions at the 
Government's pleasure.
    The country has efficient police and security services. The 
civilian security force, controlled by the Interior Ministry, comprises 
two sections: The police and the General Administration of Public 
Security and the investigatory police (Mubahathat), which is 
responsible for sedition and espionage cases. The Interior Ministry has 
a special state security investigative unit (Mubahith) that performs 
internal security investigations and gathers intelligence. In addition, 
there is an independent civilian intelligence service (Mukhabarat).
    The State owns most basic industries and services, but the retail 
and construction industries are in private hands. Oil is the principal 
natural resource, but the country's extensive natural gas resources are 
playing an increasingly important role. Rapid development in the 1970's 
and 1980's created an economy in which foreign workers, mostly South 
Asian and Arab, outnumber citizens by a ratio of 4 or 5 to 1. The 
Government has embarked upon a program of ``Qatarization,'' which is 
aimed at reducing the number of foreign workers. Many government jobs 
are offered only to citizens and private sector businesses are 
encouraged to recruit citizens as well.
    The Government restricts citizens' rights; however, there was 
substantial progress in a few areas. Citizens do not have the right to 
change their government; however, the Government's program of gradual 
democratic initiatives provided citizens with the opportunity to elect 
officials to the Central Municipal Council. Both male and female 
citizens were permitted to vote and to run for a seat on the Council. 
In addition a constitutional committee was convened in July to draft a 
permanent constitution that would provide for parliamentary elections. 
Arbitrary detention in security cases, and restrictions on the freedoms 
of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and on workers' 
rights, continued to be problems. However, the Government continued to 
take some steps to ease restrictions on the practice of non-Muslim 
religions. Despite female suffrage, in practice women's rights are 
restricted by social customs. Noncitizen workers, who make up a 
majority of the residents of the country, face discrimination in the 
workplace.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--There have been no reported instances of torture for 
several years. The Government administers most corporal punishment 
prescribed by Islamic law but does not allow amputation.
    Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
    The Government does not permit domestic human rights groups to 
exist, and no international human rights organization has asked to 
visit the country or its prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest; however, the police have the discretion to arrest 
persons based on a low level of suspicion, and arbitrary detention in 
security cases remains a problem. The authorities generally charge 
suspects within 48 hours. Suspects generally are presented to the 
Attorney General within 24 hours of arrest. The Attorney General 
decides whether to hold the suspect up to a maximum of 4 days, after 
which time the suspect is presented before the judge, who may order the 
suspect released or remanded to custody to await trial. The accused is 
entitled to legal representation throughout this process. Suspects who 
are detained in security cases generally are afforded access to 
counsel; however, they may be detained indefinitely while under 
investigation. There were no known recent cases of incommunicado 
detention.
    In June 1998, the Amir ordered the arrest of Abdulrahman Al-Nuaimi, 
a Ministry of Education official who distributed a letter to the press 
critical the Amir's decision to allow women to vote and run for office 
in the Municipal Council elections. Contrary to reports that he was 
released in 1998, Al-Nuaimi remains in custody.
    The public trial of persons arrested for involvement in the 
February 1996 coup attempt continued. Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Hamad 
Al-Thani, who was named as the prime suspect in the coup bid, was 
arrested under mysterious circumstances on or about July 23. He remains 
in custody following his appearance before the trial judge to answer 
charges of plotting to destabilize the regime and revealing military 
secrets to foreign powers. Prosecutors have called for the death 
penalty for all those accused, including Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Hammad. A 
verdict was expected in early December; however, the arrest of Hamad 
Bin Jassim Bin Hamad delayed proceedings into 2000.
    Involuntary exile has occurred but is rare. There were no reported 
cases this year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is nominally 
independent; however, most judges are foreign nationals who hold 
residence permits granted by the civil authorities, and thus hold their 
positions at the Government's pleasure. The number of citizen judges is 
increasing.
    The judiciary deals with the bureaucracies of three ministries. 
Civil (or Adlea) courts are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, and 
Shari'a (Islamic law) courts fall under the Ministry of Endowments and 
Islamic Affairs. The prosecutors fall under the Ministry of Interior.
    There are two types of courts: The civil courts, which have 
jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, and the Shari'a Court, 
which has jurisdiction in family and criminal cases. There are no 
permanent state security courts; however, although there have been no 
cases before these courts since the Amir assumed power, they have not 
been abolished formally by law and remain an option. Defendants tried 
by all courts have the right to appeal. The original case and the 
appeal in Shari'a Court are no longer heard by the same judge, and 
procedural loopholes that permitted this practice in the past are to be 
closed as part of a pending judicial reform package.
    The legal system is biased in favor of citizens and the Government. 
A Muslim litigant may request the Shari'a Court to assume jurisdiction 
in commercial or civil cases. Non-Muslims are not allowed to bring 
suits as plaintiffs in the Shari'a Court; however, they may file suit 
in the civil courts. This practice prevents non-Muslim residents from 
obtaining full legal recourse. Trials in the civil courts are public, 
but in the Shari'a Court only the disputing parties, their relatives, 
associates, and witnesses are allowed in the courtroom. Lawyers do not 
play a formal role except to prepare litigants for their cases. 
Although non-Arabic speakers are provided with interpreters, foreigners 
are disadvantaged, especially in cases involving the performance of 
contracts.
    Defendants appear before a judge for a preliminary hearing within 7 
days of their arrest. Judges may extend pretrial detention for 1 week 
at a time to allow the authorities to conduct investigations. 
Defendants in the civil courts have the right to be represented by 
defense attorneys but are not always permitted to be represented by 
counsel in the Shari'a court.
    Shari'a trials are usually brief. Shari'a family law trials are 
often held without counsel. After both parties have stated their cases 
and examined witnesses, judges are likely to deliver a verdict after a 
short deliberation. Criminal cases are normally tried within 2 to 3 
months after suspects are detained. Suspects are entitled to bail, 
except in some instances, such as in cases of violent crime. Bail may 
be provided by citizens or noncitizens. Foreigners who are charged with 
minor crimes may be released to a citizen sponsor. They are prohibited 
from departing the country until the case is resolved.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Traditional attitudes of respect for the sanctity of 
the home and the privacy of women provide a great deal of protection 
against arbitrary intrusion for most citizens and residents. A warrant 
must be obtained before police may search a residence or business, 
except in cases involving national security or emergencies. Search 
warrants are issued by judicial authorities. There were no reports of 
unauthorized searches of homes during the year. The police and security 
forces are believed to monitor the communications of suspected 
criminals, of those considered to be security risks, and of selected 
foreigners.
    With prior permission, which is usually granted, citizens may marry 
foreigners of any nationality and apply for residence permits or 
citizenship for their spouses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Government reduced 
restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press in 1996 and 
permitted a significant expansion of press freedom, some restrictions 
still remain. The Government formally lifted censorship of the media in 
1995, and since then the press has been essentially free of government 
interference. However, journalists continue to practice self-
censorship, due to real or perceived social and political pressures. 
Some journalists reportedly were subjected to pressure by the 
Government during the year after they published articles critical of 
it. No instance of explicit criticism of any citizen, whether of their 
public or private affairs, has been noted in local newspapers. 
Television and radio are state-owned, but the privately owned satellite 
television channel Al-Jazeera operates freely.
    There were no reports of instances of political censorship of 
foreign news media or broadcasts of foreign programs on local 
television over the past year. The Censorship Office in the Ministry of 
Information was abolished (together with theMinistry) in 1996, but 
censors still work at broadcast media under the overall supervision of 
the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Pornography and expressions 
deemed hostile to Islam are subject to censorship, but in practice 
censorship is applied irregularly.
    In July radio and television call-in programs addressed the 
sensitive subject of cash entitlements paid to members of the ruling 
Al-Thani family. Citizens expressed disagreement with the system in 
public forums, with no evidence of subsequent reprisals. However, one 
person did write a letter of retraction to a local newspaper a few days 
after her comments.
    A Ministry of Education official who wrote a letter critical of the 
Amir's decision to allow women to vote and run for office in the 
Municipal Council elections remains in custody (see Section 1.d.).
    Customs officials screen imported print media, videocassettes, and 
other such items for pornography, but have stopped blocking the 
importation of non-Muslim religious items.
    A growing number of citizens and residents have access to the 
Internet, which is provided through the state-owned telecommunications 
monopoly. Internet service is censored for pornographic content through 
a proxy server, which blocks those web sites containing certain key 
words and phrases. A user who believes that a site is censored 
mistakenly may submit the web address to the Internet service provider 
to have the site reviewed for suitability. The Government is responsive 
to these submissions.
    Citizens enjoy broad freedom of speech, but are restricted by the 
social and family restraints of a very traditional society. There is no 
apparent fear of government monitoring of private speech. However, the 
larger foreign population does not believe it enjoys the same freedoms 
and acts accordingly.
    There is no legal provision for academic freedom. Most instructors 
at the University of Qatar exercise self-censorship.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
severely limits freedom of assembly. The Government does not allow 
political demonstrations.
    The Government severely limits freedom of association. The 
Government does not allow political parties or membership in 
international professional organizations critical of the Government or 
of any other Arab government. Private social, sports, trade, 
professional, and cultural societies must be registered with the 
Government. Security forces monitor the activities of such groups.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The state religion is the conservative 
Hanbali school of the Sunni branch of Islam, as interpreted by Muhammad 
Ibn Abd Al-Wahab, an 18th century religious reformer who emphasized the 
strict observance of religious duties. The Government officially 
prohibits public worship by non-Muslims; however, it tolerates and 
protects private services conducted in private with prior notification 
to the authorities. The Government has indicated, through foreign 
diplomats and in meetings with Christian leaders, its long-range 
intention to identify and lease parcels of land to the recognized 
Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox communities upon which they would be 
permitted to erect churches, albeit without bells or the external 
display of crosses. In the meantime, the Government has indicated its 
support for the lease of existing villas for use in worship services by 
such groups, provided that they obtain the Qatari landlord's approval. 
The community of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
(Mormons) now meets in a villa leased for the express purpose of 
worship. The police provide traffic control for authorized Catholic 
services, which may be attended by up to 1,000 or more persons at 
times. The Government recently began to issue visas to Christian clergy 
under foreign embassy sponsorship. There are no restrictions on non-
Muslims providing religious instruction to their children. However, 
non-Muslims may not proselytize and conversion from Islam is 
theoretically a capital offense. However, there is no record of an 
execution for such a conversion since independence.
    The Government allows Shi'a Muslims to practice their faith freely; 
however, community leaders have agreed to refrain from certain public 
practices such as self-flagellation.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on internal 
travel, except around sensitive military and oil installations. In 
general, women do not require permission from male guardians to travel. 
However,men may prevent female relatives from leaving the country by 
providing their names to immigration officers at ports of departure. 
Technically, women employed by the Government must obtain official 
permission to travel abroad when requesting leave, but it is not known 
to what extent this regulation is enforced. Citizens critical of the 
Government face restrictions on their right to travel abroad.
    All citizens have the right to return. Foreigners are subject to 
immigration restrictions designed to control the size of the local 
labor pool. Foreign workers must have the permission of their sponsor 
(usually their employer) to enter and depart the country, but their 
dependents may leave the country without restriction. Foreign women who 
are married to citizens are granted residence permits and may apply for 
citizenship; however, they are expected to relinquish their foreign 
citizenship.
    The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding 
refugees, asylees, or first asylum. Those attempting to enter 
illegally, including persons seeking asylum from nearby countries, are 
refused entry. Asylum seekers who are able to obtain local sponsorship 
or employment are allowed to enter and may remain as long as they are 
employed. A Bahraini Air Force pilot defected to Qatar in 1996, and the 
Government stated that he was free to stay, calling him a refugee and 
offering him its full protection.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government or the 
political system peacefully. The political institutions blend the 
characteristics of a traditional Bedouin tribal state and a modern 
bureaucracy. There are no political parties or organized opposition 
groups. However, in March citizens had the opportunity to choose 
officials to the Central Municipal Council in free and fair elections.
    The Amir exercises most executive and legislative powers, including 
appointment of cabinet members. On March 8, citizens elected a 29-
member Central Municipal Council. For the first time, men and women age 
18 and older were permitted both to vote and to run as candidates. The 
Council is a nonpartisan body that addresses issues such as street 
repair, green space, trash collection, and public works projects. Its 
role is to advise the Minister of Municipalities and Agriculture. The 
Council cannot change policy on its own.
    Under the amended Provisional Constitution, the Amir must be chosen 
from and by the adult males of the Al-Thani family.
    In November 1998, the Amir announced his intention to form a 
constitutional committee to draft a permanent constitution that would 
provide for democratic parliamentary elections. The constitutional 
committee was inaugurated on July 13 and includes a number of 
government officials, academics, and prominent business leaders. The 
Amir reiterated in his remarks to the committee members that he expects 
their efforts to lead to the establishment of an elected parliamentary 
body.
    Women have the right to vote and some ran as candidates for the 
Central Municipal Council, but none were elected.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not permit local human rights organizations to 
exist. No international human rights organizations are known to have 
asked to investigate conditions in the country. However, Amnesty 
International and foreign embassies were invited to send observers to 
sessions of the public trial of those accused in the 1996 coup attempt. 
Foreign observers attended the trial sessions held during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Institutional, cultural, and legal discrimination based on gender, 
race, religion, social status, and disability exists.
    Women.--Violence against women and spousal abuse occur but are not 
believed to be widespread. Some foreign domestic servants, especially 
those from South Asia and the Philippines, have been mistreated by 
employers. According to Shari'a (Islamic law), all forms of physical 
abuse are illegal. The maximum penalty for rape is death. The police 
actively investigate reports of violence against women. In the last few 
years, the Government demonstrated an increased willingness to arrest 
and punish offenders, whether citizens or foreigners. Offenders who 
arecitizens usually receive lighter punishments than do foreigners. 
Abused domestic workers usually do not press charges for fear of losing 
their jobs.
    The legal system allows leniency for a man found guilty of 
committing a ``crime of honor,'' a euphemism that refers to a violent 
assault against a female by a male relative for alleged sexual 
misconduct; however, such honor killings are rare. In September a 
former minister, Ali Saeed Al-Khayareen, killed his two half-sisters 
for their alleged sexual misconduct. Al-Khayareen was being held at the 
Al-Rayyan detention center, but reportedly was released late in the 
year.
    The activities of women are restricted closely both by law and 
tradition. For example, a woman is prohibited from applying for a 
driver's license unless she has permission from a male guardian. This 
restriction does not apply to noncitizen women. The Government adheres 
to Shari'a in matters of inheritance and child custody. While Muslim 
wives have the right to inherit from their husbands, non-Muslim wives 
do not, unless a special exception is arranged. In cases of divorce, 
Shari'a prevails; younger children remain with the mother and older 
children with the father. Both parents retain permanent rights of 
visitation. However, local authorities do not allow a noncitizen parent 
to take his or her child out of the country without permission of the 
citizen parent. There has been a steady increase in the number and 
severity of complaints of spousal abuse by the foreign wives of local 
and foreign men. Women may attend court proceedings but generally are 
represented by a male relative; however, women may represent 
themselves.
    Women largely are relegated to the roles of mother and homemaker, 
but some women are now finding jobs in education, medicine, and the 
news media. Women appear to receive equal pay for equal work; however, 
they often do not receive equal allowances. These allowances generally 
cover transportation and housing costs. Increasingly, women are 
receiving government scholarships to pursue degrees at universities 
overseas. The Amir has entrusted his second wife, who is the mother of 
the Heir Apparent, with the high-profile task of establishing a 
university in Doha. In 1996 the Government appointed its first female 
undersecretary, in the Ministry of Education. Although women legally 
are able to travel abroad alone (see Section 2.d.), tradition and 
social pressures cause most to travel with male escorts. There also 
have been complaints that Qatari husbands take their foreign spouses' 
passports and, without prior approval, turn them in for Qatari 
citizenship documents. The husbands then inform their wives that the 
wives have lost their former citizenship. In other cases, foreign wives 
report being forbidden by their Qatari husbands or in-laws to visit or 
to contact foreign embassies.
    There is no independent women's rights organization, nor has the 
Government permitted the establishment of one.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's 
rights through a well-funded, free public education system (elementary 
through university) and a complete medical protection program for 
Qatari children. However, children of most foreigners are denied free 
education and have only limited medical coverage.
    Very young children, usually of African or South Asian background, 
have been used as jockeys in camel races. Little information is 
available on wages and working conditions for these children (see 
Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
    People with Disabilities.--The Government has not enacted 
legislation or otherwise mandated provision of accessibility for the 
disabled, who also face social discrimination. The Government maintains 
a hospital and schools that provide high-quality, free services to the 
mentally and physically disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Shi'a Muslims fill many positions in the 
bureaucracy and are prominent in business. However, they experience 
discrimination in employment in some sensitive areas, such as security.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government discriminates 
against some citizens of non-Qatari origin. In the private sector, many 
citizens of Iranian origin occupy some of the highest positions. 
However, they rarely are found in senior decisionmaking positions in 
government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The right of association is strictly 
limited, and all workers, including foreigners, are prohibited from 
forming labor unions. Despite this restriction, almost all workers have 
the right to strike after their case has been presented to the Labor 
Conciliation Board and ruled upon. Employers may close a place of work 
or dismiss employees once the Conciliation Board has heard the case. 
The right to strike does not exist for government employees, domestic 
workers, or members of the employer's family. No worker in a public 
utility or health or security service may strike if such a strike would 
harm the public or lead to property damage. Strikes are rare.
    The Labor Law provides for the establishment of joint consultative 
committees composed of representatives of the employer and workers. The 
committees do not discuss wages but may consider issues such as 
organization and productivity, conditions of employment, training of 
workers, and safety measures and their implementation.
    Since 1995, Qatar has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the 
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker 
rights standards.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are 
prohibited from engaging in collective bargaining. In general wages are 
set unilaterally by employers without government involvement. Local 
courts handle disputes between workers and employers.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor. Three-quarters of the work force are 
foreign workers, who are dependent on a single employer for residency 
rights. This leaves them vulnerable to abuse. For instance, employers 
must give consent before exit permits are issued to any foreign 
employee seeking to leave the country. Some employers temporarily 
withhold this consent to force foreign employees to work for longer 
periods than they wish. The Government prohibits forced and bonded 
labor by children and generally enforces this prohibition effectively; 
however, some very young children work as jockeys in camel races (see 
Sections 5 and 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Minors between the ages of 15 and 18 may be employed with 
the approval of their parents or guardians and some children may work 
in small, family-owned businesses. However, child labor is rare. 
Education is compulsory through the age of 15. Very young children, 
usually of African or South Asian background, are used as jockeys in 
camel races (see Sections 5 and 6.c. and 6.f.). Little information is 
available on wages and working conditions for these children. The 
Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and generally 
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    Minors may not work more than 6 hours a day or more than 36 hours a 
week. Employers must provide the Ministry of Labor with the names and 
occupations of their minor employees. The Ministry may prohibit the 
employment of minors in jobs that are judged dangerous to the health, 
safety, or morals of minors. Employers also must obtain permission from 
the Ministry of Education to hire a minor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage, 
although a 1962 law gives the Amir authority to set one. The 48-hour 
workweek with a 24-hour rest period is prescribed by law, although most 
government offices follow a 36-hours-per-week work schedule. Employees 
who work more than 48 hours per week, or 36 hours per week during the 
Muslim month of Ramadan, are entitled to overtime pay. This law is 
adhered to in government offices and major private sector companies. It 
is not observed with respect to domestic and personal employees. 
Domestic servants frequently work 7 days per week, more than 12 hours 
per day, with few or no holidays, and have no effective way to redress 
grievances against their employers.
    The Government has enacted regulations concerning worker safety and 
health, but enforcement, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Energy and Industry, is lax. The Department of Public Safety oversees 
safety training and conditions, and the state-run petroleum company has 
its own set of safety standards and procedures. The Labor Law of 1964, 
as amended in 1984, lists partial and permanent disabilities for which 
compensation may be awarded, some connected with handling chemicals and 
petroleum products or construction injuries. The law does not 
specifically set rates of payment and compensation.
    Foreign workers must be sponsored by a citizen or a legally 
recognized organization to obtain an entry visa and must have their 
sponsor's permission to depart the country. Any worker may seek legal 
relief from onerous work conditions, but domestic workers generally 
accept their situations in order to avoid repatriation. The Government 
also penalizes Qatari employers who violate residence and sponsorship 
laws. Some foreign domestics have been mistreated by their employers 
(see Section 5).
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no confirmed reports that persons were 
trafficked in, to, or from the country during the year.
                                 ______
                                 

                              SAUDI ARABIA

    Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without elected representative 
institutions or political parties. It is ruled by King Fahd Bin Abd Al-
Aziz Al Saud, a son of King Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud, who unified the 
country in the early 20th century. Since the death of King Abd Al-Aziz, 
the King and Crown Prince have been chosen from among his sons, who 
themselves have had preponderant influence in the choice. A 1992 royal 
decree reserves for the King exclusive power to name the Crown Prince. 
Crown Prince Abdullah has played an increasing role in governance since 
King Fahd suffered from a stroke in 1995. The Government has declared 
the Islamic holy book the Koran, and the Sunna (tradition) of the 
Prophet Muhammad, to be the country's Constitution. The Government 
bases its legitimacy on governance according to the precepts of a 
rigorously conservative form of Islam. Neither the Government nor the 
society in general accepts the concept of separation of religion and 
state. The Government prohibits the establishment of political parties 
and suppresses opposition views. In 1992 King Fahd appointed a 
Consultative Council and similar provincial assemblies. The 
Consultative Council began holding sessions in 1993 and was expanded in 
1997. The judiciary is generally independent but is subject to 
influence by the executive branch and members of the royal family.
    Police and border forces under the Ministry of Interior are 
responsible for internal security. The Mutawaa'in, or religious police, 
constitute the Committee to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue, a 
semiautonomous agency that enforces adherence to Islamic norms by 
monitoring public behavior. The Government maintains general control of 
the security forces. However, members of the security forces committed 
human rights abuses.
    The oil industry has fueled the transformation of Saudi Arabia from 
a pastoral, agricultural, and commercial society to a rapidly 
urbanizing one characterized by large-scale infrastructure projects, an 
extensive social welfare system, and a labor market comprised largely 
of foreign workers. Oil revenues account for around 40 percent of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) and 75 percent of government income. 
Agriculture accounts for only about 9 percent of GDP. Government 
spending, including spending on the national airline, power, water, 
telephone, education, and health services, accounts for 24 percent of 
GDP. About 40 percent of the economy is nominally private, and the 
Government is promoting further privatization of the economy. In 1995 
the Government began an aggressive campaign to increase the number of 
Saudi nationals represented in the public and private work forces. The 
campaign has restricted employment of some categories of foreign 
workers by limiting certain occupations to Saudis only, increasing fees 
for some types of work visas, and setting minimum wages for some job 
categories in order to increase the cost to employers of non-Saudi 
labor. In August 1998, the Government announced that Saudi citizens 
must constitute at least 5 percent of the work force in private sector 
companies by October 1998, an amount that, according to a 1995 
ministerial decree, should be 15 percent. The Government's 1997 offer 
of a limited amnesty under which illegal residents could depart the 
country without penalty was followed up in 1998 and during the year by 
a crackdown on illegal workers and the Saudis who employ or house them.
    The Government commits and tolerates serious human rights abuses. 
Citizens have neither the right nor the legal means to change their 
government. Security forces continued to abuse detainees and prisoners, 
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and facilitate incommunicado 
detention; in addition there were allegations that security forces 
committed torture. Prolonged detention without charge is a problem. 
Security forces committed such abuses, in contradiction to the law, but 
with the acquiescence of the Government. Mutawaa'in continued to 
intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and foreigners. The Government 
infringes on citizens' privacy rights. The Government prohibits or 
restricts freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, 
religion, and movement. Other continuing problems included 
discrimination and violence against women, discrimination against 
ethnic and religious minorities, and strict limitations on worker 
rights. The Government disagrees with internationally accepted 
definitions of human rights and views its interpretation of Islamic law 
as its sole source of guidance on human rights.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings during the year.
    In November 1998, several Mutawaa'in attacked and killed an elderly 
Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a 
traditional Shi'a practice). Mutawaa'in attempts to cover up the 
killing were unsuccessful. The Government reportedly is investigating 
the incident; however, the Government does not make public the results 
of investigations involving its personnel (see Sections 2.c. and 5.).
    The investigation of the 1996 Al-Khobar bombing, which killed 19 
U.S. servicemen, continued. The Government has not yet issued a report 
of its findings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--There were credible reports that the authorities abused 
detainees, both citizens and foreigners. Ministry of Interior officials 
are responsible for most incidents of abuse, including beatings and 
sleep deprivation. In addition, there were allegations of torture. 
Although the Government has ratified the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, it has 
refused to recognize the authority of the Committee Against Torture to 
investigate alleged abuses. In April 1998, the Government pledged to 
cooperate with U.N. human rights mechanisms. However, although the 
Government asks for details of reports of torture and other human 
rights abuses made by international human rights groups, it does not 
permit international observers to investigate them. The Government's 
general refusal to grant members of diplomatic missions access to the 
Ministry of Interior detention facilities, or allow members of 
international human rights groups into the country, hinders efforts to 
confirm or discount reports of abuses. The Government's past failure to 
criticize human rights abuses has contributed to the public perception 
that security forces can commit abuses with impunity.
    According to Amnesty International, in April a 70-year-old 
journalist reportedly was beaten during interrogation after his return 
to the country from Bahrain (see Section 2.a.).
    Although the number of reports of harassment by the Mutawaa'in 
remained relatively low in comparison with previous years, the 
Mutawaa'in continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and 
foreigners of both sexes (see Section l.d.).
    The Government punishes criminals according to its interpretation 
of Islamic law, or Shari'a. Punishments include flogging, amputation, 
and execution by beheading, stoning, or firing squad. The authorities 
acknowledged 100 executions during the year, a substantial increase 
from 25 in 1998, but less than the 134 reported in 1997. Executions 
included 36 men for murder (29 Saudis and 7 foreigners), 40 men for 
narcotics-related offenses (2 Saudis and 38 foreigners), 3 men for 
gang-related activities (2 Saudis and 1 foreigner), 8 men for rape (7 
Saudis and 1 foreigner), 10 men for armed robbery (7 Saudis and 3 
foreigners), and 3 women for narcotics-related offenses (all 
foreigners). The men were executed by beheading and the women were 
executed by firing squad. There were no executions by stoning. In 
accordance with Shari'a, the authorities may punish repeated thievery 
by amputation of the right hand. There were two reports of multiple 
amputations (right hand, left leg) for the crime of highway robbery 
during the year. The amputations were carried out against two Saudi 
men. Persons convicted of less serious offenses, such as alcohol 
related offenses or being alone in the company of an unrelated person 
of the opposite sex, sometimes were punished by flogging with a cane.
    Prison and jail conditions vary throughout the Kingdom. Prisons 
generally meet internationally accepted standards and provide air-
conditioned cells, good nutrition, regular exercise, and careful 
patrolling by prison guards. However, some police station jails are 
overcrowded and unsanitary. Authorities generally allowed family 
members access to detainees.
    Boards of Investigation and Public Prosecution, organized on a 
regional basis, were established by King Fahd in 1993. The members of 
these boards have the right to inspect prisons, review prisoners' 
files, and hear their complaints. However, the Government does not 
permit human rights monitors to visit prisons or jails. The Government 
does not allow impartial observers of any type access to specialized 
Ministry of Interior prisons, where it detains persons accused of 
political subversion.
    Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) are present at the Rafha refugee camp, which houses 
former Iraqi prisoners of war and civilians who fled Iraq following the 
Gulf War. According to UNHCR officials, there wasno systematic abuse of 
refugees by camp guards. When isolated instances of abuse have surfaced 
in the past, the authorities have been responsive and willing to 
investigate allegations and reprimand offending guards. The camp 
receives a high level of material assistance and is comparatively 
comfortable and well run. However, the Government generally confines 
refugees to the camp except in the event of approved emigration.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits 
arbitrary arrest; however, officers make arrests and detain persons 
without following explicit legal guidelines. There are few procedures 
to safeguard against abuse. There have been few cases of citizens 
successfully obtaining judicial redress for abuse of the Government's 
power of arrest and detention. During the year, a citizen successfully 
sued a government official for wrongful imprisonment and was awarded 
compensation, while the government official was imprisoned.
    In accordance with a 1983 Ministry of Interior regulation, 
authorities usually detain suspects for no longer than 3 days before 
charging them. However, serious exceptions have been reported. The 
regulation also has provisions for bail for less serious crimes. Also, 
authorities sometimes release detainees on the recognizance of a patron 
or sponsoring employer without the payment of bail. If they are not 
released, authorities typically detain accused persons for an average 
of 2 months before sending the case to trial or, in the case of some 
foreigners, summarily deporting them. There is no established procedure 
providing detainees the right to inform their family of their arrest.
    The Mutawaa'in have the authority to detain persons for no more 
than 24 hours for violations of the strict standards of proper dress 
and behavior. However, they sometimes exceeded this limit before 
delivering detainees to the police (see Section l.f.). Current 
procedures require a police officer to accompany the Mutawaa'in at the 
time of an arrest. Mutawaa'in generally complied with this requirement. 
During the year, in the more conservative Riyadh district, the number 
of reports received of Mutawaa'in accosting, abusing, arresting, and 
detaining persons alleged to have violated dress and behavior standards 
was the same as in 1998. The Jeddah district also received a similar 
number of reports as in the previous year.
    In October the Government detained 13 Filipino Christians in 
connection with a large prayer service held by their congregation (see 
Section 2.c.).
    Political detainees who are arrested by the General Directorate of 
Investigation (GDI), the Ministry of Interior's security service, 
commonly are held incommunicado in special prisons during the initial 
phase of an investigation, which may last weeks or months. The GDI 
allows the detainees only limited contact with their families or 
lawyers.
    The authorities may detain without charge persons who publicly 
criticize the Government, or may charge them with attempting to 
destabilize the Government (see Sections 2.a. and 3). The authorities 
in June released Salman Al-Awdah and Safar Al-Hawali, Muslim clerics 
who were arrested in September 1994 for publicly criticizing the 
Government. Their detention that year sparked protest demonstrations 
that resulted in the arrest of 157 persons for antigovernment 
activities. All now have been released.
    In January the Government released, under its annual Ramadan 
amnesty, over 7,000 prisoners and detainees, including over 3,000 
foreigners convicted or held for minor offenses.
    The total number of political detainees cannot be determined 
precisely, but it is estimated at less than 200 persons by 
international human rights organizations.
    Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of a U.S. 
military facility in Saudi Arabia, authorities have detained, 
interrogated, and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a 
Muslims suspected of fundamentalist tendencies or Iranian sympathies. 
The Government reportedly still holds in jail an unknown number of 
Shi'a arrested in the aftermath of the bombing. Government security 
forces reportedly arrest Shi'a on the smallest suspicion, hold them in 
custody for lengthy periods, and then release them without explanation 
(see Section 2.c.).
    The Government did not use forced exile, and it did not revoke 
citizenship for political purposes during the year. However, it 
previously has revoked the citizenship of opponents of the Government 
who reside outside the country, such as Mohammed Al-Masari (see Section 
3) and Osama Bin Ladin, a suspect in organizing terrorist activities, 
including the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The independence of the judiciary 
is prescribed by law and usually is respected in practice; however, 
judges occasionally accede to the influence of the executive branch, 
particularly members of the royal family and their associates, who are 
not required to appear before the courts. Moreover, the Ministry of 
Justice exercises judicial, financial, and administrative control of 
the courts.
    The legal system is based on Shari'a. Shari'a courts exercise 
jurisdiction over common criminal cases and civil suits regarding 
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. These courts base 
judgments largely on the Koran and on the Sunna, another Islamic text. 
Cases involving relatively small penalties are tried in Shari'a summary 
courts; more serious crimes are adjudicated in Shari'a courts of common 
pleas. Appeals from Shari'a courts are made to the courts of appeal.
    Other civil proceedings, including those involving claims against 
the Government and enforcement of foreign judgments, are held before 
specialized administrative tribunals, such as the Commission for the 
Settlement of Labor Disputes and the Board of Grievances.
    The Government permits Shi'a Muslims to use their own legal 
tradition to adjudicate noncriminal cases within their community.
    The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed 
personnel and civil servants who are charged with violations of 
military regulations. The Minister of Defense and Aviation and the King 
review the decisions of courts-martial.
    The Supreme Judicial Council is not a court and may not reverse 
decisions made by a court of appeals. However, the Council may review 
lower court decisions and refer them back to the lower court for 
reconsideration. Only the Supreme Judicial Council may discipline or 
remove a judge. The King appoints the members of the Council.
    The Council of Senior Religious Scholars is an autonomous body of 
20 senior religious jurists, including the Minister of Justice. It 
establishes the legal principles to guide lower-court judges in 
deciding cases.
    Defendants usually appear without an attorney before a judge, who 
determines guilt or innocence in accordance with Shari'a standards. 
Defense lawyers may offer their clients advice before trial or may 
attend the trial as interpreters for those unfamiliar with Arabic. The 
courts do not provide foreign defendants with translators. Public 
defenders are not provided. Individuals may choose any person to 
represent them by a power of attorney filed with the court and the 
Ministry of Justice. Most trials are closed. However, in a highly 
publicized 1997 case involving two foreign women charged with murder, 
the Saudi court conducted preliminary matters and the trial with 
relatively open and transparent procedures, including more effective 
use of counsel, increased consular presence, and increased family 
access.
    A woman's testimony does not carry the same weight as that of a 
man. In a Shari'a court, the testimony of one man equals that of two 
women. In the absence of two witnesses, or four witnesses in the case 
of adultery, confessions before a judge almost always are required for 
criminal conviction--a situation that repeatedly has led prosecuting 
authorities to coerce confessions from suspects by threats and abuse.
    Sentencing is not uniform. Foreign residents sometimes receive 
harsher penalties than citizens. Under Shari'a, as interpreted and 
applied in Saudi Arabia, crimes against Muslims receive harsher 
penalties than those against non-Muslims. In the case of wrongful 
death, the amount of indemnity or ``blood money'' awarded to relatives 
varies with the nationality, religion, and sex of the victim. A 
sentence may be changed at any stage of review, except for punishments 
stipulated by the Koran. In a case that was known widely but was not 
reported in the press, a member of the royal family, who shot and 
killed two Mutawaa'in who had entered his property without permission 
in October 1998, was allowed to pay ``blood money'' to the family 
members of the Mutawaa'in instead of being charged with murder.
    Provincial governors have the authority to exercise leniency and 
reduce a judge's sentence. In general, members of the royal family, and 
other powerful families, are not subject to the same rule of law as 
ordinary citizens (see Section 1.a.). For example, judges do not have 
the power to issue a warrant summoning any member of the royal family.
    The King and his advisors review cases involving capital 
punishment. The King has the authority to commute death sentences and 
grant pardons, except for capital crimes committedagainst individuals. 
In such cases, he may request the victim's next of kin to pardon the 
murderer--usually in return for compensation from the family or the 
King.
    There is insufficient information to determine the number of 
political prisoners. The Government does not provide information on 
such persons or respond to inquiries about them. Moreover, the 
Government conducts closed trials for persons who may be political 
prisoners and in other cases has detained persons incommunicado for 
long periods while under investigation.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government infringes on these rights. The sanctity 
of family life and the inviolability of the home are among the most 
fundamental of Islamic precepts. Royal decrees announced in 1992 
include provisions calling for the Government to defend the home from 
unlawful intrusions. Nonetheless, there are few protections from 
government interference with one's privacy, family, home, or 
correspondence.
    The police generally must demonstrate reasonable cause and obtain 
permission from the provincial governor before searching a private 
home; however, warrants are not required.
    Customs officials routinely open mail and shipments to search for 
contraband, including material deemed pornographic and non-Muslim 
religious material. Customs officials confiscated or censored materials 
considered offensive, including Christian Bibles and religious video 
tapes (see Section 2.c.). The authorities also open mail and use 
informants and wiretaps in internal security and criminal matters. 
Security forces used wiretaps against foreigners suspected of alcohol-
related offenses. Informants (know as ``umdas'') report ``seditious 
ideas'' or antigovernment activity in their neighborhoods to the 
Ministry of the Interior.
    The Government enforces most social and Islamic religious norms, 
which are matters of law (see Section 5). Women may not marry non-
Saudis without government permission; men must obtain approval from the 
Ministry of Interior to marry women from countries outside the six 
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In accordance with Shari'a, 
women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims; men may marry 
Christians and Jews, as well as Muslims.
    Mutawaa'in practices and incidents of abuse varied widely in 
different regions of the country, but were most numerous in the central 
Nejd region. In certain areas, both the Mutawaa'in and religious 
vigilantes acting on their own harassed, assaulted, battered, arrested, 
and detained citizens and foreigners (see Section 1.d.). The Government 
requires the Mutawaa'in to follow established procedures and to offer 
instruction in a polite manner; however, Mutawaa'in did not always 
comply with the requirements. The Government has not criticized 
publicly abuses by Mutawaa'in and religious vigilantes, but has sought 
to curtail these abuses.
    Mutawaa'in enforcement of strict standards of social behavior 
included the closing of commercial establishments during the five daily 
prayer observances, insisting upon compliance with strict norms of 
public dress, and dispersing gatherings of women in public places. 
Mutawaa'in frequently reproached Saudi and foreign women for failure to 
observe strict dress codes, and arrested men and women found together 
who were not married or closely related.
    Some professors believe that informers monitor comments made in 
university classrooms (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government severely limits 
freedom of speech and the press. The authorities do not countenance 
criticism of Islam, the ruling family, or the Government. However, 
during the year, the authorities again allowed the press some freedom 
to criticize governmental bodies and social policies through editorial 
comments and cartoons. Persons whose criticisms align them with an 
organized political opposition are subject to arrest and detention 
until they confess to a crime or sign a statement promising not to 
resume such criticisms, which is tantamount to a confession.
    The print media are privately owned but publicly subsidized. A 1982 
media policy statement and a 1965 national security law prohibit the 
dissemination of criticism of the Government. The media policy 
statement urges journalists to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote 
Arab interests, and preserve the cultural heritage of Saudi Arabia. The 
Ministry of Information appoints,and may remove, the editors in chief. 
It also provides guidelines to newspapers on controversial issues. The 
Government owns the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), which expresses official 
government views.
    Newspapers typically publish news on sensitive subjects, such as 
crime or terrorism, only after it has been released by the SPA or when 
it has been authorized by a senior government official. Two Saudi-
owned, London-based dailies, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, are 
widely distributed and read in Saudi Arabia. Both newspapers tend to 
practice self-censorship in order to comply with government 
restrictions on sensitive issues. The authorities continue to censor 
stories about Saudi Arabia in the foreign press. Censors may remove or 
blacken the offending articles, glue pages together, or prevent certain 
issues of foreign publications from entering the market. However, the 
Ministry of Information continued to relax its blackout policy 
regarding politically sensitive news concerning Saudi Arabia reported 
in the international media, although press restrictions on reporting of 
domestic news remain very stringent. The Government's policy in this 
regard appears to be motivated in part by pragmatic considerations: 
Saudi access to outside sources of information, especially the Cable 
News Network (CNN) and other satellite television channels, is 
increasingly widespread.
    According to Amnesty International, in April a 70-year-old 
journalist reportedly was beaten during interrogation after his return 
to the country from Bahrain (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government tightly restricts the entry of foreign journalists 
into the Kingdom. The Government owns and operates the television and 
radio companies. Government censors remove any reference to politics, 
religions other than Islam, pork or pigs, alcohol, and sex from foreign 
programs and songs.
    There are well over 1 million satellite receiving dishes in the 
country, which provide citizens with foreign broadcasts. The legal 
status of these devices is ambiguous. The Government ordered a halt to 
their importation in 1992 at the request of religious leaders who 
objected to foreign programming being made available on satellite 
channels. In 1994 the Government banned the sale, installation, and 
maintenance of dishes and supporting devices, but the number of dishes 
continues to increase and residents legally may subscribe to satellite 
decoding services that require a dish.
    The Government bans all books, magazines, and other materials that 
it considers sexual or pornographic in nature. The Ministry of 
Information compiles and updates a list of publications that are 
prohibited from being sold in the country. Access to the Internet is 
available through Saudi servers or through servers in other Gulf 
countries. The Government attempts to block all web sites that it deems 
sexual, pornographic, or otherwise offensive or un-Islamic. However, 
such web sites are accessible readily from within the country.
    The Government censors all forms of public artistic expression and 
prohibits cinemas and public musical or theatrical performances, except 
those that are considered folkloric.
    Academic freedom is restricted. The authorities prohibit the study 
of evolution, Freud, Marx, Western music, and Western philosophy. Some 
professors believe that informers monitor their classroom comments and 
report to government and religious authorities.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
strictly limits freedom of assembly. It prohibits public demonstrations 
as a means of political expression. Public meetings are segregated by 
sex. Unless meetings are sponsored by diplomatic missions or approved 
by the appropriate governor, foreign residents who seek to hold 
unsegregated meetings risk arrest and deportation. The authorities 
monitor any large gathering of persons, especially of women. The 
Mutawaa'in dispersed groups of women found in public places, such as 
restaurants. Government policy permits women to attend cultural and 
social events at diplomatic chanceries and residences only if they are 
accompanied by a father, brother, or husband. However, in practice 
police often implement the policy in an arbitrary manner. On many 
occasions during the year, authorities actively prohibited women from 
entering diplomatic chanceries or residences to attend cultural events 
and lectures. However, in May for the second year in a row, authorities 
allowed unescorted Saudi women to attend a women-only cultural event 
hosted at a diplomatic mission.
    The Government strictly limits freedom of association. It prohibits 
the establishment of political parties or any type of opposition group 
(see Section 3). By its power to license associations, the Government 
ensures that groups conform to public policy.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion does not exist. Islam 
is the official religion, and all citizens must be Muslims. The 
Government prohibits the public practice of other religions. Private 
non-Muslim worship is permitted.
    Conversion by a Muslim to another religion is considered apostasy. 
Public apostasy is a crime under Shari'a and punishable by death.
    Islamic practice generally is limited to that of the Wahhabi order, 
which adheres to the Hanbali school of the Sunni branch of Islam as 
interpreted by Muhammad Ibn Al-Wahab, an 18th century religious 
reformer. Practices contrary to this interpretation, such as visits to 
the tombs of renowned Muslims, are discouraged.
    The Ministry of Islamic Affairs directly supervises, and is a major 
source of funds for, the construction and maintenance of almost all 
mosques in the country. The Ministry pays the salaries of imams (prayer 
leaders) and others who work in the mosques. A governmental committee 
is responsible for defining the qualifications of imams. The Mutawaa'in 
receive their funding from the Government, and the general president of 
the Mutawaa'in holds the rank of cabinet minister. During the year, 
foreign imams were barred from leading worship during the most heavily 
attended prayer times and prohibited from delivering sermons during 
Friday congregational prayers. The Government claims that its actions 
were part of its Saudiization plan to replace foreign workers with 
citizens.
    The Shi'a Muslim minority (roughly 500,000 of nearly 14 million 
citizens) lives mostly in the eastern province. Its members are the 
objects of officially sanctioned political and economic discrimination 
(see Section 5). However, the Government for the first time appointed a 
Shi'a ambassador. Prior to 1990, the Government prohibited Shi'a public 
processions during the Islamic month of Muharram and restricted other 
processions and congregations to designated areas in the major Shi'a 
cities. Since 1990 the authorities have permitted marches on the Shi'a 
holiday of Ashura, provided that the marchers do not display banners or 
engage in self-flagellation. Ashura commemorations took place during 
the year, again without incident, as in the previous year. The 
Government seldom permits private construction of Shi'a mosques. The 
Shi'a have declined government offers to build state-supported mosques 
because the Government would prohibit the incorporation and display of 
Shi'a motifs in any such mosques.
    In November 1998 several Mutawaa'in attacked and killed an elderly 
Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a 
traditional Shi'a practice). Mutawaa'in attempts to cover up the 
killing were unsuccessful. The Government reportedly is investigating 
the incident; however, the Government does not make public the results 
of investigations involving its personnel (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    The Government reportedly still holds in jail an unknown number of 
Shi'a who were arrested in the aftermath of the Al-Khobar bombing. 
Government security forces reportedly arrest Shi'a on the smallest 
suspicion, hold them in custody for lengthy periods, and then release 
them without explanation (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government does not permit public non-Muslim religious 
activities. Non-Muslim worshippers risk arrest, lashing, and 
deportation for engaging in overt religious activity that attracts 
official attention. In 1997 for the first time, a senior Saudi leader 
stated publicly that the Government does not ``prevent'' private non-
Muslim religious worship in the home. Such private non-Muslim worship 
occurs on a wide scale through the country, including on the premises 
of several embassies. Other high level Saudi authorities have stated 
that the Government's policy allows for private non-Muslim worship and 
that the Government does not sanction investigation or harassment of 
such private worship services. However, on October 8, the Mutawaa'in 
detained 13 Filipino Christians after raiding their worship services 
because of reports that two congregations recently had held a prayer 
service for 1,000 persons. The detained Christians all were released by 
October 31, and were given 4 to 6 weeks to prepare for deportation. 
They all were deported by year's end. The Government ascribes some 
harassment of private worship services to individuals and organizations 
acting on their own authority and in contradiction of government 
policy. Representatives of many Christian denominations present in the 
country report that the Government is not interfering with their 
private worship services.
    Proselytizing is illegal. There were two cases during the year in 
which the police detained foreign Christian activists. In May the 
Mutawaa'in raided the apartment of a Filipino Christian pastor and 
detained him for proselytizing. He was released anddeported in July. 
Another Filipino was arrested for proselytizing in July and deported in 
August.
    Persons wearing religious symbols of any kind in public risk 
confrontation with the Mutawaa'in. This general prohibition against 
religious symbols also applies to Muslims. A Christian wearing a 
crucifix or a Muslim wearing a Koranic necklace in public would be 
admonished.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts the travel of 
Saudi women, who must obtain written permission from their closest male 
relative before the authorities allow them to board domestic public 
transportation or to travel abroad (see Section 5). In November the 
Ministry of Interior announced that preparations are underway to issue 
identity cards to women, which presumably will allow them to establish 
independent legal identities from men, a prerequisite to securing 
greater rights in many areas, including travel; however, no action was 
taken on the matter by year's end. Males may travel anywhere within the 
country or abroad.
    Foreigners typically are allowed to reside or work in Saudi Arabia 
only under the sponsorship of a Saudi national or business. The 
Government requires foreign residents to carry identification cards. It 
does not permit foreigners to travel outside the city of their 
employment or change their workplace without their sponsor's 
permission. Foreign residents who travel within the country may be 
asked by the authorities to show that they possess letters of 
permission from their employer or sponsor.
    Sponsors generally retain possession of foreign workers' passports. 
Foreign workers must obtain permission from their sponsors to travel 
abroad. If sponsors are involved in a commercial or labor dispute with 
foreign employees, they may ask the authorities to prohibit the 
employees from departing the country until the dispute is resolved. 
Some sponsors use this as a pressure tactic to resolve disputes in 
their favor or to have foreign employees deported. There were numerous 
reports of the Government prohibiting foreign employees involved in 
labor disputes from departing the country until the dispute was 
resolved (see Section 5).
    The Government seizes the passports of all potential suspects and 
witnesses in criminal cases and suspends the issuance of exit visas to 
them until the case is tried or otherwise concluded. As a result, some 
foreign nationals are forced to remain in the country for lengthy 
periods against their will. The authorities sometimes confiscate the 
passports of suspected oppositionists and their families. The 
Government actively discourages Shi'a travel to Iran to visit 
pilgrimage sites. The Government still punishes Shi'a who travel to 
Iran without permission from the Ministry of the Interior, or those 
suspected of such travel, by confiscating passports for up to 2 years 
(see Section 5).
    Citizens may emigrate, but the law prohibits dual citizenship. 
Apart from marriage to a Saudi national, there are no provisions for 
foreign residents to acquire citizenship. However, foreigners are 
granted citizenship in rare cases, generally through the advocacy of an 
influential patron.
    The 1992 Basic Law provides that ``the state will grant political 
asylum if the public interest mitigates'' in favor of it. The language 
does not specify clear rules for adjudicating asylum cases. In general, 
the authorities regard refugees and displaced persons like other 
foreign workers: they must have sponsors for employment or risk 
expulsion. Of the 33,000 Iraqi civilians and former prisoners of war 
allowed refuge in Saudi Arabia at the end of the Gulf War, none has 
been granted permanent asylum in the country; however, the Government 
has underwritten the entire cost of providing safe haven to the Iraqi 
refugees, and continues to provide excellent logistical and 
administrative support to the UNHCR and other resettlement agencies.
    At year's end, approximately 27,000 of the original 33,000 Iraqi 
refugees had been resettled in other countries or voluntarily 
repatriated to Iraq. Most of the approximately 6,000 remaining refugees 
are restricted to the Rafha refugee camp. The UNHCR has monitored over 
3,000 persons voluntarily returning to Iraq from Rafha since December 
1991 and found no evidence of forcible repatriation (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government has allowed some foreigners to remain temporarily in 
the country in cases where their safety would be jeopardized if they 
were deported to their home countries.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not have the right to change their government. There 
are no formal democratic institutions, and only a few citizens have a 
voice in the choice of leaders or in changing the political system. The 
King rules on civil and religious matters within certain limitations 
established by religious law, tradition, and the need to maintain 
consensus among the ruling family and religious leaders.
    The King is also the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince serves as 
Deputy Prime Minister. The King appoints all other ministers, who in 
turn appoint subordinate officials with cabinet concurrence. In 1992 
the King appointed 60 members to a Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-
Shura. This strictly advisory body began to hold sessions in 1993. In 
1997 the King expanded the council to 90 members. There is one Shi'a on 
the Council. The Council engages in debates that, while closed to the 
view of the general public, provide advice and views occasionally 
contrary to the Government's proposed policy or recommended course of 
action. The Government usually incorporates the Majlis' advice into its 
final policy announcements or tries to convince the council why the 
Government's policy is correct.
    The Council of Senior Islamic Scholars is another advisory body to 
the King and the Cabinet. It reviews the Government's public policies 
for compliance with Shari'a. The Government views the Council as an 
important source of religious legitimacy and takes the Council's 
opinions into account when promulgating legislation.
    Communication between citizens and the Government usually is 
expressed through client-patron relationships and by affinity groups 
such as tribes, families, and professional hierarchies. In theory, any 
male citizen or foreign national may express an opinion or air a 
grievance at a majlis, an open-door meeting held by the King, a prince, 
or an important national or local official. However, as governmental 
functions have become more complex, time-consuming, and centralized, 
public access to senior officials has become more restricted. Since the 
assassination of King Faisal in 1975, Saudi kings have reduced the 
frequency of their personal contacts with the public. Ministers and 
district governors more readily grant audiences at a majlis.
    Typical topics raised in a majlis are complaints about bureaucratic 
delay or insensitivity, requests for personal redress or assistance, 
and criticism of particular acts of government affecting family 
welfare. Broader ``political'' concerns--social, economic, or foreign 
policy--rarely are raised. Complaints about royal abuses of power are 
not entertained. In general, journalists, academics, and businessmen 
believe that institutionalized avenues of domestic criticism of the 
regime are closed. Feedback is filtered through private personal 
channels and has affected various policy issues, including the Middle 
East peace process, unemployment of young Saudi men, and the 
construction of new infrastructure.
    The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), an 
opposition group, was established in 1993. The Government acted almost 
immediately to repress it. In 1994 one of its founding members, 
Mohammed Al-Masari, fled to the United Kingdom, where he sought 
political asylum and established an overseas branch of the CDLR. In 
1996 internal divisions within the CDLR led to the creation of the 
rival Islamic Reform Movement (IRM), headed by Sa'ad Al-Faqih. Al-
Masari expressed the CDLR's ``understanding'' of two fatal terrorist 
bombings of U.S. military facilities in 1995 and 1996 and sympathy for 
the perpetrators. The IRM implicitly condoned the two terrorist attacks 
as well, arguing that they were a natural outgrowth of a political 
system that does not tolerate peaceful dissent. Both groups continue to 
criticize the Government, using computers and facsimile transmissions 
to send newsletters back to Saudi Arabia.
    Women play no formal role in government and politics and are 
actively discouraged from doing so. Participation by women in a majlis 
is restricted, although some women seek redress through female members 
of the royal family.
    One of the 90 members of the Majlis Ash-Shura is Shi'a.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no publicly active human rights groups, and the 
Government has made it clear that none critical of government policies 
would be permitted. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch 
reported that they received no responses to their requests for 
information or access to the country.
    The Government does not permit visits by international human rights 
groups or independent monitors. The Government disagrees with 
internationally accepted definitions of human rights and views its 
interpretation of Islamic law as the only necessary guide to protect 
human rights. The Government generally ignores, or condemns as attacks 
on Islam, citations of Saudi human rights abuses by international 
monitors or foreign governments. However, in April 1998, the Government 
provided a 51-page treatise on the functioning of its legal system to 
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and pledged cooperation with U.N. 
human rights mechanisms. Early in the year, the Government set up a 
human rights office within the International Office Department of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to attempt to monitor conditions within 
the country.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    There is legal and systemic discrimination based on sex and 
religion. The law forbids discrimination based on race, but not 
nationality. The Government and private organizations cooperate in 
providing services for the disabled. The Shi'a religious minority 
suffers social, legal, and sectarian discrimination.
    Women.--The Government does not keep statistics on spousal abuse or 
other forms of violence against women. However, based on the 
information available regarding physical spousal abuse and violence 
against women, such violence and abuse appear to be common problems. 
Hospital workers report that many women are admitted for treatment of 
injuries that apparently result from spousal violence. Some foreign 
women have suffered physical abuse from their Saudi husbands. A Saudi 
man can prevent his wife and any child or unmarried adult daughter from 
obtaining an exit visa to depart Saudi Arabia (see Section 2.d.). There 
were reports during the year that young Saudi men intimidated and 
sexually harassed women in public in Jeddah.
    Foreign embassies continued to receive many reports that employers 
abuse foreign women working as domestic servants. Some embassies of 
countries with large domestic servant populations maintain safehouses 
to which their citizens may flee to escape work situations that include 
forced confinement, withholding of food, beating and other physical 
abuse, and rape. Often the reported abuse is at the hands of female 
Saudis. In general, the Government considers such cases family matters 
and does not intervene unless charges of abuse are brought to its 
attention. It is almost impossible for foreign women to obtain redress 
in the courts due to the courts' strict evidentiary rules and the 
women's own fears of reprisals. Few employers have been punished for 
such abuses. There are no private support groups or religious 
associations to assist such women.
    By religious law and social custom, women have the right to own 
property and are entitled to financial support from their husbands or 
male relatives. However, women have few political or social rights and 
are not treated as equal members of society. There are no active 
women's rights groups. Women, including foreigners, legally may not 
drive motor vehicles and are restricted in their use of public 
facilities when men are present. Women must enter city buses by 
separate rear entrances and sit in specially designated sections. Women 
risk arrest by the Mutawaa'in for riding in a vehicle driven by a male 
who is not an employee or a close male relative. Women are not admitted 
to a hospital for medical treatment without the consent of a male 
relative. By law and custom, women may not undertake domestic or 
foreign travel alone (see Section 2.d.). However, in November the 
Ministry of Interior announced that preparations are underway to issue 
identity cards to women. Issuance of the cards presumably will allow 
women to establish independent legal identities from men, a 
prerequisite to securing greater rights in many areas, including 
travel, financial transactions, business registrations, publishing, 
employment, and, eventually, driving. However, no action on the matter 
had been taken by year's end.
    In public a woman is expected to wear an abaya, a black garment 
that covers the entire body, and also to cover her head and face. The 
Mutawaa'in generally expect women from Arab countries, Asia, and Africa 
to comply more fully with Saudi customs of dress than they do Western 
women; nonetheless, in recent years they have instructed Western women 
to wear the abaya and cover their hair. During the year, Mutawaa'in 
continued to admonish and harass women to wear their abayas and cover 
their hair.
    Some government officials and ministries still bar accredited 
female diplomats in Saudi Arabia from official meetings and diplomatic 
functions.
    Women also are subject to discrimination under Shari'a as 
interpreted in Saudi Arabia, which stipulates that daughters receive 
half the inheritance awarded to their brothers. In aShari'a court, the 
testimony of one man equals that of two women (see Section 1.e.). 
Although Islamic law permits polygyny, with up to four wives, it is 
becoming less common due to demographic and economic changes. Islamic 
law enjoins a man to treat each wife equally. In practice such equality 
is left to the discretion of the husband. Some women participate in Al-
Mesyar (or ``short daytime visit'') marriages, where the women 
relinquish their legal rights to financial support and nighttime 
cohabitation. Additionally, the husband is not required to inform his 
other wives of the marriage, and any children resulting from such a 
marriage have no inheritance rights. The Government places greater 
restrictions on women than on men regarding marriage to non-Saudis and 
non-Muslims (see Section 1.f.). While Shari'a provides women with a 
basis to own and dispose of property independently, women often are 
constrained from asserting such rights because of various legal and 
societal barriers, especially regarding employment and freedom of 
movement.
    Women must demonstrate legally specified grounds for divorce, but 
men may divorce without giving cause. In doing so, men are required to 
pay immediately an amount of money agreed upon at the time of the 
marriage, which serves as a one-time alimony payment. Women who 
demonstrate legal grounds for divorce still are entitled to this 
alimony. If divorced or widowed, a Muslim woman normally may keep her 
children until they attain a specified age: 7 years for boys, 9 years 
for girls. Children over these ages are awarded to the divorced husband 
or the deceased husband's family. Numerous divorced foreign women 
continued to be prevented by their former husbands from visiting their 
children after divorce.
    Women have access to free but segregated education through the 
university level. They constitute over 58 percent of all university 
students but are excluded from studying such subjects as engineering, 
journalism, and architecture. Men may study overseas; women may do so 
only if accompanied by a spouse or an immediate male relative.
    Women make up approximately 5 percent of the formal work force and 
own about 4 percent of the businesses, although they must deputize a 
male relative to represent the business. Most employment opportunities 
for women are in education and health care, with lesser opportunity in 
business, philanthropy, banking, retail sales, and the media. Many 
foreign women work as domestic servants and nurses. In 1997 the 
Government authorized women to work in a limited capacity in the hotel 
industry. Women who wish to enter nontraditional fields are subject to 
discrimination. Women may not accept jobs in rural areas if they are 
required to live apart from their families. Most workplaces where women 
are present are segregated by sex. Contact with male supervisors or 
clients is allowed by telephone or facsimile machine. In 1995 the 
Ministry of Commerce announced that women would no longer be issued 
business licenses for work in fields that might require them to 
supervise foreign workers, interact with male clients, or deal on a 
regular basis with government officials. However, in hospital settings 
and in the oil industry, women and men work together, and in some 
instances, women supervise male employees.
    Children.--The Government provides all children with free education 
and medical care. Children are not subject to the strict social 
segregation faced by women, although they are segregated by sex in 
schools starting at the age of 7. In more general social situations, 
boys are segregated at the age of 12 and girls at the onset of puberty.
    It is difficult to gauge the prevalence of child abuse, since the 
Government currently keeps no national statistics on such cases. One 
major hospital has begun a program to detect, report, and prevent child 
abuse. In general, Saudi culture greatly prizes children and initial 
studies show that severe abuse and neglect of children appears to be 
rare.
    Trafficking in children for forced begging persists (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.).
    People With Disabilities.--The provision of government social 
services increasingly has brought the disabled into the public 
mainstream. The media carry features lauding the accomplishments of 
disabled persons and sharply criticizing parents who neglect disabled 
children. The Government and private charitable organizations cooperate 
in education, employment, and other services for the disabled. The law 
provides hiring quotas for the disabled. There is no legislation that 
mandates public accessibility; however, newer commercial buildings 
often include such access.
    Foreign criminal rings reportedly bought and imported disabled 
children for the purpose of forced begging (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.f.).
    Religious Minorities.--Shi'a citizens are discriminated against in 
government and employment, especially in national security jobs. 
Several years ago the Government subjected Shi'a to employment 
restrictions in the oil industry and has not relaxed them. Since the 
1979 Iranian revolution, some Shi'a who are suspected of subversion 
have been subjected periodically to surveillance and limitations on 
travel abroad. Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of 
a U.S. military installation, authorities have detained, interrogated, 
and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a Muslims, including 
Shi'a returning to Saudi Arabia following travel to Iran (see Sections 
1.d. and 2.d.).
    In November 1998, several Mutawaa'in attacked and killed an elderly 
Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a 
traditional Shi'a practice). The Government reportedly is investigating 
the incident; however, the Government does not make public the results 
of investigations involving its personnel (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
    Under Saudi law, children of Saudi fathers are considered Muslim, 
regardless of the country or the religious tradition in which they may 
have been raised. In some cases, children raised in other countries and 
in other religious traditions later taken by their Saudi fathers to 
Saudi Arabia were reportedly coerced to conform to Islamic norms and 
practices.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although racial discrimination 
is illegal, there is substantial societal prejudice based on ethnic or 
national origin. Foreign workers from Africa and Asia are subject to 
various forms of formal and informal discrimination and have the most 
difficulty in obtaining justice for their grievances. For example, pay 
scales for identical or similar labor or professional services are set 
by nationality such that two similarly qualified and experienced 
foreign nationals performing the same employment duties receive varied 
compensation based on their nationalities (see Section 6.b.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Government decrees prohibit the 
establishment of labor unions and any strike activity.
    In 1995 Saudi Arabia was suspended from the U.S. Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the 
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker 
rights standards.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is forbidden. Foreign workers comprise about two-thirds of 
the work force. There is no minimum wage; wages are set by employers 
and vary according to the type of work performed and the nationality of 
the worker (see Section 5).
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor pursuant to a 1962 royal decree 
that abolished slavery. Ratification of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) Conventions 29 and 105, which prohibit forced labor, 
gives them the force of law. However, employers have significant 
control over the movements of foreign employees, which gives rise to 
situations that sometimes involve forced labor, especially in remote 
areas where workers are unable to leave their place of work.
    Some sponsors prevented foreign workers from obtaining exit visas 
to pressure them to sign a new work contract or to drop claims against 
their employers for unpaid salary (see section 2.d.). In another 
pressure tactic, some sponsors refused to provide foreign workers with 
a ``letter of no objection'' that would allow them to be employed by 
another sponsor.
    The labor laws do not protect domestic servants. There were 
credible reports that female domestic servants sometimes were forced to 
work 12 to 16 hours per day, 7 days per week. There were numerous 
confirmed reports of runaway maids (see Section 5). The authorities 
often returned runaway maids to their employers against the maids' 
wishes.
    There have been many reports of workers whose employers refused to 
pay several months, or even years, of accumulated salary or other 
promised benefits. Nondomestic workers with such grievances have the 
right to complain before the labor courts, but few do so because of 
fear of deportation. The labor system is conducive to the exploitation 
of foreign workers because enforcement of work contracts is difficult 
and generally favors employers. Labor courts, while generally fair, may 
take many months to reach a final appellate ruling, during which time 
the employer may prevent the foreign laborer from leaving the country. 
An employer also may delay a case until a worker's funds are exhausted 
and the worker is forced to return to his home country.
    The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by 
children. Nonetheless, with the rare exception of criminal begging 
rings, and the possible exceptions of family businesses, forced or 
bonded child labor does not occur (see Section 6.d.). In 1997 the 
Government actively sought to eradicate forced child begging. Criminal 
rings consisting almost exclusively of foreigners bought and imported 
South Asian children for the purpose of forced begging (see Section 
6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 13 years of age, which 
may be waived by the Ministry of Labor with the consent of the 
juvenile's guardian. There is no minimum age for workers employed in 
family oriented businesses or in other areas that are construed as 
extensions of the household, such as farmers, herdsmen, and domestic 
servants. The law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor 
by children, but it is not a problem, with the rare exception of forced 
child begging rings, and possibly family businesses (see Section 6.c.).
    Children under the age of 18 and women may not be employed in 
hazardous or harmful industries, such as mining or industries employing 
power-operated machinery. While there is no formal government entity 
responsible for enforcing the minimum age for employment of children, 
the Ministry of Justice has jurisdiction and has acted as plaintiff in 
the few cases that have arisen against alleged violators. However, in 
general children play a minimal role in the work force.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legal minimum wage. 
Labor regulations establish a 48-hour workweek at regular pay and allow 
employers to require up to 12 additional hours of overtime at time-and-
a-half pay. Labor law provides for a 24-hour rest period, normally on 
Fridays, although the employer may grant it on another day. The average 
wage generally provides a decent standard of living for a worker and 
family.
    The ILO has stated that the Government has not formulated 
legislation implementing the ILO Convention on Equal Pay and that 
regulations that segregate work places by sex, or limit vocational 
programs for women, violate ILO Convention 111.
    Some foreign nationals who have been recruited abroad have 
complained that after their arrival in Saudi Arabia they were presented 
with work contracts that specified lower wages and fewer benefits than 
originally promised. Other foreign workers reportedly have signed 
contracts in their home countries and later were pressured to sign less 
favorable contracts upon arrival. Some employees report that at the end 
of their contract service, their employers refuse to grant permission 
to allow them to return home. Foreign employees involved in disputes 
with their employers may find their freedom of movement restricted (see 
Section 2.d.). Some female domestic servants often were subjected to 
abuse (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    Saudiization is the Government's attempt to decrease the number of 
foreigners working in certain occupations and to replace them with 
Saudi workers. To accomplish this goal, the Government has taken 
several long-term steps, most notably limiting employment in certain 
fields to citizens, prohibiting renewal of existing contracts, and 
requiring that 5 percent of the work force in private sector companies 
be filled by citizen workers. The Government also requires firms to 
increase the proportion of citizen workers by 5 per cent each year. 
There is a limited number of persons, both influential and otherwise, 
who attempted to circumvent the requirements of the law. For example, 
employers have altered job descriptions or hired foreigners for 
nominally low-level positions but in fact had them fill positions 
reserved for citizens. Influential persons effectively may circumvent 
the law because the Ministry of Labor is simply unwilling to confront 
them.
    The ongoing campaign to remove illegal immigrants from the country 
has done little to Saudiize the economy because illegalimmigrants 
largely work in low-income positions, which most Saudis consider 
unsuitable. However, the campaign did improve overall working 
conditions for legally employed immigrants in low-income positions. The 
Government is carrying out the campaign by widely publicizing its 
enforcement of existing laws against illegal immigrants and Saudis 
employing or sponsoring illegal immigrants. In addition to deportation 
for illegal workers and jail terms and fines for Saudis hiring illegal 
workers, the Government announced in 1998 that houses rented to illegal 
aliens would be ordered closed. In 1997 the Government offered an 
amnesty of several months duration, which allowed illegal immigrants 
and their employers or sponsors to avoid the possibility of prosecution 
by voluntarily seeking expeditious repatriation. As of September, as 
many as 1.1 million persons departed the country under terms of the 
amnesty or were deported for violating residence and labor laws in the 
past 3 years. During this process, the Government bowed to domestic 
pressure and granted grace periods and exemptions to certain categories 
of illegal immigrants (such as servants, drivers, and shepherds), 
thereby allowing many illegal immigrants to legalize their status 
without leaving the country. The effect of the expeditious repatriation 
of some illegal immigrants and the legalization of others has been to 
improve overall working conditions for legally employed foreigners. 
Illegal immigrants generally are willing to accept lower salaries and 
fewer benefits than legally employed immigrants. Their departure or 
legalization reduced the competition for certain jobs and thereby 
reduced the incentive for legal immigrants to accept lower wages and 
fewer benefits as a means of competing with illegal immigrants. 
Furthermore, their departure or legalization removed a large portion of 
the class of persons most vulnerable to abuse and exploitation because 
of their illegal status.
    Labor regulations require employers to protect most workers from 
job-related hazards and disease. Foreign nationals report frequent 
failures to enforce health and safety standards. Farmers, herdsmen, 
domestic servants, and workers in family operated businesses are not 
covered by these regulations. Workers risk losing employment if they 
remove themselves from hazardous work conditions.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits slavery and the 
smuggling of persons into the country.
    According to reports, criminal rings consisting almost exclusively 
of foreigners bought and imported South Asian children, including 
disabled children. Ring organizers systematically forced the children 
to beg in the streets and then confiscated all money that the children 
gained. During the year, the authorities arrested some ring organizers 
and returned at least 76 children to their own countries.
    Early in the year, the Moroccan press reported that a Moroccan 
woman who had been recruited to be a domestic servant in Saudi Arabia, 
escaped a prostitution ring there and informed police, which led to the 
arrest of her Moroccan handlers, an extended family group numbering 
about 40 persons. This same group of Moroccans had been involved in 
organizing similar such activities throughout the Persian Gulf region.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 SYRIA

    Despite the existence of some institutions of democratic 
government, the political system places virtually absolute authority in 
the hands of President Hafiz Al-Asad. Al-Asad's election to a fifth 7-
year term was confirmed by a March national referendum, in which he 
received 99.9 percent of the vote. Key decisions regarding foreign 
policy, national security, internal politics, and the economy are made 
by President Asad with counsel from his ministers, high-ranking members 
of the ruling Ba'th Party, and a relatively small circle of security 
advisers. Although the Parliament is elected every 4 years, the Ba'th 
Party is ensured a majority. The Parliament does not initiate laws, but 
only passes judgment on and sometimes modifies those proposed by the 
executive branch. The judiciary is constitutionally independent, but 
this is not the case in the exceptional (state of emergency) security 
courts, which are subject to political influence. The regular courts 
display independence, although political connections and bribery can 
influence verdicts. In general all three branches of government are 
influenced to varying degrees by leaders of the Ba'th Party, whose 
primacy in state institutions is mandated by the Constitution.
    The powerful role of the security services in Government, which 
extends beyond strictly security matters, stems in part from the state 
of emergency that has been in place almost continuously since 1963. The 
Government justifies martial law because of the state of war with 
Israel and past threats from terrorist groups. Military Intelligence 
and Air Force Intelligence are military agencies, while General 
Security, State Security, and Political Security come under the purview 
of the Ministry of Interior. The branches of the security services 
operate independently of each other and outside the legal system. Their 
members commit serious human rights abuses.
    The economy is based on commerce, agriculture, oil production, and 
government services. There is a generally inefficient public sector, a 
private sector, and a mixed public/private sector. A complex 
bureaucracy, the still dominant state role in the economy, overarching 
security concerns, endemic corruption, currency restrictions, lack of 
modern financial services and communications, and a weak legal system 
hamper economic growth. The Government has sought to promote the 
private sector through investment incentives, exchange rate 
consolidation, and deregulation, especially with regard to financial 
transactions governing imports and exports. Syria posted a gross 
domestic product (GDP) growth rate of negative 4.4 percent in 1997 due 
to a slowdown in agricultural output and reduced revenues from oil 
exports. This negative trend continued in 1998, with a GDP decrease of 
1.2 percent. It was estimated that this trend continued during the 
year. A high population growth rate of 3.3 percent continues to erode 
whatever economic gains are made. Real annual per capita GDP in 1998 
was approximately $800, down from $837 in 1997. However, the Government 
has been very successful in controlling the money supply, with 
inflation remaining in the 2 percent range in 1998. Wage increases in 
the public sector have not kept pace with cost of living increases. 
Salaries were last raised in 1994 and average only about $100 per 
month. Consequently, the gap between rich and poor continues to widen, 
with many public sector workers relying on second jobs to make ends 
meet.
    The human rights situation remained poor, and the Government 
continues to restrict or deny fundamental rights, although there was 
continued marginal improvement in a few areas. The Ba'th Party 
dominates the political system, as provided for by the Constitution, 
and citizens do not have the right to change their government. The 
Government uses its vast powers so effectively that there is no 
organized political opposition, and there have been very few antiregime 
manifestations. Serious abuses include reports of extrajudicial 
killings; the widespread use of torture in detention; poor prison 
conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged detention without 
trial; fundamentally unfair trials in the security courts; an 
inefficient judiciary that suffers from corruption and, at times, 
political influence; infringement on citizens' privacy rights; denial 
of freedom of speech and of the press, despite a slight loosening of 
censorship restrictions; denial of freedom of assembly and association; 
some limits on freedom of religion; and limits on freedom of movement. 
The Government does not allow independent domestic human rights groups 
to exist. Violence and societal discrimination against women are 
problems. The Government discriminates against the stateless Kurdish 
minority, suppresses worker rights, and child labor occurs. A prisoner 
amnesty announced in July is believed also to have benefited some 
political detainees, including Jordanian citizens.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    On October 20, government forces moved against a residential 
compound and boat dock owned by President Asad's brother, Rif'at Al-
Asad. A number of Rif'at's supporters, including military guards, were 
sequestered in the compound, and the clash resulted in an unconfirmed 
number of deaths, including government forces. The Government 
reportedly claimed that the clash was the consequence of enforcing 
``legal measures'' that were taken against Rif'at and his supporters 
because of ``violations of civil and military laws.''
    There were reports of the corporal punishment of army recruits that 
led to injury or death.
    Three policemen were convicted in 1998 and sentenced to 10 years at 
hard labor by the Aleppo criminal court for the torture and killing of 
a 50-year-old man accused of heroin dealing, marking the first time 
since 1994 that members of the security forces were held accountable 
for their actions.
    There were no reports of deaths in detention; however, such deaths 
have occurred in the past. Previous deaths in detention have not been 
investigated by the Government, and the number and identities of 
prisoners who died in prisons since the 1980's remains unknown.
    In 1998 Lebanon's military prosecutor charged 18 members of the 
Lebanese Forces, an outlawed rightwing Christian militia, with carrying 
out the December 1996 bombing of a bus in Damascus, which killed at 
least 20 persons and wounded dozens of others. Eleven of the 18 persons 
charged were in custody. There were no further developments in the case 
during the year.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically 
motivated disappearances. Despite inquiries by international human 
rights organizations and foreign governments, the Government offered 
little new information on the welfare and whereabouts of persons who 
have been held incommunicado for years or about whom no more is known 
other than the approximate date of their detention, including 
Palestinians and Jordanian and Lebanese citizens reportedly abducted 
from Lebanon during and after Lebanon's civil war (see Section 1.d.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Despite the existence of constitutional prohibitions and 
several Penal Code penalties for abusers, there was credible evidence 
that security forces continued to use torture. Former prisoners and 
detainees report that torture methods include electrical shocks; 
pulling out fingernails; the insertion of objects into the rectum; 
beatings, sometimes while the victim is suspended from the ceiling; 
hyperextension of the spine; and the use of a chair that bends 
backwards to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the spine. Although 
torture may occur in prisons, torture is most likely while detainees 
are being held at one of the many detention centers run by the various 
security services throughout the country, and particularly while the 
authorities are trying to extract a confession or information about an 
alleged crime or alleged accomplices.
    The Government continues to deny the use of torture and claims that 
it would prosecute anyone believed guilty of using excessive force or 
physical abuse. Past victims of torture have identified the officials 
who beat them, up to the level of brigadier general. If allegations of 
excessive force or physical abuse are to be made in court, the 
plaintiff is required to initiate his own civil suit against the 
alleged abuser.
    Courts do not order medical examinations for defendants who claim 
that they were tortured (see Section 1.e.). There are credible reports 
of military corruption and mismanagement. There were reports of the 
corporal punishment of army recruits that led to injury or death.
    Prison conditions vary but generally are poor and do not meet 
minimum international standards for health and sanitation. Facilities 
for political or national security prisoners generally are worse than 
those for common criminals. The prison in Palmyra, where many political 
and national security prisoners have been kept, is widely considered to 
have the worst conditions. At some prisons, authorities allow 
visitationrights, but in other cases, security officials demand bribes 
from family members who wish to visit incarcerated relatives. 
Overcrowding and the denial of sufficient nourishment occurs at several 
prisons. Some former detainees have reported that the Government 
prohibits reading materials, even the Koran, for political prisoners.
    The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison or 
detention center conditions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. The Emergency Law, which authorizes the 
Government to conduct preventive arrests, overrides Penal Code 
provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, including the need 
to obtain warrants. Officials contend that the Emergency Law is applied 
only in narrowly defined cases. Nonetheless, in cases involving 
political or national security offenses, arrests generally are carried 
out in secret, and suspects may be detained incommunicado for prolonged 
periods without charge or trial and are denied the right to a judicial 
determination for the pretrial detention. Some of these practices are 
prohibited by the state of emergency, but the authorities are not held 
to these strictures.
    The Government apparently continues to detain relatives of 
detainees or of fugitives in order to obtain confessions or the 
fugitive's surrender (see Section 1.f.).
    Defendants in civil and criminal trials have the right to bail 
hearings and the possible release from detention on their own 
recognizance. There is no bail option for those accused of national 
security offenses. Unlike defendants in regular criminal and civil 
cases, security detainees do not have access to lawyers prior to or 
during questioning.
    Detainees have no legal redress for false arrest. Security forces 
often do not provide detainees' families with information on their 
welfare or location while in detention. Consequently, many persons who 
have disappeared in past years are believed to be in long-term 
detention without charge or possibly to have died in detention. It 
appears that the number of such disappearances has declined in recent 
years, although this circumstance may be due to the Government's 
success in deterring opposition political activity rather than a 
loosening of the criteria for detention. Many detainees brought to 
trial have been held incommunicado for years, and their trials often 
have been unfair (see Section 1.e.).
    Pretrial detention may be lengthy even in cases not involving 
political or national security offenses. The criminal justice system is 
backlogged. Many criminal suspects are held in pretrial detention for 
months and may have their trials extended for additional months. 
Lengthy pretrial detention and drawn-out court proceedings are caused 
by a shortage of available courts and the absence of legal provisions 
for a speedy trial or plea bargaining (see also Section 1.e.).
    Some Turkomen from among hundreds detained in 1996 still may remain 
in detention.
    There were reports of large-scale arrests of Syrians and 
Palestinian Islamists in late December. Hundreds of persons allegedly 
were arrested in the cities of Damascus, Hama, Aleppo, and Homs. Most 
of those arrested reportedly were released after signing an agreement 
not to participate in political activities, but some may remain in 
detention.
    A prisoner amnesty announced in July is believed to have benefited 
some political prisoners and detainees. While the number of those 
released is unknown, Amnesty International (AI) identified six 
prisoners held for political reasons who were released. Unconfirmed 
reports suggest that as many as 600 prisoners may have been released. 
According to AI, hundreds of persons held for political reasons also 
were released in 1998. Prior to the 1998 and 1999 releases, the last 
significant release of political detainees took place in late 1995. 
Most of those arrested in a mass crackdown in 1980 have been released, 
but some apparently remain in prolonged detention without charge. Some 
union and professional association officials detained in 1980 are 
believed to remain in detention (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). AI 
reported in 1998 that ``hundreds of Lebanese, Palestinians, and 
Jordanians have been arbitrarily arrested, some over two decades ago, 
and remain in prolonged and often secret detention.''
    The number of remaining political detainees is unknown. Estimates 
of detainees are difficult to confirm because the Government does not 
verify publicly the number of detentions without charge, the release of 
detainees, or whether detainees subsequently are sentenced to prison 
(see Section 1.e.).
    In October 1998, the Jordanian Government asked the Syrian 
Government to account for 429 named Jordanian nationals, 239 of whom 
Jordan claims have been missing since they entered Syria, and 190 of 
whom Jordan claims are Syrian prisoners. Families of missing Jordanians 
allege that there are more than 700 Jordanians in Syrian detention. The 
press reported that government sources stated that the names provided 
by Jordan were being examined and that the Government would respond 
officially. To date there has been no published official response.
    The Government has exiled citizens in the past, although the 
practice is prohibited by the Constitution. There were no known 
instances of forced exile during the year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, but the two exceptional courts dealing with 
alleged security cases are not independent of executive branch control. 
The regular court system displays considerable independence in civil 
cases, although political connections and bribery sometimes influence 
verdicts.
    The judicial system is composed of the civil and criminal courts, 
military courts, the security courts, and the religious courts, which 
adjudicate matters of personal status such as divorce and inheritance. 
The Court of Cassation is the highest court of appeal. The Supreme 
Constitutional Court is empowered to rule only on the constitutionality 
of laws and decrees; it does not hear appeals.
    Civil and criminal courts are organized under the Ministry of 
Justice. Defendants before these courts are entitled to the legal 
representation of their choice; the courts appoint lawyers for 
indigents. Defendants are presumed innocent; they are allowed to 
present evidence and to confront their accusers. Trials are public, 
except for those involving juveniles or sex offenses. Defendants may 
appeal their verdicts to a provincial appeals court and ultimately to 
the Court of Cassation. Such appeals are difficult because the courts 
do not provide verbatim transcripts of cases--only summaries prepared 
by the presiding judges. There are no juries.
    Military courts have the authority to try civilians as well as 
military personnel. The venue for a civilian defendant is decided by a 
military prosecutor. There were continuing reports that the Government 
operates military field courts in locations outside established 
courtrooms. Such courts reportedly observe fewer of the formal 
procedures of regular military courts.
    The two security courts are the Supreme State Security Court 
(SSSC), which tries political and national security cases, and the 
Economic Security Court (ESC), which tries cases involving financial 
crimes. Both courts operate under the state of emergency, not ordinary 
law, and do not observe constitutional provisions safeguarding 
defendants' rights.
    Charges against defendants in the SSSC are often vague. Many 
defendants appear to be tried for exercising normal political rights, 
such as free speech. For example, the Emergency Law authorizes the 
prosecution of anyone ``opposing the goals of the revolution,'' 
``shaking the confidence of the masses in the aims of the revolution,'' 
or attempting to ``change the economic or social structure of the 
State.'' Nonetheless, the Government contends that the SSSC tries only 
persons who have sought to use violence against the State.
    Under SSSC procedures, defendants are not present during the 
preliminary, or investigative, phase of the trial, when the prosecutor 
presents evidence. Trials usually are closed to the public. Lawyers are 
not ensured access to their clients before the trial and are excluded 
from the court during their client's initial interrogation by the 
prosecutor. Lawyers submit written defense pleas rather than oral 
presentations. The State's case often is based on confessions, and 
defendants have not been allowed to argue in court that their 
confessions were coerced. There is no known instance in which the court 
ordered a medical examination for a defendant who claimed that he was 
tortured. The SSSC reportedly has acquitted some defendants, but the 
Government does not provide any statistics on the conviction rate. 
Defendants do not have the right to appeal verdicts, but sentences are 
reviewed by the Minister of Interior, who may ratify, nullify, or alter 
sentences. The President also may intervene in the review process.
    Accurate information on the number of cases heard by the SSSC is 
difficult to obtain, although in recent years hundreds of cases are 
believed to have passed through the court annually. Many reportedly 
involved charges relating to membership in various banned political 
groups, including the Party of Communist Action and the pro-Iraqi wing 
of the Ba'th Party. Sentences as long as 15 years have been imposed in 
the past. The Government permitted delegates from AI to attend a 
session of the SSSC in1997 (see Section 4), but there have been no 
visits by human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) since 
1997.
    The Economic Security Court (ESC) holds trials for alleged 
violations of foreign-exchange laws and other economic crimes. The 
prosecution of economic crimes is not uniform since some government 
officials or business persons with close connections to the Government 
likely have violated the country's strict economic laws without 
prosecution. Like the SSSC, the ESC does not ensure due process for 
defendants. Defendants may not have adequate access to lawyers to 
prepare their defenses, and the State's case usually is based on 
confessions. Verdicts likely are influenced by high-ranking government 
officials. Those convicted of the most serious economic crimes do not 
have the right of appeal, but those convicted of lesser crimes may 
appeal to the Court of Cassation. A significant prisoner amnesty for 
individuals convicted of economic crimes was announced in July. 
Theoretically, this amnesty may have benefited thousands of people.
    A prisoner amnesty in July is believed to have benefited some 
political prisoners and detainees. While the number of those released 
is unknown, AI identified six political prisoners who were released, 
and there have been unconfirmed reports that the number may be as high 
as 600. According to AI, hundreds of persons held for political reasons 
also were released in 1998 (see Section 1.d.). The last major releases 
of political prisoners and detainees took place in late 1995, with 
approximately 2,200 to 3,000 persons believed to have been released. 
Some former prisoners reported being required to sign loyalty oaths or 
admissions of guilt as a condition of their release.
    The Government has released virtually all of those arrested at the 
time President Asad took power in 1970. However, at least two persons 
arrested during that period may remain in prison, despite the 
expiration of one of the prisoners' sentences.
    The Government denies that it holds political prisoners, arguing 
that, although the aims of some prisoners may be political, their 
activities, including subversion, were criminal. However, the Emergency 
Law and the Penal Code are so vague, and the Government's power so 
broad, that many persons were convicted and are in prison for the mere 
expression of political opposition to the Government.
    The current number of political prisoners is unknown.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Although laws provide for freedom from arbitrary 
interference, the Emergency Law authorizes the security services to 
enter homes and conduct searches with warrants if security matters, 
very broadly defined, are involved. The security services selectively 
monitor telephone conversations and facsimile transmissions. The 
Government opens mail destined for both citizens and foreign residents. 
It also prevents the delivery of human rights materials. In August 
authorities repealed a 5-year ban on entry of Jordanian newspapers 
(also see Section 2.a.).
    The Government apparently has continued its practice of threatening 
or detaining the relatives of detainees or of fugitives in order to 
obtain confessions or the fugitive's surrender (see Section 1.d.).
    Security checkpoints continue to exist, although primarily in 
military and other restricted areas. There are few police checkpoints 
on main roads and in populated areas. Generally, the security services 
set up checkpoints to search for smuggled goods, weapons, narcotics, 
and subversive literature. The searches take place without warrants. 
The Government and the Ba'th Party have monitored and tried to restrict 
some citizens' visits to foreign embassies and cultural centers.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides citizens 
with the right to express opinions freely in speech and in writing; 
however, the Government restricts these rights significantly in 
practice. The Government strictly controls dissemination of information 
and permits no written or individual criticism of the President, the 
President's family, the Ba'th Party, the military, or the legitimacy of 
the regime. The Government also does not permit sectarian issues to be 
raised. Detention and beatings for individual expressions of opinion 
that violate these unwritten rules occur frequently.
    The Emergency Law allows the Government broad discretion in 
determining what constitutes illegal expression. It prohibits the 
publishing of ``false information,'' which opposes ``the goalsof the 
revolution'' (see Section 1.e.). In the past, the Government has 
imprisoned journalists for failing to observe press restrictions. In 
1997 two journalists from a government newspaper allegedly were 
dismissed after publishing an article that was viewed as insulting to 
the Prophet Muhammad. In May a defamation case filed against a 
journalist was reported widely in the press. This case was believed to 
be the first case in which a journalist was tried for what he had 
published; he was cleared of guilt by the court. State security 
services are known to threaten local journalists, including with 
removal of credentials, for articles printed outside the country.
    The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture and 
National Guidance censor the domestic and foreign press. They usually 
prevent publication or distribution of any material deemed threatening 
or embarrassing to the security services or high levels of the 
Government. Censorship is usually stricter for materials in Arabic. 
Commonly censored subjects include: the Government's human rights 
record; Islamic fundamentalism; allegations of official involvement in 
drug trafficking; aspects of the Government's role in Lebanon; graphic 
descriptions of sex; material unfavorable to the Arab cause in the 
Middle East conflict; and material that is offensive to any of the 
country's religious groups. In addition most journalists and writers 
practice self-censorship to avoid provoking a negative government 
reaction.
    Recent trends toward a modest relaxation of censorship continued. 
The media demonstrated somewhat wider latitude in reporting on regional 
developments, including the Middle East peace process. The media 
covered some peace process events factually, but other events were 
reported selectively to buttress official views. The government-
controlled press continued to publish articles critical of official 
corruption and governmental inefficiency. In August authorities 
repealed a 5-year ban on entry of Jordanian newspapers (also see 
Section 1.f.).
    The Government or the Ba'th Party owns and operates the radio and 
television companies and the newspaper publishing houses. There are no 
privately owned newspapers, although foreign-owned, foreign-published 
newspapers circulate relatively freely. The Ministry of Information 
scripts the radio and television news programs to ensure adherence to 
the government line. The Government does not interfere with broadcasts 
from abroad. Satellite dishes have proliferated throughout all regions 
and among neighborhoods of all social and economic categories. Internet 
access and access to e-mail is limited, although preparations are 
underway to provide greater Internet access, starting with foreign 
embassies and businesses. However, in mid-year, telephone service at 
the offices and residences of several European embassies was cut 
briefly, allegedly because these lines had been used to access Internet 
providers outside the country. Telephone service was restored in 
response to a diplomatic protest by the European embassies to the 
Government.
    The Ministry of Culture and National Guidance censors fiction and 
nonfiction works, including films. It also determines which films may 
not be shown at the cultural centers operated by foreign embassies.
    The Government restricts academic freedom. Public school teachers 
are not permitted to express ideas contrary to government policy, 
although authorities allow somewhat greater freedom of expression at 
the university level.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of 
assembly does not exist. Citizens may not hold meetings unless they 
obtain permission from the Ministry of Interior. Most public 
demonstrations are organized by the Government or the Ba'th Party. The 
Government applies the restrictions on public assembly in Palestinian 
refugee camps, where controlled demonstrations have been allowed.
    In December 1998, the Government organized a student march against 
U.S. and British air strikes against Iraq. The march became violent and 
significant damage was done to diplomatic property.
    The Government restricts freedom of association. Private 
associations must be registered with the Government in order to be 
considered legal. Some groups have not been able to register, 
presumably because the Government views them as political, even though 
the groups presented themselves as cultural or professional 
associations. Unregistered groups may not hold meetings, and the 
authorities do not allow the establishment of independent political 
parties. The Government usually grants registration to groups not 
engaged in political or other activities deemed sensitive.
    In 1980 the Government dissolved, and then reconstituted under its 
control, the executive boards of professional associations after some 
members staged a national strike and advocated an endto the state of 
emergency. The associations have not been independent since that time 
and generally are led by members of the Ba'th Party, although nonparty 
members may serve on their executive boards. Some persons detained in 
1980 crackdowns on union and professional association officials may 
remain in detention (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice. 
The only advantage given to a particular religion by the Constitution 
is that which requires the President to be a Muslim. All religions and 
religious groups must register with the Government, which monitors fund 
raising and requires permits for all meetings by religious groups, 
except for worship. Recognized religious groups receive free utilities 
and are exempt from real estate taxes and taxes on official vehicles. 
Although the law does not prohibit proselytizing, the Government 
discourages such activity in practice, particularly aggressive 
proselytizing when such activity is deemed a threat to the generally 
good relations among religious groups. Foreign missionary groups are 
present but operate discreetly. The Government banned Jehovah's 
Witnesses as a politically motivated Zionist organization in 1964. 
Although Jehovah's Witnesses have continued to practice their faith 
privately, the Government arrested several Jehovah's Witnesses as they 
gathered for religious meetings in 1997. The few remaining Jews 
generally are barred from government employment and do not have 
military service obligations. Jews are the only minority group whose 
passports and identity cards note their religion.
    Officially all schools are government-run and nonsectarian, 
although some schools are run in practice by Christian and Jewish 
minorities. There is mandatory religious instruction in schools, with 
government-approved teachers and curriculums. Religion courses are 
divided into separate classes for Muslim and Christian students. Jews 
have a separate primary school, which offers religious instruction in 
Judaism, in addition to traditional subjects. Although Arabic is the 
official language in public schools, the Government permits the 
teaching of Armenian, Hebrew, Syriac (Aramaic), and Chaldean in some 
schools on the basis that these are ``liturgical languages.''
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government limits freedom of 
movement. The Government restricts travel near the Golan Heights. 
Travel to Israel is illegal. On November 13, the Government eased many 
of its travel restrictions, which made it easier for most citizens to 
travel abroad. Exit visas generally no longer are required for women, 
men over 50 years old, and Syrian expatriates. In the past, individuals 
have been denied permission to travel abroad on political grounds, 
although government officials deny that this practice occurs. The 
authorities may prosecute any person found attempting to emigrate or 
travel abroad illegally, or who is suspected of having visited Israel. 
Women over the age of 18 have the legal right to travel without the 
permission of male relatives. However, a husband may file a request 
with the Ministry of Interior to prohibit his wife's departure from the 
country. The Government's use of police checkpoints has been reduced 
(see Section 1.f.).
    As of June 30, 374,521 Palestinian refugees were registered with 
the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the country. In general 
Palestinian refugees no longer report unusual difficulties travelling 
in and out of the country, as was the case in the past. The Government 
restricts entry by Palestinians who are not resident in Syria. The 
Government does not allow the Palestinian residents of Gaza to visit 
Syria.
    There are no laws with provisions for dealing with refugees and 
asylees in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government 
cooperates on a case-by-case basis with the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations 
in assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum but is 
selective about extending protection to refugees; approximately 3,260 
persons sought asylum through the UNHCR during the first 8 months of 
the year. Although the Government denied any forced repatriation of 
those who may have had a valid claim to refugee status, in 1998 it 
apparently forcibly repatriated Iraqi, Somali, Algerian, and Libyan 
refugees. As of August 31, there were an estimated 21,319 non-
Palestinian refugees in the country, of whom about 3,962 were receiving 
assistance from the UNHCR, including 2,503 refugees of Iraqi origin.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Although citizens ostensibly vote for the President and Members of 
Parliament, they do not have the right to change their government. The 
President has run for election unopposed since taking power in 1970. 
Political opposition to his rule is not tolerated. The President and 
his senior aides, particularly those in the military and security 
services, ultimately make all basic decisions on political and economic 
life, with no element of public accountability.
    Moreover, the Constitution mandates that the Ba'th Party is the 
ruling party and is ensured a majority in all government and popular 
associations, such as workers' and women's groups. Six smaller 
political parties also are permitted and, along with the Ba'th Party, 
make up the National Progressive Front (NPF), a grouping of parties 
that represents the sole framework of legal political participation for 
citizens. While created ostensibly to give the appearance of a 
multiparty system, the NPF is dominated by the Ba'th Party and does not 
change the essentially one-party character of the political system. 
Non-Ba'th Party members of the NPF exist as political parties largely 
in name only and hew closely to Ba'th Party and government policies.
    The Ba'th Party dominates the Parliament, which is known as the 
People's Council. Although parliamentarians may criticize policies and 
modify draft laws, the executive branch retains ultimate control over 
the legislative process. Since 1990 the Government has allowed 
independent non-NPF candidates to run for a limited allotment of seats 
in the 250-member People's Council. The current number of non-NPF 
deputies is 83, ensuring a permanent absolute majority for the Ba'th 
Party-dominated NPF. Elections for the 250 seats in the People's 
Council last took place in 1998.
    Persons who have been convicted by the State Security Court may be 
deprived of their political rights after they are released from prison. 
Such restrictions include a prohibition against engaging in political 
activity, the denial of a passport, and a bar on accepting a government 
job and some other forms of employment. The duration of such 
restrictions may last from 10 years to the remainder of the former 
prisoner's life. The Government contends that this practice is mandated 
by the Penal Code and has been in effect since 1949.
    Women and minorities, with the exception of the Jewish population 
and stateless Kurds (see Section 5), participate in the political 
system without restriction. Nonetheless, women are underrepresented in 
Government. There are 2 female cabinet ministers and 26 female Members 
of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government does not allow the existence of local human rights 
groups. One or two human rights groups once operated legally but 
subsequently were banned by the Government.
    Amnesty International visited the country for 2 weeks in 1997, the 
second major visit by an international human rights organization (after 
a Human Rights Watch visit in 1995). AI delegates met with the 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Information, and 
Culture; judges from the SSSC as well as the court's prosecutor and 
several lawyers; and the secretaries general of the Arab Writers Union 
and Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union. These were the first such meetings 
held by government officials with an international human rights 
organization. There were no further such meetings or visits in 1998 or 
1999.
    As a matter of policy, the Government in its exchanges with 
international groups denies that it commits human rights abuses. It has 
not permitted representatives of international organizations to visit 
prisons. The Government states that it now responds in writing to all 
inquires from NGO's regarding human rights issues, including the cases 
of individual detainees and prisoners, through an interagency 
governmental committee established expressly for that purpose. Human 
Rights Watch reported in 1997 that the Government had not responded to 
its request to account publicly for the possibly thousands of citizens 
who were executed at Tadmur prison in the 1980's. The Government 
usually responds to queries from human rights organizations and foreign 
embassies on specific cases by claiming that the prisoner in question 
has violated national security laws.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights and equal opportunity 
for all citizens. In practice membership in the Ba'th Party orclose 
familial relations with a prominent party member or government official 
can be important for economic, social, or educational advancement. 
Party or government connections can pave the way for entrance into 
better elementary and secondary schools, access to lucrative 
employment, and greater power within the Government, the military, and 
the security services. Certain prominent positions, such as that of 
provincial governor, are reserved solely for Ba'th Party members. Apart 
from some discrimination against Kurds, there are no apparent patterns 
of systematic government discrimination based on race, sex, religion, 
disability, language, or social status. However, there are varying 
degrees of societal discrimination in each of these areas.
    Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no reliable 
statistics for domestic violence or sexual assault. The vast majority 
of cases go unreported, and victims generally are reluctant to seek 
assistance from nonfamily members. There are no laws against spousal 
rape. One preliminary academic study suggested that domestic violence 
is the largest single reason for divorces, and that such abuse is more 
prevalent among the less-educated. It appears to occur more in rural 
than in urban areas. Battered women have the legal right to seek 
redress in court, but few do so because of the social stigma attached 
to such action. The Syrian Women's Federation offers services to 
battered wives to remedy individual family problems. The Syrian Family 
Planning Association also attempts to deal with this problem. Some 
private groups, including the Family Planning Association, have 
organized seminars on violence against women, which were reported by 
the government press. There are no specifically designated shelters or 
safe havens for battered women who seek to flee their husbands.
    The Constitution provides for equality between men and women and 
equal pay for equal work. Moreover, the Government has sought to 
overcome traditional discriminatory attitudes toward women and 
encourages women's education. However, the Government has not yet 
changed personal status retirement and social security laws that 
discriminate against women. In addition some secular laws discriminate 
against women. For example under criminal law, the punishment for 
adultery and ``honor'' crimes for a woman is twice as severe as for the 
same crime committed by a man.
    For Muslims, personal status law on divorce is based on Shari'a 
(Islamic law) and discriminates against women. For example husbands may 
claim adultery as grounds for divorce, but wives face more difficulty 
in presenting the same argument. If a woman requests a divorce from her 
husband, she may not be entitled to child support in some instances. In 
addition under the law, a woman loses the right to custody of boys when 
they reach age 9 and girls at age 12.
    Inheritance for Muslims is based on Shari'a. Accordingly, women 
usually are granted half of the inheritance share of male heirs. 
However, Shari'a mandates that male heirs provide financial support to 
the female relatives who inherit less. For example a brother who 
inherits an unmarried sister's share from their parents' estate is 
obligated to provide for the sister's well-being. If the brother fails 
to do so, she has the right to sue.
    Christians and other religious groups are subject to their 
respective religious laws on marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
    Polygyny is legal but is practiced only by a small minority of 
Muslim men.
    A husband may request that his wife's travel abroad be prohibited 
(see Section 2.d.). Women generally are barred from travelling abroad 
with their children unless they are able to prove that the father has 
granted permission for the children to travel.
    Women participate actively in public life and are represented in 
most professions, as well as in the military. Women are not impeded 
from owning or managing land or other real property. Women constitute 
approximately 6 percent of judges, 10 percent of lawyers, 57 percent of 
teachers below university level, and 20 percent of university 
professors.
    Children.--There is no legal discrimination between boys and girls 
in school or in health care. Education is compulsory for all children, 
male or female, between the ages of 6 and 12. According to the Syrian 
Women's Union, about 46 percent of the total number of students through 
the secondary level are female.
    Nevertheless, societal pressure for early marriage and childbearing 
interfere with girls' educational progress, particularly in rural 
areas, where dropout rates for female students remain high.
    The law stresses the need to protect children, and the Government 
has organized seminars on the subject of child welfare. Although there 
are cases of child abuse, there is no societal pattern of abuse against 
children. The law provides for severe penalties for those found guilty 
of the most serious abuses against children.
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against 
the disabled and seeks to integrate them into the public sector work 
force. However, implementation is spotty. Regulations reserving 2 
percent of government and public sector jobs for the disabled are not 
implemented rigorously. The disabled do not have recourse to the courts 
regarding discrimination. No laws mandate access to public buildings 
for the disabled.
    Religious Minorities.--Although there is a significant amount of 
religious tolerance, religion or ethnic affiliation can be a 
contributing factor in determining career opportunities. For example 
members of the President's Alawi sect hold a predominant position in 
the security services and military, well out of proportion to their 
percentage of the population. Nevertheless, government policy 
officially disavows sectarianism.
    There is little evidence of societal discrimination or violence 
against religious minorities, including Jews.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally 
permits national and ethnic minorities to conduct traditional, 
religious, and cultural activities; however, the Government's attitude 
toward the Kurdish minority is a significant exception to this policy. 
Although the Government contends that there is no discrimination 
against the Kurdish population, it has placed limits on the use and 
teaching of the Kurdish language, Kurdish cultural expression, and, at 
times, the celebration of Kurdish festivals. Some members of the 
Kurdish community have been tried by the Supreme State Security Court 
for expressing support for greater Kurdish autonomy or independence. 
Although the Asad Government stopped the practice of stripping Kurds in 
Syria of their Syrian nationality (some 120,000 persons lost Syrian 
nationality under this program in the 1960's), it never restored this 
nationality. As a result, those who had their nationality taken away, 
and their children, have been unable to obtain Syrian nationality and 
passports, or even identification cards and birth certificates. Without 
Syrian nationality, these stateless Kurds, who according to UNHCR 
estimates number about 200,000 persons, are unable to own land, cannot 
be employed by the Government, and have no right to vote. They also 
encounter difficulties in enrolling their children in school. Stateless 
Kurdish men may not marry Syrian citizens legally.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Although the Constitution provides 
for this right, workers are not free to establish unions independent of 
the Government. All unions must belong to the General Federation of 
Trade Unions (GFTU), which is dominated by the Ba'th Party and is 
actually a part of the State's bureaucratic structure. The GFTU is an 
information channel between political decisionmakers and workers. The 
GFTU transmits instructions downward to the unions and workers but also 
conveys information to decisionmakers about worker conditions and 
needs. The GFTU provides the Government with opinions on legislation, 
organizes workers, and formulates rules for various member unions. The 
GFTU president is a senior member of the Ba'th Party. He and his deputy 
may attend cabinet meetings on economic affairs. The GFTU controls 
nearly all aspects of union activity.
    The law does not prohibit strikes, except in the agricultural 
sector. Nevertheless, workers are inhibited from striking because of 
previous government crackdowns on strikers. In 1980 the security forces 
arrested many union and professional association officials who planned 
a national strike. Some of those are believed to remain in detention or 
have been tried by the State Security Court (see Sections 1.d. and 
2.b.).
    The GFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of Arab 
Trade Unions.
    In 1992 Syria's eligibility for tariff preferences under the U.S. 
Generalized System of Preferences was suspended because the Government 
failed to take steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights 
to workers.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively does not exist in any meaningful 
sense. Government representatives are part of the bargaining process in 
the public sector. In state-owned companies, union representatives 
negotiate hours, wages, and conditions of employment with 
representatives of the employers and the supervising ministry. Workers 
serve on the boards of directors of public enterprises.
    The law provides for collective bargaining in the private sector, 
but any such agreement between labor and management must be ratified by 
the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, who has effective veto power. 
The Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization (ILO) 
has long noted the Government's refusal to abolish the Minister's power 
over collective contracts.
    Unions have the right to litigate disputes over work contracts and 
other workers' interests with employers and may ask for binding 
arbitration. In practice labor and management representatives settle 
most disputes without resort to legal remedies or arbitration. 
Management has the right to request arbitration, but this seldom is 
exercised. Arbitration usually occurs when a worker initiates a dispute 
over wages or severance pay.
    Since the unions are part of the Government's bureaucratic 
structure, they are protected by law from antiunion discrimination. 
There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
    There are no unions in the seven free trade zones. Firms in the 
zones are exempt from the laws and regulations governing hiring and 
firing, although they must observe some provisions on health, safety, 
hours, and sick and annual leave.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--There is no law 
prohibiting forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children. There were no reports of forced labor involving children, or 
foreign or domestic workers. Forced labor has been imposed as a 
punishment for some convicts.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The 1959 Labor Law protects children from exploitation in 
the workplace. Independent information and audits on government 
enforcement are not available. Although it is not prohibited by law, 
there were no reports of coerced or bonded labor (see Section 6.c.) due 
to the relative ease with which a work permit may be obtained. The 
minimum age for employment is 15 in the public sector and 12 in the 
private sector. In all cases, parental permission is required for 
children under the age of 16. The law prohibits children from working 
at night. However, all these laws apply only to children who work for a 
salary. Those who work in family businesses who are not technically 
paid a salary--a common phenomenon--do not fall under the law. The 
Government claims that the expansion of the private sector has led to 
more young children working. Education is compulsory for all children, 
male or female, between the ages of 6 and 12.
    The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs monitors employment 
conditions for persons under the age of 18, but it does not have enough 
inspectors to ensure compliance with the laws. The Ministry has the 
authority to specify the industries in which children 15 and 16 years 
of age may work. The majority of children under age 16 who are working 
do so for their parents in the agricultural sector without 
remuneration. The ILO report found that 10.5 percent of children under 
the age of 18 participate in the labor force, amounting to 4.7 percent 
of the total work force. Working hours for youths of legal age to work 
do not differ from those established for adults. Children under the age 
of 16 are prohibited by law from working in mines, at petroleum sites, 
or in other dangerous fields. Children are not allowed to lift, carry, 
or drag heavy objects. The exploitation of children for begging also is 
prohibited. The Labor Inspection Department performs unannounced spot 
checks of employers on a daily basis to enforce these regulations; 
however, the scope of these checks is unknown.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Minister of Labor and Social 
Affairs is responsible for enforcing minimum wage levels in the public 
and private sectors. The minimum wage is $42 (2,115 Syrian pounds) per 
month in the public sector, plus other compensation (for example, 
meals, uniforms, and transportation). The private sector minimum wage 
is $39 (1,940 Syrian pounds) per month in urban areas and$36 (l,790 
Syrian pounds) in the countryside. A committee of labor, management, 
and government representatives submits recommended changes in the 
minimum wage to the Minister. The minimum wage has not been adjusted 
since 1994 and does not provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. As a result, many workers take additional jobs or 
are supported by their extended families.
    The statutory workweek is 6 days of 6 hours each, but in some cases 
a 9-hour workday is permitted. The laws mandate one 24-hour rest day 
per week. Rules and regulations severely limit the ability of an 
employer to dismiss employees without cause. Even if a person is absent 
from work without notice for a long period, the employer must follow a 
lengthy procedure of trying to find the person and notify him, 
including through newspaper notices, before he is able to take any 
action against the employee. Dismissed employees have the right to 
appeal before a committee of representatives from the union, 
management, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and the 
appropriate municipality. Such committees usually find in favor of the 
employee. Dismissed employees are entitled to 80 percent of salary 
benefits while the dispute is under consideration. No additional back 
wages are awarded should the employer be found at fault, nor are wage 
penalties imposed in cases where the employer is not found at fault. 
The law does not protect temporary workers who are not subject to 
regulations on minimum wages. Small private firms and businesses employ 
such workers to avoid the costs associated with hiring permanent 
employees.
    The law mandates safety standards in all sectors, and managers are 
expected to implement them fully. In practice there is little 
enforcement without worker complaints, which occur infrequently despite 
government efforts to post notices on safety rights and regulations. 
Large companies, such as oil field contractors, also employ safety 
engineers.
    The ILO noted in August 1998 that a provision in the Labor Code 
that allows employers to keep workers at the workplace for as many as 
11 hours a day might lead to abuse. However, there have been no reports 
of such abuses. Officials from the Ministries of Health and Labor 
inspect work sites for compliance with health and safety standards. 
Such inspections appear to be haphazard, apart from those conducted in 
hotels and other facilities that cater to foreigners. Rural enforcement 
of labor laws is also more lax than that in urban areas, where 
inspectors are concentrated. Workers may lodge complaints about health 
and safety conditions with special committees established to adjudicate 
such cases. Workers have the right to remove themselves from hazardous 
conditions without risking loss of employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically 
prohibit trafficking in persons. Standard labor laws would be applied 
in the event of allegations of trafficking. There were no reports that 
persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                TUNISIA

    Tunisia is a republic dominated by a single political party. 
President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic 
Rally (RCD) party have controlled the Government, including the 
legislature, since 1987. This dominance was reaffirmed in an 
overwhelming RCD victory in October 24 legislative and presidential 
elections. July revisions to the Constitution allowed two opposition 
candidates to run against Ben Ali in the presidential elections, the 
first multicandidate presidential race in Tunisia's history. Electoral 
Code changes also reserved approximately 20 percent of representation 
in the Chamber of Deputies for opposition parties (34 of 182 seats), up 
from approximately 12 percent (19 of 163 seats) in the previous 
Chamber, which was elected in 1994. The President appoints the Prime 
Minister, the Cabinet, and the 23 governors. The executive branch and 
the President strongly influence the judiciary, particularly in 
sensitive political cases.
    The police share responsibility for internal security with a 
paramilitary national guard. The police operate in the capital and a 
few other cities. In outlying areas, their policing duties are shared 
with, or ceded to, the national guard. Both forces are under the 
control of the Minister of Interior and the President. The security 
forces continued to be responsible for serious human rights abuses.
    Tunisia has made substantial progress towards establishing an 
export-oriented market economy based on manufactured exports, tourism, 
agriculture, and petroleum. The per capita gross national product for 
1999 was approximately $2,600 while real per capita income grew by 4.5 
percent. Over 60 percent of citizens are in the middle class and enjoy 
a comfortable standard of living. The Government reported that only 6.2 
percent of citizens fell below the poverty line, and over 80 percent of 
households owned their own homes. The country has a high level of 
literacy, low population growth rates, and wide distribution of basic 
health care. The Government devotes over 60 percent of the budget to 
social and development goals.
    The Government's human rights performance was uneven, and it 
continued to commit serious abuses. There are significant limitations 
on citizens' right to change their government. The ruling RCD Party is 
firmly intertwined with government institutions throughout the country, 
making it extremely difficult for opposition parties to compete on a 
level playing field; however, there was limited progress toward greater 
pluralism. The October presidential and legislative elections marked a 
modest step toward democratic development, with opposition presidential 
candidates allowed to run for the first time, and opposition parties 
generally freer to campaign; however, while observers agree that the 
outcome of the elections generally reflected the will of the 
electorate, the campaign and election processes greatly favored the 
ruling party and there was wide disregard for the secrecy of the vote, 
in which Ben Ali won 99.44 percent of the ballots cast for President.
    Members of the security forces tortured and physically abused 
prisoners and detainees. The Government asserts that police officials 
who commit abuses are disciplined, but there have been no documented 
cases in which security officials were disciplined for such abuse. 
Prison conditions range from Spartan to poor. Security forces 
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. Lengthy pretrial detention and 
incommunicado detention are problems. The Government lowered the 
maximum incommunicado detention period from 10 to 6 days and required 
authorities to notify family members at the time of arrest; most 
defense lawyers claim that it is too soon to determine whether the new 
provisions are being enforced. On September 22, Tunisian Human Rights 
League (LTDH) vice president Khemais Ksila, who was imprisoned in 1998, 
received an early parole. The judiciary is subject to executive branch 
control, lengthy delays in trials are a problem, and due process rights 
are not always observed; however, the Government expanded the right of 
appeal and established a commission to oversee the proper 
administration of sentences. On November 15, the Government announced 
amnesty, parole, and reduced sentences for 4,000 prisoners, 600 of whom 
reportedly were political prisoners, including Islamists. The 
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights, including by 
intercepting mail and interfering with Internet communication. Security 
forces also monitored the activities of government critics and at times 
harassed them, their relatives, and associates.
    The Government continued to impose significant restrictions on 
freedom of speech and of the press, and journalists practice self-
censorship. The Government demonstrated a pattern of intolerance of 
public criticism, using criminal investigations, judicial proceedings, 
and travel controls (including denial of passports) to discourage 
criticism and limit the activities of human rights activists. The 
Government continued to use the mandatory prescreening of publications 
and control of advertising revenue as a means to discourage newspapers 
and magazines from publishing material that it considered undesirable. 
The Government regularly seized editions offoreign newspapers 
containing articles that it considered objectionable. However, the 
Government improved access to the Internet and continued to broadcast a 
monthly public affairs program that permitted citizens to debate issues 
with government officials. The Government restricts freedom of assembly 
and association. The Government limits partially the religious freedom 
of members of the Baha'i faith. The Government does not permit 
proselytizing. The Government continued to restrict the freedom of 
movement of government critics and their family members. The Government 
subjected members of the LTDH and other human rights activists to 
harassment, interrogation, property loss or damage, and denial of 
passports. After an 18-month suspension, the Government renewed contact 
with the LTDH, but refused to approve the registration of a new human 
rights nongovernmental organization (NGO), the National Council for 
Liberties (CNLT) and initiated judicial proceedings against CNLT 
members. The Government permitted observers from several international 
human rights groups to attend trials of human rights activists. In 
November the Government created, within the Prime Minister's office, a 
new Minister of Human Rights, Communication, and Relations with the 
Chamber of Deputies. Violence against women occurs. The Government 
continued to demonstrate its strong support for the rights of women and 
children; however, legal discrimination against women continued to 
exist in certain areas, such as property and inheritance law, which is 
governed by Shari'a (Islamic law), and societal discrimination exists 
in areas such as private sector employment. The Government took strong 
measures to reduce official discrimination, including adding equal 
opportunity for women as a standard part of its audits of all 
governmental entities and state-owned enterprises; however, it did not 
extend such measures to the private sector.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political killings.
    According to a prison report by human rights activist Khemais Ksila 
that was published by Amnesty International (AI), Tahar Jelassi died on 
July 24 as a result of torture by prison guards for refusing to take 
off his clothes during a routine search at Grombalia prison.
    There were no developments in the case of former Islamist Tijani 
Dridi, who allegedly died in police custody between August 2 and 7, 
1998. The Government maintains that Dridi died on July 21 from injuries 
sustained the previous day in a motorcycle collision.
    There were no developments in the September 1997 case of Ghezala 
Hannachi, an elderly woman who, according to human rights activists, 
died after police used excessive force against her during a search of 
her home. The Government maintained that Hannachi died of natural 
causes, did not release the results of the prosecutor's inquiry into 
her death, and formally closed the case in 1998.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Penal Code prohibits the use of torture and other 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there 
are credible reports that security services used various methods of 
torture to coerce confessions from detainees. The forms of torture 
included electric shock, submersion of the head in water, beatings with 
hands, sticks, and police batons, cigarette burns, and food and sleep 
deprivation. Police also reportedly utilized the ``rotisserie'' method: 
stripping prisoners naked, manacling their wrists behind their ankles, 
and beating the prisoners while they were suspended from a rod. A 
report on prison conditions by the CNLT described other forms of 
torture, including the falaqa, which consists of suspending a prisoner 
by the feet and severely beating the soles of the feet; suspension of a 
prisoner from the metal door of his cell for hours on end until the 
prisoner loses consciousness; and confinement of the prisoner to the 
``cachot,'' a tiny, unlit cell. Ksila and the CNLT both reported cases 
in which prisoners committed self-mutilation in Tunisian prisons to 
protest conditions and then, as punishment, prison authorities sutured 
the prisoners' self-inflicted wounds without anesthesia and put them 
into isolation or into ``cachot.'' The attorney of Abdelmounim Belanas 
stated that his client, who was arrested on February 21 on allegations 
that he belonged to the outlawed Tunisian CommunistWorkers Party 
(PCOT), was beaten badly in detention; Belanas stated that he also was 
tortured while in prison in 1995. In their July 10-11 trial, in which 
they were convicted of PCOT membership, and their August 6 appeal, 
Lofti Hammami, Imane Darwiche, and Henda Aroua attempted to testify 
about being subjected to torture in 1998 during their detention and 
being forced to sign confessions that they were not permitted to read. 
In addition Darwiche attempted to testify that prison guards had 
attempted to rape her. However, the presiding judges refused to record 
references to torture and rape, saying that such statements were 
irrelevant to the case. The appeals judge had Darwiche removed from the 
courtroom when she persisted in trying to testify about the attempted 
rape. Other defendants in the case alleged that they physically were 
forced to sign confessions and statements that they were not permitted 
to read. In their summary statements (which serve as the trial record), 
presiding judges did not comment on these allegations (see Sections 
1.d., 1.e, 2.a., 2.b., 4, and 6.a.).
    According to Amnesty International and defense attorneys, the 
courts routinely fail to investigate allegations of torture and 
mistreatment and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under 
torture.
    In a November 1998 report on Tunisia, the U.N. Committee Against 
Torture recommended that the Government reduce the prearraignment 
incommunicado detention period from 10 days to 48 hours, noting that 
most abuses occur during incommunicado detention. On August 2, in order 
to address U.N. concerns, the Government published amendments to the 
Penal Code, which adopted the U.N. definition of torture and increased 
the maximum penalty for those convicted of committing acts of torture 
from 5 to 8 years. The Government also shortened the maximum allowable 
period of prearraignment incommunicado detention from 10 to 6 days and 
added a requirement that the police notify suspects' families on the 
day of their arrest. Although most defense attorneys state that it is 
still too early to determine whether the Government enforces the 6-day 
maximum detention requirement, one prominent attorney stated that he 
believes that the new law usually is enforced only with respect to 
common criminals, not political detainees.
    In a report published in November 1998 as an alternative to the 
Government's report to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, the 
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) stated that 
torture was a ``blatant, grave, and systematic'' practice. The report 
listed at least 500 cases that occurred between 1990 and 1998, 
including at least 30 cases of death during torture. The majority of 
these cases occurred between 1990 and 1995. The FIDH reported that the 
total number of victims of torture between 1990 and 1998 probably 
totaled several thousand, and that government harassment discouraged 
victims of torture from filing complaints. The report was prepared in 
conjunction with the LTDH and the Committee for the Respect of 
Liberties and Human Rights in Tunisia.
    Human rights advocates maintain that charges of torture and 
mistreatment are difficult to substantiate because government 
authorities often deny medical examinations until evidence of abuse has 
disappeared. For example, in his July 10-11 and August 6 court 
appearances, Lotfi Hammami attempted to testify that judicial 
authorities rejected repeated requests for a medical examination after 
he allegedly was tortured in 1998. The Government maintained that it 
investigates all complaints of torture and mistreatment filed with the 
prosecutor's office and noted that alleged victims sometimes publicly 
accused authorities of acts of abuse without taking the steps required 
to initiate an investigation. Absent a formal complaint, the Government 
may open an administrative investigation, but is unlikely to release 
the results to the lawyers of affected prisoners. There have been no 
documented cases in which security officials were disciplined for such 
abuse.
    According to defense attorneys and former prisoners, prison 
conditions ranged from Spartan to poor and, in some cases, did not meet 
minimum international standards. Credible sources reported that 
overcrowding continued to be a serious problem, with 40 to 50 prisoners 
typically confined to a single 194-square-foot cell and up to 140 
prisoners held in a 323 square-foot-cell. A defense attorney reported 
that his client was imprisoned in a cell that contained 140 prisoners 
who were forced to sleep 3 to a cot. Defense attorneys reported that 
prisoners in the Ninth of April prison in Tunis were forced to share a 
single water and toilet facility and a single razor with their 
cellmates, creating serious sanitation problems.
    There were credible reports that conditions and prison rules were 
more stringent for political prisoners than for the general prison 
population. One credible report has alleged the existence of special 
cell blocks and prisons for political prisoners, where they might be 
held in solitary confinement for months on end. Another credible source 
reported that high-ranking leaders of the illegal An-Nahda Islamist 
movement have been held in solitary confinement since 1991. 
Othersources alleged that political prisoners regularly were moved 
among jails throughout the country, thereby making it more difficult 
for the prisoners' families to deliver food to the prisoners. One 
prisoner reported that he was moved three times while serving his 6-
month sentence; another reported serving his sentence in 10 different 
jails in 3 years. The CNLT report alleged that inmates are instructed 
to isolate newly arrived political prisoners and are punished severely 
for any contact with them. On the other hand, PCOT defendant Imane 
Darwiche reported that guards incited her mentally ill cellmates to 
violence against Darwiche, including choking her, spitting on her, and 
defecating on her personal effects. Other prisoners, including LTDH 
vice president Khemais Ksila, alleged that the authorities limited the 
quantity and variety of food that families of political prisoners could 
bring to supplement prison fare.
    There were no developments in the 1997 deaths in custody of 
prisoners Ridha Khemiri and Ahmed Ouafi, who, according to human rights 
activists, died because of prison authorities' negligence. The 
Government denied these allegations, citing authorities' efforts to 
provide medical care, but did not release the results of the autopsies 
that it reportedly conducted.
    National High Commissioner for Human Rights Rachid Driss, whose 
organization is government-funded, has conducted bimonthly, unannounced 
prison inspections since 1996. Although Driss has declared that prison 
conditions and prisoner hygiene were ``good and improving,'' details of 
his inspections have not been made public.
    The Government does not permit international organizations or the 
media to inspect or monitor prison conditions. The LTDH announced in 
its December 14 communique that the Government had granted it 
permission to resume prison visits; however, it did not make any visits 
by year's end, and the Government's willingness actually to allow such 
visits to resume remained uncertain. The LTDH was given permission to 
resume visits in 1997 but subsequently was not allowed access to 
prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain problems. The law authorizes the police to make 
arrests without warrants in the cases of suspected felons or crimes in 
progress. In August the Government changed the Penal Code to reduce 
from 10 days to 6 the time that the Government may hold a suspect 
incommunicado following arrest and prior to arraignment. Another change 
requires arresting officers to inform detainees of their rights at the 
time of arrest, and requires police to inform detainees' families of 
the arrest at the time of the arrest. Although most defense attorneys 
state that it is still too early to determine whether the Government is 
enforcing the family notification requirement, one prominent attorney 
stated that the new law rarely is enforced with respect to either 
common criminals or political detainees. Detainees have the right to be 
informed of the grounds for arrest before questioning and may request a 
medical examination. However, they do not have a right to legal 
representation during the 6-day incommunicado detention period. 
Attorneys, human rights monitors, and former detainees maintain that 
the authorities illegally extend the maximum limit of prearraignment 
detention by falsifying the date of arrest. Nizar Chaari, who was 
convicted on May 11 of belonging to An-Nahda, was arrested on May 29, 
1998, and did not appear before a judge until June 16, 1999 (see 
Section 1.e.).
    On May 12, the Government detained and then released within 48 
hours nine labor activists who circulated a petition during the April 
6-8 congress of the Tunisian Trade Union Federation (UGTT) that called 
for greater pluralism within the UGTT and threatened to establish a new 
syndicate. Another labor activist was detained for the same reasons for 
2 days upon his return from Paris on May 22. The Government noted that 
the labor activists were detained under suspicion of threatening the 
public order and violating the Publications Code, but filed no charges. 
In May and June the Government detained briefly and interrogated three 
members of the unregistered NGO, the National Council on Liberties, 
after they issued statements criticizing the detentions of the labor 
activists. In July the Government indicted two of the three, Omar 
Mestiri and Moncef Marzouki, for belonging to an illegal organization 
(see Sections 1.e., 2.a., 2.d., and 4). In July the Government arrested 
Abderraouf Chamarri and later charged him with defamation and the 
spreading of false information. The Government subjected the family 
members of Islamist activists to arbitrary arrest (see Sections 1.f, 
2.a, 2.d, 4, and 6.a.).
    Detainees have a right to be represented by counsel during 
arraignment. The Government provides legal representation for 
indigents. At arraignment the examining magistrate may decide to 
release the accused or remand him to pretrial detention. The law 
permits the release of accused persons on bail, which may be paid by a 
third party. In cases involving crimes for which thesentence exceeds 5 
years, or which involve national security, pretrial detention may last 
an initial period of 6 months and may be extended by court order for 
two additional 4-month periods. For crimes in which the penalties may 
not exceed 5 years, the court may extend the initial 6-month pretrial 
detention by an additional 3 months only. During this period, the court 
conducts an investigation, hears arguments, and accepts evidence and 
motions of both parties. In August the Government approved a law that 
gives persons indicted for criminal acts the right to appeal their 
indictment before the case comes to trial; previously, this right was 
granted in civil cases only.
    A case proceeds from investigation to a criminal court, which sets 
a trial date. There is no legal limit to the length of time the court 
may hold a case over for trial, nor is there a legal imperative for a 
speedy hearing. Complaints of prolonged detention of persons awaiting 
trial were common, and President Ben Ali publicly has encouraged judges 
to make better use of release on bail and suspended sentences. 
Seventeen students, professors, and labor activists who were sentenced 
in July for membership in the illegal PCOT complained that their rights 
were violated because their case was not tried until July 10, more than 
17 months after their arrest. Defense lawyers maintain that the 
Government purposely delayed the trial by preventing 4 of the 17 
defendants who were in government custody from appearing in the 
courtroom on May 15, the original trial date (see Sections 1.c, 1.e, 
2.a., 2.b., 4, and 6.a.). Salowa Souilem and two other persons were 
arrested and imprisoned in May 1996; they were not tried until January 
28. Souilem and her codefendants were found guilty of belonging to an 
extremist Islamic organization, Dawa'a Wa Tabligh, and sentenced to 2 
years in prison. However, Souilem and one other defendant were released 
on the day of their conviction, with the third released at the 
conclusion of his sentence in May. (His time in pretrial detention 
counted as part of his sentence.)
    Human rights activists reported that security services arbitrarily 
imposed administrative controls on former prisoners following their 
release from prison. Although the Penal Code contains provisions for 
the imposition of administrative controls following completion of a 
prison sentence, only judges have the right to order a former prisoner 
to register at a police station, and the law limits registration 
requirements to 5 years. Human rights activists allege that these 
requirements often are unreasonable and prevent former prisoners from 
being able to hold a job. One former prisoner, Habib Soltana, a former 
navy lieutenant released after serving a 4-year sentence for alleged 
membership in An-Nahda, has been required to sign in daily at a local 
police headquarters since 1995. Soltana also has been unable to resume 
his career in the navy or to obtain a passport. Radhia Aouididi, who 
was freed on June 4, was required as part of her original May 1998 
sentence to report daily for 5 years to a police station 9 miles from 
her village; after a November 25 trial, this requirement was reduced to 
a weekly sign-in and notification to police if she leaves her village 
(see Sections 1.e., 1.f., and 2.d.). Defense attorneys reported that 
some clients must sign in four or five times daily, at times that are 
determined only the previous evening. When the clients arrive at the 
police station, they may be forced to wait hours before signing in, 
making employment impossible and child care difficult. In August the 
Government enacted a law proposed by president Ben Ali on March 20 that 
establishes a commission designed to oversee the proper administration 
of sentences. The same law also allows judges to substitute community 
service for jail sentences in minor cases where the sentence would be 6 
months or less.
    There are likely a sizable number of political detainees, although 
there is no reliable estimate due to arbitrary government detention 
practices and the lack of publicly available records of arrests.
    The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government 
observes this prohibition.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, the executive branch and the President 
strongly influence the judiciary. In practice the judicial branch is 
part of the Ministry of Justice and the executive branch appoints, 
assigns, grants tenure to, and transfers judges. In addition the 
President is head of the Supreme Council of Judges. This situation 
renders judges susceptible to pressure in politically sensitive cases.
    The court system comprises the regular civil and criminal courts, 
including the courts of first instance; the courts of appeal; and the 
Court of Cassation, the nation's highest court; as well as the military 
tribunals within the Defense Ministry.
    Military tribunals try cases involving military personnel and 
civilians accused of national security crimes. A militarytribunal 
consists of a civilian judge from the Supreme Court and four military 
judges. Defendants may appeal the tribunal's verdict to the Court of 
Cassation.
    The Code of Procedure is patterned after the French legal system. 
By law the accused has the right to be present at trial, be represented 
by counsel, question witnesses, and appeal verdicts. However, in 
practice judges do not always observe these rights. The law permits 
trial in absentia of fugitives from the law. Both the accused and the 
prosecutor may appeal decisions of the lower courts. Defendants may 
request a different judge if they believe that a judge is not 
impartial. The Court of Cassation, which considers arguments on points 
of law as opposed to the facts of a case, is the final arbiter.
    Trials in the regular courts of first instance and in the courts of 
appeals are open to the public. The presiding judge or panel of judges 
dominates a trial, and defense attorneys have little opportunity to 
participate substantively. Defense lawyers contend that the courts 
often fail to grant them adequate notice of trial dates or allow them 
time to prepare their cases. Some also reported that judges restricted 
access to evidence and court records, requiring in some cases, for 
example, that all attorneys of record examine the court record on one 
specified date in judges' chambers, without allowing attorneys to copy 
material documents. They also complained that the judges sometimes 
refused to allow them to call witnesses on their clients' behalf, or to 
question key government witnesses. Lengthy delays in trials also are a 
problem (see Section 1.d.).
    Amnesty International and defense attorneys report that courts 
routinely fail to investigate allegations of torture and mistreatment, 
and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under torture (see 
Section 1.c.). Defense lawyers and human rights activists complain that 
the length of court sessions sometimes prevents reasoned deliberation. 
The July 10-11 trial of human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui, 17 
codefendants who were in government custody, and 3 defendants who were 
in hiding and tried in absentia, continued for 20 straight hours with 
only short recesses (see Sections 1.c, 1.d, 2.a., 2.b., 4, and 6.a.).
    There is no definitive information on the number of political 
prisoners. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that there might be 
hundreds of political prisoners, convicted and imprisoned for 
membership in the Islamist group An-Nahda and the Communist Workers 
Party, for disseminating information produced by these banned 
organizations, and for aiding relatives of convicted members. Reliable 
sources estimate that between 1,200 and 2,000 political prisoners were 
held in the prisons at the beginning of the year. The Government often 
releases prisoners on major national holidays, such as Independence Day 
or the anniversary of President Ben Ali's accession to power on 
November 7, 1987. On November 5, the Government announced the release 
and pardon of thousands of prisoners. Newspapers stated that 4,000 
prisoners received either a reduction in their sentences or were 
released (some conditionally). Of these 4,000, government sources 
stated that 2,600 were released from prison. Reliable human rights 
activists and lawyers estimated that approximately 600 political 
prisoners were included in those released, and government officials 
confirmed that some Islamists were released. Therefore, the number of 
political prisoners detained at year's end was estimated to be between 
600 and 1,400.
    Khemais Ksila, the vice president of the LTDH who was jailed in 
1998 for defamation, was released on September 22 after receiving an 
early parole (see Sections 2.a., 2.d., and 4). However, the Government 
does not provide details on the numbers or types of prisoners released. 
Nizar Chaari, who was convicted on May 11 of belonging to An-Nahda, was 
released on June 4. Radhia Aouididi, Saida Charbti, and Rachida Ben 
Salem were released on June 4; Aoudidi's fiancee (who has refugee 
status in France), Ben Salem's husband (who has refugee status in 
Holland), and Charbti's husband are accused of belonging to An-Nahda 
(see Section 2.d.). On February 16, Mohamed Aouididi (brother of Radhia 
Aouididi) and Mohamed Amri (brother of Radhia's fiancee) were released 
from prison. Radhia Aouididi, her mother Omssaad, her brother Mohammed, 
and Mohammed Amri were acquitted on November 25 for lack of evidence on 
charges of association with criminal elements. All defendants were 
released from requirements to sign in daily at a police station. Radhia 
Aouididi's requirement from her prior conviction was reduced to a 
weekly sign-in and notification to police if she leaves her village 
(see Section 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.). Salwa Souilem was released on 
January 28, the day of her conviction for belonging to an outlawed 
Islamic group, 4 months before the end of her sentence (see Sections 
1.d and 1.f.).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights. 
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the person, the 
home, and for the privacy of correspondence, ``except inexceptional 
cases defined by law.'' The law requires that the police have warrants 
to conduct searches; however, police sometimes ignore the requirement 
if authorities consider that state security is at stake or that a crime 
is in progress. Human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui claimed that 3 
houses of her family members were broken into and ransacked by a group 
of approximately 50 security officials on September 3, and that another 
2 houses of relatives were ransacked on September 5. Plainclothes 
police officers searched the premises without presenting either a 
search warrant or any form of identification. According to Nasraoui, 
family members who voiced objections during the search were struck and 
told that they had no choice but to submit to the search. The 
Government stated that security forces were searching for Nasraoui's 
husband, Hamma Hammami, who was convicted in absentia in July of 
membership in the outlawed Communist Workers' Party but who has been in 
hiding since February 1998 (see Sections 2.a and 4.).
    Authorities may invoke state security interests to justify 
telephone surveillance. There were numerous reports of government 
interception of facsimile and computer-transmitted communications. The 
law does not explicitly authorize these activities, although the 
Government has stated that the Code of Criminal Procedure implicitly 
gives investigating magistrates such authority. Many political 
activists experience frequent and sometimes extended interruptions of 
residential and business telephone and facsimile services. Human rights 
activists accuse the Government of using the 1998 Postal Code, with its 
broad but undefined prohibition against mail that threatens the public 
order, to interfere with their mail and interrupt the delivery of 
foreign publications. Local phone, facsimile, and copy shops require 
persons to turn over their identification cards when requesting to send 
facsimiles. Lawyers and activists stated that the Government has 
increased its practice of cutting off telephone service to activists; 
telephone service to the offices, homes, and relatives of prominent 
human rights lawyers and other activists frequently was cut, sometimes 
for long periods.
    The security services monitor the activities of political critics, 
and sometimes harass, follow, question, or otherwise intimidate their 
relatives and associates. Journalist Taoufik Ben Brik alleged that 
plainclothes policemen beat him on the street near his house on May 20 
and then searched his house without a warrant; the Government denies 
any involvement and claims that Ben Brik did not cooperate in police 
attempts to investigate the beating (see Sections 1.d, 2.a, and 4.). 
Police place journalists who write articles critical of the Government, 
or who are active in human rights organizations, under surveillance 
(see Section 2.a.). Human rights activists and lawyers also reported 
that they were under police surveillance. Lawyer Radhia Nasraoui 
complained that police frequently follow and intimidate her children, 
and other human rights activists stated that the surveillance of 
Nasraoui's family, in-laws, and office increased after Nasraoui's July 
conviction for aiding and abetting an illegal organization (see 
Sections 2.a. and 4). LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila reported that 
he continued to be subjected to government surveillance and harassment 
since his release in September. Ksila's telephone service has been cut, 
and he reported that his mail was monitored and only bills have been 
delivered. On December 17, Ksila's car was rammed by the police 
surveillance car that was following him, causing an accident in which 
the passenger side of his car was damaged badly. In accordance with the 
law for prisoners released on parole, Ksila had no passport at year's 
end; his passport was seized in 1996. He also has been unable to work 
since 1996. Sihem Bensidrine, publisher and wife of CNLT secretary 
general Omar Mestiri, reported that since April her telephone service 
was cut, her home was under daily surveillance, her children routinely 
were followed and questioned by security police, and her publishing 
house was burglarized and ransacked three times, including on December 
30, when her computer system and the CD-ROM archives of her not-yet-
published philosophy manuscripts were stolen.
    Human rights activists alleged that the Government subjected the 
family members of Islamist activists to arbitrary arrest, reportedly 
utilizing charges of ``association with criminal elements'' to punish 
family members for crimes committed by the activists. Radhia Aouididi, 
her mother Omssaad, her brother Mohammed, and Mohammed Amri were 
acquitted for lack of evidence on November 25 of charges of association 
with criminal elements. All defendants were released from requirements 
to sign in daily at a police station. Radhia Aouididi's requirement 
from her prior conviction was reduced to a weekly sign-in and 
notification to police if she leaves her village (see Sections 1.d., 
1.e., and 2.d.). Mohamed Amri, who was arrested on October 29, 1998 and 
freed on February 16, is the brother of political refugee and accused 
An-Nahda activist Ahmed Amri. Radhia Aouididi, who was arrested in 1996 
for attempting to leave the country on a false passport after her 
passport application was denied, and who was released from prison on 
June 4, is the fiancee of Ahmed Amri. Mohamed Aouididi had been 
arrested on October 30, 1998; he was freed on February 16.Omssaad 
Aouididi had been arrested on October 30, 1998 and was released the 
same day. Abdel Momen Amri, the father of Ahmed Amri, also was arrested 
on October 30, 1998 and released the same day; he was not summoned for 
the October 25 trial (see Section 1.d.).
    Human rights activists also alleged that the relatives of Islamist 
activists who are in jail or living abroad were subjected to police 
surveillance and mandatory visits to police stations to report their 
contact with relatives. The Government maintained that the Islamists' 
relatives were members or associates of the outlawed An-Nahda movement 
and that they were correctly subjected to legitimate laws prohibiting 
membership in or association with that organization. The Government 
also reportedly refused to issue passports to the family members of 
some human rights activists.
    Human rights activists allege that security services arbitrarily 
imposed administrative controls on prisoners following their release 
from prison (see Section 1.d.).
    Police presence is heavy throughout the country and traffic 
officers routinely stop motorists for no apparent reason to examine 
their personal identification and vehicular documents. The Government 
regularly prohibited the distribution of some foreign publications (see 
Section 2.a.). The security services often question citizens seen 
talking with foreign visitors or residents, particularly visiting 
international human rights monitors and journalists.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of expression and of the press; however, in practice, the 
Government restricts freedom of speech and of the press and relies upon 
direct and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and encourage a 
high degree of self-censorship. The Government also used the Press 
Code, which contains broad provisions prohibiting subversion and 
defamation, to prosecute individuals who expressed dissenting opinions. 
In a November 15 speech, President Ben Ali called for an end to self-
censorship by journalists and a change in the Press Code to eliminate 
prison sentences as penalties for some offenses; however, he did not 
identify specifically what changes would be made and took no steps to 
change the code by year's end. Ben Ali also announced the creation of 
the position of Minister of Human Rights, Communication, and Relations 
with the Chamber of Deputies. Dali Jazi, a founding member of the LTDH, 
was appointed to the position, which is within the Prime Minister's 
office.
    In July the Government jailed and prosecuted Abderraouf Chamarri 
(brother of self-exiled human rights activist Khemais Chamarri) on 
charges of defamation and dissemination of false information for a joke 
that Chamarri denied making, which linked a former minister to 
corruption; the sentence was upheld on appeal on August 10. Chamarri 
received a pardon on August 30 after he wrote a personal plea to the 
President citing health problems (see Section 1.d.). In June newspaper 
critic and composer Mohamed Gharfi was found guilty and fined for a 
1998 series of five articles criticizing the organization of the annual 
Carthage Cultural Festival. Gharfi's newspaper publisher also was found 
guilty, and both verdicts were upheld on appeal. Ten labor union 
activists who were detained for 48 hours in May and then released 
without charges, allegedly were threatened with prosecution under the 
Publications Code after they distributed a petition calling for greater 
democracy within the trade union confederation without having submitted 
advance copies to the Government (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.). The 20 
students, professors, and labor activists (including 3 fugitives tried 
in absentia), who originally were arrested in February and March 1998 
after criticizing the Government and its university policies, were 
convicted in July of membership in the outlawed PCOT (see Sections 
1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.b., 4, and 6.a.).
    LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila, who was arrested in September 
1997 and convicted in February 1998 on charges of defamation of the 
public order, dissemination of false information, and inciting the 
public to violence, was released on September 22 after receiving an 
early parole (see Sections 1.e., 2.d., and 4). After releasing 
communiques criticizing the Government in the name of the unregistered 
National Council for Liberties, two CNLT members, Omar Mestiri and 
Moncef Marzouki, were indicted in July for belonging to an illegal 
organization (see Sections 1.d., 2.d., and 4.). Moncef Marzouki also 
was arrested in November and December and charged with defamation, 
belonging to an unrecognized organization, causing a public 
disturbance, and dissemination of false information for publishing and 
distributing two communiques on behalf of the CNLT. The criminal 
investigation of ousted Social Democratic Movement (MDS) president 
Mohamed Moaada, which opened in December 1997, is ongoing. The 
Government did not react to several communiques issued by Moaada 
criticizing the Government for human rightsviolations; however, on 
November 17, Moaada was placed under house arrest. Moaada was released 
from house arrest on December 14 after he began a hunger strike on 
November 22. His house reportedly is no longer under security police 
surveillance, his telephone service was restored, and he was permitted 
to receive visitors again. Several journalists from Al-Fajr, the 
publication associated with the outlawed An-Nahda movement, remain in 
jail serving sentences that were given out in the early 1990's. The 
Government maintains that the arrests, indictments, and convictions 
were carried out in full accordance with the law.
    Although several independent newspapers and magazines--including 
two opposition party journals--exist, the Government relies upon direct 
and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and encourage a high 
degree of self-censorship. Primary among these methods is ``depot 
legal,'' the requirement that printers and publishers provide copies of 
all publications to the Chief Prosecutor, Ministry of Interior, and 
Ministry of Culture prior to distribution. In July after reviewing the 
requisite advance copy, the Government, without explaining its 
position, refused to allow the Tunisian Association of Young Lawyers to 
distribute its internal bulletin celebrating the centenary of the 
Tunisian Bar Association. The Government has refused to allow Amnesty 
International's Tunisia chapter to distribute 4,000 textbooks on human 
rights written for high school students.
    Similarly, distributors must deposit copies of publications printed 
abroad with the Chief Prosecutor and various ministries prior to their 
public release. While publishers need not wait for an authorization, 
they must obtain a receipt of deposit before distribution. On occasion 
such receipts reportedly are withheld, sometimes indefinitely. Without 
a receipt, publications may not be distributed legally. The Press Code 
contains broad provisions prohibiting subversion and defamation, 
neither of which is defined clearly. The code stipulates fines and 
confiscation for failure to comply with these provisions. The 
Government routinely utilized this method to prevent distribution of 
editions of foreign newspapers and magazines that contained articles 
critical of the country. For example, editions of Le Monde, Liberation, 
and Al-Hayat, were embargoed several times throughout the year, and the 
French newspaper La Croix is, in effect, permanently banned. On October 
21, the Government banned Le Monde, Le Canard Enchaine, L'Observateur, 
Le Point, Liberation, and Le Figaro in Tunis for their critical 
coverage of the presidential and legislative elections. Frankfurther 
Allgemeiner Zeitung and the Financial Times also were banned 
periodically since the October 24 elections. The Government also 
reportedly withheld ``depot legal'' to remove from circulation books 
that it deemed critical of the Government. A book published by French 
journalist Jean Daniel was removed from bookstore shelves on April 25 
on the grounds that the distributor had not complied with the depot 
legal requirement; at the same time, a photograph exhibit organized by 
Daniel's wife Michele was canceled and the director of the cultural 
center that organized the show was dismissed. The Government stated 
that the cultural center director was not dismissed arbitrarily but had 
reached retirement age. In addition the Government provided official 
texts on major domestic and international events and reportedly 
reprimanded publishers and editors for failing to publish these 
statements.
    The Government also relies on indirect methods, such as newsprint 
subsidies and control of public advertising revenues, to encourage 
self-censorship in the media. There were credible reports that the 
Government withheld advertising orders, a vital source of revenues, 
from publications that published articles that the Government deemed 
offensive.
    The Government exerted further control over the media by 
threatening to impose restrictions on journalists, such as refusing 
permission to travel abroad, withholding press credentials, and 
questioning and imposing police surveillance on journalists who wrote 
articles critical of the Government. Members of the security services 
also reportedly questioned journalists on the nature of press 
conferences and other public functions hosted by foreigners that they 
attended. Journalist Taoufik Ben Brik had his passport seized in April, 
was beaten, allegedly by plainclothes police, on May 20, and 
subsequently was detained and interrogated; his car also was vandalized 
in broad daylight. These events all occurred after he published 
articles critical of the Government in the French newspaper La Croix 
(see Sections 1.d., 1.f., 2.a., and 4.). Other journalists who were 
active in human rights organizations reported that they were under 
police surveillance for weeks at a time. Visiting foreign journalists 
sometimes complain of being followed by security officials.
    On May 3, for the second year in a row, the Committee to Protect 
Journalists named President Ben Ali as one of its ``10 worst enemies of 
the press.'' In July Reporters Sans Frontieres released a paper 
entitled ``Censorship: A Keystone of the Ben Ali Regime,'' which states 
that ``press freedom is nonexistent in Tunisia.'' Both reports focused 
on the presence of a restrictiveatmosphere that leads to self-
censorship and control exercised through advertising revenues. The 
Tunisian Newspaper Association remained expelled from the World 
Association of Newspapers (WAN). The WAN expelled the Association in 
1997 for its failure to oppose repression of freedom of the press.
    The Government owns and operates the Tunisian Radio and Television 
Establishment (ERTT). The ERTT's coverage of government news is taken 
directly from the official news agency, TAP. In May 1998, the ERTT 
began broadcasting a live public debate program entitled ``Face to 
Face,'' which gave ordinary citizens the opportunity to debate public 
affairs issues with government officials. Human rights activists 
described the program as progress toward greater freedom of expression. 
There are several government-owned regional radio stations and one 
national television channel. Bilateral agreements with France and Italy 
permit citizens to receive the French television channel France 2 and 
the Italian Rai-Uno. However, the Government stopped the broadcast of 
France 2 in October because of its critical coverage of the elections. 
The Government later announced plans to terminate France 2 service in 
Tunisia permanently. It stated that the termination was part of a long-
term plan to provide more broadcast time to Tunisian programming. 
Recent estimates put the number of satellite dishes in the country at 
well over 100,000. After blocking sales for several years, the 
Government instituted regulations in 1996 to govern their sale and 
installation.
    The Government encouraged greater use of the Internet, lowered 
Internet user fees and telephone connection fees in both 1998 and 1999, 
and abolished customs duties on computers. By September 1, the 
Government reported that 12,000 users were connected to the Internet 
(many of which were institutions, thus suggesting a higher number of 
individuals with Internet access), approximately double the number a 
year earlier. The Government used the Internet widely, with most 
government ministries and agencies posting information on readily 
accessible web sites. With a goal of 100,000 Internet users by 2001, 
the Government actively is connecting schools and universities to the 
Internet. However, web sites containing information critical of the 
Government posted by international NGO's and foreign governments 
frequently are blocked, including a report on Internet use in Tunisia 
by Human Rights Watch. The only two Internet service providers in 
Tunisia remain under the control of the Tunisian Internet Agency, which 
was created in 1996 and which regularly must provide lists of 
subscribers to the Government. Human rights activists allege that the 
Agency regularly interferes with and intercepts their Internet 
communications. The Press Code, including the requirement that advance 
copies of publications be provided to the Government, applies to 
information shared on the Internet (see Section 4).
    The Government limits academic freedom. Like journalists, 
university professors indicated that they sometimes practiced self-
censorship by avoiding classroom criticism of the Government or 
statements supportive of the An-Nahda movement. Professors alleged that 
the Government utilized the threat of tax audits, control over 
university positions, and strict publishing rules to encourage self-
censorship. The presence of police on campuses also discouraged 
dissent. A 1996 regulation requires professors to inform the Ministry 
of Higher Education in advance of any seminars, including the list of 
participants and subjects to be addressed. Copies of papers to be 
presented in university settings or seminars must be provided to the 
Ministry in advance.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government imposes some 
restrictions on this right. Groups that wish to hold a public meeting, 
rally, or march must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Interior by 
applying no later than 3 days in advance of the proposed event, and 
submitting the list of participants. The authorities routinely approve 
such permits for groups that support government positions, but refuse 
permission for groups that express dissenting views. Several 
independent NGO's, including the LTDH, the ATFD, and the National 
Student Union (UGET) received permission to hold a public meeting in 
December at the Africa Meridien hotel in commemoration of the 51st 
anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. The first general meeting of human rights activists in the 
country in several years was attended by a standing-room-only crowd, 
with over 500 attendees representing groups from all over the country. 
After prohibiting the Tunisia chapter of Amnesty International from 
holding public meetings in September and December 1998, the Government 
permitted the chapter to hold a public meeting in Tunis in May. 
However, the Government prohibited branch offices from holding meetings 
in public space and denied AI permission to hold a public meeting on 
November 26 to celebrate Mahmoud Romdhane's reelection to the 
International Executive Committee of AI (see Section 4). On December 4, 
the police forcibly broke up a peaceful march that was organized by the 
UGTT in commemoration of the anniversary of the death of an early 
tradeunion activist. The Government routinely granted permits to 
opposition political parties to conduct campaign rallies and other 
activities, including in public buildings, during the October election 
campaigns (see Section 3).
    Although the Constitution provides for freedom of association, the 
Government restricts this right by barring membership in political 
parties organized by religion, race, or region. On these grounds, the 
Government prosecutes members of the Islamist movement An-Nahda. Human 
rights activists alleged that the Government extended its prosecution 
of Islamist activists to include family members who were not 
politically active (see sections 1.d. and 1.f.). A criminal 
investigation against former MDS opposition party leader Mohamed Moaada 
remained open, after he allegedly met with An-Nahda leaders in Europe 
in 1997 (see Section 2.a.).
    In January the Government pardoned and released seven students who 
were arrested in December 1998 for their participation in public 
rallies organized by the UGET.
    The Government bans organizations that threaten disruption of the 
public order and uses this proscription to prosecute members of the 
PCOT. In July the courts convicted 17 students, professors, and labor 
activists of membership in the PCOT; given sentences ranging from 16 
months to 3 years, 11 of those convicted were released in August 
because it was determined that their pretrial detention counted as part 
of their sentences. PCOT leader Hamma Hammami and two other fugitives, 
in hiding since February 1998, were convicted in absentia and given 
prison sentences of 9 years and 4 months. Human rights lawyer (and wife 
of Hammami) Radhia Nasraoui, indicted in the same case but whose 
charges were reduced to misdemeanors on April 12, was given a 6-month 
suspended sentence for aiding and abetting an illegal organization (see 
Sections 1.c, 1.d., 1.e, 2.a., 4, and 6.e.). AI reported that of the 
remaining six students, five were released on November 4 as part of Ben 
Ali's presidential pardon (see Section 1.e.).
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Islam as the 
state religion and provides for the free exercise of other religions 
that do not disturb the public order, and the Government generally 
respects this right; however, it does not permit proselytizing and 
partially limits the religious freedom of Baha'is. The Government 
controls mosques and pays the salaries of prayer leaders. The 1988 Law 
on Mosques provides that only personnel appointed by the Government may 
lead activities in the mosques.
    The Government regards the Baha'i faith as a heretical sect of 
Islam and permits its 150 adherents to practice their faith only in 
private. The Government reportedly pressures Baha'is to eschew 
organized religious activities.
    With 1,800 adherents, the Jewish community is the country's largest 
indigenous religious minority. The Government ensures the Jewish 
community freedom of worship and pays the salary of the Grand Rabbi. 
The Government permits the Jewish community to operate private 
religious schools and allows Jewish children on the island of Jerba to 
split their academic day between secular public schools and private 
religious schools. The Government also encouraged Jewish emigres to 
return for the annual Jewish pilgrimage to the historic El-Ghriba 
synagogue on the island of Jerba.
    The nominal Christian community--composed of foreign temporary and 
permanent residents and a small group of native-born citizens of both 
European and Arab origin--numbers approximately 20,000 and is dispersed 
throughout the country. According to church leaders, the practicing 
Christian population numbers approximately 2,000 and includes an 
estimated 200 native-born ethnic Arab citizens who have converted to 
Christianity. In general, the Government does not permit Christian 
groups to establish new churches.
    The Government views proselytizing as an act against the public 
order. Authorities ask foreigners suspected of proselytizing to depart 
the country and do not permit them to return. There were no reported 
cases of official action against persons suspected of proselytizing.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these 
rights, and persons are free to change their place of residence or work 
at will; however, in practice the Government restricts the freedom of 
movement and foreign travel of those critical of it.
    Amendments to the passport law in October 1998 transferred power 
for canceling passports from the Ministry of Interior to the courts; 
however, the amended law contains broad provisions that permit passport 
seizure on undefined national security groundsand deny citizens the 
right either to present their case against seizure or to appeal the 
judges' decision. The Ministry of Interior must submit requests to 
seize or withhold a citizen's passport through the Public Prosecutor to 
the courts.
    Human rights monitors complain that the Government arbitrarily 
withholds passports from citizens. In July human rights activists 
circulated a list of 26 defense lawyers whose passports the authorities 
seized. Although throughout the year the Government returned passports 
to several prominent activists and lawyers, it continued to withhold 
the passports of many other citizens, including Moncef Marzouki, 
Mustapha Ben Jaafar, and Siheme Ben Sedrine (see Section 4). On March 
26, the passport of Fatma Ksila, wife of jailed LTDH vice president 
Khemais Ksila, was stolen in what she believes was a political move 
designed to prevent her travel later that day to Geneva to meet with 
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson. The Government, 
citing laws designed to prevent the trafficking of stolen passports, 
stated that Ksila, like other citizens, legally may reapply for a 
passport 1 year from the date the passport was stolen. Also during 
March, the Government prohibited Ksila's son Zaid from traveling to 
Cairo to receive a human rights award in the name of his father; the 
Government reported that, because Zaid was a minor, he needed explicit 
permission from his father to leave the country. The mother of human 
rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui was denied permission to renew her 
passport. In accordance with the law concerning prisoners released on 
parole, the Government continues to withhold the passport of Khemais 
Ksila since his September 22 release (see Section 1.f.). According to 
reliable sources, some political dissenters in self-imposed exile have 
been prevented from obtaining or renewing their passports in order to 
return to Tunisia. However, former Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali and 
former Minister of Education and the Economy Achmed Ben Sada, who both 
have been in self-exile for many years, recently had their passports 
reinstated.
    Human rights groups reported that the Government continued to 
withhold the passports of the family members of Islamist activists who 
live abroad. Radhia Aouididi was freed on June 4, 5 months before the 
expiration of her 3-year prison term on a conviction of association 
with An-Nahda and November 1996 use of a false passport (after the 
Government refused to issue her a passport). Aouididi was informed 
after her November 25 acquittal that she would be issued a passport if 
she could provide a judge's decision in her trial; however, she claimed 
that the court refused her access to copies of the November 25 decision 
(see Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 1.f.). Aoudidi's fiance Ahmed Amri, who 
lives abroad, is accused of membership in An-Nahda. After being 
released on June 4, Rachida Ben Salem and Saida Charbti, both of whose 
husbands are political refugees in Europe accused of membership in An-
Nahda, requested passports; the Government denied the requests (see 
Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 1.f.).
    The Government restricts internal travel during criminal 
investigations. Human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui was confined to the 
greater Tunis area from March 1998 until these restrictions were lifted 
with her conviction on charges of aiding an illegal organization in 
July; on February 11, Nasraoui was convicted and given a suspended 
sentence for violating her travel restrictions when she traveled 
without authorization to her mother-in-law's funeral in Sfax (see 
Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.a., and 4). Council for National Liberties 
member Omar Mestiri remains confined to Tunis pending the outcome of a 
criminal trial, which prevents him from reaching his place of 
employment outside the city limits (see Sections 1.d, 1.e, 2.a, and 4).
    Police routinely stop motorists for no apparent reason to examine 
their personal identification and vehicular documents (see Section 
1.f.).
    The Government cooperates with the office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assisting refugees. The 
Government acknowledged the UNHCR's determination of refugee status 
that was accorded to 200 individuals during the year. Approximately 100 
cases await determination by the UNHCR. The Government provides first 
asylum for refugees based on UNHCR recommendations. There is no pattern 
of abuse of refugees. Although a few refugees were deported during the 
year, none were forced to return to countries where they feared 
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides that the citizenry shall elect the 
President and members of the legislature for 5-year terms; however, 
there still are some significant limitations on citizens' right to 
change their government. In October President Ben Ali was reelected for 
a third 5-year term in the country's first multiparty presidential 
elections in October, winning 99.44 percent of the vote. According to 
the Constitution, this is to be his last term in office. The rulingRCD 
party won all 148 directly elected seats in the legislative elections. 
Observers agree that the outcome of the presidential and legislative 
elections generally reflect the will of the electorate; however, the 
campaign and election processes greatly favored the ruling party and 
there was widespread disregard for the secrecy of the vote. The ruling 
RCD party so dominates all levels of political activity that credible 
electoral challenges have been extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the 
results also reflect the general satisfaction of the vast majority with 
President Ben Ali's rule, which derives in large part from his success 
in promoting economic and social well-being. Opposition presidential 
candidates were allowed to run for the first time and opposition 
parties were able to campaign freely within the limits dictated by the 
Government; however, given the overwhelming dominance of the RCD, the 
playing field for the elections was not level. A presidentially 
appointed independent election monitoring group presented a 
confidential report to the President on the election process, which 
reportedly uncovered numerous irregularities alleged by opposition 
parties. President Ben Ali subsequently announced, during his November 
15 inauguration ceremony, that he would propose a law to require voters 
to enter the voting booth and take copies of all party ballots (not 
just the ballot with ruling-party candidates) in order to preserve the 
secrecy of the vote.
    The RCD party and its direct predecessor parties have controlled 
the political arena since independence in 1956. The RCD dominates the 
Cabinet, the Chamber of Deputies, and regional and local governments. 
The President appoints the Cabinet and the 23 governors. The Government 
and the party are integrated closely; the President of the Republic is 
also the president of the party, and the party's secretary general 
holds the rank of minister.
    The Government amended the Constitution and Electoral Code in July 
to allow party presidents who have been in office for at least 5 years 
and whose parties were represented in the 1994 to 1999 Chamber of 
Deputies (and who met other requirements such as age and nationality) 
to run in the October presidential elections. These criteria were a 
one-time alternative to the more restrictive standing requirement that 
candidates for president must receive the endorsement of 30 sitting 
deputies or municipal council presidents to be eligible to run, and 
paved the way for the first multiparty presidential elections, as 
Mohamed Belhaj Amor, secretary general of the Popular Unity Front 
(PUP), and Abderrahman Tlili, secretary general of the Union of 
Democratic Unionists party (UDU), entered the race.
    Both candidates acknowledged flaws in the Electoral Code and 
criticized the fact that the narrowly written criteria made only two 
persons eligible to run against Ben Ali. At the same time, they stated 
that they wanted to advance pluralism by seizing the opportunity to 
run. However, after the elections, there were opposition complaints 
that, despite some progress in liberalizing the electoral process, 
problems remained, especially with regard to protection of the secrecy 
of the ballot and the accuracy of the vote totals.
    The 182-seat Chamber of Deputies does not function as a 
counterweight to the executive branch; rather, it serves as an arena in 
which the executive's legislative proposals are debated prior to 
virtually automatic approval. Debate within the Chamber is often lively 
and government ministers are summoned to respond to deputies' 
questions, although heated exchanges critical of government policy are 
not reported fully in the press. Regardless of the debate, the Chamber 
has a history of approving all government proposals. The Chamber that 
emerged from the October parliamentary elections is more pluralistic 
than the Chamber in place from 1994 to 1999, as October 1998 changes in 
the Electoral Code reserved 20 percent of the seats for the opposition 
parties, distributed on a proportional basis to those parties that did 
not win directly elected district seats. Now, 5 opposition parties hold 
34 of 182 seats, or nearly 19 percent, compared with 4 opposition 
parties with 19 of 163 seats, or 12 percent, in the previous 
Parliament. The remaining 81 percent of the seats were contested in 
winner-take-all, multiseat district races, in which the ruling party 
won all 148 directly elected seats, up from 144 in the last Parliament. 
Opposition politicians recognized that the electoral changes ensured 
them more seats than they could have won in a popular election. 
However, they also argue that the winner-take-all, multiseat district 
system permanently favors the RCD and essentially freezes the 
opposition at the 20 percent level.
    All six legally recognized opposition parties fielded parliamentary 
candidates in the October elections. The Government provided public 
financing to political parties, as called for in legislation adopted in 
1997. Under the legislation, each party represented in the Chamber of 
Deputies received an annual public subsidy of approximately $54,000 
(60,000 dinars), plus an additional payment of $4,500 (5,000 dinars) 
per deputy. The Government also provided campaign financing that 
corresponded to the number of district lists that each party presented. 
Opposition politicians argued that the subsidy system reinforces the 
favored position of the rulingparty because its dominance in the 
Parliament means that it receives the great majority of the government 
funding. Moreover, with funding based on seats in Parliament, the 
opposition parties had no interest in forming coalitions against the 
RCD, but concentrated instead on competing with each other for the 
largest possible share of the 20 percent of seats reserved for the 
opposition. During the elections, opposition parties found independent 
fund raising impossible, and those that published newspapers or 
magazines faced difficulties in obtaining paid advertisers.
    Women participate in politics, but they are underrepresented in 
senior government positions. Twenty-one of the 182 Deputies elected in 
October are women, up from 13 of 163 deputies in the previous Chamber. 
The number of women in the Cabinet increased from one to four after 
April and November cabinet changes, with two women being appointed full 
ministers (the Minister of Environment and Land Management and the 
Minister for Women and Family Affairs) and two appointed junior 
ministers (the Secretary of State for Housing and the Secretary of 
State for Public Health).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Tunisian Human Rights League is the most active independent 
advocacy organization, with branches in many parts of the country. The 
organization receives and researches complaints and protests individual 
and systemic abuses. After the league published a communique welcoming 
the human rights initiatives announced in President Ben Ali's March 20 
independence day speech, then Minister of Interior Ali Chaouch met with 
LTDH president Taoufik Bouderbala on April 1, the first official 
meeting between the League and the Government since the Government 
broke off dialog in August 1997. At that time, the Government had 
accused the LTDH of prompting members of the International Human Rights 
Federation to give inaccurate testimony regarding Tunisia before the 
U.N. Human Rights Commission. While pleased with the renewed contact, 
LTDH officials reported that the Government had not provided any 
written responses to LTDH inquiries since 1994. As a result of the 
April 1 meeting, the Government returned the passports of several 
lawyers whose cases the LTDH raised with the Government. LTDH 
representatives also reported that the Government acceded to league 
requests for a thorough medical check-up of then-jailed LTDH vice 
president Khemais Ksila (who was released in September) and that a 
jailed university student be allowed a face-to-face meeting with her 
father. LTDH president Bouderbala reported that informal contacts 
between the LTDH and the Government subsequently continued, and that 
the Government addressed some league complaints about postimprisonment 
administration controls by reducing the frequency of police station 
sign-ins by some former prisoners. In June the Government provided the 
LTDH with a grant of $23,000 (25,000 dinars), its first direct subsidy 
for general LTDH operations in the League's history.
    Although the Government permitted the League to hold meetings and a 
rally in its offices, it continued to place significant obstacles in 
the way of the League's effective operation. LTDH members and other 
human rights activists reported government harassment, interrogation, 
property loss or damage, unauthorized home entry, and denial of 
passports. Local newspapers refused to publish LTDH communiques. After 
requests for permission to hold meetings in public spaces were denied 
in 1997 and 1998, the LTDH was able to secure a hotel venue for a 
December 14 meeting held in conjunction with the Young Lawyers 
Association, the ATDF, the Tunisian chapter of Amnesty International, 
and the UGET. The meeting featured speakers commenting on the 51st 
anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. This first general meeting of human rights activists in several 
years was attended by over 500 persons representing groups from all 
over the country.
    LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila, convicted in February 1998 on 
defamation charges, was released on September 22 (see Sections 1.e., 
2.a., and 2.d.). Although the Government claims that an investigation 
is ongoing, there were no developments regarding the February 12, 1998 
ransacking and burglary of the law office of human rights activist 
Radhia Nasraoui, which human rights activists believe the security 
services carried out. In a case that human rights activists believe was 
motivated by authorities' desire to retaliate for her willingness to 
defend unpopular clients, Nasraoui was convicted in July and given a 6-
month suspended sentence for aiding and abetting the outlawed Communist 
Workers Party (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.b., 4, and 6).
    On December 15, 1998, several activists applied to the Ministry of 
Interior to register a new human rights organization, the Tunisian 
National Council for Liberties. On March 2, the Government issued its 
refusal to register the CNLT as an NGO, commenting (without providing 
details) that the organization didnot comply with the law. The CNLT's 
founders filed an administrative appeal asking for reconsideration, 
which the Government has not yet acted upon. Although not recognized by 
the Government, the CNLT issued statements criticizing government human 
rights practices. Government officials stated that, in publishing 
communiques in the name of an unregistered NGO, CNLT members violated 
the Publications Code (which requires that advance copies be provided 
to the Government), belonged to an illegal organization, and threatened 
public order. The Government opened a criminal investigation of the 
head of the Tunisian Association of Young Lawyers for receiving CNLT 
members in his office. The Government detained and interrogated two 
CNLT members, Omar Mestiri and Moncef Marzouki, in May, and a third 
member in June. In July a court indicted both Mestiri and Marzouki on 
charges of belonging to an illegal organization, violating the 
Publications Code, and spreading false information; both are currently 
out of prison awaiting trial. Marzouki and CNLT member Mustapha Ben 
Jaafar, both doctors, allege that the Government prohibits them from 
treating patients in retaliation for their human rights activism. 
Marzouki also was indicted in November and December and charged with 
defamation, belonging to an unrecognized organization, public 
disturbance, and dissemination of false information for publishing and 
distributing two communiques critical of the Government's harassment of 
Omar Mestiri, his wife, Sihem Bensedrine, and former directors of MDS 
Mohamed Moaada and Ahmed Khaskoussi. Marzouki's family also claims to 
have suffered from Marzouki's activism, and his brother Ali Bedoui was 
arrested in January and given a 6-month prison sentence. The Government 
stated that Bedoui was arrested for failing to fulfill the requirement 
of a previous conviction that he report daily to the police station. 
Many CNLT members were unable to obtain passports (see Sections 1.d., 
1.e., 2.a., and 2.d.).
    The Arab Institute for Human Rights, headquartered in Tunis, was 
founded in 1989 by the LTDH, the Arab Organization for Human Rights, 
and the Union of Arab lawyers. It is an information, rather than an 
advocacy, organization, and the Government supports its activities.
    Amnesty International continued to maintain a Tunisian chapter. Its 
members complained that the Tunis office suffered repeated loss of 
telephone and facsimile service. Until June telephone information 
service provided an incorrect number to those asking for AI's telephone 
number; persons who called this number reportedly then were questioned 
by Ministry of Interior officials. Persons who were considering joining 
AI's Tunisia chapter report being discouraged actively from doing so by 
security officials. AI officials reported that they were under periodic 
police surveillance. The Government continued to deny entry to a 
London-based AI researcher responsible for Tunisian affairs, claiming 
that she has an anti-Tunisia bias. The Government refused to allow the 
Tunisia chapter of AI to distribute 4,000 books on human rights 
education for high school students. The Government permitted AI to hold 
a public meeting in Tunis in May; however, it denied requests by branch 
chapters in Tunisia to hold public meetings outside the capital. In 
November the Government denied a request by the Tunisia chapter of AI 
to hold a public meeting in Tunis to celebrate the reelection of 
Mahmoud Romdhane to the International Executive Committee of AI.
    Throughout the year, the Government permitted observers from AI, 
the International Human Rights Federation, and other international 
human rights organizations to monitor trials. The observers reported 
that the Government permitted them to conduct their work freely. 
However, the Government reportedly blocked access to the Internet web 
sites produced by some of these organizations and the web site produced 
by the Committee to Protect Journalists (see Section 2.a.). Human 
rights activists and lawyers complain of frequently interrupted postal 
and telephone services.
    Human rights offices in certain ministries and a governmental body, 
the Higher Commission on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, address and 
sometimes resolve human rights complaints. The Higher Commission 
submits confidential reports directly to President Ben Ali. On November 
17, the President created a Ministry of Human Rights, Communications, 
and Relations with the Chamber of Deputies, which is within the Prime 
Minister's office, and appointed LTDH founder Daly Jazi as Minister. On 
December 10, Jazi held a conference in which the role of NGO's in 
preserving and enforcing human rights was emphasized.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides that all citizens shall have equal rights 
and responsibilities and be equal under the law, and the Government 
generally upholds these rights in practice. Legal or societal 
discrimination is not prevalent, apart from that experienced by women 
in certain areas, such as inheritance, which is governed by Shari'a. 
Shari'a provides that daughters receive only half the amount left to 
sons.
    Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no reliable 
statistics to measure its extent. The Tunisian Democratic Women's 
Association operates the country's only counseling center for women who 
are victims of domestic violence. The center, located in Tunis, assists 
approximately 20 women per month. Instances of rape or assault by 
someone unknown to the victim are rare. Battered women first seek help 
from family members. Police intervention is often ineffective because 
police officers and the courts tend to regard domestic violence as a 
problem to be handled by the family. Nonetheless, there are stiff 
penalties for spouse abuse. Both the fine and imprisonment for battery 
or violence committed by a spouse or family member are double those for 
the same crimes committed by an individual not related to the victim.
    Women enjoy substantial rights and the Government has made serious 
efforts to advance those rights, especially in the areas of property 
ownership practices and support to divorced women. The 1956 Personal 
Status Code outlawed polygamy. A 1998 presidential decree created a 
national fund to protect the rights of divorced women, ensuring that 
the State would provide financial support to women whose former 
husbands refused to make alimony payments. Legislation requires civil 
authorities to advise couples of the merits of including provisions for 
joint property in marriage contracts. Nonetheless, most property 
acquired during marriage, including property acquired solely by the 
wife, still is held in the name of the husband. Inheritance law, based 
on Shari'a and tradition, discriminates against women, and women still 
face societal and economic discrimination in certain areas, such as 
private sector employment. The Government took strong measures to 
reduce official discrimination, including adding equal opportunity for 
women as a standard part of its audits of all governmental entities and 
state-owned enterprises; however, it did not extend such measures to 
the private sector.
    Women in increasing numbers are entering the work force, employed 
particularly in the textile, manufacturing, health, and agricultural 
sectors. According to 1994 government statistics, women constituted 25 
percent of the workforce; excluding the agricultural sector, they 
accounted for 44 percent. Women represent 44 percent of workers in the 
industrial sector and 46.1 percent of workers in the health sector. 
There are an estimated 2,000 businesses headed by women. Women 
constitute one-third of the civil service, employed primarily in the 
fields of health, education, and social affairs at the middle or lower 
levels. Women represent 60 percent of all judges in the capital and 25 
percent of the nation's total jurists. Approximately 43 percent of 
university students enrolled in the 1997-98 academic year were women. 
The law explicitly requires equal pay for equal work. The Government 
has added equal opportunity for women as a standard part of its audits 
of all government ministries, agencies, and state-owned enterprises. On 
the other hand, while the rate of illiteracy has dropped markedly in 
both rural and urban areas, the rate of female illiteracy in all 
categories is at least double that of men. Among 10- to 14-year-old 
children, 5.5 percent of urban girls are illiterate, compared with 2.2 
percent of urban boys, and 27 percent of rural girls, compared with 
less than 7 percent of rural boys.
    Several active NGO's focus, in whole or in part, on women's 
advocacy, or research women's issues, and a cadre of attorneys 
represent women in domestic cases. Media attention focuses on women's 
economic and academic accomplishments, and usually omits reference to 
culturally sensitive issues. The Government funded several studies and 
projects designed to improve the role of women in the media.
    In a November 17 cabinet reorganization, President Ben Ali created 
a separate Ministry for Women and Family Affairs, and included in the 
2000 state budget a separate, and relatively large, budget for the 
Ministry, in support of its mission to ensure the legal rights and 
improve the socioeconomic status of women. The Government supports and 
provides funding to the National Women's Union, women's professional 
associations, and the Government's Women's Research Center.
    Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to 
public education, which is compulsory until age 16. Primary school 
enrollment for the 1997-98 scholastic year was roughly the same as the 
preceding year; secondary school enrollment showed an 8 percent 
increase. The Government reported that 98 percent of children attend 
school full-time. The Government offers a maternal and child health 
program, providing pre- and post-natal services. It sponsors an 
immunization program targeting preschool-aged children, and reports 
that over 95 percent of children are vaccinated.
    In 1995 the Government promulgated laws as part of a Code for the 
Protection of Children. The code proscribes child abuse, abandonment, 
and sexual or economic exploitation. Penalties for convictions for 
abandonment and assault on minors are severe. There is no societal 
pattern of abuse of children. There is a Ministry for Children and 
Youths and a Presidential Delegate to Safeguard the Rights and Welfare 
of Children.
    People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based 
on disability and mandates that at least 1 percent of the public and 
private sector jobs be reserved for the disabled. All public buildings 
constructed since 1991 must be accessible to physically disabled 
persons. Many cities, including the capital, have begun to install 
wheelchair access ramps on city sidewalks. There is a general trend 
toward making public transportation more accessible to disabled 
persons. The Government issues special cards to the disabled for 
benefits such as unrestricted parking, priority medical services, 
preferential seating on public transportation, and consumer discounts.
    Indigenous People.--The Government estimates that the small Amazigh 
minority constitutes less than 3 percent of the population. Some older 
Amazighs have retained their native language, but the younger 
generation has been assimilated into Tunisian culture through schooling 
and marriage. Berbers are free to participate in politics and to 
express themselves culturally.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code 
stipulate the right of workers to form unions. The Tunisian General 
Federation of Labor is the country's only labor federation. About 15 
percent of the work force, including civil servants and employees of 
state-owned enterprises, are members, and a considerably larger 
proportion of the work force is covered by union contracts. There is no 
legal prohibition against the establishment of other labor federations. 
A union may be dissolved only by court order.
    The UGTT and its member unions legally are independent of the 
Government and the ruling party, but operate under regulations that 
restrict their freedom of action. The UGTT's membership includes 
persons associated with all political tendencies, although Islamists 
have been removed from union offices. There are credible reports that 
the UGTT receives substantial government subsidies to supplement modest 
union dues and funding from the National Social Security Account. While 
regional and sector-specific unions operate with more independence, the 
central UGTT leadership follows a policy of cooperation with the 
Government and its economic reform program. While criminal charges 
dating from March 1998 were dropped against dissident labor activist 
Abdelmejid Sahraoui on April 2, allowing him to run in UGTT elections, 
police physically prevented him from attending the April 6-8 UGTT 
congress and elections. Labor activists were among the 21 persons (3 of 
whom remain fugitives) convicted in July of defamation, dissemination 
of false information, and association with or membership in the illegal 
Communist Workers Party (see Sections 1.c, 1.d, 1.e, 2.a., 2.b., and 
4). Ten UGTT members (including Sahraoui) were detained for 48 hours in 
May after circulating a petition at the April UGTT congress that 
criticized the UGTT secretary general and threatened to establish an 
alternative labor federation (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
    Unions, including those representing civil servants, have the right 
to strike, provided they give 10 days' advance notice to the UGTT and 
it approves of the strike. However, this advance approval rarely is 
sought in practice. There were numerous short-lived strikes over pay 
and conditions. While the majority of these technically were illegal, 
the Government did not prosecute workers for illegal strike activity, 
and the strikes were covered objectively in the press. The 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has characterized the 
requirement for prior UGTT approval of strikes as a violation of worker 
rights. The law prohibits retribution against strikers, but there have 
been cases of employers punishing them nevertheless, which forces the 
strikers to pursue costly and time-consuming legal remedies to protect 
their rights.
    Labor disputes are settled through conciliation panels in which 
labor and management are represented equally. Tripartite regional 
arbitration commissions settle industrial disputes when conciliation 
fails.
    Unions are free to associate with international bodies.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to 
organize and bargain collectively is protected by law and observed in 
practice. Wages and working conditions are set in triennial 
negotiations between the UGTT member unions and employers. Forty-seven 
collective bargaining agreements set standards for industries in the 
private sector and cover 80 percent of the total private sector 
workforce. Each accord is negotiated by representatives of unions and 
employers in the area it covered. The Government's role in these 
negotiations is minimal, consisting mainly of lending its good offices 
if talks appear to be stalled. However, the Government must approve 
(but may not modify) the agreements. When approved the agreements set 
standards for all employees, both union and nonunion, in the areas that 
they cover. The 1999 triennial negotiation extended well beyond the May 
deadline, with a few public sector collective bargaining agreements 
still not concluded by year's end. The agreements signed provided for 
annual wage increases ranging from 4 to 6 percent.
    The UGTT also negotiates wages and work conditions of civil 
servants and employees of state-owned enterprises.
    The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. However, 
the UGTT is concerned about antiunion activity among private sector 
employers, especially the firing of union activists and the use of 
temporary workers to avoid unionization. In certain industries, such as 
textiles and construction, temporary workers account for a large 
majority of the work force. The Labor Code protects temporary workers, 
but enforcement is more difficult than in the case of permanent 
workers. The UGTT held discussions with the Government on this issue, 
but no progress was reported by year's end. A committee chaired by an 
officer from the Labor Inspectorate of the Office of the Inspector 
General of the Ministry of Social Affairs, and including a labor 
representative and an employers' association representative, approves 
all worker dismissals.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits 
forced or compulsory labor by either adults or children, and it is not 
known to occur. The Government abolished compulsory labor in 1989.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The minimum age for employment in manufacturing is 16 
years. The minimum age for light work in agriculture and some other 
nonindustrial sectors is 13 years. The law also requires children to 
attend school until age 16. Workers between the ages of 14 and 18 must 
have 12 hours of rest per day, which include the hours between 10 p.m. 
and 6 a.m. Children between the ages of 14 and 16 may work no more than 
2 hours per day. The total time that they spend in school and work may 
not exceed 7 hours per day. Inspectors of the Ministry of Social 
Affairs examine the records of employees to verify that employers 
comply with the minimum age law. Nonetheless, young children often 
perform agricultural work in rural areas and work as vendors in urban 
areas, primarily during the summer vacation from school.
    The UGTT has expressed concern that child labor continues to exist 
disguised as apprenticeship, particularly in the handicraft industry, 
and in the cases of teenage girls whose families place them as 
household domestics in order to collect their wages. There are no 
reliable statistics on the extent of this phenomenon; however, an 
independent lawyer who conducted a study of the practice concluded that 
hiring of underage girls as household domestics has declined with 
increased government enforcement of school attendance and minimum work 
age laws. The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the 
Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code provides for a 
range of administratively determined minimum wages, which are set by a 
commission of representatives from the Ministries of Social Affairs, 
Planning, Finance, and National Economy in consultation with the UGTT 
and the Employers' Association. The President approves the commission's 
recommendations. On May 1, the industrial minimum wage was raised by 
6.32 dinars to $153 (178.880 dinars) per month for a 48-hour workweek 
and $134 (156.691 dinars) per month for a 40-hour workweek. The 
agricultural minimum wage is $4.71 (5.509 dinars) per day. When 
supplemented by transportation and family allowances, the minimum wage 
provides for a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but 
nothing more, as it covers only essential costs. The Labor Code sets a 
standard 48-hour workweek for most sectors and requires one 24-hour 
rest period per week.
    Regional labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing standards. 
They inspect most firms about once every 2 years. However, the 
Government often encounters difficulty in enforcing the minimum wage 
law, particularly in nonunionized sectors of the economy. Moreover, 
more than 240,000 workers are employed in the informal sector, which 
falls outside the purview of labor legislation.
    The Ministry of Social Affairs has responsibility for enforcing 
health and safety standards in the workplace. There are special 
government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as mining, 
petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions and 
standards tend to be better in firms that are export oriented than in 
those producing exclusively for the domestic market. Workers are free 
to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing 
their employment, and they may take legal action against employers who 
retaliate against them for exercising this right.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons; however, it prohibits slavery and bonded labor. There were 
no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                          UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

    The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates 
established in 1971. None has any democratically elected institutions 
or political parties. Traditional rule in the emirates generally has 
been patriarchal, with political allegiance defined in terms of loyalty 
to the tribal leaders. Political leaders in the emirates are not 
elected, but citizens may express their concerns directly to their 
leaders via traditional mechanisms, such as the open majlis, or 
council. In accordance with the 1971 Constitution, the seven emirate 
rulers constitute a Federal Supreme Council, the highest legislative 
and executive body. The Council selects a President and Vice President 
from its membership; the President in turn appoints the Prime Minister 
and Cabinet. The Constitution requires the Council to meet annually, 
although individual leaders meet frequently in more traditional 
settings. The Cabinet manages the Federation on a day-to-day basis. A 
consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC), consisting of 
advisors appointed by the emirate rulers, has no legislative authority 
but questions government ministers in open sessions and makes policy 
recommendations to the Cabinet. Each emirate retains control over its 
own oil and mineral wealth, some aspects of internal security, and some 
regulation of internal and external commerce. The Federal Government 
asserts primacy in matters of foreign and defense policy, some aspects 
of internal security, and increasingly in matters of law and the supply 
of some government services. The judiciary generally is independent, 
but its decisions are subject to review by the political leadership.
    Each emirate maintains its own independent police force. While all 
emirate internal security organs theoretically are branches of one 
federal organization, in practice they operate with considerable 
independence.
    The UAE has a free market economy based on oil and gas production, 
trade, and light manufacturing. The Government owns the majority share 
of the petroleum production enterprise in the largest emirate, Abu 
Dhabi. The Emirate of Dubai is likewise an oil producer, as well as a 
growing financial and commercial center in the Gulf. The remaining five 
emirates have negligible petroleum or other resources and therefore 
depend in varying degrees on federal government subsidies, particularly 
for basic services such as health care, electricity, water, and 
education. The economy provides citizens with a high per capita income, 
but it is heavily dependent on foreign workers, who constitute at least 
80 percent of the general population.
    The Government continued to restrict human rights in a number of 
areas including the denial of the right of citizens to change their 
government and the right to a speedy trial, and limitations on the 
freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. The press 
continued to avoid direct criticism of the Government and exercised 
self-censorship. Women continue to make progress in education and in 
the work force, but some discrimination persists, including 
restrictions on their ability to own property. The Government limits 
worker rights.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or degrading treatment, 
and there were no confirmed reports of torture. There are consistent 
but unconfirmed reports from foreign prisoners of beatings and coerced 
confessions by police during initial detention. The Government 
conducted internal investigations of these reports, and maintained that 
they were groundless. Shari'a (Islamic law) courts frequently impose 
flogging (except in Dubai) on Muslims found guilty of adultery, 
prostitution, and drug or alcohol abuse. In practice flogging is 
administered in accordance with Shari'a so as to prevent major or 
permanent injuries. The individual administering the lashing 
traditionally holds a Koran under the arm and swings the whip using the 
forearm only. According to press accounts, punishments for adultery and 
prostitution have ranged from 39 to 200 lashes. Individuals convicted 
of drunkenness have been sentenced to 80 lashes.
    The Federal Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that convictions in the 
Shari'a courts do not necessarily require the imposition of Shari'a 
penalties on non-Muslims, but such sentences have been carried out in a 
few cases.
    In June 1998, a Shari'a court in Fujairah sentenced three Omani 
nationals convicted of robbery to have their right hands amputated. The 
Fujairah prosecutor's office stated that it did not intend to carry out 
the sentence and instead commuted the sentence to a term of 
imprisonment.
    In central prisons that hold long-term inmates, prisoners are 
provided with food, medical care, and adequate sanitation facilities, 
but sleep on slabs built into cell walls. Each prisoner is provided 
with four blankets. Only some blocks of the central prisons are air-
conditioned during the intense heat and humidity of the summer. The 
Government gradually is phasing air conditioning into the prisons. 
Currently, prisoners with medical conditions are placed in air-
conditioned rooms during the summer months. Prisoners not under 
investigation and not involved in drug cases may receive visitors up to 
three times each week and may also make occasional local telephone 
calls. In Dubai Emirate, most prisoners are allowed family visits and a 
number of telephone calls.
    The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison 
conditions.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
prohibits arrest, search, detention, or imprisonment, except in 
accordance with the law, and authorities respect these provisions in 
practice. The laws of each emirate prohibit arrest or search without 
probable cause.
    Under the Criminal Procedures Code, the police must report arrests 
within 48 hours to the Attorney General, who must determine within the 
next 24 hours whether to charge, release, or order further detention 
pending an investigation. The Attorney General may order that detainees 
be held for up to 21 days without charge. After that time, the 
authorities must obtain a court order for further detention without 
charge.
    Although the code does not specify a right to a speedy trial, 
authorities bring detainees to trial in reasonable time. Trials may 
last a substantial period of time, depending on the seriousness of the 
charges, number of witnesses, andavailability of judges. There is no 
formal system of bail, but the authorities temporarily may release 
detainees who deposit money or an important document such as a 
passport. The law permits incommunicado detention, but there is no 
evidence that it is practiced. Defendants in cases involving loss of 
life, including involuntary manslaughter, may be denied release in 
accordance with the local custom of protecting the defendant from the 
victim's aggrieved family. However, bail usually is permitted, after a 
payment of ``diya,'' a form of financial compensation for death or 
injury cases.
    Review of criminal cases by the office of the President in Abu 
Dhabi, and bureaucratic delays in processing prisoners or releasing 
them, sometimes result in detainees serving additional, unnecessary 
time in the central prisons (see Section 1.e.). Some bureaucratic 
delays have kept prisoners incarcerated for as long as several months 
beyond their court-mandated release dates.
    The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the 
independence of the judiciary; however, its decisions are subject to 
review by the political leadership.
    There is a dual system of Shari'a and civil courts. The civil 
courts generally are part of the federal system and are answerable to 
the Federal Supreme Court, located in Abu Dhabi, which has the power of 
judicial review as well as original jurisdiction in disputes between 
emirates or between the Federal Government and individual emirates. 
Courts and other parts of the judicial system in the Emirate of Dubai 
tend to maintain independence from the federal system.
    The Shari'a courts are administered by each emirate but also are 
answerable to the Federal Supreme Court. In 1994 the President decreed 
that the Shari'a courts, and not the civil courts, would have the 
authority to try almost all types of criminal cases. The decree did not 
affect the emirates of Dubai, Umm Al-Qaiwain, and Ras Al-Khaimah, which 
have lower courts independent of the federal system.
    Legal counsel may represent defendants in both court systems. Under 
the new Criminal Procedures Code, the accused has a right to counsel in 
all cases involving a capital crime or possible life imprisonment. Only 
the Emirate of Dubai has a public defender's office. If the defendant 
is indigent, the Government will provide counsel. However, in Dubai the 
Government provides indigents counsel only in felony cases. The Supreme 
Court ruled in 1993 that a defendant in an appeals case has a 
``fundamental right'' to select his attorney and that this right 
supersedes a judge's power to appoint an attorney for the defendant.
    The right to legal counsel is interpreted to mean that the accused 
has access to an attorney only after the police have completed their 
investigation. Thus, the police can question accused persons--sometimes 
for days or weeks, as in narcotics cases--without the benefit of legal 
counsel.
    Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. There are no 
jury trials. A single judge normally renders the verdict in each case, 
whether in Shari'a or civil courts; three judges sit for Dubai felony 
cases. All trials are public, except national security cases and those 
deemed by the judge likely to harm public morality. Most judges are 
foreign nationals, primarily from other Arab countries; however, the 
Ministry of Justice has trained some citizens as judges and 
prosecutors.
    Each court system has an appeal process. Death sentences may be 
appealed to the ruler of the emirate in which the offense was committed 
or to the President of the Federation. Non-Muslims who are tried for 
criminal offenses in Shari'a courts may receive civil penalties at the 
discretion of the judge. Shari'a penalties imposed on non-Muslims may 
be overturned or modified by a higher court.
    The Office of the President in the Abu Dhabi Emirate (also known as 
the Diwan), following the traditional prerogatives of a local ruler, 
maintains the practice of reviewing many types of criminal and civil 
offenses (such as alcohol use, drug-related cases, firearm use, cases 
involving personal injury, and cases affecting tribal harmony) before 
cases are released to the prosecutor's office. The Diwan also reviews 
sentences passed by judges and reserves the right to return cases to 
the courts on appeal. The Diwan's involvement leads to long delays 
prior to and following the judicial process, causing prisoners to 
remain in prison after they have completed their sentence. Although 
there are reports of intervention by other emirates' rulers in specific 
cases of personal interest, intervention does not appear to be routine.
    The military has its own court system based on Western military 
judicial practice. Military tribunals try only military personnel. 
There is no separate national security court system. In Dubai convicted 
criminals are eligible for executive pardon, often based on 
humanitarian grounds, once they have served at least half of their 
sentence.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits entry into homes without 
the owner's permission, except in accordance with the law. Police may 
enter homes without a warrant and without demonstrating probable cause; 
however, officers' actions in searching premises are subject to review, 
and officers are subject to disciplinary action if they act 
irresponsibly. Officials other than a police officer must have a court 
order to enter a private home. Local custom and practice place a high 
value on privacy, and entry into private homes without the owner's 
permission is rare. There is no known surveillance of private 
correspondence. However, foreigners have received sealed publications, 
such as magazines, through the international mail in which pictures of 
the naked human figure have been blackened over with a marking pen.
    Family law for Muslims is governed by Shari'a and the local Shari'a 
courts. As such, Muslim women are forbidden to marry non-Muslims. Such 
a marriage may result in the non-Muslim partner being arrested and 
tried.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech; however, the Government limits this right in 
practice. Most persons especially foreign nationals, refrain from 
criticizing the Government in public.
    All published material is subject to Federal Law 15 of 1988, which 
stipulates that all publications, whether books or periodicals, should 
be licensed by the Ministry of Education. The law also governs content 
and contains a list of proscribed subjects. Mindful of these 
provisions, journalists censor themselves when reporting on government 
policy, the ruling families, national security, religion, and relations 
with neighboring states. However, following an October interview with 
the semiofficial daily newspaper Al-Ittihad, in which Deputy Prime 
Minister Sultan Bin Zayid Al-Nahyan stated that uncovering 
inefficiencies in government was one of the duties of the press, Al-
Ittihad published a series of articles that criticized unnamed 
government officials who allegedly neglected their official duties in 
order to attend to their private business interests. With the 
encouragement of the Ministry of Information, Al-Ittihad printed 
several articles and commentaries late in the year that were critical 
of alleged inefficiencies in the delivery of services by the Ministries 
of Health and Education.
    The abrupt termination in April of the contract of a recently hired 
editor of Al-Ittihad followed reported criticism of his failure to 
follow tacit government guidelines regarding the reporting of political 
issues. No official reason was given for the termination. Also early in 
the year, the Abu Dhabi Emirate-owned corporation Emirates Media ceased 
publication of the semiofficial English-language daily Emirates News, 
apparently for budgetary reasons. In September Emirates Media, which 
publishes Al-Ittihad and owns Abu Dhabi's radio and television 
stations, issued a directive forbidding all its employees, including 
journalists, from speaking with representatives of foreign diplomatic 
missions without prior approval. Also in September, Dubai Emirate 
announced plans to open a press club as part of its effort to promote 
Dubai as a major regional communications hub. The club is intended to 
provide facilities for the international press, including access to 
uncensored information, and to serve as a site for open discussions 
between political and financial figures and journalists.
    Many of the local English and Arabic language newspapers are 
privately owned but receive government subsidies. Foreign publications 
routinely are subjected to censorship before distribution.
    All television and radio stations are government owned and conform 
to government reporting guidelines. These unpublished guidelines are 
not always applied consistently. In July Emirates Media purchased Ajman 
Emirate's radio and television stations, which until then had been the 
country's only privately owned broadcast outlets. Satellite receiving 
dishes are widespread and provide access to international broadcasts 
without apparent censorship. Censors at the Ministry of Information and 
Culture review imported newspapers, periodicals,books, films, and 
videos and ban any material considered pornographic, violent, 
derogatory to Islam, supportive of certain Israeli positions, unduly 
critical of friendly countries, or critical of the Government or the 
ruling families. In June the state telephone and Internet monopoly 
substantially lowered Internet prices for the second time in 2 years 
and sought to encourage greater use of the Internet. The Internet 
monopoly uses a proxy server that appears aimed, in most instances, at 
blocking material regarded as pornographic or as promoting radical 
Islamic ideologies. The proxy server does not appear, in most cases, to 
block news services or political expression unrelated to radical Islam, 
or material originating from specific countries. However, the Internet 
monopoly solicits suggestions from users regarding ``objectionable'' 
sites and sometimes has responded by briefly blocking some politically 
oriented sites, which were, after an apparent review, later unblocked.
    The unwritten but generally recognized ban on criticism of the 
Government also restricts academic freedom, although in recent years 
academics have been more open in their criticism.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
tightly restricts the freedom of peaceful assembly. Organized public 
gatherings require a government permit. Each emirate determines its own 
practice on public gatherings. Some emirates are relatively tolerant of 
seminars and conferences on sensitive subjects. Citizens normally 
confine their political discussions to the numerous gatherings or 
majlis, which are held in private homes. There are no restrictions on 
such gatherings.
    The Government tightly restricts freedom of association. 
Unauthorized political organizations are prohibited. All private 
associations, including children's clubs, charitable groups, and hobby 
associations, must be approved and licensed by local authorities; 
however, this requirement is enforced only loosely in some emirates. 
Private associations must follow the Government's censorship guidelines 
if they publish any material.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution designates Islam as the 
official religion, and Islam is also the official religion of each of 
the seven emirates. The Constitution also provides for the freedom to 
exercise religious worship in accordance with established customs, 
provided that it does not conflict with public policy or violate public 
morals, and the government generally respects this right in practice. 
However, the Government controls all mosques and prohibits 
proselytizing. Citizens are predominantly Sunni Muslims, but Shi'a 
Muslims also are free to worship and maintain mosques. Most mosques are 
government funded or subsidized, and the Ministry of Awqaf and 
Religious Affairs ensures that clergy do not deviate from approved 
topics in their sermons.
    Non-Muslims are free to practice their religion but may not 
proselytize publicly or distribute religious literature. The Government 
does not recognize all non-Muslim religions. In those emirates that 
officially recognize and thereby grant a legal identity to non-Muslim 
religious groups, only a limited number of Christian groups are granted 
such recognition. While recognizing the difference between Roman 
Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant Christianity, the 
authorities make no legal distinction between denominations within 
these Christian groups, particularly between Protestant denominations. 
Several often unrelated Christian congregations are required to share 
common facilities because of official limitations on the number of 
Christian denominations that are recognized officially. Non-Muslim and 
non-Christian religions have no legal identity in any of the emirates. 
Partly as a result of emirate policies regarding recognition of non-
Muslim denominations, facilities for Christian congregations are far 
greater in number and size than those for non-Christian and non-Muslim 
groups, despite the fact that Christians are a small minority of non-
Muslim foreigners.
    Major cities have Christian churches, some of which are built on 
land donated by the ruling families. A new Catholic church was opened 
in Sharjah in 1997 and a new Armenian Orthodox church in 1998, both 
with public ceremonies. The Government of Dubai Emirate donated a 
parcel of land in Jebel Ali in 1998 for the construction of a facility 
to be shared by four Protestant congregations and a Catholic 
congregation. Land also was designated in Jebel Ali for the 
construction of a second Christian cemetery. Some emirates permit Hindu 
and Sikh temples to exist. There are no Buddhist temples; however, 
Buddhists, along with Hindus and Sikhs, in cities without public 
facilities, conduct religious ceremonies in private homes without 
interference. Other religious communities (mostly of foreigners 
residing in Dubai and Abu Dhabi) include Ismailis, Parsis, and Iranian 
Baha'is. In 1998 Abu Dhabi Emirate donated land for the construction of 
a second Christian cemetery nearBani Yas because the existing facility 
near Umm Al Nar is nearly full. The Emirate also designated land for 
the establishment of the country's first Baha'i cemetery. The 
Government permits foreign clergy to minister to expatriate 
congregations. Non-Muslim religious groups are permitted to engage in 
private charitable activities and to send their children to private 
schools. In January Dubai Emirate established a center for the 
promotion of cultural understanding aimed at expanding contact between 
the citizen and foreign populations. One of the center's goals is to 
expose foreigners to aspects of the indigenous culture, including 
Islam.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no limitations on freedom of 
movement or relocation within the country, except for security areas 
such as defense and oil installations.
    Unrestricted foreign travel and emigration are permitted to male 
citizens except those involved in financial disputes under 
adjudication. A husband may bar his wife and children from leaving the 
country. All citizens have the right to return. There is a small 
population of stateless residents, many of whom have lived in the 
country for more than one generation. They are Bedouins or the 
descendants of Bedouins who are unable to prove that they are of UAE 
origin. There is no formal procedure for naturalization, although 
foreign women receive citizenship by marriage to a citizen, and anyone 
may receive a passport by presidential fiat. Because they are not of 
the original tribal groups, naturalized citizens may have their 
passports and citizenship status revoked for criminal or politically 
provocative actions. Such revocations are rare.
    Citizens are not restricted in seeking or changing employment. 
However, foreign nationals in specific occupations, primarily 
professional, may not change employers without first leaving the 
country for 6 months. During 1997 in an effort to liberalize employment 
regulations, the Federal Government removed the 6-month ban from some 
of these professions. Foreign nationals involved in disputes with 
citizen employers may be blacklisted by the employer with immigration 
authorities, effectively preventing their return.
    The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding 
refugees, asylees, or first asylum. It may detain persons seeking 
refugee status, particularly non-Arabs, while they await resettlement 
in a third country.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    There are no democratically elected institutions, and citizens do 
not have the right to change their government or to form political 
parties. Although there are consultative councils at the federal and 
emirate levels, most executive and legislative power is in the hands of 
the Federal Supreme Council. The seven emirate rulers, their extended 
families, and those persons and families to whom they are allied by 
historical ties, marriage, or common interest wield most political 
power in their respective emirates. Decisions at the federal level are 
generally made by consensus of the sheiks of the seven emirates and 
leading families.
    A federal consultative body, called the Federal National Council, 
consists of advisers appointed by the rulers of each emirate. The FNC 
has no legislative authority but may question ministers and make policy 
recommendations to the Cabinet. Its sessions are usually open to the 
public.
    The choice of a new emirate ruler falls to the ruling family in 
consultation with other prominent tribal figures. By tradition rulers 
and ruling families are presumed to have the right to rule, but their 
incumbency ultimately depends on the quality of their leadership and 
their responsiveness to their subjects' needs. Emirate rulers are 
accessible, in varying degrees, to citizens who have a problem or a 
request.
    Tradition rather than law has limited the political role of women. 
Women are free to hold government positions, but there are few women in 
senior positions. There are no female members of the FNC. In 1998 
President Zayid's wife, Shaykha Fatima, who is chairwoman of the 
Women's Federation, announced the Government's intention to appoint a 
number of women as special observers at the FNC. These observers are to 
learn the procedures of the FNC, and it is expected that some later may 
be appointed as members. The observers have not been named yet. In a 
magazine interview, Shaykha Fatima stated that women participate in the 
preparation of legislation dealing with social issues through 
recommendations made by the Women's Federation, and that women are only 
``steps away'' from full political participation. At the same time, she 
emphasized her view that the eventual appointment of women to the FNC 
and othergovernment positions would be ``a responsibility rather than 
an honor,'' requiring careful prior preparation. Although the small 
Shi'a minority has enjoyed commercial success, few Shi'a Muslims have 
top positions in the Federal Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no independent human rights groups. Government 
restrictions on freedom of the press and public association make it 
difficult for such groups to investigate and publicly criticize the 
Government's human rights restrictions. A human rights section exists 
within Dubai Emirate's police force to monitor allegations of human 
rights abuses. Informal public discussions of human rights, press 
reports of international human rights forums' activities, and media 
coverage of selected local human rights problems, such as foreign 
workers' conditions, are increasing public awareness of human rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equality before the law with regard 
to race, nationality, religious beliefs, or social status. However, 
there is institutional and cultural discrimination based on sex, 
nationality, and religion.
    Women.--There are reported cases of spousal abuse. Police units are 
stationed at major public hospitals so that victims of abuse may file 
complaints, or attending physicians may call upon the police to 
interview suspected victims of abuse. However, women sometimes are 
reluctant to file formal charges for social, cultural, and economic 
reasons. When abuse is reported the local police, authorities may take 
action to protect women from such abuse. The laws protect women from 
verbal abuse or harassment from men, and violators are subject to 
criminal action. There continue to be credible reports of abuse of 
female domestic servants by some local and foreign employers (see 
Section 6.e.).
    Prostitution has become an increasingly open phenomenon in recent 
years, particularly in Dubai. Although no accurate statistics are 
available, substantial numbers of women appear to be arriving from the 
states of the former Soviet Union for temporary stays during which they 
engage in prostitution and possibly other activities connected with 
organized crime. Substantial numbers of prostitutes also appear to come 
from Africa and South Asia. During the year, Dubai police established 
special patrols in areas frequented by prostitutes in an effort to 
control the phenomenon.
    Most women play a subordinate role in this family-centered society 
because of early marriages and traditional attitudes about women's 
activities and are allowed full ownership only of tailor shops and 
beauty parlors. Husbands may bar their wives and children from leaving 
the country (see Section 2.d.), and a married woman may not accept 
employment without her husband's written consent. Islamic law is 
applied in cases of divorce. Courts usually grant custody to the father 
regardless of the child's age in divorce cases. In most cases involving 
children under the age of 7 years, the mother is granted temporary 
custody, which then reverts to the father at the age of 7 years. Older 
children live with their fathers unless judicial authorities decide 
otherwise. A woman who remarries forfeits her right to the custody of 
children from a previous marriage. Islamic law permits polygyny.
    Women are restricted from holding majority shares in most 
businesses. A woman's property is not commingled with that of her 
husband. Women who work outside the home do not receive equal benefits, 
such as housing, and may face discrimination in promotion. In June 
1995, the Cabinet provisionally extended paid maternity leave for 
citizen women in the private sector to 3 months at full pay, an 
increase from 45 days, and up to 1 year's leave at half pay and a 
second year's leave at quarter pay.
    Opportunities for women have grown in government service, 
education, private business, and health services. According to 
government figures, 19.4 percent of the country's work force in 1995 
was female. The Federal Government publicly has encouraged women to 
join the work force, ensuring public sector employment for all who 
apply. According to the available statistics, women constitute 100 
percent of nursery school teachers, 55 percent of primary school 
teachers, 65 percent of intermediate and secondary school teachers, 
54.3 percent of health care workers, and 39.8 percent of all government 
employees. Cultural barriers and the lack of economic necessity have 
limited female participation. A symposium promoting the rights of women 
in the labor force was held in 1996. Participants called forincreasing 
rights granted to women including the elimination of the requirement 
that a husband give approval before his wife may work.
    Women continue to make rapid progress in education. They constitute 
over 75 percent of the student body at the National University in Al-
Ain, largely because women, unlike men, rarely study abroad. In 1998 
the Government established Zayid University, a second state-run 
university, with campuses in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, exclusively for 
women.
    Women officially are encouraged to continue their education, and 
government-sponsored women's centers provide adult education and 
technical training courses. The Federal armed forces accept female 
volunteers, who may enroll in a special training course that was 
started after the Gulf War. The Dubai Police College recruits women, 
many of whom are deployed at airports, immigration offices, and women's 
prisons. Over 200 women have graduated from the College so far.
    The law prohibits cohabitation by unmarried couples. The Government 
may imprison and deport noncitizen women if they bear children out of 
wedlock. In the event that the courts sentence women to prison for such 
an offense, local authorities hold the newborn children in a special 
facility until the mother's release and deportation. Children may 
remain in this facility longer in the event of a custody dispute. In 
Dubai Emirate, unmarried pregnant women must marry the father of the 
child; both parties are subject to arrest for fornication.
    Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children. 
Children who are citizens receive free health care and education, and 
are ensured housing. A family also may be eligible to receive aid from 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare for sons and daughters who are 
under the age of 18, unmarried, or disabled. There is no pattern of 
societal child abuse.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no federal legislation 
requiring accessibility for the disabled. However, the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs sponsors centers that provide facilities and 
services to the disabled. Services range from monthly social aid funds, 
special education, and transportation assistance, to sending a team to 
the Special Olympics.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Discrimination based on 
national origin, while not legally sanctioned, is prevalent (see 
Section 2.d.). Employment, immigration, and security policy, as well as 
cultural attitudes towards foreign workers, are conditioned by national 
origin.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--There are no unions and no strikes. 
The law does not grant workers the right to organize unions or to 
strike. Foreign workers, who make up the bulk of the work force, risk 
deportation if they attempt to organize unions or to strike.
    Since July 1995, the UAE has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation insurance programs because of the 
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker 
rights standards.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law does 
not grant workers the right to engage in collective bargaining, and it 
is not practiced. Workers in the industrial and service sectors 
normally are employed under contracts that are subject to review by the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The Ministry of Interior's 
Naturalization and Immigration Administration is responsible for 
reviewing the contracts of domestic employees as part of residency 
permit processing. The purpose of the review is to ensure that the pay 
satisfies the employee's basic needs and secures a means of living. For 
the resolution of work-related disputes, workers must rely on 
conciliation committees organized by the Ministry of Labor and Social 
Affairs or on special labor courts.
    Labor laws do not cover government employees, domestic servants, 
and agricultural workers. The latter two groups face considerable 
difficulty in obtaining assistance to resolve disputes with employers. 
While any worker may seek redress through the courts, this process puts 
a heavy financial burden on those in lower income brackets.
    In Dubai's Jebel Ali Free Zone, the same labor laws apply as in the 
rest of the country.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is illegal and not practiced. However, some unscrupulous 
employment agents bring foreign workers to the country under conditions 
approaching indenture. The Government prohibits forced and bonded child 
labor and enforces this prohibition effectively. In July authorities 
acting on information provided by the Pakistani Embassy, located and 
repatriated an 8-year-old Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped 
to work as a camel jockey. Police reportedly are investigating several 
such cases; however, no charges were filed by year's end (See Sections 
6.d. and 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Labor regulations prohibit employment of persons under the 
age of 15 and have special provisions for employing those 15 to 18 
years of age. The Department of Labor enforces the regulations. Other 
regulations permit employers to engage only adult foreign workers. In 
1993 the Government prohibited the use of children under the age of 15 
as camel jockeys and of jockeys who do not weigh more than 99 pounds. 
The Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these rules. 
However, many sources report that a significant number of camel jockeys 
are children under the minimum employment age (see Section 6.f.). 
Relevant labor laws often are not enforced, as those who own racing 
camels and employ the children come from powerful local families that 
are in effect above the law. In 1998 a local newspaper reported the 
hospitalization of a 5-year-old, 44-pound (20-kilogram), abandoned 
Bangladeshi child who had been used as a jockey and whose leg had been 
broken by a camel. Reports of underage camel jockeys continued to 
surface in the local press during the year. In July authorities, acting 
on information provided by the Pakistani Embassy, located and 
repatriated an 8-year-old Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped 
to work as a camel jockey. In August a 4-year-old boy from Bangladesh 
who had been used as a camel jockey was found wandering in the desert 
after being abandoned there by his handlers. Police reportedly are 
investigating several of these cases; however, no charges were filed by 
year's end. Otherwise, child labor is not permitted. The Government 
prohibits forced and bonded child labor and generally enforces this 
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.). The Government does not 
issue visas for foreign workers under the age of 16 years. Education is 
compulsory through the intermediate stage, approximately the age of 13 
or 14 years.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated or 
administrative minimum wage. Supply and demand determine compensation. 
However, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, there 
is an unofficial, unwritten minimum wage rate that would afford a 
worker and family a minimal standard of living. The Labor and Social 
Affairs Ministry reviews labor contracts and does not approve any 
contract that stipulates a clearly unacceptable wage (see Section 
6.b.).
    The standard workday and workweek are 8 hours per day, 6 days per 
week; however, these standards are not enforced strictly. Certain types 
of workers, notably domestic servants, may be obliged to work longer 
than the mandated standard hours. The law also provides for a minimum 
of 24 days per year of annual leave plus 10 national and religious 
holidays. In addition manual workers are not required to do outdoor 
work when the temperature exceeds 112 degrees Fahrenheit.
    Most foreign workers receive either employer-provided housing or 
housing allowances, medical care, and homeward passage from their 
employers. Most foreign workers do not earn the minimum salary of 
$1,090 per month (or $817 per month, if a housing allowance is provided 
in addition to the salary) required to obtain residency permits for 
their families. Employers have the option to petition for a 6-month ban 
from the work force against any foreign employee who leaves his job 
without fulfilling the terms of his contract.
    The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 
municipalities, and civil defense units enforce health and safety 
standards. The Government requires every large industrial concern to 
employ a certified occupational safety officer. An injured worker is 
entitled to fair compensation. Health standards are not observed 
uniformly in the housing camps that are provided for foreign workers. 
Workers' jobs are not protected if they remove themselves from what 
they consider to be unsafe working conditions. However, the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs may require employers to reinstate workers who 
were dismissed for not performing unsafe work. All workers have the 
right to lodge grievances with Ministry officials, whomake an effort to 
investigate all complaints. However, the Ministry is understaffed and 
underbudgeted; complaints and compensation claims are backlogged.
    Rulings on complaints may be appealed within the Ministry and 
ultimately to the courts. However, many workers choose not to protest 
for fear of reprisals or deportation. The press periodically carries 
reports of abuses suffered by domestic servants, particularly women, at 
the hands of some employers. Allegations have included excessive work 
hours, nonpayment of wages, and verbal and physical abuse.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically 
trafficking in persons; however, child smuggling is a crime.
    There have been reports in recent years that underage boys are 
smuggled into the country and used as camel jockeys. For example, in 
1998 a local newspaper reported the hospitalization of a 5-year-old, 
44-pound, abandoned Bangladeshi child who had been used as a jockey and 
whose leg had been broken by a camel. Reports of underage camel jockeys 
continued to appear in the local press during the year. In July 
authorities, acting on information provided by the Pakistani Embassy, 
located and repatriated an 8-year-old Pakistani boy who allegedly had 
been kidnaped to work as a camel jockey. In August a 4-year-old boy 
from Bangladesh who had been used as a camel jockey was found wandering 
in the desert after being abandoned there by his handlers. There were 
reports that in some instances, South Asian boys, generally from 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, were smuggled into the country by small, 
organized groups. Police reportedly are investigating several of these 
cases; however, no charges were filed by year's end.
    In 1993 the Government prohibited the use of children under the age 
of 15 as camel jockeys and of jockeys who do not weigh more than 99 
pounds. The Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these 
rules. However, many sources report that a significant number of camel 
jockeys are children under the minimum employment age. Relevant labor 
laws often are not enforced, as those who own racing camels and use the 
children come from powerful local families that are in effect above the 
law.
    Although no accurate statistics are available, substantial numbers 
of women appear to be arriving from the states of the former Soviet 
Union for temporary stays during which they engage in prostitution and 
possibly other activities connected with organized crime. Substantial 
numbers of prostitutes also appear to come from Africa and South Asia 
(see Section 5).
                                 ______
                                 

                                 YEMEN

    The Republic of Yemen, comprising the former (northern) Yemen Arab 
Republic (YAR) and (southern) People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(PDRY), was proclaimed in 1990. Following a brief but bloody civil war 
in mid-1994, the country was reunified under the Sana'a-based 
government. Ali Abdullah Saleh is the President and leader of the 
General People's Congress (GPC). He was elected by the legislature to a 
5-year term in 1994, and was elected to another 5-year term in the 
country's first nation-wide direct presidential election in September, 
winning 96.3 percent of the vote. The Constitution provides that the 
President be elected by popular vote from at least two candidates 
endorsed by Parliament, and the election was generally free and fair; 
however, there were some problems, including the lack of a credible 
voter registration list. In addition the President was not opposed by a 
truly competitive candidate because the candidate selected by the 
leftist opposition did not receive the minimum number of votes required 
to run from the GPC-dominated Parliament (the other opposition party 
chose not to run its own candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). 
The President's sole opponent was a member of the GPC.
    The first Parliament elected by universal adult suffrage was 
convened in 1993. Parliamentary elections were held again in 1997, with 
the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), formerly the main party of the PDRY 
and a previous coalition partner of the GPC, leading an opposition 
boycott. The GPC won an absolute majority in the 1997 Parliament, with 
Islaah the only other major party represented. International observers 
judged the elections as reasonably free and fair, while noting some 
problems with the voting. The Parliament is not yet an effective 
counterweight to executive authority, although it increasingly 
demonstrates independence from the Government. Real political power 
rests with the executive branch, particularly the President. The 
judiciary is nominally independent, but is weak and severely hampered 
by corruption, executive branch interference, and the frequent failure 
of the authorities to enforce judgments.
    The primary state security apparatus is the Political Security 
Organization (PSO), which reports directly to the President. It is 
independent of the Ministry of Interior. The Criminal Investigative 
Department (CID) of the police conducts most criminal investigations 
and makes most arrests. The Central Security Organization (CSO), a part 
of the Ministry of Interior, maintains a paramilitary force. The 
civilian authorities do not maintain effective control of the security 
forces. Members of the security forces, particularly the PSO, committed 
numerous, serious human rights abuses.
    Yemen is a very poor country, and over 40 percent of the population 
live in poverty. Its embryonic market-based economy, despite a major 
economic reform program, remains impeded by excessive government 
interference and endemic corruption. Its annual per capita gross 
national product (GNP) fell from $325 in 1997 to $260 in 1998, but rose 
to $275 in 1999. Agriculture accounts for approximately 22 percent of 
GNP, industry for approximately 27 percent, and services for 
approximately 51 percent. Oil is the primary source of foreign 
exchange. Other exports include fish, agricultural products, cotton, 
and coffee. Remittances from citizens working abroad (primarily in 
Saudi Arabia) are also important. Remittances were reduced sharply 
after Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States expelled up to 850,000 Yemeni 
workers during the Gulf War because of the Government's lack of support 
for the U.N. coalition. The Gulf states also suspended most assistance 
programs, and much Western aid was reduced. Foreign aid has begun to 
reemerge as an importance source of income. The unemployment rate is 
estimated at 40 percent, and is highest in the southern governorates, 
where, prior to unity, most adults were employed by the PDRY 
Government.
    The Government's human rights record continues to be poor. There 
are significant limitations on citizens' right to change their 
government. There were instances of extrajudicial killing by some 
members of the security forces. Members of the security forces tortured 
and otherwise abused persons, and continued to arrest and to detain 
citizens arbitrarily, especially oppositionists in the south and other 
persons regarded as ``secessionists.'' Prison conditions are poor and 
some detainees were held in private prisons not authorized by the 
Government. PSO officers have broad discretion over perceived national 
security issues. Despite constitutional constraints, they routinely 
monitor citizens' activities and search their homes, detain citizens 
for questioning, and mistreat detainees. In fact security forces 
sometimes countermand orders from the President and the Interior 
Ministry. The Government failed to hold members of the security forces 
accountable for abuses, although it investigated three security 
officers, subsequently convicted them of torturing a prisoner to death, 
fired them from their positions, and sentenced them to prison. 
Prolonged pretrial detention is a serious problem, and judicial 
corruption, inefficiency, and executive interference underminedue 
process. The Government continued to implement a comprehensive, long-
term program for judicial reform, but its effect is not yet clear. The 
Constitution limits freedom of speech and of the press, and the 
Government frequently harassed, intimidated, and detained journalists. 
Journalists practice self-censorship. The Government at times limits 
freedom of assembly. The Government imposes some restrictions on 
freedom of religion. There were some limits on freedom of movement. 
Violence and discrimination against women are problems. Female genital 
mutilation is practiced on a limited scale, primarily along the coastal 
areas of the Red Sea. Although the practice is discouraged publicly, 
the authorities do not prohibit it. Discrimination against the disabled 
and racial and ethnic minorities, and to a lesser extent, religious 
minorities, is a problem. The Government influences labor unions. Child 
labor is a problem.
    However, the Government continued to take some steps to address 
human rights problems. These steps included holding of the country's 
first direct presidential election, implementing limited political and 
legal reforms, displaying official receptiveness to and support for 
donor-funded democracy and human rights programs, and convicting three 
security officials for human rights abuses. In June the Government 
hosted the first Emerging Democracies Forum, a major international 
conference of 16 democratizing countries.
    At the invitation of the authorities, delegations from the U.N. 
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) and Amnesty International (AI) visited 
Yemen in 1998 to observe the human rights situation and make 
recommendations. One NGO, Penal Reform International (PRI), conducted a 
series of prison reform-related events from September 1998 to February. 
The Government continued to implement a comprehensive, long-term 
program for judicial reform.
    A campaign of bombings--the devices sometimes were little more than 
noise bombs--continued throughout the year, particularly in the 
southern governorates, although at a far lower rate than in previous 
years. Observers attribute the bombings to tribal disputes, religious 
extremists, and antigovernment political groups based in the country 
and abroad.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces 
committed a number of extrajudicial killings. There were no reports 
that security forces killed or injured persons at checkpoints during 
the year, as had been reported in previous years.
    In March forces from the paramilitary police Central Security Unit 
(CSU) under the command of Ahmed Nasser al-Dahiri used excessive force 
when they intervened to settle a land dispute in the village of Sa'eed 
in Al-Baida governorate. The incident began after local police 
intervened on behalf of one party and a police officer was killed. The 
police claim that the officer was killed by villagers; the villagers 
claim that he was a victim of the police's random firing into the 
crowd. Later that day, heavily armed CSU reinforcements arrived and 
occupied the village for 8 days (see Section 1.c.).
    There was credible evidence that security forces killed a prisoner 
in detention in late 1997 or early 1998. Wadia al-Shaibani, a 22-year-
old arrested in connection with the July 1997 bombings in Aden, 
apparently died after suffering a beating at the Soleyban police 
facility in Aden. Government authorities declined to investigate; they 
claimed that al-Shaibani committed suicide. The 1996 case of a YSP 
activist who died in police custody remained unresolved. The youth had 
been arrested following his participation in a peaceful demonstration 
in Mukallah. No member of the security forces has been charged in 
connection with his death. The Human Rights Committee of the 
Consultative Council (an advisory board to the President) in 1998 
investigated the death of Wadia al-Shaibani; however, it was unable to 
persuade the authorities to investigate the death or to bring charges 
against security officials.
    In July a court in Tawila in Al-Mahweet governorate convicted the 
town's security chief and two police officers of first-degree murder 
for torturing to death a teenager taken into their custody on theft 
charges in March. All three officials were fired. The security chief 
was sentenced to 10 years in jail and fined $19,000 (YR 93,000,000) in 
compensation to thevictim's family. The two police officers each were 
sentenced to 5 years in jail.
    In June 1998, the President established a committee to study the 
phenomenon of revenge killings and to make recommendations on how to 
combat that problem. There was no news on the committee's work or its 
findings at year's end.
    Tribal violence resulted in a number of killings and other abuses, 
and the Government's ability to control tribal elements remained 
limited. In addition tensions between the Government and various tribes 
periodically escalate into violent confrontations (see Section 5).
    Persons continued to be killed and injured in unexplained bombings 
and shootings that occurred during the year. In most cases, it was 
impossible to determine who was responsible for such acts or why they 
occurred, and there were no claims of responsibility. The Government 
accused southern oppositionists of perpetrating some incidents, but the 
opposition denied any involvement. Some cases appeared to have 
criminal, religious, or political motives; others appeared to be cases 
of tribal revenge or land disputes. In August four persons were killed 
in a massive explosion, which destroyed Sana'a's largest supermarket.
    On December 28, 1998, a group of 16 western tourists was kidnaped 
by terrorists in Abyan governorate near Mudiyah. The next day, 
government forces surrounded the area and attempted a rescue operation. 
Four of the hostages and three of the terrorists were killed. There 
were varying reports as to whether the government forces inadvertently 
killed any of the hostages in the crossfire. However, at least two 
apparently were shot deliberately by the kidnapers. The Government has 
stated that its decision to intervene was based on its belief that the 
hostages' lives were in immediate danger. The trial of the four 
surviving terrorists including Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) leader 
Zein Al-Abidine Al-Mihdar (also known as Abu Hassan) began in January, 
and in May they were found guilty. Abu Hassan, who during his trial 
publicly and repeatedly admitted to all charges against him, a second 
Yemeni, Abdallah Al-Jundaydi, and a Tunisian were sentenced to death; 
the remaining defendant was sentenced to 20 year's imprisonment. The 
Tunisian's sentence was commuted to 20 years at the first appellate 
review, and the Supreme Court in October commuted Al-Jundaydi's 
sentence to 20 years as well. However, Abu Hassan's death sentence was 
upheld by the Supreme Court in October and approved by President Saleh. 
He was executed by firing squad on October 17. There were no 
allegations of lack of due process in Abu Hassan's trial or during the 
subsequent appeal process. The trial of seven additional AAIA members 
on terrorism charges began in October, but it had not concluded by 
year's end (see Section 1.e.).
    b. Disappearance.--Members of the security forces continue to 
arrest and detain citizens for varying periods of time without charge 
or notification to their families. Many detainees are associated with 
the YSP or other opposition parties and are accused of being 
``secessionists.'' Most such disappearances are temporary, and 
detainees typically are released within weeks or months.
    Following an April 1998 opposition demonstration in which two 
persons were killed, the authorities rounded up and detained a large 
number of demonstrators. The security forces released 14 of the 
detainees late in the next month. Other demonstrators were released 
soon thereafter. Later in 1998, the Hadramaut primary court announced 
that a trial would begin in the case of several oppositionists for 
their role in the violence, including Hassan Ba Oum, the leader of the 
YSP in Hadramaut governorate and head of the opposition coordination 
council; however, no trial was held. Ba Oum's whereabouts were unknown 
after the April 1998 demonstrations, and there were reports that he had 
disappeared during police custody. These reports turned out to be 
false. Ba Oum remained in seclusion for most of the year, communicating 
periodically with the press. In October he turned himself in to the 
Mukallah prosecutor's office. He was detained for questioning and 
released 5 days later without charges being placed against him.
    In 1998 at the invitation of authorities, delegations from the 
UNHRC and AI visited the country to investigate the whereabouts of 
persons who have ``disappeared'' in custody since unification. In 1997 
the Government had promised AI that it would look into 27 cases of 
persons who died after they reportedly ``disappeared'' while in 
government custody during the violence associated with the civil war in 
1994. In its follow-up report issued in July, AI criticized the 
Government for not keeping this promise. The Government claims that it 
responded to AI and passed the results of its investigations to the 
UNHRC, but that the information AI provided was inadequate for 
effective investigation and conclusive action. AI has received no 
credible reports of disappearances in the last 5 years. Both the U.N. 
Committee onDisappearances and AI also continue to allege that there 
were hundreds of unresolved disappearances dating from the pre-union 
period in the former PDRY, particularly from its 1986 civil war. The 
Government asserts that it cannot be held responsible for cases that 
took place within the former PDRY prior to unity; however, it has set 
up a computer database in the Ministry of Foreign Relations to track 
disappearances, including those dating from the preunity period.
    Some tribes seek to bring their political and economic concerns to 
the attention of the Government by kidnaping and holding hostages. 
Victims include 21 foreign businessmen, diplomats, and tourists (12 
men, 7 women, and 2 children), as well as a much higher number of 
citizens. The legal magazine al-Qistas, in a 1998 study that it 
conducted on 159 kidnapings perpetrated since unity, found that Sana'a, 
Marib, and Shabwa are the areas where a foreigner is most likely to be 
kidnaped. Kidnaping victims rarely are injured, and the authorities 
generally have been successful in obtaining the negotiated release of 
foreign hostages. However, kidnapings continue in part because the 
judiciary fails to impose sentences against accused kidnapers. 
Moreover, some families linked to kidnapings also are politically or 
tribally prominent or have links with such tribes. In most cases the 
kidnapings are settled out of court, with no suspects facing trial.
    In August 1998, the Government issued by presidential decree a law 
that stipulated severe punishments up to and including capital 
punishment for persons involved in kidnaping, murder, and banditry. 
Persons charged with helping a foreign state or gang in a kidnaping or 
theft by force face sentences of 10 to 15 years, subject to doubling if 
the instigators are military officers or otherwise employed by the 
state. The law was implemented for the first time in Taiz in late 1998, 
when a man was tried under the new law, convicted, and executed.
    In October the Government announced the establishment of a special 
court in Sana'a and a Special Prosecutor to investigate and quickly try 
those accused of kidnaping foreigners, sabotaging oil pipelines, 
``carjacking,'' and other acts of sabotage.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution is ambiguous on its prohibition of cruel 
or inhuman punishment; however, members of the security forces tortured 
and otherwise abused persons in detention. Arresting authorities are 
known to use force during interrogations, especially against those 
arrested for violent crimes. Detainees sometimes are confined in leg-
irons and shackles, despite the passage of a law in 1998 outlawing this 
practice.
    The Government has acknowledged publicly that torture takes place 
but has claimed that the use of torture is not government policy. 
Nevertheless, the Government has not taken effective steps to end the 
practice or to punish those who commit such abuses. A government 
prosecutor has cited illiteracy and lack of training among police and 
security officials as reasons for the persistence of the use of undue 
force in prisons.
    In April Sana'a municipality police arrested Naji Saleh Al-Khowlani 
for his alleged involvement in a car theft ring. Al-Khowlani was held 
for 2 months, during which time he reportedly was tortured during 
regular nightly interrogation sessions in which prison officials would 
attempt to elicit a confession and extract information by burning him 
with a cigarette lighter. A medical report documented burn marks and 
other injuries on Al-Khowlani's body.
    In July a court convicted three security force officials of murder 
for torturing a teenager to death (see Section 1.a.).
    The eight Britons and two Algerians arrested in December 1998 for 
possession of illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to commit 
terrorist acts in Aden claimed during their trial during the year that 
they had been tortured; two of them claimed that they had been abused 
sexually (see Section 1.e.).
    The trial of seven additional AAIA members on terrorism charges 
began in October. Two of the defendants are being tried in absentia, 
one has admitted to some of the charges against him, and the remaining 
four pled not guilty and claim that the prosecution coerced and 
tortured them into making self-incriminating statements and confessions 
(see Section 1.e.). The judge issued a ruling prohibiting the 
publication of details about the trial.
    In 1998 several individuals on trial in Aden in connection with a 
series of bombings in 1997 testified publicly that they had been 
tortured. One defendant claimed that he had been raped while in 
custody. There is credible evidence that one other person arrested in 
connection with the same bombings died as a result of beatings 
inflicted by security officials. Accordingto eyewitnesses who also 
claimed to have been tortured, Wadia al-Shaibani was first beaten in a 
criminal security office in Aden, then transferred to the Soleyban 
police facility, were he was tortured to death (see Section 1.a.). No 
charges have been filed.
    In a related case in 1998 in which 31 persons were accused of 
conspiracy in Mahra governorate in 1997, several of the suspects 
claimed that they had confessed only because they had been tortured. 
Defense attorneys asserted the existence of films that would prove 
their clients' allegations that they had been beaten, and asked the 
judge to view the films. The judge denied this request. In late October 
1998, the court sentenced three of the defendants to death, found one 
innocent, and sentenced the others to jail for periods ranging from 6 
to 10 years (see Section 1.e.).
    Some cases of torture by security officials have been referred to 
the courts. In July three officials were convicted of torturing a 
teenager to death (see Section 1.a.). In November 1998, three officers 
from the Criminal Investigation Department of the Interior Ministry 
were arrested, tried, and convicted of torturing Khaled Abdul-Bari al-
Qadhi, a witness in a family dispute case. One of the officers, Hisham 
al-Ghazali, head of the Interior Ministry's antiterrorism unit, had 
been implicated in the abuse of defendants in the 1997 Aden bombing 
case. However, in January President Saleh commuted the sentences of all 
three officers.
    Police used excessive force in March when they intervened to settle 
a land dispute in the village of Sa'eed in Al-Baida governorate. 
Heavily armed CSU forces occupied the village for 8 days. During this 
period, they evicted residents from their homes, looted villagers' 
property and livestock, vandalized the village school and mosque, and 
filled a small pond that was the village's only source of drinking 
water with rocks. Many villagers, including the other party to the land 
dispute, fled into the mountains. CSU officers detained eight villagers 
until residents that they considered fugitives from justice 
surrendered.
    Police also used excessive force and abused their authority in 
other instances. In May two soldiers were killed and several armed 
citizens were injured in 2 days of intense fighting between security 
personnel and citizens in the village of Quradah in Taiz governorate. 
The confrontation began when armed villagers attempted forcibly to 
prevent the carrying out of orders reportedly given by Colonel Abdullah 
Al-Qadhi, commander of the Taiz military headquarters, that well water 
in Quradah be shared with citizens in the neighboring village of Al-
Marzah. Al-Qadhi had no jurisdiction over water allocation, which is a 
civil matter. Security personnel used artillery, bazookas, and heavy 
battle equipment to put down the armed protest.
    Constitution may be interpreted as permitting amputations in 
accordance with Shari'a (Islamic law). There have been no reports of 
amputations since 1991. However, a small number of persons who have 
been found guilty of theft and sentenced to amputation remain in jail 
awaiting the implementation of their sentences. The Shari'a-based law 
permits physical punishment such as flogging for minor crimes (for 
example, the penalty for the consumption of alcohol is 80 lashes). The 
law also provides for the ritual display in public of the bodies of 
executed criminals. The ostensible purpose of this practice is to 
demonstrate to the families of victims that justice has been served and 
to prevent blood feuds between tribes. In August the bodies of two men 
executed for raping and then murdering an 11-year-old boy were 
displayed publicly in Dhamar governorate.
    Prison conditions are poor and do not meet internationally 
recognized minimum standards. Prisons are overcrowded, sanitary 
conditions are poor, and food and health care are inadequate. Inmates 
depend on relatives for food and medicine. Many inmates lack mattresses 
or bedding. Prison authorities often exact money from prisoners and 
refuse to release prisoners until family members pay a bribe. Tribal 
leaders misuse the prison system by placing ``problem'' tribesmen in 
jail, either to punish them for noncriminal indiscretions or to protect 
them from retaliation or violence motivated by revenge. Refugees, 
persons with mental problems, and illegal immigrants sometimes are 
arrested without charge and placed in prisons alongside criminals.
    Conditions are equally poor in women's prisons, where children are 
likely to be incarcerated along with their mothers. By custom and 
preference, babies born in prison generally remain in prison with their 
mothers. The law requires male members of the families of female 
prisoners to arrange their release; however, female prisoners regularly 
are held in jail past the expiration of their sentences because their 
male relatives refuse to authorize their release due to the shame 
associated with their alleged behavior. Female prisoners sometimes are 
subjected to sexual harassment and violent interrogation by male police 
and prison officials.
    In April the chairman of Sana'a governorate's prosecutor's office, 
Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba, inspected several illegal prisons operated by 
the Sana'a governor's office and sent his findings to the Attorney 
General. According to Al-Shaiba's findings, 19 individuals had been 
imprisoned beyond their legal sentence; several prisoners were being 
detained in handcuffs illegally; numerous individuals were being 
detained illegally in connection with civil or commercial cases or 
because they had disobeyed a tribal sheikh; and 43 persons from 1 
region (Shibam Al-Gharas) were being detained on the same charge 
(shooting at a truck). Al-Shaiba informed the Attorney General that he 
had requested then-Sana'a governor Naji Al-Sufi to release the 
illegally imprisoned individuals, but that the governor had taken no 
action. In July Al-Shaiba reported being harassed by then-governor Al-
Sufi. The Attorney General took no action on the findings of the 
inspection report. Al-Shaiba took a voluntary leave of absence from his 
post and subsequently was transferred to the Judicial Inspection Unit 
in the Attorney General's office. Governor Al-Sufi was relieved of his 
post in October (see Section 1.e.).
    Government participated in a series of events from September 1998 
to February that were conducted by Penal Reform International (PRI), 
with support from a foreign embassy and the Taiz-based Human Rights 
Information and Training Center. These included a 2-day seminar on 
penal reform and a week-long prison management training session in 
which officials from five prisons participated. The final event of the 
program, a wrap-up session that would have brought the participants 
together to compare notes and evaluate progress, could not take place 
because of unspecified problems that arose between the Government and 
PRI. However, donor-government relations on prison reform remain good. 
The Ministry of Interior has expressed interest in further cooperation 
but has indicated a preference for working with experts with direct 
experience in prison management.
    The Government tightly controls access to detention facilities by 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), although it sometimes permits 
local and international human rights monitors access to persons accused 
of crimes. The PSO also does not permit access to its detention 
centers. The Government claims that it does not hold political 
prisoners.
    Early in the year, the Supreme National Committee for Human Rights 
visited Sana'a central prison and, after finding that minors were being 
incarcerated with adults, arranged for them to be incarcerated 
separately in two age groups, 11 to 14 years of age and 15 to 18 years 
of age. In October 50 juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an 
orphanage run by the Ministry of Social Affairs where they are to 
attend school and participate in other activities (see Sections 4 and 
5). The Committee also initiated a project to build, with the support 
of local businessman, the country's first youth reformatory (see 
Section 4).
    The Human Rights Committee of the Consultative Council continued to 
conduct spot checks of prisons and to arrange for the expeditious 
release of persons held improperly.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides due 
process safeguards; however, security forces arbitrarily arrest and 
detain persons. Enforcement of the law is irregular and in some cases 
nonexistent, particularly in cases involving security offenses. 
According to the law, detainees must be arraigned within 24 hours of 
arrest or be released. The judge or prosecuting attorney must inform 
the accused of the basis for the arrest and decide whether detention is 
required. In no case may a detainee be held longer than 7 days without 
a court order. Despite these constitutional and other legal provisions, 
arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without charge are common 
practices.
    During the year, there was a significant increase in the number of 
incidents in which journalists were detained briefly for questioning 
concerning articles that they wrote that were critical of the 
Government or that the Government considered sensitive (see Section 
2.a.).
    The law provides detainees with the right to inform their families 
of their arrests and to decline to answer questions without an attorney 
present. There are provisions for bail. In practice many authorities 
abide by these provisions only if bribed. Defense lawyers claimed that 
the eight Britons and two Algerians arrested in December 1998 for 
possessing illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to commit 
terrorist acts in Aden (see Section 1.e.) were denied their right to 
legal counsel. They also contended that defense doctors were not 
allowed to examine their clients in order to investigate allegations of 
torture and sexual abuse until several months later. The trial 
concluded in August, although according to the law, the violation of 
the right to counsel should have suspended the case.
    Citizens regularly complained that security officials did not 
observe due process procedures when arresting and detaining suspects, 
particularly those accused of involvement in the bombings and 
explosions that continued to occur in the south during the year. 
Security forces sometimes detained demonstrators (see Section 2.b.). In 
August then-governor of Sana'a Naji al-Sufi reportedly ordered the 
arrest of Hafed Fadhil, a lawyer representing the opposing party in a 
case involving one of the governor's friends. In September he illegally 
detained Judge Mohammed Saad Amer, a member of the Sana'a appeals 
court, for 2 days (see Section 1.e.).
    In cases where a criminal suspect is at large, security forces 
sometimes detain a relative while the suspect is being sought. The 
detention may continue while the concerned families negotiate 
compensation for the alleged wrongdoing. Arbitration, rather than the 
court system, commonly is used to settle cases.
    The Government has failed to ensure that detainees and prisoners 
are incarcerated only in authorized detention facilities. The Ministry 
of Interior and the PSO operate extrajudicial detention facilities. A 
large percentage of the total prison population consists of pretrial 
detainees. Thousands of persons have been imprisoned for years without 
documentation concerning charges against them, their trials, or their 
sentences.
    While a few cases of those being held without charge have been 
redressed through the efforts of local human rights groups (and a few 
illegally detained prisoners released), the authorities have done 
nothing to investigate or resolve these cases.
    Unauthorized, private prisons also exist in tribal areas, where the 
Government exercises little authority. Persons detained in these 
prisons often are held for strictly personal reasons and without trial 
or sentencing.
    The Government does not use forced exile. However, at the end of 
the 1994 civil war, the Government denied amnesty to the 16 most senior 
leaders of the armed, secessionist Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY) 
who fled abroad. Although they were not forced into exile, they are 
subject to arrest if they return. The trial of the so-called ``16'' 
concluded in March 1998 (see Section 1.c.).
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
``autonomous'' judiciary and independent judges; however, the judiciary 
is not fully independent, is weak and severely hampered by corruption, 
executive branch interference, and the frequent failure of the 
authorities to enforce judgments. Judges are appointed by the executive 
branch, and some have been harassed, reassigned, or removed from office 
following rulings against the Government. For example there are 
credible reports that during the year that the presidential appointee, 
then-governor of Sana'a, Naji al-Sufi, repeatedly interfered with and 
attempted to intimidate members of the judiciary, especially judges who 
made rulings that he did not like. In May he ordered police to surround 
the house of and arrest Judge Mohammed Bin Ali Luqman, head judge on 
the Haraz court in Sana'a governorate. In July he harassed the chairman 
of Sana'a governorate's prosecutor's office, Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba, 
after Al-Shaiba reported to the Attorney General that the governor's 
office was running illegal prisons (see Section 1.c.). In August he 
instructed armed guards to bring Hafed Fadhil, a lawyer representing 
the opposing party in a case involving one of the governor's friends, 
to the governorate's illegal jail, where he was assaulted by Al-Sufi 
and detained for the rest of the day. In September governor Al-Sufi 
detained Judge Mohammed Saad Amer, a member of the Sana'a appeals 
court, for 2 days. Governor Al-Sufi was relieved of his post in 
October, but no legal action was taken against him. Many litigants 
maintain, and the Government acknowledges, that a judge's social ties 
and susceptibility to bribery sometimes have greater influence on the 
verdict than the law or the facts of the case. Many judges are poorly 
trained, and some closely associated with the Government often render 
decisions favorable to it. The judiciary is hampered further by the 
Government's frequent reluctance to enforce judgments.
    There are five types of courts: criminal; civil (for example, 
divorce and inheritance); administrative; commercial; and military.
    All courts are governed by Shari'a. There are no jury trials under 
Shari'a. Criminal cases are adjudicated by a judge who plays an active 
role in questioning witnesses and the accused. By law the Government 
must provide attorneys for indigent defendants. However, in practice 
this never occurs; neither the Criminal Code nor the judicial budget 
allows for defense attorneys.
    By law prosecutors are a part of the judiciary and independent of 
the Government. However, in practice prosecutors look upon themselves 
as an extension of the police. They do not receive the normal judicial 
training that judges do, nor do they practice their legal obligation to 
penalize police who delay reporting arrests and detentions.
    Defense attorneys are allowed to counsel their clients, address the 
court, and examine witnesses. Defendants, including those in commercial 
courts, have the right to appeal their sentences. Trials are public. 
However, all courts may conduct closed sessions ``for reasons of public 
security or morals.'' Foreign litigants in commercial disputes have 
complained of biased rulings. However, some foreign companies have won 
cases against local defendants and seen the decisions enforced.
    In addition to regular courts, the law permits a system of tribal 
adjudication. The results of such mediation carry the same weight as 
court judgments. Persons jailed under the tribal system usually are not 
charged formally with a crime.
    Prior to unification, approximately half of the judges working in 
southern Yemen were women. However, after the 1994 civil war, 
conservative leaders of the judiciary reassigned many southern female 
judges to administrative or clerical duties. Although two female judges 
continue to practice in Aden, there are no female judges in northern 
courts.
    The Government continued the program it began in late 1997 to 
reform the judiciary. This comprehensive, long-term reform program 
intended to improve the operational efficiency and statutory 
independence of the judiciary by putting reform-minded personnel into 
the courts; forming an inter-ministerial council to oversee the reform 
project; publishing a judicial code of ethics; and making the Supreme 
Court smaller, more efficient, and less corrupt. Foreign donors have 
offered to provide assistance in implementing judicial reform, which 
the Government has accepted. However, the reform program's effect is 
not yet clear, and there were no major developments during the year.
    In February a U.N. Development Program team visited the country to 
conduct an assessment that would serve as the basis of a second 
judicial reform program, which was scheduled to begin in January 2000 
and end in 2002. In March the team noted the Government's willingness 
to address longstanding issues of accountability and transparency, and 
to implement laws more effectively. The program's goals are to 
modernize Ministry of Justice equipment, improve the country's legal 
libraries, provide special training for the Attorney General's office, 
enhance public awareness of the rule of law, and secure a building for 
the Supreme Court. At year's end, the proposed program had not been 
funded.
    Other judicial reform programs financed by international assistance 
are intended to focus on the Ministries of Justice and of Legal and 
Parliamentary Affairs and finance training in business and commercial 
law for judges; a diagnostic study of judicial education curriculum; 
training on drafting of legislation; and a review of the country's 
commercial laws to identify and fix gaps or inconsistencies. At year's 
end, no date was scheduled for the program to begin.
    The security services made several arrests, brought charges, and 
put on trial a number of persons alleged to be linked to various 
shootings, explosions, bombings, and other acts of violence that 
continued throughout the year. Citizens and human rights groups alleged 
frequently that the judiciary was not observing due process standards 
in these cases.
    Arrested in December 1998, eight Britons and two Algerians were 
tried from February to August in Aden on charges of possessing illegal 
weapons and explosives and conspiring to commit terrorist acts. The 6-
month trial did not meet minimum international standards for due 
process. Defense lawyers claimed that the prosecution lacked adequate 
evidence and that the defendants were tortured, sexually abused, and 
denied access to their lawyers (see Section 1.c.). In early August, the 
court sentenced the main suspects, the 18-year-old stepson and 17-year-
old son of Islamic militant Abu Hamza al-Masri, to jail terms of 7 and 
3 years, respectively. Yemen has accused al-Mari, head of the London-
based organization Supporters of Shari'a, of involvement with the AAIA, 
which has carried out at least one terrorist act in Yemen. Five other 
defendants received jail terms ranging from 5 to 7 years. The seven 
defendants appealed the verdict. Two of the Britons received 7-month 
sentences and were ordered released for time served; another, for 
reasons of poor health, was ordered released for time served in early 
summer. Their release was delayed because both the defense and the 
prosecution appealed the verdicts. The Appeals Court upheld the 
verdicts, and the three were released. They returned to the United 
Kingdom in October.
    The trial of seven additional AAIA members on terrorism charges 
began in October. Two of the defendants are being tried in absentia, 
one has admitted to some of the charges against him, and the remaining 
four pled not guilty and claim that the prosecution coerced and 
tortured them into making self-incriminating statements and confessions 
(see Section 1.c.). The judge issued a ruling prohibiting the 
publication of details about the trial.
    The Government claims that it does not hold political prisoners. 
Local opposition politicians and human rights activists generally 
accept this claim; however, some international human rights groups and 
members of the opposition-in-exile dispute the claim.
    At the end of the 1994 civil war, the President pardoned nearly all 
had who fought against the central Government, including military 
personnel and most leaders of the unrecognized DRY. The Government 
denied amnesty to the 16 most senior leaders of the DRY (one of whom is 
now presumed dead), who fled abroad and who are subject to arrest if 
they return. In 1997 and 1998, the so-called ``16'' were tried in 
absentia on various charges including forming a secessionist 
government, conspiracy, and forming a separate military. All but two 
were found guilty, and in March 1998, a judge sentenced five of the 
defendants to death and three to 10 years in jail. Six persons received 
suspended sentences, and two were acquitted. Many opposition figures 
have urged the President to issue an amnesty for those who received 
sentences, in the interest of promoting reconciliation between north 
and south. The President has stated that it is up to the judicial 
system to pass judgment. Defense attorneys have appealed to a higher 
court. No judgment has yet been rendered.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Despite constitutional provisions against government 
interference with privacy, security forces routinely search homes and 
private offices, monitor telephones, read personal mail, and otherwise 
intrude into personal matters for alleged security reasons. Such 
activities are conducted without legally issued warrants or judicial 
supervision. Security forces regularly monitor telephone conversations 
and interfere with the telephone service of government critics and 
opponents. Security forces sometimes detain relatives of suspects (see 
Section 1.d.). Government informers monitor meetings and assemblies 
(see Section 2.b.).
    The law prohibits arrests between the hours of sundown and dawn. 
However, persons suspected of crimes sometimes are taken from their 
homes in the middle of the night, without search warrants.
    In March security forces occupied the village of Sa'eed in Al-Baida 
governorate evicted residents from their homes, looted villagers' 
property and livestock, and vandalized the village school and mosque 
(see Section 1.a.).
    Jews traditionally face social (but not legal) restrictions on 
their residence and their employment (see Section 5).
    According to a 1995 Ministry of Interior regulation, no citizen may 
marry a foreigner without Interior Ministry permission (see Section 5). 
This regulation does not carry the force of law, and appears to be 
enforced irregularly. However, some human rights groups have raised 
concerns about the regulation.
    An estimated 5,000 persons use the Internet and 3,540 persons 
subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions on 
Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions 
costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the 
Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service 
provider. According to Teleyemen (see Section 2.a.), the Government 
blocks sexually explicit websites; however, with the exception of 
mowj.com, which is the website of the Yemeni National Opposition Front 
(MOWJ), it does not block politically oriented websites. For example 
Abu Hamza's web page (see Section 1.e.) is not blocked. There are no 
indications that Internet usage is monitored by the Government, and 
there are no reports that it has ever taken action against Internet 
users.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution restricts freedom 
of speech and of the press ``within the limits of the law,'' and the 
Government influences the media and limits press freedom. Some security 
officials attempt to influence press coverage by threatening, 
harassing, and detaining journalists. Although most citizens are 
uninhibited in their private discussions of domestic and foreign 
policies, some are cautious in public, fearing harassment for criticism 
of the Government. The Press Law criminalizes ``the humiliation of the 
State, the Cabinet, or parliamentaryinstitutions,'' and the publication 
of ``false information'' that ``threatens public order or the public 
interest.
    The relative freedom of the press permitted between unification 
(1990) and the civil war (1994) has not been reestablished. An 
atmosphere of government pressure on independent and political party 
journals continues that was not present before the civil war. The 
international human rights group, the Committee to Protect Journalists, 
criticized the Government for restrictions, harassment, and arbitrary 
detention directed at journalists.
    The Ministry of Information influences the media by its control of 
most printing presses, by subsidies to certain newspapers, and by its 
ownership of the country's sole television and radio outlets. Only one 
newspaper, the thrice-weekly Aden independent Al-Ayyam, owns its own 
press. The Government selects the items to be covered in news 
broadcasts, and often does not permit broadcast reporting critical of 
the Government. However, during the presidential election campaign, the 
media extensively covered both candidates and reported in full the many 
critical comments made by the President's opponent. The Government 
televises parliamentary debates but may edit them selectively to delete 
criticism.
    In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for the 1990 Press 
Law. The new regulations specify, among other things, that newspapers 
must apply annually to the Government for licensing renewal, and that 
they must show continuing evidence of about $4,375 (YR 700,00) in 
operating capital. Some journalists welcomed the new regulations, 
saying that they were long overdue. Others claimed that they were 
designed to drive some opposition newspapers out of business.
    Although newspapers are allowed to criticize the Government, 
journalists sometimes censor themselves, especially when writing on 
such sensitive issues as government policies toward the southern 
governorates, relations with Saudi Arabia and other foreign 
governments, and official corruption. The penalties for exceeding these 
self-imposed limits can be arrest for libel, dismissal from employment, 
or extralegal harassment. Some journalists reported being threatened by 
security officials to change the tone and substance of their reporting. 
Journalists must have a permit to travel abroad, although enforcement 
of this restriction is irregular (see Section 2.d.).
    During the year there was a significant increase in incidents in 
which journalists were detained for questioning for short periods of 
time for writing articles that were critical of the Government or that 
the Government considered touched on sensitive subjects. For example, 
in 1 week in May, six newspapers (Yemen Times, Al-Ayyam, Al-Shoura, Al-
Thawri, Al-Wahdawi, and Al-Haq) were summoned to appear before the 
Special Media Court for violating the Press Law. However, most 
individual journalists and the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate acknowledge 
that there was a decrease during the year in incidents of extralegal 
governmental harassment.
    Beginning in late December 1998, the Ministry of Information closed 
the independent weekly newspaper Al-Ray Al-Amm for 5 months for 
publishing an article critical of the Government of Saudi Arabia. The 
newspaper reopened in May.
    From mid-December 1998 through late January, security officials in 
Marib detained Hassan al-Zaidi, a Yemen Times correspondent, and a 
German journalist who were investigating the kidnaping of a German 
citizen by tribesmen in the region.
    In February PSO officials detained Nu'man Qaid Seif, editor in 
chief of the opposition Al-Shoura newspaper, for 3 days on the charge 
of disseminating false information. Seif had written an editorial on 
corruption critical of President Saleh entitled ``The President Is 
Urged to Fight Corruption.''
    In February the Ministry of Information closed Al-Shoura newspaper, 
the newspaper of the Islamist opposition party Union of Popular Forces 
(UPF), as well as a new, competing version of the same newspaper. The 
second Al-Shoura appeared following an ideological split in the UPF. 
Under the Press Law, it is illegal for more than one newspaper to use 
the same name. Some journalists allege that the Government financed the 
second Al-Shoura in order to create a pretext to shut down the 
outspokenly critical original Al-Shoura. A court in April allowed the 
original Al-Shoura to resume publication and upheld the suspension of 
the second Al-Shoura, but in September an appeals court ordered the 
original newspaper to cease publication pending the Supreme Court's 
decision as to which faction had the right to Al-Shoura's name. At 
year's end the case remained unresolved.
    In March security officials imprisoned Abdul Latif Kutbi Omar, 
editor in chief of the opposition Rabeta Party-affiliated Al-Haq 
newspaper, for 4 days for publishing an article claiming that the 
Government had granted the United States the right to operate a 
military base on Socotra Island. Some journalistsreport that 
authorities suspect Omar of having links to the London-based 
secessionist leader Abdul-Rahman al-Jiffri, who fled Yemen in 1994 and 
who now heads the Yemeni National Opposition Front (MOWJ) (see Section 
1.e.).
    In May four masked armed men severely beat Saif al-Hadheri, the 
editor in chief of the independent weekly Al-Shumua. A few days prior 
to the assault, the newspaper published an editorial on corruption that 
directly criticized the Minister of Finance. The Yemeni Journalists 
Syndicate and the Committee to Protect Journalists called on the 
Minister of Interior to investigate the assault. However, a court 
determined that the issue was personal and dismissed the case.
    Also in May, the Ministry of Information threatened to close the 
Aden weekly Al-Ayyam, the largest-circulating newspaper in the country, 
after it published an editorial entitled ``Let's Talk about Unity from 
a Social Perspective,'' which criticized the structure of local 
government, whereby southern provinces are governed by officials from 
the north. The Ministry claimed that the editorial instigated 
``national feuds,'' separatism, and harmed national unity. Journalist 
Ali Haitham al-Ghareeb was arrested and held for 5 days. Editor Hisham 
Ba Sharahil was summoned by state prosecutors and questioned for 4 
hours. Ba Sharahil was charged with violating a January court order 
banning publication of court proceedings of the trial of a group of 
British nationals whom the Government alleged had conspired to commit 
acts of terrorism in Yemen; Al-Ayyam had published comments made by the 
defense lawyer to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Ghareeb 
was sentenced to a 10-month suspended prison term. Ba Sharahil received 
a 6-month suspended sentence and a $62.50 (YR 10,000) fine.
    In June the Government filed a case against Ahmen al-Ashwal, a 
journalist for Al-Wahdawi newspaper, for publishing an article about 
corruption in the selection of teachers at Sana'a University. He was 
fined $62.50 (YR 10,000).
    In June security forces arrested Hassan Bin Husainoon, a journalist 
with Al-Haq newspaper, for writing an article entitled ``In Hadramout 
there are Non-Unity Practices,'' which alleged that officials in 
Hadramout governorate discriminate among residents. In October a court 
suspended publication of Al-Haq for 1 month for inciting 
``sectarianism'' and ``regionalism,'' and fined editor Abdel Latif Al-
Kutbi $250 (40,000 riyals) and Husainoon and two other journalists, 
Ismail Al-Riashi and Abdullah Ilamadi, $62.50 (10,000 riyals).
    In August journalist and lawyer Nabil al-Amoudi was brought before 
the Abyan preliminary court for writing an article critical of the 
Government and the human rights situation in Yemen. The case still was 
pending at year's end, but al-Amoudi is not imprisoned.
    In August Jamal Ahmed Amer, editor of Al-Wahdawi newspaper and 
member of the opposition Nasserite Party, was detained and held 
incommunicado for 6 days for writing an article critical of Yemeni-
Saudi Arabian relations. The Minister of Interior personally questioned 
Amer by telephone. Al-Wahdawi's editor, Abdelaziz Sultan, also was 
called for questioning and interrogated personally by the Minister of 
Information. Amer has filed a suit against the Minister of Interior, 
which still is pending. Also in August, security officials detained 
Jamil al-Samit, a journalist for the Taiz-based official newspaper Al-
Jumhurriyah, for writing an article about the use of excessive force by 
the military in putting down a civilian protest in Quradah (see Section 
1.a.). He remains imprisoned in Taiz central prison.
    In September Al-Ayyam's editor Hisham Ba Sharahil twice was called 
to the Aden prosecutor's office for questioning. He first was called in 
connection to the publication in August of an interview with Islamic 
militant Abu Hamza al-Masri (see Section 1.e.), then was summoned a few 
days later, for publication in July of an opposition statement that 
allegedly misquoted the Koran.
    In October 1998, three journalists from Al-Thawri, the newspaper of 
the Yemen Socialist Party, were acquitted of all charges related to the 
case brought against them by the Sana'a prosecutor's office in relation 
to articles criticizing the Government.
    The editor of Al-Shoura, the newspaper of the Islamist opposition 
party UPF, stated in August that traditional mediation and a published 
apology effectively had ended the case brought against the newspaper by 
the Government in 1995. The case involved two journalists who had been 
found guilty of slander and character assassination against an 
important sheikh, a leader of the Islaah party. The judge ordered that 
the newspaper be closed and that the journalists be flogged with 80 
lashes, stopped from working for 1 year, and fined$625 (YR 100,000). 
The Ministry of Justice suspended this judgment while reviewing its 
conformity with law and judicial procedure.
    After he died in a traffic accident in June, the Special Media 
Court terminated the case that it had filed against Abdul Aziz al-
Saqqaf, the editor of the English-language weekly Yemen Times, for 
publishing a story questioning the disposition of government profits 
from oil exports. The Yemen Times requested that the case be continued, 
arguing that the charges involved the newspaper's journalism, not Al-
Saqqaf personally, but the judge sustained his ruling.
    The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate defends freedom of the press and 
publicizes human rights concerns. For example in September it sponsored 
a symposium on ``Media and Its Role in Spreading a Human Rights 
Culture.'' Critics claim that the Syndicate has too many nonjournalist 
members who support government policy. In the spring, several 
independent and opposition party journalists formed a rival union, the 
Committee for the Defense of Journalists, under the leadership of 
Hisham Ba Sharahil, the publisher of Al-Ayyam newspaper, to defend more 
vigorously journalists harassed by the Government.
    Customs officials confiscate foreign publications regarded as 
pornographic or objectionable because of religious or political 
content. The Ministry of Information routinely delayed the distribution 
of international Arabic-language dailies such as Al-Hayat and Al-Sharq 
Al-Awsat in an apparent effort to decrease their sales in the country. 
For several days in February, the Ministry banned sales of Al-Hayat 
because it published a threat from the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army against 
foreign ambassadors in Sana'a, and Al-Sharq Al-Awsat because it printed 
allegations that Yemen was providing arms to the Aideed faction in 
Somalia and supporting Eritrea in that country's war with Ethiopia.
    An author must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Culture to 
publish a book. Most books are approved, but the process is time-
consuming for the author. The author must submit copies of the book to 
the Ministry. Officials at the National Library must read and endorse 
the text. It then is submitted to a special committee for final 
approval. If a book is not deemed appropriate for publication, the 
Ministry simply does not issue a decision. Publishers usually do not 
deal with an author who has not yet obtained a permit.
    An estimated 5,000 persons use the Internet and 3,540 persons 
subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions on 
Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions 
costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the 
Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service 
provider. With the exception of mowj.com, the website of the Yemeni 
National Opposition Front, the Government does not block politically 
oriented websites (see Section 1.f.).
    Academic freedom is restricted somewhat because of the extreme 
politicization of university campuses. A majority of professors and 
students align themselves with either the ruling GPC party or the 
opposition Islaah party. Each group closely monitors the activities of 
the other. Top administrative positions usually are awarded to 
political allies of these two major parties.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There are no 
constitutional restrictions on the right to assemble peacefully; 
however, the Government limited this right in practice. The Government 
claims that it bans and disrupts some demonstrations to prevent them 
from degenerating into riots and violence. The Government requires a 
permit for these purposes, but it issues them routinely. Government 
informers monitor meetings and assemblies. Following the demonstrations 
of June and July 1998, the Government sent a draft law to Parliament in 
September 1998 that would impose significant limitations on the right 
to assemble and to demonstrate. The draft law was criticized by many 
lawyers, human rights activists, and members of Parliament. The 
Parliament continues to withhold action on this proposed law.
    In April security authorities banned a rally by the Yemeni 
Socialist Party in Al Dali governorate to commemorate the deaths of the 
two persons who were killed by police during violent demonstrations in 
Mukallah in April 1998. YSP leaders claimed the authorities banned the 
demonstration under the pretext that there is no law to regulate 
marches and demonstrations.
    In July police refused to allow students at Sana'a University to 
organize a demonstration to protest the university's system of 
administering examinations.
    There are no constitutional restrictions on the freedom of 
association, and the Government generally respects this right 
inpractice. Associations must obtain an operating license from the 
Ministry of Labor, usually a routine matter.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion, and although 
followers of other religions are free to worship according to their 
beliefs, the Government places some restrictions on religious practice; 
it bans proselytizing by non-Muslims and forbids conversions.
    Virtually all citizens are Muslims, either of the Zaydi branch of 
Shi'a Islam or the Shafa'i branch of Sunni Islam. There are also some 
Ismailis in the north. Private Islamic organizations may maintain ties 
to pan-Islamic organizations and operate schools, but the Government 
monitors their activities.
    Most Christians are foreign residents, except for a few families of 
Indian origin in Aden. There are several churches and Hindu temples in 
Aden, but no non-Muslim public places of worship exist in the former 
North Yemen. The Government does not allow the building of new non-
Muslim places of worship without permission. Church services are held 
regularly without harassment in private homes or facilities such as 
schools. However, security forces occasionally censor the mail of 
Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community, ostensibly to 
prevent proselytizing.
    Christian missionaries operate in Yemen and most are dedicated to 
the provision of medical services; others are employed in teaching and 
social services.
    Under Islam the conversion of a Muslim to another religion is 
considered apostasy, a crime punishable by death. There were no reports 
of cases in which the crime has been charged or prosecuted by 
government authorities.
    Nearly all of the country's once sizable Jewish population has 
emigrated. There are no legal restrictions on the few hundred Jews who 
remain, although there are traditional restrictions on places of 
residence and choice of employment (see Section 5).
    Following unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, owners of 
property previously expropriated by the Communist government of the 
former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, including religious 
organizations, were invited to seek restitution of their property. 
However, implementation of the process, including for religious 
institutions, has been extremely limited, and very few properties have 
been returned to any previous owner.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There were some limits on freedom of 
movement. In general the Government does not obstruct domestic travel, 
although the army and security forces maintain checkpoints on major 
roads. There were no reports that security forces killed or injured 
persons at checkpoints during the year, as had been reported in 
previous years (see Section 1.a.).
    In certain areas, armed tribesmen occasionally man checkpoints 
alongside military or security officials, and subject travelers to 
physical harassment, bribe demands, or theft.
    The Government does not obstruct routinely foreign travel or the 
right to emigrate and return. However, journalists must have a permit 
to travel abroad. Women must obtain permission from a male relative 
before applying for a passport or departing the country. Enforcement of 
the restrictions on journalists and women is irregular.
    Immigrants and refugees traveling within the country often are 
required by security officials at government checkpoints to show that 
they possess resident status or refugee identification cards.
    The law does not include provisions for granting refugee or asylee 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the 
Government has granted refugee status to some persons and resettled 
them.
    The Government in 1998 offered first asylum to 13,937 Somalis, who 
fled the fighting in that country. This brought the total number of 
registered Somali refugees in the country to 57,400. The Government 
also cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 
assisting refugees from Eritrea (2,500 persons), Ethiopia (2,600 
persons) and various other countries (150 persons). The Government 
permitted the UNHCR to monitor the situation of 2,000 Iraqis in Yemen.
    Approximately 47,300 Somali refugees have been integrated into 
society and are no longer receiving food or financial assistance from 
the UNHCR. However, they still are eligible for medicaltreatment at 
UNHCR facilities in Aden and Sana'a. Also, the UNHCR provides small 
loans to refugee women who wish to initiate income-generating 
activities.
    The UNHCR provides food and medical assistance for up to 10,500 
Somalis and Ethiopians in a temporary refugee camp at al-Jahin in Abyan 
governorate. Children receive schooling in the camp, and adults are 
eligible for vocational training. The Government in 1998 approved a new 
UNHCR facility to be built at a site in Lahaj governorate, and at 
year's end, it was under construction. The UNHCR, in coordination with 
the Government, issues identification cards to Somali refugees and 
recognized cases of other nationalities.
    The UNHCR reports that the Government consults with it prior to 
returning illegal immigrants to their countries of origin in order to 
avoid the involuntary repatriation of refugees with a credible fear of 
persecution. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a 
country where they feared persecution. The UNHCR facilitated the 
voluntary repatriation of some Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees, as well 
as the voluntary return of 1,659 Somali refugees to areas of Somalia 
that are considered safe.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government; however, there are significant limitations in practice. The 
Government is by law accountable to the Parliament; however, the 
Parliament is not yet an effective counterweight to executive 
authority. Decisionmaking and real political power still rest in the 
hands of the executive branch, particularly the President. In addition 
the Constitution prohibits the establishment of parties that are 
contrary to Islam, oppose the goals of the Yemeni revolution, or 
violate Yemen's international commitments.
    The President appoints the Prime Minister, who forms the 
Government. The Cabinet consists of 24 ministers. Parliament is elected 
by universal adult suffrage; the first such election was held in 1993.
    Ali Abdullah Saleh, the President and leader of the GPC, was 
elected to a 5-year term in the country's first nation-wide direct 
presidential election in September, winning 96.3 percent of the vote. 
The Constitution provides that the President be elected by popular vote 
from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and the election 
was generally free and fair; however, there were some problems, 
including the lack of a credible voter registration list. In addition 
the President was not opposed by a truly competitive candidate because 
the candidate selected by the leftist opposition coalition did not 
receive the minimum number of votes required to run from the GPC-
dominated Parliament (the other opposition party chose not to run its 
own candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). The President's sole 
opponent was a member of the GPC. There was no significant violence 
associated with the election.
    International observers judged the 1997 parliamentary elections as 
``reasonably free and fair'' despite some problems associated with the 
voting.
    The President has the authority to introduce legislation and 
promulgate laws by decree when Parliament is not in session. Decrees 
must be approved by Parliament 30 days after reconvening. In theory if 
a decree is not approved, it does not become law; in practice, a decree 
remains in effect unless it is later affirmatively rejected by 
Parliament. Although the Constitution also permits Parliament to 
initiate legislation, to date it has not done so. Parliament generally 
is relegated to debating policies that the Government already has 
submitted, although it sometimes successfully revises or opposes draft 
legislation submitted by the Government. Despite the fact that the 
President's party enjoys an absolute majority, Parliament has rejected 
or delayed action on major legislation introduced by the Government, 
and on occasion it has forced significant modification. The Parliament 
also has criticized strongly the Government for some actions, including 
the lifting of subsidies that led to widespread violence in June 1998. 
Ministers frequently are called to Parliament to defend actions, 
policies, or proposed legislation, and parliamentarians are sometimes 
sharply critical during these sessions. Parliamentarians and 
parliamentary staff attended foreign NGO-sponsored training workshops 
designed to increase their independence and effectiveness.
    The President is advised by the 58-member Consultative Council, a 
board of appointed notables chaired by a former prime minister. The 
Council advises the President on a range of issues but has no 
constitutional powers.
    Formal government authority is centralized in Sana'a; many 
citizens, especially in urban areas, complain about theinability of 
local and governorate entities to make policy or resource decisions. In 
some governorates, tribal leaders exercise considerable discretion in 
the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Central government 
authority in these areas is often weak.
    The multiparty system remains weak. The GPC dominates the 
Parliament, and Islaah is the only other party of significance. All 
parties must be registered in accordance with the political parties law 
of 1991, which stipulates that each party must have at least 75 
founders and 2,500 members. Some oppositionists contend that they 
cannot organize new parties because of the prohibitively high legal 
requirements on the minimum number of members and leaders. Twelve 
parties participated in the 1997 elections, compared with 16 in 1993. 
The YSP and several smaller parties boycotted the 1997 elections, 
leading to lower voter turnout in the south. These same parties also 
boycotted the country's first nationwide direct presidential election 
in September. There was no significant violence associated with this 
election.
    The Government provides financial support to political parties, 
including a small stipend to publish their own newspapers.
    Although women vote and hold office, these rights often are limited 
by cultural norms and religious customs; and women are underrepresented 
in Government and politics. Two women were elected to the Parliament in 
1997 (the same number as in 1993), and an increasing number hold senior 
leadership positions in the Government or in the GPC. Many Akhdam, a 
small ethnic minority that may be descendants of African slaves, are 
not permitted to participate in the political process, mainly due to 
their inability to obtain citizenship. There are no longer any credible 
reports that members of religious minorities are not permitted to 
participate in the political process.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The concept of local nongovernmental human rights organizations is 
relatively new, with the first groups forming only in the years since 
unification. Several groups held workshops and other activities during 
the year without government interference and often with government 
support.
    The Government cooperates with NGO's, although NGO's complain that 
there is a lack of response to their requests from government 
officials. The Government's ability to be responsive is limited in part 
by a lack of material and human resources. In 1998 the Government 
introduced a new draft law for regulating the formation and activities 
of NGO's. While more liberal than the law it is designed to replace, 
the proposal still contains significant limitations on such 
organizations. The Parliament again failed to take any action on the 
proposed new law during the year.
    Several new NGO's devoted to human rights education and 
democratization were formed during the year. The most notable among 
them are: Al Nushataa, or ``The Activists,'' a group formed by former 
members of the Yemeni Human Rights Organization, whose first activity 
was an art show on human rights at the French cultural center; the 
Organization of the Defense of Human Rights, a lawyers' group formed by 
the attorney and parliamentarian Mohamed Naji Alao; and the National 
Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development, an NGO formed in 
September by journalist Jamal Awadi. None of these groups is funded by 
the Government.
    The Taiz-based Human Rights Information and Training Center 
(HRITC), perhaps the country's most respected human rights NGO 
sponsored training workshops for other NGO's. Several donors have 
supported the HRITC. The HRITC, in cooperation with a foreign embassy, 
coordinated the series of events conducted by Penal Reform 
International from September 1998 to February (see Section 1.c.).
    The Yemeni Organization for the Defense of Liberties and Human 
Rights, the only NGO without government sponsorship that engages in 
human rights advocacy as such, is based in Aden. Although the 
organization continued to suffer from a lack of funds, it actively 
publicized human rights abuses, particularly in the south, and provided 
support to new human rights NGO's.
    In June 1998, Penal Reform International (PRI), a London-based NGO, 
conducted a fact-finding mission to Yemen. It identified several issues 
of concern, including the mistreatment of prisoners, lack of education 
and resources for prison officials, and unsanitary and overcrowded 
conditions. With the support of a foreign embassy and the HRITC, PRI 
organized prison management training workshops and other activities for 
prison and security officials from September 1998 to February.
    Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Parliament of the 
European Union, and the Committee to Protect Journalists observe the 
country closely. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
maintains a resident representative in Yemen. The Government has given 
these groups broad access to government officials, records, refugee 
camps, and prisons. The Government had acknowledged some abuses alleged 
in a 1997 AI report, and rejected other allegations. AI's follow-up 
report, issued in July, criticized the Government for not keeping its 
promise to investigate some of these abuses. The Government claims that 
it responded to AI, and passed the results of its investigations to the 
UNHRC, but that the information AI provided was inadequate for 
effective investigation and conclusive action.
    The Yemeni Human Rights Organization (YHRO) is a local human rights 
group headquartered in Sana'a with branches in seven other cities. It 
was founded by the Government, and oppositionists as well as some human 
rights experts have viewed its findings as not objective. The head of 
the YHRO, a member of the judiciary, was transferred from his post as 
head of the Sana'a Court of Appeals to the Dhamar Court of Appeals in 
1998. This was seen by some observers as a demotion or an attempt by 
the Government to marginalize the judge, who was seen as too 
independent on human rights questions.
    The Supreme National Committee for Human Rights, which was formed 
in 1997 and reports to the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, is mandated with ensuring that Yemen meets its obligations 
with respect to implementing international human rights conventions and 
to look into specific instances of abuse.
    In March the Government implemented a series of reforms to 
institutionalize and enhance the independence of the committee. These 
reforms included the establishment of a general coordinator position 
with the rank of Under Secretary; the addition of the Ministers of 
Information and of Labor and Vocational Training to the committee, the 
allocation of an independent budget and accounting unit, and the 
creation of an advisory commission that includes local legal experts, 
academics, and human rights activists.
    Early in the year, after visiting Sana'a central prison and finding 
that minors were being incarcerated with adults, the committee arranged 
for them to be incarcerated separately in two age groups, 11 to 14 
years of age and 15 to 18 years of age. In October 50 juvenile inmates 
were moved from the prison to an orphanage run by the Ministry of 
Social Affairs where they are to attend school and participate in other 
activities (see Sections 1.c. and 5). The Committee also initiated a 
project to build with the support of local businessman the country's 
first youth reformatory. In September committee officials traveled to 
several governorates to monitor the presidential elections. In October 
in the first training of its kind, the committee conducted a series of 
human rights workshops for police officers in Sana'a and several other 
governorates. The committee plans to continue its human rights training 
in 2000. The committee also is studying ways to address the problem of 
female prisoners being held longer than their terms.
    The committee views education to effect cultural change as its 
highest priority. To this end, it sought support from donors during the 
year for a project to make human rights a part of secondary school 
curriculums. The committee has been less active in looking into 
specific cases of abuse. Many persons alleged that it has not followed 
up on its stated commitment to investigate allegations of human rights 
abuses. For example in 1998 the committee declined to investigate the 
case of Wadia al-Shaibani, who reportedly died while in the custody of 
security forces in Aden (see Section 1.a.). Instead, it accepted the 
official coroner's report of death by suicide. The committee is 
hampered by a lack of human and material resources.
    The Human Rights Committee of the President's Consultative Council 
has had limited success in investigating human rights abuses. However, 
members of the Committee expressed frustration at the lack of 
subsequent action by the authorities. Its activities were affected 
deeply by the death of its chairman, Abdulaziz al-Saqqaf, in an 
automobile accident in March. The new chairman is Abu Bakr al-Qirby.
    A parliamentary human rights committee has investigated some 
reports of human rights abuses. It suffers from lack of official and 
financial support and has no authority except to issue reports.
    The Committee to Combat Torture is composed of 100 senior 
parliamentarians and party leaders, including some opposition members, 
but apparently was inactive during the year.
    The Center for Future Studies, a think tank affiliated with the 
Islaah Party, issues an annual report on human rights practices, 
providing a wide-ranging overview of human rights. There is little 
followup to the report.
    Two delegations from the UNHRC visited in late 1998. One delegation 
looked into what progress the Government had made on cases of 
``disappearances'' (see Section 1.b.). The other conducted an 
assessment of the Government's need for technical assistance, 
particularly for the Supreme National Committee on Human Rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal in general 
rights and duties,'' and that society ``is based on social solidarity, 
which is based on justice, freedom, and equality according to the law; 
however, discrimination based on race, sex, disability, and, to a 
lesser extent, religion, exists. Entrenched cultural attitudes often 
prevent women from enjoying equal rights.
    Women.--Although spousal abuse is reportedly common, it generally 
is undocumented. In Yemen's traditional society, an abused woman would 
be expected to take her complaint to a male relative (rather than the 
authorities), who should intercede on her behalf or provide her 
sanctuary if required. The press and women's rights activists only 
recently have begun to investigate or report on violations of women's 
rights. During the year, violence against women was the subject of at 
least two women's conferences and featured in a cover story of the 
human rights magazine, Al-Qistas.
    Women face significant restrictions on their role in society. The 
law, social custom, and Shar'ia discriminates against women. Men are 
permitted to take as many as four wives, although very few do so. By 
law the minimum age of marriage is 15. However, the law largely is not 
enforced, and some girls marry as early as age 12. In 1998 some 
conservative Members of Parliament attempted to eliminate the ``minimum 
age'' requirement on the grounds that parents should decide when their 
daughters are old enough to marry. Their draft law failed by a large 
majority. A 1998 draft law to raise the minimum age of marriage to 18 
also failed by a large majority. The law stipulates that the wife's 
``consent'' is required; ``consent'' is defined as ``silence'' for 
previously unwed women and ``pronouncement of consent'' for divorced 
women. The husband and the wife's ``guardian'' (usually her father) 
sign the marriage contract; in Aden and some outlying governorates, the 
wife also signs. The practice of bride price payments is widespread, 
despite efforts to limit the size of such payments.
    The law stipulates that the wife must obey the husband. She must 
live with him at the place stipulated in the contract, consummate the 
marriage, and not leave the home without his consent. Husbands may 
divorce wives without justifying their action in court. Women have the 
legal right to divorce; however, they must provide a justification such 
as nonsupport, impotence, or taking a second wife without her consent. 
Following a divorce, the family home and older children often are 
awarded to the husband. The divorced woman usually returns to her 
father's home, or to the home of another male relative. Her former 
husband must continue to support her for another 3 months, since she 
cannot remarry until she proves that she is not pregnant.
    Women who seek to travel abroad must obtain permission from their 
husbands or fathers to receive a passport and to travel. They also are 
expected to be accompanied by male relatives. However, enforcement of 
this requirement is irregular.
    Shari'a-based law permits a Muslim man to marry a Christian or 
Jewish woman, but no Muslim woman may marry outside of Islam. Married 
women do not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born 
spouses; however, they may confer citizenship on children born in Yemen 
of foreign-born fathers.
    According to a 1995 Interior Ministry regulation, any citizen who 
wishes to marry a foreigner must obtain the permission of the Ministry. 
A Yemeni woman wishing to marry a foreigner must present proof of her 
parents' approval to the Interior Ministry. A foreign woman who wishes 
to marry a Yemeni man must prove to the Ministry that she is ``of good 
conduct and behavior,'' and ``is free from contagious disease.'' There 
are no corresponding requirements for men to demonstrate parental 
approval, good conduct, or freedom from contagious diseases. Although 
the regulation does not have the force of law and is applied 
irregularly, some human rights groups have raised concerns about it.
    The Government consistently supports women's rights and the 
expansion of the public role of women. The President frequently speaks 
publicly about the importance of women's development. During the year, 
the Prime Minister mandated that all ministries must promote at least 
one woman to the director general level; at year's end only the Justice 
and Interior Ministries hadfailed to do so. Several ministries have 
several female director generals. With the Government's active support, 
bilateral and multilateral donors have initiated long-term (1994-2004) 
projects worth $31 million (YR 4.96 billion) aimed at advancing 
vocational education and reproductive health for women and girls.
    An estimated 76.3 percent of women are illiterate, compared with 
approximately 36.6 percent of men. The fertility rate is 6.7 children 
per woman. Most women have little access to basic health care. Only 
approximately 22 percent of births are attended by trained health-care 
personnel. Even where clinics are available, many women do not use them 
because their male relatives, or they themselves, refuse to allow a 
male doctor to examine them.
    In general women in the south, particularly in Aden, are better 
educated and have had somewhat greater employment opportunities than 
their northern counterparts. However, since the 1994 civil war the 
number of working women in the south appears to have declined, due not 
only to the stagnant economy but also to increasing cultural pressure 
from the north.
    The National Women's Committee (NWC), a government-sponsored semi-
independent women's association, promotes female education and civic 
responsibility. In September the NWC organized a highly publicized 
conference on women's role in the electoral process at which the 
President delivered the keynote address. There are numbers of recently 
formed NGO's working for women's advancement. These include the Social 
Association for Productive Families, which promotes vocational 
development for women; the Women and Children's Department of the 
Center for Future Studies, which organizes seminars and publishes 
studies on women and children; the Woman and Child Development 
Association, which focuses on health education and illiteracy; and the 
Yemeni Council for Motherhood and Childhood, which provides microcredit 
and vocational training to women.
    Children.--While the Government has asserted its commitment to 
protect children's rights, it lacks the resources necessary to ensure 
adequate health care, education, and welfare services for children. The 
United Nations Development Program estimates that 30 percent of 
children are malnourished. The infant mortality rate is 75 deaths per 
1,000 births, down from 105 in 1998.
    The law provides for universal free education for 9 years, which is 
compulsory, but this provision is not enforced. Many children, 
especially girls, do not attend primary school. According to UNICEF's 
``Report on Children and Women in Yemen: 1998'' (released in 
September), an estimated 45 percent of primary school-age children 
(ages 6 to 15) do not attend school. Some rural areas have no schools 
for their school-age population. In 1998 to encourage girls' attendance 
at school, Parliament passed a law that eliminated school fees and the 
requirement of uniforms for girls. According to the UNICEF report, 
enrollment of girls in school increased by 4 percent in 1998, but 
enrollment of boys declined 10 percent because older boys from poor 
families left school to work.
    Early in the year, after visiting Sana'a Central Prison and finding 
that minors were being incarcerated with adults, the Supreme National 
Committee for Human Rights arranged for them to be incarcerated 
separately in two age groups, 11 to 14 years old and 15 to 18 years 
old. In October 50 juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an 
orphanage run by the Ministry of Social Affairs where they can attend 
school and participate in other activities (see Sections 1.c. and 4). 
The Committee also initiated a project to build with the support of 
local businessman the country's first youth reformatory (see Section 
4).
    Child marriage is common in rural areas. Although the law requires 
that a girl be 15 to marry, it is not enforced, and marriages of girls 
as young as age 12 occur. Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is 
widely condemned by international health experts as damaging to both 
physical and psychological health, is practiced by some citizens. 
According to a 1997 demographic survey conducted by the Government, 
nearly one-fourth (23 percent) of women who have ever been married have 
been subjected to FGM. However, the prevalence of the practice varies 
substantially by region. Citizens of African origin or those living in 
communities with heavy African influence are more likely to practice 
FGM. For example according to the survey, approximately 69 percent of 
women living in coastal areas were subjected to FGM, compared with 15 
percent in mountainous regions, and 5 percent in the plateau and desert 
regions. The procedure is confined mainly to excision, with 
infibulation being practiced only among East African immigrants and 
refugees. FGM rarely is reported among the Shaf'ai religious sect, and 
adherents to the Zaydi sect reputedly do not practice it at all. The 
Government's publication of the data on FGM was an important first step 
in addressing this problem;however, while some government health 
workers and officials actively and publicly discouraged the practice, 
the Government has not passed legislation to outlaw it nor have local 
women's groups adopted the problem as a major concern.
    People with Disabilities.--Persons with mental and physical 
disabilities face distinct social prejudices, as well as discrimination 
in education and employment. In 1998 the Government mandated acceptance 
of disabled students in schools, exempted them from paying tuition, and 
required that schools be made more accessible to disabled students, but 
it is unclear to what extent these new laws have been implemented. 
There is no national law mandating the accessibility of buildings for 
the disabled. Some disabled persons are reduced to begging to support 
themselves. Mentally ill patients, particularly those who commit 
crimes, are imprisoned and even shackled when there is no one to care 
for them. Persons with mental problems sometimes are arrested without 
charge and placed in prisons alongside criminals (see Section 1.c.). 
The ICRC, in cooperation with the Yemeni Red Crescent Society, built 
and now staffs separate detention facilities for mentally disabled 
prisoners. These facilities are located in Sana'a, Ibb, and Taiz, and 
collectively can care for a population of 300 persons.
    The Handicapped Society, the country's largest NGO involved in 
assisting the disabled, was founded in 1988 and has branches in 13 
governorates. Funded by international donors (primarily the Swedish 
organization Radda Barnen) and a modest annual grant from the 
Government, the Handicapped Society provides rehabilitation assistance 
and vocational training, and sponsors cultural and sports activities 
for disabled persons. The Ministry of Education has assigned three 
teachers to teach students at the disabled-accessible classrooms at the 
Society's Sana'a branch. Believing that the needs of disabled women 
were not being addressed adequately by the Handicapped Society, 
activists in 1998 established with government support the Challenge 
Society. The Challenge Society provides 85 disabled females between the 
ages of 6 and 30 with medical care, support services, and vocational 
training.
    Religious Minorities.--Apart from a small but undetermined number 
of Christians and Hindus in Aden, Jews are the only indigenous 
religious minority. Their numbers have diminished significantly--from 
several tens of thousands to a few hundred--due to voluntary 
emigration. Although the law makes no distinction, Jews traditionally 
are restricted to living in one section of a city or village and often 
are confined to a limited choice of employment, usually farming or 
handicrafts. Jews may, and do, own real property.
    Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community are employed 
in teaching, social services, and health care. Occasionally the 
security authorities harass such clergy by censoring their mail, 
ostensibly to prevent proselytizing (see Section 2.c.). In July 1998, a 
gunman murdered three nuns belonging to the Sisters of Charity order in 
Hodeidah. The Government immediately arrested the individual, who the 
Government declared was deranged. No trial was held and the person was 
incarcerated in a psychiatric facility. The attack did not appear to be 
part of an organized campaign against Christians or foreigners.
    A hospital in Jibla operated by the Baptist Church has experienced 
occasional threats and harassment from local Islamic extremists who 
feared that the hospital might be used to spread Christianity. There 
have been no reports of threats by extremists in several years.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Yemenis with a non-Yemeni 
parent, called ``muwalladin,'' sometimes face discrimination in 
employment and in other areas. Persons who seek employment at Sana'a 
University or admission to the military academy must by law demonstrate 
that they have two Yemeni parents. Nonetheless, many senior government 
officials, including Members of Parliament and ministers, have only one 
Yemeni parent. In some cases, naturalization of the non-Yemeni parent 
is sufficient to overcome the ``two-Yemeni parent'' requirement.
    A small group of persons claiming to be the descendants of ancient 
Ethiopian occupiers of Yemen, who later were enslaved, are considered 
the lowest social class. Known as the ``Akhdam'' (servants), they live 
in squalor and endure persistent social discrimination.
    There were reports by human rights groups that some immigrants of 
African origin were having difficulty in securing Interior Ministry 
permission to marry Yemeni citizens. An Interior Ministry regulation 
requires that marriages of citizens andforeigners be approved in 
advance by the Ministry (see also Section 1.f.).
    Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the year, and the 
Government's ability to control tribal elements responsible for 
kidnapings, shootings, and other acts of violence remained limited. A 
prominent sheikh was killed in Sana'a in April, reportedly in 
connection with a tribal revenge case dating to 1962 between the Abu 
Nashtan and Al-Faqih tribes. In May an estimated 250 tribesmen from the 
Hashid and Redaa tribes stormed Hodeidah central prison, where 
authorities had detained an individual responsible for igniting a blood 
feud between the two tribes. In July tribesmen from the Haraz tribe 
blocked the Sana'a-Hodeida road, kidnaping drivers and seizing six 
trucks belonging to the rival Jaham tribe. Also in July, tribesmen from 
the Al-Ahwaj tribe attempted to kill the commander of the Army Corps of 
Engineers, who is a member of the rival Abu Luhum tribe. The Hashid and 
Khowlan tribes are involved in an ongoing violent feud in which several 
persons have been killed. Tensions, which periodically escalate into 
violent confrontations, continue between the Government and the Khowlan 
and other tribes in Marib.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that 
citizens have the right to form unions. While the Government permits 
this right in practice, it also seeks to place its own personnel in 
positions of influence inside unions and syndicates. The 1995 Labor Law 
(amended in 1997) provides both for the right to form unions and for 
the right to strike. However, a strike is not allowed unless a dispute 
between workers and employers is ``final'' and ``incontestable'' (a 
prior attempt must have been made to settle through negotiation or 
arbitration). The proposal to strike must be submitted to at least 60 
percent of all concerned workers, of whom 25 percent must vote in favor 
of the proposal. Strikes for explicit ``political purposes'' are 
prohibited. In practice the law tends to discourage strikes. The law 
provides equal labor rights for women, and it confirms the freedom of 
workers to associate. The Labor Law does not stipulate a minimum 
membership for unions, nor does it limit them to a specific enterprise 
or firm. Thus, citizens may associate by profession or trade.
    The Yemeni Confederation of Labor Unions (YCLU) remains the sole 
national umbrella organization. The YCLU claims 350,000 members in 15 
unions and denies any association with the Government, although it 
works closely with the Government to resolve labor disputes through 
negotiation. Observers suggest that the Government likely would not 
tolerate the establishment of an alternative labor federation unless it 
believed it to be in its best interest.
    By law civil servants and public sector workers, and some 
categories of farm workers, may not join unions. Only the General 
Assembly of the YCLU may dissolve unions.
    There were no strikes during the year.
    The YCLU is affiliated with the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions 
and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1995 Labor 
Law provides workers with the right to organize and bargain 
collectively. The Government permits these activities; however, it 
seeks to influence them by placing its own personnel inside groups and 
organizations. All collective bargaining agreements must be deposited 
with and reviewed by the Ministry of Labor; such agreements exist. 
Unions may negotiate wage settlements for their members and can resort 
to strikes or other actions to achieve their demands.
    The law protects employees from antiunion discrimination. Employers 
do not have the right to dismiss an employee for union activities. 
Employees may appeal cases of antiunion discrimination to the Ministry 
of Labor. Employees also may take a case to the labor courts, which 
often are disposed favorably toward workers, especially if the employer 
is a foreign company.
    There are no export processing zones in operation; an EPZ is 
planned for Aden.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of its 
practice. The law does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by children 
specifically, but such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Child labor is common, especially in rural areas. Many 
children are required to work in subsistence farming because of the 
poverty of their families. Even in urban areas, children work in stores 
and workshops, sell goods on the streets, and beg. The law does not 
prohibit forced or bonded labor by children specifically, but such 
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
    The established minimum age for employment is 15 in the private 
sector and 18 in the public sector. By special permit, children between 
the ages of 12 and 15 may work. The Government rarely enforces these 
provisions, especially in rural and remote areas. The Government also 
does not enforce laws regarding 9 years of compulsory education for 
children and many school-aged children work instead of attending 
school, particularly where schools are not available.
    The results of the 1994 national census showed that 231,655 
children between the ages of 10 and 14 years, or 6.5 percent of all 
children in that age group, were working. Experts believe that the 
number has increased since 1994.
    After voting in support of the International Labor Organization's 
(ILO) basic agreement in May, the Consultative Council adopted the 
ILO's Child Labor Strategy to address persistent child labor problems. 
A special council, under the leadership of the Minister of Labor, uses 
the strategy as a government-wide guideline for enforcing existing 
child labor laws and formulating and implementing new laws.
    The Ministry of Labor occasionally inspects factories in the major 
population areas. Ministry officials state that they lack the resources 
to enforce child labor laws more effectively. However, since a great 
percentage of the country's underage work force is in the agricultural 
sector in remote rural areas, it is difficult for the Government to 
protect most child workers.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no established minimum 
wage for any type of employment. The Labor Law states that ``it shall 
not be permissible that the minimal level of the wage of a worker 
should be less than the minimal wages of government civil servants.'' 
According to the Ministry of Labor, the average minimum wage of civil 
servants for 1994-95 was approximately $50 to $62 (yr 8,000 to 10,000) 
per month. Private sector workers, especially skilled technicians, do 
far better. The average wage does not provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and family. A combination of inflation, the loss of 
government-provided subsidies, and a decline in the exchange value of 
the national currency continued to erode wages.
    The law specifies a 40-hour workweek with a maximum 8-hour workday, 
but many workshops and stores operate 10 to 12-hour shifts without 
penalty. The workweek for government employees is 35 hours: 7 hours per 
day Saturday through Wednesday.
    The Ministry of Labor has the responsibility for regulating 
workplace health and safety conditions. The requisite legislation for 
regulating occupational health is contained in the Labor Law, but 
enforcement is nonexistent. Many workers regularly are exposed to toxic 
industrial products and develop respiratory illnesses. Some foreign-
owned companies implement higher health, safety, and environmental 
standards than the Government requires. Workers have the right to 
remove themselves from dangerous work situations and can challenge 
dismissals in court.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in 
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, 
or from the country.
                               SOUTH ASIA

                              ----------                              


                             AFGHANISTAN *

    Afghanistan continued to experience civil war and political 
instability for the 20th consecutive year. There was no functioning 
central government. The Pashtun-dominated ultra-conservative Islamic 
movement known as the Taliban controlled about 90 percent of the 
country, including the capital of Kabul, and all of the largest urban 
areas. A Taliban edict in 1997 renamed the country the Islamic Emirate 
of Afghanistan, with Taliban leader Mullah Omar as Head of State and 
Commander of the Faithful. There is a six-member ruling council in 
Kabul, but ultimate authority for Taliban rule rested in Mullah Omar, 
head of the inner Shura (Council), located in the southern city of 
Kandahar. Former President Burhanuddin Rabbani claimed to be the head 
of the Government and controlled most of the country's embassies abroad 
and retained Afghanistan's United Nations seat after the U.N. General 
Assembly deferred a decision on Afghanistan's credentials another time 
in December. Rabbani and his military commander, Ahmed Shah Masood, 
both Tajiks, also maintained control of some largely ethnic Tajik 
territory in the country's northeast. Masood's forces were within 
rocket range of Taliban-held Kabul until late July when the Taliban 
summer offensive pushed Masood's forces out of the Shomali plain, north 
of Kabul. Commander Masood and commanders under the United Front for 
Afghanistan (UFA), also known as the Northern Alliance, defended the 
last of the territories held by the Northern Alliance in the north and 
center of the country from Taliban attacks. The U.N. Special Envoy to 
Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, engaged in extensive discussions with the 
Afghan parties and other interested nations until his resignation in 
the fall. A group of representatives from the six nations bordering 
Afghanistan plus the United States and Russia met in Tashkent, 
Uzbekistan in July to seek an end the conflict. During the year, a 
process to convene a Loya Jirga, or Grand Assembly of traditional 
leaders, which was focused around former King Zahir Shah and based in 
Rome, slowly began to take shape. A number of provincial 
administrations maintained limited functions, but civil institutions 
were rudimentary. There is no countrywide recognized constitution, rule 
of law, or independent judiciary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * The U.S. Embassy in Kabul has been closed for security reasons 
since January, 1989. Information on the human rights situation is 
therefore limited.
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    The Taliban remained the country's primary military force.
    Taliban members committed numerous serious human rights abuses in 
areas they occupied.
    Agriculture, including high levels of opium poppy cultivation, was 
the mainstay of the economy. During the year, Afghanistan became the 
largest opium producer in the world. Lack of resources and the war have 
impeded reconstruction of irrigation systems, repair of market roads, 
and replanting of orchards in some areas. The presence of millions 
landmines and unexploded ordnance throughout the country has restricted 
areas for cultivation and slowed the return of refugees who are needed 
to rebuild the economy. There was some laying of new mines during the 
year, primarily by the Northern Alliance. Trade was mainly in opium, 
fruits, minerals, and gems, as well as goods smuggled to Pakistan. 
There were rival currencies, both very inflated. Formal economic 
activity remained minimal in most of the country, especially rural 
areas, and was inhibited by recurrent fighting and by local commanders' 
roadblocks in non-Taliban controlled areas. The country is also 
dependent on international assistance. Per capita income, based on 
World Bank figures, is about $280 per year. Reconstruction was 
continuing in Herat, Kandahar, and Ghazni, areas that are under firm 
Taliban control. Areas outside of Taliban control suffered from 
brigandage.
    The overall human rights situation was extremely poor, and the 
Taliban continued to commit serious human rights violations. Citizens 
were precluded from changing their government or choosing their leaders 
peacefully. Taliban forces reportedly were responsible for political 
and other extrajudicial killings, including targeted killings, mass 
killings, summary executions, and deaths in custody. There were 
allegations that Taliban forces were responsible for disappearances. 
Prison conditions were poor. Summary justice was common. The Taliban 
imposed strict and oppressive order by means of stiff punishments for 
crimes in the areas that they controlled. The Taliban's Islamic courts 
and religious police, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and 
Suppression of Vice (PVSV), enforced their ultra-conservative 
interpretation of Islamic law. They set punishments such as public 
executions for adultery or murder, and amputations of one hand and one 
foot for theft. For lesser infractions, Taliban militiamen often judged 
accused offenders and meted out punishments, such as beatings, on the 
spot. The Taliban arbitrarily arrested and detained persons and 
infringedon citizens' privacy rights. The United Nations reported in 
August that the Taliban used a scorched earth policy during its summer 
offensive, including the burning of homes, the killing of livestock, 
the uprooting of orchards, and the destruction of irrigation systems 
(see Section 1.g.). Many civilians were relocated forcibly by the 
Taliban during the offensive. Taliban forces were responsible for the 
indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas. Civil war conditions and 
the unfettered actions of competing factions effectively limited the 
freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association. Freedom of religion 
is restricted severely and Taliban members vigorously enforced their 
interpretation of Islamic law. Freedom of movement is also limited. 
Years of conflict have left approximately 258,600 citizens as 
internally displaced persons, while more than 2.6 million of the 
country's population of approximately 25.8 million live outside the 
country as refugees. Although the continued fighting has discouraged 
many refugees from returning to their country, approximately 96,700 
returned voluntarily with U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
assistance during the year. All factions have harassed domestic and 
international NGO's.
    The human rights situation for women was extremely poor. Violence 
against women remained a problem throughout the country. Women and 
girls were subjected to rape, kidnaping, and forced marriage, 
particularly in areas outside of Taliban control. Taliban restrictions 
against women and girls remained widespread, institutionally 
sanctioned, and systematic. The Taliban imposed strict dress codes and 
prohibited women from working outside the home except in limited 
circumstances in the health care field and in some humanitarian 
assistance projects. The treatment of women and girls in Taliban 
controlled areas improved slightly. Although girls were prohibited 
formally from attending school, several organizations were able to run 
elementary schools and home schools with girls in attendance despite 
the formal prohibition. Nonetheless, there was widespread and widely 
accepted societal discrimination against women and girls throughout the 
country. The Taliban detained persons because of their ethnic origins. 
Worker rights were not defined. Child labor persists. There were 
reports that the Taliban used forced labor.
    Masood's forces and the Northern Alliance members committed 
numerous, serious abuses. Masood's forces continued sporadic rocket 
attacks against Kabul. Anti-Taliban forces bombarded civilians 
indiscriminately. Various factors infringed on citizens' privacy 
rights. Armed units of the Northern Alliance, local commanders, and 
rogue individuals were responsible for political killings, abductions, 
kidnapings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, and looting.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, IncludingFreedom 
        From:
     a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Taliban forces 
committed a large number of political and other extrajudicial killings, 
both within the country and in the refugee community in Pakistan. 
According to press reports, on January 21, members of the Taliban 
killed six persons in Khost when they tried to ban a traditional game. 
The local population requested reparations for the deaths. On May 19, 
the Taliban reported an attempted uprising in the western city of 
Herat; the Taliban stated that eight persons were executed in 
connection with the incident. The Northern Alliance claimed that over 
50 persons were executed by the Taliban.
    On May 9, the Taliban recaptured Yakaolang, in Bamiyan province. 
According to reports received by Amnesty International (AI), persons 
who remained in the town after its recapture in May later were targets 
of systematic killings by the Taliban. Hundreds of men reportedly were 
taken away and killed (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). On May 9, the 
Taliban also recaptured Bamiyan, which previously had changed hands 
several times. There were reports that the Taliban carried out summary 
executions upon entering the city. Estimates of the number of civilians 
allegedly killed varies widely, but Amnesty International reported that 
hundreds of men, and in a few instances women and children, were 
separated from their families and taken away (see Sections 1.b. and 
1.g.).
    During the summer, the combat between the Taliban and the Northern 
Alliance intensified. On July 28, the Taliban launched a major military 
offensive. It was reinforced by 2,000 to 5,000 recruits, many of them 
non-Afghans and some below the age of 14. This offensive led to the 
capture of most of the Shomali Plainsup to the entrance of the Panjshir 
Valley. Dozens of noncombatants were killed in a deliberate manner, 
according to Amnesty International. Combatants from neighboring 
countries who joined the Taliban forces reportedly contributed to an 
increase in the level of atrocities against civilians, particularly 
against women (see Section 1.g). In the Bagram area, several groups of 
male civilians, ranging from 9 to 23 persons, reportedly were killed by 
the Taliban.
    According to Amnesty International, over a dozen detainees died 
while in Taliban custody between early 1998 and early 1999. They 
include two former Nangarhar University lecturers and U.N. agency staff 
workers Pohandoy Mohammad Nazir Habibi and Pohanmal Mohammad Hashem 
Basharyar. Habibi and Basharyar were active in Afghan intellectual 
circles seeking peace through political means. The two men reportedly 
were forced into a car in July 1998 by members of the provincial 
internal security office. Their bodies were found several days later. 
Other detainees reportedly have died in a similar fashion, including 
Dagarwal Agha Mohammad, Sher Mohammad, General Solhmal, Abdul Ghani, 
Ghadim Shah, and Mohammad Khan Tudai. According to AI, Taliban 
officials arrested these persons, all of whom took active roles in 
discussions of options for a political settlement. Several days to one 
month after arrest, the bodies of these persons were discovered, often 
bearing signs of torture, in a field or hanging from tree.
    According to an October 1998 report, members of the Turkmen 
community also have been arrested by the Taliban, tortured, and killed 
in detention, including Agha Mohammad Doktor, a Turkmen military 
commander, and Abdul Manan, a respected religious leader from the 
northern part of the country.
    In 1998 there were credible reports that the Taliban executed large 
numbers of civilians during fighting with the National Islamic Movement 
of Afghanistan in Faryab province, and that the Taliban engaged in mass 
killings in Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998; ethnic Hazaras and to a 
lesser extent ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks reportedly were targeted. An 
estimated 2,000 to 5,000 persons reportedly were killed by the Taliban 
in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998; the Taliban killed an estimated 500 persons 
in its recapture of Bamiyan in September 1998. In November 1998, there 
were reports that an estimated 300 civilians, including women and 
children, were killed by a Taliban official in the southeastern 
province of Zabol; he was reportedly arrested by the Taliban.
    Political killings of moderate Afghan leaders residing in Pakistan 
continued during the year; many believed that these killings occurred 
at the direction of the Taliban. In January in Peshawar, unknown 
assailants killed the wife and child of Abdul Haq, a jihad-era 
commander and current moderate activist. Apparently, the killers 
expected to find Abdul Haq at home. Abdul Haq since has relocated from 
Pakistan. On February 10, the daughter of a former adviser to President 
Rabbani's Justice Ministry was killed in Pakistan. On April 1, an aide 
to Haji Qadir was killed in Peshawar. In July former Afghan senator 
Abdul Ahad Karzai, father of moderate activist Hamid Karzai, was killed 
outside of a mosque in Quetta, Pakistan. Both the Karzai and Abdul Haq 
family killings are widely believed to be part of a wider Taliban 
campaign against moderate activists, especially against those 
affiliated with the movement supported by former king Zahir Shah. 
Several Afghan moderates were killed in Pakistan in 1998, including 
Dagarwal Basir, General Nazar Mohammad, Dagarwal Latif, Hashim 
Paktyanai, General Shirin Agha; and General Rahim. Over the course of 
the year, a number of moderate activists in Pakistan resettled in third 
countries, in part as a result of these killings. In response to the 
concerns raised by Amnesty International about the killings of Afghan 
moderates in Pakistan, Taliban authorities in January denied Taliban 
involvement in such killings, stating that ``other groups commit 
terrorist acts and violations and put the blame on the Taliban.''
    In July 1998, two Afghan U.N. employees were kidnaped and murdered. 
The alleged motive for the killings was that the two were former 
communists. The Taliban were implicated but denied any role in the 
murders. Other former Afghan communists, both in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, also were killed under circumstances that implicated the 
Taliban. Mohammad Hashim Paktianai, a cousin of former Afghan Communist 
President Najibullah (who was executed by the Taliban when they took 
Kabul in 1996), was killed by unidentified gunmen near his home in 
Peshawar in November 1998.
    The Taliban used swift summary trials and implemented strict 
punishments according to Islamic law; the Taliban ordered public 
executions, which sometimes took place before crowds of up to30,000 
persons at Kabul Stadium. The Taliban also ordered death by stoning for 
adultery, and by toppling walls on offenders for homosexual 
transgressions; five persons reportedly were killed by this method in 
1998 (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
    The Taliban have used excessive force against demonstrators. In 
December 1998, two students at Nangarhar medical college reportedly 
were killed by members of the Taliban when they fired upon a crowd of 
students who were protesting their dean's misappropriation of hostel 
funds. Taliban leader Mullah Omar ordered an investigation of the 
incident, but it is not known whether an investigation took place or 
what the results of any investigation may have been.
    During the year, Taliban planes bombed cities held by opposition 
forces, killing and injuring civilians (see Section 1.g.). Several 
cities and areas of Afghanistan in the north, west, and east changed 
hands between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance on more than one 
occasion; the continued warfare during the year between the Taliban and 
Northern Alliance factions resulted in the killings of civilians.
    Opposition forces fired rockets into Kabul on a number of 
occasions. In many of these attacks, civilians were killed or injured 
(see Section 1.g).
    In other areas, combatants sought to kill rival commanders and 
their sympathizers. The perpetrators of these killings and their 
motives were difficult to identify, as political motives often are 
entwined with family and tribal feuds, battles over the drug trade, and 
personal vendettas. During the year, a long-running feud among Northern 
Alliance members led to a number killings of prominent commanders, 
including Bahadur in November and Abdul Chesik in December.
    On August 25, a truck bomb exploded near the home of Mullah Omar in 
Kandahar; seven persons, including three of Mullah Omar's bodyguards, 
reportedly were killed. At year's end, it was not clear who was 
responsible for the blast. On the November 13, a car bomb destroyed the 
vehicle of Taliban official Abdul Hai Mutmain.
    Commander Masood on January 24 denied responsibility for the 
killing of the governor of Badakhshan, Mowlavi Khairadmand, a former 
member of the Hezb-i-Islami, who was killed in November 1998.
    There were unconfirmed reports in 1998 that 10 unarmed 
demonstrators were killed in Mazar-i-Sharif in March 1998. Forces loyal 
to the local Jamiat strongman, Commander Atta, allegedly shot at up to 
3,000 pro-peace demonstrators. Atta may have feared that the crowd 
intended to storm his headquarters.
    In 1998, the U.N. found several mass graves connected with the 
massacre of Taliban soldiers near Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997, which 
contained evidence consistent with mass executions. Independent 
investigations of these mass and other killings, including killings by 
the Taliban, were hindered by the continuing warfare and the 
unwillingness of local commanders to allow investigators to visit the 
areas in question. The Taliban leadership has indicated in several of 
these cases that investigations were under way or that investigations 
would be permitted. However, according to neutral observers, no real 
progress was made by the Taliban in facilitating investigations; mass 
and other killings from 1997 and 1998 have not been investigated fully. 
By year's end, six U.N. Civilian Affairs Officers were assigned to a 
civilian monitoring unit inside the country to help investigate the 
atrocities and to serve as an early warning mechanism for human rights 
abuses.
    In August 1998, Lieutenant Colonel Carmine Calo, an Italian serving 
with the United Nations Special Mission, was killed in Kabul. There has 
been no investigation of the killing.
    There were reports that as many as 2,000 Taliban soldiers were 
killed by the Northern Alliance, including the Hazara Hezb-i-Wahdat, 
near Mazar-i-Sharif as they retreated from the city in 1997. In 
December 1997, a U.N. team found several mass gravesites connected with 
the massacre of Taliban soldiers near Mazar-i-Sharif, which contained 
evidence consistent with mass executions.
    b. Disappearance.--The strict security enforced by the Taliban in 
areas under their control has resulted in a decrease in abductions, 
kidnapings, and hostage taking for ransom. However, there were 
allegations that the Taliban maintained private prisons to settle 
personalvendettas and that they were responsible for disappearances in 
areas under their control. There were unconfirmed reports that some 
Taliban soldiers (often reported to be foreigners) abducted girls and 
women from villages in the Shomali plains during fighting in August, 
and that women taken in trucks from the area of fighting were 
trafficked to Pakistan and to the Arab Gulf states. In 1998 there were 
credible reports that the Taliban detained hundreds of persons, mostly 
ethnic Hazaras, after the takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif; the whereabouts 
of many such persons remained unknown at year's end. There were 
unconfirmed reports that some Taliban soldiers abducted girls and women 
from Hazara neighborhoods in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998; the whereabouts of 
some of these women also were unknown at year's end (see Section 5). 
Some of those who have disappeared are believed to have been killed 
after being arrested, but their bodies have not been found (see Section 
1.a.). Since 1998 persons who have disappeared in this manner include: 
General Abdul Rahman; General Farooq; Moulvi Shabuddin; Waliullah 
Dagarwal; General Syed Agha Rayees; Engineer Nabi Shah; and Wolaswal 
Ismail.
    Abductions, kidnapings, and hostage-taking for ransom or for 
political reasons also occurred in non-Taliban areas, but specific 
information was lacking. In northern areas, women were at risk of being 
raped and kidnaped, according to the U.N. There were unconfirmed 
reports that local commanders were kidnaping young women. Some of the 
women reportedly then were forced to marry their kidnapers. Others 
simply remained missing. To avoid this danger, some families reportedly 
sent their daughters to Pakistan or to Iran (see Section 5).
    Groups in Russia listed nearly 300 Soviet soldiers formerly serving 
in Afghanistan as missing in action or prisoners of war (POW's). Most 
were thought to be dead or to have assimilated voluntarily into Afghan 
society, though some are alleged to be held against their will. A 
number of persons from the former Soviet Union missing from the period 
of the Soviet occupation are presumed dead.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Taliban are believed to have used torture against 
opponents and POW's. Torture does not appear to be a routine practice 
in all cases. The Taliban reportedly beat a number of persons detained 
for political reasons between early 1998 and early 1999 (see Section 
1.d.).
    The Taliban ruled strictly in areas that they controlled, 
establishing ad hoc and rudimentary judicial systems, based on their 
understanding of Islamic justice. Taliban courts imposed their extreme 
interpretation of Islamic law and punishments following swift summary 
trials. Murderers were subjected to public executions, a punishment 
that at times was inflicted by the victims' families (see Section 
1.a.). Thieves were subjected to public amputations of either one hand 
or one foot, or both. In 1998 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture 
was particularly concerned about the use of amputation as a form of 
punishment by Taliban authorities. Adulterers were stoned to death or 
publicly whipped with 100 lashes. Those found guilty of homosexual acts 
were crushed by having walls toppled over them. During the year, this 
punishment was carried out on at least one occasion, although the 
victim reportedly survived. In 1998 at least seven such punishments 
were reported; five persons died after having walls toppled on them.
    Taliban forces threatened and beat women, for what they considered 
``immodest dress.'' They threatened and beat men for ``immodest dress'' 
and for incorrect beard length.
    Some of Masood's commanders in the north reportedly used torture 
routinely to extract information from and break the will of prisoners 
and political opponents.
    All Afghan factions are believed to have used torture against 
opponents and POW's, though specific information generally is lacking. 
Torture does not appear to be a routine practice in all cases.
    According to Amnesty International, between April 21 and May 9, 
while the Hezb-i-Wahdat held Bamiyan and surrounding areas, 
noncombatants suspected of collaborating with the Taliban were targeted 
for severe beatings and arbitrary detention.
    Prison conditions are poor. Prisoners held by some factions are not 
given food, as normally this is the responsibility of prisoners' 
relatives, who are allowed to visit to provide them with food once or 
twice a week. Those who have no relatives have to petition the local 
council or rely on other inmates.Prisoners live in overcrowded, 
unsanitary conditions in collective cells.
    There are credible reports that torture occurred in prisons under 
the control of both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Local 
authorities maintain prisons in territories under their control and 
reportedly established torture cells in some of them. The Taliban 
operate prisons in Kandahar, Herat, Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif, 
Pul-i-Khumri, Shibarghan, Qala-e-Zaini, and Maimana. The Northern 
Alliance maintains prisons in Panjshir and Taloqan, and there also is a 
prison in the north at Faizabad, in Badakhshan province. According to 
Amnesty International, there have been reports that the Taliban forced 
prisoners to work on the construction of a new story on the Kandahar 
prison, and that some Taliban prisoners held by Masood were forced to 
labor in life-threatening conditions, such as digging trenches in mined 
areas.
    There were reports that an Afghan human rights organization visited 
a Taliban prison in Mazar-i-Sharif in February. Intensified fighting 
and poor security for foreign personnel limited the ICRC's ability to 
monitor prison conditions, especially in and around Mazar-i-Sharif 
after that city fell to the Taliban. However, the ICRC's access 
improved toward the end of the year. The ICRC visited approximately 
8,000 detainees in 50 different places of detention in 1998.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--With the absence of 
formal legal and law enforcement institutions, justice was not 
administered according to formal legal codes, and persons were 
subjected to arbitrary detention. There are credible reports that both 
Taliban and Northern Alliance militia extorted bribes from civilians in 
return for their release from prison or to avoid arrest. Judicial and 
police procedures varied from locality to locality. Little is known 
about the procedures for taking persons into custody and bringing them 
to justice. In both Taliban and non-Taliban areas, the practices varied 
depending on the locality, the local commanders, and other authorities. 
Some areas have a more formal judicial structure than others.
    In the spring the Taliban reportedly took approximately 550 persons 
in Bamiyan hostage and transferred them to different prisons in Parwan, 
Kabul, and Kandahar, according to U.N. reports. Among those arrested 
were Sayed Adil Kazimi Paykar from Fatmasti, Natiqi from Kushak, Sheikh 
Emami from Surmara, and Sheikh Zaki from Kalu, all members of the 
Council for National Understanding and National Unity of Afghanistan 
(see Section 1.g.). Amnesty International also reported that the 
Taliban have taken children hostage in an effort to compel their 
fathers to surrender; the fathers of such children generally are 
reported to be political opponents of the Taliban. Children detained in 
this manner include Farhad and Mohammad Sheikh-Fardin, sons of Noor 
Agha Rooyeen, a member of the Council of National Understanding and 
National Unity of Afghanistan; and Abdul Zahir, son of General Golrank, 
a former military commander under President Najibullah. The families of 
these children have been told that the children would be released when 
their fathers surrender to the Taliban.
    Amnesty International also reported that as of March up to 200 
prominent persons or local community leaders who supported peace 
efforts had been arrested in southern and eastern Afghanistan since 
early 1998; many reported beatings while in detention. Other estimates 
ranged from 25 to 400 persons detained. The majority of them reportedly 
were arrested in October 1998, mainly in Jalalabad. Among those 
arrested in Jalalabad in October 1998 were Kuhat Khan, a retired 
military officer and a Member of Parliament at the time of President 
Najibullah; and Bashir Mahmood, a Pashtun founding member of the 
Islamic Council for Freedom and Democracy. Some of those detained 
allegedly were arrested for planning to carry out a coup or other 
activities against the Taliban; however, the arrests appeared to be 
aimed at possible opposition figures and included tribal elders, 
intellectuals, members of various parties or groups, and persons 
associated with prior regimes, particularly that of President 
Najibullah. Other persons reportedly detained by the Taliban for their 
political activity or past political affiliations included Mohammad 
Anwar Sultani, Malik Khan Arab; Dagarwal Mohammad Yasin; Alaghadar 
Nisar Ahmad; Abdul Quader Emami; Dagarwal Shah Mahmood Khan; Abdul 
Malik; Malik M. Amin; Zairat Gul; Mohammad Nazir; Soleiman Shah; 
Lawang; Jan Mohammad; and Rahemi. At least three Afghan staff members 
of the United Nations also were arrested. As of February approximately 
100 persons were believed to remain in detention.
    All factions probably hold political detainees, but no firm numbers 
are available. Thousands of prisoners of war are held by the Taliban 
and Masood. Masood reportedly holds a number of Pakistanis, along with 
several hundred Taliban soldiers, as POW's. Prisoner releases by all 
factions occurred during the year, often with the assistance of the 
ICRC, sometimes on the occasion of religious holidays. Generally, small 
numbers of prisoners were released at any given time. In January, the 
Taliban released 250 prisoners held at Pol-e-Charkhi prison on the 
occasion of Ramadan, according to press reports. Other prisoners were 
released in Kunduz. In February, the Taliban released approximately 70 
prisoners from a prison in Mazar-i-Sharif on the recommendation of an 
Afghan human rights organization.
    On January 15, Commander Masood freed 58 Taliban prisoners during 
Ramadan; there were similar releases to mark Ramadan in December. In 
February, the International Committee of the Red Cross facilitated 
prisoner exchanges between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance that 
resulted in the exchange of 62 persons. During 1998 the ICRC registered 
almost 4,400 prisoners of war across the country.
    There was no information available on forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--With no functioning nationwide 
judicial system, many municipal and provincial authorities relied on 
some interpretation of Shari'a (Islamic) law and traditional tribal 
codes of justice.
    The Taliban have Islamic courts in areas under their control to 
judge criminal cases and resolve disputes. According to the U.N., the 
Taliban assert that there is a lower court and a higher court in every 
province, and a Supreme Court in Kabul. In January Mullah Omar 
promulgated a decree asking the Supreme Court and military courts not 
to interfere with one another, according to press reports. The courts 
meted out punishments including execution and amputation, and 
reportedly heard cases in sessions that lasted only a few minutes. The 
courts reportedly dealt with all complaints relying on the Taliban's 
interpretation of Islamic law and punishments as well as traditional 
tribal customs (see Section 1.c.). In cases involving murder and rape, 
convicted prisoners generally were ordered executed, although relatives 
of the victim could instead choose to accept other restitution (see 
Section 1.a.). Decisions of the courts were reportedly final. According 
to Amnesty International, some judges in these courts were untrained in 
law, and at times based their judgments on a mixture of their personal 
understanding of Islamic law and a tribal code of honor prevalent in 
Pashtun areas.
    Defendants do not have the right to an attorney.
    Little is known about the administration of justice in the areas 
controlled by the Northern Alliance. The administration and 
implementation of justice varied from area to area and depended on the 
whims of local commanders or other authorities, who summarily execute, 
torture, and mete out punishments without reference to any other 
authority.
    All factions probably hold political prisoners, but no firm 
estimates of numbers are available.
    f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Interfactional fighting often resulted in the homes 
and businesses of civilians being invaded and looted by the opposing 
forces--whether victor or loser. Some armed gunmen reportedly acted 
with impunity given the absence of any legal protection or a responsive 
police force. It was unclear what authority controlled the actions of 
the Taliban militiamen who patrolled the streets of cities and towns. A 
number of incidents were reported in which Taliban soldiers, persons 
masquerading as Taliban, or foreign sympathizers fighting alongside the 
Taliban, entered private homes without prior notification or informed 
consent. In Kabul the soldiers allegedly searched homes for evidence of 
cooperation with the former authorities or for violations of Taliban 
religion-based decrees, including the ban on the possession of 
depiction of living things (photographs, stuffed animals, dolls, etc.). 
Members of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of 
Vice, the Taliban's religious police, beat individuals on the streets 
for infractions of Taliban rules concerning dress, hair length, and 
facial hair, as well as for the violation of the prohibition on women 
being in the company of men who were unrelated to them. The Taliban 
required women to wear a burqa, a tent-like outergarment that covers a 
woman from head to toe, when in public (see Section 5). Men are 
required to have beards of a certain length or longer, not to trim 
their beards, and to wear head coverings. Men whose beards did not 
conform to the guidelines on beard length set out by the Taliban were 
subject to imprisonment for 10 days and mandatory Islamic instruction. 
According to AI, the Taliban have taken children hostage in an effort 
to compel their fathers to surrender (see Section 1.d.).
    According to press reports, on January 29, members of the Ministry 
for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice threatened men in 
Kabul with punishment if they did not recite the five daily prayers, 
and called upon neighbors to turn in violators.
    There were reports that some prisoners of the Taliban, including 
the sons of families that had opposed Taliban social restrictions, had 
been drafted forcibly and sent to the front. There were also reports 
that the Taliban forcibly conscripted or attempted to forcibly 
conscript persons in 1997 and 1998; some of these reports were 
unconfirmed.
    In 1998 the Taliban prohibited satellite dishes, as part of an 
effort to ban music, television, and movies (see Section 2.a.); the ban 
continued through year's end. However, televisions reportedly are 
widely sold, and their use generally is ignored unless reported by a 
neighbor.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--The continuing internal conflict resulted in many 
instances of the use of excessive force. After a lull in the early part 
of the year, the conflict intensified in the northern and central areas 
of the country, and much of the fighting during the year took place in 
areas inhabited by non-Pashtun minorities.
    In late April, the Taliban bombed cities held by the Northern 
Alliance, such as Taloqan, Dara-e-Suf, and Jebel-u-Seraj. In September, 
the Taliban bombed Taloqan again, resulting in the deaths of civilians, 
property damage, and the displacement of residents.
    On May 9, the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan. Most of the population 
evacuated the city and took refuge in the mountains. The U.N. reported 
that 361 infants and 138 adults died as a result of cold and hunger 
following their escape to the mountains. According to reports received 
by Amnesty International, those who remained in Bamiyan later were 
targets of systematic killings (see Section 1.a.). There were reports 
of summary executions carried out by the Taliban after they entered the 
city. It was estimated by AI that hundreds of men and some women and 
children also were taken away by the Taliban after the capture of 
Bamiyan. On May 14, the Taliban took Yakaolang, the second largest city 
in Bamiyan province. Approximately 150 persons, including women and 
children, reportedly were taken captive by Taliban forces from Berson 
village and transferred to Parwan province. Hundreds of men, and in 
some instances women and children, reportedly were separated from their 
families and taken away from Yakaolang (see Section 1.c.). During the 
spring offensive, the U. N. estimated that 15 percent of the homes in 
Bamiyan province were destroyed systematically and another 21 percent 
were damaged heavily. According to the U.N., 66 percent of all cattle 
in the area reportedly were killed in the fighting. Household goods, 
commercial vehicles, and shops were sold, looted, or destroyed. As a 
result of the fighting and destruction, spring planting was not 
possible; this led to shortages of food in the province later in the 
year.
    Most of the civilian population was displaced from the area of the 
conflict in Bamiyan province by mid-May. However, 66 percent returned 
by August, including Hazaras and Tajiks.
    On July 28, the Taliban began a large-scale military offensive 
across the Shomali plains north of Kabul. Taliban forces used in the 
offensive reportedly included non-Afghans. The initial Taliban 
offensive led to the capture of most of the Shomali Plains up to the 
entrance of the Panjshir Valley. The Taliban also made gains in the 
northern part of the country along the Amu Darya River. However, on 
August 5 the Northern Alliance counterattacked and retook most of the 
territory lost the previous week. On August 11 the Taliban also 
launched a new attack in the Shomali plains north of Kabul.
    After the initial offensive failed, the Taliban carried out a 
scorched earth policy in the Shomali plain area. Refugees fromthe 
Hazarajat area (in the Shomali plain) reported to the U.N. that the 
Taliban carried out summary executions of noncombatants, including 
women and children; arbitrarily detained persons; forcibly relocated 
the civilian population; burned of homes and crops; and used forced 
labor. Some of the Taliban field commanders allegedly responsible were 
named, including Abdul Wahid Ghorbandi.
    The Northern Alliance claimed that 250,000 persons fled the Shomali 
plains in August and September and sought refuge in the Panjshir 
valley. Other estimates placed the number of persons who fled the 
Shomali plains at 100,000 to 150,000 persons, of whom over 50,000 
reportedly were relocated by Taliban forces. During a 4-day period in 
August, the U.N. estimated that over 20,000 persons fled to Kabul, 
bringing the total to 40,000 over a 2-week period. Approximately 800 
families reportedly sought refuge in the abandoned Soviet embassy 
compound in Kabul; 70 percent of persons taking refuge there were 
reported to be women and children. Some families initially relocated to 
Jalalabad, but reportedly later were allowed to go to Kabul, where 
their needs could more easily be met and which was closer to the homes 
they had fled. There were reports that dozens of trucks used to 
relocate displaced persons were filled only with women and children, 
indicating that adult men may have been separated from their families 
by the Taliban. Both men and women reportedly were separated from their 
families by the Taliban; according to one international human rights 
organization, some 1,000 ethnic Tajik men were separated from their 
families during the exodus and detained by the Taliban. The whereabouts 
of most of those separated from their families remained unknown at 
year's end. The towns of Istalif, Farza, Kalakan and Guldara were 
affected most by the offensive; Qarabagh and parts of Bagram were 
affected to a lesser degree (see Section 1.a.).
    The Taliban claimed that opponents conducted attacks from the homes 
of civilians in the Shomali area, making them legitimate military 
targets. Later in the year, Taliban leader Mullah Omar criticized the 
burning of homes, but no action is known to have been taken against 
those responsible for the abuses that occurred during the offensive in 
the Shomali plains.
    In September the Taliban increased pressure on Northern Alliance 
positions north of Kunduz city and to the east of Khanabad in Takhar 
province. On September 25, the Taliban launched a major offensive in 
northern Kunduz province, near the Tajikistan border. They recaptured 
the Amu Darya river port of Sher Khan Bandar and the nearby districts 
of Imam Sahib and Dasht-e-Archi.
    In August 1998, the Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif. There were 
reports that as many as 5,000 persons, mostly ethnic Hazara civilians, 
were massacred by the Taliban after the takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif. In 
September 1998, the Taliban captured Bamiyan; during the fighting an 
estimated 200 civilians were killed. There were also credible reports 
of a massacre of 45 civilians in a village near Bamiyan by Taliban 
commanders in September 1998. Amnesty International reported that the 
Taliban massacred 70 Hazara civilians, including children, in 
Qezelabad, near Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997. There were also reports that 
Taliban forces in Faryab province killed some 600 civilians in late 
1997.
    In general, independent investigations of alleged killings were 
hindered by continuing warfare and the unwillingness of local 
commanders to allow investigators to visit the areas in question (see 
Section 1.a.). The Taliban denied charges that its forces massacred or 
committed atrocities against civilians and claimed that civilian 
deaths, if any, resulted from combat.
    On April 11, the Northern Alliance began firing rockets on Kabul; 
the firing continued sporadically until the Taliban offensive in late 
July drove the Northern Alliance out of rocket range. On April 16 heavy 
fighting broke out around Khenjan, north of the Salang tunnel in 
Baghlan province, as well as in various localities of Faryab province 
in the northwest. On April 21 anti-Taliban forces seized the city of 
Bamiyan in the central part of the country. Bamiyan is inhabited mainly 
by Hazaras, and was the stronghold of the Hezb-i-Wahdat until September 
1998. By late October, the Northern Alliance drove the Taliban back 
more or less to the positions held earlier in the year.
    The discovery of mass graves near Shibarghan in the northern part 
of the country in 1997 was widely reported. The graves allegedly 
contained 2,000 corpses, reportedly those of Taliban forces captured 
near Mazar-i-Sharif in mid-1997 and executed by Northern Alliance 
forces.
    There were reports that Masood's commanders in the northeast were 
``taxing'' humanitarian assistance entering Afghanistan from 
Tajikistan, harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid convoys, and 
otherwise hindering the movement of humanitarian aid (see Section 4).
    Continued warfare also resulted in massive forced displacement of 
civilians the (see Section 1.g.). Over the course of the year, it is 
estimated that up to 200,000 persons may have fled the fighting. An 
estimated 258,600 Afghans remain internally displaced following years 
of conflict. More than 2.6 million Afghans are living as refugees in 
Pakistan and Iran. A much larger number over the twenty years has 
sought refuge abroad. Women and children constituted the majority of 
those in need of humanitarian assistance.
    Afghanistan is the most heavily mined country in the world, 
according to U.N. mine clearing experts. The U.N. estimates that there 
are 5 to 7 million landmines and over 750,000 pieces of unexploded 
ordnance throughout the country, sown mainly during the Soviet 
occupation. Some NGO's estimate that there may be less than 1 million. 
The landmines and unexploded ordnance cause deaths and injuries, 
restrict areas available for cultivation, and slow the return of 
refugees. The mines covered more than an estimated 420 square miles at 
year's end, including over 285 square miles of grazing land; over 100 
square miles of agricultural land; almost 25 square miles of roads; 7.5 
square miles of residential area; and over 2 square miles of irrigation 
systems and canals, according to the NGO Halo Trust. From 1995 to 1997 
new mines are believed to have been laid over 90 square miles of land, 
reportedly mainly by the Northern Alliance in the western provinces of 
Badghis and Faryab. Additional newly mined areas have been reported but 
not confirmed in the frontline areas north of Kabul, including Parwan, 
Kapisa, and the Panjshir Valley, and in the northern provinces of 
Kunduz and Takhar in 1999 offensives. These reportedly were laid by the 
Northern Alliance in response to the Taliban's late summer offensive. 
Taliban leader Mullah Omar reportedly banned the use, production, 
trade, and stockpiling of mines in 1998.
    An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by 
landmines. Currently, casualties caused by landmines and unexploded 
ordnance are estimated at 10 to 12 per day. In some parts of the 
country, including in Herat and Kandahar, almost 90 percent of 
households are affected by the presence of landmines. Ninety-six 
percent of civilian mine and unexploded ordinance casualties are male. 
Fifty-three percent occur in the 18 to 40 age group, while 34 percent 
of the casualties involve children, according to the U.N.'s Mine Action 
Center. Landmines and unexploded ordnance resulted in death in 
approximately 30 percent of cases, and in serious injuries and 
disability, including amputation and blindness, in approximately 20 
percent of cases.
    With funding from international donors, the United Nations has 
organized and trained mine detection and clearance teams, which operate 
throughout the country. Nearly all areas that have been cleared are in 
productive use, and approximately 1.53 million refugees and internally 
displaced persons have returned to areas cleared of mines and 
unexploded ordnance. Nevertheless, the mines are expected to pose a 
threat for many years. In 1997 the 4,000 mine clearers suffered from an 
accident rate of 1 per week. However, clearance rates and safety have 
increased for clearance teams assisted by dogs. U.N. agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) have instituted a number of mine 
awareness campaigns and educational programs for women and children in 
various parts of the country, but many were curtailed as a result of 
Taliban restrictions on women and girls.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--There are no laws that effectively 
provide for freedom of speech and of the press, and senior officials of 
various warring factions allegedly attempted to intimidate journalists 
and influence their reporting. The few newspapers in the country, all 
of which were published only sporadically, were for the most part 
affiliated with different factions. Various factions maintain their own 
communications facilities. The Taliban selectively ban the entry of 
foreign newspapers into their territory. Many foreign books are 
prohibited. The Taliban radio station, the Voice of Shariat, broadcasts 
religious programming and Taliban pronouncements.
    All factions have attempted to pressure foreign journalists who 
report on the Afghan conflict. The Taliban initially cooperated with 
members of the international press who arrived in Kabul, but later 
imposed restrictions upon them. During the year, foreign journalists 
were forbidden to film or photograph persons or animals, were not 
allowed to interview women, and were required to be accompanied at all 
times by a Taliban escort to ensure that these restrictions were 
enforced. In 1998 foreign journalists were not permitted into Mazar-i-
Sharif after the Taliban took the city and reportedly massacred as many 
as 5,000 persons (see Section 1.g.). However, by year's end, few 
journalists cited problems in reporting from Afghanistan.
    The Taliban reportedly require most journalists to stay at the 
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul (allegedly for security and economic 
reasons). Journalists also reported that the Taliban attempted to 
control who could act as drivers and interpreters for them.
    In August 1998, Iranian journalist Mahmoud Saremi was killed after 
being abducted by Taliban soldiers in Mazar-i-Sharif, along with eight 
Iranian diplomats. Saremi was the Afghanistan bureau chief for the 
official Iranian news agency, IRNA. Taliban officials stated that those 
responsible for Saremi's killing were not acting under official orders 
and would be punished; however, no action was known to have been taken 
regarding the case by year's end.
    The Taliban continue to prohibit music, movies, and television on 
religious grounds. In August 1998 television sets, videocassette 
recorders, videocassettes, audiocassettes, and satellite dishes were 
outlawed in order to enforce the prohibition. However, televisions 
reportedly are widely sold, and their use generally is ignored unless 
reported by a neighbor.
    The Taliban severely restrict academic freedom, particularly 
education for girls (see Section 5).
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Civil war, 
tenuous security, and likely opposition from local authorities 
seriously inhibited freedom of assembly and association.
    It is unknown whether laws exist that govern the formation of 
associations. Many domestic NGO's continue to operate in the country, 
and many international NGO's also continue to operate (see Section 4). 
There were reports that the Taliban require NGO's to go through 
burdensome registration procedures in order to be allowed to operate, 
and attempted to exert control over NGO staffing and office locations, 
especially in Kabul.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted 
severely, and Taliban members vigorously enforced their interpretation 
of Islamic law. Afghanistan's official name, according to both the 
Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) and the Northern Alliance (the 
Islamic State of Afghanistan), reflects the desire of the factions to 
promote Islam as a state religion. Some 85 percent of the population is 
Sunni Muslim, and Shi'a Muslims constitute most of the remainder. The 
Hazara ethnic group is predominantly Shi'a; Hazaras are among the most 
economically disadvantaged persons in the country. The Hazara Shi'a 
minority want a national government to give them equal rights as 
citizens. There are unconfirmed reports that the Taliban have occupied 
and ``cleaned'' Shi'a mosques for the use of Sunnis.
    The Taliban sought to impose their extreme interpretation of 
Islamic observance in areas that they control. Prayer is mandatory for 
all, and those who are observed not praying at appointed times or who 
are late attending prayer are subject to beatings. Members of the 
Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice, which was 
raised to the status of a ministry in May 1998, regularly check 
passersby to see that men's beards and apparel meet Taliban 
requirements, to ensure that women are dressed in strict traditional 
Taliban-approved garb, and to ascertain that women are not in the 
company of men who are unrelated to them (see Section 5). There have 
been reports that PVSV members in Kabul stopped persons on the street 
and quizzed them to determine if they knew how to recite various 
Koranic prayers. According to regulations, a man who has shaved or cut 
his beard may be imprisoned. Beards must protrude farther than would a 
fist clamped at the base of the chin. All students at Kabul University 
reportedly are required to have beards in order to study there (no 
female students are allowed). There also are credible reports that 
Taliban members gave forcedhaircuts to males in Kabul. Enforcement of 
Taliban social strictures is much stricter in the cities, especially 
Kabul.
    The small number of non-Muslim residents in the country may 
practice their faith, but may not proselytize. Almost all of the 
country's small Hindu and Sikh population, which once numbered about 
50,000, has emigrated or taken refuge abroad. There were reports that 
Hindus are required to wear a piece of yellow cloth attached to their 
clothing to identify their religious identity; Sikhs reportedly were 
required to wear some form of identification as well. This rule 
allegedly was imposed to spare non-Muslims from the enforcement of 
rules that are mandatory for Muslims and from harassment by the PVSV. 
Human Rights Watch reported that in September, the Taliban issued 
decrees that forbade non-Muslims from building new places of worship; 
prohibited non-Muslims from criticizing Muslims; ordered non-Muslims to 
identify their homes by placing yellow cloth on their rooftops; and 
required non-Muslim women to wear a yellow dress with a special mark.
    In November 1998, Taliban officials accepted responsibility for the 
defacing of one of two historic statues of Buddha near Bamiyan during 
their takeover of that city earlier in the year. The Taliban claimed 
that the vandalism was the result of an unauthorized act by one of 
their soldiers, and that the statutes were being protected by the 
Taliban from further harm. Some Taliban leaders claimed tolerance of 
religious minorities, although there reportedly have been restrictions 
imposed upon Shi'a Muslims in Taliban-controlled territory. Such 
restrictions have not been imposed on a uniform basis.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although in principle citizens have the 
right to travel freely both inside and outside the country, their 
ability to travel within the country was hampered by warfare, 
brigandage, millions of landmines, a road network in a state of 
disrepair, and limited domestic air service, complicated by factional 
threats to air traffic. Some Afghans reported difficulty in receiving 
necessary permits to leave the country for tourism or business 
purposes, while others reported no such difficulty. The Taliban's 
restrictions on women further curtail freedom of movement (see Section 
5). Despite these obstacles, many persons continued to travel 
relatively freely, with buses plying routes in most parts of the 
country. However, due to intermittent fighting in various areas, 
international aid agencies often found that their ability to travel, 
work, and distribute assistance was hampered. International travel 
continued to be difficult as both the Taliban and Masood threatened to 
shoot down any planes that flew over areas of the country that they 
controlled, without their permission.
    Commercial trade was impeded in certain non-Taliban areas, as local 
commanders and criminals continued to demonstrate their control over 
the roads by demanding road tolls and sometimes closing roads. There 
were reports in 1998 that some Taliban commanders, who previously 
gained popularity by sweeping away the checkpoints that local warlords 
used to shake down travelers, were setting up checkpoints themselves 
and demanding tolls for passage, but there were no such reports during 
the year.
    There also have been instances of the forcible expulsion of 
individuals on ethnic grounds. During the year, there were reports of 
forced expulsions of ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks from areas newly 
occupied by the Taliban.
    Afghans continued to form one of the world's largest refugee 
populations. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, 
about 2.6 million Afghans remain outside the country as registered 
refugees: 1.4 million in Iran, 1.2 million in Pakistan, 20,000 in 
Russia, 17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the central Asian republics. 
Women and children constitute 75 percent of the refugee population. In 
addition, there are more than 300,000 Afghans who are internally 
displaced following years of fighting. A total of 4,069,000 Afghan 
refugees have been repatriated since 1988, with over 1.5 million 
returning to Afghanistan in the peak year of 1992. Although the 
continued fighting has discouraged many refugees from returning to 
their country, 88,000 returned between January and October 1998. As 
many as 10,000 Afghans in Iran were repatriated to the country between 
December 1998 and January; it is not known how many of these persons 
were refugees or how many were repatriated forcibly. Many were 
reportedly ethnic Hazara or Tajik. However, by year's end, some 75,000 
Afghans reportedly were repatriated forcibly to Afghanistan from Iran, 
without a determination as to refugee status.
    There was no available information on policies regarding refugees, 
asylum, provision of first asylum, or the forced return of refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    There was no functioning central government in the country. The 
continuing struggle for political power among the major armed groups 
prevented citizens from changing their government or choosing their 
leaders peacefully and democratically. Most political changes came 
about through shifting military fortunes. No faction held elections or 
respected citizens' right to change their government democratically.
    The Taliban movement's authority emanates from its leader, Mullah 
Omar, who carries the title Commander of the Faithful, and from the 
Taliban's military occupation of most of the country. Governmental 
functions are exercised through the key Taliban governing body, the 
Inner Shura (Council) based in Kandahar, and by ministries based in 
Kabul.
    The Northern Alliance, headed by nominal President Rabbani, holds 
power with de facto Defense Minister Masood as Rabbani's primary 
military backer. Rabbani received nominal support from General Dostam, 
and a faction of the Shi'a Hazara Hezb-i-Wahdat. Another faction of the 
Hezb-i-Wahdat nominally allied with the Taliban early in the year. 
Rabbani and Masood control the northeastern, largely Tajik, portion of 
the country, including the strategic Panjshir valley north of Kabul.
    Discontent with the Taliban's strictures and rural village values 
was strong in large, non-Pashtun cities such as Herat, Kabul, and other 
northern cities. The Taliban's military successes did not encourage the 
group's leaders to engage meaningfully in political dialog with 
opponents. Efforts in 1998 to convene a national body of Muslim 
scholars (ulema) to discuss the future of the country broke down when 
both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance disagreed over the possible 
membership and sequence of the talks. Peace talks convened in April 
1998 in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, but broke down quickly. Moderate and 
neutral Afghans, mostly living outside of the country, continue their 
efforts to organize a traditional Grand National Assembly (Loya Jirga), 
and held meetings in Rome in July and November. The former King 
supports this process. Another group of moderates met several times 
during the year in Cyprus and Tehran.
    The United Nations and the international community continued their 
efforts to help Afghans reach a political settlement. U.N. Special 
Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi announced late in the year that he had ``frozen'' 
his work as a consequence of the non-responsiveness of Afghanistan's 
neighbors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are many NGO's, both domestic and international, in the 
country. Some are based in neighboring countries, mostly Pakistan, with 
branches inside Afghanistan; others are based in Afghan cities and 
rural areas. The focus of their activities is primarily humanitarian 
assistance, rehabilitation, health, education, and agriculture.
    All factions harassed domestic and international NGO's. The Taliban 
have interfered consistently with the operation of the United Nations 
and NGO's. Tactics used have included threatening to impound the 
vehicles of NGO's that do not work on projects preferred by the 
Taliban, threatening to close projects that do not include Taliban 
supervisors or workers, and, in the case of one local NGO, the 
detention of its director and the impounding of all of its equipment in 
an effort to increase Taliban control of the organization. The Taliban 
announced in March 1998 that foreign Muslim women, including U.N. 
workers, would be allowed to perform their jobs only if accompanied by 
a male relative, a move that hampered NGO and relief operations. The 
United Nations withdrew its personnel from southern Afghanistan in late 
March 1998 to protest the assault on a U.N. worker by the Taliban 
governor of Kandahar province and the interference with its work by the 
Taliban. After reaching agreements with local officials, the U.N. 
returned to Kandahar in May. In April 1998, Taliban authorities 
rejected the participation of a U.N. official on the U.N. team selected 
to negotiate with the Taliban on the travel restrictions for foreign 
Muslim women and other issues, because he was perceived to be ``anti-
Taliban.'' In June 1998, the Taliban required allNGO's in Kabul to 
relocate to a single location in a bomb-damaged former school; those 
who refused were threatened with expulsion from the country. However, 
the order was not enforced. In November 1998, the U.N. World Food 
Program (UNWFP) accused the Taliban of looting 1,364 tons of food, 
stealing trucks from the UNWFP's compound in Bamiyan, and occupying 
UNWFP offices in Bamiyan and Yakaolang.
    In June and July 1998, several Afghan workers for international 
NGO's were detained for questioning by the Taliban, but most were 
released within a few days. In July 1998, two Afghan U.N. workers were 
abducted and killed by unknown assailants; one of the bodies bore signs 
of torture. In August 1998, Lieutenant Colonel Carmine Calo, who was 
serving with the United Nations Special Mission, was killed in Kabul, 
triggering the departure of most foreign U.N. and NGO staff members 
from the country.
    However, the working environment for the U.N. and humanitarian 
community improved somewhat during the year. U.N. and other expatriate 
workers began returning early in the year following normalization of 
the security environment. However, on June 15 staff members of an 
international NGO were detained and beaten by members of the Taliban in 
Bamiyan province. After the June incident, Mullah Omar issued an edict 
stating that any person causing annoyance to a foreign worker could 
face punishment of up to 5 years in prison. However, in November U.N. 
properties were targeted in organized demonstrations in several cities 
when U.N. sanctions related to terrorism were imposed on the country. 
Certain key issues, including the mobility of international female 
Muslim staff and access by Afghan women and girls to programs, remain 
largely unresolved.
    For much of 1998, Northern Alliance and autonomous commanders also 
prevented NGO's and international organizations from delivering 
humanitarian assistance. There were reports that Masood's commanders in 
the northeast were ``taxing'' humanitarian assistance entering 
Afghanistan from Tajikistan, harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid 
convoys, and otherwise hindering the movement of humanitarian aid.
    The Afghan League of Human Rights operated both in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan; it produces an annual report. The Cooperation Center for 
Afghanistan (CCA) is an Afghan NGO that operated in both Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. The CCA maintains an office in Peshawar, where it produces 
a monthly newsletter on the Afghan human rights situation. It also 
monitors and documents the human rights situation from several offices 
in both Taliban-controlled and Northern Alliance-controlled cities. The 
National Commission on Human Rights in Afghanistan began operations 
during 1998 in Pakistan, conducting seminars on human rights issues, 
issuing press statements criticizing specific instances of human rights 
abuses, and placing articles in Pashtu and Dari newspapers. The 
Afghanistan Commission for Human Rights, founded in 1997 after 
discussions with Taliban authorities on Islamic aspects of human 
rights, also started activities in Pakistan in 1998, focused on the 
plight of Afghan prisoners in Pakistani prisons and on children's 
rights. However, the civil war and lack of security continued to make 
it difficult for human rights organizations to monitor adequately the 
situation inside Afghanistan.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    There is no functioning constitution, and therefore there are no 
constitutional provisions that prohibit or protect against 
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, disability, language, or 
social status. It is not known whether specific laws prohibit 
discrimination; local custom and practices generally prevail. 
Discrimination against women is prevalent throughout the country. Its 
severity varies from area to area, depending on the local leadership's 
attitude towards education for girls and employment for women and on 
local attitudes. Historically, the minority Shi'a faced discrimination 
from the majority Sunni population. There has been greater acceptance 
of the disabled as the number of persons maimed by landmines increased, 
and the presence of the disabled became more widespread. During the 
year, the Taliban on at least one occasion sought to execute a 
homosexual by toppling a wall to crush the victim; however, the person 
reportedly survived (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    Women.--As lawlessness and interfactional fighting continued in 
some areas, violence against women occurred frequently, including 
beatings, rapes, forced marriages, disappearances, kidnapings, and 
killings. Such incidents generally went unreported and mostinformation 
was anecdotal. It was difficult to document rapes, in particular, in 
view of the social stigma that surrounds the problem. Although the 
stability brought by the Taliban to most of the country acted in 
general to reduce violence against women, particularly rapes and 
kidnapings, Taliban members continued to threaten or beat women to 
enforce the Taliban's dress code for women. There were unconfirmed 
reports that the Taliban or foreign ``volunteers'' fighting alongside 
the Taliban abducted women during the August military offensive in the 
Shomali plains; there were also unconfirmed reports that Taliban 
soldiers raped and abducted women from Hazara neighborhoods in Mazar-i-
Sharif in August 1998. The whereabouts of some of these women were 
unknown at year's end. The enforced seclusion of women within the home 
greatly limited the information available on domestic violence and 
marital rape. In a climate of secrecy and impunity, it is likely that 
domestic violence against women remained a serious problem.
    Women accused of adultery offenses also are subjected to violence. 
Adultery is punishable by death through stoning. At least one accused 
adulteress was sentenced to 100 lashes in 1998; her sentence was 
carried out publicly (see Section 1.c.). One woman convicted of killing 
her husband in 1997 was executed publicly by a firing squad in the 
Kabul sports area in November.
    Overall, the situation of women and girls remained mostly 
unchanged, as the Taliban generally continued the application of their 
ultra-conservative interpretation of Islamic law.
    In 1992 a new government was installed and the previous trend 
towards increasing numbers of women working outside of the home was 
reversed. Since the advent of the Taliban in 1994, the trend towards 
excluding women from employment has intensified.
    The treatment of women under Taliban rule has been particularly 
harsh, although there was marginal improvement in some areas during the 
year. In the areas where they took control, the Taliban initially 
excluded women from all employment outside the home, apart from the 
traditional work of women in agriculture; women were forbidden to leave 
the home except in the company of a male relative. In urban areas, and 
particularly after the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, the Taliban forced 
almost all women to quit their jobs as professionals and clerical 
workers, including teachers, doctors, nurses, bank tellers, and aid 
workers. In a few cases, the Taliban relented and allowed women to work 
in health care occupations under restricted circumstances. The 
prohibition on women working outside of the home has been especially 
difficult for the large numbers of widows left by 20 years of civil 
war; there are an estimated 30,000 widows in Kabul alone. Many women 
reportedly have been reduced to selling all of their possessions and to 
begging to feed their families.
    However, during the year, restrictions on women's employment 
reportedly eased somewhat. The Taliban allowed Afghan women to work in 
the medical sector as doctors and nurses, treating other women. 
Medicins Sans Frontieres and other international NGO's reported that 
they were able to recruit both male and female health care staff 
without administrative obstacles, and that the main difficulty faced in 
recruitment of medical staff was the lack of qualified female 
personnel. However, during the year there were reports that the Taliban 
reopened schools for doctors and nurses, and that women were allowed to 
attend. A limited number of women were allowed to work for 
international agencies and NGO's, but they were not allowed to work in 
the offices of their employers; they were required to go directly from 
their homes to the project sites on which they worked. A Taliban edict 
issued during the year allowed needy widows with no other means of 
support to seek employment; but many widows reportedly were unaware of 
the change, and there is little work available. Women reportedly were 
allowed to claim international assistance directly rather than through 
their close male relatives, as a 1997 edict stipulated; the Taliban's 
edict had required that international assistance be provided to women 
through their close male relatives rather than directly. However, male 
relatives still were required to obtain the permission of the Ministry 
for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice for female home 
based-employment.
    Girls were formally prohibited from attending school. Formal 
restrictions against the education of girls remain, apart from 
instruction provided in mosques, which is mainly religious in content. 
However, there are a growing number of girls educated by international 
NGO's in formal schools, community-based schools, and home schools (see 
Section 5).
    Most Afghans lack any access to adequate medical facilities, and 
the provision of health care under Taliban rule remains poor. Life 
expectancy rates are estimated at 44 years for women and 43 years for 
men. In most regions, there is less than one physician per 10,000 
persons. Health services reach only 29 percent of the population and 
only 17 percent of the rural population. Clean water reaches only about 
12 percent of the population. Health care for both men and women was 
hampered by the Taliban's ban on images of humans, which caused the 
destruction of public education posters and made the provision and 
dissemination of health information in a society with high levels of 
illiteracy more difficult. Tuberculosis rates for women and maternal 
mortality rates are extremely high. However, the Taliban significantly 
reduced women's access to health care, although it has since loosened 
restrictions somewhat. In 1997 the Taliban announced a policy of 
segregating men and women in hospitals; this policy reportedly 
continued at year's end. In 1997 in an attempt to centralize medical 
care for women, the Taliban also directed most hospitals in Kabul to 
cease services to women and to discharge female staff. Services for 
women were to be provided by a single hospital still partially under 
construction, which resulted in a drastic reduction in access to, and 
the quality of, health care for women. Later, women were permitted to 
seek treatment from female medical personnel working in designated 
women's wards or clinics; since June 1998 they have been permitted to 
seek treatment from male doctors only if accompanied by a male 
relative. In practice women were excluded from treatment by male 
physicians in most hospitals. These rules, while not enforced 
universally, made obtaining treatment extremely difficult for most 
women, and especially for Kabul's widows, many of whom have lost all 
such male family members. Further, even when a woman was allowed to be 
treated by a male doctor, he was prohibited from examining her except 
if she were fully clothed in Taliban-approved garb, and from touching 
her, thus limiting the possibility of any meaningful treatment. The 
participants in a 1998 survey of 160 Afghan women reported poor or no 
access to health care in Kabul. Most of the participants also reported 
a decline in their mental health. However, there were credible reports 
that the restrictions on women's health care were not applied in 
practice at year's end, and that there were some improvements in access 
to health care for women during the year. At year's end, all Kabul 
hospitals apart from the military hospital reportedly treated women. 
Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital in Kabul provided a full range of health 
services to women, but there was only one maternity hospital in the 
country.
    The Taliban decreed what women could wear in public. Women in 
public spaces were required to wear a burqa, a loose, head-to-toe 
garment that has a small cloth screen for vision. While in many, 
particularly rural, areas of the country, the burqa was the customary 
women's outer garment, the requirement for all women to wear the burqa 
represented a significant change in practice for many women, 
particularly in urban areas. According to a decree announced by the 
religious police in 1997, women found outside the home who were not 
covered properly would be punished severely along with their family 
elders. In Kabul and elsewhere women found in public who were not 
wearing the burqa, or whose burqas did not cover their ankles properly, 
reportedly have been beaten by Taliban militiamen. Some poor women 
cannot afford the cost of a burqa, and thus are forced to remain at 
home or risk beatings if they go out without one.
    During the year, there were reports of differences in the 
enforcement of the requirement for women to wear the burqa. Enforcement 
reportedly was relatively lax in rural and non-Pashtun areas, and there 
were reports that some women in Herat and in rural areas cover their 
heads with large scarves that leave the face uncovered and have not 
faced reprisals. The Taliban's dress code for women apparently is not 
enforced strictly upon the nomad population of several hundred thousand 
or upon the few female foreigners, who nonetheless must cover their 
hair, arms, and legs. Women in their homes must not be visible from the 
street; the Taliban require that homes with female occupants have their 
windows painted over.
    Women were expected to leave their homes only while escorted by a 
male relative, further curtailing the appearance and movement of women 
in public even when wearing approved clothing. Women appearing in 
public without a male relative ran the risk of beatings by the Taliban. 
Some observers reported seeing fewer and fewer women on the streets in 
Taliban-controlled areas. Women are not allowed to drive, and taxi 
drivers reportedly are beaten if they take unescorted women as 
passengers. Women only may ride on buses designated as women's buses; 
there are reportedly not enough such buses to meet the demand, and the 
wait for women's buses can be long. In December 1998, the Taliban 
ordered that bus drivers who take female passengers must encase the bus 
in curtains, and put up a curtain so that the female passengers cannot 
see or be seen by the driver. Bus drivers also were told that they must 
employ boys under the age of 15 to collect fares from female 
passengers, and that neither the drivers nor the fare collectors were 
to mingle with the passengers.
    Amnesty International has reported that the Taliban have ordered 
the closure of women's public baths.
    Women are also forbidden to enter mosques or other places of 
worship unless the mosque had separate sections for men and women. Most 
women pray at home alone or with other family members. Women also 
reportedly have been prohibited from appearing on the streets for 
certain periods during the month of Ramadan.
    The Taliban's restrictions regarding the social behavior of men and 
women were communicated by edicts and enforced mainly by the Ministry 
for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice. The United Nations 
and numerous other interlocutors noted that the edicts are enforced 
with varying degrees of rigor throughout the country. The restrictions 
were imposed most heavily in urban areas, where women had enjoyed wider 
access to educational and employment opportunities before the Taliban 
gained control.
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women noted after 
her September visit some improvements in the status of women, including 
the existence of home schools as well as limited primary educational 
institutions for girls run by the Religious Ministry in Kabul; 
increased access of women to health care; and the permission given for 
widows to work. The Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women also 
noted continuing violations of the physical security of women and the 
practice of lashings and public beatings; violations of the rights to 
education, health, employment, freedom of movement, and freedom of 
association, and of family rights, including the existence of polygyny 
and forced marriage. She also noted that minority women sometimes were 
subject to forced displacement and that there were some cases of 
trafficking in women and children (see Section 1.f.).
    Children.--Local administrative bodies and international assistance 
organizations undertook to ensure children's welfare to the extent 
possible; however, the situation of children is very poor. Infant 
mortality is 250 out of 1,000 births and Medicins Sans Frontieres 
reports that 250,000 children per year die of malnutrition. One quarter 
of children die before the age of 5. Approximately 45 percent of the 
population is made up of children age 14 or under. The Taliban's 
restrictions on male-female medical treatment have had a detrimental 
effect on children. Physicians for Human Rights has reported that 
children sometimes are denied medical care when the authorities do not 
let male doctors visit children's wards, which may be located within 
the women's ward of a hospital, or do not allow male doctors to see 
children accompanied only by their mothers. A UNICEF study also 
reported that the majority of children are highly traumatized and 
expect to die before reaching adulthood. Some 90 percent have 
nightmares and suffer from acute anxiety, while 70 percent have seen 
acts of violence, including the killing of parents or relatives.
    Taliban restrictions on the movement of women and girls in areas 
that they controlled hampered the ability of U.N. agencies and NGO's to 
implement effectively health and education programs aimed at both boys 
and girls.
    The educational sector currently is characterized by limited human 
and financial resources; the absence of a national educational policy 
and curriculum; the unpreparedness of the authorities to rehabilitate 
destroyed facilities; and discriminatory policies banning the access of 
females to all levels of education, according to a report by the Gender 
Advisor to the U.N. System in Afghanistan. Female literacy is 
approximately 4 percent, compared with an overall literacy rate of 30 
percent. There have been reports that the ban on women working outside 
of the home has hampered the education of boys, since a large 
percentage of the country's teachers were women prior the advent of 
Taliban rule.
    The Taliban have eliminated most of the formal opportunities for 
girls' education that existed in areas that they have taken over; 
however, some girls' schools still operate in rural areas and some 
towns. Some girls also are receiving an education in informal home 
schools, which are tolerated to varying degrees by the Taliban 
authorities around the country. During the year, there were reports 
that the number of children that these home schools reach was 
increasing, and that there has been an increase in the attendance of 
girls in various educational settings, including formal schools. 
However, in June 1998, more than 100 NGO-funded girls' schools and 
home-based women's vocational projects were closed by the Taliban in 
Kabul. In 1998 the Taliban also stated that schools would not be 
allowed to teach girls over the age of 8, that schools teaching girls 
would be required to be licensed, and that such schools would be 
required to limit their curriculums to the Koran. However, the 
Taliban's implementation of educational policy is inconsistent and 
varies from region to region, as well as over time.
    In September the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women 
noted the existence of home schools and also of limited primary 
educational institutions for girls run by the Religious Ministry in 
Kabul. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women was told 
by the Taliban in September that primary education is available to 
girls between the ages of 6 and 10, and that this was dispensed in 
mosque schools under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. About three-
quarters of the curricula in the Ministry of Religious Affairs schools 
reportedly deals with religious and moral subjects. Taliban-sponsored 
public schools, at both the elementary and secondary levels, provide 
education only to boys, and emphasize religious studies. However, 
schools run by NGO's and international donors are mostly open to both 
boys and girls.
    Despite the limitations on education and the Taliban's restrictions 
on female education, approximately 25 to 30 percent of boys were 
estimated to be enrolled in school and up to 10 percent of girls were 
estimated to attend some form of school, whether NGO-run, mosque 
schools, or
home schools, according to UNICEF. This represents a modest increase in 
both boys' and girls' school enrollment over the last 5 years. Prior to 
the Taliban takeover in 1996, more than 100,000 girls reportedly 
attended public school in Kabul in grades kindergarten to 12, according 
to a U.N. survey. During the year, approximately 300,000 to 350,000 
school-age children attended schools run or funded by various 
assistance agencies and NGO's. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan 
(SCA) reported that it served 175,000 students in 567 schools; most 
these were formal schools, but 39 were home schools. In a few areas, 
over 50 percent of students reportedly were girls. The SCA reported 
that 20 percent of the students in its formal schools, mostly located 
in rural areas, are girls. Many boys also were being educated in home 
schools, because of administrative problems in the Taliban-run schools, 
including problems in the payment of teachers' salaries. A high 
proportion of the students in Northern Alliance-controlled territory 
reportedly were girls. In areas newly captured by the Taliban, such as 
Hazarajat, the community successfully petitioned Taliban 
representatives to reopen the schools. In Herat, which was captured by 
the Taliban in 1995, girls' schools have remained closed except in the 
refugee camps maintained by international NGO's. Nonetheless, 
approximately 5 percent of girls were enrolled in school in Kandahar; 
approximately 20 percent of girls were enrolled in Herat. During the 
year, demand for education reportedly is increasing among refugees and 
returnees to Afghanistan, but some families have sent girls abroad for 
education in order to evade the Taliban's prohibitions on females 
attending school.
    There have been unconfirmed reports that the Taliban use child 
soldiers. There were some cases of trafficking in children (see Section 
6.f.).
    The Taliban have banned certain recreational activities, such as 
kite flying and playing chess. Dolls and stuffed animals are prohibited 
due to the Taliban's interpretation of religious injunctions against 
representations of living beings.
    People with Disabilities.--There are few measures to protect the 
rights of the mentally and physically disabled or to mandate 
accessibility for them. Victims of landmines continued to be a major 
focus of international humanitarian relief organizations, which devoted 
resources to providing prostheses, medical treatment, and 
rehabilitation therapy to amputees. It is believed that there was more 
public acceptance of the disabled because of the increasing prevalence 
of the disabled due to landmines or other war-related injuries. There 
are reports that disabled women, who need a prosthesis or other aid to 
walk, are virtually homebound because they cannot wear the burqa over 
the prosthesis or other aid.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--It is estimated that thousands 
of members of the ethnic Hazara minority may have been killed by the 
Taliban in 1998 (see Section 1.a.).
    During the year, there were reports of forced expulsions of ethnic 
Hazaras and Tajiks from areas newly occupied by the Taliban.
    There were reliable reports that individuals were detained by both 
the Taliban and Northern Alliance because of their ethnic origins and 
suspected sympathy with opponents. Ethnic Hazara, who are 
overwhelmingly Shi'a, reportedly have been targeted for ethnically-
motivated attacks, in particular by the overwhelmingly Sunni and ethnic 
Pashtun Taliban forces.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Little is known about labor laws and 
practices, although only an insignificant fraction of the work force 
has ever labored in an industrial setting. There were no reports of 
labor rallies or strikes. Labor rights are not defined, and in the 
context of the breakdown of governmental authority there is no 
effective central authority to enforce them. Many of Kabul's industrial 
workers are unemployed due to the destruction or abandonment of the 
city's minuscule manufacturing base. The only large employer in Kabul 
is the governmental structure of minimally functioning ministries.
    Workers in government ministries reportedly have been fired because 
they had received part of their education abroad, or because of 
contacts with the previous regimes, although certain officials in 
previous administrations still are employed under the Taliban. Others 
reportedly have been fired for violating Taliban regulations concerning 
beard length.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Afghanistan 
lacks a tradition of genuine labor-management bargaining. There are no 
known labor courts or other mechanisms for resolving labor disputes.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Little information 
is available on forced or compulsory labor, including child labor. 
There have been reports that the Taliban forced prisoners to do 
construction work at Kandahar prison (see Section 1.c.). There have 
been credible reports that Masood forced Taliban prisoners to work on 
road and airstrip construction projects. There were some cases of 
trafficking in women and children (see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--There is no evidence that authorities in any part of the 
country enforce labor laws, if they exist, relating to the employment 
of children. Children from the ages of 6 to 14 often work to help 
support their families by herding animals in rural areas, and by 
collecting paper and firewood, shining shoes, begging, or collecting 
scrap metal among street debris in the cities. Some of these practices 
expose children to the danger of landmines.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no available 
information regarding a statutory minimum wage or the enforcement of 
safe labor practices. Many workers apparently are allotted time off 
regularly for prayers and observance of religious holidays.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no available information 
regarding legislation prohibiting the trafficking in persons. The U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women reported that there were 
some cases of trafficking in women and children (see Section 5). There 
were unconfirmed reports that some Taliban soldiers (often reported to 
be foreigners) abducted girls and women from villages in the Shomali 
plains during fighting in August, and that women taken in trucks from 
the area of fighting were trafficked to Pakistan and to the Arab Gulf 
states.
                                 ______
                                 

                               BANGLADESH

    Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy, with broad powers 
exercised by the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is the 
leader of the Awami League, which came to power in 1996 in national 
elections deemed to be free and fair by international observers. There 
is an active political opposition. Violence is a pervasive feature of 
politics, including political campaigns and elections, and elections 
frequently are marred by violence, intimidation of voters, and rigging. 
The major opposition political parties often boycott or otherwise 
absent themselves from Parliament, making it a less effective 
deliberative body. The Awami League Government has been accused of 
abusing its parliamentary majority to prevent real debate on 
legislation and national issues. The higher levels of the judiciary 
display a significant degree of independence and often rule against the 
Government; however, lower judicial officers fall under the executive, 
and are reluctant to challenge government decisions.
    The Home Affairs Ministry controls the police and paramilitary 
forces, which bear primary responsibility for maintaining internal 
security. Civilian authorities' control over the police is weak, and 
there is widespread police corruption and lack of discipline. Police 
officers committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
    Bangladesh is a very poor country. Annual per capita income among 
the population of 128 million is less than $300. Slightly more than 
half of all children are chronically malnourished. Seventy percent of 
the work force is involved in agriculture, which accounts for one-third 
of the gross domestic product. The economy is market-based, but the 
Government still plays a significant role. The industrial sector is 
growing, albeit slowly, based largely on the manufacture of garments 
and textiles by privately owned companies. A small wealthy elite 
controls much of the private economy, but there is an emerging middle 
class. Foreign investment has increased significantly in the gas sector 
and in electrical power generation facilities. Foreign aid is still 
significant, but has diminished somewhat in relative importance vis-a-
vis increased earnings from exports and remittances from workers 
overseas. Efforts to improve governance and economic growth through 
reform have been unsuccessful, and were blocked by bureaucratic 
intransigence, vested economic interests, endemic corruption, and 
political polarization. The Government's commitment to economic reform 
is weak. Periodic natural disasters, including a severe flood in 1998, 
also hamper development. Despite the flood, the economic growth rate 
during the last fiscal year was about 5 percent.
    The Government continued to restrict or deny many fundamental 
rights, and failed to prevent or punish abuses committed by others. 
Police committed a number of extrajudicial killings, and some persons 
died in police custody under suspicious circumstances. Police routinely 
used torture, beatings, and other forms of abuse while interrogating 
suspects. Police frequently beat demonstrators, at times Members of 
Parliament (M.P.'s). The Government rarely convicts and punishes those 
responsible for torture or unlawful deaths. Prison conditions are 
extremely poor for the majority of the prison population. Rape of 
female detainees in prison or other official custody is a problem. The 
Government continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily, and to 
use the Special Powers Act (SPA) and Section 54 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure, which allow for arbitrary arrest and preventive detention, 
to harass political opponents and other citizens by detaining them 
without formal charges. The Government filed numerous criminal cases 
against opposition leaders and activists; at least some times, these 
charges were false. Much of the judiciary is subject to executive 
influence and suffers from corruption. A large case backlog slowed the 
judicial process, and lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. The 
Government sometimes infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Virtually 
all journalists practiced some self-censorship. Attacks on journalists 
and efforts to intimidate them by government officials, political party 
activists, and others, occasionally occurred. The Government limited 
freedom of assembly, particularly for political opponents, and on 
occasion limited freedom of movement. The Government generally 
permitted a wide variety of human rights groups to conduct their 
activities, but it continued to refuse to register a local chapter of 
Amnesty International. Abuse of children and child prostitution are 
problems. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious 
problems. Discrimination against the disabled, indigenous people, and 
religious minorities was a problem. There was occasional violence 
against members of the Ahmadiya religious minority. The Government 
continued to limit many worker rights. Some domestic servants, 
including many children, work in conditions that resemble servitude, 
and many suffer abuse. Child labor and abuse of child workers remained 
widespread and serious problems. However, a 1995 agreement has 
eliminated about 95 percent of child labor in the export garment 
sector, the main exportindustry. Trafficking in women and children for 
the purpose of forced prostitution and at times for forced labor 
remained serious problems. Both ruling and opposition political parties 
and their activists routinely employed violence, causing many deaths 
and numerous injuries. Vigilante justice resulted in numerous killings.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed a 
number of extrajudicial killings.
    Security forces sometimes used unwarranted lethal force. In March 
police in Jhenidah shot and killed a student who was part of a village 
crowd that was holding five policemen whom the residents accused of 
street robbery. On March 14, police officers in Dhaka drowned college 
student Mujibur Rahman. Police had searched the Rahman family's house, 
purportedly looking for stolen goods. Mujibur Rahman attempted to flee 
by boat across a nearby lake after police began to beat his sister, 
Shilpi, at the house. Eyewitnesses saw pursuing police in another boat 
hit Rahman with bamboo sticks, fling him into the water, then continue 
to strike him until he drowned. Authorities took no action against the 
police involved in the Jhenidah or Mujibur Rahman incidents. On July 3, 
three policemen in Dhaka allegedly severely beat a young man they had 
detained, Mohammed Shahjada Tuku, then threw him into a canal where he 
drowned. As of year's end, no one was arrested in this case.
    According to government figures, 101 persons died in prison and 
police custody during the first 9 months of the year (see Section 
1.c.).
    Most abuses go unpunished, and the resulting climate of impunity 
remains a serious obstacle to ending police abuse and extrajudicial 
killings. However, in some instances where there was evidence of police 
culpability for extrajudicial killings, the authorities took action. In 
March four police officers were charged with murder after a body was 
found in the rooftop water tank of the Detective Branch in Dhaka. A 
police sergeant in Agargaon was arrested and charged in July after he 
shot and killed a rickshaw puller.
    Court proceedings continued against 13 persons, including 12 police 
officers, arrested and charged after a college student in police 
custody was beaten to death in July 1998. There was no verdict as of 
year's end. However, the Government decided that the July 1998 police 
shooting of a female squatter in Satkhira was justifiable self defense 
in the face of mob attacks during an eviction protest. A police inquiry 
into the shooting deaths of four persons by police after a 1997 
opposition rally in Chittagong ruled that the violence had been 
provoked by the opposition, and that police exercised restraint.
    In 1995 the Government charged former President Hossain Mohammad 
Ershad with ordering the 1981 murder of the alleged assassin of 
President Ziaur Rahman. Ershad was granted bail in 1997. In late 1998, 
immediately after Ershad took a stronger stance against the Government, 
the Prime Minister made remarks implying that the Government might 
accelerate the case. There were some preliminary court proceedings in 
the murder case during the year, and the Government unsuccessfully 
requested the High Court to revoke Ershad's bail.
    In 1998 a judge convicted and sentenced to death 15 persons for the 
1975 murder of then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (father of current 
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina) and several of his family members (see 
Section 1.e.). The High Court's review of the death sentences was still 
pending at year's end.
    The Government continued to imprison eight individuals accused of 
perpetrating the November 1975 murders of four senior Awami League 
leaders who were then in jail (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
    Violence, often resulting in killings, is a pervasive element in 
Bangladeshi politics (see Sections 1.c. and 3). Supporters of different 
political parties, and sometimes supporters of different factions of 
one party, often clash with each other and with police during rallies 
and demonstrations. Awami Leaque supporters, often with the connivance 
and support of the police, violently disrupted rallies and 
demonstrations of the opposition parties (see Sections 2.b. and 3), 
which resulted in numerous deaths. Opposition parties also used armed 
violence and intimidation to disrupt their opponents' gatherings and 
rallies, as well as to enforce general strikes (see Section 2.b.). 
During the year, 24 persons died in hartal-related violence.
    During an opposition-called hartal on February 9, eyewitnesses saw 
Maqbul Hossain, an Awami League Member of Parliament (M.P.) for the 
Dhanmondi area of Dhaka, lead a procession of vehicles to defy the 
strike. According to witnesses, members of Maqbul's motorcade 
brandished guns and other weapons openly. When the convoy encountered 
two groups of activists from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), 
the major opposition party, being chased by police, armed men exited 
their vehicles, fired shots in the air, and chased the BNP supporters. 
Two young men were seized and dragged towards Maqbul Hossain's car, 
whereupon M.P. Hossain ordered them to be killed. Members of Hossain's 
entourage then shot in the chest at point-blank range one of the men, 
BNP activist Sajal Chowdhury; the other was beaten (see Section 1.c.). 
About a dozen police officers who were standing nearby in riot gear 
made no effort to intervene or to apprehend the gunmen, nor did the 
Government later take action against those responsible. However, police 
summoned the family of Chowdhury, which filed a murder complaint 
against M.P. Hossain and the armed men, for repeated interrogations. 
One family member was arrested on criminal charges, then detained under 
the SPA after a judge granted him bail (see Section 1.d.). Newspapers 
largely did not report the story (see Section 2.a.). Eight persons were 
killed in hartal-related violence during the nationwide strike held 
February 9-11.
    On February 23, during the first day of a 3-day hartal, a rickshaw 
pullers' union activist affiliated with the Awami League was killed 
when a bomb was thrown at an antihartal procession. A BNP activist also 
was killed in Barisal (see Section 3). On February 24, the second day 
of the hartal, three more persons were killed, one each in Feni, Pabna, 
and Rajshahi (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
    In March two persons were killed while making bombs at a ruling 
party M.P.'s residence in Sylhet; credible reports state that the bombs 
were to have been used in local intra-party conflicts. Police arrested 
the M.P. in May for involvement in bomb making. The M.P. was on bail, 
and the case remained pending at year's end. On February 16, masked 
gunmen shot and killed Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal leader Kazi Aref Ahmed 
and five other party officials as they were addressing a public rally 
in a village near Kushtia. On March 7, two bombs that exploded in 
Jessore killed eight persons attending the performance of the left-
affiliated cultural group Udichi Shilpa Gosthi (see Section 1.c.). 
While authorities charged or detained opposition leaders and activists 
in both incidents, the identity of the perpetrators remained unclear at 
year's end (see Section 1.d.).
    One policeman died and eight others were injured on July 7 when 
several small bombs were hurled at riot police after an opposition 
procession ended in central Dhaka. One man died on July 8 when a brick 
was thrown through a bus window. Authorities later initiated a formal 
investigation of 150 opposition leaders and activists, including four 
M.P.'s; the opposition blamed an agent provocateur from the ruling 
party for the bombing incident.
    In August BNP activist Chowdhury Shahen Shah was stabbed to death. 
The BNP asserts that Awami League activists killed him; police claim 
that he was attacked over a family land dispute. Awami League activists 
chopped to death a BNP youth front leader in Natore on the first day of 
a 60-hour opposition-called hartal that ended on September 15 (see 
Section 1.c.). On November 7, during the first day of a 42-hour 
opposition-led hartal, a stray bullet, allegedly shot by a police 
officer, killed a housewife, and a BNP ward leader was shot and killed 
by unidentified assailants (see Section 1.c.).
    Violence also is endemic between the student political wings of the 
major national parties, and between rival factions within the parties. 
Several persons were killed in local factional disputes within the 
student wing of the ruling Awami League, including incidents in 
Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Sirajganj (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
    There was occasional violence against members of the Ahmadiya 
religious minority. For example, on October 8, a bomb exploded during 
Friday prayers at an Ahmadiya mosque in Khulna, killing at least six 
persons and injuring others (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
    Vigilante violence against criminals by private citizens is common. 
The Government reported that 20 persons were killed by vigilantes as of 
September 30. Authorities rarely arrest and punish those responsible 
for vigilante violence. Ten persons were beaten to death by vigilante 
mobs in Dhaka and Chittagong in a 1-month period beginning August 3; 
authorities charged no one in the deaths. Two men who allegedly 
attempted to rob a woman were beaten to death by a mob next to the 
National Mosque in downtown Dhaka on August 3. An August 21 editorial 
in a proruling party newspaper criticized the spate of killings, and 
attributed the phenomenon to the public's lack of faith in the law 
enforcement system.
    Human rights groups and press reports indicate that vigilante 
violence against women who are accused of having committed moral 
offenses is common, particularly in rural areas, and sometimes is led 
by religious leaders (see Section 5).
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    There were no developments in the 1996 disappearance of Kalpana 
Chakma, central organizing secretary of the Hill Women's Federation, an 
organization of tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading punishment; however, police routinely employ physical and 
psychological torture and other abuse during arrests and 
interrogations. Torture may consist of threats, beatings and, 
occasionally, the use of electric shock. The Government rarely convicts 
or punishes those responsible for torture, and a climate of impunity 
allows such police abuses to continue. After several Dhaka policemen 
were arrested in 1998 for allegedly beating to death a college student 
in police custody (see Section 1.a.), the deputy commissioner of the 
Dhaka police detective branch publicly defended the use of physical 
coercion against suspects, saying that the practice was necessary in 
order to obtain information. Housewife Nasima Begum was beaten after 
her arrest under the SPA on April 25, then subjected to harsh 
interrogation lasting several days (see also Section 1.d.).
    Rape of female detainees in police or other official custody is a 
problem. Authorities routinely do not take action against those 
responsible, nor do they move to correct the circumstances that promote 
such abuses. According to human rights groups and media reports, police 
engaged in violence and looting during the July raid of the Tanbazar 
and Nimtali red-light districts, allegedly attacking residents as well 
as over 40 female human rights activists who were protesting the 
eviction. In July the evicted sex workers, who were detained forcibly 
in a center for vagrants, alleged that the guards, center employees, 
and the vagrants who were staying at the center tortured and raped some 
of them because they refused to provide sexual favors (see Section 
1.f.). Police also rape women who are not in custody.
    On September 14, a police constable allegedly raped a 15-year-old 
girl in a government building in Tangail; the girl had been visiting a 
relative in an adjacent medical clinic. In addition after women report 
that they were raped (or were involved in family disputes), they 
frequently are detained in ``safe custody,'' where they endure poor 
conditions, and sometimes are raped or otherwise abused (see Sections 
1.d. and 5).
    According to family members throughout her April and May 
imprisonment (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.), police did not permit 
Zobaida Rashid, wife of a convicted murderer of Sheikh Mujib Rahman, 
access to necessary medications or other health care. Prison guards 
slapped and kicked Zobaida occasionally, denied her proper food, and 
did not permit other prisoners to talk with her.
    The police often employ excessive, sometimes lethal, force in 
dealing with opposition demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and 3). 
On January 26, during an opposition-enforced hartal, police reportedly 
beat a BNP M.P. near the National Press Club in Dhaka; the M.P. was 
admitted later to a hospital with head injuries (see Sections 1.a., 
2.b., and 3). On February 9, police did not interfere as an Awami 
Leaque M.P. ordered the killings of two BNP activists; one was shot to 
death and the other was beaten with a pistol (see Section 1.a.). On 
February 11, police shot Shafiul Alam Prodhan, president of the small 
opposition party Jatiya Ganotantrik, with pellets in Central Dhaka. 
Allegedly, police suddenly launched an attack on the party's prohartal 
procession, and shot Prodhan from behind. Police and ruling party 
activists also reportedly opened fire on a procession of opposition-
party Jamaat-e-Islami members in downtown Dhaka, wounding three Jamaat 
activists and a roadside vendor. During a general strike on May 11, 
police beat several senior opposition leaders leading a procession. 
Police injured at least 20 persons, including 5 journalists, when they 
fired rubber bullets and tear gas. Police also partially stripped one 
opposition female demonstrator of her sari. On February 24, in Dhaka, a 
rickshaw puller had his arm blown off in front of the National Press 
Club; some eyewitnesses said that the bomb came from a bus manned by 
antihartal activists, while others said that it came from nearby 
prohartal activists. Police apprehended no one in the incident, but 
clubbed the bus passengers before letting them go on their way. Police 
also beat at least four photographers taking pictures of the incident 
(see Section 2.a.).
    Police corruption remains a problem and there were credible reports 
that police facilitated or were involved in trafficking in women and 
children (see Section 6.f.).
    Both opposition and ruling parties routinely use actual or 
threatened violence to achieve political ends. Violence is a common 
feature during rallies, demonstrations, and general strikes. For 
example, several persons were killed and over 350 persons of various 
parties were injured by gunshots, bombs, stab wounds, and clubs, during 
a 3-day hartal in February (see Sections 1.a., 2.b. and 3). On March 7, 
two bomb explosions killed 8 persons and injured over 100 persons in 
Jessore (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
    Some opposition political activities allegedly are staged with the 
intent of provoking violent clashes, in order to embarrass the 
Government and galvanize public opinion (see Section 2.b.). A September 
12 opposition sit-in around the Secretariat, the office complex in 
central Dhaka where most government ministries have their headquarters, 
ended in police clashes with the opposition when several small bombs 
were thrown near police, and police responded with tear gas and rubber 
bullets. In addition police beat several BNP leaders, including four 
M.P.'s. More than a dozen police members received bomb injuries over 
the 3 days. On September 13, after a policeman received a head injury 
from a bomb blast, angry police officers chased and beat many nearby 
pedestrians, administering a severe beating to one middle-aged man 
emerging from a mosque. The opposition claimed that ruling party 
provocateurs were responsible for the bombs. During the violence at the 
sit-in, and the ensuing 3-day nationwide general strike called by the 
opposition, 1 person was killed and at least 300 persons were injured 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). During a November 8 hartal, police fired 
rubber bullets at a BNP procession, wounding BNP M.P. Sadeq Hossain 
Khoka, former Environment Minister Abdullah Al Noman, and a BNP city 
ward commissioner. In addition to several other deaths, newspapers 
estimated that more than 80 persons were injured during the hartal (see 
Section 1.a.).
    During a November 15 parliamentary election in Tangail, at a 
polling center voters began to throw stones at security forces, which 
then opened fire. Police wounded nine persons, many seriously (see 
Section 3).
    During the February 16 murder attack of Kazi Aref Ahmed, unknown 
gunmen killed 6 persons and injured over 20 others (see Section 1.a.). 
The slayings seemingly were part of settling scores between local 
splinter political parties which have evolved into gangs.
    In October 6 persons were killed and 40 persons were injured when a 
bomb exploded inside of a Khulna mosque (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
    There was occasional violence against members of the Ahmadiya 
religious minority. In January several hundred persons attacked the 
Ahmadiya place of worship in Kushtia, beating many devotees and 
destroying property (see Section 5).
    In rural areas, human rights groups and press reports indicate that 
vigilantism against women for perceived moral transgressions occurs, 
and may include humiliating, painful punishments (see Sections 1.a. and 
5).
    Prison conditions are extremely poor for the majority of the prison 
population. Official figures indicated that 100 persons died in prison 
as of September 30 (see Section 1.a.). According to credible sources, 
poor conditions were at least a contributing factor in many of these 
deaths. Most prisons are overcrowded and lack adequate facilities. 
According to government figures, the current prison population of more 
than 60,000 is roughly 250 percent of the official prison capacity. In 
some cases, cells are so crowded that prisoners sleep in shifts. A 1998 
judicial report noted the poor physical condition of jails and 
unhygienic food preparation. The treatment of prisoners in the jails is 
not equal. There are three classes of cells: A, B, and C. Common 
criminals and low-level political workers generally are held in C 
cells, which often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor quality 
food. The use of restraining devices on prisoners in these cells is 
common. Conditions in A and B cells are markedly better; A cells are 
reserved for prominent prisoners.
    In general the Government does not permit prison visits by 
independent human rights monitors (see Section 4). Government-appointed 
committees of prominent private citizens in each prison locality 
monitor prisons monthly, but do not release their findings. District 
judges also visit prisons monthly, but rarely disclose their findings.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued 
to arrest and to detain persons arbitrarily, as well as to use national 
security legislation(the SPA) to detain citizens without formal charges 
or specific complaints being filed against them. The Constitution 
states that each person arrested shall be informed of the grounds for 
detention, provided access to a lawyer of his choice, brought before a 
magistrate within 24 hours, and freed unless the magistrate authorizes 
continued detention. However, the Constitution specifically allows 
preventive detention, with specified safeguards, outside these 
requirements. In practice, authorities frequently violate these 
constitutional provisions, even in non-preventive detention cases. In 
an April ruling, a two-judge High Court panel criticized the police 
force for rampant abuse of detention laws and powers.
    Under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, individuals may 
be detained for suspicion of criminal activity without an order from a 
magistrate or a warrant. Some persons initially detained under Section 
54 subsequently are charged with a crime, while others are released 
without any charge. According to the Government, 1,329 persons were 
detained in Dhaka alone under Section 54 through September 30. In 1998 
the Home Minister acknowledged that police abuse Section 54. The 
Government sometimes uses Section 54 to harass and to intimidate 
members of the political opposition and their families. After a bomb 
exploded in Jessore in March, police quickly detained 46 activists of 
the Jamaat-e-Islami and its student front, many under Section 54. There 
did not appear to be concrete evidence tying those detained to the 
crime, and the activists eventually were released (see Sections 1.a. 
and 1.c.). In addition police commonly detain opposition activists 
prior to and during general strikes without citing any legal authority, 
holding them until the event is over. On September 13, police arrested 
the one non-M.P. in a prohartal procession of nine BNP leaders. The 
police also on occasion detain persons for personal vengeance.
    Under the SPA, the Government or a district magistrate may order 
anyone detained for 30 days to prevent the commission of an act likely 
``to prejudice the security of the country.'' Other offenses subject to 
the SPA include smuggling, black market activity, or hoarding. The 
Government (or magistrate) must inform the detainee of the grounds for 
detention within 15 days, and the Government must approve the grounds 
for detention within 30 days or release the detainee. In practice 
detainees sometimes are held for longer periods without the Government 
stating the grounds for the detention or formally approving it. 
Detainees may appeal their detention, and the Government may grant 
early release.
    An advisory board composed of two persons who have been, or are 
qualified to be, high court judges, and one civil servant are supposed 
to examine the cases of SPA detainees after 4 months. If the Government 
adequately defends its detention order, the detainee remains 
imprisoned; if not, the detainee is released. Appellate courts 
sometimes order authorities to release SPA detainees after finding that 
the Government is unable to justify the detention. If the defendant in 
an SPA case is able to present his case before the High Court in Dhaka, 
the High Court generally rules in favor of the defendant. However, many 
defendants are either too poor or, because of strict detention, are 
unable to obtain legal counsel and thereby move the case beyond the 
magistrate level. Magistrates are subject to the administrative 
controls of the Law Ministry and are less likely to dismiss a case (see 
Section 1.e.). Detainees are allowed to consult with lawyers, although 
usually not until a charge is filed. They are not entitled to be 
represented by a lawyer before an advisory board. Detainees may receive 
visitors. While in the past the Government has held incommunicado some 
prominent prisoners, there were no known cases of incommunicado 
detention during the year.
    There is a system of bail for criminal offenses. Bail is granted 
commonly for both violent and nonviolent crimes. If bail is not 
granted, the law does not specify a time limit on pretrial detention. 
Persons arrested under the Women and Children Repression Prevention 
Act, which provides special procedures for persons accused of violence 
against women and children, cannot be granted bail during an initial 
investigation period of up to 90 days. Some human rights groups express 
concern that a large number of allegations made under the act are 
false, since the non-bailable period of detention is an effective tool 
for exacting personal vengeance. According to government figures, 1,968 
persons were detained under this act during the first 9 months of the 
year.
    Prisons often are used to provide ``safe custody'' for women who 
are victims of rapes or domestic violence (see Sections 1.d. and 5). 
One study conducted by the Bangladesh National Woman Lawyers 
Association (BNWLA) found that nearly half of the women in Dhaka's 
Central Jail were crime victims being held in safe custody, not 
criminals (see Sections 1.c. and 5). While women may consent initially 
to this arrangement, it often is difficult for them later to obtain 
their release, or to gain access to family or lawyers. One 25-year-old 
woman who was freed during the year through the efforts of a human 
rights group had agreed to safe custody after being gang raped, then 
spent almost4 years in prison while seeking her release. Police 
officers sometimes rape women in ``safe custody'' (see Section 1.c.).
    A major problem with the court system is the overwhelming backlog 
of cases, which produces long pretrial delays. According to an official 
of the Law Ministry, almost 800,000 cases were pending in criminal and 
civil courts in December. Approximately 44,000 persons, or 73 percent 
of the country's prison population, were awaiting trial or under trial. 
Government sources report that the period between detention and trial 
averages 6 months, but press and human rights groups report some 
instances of pretrial detention lasting several years. Trials often are 
characterized by lengthy adjournments, which considerably prolong the 
incarceration of accused persons who do not receive bail.
    The Government cites a significant reduction in the number of 
persons held under the SPA as evidence that it is minimizing its use of 
the act. According to the Government, 739 persons were under SPA 
detention as of August. This was somewhat fewer than the 885 persons 
under detention as of July 1998, and a substantial decrease from the 
approximately 2,000 persons under SPA detention in mid-1997. According 
to the Government, authorities detained 2,586 persons under the SPA 
from the beginning of the year through the end of August--1,642 for 
terrorism and antisocial activity, 932 for smuggling, and 12 for acts 
prejudicial to national security. The Government released 2,307 SPA 
detainees during the same period.
    There are credible reports from human rights monitors and political 
activists that the Awami League Government uses the SPA as a tool to 
harass and to intimidate political opponents and others. On April 21, 
authorities arrested Zobaida Rashid, the wife of one of the persons 
convicted in absentia in November 1998 for the 1975 murder of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman (father of the current Prime Minister), without a 
warrant. Zobaida Rashid had been arrested in 1996 in the Sheikh Mujib 
murder case, and there were credible reports of her mistreatment in 
custody at the time; in June 1997, the High Court ordered charges 
against her dismissed as groundless. After her April arrest, Rashid was 
held under the SPA--the Government alleged that Zobaida was plotting to 
undermine stability in Bangladesh and create a crisis situation through 
attacks on power and water facilities. Her lawyer argued that she 
actually was detained because authorities had never accepted the 
dismissal of charges against her in the Sheikh Mujib trial. Her family 
alleged that she was mistreated while in prison (see Section 1.c.). She 
was freed in early June, several days after the High Court ruled her 
detention illegal. On February 24, police arrested Neaz Ahmed, the 
brother-in-law of Sajal Chowdhury, an opposition activist killed 2 
weeks earlier by gunmen linked to a ruling party M.P. (see Section 
1.a.). Ahmed was a key witness in the family's murder complaint. He was 
charged with offenses ranging from bombing the residence of the Speaker 
of Parliament to looting, arson, and rioting. After a judge granted him 
bail, the Government detained him under the SPA. He finally was freed 
on March 31, after the High Court declared his detention illegal.
    Citizens who are not political opponents sometimes also are 
detained arbitrarily. Housewife Nasima Begum was arrested under the SPA 
on April 25, allegedly for treason and sabotage; credible reports 
stated that she was detained as a result of a personal dispute over 
property. She was released on May 14 after the High Court ruled the 
charges unfounded (see Section 1.c.). A 10-year-old boy was detained 
under the SPA on December 22, 1998; police recorded his age as 19 in 
jail records. The Home Minister ordered the boy released in early 
January, after press reports and a High Court directive to police to 
explain the case. On July 24, police forcibly removed 267 sex workers 
from two Dhaka brothels, and then detained them without charges and 
without allowing them access to legal counsel for several weeks (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.f.). In its April judgment criticizing the police 
for abuse of detention powers, the High Court commented that the police 
had become a law breaking agency. Most persons detained under the SPA 
ultimately are released without charges being brought to trial (see 
Sections 1.f. and 2.a.).
    The Government sometimes uses serial detentions to prevent the 
release of political activists. Saidur Rahman Newton, vice president of 
the BNP's student wing, was arrested first on January 6. He was granted 
bail six times over the next 6 months, but was detained in prison on 
new charges each time.
    Numerous court cases have been filed against opposition M.P.'s and 
activists, on charges ranging from corruption to murder. In June the 
Prime Minister told Parliament that more than 70 current BNP M.P.'s 
were under investigation for alleged corruption during the previous 
government. Obaidur Rahman, a BNP M.P., remained in prison. Rahman and 
two other political figures were arrested in October 1998 for alleged 
complicity in the 1975 ``jail killings'' of four senior Awami League 
leaders. In July and August the Government suffered reversals when 
courts invalidated as legally deficient two government efforts atcharge 
sheets (similar to an indictment) in the case. The Government continued 
to hold eight persons accused of perpetrating these murders; at year's 
end, legal proceedings remained at a preliminary stage due to legal 
challenges by defense lawyers.
    Some opposition activists were detained or charged in questionable 
cases. In April authorities charged 22 persons with the August 1998 
murder of Jessore magazine editor Saiful Alam Makul (see Section 2.a.). 
All 22 persons are opposition party members, including a former 
minister of social welfare and 20 other persons from the BNP. 
Journalists and others cited numerous weaknesses in the Government's 
case, leading some observers to allege that the charges were a means to 
harass the opposition and allow the real murderers to escape.
    In July the Government detained two union officials who were 
organizing a government strike; after a month, the High Court declared 
the detention to be illegal, and they were released (see 6.a.).
    It is difficult to estimate the total number of detentions for 
political reasons. In some instances criminal charges may apply to the 
actions of activists, and many criminals claim political affiliations. 
Because of crowded court dockets and magistrates who are reluctant to 
challenge the Government, the judicial system does not deal effectively 
with criminal cases that may be political in origin. There is no 
independent body with the authority and ability to monitor detentions, 
or to prevent, detect, or publicize cases of political harassment. Most 
such detentions appear to be for short periods, such as several days or 
weeks. Defendants in most cases receive bail, but dismissal of wrongful 
charges or acquittal may take years.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary; however, under a longstanding ``temporary'' 
provision of the Constitution, some subordinate courts remain part of 
the executive and are subject to its influence. The higher levels of 
the judiciary display a significant degree of independence and often 
rule against the Government in criminal, civil, and even politically 
controversial cases; however, lower level courts are more susceptible 
to pressure from the executive branch. There also is corruption within 
the legal process, especially at lower levels.
    There was tension between the executive and the judiciary during 
the year. The Government repeatedly charged that the High Court 
indiscriminately granted bail to criminals, crippling efforts to combat 
crime. In March the Supreme Court dismissed a contempt of court 
petition brought by the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association 
against the Prime Minister for remarks she made at a January press 
conference. The Prime Minister said that her remarks were 
mischaracterized, and apologized for any offense. The Supreme Court's 
judgment observed that the Prime Minister's remarks contained gross 
factual errors about bail decisions and called into public question the 
independence of the judiciary. The judgment noted that the courts were 
at a serious disadvantage in responding to such political attacks. 
Speaking to Parliament in September, the Home Minister accused High 
Court judges of ``sheltering terrorists'' by granting them bail.
    The court system has two levels: The lower courts and the Supreme 
Court. Both hear civil and criminal cases. The lower courts consist of 
magistrates, who are part of the administrative branch of government, 
and session and district judges, who belong to the judicial branch. The 
Supreme Court is divided into two sections, the High Court and the 
Appellate Court. The High Court hears original cases and reviews cases 
from the lower courts. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to hear 
appeals of judgments, decrees, orders, or sentences of the High Court. 
Rulings of the Appellate Court are binding on all other courts.
    Trials are public. The law provides the accused with the right to 
be represented by counsel, to review accusatory material, to call 
witnesses, and to appeal verdicts. State-funded defense attorneys 
rarely are provided, and there are few legal aid programs to offer 
financial assistance. In rural areas, individuals often do not receive 
legal representation. In urban areas, legal counsel generally is 
available if individuals can afford the expense. However, sometimes 
detainees and suspects on police remand are denied access to legal 
counsel. Trials conducted under the SPA and the Women and Children 
Repression Prevention Act are similar to normal trials, but are tried 
without the lengthy adjournments typical in other cases.
    Persons may be tried in absentia, although this rarely is done. In 
November 1998, 15 of the 19 defendants tried for the 1975 killing of 
then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (father of current Prime Minister 
Sheikh Hasina) and several of his family members were convicted and 
sentenced to death, and 4 persons were acquitted. Fourteen of the 
defendants were tried in absentia, and 12 of them were convicted. At 
year's end, all 15 death sentences were awaiting automatic review by 
the High Court. The High Court is to rule simultaneously on appeals 
filed by five defendants present in the country. There is no automatic 
right to a retrial if a person convicted in absentia later returns. 
Absent defendants may be represented by state-appointed counsel (as was 
done in the Sheikh Mujibur case), but may not choose their own 
attorneys, and, if convicted, may not file appeals until they return to 
the country.
    A major problem of the court system is the overwhelming backlog of 
cases, and trials under way typically are marked by extended 
continuances while many accused persons remain in prison (see Section 
1.d.). These conditions, and the corruption encountered in the judicial 
process, effectively prevent many persons from obtaining a fair trial 
or justice. According to one independent sample survey conducted by 
Transparency International, more than half of the persons involved in 
court cases paid bribes to court officials. Because of the difficulty 
accessing the courts and because litigation is time consuming, 
alternate dispute resolution by traditional village leaders, which is 
regarded by some persons to be more transparent and swift, is popular 
in rural communities.
    The Government states that it holds no political prisoners, but the 
BNP and human rights monitors claim that many opposition activists have 
been arrested and convicted under criminal charges as a pretext for 
their political activities. It is not clear how many political 
prisoners actually are being held (also see Section 1.d).
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The law requires authorities to obtain a judicial 
warrant before entering a home; however, according to human rights 
monitors, police rarely obtain warrants, and officers violating the 
procedure are not punished. In addition the SPA permits searches 
without a warrant.
    The Government sometimes forcibly resettles persons against their 
will. On July 24, police forcibly removed 267 sex workers from a large 
brothel district in Tanbazar, Narayanganj. Authorities claimed that the 
women wished to be rehabilitated, but credible eyewitness accounts 
state that the women refused the offer. The 267 women were confined in 
a center for vagrants, where some alleged that they were abused. 
Although most women were released from the vagrant houses by year's 
end, some continued to be detained at the end of the year (see Sections 
1.c.). The July ``rehabilitation'' drive in Tanbazar also caused 
several thousand other sex workers to flee the area.
    From August 8-11, 1,500 police and paramilitary troops forced more 
than 50,000 persons from their homes in six Dhaka slum areas. The 
action followed the August 6 murder of one police officer and wounding 
of nine others by a criminal gang in one of the slums. On August 7, 
authorities decided to demolish 74 Dhaka slums on Government-owned 
land. On August 11, the High Court temporarily barred the Government 
from continuing with the slum clearance drive after three human rights 
organizations argued that the Government had not followed the required 
legal process. On August 24, the High Court reversed its restriction, 
but urged the Government to adopt a phased approach to slum clearance, 
with prior assistance for voluntary resettlement. The Government stated 
that it viewed the order as morally, if not legally, binding, and has 
not attempted to carry out its earlier plans for large-scale slum 
clearance in Dhaka. A September 27 government circular asked all 
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to cease operations in slum 
areas, and to shift their efforts to assisting the Government's 
resettlement efforts. NGO's did not respond to the request and the 
Government withdrew the circular.
    The Government sometimes punishes family members for the alleged 
violations of others (see Section 1.c.).
    The police Special Branch, National Security Intelligence, and the 
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) employ informers to 
report on citizens perceived to be political opponents of the 
Government, and conduct surveillance of them. Human rights activists, 
foreign NGO's, and journalists report occasional harassment by these 
security organizations. After a reporter published a story about the 
alleged suicide of an army general in December, the DGFI subjected him 
to a 3-hour interrogation.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech, expression, and the press, subject to ``reasonable 
restrictions'' in the interest of security, friendly relations with 
foreign states, public order, decency and morality, or to prohibit 
defamation or incitement to an offense, and with some exceptions, the 
Government generally respects these rights. Citizens freely express 
criticism of the Government.
    The press, numbering hundreds of daily and weekly publications, is 
a forum for a wide range of views. While most publications support the 
overall policies of the Government, many newspapers report critically 
on government policies and activities, including those of the Prime 
Minister. In addition to an official government-owned wire service, 
there is one privately owned wire service affiliated with a major 
international company. A second such service closed early in the year 
for financial reasons.
    Newspaper ownership and content are not subject to direct 
government restriction. However, if the Government chooses, it can 
influence journalists through financial means. Government-sponsored 
advertising and allocations of newsprint imported at a favorable tariff 
rate are central to many newspapers' financial viability. Government-
sponsored advertising is the largest source of revenue for many 
newspapers. In allocating advertising through the Department of Films 
and Publications, the Government states that it considers circulation 
of the newspapers, wage board implementation, objectivity in reporting, 
coverage of development activities, and ``attitude towards the spirit 
of Bangladesh's War of Liberation.'' Commercial organizations often are 
reluctant to advertise in newspapers critical of the Government due to 
fear of unspecified governmental or bureaucratic retaliation.
    Attacks on journalists and newspapers, and efforts to intimidate 
them by government officials, political party activists, and others, 
occasionally occur. Such attacks by political activists are common 
during times of political street violence, and some journalists also 
are injured in police actions (see Section 1.c.). On February 11, 
activists from the ruling party ransacked the offices of a newspaper 
associated with Jamaat-e-Islami. On February 24, the Jamaat-e-Islami's 
Sangbad newspaper was raided by Awami League activists during a hartal, 
then subjected to tear gas by police responding to the journalists' 
distress call. On May 20, activists from the Jamaat student front threw 
stones and issued threats at the Chittagong office of an independent 
Bangla daily. On August 30, several gunshots were fired at the offices 
of a progovernment Bangla daily just after a procession from the BNP 
passed the building. One employee of the newspaper suffered a gunshot 
wound. In April authorities charged 22 members of the opposition with 
the August 1998 murder of magazine editor Saiful Alam Makul, but there 
is doubt that the persons who were charged are guilty of the crime (see 
Section 1.d.). When a rickshaw puller had his arm blown off during a 
February hartal, police officers beat at least four photographers 
taking pictures of the incident (see Section 1.c.).
    Virtually all print journalists practice self-censorship to some 
degree, and are reluctant to criticize politically influential 
personalities in both the Government and the opposition. Many 
journalists cite fear of possible harassment, retaliation, or physical 
harm as a reason to avoid sensitive stories. For example, when Awami 
League M.P. Makbul Hossain ordered the murder of a BNP student activist 
on February 9 during an opposition-called hartal, only one newspaper 
covered the details of the killing; other newspapers picked up the 
story only in a very limited fashion, with very few follow-up stories 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). A February report that detailed rampant 
corruption in the December 10, 1998 parliamentary by-election (see 
Section 3) received extensive coverage only in the handful of 
opposition-affiliated newspapers. In August the High Court directed 
four newspapers to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt 
for publishing allegedly distorted articles in 1998 regarding the 
granting of bail by the Court.
    Journalists and others are potentially subject to incarceration as 
a result of criminal libel proceedings filed by private parties. Ruling 
party M.P.'s filed separate criminal libel suits against several 
newspapers after articles were published that the politicians viewed as 
false and defamatory. The journalists in all cases received 
anticipatory bail from the courts, and none of the cases moved to 
trial. Sedition charges filed against a Bangla newspaper in February 
1998 remained pending, and those persons accused remained on bail.
    Feminist author Taslima Nasreen, whose writings and statements 
provoked death threats from some Islamic groups in 1993 and 1994, left 
the country for Europe in 1994. Nasreen returned to Bangladesh in 
September 1998, and then left the country again in January (see Section 
5). The Government provided some protection for Nasreen from possible 
threats, and she remained in hiding. During her stay, the Government 
made no move to proceed with charges filed against her in 1994 of 
intentionally insulting religious beliefs, and a judge ordered 
anticipatory bail on a similar case filed in 1994 by a private citizen.
    The Government owns and controls radio and television stations, 
which do not provide balanced coverage of the news. The activities of 
the Prime Minister occupy the bulk of prime time news bulletins on both 
television and radio, followed by the activities of members of the 
Cabinet. Opposition party news gets little coverage. In its 1996 
election manifesto, the Awami League called for the privatization of 
the state-controlled media. A government committee subsequently 
recommended measures for authorizing private radio and television 
broadcasts. No move has been made to grant autonomy to the state-owned 
Bangladesh Radio and Television. However, the Ministry of Information 
solicited and received bids from parties interested in establishing 
private television and radio stations. A private radio station began 
operations in March, and the Government approved a private television 
station owned by the same person. That television station did not begin 
broadcasting by year's end. As a condition of operation, both these 
stations are required to broadcast free some government news bulletins 
and speeches by the Prime Minister and President.
    Foreign publications are subject to review and censorship. 
Censorship most often is used in cases of immodest or obscene 
photographs, perceived misrepresentation or defamation of Islam, and 
objectionable comments about national leaders. The Government banned 
the March 20 issue of the West Bengal weekly Desh, which contained a 
poem by Taslima Nasreen. On August 12, the Government announced that it 
was banning the import, sale, and distribution of the book ``My 
Childhood'' by Nasreen. In both cases, the Government bans cited the 
likelihood that the material would hurt the feelings and religious 
sentiments of the Muslim community and inflame passions.
    A government Film Censor Board reviews local and foreign films, and 
may censor or ban them on the grounds of state security, law and order, 
religious sentiment, obscenity, foreign relations, defamation, or 
plagiarism. No films were banned or censored during the year. The 
Government does not limit citizens' access to the Internet.
    Academic freedom generally is respected by the Government. Teachers 
and students at all levels are free to pursue academic assignments 
except on extremely sensitive religious and political topics.
    The situation on public university campuses remains volatile, 
seriously inhibiting the ability of students to receive a university 
education and of teachers to teach. Armed clashes between rival student 
groups resulted in temporary closures of universities or colleges in 
Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Sylhet, and Mymemsingh. In August 
students at Jahangirnagar University near Dhaka protested what they 
viewed as ineffective responses by the university to deal with campus 
violence caused by two rival local factions of the ruling party's 
student wing. Violence between student political factions has little to 
do with ideological differences, and more to do with extortion rackets 
run by nonstudent party activists, including those based on physical 
control of dormitories. As a result of widespread violence and campus 
closures, it takes on average 6 years or more to earn a 4-year degree. 
However, several private universities that were established during the 
1990's are not affected by student political violence.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom of assembly, subject to restrictions in the 
interest of public order and public health; however, the Government 
limits this right on occasion. The Government sometimes prohibits 
rallies for security reasons, but many independent observers believe 
that such explanations usually are a pretext. Several rallies of Kader 
Siddiqi, a dissident ruling party M.P. who later was expelled from the 
Awami League, were prohibited in July and August for alleged security 
reasons. In December Kader Siddiqi scheduled a Dhaka rally at which he 
planned to announce the formation of a new political party. Members of 
the Awami League student wing broke up the rally with gunfire, homemade 
bombs, and beatings. Subsequently, the Government refused to allow 
Siddiqi to hold another rally at a popular Dhaka park, although it 
routinely authorized other such rallies. When Siddiqi's followers came 
to the park for the rally, police forcefully removed them (see Section 
3). Authorities banned an April 3 BNP rally in Rajshahi after the Awami 
League also called a rally for the same time and place.
    Authorities also permit armed ruling party activists to blockade 
roads and take other steps to disrupt opposition events. For example, 
ruling party activists placed barricades on several roads into Dhaka on 
the morning of September 12, preventing opposition activists from 
joining a sit-in around the Secretariat.
    Ruling party supporters, often with the connivance and support of 
the police, violently disrupted rallies and demonstrations of the 
opposition parties. On March 3, Awami League activists attacked a 
Jatiya Party rally in Rangpur, injuring 50 persons. Police did not 
intervene to stop the violence, and no one was arrested. On May 11, 
police forcibly prevented a small group of prohartal processionists, 
led by BNP M.P.'s, from reaching the BNP Dhaka headquarters. Police 
fired rubber bullets and tear gas, and at one point nearly removed a 
female activist's sari (see Section 1.c.). During a September 13-15 
hartal, police broke up a BNP procession near the BNP Dhaka 
headquarters and briefly detained and beat several party leaders, 
including four M.P.'s, (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Two days later, 33 
BNP M.P.'s were allowed to parade and give speeches, but their 
supporters were kept away.
    Numerous opposition-called hartals took place during the year at 
the national or local levels. There were 27 days of hartals during the 
year. The opposition called several hartals in January and February to 
protest the holding of municipal council elections without taking steps 
demanded by the opposition (see Section 3). The strikes included ones 
on January 26, February 9-11, and February 23-25. On July 8, the 
opposition called a hartal to protest the Government's budget. The 
opposition called a hartal from September 13-15 to protest the violent 
end to the opposition's September 12 sit-in at the Secretariat (see 
Section 1.c.). The opposition also called hartals on November 1, 
November 7-9, November 16, November 26, December 5-6, December 13, 
December 13-14, December 15, and December 18, and other days.
    Many persons died in violence during the numerous hartals, and 
hundreds were injured, including opposition activists, police, and many 
ordinary citizens (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 3).
    Local ruling party groups sometimes also call local general 
strikes. An Awami League faction enforced a general strike in 
Chittagong on July 8 when its leader was arrested. Party activists 
enforce these strikes through threatened or actual violence toward 
strikebreakers. Those who are opposed to or neutral toward the strike 
are coerced into observing prohibitions against vehicular transport and 
normal operation of businesses. Both opposition and ruling party 
activists mount processions during general strikes. Police rarely 
interfere with ruling party processions on such occasions; police and 
ruling party activists often work in tandem to disrupt and to 
discourage opposition processions. On May 13, a High Court panel, 
acting on its own initiative, affirmed that violence and coercion for 
or against general strikes constituted criminal activities, and 
directed police to take appropriate action. At the request of the BNP, 
the Supreme Court stayed this ruling.
    The Constitution provides for the right of every citizen to form 
associations, subject to ``reasonable restrictions'' in the interest of 
morality or public order, and in general the Government respects this 
right. Individuals are free to join private groups, but a local 
magistrate must approve public meetings.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Islam as the 
state religion but also stipulates the right to practice the religion 
of one's choice, and the Government respects this provision in 
practice. However, although the Government is secular, religion exerts 
a powerful influence on politics, and the Government is sensitive to 
the Muslim consciousness of the majority of its citizens. Approximately 
88 percent of the population are Muslim. Some members of the Hindu, 
Christian, and Buddhist minorities continue to perceive and experience 
discrimination toward them from the Muslim majority (see Section 5).
    The law permits citizens to proselytize. However, strong social 
resistance to conversion from Islam means that most missionary efforts 
by non-Muslims are aimed at Hindus and tribal groups. The Government 
allows various religions to establish places of worship, to train 
clergy, to travel for religious purposes, and to maintain links with 
co-religionists abroad. Foreign missionaries may work in the country, 
but their right to proselytize is not protected by the Constitution. 
Some missionaries face problems in obtaining visas.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally are able to move 
freely within the country and to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to 
repatriate; however, there were instances in which the Government 
restricted these rights. The Government confiscated the passports of 
two high-profile members of the opposition Jatiya Party, depriving them 
of the right to travel outside the country. In August immigration 
officers seized the passport of the party's general secretary, Naziur 
Rahman Monzur, as he was at the airport preparing to leave the country 
on a personal trip. In December party chairman and former president, 
Mohammed Ershad, was at the airport with the Chinese Ambassador 
awaiting a flight to China on an official visit. Airport officials 
seized his passport. Ershad appealed to the courts for its return. A 
hearing was scheduled for January 31, 2000.
    The law does not include provisions for granting refugee and asylee 
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 
Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. The law does not provide for first asylum or resettlement of 
asylum seekers. However, in practice, the Government grants temporary 
asylum to individual asylum seekers whom the UNHCR has interviewed and 
recognized as refugees, on a case-by-case basis. At the request of the 
UNHCR, the Government has allowed about 200 asylum seekers, mostly from 
Somalia and Iran, to remain in Bangladesh for several years until they 
can arrange their resettlement in another country.
    Approximately 300,000 Bihari Muslims live in various camps around 
the country; they have remained in the country since 1971 awaiting 
settlement in Pakistan. Biharis are non-Bengali Muslims who emigrated 
to what formerly was East Pakistan during the 1947 partition of British 
India. Most supported Pakistan during Bangladesh's 1971 war of 
independence. They later declined to accept Bangladesh citizenship and 
asked to be repatriated to Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan 
historically has been reluctant to accept the Biharis.
    Approximately 260,000 Rohingya refugees (Muslims from the northern 
Burmese state of Arakan) crossed into southeastern Bangladesh in late 
1991 and 1992, fleeing repression. Since 1992 approximately 238,000 
Rohingyas have been repatriated voluntarily to Burma, leaving 
approximately 22,000 in two camps administered by the Government in 
cooperation with the UNHCR. After blocking further repatriation since 
August 1997, Burma allowed repatriation to resume in November 1998, but 
at such a slow rate that births in the camps outnumbered repatriations. 
The UNHCR urged the Government to allow any refugees who could not 
return to Burma to be allowed to work in the country, benefit from 
local medical programs, and send their children tolocal schools. The 
Government refused these requests, insisting that all Rohingya refugees 
must remain in the camps until they return to Burma. In July the 
Burmese Foreign Minister visited Dhaka, but the Government was unable 
to obtain assurances of concrete Burmese steps to accelerate 
repatriation. While some reports indicated that refugees had been 
pressured to volunteer for repatriation, UNHCR officials state that 
procedures for verifying the voluntariness of repatriation applications 
were followed rigorously.
    Several thousand more Rohingyas arrived during the year, but recent 
arrivals avoided the camps and attempted to settle in the southeastern 
areas of the country. The Government effectively denied first asylum to 
the new arrivals it encountered by categorizing them as illegal 
economic migrants, turned back as many as possible at the border, and 
denied UNHCR officials access to those who did enter the country 
successfully.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Bangladesh is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy in which 
elections by secret ballot are held on the basis of universal suffrage. 
M.P.'s are elected at least every 5 years. The Parliament has 300 
elected members, with 30 additional seats for women, who are chosen by 
Parliament. Under a 1996 constitutional amendment, general 
parliamentary elections are presided over by a caretaker government, 
led by the most recently retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
Domestic and international observers deemed the last general election, 
held in June 1996, to be generally free and fair. The high voter 
turnout of 75 percent set a new record.
    In June the Government passed legislation that allowed it to delay 
by several months elections for the new upazilla (sub-district) level 
of government, and for mayor and ward commissioners in four major 
cities. The elections had been required to be held in July and 
September, respectively. At the end of December, the opposition was 
agitating against scheduling upazilla elections and municipal 
elections. The Government had not scheduled upazilla elections, and 
municipal elections in three of the four cities were tied up in legal 
challenges. The city elections in Chittagong were scheduled for January 
3, 2000, despite opposition party threats of resistance.
    Elections often are marred by violence, intimidation of voters, and 
vote rigging. The Government and activists of major political parties 
frequently use violence and harassment against political opponents, 
practices that intensify in the period prior to elections. On February 
22, the Fair Election Monitoring Alliance (FEMA), an independent 
umbrella group of NGO's, published its final report on the December 10, 
1998 parliamentary by-election in Pabna. The report documented 
unchecked harassment of opposition supporters by police and ruling 
party activists, concerns about the neutrality of election officials, 
unfair use of government resources to campaign for the ruling party 
candidate, and lopsided results from several polling stations that 
presented prima facie evidence of manipulation. The report concluded 
that the numerous irregularities raised doubt that the victory of the 
Awami League candidate in the by-election represented the will of the 
voters (see Section 2.a.).
    Citing problems in the Pabna by-election, the opposition alliance 
presented a four-point ultimatum to the Government on January 6, 
threatening to boycott upcoming municipal council elections if its 
demands were not met. The opposition stated that the demands, including 
resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner, were required to ensure 
fairness in the elections. The Government did not meet the demands, and 
the opposition boycotted the February 23-25 elections. The opposition 
called a 3-day nationwide general strike to coincide with the 
elections, but did not otherwise obstruct balloting significantly. Some 
opposition candidates ran despite the boycott and won. Violence during 
the elections resulted primarily from conflict between supporters of 
rival ruling party candidates in the elections. The opposition also 
boycotted and called a local hartal, but did not otherwise obstruct a 
May 10 parliamentary by-election in Meherpur. The by-election was held 
to fill the vacancy resulting from the death of the incumbent BNP M.P.
    The ruling Awami League expelled its dissident member Kader Siddiqi 
after his prolonged criticism of the party and its leadership. After 
his expulsion, Siddiqi resigned his seat in Parliament and immediately 
began to campaign as an independent candidate to regain his seat in a 
by-election. The election was marked by massive fraud and vote rigging, 
calling into serious question the purported victory of the Awami League 
candidate in preliminary results. However, the Election Commission 
refused to certify the election results, and at year's end, the 
election dispute still was unresolved, and the parliamentary seat 
remained vacant.
    Political activists, at the local and national levels, also 
reportedly engage in extortion from businesses and individuals.
    Under constitutional amendments enacted in 1991, the country 
changed from a presidential system to a parliament-led system. The 
changes stipulated that an M.P. who resigns from his party or votes 
against it in Parliament automatically loses his seat. In practice, 
this provision solidifies the control of Parliament by the Government 
and the Prime Minister. The lack of democracy within the political 
parties that have formed governments since 1991 has resulted in a 
concentration of political power in the office of the Prime Minister. 
In practice the Prime Minister usually decides on major governmental 
policies with little or no involvement by Parliament. Parliament's 
effectiveness as a deliberative body is undermined further by the 
country's narrow, partisan politics. However, parliamentary standing 
committees on government ministries, which were formed in 1998, now are 
headed by M.P.'s rather than the ministers concerned, increasing the 
committees' effectiveness in overseeing government work.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Thirty 
parliamentary seats are reserved for women chosen by majority vote in 
Parliament; critics charge that these seats act far less to empower 
women than to enhance the ruling party's majority. In addition to these 
seats, women are free to contest any seat in Parliament. Seven women 
were elected in their own right in the 1996 national elections. Seats 
are not specifically reserved for other minority groups, such as tribal 
people. Of the 300 elected M.P.'s, three are Tribal Buddhists from the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts and five are Hindu. The rest are Bengali 
Muslims. The Jamaat-I-Islami, the country's largest Islamic political 
party, had 18 seats in Parliament after the 1991 elections, but only 3 
after the 1996 elections.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    The Government generally permits human rights groups to conduct 
their activities. A wide variety of groups publish reports, hold press 
conferences, and issue appeals to the Government with regard to 
specific cases. While human rights groups often are sharply critical of 
the Government, irrespective of the ruling party, they frequently 
practice self-censorship, particularly on some politically sensitive 
cases and subjects. In past years, the Government has consulted with 
human rights groups on some draft legislation and taken their views 
into account. However, the Government continues to refuse to register 
the Bangladesh Section of Amnesty International, which since 1990 has 
applied several times for registration under the Societies Registration 
Act. Without this registration, a voluntary organization cannot receive 
funding from abroad. Observers attribute the situation to resentment of 
criticism of the Government's human rights record by Amnesty 
International.
    The Government is defensive about international criticism regarding 
human rights issues. However, the Government has been open to dialog 
with international organizations and foreign diplomatic missions 
regarding issues such as the detention of opposition leaders and 
trafficking in women and children. At year's end, legislation to 
establish a National Human Rights Commission had been submitted to the 
cabinet for approval.
    The Government has put pressure on individual human rights 
advocates in the past, but there were no reports of such incidents 
during the year. Such pressure has included long delays in issuing re-
entry visas. Missionaries who advocate human rights have faced similar 
problems.
    Human rights organizations also report that the Government has put 
pressure on them usually in the form of harassment by government 
intelligence agencies, and threats from activists of the ruling party. 
In the past, some NGO's also have faced attacks organized by Muslim 
religious leaders who contend that their activities are ``un-Islamic.'' 
The Government sometimes has failed to criticize, investigate, and 
prosecute perpetrators of these attacks.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal before the 
law and are entitled to equal protection by the law.'' However, in 
practice the Government does not enforce strongly laws aimed at 
eliminating discrimination. In this context, women, children, minority 
groups, and the disabled often confront social and economic 
disadvantages.
    Women.--Violence against women is difficult to quantify because of 
unreliable statistics, but wife beating appears to be widespread. The 
Government, the media, and women's rightsorganizations have fostered a 
growing awareness of the problem of violence against women.
    Much of the violence against women is related to disputes over 
dowries. According to one human rights group, there were 96 dowry-
related killings during the year. Human rights groups and press reports 
indicate that incidents of vigilantism against women--sometimes led by 
religious leaders--at times occur, particularly in rural areas. These 
include humiliating, painful punishments, such as the whipping of women 
accused of moral offenses. Some women are disfigured by assailants who 
fling acid in their faces. The most common motivation for acid-throwing 
attacks against women is revenge by a rejected suitor. There were 130 
cases of acid-throwing reported to police in 1998, the last full year 
for which statistics are available. Few perpetrators of such 
extrajudicial punishments are prosecuted.
    The law prohibits rape and physical spousal abuse, but it makes no 
specific provision for spousal rape as a crime. The Government has 
enacted laws specifically prohibiting certain forms of discrimination 
against women, including the Anti-Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, the 
Cruelty to Women Law of 1983, and the Women and Children Repression 
Prevention Act of 1995. However, enforcement of these laws is weak, 
especially in rural areas, and the Government seldom prosecutes those 
cases that are filed. There are five government-run and four private 
shelter homes available for use by women who are victims of violence. 
These are insufficient to meet victims' shelter needs. As a result, the 
Government often holds women who file rape complaints in ``safe 
custody,'' usually in prison. ``Safe custody'' frequently results in 
further abuses against victims, discouraging the filing of complaints 
by other women, and often continues for extended periods, during which 
the woman is often unable to gain release (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
    There is extensive trafficking in women for the purpose of forced 
prostitution within the country and to other countries in Asia (see 
Section 6.f.).
    For the most part, women remain in a subordinate position in 
society, and the Government has not acted effectively to protect their 
basic freedoms. Literacy rates are approximately 26 percent for women, 
compared with 49 percent for men. In recent years, female school 
enrollment has improved. Approximately 50 percent of primary and 
secondary school students are female. Women often are ignorant of their 
rights because of continued high illiteracy rates and unequal 
educational opportunities, and strong social stigmas and lack of 
economic means to obtain legal assistance frequently keep women from 
seeking redress in the courts. Many NGO's operate programs to raise 
women's awareness of their rights, and to encourage and assist them in 
exercising those rights.
    Under the 1961 Muslim Family Ordinance, female heirs inherit less 
than male relatives do, and wives have fewer divorce rights than 
husbands. Men are permitted to have up to four wives, although this 
right rarely is exercised. Laws provide some protection for women 
against arbitrary divorce and the taking of additional wives by 
husbands without the first wife's consent, but the protections 
generally apply only to registered marriages. Marriages in rural areas 
often are not registered because of ignorance of the law. Under the 
law, a Muslim husband is required to pay his ex-wife alimony for only 3 
months, but this rarely is enforced.
    Employment opportunities have been stronger for women than for men 
in the last decade, which largely is due to the growth of the export 
garment industry in Dhaka and Chittagong. Eighty percent of the 1.4 
million garment sector workers are women. Programs extending credit to 
large numbers of rural women also have contributed to greater economic 
power for them. However, women still occupy only a small fraction of 
other wage-earning jobs, and hold fewer than 5 percent of government 
jobs. The Government's policy to include more women in government jobs 
has had limited effect. In recent years, 14.4 percent of all recruits 
into government service have been women.
    The garment and shrimp processing industries are the highest 
employers of women laborers. Forty-three percent of women work in the 
agriculture, fisheries, and livestock sectors, but 70 percent of them 
are unpaid family laborers. Many women also work as manual laborers on 
construction projects, constituting nearly 24 percent of all 
manufacturing workers. Women also are found in the electronics, food 
processing, beverage, and handicraft industries.
    Children.--The Government undertakes programs in the areas of 
primary education, health, and nutrition. Many of these efforts are 
supplemented by local and foreign NGO's. While much remains to be done, 
these joint efforts have allowed the country to make significant 
progress in improving health, nutrition, andeducation. For example, the 
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), a domestic NGO, provides 
primary education to more than 1.2 million children. The Government 
made universal primary education between the ages of 6 and 10 years 
mandatory in 1991, but stated that it lacked the resources to implement 
the law fully. According to Education Ministry figures, approximately 
86 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 10 years are enrolled 
in school, including 84 percent of girls. Attendance rates drop 
steadily with age, and only about half of all children complete grade 
5. To reach the maximum number of children with limited facilities, 
most schools have two shifts. As a result, most children spend only 3 
hours per day in the classroom. The Government provides incentives for 
rural female children between the ages of 12 and 16 to remain in 
school. These incentives have been effective in increasing the number 
of girls in school.
    Because of widespread poverty, many children are compelled to work 
at a very young age. This frequently results in abuse of children, 
mainly through mistreatment by employers during domestic service 
(children who work in domestic service may work in conditions that 
resemble servitude) (see Section 6.c.) and prostitution; this labor-
related child abuse occurs commonly at all levels of society and 
throughout the country (see Section 6.d.). Reports from human rights 
monitors indicate that child abandonment, kidnaping, and trafficking 
for labor bondage and prostitution continue to be serious and 
widespread problems. There is extensive trafficking of children, 
primarily to India, Pakistan, and destinations within the country 
largely for the purposes of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The 
U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) has estimated that there are about 10,000 
child prostitutes in the country. Other estimates have been as high as 
29,000. Prostitution is legal, but only for those over 18 years of age 
with government certification. However, this minimum age requirement 
commonly is ignored by authorities, and is circumvented easily by false 
statements of age. Procurers of minors rarely are prosecuted, and large 
numbers of child prostitutes work in brothels. The law stipulates a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment for persons found guilty of 
forcing a child into prostitution.
    People with Disabilities.--The law provides for equal treatment and 
freedom from discrimination for the disabled; however, in practice, the 
disabled face social and economic discrimination. The Government has 
not enacted specific legislation or otherwise mandated accessibility 
for the disabled. Facilities for treating the mentally ill or the 
retarded are inadequate. Unless a family has money to pay for private 
service, a mentally ill person can find little treatment in the 
country.
    Indigenous People.--Tribal people have had a marginal ability to 
influence decisions concerning the use of their lands. The 1997 
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord has been in effect for 2 
years, and has ended 25 years of insurgency in the CHT. The situation 
in the CHT was peaceful at year's end. Former insurgent leader Shantu 
Larma accepted a position as Regional Council Chairman in May, allowing 
formation of the long-stalled body to go forward. However, there is 
still confusion regarding the overlapping responsibilities of 
government bodies with responsibilities in the Hill Tracts. The Land 
Commission that is to deal with land disputes between tribals and 
Bengali settlers was established during the year, but had not begun 
operating. Tribal leaders also have expressed disappointment at the 
lack of progress in providing assistance to tribals that left the area 
during the insurgency.
    Until 1985 the Government regularly allotted land in the CHT to 
Bengali settlers, including land that was claimed by indigenous people 
under traditional concepts of land ownership. This led to the 
displacement of many tribal groups, such as the Chakmas and Marmas. 
Bengali inhabitants in the CHT increased from 3 percent of the region's 
population in 1947 to approximately 50 percent of the area's population 
of 1 million in 1997. In response to the Government's action, the 
Shanti-Bahini, a tribal group, had waged a low-level conflict in the 
CHT from the early 1970's until the signing of the peace agreement with 
the Government in December 1997. During the periods of violence, all 
those involved--indigenous tribes, settlers, and security forces--
accused each other of human rights violations. The terms of the 1997 
pact provided for a strong local government, consisting of mostly 
tribal representatives, including the chairperson; reduction of the 
military presence in the CHT region; and a substantial compensation 
package for displaced tribal families.
    Tribal people in other areas also have reported problems of loss of 
land to Bengali Muslims through questionable legal practices and other 
means. The Garos, of the Modhupur forest region in north central 
Bangladesh, continue to face problems in maintaining their cultural 
traditions and livelihoods in theface of deforestation and encroachment 
by surrounding Bengali communities. The pressure on the Garo community 
has resulted in greater migration to urban areas and to the Indian 
state of Meghalaya, threatening the existence of an already small 
community estimated at only 16,000 persons. The Government had 
indicated in 1995 that it would establish a national park of 400 acres 
in the Mymensingh district. Part of the land would be taken from the 
Garo tribals. Action still is pending on that proposal. The Government 
has not ruled out moving the tribals from the land.
    Religious Minorities.--Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists constitute 
about 12 percent of the population.
    Islamic extremists occasionally have attacked women, religious 
minorities, and development workers. The Government sometimes has 
failed to criticize, investigate, and prosecute perpetrators of these 
attacks. The Ahmadiyas, whom many mainstream Muslims consider 
heretical, have been the target of some attacks and harassment. In 
January several hundred persons attacked the Ahmadiya place of worship 
in Koldiar village in Kushtia. Devotees were beaten, and the place of 
worship was ransacked. Following the attack, Ahmadiyas were harassed on 
the streets and prevented from praying at their place of worship. 
Ahmadiyas alleged that the local police did not intervene to stop these 
abuses. According to press reports, the assistant police inspector in 
the area was fired and the officer in charge of the police station was 
withdrawn for failure to discharge their duties during the incident. At 
year's end, Ahmadiyas reported that their mosque was still under the 
control of local police and that they have not been allowed to return. 
On October 8, a bomb exploded during Friday prayers at an Ahmadiya 
mosque in Khulna. Six persons were killed and over 40 others were 
injured (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). At approximately the same time, 
unexploded bombs were found at a Sunni mosque in Dhaka. On October 10, 
two explosive devices were located at the Ahmadiya Central Mosque in 
Dhaka. Although police conducted an investigation, no suspects were 
arrested or detained. Seven persons were injured on November 12 when a 
mob ransacked an Ahmadiya mosque near Natore in western Bangladesh. 
According to press reports, the attack was provoked by Muslims from 
Dhaka.
    Religious minorities are in practice disadvantaged in such areas as 
access to government jobs and political office. Selection boards in the 
government services often lack minority group representation.
    Many Hindus have been unable to recover landholdings lost because 
of discrimination in the application of the law, especially the Vested 
Property Act. Property ownership, particularly among Hindus, has been a 
contentious issue since independence in 1971, when many Hindus lost 
land holdings because of anti-Hindu discrimination in the application 
of the law. Prior to its 1996 election victory, the Awami League 
promised to repeal the Vested Property Act, the law used to deprive 
Hindus of their property. However, the Government so far has taken no 
action. There have been in past years cases of violence directed 
against religious minority communities that also have resulted in the 
loss of property. The last such major incidents occurred in 1992, 
although there also were some minor incidents of this type during the 
period surrounding the 1996 elections. Such intercommunal violence 
reportedly has caused some members of religious minorities to depart 
the country. According to press reports, in January Muslim youths 
smashed a mud-and-straw image of a Hindu goddess as Hindus were 
celebrating the festival of Saraswati, causing several hundred Hindus 
to flee.
    Feminist author Taslima Nasreen left the country in January due to 
concerns about her personal security (see Section 2.a.). Some Islamic 
groups issued statements protesting her departure after she was allowed 
to leave.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right to join unions and--with government approval--the right to form a 
union. Approximately 1.8 million of the country's 5 million workers in 
the formal sector belong to unions (the total work force is 
approximately 58 million). There is a large unreported informal sector, 
for which no reliable labor statistics exist.
    For a union to obtain and maintain its registration, 30 percent 
workplace participation is required. Moreover, would-be unionists 
technically are forbidden to engage in many activities prior to 
registration, and legally are not protected from employer retaliation 
during this period. Labor activists have protested that this 
requirement severely restricts workers' freedom to organize, and the 
International Labor Organization(ILO) has requested the Government to 
amend the 30 percent provision due to the same grounds. The ILO also 
has requested the Government to amend legislative provisions that bar 
registration of a union that is composed of workers from different 
workplaces owned by different employers. About 15 percent of the 
approximately 5,450 labor unions are affiliated with 23 officially 
registered National Trade Union (NTU) centers. There also are several 
unregistered NTU's.
    With the exception of workers in the railway, postal, telegraph, 
and telephone departments, civil servants, police, and military 
personnel are forbidden to join unions. Many civil servants who are 
forbidden to join unions, such as teachers and nurses, have formed 
associations that perform functions similar to labor unions, that is, 
providing for members' welfare, offering legal services, and airing 
grievances. However, collective bargaining is prohibited. Some workers 
have formed unregistered unions, particularly university employees and 
workers in the construction and transport (both public and private) 
industries. The Government banned trade union activity in the 
Bangladesh Bank, the country's central bank, in early 1998. The ban 
followed an incident in which some labor unionists affiliated with the 
ruling party's trade union assaulted a senior bank official, after 
which there were clashes between members of rival unions. In July and 
August, low paid government employees staged protests inside the 
Secretariat, the office complex in central Dhaka housing most 
ministries. The employees' demands included a significant pay increase 
and changes in working hours. When police suppressed the protests, 
there were violent clashes, and workers ransacked some offices, 
including that of the Labor Minister. Police arrested two officials of 
the protesting union for alleged criminal offenses, then detained them 
under the SPA. After more than 1 month, the High Court declared the 
detention illegal and ordered the two men to be released (see Section 
1.d.). The ILO Committee of Experts stated that the Government's 
rejections of several applications for registration by trade unions in 
the textile, metal, and garment sectors were on unjustified grounds.
    There are no legal restrictions on political activities by labor 
unions, although the calling of nationwide general strikes (hartals) or 
transportation blockades by unions is considered a criminal rather than 
a political act and thus forbidden.
    While unions are not part of the government structure, they are 
highly politicized, and are strongest in state-owned enterprises. 
Virtually all the NTU centers are affiliated with political parties, 
including one with the ruling Awami League. Some unions are militant 
and engage in intimidation and vandalism. Illegal blockades of public 
transportation routes by strikers frequently occurred during the year. 
Pitched battles between members of rival labor unions occur regularly. 
Fighting often is over the control of rackets or extortion payoffs and 
typically involves knives, guns, and homemade bombs.
    Workers are eligible for membership on their union's executive 
staff, the size of which is set by law in proportion to the number of 
union members. The Registrar of Trade Unions may cancel registration of 
a union with the concurrence of the Labor Court, but no such actions 
were known to have been taken during the year.
    The right to strike is not recognized specifically in the law, but 
strikes are a common form of protest. General strikes are standard 
tools of political opposition groups and are used to pressure the 
Government to meet political demands (see Section 2.b.). There were no 
labor-related nationwide strikes during the year. Workers at Chittagong 
port, the country's major harbor, conducted several industrial actions 
to protest a proposed privately run port facility, and went on strike 
for more than a week in September over a pay dispute. Some employees 
organized in professional associations or unregistered unions also went 
on strike during the year. University teachers went on strike for short 
periods over pay and benefits, as well as the continuing problem of 
campus violence. Wildcat strikes are illegal but occur frequently, with 
varying government responses. Wildcat strikes in the transportation 
sector are particularly common.
    The Essential Services Ordinance permits the Government to bar 
strikes for 3 months in any sector that it declares essential. This 
ban, which generally is obeyed, in the past has been applied to 
national airline pilots, water supply workers, shipping employees, and 
electricity supply workers. The ban may be renewed for 3-month-periods. 
The Government is empowered to prohibit a strike or lockout at any time 
before or after the strike or lockout begins and to refer the dispute 
to the Labor Court. Mechanisms for conciliation, arbitration, and labor 
court dispute resolution were established under the Industrial 
Relations Ordinance of 1969. Workers have the right to strike in the 
event of a failure to settle. If a strike lasts 30 days or longer, the 
Government may prohibit the strike and refer the dispute to the Labor 
Court for adjudication. This has not happened since 1993. The ILO has 
criticized the provisions ofthe Industrial Relations Ordinance that 
require three-quarters of a worker's organization to consent to a 
strike and that grant the Government authority to prohibit a strike at 
any time if it is considered prejudicial to the national interest or if 
it involves a public utility service.
    There are provisions in the Industrial Relations Ordinance for the 
immunity of registered unions or union officers from civil liability. 
Enforcement of these provisions is uneven. In past illegal work 
actions, such as transportation blockades, police have arrested union 
members under the SPA or regular criminal codes.
    There are no restrictions on affiliation with international labor 
organizations, and unions and federations maintain a variety of such 
links. Trade unionists are required to obtain government clearance to 
travel to ILO meetings, but there were no reports that clearances were 
denied during the year.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective 
bargaining is legal only for private sector workers, on the condition 
that they are represented by unions legally registered as collective 
bargaining agents by the Registrar of Trade Unions. Collective 
bargaining occurs on occasion in large private enterprises such as 
pharmaceuticals, jute, or textiles but, because of high unemployment, 
workers may forgo collective bargaining due to concerns over job 
security. Collective bargaining in small private enterprises generally 
does not occur. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions 
(ICFTU) has criticized the country for what it views as legal 
impediments which hamper such bargaining.
    Public sector workers' pay levels and other benefits are set by the 
National Pay and Wages Commission, whose recommendations are binding 
and may not be disputed except on the issue of implementation.
    The Registrar of Trade Unions has wide powers to interfere in 
internal union affairs. He has the authority to enter union premises 
and inspect documents; however, there were no reports during the year 
that the Registrar of Trade Unions had abused these powers.
    Under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, there is considerable 
leeway for discrimination against union members and organizers by 
employers. For example, the Ordinance allows the arbitrary transfer of 
workers suspected of union activities or termination with payment of 
mandatory severance benefits (2 weeks' salary). In practice, private 
sector employers usually discourage any union activity, sometimes 
working in collaboration with local police. The Registrar of Trade 
Unions rules on discrimination complaints. In a number of cases, the 
Labor Court has ordered the reinstatement of workers fired for union 
activities. However, the Labor Court's overall effectiveness is 
hampered by a serious case backlog, and there also have been 
allegations that some of its deliberations have been corrupted by 
employers.
    The country's two export processing zones (EPZ's) are exempted from 
the application of the Employment of Labor (Standing Orders) Act of 
1965, the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969, and the Factories Act 
of 1965. Among other things, these laws establish the freedom of 
association and the right to bargain collectively, and set forth 
occupational safety and health standards. While substitutes for some of 
the provisions of these laws have been implemented through EPZ 
regulations, professional and industry-based unions are prohibited in 
the zones. A small number of workers in the EPZ's have skirted 
prohibitions on forming unions by setting up associations. The 
Government has not implemented its 1992 commitment to end restrictions 
on freedom of association and formation of unions by 1997, and to apply 
all sections to labor law in the EPZ's by 2000. No collective 
bargaining takes place in the EPZ's. Approximately 84,000 persons are 
employed in EPZ's, primarily in the textile and apparel, electronics 
component, and leather industries.
    An NGO study released in December reported the following practices, 
among others, in the Chittagong and Savar EPZ's: Sexual harassment and 
abuse, physical abuse, unpaid overtime work, child labor, noncompliance 
with minimum wage regulations, lack of information available to workers 
about their legal rights, and substandard safety conditions. However, 
serious questions were raised about the methodology of the study and of 
the reliability of its findings.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by 
children; however, the Government does not enforce this prohibition 
effectively. The Factories Act and Shops and Establishments Act, both 
passed in 1965, established inspection mechanisms to enforce laws 
against forced labor; however, these laws are not rigorously enforced, 
partly becauseresources for enforcement are scarce. There is no large-
scale bonded or forced labor; however, numerous domestic servants, 
including many children, work in conditions that resemble servitude and 
many suffer physical abuse, sometimes resulting in death. In at least 
some cases, the Government does bring criminal charges against 
employers who abuse domestic servants. There is extensive trafficking 
in both women and children, mainly for purposes of forced prostitution, 
although in some instances for labor servitude outside of the country 
(see Section 6.f.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--There is no law that uniformly prohibits the employment of 
children, and child labor is a serious problem. Some laws prohibit 
labor by children in certain sectors. The Factories Act of 1965 bars 
children under the age of 14 from working in factories. This law also 
stipulates that children and adolescents are allowed to work only a 
maximum 5-hour day and only between the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The 
Shops and Establishments Act of 1965 prohibits the employment of 
children younger than the age of 12 in commercial workplaces. The 
Employment of Children Act of 1938 prohibits the employment of children 
under the age of 15 in the railways or in goods' handling within ports.
    Coverage and enforcement of these rules is inadequate. Because of 
widespread poverty, many children begin to work at a very young age. 
According to a 1996 labor force survey by the Government, the country 
has 6.3 million working children between the ages of 5 and 14 years who 
work for compensation and are not enrolled in school. Also, children 
often work alongside other family members in small-scale and 
subsistence agriculture. UNICEF and ILO surveys indicate that, of 
children 6 to 17 years of age, 21 percent of boys and 4 percent of 
girls work in paid employment. Hours usually are long and the pay low, 
and the conditions sometimes are hazardous. Children drive rickshaws, 
break bricks at construction sites, carry fruit, vegetables, and dry 
goods for shoppers at markets, work at tea stalls, and work as 
beachcombers in the shrimp industry. Many children work in the beedi 
(hand-rolled cigarette) industry, and children under 18 years sometimes 
work in hazardous circumstances in the leather industry. Children 
routinely perform domestic work. Cases of children being abused 
physically and occasionally killed by the head of the household where 
they work are reported in the press. In at least some cases, the 
Government does bring criminal charges against employers who abuse 
domestic servants. Some children are trafficked domestically or 
overseas, often for prostitution, and child prostitution is a serious 
problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). Under the law, every child must 
attend school through the fifth grade, or the age of 10 years. However, 
the Government continues to maintain that it does not yet have the 
resources to implement this law effectively.
    Protracted negotiations led to the July 1995 signing of a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF, and the ILO to 
eliminate child labor in the garment sector. Under the MOU, the garment 
sector was to become child labor free by October 31, 1996, with former 
child laborers enrolled in UNICEF-sponsored schools and follow-up 
inspections of factories by ILO-managed inspection teams. Under the 
program, former child-employees receive a small monthly stipend while 
attending school to help replace their lost income. Violations of the 
ban on child labor in the garment export sector rose slightly from low 
levels as the year progressed, to about 5 percent of factories 
inspected. According to ILO inspectors, most factories where violations 
were committed had one or two child laborers, and only about 1 percent 
of the factories had more than this amount. However, a BGMEA 
arbitration committee, which is tasked with imposing fines on violating 
factories, functions slowly. The number of children working in 
nonexport, or nonfactory garment production, is unknown.
    The Government did not grant the Ministry of Labor additional 
resources to enforce its commitment as a member of the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation to eliminate hazardous child labor 
by 2000, and to eliminate all child labor by 2010; the existing small 
corps of labor inspectors continues to be ineffective against all labor 
problems because of inefficiency and corruption.
    UNICEF is implementing a ``hard-to-reach'' program to provide 
education to 350,000 (primarily working) children in urban slum areas. 
ILO/IPEC has approximately 24 ongoing programs, the largest involving 
3,000 children in hazardous conditions, designed to ensure that 
children receive an education, rather than removing children from work.
    The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including 
that performed by children; however, the Government does not enforce 
this prohibition effectively, and some children work as domestic 
servants in conditions that resemble labor servitude orare trafficked 
for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum 
wage. Instead, the Wage Commission, which convenes every several years, 
sets wages and benefits industry by industry. In most cases, private 
sector employers ignore this wage structure. For example, in the 
garment industry, legal minimum wages are not paid by many factories, 
and it is common for workers of smaller factories to experience delays 
in receiving their pay, or to receive ``trainee'' wages well past the 
maximum 3 months. The average monthly wage of $1.50 to $2.50 per day 
(taka 76 to taka 130) is sufficient to provide an individual with a 
minimal standard of living, but is not sufficient to provide a decent 
standard of living for a worker and family.
    The law sets a standard 48-hour workweek with 1 day off mandated. A 
60-hour workweek, inclusive of a maximum 12 hours of overtime, is 
allowed. The law is enforced poorly in industries such as hosiery and 
ready-made garments.
    The Factories Act of 1965 nominally sets occupational health and 
safety standards. The law is comprehensive but largely is ignored by 
employers. For example, there are many fire safety violations in the 
garment industry. Many factories are located in structures that were 
not designed adequately for industrial use, nor for the easy evacuation 
of large work forces. In addition, numerous factories have insufficient 
toilet facilities (for example, 1 toilet for 300 employees). Workers 
may resort to legal action for enforcement of the law's provisions, but 
few cases actually are prosecuted. Enforcement by the Labor Ministry's 
industrial inspectors is weak, due both to the low number of labor 
inspectors (100 for 300,000 covered establishments), and to endemic 
corruption and inefficiency among inspectors. Due to a high 
unemployment rate and inadequate enforcement of the laws, workers 
demanding correction of dangerous working conditions or refusing to 
participate in perceived dangerous activities risk losing their jobs.
     f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is extensive trafficking in both 
women and children, primarily to India, Pakistan, and destinations 
within the country, mainly for purposes of forced prostitution, 
although in some instances for labor servitude. Some children also are 
trafficked to the Middle East to work as camel jockeys.
    The number of women and children trafficked is unknown; human 
rights monitors estimate that several thousand women and children are 
victims of trafficking each year. Most trafficked persons are lured by 
promises of good jobs or marriage, and some are forced into involuntary 
servitude outside of the country. Seeing no alternative for breaking 
the cycle of poverty, parents often willingly send their children away. 
Unwed mothers, orphans, and others outside of the normal family support 
system also are susceptible. Traffickers living abroad often arrive in 
a village and ``marry'' a woman, only to dispose of her upon arrival in 
the destination country, where women are sold by their new ``friends,'' 
or ``usbands'' into bonded labor, menial jobs, or prostitution. Much of 
the trafficking and smuggling of persons is conducted by criminal 
gangs. The border between Bangladesh and India is porous, especially 
around Jessore and Benapole, making illegal border crossings easy.
    The law provides severe penalties for trafficking, but few 
perpetrators are punished. Human rights monitors also credibly report 
that police and local government officials often either ignore 
trafficking in women and children for prostitution, easily are bribed 
to look the other way, or even are involved in the operation (see 
Section 1.c.). According to one anti-trafficking organization, 63 
persons were arrested during the year for trafficking. While most of 
those arrested were not prosecuted by year's end, 13 persons arrested 
previously were convicted for trafficking offenses and sentenced to 
life imprisonment. Exact numbers of those arrested are difficult to 
obtain as charges against traffickers usually are for lesser crimes, 
such as crossing borders without proper documents.
    UNICEF has estimated that there are about 10,000 child prostitutes 
in Bangladesh; other estimates have been as high as 29,000. 
Prostitution is legal, but only for those over 18 years of age with 
government certification; however, this minimum age requirement 
commonly is ignored by authorities, and is circumvented easily by false 
statements of age. Procurers of minors rarely are prosecuted, and large 
numbers of child prostitutes work in brothels. The law stipulates a 
maximum sentence of life imprisonment for persons found guilty of 
forcing a child into prostitution.
    The Government has expressed concern about the problem and has 
worked with NGO's and international organizations against trafficking, 
conducting awareness campaigns, research, lobbying, and rescue and 
rehabilitation programs. Some NGO's and international organizations 
have been active in addressing the problem. For example, the 
Association for Community Development conducted a study on trafficking 
issues and conducted workshops and outreach programs aimed at reaching 
potential victims of trafficking before they are trafficked. The 
Bangladesh National Women Lawyer's Association (BNWLA) conducts 
awareness programs, aimed at alerting poor persons to the dangers of 
trafficking through leaflets, stickers, and posters. The BNWLA also 
provides legal assistance to trafficking victims, and initiates legal 
action against traffickers. The BNWLA runs a shelter home for 
trafficked women and children that provides health care, counseling, 
and training. The Center for Women and Children (CWCS) has networks to 
monitor trafficking across the country, conducts awareness meetings, 
and has a pilot project to make police aware of the rights of women and 
children. Awareness of trafficking is increasing, and it receives 
frequent press coverage. Two umbrella organizations of anti-trafficking 
NGO's exist, and are seeking to improve coordination and planning of 
efforts against the problem.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 BHUTAN

    Bhutan is ruled by a hereditary monarch, King Jigme Singye 
Wangchuk, who governs with the support of a National Assembly and a 
Council of Ministers; there is no written constitution to protect 
fundamental political and human rights. Since ascending to the throne 
in 1972, the King has continued efforts toward social and political 
modernization begun by his father. In the last few years, Bhutan has 
rapidly improved services in education, health care, sanitation, and 
communications, with parallel but slower developments of the role of 
representatives in governance and decision making. In recent years, 
Bhutan has adopted some measures to transfer power from the King to the 
National Assembly. The judiciary is not independent of the King.
    Approximately two-thirds of the government-declared population of 
600,000 is composed of Buddhists with cultural traditions akin to those 
of Tibet. The Buddhist majority consists of two principal ethnic and 
linguistic groups: the Ngalongs of the western part of the country and 
the Sharchops of the eastern part of the country. The remaining third 
of the population, ethnic Nepalis, most of whom are Hindus, live in the 
country's southern districts. Bhutanese dissident groups claim that the 
actual population is between 650,000 and 700,000 and that the 
Government underreports the number of ethnic Nepalese in the country. 
The rapid growth of this ethnic Nepalese segment of the population led 
some in the Buddhist majority to fear for the survival of their 
culture. Government efforts to tighten citizenship requirements and to 
control illegal immigration resulted in political protests and led to 
ethnic conflict and repression of ethnic Nepalese in southern districts 
during the late 1980's and early 1990's. Tens of thousands of ethnic 
Nepalese left the country in 1991-92, many forcibly expelled. 
Approximately 97,000 ethnic Nepalese remain in refugee camps in Nepal 
and upwards of 15,000 reside outside of the camps in the Indian states 
of Assam and West Bengal. The Government maintains that some of those 
in the camps were never citizens, and therefore have no right to 
return. In 1998 the Government began resettling Buddhist Bhutanese from 
other regions of the country on land in southern districts vacated by 
the ethnic Nepalese now living in refugee camps in Nepal. A National 
Assembly resolution adopted in 1997 prohibits still-resident immediate 
family members of ethnic Nepalese refugees from holding jobs with the 
Government or the armed forces. In early 1998, the Government 
implemented the resolution, and had dismissed 429 civil servants by 
November 1998, when implementation of the resolution was discontinued.
    The Royal Bhutan Police, assisted by the Royal Bhutan Army, 
including those assigned to the Royal Body Guard, and a national 
militia, maintain internal security. Some members of these forces 
committed human rights abuses against ethnic Nepalese.
    The economy is based on agriculture and forestry, which provide the 
main livelihood for 90 percent of the population and account for about 
half of the gross domestic product. Agriculture consists largely of 
subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Cardamon, citrus fruit, and 
spices are the leading agricultural exports. Cement and electricity are 
the other important exports. Strong trade and monetary ties link the 
economy closely to that of India. Hydroelectric power production 
potential and tourism are key resources, although the Government limits 
foreign tourist arrivals for reasons of lack of adequate tourist 
infrastructure and environmental concerns. Tourist arrivals are limited 
by means of pricing policies. Bhutan is a poor country. The gross 
national product (GNP) per capita is estimated to be $470.
    The Government significantly restricts the rights of the Kingdom's 
citizens, and problems remain in several areas. The King exercises 
strong, active, and direct power over the Government. Citizens do not 
yet have the right to change their government. The Government 
discourages political parties, and none operate legally. There were 
reports that security forces beat ethnic Nepalese refugees who entered 
the country to demonstrate. Arbitrary arrest and detention remain 
problems. Judges serve at the King's pleasure, and the Government 
limits significantly the right to a fair trial. Criminal cases and a 
variety of civil matters are adjudicated under a legal code established 
in the 17th century and revised and modernized in 1958 and 1965. In 
late 1998, the Government formed a special committee of jurists and 
government officials to review the country's basic law and propose 
changes. Programs to build a body of written law and to train lawyers 
are progressing. For example, the Government sends many lawyers to 
India and other countries for legal training. The Government limits 
significantly citizens' right to privacy. The Government restricts 
freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and association. The Government 
launched the country's first indigenous television service in June, 
modifying a ban on private television reception that had been in place 
since 1989. Citizens face significant limitations on freedom of 
religion. In July 1998, the Government initiated steps to renew 
negotiations with the Government of Nepal on procedures for the 
screening and repatriation of ethnic Nepalese in the refugee camps, and 
the two governments held a series of meetings during the second half of 
that year. After a 3-year hiatus, ministerial-level bilateraltalks 
resumed in September. The Government restricts worker rights.
    The Government claims that it has prosecuted government personnel 
for unspecified abuses committed in the early 1990's; however, public 
indications are that it has done little to investigate and prosecute 
security force officials responsible for torture, rape, and other 
abuses committed against ethnic Nepalese residents.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
confirmed reports of political or other extrajudicial killings during 
the year; however, there were press reports that a prisoner detained 
since 1997 died after he was tortured (see Section 1.c.). Human rights 
groups allege that Gomchen Karma, a Buddhist monk arrested in October 
1997 during a peaceful demonstration in the eastern part of the 
country, was shot and killed by a government official. The Government 
stated that the shooting was accidental, that the official responsible 
has been suspended from duty and charged in connection with the 
incident, and that his case was being heard as of the end of 1998.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and abuse; however, human rights 
advocates state that in practice security forces ignore these 
provisions. There were reports that numerous ethnic Nepalese refugees 
attempting to return to the country were captured by security forces, 
beaten, and sent back across the border. Persons holding peaceful 
marches from India to Bhutan report that during the year, the police 
assaulted them, injuring several demonstrators, and then arrested and 
deported all of the marchers to Nepal (see Section 5). Instances of 
torture of ethnic Nepalese who attempted to return to the country 
occurred in 1996. Refugee newspapers published in Nepal allege that 
Nima Gyaltsen, a prisoner detained since 1997 without charge or trial 
in Zilnon Namgyeling jail in Thimphu, died after being subjected to 
torture during his incarceration. Amnesty International reported that 
19-year-old Needup Phuntso was expelled from school in March 1998 and 
was tortured by members of the Royal Bhutanese police after his arrest 
in Thimphu in July 1998.
    Refugee groups credibly claim that persons detained as suspected 
dissidents in the early 1990's were tortured by security forces, who 
also committed acts of rape. During those years, the Government's 
ethnic policies and the crackdown on ethnic Nepalese political 
agitation created a climate of impunity in which the Government tacitly 
condoned the physical abuse of ethnic Nepalese. The Government denies 
these abuses but also claims it has investigated and prosecuted three 
government officials for unspecified abuses of authority during that 
period. Details of these cases have not been made public, and there is 
little indication that the Government has adequately investigated or 
punished any security force officials involved in the widespread abuses 
of 1989-92. Human rights groups allege that a Buddhist monk arrested in 
October 1997, Thinley Oezor Kenpo, was tortured in custody in 1997. 
According to Amnesty International, Kenpo was one of 120 persons 
arrested for political reasons since 1997 who by December 1998 had been 
sentenced to up to 15 years in prison.
    Prison conditions are reportedly adequate, if austere. In 1993 the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began a program of 
visits to prisons in the capital, Thimphu. In 1994 a new prison in 
Chemgang was opened. Together, these events contributed to a 
substantial improvement in conditions of detention over those that 
existed until a few years ago. Bhutanese human rights groups active 
outside the country maintain that prison conditions outside of Thimphu 
remain oppressive.
    The Government and the ICRC signed a new Memorandum of 
Understanding in September 1998, extending the ICRC prison visits 
program for another 5 years. During the same month, an ICRC team 
visited 54 inmates in Chemgang central jail and 127 inmates in Thimphu 
district jail. The ICRC conducted two prison visits during the year, as 
it has done for each of the past six years.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention remain problems. Under the Police Act of 1979, police may not 
arrest a person without a warrant and must produce an arrested person 
before a court within 24 hours of arrest, exclusive of travel time from 
place of arrest. Legalprotections are incomplete, however, due to the 
lack of a fully elaborated criminal procedure code and to deficiencies 
in police training and practice. Incommunicado detention is known to 
occur. Incommunicado detention of suspected militants was a serious 
problem in 1991 and 1992, but the initiation of ICRC prison visits and 
the establishment of an ICRC mail service between detainees and family 
members has helped to allay this problem. Of those detained in 
connection with political dissidence and violence in southern areas in 
1991-92, 1,685 were ultimately amnestied, 58 are serving sentences 
after conviction by the High Court, 9 were acquitted by the High Court, 
and 71 were released after serving prison sentences.
    Four persons were arrested in February 1997 in Trashi and charged 
with involvement in seditious activities. They were convicted by the 
High Court and are currently serving prison sentences. Human rights 
groups allege that in July and August 1997, the Royal Bhutan Police 
(RBP) in and around Samdrup Jongkar town in the east arrested some 50 
suspected supporters of a Bhutanese dissident group active outside the 
country. The Government states that only 16 persons were arrested 
during this period and that they have been charged with involvement in 
seditious activities and are awaiting trial. Many were said to be 
supporters of one-time Druk National Congress (DNC) and United Front 
for Democracy in Bhutan (UFD) leader Rongthong KunleyDorji, who was 
arrested in India in April 1997, following the issuance of an 
extradition request by Bhutanese authorities. Dorji faces extradition 
proceedings in India and possible return to Bhutan to face charges of 
fraud, nonpayment of loans, and incitement to violence. The original 
Bhutanese extradition request included a third charge, ``anti-national 
activities,'' but this was later dropped when it became clear that 
Indian law would preclude his extradition to face political charges. 
Human rights groups contend that the charges brought against Dorji are 
politically motivated and constitute an attempt by the government to 
suppress his prodemocracy activities. In June 1998 an Indian court 
granted Dorji bail, but placed restrictions on his movements. Dorji's 
extradition case still is pending in the Indian courts. According to an 
Amnesty International report released during the year, 30 persons were 
detained in 1998, most of them on suspicion of being members or 
supporters of the DNC.
    Amnesty International (AI) has reported that some of those arrested 
are feared to be at risk of torture. Bhutanese human rights groups 
outside the country claim that the arrests, including those of several 
Buddhist monks, are aimed at imposing Ngalong norms on the eastern, 
Sharchop community, which has a distinct ethnic and religious identity. 
The Government denies that it has such a policy; many government 
officials, including both the former Head of Government, Foreign 
Minister Jigme Thinley, and the Chief Justice of the High Court Sonam 
Tobgye, are Sharchops.
    Persons holding peaceful marches from India to Bhutan charge that 
during the year, the police assaulted them, injuring several 
demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all of the marchers to 
Nepal (see Section 5). By one estimate, approximately 100 marchers were 
arrested and deported during the year. The Government acknowledged that 
58 persons whom it described as ``terrorists'' were serving sentences 
at the end of 1998 for crimes including rape, murder, and robbery. It 
stated that a total of 134 persons were arrested in connection with the 
October 1997 disturbances in the east; of that number, more than one-
half either had been tried and acquitted or had been released after 
serving short sentences.
    Although the Government does not formally use exile as a form of 
punishment, many accused political dissidents freed under Government 
amnesties say that they were released on the condition that they depart 
the country. Many of them subsequently registered at refugee camps in 
Nepal. The Government denies this.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is no written constitution, 
and the judiciary is not independent of the King.
    The judicial system consists of district courts and a High Court in 
Thimphu. Judges are appointed by the King on the recommendation of the 
Chief Justice and may be removed by him. Village headmen adjudicate 
minor offenses and administrative matters.
    Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated under 
a legal code established in the 17th century and revised in 1958 and 
1965. For offenses against the State, state-appointed prosecutors file 
charges and prosecute cases. In other cases, the relevant organizations 
and departments of government file charges and conduct the prosecution. 
Defendants are supposed to be presented with written charges in 
languages that they understand and given time to prepare their own 
defense. However, this practice is not always followed, according to 
some political dissidents. In cases where defendants cannot write their 
owndefense, courts assign judicial officers to assist defendants. There 
were reports that defendants receive legal representation at trial, and 
that they may choose from a list of 150 government-licensed and 
employed advocates to assist with their defense; however, it is not 
known how many defendants actually receive such assistance. A legal 
education program is gradually building a body of persons who have 
received formal training in the law abroad. Village headmen, who have 
the power to arbitrate disputes, make up the bottom rung of the 
judicial system. Magistrates can review their decisions, each with 
responsibility for a block of villages. Magistrates' decisions can be 
appealed to district judges, of which there is one for each of the 
country's 20 districts. The High Court in Thimphu is the country's 
supreme court. Its decisions can be appealed to the King.
    Defendants have the right to appeal to the High Court and may make 
a final appeal to the King, who traditionally delegates the decision to 
the Royal Advisory Council. Trials are to be conducted in open 
hearings; however, there are allegations that this is not always the 
case in practice.
    Questions of family law, such as marriage, divorce, and adoption, 
are traditionally resolved according to a citizen's religion: Buddhist 
tradition for the majority of the population and Hindu tradition for 
the ethnic Nepalese; however, the Government states that there is one 
formal law that governs these matters.
    Some or all of the approximately 75 prisoners serving sentences for 
offenses related to political dissidence or violence, primarily by 
ethnic Nepalese during 1991-92, may be political prisoners.
    On December 17, the King pardoned 200 prisoners to mark National 
Day; all reportedly were released. Among them were 40 persons convicted 
of ``anti-national'' offenses, including prominent ethnic Nepalese 
dissident and internationally recognized political prisoner Tek Nath 
Rizal. Tek Nath Rizal was arrested in 1988 in Nepal and extradited to 
Bhutan, where he was held in solitary confinement in Wangdiphodrang 
military prison until his 1992 conviction for ``anti-national'' crimes, 
including writing and distributing political pamphlets and attending 
political meetings. He was convicted under the 1993 National Security 
Act, although at the time of his conviction it had not yet been passed. 
However, a United Nations Human Rights Commission Working Group on 
Arbitrary Detention that visited the country in 1994 at the 
Government's invitation determined that Rizal had received a fair trial 
and declared his detention ``not to be arbitrary.''
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--There are no laws providing for these rights. The 
Government requires all citizens, including minorities, to wear the 
traditional dress of the Buddhist majority when visiting Buddhist 
religious buildings, monasteries, or government offices, and in schools 
and when attending official functions and public ceremonies. According 
to human rights groups police regularly conduct house-to-house searches 
for suspected dissidents without explanation or legal justification.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government restricts freedom 
of speech and of the press. The country's only regular publication is 
Kuensel, a government-run weekly newspaper with a circulation of 
10,000. Bhutanese human rights groups state that government ministries 
regularly review editorial material and have the power to, and 
regularly do, suppress or change content. They allege that the board of 
directors nominally responsible for editorial policy is appointed by 
and can be removed by the Government. Kuensel, which publishes 
simultaneous editions in the English, Dzongkha, and Nepali languages, 
supports the Government but does occasionally report criticism of the 
King and Government policies in the National Assembly. Nepalese, 
Indian, and other foreign newspapers are available.
    In 1989 the Government banned all private television reception and 
ordered that television antennas and satellite dishes be dismantled. 
Many homes in Paro and Thimphu nonetheless have satellite dishes and 
receive signals from international broadcasters. In June the Government 
introduced locally produced television service with the inauguration of 
the Bhutan Broadcasting Service. The service broadcasts 4 hours of 
programming daily: 2 hours of locally-produced programming in Dzongkha, 
and 2 hours of English-language programming produced outside of the 
country (such as from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and 
the Cable News Network (CNN). Late in the year, the Government began 
licensing cable operators to provide service in Thimphu and Paro. The 
Government radio station broadcasts each day in the four major 
languages (Dzongkha,Nepali, English, and Sharchop). The Government 
inaugurated the country's first Internet service provider, Druknet, in 
June.
    English is the medium of instruction in schools and the national 
language, Dzongkha, is taught as second language. The teaching of 
Nepali as a second language was discontinued in 1990.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government 
restricts freedom of assembly and association. Citizens may engage in 
peaceful assembly and association only for purposes approved by the 
Government. Although the Government allows civic and business 
organizations, there are no legally recognized political parties. The 
Government regards parties organized by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the 
Bhutan People's Party (BPP) and the Bhutan National Democratic Party 
(BNDP)--as well as the Druk National Congress (DNC)--as ``terrorist and 
anti-national'' organizations and has declared them illegal. These 
parties do not conduct activities inside the country. They seek the 
repatriation of refugees and democratic reform.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government imposes limits on freedom 
of religion. The Drukpa branch of the Kagyupa School of Mahayana 
Buddhism is the state religion. About two-thirds of the population 
practice either Drukpa Kagyupa or Ningmapa Buddhism. The Drukpa branch 
is practiced predominantly in the western and central parts of the 
country, which are inhabited mainly by ethnic Ngalongs (descendants of 
Tibetan immigrants who predominate in government and the civil service, 
and whose cultural norms have been declared to be the standard for all 
citizens). The Ningmapa school is practiced predominantly in the 
eastern part of the country, although there are adherents in other 
areas, including the royal family. Most of those living in the east are 
ethnic Sharchops--the descendants of those thought to be the country's 
original inhabitants. The Government subsidizes monasteries and shrines 
of the Drukpa sect and provides aid to about one-third of the Kingdom's 
12,000 monks. The Government also provides financial assistance for the 
construction of Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa Buddhist temples and 
shrines. In the early 1990's, the Government provided funds for the 
construction of new Hindu temples and centers of Sanskrit and Hindu 
learning and for the renovation of existing temples and places of Hindu 
learning. The Drukpa branch enjoys statutory representation in the 
National Assembly and in the Royal Advisory Council and is an 
influential voice on public policy. Citizens of other faiths, mostly 
Hindus, enjoy freedom of worship but may not proselytize. Under the 
law, conversions are illegal.
    The King has declared major Hindu festivals to be national 
holidays, and the royal family participates in them. Foreign 
missionaries are not permitted to proselytize, but international 
Christian relief organizations and Jesuit priests are active in 
education and humanitarian activities. According to dissidents living 
outside of the country, the Government restricts the import into the 
country of printed religious matter; only Buddhist religious texts are 
allowed to enter.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens traveling in border regions are 
required to show their citizenship identity cards at immigration check 
points, which in some cases are located at a considerable distance from 
what is in effect an open border with India. By treaty, citizens may 
reside and work in India.
    Bhutan is not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol (See Section 5 regarding 
the ethnic Nepalese refugee situation).
    The Government states that it recognizes the right to asylum in 
accordance with international refugee law; however, it has no official 
policy regarding refugees, asylum, first asylum, or the return of 
refugees to countries in which they fear persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens do not yet have the right to change their government. 
Bhutan is a monarchy with sovereign power vested in the King. In June 
1998, the King introduced term limits for his Council of Ministers and 
proposed measures to increase the role of the National Assembly in the 
formation of his Government. The National Assembly elected a new 
Council of Ministers and Government in July 1998 to a 5-year term. 
There are elected or partially elected assemblies at the local, 
district, and national levels, and the Government claims to encourage 
decentralization and citizen participation. Since 1969, the National 
Assembly has had the power to remove ministers, who are appointed by 
the King, but it has never done so. Political authority resides 
ultimately in the King and decisionmaking involves only a small number 
of officials. Major decisions are routinely made by officialssubject to 
questioning by the National Assembly, but the National Assembly is not 
known to have overturned any decisions reached by the King and 
government officials.
    Political parties do not exist legally, and their formation is 
discouraged by the Government as unnecessarily divisive. The Government 
prohibits parties established abroad by ethnic Nepalese (see Section 
2.b.).
    The National Assembly, established in 1953, has 150 members. Of 
these, 105 are elected by citizens, 10 are selected by a part of the 
Buddhist clergy, and the remaining 35 are appointed by the King to 
represent the Government.
    The procedures for the nomination and election of National Assembly 
members are set out in an amendment to the country's Basic Law proposed 
by the King and adopted by the 73rd session of the National Assembly in 
1995. It provides that in order to be eligible for nomination as a 
candidate for election to the National Assembly, a person must be a 
citizen of Bhutan, be at least 25 years of age, not be married to a 
foreign national, not have been terminated or compulsorily retired for 
misconduct from government service, not have committed any act of 
treason against the King, the people, and country, have no criminal 
record or any criminal case pending against him, have respect for the 
nation's laws, and be able to read and write in Dzongkha (the language, 
having different dialects in the eastern and western areas of the 
country, spoken by Bhutanese Buddhists).
    Each National Assembly constituency consists of a number of 
villages. Each village is permitted to nominate one candidate but must 
do so by consensus. There is no provision for self-nomination and the 
law states that ``no person . . . may campaign for the candidacy or 
canvass through other means.'' If more than one village within a 
constituency puts forward a candidate, an election is conducted by the 
district development committee, and the candidate obtaining a simple 
majority of votes cast is declared the winner. Individuals do not have 
the right to vote. Every family in a village is entitled to one vote in 
elections. The law does not make clear how a candidate is selected if 
none achieves a simple majority. It does state, however, that in case 
of a tie among the candidates in the election, drawing of lots shall be 
resorted to. The candidate whose name is drawn shall be deemed to be 
elected.
    Human rights activists claim that the only time individual citizens 
have any involvement in choosing a National Assembly representative is 
when they are asked for their consensus approval of a village candidate 
by the village headman. The name put to villagers for consensus 
approval by the headman is suggested to him by district officials, who 
in turn take their direction from the central Government. Consensus 
approval takes place at a public gathering. There is no secret ballot, 
according to human rights activists.
    The Assembly enacts laws, approves senior Government appointments, 
and advises the King on matters of national importance. Voting is by 
secret ballot, with a simple majority needed to pass a measure. The 
King may not formally veto legislation, but may return bills for 
further consideration. The Assembly occasionally rejects the King's 
recommendations or delays implementing them, but in general, the King 
has enough influence to persuade the Assembly to approve legislation 
that he considers essential or to withdraw proposals he opposes. The 
Assembly may question government officials and force them to resign by 
a two-thirds vote of no confidence. The National Assembly has never 
compelled any government official to resign. The Royal Civil Service 
Commission is responsible for disciplining subministerial level 
government officials and has removed several following their 
convictions for crimes including embezzlement.
    In June 1998, the King issued a decree setting out several measures 
intended to increase the role of the National Assembly in the formation 
and dissolution of his Government. The decree, later adopted by the 
76th session of the National Assembly, provided that all cabinet 
ministers are to be elected by the National Assembly and that the roles 
and responsibilities of the cabinet ministries were to be spelled out. 
Each cabinet minister is to be elected by simple majority in a secret 
ballot in the National Assembly from among candidates nominated by the 
King. The King is to select nominees for Cabinet office from among 
senior government officials holding the rank of secretary or above. The 
King is to award the portfolios of his ministers, whose terms will be 
limited to 5 years, after which they must pass a vote of confidence in 
the National Assembly in order to remain in office. Finally, the decree 
provided that the National Assembly, by a two-thirds vote of no 
confidence, can require the King to abdicate and to be replaced by the 
next in the line of succession. After adopting the decree, the National 
Assembly elected a new Cabinet of Ministers consistent with the decree. 
Human rights groups maintain that since only the King may nominate 
candidates for cabinet office, their election by the National Assembly 
is not a significant democratic reform. TheThe King also removed 
himself as Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers in 1998; Foreign 
Minister Jigme Thinley was elected to that position by the National 
Assembly for one year, and was replaced by Minister for Health and 
Education Sangay Ngedup in July.
    Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although 
they have made small but visible gains. Three women hold seats in the 
National Assembly.
    All major ethnic groups, including ethnic Nepalese, are represented 
in the National Assembly. There are 16 ``southern Bhutanese'' in the 
National Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are no legal human rights nongovernmental organizations 
(NGO's) in the country. The Government regards human rights groups 
established by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the Human Rights Organization of 
Bhutan, the People's Forum for Human Rights in Bhutan, and the 
Association of Human Rights Activists--Bhutan--as political 
organizations and does not permit them to operate in the country. 
Amnesty International (AI) visited Bhutan in 1992 to investigate and to 
report on the alleged abuse of ethnic Nepalese. In late November 1998, 
AI again sent a delegation to the country; by year's end, it had not 
published a report on the visit.
    ICRC representatives continue twice yearly prison visits, and the 
Government has allowed them access to detention facilities, including 
those in southern districts inhabited by ethnic Nepalese. The chairman 
and members of the United Nations Human Rights Commission Working Group 
on Arbitrary Detention made a second visit to the country in May 1996 
as a follow-up to an October 1994 visit. In addition to meetings with 
government officials, members of the working group visited prisons and 
interviewed prisoners in Thimphu, Phuntsoling, and Samtse.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    Ongoing government efforts to cultivate a national identity rooted 
in the language, religion, and culture of the Ngalong ethnic group 
constrain cultural expression by other ethnic groups. In the 1980's and 
early 1990's, concern over rapid population growth and political 
agitation by ethnic Nepalese resulted in policies and abusive practices 
that led to the departure of tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalese, many 
of whom were expelled forcibly.
    The Government claims that ethnic and gender discrimination in 
employment is not a problem. It claims that ethnic Nepalese fill 22 
percent of government jobs, which is slightly less than their 
proportion of the total population. Bhutanese human rights groups 
active outside the country claim that ethnic Nepalese actually make up 
about 35 percent of the country's population and that the Government 
underreports their number. Women are accorded respect in the traditions 
of most ethnic groups; however, persistence of traditional gender roles 
apparently accounts for the low proportion of women in government 
employment. Exile groups claim that ethnic and gender discrimination is 
a problem.
    Women.--There is no evidence that rape or spousal abuse are 
extensive problems.
    There are credible reports by refugees and human rights groups that 
security forces raped large numbers of ethnic Nepalese women in the 
southern area of the country in 1991 and 1992. According to Amnesty 
International, some women were said to have died as a result. In one 
independent survey of 1,779 refugee families, 26 percent of the 
respondents cited rape, fear of rape, or threat of rape as a prime 
reason for their departure from the country. The Government has denied 
these reports.
    Rape was made a criminal offense in 1953, but that law had weak 
penalties and was enforced poorly. In 1993 the National Assembly 
adopted a revised rape act with clear definitions of criminal sexual 
assault and stronger penalties. In cases of rape involving minors, 
sentences range from 5 to 17 years. In extreme cases, a rapist may be 
imprisoned for life.
    Women constitute 48 percent of the population and participate 
freely in the social and economic life of the country. Forty-three 
percent of enrollment in school is female, and 16 percent of civil 
service employees are women. Inheritance law provides for equal 
inheritance among all sons and daughters, but traditional inheritance 
practices, which vary among ethnic groups, may be observed if the heirs 
choose to forego legal challenges. Dowry is not practiced, even among 
ethnic Nepalese Hindus. Among some groups, inheritance practices 
favoringdaughters are said to account for the large numbers of women 
among owners of shops and businesses and for an accompanying tendency 
of women to drop out of higher education to go into business. However, 
female school enrollment has been growing in response to government 
policies. Women are increasingly found among senior officials and 
private sector entrepreneurs, especially in the tourism industry. Women 
in unskilled jobs are generally paid slightly less than men.
    Polygamy is sanctioned provided the first wife gives her 
permission. Marriages may be arranged by partners themselves as well as 
by their parents. Divorce is common. Recent legislation requires that 
all marriages must be registered and favors women in matters of 
alimony.
    Children.--The Government has demonstrated its commitment to child 
welfare by its rapid expansion of primary schools, health-care 
facilities, and immunization programs. The mortality rates for both 
infants and children under 5 years have dropped dramatically since 
1989, and primary school enrollment has increased at 9 percent per year 
since 1991, with enrollment of girls increasing at an even higher rate. 
In 1995 the participation rate for boys and girls in primary schools 
was estimated at 72 percent, with the rate of completion of 7 years of 
schooling at 60 percent for girls and at 59 percent for boys. Children 
enjoy a privileged position in society and benefit from international 
development programs focused on maternal and child welfare. Amnesty 
International reported that at least 23 students, between 7 and 21 
years of age, whose relatives had been arrested for supporting the pro-
democracy movement, were expelled from school in eastern Bhutan in 
1998. AI also reported that 19-year-old Needup Phuntso was expelled 
from school in March 1998 and was tortured by members of the Royal 
Bhutanese police after his arrest in Thimphu in July 1998 (see Section 
1.c.).
    A study by UNICEF found that boys and girls receive equal treatment 
regarding nutrition and health care and that there is little difference 
in child mortality rates between the sexes. Government policies aimed 
at increasing enrollment of girls have increased the proportion of 
girls in primary schools from 39 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 1995.
    There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence of official 
discrimination toward people with disabilities but the Government has 
not passed legislation mandating accessibility for the disabled.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Nepalese have lived in 
the southern part of the country for centuries, and the early phases of 
economic development at the turn of the century brought a large influx 
of additional ethnic Nepalese. In the late 1980's, concern over the 
increase in the population of and political agitation among ethnic 
Nepalese prompted aggressive government efforts to assert a national 
culture, to tighten control over southern regions, to control illegal 
immigration, to expel ethnic Nepalese, and to promote national 
integration. Early efforts at national integration focused on 
assimilation, including financial incentives for intermarriage, 
education for some students in regions other than their own, and an 
increase in development funds in the south.
    Beginning in 1989, more discriminatory measures were introduced, 
aimed at shaping a new national identity, known as Drukpa. Drukpa is 
based on the customs of the non-ethnic Nepali Ngalong ethnic group 
predominant in the western part of the country. Measures included a 
requirement that national dress be worn for official occasions and as a 
school uniform, the teaching of Dzongkha as a second language in all 
schools, and an end to instruction in Nepali as a second language 
(English is the language of instruction in all schools). Also, 
beginning in 1988, the Government refused to renew the contracts of 
tens of thousands of Nepalese guest workers. Many of these workers had 
resided in the country for years, in some cases with their families.
    Citizenship became a highly contentious issue. Requirements for 
citizenship were first formalized in the Citizenship Law of 1958, which 
granted citizenship to all adults who owned land and had lived in the 
country for at least 10 years. In 1985, however, a new citizenship law 
significantly tightened requirements for citizenship and resulted in 
the denaturalization of many ethnic Nepalese. While previously 
citizenship was conferred upon children whose father was a citizen 
under the 1958 law, the 1985 law required that both parents be citizens 
in order to confer citizenship on a child, and that persons seeking to 
prove citizenship through their own or their parents' residency in 
1958be able to prove residency in the country at that time. In many 
cases, persons were unable to produce the documentation necessary, such 
as land tax receipts from 1958, to show residency nearly 30 years 
before. The law permits residents who lost citizenship under the 1985 
law to apply for naturalization if they can prove residence during the 
previous 15 years. The Government declared all residents who could not 
meet the new requirements to be illegal immigrants.
    The 1985 Citizenship Act also provides for the revocation of the 
citizenship of any naturalized citizen who ``has shown by act or speech 
to be disloyal in any manner whatsoever to the King, country, and 
people of Bhutan.'' The Home Ministry, in a circular notification in 
1990, advised that ``any Bhutanese nationals leaving the country to 
assist and help the anti-nationals shall no longer be considered as 
Bhutanese citizens . . . such people's family members living in the 
same household will also be held fully responsible and forfeit their 
citizenship.'' Human rights groups allege that these provisions were 
widely used to revoke the citizenship of ethnic Nepalese who were 
subsequently expelled or otherwise departed from the country. Beginning 
in 1988, the Government expelled large numbers of ethnic Nepalese 
through enforcement of the new citizenship laws.
    Outraged by what they saw as a campaign of repression, ethnic 
Nepalese mounted a series of demonstrations, sometimes violent, in 
September 1990. The protests were spearheaded by the newly formed 
Bhutan People's Party (BPP) which demanded full citizenship rights for 
ethnic Nepalese, the reintroduction of Nepali as a medium of education 
in the south, and democratic reforms. Characterizing the BPP as a 
``terrorist'' movement backed by Indian sympathizers, the authorities 
cracked down on its activities and ordered the closure of local 
Nepalese schools, clinics, and development programs after several were 
raided or bombed by dissidents. Many ethnic Nepalese schools were 
reportedly turned into Army barracks. There were credible reports that 
many ethnic Nepalese activists were beaten and tortured while in 
custody, and that security forces committed acts of rape. There were 
also credible reports that militants, including BPP members, attacked 
and murdered census officers and other officials, and engaged in 
bombings. Local officials took advantage of the climate of repression 
to coerce ethnic Nepalese to sell their land below its fair value and 
to emigrate.
    Beginning in 1991, ethnic Nepalese began to leave southern areas of 
the country in large numbers and take refuge in Nepal. Many were 
forcibly expelled. According to Amnesty International, entire villages 
were sometimes evicted en masse in retaliation for an attack on a local 
government official. Many ethnic Nepalese were forced to sign 
``voluntary migration forms'' wherein they agreed to leave the country, 
after local officials threatened to fine or imprison them for failing 
to comply. By August 1991, according to NGO reports, 2,500 refugees 
were already camped illegally in Nepal, with a steady stream still 
coming from Bhutan. The UNHCR began providing food and shelter in 
September of that year, and by year's end, there were 6,000 refugees in 
Nepal. The number of registered refugees grew to approximately 62,000 
by August 1992, and to approximately 80,000 by June 1993, when the 
UNHCR began individual screening of refugees. The flow slowed 
considerably thereafter; there were no new refugee arrivals from Bhutan 
to the camps during the year. As of late 1999, there were approximately 
97,000 refugees registered in camps in Nepal, with much of the increase 
since 1993 the result of births to residents of the camps. An 
additional 15,000 refugees, according to UNHCR estimates, are living 
outside the camps in Nepal and India.
    Ethnic Nepalese political groups in exile complain that the 
revision of the country's citizenship laws in 1985 denaturalized tens 
of thousands of former residents of Bhutan. They also complain that the 
new laws have been selectively applied and make unfair demands for 
documentation on a largely illiterate group in a country that has only 
recently adopted basic administrative procedures. They claim that many 
ethnic Nepalese whose families have been in the country for generations 
were expelled in the early 1990's because they were unable to document 
their claims to residence. The Government denies this and asserts that 
a three-member village committee--typically ethnic Nepalese in southern 
districts--certifies in writing that a resident is a Bhutanese citizen 
in cases where documents cannot be produced.
    The Government maintains that many of those who departed the 
country in 1991-92 were Nepalese or Indian citizens who came to the 
country after the enactment of the 1958 Citizenship law but were not 
detected until a census in 1988. The Government also claims that many 
persons registered in the camps as refugees may never have resided in 
the country. A royal decree in 1991 made forcible expulsion of a 
citizen a criminal offense. In a January 1992 edict, the King noted 
reports that officials had been forcing Bhutanese nationals to leave 
the country but stressed that this was a serious and punishable 
violation of law. Nevertheless, only three officials were ever punished 
for abusing their authority during this period. According to the UNHCR, 
the overwhelming majority of refugees who have entered the campssince 
screening began in June 1993 have documentary proof of Bhutanese 
nationality. Random checks and surveys of camp residents--including 
both pre- and post-June 1993 arrivals--bear this out.
    A Nepal-Bhutan ministerial committee met seven times between 1994 
and 1996, and a secretarial-level committee met twice in 1997 in 
efforts to resolve the Bhutanese refugee problem. During 1998, Foreign 
Minister Jigme Thinley took office with a mandate to resolve the 
refugee issue, and several meetings were held with representatives of 
the Nepalese Government, the UNHCR, and NGO's. However, the dialog lost 
momentum in 1998 and was suspended by the Bhutanese Government pending 
the formation of a new government in Nepal in 1999. After a 3-year 
hiatus, the foreign ministers of Nepal and Bhutan met in September in 
Kathmandu to resume discussions on the refugee issue.
    In March 1996 refugees began a series of ``peace marches'' from 
Nepal to Bhutan to assert their right to return to Bhutan. The marchers 
who crossed into Bhutan in August, November, and December 1996 were 
immediately detained and deported by Bhutanese police. In the December 
1996 incident, police reportedly used force against the marchers. Such 
marches were also held in 1998 and 1999; the marchers charge that the 
police assaulted them during each march, injuring several 
demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all marchers. A 
resolution adopted by the National Assembly in July 1997 prohibits the 
still-resident family members of ethnic Nepalese refugees from holding 
jobs with the Government or in the armed forces. Under the resolution, 
those holding such jobs were to be involuntarily retired. The 
Government made clear that for the purposes of this resolution, family 
member would be defined as a parent, a child, a sibling, or a member of 
the same household. The Government states that 429 civil servants, many 
of them ethnic Nepalese, were retired compulsorily in accordance with 
the July 1997 National Assembly resolution, and that the program was 
terminated in November. The Government states that those forced to 
retire were accorded retirement benefits in proportion to their years 
of government service. The Government also began a program of 
resettling Buddhist Bhutanese from other regions of the country on land 
in the southern part of the country vacated by the ethnic Nepalese now 
living in refugee camps in Nepal. Human rights groups maintain that 
this action prejudices any eventual outcome of negotiations over the 
return of the refugees to the country. The Government maintains that 
this is not its first resettlement program and that Bhutanese citizens 
who are ethnic Nepalese from the south are sometimes resettled on more 
fertile land in other parts of the country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions are not permitted, and 
there are no labor unions. Workers do not have the right to strike, and 
the Government is not a member of the International Labor Organization.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no 
collective bargaining in industry. Industry accounts for about 25 
percent of the gross domestic product, but employs only a minute 
fraction of the total work force. The Government affects wages in the 
manufacturing sector through its control over wages in state-owned 
industries.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government 
abolished its system of compulsory labor taxes in December 1995. 
Laborers in rural development schemes previously paid through this 
system are now paid regular wages. There is no evidence to suggest that 
domestic workers are subjected to coerced or bonded labor. The law does 
not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such 
practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 18 years 
for citizens and 20 years for noncitizens. A UNICEF study suggested 
that children as young as 11 years are sometimes employed with road-
building teams. The law does not specifically prohibit forced and 
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur 
(see Section 6.c.). The Government provides free and compulsory primary 
school education, and 72 percent of the school-aged population is 
enrolled. Children often do agricultural work and chores on family 
farms. There is no law barring ethnic Nepalese children from attending 
school. However, most of the 75 primary schools in southern areas that 
were closed in 1990 remain closed today. The closure of the schools 
acts as an effective barrier to the ability of the ethnic Nepalese in 
southern areas to obtain a primary education.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A circular effective February 1, 
1994, established wage rates, rules and regulations for labor 
recruiting agencies, and regulations for payment of workmen's 
compensation. Wage rates are periodically revised, and range upward 
from a minimum of roughly $1.50 (50 ngultrums) per day for unskilled 
and skilled laborers, with various allowances paid in cash or kind in 
addition. This minimum wage does provide a decent standard of living 
for a worker and family in the local context. The workday is defined as 
8 hours with a 1-hour lunch break. Work in excess of this must be paid 
at one and one-half times normal rates. Workers paid on a monthly basis 
are entitled to 1 day's paid leave for 6 days of work and 15 days of 
leave annually. The largest salaried work force is the government 
service, which has an administered wage structure last revised in 1988 
but supplemented by special allowances and increases since then, 
including a 25 percent increase in July 1997. Only about 30 industrial 
plants employ more than 50 workers. Smaller industrial units include 69 
plants of medium size, 197 small units, 692 ``mini'' units, and 651 
cottage industry units. The Government favors a family-owned farm 
policy; this, along with the country's rugged geography and land laws 
that prohibit a farmer from selling his last five acres and that 
require the sale of holdings in excess of 25 acres, result in a 
predominantly self-employed agricultural work force. Workers are 
entitled to free medical care within the country. They are eligible for 
compensation for partial or total disability, and in the event of 
death, their families are entitled to compensation. Existing labor 
regulations do not grant workers the right to remove themselves from 
work situations that endanger health and safety without jeopardizing 
their continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking 
in persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, 
to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 INDIA

    India is a longstanding parliamentary democracy with a bicameral 
parliament. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, whose Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) led a 13-party coalition, took office in March 1998 and 
heads the Government. The Government lost a parliamentary vote of 
confidence on April 17, and new parliamentary elections were held in 
September and early October after the President dissolved the lower 
house of Parliament in April. President K.R. Narayanan, who was elected 
by an electoral college consisting of Members of Parliament and members 
of state assemblies, is Head of State and also has special emergency 
powers. The judiciary is independent.
    Although the 25 state governments have primary responsibility for 
maintaining law and order, the central Government provides guidance and 
support through the use of paramilitary forces throughout the country. 
The Union Ministry for Home Affairs controls most of the paramilitary 
forces, the internal intelligence bureaus, and the nationwide police 
service; it provides training for senior police officers for the state-
organized police forces. The armed forces are under civilian control. 
Security forces committed significant human rights abuses, particularly 
in Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeastern states.
    India is in a transition from a government-controlled economy to 
one that is largely market oriented. The private sector is predominant 
in agriculture, most nonfinancial services, consumer goods 
manufacturing, and some heavy industry. Economic liberalization and 
structural reforms begun in 1991 continue, although momentum has 
slowed. The country's economic problems are compounded by rapid 
population growth of 1.7 percent per year with a current population of 
more than 1 billion. Income distribution remained very unequal, with 
the top 20 percent of the population receiving 39.3 percent of income 
and the bottom 20 percent receiving 9.2 percent of income. Forty 
percent of the urban population and half of the rural population live 
below the poverty level.
    There continued to be significant human rights abuses, despite 
extensive constitutional and statutory safeguards. Serious human rights 
abuses included: Political and other extrajudicial killings, including 
faked encounter killings and deaths of suspects in police custody 
throughout the country and excessive use of force by security forces 
combating active insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and several 
northeastern states; torture and rape by police and other agents of the 
Government; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and incommunicado 
detention in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast; continued detention 
throughout the country of thousands arrested under special security 
legislation; lengthy pretrial detention; prolonged detention while 
undergoing trial; lengthy delays in trials; occasional limits on 
freedom of the press and freedom of movement; harassment and arrest of 
human rights monitors; extensive societal violence against women; legal 
and societal discrimination against women; female bondage and forced 
prostitution; child prostitution and infanticide; discrimination 
against the disabled; serious discrimination and violence against 
indigenous people and scheduled castes and tribes; widespread 
intercaste and communal violence; societal violence against Christians 
and Muslims; widespread exploitation of indentured, bonded, and child 
labor; and trafficking in women and children.
    Many of these abuses are generated by intense social tensions, 
violent secessionist movements, and the authorities' attempts to 
repress them, and deficient police methods and training. These problems 
are acute in Jammu and Kashmir, where judicial tolerance of the 
Government's heavy-handed antimilitant tactics, the refusal of security 
forces to obey court orders, and terrorist threats have disrupted the 
judicial system. The number of insurgency-related killings and acts of 
torture in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast by regular security 
forces showed no clear improvement from the previous year; this also 
was true in the northeast, despite negotiated cease-fires in the 
northeast between the Government and insurgent forces and between some 
tribal groups. Security forces summarily killed suspected militants and 
civilians; with few exceptions, they acted with impunity.
    The concerted campaign of execution-style killings of civilians by 
Kashmiri militant groups, begun in 1998, continued and included several 
killings of political leaders and party workers. Separatist militants 
were responsible for numerous, serious abuses, including extrajudicial 
executions of members of the armed forces and civilians and other 
political killings, torture, and brutality. Separatist militants also 
were responsible for kidnaping and extortion in Jammu and Kashmir and 
northeast India.
    The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces 
into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around Kargil 
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military campaign to 
repel the intrusion resulted in a large number of casualties among 
combatants on both sides, as well as some civilian deaths and the 
internal displacement of as many as 50,000 persons.
    Nearly 100 persons were killed in election-related violence 
throughout the country in September and October.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political killings 
by government forces (including deaths in custody and faked encounter 
killings) continued at a high level in the state of Jammu and Kashmir 
and several northeastern states, where separatist insurgencies 
continued. Security forces offered bounties for wanted militants 
brought in dead or alive.
    The Minister of Home Affairs for Jammu and Kashmir said that 
security forces had killed 762 militants in the state as of October. 
(Kashmir has been at the center of a territorial dispute between India 
and Pakistan since the two nations gained their independence in 1947; 
both claim Kashmir.) Kashmiri separatist groups maintain that many such 
``encounters'' are faked and that suspected militants offering no 
resistance are summarily executed. Statements by senior police and army 
officials confirm that the security forces are under instructions to 
kill foreign militants rather than attempt to capture them alive. Human 
rights groups allege that this is particularly true in the case of 
security force encounters with non-Kashmiri militants who cross into 
Jammu and Kashmir illegally. Although credible evidence to corroborate 
cases and quantify trends is lacking, most observers believe that the 
number of killings attributed to regular Indian forces showed no 
decrease from the previous year. According to press reports and 
anecdotal accounts, those persons killed typically were detained by 
security forces, and their bodies, bearing multiple bullet wounds and 
often marks of torture, were returned to relatives or were otherwise 
discovered the same day or a few days later. For example, on May 15 a 
patrol of the Rashtriya Rifles (a regular army unit specially trained 
to and assigned to counterinsurgency duty) took two brothers, Abdul 
Qayoom and Nazir Ahmed intocustody in Handwara, Jammu and Kashmir. A 
few days later, the bodies of the two men were returned to family 
members, who were told that they were killed while trying to escape.
    NGO's active in Jammu and Kashmir reported that on April 1, Fayaz 
Ahmed Bhatt of Anantnag was killed following his arrest by security 
forces and that his body was returned to family members by police in 
Nishat. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), a government-
appointed and financed investigative body (see Section 4), directed 
that all deaths in encounters immediately be investigated by an 
independent agency, but members of the security forces rarely are held 
accountable for these killings. The NHRC itself may inquire into 
alleged human rights abuses by security forces in Jammu and Kashmir, 
but does not have the statutory power to investigate such allegations 
if it is not satisfied with the responses to its inquiries. Authorities 
generally have not reported encounter deaths that occur in Jammu and 
Kashmir to the NHRC. Human rights groups alleged that security forces 
summarily executed a number of captured non-Kashmiri militants in Jammu 
and Kashmir. During conflicts with armed militants, security forces 
allegedly respond indiscriminately to a burst of gunfire.
    Soldiers also killed civilians during military counterinsurgency 
operations. For example, on August 4, 1998, suspected government-
sponsored counter-militants entered Saalan village, Poonch district, 
and summarily executed 19 relatives of a suspected Harkat-ul-Ansar 
militant, including 14 children and 2 women. During the year, portions 
of the Jammu and Kashmir human rights commission report on this 
incident became public; the commission held the army and government-
supported militants responsible. Human rights activists in Jammu and 
Kashmir alleged that members of the Rashtriya Rifles shot and killed 
Hajra Begum in Fatehpora village, near Baramullah town. Reportedly, the 
soldiers went to Begum's home late at night and attempted to rape one 
of Begum's daughters. When Begum resisted, the soldiers shot and killed 
her and wounded her brother, Bashir Ahmad Rather.
    According to an army spokesman, in Jammu and Kashmir security 
forces killed 10,727 militants during the 1990's. In November Jammu and 
Kashmir governor Girish Chander Saxena said that from 1989-99 militants 
killed 8,000 civilians and 2,000 security force members, and that 
another 2,600 civilians died in crossfire between security forces and 
militant groups. Government figures reveal that 867 civilians, 232 
members of the security forces, and 999 militants were killed in Jammu 
and Kashmir in 1998. According to the Government, in 1998, 632 
civilians, 126 security forces members, and 270 militants were killed 
in the northeastern states, and the Government reported 811 total 
killings in the northeast during the year.
    Impunity has been and remains a serious problem in Jammu and 
Kashmir. Security forces have committed thousands of serious human 
rights violations over the course of the conflict, including 
extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture. Despite this 
record of abuse, between January 1990 and September 1998, only 295 
members of the security forces were prosecuted and punished for any of 
these crimes, and no compensation was paid to the victims or their 
families, according to the Union Home Ministry. During the same period, 
113 members of the security forces were punished for human rights 
abuses in the northeastern states. Punishments ranged from reduction in 
rank to imprisonment for up to 10 years. According to the NHRC's most 
recent report, released in 1998, 259 complaints of alleged human rights 
violations by the Border Security Force were registered between January 
1990 and March 1997. During the same period, only 31 investigations 
into allegations of human rights abuses by members of the army were 
completed, resulting in the conviction and sentencing of 81 armed 
forces personnel, including 29 officers.
    In the past, scrutiny by the NHRC and international human rights 
organizations, when permitted, and the persistence of individual 
magistrates resulted in somewhat greater accountability for abuses 
committed by members of the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir; 
however, in July 1998, the Government rejected the NHRC's 
recommendations to bring the army and paramilitary forces under closer 
scrutiny by allowing the NHRC to investigate complaints of their 
excesses. According to a credible Kashmir-based NGO, the killing of 
civilians by security forces increased during the year but did not 
reach the levels of the mid-1990's. The majority of complaints were 
about individual cases; there were no reports of entire villages being 
burned by armed forces or of mass killings. The NHRC continues to 
receive complaints alleging human rights violations by the security 
forces, especially from Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states. 
The vast majority of violations by security forces continue to go 
uninvestigated and unpunished.
    There were many allegations that military and paramilitary forces 
in the northeast engage in arbitrary detention, abduction, torture, and 
the extrajudicial execution of militants, as well as rape (see Sections 
1.c. and 1.g.). TheArmed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 and the 
Disturbed Areas Act of 1976 remained in effect in several states where 
active secessionist movements exist, namely, in Jammu and Kashmir, 
Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and parts of Tripura. The Disturbed Areas Act 
gives police extraordinary powers of arrest and detention, which 
according to human rights groups allow security forces to operate with 
virtual impunity in areas under the act. The Armed Forces Special 
Powers Act of 1958 provides search and arrest powers without warrants.
    Human rights monitors allege that, as in Jammu and Kashmir, 
government reports of deaths during ``encounters'' between insurgent 
groups and security forces in northeastern states actually are staged, 
and that those insurgents who were reported dead were killed after 
being detained by security forces. More than 25 encounters occurred 
between security forces and militant groups during the first 7 months 
of the year, leaving 34 militants and 48 members of the security forces 
dead in the northeastern states, according to a compilation of 
newspaper accounts. For example, in a shootout on February 23 in 
Jankhang, Nagaon district, army Major Murli Gangadhar and ``Pratap,'' 
the area commander of the Kabri National Volunteers militant group were 
shot and killed. In Guwahati district, police shot and killed a 
National Democratic Front of Bodoland leader at Bhetapara on March 3. 
On May 17, the army shot and killed a United Liberation Front of Assam 
(ULFA) leader in Darrang district. On August 5, police killed a ULFA 
militant, Babul Ingty, alias Putul Teron, who was wanted in connection 
with more than 25 cases of murder, kidnaping, and extortion. In Tripura 
during the first 8 months of the year, there were at least 9 encounters 
between security forces and various militant groups resulting in the 
deaths of 55 militants and 24 members of the security forces, according 
to a compilation of newspaper articles. On March 3, the army killed 
five militants in Chandel district. On March 28, the security forces 
killed an ULFA militant in Tinsukia district. In Manipur security 
forces shot a Manipur People's Army (MPA) militant and injured two 
persons in an encounter near the Manipur-Assam border. On April 12, 
five suspected People's Liberation Army (PLA) terrorists were killed in 
an encounter with the army in Bishenpur district.
    In a positive development, in July the Supreme Court directed the 
central Government to explain why it had not acceded to the request of 
the NHRC to release records pertaining to the October 1993 killing of 
some 60 civilians by security forces in Bijbehara town, Anantnag 
district; however, the Government did not respond.
    Since 1980 clashes between police and Naxalite Maoist 
revolutionaries of the Peoples' War Group (PWG) have occurred in 
northwestern Andhra Pradesh. Over the past few years, hundreds of 
policemen and suspected Naxalites have been killed, according to press 
reports and human rights organizations. According to local human rights 
groups, 135 persons were killed in police ``Encounters'' in the first 6 
months of the year. Nineteen years of guerrilla-style conflict have led 
to serious human rights abuses by both sides. Human rights groups 
allege that ``encounters'' often are faked by the police to cover up 
the torture and subsequent murder of Naxalite suspects, sympathizers, 
or informers. For example, in May police took into custody three 
leaders of a radical students union who were suspected of having links 
with the PWG. According to human rights groups, the police tortured and 
killed two of the students, abandoning their bodies in a forest. The 
third student later was released, although he too underwent torture 
(see Section 1.c.). In another incident cited by human rights groups, 
police arrested, tortured, then killed four of six farmers in a village 
in Adilabad district in April (see Section 1.c.). Their bodies were 
found in a forest 150 miles away from the village, and the incident was 
reported as an ``encounter death.'' After the villagers protested, the 
police produced the other two farmers in court as ``suspected 
extremists.'' The PWG alleged that police killed three of their 
members, Adi Reddy, Santosh Reddy, and Seelam Naresh, in a ``faked 
encounter'' in Koyyuru forest, Karnataka, on December 2, and that 
another PWG member helped frame them. As further evidence that 
``encounters'' often are faked by police, human rights groups also cite 
the refusal of police officials to hand over the corpses of suspects 
killed in ``encounters,'' which often are cremated before families can 
view the bodies. Villagers in PWG-dominated areas complain of regular 
harassment and arbitrary detention by police. Police officials rarely 
if ever are held accountable for human rights abuses. In 1998 the 
Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, a local NGO, documented more 
than 100 encounter killings by police in which no perpetrators were 
prosecuted. The NHRC is investigating some 285 reported cases of so-
called ``fake encounter deaths'' allegedly committed by the Andhra 
police in connection with anti-Naxalite operations. In its 1996-97 
report, the NHRC stated that the evidence on record did not reveal that 
any prior attempt was made by the police to arrest the deceased 
persons. The report observed that in none of these encounters did 
police personnel receive any injury, while one or more persons from the 
other side died. The Commission further observed that ``no attempt 
whatsoever'' was made to ascertain theidentity of the police officers 
who fired the weapons that caused the deaths and that no attempt was 
made to investigate the circumstances under which the police opened 
fire. ``As this appeared to be the pattern of the procedure followed by 
the police,'' the report concluded, ``the Commission felt it necessary 
to conclude that the procedure followed by them was opposed to law.'' 
According to the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, the NHRC has 
evidence of police culpability in several cases of ``encounter deaths'' 
involving suspected Naxalites. However, such cases have not been 
adjudicated in the courts or have otherwise not been acted on by the 
state government. For example, of six cases referred by the Andhra 
Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee to the NHRC in 1994, evidence of 
police culpability was found in five. The NHRC directed the state 
government to investigate the cases; however, action apparently never 
was taken by the state. The state government's failure to act 
expeditiously in these cases has discouraged local human rights groups 
from filing additional ``encounter death'' cases with the NHRC.
    The Disturbed Areas Act has been in force in a number of districts 
in Andhra Pradesh for over 2 years. Human rights groups allege that 
security forces have been able to operate with virtual impunity in 
parts of Andhra Pradesh under the act. They further allege that Andhra 
Pradesh police officers train and provide weapons to an armed vigilante 
group known as the ``Green Tigers,'' whose mission is to combat 
Naxalite groups in the state. Little is known about the size, 
composition, or activities of this group.
    Police also used excessive force indiscriminately against 
demonstrators, killing many citizens. For example, in Tirunelveli, 
Tamil Nadu 17 persons drowned in a river in July when thousands of 
demonstrators ran to escape a police beating. The demonstrators were 
demanding government intervention in a labor dispute at a local coffee 
estate and the release of 652 estate workers imprisoned after a 
previous demonstration (see Section 2.b.). The police reportedly began 
to throw rocks at demonstrators, beat them with batons, fired weapons 
in the air, and chased the demonstrators into a nearby river. The 
police reportedly followed demonstrators into the river and hit some of 
them with batons. They also allegedly beat persons attempting to rescue 
drowning demonstrators. Leaders of the demonstration alleged that the 
autopsies of the victims were flawed, but the state government rejected 
their demand for a second post mortem. The state has ordered an 
investigation into the incident to be conducted by a retired Supreme 
Court judge. By year's end, no progress had been made.
    On July 17, police killed two persons at Chhapra and one at 
Darbhanga in Bihar after a scheduled entrance exam for the army was 
postponed, resulting in a riot. More than 30 persons, including a 
senior army officer and a police subinspector, were injured. In 
February in Murshidabad district, West Bengal, the Border Security 
Force shot and killed two villagers and injured another when a group of 
villagers tried to smuggle cattle into Bangladesh.
    Throughout the country, numerous accused criminals continue to be 
killed in encounters with police. For example, the People's Union for 
Civil Liberties (PUCL) in Bihar alleged that police shot and killed 
Lallu Singh and Bharat Singh, two unarmed men who had surrendered to 
them at Dadpur, Dhagwanpur district, on June 22, 1998. Police contend 
that the two persons were planning to commit a ``serious crime,'' and 
that they were armed and resisting arrest. However, witnesses to the 
killings told the PUCL that the two had surrendered, offered no 
resistance, and were shot at point-blank range.
    According to the Government, 462 civilians and 106 police officers 
died in exchanges of gunfire involving police in 1997. In January the 
NHRC directed the government of Uttar Pradesh to pay an interim 
compensation of $11,500 (500,250 rupees) each to the families of three 
young men killed due to indiscriminate firing by police on the Banaras 
Hindu University campus. Two of the victims were students and the third 
a former student when the shootings occurred in February 1997.
    Security forces also held persons in incommunicado detention; on 
occasion, as in the 1996 case of human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi, 
such missing persons later were found dead (see Sections 1.b. and 4). 
As of December 1997, 55 cases of disappearance and custodial death 
still were pending against Border Security Force personnel in Jammu and 
Kashmir (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
    While extrajudicial killings continued in areas buffeted by 
separatist insurgencies, the press and judiciary also continued to give 
attention to deaths in police custody. According to the Government, 817 
persons died in prisons between January 1 and September 30, 1998, many 
from natural causes, in some cases aggravated by poor prison conditions 
(see Section 1.c.). Humanrights groups allege that many deaths in 
prisons are due to torture.
    The NHRC has focused on torture and deaths in custody by directing 
district magistrates to report all deaths in police and judicial 
custody and stating that failure to do so would be interpreted as an 
attempted coverup. Magistrates appear to be complying with this 
directive. However, the NHRC has no authority to investigate directly 
abuses by the security forces, and security forces therefore are not 
required to--and do not--report custodial deaths in Jammu and Kashmir 
or the northeast. In 1998 the NHRC ordered the Central Bureau of 
Investigation (CBI) (the central government agency charged with 
investigation of serious crimes), to investigate the torture death of 
Delhi leather merchant Hari Shankar Pal, who was arrested along with 
five other persons and beaten by Hauz Kazi police on December 8, 1997. 
After 2 days of abuse, police took Pal to the city's Ram Manohar Lohia 
hospital, where he was pronounced dead upon arrival. The results of the 
May 1998 CBI investigation were not made public; the station house 
officer of the Hauz Kazi police station was transferred to another 
duty. In September the NHRC directed the government of Punjab to pay 
compensation to the family of Mela Singh, Mansa district, Punjab, who 
died in the Lehragaga police station on December 2, 1994. In a 
complaint to the NHRC, the victim's wife alleged that the police had 
detained her husband illegally for 4 days and that he died in police 
custody due to torture. According to credible NGO's, on August 16, 
police allegedly tortured Lakhbir Singh Lakha to death in police 
custody at a police post in Chohla Sahib in Tarn Taran district, 
Punjab. On September 18, Devinder Singh, a young Sikh, died in police 
custody at the Ropar police station in Punjab. Devinder Singh was 
arrested with his two brothers; all three persons allegedly were 
tortured (see Section 1.c.). As of year's end, no one had been held 
accountable.
    On June 2, the NHRC demanded a response from Delhi police to a 
complaint that it received alleging that Raziuddin died April 30 of 
torture injuries inflicted in Tihar jail following his arrest by the 
crime branch of the Delhi police. The NHRC also received a complaint 
alleging that police in Jehanabad village, near Pilibit, Uttar Pradesh, 
beat to death 20-year-old Dilshad on May 23, hours after arresting him. 
An autopsy was conducted, but instead of returning the body to family 
members, the complaint alleged that police had the body cremated on May 
24, without the consent of the family. In Haryana six police officers 
were suspended and charged with culpable homicide and wrongful 
confinement in connection with the death in custody on August 15 of 
Mohinder Singh, a 45-year-old employee of the Haryana state electricity 
board. Alipur police arrested Singh the same day. His body was brought 
to nearby Hindu Rao hospital a few hours later, allegedly bearing marks 
of torture. In Gujarat the NHRC demanded information from authorities 
regarding the June 25 death of Ganga Nepali, an inmate of Sabarmati 
jail. According to the report of a three-member committee established 
by the West Bengal government's prisons department, there were 46 
custodial deaths in the state in 1995-96, 44 in 1996-97, and 66 in 
1997-98. On March 19, for example, the charred body of Pappu Ahmed was 
found in the Howrah jail toilet. Jail authorities claim that Ahmed was 
a drug addict and had committed suicide. The West Bengal Human Rights 
Commission ordered an investigation, questioning how he got matches and 
kerosene, and the suicide motive. In May Jagadeesan, a 14-year-old 
student who was arrested for causing damage to public property in 
Sivaganga district, Tamil Nadu, died from torture injuries inflicted by 
police. The Tamil Nadu government ordered an investigation, and the 
policemen involved were suspended from active duty.
    An army major was arrested in 1998 for the 1996 killing of human 
rights monitor Jalil Andrabi. The case still was being heard at year's 
end, but human rights workers alleged that the central Government and 
Jammu and Kashmir state both were attempting to subvert the judicial 
process by withholding evidence. There were no developments in the 1996 
killing of human rights monitor Parag Das, who allegedly was killed by 
a militant who previously had surrendered and was supported by the 
Government (see Section 4.).
    Killings and abductions of suspected militants and other persons by 
progovernment countermilitants continued as a significant pattern in 
Jammu and Kashmir. Countermilitants are former separatist militants who 
surrendered to government forces but have retained their arms and 
paramilitary organization. Government agencies fund, exchange 
intelligence with, and direct operations of countermilitants as part of 
the counterinsurgency effort. Countermilitants are known to search 
persons at roadblocks (see Section 2.d.) and guard extensive areas of 
the Kashmir valley from attacks by militants. The Government, through 
its sponsoring and condoning of extrajudicial countermilitant 
activities is responsible for killings, abductions, and other abuses 
committed by these militant groups. Perhaps as many as 3,000 
individuals continue to operate in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in 
the countryside, outsidemajor towns. The Hizbul Mujahideen, a Kashmiri 
militant group, told the press in June 1998 that progovernment 
countermilitants had killed 350 of its members. According to the 
Lashkar-I-Toiba, another militant group, security forces killed 21 
members during the year in Jammu and Kashmir; however, this number has 
not been confirmed, and comes from one of only many groups in the 
state. Precise numbers are unavailable. The Government recruited 
countermilitants into the Special Operations Group of the Jammu and 
Kashmir police and into the Border Security Force (BSF).
    Militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir increasingly targeted members 
of the security forces and civilians during the year. On April 29, five 
militants forcibly entered the home of Ahad Ganai, in Kreshipora, 
Kupwara district, rounded up the residents, and shot them with 
automatic weapons, killing eight family members, including children. On 
July 13, militants attacked a BSF residential compound in Baramulla 
district, killing three BSF troops; two militants also died in the 
exchange. On August 10, militants attacked a BSF position in Rajouri 
district, killing one BSF soldier and injuring two others. On August 
11, militants killed three BSF soldiers and injured three others in 
Rajouri district. Militants also carried out attacks on security forces 
and civilians that killed numerous persons (see Section 1.g.).
    The police, BSF, and army each reported that during the year they 
had the highest number of causalities of any year during the past 
decade of militancy. The BSF reported that during the year militants 
killed over 35 persons, including 5 officers. The police forces 
reported that, as of September, 61 policemen had been killed. Army 
statistics indicated that during the year over 200 soldiers were killed 
in counter-insurgency violence in Jammu and Kashmir. The year's total 
number of security force deaths (over 300 according to the Home 
Minister) indicates a nearly 50 percent increase above prior years.
    During the period of increased militant attacks against the 
security forces, there was a parallel decline in massacres of unarmed 
civilians in Jammu and Kashmir; however, incidents of mass killings of 
civilians still occurred. Between May and July, Muslim militants 
carried out four mass killings of Hindu villagers in Jammu and Kashmir. 
On July 20, approximately 20 militants entered two houses in the Doda 
district of Jammu region, and opened fire with automatic weapons, 
killing over 15 Hindu persons, including 3 women and 7 children; one 
woman was 75 years old. The militants, identified by a survivor as 
belonging to Hizbul-Mujahideen, specifically were targeting five men in 
the houses who were members of their local village defense committee 
(VDC). In 1998 the state police created dozens of VDC's throughout 
Jammu as a means of arming Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits) against attacks by 
Muslim militants (see Section 5).
    Insurgency and increased ethnic violence took a heavy toll in the 
northeast. Extensive, complex patterns of violence continued in many of 
the seven northeastern states. The main insurgent groups in the 
northeast include two factions of the National Socialist Council of 
Nagaland (NSCN) in Nagaland; Meitei extremists in Manipur; the ULFA and 
the Bodo security force in Assam; and the ATTF and the NLFT in Tripura. 
The proclaimed objective of many of these groups is to secede from of 
the country, creating new, independent nations. Their stated grievances 
against the Government range from charges of neglect and indifference 
to the endemic poverty of the region, to allegations of active 
discrimination against the tribal and nontribal people of the region by 
the central Government (see Section 5). The oldest of these conflicts, 
involving the Nagas, dates back to the country's independence in 1947. 
On August 1, 1997, a cease-fire between the Government and the Isak-
Muivah faction of the NSCN (NCSN-IM) entered into effect and largely 
has been observed by the Government and all insurgent groups in the 
state. During the latter part of the year, the cease-fire was extended 
through July 31, 2000. In May underground Naga leaders Isak Chisi Swu 
and Thuingaleng Muivah, chairman and general secretary respectively of 
the NSCM-IM, visited Nagaland for the first time in 33 years. The 
Government asked the NSCM-IM to define the geographical boundary of 
``Nagalim'' to enable it to extend the cease-fire zone to these areas. 
On August 18, the NSCM-IM killed Dally Mungro, general secretary of the 
Khaplang faction of the NSCN, along with two of his associates.
    The Kuki and Paite ethnic tribes also entered into a cease-fire in 
March 1998, which was signed in the presence of Manipur's chief 
minister. Both sides observed the cease-fire, and in October 1998 a 
peace accord between them was signed. In 1997 violence between the Kuki 
and Paite communities led to hundreds of deaths and the burning of many 
homes. Elsewhere in the northeast, the upsurge in Bodo-Santhal ethnic 
clashes, which began in April 1998, continued throughout the year. More 
than 260,000 persons live under poor conditions in relief camps in 
Assam's Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon, and adjoining districts as a result of 
the ongoing violence between Bodos and Santhals. Thekillings of ULFA 
leaders' family members during the year renewed concerns about the 
situation in Assam. There also were encounters between security forces 
and the NSCN-Khaplang faction throughout the year.
    In Tripura kidnapings committed by militant groups operating in the 
state continued to be a problem. For example on March 19 a Communist 
Party (Marxist) leader was kidnaped and killed by the National 
Liberation Front of Tripura militants. Even after ransom is paid for 
captives, many are killed. According to a compilation of newspaper 
accounts compiled during the first 8 months of the year, more than 193 
persons were killed in insurgency-related violence in Assam; 184 in 
Tripura; 88 in Manipur; 7 in Mizoram; 5 in Nagaland; and 4 in 
Meghalaya. On March 7, ULFA militants shot and killed a local Congress 
Party leader in Assam. On March 26, ULFA militants killed the Assam 
state agriculture minister's brother and injured the health minister's 
brother. On March 29, ULFA militants shot and killed the nephew of the 
public health engineering minister in north Lakhimpur district. On the 
same day, an armed group of Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist 
Liberation) members shot and killed three members of a rival faction in 
retaliation for the earlier murder of some of their members. On May 19, 
in south Tripura district, NLFT insurgents hacked to death Halendra 
Tripura, a tribal Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) leader, and 
his brother-in-law, Ananda Mohan Roaja, a senior tribal leader and a 
member of the Tripura state legislative assembly. On June 17, suspected 
monitors of the Congress and the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity killed CPM 
member Sukhlal Debnath in Mohanpur, Sadar subdivision. On July 14, 
suspected NLFT militants killed Amar Pal, a CPM leader, and abducted 
his nephew in Dhanlekha village in south Tripura (see Section 1.b.). In 
August militants belonging to the Isac-Muivah faction of the NSCN-IM 
and Mizoram's tribal Hmar People's Conference (HPC) killed at least one 
person during a spree of abductions (see Section 1.b.). Three militant 
attacks occurred in November, killing numerous persons; these attacks 
made use of some unconventional weapons, and in some cases targeted 
civilians (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
    The kidnaping of NGO environmental monitor Sanjay Ghosh in 1997 and 
his death at the hands of his ULFA captors continued to attract wide 
public criticism. On August 6, 1997, ULFA confirmed that Ghosh died in 
captivity after being ``arrested and tried.'' ULFA still has not 
produced Ghosh's body. In June the CBI filed murder charges in 
connection with the case against ULFA leader Paresh Arua and 10 other 
ULFA members. Groups representing several ethnic tribal peoples in 
Assam, including the Santhals, Mundas, Oraons, Gonds, Savars, Bhils, 
Koyas, Kharias, Lohars, and Parjas, allege that they have been the 
target of systematic violence at the hands of the National Democratic 
Front for Bodoland. In Assam surrendered members of the ULFA (Sulfa's) 
were labeled as traitors and targeted for murder by ULFA members. On 
March 6, ULFA members fired a rocket-propelled grenade at a Guwahati 
apartment building housing several Sulfa's; there were minor injuries. 
In retaliation for this and other attacks, the relatives of ULFA 
members allegedly have been targeted. For example, on March 6, just 
hours after the apartment building rocketing, unidentified gunmen 
attacked three houses in Guwahati belonging to the relatives of ULFA 
members, killing six persons and injuring a 50-year-old woman.
    Naxalite Maoist revolutionaries of the PWG killed dozens of 
persons, declaring them ``class enemies'' or police informers. On March 
3, a group of about 60 armed Naxalites entered Bhimpura village, Bihar, 
forcibly entered 25 homes, and murdered 5 persons, including 3 members 
of a family. In areas under their control, Naxalites dispense summary 
justice in ``People's Courts,'' which in some cases condemn to death 
suspected police informers, village headmen, and others deemed to be 
``class enemies'' or ``caste oppressors'' (landlords); the Naxalites 
also extort money from these groups, as well as businesses. On February 
10, the Naxalite PWG killed seven lower caste villagers in Bihar (see 
Section 5). On September 4, Naxalite members shot and killed the 
superintendent of police in Hyderabad. On September 15, 10 to 15 
Naxalite insurgents in Sirpur, Andhra Pradesh shot and killed Paliwai 
Purushottam Rao, a member of the Andhra Pradesh legislative assembly, 
as well as 3 bodyguards. On December 15, Naxalite extremists belonging 
to the PWG hacked to death Madhya Pradesh state minister Likhiram 
Kaware, a three-term Congress Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA), as 
he slept at his ancestral home in Sonepuri. According to media reports, 
the PWG left a note at the murder scene stating that the killing was in 
retaliation for police action against group members carried out in 
Andhra Pradesh on December 1, in which four extremists were killed. 
This is the first known instance in which PWG extremists targeted a 
high-level government official. The PWG also use land mines to kill 
police (see Section 1.g.), and insurgents use bombs to kill government 
officials, police, and civilians. Naxalite violence has plagued Andhra 
Pradesh since the early 1980's, and has claimed more than 500 civilian 
and police victims since 1996 alone.
    In November 1997, an independent commission of inquiry established 
by Parliament in 1991 to investigate the May 21, 1991 assassination of 
former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi tabled an interim report of its 
findings in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament). The report 
pointed to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as clearly 
responsible for the assassination but was inconclusive on the question 
of whether the LTTE had received assistance in carrying out the murder. 
It criticized the then-government for an alleged failure to provide 
comprehensive security for the former Prime Minister. On January 28, 
1998, a designated lower court in Chennai sentenced to death all 26 
persons accused in the assassination. The CBI originally charged 41 
persons in the case; 12 since have died, and 3 have evaded capture 
(including LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan). Many of those 
sentenced, who include both Indian and Sri Lankan nationals, allegedly 
played a peripheral role in the assassination plot, but the court 
upheld the CBI contention that all of them were aware that they were 
conspiring in a common cause. Having heard an appeal of the 
convictions, the Supreme Court on May 11 acquitted 19 of the 26 accused 
persons and upheld the convictions of 7 persons (see Section 1.d.). It 
sustained the death sentence in the case of four of the convicted 
persons and changed the sentence of three others to life imprisonment.
    The incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces into territory on the 
Indian side of the line of control around Kargil and the Indian 
military campaign to repel the intrusion resulted in a large number of 
casualties on both sides, including civilians (see Section 1.g.).
    Nearly 100 persons were killed in election-related violence 
throughout the country in September and October (see Sections 1.g. and 
4).
    Religiously and ethnically motivated violence led to large numbers 
of deaths (see Section 5).
    Mob lynchings of tribal people occur in many states (see Section 
5).
    In April security officials reported that 6 Bangladeshis and three 
Indians were killed and that over 60 persons were wounded in a border 
exchange of mortar rounds and gunfire along the West Bengal-Bangladesh 
border. There are about one or two such incidents reported annually.
    b. Disappearance.--According to human rights groups, 
unacknowledged, incommunicado detention of suspected militants 
continued in Jammu and Kashmir; however, the Government has not 
released any recent figures.
    The Jammu and Kashmir police acknowledged that 1,228 suspected 
militants were arrested during 1998 and that an additional 187 
surrendered. Of this number, 529 persons were released after 
preliminary questioning, 457 persons were charged under special 
security laws, and the remaining persons were released at a later stage 
of judicial review. In addition the Jammu and Kashmir police stated 
that in 1998 it held 514 persons under the Public Safety Act (PSA). The 
Jammu and Kashmir Minister of Home Affairs said that 552 militants were 
arrested and 62 persons surrendered during the first 9 months of the 
year. According to an Amnesty International report that was released 
during the year, there are over 800 unsolved disappearances in Kashmir 
since 1990. The Government was unable to provide complete statistics 
for the number of persons held under special security laws in the 
northeast, but acknowledged that 43 persons were in detention under the 
National Security Act as of December 31, 1998. Although the Government 
allowed the Terrorist and Disruptive Practices (Prevention) Act (TADA) 
to lapse in 1995, one credible human rights organization stated that 
more than 1,000 persons remained in detention awaiting prosecution 
under the law. Several thousand others are held in short-term 
confinement in transit and interrogation centers.
    Human rights groups maintain that several hundred more persons are 
held by the military and paramilitary forces in long-term 
unacknowledged detention in interrogation centers and transit camps in 
Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeast that nominally are intended for 
only short-term confinement. Human rights groups fear that many of 
these unacknowledged prisoners are subject to torture and extrajudicial 
killing (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). According to one credible NGO, 
there were 1,300 writs of habeas corpus pending in the Jammu and 
Kashmir High Court at midyear. In March Amnesty International reported 
that the fates of between 700 and 800 persons reported missing in Jammu 
and Kashmir since 1990 remain unexplained by authorities. The U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Torture reported in 1997 that more than 15,000 
habeas corpus petitions have been filed in India since 1990, ``but that 
in the vast majority of these cases the authorities had not responded 
to the petitions.'' During the year, the Working Group on Enforced or 
Involuntary Disappearances of the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rightstransmitted 33 newly reported cases of disappearance to the 
Government, 14 of which reportedly occurred in 1998. The Government 
submitted information on eight cases of disappearance to the Working 
Group during the year. In one prominent case in Jammu and Kashmir, the 
Government responded to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, 
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions in 1997 and stated that human rights 
monitor Jalil Andrabi was not arrested by security forces, as alleged 
by human rights groups, but that he was abducted by ``unidentified 
armed persons.'' Andrabi was last seen alive in the presence of 
countermilitants and members of the security forces on March 8, 1996, 
in Srinagar. Despite the Government's statement, the army in February 
1996 identified to a Srinagar court a major with a temporary commission 
as the individual primarily responsible for Andrabi's death. Allegedly 
security forces dumped Andrabi's body into the Jhelum River. His case 
also is the subject of an inquiry by the NHRC. In 1998 an army major 
was arrested for the killing of Andrabi. There was no progress in the 
case by year's end (see Sections 1.a. and 4). In April 1998, the 
Government stated that it would investigate the fate of eight persons 
who reportedly disappeared in Jammu and Kashmir during 1997: Fayaz 
Ahmad Beigh, Fayaz Ahmad Khan, Abdula Rashid Wahid, Mohammed Ashraf 
Dar, Mohammed Afzal Shah, Nisar Ahmad Wani, Manzoor Ahmad Dar, and 
Bilal Ahmad Sheikh. By September 1998, the Government could account for 
only one of the eight, claiming that Fayaz Ahmad Beigh escaped police 
custody on September 9, 1997, and was believed to have crossed the line 
of control into Pakistan. By year's end, no new information was 
available. As of December 1997, 55 cases of disappearance and custodial 
death still were pending against Border Security Force personnel in 
Jammu and Kashmir (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    The Government maintains that screening committees administered by 
the state governments provide information about detainees to their 
families. However, other sources indicate that families are able to 
confirm the detention of their relatives only by bribing prison guards. 
For example witnesses report that uniformed security forces arrested 
Muhammad Ashraf Mir, Bilal Ahmad Mir, Munir Ahmad Mir, and Gulzar Ahmad 
Wani on Residency Road, Kashmir valley, on May 4 and took them to an 
unknown location. Authorities did not provide any information about the 
arrests, despite repeated requests from family members. A program of 
prison visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 
which began in October 1995, is designed in part to help assure 
communications between detainees and their families. During the year, 
the ICRC visited approximately 1,000 detainees in 20 places of 
detention. All acknowledged detention centers in Jammu and Kashmir and 
Kashmiri detainees elsewhere in the country were visited. However, the 
ICRC is not authorized to visit interrogation centers or transit 
centers, nor does it have access to regular detention centers in the 
northeast (see Sections 1.c. and 4).
    In Punjab the pattern of disappearances prevalent in the early 
1990's appears to be at an end. Hundreds of police and security 
officials were not held accountable for serious human rights abuses 
committed during the counterinsurgency of 1984-94. However, steps were 
taken against a few such violators. The CBI claims to be pursuing 
actively charges against dozens of police officials implicated in the 
``mass cremations'' case. Police in the Tarn Taran district secretly 
disposed of bodies of suspected militants believed to have been 
abducted and extrajudicially executed, cremating them without the 
knowledge or consent of their families. The CBI, in its report to the 
Supreme Court in December 1996, stated that Punjab police secretly had 
cremated over 2,000 bodies in Tarn Taran; of these, 585 bodies had been 
identified fully, 274 had been identified partially, and 1,238 were 
unidentified. Most reportedly were killed by border security forces 
while trying to enter the country from Pakistan, were unidentified 
victims of accidents or suicide, or died in clashes between militant 
factions. However, 424 persons were apparently militants killed in the 
interior of the district, 291 of whom subsequently were identified. 
These numbers demonstrate the extent of the bloodshed during those 
years and, given the pattern of police abuses prevalent during the 
period, credibly include many killed in extrajudicial executions. The 
NHRC is seeking to obtain compensation for the families of those 
victims whose remains were identified, but the Government has 
challenged the NHRC's jurisdiction in the cases. In September 1998, the 
Supreme Court upheld the right of the NHRC to investigate the cases. In 
August 1998, the Committee for the Coordination on Disappearances in 
Punjab (CCDP) member and former Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh 
presented the chief minister of Punjab with a list of approximately 
3,000 persons who either were missing or had died in encounters with 
security forces during the period of unrest in Punjab. Former justice 
Singh also announced that the CCDP would form a three-member commission 
to investigate the mass cremations. The Commission received little 
cooperation from state government authorities and made little progress 
during the year (see Section 4).
    In August Amnesty International called on the Government to explain 
the disappearances and prosecute those responsible. Itexpressed concern 
that police in Punjab might be obstructing the judicial inquiry into 
the death of human rights monitor Jaswant Singh Khalra. Khalra was 
investigating the cremation of unidentified bodies by Tarn Taran 
police. Several witnesses observed Punjab police officials arrest 
Khalra outside his Amritsar home on September 6, 1995. Police officials 
subsequently denied that they had arrested Khalra, and he has not been 
seen since. On July 30, 1996, following its investigation, the CBI 
identified nine Punjab police officials as responsible for Khalra's 
abduction and recommended their prosecution. One of the suspects 
subsequently died, reportedly by suicide; none of the others were 
charged by year's end. In July 1998, Punjab police arrested Jaspal 
Singh Dhillon, another member of the CCDP who was active in the Tarn 
Taran investigation, on suspicion of conspiring to free several 
convicted Sikh separatists from a Chandigarh jail. He was released on 
bail on May 27. These events prompted extended public debate over the 
accountability of Punjab police for excesses while suppressing a 
violent insurgency. According to human rights monitors in Punjab, 
approximately 100 police officials were either facing charges, were 
prosecuted, or were under investigation for human rights abuses at 
year's end. Early in the year, the Punjab High Court, acting on a 
petition by the Punjab police, ordered the suspension of public 
hearings conducted by the People's Commission of Enquiry; at year's 
end, they had not resumed.
    There are credible reports that police throughout the country often 
do not file required arrest reports. As a result, there are hundreds of 
unsolved disappearances in which relatives claim that an individual was 
taken into police custody and never heard from again. Police usually 
deny these claims, countering that there are no records of arrest. In 
Manipur 14-year-old Yumlembam Sanamacha of Thoubal district has been 
missing since his arrest by soldiers on February 12, 1998. The army 
reportedly detained him because of his alleged links with insurgent 
groups. The All-Manipur Students' Union petitioned the Guwahati High 
Court for Sanamacha's release. The Court ordered the army to produce 
the boy, but it failed to do so and his whereabouts remain unknown. On 
May 5, police in Siliguri, West Bengal, arrested 14-year-old Pinter 
Yadav and his 9-year-old cousin. According to local human rights 
monitors, the boys were beaten, and when Pinter began to vomit blood he 
was taken to a local police station. He has not been seen since, and 
efforts by family members to petition police for information were 
unsuccessful.
    Militants in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast continued to use 
kidnapings to sow terror, seek the release of detained comrades, and 
extort funds. Sometimes kidnaped persons later were killed (see 
Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). According to government figures, there were 
634 kidnapings in the northeast during the year. There were no new 
developments in the case of the 1995 kidnapings of American, British, 
German, and Norwegian nationals, despite police cooperation with 
foreign diplomats.
    On July 14, suspected NLFT militants killed Amar Pal, a CPM leader, 
and abducted his nephew in Dhanlekha village in south Tripura (see 
Section 1.a.). On July 31, a Jalpaiguri tea garden owner was kidnaped 
in Assam. On August 3, a group of eight rebels reportedly belonging to 
the Isac-Muivah faction of NSCN-IM and Mizoram's tribal Hmar People's 
Conference (HPC) kidnaped Goutam Roy and Hitesh Puri, both senior tea 
executives. On August 4, a gang of five militants, suspected of being 
members of NSCN-IM and the Assam-based Muslim United Liberation Tigers 
(MULT), kidnaped Debojyoti Sharma, another tea executive and demanded 
ransom, to fund their activities. The kidnap victims later were 
released. In August militants belonging to the Isac-Muivah faction of 
the NSCN-IM and Mizoram's tribal Hmar People's Conference (HPC) killed 
at least one person during a spree of abductions (see Section 1.a.).
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and confessions extracted by 
force are generally inadmissible in court; however, torture is common 
throughout the country, and authorities often use torture during 
interrogations. In other instances, they torture detainees to extort 
money and sometimes as summary punishment.
    In 1997 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture reported that the 
security forces systematically practice torture against persons in 
Jammu and Kashmir in order to coerce them to confess to militant 
activity, to reveal information about suspected militants, or to 
inflict punishment for suspected support or sympathy with militants. 
Information is not made public regarding instances of action taken 
against security force personnel in Jammu and Kashmir for acts of 
torture.
    On April 14, 1996, Mohammad Iqbal was arrested by soldiers of the 
Rashtriya Rifles and taken to Chhatru Camp, near Kishtwar, Jammu and 
Kashmir. His body, bearing marks of torture, was discovered in the 
nearby Chhatru river soon thereafter; no onehas been charged in the 
case. According to local human rights organizations, on November 3, 
1995, Banihal police station officers arrested Ayaz Ahmad Wani of 
Bankoot village, Banihal, and tortured him there and in the jail at 
Ramban for 5 days. On November 8, 1995, police brought the youth to a 
hospital in Ramban with marks indicating torture on his arms, hands, 
face, and genitals. He was transferred to the government medical 
college in Jammu, where he died of his injuries on November 9, 1995. An 
autopsy revealed that he had suffered injuries to his kidneys, heart, 
and stomach and that his wrists and feet were broken. The father of the 
victim filed a complaint with the NHRC, and on July 18, 1998, the case 
was referred to police for investigation. There was no further progress 
in the case by year's end. Human rights monitors maintain that there is 
a similar pattern of abuse by security forces in the northeast. Police 
atrocities against indigenous people include torture (see Section 5).
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture noted in 1997 that methods 
of torture included beating, rape, crushing the leg muscles with a 
wooden roller, burning with heated objects, and electric shocks. 
Because many alleged torture victims die in custody, and others are 
afraid to speak out, there are few firsthand accounts, although marks 
of torture often have been found on the bodies of deceased detainees. 
The U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial Killings 
renewed their requests to visit during the year, but the Government did 
not permit them to do so (see Section 4).
    The prevalence of torture by police in detention facilities 
throughout the country is borne out by the number of cases of deaths in 
police custody (see Section 1.a.). Delhi's Tihar jail is notorious for 
the mistreatment of prisoners, with 1 of every 11 custodial deaths 
occurring there. Police and jailers typically assault new prisoners for 
money and personal articles. In addition police commonly torture 
detainees during custodial interrogation. Although police officers are 
subject to prosecution for such offenses under Section 302 of the Penal 
Code, the Government often fails to hold them accountable. Two 
kidnaping suspects allege that police tortured them while in detention 
in a Calcutta prison in November; the Home Minister denied that the 
boys were subjected to anything other than routine interrogation. The 
family of one of them asked the NHRC to investigate the allegation; at 
year's end, it still was under investigation. According to human rights 
groups, in May the Andhra Pradesh police tortured three students who 
were suspected of having links with the PWG; two persons died (see 
Section 1.a.). In another incident, police tortured six farmers in a 
village in Adilabad district in April (see Section 1.a.). According to 
human rights NGO's, on September 18, police beat Devinder Singh, 
Sapinder Singh, and Karnail Singh, three Sikh brothers, in a police 
courtyard in Punjab, apparently to extort a confession from them that 
they possessed an assault rifle. Allegedly, their legs were pulled open 
to 180 degrees, gasoline was applied to their genitals, and they were 
beaten badly. Devinder Singh allegedly died as result of his injuries 
(see Section 1.a.).
    According to press reports, prison officials used prisoners as 
domestic servants and sold female prisoners to brothels (see Sections 
6.c. and 6.f.).
    The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture stated in 1997 that, in 
Jammu and Kashmir, torture victims or their relatives reportedly have 
had difficulty in filing complaints because local police were issued 
instructions not to open a case without permission from higher 
authorities. In addition the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special 
Powers Act provides that unless approval is obtained from the central 
Government, no ``prosecution, suit, or other legal proceeding shall be 
instituted . . . against any person in respect of anything done or 
purported to be done in exercise of the powers ``of the act.'' This 
provision reportedly allows the security forces to act with virtual 
impunity.
    There also were incidents in which police beat journalists (see 
Section 2.a.) and demonstrators (see Section 2.b.). Police also 
committed abuses against tribal people (see Section 5).
    The rape of persons in custody is part of the broader pattern of 
custodial abuse. Limits placed on the arrest, search, and police 
custody of women appear effectively to limit the frequency of rape in 
custody, although it does occur on occasion. The NHRC received reports 
of only three cases of custodial rape between April 1, 1996, and March 
31, 1997. The 24-hour reporting requirement applies to custodial rape 
as well as custodial death. However, the requirement does not apply to 
rape by policemen outside police stations. NGO's claim that rape by 
police, including custodial rape, is more common than NHRC figures 
indicate. Although evidence is lacking, a larger number appears 
credible, in light of other evidence of abusive behavior by police and 
the likelihood that many rapes go unreported due to a sense of shame 
and a fear of retribution. In Gujarat a police constable in Vadodara is 
facing charges in connection with the rape of a woman while in custody.
    There is a pattern of rape by paramilitary personnel in Jammu and 
Kashmir and the northeast as a means of instilling fear among 
noncombatants in insurgency-affected areas (see Section 1.g.), but is 
not included in NHRC statistics because it involves military forces.
    Human rights monitors allege that army personnel summoned a woman 
and her four daughters from Mangota village, Doda district, Jammu and 
Kashmir, to a nearby camp on March 15, where the women were held 
captive for 4 days and repeatedly raped. The victims filed a complaint 
with Doda police naming Charanjit Sharma, the officer in charge of the 
camp, as one of their assailants (see Section 1.g.).
    In addition to the 888 complaints of custodial death (700 in 
judicial custody and 188 in police custody) and 3 cases of custodial 
rape received by the NHRC between April 1, 1996, and March 31, 1997, 
1,643 complaints of other police excesses were filed with the NHRC. As 
a result of NHRC action during this period, criminal prosecutions were 
brought against 144 police officials and 23 civilians and monetary 
compensation in amounts ranging from $1,250 (54,375 rupees) to $3,750 
(163,125 rupees) were recommended for payment in 55 cases. In its 
annual report for the period, the NHRC remarked that over half of the 
more than 20,000 complaints that it received ``relate to the conduct of 
the police.''
    Police corruption undermines efforts to combat trafficking in women 
and children (see Section 6.f.).
    During the year Human Rights Watch published a report that asserted 
that the Maharashtra government was complicit with the Dabhol Power 
Corporation (a joint venture of the Enron Corporation, General 
Electric, and Bechtel) in numerous human rights abuses. According to 
HRW, the Maharashtra government also engaged in a systematic pattern of 
suppression of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly coupled with 
arbitrary detentions, excessive use of force, and threats.
    Religiously motivated violence led to a number of deaths and 
injuries as well as damage to property (see Section 5).
    Some militants groups in the northeast use rape as a tactic to 
terrorize the populace (see Section 5).
    Prison conditions are poor. Prisons are severely overcrowded, and 
the provision of food and medical care is frequently inadequate.
    Prisons operate above capacity, because of thousands of prisoners 
awaiting hearings. For example, in West Bengal, Sheikh Feku, an alleged 
thief, was released from jail in mid-June after having been in jail for 
3 years awaiting trial. Overcrowding in jails also is severe. Delhi's 
Tihar jail, with a designed capacity of 3,300 persons, houses 9,000 
prisoners. The inspector general of prisons for Karnataka said in June 
that Mysore jail, designed to hold 350 inmates, holds 850 persons, and 
that Bangalore jail, built for 700 persons, holds 2,500 inmates. 
According to the inspector general of prisons, water supply and 
sanitation systems in both facilities are in disrepair and medical 
facilities are nonexistent, with the result that prisoners must be 
taken to government medical institutions for health checks. The states 
are waiting for a national jail manual to facilitate reform; however, 
aside from providing financial aid to the states, the central 
Government has not initiated any standard reforms. The Prison Act of 
1894 remains unamended. According to the South Asia Human Rights 
Documentation Center, in the poorest states, such as Bihar, where 265 
police stations have no lock-up facilities, the lack of prisons led 
police to shackle prisoners to trees. An NHRC investigatory team 
visiting Meerut jail in Uttar Pradesh in 1998 found some 3,000 inmates 
in a facility designed to hold 650 persons. As a result of this and 
other jail visits, the NHRC hired a consultant to draft the prison 
reform bill to be submitted to the Government. The bill, meant to be 
enacted by the national Parliament, encountered opposition from state 
governments on the basis that prison management is the responsibility 
of the states. The 700 deaths in judicial custody in 1998, occurring in 
a prison population of approximately 155,000, many of whom are held for 
years, include a large proportion of deaths from natural causes, in 
some cases aggravated by poor conditions in prisons (see Section 1.a.). 
Deaths in police custody, which typically occur within hours or days of 
initial detention, more clearly imply violent abuse. The NHRC has no 
authority to investigate abuses by security forces directly, and 
security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast are not required 
to report custodial deaths to the Commission.
    With the exception of an agreement with the ICRC for visits to 
detention facilities in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government does not 
allow NGO's to monitor prison conditions (see Section 4).However, 15 
states and union territories have authorized the NHRC to conduct 
surprise check-ups on jails. Although custodial abuse is deeply rooted 
in police practices, increased press reporting and parliamentary 
questioning provide evidence of growing public awareness of the 
problem. The NHRC has identified torture and deaths in detention as one 
of its priority concerns. In 1998 it created a ``Special Rapporteur and 
Chief Coordinator of Custodial Justice'' to help implement its 
directive to state prison authorities to ensure that medical check-ups 
are performed on all inmates. The Commission noted that there is an 
alarmingly high incidence of tuberculosis among inmates and that, 
according to one study, this was the cause of 79 percent of deaths in 
judicial custody.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--During the early 1980's, 
the Government implemented a variety of special security laws intended 
to help law enforcement authorities fight separatist insurgency, and 
there were credible reports of widespread arbitrary arrest and 
detention under these laws.
    Although the law that had been subject to the most extensive abuse, 
the TADA, lapsed in May 1995, 1,502 persons previously arrested under 
the act continued to be held as of January 1, 1997, in a number of 
states, according to the NHRC's most recent report. A small number of 
arrests under the TADA continued for crimes allegedly committed before 
the law lapsed. In 1997 the Government asserted that all the TADA cases 
would be reviewed. However, few persons have been released as a result 
of the review. Criminal cases are proceeding against most of those 
still held under the TADA, with more than 3,000 charged under other 
laws in addition to the TADA. In 1996 the Supreme Court eased bail 
guidelines for persons accused under TADA, taking into account the 
large backlog of cases in special TADA courts. On March 23, the state 
minister for home affairs told the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly 
that 16,620 persons had been detained under the TADA in the state since 
1990; of these, 1,640 were brought to trial, and 10 were convicted. 
TADA courts use abridged procedures. For example, defense counsel is 
not permitted to see witnesses for the prosecution, who are kept behind 
screens while testifying in court. Also, confessions extracted under 
duress are admissible as evidence.
    On May 10, the Tamil Nadu government withdrew the ``Prevention of 
Terrorist Activities Act,'' which attempted to resurrect provisions of 
the lapsed TADA. Passed by the Tamil Nadu state assembly in May 1998 
following a series of terrorist bombings in Coimbatore, the bill was 
never signed into law. Similar bills are pending in the Madhya Pradesh 
and Andhra Pradesh state assemblies. If enacted they would provide for 
special courts to try offenses, place the burden of proof at the bail 
stage on the accused, make confessions to a police officer of the rank 
of superintendent of police admissible as evidence, extend the period 
of remand from 15 to 60 days, and set mandatory sentences for 
terrorism-related offenses.
    The Constitution provides that detainees have the right to be 
informed of the grounds for their arrest, to be represented by counsel, 
and, unless held under a preventive detention law, to appear before a 
magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. At this initial appearance, the 
accused either must be remanded for further investigation or released. 
The Supreme Court has upheld these provisions. An accused person must 
be informed of his right to bail at the time of arrest and may, unless 
he is held on a nonbailable offense, apply for bail at any time. The 
police must file charges within 60 to 90 days of arrest; if they fail 
to do so, court approval of a bail application becomes mandatory.
    The Constitution permits preventive detention laws in the event of 
threats to public order and national security. These laws provide for 
limits on the length of detention and for judicial review. Several laws 
of this type remain in effect.
    The National Security Act (NSA) of 1980 permits the detention of 
persons considered to be security risks; police anywhere in the country 
(except Jammu and Kashmir) may detain suspects under NSA provisions. 
Under these provisions the authorities may detain a suspect without 
charge or trial for as long as a year on loosely defined security 
grounds. The state government must confirm the detention order, which 
is reviewed by an advisory board of three High Court judges within 7 
weeks of the arrest. NSA detainees are permitted visits by family 
members and lawyers and must be informed of the grounds for their 
detention within 5 days (10 to 15 days in exceptional circumstances). 
According to the Government, 1,163 persons were being held under the 
NSA at the end of 1997. The NSA does not define ``security risk.'' 
Human rights groups allege that preventive detention can be ordered and 
extended under the act purely on the opinion of the detaining authority 
and after advisory board review. Such a subjective decision cannot be 
overturned by any court.
    The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA) of 1978 covers 
corresponding procedures for that state. Over half of the detainees in 
Jammu and Kashmir are held under the PSA. Jammu and Kashmir police 
reported that 514 persons were being held under the PSA as of December 
31, 1998. In September and November alone, the Jammu and Kashmir police 
arrested 25 members of the Kashmiri separatist All Parties Hurriyat 
Conference (APHC). These arrests followed a series of terrorist attacks 
in the state for which members of this group allegedly were responsible 
(see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and 4). On October 8, Chief Minister Farooq 
Abdullah told a public audience that because Hurriyat leaders had 
planted land mines, buried hand grenades, and used violence to sabotage 
the polls, ``We are going to be very harsh and I am sending them to the 
places where they will see no hope.'' Hurriyat leaders were sent to 
Jodhpur jail for 3 years. Although prison officials denied the APHC 
members legal counsel on October 13, they subsequently granted access 
on October 27. On November 15, legal counsel filed a writ petition in 
the Kashmir High Court that challenged the constitutionality and 
reasonableness of the PSA. The petition also questioned the legality of 
the decision to shift the APHC leaders out of the state. In late 
October Governor Girjesh Saxena told a foreign delegation that the 
state government had sufficient grounds to detain the leaders, but 
lacked enough evidence to convict them. The NHRC was asked to take 
action on the case. In December Shabir Shah, president of the Jammu and 
Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party, was released. At the time of Shah's 
release, Amnesty International issued a statement that expressed 
concern about the 25 arrested leaders of the APHC and explicitly 
suggested that the charges were politically motivated.
    On November 27, 1997, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional 
validity of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958. In a 
representation made to the NHRC, the South Asia Human Rights 
Documentation Center (SAHRDC) asserted that the act's powers were ``too 
vast and sweeping and pose a grave threat to the fundamental rights and 
liberties of the citizenry of the (disturbed) areas covered by the 
act.'' The SAHRDC asserted that the powers granted to authorities under 
section 3 of the act to declare any area to be a ``disturbed area,'' 
and thus subject to the other provisions of the act, were too wide. 
Moreover, the SAHRDC noted that section 4(a) of the act empowers any 
commissioned officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or any 
other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces to fire upon and 
otherwise use force, ``even to the point of death,'' if he believes 
that it is necessary for the maintenance of law and order. Further, 
section 6 of the act states that ``no prosecution, suit or other legal 
proceedings shall be instituted,'' except with the previous sanction of 
the central Government ``against any person in respect of anything done 
or purported to be done in exercise of powers'' conferred by the act.
    The court system is extremely overloaded, resulting in the 
detention of numerous persons awaiting trial for periods longer than 
they would receive if convicted. Prisoners may be held for months or 
even years before obtaining a trial date. According to a reply to a 
parliamentary question in July 1994, more than 111,000 criminal cases 
were pending in the Allahabad High Court, the most serious case backlog 
in the country, of which nearly 29,000 cases had been pending for 5 to 
8 years. A statement to Parliament in July 1996 indicated that criminal 
and civil cases pending before the country's high courts numbered 
nearly 2.9 million in 1995, roughly the same as in 1994 but an increase 
from 2.65 million in 1993. According to the Union Home Ministry, the 
total number of civil and criminal cases pending for 3 or more years in 
all courts throughout the country was 5,116,895 on December 31, 1998. 
In its most recent report, the NHRC reported that nearly 80 percent of 
all prisoners held between April 1996, and March 1997, were so-called 
``under-trials,'' i.e., unconvicted remand prisoners awaiting the start 
or conclusion of their trials. In March the chairman of the NHRC stated 
that 60 percent of all police arrests were ``unnecessary and 
unjustifiable,'' and that the incarceration of those wrongly arrested 
accounted for 43 percent of the total annual expenditure on prisons. 
For example, the chairman stated that only 10 to 15 percent of inmates 
in Delhi's Tihar jail are convicts; the rest are remand prisoners 
awaiting trial. The NHRC conducted a campaign to release remand 
prisoners awaiting trial for bailable offenses, but who are unable to 
afford bail. Through its efforts during the year, 200 such prisoners 
were released from Delhi's Tihar jail, 100 from jails in Punjab, and 
319 from jails in Tamil Nadu.
    In June 1997, Rongthong Kunley Dorji, a Bhutanese dissident, was 
placed in judicial custody pending review of an extradition request 
from the Government of Bhutan on charges that included political 
offenses as well as financial malfeasance. On June 12, 1998, Dorji was 
released on bail following the New Delhi High Court's decision to deny 
a government appeal and let stand a lower court's order to grant bail 
in the case. Dorji still awaits conclusion of his extradition hearing.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is an independent judiciary 
with strong constitutional safeguards. Under a Supreme Court ruling, 
the Chief Justice, in consultation with his colleagues, has a decisive 
voice in selecting judicial candidates. The President appoints judges, 
and they can serve up to the age of 62 on the state high courts and up 
to the age of 65 on the Supreme Court.
    Courts of first resort exist at the subdistrict and district 
levels. More serious cases and appeals are heard in state-level high 
courts and by the national-level supreme court, which also rules on 
constitutional questions. State governments appoint subdistrict and 
district judicial magistrates. High court judges are appointed on the 
recommendation of the federal law ministry, with the advice of the 
Supreme Court, the High Court Chief Justice, and the chief minister of 
the State, usually from among district judges or lawyers practicing 
before the same courts. Supreme Court judges are appointed similarly 
from among High Court judges. The Chief Justice is selected on the 
basis of seniority.
    When legal procedures function normally, they generally assure a 
fair trial, but the process is often drawn out and inaccessible to the 
poor. Defendants have the right to choose counsel from a bar that is 
fully independent of the government. There are effective channels for 
appeal at most levels of the judicial system.
    The Criminal Procedure Code provides for an open trial in most 
cases, but it allows exceptions in proceedings involving official 
secrets, trials in which statements prejudicial to the safety of the 
state might be made, or under provisions of special security 
legislation. Sentences must be announced in public.
    Muslim personal status law governs many noncriminal matters 
involving Muslims--including family law, inheritance, and divorce. The 
Government does not interfere in the personal status laws of the 
minority communities, with the result that personal status laws that 
discriminate against women are upheld.
    In Jammu and Kashmir, the judicial system barely functions due to 
threats by militants against judges, witnesses, and their family 
members; because of judicial tolerance of the Government's heavy-handed 
antimilitant actions; and because of the frequent refusal by security 
forces to obey court orders. Courts there are reluctant to hear cases 
involving terrorist crimes and fail to act expeditiously on habeas 
corpus cases, if they act at all. Similar to 1998, there were a few 
convictions of alleged terrorists in the Jammu high court during the 
year. Many more accused militants have been in pretrial detention for 
years (see Section 1.d.).
    Criminal gangs in all four southern states have been known to 
attack rivals and scare off complainants and witnesses from court 
premises, denying free access to justice. In some cases, accused 
persons have been attacked while being escorted by police to the 
courts. In July an accused person was killed in Kerala in an explosion 
triggered as he passed by with a police escort.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The police must obtain warrants for searches and 
seizures. In a criminal investigation, the police may conduct searches 
without warrants to avoid undue delay, but they must justify the 
searches in writing to the nearest magistrate with jurisdiction over 
the offense. The authorities in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam 
have special powers to search and arrest without a warrant.
    The government Enforcement Directorate (ED) searches, interrogates, 
and arrests thousands of business and management professionals 
annually, often without search warrants. However, the ED ultimately 
convicts very few persons. In 1997 only 28 persons out of thousands 
arrested were convicted, according to the Times of India.
    The Indian Telegraph Act authorizes the surveillance of 
communications, including monitoring telephone conversations and 
intercepting personal mail, in case of public emergency or ``in the 
interest of the public safety or tranquillity.'' Every state government 
has used these powers, as has the central Government.
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Government forces continue to commit serious 
violations of humanitarian law in the disputed state of Jammu and 
Kashmir.Between 350,000 and 450,000 army and paramilitary forces are 
deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. The Muslim majority population in the 
Kashmir valley suffers from the repressive tactics of the security 
forces. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, and the Armed 
Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, both passed in July 
1990, security forces personnel have extraordinary powers, including 
authority to shoot suspected lawbreakers and those persons disturbing 
the peace and to destroy structures suspected of harboring militants or 
arms.
    Civilian deaths caused by security forces appeared to diminish for 
the sixth consecutive year in Jammu and Kashmir, although final 
statistics for 1999 were not available at year's end. This decrease 
apparently is due to press scrutiny and public criticism of abuses in 
previous years, the increased training of military and paramilitary 
forces in humanitarian law, and a greater respect by commanders for the 
rule of law. The improvement has taken the form of increased discipline 
and care in avoiding collateral civilian injuries and deaths (i.e., 
deaths in crossfire). The Union Home Ministry was unable to report how 
many such deaths occurred during the year but reported that 84 such 
deaths occurred in Jammu and Kashmir in 1996-1997. The security forces 
have not ceased to abduct and extrajudicially execute suspected 
militants, nor have they accepted accountability for these abuses. 
However, many commanders' inclination to distance their units from such 
practices has led to reduced participation in them and a transfer of 
some of such actions to government-supported countermilitants.
    According to Kashmiri human rights groups and press reports, on May 
9 the police in Srinagar retaliated for the murder of one of their 
colleagues by attacking civilians in the crowded residential and 
commercial area of the city where the original incident occurred. 
Police allegedly cordoned off the area and beat residents, including 
members of a wedding party. Human rights groups state that members of 
the Rashtriya Rifles entered the village of Chak Doodipora, Handwara 
district, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 18 during a search operation. The 
soldiers allegedly beat some 2 dozen residents, including women and 
children, leaving 12 of them seriously injured. On May 12, a group of 
suspected countermilitants invaded the home of a 40-year-old Kupwara 
college lecturer, murdering him, his wife, his sister-in-law, and his 
3-year-old daughter. According to credible reports, in addition to 
harassment during searches and arbitrary arrests (see Section 1.d.) 
security forces abduct and sometimes use civilians as human shields in 
night patrolling and searching for land mines; the abuses so far have 
occurred mostly in the Kupwara and Doda districts. Because of Doda's 
inaccessibility, the abuses there allegedly have been underreported 
greatly.
    The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces 
into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around Kargil 
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military campaign to 
repel the intrusion left 524 Indian soldiers dead and 1,363 wounded, 
according to December 1 statistics by Defense Minister George 
Fernandes. Earlier Government figures stated that 696 Pakistani 
soldiers were killed. A senior Pakistani police official estimated that 
approximately 40 civilians were killed on the Pakistani side of the 
line of control. However, additional official Pakistani Government 
statistics regarding the conflict were not available at year's end. 
There was some use of torture during the conflict. On June 10, the 
Pakistan army returned the bodies of six Indian soldiers, which bore 
evidence of severe torture; however, the ICRC declined an invitation to 
conduct an autopsy. The fighting also caused some civilian deaths and 
the internal displacement of as many as 50,000 neighboring residents 
(see Section 2.d.).
    The Kargil conflict resulted in an increased counterinsurgency 
campaign, often with repressive offensive measures. According to a 
credible government source, as of early December over 450 militants 
were killed since the Kargil conflict began. Another credible 
government source said that offensive operations after the Kargil 
affair yielded 12 to 17 dead militants per day--that the army and 
paramilitary Rashtriya Rifles were carrying out major bombing 
operations with heavy weapons in both the northern and southern Kashmir 
valley.
    On September 24, seven persons were killed when police in Surat 
opened fire on a crowd that insisted on changing the parade route of a 
religious idol through the town. Reportedly, police, fearing an 
outbreak of communal violence, prevented the Hindu gathering from 
parading through a Muslim neighborhood past a prominent mosque. When 
the use of tear gas failed to quell the increasingly restive crowd, 
police resorted to firing weapons, according to press accounts. State 
authorities ordered an inquiry into the shooting (see Section 5).
    Kashmiri militant groups also committed serious abuses. In addition 
to political killings, kidnapings, and rapes of politicians and 
civilians (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.), insurgents engaged in 
extortion and carried out acts of randomterror that killed hundreds of 
Kashmiris. Many of the militants are not Indian citizens, but are 
Afghani, Pakistani, and other nationalities. Over the last decade, they 
have made liberal use of time-delayed explosives, land mines, grenades, 
and snipers. In the fall there was a significant upsurge in militant 
violence towards security forces, and a tendency to use heavy weapons 
such as grenades and rockets. Militants killed and injured numerous 
security personnel and destroyed a great deal of security force 
property. On July 24, militants fired rockets at a Central Reserve 
Police Force (CRPF) picket in Doda district, killing one CRPF 
policeman. On August 6, militants fired rockets at a Rashtriya Rifles 
camp in Kupwara district; five army troops and six militants were 
killed, and three soldiers were wounded in the exchange. On August 7, 
militants ambushed the convoy of a Rashtriya Rifles colonel in Kupwara 
district, killing four soldiers; in four separate rocket attacks 
against police and Rastriya Rifles positions in Kupwara, Chadora, 
Poonch, and Rajouri districts, militants killed two BSF members and 
injured seven persons. On August 13, a rocket attack on a Rastriya 
Rifles checkpost in Badgam district killed two soldiers and two 
militants. On August 14, in six separate but coordinated rocket and 
small arms attacks on Rastriya Rifles positions in Kupwara district, 
militants killed eight army personnel and injured 15 persons. On August 
12, two marine commandos were killed near Bandipur, Baramula district, 
Jammu and Kashmir, when militants detonated a roadside bomb as the 
marines' vehicle passed. On September 29, a grenade attack on the Civil 
Secretariat in Srinagar killed one policeman and one civilian. On 
October 28, two coordinated rocket-propelled grenade attacks against 
the civil secretariat and a Border Security Post in Srinagar killed 4 
persons and injured 20 others. On November 9, militants killed six 
persons during a grenade attack on an army position in Gandherbal. In 
addition militants made numerous other attacks and killed and injured 
many other persons.
    On November 11, a bomb blast aboard a Jammu-Delhi train killed 14 
persons and injured 12 others; no group claimed responsibility.
    During the period of increased attacks against security forces (see 
Section 1.a.), there was a parallel decline in massacres of unarmed 
civilians; nevertheless, such attacks continued. Militants carried out 
several execution-style mass murders of Hindu (Pandit) villagers in 
Jammu and Kashmir (see Section 5). On February 20, Kashmiri militants 
killed 20 villagers, including 6 women, 1 girl, and several members of 
a wedding party, in 3 coordinated attacks on villages in Udhampur and 
Rajouri districts of the Jammu region (see Section 1.a.). The army 
stated that the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba militant group was 
responsible for the killings, although the army killed the only two 
militants identified in the case. Between June 28 and July 1, militants 
killed 36 civilians in Jammu and Kashmir. On June 28, 15 Muslims of 2 
families, including 7 children and 3 women, were shot and killed by 
militants in Poonch district. On June 29, unidentified assailants shot 
and killed 12 male Hindu laborers in a village near Anantnag in the 
Kashmir valley; the workers were separated from their wives and 
children before being summarily executed. On July 1, nine members of 
two Hindu families, including three women and a child, were murdered by 
militants in Poonch district, near the site of the June 28 killings. On 
July 20, some 20 militants entered 2 houses in Doda district and opened 
fire with automatic weapons, killing over 15 Hindu persons (see 
Sections 1.a. and 5).
    Also on July 20, in the Poonch district of Jammu region, militants 
killed four members of a government road engineering group who are 
believed to have been migrant Hindu laborers from Bihar. Most officials 
cited militant anger at the BJP Government over the Pakistani 
withdrawal from Kargil as the principal reason for the attacks.
    Extremist and terrorist activities in the northeast claimed many 
lives. In addition to ambushes, terrorists increasingly resorted to 
destroying bridges, laying time bombs on roads and railway tracks, and 
in one instance, detonating a bomb in a busy railway station. On April 
27, five persons, including three Border Security Force personnel, were 
killed when the ULFA blew up their vehicle in Barpeta district, Assam. 
On June 22, a bomb exploded in the new Jailpurgiri railway station in 
Siliguri, West Bengal, killing 9 persons and seriously injuring 65 
others; those persons responsible for the bombing were not identified. 
Six policemen and a home guard were killed on June 29 when suspected 
Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) militants blew up two police cars 
using a remote-controlled device. On April 15, Naxalite militants 
ambushed the vehicle of a Congress Party politician, Sripada Rao, in 
Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh, killing him on the spot. As part of a 
series of Naxalite political killings (see Section 1.a.), on September 
13, a bomb attack killed five policemen at a police station in 
Papannapet, Andhra Pradesh.
    Nearly 100 persons were killed in election-related violence 
throughout the country in September and October (see Section 3). On 
September 7, in the Anantnag district of Kashmir, Ghulam Hyder Noorani, 
a BJP parliamentary candidate, was killed by a remote-detonated land 
mine, along with two bodyguards. On September 9, militants threw a hand 
grenade into a jeep, injuring 11 BJP activists and 2 policemen. 
Numerous Hurriyat leaders, who were suspected of the attacks, later 
were arrested (see Section 1.d.). Militant groups in the northeast 
states of Assam, Tripura, and Manipur, killed persons prior to the 
election and fired on polling places and security forces deployed for 
the voting. Approximately 15 civilians and 14 security force members 
were killed in the northeast as a result of election violence. In 
Tripura the NLFT also used land mines, and the NFLT shot and killed 
numerous civilians (see Section 5). Violence also marred the elections 
in Bihar. On September 18, in the first phase of polling for the Lok 
Sabha elections in Bihar, extremists from the Maoist Communist Center 
and the People's War, set up land mines in four of the constituencies 
on routes leading to polling booths. In Palamau a land mine blew up a 
truck carrying police personnel. Near Barhi, Hazaribagh, nine persons 
were killed in two bomb incidents (see Sections 1.a. and 3).
    During the year, police arrested numerous persons suspected of 
involvement in previous terrorist attacks. Charges also were brought 
against persons accused of involvement with human suicide bomb attacks 
to advance Sikh separatism, as well against dozens of captured 
separatist insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir for bombings, killings, and 
acts of sabotage.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally 
respects these rights in practice; however, there are some limitations. 
A vigorous press reflects a wide variety of political, social, and 
economic beliefs. Newspapers and magazines regularly publish 
investigative reports and allegations of government wrongdoing, and the 
press generally champions human rights and criticizes perceived 
government lapses.
    Under the Official Secrets Act, the Government may restrict 
publication of sensitive stories; however, the Government sometimes 
interprets this broadly to suppress criticism of its policies. Human 
rights monitors state that government pressure caused one national 
English-language daily to suppress some stories and to transfer a 
reporter in 1998. The 1971 Newspapers Incitements to Offenses Act 
remains in effect in Jammu and Kashmir. Under the act, a district 
magistrate may prohibit the press from publishing material resulting in 
``incitement to murder'' or ``any act of violence.'' As punishment the 
act stipulates that the authorities may seize newspapers and printing 
presses. Despite these restrictions, newspapers in Srinagar regularly 
publish militant press releases attacking the Government and report in 
detail on alleged human rights abuses. The authorities generally 
allowed foreign journalists to travel freely in Jammu and Kashmir, 
where they regularly spoke with militant leaders and filed reports on 
government abuses. For a week in June, during the confrontation between 
Indian forces and Pakistan-backed forces in the Kargil region of Jammu 
and Kashmir (see Section 1.g.), journalists were barred from traveling 
to the immediate area of the fighting. However, the Government allowed 
the acts of violence that occurred in Jammu and Kashmir during the 
September and October elections (see Sections 1.g. and 4) to receive 
wide coverage. In contrast, during the 1996 and 1998 elections, the 
state government banned the publication of any material aimed at 
intimidating the electorate.
    In May the NHRC directed the Punjab police to submit a report on a 
complaint filed by journalist and author Harinder Singh alleging that 
police tortured him. Singh is the author of a novel called ``Vanity 
Incarnate,'' which is controversial in Punjab because of its portrayal 
of Sikh gurus. In his complaint, Singh alleged that after receiving 
several death threats he went to police seeking protection. Shortly 
thereafter, police allegedly took Singh from his residence, assaulted 
him, and subjected him to electric shocks. According to the complaint, 
police held Singh for 20 weeks during which time he continuously was 
tortured. After being released on bail on April 21, Singh filed a 
complaint against police in the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Also in 
Punjab, the NHRC in July 1998 called for a CBI investigation into the 
1992 abduction of journalist Avtar Singh Mander, who has not been seen 
since his disappearance in Jalandhar. Witnesses allege that police 
officials picked up Mander, a charge the police deny. A May 1994 
investigation by Punjab state authorities found that Mander had not 
been taken into custody, and no further effort was made by authorities 
to trace his whereabouts.
    In Assam the state government has attempted to impede criticism by 
filing a number of ``criminal defamation'' charges against journalists. 
Police beat Prakash Mahanta, a reporter for the Assamese-language daily 
Natoon Samoy, at his home, then arrested and detained him at Nagaon 
state police station in 1998. Press freedom campaigners allege that 
Mahanta's ``crime'' was to write an article detailing alleged campaign 
irregularities by the wife of Assam chief minister Prafulla Kumar 
Mahanta. According to news reports, the chief minister denied the 
charge and said that Prakash Mahanta had been involved in ``anti-
national'' activities. According to human rights activists, Mahanta was 
released and never convicted. In the beginning of the year, the editor 
of the Assamese daily Assam Pratidin was arrested and charged.
    In October 1998, the Manipur government announced curbs on the 
publication of insurgency-related news. The publication of insurgent's 
press releases, public invitations to slain militants' funerals, and 
calls to boycott Republic Day and Independence Day functions were 
prohibited. Penalties for violating the prohibition included arrest and 
criminal prosecution of newspaper owners and editors and cancellation 
of newspapers' registration. These restrictions continued during the 
year.
    The Press Council of India is a statutory body of journalists, 
publishers, academics, and politicians, with a chairman appointed by 
the Government. Designed to be a self-regulating mechanism for the 
press, it investigates complaints of irresponsible journalism and sets 
a code of conduct for publishers. This code includes not publishing 
articles or details that might incite caste or communal violence. The 
Council publicly criticizes newspapers or journalists it believes have 
broken the code of conduct, but its findings, while noted by the press 
community, carry no legal weight.
    National television and radio, which are government monopolies, 
frequently are accused of having a strong pro-Government bias. However, 
international satellite television is widely distributed in middle 
class neighborhoods by cable and gradually is eroding the Government's 
monopoly on television.
    The Government maintains a list of banned books that cannot be 
imported or sold in the country; some--like Salman Rushdie's ``Satanic 
Verses''--because they contain material government sponsors have deemed 
inflammatory.
    A government censorship board reviews films before licensing them 
for distribution. The board deletes material deemed offensive to public 
morals or communal sentiment. Producers of video news magazines also 
must submit their products to the board, which occasionally censors 
stories that portray the Government in an unfavorable light. The 
board's rulings may be appealed and overturned. In March the 
Maharashtra government censored the film ``Fire,'' charging that its 
depiction of a lesbian relationship offended morals. The decision came 
after members of the Hindu fundamentalist Shiv Sena political party 
ransacked the theater in which the film was being shown. The film was 
not censored in any other state; Shiv Sainiks similarly ransacked a 
theater showing the film in Delhi.
    Intimidation by militant groups results in a good deal of self-
censorship. Kashmiri militant groups threatened journalists and editors 
and even imposed temporary bans on some publications that were critical 
of their activities. In August militants just outside Srinagar fired on 
a television camera crew. Kashmiri militants attempted to halt cable 
television broadcasts in the Kashmir valley during the year, claiming 
that they contained ``un-Islamic'' programming. In a concerted year-
long campaign, militants of the Harkat-Ul-Ansar terrorist group 
threatened and targeted cable operators in Kashmir with violence. For 
example, on December 1 suspected HUA militants hurled a grenade at a 
cable operator's shop in Srinagar, injuring three persons. Earlier in 
the year, militants fired at a cable operator in Bemina, injuring two 
persons, and bombed a cable shop in Zakura, injuring three persons.
    In July political parties in favor of the building of the Sardar 
Sarovar dam across the Narmada river burned copies of the book ``The 
Greater Common Good,'' by novelist Arundhati Roy, which discusses the 
socio-environmental costs of the Narmada project (see Section 2.d.). 
Facing threats from the youth wings of the BJP and the Congress party, 
bookstores in Ahmedabad, Gujurat, also began to remove the book from 
their shelves.
    Citizens enjoy complete academic freedom, and students and faculty 
espouse a wide range of views. In addition to 10 national universities 
and about 160 state universities, states are empowered to accredit 
locally run private institutions.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government 
generally respected this right in practice. The authorities sometimes 
require permits and notification prior to holding parades or 
demonstrations, but local governments ordinarily respect the right to 
protest peacefully, except in Jammu and Kashmir, where separatist 
parties routinely are denied permits for public gatherings. During 
periods of civil tension, the authorities may ban public assemblies or 
impose a curfew under the Criminal Procedure Code.
    Srinagar and other parts of Jammu and Kashmir occasionally came 
under curfew but more often were affected by strikes called by 
militants.
    On June 11, police killed 4 fishworkers and injured 13 others when 
they opened fire on an anti-shrimp culture protest organized by the NGO 
Chilika Matsyajibi Mahasangh in Orissa.
    In July 17 persons drowned in a river in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu 
when thousands of demonstrators ran to escape a police beating. The 
demonstrators were demanding government intervention in a labor dispute 
at a local tea estate and the release of 652 estate workers who had 
been imprisoned after a previous demonstration (see Section 1.a.).
    Beginning at midyear, the Government implemented a new requirement 
that NGO's secure the prior approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs 
before organizing international conferences. Human rights groups 
contend that the new requirement provides the Government with 
substantial political control of the work of NGO's and is an 
abridgement of their freedom of assembly and association. In July three 
foreign nationals were denied visas to attend an annual conference on 
building civil society; the conference was sponsored by a foreign 
university and held in Bangalore. The organizers decided to disregard 
the ban and hold it anyway. On the eve of the event, the Australian 
chair of the IALC was detained briefly, but the conference nevertheless 
was held and the police did not detain anyone else.
    The Constitution provides for the right to form associations, and 
the Government generally respected this right in practice.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. India is 
a secular state in which all faiths generally enjoy freedom of worship; 
Government policy does not favor any religious group. However, tension 
between Muslims and Hindus, and to a lesser extent between Hindus and 
Christians, continues to pose a challenge to the secular foundation of 
the State (see Section 5). In addition governments at state and local 
levels only partially respect religious freedom.
    No registration is required for religions. Legally mandated 
benefits are assigned to certain groups, including some groups defined 
by their religion.
    There are many religions and a large variety of denominations, 
groups, and subgroups in the country, but Hinduism is the dominant 
religion. According to 1998 government statistics, Hindus constitute 
82.4 percent of the population, Muslims 12.7 percent, Christians 2.3 
percent, Sikhs 2.0 percent, Buddhists 0.7 percent, Jains 0.4 percent, 
and others, including Parsis, Jews, and Baha'is, 0.4 percent.
    The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act makes it an 
offense to use any religious site for political purposes or to use 
temples for harboring persons accused or convicted of crimes.
    The current legal system accommodates minority religions' personal 
status laws; there are different personal laws for different religious 
communities. Religion-specific laws pertain in matters of marriage, 
divorce, adoption, and inheritance. For example, Muslim personal status 
law governs many noncriminal matters involving Muslims, including 
family law, inheritance, and divorce. The personal status laws of the 
religious communities sometimes discriminate against women. Under 
Islamic law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife spontaneously and 
unilaterally; there is no such provision for women. Islamic law also 
allows a man to have up to four wives but prohibits polyandry. Under 
the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, a Christian woman may demand divorce 
only in the case of spousal abuse and in the case of certain categories 
of adultery; for a Christian man, adultery alone is sufficient. In May 
1997, the Mumbai High Court recognized abuse alone as sufficient 
grounds for a Christian woman to obtain a divorce.
    No national law bars proselytizing by Indian Christians. Foreign 
missionaries generally can renew their visas, but since the mid-1960's 
the Government has refused to admit new resident foreign missionaries. 
New arrivals currently enter as tourists on short-term visas. During 
the year, as in the past, stateofficials refused to issue permits for 
foreign Christian missionaries to enter some northeastern states. In 
March several declared missionaries reported that the Government had 
instituted a policy of not renewing missionaries' visas. Renewal had 
been routine until the institution of this new policy. The policy is 
being applied unevenly, as at least one Christian missionary succeeded 
in obtaining an extension as late as the fall of 1998. Missionaries and 
religious organizations must comply with the Foreign Contribution 
Regulation Act (FCRA), which restricts funding from abroad and, 
therefore, the ability of certain groups to finance their activities. 
The Government is empowered to ban a religious organization if it has 
violated the FCRA, has provoked intercommunity friction, or has been 
involved in terrorism or sedition. There is no ban on professing or 
propagating religious beliefs, but speaking publicly against other 
beliefs is considered dangerous to public order, and is prohibited.
    In September the Union Home Ministry, after declining to extend his 
visa, ordered a 57-year-old American priest to leave the country. 
Father Anthony Raymond Ceresko, a teacher at a seminary in Bangalore, 
entered the country in 1991 and had been able to renew his residence 
permit every year since until this year. Ceresko left the country on 
September 17.
    In early February, following a series of attacks on Christians, the 
office of the director general of police in Gujarat reportedly sent a 
circular instructing district officials to collect information about 
Christians, including the number of missionaries, their funding 
sources, and the ``tricks'' they used to convert persons. After public 
criticism of the census, the government of Gujarat stated that it was 
being conducted to assist in the protection of Christians and later 
expanded it to cover Hindus as well. However, Christians obtained a 
court order barring the census. On March 2, the government of Gujarat 
withdrew the effort. However, in December the United Christian Forum 
for Human Rights and its convener, John Dayal, expressed concern to the 
press about a ``survey'' of Christian institutions and missionaries 
allegedly being conducted by the Delhi police. Dayal said that police 
had been asking the principals of Christian schools, the heads of 
Christian-affiliated hospitals, and individuals about their background 
and funding sources. Those persons questioned reportedly were asked to 
fill out a form ordinarily reserved to take the written statements of 
suspected criminals. The Forum complained that ``such surveys tend to 
intimidate the sisters, priests, and individuals.''
    While the law is meant to protect religious freedom, enforcement of 
the law has been poor, particularly at the state and local levels, 
where the failure to deal adequately with intragroup and intergroup 
conflict and with local disturbances has abridged the right to 
religious freedom. In particular, Hindu extremist groups continued to 
attack Christians. In many cases, the government response was 
inadequate, consisting largely of statements criticizing the violence 
against Christians but with few efforts to hold accountable those 
persons responsible or to prevent such incidents from occurring (see 
Section 5). Throughout the year, the Government generally described the 
violence and attacks as a series of isolated local phenomena, in some 
states calling for a national debate on conversions, which Hindus had 
advocated being banned. On February 19, Muslim imams and Members of 
Parliament joined Christian leaders to rally against the Prime 
Minister's call for a debate on conversions and to criticize the BJP's 
slow response to attacks against Christians. In August a bill was 
introduced in Gujarat that would allow harsh punishment to be meted out 
to anyone in the state found guilty of converting someone to another 
religion through use of force, provision on material benefits, or 
fraud. Human rights groups fear that if passed the bill--called the 
Gujarat Freedom of Religion Bill, 1999--could be used to restrict the 
fundamental right to chose one's religion. At year's end, the bill was 
still up for legislative review.
    In 1998 and early 1999 there was an unusual and serious outbreak of 
societal violence against Christians, apparently sparked by rumors of 
``forced conversions'' of Hindus to Christianity (see Section 5). The 
Government reacted with statements criticizing the violence against 
Christians, but efforts to prevent such incidents from occurring and to 
prosecute those responsible at the state and local levels were 
inadequate. In early 1999, the Government described the violence as a 
series of isolated local phenomena. The Prime Minister on January 4 
pledged not to tolerate any further violence against Christians. In 
early January, the state government of Gujarat increased police 
protection for Christians in the Dangs district, but stated that the 
press had blown the recent incidents of violence against Christians out 
of proportion. On January 10, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the Dangs 
district in Gujarat. However, The positive effect of this gesture was 
mitigated by the presence in his entourage of Hindu Jagaran Manch 
president Janubhai Pawar, who had been arrested in connection with 
violence against Christians that occurred on December 25, 1998. While 
in Gujarat, Vajpayee called for a national debate on conversions, which 
some Hindu groups had requested be banned. During thesame month, Home 
Minister L.K. Advani called for a thorough study to determine by how 
much the Christian population in the Dangs area had grown in the last 
10 years and what factors had led to violence and anger over alleged 
``forced conversions.'' On January 26, President Narayanan made a 
televised plea for religious tolerance. On January 30, the anniversary 
of the death of Mahatma Gandhi, Prime Minister Vajpayee criticized the 
recent attacks, called for religious tolerance, and announced that he 
would start a fast to protest the recent violence against Christians 
and against low caste Hindus by higher caste Hindus in Bihar. Also on 
January 30, Madan Lal Khurana, Minister of Public Affairs and Tourism, 
who had been critical of the Government's handling of the recent 
attacks, resigned. He claimed that he had been silenced when he tried 
to criticize Hindu militants who made anti-Christian statements. In 
early 1999 the district superintendent of police and the district 
collector were transferred out of the Dangs district, and the governor 
of Gujarat was shifted to another state.
    On occasion, Hindu-Muslim violence led to killings and a cycle of 
retaliation. In some instances, local police and government officials 
abetted the violence, and at times security forces were responsible for 
abuses. Police on occasion accompanied Hindu fundamentalists who were 
responsible for violence (see Section 5). Government officials 
allegedly also place bureaucratic roadblocks in front of Christian-
affiliated foreign relief organizations, many of which are not engaged 
in religious activities (see Section 4). In a few instances, state 
governments investigated and sometimes arrested suspects in cases of 
anti-Christian violence. For example, after an Australian missionary 
was murdered in Orissa (see Section 5), several suspects were arrested. 
In another instance, the Tamil Nadu government ordered the police to 
investigate a series of church burnings (see Section 5); however, no 
one had been arrested at year's end. In general government response has 
been poor with respect to such incidences.
    In August the central Home Ministry banned the Biennial Meeting of 
the International Anglican Liturgical Consultation (IALC) in Kottayam, 
Kerala.
    On January 7, the National Commission for Minorities (NCM), a 
quasigovernmental body established in 1992 to protect the rights of 
religious minorities, sent a team to Gujarat to depose witnesses and 
evaluate the Government's response to the recent violence against 
Christians. The government of Gujarat reportedly tried to stall the 
efforts of the team. The NCM released a report on January 31, which was 
critical of the Government's response to the occurrences, stating that 
``the communal situation in Gujarat is serious and of alarming 
dimensions and there is a pressing need to take extraordinary steps to 
prevent it from flaring up further and spreading to other parts of the 
country.'' The NCM urged the central Government to invoke Article 355 
of the Constitution, which would empower the central Government to 
``give direction'' to a state government to ensure compliance with 
federal laws, on the grounds that the government of Gujarat had failed 
to take adequate measures to check the violence against minorities. The 
recommendation was not accepted. On January 13, the NCM chairman, 
Professor Tahir Mahmood, said that the NCM had recommended that Hindus 
be declared minorities in 5 states--Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, 
Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, and in the Lakshadweep Union 
Territory; this would help the NCM to recognize the problems of Hindus 
in those states.
    The BJP is one of a number of offshoots of the Rashtriya 
Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), an organization that espouses a return to 
Hindu values and cultural norms. Members of the BJP, the RSS, and other 
affiliated organizations were implicated in incidents of violence and 
discrimination against Christians and Muslims. The BJP and RSS express 
respect and tolerance for other religions, but the RSS in particular 
opposes conversions from Hinduism and believes that all Indians should 
adhere to Hindu cultural values. The BJP officially agrees that the 
caste system should be eliminated, but many of its members are 
ambivalent about this. Most BJP leaders are also RSS members. The BJP's 
longstanding cultural agenda includes calls for construction of a new 
Hindu temple to replace an ancient Hindu temple that was believed to 
have stood on the site of a mosque in Ayodhya that was destroyed by a 
Hindu mob in 1992; for the repeal of Article 370 of the Constitution, 
which grants special rights to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, India's 
only Muslim majority state; and for the enactment of a uniform civil 
code that would apply to members of all religions. All of these 
proposals are opposed strongly by some minority religious groups. 
However, the BJP-led national Government took no steps to implement 
these measures and has promised that it would not do so during its 
tenure in the Parliament. While at the national level the BJP has 
downplayed its Hindu nationalist agenda, some Christian groups have 
noted the coincidence of its coming to power and an increase in 
complaints of discrimination against minority religious communities. 
These groups also claim that BJP officials at state and local levels 
have become increasingly uncooperative.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy freedom of movement 
within the country except in certain border areas where, for security 
reasons, special permits are required. Under the Passports Act of 1967, 
the Government may deny a passport to any applicant who ``may or is 
likely to engage outside India in activities prejudicial to the 
sovereignty and integrity of India.'' The Government uses this 
provision to prohibit the foreign travel of some government critics, 
especially those advocating Sikh independence and the violent 
separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir. On September 23, the 
Government prevented Mirwais Unmar Farooq and Maulana Mohammad Abbas 
Ansari, two members of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, a Kashmiri 
separatist group, from leaving the country to attend a meeting of the 
Organization of Islamic Conference. On May 11, the Union Home Ministry 
accepted the recommendation of the NHRC and permitted another member of 
the APHC to travel abroad for medical treatment.
    Vehicle checkpoints, at which Border Security Forces routinely 
frisk and question occupants, are a common feature throughout most of 
Jammu and Kashmir. It also is common for police to block entry and exit 
points in preparation for gathering young males for police lineups. 
According to a credible source, these search and cordon operations 
seldom yield any results. Nevertheless, these searches tend to focus on 
troubled areas, as opposed to the mass searches that were common in the 
past.
    On June 18, the NHRC received a complaint alleging that more than 
4,700 families that were forced to leave their homes in Karwar, north 
Kerala, due to planned construction of the navy's Sea Bird Naval Base 
were compensated inadequately for their homes.
    Human Rights Watch alleged that the Maharashtra government colluded 
with the Dabhol Power Corporation to suppress peaceful protests over 
the forcible eviction of 2,000 persons from their homes (see Section 
1.c.).
    In February the Supreme Court lifted its stay on the construction 
of the Narmada dam in Madhya Pradesh after the Gujarat government 
promised displaced families greater compensation (among other 
improvements). However, many human rights advocates and NGO's continued 
to allege that the construction of the dam would displace 40,000 
families without adequately compensating those who are resettled (see 
Section 2.b.). (Opposition to the Narmada project was greatest during 
the early 1990's, resulting in prolonged financial and legal stalls.)
    Citizens may emigrate without restriction.
    Since 1990, more than 235,000 Bangladeshis have been deported, many 
from Maharashtra and West Bengal. The occasional deportation of 
Bangladeshis judged to have entered the country illegally continued 
during the year, but there was no repetition of the systematic roundup 
of Bangladeshis for mass deportation that was conducted by the 
government of Maharashtra in 1998. The Government estimates that there 
are 10 million Bangladeshis living illegally in the country.
    The law does not contain provisions for processing refugees or 
asylum seekers in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, nor is there a clear 
national policy for the treatment of refugees. The Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has no formal status, 
but the Government permits the UNHCR to assist certain groups of 
refugees (notably Afghans, Iranians, Somalis, Burmese, and Sudanese).
    The Government has not permitted the UNHCR to assist other groups 
of refugees, including Sri Lankan Tamils to whose camps in Tamil Nadu 
the Government has barred access by the UNHCR and NGO's (see Section 
4). The Government provides first asylum to refugees, most notably in 
recent years to Tibetan and Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. However, this 
policy is applied inconsistently. For example, the insistence of some 
border authorities on the presentation of passport and visas by those 
claiming refugee status occasionally has resulted in individuals or 
groups being refused admittance. This has occurred in recent years in 
cases involving Chin and Rakhine refugees from Burma and Afghans who 
entered the country via Pakistan. Refugees are not required to make 
claims in other countries. Cramped and unhygienic conditions are 
reported to exist in some of the camps for Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil 
Nadu.
    The Government recognizes certain groups, including Chakmas from 
Bangladesh, Tamils from Sri Lanka, and Tibetans, as refugees and 
provides them with assistance in refugee camps or in resettlement 
areas. According to UNHCR and government statistics, there were 
approximately 98,000 Tibetans, approximately 70,337 Sri Lankan Tamils 
in 131 camps, and perhapsas many as 80,000 Sri Lankan Tamils outside of 
the camps living in the country at year's end. The refugees in the 
camps are not permitted to work. Many Chakmas from Bangladesh have been 
repatriated voluntarily, including all of the estimated 56,000 persons 
who had been residing in Tripura. Some 80,000 Chakma permanent 
residents remain in Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram; their right to 
citizenship has been upheld by the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme 
Court's order to extend citizenship to this group was not implemented 
by year's end. The UNHCR reports that 14,962 Afghans, 664 Burmese, 189 
Iranians, 173 Somalis, 81 Sudanese, and 60 others, including Iraqis and 
Ethiopians, were receiving assistance from the UNHCR in the country as 
of August 31. Although the Government formally does not recognize these 
persons as refugees, it does not deport them. Instead, they received 
renewable residence permits or their status was ignored. Increasingly 
during the year, some of these groups--Afghans, Iraqis, and Iranians in 
particular--were not granted renewal of their residence permits by the 
authorities on the grounds that they were not in possession of valid 
national passports. Due to financial and refugee-related reasons, many 
refugees were unable or unwilling to obtain or renew their national 
passports and were, therefore, unable to regularize their status in 
India.
    The government of Tamil Nadu provides educational facilities to Sri 
Lankan Tamil refugee children, and the central Government provides some 
assistance and channels assistance from NGO and church groups. The 
central Government has, for the most part, denied NGO's and the UNHCR 
direct access to the camps. NGO's report refugee complaints about 
deteriorated housing, poor sanitation, delayed dole payments, and 
inadequate medical care in the Tamil refugee camps. The NHRC has 
intervened to uphold the right of several Sri Lankan Tamils detained in 
so-called ``special camps'' to remain in the country. The Government 
uses these camps to hold suspected members of the LTTE terrorist 
organization. Human rights groups allege that inmates of the special 
camps sometimes are subjected to physical abuse and that their 
confinement to the camps amounts to imprisonment without trial. They 
allege that several of those acquitted by the Supreme Court on May 11 
of involvement in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi (see Section 1.a.) remain confined in these special camps.
    More than 260,000 Santhals are displaced due to ongoing Bodo-
Santhal violence, and live under poor conditions in relief camps in 
Assam's Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon, and adjoining districts (see Section 
1.a.).
    Ethnic Chins are among the nonrecognized refugees in the 
northeastern states, particularly Mizoram. Chins and Chakma refugees 
have been targeted by student-led demonstrations protesting their 
presence in Mizoram. Recent tensions between security forces and Chin 
National Force (CNF) insurgents operating in Burma allegedly have 
resulted in the detention, interrogation, and expulsion of some persons 
associated with the CNF. Human rights monitors allege that a unit of 
the Assam Rifles of the Indian army raided a Chin refugee camp in 
Mizoram in July, killing six suspected members of the CNF and 
destroying the camp. In Manipur the Manipur Underground attempted to 
impose a $3 (130.5 rupees) ``tax'' on all non-Manipuris above the age 
of 12 as the price for continued permission for them to live in the 
state. The National Liberation Front of Tripura is imposing a similar 
tax in Tripura. On March 13, a tribal woman was beaten by fellow 
tribals in Udaipur subdivision, Tripura, because she lived in a 
``Bengali locality'' (see Section 1.c.). (Tribals reportedly feel 
threatened by the influx of Bengali-speaking persons from West Bengal 
and Bangladesh, and believed to have regarded her residence as a 
betrayal of her people.)
    Mizoram human rights groups estimate that some 37,000 Reangs, a 
tribal group from Mizoram, which has been displaced due to a sectarian 
conflict, presently are being sheltered in four camps in North Tripura; 
conditions in their camps are poor and the Tripura government has asked 
the central Government to allot funds for their care. In August the 
Mizoram government announced its willingness to take back the displaced 
Reangs.
    The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces 
into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around Kargil 
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military campaign to 
repel the intrusion forced as many as 50,000 residents of Jammu and 
Kashmir from their homes, a number of whom took refuge on the Pakistani 
side of the line of control. Many had their homes destroyed and 
remained displaced at year's end (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.).
    On December 21, the Assam government offered a good will ``safe 
passage'' for 11 days to militant groups so that they could visit their 
families without fearing arrest; 173 militants mostly belonging to ULFA 
accepted the offer. The only strings attached were that the militants 
could not carry weapons and that they should inform the police about 
their intentions to visit their families.
    There were no reports during the year of the forced return of 
persons to countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their 
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice 
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage. India has a democratic, parliamentary system of 
government with representatives elected in multiparty elections. A 
Parliament sits for 5 years unless dissolved earlier for new elections, 
except under constitutionally defined emergency situations. State 
governments are elected at regular intervals except in states under 
President's Rule, i.e., rule by the central Government.
    On the advice of the Prime Minister, the President may proclaim a 
state of emergency in any part of the national territory in the event 
of war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. Similarly, President's 
Rule may be declared in the event of a collapse of a state's 
constitutional machinery. The Supreme Court in May 1995 upheld the 
Government's authority to suspend fundamental rights during an 
emergency. President Narayanan dissolved the lower house of Parliament 
on April 17 after the BJP-led government lost a vote of confidence in 
the Lok Sabha. Elections were held in September and October. Some 374 
million voters, or 62.04 percent of the electorate, cast ballots. The 
new Government, a coalition of 13 political parties in the BJP-led 
National Democratic Alliance government, was sworn into office under 
Prime Minister Vajpayee on October 13.
    More than 100 persons were killed in election-related violence in 
various parts of the country, predominantly in Kashmir, Tripura, Assam, 
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar (see Section 1.g.), and there 
were localized allegations of voter fraud. Human rights groups reported 
that security forces in some parts of Jammu and Kashmir compelled 
residents to vote and that at least three persons who refused were 
killed. The worst violence occurred during the third phase of voting on 
September 18; rioting on that day left 29 dead in Bihar, including 14 
policemen, a magistrate and 11 polling officials.
    In Jammu and Kashmir, militants committed numerous abuses--many 
against civilians--to disrupt voting. On August 29, the Pakistan-based 
Al Badr militant group stated that it sent militants into Kashmir with 
the explicit aim of disrupting the elections. The night before the 
vote, militants reportedly visited several villages warning persons not 
to vote. It is believed that the principal reason for the low turnout 
(about 14 percent of the electorate) in Kashmir was the militant threat 
of violence. In southern Bihar, extremist leftists of the Maoist 
Communist Conference (MMC) and the People's War Group (PWG) threatened 
to amputate the hands of persons who voted or to kill them; during the 
polling-phases, they killed numerous persons (see Section 1.g.).
    No legal impediments hinder participation by women in the political 
process; however, they are underrepresented in government and politics. 
A large proportion of women participates in voting throughout the 
country, and numerous women represent all major parties in the national 
and state legislatures. There are 67 women among the 790 Members of 
Parliament, including the Deputy Speaker of the Upper House, and there 
are 6 women in the 69-member Cabinet. The 1993 passage of the 
``Panchayati Raj'' constitutional amendments reserved 30 percent of 
seats in elected village councils (Panchayats) for women, and this has, 
in fact, brought more than 1 million women into the political arena at 
the grassroots level. In July 1998 debate over the Women's Reservation 
Bill, which was designed to reserve one-third of parliamentary seats 
for women, subsided when the bill's formal introduction was prevented 
due to opposition from members of both the governing and the opposition 
parties. The Women's Reservation Bill was introduced in parliamentary 
sessions in November and December 1998, despite strong opposition, but 
it was not enacted by year's end.
    The Constitution reserves seats in Parliament and state 
legislatures for ``scheduled tribes'' and ``scheduled castes'' in 
proportion to their population (see Section 5). Indigenous people 
participate actively in national and local politics, but their impact 
depends on their numerical strength. In the northeastern states, 
indigenous people are a large proportion of the population and 
consequently exercise a dominant influence in the political process. In 
Maharashtra and Gujarat, on the other hand, tribal people are a small 
minority and have been unsuccessful in blocking projects that they 
oppose.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Independent human rights organizations operate throughout most of 
the country, investigating abuses and publishing their findings; 
however, in some states and in a few circumstances, human rights groups 
face some restrictions. Human rights monitors in Jammu and Kashmir have 
been unable to move around the state to document human rights 
violations due to fear of retribution by security forces and 
countermilitants. Since 1992 several individuals closely involved in 
the documentation of violations in Jammu and Kashmir, including lawyers 
and journalists, have been attacked and in some cases killed. 
International human rights monitors have had difficulty in obtaining 
visas to visit the country for investigation purposes. For example, 
during the year the authorities continued to deny Human Rights Watch 
and Amnesty International permission to visit Jammu and Kashmir; 
however, some foreign diplomats gained improved access to some prisons 
in Jammu and Kashmir. The Government also continued to deny the U.N. 
Special Rapporteurs on Torture and Extrajudicial Killings permission to 
visit the country, despite their repeated requests. Moreover, the 
police and security forces have targeted human rights monitors for 
arrest and harassment. However, in February U.N. High Commissioner for 
Human Rights Mary Robinson was allowed to visit the country. She met 
with the Prime Minister, Home Minister, and External Affairs Minister.
    On September 27, the Ministry of Home Affairs sent a notice to 
several prominent NGO's asking them to justify their status as 
nonpolitical organizations under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) 
Act. According to Human Rights Watch, the notice effectively was a 
threat to cut off foreign funding. The NGO's, many of which worked on 
women's rights, communal violence, and Dalit and tribal issues, 
publicly had criticized the policies of the BJP-led Government and the 
anti-secular activities of the Sangh Parivar, a collective of rightwing 
Hindu organizations of which the BJP is a member.
    Several Christian-affiliated (in many cases, non-evangelical) 
international relief agencies stated that, during the year, their work 
in delivering services to the poor became considerably more difficult 
due to threats, increased bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases, 
physical attacks on their field workers by Hindu extremists (see 
Sections 2.c. and 5).
    According to Amnesty International, on January 8, the Orissa 
government served a show-cause notice on an NGO that works with tribal 
communities in the Rayagada and Koraput districts of the state; 
allegedly, in December 1998 a similar letter was written to another NGO 
in the region. The notices threatened the organizations with the 
withdrawal of official registration and funding on the basis of reports 
that they had been involved in criminal activities and had incited 
tribal people to violence in an attempt to prevent the establishment of 
industrial projects in the district. Allegedly, two more NGO's later 
were threatened with withdrawal of funding. There is widespread 
opposition to the construction of bauxite mines and aluminum processing 
plants in the area where the NGO's are working.
    No definitive resolution of the case of abducted and murdered 
Kashmir human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi was reached. Human rights 
workers alleged that the State was attempting to subvert the judicial 
process by withholding evidence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). In Assam 
the investigation into the 1996 murder of human rights monitor and 
journalist Parag Das has yielded no definitive information on the 
identity of his killer. The assailant was allegedly a militant who 
previously had surrendered and was supported by the Government (see 
Section 1.a.). On June 8, 1998, special operations group personnel of 
the Jammu and Kashmir police arrested Ali Mohammad Sheikh, a researcher 
for a local human rights organization, in Dalgate, Srinagar. Sheikh 
initially was held at the Khanabal, Anantnag special operations group 
camp and family members were denied permission to see him. Also in June 
1998, the government of Andhra Pradesh issued a directive to faculty 
members of state universities not to associate with the Andhra Pradesh 
Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC), a well-respected human rights 
organization. The state government provided no explanation as to why it 
had taken this action. By year's end, there had been no enforcement of 
the directive, but it had not been rescinded. On June 8, an agent of 
the intelligence wing of the New Delhi police visited and questioned 
the director of the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center about 
his appeal for intervention to secure the release of a Kashmiri human 
rights monitor and political dissident arrested a few days earlier.
    The NHRC and the Manipur state Human Rights Commission both 
expressed concern for the safety of Wahengbam Joykumar Singh, a human 
rights monitor from Manipur, according to Amnesty International. On 
June 28, Joykumar Singh visited the camp of the Assam Rifles, an army 
unit, to recover his identity cardtaken from him by soldiers of this 
unit the previous day. A unit captain allegedly warned Joykumar Singh 
that he would be killed unless he withdrew two complaints of human 
rights violations he had filed against members of the unit; Joykumar 
Singh reportedly went into hiding shortly thereafter and remained in 
hiding at year's end. On April 16, Y. Mani, Vice President of the All 
Manipur United Clubs Organization (AMUCO) was taken into custody by a 
unit of the Rashtriya Rifles, beaten and threatened with death, 
according to Amnesty International. Just prior to the arrest, the AMUCO 
had issued a public complaint about human rights violations by security 
forces in Manipur. Mani was handed over to the superintendent of police 
in Bishenpur district, Manipur, and released on April 17, after the 
intervention of the state governor. Delhi High Court requested the 
Ministry of External Affairs to respond to a complaint by human rights 
monitor and Islamic scholar Iqbal Ahmad Ansari that he had been denied 
renewal of his passport and consequently was unable to attend the 
Parliament of the World's Religions in South Africa. Ansari alleged 
that he applied for passport renewal in August in the regional passport 
office in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh in anticipation of the December 1-8 
Parliament in Cape Town, but that the office took no action on his 
application despite his repeated requests.
    The Government appointed a National Human Rights Commission in 1993 
with powers to investigate and recommend policy changes, punishment, 
and compensation in cases of police abuse. In addition the NHRC is 
directed to contribute to the establishment, growth, and functioning of 
human rights NGO's. The Government appoints the members and finances 
the operations of the NHRC. The NHRC is seriously understaffed and 
prohibited by statute from directly investigating allegations of abuse 
involving army and paramilitary forces.
    Between April 1996, and March 1997 (the most recent reporting 
year), the NHRC received 20,514 new complaints of human rights 
violations. At the end of that period, 4,010 complaints awaited 
consideration. Of the 16,823 cases considered during the year, 8,048 
were dismissed; 2,272 were transmitted to other governmental 
authorities for disposition; 528 were concluded, and 5,975 were 
pending. In the preceding 12-month period (April 1995 through March 
1996), the Commission received 10,195 complaints. The increased number 
of complaints in the most recent reporting year is believed to be the 
result of the Commission's increased visibility. That trend continued, 
and the Commission estimated that it had received more than 70,000 
complaints during its 1997-98 reporting year. By the end of the year, 
the report for that year still had not been published.
    The NHRC has sought to encourage a culture supportive of human 
rights by fostering human rights education in schools and universities, 
by offering support and encouragement to human rights NGO's, by 
supporting training programs for the police, military forces, and 
paramilitary forces, and by making recommendations to the central and 
the state governments. During the year, the NHRC carried out, with the 
assistance of NGO's, a human rights training program for state police 
that include stress counseling. The NHRC also has influenced the 
legislative process (particularly in advocating abolition of the TADA, 
and by proposing prison reform legislation. State human rights 
commissions exist in Assam, Manipur, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, 
West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, and 
Rajasthan; Uttar Pradesh took legal steps to establish a commission but 
has yet to appoint members. In addition special courts to hear human 
rights cases have been established in Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and 
Andhra Pradesh. The courts in Uttar Pradesh are not functioning, and in 
September, the state high court ordered that they be activated; despite 
the order, by year's end they were not. The NHRC also encouraged the 
establishment of human rights cells in police headquarters in the 
states.
    The NHRC also was involved in programs to eliminate child labor 
(see Section 6).
    The state human rights commission established in Jammu and Kashmir 
by an act of the state legislature, in 1997, has no power to 
investigate independently alleged human rights violations committed by 
members of the security forces. Credible human rights monitors say that 
the Jammu and Kashmir commission has not yet demonstrated effective, 
independent protection of human rights in the state.
    A People's Commission that was established in 1998 by retired 
Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh to highlight the fate of more than 
2,000 persons who ``disappeared'' during the period of political unrest 
in Punjab received little cooperation from state government 
authorities.
    The prison visits program in Jammu and Kashmir by the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, initiated in October 1995, continued during 
the year (see Section 1.c.). ICRCrepresentatives also continued 
training police and border security force personnel in international 
humanitarian law.
    The Government continued to refuse repeated UNHCR requests for 
access to the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee camps in Tamil Nadu (see Section 
2.d.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The traditional caste system as well as differences of ethnicity, 
religion, and language deeply divide society. Despite laws designed to 
prevent discrimination, other legislation as well as social and 
cultural practices have a profound discriminatory impact. According to 
the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, 
caste clashes are frequent in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu.
    Women.--Domestic violence is common. According to a 1996 survey in 
Uttar Pradesh, 30 percent of married men acknowledged physically 
abusing their wives. Dowry disputes also are a serious problem. In the 
typical dowry dispute, a groom's family members harass a new wife whom 
they believe has not provided a sufficient dowry. This harassment 
sometimes ends in the woman's death, which family members often try to 
portray as a suicide or kitchen accident. Although most ``dowry 
deaths'' involve lower and middle-class families, the phenomenon 
crosses both caste and religious lines. According to National Crime 
Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics, 6,006 dowry deaths occurred in the 
country in 1997, including 1,786 dowry deaths in Uttar Pradesh, 761 in 
Bihar, 550 in Madhya Pradesh, 520 in Andhra Pradesh, 420 in 
Maharashtra, 195 in Karnataka, 153 in Tamil Nadu, and 25 in Kerala.
    Under a 1986 amendment to the Penal Code, the court must presume 
that the husband or the wife's in-laws are responsible for every 
unnatural death of a woman in the first 7 years of marriage--provided 
that harassment is proven. In such cases, police procedures require 
that an officer of deputy superintendent rank or above conduct the 
investigation and that a team of two or more doctors perform the post 
mortem procedures. According to human rights monitors, in practice 
police do not consistently follow these procedures.
    The issue of rape has received greater political and social 
attention. In Orissa in January, the victim of a 1997 rape in which the 
state advocate general Indrajit Roy was charged, was gang raped in 
apparent retaliation for her pursuit of charges against Roy. Roy was 
forced to resign in August 1998, nearly a year after attempted rape 
charges were filed against him. The victim originally had gone to him 
seeking assistance in a dowry case against her husband. The media was 
very critical of the state government's handling of the case, and the 
gang rape was cited as one of the reasons that Orissa Chief Minister 
J.B. Patnaik subsequently was forced to resign on February 7. After the 
gang rape, the NHRC directed the state's chief of police to provide 
police protection to the victim and to submit a full report on the 
incident to the Commission. The press consistently reports that such 
violence against women is increasing, although local women's 
organizations claim that there simply has been increased reporting. 
Only 10 percent of rape cases make it through the courts, and police 
typically fail to arrest rapists. The NHRC criticized the conduct of an 
investigation into a well-publicized kidnaping and rape case in 
Rajasthan that occurred during the year. Acting on an anonymous 
complaint, the NHRC and local police rescued a 24-year-old woman who 
had been held in the Jaipur home of Manohar Lal Sharma for 2 to 3 years 
and repeatedly raped; six persons were charged. Police in Jaipur 
earlier had reported that they had been unable to locate the woman and 
that those persons whom are now accused could not have been involved 
because they were from ``respectable families,'' according to press 
reports. On October 3, Delhi police constable Deepak Dubey was 
dismissed from service, arrested, and charged with raping a sex worker 
in the Kamla Market police station. On December 13, Pappan Singh, 
Kanji, an Padam Singh, three brothers from Geejgar village, Dausa 
district, Rajasthan, allegedly broke into a low caste ``Dalit'' home in 
the village, raped a 16-year-old woman, then poured kerosene on her and 
set her on fire, causing her to die. Two of the suspects were arrested 
and charged with murder and rape; the third, Padam Singh, was being 
sought at year's end.
    The Union Home Ministry reported that there were 15,452 cases of 
rape reported in 1998. According to NCRB statistics for 1997, there 
were 15,330 rapes reported that year, 15,617 abductions of women, 6,006 
dowry deaths, 36,592 reported cases of torture of women, 30,764 cases 
of molestation, and 5,796 cases of sexual harassment. The NCRB recorded 
a total of 121,265 crimes against women in 1997, up from the 1996 total 
of 115,723. Also in 1997, 678 cases of gang rape were recorded. Gang 
rapes often arecommitted as punishment for alleged adultery or as a 
means of coercion or revenge in rural property disputes and feuds.
    Numerous laws exist to protect the rights of women, including the 
Equal Remuneration Act, the Prevention of Immoral Traffic Act, the Sati 
(Widow Burning) Prevention Act, and the Dowry Prohibition Act. However, 
the Government often is unable to enforce these laws, especially in 
rural areas where traditions are deeply rooted. According to press 
reports, the rate of acquittal in dowry death cases is high, and 
because of court backlogs it takes 6 to 7 years on average to dispose 
of such cases.
    The country is a significant source, transit point, and destination 
for many thousands of trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
    Prostitution is widespread, with an estimated 2.3 million 
prostitutes in the country, some 575,000 of whom are children. Many 
indigenous tribal women are forced into sexual exploitation. In Assam's 
Chars River islands, some women work as prostitutes in exchange for as 
little as $0.23 (10 rupees). In 1998 prostitutes began to demand legal 
rights, licenses, and reemployment training, especially in Mumbai and 
New Delhi. In 1997 Karnataka's government made sexual harassment a 
criminal offense.
    Higher female mortality at all age levels, including female 
infanticide and sex selective termination of pregnancies, accounts for 
an increase in the ratio of males to females to 107.9 males per 100 
females in 1991, from 104.7 males per 100 females in 1981, and from 
102.9 males per 100 females at the turn of the century.
    Literacy rates for women are significantly lower than rates for 
men; one recent study found that 38 percent of women were literate, 
compared with 66 percent of men.
    The law prohibits discrimination in the workplace, but enforcement 
is inadequate. In both rural and urban areas, women get lower wages 
than men for doing the same job. Women experience economic 
discrimination in access to employment and credit. This acts as an 
impediment to women owning a business and their ascent to managerial 
positions within businesses often is slower than that of males. State 
governments have supported micro-credit programs for women that have 
begun to have an impact in many rural districts.
    The personal status laws of the religious communities discriminate 
against women. Under the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, a Christian woman 
may demand divorce only in the case of spousal abuse and in the case of 
certain categories of adultery; for a Christian man, adultery alone is 
sufficient. In 1997 the Mumbai High Court recognized abuse alone as 
sufficient grounds for a Christian woman to obtain a divorce. Under 
Islamic law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife spontaneously and 
unilaterally; there is no such provision for women. Islamic law also 
allows a man to have up to four wives but prohibits polyandry.
    The Hindu Succession Act provides equal inheritance rights for 
Hindu women, but married daughters seldom are given a share in parental 
property. Islamic law recognizes a woman's right of inheritance but 
specifies that a daughter's share should be only one-half that of a 
son.
    Under many tribal land systems, notably in Bihar, tribal women do 
not have the right to own land. Other laws relating to the ownership of 
assets and land accord women little control over land use, retention, 
or sale. However, several exceptions exist, as in Ladakh and Meghalaya, 
where women may have several husbands and control the family 
inheritance. This also is an exception to the prohibition of polyandry.
    Thousands of grassroots organizations work for social justice and 
the economic advancement of women, in addition to the National 
Commission for Women. The Government usually supports these efforts, 
despite strong resistance from traditionally privileged groups.
    Children.--The Government does not provide compulsory, free, and 
universal primary education, and only approximately 59 percent of 
children between the ages of 5 and 14 attend school. Of a primary 
school-age population of approximately 203 million, about 120 million 
children attend school. No significant sectors or groups actively are 
excluded, but the economic reality is that children of wealthier 
families are more likely to attend school than those of poor families. 
According to a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) study 
conducted in 1993, the dropout rate from primary school was 34 percent. 
A significant gender gap exists in school attendance, particularly at 
the secondary level. According to the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF),59 
percent of boys and 38 percent of girls were enrolled in secondary 
school. Upon taking office in March 1998, the BJP-led Government 
pledged to ``implement the constitutional provision (Article 45) of 
making primary education free and compulsory,'' promising to increase 
gradually ``government and non-government'' spending on education to 6 
percent of gross domestic product. The Government further pledged to 
present a ``national charter for children,'' to ``take measures to 
eliminate child labor,'' and to ensure that ``no child remains 
illiterate, hungry, or lacks medical care.'' Budgetary allocations for 
this work were not forthcoming, and by the time the Government fell in 
April, little had been done to fulfill these pledges. The current BJP-
led Government reiterated its earlier pledge, but little was done to 
fulfill it.
    The actual percentage of the Union budget spent on education is 
approximately 5.9 percent. The state governments also spend on 
education, but no comprehensive figure of combined federal-state 
expenditure is available. A 1993 study commissioned by the UNDP 
estimated that India as a whole devoted about 3.7 percent of gross 
national product to education.
    Child welfare organizations estimate that there are 500,000 street 
children nationwide living in abject poverty.
    Child prostitution occurs in the cities, and there are an estimated 
575,00 child prostitutes nationwide. Trafficking in children for the 
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
    According to an International Labor Organization estimate, 15 
percent of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes are 
children.
    A group on child prostitution set up by the NHRC includes 
representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department 
of Women and Child Development, NGO's, and UNICEF. It continued to meet 
throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal 
prohibitions.
    Runaway children, especially in larger cities, are at high risk for 
sexually transmitted diseases and HIV. They often work 18- to 20-hour 
days, frequently in hazardous conditions (see Section 6.c.), and suffer 
sexual and mental abuse. In addition schoolteachers often beat 
children.
    The Union Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment has set up a 
24-hour ``child help line'' phone-in service for children in distress 
in nine cities. Run by NGO's with government funding, the child help 
line services target street children, orphans, destitutes, runaway 
children, and children suffering abuse and exploitation. During one 6-
month period, the help lines received 25,000 calls, including 2,190 
seeking medical assistance for children, 1,056 seeking shelter, 138 
reporting missing children, and 125 reporting physical or sexual abuse 
of children.
    In its most recent annual report, the NHRC detailed its efforts to 
examine conditions in juvenile homes and to recommend improvements. The 
Commission also issued directions to all state governments to report 
within 24 hours any instance of death or rape in such institutions. The 
Commission reported that it had taken this initiative following receipt 
of reports of a young boy's death in such a home in Delhi in 1996. 
Speaking in March, NHRC member Justice V.S. Malimath said that cases of 
abuse and torture of children confined to juvenile homes had been 
reported. In some cases, the Commission had acted to transfer oversight 
of homes to private voluntary organizations ``after the (state) 
government failed to provide a healthy environment to children in these 
homes.''
    The Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act of 1929, as amended in 
1978, prohibits child marriage, a traditional practice in northern 
India. The act raised the age requirement for marriage for girls to 18 
from 15 years, but the Government does not enforce it effectively. 
According to one report, 50 percent of girls in Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar 
Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh are married at or before age 16. The Union 
Home Ministry reported that just 21 cases were registered under the 
Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act during 1998. The NHRC, in 
consultation with the National Commission for Women and the Department 
of Women and Child Development, recommended that a new draft ``marriage 
bill'' be enacted to strengthen the prohibitions of the 1929 act. The 
NHRC, in its 1996-1997 report, criticized the then-government for 
rejecting this suggestion, a response that the Commission concluded 
amounted, ``essentially, to a total disinclination to strengthen or 
alter the law, in any respect, or indeed to see to its better 
implementation in any manner.''
    The traditional preference for male children continues. Although a 
law passed in 1994 prohibits the use of amniocentesis and sonogram 
tests for sex determination, the tests are widelymisused for this 
purpose, and termination of a disproportionate number of pregnancies 
with female fetuses occurs. In the 11 years since the southern state of 
Maharashtra passed a law banning the use of such tests for sex 
determination, the state government has filed charges against one 
doctor; he was acquitted. Human rights groups estimate that at least 
10,000 cases of female infanticide occur yearly, primarily in poor 
rural areas. Parts of Tamil Nadu (Dharmapuri, Salem, and Madurai 
districts) still have high rates of female infanticide. According to 
statistics compiled by the Dharmapuri office of the Directorate of 
Health Services, 1,260 female infants were killed in the district in 
1997. Police have not investigated these cases. In 1998 the Tamil Nadu 
Human Rights Commission suggested that a separate mandatory police 
investigation into the death of every female infant become mandatory, 
but there is no legislation that requires such action. In addition 
parents often give priority in health care and nutrition to male 
infants. Women's rights groups point out that the burden of providing 
girls with an adequate dowry is one factor that makes daughters less 
desirable. Although abetting or taking dowry is theoretically illegal 
under the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, it still is practiced widely.
    Bonded and unbonded child labor continues to be a serious problem 
throughout the country (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
    People with Disabilities.--According to regional NGO's, there are 
over 90 million disabled persons in the country. There is no 
legislation or otherwise mandated provision of accessibility for the 
disabled. With the adoption of the Persons with Disability (Equal 
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act in 
1995, a nascent disabled rights movement slowly is raising awareness 
and empowering the disabled. Although the act extends independence, 
freedom, and equal rights to all persons with disabilities, most 
disabled-related organizations admit that its practical effects have 
been minimal so far, in part due to a clause that makes the 
implementation of programs dependent on the ``economic capacit'' of the 
Government. To a large degree, physical impediments still limit 
mobility, legislation prevents equality, and societal discrimination 
maintains the status quo of the disabled.
    The Disabled Division of the Ministry of Welfare had a budget 
provision of more than $38 million (1.65 million rupees) for the 1998-
99 fiscal year for a number of organizations and committees at the 
national, regional, and local levels. The Ministry delivers 
rehabilitation services to the rural population through 16 district 
centers. A national rehabilitation plan commits the Government to 
putting a rehabilitation center in each of more than 400 districts, but 
services still are concentrated in urban areas. However, the impact of 
government programs so far has been limited. Significant funding is 
provided to a handful of government organizations such as the 
Artificial Limbs Manufacturing Corporation of India, the National 
Handicapped Finance and Development Corporation, and the Rehabilitation 
Council of India. Each program/entity provides specific services or 
training which include producing aids and prosthetics, promoting 
disabled-oriented economic development activities, offering training to 
health-care professionals and vocational instructors concerning 
disabled-related issues, and providing comprehensive rehabilitation 
services to the rural disabled.
    Additional mini-grants are offered to NGO's that coordinate 
programs for the disabled to facilitate their physical, social and 
psychological rehabilitation and integration into mainstream society. 
During 1998-99, $3 million (130.5 million rupees) was available. 
However, only half of this amount was allocated due to funding 
restrictions placed on each providing organization and the small number 
of them that exist.
    Two significant programs to benefit the disabled are the National 
Project to Integrate Mentally Retarded in Family and Community and the 
National Institute for the Multiple Disabilities. The first project, 
launched in six states in 1998, primarily focuses on children from the 
economically weaker sections and promotes awareness concerning the 
mentally disabled, their problems, and their rights. The second, 
currently being proposed by the Ministry of Welfare, is to provide 
rehabilitation services to persons with multiple disabilities as well 
as develop courses and materials to foster greater awareness among 
communities throughout the country.
    According to the Persons with Disability Act, 3 percent of 
positions in official offices and state-owned enterprises should be 
reserved for persons with visual, hearing, or orthopedic disabilities. 
The Government provides special railway fares, education allowances, 
scholarships, customs exemptions, budgetary funds from the Ministry of 
Rural Development, and rehabilitation training to assist the disabled. 
However, implementation of these entitlements is not thorough. Although 
the Government has made significant steps toward improving theplight of 
the disabled, its involvement has been insufficient. The majority of 
responsibility for caring for disabled persons still lies with family 
members and voluntary groups.
    The NHRC continues to receive complaints relating to harassment, 
intolerance, and discrimination against the disabled. It currently is 
gathering information on these cases and forwarding assessments to 
concerned NGO's and government entities. However, this process is slow, 
and its effects so far have been minimal.
    The NHRC continued its efforts to improve conditions in mental 
hospitals and enhance awareness of the rights of those with mental 
disabilities during the year. In 1997 it commissioned an assessment of 
conditions at mental hospitals throughout the country, to be conducted 
by the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuroscience. The rights 
of the mentally ill and mentally disabled are provided for in the 
Constitution and the Mental Health Act of 1987. However, the NHRC noted 
that despite these protections, conditions in many mental hospitals are 
far from satisfactory. They continue to embody old concepts of mental 
health care and essentially function as custodial rather than 
therapeutic institutions. Overcrowded and serving as ``dumping 
grounds'' by desperate relatives, some mental hospitals lack even basic 
amenities and have poor medical facilities. In August the NHRC reported 
that it had assumed the management of mental hospitals in Ranchi, 
Bihar, Agra, Uttar Pradesh, and Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, at the 
direction of the Supreme Court.
    Indigenous People.--The Innerline Regulations enacted by the 
British in 1873 still provide the basis for safeguarding tribal rights 
in most of the border states of the northeast. They are in effect in 
Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram, but not in Tripura, 
where the tribal population has been reduced to 30 percent of the total 
population due to increased Bengali migration since partition. These 
regulations prohibit any person, including citizens from other states, 
from going beyond an inner boundary without a valid permit. No rubber, 
wax, ivory, or other forest products may be removed from the protected 
areas without prior authorization. No outsiders are allowed to own land 
in the tribal areas without approval from tribal authorities.
    Despite constitutional safeguards, the rights of indigenous groups 
in eastern India often are ignored. Indigenous people suffer 
discrimination and harassment, have been deprived wrongly of their 
land, and have been subject to torture and to arbitrary arrest. There 
has been encroachment on tribal land in almost every state of eastern 
India, including by illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, and by businesses 
that illegally have removed forest and mineral products. Moreover, 
persons from other backgrounds often usurp places reserved for members 
of tribes and lower castes in national education institutions. Mob 
lynchings, arson, and police atrocities against tribal people occur in 
many states.
    In the Andaman Islands, the local government implemented a policy 
during the year of permitting development of the Jawara tribal area 
that threatens indigenous group's way of life. The construction of a 
road through the forest that is inhabited by this group and the 
encroachment of Indian settlers have impacted negatively indigenous 
group's cultural vitality, economic self-sufficiency, and physical and 
mental health. These integrative policies have been driven in part by 
humanitarian motives, but interest in commercially exploiting virgin 
forests inhabited by tribal people is another strong factor. The most 
recent manifestation of this negative trend was a destructive outbreak 
of measles among the Jawara tribal people, reported in the press in 
September.
    Such violations led to numerous tribal movements demanding the 
protection of land and property rights. The Jharkhand Movement in Bihar 
and Orissa, and the Bodo Movement in Assam, reflect deep economic and 
social grievances among indigenous people. In the Jharkhand area, 
tribal people complain that they have been relegated to unskilled 
mining jobs, have lost their forests to industrial construction, and 
have been displaced by development projects. The Government has 
considered the creation of an independent Jharkand state, but the 
affected state governments oppose the idea.
    However, there is some local autonomy in the northeast. In 
Meghalaya tribal chiefs still wield influence in certain villages. The 
Nagaland government controls the rights to certain mineral resources, 
and autonomous district councils in Tripura, Assam, and Meghalaya 
control matters such as education, rural development, and forestry in 
cooperation with the state governors.
    The 1991 census, the last conducted, showed that 8.08 percent of 
citizens belonged to scheduled tribes. According to the Indian 
Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal People (ICITP), 80 percent of 
the tribal population live below the poverty line.
     In May 1998, the NHRC established a panel to investigate the 
condition of the country's 20 million denotified tribal people. These 
are tribal people who, in 1871, were labeled by the British colonial 
government as belonging to ``criminal tribes.'' The Colonial Act 
listing these tribes was repealed in 1951, but the stigma remains and 
many of these tribal people still are discriminated against actively. 
According to the ICITP, more than 40,000 tribal women, mainly from 
Orissa and Bihar, have been forced into economic and sexual 
exploitation (see Section 6.f.); many come from tribes driven off the 
land by national park schemes. Special courts to hear complaints of 
atrocities committed against tribal people were to have been 
established under the protection of Civil Rights Act of 1976, but this 
has not been done.
    Religious Minorities.--The potential for renewed Hindu-Muslim 
violence remains considerable. Hindus and Muslims continue to feud over 
the construction of mosques several centuries ago on three sites where 
Hindus believe that temples stood previously. In 1998 the Sri Krishna 
Commission, established by the Government to inquire into the cause of 
Hindu-Muslim riots in Mumbai in December 1992 and January 1993, 
released its report. The riots, which followed the destruction of a 
historic mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992, left more than 1,000 
persons, mostly Muslims, dead. Maharashtra's BJP-Shiv Sena ruling 
coalition rejected the report, which laid responsibility for much of 
the violence on leaders from both parties; several Muslim organizations 
have asked the Supreme Court to reverse this rejection, but at year's 
end, the Supreme Court had not reached a decision. In September and 
October, new state assembly elections were held in Maharashtra and the 
incumbent BJP-Shiv Sena government was replaced by a coalition led by 
the Indian National Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party. The 
new Maharashtra government has pledged to take action on the Sri 
Krishna report. On July 20, violence erupted between Hindus and Muslims 
in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, claiming one life. The violence began when a 
band of Hindu youths set fire to Muslim shops and vehicles after 
encountering some Muslim youths teasing a mentally disabled woman in 
the Muslim-dominated old city. Police responded by declaring an area-
wide curfew, thereby bringing the rioting under control; however, there 
was renewed communal violence on July 22, when the curfew was lifted. 
On August 26, a mob of approximately 15 persons, possibly led by Hindu 
extremist Dara Singh, mutilated and burned to death a Muslim cattle 
trader in Padiabeda village, Orissa. According to press reports, men 
with bows and arrows and axes attacked the cattle trader. Both his 
hands were severed, and he was thrown into his shop, which had been set 
ablaze. Some 400 persons witnessed the killing, and 3 suspects were 
arrested in connection with the killing; however, there were no 
convictions.
    Attacks by Muslim militants seeking to end Indian rule in Jammu and 
Kashmir, and continued political violence, drove most Hindus in the 
Kashmir Valley (Pandits) to seek refuge in camps in Jammu, with 
relatives in New Delhi, or elsewhere. Throughout the year, militants 
carried out several execution-style mass killings of Hindu villagers 
and violently targeted Pandits in Jammu and Kashmir (see Sections 1.a. 
and 1.g.). During the year, there were at least three separate attacks 
on Pandit villages in Jammu and Kashmir in which some 41 persons were 
killed. For example, on July 1, Muslim militants are believed to have 
killed nine members of two Hindu families, including three women and a 
child, in Poonch district, Jammu and Kashmir. The Pandit community 
criticizes bleak conditions in the camps and fears that a negotiated 
solution giving greater autonomy to the Muslim majority might threaten 
its own survival in Jammu and Kashmir as a culturally and historically 
distinctive group. The NHRC released a 39-page judgement in June, in 
response to a petition from Hindu Pandits alleging that genocide had 
been committed against them. The NHRC found that the crimes against the 
Pandits ``fall short of the ultimate crime: genocide,'' but stated that 
compensation to the community had been inadequate.
    There was a sharp increase in the number of attacks against 
Christian communities and Christian missionaries during the year. On 
December 1, Home Minister L.K. Advani told Parliament that there had 
been 31 attacks on churches during the year, with 15 occurring in 
Gujurat, 7 in Tamil Nadu, 5 in Kerala, 2 in Orissa, and one each in 
Haryana and Madhya Pradesh. He said that 89 persons had been arrested 
in connection with these attacks and those from previous years. There 
were approximately incidents during the year, primarily of mob violence 
that took the form of destruction of churches and religious property 
and violent attacks on Christian pilgrims and leaders, occurring in all 
parts of the country. The press reported the following incidents: On 
January 11, two Christian prayer halls were set on fire and damaged in 
the Dangs district of Gujarat. On January 27, 12 Christian villagers 
forcibly were ``reconverted'' to Hinduism under threat of the loss of 
the right to use the local well and the destruction of their homes. The 
``reconversion'' was carried out by youths working with Swami Ashim 
Anand, a Hindu man active in ``reconverting'' tribal people in the 
area. However, the villagers stated that prior to becoming Christians, 
they had not been Hindu.
    On January 23, Australian missionary Graham Staines and his two 
young sons were killed. The three were asleep in their car in 
Manoharpur, Keonjhar district, Orissa, when a mob shouting Hindu 
slogans set fire to their car. Villagers who tried to help Staines and 
his sons reportedly were beaten. Staines and his sons were in the 
village to attend an annual bible camp. Staines had worked in the 
country for many years and ran a hospital and clinic for lepers in 
Orissa. Police arrested 51 suspects in connection with the crime and 
sought others, including Dara Singh, who allegedly organized the attack 
and is a supporter of the Bajrang Dal. However, most of those arrested 
were released due to insufficient evidence. Some of the suspects 
reportedly were members or supporters of the Bajrang Dal. On January 
30, Home Minister L.K. Advani stated that the Bajrang Dal was not 
involved in the Staines killings. However, soon after the incident, the 
Government ordered a judicial inquiry into the killings. Supreme Court 
Justice D.P. Wadwha was appointed to head the Commission of Inquiry. 
The Commission was criticized for not moving as aggressively as many 
had hoped; the head of the Commission criticized the central Government 
for failing to provide adequate resources to conduct the investigation. 
Hearings were held from March 30 to April 17 in Bhubhaneshwar, Orissa. 
The report of the Commission of Inquiry was submitted to the Government 
on June 21, and was made public on August 5. The Wadhwa Commission 
report found no evidence of involvement of the Bajrang Dal or any other 
``politico-religious organization.'' It found that the Staines murders 
were perpetrated under the direction of Rabindra Kumar Pal, alias Dara 
Singh, a wanted criminal and Hindu extremist. The report nevertheless 
documented Dara Singh's support for the Bajrang Dal. The National 
Commission for Minorities and other human rights monitors disputed the 
Wadhwa Commission finding. The National Commission for Minorities's 
own, separate inquiry found evidence suggesting that the Bajrang Dal 
was involved in the murders. Villagers questioned by the commission 
reportedly stated that the killers cheered ``long live the Bajrang 
Dal'' shortly before the attack took place.
    On March 16, clashes between Hindu and Christian tribal people in 
the village of Ranalai, southern Orissa broke out, which resulted in 
injuries to more than 12 persons and the burning of 157 Christian 
homes. The dispute began in February when a Christian cross that had 
been etched into a hillside 20 years earlier was converted into a Hindu 
Trishul (trident symbol).
    Local Christians painted over the trident and repainted the cross. 
Despite local efforts to mediate the dispute, violence broke out on 
March 16. By March 17, 26 persons from both communities had been 
arrested for their alleged involvement in the incident. Bharat Paik, 
head of the local BJP, reportedly claimed that the Christians burned 
their own homes. On September 2, Father Arul Doss, a 35-year-old Roman 
Catholic priest, was murdered in a night raid by Hindu extremists on a 
church in Jambani village in Orissa's Mayurbhanj district. Doss was 
pulled from the church, shot with arrows, and beaten to death by his 
assailants. The mob also severely beat Doss's associate and vandalized 
the one-room church, before setting it on fire. In a public statement 
the same day, Prime Minister Vajpayee strongly criticized Father Doss's 
murder and called for its perpetrators to be brought to justice. On 
September 20 in Chapra, Bihar, two young men attacked a Roman Catholic 
nun; they reportedly questioned her about the number of conversions she 
and her sister nuns had made at Jalalpur convent. The men stripped the 
nun, forced her to drink urine, and attempted to rape her. Bihar Police 
Chief K.A. Jacob visited the scene of the crime 3 days later, and the 
state government established a three-member committee to investigate 
the crime. Christian organizations under the leadership of the 
Archbishop of New Delhi held a sit-in on September 26 to protest the 
humiliation of the nun.
    Tamil Nadu was the scene of multiple church burnings between 
September 30 and November 12. During this 6-week period, nine thatched-
roof buildings used for worship services by the Church of South India 
(a member of the Anglican Communion), the Syrian Catholic Church, and 
various Pentecostal denominations were burnt down; no one was killed. 
The incidents involved the destruction of churches on September 30, in 
Melkrishnapudur, Kanyakumari (Church of South India); October 4, in 
Kuzhithurai, Kanyakumari (Syrian Catholic Church); October 31, in 
Mogappair, Chennai (Church of South India); November 5, in Kodambakkam, 
Chennai (Seventh Day Adventist Church); November 7, in Thirumangalam, 
Chennai (International Evangelist Church); November 7, in Tirumalai, 
Tiruchi (Denomination Unknown); November 7, in Reddiarpatti, 
Tirunelveli (Pentecostal Mission); November 9, in Santhome, Chennai 
(Denomination Unknown), and November 12, in Vellore, North Tamil Nadu 
(Methodist). (It is possible that the November 7 and 9 incidents were 
started by the widespread use of firecrackers during the Hindu festival 
of Deepavali.)
    On November 11, a mob of about 40 persons attacked a Christian 
gathering outside a church in the Khyala area of Delhi, in the first 
such incident in the capital. At least 12 persons were injured in the 
attack, when the mob descended on an open-air bible reading session, 
allegedly tearing pamphlets and damaging two bibles. A police spokesman 
said the mob ``may have had some BJP activists'' and four persons that 
are suspected of instigating the attacks were being sought.
    Since 1998 Christian aid workers have been harassed increasingly. 
Many report having been hampered in their work due to threats, 
bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases, physical attacks on their 
workers. Several Christian relief organizations have reported 
difficulty in getting visas renewed for foreign relief workers (see 
Sections 2.d. and 4).
    Members of militant Hindu organizations (including members of the 
Hindu Jagran Manch, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and the Bajrang Dal) 
reportedly are concerned about Christians' efforts to convert Hindus. 
They claimed that Hindus, including economically disadvantaged Dalits 
and tribals, were being forced or induced to convert by Christian 
missionaries. On September 6, Vishwa Hindu Parishad working president 
Ashok Singhal called for enactment of a law banning forced conversions. 
Missionaries have been operating schools and medical clinics for many 
years in tribal areas, including in the Dangs district in Gujarat. 
Tribals, such as those attacked in the Dangs district in 1998, and 
Dalits are outside of the caste system and occupy the very lowest 
position in the social hierarchy. However, they have made socioeconomic 
gains as a result of the missionary schools and other institutions, 
which, among other things, have increased literacy among the lowest 
castes.
    On January 5, a new Hindu militant group, the Hindu Dharma Raksha 
Samiti, held its second convention in Peth, Maharashtra. Among other 
demands issued by its leaders was an ultimatum to missionaries to close 
their offices in tribal districts in certain parts of Gujarat and 
Maharashtra by March 31, or be held responsible for any ensuing 
conflicts. On February 21, the Bajrang Dal held a convocation in 
Mumbai, which approximately 20,000 persons attended. At the 
convocation, antiminority rhetoric reportedly was common, and numerous 
resolutions were passed, which, if ever acted upon, would restrict 
freedom of religion and increase communal tensions. Among the 
resolutions passed were ones that called for a ban on conversion from 
Hinduism and a ban on using loudspeakers at mosques for the call to 
prayer.
    On January 29 leading Muslim religious leaders and politicians 
joined Christian leaders at a protest held in New Delhi against the 
Government's response to violence against Christians. The multifaith 
group Religions for Social Justice was established in New Delhi in 
January following the Staines murders to help promote inter-religious 
understanding.
    The practice of dedicating or marrying young, prepubescent girls to 
a Hindu deity or temple as ``servants of god'' ``Devadasis,'' is 
reported by Human Rights Watch to continue in several southern states, 
including Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. Devadasis, who generally are 
Dalits, may not marry. They are taken from their families and are 
required to provide sexual services to priests and high caste Hindus. 
Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban brothels. In 1992 the 
state of Karnataka passed the Karnataka Devadasi (Prohibition) Act and 
called for the rehabilitation of Devadasis, but this law reportedly 
suffers from a lack of enforcement and criminalizes the actions of 
Devadasis. Since Devadasis are by custom required to be sexually 
available to higher caste men, it reportedly is difficult for them to 
obtain justice from the legal system if they are raped.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's caste system 
historically has strong ties to Hinduism. It delineates clear social 
strata, assigning highly structured religious, cultural, and social 
roles to each caste and sub-caste. Members of each caste--and 
frequently each sub-caste--are expected to fulfill a specific set of 
duties (known as dharma) in order to secure elevation to a higher caste 
through rebirth. Dalits (formerly called untouchables) are viewed by 
many Hindus as separate from or ``below'' the caste system; 
nonetheless, they too are expected to follow their dharma if they hope 
to achieve caste in a future life. Despite longstanding efforts to 
eliminate the discriminatory aspects of caste, societal, political, and 
economic pressures continue to ensure its widespread practice.
    The Constitution gives the President the authority to specify 
historically disadvantaged castes, Dalits, and ``tribals'' (members of 
indigenous groups historically outside the caste system). These 
``scheduled'' castes, Dalits, and tribes are entitled to affirmative 
action and hiring quotas in employment, benefits from special 
development funds, and special training programs. The impact of 
reservations and quotas on society andon the groups they are designed 
to benefit is presently a subject of active debate. According to the 
1991 census, scheduled castes, including Dalits, made up 16 percent and 
scheduled tribes 8 percent of the country's 1991 population of 846 
million. Christians historically have rejected the concept of caste. 
However, because many Christians descended from low caste Hindu 
families, many continue to suffer the same social and economic 
limitations that low caste Hindus do, particularly in rural areas. Low 
caste Hindus who convert to Christianity lose their eligibility for 
affirmative action programs. Those who become Buddhists or Sikhs do 
not. In some states, government jobs are reserved for Muslims of low 
caste descent.
    The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of 
Atrocities) Act of 1989 specifies new offenses against disadvantaged 
persons and provides stiffer penalties for offenders. However, this act 
has had only a modest effect in curbing abuse. The Union Home Ministry 
reported that 14,413 crimes against scheduled castes and 2,413 crimes 
against scheduled tribes were recorded in 1998. This represents a 
significant decrease from the 20,312 crimes against scheduled castes 
and 3,193 crimes against scheduled tribes recorded in 1997. However, 
human rights NGO's allege that caste violence is actually on the 
increase.
    The practice of untouchability (``untouchables''--now called 
Dalits--along with tribals occupy the lowest strata of the caste 
system) was outlawed in theory by the Constitution and the 1955 Civil 
Rights Act, but it remains an important aspect of life. 
``Untouchability'' refers to the social disabilities imposed on persons 
because of their birth into certain Hindu castes. Dalits are considered 
unclean by higher caste Hindus and thus traditionally are relegated to 
separate villages or neighborhoods and to low paying and often 
undesirable occupations (such as scavenging, street sweeping, and 
removing human waste and dead animals). Many rural Dalits work as 
agricultural laborers for higher caste landowners. By custom Dalits may 
be required to perform tasks for upper caste Hindus without 
remuneration. The majority of bonded laborers are Dalits (see Section 
6.c.). Dalits are among the poorest of Indians, generally do not own 
land, and are often illiterate. They face significant discrimination 
despite the laws that exist to protect them, and often are prohibited 
from using the same wells as higher caste Hindus and from attending the 
same temples as higher caste Hindus. NGO's report that crimes committed 
by higher caste Hindus against Dalits often go unpunished, either 
because the authorities do not prosecute vigorously such cases or 
because the crimes are unreported by the victims, who fear retaliation. 
In recent years, groups--including some that use violence--have 
organized to protect Dalit rights.
    Intercaste violence claims hundreds of lives each year; it was 
particularly pronounced in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu states. 
On January 26, approximately 100 upper caste members of the Ranvir 
Sena, a private army, killed 24 Dalits in Shankarbigha, Jehanbad 
district, Bihar. President Narayanan criticized the attack and called 
on state authorities to intervene to halt the intercaste violence. On 
February 10, the Ranvir Sena killed 12 persons in the lower caste 
village of Narayanpur, Bihar, including 4 women and a 12-year-old girl. 
On February 14, leftist militants reportedly killed seven upper caste 
Hindus; on March 2, 5 more upper caste Hindus were killed in Bhimpura 
village, Jehanabad District, Bihar. On March 18, militants of the 
Maoist Communist Center in Senari village, Bihar, killed at least 35 
upper caste villagers who were asleep. On April 21, about 100 members 
of the Ranvir Sena killed 12 Dalit and other lower caste villagers in 
Sendani subdivision, Gaya district, Bihar. Police responded quickly to 
the incident and may have prevented further violence. By late April, 47 
persons had been arrested in connection with the April 21 killings. 
However, in general, the members of the Ranvir Sena who were arrested 
were released on bail shortly thereafter, and none were convicted in 
connection with attacks on low caste villagers. According to Human 
Rights Watch, police made little effort to prevent the killings, 
despite the fact that the Ranvir Sena often publicly announced its 
intentions days before each attack; allegedly, police also failed to 
provide protection for villagers in the aftermath of such attacks. 
According to Human Rights Watch, on June 19 a gang of upper-caste 
Hindus looted and destroyed the houses in a Dalit settlement in 
Kodankipatti, Madurai district, after Dalits there had demanded a share 
in the common property of the village. On February 12, President 
Narayanan dismissed the government of Bihar on the recommendation of 
the Federal Cabinet, due to concerns about lawlessness in the state. 
However, on March 8, the dismissal was reversed, and the Bihar 
government was reinstated.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
right of association. Workers may establish and join unions of their 
own choosing without prior authorization. More than 397.2 million 
persons constitutethe country's active work force. Some 30 million of 
these workers are employed in the formal sector. The rest are 
overwhelmingly agricultural workers and, to a lesser extent, urban non-
industrial laborers. While some trade unions represent agricultural 
workers and informal sector workers, most of the country's estimated 13 
to 15 million union members are part of the 30 million member formal 
sector. Of these 13 to 15 million unionized workers, some 80 percent 
are members of unions affiliated with one of the 5 major trade union 
centrals. All major trade centrals are affiliated to a greater or 
lesser extent with particular political parties. Central unions 
recently have stressed their independence and in some cases are 
attempting to sever previously tight party control.
    Trade unions often exercise the right to strike, but public sector 
unions are required to give at least 16 days notice prior to striking. 
Some states have laws requiring workers in certain nonpublic sector 
industries to give prior strike notice.
    The Essential Services Maintenance Act allows the Government to ban 
strikes and requires conciliation or arbitration in specified essential 
industries. Legal mechanisms exist for challenging the assertion that a 
given dispute falls within the scope of this act. However, the 
``essential services'' has never been defined in law. It thus is open 
to interpretation and subject to varying interpretations from state to 
state. The government of Maharashtra passed a law in February banning 
strikes in essential services, including transport services, milk 
supply services, the electricity department, and hospitals. The 
Industrial Disputes Act prohibits retribution by employers against 
employees involved in legal strike actions. This prohibition is 
observed in practice.
    When abuses, such as intimidation or suppression of legitimate 
trade union activities, are perpetrated against nationally organized or 
other large-scale unions or unionized workers, the authorities 
generally respond by prosecuting and punishing those responsible. 
Unaffiliated unions of low caste or tribal workers are not able, in all 
instances, to secure for themselves the protections and rights provided 
by law. However, six men were convicted in 1998 on charges related to 
the 1991 killing of tribal union leader Shankar Guha Niyogi. The gunman 
was sentenced to death, while industrialist Chandrakant Shah and four 
others received life sentences. On appeal, the Madhya Pradesh High 
Court released four of the six men, including Shah. After much 
deliberation, the government decided not to appeal the High Court 
judgment to the Supreme Court.
    According to Ministry of Labor statistics, during the first 9 
months of the year there were 601 strikes and lockouts throughout the 
country, involving 400,000 workers. In all, 3.9 million ``person-days'' 
were lost due to strikes and 4 million ``person-days'' were lost due to 
lockouts during this period. For example, in January over 800,000 Bihar 
government employees, including teachers, went on strike demanding 
wages on a par with those paid by the central Government and raising 
the retirement age. The strike ended on May 7, with the Bihar 
government conceding to worker demands. In May over 10,000 temporary 
contract workers in West Bengal belonging to the Center of India Trade 
Unions affiliated with the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) went 
on strike demanding permanent jobs for themselves as well as jobs for 
those displaced by Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd. and other local persons. 
In October truck operators went on strike over a 35 percent hike in 
diesel prices.
    The Kerala High Court declared in July 1997 that all general 
strikes (bandhs) were illegal and all organizers of protests would be 
liable for losses caused by shutdowns. Later in the year, the Supreme 
Court of India upheld the verdict drawing attention to the difference 
between a complete closedown of all activities (bandh), and a general 
strike (hartal). While it is likely that the ruling was introduced in 
relation to political strikes, unions stated that remained a potential 
threat to their activities. Other court rulings during 1997 also 
declared strikes illegal and made striking workers pay damages because 
consumers and the public suffered during strikes.
    In January the Government announced plans to establish a national 
commission on labor to review and reform labor laws. The planning 
commission was set up and reportedly is preparing a comprehensive labor 
code to replace current central and state labor laws.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international trade union 
organizations. The Indian National Trade Union Congress and the Hind 
Mazdoor Sabha are affiliated with the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions, while the All India Trade Union Congress is 
affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Theright to 
bargain collectively has existed for decades. The Trade Union Act 
prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers, and 
employers may be penalized if they discriminate against employees 
engaged in union activities.
    Collective bargaining is the normal means of setting wages and 
settling disputes in unionized plants in the organized industrial 
sector. Trade unions vigorously defend worker interests in this 
process. Although a system of specialized labor courts adjudicates 
labor disputes, there are long delays and a backlog of unresolved 
cases. When the parties are unable to agree on equitable wages, the 
Government may establish boards of union, management, and government 
representatives to determine them.
    In practice legal protections of worker rights are effective only 
for the 30 million workers in the organized industrial sector, out of a 
total work force of more than 397.2 million persons. Outside the modern 
industrial sector, laws are difficult to enforce. Union membership is 
rare in the informal sector, and collective bargaining does not exist.
    There are seven export processing zones (EPZ's). Entry into the 
EPZ's ordinarily is limited to employees. Such entry restrictions apply 
to union organizers. Each company buses its workers directly to and 
from the factory door. While workers in the EPZ's have the right to 
organize and to bargain collectively, union activity is rare. In 
addition unions have not pursued vigorously efforts to organize 
private-sector employees anywhere in the years since EPZ's were 
established. There have been efforts to organize workers in the EPZ's 
and unions have complained that these attempts were suppressed in 
Kerala and Gujurat. The fact that organizers are barred from EPZ's and 
workers are bused to EPZ's helps prevent unions from forming. Women 
constitute the bulk of the work force in the EPZ's. The International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions reports that overtime is compulsory 
in the EPZ's, that workers often are employed on temporary contracts 
with fictitious contractors rather than directly by the company, and 
that workers fear that complaints about substandard working conditions 
would result in their being fired. In March the Union Ministry of 
Commerce announced its intention to convert all EPZ's into free trade 
zones and eliminate government interference in their functioning. Trade 
unions fear that this would lead to a curb in worker rights in these 
zones and have asked the Government not to implement the plan; by 
year's end, the plan had not been implemented.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Both the 
Constitution and specific statute prohibit forced or compulsory labor, 
and Bonded labor, as a form of compulsory labor, also is prohibited by 
statute; however, such practices are widespread. The Bonded Labor 
System (Abolition) Act of 1976 prohibits all bonded labor, by adults 
and children. Offenders may be sentenced to up to 3 years in prison, 
but prosecutions are rare. Enforcement of this statute, which is the 
responsibility of state governments, varies from state to state and has 
not been effective due to the lack of adequate resources for 
enforcement and, to some extent, to societal acceptance. Some NGO's 
estimate that the number of bonded laborers is 5 million persons; 
however, in a report released during the year, Human Rights Watch 
estimated that 40 million persons, including 15 million children, are 
bonded laborers (see Section 6.d.). The report notes that the majority 
of bonded laborers are Dalits (see Section 5), and that bondage is 
passed from one generation to the next.
    A Supreme Court decision defined forced labor as work at less than 
the minimum wage, which is usually set by the state governments. Under 
this definition, which differs from that of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), forced labor is widespread, especially in rural 
areas.
    Bonded labor, the result of a private contractual relationship 
whereby a worker incurs or inherits debts to a contractor and then must 
work off the debt plus interest, is illegal but widespread. The 
Government estimates that between enactment of the Bonded Labor 
(Abolition) Act in 1976 and March 1993, 251,424 bonded workers were 
released from their obligations. Other sources maintain that those 
released constituted only one-twentieth of the total number of bonded 
laborers. State governments are responsible for enforcing the act. In 
February 1997, the Supreme Court required state governments to file 
detailed affidavits on the status of bonded labor. Some press reports 
indicate that Tamil Nadu alone has an estimated 25,800 bonded laborers, 
in response to which the state government is working on rehabilitation 
plans. It has allocated $1.25 million (54.4 million rupees) for these 
plans. Following the state government responses, the Supreme Court 
directed each state to undertake a survey of bonded laborers. In West 
Bengal, organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi immigrants is a source 
of bonded labor (see Section 6.f.). Calcutta police arrested five 
members of such a gang on May 19 and detained52 Bangladeshis who had 
entered the country illegally, including 19 children. In June the Union 
Ministry of Labor directed state government officials in Bihar to 
ensure that freed bonded laborers do not revert to bondage; 74 low 
caste laborers were released from bondage by the state labor department 
during the year. Some 900 laborers were released from bondage in 
Arunachal Pradesh, in conformity with a Supreme Court order.
    The working conditions of domestic servants and children in the 
workplace often amount to bonded labor. Children sent from their homes 
to work because their parents cannot afford to feed them, or in order 
to pay off a debt incurred by a parent or relative, have little choice 
in the matter. There are no universally accepted figures for the number 
of bonded child laborers. However, in the carpet industry alone, human 
rights organizations estimate that there may be as many as 300,000 
children working, many of them under conditions that amount to bonded 
labor. Officials claim that they cannot stop this practice because the 
children are working with their parents' consent. In addition, in the 
following industries, there is a reasonable basis to believe that 
products were produced using forced or indentured child labor: 
Brassware; hand-knotted wool carpets; explosive fireworks; footwear; 
hand-blown glass bangles; hand-made locks; hand-dipped matches; hand-
broken quarried stones; hand-spun silk thread and hand-loomed silk 
cloth; hand-made bricks and beedis (hand-rolled cigarettes).
    In October 1998, a Human Rights Watch team headed by the Karnataka 
state labor commissioner conducted surprise inspections on silk twining 
factories in and around the town of Magadi. The team found 53 child 
workers under the age of 14 years working in the plants. The 
inspections revealed children locked in plants, forbidden to talk to 
each other, and beaten for slow work. The labor commissioner estimated 
that there were 3,000 bonded child laborers in the Magadi silk twining 
factories.
    Female bondage, forced prostitution, and the trafficking of women 
and children for the purpose of forced prostitution are widespread 
problems (see Section 6.f.). According to press reports, prison 
officials used prisoners as domestic servants and sold female prisoners 
to brothels (see Section 1.c.).
    In Punjab persons are sold in an organized trade in weekend bazaars 
for the purposes of forced domestic labor and forced sexual service. In 
1998 one person was arrested in connection with this human trade. He 
was released later on bail.
    In December domestic media reported that child laborers were being 
sold in an organized ring at the annual Sonepur cattle fair in Bihar. 
According to these reports, children of impoverished families in 
surrounding districts are brought to the fair and sold in an organized 
traffic. One reporter talked to a buyer, a shopkeeper, who had paid 
just $21 (900 rupees) for a 12-year-old child. Persons sometimes are 
sold into virtual slavery (see Section 6.f.).
    In July a spokesman for the South Asian Coalition on Child 
Servitude (SACCS), a Delhi-based NGO, told the press that SACCS had 
freed 35 bonded laborers from carpet and sari looms in Varanasi and 
Allahabad to pay off loans incurred by family members. SACCS filed a 
complaint against the employers with the NHRC.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Article 24 of the Constitution and the Child Labor 
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986 are the principal protections 
against the exploitation of children in the workplace. Provisions for 
the protection of children in the workplace also are made in the Beedi 
and Cigar Workers (Condition of Employment) Act of 1966, the Factories 
Act of 1948, the Mines Act of 1952, the Motor Transport Workers Act of 
1961, the Plantations Labor Act of 1951, and the Minimum Wages Act of 
1948. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children but 
does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
    The enforcement of child labor laws is the responsibility of the 
state governments. Enforcement is inadequate, especially in the 
informal sector where most children who work are employed. The 
continuing prevalence of child labor may be attributed to social 
acceptance of the practice and to the failure of the state and federal 
governments to make primary school education compulsory.
    Work by children under 14 years of age is barred completely in 
``hazardous industries,'' which include passenger, goods, and mail 
transport by railway; carpet weaving; cinder picking, cleaning of ash 
pits; cement manufacturing; building and construction; cloth printing; 
dyeing and weaving; manufacturing of matches, explosives, and 
fireworks; catering within railway premises or port limits; beedi 
(cigarette) making; mica cutting and splitting; abattoirs; wool 
cleaning; printing; cashew and cashewnut descaling and processing; and 
soldering processes in electronics industries. In 1998 the Government 
increased the number of industries and occupations in which child labor 
is prohibited from 18 to 54.
    In addition to industries that utilize forced or indentured child 
labor (see Section 6.c.), there is evidence that child labor is used in 
the following industries: Hand-knotted carpets; gemstone polishing; 
leather goods; and sporting goods.
    In occupations and processes in which child labor is permitted, 
work by children is permissible only for 6 hours between 8 a.m. and 7 
p.m., with 1 day's rest weekly.
    Primary school education is not compulsory, free, and universal.
    The BJP-led coalition Government continued its predecessors' 
comprehensive plan to eliminate child labor from hazardous industries 
and eventually from all industries, but it did not repeat the previous 
government's pledge to accomplish the first by 2000 and the second by 
2010. This program, for which approximately $260 million (11.3 billion 
rupees) was budgeted, includes the enhanced enforcement of child labor 
laws, income supplements for families, subsidized school lunches in 
areas where child labor is concentrated, and a public awareness 
campaign.
    Estimates of the number of child laborers range widely. The 
government census of 1991 puts the number of child workers at 11.28 
million. The ILO estimates the number at 44 million, while NGO's state 
that the figure is 55 million. Interpolation of census figures by the 
National Labor Institute indicates that of a total of 203 million 
children between the ages of 5 and 14, 116 million are in school, 12.6 
million are in full-time employment, and the status of 74 million is 
unknown. Most, if not all, of the 87 million children not in school do 
housework, work on family farms, work alongside their parents as paid 
agricultural laborers, work as domestic servants, or are otherwise 
employed. A survey of child labor throughout the country ordered by the 
Supreme Court in this judgment was completed during 1997 and documented 
the existence of some 126,665 wage-earning child laborers. When this 
figure was challenged as patently low, the states conducted a second 
survey, in which an additional 428,305 child laborers in hazardous 
industries were found. However, even the combined total of the two 
surveys understates the true dimension of the problem.
    According to the ILO, labor inspectors conducted 13,257 inspections 
in 1997-98, finding 958 violations of the Child Labor Prohibition Act, 
prosecuting 676 of these cases, and obtaining 29 convictions. According 
to the Government, from 1996-97, labor inspectors conducted 35,886 
inspections, over twice as many as the following year. Between 1993 and 
the end of 1997, the government released about 8,000 children from 
illegal workplaces and brought charges against approximately 4,000 
employers. Since promulgation of the 1987 National Child Labor Policy, 
the Government has established 77 ``rehabilitation'' centers for the 
education and care of children removed from illegal workplaces 
throughout the country. Some 200,000 to 250,000 children have received 
care and schooling at these facilities, during which time their 
families have received a small stipend--usually $2.35 to $4.70 (100 to 
200 rupees) monthly, at an estimated cost to the Government of 
approximately $17.68 million (750 million rupees) per year. According 
to the Union Labor Minister, the Government spent $63 million (2.7 
billion rupees) on these programs in 1998-99. In the hand-knotted 
carpet producing area of Uttar Pradesh, the NHRC and NGO's have worked 
with the state government to establish a task force for the elimination 
of child labor.
    Employers in some industries also have taken steps to combat child 
labor. The Carpet Export Promotion Council (CEPC), a quasi-governmental 
organization that receives funding from the Ministry of Textiles, has a 
membership of 2,500 exporters who have subscribed to a code of conduct 
barring them from purchasing hand-knotted carpets known to have been 
produced with child labor. The CEPC conducts inspections to insure 
compliance, and allows members to use voluntarily a government-
originated label to signify adherence to the code of conduct. Rugmark, 
which is a private initiative, operates a similar voluntary label 
scheme. However, the CEPC states that even with the program it is 
impossible to ensure that a carpet has been produced without child 
labor, given the difficulties of monitoring a decentralized and 
geographically dispersed industry. A private-sector research and 
consulting firm conducts the inspections, which cover only 10 percent 
of registered looms. The inspectors have difficulty locating registered 
looms. The Government also cooperates with UNICEF, UNESCO, the UNDP, 
and the ILO in its efforts to eliminate child labor. Since 1992 it has 
participated in the ILO's International Program on the Elimination of 
Child Labor (IPEC). Approximately 90,000 children were removed from 
work and received education and stipends through IPEC programs. 
NGO'salso have helped to free children from the work force. The South 
Asia Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS) has freed over 34,000 
children from the work force, and operates an education and training 
center for children in New Delhi. Since November 1997, the SACCS and 
the NHRC have freed 200 children and brought charges against several 
employers in eastern Uttar Pradesh.
    The NHRC, continuing its own child labor agenda, organized NGO 
programs to provide special schooling, rehabilitation, and family 
income supplements for children in the glass industry in Firozabad. The 
NHRC also intervened in individual cases. A 1996 Supreme Court decision 
imposed a penalty of about $570 (20,000 rupees) on an employer who 
violated constitutional and statutory prohibitions on the use of child 
labor in hazardous industries and ordered the creation of a child labor 
rehabilitation fund out of which parents and guardians would receive an 
income supplement payment on condition that the children removed from 
employment attend school.
    The Government continued previous governments' efforts initiated in 
1994 to pass more effective laws banning child labor and to enhance the 
enforcement of existing laws. The Government's program to eliminate 
child labor is aimed at progressively withdrawing children from the 
workplace in hazardous industries and placing them in schools through 
initiatives in education, rural development, women and child 
development, health, and labor programs. Government efforts to 
eliminate child labor have touched only a small fraction of children in 
the workplace. A 1996 Supreme Court decision raised penalties for 
employers of children in hazardous industries and established a welfare 
fund for formerly employed children.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The directive principles of the 
Constitution declare that ``the state shall endeavor to secure . . . to 
all workers . . . a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent 
standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural 
opportunities.'' Laws set minimum wages, hours of work, and safety and 
health standards. Laws governing minimum wages and hours of work 
generally are observed in industries subject to the Factories Act but 
largely are unenforced elsewhere and do not ensure acceptable 
conditions of work for the 90 percent of the work force not subject to 
the Factories Act.
    Minimum wages vary according to the state and to the sector of 
industry. Such wages provide only a minimal standard of living for a 
worker and are inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family. Most workers employed in units subject to the 
Factories Act receive much more than the minimum wage, including 
mandated bonuses and other benefits. The state governments set a 
separate minimum wage for agricultural workers but do not enforce it 
well. Some industries, such as the apparel and footwear industries, do 
not have a prescribed minimum wage in any of the states where they are 
manufactured.
    The Factories Act establishes an 8-hour workday, a 48-hour 
workweek, and various standards for working conditions. These standards 
generally are enforced and accepted in the modern industrial sector but 
tend not to be observed in older and less economically robust 
industries. State governments are responsible for enforcement of the 
Factories Act. However, the large number of industries covered by a 
small cadre of factory inspectors and their limited training and 
susceptibility to bribery result in lax enforcement.
    The enforcement of safety and health standards also is poor. 
Although occupational safety and health measures vary widely, in 
general neither state nor central government resources for inspection 
and enforcement of standards are adequate. However, the courts have 
begun to take work-related illnesses more seriously.
    Industrial accidents continued to occur frequently due to lack of 
proper enforcement. Chemical industries are the most prone to 
accidents. In April 1998, at least 5 persons were killed and 15 others 
were injured when a mixing tank exploded in a chemical factory near 
Mumbai. In June five children and an adult were killed in West Bengal 
while mining coal illegally. According to the Director General of 
Mines' Safety rules, mining companies must seal the mouths of abandoned 
underground mines; and open-cast mines are to be bulldozed and 
reforested. These rules are seldom--if ever--followed. Illegal mining 
is rampant.
    Safety conditions tend to be better in the EPZ's. The law does not 
provide workers with the right to remove themselves from work 
situations that endanger health and safety without jeopardizing their 
continued employment.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--The country is a significant source, 
transit point, and destination for numerous trafficked persons, 
primarily for the purpose of forced prostitution and forced labor.
    Women's rights organizations and NGO's estimate that more than 
12,000 and perhaps as many as 50,000 women and children are trafficked 
into the country annually from neighboring states for the sex trade. 
According to an International Labor Organization estimate, 15 percent 
of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes are children. The 
traffic is controlled largely by organized crime. Corruption at the 
enforcement level and a lack of government reslve to combat the problem 
tend to perpetuate it.
    There is a growing pattern of trafficking in child prostitutes from 
Nepal. According to one estimate, 5,000 to 7,000 children, mostly 
between he ages of 10 and 18, are drawn into this traffic annually. 
Girls as young as 7 years of age are trafficked from economically-
depressed neighborhoods in Nepal, Bangladesh, and rural areas of the 
country to the major prostitution centers of Mumbai, Calcutta, and 
Delhi. Currently there are some 100,000 to 200,000 women and girls 
working in brothels in Mumbai and some 40-100,000 in Calcutta. In 
Mumbai an estimated 90 percent of sex workers started when they were 
under 18 years of age; half are from Nepal. A similar profile is 
believed to exist in Calcutta, though Bangladesh is substituted for 
Nepal as a key source of underprivileged women trafficked. NGO's in the 
region estimate that some 6,000 to 10,000 girls are trafficked annually 
from Nepal to Indian brothels and a similar number are trafficked from 
Bangladesh.
    Within the country, women from economically depressed areas move 
into the sex trade in the cities.
    Many indigenous tribal women are forced into sexual exploitation. 
According to the Indian Centre for Indigenous and Tribal Peoples 
(ICITP), more than 40,000 tribal women, mainly from Orissa and Bihar, 
were forced into economic and sexual exploitation; many come from 
tribes driven off their land by national park schemes. In Punjab 
persons of both sexes are sold in an organized trade in weekend bazaars 
ostensibly as farm labor; many instead are purchased for the purposes 
of forced sexual service. In 1998 one person was arrested in connection 
with this human trade. He was released later on bail.
    The number of women being trafficked out of India to other 
countries is comparatively small.
    In a study published in 1996, the National Commission for Women 
reported that organized crime plays a major role in the sex trafficking 
trade in the country and that women and children who are trafficked 
frequently are subjected to extortion, beatings, and rape.
    Trafficking of persons from within and into the country for forced 
labor also is a significant problem. In December the media reported 
that an organized ring was selling children from surrounding areas for 
labor at the annual Sonepur cattle fair in Bihar. There was a report 
that a 12-year-old child was purchased for $21 (900 rupees) (see 
Section 6.c.).
    In West Bengal, the organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi 
immigrants is a source of bonded labor. Calcutta police arrested five 
members of one gang on May 19 and detained 52 Bangladeshis who entered 
the country illegally, including 19 children. Calcutta is a convenient 
transit point for traffickers who send Bangladeshis to New Delhi, 
Mumbai, Uttar Pradesh, and West Asia. Persons sometimes are sold into 
virtual slavery. Many boys, some of whom are as young as age four, end 
up as riders in camel races in West Asia and the Gulf States, 
especially to the United Arab Emirates, or begging during the Haj. 
Girls and women end up either as domestic workers or sex workers.
    The country's legal code generally is technically adequate for 
dealing with the problems of trafficking, violence against women, and 
prostitution. The Prevention of Immoral Trafficking Act (PITA) of 1986 
superseded and strengthened the All-India Suppression of Immoral 
Traffic Act (SITA). The PITA sought to toughen penalties for 
trafficking in children, particularly focusing on traffickers, pimps, 
landlords, and brothel operators, while protecting underage girls as 
victims. The PITA requires police to use only female police officers to 
interrogate girls rescued from brothels. The PITA also requires the 
State to provide protection and rehabilitation for these rescued girls. 
The PITA grants a form of quasi-toleration for prostitution, as 
prostitution, per se, is not a crime, only solicitation or practice in 
or near a public place. Some NGO's note that this ambiguity, which is 
intended to protect the victims of trafficking, has been exploited to 
protect the sex industry.
    However, the country's prostitution and trafficking laws fail to 
impose on the clients and organizers of the sex trade the same 
penalties imposed on prostitutes found soliciting or practicing their 
trade in or near (200 meters) public places. Using the PITA's 
provisions against soliciting or practicing, policeregularly can arrest 
sex workers, extort money from them, evict them, and take away their 
children. The client, on the other hand, largely is immune from any law 
enforcement threat as he only has committed a crime if he is engaged in 
sex with a sex worker in a public place or is having sex with a girl 
under the age of 16 years (statutory rape). Similarly, although the 
intention of the 1986 PITA was to focus enforcement efforts against the 
traffickers, pimps, and border operators, the opposite currently is the 
reality; a Calcutta NGO reports that an averag of some 80 to 90 percent 
of the arrests made under the PITA in West Bengal state in the 1990's 
are of female sex workers. Implementation of the PITA's provisions for 
protection and rehabilitation of these women and children brought out 
of the sex trade is seriously lacking. NGO's familiar with the legal 
history of prostitution and trafficking laws see the failure of the 
judiciary to recognize this inequity in the law's practice as a ``blind 
spot,'' which continues.
    NGO's allege that corruption at the enforcement level and a lack of 
government resolve to combat the problem tend to perpetuate it. 
Although charged with enforcing the country's laws on prostitution and 
trafficking in women and children, NGO's, observers, and those in the 
sex trade uniformly view the police as part of the problem. Sex workers 
in Mumbai and Calcutta claim that police intervention in their lives 
usually is characterized by harassment, extortion, and occasional 
arrests on soliciting charges. Seldom are the police seen as a positive 
force, addressing the violence of pimps and traffickers while 
protecting underage girls from bonded sex labor. A commonly held view 
among sex workers and NGO's is that local police and politicians 
responsible for the red light areas receive bribes from organized crime 
networks to protect the lucrative sex trade.
    NGO's and others allege that when police take action against 
brothels suspected of enslaving minors, the resulting police raids 
often are planned poorly and seldom are coordinated with NGO's or 
government social agencies. Therefore, the police action often worsens 
the plight of the girls and women indebted to traffickers and brothel 
owners. Girls ``rescued'' from brothels are treated as criminals and 
often are abused sexually by their police ``rescuers'' or by the staff 
of government remand centers where they are housed temporarily before 
being brought back to the brothels as a result of the bribes paid by 
brothel operators, or legally released into the custody of traffickers 
and madams posing as relatives. In these cases, the debt owned by the 
girls to the brothel operators and traffickers increases further as the 
costs of bribing or legally obtaining release of the girls is added on 
to their bond of labor. NGO's invariably point to the 1996 police 
roundup of 476 sex workers in Mumbai when explaining their dim view of 
forced ``sweep'' rescues.
    As was the case in the 1996 raids, NGO's complain that they seldom 
are given advance notice of police raids on brothels and therefore are 
not able to lend valuable assistance in identifying and interviewing 
underage victims. Nor are the NGO's canvassed by the police for advice 
or assistance in planning law enforcement action to protect the victims 
during raids; although over 400 girls and women were arrested in the 
1996 raids, few pimps or brothel managers were picked up and none were 
prosecuted to conviction. The NGO's found themselves caught off guard 
by the large-scale police action and were ill-prepared to cope with a 
sudden huge demand for shelter for these rescued sex workers. As a 
result, many of the girls were sent to government centers known for 
their harsh conditions--considered by many to be in a worse state than 
the brothels. In the end, some of the girls died in state detention and 
many returned to the sex trade voluntarily, given their lack of 
options; success stories from this raid were rare.
    Some NGO's possess knowledge of trafficking conditions in the 
brothel areas such as Kamathipura, including identification of 
traffickers and locations of girls being held captive by brothel 
owners. However, with the lingering effects of the 1996 raid, most of 
these NGO's are reluctant to trust the police with this information. 
Cooperation among NGO's in sharing information and mapping out the 
magnitude and scope of the trafficking problem in Mumbai has not been 
significant to date, but appears to be improving. NGO's working to 
rescue women and girls from forced sexual work report that ``complaint-
based'' police rescues are quite effective. Unlike the ``sweep'' type 
rescues such as the one carried out in Kamathipura in 1996, these are 
focused attempts to rescue a small number of women and girls using 
specific information about the victim's location, names and appearance, 
often supplied by NGO's; police responses in such cases frequently has 
resulted in the rescue of the women and girls involved.
    Similar efforts to improve NGO coordination are being made in 
Calcutta, where some 10 NGO's meet monthly as part of the ``Action 
Against Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children'' forum. Every 
3 months the group attempts to meet with counterparts from Bangladesh 
and Nepal. Calcutta NGO's such as Sanlaap also are seeking to build 
stronger working relationships with local police.
    There are roughly 80 NGO's in 10 states around the country working 
for the emancipation and rehabilitation of women and children 
trafficked into the sex trade.
    A group on child prostitution established by the NHRC includes 
representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department 
of Women and Child Development, NGO's, and UNICEF. It continued to meet 
throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal 
prohibitions.
                                 ______
                                 

                                MALDIVES

    The Republic of Maldives, which comprises 1,190 islands (less than 
200 of which are inhabited), with a population of approximately 270,000 
persons, has a parliamentary form of government with a very strong 
executive. The President appoints the Cabinet, members of the 
judiciary, and one-sixth of the Parliament. The President derives 
additional influence from his constitutional role as the ``supreme 
authority to propagate the tenets'' of Islam. Political parties are 
officially discouraged, and candidates for the unicameral legislature, 
the People's Majlis, run as individuals. The Majlis selects a single 
presidential nominee who is approved or rejected in a national 
referendum. The Majlis must approve all legislation and can enact 
legislation without presidential approval. Civil law is subordinate to 
Islamic law, but civil law is generally applied in criminal and civil 
cases. The judiciary is subject to executive influence.
    The National Security Service (NSS) performs its duties under 
effective civilian control. The NSS includes the armed forces and 
police, and its members serve in both police and military capacities 
during their careers. The police division investigates crimes, collects 
intelligence, makes arrests, and enforces house arrest.
    Fishing, small-scale agriculture, and tourism provide employment 
for over one-half of the work force. Tourism accounts for over one-
quarter of government revenues and roughly 40 percent of foreign 
exchange receipts. Manufacturing accounts for 6 percent of gross 
domestic product.
    The Government restricts human rights in several areas. The Majlis 
has assumed a more active political role in recent years, and its 
members routinely differ with government policy on many issues; 
however, the President's power to appoint a significant portion of the 
Parliament still constrains citizens' ability to change their 
government. Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems. A continued 
easing of government restrictions and the Press Council's balanced 
handling of issues related to journalistic standards allowed a greater 
diversity of views in the media. Nevertheless, the Government banned a 
book in 1997 because it contained derogatory comments about a previous 
president. The Government limits freedom of assembly and association. 
There are significant restrictions on the freedom of religion; the 
Government has detained arbitrarily and expelled foreigners for 
proselytizing and detained citizens who converted. Women face a variety 
of legal and social disadvantages. Some of these restrictions are 
linked to the Government's observance of Shari'a (Islamic law) and 
other Islamic customs. The Government restricts worker rights. 
Nonetheless, in recent years there has been some progress in certain 
areas; the courts were reorganized in 1997, and a new Constitution, 
which provides for the protection of certain fundamental rights, went 
into effect at the beginning of 1998. In addition, procedural rules 
limiting indefinite police detention were instituted, and the 
presidential nominating process involved competition among candidates 
for the first time in 1998.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no 
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated 
disappearances.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--There were no reports of beatings or other mistreatment of 
persons in police custody during the year; however, convicted criminals 
may be flogged under judicial supervision when this punishment is 
prescribed by Islamic law (i.e., only when the criminal confesses to 
the crime and only for the offenses of marital infidelity and alcohol 
abuse). There were no public floggings during the year. In 1998 there 
were two private floggings (carried out without public spectators) due 
to the confession of an extramarital affair. The man was subsequently 
banished, and the woman was placed under house arrest for 12 months. 
Punishments are usually confined to fines, compensatory payment, house 
arrest, imprisonment, or banishment to a remote atoll. The Government 
generally permits those who are banished to receive visits by family 
members.
    Amnesty International reported that prisoners have been mistreated, 
including by being handcuffed to coconut palms, being handcuffed in 
their cells, and being held in solitary confinement for long periods. 
Female prisoners reportedly have been jabbed awake for dawn prayers by 
male prison guards in a humiliating manner.
    Prison conditions, including food and prisoner housing, are 
generally adequate; however, Amnesty International reported that cells 
may be overcrowded and lack adequate sleeping space. Prisoners are 
allowed to work in prison and given the opportunity for regular 
exercise and recreation. Spouses are allowed privacy during visits with 
incarcerated partners. The country's prison facility was destroyed by 
fire during the year, and the prisoners were moved to another island 
with improved conditions. The Government is surveying prison facilities 
in other countries to incorporate international standards and 
improvements in the reconstruction of the prison.
    The Government has permitted prison visits by foreign diplomats.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The 1997 Constitution 
states that no person shall be arrested or detained for more than 24 
hours without being informed of the grounds for the arrest or 
detention; however, in 1998 authorities arbitrarily detained foreigners 
for allegedly proselytizing Christianity and detained citizens who 
supposedly converted (see Section 2.c.). Police initiate investigations 
based on suspicion of criminal activity or in response to written 
complaints from citizens, police officers, or government officials. 
They are not required to obtain warrants for arrests. Based on the 
results of police investigations, the Attorney General refers cases to 
the appropriate court. The authorities generally keep the details of a 
case confidential until they are confident that the charges are likely 
to be upheld.
    Depending upon the charges, a suspect may remain free, detained in 
prison, or under house arrest for 15 days during investigations. The 
President may extend pretrial detention for an additional 30 days, but 
in most cases the suspect is released if not brought to trial within 15 
days. Those who are released pending trial may not leave a specific 
atoll. The law providing for the indefinite detention of individuals 
under investigation was revised substantially in 1998. Within 24 hours 
of an arrest, an individual must be told of the grounds for the arrest. 
An individual can then be held for 7 days. If no legal proceedings have 
been initiated within 7 days, the case is referred to an anonymous 
three-member civilian commission appointed by the President that can 
authorize an additional 15 days' detention. After that time, if legal 
proceedings still have not beeninitiated, a judge must sanction the 
continued detention on a monthly basis. There is no right to legal 
counsel during police interrogation. There is no provision for bail.
    The Government may prohibit access to a telephone and non-family 
visits to those under house arrest. While there have been no reported 
cases of incommunicado detention in recent years, the law does not 
provide safeguards against this abuse.
    The Government detained three individuals in April 1995 who 
remained under house arrest without charge until October 1995, when 
their detention was lifted. No charges were brought against them. The 
Government has offered no reasons for their detention. However, it is 
widely believed that their detention was the result of political 
differences with the Government rather than due to any threat that the 
men--all of whom are elderly and well known figures--pose to national 
security. According to an Amnesty International (AI) report in June 
1998, Ismail Saadiq, a Maldivian businessman, was taken into police 
custody possibly for political reasons in Male and later detained 
because he allegedly had been in contact with a British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) reporter. According to AI, he previously had been 
under house arrest for alleged business irregularities, and was told 
that the media contact violated house arrest rules. The Government 
claimed that Saadiq was a businessman involved in fraud and corruption. 
At year's end, the exact details surrounding Saadiq's detention could 
not be confirmed, but he was convicted of fraud in December 1998, and 
is awaiting trial on other fraud charges.
    There were no reports of the external exile of citizens, although 
24 foreigners suspected of proselytization were banished for life in 
1998 (see Section 2.c.). The Government sometimes banishes convicted 
criminals to inhabited atolls away from their home communities; a man 
who confessed to an extramarital affair in April 1998 was banished for 
1 year.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1997 Constitution does not 
provide for an independent judiciary, and the judiciary is subject to 
executive influence. In addition to his authority to review High Court 
decisions, the President influences the judiciary through his power to 
appoint and dismiss judges, all of whom serve at his pleasure and are 
not subject to confirmation by the Majlis. The President nevertheless 
has removed only two judges since 1987. Both dismissals followed the 
recommendation of the Justice Ministry that found the judges' 
professional qualifications to be below standard. The President may 
also grant pardons and amnesties.
    In September 1997 the court system, under the Ministry of Justice, 
was reorganized and court administration has improved. There are three 
courts: One for civil matters; one for criminal cases; and one for 
family and juvenile issues. On the recommendation of the Ministry of 
Justice, the President appoints a principal judge for each court. There 
is also a High Court on Male, which is independent of the Justice 
Ministry and which handles a wide range of cases, including politically 
sensitive ones. The High Court also acts as a court of appeals. Under a 
1995 presidential decree, High Court rulings can be reviewed by a 5-
member advisory council appointed by the President. The President also 
has authority to affirm judgments of the High Court, to order a second 
hearing, or to overturn the Court's decision. In addition to the Male 
courts, there are 204 general courts on the islands.
    There are no jury trials. Most trials are public and are conducted 
by judges and magistrates trained in Islamic, civil, and criminal law. 
Magistrates usually adjudicate cases on outer islands, but when more 
complex legal questions are involved, the Justice Ministry will send 
more experienced judges to handle the case.
    The Constitution provides that an accused person be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty, and that an accused person has the right 
to defend himself ``in accordance with Shari'a.'' During a trial, the 
accused also may call witnesses, and be assisted by a lawyer. Courts do 
not provide lawyers to indigent defendants. Judges question the 
concerned parties and attempt to establish the facts of a case.
    Civil law is subordinate to Islamic law, or Shari'a. Shari'a is 
applied in situations not covered by civil law as well as in certain 
acts such as divorce and adultery. Courts adjudicating matrimonial and 
criminal cases generally do not allow legal counsel in court because, 
according to a local interpretation of Shari'a, all answers and 
submissions should come directly from the parties involved. However, 
the High Court allows legal counsel in all cases, including those in 
which the right to counsel was denied in the lower court. Under Islamic 
practice, the testimony of two women is required to equal that of one 
man in matters involving Shari'a, such as adultery, finance and 
inheritance. In other cases, the testimony of men and women are equal.
    Ilyas Ibrahim, the President's chief rival for the 1993 
presidential nomination, and a relative of the President, was tried in 
absentia in 1994 and sentenced to 15 years' banishment on the charge of 
illegally attempting to become president and to 6 months banishment for 
violating his oath as minister. Ilyas returned from his self-imposed 
foreign exile in 1996 and was placed under house arrest for several 
months. The President has since pardoned him, and there are no 
restrictions on his political rights. In November 1998 President Gayoom 
appointed Ilyas to the Cabinet as Minister of Transport and Civil 
Aviation. In November, Ilyas was elected to a parliamentary seat from 
Male.
    There were no reports of political prisoners. Amnesty International 
reports that Wu Mei De, a Chinese national, has been detained since 
1993, which AI states apparently occurred as a result of official 
connivance in a dispute with his former Maldivian business partner. De 
has been offered the opportunity to leave the country, but has declined 
to do so.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The 1997 Constitution prohibits security officials 
from opening or reading letters, telegrams, and wireless messages or 
monitoring telephone conversations, ``except as expressly provided by 
law.'' The NSS may open the mail of private citizens and monitor 
telephone conversations if authorized in the course of a criminal 
investigation.
    Although the 1997 Constitution makes residential premises and 
dwellings inviolable, there is no legal requirement for search or 
arrest warrants. The Attorney General or a commanding officer of the 
police must approve the search of private residences.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Law No. 4/68 of 1968 prohibits 
public statements that are contrary to Islam, threaten the public 
order, or are libelous. In April 1996, a journalist was sentenced under 
this law to 2 years' imprisonment for comments made about the 1994 
general elections in an article published in the Philippines. On appeal 
the High Court reduced his sentence to 6 months. The President pardoned 
the journalist at the beginning of 1997.
    The Penal Code prohibits inciting the people against the 
Government. However, a 1990 amendment to the Penal Code decriminalized 
``any true account of any act of commission or omission past or present 
by the Government in a lawfully registered newspaper or magazine, so as 
to reveal dissatisfaction or to effect its reform.''
    The Press Council established by the Government in December 1993 is 
composed of official government and private media representatives, 
lawyers, and government officials. The Council reviews charges of 
journalist misconduct (advising the Ministry of Information, Arts, and 
Culture on measures to be taken against reporters, when appropriate) 
and promotes professional standards within the media (recommending 
reforms and making suggestions for improvement). In 1998, the Press 
Council organized a 6-month training program for 12 journalists to 
improve media reporting and accuracy. The Council met regularly, and 
private journalists were satisfied with its objectivity and 
performance. Regulations that made publishers responsible for the 
content of the material they published remained in effect but did not 
result in any legal actions, despite reports in 1994 that the 
regulations were under review and that a change was likely. The 
Government agreed that private journalists, rather than the Government, 
should take responsibility for preparation of a journalistic code of 
ethics. Individual newspapers and journals established their own 
ethical guidelines in many cases.
    There were no reports of government censorship of the electronic 
media, nor were there closures of any publications or reports of 
intimidation of journalists. However, pornography and material 
otherwise deemed objectionable to Islamic values may be banned. In 
January the Government banned the animated movie ``The Prince of 
Egypt,'' on the grounds that it was offensive to Islam (see Section 
2.c.). The Government banned a book in 1997 written by an elderly close 
relative of the President for its derogatory comments about a deceased 
previous president, after the relatives of the latter complained. No 
journalists were arrested during the year. The Government discontinued 
its practice of providing reporting guidelines to the media in 1994.
    Television news and public affairs programming routinely discussed 
topics of current concern and freely criticized government performance. 
Regular press conferences instituted with government ministers in 1995 
continued. Journalists are more self-confident than in the past; self-
censorship appears to have diminished, although it remains a problem. 
Since it is not clear when criticism violates Law 4/68, journalists 
andpublishers continue to watch what they say, particularly on 
political topics, to avoid entanglement with the Government.
    The Government owns and operates the only television and radio 
station. It does not interfere with foreign broadcasts or with the sale 
of satellite receivers. Reports drawn from foreign newscasts are aired 
on the Government television station.
    Cable News Network (CNN) is shown, uncensored, daily on local 
television. In 1996 a company began providing Internet services. The 
Government enacted no regulations governing Internet access but does 
seek to block distribution of pornographic material via the Internet.
    Although 88 newspapers and periodicals are registered with the 
Government, only about 60 regularly publish. Aafathis, a morning daily, 
is often critical of government policy. Another daily, Miadhu, began 
publishing in 1996, and Haveeru is the evening daily. Both Miadhu's and 
Haveeru's publishers are progovernment.
    There are no legal prohibitions on the import of foreign 
publications except those containing pornography or material otherwise 
deemed objectionable to Islamic values. No seizures of foreign 
publications were reported during the year. There are no reported 
restrictions on academic freedom. Some teachers are reportedly vocal in 
their criticism of the Government.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1997 
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly ``peaceably and in a 
manner that does not contravene the law,'' however, the Government 
imposes limits on this right in practice. The Home Ministry permits 
public political meetings during electoral campaigns but limits them to 
small gatherings on private premises.
    The Government registers clubs and other private associations if 
they do not contravene Islamic or civil law; however, the Government 
imposes some limits on freedom of association. While not forbidden by 
law, the President officially discourages political parties on the 
grounds that they are inappropriate to the homogeneous nature of 
society. However, many Majlis members were active and outspoken critics 
of the Government and have stimulated closer parliamentary examination 
of government policy.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted 
significantly. The 1997 Constitution designates Islam as the official 
state religion and the Government interprets this provision to impose a 
requirement that citizens be Muslims. The practice of any religion 
other than Islam is prohibited by law. However, foreign residents are 
allowed to practice their religion if they do so privately.
    There are no places of worship for adherents of other religions. 
The Government prohibits the importation of icons and religious 
statues, but generally permits the importation of individual religious 
tracts, such as Bibles, for personal use. It also prohibits non-Muslim 
clergy and missionaries from proselytizing and conducting public 
worship services. Conversion of a Muslim to another faith is a 
violation of Shari'a and may result in a loss of the convert's 
citizenship.
    Islamic instruction is a mandatory part of the school curriculum, 
and the Government funds the instructors who teach Islam. The 
Government also has set standards for individuals who conduct Friday 
services at mosques to ensure adequate theological qualifications.
    In April 1998 the Government asked the Seychelles Government to 
stop the radio broadcast of Christian programming in the local 
language, Dhivehi, to the country. However, the broadcasts continued 
throughout the year. During June 1998, the authorities detained 24 
foreigners (including children) for alleged Christian proselytization 
without explaining the charges against them, and then expelled them 
from the country for life. Following the expulsion of the foreigners, 
police took two female citizens into custody for allegedly converting 
to Christianity. As many as a dozen other citizens were questioned. The 
women were detained from mid-June to late September 1998, during which 
time they received extensive counseling. No formal charges were ever 
brought against them, and they were released to their families. In 
January the Government banned the animated movie ``The Prince of 
Egypt'' on the ground that ``its portrayal of the Prophet Moses was 
offensive to Islam, because all prophets and messengers of God are not 
to be animated or portrayed in any way'' (see Section 2.a.).
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel at home and 
abroad, to emigrate, and to return. Because of overcrowding, the 
Government discourages migration into the capital island of Male or its 
surrounding atoll. Foreign workers are often kept at their worksites. 
Their ability to travel freely is restricted, and they are not allowed 
to mingle with the local population on the islands. The issue of the 
provision of first asylum did not arise during the year. The Government 
has not formulated a policy regarding first asylum. There were no 
reports of forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to refugee 
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens' ability to change their government is constrained, as a 
strong executive exerts significant influence over both the legislature 
and the judiciary. Under the 1997 Constitution, the Majlis chooses a 
single presidential nominee, who must be a Sunni Muslim male, from a 
list of self-announced candidates for the nomination. Would-be nominees 
for President are not permitted to campaign for the nomination. The 
nominee is then confirmed or rejected by secret ballot in a nationwide 
referendum. From a field of five candidates, President Gayoom was 
nominated by the Majlis and was confirmed for a fifth 5-year term in 
October 1998. Observers from the South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation found the referendum to be free and fair.
    The elected members of the Majlis, who must be Muslims, serve 5-
year terms. All citizens over 21 years of age may vote. Of the body's 
50 members, 42 are elected--2 from each of the 20 inhabited atolls and 
2 from Male--and the President appoints 8 members. Individuals or 
groups are free to approach members of the Majlis with grievances or 
opinions on proposed legislation, and any member may introduce 
legislation. There are no political parties, which are officially 
discouraged.
    The office of the President is the most powerful political 
institution. The 1997 Constitution gives Islamic law preeminence over 
civil law and designates the President as the ``supreme authority to 
propagate the tenets'' of Islam. The President's authority to appoint 
one-sixth of the Majlis members, which is one-third of the total needed 
for nominating the President, provides the President with a power base 
and strong political leverage. The President currently is also 
commander in chief of the armed forces, and is the Minister of Defense 
and National Security, the Minister of Finance and Treasury, and the 
Governor of the Maldivian Monetary Authority.
    Relations between the Government and the Majlis have been 
constructive. The Government may introduce legislation, but may not 
enact a bill into law without the Majlis' approval. However, the Majlis 
may enact legislation into law without presidential assent if the 
President fails to act on the proposal within 30 days or if a bill is 
re-passed with a two-thirds majority. In recent years, the Majlis has 
become increasingly independent, challenging government policies and 
rejecting government-proposed legislation.
    In 1993 the Majlis introduced a question time in which members may 
question government ministers about public policy. Debate on the floor 
has since become increasingly sharp and more open. Elections to the 
People's Majlis were held in November. According to observers from the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the elections 
were generally free and fair. However, several losing candidates 
challenged the election results and the courts currently are 
considering their claims of campaign irregularities.
    Women are not eligible to become president but may hold other 
government posts. For reasons of tradition and culture, few women seek 
or are selected for public office. In order to increase participation 
by women in the political process, the Government continued a political 
awareness campaign in the atolls. Three women, two appointed by the 
President, served in the Majlis before the November elections and sat 
in the Cabinet. In November, six women ran for seats in the People's 
Majlis and two were elected. During the November elections, observers 
from the SAARC noted that women participated equally in the electoral 
process.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    Although not prohibited, there are no active local human rights 
groups. The Government has been responsive to at least one foreign 
government's interest in examining human rights issues. The Government 
also facilitated visits of teams of South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation election observers in 1994, 1998, and 1999.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The 1997 Constitution declares all citizens equal before the law, 
but there is no specific provision to prohibit discrimination based on 
these factors. Women have traditionally been disadvantaged, 
particularly in terms of education and the application of Islamic law 
to matters such as divorce, inheritance, and testimony in legal 
proceedings.
    Women.--There are no firm data on the extent of violence against 
women because of the value attached to privacy in this conservative 
society. The Government commissioned a study in 1997 from a local 
nongovernmental organization (NGO) on domestic violence, but it was 
never completed. Police officials report that they receive few 
complaints of assaults against women. Women's rights advocates agree 
that wife beating and other forms of violence are not widespread. Rape 
and other violent crimes against women are extremely rare. None were 
reported or prosecuted during the year.
    Women traditionally have played a subordinate role in society, 
although they now participate in public life in growing numbers and 
gradually are participating at higher levels. Well-educated women 
maintain that cultural norms, not the law, inhibit women's education 
and career choices. In many instances, education for girls is curtailed 
after the seventh grade, largely because parents do not allow girls to 
leave their home island for an island having a secondary school. 
Nonetheless, women enjoy a higher literacy rate (98 percent) than men 
(96 percent). Due largely to orthodox Islamic training, there is a 
strong strain of conservative sentiment--especially among small 
businessmen and residents of the outer islands--that opposes an active 
role for women outside the home. However, the Government has undertaken 
legal literacy programs to make women aware of their legal rights and 
has conducted workshops on gender and political awareness in the outer 
atolls. The Government also is constructing women centers in the 
atolls, which are facilities where family health workers can provide 
medical services. The women centers also provide libraries and space 
for meetings and other activities.
    Under Islamic practice, husbands may divorce their wives more 
easily than vice versa, absent any mutual agreement to divorce. Islamic 
law also governs intestate inheritance, granting male heirs twice the 
share of female heirs. A woman's testimony is equal to only one-half of 
that of a man in matters involving adultery, finance, and inheritance 
(see Section 1.e.). Women who work for wages receive pay equal to that 
of men in the same positions. About 10 percent of uniformed NSS 
personnel are women.
    Children.--The Government does not have a program of compulsory 
education, but provides universal access to primary education. The 
percentage of school-age children actually in school is as follows: 
(grades 1 to 5) 99.26 percent, (grades 6 to 7) 96.2 percent, and grades 
(8 to 10) 51.09 percent. Of the students enrolled 49 percent are female 
and 51 percent are male. The Government is committed to the protection 
of children's rights and welfare. The Government is working with the 
UNICEF to implement the rights provided for in the U.N. Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. The Government established a National Council 
for the Protection of the Rights of the Child in 1992. Government 
policy provides for equal access to educational and health programs for 
both male and female children. Laws protecting children's rights apply 
with equal force to children of either sex.
    Children's rights are incorporated into law, which specifically 
protects children from both physical and psychological abuse, including 
abuse at the hands of teachers or parents. The Ministry of Women's 
Affairs and Social Welfare has the authority to enforce this law, takes 
its responsibility seriously, and has received strong popular support 
for its efforts. The Government is reviewing this law to see if 
improvements and additional protections are necessary. There is no 
reported societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
    People with Disabilities.--There is no law that specifically 
addresses the rights of the physically or mentally disabled. During the 
year, the Government initiated a survey to identify the magnitude of 
the need in the country. The Government has established programs and 
provided services for the disabled. There is no legislated or mandated 
accessibility for the disabled.
    Persons with disabilities are usually cared for by their families. 
When such care is unavailable, persons with disabilities are kept in 
the Institute for Needy People, which also assists elderly persons. The 
Government provides freemedication for all mentally ill persons in the 
islands, and mobile teams regularly visit mentally ill patients. The 
Government provides assistance to the physically disabled and enacted a 
new building code during the year, which mandated that all new 
government buildings and jetties must be accessible to disabled 
persons.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--While the Government does not 
expressly prohibit unions, it recognizes neither the right to form them 
nor the right to strike. There were no reports of efforts to form 
unions during the year.
    The work force consists of approximately 64,000 persons, about 20 
percent of whom are employed in fishing. About 16,700 foreigners work 
in the country, many in tourist hotels, retail/wholesale trade, 
factories, or on construction projects. The great majority of workers 
are employed outside of the wage sector. The Government estimates that 
the manufacturing sector employs about 15 percent of the labor force 
and tourism another 10 percent.
    Workers can affiliate with international labor federations.
    In 1995 the U.S. Government suspended Maldives' eligibility for 
tariff preferences under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences 
because the Government failed to take steps to afford internationally 
recognized worker rights to Maldivian workers.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law neither 
prohibits nor protects workers' rights to organize and bargain 
collectively. Wages in the private sector are set by contract between 
employers and employees and are usually based on the rates for similar 
work in the public sector. There are no laws specifically prohibiting 
antiunion discrimination by employers against union members or 
organizers. The Government has exerted pressure in the past to 
discourage seamen from joining foreign seamen's unions as a means to 
secure higher wages. There have been no reported complaints alleging 
such discrimination or claiming government interference with workers' 
attempts to join unions in the past 5 years.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is not prohibited by law. However, there were no reports that it 
is practiced. The Government does not specifically prohibit forced and 
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--There is no compulsory education law, but more than 96 
percent of school-age children to grade 7 are enrolled in school. A 
1992 law bars children under 14 years of age from ``places of waged 
work and from work that is not suitable for that child's age, health, 
or physical ability or that might obstruct the education or adversely 
affect the mentality or behavior of the child.'' An earlier law 
prohibits government employment of children under the age of 16. There 
are no reports of children being employed in the small industrial 
sector, although children work in family fishing, agricultural, and 
commercial activities. The hours of work of young workers are not 
specifically limited by statute. The Government does not specifically 
prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices are 
not known to occur (see Section 6.c.). A Children's Unit in the 
Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare is responsible for 
monitoring compliance with the child labor regulations. It relies upon 
complaints filed with it rather than initiating its own inspections to 
ensure compliance. As a result, oversight is incomplete.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1994 the Government 
promulgated its first set of regulations for employer-employee 
relations. The regulations specify the terms that must be incorporated 
into employment contracts and address such issues as training, work 
hours, safety, remuneration, leave, fines, termination, etc. There is 
no national minimum wage for the private sector, although the 
Government has established wage floors for certain kinds of work. Given 
the severe shortage of labor, employers must offer competitive pay and 
conditions to attract skilled workers.
    There are no statutory provisions for hours of work, but the 
regulations require that a work contract specify the normal work and 
overtime hours on a weekly or monthly basis. In the public sector, a 7-
hour day and a 5-day workweek have been established through 
administrative circulars from the President's office.
    Overtime pay in the public sector was instituted in 1990. Employees 
are authorized 20 days of annual leave, 30 days of medical leave, 
maternity leave of 45 days, and special annual leave of 10 days for 
extraordinary circumstances. There are no laws governing health and 
safety conditions. However, there are regulatory requirements that 
employers provide a safe working environment and ensure the observance 
of safety measures. It is unclear, however, whether workers can remove 
themselves from unsafe working conditions without risking the loss of 
their jobs. The Ministry of Trade, Industries, and Labour set up a 
Labour Dispute Settlement Unit in 1998 to resolve wage and labor 
disputes and to visit worksites and enforce labor regulations.
    In 1997 the Government for the first time worked closely with the 
International Labor Organization to address a number of labor issues, 
including the right of association, the right to organize, and 
acceptable conditions of work. A draft labor law is under consideration 
by the Government.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no reports that persons were 
trafficked in, to, or from the country.
                                 ______
                                 

                                 NEPAL

    Nepal is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of 
government. In 1990 the King, formerly an absolute monarch, legalized 
political parties, after which an interim government promulgated a new 
Constitution. The King retains important residual powers, but has 
dissociated himself from direct day-to-day government activities. The 
democratically elected Parliament consists of the House of 
Representatives (lower house) and the National Council (upper house). 
In May the country's third national parliamentary elections were held, 
which international observers considered to be generally free and fair. 
In February 1996, the leaders of the Maoist United People's Front (UPF) 
launched a ``People's War'' in the midwestern region of the country, 
which has led to violence in 27 of 75 districts. The insurrection has 
been waged through torture, killings, and bombings involving civilians 
and public officials. The Constitution provides for an independent 
judiciary; however, the courts are susceptible to political pressure 
and corruption.
    The National Police Force maintains internal security. Police 
reaction to the ``People's War'' insurgency led to incidents of 
unwarranted force against prisoners and noncombatants. The army is 
traditionally loyal to the King and has avoided involvement in domestic 
politics. The police are subject to civilian control, but local 
officials have wide discretion in maintaining law and order. The police 
committed numerous human rights abuses.
    Nepal is an extremely poor country, with an annual per capita gross 
domestic product of approximately $210. Over 80 percent of its 21 
million persons support themselves through subsistence agriculture. 
Principal crops include rice, wheat, maize, jute, and potatoes. Tourism 
and the export of carpets and garments are the major sources of foreign 
exchange. Foreign aid accounts for more than half of the development 
budget. The economy is mixed, with approximately 50 public sector 
firms. Many former government firms have been privatized since 1992.
    The Government generally respected citizen's human rights in many 
areas; however, problems remain. The police at times used unwarranted 
lethal force. One person died in custody due to torture. The police 
continue to abuse detainees, using torture as punishment or to extract 
confessions. The police also conducted raids on newspapers suspected of 
having links to the Maoists. The Government rarely investigates 
allegations of police brutality or punishes police officers who commit 
abuses.
    Prison conditions remain poor. The authorities use arbitrary arrest 
and detention. Lengthy pretrial detention, judicial susceptibility to 
political pressure and corruption, and long delays before trial remain 
problems. The Government continues to impose some restrictions on 
freedom of expression. The Government imposes restrictions on freedom 
of religion. Women, the disabled, and lower castes suffer from 
widespread discrimination. Violence against women, trafficking in women 
and girls for prostitution, forced labor, and child labor also remain 
serious problems. There were reported instances of forced child labor.
    In 1996 Parliament unanimously enacted a bill providing for a 
permanent human rights commission with the authority to investigate 
human rights abuses. However, the commission still has not been 
established.
    The Maoist insurgents continued to commit numerous abuses, 
including killings and bombings.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--On a number of 
occasions, the Government used unwarranted lethal force against persons 
suspected of involvement in the ``People's War'' in the central part of 
the country. Launched in 1996 by UPF leaders Baburam Bhattarai and 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the ``People's War'' is a self-declared Maoist 
insurgency.
    In 1997 Amnesty International (AI) reported that police ``have 
repeatedly resorted to the use of lethal force in situations where such 
force was clearly unjustified.'' AI's statement was based on an 
investigation of 50 killings committed by police, mostly in 1996.
    In August truck driver Ale Tamang died as a result of torture while 
in police custody; in October 1998, Ganesh Rai died after being 
tortured by police while in custody (see Section 1.c.).
    The Government continued efforts to combat the Maoist insurgency. 
In May 1998, the police began a sweep in the mid-western districts. 
According to press reports, 139 UPF insurgents and 8 police officers 
were killed during the operation, and there were widespread allegations 
of police abuses in connection with the sweep. According to Amnesty 
International, 227 persons were killed in the 1998 police sweeps 
against UPF insurgents. Official sources admitted that more than 3,000 
persons were arrested during police operations aimed at locating UPF 
members. In June 1998, police Inspector General Kharel stated that 20 
to 30 police officers had been charged with abuses against the public 
in connection with their actions during the sweep. At year's end it was 
not known whether the officers had been brought to trial.
    The insurgents were responsible for numerous abuses. Guerrillas, 
usually armed with homemade guns, explosives, knives, and sticks, 
attacked landowners, civilians, government officials, and government 
facilities in a number of districts. On February 1, Bhotechaur 
municipality ward chairman Dilli Prasad Chaulagai was attacked by a 
group of six insurgents. The assailants severed his leg with a khukuri 
knife (a large, machete-like implement common in rural areas) and shot 
and killed him. The former chairman of the Ghumkharka municipality, 
Bhim Prasad Timilsina, was abducted and murdered by three UPF members 
on February 27. In Rukum in early March, Maoists were suspected of 
killing Yadu Gautam, a Communist Party of Nepal--United Marxist-
Leninist (UML) parliamentary candidate. Gautam reportedly was killed 
with khukuri knives. Clashes between police and Maoist rebels resulted 
in a number of deaths, including some during the period prior to and 
during the elections in May. On March 11, Maoists killed seven police 
officers in Dang district and on the same day burned to death seven 
workers of the UML in Rolpa district. Two policemen died and four 
others were injured in a police-Maoist clash in Baglung on April 10. A 
policeman died and another two were injured in a May 2 encounter with 
Maoists in Hajarai. Two more policemen reportedly were killed and 
several others injured by Maoists in Gaurigoan on May 3. On May 22, 
Maoists attacked and bombed a police post in Takukot village, Gorkha 
district. Five police officers and one Maoist reportedly were killed 
and two persons were wounded in the incident. On June 20, a group of 15 
Maoists killed Nepali Congress worker Nara Hahadur Moktan in Kabhre 
district. On August 4, a police official was killed and a child injured 
when insurgents attacked a police constable in Siraha district. On 
August 29, Maoists killed Majhauwa municipality secretary Dhanik Mandal 
and his son. According to December government figures, since 1996 the 
insurgency has resulted in the deaths of 1,124 persons, including 109 
police officers, 174 civilians, and 841 insurgents. The press has 
reported over 1,150 deaths.
    b. Disappearance.--Amnesty International reported that on January 
8, lawyer and human rights defender Rajendra Dhakal disappeared after 
his arrest in Jamdi in Tanahun district. He reportedly was arrested 
because of his alleged involvement in Maoist violence. Dhakal, along 
with two teachers arrested at the same time, was taken to the Bel 
Chantan police post. The teachers later were released. In response to a 
Supreme Court order later that month to produce Dhakal within 7 days, 
Gorkha police denied having arrested him. In June the government 
newspaper reported that families of nine persons missing since police 
incarceration filed petitions with the Supreme Court, but that no 
action resulted from the petitions. The newspaper indicated the 
possibility that the missing persons could have been affiliated with 
the Maoists. Amnesty International also reported that Bishnu Pukar 
Shrestha, a secondary school teacher, lawyer, and member of a human 
rights organization, disappeared after having been forced into a jeep 
during an arrest in Kathmandu on September 2. In response to a Supreme 
Court writ of habeas corpus, authorities denied that Shrestha was in 
custody although he was reportedly being held at the National Police 
Academy. In December, AI reported that Suresh Ale Magar and Pawan 
Shrestha were released from the central jail in Kathmandu on December 
23 under a Supreme Court order, but were reportedly immediately re-
arrested in front of the jail. Amnesty International reported that they 
were apparently forced into a police van outside of the jail but the 
police deny having them in custody. At year's end, their whereabouts 
were unknown. According to local human rights organizations, 
approximately 70 persons had disappeared after being in police custody 
during the year and over 125 persons had disappeared in the last 4 
years.
    In July 1998, Amnesty International reported that Mohan Prasad Ali, 
a teacher from Dhakeri village in Banke district, was apprehended by 
police in June 1998. He has not been seen since. In November 1998 AI 
reported that government officials told members of a delegation that it 
sent to Nepal that UPF militants had abducted Mohan Prasad Ali. Two men 
injured at a June 1998 incident at Sakla village, Lal Bahadur Puma and 
Hari Narayan Sham, were evacuated by helicopter and are also reported 
to have disappeared. At year's end, the whereabouts of Lal Bahadur Puma 
and Hari Narayan Sham were unknown. Two student activists taken into 
custody in 1993 and 1994 remain missing.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and criminal law prohibit torture; 
however, the police often use torture and beatings to punish suspects 
or to extract confessions. According to Amnesty International, torture 
methods include boxing of the ears, beating of the feet, and the 
rolling of weights over the thighs. Amnesty International noted that 
torture apparently was used to intimidate or punish detainees and to 
extract information and/or confessions, and that torture often took 
place while detainees were held incommunicado and unable to contact 
family, doctors, or lawyers (see Section 1.d.). The Government has 
failed to conduct thorough and independent investigations of reports of 
police brutality and has refused to take significant disciplinary 
action against officers involved. Police often are unwilling to 
investigate and to discipline fellow officers, and persons are afraid 
to bring cases against police for fear of reprisals. The Constitution 
provides for compensation for victims of torture, and the Torture 
Compensation Act, providing for such compensation, was passed by 
Parliament in 1996. According to Amnesty International, 12 persons made 
claims under the act in 1998; 6 later withdrew their complaints, 
reportedly because of fear for their safety. The Government has begun 
human rights education for the police force. According to an August 
government newspaper report, the Government suspended seven police 
personnel and appointed a high-level commission to probe the death of 
trucker Ale Tamang following alleged police torture while in custody on 
the charge of theft. The police allegedly doused the victim's legs with 
kerosene and set them on fire, dipped them in water, and again burned 
them. The appointment of the commission came after considerable public 
criticism. In October 1998, Ganesh Rai died in police custody as a 
result of torture. Two policemen were suspended in connection with the 
case.
    Human rights groups have reported instances of torture in areas 
affected by the ``People's War.'' Dozens of male detainees reported 
having torture inflicted on them by the police, while women in these 
areas have reported instances of rape and sexual abuse by the police. 
Representatives of Amnesty International who visited the country after 
the May 1998 police sweeps against UPF insurgents began reported that 
they found evidence of ``the systematic use of severe torture'' by 
police. AI also raised its concerns over the relative impunity of the 
police for such actions.
    Local and international human rights groups also have documented 
Maoist violence in areas affected by the ``People's War,'' including 
the severing of arms and limbs. The Maoists most often have targeted 
political leaders, local elites, and suspected informers, including 
representatives of the more moderate Communist Party of Nepal--United 
Marxist-Leninist (UML) and of the Nepali Congress Party (NPC). 
Throughout the year, Maoists looted banks and bombed or set fire to 
government offices, hospitals, and homes of local political leaders. 
International nongovernmental organization (NGO) offices also were 
attacked on several occasions. There also were cases of intimidation, 
torture, or other degrading treatment. On February 16, insurgents threw 
a gasoline bomb at a truck in Kathmandu. No one was injured. Maoists 
were suspected of bombing the home of Padam Prasad Pokhrel, the 
civilian official who controls the country's police force, on March 2. 
No one was injured in the bombing. On March 29, the office of an 
international NGO in Gadhi, Kabhre district was looted by Maoists. On 
April 7, a hospital run by the Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
(ADRA) in Makwanpur district was bombed by the Maoists; no one was 
hurt. On April 15, in Kathmandu, four suspected Maoists entered a tax 
office during working hours, poured gasoline in the office, and set 
fire to it. The perpetrators left pamphlets calling for a general 
strike. On April 18, insurgents stopped Lalitpur land revenue official 
Tara Nath Subedi, smeared black paint on his face, and told him to stop 
accepting bribes. They then doused him with gasoline and tried to set 
him on fire, but Subedi escaped. On May 1, two policemen and three 
election officials were injured by a Maoist bomb while heading to Sisna 
village. On June 8, Maoists attacked Govinda Pahadi of Sindhuli with 
khukuri knives, and seriously wounded him. On June 25, Maoists attacked 
Yadu Prasad Wasti and Gunjeswor Neupane in Gorkha district. The two 
reportedly were tied up with ropes and beaten with polythene pipes. In 
Tanahu district on August 5, Maoists dragged Raj Lohani, a member of 
the Nepali Congress district committee, out of a truck carrying some 
100 passengers and killed him in front of them. The Maoists called for 
a general strike on October 8; on the night prior to the strike, bombs 
exploded in Kathmandu, Gorkha, Bhadrapur, Jhapa, Syangja, Chitwan, 
Birgunj, and Sindhulimadi. At least 10 persons were injured in the 
bombings. Bombs were defused by the army in Hetauda and Nuwakot.
    On September 22, deputy superintendent of police Thule Rai was 
abducted by Maoist insurgents in Rukum. He was released on December 20.
    Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding is common in prisons and 
authorities sometimes handcuff or fetter detainees. Women are normally 
incarcerated separately from men, but in similar conditions. The 
Government still has not implemented a provision in the 1992 Children's 
Act calling for the establishment of a juvenile home and juvenile 
court. Consequently, children are sometimes incarcerated with adults--
either with an incarcerated parent, or, as one local NGO reports, as 
criminal offenders. The Department of Prisons states that there are no 
cases of children in jail or custody for offenses they have committed; 
close to 100 noncriminal dependent children, however, are incarcerated 
along with their parents (see Section 5). In Rukum district, a 13-year-
old boy was arrested in 1997 and accused of being a Maoist. He was held 
for 6 months with 54 adults in a cell designed for only 15 persons, 
before a trial date was scheduled.
    There has been some improvement in prison conditions. The 
authorities are more likely to transfer sick prisoners to hospitals 
than they were in the past. However, due to the inadequacy of medical 
facilities in the country, the authorities sometimes place the mentally 
ill in jails under inhumane conditions.
    The Government permits local human rights groups and the 
International Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisons.
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution 
stipulates that the authorities must arraign or release a suspect 
within 24 hours of arrest, but the police often violate this provision. 
Under the Public Offenses Act of 1970, the police must obtain warrants 
for an arrest unless a person is caught in the act of committing a 
crime. For many offenses, the case must be filed in court within 7 days 
of arrest. If the court upholds the detention, the law authorizes the 
police to hold the suspect for 25 days to complete their investigation, 
with a possible extension of 7 days. However, the police often hold 
prisoners longer. The Supreme Court on occasion has ordered the release 
of detainees held longer than 24 hours without a court appearance. 
Amnesty International reported that on November 30, 1998, Bhanu Sharma, 
a pharmacist, was approached by police at his home in Dang district; 
the police requested medicine. On the way to his shop, the police 
forced Sharma into a van and took him to the district police office. On 
January 5, Sharma reportedly was transferred to a police-training 
center in Kathmandu. On January 13, a writ of habeas corpus was filed 
in the Supreme Court, and Sharma was released on February 7.
    Detainees do not have the legal right to receive visits by family 
members, and they are permitted access to lawyers only after the 
authorities file charges. In practice the police grant access to 
prisoners on a basis that varies from prison to prison. Persons have a 
right to legal representation and a court appointed lawyer, but 
government lawyers or access to private attorneys is provided only on 
request. Consequently, those unaware of their rights may not have legal 
representation. There is a system of bail, but bonds are too expensive 
for most citizens. According to the Department of Prisons, over half of 
the 6,000 persons imprisoned are awaiting trial. Due to court backlogs, 
a slow appeals process, and poor access to legal representation, 
pretrial detention often exceeds the period to which persons 
subsequently are sentenced after a trial and conviction.
    Under the Public Security Act, the authorities may detain persons 
who allegedly threaten domestic security and tranquillity, amicable 
relations with other states, and relations between citizens of 
different classes or religions. Persons whom the Government detains 
under the act are considered to be in preventive detention and can be 
held for up to 6 months without being charged with a crime. Human 
rights groups allege that the police have used arbitrary arrest and 
detention during the ``People's War'' to intimidate communities 
considered sympathetic to the Maoists (see Section 1.b.). Since the 
insurgents began their terrorist campaigns, 5,178 Maoist-related 
arrests had been made through December. Of those arrested 1,518 had 
been charged with crimes and were awaiting trial. The remainder had 
been released.
    The 1991 amendments to the Public Security Act allow the 
authorities to extend periods of detention after submitting written 
notices to the Home Ministry. The police must notify the district court 
of the detention within 24 hours, and it may order an additional 6 
months of detention before authorities file official charges. In 1997 
the police asked the Government to enact legislation that would extend 
the maximum time of detention under the act to between 2 and 10 years; 
by year's end, no action was taken on this request.
    Other laws, including the Public Offenses Act, permit arbitrary 
detention. This act and its many amendments cover crimes such as 
disturbing the peace, vandalism, rioting, and fighting. Under this act, 
the Government detained hundreds of civil servants during a 55-day 
antigovernment strike in 1991. Human rights monitors express concern 
that the act vests too much discretionary power in the Chief District 
Officer (CDO), the highest-ranking civil servant in each of the 
country's 75 districts. The act authorizes the CDO to order detentions, 
to issue search warrants, and to specify fines and other punishments 
for misdemeanors without judicial review. Few recent instances of the 
use of the Public Offenses Act have come to light, since it has become 
more common, particularly with the Maoists, to arrest persons under the 
Public Security Act.
    Under the Public Offenses Act hundreds of persons were arrested on 
March 18, 1996 for staging a peaceful protest of the human rights 
situation in China organized by Amnesty International in Kathmandu. 
Although most were released the same day, several AI officers and 14 
Tibetans were held in jail for up to 7 days, some without being 
charged. Amnesty International reported that many persons interviewed 
by AI investigators after the May 1998 sweeps against the UPF reported 
one or more of the following: That they were detained without having 
been given arrest warrants at the time of the arrest; that they were 
not presented before a judicial authority within 24 hours, as required 
under the Constitution; that they were held for periods longer than the 
25 days allowed under the Public Offenses Act; that they were not told 
of the charges against them; and that they were denied access to an 
attorney, at least during the initial period of their detention. 
Authorities detained journalists and their advocates on occasion, on 
suspicion of having ties to or sympathy for the Maoists (see Section 
2.a.).
    The Constitution prohibits exile; it is not used.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary and the Supreme Court has demonstrated 
independence; however, lower level courts remain vulnerable to 
political pressure. In addition, bribery of lower level judges and 
court staff is endemic.
    The Supreme Court has the right to review the constitutionality of 
legislation passed by Parliament. It has ruled that provisions in the 
1992 Labor Act and in the 1991 Nepal Citizenship Act are 
unconstitutional. In 1995 the Court also decided that the dissolution 
of the Parliament at the request of a former Prime Minister was 
unconstitutional, and ordered the body restored.
    Appellate and district courts have become increasingly independent, 
although they sometimes bend to political pressure. In Rolpa, one of 
the districts most affected by the ``People'sWar,'' human rights groups 
have accused the district courts of acting in complicity with CDO's in 
violating detainees' rights. These groups allege that arrest without a 
warrant, prolonged detention without trial, and police torture occur in 
these areas.
    The judicial system consists of three levels: District courts, 
appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The King appoints judges on 
the recommendation of the Judicial Council, a constitutional body 
chaired by the Chief Justice. The Council is also responsible for the 
assignment of judges, disciplinary action, and other administrative 
matters. Judges decide cases; there is no jury system.
    Delays in the administration of justice are a severe problem. 
According to the latest statistics, approximately 150,000 cases are 
active throughout the country. The Supreme Court has a backlog of 
approximately 15,000 cases, which it expects to take 4 years to clear. 
A case appealed to the Supreme Court may take more than 10 years to 
conclude.
    The Constitution provides for the right to counsel, equal 
protection under the law, protection from double jeopardy, protection 
from retroactive application of the law, and for public trials, except 
in some security and customs cases. All lower court decisions, 
including acquittals, are subject to appeal. The Supreme Court is the 
court of last appeal, but the King may grant pardons. The King can also 
suspend, commute, or remit any sentence. On the recommendation of the 
Government, the King often pardons up to 12 prisoners--if they have 
served 75 percent of their sentence and shown good behavior--on 
national holidays.
    Although the Constitution provides for the right to counsel, there 
were reports of cases in which authorities allegedly penalized 
attorneys involved in the defense of human rights. Amnesty 
International reported that on January 8, lawyer and human rights 
defender Rajendra Dhakal was arrested in Tanahum district; the police 
had reportedly obtained a warrant for his arrest because of his alleged 
involvement in Maoist violence. Dhakal, who was chairman of the Gorkha 
district bar association and a member of the local human rights 
organization Forum for Protection of Human Rights (FOPHUR), had been 
arrested repeatedly since the start of the Maoist insurgency. Dhakal 
reportedly has disappeared since his arrest, as has teacher, lawyer, 
and human rights organization member Bishnu Pukar Shrestha (see Section 
1.b.). Kathmandu newspapers reported that in July four lawyers pleading 
for a group of detained journalist themselves were ordered detained by 
district judge Surnedra Bir Sing Basnet as they tried to express their 
views on the judicial order to detain the three journalists. After 
other attorneys came to protest the arrests, the attorneys were 
released (see Section 2.a.).
    Military courts adjudicate cases concerning military personnel, who 
are immune from prosecution in civilian courts. In 1992 the Supreme 
Court ruled that military courts could no longer try civilians for 
crimes involving the military services.
    The authorities may prosecute terrorism or treason cases under the 
Treason Act. Specially constituted tribunals hear these trials in 
closed sessions. No such trials took place during the past 4 years.
    There were no reports of political prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government generally respected the privacy of the 
home and family. Search warrants are required before searches and 
seizures may be carried out, except in cases involving suspected 
security and narcotics violations. As amended, the Police Act of 1955 
empowers the police to issue warrants for searches and seizures in 
criminal cases upon receipt of information about criminal activities. 
Within 24 hours of their issuance, warrants in misdemeanor cases must 
be approved by the CDO. Court judges must approve them in felony cases.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution specifies that 
all citizens shall have freedom of thought and expression and that the 
Government may not censor any news item or other reading material; 
however, the Government imposes some restrictions on these rights. The 
Constitution prohibits speech and writing that would threaten the 
sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom; disturb the harmonious 
relations among persons of different castes or communities; promote 
sedition, defamation, contempt of court, or crime; or contradict decent 
public behavior or morality.
    The Press and Publications Act provides for the licensing of 
publications and the granting of credentials to journalists. The act 
includes penalties for violating these requirements. The Actalso 
prohibits publication of material that, among other things, promotes 
disrespect toward the King or the royal family; that undermines 
security, peace, order, the dignity of the King, or the integrity or 
sovereignty of the Kingdom; that creates animosity among persons of 
different castes and religions; or that adversely affects the good 
conduct or morality of the public. The Act also provides a basis for 
banning foreign publications. However, foreign publications are now 
widely available.
    There are hundreds of independent vernacular and English newspapers 
available, representing various political points of view. The 
Government owns the daily Nepali-language newspaper with the largest 
circulation. Editors and writers at the Government newspaper practice 
self-censorship and generally reflect government policy. Ruling 
political parties have influenced the editorial policy of the 
government newspaper to their advantage. However, despite the 
sensitivity of the Government to the ``People's War,'' the press has 
not faced overt pressure to report on it in a particular way. Views of 
human rights groups, the statements of the police, and the press 
releases of Maoist leaders have all been reported in the local press.
    Nevertheless, journalists and their advocates are detained on 
occasion. On January 5, the Kathmandu offices of the weekly newspaper 
Janadesh were raided, and 13 persons, including 4 journalists, were 
arrested. Computers and printing materials were seized. Police 
reportedly did not have a search warrant; the newspaper was accused of 
having links with Maoists. On April 1, police reportedly seized 
computers and printing equipment from the Kathmandu office of the 
newspaper Jwala. The journalists and the newspaper were suspected of 
having links with Maoists, and Jwala's facilities had been used by the 
publication Janadesh since it was closed by police in January. In early 
April, several journalists and a photographer reportedly were arrested 
in Kathmandu. On April 20, the offices of Mahima and Jana Ahwan, two 
small pro-Maoist newspapers, were raided by police. On April 28, 
Krishna Shen, the editor of Janadesh, and two other employees of 
Janadesh were arrested in connection with the publication of an 
interview with Baburam Bhattarai, a leader of the Maoists, in the 
newspaper. Thousands of copies of the paper allegedly were confiscated. 
Shen remained in detention at year's end. Kathmandu newspapers reported 
in July that four lawyers pleading for a group of three detained 
journalists themselves were ordered detained by district judge Surnedra 
Bir Sing Basnet as they tried to express their views on the judicial 
order to detain the journalists. The journalists reportedly were 
detained for publishing a news item entitled ``Allegations of 
Corruption Against a Judge'' and were released after agreeing to 
publish an apology daily for 2 weeks on the front page of their 
newspaper.
    The Government owns the only television station. The Government 
also owns and controls one radio station that broadcasts on both AM and 
FM. Television time on the government-owned television station is 
leased regularly to private producers. Radio reaches the greatest 
number of persons and has the largest influence. Programming currently 
reflects a broader range of interests and political viewpoints than 
prior to the political transformation in 1990.
    There are two private radio stations and one community-owned radio 
station that have their own transmitters. Other private or community-
run radio stations lease time on a government-owned transmitter. Six 
private radio stations have been licensed outside of the capital city. 
Government-owned Radio Nepal broadcasts throughout the country through 
a series of repeater stations. Although nongovernment radio stations 
legally are precluded from broadcasting locally developed news, private 
stations routinely broadcast news without penalty. Private stations are 
permitted to rebroadcast news from abroad. Private radio stations, like 
print media, practice self-censorship. In August one private radio 
station reported that a government official asked the station to stop a 
live call-in advice show dealing with the topics of HIV/AIDS and 
teenage problems. Other talk shows on sensitive topics continued 
without government comment. The Government does not restrict access to 
foreign radio broadcasts or to the purchase of television satellite 
dishes that can access international news from the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC), the Cable News Network (CNN) and Deutsche Welle. A 
small but growing number of citizens also have access to foreign news 
through private cable networks. Indian and Pakistani broadcast 
television is also readily available in many parts of the country.
    The Broadcast Act of 1993 allows private television and FM radio 
broadcasts, but implementation by the Government has been slow. There 
are two private cable television networks, which have been operating 
for close to 3 years in the Kathmandu valley. They provide mainly 
entertainment programming, but commentary critical of government 
policies occurs occasionally during publicly broadcast discussion 
programs.
    There have been many debates about liberalizing the media and 
privatizing government-owned media. This debate has put pressure, so 
far resisted, on successive governments to open the airwaves and divest 
government-controlled printing operations.
    The Government limits academic freedom to the same extent as it 
limits the media. No overt efforts to enforce these limitations were 
reported this year.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the 
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, this right may be 
restricted by law on vague grounds such as undermining the sovereignty 
and integrity of the State or disturbing law and order. Persons 
protesting Chinese human rights policy were arrested and detained in 
1996 before and during peaceful protests (see Section 1.d.). On March 
11, 27 Tibetan demonstrators were arrested in Pokhara; the police used 
tear gas and batons to break up the demonstration. All of the 
protesters were released soon after the incident.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution describes Nepal as a 
``Hindu Kingdom'' (although it does not establish Hinduism as the state 
religion), provides for freedom of religion, and permits the practice 
of all religions; however, although the Government generally has not 
interfered with the practice of other religions, conversion and 
proselytizing are prohibited and punishable with fines or imprisonment, 
and members of minority religions occasionally complain of police 
harassment. Some Christian groups are concerned that the ban on 
proselytizing limits the expression of non-Hindu religious belief.
    The large majority of citizens are Hindu. There are smaller numbers 
of Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian citizens, as well. On April 2, 
Christian groups in Kathmandu were prevented from holding a planned 
Good Friday gathering in a public park in the Lalitpur district of the 
city because the organizers had not obtained the required permit. 
Similar Christian gatherings celebrating the Easter period have been 
allowed in the past. An estimated 400 would-be attendees went to the 
local district administrative office to protest, and three reportedly 
were injured when police attempted to disperse the group. Two days 
later, on Easter Sunday (April 4), the authorities allowed Christians 
to hold a procession through the streets of downtown Kathmandu and the 
Lalitpur district, which ended at an open air theater. The required 
permit was obtained prior to this event.
    A conviction for conversion or proselytizing can result in fines or 
imprisonment or, in the case of foreigners, expulsion from the country. 
However, arrests or detentions for proselytizing are rare, and there 
have been few incidents of punishment or investigation in connection 
with conversion or proselytization during the last few years. For 
approximately 1 month in 1997, a Seventh-Day Adventist aid 
organization, the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), was 
the subject of slanderous and vituperative attacks in the press by 
Hindu extremist organizations. These attacks began after a disgruntled 
former ADRA employee alleged that ADRA had been proselytizing. ADRA 
denied the allegation. ADRA had links to an Adventist school 
(established for the children of Adventist workers in the country), 
which also had been accused of proselytizing. The Government later 
convened an investigative panel that found the claims baseless and 
dismissed them. The investigative panel asked ADRA to confine itself to 
the relief and welfare activities for which it was registered; since 
ADRA already confined its activities to these areas, the request posed 
no new limitations. However, to clarify its function and role, ADRA 
severed all official ties to the school. As of year's end both ADRA and 
the school were operating normally.
    In March a foreign medical doctor who had been operating a 
missionary-run clinic in Kathmandu visited the Home Ministry to renew 
his visa but learned that the Ministry had canceled his visa 8 months 
before. The Home Ministry detained him for 2 nights and then deported 
him on March 31. The Government never gave an exact reason for 
canceling the visa or for the deportation; the doctor believes that a 
former business partner made allegations to the Government that the 
doctor had proselytized.
    For decades dozens of Christian missionary hospitals, welfare 
organizations, and schools have operated in the country. These 
organizations have not proselytized and have not faced religious 
discrimination. Missionary schools are among the most respected 
institutions of secondary education in the country; most of the 
country's governing and business elite graduated from Jesuit high 
schools. Many foreign Christian organizations have direct ties to 
Nepali churches and sponsor Nepali priests for religious training 
abroad.
    The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of caste, 
except for traditional religious practices at Hindu temples, where, for 
example, members of the lowest caste are not permitted.
    The Press and Publications Act, among other things, prescribes 
penalties for the publication of materials that create animosity among 
persons of different castes or religions. In August 1998, an Internet 
service provider warned a group of foreigners to stop a religiously 
oriented electronic discussion group because the content of the 
discussions violated laws against proselytizing.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of 
movement and residence, and the Government generally does not restrict 
travel abroad. However, the Government restricts travel to some areas 
near the Chinese border for foreign tourists and for foreign residents, 
such as Tibetans residing in the country. The Government also has 
imposed restrictions on women's travel to the Gulf states to work as 
domestic servants, in response to cases of abuse of such women in the 
past. These restrictions do not apply to women who are traveling to the 
Gulf states for other reasons, nor do they apply for travel to other 
areas. Women's rights groups have protested the ban as discriminatory. 
The Government allows citizens abroad to return, and is not known to 
revoke citizenship for political reasons.
    The Government has no official refugee policy. However, it does 
provide asylum for refugees and has cooperated with the office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and with other 
humanitarian organizations, in assisting refugees from Bhutan and Tibet 
(China). The UNHCR has maintained an office in Kathmandu since 1989. 
Since 1959 the Government has accepted approximately 20,000 Tibetan 
refugees, many of whom still reside in the country. Since 1991 it also 
has provided asylum to some 97,000 Bhutanese refugees, the great 
majority of whom are now living in UNHCR-administered camps in the 
eastern part of the country.
    In 1995 the Government reversed a 1960's decision to suspend the 
issuance of identification cards to Tibetans legally residing in Nepal 
before 1989, and again began to issue them identification cards. 
However, later that year the program was suspended yet another time in 
connection with a change in government, and there remained many 
Tibetans with no form of identification and no permanent status. 
Undocumented Tibetan residents faced difficulties in obtaining basic 
rights and were unable to travel abroad or to access such services as 
banking. In 1998 the Government reactivated the program and by year's 
end completed documenting the remaining Tibetans legally residing in 
the country.
    China and the Government of Nepal tightened control of movement 
across their border in 1986, but both sides have enforced these 
restrictions haphazardly. Police and customs officials occasionally 
harass Tibetan asylum seekers who cross the border from China. Border 
police often extort money from Tibetans in exchange for passage. With 
the change from a Communist Party government to a coalition government 
headed by the Nepali Congress Party in September 1995, the former 
practice of forcibly returning asylum seekers to China has stopped. 
There were no reports of forced expulsion of Tibetan asylum seekers 
during the year.
    There are approximately 97,000 ethnic Nepali refugees from Bhutan 
in UNHCR-administered camps in the southeastern region of the country. 
An additional 15,000 refugees reside outside the camps in either Nepal 
or India. The total represents approximately one-sixth of Bhutan's 
estimated pre-1991 population.
    The UNHCR monitors the condition of the Bhutanese refugees and 
provides for their basic needs. The Government accepts the refugee 
presence as temporary, on humanitarian grounds, but offers little more 
than a place to stay. The Government officially restricts refugee 
freedom of movement and work, but does not strictly enforce its 
policies. Living conditions in the camps have improved dramatically 
since 1992. Adequate clean water is available and health, sanitation, 
and nutrition standards are acceptable. Violence has sometimes broken 
out between camp residents and the surrounding local population. The 
UNHCR and other donors and relief organizations have defused tensions 
through a refugee-affected areas assistance plan aimed at improving 
conditions in communities adjacent to the camps.
    In 1993 the Governments of Nepal and Bhutan formed a joint 
committee and began bilateral talks to resolve the refugee problem and 
to determine different categories of refugees in preparation for future 
repatriation. After a 3-year hiatus, an eighth round of bilateral talks 
was held in September. Since that time, the foreign ministers of Nepal 
and Bhutan have met twice for informal talks on the refugee issue. The 
limited progress in bilateral negotiations has led to 
increasedfrustration in the camps and to a recent campaign of ``peace 
marches'' in 1998 and 1999 by refugees seeking to return to Bhutan.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens, through their elected representatives, have the right to 
amend the Constitution with the exception of certain basic principles 
that they may not change--sovereignty vested in the people, the 
multiparty system, fundamental rights, and the constitutional monarchy.
    Parliamentary elections are scheduled at least every 5 years. 
Midterm elections may be called if the ruling party loses its majority, 
loses a vote of no confidence, or calls for elections. The Constitution 
grants suffrage to all citizens aged 18 and over.
    The House of Representatives, or lower house, may send legislation 
directly to the King by majority vote. The National Council, or upper 
house, may amend or reject lower house legislation, but the lower house 
can overrule its objections. The upper house may also introduce 
legislation and send it to the lower house for consideration.
    The King exercises certain powers with the advice and consent of 
the Council of Ministers. These include exclusive authority to enact, 
amend, and repeal laws relating to succession to the throne. The King's 
income and property are tax-exempt and inviolable, and no question may 
be raised in any court about any act performed by the King. The 
Constitution also permits the King to exercise emergency powers in the 
event of war, external aggression, armed revolt, or extreme economic 
depression. In such an emergency, the King may suspend without judicial 
review many basic freedoms, including the freedoms of expression and 
assembly, freedom from censorship, and freedom from preventive 
detention. However, he may not suspend habeas corpus or the right to 
form associations. The King's declaration of a state of emergency must 
be approved by a two-thirds majority of the lower house of the 
Parliament. If the lower house is not in session, the upper house 
exercises this power. A state of emergency may be maintained for up to 
3 months without legislative approval and up to 6 months, renewable 
only once for an additional 6 months, if the legislature grants 
approval.
    The Constitution bars the registration and participation in 
elections of any political party that is based on ``religion, 
community, caste, tribe, or region,'' or that does not operate openly 
and democratically.
    National elections were held in two rounds in May. The Nepali 
Congress Party (NCP) won 54 percent of the seats in the lower house and 
formed the first majority government since 1994. Clashes between police 
and Maoist rebels in May left several persons dead and many injured 
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c). There were sporadic incidents of violence 
during the voting on May 3 and May 17; the violence occurred mainly 
between supporters of rival political parties. On May 17, four bombs 
were defused in Karaiya village in Rupandehi district. However, unlike 
the 1997 local elections, when Maoist violence and threats forced the 
postponement of voting in parts of 15 of the 75 electoral districts, 
for the most part the elections were held throughout the country 
according to schedule. In polling stations where the voting on May 3 
was postponed, the voting took place on May 5 and 6; in polling 
stations where the voting on May 17 was postponed, the voting was held 
May 19-21. Maoist efforts to disrupt the elections by intimidating 
voters and candidates had little effect. Voter turnout was 66 percent, 
significantly higher than in previous elections. International 
observers considered the elections to be generally free and fair.
    There are no specific laws that restrict women, indigenous peoples, 
or minorities from participating in the Government or in political 
parties. Tradition limits the roles of women and of some castes and 
tribes in the political process. However, the Constitution requires 
that women constitute 5 percent of each party's candidates for the 
House of Representatives. A royal ordinance, which since has been 
ratified by Parliament, also requires that 20 percent of all village 
and municipal level seats be reserved for female candidates. The spring 
elections resulted in an increase from 7 to 12 in the number of women 
in the 205-seat lower house and from 5 to 9 in the 60-seat upper house.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are approximately 10 NGO human rights organizations. These 
include the Human Rights Organization of Nepal (HURON), the Informal 
Sector Services Center (INSEC), the International Institute for Human 
Rights, Environment, and Development (INHURED), and the Forum for the 
Protection of Human Rights(FOPHUR). The Nepal Law Society also monitors 
human rights abuses and a number of NGO's focus on specific areas such 
as torture, child labor, women's rights, or ethnic minorities. Groups 
are free to publish reports on human rights abuses. The Government also 
has allowed groups to visit prisons and prisoners. The Government 
rarely arrests or detains those reporting on human rights problems, but 
in June 1998 the police arrested Gopal Siwakoti Chintan, a human rights 
activist, for alleged collaboration with the UPF. The police also 
confiscated audiotapes and videotapes of interviews with victims of 
human rights violations from Chintan's office. The police later 
released Chintan due to a lack of evidence that he had collaborated 
with the UPF. There were reports that the Government and UPF militants 
limited the activities of human rights activists.
    In 1996 the Parliament enacted the National Human Rights Commission 
Act, which called for a government-appointed commission to investigate 
charges of human rights violations. However, none of the six 
governments in office since the passage of the act has convened the 
commission. In July the Supreme Court ordered the Government to set up 
the human rights commission immediately. After the July order, 
editorials and human rights groups were vocal in calling for the new 
Government to activate the commission. As they blocked traffic in 
August to demand the implementation of the court order, 29 human rights 
activists were arrested. In September the Government organized a task 
force to work on the implementation of the National Human Rights 
Commission Act, including establishing a budget and providing for an 
office for the Human Rights Commission. The task force made its 
recommendations to the Cabinet in late December.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution specifies that the State shall not discriminate 
against citizens on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, or ideology. 
However, there is still a caste system. Discrimination against lower 
castes, women, and the disabled remains common, especially in rural 
areas.
    Women.--Violence against women is a serious problem. There is no 
law against domestic violence, which is widespread. In one study, 50 
percent of the respondents said that they know someone who was the 
victim of domestic violence. In another survey, respondents listed the 
perpetrators of violence in 77 percent of incidents as family members, 
and 58 percent reported that it is a daily occurrence. Little public 
attention is given to violence against women in the home; the 
Government makes no special effort to combat it.
    Rape and incest are also problems, particularly in rural areas. 
Laws against rape provide for prison sentences of 6 to 10 years for the 
rape of a woman under 14 years of age and 3 to 5 years for the rape of 
a woman over the age of 14. The law prescribes 1-year's imprisonment or 
a fine for the rape of a prostitute.
    There is a general unwillingness among citizens, and particularly 
among government figures, to recognize violence against women as a 
problem. In a survey conducted by Saathi, a local NGO, 42 percent of 
the respondents said that in their experience medical practitioners 
were uncooperative or negligent in cases of violence against women and 
girls. This unwillingness to recognize violence against women and girls 
as unacceptable in daily life is seen not just in the medical 
profession, but among the police and politicians as well.
    The police department has a ``women's cell'' in five cities, 
including Kathmandu. These cells are made up entirely of female 
officers, who receive special training in handling victims of domestic 
violence. The police also have sent out directives instructing all 
officers to treat domestic violence as a criminal offense that should 
be prosecuted. However, according to a police official, this type of 
directive is difficult to enforce because of entrenched discriminatory 
attitudes. Even though the police may make an arrest, further 
prosecution seldom is pursued by the victim or by the Government.
    At least six NGO's in Kathmandu work on the problem of violence 
against women and on women's issues in general. Saathi's assistance 
program includes a women's shelter and a suicide intervention center. 
The shelter provides housing, medical attention, counseling, and legal 
advocacy for the victims of violence.
    Two conferences were held in 1997 that focused on the problem of 
violence against women. One was a national conference of NGO's, 
government officials, and parliamentarians organized by the NGO Saathi. 
The Government announced new initiatives at the meeting, including the 
formation of a new National Women's Commission to help guide government 
policy. The conference participantsformulated a common strategy to 
unite NGO efforts in the field, as well. There was also an 
international conference organized by the UNICEF regional office for 
South Asia.
    The dowry tradition is strong, with greater prevalence in the Terai 
region. The killing of brides because of defaults on dowry payments is 
rare, but does occur. More common is the physical abuse of wives by the 
husband and the husband's family to obtain additional dowry or to force 
the woman to leave to enable the son to remarry.
    Trafficking in women remains a deeply ingrained social problem in 
several of the country's poorest areas, and large numbers of women 
still are forced to work against their will as prostitutes in other 
countries (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Although the Constitution provides protections for women, including 
equal pay for equal work, the Government has not taken significant 
action to implement its provisions. Women face discrimination, 
particularly in rural areas, where religious and cultural tradition, 
lack of education, and ignorance of the law remain severe impediments 
to their exercise of basic rights such as the right to vote or to hold 
property in their own names.
    Women have benefited from changes in marriage and inheritance laws. 
In 1994 the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the Citizenship Law 
that discriminated against foreign spouses of Nepalese women. However, 
many other discriminatory laws still remain. According to legal 
experts, there are more than 20 laws that discriminate against women. 
For example, the law grants women the right to divorce, but on narrower 
grounds than those applicable to men. The law on property rights also 
favors men in its provisions for inheritance, land tenancy, and the 
division of family property. In 1995 the Supreme Court also ordered the 
Council of Ministers to enact legislation within 1 year giving women 
property rights in regard to inheritance and land tenancy that were 
equal to those of men. To comply with this order, the Government 
introduced an amendment to the Civil Code in April 1998 that would have 
allowed daughters to inherit parental property, but only if they 
remained unmarried until the age of 35. Moreover, if a woman married 
after age 35, the amendment stipulated that she would be obliged to 
return the inherited property. At year's end, this amendment, which 
would appear to only partially meet the requirements of the Supreme 
Court, remained stalled in Parliament.
    According to the 1991 census, the female literacy rate is 26 
percent, compared with 57 percent for men. Human rights groups report 
that girls attend secondary schools at a rate half that of boys. There 
are now many NGO's focused on integrating women into society and the 
economy. These NGO's work in the areas of literacy, small business, 
skills transfer, and against trafficking in women and girls.
    There are a growing number of women's advocacy groups and most 
political parties have women's groups. Members of Parliament have begun 
working for the passage of tougher laws for crimes of sexual assault, 
but have had little success so far.
    Children.--Although education is not compulsory, the Government 
provides free primary education for all children between the ages of 6 
and 12, but many families cannot afford school supplies or clothing. 
Schools charge fees for further education. Free health care is provided 
through government clinics, but they are poorly equipped and too few in 
number to meet the demand. Community-based health programs assist in 
the prevention of childhood diseases and provide primary health care 
services. Due to poor or nonexistent sanitation in rural areas, many 
children are at risk from severe and fatal illnesses.
    The Children's Act of 1992 provides legal protection for children 
in the workplace and in criminal proceedings. Although it calls for the 
establishment of child welfare committees and orphanages, the 
Government has established few such facilities. The Labor Act of 1992 
prohibits the employment of minors less than 14 years of age, but 
employers, particularly in the informal sector and in agriculture, 
widely ignore the law.
    Children under the age of 16 work in all sectors of the economy. 
Children's rights groups estimate that up to half of all children work. 
As recently as early 1994, the carpet industry employed an estimated 
23,000 children, or nearly one-third of all workers in that industry. 
Due to negative publicity in consumer nations, these figures have 
declined and children now account for less than 2,000 workers (see 
Section 6.d.). In 1996 a consortium of carpet manufacturers established 
a certification system for carpets made without child labor. The 
Ministry of Labor is increasing its efforts to monitor the use of child 
labor. Children continue to work in the agriculture, pottery, basket 
weaving, sewing, weaving, and ironsmithing industries. There also were 
reports that the UPF uses children as messengers andrunners. Forced 
child labor exists, but only limited instances have been reported in 
recent years (see Section 6.c).
    Forced prostitution and trafficking in young girls remain serious 
and deeply ingrained problems (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
    Social attitudes view a female child as a commodity, to be bartered 
off in marriage, or as a burden. Some persons, in fact, consider 
marrying a girl before menarche an honorable, sacred act that increases 
one's chances of a better afterlife. As a result, child brides are 
common. According to the UNICEF's Regional Office for South Asia, 40 
percent of all marriages are consummated with a girl under 14 years of 
age. The age difference in marriage is often cited as one cause of 
domestic violence.
    A local NGO reports that approximately 100 children considered 
delinquents or accused of public offenses are incarcerated with adults 
because the Government has not established juvenile homes. Some of 
these delinquent children allegedly are as young as 9 years old, even 
though, under the law, children under 18 cannot be charged with crimes; 
the Government maintains that there are no persons under the age of 18 
that are incarcerated for crimes they have committed. However, 
according to the press, close to 100 children are in jails as 
noncriminal dependents of incarcerated adults (see Section 1.c.).
    People with Disabilities.--The disabled face widespread 
discrimination. Families often are stigmatized by and ashamed of 
disabled family members, who may be hidden away or neglected. Economic 
integration is further hampered by the general view that the disabled 
are unproductive. The mentally retarded are associated with the 
mentally ill. Sometimes, mentally ill and retarded persons are placed 
in prisons due to the lack of facilities or support.
    The Government has long been involved in providing for the 
disabled, but the level of government assistance has not met the needs 
of the disabled. The 1982 Disabled Persons Protection and Welfare Act 
and additional 1994 rules mandate accessibility to buildings, to 
transportation, to employment, to education, and to other state 
services. However, despite government funding for special education 
programs, the Government does not implement or enforce laws regarding 
the disabled. A number of NGO's working with the disabled receive 
significant funding from the Government, but persons who are physically 
or mentally disabled rely almost exclusively on family members to 
assist them.
    Religious Minorities.--In the past, disputes during local elections 
have escalated to isolated clashes between Hindu and Muslim supporters. 
The country's small but significant Muslim enclaves in the districts 
along the border with India and in Kathmandu are not well integrated 
with the larger Hindu majority. The lack of integration between these 
communities has contributed to this problem.
    Some Christian groups report that Hindu extremism has increased in 
recent years. In January the Hindu chauvinist political party Shiv Sena 
opened an office in Kathmandu; a few Shiv Sena candidates 
unsuccessfully ran for office in the 1999 general elections. Some 
political figures have made public statements critical of Christian 
missionary activities. Some citizens are wary of proselytizing and 
conversion by Christians and therefore view the growth of Christianity 
with alarm.
    Hindu citizens who convert to Islam or to Christianity face 
isolated incidents of hostility or discrimination from Hindu extremist 
groups, in addition to possible legal penalties (see Section 2.c.). 
While this prejudice is not systematic, it can be vehement and 
sometimes violent. Nevertheless, converts generally do not fear to 
admit in public their Islamic or Christian affiliations.
    The caste system strongly influences society, even though it is 
prohibited by the Constitution. However, traditional religious 
practices at Hindu temples are an exception to this prohibition.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country has over 75 ethnic 
groups that speak 50 different languages. The Constitution provides 
that each community ``shall have the right to preserve and promote its 
language, script, and culture.'' The Constitution further specifies 
that each community has the right to operate schools up to the primary 
level in its mother tongue.
    Discrimination against lower castes is especially common in the 
rural areas in the west. Although the Government has outlawed the 
public shunning of ``untouchables,'' an exception was retained for 
traditional practices at Hindu religious sites. Economic,social, and 
educational advancement tend to be a function of historical patterns, 
geographic location, and caste. Better education and higher levels of 
prosperity, especially in the Kathmandu valley, are slowly reducing 
caste distinctions and increasing opportunities for lower socioeconomic 
groups. Better educated urban-oriented castes (Brahmin, Chhetri, and 
certain elements of the Newar community traditionally dominant in the 
Kathmandu valley) continue to dominate politics and senior 
administrative and military positions, and to control a 
disproportionate share of natural resources in their territories.
    In remote areas, school lessons and national radio broadcasts often 
are conducted in the local language. However, in areas with nearby 
municipalities, education at the primary, secondary, and university 
levels is conducted almost exclusively in Nepali, which is 
constitutionally mandated as the official language of the State. Human 
rights groups report that the languages of the small Kusunda, Dura, and 
Meche communities are nearly extinct and that non-Hindu peoples are 
losing their culture.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the 
freedom to establish and to join unions and associations. It permits 
restriction of unions only in cases of subversion, sedition, or similar 
conditions. Despite the political transformation in 1990, trade unions 
are still developing their administrative structures to organize 
workers, to bargain collectively, and to conduct worker education 
programs. A prior UML government ``automatically'' registered its own 
affiliated unions but interfered in the registration of unions 
associated with the Nepali Congress Party's labor organization.
    Union participation in the formal sector is significant, but it 
accounts for only a small portion of the labor force. In 1992 
Parliament passed the Labor Act and the Trade Union Act, and formulated 
enabling regulations. However, the Government has not yet fully 
implemented the laws. The Trade Union Act defines procedures for 
establishing trade unions, associations, and federations. It also 
protects unions and officials from lawsuits arising from actions taken 
in the discharge of union duties, including collective bargaining.
    The law permits strikes, except by employees in essential services 
such as water supply, electricity, and telecommunications. The law 
empowers the Government to halt a strike or to suspend a union's 
activities if the union disturbs the peace or if it adversely affects 
the nation's economic interests. Under the Labor Act, 60 percent of a 
union's membership must vote in favor of a strike in a secret ballot 
for the strike to be legal. On March 24, the Government banned all 
strikes in the communications, transportation, and security sectors, 
pending the completion of the parliamentary elections in May. This, 
along with the hiring of replacement crews, ended a pilot's strike that 
had crippled state-controlled Royal Nepal Airlines since March 15. All 
but one of the airline's employees were later reinstated.
    The Trade Union Act prohibits employers from discriminating against 
trade union members or organizers. There have been few reports of 
discrimination against union members.
    The Government does not restrict unions from joining international 
labor bodies. Several trade federations and union organizations 
maintain a variety of international affiliations.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Act 
provides for collective bargaining, although the organizational 
structures to implement the Act's provisions have not been established. 
Collective bargaining agreements cover an estimated 20 percent of wage 
earners in the organized sector. However, labor remains widely unable 
to use collective bargaining effectively due to inexperience and 
employer reluctance to bargain.
    There are no export processing zones.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution 
prohibits slavery, serfdom, forced labor, or trafficking in human 
beings in any form; however, forced labor and trafficking in persons 
remain problems (see Section 6.f.). The Department of Labor enforces 
laws against forced labor in the small formal sector, but remains 
unable to enforce the law outside that sector.
    Large numbers of women still are forced to work against their will 
as prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). Bonded labor is a continuing 
problem, especially in agricultural work. Bonded laborers are usually 
members of lower castes. Bonded labor reportedly occurs among certain 
ethnic groups in the westernTerai region. An estimated 100,000 persons 
also are forced to work under the ``Kamaiya'' or bonded labor system in 
the southern Terai region. These ``Kamaiyas'' generally are 
agricultural workers who work for the same landlords their family may 
have served for many generations. In August the Government announced a 
program to free about 83,400 bonded laborers by paying off 
approximately $330,000 (22,500,000 rupees) in debt, by providing 
laborers with unspecified alternative employment, and by distributing 
land to the laborers.
    The Nepal Labor Act specifically prohibits forced or bonded child 
labor, but enforcement of this law has been inadequate. The law 
prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, but it exists in some 
sectors. Limited instances of forced child labor have been reported, 
and an estimated 40,000 children work as bonded laborers. Each year, an 
estimated 5,000 to 7,000 girls between the ages of 10 and 18 are 
trafficked to India to work as prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). 
In late 1998, police freed approximately 12 children, some as young as 
8 years of age, from forced 18-hour days of labor under harsh 
conditions in a Kathmandu carpet factory. There was a press report in 
February that during a raid, police found 14 boys aged 15 to 17 who 
were employed forcibly in a wool factory in Jorpati (see Section 6.d.).
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--The Constitution stipulates that children shall not be 
employed in factories, mines, or similar hazardous work. The law also 
establishes a minimum age for employment of minors at 16 years in 
industry and 14 years in agriculture. The Constitution limits children 
between the ages of 14 and 16 years to a 36-hour workweek. The law also 
mandates acceptable working conditions for children. However, both the 
resources and the commitment devoted to the enforcement of these 
provisions are limited and child workers are found in many sectors of 
the economy (see Section 5). Although the law prohibits forced or 
bonded labor by children, it exists in some sectors (see Section 6.c.). 
Limited instances of forced child labor have been reported, and an 
estimated 40,000 children work as bonded laborers.
    According to a recent ILO study, up to 40 percent of all children 
work, mostly in agriculture. According to a recent ILO study, most 
working children in the country are girls. Roughly 60 percent of the 
children who work also attend school. However, approximately 70 to 75 
percent of boys who work go to school, compared with 50 to 60 percent 
of the girls who work. In 1996 a certification system for carpets made 
without child labor was established. Of the 207 carpet factories that 
export, approximately 30 have signed on to this or a similar agreement 
(see Section 5). Over half of all carpet factories now participate in 
this or a similar agreement. Partially as a result of this initiative, 
and of consumer pressure, children now reportedly constitute only 5 
percent of the work force in the export-oriented carpet industry, and 
the carpet manufacturers association in August pledged publicly to end 
child labor in the industry by 2005. However, children's rights 
activists say that, in the smaller factories, children are still a 
large part of the work force. There was a press report in February that 
during a raid, police found 14 boys aged 15 to 17 who were forcibly 
employed in a wool factory in Jorpati (see Section 6.c.). In December 
1998, police freed 12 children from forced labor in a Kathmandu carpet 
factory (see Section 6.c). The children were taken to a rehabilitation 
home and the factory owner was tried, convicted, and sentenced to a 
prison term of less than 1 year; at year's end, he reportedly had 
served his sentence and been freed. Children continue to work in the 
agriculture, pottery, basket weaving, sewing, weaving, and ironsmithing 
industries. Few or no children work in the garment industry.
    The Ministry of Labor's enforcement record is improving. In the 
urban formal sector, it has had some success in enforcing laws relating 
to tenure, minimum wage, and holidays. Government inspectors are also 
increasing their monitoring of the use of child labor in carpet 
factories. The Government has introduced a number of programs beginning 
in 1998 that are designed to reduce child labor. For example, the 
Ministry of Labor has set up three centers for children of carpet 
weavers, who might otherwise join their parents at the loom. The 
centers provide day care or education for the children, depending upon 
their ages. The Government also conducts public awareness programs to 
raise public sensitivity to the problem of child labor.
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1997 legislation was passed 
that raised the minimum wage for unskilled labor to $22 (1,300 rupees) 
per month from $19 (1,150 rupees). The law also defined monthly minimum 
wages for semi-skilled labor at $23 (1,350 rupees), skilled labor at 
$25 (1,460 rupees), and highly skilled labor at $28 (1,650 rupees). The 
minimum wage for children ages 14 to 16 was set at $17 (1,025 rupees). 
These wages are sufficient only for the most minimalstandard of living. 
Wages in the unorganized service sector and in agriculture are often as 
much as 50 percent lower. The Labor Act calls for a 48-hour workweek, 
with 1 day off per week, and limits overtime to 20 hours per week. 
Health and safety standards and other benefits such as a provident fund 
and maternity benefits are also established in the act. Implementation 
of the new Labor Act has been slow, as the Government has not created 
the necessary regulatory or administrative structures to enforce its 
provisions. Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from 
dangerous work situations. Although the law authorizes labor officers 
to order employers to rectify unsafe conditions, enforcement of safety 
standards remains minimal.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and girls remains 
a deeply ingrained social problem in several of the country's poorest 
areas. Nepal is a primary ``sending'' country for the South Asia 
region; most women and girls trafficked from Nepal go to India. 
Estimates of the number of girls and women working as prostitutes in 
India range between 100,000 and 200,000. The best available data 
suggest that approximately 5,000 to 7,000 Nepali girls between the ages 
of 10 and 18 are lured or abducted into prostitution each year. 
Prostitution is also a problem in the Kathmandu valley. A children's 
human rights group states that 20 percent of prostitutes in the country 
are younger than 16 years old. In many cases, parents or relatives sell 
women and young girls into sexual slavery. Every year, it is estimated 
that hundreds of girls and women return to the country after having 
worked as prostitutes in India. Most are destitute, and it is estimated 
that over 65 percent of such women are HIV-positive when they return. 
There is legislation to protect women from coercive trafficking, 
including a ban on female domestic labor leaving the country to work in 
Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf (see Section 2.d.). 
Women's rights groups have protested the ban as discriminatory. 
According to press reports, on August 18, five convicted traffickers 
who had been given 20-year sentences but were released within 3 years 
attacked a 17-year-old living at the Women's Rehabilitation Center 
(WOREC). The attackers reportedly attacked her after failing to find 
another woman who had filed a case against them after she had been 
rescued from a brothel in Bombay in a 1996 raid. According to WOREC, in 
spite of the fact that the five had threatened their accuser in an 
effort to get her to change her story, they were released early from 
their sentences. WOREC and other organizations involved in the 
rehabilitation of women who have been trafficked state that their 
members have been threatened and that their offices have been 
vandalized because of their activities. However, despite the existence 
of antitrafficking legislation and recent attempts to increase the 
imposition of penalties on traffickers, antitrafficking legislation is 
not well enforced. The fear of the spread of AIDS by returning 
prostitutes has discouraged the Government from promoting the 
rehabilitation of prostitutes. Government efforts focus more on 
preventing prostitution and trafficking in women. The Ministry of Labor 
and Social Welfare sponsors job and skill training programs in several 
poor districts known for sending prostitutes to India. In May, the 
Ministry of Women and Social Welfare opened the Women's Self-Reliance 
and Rehabilitation Center, a rehabilitation and skills training center 
for women returned from being trafficked and for women and girls at 
risk of being trafficked. Several NGO's have similar programs, 
including rehabilitation and training programs for victims of 
trafficking.
    In June the police hosted a workshop in Kathmandu to provide 
recommendations for new legislation regarding trafficking and the 
sexual exploitation of children. The Prime Minister opened the seminar, 
and the Minister of Law and Justice, the Attorney General, and the 
Inspector General of Police all gave presentations. A follow-up 
workshop was held in July.
                                 ______
                                 

                                PAKISTAN

    For most of the year, Pakistan was an Islamic republic with a 
democratic political system; however, on October 12, the elected 
civilian government of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif was overthrown 
in a bloodless coup led by Army Chief of Staff General Pervez 
Musharraf. General Musharraf, in consultation with senior military 
commanders, designated himself Chief Executive, and suspended the 
Constitution, the National Assembly, the Senate, and the provincial 
assemblies. The office of the President, which is mainly ceremonial, 
was retained. General Musharraf appointed an advisory National Security 
Council, which included both military and civilian advisers, and a 
civilian cabinet. The government bureaucracy continued to function; 
however, at all levels, the functioning of the Government after the 
coup was ``monitored'' by military commanders. Prior to the coup, the 
Prime Minister, selected by a majority within a popularly elected 
Parliament, had wide constitutional power. The Pakistan Muslim League 
(PML) Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which came to power in 
February 1997 with a two-thirds Parliamentary majority, passed 
constitutional amendments (the 13th and 14th) in 1998, which enhanced 
the power of the Prime Minister by removing the power of the President 
to dismiss the Government at his discretion and banning defections from 
political parties, two of the most frequently used methods of bringing 
down previous governments. These measures, which enjoyed opposition 
support, were aimed at enhancing political stability at the national 
level. As a result of these changes, the Sharif Government had greater 
power than any of its predecessors since the return of formal democracy 
in 1988. However, the military continued to exercise considerable 
influence over decision-making. The power of the Government was further 
enhanced by a 1997 constitutional confrontation between the Prime 
Minister and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court over the selection 
of five new justices for the Court. As a result of this struggle, the 
former President resigned in December 1997, and the Prime Minister's 
candidate was elected by the Parliament to the presidency. That same 
month, a Supreme Court panel deprived the Chief Justice of his position 
and a new Chief Justice was sworn in. Some observers feared that this 
confrontation damaged the prestige and independence of the judiciary. 
The Constitution provided for an independent judiciary; however, it was 
subject to executive branch influence. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court 
demonstrated a continued degree of independence on a number of 
occasions prior to the coup. Corruption and inefficiency are problems 
in all branches.
    Responsibility for internal security rests primarily with the 
police, although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and Frontier 
Constabulary, provide support in areas where law and order problems are 
acute, such as Karachi and the frontier areas. Provincial governments 
control the police and paramilitary forces when they are assisting in 
law and order operations. The regular army also occasionally is 
deployed to assist in maintaining public order in sensitive areas 
during certain religious holidays. After the coup, the army played a 
role in enforcing exit control restrictions at airports and border 
crossings as part of the Musharraf regime's accountability efforts. 
Members of the security forces committed numerous serious human rights 
abuses.
    Pakistan is a poor country, with great extremes in the distribution 
of wealth. Its per capita annual income is $490. The overall illiteracy 
rate is 62 percent, and is even higher for women. Cotton, textiles and 
apparel, rice, and leather products are the principal exports. The 
economy includes both state-run and private industries and financial 
institutions. The Constitution provides for the right of private 
businesses to operate freely in most sectors of the economy. The 
Government has made several economic reforms, including privatizing 
state-owned enterprises and reducing tariffs. Politically driven 
confrontations with Independent Power Projects (IPPS) and the 
Government's inability to repay investors in hard currency have damaged 
investor confidence and hampered privatization.
    The Government's poor human rights record deteriorated under the 
Sharif Government, and there were serious problems in several areas; 
however, the situation worsened with the seizure of power by General 
Musharraf, in that after the coup, citizens no longer had the right to 
change their government peacefully. Despite attempts to reform and to 
professionalize the police, both before and after the coup police 
committed numerous extrajudicial killings and tortured, abused, and 
raped citizens. While the officers responsible for such abuses 
sometimes were transferred or suspended for their actions, there is no 
evidence that any police officers were brought to justice. In general, 
police continued to commit serious abuses with impunity. Prison 
conditions remained poor, and police arbitrarily arrested anddetained 
citizens. In Karachi killings between rival political factions often 
were carried out with the assistance of criminal gangs; however, many 
such killings also were believed to have been committed by or with the 
participation of security forces. The Sharif Government used the 
``accountability'' process--which supposedly was designed to expose 
previous wrongdoing, recoup ill-gotten gains, and restore public 
confidence in government institutions--for political purposes by 
harassing and arresting a number of prominent politicians and 
bureaucrats connected with the main opposition party. Few of those 
arrested and questioned were put on trial; however, former Prime 
Minister Benazir Bhutto and her husband were convicted on corruption 
charges in April. Bhutto was sentenced to 5 years in prison, 
disqualified from holding public office, and fined. The Musharraf 
regime used arbitrary detention, including incommunicado detention, 
against political figures from the Sharif Government and their 
families; and the Musharraf regime's anti-corruption campaign violated 
due process. Case backlogs under both Governments led to long delays in 
trials, and lengthy pretrial detention is common. The judiciary is 
subject to executive and other outside influence, and suffers from 
inadequate resources, inefficiency, and corruption. Despite concerns 
about damage to the judiciary due to the December 1997 confrontation 
between the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, 
there were instances prior to the coup in which the Supreme Court 
showed a continued degree of independence. While in February 1998 the 
Sharif Government ceased using military courts to try certain civilian 
cases at the demand of the Supreme Court, special antiterrorism courts 
expanded their jurisdiction to include murder, gang rape, child 
molestation, and ``illegal'' strikes. These courts are authorized to 
try terrorists swiftly, and those convicted may appeal only to a higher 
military court. In October 1998, the National Assembly voted for a 15th 
constitutional amendment, which would oblige the Government to enforce 
Shari'a (Islamic law). However, the Senate did not vote on the measure 
before it was suspended by the Musharraf regime in October. Both the 
Sharif Government and the Musharraf Government infringed on citizen's 
privacy rights. Although the press continued to publish relatively 
freely, the Sharif Government used its large advertising budget to 
influence content, journalists practiced self-censorship, the broadcast 
media remain a closely controlled government monopoly, and the Sharif 
Government made several attempts to curb press criticism. In 
particular, the Sharif Government continued its actions against the 
Jang newspaper group and jailed and harassed prominent journalists such 
as Friday Times editor Najam Sethi. The Musharraf regime appeared to 
cease direct attempts to manage the press, which were common under the 
Sharif Government. The Sharif Government imposed limits on the freedom 
of assembly. Although it allowed a number of large-scale, 
antigovernment demonstrations to take place, it also prevented 
demonstrations and strikes and arrested organizers when it believed 
that security was threatened, particularly in advance of the September 
4 strike called by general traders and sponsored by opposition parties. 
The Sharif Government limited freedom of association, and targeted the 
activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), revoking the 
licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in Punjab. Both Governments imposed 
limits on freedom of religion, particularly for Ahmadis. Three Ahmadis 
sentenced in 1997 to life in prison for blasphemy remain incarcerated. 
Both Governments imposed limits on freedom of movement. Governor's Rule 
continued in Sindh province until the coup, under which its citizens 
continued to be denied democratic representation at the provincial 
level. The Prime Minister in June appointed an Advisor for Sindh 
Affairs, who exercised executive authority in the province without a 
popular mandate. After the coup, Sindh shared the same status as the 
other provinces; assemblies in the other provinces were suspended and 
General Musharraf appointed governors for all four provinces. The 
Musharraf Government spoke out against some of the human rights abuses 
of the previous regime and appointed NGO representatives to a number of 
senior positions, but it was not clear at year's end whether the 
Musharraf regime would take concrete steps to address such problems.
    Significant numbers of women were subjected to violence, abuse, 
rape, trafficking, and other forms of degradation by their spouses and 
members of society at large. The Government failed to take action in a 
high profile ``honor killing'' case and such killings continued 
throughout the country. There was considerable discrimination against 
women, and traditional social and legal constraints kept women in a 
subordinate position in society. Violence against children, as well as 
child abuse, prostitution, and trafficking remained problems. Female 
children still lag far behind boys in education, health care, and other 
social benefits. There was considerable discrimination against 
religious minorities. Both Governments as well as sectarian groups 
continued to discriminate againstreligious minorities, particularly 
Ahmadis and Christians. Religious and ethnic-based rivalries resulted 
in numerous killings and civil disturbances. The Government and 
employers continued to restrict worker rights significantly. Bonded 
labor by both adults and children remained a problem. Debt slavery 
persisted. The use of child labor remained widespread, although it now 
generally is recognized as a serious problem, and industrial exporters 
have adopted a number of measures to eliminate child labor from 
specific sectors. Mob violence and terrorist attacks remained problems.
    In May heavy fighting broke out between Indian forces and Kashmiri 
militants in the Kargil sector of Indian-held Kashmir, and continued 
until July. Regular Pakistani forces were also involved in the 
conflict. Civilians were killed on both sides of the line of control 
during the conflict, and tens of thousands of persons were displaced on 
both sides of the line of control.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed 
extrajudicial killings. The extrajudicial killing of criminal suspects, 
often in the form of deaths in police custody or staged encounters in 
which police shoot and kill the suspects, is common. Police officials 
generally insist that these deaths occur during attempts at escape or 
at resisting arrest; family members and the press insist that many of 
these deaths are staged. Police have been known to kill suspected 
criminals to prevent them from implicating police in crimes during 
court proceedings. After an attempt was made on the Prime Minister's 
life in early January, as many as 40 Sunni extremists associated with 
the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, the group believed responsible, may have been 
killed in police encounters. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan 
(HRCP) estimates that there were 161 extrajudicial killings in the 
first 4 months of the year. In March the Sindh Home Department conceded 
that at least two incidents since imposition of Governor's Rule 
resulted in extrajudicial deaths. Press reports note that in Punjab 
alone 265 individuals were killed in 182 encounters with police between 
January and June. The Urdu daily newspaper Khabrain reported on 
December 6 that there were 285 police encounters in Punjab in the first 
10 months of the year and that 357 persons lost their lives. In October 
there were reports of police encounter killings of members of the 
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi by the police 
in Punjab, following a wave of sectarian violence in the province (see 
Section 2.c.). Estimates of SSP and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi members killed by 
police in this manner range from 16 to 40 persons. Police officials 
maintain in private that due to the lack of concrete evidence, witness 
intimidation, corruption in and threats against the judiciary, and 
sometimes political pressure, courts often fail to punish criminals 
involved in serious crimes. Police professionalism is low. The police 
view the killings of criminal suspects as appropriate given the lack of 
effective action by the judiciary against criminals. The judiciary, on 
the other hand, faults the police for presenting weak cases that do not 
stand up in court.
    Police officers occasionally are transferred or briefly suspended 
for their involvement in extrajudicial killings. However, court-ordered 
inquiries into these killings so far have failed to result in any 
police officer receiving criminal punishment. Punjabi police killed 
Tahir Prince on February 10. Following the filing of a writ by the 
victim's mother, the Lahore High Court ordered registration of a case 
against the police officers involved; however, no departmental action 
has been taken. In general police continued to commit such killings 
with impunity.
    Following the coup in October, a number of police officials were 
charged or sanctioned for extrajudicial killings. On December 2, the 
Lahore High Court ordered the registration of cases against the Deputy 
Inspector General (DIG) of Police Sarghoda Range and six other police 
officers in the April 5 killing of two Sarghoda residents. The 
residents reportedly were mistaken for a Lashkar-i-Jhangvi member and 
killed in a police encounter. On December 7, the Punjab Chief Secretary 
announced that three senior Lahore-based police officials would be 
removed following the killing of a suspect in police custody. The 
suspect was charged in connection with a series of killings of children 
in Lahore. One police sub-inspector was sentenced to death during the 
year in the 1997 killing of Iraqi Noel, whom the police officer had 
taken into custody.
    The police and security forces were responsible for the deaths of a 
number of individuals associated with political or terrorist groups. 
For example, Punjab police officers killed activists of the extremist 
sectarian organization Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, which was implicated in an 
attempt to kill the Prime Minister in January. During the year, three 
individuals charged with attempting to assassinate the Prime Minister 
in January were killed in police custody during an alleged escape 
attempt. As of August, 21 activists from this organization were killed 
in police encounters, according to press accounts and the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan.
    The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), an opposition party that has 
demonstrated a willingness to use violence to further its objectives, 
claimed that its adherents were being targeted specifically by the 
police for extrajudicial killings. The MQM was formed by Altaf Hussein 
in 1984 as a student movement to further the rights of Mohajirs, the 
descendants of Urdu-speaking Muslims who migrated from India to 
Pakistan following partition in 1947. It soon became an organization 
with criminal elements, which generated income through extortion and 
other forms of racketeering. The MQM presently is split between the 
original MQM, formerly known as the Mohajir Quami Movement, and headed 
by Altaf Hussain (MQM-Altaf), a large breakaway group (MQM-Haqiqi), and 
other, smaller factions. The MQM-Altaf, in part because of its 
efficient organization and willingness to use violence and intimidation 
to achieve its goals, became the dominant political party in the Sindh 
urban centers of Karachi and Hyderabad. The MQM, despite a number of 
moderate and nonviolent leaders now in the Senate, National Assembly, 
and Sindh Provincial Assembly, has not been able to separate itself 
from its violent past. As a result, it has antagonized followers, 
suffered violent breakaways, and continually been at odds with 
successive governments. In March MQM Senator Aftab Sheikh accused the 
Sindh police, the paramilitary Rangers, and Government intelligence 
agencies of abducting two MQM members--Farid and Shamim--and killing 
them in custody; the two reportedly were handcuffed when killed. In 
July London-based MQM chief Altaf Hussain accused the Karachi police of 
killing Mohammed Shahid after his arrest. Altaf Hussain also claimed in 
July that 14 MQM workers were killed extrajudicially since the 
imposition of Governor's Rule. In a July report, the MQM listed 10 
persons, mostly MQM activists, killed in extrajudicial incidents by 
Karachi police between October 1998 and March. In September MQM 
activist Rehan Bandhani died in police custody. According to the daily 
newspaper The News, the police initially argued that Bandhani had died 
of a heart attack, but a police officer later was charged with 
unintentional murder. On September 7, two MQM activists were killed in 
an encounter with police; police officials stated that the two men shot 
first, but witnesses claim that the two were taken, unarmed, from their 
homes and shot by police in a nearby field.
    In NWFP the family of a notorious criminal known as ``Shaitan'' 
accused police of killing him in custody on May 9. The NWFP government 
has taken no action; however, the government of the NWFP set up a 
committee of inquiry to look into the death of Pakistan Muslim League 
youth wing leader Qasim Khan, who died while in custody of the Peshawar 
police on July 18. In 1998, Awais Akram, Arbab Yousah, and Abbas died 
while in police custody; in all three cases police officers were 
charged in connection with the deaths, but no information was available 
as the disposition of the cases at year's end. Ghulam Jillani, a 14-
year-old boy, died while in police custody in Manshera in May 1998. 
Then NWFP Chief Minister Sardar Mehtab Ahmed Khan dismissed the entire 
staff of the police station involved. The Abbottabad session judge led 
a committee of inquiry that investigated the incident; the committee 
held the Station House Officer and the staff of the police station 
responsible for Jillani's death. At year's end, the officers involved 
were appealing the decision.
    The Sharif Government also used lethal force against political 
opponents and underground organizations.
    Politically motivated violence and sectarian violence continued to 
be a problem, although in the weeks following the October 12 coup there 
were few if any reported cases of such violence. Governor's Rule, 
imposed to correct a serious law and order problem created in part by 
political tensions in the province, continued in Sindh until the coup. 
Despite improved security conditions under Governor's Rule, there were 
75 deaths that were presumed to be the result of political violence in 
Karachi. Terrorist incidents were frequent in the Punjab. On January 3, 
four persons were killed and several were injured when a bomb placed 
under a bridge outside of Lahore exploded. The bombing occurred 
approximately 1 hour before Prime Minister Sharif wasto have crossed 
the bridge, and was believed to be an assassination attempt. Two 
members of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi extremist group were arrested in 
connection with the blast later that month. According to press reports, 
on May 24, at least 10 persons were reportedly killed by an explosion 
near a market in Daska, Punjab. There were several other bombings 
during the year, some of which resulted in deaths. The perpetrators of 
most such bombings were unknown at year's end. In 1998, there were 
several bombings in which persons were killed. At year's end, it was 
not known who carried out these bombings.
    Women were killed by family members in so-called ``honor 
killings.'' On April 6, Samia Imran, who sought a divorce against the 
wishes of her husband and family, was shot and killed in the Lahore 
office of lawyer Hina Jilani by a man accompanying her mother. The 
gunman and the victim's mother fled after the killing. The gunman later 
was shot and killed by police. Three members of Imran's family--her 
father, mother, and uncle--were charged in connection with her killing. 
However, by year's end, the three remained at large (see Section 5.).
    There was extensive religious violence, particularly between rival 
Sunni and Shi'a organizations, with 1 newspaper estimating that 300 
persons were killed in sectarian attacks during the last 2 years (see 
Sections 2.c. and 5).
    On January 12, in Peshawar, the wife and son of well-known Afghan 
moderate Abdul Haq were shot and killed in their sleep by unknown 
assailants. A guard also was killed in the attack. Haq was well known 
for his efforts to promote an intra-Afghan dialog; his brother was a 
former governor in Afghanistan who has joined forces with Ahmad Shah 
Masood against the Taliban. On March 27, Mohammed Jehanzeb, the 
secretary of Abdul Haq's brother (and Taliban opponent) Haji Qadir, was 
shot and killed by unknown assailants in Peshawar. On July 14 former 
Afghan senator Abdul Ahad Karzai was shot and killed by two gunmen 
while returning home from prayers at a local mosque in Quetta. Between 
January 1998 and January 1999, it was estimated that up to 12 Afghan 
moderates or former members of the Communist Party were killed by 
unknown assailants (see Section 2.d.). Among those reported killed were 
Dagarwal Basir, General Nazar Mohammed, Dagarwal Latif, Hashim 
Paktyanai, General Shirin Agha, and General Rahim. To date, there have 
been no arrests or convictions in connection with these killings.
    In May heavy fighting broke out between Indian forces and Kashmiri 
militants in the Kargil sector of Indian-held Kashmir. Regular 
Pakistani forces also were involved in this engagement, which did not 
end until Pakistani forces withdrew in July. Tension along the line of 
control was high during this period, and there was shelling in several 
sectors. On June 10, the Pakistani army returned the bodies of six 
Indian soldiers, which bore signs of severe torture; however, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross declined an invitation to do 
an autopsy. A senior police official in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir 
estimated that approximately 40 civilians were killed on the Pakistani 
side of the line of control.
    b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed cases of politically 
motivated disappearances. Those killed in intra-Mohajir violence in 
Karachi sometimes are first held briefly by opposing groups (or, as the 
MQM-Altaf alleges, by security forces) and tortured. However, bodies of 
these victims, often mutilated, generally are dumped in the street soon 
after the victims are abducted; however, the incidence of such crimes 
decreased greatly during year.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--The Constitution and the Penal Code expressly forbid 
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, 
police regularly torture, beat, and otherwise abuse persons. Police 
routinely use force to elicit confessions; however, there were fewer 
such reports during the year than in previous years, particularly in 
Sindh after the coup, and human rights organizations reported greater 
cooperation from the police in investigating such cases than in 
previous years. Human rights observers suggest that because of the 
widespread use of physical torture by the police, suspects usually 
confess to crimes regardless of their guilt or innocence; the courts 
subsequently throw out many such confessions.
    Common torture methods include: beating; burning with cigarettes; 
whipping the soles of the feet; sexual assault; prolonged isolation; 
electric shock; denial of food or sleep; hanging upside down; forced 
spreading of the legs with bar fetters; and public humiliation. Some 
magistrates help cover up the abuse by issuing investigation reports 
stating that the victims died of natural causes.
    Torture by the police of persons in custody occurs throughout the 
country. Police tortured or mistreated prisoners considered to be 
opponents or critics of the Sharif Government. On January 4, Senator 
Aftab Sheikh and other MQM officials visited two MQM members of the 
provincial assembly at Karachi central prison, including former Labor 
Minister Shoaib Bukhari. The parliamentarians accused the police of 
torturing and humiliating them for 10 days after their arrest on 
November 20, 1998. The prisoners claimed that they had been struck with 
rifle butts, slapped, stripped naked, and forced to stand continuously 
for up to 36 hours. Seventy prisoners awaiting or undergoing trial at 
Karachi prison, all MQM members, charged that they had been arrested 
illegally and tortured to induce confessions. Family members alleged 
that they also often had been beaten in raids, and that relatives had 
been taken as hostage for those whom the police sought.
    Opposition leader Hussain Haqqani alleged that he was tortured, 
beaten, and subjected to psychological abuse during his incarceration 
by the Intelligence Bureau between May 4 and May 7. Haqqani was 
arrested on previous dormant corruption charges; he claimed that this 
was a pretext for his arrest. Records of a medical examination 
conducted by the High Court after Haqqani's interrogation subsequently 
were ``lost'' by authorities. Haqqani was transferred to the Federal 
Investigative Agency (FIA) on May 7, but remained incarcerated for 2\1/
2\ months. During the May 8 arrest of journalist Najam Sethi, Sethi's 
wife reportedly was tied up by police (see Section 2.a.).
    In May Asif Zardari, husband of former Pakistan People's Party 
(PPP) Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was taken from prison to a police 
interrogation center in Karachi, where he was kept awake for 4 days, 
beaten, and cut with knives. On May 19, he was taken to a hospital for 
treatment. Observers doubted police claims that cuts on his neck were 
the result of a suicide attempt. In August the secretary general of the 
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) noted in a public statement that the 
IPU was ``alarmed'' over the alleged torture of Zardari.
    Despite some cases during the year in which police officers were 
investigated or charged in connection with abuse of detainees, the 
failure of successive governments effectively to prosecute and to 
punish abusers is the single greatest obstacle to ending or reducing 
the incidence of abuse by the police. The authorities sometimes 
transferred, suspended, or arrested offending officers, but seldom 
prosecuted or punished them. Investigating officers generally shield 
their colleagues. Amnesty International (AI) estimates that at least 
100 persons die from police torture each year. The failure to prosecute 
and punish abusers in a timely fashion was one of the chief arguments 
used by the Government in introducing the 15th Amendment designed to 
enforce Shari'a law throughout the country in 1998.
    The 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act allowed confessions obtained while in 
police custody to be used to convict defendants in the new ``special 
courts.'' Human rights organizations and the press criticized this 
provision of the law, as it commonly is believed that the police 
regularly torture suspects. Police generally did not attempt to use 
confessions to secure convictions under this law and the Government 
agreed to amend the law after the Supreme Court in 1998 invalidated 
this and other sections of the Anti-Terrorist Act.
    Due to greater scrutiny by NGO's and the media, as well as a 
program of prison inspections in the Punjab, the incidence of torture 
and abuse may be decreasing in prisons. In Karachi human rights groups 
are active in particular cases and the Citizens Police Liaison 
Committee (CPLC) has been effective in bringing cases against police 
who make false arrests, practice torture, or take bribes. Cooperation 
between the CPLC and the police human rights complaint cell resulted in 
the dismissal of 216 policemen and demotion or fines for 1,226 during 
the 9 months between November 1998 and July 1999.
    Corruption is an endemic problem among local police officers. 
Police and prison officials frequently use the threat of abuse to 
extort money from prisoners and their families. Police accept money for 
registration of cases on false charges and maytorture innocent 
citizens. Persons pay police to humiliate their opponents and to avenge 
their personal grievances.
    In the past, successive governments recruited police officers in 
violation of considerations of merit and the department's regulations. 
In some instances, recruits had criminal records. In 1997 Punjab 
province Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif declared that his own police 
were ``corrupt and inefficient.'' He appointed new senior officials to 
improve effectiveness, while resisting pressure to appoint those 
recommended by influential supporters to police positions. In an 
attempt to increase police professionalism, a Punjab elite police 
training academy was established in November 1997 and began training 
hundreds of constables. It is widely acknowledged that police 
corruption is most serious at the level of the Station House Officer 
(SHO), the official who runs each individual precinct. In 1998, 300 new 
SHO's recruited on merit were due to begin a long-delayed 20-month 
special training course. If they are allowed to replace corrupt SHO's, 
observers believe that they might improve police performance greatly. 
However, SHO's are very powerful (it is suspected that some have killed 
senior police officers that were trying to inhibit their corruption), 
and observers question whether their replacement is feasible.
    It is accepted commonly, and high-ranking government officials have 
stated publicly, that police stations are sold--meaning that police 
officials pay bribes to politicians and senior officials in the 
department in order to get posted to the police stations of their 
choice. The police then recoup their investment by extorting money from 
the citizenry.
    Even when actions are taken to address police abuses, the results 
are often mixed. In urban Sindh, the operation of citizen-police 
liaison committees helped to curb some police excesses, but there are 
still many complaints of police abuse.
    Special women's police stations were established in 1994 in 
response to growing numbers of complaints of custodial abuse of women, 
including rape. These police stations are staffed by female personnel, 
but receive even less material and human resources than regular police 
stations, according to human rights advocates. According to the 
government's own Commission of Inquiry for Women, the stations do not 
function independently or fulfill their purpose. Despite court orders 
and regulations requiring that female suspects be interrogated only by 
female police officers, women continued to be detained overnight at 
regular police stations and abused by male officers. In a study of 
Lahore newspapers from January to May 1999, the Human Rights Commission 
of Pakistan found 11 cases of violence, rape, or torture of women while 
in police custody. In August 1998, ``Nasreen'' accused the SHO of 
Lahore's Mozang police station of raping her after she visited the 
station to register a complaint against her in-laws. At the end of 
1998, the case was under internal investigation by Lahore police; the 
disposition of the case was unknown at year's end. Instances of abuse 
of women in prisons are less frequent than in police stations. Sexual 
abuse of child detainees by police or guards is reportedly a problem as 
well.
    The Hudood Ordinances, promulgated by the central martial law 
government in 1979, were an attempt to make the Penal Code more 
Islamic. These ordinances provide for harsh punishments for violations 
of Shari'a (Islamic law), including death by stoning for unlawful 
sexual relations and amputation for some other crimes. These severe 
Koranic penalties--known as Hadd punishments--require a high standard 
of evidence. In effect, four adult Muslim men of good character must 
witness an act for a Hadd punishment to apply. In 20 years, not a 
single Hadd punishment has been carried out. However, on the basis of 
lesser evidence, ordinary punishments such as jail terms or fines are 
imposed. From 1979 to 1995, over 1 million Hudood cases were filed with 
the police, and 300,000 have been heard by the courts. The laws are 
applied to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
    Women frequently are charged under the Hudood laws on sexual 
misconduct, such as adultery. Approximately one-third of the women in 
jails in Lahore, Peshawar, and Mardan in 1998 were awaiting trial for 
adultery. Most women tried under the ordinance are acquitted, but the 
stigma of having been jailed for adultery is severe. A Hudood law meant 
to deter false accusations is enforced weakly, and one human rights 
monitor has claimed that 80 percent of all adultery-related Hudood 
cases are filed without any supporting evidence. According to Amnesty 
International, men accused of rape sometimes are acquitted and released 
while their victims are held on adultery charges. The Commission of 
Inquiry for Women has recommended that the Hudoodlaws be repealed, as 
they are based on an erroneous interpretation of Shari'a (see Section 
5).
    The Federal Crimes Regulation (FCR), which applies in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), allows the punishment of relatives, 
friends, and neighbors of suspects. Authorities are empowered to 
blockade villages or to detain fellow members of a fugitive's tribe in 
order to obtain the surrender of a fugitive. In December 1998, a 
Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-Tulaba, an extremist Islamic 
group in Orakzai Tribal Agency, fined six alleged accomplices to a 
killing and burned down their homes as punishment (see Sections 1.e. 
and 1.f.).
    Police routinely use excessive force against demonstrators or 
strikers. In February police forcibly dispersed a demonstration in 
Lahore staged by the Jamaat-i-Islami. Police with batons charged 
demonstrators and fired tear gas shells into the party's Lahore 
offices. On September 11, police reportedly used force to break up a 
demonstration by a coalition of opposition groups in Karachi, and the 
headquarters of two major opposition parties, the MQM and the PPP, 
reportedly were damaged. On September 12, police used water cannons, 
teargas, and sticks to break up a PPP-organized sit-in in Karachi. In 
mid-October, the press reported that police used force to break up a 
rally in support of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif; more than one 
dozen protestors reportedly were arrested in Karachi on October 14. On 
December 11, police used force to disperse a demonstration in Lahore 
that was held to protest the handling of a serial murder case by the 
police. Police charged the crowd, beat persons with batons, and 
arrested 30 persons.
    Police at times also beat and arrested journalists. For example, 
during a December 11 protest against the handling of a criminal case in 
Lahore, the police beat press photographers and smashed their cameras 
after photographers reportedly recognized a plainclothes policeman, who 
was hurling bricks into the crowd.
    Police authorities failed in some instances to protect members of 
religious minorities--particularly Ahmadis and Christians--from 
societal attacks (see Section 5).
    On January 3, several persons were injured when a bomb placed under 
a bridge outside of Lahore exploded, in what was believed to be an 
assassination attempt against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (see Section 
1.a.). On September 6, an explosion in a madrassah in Karachi injured 
more than 20 persons; those injured had rushed to the scene of a 
previous explosion, in which there were no injuries. On April 17, 
unidentified men threw small explosives at the home of the Army Corps 
Commander in Peshawar, injuring five guards. On November 12, a series 
of rocket attacks in Islamabad injured one person. There were several 
other bombings during the year, some of which resulted in injuries. The 
perpetrators of most such bombings were unknown at year's end.
    Prison conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding is a major 
problem. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), 
there are currently 82,000 prisoners in Pakistani jails, which have an 
officially authorized population of 35,833; most prisoners are held in 
severely overcrowded conditions. In September an investigative reporter 
for The Nation visited Adiala jail in Rawalpindi. According to the 
reporter, the prison currently holds 4,277 prisoners but was built for 
2,000. A press survey in July revealed that the 16 jails of Sindh 
province, with a total capacity of 7,769 prisoners, were actually 
housing over 14,000. Karachi central prison is the most overcrowded, 
with a population of 4,460 prisoners and a capacity for only 991; only 
2 toilets are available for each 100 prisoners in the lowest 
classification of cells. The HRCP claims that the Lahore district jail, 
built to house 1,045 prisoners, contains 3,200. The Punjab Home 
Department admitted before the Lahore High Court in July that over 
50,000 prisoners were being held in Punjabi jails meant for 17,271. The 
department claimed that it had plans on the books to build new jails in 
22 district and subdivisional headquarters, but that the work had been 
delayed by financial constraints. Some 80 percent of prisoners are 
``awaiting trial,'' mostly for petty offenses.
    Prisoners in jail routinely are shackled. The principal of the 
institute for jail staff training in Lahore admitted in a July press 
interview that fettering is the most convenient way of administering an 
overcrowded jail. While the Pakistan Prison Act of 1894 permits 
fettering for a variety of offenses, the punishment is usually given 
for administrative convenience, or to extract bribes from prisoners. 
(The shackles used are tight, heavy, and painful, and reportedly have 
led to gangrene andamputation in several cases.) Although the Sindh 
High Court ruled the practice illegal in 1993, the practice continues, 
and outside observers visiting Sindhi jails regularly see fettered 
prisoners.
    There are three classes (A, B, and C) of prison facilities. Class 
``C'' cells generally hold common criminals and those in pretrial 
detention. Such cells often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor 
food. Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffer the most abuse, such 
as beatings and being forced to kneel for long periods. In 1998, the 
Senate's Committee on Human Rights reported to the Prime Minister that 
at one facility in Hyderabad, 60 prisoners were confined in a space 100 
feet by 30 feet with only 1 latrine. Such unsanitary conditions are 
common in small, poorly ventilated, and decrepit colonial-era prisons. 
Inadequate food, often consisting of only a few pieces of bread, leads 
to chronic malnutrition for those unable to supplement their diet with 
help from family or friends. Access to medical care is a problem. 
Mentally ill prisoners usually are not provided with adequate treatment 
and often are not segregated from the general prison population. 
Foreign prisoners often remain in prison long after their sentences are 
completed because there is no one to pay for their deportation to their 
home country. Conditions in ``B'' and ``A'' cells are markedly better 
than in ``C'' cells. Prisoners in ``A'' cells are permitted to have 
servants, special food, and televisions. The authorities reserve ``A'' 
cells for prominent persons. Especially prominent individuals--
including some political figures--sometimes are held under house arrest 
and permitted to receive visitors.
    The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
    Landlords in rural Sindh and political factions in Karachi operated 
private jails (see Section 1.d.).
    On June 10, during the Kargil conflict, the Pakistani army returned 
the bodies of six Indian soldiers, which bore signs of severe torture; 
however, the International Committee of the Red Cross declined an 
invitation to do an autopsy (see Section 1.a.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law regulates arrest 
and detention procedures; however, the authorities do not always comply 
with the law and police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. The 
law permits a Deputy Commissioner (DC) of a local district to order 
detention without charge for 30 days of persons suspected of 
threatening public order and safety. The DC may renew detention in 30-
day increments, up to a total of 90 days. Human rights monitors report 
instances in which prisoners jailed under the Maintenance of Public 
Order Act have been imprisoned for up to 6 months without charge. For 
other criminal offenses, the police may hold a suspect for 24 hours 
without charge. After the prisoner is produced before a magistrate, the 
court can grant permission for continued detention for a maximum period 
of 14 days if the police provide material proof that this is necessary 
for an investigation.
    Police may arrest individuals on the basis of a First Incident 
Report (FIR) filed by a complainant. The police have been known to file 
FIR's without supporting evidence. FIR's frequently are used to harass 
or intimidate individuals. Charges against an individual also may be 
based on a ``blind'' FIR, which lists the perpetrators as ``person or 
persons unknown.'' If the case is not solved, the FIR is placed in the 
inactive file. When needed, a FIR is reactivated and taken to a 
magistrate by the police, who then name a suspect and ask that the 
suspect be remanded for 14 days while they investigate further. After 
14 days, the case is dropped for lack of evidence, but then another FIR 
is activated and brought against the accused. In this manner, rolling 
charges can be used to hold a suspect in continuous custody.
    If the police can provide material proof that detention (physical 
remand or police custody for the purpose of interrogation) is necessary 
for an investigation, a court may extend detention for a total of 14 
days. However, such proof may be little more than unsubstantiated 
assertions by the police. In practice the authorities do not fully 
observe the limits on detention. Police are not required to notify 
anyone when an arrest is made and often hold detainees without charge 
until a court challenges them. The police sometimes detain individuals 
arbitrarily without charge or on false charges, in order to extort 
payment for their release. Human rights monitors report that a number 
of police stations have secretdetention cells in which individuals are 
kept while the police bargain for a higher price for their release. 
There are also reports that the police move prisoners from one police 
station to another if they suspect a surprise visit by higher 
authorities. Some women continue to be detained arbitrarily and 
sexually abused (see Section 1.c.). Police also detain relatives of 
wanted criminals in order to compel suspects to surrender (see Section 
1.f.). Police have been known to detain persons in connection with 
personal vendettas.
    The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within 
30 days of their arrest. However, in many cases, trials do not start 
until 6 months after the filing of charges. In 1998 the Human Rights 
Commission of Pakistan estimated that there were almost as many 
individuals awaiting trial in jails as there were prisoners. According 
to the chief justice of the Lahore High Court, there were over 500,000 
civil and criminal cases backlogged in the province's subordinate court 
system as of April. In 62 Lahore city courts, 7,000 prisoners are 
awaiting trial in 6,000 cases. In 3,500 of these cases, the police have 
not even brought a ``challan,'' or indictment, to the court. In 1997 
the Government justified the creation of antiterrorist courts by citing 
the large number of murder and other cases that are clogging the 
regular court system (see Section 1.e.).
    Asif Zardari, husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, has 
waited for over 2 years for his trial on charges of killing his 
brother-in-law, Murtaza Bhutto, to begin. Charges were first filed 
against Zardari in July 1997 and transferred successively to two 
different courts, where several judges refused to preside. To date only 
2 of 223 witnesses have been heard.
    The Government permits visits by human rights monitors, family 
members, and lawyers. However, in some cases, authorities refuse family 
visits and in some police stations, persons are expected to pay bribes 
in order to visit a prisoner. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) have a separate legal system, the Frontier Crimes Regulation, 
which recognizes the doctrine of collective responsibility. Authorities 
are empowered to detain fellow members of a fugitive's tribe, or to 
blockade the fugitive's village, pending his surrender or punishment by 
his own tribe in accordance with local tradition. The Government 
continued to exercise such authority, repeatedly, during the year. 
Roman Ali, arrested in 1993 at the age of 12 for his fugitive elder 
brother's crimes, was sentenced to a long prison term in 1994. In 1996, 
a petition against this sentence in the Peshawar High Court was 
dismissed. During the year, Ali's appeal to the Secretary of the Home 
Department was denied, and his appeal to the Supreme Court was not 
heard due to the Court's lack of jurisdiction over the case.
    The Government sometimes uses mass arrests to quell possible civil 
unrest. In April approximately 600 PPP members were arrested prior to a 
planned May 1 demonstration in Islamabad against former prime minister 
Benazir Bhutto's April conviction on corruption charges and 
disqualification from holding public office. Most were released on May 
2. Early on July 28, police tore down antigovernment posters and 
arrested MQM legislators and activists to halt a peaceful hunger strike 
being conducted in front of the Karachi Press Club. Most of those 
arrested were released quickly, and the protest was resumed a few hours 
later. In August and September, police arrested as many as 2,500 
activists from the PPP and the Muttahida Quami Movement in Karachi and 
other parts of Sindh province in anticipation of a September 4 
opposition rally. Several hundred more, including several senior 
opposition leaders and parliamentarians, were arrested several days 
later prior to an opposition demonstration in Karachi. On September 11, 
police reportedly used force to end a demonstration by a coalition of 
opposition groups in Karachi; police publicly reported arresting 107 
persons in connection with the demonstration, but other reliable 
estimates place the number arrested at 600 or more. Police detained 
hundreds of MQM and PPP activists and senior leaders prior to a banned 
opposition march planned for September 25, as well as in the days 
immediately after it was to have occurred. Among those detained was MQM 
Senator Nasreen Jalil, who was arrested at her home on September 24 and 
held incommunicado for several days (see Section 2.b.) until her 
release on September 29. Also in September, the Government placed 
Fazlur Rehman, the leader of one faction of the religious party Jamiat 
Ulema-i-Islami, under house arrest to prevent him from traveling to the 
NWFP tribal areas to attend a political rally. Rehman previously had 
traveled frequently to the region to attend rallies, which are 
prohibited in the tribal areas. Rehman was released after 3 days (see 
Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 2.d.). In early October, hundreds of religious 
extremists, including the leader of theSipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Maulana 
Muhammad Azam Tariq, and SSP branch president Maulana Mohammad Ahmad 
Ludhianvi, were arrested after a wave of sectarian violence broke out 
in Punjab and Sindh. However, since the coup, there have been reports 
that arrests of political activists have decreased.
    The Sharif Government's ``accountability cell,'' which ostensibly 
was created to uncover corruption in an evenhanded manner, was headed 
by a close associate of the Prime Minister, Senator Saifur Rehman, and 
conducted politically driven investigations of, and campaigns of 
vilification against, opposition politicians, senior civil servants, 
and business figures. These investigations were designed to extract 
evidence and in some cases, the televised confessions of alleged 
wrongdoers. Rehman may have arranged for the arrest of Hussain Haqqani 
and Najam Sethi (see Section 2.a.). However, before the coup, most 
politicians and bureaucrats who had been charged with corruption or 
other crimes were out on bail. In 1998, authorities arrested and 
questioned the wife and daughter of former Pakistan Steel executive 
Usman Farooqi in an attempt to pressure the already-imprisoned Farooqi. 
At year's end, Farooqi remained in detention. In 1998 in an effort to 
compel a former bureaucrat to return to Pakistan, the Government 
prevented the departure of family members, even those who were not 
citizens of Pakistan, on the grounds that they were ``beneficiaries'' 
of alleged corruption. In July 1998, the Lahore High Court ruled that 
this approach was invalid.
    In several high-profile arrests of Sharif Government critics, the 
police or intelligence services entered homes and arrested individuals 
without warrants or due process and held them for periods of days or 
weeks. On May 4, Intelligence Bureau officials arrested opposition 
leader and journalist Hussain Haqqani without a warrant and held him 
incommunicado until May 7 without filing charges (see Section 1.c.). On 
May 8, approximately 30 policemen broke into Friday Times editor Najam 
Sethi's home, beat him, tied up his wife, destroyed property, and took 
Sethi away without warrant. According to press reports, Sethi was 
interrogated by the intelligence services as a suspected ``espionage 
agent.'' Sethi was held incommunicado for several days and denied 
access to an attorney (see Section 2.a.).
    On occasion, persons are detained arbitrarily because of disputes 
with powerful or well-connected persons. On January 28, Humaira Mahmood 
and her husband Mahmood Butt were detained without a warrant by Punjab 
police at the Karachi airport (in Sindh province), as they were trying 
to leave the country. Mahmood Butt's mother was also detained. In 1997 
the couple had married against the wishes of Humaira's father, Abbas 
Khokar, a member of the Punjab Provincial Assembly (see Section 5). 
Mahmood and her husband reportedly were taken separately to Lahore, 
where they were detained separately and were beaten in an attempt to 
force them to renounce their marriage. On February 1, the pair appeared 
in court in Lahore. After the hearing, Mahmood Butt and his mother were 
released by court order; Humaira was released by court order on 
February 18.
    The Musharraf Government detained without a warrant and without 
charge several dozen political figures, military officers, government 
administrators, and Sharif family members following the October 12 
coup. Nawaz Sharif and members of his family, including Punjab chief 
minister Shahbaz Sharif; most of the Cabinet; several senior advisors 
to the Prime Minister or to the Government; and a number of military 
and police officials were arrested or placed under house arrest 
immediately following the coup. Nawaz Sharif was held incommunicado 
from the time of his arrest until he was brought to court on November 
18. Most others were released within a few days; however, at year's 
end, 32 were estimated to remain in custody. Many of those arrested 
immediately after the coup were held incommunicado. Former Prime 
Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother, former Punjab chief minister 
Shahbaz Sharif, were held incommunicado in Chaklala, Rawalpindi; many 
other Sharif family members were held with limited outside contact in 
``protective custody'' in the Sharif estate outside of Lahore following 
the coup. The oldest son of Nawaz Sharif, Hussain Sharif, reportedly 
was held incommunicado, except for one occasion on which he was allowed 
access to counsel, in solitary confinement from October 12 until a 
court-ordered visit with his wife on December 11. Other Sharif family 
members still in detention at year's end included Nawaz Sharif's father 
Mian Mohammad Sharif; his brother Abbas Sharif; his son-in-law Captain 
Safdar; his nephew Hamza Shahbaz (son of Shahbaz Sharif), and his 
brother-in-law Chaudhry Sher Ali. Former Information Minister Mushahid 
Hussain was kept in ``protective custody,'' along with his family, at 
his residence in Islamabad from October 12 until December 14, when he 
was removed bymilitary officers from his home and taken to a government 
guest house in Islamabad. He then was held incommunicado by the 
military until December 24, when he was allowed to meet with his family 
under a court order.
    Several key figures among those initially arrested without charge, 
including Nawaz Sharif, were being held in connection with the 
``hijacking'' of General Musharraf's airplane on October 12. On that 
day, General Musharraf was returning from a conference in Sri Lanka, 
and the commercial aircraft in which he was flying initially was denied 
permission to land in Karachi, purportedly under orders from Prime 
Minister Sharif. This event, along with Sharif's summary replacement of 
General Musharraf with the Director General of the Inter-Services 
Intelligence Directorate, Khawaja Ziauddin, led to the coup. Military 
officers took over the airport in Karachi and allowed Musharraf's 
airplane to land. In the weeks following Sharif's arrest, he was 
detained without charge and was denied access to counsel and to family 
members (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). A First Incident Report was not 
filed in the case until November 10. The FIR charged Sharif with 
attempted murder, hijacking, and criminal conspiracy. Former Sharif 
advisor Ghous Ali Shah, former Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) 
chairman Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, former Director of Civil Aviation 
Aminullah Chaudhary, and former Inspector General of Police Rana 
Maqbool were charged along with Sharif. The accused were to be tried 
before an antiterrorism court. Nawaz Sharif was formally arrested and 
remanded to police custody only after being brought to Karachi on 
November 18. On November 19, Sharif first appeared in an antiterrorism 
court in Karachi. On November 26, three other individuals--former 
Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif, former Senator Saifur Rehman, and 
former secretary to the Prime Minister Saeed Mehdi--were named 
codefendants in the case. Sharif complained of ``inhumane'' treatment 
during his incarceration, including being held incommunicado in a 
cramped cell. On November 29, the judge in the case ordered him 
transferred to an ``A'' class cell. Following changes in the 
Antiterrorism Act (see Section 1.e.), the formal filing of charges 
(challan) against Nawaz Sharif occurred on December 8. Nawaz Sharif and 
his brother Shahbaz Sharif were paroled briefly on December 15 and 
flown by the authorities to Lahore, the day after the death of Nawaz 
Sharif's mother-in-law.
    Although many of those detained immediately following the coup were 
released in the days afterwards or subsequently were charged through 
the court system, several individuals remained in custody without 
charge. As of year's end, former ministers Muhammed Ishaq Dar, Sayed 
Mushahid Hussain, and Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan; former Director General 
of the Inter-Services Intelligence Bureau Khawaja Ziauddin; Mujibur 
Rehman, brother of Saifur Rehman; former Director General of the 
Federal Investigative Agency Mohammed Mushtaq; and several other 
officials and members of Parliament or provincial assemblies apparently 
still were detained without charge.
    Private jails are believed to exist in tribal and feudal areas. 
Human rights groups allege that as many as 50 private jails, housing 
some 4,500 bonded laborers, were being maintained by landlords in lower 
Sindh. Some prisoners reportedly have been held for many years. In the 
five districts of upper Sindh, landlords have been defying the courts 
and police by holding tribal jirgas, which settle feuds and award fines 
as well as the death penalty--even in jails--in defiance of provincial 
laws. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and the district 
administration in Umerkot, Sindh, attempted in April to the release of 
a family of agricultural workers from their landlord's private jail in 
Kunri. A member of the family, Mangal Bheel, escaped from the prison in 
January, and approached authorities for help.
    The Government does not use forced exile.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Until the October coup, the 
Constitution provided for an independent judiciary; however, in 
practice, the judiciary was subject to political influence under the 
Sharif Government. A series of events in 1997 led to serious concerns 
about the prestige and independence of the judiciary under the Sharif 
Government. However, under Sharif the Supreme Court demonstrated a 
continued degree of independence on a number of occasions. For example, 
the Supreme Court ruled in February that the military courts used to 
try certain civilian cases were unconstitutional. After the coup, the 
Musharraf regime pledged to respect the independence of the judicial 
system, despite having suspended the Constitution; however, Provisional 
Constitution Order Number 1, issued on October 14, provided thatall 
courts functioning at the time of the change in government would 
continue to operate, but that no court would have the power to issue 
orders against General Musharraf or any person exercising powers or 
jurisdiction under his authority, thereby effectively removing the 
actions of the Musharraf regime from judicial oversight. However, by 
year's end the Musharraf regime had not acted to limit the judiciary. 
On November 15, PML legislator Zafar Ali Shah filed a petition with the 
Supreme Court challenging the October 12 coup. At year's end, the 
Supreme Court was scheduled to hear arguments about the legality of the 
military takeover on January 31, 2000. Under both Governments low 
salaries, inadequate resources, heavy workloads, and corruption 
contribute to judicial inefficiency, particularly in the lower courts.
    The judicial system involves several different court systems with 
overlapping and sometimes competing jurisdictions. There are civil and 
criminal systems with special courts for banking, antinarcotics and 
antiterrorist cases, as well as the federal Shariat Court for certain 
Hudood offenses. The Hudood ordinances criminalize nonmarital rape, 
extramarital sex (including adultery and fornication), and various 
gambling, alcohol, and property offenses. The appeals process in the 
civil system is: civil court; district court; High Court; and the 
Supreme Court. In the criminal system, the progression is magistrate, 
sessions court, High Court, and the Supreme Court.
    The judiciary has argued that it has not been able to try and 
convict terrorist suspects in a timely manner because of poor police 
casework, prosecutorial negligence, and the resulting lack of evidence. 
In response to this problem, the Sharif Government passed the Anti-
Terrorist Act in 1997; special antiterrorist courts began operation in 
August 1997. The antiterrorist courts, designed for the speedy 
punishment of terrorist suspects, have special streamlined procedures 
but due to continued terrorist intimidation of witnesses, police, and 
judges, produced only a handful of convictions of terrorist suspects in 
1998. Under the Anti-Terrorist Act, terrorist killings are punishable 
by death and any act, including speech, intended to stir up religious 
hatred is punishable by up to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. Cases are 
to be decided within 7 working days, but judges are free to extend the 
period of time as conditions require. Trials in absentia were 
permitted, then subsequently prohibited in October 1998. Appeals to an 
appellate tribunal also were required to take no more than 7 days, but 
appellate authority since has been restored to the High and Supreme 
Courts, under which these time limits do not apply. Under the 
Antiterrorist Act, bail is not to be granted if the court has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty. Because of 
the law's bail provisions, Islamic scholar Yusuf Ali was unable to 
obtain bail. After the suspension of this provision, judges continued 
to avoid hearing his bail application. He was held in a ``C'' class 
cell from March 1997 until his release in June.
    Leading members of the judiciary, human rights groups, the press, 
and politicians from a number of parties expressed strong reservations 
about the antiterrorist courts, charging that they constitute a 
parallel judicial system and could be used as tools of political 
repression. Government officials and police believed that the deterrent 
effect of the act's death penalty provisions contributed significantly 
to a reduction in sectarian terror after its passage. The antiterrorist 
courts also are empowered to try persons accused of particularly 
``heinous'' crimes, such as gang rape and child killings, and several 
convicts have been executed under these provisions. In 1997 cases filed 
under section 295(a) of the Penal Code (one of the so-called blasphemy 
laws) were transferred to the antiterrorist courts. Human rights 
advocates feared that if blasphemy cases were tried in the 
antiterrorist courts, alleged blasphemers, who in the past normally 
were granted bail or released for lack of evidence were likely to be 
convicted, given the less stringent rules of evidence required under 
the Anti-Terrorism Act.
    In November 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the 
establishment of military courts in Karachi, which had been under 
Governor's Rule since October 1998. These courts were to try cases 
involving heinous acts and terrorism, which the Government stated were 
a serious challenge to public authority that the existing court system 
was inadequate to address. They were intended to bring swifter justice 
to the city, which had been plagued by terrorism, violence, and a 
general breakdown in law and order. Military courts began operating in 
December 1998. In January the Supreme Court ruled in an interim 
decision that military trial courts could not impose the death penalty. 
On February 17, the Supreme Court ruled that the military courts were 
unconstitutional and ordered the establishment of additional 
antiterrorist courts; however, it allowed thesentences already handed 
down by the military courts to stand. The antiterrorist courts were to 
operate under the supervision of two Supreme Court justices, and both 
courts of first instance and appellate courts were to render decisions 
within 7 days; in practice, this did not occur. In response, on April 
27, the Sharif Government promulgated an ordinance transferring cases 
from military trial courts to antiterrorist courts and expanded the 
jurisdiction to cover the same types of offenses as the military 
courts, including murder, gang rape, and child molestation. Various 
``civil commotion'' offenses (including writing graffiti and putting up 
wall posters) also were added to the jurisdiction of the antiterrorist 
courts. In August the Sharif Government again promulgated the April 
antiterrorism ordinance but dropped the injunctions against graffiti 
and wall posters. The April ordinance made strikes and go-slows illegal 
as ``civil commotion'' offenses; both were punishable by incarceration 
and fine (see Section 2.b. and Section 6). Prior to August, some 
opposition leaders and members of the human rights community feared 
that the ``civil commotion'' offenses would be used to suppress 
political dissent. In the first 7 months of the year, the military 
trial courts, which operated until mid-February, sentenced two persons 
to death in Sindh, and antiterrorism courts subsequently sentenced 42 
persons to death in the same province. Two of the sentences have been 
carried out and the rest are on appeal. On December 2, the Musharraf 
Government again modified the ATA provisions, by adding a number of 
additional offenses to the ATA, including acts to outrage religious 
feelings; efforts to ``wage war against the state''; conspiracy; acts 
committed in abetting an offense; and kidnaping or abduction to confine 
a person. By ordinance the Musharraf regime created a special 
antiterrorist court in Sindh presided over by a High Court justice 
rather than a lower level judge, as is usually the case. The amended 
provision permits the High Court justice to ``transfer . . . any case 
pending before any other special court . . . and try the case'' in his 
court. Supporters of Nawaz Sharif maintained that these changes were 
designed to assist the Musharraf regime with its prosecution of Sharif.
    The Musharraf regime also established special courts to deal with 
``accountability,'' or corruption, cases. On November 16, the Musharraf 
regime created by ordinance a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and 
special accountability courts to try corruption cases. The NAB was 
given broad powers to prosecute such cases, and the accountability 
courts were expected to try cases within 30 days. The ordinance allows 
those suspected of defaulting on government loans or of corrupt 
practices to be detained for 90 days without charge and, prior to being 
charged, does not allow access to counsel. The NAB was created in part 
to deal with as much as $4 billion (approximately PRs 208 billion) that 
it is estimated is owed to the country's banks (all of which are state-
owned) by debtors, mainly from among the wealthy elite. It was believed 
that many wealthy and politically well connected persons had taken out 
bank loans over the years with no intention of repaying them. The NAB 
has stated that it would not target genuine business failures or small 
defaulters and does not appear to have done so. In accountability 
cases, there is a presumption of guilt, and conviction under the 
ordinance can result in 14 years' imprisonment; fines; and confiscation 
of property. Those convicted also are disqualified from running for 
office or holding office for 21 years. According to unconfirmed press 
reports, the Musharraf regime made an informal decision that the 
military and the judiciary would not fall under the jurisdiction of the 
NAB. The Musharraf regime denied this. However, by year's end, no 
serving members of the military or the judiciary have been charged by 
the NAB. On November 17, the day after General Musharraf's well-
publicized 4-week grace period to repay loans expired, the military 
began arresting those suspected of defaulting on bank loans. Persons 
were arrested throughout the country on default or corruption charges; 
by year's end, it was estimated that at least 100 persons may have been 
arrested on charges of defaulting on bank loans or corruption. Those 
arrested were prominent persons, from across the business and political 
spectrums; some were also retired military personnel and government 
bureaucrats. Those included on a published list of persons charged with 
corruption by the NAB included deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and 
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. On December 27, former Punjab 
chief minister Arif Nakai was disqualified from holding office for 21 
years, after he admitted on December 18 that he took approximately 
$37,000 (PRs 1.9 million) from official accounts to finance his 
family's travel to Saudi Arabia. Nakai repaid the amount to the NAB. 
Some persons expressed concern over the concentration of power in the 
NAB, the fact that the NAB chairman is a member of the military, and 
the presumption of guilt imposed on those tried for corruption.
    The civil judicial system provides for an open trial, the 
presumption of innocence, cross-examination by an attorney, and appeal 
of sentences. Attorneys are appointed for indigents only in capital 
cases. There are no injury trials. Due to the limited number of judges, 
the heavy backlog of cases, and lengthy court procedures, cases 
routinely take years, although defendants are required to make frequent 
court appearances. Under both the Hudood and standard criminal codes, 
there are bailable and nonbailable offenses. According to the Criminal 
Procedures Code, the accused in bailable offenses must be granted bail. 
The Code also stipulates that those accused in nonbailable offenses 
should be granted bail if the crime of which they are accused carries a 
sentence of less than 10 years. Many accused, especially well-connected 
individuals who are made aware of impending warrants against them, are 
able to obtain pre-arrest bail, and thus they are spared both arrest 
and incarceration.
    The federal Shariat Court and the Shari'a bench of the Supreme 
Court severe as appellate courts for certain convictions in criminal 
court under the Hudood ordinances. The federal Shariat Court also may 
overturn any legislation judged to be inconsistent with the tenets of 
Islam. However, these cases may be appealed to the Shari'a bench of the 
Supreme Court. In two areas of NWFP--Malakand and Kohistan--Shari'a law 
was instituted beginning in January, in the first by regulation and the 
second by an ordinance. On September 20, a bill was passed by the NWFP 
Assembly that incorporated the Kohistan ordinance into law; Shari'a law 
now applies in Kohistan (see Section 2.c.).
    The judicial process continued to be impeded by bureaucratic 
inflighting, inactivity, and the overlapping jurisdictions of the 
different court systems. Heavy backlogs that severely delayed the 
application of justice remained, due to scores of unfilled judgeships 
and to archaic and inefficient court procedures. The politicized 
appointment process also holds up the promotion of many lower court 
judges to the High Courts. Although the higheer level judiciary is 
considered competent and generally honest, there are widespread reports 
of corruption among lower level magistrates and minor functionaries.
    On June 11, 16-year-old Mohammad Saleem was convicted by an 
antiterrorist court of killing three police officers; however, Saleem 
was tried and acquitted of the same charges by a court in January on 
the grounds of insufficient evidence and lack of a motive.
    On August 21, two MQM members, Mohammed Saleem and Ahmed Saeed, 
were convicted in an antiterrorist court of the 1997 killings of two 
foreign employees of Union Texas Petroleum and their driver. The two 
were sentenced to death, as well as to and approximately $40,000 (PRs 2 
million) in fines. Many questioned the fairness of the trial, since the 
convictions were based largely on the confessions of the accused; the 
confessions later were retracted on the grounds that they were obtained 
by the police through the use of torture.
    Persons in jail waiting trial sometimes are held for periods longer 
than the sentence they would receive if convicted. Court officials 
report that each judge reviews between 70 and 80 cases per day, but 
that action is taken on only 3 or 4 each week. Eighty thousand criminal 
cases were reported pending in Sindh at the end of 1997, 67,800 of 
which were in Karachi. The Law Ministry, in reply to a question in the 
National Assembly in 1997, reported that there were over 150,000 cases 
pending with the superior judiciary, which includes the Supreme Court 
and the four provincial High Courts. During the year, there are 
approximately 125,000 cases pending. Clogged lower courts exacerbate 
the situation; the majority of cases in the High Courts consist of 
appeals of lower court rulings. Once an appeal reaches the High Court, 
there are further opportunities for delay because decisions of 
individual judges frequently are referred to panels composed of two or 
three judges. There continued to be charges that magistrates and 
police, under pressure to achieve high conviction rates, persuade 
detainees to plead guilty without informing them of the consequences. 
Politically powerful persons also attempt to influence magistrates' 
decisions and have used various forms of pressure on magistrates, 
including the threat to transfer them to other assignments.
    Press reports in July noted that hundreds of prisoners remained in 
the Karachi central prison after the competition of their sentences. 
The Sindh Home Department stated that at least 10 percent of under-
trial prisoners in Karachi central prison had no access to free legal 
aid or the possibility of bail, even if qualified. Reporters 
interviewing male prisoners in 1 block discovered that 18 out of 110 
prisoners, or 16 percent, were notrepresented by attorneys. As of 
March, 6,000 cases were awaiting trial in 62 Lahore courts, with 7,000 
prisoners awaiting a court date. In 3,500 of these cases, the police 
have not yet submitted a ``challan,'' or indictment.
    The Penal Code incorporates the doctrine of Qisas (roughly, an eye 
for an eye) and Diyat (blood money). Qisas is not known to have been 
invoked; however, the Penal Code's provision for Diyat occasionally is 
applied, particularly in the NWFP, with the result that compensation is 
sometimes paid to the family of a victim in place of punishment of the 
wrongdoer. Under these ordinances only the family of the victim, not 
the State, may pardon the defendant. The Hudood, Qisas, and Diyat 
ordinances apply to both ordinary criminal courts and Shariat courts. 
According to Christian activists, if a Muslim kills a non-Muslim, he 
can compensate for the crime by paying the victim's family Diyat; 
however, a non-Muslim does not have the option of paying Diyat and must 
serve a jail sentence or face the death penalty for his crime. Failure 
to pay Diyat in non-capital cases can result in indefinitely extended 
incarceration, under Section 331 of the Diyat ordinance. In 1998 the 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan noted that there were 58 
individuals still in prison after the completion of their jail terms 
because they could not pay the Diyat. The HRCP made public the case of 
one such convict, Nosheran Khan, in the NWFP. Khan has been in prison 
since 1996 and cannot be released until he pays his Diyat fine of 
approximately $3,843 (PRs 20,000).
    Appeals of certain Hudood convictions involving penalties in excess 
of 2 years' imprisonment are referred exclusively to the Shariat courts 
and are heard jointly by Islamic scholars and High Court judges using 
ordinary criminal procedures. Judges and attorneys must be Muslim and 
be familiar with Islamic law. Within these limits, defendants in a 
Shariat court are entitled to the lawyer of their choice. There is a 
system of bail.
    The Hudood ordinances criminalize nonmarital rape, extramarital sex 
(including adultery and fornication), and various gambling, alcohol, 
and property offenses. Offenses are distinguished according to 
punishment, with some offenses liable to Hadd, or Koranic punishment 
(see Section 1.c.), and others to Tazir, or secular punishment. 
Although both types of cases are tried in ordinary criminal courts, 
special, more stringent rules of evidence apply in Hadd cases; Hadd 
punishments are mandatory if there is enough evidence to support them. 
Hadd punishments regarding sexual offences are most severe for married 
Muslims; for example, if a married Muslim man confesses to a rape or 
there are four adult male Muslim witnesses to the act, the accused 
rapist must be stoned to death; if the accused rapist is not Muslim 
and/or married, if he confesses, or if the act is witnessed by 4 adult 
males (not all Muslim), the accused must be sentenced to 100 lashes 
with a whip, and such other punishment, including death, as the Court 
may deem fit in the case. The testimony of four female witnesses, or 
that of the victim alone, is insufficient to impose Hadd punishments. 
If the evidence falls short of Hadd requirements, then the accused may 
be sentenced to a lesser class of penalties (Tazir); since it is 
difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to support the Hadd 
punishments, most rape cases are tried at the Tazir level of evidence 
and sentencing (under which a rapist may be sentenced to up to 25 years 
in prison and 30 lashes). No Hadd punishment has ever been applied in 
the 20 years that the Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir 
punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim 
offenders. Under Tazir the evidentiary requirement for financial or 
future obligations is for two male witnesses or one male and two female 
witnesses; in all other matters, the court may accept the testimony of 
one man or one woman (see Section 5).
    Administration of justice in the FATA is normally the 
responsibility of tribal elders and maliks, or leaders. They may 
conduct hearings according to Islamic law and tribal custom. In such 
proceedings the accused have no right to legal representation, bail, or 
appeal. The usual penalties consist of fines, even for murder. However, 
the Government's political agents, who are federal civil servants 
assigned to tribal agencies, oversee such proceedings and may impose 
prison terms of up to 14 years. Paramilitary forces under the direction 
of the political agents frequently perform punitive actions during 
enforcement operations. For example in raids on criminal activities, 
the authorities have been known to damage surrounding homes as 
extrajudicial punishment of residents for having tolerated nearby 
criminal activity (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.).
    In remote areas outside the jurisdiction of federal political 
agents, tribal councils occasionally levy harsher, unsanctioned 
punishments, including flogging or death by shooting or stoning.
    For example, in May a local ``jirga,'' or council, sentenced a man 
to death in Mohmand agency for the killing of relatives. The council 
also expelled the man's brother from the area. In December 1998, a 
Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-Tulaba, an extremist Islamic 
group in Orakzai Tribal Agency, fined six alleged accomplices to a 
killing and burned down their homes as punishment.
    Another related form of rough justice operating in the NWFP, 
particularly in the tribal areas, is the concept of Pakhtunwali, or the 
Pakhtun Tribal Code, in which revenge is an important element. Under 
this code, a man, his family, and his tribe are obligated to take 
revenge for wrongs--either real or perceived--in order to redeem their 
honor. More often than not, these disputes arise over women and land, 
and frequently result in violence, such as the Samia Imran case (see 
Section 5), in which a woman seeking a divorce against the wishes of 
her husband and family was shot and killed in April in the office of 
lawyer Hina Jilani, apparently at the behest of her family.
    There are limited numbers of political prisoners. Certain sections 
of the Penal Code directly target members of the Ahmadi faith. Since 
they were adopted, Ahmadis incarcerated under these provisions number 
approximately 200, according to Ahmadi sources. A number of minority 
religious groups argue that other sections of the Penal Code--
particularly the related blasphemy laws--are used in a discriminatory 
fashion by local officials or private individuals to punish religious 
minorities. While precise numbers are unavailable, the Ahmadis estimate 
that 61 of their coreligionists were charged in criminal cases ``on a 
religious basis'' as of August (see Section 2.c. and Section 5).
    Some political groups also argue that they are marked for arrest 
based on their political affiliation. The Muttahida Quami Movement, in 
particular, has argued that the Sharif Government has used 
antiterrorist court convictions in Sindh to silence its activists.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government infringes on citizen's privacy rights. 
The Anti-Terrorist Act allowed police, or military personnel acting as 
police, to enter and to search homes and offices without search 
warrants, and to confiscate property or arms likely to be used in a 
terrorist act (which is defined very broadly). This provision was never 
tested in the courts. While the Antiterrorist Act was partially 
suspended in 1998, the Government promulgated new Antiterrorism 
Ordinances in October 1998 and in April. By prior law, the police had 
to obtain a warrant to search a house, but they did not need a warrant 
to search a person. Regardless of the law, the police entered homes 
without a warrant and have been known to steal valuables during 
searches. In the absence of a warrant, a policeman is subject to 
charges of criminal trespass. However, policemen seldom are punished 
for illegal entry. In late September, the family members of persons 
sought by the police in connection with a banned opposition march 
reported forcible, warrantless searches of their homes (see Section 
2.b.).
    The Government maintains several domestic intelligence services 
that monitor politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists, 
and suspected foreign intelligence agents. Credible reports indicate 
that the authorities routinely use wiretaps and intercept and open 
mail. In his order dismissing former Prime Minister Bhutto in 1996, 
President Leghari accused the Government of massive illegal 
wiretapping, including eavesdropping on the telephone conversations of 
judges, political party leaders, and military and civilian officials. 
In 1997 the Supreme Court directed the federal Government to seek the 
Court's permission before carrying out any future wiretapping or 
eavesdropping operations. Nonetheless, that same year, a lawyer for a 
former director of the Intelligence Bureau, charged with illegal 
wiretapping during Benazir Bhutto's second term in office, presented 
the Supreme Court with a list of 12 government agencies that still 
tapped and monitored telephone calls of citizens. The case is pending 
in the Supreme Court. A press story in October 1998 quoted anonymous 
cabinet ministers who complained of wiretapping of their telephones by 
the Intelligence Bureau.
    Police sometimes arrest and detain relatives of wanted criminals in 
an attempt to compel suspects to surrender. In some cases, the 
authorities have detained entire families in order to force a relative 
who was the subject of an arrest warrant to surrender (see Section 
1.d.). In September two adult children of opposition party leaders were 
arrested in Karachi when policecould not locate their parents in a 
sweep conducted by police prior to a planned opposition march (see 
Section 2.b.).
    While the Government generally does not interfere with the right to 
marry, the Government on occasion assists influential families in 
efforts to prevent marriages entered into without the consent of the 
families involved. For example, between December 1998 and February, 
Punjabi police attempted to stop Humaira Mahmood and her husband 
Mahmood Butt from living together as man and wife. The couple were 
married legally in 1997, but Humaira's father, Abbas Khokar, a member 
of the Punjab provincial assembly, did not approve of the marriage and 
enlisted the police to help him prevent the pair from living together 
once he discovered the marriage had taken place (see Section 5). In 
July police in Kot Ghulam Mohammed (Mirpurkas district, Sindh) raided 
the home of Javed Dal and arrested his family members as hostages. Dal 
had eloped with his cousin. His wife's father, Somar Dal, used his 
influence as a member of the Sindh National Front executive committee 
to instigate the arrests, which were carried out without warrants (see 
Section 5). The authorities also fail to prosecute vigorously cases in 
which families punish members (generally women) for marrying or seeking 
a divorce against the wishes of other family members, such as in the 
case of Samia Imran, who had sought a divorce against the wishes of her 
influential father and was killed in April, apparently at the behest of 
the family (see Section 5).
    Press reports routinely describe couples who are less fortunate, 
such as Abdul Ghaffar and Shabana Bibi of Gila Deedar Singh, who were 
abducted from a Gujranwala court on May 15 by 16 armed men representing 
Shabana Bibi's parents, who opposed the match. At year's end, the 
couple's fate was not known.
    Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men 
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of 
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed 
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved (see 
Sections 2.c.).
    The Frontier Crimes Regulation, the separate legal system in the 
FATA, permits collective responsibility, and empowers the authorities 
to detain innocent members of the suspect's tribe, or blockade an 
entire village (see Section 1.d.). The Government demolished the houses 
of several alleged criminals, as well as the homes of those who 
allegedly tolerated nearby criminal activity.
    On December 13, a Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-Tulaba, 
an extremist Islamic group in Orakzai Tribal Agency, fined six alleged 
accomplices to a killing and burned down their homes as punishment (see 
Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). On December 29, riots occurred in Karachi in 
response to the demolition by security forces of up to 300 homes in the 
low income Gharibabad neighborhood, which is widely considered to be an 
MQM-Altaf stronghold. Authorities claimed that the homes were built 
without permits and that they sheltered terrorists and criminals.
    In March three young girls who had converted to Islam from 
Christianity were removed from their parent's custody by a court (see 
Section 2.c.). The girls' parents attributed the loss of their girls to 
the influence of religious extremists who packed the courtroom, and 
claim to have suffered harassment because of the case. However, the 
importance of the parent's religion in the judge's decision was not 
clear. The girls' family since has moved, and reportedly is in hiding.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and of the press, and citizens are broadly free to 
discuss public issues; however, journalists practice a degree of self-
censorship, and the situation with respect to freedom of speech and of 
the press deteriorated during the first 10 months of the year, as the 
Sharif Government attempted to silence several critics, and to 
influence directly the substance of media reporting. At year's end, the 
Musharraf regime had not attempted to exercise direct control over 
views expressed in the print media. Nonetheless, views expressed in 
editorials and commentary are often frank and pointed in their 
criticism of the Government. True investigative journalism is rare; 
instead the press acts freely to publish charges and countercharges by 
named and unnamed parties and individuals representing competing class, 
political, and social interests.
    Anyone who damages the Constitution by any act, including the 
publication of statements against the spirit of the Constitution, can 
be prosecuted for treason. However, prosecutions under this provision 
have been rare. The Constitution also prohibits the ridicule of Islam, 
the armed forces, or the judiciary. This provision served as grounds 
for the 1997 charges against the presidential candidacy of Rafiq Tarar, 
based on press statements made several years previously that were 
critical of the judiciary. The charges against Tarar later were 
dismissed.
    The Penal Code mandates the death sentence for anyone defiling the 
name of the Prophet Mohammed, life imprisonment for desecrating the 
Koran, and up to 10 years in prison for insulting another's religious 
beliefs (i.e., any religion, not just Islam) with intent to outrage 
religious feelings (see Section 2.c.). The Antiterrorist Act stipulates 
imprisonment with rigorous labor for up to 7 years for using abusive or 
insulting words, or possessing or distributing written or recorded 
material, with intent to stir up sectarian hatred. No warrant is 
required to seize such material (while the Antiterrorist Act was 
partially suspended in 1998, the Government promulgated new 
Antiterrorism Ordinances in October 1998 and in April). In November two 
journalists, Zahoor Ansari and Ayub Khoso, were sentenced to 17 years 
in prison and a fine by an antiterrorist court; they were sentenced to 
10 years under Section 295(a) and 7 years under the Antiterrorist Act. 
The journalists, who worked for the Sindhi daily newspaper Alakh, were 
charged with publishing derogatory words against the Prophet and 
insulting the religious feelings of Muslims, according to press reports 
(see Section 2.c.).
    The competitive nature of politics helps to ensure press freedom, 
since the media often serves as a forum for political parties, 
commercial, religious, and various other interests, as well as 
influential individuals, to compete with and criticize each other 
publicly. Although the press does not criticize Islam as such, leaders 
of religious parties and movements are not exempt from the public 
scrutiny and criticism routinely experienced by their secular 
counterparts. The press traditionally has avoided negative coverage of 
the armed forces, and the Office of Inter-Services Public Relations 
(ISPR) has served to hold press coverage of military matters under 
close restraint. Officially, the ISPR closely controls and coordinates 
the release of military news and access to military sources.
    Detailed public discussion of the military as an institution is 
hampered severely since any published discussion, let alone criticism, 
of the defense budget is proscribed by law. However, in 1997 this code 
of silence was undermined when a National Assembly committee, by 
discussion of defense appropriations and corruption in defense 
contracts in open session, made possible (and legal) newspaper coverage 
of the same issues. Discussion of the defense budget continued during 
the year, especially in the English language press. The resignation of 
Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat in October 1998 also was 
widely discussed in the press.
    Government leaks, while not uncommon, are managed carefully: It is 
common knowledge that journalists, who routinely are underpaid, are on 
the unofficial payrolls of many competing interests, and the military 
(or elements within it) is presumed to be no exception. Favorable press 
coverage in 1998 of the Prime Minister's family compound/hospital/
college south of Lahore was widely understood to have been obtained for 
a price. Rumors of intimidation, heavy-handed surveillance, and even 
legal action to quiet the unduly curious or nondeferential reporter are 
common. The Government has considerable leverage over the press through 
its substantial budget for advertising and public interest campaigns 
and its control over the supply of newsprint and its ability to enforce 
regulations. Human rights groups, journalists, and opposition figures 
accused the Government of attempting to silence journalists and public 
figures, especially when critical of the Prime Minister or his family. 
A number of high profile cases of arrest and intimidation of government 
critics during the year support these claims. The owners of the Jang 
newspaper group, which publishes widely read Urdu and English language 
dailies, and had published articles unflattering to the Sharif 
Government, state that the Sharif Government made a number of demands 
on the group in 1998. These demands included that Jang fire 16 senior 
journalists who were critical of the Sharif Government and replace them 
with journalists of the Sharif Government's choosing; that Jang 
publications refrain from publishing negative articles about the Sharif 
family; that Jang publications support the adoption of the 15th 
Amendment; and that Jang publications adopt a progovernment editorial 
slant. There is credible evidence thatSenator Saifur Rehman, a close 
associate of the Prime Minister and head of the Accountability Bureau, 
demanded that they be fired. The Sharif Government froze Jang group 
bank accounts, ceased placing government advertising in Jang 
newspapers, filed approximately $13 million (PRs 676 million) in income 
tax notices with the group, sealed Jang warehouses, severely limited 
Jang's access to newsprint, and raided the group's offices in December 
1998. The Sharif Government filed sedition charges against Jang 
publisher Mir Shakil Ur Rehman. Police again raided Jang premises on 
January 31, reportedly confiscating newsprint. In February the Sharif 
Government suspended its sedition case against Rehman and ceased direct 
interference with publication of Jang group newspapers. However, by 
August, Jang had modified its editorial content, stopped allowing one 
prominent journalist to use her own byline, and hired pro-Government 
journalists. At year's end, the tax charges remain outstanding.
    In May a crackdown on the press began. Prominent journalist Najam 
Sethi, editor of the weekly newspaper Friday Times, was arrested and 
detained on May 8 after an April 30 speech in New Delhi in which Sethi 
highlighted a number of crises faced by the country; the speech 
previously was published without incident in the Lahore-based Friday 
Times newspaper. Sethi also allegedly had assisted a British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reporting team that was investigating 
corruption within the Prime Minister's family. Approximately 30 
policemen broke into Sethi's home very early in the morning, beat him, 
tied up his wife, destroyed property, and detained Sethi without a 
warrant. According to press reports, Sethi was detained and 
interrogated by Government intelligence services as a suspected 
``espionage agent.'' Sethi was held incommunicado for several days and 
was denied access to an attorney. On May 13, a plainclothes police 
detachment seized over 30,000 copies of the Friday Times, essentially 
the entire press run for the week. Police produced no warrant or court 
order. On May 20, the Supreme Court ordered that Sethi be allowed 
visits with his wife. On June 1, Sethi was transferred from the custody 
of the Inter Services Intelligence Department to police custody. At 
that time, Sethi was ordered held for 7 days on police remand, pending 
a hearing by an antiterrorist court magistrate regarding charges of 
``antinational activities'' filed by a ruling party member of the 
National Assembly. On June 2, following intense international pressure 
and strong criticism from the Pakistani Supreme Court, the Attorney 
General dropped the charges against Sethi and ordered him released. 
Sethi was released the same day. However, Sharif Government pressure on 
Sethi did not end with his release from jail. Sethi was called to 
appear before the Chief Electoral Commission to defend himself against 
charges made by a ruling party member of the National Assembly that 
Sethi's name should be struck from Muslim electoral rolls. The Pakistan 
Muslim League legislator argued that Sethi was a non-Muslim as defined 
by Section 260 (3) of the Constitution, and he further argued that as a 
former federal minister, his comments in New Delhi disqualified him for 
further legislative service under Sections 62 and 63 of the 
Constitution. These sections disqualify those who ``oppose the ideology 
of Pakistan'' from serving in the National Assembly or Senate. The case 
against Sethi was dismissed by the Chief Election Commissioner on 
October 6. In June Sethi found that he had been placed on the Exit 
Control List, and reportedly was not permitted to leave the country to 
receive a human rights award in London. According to Sethi, there are 
also approximately 50 tax cases currently filed against him and his 
family.
    Other journalists also were targeted, many of whom also had 
assisted the BBC documentary team that was investigating corruption 
within the Sharif family. On May 4, the Intelligence Bureau detained 
opposition political leader and commentator Hussain Haqqani. A vocal 
critic of the Government, Haqqani highlighted wrongdoing by government 
officials in his writings, and assisted the BBC documentary team 
investigating corruption. Haqqani was held by the Intelligence Bureau 
between May 4 and May 7, based on corruption charges filed previously. 
According to Haqqani, his interrogators demanded to know why he had 
been critical of the Government and questioned him about the activities 
of Najam Sethi; Haqqani was beaten while in custody. Haqqani was 
transferred to Federal Investigative Agency custody on May 7. On May 
10, Haqqani's lawyer was allowed access to his client. Haqqani was 
released on bail on July 30. The charges are still pending. The 
authorities also harassed other journalists involved in the BBC 
documentary. Idrees Bakhtiar, the BBC's correspondent in Karachi, was 
questioned by police and subjected to a warrantless search of his home 
in February. Mehmood Ahmed Khan Lodhi, a journalist, was questioned by 
police authorities from May 2-4 concerning his involvement in the 
documentary. Lodhi was released after journalists covering the Punjab 
provincial assembly boycotted the May 4 assembly sessionto protest 
Lodhi's arrest. Imtiaz Alam, current affairs editor of The News, 
reportedly received threatening phone calls, including death threats, 
regarding his contacts with the BBC film crew; on May 5, unknown 
persons set his car on fire. Ejaz Haider, news editor at the Friday 
Times, also reported receiving death threats in early May.
    A number of journalists--including Ejaz Haider Bokhari of the 
Friday Times, Imtiaz Alam of the News, and Dawn Islamabad bureau chief 
Mohammed Ziauddin--were subjected to warnings from police or anonymous 
sources regarding their criticism of government policies. In March Dawn 
correspondent M.H. Khan was charged in Hyderabad for a story that 
showed photographs of fettered prisoners. Police looking for 
``objectionable'' material raided the Karachi home of News reporter Gul 
Nasreen Akhter. In July the news editor of the Sindhi daily Kawish was 
arrested in Kotri, apparently after criticism of the police in the 
press. On July 5, the staff of the magazine Pulse arrived at work to 
find that the offices had been broken into and raided by unknown 
persons, shortly after the magazine had published a series of stories 
detailing corruption within the Intelligence Bureau. An editorial in 
the News noted that reports of Sindhi journalists or editors being 
taken into custody ``regularly appear'' in newspapers. News reporter 
Moosa Kaleem was detained in August on unspecified charges. Journalist 
Maleeha Lodhi in January reported harassment including death threats, 
phone tapping and threatened accountability cases because of her 
position at the Jang publication The News.
    Foreign reporters also reported harassment by the Sharif Government 
during the year, after publication of stories unflattering to the 
Sharif family.
    The increasing harassment and detention of journalists during the 
first 10 months of the year led to increasing self-censorship by 
members of the press. For example, by August, the Jang group, which had 
suffered harassment earlier in the year, acceded to some of the 
Government's demands regarding its reporting, editorial content, and 
hiring, including not publishing stories critical of the Prime Minister 
and his business interests.
    Following the October 12 coup, the Musharraf regime appeared to 
cease direct efforts to manage the press, which were common under the 
Sharif Government. Articles critical of the Musharraf regime appeared 
regularly in the press. After the coup, editors and journalists 
reported no attempts by the ISPR or other government agencies to 
influence editorial content. However, some journalists continued to 
practice self-censorship as a precautionary measure, and the Supreme 
Court charged Dawn journalist Ardeshir Cowasjee with contempt of court 
on October 26 following comments Cowasjee made on television regarding 
corruption in the judiciary. The chief legal advisor to General 
Musharraf, senior National Security Council member Sharifuddin Pirzada, 
appeared as a friend of the court on behalf of Cowasjee.
    At year's end, the case had not been resolved. During a December 11 
protest against the handling of a criminal case in Lahore, the police 
beat press photographers and smashed their cameras, after photographers 
reportedly recognized a plainclothes policeman, who was hurling bricks 
into the crowd (see Section 1.c.). The following day, apparently acting 
on erroneous information, the Lahore police entered the Lahore Press 
Club and tried to block all entry and exit points in an attempt to stop 
a follow-up demonstration. The demonstration, actually scheduled for 
December 13, was held without incident.
    The State no longer publishes daily newspapers; the former Press 
Trust sold or liquidated its string of newspapers and magazines in the 
early 1990's. The Ministry of Information controls and manages the 
country's primary wire service--APP, the Associated Press of Pakistan. 
APP is both the Government's own news agency and the official carrier 
of international wire service stories to the local media. The few small 
privately owned wire services usually are circumspect in their coverage 
of sensitive domestic news and tend to follow a government line.
    A Print, Press, and Publications Ordinance, requiring the 
registration of printing presses and newspapers, was allowed to lapse 
in 1997 after several years of waning application. In practice, 
registering a new publication is a simple administrative act, and is 
not subject to political or government scrutiny.
    Foreign books must pass government censors before being reprinted. 
Books and magazines may be imported freely, but are likewise subject to 
censorship for objectionable sexual orreligious content. English 
language publications have not been affected by the direct proscription 
of books and magazines promulgated by the Chief Commissioner in 
Islamabad, who banned five Sindhi-language publications in the second 
half of 1997 for ``objectionable material against Pakistan,'' i.e., 
expressions of Sindhi nationalism.
    Privately owned newspapers freely discuss public policy and 
criticize the Government. They report remarks made by opposition 
politicians, and their editorials reflect a wide spectrum of views. The 
effort to ensure that newspapers carry their statements or press 
releases sometimes leads to undue pressure by local police, political 
parties, ethnic, sectarian, and religious groups, militant student 
organizations, and occasionally commercial interests. Such pressure is 
a common feature of journalism, and, when a group is extreme in its 
views, can include physical violence, the sacking of offices, the 
intimidation or beating of journalists, and interference with the 
distribution of newspapers. At times landlords and their agents, who 
have become accustomed to terrorizing the powerless on their lands in 
an atmosphere of impunity, also retaliate against journalists who shed 
light on their crimes. Journalists working in small provincial towns 
and villages generally can expect more difficulties from arbitrary 
local authorities and influential individuals than their big city 
counterparts. However, violence against and intimidation of journalists 
is a nationwide problem.
    The broadcast media are government monopolies. The Government owns 
and operates the bulk of radio and television stations through its two 
official broadcast bureaucracies, the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation 
and Pakistan Television (PTV). Domestic news coverage and public 
affairs programming on these broadcast media are controlled closely by 
the Government and traditionally have reflected strongly the views of 
the party in power. One private radio station, one television 
broadcaster, and a semi-private cable television operation have been 
licensed under special contractual arrangements with the Government 
(these were under investigation for possible corruption in making 
deals, but so far no irregularities have been found). The semi-private 
television station, Shalimar Television Network (STN), occasionally has 
been closed due to disputes with the Ministry of Information and to 
financial difficulties. None of these stations is permitted to produce 
news and public affairs programming; the private television station 
rebroadcasts or simulcasts the regular PTV evening news. The Shalimar 
Television Network also rebroadcasts PTV news, in addition to current 
affairs programming from foreign broadcasters, such as the British 
Broadcasting Corporation. While the STN routinely censors those 
segments considered to be socially or sexually offensive, rarely, if 
ever, are foreign news stories censored for content. In July, soon 
after STN aired news stories critical of the Sharif Government's 
handling of the Kargil crisis, the government-owned and operated 
Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) announced plans to turn the STN 
into an ``all-news'' channel, scheduled to start in October; after the 
coup, the starting date was rescheduled for March, 2000. This station 
would be under direct government control. The Prime Minister 
established strict rules regulating morality in government broadcasting 
and advertising on PTV in 1997, banning western-style dancing, male and 
female co-hosting of programs, and depictions of women washing in soap 
commercials. In January 1998, the government of Punjab stated that 
dances performed by women would be banned from television broadcasts, 
but took no steps to implement the decree. The Ministry of Information 
monitors advertising on all broadcast media, editing or removing 
advertisements deemed morally objectionable. The Secretary for 
Information was quoted in the press as stating that additional, private 
television and radio channels would soon be licensed, echoing a pledge 
made by General Musharraf. However, by year's end, no such licenses 
were granted. Satellite dishes are readily available on the local 
market and are priced within reach of almost everyone with a television 
set--well into the lower-middle classes. South Asian satellite channels 
(usually India-based) have become very important sources of news and 
information, as well as popular entertainment. On October 12, as the 
coup was occurring, television and radio programming was interrupted 
for several hours.
    Literary and creative works remain generally free of censorship. 
Dance performances, even classical performances, are subject to protest 
by certain religious groups. Obscene literature, a category broadly 
defined by the Government, is subject to seizure. Dramas and 
documentaries on previously taboo subjects, including corruption, 
social privilege, narcotics, violence against women, and female 
inequality, are broadcast on television, but some sensitive series have 
been cancelled before broadcast.
    The Government and universities generally respect academic freedom. 
The atmosphere of violence and intolerance fostered by student 
organizations, typically tied to political parties, continued to 
threaten academic freedom, despite the fact that a 1992 Supreme Court 
ruling prohibits student political organizations on campuses. On some 
campuses, well-armed groups of students, primarily from radical 
religious organizations, clash with and intimidate other students, 
instructors, and administrators on matters of language, syllabus, 
examination policies, grades, doctrine, and dress. These groups 
facilitate cheating on examinations, interfere in the hiring of staff 
at the campuses, control new admissions, and sometimes control the 
funds of their institutions. At Punjab University, the largest 
university in the province, Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba (IJT--the student 
wing of the religious political party Jamaat-i-Islami) imposes its 
self-defined code of conduct on teachers and other students. On 
December 21, 18 persons at Quaid-e-Azam University were injured in a 
clash between Pakhtun and Sindhi students at the university. There have 
been no arrests in connection with the incident.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution 
provides for freedom ``to assemble peacefully and without arms subject 
to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of public 
order;'' however, while the Government generally permits peaceful 
assembly, it occasionally interferes with large rallies, which are held 
by all political parties. Since 1984 Ahmadis have been prohibited from 
holding any conferences or gatherings.
    District magistrates occasionally exercised their power under the 
Criminal Procedures Code to ban meetings of more than four persons when 
demonstrations seemed likely to result in violence. During the year, 
police made preventive arrests of political party organizers prior to 
announced demonstrations. In August police detained as many as 2,500 
workers of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the MQM in Sindh 
several days before a planned September 4 strike organized by the PPP. 
On September 24, Sindh provincial authorities prohibited a march that 
was to be held by opposition parties on September 25. Police blocked 
off the starting point for the march and detained hundreds of MQM and 
PPP activists and senior leaders prior to the event, as well as in the 
days immediately after it was to have occurred. Among those detained 
was MQM Senator Nasreen Jalil, who was arrested at her home on 
September 24 and held incommunicado for several days; she was released 
on September 29. The family members of those sought by the authorities 
reported forcible, warrantless searches, and at least two adult 
children of absent opposition party leaders were arrested when police 
could not locate their parents (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.). In October 
the authorities blocked a march planned by the Jammu and Kashmir 
Liberation Front in Kashmir. Police arrested as many as 250 activists 
prior to and during the planned event.
    The MQM has been harassed in its regular political activities, 
especially by the Sindh police. In one of several such incidents, the 
police cordoned off the MQM headquarters (``nine zero'') on July 31 and 
surrounded a residential area. Persons living in the area were barred 
from leaving for work, and visitors were not allowed to enter. On the 
same day, according to the MQM, a busload of supporters coming from 
Nawabshah to support an MQM hunger strike was stopped near nine zero 
and told to leave Karachi. On August 14, as party members enforced a 
strike by threatening shopkeepers with pistols in Hyderabad, police 
beat MQM marchers. However, larger and more prominent demonstrations, 
such as the party's August 14 Independence Day march to the tomb of 
Pakistan's founder, took place with only minimal harassment.
    In August the Government issued a new ordinance related to the 
antiterrorism courts (see Section 1.e.). One section of the ordinance 
made ``illegal strikes, go-slows, (or) lock outs . . .'' punishable by 
up to 7 years' imprisonment and a fine. A wide spectrum of opposition 
groups opposed this measure, fearing that it would be used to silence 
legitimate dissent. Some groups argued that the ordinance was adopted 
specifically to counter opposition plans to organize a strike on 
September 4.
    Police sometimes used excessive force against demonstrators. In 
September, large numbers of police were deployed in Karachi in 
preparation for a September 4 opposition strike. The police killed two 
MQM activists. On September 4, police used water cannons, teargas, and 
batons to counter a PPP sit-in in Karachi on September 12. On September 
25, persons who attempted to hold a march, which had been prohibited, 
were dispersed by police, who beat and used tear gas against them. In 
October police usedforce to disperse a planned march by the Jammu and 
Kashmir Liberation Front in Kashmir.
    The authorities sometimes prevented leaders of politico-religious 
parties from traveling to certain areas if they believed that the 
presence of such leaders would increase sectarian tensions or cause 
public violence. In April, the leader of the Tehrik-i-Nefaz-i-Shariat-
i-Mohammadi (TNSM), Mullah Sufi Mohammad, was released from house 
arrest in Malakand. In April meetings of five or more persons were 
banned in Malakand division, but were lifted shortly afterwards when 
Sufi agreed to address only his party's meetings. In September Jamiat 
Ulema-i-Islami leader Fazlur Rehman was placed under house arrest by 
the Sharif Government to prevent him from traveling to NWFP tribal 
areas to address a political rally (see Section 1.d.). In November the 
Musharraf regime also briefly placed Rehman under house arrest to 
prevent him from leading a political demonstration in the NWFP.
    The Constitution provides for freedom of association subject to 
restriction by government ordinance and law; however, while these 
ordinances and laws apparently have not been used since the martial law 
period, the Sharif Government targeted the activities of NGO's, 
revoking the licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in Punjab. In November, the 
government of Punjab lifted the ban on the registration of NGO's 
imposed under the Sharif Government, but the NGO's previously 
delicensed remained so at year's end. There are no banned groups or 
parties.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--Pakistan is an Islamic republic in which 
approximately 95 percent of the population is Muslim, and while the 
Constitution grants citizens the right to ``profess, practice, and 
propagate'' their religion, the Government imposes limits on freedom of 
religion. The majority of the population is Sunni Muslim, but 20 to 25 
percent of the population is Shi'a. The Constitution requires that laws 
be consistent with Islam and imposes some elements of Koranic law on 
both Muslims and religious minorities. While there is no law 
establishing the Koranic death penalty for apostates (those who convert 
from Islam), social pressure against such an action is so powerful that 
most such conversions take place in secret. Reprisals and threats of 
reprisals against suspected converts are common. Members of religious 
minorities are subject to violence and harassment, and police at times 
refuse to prevent such actions or charge persons who commit them. For 
example, according to the HRCP, in one case prior to 1999, Muhammad 
Akram was threatened with death by an influential local religious 
organization after he joined the Ahmadiyya community, whose members are 
regarded as non-Muslims under the Constitution. The threat was 
published on the organization's own letterhead, but no legal action has 
been taken against the group.
    ``Islamiyyat'' (Islamic studies) is compulsory for all Muslim 
students in state-run schools. Students of other faiths are not 
required to study Islam but are not provided with parallel studies in 
their own religion. In practice many non-Muslim students are compelled 
by teachers to complete the Islamiyyat studies. An education policy 
announced by the Government in 1998 included provisions for increased 
mandatory Islamic instruction in public schools.
    Minority religious groups feared that the explicit constitutional 
imposition of Shari'a (Islamic law) favored by the Prime Minister in 
his proposed 15th amendment and his goal of Islamizing government and 
society might further restrict the freedom to practice non-Islamic 
religions. The Sharif Government countered that the proposed amendment 
contained specific language protecting the rights of minorities. In two 
areas of the NWFP--in Malakand and Kohistan--Shari'a law was instituted 
beginning in January, in the first by regulation and the second by an 
ordinance. On September 20, a bill was passed by the NWFP Assembly that 
incorporated the Kohistan ordinance in into law; Shari'a law now 
applies in Kohistan (see Section 1.e.). On December 23, the Supreme 
Court ruled that interest is un-Islamic and directed the Government to 
implement an interest-free financial system by June, 2001. 
Discriminatory religious legislation has added to an atmosphere of 
religious intolerance, which has led to acts of violence directed 
against minority Muslim sects, as well as against Christians, Hindus, 
and members of Muslim offshoot sects such as Ahmadis and Zikris (see 
Section 5). Since the coup, no action has been taken on the 15th 
amendment.
    Then-Prime Minister Sharif spoke out in support of the rights of 
religious minorities, and hosted a Christmas dinner in 1997 for 1,200 
persons. In September, the Government removed colonial-eraentries for 
``sect'' from government job application forms to prevent 
discrimination in hiring. However, the faith of some, particularly 
Christians, often can be ascertained from their names. General 
Musharraf and members of his staff apparently consulted with religious 
minorities on some cabinet appointments.
    In February 1997, a mob looted and burned the Christian village of 
Shantinagar in Punjab. Local police participated in the attack and are 
suspected of having instigated the riot by inventing spurious charges 
that a Christian man had desecrated a copy of the Koran. Hundreds of 
homes and a dozen churches were destroyed, and 20,000 persons were left 
homeless. The central Government took immediate relief action, 
deploying troops briefly to restore order, and the Prime Minister 
visited the village. The Government has rebuilt damaged and destroyed 
homes, but has not provided compensation for personal property lost in 
the incident. The villagers remain fearful of further attacks, and the 
police officers believed to be responsible for the riot, though 
transferred and briefly suspended, have not faced criminal sanctions. 
The 86 persons who were charged with offenses related to the attack 
remain free on bail and there was no indication that authorities 
planned to bring them to trial.
    In March 1998, a district court in Rawalpindi removed three 
sisters, ages 11 to 15, who had converted from Christianity to Islam, 
from the custody of their Christian parents. The importance of the 
parents' religion in the judge's decision, however, was not clear. A 
subsequent court decision in March, over the parents' objections, 
awarded custody of the two youngest girls to their older sister (who 
reportedly had converted to Islam) and her Muslim husband; the eldest 
of the three girls reportedly had married her attorney. The girl's 
parents attributed the loss of their girls to the influence of 
religious extremists who packed the courtroom, and claim to have 
suffered harassment because of the case. The girls' family since has 
moved, and reportedly is in hiding.
    The Ahmadis are subject to specific restrictions under law. A 1974 
Constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority 
because, according to the Government, they do not accept Mohammed as 
the last prophet of Islam. However, Ahmadis regard themselves as 
Muslims and observe Islamic practices. In 1984 the Government inserted 
Section 298(c) into the Penal Code, prohibiting Ahmadis from calling 
themselves Muslim and banning them from using Islamic words, phrases, 
and greetings. The constitutionality of Section 298(c) was upheld in a 
split-decision Supreme Court case in 1996. The punishment for violation 
of this section is imprisonment for up to 3 years and a fine. This 
provision has been used extensively by the Government and anti-Ahmadi 
religious groups to harass Ahmadis. Ahmadis continue to suffer from a 
variety of restrictions of religious freedom and widespread societal 
discrimination, including violation of their places of worship, being 
barred from burial in Muslim graveyards, denial of freedom of faith, 
speech, and assembly, and restrictions on their press. Several Ahmadi 
mosques remained closed. Since 1984, Ahmadis have been prohibited from 
holding any conferences or gatherings. Tabloid-style Urdu newspapers 
also frequently whip up popular emotions against Ahmadis by running 
``conspiracy'' stories.
    Section 295(a), the blasphemy provision of the Penal Code, 
originally stipulated a maximum 2-year sentence for insulting the 
religion of any class of citizens. This sentence was increased to 10 
years in 1991. In 1982 Section 295(b) was added, which stipulated a 
sentence of life imprisonment for ``whoever willfully defiles, damages, 
or desecrates a copy of the holy Koran.'' In 1986 another amendment, 
Section 295(c), established the death penalty or life imprisonment for 
directly or indirectly defiling ``the sacred name of the holy prophet 
Mohammed.'' In 1991 a court struck down the option of life 
imprisonment. These laws, especially Section 295(c), have been used by 
rivals and the authorities to threaten, punish, or intimidate Ahmadis, 
Christians, and even orthodox Muslims. No one has been executed by the 
State under any of these provisions, although religious extremists have 
killed some persons accused under them. Since 1996 magistrates have 
been required to investigate allegations of blasphemy to see whether 
they are credible before filing formal charges. During the year, the 
Ministry of Religious Affairs announced the creation of ``Peace 
Committees'' to review charges of blasphemy before the police can act 
on them; however, these committees are not yet operative. On September 
8, Ataulla Waraich was arrested and charged under Section 298(b) after 
he constructed an Ahmadi mosque on his property; during the year, Qim 
Ali was charged with violating Section 298(c) because he stated that he 
was a Muslim, and Dr. Abdul Ghani Ahmadi was charged under Sections 
295(a), 295(c), 298(c) for preaching. In September 1998, aShi'a Muslim, 
Ghulam Akbar, was convicted of blasphemy in Rahimyar Khan, Punjab, for 
allegedly making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed in 1995. 
He was sentenced to death, the first time a Muslim had been sentenced 
to death for a violation of the blasphemy law. The case remained under 
appeal as of June 30; there was no further information on the case at 
year's end. Ghulam Hussain, a Shi'a Muslim, received a 30-year jail 
sentence and a $1,500 (PRs 75,000) fine for blasphemy against the 
companions of the prophet.
    According to Ahmadi sources, 80 Ahmadis were implicated in criminal 
cases on a ``religious basis'' (including blasphemy) in 22 cases 
between January and early December; 44 Ahmadis were charged with 
violating blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws during 1998. According to 
these sources, a total of 195 Ahmadis have been charged under the law 
since its inception. A Christian organization, the National Commission 
for Justice and Peace (NCJP), used public sources to compile lists of 
accused under the blasphemy law. By the NCJP's statistics, 14 incidents 
involving accusations of blasphemy on the part of Muslims took place 
between January and June. Ghulam Mustafa, an Ahmadi religious teacher, 
was charged for preaching on February 15 under Sections 298(c) and 
295c. Intizar Ahmad Bajwa was charged in Purur under 298(c) on May 19. 
On June 21, three Ahmadis were arrested and another three were charged 
with blasphemy in Sheikupura, Punjab. Seven Ahmadis were charged in 
Bakhoo Bhatti, Punjab, with blasphemy on July 3. Mustaq Ahmad Saggon 
and Nasir Ahmad, two Ahmadis, were charged in Muzaffargarh on July 19 
under Section 295 for preaching and distribution of religious 
literature. The case has been transferred to an antiterrorist court at 
Dera Ghazi Khan. On July 30, according to Ahmadi sources, a 
subdivisional magistrate ordered an Ahmadi mosque sealed in Naseerabad, 
Sindh; it remained sealed at year's end. Three Ahmadis were convicted 
of blasphemy in December 1997. Abdul Qadeer, Muhammad Shahbaz, and 
Ishfaq Ahmad were found guilty of violating Section 295(c) and 
sentenced to life imprisonment and $1,250(PRs 50,000) fines. Lawyers 
for the men have appealed the decision to the Lahore High Court, whose 
ruling had not been issued by year's end. The Lahore High Court has 
turned down an application for bail while this appeal is under 
consideration. Their request for bail has been taken to the Supreme 
Court, which has not yet given a date for a bail hearing. In the 
meantime, the men are serving their sentences in the Sheikhupura jail. 
A number of other persons are in jails awaiting trial on blasphemy 
charges. A Muslim religious scholar, Muhammad Yusuf Ali, was charged 
under Sections 295(a) and (c) and was jailed in a class ``C'' cell from 
March 1997 until his release in June. Due to threats by religious 
extremists, his wife had to resign from her job as a professor and go 
into hiding with their children.
    On December 14, a group of several hundred persons looted and 
burned property in Haveli Lakha, Okara district, Punjab that belonged 
to Mohammad Nawaz, a local Ahmadi leader accused of planning to build 
an Ahmadi house of worship. A neighbor reportedly incited the incident 
by accusing Nawaz of building the house of worship after the two were 
involved in a property dispute. Nawaz, a doctor, reportedly intended to 
build a free standing clinic next to his home. The mob destroyed the 
clinic, which was under construction, and looted and burned Nawaz's 
home. Police arrived at the scene, but did nothing to stop the crowd. 
By year's end, neither the neighbor nor anyone in the crowd had been 
arrested or questioned in connection with the incident, and police had 
taken no steps to find or return any of Nawaz's property. However, 
Nawaz and his two sons were arrested by the police on December 15 and 
charged with blasphemy. On December 20, Nawaz and his sons were granted 
bail, but the blasphemy case against them was pending at year's end. 
Other Ahmadis in Haveli Lakha also were charged with blasphemy in 
connection with the incident, even though they were not in the town at 
the time. Abdul Sattar Chaudhry, Muhammad Yar Jandeka, and Nasir 
Jandeka were charged under Section 298(c) for declaring themselves 
Muslims.
    The predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center of Rabwah often 
has been a site of violence against Ahmadis (see Section 5). On 
November 17, 1998, the Punjab assembly unanimously passed a resolution 
to change the name of the Punjab town that serves as the administrative 
religious center of the Ahmadi community from ``Rabwah'' to ``Chenab 
Nagar.'' The son of a prominent Muslim fundamentalist filed charges in 
March against prominent Ahmadi leaders in Rabwah. He charged that Mirza 
Masroor Ahmad, the country's senior Ahmadi leader, and retired Colonel 
Ayyaz Mahmud, the leader of the Ahmadis in Rabwah, had directed Ahmadi 
activists to cross out the name Chenab Nagar on a recently installed 
plaque and write in Rabwah. The plaque also contained Koranic verses. 
The Ahmadi leaders denied this allegation. On April 30, Ahmad and three 
of his colleagues werearrested on blasphemy charges for allegedly 
inciting the desecration of the plaque. The blasphemy charges against 
three of the four eventually were dropped, and the four were released 
after spending more than a week in jail. However, Ahmad still faces 
charges under Section 295(c), and the three others still face criminal 
charges under the Maintenance of Public Order Act.
    In October Shafiq Masih, a Christian, was acquitted of a blasphemy 
charge under Section 295(c), but was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment 
under Section 295(a) for having uttered derogatory comments against the 
Prophet Mohammed; he is appealing the decision. In December Hussain 
Masih, a Christian charged with blasphemy under Section 295(c), was 
granted bail due to lack of evidence, according to Christian activists. 
Masih, his son Isaac, and Sehr Ghuri had been accused in November 1998 
of making derogatory remarks against the Prophet Mohammed and against 
the Muslim community. Ghuri was previously released on bail; Isaac 
Masih never surrendered to the authorities. Ayub Masih (a Christian 
detained since October 1996) was convicted of blasphemy under Section 
295(c) for making favorable comments about Salman Rushdie, author of 
the controversial book ``The Satanic Verses'' and was sentenced to 
death in April 1998. Ayub's family and 13 other landless Christian 
families were forced from their village in 1996 following the charges. 
Masih survived an attempt on his life in 1997, when he was shot at 
outside of the courtroom while on trial. Although the case was pending 
appeal before the Lahore High Court, Ayub's principal defender, 
Faisalabad Roman Catholic bishop and human rights activist John Joseph, 
committed suicide in May 1998 with a handgun outside the Sahiwal court 
where Ayub had been convicted, to protest the conviction. The High 
Court appeal is still pending. Following the Bishop's suicide, there 
were violent incidents in Faisalabad and Lahore, involving both 
Christian and Muslim perpetrators. Another Christian, Ranjha Masih, was 
charged with blasphemy during one of these incidents after throwing 
rocks at an Islamic sign; he remains in a Faisalabad prison. Nazir 
Masih, a Christian arrested and charged under Sections 298 and 298(a) 
in August 1998 for allegedly insulting the daughter of the Prophet 
Mohammed, was released on bail during the year.
    In March a judge in the antiterrorist court of Muzaffargarh 
sentenced Muhammad Ishaq to 17 years in jail and a $2,000 (PRs 100,000) 
fine for propagating ``un-Islamic'' ideas. Ishaq was a member of the 
association of Partisans of Islam. In November two journalists, Zahoor 
Ansari and Ayub Khoso, were sentenced to 17 years in prison and a fine 
by an antiterrorist court. The journalists, who worked for the Sindhi 
daily newspaper Alakh, were charged with publishing derogatory words 
against the Prophet and insulting the religious feelings of Muslims, 
according to press reports (see Section 2.a.).
    Sectarian violence and tensions continued to be a serious problem 
throughout the country. One newspaper reported that there have been 300 
persons killed in sectarian violence in Punjab in the last 2 years (see 
Section 1.a.). However, sectarian violence decreased after the October 
12 coup.
    In April Prime Minister Sharif established a 10-member committee of 
religious scholars whose declared purpose was to eliminate growing 
sectarian terrorism and religious dissension in the country. The 
committee collapsed after a few weeks because Shi'a leaders were 
unhappy with the committee chairman, Dr. Israr Ahmad, head of the 
Tanzeem-e-Islami, who reportedly has a reputation for religious 
intolerance. In the same month, President Rafiq Tarar chaired a seminar 
in Lahore to foster better understanding between Christians and 
Muslims. At this interfaith gathering, participants discussed 
reconciliation efforts since the February 1997 anti-Christian violence 
in the Christian community of Shantinagar in Punjab, in which mobs 
looted and burned the village. Hundreds of homes and a dozen churches 
were destroyed, and 20,000 persons were left homeless.
    However, after the coup, sectarian violence decreased. General 
Musharraf emphasized the rights of religious minorities in his 
speeches, and the Musharraf Government stated that it was committed to 
protecting the rights of religious minorities. According to persons in 
religious minority communities, the Musharraf Government made efforts 
to seek minority input into decision-making and offered cabinet 
positions to individuals from religious minority communities. General 
Musharraf appointed an Islamic religious scholar to the National 
Security Council.
    When blasphemy and other religious cases are brought to court, 
extremists often pack the courtroom and make public threats about the 
consequences of an acquittal. As a result, judges and magistrates, 
seeking to avoid a confrontation with theextremists, often continue 
trials indefinitely, and the accused is burdened with further legal 
costs and repeated court appearances. Many judges also seek to pass the 
cases to other jurists. Prior to his killing in 1997, Lahore High Court 
justice Arif Iqbal Hussain Bhatti, one of the two judges who in 1995 
ruled to acquit accused Christian blasphemers Salamat and Rehmat Masih, 
received several death threats from Islamic extremist groups. Bhatti's 
killer, presumed to be a religious extremist, was arrested during the 
year, and is being held in Camp Jail in Lahore.
    The Government distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims with 
regard to political rights. In national and local elections, Muslims 
cast their votes for Muslim candidates by geographic locality, while 
non-Muslims can cast their votes only for at-large non-Muslim 
candidates. Legal provisions for minority reserved seats do not extend 
to the Senate and the Federal Cabinet, which currently are composed 
entirely of Muslims. Furthermore, according to the Constitution, the 
President and the Prime Minister must be Muslim. The Prime Minister, 
federal ministers, and ministers of state, as well as elected members 
of the Senate and National Assembly (including non-Muslims) must take a 
religious oath to ``strive to preserve the Islamic ideology, which is 
the basis for the creation of Pakistan'' (see Section 3).
    Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men 
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of 
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed 
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved.
    The Government designates religion on passports. In order to get a 
passport, citizens must declare whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim; 
Muslims must also affirm that they accept the unqualified finality of 
the prophethood of Mohammed and declare that Ahmadis are non-Muslims.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Most citizens enjoy freedom of movement 
within the country and the freedom to travel abroad; however, the 
Government limits these rights. The authorities at times prevent 
political party leaders from traveling to certain parts of the country; 
on September 3, the Government placed Fazlur Rehman, the leader of one 
faction of the religious party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami, under house 
arrest to prevent him from traveling to the NWFP tribal areas to attend 
a political rally. He was released 3 days later (see Section 2.b.). 
Travel to Israel is prohibited by law. Government employees and 
students must obtain ``no objection'' certificates before travelling 
abroad, although this requirement rarely is enforced against students. 
Citizens regularly exercise the right to emigrate. However, an Exit 
Control List (ECL), which is constantly being revised, is used to 
prevent the departure of wanted criminals and individuals under 
investigation for defaulting on loans, corruption, or other offenses. 
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan estimated that there were 1,738 
individuals reportedly on the ECL in late 1998, including 56 
parliamentarians. As of early November, the press reported that as many 
as 8,000 persons suspected of corruption were believed to be on the 
ECL, many of them placed there by the Musharraf regime. After the coup, 
all parliamentarians also were placed on the ECL. No judicial action is 
required to add a name to the ECL, and there is no judicial recourse or 
formal appeal mechanism if one's name is added. The process for adding 
names to the list is not open to public scrutiny. Zafaryab Ahmed, a 
prominent human rights activist, was placed on the ECL in 1998 and was 
not allowed to leave the country until December 1998. However, in some 
instances, courts have directed the Government to lift restrictions on 
some ECL-listed politicians' travel abroad. For example, Benazir 
Bhutto, former Prime Minister and leader of the PPP, was placed on the 
ECL and was prevented from leaving the country in December 1998. Bhutto 
was allowed to leave later that month following a court order to the 
Government to lift the travel restriction against her.
    The Sharif Government continued to use ECL authority to harass 
opponents and assist the politically powerful. Politicians who angered 
the Sharif Government were regularly placed on the Exit Control List, 
often hearing about the restriction only when attempting to board 
international flights. Journalist Najam Sethi, who was charged with 
treason by the Sharif Government (see Section 2.a.), also was placed on 
the ECL, and reportedly was not permitted to leave the country in June 
to receive a human rights award in London. According to press reports, 
Syed Qamar Abbas, a former member of the NWFP assembly, was placed 
onthe ECL while he was on trial for murder; he was removed after his 
acquittal. The ECL sometimes is used by the politically powerful in 
connection with personal disputes. Humaira Mahmood, a woman who married 
in defiance of her father's wishes, was placed arbitrarily on the ECL 
in December 1998 by her influential father. In January she and her 
husband were arrested when trying to leave Pakistan from Karachi 
airport. The couple eventually was allowed to depart Pakistan following 
intervention by the Lahore High Court (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 5).
    The Musharraf regime stepped up the use of the ECL, particularly to 
prevent those suspected of loan defaults or corruption from leaving the 
country. According to press reports, over 3,000 names were added to the 
exit control list after the Musharraf regime came to power. The focus 
apparently was on potential loan defaulters, as part of the Musharraf 
regime's emphasis on accountability. The army enforced the ECL, 
especially after the expiration of the grace period for the repayment 
of defaulted loans on November 17. After October 12, there continued to 
be periodic reports of persons denied permission to travel. The 
Musharraf regime refused permission for former senator and human rights 
activist Nasreen Jalil to travel to a conference on penal reform held 
in Nepal in November. Human rights activist Asma Jehangir also was 
prevented from attending a meeting in Kosovo in December, in her 
capacity as U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings.
    Pakistan has not signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees and has not adopted domestic legislation concerning the 
treatment of refugees. In December the office of the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted a change in the practice of 
granting ``prima facie'' status to all Afghans in the country; under 
the new policy, all refugee determinations are to be made on a case by 
case basis. Means for screening Afghan refugees have not yet been 
established, but the shift in policy implies an increase in the number 
of Afghans to be repatriated and a decrease in the admission of new 
arrivals.
    The Government cooperates with the office of the UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. First asylum has been 
provided to refugees from Afghanistan since 1979, when several million 
Afghans fleeing Soviet occupation poured across the border. There still 
are believed to be 1.2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan who have 
been granted first asylum. In addition to refugees recognized and 
assisted by UNHCR, a large number of unregistered Afghans are believed 
to live in the country, mostly in urban areas.
    The Government has not granted permanent legal resettlement to 
Afghan refugees but allows them to live and work in Pakistan. Many are 
self-supporting and live outside of refugee camps, which has resulted 
in some hostility among local communities, whose residents believe that 
Afghans take job opportunities from them and contribute to crime in the 
country. On June 13, police in Peshawar swept Afghan shop keepers and 
their patrons out of the Hayatabad Kar Khanah market area, demolishing 
stalls as they went, and beating persons who resisted. This incident, 
along with the March press reports concerning the possible confinement 
of refugees to camps and the April relocation of Afghan refugees from 
the Nasir Bagh camp, led some to fear an attempt by the provincial 
government to make life more difficult for Afghan refugees and thus to 
encourage them to return to Afghanistan. The press reported on similar 
initiatives in Islamabad and Rawalpindi in November and December, but 
these plans had not been implemented by year's end. At the same time, 
authorities in Quetta detained a number of newly arrived Afghans, 
mostly non-Pakhtun minorities, with plans to deport them. UNHCR was 
permitted to screen a number of these detainees and those determined to 
be refugees were not deported.
    Most refugee villages (camps) are well established, and living 
conditions resemble conditions in neighboring Pakistani villages, 
although assistance to the refugee villages has dropped off 
considerably since the early 1990's. Most recent arrivals have moved to 
urban areas such as Peshawar and Quetta, but some have been located in 
camps such as New Akora Khattak camp, established in 1996. Conditions 
for newly arrived Afghans are less favorable than for refugees in the 
long-established camps. For example, sanitation, health care, shelter, 
and fresh water have been ongoing problems in New Akora Khattak, 
although new shelters, schools, and health facilities were established 
during the year. Some of the most recently arrived families still 
reside in makeshift tent dwellings. On April 23, the office of the 
Commissioner for Afghan Refugees began relocating 874 Afghan refugees 
from Nasir Bagh camp to make room for construction of a new highway. 
Some of these refugees were sent to New Akora Khattak camp. However, 
many reportedly returned toAfghanistan or moved to other locations in 
Pakistan. The relocation effort later slowed in 1999.
    According to the UNHCR, there were no reports of the forced return 
of persons to a country where they feared persecution. The Government 
is cooperating with the UNHCR to support voluntary repatriation of 
Afghans to rural areas of Afghanistan considered to be safe. During the 
year, approximately 92,000 Afghans returned to Afghanistan; in 1998, 
approximately 93,000 Afghans returned to Afghanistan.
    Afghan refugees have limited access to legal protection and depend 
on the ability of the UNHCR and leaders of their groups to resolve 
disputes among themselves and with Pakistanis. Police frequently 
attempt to prevent Afghan nationals from entering cities, and there are 
reports that some have been forced back into refugee camps. Most able-
bodied male refugees have found at least intermittent employment, but 
they are not covered by labor laws. Women and girls obtained better 
education and health care than is currently available in Afghanistan 
from NGO's who provided services. However, Afghan women working for 
NGO's occasionally have been targets for harassment and violence by 
conservatives, including Taliban sympathizers, in the Afghan refugee 
community.
    Afghan moderates also reportedly have been the targets of 
harassment and violence from conservatives in the Afghan refugee 
community, including Taliban or Taliban sympathizers. On January 12 in 
Peshawar, the wife and son of well-known Afghan moderate Abdul Haq were 
shot and killed in their sleep by unknown assailants. Haq is well known 
for his efforts to promote an intra-Afghan dialog; his brother was a 
former governor in Afghanistan who has joined forces with Ahmad Shah 
Masood against the Taliban. On March 27, Mohammed Jehanzeb, the 
secretary of Abdul Haq's brother (and Taliban opponent) Haji Qadir, was 
shot and killed by unknown assailants in Peshawar. On July 14, moderate 
Afghan tribal leader and former senator Abdul Ahmad Karzai was shot and 
killed by two gunmen while returning home from prayers at a local 
mosque. Between January 1998 and January 1999, it was estimated that up 
to 12 Afghan moderates or former members of the Communist Party were 
killed by unknown assailants (see Section 1.a.). Among those reported 
killed were Dagarwal Basir, General Nazar Mohammed, Dagarwal Latif, 
Hashim Paktyanai, General Shirin Agha, and General Rahim.
    By year's end, there had been no arrests or convictions in 
connection with any these killings. On December 4, a fire was 
reportedly set at the home of an Afghan moderate active in the intra-
Afghan dialog movement in the Shamsatu refugee camp in Peshawar. The 
moderate's car and part of the moderate's residential compound were 
burned, but no one was injured.
    The resettlement of Biharis continued to be a contentious issue. 
The Biharis are Urdu-speakers from the Indian state of Bihar who went 
to East Pakistan--now Bangladesh--at the time of partition in 1947. 
When Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan in 1971, the Biharis 
indicated a preference for resettlement in Pakistan. Since that time, 
approximately 250,000 Biharis have been in refugee camps in Bangladesh. 
While the Mohajir community--descendants of Muslims who immigrated to 
present-day Pakistan from India during partition--supports 
resettlement, the Sindhi community opposes it. In 1993 the Government 
flew 342 Biharis to Pakistan and placed them in temporary housing in 
central Punjab. No further resettlement has occurred.
    Tens of thousands of persons reportedly left their homes on both 
sides of the line of control during the Kargil conflict; 100 villages 
on the Pakistani side of the line of control were reportedly evacuated 
in mid-June. In June there reportedly were 14,000 displaced persons 
from Indian-held Kashmir living in 20 camps on the Pakistani side of 
the line of control.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Until the military coup on October 12, citizens had the right and 
the ability to change their government peacefully. With certain 
exceptions, citizens 21 years of age and over had the right to vote. 
However, several million nomads and bonded laborers could not vote 
because the National Election Commission had ruled that they did not 
``ordinarily reside in an electoral area'', nor [did] they own or 
possess ``a dwelling or immovable property in that area.'' Bonded 
laborers with an address and an identity card were eligible to vote. 
Political parties were allowed to operate freely after the full lifting 
of martial law in 1988. Unregistered political parties were permitted 
to participate in elections. Members of the national and provincial 
assemblies were elected directly. The Constitution required that the 
President and the Prime Minister be Muslims.
    Even before the coup, the Chief of the Army Staff historically had 
exercised influence on many major policy decisions. After the 
imposition of a military government, the Constitution was suspended and 
representative bodies, including the National Assembly, the Senate, and 
the provincial assemblies, were suspended indefinitely. However, the 
Musharraf regime did not ban political parties, and the parties active 
prior to the coup, including the Pakistan Muslim League, continued 
their activities. The Musharraf regime pledged to return to democracy, 
but did not provide a timetable for elections by year's end. In 
December General Musharraf stated that local elections would be held by 
the end of 2000. Other senior government officials believe that these 
elections could be held as early as September 2000. General Musharraf 
also pledged to carry out electoral reforms, including the appointment 
of an autonomous electoral commission and the reconstitution of 
accurate, comprehensive electoral rolls, but took no action to 
implement such reforms by year's end. General Musharraf appointed a 
cabinet in late October and early November. Musharraf also appointed 
new governors in all four provinces in October.
    National elections for national and provincial assemblies last were 
held in February 1997. Election observers, including teams from the 
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and groups representing the 
European Union, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the South Asian 
association for regional cooperation, concluded that the elections were 
generally ``free and fair'' with no evidence of systemic or widespread 
abuse of the electoral process. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan 
Muslim League won a majority of seats and formed a government.
    Elections for local government bodies were held in Punjab in May 
1998. Although ruling party candidates won the most seats, the 
provincial government did not name chairmen to these bodies or allow 
them to take office until December 1998. Specially nominated women, 
worker, and peasant representatives were chosen, after long delay, in 
October 1998. Elections were held in Baluchistan in March and a 
chairman was named in August. Elections have not been held in the two 
other provinces since 1993, when these bodies were dissolved by a 
caretaker government because of charges of corruption. Local government 
elections were postponed indefinitely in NWFP and Sindh. In the 
interim, appointed civil servants continued to administer local 
governments in all four provinces. Since the coup on October 12, there 
have not been any active local bodies in any of the provinces. Local 
body elections are tentatively planned to occur in 2000.
    Citizens' right to change the government has been restricted at the 
local level in Sindh. Elected local bodies (the rough equivalent of 
district and city councils) were replaced in April 1998 by appointed 
Khidmat (service) committees, which were packed heavily with supporters 
of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League, and were widely seen as an 
attempt to eliminate the need for local elections in Sindh. In November 
1998, the Sharif Government imposed Governor's Rule in the province of 
Sindh. This decision followed a threat to the Sindh's ruling PML 
coalition government by one of its primary coalition partners. The 
reason cited by the Sharif Government for the imposition of Governor's 
Rule--which suspended the democratically elected provincial legislature 
and invested the State's appointed governor with the authority to 
oversee the province's affairs--was a critical law and order problem 
within the province. On June 17, then-Prime Minister Sharif created the 
position of Advisor on Sindh Affairs, and appointed Syed Ghous Ali 
Shah, a member of the PML, to the post. Despite the effective 
continuation of Governor's Rule in Sindh, Shah, not the governor, 
enjoyed executive powers in the province under the Sharif Government. 
Neither elected nor responsible to an elected body, Shah had primary 
responsibility for the management of the government of Sindh until his 
arrest following the October 12 coup. Suspension of the Sindh assembly 
did not require new elections, but members were able to do little more 
than give speeches and propose private bills 1 day a week. In September 
Syed Ghous Ali Shah announced the creation of an appointed ``Members 
Advisory Council for the Prime Minister's Advisor on Sindh.'' The 
members of this council were to have the powers of a provincial 
minister, but the council was eliminated after October 12.
    In October the local and provincial governments, including in 
Sindh, were suspended by the Musharraf regime; the provinces are ruled 
by governors appointed by General Musharraf.
    Because of a longstanding territorial dispute with India, the 
political status of the northern areas--Hunza, Gilgit, and Baltistan--
is not resolved. As a result, more than 1 millioninhabitants of the 
northern areas are not covered under any Constitution and have no 
representation in the federal legislature. The area is administered by 
an appointed civil servant. While there is an elected Northern Areas 
Council, this body serves in an advisory capacity and has no authority 
to change laws or to raise and spend revenue. In May the Supreme Court 
directed the Government to take steps within 6 months that would 
provide the residents of the northern areas with government by their 
chosen representatives and an independent judiciary. The court left it 
to the Government to determine how this objective would be achieved. On 
November 3, the Musharraf regime allowed previously scheduled elections 
to take place in the northern areas. Independent candidates and 
candidates from the PML, the PPP, and the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan won 
seats.
    The right of citizens to change their government also has been 
hampered at the provincial level by the failure to release the 1998 
census figures and by the likely underestimation of the population of 
Sindh and, in particular, Karachi. The national census, held after a 
delay of 7 years, was carried out in March 1998. The census was 
postponed repeatedly due to pressure from ethnic groups and provincial 
rivalries. Census figures serve as the basis for determining political 
representation and also for allocating funds to the various provinces 
from the federal treasury. Residents of areas who expected results that 
indicated either greater population shifts to their regions or smaller 
shifts away from their regions disputed preliminary census results. The 
9.26 million census figure for Karachi, for example, is estimated to be 
3 to 5 million short of the actual figure.
    Although women participate in Government, and former Prime Minister 
Benazir Bhutto is leader of the opposition, they are underrepresented 
in political life at all levels. Six women held seats in the 217-member 
National Assembly, up from 4 seats in the previous Parliament. Thirty-
five women, more than ever before, campaigned for seats in the 1997 
national elections. The Parliamentary Commission on the Status of Women 
in Pakistan recommended reserving one-third of seats in all elected 
bodies for women. In April 1998, the Federal Cabinet announced that 
women's representation in local councils should be increased by 100 
percent, but by year's end no steps had been taken to implement this 
announcement. While women participate in large numbers in elections, 
some women are dissuaded from voting in elections by family, religious, 
and social customs in rural areas. According to the Parliamentary 
Commission, women in some tribal areas were intimidated into not voting 
during the 1997 elections. Announcements were made on mosque 
loudspeakers that voting by women was un-Islamic and women going to 
polling stations risked having their houses burned down. As a result, 
no more than 37 women out of 6,600 registered to vote actually cast 
ballots in Jamrud, in the Khyber Agency. General Musharraf appointed a 
woman to his National Security Council and another to his cabinet.
    Minorities are underrepresented in government and politics.
    Under the electoral system, minorities vote for reserved at-large 
seats, not for nonminority candidates who represent actual 
constituencies. Because of this system, local parliamentary 
representatives have little incentive to promote their minority 
constituents' interests. Many Christian activists state that these 
``separate electorates'' are the greatest obstacle to the attainment of 
Christian religious and civil liberties. Ahmadi leaders encourage their 
followers not to register as ``non-Muslims,'' so most Ahmadis are 
completely unrepresented. In the National Assembly (NA), Christians 
hold four reserved seats; Hindus and members of scheduled castes 
another four; Ahmadis one; and Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis, and other non-
Muslims one (see Section 2.c.). Each of the four categories is 
maintained on a separate electoral roll, and minorities cannot cast 
votes for the Muslim constituency seats. Also, under Article 106 of the 
Constitution, seats in the provincial assemblies are reserved for 
minorities. However, on June 28 the election tribunal of the NWFP 
disqualified Walter Siraj, the elected Christian seat member of the 
provincial assembly. Siraj's opponent had filed a petition alleging 
that Siraj rigged the election. A by-election was ordered. With the 
disqualification of Siraj, two of the three seats reserved for 
minorities in the NWFP were vacant. The 1997 general election report 
states that each Christian NA member represents 327,606 persons; each 
Hindu and scheduled castes NA member, 319,029; the Sikh, Buddhist, 
Parsi, and other non-Muslim member, 112,801; and the Ahmadi member 
104,244. These figures significantly understate the population of most 
of the minority groups because they are based on 1981 census figures. 
By year's end, the 1998 census figures for religious minorities had not 
been published.
    Tribal people are underrepresented in government and politics. The 
February 1997 elections for the eight National Assembly members from 
the FATA were for the first time conducted on the basis of universal 
adult franchise. Prior to 1997, in keeping with local traditions, 
tribal leaders, or maliks, appointed in the governor's name by the 
central Government's political agents in each agency, elected the FATA 
National Assembly members. In accordance with the Government's general 
ban on political party activities in the FATA, candidates were not 
allowed to register by political party, and political party rallies 
were not allowed. However, several political parties did campaign 
covertly for their candidates. Tribal people, including large numbers 
of women in some of the tribal agencies, registered to vote, despite 
campaigns by some tribes against female participation in the elections. 
However, on election day, far fewer registered women in proportion to 
registered men actually voted, as tribal traditions against public 
roles for women reasserted themselves.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are several domestic human rights organizations, and new 
human rights and legal aid groups continue to form. These groups 
generally are free to operate without government restriction; they are, 
however, required to be licensed. The Government has provided 
protection to human rights lawyers defending accused blasphemers 
following threats and attacks on the lawyers by religious extremists. 
These threats became more explicit and public in 1998, with signed 
graffiti calling for the killing of well-known human rights activist 
Asma Jehangir.
    However, the Sharif Government limited the freedom of association 
of NGO's, and revoked the licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in Punjab (see 
Section 2.b.). Punjab's minister for women, social welfare, and Bait-
ul-Mal Pir Syed Binyamin Rizvi began a campaign in the press against 
NGO's in late December 1998, particularly targeting NGO's that worked 
on women's issues and espoused ``un-Islamic values.'' In January the 
Prime Minister ordered the government of the Punjab to begin a campaign 
to withdraw licensing of certain nongovernmental organizations. Without 
such licensing, the organizations were not permitted to operate. 
Altogether, the authorities withdrew the licenses of 1,941 
organizations out of 5,967 that were licensed in Punjab in early May. 
The Sharif Government also reportedly pressed all NGO's to open their 
books, and published a list of NGO's receiving foreign funding. 
Delicensed NGO's that allegedly were nonexistent or engaged in 
fraudulent activity also had their bank accounts frozen. Forty-one 
other NGO's were probed, and 944 were given 3 months to improve their 
performance. In August the Government of the NWFP began a similar 
review of nongovernmental organizations within the province. Prior to 
its review of NGO's, NWFP authorities raided and closed the respected 
Aurat Association in Manshera, an NGO devoted to women's rights. The 
Sharif Government argued that the review of NGO's was an attempt to 
remove fraudulent and inactive NGO's from the registers. 
Representatives from NGO's countered that a number of legitimate groups 
were required to cease operations and that the withdrawal of licenses 
was in part an effort to bring NGO's more firmly under government 
control. Several prominent human rights groups in Karachi reported in 
May that they were harassed by false charges, allegedly planted by the 
Sharif Government in the Urdu press, that they were embezzling funds. 
At the same time, the head of an organization that publishes books 
about women's rights reported that she was the target of charges by a 
Sindh government official; the charges involved unspecified ``anti-
State'' and ``anti-Islam'' activities. Prominent figures in the NGO 
community feared that this campaign against ``corrupt'' NGO's, along 
with harassment aimed at unpopular NGO's that were not shut down, was 
an attempt by the Sharif Government specifically to stifle NGO's 
working on unpopular issues, such as women's and civil rights, and 
those who disagreed with the Government, including those working 
against the 15th (Shari'a) Amendment and against the Government on 
nuclear issues.
    At a conference organized by a number of influential advocacy NGO's 
in June, representatives from the NGO community complained that certain 
NGO's had suffered harassment by police authorities because of their 
advocacy activities. The Musharraf regime began an effort to reach out 
to civil society. Soon after taking office, the new Punjab government 
under General Musharraf on November 18 lifted the ban on NGO 
registration. Several Musharraf cabinet members were active with NGO's 
before their appointment.
    International human rights organizations have been permitted to 
visit the country and travel freely. Several international 
organizations operate in the country, many of which aid refugees. 
However, since 1998 foreign NGO staff members have at times had 
difficulty in obtaining visas; certain international NGO's had 
consistent difficulty in obtaining such visas for their foreign staff.
    The Ministry of Human Rights, established in 1995, is now a 
department within the Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights, and 
Parliamentary Affairs. Some 125 employees staff the department, which 
is headquartered in Islamabad and has four regional offices. The 
department has set up a ``fund for women in distress and detention'' 
and a ``relief and revolving fund'' for victims of human rights 
violations. Because of its limited budget, the department operates 
primarily on a case-by-case basis, but is seeking help from donor 
agencies on projects for institutional capacity building and human 
rights awareness. The department was able to finalize and begin limited 
implementation of a reform program for jails. However, the department 
is not viewed as very effective by human rights observers. The 
Government has failed to take follow-up action on the 1997 report of 
the Commission of Inquiry for Women.
    In August Prime Minister Sharif constituted a cabinet committee on 
human rights issues. According to press reports, the committee was to 
consider recommendations to remove ``administrative lapses and legal 
lacunae'' in the human rights area. No concrete action was taken by the 
committee prior to the October coup, and the committee was disbanded 
after the coup. However, members of General Musharraf's cabinet and of 
the National Security Council continue to meet on human rights issues.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language, or Social Status
    The Constitution, which was suspended in October, provided for 
equality before the law for all citizens and broadly prohibits 
discrimination based on race, religion, caste, residence, or place of 
birth. In practice, however, there is significant discrimination based 
on these factors.
    Women.--Domestic violence is a widespread and serious problem. 
Human rights groups estimate that anywhere from 70 to 90 percent of 
women are victims of domestic violence at the hands of their husbands, 
in-laws, or other relatives. The Progressive Women's Association 
reported in September that one out of every two women is the victim of 
mental or physical violence. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry 
for Women reported that violence against women ``has been described as 
the most pervasive violation of human rights'' in the country, and it 
called for legislation clearly stating that domestic violence against 
women is a criminal offense. Husbands are known to kill their wives 
even for trivial offenses. On March 22 in Karachi, Bilawal, after an 
argument with his wife Zainab, doused her with kerosene and burned her 
to death. This case was one of numerous incidents, consistent with the 
findings of a poll reported by the Pakistan Peace Coalition in April. A 
survey of 1,000 women in 10 communities of rural Punjab found that 82 
percent of the women feared violence from their husbands over trivial 
matters. While abusers may be charged with assault, cases rarely are 
filed. Police usually return battered women to their abusive family 
members. Women are reluctant to file charges because of societal mores 
that stigmatize divorce and make women economically and psychologically 
dependent on their relatives. Relatives also are reluctant to report 
cases of abuse in order to protect the reputation of the family. There 
are no specific laws pertaining to domestic violence, except for the 
Qisas and Diyat ordinances which are rarely invoked and may privatize 
the crime (see Section 1.e.). However, Qisas and Diyat cannot be 
invoked where the victim's heir is a direct lineal descendant of the 
perpetrator, such as when a woman is killed by her husband. Police and 
judges tend to see domestic violence as a family problem, and are 
reluctant to take any action in such cases. Thus, it is very difficult 
for women to obtain relief from the justice system in cases of domestic 
violence.
    The Shirkat Gah Women's Resource Center in Karachi published a 
report early in the year that summarized reports in the English-
language press about violence against women in Pakistan between 1993 
and 1998. Even in this selective medium, and limiting itself to reports 
of violence instigated by close male relatives, Shirkat Gah documented 
535 women who were killed or who committed suicide during the period; 
95 of the women werekilled or committed suicide when they expressed 
interest in marrying a man of their own choice.
    During the year, there were hundreds of incidents involving 
violence against women reported in the press. The press continued to 
draw attention to killings of married women by relatives over dowry or 
other family-related disputes. Most of the victims are burned to death, 
allegedly in kitchen stove accidents; some women were reportedly burned 
with acid. In a survey of newspaper reports in Lahore from January to 
November, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) found a total 
of 675 killings of women and 272 burn cases involving women reported. 
Seventy-seven persons were held in connection with the killings; at 
year's end it was not known how many had been convicted, or if any 
individuals had been charged in connection with the burn cases. 
According to the Commission of Inquiry for Women, newspapers from 
Lahore reported an average of 15 cases of stove deaths per month during 
a 6-month period in 1997; most of the victims were young married women. 
The Commission noted that many cases are not reported by hospitals and, 
even when they are, the police are reluctant to investigate or file 
charges. Human rights monitors agree that most `'stove deaths'' are in 
fact killings based upon a suspicion of illicit sexual relationship or 
upon dowry demands. Increased media coverage of cases of wife burnings, 
spousal abuse, spousal killing, and rape has helped to raise awareness 
about violence against women. By year's end, there was no progress in 
the 1998 case of Shahnaz, who died after her husband poured gasoline on 
her and set her on fire. The police registered a case against her 
husband and three other in-laws. The case remained pending.
    A crisis center for women in distress was opened in 1997 in 
Islamabad. The center, the first of its kind in Pakistan, is an 
initiative of the Ministry of Women's Development with the assistance 
of local NGO's. The center offers legal and medical referrals from 
volunteer doctors and lawyers, counseling from trained psychologists, 
and a hot line for women in distress. Although the center opened before 
funding had been allocated and staff hired, the center is now fully 
staffed. Staff for a second center in Vehari, in southern Punjab, began 
training in October.
    Rape is an extensive problem. The HRCP estimates that at least 
eight women, five of them minors, are raped every day in Pakistan, and 
more than two-thirds of those are gang-raped. In 1997 the National 
Assembly passed a law that provided for the death penalty for persons 
convicted of gang rape. No executions have been carried out under this 
law and conviction rates remained low. This is because rape, and gang 
rape in particular, is commonly used as a means of social control by 
landlords and local criminal bosses seeking to humiliate and terrorize 
local residents. Therefore, police rarely respond to and are sometimes 
implicated in these attacks. It is estimated that less than one-third 
of all rapes are reported to the police. The police themselves 
frequently are charged with raping women (see Section 1.c.). 
Parliamentary Affairs Minister Muhammad Yasin Khan Wattoo informed the 
Senate on April 28 that in the first 90 days of the year 472 women 
reported that they were raped. The HRCP in the first 9 months of the 
year tallied 485 rape cases recorded in Lahore newspapers. Of these 
instances, cases were registered in 74 percent of the rapes but 
suspects were arrested in only 10 percent. More than 50 percent 
involved gang rape. According to a police official, in a majority of 
rape cases the victims are pressured to drop rape charges because of 
the threat of Hudood adultery charges being brought against them. All 
consensual extramarital sexual relations are considered violations of 
the Hudood Ordinances, which carry either Hadd (Koranic) or Tazir 
(secular) punishments (see Section 1.e.). Accordingly, if a woman 
cannot prove the absence of consent, there is a risk that she may be 
charged with a violation of the Hudood ordinances for fornication or 
adultery. The Hadd, or maximum punishment for this offense, is public 
flogging or stoning; however, in order for Hadd punishments to apply, 
special, more stringent rules of evidence are followed. Hadd 
punishments are mandatory if there is enough evidence to support them, 
and for sexual offenses require four adult male Muslims to witness the 
act or a confession. For non-Muslims or in cases where all of the 4 
male witnesses are not Muslim, the punishment is less severe. The 
testimony of four female witnesses, or that of the victim alone, is 
insufficient to impose Hadd punishments; therefore, even if a man rapes 
a woman in the presence of several women, he cannot be subjected to the 
Hadd punishment. If the evidence falls short of Hadd requirements, then 
the accused may be sentenced to a lesser class of penalties (Tazir); 
since it is difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to support the Hadd 
punishments, most rape cases are tried at the Tazir level of evidence 
and sentencing (under which a rapist may be sentenced to up to 25 years 
inprison and 30 lashes). No Hadd punishment has ever been applied in 
the 20 years that the Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir 
punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim 
offenders.
    According to an HRCP lawyer, the Government has brought fewer 
charges against women under the Hudood Ordinances than in the past, and 
the courts have shown greater leniency toward women in their sentences 
and in the granting of bail. Even if a woman wishes to bring rape 
charges, she may have trouble bringing her attacker to justice. 
According to Amnesty International, men accused of rape sometimes are 
acquitted and released, while their victims are held on adultery 
charges.
    According to Human Rights Watch, women face difficulty at every 
level of the judicial system in bringing rape cases. Police are 
reluctant to take the complaint and may act in an abusive fashion 
against the victim; the courts do not have consistent standards of 
proof as to what constitutes rape and to what corroboration is 
required; and judges, police, and prosecutors are biased against female 
rape victims, tending towards a presumption of female consent and the 
belief that women lie about such things. Judges on the whole reportedly 
are reluctant to convict; however, if there is some evidence, judges 
have been known to convict the accused of the lesser offense of 
adultery or fornication (consensual sex). Human Rights Watch also 
reports that women face problems in the collection of evidence; that 
the doctors tasked to examine rape victims often believe that the 
victims are lying; that they are trained insufficiently and have 
inadequate facilities for the collection of forensic evidence 
pertaining to rape; that they do not testify very effectively in court; 
and that they tend to focus on the virginity status of the victim, and, 
due either to an inadequate understanding of the need for prompt 
medical evaluations or to inadequate resources, often delay the medical 
examinations for many days or even weeks, making any evidence that they 
collect of dubious utility. Medical examiners and police also have been 
known to be physically and verbally abusive during these exams, 
especially in cases where a woman is charged with adultery or 
fornication (for which an exam may be requested) and does not wish to 
be examined (such women, despite the fact that by law they should not 
be examined without their consent, have been examined, and even have 
been beaten for their refusal to be examined). Police and doctors often 
do not know that a woman must consent to this type of exam before it 
can be performed, and judges may not inform women of their right to 
decline. If they report rape to the police, women's cases often are 
delayed or mishandled, and women frequently are harassed by police or 
the perpetrators to drop the case. Police may accept bribes to get the 
complainant to drop a case, or may request bribes to carry it forward. 
Police tend to investigate the cases poorly, as well, and may not 
inform women of the need for a medical exam or may stall or block 
women's attempts to obtain one.
    The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for Women has criticized 
the Hudood Ordinances relating to extramarital sex and recommended that 
they be repealed, asserting that they are based on an erroneous 
interpretation of the Shari'a. The Commission charged that the laws on 
adultery and rape have been subject to widespread misuse, with 95 
percent of the women accused of adultery being found innocent either in 
the court of first instance or on appeal. However, by that time, the 
Commission pointed out, the woman may have spent months in jail, 
suffering sexual abuse at the hands of the police and the destruction 
of her reputation. The Commission found that the main victims of the 
Hudood laws are poor women who are unable to defend themselves against 
slanderous charges. The laws also have been used by husbands and other 
male family members to punish their wives and female relatives for 
reasons having nothing to do with sexual propriety, according to the 
Commission. At year's end, 500 women were awaiting trial for adultery 
under the Hudood Ordinance in Lahore; 400 in Peshawar; and 300 in 
Mardan (see Section 1.e.).
    Marital rape is not a crime. The 1979 Hudood ordinances abolished 
punishment for raping one's wife. However, the Commission of Inquiry 
for Women has recommended reinstating penalties for marital rape. 
Marriage registration (nikah) sometimes occurs years before a marriage 
is consummated (rukh sati). The nikah (unconsummated) marriage is 
regarded as a formal marital relationship, and thus a woman or girl 
cannot be raped by a man to whom her marriage is registered, even if 
the marriage has not yet been entered into formally.
    There are numerous reports of women killed or mutilated by male 
relatives who suspect them of adultery. Few such cases are investigated 
seriously and those who are arrested often are acquitted on the grounds 
that they were ``provoked,'' or for alack of witnesses. While the 
tradition of killing those suspected of illicit sexual relations in so-
called ``honor killings'', in order to restore tribal or family honor, 
applies equally to offending men and women, women are far more likely 
to be killed than men. The Progressive Women's Association, a human 
rights NGO, estimated in September that as many as 300 women are killed 
each year by their husbands or family, mostly as a result of ``honor 
killings'', known as (``karo/kari'' in Sindh). The problem is believed 
to be even more extensive in rural Sindh. ``Karo/kari'' (or adulterer/
adulteress) killings are common in rural Sindh and Baluchistan. The 
HRCP reported 19 such cases in February and 22 in May, noting that the 
actual figures are doubtless much higher. Tribal custom among the 
Baluch and the Pathans also sanctions such killings. The Commission of 
Inquiry for Women has rejected the whole concept of ``honor'' as a 
mitigating circumstance in a murder case and recommended that such 
killings be treated as simple murder. Even women who are the victims of 
rape may become the victims of their families' vengeance against the 
victims' ``defilement.'' In the Federally Administered Tribal Area's 
Kurram agency in March, Amnesty International reported that a tribal 
firing squad killed 16-year-old Lal Jamilla Mandokhel, a mentally 
retarded girl, after she was raped repeatedly by a field assistant in 
the agriculture department. The police took the accused into protective 
custody but turned the girl over to her tribe after the filing of a 
FIR. Her tribe found that she had brought shame to the tribe, which 
could only be remedied by her death. The tribesmen also demanded the 
return of her attacker by police for public execution. AI also reported 
that if an accused adulteress is killed, and the adulterer manages to 
escape this fate, he may be required under the karo/kari tradition to 
compensate the family of the accused adulteress; sometimes, a woman 
from the adulterer's family is given in compensation to repair the 
honor of the adulteress' family.
    The Government has failed to take action in honor killing cases, 
particularly when influential families are involved. Samia Imran, a 
married woman from Peshawar seeking a divorce against the wishes of her 
husband and her family and who was thought to be dishonoring them, was 
shot and killed on April 6 in the Lahore office of lawyer and human 
rights activist Hina Jilani. Her parents arranged the meeting on the 
pretext of consenting to the divorce. The victim's mother, Israt Bibi, 
was accompanied to the meeting by Habib ur-Rehman, who shot Samia when 
his presence at the meeting was challenged. Rehman took a hostage after 
the shooting and escaped with the victim's mother. Although Rehman was 
killed later in an exchange with police, the victim's mother, father, 
and uncle also were charged in the case. The perpetrators, who come 
from a prominent family, were not apprehended. The case generated 
extensive publicity, and Hina Jilani and her sister, prominent human 
rights activist Asma Jahangir, were threatened publicly with arrest and 
violence. According to Jilani, the police refused to take statements 
from eyewitnesses and tampered with evidence. Asma Jehangir and Hina 
Jilani were charged by Samia's father in June with kidnaping her, but 
the case has been stayed pending the case against her family members. 
FIRs had been filed against them by Samia's father in June. Many 
believe that the Sarwar family used their influence to stall the case 
and be granted pre-arrest bail. Amnesty International reported that 
Ghazala, a woman living in Joharabad, Punjab, was set on fire and 
killed by her brother on January 6 because her family suspected that 
she was in a relationship with a neighbor. On January 19 in Jampur 
city, Punjab, Ameer Bukhsh killed his wife Khadeja and a bank officer 
he alleged she was having an affair with. Buksh turned himself in for 
the killings, and his brother-in-law Abdul Qadir filed a complaint 
against him for murder, stating that Buksh killed the bank officer for 
some other reason and then killed his wife to cover it up. However, 
Qadir reportedly was threatened by the police with being implicated in 
a murder case if he did not change his story.
    Trafficking in women also is a significant problem (see Section 
6.f.).
    There are significant barriers to the advancement of women, 
beginning at birth. In general female children are less valued and 
cared for than male children are. According to a United Nations study, 
girls receive less nourishment, health care, and education than boys 
do. According to a 1996 report by the Islamabad-based human development 
center, only 16 women are economically active for every 100 men.
    Discrimination against women is particularly acute in rural areas. 
In some areas of rural Sindh and Baluchistan, female literacy rates are 
2 percent or less. A survey of rural females by the National Institute 
of Psychology found that 42 percent of parents cited ``no financial 
benefit'' as the reason they kepttheir daughters from attending school, 
and sent their sons instead. Similarly, a study by the NWFP directorate 
of primary education concluded that most girls in rural areas do not go 
to school because they have to look after the household while their 
mothers help in the fields. In Karachi only 45 percent of girls 
completing matriculation (10th grade) exams in science in 1999 would be 
able to find places in government-run colleges, as opposed to 95 
percent of boys passing the same tests. For 14,424 girls passing the 
exam in 1999, only about 8,000 places are available, according to 1998 
figures. In Baluchistan conditions are much worse, with only 2 percent 
of the province's women having received any formal education.
    Human rights monitors and women's groups believe that a narrow 
interpretation of the Shari'a has had a harmful effect on the rights of 
women and minorities, as it reinforces popular attitudes and 
perceptions and contributes to an atmosphere in which discriminatory 
treatment of women and non-Muslims is more readily accepted.
    Both civil and religious laws theoretically protect women's rights 
in cases of divorce, but many women are unaware of them, and often the 
laws are not observed. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for 
Women has recommended that marriage registration (nikahnama) be made 
mandatory and that women, as well as men, have the right to initiate 
divorce proceedings. It also has called for the punishment of those who 
coerce women or girls into forced marriages. A husband legally is bound 
to maintain his wife until 3 months after the divorce. A father is 
bound to maintain his children until they reach the age of 14 for 
males, or to the age of 16 for females. However, the legal system is so 
complicated and lengthy that it can take years for the children to get 
maintenance.
    In inheritance cases women generally do not receive--or are pressed 
to surrender--the share of the inheritance they legally are due. In 
rural areas, the practice of a woman ``marrying the Koran'' still is 
widely accepted if the family cannot arrange a suitable marriage or 
wants to keep the family wealth intact. A woman ``married to the 
Koran'' is forbidden to have any contact with males over 14 years of 
age, including her immediate family members. Press reports indicate 
that the practice of buying and selling brides still occurs in parts of 
the NWFP and the Punjab.
    A special three-member bench of the Lahore High Court upheld in 
1997 the federal Shariat Court's ruling that a Muslim woman can marry 
without the consent of her wali (guardian--usually her father). 
However, in practice social custom dictates that couples are to marry 
at the direction of family elders. When this custom is violated, 
especially across ethnic lines, violence against the couple may result, 
and the authorities generally fail to prosecute such cases vigorously. 
The February 1998 marriage of a teenage Pathan girl to a Mohajir man in 
Karachi against her family's will led to large-scale ethnic riots in 
Karachi, the bringing of a kidnaping case against the groom, the 
shooting and serious injury of the groom in the courtroom, and numerous 
death threats against the groom and his family. In May 1998, a woman in 
Karachi was killed by her father, Alauddin, for marrying a mechanic 
from his auto repair shop. In July 1998 in the NWFP, Hidayat Bibi and 
her husband were killed by her uncle after they eloped. In a well 
publicized case, Humaira Mahmood, daughter of a Punjab provincial 
assembly member, in 1997 married Mahmood Butt against the wishes of her 
father. Soon after her marriage, she was beaten severely by her brother 
and allegedly was forced to register a marriage to her cousin. In 
November 1998, she took refuge in a shelter for women in Karachi. 
Mahmood's brother and several Punjab policemen from her father's 
district kidnaped her from the home in December 1998, with the 
acquiescence of Sindh police. Protests by women's groups led to the 
intervention of the governor and Mahmood's release from illegal 
detention to Darul Aman, a government-run shelter for women. However, 
soon after this she took refuge in another shelter in Karachi. 
Mahmood's name, along with her husband's, was placed on the ECL, 
preventing them from leaving the country. Mahmood appealed the 
placement of her name on the ECL. On January 28, she and her husband 
were detained without a warrant by Punjab police at the Karachi airport 
(in Sindh province), as they were trying to leave the country. Mahmood 
Butt's mother also was detained. Mahmood and her husband reportedly 
were taken separately to Lahore, where they were detained separately 
and were beaten in an attempt to force them to renounce their marriage. 
Humaira was charged with adultery by her father, based on a videotape 
of the sham marriage into which Humaira had been forced against her 
will. On January 28, Mahmood Butt and his mother were released by court 
order. Humaira also was briefly released. On February 2, the pair 
appeared in court in Lahore. On February 18, the Lahore High Court 
ruled that Humaira and Mahmood's 1997 marriagewas valid, and that her 
marriage to her cousin was invalid. The court also dismissed the 
abduction charges against Mahmood Butt, ordered the release of Humaira 
Mahmood, imposed a 3-month prison sentence against Subah Sadiq, the 
police officer who detained the couple at the Karachi airport in 
January, and directed the Punjab inspector general of police to ensure 
their safety. Humaira's father appealed the court's decision. However, 
Humaira Mahmood and Mahmood Butt left the country without incident on 
February 20. No action was taken against Humaira's father.
    Press reports routinely describe couples who are less fortunate, 
such as Abdul Ghaffar and Shabana Bibi of Gila Deedar Singh, who were 
abducted from a Gujranwala court on May 15 by 16 armed men representing 
Shabana Bibi's parents, who opposed the match. At year's end, the 
couple's fate was unknown. In July police in Kot Ghulam Mohammed 
(Mirpurkas district, Sindh) raided the home of Javed Dal and arrested 
his family members as hostages. Dal had eloped with his cousin. His 
wife's father, Somar Dal, used his influence as a member of the Sindh 
National Front executive committee to instigate the arrests, which were 
carried out without warrants.
    Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men 
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of 
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed 
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved.
    The value of women's testimony is not equal to that of a man's in 
certain court cases (see Section 1.e.).
    Although a small number of women study and teach in universities, 
postgraduate employment opportunities largely remain limited to 
teaching, medical services, and the law. Nevertheless, an increasing 
number of women are entering the commercial and public sectors.
    Women's organizations operate primarily in urban centers. Many 
concentrate on educating women about existing legal rights. Other 
groups concentrate on providing legal aid to poor women in prison who 
may not be able to afford an attorney.
    Children.--There is no federal law on compulsory education, and 
neither the federal nor provincial governments provide sufficient 
resources to assure universal education. The education system is in 
disarray, with studies showing that only 65 to 70 percent of children 
under the age of 12 are enrolled in school, less than half of whom 
actually complete primary school. Even in relatively prosperous 
Karachi, enrollment figures are low. Before his killing in October 
1998, M.I. Memon the head of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary 
Education in Karachi estimated that only 1.1 million of Karachi's 
school-age children actually were attending school: 500,000 in the 
public schools; 500,000 in private schools; and 100,000 in madrassahs 
(Islamic religious schools). Since the lowest estimate of school-age 
children in Karachi is 4 million, even in the wealthiest, most 
developed city in the country, it would appear that no more than 27.5 
percent of school age children are attending school. Even those 
children who go to school are not assured of being able to read and 
write. According to UNICEF figures, a nationwide sample of children in 
grade five revealed that only 33 percent could read with comprehension, 
while a mere 17 percent were able to write a simple letter. Development 
experts point to a number of factors for the poor state of public 
education, including the low percentage of gross national product 
devoted to education and inefficient and corrupt federal and provincial 
bureaucracies. One member of the Prime Minister's education task force 
estimated that up to 50 percent of the education budget is 
``pilfered.''
    Information about progress in educating girls is contradictory. A 
recent survey found that the enrollment rate for girls under age 12 was 
65 percent, which was less than that of boys (75 percent), but was 
considerably higher than the 1990 figure of 50 percent. Since official 
government figures count at most 1.5 million school-age children in 
public and private schools and madrassahs in Karachi (of an estimated 4 
million or more between the ages of 5 and 14), enrollment figures of 65 
and 75 percent are difficult to account for. Similarly, the female 
literacy rate has doubled during the past two decades, although, at 
roughly 27 percent, it is just over half that of males. However, an 
Oxfam report released in March stated that the proportion of girls 
enrolled in school fell by 10 percent in the first half of the 1990's.
    The federal Government announced a new education policy in March 
1998, which dealt mostly with the construction of new schools but that 
included provisions for increased Islamic instruction in public 
schools. Education is a provincial responsibility under the 
Constitution. In 1998 the government of Punjab, the country's most 
populous province, began an ambitious program to improve the quality of 
its educational system. A comprehensive survey was performed to 
identify school buildings that were being misused and the large numbers 
of teachers and administrators who were not performing their duties or 
even showing up for work. Administrative action against these ``ghost 
schools'' began, and the Government was better placed to ensure that 
its education budget was not misused. The Punjab government also worked 
closely with both international and local NGO's to improve primary and 
secondary education. However, no legal action has been taken against 
those found responsible for the misuse of government property.
    Health care services, like education, remained seriously inadequate 
for the nation's children. Children suffer a high rate of preventable 
childhood diseases. Public health administration suffers from poor 
management, avoidance of responsibility, false data, and lack of 
cooperation among agencies. Polio, and effective vaccination to prevent 
it, remain problems. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported 1,147 
cases of polio in the country in 1997. The WHO and the Center for 
Disease Control reported that the full (three-dose) course of oral 
polio vaccine has been given to only 57 percent of children in Punjab, 
50 percent in the NWFP, 42 percent in Sindh, and 22 percent in 
Baluchistan. However, even the high number of reported polio cases may 
be too low, and the reported protection rate may be too high. Public 
health professors at a Karachi medical school report that vaccines 
frequently are degraded by poor storage, and that vaccination rates are 
inflated. On June 27, the English-language newspaper Dawn reported that 
doctors in Sindh had persuaded the Sindh health department to order a 
halt to reporting of polio cases. Doctors are required by law to 
vaccinate all children under 5 years old within a 1.2 mile range (3 
miles in rural areas), but they were taking steps to avoid the 
responsibility. Although the Government has undertaken six national 
immunization days since 1994, a Center for Disease Control official who 
observed a June polio immunization campaign in Quetta, the capital of 
Baluchistan, reported that vaccination teams had no maps, census data, 
or plans. The International Labor Organization reports that 8 percent 
of children suffer from iron deficiency and 30 to 40 percent of 
children in the country suffer from stunted growth. According to a 
family-planning NGO, up to 50 percent of children are born iodine-
deficient, resulting in high rates of mental retardation.
    Many children begin working at a very early age (see Section 6.d.). 
At the age of 5 or 6, many female children assume responsibility for 
younger siblings.
    Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f).
    Children sometimes are kidnaped to be used as forced labor, for 
ransom, or to seek revenge against an enemy (see Sections 6.c. and 
6.d.). In rural areas, it is a traditional practice for poor parents to 
give children to rich landlords in exchange for money or land, 
according to human rights advocates. These children frequently are 
abused by these landlords and held as bonded laborers for life. 
Landlords also have been known to pay impoverished parents for the 
``virginity'' of their daughters, whom the landlords then rape. 
Incidents of rape and killing of minor teenage children are common. A 
1996 survey conducted in Punjab showed that 40 percent of reported rape 
victims were minors, with the youngest victim in the study only 8 years 
old. A UNICEF-sponsored study of Punjab found that 15 percent of girls 
reported having been sexually abused. Sexual abuse of boys is more 
common in segments of society where women and girls traditionally 
remain within the home. A Human Rights Commission of Pakistan study in 
the NWFP found 723 cases of sexual abuse of boys and 635 of girls 
between January and June 1998. Child prostitution involving boys and 
girls is widely known to exist but rarely is discussed. The NGO Shabab-
i-Milli has launched a campaign to combat child prostitution by raising 
public awareness about the problem. The Commission of Inquiry for Women 
has observed that child sexual abuse is a subject that ``has been 
virtually ignored in Pakistan,'' and called for a public education 
campaign on the subject, including introducing it into school 
curriculums and training nurses and doctors in how to handle such 
cases.
    Children's rights theoretically are protected by numerous laws that 
incorporate elements of the U.N. Convention on the Rightsof the Child. 
However, the Government frequently fails to enforce these laws. There 
are two facilities--one in Karachi and one in Bahawalpur--that serve as 
reform schools for juvenile offenders. There is only one jail in each 
province for convicted prisoners under 21 years of age, and children 
frequently are incarcerated along with the general prison population, 
sharing prison conditions that are extremely poor (see Section 1.c.). 
Many children in prison were born to female inmates who were sexually 
abused by prison guards. Although Punjab and Sindh provinces have laws 
mandating special judicial procedures for child offenders, in practice, 
children and adults essentially are treated equally. An estimated 4,000 
children were held in the nation's prisons, some as young as 8 years 
old, compared with 3,480 in 1998. In Punjab in 1998 1,508 children 
under age 18 were found in prison in an NGO survey, 16 of whom were 
below the age of 12. Imprisoned children often spend long periods of 
time in prison awaiting trial or a hearing before a magistrate, often 
in violation of the law. One child spent 3 years and 4 months awaiting 
trial. Children are subject to the same delays and inefficiencies in 
the justice system as adults are (see Section 1.e.). Peshawar's jail in 
1998 contained 183 children, 40 percent of whom were Afghan refugees. 
These prisoners were separated from the adult prisoners. According to 
some estimates, there are 900 children in Karachi's central jail, in a 
space meant to house 300; these children are 18 and under. Human Rights 
Watch reports that children frequently are beaten and even tortured 
while in detention; usually this is done to extract confessions, but it 
is done also to punish or intimidate child detainees or to extort 
payment from their families for their release. Sexual abuse of child 
detainees by police or guards reportedly is a problem as well (see 
Section 1.c.). On April 11, a riot reportedly broke out in the juvenile 
ward of the Sahiwal Central Prison in Punjab, after a 13-year-old 
prisoner was beaten for complaining about sexual abuse at the hands of 
the head warder. Nearly 20 children reportedly were injured as the riot 
was quelled, and 10 children were charged in connection with the 
incident. The Deputy Inspector General of Prisons visited the prison 
soon after the incident and ordered the suspension of the head warder 
accused, the assistant superintendent of the prison, and another 
warder.
    Courts also may order that children be sent to reform schools or 
various types of residential facilities, many designed to provide 
vocational or other training. Juvenile offenders, and in some cases, 
homeless and destitute children, may be sent to these residential 
facilities, for terms not to exceed the amount of time until they reach 
majority. Conditions in these institutions reportedly are poor, similar 
to those found in jails. Abuse and torture of the children in such 
institutions is a problem; one study found that 17.4 percent of the 
inmates of the Youthful Offenders Industrial School in Karachi had been 
tortured or otherwise mistreated. Educational facilities in these 
institutions often are inadequate. Extortion on the part of the staff 
at such institutions is reportedly endemic; parents of inmates often 
are required to pay lower level staff members to visit their children 
or bring them food. Drug trafficking by guards and other staff also is 
a problem; some children reportedly have developed drug habits while in 
these institutions, and are supplied by their guards.
    According to press reports, there are several madrassahs where 
children are confined illegally and kept in unhealthy conditions, and 
there were several reports of the abuse of children studying at 
madrassahs during the year. In one 1998 case, 14 children were found in 
fetters at a madrassah in Lahore. The principal of the madrassah was 
arrested, but was released when he claimed that the parents were 
responsible for the use of fetters. A member of the Council of Islamic 
Ideology has condemned the fettering of children. Sexual abuse of boys 
is widely believed to occur at some madrassahs.
    People with Disabilities.--There are no laws requiring equal 
accessibility to public buildings for disabled persons. The vast 
majority of the physically and mentally disabled are cared for by their 
families. However, in some cases these individuals are forced into 
begging, while organized criminal ``beggarmasters'' skim off much of 
the proceeds. There have been allegations of exploitation of 
microcephalic persons at Jhelum, a Punjab town where such individuals 
are cared for at a local shrine. There is a legal provision requiring 
public and private organizations to reserve at least 2 percent of their 
jobs for qualified disabled persons. Organizations that do not wish to 
hire disabled persons can instead give a certain amount of money to the 
government treasury, which goes into a fund for the disabled. This 
obligation rarely is enforced. A NationalCouncil for the Rehabilitation 
of the Disabled provides some job placement and loan facilities.
    Religious Minorities.--Government authorities afford religious 
minorities fewer protections than are afforded to Sunni Muslim 
citizens. Members of religious minorities are subject to violence and 
harassment, and police at times refuse to prevent such actions or to 
charge persons who commit them.
    Sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi'a continued to be a 
serious problem throughout the country. In Punjab in particular, a 
deadly pattern of Sunni-Shi'a violence in which terrorists killed 
persons because of their membership in rival sectarian organizations, 
or simply for their religious identification, continued. On January 4, 
several motorcycle gunmen fired on an early morning prayer service at a 
Shi'a mosque in Karamdad Qureshi, Punjab, killing 17 persons and 
wounding at least 25 others. Police arrested 46 members of the Sipah-e-
Sahabah Pakistan (SSP), a Sunni militant group, in connection with the 
attack. It was widely believed that an offshoot of the SSP, the 
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, was responsible for the attack. On March 24, 
motorcycle gunmen shot and killed Barkat Ali, a leader of the Shi'a 
group Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafria, outside his home in the Tunsa 
area of Punjab. The gunmen are believed to belong to the SSP. Four 
individuals abducted and then killed Mirza Ghulam Qadir on April 14. 
Qadir was the nephew of the supreme head of the Ahmadi community. 
Ahmadis believe that militants from the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi killed him 
for religious reasons. Police killed the perpetrators in an encounter 
following the killing. On the evening of April 25, (the 8th of 
Moharram), four Shi'a Punjabis visiting a village near Dera Ismail Khan 
in the NWFP to recite Moharram morning prayers were killed in their 
sleep. Sunni religious militants were believed to have committed the 
killings in order to provoke Shi'a-Sunni conflict during the 
traditionally tense 9th and 10th of Moharram. Local authorities in the 
NWFP and in Punjab took steps to calm sentiments, and there was no 
further violence in connection with this incident. On August 19, 
Mohammed Khalid Rajput, an SSP activist, was shot and killed, 
apparently when members of the rival Shi'a organization, Tehrik-e-
Nifaz-e-Fiqh-Jafria, fired on an SSP rally in Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP. 
On the following day, a Shi'a mourning procession was fired upon, 
although there were no casualties. Five persons were charged in 
connection with the killing; three had been arrested by year's end. On 
September 6, an explosion in a madrassah in Karachi injured more than 
20 persons; those injured had rushed to the scene of a previous 
explosion, in which there were no injuries. On September 24, the 
Secretary General of the TJP in Dera Ismail Khan was killed by three 
SSP leaders, setting off a wave of sectarian violence. All three of the 
leaders were arrested soon after the killing; the case was pending at 
year's end. After the killing, attacks began in Punjab and Sindh, 
perpetrated by both Shi'as and Sunnis, in which more than 30 persons 
were killed. Among those killed were President of the Gujranwala 
division of the TJP, Ijaz Hussain Rasool Nagri, on September 30; 9 
worshipers in a Shi'a mosque in Karachi on October 1; Assistant 
Inspector General of Police in the NWFP, Farooq Haider, a Shi'a, on 
October 2; 5 students in a Sunni madrassah in Karachi, on October 2; 
Dr. Qaiser Abbas Sayyal, a relative of an advisor to the Prime 
Minister, along with several others, in a clinic in Lahore in early 
October. On October 6, Nisa Ali Hazara, a Shi'a member of the Baluch 
Assembly and the Baluchistan Education Minister, was shot and injured 
in Quetta by masked gunmen as his car left the Baluch Assembly; his 
driver was killed. Also on October 6, two Shi'a homeopathic doctors, 
Al-e Hassan and Muttasim Hassan, were shot and killed at their home in 
Karachi by motorcycle gunmen; another doctor, Mohammad Nisar, an 
influential member of the Sunni Jamaat-i-Islami, was killed in Karachi 
earlier on the same day. Aun Mohammed Rizvi, a senior Shi'a official 
from the state-run television station, was shot and killed by 
motorcycle gunmen in Rawalpindi on October 7. The Punjab government 
ordered a crackdown on extremists in early October, as a result of 
which several hundred persons, including the leader of the SSP, Maulana 
Mohammad Azam Tariq, and SSP branch president Maulana Mohammad Ahmad 
Ludhianvi, were arrested. Tariq has since been released. On November 4, 
three explosions occurred in Murdike, where the Sunni militant group 
Lashkar-e-Taiba was holding its annual conference; 1 person was killed 
and more than 30 were injured. There were reports of between 16 and 40 
encounter killings of members of the SSP and the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. On 
December 27, 13 Sunnis were killed and 6 were injured in Sikanderpur 
village, Haripur district, NWFP. The victims, who reportedly belonged 
to the SSP, were returning from the funeral of another SSP member and 
were killed by three Shi'as. Prior to the incident, there had been a 
dispute in the area over the construction of a Shi'amosque in a 
graveyard claimed by local Sunnis. On December 28, despite an increase 
in security in the area, thousands of SSP members destroyed homes and 
shops belonging to local Shi'as after attending the funerals of those 
killed the previous day. At year's end, no suspects had been detained 
in connection with these events.
    In July the Government released Sunni extremist leader Mohammad 
Azam Tariq, chief of the SSP, who had been arrested in May 1997 and 
charged with the murder of a former PPP member of Parliament and in 58 
other cases of murder, terrorism, and incitement to sectarian violence. 
The SSP and its militant offshoot, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, frequently are 
involved in anti-Shi'a sectarian violence.
    Ahmadis are often targets of religious intolerance, much of which 
is instigated by organized religious extremists. For example, in a July 
1998 sermon at a rally in Lahore, the head of the influential Tanzeem 
Islami organization, Israr Ahmed, stated that the Government and 
Muslims have a right to commit a ``general massacre'' of the Ahmadis, 
since they are heretics. Ahmadi leaders charge that militant Sunni 
mullahs and their followers sometimes stage marches through the streets 
of Rabwah, a predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center in central 
Punjab. Backed by mobs of 100 to 200 persons, the mullahs purportedly 
stride down the streets uttering diatribes against the Ahmadis and 
their founder, a situation that often leads to violence. Police 
generally are present during these marches, the Ahmadis claim, but as a 
rule do not intervene to prevent trouble. A number of Ahmadis were 
injured seriously in attacks by religious extremists, and Ahmadi 
leaders attribute several killings of Ahmadis during the year to anti-
Ahmadi extremists. The Majlis Tahafuz Khatam-e-Nabuwwat (Committee for 
the Finality of the Prophethood) actively promoted an anti-Ahmadi 
agenda during the year. According to press reports, in August Religious 
Affairs Minister Raja Zafarul Haq asserted that ``un-Islamic'' 
activities would not be tolerated and sent a message of support to the 
international Khatam-e-Nabuwwat movement. According to press reports, 
Muslim clerics called on President Tarar on April 23 to ask the 
President to extend the anti-Ahmadi ordinance to Azad Kashmir. There 
has been no progress in the 1998 killings of Muhammad Ayub Azam and 
Maleek Nasir.
    Ahmadis suffer from harassment and discrimination and have limited 
chances for advancement into management levels in government service 
(see Section 2.c.). Even the rumor that someone may be an Ahmadi or 
have Ahmadi relatives can stifle opportunities for employment or 
promotion. Ahmadi students in public schools are subject to abuse by 
their non-Ahmadi classmates, and the quality of teachers assigned to 
predominantly Ahmadi schools by the Government is poor. However, most 
Ahmadis are home-schooled or go to private Ahmadi-run schools. Young 
Ahmadis and their parents also complain of difficulty in gaining 
admittance to good colleges, forcing many children to go abroad for 
higher education. Certain sections of the Penal Code also have caused 
problems for the group (see Section 2.c.), particularly the provision 
that forbids Ahmadis from ``directly or indirectly'' posing as Muslims. 
Armed with this vague wording, mullahs have brought charges against 
Ahmadis for using the standard Muslim greeting form and naming their 
children Mohammed.
    Other religious minority groups also experience considerable 
discrimination in employment and education. In the country's early 
years, minorities were able to rise to the senior ranks of the military 
and civil service. Today, many are unable to rise above mid-level 
ranks. Discrimination in employment is believed to be common. 
Christians in particular have difficulty finding jobs other than those 
of menial labor, although Christian activists say that the employment 
situation has improved somewhat in the private sector. Christians find 
themselves disproportionately over-represented in Pakistan's most 
oppressed social group--that of bonded laborers. Like Ahmadis, many 
Christians complain about the difficulty that their children have in 
gaining admission to government schools and colleges, a problem they 
attribute to discrimination. Many Christians continue to express fear 
of forced marriages between Muslim males and Christian women, although 
the practice is relatively rare. Reprisals against suspected converts 
to Christianity occur, and a general atmosphere of religious 
intolerance has led to acts of violence against religious minorities 
(see Section 2.c.). For example, on October 22, a Christian church in 
Lahore was set on fire and sustained major damage. An individual was 
charged in connection with the incident the same day. There are 
restrictions on certain testimony in court by non-Muslims (see Section 
1.e.).
    In August the leader of the Sunni religious party Jamiat Ulema-i-
Islami (JUI), Fazlur Rehman, accused the Aga Khan Foundation of the 
killing of a Sunni religious leader and his nephew in Chitral and 
called for the closure of Aga Khan activities. The Sunni leader was 
killed by an Ismaili in a property dispute on August 19. The Aga Khan 
Foundation is a community service organization sponsored by Ismaili 
Shi'as. On November 4, a series of explosions killed one person and 
injured 30 others in Murdike. The militant Sunni extremist organization 
Lashkar-e-Taiba was holding its annual conference in the town at the 
time. In November 1998, nine members of a Christian family were killed 
and mutilated in their home in Nowshera, in an attack that some 
Christians alleged was sectarian. In December 1998, four family members 
were arrested and charged with the crime. They asserted their innocence 
to the press. Two alleged that they had been tortured to induce 
confessions; one of the family members who confessed was being tried at 
year's end.
    Although there are few if any citizens who are Jewish, anti-Semitic 
sentiments appear to be widespread, and anti-Semitic press articles are 
relatively common.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Industrial Relations Ordinance of 
1969 (IRO) provides for the right of industrial workers to form trade 
unions but is subject to major restrictions in some employment areas. 
The Essential Services Maintenance Act of 1952 (ESA) covers sectors 
associated with the state administration, i.e., government services and 
state enterprises, such as oil and gas production, electricity 
generation and transmission, the state-owned airline, and ports. 
Workers in these sectors are allowed to form unions. However, the ESA 
sharply restricts normal union activities, usually prohibiting, for 
example, the right to strike in affected organizations. A worker's 
right to quit also may be curtailed under the ESMA. For each industry 
subject to the ESMA, the Government must make a finding, renewable 
every 6 months, on the limits of union activity. There is no provision 
allowing agricultural workers or teachers to unionize, as they are not 
defined as ``an industry.'' Following assumption of responsibility of 
the utility by the military, a presidential ordinance in December 1998 
banned all union activity in the water and power development authority 
(employing 130,000 workers) for 2 years. The International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) reports that in July the 
government of Punjab announced that it had decided to curb the 
activities of unions and associations, including the All Pakistan 
Clerks' Association, because they were perceived as obstructing public 
policy.
    Other restrictions on union activities include the Antiterrorism 
Ordinance of 1999 (ATO), promulgated in the early part of the year. The 
ATO codified the crime of a ``terrorist act,'' including, ``an act of 
civil commotion.'' Such acts are punishable by imprisonment of 7 years 
to life, as well as fines. ``Civil commotion'' include illegal strikes, 
go-slows, and lockouts. Under the original ordinance, those 
distributing, publishing, or pasting a handbill, or making graffiti or 
wall chalking ``intended to create unrest'' were subject to arrest. 
According to the ILO, this ordinance prevented leafleting, posters, or 
even word-of-mouth notices of public meetings. Later in the year, the 
ATO was renewed with an amendment eliminating references to handbills, 
graffiti, or the intent to create civil commotion (see Section 1.e. and 
2.b.).
    According to government estimates, union members make up only about 
10 percent of the industrial labor force and 3 percent of the total 
estimated work force. Unions claim that the number of union members is 
underestimated. Contract labor continues to flourish, undercutting the 
power of the unions and exploiting workers willing to work on temporary 
contracts. These workers receive fewer benefits and have no job 
security.
    Legally required conciliation proceedings and cooling-off periods 
constrain the right to strike, as does the Government's authority to 
ban any strike that may cause ``serious hardship to the community'' or 
prejudice the national interest. The Government also may ban a strike 
that has continued for 30 days.
    Strikes are rare. When they occur, they usually are illegal and 
short. The Government regards as illegal any strike conducted by 
workers who are not members of a legally registered union. Police do 
not hesitate to crack down on worker demonstrations. The law prohibits 
employers from seeking retribution against leaders of a legal strike 
and stipulates criminal penalties for offenders. The courts may 
imprison employers for violating thisprohibition, but they are more 
likely to fine them. The law does not protect leaders of illegal 
strikes.
    Unions may belong to federations, and there are eight major 
federations. The Government permits trade unions across the political 
spectrum. While many unions remain aloof from politics, some are 
associated with political parties. Unions associated with opposition 
parties are allowed to carry on their activities freely.
    In 1997 the Cabinet passed an amendment to the IRO which states 
that: 1) only employees of the represented industry can hold office in 
a trade union; and 2) if trade unions form a federation, the federation 
cannot bargain with individual employers; each component union has to 
bargain for itself. The first provision disadvantages smaller unions, 
which may not have enough officers capable of bargaining. The second 
provision is an attempt to weaken the power of the federations. This 
amendment has been challenged by the trade unions and, as a result, has 
not yet come into force. Late in 1997, the Prime Minister announced the 
Government's new investment policy, under which, in order to improve 
working relations among employees and employers, trade union activity 
would be industry-based and not factory-based. The new policy also 
decrees that, in order to check the growth of trade unions, unions 
receiving less than 20 percent of the votes in a referendum are to be 
dissolved automatically and their registrations canceled. No action has 
been taken to implement these elements of the investment policy.
    The International Labor Organization (ILO) has stated repeatedly 
that current law and practice violate the Government's commitments 
under ILO Convention 87. The ILO has urged the Government to lift 
prohibitions against union activity with respect to teachers, and 
radio, television, railway, forestry, hospital, and other government 
employees, as well as to rescind the existing ban on strikes. The ILO 
also expressed concern about the practice of artificial promotions that 
exclude workers from the purview of Convention 111. In response to a 
government request, the ILO has provided technical assistance to help 
bring the country's labor laws into conformity with the ILO's 
conventions. However, no legislative remedies have been applied.
    In 1994 a government task force on labor prepared a report 
recommending improvements on worker rights problems, which were the 
basis for the development of a new labor policy by the Government. The 
Government has not yet approved the new labor policy; however, the 
Government has implemented two components of the proposed labor policy: 
1) improvements in the workers' welfare fund; and 2) increases in 
social security benefits for workers. In 1997 the Prime Minister and 
trade union representatives agreed to establish a committee to examine 
the labor laws and draft legislation to bring them into conformity with 
ILO conventions and the national Constitution. No concrete action has 
yet been taken by this committee.
    Federations are free to affiliate with international federations 
and confederations. For example, trade unions belong to the ICFTU and 
to secretariats affiliated with the ICFTU.
    The United States revoked generalized system of preferences (GSP) 
trade benefits in 1996 for failure to make progress on worker rights 
issues.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of 
industrial workers to organize and to freely elect representatives to 
act as collective bargaining agents is established in law. The IRO 
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. Under the law, private 
employers are required to reinstate workers fired for union activities. 
However, in practice, such redress has not been available to workers, 
because workers usually do not pursue redress through the courts, 
because they view the legal system as slow, prohibitively expensive, 
and corrupt.
    In general, legally constituted unions have the right to bargain 
collectively. However, the many restrictions on forming unions (see 
Section 6.a.) preclude collective bargaining by large sections of the 
labor force, e.g., agricultural workers, who are not provided with the 
right to strike, to bargain collectively, or to make demands on 
employers. The National Bank of Pakistan Employees Union filed suit 
against the Government for implementing a banking companies ordinance 
that prohibited union activities in banks during working hours and 
allowed only current bank employees to serve as bank trade union 
officials. Labor unions report that the practice of giving 
artificialpromotions to make workers ineligible for union membership is 
prevalent in the financial sector.
    The ESA also restricts collective bargaining. For each industry 
subject to the ESA (see Section 6.a.), the Government must make a 
finding, renewable every 6 months, on the limits of union activity. In 
cases in which the Government prohibits collective bargaining, special 
wage boards decide wage levels.
    These boards are established at the provincial level and comprise 
representatives from industry, labor, and the provincial labor 
ministry, which provides the chairman. The chairman may name additional 
industry and labor representatives to the board. Despite the presence 
of the labor representatives, unions generally are dissatisfied with 
the boards' findings. Disputes are adjudicated before the National 
Industrial Relations Commission. A worker's right to quit also may be 
curtailed under the ESA. Dismissed workers have no recourse to the 
labor courts.
    The ESA exempts export promotion zones (EPZ's) from the IRO's 
provision granting workers the right to form trade unions. Only one EPZ 
currently exists, in Karachi. Nearly 6,000 persons are employed there, 
according to government sources. In 1996 the cabinet decided to 
withdraw these exemptions beginning in January 2000. However, the 
Government has stated that it will honor agreements with investors 
regarding the exemptions, making it unlikely that the Export processing 
zone Authority provision will be lifted before 2001.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and 
the law prohibit forced labor, including forced labor by children; 
however, the Government does not enforce these prohibitions 
effectively. Critics argue that the ESA's limitation on some worker 
rights, especially the right to quit, constitutes a form of compulsory 
labor. The ILO has objected to this violation of Convention 29. The 
Government has responded that the maintenance of essential services is 
required for the defense and security of the country, and that 
continued reviews have limited these services to a few, e.g., 
electricity generation and distribution, and air and sea ports.
    There is a reasonable basis to believe that hand made bricks and 
hand woven wool carpets are produced using forced or indentured child 
labor. Illegal bonded labor is widespread. It is common in the brick, 
glass, and fishing industries and is found among agricultural and 
construction workers in rural areas. A recent study by local unions 
suggests that over 200,000 families work in debt slavery in the brick 
kiln industry. There is no evidence that bonded labor is used in the 
production of export items such as sporting goods and surgical 
equipment. However, bonded labor reportedly is used in the production 
of carpets for export under the peshgi system, by which a worker is 
advanced money and raw materials for a carpet he promises to complete. 
Conservative estimates put the number of bonded workers at several 
million.
    The Constitution and the law prohibit slavery. However, in remote 
areas of rural Sindh, bonded agricultural labor and debt slavery have a 
long history, despite constitutional and legal prohibitions. Landlords 
have kept entire families in private prisons and families have been 
sold by one landlord to another. According to press reports, raids by 
Government officials and human rights activists over a 2-year period 
from January 1995 to January 1997 resulted in the liberation of 349 
bonded laborers. The Government of Punjab has now reportedly enhanced 
its activities, particularly in regard to bonded and child labor.
    The Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act adopted in 1992 outlawed 
bonded labor, canceled all existing bonded debts, and forbade lawsuits 
for the recovery of existing debts. The act makes bonded labor by 
children punishable by up to 5 years in prison and up to $1000 (PRs 
50,000) in fines. However, the provincial governments, which are 
responsible for enforcing the law, have failed to establish enforcement 
mechanisms. Hence, the law is largely ineffective. Lacking employment 
alternatives, many workers have returned to bonded labor.
    Children in juvenile detention facilities reportedly are required 
to work; children at the Karachi Central Jail, who either are 
imprisoned for crimes they have committed, were detained with their 
parents, or were born in jail, reportedly are involved in woodcrafts 
and television repairs (see Section 6.d.).
    Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.)Children 
sometimes are kidnaped to be used as forced labor. According to 1996 
ILO estimates, 3.3 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 years 
(about 8 percent of this population group) are ``economically active.'' 
Of these, about two-thirds work in agriculture. Seventy percent of the 
working children have the status of ``unpaid family helpers.'' Many 
observers believe that the ILO estimates understate the true dimensions 
of the problem. Observers also believe that the incidence of bonded 
labor among such children is significant, but there are no reliable 
figures available on this.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--Child labor is common and results from a combination of 
severe poverty, employer greed, and inadequate enforcement of laws 
intended to control it. The Constitution prohibits the employment of 
children aged 14 years and under in factories, mines, and other 
hazardous occupations. The Employment of Children Act of 1991, whose 
provisions were extended by the President in 1998 to the FATA, 
prohibits the employment of children under age 14 in certain 
occupations and regulates their conditions of work. Under this law, no 
child is allowed to work overtime or at night. Penalties for the 
violation of the act include fines of up to $400 (PRs 20,000) or 1 year 
in prison. The Government acknowledges that child labor is a problem. 
The Constitution prohibits forced labor, including forced labor 
performed by children; however, forced and bonded labor by children is 
common (see Section 6.c.).
    Children in juvenile detention facilities reportedly are required 
to work; children at the Karachi Central Jail, who either are 
imprisoned for crimes they have committed, were detained with their 
parents, or were born in jail, are reportedly involved in woodcrafts 
and television repairs (see Section 6.c.).
    In 1996 the Government announced the results of its first 
comprehensive child labor survey conducted with the assistance of the 
ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO-
IPEC). According to the survey, 8.3 percent (or between 3.3 and 3.6 
million) of children between the ages of 5 and 14 worked. The child 
labor force was predominately male (73 percent) and predominately rural 
(71 percent). About 60 percent of child labor in the country occurred 
in Punjab. Some 45.8 percent of child laborers worked 35 hours or more 
per week and 12.6 percent worked 56 hours or more. The majority (67 
percent) of child laborers worked in agriculture, forestry, hunting, 
and fishing industries; 11 percent in the manufacturing sector, 9 
percent in wholesale and retail, and 8 percent in social and personal 
services. In occupational terms, craft and related trade work accounted 
for about 19 percent of child laborers, while 71 percent worked in 
unskilled jobs. Only the Government and exporters regard the ILO survey 
as an accurate measurement of the incidence of child labor. Many 
observers believe that it understates the true dimensions of the 
problem, with high-range estimates of as many as 20 million child 
laborers. A recent ILO survey indicated that agriculture is the largest 
child labor industry; followed by the informal sector, including 
domestic work, street vending, illegal work, and family businesses; 
hazardous work, such as the leather, surgical instruments, and brick 
kiln industries rank third. The report also noted that when programs 
are developed to eliminate child labor in one industry, parents often 
shift their children to work in other industries. A survey conducted by 
the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan published in June noted that 
there are approximately 4,000 children working in auto workshops in the 
Mardan district of the NWFP. The report stated that most of the 
children were between the ages of 3 and 8.
    Child labor is widely employed in the carpet industry, much of 
which is family-run. Most children working in the carpet industry are 
female. Carpet manufacturers are working with ILO-IPEC to establish a 
program to eliminate child labor from the industry through monitoring 
and rehabilitation. Although surgical instrument manufacturers have 
taken steps to remove child laborers from their factories, child labor 
in this industry still occurs at rudimentary offsite filing and 
polishing centers run by subcontractors for low-end items. Almost all 
children working in the surgical instrument industry are male. 
According to the ILO and the Punjab Welfare Department, approximately 
15 percent of the work force in the surgical instrument industry in 
Sialkot is made up of children; it is estimated that 7,500 such 
children are under age 14. According to a June report issued by Public 
Services International, the average age of children in the surgical 
instrumentindustry is 12; children in the industry are prone to 
injuries from machinery and burns from hot metal, as well as 
respiratory illnesses from inhaling poisonous metal dust. Child labor 
is not regarded as a particular problem in the textile and apparel 
industries, but no specific studies of the sector have been performed 
on this issue.
    In October 1997, soccer ball manufacturers, importers, the ILO, and 
UNICEF implemented an 18-month action plan agreed upon in February 1997 
(the Atlanta Agreement) to eliminate child labor from the soccer ball 
industry. This project, based in Sialkot, monitored the production of 
soccer balls at newly established stitching centers, and had set up 154 
rehabilitation centers for the education of former child laborers and 
their younger siblings. The project also sought to identify unemployed 
adults from the families of former child stitchers to take up stitching 
work and replace lost income. By May 1998, 83 percent of production was 
verified as having moved to monitored stitching centers. Women have 
been reluctant to move from their homes to stitching centers. The 
project is working to establish small home-based stitching centers in 
individual villages to counter this unwillingness to travel to work, 
and some 80 village-based stitching centers had been set up for women 
as of October 1998; by March there were 138 such centers for women. 
Saga Sports, which also manufactures soccer balls, has built modern 
community-based facilities in 10 villages with a high percentage of 
family stitching operations. The facilities contain workspace for 
stitchers as well as dining areas, child care centers, recreation 
areas, and medical clinics. Each facility also has its own water 
system, waste disposal system, generator for electricity, and 
transportation system. Meals, child care, medical services, and use of 
the facilities are provided free of charge to Saga workers and their 
families; use of non-production areas is allowed to all community 
members. These centers reportedly have created approximately 6,000 
jobs, 400 to 500 of which are held by women. By the end of the year, 
approximately 6,000 children had been removed from the industry.
    Under a memorandum of understanding with the Government, the ILO/
IPEC program in Pakistan is involved with a number of other projects 
concerning child labor. The ILO works with the Government, employers, 
workers, and NGO's in pursuing a national policy and plan of action for 
child labor. The Government established 30 rehabilitation centers (50 
are planned) for former child laborers through the Pakistan Bait-u-Mal, 
the Government's social welfare fund. Each center educates 120 
children. The ILO created a similar program in conjunction with the 
European Union, specifically targeting child bonded laborers. In 
December 1998, the ILO and the Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation launched a large scale project to combat child labor and 
child abuse in the NWFP.
    In response to international criticism, the Government has begun to 
push provincial authorities to enforce child labor laws. However, 
enforcement of child labor laws remains a problem. There are relatively 
few child labor inspectors in most districts, and the inspectors often 
receive little training and have insufficient resources. By law the 
inspectors also may not inspect facilities that employ less than 10 
persons; most child labor occurs in facilities smaller than this. 
Hundreds of convictions are obtained each year for violations of child 
labor laws, but low fines levied by the courts--ranging from an average 
of $7 (PRs 364) in the NWFP to an average of $140 (PRs 7,280) in 
Baluchistan--do not serve as a significant deterrent. The 1991 
Employment of Children Act allows for fines of up to $350 (PRs 18,200). 
Often, penalties are not imposed on those found to be violating child 
labor laws.
    The Child Care Foundation of Pakistan, a national NGO, was 
established in 1996 with support from Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce. 
Other NGO's, such as the Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal, conduct programs to end 
child labor. Bait-ul-Mal, with funding from the Government and from 
international organizations, operates 33 education centers for 
children, known collectively as the National Center for the 
Rehabilitation of Child Labor. Parents of working children are offered 
compensation of $6 per month (PRs 300), plus a small daily stipend of 
approximately $0.10 (PRs 5) in exchange for sending their children to 
school. The children in the centers receive free schooling, uniforms, 
books, and meals. However, it appears that many children do not remain 
in these schools for more than 1 year; the schools are often in areas 
far from their clients; and it has been reported that some children are 
sent to these schools rather than to public schools, in order to 
qualify for the stipend. The Bunyad Literacy Community Council also 
runs schools for children. It focuses on children who work in the 
soccer ball industry, and its programs are aimed at transitioning 
children out of working and into mainstream schooling. Other local 
NGO's are involvedin the elimination of child labor, as well, including 
Rugmark Pakistan, Sudhuur, and the Society for the Protection of the 
Rights of the Child.
    e. Acceptable Conditions at Work.--Federal statutes applicable 
throughout the country govern labor regulations. The minimum wage for 
unskilled workers is $38 (PRs 1,976) per month, with only slightly 
higher minimum rates for skilled workers. It applies only to industrial 
and commercial establishments employing 50 or more workers and not to 
agricultural or other workers in the informal sectors. The minimum wage 
is usually inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a 
worker and family, since families tend to be large.
    Federal law provides for a maximum workweek of 48 hours (54 hours 
for seasonal factories) with rest periods during the workday and paid 
annual holidays. These regulations do not apply to agricultural 
workers, workers in factories with fewer than 10 employees, and 
contractors. Many workers are unaware of the regulations that protect 
their rights because of their lack of education.
    Additional benefits required by the Federal Labor Code include 
official government holidays, overtime pay, annual and sick leaves, 
health and safety standards in the workplace, health care, workers 
children's education, social security, employees old age benefits and a 
workers welfare fund. Employees earning more than $60 (PRs 3,120) per 
month are not considered workers for the sake of these benefits.
    The provinces have been ineffective in enforcing labor regulations, 
because of limited resources, corruption, and inadequate regulatory 
structures. In general health and safety standards are poor. Although 
organized labor presses for improvements, the Government has done 
little and weakly enforces existing legal protection. Workers cannot 
remove themselves from dangerous working conditions without risking 
loss of employment. There is a serious lack of adherence to mine safety 
and health protocols. For example, mines often have only one opening 
for entry, egress and ventilation.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in persons, especially in 
women, is a significant problem, and the law prohibits the trafficking 
of women under age 21 into the country for sexual purposes, as well as 
kidnapping and slavery. However, despite widespread general knowledge 
about trafficking, the Government has done little to stem the flow of 
women trafficked into the country or to help victims of trafficking.
    Pakistan is a receiving country for thousands of trafficked women 
every year, mainly from Bangladesh. The Commission of Inquiry for Women 
drew attention to the problem of ``enforced prostitution and 
trafficking in women,'' noting that women are the victims of 
exploitation by police and pimps, and should be treated with 
compassion. A Karachi-based NGO estimates that 100 to 150 women are 
trafficked into the country each day from Bangladesh and are sold for 
both domestic labor throughout the country and for forced prostitution 
in Karachi. Press reports also indicate that the practice of buying and 
selling brides still occurs in parts of the NWFP and Punjab. 
Trafficking victims usually are deceived with false prospects of 
marriage or offers of work in legitimate jobs in Pakistan. Most are 
smuggled from Bangladesh through India to Pakistan. Smaller numbers of 
Burmese, Sri Lankan, Indian, and Afghan women also are trafficked. Such 
women generally do not have legal residency, and, if arrested in police 
raids, end up in jail for violation of immigration laws or violations 
of the Hudood ordinance. Without money to pay for bail, they often are 
bailed out by their pimps, who force them to return to prostitution. 
Small numbers of escaped trafficking victims end up in shelters, but 
most do not, as there are few such shelters available. Many women who 
are not bailed out never are repatriated; rather, they languish in 
confinement while waiting to go home.
    Women who are high school graduates reportedly cost approximately 
$5,000 (PRs 260,000); less educated women who are not physically 
attractive reportedly cost approximately one-third as much. Some women 
sold in shops in Karachi reportedly are sent to Persian Gulf states, 
where they are slaves; women sent to rural Pakistan reportedly are de 
facto slaves. Buyers in such shops reportedly purchase women for 
purposes of labor or sex; some are married to their buyers.
    There are reports that Afghan and Bangladeshi girls are trafficked 
into the country for sexual purposes.
    Young boys are trafficked from Pakistan to the Persian Gulf to work 
as camel jockeys; sometimes they are abducted by traffickers in the 
country and sent abroad without the knowledge of their parents. The 
conditions such children live under often are poor, and many children 
reportedly are injured or maimed while racing camels. In July the case 
of an 8\1/2\year-old Pakistani boy was reported in the United Arab 
Emirates. He had been kidnaped in the city of Larkan in 1997 and 
smuggled through Iran to al-Ein in the Abu Dhabi emirate, where he was 
forced to work as a camel jockey. He was rescued by the police, who 
acted on a tip, and returned him to his parents. Within the country, 
children sometimes are kidnaped to be used as forced labor, for ransom, 
or to seek revenge against an enemy (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). In 
rural areas, it is a traditional practice for poor parents to give 
children to rich landlords in exchange for money or land, according to 
human rights advocates. These children frequently are abused by these 
landlords and held as bonded laborers for life.
                                 ______
                                 

                               SRI LANKA

    Sri Lanka is a longstanding democratic republic with an active 
multiparty system. Constitutional power is shared between the popularly 
elected President and the 225-member Parliament. In 1994 Chandrika 
Kumaratunga, the head of the governing People's Alliance (PA) 
coalition, was elected President in free and fair elections. In 
November President Kumaratunga scheduled presidential elections for 
December 21 even though her 6-year term was not set to expire until 
November 2000. The preelection period was marked by violence. On 
December 18, a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) 
unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the President. Kumaratunga was 
reelected on December 21 in elections that were characterized as 
generally free and fair; however, there were credible accounts of 
voting irregularities and at least six persons were killed in election-
related violence. The Parliament was elected in free and fair elections 
in 1994; new parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2000. The 
Government respects constitutional provisions for an independent 
judiciary.
    For the past 16 years the Government has fought LTTE, an insurgent 
organization fighting for a separate state in the north and east for 
the country's Tamil minority. The conflict has claimed approximately 
60,000 lives. In a failed attempt to open a land-based supply route to 
Jaffna in 1997 and 1998, 5,000 combatants on both sides were killed and 
tens of thousands of persons were displaced from their homes. During 
the year, government forces gained territory in the north and west of 
the island through a series of offensives. In November the LTTE 
counterattacked and successfully pushed back the government forces to 
new defensive lines, recapturing most of the territory that the 
Government had seized over the past 2 years. It is estimated that more 
than a thousand combatants were killed on both sides.
    The Government, through the Ministry of Defense, controls all 
security forces. The 60,000-member police force is responsible for 
internal security in most areas of the country and also has been used 
in military operations against the LTTE. The 120,000-member army (which 
includes the Army Volunteer Force), the 17,000-member navy, and the 
18,500-member air force bear principal responsibility for conducting 
operations against the LTTE insurgents. The Police Paramilitary Special 
Task Force (STF) also battles the LTTE. The more than 15,000-member 
Home Guards, an armed force drawn from local communities and 
responsible to the police, provides security for Muslim and Sinhalese 
village communities in or near the war zone. The Government also arms 
and directs various Tamil militias opposed to the LTTE, although at 
times these groups act independently of government authority. During 
the year, some members of the security forces committed serious human 
rights abuses.
    Sri Lanka is a low-income country with a market economy based on 
the export of textiles, tea, rubber, coconuts, and gems, and on 
earnings from tourism and repatriated earnings of citizens employed 
abroad. The gross domestic product per capita is approximately $850. 
The economy's growth rate was 4.7 percent in 1998 and growth for 1999 
was expected to be less than 4.0 percent due to declining strength in 
the garment industry and a contraction in the market for export of tea. 
In 1997 the Government intensified efforts to promote economic reform 
and liberalization, including privatizing some government enterprises 
and promoting foreign investment and trade. These steps continued 
during the year.
    The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens 
in areas not affected by the insurgency; however, the ongoing war with 
the LTTE continued to be accompanied by serious human rights abuses by 
the security forces. Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial 
killings, and almost certainly killed prisoners captured on the 
battlefield. In addition up to 15 individuals disappeared from security 
force custody in Vavuniya and in the east. In the past, persons also 
have disappeared or have been killed after last being seen near the 
army's forward defense lines in the north, areas civilians are ordered 
by the military to avoid. The circumstances of such disappearances and 
killings were unclear, and with the many military offensives and 
forward defense line changes throughout the year, the risk to civilians 
remained high. Torture remained a serious problem, and prison 
conditions remained poor. Arbitrary arrests--including short-term mass 
arrests and detentions--continued, often accompanied by failure of the 
security forces to comply with the protective provisions of the 
Emergency Regulations (ER). Impunity for those responsible for human 
rights abuses also remained a serious problem. Little progress was made 
in resolving cases of extrajudicial killing or disappearance. In most 
cases, there was no investigation or prosecution at all, giving the 
appearance of impunity for those responsible for human rights 
violations. No arrests were made in connection with the disappearance 
and presumed killing of at least 350 civilians whom the security forces 
suspected were members or sympathizers of the LTTE in Jaffna in 1996 
and 1997. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights and 
restricted freedom of the press. The Government continued to engage in 
censorship of domestic newspaper reporting and foreign television 
broadcasts on military and security operations during the year. On 
occasion security forces harassed journalists. On one occasion 
government forces assaulted journalists and forcibly dispersed a march 
by the leading opposition party. There were some restrictions on 
freedom of movement, especially from Vavuniya to the south and Colombo. 
Violence and discrimination against women, child prostitution, child 
labor, and discrimination against the disabled continued to be 
problems. There is some discrimination and occasional violence against 
religious minorities and widespread ethnic discrimination against 
Tamils. Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced 
prostitution occurs.
    In positive developments, the Government took steps to control 
abuses. The national Human Rights Commission (HRC) continued its 
operations in 11 offices around the nation; however, human rights 
observers believed the HRC was not pursuing its mandate aggressively 
due to poor leadership. In 1998 the Government also established a 
cabinet-level committee initially known as the Anti-Harassment 
Committee and later renamed the Committee to Inquire into Undue Arrest 
and Harassment (CIUAH). The CIUAH has a mandate to investigate 
complaints associated with alleged harassment and arrests and other 
security force actions. Human rights groups state that the committee is 
somewhat effective; however, critics believe that the committee's 
services have not been advertised widely and question its continued 
viability. In July 1998, one of the six soldiers convicted in the 
Krishanthi Kumaraswamy murder and rape case claimed that he knew where 
the bodies of up to 400 Tamils killed by security forces in 1996 had 
been buried. In part as a result of international pressure and prodding 
by the HRC, the Government agreed to open an investigation. During the 
year, two exhumation investigations recovered 15 bodies. At year's end, 
the Government was continuing its investigation and had not yet sought 
criminal indictments against any security force personnel in relation 
to the killings.
    There was no attempt, as in the past, to use the ER to cover up 
security force misdeeds. Through its rulings, the judiciary continued 
to exhibit its independence and uphold individual civil rights. 
Security forces continued to take effective measures to limit civilian 
casualties during military operations; however, the air force bombed a 
civilian village near the north of Puthukudiyiruppu (PTK) on September 
15, killing 22 persons, and in November at least 37 civilians were 
killed in fighting at theMadhu Church during an exchange of shelling 
between SLA and LTTE troops. The Government captured and took prisoner 
more than 90 LTTE cadres throughout the year. The Government also 
continued to provide relief to those displaced by the conflict even 
though many were still in areas under LTTE control such as the Vanni 
area. However, government restrictions on medical supplies and a 
significant reduction in food rations contributed to poor health 
conditions for civilians in the Vanni area. In 1997 three regional 
commissions published a report that documented that more than 16,000 
persons had disappeared over the period from 1988 to 1994 after having 
been removed forcibly by security forces (including paramilitary 
organizations) and antigovernment elements, primarily the leftist 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Following publication of this report, 
the Government began submitting cases of alleged human rights abuses to 
the Attorney General's office for review and possible prosecution of 
those involved. The Attorney General referred over 290 indictments to 
the courts, action reportedly had been filed against 489 security force 
personnel, and 25 cases were moving through the court system by year's 
end. A fourth commission was established in May 1998 to investigate the 
10,000 cases of disappearance that the first 3 commissions could not 
investigate before their mandates expired. The report was scheduled for 
release on October 29; however, by the end of year, the commission had 
not completed its investigation or released its final report.
    There are several former Tamil insurgent organizations that now are 
aligned with the Government. These progovernment Tamil militants, who 
are armed and at times directed by the security forces, sometimes 
committed extrajudicial killings and were responsible for 
disappearances, torture, detentions, extortion, and forced conscription 
in Vavuniya and the east. The military wing of the People's Liberation 
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) committed many such abuses. Both 
PLOTE and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) effectively 
were disarmed by the Government in Vavuniya after a May 15 shootout 
between the groups in Colombo.
    The LTTE continued to attack civilians. The LTTE regularly 
committed extrajudicial killings, including killing prisoners taken on 
the battlefields, and also was responsible for disappearances, torture, 
arbitrary arrest, detentions, and extortion. After a period of relative 
calm at the beginning of the year, the LTTE began a long series of 
attacks, killing close to 100 civilians, including moderate Tamil 
politician Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam. In the north, at least 14 persons 
found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-described courts were 
killed by public execution and their bodies tied to lamp posts or 
otherwise left for public display. Through a campaign of killing and 
intimidation, the LTTE continued to undermine the work of the local 
government bodies in Jaffna whose members were elected in free and fair 
elections in January 1998. In addition the LTTE warned Tamil 
politicians in the east to discontinue their political activities 
during part of the year; however, they later lifted their ban on such 
activity.
    The LTTE continued to control large sections of the north and east 
of the country through authoritarian military rule. It denied those 
under its authority the right to change their government, infringed on 
their privacy rights, forcibly recruited children, routinely violated 
their civil liberties, operated an unfair court system, restricted 
freedom of movement, and severely discriminated against ethnic and 
religious minorities.
                        respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom 
        From:
    a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police, home guards, 
and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings in many places, 
including the eastern province, and army personnel also were 
responsible for killing a number of persons in the Vavuniya area and in 
Jaffna in the north. In July Ida Carmelita, a young Tamil girl, 
allegedly was kidnaped, gang raped, and killed in the Mannar area by 
five soldiers. At year's end, the case still was being investigated. In 
September an air force bombing of Puthukkudiyiruppu in the north killed 
over 20 civilians and wounded 40 others (see Section l.g.). Security 
forces killed at least two other persons in Vavuniya. At least three 
killings occurred in the Batticaloa area, associated with operations 
against the LTTE insurgents. In November at least 37 civilians were 
killed in fighting at the Madhu Church during an exchange of shelling 
between SLA and LTTE troops (see Section 1.g.). About 3,000 internally 
displaced persons (IDP's) sought shelter at the church a few days 
earlier as the fighting between the LTTE and government forces 
escalated. The circumstances of the shelling remain unclear; however 
both the government security forces and the LTTE knew that civilians 
were inside the church. At least one person died in police custody in 
Kandy after being arrested for suspected terrorist activity (see 
Section 1.c.). The exact number of extrajudicial killings was 
impossible to ascertain due to frequent censorship of news relating to 
militaryor police operations and to lack of regular access to the north 
and east where the war between the Government and the LTTE insurgents 
is being waged.
    In some cases extrajudicial killings were reprisals against 
civilians for LTTE attacks in which members of the security forces or 
civilians were killed or injured. In most cases, the security forces 
claimed that the victims were members of the LTTE, but human rights 
monitors believe otherwise. In Thampalakamam in February 1998, police 
and home guards allegedly massacred eight Tamil civilians, including 
three children, possibly in reprisal for the LTTE bombing of the Temple 
of the Tooth 1 week earlier. Some 31 police officers and 10 home guards 
were arrested in connection with the case. Twenty-one of these 
individuals were charged, 4 with murder and 17 with unlawful assembly. 
The other 20 were released after the Attorney General determined that 
there was insufficient evidence against them. The cases were scheduled 
to be heard during the year; however, they had not begun by year's end. 
The perpetrators of most extrajudicial killings were not arrested by 
year's end.
    Impunity remains a serious problem. Since April 1995 at least 761 
persons have been killed extrajudicially by the security forces or have 
disappeared after being taken into security force custody and are 
presumed dead. With the exception of the six security force personnel 
convicted in the 1996 killing of Krishanthi Kumaraswamy, no member of 
the security forces has been convicted for any of these crimes. In the 
vast majority of cases where military personnel may have committed 
human rights violations, the Government has not identified those 
responsible and brought them to justice. In August 1998, the Government 
reimposed a state of emergency nationwide. There was no evidence that 
the Government was using the ER, as in previous years, to conceal 
extrajudicial killings or disappearances. Nevertheless, crucial 
safeguards built into the ER and the legislation establishing the HRC 
often were ignored by the security forces--especially those provisions 
requiring receipts to be issued for arrests and ordering the security 
forces to notify the HRC of any arrest within 48 hours. Although 
security force personnel can be fined or jailed for failure to comply 
with the ER, none were known to have been punished during the year.
    The 1997 death of Reverend Arulpalan was not investigated during 
the year.
    In December 1997, three Tamil prisoners were hacked to death in 
prison by Sinhalese prisoners at Kalutara prison. Prison staff and army 
personnel at the prison allegedly failed to take measures to protect 
the detainees even as the attack occurred. At year's end nobody had 
been charged.
    In 1998 6 persons were found guilty and sentenced to death and 2 
persons were acquitted in the case of the 16 police and army personnel 
who were arrested for the rape and murder of Krishanthi Kumaraaswamy, 
the murder of 2 of her family members, and the rape and murder of 
another individual.
    At his sentencing in the Kumaraswamy case, one of those convicted, 
former Lance Corporal Somaratne Rajapakse, claimed that he had 
knowledge of mass graves at Chemmani in Jaffna where the bodies of up 
to 400 persons killed by security forces in 1996 had been buried. On 
July 22, 1998, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) issued a statement 
indicating that the police criminal investigation department had been 
directed to examine the allegation. In August 1998, the MOD stated that 
a forensic expert, a government analyst, and police detectives would 
visit the site. The HRC also was involved in investigating the claim 
and asked for United Nations forensic assistance. The Government was 
slow to move on the case; however, due to international pressure the 
process again was put in motion early in the year. On January 7, the 
Attorney General filed a request in the Jaffna magistrate's court to 
order exhumations of the Chemmani site. In March a team of Government 
investigators visited the site and collected preliminary soil samples. 
On June 16, Rajapakse identified one site; excavations witnessed by 
international observers yielded the skeletal remains of two persons. 
The two victims were provisionally identified as two young men who had 
disappeared in 1996 (see Section 1.b.). In August and September, 5 
persons convicted in the Kumaraswamy case identified a total of 16 
sites where they said they had buried between 120 and 140 bodies on the 
orders of their superiors. Exhumations, again observed by international 
experts, resumed on August 30. During this phase of exhumations, an 
additional 13 bodies were uncovered. On December 6, the Government 
submitted its forensic report to a magistrate in Jaffna; the report 
stated that 10 of the remains, including one skeleton that was bound 
and blindfolded, showed signs of physical assault and murder. The cause 
of death was not determined for the remaining bodies; however, the 
report stated that physical assault and murder could not be ruled out. 
By year's end, 13 of the bodies had not been identified.
    Rajapakse and others convicted in the Kumaranswamy case also 
disclosed the names of the 20 security force personnel, including2 
former policemen, who allegedly were responsible for the killings in 
the Chemmani case. On September 21, the Attorney General announced that 
the Government would attempt to confirm the identity of those who 
reportedly were involved in the killings; however, by year's end the 
investigation was ongoing and no arrests were ordered.
    The case against 8 soldiers and 1 reserve police constable arrested 
in February 1996 in the massacre of 24 Tamil villagers in Kumarapuram 
came to trial in September 1997. In November 1998, six of the soldiers 
were charged with murder and the case was scheduled for trial during 
the year; however, no action was taken by year's end. The other two 
accused security force agents were released due to lack of evidence.
    At year's end, the Attorney General had not made a recommendation 
concerning prosecution in the case of the six police officers who were 
accused of killing a Tamil textile merchant whose charred body was 
found in 1996.
    The case of the 22 STF members who were arrested on suspicion of 
murdering 23 Tamil youths in 1995 was scheduled to be heard in March; 
however, the prosecution did not appear. At a resumption of the 
proceedings in December the judge asked the case to be assigned to 
another court, and a new hearing is scheduled for February 2000.
    The PA Government came to power in 1994 and promised to bring to 
justice the perpetrators of extrajudicial killings from previous years. 
In 1994 it began prosecutions in several extrajudicial murders 
allegedly committed by members of the security forces. The trial of 21 
soldiers accused of massacring 35 Tamil civilians in 1992 in the 
village of Mailanthani in Batticaloa district was transferred to the 
Colombo High Court in 1996. The trial is scheduled to begin in May 
2000.
    There were no developments in the government investigations into 
the mass graves at Sooriyakanda, which contain an estimated 300 bodies, 
or the grave at Ankumbura, which is thought to contain the bodies of 36 
people killed by the police in 1989. There were also no developments in 
the Nikaweratiya army camp incident in which soldiers allegedly killed 
20 youths in 1989 during the period of the JVP uprising.
    In 1996 a presidential commission was established to investigate 
alleged torture and murder during the 1988-89 JVP uprising at a 
government-run detention center at the Batalanda housing estate near 
Colombo. In August 1998, five senior police officials were placed on 
compulsory leave for their involvement in the case, but they reportedly 
had been returned to duty in December of that year. In a final 
judgment, the trial court found the accused not guilty and closed the 
case.
    Former insurgent Tamil militant groups now aligned with the 
Government committed extrajudicial killings in the eastern province and 
in the Vavuniya area in the north. The military wing of PLOTE and the 
Razeek group were responsible for killing a number of persons. The 
security forces arm and use these militias and a number of other Tamil 
militant organizations to provide information, to help identify LTTE 
insurgents, and, in some cases, to fight in military operations against 
the insurgents. The exact size of these militias is impossible to 
ascertain, but they probably total fewer than 2,000 persons. Although 
the army in some instances took steps to convert Tamil militia groups 
into regular army units, military oversight of these groups is 
generally inadequate. These groups frequently operated beyond 
government control. Complaints about their activities continued, 
especially in transit camps for IDP's in Vavuniya. The militias gain 
access to these camps through a variety of means, including bribery and 
threats. It was impossible to determine the number of victims because 
of the secrecy with which these groups operated. Those killed by these 
militants probably included both LTTE operatives and civilians who 
failed to comply with extortion demands. In May the Government forbade 
these groups from carrying arms in public and from stockpiling weapons, 
but this prohibition has generally not been effective. The September 
killing of the PLOTE military wing leader led to a reduced number of 
complaints against the group.
    During provincial council elections in January, members of the 
country's two main political parties committed over 800 acts of 
violence. At least two persons were killed as a result of this violence 
(see Section 3).
    On September 7, unknown assailants shot and killed controversial 
journalist Rohana Kumara, editor of the Sinhala-language newspaper 
Satana (see Section 2.a.). Allegations of government involvement were 
not substantiated.
    On November 2, unknown assailants shot and killed Ramesh Nadarajah, 
a Tamil Member of Parliament for the Eelam People's Democratic Party 
(EPDP) and the editor of a weekly Tamil-language newspaper. No 
individual or group claimed responsibility for this attack by year's 
end; however, some persons speculated thatthe perpetrators targeted 
Nadarajah either because of his affiliation with the Government or in 
an attempt to suppress freedom of expression (see Section 2.a.).
    On November 14, a grenade exploded close to a political rally held 
by the opposition United National Party (UNP) prior to the December 
presidential elections (see Section 3). One person was killed in the 
attack and about 35 others were injured. No one claimed responsibility 
for the incident.
    The LTTE continued to commit extrajudicial killings, including both 
targeted attacks and bombings (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). On March 9, 
a bomb planted by an LTTE insurgent exploded on a bus in Colombo, 
killing 1 person and wounding more than a dozen others.
    In April an LTTE bomb exploded on a bus in Kandy, killing 2 persons 
and wounding 15 others. On July 14, a bomb planted by LTTE insurgents 
in Batticaloa killed 2 civilians and wounded as many as 29 others. On 
July 26, LTTE insurgents opened fire on the Ranga hotel in Vavuniya, 
killing two security force members and three civilians.
    On July 29, a suicide bomber killed moderate Tamil parliamentarian 
Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam in Colombo. Tiruchelvam also was the founder of 
the International Center for Ethnic Studies and the Law and Society 
Trust, a human rights research and advocacy organization. Tiruchelvam 
reportedly had angered the LTTE by supporting an alternative to a 
separate Tamil state.
    On August 11, the LTTE detonated Claymore mines in Batticaloa, 
killing 9 police agents and injuring 30. On September 2, the LTTE 
allegedly killed the vice president of PLOTE and two other persons in a 
Claymore mine bombing.
    On September 18, members of the LTTE killed more than 50 civilians, 
including women and children, with machetes close to Amparai. This 
attack allegedly was in retaliation for the airforce bombing of PTK on 
September 15 (see Section 1.g.).
    On September 27, an explosion attributed to the LTTE killed 1 
person and wounded 31 on a bus in Badulla.
    On December 18, an LTTE suicide bomber attempted to assassinate 
President Kumaratunga at a rally 3 days before the presidential 
elections. The bomb injured slightly the President, Justice Minister 
Peiris, and many other persons, and killed the perpetrator and 13 other 
persons, including a deputy inspector general of police for Colombo 
(see Sections 1.g. and 3).
    On December 18, an insurgent affiliated with the LTTE allegedly 
also bombed a rally of the UNP, killing 11 and injuring 43 (see Section 
3).
    The LTTE also targeted progovernment Tamil groups. For example, on 
May 29, an LTTE suicide bomber targeted Ganesh Kumar, leader of the 
Razeek group; Kumar was killed and nine civilians were injured (see 
Section 1.g.).
    The LTTE also committed a number of ``lamp post'' killings.
    At least 14 persons found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-
described courts were killed by the LTTE in public executions and their 
bodies tied to lamp posts or otherwise left for public display. The 
LTTE has attacked government installations, killing and wounding 
civilians, and the LTTE sometimes also kills its own injured troops to 
avoid their capture (see Section 1.g.).
    In July 1997, the Attorney General determined that there was 
insufficient evidence to charge anyone in the October 1994 suicide 
bombing that killed the UNP presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake 
and 58 other persons, although the LTTE generally is believed to be 
responsible. No further investigations were continuing.
    On March 26, municipal workers uncovered a pit near the Durraipa 
Stadium in Jaffna that contained the skeletal remains of several 
persons. Forensic evidence suggested that these remains were about 10 
years old. This discovery potentially implicated the Indian 
Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), which occupied Jaffna at the time. Critics 
contrasted the prompt investigation of the Durraipa stadium graves with 
the slow investigation of the Chemmani mass graves.
    b. Disappearance.--Disappearances at the hands of the security 
forces continued in the north and east. During the year, there were no 
reports of disappearances in Colombo, Trincomalee, or Jaffna. At least 
15 disappearances involved cases where individuals were last known to 
be in security force custody in Vavuniya and Batticaloa. In October 
three Tamils were taken by the home guards and later were found 
decapitated. As with extrajudicial killings, the exact number of 
disappearances was impossible to ascertain due tocensorship of news 
about security force operations and infrequent access to the north and 
east.
    Those who disappeared in 1999 and in previous years are presumed 
dead. The commander of the army and the Inspector General of police 
both have criticized the disappearances and stated that the 
perpetrators would be called to account. Nonetheless, there have been 
very few security force personnel prosecutions to date.
    Three regional commissions were set up in November 1994 to inquire 
into disappearances that occurred from 1988-94, most of which occurred 
during the 1988-89 period of the JVP uprising. The commission found 
that 16,742 persons disappeared after having been removed involuntarily 
from their homes, in most cases by security forces. In other cases, 
antigovernment elements--in particular the leftist JVP--were determined 
to be responsible for the disappearances. The Attorney General's office 
has opened over 900 files and referred over 290 indictments to the 
appropriate courts involving 489 members of the security forces on 
abduction and murder charges. The courts had initiated proceedings in 
at least 25 of those cases by year's end. In December a police officer 
was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for an abduction carried out in 
Hanbantota in the late 1980's.
    In May 1998, a fourth commission was established to look into 
approximately 10,000 cases of disappearance that the initial 3 
commissions had been unable to investigate before their mandates 
expired. The commission is not to investigate cases of disappearance, 
which occurred after 1994, but is to focus only on cases that were not 
completed by the first three commissions. Human rights observers have 
criticized the Government for not extending the mandate of this 
commission to include cases of disappearance that occurred since the 
Kumaratunga Government took office in 1994. The commission is charged 
with facilitating payment of monetary compensation to the families of 
persons who disappeared, as well as forwarding cases to the Attorney 
General for possible prosecution. The commission submitted an interim 
report to President Kumaratunga in December. By year's end, the 
commission had not published its final report.
    The trial of 9 suspects, including an army brigadier general, in 
the disappearance of 32 youths from the southern town of Embilipitiya 
in 1989 and 1990 concluded. Seven of the nine accused (excluding the 
brigadier) were found guilty and sentenced in February to 10 years' 
imprisonment. There were no developments in the Vantharamulle case, in 
which army troops allegedly abducted 158 Tamils from a refugee camp in 
the Batticaloa district in 1990. Observers maintain that there is 
credible evidence identifying the alleged perpetrators. Proceedings 
began early in the year against an army major and former subinspector 
of police in the case of 31 youths who allegedly disappeared following 
their arrests in Divulapitiya in 1989. The army major died after being 
charged in magistrate court, and the case against the former police 
officer is scheduled to continue in March 2000.
    Progovernment Tamil militias also were responsible for 
disappearances. These militias detain persons at various locations that 
serve, in effect, as undeclared detention centers. Human rights 
observers believe that the PLOTE was a major offender in the case of 
disappearances. However, the HRC has no mandate or authority to enforce 
respect for human rights among these militia groups. When the HRC 
office director for Vavuniya complained about PLOTE activity, he 
received death threats. He eventually departed the country. It was 
impossible to determine the exact number of victims because of the 
secrecy with which these groups operated. The Government has taken no 
clear steps to stop these militants' actions, although tighter 
restrictions on these groups' rights to bear arms were implemented 
following a May 15 shootout between PLOTE and TELO supporters near a 
popular shopping center in downtown Colombo.
    The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined number of civilian 
disappearances in the north and east of the island during the year. 
Although the LTTE has denied taking any prisoners from several of its 
battles, it is known to be holding 12 civilian crew members of vessels 
it has hijacked since 1995, along with 15 security force personnel. The 
LTTE has not notified the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) of any new security forces prisoners since 1994.
    c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Despite legal prohibitions, the security forces and police 
continue to torture and mistreat persons in police custody and prisons. 
At least one person died in police custody during the year as a result 
of beatings received after he was arrested for suspected terrorist 
activity (see Section 1.a.).
    The Convention Against Torture Act (CATA) made torture a punishable 
offense. Under the CATA, torture is defined as a specific crime, the 
High Court has jurisdiction over violations, and criminal conviction 
carries a 7-year minimum sentence.
    However, according to a June Amnesty International (AI) report, the 
CATA does not implement several provisions in the UN Convention; this 
resulted in torture being prohibited under specific circumstances and 
allowed under others. The Government has not yet developed effective 
regulations under the new legislation to prosecute and punish military 
and police personnel responsible for torture; however, it has ceased 
paying fines incurred by security force personnel guilty of the 
offense. Security force personnel have been fined under civil law for 
engaging in torture; however, they have not yet been prosecuted under 
criminal law. Members of the security forces continued to torture and 
mistreat detainees and other prisoners, both male and female, 
particularly during interrogation. Several children reportedly have 
been subjected to torture in detention during the past several years. 
Most torture victims were Tamils suspected of being LTTE insurgents or 
collaborators; however, there also have been sporadic reports of the 
use of torture against suspected criminals.
    Methods of torture included electric shock, beatings (especially on 
the soles of the feet), suspension by the wrists or feet in contorted 
positions, burning, and near drownings. In other cases, victims are 
forced to remain in unnatural positions for extended periods, or have 
bags laced with insecticide, chili powder or gasoline placed over their 
heads. Detainees have reported broken bones and other serious injuries 
as a result of their mistreatment. There were no reports of rape in 
detention.
    Under fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution, torture 
victims may file civil suit for compensation in the High Court. The 
Court has granted awards ranging from $200 (14,200 rupees) to $2,500 
(182,500 rupees). However, most cases take 2 years or more to move 
through the courts. Despite the existence of this law, torture 
continues to be committed with relative impunity, and no one has ever 
been convicted under the CATA for torture. During the year, charges 
were filed under CATA against fewer than a dozen police officers.
    Progovernment Tamil militants in the east and north, directly 
responsible to the security forces, also engaged in torture. The PLOTE 
in Vavuniya has drawn the most criticism for routinely torturing its 
opponents. Security forces have done little to stop this practice.
    On July 15, presidential security and police personnel injured 30 
members of the UNP opposition party with batons and tear gas at a 
protest against the Government's failure to fulfill campaign pledges 
(see Section 2.b.). Security forces also allegedly assaulted 12 
journalists and photographers and confiscated their cameras at this 
protest (see Section 2.a.).
    During provincial council elections in January, members of the 2 
main political parties participated in over 800 violent incidents, 
ranging from defacement of campaign posters to assault. This violence 
resulted in scores of injuries and 2 deaths (see Sections 1.a. and 3).
    On November 14, an explosion at a UNP political rally killed 1 
person and injured about 35 others. No one claimed responsibility for 
the attack (see Sections 1.a. and 3).
    The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. Security force 
prisoners released by the LTTE said that they occasionally had been 
subjected to torture, including being hung upside down and beaten, 
having pins inserted under their fingernails, and being burned by hot 
rods.
    The LTTE was responsible for a number of bomb attacks during the 
year, which killed and injured dozens of civilians (see Sections 1.a 
and 1.g.). In September the LTTE attacked a Chinese merchant ship, 
which had strayed to within about 7 miles of the coast. None of the 
crew was hurt in the attack, and the ship was rescued and escorted to 
Trincomalee Harbor by the navy (see Section 1.g.).
    Prison conditions generally are poor and do not meet minimum 
international standards because of overcrowding and lack of sanitary 
facilities. An increase in detentions associated with the war with the 
LTTE caused a significant deterioration in already poor standards in 
short-term detention centers as well as in undeclared detention centers 
run by progovernment Tamil groups such as the PLOTE (see Section 1.d.).
    The Government permitted representatives from the ICRC to visit 
approximately 250 places of detention. The HRC also made over 1,400 
visits to police stations and detention facilities during the year (see 
Section 1.d.).
    Conditions also are poor in detention facilities operated by the 
LTTE. Some former prisoners reported being handcuffed and shackled 
during much of their captivity.
    The LTTE permitted the ICRC to visit only a few detainees (see 
Section 1.d.).
    d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and 
detention are problems. Under ordinary law, authorities must inform an 
arrested person of the reason for arrest and bring that person before a 
magistrate within 24 hours. In practice, persons detained generally 
appear before a magistrate within a few days of arrest. The magistrate 
may authorize bail or order continued pretrial detention for up to 3 
months or longer. Under the ER and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 
(PTA), security forces may detain suspects for extended periods of time 
without court approval. The ER, in force periodically since 1979 and 
reactivated in August 1998, allows pretrial detention for a maximum of 
four consecutive 3-month periods. A magistrate must order further 
detention. Detainees may challenge their detention and sue the 
Government for violating their civil rights in the Supreme Court.
    In spite of the Government's announcements that it would close all 
secret detention centers, there were continued reports that the 
security forces held persons for short amounts of time in smaller camps 
for interrogation before transferring them to declared places of 
detention. This allegedly occurred on the Jaffna peninsula, in 
Vavuniya, and in the east (see Section 1.c.).
    Large-scale arrests of Tamils continued during the year; these 
arrests were particularly prevalent after LTTE bombings. The Government 
detained more than 1,970 persons under the ER and the PTA during the 
year, a slightly higher number than in 1998. Many of these detainees 
were arrested during operations against the LTTE. The majority of those 
arrested were released after periods lasting several days to several 
months; however, the total number of prisoners held under the ER and 
the PTA was consistently close to 2,000. Hundreds of Tamils who were 
arrested under the PTA were being held without bail awaiting trial; 
some of these persons have been held for up to 5 years. According to 
the Attorney General, there are almost 1,000 cases under the PTA or ER 
before the high courts.
    Arrests and detentions by the police took place in violation of the 
legal safeguards built into the ER and other legislation, particularly 
regarding requirements that receipts be issued and that the HRC be 
notified of any arrest within 48 hours. Those arrested by the army 
generally were turned over to the police within 24 hours as required 
under the ER. The HRC has a legal mandate to visit those arrested, and 
police officials generally respected this mandate; however, due to 
censorship and infrequent access to the area, it was unclear what was 
happening in the north and east.
    Security forces continued to conduct large-scale detentions and 
arrests of young Tamils, both male and female, on suspicion of being 
members or sympathizers of the LTTE. Major sweeps and arrests occurred 
in Colombo, in the east and on the Jaffna peninsula. Hundreds of Tamils 
at a time were picked up during police actions. Most were released 
after identity checks lasting several hours to several days. The 
Government justified the arrests on security grounds, but many Tamils 
claimed that the arrests were a form of harassment. In addition those 
arrested, most of whom were innocent of any wrongdoing, sometimes were 
detained in prisons together with hardened criminals. Security forces 
also caused other problems for Tamils. Tamils complained that they were 
verbally abused and held for extended periods of time at the security 
checkpoints that have been set up throughout Colombo. In July 1998, the 
President established the CIUAH. The committee, which includes senior 
opposition party and Tamil representatives, was tasked to look into 
complaints stemming from arrests and other security force actions and 
take remedial action as necessary. The committee set up a telephone hot 
line and received and investigated more than 100 complaints during the 
year. Opinions on the effectiveness of the CIUAH are mixed. Some human 
rights observers believe that the work of the committee acted as a 
deterrent to random arrests and helped to alleviate some of the 
problems encountered by detainees and their families. However, some 
critics claim that, following an initial rash of publicity, the 
committee's services have not been widely advertised. For example, the 
fax number for the committee is not in the Colombo telephone directory. 
Those wishing to contact the CIUAH usually are referred through human 
rights lawyers or find it by word of mouth. Finally, many Tamils 
believe that the CIUAH does little to deter police agents from stopping 
them more frequently at security forces checkpoints in the capital.
    The HRC continued to investigate the legality of detention in cases 
referred to it by the Supreme Court and private citizens. Although the 
HRC legally is constituted to exercise oversight over arrests and 
detentions by the security forces and to undertake visits to prisons, 
members of the security forces sometimes breached the regulations and 
failed to cooperate with the HRC.
    The Government continued to give the ICRC unhindered access to 
approximately 250 detention centers, police stations, and armycamps 
throughout the country that were recognized officially as places of 
detention. This played an important role in enabling the ICRC to 
monitor the human rights practices of the security forces. The HRC, 
through its 10 regional offices, also visited places of detention; 
however, human rights observers believed that due to inadequate 
leadership and a failure of the HRC to give long term contracts to many 
of its workers, the organization was not pursuing its mandate (see 
Section 4).
    The PLOTE continued to run places of illegal detention in Vavuniya.
    The LTTE continued to detain civilians, often holding them for 
ransom. For example, in September the LTTE held three businessmen for a 
ransom of $550,000 (40 million rupees). There continued to be 
unconfirmed reports that the LTTE was holding in custody more than 
2,000 civilians in the northern part of the island. Those held included 
12 civilian crew members of 3 vessels hijacked by the LTTE since 1995. 
The LTTE did not permit the ICRC or any other humanitarian organization 
to visit its detainees aside from these crew members and 15 security 
force personnel.
    The Government does not practice forced exile. There are no legal 
provisions allowing or prohibiting its use.
    e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an 
independent judiciary, and the Government respects these provisions in 
practice.
    The President appoints judges to the Supreme Court, the courts of 
appeal, and the high courts. A judicial service commission, composed of 
the chief justice and two Supreme Court judges, appoints, transfers, 
and dismisses lower court judges. Judges serve until mandatory 
retirement age, which is 65 for the Supreme Court and 62 for judges on 
other courts. Judges can be removed for reasons of misbehavior or 
physical or mental incapacity, but only after a legal investigation 
followed by joint action of the President and the Parliament.
    In criminal cases, defendants are tried in public by juries. They 
are informed of the charges and evidence against them, may be 
represented by the counsel of their choice, and have the right to 
appeal. The Government provides counsel for indigent persons tried on 
criminal charges in the high courts and the courts of appeal but not in 
other cases. Private legal aid organizations assist some defendants. In 
addition, the Ministry of Justice has created five community legal aid 
centers to assist those who cannot afford representation and to serve 
as educational resources for local communities. There are no jury 
trials in cases brought under the PTA. Confessions, which are 
inadmissible in criminal proceedings, are allowed in PTA cases. Most 
convictions under the PTA rely heavily on them. Defendants bear the 
burden of proof to demonstrate that their confessions were obtained by 
coercion. Defendants in PTA cases have the right to appeal. Although 
over l,000 cases under the PTA and the ER were before the courts, no 
cases came to trial during the year.
    Most court proceedings are conducted in English or Sinhala, which, 
due to a shortage of court-appointed interpreters, has restricted the 
ability of Tamil-speaking defendants to get a fair hearing. Few judges 
speak Tamil. The ER was published only recently in Tamil, and there are 
no law reports and few legal textbooks in Tamil.
    In Jaffna LTTE threats to court officials disrupted normal court 
operations. The courts were operating on only a limited basis by year's 
end.
    The LTTE has its own self-described court system, composed of young 
judges with little or no legal training. The courts operate without 
codified or defined legal authority and essentially operate as agents 
of the LTTE rather than as an independent judiciary. The courts 
reportedly impose severe punishments, including execution. During the 
course of the year, the LTTE committed several ``lamp post'' killings 
in which the bodies of those executed were left for public display (see 
Section l.a.).
    The Government claims that all persons held under the ER and the 
PTA are suspected members of the LTTE and, therefore, legitimate 
security threats. There is insufficient information to verify this 
claim and to determine whether these detainees or members of the now 
legal JVP, who were detained in similar fashion in past years, were 
political prisoners. Between 200 and 300 of those previously detained--
mostly JVP members--have been convicted under criminal law and remain 
incarcerated. In many cases, human rights monitors question the 
legitimacy of the criminal charges brought against these persons.
    The LTTE also holds a number of political prisoners. The number is 
impossible to determine because of the secretive nature of 
theorganization. The LTTE refuses to allow the ICRC access to these 
prisoners.
    f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--The Government generally respects many of the 
constitutional protections of individual privacy and the sanctity of 
the family and home; however, it infringes on these rights in some 
areas. The police obtain proper warrants for arrests and searches 
conducted under ordinary law; however, the security forces are not 
required to obtain warrants for searches conducted under either the ER 
or the PTA. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for providing 
oversight for such searches. There is no judicial review or other means 
of redress for alleged illegal searches under the ER. Some Tamils 
complained that their homes were searched as a means of general 
harassment by the security forces. The Government is believed to 
monitor telephone conversations and correspondence on a selective 
basis. The security forces routinely open mail destined for the LTTE-
controlled areas and seize contraband. The Government censors 
international television broadcasts received in the country that cover 
military operations (see Section 2.a).
    Progovernment Tamil militant groups, nominally operating under 
government control, use forced conscription. There are credible reports 
that Tamil youth in the east in particular have been forced to join 
these groups under threats to themselves and their families.
    The LTTE routinely invades the privacy of citizens, maintaining an 
effective network of informants. There are credible reports the LTTE 
has warned Muslims displaced from the Mannar area (approximately 55,000 
persons) not to return to their homes until the conflict is over. The 
LTTE also forcibly recruits children (see Section 6.c.).
    g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--Hostilities between the Government and the LTTE 
continued throughout the year. After failing to open a land-based 
supply route to Jaffna during 1997-98, the SLA launched Operation Rana 
Gosa in March. In a series of offensives between March and September 
the SLA gained territory in the north and west of the island. However, 
in November the LTTE counterattacked and successfully pushed back 
government forces to new defensive lines, and recaptured most of the 
territory the SLA had gained since 1997. The President replaced several 
officials in the military, and imposed a ban on press coverage of the 
war following the Government's losses to the LTTE (see Section 2.a.). 
It is estimated that more than 1,000 combatants on both sides were 
killed.
    Over 340,000 persons, principally in the Vanni region, remain 
displaced by the past several years of fighting.
    In the past, the Government often has publicized aspects of its 
planned operations to allow civilians time to vacate the probable areas 
to be affected. However, the military was more secretive during the 
year and did not give public warnings before the commencement of its 
advances. At least 36 persons were killed by security forces during the 
year. Despite the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to assess targets 
before attacks, bombings and artillery fire against LTTE installations 
have killed civilians working at those installations or living nearby.
    On September 15, the air force dropped 3 bombs on a village near 
PTK in the Vanni, killing 22 persons (see Section 1.a.). Human rights 
observers, including the ICRC and AI, alleged that those killed were 
civilians. Government officials acknowledged that 22 men, women, and 
children were killed by the air force bomb; however, they alleged that 
the airforce targeted an LTTE training camp, and at first did not admit 
the possibility that civilians were killed in error. The Government 
later acknowledged quietly that the attack was an accident.
    In November at least 37 civilians were killed in fighting at the 
Madhu Church during an exchange of shelling between SLA and LTTE troops 
(see Section 1.a.).
    The security forces continued to receive instruction in 
international humanitarian law as part of their training courses (see 
Section 4). According to the military, the army also has established 
human rights cells in each division and human rights offices in each 
brigade and battalion. Civilian casualties in the north and east battle 
zone remained relatively low during the year. The armed forces operate 
under written rules of engagement that severely restrict the shelling, 
bombardment, or other use of firepower against civilian-occupied areas 
such as villages. Although incidents occurred where the rules 
apparently were breached or waived, these were isolated cases. In some 
cases, poor targeting by the armed forces resulted in 
civiliancasualties from artillery fire and bombs. The security forces 
use aerial observation for selecting targets for shelling and bombing. 
They also attempt to locate the source of incoming mortar fire before 
responding; however, inaccurate mortar and artillery fire killed 
civilians.
    The Government continued to provide food relief to displaced and 
other needy citizens, including those living in areas controlled by the 
LTTE. However, the Government decided to cut significantly food rations 
to the north in 1998. Food also is distributed by the Commissioner 
General for Essential Services (CGES) and the Multi-Purpose Cooperative 
Societies (MCPS). Food rations are delivered by the Government to the 
Vanni area through a checkpoint whose location was moved twice as a 
result of changes in the battlefield situation. This checkpoint is 
controlled on one side by the security forces and on the other by the 
LTTE. The border into the territory controlled by the LTTE (``uncleared 
area'' in Government parlance) was closed a total of five times during 
the year, including a long period of closure from late June until early 
August (see Section 2.d.). These closures were related directly to the 
armed conflict. As a result, the distribution of food to the north was 
erratic during the year. Nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
representatives expressed concern that these interruptions had an 
impact on food reserves in the Vanni area and may have led to worsened 
nutrition there.
    The Government maintained a long list of prohibited ``war-related'' 
medical items, such as sutures, plaster of paris, intravenous liquid 
supplies, bandages, and some drugs. NGO's and other groups that sought 
to take these items to LTTE-controlled areas in the Vanni region needed 
permission from local officials as well as from the MOD. Delays were 
common and approval sometimes was denied, due to fear that supplies 
would fall into the hands of the LTTE. As a result, many medical items 
in the Vanni region were in short supply. This shortfall contributed to 
an already serious deterioration in the quality and quantity of medical 
care furnished to the civilian population. Government restrictions on 
the transport of items such as cement, batteries, and currency into the 
LTTE-controlled areas also had a negative impact on the relief work of 
NGO's in those areas.
    The Ministry of Defense reported that during the course of the 
year, over 35 LTTE insurgents turned themselves in and over 400 either 
surrendered on the battlefield or were arrested in security sweeps, 
with many of those arrested subsequently sent to rehabilitation 
centers. The ICRC continued to visit approximately 150 former LTTE 
members now in government rehabilitation camps who had surrendered 
during the previous 2 years. Given the scale of hostilities and the 
large number of LTTE casualties, observers found the number of 
prisoners taken under battlefield conditions to be extremely low; many 
LTTE fighters apparently were killed rather than taken prisoner. 
Observers believed that on the government side, an unwritten ``take-no-
prisoners'' policy generally remained in effect. However, various other 
factors may have limited the number of prisoners taken, such as the 
LTTE's efforts to remove wounded fighters from the battlefield, the 
proclivity of its fighters to choose suicide over capture, and the 
LTTE's occasional practice of killing its own badly wounded fighters 
(see Section 1.a.). No army or other security forces personnel were 
prosecuted or disciplined for executing prisoners.
    The Government refused to permit relief organizations to provide 
medical attention to wounded LTTE fighters, although it has offered to 
treat any LTTE wounded entrusted to Government care. During the course 
of the year, there were verifiable instances of wounded LTTE cadres 
surrendering to the Government and receiving appropriate medical care.
    The LTTE admits that it kills security forces personnel rather than 
take them prisoner. Eyewitness accounts confirm that the LTTE has 
executed wounded soldiers on the battlefield. The LTTE admits to 
holding only 15 security forces prisoners, all of whom were captured in 
1993 and 1994. The LTTE is believed to have killed most of the police 
officers and security force personnel it has captured in recent years. 
However, the LTTE released two army deserters who surrendered to it in 
1998. In November the LTTE handed over 11 SLA members who were captured 
during the year to the ICRC.
    The LTTE uses excessive force in the war. During the course of the 
year, the LTTE attempted to assassinate the President, killed a Member 
of Parliament, killed other noncombatants, and engaged in hostage 
taking, hijackings and bombing of civilian targets.
    On December 18, an LTTE suicide bomber attempted to assassinate 
President Kumaratunga; the bomb injured the President and Justice 
Minister Peiris and killed 14 persons, including the perpetrator (see 
Sections 1.a. and 3). That same day the LTTE allegedly bombed a UNP 
rally, killing 11 civilians (see Section 1.a.).
    On September 18, LTTE insurgents massacred more than 50 Sinhalese 
men, women, and children in Gonagala, allegedly in retaliation for the 
air force bombing of PTK (see Section 1.a.).
    A number of suicide bombings, Claymore mine attacks and ``pistol 
gang'' shootings occurred during the year, killing and injuring dozens 
of civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    In September the LTTE attacked a Chinese merchant ship, which had 
strayed to within about 7 miles of the coast. None of the crew was hurt 
in the attack, and the ship was rescued and escorted to Trincomalee 
Harbor by the navy (see Section 1.c.).
    The LTTE has been accused in the past of using church and temple 
compounds, where civilians are instructed by the Government to 
congregate in the event of hostilities, as shields for the storage of 
munitions; however, there were no reports that this occurred during the 
year. Reports that the LTTE was using children on the battlefield were 
verified when 25 LTTE fighters surrendered en masse in September 1998. 
At least one of those who surrendered was 13 years old; most of the 
others were between 15 and 17.
    The LTTE expropriates food, fuel, and other items meant for IDP's, 
thus exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE-controlled areas. 
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE-controlled and other parts of 
the Vanni region. Experts have reported an increase in anemia and a 
lower birth rate, both indications of lower levels of nutrition. 
Nutrition levels were generally below the national average, and there 
were confirmed cases of malnutrition, including hundreds of cases of 
malnourished children. Malnutrition resulted from several factors, 
including food shortages, poverty, and conflict-related dislocations.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
    a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for 
freedom of speech and expression; however, the Government restricts 
these rights in practice, often using national security grounds 
permitted by law. During the year, the Government limited the access of 
domestic and foreign media to information, and continued to censor news 
relating to the military and security situation. In June 1998, the 
Government imposed direct censorship on all domestic and foreign media 
reports relating to ongoing or possible future military and other 
security operations. Although enforcement was lax at the beginning of 
the year, the Government reissued its censorship order in November 
after the military suffered setbacks in the field. Even when no 
specific government censorship is exercised, private television 
stations impose their own, informal censorship on international 
television news rebroadcast in the country, with almost all references 
to Sri Lanka removed.
    Despite earlier campaign promises to divest itself of its media 
holdings, the Government controls the country's largest newspaper 
chain, two major television stations, and the Sri Lanka Broadcasting 
Corporation (a radio station). However, there are a variety of 
independent, privately owned newspapers, journals and radio and 
television stations, most of which freely criticize the Government and 
its policies. However, some journalists practiced self-censorship due 
to fear of intimidation. There is also one privately owned newspaper 
published in Jaffna. There are no political restrictions on the 
establishment of new media entries.
    The Government still has failed to reform the press law and 
privatize government-owned media as promised during the 1994 election 
campaign. In 1997 the Government presented a draft broadcasting reform 
bill in Parliament, but there was considerable opposition from members 
of the media, and the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the bill 
was inconsistent with the Constitution. Revisions subsequently proposed 
by a blue-ribbon panel have yet to be implemented. A highly-touted 
national media policy proposed by the Government in 1994 and again 
during the year was criticized as irrelevant by senior editors.
    On March 14, a journalist for an independent Sinhala-language 
newspaper, was abducted from his home and assaulted, allegedly by a 
brigadier in the army. Army officials placed the brigadier under open 
arrest pending a full police inquiry; the case was still pending at 
year's end.
    On July 15, members of the presidential security division attacked 
journalists who were covering an opposition party rally in the vicinity 
of the President's residence. The perpetrators injured protesters, 
including journalists and photographers and confiscated cameras. 
Involvement by the presidential security division was at first denied, 
then later confirmed by the media minister (see Sections 1.c. and 
2.b.).
    In August the offices of the only Tamil-language daily newspaper in 
the north of the country were attacked, allegedly by aprogovernment 
Tamil paramilitary group accused by the newspaper of extortion and 
bullying tactics in and around Jaffna.
    A journalist who regularly reports on defense matters, including 
corruption in military procurements, was attacked in his home by armed 
men in February 1998. He and his family were threatened at gunpoint 
before the attackers fled. The Government criticized the attack and 
subsequently arrested and indicted two air force personnel in the case, 
including the bodyguard of a former commander of the air force. A 
formal indictment was handed down early in the year against the accused 
and the case was due for trial in November; however, the trial was 
postponed until May 2000.
    On September 7, unknown assailants shot and killed Rohana Kumara, 
editor of the Sinhala-language newspaper Satana. The newspaper was 
critical of leading figures in the ruling coalition (see Section 1.a.). 
Allegations of government involvement in the attack were not 
substantiated.
    On November 2, unknown assailants shot and killed Ramesh Nadarajah, 
a Tamil Member of Parliament for the EPDP and the editor of a weekly 
Tamil-language newspaper (see Section 1.a.).
    The editor of a leading national newspaper who was found guilty of 
defaming the president in 1997 since has appealed the verdict. After 
many postponements the appeal is scheduled for early 2000. Another 
defamation case filed by the President in 1995 and three others filed 
in 1997--all against editors of major newspapers, either critical of 
the Government or proopposition--still were pending and unresolved. 
These cases were viewed by journalists as frivolous and intended only 
to intimidate and harass the media.
    The Sri Lanka Tamil Media Alliance was formed during the year to 
protect the interests of Tamil journalists, who allege that they are 
subject to harassment and intimidation by Tamil paramilitary groups and 
Sri Lankan security forces. Regional Tamil correspondents working in 
the war zones have complained of arbitrary arrest and detention and 
difficulty in obtaining press accreditation cards. In August the Sri 
Lanka Tamil Media Alliance filed the first-ever fundamental rights test 
case on behalf of an ethnic Tamil reporter on the staff of the 
government owned and controlled Tamil language daily.
    Both foreign and national journalists are allowed to go to the 
conflict areas; however, they must receive advance permission from the 
Ministry of Defense. The Foreign Ministry also must approve visits to 
conflict areas by foreign journalists. Bureaucratic delays in 
processing requests have been reduced but still prevail. The Government 
occasionally arranges for groups of journalists to visit Jaffna and the 
vicinity of the front lines on tightly organized briefing tours. 
However, after censorship was imposed in June 1998, the Government 
became the only source of most news about security and defense matters 
that could be disseminated to the public legally.
    The LTTE does not tolerate freedom of expression. It tightly 
restricts the print and broadcast media in areas under its control. In 
the past, the LTTE has killed those reporting and publishing on human 
rights.
    The Government generally respects academic freedom.
    The LTTE does not respect academic freedom and has repressed and 
killed intellectuals who criticize it, most notably the moderate and 
widely-respected Tamil politician and academic, Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam, 
who was killed by a suicide bomber on July 29 (see Section 1.a.). The 
LTTE severely repressed members of a human rights organization, the 
University Teachers for Human Rights, which formerly was based on the 
Jaffna peninsula; most former members of this group have been killed.
    b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides 
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in 
practice. Although the PTA may restrict this freedom, the Government 
did not use the act for that purpose during the year. The Government 
generally granted permits for demonstrations, including those by 
opposition parties and minority groups. Nonetheless, both the main 
opposition UNP and the PA Government continued to accuse each other of 
political thuggery and hooliganism, complaining that supporters of the 
opposing party disrupted rallies and other political events.
    During the year several incidents of violence occurred at political 
rallies held by the PA and the opposition UNP, including an attempted 
assassination of the President (see Sections 1.a. and 3).
    On July 15, government security forces injured several journalists 
and other demonstraters at a UNP rally near the presidential palace 
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
    The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government 
respects this right in practice. Although the PTA may restrict this 
right, the Government did not use the act for that during the year.
    The LTTE does not allow freedom of association in the areas it 
controls. On the Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE occasionally has posted in 
public places the names of those Tamil civilians whose association with 
security forces and other Government entities it seeks to prevent. The 
LTTE has killed Tamil civilians who have cooperated with the security 
forces in establishing a civil administration in Jaffna under a 
political leadership elected freely and fairly in January 1998.
    c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution gives Buddhism a foremost 
position, but it also provides for the right of members of other faiths 
to practice their religions freely, and the Government respects this 
right in practice. Despite the special status afforded by the 
Constitution to Buddhism, major religious festivals of all faiths are 
celebrated as public holidays.
    Foreign clergy may work in Sri Lanka, but for more than 30 years 
the Government has prohibited the entry of new foreign Jesuit clergy. 
In 1962 the Government reached an agreement with the Catholic Church 
that new foreign clergy would not be permitted to enter the country on 
a permanent basis. As foreign clergy retired, Sri Lankans would replace 
them. It permitted those already in the country to remain. However, the 
Jesuits want their clergy to be replaced by foreign members of their 
order as they retire. The local Catholic Church hierarchy does not 
support the Jesuits in the dispute and is not lobbying the Government 
to change the agreement. Most religious workers in the country, 
including most Christian clergy, are Sri Lankan in origin.
    Some evangelical Christians, who constitute less than 1 percent of 
the population, have expressed concern that their efforts at 
proselytizing often are met with hostility and harassment by the local 
Buddhist clergy and others opposed to their work (see Section 5). They 
sometimes complain that the Government tacitly condones such 
harassment; however, there is no evidence to support this claim. In 
1997 the Assemblies of God Church filed a fundamental rights case with 
the Supreme Court after the local village council in Gampaha had tried 
to block the construction of a church on the grounds that it would 
interfere with Buddhism.
    The Supreme Court ruled that the construction of the church could 
proceed. The construction of the new church was nearing completion at 
year's end. However, in May two bombs exploded in the hall of the 
church; no one was injured but the structure was damaged slightly (see 
Section 5).
    The LTTE has discriminated against Muslims in the past. In 1990 it 
evicted some 46,000 thousand Muslims from areas under its control in 
the north. The LTTE also has expropriated Muslim homes, lands, and 
businesses, and threatened Muslim families with death if they attempted 
to return to areas under LTTE control.
    d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, 
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution grants every citizen 
``freedom of movement and of choosing his residence'' and ``freedom to 
return to Sri Lanka,'' and the Government generally respects the right 
to domestic and foreign travel; however, the war with the LTTE prompted 
the Government to impose more stringent checks on travelers from the 
north and the east and on movement in Colombo, particularly after dark. 
Tamils must obtain police passes in order to move freely in the north 
and east and frequently are harassed at checkpoints around the country 
(see Section 1.c.). These security measures have the effect of 
restricting the movement of Tamils, especially young males. Prior to 
the government military offensive on the Jaffna peninsula in 1995 and 
1996, an estimated 600,000 citizens had been displaced by the 
insurgency. Most lived in camps financed by the Government and NGO's. 
The Jaffna offensive, in addition to the military advance in 
Kilinochchi in the Vanni region in July 1996, resulted in the 
displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons in LTTE-controlled 
areas of the Vanni region; some of these persons were being displaced 
for a second or third time. Some of the displaced persons lived with 
friends or relatives, or in ``welfare centers'' in schools, religious 
institutions and other public buildings. Many others lived in makeshift 
shelters or camped out under trees. The Government continued to supply 
them with food, medicine and other essential supplies. The military 
offensive in the Vanni region that began in May 1997 and continued 
until the end of 1998 displaced an additional 70,000 persons. However, 
well over 100,000 persons have left the LTTE-controlled parts of the 
Vanni region since 1996, and this has helped to relieve the situation. 
Most of these displaced persons have returned to their homes on the 
Jaffna peninsula.
    The movement of persons in Jaffna is regulated strictly by military 
checkpoints throughout the city, although the military has reduced the 
number of checkpoints there compared with 1997. For Tamils, travel from 
Jaffna to other parts of the country is extremely difficult, due in 
part to security restrictions imposed by the security forces and in 
part by the limited availability of transportation to the south.
    From October 1996 until the end of 1999, over 150,000 persons are 
estimated to have moved out of LTTE-controlled regions through Vavuniya 
and other transit points in government-controlled regions. Of these, 
over 100,000 persons were repatriated to or otherwise reached Jaffna 
and other Tamil-majority areas. Many had left the Vanni region with the 
intention of proceeding south; they opted for other destinations only 
after learning that they would have to remain in transit camps until 
security clearances for southward travel were obtained. Obtaining a 
clearance can take between 2 and 4 months in some cases, and some human 
rights groups alleged that the procedures were arbitrary and 
unreasonably strict. Clearance procedures were applied to everyone, 
including the elderly and the very young. While the Government had a 
legitimate interest in identifying LTTE infiltrators, it also appeared 
reluctant to allow displaced Tamils to travel to Colombo where they 
might contribute to unemployment and other social problems. About 
14,000 of these displaced persons continue to live in substandard 
conditions in camps in Vavuniya and Mannar. Many of these persons hope 
to return to their homes in the areas of conflict once the fighting 
stops.
    Prior to 1996, the LTTE severely restricted the movement of Tamils 
under its control, often levying a large ``exit tax'' on persons who 
sought to travel to areas under government control and requiring 
travelers to leave all their property in escrow. In addition, it 
usually would grant permission to only one family member to travel at a 
time. However, following the Government capture of Jaffna the LTTE 
began to allow persons to move more freely into government-controlled 
areas, although it occasionally disrupted the flow of persons exiting 
the Vanni region through the checkpoint. In November most of the 
residents of Vavuniya evacuated the town due to LTTE threats that it 
was planning to shell the town as part of its counterattack against the 
Government. A week later, the LTTE withdrew its threat and most of the 
town's residents returned. The LTTE also disrupted the movement of 
IDP's from Trincomalee and Mannar to Jaffna by hijacking or attacking 
civilian shipping in the north. The LTTE also disrupted civilian air 
traffic to Jaffna; in August 1998 it began warning civilians and 
humanitarian workers not to use civilian flights servicing the 
peninsula. Humanitarian groups estimate that there are more than 
200,000 IDP's in LTTE-controlled areas (see Section 1.g.).
    Several thousand Tamils fled LTTE-controlled areas to Tamil Nadu in 
southern India in 1998. An estimated 64,000 Tamil refugees live in 
camps there, having left Sri Lanka at various times throughout the 
period of the conflict. Another 100,000 refugees are believed to have 
been integrated into Tamil society in southern India.
    The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting 
refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise 
during the year. The Government does not permit the entry of refugees 
into the country or grant first asylum, nor does it aid those who 
manage to enter to seek permanent residence elsewhere. The law does not 
include provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in accordance 
with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and 
its 1967 Protocol. There were no instances of forcible repatriation of 
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to 
        Change Their Government
    Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government 
through periodic multiparty elections based on universal adult 
suffrage. This right was exercised during parliamentary elections in 
August 1994, when the PA coalition ended the l7-year rule of the UNP, 
during the presidential elections in November 1994, when PA 
presidential candidate Chandrika Kumaratunga won 62 percent of the 
vote, and in December when Kumaratunga was reelected in elections that 
were generally free and fair but were marred by voting irregularities 
and violence.
    In November President Kumaratunga called for presidential elections 
to be held on December 21 even though her 6-year term was not set to 
expire until November 2000. The preelection period was marked by 
violence. On November 14, a grenade exploded in the vicinity of a UNP 
rally featuring opposition leader and presidential candidate, Ranil 
Wickremesinghe. One youth was killed in the blast and about 35 persons 
were injured (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). On November 29, the main UNP 
headquarters were attacked by 25 armed persons who threatened security 
staff, tore down posters, and broke windows.
    On December 18, an LTTE suicide bomber attempted to assassinate 
President Kumaratunga at a rally 3 days before the presidential 
elections. The bomb injured the President, Justice Minister Peiris, and 
many others, and killed 13 bystanders (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
    On December 18, the LTTE allegedly also bombed a rally of the UNP, 
killing 11 civilians (see Section 1.a.).
    There also were allegations that the ruling PA party took measures 
to undermine free and fair elections. On November 12, President 
Kumaratunga appointed an acting election comissioner. There were 
allegations that this appointment was politically motivated, although 
he permitted local election monitors and some international observers 
to participate in elections. On November 6, after a series of military 
setbacks in the war with the LTTE, the Government implemented a strict 
censorship policy regarding reporting of military or security news (see 
Section 2.a.). Opposition figures criticized this policy for curtailing 
freedom of expression, and alleged that it was implemented to cover up 
the recent military setbacks prior to the elections.
    On December 21, President Kumaratunga was reelected with 51 percent 
of the vote. There were credible accounts of voting irregularities in 
several locations around the country. At least six persons were killed 
on December 21 in election-related violence. By year's end, local 
observers had not issued reports on the elections; however, they 
expressed concern about whether the vote was free and fair. A team of 
international observers stated that, despite some irregularities, they 
were satisfied with the conduct of the elections. None of the 
opposition candidates challenged the election results.
    Elections for seven of the country's nine provincial councils took 
place during the year. In January elections were held in the northwest 
('Wayamba') province; the ruling PA won 28 seats, the UNP won 19 seats, 
and the JVP won 3 seats. This election was marked by violence and 
accusations of electoral fraud. The Center for Monitoring Election 
Violence (CMEV) reported more than 800 instances of violence, including 
2 cases of murder and 11 cases of attempted murder, as well as a large 
number of assaults and cases of intimidation (see Sections 1.a. and 
1.c.). In response to sharp criticism about the way that the vote was 
conducted, the President appointed a commission staffed by two retired 
judges to evaluate allegations of electoral fraud. Although they agreed 
that the poll was flawed, no new election was called. In February the 
President also created a bipartisan monitoring committee (which she 
chaired) to ensure that the remaining provincial council elections were 
``free and fair.'' Although there was some criticism following the five 
provincial council elections held in April and the southern province 
election held in June, reported incidents of violence were far fewer 
than in January. The ruling PA party narrowly won elections in the 
April provincial council elections, claiming 120 of 263 seats. The UNP 
took 112 seats and the JVP won 15. In the June southern provincial 
elections, the PA gained 27 seats, the UNP won 21, and the JVP won 7.
    In January 1998, the Government held local government elections in 
Jaffna for the first time in over a decade. Although turnout for the 
elections was relatively low due in part to threats from the LTTE and 
in part to outdated electoral register, observers believed that the 
elections were free and fair. Voters elected 239 representatives from 5 
Tamil political parties to serve on 17 local councils.
    The Commissioner of Elections recognizes 34 parties; however, only 
10 parties actually hold seats in the 225-member Parliament. The two 
most influential parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (the principal 
component party of the governing PA coalition) and the UNP, generally 
draw their support from the majority Sinhalese community. Historically, 
these two parties have alternated in power.
    Although there are no legal impediments to the participation of 
women in politics or government, the social mores in some communities 
limit women's activities outside the home, and they are 
underrepresented. Nonetheless, in August 1994, voters elected a 
Parliament that chose a female prime minister for the third time in the 
country's history. In November 1994, a woman was elected President for 
the first time; she was reelected in December for a second term. Eleven 
women hold seats in the Parliament. In addition to the Prime Minister, 
the Minister for Women's Affairs and the Minister of Social Services, a 
number of deputy ministers are women.
    There are 27 Tamil and 20 Muslim Members of Parliament.
    The LTTE refuses to allow elections in areas under its control. 
Through a campaign of murder and intimidation, it effectively 
undermined the functioning of local government bodies in Jaffna, whose 
members were elected in January 1998. This campaign included the murder 
of 2 of Jaffna's mayors and death threatsagainst members of the 17 
local councils. Throughout the period of the conflict, the LTTE has 
killed popularly elected politicians, including those elected by Tamils 
in areas the LTTE claims to be part of a Tamil homeland. During the 
summer, the LTTE told politicians in the east to suspend their 
political activities and stay away from their constituencies; however, 
this ban was lifted by year's end.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and 
        Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human 
        Rights
    There are several domestic NGO human rights groups, including the 
Movement for Interracial Justice and Equality (MIRJE), the University 
Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna (UTHR-J), the Civil Rights Movement 
(CRM), and the Law and Society Trust (LST), that monitor civil and 
political liberties. There are no adverse regulations governing the 
activities of local and foreign NGO's, although in February the 
Government began requiring NGO's to include action plans and detailed 
descriptions of funding sources as part of its official registration 
process. Some NGO workers believed that this was an attempt by the 
Government to exert greater control over the NGO sector after human 
rights groups criticized the Government's handling of the Wayamba 
elections in January (see Section 3). However, few NGO's complied with 
these new reporting requirements. The Government generally cooperated 
with NGO's, with members of Parliament, and with other officials 
frequently participating in seminars and other events concerning human 
rights and humanitarian affairs.
    The Government continued to allow the ICRC unrestricted access to 
detention facilities (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In the past, the 
ICRC provided international humanitarian law training materials and 
training to the security forces on an ad hoc basis. The UNHCR, the 
ICRC, and a variety of international NGO's assisted in the delivery of 
medical and other essential supplies to the Vanni area, even with the 
many restrictions on such supplies (see Section 1.g.). Some observers 
believed that increased restrictions on relief work, coupled with a cut 
in dry food rations, were linked to a government policy to draw persons 
out of the LTTE-controlled parts of the Vanni region. There was 
insufficient evidence to verify this claim.
    During the year, the HRC conducted more than 1,000 visits to police 
stations and over 300 visits to detention facilities. It is estimated 
that the HRC has well over 2,500 cases of alleged human rights abuse 
pending. The commission also began the investigation into the 
allegations by former Lance Corporal Rajapakse about mass graves at 
Chemmani in Jaffna, which resulted in the government investigation and 
exhumations (see Section 1.a.). Nonetheless, human rights observers 
believed that the work of the HRC was hampered severely by a lack of 
strong leadership within the organization. For example, after almost 3 
years of operation, the HRC has failed to hire permanent staff. The 
organization also responded inadequately to requests from its field 
officers for protection when inquiries placed them in danger. The HRC 
also has been criticized for micromanaging the activities of the field 
offices, which are poorly equipped. The establishment of the CIUAH in 
1998 strengthened claims of the HRC's ineffectiveness, since the 
responsibilities of the CIUAH clearly fell within the HRC's mandate 
(see Section 1.d.). The tenure of the HRC commissioners, including the 
chairman, is set to expire in March 2000.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, 
        Language or Social Status
    The Constitution provides for equal rights under the law for all 
citizens, and the Government generally respects these rights. The 
Supreme Court regularly upholds court rulings in cases in which 
individuals file suit over the abridgment of their fundamental civil 
rights. The HRC and the CIUAH are other mechanisms that the Government 
has established to ensure enforcement of constitutional provisions in 
addition to access to the courts (see Section 1.d.).
    Women.--Sexual assault, rape, and spousal abuse (often associated 
with alcohol abuse) represent serious and pervasive forms of societal 
violence against women. Amendments to the Penal Code introduced in 1995 
specifically addressed sexual abuse and exploitation. Rape laws were 
modified to create a more equitable burden of proof and to make 
punishments more stringent. Marital rape is considered an offense in 
cases of spouses living under judicial separation, and laws govern 
sexual harassment in the workplace and sexual molestation. While the 
Penal Code may ease some of the problems faced by victims of sexual 
assault, many women's organizations believe that greater sensitization 
of police and judicial officials also is required. The Government set 
up the Children and Women Protection Bureau within the police in 1994 
to respond to calls for greater awareness and attention. Police 
statistics indicated that there were 26,660 crimes against women during 
the period from January to July, compared with 26,565crimes between 
January and June of 1998. Laws against procuring and trafficking were 
strengthened in 1995, facilitating the prosecution of brothel owners; 
however, trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution 
occurs (see Section 6.f.).
    The Constitution provides for equal employment opportunities in the 
public sector. However, women have no legal protection against 
discrimination in the private sector, where they sometimes are paid 
less than men for equal work, often experience difficulty in rising to 
supervisory positions, and face sexual harassment. Women constitute 
approximately one-half of the formal work force.
    Women have equal rights under national, civil, and criminal law. 
However, issues related to family law, including divorce, child custody 
and inheritance, are adjudicated by the customary law of each ethnic or 
religious group. The minimum age of marriage for women is 18 years, 
except in the case of Muslims, who continue to follow their customary 
marriage practices. The application of different legal practices based 
on membership in a religious or ethnic group often results in 
discrimination against women.
    Children.--The Government is committed to protecting the welfare 
and rights of children, but is constrained by a lack of resources. The 
Government demonstrates a strong commitment to children's rights and 
welfare through its extensive systems of public education and medical 
care. The 1997 Compulsory Attendance at Schools Act of 1997 was 
implemented in January 1998 and requires that children between the ages 
of 5 and 14 attend school (see Section 6.d.). Education is free through 
the university level. Health care, including immunization programs, 
also is free.
    There is a significant problem of child prostitution in certain 
coastal resort areas. The Government estimates that there are more than 
2,000 active child prostitutes in the country, but private groups claim 
the number is much higher; estimates range as high as 15,000 to 20,000 
(see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). A 1998 U.N. International Labor Office 
study placed the total at 30,000. The bulk of child sexual abuse in the 
form of child prostitution is committed by citizens; however, some 
child prostitutes are boys who sell themselves to foreign tourists. 
Some of these children are forced into prostitution. The Government has 
pushed for greater international cooperation to bring those guilty of 
pedophilia to justice. Several foreign pedophiles were brought before 
courts during the year. The penalty for conviction is usually a fine 
and deportation. Two foreign pedophiles were convicted during the year; 
one was sentenced to 14 years in prison and the other was deported (see 
Section 6.f.). In 1995 the Ministry of Media, Tourism, and Aviation 
created a task force specifically to study the problem of sex tourism 
and related offenses. It was abolished at the end of 1997 and 
superseded by a presidential task force on child protection.
    Following the recommendation of the task force, the Government 
created the National Child Protection Authority (NCPA) in 1998. In May 
the President appointed board members to the NCPA. The law establishing 
the NCPA consolidated existing legislation and defined a child as 
anyone under age 18. Under the law, the definition of child abuse 
includes all acts of sexual violence against, trafficking in, and 
cruelty to children. The law also prohibits the use of children in 
exploitative labor or illegal activities or in any act contrary to 
compulsory education regulations. The legislation further widened the 
definition of child abuse to include the involvement of children in 
war. The NCPA board is composed of senior law enforcement officers as 
well as representatives from education and the medical and legal 
professions, and reports directly to the President. At year's end, the 
NCPA was involved in recruiting permanent staff.
    In the first half of the year, the police recorded 2,066 cases of 
crimes against children, compared with 1,752 crimes in the first half 
of 1998. Although NGO's welcomed the NCPA legislation, many attribute 
the problem of exploitation of children to the lack of law enforcement 
rather than inadequate legislation. Many law enforcement resources are 
diverted to the conflict with the LTTE.
    Labor force surveys over the past several years have suggested that 
more than 16,000 children may be fully employed (see Section 6.d.). 
Additional thousands of children are believed to be working in domestic 
service. There have been reports of rural children working as domestic 
servants in urban households--often given into service by poverty 
stricken parents--and being abused by their employers. Some of these 
children reportedly have been starved, beaten, sexually abused, and 
forced into prostitution (see Section 6.c.). The Government states that 
it does not have sufficient resources to protect these children from 
such exploitation (see Section 6.d.). Nonetheless, the Government has 
supported a high-profile UNICEF advertising campaign aimed at combating 
child labor.
    The LTTE recruits children for use in battlefield support functions 
and in combat. It has been confirmed that some ofthese children are as 
young as age 13, and some are recruited forcibly (see Section 1.g.). In 
May 1998, the LTTE gave assurances to the Special Representative of the 
U.N. Secretary General for Children in Armed Combat that it would not 
recruit children under the age of 17; however, it is not clear that the 
LTTE has honored this pledge.
    People With Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility 
to buildings or government services for the disabled. The World Health 
Organization estimates that 7 percent of the population are disabled. 
Most disabled persons who are unable to work are cared for by their 
families. The Department of Social Services operates eight vocational 
training schools for the physically and mentally disabled and sponsors 
a program of job training and job placement for graduates. Some private 
companies, at the urging of the Government, have provided training and 
jobs to disabled veterans. The Government also provides some financial 
support to NGO's that assist the disabled, subsidizes prosthetic 
devices and other medical aids for the disabled, makes some purchases 
from disabled suppliers, and has registered 74 schools and training 
institutions for the disabled run by NGO's. The Social Services 
Ministry has selected job placement officers to help the estimated 
200,000 work-eligible disabled persons to find jobs. In spite of these 
efforts, the disabled still face difficulties arising from 
discrimination and negative attitudes. In December 1996, Parliament 
passed legislation forbidding discrimination against any person on the 
grounds of disability. No cases are known to have been filed under this 
law.
    Indigenous People.--The indigenous people of Sri Lanka, known as 
Veddas, number less than 1,000. They prefer to maintain their isolated 
traditional way of life and are protected by the Constitution. There 
are no legal restrictions on their participation in the political or 
economic life of the nation. In August 1998, the Government fulfilled a 
long-standing Vedda demand when the president issued an order granting 
many Veddas the right to hunt and gather in specific protected forest 
areas. The executive order granted the Veddas the freedom to protect 
their culture and to carry on their traditional way of life without 
hindrance. Under a pilot program, special identity cards were issued to 
some Veddas to facilitate their use of these forest areas. However, 
some Veddas still complain that they are being pushed off of their 
land.
    Religious Minorities.--Discrimination based on religious 
differences is much less common than discrimination based on ethnic 
group or caste. In general, the members of the various faiths tend to 
be tolerant of each other's religious beliefs. However, on occasion 
evangelical Christians have been harassed by Buddhist monks for their 
attempts to convert Buddhists to Christianity (see Section 2.c.). In 
March 1988, the leader of an Assemblies of God congregation in the 
southern town of Tissamaharama was killed by unknown assailants. In 
April two bombs were placed in the church hall of this congregation, 
now run by the pastor's widow (see Section 1.c.). No one was injured; 
however, the building sustained some structural damage.
    In the northern part of the island, LTTE insurgents expelled some 
46,000 Muslim inhabitants from their homes in 1990--virtually the 
entire Muslim population. Most of these persons remain displaced. In 
the past, the LTTE has expropriated Muslim homes, lands, and businesses 
and threatened Muslim families with death if they attempt to return.
    National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are approximately 1 
million Tamils of comparatively recent Indian origin, the so-called 
``hill Tamils'' or ``Indian Tamils,'' whose ancestors originally were 
brought to Sri Lanka in the 19th century to work on plantations. About 
75,000 of these persons do not qualify for either Indian or Sri Lankan 
citizenship and face discrimination, especially in the allocation of 
Government funds for education. Without national identity cards, they 
are also vulnerable to arrest by the security forces. However, the 
Government has stated that none of these persons would be forced to 
depart the country. During the year, the Government introduced a 
program to begin registering these individuals. During the year, some 
``Indian'' Tamils received identity cards; however, the program 
reportedly was not progressing quickly.
    Both Sri Lankan and ``Indian'' Tamils maintain that they have long 
been the victims of systematic discrimination in university education, 
government employment and in other matters controlled by the 
Government. However, in recent years, there has been little clear 
evidence of overt discrimination in university enrollment or government 
employment, although some groupscontinue to assert that it exists. In 
January 1996, the Government established a parliamentary select 
committee to consider a ``devolution'' package designed to devolve 
wide-ranging powers to local governments, thereby providing ethnic 
minorities greater autonomy in governing their local affairs. The 
devolution proposals were placed before Parliament in September 1997. 
Although much has been made of the devolution proposals as a 
springboard to talks with the LTTE and a possible means to end the 
ethnic war, the ruling PA and opposition UNP could not agree on several 
key aspects of the proposals. The proposal was not voted upon in 
Parliament by year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
    a. The Right of Association.--The Government respects the 
Constitutional right of workers to establish labor unions. Any seven 
workers may form a union, adopt a charter, elect leaders, and publicize 
their views. Over 70 percent of the plantation work force, which is 
overwhelmingly ``Indian'' Tamil, is unionized. In total there are over 
900,000 union members, 650,000 of whom are women. Approximately 20 
percent of the nonagricultural work force in the private sector also is 
unionized. Unions represent most workers in large private firms, but 
those in small scale agriculture and small businesses usually do not 
belong to unions. Public sector employees are unionized at very high 
rates.
    Most large unions are affiliated with political parties and play a 
prominent role in the political process, though major unions in the 
public sector are politically independent. More than 30 labor unions 
have political affiliations, but there are also a small number of 
unaffiliated unions, some of which have active leaders and a relatively 
large membership. In 1998 the most recent year for which data are 
available, the Department of Labor registered 111 new unions and 
canceled the registration of 14 others, bringing the total number of 
functioning unions to 1,678. The Department of Labor is authorized by 
law to cancel the registration of any union that does not submit an 
annual report. This requirement is the only legal grounds for 
cancellation of registration.
    All workers, other than civil servants and workers in ``essential'' 
services, have the right to strike. By law workers also may lodge 
complaints with the Commissioner of Labor, a labor tribunal or the 
Supreme Court to protect their rights. Before September 1994, the 
Government controlled strikes by declaring some industries to be 
essential under the ER. Subsequently, this practice largely ceased, 
with the Government permitting, for example, a 5-week postal strike 
early in 1998. However, the President retains the power to designate 
any industry as an essential service. In June the Government attempted 
to break a doctors' strike by declaring medical services, which are 
provided by the State under a program of socialized medicine, as 
essential. However, the doctors continued to strike, defying the order 
until it was revoked, and the Government agreed to consider the 
doctors' grievances. The International Labor Organization has pointed 
out to the Government that essential services should be limited to 
services where an interruption would endanger the life, personal 
safety, or health of the population.
    Civil servants collectively may submit labor grievances to the 
public service commission but have no legal grounds to strike. 
Nonetheless, government workers in the transportation, medical, 
educational, power generation, financial, and port sectors have staged 
brief strikes and other work actions in recent years. There were 128 
strikes in the public sector during the year. There were 115 strikes 
during 1998 and 156 strikes in 1997.
    The law prohibits retribution against strikers in nonessential 
sectors. Employers may dismiss workers only for disciplinary reasons, 
mainly misconduct. Incompetence or low productivity are not grounds for 
dismissal. Any employees who have been dismissed have a right to appeal 
their termination before a labor tribunal.
    Unions are free to affiliate with international bodies, and many of 
them have done so. However, there is no national trade union center 
that is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) to centralize or facilitate this contact.
    b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law 
provides for the right to collective bargaining, and it is widely 
practiced. Large firms may have employees in as many as 60 different 
unions. In enterprises without unions, including those in the export 
processing zones (EPZ's), worker councils--composed of employees, 
employers and often a public sector representative--are generally the 
forums for labor/management negotiation. However, the councils are not 
mandatory outside the EPZ's, do not have the power to negotiate binding 
contracts, and have been criticized as ineffective by labor advocates.
    For most of the year, the law did not require management to 
recognize or bargain with unions, and in some cases employers declined 
to recognize the unions in their factories. However, in December 
Parliament passed an amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act, which 
requires employers to recognize trade unions and the right to 
collective bargaining. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination. 
Employers found guilty of such discrimination are required to reinstate 
workers fired for union activities, but have the right to transfer them 
to different locations.
    There are approximately 87,500 workers employed in the EPZ's, a 
large percentage of them women. Under the law, workers in the EPZ's 
have the same rights to join unions as other workers. However, few 
unions have been formed in the EPZ's, largely because of severe 
restrictions on access by union organizers to the zones. While the 
unionization rate in the rest of the country is approximately 25 
percent, the rate within the EPZ's is only 0.2 percent. Some labor 
representatives allege that the Government's Board of Investment (BOI), 
which manages the EPZ's, has discouraged union activity and few unions 
have been formed. Work councils in the EPZ's are chaired by the BOI and 
only have the power to make recommendations. While employers in the 
EPZ's offer higher wages and better working conditions generally than 
employers elsewhere, (workers face other concerns, such as security, 
expensive but low quality boarding houses, and sexual harassment). In 
most instances, wage boards establish minimum wages and conditions of 
employment, except in the EPZ's, where wages and work conditions are 
set by the BOI.
    c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory 
labor is prohibited by provisions of the Abolition of Slavery Act of 
1844; however, there were reports of its use. The act does not prohibit 
forced or bonded labor by children specifically, but government 
officials interpret it as applying to persons of all ages. There are 
credible reports that some rural children are employed in debt bondage 
as domestic servants in urban households; some of these children 
reportedly have been abused (see Section 5). Some children were forced 
into prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.) There are credible reports 
that some members of the STF operating in the Batticaloa area forced 
local villagers to work without compensation in clearing jungle areas 
and in other manual labor in and near STF camps during the year. In 
some cases, the villagers were threatened directly or indirectly with 
physical abuse if they did not perform the work.
    The LTTE continues to conscript high-school age children for work 
as cooks, messengers, and clerks. In some cases, the children 
reportedly help build fortifications. In the past, children as young as 
age 10 were said to be recruited and placed for 2 to 4 years in special 
schools that provided them with a mixture of LTTE ideology and formal 
education. The LTTE uses children as young as 13 in battle, and 
children sometimes are recruited forcibly into the LTTE. In May the 
LTTE began a program of compulsory physical training, including mock 
military drills, for most of the population of the areas that it 
controls, including schoolchildren and the aged. According to LTTE 
spokesmen, this work is meant to keep the population fit; however, it 
is widely believed that the training was established in order to gain 
tighter control over the population.
    d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for 
Employment.--In 1998 Parliament passed the National Child Protection 
Authority Act (NCPA) to combat the problem of child abuse, including 
unlawful child labor. The act consolidated existing legislation that 
clearly established what types of employment are restricted for 
children, which age groups are affected, and what the minimum age for 
child labor is for particular jobs. The minimum age for employment is 
14, although the law continues to permit the employment of younger 
children by their parents or guardians in limited agricultural work. 
Under certain circumstances domestic employment is permitted for 
children as young as age 12. A recent study reported that child 
domestic servants are employed in 8.6 percent of homes in the southern 
province. The same study reported that child laborers in the domestic 
service sector often are deprived of an education. The law also permits 
employment in any school or institution for training purposes. The 
Compulsory Attendance at Schools Act of 1997, which requires children 
between the ages of 5 and 14 to attend school, has been in effect since 
January 1998, although it still is being implemented. The ultimate 
effect that this may have on the child labor problem remains unclear.
    Persons under age 16 may not be employed in any public enterprise 
in which life or limb is endangered. There are no reports that children 
are employed in the EPZ's, the garment industry, or any other export 
industry, although children sometimes are employed during harvest 
periods in the plantation sectors and in non-plantation agriculture. 
About 85 percent of children below the age of 16 attend school. The law 
permits the employment of suchpersons for not more than 1 hour on any 
day before school. However, a 1995 labor survey of the plantations 
indicated that half of all children in plantations drop out of school 
after the fourth grade, leaving a large pool of children between the 
ages of 10 and 15 available to pursue employment.
    Despite legislation, some child labor still exists. A 1997 census 
and statistics department survey found that 16,511 children between the 
ages of 10 and 14 were fully employed. This included 11,132 males and 
5,379 females. Additional thousands of children (estimates range from 
50,000 to 100,000) are believed to be employed in domestic service, 
although this situation is not regulated or documented. Many child 
domestics are subjected to physical, sexual, and/or emotional abuse. A 
significant portion of employed children work outside their families. 
In addition to domestic service, regular employment of children occurs 
mainly in the informal sector and in family enterprises such as family 
farms, crafts, small trade establishments, eating houses, and repair 
shops. Children also are involved in the manufacture of coconut fiber 
products, bricks, fishing, wrapping tobacco, street trading, and 
farming. Government inspections have been unable to eliminate these 
forms of child labor (see Section 5), though an awareness campaign 
coupled with the establishment of hot lines for reporting child labor 
led to over 500 complaints in 1998. There are an estimated 250 to 300 
prosecutions each year in cases related to the employment of minors. 
Under legislation dating from 1956, the maximum penalty for employing 
minors is about $14 (1,000 rupees), with a maximum jail term of 6 
months.
    Children work as prostitutes as well (see Section 6.f.). Estimates 
of the number of child prostitutes range from 2,000 to 30,000; however, 
there are no reliable statistics (see Section 5). Although forced or 
bonded labor by persons of any age are prohibited by law, some rural 
children reportedly serve in debt bondage (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
    e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Department of Labor 
effectively enforces the minimum wage law for large companies through 
routine inspections; however, staffing shortages prevent the Department 
from effectively monitoring the informal sector. While there is no 
universal national minimum wage, about 40 wage boards set minimum wages 
and working conditions by sector and industry. According to the 
statistics department of the Labor Ministry, current minimum wage rates 
average $30 (2,130 rupees) per month in industry, commerce, and the 
service sector; and $1.33 (95 rupees) per day in agriculture. The 
minimum wage in the garment industry is $35 (2,535 rupees) per month. 
These minimum wages are insufficient to provide a decent standard of 
living for a worker and the standard family of five, but the vast 
majority of families have more than one breadwinner. Most permanent 
full-time workers are covered by laws that prohibit them from working 
regularly more than 45 hours per week (a 5-and-one-half day workweek). 
Such workers also receive 14 days of annual leave, 14 to 21 days of 
medical leave, and some 20 local holidays each year.
    Maternity leave is available for permanent and casual female 
workers. Employers must contribute 12 percent of a worker's wage to an 
employee's provident fund and 3 percent to an employee's trust fund. 
Employers who fail to comply may be fined, although the effectiveness 
of government enforcement of this provision is unknown.
    Several laws protect the safety and health of industrial workers. 
However, the Department of Labor's small staff of inspectors is 
inadequate to enforce compliance with the laws. Workers have the 
statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger 
their health, but many workers are unaware of, or indifferent to, 
health risks, and fear that they would lose their jobs if they removed 
themselves.
    f. Trafficking in Persons.--Penal Code amendments enacted in 1995 
made trafficking in persons illegal; however, there are credible 
reports that trafficking in women and children occurs. According to 
police reports, there is a floating pool of 200 foreign female sex 
workers in the country who were trafficked from the former Soviet 
Union, Thailand, and China. There are also occasional reports of female 
Sri Lankan domestic workers in the Gulf States being abused and 
illegally exploited.
    Internal trafficking in male children also is a problem, especially 
from areas bordering northern and eastern provinces. Protecting 
Environment and Children Everywhere (PEACE), a domestic NGO estimates 
that there are at least 5,000 male children between the ages of 8 and 
15 who are engaged as sex workers both at beach and mountain resorts. 
Some of these children are forced into prostitution by their parents or 
organized crime (see Section 5). PEACE also reports that there are an 
additional 7,000 young men aged 15 to 18 who are self-employed 
prostitutes. The country reportedly has a growing reputation as a 
destination for foreign pedophiles; however, officials believe that 
approximately 30 percent of the clients are tourists and 70 percent are 
locals. The Government occasionally prosecuted foreign pedophiles. 
During the year, two foreign pedophiles were convicted; one was 
sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment and the other received a suspended 
sentence and was deported (see Section 5).
                               APPENDICES

                              ----------                              


            Appendix A.--Notes on Preparation of the Reports

    We base the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on 
information available from all sources, including American and foreign 
government officials, victims of human rights abuse, academic and 
congressional studies, and reports from the press, international 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) concerned with 
human rights. We find particularly helpful, and make reference in most 
reports to, the role of NGO's, ranging from groups in a single country 
to those that concern themselves with human rights worldwide. While 
much of the information we use is already public, information on 
particular abuses frequently cannot be attributed, for obvious reasons, 
to specific sources.
    By law we must submit the reports to Congress by February 25. To 
comply we provide guidance to United States diplomatic missions in July 
for submission of draft reports in September and October, which we 
update at year's end as necessary. Other offices in the Department of 
State provide contributions and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, 
and Labor prepares a final draft. Because of the preparation time 
required, it is possible that yearend developments may not be reflected 
fully. We make every effort to include reference to major events or 
significant changes in trends.
    We have attempted to make these country reports as comprehensive as 
space will allow, while taking care to make them objective and as 
uniform as possible in both scope and quality of coverage. We have 
given particular attention to attaining a high standard of consistency 
despite the multiplicity of sources and the obvious problems related to 
varying degrees of access to information, structural differences in 
political and social systems, and trends in world opinion regarding 
human rights practices in specific countries.
    It is often difficult to evaluate the credibility of reports of 
human rights abuses. With the exception of some terrorist 
organizations, most opposition groups and certainly most governments 
deny that they commit human rights abuses and often go to great lengths 
to conceal any evidence of such acts. There are often few eyewitnesses 
to specific abuses, and they frequently are intimidated or otherwise 
prevented from reporting what they know. On the other hand, individuals 
and groups opposed to a particular government sometimes have powerful 
incentives to exaggerate or fabricate abuses, and some governments 
similarly distort or exaggerate abuses attributed to opposition groups. 
We have made every effort to identify those groups (e.g., government 
forces, terrorists, etc.) that are believed, based on all the evidence 
available, to have committed human rights abuses. Where credible 
evidence is lacking, we have tried to indicate why. Many governments 
that profess to oppose human rights abuses in fact secretly order or 
tacitly condone them or simply lack the will or the ability to control 
those responsible for them. Consequently, in judging a government's 
policy, it is important to look beyond statements of policy or intent 
in order to examine what in fact a government has done to prevent human 
rights abuses, including the extent to which it investigates, tries, 
and appropriately punishes those who commit such abuses. We continue to 
make every effort to do that in these reports.
    To increase uniformity, the introductory section of each report 
contains a brief setting, indicating how the country is governed and 
providing the context for examining the country's human rights 
performance. A description of the political framework and the role of 
security and law enforcement agencies with respect to human rights is 
followed by a brief characterization of the economy. The setting 
concludes with an overview of human rights developments in the year 
under review, mentioning specific areas (e.g., torture, freedom of 
speech and press, discrimination) in which abuses and problems 
occurred.
    We have continued the effort from previous years to expand 
reporting on human rights practices affecting women, children, and 
indigenous people. We discuss in the appropriate section of the report 
any abuses that are targeted specifically against women (e.g., rape or 
other violence perpetrated by governmental or organized opposition 
forces, or discriminatory laws or regulations). In Section 5, we 
continue to discuss socioeconomic discrimination; societal violence 
against women, children, or minority group members; and the efforts, if 
any, of governments to combat these problems.
    With regard to governmental policies on the welfare of children, 
readers may wish to consult ``The State of the World's Children 1999,'' 
published by the U.N. Children's Fund, which provides a wide range of 
data on health, education, nutrition, and rates of infant mortality and 
mortality under 5 years of age in some 145 countries, as well as 
information on the degree of progress that these countries are making 
in reducing the key mortality rate for those under age 5.
    The following notes on specific categories of the report are not 
meant to be comprehensive descriptions of each category but to provide 
definitions of key terms used in the reports and to explain the 
organization of material within the format:
    Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Includes killings in 
which there is evidence of government instigation without due process 
of law or of political motivation by government or by opposition 
groups; also covers extrajudicial killings (e.g., deliberate, illegal, 
or excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or 
other agents of the State whether against criminal suspects, detainees, 
prisoners, or others), as well as killings committed by police or 
security forces in operations or while in the performance of their 
duties that resulted in the death of persons without due process of law 
(e.g., mistargeted bombing or shelling, killing of bystanders, etc.); 
excludes combat deaths and killings by common criminals, if the 
likelihood of political motivation can be ruled out (see also Section 
1.g.). Although mentioned briefly here, deaths in detention due to 
official negligence are covered in detail in Section 1.c.
    Disappearance.--Covers unresolved cases in which political 
motivation appears likely and in which the victims have not been found 
or perpetrators have not been identified; cases eventually classed as 
political killings in which the bodies of those missing are discovered 
also are covered in the above category, while those eventually 
identified as arrest or detention may be covered under ``Arbitrary 
Arrest, Detention, or Exile.''
    Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.--Torture is here defined as an extremely severe form of 
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, committed by or 
at the instigation of government forces or opposition groups, with 
specific intent to cause extremely severe pain or suffering, whether 
mental or physical. Discussion concentrates on actual practices, not on 
whether they fit any precise definition, and includes use of physical 
and other force that may fall short of torture but which is cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading. This section also covers prison conditions, 
including whether conditions meet minimum international standards, and 
deaths in custody due to negligence by government officials.
    Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Covers cases in which 
detainees, including political detainees, are held in official custody 
without charges or, if charged, are denied a public preliminary 
judicial hearing within a reasonable period. Also discusses whether, 
and under what circumstances, governments exile citizens.
    Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Briefly describes the court system 
and evaluates whether there is an independent judiciary and whether 
trials are both fair and public (failure to hold any trial is noted in 
the category above); includes discussion of ``political prisoners'' 
(political detainees are covered above), defined as those convicted and 
imprisoned for essentially political beliefs or nonviolent acts of 
dissent or expression, regardless of the actual charge.
    Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or 
Correspondence.--Discusses the ``passive'' right of the individual to 
noninterference by the State; includes the right to receive foreign 
publications, for example, while the right to publish is discussed 
under ``Freedom of Speech and Press''; includes the right to be free 
from coercive population control measures, including coerced abortion 
and involuntary sterilization, but does not include cultural or 
traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation, which are 
addressed in Section 5.
    Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in 
Internal Conflicts.--An optional subsection for use in describing 
abuses that occur in countries experiencing significant internal armed 
conflict. Includes indiscriminate, nonselective killings arising from 
excessive use of force, e.g., by police in putting down demonstrations, 
or by the shelling of villages (deliberate, targeted killing would be 
discussed in Section l.a.). Also includes abuses against civilian 
noncombatants. For reports in which use of this section would be 
inappropriate, i.e., in which there is no significant internal 
conflict, lethal use of excessive force by security forces (which is 
herein defined as a form of extrajudicial killing) is discussed in 
Section 1.a.; nonlethal excessive force in Section 1.c.
    Freedom of Speech and Press.--Evaluates whether these freedoms 
exist and describes any direct or indirect restrictions. Includes 
discussion of academic freedom.
    Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Evaluates the 
ability of individuals and groups (including political parties) to 
exercise these freedoms. Includes the ability of trade associations, 
professional bodies, and similar groups to maintain relations or 
affiliate with recognized international bodies in their fields. The 
right of labor to associate and to organize and bargain collectively is 
discussed under Section 6, Worker Rights (see Appendix B).
    Freedom of Religion.--Discusses whether the constitution or laws 
provide for the right of citizens of whatever religious belief to 
worship free of government interference and whether the government 
respects that right. Includes the freedom to publish religious 
documents in foreign languages; addresses the treatment of foreign 
clergy and whether religious belief affects membership in a ruling 
party or a career in government.
    Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration, 
and Repatriation.--Includes discussion of forced resettlement; 
``refugees'' may refer to persons displaced by civil strife or natural 
disaster as well as persons who are ``refugees'' within the meaning of 
the Refugee Act of 1980, i.e., persons with a ``well-founded fear of 
persecution'' in their country of origin or, if stateless, in their 
country of habitual residence, on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political 
opinion.
    Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their 
Government.--Discusses the extent to which citizens have freedom of 
political choice and have the legal right and ability in practice to 
change the laws and officials that govern them; assesses whether 
elections are free and fair.
    Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental 
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.--Discusses whether 
the government permits the free functioning of local human rights 
groups (including the right to investigate and publish their findings 
on alleged human rights abuses) and whether they are subject to 
reprisal by government or other forces. Also discusses whether the 
government grants access to and cooperates with outside entities 
(including foreign human rights organizations, international 
organizations, and foreign governments) interested in human rights 
developments in the country.
    Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language, 
or Social Status.--Every report contains a subheading on Women, 
Children, and People with Disabilities. As appropriate, some reports 
also include subheadings on Indigenous People, Religious Minorities, 
and National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities. Discrimination against groups 
not fitting one of the above subheadings is discussed in the 
introductory paragraph(s) of Section 5. In this section we address 
discrimination and abuses not discussed elsewhere in the report, 
focusing on laws, regulations, or state practices that are inconsistent 
with equal access to housing, employment, education, health care, or 
other governmental benefits for members of specific groups. (Abuses by 
government or opposition forces, such as killing, torture and other 
violence, or restriction of voting rights or free speech targeted 
against specific groups would be discussed under the appropriate 
preceding sections.) Societal violence against women, e.g., ``dowry 
deaths,'' wife beating, rape, and government tolerance of such abuse is 
discussed in this section under the subheading on women. We also 
discuss under this subheading the extent to which the law provides for, 
and the government enforces, equality of economic opportunity for 
women. Similarly, we discuss violence or other abuse against children 
under that subheading. Because female genital mutilation is most often 
performed on children, we discuss it under that subheading.
    Worker Rights.-- See Appendix B.

                Appendix B.--Reporting on Worker Rights

    The 1984 Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act requires 
reporting on worker rights in GSP beneficiary countries. It states that 
internationally recognized worker rights include ``(A) the right of 
association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a 
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a 
minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable 
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and 
occupational safety and health.'' All five aspects of worker rights are 
discussed in each report in a final section under the heading ``Worker 
Rights.'' The discussion of worker rights considers not only laws and 
regulations but also their practical implementation, taking into 
account the following additional guidelines:
    A. ``The right of association'' has been defined by the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) to include the right of workers 
and employers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing 
without previous authorization; to draw up their own constitutions and 
rules, elect their representatives, and formulate their programs; to 
join in confederations and affiliate with international organizations; 
and to be protected against dissolution or suspension by administrative 
authority.
    The right of association includes the right of workers to strike. 
While strikes may be restricted in essential services (i.e., those 
services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal 
safety, or health of a significant portion of the population) and in 
the public sector, these restrictions must be offset by adequate 
guarantees to safeguard the interests of the workers concerned (e.g., 
machinery for mediation and arbitration; due process; and the right to 
judicial review of all legal actions). Reporting on restrictions 
affecting the ability of workers to strike generally includes 
information on any procedures that may exist for safeguarding workers' 
interests.
    B. ``The right to organize and bargain collectively'' includes the 
right of workers to be represented in negotiating the prevention and 
settlement of disputes with employers; the right to protection against 
interference; and the right to protection against acts of antiunion 
discrimination. Governments should promote machinery for voluntary 
negotiations between employers and workers and their organizations. 
Reporting on the right to organize and bargain collectively includes 
descriptions of the extent to which collective bargaining takes place 
and the extent to which unions, both in law and practice, are 
effectively protected against antiunion discrimination.
    C. ``Forced or compulsory labor'' is defined as work or service 
exacted from any person under the menace of penalty and for which the 
person has not volunteered. ``Work or service'' does not apply in 
instances in which obligations are imposed to undergo education or 
training. ``Menace of penalty'' includes loss of rights or privileges 
as well as penal sanctions. The ILO has exempted the following from its 
definition of forced labor: compulsory military service, normal civic 
obligations, certain forms of prison labor, emergencies, and minor 
communal services. Forced labor should not be used as a means of (1) 
mobilizing and using labor for purposes of economic development; (2) 
racial, social, national, or religious discrimination; (3) political 
coercion or education, or as a punishment for holding or expressing 
political views or views ideologically opposed to the established 
political, social, or economic system; (4) labor discipline; or (5) as 
a punishment for having participated in strikes. Constitutional 
provisions concerning the obligation of citizens to work do not violate 
this right so long as they do not take the form of legal obligations 
enforced by sanctions and are consistent with the principle of ``freely 
chosen employment.''
    D. ``Minimum age for employment of children'' concerns the 
effective abolition of child labor by raising the minimum age for 
employment to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental 
development of young people. In addition young people should not be 
employed in hazardous conditions or at night.
    E. ``Acceptable conditions of work'' refers to the establishment 
and maintenance of machinery, adapted to national conditions, that 
provides for minimum working standards, i.e., wages that provide a 
decent living for workers and their families; working hours that do not 
exceed 48 hours per week, with a full 24-hour rest day; a specified 
annual paid holiday; and minimum conditions for the protection of the 
safety and health of workers. Differences in levels of economic 
development are taken into account in the formulation of 
internationally recognized labor standards. For example many ILO 
standards concerning working conditions permit flexibility in their 
scope and coverage. They may also permit countries a wide choice in 
their implementation, including progressive implementation, by enabling 
countries to accept a standard in part or subject to specified 
exceptions. Countries are expected to take steps over time to achieve 
the higher levels specified in such standards. However, it should be 
understood that this flexibility applies only to internationally 
recognized standards concerning working conditions. No flexibility is 
permitted concerning the acceptance of the basic principles contained 
in human rights standards, i.e., freedom of association, the right to 
organize and bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced labor, and 
the absence of discrimination.
    F. ``Trafficking in persons'' is defined as all acts involving the 
recruitment, abduction, transport, harboring, transfer, sale, or 
receipt of persons that occur within national or across international 
borders; involving the use of force, coercion, fraud, or deception; and 
resulting in persons being subjected to slavery or slavery-like 
conditions, or subjected to forced labor or services, domestic 
servitude, forced or bonded sweatshop labor, or other debt bondage. 
Describes legal prohibitions against trafficking; the extent to which 
the government enforces these prohibitions; whether the country is a 
source, transit, or destination country for trafficked victims; the 
extent of trafficking in persons in, from, or to the country, other 
geographic regions or countries affected by the traffic; and aid or 
protection available to victims.
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          Appendix D.--International Human Rights Conventions

    (1) Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of September 
25, 1926, as amended by the Protocol of December 7, 1953.
    (2) Convention Concerning Forced Labor of June 28, 1930 (ILO 
Convention 29).
    (3) Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organize of July 9, 1948 (ILO Convention 87).
    (4) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide of December 9, 1948.
    (5) Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the 
Right to Organize and Bargan Collectively of July 1, 1949 (ILO 
Convention 98).
    (6) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 
of August 12, 1949.
    (7) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949.
    (8) Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of 
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others of March 21, 1950.
    (9) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950.
    (10) Convention on the Political Rights of Women of March 31, 1953.
    (11) Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the 
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of 
September 7, 1956.
    (12) Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor of June 
25, 1957 ILO Convention 105.
    (13) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination of December 21, 1965.
    (14) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 
December 16, 1966.
    (15) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
of December 16, 1966.
    (16) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28, 
1952.
    (17) Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of January 31, 
1967.
    (18) American Convention on Human Rights of November 22, 1969.
    (19) Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment 
of June 26, 1973 (ILO Convention 138).
    (20) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed 
Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 8, 1977.
    (21) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International 
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of June 8, 1977.
    (22) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women of December 18, 1979.
    (23) Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of December 10, 1984.
    (24) Convention on the Rights of the Child of November 20, 1989.
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                 Appendix F.--55th UNCHR Voting Record

    The following resolutions were adopted without a vote (by 
consensus) at the 55th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights:


 
 
 
                       1999/1                   Situation of human
                                                 rights in Sierra Leone
                       1999/4                   Question of Western
                                                 Sahara
                       1999/9                   Situation of human
                                                 rights in Afghanistan
                       1999/10                  Situation of human
                                                 rights in Burundi
                       1999/11                  Situation of human
                                                 rights in Nigeria
                       1999/15                  Situation of human
                                                 rights in Sudan
                       1999/16                  Cooperation with
                                                 representatives of
                                                 United Nations human
                                                 rights bodies
                       1999/17                  Situation of human
                                                 rights in Equatorial
                                                 Guinea and assistance
                                                 in the field of human
                                                 rights
                       1999/20                  Situation of human
                                                 rights in Rwanda
                       1999/24                  The right to food
                       1999/25                  Question of the
                                                 realization in all
                                                 countries of economic,
                                                 social and cultural
                                                 rights contained in the
                                                 Universal Declaration
                                                 of Human Rights and in
                                                 the International
                                                 Covenant on Economic,
                                                 Social and Cultural
                                                 Rights, and study of
                                                 special problems which
                                                 the developing
                                                 countries face in their
                                                 efforts to achieve
                                                 these human rights
                       1999/26                  Human rights and extreme
                                                 poverty
                       1999/28                  Human rights and
                                                 arbitrary deprivation
                                                 of nationality
                       1999/29                  Hostage-taking
                       1999/30                  Question of a draft
                                                 optional protocol to
                                                 the Convention against
                                                 Torture and Other Cruel
                                                 Inhuman and Degrading
                                                 Treatment or Punishment
                       1999/31                  Independence and
                                                 impartiality of the
                                                 judiciary, jurors and
                                                 assessors and the
                                                 independence of lawyers
                       1999/32                  Torture and other cruel,
                                                 inhuman or degrading
                                                 treatment or punishment
                       1999/33                  The right to
                                                 restitution,
                                                 compensation and
                                                 rehabilitation for
                                                 victims of grave
                                                 violations of human
                                                 rights and fundamental
                                                 freedoms
                       1999/34                  Impunity
                       1999/35                  Extrajudicial, summary
                                                 or arbitrary executions
                       1999/36                  Right to freedom of
                                                 expression and opinion
                       1999/37                  Question of arbitrary
                                                 detention
                       1999/38                  Question of enforced or
                                                 involuntary
                                                 disappearances
                       1999/39                  Implementation of the
                                                 Declaration on the
                                                 Elimination of All
                                                 Forms of Intolerance
                                                 and of Discrimination
                                                 Based on Religion or
                                                 Belief
                       1999/40                  Traffic in Women and
                                                 Girls
                       1999/41                  Integrating the human
                                                 rights of women
                                                 throughout the United
                                                 Nations system
                       1999/42                  Elimination of violence
                                                 against women
                       1999/44                  Human rights of migrants
                       1999/45                  International Convention
                                                 on the Protection of
                                                 the Rights of All
                                                 Migrant Workers and
                                                 Members of Their
                                                 Families
                       1999/47                  Internally displaced
                                                 persons
                       1999/48                  Rights of persons
                                                 belonging to national
                                                 or ethnic, religious
                                                 and linguistic
                                                 minorities
                       1999/49                  The protection of human
                                                 rights in the context
                                                 of human
                                                 immunodeficincy virus
                                                 (HIV) and acquired
                                                 immune deficiency
                                                 syndrome (AIDS)
                       1999/50                  Working group of the
                                                 Commission on Human
                                                 Rights to elaborate a
                                                 draft declaration in
                                                 accordance with
                                                 paragraph 5 of General
                                                 Assembly resolution 49/
                                                 214 of 23 December 1994
                       1999/51                  Working group on
                                                 Indigenous Populations
                                                 of the Sub-Commission
                                                 on Prevention of
                                                 Discrimination and
                                                 Protection of
                                                 Minorities and the
                                                 International Decade of
                                                 the World's Indigenous
                                                 People
                       1999/52                  A permanent forum for
                                                 indigenous people in
                                                 the United Nations
                                                 system
                       1999/53                  Forum on economic,
                                                 social and cultural
                                                 rights: the Social
                                                 Forum
                       1999/54                  Strengthening of the
                                                 Office of the United
                                                 Nations High
                                                 Commissioner for Human
                                                 Rights
                       1999/66                  Situation of human
                                                 rights in the
                                                 Democratic Republic of
                                                 the Congo
                       1999/60                  Development of public
                                                 information activities
                                                 in the field of human
                                                 rights, including the
                                                 World Public
                                                 Information Campaign on
                                                 Human Rights
                       1999/62                  Towards a culture of
                                                 peace
                       1999/63                  Human rights and
                                                 bioethics
                       1999/64                  United Nations Decade
                                                 for Human Rights
                                                 Education
                       1999/65                  Fundamental standards of
                                                 humanity
                       1999/66                  Implementation of the
                                                 Declaration on the
                                                 Right and
                                                 Responsibility of
                                                 Individuals, Groups and
                                                 Organs of Society to
                                                 Promote and Protect
                                                 Universally Recognized
                                                 Human Rights and
                                                 Fundamental Freedoms
                       1999/68                  Enhancement of
                                                 international
                                                 cooperation for the
                                                 promotion and
                                                 protection of human
                                                 rights in the Asian and
                                                 Pacific region
                       1999/69                  Regional cooperation for
                                                 the promotion and
                                                 protection of human
                                                 rights in the Asia and
                                                 Pacific region
                       1999/71                  Regional arrangements
                                                 for the promotion and
                                                 protection of human
                                                 rights
                       1999/72                  National institutions
                                                 for the protection and
                                                 promotion of human
                                                 rights
                       1999/74                  Assistance to States in
                                                 strengthening the rule
                                                 of law
                       1999/75                  Assistance to Somalia in
                                                 the field of human
                                                 rights
                       1999/76                  Situation of human
                                                 rights in Cambodia
                       1999/77                  Situation of human
                                                 rights in Haiti
                       1999/78                  Racism, racial
                                                 discrimination,
                                                 xenophobia and related
                                                 intolerance
                       1999/80                  Rights of the child
                       1999/81                  Work of the Sub-
                                                 Commission on
                                                 Prevention of
                                                 Discrimination and
                                                 Protection of
                                                 Minorities
                       1999/82                  Defamation of religions
 

    The following resolutions were adopted by vote at the 55th session 
of the Commission on Human rights (letter designation refers to the 
vote chart):


 
 
 
A.                     1999/2                   Situation of human
                                                 rights in Kosovo
                                                 (Adopted 44-1-6)
B.                     1999/3                   The use of mercenaries
                                                 as means of violating
                                                 Human rights in and
                                                 impeding the exercise
                                                 of the right peoples to
                                                 self-determination
                                                 (Adopted 35-12-6)
C.                     1999/5                   Question of the
                                                 violation of human
                                                 rights in the occupied
                                                 Arab territories,
                                                 including Palestine
                                                 (Adopted 31-1-21)
D.                     1999/6                   Human rights in the
                                                 occupied Syrian Golan
                                                 (Adopted 31-1-20)
E.                     1999/7                   Israeli settlements in
                                                 the occupied Arab
                                                 Territories (Adopted 50-
                                                 1-2)
F.                     1999/8                   Human rights in Cuba
                                                 (Adopted 21-20-12)
G.                     1999/12                  Human rights situation
                                                 in southern Lebanon and
                                                 west Beeka (Adopted 49-
                                                 1-3)
H.                     1999/13                  Human rights situation
                                                 in Islamic Republic of
                                                 Iran (Adopted 23-16-14)
I.                     1999/14                  Situation of human
                                                 rights in Iraq (Adopted
                                                 35-0-18)
J.                     1999/18                  The situation of human
                                                 rights in the Federal
                                                 Republic of Yugoslavia
                                                 (Serbia and
                                                 Montenegro), The
                                                 Republic of Croatia and
                                                 Bosnia-Herzogovina
                                                 (Adopted 46-1-6)
K.                     1999/21                  Human Rights and
                                                 universal coercive
                                                 measures (Adopted 37-10-
                                                 6)
L.                     1999/22                  Effects on the full
                                                 enjoyment of human
                                                 rights of the economic
                                                 adjustment policies
                                                 arising from foreign
                                                 debt and, in
                                                 particular, the
                                                 implementation of the
                                                 Declaration on the
                                                 Right To Development
                                                 (Adopted 30-15-18)
M.                     1999/23                  Adverse effects of the
                                                 illicit movement and
                                                 dumping of toxic and
                                                 dangerous products and
                                                 wastes on the enjoyment
                                                 of human rights.
                                                 (Adopted 36-16-1)
N.                     1999/27                  Human rights and
                                                 terrorism (Adopted 27-0-
                                                 26)
O.                     1999/43                  Abduction of children
                                                 from northern Uganda
                                                 (Adopted 28-1-24)
P.                     1999/46                  Contemporary forms of
                                                 slavery (Adopted 36-0-
                                                 17)
Q.                     1999/55                  Situation in occupied
                                                 Palestine (Adopted 44-1-
                                                 8)
R.                     1999/57                  Promotion of the right
                                                 to democracy (Adopted
                                                 51-0-2)
S.                     1999/58                  Impunity of perpetrators
                                                 of violations of
                                                 economic, social and
                                                 cultural rights
                                                 (Adopted 21-9-22)
T.                     1999/59                  Globalization and its
                                                 impact on the full
                                                 enjoyment of all human
                                                 rights (Adopted 30-2-
                                                 22)
U.                     1999/61                  Question of the death
                                                 penalty (Adopted 30-11-
                                                 12)
V.                     1999/67                  Convention on the
                                                 Prevention and
                                                 Punishment Of the Crime
                                                 of Genocide (Adopted 48-
                                                 0-5)
W.                     1999/70                  Composition of the staff
                                                 of the Office of the
                                                 United Nations High
                                                 Commissioner for Human
                                                 Rights (Adopted 34-16-
                                                 3)
X.                     1999/73                  Mainstreaming technical
                                                 cooperation in all
                                                 areas of human rights
                                                 (Adopted 27-19-7)
 

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           Appendix G.--Universal Declaration of Human Rights

                                Preamble

    Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
    Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the 
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech 
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the 
highest aspiration of the common people,
    Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have 
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and 
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,
    Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly 
relations between nations,
    Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter 
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and 
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and 
have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life 
in larger freedom,
    Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-
operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect 
for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
    Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of 
the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,
    Now, therefore, The General Assembly, proclaims this Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all 
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every 
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall 
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights 
and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international, 
to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, 
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the 
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Article 1
    All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. 
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one 
another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2
    Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in 
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national 
or social origin, property, birth or other status.
    Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the 
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or 
territory to which a person belongs whether it be independent, trust, 
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3
    Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.
Article 4
    No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave 
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
Article 5
    No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 6
    Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before 
the law.
Article 7
    All are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to 
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this 
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8
    Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent 
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted 
him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9
    No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10
    Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing 
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his 
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
Article 11
    1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be 
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public 
trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
    2. No one shall be held guilty without any limitation due to race, 
of any penal offence on account of nationality or religion, have the 
any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under 
national or international law, at the time when it was committed.
Article 12
    No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour 
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.
Article 13
    1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence 
within the borders of each state.
    2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, 
and to return to his country.
Article 14
    1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries 
asylum from persecution.
    2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions 
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 15
    1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
    2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor be 
denied the right to change his nationality.
Article 16
    1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family. 
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and 
at its dissolution.
    2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses.
    3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Article 17
    1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in 
association with others.
    2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 18
    Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, 
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or 
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, 
worship and observance.
Article 19
    Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this 
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to 
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.
Article 20
    1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and 
association.
    2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Article 21
    1. Everyone has the right to take part in the Government of his 
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
    2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his 
country.
    3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of 
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine 
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be 
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Article 22
    1. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social 
security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and 
international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and 
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights 
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality.
Article 23
    1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to 
just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against 
unemployment.
    2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay 
for equal work.
    3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable 
remuneration insuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of 
human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social 
protection.
    4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests.
Article 24
    Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable 
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25
    1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the 
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, 
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and 
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in 
circumstances beyond his control.
    2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and 
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall 
enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26
    1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at 
least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education 
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made 
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to 
all on the basis of merit.
    2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human 
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall 
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of 
peace.
    3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that 
shall be given to their children.
Article 27
    1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural 
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits.
    2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.
Article 28
    Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which 
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully 
realized.
Article 29
    1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and 
full development of his personality is possible.
    2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be 
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for 
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and 
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, 
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
    3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary 
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 30
    Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any 
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to 
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and 
freedoms set forth herein.

Hundred and eighty-third plenary meeting
Resolution 217(A)(III) of the United Nations General Assembly,
December 10, 1948

  (This material is in the public domain and may be reprinted without 
          permission; citation of this source is appreciated.)

                                 ______
                                 

                           1999 COUNTRY INDEX

Forward
Letter of Transmittal
Introduction
Preface
Africa:
          Angola
          Benin
          Botswana
          Burkina Faso
          Burundi
          Cameroon
          Cape Verde
          Central African Republic
          Chad
          Comoros
          Congo, Democratic Republic of
          Congo, Republic of
          Cote d'Ivoire
          Djibouti
          Equatorial Guinea
          Eritrea
          Ethiopia
          Gabon
          Gambia, The
          Ghana
          Guinea
          Guinea-Bissau
          Kenya
          Lesotho
          Liberia
          Madagascar
          Malawi
          Mali
          Mauritania
          Mauritius
          Mozambique
          Namibia
          Niger
          Nigeria
          Rwanda
          Sao Tome and Principe
          Senegal
          Seychelles
          Sierra Leone
          Somalia
          South Africa
          Sudan
          Swaziland
          Tanzania
          Togo
          Uganda
          Zambia
          Zimbabwe
East Asia and the Pacific:
          Australia
          Brunei
          Burma
          Cambodia
          China (includes Hong Kong)
          China (Taiwan only)
          Fiji
          Indonesia
          Japan
          Kiribati
          Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
          Korea, Republic of
          Laos
          Malaysia
          Marshall Islands
          Micronesia, Federated States of
          Mongolia
          Nauru
          New Zealand
          Palau
          Papua New Guinea
          Philippines
          Samoa
          Singapore
          Solomon Islands
          Thailand
          Tonga
          Tuvalu
          Vanuatu
          Vietnam
Europe:
          Albania
          Andorra
          Armenia
          Austria
          Azerbaijan
          Belarus
          Belgium
          Bosnia and Herzegovina
          Bulgaria
          Canada
          Croatia
          Cyprus
          Czech Republic
          Denmark
          Estonia
          Finland
          France
          Georgia
          Germany
          Greece
          Hungary
          Iceland
          Ireland
          Italy
          Kazakhstan
          Kyrgyz Republic
          Latvia
          Liechtenstein
          Lithuania
          Luxembourg
          Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
          Malta
          Moldova
          Monaco
          Netherlands, The
          Norway
          Poland
          Portugal (includes Macau)
          Romania
          Russia
          San Marino
          Serbia-Montenegro
          Slovak Republic
          Slovenia
          Spain
          Sweden
          Switzerland
          Tajikistan
          Turkey
          Turkmenistan
          Ukraine
          United Kingdom
          Uzbekistan
Near East and North Africa:
          Algeria
          Bahrain
          Egypt
          Iran
          Iraq
          Israel and the occupied territories
          Jordan
          Kuwait
          Lebanon
          Libya
          Morocco
          The Western Sahara
          Oman
          Qatar
          Saudi Arabia
          Syria
          Tunisia
          United Arab Emirates
          Yemen
South Asia:
          Afghanistan
          Bangladesh
          Bhutan
          India
          Maldives
          Nepal
          Pakistan
          Sri Lanka
Western Hemisphere:
          Antigua and Barbuda
          Argentina
          Bahamas
          Barbados
          Belize
          Bolivia
          Brazil
          Canada
          Chile
          Colombia
          Costa Rica
          Cuba
          Dominica
          Dominican Republic
          Ecuador
          El Salvador
          Grenada
          Guatemala
          Guyana
          Haiti
          Honduras
          Jamaica
          Mexico
          Nicaragua
          Panama
          Paraguay
          Peru
          St. Kitts and Nevis
          Saint Lucia
          Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
          Suriname
          Trinidad and Tobago
          Uruguay
          Venezuela
Appendixes:
         A. Notes on Preparation of the Reports
         B. Reporting on Worker Rights
         C. Selected International Human Rights Conventions
         D. Explanation of Chart in Appendix C
         E. FY 1999 U.S. Economic and Military Assistance--Actual 
        Obligations
         F. 55th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission: Voting 
        Record and Voting Table
         G. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights

                                
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