[JPRT, 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
106th Congress
2d Session JOINT COMMITTEE PRINT
_______________________________________________________________________
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1999--VOLUME II
__________
R E P O R T
submitted to the
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
and the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
U.S. SENATE
by the
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 116(d) AND 502B(b) OF THE FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1961, AS AMENDED
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]CONGRESS.#13
APRIL 2000
Printed for the use of the Committees on International Relations of the
U.S. House of Representatives and Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate
respectively
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York, Chairman
WILLIAM GOODLING, Pennsylvania SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
JAMES A LEACH, Iowa TOM LANTOS, California
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DAN BURTON, Indiana Samoa
ELTON GALLEGLY, California MATTHEW G. MARTINEZ, California
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
CASS BALLENGER, North Carolina ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
DANA ROHRABACHER, California SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois CYNTHIA A. McKINNEY, Georgia
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida
PETER T. KING, New York PAT DANNER, Missouri
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio EARL F. HILLIARD, Alabama
MARSHALL ``MARK'' SANFORD, South BRAD SHERMAN, California
Carolina ROBERT WEXLER, Florida
MATT SALMON, Arizona STEVEN R. ROTHMAN, New Jersey
AMO HOUGHTON, New York JIM DAVIS, Florida
TOM CAMPBELL, California EARL POMEROY, North Dakota
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts
KEVIN BRADY, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
RICHARD BURR, North Carolina BARBARA LEE, California
PAUL E. GILLMOR, Ohio JOSEPH CROWLEY, New York
GEORGE P. RADANOVICH, California JOSEPH M. HOEFFEL, Pennsylvania
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana
THOMAS G. TANCREDO, Colorado
Richard J. Garon, Chief of Staff
Kathleen Bertelsen Moazed, Democratic Chief of Staff
------
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
ROD GRAMS, Minnesota JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota
JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri BARBARA BOXER, California
BILL FRIST, Tennessee ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island
Stephen E. Biegun, Staff Director
Edwin K. Hall, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
VOLUME I
Page
Foreword......................................................... VII
Letter of Transmittal............................................ IX
Preface.......................................................... XI
Introduction..................................................... XV
Africa:
Angola....................................................... 1
Benin........................................................ 14
Botswana..................................................... 20
Burkina Faso................................................. 29
Burundi...................................................... 39
Cameroon..................................................... 47
Cape Verde................................................... 69
Central African Republic..................................... 74
Chad......................................................... 85
Comoros...................................................... 94
Congo, Democratic Republic of................................ 99
Congo, Republic of........................................... 128
Cote d'Ivoire................................................ 138
Djibouti..................................................... 155
Equatorial Guinea............................................ 166
Eritrea...................................................... 173
Ethiopia..................................................... 182
Gabon........................................................ 203
Gambia, The.................................................. 211
Ghana........................................................ 220
Guinea....................................................... 237
Guinea-Bissau................................................ 249
Kenya........................................................ 256
Lesotho...................................................... 279
Liberia...................................................... 288
Madagascar................................................... 299
Malawi....................................................... 305
Mali......................................................... 313
Mauritania................................................... 321
Mauritius.................................................... 337
Mozambique................................................... 343
Namibia...................................................... 357
Niger........................................................ 369
Nigeria...................................................... 379
Rwanda....................................................... 402
Sao Tome and Principe........................................ 412
Senegal...................................................... 415
Seychelles................................................... 427
Sierra Leone................................................. 433
Somalia...................................................... 442
South Africa................................................. 449
Sudan........................................................ 464
Swaziland.................................................... 482
Tanzania..................................................... 490
Togo......................................................... 505
Uganda....................................................... 518
Zambia....................................................... 535
Zimbabwe..................................................... 547
Latin America, Canada, and the Caribbean:
Antigua and Barbuda.......................................... 569
Argentina.................................................... 573
Bahamas...................................................... 584
Barbados..................................................... 590
Belize....................................................... 594
Bolivia...................................................... 601
Brazil....................................................... 611
Canada....................................................... 634
Chile........................................................ 641
Colombia..................................................... 656
Costa Rica................................................... 691
Cuba......................................................... 698
Dominica..................................................... 718
Dominican Republic........................................... 722
Ecuador...................................................... 737
El Salvador.................................................. 747
Grenada...................................................... 763
Guatemala.................................................... 767
Guyana....................................................... 792
Haiti........................................................ 801
Honduras..................................................... 815
Jamaica...................................................... 829
Mexico....................................................... 834
Nicaragua.................................................... 857
Panama....................................................... 872
Paraguay..................................................... 885
Peru......................................................... 896
St. Kitts and Nevis.......................................... 924
Saint Lucia.................................................. 928
St. Vincent and the Grenadines............................... 932
Suriname..................................................... 936
Trinidad and Tobago.......................................... 943
Uruguay...................................................... 948
Venezuela.................................................... 954
East Asia and the Pacific:
Australia.................................................... 971
Brunei....................................................... 978
Burma........................................................ 984
Cambodia..................................................... 1006
China (includes Hong Kong and Macau).....................1018, 1089
China (Taiwan only).......................................... 1095
Fiji......................................................... 1106
Indonesia.................................................... 1113
Japan........................................................ 1153
Kiribati..................................................... 1166
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of....................... 1179
Korea, Republic of........................................... 1169
Laos......................................................... 1189
Malaysia..................................................... 1199
Marshall Islands............................................. 1227
Micronesia, Federated States of.............................. 1230
Mongolia..................................................... 1234
Nauru........................................................ 1239
New Zealand.................................................. 1242
Palau........................................................ 1247
Papua New Guinea............................................. 1251
Philippines.................................................. 1256
Samoa........................................................ 1268
Singapore.................................................... 1272
Solomon Islands.............................................. 1288
Thailand..................................................... 12928
Tonga........................................................ 1306
Tuvalu....................................................... 1309
Vanuatu...................................................... 1312
Vietnam...................................................... 1316
VOLUME II
Europe:
Albania...................................................... 1337
Andorra...................................................... 1348
Armenia...................................................... 1351
Austria...................................................... 1366
Azerbaijan................................................... 1375
Belarus...................................................... 1390
Belgium...................................................... 1414
Bosnia and Herzegovina....................................... 1422
Bulgaria..................................................... 1440
Croatia...................................................... 1458
Cyprus....................................................... 1479
Czech Republic............................................... 1488
Denmark...................................................... 1503
Estonia...................................................... 1507
Finland...................................................... 1515
France....................................................... 1519
Georgia...................................................... 1531
Germany...................................................... 1546
Greece....................................................... 1559
Hungary...................................................... 1574
Iceland...................................................... 1585
Ireland...................................................... 1590
Italy........................................................ 1598
Kazakhstan................................................... 1606
Kyrgyz Republic.............................................. 1628
Latvia....................................................... 1640
Liechtenstein................................................ 1649
Lithuania.................................................... 1652
Luxembourg................................................... 1661
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia........................ 1664
Malta........................................................ 1675
Moldova...................................................... 1678
Monaco....................................................... 1688
Netherlands, The............................................. 1691
Norway....................................................... 1698
Poland....................................................... 1702
Portugal..................................................... 1719
Romania...................................................... 1725
Russia....................................................... 1735
San Marino................................................... 1797
Serbia-Montenegro............................................ 1799
Slovak Republic.............................................. 1844
Slovenia..................................................... 1857
Spain........................................................ 1861
Sweden....................................................... 1875
Switzerland.................................................. 1882
Tajikistan................................................... 1890
Turkey....................................................... 1902
Turkmenistan................................................. 1937
Ukraine...................................................... 1947
United Kingdom............................................... 1970
Uzbekistan................................................... 1988
Near East and North Africa:
Algeria...................................................... 2009
Bahrain...................................................... 2020
Egypt........................................................ 2031
Iran......................................................... 2050
Iraq......................................................... 2070
Israel and the occupied territories.......................... 2092
Jordan....................................................... 2124
Kuwait....................................................... 2137
Lebanon...................................................... 2151
Libya........................................................ 2162
Morocco...................................................... 2170
Western Sahara............................................... 2189
Oman......................................................... 2192
Qatar........................................................ 2201
Saudi Arabia................................................. 2207
Syria........................................................ 2219
Tunisia...................................................... 2230
United Arab Emirates......................................... 2248
Yemen........................................................ 2256
South Asia:
Afghanistan.................................................. 2277
Bangladesh................................................... 2294
Bhutan....................................................... 2315
India........................................................ 2325
Maldives..................................................... 2367
Nepal........................................................ 2374
Pakistan..................................................... 2389
Sri Lanka.................................................... 2434
Appendices:
A. Notes on Preparation of the Reports....................... 2457
B. Reporting on Worker Rights................................ 2459
C. International Human Rights Conventions.................... 2462
D. Information on International Human Rights Conventions
Listed in Appendix C....................................... 2468
E. FY 1999 U.S. Economic and Security Assistance (Actual
Obligations)............................................... 2469
F. 55th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission Voting
Record..................................................... 2474
G. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights...... 2478
FOREWORD
----------
The country reports on human rights practices contained
herein were prepared by the Department of State in accordance
with sections 126(d) and 502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended. They also fulfill the legislative
requirements of section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended.
The reports cover the human rights practices of all nations
that are members of the United Nations and a few that are not.
They are printed to assist Members of Congress in the
consideration of legislation, particularly foreign assistance
legislation.
Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Committee on International Relations.
Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
----------
Department of State,
Washington, DC, February 25, 1999.
Hon. Jesse Helms,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.
Dear Mr. Chairman: On behalf of the Secretary of State, I
am transmitting to you the Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices for 1998, prepared in compliance with sections
116(d)(1) and 502(B)(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,
as amended, and section 505(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, as
amended.
We hope this report is helpful. Please let us know if we
can provide any further information.
Sincerely,
Barbara Larkin,
Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs.
Enclosure.
PREFACE 1999
----------
HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS
Why The Reports Are Prepared
This report is submitted to the Congress by the Department
of State in compliance with sections 116(d) and 502(b) of the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (FAA), as amended, and section
504 of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended. The law provides that
the Secretary of State shall transmit to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate, by February 25 ``a full and complete report
regarding the status of internationally recognized human
rights, within the meaning of subsection (A) in countries that
receive assistance under this part, and (B) in all other
foreign countries which are members of the United Nations and
which are not otherwise the subject of a human rights report
under this Act.'' We have also included reports on several
countries that do not fall into the categories established by
these statutes and that thus are not covered by the
congressional requirement.
The responsibility of the United States to speak out on
behalf of international human rights standards was formalized
in the early 1970's. In 1976 Congress enacted legislation
creating a Coordinator of Human Rights in the Department of
State, a position later upgraded to Assistant Secretary. In
1994 the Congress created a position of Senior Advisor for
Women's Rights. Congress also has written into law formal
requirements that U.S. foreign and trade policy take into
account countries' human rights and worker rights performance
and that country reports be submitted to the Congress on an
annual basis. The first reports, in 1977, covered only
countries receiving U.S. aid, numbering 82; this year 194
reports are submitted.
How The Reports Are Prepared
In August 1993, the Secretary of State moved to strengthen
further the human rights efforts of our embassies. All sections
in each embassy were asked to contribute information and to
corroborate reports of human rights violations, and new efforts
were made to link mission programming to the advancement of
human rights and democracy. In 1994 the Bureau of Human Rights
and Humanitarian Affairs was reorganized and renamed as the
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, reflecting both a
broader sweep and a more focused approach to the interlocking
issues of human rights, worker rights, and democracy. The 1999
human rights reports reflect a year of dedicated effort by
hundreds of State Department, Foreign Service, and other U.S.
Government employees.
Our embassies, which prepared the initial drafts of the
reports, gathered information throughout the year from a
variety of sources across the political spectrum, including
government officials, jurists, military sources, journalists,
human rights monitors, academics, and labor activists. This
information-gathering can be hazardous, and U.S. Foreign
Service Officers regularly go to great lengths, under trying
and sometimes dangerous conditions, to investigate reports of
human rights abuse, monitor elections, and come to the aid of
individuals at risk, such as political dissidents and human
rights defenders whose rights are threatened by their
governments.
After the embassies completed their drafts, the texts were
sent to Washington for careful review by the Bureau of
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, in cooperation with other
State Department offices. As they worked to corroborate,
analyze, and edit the reports, the Department officers drew on
their own sources of information. These included reports
provided by U.S. and other human rights groups, foreign
government officials, representatives from the United Nations
and other international and regional organizations and
institutions, and experts from academia and the media. Officers
also consulted with experts on worker rights issues, refugee
issues, military and police matters, women's issues, and legal
matters. The guiding principle was to ensure that all relevant
information was assessed as objectively, thoroughly, and fairly
as possible.
The reports in this volume will be used as a resource for
shaping policy, conducting diplomacy, and making assistance,
training, and other resource allocations. They also will serve
as a basis for the U.S. Government's cooperation with private
groups to promote the observance of internationally recognized
human rights.
The Country Reports on Human Rights Practices cover
internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and
worker rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. These rights include freedom from torture or
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
from prolonged detention without charges; from disappearance or
clandestine detention; and from other flagrant violations of
the right to life, liberty, and the security of the person.
Universal human rights aim to incorporate respect for human
dignity into the processes of government and law. All persons
have the inalienable right to change their government by
peaceful means and to enjoy basic freedoms, such as freedom of
expression, association, assembly, movement, and religion,
without discrimination on the basis of race, religion, national
origin, or sex. The right to join a free trade union is a
necessary condition of a free society and economy. Thus the
reports assess key internationally recognized worker rights,
including the right of association; the right to organize and
bargain collectively; prohibition of forced or compulsory
labor; the status of child labor practices and the minimum age
for employment of children; and acceptable work conditions.
Within the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
the editorial staff of the Country Reports Team consists of:
Editor in Chief--Marc J. Susser; Supervisory Editor--Leslie A.
Gerson; Managing Editor--Jeannette P. Dubrow; Technical
Editor--Larry Arthur; Editors--Liana Brooks, Frank B. Crump,
Joan Garner, Stanley Ifshin, David T. Jones, Lisa N. Kaplan,
Susan F. Kovalik, Amy E. McKee, Gregory P. Moody, Diana D.
Perry-Elby, Yvette Saint-Andre, Rachel D. Settlage, John C.
Sheerin, Carol A. Timko, James C. Todd, Stephen W. Worrel;
Assistant Editors--John Bradshaw, Charles J. Brown, Christine
Camillo, Douglas B. Dearborn, Carol G. Finerty, Jose Garriga,
Ramona Harper, Peter Higgins, Ann Hudock, Alex Kronemer, Susan
Keogh, Paul Martin, Edmund McWilliams, Robert L. Norman, David
Park, Maria Pica, Susan O'Sullivan, Tamara J. Resler, Mark D.
Schall, Madeleine Seidenstricker, Wendy L. Shapiro, Wendy B.
Silverman, Mark A. Simonoff, Yvonne F. Thayer, Amy Young,
Robert C. Ward; Editorial Assistants--Charmaine Coleman, Linda
Hayes, Katie Janick, Laura Muir, Carrie O'Connell, Jennifer
Pekkinen, Joshua Rubinstein, Vonzella Taylor, Eunice Watson.
INTRODUCTION TO THE 1999 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
I. The Third Globalization: Transnational Human Rights Networks
Today, all the talk is of globalization. But far too often,
both its advocates and its critics have portrayed globalization
as an exclusively economic and technological phenomenon. In
fact, in the new millennium, there are at least three universal
``languages:'' money, the Internet, and democracy and human
rights. An overlooked ``third globalization''--the rise of
transnational human rights networks of both public and private
actors--has helped develop what may over time become an
international civil society capable of working with
governments, international institutions, and multinational
corporations to promote both democracy and the standards
embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In Davos recently, President Clinton noted that ``Since
globalization is about more than economics, our interdependence
requires us to find ways to meet the challenges of advancing
our values.'' In 1999 the United States continued to meet that
challenge. As a leader in promoting democracy and human rights
around the world, the United States played an essential and
catalyzing role in the process of creating transnational human
rights networks. Just this past year, President Clinton and
Secretary Albright helped forge international solutions to the
crises in Kosovo and East Timor by encouraging a wide range of
governmental and nongovernmental actors to join together in
public-private networks to promote international justice. The
United States is committed to the long-term project of helping
such networks develop into an international civil society, an
effective partnership of governments, international agencies,
multinational corporations, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) that will support democracy worldwide and promote the
standards embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights.
The great American civil rights leader Martin Luther King,
Jr. acknowledged ``the interrelatedness of all communities and
states . . . caught in an inescapable network of mutuality,
tied in a single garment of destiny.'' What Dr. King
understood, even 40 years ago, was the need--in an increasingly
interdependent world--for governments, businesses, NGO's, and
individuals to work together as agents of change. But what Dr.
King could not fully envision was an era in which these growing
national networks would face both the profound opportunities
and the challenges posed by globalization.
Traditionally, networks have evolved out of communities of
like-minded individuals who gather around shared interests and
values. Often they begin as informal conversations, over dinner
tables and conference tables, which help individuals identify a
shared set of values and standards upon which they can base
their behavior. They help generate what de Tocqueville called
``habits of the heart''--those characteristics of human nature
that encourage otherwise isolated individuals to connect with
one another into a broader community. At times, private
networks coalesce into a single NGO. More frequently, however,
they remain loose coalitions of membership-based citizens'
lobbies, labor unions, foundations, academics, professional
associations, religious bodies, and other groups that share a
desire to identify solutions to a single problem.
Such networks developed at the neighborhood, the community,
and at times the national level. But today, new kinds of
networks--linked by air transport, telecommunications, the
global media, and the Internet--are helping create
transnational communities of shared institutions, shared ideas,
and--most importantly--shared values. We are rapidly moving
toward a global network of government officials, activists,
thinkers, and practitioners who share a common commitment to
democracy, the universality of human rights, and respect for
the rule of law.
Not surprisingly, the emergence of global
telecommunications and commercial networks--the two other new
``global languages''--have served as important driving forces
behind this trend. Just as the Berlin Wall once stood as a
physical barrier to movement and the free spread of democracy,
governments that abuse human rights also seek to build walls
that will stop the free flow of information. But the global
information revolution has perforated such walls: E-mail, the
Internet, cell phones, and other technologies have helped
activists from around the globe to connect with one another in
ways that were impossible only 10 years ago. The Internet has
created a world in which traditional hierarchical,
bidirectional models of authority have been replaced by
nonhierarchical, multidirectional systems that naturally feed
the growth of transnational networks. Similarly, the global
commercial revolution has multiplied contact points between
open and closed societies. As corporations, banks,
international financial institutions, and private investors
engage with transitional societies, they increasingly serve as
transmission belts for human rights norms and advocates for
human rights improvements.
Increasingly, some of the most successful transnational
networks are those that partner with, respond to, or support
government initiatives on behalf of democracy and human rights.
Perhaps the best example of the power of such public-private
network partnerships can be found in the developments over the
past year in Kosovo and East Timor. In the days and weeks
leading up to both NATO's decision to use military force to
stop Serb atrocities in Kosovo and the United Nations' decision
to use military force to stop militia and army human rights
abuses in East Timor, transnational networks of human rights
activistsplayed a key role. During and after the Kosovo crisis,
networks of human rights advocates and humanitarian relief workers
worked closely with governments, the International Criminal Tribunal
for the Former Yugoslavia, and NATO and KFOR forces to document
allegations of war crimes and violations of humanitarian law. In both
Kosovo and East Timor, NGO's are working with U.N. missions to build
networks to support reconstruction, document human rights abuses, and
support justice initiatives.
When nongovernmental groups worked with intergovernmental
agencies and national governments in Kosovo and East Timor, NGO
efforts enriched government policy-creation efforts, and
governments in turn helped guide and coordinate the work of
NGO's. As a result of this public-private collaboration,
governments successfully pooled their military and financial
resources to halt the atrocities, and the international
community began the hard work of rebuilding badly damaged
societies.
Transnational human rights networks of governments and
nongovernmental actors have also worked closely together to
secure the adoption of a wide range of declarations,
international treaties, conventions, and protocols addressing
key human rights issues. Many of these networks emerged from
the world human rights conferences that took place in the
1990's. At the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in
1993 and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in
1995, NGO activists worked with democratic governments to
combat efforts made by dictatorships to distort the
conferences' final declarations. Both conferences also led to
the creation of permanent confederations of NGO's, which have
continued to work in partnership with democratic governments.
More recently, NGO's and governments have worked together to
secure agreements on eliminating the worst forms of child labor
and ending the use of child soldiers.
Transnational networks have played an important role in
shaping the robust debate over how to guarantee international
justice. While various actors in the international community do
not yet agree fully on how best to address past human rights
violations, particularly in the context of difficult democratic
transitions, a great deal of concrete progress nonetheless has
been made. As recently as the Vienna Conference on Human
Rights, most governments (and many NGO's) regarded efforts to
establish international judicial mechanisms to promote justice
as remote or even utopian. Yet 7 years later, the world has
witnessed the establishment of International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Indeed, there also has
been active and sometimes controversial domestic civil and
criminal litigation against former dictators.
Each of these developments took place in part because like-
minded governments worked with NGO's to create a public-private
network through which ``the international community'' could
address critical human rights concerns. To be sure, no
international consensus yet exists on many international
justice issues, including the establishment of an International
Criminal Court. However, the critical achievements of
transnational human rights networks have been to place
international justice issues on the agenda and to search for
forums in which justice ultimately can be reached.
The United States continues to be a leader in the formation
of new transnational human rights networks. For example, the
U.S. Institute of Peace and the Department of State recently
hosted a roundtable on justice and reconciliation at which
visiting Indonesian officials drew on the experiences of five
other countries--El Salvador, Chile, Argentina, South Africa,
and South Korea--that have confronted the human rights abuses
of prior authoritarian regimes while making the transition to
democracy. Participants focused on the advantages and
disadvantages of a range of mechanisms for promoting justice
and reconciliation: Truth commissions, noncriminal sanctions,
criminal accountability, and compensation for victims. Other
recent successful efforts at human rights networking began at a
private-public conference at the United States Holocaust Museum
in Washington to discuss the design of an atrocities prevention
information and action network and at a public-private
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
supplemental Human Dimension Meeting on Roma and Sinti issues.
In a number of critical areas, the Department of State has
appointed special representatives to take the lead on building
and working with existing human rights and civil society
networks. As 1999 ended, Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Stuart Eizenstat, in his role as Special Representative of the
President and Secretary of State on Holocaust-Era Issues,
catalyzed efforts by the German Government and German industry
to capitalize a multibillion dollar foundation to make payments
to those who worked as forced and slave laborers for German
companies during the Nazi era and to others who were injured
during World War II. He also helped stimulate the work of the
historical commissions of 19 nations, including the United
States, to examine their roles during the War and their
relationship to Holocaust-related assets.
Others have played an equally important role. Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Alan Larson has worked
with a wide range of civil society groups in the Department's
advisory group on international economic policy and the
transatlantic consumer dialog. He also plays an active role in
bringing the private business sector together with other civil
society groups to address issues ranging from foreign economic
policy to corporate responsibility. Robert Seiple, Ambassador
atLarge for International Religious Freedom, has worked closely
with advisory groups and religious organizations, as well as the
Commission on International Religious Freedom, to develop strategies to
expand religious freedom worldwide. David Scheffer, Ambassador at Large
for War Crimes Issues, has undertaken similar efforts along with
governments, intergovernmental entities, and NGO's dedicated to
accountability and justice for past abuses and prevention of future
atrocities. Joseph Onek, the Department of State's Global Rule of Law
Coordinator, has built partnerships with bar associations, ministries
of justice, judicial and prosecutorial training centers, and legal
academics to promote rule of law and legal institutions worldwide.
Theresa Loar, the Department's Senior Coordinator on Women's Issues and
Director of the President's Interagency Council on Women, has worked
closely with existing global networks to promote women's rights as
human rights leading to the fifth anniversary of the Beijing Women's
Conference. Sandra Polaski, the Secretary's Special Representative for
International Labor Affairs, has strengthened the connection between
the Department of State and the international labor movement by
regularly convening the Secretary's Advisory Committee on International
Labor Diplomacy and expanding the international labor function within
the Department of State.
Over the past 2 years, public-private transnational
networks also have helped advance and promote the cause of
democracy, as both a fundamental human right in itself and as a
means to greater protection for a wide range of human rights.
One of the most startling political changes of the post-Cold
War era has been the explosion in the number of democracies
worldwide: By most counts the number of democratic governments
expanded fourfold in the last quarter of the 20th Century, from
30 in 1974 to some 120 today. The U.S. Government's democracy-
promotion efforts have played an important role in bringing
about this fundamental revolution in the way most nations are
governed.
In 1999 U.S. democracy-promotion strategy set out upon four
new paths: Priority-setting; resource-matching; standard-
setting; and network-building. First, in an effort to give
greater priority in U.S. support to countries that are at
critical transition points in their movement toward democracy,
Secretary of State Albright designated four countries--
Colombia, Indonesia, Nigeria and Ukraine--as ``democracy
priority'' countries. Second, the Secretary used her
legislatively enhanced authority over the Agency for
International Development to gain greater oversight over the
assistance budgeting process, thereby seeking to channel more
resources directly to the democracy priority countries. Third,
to make clear that the right of democratic governance is not
simply a privilege or a luxury, the United States introduced a
resolution at the 55th Session of the United Nations Human
Rights Commission in Geneva that explicitly reaffirmed that
each individual has not just a hope of, but a right to,
democratic governance: the resolution passed by a margin of 51-
0, with only 2 member countries abstaining.
Fourth and finally, an impressive series of gatherings has
helped lay the groundwork for creating a worldwide community of
democracy activists and practitioners. In Mali, African
governments and democratic activists met with aid officials
from donor nations to discuss democratic development. In India,
the world's democratic NGO's gathered in the first meeting of
the ``Worldwide Movement for Democracy'' to discover shared
values that transcend regional, cultural, or religious
differences. In Yemen, small and emerging democracies met to
identify common concerns. In Romania, new and restored
democracies agreed on an agenda of action to support democracy
in international fora. In the Republic of Korea, activists
gathered at separate events to discuss the interrelationship
between democracy and economic growth and the need for a
network of Asian democrats. In Austria, Iceland, Northern
Ireland, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay, women from
government and NGO communities gathered at Vital Voices
conferences to promote greater political participation for
women in democratic dialog.
In the first months of 2000, U.S. democracy-promotion
efforts have expanded in two new directions. First, as
challenges to democratic governance have emerged in Paraguay,
Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, and Pakistan, the global democratic
network has worked to develop common strategies not just to
promote ``democratic advance,'' but also to combat ``democratic
backsliding.''
Second, to develop a full-fledged intergovernmental dialog
among those nations of the world committed to pursuing a
democratic path and to explore how best to strengthen
democratic institutions and processes, the foreign ministers of
Poland, the Czech Republic, Chile, India, the Republic of
Korea, Mali, and the United States have agreed to convene in
Warsaw, Poland, in June 2000 a meeting of the ``Community of
Democracies.'' This intergovernmental gathering should provide
an unprecedented opportunity for established, emerging, and
aspiring democracies to exchange experiences, to identify best
practices, and to formulate an agenda for international
cooperation in order to realize democracy's full potential.
Concurrent with the ministerial meeting, a number of
distinguished thinkers and path-breaking promoters of democracy
from around the world will gather in Warsaw to discuss
complementary issues and ideas. These representatives of
intellectual life and civil society will present to the
ministerial meeting their ideas as to how governments and
citizens can better work together to strengthenand preserve
democracy, thereby helping to strengthen the public-private regime
dedicated to democracy-promotion and preservation.
Transnational human rights and democracy networks also can
play an influential role in securing change within
international institutions. In recent years, the World Bank,
Regional Development Banks, and the United Nations Development
Program, with the support of the U.S. Government, all actively
have sought out dialog with a wide range of human rights and
democracy groups to integrate respect for human rights,
democratic governance, and the rule of law into their vision of
human development. Much of the work of the U.N. Commissions on
Human Rights and the Status of Women now takes place on the
margins of the formal sessions, in informal networking among
governments, and between NGO's and governments. Other U.N.
bodies, such as UNICEF, UNIFEM, and the offices of the U.N.
High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights frequently
seek out the counsel of networks of like-minded governments,
NGO's, and regional organizations, such as the European Union,
the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American
States, and the Organization for African Unity.
In addition in areas ranging from environmental protection
to human rights, corporations have begun to meet regularly not
only with unions but with broader transnational human rights
networks to identify how they can work together to solve
problems. Corporate social responsibility increasingly has been
accepted as a core tenet of global corporate citizenship,
generating gatherings from Davos to San Francisco to London, as
well as new networks of concern, including the new Global
Sullivan Principles, the Fair Labor Association, the Worker
Rights Consortium, the SA 8000 initiative, the ``No Sweat''
Initiative, and the Apparel Industry Partnership.
The U.S. Government has sought to encourage this trend by
interacting and building alliances with multinational
corporations that share a commitment has to establish a public-
private network devoted to human rights advancement. In
partnership with American companies, we have developed a set of
voluntary Model Business Principles; we also have worked with
the business and labor communities as well as the International
Labor Organization to promote 1998's Declaration on Core Labor
Standards. We are working closely with the garment and footwear
industries, trade unions, and community activists to combat the
still-too-pervasive reality of sweatshop labor at home and
abroad. Most recently, we have been exploring new ways to work
together with community activists, human rights NGO's, and
corporations working in the extractive industries to promote
human rights, support democratic institutions, and strengthen
the rule of law, particularly in the three democracy-priority
countries of Colombia, Indonesia, and Nigeria.
In every area, the work of the U.S. Government in
democracy, human rights, and labor is increasingly being done
not in isolation, but in partnership: Not just with other
public entities, such as governments and intergovernmental
organizations and international financial institutions, but
with private entities, such as human rights and humanitarian
NGO's; the media; labor unions; religious organizations; and
corporations and commercial entities. As the new millennium
unfolds, these transnational human rights networks will only
expand and flourish. As international commerce and
telecommunications continue to bind the world's peoples
together, the United States will remain committed to using the
universal language of human rights to build public-private
networks to promote democracy and human rights worldwide.
II. The Year in Review
Perhaps because there was no defining moment like the
collapse of the Berlin Wall, few analysts noticed that 1999 saw
as profound a positive trend toward freedom as 1989. Thanks to
democratic elections in Indonesia and Nigeria, two of the
world's most populous states, more people came under democratic
rule than in any other recent year, including 1989. In
addition, the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the international
intervention in East Timor demonstrated that the international
community has the will and the capacity to act against the most
profound violations of human rights.
Yet these significant gains in democracy and human rights
cannot overshadow the fact that the past year also saw a number
of profound challenges to human rights. Serbia's expulsion of
over 850,000 Albanians, the Indonesian military's complicity in
the militia rampage through East Timor, and the horrors
perpetrated by rebels in Sierra Leone all show that the world
still has a long way to go before it fully adheres to the
precepts of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In
addition, the coup in Pakistan and popular dissatisfaction in
Latin America clearly demonstrate that the road to democratic
governance is not without its problems and challenges. And
despite the gains in Nigeria and Indonesia, too many
authoritarian governments continue to deny basic human rights,
including the right to democracy, to their citizens. The
following sections highlight key developments over the past
year in human rights, democracy, and labor.
A. Developments in Human Rights
1. The Right to Democratic Dissent. Article One of the
United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders states
that ``Everyone hasthe right . . . to promote and to strive for
the protection and realization of human rights and fundamental
freedoms.'' All too often, we take this principle for granted. Yet each
year, dedicated human rights activists and democratic dissidents around
the world lose their lives defending this remarkable, transforming
idea. In a large number of the countries covered in this report, human
rights defenders and democratic dissidents face harassment,
imprisonment, disappearances, or torture; in some cases, the risk comes
from government sources. In many others, however, the risk is from
nongovernmental insurgent, terrorist, or criminal elements.
Certain countries seem to take particular pleasure in
restricting the right to democratic dissent. Take Serbia, where
the Government of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia President
Slobodan Milosevic initiated a brutal and indiscriminate police
and military crackdown against ethnic Albanian opponents in
Kosovo and sought to limit and suppress dissent closer to home.
The Kosovo campaign ended only after the international
community intervened militarily. Before and during the
conflict, Kosovar Albanians known to oppose the regime were
murdered, raped, disappeared, expelled, or detained in Serbian
prisons. In addition over 850,000 Kosovar Albanian civilians
were expelled forcibly to neighboring Albania, Montenegro, and
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Severe violations of
human rights, though less dramatic, also characterized the
situation in the Serbian heartland, where the regime muzzled
independent voices and forcibly dispersed citizens peaceably
protesting government policies.
Similarly in Cuba, the regime of Fidel Castro continued to
suppress opposition and criticism. Cuban authorities routinely
harass, threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and
defame human rights advocates and members of independent
professional associations, including journalists, economists,
doctors, and lawyers, often with the goal of coercing them into
leaving the country. The Government denied political dissidents
and human rights advocates due process and subjected them to
unfair trials. Many remained in prison at year's end. Although
the Government sought to discourage and thwart foreign contacts
with human rights activists, it did publicly state before the
Ibero-American Summit in November that visiting delegations
were free to meet with any person in the country, and about 20
dissidents met with 9 different delegations, including 3 heads
of state. Prior to the summit, however, authorities temporarily
detained a number of human rights activists to prevent them
from preparing for meetings with the visiting leaders.
In Asia, dissidents and defenders face a range of
challenges. In China, authorities broadened and intensified
their efforts to suppress those perceived to threaten
government power or national stability. Citizens who sought to
express openly dissenting political and religious views faced
widespread repression. In the weeks leading up to both June
4th, the 10th anniversary of the Tiananmen massacre, and
October 1st, the 50th anniversary of the founding of the
People's Republic, the Government moved against political
dissidents across the country, detaining and formally arresting
scores of activists in cities and provinces nationwide and
thwarting any attempts to use the anniversaries as
opportunities for protest. Authorities targeted members of the
China Democracy Party (CDP), which had already had three of its
leaders sentenced to lengthy prison terms in December 1998.
Beginning in May, dozens of CDP members were arrested in a
widening crackdown, and additional CDP leaders were convicted
of subversion and sentenced to long prison terms in closed
trials that flagrantly violated due process. Others were kept
detained for long periods without charge. In addition both
leaders and followers of the popular Falun Gong spiritual
movement faced harassment, beatings, arrest, detention, and in
some cases, sentences to prison terms for protesting the
Government's decision to outlaw their practice. Many not
formally arrested reportedly were sentenced administratively,
without trial, to up to 3 years in reeducation-through-labor
camps. By year's end, almost all of the key leaders of the CDP
were serving long prison terms, and only a handful of
dissidents nationwide dared to remain active publicly.
In North Korea, government repression is so severe that no
organized opposition to the regime is known to exist. The
Government regards almost any independent activity--including
listening to foreign broadcasts, writing letters, and
possessing ``reactionary'' printed matter--crimes against the
state. In Burma, the military junta intensified its systematic
use of coercion and intimidation to restrict further freedom of
association. Authorities undertook a sustained, systematic
campaign to destroy the National League for Democracy (NLD)
without formally banning it, pressuring thousands of NLD party
members to resign and closing NLD offices throughout the
country. Hundreds of prodemocracy activists remain in jail.
Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has had to constrain her
activities as a result of threats from the junta, which has
severely restricted her freedom of movement.
Dissidents and defenders in the former Soviet Union also
faced problems. In Belarus, two well-known opposition leaders
disappeared under mysterious circumstances. Government security
forces closely monitored human rights activists and arbitrarily
arrested, detained, and beat political opponents and average
citizens. Similarly in Uzbekistan, security forces arbitrarily
arrested or detained human rights activists, pious Muslims, and
other citizens on false charges. At least one human
rightsactivist died in prison, allegedly after not receiving adequate
medical care. In Turkmenistan, opposition figures and human rights
activists regularly face arbitrary arrest, prolonged pretrial
detention, unfair trials, and interference with privacy.
In the Middle East, dissidents and defenders had to contend
with similar difficulties. In Iraq, the regime of Saddam
Hussein continued to commit widespread, serious, and systematic
human rights abuses, summarily executing actual and perceived
political opponents. In Syria, the Government uses its vast
powers to quash all organized political opposition.
Defenders and dissidents in Africa also faced severe
challenges. In Sudan, despite the adoption of a new
Constitution through a referendum in June 1998, the Government
continues to restrict most civil liberties, including freedom
of assembly, association, religion, and movement. Government
security forces regularly tortured, beat, harassed, arbitrarily
arrested, and detained opponents or suspected opponents of the
Government, and they did so with impunity. Government forces
also were responsible for extrajudicial killings and
disappearances. In Equatorial Guinea, the Government encouraged
the illegal kidnaping and involuntary repatriation of political
opponents living abroad. There are no effective domestic human
rights NGO's, and in April the Government promulgated a new law
that further restricted NGO's and precluded them from
functioning in the area of human rights.
A growing trend around the world is the threat posed to
democratic dissent by nongovernmental insurgent, terrorist, or
criminal forces. In Colombia, for example, paramilitary forces,
some with links to the armed forces, were responsible for the
murder of numerous human rights activists as well as threats
against many others. Guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC) murdered three American indigenous
rights activists who had traveled to that country to work with
local indigenous leaders. In Sri Lanka, human rights defender
and Tamil parliamentarian Neelan Tiruchelvam was killed by a
suicide bomber believed to be linked with the separatist
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Some countries saw improvements in the treatment of
defenders and dissidents. Domestic human rights organizations
continued to play a significant and increasing role in securing
improved human rights conditions, although some NGO's reported
monitoring and interference by the authorities. In April the
Parliament repealed the 1963 Anti-Subversion Law, although it
subsequently incorporated six crimes specified in that law into
the Criminal Code. In March, the Habibie Government freed 52
political prisoners, and in December the Wahid Government freed
196 more. However, activists working in East and West Timor,
Aceh, and Papua (Irian Jaya) continued to face significant
restrictions on and interference in their activity.
A number of governments took the positive step of releasing
prominent defenders and dissidents. In Turkey, the Government
suspended for 6 months the sentence of former Human Rights
Association Chairman Akin Birdal, citing medical reasons
stemming from injuries Birdal sustained during a May 1998
attempt on his life. However, Birdal is subject to
reimprisonment to resume his sentence in March 2000 and also
faces many other charges. In Tunisia, the Government released
on early parole Tunisian Human Rights League Vice President
Khemais Ksila, who was arrested in September 1997 and convicted
on charges of defamation of the public order, dissemination of
false information, and inciting the public to violence. In
Morocco, political dissident Abraham Serfaty, who had been
exiled since 1991, was allowed to return. In Bhutan, the
Government released dissident and former government official
Tek Nath Rizal, who had been held for nearly 10 years. In
Russia, retired Russian naval captain and environmental
activist Aleksandr Nikitin was acquitted of espionage charges,
but his legal difficulties and official harassment continue.
The passport and visa services office has refused to issue him
an international passport, and the local tax police have called
him in for questioning, claiming that he owes personal income
tax on all funds that western organizations raised and spent on
his legal defense.
2. Human Rights in Countries in Conflict. Civilians
continue to endure human rights abuses, war crimes, and
violations of humanitarian law in those countries facing
internal insurgencies or civil war. Throughout the world,
insurgents, paramilitary forces, and government security,
military, and police forces used murder, rape, and inhumane
tactics to assert control over territory, to secure the
cooperation of civilians, and to silence opposition voices. As
was the case in previous years, tens of thousands of civilian
men, women, and children continued to die not only from
conflict, but also from premeditated campaigns intended to
instill terror among civilian populations.
Africa continues to be the locus of many of the world's
worst conflicts. In Sierra Leone, rebel forces committed
numerous egregious abuses, including murder, abduction,
deliberate mutilations, and rape. Progovernment militias also
committed abuses, albeit on a lesser scale. The rebels
continued their particularly vicious practice of cutting off
the ears, noses, hands, arms, and legs of noncombatants--
including small children and elderly women. Rebel forces
abducted missionaries, aid workers, U.N. personnel, and
journalists; ambushed humanitarian relief convoys; raided
refugee sites; and extorted and stole food. They abducted
children to use as soldiers and other civilians to serve as
forced laborers, sex slaves, andhuman shields. After the May
cease-fire, insurgents continued to commit abuses, although
significantly fewer were reported.
Continued civil conflict in the Democratic Republic of
Congo saw government forces lose control of more than half the
country's territory to rebels, who were often supported by
troops from other African countries. Government security forces
increasingly used arbitrary arrest and detention throughout the
year and were responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings,
disappearances, torture, beatings, rapes, and other abuses.
Rebel forces also committed serious abuses, including murder,
disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, rape, extortion,
robbery, harassment of human rights workers and journalists,
and recruitment of child soldiers.
In Angola, fighting between government and rebel forces led
to numerous, serious human rights abuses by both sides. In
Burundi, government forces killed both rebels and civilians,
including women, children, and the elderly. Rebel forces also
attacked and killed civilians. Rebel attacks on the military
often generated army reprisals against civilians suspected of
cooperating with the insurgents. At year's end, the army
forcibly relocated an estimated 330,000 Hutus in
``regroupment'' sites in an effort to stop rebel attacks. In
Uganda, insurgent groups, including the Lord's Resistance Army
and Allied Democratic Forces, killed, tortured, maimed, raped,
and abducted many persons (including children).
Other parts of the world were not immune to conflict. In
Serbia, Government military and security forces forcibly
expelled over 850,000 Kosovar Albanians from their homes. Many
women were raped in the process. The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is in the process of
investigating reports of 11,000 persons killed and buried in
529 mass graves and has indicted Yugoslav Federal President
Slobodan Milosevic and several other senior Government
officials for war crimes and crimes against humanity. At the
conclusion of the conflict, the international community assumed
responsibility for the administration of Kosovo; since then it
has had to contend both with Kosovar Albanian reprisals against
the rump Serbian population and Serb attacks against Albanians
in the remaining Serb enclaves.
In Russia, the seizure by armed insurgent groups from
Chechnya of villages in the neighboring republic of Dagestan
escalated by year's end into a full-fledged attack by Russian
forces on separatists in Chechnya, including the Chechen
capital of Groznyy. The Russian attack included air strikes and
the indiscriminate shelling of cities predominantly inhabited
by civilians. These attacks, which in turn led to house-to-
house fighting in Groznyy, led to the death of numerous
civilians and the displacement of hundreds of thousands more.
There are credible reports of Russian military forces carrying
out summary executions of civilians in Alkhan-Yurt and in the
course of the Groznyy offensive. As this report was going to
press, there were credible reports that Russian forces were
rounding up Chechen men of military age and sending them to
``filtration'' camps, where they allegedly were tortured. The
Russian Government has a duty to protect its citizens from
terrorist attacks but must comply with its international
commitments and obligations to protect civilians and must not
engage in extrajudicial killing, the blocking of borders to
prevent civilians from fleeing, and other violations in the
name of internal security. Chechen separatists also reportedly
committed abuses, including the killing of civilians.
Afghanistan suffered its 20th consecutive year of civil war
and political instability. Both the ultraconservative movement
known as the Taliban (which controls roughly 90 percent of the
country) and the United Front for Afghanistan (also known as
the Northern Alliance) committed serious human rights abuses,
particularly against women and girls, in the areas they
occupied and during their attempts to conquer territory. Both
also were responsible for the indiscriminate bombardment of
civilians. Years of conflict have left an estimated 2.6 million
Afghans living outside the country as refugees, while another
250,000 are internally displaced.
In Indonesia, civil conflict and violence continued or
worsened despite the country's relatively successful struggle
to move from dictatorship to democracy. A variety of motives
drove the violence. Dissatisfaction that had remained pent up
under the long-time rule of Soeharto boiled over under
successor Governments. Anger at Indonesian military, security,
and police units only fed widespread popular support for
independence in East Timor, Aceh, and Papua (Irian Jaya). In
Aceh, military forces and police committed numerous abuses,
including extrajudicial killings, excessive force,
disappearances, rape, arbitrary arrest, and detention without
trial. Military forces sometimes resorted to force in order to
disrupt peaceful demonstrations. Thousands of Acehnese
residents fled their villages during various security
crackdowns against separatist groups. In addition, dozens of
low-level civil servants, police, and military personnel were
murdered and abducted, most likely by separatists. In Ambon and
throughout Maluku, fighting between Moslems and Christians left
more than 1,000 dead by the end of the year. In West
Kalimantan, more than 200 persons died in fighting pitting
Madurese immigrants against indigenous Dayak and Melayu groups.
In East Timor, paramilitary units supported by or under the
control of the Indonesian military went on a rampage of
violence, looting, and destruction after a United Nations-
sponsoredreferendum saw more than 78 percent of Timorese vote
for independence. Elements of the Indonesian security forces and the
prointegration militias (which were armed and largely supported by the
military) were responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings. In
September hundreds of persons were killed in a wave of military-
sponsored militia violence after the announcement of the
proindependence vote. Over 250,000 East Timorese fled the violence.
Violations included summary executions, massacres, rapes, deportations,
and the destruction of property. Both an International Commission of
Inquiry and an investigative commission established by the Indonesian
Human Rights Commission subsequently concluded that the Indonesian
military failed to stop, colluded in, or participated in the violence.
In the early part of the year, proindependence groups also committed
serious abuses, including killings.
In Sri Lanka, the Government's conflict with the separatist
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) continued to result in
serious human rights abuses by both sides. Government security
forces committed extrajudicial killings and at least 15
individuals disappeared from their custody. The Government did
begin to investigate allegations that as many as 400 Tamils
killed by security forces were buried in multiple graves in the
town of Chemmani. Two exhumations recovered 15 bodies, but
authorities have not yet sought criminal indictments against
security forces in relation to the killings. LTTE forces were
responsible for extrajudicial executions, disappearances,
torture, arbitrary arrests, and detentions. LTTE attacks and
suicide bombings killed close to 100 civilians, and at least 14
persons who were found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-
described courts were executed publicly.
In Colombia, despite the Government's efforts to negotiate
an end to hostilities, widespread internal armed conflict and
rampant political and criminal violence persisted. Government
security forces, paramilitary groups, guerrillas, and narcotics
traffickers all continued to commit numerous serious abuses,
including extrajudicial killings and torture. Throughout the
country, paramilitary groups killed, tortured, and threatened
civilians suspected of sympathizing with guerrillas in an
orchestrated campaign to terrorize them into fleeing their
homes. These groups were responsible for numerous massacres.
Guerrillas regularly attacked civilian populations, kidnapped
numerous individuals, committed massacres and summary
executions, killed medical and religious personnel, and
forcibly recruited civilians (including children). The
Government took important steps toward ending collaboration by
some security force members with the paramilitaries. President
Pastrana, Vice President Bell, and members of the military high
command declared repeatedly that collaboration--whether by
commission or omission--by members of the security forces with
paramilitary groups would not be tolerated. The President
removed from service four generals and numerous mid-level
officers and noncommissioned officers for collaboration, for
failing to confront paramilitaries aggressively, or for failing
to protect the local population.
3. Religious Freedom. In September the Department of State
delivered to Congress the first Annual Report on International
Religious Freedom. The Department carries a statutory
responsibility to prepare these reports annually. The Report
sought to create a comprehensive record of the state of
religious freedom around the world and to highlight the most
significant violations of this right. The Report demonstrates
that violations of religious freedom, including religious
persecution, are not confined to any one country, religion, or
nationality. Throughout the world, Baha'is, Buddhists,
Christians, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, and other believers continue
to suffer for their faith.
Too much of the world's population still lives in countries
in which religious freedom is restricted or prohibited.
Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes remain determined to
control religious belief and practice. Other regimes are
hostile to minority or ``unapproved'' religions. Some tolerate,
and thereby encourage, persecution or discrimination. Still
other governments have adopted discriminatory legislation or
policies that give preferences to favored religions while
disadvantaging others. Some democratic states have
indiscriminately identified minority religions as dangerous
``sects'' or ``cults.''
The International Religious Freedom Act also required the
President or his designee (in this case the Secretary of State)
to use the Annual Report on International Religious Freedom and
other resources to identify those countries where the
government has engaged in or tolerated ``severe'' or
``particularly severe'' violations of religious freedom. In
October Secretary Albright informed Congress that she was
designating five ``Countries of Particular Concern'': Burma,
China, Iran, Iraq, and Sudan. The Secretary also informed
Congress that she was identifying as particularly severe
violators the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the Government
of Serbia. This last action was not taken under the auspices of
the International Religious Freedom Act because the United
States does not regard the Taliban as a government or Serbia as
a country as envisioned by the act.
In Burma, the Government arrests and imprisons Buddhist
monks who promote human and political rights. Security forces
destroyed or looted churches, mosques, and Buddhist monasteries
in some insurgent ethnic minority areas. In some insurgent
China ethnic minority areas, security forces used coercive
measures to induce Christians to convert to Buddhism.
China continued to restrict freedom of religion and
intensified controls on some unregistered churches. Unapproved
religious groups, including Protestant and Catholic groups,
continued to experience varying degrees of official
interference, repression, and persecution. The Government
continued to enforce 1994 State Council regulations requiring
all places of religious activity to register with the
Government and come under the supervision of official,
``patriotic'' religious organizations. In some areas,
authorities guided by national policy made strong efforts to
control the activities of unapproved Catholic and Protestant
churches; religious services were broken up and church leaders
or adherents were harassed, fined, detained, and at times,
beaten. According to reports, there were instances of torture.
At year's end, some remained in prison because of their
religious activities, while others remained unaccounted for. In
Tibet, the Government expanded and intensified its ``patriotic
education campaign'' aimed at controlling monasteries and
expelling supporters of the Dalai Lama, increasing pressure on
Tibetan Buddhists. Controls on religious freedom in Xinjiang
also remained tight. The Government also launched a crackdown
against the Falun Gong spiritual movement in July. Tens of
thousands of Falun Gong members reportedly were detained in
outdoor stadiums and forced to sign statements disavowing the
Falun Gong before being released.
In Iran, the Government committed numerous human rights
abuses based in part on religion. Religious minorities, in
particular Bahais, continued to suffer repression by
conservative elements of the judiciary and security
establishment. Thirteen Jews were arrested in February and
March on suspicion of espionage on behalf of Israel, an offense
punishable by death, leading to charges of anti-Semitism. In
Iraq, the Government of Saddam Hussein has conducted a campaign
of murder, summary execution and protracted arbitrary arrest
against the religious leaders and adherents of the Shia Muslim
population. Security forces have murdered senior Shia clerics,
desecrated mosques and holy sites, and arrested untold numbers
of Shi'a. In Sudan, discrimination and violence against
religious minorities persisted. Government security forces
harassed and detained persons on the basis of their religion.
Eyewitnesses reported aerial bombardments of Christians,
Muslims, and animists in the Nuba Mountains. Government-
supported forces conducted raids, abducted persons--including
women and children--and sold them into slavery. Many non-
Muslims were converted forcibly to Islam.
In Afghanistan, the ultraconservative movement known as the
Taliban, which controls about 90 percent of the country,
enforced their interpretation of Islamic law through
punishments such as public executions for adultery or murder
and amputations of one hand and one foot for theft. Taliban
militiamen often judged accused offenders and meted out
punishments, such as beatings, on the spot. In Serbia, a
predominantly Christian Orthodox country, authorities employed
killing, torture, rape, and the forced mass emigration of
Kosovar Albanians, who are overwhelmingly Muslim, in an effort
to drive them from the country.
Other countries also saw significant violations of
religious freedom. In Saudi Arabia, neither the Government nor
society in general accepts the concept of separation of
religion and state. The religious police enforce adherence to
Islamic norms, intimidating, abusing, and detaining citizens
and foreigners. In Pakistan, both the pre and postcoup
Governments, as well as sectarian groups, continued to
discriminate against religious minorities, particularly Ahmadis
and Christians. Three Ahmadis sentenced in 1997 to life in
prison for blasphemy remain incarcerated. Religious and ethnic-
based rivalries resulted in numerous killings and civil
disturbances. In India, there was widespread intercaste and
communal violence.
In Uzbekistan, the Government harassed and arrested
hundreds of Islamic leaders and believers on questionable
grounds, citing the threat of extremism. While the Government
tolerated the existence of some Christian denominations and
even facilitated their registration, its laws still have the
potential to limit the activity of some evangelical Christian
groups. In Vietnam, the Government arbitrarily arrested and
detained citizens for the peaceful expression of their
religious views. The Government significantly restricts the
operation of religious organizations other than those approved
by the State.
In countries such as Indonesia, the problem was not
government repression, but communal violence. In Maluku
province, fighting principally involved Muslims and Christians
(mostly Protestants). More than a thousand died and tens of
thousands were displaced. Clashes began in the provincial
capital of Ambon in January, then spread to neighboring
islands. Economic tensions between native Christians and
Muslims who migrated to Maluku in recent decades were a
significant factor. Christian and Muslim communities in Maluku
blamed each other for initiating and perpetuating the violence.
Exhaustive mediation efforts, including an initiative launched
by the Indonesian military in April, failed to secure a durable
peace.
In Azerbaijan, the news was better. President Aliyev
publicly took law enforcement and security officials to task
for the harassment of religious believers. He also pledged that
such abuse would not continue and that violators would be
punished. The Government rescinded deportation orders for
foreign religious workers, secured the reinstatement of
believers who had lost their jobs, and prosecuted members of a
local police force accused of harassment.
4. Press Freedom and the Information Revolution. Attacks on
independent media--whether print, broadcast, or electronic--
remained commonplace. Journalists continued to risk harassment,
arrest, and even death to report the news. Murder remained the
leading cause of job-related deaths among journalists
worldwide. A wide range of governments throughout the world
continue to utilize a variety of tools, including licensing,
limits on access to newsprint, control over government
advertising, jamming, and censorship, to inhibit independent
voices. The growth of new, Internet-based media did help
facilitate public access to a wide range of information, but
some governments continued to develop means to monitor e-mail
and Internet use and restrict access to controversial,
political, news-oriented, and human rights web sites. Other
governments have chosen to prohibit Internet access or limit it
to political elites.
In China, control and manipulation of the press by the
Government for political purposes increased during the year.
After authorities moved at the end of 1998 to close a number of
newspapers and fire several editors, the press and publishing
industries were more cautious. Nonetheless, the press continued
to report on cases of corruption and abuse of power by some
local officials. As part of its crackdown against the Falun
Gong, the Government used the state-controlled media to conduct
a nationwide propaganda campaign. By some estimates, as many as
8.9 million Chinese citizens had access to the Internet, but
the Government increased its efforts to try to restrict
information available on the Internet and to monitor usage.
In Cuba, the Castro regime continued to tightly control
access to information. In February the National Assembly passed
the Law to Protect National Independence and the Economy, which
outlaws possession and dissemination of ``subversive''
literature or information that could be used by U.S.
authorities in the application of U.S. legislation. The
Government has not yet charged anyone under the new law, but
many independent journalists have been threatened with arrest,
some repeatedly. National Assembly President Ricardo Alarcon
told foreign correspondents that even reporters working for
accredited foreign media could be sentenced to up to 20 years
in prison under the new law. The Government continued to
subject independent journalists to internal travel bans,
arbitrary and periodic brief detentions, small acts of
repudiation, harassment, seizures of office and photographic
equipment, and repeated threats of prolonged imprisonment. The
Government tightly controls access to computers, limiting
access to the Internet to certain Government offices, selected
institutes, and foreigners.
In Serbia, the Government of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
President Slobodan Milosevic continues to harass and detain
journalists and shut down their newspapers and radio stations.
At least one journalist was murdered under suspicious
circumstances. In Serbia's sister republic of Montenegro,
however, the Government worked to provide a hospitable working
environment to independent media, including media that were
harassed, threatened, or shut down by Serbian authorities.
In Ethiopia, fewer journalists were detained than in
previous years, but at least eight remained in detention at
year's end. Some 45 journalists obtained bail during the year
but still are subject to trial. In Peru, the Government
inhibits freedom of speech and of the press. Journalists faced
increased government harassment and intimidation and practiced
a great degree of self-censorship.
In Ukraine, the Government increasingly interfered with
freedom of the press, most notably in the period before the
October presidential elections. Government authorities stepped
up pressure on the media, particularly broadcast outlets,
through tax inspections and other measures. In Russia,
journalists complained of increasing governmental interference.
In mid-January 2000, Russian authorities detained Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent Andrey Babitskiy and held
him incommunicado, but they did not make public his detention
until the end of the month. On February 3, the Government
claimed that Russian forces had turned Babitskiy over to
Chechen forces in exchange for Russian soldiers; neither
Babitskiy's wife nor his employer has heard from him since, and
his whereabouts remain unknown.
In Turkey, Parliament suspended for 3 years the sentences
of writers and journalists convicted of crimes involving
freedom of expression through the media. By the end of the
year, at least 25 had been released. However, the law did not
apply to crimes committed through speech, and human rights
observers and some released writers said the conditions for the
suspension amount to censorship. Limits on freedom of speech
and of the press remained a serious problem. Authorities banned
or confiscated publications and raided newspaper offices, and
security forces occasionally beat journalists. Police continued
to interfere with the distribution of some Kurdish newspapers,
and radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish remained
illegal. Although Kurdish music recordings were widely
available, bans on certain songs and singers persisted. The
Committee to Protect Journalists estimated at year's end that
at least 18 journalists remain in prison.
5. Women. The plight of women in Afghanistan continued to
be the most serious women's human rights crisis in the world
today. Taliban discrimination against women and girls remained
both systematic and institutionally sanctioned. The Taliban
imposed strict dress codes and restricted women from working
outside the home except in very limited circumstances such
ashealth care and humanitarian assistance. They also severely
restricted women's and girls' access to many levels and types of
education. The impact of Taliban restrictions is most acutely felt in
cities such as Kabul and Herat, where there are a number of educated
and professional women.
Elsewhere, women continue to face a wide range of human
rights abuses. On a daily basis, women faced violence, abuse,
rape, and other forms of degradation by their spouses and by
members of society at large. Women suffer domestic violence in
most if not all countries around the world. Many governments
still fail to act against ``honor killings,'' domestic
violence, and even rape. In Nigeria, for example, the law
allows a husband to ``chastise'' his wife, as long as it does
not result in ``grievous harm.'' In China, many women contended
with domestic violence. Coercive family planning practices
sometimes included forced abortion and forced sterilization.
Trafficking and prostitution continued. In India, Bangladesh,
and Nepal, dowry-related violence remained a serious problem.
In Egypt, India, Iran, Oman, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Yemen, and a number of other societies where religion and
tradition play a predominant role, societal and cultural
constraints kept women in a subordinate position.
In Kuwait, women do not have the right to vote or seek
election to the National Assembly. Although the ruling Amir
issued a decree in May which sought to give women the right to
vote, to seek election to the National Assembly beginning with
the parliamentary election scheduled for 2003, and to hold
cabinet office, the Parliament vetoed it on constitutional
grounds. Subsequent identical legislation introduced by Members
of Parliament was defeated by a two-vote margin.
Female genital mutilation, which has negative, life-long
health consequences for women and girls, continues to be
practiced in much of Sub-Saharan Africa, and to varying degrees
in some countries in the Middle East, including Egypt, Oman,
and Yemen. Trafficking of women and children remains endemic in
many parts of the world; in response, the Department of State
has for the first time established a separate section in each
Country Report to highlight U.S. concern about this serious
problem (see Section C.2 below).
6. Protection of Minorities. In some states, majorities in
power choose to mistreat or persecute those not like
themselves. However, persecution and discrimination is not
confined to states but also can be present in societies. Much
remains to be done on the national level, and far too many
governments do not grant individuals their rights because of
race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social status. In
many cases, such repression inevitably leads to violence and
separatism.
In China, for example, particularly serious human rights
abuses persisted in minority areas, especially in Tibet and
Xinjiang, where restrictions on religion and other fundamental
freedoms intensified. Some minority groups, particularly
Tibetan Buddhists and Muslim Uighurs, came under increasing
pressure as the Government clamped down on dissent and
``separatist'' activities. In Tibet, the Government expanded
and intensified its continuing ``patriotic education campaign''
aimed at controlling the monasteries and expelling supporters
of the Dalai Lama. In Xinjiang, where violence between the
Government and separatist forces has escalated since 1996,
authorities tightened restrictions on religion and other
fundamental freedoms in an effort to control independence
groups.
In Serbia, discrimination and violence against Kosovar
Albanians, Muslims, Roma, and other religious and ethnic
minorities worsened during the year. The Milosevic regime's
oppressive policies toward Kosovo's ethnic Albanians imperiled
prospects for interethnic cooperation and encouraged a
separatist insurgency. In response, the regime launched a
brutal police and military crackdown against the insurgents,
which escalated into a full-fledged campaign of ethnic
cleansing against civilians. As many as 850,000 Kosovars fled
the province for squalid camps in neighboring states. After
diplomatic intervention failed to resolve the matter, NATO
forces began an air campaign against the Serbian regime. In
June Serbia withdrew its forces from Kosovo, and the
international community assumed responsibility for the
province's administration. Since then, international
peacekeeping forces have had to contend both with Kosovar
Albanian reprisals against the rump Serbian population, and
Serb attacks against Albanians in remaining Serb enclaves.
Although the erection of a wall to separate Roma from their
neighbors in the Czech city of Usti nad Labem captured
international attention, the problems facing Roma and Sinti
populations in Europe went far beyond the building of a wall.
Both populations suffer disproportionately from poverty,
unemployment, and other socioeconomic ills. In many countries,
particularly in Central and Southeastern Europe, they face
prejudice, discrimination, and abuse.
7. The Holocaust: Completing the Historical Record.
Spearheaded by Deputy Treasury Secretary Stuart Eizenstat in
his capacity as Special Representative of the President and
Secretary of State on Holocaust-era issues, the United States
promoted further international recognition of the need for
justice and remembrance for the victims of the greatest human
rights violation of the 20th Century, the Holocaust. German
industry and government pledged DM10 billion to capitalize a
foundation that, among other things, will make payments to
those who worked as forced and slave laborers for German
companies during the Nazi era.Nineteen nations, including the
United States, have established Holocaust Commissions to review their
own involvement with Holocaust-era assets. Consistent with the 1998
Washington Conference on Art Principles, millions of dollars worth of
art stolen by the Nazis are being returned to rightful owners. At the
Stockholm International Forum in January 2000, the United States, along
with over 40 other governments, made an unprecedented common political
commitment to strengthening Holocaust education, remembrance and
research activities, and to opening archives bearing on the Holocaust.
B. Developments in Democracy
1. Democracies Under Threat. In The Third Wave, his seminal
study of democratization, Samuel Huntington warned that the
wave of democratization that began with Portugal in 1974 (and
continues today) might suffer significant reversals in
countries where conditions for democracy are weak. Over the
past year, the number of democracies around the world continued
to grow, but a small number of countries on the path to
democracy saw reversals or threats to democratic governance.
This trend was particularly notable in Latin America, where
elected governments in Ecuador and Paraguay confronted
attempted coups or instability, and an elected government in
Peru undermined democratic governance by concentrating power in
the executive. In Ecuador, what could have been a disastrous
coup became instead an unfortunate but ultimately
constitutional succession. Indigenous activists, with the
support of elements of the military, occupied the Ecuadorian
Congress building, demanded the resignation of President Jamil
Mahuad and attempted to replace him with a three-person junta
that included an indigenous leader, a former Supreme Court
judge, and a military officer. To end the institutional crisis,
President Mahuad asked Ecuadorians to support Vice President
Gustavo Noboa as his constitutional successor. The National
Assembly confirmed the change in presidents the same day.
In Paraguay, President Raul Cubas Grau, a protege of
retired General and coup plotter Lino Oviedo, sought to
undercut the constitutional authority of the legislative and
judicial branches. In March, Cubas' foe and Vice President Luis
Maria Argana was assassinated, allegedly by Oviedo supporters.
On March 28, after widespread demonstrations against Cubas and
Oviedo, Cubas resigned, and Oviedo fled Paraguay. Senate
president Luis Gonzalez Macchi assumed the presidency, forming
a national unity Government that included, for the first time
in 50 years, the two major opposition parties. By the end of
the year, however, the Government faced economic difficulties,
rural unrest, and increasing opposition.
In Peru, a dominant executive branch often uses its control
of the legislature and the judiciary to the detriment of the
democratic process. The Constitutional Tribunal has not
functioned effectively since 1997, when Congress removed three
of its members for opposing an interpretation of a law
permitting President Fujimori to run for a third consecutive
term. In Venezuela, President Hugo Chavez Frias, the leader of
an attempted coup in 1992, was elected President on a promise
of radical reform, including constitutional change through the
election of a National Constitutional Assembly (ANC). In April,
voters overwhelmingly approved his referendum, giving the ANC a
6-month mandate to rewrite the Constitution. The ANC, which was
dominated by Chavez's political party, drafted a new
constitution, which was approved by voters in December. At
year's end some observers remained concerned that too much
power was being concentrated in Chavez's hands.
In other parts of the world, the main threat to democracy
came from the military. In Pakistan, Army Chief of Staff
General Pervaiz Musharraf overthrew the elected civilian
Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in an October
bloodless coup. Musharraf, in consultation with senior military
commanders, designated himself Chief Executive, and suspended
the Constitution, the National Assembly, the Senate, and the
provincial assemblies. Despite repeated promises to restore
democracy, Musharraf at year's end had not established either a
timetable or milestones; his decision early in 2000 to require
judges to swear a loyalty oath to the military (rather than the
Constitution) further distanced his regime from a return to
democratic rule.
In Cote d'Ivoire, retired General Robert Guei took over the
Government after a mutiny that began in December evolved into a
major military revolt and culminated in the dismissal and
forced departure of President Henri Konan Bedie. The Guei
regime arrested numerous Government ministers and military
officers; by year's end, it had released all except 40. Guei
has pledged to rewrite the Constitution, clean up government
corruption, and hold fair and transparent elections.
2. Free and Fair Elections. According to Freedom House,
there were 120 democracies at the end of 1999, a net increase
of 3 over the previous year, and the largest number ever. As
noted above, however, this trend away from dictatorship saw
several reversals, most notably in Pakistan. Although Indonesia
and Nigeria, two of the world's most populous states, made
great strides toward democratic rule, a number of other states
saw tainted or flawed elections stall their transitions to
democracy.
Indonesia made significant progress in its transition from
authoritarian to democratic rule. In June, the country held its
first pluralistic, competitive, free, and fair
parliamentaryelections in 43 years. A new Parliament (DPR) and People's
Consultative Assembly (MPR) were installed on October 1st. In
accordance with constitutional procedures, the MPR subsequently
elected, in a transparent balloting procedure, Abdurrahman Wahid as
President, and Megawati Soekarnoputri as Vice President.
In Nigeria, the military regime of General Abdulsalami
Abubakar completed its transition to democratic civilian rule
with the election and subsequent May inauguration of retired
General Olusegun Obasanjo as President. In accordance with
Abubakar's transition program, members of the new civilian
Government were chosen in four elections held over a 3-month
period. Elections for local Government leaders were held in
December 1998, those for state legislators and governors in
January, and those for national legislators and president in
February. The elections, most notably the presidential
election, were flawed, but most observers agreed that the
election of Obasanjo as President reflected the will of the
majority of voters.
Several states saw limited gains. In Tunisia, the October
presidential and legislative elections marked a modest step
toward democratic development, with opposition presidential
candidates allowed to participate in the presidential race for
the first time in Tunisia's history. However, the campaign and
election processes greatly favored the ruling party, and there
was wide disregard for the secrecy of the vote. In Niger,
President Ibrahim Mainassara Bare, who overthrew a
democratically elected Government in 1996, was assassinated in
January by members of his presidential guard. A group of
military officers led by Major Daouda Malam Wanke asserted
control over the Government and announced a 9-month transition
to a democratically elected Government. In July citizens voted
to approve a new Constitution. In November they voted for a new
National Assembly and for a new President; Tandja Mamadou was
elected President with 60 percent of the vote in an election
that was considered by international observers to be generally
free and fair.
Other countries were not as successful in their
transitions. In Belarus, Aleksandr Lukashenko's legal term as
President expired in July. He had extended arbitrarily his term
of office until 2001 after the illegal 1996 constitutional
referendum. In Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev was elected in
January to a new 7-year term in an election that fell far short
of international standards. Parliamentary elections held in
October were an improvement over the presidential election but
still fell short of international standards. In Azerbaijan, the
country's first-ever municipal elections held in December, were
marred by a nearly universal pattern of interference by local
officials, which allowed them to control the selection of the
election committees that supervised the election. In Armenia,
irregularities marred both the May parliamentary elections and
the October local elections. OSCE observers categorized the
parliamentary elections as a step toward compliance with OSCE
commitments, but said that they still failed to meet
international standards.
In Haiti, a prolonged stalemate between President Rene
Preval and the opposition-controlled legislature prevented the
holding of elections in autumn 1998 to replace the Parliament
as legally required. Preval announced that he would not
recognize Parliament's decision to extend its incumbents'
mandates until new elections could be held, thereby leaving the
country without a functioning legislative branch for over a
year. In March, Prime Minister Alexis formed a cabinet after
negotiations with the five-party opposition coalition. Due to
the absence of a parliament, the new ministers took office
without being confirmed. The international community is
assisting Haiti in preparations for new elections, scheduled
for March and April 2000, with the goal of restoring the lapsed
democratic institutions.
In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni, elected to a 5-year
term in 1996 under the 1995 Constitution, continued to dominate
the Government. The 1995 Constitution formally extended the
one-party movement form of government for 5 years and severely
restricted political activity. Although Museveni supporters
remained in control of the legislative branch, Parliament acted
with increasing independence and assertiveness during the year.
A national referendum on whether to allow multipartyism again
is scheduled for 2000.
3. Civil Society. In many nations, civil society--that
broad array of nongovernmental organizations, clubs, societies,
trade unions, and political parties that are the domestic
counterparts to transnational networks--played an increasingly
influential role. Although some critics have warned that the
emergence of the Internet culture would stunt social
interaction, civil society groups showed no sign of slowing
down at year's end, and as noted above, many were taking
advantage of technological developments to establish new
transnational networks of common interest and concern.
Many governments continue to seek means to limit, repress,
or shut down the growth and development of civil society, which
they regard as a profound threat to their authoritarian rule.
In Belarus, for example, Government restrictions prevent an
embryonic civil society from developing further. The security
services infringed on citizens' privacy rights and monitored
closely the activities of opposition politicians and other
segments of the population. Restrictions on freedom of speech,
the press, and peaceful assembly continued, and the Government
did not respect freedom of association.
In Iraq, then-U.N. Special Rapporteur for Iraq Max Van der
Stoel noted in his February and October reports that freedom of
speech, press, assembly, movement, and association do not
exist. The Government effectively has eliminated the civil
rights to life, liberty, and physical integrity and the
freedoms of thought, expression, association and assembly. In
Cuba, the Government denied citizens the freedoms of speech,
press, assembly, and association. Authorities routinely harass,
threaten, arbitrarily arrest, detain, imprison, and defame
members of independent associations, including human rights
advocates, journalists, economists, doctors, and lawyers, often
with the goal of coercing them into leaving the country.
In China, an unknown number of persons, estimated at
several thousand, have been detained for peacefully expressing
their political, religious, or social views. Persons or groups
seeking to promote political change, monitor human rights, or
in any way challenge the authority of the Communist Party were
repressed, their leaders often harassed, beaten, and jailed. At
the same time, most average citizens went about their daily
lives without significant interference from the Government,
enjoying looser economic controls, increased access to outside
sources of information, greater room for individual choice, and
more diversity in cultural life. Social groups with economic
resources at their disposal continued to play an increasing
role in community life. Pilot experiments with contested local
village elections continued.
In Malaysia, a U.N. Special Rapporteur reported that the
Government systematically curtailed freedom of expression.
Government restrictions and proliferating slander and libel
suits stifled freedom of speech, and the Government
significantly restricted freedom of movement, association, and
assembly. The Government prohibited some peaceful gatherings,
prevented students from participating in some political
activities, and regularly and harshly criticizes domestic NGO's
that venture into the political arena.
In Turkey, which has an active and growing civil society
movement, the Government still continued to limit freedom of
assembly and association, and police harassed, beat, abused,
and detained a large number of demonstrators. The Saturday
Mothers, who had held weekly vigils in Istanbul for more than 3
years to protest the disappearances of their relatives,
discontinued their gatherings this year in the face of ongoing
police harassment, abuse, and detention of the group's members.
In general, the Government continued to harass, intimidate,
indict, and imprison individuals for ideas that they had
expressed in public forums. However, there were some signs of a
growing tolerance for civil society: State Minister Irtemcelik
and President Demirel met with NGO's, and one office of a human
rights NGO reopened in October after being closed for 5 years.
4. Rule of Law. All too often, authoritarian governments
insist that they respect the rule of law when in fact they
abuse the law to justify their rule. In far too many
countries--Belarus, Burma, Cuba, Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam, for example--
absolute rulers use the legal system to serve their own
interests. Without the rule of law, these leaders violate human
rights with impunity, suspend democracy, void contracts, and
engage in corrupt practices. Governments that respect the rule
of law have transparent and fair legal systems that feature
professional and independent judges who act as final arbiters
of the law.
In China, abuses included instances of extrajudicial
killings, torture, and other mistreatment of prisoners, forced
confessions, arbitrary arrest and detention, lengthy
incommunicado detention, and denial of due process. In many
cases, particularly in sensitive political cases, the judicial
system denies criminal defendants basic legal safeguards and
due process. A number of statutes passed in recent years hold
the potential to enhance citizens' rights. If fully
implemented, these laws would bring criminal laws closer toward
compliance with international norms. However, the new statutes
are violated routinely in cases involving political dissidents.
In Malaysia, police continued to use certain provisions of
the legal code to detain some individuals without trial or
charge. Prolonged pretrial detention occurs in some cases. The
police were criticized for reports of physical abuse of
prisoners and other citizens, although the number of police
extrajudicial killings declined during the year. Many observers
expressed serious concern about the decreasing independence and
impartiality of the judiciary and about apparently politically
motivated selective prosecution by the Attorney General.
In Pakistan, rule of law problems were rampant both before
and after the October coup. The judiciary was subject to
executive and other outside influence and suffers from
inadequate resources, inefficiency, and corruption. The former
Sharif Government used special antiterrorism courts to try the
crimes of murder, gang rape, child molestation, and ``illegal''
strikes. After the coup, General Musharraf illegally detained a
number of political figures from the Sharif Government and
their families.
In Algeria, the authorities did not always respect
defendants' rights to due process, and security forces
committed extrajudicial killings, tortured detainees, and
arbitrarily detained many individuals suspected of involvement
with armed Islamist groups. However, there were no reports of
new disappearances during the year in which the security forces
were suspected. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trial
delaysare problems, as are illegal searches and infringements
on citizens' privacy rights.
In Peru, arbitrary arrest, prolonged pretrial detention,
lack of due process, and lengthy trial delays remained
problems. In July, the Government announced its withdrawal from
the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
after the Court determined that Peru had failed to provide due
process in the case of four Chileans convicted by a military
tribunal of treason. In Haiti, the judiciary remained plagued
by understaffing, inadequate resources, and in many cases,
corrupt and untrained judges. Judicial dockets remain clogged,
and fair and expeditious trials are the exception rather than
the rule. In a number of key cases, the executive branch
continued to detain persons in defiance of release orders
issued by judges. The 5-year-old Haitian National Police
continues to benefit from international assistance, but it is
grappling with problems of excessive use of force and other
human rights abuses, including a marked increase over last year
in the number of extrajudicial killings. Arbitrary arrest and
detention and prolonged pretrial detention also remained
problems.
Several countries saw positive developments in the rule of
law. In Israel, a September decision by the High Court of
Justice resulted in a significant reduction in the number of
abuses committed by members of the security forces during the
interrogation of security prisoners. In Cambodia, the
Government withdrew a draft NGO law that had been criticized
for its potential to place NGO's under arbitrary and severe
restrictions on their ability to operate.
In Colombia, the Pastrana administration took measures to
initiate structural reform and strengthen the rule of law. In
July, the regional ``anonymous'' court system was abolished and
replaced with a new specialized jurisdiction. In August,
Congress passed a military penal reform bill that, while not
yet implemented, is expected to correct some of the worst
abuses in the military justice system and to be of great help
in the fight against impunity. Thanks to the diligent efforts
of the Prosecutor General's Human Rights Unit, a number of
security force members were investigated, prosecuted, and
convicted of past human rights violations. Impunity, although
still widespread, is no longer total. Nonetheless, the civilian
judiciary remains inefficient, overburdened by a large case
backlog, and undermined by intimidation.
C. Developments in Labor
1. Worker Rights. Throughout the year, the impact of
globalization on worker rights was the subject of serious
discussion in many international forums. The World Trade
Organization (WTO) Ministerial in Seattle saw a transnational
network of human rights, environmental, and labor organizations
focus debate on public concern that workers and their families,
particularly in developing countries, receive a fair share of
the benefits derived from the global economy. In response, the
United States sought to win support for a proposal calling for
establishment of a working group in the WTO that would examine
the relationship between trade and labor. On several occasions
in Seattle, President Clinton strongly urged both the WTO and
the international community to remember that free trade cannot
come at the cost of excluding workers.
Despite the fact that Seattle did not lead to a new round
of negotiations, a number of positive developments did take
place during the year. In June, member nations of the
International Labor Organization (ILO) unanimously adopted a
landmark convention on the prohibition and immediate
elimination of the worst forms of child labor. By this action,
member nations pledged to ban a number of abuses, including
child slavery; bonded labor; work that is inherently harmful to
the health or morals of children, such as dangerous work or
child prostitution; and the forced or compulsory recruitment of
children under 18 for use in armed conflict.
President Clinton traveled to Geneva to support the
adoption of the convention, and worked with Congress to ensure
that the United States was one of the first countries in the
world to sign and ratify it. In January 2000, governments again
met in Geneva to adopt a draft optional protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child that prohibits
governments and insurgencies from using child soldiers. It is
expected that the protocol will be formally adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly later this year. President
Clinton has indicated that the United States is committed to a
process of speedy review and signature and to working with the
Senate to ensure ratification.
Notwithstanding the growing international consensus in
support of worker rights, certain governments continued to
violate core worker rights in defiance of their obligations
under the ILO's Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. Trade unions continued to face harassment and
closure, many workers continued to face discrimination, and
bonded and forced labor remained significant problems.
Despite the new convention, child labor remained a severe
problem in many parts of the world. According to the ILO, more
than 250 million children under the age of 15 work around the
world, many in dangerous conditions. The ILO's International
Program on the Elimination of Child Labor, to which the United
States is by far the largest contributor, made some progress,
but much more remains to be done.
Another problem common to many parts of the world is the
misuse, mistreatment, and abuse of domestic labor. In much of
the Middle East and parts of Europe, Asia, and the Americas,
workers who travel from developing countries to work as
domestic servants, as well as native-born workers, must contend
with poor working and living conditions, minimal or nonexistent
wages, violence, and sexual assault. Although some governments
have taken steps to minimize abuses, many domestic workers find
they must tolerate terrible working conditions to support their
often far-off families.
Workers in a number of countries faced significant
violations of their rights. In China, the Government continued
to restrict tightly worker rights. The Communist Party controls
the country's sole official union, and independent trade unions
are illegal. The Government continued to detain and arrest
independent labor activists, sentencing at least seven to terms
ranging from 1 to 10 years. Neither the Constitution nor the
labor law provides for the right to strike. Forced labor is a
serious problem, particularly in penal institutions. Some
prisons contract to perform manufacturing and assembly work,
while others operate their own companies. A 1999 directory of
Chinese corporations published by a foreign business-
information company listed at least two prisons as business
enterprises. The Government also maintains a network of
reeducation-through-labor camps, whose inmates are required to
work. There have been reports that products made in these
facilities are exported. Most anecdotal reports conclude that
work conditions in prison factories are similar to those in
other factories, but conditions on the penal system's farms and
in mines can be very harsh.
In Burma, the Government continued to restrict worker
rights and ban unions. The forced use of citizens as porters by
the army remained a common practice. Forced civilian labor
remained widespread, although its use on major infrastructure
projects has declined due to the use of soldiers. Child labor
including forced child labor remained widespread. In Vietnam,
the Government continues to restrict worker rights. Child labor
is a problem and there were some reports of forced child labor.
In Indonesia, enforcement of labor standards remained
inconsistent and weak in some areas. Forced and bonded child
labor remained a problem, particularly on fishing platforms,
despite government efforts to reduce the problem. In Thailand,
forced labor and illegal child labor are problems.
In the former Soviet Union, Belarus in particular stands
out for its repression of the rights of workers. In Russia,
workers face long delays in receiving their wages, as do
pensioners. Conditions of work are health and even life
threatening in many industries. Workers do have the right to
join unions, but plant managers frequently work with the
Federation of Independent Trade Unions, the successor to
Communist trade unions, to destroy new unions. Court rulings
have further limited the right of association by ruling that
collective action based on nonpayment of wages is not a strike
and that individuals who participate in such actions are not
protected by the law. The Labor Code prohibits forced or
compulsory labor, but there were credible reports of soldiers
being ``sold'' by their superior officers to perform work for
private citizens or organizations.
In Guatemala, poverty, the legacy of violent repression of
labor activists and others, the deep hostility of many in
business and the military towards trade unions, and a weak
labor inspection and labor court system continued to constrain
worker rights and limit enforcement of standards. In one case
in which vigilantes abducted union leaders, physically abused
them, and forced them to resign from their jobs and union
positions, none of the vigilantes has been arrested, although
more than a dozen suspects have been indicted on charges
ranging from coercion to illegal detention. While the
Constitution bars employment of minors under the age of 14,
child labor remains a serious problem. Most child labor occurs
in agriculture, domestic service, construction, stone
quarrying, and family businesses. According to the Guatemalan
Labor Ministry, 3,000 to 5,000 children are employed in the
illegal cottage fireworks industry. This dangerous employment
violates ILO Convention 182 banning the worst forms of child
labor.
In Colombia, the Government, under strong international
pressure, bowed to the demands of its unions, agreeing to the
dispatch of a special ILO team to investigate killing and
kidnaping of trade unionists and other worker rights
violations. Physical intimidation of trade unionists, including
killings, remains a very serious problem.
In India, the use of forced and bonded adult and child
labor, though illegal, continues. While programs sponsored by
the ILO and private groups have moved many children from, for
example, carpet looms to classrooms, enforcement of child and
bonded labor laws is spotty. Dalits and tribals, who constitute
the majority of India's bonded labor, continue to face
widespread discrimination. In Pakistan, child and bonded labor
remains a serious problem. Thousands of families work in debt
bondage, with children born into a life of bonded labor. While
the Government has worked with the ILO to move children from
work to school in several industries, enforcement of the laws
against bonded and child labor has been inadequate. In
Bangladesh, the Government failed to keep promises it had made
to the international community with regard to worker rights,
notably affording workers freedom of association and the right
to organize in export processing zones. However, the Government
hasworked constructively with the ILO on a program to reduce
child labor.
2. Trafficking of Persons. Trafficking in persons is a
growing global problem that touches countries on every
continent. The insidious reach of this modern-day form of
slavery hurts women, children, and men from all walks of life,
and of every age, religion, and culture. Traffickers rob their
victims of basic human rights. They exploit and trade in human
hopes and dreams to profit from inhuman suffering and misery.
Victims are treated as chattel to be bought and sold across
international and within national borders. This human tragedy
rips the fabric of communities and tears families apart.
The trafficking industry is one of the fastest growing and
most lucrative criminal enterprises in the world. Profits are
enormous, generating billions of dollars annually and feeding
into criminal syndicates' involvement in other illicit and
violent activities. Trafficking in persons is considered the
third largest source of profits for organized crime, behind
only drugs and guns.
Trafficking cases appear in many forms. In some cases,
traffickers move victims through transit countries using drugs,
violence, and threats to ensure cooperation. In other cases,
economically desperate parents sell their child to traffickers.
Many times, trafficked victims begin their journey voluntarily
and unwittingly fall into the hands of trafficking schemes.
In Russia and the Ukraine, for example, victims who yearn
for economic independence within economies that offer few jobs,
are lured by advertisements promising well-paying jobs abroad.
However, once victims arrive in countries of destination, they
are held captive and forced into bonded labor, domestic
servitude or the commercial sex industry through threats,
psychological coercion and severe physical brutality, including
rape, torture, starvation, imprisonment, and death.
The majority of trafficking victims are girls and women.
The reasons for this are linked to the economic and social
status of women in many countries. Not all victims are women,
however. Boys are frequently trafficked for prostitution,
pornography, and in at least one country, used as camel
jockeys. Men from a number of countries such as China are
trafficked overseas to work in restaurants or in sweatshops in
the garment industry. They travel to their destinations in
rickety boats or cargo containers before becoming indentured
servants to pay their ``debts.'' If they try to leave
employment, they risk violence or the extortion of their family
members back home.
The underground nature of trafficking makes it difficult to
quantify. The most reliable estimates place the level of
trafficking at 1 to 2 million persons trafficked annually. As
this report documents, trafficking into the commercial sex
industry is merely one form of a broader range of trafficking
exploited by organized criminal enterprises.
The problem is particularly widespread in South Asia. India
and Pakistan are significant countries of origin, transit, and
destination. Poor economic conditions in Nepal, Bangladesh, and
rural areas of India result in women and children being
trafficked into major cities for the sex trade and forced
labor. In many cases, girls from poverty-stricken families are
sold to traffickers by parents or relatives. Women who seek to
return home often face stigmatization. Many are HIV positive.
While criminal laws against trafficking exist, inadequate
enforcement and lax penalties do little to stem trafficking
patterns.
In East Asia, many women are coerced into prostitution
under the guise of overseas employment contracts. In Thailand,
women from hill tribes and neighboring countries are especially
vulnerable to exploitation because of their inability to speak
Thai. In Burma, women and children in border areas and from the
Shan ethnic minority are particularly susceptible to being
forced by traffickers into neighboring countries to work as
prostitutes. In the Philippines, some women are lured into
entering employment contracts overseas by unethical recruiters.
Once they arrive at their destination, the women are subjected
to work in the sex entertainment industry or suffer abuse at
the hands of foreign employers or husbands.
The range and scope of trafficking in Africa remains
largely undocumented. Officials in Europe, however, report an
active and growing market from trafficking in women and
children from Nigeria. There is evidence that Nigerian crime
syndicates may use threats, physical injury, and legal coercion
to stop women forced into the sex trade from escaping. Inside
Nigeria, there is an active trade in child laborers, some
exported to neighboring countries, from the Niger Delta region.
Trafficking also exists in the Western Hemisphere. Forced
prostitution is also a problem in the Dominican Republic, where
there are disparities in law enforcement. In Brazil, the sexual
exploitation and prostitution of children is a serious problem.
Prostitution rings foster a sexual tourism industry that
exports children from the Amazon region to large urban centers
and major cities.
III. Conclusion
The events of the past year have demonstrated the
undisputed and growing power of transnational public-private
networks in promoting democracy, human rights, and labor.
Traditionally, ``norm entrepreneurs'' have been individuals
whose role in society or government has given them the ability
to influence the direction of policy. Oscar Arias Sanchez,
former President Jimmy Carter, the Dalai Lama, Mahatma Gandhi,
Vaclav Havel, Pope John Paul II, Martin Luther King, Nelson
Mandela, and Eleanor Roosevelt are but a few of the human
rights advocates who instantly come to mind. Such individuals
still have an important role to play, but increasingly, public
and private networks of transnational actors are becoming
``norm entrepreneurs'' in and of themselves--networks capable
of mobilizing popular opinion and political support at the
national and international level in order to secure
international recognition and acceptance of new principles,
standards, or approaches to complex human rights problems.
These transnational networks increasingly wield influence
comparable to the power of individual nation-states, in their
capacity to spotlight abuses, mobilize shame, generate
political pressure, and develop structural solutions. But
recent history also teaches that such networks cannot succeed
without involving democratic governments dedicated to the same
human rights goals. As President Clinton noted in Davos
recently, all sides need to ``lower the rhetoric and focus on
results.'' No transnational network can firmly or permanently
entrench human rights, democracy, or the rule of law in
unfamiliar soil without forging partnerships with democratic
governments and other domestic and international members of the
emerging human rights community. These partnerships, which
cross public and private, institutional and national lines,
will be increasingly challenged to work together and prod one
another to yield creative and enduring solutions to emerging
problems. As this new century unfolds, the United States will
continue to be a leader in creating and partnering with such
transnational networks to seek democracy and human rights for
all the world's peoples.
Harold Hongju Koh,
Assistant Secretary of State,
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.
EUROPE
----------
ALBANIA
Albania is a republic with a multiparty parliament, a prime
minister, and a president elected by the Parliament. The Prime Minister
heads the Government; the presidency is a largely ceremonial position
with limited executive power. The Socialist Party and its allies won
121 of 155 parliamentary seats in 1997 elections held after a 5-month
period of chaos and anarchy. Observers deemed the elections to be
acceptable and satisfactory under the circumstances. The largest
opposition group, the Democratic Party, ended its 10-month long boycott
of the Parliament (its second such boycott in 2 years based on charges
of unfair practices by the ruling Socialists and their coalition
partners) in July. Socialist Pandeli Majko served as Prime Minister
until October. After losing the October electoral contest for
chairmanship of the Socialist Party, Majko resigned, and the Party
chose Deputy Prime Minister Ilir Meta to replace him; Meta took office
in October. The Constitution provides for an independent judiciary;
however, continued political instability, limited resources, political
pressure, and endemic corruption weaken the judiciary's ability to
function independently and efficiently.
Local police units that report to the Minister of Public Order are
principally responsible for internal security. One of the most serious
problems involving public order and internal security is the fact that
police officers are largely untrained and often unreliable. The
international community established training programs to improve the
quality of the police forces; the programs have trained a large number
of police officers. The Ministry also has a small force of well-trained
and effective police officers organized into special duty units. During
the year the Government reestablished law and order in areas of the
country that had been almost totally beyond central government control
since 1997. Police waged major operations in the districts of Tropoja,
Vlora, Shkoder, Burrel, Fier, and Gjirokaster, where criminal gangs
were active. The Ministry claims that it broke up at least 32 criminal
gangs. Serious problems in the area of policing remain nonetheless. The
police are affected by, and are sometimes part of, the country's
endemic corruption. The National Intelligence Service (ShIK) is
responsible for both internal and external intelligence gathering and
counterintelligence. The armed forces did not have a role in domestic
security until 1998, when a special 120-man ``commando'' unit was
authorized. The new unit operates in an antiterrorist role under the
Minister of Defense. During times of domestic crisis, the Minister of
Public Order can request command authority over the unit. The police
committed human rights abuses.
Albania is a poor country in transition from central economic
planning to a free market system, and many issues related to
privatization, ownership claims, and appropriate regulation of business
are not yet resolved. The country experienced slow but stable progress
in its recovery efforts from the collapse of 1997 and turmoil of 1998.
The inflation rate dropped from about 10 percent during 1998 to close
to zero in 1999. Gross domestic product (GDP) grew by about 8 percent.
The official unemployment rate was 18 percent, a slight increase from
the 17 percent of the previous year. With two-thirds of all workers
employed in agriculture--mostly at the subsistence level--remittances
from citizens working abroad are extremely important, as is foreign
assistance. The GDP may be underestimated because considerable income
also is thought to be derived from various organized and semiorganized
criminal activities. A variety of other unreported, noncriminal
activities, such as unlicensed small businesses, along with the
Government's inability to collect fully accurate statistics, also
contribute to the GDP's underestimation.
There continued to be problems in the Government's human rights
record in several areas; however, there were some improvements in a few
areas. The opposition Democratic Party continued to allege that the
Government was responsible for the murders of some of its members
during 1998 and made additional allegations regarding alleged murders
during 1999. The police beat and otherwise abused suspects and
prisoners, and there were deaths in custody. The Democratic Party often
legitimately complained about incidents of police harassment of its
members and of the dismissal of some of its members from official
positions for political reasons. The police at times arbitrarily
arrested and detained persons. Prolonged pretrial detention is a
problem. The judiciary is inefficient and subject to corruption and
executive pressure. There were complaints of unqualified and
unprofessional judges and credible accounts of judges who were
intimidated or bribed by powerful criminals. The Government often
infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Government respect for freedom
of speech and of the press improved; however, police at times beat
journalists, and academic freedom was constrained. These improvements
were largely offset by the Government's continued passive approach to
basic law enforcement: in too many instances crime, corruption, and
vigilantism undermined the Government's efforts to restore civil order.
The country hosted nearly 450,000 refugees from neighboring Kosovo
during the violent conflict and NATO military action in that province.
Violence and discrimination against women, trafficking in women and
children, and child abuse were significant problems. Discrimination and
violence against religious and ethnic minorities, particularly against
Roma, remained problems. The Government took some steps to improve the
treatment of ethnic minorities. Child labor is a problem. Vigilante
action resulted in many killings.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed cases of political killings by the Government, despite
repeated claims by the main opposition party that its members were
harassed, beaten, and sometimes murdered by government agents. The
Democratic Party claimed that over 21 members, supporters, local
government officials, and former national party officials were killed
during the 2 years that the Socialists were in power (1997-99). The
Party claimed that at least three of its members were killed during
1998: The chairman of the local branch of the Democratic Party of Kish-
Arra village of Shkoder, the deputy chairman of the polling station in
the Gjinar commune of the Elbasan district, and the chairman of the
Democratic Party branch of Boric village in Malesia e Madhe. The
Democratic Party accused the Government of failing to investigate these
crimes, noting that no suspects were tried for the murders. The
Democrats asked for the creation of an independent investigatory group
that would oversee the investigation of these crimes (which the Party
considers to be political).
Police committed extrajudicial killings. In January a 19-year-old
man from Elbasan, Kastriot Bega, was arrested by police on charges of
murder. He was taken first to the police station and later to the
hospital, which he reached in critical condition, and died soon
thereafter. The police claimed that he died a natural death, but the
hospital staff said that his body bore multiple marks from beating and
mistreatment. In December Bardhyl Balliu, a Kavaje citizen, was
detained by the Tirana police force; he died in police custody while
awaiting trial.
The country continued to experience high levels of violent crime.
When Minister of Public Order Spartak Poci took office in May, he
estimated that overall crime had increased by 20 percent compared with
the previous year; violent crime rose by 28 percent, and murder by 16
percent. The press reported in June that the house of the Prefect of
Shkodra was blown up; he was not at home at the time.
Ministry of Public Order statistics show that 432 murders took
place throughout the country during the year; 62 of them were in
Tirana. The February 21 murder of a prominent lawyer, Kleanthi Koci,
who was chairman of the Association of Defense Attorneys, led to a
large public demonstration at his funeral against crime, which was an
expression of public frustration with the lack of order and security in
the country. On June 10, near Bajram Curri, two employees of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were killed;
their official vehicle was ambushed by gunmen along a rural road. The
OSCE closed its office in Bajram Curri following the incident.
Shelling across the border by Serbian military forces killed
several persons. For example in April Serbian artillery fire killed 2
persons and wounded 12 others in the towns of Tropoja and Padesh. Two
persons were killed in May in the small border village of Cahani.
Many killings occurred throughout the country as the result of
individual or clan vigilante actions sometimes connected to traditional
``blood feuds,'' or in conflicts involving various criminal gangs.
b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically
motivated disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution stipulates that ``no one can be subject
to torture, or cruel and brutal treatment;'' however, the police often
beat suspects in the process of arresting them, and the Albanian
Helsinki Committee reported that the police beat or otherwise
mistreated prisoners. The Penal Code makes the use of torture a crime
punishable by up to 10 years' imprisonment. According to the Albanian
Helsinki Committee, major police stations were the sites of the worst
abuse of detainees, and all stations were overcrowded. There were at
least two deaths of suspects in police custody (see Section 1.a.).
There were a number of reports of police violence. The Socialist
Party newspaper Zeri i Popullit on June 1 described a violent raid in
May by the police in the village of Spotalte in Lushnje. Ministry of
Interior special forces reportedly were looking for a criminal, but
when they failed to find him they brutally mistreated members of the
community; police beat persons and made unauthorized searches of
houses. They allegedly arrested two villagers and stole money from
local residents. The press reported a similar incident in the town of
Cerrik, where dozens of persons voiced their protest against police
violence, which also apparently was directed at the community due to
its alleged ties to organized criminal gangs.
According to the Democratic Party, Besnik Jaku, the leader of the
Tirana University student hunger strike was beaten in police custody in
December 1998. In April Besim Biberaj suffered multiple broken bones
while illegally detained for 3 days at a Tirana police station.
Police at times beat journalists (see Section 2.a.).
The majority of police officers receive little or no training.
Western governments continued police training programs aimed at
improving technical expertise, operational procedures, and respect for
human rights. These training and education programs began to improve
the level of professionalism of the police, but the overall performance
of law enforcement remained weak.
Police corruption remains widespread. Sources in the Ministry of
Interior stated that more than 491 police officers were fired from
their jobs during the year because of incompetence, lack of discipline,
or violations of the law.
Prison conditions remained poor, although they improved during the
year with the construction of new prisons and the repair of old ones.
While the Government financed much of this work, it has also received
international assistance, particularly from European Union (EU)
countries. All prisons were destroyed or severely damaged in 1997 when
armed groups stormed them and released the prisoners. The Government
reopened 8 prisons (housing over 1,000 inmates), but the existing
facilities are inadequate to house properly all current prisoners.
Overcrowding created very difficult living conditions.
In previous years, as a result of the overcrowding in prisons,
juvenile and adult inmates shared cells. The Government took steps
during the year to separate them. The Ministry of Justice ordered the
construction of a new facility for juvenile inmates in Kruje and sought
foreign assistance to complete this project. The opening of the new
prison in Lezhe (with a capacity of 800 inmates) is expected to help
reduce overcrowding and facilitate the process of repatriating Albanian
prisoners from foreign prisons, mainly from Greece and Italy. (More
than 2,000 Albanians are serving sentences in Greek prisons, and over
1,500 others are serving sentences in Italian prisons.) By year's end
the prison's construction was more than 70 percent completed; its
completion date was unknown. In 1998 the first five inmates were
transferred from Greek prisons to Albanian prisons. Another 35 requests
for transfers were filed with the Greek Ministry of Justice. Family
visitation is allowed.
The Government has cooperated with the International Committee of
the Red Cross and with other nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and
has improved access for prison inspections.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police at times
arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The 1995 Penal Procedures
Code sets out the rights of detained and arrested persons. By law a
police officer or prosecutor may order a suspect into custody. Detained
persons must be informed immediately of the charges against them and of
their rights. A prosecutor must be notified immediately after a suspect
is detained by the police. Within 48 hours of the arrest or detention a
court must decide, in the presence of the prosecutor, the suspect, and
the suspect's lawyer, the type of detention to be imposed. Legal
counsel must be provided free of charge if the defendant cannot afford
a private attorney.
Bail in the form of money or property may be required if the judge
believes that the accused otherwise may not appear for trial.
Alternatively a suspect may be placed under house arrest. The court may
order pretrial confinement in cases where there is reason to believe
that the accused may leave the country or is a danger to society.
The Penal Procedures Code requires completion of pretrial
investigations within 3 months. The prosecutor may extend this period
by 3-month intervals in especially difficult cases. The accused and the
injured party have the right to appeal these extensions to the district
court. In practice lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. Delayed
investigations are also a serious problem, and the cases of many
detained persons exceed the time limits set by law. In September a
Democratic Party paper alleged that three persons from the northern
city of Kukes were held in police custody for more than 16 months
without trial.
The Democratic Party claimed that the Government detained and sent
to prison dozens of its supporters during the year. Some of them were
victims of cruel and inhuman treatment (see Section 1.c.).
There were no clear cases of detainees being held for strictly
political reasons, but several notable arrests appeared to be motivated
by politics as well as by law enforcement interests. In September 1998,
the police arrested a number of persons associated with the Democratic
Party who participated in the events of September 14, 1998, and
prosecutors charged them with taking part in an ``armed rebellion'' and
in ``a failed coup d'etat'' (also see Section 1.e.). The Democratic
Party complained that the arrests were purely political, which is a
claim highlighted by the presence of the chairman of the Monarchist
Legality Party, the third largest political party in the country, among
the arrestees. The case had not come to trial by year's end.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, continued political instability,
limited resources, political pressure, and endemic corruption all
weaken the judiciary's ability to function independently and
efficiently. Corruption remains a serious problem, especially with the
growth of organized crime, and judges are subjected both to bribery
attempts and intimidation.
Many court buildings were destroyed in the civil unrest in 1997,
and although all reopened, important records and legal materials were
lost permanently. Long case backlogs are typical. The removal of court
budgets from the control of the Ministry of Justice to a separate,
independent body, the Judicial Budget Office, and the establishment of
a school for magistrates were useful steps towards strengthening the
independence of the judiciary. A board chaired by the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court runs the Judicial Budget Office. All other board
members are judges.
The judicial system comprises district courts of the first
instance, military courts, six courts of appeal, and the Supreme Court.
There is also a separate and independent Constitutional Court. The
Supreme Court hears appeals from the Courts of Appeal, while the
Constitutional Court reviews those cases requiring constitutional
interpretation.
The President heads the High Council of Justice, which has
authority to appoint, discipline, and dismiss judges of the courts of
first instance and of the courts of appeal. Judges who are dismissed
have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. In addition to the
President, the Council consists of the Minister of Justice, the head of
the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General, three judges (chosen by
sitting judges), two prosecutors (selected by the prosecutors), and
four independent lawyers named by the Parliament.
The President of the Republic nominates the President and Vice
President of the Supreme Court, and the Parliament elects all of the
Supreme Court's justices. The President selects four of the nine
members of the Constitutional Court; five are elected by the
Parliament. Parliament has the authority to approve and dismiss the
judges of the Constitutional Court and the members of the Supreme
Court. According to the law, dismissal only may be ordered after
conviction for a serious crime or for mental incompetence. In May the
Chief Judge of the Supreme Court was dismissed 3 years before the
expiration of his mandate. The Parliament judged that the mandate of
the Chief Judge had ended because of the entry into force of the new
Constitution; the Chief Judge claimed that the term of his mandate had
not ended and that he had 3 more years to serve. He filed charges with
the Constitutional Court against the decision of the President and the
Parliament. The Constitutional Court found the decision to be in
accordance with the law and approved the removal. He then took his case
to the European Court of Human Rights. The opposition criticized his
removal and claimed that it was anticonstitutional and illegal. In 1998
three other judges were nominated to be members of the Supreme Court
without the prior experience required under the Constitution. These
judicial candidates openly maintain ties to the ruling party.
Constitutional Court justices in theory serve maximum 9-year terms,
with three justices rotating every 3 years. Justices of the Supreme
Court serve for 7 years.
Under the 1998 Constitution, the President appoints the prosecutor
general with the consent of the Parliament. The President appoints and
dismisses other prosecutors on the recommendation of the prosecutor
general.
Parliament approves the courts' budgets and allocates the funds.
Each court may determine how it wishes to spend the money allocated to
it. The Justice Ministry provides and approves administrative
personnel.
Courts operate with very limited material resources. As a result,
in many instances the court system was unable to process cases in a
timely fashion. Public opinion holds the judiciary, in particular,
responsible for government failure to stop criminal activity. In July
police forces in Shkoder, the country's third largest city, blocked the
main entrance of the District Court and did not allow officers of the
court to enter the building as a sign of protest following the court's
release of suspected criminals who were detained by the police. The
judge and prosecutors argued that this protest constituted intimidation
and violated the court's independence. The situation was defused
relatively quickly and without complications, but it brought to light
the serious problems that the judicial system faces. A tense atmosphere
exists between the police and the judiciary. Each side cites the
failures of the other as the reason that many criminals avoid
imprisonment. The courts accuse the police of failing to provide the
solid investigation and evidence necessary to prosecute successfully,
and the police allege that corruption and bribery taint the courts.
The Constitution provides that all citizens enjoy the right to a
fair, speedy, and public trial, except in cases where the necessities
of public order, national security, or the interests of minors or other
private parties require restrictions. Defendants, witnesses, and others
who do not speak Albanian are entitled to the services of a translator.
If convicted, the accused has the right to appeal the decision within 5
days to the Court of Appeals.
The Democratic Party also asserted that the chairman of the
Legality Party (the Monarchists), Ekrem Spahia, and 12 members and
supporters of this party are being tried unfairly for participation in
the events of September 14, 1998, which followed the murder of the
Democratic Party parliamentarian, Azem Hajdari, by unknown persons. The
Democrats believe that all these individuals are being imprisoned for
political reasons.
Fatos Nano, the former Prime Minister, was acquitted of charges of
corruption and abuse of power by a Tirana court on October 5. A court
spokesman said that the court decided that a 12-year sentence given to
him 5 years ago was ``not based on facts.''
Local human rights groups and the political opposition complained
about procedural violations in the legal case against six former
government officials, including the former Ministers of Defense and the
Interior, who were charged in August 1998 with crimes against humanity
for their role in suppressing the popular uprisings in 1997. In
February the Government released them from house arrest but still had
not tried them by year's end.
On March 22, a Tirana court ordered that Vlora gang leader Zani
Caushi be released from jail. Observers suggested that Caushi's friends
in Vlora intimidated some of the witnesses in his case, while the
opposition press accused the Socialist Party of having links to Caushi
and therefore seeking to ensure his release. Seven other members of
Caushi's gang received prison terms of between 3 and 15 years for
crimes ranging from armed robbery to kidnaping.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms
provides for the inviolability of the individual person, of dwellings,
and of the privacy of correspondence; however, the Government often
infringed on these rights. Police often conduct searches without first
obtaining warrants. The Democratic Party claimed that in August the
police surrounded the house of a Democratic Party Member of Parliament,
Myslim Murrizi, and later broke into his house and terrorized his
family. The police confiscated two properly licensed hunting guns owned
by the family. In February DP opposition leader Sali Berisha reported
that a court ordered that his telephone be wiretapped. Justice Minister
Thimio Kondi said that wiretapping is legal and denied that the
authorities had political motives for wiretapping Berisha's telephone.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Law on Fundamental Human
Rights and Freedoms provides for freedom of speech and of the press,
and the Government generally respected these rights; however, police at
times beat journalists. The media are active and unrestrained but have
developed little sense of journalistic responsibility or professional
integrity. Sensationalism is the norm in the newspapers, and the
political party-oriented newspapers in particular print gossip,
unsubstantiated accusations, and outright fabrications. Some
publications appear to be making efforts to improve professional
standards and to provide more balanced and accurate reporting.
Political parties, trade unions, and various societies and groups
publish their own newspapers or magazines, and competition with
commercial publications is very keen. An estimated 200 publications are
available, including daily and weekly newspapers, magazines,
newsletters, and pamphlets. Five newspapers and two magazines are
published in Greek in the south. A difficult economic situation,
coupled with readers' distrust of the press, resulted in a significant
drop in newspaper sales during the year. The total daily circulation of
all newspapers dropped from about 75,000 copies to less than 65,000
copies. This came after a drop in 1998 from 85,000 to 75,000 copies.
Newspaper and magazine publishers considered 1999 a very bad year for
circulation and readership. The opening of many new private radio and
television stations, as well as an increase in the price of newspapers
and magazines, are the main reasons for this sharp fall in circulation.
In May state-run radio and television was converted into a public
entity. Its outlets provide the most widespread and universally
accessible domestic programming. This entity no longer is financed by
the State and has no direct connection to the Government. Rather, it is
run by the Leading Council of Radio and Television, a body elected by
the Parliament.
Fifty private television channels and 30 private radio channels
operate, unregulated, all over the country. The wide availability of
satellite dishes provides citizens with easy access to international
programming. The Government established new licensing procedures during
the year to promote a more stable broadcasting environment. The
Parliament created the National Council of Radio and Television, which
is responsible for issuing private radio and television licenses. The
Council consists of seven members: Three members appointed by the
ruling parties, three members from the opposition parties, and one
member appointed by the President. The chairman serves a 6-year term
while other council members are elected to 5-year terms. As of
September, the opposition had not yet proposed its members for both
councils. The licensing of private radio and television stations had
not yet begun by year's end.
Attacks on journalists continued--both beatings by the police and
assaults by unknown assailants. According to human rights NGO's, in
July police officers in Elbasan mistreated two journalists of the
independent Koha Jone. In September two persons attacked and maltreated
a Koha Jone journalist in Vlore. In September the independent press
accused the Tirana chief of police of violence against a cameraman from
a private television channel who was filming a murder victim downtown.
The cameraman allegedly was beaten by the police on orders of the chief
of police who was present at the scene. Unidentified gunmen seriously
injured journalist Vjollca Karanxha while she was filming in Pogradec
on November 22. Karanxha is a reporter for the local radio and
television station and often has written about the role of local
officials in smuggling and corruption.
Academic freedom continues to be limited. University professors
complain that some faculty members are hired or fired for political
reasons and that students who have the right political connections get
preferential treatment regardless of their personal qualifications. The
Government maintains that changes in university staffing are made on
the basis of merit. The Tirana University hunger strike, begun in
December of 1998 to protest the Government's indifference towards the
poor living conditions at the university, ended after 2 weeks.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Law on
Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms provides for the right of
peaceful assembly, and the Government generally respected this right in
practice. According to the law, organizers must obtain permits for
gatherings in public places, which the police may refuse to issue for
reasons such as security and traffic. In practice rallies and
demonstrations were very common. The Government made no concerted
efforts to prevent them, and the police generally maintained order with
due respect for citizens' rights; however, in some cases individuals
claimed that the police or secret agents of the ShIK intimidated them
because of their participation in opposition rallies, while others
claimed that they were fired from their jobs because they participated
in opposition rallies.
The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms provides for the
right of association, and the Government generally respected this right
in practice. A political party must apply to the Ministry of Justice
for official certification. It must declare an aim or purpose that is
not anticonstitutional or otherwise contrary to law, describe its
organizational structure, and account for all public and private funds
it receives.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. According
to the 1998 Constitution, there is no official religion, and all
religions are equal. However, the predominant religious communities
(Muslim, Orthodox, and Roman Catholic) enjoy de facto recognition by
the authorities that gives them the legal right to hold bank accounts,
to own property and buildings, and to function as juridical persons
based on their historical presence in the country. Religious
movements--with the exception of the three de facto recognized
religions--can acquire the official status of a juridical person only
by registering under the Law on Associations, which recognizes the
status of a nonprofit association irrespective of whether the
organization has a cultural, recreational, religious, or humanitarian
character.
The majority of citizens are secular in orientation after decades
of rigidly enforced atheism. Muslims, who make up the largest
traditional religious group, adhere to a moderate form of Sunni Islam.
The Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches are the
other large denominations. The Albanian Orthodox Church split from the
Greek Orthodox Church early in the century, and adherents strongly
identify with the national church as distinct from the Greek Church.
The current archbishop is a Greek citizen, even though the Albanian
Orthodox Church's 1929 statute states that all its archbishops must be
of Albanian heritage, because there are no Albanian clerics qualified
for this position. Bektashis, (Muslim believers who adhere to a very
loose form of Islam), form another large denomination in the country.
Foreign clergy, including Muslim clerics, Christian and Baha'i
missionaries, Jehovah's Witnesses, Mormons, and many others freely
carry out religious activities. The Religious Council of the State
Secretariat, an office that functions under the Prime Minister's
authority but that has no clear mandate or decisionmaking power, was
renamed ``The State Committee on Cults'' in September. The Committee
chairman is to have the status of a deputy minister, and this office is
to coordinate all issues connected with religion and the State. This
office estimates that there are 12 different Muslim societies and
groups with approximately 324 representatives throughout the country
and more than 79 Christian societies and sects with 344 missionaries
representing Christian or Baha'i organizations.
The Government has not yet returned all the properties and
religious objects under its control that were confiscated under the
Communist regime in 1967. In cases where religious buildings were
returned, the Government often failed to return the land that surrounds
the buildings. The Government also is unable to compensate the churches
adequately for the extensive damage that many religious properties
suffered. The Orthodox Church has complained that it has had difficulty
in recovering some religious icons for restoration and safekeeping.
The Albanian Evangelical Alliance, an association of Protestant
Churches, has complained that it has encountered administrative
obstacles to building churches and to accessing the media. The growing
evangelical community continues to seek official recognition and
participation in the religious affairs section of the Council of
Ministers.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Law on Fundamental Human Rights and
Freedoms provides for freedom of movement within the country and for
freedom to leave the country and return, and the Government respects
these rights in practice.
A pressing problem that arose as a result of uncontrolled internal
migration is the problem of local registration and status. A survey
conducted by an NGO, The Society for Democratic Culture, from April to
August highlighted the fact that many families (the numbers vary from
hundreds to thousands) moved from the poor northeast to more prosperous
zones and are no longer registered at all. The survey conducted covered
three pilot zones: An area near Durres with 15,000 inhabitants, an area
in the Vlore district with 12,000 inhabitants, and a Tirana area with
over 20,000 inhabitants. The survey found that during election
campaigns, these citizens are registered as inhabitants of these zones
and thus are permitted to vote; however, in the period between
elections, these citizens are not considered inhabitants of these zones
and are denied even basic education. In many educational institutions,
students must have, among other documents, an official document from
the district that acknowledges that they are inhabitants of the
district. The lack of such documents prevents many students from these
areas from attending school.
Citizens who fled the country during or after the Communist regime
are welcomed back, and if they lost their citizenship they may have it
restored. Albanian-born citizens who emigrate may hold dual
citizenship.
The Constitution gives foreigners the right of refuge in the
country, and a 1996 asylum law includes provisions for granting refugee
or asylee status. The Government accepts the entrance of refugees, does
not expel those with valid claims to refugee status, and works with the
international community to provide housing and support for them. It
also provides first asylum. Over 450,000 Kosovar Albanians were
afforded refuge during the Kosovo crisis, finding shelter with extended
family or in facilities operated by the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) or other international entities. The Government
cooperated with the UNHCR and others to provide support to the
refugees.
Organized criminal gangs have made the smuggling of illegal
immigrants--Albanians, Kurds, Pakistanis, Chinese, Turks, and others
from the Middle East and Asia--into a lucrative business. Italy is the
most common destination. The Government claims that it has taken steps
to combat the problem, but that a lack of resources hinders its
efforts. Italian military and border patrol squads operate in various
coastal zones in an effort to stop the flow of illegal immigrants.
Individuals who become stranded in Albania while trying to use this
illegal pipeline are eligible for a ``care and maintenance'' program
run by the UNHCR and the Albanian Red Cross and can have their cases
evaluated by UNHCR officials. There were no reports of the forced
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution states that ``Governance is based on a system of
elections that are free, equal, general, and periodic;'' citizens
elected a government in 1997 in what international observers considered
to be a satisfactory process, given the proceeding months of chaos and
anarchy.
The main opposition group, the Democratic Party, boycotted the
Parliament throughout most of the year, refusing to participate in
virtually all government functions at the national level. Top DP
officials, including former president Sali Berisha, refused to testify
in the investigation into the September 1998 killing of DP
parliamentarian Azem Hajdari, stating that the investigation was
politically motivated. The DP, led by Berisha, returned to the
Parliament in July after the Government committed itself to investigate
Hajdari's murder fully and fairly.
The Constitution prohibits the formation of any party or
organization that is totalitarian; incites and supports racial,
religious, or ethnic hatred; uses violence to take power or influence
state policies; or is nontransparent or secretive in character.
No legal impediments hinder the full participation of women and
minorities in government, and the major political parties have women's
organizations and have women serving on their central committees;
however, women continue to be underrepresented in both politics and
government. In the Parliament 10 of 155 members are women (1 of whom
serves as deputy prime minister). In the current government three
ministers are women. Ethnic Greeks constitute the largest minority.
They are represented in the current Government and participate actively
in various political parties.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally permitted human rights and related
organizations to function freely, although the lawlessness in some
areas of the country severely limited the practical access of some of
these organizations. The Albanian Helsinki Committee, the Albanian
Human Rights Group, the Albanian Human Rights Documentation Center, the
Society for Democratic Culture, the Albanian Institute for Contemporary
Studies, and the Women's Center were among the most active domestic
NGO's involved in human rights activities. Despite the assistance of
international donors, the work of all of these organizations is
hampered by a shortage of funds and equipment; the Government
cooperated only minimally with these local groups.
In February the Parliament ratified a new law to create the
country's first national human rights ombudsman; however, no one had
been appointed to the post by year's end.
A wide variety of international human rights NGO's visit or operate
within the country with the cooperation of the Government and generally
without restriction. These organizations are free to publish and
disseminate their findings, including criticisms of the Government. The
Government also cooperates with the United Nations and other
international entities on human rights issues. During the Kosovo
conflict and the influx of refugees into Albania, the number of NGO's
active in Albania increased several fold. The Government played a key
role in facilitating and coordinating their work.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions prohibits discrimination
based on sex, race, ethnicity, language, or religion. However, women
and some minority groups complain that discrimination continues in
practice.
Women.--Violence against women and spousal abuse still occur in
this traditionally male-dominated society. Cultural acceptance and lax
police response result in most abuse going unreported. No government-
sponsored program protects the rights of women. An NGO maintains a
shelter in Tirana for abused women, but the facility has the capacity
to house only a few victims at a time. The same NGO also operates a hot
line that women and girls can call for advice and counseling. The line
received thousands of calls during the year. The UNHCR reported some
cases of rape and sexual assault of Kosovar Albanian women in refugee
camps. The concepts of marital rape and sexual harassment are not well
established, and most such acts would not be considered crimes.
Many men, especially those from the northeastern part of the
country, still follow the traditional code known as the ``kanun,'' in
which women are considered chattel and may be treated as such. Also
under the kanun, it is acceptable to kidnap young women for brides;
this practice, too, continues in some areas of the northeast.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a
significant problem (see Section 6.f.).
Women are not excluded, by law or in practice, from any occupation;
however, they are not well-represented at the highest levels of their
fields. The Labor Code mandates equal pay for equal work, but no data
are available on how well this principle is implemented in practice.
Women enjoy equal access to higher education, but they are not accorded
full and equal opportunity in their careers, and it is common for well-
educated women to be underemployed or to work outside the field of
their training. An increasing number of women are beginning to venture
out on their own, opening shops and small businesses. Many are
migrating along with men to Greece and Italy to seek employment.
Children.--The Government's commitment to children's rights and
welfare is codified in domestic law and through international
agreements. The law provides for the right to at least 8 years of free
education and also authorizes private schools. School attendance is
mandatory through the eighth grade (or age 18, whichever comes first);
however, in practice many children leave school earlier than allowed by
law in order to work with their families, especially in rural areas. A
study by the Albanian Helsinki Committee noted that a few thousand
children, largely from the underdeveloped northeast of the country,
were forced to quit school because their families were involved in
``blood feuds'' that endangered the safety of even minor family
members.
Child abuse is a little-reported problem, but the authorities and
NGO's believe that it exists. Trafficking in children is a problem (see
Section 6.f.). Criminals may kidnap children from families or
orphanages to be sold to prostitution or pederasty rings abroad. Within
the country, Romani children often work as beggars, and the police
generally ignore the practice.
People with Disabilities.--Widespread poverty, unregulated
occupational hazards, and poor medical care pose significant problems
for many disabled persons. The disabled are eligible for various forms
of public assistance, but budgetary constraints mean that the amounts
that they receive are very low. No law mandates accessibility to public
buildings for people with disabilities, and little has been done in
that regard.
Religious Minoritites.--The Archbishop of the country's Orthodox
Church has noted incidents in which the Orthodox and their churches or
other buildings have been the targets of vandalism. There were reports
that a number of Orthodox churches in the south were burned. The
Albanian Helsinki Committee issued a report on August 26 stating that
unknown persons damaged or desecrated more than 10 Orthodox churches
and monasteries in 1998 and 1999. In January a Greek Orthodox church
was burned to the ground. In July a Greek Orthodox church in Ksamil was
desecrated with human feces smeared on icons, then set on fire. Also in
July, a Greek Orthodox church in Metohi was burned down.
The Sunnis and Orthodox Christians consider Baha'is to be a threat
and exercise increasing pressure on authorities to ostracize them. In a
press interview, Hazhi Hafiz Savri Koci, the leader of the Sunni Muslim
community, declared that ``the virus of pseudo-religions, such as the
Baha'i Faith, has infiltrated our weak body. We are at war with them,
because they are trying to corrupt our souls through the power of
money, spreading religious beliefs and superstition that are totally
alien to the Albanian character and tradition.''
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government played a
constructive role in maintaining the nation's generally positive record
on the treatment of minorities. While no recent official statistics
exist regarding the size of the various ethnic communities, ethnic
Greeks are the most organized and receive the most attention and
assistance from abroad. There are also substantial groups of
Macedonians, Vlachs, and Roma.
Greek-language public elementary schools are now common in much of
the southern part of the country, where almost all ethnic Greeks live.
However, there are no Greek-language high schools. There is a Greek
chair at the University of Gjirokaster. The Greek minority association,
known as Omonia, continued to press the authorities for more measures
to protect the rights of the Greek minority, including the creation of
additional Greek-language classes in some parts of southern Albania.
The organization also complained that a number of Orthodox churches in
the south (mainly in areas inhabited by the Greek minority) were burned
in acts of ethnic violence. The organization reported that during 1998,
more than 14 persons, mainly from the ethnic Greek minority, were
kidnaped and held for ransom. This organization appealed to the
Government to take measures to stop what it called ``attacks against
the ethnic Greek minority.''
Classes in the Macedonian language are available to students in the
districts of Pogradeci and Devolli on the border of the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The FYROM Government provides texts for
these classes. A small group of ethnic Montenegrins and ethnic Serbs
exists in the north. No discrimination was reported against the Vlachs,
who speak Romanian as well as Albanian, or against the Cams, non-
Orthodox ethnic Albanians who were exiled from Greece in 1944. Both
groups live mainly in the south.
Two distinct groups of Roma, the Jevg and the Arrixhi (Gabel), are
established in the country. The Jevg tend to be settled in urban areas
and are generally more integrated in the economy than the Arrixhi. Roma
are clearly the most neglected minority group. Broadly speaking, they
suffer from high illiteracy, poor public health conditions, and marked
economic disadvantages. Roma encounter much societal discrimination,
but generally neither the police nor individuals target Roma for
violence.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form
independent trade unions. The 1993 Labor Code established procedures
for the protection of workers' rights through collective bargaining
agreements. Two major federations act as umbrella organizations for
most of the country's unions: The Independent Confederation of Trade
Unions of Albania (127,000 members) and the Confederation of Trade
Unions (80,000 members). Both organizations experienced a drop in
membership during the year. Some unions chose not to join either of the
federations. No union has an official political affiliation, and the
Government does not provide any financial support for unions.
The Law on Major Constitutional Provisions and other legislation
provide that all workers except the uniformed military, the police, and
some court officials have the right to strike. The law forbids strikes
that are declared openly to be political or that are judged by the
courts to be political. The two unions organized a number of national
and local strikes during the year. Major strikes were carried out by
the teachers, drivers, health workers, and miners unions. In June
Tirana airport ground staff went on strike; they returned to work after
receiving a 30 percent salary increase.
Government statistics indicated that approximately 330,000 workers
were employed formally (111,000 in the private sector and 213,000 in
the public sector) and that an additional 761,000 persons worked in
agriculture. A total of 235,037 persons were registered as unemployed.
The official unemployment rate was 18 percent during the year.
Unions are free to join and maintain ties with international
organizations, and many do.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Citizens in all
fields of employment, except uniformed members of the armed forces,
police officers, and some court employees, have the right to organize
and bargain collectively. In practice unions representing public sector
employees negotiate directly with the Government.
Labor unions did not operate from a position of strength, in view
of economic conditions, which consisted of very high unemployment, slow
recovery from the economic collapse, and extensive destruction of
economic infrastructure due to recurrent episodes of violence and
looting. Effective collective bargaining in these circumstances is very
difficult, and agreements are hard to enforce.
There are no functioning export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Law on Major
Constitutional Provisions and the Labor Code prohibit forced or
compulsory labor, and generally it is not known to occur; however,
traffickers kidnap women for prostitution, and family members sell
daughters, sisters, and wives to traffickers against their will (see
Section 6.f.). The law also forbids forced or bonded labor by children,
and the Government generally enforces these prohibitions; however,
there were reports that children are trafficked and forced to work
abroad as prostitutes or beggars (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age of employment at 16
years and limits the amount and type of labor that can be performed by
persons under age 18. Children between the ages of 14 and 16 legally
may work in part-time jobs during summer vacation. Primary school
education is compulsory and free through age 18 or the eighth grade,
whichever comes first. In rural areas, children continue to assist
families in farm work.
The Ministry of Labor may enforce the minimum age requirements
through the courts, but no recent cases of this actually occurring were
known. In Tirana and other cities it is common to see children selling
cigarettes and candies on the street. The law forbids forced or bonded
labor by children, but there were some reports of such practices (see
Sections 6.e. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for all
workers over age 16 is approximately $50 (6,750 lek) per month, which
is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family. Many workers look for second jobs, which are difficult to
find. Remittances from those working abroad are very important for many
families. The law provides for social assistance (income support) and
unemployment compensation, but these are very limited, both in terms of
the amounts received and the number of persons actually covered. The
average wage for workers in the public sector is approximately $100
(13,500 lek) per month.
The difference between the monthly average wage of persons who live
in the rural and urban areas is considerable: persons who work and live
in urban areas earn almost 50 percent more than those who live and work
in rural areas. Data from the National Institute of Statistics
indicated that in rural areas more than 20 percent of persons live
under the official poverty line, while in urban areas the figure is 11
percent. Nationwide, over 17 percent of the population live under the
official poverty line. No data are available for private sector wages,
but they are believed to be considerably higher than in the public
sector.
The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours, although in practice hours
typically are set by individual or collective agreement. Many persons
work 6 days a week.
The Government sets occupational health and safety standards, but
it has limited funds to make improvements in the remaining state-owned
enterprises and a limited ability to enforce standards in the private
sector. Actual conditions in the workplace are generally very poor and
often dangerous. In the two cases of deaths recorded in the
construction industry during the year, the victims' families did not
receive any financial support from the state social security
administration because the workers were not insured. The Labor Code
lists the safety obligations of employers and employees but does not
provide specific protection for workers who choose to leave a workplace
because of hazardous conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No laws criminalize trafficking in
persons, although antikidnaping laws may be used to prosecute such
cases.
Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a significant problem. The country is both a
significant transit and source country for such trafficking. NGO's
estimate that there are 30,000 Albanian women currently working abroad
as prostitutes. The country is also a major conduit for trafficked
women from Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Criminal
gangs recruit or coerce women to work as prostitutes abroad, most often
in Italy and Greece. There are also reports that traffickers kidnap
women for prostitution and that family members sell daughters, sisters,
and wives to traffickers against their will.
The Government has had only periodic success in arresting the
criminal organizers. During the year there was a shift in the
prostitution network. Albanian traffickers began to recruit prostitutes
from other East European countries, mainly from Moldova, Ukraine,
Russia, and Bulgaria. These young women are ``bought'' for a price of
$1,000 to $3,000 from international traffickers and forced into
prostitution in Western European countries, mainly Italy and Greece.
The Albanian police detained a large number of such prostitutes and
arrested some of the Albanian traffickers, but no suspects were tried
in connection with these crimes. In February police dismissed an
officer who was involved in a network that smuggled illegal immigrants
into the country via Rinas airport. In August police cracked a network
that was smuggling prostitutes from Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, and
Romania via Albania to Italy. Police detained 13 prostitutes and three
men in a motel near Shodra. Also in August, Prosecutor General Arben
Rakipi said that Italian Mafia bosses actively were engaged in
trafficking in Albania; in July Albanian police arrested Giuseppe Muolo
of Sacra Corona Unita, a Mafia group in southern Italy.
Anecdotal evidence gathered from victims outlines the trafficking
process. Organized crime groups responsible for trafficking in persons
have the power to move their victims easily from one place to another
without intervention. These traffickers steal the victims'
identification documents so that they have no freedom of movement.
Cases have been reported in which trafficked women and girls were
raped, sexually assaulted, beaten, and injected with heroin. Women and
girls have reported that they have been isolated, infrequently fed, and
denied sleep. Women and girls who are able to escape their traffickers
face rigid notions of family honor upon their return to their
communities, which make it extremely difficult for them to marry or
continue their lives as before.
Trafficking in children is also a problem. Criminals may kidnap
children from families or orphanages to be sold to prostitution or
pederasty rings abroad. In May gangsters belonging to a prostitution
ring in Vlora killed a 16-year-old refugee girl in a kidnap attempt.
Children also are forced to work as beggars.
A number of women's associations and NGO's are seeking to raise
public awareness of prostitution and related crimes. Most of the work
done to assist trafficked women is performed by small, local NGO's,
consisting of one to five women who work with few resources and almost
no external support. One NGO organized a national seminar on this issue
and prepared a TV documentary on trafficking in women. The campaign
waged by this NGO, ``Stop the Trafficking of Albanian Women,'' was
aimed at sensitizing the public to this serious problem. In July 1998,
a major conference was held in Tirana on ``Trafficking in Albanian
Women and Children: Human Dimensions and Legal Responses,'' which was
attended by 130 participants, including NGO's, journalists, judges,
prosecutors, and government officials. In September the International
Organization for Migration and the British Department for International
Development held a workshop to address the problem of trafficking;
national and international NGO's attended.
______
ANDORRA
The Principality of Andorra is a constitutional parliamentary
democracy. Two Princes with joint authority representing secular and
religious authorities have headed the Principality since 1278. Under
the 1993 Constitution, the two Princes--the President of France and the
Spanish Bishop of ``Seu d'Urgell''--serve equally as heads of state and
are each represented in Andorra by a delegate. Elections were held in
1997 to choose members of the ``Consell General'' (the Parliament),
which selects the head of government. The judiciary functions
independently.
Andorra has no defense force and depends on neighboring Spain and
France for external defense. The national police, under effective
civilian control, have sole responsibility for internal security.
The market-based economy is dependent on those of its neighbors
France and Spain. Andorra is recovering from a serious economic
recession, but the economy provides citizens with a good standard of
living. Tourism is still an important source of income. Because of
banking secrecy laws, the financial services sector is growing in
importance.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of
dealing with individual instances of abuse.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
observes these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The highest judicial body is the five-member Superior Council of
Justice. One member each is appointed by: The two Princes; the head of
government; the President of the Parliament; and, collectively, members
of the lower courts. Members of the judiciary are appointed for 6-year
terms.
The judiciary provided citizens with a fair and efficient judicial
process.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides citizens with safeguards
against arbitrary interference with their ``privacy, honor, and
reputation,'' and government authorities generally respect these
prohibitions. Private dwellings are considered inviolable. No searches
of private premises may be conducted without a judicially issued
warrant. The law also protects private communications.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice. Since adoption of the 1993 Constitution, the Government has
registered seven political parties.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Constitution acknowledges a special relationship between the Roman
Catholic Church and the state, ``in accordance with Andorran
tradition.'' The Catholic Church receives no direct subsidies from the
Government. Catholic religious instruction is provided in public
schools to those students who elect to receive it. Recent governmental
attempts to eliminate this practice met with resistance from parental
groups and the Spanish Co-Prince.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. It
is government policy not to expel persons having valid claims to
refugee status, and there were no reports of such expulsions. The issue
of first asylum did not arise during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
Progress has been made, but women continue to play a relatively
minor role in politics. Despite the absence of formal barriers, few
women have run for office. Only 2 of 28 Members of Parliament are
women, and only 2 women occupy cabinet level positions. Prior to the
current administration, only two women held elective office.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government accepts international and nongovernmental
investigations of allegations of human rights abuses. During 1998 the
first two domestic human rights groups were formed. One defends the
rights of foreign residents; the other actively supports women's
rights. However, the Government declined to create a secretariat of
women's affairs, as the latter association requested.
In one case, a citizen filed a complaint with the European Court of
Human Rights when the judge in his case disallowed his appeal to the
Constitutional Court. The appeal contended that his trial was not
sufficiently impartial.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution declares that all persons are equal before the law
and prohibits discrimination on grounds of birth, race, sex, origin,
religion, opinions, or any other personal or social condition, although
the law grants many rights and privileges exclusively to citizens. The
Government effectively enforces these provisions.
Women.--Little data exist regarding marital abuse, although the
police received four complaints of physical or psychological abuse
during the year.
In theory there is no legal discrimination against women, either
privately or professionally, but the Association of Andorran Women
reports that in practice, there have been many cases of women dismissed
from employment due to pregnancy. The Association actively promotes
women's issues through information exchanges and limited direct support
to those in need.
Children.--The Government's commitment to children's welfare is
demonstrated by its systems of health care and education. Free public
education begins at age 4 and is compulsory until age 16. The
Government provides free nursery schools, although the existing number
falls short of the needs.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. The law mandates access to new buildings for people
with disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in
practice.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Spanish nationals are the
largest group of foreign residents, accounting for approximately 43
percent of the population. Other sizable foreign groups are Portuguese,
French, and British. A small but fast growing group of African
immigrants, especially from North Africa, work mostly in agriculture
and construction.
Although the Constitution states that foreign legal residents enjoy
the same rights and freedoms as citizens, some immigrant workers
believe that they do not have the same rights and security. Recent
legislation has improved the quality of life for immigrant workers.
Nevertheless, many immigrant workers hold only ``temporary work
authorizations.'' These permits are valid only as long as the job
exists for which the permit was obtained. When job contracts expire,
temporary workers must leave the country. The Government prohibits the
issuance of work permits, unless workers can demonstrate that they have
a fixed address with minimally satisfactory living conditions.
More than 4,000 immigrants do not have work permits or residence
permits, due to the fact that the quota for immigration is not as high
as the number of workers needed and employed in the country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution recognizes the right
of all persons to form and maintain managerial, professional, and trade
union associations without prejudice. In accordance with constitutional
provisions, a registry of associations was established in 1996 and is
being maintained. Strikes were illegal under the old system, and the
new Constitution does not state explicitly that strikes are permitted.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution states that both ``workers and employers have the right to
defend their own economic and social interests.'' Parliament is charged
with adopting legislation to regulate this right in order to guarantee
the provision of essential services. Antiunion discrimination is not
prohibited under the law. A police trade union was registered during
the year. It is the first such association to exist in the country.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including that performed by children, is not specifically prohibited by
law, but it has not occurred.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Children under the age of 18 normally are prohibited from
working, although in exceptional circumstances children ages 16 and 17
may be allowed to work. The Labor Inspection Office in the Ministry of
Social Welfare, Public Health, and Labor enforces child labor
regulations. Forced and bonded labor by children is not prohibited
specifically, but there were no reports of its practice (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The workweek is limited to 40
hours, although longer hours may be required. The legal maximums for
overtime hours are 66 hours per month and 426 hours per year. An
official minimum wage is set by government regulations. Other, higher
wages are established by contract. The minimum wage is approximately
$4.20 (641 pesetas) per hour, and the Labor Inspection Office enforces
its observance. The minimum wage barely provides a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Workers can be dismissed with 15 days'
to 6 months' notice depending on how long they have been working for
the company. A minimal indemnification of 1 month's salary per year
worked is paid if a worker is fired without justification.
A dismissed worker receives unemployment and health benefits for
only 25 days. A board composed of Andorran nationals, although they
represent only a small portion of the work force, controls retirement
benefits. The Labor Inspection Service hears labor complaints.
The Labor Inspection Service sets occupational health and safety
standards and takes the necessary steps to see that they are enforced.
The law authorizes employees to refuse certain tasks if their employers
do not provide the customary level of protection.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
ARMENIA
Armenia has a constitution that provides for the separation of
powers; however, the directly elected President has extensive powers of
appointment and decree that are not balanced by the legislature or an
independent judiciary. The President appoints the Prime Minister, who
is in charge of the Cabinet. Robert Kocharian was elected President in
a multicandidate election in 1998 after former President Levon Ter-
Petrossian was forced to resign in February by his former political
allies in the Government and Parliament. Then President Ter-
Petrossian's reelection in 1996 was flawed by numerous irregularities
and serious breaches of the election law. There also were serious flaws
in both rounds of the 1998 presidential elections. Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) observers witnessed very
substantial irregularities and concluded that the elections seriously
challenged international democratic norms in regard to most key
criteria. It appears that ballot box stuffing, discrepancies in vote
counts, a large number of unauthorized persons in polling stations, and
other fraud perpetrated by local power structures inflated the number
of votes for Kocharian. Nonetheless, the 1998 elections and the May
parliamentary and October municipal elections showed continued
improvement with respect to voting practices and vote-counting as well
as to the ability of a pluralistic group of candidates to campaign
freely. Although irregularities marred both the parliamentary elections
and local elections, OSCE observers categorized the former as an step
toward compliance with OSCE commitments, but stated that they still
failed to meet international standards. Observers reported that the
situation was much improved in terms of ending ballot box stuffing and
overt intimidation by supporters of various candidates; however, they
still noted problems in many precincts with inaccurate or obsolete
voting lists, the presence of unauthorized personnel during the voting
and counting processes, and possible irregularities involving voting of
military personnel. Some local observers reported that municipal
elections also were flawed. The Parliament differs from previous ones
in two important ways: First, members are required to serve full-time
and not to hold jobs outside the legislature; and second, the number of
seats was reduced from 190 to 131. The current parliamentary majority
usually votes in support of the Government. The legislators do not
always represent effectively either the needs of their constituents or
the existing political party composition, although they do so more
effectively than in previous parliaments. The current majority, made up
of a coalition, called Unity, of the two largest parties, the Peoples'
Party and the Republican Party, also attracts the votes of most
deputies elected as independents. Although the leaders of both parties
were killed in the October 27 terrorist attack on parliament, this did
not appear to affect the continuity of their coalition by year's end.
The legislature approves new laws, must confirm the Prime Minister's
program, and can remove the Prime Minister by a vote of no confidence.
Both the Government and the legislature can propose legislation. The
Constitution provides for an independent judiciary; however, in
practice, the courts are subject to pressure from the executive branch
and corruption.
The Ministries of Internal Affairs and of National Security,
formerly one ministry which was split in June, are jointly responsible
for domestic security, intelligence activities, border controls, and
the national police force. Members of the security forces committed
human rights abuses.
The transition from a centralized, controlled economy to a market
economy continued to move forward, although the industrial sector still
is not functioning at full capacity and its output remains low.
Unemployment remains high, resulting in a high degree of income
inequality, but the exact figure is difficult to quantify. This is
because a significant amount of economic activity, perhaps as much as
40 percent, is not captured by government accounting or taxation;
unemployment is approximately 50 percent. Women form a
disproportionately large number of the unemployed. Most small and
medium-sized enterprises have been privatized, as has most agricultural
land. About 75 percent of landowners now have secure title to their
land. The gross domestic product (GDP) fell slightly to about $590 per
capita. Inflation fell to 2.1 percent for the year. Foreign assistance
and remittances from Armenians abroad play a major role in sustaining
the economy, although the financial crisis in Russia, where many
Armenians went to look for work, cut deeply into the flow of
remittances. The Government is working to resolve its current budget
crisis through increased taxes on gasoline and imported tobacco, as
well as through cuts in most areas of government spending.
The Government's human rights record was poor in several important
areas, and problems persist. Substantial intervention by local power
structures in the election process continues to restrict citizens'
ability to change their government peacefully. Members of the security
forces committed extrajudicial killings, routinely beat detainees
during arrest and interrogation, arbitrarily arrested and detained
persons without warrants, and did not respect constitutional
protections regarding privacy and due process. Impunity remains a
problem, and the Government rarely investigates abuses by members of
the security forces. Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening,
and lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. The judiciary is subject
to political pressure and does not enforce constitutional protections
effectively. There are some limits on press freedom, and many
journalists practice self-censorship. State television, which refrains
from criticizing government policy, remains the major source of news
for most of the population, but independent television and newspapers,
along with private radio stations, offer substantial competition. The
nongovernmental media often criticize the country's leadership and
policies. Burdensome registration requirements hinder freedom of
association. The law places some restrictions on religious freedom,
including a prohibition against proselytizing by religions other than
the Armenian Apostolic Church. Registration requirements for religious
groups kept Jehovah's Witnesses from operating legally, and eight
members of Jehovah's Witnesses are in jail for refusing military
service; three more arrested on those charges were released on bail.
The Government places some restrictions on freedom of movement.
Discrimination against women, the disabled, and minorities remains a
problem.
After his election, President Kocharian appointed an opposition
presidential candidate to head two presidential commissions charged
with improving human rights and reforming the Constitution to create a
more even balance of power among the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches. A subsequent commission on balancing the powers of
the three branches of government presented several proposals that would
weaken the influence of the executive over the other branches. These
proposals are scheduled to be voted upon in a national referendum in
May 2000. To date the Human Rights Commission has submitted a number of
proposals, one of which is establishment of an office of ombudsman;
however, there was no action taken on the ombudsman proposal by year's
end.
On October 27, five terrorists entered the National Assembly and
opened fire, killing the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the National
Assembly and six other Members of Parliament and wounding at least five
more persons. Investigation of the killings, conducted by the Deputy
Prosecutor General, was continuing at year's end. Fifteen persons were
detained for interrogation, including a Deputy of the National
Assembly, a former presidential chief of staff, and the deputy chief of
state television. Defense attorneys and the press accused the Deputy
Prosecutor General of using coercion, including physical abuse of the
accused, to extract evidence, and President Kocharian expressed concern
that the rights of the accused be respected.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by police or security forces during the
year; however, there were numerous reports of extrajudicial killings.
Local human rights groups reported five cases of death in custody as
result of beatings and torture. Oleg Arishin, who died on April 27, and
Stepan Gevorgian, who died on April 15, had been charged with robbery
and assault. During the trial, Gevorgian filed motions of mistreatment
that were rejected by the court; his family stated that his corpse
revealed clear evidence that he was beaten severely. Yerevan native
Arsen Stepanian was taken to a district police headquarters in July to
testify on a dispute with a representative of the local electric power
net. Stepanian died several hours later at home; post mortem
examination confirmed that he had suffered broken bones and a heart
attack. No one was charged in these deaths. On October 12, the
International Helsinki Federation requested that President Kocharian
investigate these cases; however, by year's end, no legal action was
taken.
Two other cases of death in custody involved Edward Vardanian, who
allegedly committed suicide during interrogation at the police precinct
in the city of Abovian in March, and Artush Ghazarian, military
commissar of the city of Tashir, who allegedly died of beatings in
September while in custody during his interrogation on unspecified
charges.
There was a significant number of deaths of military servicemen
reportedly due to mistreatment (see Section 1.c.).
Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening and medical
treatment is inadequate. Three were a number of deaths due to disease
(see Section 1.c.).
Charges against five police officers for a 1993 death, a case
repeatedly remanded for investigation by the Supreme Court, were never
pressed despite assurances by a previous Prosecutor General.
On October 27, five terrorists opened fire on a session of the
National Assembly with automatic weapons. They killed the Prime
Minister, the Speaker of the National Assembly, the two Deputy
Speakers, the Minister for Special Projects, and three Deputies, and
wounded the Minister of Privatization and four other Deputies, some
critically. The gunmen claimed that they intended to kill only the
Prime Minister, and that the other victims died in a cross-fire with
guards, although video footage clearly showed the terrorists firing
into victims in other parts of the room. Announcing that they were
carrying out a coup against alleged corruption in the Government, they
then held approximately 150 hostages inside the Parliament building,
gradually releasing them during the night.
On the morning of October 28, the terrorists released about 50
remaining hostages and surrendered to security forces. According to
their reported statements, their motives were related to frustration
over the direction in which the country was going, but also may have
included personal grievances. Security at the Parliament building,
which was handled by special parliamentary guards, was extremely lax,
and criticism mounted, including from the Ministry of Defense, against
the Ministers of National Security and of Interior and the Prosecutor
General; the two latter officials submitted their resignations on
October 29. Their resignations were subsequently were accepted by the
President. The Minister of National Security resigned on November 1,
and subsequently was appointed presidential chief of staff. The Deputy
Prosecutor General (who is also military prosecutor general) was placed
in charge of investigating the killings. Fifteen persons were detained
for interrogation by year's end, including a Deputy of the National
Assembly (who was stripped of his parliamentary immunity by a vote of
that body), a former presidential chief of staff and advisor, and the
deputy chief of state television. The investigation was criticized by
attorneys for the detainees, by the media, and by representatives of
several political parties for reported human rights abuses (see Section
1.c.). Gagik Jahangirian, the military prosecutor who is conducting the
investigation into the parliamentary shootings, repeatedly rejected
calls for the creation of a special parliamentary committee to ensure
an impartial investigation. The chairman of the National Democratic
Union, Vazgen Manukian, and other opposition politicians charged the
authorities with manipulation of the investigation for political
reasons.
On the night of February 9, the body of Artsrun Margarian, Deputy
Minister of Interior and National Security and Chief of Internal
Troops, was found on the roadside near Yerevan. Margarian's two
bodyguards, arrested after his death and charged with homicide, were
released from custody in July and not charged for lack of evidence (see
Section 1.c.). The third person allegedly involved in Margarian's
death, Doctor Hrant Papikian, is charged with not reporting plotted
crimes. Court hearings on the Margarian case began in October; however,
there was no verdict by year's end.
Margarian's case was one of a number of high-profile murders during
the last 2 years that may have been related to corruption or criminal
activities. Another case, the murder of Deputy Minister of Defense
Vahram Khorkhoruni on December 10, 1998, is still under investigation.
The lack of progress on the Margarian and Khorkhoruni cases was one of
the reasons given by the Defense Ministry for demanding the
resignations of the three major nonmilitary security officials.
Investigation of the August 1998 murder of Prosecutor General Henrik
Khachatrian by a subordinate was completed; the official verdict was
``homicide and suicide.''
In June the Prosecutor General's office completed investigation of
a criminal indictment against former Minister of Interior and former
mayor of Yerevan Vano Siradeghian, former commander of Interior
Ministry troops Vahan Harutyunian, and others. Siradeghian's indictment
listed 10 counts, including, among other charges, the 1993 murder of
Armenian railroad director Hambartzum Ghandilian, the murder of
Ashtarak district executive committee chairman Hovannes Sukiasian, and
the attempted murder of the chief of the Prosecutor General's
investigation department, Vladimir Grigorian, as well as kidnaping and
bribery. Court hearings in the Siradeghian case, which also involves 11
other defendants, began in September but were postponed several times
at the request of Siradeghian's attorneys. At year's end, the case was
in progress in a Yerevan court.
Another Siradeghian-related court case involved the trial of an
armed gang led by Armen Ter-Sahakian. Most of the gang members were
former Interior Ministry employees. The gang allegedly was responsible
for a number of murders of top officials carried out since the country
gained independence, as well as for extortion, robbery, and illegal
possession of weapons. At year's end, the trial was in its intermediate
stages.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
In September the Government unilaterally released three POW's under
OSCE auspices; Azerbaijan reciprocated by unilaterally releasing four
POW's. In October two more Azeri POW's were released, and still one
more was released in December.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the law prohibit torture; however,
the practice of security personnel beating pretrial detainees during
arrest and interrogation remains a routine part of criminal
investigations, and prosecutors rely on such confessions to secure
convictions. Most cases of police brutality go unreported. Impunity
remains a problem.
Local human rights groups reported five cases of death in custody
due to torture and beatings (see Section 1.a.).
Attorneys for the five gunmen charged in the October 27 killings in
Parliament claimed in the media that the accused were being held in
inhuman conditions and were beaten during interrogations. The
government-appointed Commission on Human Rights made several attempts
to see the prisoners to verify charges that they were being physically
abused but was not able to see them. An attorney for National Assembly
Deputy Mushegh Movsesian, who was detained in connection with the case,
also claimed that his client was beaten, and a parliamentary candidate
who examined him agreed. The attorney requested that Movsesian be
examined for a severe ulcer from which he reportedly was suffering; the
deputy prosecutor general's office agreed to this on December 24.
Although defense lawyers may present evidence of torture in an
effort to overturn improperly obtained confessions, and according to
law all such charges must be investigated, judges and prosecutors
routinely ignore such complaints even when the perpetrator can be
identified.
The Government has not conducted investigations of abuse by
security services, except in rare cases where death has resulted and
under pressure from human rights groups. The number of deaths of
conscripts from training accidents and physical abuse decreased by 33
percent between 1997 and September, according to government figures.
While this number cannot be verified, based on information from human
rights groups the figure of 120 noncombat deaths during the year
appears to be accurate. Amnesty International stated that a conscript
arrested for being absent without leave was beaten so badly in August
1998 that subsequently he died. The case currently is pending in the
Echmiadzin regional court. The military prosecutor's office reported
that in September investigations were continuing in 32 cases involving
deaths. President Kocharian met in November with the parents of
conscripts who died or were injured severely during training and
promised them that the cases would be investigated fully. There are no
separate military courts (see Section 1.e.). Military cases that go to
trial (many are settled administratively) in civilian courts are
handled by the military prosecutor's office. Members of the Yezidi
ethnic-religious minority complain that ``hazing'' and beating of
conscripts, common throughout the former Soviet Union, are especially
severe for conscripts from their ranks.
According to a March letter from the President's Office to Human
Rights Watch, the military Prosecutor General or the military Inspector
General had fired 18 employees of those 2 offices since July 1997 for
violations of criminal procedure leading to suicides or accidental
deaths of servicemen. The President's letter also stated that the
military Inspector General and Prosecutor General had prosecuted and
convicted 80 military officers in 1998 for violations of the military
code; 32 were for abuse of power, 3 for murder or attempted murder, 2
for causing suicides, and 2 for causing maiming or severe bodily
injury. The Ministry of Defense declined to provide exact details on
cases involving national security while the country remained
technically in a state of war with Azerbaijan.
Homosexuals complain that police physically and mentally abuse
them, especially if they have no means to pay police extortions. Those
accused of homosexuality in the military generally are believed to
suffer beatings and other physical abuse.
Prison conditions are harsh and life threatening. Facilities are
often overcrowded and food is inadequate to preserve health unless
supplemented by assistance from families. Medical and sanitary
facilities in prisons are inadequate. Tuberculosis and other
communicable diseases are common, and there were a number of deaths
from such diseases during the year. Although agreement in principle was
been reached in 1997 to transfer responsibility for prisons from the
Ministry of Internal Affairs to the Ministry of Justice to improve
oversight, no action to that effect was taken by year's end. Physical
abuse by guards and by other prisoners is a problem. After a visit to
the principal prison in Yerevan for detainees held by the Ministry of
the Interior, the head of the Armenia Human Rights Commission reported
on December 23 that complaints by prisoners had focused on poor
conditions in their cells and on reported physical and verbal abuse by
Interior Ministry personnel.
According to his lawyer, Ministry of Internal Affairs staff beat
former Minister of Education Ashot Bleyan while he was in prison on
August 18. He was awaiting trial on corruption charges (see Section
1.d.).
According to the Armenian Helsinki Association, the two bodyguards
of the late Deputy Interior Minister Artsrun Margarian were subjected
to torture in February during the investigation into Margarian's death
(see Section 1.a.).
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had free access
to detention facilities run by the Ministry of Interior. In these
facilities, the ICRC is able to visit, according to its standard
modalities, any prisoner in whom it has an interest, whether in prisons
or in local police stations. Also, the ICRC had regular access to POW's
from the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the prison of the Ministry of
National Security and the military police stations. The ICRC also had
access to POW's in Nagorno-Karabakh.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Authorities continued to
arrest and detain criminal suspects without legal warrants, often on
the pretext that they were material witnesses. The police frequently
imprison detainees without notification of their family members. It
often is several days before family members obtain information as to
whether someone has been arrested and the person's location. Security
agencies often restrict access of lawyers and family members to
prisoners until the preliminary investigation phase is complete, a
process that can last weeks. During the year, the amount of time that
detainees could be held without being charged officially was extended
from 72 to 96 hours.
The transitional provisions of the Constitution provide that
Soviet-era procedures for searches and arrests were to continue until
the new Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure Code came into effect in
January. Although the Criminal Procedure Code entered into force, the
Criminal Code remains under consideration in Parliament, and the likely
date of its passage remains unclear. A suspect may be detained for no
more than 12 months pending trial, after which the suspect must be
released or tried. However, this latter provision is not always
enforced. There is no provision for bail, although detainees may sign a
document and remain at liberty under their own recognizance pending
trial.
Former deputy chief of customs Mihran Movsesian, a relative of
detained National Assembly Deputy Musegh Movsesian, told the media that
he was called to the Ministry of National Security in early November
for questioning about the killings in Parliament. Movsesion said that
he was detained for the next 30 days in the Ministry's holding facility
for national security cases without being charged, in violation of the
legal provision that detainees must be charged within 96 hours.
Movsesian then was released without charge and was never given any
official explanation for his detention.
Former Education Minister Ashot Bleyan was detained by two law
enforcement officials on May 14 after being charged with embezzlement
of public funds intended for the purchase of textbooks (see Section
1.c.). Supporters of Bleyan formed a committee for his defense. Human
Rights Watch reports that according to his lawyer, he was beaten while
in detention by Interior Ministry officials, and Bleyan stated in
September that the procuracy official handling the case was present
during the beating; the lawyer's report was not confirmed
independently.
Armed forces recruiters sometimes take hostages to compel the
surrender of draft-evading or deserting relatives (see Section 1.f.).
A local human rights group alleges that there are cases in which
security authorities use confinement in mental institutions as an
alternative form of detention.
The ICRC reported that civilian and military personnel on all sides
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict occasionally engage in cross-border
hostage taking, sometimes to win release of a friend or relative held
on the other side, but sometimes for financial gain. Such incidents
reportedly declined significantly during the year.
There were no reports of forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution nominally
provides for an independent judiciary; however, in practice courts are
subject to pressure from the executive branch and to corruption. The
Constitution's provisions do not appear designed to insulate the courts
from political pressure. Other legal and constitutional provisions make
judges and prosecutors dependent on the executive branch for their
employment. The inherited Soviet system views the court largely as a
rubber stamp for the prosecutor and not a defender of citizens' rights.
Prosecutors still greatly overshadow defense lawyers and judges during
trials. Under the Constitution, the Council of Justice, headed by the
President, the Prosecutor General, and the Justice Minister, appoints
and disciplines judges for the tribunal courts of first instance,
review courts, and the Court of Appeals. The President appoints the
other 14 members of the Justice Council and 4 of the 9 Constitutional
Court judges. This authority gives the President dominant influence in
appointing and dismissing judges at all levels. Judges are subject to
review by the President through the Council of Justice after 3 years.
Thereupon, their tenure is permanent until they reach the age of 65.
According to the transitional provisions of the Constitution, the
existing courts retained their powers until the new judicial system
began to function in January. During the transition, district courts
tried most cases, with a right of appeal to regional courts and then to
the Supreme Court.
The 1995 Constitution requires a new three-level court system. The
highest court, the Court of Cassation, began functioning in the summer
of 1998. First instance courts try most cases, with a right of appeal
to the Appellate Court and then to the Court of Cassation. The
Constitutional Court rules on the conformity of legislation with the
Constitution, approves international agreements, and decides election-
related legal questions. It can accept only cases proposed by the
President, by two-thirds of all parliamentary deputies, or election-
related cases brought by candidates for parliament or the presidency.
Due to these limitations, the Constitutional Court cannot ensure
effectively constitutional human rights safeguards.
Judges for the two lower-level courts, the Appellate Court and
courts of the first instance, began functioning in January. The
selection of judges was based on: their scores on a multiple choice
test to determine their fitness to be judges under the new system,
based on previously published information regarding the new legal
codes; and their interviews with the Minister of Justice. Next, the
list of nominations was approved by the Council of Justice and,
finally, by the President. About 55 percent of the appointed judges
were judges under the old structure. The executive branch continued to
have a dominant role in judicial selection. Based on the results of
this four-stage selection, 123 judges were appointed to the new courts
on January 12. Unless they are found guilty of malfeasance, their
tenure is permanent until they reach the age of 65.
The judicial system continued to be in transition. As part of the
package of judicial reform legislation mandated by the Constitution,
both prosecutors and defense counsels began a process of retraining and
recertification in order to retain their positions. Even though the
newly passed legislation reduced significantly prosecutors' supervision
of civil cases, prosecutors still greatly overshadow defense lawyers
and judges during trials.
The new Criminal Code, which is intended to clarify contradictory
provisions of the law and create a more unitary, modern, and workable
legal system has not yet been approved. Two other new codes, the Civil
Code and the Criminal Procedures Code, were passed in the summer of
1998 and went into effect in January. Under the new codes, prosecutors
are expected to continue to have more influence than judges do. The
functions of the Ministry of Justice have been reduced substantially
with the establishment of the Council of Court Chairs, which is
responsible for financial and budgetary issues for the courts. The
Council of Court Chairs includes 21 court chairs (the senior judges of
multi-judge panels) at all levels.
The new criminal procedure code does not allow detainees to file a
complaint in court prior to trial to redress abuses by the procuracy,
police, or other security forces during criminal investigations. Under
the new code, the police may detain individuals for up to 12 hours
before notifying family members, witnesses have no right to legal
counsel during questioning while in police custody--even though failure
to testify is a criminal offense--and detainees must seek permission
from the police or procuracy to obtain a forensic medical examination
to substantiate a report of torture.
President Kocharian established in June 1998 a constitutional
reform commission, one of whose stated goals is to strengthen the
independence of the judiciary and give the courts more authority in
safeguarding human rights. On March 1, the commission submitted its
suggestions for constitutional amendments to the President. One
proposed change was to remove the prohibition against dual citizenship.
The President disbanded the old commission and by a July 23 decree
appointed new members to amend the Constitution's chapter on the
judiciary. Such constitutional revisions must pass both Parliament and
a national referendum.
The military legal system operates essentially as it did in the
Soviet era. There is no military court system; trials involving
military personnel take place in the civil court system and are handled
by military prosecutors. Military prosecutors perform the same
functions as their civilian counterparts; pending passage of a new
criminal code, they operate in accordance with the Soviet-era Criminal
Code. In 1998 the military prosecutor abolished military ranks for the
prosecutors in his service.
All trials are public except when government secrets are at issue.
Defendants are required to attend their trials unless they have been
accused of a minor crime not punishable by imprisonment. Defendants
have access to a lawyer of their own choosing. The court appoints an
attorney for any defendant who needs one. Defendants may confront
witnesses and present evidence. The Constitution provides that those
accused of crimes shall be informed of charges against them. However,
the constitutionally mandated presumption of innocence is ineffective,
and acquittals are rare once a case comes to trial. Defendants and
prosecutors have the right of appeal.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
The five remaining defendants in the ``Dro'' case remain in prison
following conviction of criminal charges of murder. Two were condemned
to death, but given the country's current moratorium on the death
penalty, they may instead serve life or 25-year sentences. A sixth
Dashnak prisoner, convicted of the murder of a policeman in a separate
case, also remained in jail under sentence of death.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits unauthorized searches and
preserves citizens' rights to privacy and confidentiality of
correspondence, conversations, and other messages; however, authorities
at times infringed on these rights. The security ministries must
petition a judge for permission to wiretap a telephone or intercept
correspondence. The judge acting alone purportedly must find a
compelling need for the wiretap before granting the agency permission
to proceed. No evidence of illegal wiretapping came to public attention
during the year.
The law requires security forces to obtain a search warrant from a
judge before conducting a search. Security forces were refused issuance
of warrants due to lack of evidence in several cases; however, in
practice there are charges that searches continue to be made without a
warrant. The Constitution provides that the judiciary must exclude
evidence obtained without a warrant. Legislation passed in 1997 to
improve security of bank deposits has been enforced.
There continued to be violations of the right to privacy during
army conscription drives. Armed forces recruiters sometimes take
hostages to compel the surrender of draft-evading or deserting
relatives. There are credible reports of improper conscription of
ethnic Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan, who by law are exempt from
military service. There were no reported cases of punitive conscription
of males who offended local officials.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press; however, while the Government
generally respects freedom of speech, there are some limits on freedom
of the press and journalists practice self-censorship. There is no
official censorship, publications present a variety of views, and the
opposition press regularly criticizes government policies and leaders,
including the President, on sensitive issues such as the Nagorno-
Karabakh peace process and privatization.
However, to avoid retribution experienced in years past on the part
of powerful officials and other individuals, many journalists practice
self-censorship, particularly in reporting on major corruption or
national security issues. Many journalists remain cautious in their
reporting, and the range of subjects considered sensitive for national
security is relatively large.
Newspapers, with the exception of Hayastani Hanrapetutyun and
Respublica Armenia (both joint ventures between Parliament and their
staffs), are privately owned. The state printing house and distribution
agency both now function as commercial enterprises, with no visible
government intervention.
The sensationalist political tabloid Oragir and its successor
Haykakan Zhamanak were subjected on several occasions in 1999 to legal
pressure and intimidation stemming from articles that accused
government figures of corruption and revealed alleged dubious
connections between the then-Minister of Interior and National Security
and a gasoline importing private company. A series of court cases and
incidents included a public scuffle in June, when court bailiffs tried
unsuccessfully to seize Oragir's equipment to satisfy a libel judgment.
In September Oragir editor Nikol Pashinian was found guilty of libel,
slander, libeling a public official, and contempt of court (for not
publishing a retraction demanded by a court) and sentenced to 1 year of
corrective labor and ordered to pay a fine of $25,000 (13.5 million
drams). Pashinian appealed the judgment and not paid the fine; other
journalists, who up to then had been largely nonsupportive of his case,
passed a resolution criticizing the punishment as unduly harsh and for
several weeks rallied almost daily in front of the President's office
demanding a more lenient sentence. At year's end, no decision on the
Pashinian case had been announced by the appeals court.
On December 23, the offices of Haykakan Zhamanak were invaded by
approximately a dozen men who beat and kicked Pashinian and other male
members of the staff. They reportedly were led by a local businessman
who was angered by an article in Haykakan Zhamanak that accused him of
corruption. Pashinian afterwards announced that he would not file
charges against his assailants, but that he expected them to apologize
to all journalists for the attack. On December 25, the Russian
newspaper Novoye Vremya had reprinted an article originally published
in the Russian press accusing the late Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsian
of corruption. Novoye Vermya's editor subsequently reportedly received
a threatening telephone call purporting to be from the Yerkrapah Union,
a social/political faction of veterans of the Nagorno-Karabakh war
founded by Sargsian. The caller warned the editor that if his paper
continued to ``insult'' the slain Prime Minister, his house would be
burned. On December 31, a fire characterized by media reports as arson
damaged the Yerevan offices of the Russian newspaper.
Newspapers operate with extremely limited resources, and none are
completely independent of patronage from economic or political interest
groups or individuals. Due to prevailing economic conditions, newspaper
circulation is small (a total of 40,000 copies, by the Department of
Information's estimates, or about 1 copy per 100 persons). The state-
owned newspaper printing and distribution companies have been
privatized, except for a small government stake. There were no
complaints of official government pressure on news media.
State institutions that previously had tended to exert control over
the media have lost most of their functions. The Department of
Information, created in 1997 to replace the disbanded Ministry of
Information, continued to exist, but with no clear purpose beyond
allocating small government subsidies to newspapers and occasionally
interceding with the state-owned newspaper distribution agency to
forward a share of its receipts to the newspapers. A board was created
in late 1997 with representatives from the President's Office,
Government, and Parliament, to supervise the transformation of the
state-owned press agency, printing, and newspaper distribution into
commercial enterprises. The board has not been active during the past 2
years, and state-owned enterprises remain under government control. The
President's Office continued to influence state television news
coverage.
The most widely available of the two state-owned television
channels takes policy guidance from the Government; presenting mostly
factual reporting, it avoids editorial commentary or criticism of
official actions. During the May parliamentary elections, the coverage
of political parties on state television and other media generally was
balanced and largely neutral. Single-mandate candidates were not
entitled to free programing, but had no restrictions on paid time. In
Yerevan and major regional media markets, private television stations
now offer independent news coverage of good technical quality. Most
radio stations are private. Opposition parties and politicians receive
adequate news coverage and access on these channels. Legislation has
not been passed yet to regulate the current arbitrary and
nontransparent process of license issuance. Draft broadcast and media
laws, the subject of intensive discussion among journalists, were
revised extensively, but for a second year they were not discussed by
Parliament. One new measure announced in October 1998, a 25-fold
increase in licensing fees for television broadcasters, was expected to
have a serious effect on struggling private stations; these stations
appealed for the measure's cancellation. After the President's
intervention, the overall increase was significantly lowered (to three-
fold). The few international newspapers and magazines imported are not
censored. There are no restrictions on reception of satellite
television and other foreign media, and this material is not censored.
The Government partially respects academic freedom. There are more
than 80 private institutions of higher education. The Ministry of
Education must approve the curriculum of all schools that grant degrees
recognized by the State, seriously limiting the freedom of individual
schools and teachers in their choice of textbooks and course material.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice. The Constitution provides for freedom of
association, and the Government generally respects this right in
practice; however, there are some important exceptions. There are
cumbersome registration requirements for all political parties,
associations, and organizations. The process of registering an
organization is time consuming, and some human rights or political
organizations have been compelled by the Government to revise their
bylaws several times in order to have their registrations accepted. No
human rights or political organization reported problems with
registration during the year.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the law specifies some restrictions on the religious
freedom of adherents of faiths other than the Armenian apostolic
church, which has formal legal status as the national church.
The 1991 Law on Freedom of Conscience, amended in 1997, establishes
the separation of church and state, but grants the Armenian Apostolic
Church special status. The law forbids ``proselytizing'' (undefined in
the law) except by the Armenian Apostolic Church and requires all
religious denominations and organizations to register with the State
Council on Religious Affairs. Petitioning organizations must ``be free
from materialism and of a purely spiritual nature,'' and must subscribe
to a doctrine based on ``historically recognized holy scriptures.''
A presidential decree issued in 1993 supplemented the 1991 law and
strengthened the position of the Armenian Apostolic Church. The decree
enjoins the Council on Religious Affairs to investigate the activities
of the representatives of registered religious organizations and to ban
missionaries who engage in activities contrary to their status. The
Council on Religious Affairs took no action against missionaries during
the year and even members of Jehovah's Witnesses, which is not
registered, were allowed to engage fairly openly in missionary
activity.
In 1996 Parliament passed legislation tightening registration
requirements by raising from 50 to 200 adult members the minimum number
required for registration. The law banned funding for foreign-based
churches from centers outside Armenia. The 1996 legislation also
mandated that religious organizations except the Armenian Apostolic
Church need prior permission from the State Council on Religious
Affairs to engage in religious activities in public places, travel
abroad, or to invite foreign guests to the country. Despite these
mandated restrictions, in practice there is no restriction on travel by
the religious personnel of any denomination, including those that are
unregistered. Members of unregistered minority religious organizations
are allowed to bring in small quantities of religious literature for
their own use, but large shipments by unregistered groups are
prohibited.
As of year's end, registered religious groups had reported no
adverse consequences from the law. The ban on foreign funding has not
been enforced and is considered unenforceable by the Council on
Religious Affairs. The Council has such limited resources that it has
not performed any acts except the annual reregistering of religious
groups. No registered religious group was denied reregistration under
the amended law. All existing denominations reregistered except the
Hare Krishnas, who reportedly dropped below even the previous 50-member
threshold and hence did not seek to reregister and are no longer
active. A few new organizations registered, in some instances groups
created after splits in previous organizations, bringing the number of
registered groups to 48.
However, the Council on Religious Affairs continued to deny
registration to Jehovah's Witnesses, no longer on the grounds that the
group does not permit military service, but because its ``illegal
proselytism'' is allegedly integral to its activity and because of the
``dissatisfaction and tension'' caused in some communities by its
public preaching. A regional leader of Jehovah's Witnesses held
meetings with the Council on Religious Affairs in September, which he
described as ``encouraging,'' but there was no change in the denial of
registration by year's end. Jehovah's Witnesses have challenged their
nonregistration in the courts as recommended in 1998 by the President's
Human Rights Commission.
Eleven members of Jehovah's Witnesses remained in detention,
charged with draft evasion or, if forcibly drafted, with desertion.
According to Amnesty International, at least one Jehovah's Witnesses
conscript was beaten severely by military personnel in December 1998
for refusal to wear a uniform. Around 50 Jehovah's Witnesses were
reportedly in hiding from the draft. Alternative nonmilitary service is
sometimes available for persons willing to act as teachers in remote
villages, an option not available under current law to members of
Jehovah's Witnesses. The President's office stated in March that a law
was being drafted that would regulate alternative service for Jehovah's
Witnesses and other conscientious objectors, but it had not been
introduced by year's end. At least one member of Jehovah's Witnesses
detained for draft evasion during the year indicated in writing his
willingness to perform alternative service. A Jehovah's Witnesses
official noted that some forms of alternate service would be
problematic for members of his group, due to their creed's prohibition
of participation in some government organs.
Police curtailed a Jehovah's Witnesses convention held in September
at a privately owned, rented facility outside Yerevan and tried to
disperse the meeting nonviolently, citing an alleged decree by the
National Security Council; however, they were unable to produce such a
decree, and an official of the Council on Religious Affairs stated that
it had not authorized dispersal of the meeting and was not aware of the
decree. The police left without dispersing the meeting, but shortly
thereafter power to the building was interrupted. Jehovah's Witnesses
ended their meeting prematurely but peacefully. No agency admitted
responsibility for the power interruption.
According to the law, a religious organization refused registration
cannot publish a newspaper or magazine, rent a meeting place on
government-owned property, have its own program on television or radio,
or officially sponsor the visas of visitors. Jehovah's Witnesses
continue to have problems renting meeting places. Lack of official visa
sponsorship means that visitors of Jehovah's Witnesses must pay for a
tourist visa.
The Armenian Apostolic Church elected a new head, or Catholicos, at
an ecclesiastical conference in October attended by delegations from
around the world. Although several candidates for this office alleged
government interference in the election process, the vote was held in
an open atmosphere and there were no signs of pressure or intimidation
by government agencies.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and
repatriation; however, the Government places restrictions on some of
those rights. The Government may deny passports to persons possessing
state secrets, to those subject to military service, and to those whose
relatives have made financial claims against them. Men of military age
must overcome substantial bureaucratic obstacles to international
travel. The Government does not restrict internal movement, and
citizens have the right to change their residence or workplace freely.
They must negotiate with a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy to
register these changes, but this practice is now more a nuisance than
an impediment. In addition registration of a residence is a difficult
process, particularly for those who live in a rented dwelling.
After the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted between Armenia and
Azerbaijan in 1988, ethnic minorities on both sides were subject to
discrimination and intimidation, often accompanied by violence intended
to drive them from the country. Almost all the ethnic Azeris living in
Armenia at the time, some 185,000 persons, fled to Azerbaijan. Of the
400,000 ethnic Armenians then living in Azerbaijan, 330,000 fled and
gained refugee status in Armenia. The majority of the rest took refuge
in Russia, with small numbers remaining in Azerbaijan.
The National Assembly passed a law on citizenship in 1996 that
provides for refugees of Armenian ethnicity to gain citizenship,
provided they are stateless and have resided in the country for the
past 3 years. In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for the
law and began new efforts to encourage refugees to accept Armenian
citizenship. In January the Government decided to allow refugees to
naturalize when registered under their factual residence (the residence
at which the refugee actually resides), and in March the refugee law
was adopted by the National Assembly. During the final months of the
year, the Government established a new system at the local level,
making the acquisition of citizenship easier for refugees. As a result,
an increased number of refugees chose to accept citizenship: from
August through November, 6,473 refugees received citizenship, compared
with a total of 7,200 total in 1998. However, a government report at
year's end said that most refugees are still reluctant to become
citizens, fearing the loss of free housing, military service
exemptions, and other benefits accorded refugees.
The Government cooperates with the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting ethnic Armenian refugees. The newly passed refugee law has
provisions for granting refugee and asylee status in accordance with
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. The Government respects the right of first asylum.
During the year, at least one Sudanese was granted asylum based on fear
of religious prosecution if he returned to Sudan.
Border officials have no training on asylum issues. In some cases,
persons denied permission for legal residence are subjected to fines
for illegal residence when they attempt to depart the country. There
were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Serious flaws in the 1998 presidential election continued to
restrict the constitutional ability of citizens to change their
government peacefully, as had the previous Government's manipulation of
the 1996 presidential election. Serious breaches of the election law
and numerous irregularities in the 1995 parliamentary elections, and
the 1996 and 1998 presidential elections resulted in a lack of public
confidence in the integrity of the overall election process.
In both rounds of the 1998 presidential elections, OSCE observers
witnessed very substantial irregularities and concluded that the
elections seriously challenged international democratic norms in regard
to most key criteria. There were unusually high voter turnouts in
certain areas, particularly in the second round, and these increases
corresponded directly to high vote percentages for then Acting
President Kocharian. Based on detailed analysis of the results tracked
by observer reports in certain districts, it appears that ballot box
stuffing, discrepancies in vote counts, a large number of unauthorized
persons in polling stations, and other fraud perpetrated by local power
structures inflated the number of votes for Kocharian by well over
100,000 votes in the second round, which he won by approximately
290,000 votes. Some military units were compelled to vote without
exception for Kocharian, and officials used pressure to encourage a
large turnout for the ``official'' candidate. Voters enjoyed a full
spectrum of choices among candidates; all presidential candidates were
provided opportunities to present themselves to the electorate through
the provision of free and paid access to state media. However, state
television, the most influential single source of information, provided
coverage biased heavily in favor of the acting president. The electoral
process fell far short of the authorities' commitments to their
citizens. There were no legal consequences for electoral fraud. The
Government pursued only minor violations and no penalties were
announced. There was no criminal investigation of the amply documented
ballot box stuffing.
The May parliamentary elections showed continued improvement toward
compliance with OSCE commitments, but still failed to meet
international standards. Nonetheless, during the election, observers
from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) noted
improvements in the electoral framework and the political environment.
Freedom of association, freedom of assembly, and freedom of expression
were respected during the campaign. The previously banned party ARF-
Dashnaksutyun reentered political activity in 1998. The May 30
elections took place under a new electoral code that represented a
substantial improvement compared with previous legislation and
incorporated recommendations of international organizations. For
example the code provides for the accreditation of domestic nonpartisan
observers. It abolishes one level of election bureaucracy (the
community election commissions) and provides for the courts to address
electoral complaints during the campaign rather than after results are
announced.
However, election administration was uneven on election day. In
many precincts, election officials, candidates' proxies, and domestic
observers worked together to provide transparent voting and counting
procedures. The areas of most concern witnessed by OSCE/ODIHR observers
included the poor quality of the voter lists, which often were outdated
or inaccurate; mistakes in registration; voting by military personnel;
problems in the formation of the election commissions and the status of
their members; and the presence of unauthorized personnel in precincts
during voting and counting procedures. Thousands of voters had to
appeal to local courts on election day in order to cast their votes,
after finding that their names had been left off local voter lists.
Opposition parties such as the National Democratic Union, the Self-
Determination Union, the Communist Party, Hayrenik, and Azatutuyun
criticized the exclusion of numerous residents from the lists. The
Central Election Commission blamed the omissions on the negligence of
some civil servants. Twelve criminal cases related to parliamentary
election fraud, involving 16 persons, remain under investigation by the
Prosecutor General's office at year's end.
In the May parliamentary elections, many observers witnessed
soldiers closely supervised by their commanding officers and left alone
for a few minutes to cast ballots; in some cases, soldiers were
instructed to vote for the Unity Alliance. In addition press reports
and a number of election observers noted that supporters of many
candidates offered both monetary and other inducements to voters to
encourage votes for their candidate.
In the October municipal elections, the three major problems were:
the politicization of election commissions, obsolete or incorrect voter
lists, and the use of old seals (the election law mandates that new
ones be provided by regional election commissions for each election, as
a check on ballot box stuffing), presumably because the funds were
lacking to buy new seals.
Four districts of Yerevan held local by-elections on July 11. In
the Achapniak district, violence erupted when armed supporters of one
of the candidates beat and fired upon supporters of another candidate.
The Central Elections Commission suspended this vote and declared it
invalid. A criminal investigation was launched, which resulted in the
arrest of 14 persons; the police still are seeking 10 more persons
allegedly involved in the Achapniak violence. Those arrested are being
prosecuted, but at year's end, the accused were free on bail and were
not brought to trial due to continuances requested by their attorneys.
The by-election in Achapniak was rescheduled 6 weeks later. Neither of
the candidates whose followers were involved in the original violence
ran in the rescheduled election, although they were not barred from
doing so. The election took place without incident.
Further improvements were made to the electoral framework and
election administration for the October 24 municipal elections of
community mayors and councils of elders. Candidate proxies, media,
domestic observers, and international observers were entitled to
monitor all stages of the election process; however, international
observers did not monitor all stages. Shortly before the election, an
amendment addressing procedures for military personnel to participate
in municipal elections was passed, restricting military voting to the
place of the soldier's permanent residence. This amendment, in
practice, prevents a majority of the military from voting, as many
soldiers are stationed far from their permanent residences and cannot
obtain leave to return home to vote.
On October 16, the Constitutional Court struck down the Law on
Local Self-government and the Law on Refugees, which prohibited
refugees with permanent residence (``propiska'') in Armenia from
participating in municipal elections, concluding that they were in
conflict with the Constitution and provisions of the electoral code.
The Constitutional Court decision gave refugees with permanent
residence the right to vote in such municipal elections. Nevertheless,
by presidential decree, municipal elections were postponed in
communities where refugees make up more than 50 percent of the
population.
Mayors and other community heads, in conjunction with relevant
authorities, updated and significantly improved the voter lists before
the October 24 municipal elections. As a result, the number of citizens
appealing for inclusion on voter lists in the Court of First Instance
was reduced significantly. Council of Europe observers described the
October 24 election as free and fair; however, the observers noted
several minor irregularities, including use of previously used seals
(the law provides that new ones should be provided for each election as
a check on ballot box stuffing) and defects in the voter lists.
However, according to Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the newspaper
Haykakan Zhamanak, few parties fielded candidates in the elections
other than the two progovernment coalition parties. The nonpartisan,
professionally trained Armenian election observers from ``It's Your
Choice'' highlighted serious flaws in the distribution of power within
election commissions, and inaccurate voting lists, noting that ``many
voters whose names were not on the lists, out of weariness and
frustration, did not appeal to the court and thus could not exercise
their constitutional right.'' This group's election report suggests
that there were only serious multiparty contests in less than one-third
of the precincts.
The Government recently confirmed its decision to postpone a
national census until 2001 for budgetary reasons. This has raised
political concerns about the integrity of the process that is to create
new electoral districts, since existing voter rolls and other
population records are in some areas out-of-date and seriously flawed.
Under the Constitution, the President appoints the Prime Minister
and makes the final selection of qualified candidates for judgeships.
The Constitution provides for independent legislative and judicial
branches, but in practice these branches are not insulated from
political pressure from the executive branch.
The Government appoints the 10 regional governors (marzpets) and
the mayor of Yerevan. The Constitution gives local communities the
right to elect local authorities. However, local elected officials have
limited powers and are overshadowed in practice by the appointed
governors, who can remove them from office.
In compliance with the Constitution, the newly elected National
Assembly operates as a full-time Parliament. It consists of 131
deputies; 56 are elected on a proportional basis and 75 on a district-
by-district majority basis. Regular sessions are held twice a year: the
first from mid-September to mid-December; and the second from early
February until mid-June. Given the press of legislative business
connected with the total reform of the legal system, special sessions
frequently are called, but may not last more than 6 days. Following the
deaths of the speaker and his two deputies in the October 27 terrorist
attack, the National Assembly elected a new speaker and deputies on
November 2 according to established constitutional procedures.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women and
minorities in government and politics; however, due to traditional
social attitudes, both groups are underrepresented in all branches of
government. There are no female cabinet ministers. Only 4 of the 131
deputies in the Parliament are women. There are no minority
representatives in the Cabinet or in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitudes Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are several human rights NGO's that are active and operate
openly, criticize abuses publicly, and publish their findings on
government human rights violations. In general public access to
information on human rights cases usually is adequate, with extensive
media coverage of significant court cases, and more openness by
civilian and military prosecutors. During the year, one domestic human
rights group, the Armenia Helsinki Association for the first time was
allowed to visit death row and talk with convicts sentenced to death.
In February a Ministry of Defense official warned a member of an
organization dealing with conscripts to desist from cooperating with
international human rights organizations. In March Mikael Danielyan,
chair of the Armenia Helsinki Association, was accused of making
unfounded accusations after he complained about the refusal of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs to grant access to pretrial detention
facilities for monitoring; Danielyan had submitted written requests and
made repeated attempts to gain access for over a year.
An office created by the Prosecutor General in July 1997 to
communicate with international observers was responsive to requests for
information, although information about criminal cases stemming from
elections remained relatively general and incomplete. International
observers requesting information on election-related complaints
received more precise and detailed information on their resolution.
In 1998 President Kocharian appointed a prominent opposition
politician to head a new human rights commission within the President's
office. The commission exists essentially as a reference bureau and has
no formal legal powers. However, it has had a modest impact in getting
authorities to review official actions on social issues ranging from
apartment allocations to police behavior, in some cases winning
official reconsideration. It refers such cases to the appropriate
agency, but it does not follow up on specific issues.
The Government has permitted monitoring of human rights by the
Council of Europe and by the ICRC, which retains full access to
civilian detention facilities.
The Government invited an OSCE/ODIHR election observer mission to
observe the May parliamentary elections, and provided domestic and
international observers with unimpeded countrywide access to both the
May and October elections (see Section 3). Current electoral law allows
local observer organizations to monitor parliamentary but not
presidential elections, and such local organizations reported no
impediments to election observation during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, gender,
religion, disability, language, or social status. However, cultural and
economic factors prevent women, ethnic and religious minorities, and
persons with disabilities from participating fully in public life. The
religion law discriminates against some religious groups.
Women.--There is no specific law banning violence against women,
and few cases of rape, spousal abuse, or other violence against women
were reported; however, their number is likely higher than the
statistics indicate. Domestic violence cases usually are not reported
to the police, and women are not protected from it. There is at least
one nongovernmental organization that provides shelter and assistance
to battered women; it is located in the Gyumri area, but embarrassment
and concerns for family honor make the problem particularly sensitive
and difficult to quantify. Even womens' groups and health professionals
decline to offer specific figures, but do not indicate that such
violence is especially common.
In the first 11 months of the year, the Prosecutor's Office
registered 18 cases of rape. The Prosecutor General's Office also
reported nine attempted murders against women involving serious
injuries. The law (the old Soviet Criminal Code) cites specific
punishments for rape, forced abortion, forbidding a woman from
marrying, and discrimination in hiring due to pregnancy.
Prostitution is not illegal, and according to anecdotal evidence,
most prostitutes stopped by police for street-walking are simply sent
to a hospital or physician for a medical check-up. Armenian women work
as prostitutes in the Middle East, and there have been reports of
trafficking in women and girls in the past, but there were no reports
during the year (see Section 6.f.).
Males often play a dominant role in many societal institutions. In
the workplace, women receive equal pay for equal work, but generally
are not afforded the same professional opportunities given to men and
often are relegated to more menial or low-skill jobs. The 1972 Law on
Employment prohibits discrimination in employment, but the extremely
high unemployment rate makes it difficult to gauge how effectively the
law has been implemented to prevent discrimination. Formerly, labor
unions protected women's rights in the workplace at least nominally,
but the current weakness of unions (see Section 6.a.) likely has
rendered them even less effective in this role. According to official
statistics, women make up 65 percent of those officially registered as
unemployed. Currently there are more women receiving university and
postgraduate education than men. This statistic may be accounted for in
part by the Nagorno-Karabakh situation, which necessitates a high
number of males in military service, and in part by the economic
situation, which has caused males to emigrate in search of employment.
Children.--The Government does not have the economic means to
provide fully for the welfare of children. Education is free,
universal, and compulsory through age 16, but many facilities are
impoverished and in poor condition, and teachers are forced to tutor
pupils privately to supplement salaries that are low and irregularly
paid. Some teachers are known to demand bribes from parents in return
for good or passing grades for their children. Free children's health
care is available for treatment of some diseases and for emergency
cases, but it is often of poor quality, with an increasing trend toward
overt or concealed payment of fees for service.
Girls and boys receive equal educational opportunities. The
Government focuses its efforts regarding children's rights and welfare
on measures to insulate large families--those with four or more
children--from the effects of the country's current difficult
circumstances. The Government similarly directs foreign humanitarian
aid programs toward larger families. Despite social programs, the
problem of street children remains significant. However, the family
tradition remains strong, and child abuse does not appear to be a
serious problem.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution provides for the right
to social security in the event of disability. The 1993 Law on Invalids
provides for the social, political, and individual rights of the
disabled, but does not mandate the provision of accessibility for the
disabled. During the year, expenditures for the health sector were cut
by approximately $4.8 million (2.6 billion drams) from the projected
level, which affected the disabled, who are supposed to be treated
free. According to the former Minister of Social Security, the social
sector budget also is being cut by approximately $550,000 (300 million
drams). In the current economic circumstances and in an effort to meet
international financial institution guidelines on reduction of the
budget deficit, the Government has had difficulty fulfilling its
commitments in this area.
The Government's enforcement of the rights of the disabled remains
rudimentary. Legal safeguards for those with psychiatric problems are
inadequate to protect patients' rights. There is societal
discrimination against the disabled. Hospitals, residential care, and
other facilities for the seriously disabled do not meet international
norms. A local human rights group alleges that there are cases in which
security authorities use confinement in mental institutions as an
alternative form of detention.
Religious Minorities.--There was no reported violence against
minority religious groups. However, newer religious groups are viewed
with suspicion, especially by some clergy in the Armenian Apostolic
Church and their supporters in the bureaucracy.
A relatively high percentage of members of some religious
minorities, particularly Hare Khrishnas but evangelical Christians as
well, joined the wave of emigration from the country, for social,
economic, and philosophical reasons. Despite the Government's previous
pledge to apprehend alleged members of the Yerkrapah Union political
faction who staged a series of destructive attacks against a dozen
religious groups in 1995, the authorities still had taken no steps to
bring the perpetrators to justice.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population is around 94
percent ethnic Armenian. The Government does not discriminate against
the small, officially recognized ``national'' communities, although the
economic and social situation of such groups has deteriorated
substantially since independence in 1991. Groups that the Government
includes in this category are Russians, Jews, Kurds, Yezidis,
Georgians, Greeks, and Assyrians. As a result of the protracted
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there is no significant Azeri minority (see
Section 2.d.). Several hundred Azeris or persons of mixed Azeri
heritage still living in the country maintain a low profile in the face
of societal discrimination.
The Constitution grants national minorities the right to preserve
their cultural traditions and language, and the 1992 law on language
provides linguistic minorities with the right to publish and study in
their native language. There are token publications in minority
languages, but the Government has devoted minimal resources to
maintaining minority language schools. The large network of Russian-
language schools has dwindled in recent years. In practice virtually
all students, including members of the Yezidi and Greek communities,
now attend Armenian-language schools, with very limited classes
available in their mother tongues. In the Yezidi community, a high
percentage of pupils do not attend school, partly for family economic
reasons and partly because of discrimination by ethnic Armenian
students and teachers.
Yezidi leaders continued to complain that police and local
authorities subject their community to discrimination. The Yezidis,
whose number is estimated at 60,000 by Yezidi leaders, speak a Kurdish
dialect and practice a traditional, non-Christian, non-Muslim religion
with elements derived from Zoroastrianism, Islam, and animism. They
cite numerous incidents of unfair adjudication of land, water, and
grazing disputes; nonreceipt of privatized agricultural land; an
unusually high number of beatings of Yezidi conscripts in the army; and
lack of police response to even serious crimes committed against
Yezidis. The Yezidi complaints likely reflect societal discrimination
as well as the more general problem of poorly functioning local
government bodies. The Yezidi leaders met in July 1998 with the
President's human rights commission with which and received an
affirmation that the Government would improve the situation; however,
the Government took no action during the year.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides employees
with the right to form and join trade unions and the right to strike.
The Constitution stipulates that the right to form associations--
including political parties and trade unions--may be limited with
respect to persons serving in the armed services and law enforcement
agencies. A 1993 presidential decree prohibits the Government and other
employers from retaliating against strikers and labor leaders, but
workers have little confidence in this protection. In practice labor
organization remains weak due to high unemployment and the weak
economy. Workers have neither the financial resources to maintain a
strike nor enforceable legal protection against retaliation, and
existing unions play a relatively passive role. However, there were no
reports of retaliation against strikers or labor leaders. The
purportedly independent labor federation created in December 1997
continues in operation, but took no action during the year.
The absence of real unions and of accurate employment data
precludes a reliable estimate of the percentage of the work force that
is unionized.
Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations, but
none did so during the year.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is not practiced. The Constitution provides all citizens
with the right to a just wage no lower than the minimum set by the
Government. Although the 1992 Law on Employment provides for the right
to organize and bargain collectively, voluntary and direct negotiations
do not take place between unions and employers without the
participation of the Government because most large employers remain
under state control. The near collapse of major industrial production
has undercut the organization of labor unions.
The Government encourages profitable factories to establish their
own pay scales. Factory directorates generally set the pay scales
without consultation with employees. The Arbitration Commission
adjudicates wage and other labor disputes.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the 1992 Law on Employment prohibit forced and bonded labor, including
that by children, and it generally is not known to occur. There were
reports of trafficking in women and girls in the past; however, there
were no such reports during the year (see Section 6.f.). This provision
is enforced by the local community councils, unemployment offices, and,
as a final board of appeal, the Arbitration Commission.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--According to the 1992 Law on Employment, 16 years is the
minimum age for employment. Children may work from the age of 14 with
the permission of a medical commission and the relevant labor union
board. The Law on Employment is enforced by local community councils,
unemployment offices, and, as a final board of appeal, the Arbitration
Commission. Forced or bonded labor by children is prohibited, and it is
not known to occur.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the minimum
wage by decree. In October 1998, Parliament quintupled the national
minimum wage to less than $10 (5,000 drams) per month; however, the
minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for
a worker and family. The majority of the population lives below the
officially recognized poverty line as a result of economic dislocations
caused by the breakup of the Soviet Union, the 1988 earthquake, the
conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh and the resulting blockade by Azerbaijan
and Turkey, and disruptions in trade. However, a significant amount of
economic activity takes place unrecorded and untaxed by local
authorities. The extent to which this improves the overall economic
situation is unknown.
The majority of industrial enterprises are either idle or operating
at a fraction of their capacity. Some furloughed workers still are
receiving minimal partial compensation from their enterprises, but most
are no longer receiving any payment if they are not working. The
standard legal workweek is 40 hours; many persons work multiple jobs.
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to clean and safe
work places, but Soviet-era occupational and safety standards remain in
force. Labor legislation from 1988 places responsibility on the
employer and the management of each firm to ensure ``healthy and
normal'' labor conditions for employees, but it provides no definition
of healthy and normal. The employment situation is such that workers
are reluctant to complain about hazardous working conditions due to the
risk of losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The legal code does not prohibit
specifically trafficking in persons, although it does prohibit
exploitation by force of persons for financial gain. The Criminal Code
specifically prohibits the keeping of what are generally considered to
be brothels. Armenian women work as prostitutes in the Middle East, and
there have been reports of trafficking in women and girls in the past.
There are reports that older girls in a local orphanage were approached
with offers to engage in prostitution, either locally or abroad. The
Criminal Code does not forbid prostitution. The 10 cases of trafficking
in women or procuring currently in court are being prosecuted under the
Criminal Code prohibition on brothels.
______
AUSTRIA
Austria is a constitutional democracy with a federal parliamentary
form of government. Citizens choose their representatives in periodic,
free, and fair multiparty elections. The judiciary is independent.
The police are subordinated to the executive and judicial
authorities. The national police maintain internal security. The army
is responsible for external security. The police are generally well
trained and disciplined, although some members of the police were
responsible for instances of human rights abuses.
Austria's highly developed, market-based economy, with its mix of
technologically advanced industry, modern agriculture, and tourism,
affords its citizens a high standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. There were some reports of abuse by
police, which involved occasional beatings but mainly involved verbal
abuse and threats. Legislation went into effect to increase protection
for women against domestic violence, which has been a problem and is
considered to be greatly underreported. Trafficking in women for
prostitution is a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In May an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant died while being
deported; his hands and feet were cuffed and his mouth was taped shut
to control his violent behavior (see Section 2.d.).
On September 15, police shot and killed Horst Ludwig Meyer, a
suspected member of the German terrorist group Red Army Faction, when
he opened fire on them near Vienna. Meyer and an accomplice are
believed to have killed a German diplomat, Gerold von Braunmuhl, and,
in a separate attack, German businessman Heinz Beckurts and his driver,
in 1986. Meyer and his accomplice also are accused of killing a
Deutsche Bank spokesman, Alfred Herrenhausen, in 1989 and involvement
in a 1988 attack against a NATO installation in Spain. His accomplice,
Andrea Klump, was arrested and subsequently extradited to Germany on
December 23.
In March Franz Fuchs was convicted for killing four Roma in 1995
and injuring 15 other persons in a letter bomb campaign between 1993
and 1997 (see Section 5).
A French appeals court was considering an Austrian government
request for the extradition of the terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez
(alias ``Carlos the Jackal'') at year's end. Austria formally has
sought the extradition of ``Carlos'' since French authorities captured
him in 1994. He is wanted on charges of manslaughter, kidnaping, and
blackmail in connection with the terrorist attacks at Vienna's OPEC
headquarters in December 1975.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although the Constitution prohibits such practices,
government statistics for 1998 showed 356 complaints against federal
police officials for ``unjustified use of force,'' compared with 321 in
1997. Of the 356 complaints, 288 resulted in investigations (compared
with 339 in 1997). The number of suspensions dropped from 31 in 1997 to
22 in 1998. Four police officials were convicted of excessive use of
force in 1998; two officers were convicted in 1999. Of the 158 cases
pending in 1998, 44 have been dismissed due to lack of evidence; the
other cases remain pending. Types of abuse ranged from slander to
kicking and hitting, resulting mainly in bruising. Some of the violence
appears to be racially motivated.
In May an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant died while being
deported; his hands and feet were cuffed and his mouth was taped shut
to control his violent behavior. Two of the three police officers who
accompanied him were suspended and a committee was created with the
goal of ensuring that the police and gendarmerie respect human rights
while carrying out their duties (see Section 2.d.).
According to some witnesses, in March a dark-skinned French citizen
suspected of dealing drugs, known only as Mohammed S., allegedly was
beaten by police officers during an arrest. Witnesses alleged that two
officers kicked, hit, and sprayed the man with pepper spray after he
had been immobilized. After a short period of time, additional officers
and an ambulance arrived and the suspect was taken to the hospital.
Minister of the Interior Karl Schloegl invited the witnesses to tell
him personally what happened and stated that his Ministry, the district
attorney, and police management would investigate the matter. Several
other witnesses later came forward and contradicted the earlier
testimony. Charges were filed against the police officers, but were
dropped in July due to lack of evidence.
On March 16, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) expressed concern regarding reports of serious
cases of police brutality towards persons of foreign origin and ethnic
minorities.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards and the
Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors. In
individual cases, investigating judges or prison directors have
jurisdiction over questions of access to the defendant.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention and the Government observes
this prohibition.
In criminal cases the law provides for investigative or pretrial
detention for up to 48 hours; however, in cases of charges of
``aggressive behavior'' an investigative judge may decide within that
period to grant a prosecution request for detention of up to 2 years
pending completion of an investigation. The grounds required for such
investigative detention are specified in the law, as are conditions for
bail. The investigative judge is required to evaluate an investigative
detention after 2 weeks, 1 month, and every 2 months after the arrest.
Forced exile is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, and the Government generally respects this right
in practice, although stringent slander laws tend to discourage reports
of police brutality. Publications may be removed from circulation if
they violate legal provisions concerning morality or public security,
but such cases are extremely rare.
The government monopoly in television and national radio is
gradually being dismantled. A 1993 law permitted licensing of regional
private radio stations, but legal challenges by unsuccessful applicants
for licenses delayed implementation of the law. Rewritten radio
frequency rules went into effect in April 1998. As of July, there were
51 private radio stations. Second quarter figures show that while 71.3
percent of citizens listen to the state-run radio stations, 20.1
percent listen to private stations.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly and association, except for Nazi
organizations and activities (an exception stipulated also in the
Austrian State Treaty of 1955). The Law on the Formation of
Associations states that permission to form an organization may be
denied if it is apparent that the organization will pursue the illegal
activities of a prohibited organization.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion of individuals and the Government generally respects this
right in practice. However, the status of religious organizations is
governed by the 1874 ``Law on Recognition'' of churches and by a
January 1998 law establishing the status of ``confessional
communities.'' Religious recognition under the 1874 law has wide-
ranging implications, for example, the authority to participate in the
state-collected religious taxation program, to engage in religious
education, and to import religious workers to act as ministers,
missionaries, or teachers. Although in the past nonrecognized religious
groups have had problems obtaining resident permits for foreign
religious workers, administrative procedures adopted in 1997 have
addressed this problem in part. Officially, 75.3 percent of the
population are Roman Catholic, and there are 11 other recognized
religious organizations.
Religious organizations may be divided into three different legal
categories (listed in descending order of status): officially
recognized religious societies, religious confessional communities, and
clubs.
Under the law, religious societies have ``public law corporation''
status. This status permits religious societies to engage in a number
of public or quasi-public activities that are denied to other religious
organizations. The Constitution singles out religious societies for
special recognition. Among the many benefits provided to religious
societies that are not granted to other religious organizations are
state subsidies for religious teachers (at both public and private
schools), and access of the clergy to hospitals, prisons, and the
military chaplaincy.
Previously, some nonrecognized religious groups were able to
organize as legal entities or associations, although this route has not
been available universally. Some groups even have done so while
applying for recognition as religious communities under the 1874 law.
Many such applications for recognition have languished in the Education
Ministry, in some cases for years. Following years of bureaucratic
delay and an administrative court order instructing the Education
Ministry to render a decision, in 1997 the Ministry denied the request
for recognition of Jehovah's Witnesses. Jehovah's Witnesses appealed
this decision to the Constitutional Court.
In January 1998, a law went into effect that allows nonrecognized
religious groups to seek official status as confessional communities
without the fiscal and educational privileges available to recognized
religions. Religious confessional communities, once they are recognized
officially as such by the Government, have juridical standing, which
permits them to engage in such activities as purchasing real estate in
their own names, contracting for goods and services, and other
activities. To apply groups must have 300 members and submit to the
Government their written statutes, describing the goals, rights, and
obligations of members, membership regulations, officials, and
financing. Groups also must submit a written version of their religious
doctrine, which must differ from that of any existing religion
recognized under the 1874 law or registered under the new law, for a
determination that their basic beliefs do not violate public security,
public order, health and morals, or the rights and freedoms of
citizens. A religious organization that seeks to obtain this new status
is subject to a 6-month waiting period from the time of application to
the Ministry of Education and Culture. The new law also sets out
additional criteria for eventual recognition according to the 1874 law,
such as a 20-year observation period (at least 10 of which must be as a
group organized as a confessional community under the new law) and
membership equaling at least two one-thousandths of the country's
population. Many religious groups and independent congregations do not
meet the 300-member threshold for registration under the new law. Only
Jehovah's Witnesses currently meet the higher membership requirement
for recognition under the 1874 law.
In a decision issued in March 1998, the Constitutional Court voided
the Education Ministry's decision on Jehovah's Witnesses and ordered a
new decision based on the January law on the Status of Confessional
Communities. In July 1998, Jehovah's Witnesses received the status of a
confessional community. According to the 1998 law, the group is now
subject to a 10-year observation period before they are eligible for
recognition.
As of July 10, 1998, the Education Ministry had granted the status
of ``confessional community'' to eight religious groups, including for
example, Jehovah's Witnesses, Baptists, and Seventh-Day Adventists. The
Church of Scientology and the Hindu Mandir Association withdrew their
applications. Later, the Hindu Mandir Association reapplied as the
Hindu religious community and was granted confessional community status
in December 1998. The Ministry rejected the application of the Sahaja
Yoga group; in 1998 the group appealed the decision to the
Constitutional Court.
Proponents of the law describe it as an opportunity for religious
groups to become officially registered as religious organizations,
providing them with a government ``quality seal.'' However, numerous
religious groups not recognized by the State, as well as some religious
law experts dismiss the purported benefits of obtaining status under
the law and have complained that the law's additional criteria for
recognition under the 1874 law obstruct claims to recognition and
formalize a second-class status for nonrecognized groups. Experts have
questioned the law's constitutionality.
After the Education Ministry granted Jehovah's Witnesses the status
of Confessional Community, the group immediately in 1998 requested that
it be recognized as a religious group under the 1874 law. The Education
Ministry denied the application, on the basis that, as a confessional
community, Jehovah's Witnesses would need to submit to the required 10-
year observation period. The group has appealed this decision to the
Constitutional Court, arguing that a 10-year waiting period is
unconstitutional. A decision is expected in 2000.
Also in 1998, Jehovah's Witnesses filed a complaint with the
European Court for Human Rights, arguing that the group has not yet
been granted full status as a religious entity under the 1874 law,
despite having made numerous attempts over more than two decades.
Religious associations that do not qualify for either religious
society or confessional community status may apply to become ``clubs.''
This status is granted relatively freely, although clubs do not have
legal standing and are unable to purchase property, churches, or engage
in other activities permitted to the other two legal categories.
During the year, the Government continued its information campaign
against religious sects considered potentially harmful to individuals
and society. As part of the campaign, the Family Ministry established a
new Federal Office on Sects, which is responsible for collecting and
providing information on sects active in the country. While the law
stipulates that the Office has independent status, the head of the
Office is appointed and supervised by the Minister for Environment,
Youth, and Family, and the Office is supported by public funds. In
September the Family Ministry released a second edition of the brochure
entitled ``Sects: Knowledge Protects,'' describing numerous
nonrecognized religious groups in negative terms found offensive by
many of the groups listed. The brochure lists Jehovah's Witnesses,
despite its confessional community status.
Members of the Unification Church and the Church of Scientology
complained of discrimination and harassment by the police and the
public.
In April the conservative Austrian People's Party (OVP) convention
formally adopted a decision made by the party's executive board in 1997
that party membership is incompatible with membership in a sect. This
policy led to the resignation of a local OVP official in 1997. Shortly
after this decision, a member of the provincial parliament of Upper
Austria called for a requirement that civil service applicants and
employees sign a declaration that they are not members of the Church of
Scientology and that they do not support the Church's goals. False
statements would be grounds for disqualification or rejection from the
applicants' employment pool. Any person who already was employed and
found to be a member of the Church of Scientology would be dismissed.
The requirement had not been made law at year's end.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict
movement, including emigration. Citizens who leave the country have the
right to return at any time.
Austria has signed the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, but subscribes to the ``safe
country'' concept, which requires asylum seekers who enter illegally to
depart and seek refugee status from outside the country. In response to
continuing criticism by the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations, the Government
passed an amendment to the 1991 asylum law in 1997 designed to bring
some improvements to the ``safe country'' rule and the appellate
procedure. The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The UNHCR and other
humanitarian organizations generally approve of the 1997 asylum law,
but there is still some dissatisfaction with its implementation. A
January amendment to the 1997 asylum law, which authorizes the Ministry
of Interior to draw up a ``white list'' of ``safe third countries,''
drew sharp criticism from human rights and refugee advocacy groups.
There is widespread opposition to this concept based on the fear that
it compromises the principle of individual investigation of claims.
This principle was upheld in a February ruling of the Administrative
Court, which reversed a denial of asylum made on the basis of the
``safe third country'' rule. Individuals found to be bona fide refugees
by government authorities are not sent back to the countries from which
they fled. In 1997 the Government established an appeal body for
refugees--the Independent Federal Asylum Senate. Asylum seekers whose
claims have been rejected by the Federal Asylum Office may appeal to
this body; the Administrative Court is the court of last instance.
Of the estimated 95,000 Bosnian refugees who arrived between April
1992 and July 1993, the Government provided temporary protected status
(TPS), similar to first asylum, to 47,000, which made them eligible to
receive government assistance without having to file asylum
applications. Most of the other 48,000 refugees were deemed to have
other means of support, either from families already present in Austria
or from nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). The overwhelming number
of all Bosnian refugees has been integrated into the labor market. They
now hold ``gastarbeiter'' status, which means that their residency
permit is evaluated each year on the basis of the country's overall
labor demand. Many of the refugees have chosen voluntarily to return to
their homeland, a process that still continues. In 1997 4,200 Bosnians
returned to their homeland; a similar number returned by the end of
1998. In December 482 Bosnian refugees still remained in the country in
TPS, and still received public assistance. In July 1998, temporary
residency rights for citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina were extended
beyond the deadline of July 31, 1998 until the summer of 2000. TPS is
reserved for those who cannot be absorbed readily as foreign labor or
into the community, such as the elderly, the sick, traumatized persons,
and illiterate persons.
During the Kosovo crisis, Austria accepted an estimated 10,000 to
15,000 refugees. A total of 5,080 Kosovar Albanians were evacuated
directly from Macedonia and admitted to Austria under cover of TPS.
Also, the immigration law was modified to allow Kosovar Albanians
already in the country in a variety of statuses to extend their stay.
In December approximately 1,593 Kosovar Albanians of the total of 5,080
refugees under TPS remained in the country. They receive public
assistance under a care program similar to the one set up during the
Bosnian crisis. In December the deadline for the end of TPS for Kosovar
Albanians was extended beyond December 31 to March 31, 2000, or July
31, 2000, depending on the level of destruction of housing in the area
of residence and other individual criteria. A new incentive program for
voluntary returnees was developed. About 1,500 Kosovars are expected to
stay in the country until March 31, 2000, while about 800 could extend
their stay until July 31, 2000.
Asylum applications more than doubled in 1998, from 6,719 in 1997
to 13,805. In 1998 500 applications were accepted and 3,491 requests
were denied, compared with 639 approvals and 7,286 denials in 1997. The
1998 approval figure includes asylum seekers from the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY) (6,647), Iraq (1,963), Iran (950), Afghanistan
(467), and India (472). A majority of asylum seekers are male. In the
first half of the year requests for asylum more than doubled to 9,830
from 4,526 in 1998. The increase is attributed to the Kosovo conflict:
80 to 85 percent of asylum seekers from the FRY are Kosovar Albanians;
about 55 percent are Kurds from Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and Syria. Improved
border controls resulting from the Government's full implementation of
the Schengen Agreement in April 1997 also have led to an increase in
asylum applications. Aliens who formerly used the country as merely a
transit point are now filing asylum applications.
On May 1, an unsuccessful Nigerian asylum applicant, Marcus
Omofuma, died while being deported to Lagos via Sofia, Bulgaria.
Omofuma's violent, uncooperative behavior led authorities to increase
their normal escort from two to three immigration officials. Omafuma's
hands and feet were cuffed so that he could not injure himself or
others. Additionally, en route to Sofia, the officials taped his mouth
shut to silence his loud outcries. Believing that the man had lost
consciousness during the flight, the officials summoned a doctor after
landing; the doctor pronounced Omofuma dead. A preliminary Bulgarian
autopsy found that he had suffocated; a subsequent autopsy performed by
an Austrian physician found that Omofuma's death was a result of a
heart attack, brought on by extreme stress and a heart weakened by
disease. The two doctors are expected to examine each others' reports
in the hopes of arriving at an agreement as to the cause of death.
Interior Minister Schloegl promised to review thoroughly internal
procedures regarding deportations and temporarily suspended any
deportations of individuals expected to behave violently, and turned
the case over to the state prosecutor. Two of the three police officers
who accompanied Omofuma were suspended. In June Schloegl announced the
creation of a committee, composed of representatives from the Justice
and Interior Ministries, as well as from NGO's, with the goal of
ensuring that the police and gendarmerie respect human rights while
carrying out their duties. Schloegl also announced a new policy
requiring that all potentially violent individuals be deported via
chartered aircraft, rather than on commercial flights. The first such
chartered flight took place in late June. Schloegl stated that
deportees being returned by air should only be accompanied by properly
trained officials. The investigation into the Omofuma case was
continuing at year's end, and the police officers remained suspended.
Civil charges were filed on behalf of Omofuma's young daughter
stating that Omofuma's human rights were violated. The case was first
filed in the administrative appellate senate in the province of Lower
Austria. The senate rejected the case, saying that it did not have
jurisdiction, and that the case should be handled by the city of
Vienna. The decision of the administrative appellate senate in Vienna
was pending at year's end.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully. Citizens exercise this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage. National elections were held on October 3, in which the
Social Democrats won 65 seats in Parliament; the Freedom Party, 52; and
the People's Party 52. Negotiations on forming a new coalition
government were underway at year's end.
Approximately 32 percent of the members of Parliament and 4 of 16
cabinet members are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. In some cases, they have been dissatisfied with the
information that the authorities have supplied in response to specific
complaints.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law provides for protection against any of these kinds of
discrimination in employment, provision of welfare benefits, and other
matters, and the Government generally enforces its provisions
effectively.
Women.--Violence against women remains a problem. In June the
Minister for Women's Affairs reported that an estimated 300,000 women
are abused annually. Police and judges enforce laws against violence;
however, less than 10 percent of abused women are estimated to file
complaints. Overall, the Women's Ministry estimates that one-fifth of
the country's 1.5 million adult women has suffered from violence in a
relationship. Many public officials and the media considered this to be
an extremely high figure, and as a result, legislators in July passed
an amendment to the 1997 Law on the Protection Against Violence in the
Family. This amendment extends the period during which police can expel
abusive family members from family homes from 7 days to 2 weeks; in
special cases, a court order can extend the period for up to 3 months.
Between May 1997, when the violence protection law entered into force,
and March, the interdiction to prevent abusive family members from
returning home was applied in 4,478 cases. The Government also sponsors
shelters and help lines for women. A 24-hour women's help line, as the
first point of contact for abused women and children, was established
in 1996 and has been used by 12,550 women.
Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.). While
prostitution is legal, trafficking for the purposes of prostitution is
illegal.
Most legal restrictions on women's rights have been abolished. In
1994 the European Court of Justice ruled that the country's law
prohibiting women from working nights was not permissible and gave the
Government until 2001 to adapt its legislation to gender-neutral
European Union (EU) regulations. Legislation went into effect in
January 1, 1998, requiring that collective bargaining units take action
by 2001 to eliminate restrictions on nighttime work for women.
In addition to the federal Women's Affairs Ministry, a federal
Equality Commission and a federal Commissioner for Equal Treatment
oversee laws prescribing equal treatment of men and women. Sixty
percent of women between the ages of 15 and 60 are in the labor force.
Despite substantial gains, women's incomes average 30 percent less than
those of men.
As of January 1, 1998, women were allowed to serve in the military
voluntarily. On April 1, 1998, the first women began training. On
December 1, 1998, the first women, both doctors, were taken into the
military. The long-term expectation is that women may make up about 5
percent of the military. As of June, there were a total of 73 female
soldiers; in November there were 89. Of those, 12 women were pursuing
the officer career track while 46 women were pursuing the
noncommissioned officer (NCO) career track. The remaining 31 include 5
medical doctors (4 of whom are already officers) and 26 women who are
in the military strictly to train as high-level athletes. There are no
restrictions on the type or location of assignments given to women. It
was expected that approximately 12 more women would enter the military
before the end of the year. The first females to complete a course of
instruction in the NCO academy graduated in December.
Although labor laws provide for equal treatment for women in the
civil service, they remain underrepresented. To remedy this
circumstance, a 1993 law requires hiring women of equivalent
qualifications ahead of men in civil service areas in which less than
40 percent of the employees are women; however, there are no penalties
for failing to attain the 40 percent target.
Women may be awarded compensation of up to 4 months' salary if
discriminated against in promotions because of their sex. The Labor
Court also can order employers to compensate victims of sexual
harassment.
Women's rights organizations are partly politically affiliated, and
partly autonomous groups. In voicing their concerns, they receive wide
public attention.
Children.--Laws protect the vast majority of children's rights
established in international conventions and in some respects go beyond
them. Each provincial government and the federal Ministry for Youth and
Family Affairs has an ``Ombudsperson for Children and Adolescents''
whose main function is to resolve complaints about violations of rights
of children.
While 9 years of education are mandatory for all children,
beginning at age 6, the Government also provides free education through
the level of technical or vocational programs or university.
Educational opportunity is equal for girls and boys. Comprehensive,
government-financed medical care is available for all children without
regard to gender.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children, although
heightened public awareness of abuse has led the Government to increase
its efforts to monitor the issue and prosecute offenders. Reports of
suspected sexual abuse of children in 1998 increased to 945, compared
with 895 in 1997. The number of related convictions increased to 351
from 314. The rest of the cases remain pending or were dismissed. The
growing number of reported incidences of child abuse is considered a
result of increased public awareness of the problem. According to the
Penal Code, sexual intercourse between an adult and a child (under 14
years of age) is punishable with a prison sentence of up to 10 years;
in case of pregnancy of the victim, the sentence can be extended to up
to 15 years.
Stricter regulations on child pornography went into effect in 1997.
Under the new laws, any citizen engaging in child pornography in a
foreign country becomes punishable under Austrian law even if the
actions are not punishable in the country where this violation was
committed. The laws also entail more severe provisions for the
possession, trading, and private viewing of pornographic materials. For
example, exchanging videos is now illegal even if done privately rather
than as a business transaction.
In the context of its EU presidency, the Government advanced a
multiyear plan to prevent misuse of the Internet. In February 1997
authorities set up a 24-hour ``tip line'' for citizens to report leads
on child pornography on the Internet and to lodge complaints. In
December 1998, the Government announced its action plan to combat the
promotion of child abuse and child pornography through the Internet.
The Government cosponsored an international conference in Vienna
from September 29 to October 1, on combating child pornography on the
Internet. The conference aimed to establish international practices
acceptable to law enforcement and justice officials, as well as to the
Internet service provider industry, to purge child pornography from the
Internet.
People with Disabilities.--The law protects disabled individuals
from discrimination in housing, education, and employment. In July
1997, Parliament passed an amendment to the Constitution explicitly
requiring the State to provide for equal rights for the disabled ``in
all areas of everyday life.'' The law requires all private enterprises
and state and federal government offices to employ 1 disabled person
for every 25 to 45 employees, depending on the type of work. Employers
who do not meet this requirement must pay a fee to the Government, and
the proceeds help finance services for the disabled such as training
programs, wage subsidies, and workplace adaptations. However, the law
has received some criticism, since many observers believe that
penalties are too low to discourage companies from bypassing the
requirement. No federal law mandates access for the physically
disabled; some public buildings are virtually inaccessible to those
unable to climb stairs.
Mentally retarded women can be sterilized involuntarily at the
request of parents, in the case of minors, or, by request of the
responsible family member or by court order, in the case of adults. One
political party has called for restrictive legislation to make it more
difficult to sterilize mentally retarded women; however, no legislative
action has ever been taken on this proposal.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to an Interior
Ministry report on rightwing extremism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia,
in 1998 there were 244 reported rightwing incidents, 31 anti-Semitic
incidents, and 8 xenophobic incidents. A total of 41 individuals were
convicted. In 1997 the Ministry reported 279 rightwing incidents, 32
anti-Semitic incidents, and 11 xenophobic incidents; criminal
convictions were obtained in 47 cases. In 1997 the Anti-Defamation
League opened an office in Vienna for Central and Eastern Europe. The
EU opened an office against racism and xenophobia in Vienna in July
1998. On March 16, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (CERD) expressed concern regarding reports of serious
cases of police brutality towards persons of foreign origin and ethnic
minorities.
Legislation in 1997 provided law enforcement agencies with expanded
investigative tools, such as electronic eavesdropping, merging of
databases, and witness protection programs. Criminal investigations
begun in 1995 against three Austrians for spreading fascist and extreme
rightwing propaganda through the Internet were dropped in 1997 due to
lack of sufficient evidence. Cases against two individuals accused in
1997 of spreading rightwing propaganda via the Internet were dropped in
1998, again due to insufficient evidence.
In October authorities arrested 69 suspected neo-Nazis in the
province of Upper Austria. The group had contacts with neo-Nazis in
several other countries. In a separate action in November, 17 skinheads
in the same province were charged with violation of the law against
neo-Nazi activities.
In March Franz Fuchs, the suspect accused of masterminding a
xenophobic, deadly letter bomb campaign between 1993 and 1997, was
convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. The attacks killed four
members of the Roma minority in Burgenland province in 1995 and injured
15 other persons in Austria and in Germany. Fuchs was barred from the
proceedings after yelling xenophobic slogans at the start of the trial.
During the national election campaign, the Freedom Party (FPO)
exploited the fears of many citizens that EU expansion and a continued
influx of asylum seekers and refugees from the Balkans and other areas
would result in uncontrolled immigration. The Vienna FPO chapter widely
distributed placards carrying antiimmigrant slogans, including a call
to stop ``over-foreignization.`` In reaction, on November 12, several
tens of thousands of demonstrators attended a Vienna rally against
racism and xenophobia.
Religious Minorities.--In March CERD noted a number of reported
acts of anti-Semitism and hostility against certain ethnic groups. The
head of Austria's Jewish community reported an increase in expressions
of anti-Semitism in the course of the campaign leading up to the
October 3 elections, as well as after the elections. Members of the
community reported receiving threatening mail, being attacked verbally,
and occasionally being shoved forcefully aside by pedestrians. The head
of the Jewish community concluded that this reflected an increasing
intolerance toward minorities and appealed for the cooperation of all
political forces to combat xenophobia and racism.
The second suspect in the desecration of the Jewish cemetery in
Eisenstadt in 1993 has not been apprehended, and the investigation is
no longer being pursued actively.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form and
join unions without prior authorization, under general constitutional
provisions regarding freedom of association. In practice trade unions
have an important and independent voice in the political, social, and
economic life of the country. Fifty-two percent of the work force are
organized into 14 national unions belonging to the Austrian Trade Union
Federation (OGB), which has a highly centralized leadership structure.
Individual unions and the OGB are independent of government or
political party control, although formal factions within these
organizations are allied closely with political parties.
Although the right to strike is not provided explicitly in the
Constitution or in national legislation, it is universally recognized.
Historically, strikes have been comparatively few and usually of short
duration. In 1998 there was a strike by employees of the Finance
Ministry. A major reason for the record of labor peace is the
unofficial system of ``social partnership'' among labor, management,
and government. At the center of the system is the Joint Parity
Commission for Wages and Prices, which has an important voice on major
economic questions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have the
right to organize and bargain collectively. Almost all large companies,
private or state-owned, are organized. Worker councils operate at the
enterprise level, and workers are entitled by law to elect one-third of
the members of the supervisory boards of major companies. Collective
agreements covering wages, benefits, and working conditions are
negotiated by the OGB with the National Chamber of Commerce and its
associations, which represent the employers. The Joint Parity
Commission sets wage and price policy guidelines. A 1973 law obliges
employers in enterprises with more than five employees to prove that
job dismissals are not motivated by antiunion discrimination. Employers
found guilty of this offense are required to reinstate workers. Labor
and business representatives remain in a longstanding disagreement over
how to comply with the obligation under the International Labor
Organization's Convention 98 to provide legal protection to employees
against arbitrary dismissals in firms with five employees or fewer.
Typically, legal disputes between employers and employees regarding
job-related matters are handled by a special arbitration court for
social affairs. The OGB is exclusively responsible for collective
bargaining. The leadership of the Chamber of Labor, the Chamber of
Commerce, and the OGB are elected democratically.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is
prohibited by law and generally is not practiced. Trafficking in women
for the purpose of forced prostitution remains a problem (see Section
6.f.). The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
enforces this prohibition effectively.
Former forced laborers have filed suits against Austrian companies
that used forced labor provided by the Nazi government. In October
1998, the Government set up a commission to analyze several Nazi-era
issues, including forced labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum legal working age is 15 years. The Labor
Inspectorate of the Ministry of Social Affairs effectively enforces the
law. The Government has adopted laws and policies to protect children
from exploitation in the work place. The law prohibits forced and
bonded child labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition
effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated national
minimum wage. Instead, nationwide collective bargaining agreements set
minimums by job classification for each industry. The generally
accepted unofficial minimum gross income is $13,000 (ATS 168,000) per
year. Every worker is entitled to a variety of generous social
benefits. The average citizen has a high standard of living, and even
the minimum wages are sufficient to permit a decent living for workers
and their families.
Although the legal workweek has been established at 40 hours since
1975, more than 50 percent of the labor force is covered by collective
bargaining agreements that set the workweek at 38 or 38\1/2\ hours.
Extensive legislation, regularly enforced by the Labor Inspectorate
of the Ministry of Social Affairs, provides for mandatory occupational
health and safety standards. Workers may file complaints anonymously
with the Labor Inspectorate, which may bring suit against the employer
on behalf of the employee; however, this option is rarely exercised, as
workers normally rely instead on the Chambers of Labor, which file
suits on their behalf.
The Labor Code provides that workers have the right to remove
themselves from a job if they fear ``serious, immediate danger to life
and health'' without incurring any prejudice to their job or career.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no single law covering
trafficking in persons generally, but several laws contain provisions
that apply to this problem. Trafficking for the purpose of prostitution
is illegal, and the law provides for a jail sentence of up to 10 years
for convicted traffickers. (Prostitution itself is legal.) Another law
covers trafficking in persons for purposes other than prostitution.
NGO's report that enforcement is weak and that convicted traffickers
generally receive sentences of less than 3 years' imprisonment. The
country is both a significant transit and destination point, primarily
for women from Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet
Union, who are trafficked into prostitution and other forms of forced
dependency. Organized crime groups from these areas also are involved
in trafficking. The country is particularly attractive to traffickers
due to its geographical location and the fact that citizens of the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary do not require visas to enter the
country.
A witness protection program granting temporary resident status to
women willing to testify against their traffickers went into effect on
January 1, 1998. In the past, because so few witnesses agreed to
testify against their traffickers, prosecution was difficult and those
trafficked often simply were expelled from the country. The witness
protection plan is aimed at generating more support from witnesses;
however, victims still rarely agree to testify, due to fear of
retribution. The temporary resident status allows victims to stay in
the country only during a trial; no provisions are made for them to
stay in the country following their testimony. Virtually all victims
are deported. Various NGO's, with the support of the Government, have
begun to broaden their assistance and strong support for battered
spouses to include those women seeking to flee from the prostitution
traps created by criminal elements. There is one NGO center that
provides comprehensive counseling, educational services, and emergency
housing to victims of trafficking. In 1995 the Government established
an interministerial working group on trafficking in women, which was
disbanded in 1998.
______
AZERBAIJAN
Azerbaijan is a republic with a presidential form of government.
Heydar Aliyev, who assumed presidential powers after the overthrow of
his democratically elected predecessor in 1993, was reelected in
October 1998 in a controversial election marred by numerous, serious
irregularities, violations of the election law, and lack of
transparency in the vote counting process at the district and national
levels. President Aliyev and his supporters, many from his home region
of Nakhchivan, continue to dominate the Government and the multiparty
125-member Parliament chosen in the flawed 1995 elections. The
Constitution, adopted in a 1995 referendum, established a system of
government based on a division of powers among a strong presidency, a
legislature with the power to approve the budget and impeach the
President, and a judiciary with limited independence. The judiciary
does not function independently of the executive branch and is corrupt
and inefficient.
After years of interethnic conflict between Armenians and
Azerbaijanis, Armenian forces and forces of the self-styled ``Republic
of Nagorno-Karabakh'' (which is not recognized by any government)
continue to occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijan's territory. A cease-fire
was concluded in 1994, and the peace process continues. The Presidents
of Azerbaijan and Armenia held a series of direct meetings in the
second half of the year to discuss a compromise resolution. However,
exchanges of fire occurred frequently along the Azerbaijan-Armenian
border and along the line of contact with Nagorno-Karabakh, causing
casualties. Military operations continued to affect the civilian
population. There are 800,000 Azerbaijani refugees and internally
displaced persons (IDP's) who cannot return to their homes. In the part
of Azerbaijan that Armenians control, a heavily militarized ruling
structure prevents ethnic Azerbaijanis from returning to their homes.
In the part of Azerbaijan that the Government controls, government
efforts to hinder the opposition continue to impede the transition to
democracy.
Police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of
National Security are responsible for internal security. Members of the
police committed numerous human rights abuses.
Azerbaijan continued its economic transition from central planning
to a free market. Reforms continued on paper, but stagnated in
practice. Economic growth has been spurred by substantial foreign
investment in the hydrocarbon sector, but it is offset by a highly
organized system of corruption and patronage. While government
statistics pointed to continued economic growth during the year, the
real economy was hit hard by a large-scale drop off in foreign business
activity, due largely to low oil prices early in the year, endemic
corruption, and a deteriorating business climate. The country has rich
petroleum reserves and significant agricultural potential. Oil and oil
products are the largest export, followed by cotton and tobacco. Other
key industries are chemicals and oil field machinery. The Government
signed several new oil production sharing agreements with foreign oil
companies in 1999. Agriculture employs 33 percent of the labor force
and makes up 20 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). The
leading crops are wheat, fruit and vegetables, cotton, tobacco, and
grapes. Privatization of industry continues through auction sales of
small- and medium-sized state-owned enterprises. Large enterprises
remain almost exclusively under government control and operate at a
fraction of their capacity. Accumulation of large wage arrears is
common. Private retail enterprises, cotton gins, and grain mills are
proliferating. About 90 percent of the nation's farmland is now in
private hands, but new small farmers have poor access to credit and
markets, and commercial agriculture remains weak. Per capita GDP is
approximately $500 per year. Much of the labor force is employed in the
state sector where wages are low. The overall economic situation of the
average citizen remains tenuous, although in urban areas a growing
moneyed class with trade and oil-related interests has emerged.
According to official statistics, the economy now is only 60 percent of
the size of the economy in 1991. According to the World Bank, 60
percent of the citizens live in poverty. Economic opportunity for the
average citizen still depends largely on connections to the Government.
Severe disparities of income have emerged that are attributed partly to
patronage and corruption.
The Government's human rights record was poor, and serious problems
remained; however, there was significant improvement in one area. The
Government continues to restrict citizens' ability to change their
government peacefully. Police beat persons in custody, arbitrarily
arrested and detained persons, and conducted searches and seizures
without warrants. In most instances, the Government took no action to
punish abusers, although perpetrators were prosecuted in a handful of
cases. Prison conditions remained harsh, and some prisoners died as a
result of these conditions. The judiciary is corrupt, inefficient, and
subject to executive influence. Corruption continued to pervade most
government organs, and it is widely believed that most persons in
appointed government positions and in state employment purchase their
positions. The Government holds an estimated 50 political prisoners,
down from 75 in 1998. A number of prisoners were released upon
expiration of their sentences, and others were granted amnesty. The
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights. The Government
continued to impose some limits on freedom of speech and of the press.
Although the Government abolished censorship in August 1998, government
officials throughout the year sought to intimidate independent and
opposition newspapers by repeatedly suing them for defamation. As a
result, journalists practiced self-censorship. Nevertheless, scores of
opposition and independent newspapers continued to publish and discuss
a wide range of sensitive domestic and foreign policy issues. However,
journalists were subject to violence on occasion by unknown assailants
who sought to stop media criticism of the Government. Lengthy pretrial
detention is still a problem. The Government continued to deny
broadcast licenses to all truly independent organizations applying to
open television and radio stations. The Government also tightly
controlled official radio and television, the primary source of
information for most of the population. In July and August, authorities
forced all but two of the regional television stations that were
broadcasting without licenses to close.
The Government restricted freedom of assembly and association.
Police suppressed or refused to allow any large-scale peaceful public
demonstrations, while allowing smaller ones (of less than 50
participants) to occur. Opposition political parties, unable to mount
large-scale public activities, focused on holding smaller-scale
meetings and seminars throughout the country. In many cases, opposition
attempts to hold meetings in the regions outside the capital initially
were refused by local authorities and were allowed only after
intervention by the central Government. The Government tolerated the
existence of many opposition political parties, although it continued
to refuse to register some. After maintaining a pattern of low-level
harassment against activity by religious minorities throughout most of
the year, the lower levels of Government escalated this activity by
cracking down on the legally registered Russian Baptist Church in
September. However, the Government took steps to improve its record on
religious liberty in the wake of President Aliyev's public commitment
to do so in November. The Government also acted to redress earlier
harassment, including arrests, deportation orders, and a failure to
register religious groups, by lower-level government and security
officials. Local authorities restricted freedom of movement in some
instances.
The Government held the country's first-ever municipal elections on
December 12; however, the electoral process was marred by a nearly
universal pattern of interference by local officials, which allowed
them to control the selection of the election committees that
supervised the election. The Government was critical of certain
domestic human rights activists, although it was open to limited dialog
with domestic and international human rights organizations. Societal
discrimination and violence against women and discrimination against
certain ethnic minorities are problems.
Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict continued. They resulted in injuries and deaths among
combatants and occasionally civilians, and the taking of prisoners,
including civilians. Insurgent Armenian forces in Nagorno-Karabakh and
the occupied territories continued to prevent the return of IDP's to
their homes. This restriction resulted in significant human suffering
for hundreds of thousands of persons.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other clearly extrajudicial killings.
There were several reports of deaths of prisoners resulting from
other than natural causes while in official custody (see Section 1.c.).
There were at least two reports of deaths of prisoners, due at
least in part to prison conditions while in official custody, and
several prisoners were killed during a reported uprising at a prison in
January (see Section 1.c.). At year's end, the Government had not
released its long-awaited report on the prison uprising.
There have been no further confirmed developments in the cases of
the death of Firuz Gurbanov in August 1997, after which a police
official was arrested, or in the death of Samir Zulfugarov in Baku in
August 1997 where a police official reportedly was under investigation
in connection with the death.
There has been no action by the Government in the killing of
opposition Azerbaijan Popular Front member of Parliament Shakhmerdan
Jafarov in July 1995.
Cease-fire violations by both sides in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict occasionally resulted in injuries to civilians. During the
year, three persons were killed and five were wounded by land mines
laid near the disputed area of Nagorno-Karabakh. These mines were laid
by the Governments of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the Karabakh Armenian
authorities.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The Government released by year's end all six Armenian prisoners of
war, including civilians, that it had been holding. Nagorno-Karabakh
authorities released two Azerbaijani prisoners and reportedly still
hold three prisoners. The ICRC repeatedly asked the concerned parties
for notification of any person captured in relation to the conflict,
access to all places of detention connected with the conflict, and
release of all such persons. The ICRC also urged the parties to provide
information on the fate of persons reported as missing in action. The
Government again presented to the ICRC a list of 856 persons allegedly
held by the Armenians; the list was also presented in 1998.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Torture is illegal; however, there are credible reports
that the police practice of beating prisoners during arrest,
interrogation, and pretrial detention was widespread. The Government
does not hold most members of the police accountable for their actions.
Impunity continues to be a problem, and in most instances, the
Government took no action to punish abusers, although perpetrators were
prosecuted in a handful of cases. In an August report, Human Rights
Watch noted that the most severe and routine physical abuse of
detainees takes place just prior to and during the preliminary
investigation, as police and other investigators ``isolate detainees
from all contact with the outside world, and beat and coerce
confessions from suspects and statements from witnesses.''
Police forcibly dispersed an unsanctioned demonstration on May 8.
The demonstrators, organized by a combination of opposition parties,
were attempting to assemble near a Baku cemetery to march to the
Karabakh front over a hundred miles away to protest Armenian occupation
of Azerbaijani territory. The Government refused to issue a permit for
the march and ordered police to break up the rally. Several protesters
were detained briefly before being released without charges (see
Section 2.b.).
Police harassed, detained, and arrested members of evangelical
Christian and other groups, conducted illegal searches and seized their
documents and property (see Section 2.c.). President Aliyev criticized
these actions in November (see Section 2.c.).
Prison conditions are harsh. The quality of food, housing, and
medical care is poor. Prisoners must rely on their families to procure
food and medicine. There are widespread and credible reports that
authorities deny or give inadequate medical treatment to prisoners with
serious medical conditions. Authorities severely limit opportunities
for exercise and visits by lawyers and family members of prisoners in
security prisons. Some prisoners are kept in ``separation cells'' often
located in basements, in which prisoners reportedly are denied food and
sleep in order to elicit confessions from them without actually leaving
physical evidence of abuse. Men and women are housed in separate prison
facilities.
On January 7, 14 persons, including 11 prisoners and three
government personnel, were killed when the authorities suppressed an
alleged attempted escape by some of the inmates of the Gobustan prison.
Those inmates killed were in prison on various coup and assassination
convictions. Independent media speculated that frustration over the
Government's failure to include any ``political'' prisoners in the
December 31, 1998 amnesty granted to 12,000 convicts (including some
convicted of serious crimes) may have sparked the prison incident.
Human rights organizations were able to visit prisons on several
occasions. However, the Government continued to deny the ICRC access to
prisons except those where persons held in relation to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict were detained. Various foreign embassies have
petitioned the Government for permission to visit all prisons. In
general the Government denies access to detainees held in security
prisons that hold both high risk common criminals and high risk persons
sentenced for crimes with a political connection, for example, persons
sentenced in connection with coup attempts and military mutinies.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Authorities arbitrarily
arrest and detain persons without legal warrants. Often authorities do
not notify family members after arrests. Frequently, it is days before
family members are able to obtain information as to whether authorities
have arrested someone and where authorities are holding the detainee.
Family members do not enjoy the right of visitation. Authorities
generally deny bail to detained individuals and often do not inform
detainees of the charges against them. There is no legal protection
concerning the right of detainees to be charged or released within a
certain period of time, or for accused persons to receive an
expeditious trial. While the situation appears to be gradually
improving, lengthy pretrial detention is still a problem. In July the
Constitutional Court ruled that detainees could have access to a lawyer
from the time of detention rather than only after they have been
charged with a crime, but access to lawyers is often poor. In the past,
police sometimes detained relatives of suspects being sought in an
attempt to force the family to reveal a suspect's whereabouts (see
Section 1.f.).
During the year, police detained members or supporters of
opposition parties who were participating in small demonstrations or
other political activity. All were released after brief detentions and
without further charges.
The Government continued to harass parties critical of the
Government by arbitrarily arresting party members, including close
associates or relatives of opposition party leaders. During the summer,
the Government arrested Etibar Guliyev, a nephew of Rasul Guliyev, co-
chairman of the Azerbaijan Democratic Party. He was accused of
smuggling on his return to Azerbaijan from abroad. Rza Guliyev, another
nephew of Guliyev, was arrested in 1998, convicted of tax evasion after
initially being charged with embezzlement, and is serving a sentence of
8 years in prison. Guliyev had been forced to resign as Chairman of the
Parliament in 1996. He now is living abroad and is accused by the
Government of large-scale embezzlement. The action taken against
Guliyev's nephews appeared to be politically motivated. In June several
members of the Popular Front Party were arrested and briefly detained
following small demonstrations. This pattern of arrests and detentions
recurred throughout the year.
Police detained protesters in Baku in May in an unsanctioned
demonstration (see Section 2.b.). Police beat, harassed, detained, and
arrested members of evangelical Christian and other groups, and seized
their documents and property (see Section 2.c.).
In 1998 the Government arrested an aide to the chairman of the
Popular Front Party, accusing him of illegal possession of a pistol and
hand grenade, which independent observers believe were planted. It
arrested two other associates of the Popular Front Party chairman at a
demonstration in November 1998. All were convicted; one on a weapons
charge and the other two of disturbing public order and resisting the
police. The first was amnestied during the year, but the other two are
still in prison. The Government convicted of embezzlement and jailed a
deputy director of a state oil refinery previously run by Rasul
Guliyev, a former chairman of the Parliament now living abroad whom the
Government accuses of large-scale embezzlement.
In addition, the Government originally rejected the appeal for the
release of journalist Fuad Qahramanli, who was being kept in prison for
having written an unpublished article discussing opposition rally
tactics. In July Qahramanli was granted amnesty (see Section 2.a.).
In 1997 an aide to opposition leader Isa Gambar and a relative of
Gambar, initially detained for political reasons, were charged with
failure to notify the Government of a crime, convicted, and sentenced
to 3 years in prison (see Section 1.e.). Both were released in July.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for a
judiciary with limited independence; however, in practice judges do not
function independently of the executive branch. The judicial system is
subject to the influence of executive authorities. The President
appoints Supreme and Constitutional Court judges, subject to
confirmation by Parliament. The President directly appoints lower level
judges with no requirement for confirmation. The Constitutional Court,
formed in 1998, overruled several minor administrative and legislative
acts as unconstitutional in its first full year of activity, but the
short-term effect was limited. The judiciary also is widely believed to
be corrupt and inefficient.
Courts of general jurisdiction may hear criminal, civil, and
juvenile cases. District and municipal courts try the overwhelming
majority of cases. The Supreme Court also may act as the court of first
instance, depending on the nature and seriousness of the crime.
The Government organizes prosecutors into offices at the district,
municipal, and republic level. They are ultimately responsible to the
Minister of Justice, are appointed by the President, and are confirmed
by Parliament. The Constitution prescribes equal status for prosecutors
and defense attorneys before the courts. In practice, however,
prosecutors' prerogatives greatly outweigh those of defense attorneys
and often those of the judges themselves. Investigations often rely on
obtaining confessions rather than obtaining evidence against suspects.
No judge has dismissed a case based on a prisoner's claim of having
been beaten.
Cases at the district court level are tried before a panel
consisting of one judge and two lay assessors. The judge presides over
and directs trials. Judges frequently send cases unlikely to end in
convictions back to the prosecutor for ``additional investigation.''
Such cases may be either dropped or closed, occasionally without
informing either the court or the defendant.
The Constitution provides for public trials except in cases
involving state, commercial, or professional secrets, or matters
involving confidentiality of personal or family matters. The
Constitution provides for the presumption of innocence in criminal
cases and for numerous other rights, including an exclusionary rule
barring the use of illegally obtained evidence and for a suspect's
right to legal counsel, to be informed immediately of his legal rights,
and of the charges against him. However, the Government has not made
significant efforts to enforce these rights throughout the criminal
justice system. Defendants may confront witnesses and present evidence.
The court appoints an attorney for indigent defendants. Defendants and
prosecutors have the right of appeal. The Government generally has
observed the constitutional provision for public trial. Foreign and
domestic observers generally are able to attend trials.
Opposition political parties and NGO's credibly estimate that the
Government held about 50 political prisoners at year's end. The
reduction from 75 prisoners in 1998 apparently reflected a combination
of releases of some prisoners in a general amnesty and completion of
jail sentences for others.
The Government continues to assert that it holds no political
prisoners.
On February 17, a Baku district court found 14 participants in a
November 8, 1998, opposition demonstration guilty of disturbing public
order and resisting police. Four of the defendants are from the Popular
Front Party, six are from the National Democratic Party, and six others
are unaffiliated. The demonstrators were participating in a legally
sanctioned rally that reportedly transpired without incident until a
dozen assailants separate from the rally disrupted the event.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government infringed on these rights. The
Constitution provides for secrecy of correspondence and telephone
conversations, subject to limits provided by law in criminal
investigations or in prevention of a crime. The Constitution allows
searches of residences only with a court order or in cases provided by
law. However, citizens widely believe that the Ministry of National
Security monitors telephones and Internet traffic, especially those of
foreigners and prominent political and business figures. Police often
conducted searches without a warrant, and investigations sometimes
resulted in confining the individuals to their city of residence or a
brief jail sentence for questioning. There were credible allegations
that police continued to intimidate and harass family members of
suspects.
There were credible reports that individuals linked to opposition
parties were fired from their jobs (see Section 2.b.). The Government
continued to harass some opposition party leaders by arresting their
relatives (see Section 1.f.). Police harassed and detained members of
evangelical Christian and other groups, carried out arbitrary searches,
and seized their documents and property (see Section 2.c.).
In June a court ruled in favor of a group of Muslim women who sued
for the right to wear Islamic headscarves in passport photos. In
September the Supreme Court overturned the lower court ruling; the case
was on appeal in the Prosecutor General's office at year's end (see
Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press and specifically outlaws press
censorship; however, the Government in some cases did not respect these
rights in practice. The Government did not take any measures to
reinstitute press censorship, which was abolished in 1998; however,
actions taken by several prominent government officials, including an
ongoing series of libel suits, many of which ended with the levying of
excessively high fines (which, if ever collected, would immediately
bankrupt any independent or opposition newspaper), created an
atmosphere in which journalists exercise self-censorship. Most of the
excessive fines have been appealed; however, in those cases in which
there have been rulings, the appeals were denied. Prominent opposition
politicians criticized the Government without reprisal; however, in one
case, former president Elchibey was charged with slander in 1998 after
he accused the President of having helped organize a terrorist
organization, the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), during the Soviet
era. The charges were dropped in January.
While the press debated a wide variety of sensitive topics
throughout the year, other factors restricted the public's ability to
be informed about and discuss political issues. Most newspapers are
printed in the Government's publishing house. The Government's near
monopoly of publishing facilities and its control over the price of
newsprint gives it leverage over the press, a critical matter given the
precarious finances of most opposition newspapers. Some editors
complain about having their print runs limited by the state printing
press, and many cite the threat of increases in paper and printing
prices as a constraint on the free press.
The spate of lawsuits by prominent government officials against
opposition or independent media outlets also had a negative effect on
freedom of the press in practice. Courts invariably ruled in favor of
the government plaintiffs, while ruling against opposition plaintiffs
pursuing similar charges against progovernment media outlets in all but
two cases. It appears that the extremely high financial penalties
levied by the courts were designed to repress criticism rather than to
foster responsible journalism. However, none of the fines had been
collected by year's end, and no media outlets were closed for that
reason. Nevertheless, the media outlets in question credibly claimed
publicly and privately that the threat of the charges forced them to
exercise self-censorship.
Journalists were subject to violence. Several incidents were
reported in June and July in which masked assailants kidnaped, beat,
and threatened journalists. Two of the three cases of harassment of
journalists involved journalists from Hurriyet, a newspaper associated
with Rasul Guliyev. Although the number of violent incidents against
journalists decreased during the year, despite promises of rapid
action, police have yet to determine the identity of any of the
assailants. While the Government denies any relationship with the
assailants, the incidents involved opposition journalists who were
warned to stop criticizing government officials or policies.
Rovshan Ismailov of Ganun (Law) magazine was beaten on April 13 in
the Izami district of Baku. He said that he was shopping when several
plainclothes police officers approached him, and he identified himself
as a journalist. Following a verbal confrontation, Ismailov said that
the officers beat him. At year's end no action had been taken against
the officers.
In June unknown assailants kidnaped opposition journalist Kamil
Tagisoy, whom unknown assailants kidnaped, beat, and warned to stop
writing about President Aliyev's health. On June 30, three persons
claiming to be employees of the National Security Ministry intercepted
a car in which two journalists from the opposition newspaper Yeni
Musavat were traveling and abducted the newspaper's deputy editor,
Shirzad Mamedli. Mamedli was released 1 hour later after having been
beaten severely.
Approximately 30 journalists and members of NGO's held an
unsanctioned protest on July 6 in front of the Prosecutor-General's
office in Baku to protest such harassment and violence against
independent journalists. The previous day the Baku mayor's office had
refused permission to stage the protest.
In May the Government rejected an appeal for the release of
journalist Fuad Qahramanli of CAG newspaper (published by the Democracy
Development Foundation), who was being kept in prison for having
written an article that was never published. In June 1998, police from
the Department Against Organized Crime declared the article, entitled
``The Opposition Rally Tactics,'' to be dangerous and subversive. On
July 11, the Government granted amnesty to Qahramanli (see Section
1.d.).
There has been no further action taken on the following cases: The
beating of a journalist in February 1998; the attack on 34 journalists
by police when they were reporting on an opposition rally in Baku in
September 1998; and the attack on 4 journalists when they were
protesting peacefully the defamation trial of Yeni Musavat in November
1998.
Despite government pressure and such attacks, the independent and
opposition press played an active, influential role in politics.
Articles critical of government policy and high government figures,
including the President, and discussion of sensitive areas of domestic
and foreign policy, appeared routinely in the opposition and
independent print and broadcast media. The independent press does not
always meet internationally accepted journalistic standards.
A large number of newspapers continued to publish. One reliable
source put the number of registered newspapers at 600, and the number
actually publishing at least once a month at nearly 100. These included
independent newspapers and newspapers with links to major and minor
opposition parties. Government-run kiosks and 27 independent news
distributors distributed opposition and independent newspapers. A
number of editors continued to complain that the government-run kiosks
refuse to carry their newspapers or claim to have sold all received
copies while, in fact, retaining many unsold copies in stock.
The Government tightly controlled official radio and television,
the source of information for much of the population because the cost
of newspapers makes them unaffordable for most persons. Television and
radio stations require a license to operate, and the Government used
this requirement to prevent several independent stations from
broadcasting. Since 1993 no truly independent broadcaster has received
a frequency from the State Commission on Radio and Television
Frequencies and the Ministry of Communications. There are a limited
number of private television stations, whose broadcasts can be received
only in Baku or in local areas outside the capital. Only one of the
private stations is not directly under the control of a government
official, and it is believed widely that this station also has
compromised its independence. Independent radio, preferred by the
overwhelming majority of listeners, largely is oriented to
entertainment, but one independent station airs political topics,
although news is only a small portion of its program. Opposition
parties had virtually no access to the official electronic media. The
Government periodically used state television to conduct campaigns of
denunciation and harassment against political parties and leaders
critical of the Government.
Three independent television stations operate in Baku. Six
independent television stations operating outside of Baku, which had
been rebroadcasting without frequency licenses, were closed in July and
August. In July and August, authorities--in one case armed with guns--
forced all but two of the regional television stations that were
broadcasting without licenses to close.
During the fall, authorities shut down the independent, foreign-
owned television station SARA on the grounds that the law prohibits
foreign ownership of domestic television stations. Observers noted that
for 5 years Sara aired without problems as a mainly entertainment
channel, until it started airing political programs in the summer; the
Government closed down the station after it gave a prominent platform
on a program to opposition leaders discussing the Nagorno-Karabakh
dispute. On December 24, the Economic Court upheld a Lower Court ruling
against SARA's owners.
At year's end, there were four independent television stations
operating outside of Baku, one each in the cities of Ganja,
Mingechevir, Quba, and Sumqayit. Four other independent stations in
Quba, Tovuz, Zagatala, and Belakan, remain closed. Three Russian and
three Turkish television stations and radio programs are rebroadcast
locally through Azerbaijani facilities and are seen and heard in most
parts of the country. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of
America broadcast without restriction. There are no restrictions on
reception of foreign stations via satellite. The Government granted new
broadcast licenses to a few foreign radio stations, plus several
regional television stations directly under the control of the local
executive commission. The Government has delayed action for more than a
year on the applications to broadcast of more than 10 independent
broadcasters.
The Government allowed limited Internet access. There are 2
Internet service providers, although more than 12 vendors sell
accounts. Both providers have formal links with the Ministry of
Communications. Connecting costs, which average $3 per hour (down from
$10 per hour in 1998), are still beyond the budgets of most citizens;
few citizens have accounts of their own. Many persons believe that the
Government monitors Internet traffic, especially that of foreign
businesses and opposition-oriented intellectuals and leaders (see
Section 1.f.).
Appointments to government-controlled academic positions are
heavily dependent on political connections. Nevertheless, several
professors with tenure are active in opposition parties. There were no
complaints of violation of academic freedom or of censorship of books
or academic journals.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts
this right when it decides that it is in its interest to do so.
Authorities frequently prevented political parties critical of the
Government from conducting many indoor meetings as well as outdoor
gatherings. The Government allowed some political party gatherings,
such as the Popular Front's 10th anniversary meeting in July.
Authorities also permitted opposition parties to organize so-called
``pickets,'' demonstrations with less than 50 participants. Authorities
cited questionable security considerations repeatedly to ban any larger
demonstrations throughout the year.
The Government detained persons at unauthorized rallies and
meetings, but released them without charges after brief detention.
Police briefly detained demonstrators at the May 8 rally before
releasing them without charges. Police forcibly dispersed an
unsanctioned demonstration on May 8. The demonstrators, organized by a
combination of opposition parties, were attempting to assemble near a
Baku cemetery to march to the Karabakh front over a hundred miles away
to protest Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani territory. The Government
refused to issue a permit for the march and ordered police to break up
the rally. Several protesters were detained briefly before being
released without charges (see Section 1.c.). In July journalists and
members of NGO's held an unsanctioned protest in Baku to protest
harassment and violence against independent journalists (see Section
2.a.).
Heads of local governments in several different sections of the
country repeatedly refused the requests of opposition members of
Parliament, such as Popular Front First Deputy chairman Ali Kerimov, to
hold organized meetings with constituents and interested citizens. On
several occasions, central government authorities intervened to
overrule the local authorities and allow Kerimov and other opposition
members of Parliament to hold the meetings.
Four participants in a November 1998 opposition rally were arrested
and sentenced to jail terms of up to 3 years; however, none of the
persons who attacked these peaceful demonstrators has been arrested,
despite the fact that the faces of the attackers apparently were
recorded on film. At year's end, no action had been taken against the
attackers.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, although in
practice the Government continued to restrict this freedom when it was
in its interest to do so. The Government requires political parties to
register. There are over 30 registered political parties. Some of these
are affiliated with or support the President's party. At least 10
registered parties are considered opposition parties. The Government
continued to refuse to register the Azerbaijan Democratic Party; the
Supreme Court is to hold a hearing early in 2000 on the Democratic
Party's suit against the Government. Other unregistered parties have
not met the legal requirements for registration. Nevertheless,
unregistered political parties continued to function openly, and
members of unregistered political parties can run for president but
must be sponsored by a registered party or an independent ``voters
initiative group.'' Members of unregistered parties may run for
Parliament, but only as independents in a direct constituency, not on a
party list. A party must be registered to run a list of candidates.
Members of unregistered parties running in municipal elections had to
run as independents, or be nominated by a registered party or another
voter initiatives group.
Credible reports of harassment, including beatings, of political
figures continued. There were credible reports that individuals linked
to opposition parties (and their relatives) were fired from their jobs.
Members of Parliament who switched to opposition parties were, in some
cases, subjected to criticism in the government media and to anti-
member rallies promoted by local authorities in the home districts of
those members. The Government has not yet returned the Popular Front's
headquarters nor many of its regional offices, which were seized in
1993.
Explicitly ethnically or religiously based parties have not been
registered.
The Government generally allowed private associations to function
freely. The Ministry of Justice requires private organizations to
register but does not grant this registration freely and expeditiously.
It denied or unduly delayed registration for numerous private voluntary
organizations, including two private human rights organizations.
Nevertheless, unregistered associations functioned openly.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution allows persons of all
faiths to practice their religion without restrictions, and the
Government respects this provision in practice for Shi'a and Sunni
Muslims, Russian Orthodox Christians, and Jews; however, other
religious groups, which lack a long history in the country, are
subjected routinely to low level harassment. The Government frequently
used clauses in the Law on Religious Freedom to restrict religious
activity by foreigners and nontraditional religious groups. There is no
state religion, and the right to choose or change one's religious
affiliation is provided for.
The Law on Religious Freedom contains provisions that allow the
Government to restrict effectively religious activity by foreigners and
even Azerbaijani members of nontraditional religious groups. These
restrictions consist of burdensome registration requirements,
limitations on freedom to proselytize, and interference with
dissemination of printed materials. Most of the groups affected note
that these restrictions have been applied sporadically, and most groups
operate freely. Where these restrictions are applied, they are used to
harass minority religions rather than eliminate them. In addition a law
on foreigners and stateless persons contains language that prohibits
religious ``propaganda'' by foreigners. This provision was reinforced
by a presidential decree in 1997, and the Government uses these and
other legal provisions to restrict religious activity by foreign, and
to a lesser degree Azerbaijani, members of nontraditional religious
groups. There is no state religion.
In early November President Aliyev announced to the National
Security Council, and later in a nationwide television broadcast, that
the Government henceforth would abide by OSCE standards of religious
liberty. Apparently in conformity with his directives, government
officials subsequently took steps to rectify some past violations of
these standards, including the registration of a number of religious
organizations that previously had been denied registration.
The most common restriction on religious freedom results from the
requirement in the Law on Religion that all religious organizations be
registered by the Government in order to function legally. This is in
principle done by obtaining approval from the Department of Religious
Affairs and then applying for formal registration with the Ministry of
Justice. The Government states that so far it has registered
approximately 190 Muslim organizations and 50 ``other'' groups. In
practice, however, the process suffers from a lack of transparency,
particularly within the Department of Religious Affairs. This office,
an independent entity subordinated directly to the Council of
Ministers, has been a bottleneck in the registration process. A wide
variety of religious groups have been subjected to interminable delays,
and a number of them remain unregistered; however, in response to the
President's November calls for adherence to international standards of
religious liberty, the Government took several steps to rectify
previous problems.
Registration enables a religious organization to maintain a bank
account, legally rent property, and generally to act as a legal entity.
Lack of registration makes it harder, but not impossible, for a
religious group to function. Unregistered groups often continue to
operate, but participants are subject to arrest, fines, and--in the
cases of foreigners--deportation. Human Rights Watch alleged in
February 1998 that officials responsible for registration have taken
bribes in order to facilitate registration. Religious groups are
permitted to appeal registration denials to the courts, but the only
group to do so to date--the Pentecostal ``Word of Life'' Church--lost
its case in May 1998. The Catholic Church was registered in April after
an 18-month delay. Following the President's November statements, the
Government, specifically the Department of Religious Affairs and the
Ministry of Justice, took action on several applications by religious
groups for registration that had been languishing, in some cases for
years. The Cathedral of Praise and the Nehemiah were registered in
December, but at year's end Jehovah's Witnesses were not registered.
Prompted by the November statements, some other religious groups that
had been operating under continual low-level harassment because the
Religious Affairs Department earlier had denied them registration were
seeking registration at year's end.
The Religious Affairs Department repeatedly sought to interfere in
the internal affairs of at least two religious groups, refusing to
permit a Catholic Church to select its own priest and refusing to
recognize the Evangelical Lutheran Church's right to select its own
leadership. In December, the President's office overruled the Religious
Affairs Department and officially recognized the right of both groups
to make their internal organizational decisions freely and without
interference.
Six Jehovah's Witnesses were fired for their religious affiliation
in September in Garadag, and, along with two others, were given
administrative fines by the local government. In November, following
President Aliyev's public comments, the six were reinstated in their
jobs with full back pay. The eight members now are pursuing an appeal
of their administrative fines through the court system. A member of the
Jehovah's Witnesses in Khachmaz was detained by police in August; he
reportedly was beaten, and his religious material was confiscated. In
December the prosecutor's office opened an investigation into the
police actions.
In September police interrupted a service at the legally registered
Evangelical Baptist church and detained approximately 70 worshippers.
Authorities sentenced two Azerbaijani church officials to 15 days in
jail on charges of resisting police. Other religious groups reported
police harassment in August and September. Some religious groups
reported that the harassment ceased after President Aliyev's public
comments in November.
The Law on Religion subordinates all Islamic religious
organizations to the Azerbaijan-based Spiritual Directorate of Caucasus
Muslims. In June a court decided in favor of a group of Muslim women
who sued for the right to wear Islamic headscarves in passport
photography. The judges ruled in favor of the women, who said that
there was nothing in the law that prevented them from wearing Islamic
headscarves in official photographs. In September the Supreme Court
overturned the lower court ruling; the case was on appeal in the
Prosecutor General's office at year's end (see Section 1.f.).
The Law on Religion also permits the production and dissemination
of religious literature only with the approval of the Department of
Religious Affairs and with the agreement of local government
authorities. The Government now interprets this provision to mean that
only religious groups can engage in such activity and argues that
booksellers and other entrepreneurs are forbidden to engage in that
activity. For example, the Department of Religious Affairs in October
1998 held up a shipment of books imported by a private individual not
associated with a local congregation for sale at a legally registered
bookstore in Baku after it determined that some of the books had
religious content. The books were held until June when the Deputy Prime
Minister's office overruled the Religious Affairs Department and
ordered the books released to the bookseller. In one case, officials
delayed the importation of a shipment of religious literature by a
private individual not associated with a local congregation; on June 10
the shipment was released by customs.
The Department of Religious Affairs sought throughout the first
half of the year to prevent a local bookstore from importing books with
religious content. The Department based its restriction on a clause in
the Law on Religious Freedom that states that religious groups may
produce, import, and disseminate religious literature. The Department
of Religious Affairs argued that this clause means that only religious
groups may engage in such activities. The Council of Ministers
overruled the Department in June, ordering the books released to the
bookseller.
Some government bias against foreign missionary groups persisted.
Foreign Christian and other groups complained credibly of official
harassment. Members of unregistered groups are subject to arrest and
fines, and foreigners can be deported. Foreign Christian and other
groups were subject to harassment and detention under a provision in
the Law on Religious Freedom banning ``religious propaganda'' by
foreigners. The Department for Religious Affairs also used the
provision of the law on foreigners and stateless persons that prohibits
religious ``propaganda'' (i.e., proselytizing) by foreigners, to harass
foreign missionaries and religious figures. In September nine
foreigners were arrested and sentenced to deportation under this
provision. In November the Supreme Court overturned these sentences,
ruling that they violated constitutional provisions for religious
freedom. In January and June, articles appeared throughout the press
crudely depicting Christian missionary groups as a threat to the
nation. In August several evangelical Christian and other religious
groups reported a wave of police harassment, including detention,
arbitrary search and seizure of documents and other private property,
and warnings to desist from religious activity. In September the police
interrupted a service at the legally registered Baptist Church and
began questioning worshippers. Without giving a reason for their
action, uniformed and plainclothes police officers refused to release
persons until obtaining their names and addresses. Police criticized
ethnic Azeri Christians for dropping their Muslim affiliation.
Approximately 70 Azeris and foreigners were detained for several days
of questioning. Two Azeri pastors were sentenced to 15 days in jail for
allegedly resisting the police, a charge contested by all available
witnesses.
Because of anti-Armenian sentiment and the forced departure of most
of the Armenian population, Armenian churches remained closed (see
Section 5). The same situation prevails for Azerbaijani mosques in the
portions of southwest Azerbaijan controlled by Armenian separatists
(see section 5). The Jewish community has freedom to worship and
conduct educational activities and, during the year, enjoyed the public
support of the Government.
Places of worship seized by the former Soviet Government during the
Communist era from the Baha'is, the Catholics, the Lutherans, and the
Baptists have not yet been returned to those groups.
Some government officials share the strong popular prejudice
against ethnic Azerbaijanis who have converted to Christianity and
other religions (see Section 5). For example an ethnic Azerbaijani was
subjected to administrative fines by local officials in Baku in July
for possessing Christian literature, and another ethnic Azerbaijani
reported that he was arrested, beaten, and imprisoned in August for
changing his religious affiliation and becoming a member of Jehovah's
Witnesses.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
of citizens to choose freely their place of domicile and to travel
abroad and return, and the Government generally respects these
provisions; however, at times it limited the movement of members of
opposition parties. In at least one case, the Government limited the
movement of members of opposition parties. Residents of border areas in
both Azerbaijan and Iran travel across the border in this restricted
zone without visas. Foreigners and citizens require a visa to travel to
the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan. Local officials harass and deny
passports to some members of the Armenian minority who wish to
emigrate.
In late 1998 and early this year, former president Abulfaz Elchibey
was prevented from traveling outside Baku for approximately 2 months
while under investigation and on trial for insulting the President; the
charges were dropped in February.
The Government officially recognizes freedom of emigration. Jewish
emigration to Israel and other countries is unrestricted by the
Government. However, with the majority of those who wish to emigrate
already having left, the number of Jewish emigrants is now small. The
remaining Armenian population in Azerbaijan (other than Armenians
residing in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan) is approximately
10,000 to 20,000, almost exclusively persons of mixed descent or in
mixed marriages. While official government policy is that ethnic
Armenians are free to travel, low-level officials seeking bribes
harassed Azerbaijani citizens of Armenian origin who sought to emigrate
or obtain passports.
There were no draft notifications that restricted movement during
the year. Draft-age men must obtain documents from military officials
before they can leave for international travel.
The number of refugees and internally displaced persons from the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is approximately 800,000. Armenians have
settled in parts of the occupied territories. However, Armenians have
not allowed the hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis who were forced
out of the now-occupied territories to return to their homes. The
Government provides almost no assistance to these persons, who rely on
donations from foreign countries. Most of these internally displaced
persons continue to live in camps and other temporary shelters, often
at below-subsistence levels, without adequate food, housing, education,
sanitation, or medical care. The parties to the conflict have cut
normal trade and transportation links to the other side, causing severe
hardship to civilians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia, and the Azerbaijani
exclave of Nakhchivan.
The Constitution provides for political asylum consistent with
international norms. The Government is receptive to international
assistance for refugees and IDP's. It cooperates with international
organizations to provide aid for them. The Government cooperates with
the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The issue
of the provision of first asylum did not arise. There were no reports
of the forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
In theory the election law and Constitution allow citizens to
change their government by peaceful means; however, the Government
continues to restrict citizens' ability to change their Government
peacefully by interfering in elections.
Azerbaijan is a republic with a strong presidency, and a
legislature that the Constitution describes as independent. However, in
practice the legislature's independence from the executive is marginal.
The Parliament exercises little legislative initiative independent of
the executive. As a result of the flawed 1995 parliamentary elections,
the New Azerbaijan Party led by President Aliyev, along with other
parties and nominally independent deputies loyal to the President,
occupy the overwhelming majority of seats in the 125-member Parliament.
The ruling party held its first party congress in December. Parties
considering themselves as belonging to the opposition hold 20 seats and
formed a unified bloc in April, but their ability to influence
legislation is less than marginal. Opposition parties continued to be
active outside the Parliament, agitating for their views in their
newspapers and through public statements. However, the Government
continued to deny registration to the opposition Azerbaijani Democratic
Party (see Section 2.b.).
Parliamentary by-elections were held on two occasions and were
marked by claims of fraud, although the lack of independent observers
made verification impossible.
The 1998 presidential election was an improvement over the previous
elections, especially in regard to reduced multiple voting and the
presence of domestic observers. However, some domestic and
international observers witnessed ballot stuffing and irregularities in
vote counting, and some were barred from observing the vote counting.
Neither domestic nor international observers were allowed to monitor
the compilation of the national vote totals. The observed
irregularities and lack of transparency in vote counting led to serious
doubts about the accuracy of the 76 percent of the vote officially
recorded for President Aliyev. In August newspapers quoted the chairman
of the CEC as admitting that Aliyev's vote total had been overstated by
12 to 15 percent. International observers, including the OSCE/ODIHR,
concluded that the election did not meet international standards.
Courts did not give serious consideration to the complaints filed
by runner-up E'tibar Mammedov, who charged that the President did not
receive the necessary two-thirds vote to avoid a run-off. The CEC did
not publish vote totals of election districts within the time period
required by the election law, and by the end of 1999, it still had not
published vote totals for election precincts. The election law required
that the full vote totals be published within 30 days of the election;
that is, by November 11, 1998.
During and prior to the presidential election campaign, the
Government took a number of steps to improve the election and overall
political environment. In addition to amending the election law, the
Government abolished press censorship, ended the criminal investigation
of certain opposition figures, allowed the opposition to conduct some
rallies, and gave registered opposition presidential candidates access
to state broadcast media. On the other hand, the state media's
reporting on the election was biased heavily in favor of the President.
The CEC and local commissions were insufficiently representative and
did not function impartially. The Government did not fully respect
freedom of assembly.
The 1995 Constitution required that the country's first-ever
municipal elections be held by November 1997. However, the elections
were delayed repeatedly until they were finally held on December 12.
The municipal election process was deeply flawed. The legislation
governing the elections reflected some recommendations of international
observers, but several serious problems were not remedied. The process
of selecting territorial and precinct electoral commissions to oversee
the municipal elections was marred by widespread irregularities with an
overwhelming pattern of favoring the ruling party and supporters of
local authorities. The process of registering candidates was marred
similarly by widespread irregularities, that favored the authorities.
The elections themselves were criticized heavily by observers,
including the Council of Europe (COE), which noted numerous instances
of ballot-stuffing, voter intimidation, and other violations.
Major opposition parties, with the exception of the unregistered
Azerbaijan Democratic Party (see Section 2.b.) and the Azerbaijan
National Independence Party (chaired by presidential election runner-up
Mammedov), agreed to participate in the December municipal elections.
There are no legal restrictions on women's participation in
politics; however, traditional social norms restrict women's roles in
politics. In past elections and also in the December municipal
elections, in a practice known as family voting, men often cast the
votes of their wives and other female members of their families. In the
1998 presidential election, this practice was seen less often. There
are 11 female Members of Parliament and 2 women with ministerial rank.
There are no restrictions on the participation of minorities in
politics as individuals; however, explicitly ethnically or religiously
based parties have not been registered. Members of indigenous ethnic
minorities such as Talysh, Lezghis, and Kurds occupy some senior
government positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several human rights organizations monitor the human rights
situation in the country. For the most part, the Government posed no
objections to international human rights groups. Some of these groups
investigate human rights abuses and disseminate their findings through
the media. However, the Government has been critical of certain
domestic human rights activists who have raised politically sensitive
issues.
The Government has demonstrated a limited willingness to discuss
human rights problems with international and domestic nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's). The ICRC has had access to prisoners of war as
well as civilians held in relation to the conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh. However, the ICRC has requested and been denied access to
prisoners not related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict being held in
special security and other prisons.
Government officials occasionally criticize human rights activists.
The chief prosecutor threatened the chairman of the Azerbaijan Human
Rights Center, Eldar Zeynalov, with criminal prosecution if he
continued to claim that Azerbaijan held political prisoners. Zeynalov's
organization continues these claims about political prisoners, and he
has faced no legal action. The Government registered the Azerbaijan
Human Rights Center in November; its chairman Eldar Zeynalov now is
routinely granted access to prisons and the Center operates normally.
The Ministry of Justice continued to deny registration to many
local human rights NGO's, but the Government has not tried to halt
their activities. Registration enables a human rights organization to
maintain a bank account legally, rent property, and generally to act as
a legal entity. Lack of registration makes it harder, but not
impossible, for a human rights group to function.
The ICRC conducted education programs on international humanitarian
law for officials of the Ministries of Interior and Defense, and for
university and secondary school students.
In August the Government created a Commission on Human Rights,
funded by a $400,000 U.N. Development Program grant, which is headed by
Justice Minister Sudaba Hasanova. By year's end, the commission had not
taken any significant actions.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights without respect to
gender, race, nationality or national origin, religion, language,
social status, or membership in political parties, trade unions, or
other public organizations. However, in the wake of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, there is widespread anti-Armenian sentiment in
society. Preventing discrimination is not a major government priority.
Women.--Discussion of violence against women is a taboo subject in
Azerbaijan's patriarchal society, but it remains a problem. In rural
areas, women have no real recourse against violence by their husbands,
regardless of the law. Rape is severely punishable, but, especially in
rural areas, only a small fraction of offenses against women are
reported or prosecuted. Police statistics note that, compared with the
first 6 months of 1998, rape and rape attempts increased by 50 percent
in the first 6 months of the year. This increase appears to be due to
both an increase in actual instances and an increase in the reporting
of such cases, although the figures still reflect considerable
underreporting, especially from conservative rural areas. There are no
government sponsored or funded programs for victims of violence. There
are no specific laws concerning spousal abuse or spousal rape.
Prostitution is a prominent problem, particularly in the capital
city of Baku. Most women become prostitutes in order to support their
family, and sometimes it even is encouraged by the family due to the
large amount of money to be made. The Society for the Defense of
Women's Rights (SDWR) held a mid-February conference to highlight
concerns over the growing incidence of prostitution and sexually
transmitted diseases. At the conference, it was reported that there are
more than 30 illegal houses of prostitution in Baku alone, the majority
of which are run by high-ranking officials in government and routinely
used by members of the prosecutor's office and the police.
Trafficking in women is a problem, and the country is a source and
transit point for trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
Women nominally enjoy the same legal rights as men, including the
right to participate in all aspects of economic and social life. In
general women have extensive opportunities for education and work.
However, traditional social norms continue to restrict women's roles in
the economy. Representation of women is sharply lower in higher levels
of the work force. There are few women in executive positions in
leading economic enterprises.
Eighteen women's NGO's are registered and deal with the problems of
women. The Association for the Defense of Rights of Azerbaijani Women
spends most of its time fighting uniquely post-Soviet problems. It has
helped divorced women, widows, and wives whose husbands are in prison,
all of whom have become socially and legally vulnerable since the fall
of the Soviet Union. It assisted widows whose landlords privatized
their apartments and then evicted them. It also worked with divorced
women who feel that they have been treated unfairly by divorce courts.
Two of the 18 women's NGO's deal with the problems of prostitution and
women trafficking (see Section 6.f.).
Children.--The Constitution and laws commit the Government to
protect the rights of children to education and health; however,
difficult economic circumstances limit the Government's ability to
carry out these commitments. Education is compulsory, free, and
universal until the age of 17. The Constitution places children's
rights on the same footing as those of adults. The Criminal Code
prescribes severe penalties for crimes against children. The Government
provides minimum standards of health care for children, although the
quality of medical care overall is very low. The Government has
authorized subsidies for children in an attempt to shield families
against economic hardship in the wake of price liberalization, but
these subsidies do not come close to covering the shortfall in family
budgets. There are a large number of refugee and displaced children
living in substandard conditions in refugee camps and public buildings.
Children sometimes beg on the streets of Baku and other towns.
There is no known societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--The Law on Support for the Disabled,
enacted in 1993, prescribes priority for invalids and the disabled in
obtaining housing, as well as discounts for public transport, and
pension supplements. The Government does not have the means in its
current financial crisis to fulfill its commitments. There are no
special provisions in the law mandating accessibility to buildings for
the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--There is considerable popular concern about
the conversion of ethnic Azerbaijanis to faiths considered alien to
Azerbaijani traditions. Opposition to proselytizing within the
population thus far has been limited to verbal criticism and appears
focused against two groups. The first consists of evangelical Christian
and so-called ``nontraditional'' religious groups. There is some
evidence of widespread prejudice against ethnic Azerbaijanis who have
converted to Christianity. During the year, articles periodically
appeared in progovernment and independent newspapers and electronic
media crudely depicting Christian missionary groups as a threat to the
identity of the nation. The perceived threat from such groups is
primarily cultural rather than religious. Often these articles attempt
to associate evangelists with the intelligence sources of Christian
Russia and Armenia, portraying them as part of a plot to undermine or
control Muslim Azerbaijan.
Occasionally, popular reaction goes beyond verbal criticism. In
August a crowd of Muslims reportedly broke into a Baptist summer camp
in Nardaran, threatening inhabitants and causing significant property
damage. Police made no attempt to intervene and said that they found no
evidence of the incident.
Several members of Jehovah's Witnesses reportedly were subjected to
humiliation and degradation in early September when a factory manager
assembled the plant's work force and berated the members of Jehovah's
Witnesses for betraying their country by adopting a new religion.
During the event, the father of one of the members of Jehovah's
Witnesses publicly disowned her for adopting the new religion. In
November, the factory reinstated the members with full back pay (see
Section 2.c.).
The second target of societal hostility is Muslim groups, mostly
from Iran, which seek to spread political Islam. Newspaper articles
appear periodically depicting certain foreign-backed Muslim
missionaries as a threat to stability and civil peace, and in some
cases, as part of an Iranian strategy to destabilize and ultimately
establish control over Azerbaijan.
Reflecting the intense popular hostility toward Armenians that
prevails in the country and the forced departure of most of the
Armenian population, all Armenian churches, many of them damaged in
ethnic riots which took place over a decade ago, remain closed. As a
consequence, ethnic Armenians who remain in Azerbaijan, estimated to
number between 10,000 and 30,000, are deprived of an opportunity for
public worship. A similar situation exists in the Armenian-controlled
portions of Azerbaijan, from which the Armenians forced approximately
550,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis to flee their homes and where those mosques
that have not been destroyed are not functioning.
Jews generally do not suffer from societal discrimination. However,
according to the Union of Councils for Soviet Jews, two Baku synagogues
were desecrated in the fall of 1998. According to press reports,
evangelical Christians are not welcome in Nagorno-Karabakh, a part of
the country not under government control.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The outbreak of hostilities,
anti-Armenian riots, and economic collapse in the final years of the
Soviet Union led to the expulsion of almost all Armenians and the
departure of Russians and others. An estimated 10,000 to 20,000
Armenians still live in Azerbaijan, mostly women with ethnic
Azerbaijani or Russian husbands. Most seek to shield their national
identity. Some have changed their nationality, as reported in their
passports, to Azerbaijani. With the nearly complete departure of the
Armenian population, the number of problems reported by this ethnic
minority has decreased. Armenians have complained of discrimination in
employment and harassment at schools and workplaces and of refusal of
local government authorities to pay pensions. The problem of local
government authorities refusing to grant passports to Armenians has
been reduced. Armenian widows have had permits to live in Baku revoked.
However, some persons of mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani descent continue to
occupy government positions.
Indigenous ethnic minorities such as the Talysh, Lezghis, Avars,
and Georgians do not suffer discrimination. However, Meskhetian Turks
displaced from Central Asia as well as Kurdish displaced persons from
the Lachin region complain of discrimination.
In the area of the country controlled by insurgent (Armenian)
forces, the Armenians forced approximately 800,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis
to flee their homes. The regime that now controls these areas
effectively has banned them from all spheres of civil, political, and
economic life.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The overwhelming majority of labor
unions still operate as they did under the Soviet system and remain
tightly linked to the Government. The Constitution provides for freedom
of association, including the right to form labor unions; however, one
or another subbranch of the government-run Azerbaijani Labor Federation
organizes most industrial and white-collar workers. Most major
industries remain state-owned.
An independent union of oil workers that was displaced by a
progovernment union in 1997 has not been revived. In 1997 the state oil
company formed a progovernment union, the Azerbaijan Union of Oil and
Gas Industry Workers, which took over the former independent oil
workers union without a vote of the union membership. It continues to
operate without a vote of its rank and file workers. An independent
group of oil workers, the Committee to Defend the Rights of Azerbaijani
Oil Workers, operates outside of established trade union structures and
promotes the interests of workers in the petroleum sector.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and there are no
legal restrictions on strikes or provisions for retribution against
strikers. There were a number of threatened strikes in the oil industry
during the year over wage arrears, all of which were prevented through
negotiations and compromises. Oil workers continue to demand
restoration of wage arrears amounting to several months pay. They do so
internally but not through public protest. There are no established
mechanisms to avoid wildcat strikes.
Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate with
international bodies; however, none has done so.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1996 law
provides for collective bargaining agreements to set wages in state
enterprises. A labor inspectorate was established in 1997. However,
these laws have not produced an effective system of collective
bargaining between unions and enterprise management. Government-
appointed boards and directors run the major enterprises and set wages.
Unions effectively do not participate in determining wage levels. In a
carryover from the Soviet system, both management and workers are
considered members of the professional unions.
There are no export processing zones. A 4-year effort supported by
the United Nations Development Program to create an economic zone in
Sumgait was abandoned early in the year; Parliament never considered
legislation to create such a zone.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
allows forced or compulsory labor only under states of emergency or
martial law or as the result of a court decision affecting a condemned
person, and the Government has not invoked this clause; however, women
are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section
6.f.). Two departments in the General Prosecutor's Office (the
Department of Implementation of the Labor Code and the Department for
Enforcement of the Law on Minors) enforce the prohibition on forced or
compulsory labor. There are no constitutional provisions or laws
specifically prohibiting forced and bonded labor by children, but such
practices are not known to occur. There were no reports during the year
of compulsory cotton picking by children or adults.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum employment age is 16 years. Primary school
education is compulsory, free, and universal. Children are normally in
school until the age of 17. The law allows children between the ages of
14 and 15 to work with the consent of their parents and limits the
workweek of children between the ages of 14 and 16 to 24 hours per
week. Children at the age of 15 may work if the workplace's labor union
does not object. There is no explicit restriction on the kinds of labor
that 15-year-old children may perform with union consent. The Labor and
Social Security Ministry has primary enforcement responsibility for
child labor laws. With high adult unemployment, there have been few, if
any, complaints of abuses of child labor laws. The Government does not
specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets the
nationwide administrative minimum wage by decree. It is $3.00 (12,500
manat) per month. This wage is not sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. The recommended monthly
wage level to meet basic subsistence needs was estimated to be $50
(215,000 manat) per person. Since practically all persons who work earn
more than the minimum wage, enforcing its low level is not a major
issue in labor or political debate.
The disruption of economic links with the rest of the former Soviet
Union continues to affect employment in many industries. Idle factory
workers typically receive less than half of their former wage. Under
these conditions, many workers rely on the safety net of the extended
family. More workers and unemployed persons turn to second jobs and
makeshift employment in the informal sector, such as operating the
family car as a taxi, selling produce from private gardens, or
operating small roadside shops. Until the collapse of the Russian
economy in 1998, many Azerbaijanis (estimates range as high as 1
million) supported themselves on remittances from relatives working in
Russia, primarily as street traders. This source of support was
curtailed severely during the year, although reliable statistics as to
the precise amounts involved are not available. Combinations of these
and other strategies are the only way for broad sectors of the urban
population to reach a subsistence income level.
The legal workweek is 40 hours. There is a 1-hour lunch break per
day and shorter breaks in the morning and afternoon. The Government
attempts to enforce this law in the private sector of registered
private businesses, but does not enforce these rules in the informal
sector where the majority of citizens make their living.
Health and safety standards exist, but usually they are ignored in
the workplace. Workers cannot leave dangerous work conditions without
fear of losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Azerbaijan is a source and a transit
point for trafficked women. The women who are trafficked engage in
labor, mainly associated with the sex industry, and forced
prostitution. Women from Azerbaijan usually are sent to the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) or Western Europe, mainly Germany, to participate as
workers in the sex industry (for example, in strip clubs) and as
prostitutes. Women from Iran, Russia, and sometimes Iraq, are
transported through Baku to the UAE, Europe, and occasionally the
United States for the same purposes. The problems of trafficking in
women and sexual exploitation are addressed briefly in the Criminal
Code, but are largely unknown and ignored. Two of the country's 18
women's NGO's deal with the problems of trafficking in women and
prostitution, mainly by concentrating on educating women, particularly
those in rural areas, about the dangers of such practices.
______
BELARUS
Belarus has a government in which nearly all power is concentrated
in the hands of the President. Since his election in July 1994 to a 5-
year term as the country's first President, Alexandr Lukashenko has
consolidated power steadily in the executive branch through
authoritarian means. He used a November 1996 referendum to amend the
1994 Constitution in order to broaden his powers and extend his term in
office. The President ignored the then-Constitutional Court's ruling
that the Constitution could not be amended by referendum. As a result,
the current political system is based on the 1996 Constitution, which
was adopted in an unconstitutional manner. Most members of the
international community criticized the flawed referendum and do not
recognize the legitimacy of the 1996 Constitution, legislature, or
Alexandr Lukashenko's continuation in office beyond the legal
expiration of his term in July. Although the amended Constitution
provides for a formal separation of powers, the President dominates all
other branches of government. The current acting legislature was not
elected directly, but was created out of the remnants of the former
Parliament, which Lukashenko disbanded soon after the 1996 referendum.
The Constitution limits the legislature to meeting twice per year for
no more than a total of 170 days. Presidential decrees made when the
legislature is out of session have the force of law, except--in
theory--in those cases restricted by the 1996 Constitution. The 1996
Constitution also allows the President to issue decrees having the
force of law in circumstances of ``specific necessity and urgency,'' a
provision that President Lukashenko has interpreted broadly. The
judiciary is not independent.
Law enforcement and internal security responsibilities are shared
by the Committee for State Security (KGB) and Ministry of Internal
Affairs (MVD), both of which answer directly to the President. Civilian
authorities do not maintain effective control of the security forces.
Under President Lukashenko's direction, the Presidential Guard--
initially created to protect senior officials--continued to act against
the President's political enemies with no judicial or legislative
oversight. On May 25, the Law on the State Guard officially entered
into force. The law, which already had been operative on a de facto
basis for a number of years, gives the President the right to
subordinate all security bodies to his personal command.Members of the
security forces committed numerous human rights abuses.
The country's political leadership opposes any significant economic
reforms and remains committed ideologically to a planned economy.
Government officials claimed that the gross domestic product (GDP) grew
during the first 6 months of the year by 3 percent, but most
independent analysts agree that any growth that has occurred was the
result principally of continued massive credits to the debt-ridden
state sector. Discriminatory foreign exchange controls have contributed
to sharp declines in foreign trade and investment. Both exports and
imports continued to fall given the country's growing isolation from
world and regional trade flows. Foreign investment fell by 42 percent
to $30 million during the first 6 months of the year. Per capita GDP
remained constant at approximately $1,100, but in reality was probably
much lower. Leading exports are trucks, tractors, chemical fertilizers,
and fibers. The majority of workers are employed in the state
industrial and agricultural sectors. Although the unreliability of
official statistics makes it difficult to assess accurately economic
conditions, living standards for many segments of society continued to
decline. Annual inflation was over 350 percent. Following a doubling by
the Government on May 1, average monthly wages stood at approximately
$40 at mid-year. Residents of small towns and rural areas, where
incomes are particularly low and wage arrears more prevalent, sustain
themselves through unreported economic activity and small gardens.
The Government's human rights record worsened significantly. The
Government severely limits the right of citizens to change their
government, and the President took severe measures to neutralize a
large-scale public campaign initiated by opposition leaders to draw
attention to the expiration of his legal term in office on July 20.
Well-known political figures disappeared under mysterious
circumstances. Security forces continued to beat political opponents
and detainees. There were reports of severe hazing in military units
during the year. Prison conditions remained poor. Security forces
arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens, and the number of
apparently politically motivated arrests increased, although most of
those arrested soon were released. Prolonged detention and delays in
trials were common and also occurred in a number of politically
sensitive cases. Although one political prisoner was released, at least
one other individual whose conviction human rights groups believe was
politically motivated remains incarcerated. The security services
infringed on citizens' privacy rights and monitored closely the
activities of opposition politicians and other segments of the
population. Restrictions on freedom of speech, the press, and peaceful
assembly continued, and the Government did not respect freedom of
association. The Government continued to impose limits on freedom of
religion, and restricted freedom of movement. Government security
agents monitored closely human rights monitors and hindered their
efforts. Domestic violence and discrimination against women remained
significant problems. Societal anti-Semitism persists. Authorities
continued to restrict workers' rights to associate freely, organize,
and bargain.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--On May 7, former Minister of Internal Affairs
Yury Zakharenko disappeared shortly after he told his family in a
telephone conversation that he was on his way home. Zakharenko, a close
associate of the then-detained former Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir,
disappeared after voting began in an opposition presidential election
initiative, in which Chigir was one of the principal candidates.
Witnesses reported seeing Zakharenko on the evening of his
disappearance being pushed by several men into an unmarked car.
According to Zakharenko's family, government security officials did
little to look for him or inquire into the details of his
disappearance. On May 19, Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakov
stated publicly that there was ``no information'' to indicate that a
crime had been committed against Zakharenko. An investigation into the
disappearance apparently was begun only several months later after
another opposition political figure disappeared in mid-September.
On September 16, following a meeting earlier during that day
broadcast on state television in which President Lukashenko ordered the
chiefs of his security services to crackdown on ``opposition scum,''
13th Supreme Soviet Deputy Chairman Viktor Gonchar disappeared, along
with local business associate Anatoliy Krasovsky. Shortly before his
disappearance, Gonchar telephoned his wife to inform her that he was on
his way home. Broken glass and blood were discovered later at the site
where relatives and friends of the men believe the vehicle in which the
two were travelling may have been stopped. A high-profile
antigovernment politician, Gonchar was considered an active fund raiser
for the opposition. Although government authorities denied any
involvement, there is no public evidence of concrete progress by
government investigators to resolve the cases.
In mid-December, former National Bank chairwoman Tamara Vinnikova,
who disappeared from an apartment where she had been held closely
guarded under house arrest since November 1997 (see Section 1.d.),
reappeared. Vinnikova apparently was able to escape from her guards and
eventually make her way to another country (see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The 1996 Constitution provides for the inviolability of
the person and specifically prohibits torture, as well as cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, police and prison guards beat
detainees and prisoners. Law enforcement and prison officials may use
physical force against detainees and prisoners if the latter are
violent, have refused to obey the instructions of the prison
administration, or have violated ``maliciously'' the terms of their
sentences. However, human rights monitors credibly report that
investigators coerce confessions through beatings and psychological
pressure. Although such behavior is against the law, the Government
seldom, if ever, punishes those who commit such abuses. Guards use
force against detainees to coerce confessions as well as during routine
activities. Police also beat demonstrators (see Section 2.b.).
On April 2, plainclothes security officials beat opposition
activist Halina Kunina following an unsanctioned demonstration in
Minsk, during which over 20 persons--including 9 minors--were detained.
Kunina reportedly was hospitalized with a concussion for several days.
On April 25, Omon special forces militia in the city of Grodno used
truncheons and tear gas to break up a peaceful demonstration of
approximately 40 youths who were staging a march to mark the
anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster. Subsequently, nine demonstrators
were detained briefly for between 2 to 4 days, including one who
required medical attention for a concussion she received during the
incident.
On June 11, following a trial closed to the public, press, and
international observers, the Supreme Court sentenced Viktar Yancheuski,
Anatol Haurylau, and Raman Radzikouski to 11, 5, and 4 years in prison,
respectively (Radzikouski later received amnesty) for their alleged
roles in the murder of Lukashenko adviser and Mahileu local government
official Yauhen Mikalutski. Mikalutski was killed in October 1997 by a
radio-controlled car bomb. Independent local analysts speculate the
murder was probably connected with the illegal trade of alcohol to
Russia. Government authorities claimed that Valery Tkachev, another
suspect in the case, committed suicide by hanging himself in a
detention facility in December 1997. Relatives of Yancheuski, Haurylau,
and Radzikouski claimed that government investigators used physical
coercion against the defendants in order to try to get them to confess
to a crime that they did not commit. The officers of the Minsk Advisory
and Monitoring Group (AMG) of Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE), who were permitted to interview the defendants, found
that their statements of beatings while in detention were credible,
noted that it was clear that they were under heavy psychological
pressure to cooperate, and that they had not been given access to legal
counsel.
On July 17, Uladimir Antonaw, a 20-year-old member of the youth
branch of the opposition Belarusian Popular Front, was detained by
militia officers in Minsk for allegedly writing anti-presidential
slogans on public buildings. No charges officially were brought against
him, but Antonaw was detained for 5 days. Antonaw claims that militia
officers beat him with truncheons and tried to coerce him to confess.
The local human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) Spring '96
confirmed Antonaw's account of the treatment he received while in
detention.
Over 70 persons were detained briefly following demonstrations in
Minsk and other cities on July 21 and July 27. Government security
officials beat some of the detainees (see Section 1.c.).
Following the July 21 demonstration, militia officers in Minsk beat
Oleg Volchek, an opposition activist and chairman of a nongovernmental
commission investigating the disappearance of former Internal Affairs
Minister Yury Zakharenko. Volchek, who was treated and released that
evening for the injuries he sustained, later filed an official
complaint about the conduct of the militia officers with a local
prosecutor's office. Charges of ``malicious hooliganism'' filed against
Volchek for his participation in the demonstration later were dropped;
however, government authorities also did not take any disciplinary
action against the officers involved in the beating incident.
Pavel Znavets, deputy of the 13th Supreme Soviet, illegally
disbanded by Lukashenko after a 1996 referendum (see Section 3) also
was detained and beaten following the July 21 demonstration. Militia
officers in Minsk reportedly also beat Alyaksey Lapitski, a member of
the Frantsysk Skaryna Belarusian Language Society (BLS), whom they
detained for participating in the demonstration. A subsequent medical
examination confirmed Lapitski's account of physical abuse. The BLS
filed an official complaint with local authorities. There were reports
that no disciplinary action was taken against the officers involved in
these cases.
On July 27, 21-year-old Yawhen Asinski was detained for allegedly
kicking a militia officer during an opposition demonstration
commemorating the anniversary of the declaration of Belarusian
sovereignty from the Soviet Union (see Section 1.d.). At a news
conference held by the human rights NGO Spring '96, following his
release on September 6, Asinski claimed that uniformed militia and
plainclothes government security officers hit him in the abdomen,
kidneys, and back both before and after his arrest. According to
Asinski, he was subjected to food and sleep deprivation during his
first three days in detention and placed with 18 other prisoners in a
cell meant for up to 10 persons. An OSCE observer who later interviewed
Asinski found his claims of physical abuse to be credible. Charges of
``malicious hooliganism'' filed against Asinski remained pending at
year's end.
On October 17, uniformed and plainclothes security forces beat
demonstrators who were detained following a large antigovernment
demonstration in Minsk (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.). At least 20 of the
demonstrators subsequently registered their accounts of physical abuse
while in custody with the Minsk-based Independent Association for Legal
Assistance to the Population. On October 19, police officers of the
Sovietsky District station in Minsk beat 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy and
well-known independent journalist Valery Schukin following his
detention for participation in the demonstration.
On December 13, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy Andrei Klimov, who had
been held in pretrial detention on politically motivated charges since
February 1998 (see Section 1.d.), was beaten severely by prison guards
after he refused to attend a court hearing on his case. During the
beating, Klimov suffered a concussion and other injuries. Despite the
recommendation of examining doctors, Klimov was not permitted immediate
hospitalization. On December 23, the Procurator General's office
announced that it would not institute criminal proceedings against the
officers involved in the incident since they had taken ``adequate
measures'' with regard to Klimov.
The Ministry of Defense announced in 1996 that ``dedovshchina,''
the practice of hazing new recruits, would no longer be tolerated.
However, this practice apparently has not abated. According to official
data, 48 cases of ``dedovshchina'' were reported during the first 8
months of the year. During 1998 73 cases were reported.
Prison conditions are poor, and are marked by severe overcrowding,
shortages of food and medicine, and the spread of diseases such as
tuberculosis, syphilis, and AIDS. Conditions at prison hospitals also
are poor, according to human rights monitors. Detainees in pretrial
detention facilities also reported poor conditions and denial of
medical treatment, which contributed to their declining health while
they awaited trial. AMG officers who visited a detention facility in
Vitebsk during June noted that in 1 cell 16 female prisoners shared 10
beds, while in another, 14 prisoners between the ages of 14 and 17
shared 8 beds. During an interview with a government newspaper in
February, the deputy procurator general acknowledged continued severe
prison overcrowding. He stated that detention centers and corrective
labor institutions house 150 percent of the authorized number of
prisoners, and noted the problem facilitated the spread of contagious
diseases. On November 3, Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakov
publicly acknowledged that the country's total prison population
remained at over 60,000 persons, and that prison conditions in the
country did not meet ``basic standards.'' A government amnesty for
lesser offenders that went into effect on January 21 was intended to
decrease the total prison population by approximately 8,000 inmates,
but it is unclear to what extent it was implemented. Those convicted of
alleged ``economic crimes,'' for example, reportedly were granted
amnesty and released from prison only after payment of financial
restitution.
Male and female prisoners are housed separately. Following an
inspection of a correctional facility for women in Gomel on June 22,
Minister of Internal Affairs Yury Sivakov noted in an interview with
the official press that, although it was intended to house only 1,350
inmates, it currently held 2,800. He commented ``here women are not
serving time but are suffering, and correctional facility Number 4 is
our headache.''
Human rights monitors sometimes were granted access to observe
prison conditions, although the Government did not honor some requests
to meet with individual prisoners. OSCE AMG officers, for example, were
permitted to visit former Minister of Agriculture Leonov and State Farm
Director Staravoitov (see Section 1.d.) on August 13 and 24,
respectively. However, an official AMG request to visit Viktor Gonchar,
who was detained on March 1 for 10 days on charges related to his
involvement in an opposition presidential initiative, was not granted
(see Section 1.b.). The AMG was not given access to Gonchar despite an
appeal by the OSCE that he be released and reports that Gonchar was on
a potentially health-threatening nonliquid hunger strike (see Section
2.b.). Despite his weakened condition, government security officials
released Gonchar upon completion of his sentence by dumping him from a
car into a pile of snow near his home. Gonchar subsequently disappeared
in September. (see Section 1.b.)
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government has
amended only slightly its Soviet-era law on detention, and during the
year, security forces continued to arrest arbitrarily and detain
citizens, most often in connection with demonstrations, some of which
were not authorized. There continued to be politically motivated
arrests, although most of those arrested soon were released. The
Criminal Procedure Code provides that police may detain a person
suspected of a crime for 24 hours without a warrant, within which time
the procurator is notified. The procurator then has 48 hours to review
the legality of the detention. If the procurator deems the detention
legal, a suspect can be held for a maximum of l0 days without formal
charge. However, usually once the decision is made to hold a suspect, a
formal charge is made. Once a suspect is charged, a trial must be
initiated within 2 months, although in some cases the Procurator
General can extend pretrial detention to 18 months to allow for further
investigation. Alternatively, a suspect who has been charged can be
released on a written pledge not to flee, in which case there is no
time limit on the pretrial investigation. The law allows detainees the
right to apply to the court (rather than the procurator) to determine
the legality of their detentions. However, in practice, suspects'
appeals to have their detentions reviewed by the courts frequently are
suppressed because detainees are at the mercy of investigators, and
detention officials are unwilling to forward the appeals. There is no
provision for bail under the current legal code. According to the
Belarusian-Helsinki Committee, in late 1998 there were 64,000 persons
in detention.
By law detainees may be allowed unlimited access to legal counsel,
and, for those who cannot afford counsel, the court appoints a lawyer.
However, investigators routinely fail to inform detainees of their
rights and conduct preliminary interrogations without giving detainees
an opportunity to consult counsel. The information gained then is used
against the defendant in court. Even when appointed by the State,
defense attorneys are subordinate to the executive branch of power.
Detainees and lawyers both report restrictions on consultations.
Following the arrest of opposition leader and former Prime Minister
Mikhail Chigir on March 30, government authorities initially refused
his request that his wife, an attorney, officially represent him.
However, this decision later was changed to allow Mrs. Chigir to act in
this capacity. Chigir was released on November 30, but informed that he
still faced trial on charges of negligence and abuse of power.
Government authorities have disbarred or threatened to disbar a number
of attorneys who have been involved in politically sensitive cases.
Although on August 10 the Ministry of Justice agreed to register
the Association for Legal Assistance to the Population (ALAP), an
independent organization that provides legal assistance to those who
have suffered from police brutality or political persecution, it
subjected the organization to a comprehensive ``inspection'' on October
20, shortly after a large antigovernment demonstration during which the
ALAP maintained that a large number of persons were beaten by
government security officials. On November 9, the Ministry of Justice
suspended the ALAP's license due to such irregularities as alleged
violations of the advertising law in its newspaper advertisements. On
December 28, the Ministry of Justice informed the ALAP that its license
to provide legal services would not be renewed. However, the ALAP
maintains that a license is required only to work with business
organizations, and intends to continue to try to assist private
individuals.
Prominent human rights attorney Vera Stremkovskaya, who was
threatened with disbarment by the Ministry of Justice and Minsk
Collegium of Advocates in late 1998 for comments she made during a
foreign trip that were critical of human rights violations in Belarus,
was charged with slander by a local prosecutor's office on April 14.
The charge stemmed from comments she made during judicial proceedings
in defense of Vasiliy Staravoitov, a state farm director charged with
embezzlement. The procurator general's office pursued the case
throughout the year and called Stremkovskaya in for official
questioning on September 29. However, the charge subsequently was
dropped in late December due to lack of evidence. The treatment of
Stremkovskaya highlighted the lack of a truly independent bar
association and political interference in the legal process (see
Section 1.e.).
As in 1998, the Government again held hundreds of political
detainees during the year. Most were peaceful participants in
antigovernment demonstrations who were held anywhere from several hours
to several days (see Section 2.b.). For example, Yawhen Skocha, a
deputy chairman of the Belarusian Popular Front (BNF) youth movement,
was given a 10-day ``administrative'' sentence on February 15 for
leading an unsanctioned, but peaceful, antigovernment demonstration the
previous day in Minsk, following which a total of 15 persons were
detained briefly. On June 10, Skocha was given an additional 1-year
suspended sentence on a charge related to the demonstration--
``organization of a group action in violation of public order.''
On May 1, 19 opposition activists, including the chairman of the
Belarusian Social Democratic Party (BSDP), were detained briefly for
attempting to participate in an official Labor Day celebratory event in
Minsk. Viktor Babayed, the chairman of the Belarusian Congress of
Democratic Trade Unions, also was detained briefly.
On July 21, government security officers arrested and briefly
detained 53 persons who participated in an unsanctioned, but peaceful,
antigovernment demonstration. On July 27, 19 persons were detained for
participating in an unsanctioned, but peaceful, demonstration to
commemorate Belarus's 1990 declaration of sovereignty from the Soviet
Union. BSDP chairman Mikalay Statkevich was detained following the
demonstration and given a 10-day prison sentence for organizing the
demonstration. However, Yawhen Asinski was held until September 6 (see
Section 1.c.).
On October 17, approximately 93 persons were arrested for
participating in a large unsanctioned demonstration and protest march.
In a series of assembly line-style court judgements, roughly 17 persons
were sentenced to prison terms of up to 15 days, and 19 persons were
fined. A number of opposition leaders associated with the
demonstration, including Mikolai Statkevich and Lyudmila Gryaznova were
arrested at their homes on the evening of October 17. A number of other
opposition political figures went into hiding to escape wide-ranging
roundups conducted by government security officers. Gryaznova
subsequently was fined approximately $500 (300 million rubles) while
Statkevich was released on October 31 following the intervention of the
chairman of the OSCE parliamentary assembly committee on Belarus.
On October 19, 13th Supreme Soviet Deputy and United Civic Party
deputy chairman Anatoliy Lebedko was arrested for his role in the
October 17 demonstration. He was given a 10-day sentence even though he
did not participate in the protest march that ended in clashes with
security officials. Despite backing out from participating in the
demonstration and protest march, opposition Youth Front member Yevtgeny
Afnagel was given a 15-day sentence. While searching for his father,
government security briefly detained the son of independent newspaper
editor Pavel Zhuk for questioning.
Unidentified, nonuniformed officials working for the security
services regularly apprehend participants in antigovernment
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.). There are credible reports that
plainclothes security officials sometimes infiltrate antigovernment
demonstrations in order to either report on opposition protesters or
provoke clashes between demonstrators and police. Security officers on
occasion also preemptively have apprehended organizers and individuals
considered to be potential participants prior to demonstrations,
including those that had been sanctioned by the Government.
Security force officials detained journalists and NGO officials
during the year (See Sections 2.b. and 4.).
Following demonstrations, government security officials have held
some detainees incommunicado.
In addition to the hundreds of antigovernment protestors, whom
authorities held for several hours or days, there were several
prominent political detainees whom the Government held for prolonged
periods in pretrial detention, some for over a year.
On March 30, opposition leader and former Prime Minister Mikhail
Chigir was arrested on charges of alleged financial impropriety and
exceeding his authority during his tenure as a head of a state bank
several years previously. Chigir's arrest occurred just prior to a
public ceremony to register his participation in an opposition-
organized presidential election initiative aimed at drawing attention
to the upcoming end of Lukashenko's legal 5-year term in office. It
also followed several warnings from government security officials to
Chigir that to cease his political activities. He remained in pretrial
detention until November, although the procurator's office failed to
present any substantive or specific evidence of his alleged crimes.
Despite protests from the OSCE and a number of foreign governments
Chagir remained in pretrial detention until November 30. Trial
proceedings, which government authorities indicated would be followed
through, remained pending as of year's end.
In February 1998, police arrested Andrei Klimov, a successful
entrepreneur and member of the Parliament that was dissolved in late
1996, on charges of embezzlement and other financial irregularities.
Kilmov's supporters and some human rights observers believe that his
arrest was politically motivated, because Klimov is an outspoken critic
of President Lukashenko and had participated in a commission that
examined violations of the law and the Constitution by the President.
Klimov's period of pretrial detention was extended on several
occasions. He was beaten severely by prison guards in December (see
Section 1.c.). As of year's end, Klimov remained in detention while his
trial, which began on July 22, continued.
Former director of the joint-stock agribusiness (Rassvet) Vasiliy
Staravoitov and former Agriculture Minister Vasily Leonov were arrested
in late 1997 for allegedly embezzling state credits. Authorities denied
appeals for their release on their own recognizance due to age and poor
health. The trial of the 75-year-old Staravoitov, which officially
began in November 1998, was delayed repeatedly due to his weak physical
condition aggravated by poor prison conditions. On May 30, Staravoitov
was found guilty and sentenced to foreiture of property and 2 years
(including time already served) in a labor camp. Staravoitov was
released on November 11 after completion of his sentence. Domestic
human rights groups believe that both Staravoitov and Leonov were
arrested to draw attention away from a poor harvest on heavily
subsidized state farms. The Government is dedicated to maintaining a
Soviet model of agriculture and Rassvet's demonstrated independence in
implementing reforms not sanctioned by the Government apparently posed
a threat to such efforts. Immediately following Staravoitov's arrest,
the Government renationalized his company. The trial of Leonov, which
began in Minsk on August 17, was ongoing at year's end. While in
detention, Leonov has suffered two heart attacks. Leonov also initiated
a hunger strike to protest the initial refusal by prison authorities to
provide him with medical supplies brought by his relatives.
Former National Bank chairwoman Tamara Vinnikova was arrested in
January 1997 on allegations of malfeasance during her previous tenure
as head of a state bank. The timing of her arrest, which coincided with
her increasingly public challenges to President Lukashenko's economic
policies, led observers to suspect a political motive. Due to her
failing health, following 10 months in a KGB facility, Vinnikova was
allowed to continue her period of pretrial detention under house arrest
beginning in November 1997. While under house arrest, her visitors and
incoming phone calls were monitored around-the-clock by guards from the
Presidential Security Service. On April 8, Vinnikova disappeared. She
was apparently able to escape from her guards and eventually make it to
another country. Following her reappearance in mid-December, Vinnikova
claimed in a radio news interview she went into hiding in order to
escape a suspected conspiracy against her life (see Section 1.b.).
Statistics on the current number of persons in pretrial detention
and the average length of pretrial detention were not available. As of
August 1998, there were approximately 11,000 persons in pretrial
detention.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however in practice the judiciary is not
independent and largely is unable to act as a check on the executive
branch and its agents. Reforms adopted to support the independence of
the judiciary in 1995 were not implemented. Without major structural
reforms, the independence of the judiciary cannot be realized. The
November 1996 constitutional referendum further subordinated the
judiciary to the executive branch by giving the President the power to
appoint 6 of the 12 members of the Constitutional Court, including the
chairman. The remaining six are appointed by the Council of the
Republic, which itself is composed of individuals appointed by the
President or elected by individuals influenced by the President. The
President also appoints the chairmen of the Supreme Court and the
Supreme Economic Court. The President also has authority under the
Constitution to appoint and dismiss all district and military judges.
The criminal justice system follows the former Soviet model and has
three tiers: District courts; regional courts; and the Supreme Court.
Several modifications have been made, brought about by the passage of
the new Constitution, including direct presidential appointments. The
Constitutional Court was established in 1994 to adjudicate serious
constitutional issues, but, dependent on the executive branch, it does
not challenge presidential initiatives. In addition the Constitutional
Court has no means to enforce its decisions.
Judges adjudicate trials; only in capital offense trials in which
the defendant pleads not guilty and demands a jury trial do juries
determine innocence or guilt. Judges are dependent on the Ministry of
Justice for sustaining court infrastructure and on local executive
branch officials for providing their personal housing. In addition
judges owe their positions to the President. Although the Procurator's
Office categorically denies it, there are widespread and credible
reports that ``telephone justice'' (the practice of executive and local
authorities dictating to the courts the outcome of trials) continues.
On February 24, Belarusian judge Yury Sushkov announced at a press
conference in Germany that he had asked for political asylum from
German authorities. Sushkov claimed that KGB officials forced him to
sentence two Belarusian customs officers to several years in prison,
despite a lack of conclusive evidence of their guilt. He stated that he
could no longer, ``make dishonest decisions and act against principles
of juridical consciousness.''
On August 5, while on an inspection tour in the Brest oblast in the
western part of the country, Lukashenko told local reporters that he
personally exercised control over ``certain'' ongoing judicial cases,
including that of former Prime Minister and opposition leader Mikhail
Chigir (see Section 1.d.). Lukashenko stated, ``I have them under
control, I am not going to allow any injustice there myself.'' On
August 30, during a government interagency commission on crime covered
by the official media, President Lukashenko reportedly stated, ``It is
natural for the Head of State to exercise control over one criminal
case or another . . . especially in our country, where the Head of
State controls all the branches of power--legislative, executive, and
judicial.''
Prosecutors, like the courts, are organized into offices at the
district, regional, and republic levels. They are ultimately
responsible to, and serve at the pleasure of, the Procurator General
who, according to the Constitution, is appointed by the Council of the
Republic.
In May 1997, Lukashenko issued presidential decree number 12,
``Several Measures on Improving the Practice of Lawyers and Notaries,''
which, according to international legal experts and human rights
monitors, seriously compromised the independence of lawyers from the
Government. The decree, which ostensibly was issued in response to
allegedly exorbitant attorneys' fees, subordinated all lawyers to the
Ministry of Justice, which controls the licensing of lawyers, and
placed the bar association under much greater Ministry of Justice
control.
During 1997 and 1998, the Government used the decree to strip
several lawyers of their licenses, including President Lukashenko's
political opponents, such as former Supreme Soviet chairman Mecheslav
Gryb, and prominent defense attorneys Garry Pogonyailo and Nadezhda
Dudareva. Human rights activist and defense attorney Vera Stremkovskaya
was threatened with disbarment following her public criticisms of the
Government while on a visit abroad in 1998. She was charged with
``slander'' in April for comments she made in a court while defending a
client. The charge was dropped later in the year (see Section 1.d.).
The Constitution provides for public trials, although exceptions
can be made in cases established by law (for example, in cases of rape
or on grounds of national security). Defendants have the legal right to
attend proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence on their
own behalf. However, these rights are not always respected in practice.
Defendants' legal right to be represented by counsel also is not always
respected in practice. While the 1996 Constitution establishes a
presumption of innocence, in practice defendants frequently must prove
their innocence.
Both defendants and prosecutors have the right of appeal, and most
criminal cases are appealed, according to legal sources. In appeals
neither defendants nor witnesses appear before the court; the court
merely reviews the protocol and other documents from the lower court's
trial. Appeals rarely result in reversals of verdicts. In criminal
cases, the prosecution has the right to appeal an acquittal for retrial
to a higher court on the same charge.
On July 22, according to the OSCE's AMG, the well-known lawyer,
journalist, human rights activist, and 13th Supreme Soviet deputy
Valeri Shchukin was detained illegally in a court building while
attempting to attend the trial of Andrei Klimov (see Section 1.d.). The
trial proceedings were open to the public. In front of OSCE observers
and acting without any legal basis or written order, militia officers
removed Shchukin from the building by force. Shchukin summarily was
given a 15-day prison sentence for ``petty hooliganism'' by a judge
who, by way of explanation to one of the OSCE officers, stated that the
action was taken because Shchukin was ``not normal.'' Shchukin
subsequently was released after serving 7 days of the sentence.
Antigovernment protestors arrested after demonstrations were
subjected to assembly line style trials, sometimes without the right to
counsel or the opportunity to present evidence or call witnesses.
On February 23, political prisoner and BNF youth front member
Aleksei Shidlovskiy was released from prison 2 days prior to the
conclusion of one year of an 18-month sentence for ``malicious
hooliganism with extreme cynicism'' in a hard-regime labor camp. The
charges stemmed from his alleged spray painting of antipresidential
slogans in August 1997. Despite his youth (Shidlovskiy turned 19 while
in detention) and the nonviolent nature of the charges, Shidlovskiy was
denied release pending trial. During the trial, Shidlovskiy and Vadim
Labkovicyh, another teenage defendant in the case, were held in a
guarded cage as if they were dangerous criminals. A representative of
Human Rights Watch who observed the trial in February 1998 referred to
it as an ``absurd parody of criminal justice and a grotesque show trial
aimed at intimidating young people from expressing their opposition to
the current regime.'' The sentence of Labkovich, who also was held for
6 months in pretrial detention, was suspended and no further action has
been taken against him. The prolonged and harsh pretrial detention, the
punitive use of what apparently was a relatively minor charge, and the
disproportionate nature of the sentences handed down to Shidlovskiy and
Labkovich were both excessive and reminiscent of Soviet-era practices
(see Section 1.c.).
Vladimir Kudinov was convicted in 1997 and sentenced to 7 years in
prison and full confiscation of property for allegedly bribing a police
officer. He is considered by many opposition activists and human rights
observers to be a victim of political persecution. Prior to his arrest,
Kudinov was an active and vocal critic of President Lukashenko.
Government authorities first began to harass Kudinov in 1995 during his
campaign for a seat in the Supreme Soviet. In 1996 Kudinov signed an
impeachment petition against Lukashenko. His conviction and lengthy
sentence appear to fit a government pattern of using charges of alleged
economic related crimes to silence and intimidate critics. As part of a
general presidential amnesty, Kudinov's sentence was reduced by 1 year
in January.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for protection against
illegal interference in a citizen's personal life, including invasion
of privacy, telephone, and other communications. However, the
Government does not respect these rights in practice. Although the
inviolability of the home also is provided for by the Constitution,
which states that, ``no one shall have the right to enter, without
legal reason, the dwelling and other legal property of a citizen
against such a citizen's will,'' in practice, government monitoring of
residences, telephones, and computers continued unabated. The KGB is
widely believed to enter homes without warrants, conduct unauthorized
searches, and read mail. Political, human rights, and other NGO's
believe that their conversations and correspondence are monitored
routinely by the security services. Some opposition figures have
reported a reluctance to visit some foreign embassies due to fear of
reprisal.
Nearly all opposition political figures assume that the Government
monitors their activities and conversations. The Lukashenko Government
did nothing to refute these assumptions. Militia officers assigned to
stand outside diplomatic missions are known to keep records of visits
by political opposition leaders. In addition even government officials
do not appear to be exempt from monitoring.
On February 12, militia in Gomel, claiming a bomb threat in the
building, conducted an illegal search of the local office of the
Belarusian Helsinki Committee, a human rights NGO. No bomb was found,
but the militia officers seized 14,000 leaflets concerning the recently
declared opposition presidential election initiative.
On April 26, just short of a month after his arrest on charges of
alleged financial impropriety, the office of former Prime Minister
Mikhail Chigir was broken into. A computer containing data related to
an opposition political campaign in which Chigir was participating was
stolen, along with other equipment. Opposition activists allege that,
in view of the almost certain continual government surveillance of the
office, government security officials likely were behind the incident.
On May 11, government security officers in Minsk used the pretext
of a bomb threat to search the offices of the Francisak Skaryna
Belarusian Language Society (BLS). The involvement of the BLS in an
ongoing opposition presidential election initiative suggests a
political motive for the incident.
On May 14, Ministry of Interior officers searched the Minsk office
of Irex/Promedia, an international organization involved in the
implementation of projects to strengthen independent newspapers,
without legal authorization. The local head of the organization, her
daughter, and a staff member were questioned by these officers over a
period of several hours. The OSCE later protested the incident with
government authorities.
On September 11 and October 28, under the pretext of looking for
the offices of an independent newspaper that tax inspectors were trying
to shut down, police officers attempted to search the headquarters of
the opposition United Civic Party in Minsk without a warrant.
The KGB, MVD, and certain border guard detachments have the right
to request permission to install wiretaps, but under the law must
obtain a prosecutor's permission before installation. The Presidential
Guard (or security service) formed in 1995 reportedly conducted
surveillance activities of the President's political opponents. There
is no judicial or legislative oversight of the Presidential Guard's
budget or activities, and the executive branch repeatedly has thwarted
attempts to exercise such oversight.
In June the National Assembly revised the administrative offenses
code to increase the penalties for those who obstruct KGB officers. For
example, a new article prohibits preventing KGB officers from entering
the premises of a company, establishment or organization, and for
failing to allow audits or checks to be made, as well as for
unjustified restriction or refusal to provide information, including
access to company information systems and data bases.
In early 1997, the Ministry of Communications renegotiated
contracts for supplying telephone service. The new contracts forbid
subscribers from using telephone communications for purposes that run
counter to state interests and public order. The Ministry has the right
to terminate telephone service to those who breach this provision.
Presidential decree number 218, issued in March 1997, prohibits the
import and export of printed, audio, and visual information that could
``damage'' the economic and political interests of the country (see
Section 2.a.).
In October security forces searching for his father detained the
young son of a newspaper editor (see Section 1.d.).
On November 23, President Lukashenko signed decree number 40, which
allowed the Government to nationalize the property of any individual if
the President determines that the individual has caused financial
damage to the State.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, as well as the freedom to receive, retain, and
disseminate information; however, the Government restricts these rights
in practice. The executive branch continued its suppression of freedom
of speech. Despite the constitutional provisions, a 1998 government
decree limited citizens' right to express their opinions. As part of an
overall crackdown on opposition activity, the Government stepped up its
campaign of harassment against the independent media. Although the
Constitution prohibits a monopoly of mass media, the Government also
continued to restrict severely the right to a free press through near-
monopolies on the means of production and on national level broadcast
media and by denying accreditation of journalists critical of the
regime. The Government also kept up economic pressure on the
independent media by pressuring advertisers to withdraw advertisements,
as well as through fines and other administrative harassment. Employees
at some state-run enterprises are discouraged from subscribing to
independent newspapers and journals.
In 1996 President Lukashenko signed a decree ordering that all
editors in chief of state-supported newspapers would henceforth be
official state employees and would become members of the appropriate
local level government council. Another decree granted the Ministry of
Press the authority to assign graduates of state supported journalism
schools to work in state-owned media organizations as a means of
payment for their schooling. These decrees remain in effect.
Presidential decree number 5, issued in 1997, prohibits a range of
broadly defined activities and limits freedom of expression. For
example, the decree prohibits individuals from carrying placards or
flags bearing emblems that are not registered officially with the
State, as well as ``emblems, symbols, and posters whose content is
intended to harm the State and public order, rights, and legal
interests of the citizens.'' The decree also bans activities that are
``humiliating to the dignity and honor of the executive persons of
state bodies.''
On March 2, government authorities in the Lenin region of Grodno
launched an investigation of the activities of cartoonist Alexsei Surov
on suspicion of insulting the honor and dignity of high-ranking
government officials. The investigation was opened on the basis of a
small booklet of political cartoons about President Lukashenko by
Surov. Surov's workplace at the Grodno puppet theater also was
searched. A local prosecutor reportedly later decided to close the
case.
On October 14, police officers in Minsk detained for 5 hours a 13
year old boy, Roman Shkor, who was handing out leaflets advertising an
upcoming opposition demonstration. The leaflets were confiscated.
On November 7, police officers in the town of Borisov briefly
detained Alesya Yasyuk, a member of the Belarusian Social Democratic
Party (BDSP), after she displayed at a public event the traditional
white-red-white national flag now associated with the opposition.
The Defamation Law makes no distinction between private and public
persons for the purposes of lawsuits for defamation of character. A
public figure who has been criticized for poor performance in office
may ask the public prosecutor to sue the newspaper that printed the
criticism. In June 1998, the lower house of the National Assembly
approved a bill that stipulated that public insults or libel against
the President could be punished by up to 4 years in prison, 2 years in
a labor camp, or a large fine. However, there were no reports that
anyone has been arrested or charged subsequently for this offense, and
the bill apparently was devised principally as a means of intimidation.
In 1997 the Council of Ministers issued a decree that prohibited
and restricted the movement of goods across customs borders. The decree
specifically prohibited the import and export of printed, audio, and
video materials, or other news media containing information that could
damage the economic and political interests of the country. Some
bulletins affiliated with the opposition published outside of the
country appeared to be targeted by the decree, and there were a number
of incidents in 1997-98 in which customs officials confiscated
opposition materials at the country's borders.
In January 1998, more stringent regulatory provisions, introduced
by amendments to the Law on Press and Other Mass Media that were
adopted by the Council of the Republic in December 1997, went into
effect. The new regulatory provisions grant greater authority to the
Government to ban and censor critical reporting. For example the State
Committee on the Press was given authority to suspend for 3 months
publication of periodicals or newspapers without a court ruling.
In December 1998, new regulations went into effect restricting the
distribution of legal information to specially licensed media. The
regulations required the independent media that publish legal acts to
apply for licenses from a commission under the Ministry of Justice;
several independent informational bulletins subsequently were denied
licenses.
On December 17, President Lukashenko signed new amendments to the
law ``On Press and Other Media.'' The amendments ban the media from
disseminating information on behalf of political parties, trade unions,
and NGO's that are not registered with the Ministry of Justice.
Independent newspapers are widely available in Minsk, but outside
of the capital most towns carry only local newspapers, only some of
which are independent. On February 17, the State Committee on the Press
officially warned six independent newspapers (Naviny, Narodnaya Volya,
Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, Imya, Zhoda, and Pahonya) that they
risked closure if they continued to publish information about an
opposition presidential election initiative aimed at drawing attention
to the approaching end of Lukashenko's 5-year legal presidential term.
Mikhail Podgainy, the head of the State Committee on the Press,
announced publicly that the newspapers would be shut if they ignored
the warning. On May 13, the Supreme Economic Court dismissed appeals
filed by the independent newspapers that there were no grounds on which
the State Committee on the Press could issue such an official warning.
On May 26, the State Committee on the Press issued its second
warning to Naviny after it published an article entitled ``Carbuncules
of Lawfulness'' for which the newspaper was accused of ``inciting
social discord and defaming police officers.'' The Supreme Economic
Court upheld the warning on August 26, following an appeal by Naviny.
On June 24, the State Committee on the Press issued its second warning
to Imya for an article the newspaper published relating to President
Lukashenko. Under the December 1997 amendments to the Law on Press and
Other Media, newspapers can be banned if two warnings are issued. The
Committee to Protect Journalists and Article 19, another international
NGO, both sent open letters to the Government expressing concern about
the possible closure of independent newspapers.
In addition to warnings from the State Committee on the Press, the
judiciary and security services also were used to exert pressure on the
independent media. For example on July 26, Judge Nadezhda Chmara, the
presiding judge in the trial of former state farm director Staravoitov
(see Section 1.d.), won a libel suit against Belorusskaya Delovaya
Gazeta. Chmara claimed that the newspaper in one of its articles on the
case had accused her indirectly of professional misconduct. Belorusskya
Delovaya Gazeta was ordered to print a retraction and to pay the judge
an unprecedented fine of approximately $6,550 (or 2 billion rubles at
the then official rate). The ruling is currently under appeal by the
newspaper. The ruling was appealed by the newspaper.
On September 24, the newspaper Naviny lost a libel suit brought
against it by National Security Council Chairman Viktor Sheiman for an
article that had implied that Sheiman possessed property valued beyond
what his official salary could provide. Sheiman apparently was ordered
to file the lawsuit during a September 16 meeting with President
Lukashenko. The newspaper and one of its reporters were ordered to pay
a combined fine of approximately $30,000 (10 billion rubles at the then
official rate). The unprecedented size of the fine forced Naviny, which
published its last issue on September 29, into bankruptcy. Newsprint
owned by the paper was confiscated by government authorities, and its
bank account was frozen. On October 26, tax officials in Minsk
inventoried the personal property of Naviny editor Pavel Zhuk. On
November 8, a Minsk city court upheld the libel judgement, which had
been appealed by Naviny.
On September 30, the Belarusian State Committee on the Press
annulled the registration certificates of nine independent newspapers
and periodicals, including a successor newspaper to Naviny, on the
pretext that they had not submitted documentary approval of their
office addresses. The registration certificates later were renewed on
November 4.
On March 2, government security officials raided the offices of the
independent newspaper Pahonya in Grodno and confiscated material
related to the opposition's May 16 presidential election initiative. On
April 7, KGB officers detained and questioned Naviny journalist Aleh
Hruzdzilovich for several hours. Hruzdzilovich recently had written an
article entitled, ``A Secret Plan Against the Opposition,'' based on a
reportedly confidential government document outlining methods to be
used to crack down on the opposition.
On July 22, militia officers and government prosecutors searched
the offices of Imya, confiscated computer equipment, and briefly
detained for questioning chief editor Irina Khalip. A local
prosecutor's office in Minsk recently had begun an investigation into a
criminal case of libel against the newspaper for an article in which it
detailed infighting and high level corruption within the Government. In
a letter sent to the Minister of Justice, the Paris-based human rights
NGO Reporters Sans Frontieres protested the judicial harassment of
Khalip.
Also in July, OSCE Freedom of Media representative Freimunt Duve
issued a public statement protesting reported threats by government
security officers against Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta chief editor
Piotr Martsev, whose paper also had published a series of articles
detailing government corruption and infighting. On October 4, Duve sent
a letter of complaint to the Foreign Minister concerning the
Government's ``continued attempts to stifle freedom of expression.''
On November 4, two independent journalists were barred from
attending a government conference on health care issues held at Brest
regional executive committee offices. However, state media
representatives were permitted to cover the event. A spokesperson for
the Brest regional executive committee explained that, in addition to
accreditation, journalists were required to have the permission of the
executive committee chairman to observe its meetings.
Until government authorities shut it down during 1996, Radio 101.2
had been the sole Belarusian language independent station in the
country. The Belarusian Patriotic Union of Youth, a government-
subsidized presidential youth organization, was permitted to take
control of Radio 101.2.
State-controlled Belarusian television and radio (B-TR) maintains
its monopoly as the only nationwide television station. Its news
programs regularly featured reporting heavily biased in favor of the
Government and refused to provide an outlet for opposing viewpoints.
Local, independent television stations operated in some areas, and were
relatively unimpeded in reporting on local news. However, some of these
stations reported that they were under pressure not to report on
national-level issues or were subject to censorship.
Broadcasts into the country from Russian television stations
represent the only significant source of independent information from
broadcast media and constitute a frequent source of irritation to the
Lukashenko Government. However, to transmit their video material to
Moscow, Russian stations rely on the B-TR broadcasting facility.
According to Russian television crews, authorities sometimes have tried
to limit access to this facility, although there were no reports of
this occurring during the year.
On May 21, the government newspaper Respublika criticized
Belarusian language programs broadcast by a Polish radio station in
Warsaw for negative reporting about President Lukashenko.
In March 1998, the presidential administration issued an internal
directive entitled ``On Strengthening Countermeasures Against Articles
in the Opposition Press.'' The directive specifically lists 10
independent media organizations covered by these provisions, and
prohibits government officials from making comments or distributing
documents to non-state media. It also forbids state enterprises from
advertising in non-state media. Although the directive does not
restrict directly independent media or impinge on the right of citizens
to receive information, it does restrict government officials in
speaking to the independent media and gives further advantages to the
state press.
On January 6, Anna Shidlovskaya, a correspondent for the
independent news service Belapan and newspaper Belorusskaya Delovaya
Gazeta, was prevented from attending an open session of the Gomel
executive committee by the head of the committee's information
department. The independent Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ)
later protested the decision to order Shidlovskaya out of a conference
hall 5 minutes before the executive committee was due to meet.
A 1997 Council of Ministers decree nullified the accreditation of
all correspondents and required all foreign media correspondents to
apply for reaccreditation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the
application form for accreditation requested biographic information, as
well as a record of the applicant's journalistic activity. Journalists
who were residents of Belarus also were required to register with the
state tax authorities. The impact of the decree is still unclear,
although it does not appear that the Government specifically invoked
the decree during 1998 or this year as a tool to exclude certain
journalists.
On June 20, the poet Vladimir Neklyayev, who chaired the Belarusian
Writers' Union, sought asylum in Poland. Neklyayev accused government
authorities of disrespect for the Belarusian language, history, and
culture and claimed that recent financial inspections of a magazine
that he edited were motivated politically.
On August 11, the international NGO Reporters Sans Frontiers
described Belarus as an enemy of the Internet. A public statement
issued by the organization noted that citizens were not free to explore
Internet independently. Although there are several Internet providers
in the country they all are state controlled. The Government's state
monopoly on Internet service offers high prices, poor quality, and
limited service, and allows for the monitoring of practically all e-
mail traffic. Although the Government has full control, it does not
appear to be cutting off access entirely, and those who do have access
appear to be able to contact a full range of unfiltered international
web sites.
The Government restricts academic freedom. A sharply critical Human
Rights Watch report released in Minsk on July 27 detailed government
restrictions on academic freedom. The report noted that the Lukashenko
Government had suppressed research on controversial topics,
recentralized academic decision making, and maintained a ban on
political activity on campuses. At the same time, a ``systematic
crackdown'' on political dissent on campuses had targeted outspoken
students and lecturers who were threatened with expulsion, often for
their off-campus political activity. The report also asserted that
state university authorities issue reprimands and warnings to
politically active lecturers, independent historians, and other
academics. It stated that university employees who challenge the status
quo are told to curtail political activities or change the focus of
their academic inquiry. University administrators target research into
politically sensitive issues, such as the Belarusian independence
movement during the Soviet era, a theme that is seen to challenge the
State's policy of integration with Russian and is discouraged actively.
The Government continued to harass students engaged in
antigovernment activities, such as demonstrations. Aleksey Shidlovskiy,
who was released in February from a hard labor facility where he had
been sentenced for spray painting antipresidential graffiti (see
Section 1.e.), was expelled from his university while in pretrial
detention. Members of the propresidential, government-funded Belarusian
Patriotic Union of Youth served as the regime's watchdog against
antigovernment activities. Moreover, members of the Union reportedly
received preferential treatment at state schools.
On December 21, Ales Ostrovsky, a professor at the Grodno State
Medical Institute, was detained for 2 days and reprimanded by local
authorities for allegedly ``violating public discipline'' after he
attempted to speak out against the Belarus-Russia Union Treaty during a
meeting of the pro-Lukashenko Belarusian Patriotic Youth Union. He also
reportedly was warned by the rector of his university not to violate
``labor discipline.''
In 1997 the Council of Ministers issued a decree, effective as of
the 1997-98 academic year, requiring students who receive free
university education from the state to accept jobs assigned by the
Government upon graduation. It remains unclear to what extent this
decree is actually enforced. On May 30, 15 members of the youth wing of
the Belarusian social democratic party staged a demonstration in Minsk
against the practice, including the reported assigning of students to
jobs in areas contaminated by radiation by the Chernobyl disaster.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
restricts this right in practice. Organizers must apply at least 15
days in advance to local officials for permission to conduct a
demonstration, rally, or meeting. The local government must respond
with a decision not later than 5 days prior to the scheduled event.
President Lukashenko issued decree number 5 in March 1997 in part
to regulate what he termed the ``orgy'' of street protests taking
place. The decree further limited citizens' ability to assemble
peacefully by restricting the locations where rallies may take place
and allowing local authorities to put strict limits on the number of
participants. The decree also prohibited the display of unregistered
flags and symbols, as well as placards bearing messages deemed
threatening to the State or public order (see Section 2.a.). The
decree, along with subsequent amendments adopted by the acting
legislature, imposed severe penalties on those who violate the law,
particularly the organizers of events. Although the decree allows for
either monetary fines or detention for up to 15 days, courts frequently
impose high fines knowing that those convicted cannot pay. When
individuals fail to pay fines, authorities threaten to confiscate their
property. The courts punished organizers of rallies with fines of
several times the average monthly wage.
In late January, an opposition coalition ``congress of democratic
forces'' undertook to arrange for alternative presidential elections to
be held from May 6 to May 16 in order to draw attention to the end of
President Lukashenko's legal 5-year term in office (See section 3). In
response, authorities initiated a widespread crackdown on opposition
political activities throughout the country. Procurator General Oleg
Bozhelko warned in a public statement on February 8 that participation
in the opposition initiative could result in prosecution for attempting
to ``seize power unconstitutionally and destabilizing society.''
Public demonstrations occurred frequently in Minsk but were always
under strict government control, including through open videotaping of
the participants by the police and plainclothes security officers.
Demonstrations also occurred in other parts of the country, but were
less frequent in areas in the east close to the border with Russia.
Following some sanctioned and unsanctioned demonstrations police and
other security officials continued to round up, beat, detain, and try
to coerce forced confessions from some demonstration participants (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
On April 2, 13th Supreme Soviet deputies Anatoliy Lebedko and
Valery Shchukin were detained for leading an unsanctioned demonstration
to protest comments by some government officials hinting at a possible
redeployment of nuclear weapons into the country. Local authorities had
notified the demonstration organizers at the last moment that their
march could not be held. Lebedko was held in administrative detention
for 3 days and fined approximately $150 (44 million rubles). Shchukin
was given a 5-day sentence. Approximately 18 other persons also were
detained after the march, including one who required hospitalization
after a beating inflicted by security officers (see Section 1.c.).
On April 16, a local court fined Valeri Kostko and Dimitri
Bondarenko, members of the local human rights NGO's Belarusian Helsinki
Committee and Charter '97, the equivalent of about $150 (44 million
rubles) and $160 (47 million rubles), respectively, for leading a
demonstration in Minsk on February 27. Although the demonstrators had
received approval to march on a public sidewalk, they were fined after
being forced to use a lane in the street because the sidewalk was
blocked by snow.
On April 21, a court in Grodno fined Association of Belarusian
Poles chairman Tadeusz Gavin approximately $230 (67 million rubles) for
leading an unsanctioned demonstration on April 17. Local authorities
twice earlier had denied the Association of Belarusian Poles permission
to hold a demonstration.
On April 25, special forces militia troops in Grodno used force to
break up an unsanctioned, but peaceful, opposition demonstration (see
Section 1.c.).
On April 27, a court in Grodno sentenced local United Civic Party
and Entrepreneurs' Association chairman Valery Levonevsky to 13 days in
prison for allegedly staging an unsanctioned demonstration near the
offices of the local executive committee. Levonevsky, who pleaded not
guilty to the charges, claimed that he had had an appointment within
the building in question and that the arrest probably was made only as
a precautionary measure because of a scheduled upcoming session in
Grodno of the parliamentary assembly of the Belarusian-Russian Union.
On May 1, 19 persons, including the chairman of the Belarusian
Social Democratic Party, were detained in Minsk for attempting to
participate in an officially sanctioned Labor Day celebration. Charges
later were dropped against the participants (see Section 1.d.).
In June 1998, following numerous complaints filed by citizens and 2
days of public hearings, the Minsk city council passed a resolution
that called for the Ministry of Interior to consider ways of preserving
public order during demonstrations that did not violate civil rights
and to increase the personal accountability of its officers. However,
the effect of this resolution, if any, appears principally to have been
that security forces usually try to detain individuals after
demonstrations already have concluded and to do so out of sight of
witnesses.
On June 15, Minsk city officials denied permission to the
Belarusian Social Democratic Party and Belarusian Popular Front to hold
a demonstration against war, dictatorship, and fascism, citing the
deaths of 52 people in a stampede in a metro station 3 weeks earlier to
justify their decision.
Over 70 persons were detained briefly following demonstrations in
Minsk and other cities on July 21 and July 27. Government security
officials beat some of the detainees (see Section l.c.). BSDP chairman
Mikalay Statkevich was detained and sentenced to 10 days in prison for
leading the sanctioned July 27 protest on an unauthorized march route.
Government authorities also subsequently opened an investigation
against Statkevich for ``disrupting public order,'' a charge that could
carry up to 3 years in prison.
Four participants (Grodno medical institute lecturer Ales
Ostrovsky, BNF local leader Sergei Malchik, Pahonya editor Nikolai
Markevich, and businessman Nikolai Voron) in an antigovernment
demonstration in Grodno on July 21 were given fines of between about
$100 (30 million rubles) and about $400 (120 million rubles),
exceptionaly high in a country where the average monthly wage was then
$40 (12 million rubles). Since they could not pay immediately, local
authorities reportedly indicated that they would begin to confiscate
their property. According to Ostrovsky, local authorities also told him
that 20 percent of his monthly salary would be deducted until his fine
was paid.
On December 8, following a small unsanctioned protest in Minsk
against the signing of a union treaty between Belarus and Russia, at
least six demonstrators, including Belarusian Popular Front deputy
chairman Vyuacheslav Sivchik and noted poet Slavomir Adamovich, were
briefly detained. Dmitry Kasperovich, a 17-year-old member of the
Popular Front's youth wing lost a tooth while being taken into custody.
On December 15, Sivchik was fined about $300 (218 million rubles).
Others were given lesser fines or official warnings.
In connection with a new presidential decree entitled ``On Measures
to Prevent Emergencies During Mass Events'' promulgated in early
September, President Lukashenko told high level security officers in a
September 16 meeting that opposition demonstrations in Minsk should be
allowed only at locations outside of the city's center. It subsequently
became more difficult to obtain permission to hold public protests.
Opposition party organizers were denied permission to hold a March for
Freedom demonstration, which had been planned for the downtown area on
October 17. When protesters decided nevertheless to march toward the
center of Minsk, special forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs
blocked their way and forcibly dispersed the crowd (see Section 1.d.).
The acting head of the OSCE office in Minsk noted publicly on October
18 that the refusal by Minsk city authorities to allow the March was
``at the base of the conflict.''
On October 22, Minsk city authorities also banned the annual Dzyzdy
commemorative march held in Minsk. However, as the march route led away
from the center of Minsk, government security officials did not prevent
opposition supporters from going through with the march.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government does not respect this right in practice. According to
members of parties in opposition to the President, authorities
frequently deny permission to opposition groups to meet in public
buildings. Employees at state-run enterprises are discouraged from
joining independent trade unions, and the Ministry of Justice long
denied registration to the Congress of Independent Trade Unions (see
Section 6.a.). The Government regularly harasses members and supporters
of opposition parties, and confiscates their leaflets and publications.
Government officials have warned alumni of foreign-sponsored education
programs against continued affiliation with their program's sponsoring
agency.
On January 26, just before a coalition of opposition parties held a
large ``congress of democratic forces,'' President Lukashenko issued
decree number 2 requiring that all political parties, trade unions, and
nongovernmental organizations reregister with authorities by July 1.
Such public associations already had completed a lengthy reregistration
process in 1995. The timing of the decree, which increased the scope of
operations and number of members organizations would need to
demonstrate to qualify for reregistration, apparently was intended as a
method of political intimidation at a time of increased opposition
activity. On July 1, regulations prohibiting private organizations from
using private residences as their legal addresses were announced. In
view of Government control or ownership of many office buildings, the
regulations had the effect of complicating the reregistration process.
The deadline for reregistration subsequently was extended until
August 1 and again to October 1. Although most of the major political
parties, unions, and NGO's that applied eventually were allowed to
reregister, the process in practice often was complicated and drawn
out. After the reregistration period had begun, government authorities
announced that organizations would have to alter their charters to
indicate recognition of the 1996 Constitution, and that the words
``popular'' or ``national'' could not be used in their titles. On
December 17, an amendment to the law on public associations officially
went into effect that prohibits political and social organizations from
using the words ``Belarus,'' ``Republic of Belarus,'' ``National,'' or
``Popular'' in their titles. The Belarusian Association of Poles was
denied reregistration twice before finally getting approval. The All-
Belarusian Club of Voters was given permission to reregister in mid-
November only after suing government authorities in court. As of year's
end, the Association of Young Politicians, headed by well-known
opposition leader Anatoliy Lebedko, the Belarusian Human Rights League,
and the Belarusian Independent Association of Industrial Trade Unions
had not been allowed to reregister. On December 17, President
Lukashenko signed into law a bill on amendments to the Administrative
Offenses Code that would make any work on behalf of unregistered NGO's
punishable by fines. On December 27, the amendments entered into force.
By the end of the year, the Ministry of Justice had reregistered 17 of
27 political parties (18 had applied), and 38 of 42 national trade
unions. Of approximately 2,500 NGO's, approximately 1,316 were
reregistered.
In April the Ministry of Justice blocked efforts by the Belarus
Lambda League, the country's first and only lesbian and gay rights
organization, to gain official registration as an NGO. The Ministry
cited technical reasons, although Belarus Lambda League members claimed
authorities were seeking to deny registration to a gay and lesbian
organization and initiated an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Members of local human rights NGO's also were harassed for
involvement in or association with the opposition presidential election
initiative. Gomel branch Belarusian Helsinki Committee (BHC) head
Yevgeny Murashko was detained briefly in February following his
participation in a human rights seminar with opposition Central
Election Commission chairman Viktor Gonchar. In late June, Murashko
also was given a 2-year suspended sentence ``for violating procedures
of holding an assembly.''
On February 16, local KGB officials in Vitebsk issued an official
warning to opposition Central Election Commission Deputy Chairman Iosif
Naumchik that his political activities could result in charges of
conspiracy to seize state power under article 61-1 of the criminal
code, punishable by 8 to 12 years in prison. Similar warnings were
issued to opposition Central Election Commission members Lidiya
Sazonovets and Sergei Obodovsky in February.
On February 25, government security officials raided a meeting of
the opposition Central Election Commission in Minsk and arrested its 15
members. Commission chairman Viktor Gonchar subsequently was sentenced
to 10 days in prison for organizing an ``unsanctioned rally'' (see
Section 1.d.). He remained under investigation on charges of illegally
claiming a public office until he disappeared in September (See section
1.b.) Other commission members were sentenced to 5 days in prison,
fined between about $40 (10 million rubles) and about $60 (15 million
rubles), or given official warnings.
On March 12, the Ministry of Justice issued a public statement
calling on citizens ``not to give in to provocations on the part of
irresponsible politicians.'' Further official warnings from the KGB
later were given to a number of opposition activists including Central
Election Commission member Nikolai Pokhabov and BNF member Tatyana
Leschinskaya.
A number of opposition election initiative workers complained that
either they or their family members were threatened by intimations that
they could be fired from their jobs because of their political
activities. Government security officials frequently confiscated ballot
forms to be used in the opposition election initiative.
On June 23 the 13th Supreme Soviet sought to hold a meeting in a
Minsk Restaurant, but the members were driven out by a special-purpose
police detachment that claimed that a bomb had been planted in the
restaurant. The chairman, Seymon Sharetsky, told a reporter that the
bomb story had been planned much earlier. The session continued on the
street near the restaurant and adopted an appeal to Lukashenko for
political dialog.
On July 22, following a meeting the previous day of the 13th
Supreme Soviet (Supsov) in Minsk held to mark the end of Lukashenko's
legal 5-year term in office, Supsov chairman Semyon Sharetsky sought
temporary refuge in Lithuania due to his fear that he might be
arrested. As of year's end, Sharetsky remained in Lithuania.
The Government continued to attempt to limit severely the
activities of NGO's (see Section 4).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice. The
Government enforces a 1995 Cabinet of Ministers decree that controls
religious workers, in an attempt to protect orthodoxy and prevent the
growth of evangelical religions. Foreigners generally are prohibited
from preaching or heading churches, at least with respect to what the
Government views as ``nontraditional'' religions, which include
Protestant faiths. A 1997 directive by the Council of Ministers
prohibits teaching religion at youth camps. Further restrictive
regulations governing the activities of foreign religious workers and
clergy were passed by the Council of Ministers in February, although it
remains unclear at year's end to what extent they were being enforced.
The Government's State Committee on Religious and National Affairs
(SCRNA), which was established in January 1997, appears to categorize
religions and denominations. Some are viewed as ``traditional,''
including Russian Orthodoxy, Roman Catholicism, Judaism, and Islam (as
practiced by a small community of ethnic Tatars with roots in the
country dating back to the 11th century); some are viewed as
``nontraditional,'' including some Protestant and other faiths; and
some are viewed as ``sects,'' including Eastern religions and other
faiths. The authorities deny permission to register legally at the
national level to some faiths considered to be nontraditional, and to
all considered to be sects. Without legal registration, it is extremely
difficult to rent or purchase property in order to hold religious
services.
While all registered religious organizations enjoy tax-exempt
status, any government subsidies appear limited principally to the
Orthodox Church. Citizens are not prohibited from proselytizing, but
foreign missionaries may not engage in religious activities outside the
institutions that invited them. Only religious organizations already
registered in the country may invite foreign clergy. Foreign religious
workers who do not register with the authorities, or who fail to get
approval for religious activities--often a difficult bureaucratic
process--have been expelled from the country.
The Government and the President encourage a greater role for the
Orthodox Church. However, the effort has not slowed the growth of Roman
Catholic and Protestant churches. Nevertheless, the Catholic Church has
experienced difficulty getting permission from authorities to bring in
a sufficient number of outside religious workers to make up for a
shortage of native clergy. According to an independent Russian press
report, President Lukashenko told Russian Orthodox Church Patriarch
Aleksey II, during a visit by the Patriarch to Minsk in September 1998,
that Christian values should become ``the state ideology of Belarus.''
During a press conference held in Minsk in late 1998, Vyacheslav
Savitskiy, an official of the State Committee on Religious and Ethnic
Affairs, emphasized the existence of ``destructive sects'' in the
country. According to Savitskiy, the Government had denied registration
requests of 11 such "sects." For example, the authorities consistently
have denied the repeated registration attempts of the Belarus Orthodox
Autocephalous Church. On November 7, Belarusian Autocephalous Orthodox
Church priest Yan Spasyuk announced a hunger strike to protest the
continued unwillingness of local authorities in Grodno to register his
parish, as well as a recent police raid on his house while he was
conducting a prayer service. On November 28, at the urging of his
family and parishioners, Spasyuk called off the hunger strike.
During a religious conference held in Minsk on April 22, Belarusian
Orthodox Church Patriarchal Exarch Filaret stated that the Orthodox
Church does not seek the role of interconfessional leader or to become
a state-run church. However, he stressed, the Orthodox Church would
cooperate only with religious faiths that have ``historical roots'' in
the country. Filaret also remarked that he was against the ``invasion
of those foreign religions that corrupt souls.''
The President granted the Orthodox Church special financial
advantages, which other denominations do not enjoy, and has declared
the preservation and development of Orthodox Christianity a ``moral
necessity.'' Bishops must receive permission from the State Committee
on Religious Affairs before transferring a foreign priest to another
parish.
According to the Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish
Congress, in March 1998 material from The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion was included in a government-controlled religious broadcast. In
spite of protests from the Jewish community, the program was
rebroadcast in May and again in July. In a television interview given
in Moscow in December 1998, President Lukashenko remarked that ``the
main anti-Semites in Russia are representatives of the Jewish
population'' (see Section 5.). However, government authorities in
general appear to try to maintain good relations with leaders of the
Jewish community. Following an arson attack on April 11, 1999 at the
main synagogue in Minsk (see Section 5), police reportedly responded
quickly. On April 16, the SCRNA agreed to a four-point plan with the
head of the Union of Jewish Religious Organizations of Belarus to
combat anti-Semitism. It remains unclear to what extent SCRNA may
implement this plan.
Restitution of religious property remained limited during the year.
A key obstacle is the lack of a legal basis for restitution of property
that was seized during the Soviet era and the Nazi occupation. The few
returns of property to religious communities have been on an individual
and inconsistent basis, and local government authorities in general are
reluctant to cooperate on the issue without some form of compensation
to replace properties that sometimes have become important public
facilities. Over the past several years, the Jewish community has
lobbied the Government successfully to return three synagogues in Minsk
and several buildings outside the capital. In August 1998, following
extensive restoration, the Catholic community reconsecrated a church in
Pruzhany that had been shut down by Soviet authorities following World
War II. The consecration ceremony was lead by the church's former
priest who had spent 10 years in Siberia during the Soviet period.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--According to the Constitution, citizens
are free to travel within the country and to live and work where they
wish; however, the Government restricts these rights in practice. All
adults are issued internal passports, which serve as primary identity
documents and are required for travel, permanent housing, and hotel
registration.
On June 1, the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional an
article of the Administrative Code barring enterprises, establishments,
and organizations from employing persons without a ``propiska'' (pass),
or the compulsory registration of their residence address. Under
Article 182 of the Administrative Code, employers faced fines for
giving jobs to persons who had no stamp in their passport indicating
that their residence and their new place of employment were located in
the same city or district. However, it remains unclear to what extent
this court decision actually has affected local security officials. In
practice the right to choose one's residence appears to remain
restricted. On November 29, the Ministry of Internal Affairs announced
a three-stage program to replace the ``propiska'' system in the period
2000-05; however, there were no reports of any action to implement the
program at year's end.
Government regulations on entry and exit require citizens who wish
to travel abroad to receive first a ``global'' exit visa in their
passport, valid for between 1 and 5 years. Once the traveler has these
documents, the law does not restrict travel.
Following the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in 1996, the
Government took measures aimed at limiting the travel of opposition
politicians who refused to submit to the legislature created by the
November 1996 referendum. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced in
December 1996 that those Parliamentarians who did not join the new
legislature could no longer travel on their diplomatic passports,
despite the fact that these individuals had been assured that they
would retain their status as deputies until their terms of office
expired. Although their diplomatic passports were not confiscated, the
border guards reportedly had a blacklist of opposition members who were
to be denied exit from the country if they used a diplomatic passport.
Subsequent to the January 1997 refusal by border guards to allow former
Supreme Soviet Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich and parliamentary deputy
Anatoliy Lebedko to travel abroad on their diplomatic passports, a
number of members of the former Supreme Soviet have either acquired
regular passports and have been allowed to travel abroad, or have
departed from Russia using their Belarusian diplomatic passports.
Government authorities canceled the ``global'' exit visas in the
regular passports of 13th Supreme Soviet deputies Pavel Znavets and
Viktor Gonchar in July and August respectively, based on ongoing
investigations related to their political activities (see Sections 1.d.
and 2.b.). Citing pending charges against him related to his
participation in antigovernment demonstrations in Minsk in July and
October (see Section 1.d.), and despite an invitation from the OSCE,
government authorities denied permission to Belarusian Social
Democratic Party leader Mikalay Statkevich to travel with an opposition
delegation to the OSCE summit held in Istanbul in November.
According to official data, the State did not deny any citizen
permission to emigrate. However, legislation restricting emigration by
those with access to ``state secrets'' remained in effect, and any
citizen involved in a criminal investigation also was ineligible to
emigrate. Prospective emigrants who have been refused the right to
emigrate may appeal to the courts.
The Constitution gives aliens and stateless persons the same rights
as citizens, except in cases established by law, international
agreement, or the Constitution. The Constitution also allows the State
to grant refugee status to persons who were being persecuted in other
states for their political and religious convictions, or because of
nationality. The Government does not have a law on first asylum, nor
has it signed readmission agreements with any of its neighboring
states.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. In May 1997, the Government implemented for the first time
the 1995 Law on Refugees, granting refugee status to a group of
Afghans. As of October, the Government had granted official refugee
status to 248 persons (including 185 from Afghanistan, 31 from Georgia,
18 from Ethiopia, and 11 from Tajikistan) many of whom have lived in
the country prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since its
formation in early 1997 from the State Migration Service, the Committee
on Migration within the Ministry of Labor has turned down 17
applications for refugee status.
On July 17, the chairman of the Migration Committee announced that
there were between 100,000 and 150,000 illegal migrants in the country.
As of early in the year, 2,700 potential asylum seekers had registered
with the UNHCR in Belarus. Some refugees continue to report difficulty
registering with local authorities, and continued delay in establishing
a comprehensive asylum policy and refugee policy has made the lives of
these individuals difficult. The UNHCR had no reports of any case of
bona fide refugees being forced to return countries in which they
feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Government severely limits the right of citizens to change
their government. In November 1996, the executive branch conducted a
controversial constitutional referendum that was neither free nor fair,
according to credible international observers, including
representatives of the European Union and the OSCE. Many Members of
Parliament and of the Constitutional Court actively opposed President
Lukashenko's proposals for both substantive and procedural reasons. The
justices asserted that the referendum gave Lukashenko control over the
legislative and judicial branches of government and extended his term
in office. They also criticized it on procedural grounds as an
unconstitutional means to eliminate the Constitution's checks and
balances and grant the President virtually unlimited powers.
In the period leading up to the referendum, opponents of President
Lukashenko's proposals were denied access to the media, election
officials failed to record the names of early voters, and no texts of
the proposed Constitution were made available to voters until several
days after citizens began voting. As a result of these irregularities,
the head of the Central Election Commission (CEC) announced prior to
the event that he would not be able to certify the results of the
referendum. President Lukashenko promptly fired him, although the
Constitution in force at the time gave the Parliament the exclusive
authority to appoint and dismiss the CEC Chairman. Members of the
security forces forcibly removed the head of the CEC from his office.
Shortly thereafter, Prime Minister Mikhail Chigir resigned in protest
of President Lukashenko's refusal to cancel the widely criticized
referendum.
Most members of the international community chose not to send
election monitors to observe the referendum because of the illegitimacy
of the entire process. Human rights organizations, including the
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, the Committee to Protect
Journalists, and Human Rights Watch, protested the conduct of the
referendum.
The Constitutional Court formally ruled that the issues posed in
President Lukashenko's referendum could not be decided legally through
a referendum, and that its results should be purely advisory,
consistent with the Constitution. However, after winning the
referendum--according to the Government's own official count--President
Lukashenko began to implement it immediately. The new Constitution
established a bicameral legislature. Its 110-member lower house was
formed out of the membership of the existing Supreme Soviet; deputies
volunteered or were lured by promises of free housing and other
benefits to serve in the body. The 64-member upper house was created by
a combination of presidential appointments and elections by the 6
regional or oblast councils and the Minsk City Council. The transition
left 86 electoral districts unrepresented because the new Constitution
reduced the number of representatives, and also because a full Supreme
Soviet had never been seated, largely due to the executive branch's
intervention in the 1995 elections.
Despite consultative assistance provided by the OSCE's AMG,
President Lukashenko's National Assembly passed in December 1998
seriously flawed legislation on local elections, which were held on
April 4 and 18. A late modification to Article 33 of the law, inserted
at the insistence of the President, effectively bars many opposition
candidates from running in local elections by prohibiting the
participation of individuals who have been fined administratively by
government authorities. The OSCE issued an official statement that the
provisions of the law did not provide for a free and fair election
process. Consequently, the OSCE did not organize an election
observation program.
On August 31, amendments to the referendum law came into force,
which the OSCE declared were not in accordance with international
standards. The amended law provides that referendums may be initiated
by the President, the President's National Assembly, or 450,000
signatures--including a minimum of 30,000 in the city of Minsk and in
each of the country's 6 oblasts. The law makes 10 percent of all
signatures subject to verification, and all signatures may be
invalidated if the commission finds just 1 percent (4500 signatures) to
be faulty. It also gave the President the prerogative to decide on the
validity of referendum results.
In late January, an opposition coalition ``congress of democratic
forces'' undertook to arrange for alternative presidential elections to
be held from May 6 to May 16 in order to draw attention to the end of
President Lukashenko's legal 5-year term in office in July. In
response, authorities initiated a widespread crackdown on opposition
political activities throughout the country. Procurator General Oleg
Bozhelko warned in a public statement on February 8 that participation
in the opposition initiative could result in prosecution for attempting
to ``seize power unconstitutionally and destabilizing society.''
A number of opposition election initiative workers complained that
either they or their family members were threatened by intimations that
they could be fired from their jobs because of their political
activities. Government security officials frequently confiscated ballot
forms to be used in the opposition election initiative (see Section
2.a.).
There are no legal restrictions on women's participation in
politics and government; however, with the exception of the judiciary,
social barriers to women in politics are strong, and men hold virtually
all leadership positions. In the acting legislature, women hold 19 of
110 seats in the lower house and 5 of 64 in the upper house. The Deputy
Chair of the upper house is a woman. The Minister of Social Security is
the only female member of the Council of Ministers. The head of the
Government's Central Election Commission also is a woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are several domestic human rights groups active in the
country; however, members of domestic human rights organizations
reported that the Government hindered their attempts to investigate
alleged human rights violations. The Government monitored NGO
correspondence and telephone conversations. The Government also
attempted to limit severely the activities of NGO's through a time
consuming reregistration process, denial of registration, questionable
tax audits, and other means (see Section 2.b.). The Ministry of Justice
tried to restrict the Belarusian Helsinki Committee to providing
support only to members of its own association and warned initially
that it might otherwise not be allowed to reregister. Human rights
monitors of the BHC also briefly were detained and interrogated by
government security services during the year (see Section 2.b.).
The Ministry of Justice issued official warnings to the BHC during
March after materials related to an ongoing opposition presidential
election initiative were found in one of its regional offices. However,
following an appeal by BHC, the Supreme Economic Court annulled one of
the warnings on December 8. On November 25, the administrative
department of the Presidential Administration, which controls either
directly or indirectly a significant amount of commercial real estate
in Minsk, informed the BHC that it would have to vacate its offices.
However, at year's end, it appeared that the BHC would be allowed to
remain at its current premises.
On October 4, uniformed and plainclothes security officers,
including a Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, broke into the Minsk
office of the human rights NGO Spring '96. The officers did not present
a warrant while conducting a comprehensive search of the premises.
Computer equipment, which included a comprehensive database of human
rights violations, was confiscated. Although the equipment later was
returned, when Spring '96 chairman Ales Bialatsky was summoned to a
police station to pick it up on November 18 he was arrested for his
participation in an antigovernment demonstration in Minsk in mid-
October. A judge later dismissed the charges against Bialatsky.
The country's poor human rights record continued to draw the
attention of many international human rights organizations. In general
the Government has been willing to discuss human rights with
international NGO's whose members have been allowed to visit the
country. At a press conference held in Minsk on July 15, the chairman
of Human Rights Watch criticized the Government for its ``regular
attacks on democracy.''
In February 1998, after protracted negotiations, the Government
finally approved the opening in Minsk of the OSCE's Advisory and
Monitoring Group office. Although government authorities often have
disregarded OSCE intervention on human rights cases and its advice on
draft legislation, the OSCE's presence in Minsk provides a potentially
important forum for dialog on these issues. In September 1999, through
OSCE-brokered meetings initiated by OSCE Parliamentary Assembly's
Belarus ad hoc committee chairman Adrian Severin, government and
opposition representatives began a dialog to try resolve the country's
ongoing constitutional and political crisis. However, at year's end,
the government's cooperation in this process had come to a standstill.
On August 20, a draft resolution critical of the country's human
rights practices was removed from a vote at the U.N. subcommission on
Human Rights Encouragement and Protection after the Government agreed
to a number of measures on the adoption of human rights-related
reforms. The Government took no action on implementing these reforms by
year's end.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that all citizens are equal before the law
and have the right, without any discrimination, to equal protection of
their rights and legitimate interests. However, the Constitution does
not prohibit specifically discrimination based on factors such as race,
sex, or religion. The Law on Citizenship, passed by the Parliament,
grants citizenship to any person living permanently on the territory of
the country as of October 19, 1991. Those who arrived in the country
after that date and wish to become citizens are required to submit an
application for citizenship, take an oath to support the Constitution,
have a legal source of income, and have lived in the country for 7
years.
Women.--Although statistics are not available, domestic violence
including spousal abuse against women is a significant problem,
according to women's groups. There are laws that prohibit spousal
abuse. Knowledgeable sources indicate that police generally are not
hesitant to enforce the laws against domestic violence, and that the
courts are not reluctant to impose sentences. The main problem,
according to women's groups, is a general reluctance among women to
report incidents of domestic violence. Violence against women was not
the subject of extensive media coverage, marches, or demonstrations
during the year.
Although government authorities and local human rights observers
report that prostitution does not yet appear to be a significant
problem within the country, there is much anecdotal evidence that it
may be growing. Local street prostitution appears to be growing as the
economy deteriorates, and prostitution rings operate in state-owned
hotels. Young women seeking to work or travel abroad also are
vulnerable to sexual exploitation. The Ministry of Internal Affairs
claims that very few women are deported back to Belarus for engaging in
prostitution. However, it acknowledges that Russian criminal
organizations may try actively to recruit and lure Belarusian women
into serving as prostitutes in Western Europe and the Middle East.
There is evidence of trafficking in women (see Section 6.f.).
Sexual harassment is reportedly widespread, but there are not any
specific laws to deal with the problem other than laws against physical
assault.
The law requires equal wages for equal work; however, such is not
always the case in practice. Women have significantly fewer
opportunities for advancement to the upper ranks of management. Women
report that managers frequently take into consideration whether a woman
has children when considering potential job opportunities. The state
press reported in September that approximately 64 percent of those
considered by the Government to be long-term unemployed are single
mothers.
The level of education of women is higher than that of men. Women
make up approximately 58 percent of workers with a higher education and
approximately 66 percent of workers with a specialized secondary
education. In these sectors, between two-thirds and three-fourths of
employees (mostly women) live beneath the official poverty level. Women
legally are equal to men with regard to property ownership and
inheritance. There are active women's groups, most of which focus on
issues such as child welfare, environmental concerns (in the aftermath
of Chernobyl), and the preservation of the family. A private university
in Minsk established the country's first gender studies faculty during
1997.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's welfare and
health, particularly as related to consequences of the nuclear accident
at Chernobyl, and, with the help of foreign donors, tries to give them
special attention. By law everyone is entitled to health care,
including children. There does not appear to be any difference in the
treatment of girls and boys. Children begin school at the age of 6 and
are required to complete 9 years, although the Government makes 11
years of education available at no cost and began in 1998 to develop a
12-year education program. Higher education also is available at no
cost on a competitive basis. Families with children receive token
government benefits. According to one World Bank study, the majority of
those living in poverty are families with multiple children or single
mothers.
The Government continued to discourage the promotion of, or the
teaching of students in, the Belarusian language by limiting the
available of early childhood education in Belarusian. According to one
study by the Francisak Skaryna Belarusian language society, the share
of first graders studying in Belarusian-language classes shrank from
75.3 percent in 1993-94, prior to the Lukashenko presidency, to 28.7
percent in 1997-98. In the capital city of Minsk, the share reportedly
decreased from 58.6 to 4.8 percent. Only 11.2 percent of secondary
students in Minsk currently are taught in Belarusian. Government
authorities claim that the only schools that have been closed which
taught in the Belarusian language are those that experienced
diminishing enrollment.
There does not appear to be a societal pattern of abuse of
children.
People with Disabilities.--A 1992 law mandated accessibility to
transport, residences, businesses, and offices for the disabled;
however, facilities, including transport and office buildings, often
are not accessible to the disabled. The country's continued difficult
financial condition makes it especially difficult for local governments
to budget sufficient funds to implement the 1992 law. The central
Government continues to provide some minimal subsidies to the disabled.
However, continued high inflation and sharp decline in the value of the
Belarusian ruble greatly reduced the real worth of those limited
subsidies.
Religious Minorities.--Societal anti-Semitism exists but usually is
not manifested openly. Senior government officials, including the
President and the state media, sometimes have used coded anti-Semitic
language in their attacks on perceived opponents. In a television
interview given in Moscow in December 1998, in which he sought to
criticize Russian financier and Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth
of Independent States Boris Berezovskiy, President Lukashenko stated
that Berezovskiy's activities, ``might result in Jewish pogroms in
Russia.'' Lukashenko also remarked that ``the main anti-Semites in
Russia are representatives of the Jewish population.''
In April there was an arson attempt on a synagogue in Minsk, during
which the door to the structure sustained minor damage, and the
graffiti, ``Kill Yids, save Russia,'' was spraypainted on a wall.
However, police reportedly responded quickly. In reaction to the
incident, the State Committee on Religious and National Affairs agreed
with the head of the Union of Jewish Religious Organizations to a four-
point plan to combat anti-Semitism. It remained unclear at year's end
to what extent the Government would implement this plan.
According to the Anti-Defamation League and the World Jewish
Congress, in March 1998 government-controlled radio broadcast material
from the Protocols of the Elders of Zion on a religious program. In
spite of protests from the Jewish community, the program was
rebroadcast in May and again in July. Following a written complaint
from the Belarusian Helsinki Committee, the chairman of the State
Committee on the Press noted publicly on May 4 that local newspapers
that publish anti-Semitic material would be given official warnings. In
June an official warning was given to Lichnost, one such local
newspaper. Under the December 1997 amendments to the Law on Press and
Other Media, newspapers can be banned if two warnings are issued (see
Section 2.a.). According to the Anti-Defamation League and World Jewish
Congress, a number of newspapers regularly print anti-Semitic material.
On October 15, the Belarusian Judaic Religious Association (JRA)
spoke out publicly against an anti-Semitic article that appeared in the
newspaper Slavyanski Nabat, written by National Assembly deputies
Valery Drako and Sergei Kostyan. Drako and Kostyan asserted in their
article that many Jews held high rank in the Nazi Wehrmacht and equated
Zionism with fascism.
A number of Jewish cemeteries and sites have been desecrated in
recent years. In February a cemetery was desecrated in Rechitsa, which
had also been vandalized in 1997. Cemeteries were desecrated in Borisov
and Orsha in April 1998, and in Gomel and Berezino in July 1998. In
August 1998, a memorial to Holocaust victims in Brest was desecrated. A
15-year-old skinhead was caught in connection with the Brest
desecration. Local officials reportedly have failed to come up with any
leads in the other cases. In September the head of a local Jewish
organization in Brest issued a statement complaining about continued
incidents of anti-Semitic graffiti appearing in the city, and what he
claimed to be the apparent indifference of local authorities. As of
year's end, there were no reports of action by the authorities.
Many members of the Jewish community remain concerned that the
Lukashenko Government's plans to promote greater unity with Russia may
be accompanied by political appeals to groups in Russia that tolerate
or promote anti-Semitism. Lukashenko's calls for ``Slavic solidarity''
are well received and supported by anti-Semitic, neo-Fascist
organizations in Russia. For example, the organization Russian National
Unity has an active branch in Belarus, and its literature is
distributed in public places in Minsk. On February 5, members of this
organization severely beat Charter '97 human rights activist Andrei
Sannikov when he objected to their distribution of leaflets on a public
square in downtown Minsk. A criminal case against Sannikov's assailants
was later suspended on the grounds of lack of evidence.
The country's small Muslim community, with roots in the country
dating to the Middle Ages, does not report significant societal
prejudice. However, on August 9, the Slonim mosque--the first mosque to
open in the country during the last 60 years--was vandalized just prior
to the holding of a Tatar youth convention in the city.
Section 6. Worker rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution upholds the right of
workers, except state security and military personnel, to form and join
independent unions on a voluntary basis and to carry out actions in
defense of worker rights, including the right to strike; however, these
rights are not respected in practice. The independent trade union
movement is still in its infancy. The Belarusian Free Trade Union
(BFTU) was established in 1991 and registered in 1992. Following the
1995 Minsk metro workers strike, the President issued a decree
suspending its activities. In 1996 the BFTU leaders formed a new
umbrella organization, the Congress of Democratic Trade Unions (BCDTU),
which encompasses four leading independent unions and is reported to
have approximately 15,000 members.
On December 9, a branch of the independent Free Union of Metal
Workers (FUMW) was evicted from its offices at the Minsk Automobile
Factory. On December 16, six independent union representatives,
including FUMW activist Dimitry Plis, were arrested at the Minsk
Automobile Factory for picketing its entrance. Some later were found
guilty of holding an unsanctioned rally and fined.
The Government has taken measures to suppress independent trade
unions. For example, members of independent trade unions have been
arrested for distributing union literature, had material confiscated at
the borders, have been denied access to work sites, have been subjected
to excessive fines, and have been pressured by their managers and state
security services to resign from their jobs because of trade union
activities. Despite the repeal by the Government of its illegal ban on
the BFTU, as well as the Ministry of Justices' reregistration of the
BFTU and BCDTU (following a Presidential decree issued in January
requiring that all public organizations, including unions, reregister),
government authorities have continued to threaten and harass
independent union members.
For example, according to the BFTU, Georgy Mukhin was fired by the
Minsk Tractor Works in early March as a result of his activism on
behalf of the FTUMW. Sergei Antonchik, a union organizer affiliated
with the BFTU who heads the National Strike Committee, was detained
briefly on March 6 for organizing an unsanctioned demonstration in the
city of Orsha. He subsequently was fined by a local court. Antonchik's
Minsk office also was raided by government security officials who
confiscated antigovernment bulletins.
In October the Ministry of Justice turned down the application of
the Belarusian Independent Association of Industrial Trade Unions
(BIAITU), which represents approximately 340,000 workers and is
composed of 3 large official unions that have been critical of the
Government's economic policies, to reregister as a legal organization.
The decision apparently was based on a finding that the BIAITU's
charter was inconsistent with its status as an umbrella organization of
different unions. In early November, Minsk city authorities refused a
request submitted by BIAITU leaders for permission to hold a public
demonstration to protest the Ministry of Justice's decision.
The Government continues to discourage employees at state-run
enterprises from joining independent trade unions. Lukashenko signed a
new restrictive Presidential decree (number 29) to ``tighten labor
discipline'' July 26. The decree, which has as one of its aims the
placement of all workers on individual rather than collective
contracts, was criticized heavily by both independent and official
union leaders, who believe that it was designed principally to enable
the presidential administration to increase its control over the labor
sector.
The Official Federation of Trade Unions of Belarus (FTUB), formerly
the Belarusian branch of the Soviet Union's All-Union Central Council
of Trade Unions, consists of approximately 4.4 million workers
(including retirees) and is by far the largest trade union
organization. According to official union federation figures, 92
percent of the workforce is unionized. Although wary in the past of
challenging the regime seriously, some FTUB leaders are becoming
increasingly vocal in their criticism of the polices of the Lukashenko
regime. In retaliation, some FTUB officials claim they have been
subjected to threats and harassment from the Government. In late
January the BFTU and FTUB-affiliated automobile and agricultural
equipment manufacturing union held a joint demonstration in Minsk to
protest falling living standards.
On September 30, the FTUB held a demonstration in Minsk, also
supported by independent unions, to protest presidential decree number
29. However, Minsk city officials allowed the protest rally to take
place only in a location away from the city center. Prior to the
demonstration, President Lukashenko ridiculed the leaders, accusing
them of manipulating popular hardship for political advantage, and
warning them that persons who did not adhere to the Government's
restrictions in the demonstration would ``get it in full.''
Although sometimes willing to try to cooperate with official union
leaders to achieve mutual objectives, such as on September 30 and
during a joint demonstration held in late January, independent labor
union leaders remain skeptical that most FTUB representatives are
prepared to promote effectively workers' rights. Independent labor
leaders also maintain that the official trade unions' continued control
over social welfare functions usually performed by the State (such as
pension funds) is an obstacle to the growth of true, independent trade
unions. On December 17, approximately 100 members of the free trade
union picketed the Zenit factory in Mogilyov to protest the fact that
state managers would allow only representatives of an official union to
maintain an office at the plant.
Tight control by the Government over public demonstrations (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.b.) makes it difficult for unions to strike or hold
public rallies to further their objectives. Although union members
undertook work stoppages, usually in response to late payment of wages,
precise data on the number of strikes that took place is unavailable.
Unions may affiliate freely with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Legislation
dating from the Soviet era provides for the right to organize and
bargain collectively. However, according to a poll conducted by the
Ministry of Labor's Labor Research Institute in January 1998, although
most industrial workers believe that the terms of their employment were
governed by collective bargaining agreements, only 17 percent of the
workers polled thought that collective bargaining agreements were
executed as stipulated. Some analysts believe that the new presidential
decree on labor discipline (see Section 6.a.), which aims at placing
all workers on individual rather than collective contracts, could
significantly threaten the principle of collective bargaining. Since
the economy is still largely in the hands of the State, unions usually
seek political redress for their economic problems. Workers and
independent unions have recourse to the court system.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor, except in cases when the work or service to be
performed is fixed by a court's decision or in accordance with the Law
on the State of Emergency or martial law. The Constitutional provision
prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens, although
its application to children is not specified. With the possible
exception of juvenile prisoners, however, forced and bonded labor by
children is not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law establishes 16 as the minimum age for employment.
With the written consent of one parent (or legal guardian), a 14-year-
old child may conclude a labor contract. The Prosecutor General's
office reportedly enforces this law effectively. The constitutional
provision prohibiting forced or bonded labor applies to all citizens,
although its application to children is not specified (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--During 1998 average monthly real
wages declined significantly from about $88 to about $30 a month. The
minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family. Agriculture workers are paid approximately 39 percent less
than the average monthly wages. The country's continuing economic
problems make it difficult for the average worker to earn a decent
living. At year's end, major wage arrearages remained, especially in
the agricultural sector.
The Constitution and Labor Code set a limit of 40 hours of work per
week and provide for at least one 24-hour rest period per week. Because
of the country's difficult economic situation, an increasing number of
workers find themselves working considerably less than 40 hours per
week. Factories reportedly often require workers to take unpaid
furloughs due to shortages of raw materials and energy and lack of
demand for factory output.
The law establishes minimum conditions for workplace safety and
worker health; however, these standards often are ignored. Workers at
many heavy machinery plants do not wear even minimal safety gear, such
as gloves, hard hats, or welding glasses. A State Labor Inspectorate
exists, but does not have the authority to enforce compliance, and
violations often are ignored. The high accident rate is due to lack of
protective clothing, shoes, and equipment, nonobservance of temperature
regulations, the use of outdated machinery, and inebriation on the job.
Official data indicate that 130 workers died in industrial accidents
during the first 6 months of 1999, half of which were due to drinking
on the job. According to the Ministry of Labor, 294 persons died and
1300 were injured in workplace accidents during 1998. There is no
provision in the law that allows workers to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without risking loss of their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no specific law against
trafficking, although it is possible in theory that existing laws would
be sufficient to prosecute traffickers. There were no reports of
government efforts to prosecute traffickers.
A 1999 OSCE report, while acknowledging that reliable data are
impossible to obtain, describes Belarus as a source country for women
being trafficked to Central and Western Europe for purposes of
prostitution. Information from such scattered destinations as the
Netherlands, Lithuania and Bosnia, refer to Belarus among the source
countries for women being trafficked to or through their countries.
There is much anecdotal evidence that young women are being
trafficked by the Russian mafia, and end up in Cyprus, Greece, Israel,
and Western Europe working as prostitutes. The Ministry of the Interior
acknowledges that Russian criminal organizations may try actively to
recruit and lure Belarusian women into serving as prostitutes in
Western Europe and the Middle East.
______
BELGIUM
Belgium is a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarch
who plays a mainly symbolic role. The Council of Ministers (Cabinet),
led by the Prime Minister, holds office as long as it retains the
confidence of the lower house of the bicameral Parliament.
Constitutional reforms enacted in 1993 transformed Belgium from a
unitary into a federal state with several levels of government,
including national, regional (Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels), and
community (Flemish, Francophone, and German) levels. The judiciary is
independent.
The Government maintains effective control of all security forces.
The Police Judiciaire and the Gendarmerie currently share
responsibility for internal security with the municipal police, but the
two organizations are to be merged at the federal level, and the
Gendarmerie and municipal police are to be integrated at the local
level under a reorganization plan that is to be implemented fully by
April 1, 2001.
The country is highly industrialized, with a vigorous private
sector and limited government participation in industry. The primary
exports are iron and steel. The economy provides a high standard of
living for most citizens.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of
dealing with individual instances of abuse. The Government is taking
steps to combat violence against women and trafficking in women and
children.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In February Parliament enacted legislation that further defines
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide and also imposes
penalties for such crimes.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that officials employed them.
In addition to the integration of the police forces, the
reorganization plan calls for the creation of an independent oversight
body for the federal police and also for the creation of a new
anticorruption unit.
Prison conditions vary. Newer prisons meet international standards.
Older facilities meet or nearly meet minimum international standards
despite their Spartan physical conditions and limited resources. In
September the prison system, designed to hold 7,533 prisoners, held
8,350 inmates. A continuing program is intended to improve overall
conditions and expand capacity to 8,000 beds by 2000. Women and men are
housed in separate prisons. Men constitute 95 percent of all detainees.
A third of male prisoners are under the age of 25; 70 percent are under
the age of 35.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this
prohibition. Arrested persons must be brought before a judge within 24
hours. Pretrial confinement is subject to monthly review by a panel of
judges, which may extend pretrial detention based on established
criteria (e.g., whether, in the court's view, the arrested person would
be likely to commit further crimes or attempt to flee if released).
Bail exists in principle under the law but is granted rarely. The
Government no longer separates convicted criminals and pretrial
detainees. Pretrial detainees receive different benefits from convicted
criminals, such as the right to more frequent family visits.
Approximately 40 percent of the total prison population consists of
pretrial detainees. Arrested persons are allowed prompt access to a
lawyer of their choosing or, if they cannot afford one, to an attorney
appointed by the state.
The law prohibits exile, and the government does not employ it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The judicial system is organized according to specialization and
territorial jurisdiction, with 5 territorial levels: Canton (225),
district (27), provinces and Brussels (11), courts of appeal (5), and
for the whole Kingdom--the Cour de Cassation. The latter is the highest
appeals court.
Military tribunals try military personnel for common law as well as
military crimes. All military tribunals consist of four officers and a
civilian judge. At the appellate level, the civilian judge presides.
The accused has the right of appeal to a higher military court.
Each judicial district has a Labor Court, which deals with
litigation between employers and employees regarding wages, notice,
competition clauses, and social security benefits.
The judiciary enforces the law's provision for the right to a fair
trial. Charges are clearly and formally stated, and there is a
presumption of innocence. All defendants have the right to be present,
to have counsel (at public expense if needed), to confront witnesses,
to present evidence, and to appeal.
The Government continued to implement judicial reforms in the wake
of public dissatisfaction with the handling of the 1996 Dutroux
pedophile investigation (see Section 6.f.). The reform legislation
included the creation of a board of attorneys general, whose purpose is
to oversee and streamline nationwide policy on criminal prosecutions.
Changes also were made in the procedure governing the appointment and
promotion of magistrates. The Government also created a High Council on
Justice to supervise the appointment and promotion of magistrates. The
Government plans for the Council to serve as a permanent monitoring
board for the entire justice system and to be empowered to hear
complaints against individual magistrates.
Following its review of the judicial system, the Government
implemented several reforms that granted stronger rights to victims of
crime. These measures allow victims to have more access to information
during an investigation, as well as the right to appeal if an
investigation does not result in a decision to bring charges. As part
of its program of judicial reform, the Government since 1997 opened 11
``justice houses.'' These facilities combine a variety of legal
services under one roof, including legal aid, mediation, and victims'
assistance. The Government plans to open a justice house in the
remaining 16 judicial districts by 2001.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for these
freedoms, and the Government respects these rights in practice. An
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press.
The Government operates several radio and television networks but
does not control program content. Boards of directors that represent
the main political, linguistic, and opinion groups supervise programs.
A government representative sits on each board but has no veto power.
Private radio and television stations operate with government licenses.
Almost all homes have access by cable to television from other Western
European countries and elsewhere abroad. Satellite services are also
available.
There are restrictions on the press regarding libel, slander, and
the advocacy of racial or ethnic discrimination, hate, or violence. A
law passed in February prevents political parties that espouse
discrimination from receiving federal funds.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. However, during the year two demonstrations were banned. In
March the city of Brussels banned all protests and demonstrations
concerning the NATO air strikes in Kosovo. City authorities cited law
and order reasons for this decision. In April a local politician
climbed the fence at Klein Brogel air base as part of an antinuclear
demonstration and was cited for breaking and entering. Local
authorities banned future antinuclear demonstrations at the base. In
July a district judge ruled that the legal case against the politician
did not fall under the jurisdiction of the district court. No further
action was taken on the matter.
The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
respects this provision in practice. Citizens are free to form
organizations and establish ties to international bodies; however, the
Antiracism Law (see Section 5) prohibits membership in organizations
that practice discrimination overtly and repeatedly. In April a
district judge in Ghent ruled that the ``Hells Angels'' are a private
militia as defined by the law and ordered that the group be disbanded.
The organization appealed the decision and related sanctions, and the
appeal verdict was pending at year's end.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the government respects this right in practice. The
Government does not hinder the practice of any faith. The law accords
``recognized'' status to Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism,
Anglicanism, Islam, and Greek and Russian Orthodoxy, and these
religions receive subsidies from general government revenues. Taxpayers
who object to contributing to religious subsidies have no recourse. By
law each recognized religion has the right to provide teachers at
government expense for religious instruction in schools, but not all
avail themselves of this right. For recognized religions, the
Government pays the salaries, retirement, and lodging expenses of
ministers and also subsidizes the renovation of church buildings.
The lack of independent recognized status generally does not
prevent religious groups from freely practicing their religions.
However, in September 110 national police officers raided Church of
Scientology facilities and the homes and businesses of about 20 members
of the Church. One member's home in France was raided simultaneously by
the French authorities. At year's end, an investigation continued, and
no arrests had been made.
Although Islam was declared a recognized religion in 1974, Muslims
have not had an elected body to act as their representative in dealings
with the federal government. In December 1998, Muslims held nationwide
elections for an assembly consisting of 51 persons representing
numerous communities of the Muslim faith. Of those elected, four were
women. The Muslim representative body recognized by the Government
currently is composed of 16 members appointed by the elected assembly
and the current Muslim executive council. A 17th member may be
appointed in the future, although no individual has been named to fill
this position.
The Evangelical Association (a group of evangelical Christian
organizations) continued to claim discrimination due to the
Government's refusal to grant it recognized status separate from the
Protestant religion. Despite the Government's refusal, it is
negotiating with the group in an effort to ensure that the Evangelical
Association enjoys the same benefits as recognized religions by
mediating discussions to enable the evangelical association to obtain a
seat in the leadership of the recognized Protestant church.
In 1998 Parliament adopted recommendations from a 1997 commission's
report on government policy toward sects, particularly sects deemed
``harmful'' under the law. The report divided sects into two broadly
defined categories: It characterized a ``sect'' as any religious-based
organization, and a ``harmful sect'' as a group that may pose a threat
to society or individuals. One of the primary recommendations was to
create a ``Center for Information and Advice on Harmful Sectarian
Organizations.'' The Center opened in October and is working with a
limited staff of two persons. It is tasked with collecting publicly
available information on a wide range of religious and philosophical
groups and providing information and advice to the public regarding the
legal rights of freedom of association, freedom of privacy, and freedom
of religion. The Government has not yet published regulations for its
operations. In 1998 the Government also created an interagency body
designed to work in conjunction with the Center to coordinate
government policy on sects, but this body had not been set up by year's
end. Nor had the Government or Parliament yet taken any action to
establish a special police unit on sects or to designate special
magistrates to monitor cases involving sects, which were two other
recommendations of the 1997 commission.
The parliamentary report also recommended that the country's
community governments sponsor information campaigns to educate the
public--especially children--regarding the phenomenon of harmful sects.
In March the Francophone Community government launched a prevention
campaign called ``Gurus, Beware!'' The campaign was intended to fulfill
the commission's recommendation to educate the country's youth on the
dangers posed by harmful sects. Information for the campaign was
disseminated through pamphlets, brochures, television, and motion
picture advertisements. On one page, the brochure discussed 20 of the
groups listed in the 1997 commission report and stated that the country
harbors certain ``dangerous sects.'' In April 1999, one of the groups
discussed in the brochure, the Anthroposophic Society (which is based
in Antwerp), filed suit to halt its distribution. An Antwerp court
issued an order enjoining the Francophone Community government from
further distribution of the brochure until all defamatory language
referring to this group was removed from the text. The Francophone
Community agreed not to publish any additional brochures.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The law include provisions for granting refugee or asylee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. The Government
provides first asylum, and during the first 11 months of the year
approximately 31,000 new applications for asylum were filed, compared
with 21,947 for all of 1998. A total of 1,404 applicants, mostly from
previous years, were granted permanent residence. Counting those from
previous years, 33,730 applications remained pending. Of new asylum
seekers during the year, 35 to 40 percent were displaced residents of
Kosovo.
In May the Government decided to extend special asylum status to
about 15,000 Kosovar Albanian refugees who entered the country
illegally in the past year. This regularization of status enabled these
refugees to receive the same benefits, including the right to work and
claim social security benefits, as 1,200 Kosovars already welcomed by
the Government. In late 1999, the Government planned to abolish the
special status held by Kosovars, but those still holding this special
status are to be able to obtain extensions for up to 6 months. They may
then apply for regular refugee status, which 2,300 members of this
group already have done.
Extensions of a special program initiated in 1992 for refugees from
the former Yugoslavia were discontinued at the beginning of the year.
The displaced persons admitted under that program were allowed either
to adjust their status and become permanent residents or to apply for
political asylum.
Asylum seekers arriving by air with no papers are detained for up
to 5 months while awaiting consideration of their cases. The children
do not attend school. If no asylum decision has been reached by the end
of the 5-month period, then the asylum seeker is released or
voluntarily repatriated. At the discretion of the Minister of Interior,
the Cabinet may exempt certain cities, which have already accepted
large refugee populations, from giving legal residence to new refugees
or asylees.
In 1998 a Senate commission recommended reforms to immigration law
designed to create a more ``just and humane'' immigration policy. The
commission criticized the conditions in detention centers and advocated
the upgrading and renovation of certain centers. In addition to
improving the physical infrastructure of the centers, the commission
recommended that detainees receive improved access to legal, medical,
and social services.
The commission also proposed the creation of a national body to
oversee the quality of conditions in detention centers.
In September 1998, a Nigerian woman died following a struggle with
police who were trying forcibly to repatriate her. In the aftermath of
this incident the Government fully adopted new policies on asylum in
1999, which mirrored recommendations made earlier that year by the
Senate commission with regard to matters such as limiting the period of
detention, adding staff and funding, reviewing cases and documentation,
and enlarging reception centers. The Government also created a task
force to monitor asylum policy in November. In addition, based on the
recommendations, the Gendarmerie unit that deals with forced
repatriations was enlarged and better trained.
After the change in government in July, immigration and asylum
measures became a focus of the new Government. The Minister of Interior
created working groups to develop a plan for the Government and hired a
significant number of additional officials in the Aliens Office to
handle processing and interviewing.
As a first step in the comprehensive changes in asylum and
immigration policies, in October the Government initiated a mass
repatriation of 74 Slovak Roma who were denied asylum. Some reports
indicated that not all deportees departed voluntarily but were tricked
into appearing for the repatriation. In December the Government used
military aircraft to carry out a second repatriation. This time 15
Nigerians who were living illegally in Belgium were sent home.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully. Citizens ages 18 and older exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal and compulsory (under penalty of fine) suffrage. Direct
popular elections for parliamentary seats (excluding some Senators
elected by community councils and others elected by Senate members) are
held at least every 4 years. Opposition parties operate freely.
In 1998 the European Court of Justice censured Belgium for its
failure to comply with a European Council directive requiring members
states to accord to all citizens of European Union (EU) countries
resident in another EU country the right to vote in municipal
elections. In 1998 Parliament amended the Constitution to extend that
right to EU citizens and passed implementing legislation in January.
The Federal Government is responsible for such matters of state as
security, justice, social security, and fiscal and monetary policy. The
regional governments are charged with matters that directly affect the
geographical regions and the material well-being of their residents,
such as commerce and trade, public works, and environmental policy. The
linguistic community councils handle matters more directly affecting
the mental and cultural well-being of the individual, such as education
and the administration of certain social welfare programs.
Women are underrepresented in government but hold some senior
positions. Of 18 federal ministers, 3 are women. In the Federal
Parliament, 34 of 150 house members and 20 of 71 Senators are women.
These numbers show a slight increase in the role of women in the
Federal Government, partially due to a 1998 law that requires that 33
percent of the candidates on the ballot in all elections be women.
Following the June 13 general elections, for the first time two women
became Vice Premiers in the Cabinet.
The existence of communities speaking Dutch, French, and German
engenders significant complexities for the state. Most major
institutions, including political parties, are divided along linguistic
lines. National decisions often take into account the specific needs of
each regional and linguistic group.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Numerous human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on these factors, and the
Government enforces it. With Dutch, French, and German as official
languages, the counry has a complex linguistic regime, including
language requirements for various elective and appointive positions. In
February the Senate passed a new law intended to prevent official
financing of any racist or xenophobic party or any party that does not
respect human rights.
Women.--A 1997 parliamentary report described domestic violence
against women as still ``covered by a culture of silence.'' In one
academic study, an eminent sociologist found that slightly less than 1
percent of the women in a particular town had reported incidents of
domestic violence to the authorities. However, the number of unreported
incidents is higher, and other studies suggest that approximately 6
percent of women in several other towns were abused by their domestic
partners.
A 1998 law defines and criminalizes domestic violence. The
legislation aims to protect married and unmarried partners. Women's
groups believe that it is an important step in recognizing domestic
violence as constituting a offense distinct from other forms of
aggression. The legislation allows social organizations to represent
victims of domestic violence in court provided that they have the
victim's consent. In early 1999 a law was passed allowing police entry
into a home without the consent of the head of household when
investigating a domestic violence complaint. According to its
proponents, the police do not use the law enough. The legislation also
requires the Government to maintain a database of statistics on the
subject, but by year's end it had not made any progress on implementing
any provisions of the law and did not yet have any accurate statistics
on domestic violence.
A number of shelters and telephone help lines operate throughout
the country. In addition to providing women with shelter and advice,
many offer assistance on legal matters, job placement, and
psychological counseling for both partners. Approximately 80 percent of
these organizations' budgets are provided by one of the three regional
governments.
The law prohibits organizing prostitution or assisting immigration
for the purpose of prostitution, but not prostitution itself.
Parliament enacted a law in 1995 that defined and criminalized
trafficking in persons, but cases of trafficking in women continued
(see Section 6.f.).
Sexual harassment is illegal. The Government implemented procedures
to monitor sexual harassment claims in the private sector in 1992 and
in the public sector in 1995. Victims of sexual harassment have the
right to sue their harassers under existing law. A 1998 government
investigation of sexual harassment determined that one out of three
women is harassed sexually in the workplace. Due to improper
interpretation of sexual harassment and victim denial, this figure is
considered understated.
In May a revision of the law on equal opportunity in the workplace
was passed, which stated that sexual harassment can be a form of sexual
discrimination. The act outlaws discrimination in hiring, working
conditions, promotion, wages, and contract termination. Due to the
revision, sexual harassment can result in civil and administrative
action by the Ministry of Labor. It now has a broader legal basis in
court, and victims of sexual harassment have an additional recourse--
reversal of proof, which requires the defendant to provide evidence in
the case. Reversal of proof only occurs in cases in which sexual
harassment is judged in a court as a form of sexual discrimination. As
a result of the new codes, more cases now go to the Labor Court.
However, despite the new laws, most cases of sexual harassment are
resolved informally.
Equal treatment of men and women is provided for by the
Constitution, federal law, and treaties incorporated into law. The
Government actively promotes a comprehensive approach to the
integration of women at all levels of decisionmaking. The Division of
Equal Opportunity, a part of the Ministry of Labor, focuses
specifically on issues affecting women, including violence against
women, sexual harassment, and the participation of women in the
political process. Beginning in 1999, federal law requires that one-
third of all candidates for elected office be women.
The female unemployment rate (10.9 percent at the end of 1998)
exceeded the male unemployment rate (6.7 percent), according to one
government study released in June. The net average salary for a woman
is only 84 percent of the national average salary.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded system of public
education and health care. It provides compulsory education up to the
age of 18. The Francophone and Flemish communities have agencies
specifically dealing with children's needs.
Government and private groups provide shelters for runaways and
counseling for children who were abused physically or sexually.
There are comprehensive child protection laws. Children have the
right to a voice in court cases that affect them, such as divorce
proceedings. The law states that a minor ``capable of understanding''
can request permission to be heard by a judge, or that a judge can
request an interview with a child. In 1995 the Government enacted laws
designed to combat child pornography by increasing penalties for such
crimes and for those in possession of pedophilic materials. The law
permits the prosecution of Belgian citizens who commit such crimes
abroad and provides that criminals convicted of the sexual abuse of
children cannot receive parole without first receiving specialized
assistance and must continue counseling and treatment upon their
release from prison.
Belgium is both a transit point and a destination for trafficking
in children (see Section 6.f.).
In another response to public criticism of the handling of the
pedophile case (see Sections 1.e. and 6.f.), the Government assisted in
the establishment of Child Focus, a center for missing and exploited
children that opened in December 1997. During its first 9 months of
operation, the center's hot line received 23,000 calls, averaging 80
calls per day, resulting in 639 active cases. A total of 77 percent of
the cases related to runaways or parental abductions. The remaining
cases involved missing children (12 percent) and sexual exploitation
(11 percent). By comparison, in the first 9 months of 1999, the hot
line averaged over 120 calls per day.
Child prostitution is of limited scope, but in response to
recommendations made in a 1994 government study, the police received
instructions to be especially diligent in combating prostitution among
those who appear to be under the age of 18.
There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
People with Disabilities.--The law provides for the protection of
disabled persons from discrimination in employment, education, and in
the provision of other state services. The Government mandates that
public buildings erected since 1970 be accessible to the disabled and
offers subsidies to induce the owners of other buildings to make
necessary modifications. However, many older buildings are not
accessible.
The Government provides financial assistance for the disabled. It
gives special aid to parents of disabled children and to disabled
parents. Regional and community programs provide other assistance, such
as job training. Disabled persons are eligible to receive services in
any of the three regions (Flanders, Wallonia, or Brussels), not just
their region of residence.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities--Belgium is a pluralistic society
in which individual differences in general are respected, and
linguistic rights in particular are protected. Some 60 percent of
citizens are native Dutch speakers, about 40 percent are French
speakers, and fewer than 1 percent are German speakers.
An Antiracism Law penalizes the incitement of discrimination, hate,
or violence based on race, ethnicity, or nationality. It is illegal for
providers of goods or services (including housing) to discriminate on
the basis of any of these factors and for employers to consider these
factors in their decisions to hire, train, or dismiss workers.
In 1998 the Center for Equal Opportunity and the Fight Against
Racism, a parliamentary organization tasked with investigating
complaints of discrimination based on race, handled 1,241 complaints
leading to mediation or court action in 848 cases. In the first 6
months of 1999 the Center handled approximately 550 complaints, 299 of
which resulted in mediation or court action.
In 1998 legal actions were completed against six paratroopers who
participated in the 1993 U.N. peacekeeping operation in Somalia and who
were accused of dishonorable, racist acts there. Two were acquitted due
to lack of evidence, two received probation, one received a suspended
sentence unrelated to racism, and one received a 12-month prison
sentence, a fine, and a 5-year suspension of civil and political
rights. In the aftermath of the process, the armed forces performed an
internal investigation of racism, but the review found no indication
that it was a systemic problem. Despite this finding, during the year
the armed forces began mandatory diversity training for all new
employees.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Under the Constitution, workers have
the right to associate freely, which includes the freedom to organize
and join unions of their own choosing. The Government does not hamper
such activities, and workers fully and freely exercise their right of
association. About 60 percent of workers are members of labor unions.
This number includes employed and unemployed workers. Unions are
independent of the Government but have important links with major
political parties. The Government does not require unions to register.
In its 1999 report, the International Labor Organization's
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations reiterated its criticism that the Government should
adopt legislation establishing ``objective, predetermined, and detailed
criteria'' to enable employers' organizations and trade unions to have
access to the National Labor Council. Because of restrictive
interpretation of the legislation in force, only the Christian,
Socialist, and Liberal trade union confederations have access to the
National Labor Council.
In order to exclude trade unions from the Criminal Organizations
bill, the trade unions forced amendment to the bill in a January 10
act. Unions feared that the bill would undermine their basic rights,
including the right to strike.
Unions have the right to strike, and even strikes by civil servants
and workers in ``essential'' services are tolerated. However, seamen,
the military, and magistrates have no right to strike. In January the
Gendarmerie obtained a limited right to strike as part of the police
reform package; this provision is to be implemented by April 1, 2001.
Even though many strikes begin as wildcat actions, strikers are not
prosecuted for failure to observe strike procedures in collective
bargaining agreements. Crimes committed during a strike action, such as
causing bodily harm or damage to property, are clearly illegal strike
methods, which the authorities prosecute.
The December 1998 act on the merger of the police forces gave the
federal police the right to strike. The Government has the authority to
order necessary forces back to work during a strike in order to
maintain law and order.
The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) in its
``Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights 1999'' again
mentioned that for several years employers made applications to civil
courts to end strikes. The report added that, more recently, judges
tend to rule that labor conflicts are not within their jurisdiction.
This stance reinforces the widely accepted practice that any discussion
of the right to strike is a subject for collective bargaining between
workers and employers and not a legal matter. Although draft laws were
submitted, no legal action was taken by Parliament to end the legal
confusion.
Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and
are free to affiliate with international labor bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is recognized, protected, and
exercised freely. Every other year the employers' federation and the
unions negotiate a nationwide collective bargaining agreement, covering
2.4 million private sector workers, that establishes the framework for
negotiations at the plant and branch levels. In the fall of 1998,
employers and unions agreed on a nationwide collective bargaining
agreement that focuses on collective bargaining at the branch and plant
levels and limits compensation increases to 5.9 percent for the 1999-
2000 period. The agreement covers cost of living adjustments, wage
increases, and job creation measures.
The law prohibits discrimination against organizers and members of
unions and protects against the termination of contracts of members of
workers' councils, members of health or safety committees, and shop
stewards. Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are
required to reinstate workers fired for union activities. Effective
mechanisms such as the labor courts exist for adjudicating disputes
between labor and management.
In May and in anticipation of the merger of the police forces,
Parliament enacted new legislation on collective bargaining procedures
between the federal authorities and the unions and professional
organizations representing all law enforcement agents.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and it is not known to occur. The law also
prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government enforces
this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 15, but
education is compulsory until age 18. Youths between the ages of 15 and
18 may participate in part-time work/study programs and may work full
time during school vacations. The labor courts effectively monitor
compliance with national laws and standards. There are no industries
where any significant child labor exists. The Government prohibits
forced and bonded child labor and enforces this prohibition effectively
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly national minimum
wage for workers over 21 years of age is $1,228 (45,427 Belgian
francs); 18-year-olds must be paid at least 82 percent of the minimum,
19-year-olds 88 percent, and 20-year-olds 94 percent. The minimum wage,
coupled with extensive social benefits, provides workers with a
standard of living appropriate to a highly developed nation. Minimum
wages in the private sector are set in biennial, nationwide collective
bargaining meetings (see Section 6.b.), which lead to formal agreements
signed in the National Labor Council and made mandatory by royal decree
for the entire private sector. In the public sector, the minimum wage
is determined in negotiations between the Government and the public
service unions. The Ministry of Labor effectively enforces the law
regarding minimum wages. By law the standard workweek cannot exceed 39
hours and must have at least one 24-hour rest period. Many collective
bargaining agreements set standard workweeks of 35 to 38 hours. The law
requires overtime pay for hours worked in excess of the standard. Work
done from the 9th to the 11th hour per day or from the 40th to the 50th
hour per week is considered allowable overtime. Longer workdays are
permitted only if agreed upon in a collective bargaining agreement.
These laws and regulations are enforced effectively by the Ministry of
Labor and the labor courts.
The law calls for comprehensive provisions for worker safety.
Collective bargaining agreements can supplement these laws. Workers
have the right to remove themselves from situations that endanger their
safety or health without jeopardy to their continued employment, and
the law protects workers who file complaints about such situations. The
Labor Ministry implements health and safety legislation through a team
of inspectors and determines whether workers qualify for disability and
medical benefits. The law mandates health and safety committees in
companies with more than 50 employees. Labor courts effectively monitor
compliance with national health and safety laws and standards.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--A 1995 law defines and criminalizes
trafficking in persons. Under the law, victims of trafficking may be
granted temporary residence permits and are eligible to receive aid
from government-funded reception centers. Since 1994 the majority of
cases were victims of either sexual or economic exploitation. The
victims of sexual exploitation increasingly are women under age 18.
Since enactment of this law, a magistrate was designated in each
judicial district to supervise cases involving trafficking in persons.
As a result of the new law, the Government reports significant
increases in witness testimony and the successful prosecution of
traffickers.
Belgium is both a transit point and destination for trafficking in
women and children. In September the three NGO's involved in assisting
victims of trafficking in persons reported 185 active cases of
trafficking in women from over 30 countries. The largest number of
victims were Albanian. Cases on 28 children from 7 different countries
also were active; the largest number were from Albania and Macedonia.
In 1996 the authorities uncovered a suspected pedophile/child
pornography and trafficking ring. The criminal investigation of this
suspected ring continued during the year. Five suspects remained in
detention; however, their trial is unlikely to begin before mid-2000.
In February a parliamentary commission, appointed in the aftermath of
this case and tasked with investigating allegations of corruption and
complicity in the law enforcement and judicial systems, issued its
report. The commission sharply criticized the entire judicial system,
including both the police and judiciary for undisciplined, inept, and
potentially corrupt handling of the pedophile scandal and associated
crimes. It also recommended that disciplinary action be considered
against numerous police officers and magistrates involved in this
investigation. As of September, only one police officer received a
warning. No other officials were disciplined.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
The 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (the Dayton Accords) created the independent state of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, previously one of the constituent republics of
Yugoslavia. The agreement also created two multiethnic constituent
entities within the state: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(the Federation) and the Republika Srpska (RS). The Federation, which
has a postwar Bosniak and Croat majority, occupies 51 percent of the
territory; the RS, which has a postwar Bosnian Serb majority, occupies
49 percent. The Constitution (Annex 4 of the Dayton Accords)
establishes a statewide government with a bicameral legislature, a
three-member presidency (consisting of a Bosniak, a Serb, and a Croat),
a council of ministers, a constitutional court, and a central bank. The
Accords also provided for the Office of the High Representative (OHR)
to oversee implementation of civilian provisions. The entities maintain
separate armies, but under the Constitution, these are under the
ultimate control of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1998
Bosnia and Herzegovina held its most peaceful and pluralistic elections
since the 1995 Dayton Accords put an end to 3 years of war. Multiethnic
parties committed to building on the foundation established at Dayton
made some progress during the presidential and assembly elections. At
the same time, the largest political parties, which won a majority of
assembly seats, continued to be ethnically based. These were the
Bosniak-dominated Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Croatian
Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ), and the Serb
Democratic Party-Serb Radical Party coalition (SDS/SRS). Although
formally independent, the judiciary remains subject to influence by
political parties and the executive branch.
One of the two entities that make up Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was established in March 1994 and
transformed the government structure of the Bosnian territories under
Bosniak and Croatian control. The President of the Federation appoints
the Prime Minister subject to parliamentary approval. The Federation
Parliament is bicameral. Federation structures have been implemented
only gradually. Major steps were the creation of canton governments,
the unification of Sarajevo under Federation control in spring 1996,
and the 1996 and 1998 elections of the Federation Parliament. However,
serious ethnic and political rivalries continue to divide Croats and
Bosniaks. Parallel Bosniak and Croat government structures often exist
in practice.
The Republika Srpska of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RS) is the other
entity. In 1997-98 most of the RS political and administrative agencies
moved from Pale, a stronghold of former Bosnian Serb leader and
indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, to Banja Luka. The President
and Vice President were elected in 1998 for 2-year terms. Their terms
of office are to increase to 4 years after the 2000 elections. The RS
National Assembly is unicameral and elected on a proportional basis.
The 1998 elections were relatively free and fair but resulted in the
election of a hard-line president, Nikola Poplasen of the SRS. He
refused to nominate a candidate for prime minister with sufficient
support in the RS Assembly to form a government. This episode
eventually contributed to a confrontation with the OHR in which the OHR
removed Poplasen from office on March 5. Vice President Nikola Sarovic
has not yet been permitted to step into the position.
Also on March 5, but unrelated to Poplasen's dismissal, Roberts B.
Owen, arbitrator for the Brcko Arbitral Tribunal, announced a final
award, whereby the entire prewar Brcko municipality was to become a
``self-governing neutral district,'' which would belong to both
entities. The award delegated to the district's internationally
appointed supervisor the responsibility for deciding when the district
would begin to govern itself under a new district statute. Until then
the supervisor would retain ultimate authority over the district. The
final disposition of this region was a highly sensitive issue since the
region of Brcko connects the eastern and western sections of the RS.
Until new laws are issued or existing laws are adapted, the supervisor
retains discretion as to which laws, Federation or RS, are to apply in
Brcko. A new district statute was issued by the supervisor on December
7, and a districtwide multiethnic police force was to be established
officially in January 2000. Demilitarization of the Brcko district was
underway and scheduled to be completed by the end of February 2000. On
August 18, the Brcko Tribunal issued an annex to the final award,
clarifying implementation of the award. In particular, it established
the citizenship status of district residents and confirmed the right of
transit by military forces of both entities. It also directed the
supervisor to address such issues as taxation, law enforcement,
district management, and composition of the district assembly.
The Constitution gives the government of each entity responsibility
for law enforcement in accordance with internationally recognized
standards. The Stabilization Force (SFOR), led by NATO, continued to
implement the military aspects of the Dayton Accords and create a
secure environment for implementation of the nonmilitary aspects of the
settlement, such as: Civilian reconstruction, the return of refugees
and displaced persons, elections, and freedom of movement of the
civilian population. The International Police Task Force (IPTF),
established by the United Nations under Annex 11 of the Dayton Accords,
oversees police restructuring and training. The IPTF also may
investigate human rights abuses. Police in both entities have violated
international standards and discriminated on political, religious, and
ethnic grounds. However, with training and increased professionalism of
the police and the increasing activism of professional standards units,
these cases were decreasing compared with 1998. During the year, both
the Federation and the RS used internal affairs units to investigate
and dismiss officers. Police continued to suffer from the legacy of a
Communist system, with ``special'' or secret police operating in all
areas. These forces were outside the normal police chain of command,
reporting directly to the senior political leadership. In addition to
locally recruited police forces, each entity also maintains an army.
Security forces committed human rights abuses throughout the country.
The economy remains weak and dependent upon international
assistance. During the year gross domestic product (GDP) was $3.5
billion in the Federation; estimates of the GDP in the RS were lower.
According to government statistics, GDP per capita was $600 for both
entities. The continued return of refugees from abroad was expected to
compound the problem of job creation and to reduce remittances.
International assistance financed infrastructure reconstruction and
provided loans to the manufacturing sector.
The commitment to respect citizens' human rights and civil
liberties remains tenuous in the country, and the degree of respect for
these rights continues to vary among areas with Bosniak, Bosnian Croat,
and Bosnian Serb majorities; serious human rights abuses continued in
several areas.
There were four deaths in custody, all in the RS, and isolated
instances of political, ethnic, or religious killings continued.
Killings due to bombings and booby traps also continued. Human rights
abuses by the police continued during the year, and serious problems
persisted. Police continued to commit abuses throughout the country,
principally the physical abuse of detainees. Some police in the RS beat
refugees. Police in all areas also used excessive force, or did not
ensure security, to discourage minority resettlement in majority areas.
Members of security forces also abused and physically mistreated other
citizens. Prison conditions continued to be poor in both entities.
In the RS, criminal procedure legislation that was held over from
the prewar Yugoslav period granted police wide latitude to detain
suspects for long periods of time before filing charges. However, there
were fewer cases of arbitrary arrest and detention than in the previous
year. Confusion over the rules for arrest and detention of suspects for
The Hague-based International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) has led in some instances to questionable detentions
in both the Federation and the RS. While its rhetorical support for
cooperation with the ICTY has improved, the RS continues its de facto
refusal to take action against any Serbs indicted by the ICTY.
The judiciary in both entities remained subject to coercive
influence by dominant political parties and by the executive branch. In
many areas, close ties exist between courts of law and the ruling
parties, and those judges who show independence are subject to
intimidation by the authorities. Even when independent decisions are
rendered, local authorities often refuse to carry them out. Authorities
in all areas infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
Authorities and dominant political parties exerted influence over
the media and freedom of speech and of the press was limited to varying
degrees in the different entities. During the year, the High
Representative imposed a new media law for the Federation and a series
of amendments to the media law in the RS. The High Representative also
imposed measures removing criminal penalties for slander and libel.
Academic freedom was restricted. Authorities imposed some limits on
freedom of assembly and association. Religious discrimination remained
a problem. Both governments and private groups continued to restrict
religious practices by minorities in majority areas. Although freedom
of movement continued to improve, some limits remained in practice.
Discrimination against women persists, prostitution is widespread,
and trafficking in women and trafficking in women and girls is a
serious problem. Severe discrimination continues in areas dominated by
one ethnic group, particularly in the treatment of refugees and
displaced persons. The political leadership at all levels, in varying
degrees, in both entities continues to obstruct minority returns. Local
authorities and mobs (in most cases believed to be organized or
approved by local authorities) harassed minority returnees and
violently resisted their return. The destruction of minority-owned
houses continued, particularly in Croat-controlled areas. Marginal
economic conditions and severe discrimination in the educational system
also complicated returns. Enactment of property legislation proceeded
in both entities under pressure from the international community, but
implementation was sporadic and very slow. Mob violence was a serious
problem. Some restrictions on freedom of movement continued. Ethnic
discrimination remains a serious problem.
During the year, there were increased efforts on the part of SFOR
to apprehend perpetrators of wartime atrocities. SFOR's more aggressive
approach of apprehending individuals indicted by the ICTY, which began
in the summer of 1997, resulted during the year in the apprehension of
7 (including 1 killed) indictees out of the 93 publicly indicted by the
Tribunal. This brought the total number of indictees taken into custody
since the Tribunal's inception to 35. At year's end there were 32
persons in ICTY custody awaiting trial or on trial. There was one death
in custody during an attempted arrest of an indictee, and several
deaths in custody during the year. There were 31 public indictees still
at large at year's end. ICTY trials during the year resulted in 2
convictions and no acquittals.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by police; however, there were four
deaths in custody, all in the RS. On August 13 in Kozarac, a Bosniak
returnee shot and killed the leader of an Orthodox religious
association. A Bosniak who recently converted to the Orthodox religion
also was killed in the incident. The shooting stemmed from a dispute
over the property where the shooting occurred. The perpetrator died in
police custody. While his death was judged a suicide by local
authorities, IPTF officials are not convinced of that determination,
and their investigation into the incident was ongoing at year's end.
On March 16, Federation Deputy Interior Minister Jozo Leutar, a
Bosnian Croat, was injured fatally in a car bombing in the center of
Sarajevo on March 16; he died on March 28. Two other persons in the car
also were injured. Ethnic divisions within the police and political
interference from some quarters hampered progress of the investigation,
which remains a contentious political issue. At year's end, no suspects
had been arrested. However, UN officials have stated publicly that
suspects were identified.
In April a Sokolac court in the RS acquitted six Bosniak suspects
who had been tortured by RS police while they were being interrogated
for the August 1998 murder of Pale Public Security Center Deputy Chief
Srdjan Knezevic. The judge found that there was insufficient evidence
to link them to the crime.
In May a trial began against Bosniak Muris Ljubucic for the July
1998 bombing that killed Croat Travnik police officer Anto Vajan. This
was the first indictment and trial since violence against Croat police
officers began in 1998. The trial ended in an acquittal.
Many, if not most, of the perpetrators of killings and other brutal
acts committed in previous years remained unpunished. This includes war
criminals indicted by the ICTY, those responsible for the up to 8,000
killed by the Bosnian Serb Army after the fall of Srebrenica, and those
responsible for up to 13,000 others still missing and presumed killed
as a result of ``ethnic cleansing'' in Bosnia. In April a Sarajevo
court sentenced Goran Vasic to 10 years in prison for war crimes during
the 1992-95 conflict, although he was acquitted in the 1993 murder of
Deputy Prime Minister Hakija Turajlic due to lack of evidence.
During the year, there were increased efforts on the part of SFOR
to apprehend perpetrators of wartime atrocities. SFOR's more aggressive
approach of apprehending individuals indicted by the ICTY, which began
in the summer of 1997, resulted during the year in the apprehension of
7 indictees out of the 93 publicly indicted by the Tribunal. Seven were
detained forcibly, and none turned themselves in to NATO troops. This
brought the total number of indictees taken into custody since the
Tribunal's inception to 35. At year's end there were 32 persons in ICTY
custody awaiting trial or on trial.
In January indicted war criminal Dragon Gagovic was killed during
an attempt by SFOR to detain him (see Section 1.b.). The ICTY indicted
Gagovic in June 1995 for crimes against humanity and for grave breaches
of the laws or customs of war. During SFOR's attempt to arrest him,
Gagovic attempted to ram SFOR soldiers with his car. The soldiers
opened fire and hit Gagovic, who was pronounced dead on arrival at a
nearby hospital. There were several other deaths in custody during the
year. On June 7, Dragan Kulundzija who was charged with murder was
arrested by SFOR. According to the ICTY indictment, Kulundzija
subjected detainees to torture and inhumane treatment while serving as
a shift commander at the Keraterm concentration camp near Prijedor. In
June SFOR troops arrested Radomir Kovac, a subcommander of the RS
military police and a paramilitary leader in Foca, who was charged with
a ``grave breach'' of the 1949 Geneva Convention and crimes including
the rape and enslavement of women. In July SFOR troops arrested
Radoslav Brdjanin who was the Bosnian Serb Vice President during the
war. Austrian police arrested Momir Talic, commander of the RS army, in
Vienna on August 25 during an Organization for Security and Cooperation
in Europe (OSCE) sponsored conference on military ethics. Talic was the
subject of a sealed indictment from the ICTY for war crimes against the
civilian population and ``willful killing'' when he served as the
commander of Serb forces in northwest Bosnia in 1992. Talic was
transferred to The Hague immediately after his arrest. In December SFOR
troops arrested former Bosnian Serb Major General Stanislav Galic. Of
the 31 public indictees still at large at year's end, the majority
reportedly live in the RS (many allegedly in Prijedor and Foca),
although RS authorities made no effort to arrest these indictees. The
ICTY during the year issued 2 convictions and no acquittals. This
brings the total number of convictions to 13 since ICTY's inception. In
October the ICTY acquitted Bosnian Serb Goran Jelisic on genocide
charges; Jelisic previously had pled guilty to 31 counts of war crimes
and crimes against humanity.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances during the year.
The OHR in late 1997 took the lead in forging an agreement among
the Bosniak, Bosnian Croat, and Bosnian Serb commissions for missing
persons to expedite exhumations across the interentity boundary line
(IEBL). The State Commission for Missing Persons reported that the
remains of an estimated 1,199 persons had been recovered in the first 8
months of the year. Of those, 829 were Bosniaks, 120 were Croats, and
240 were Serbs. In addition to those killed in Srebrenica and Zepa, the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that since
1995 it received requests from family members to trace 19,834 persons
missing from the war years: 2,024 of these persons were accounted for
(281 of whom were found alive). The ICRC noted that Serb, Croat, and
Bosniak authorities were in a position to provide more information in
response to its inquiries, particularly those concerning 286 persons,
known to have been detained at one time in connection with the war, who
remained missing.
The International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP) funds the
interentity exhumations process, provides support to families of the
missing, and puts political pressure on Bosnian officials to provide
information on missing persons.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution provides for the right to freedom from
torture and cruel or inhuman treatment or punishment; however, in all
areas of the country, police and prison officials abused and physically
mistreated persons at the time of arrest and during detention. There
were reports of RS police beating refugees during the year, and there
were serious incidents of police beatings and torture in Pale and
Teslic in the RS and in Capljina in the Federation in 1998.
U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) and OSCE monitors heard
reports from Kosovar refugees of numerous human rights violations
perpetrated by RS police. These violations included beatings,
harassment, and extortion of money (see Section 2.d.). Refugees also
reported incidents of RS police confiscating and destroying refugees'
documents.
The military at times used force to prevent the eviction of
soldiers and the return of prewar owners (see Section 2.d.).
Serb police continued to employ excessive force to prevent Bosniak
former residents from returning to, or staying in, RS territory.
Similar patterns of abuse occurred in Croat majority areas. A pattern
of poor police protection and violence against minority communities
continued in several areas. Police in Stolac and in Gacko proved
unwilling or unable to contain the numerous instances of arson designed
to intimidate returnees. In January the IPTF and the U.N. determined
that the Stolac police had failed to respond adequately to over 70
instances of violence against or intimidation of returnees in 1998. In
addition, the IPTF found that the command structure of the Stolac
police department was inadequate and vulnerable to outside influence.
As a result, every member of the Stolac police administration was
placed on a 3-month probation starting February 3. In May the IPTF
determined that surplus officers had been removed, integration of
minority officers had progressed, and security planning for returning
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP's) had improved.
However, the Stolac police force is not yet sufficiently integrated,
effective, or professional. The IPTF concluded that the deficiencies of
the Stolac police force were symptomatic of law enforcement problems
throughout the Herzegovina-Neretva canton.
There also were instances in which police did not act to halt mob
violence. In August the OSCE replaced Drvar mayor Mile Marceta with
Momcilo Bajic after repeated threats against Marceta made it impossible
for him to fulfill his responsibilities. Marceta was supportive of Serb
returns to Drvar. The Drvar police did not make a sufficient effort to
protect Marceta. The OSCE also removed Borivoj Malbasic as president of
the municipal council. In addition, the High Representative, working
with the IPTF, removed the interior minister of Herzeg Bosna canton
after he failed to promote security in the canton and to investigate a
number of violent incidents.
At times some police officers impeded the enforcement of the law by
their unwillingness to execute eviction orders. Government leaders in
both the RS and the Federation often have used a variety of tactics,
including public statements, to inhibit the return of IDP's (see
Section 2.d.).
In April a Sokolac court in the RS acquitted six suspects who had
been tortured by RS police while they were being interrogated for the
August 1998 murder of Pale Public Security Center Deputy Chief Srdjan
Knezevic.
The IPTF made significant progress in its efforts to restructure
and increase professionalism in the police force. The IPTF neared
completion of its programs to provide human dignity and basic skills
training to all Federation and RS police officers. The IPTF continued
its certification of Federation and RS police and decertified officers
on a variety of charges. This process involved written and
psychological examinations. In addition, an IPTF unit in The Hague
checks all names of police officials through the ICTY data base. In
October the RS police academy graduated its second class, with 81 men
and 27 women representing different ethnic backgrounds. At year's end,
the Federation Academy had begun training its fourth graduating class,
containing a majority of ethnic Serb cadets. All Federation canton
governments have agreed to an ethnically mixed police force in
principle. The Federation police include Croat, as well as Bosniak,
officers and generally reflect the appropriate ethnic mix within each
canton. However, the police forces throughout the country generally do
not reflect higher standards of ethnic representation required by
various agreements. In practice, the majority of cantons have parallel
police forces, with separate budgets and chains of command, divided
along ethnic lines. Cooperation between the RS and the Federation
Interior Ministries often is better than cooperation between federation
cantons. The integration of women into the police force is uneven. Of
the 22 academy cadets from Tuzla canton, 21 are women, and more than
half of the cadets in the Federation police academy are women. However,
in Brcko none of the 230 officers are women. In January three Roma
became police officers in the Tuzla-Podrinje canton in the Federation.
IPTF certification of officers proceeded more slowly in the RS, but
there was progress on significant law enforcement reforms. In July
1998, the RS National Assembly passed a law separating the police and
intelligence forces. Police officials were trying to recruit more
minority candidates. RS police and international monitors were in the
process of establishing an IPTF physical presence within RS police
facilities to ensure proper IPTF monitoring of police reforms.
Authorities in the RS adopted a policies and procedures manual that
instituted, among other reforms, a public information bureau and
internal affairs unit. Under these reforms, the RS authorities fired
officers accused of graft or brutality.
In addition to attacks on members of other ethnic groups committed
in both entities, Serbs in the RS threatened members of international
organizations. On January 9, five IPTF monitors were injured, two of
them seriously, in Foca following the death of indicted war criminal
Dragon Gagovic (see Sections 1.a. and 4). The IPTF station was
ransacked and two U.N. vehicles were burned. Gagovic died during an
SFOR attempt to detain him. Later, 100 local residents attacked the
IPTF station, badly damaging the office, equipment, and vehicles.
International activities in Foca were suspended after the attack, and
the IPTF currently has only a limited presence there. The RS Interior
Ministry appointed the Foca chief of police to investigate the
incident. The IPTF is monitoring the investigation.
On March 5, in Ugljevik in the RS, a mob of between 15 and 20
persons attacked 4 SFOR soldiers as they left a restaurant. As the
soldiers ran for their vehicle, on was struck from behind with a club.
When he was attacked a second time, he fired his weapon twice. His
attacker, a local policeman, was pronounced dead on arrival at a local
hospital.
In late March, an SRS and SDS-inspired mob attacked international
offices, including the U.S. embassy branch office in Banja Luka, which
resulted in extensive damage and injury to a security guard. The mob
was protesting the NATO bombing campaign against the FRY. Also in
March, the OSCE reading room in Visegrad was the target of a rocket
attack. There were bombings in or around IPTF stations in Trebinje,
Gradiska, Bijeljina, and Pale. U.N. vehicles were burned in Bijeljina,
Doboj, and Zvornik.
In May two rocket propelled grenades and struck the living quarters
of the Joint Commission Observer (JCO) in Zvornik. There were no
reports of injuries, but two buildings were damaged.
In August the residence of the European Union's Joint Commission
Observer (JCO) in Doboj was attacked and slightly damaged by unknown
perpetrators. No one was injured and local authorities were continuing
their investigation at year's end.
On October 14, an estimated 200 students threw rocks and bottles at
troops from SFOR's Mobile Specialized Unite (MSU) outside the Interior
Ministry building in Mostar. There were no reports of serious injuries.
The attack came after SFOR began raids against municipal offices in
Mostar that were undermining the Dayton Accords and after local radio
broadcasts called on Croat residents to protest SFOR's actions (see
Section 2.a.).
On October 30 and 31, SFOR and IPTF personnel in Zvornik in the RS
were targeted in separate grenade attacks. There were no injuries to
SFOR or IPTF personnel, but one civilian was slightly injured in the
attack.
On October 6, it was reported that two masked men attacked and
stabbed municipal council member Munib Hasanovic in the Srebrenica
municipal building in the RS. RS police opened an investigation into
the attack and the IPTF was monitoring its progress closely, although
there was no progress in the case by year's end.
Individual and societal violence continued to be a problem and
numerous bombings caused injuries. On February 10, a Bosnian Croat
policeman in Travnik was injured by a car bomb, which detonated when he
opened the door of his private vehicle, parked near the Travnik police
station. The IPTF is monitoring the investigation by local authorities,
which continued at year's end. Local police have not concluded their
investigation, but this attack was one of a series of violent incidents
in Central Bosnia canton, an area with a population almost equally
divided between Bosniaks and Croats.
A pattern of deliberate mob violence against Serbs who sought to
return to their prewar homes continued throughout the year, especially
in Travnik, but such incidents decreased in number and severity
compared to 1998. In June eight persons were injured in the RS village
of Tarevci during visits by returning refugees and IDP's. A crowd of
Serbs gathered and threw sticks and stones at the approximately 60
Bosniak returnees there, who reportedly yelled provocative statements
as they drove through town. An unidentified Serb threw a grenade into
the crowd. Local police did not take effective action to improve the
situation or to find those responsible for the attack. In July several
violent incidents occurred in Drvar. Croat residents protested against
further returns after the alleged rape of a Croat woman by a Serb man.
(International law enforcement officials have concluded that this
allegation was untrue.) SFOR increased its presence in the area. On
July 3, an elderly Serb couple was attacked by Croat youths and
injured. On July 4, another violent physical exchange occurred between
Croats and Serbs. In August Bosnian Croat residents of Drvar beat three
elderly Bosnian Serb returnee men. Local police at the scene allowed
the perpetrators to leave but took the victims to the police station to
give statements. On March 20, a Bosniak-owned home was bombed in the
predominantly Croat town of Stolac. In April there were several violent
incidents directed at Bosniak returnees in Borovnica in Prozor-Rama
municipality, including a hand grenade that damaged a mosque and the
arson of homes of several Bosniak returnees. Also in April, Bosniak and
Croat residents traded gunfire between the Croat village of Urici and
the Bosniak village of Memici-Blace. On April 27, unknown persons
planted a bomb that exploded and caused a fire at the home of middle
Bosnia canton former governor Ivan Saric in a village outside of Gornje
Vakuf. No one was injured. An investigation was opened by canton and
Federation antiterrorism officers. In May two Bosniak returnee houses
in the Novi Grad area of the RS were attacked. One was destroyed by an
explosion. Novi Grad continues to be a stronghold of hard-line Serbs.
On September 9, unknown persons attacked the Bosniak village of
Fazlagica Kula near Gacko in the RS with what appeared to be hand
grenades. There were no reported injuries.
Prior to the attack, Bosniak returnees in the village were harassed
with taunts and driveby shootings.
During the year there were several attacks on the homes of Romani
families returning to Bijeljina, including grenades and bombs thrown
into the yards outside their houses.
Conditions in Federation and RS prisons are poor and well below
minimum international standards in terms of overcrowding, hygiene, and
access to medical care. Facilities are antiquated and extremely poor.
International community representatives were given widespread and
for the most part unhindered access to detention facilities and
prisoners in the RS as well as in the Federation.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--There were fewer cases
of arbitrary arrest and detention in both the Federation and the RS
compared with 1998. In prior years, police in both entities enjoyed
great latitude based on Communist-era criminal procedure laws that
permitted them to detain persons for up to 6 months without bringing
formal charges against them. The Federation revised these laws,
removing this power from police, although not from investigative
judges. The detention laws remain in force in the RS.
In one unconfirmed report, RS police in Sokolac detained several
draft-aged male refugees from the FRY at the police station in the
spring.
Human rights NGO's contend that there are cases in which persons
who ostensibly are detained on criminal charges actually are
incarcerated for political reasons. For example, Ibrahim Djedovic, a
parliamentary deputy for the Democratic National Union (DNZ), which the
ruling Bosniak SDA views as a renegade party due to its activities
during the war, was arrested and jailed in May 1997 for war crimes,
after he arrived in Sarajevo to take up his parliamentary seat. The
ICTY investigated Djedovic and decided not to arrest him for his
alleged activities. Most local and international observers believe that
Djedovic was arrested due to his political affiliation and not because
of alleged war crimes. The Sarajevo cantonal court convicted and
sentenced Djedovic to 10 years in 1998. He remained free at the end of
1998 pending appeal of his conviction to the Federation Supreme Court
and currently serves as a DNZ deputy in the Federation House of
Representatives. A retrial in the case was ordered in June.
There were no reports that forced exile generally was used as a
legal punishment. However, in some Croat-dominated areas of the
Federation, local Croat authorities and civilians attempted to expel
returning Serbs. For example on July 3, the Canton 10 interior minister
instructed the local police to expel all returnees who failed to change
their registration from their previous temporary residence to Drvar and
failed to obtain identification cards within 10 days. The action was an
attempt to harass returnees since authorities also hindered returnees
attempts to register (see Section 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Both the Federation and RS
Constitutions provide for an independent judiciary; however, the
executive and the leading political parties continue to influence the
judicial system. Party affiliation and political connections weighed
heavily in the appointment of prosecutors and judges.
The existing judicial hierarchy in the Federation consists of
municipal courts, which have original jurisdiction in most civil and
criminal cases; cantonal courts, which have appellate jurisdiction over
the canton's municipalities; and three central courts (Constitutional,
Supreme, and Human Rights--although the third of these is not
operational). Reforms introduced by the OHR are to allow the Supreme
Court to take immediate jurisdiction as the ``court of first instance''
for crimes including terrorism, organized crime, smuggling, and
intercantonal crime. The Federation Constitution provides for the
appointment of judges by the President, with the concurrence of the
Vice President and the approval of the Assembly, to an initial term of
5 years. Judges may be reappointed following this initial term to serve
until the age of 70.
The RS judicial hierarchy includes a Supreme Court to provide for
the unified enforcement of the law and a Constitutional Court to assure
conformity of laws, regulations, and general enactments with the
Constitution. The RS has both municipal and district courts, with the
district courts having appellate jurisdiction. Judges are appointed and
recalled by the National Assembly and have life tenure.
In June judicial associations in both entities adopted identical
codes of ethics for judges and prosecutors. In August the OHR imposed
laws strengthening the Federation prosecutor's office and protecting
the identity of witnesses in sensitive cases in the Federation. The
international community continued training programs in the Federation
to familiarize judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and the police
with the Federation's newly reformed Criminal Code, which entered into
effect in November 1998. The RS has not yet adopted similar criminal
law reforms. Some NGO's expressed concern over the judicial selection
process in eight federation cantons, especially in Sarajevo and Tuzla.
Legal experts argued that the laws on judicial selection in those two
cantons were inconsistent with the canton and Federation Constitutions.
Both the Federation and RS Constitutions provide for open and
public trials and give the accused the right to legal counsel.
In May the RS Supreme Court ruled that three Bosniaks were
wrongfully convicted of the 1996 murders of four Bosnian Serb
woodcutters in Zvornik. A fourth defendant's conviction was upheld, but
his sentence was reduced from 10 to 6 years. The convictions of three
other defendants were overturned in May during an appeal in the RS
district court in Bijeljina on the grounds that the defendants were
denied the right to choose their own counsel. The original trial of all
seven defendants was marred by pervasive and systematic human rights
abuses. Confessions, coerced by torture, were the primary evidence used
by prosecutors in the first trial. In its decision to release three of
the remaining four defendants, the RS Supreme Court made no mention of
human rights abuses committed by RS authorities during the
investigation, the original trial, or the appeal. No date for a new
trial was set by year's end.
In March the cantonal court in Sarajevo acquitted Bosnian Serb
Miodrag Andric, who was being tried for war crimes, after the court
finally permitted witnesses to testify in a court in Rogatica in the
RS.
Human rights organizations reported that judicial institutions in
both entities were controlled or influenced by the ruling parties.
Courts were often reluctant or unwilling to try cases of human rights
abuse referred to them. A lack of resources and a huge backlog of
unresolved cases provided a convenient excuse for judicial inaction.
Even when the courts rendered a fair judgment, local officials often
refused to implement their decisions. This was especially the case for
those who won decisions mandating eviction of illegal occupants from
their property. In addition, organized crime elements sought to
pressure judges, especially in central Bosnia and Herzeg-Neretva
canton.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides
for the right to ``private and family life, home and correspondence,''
and the right to protection of property; however, authorities in all
areas infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
Since the war, large numbers of citizens have been denied the right
to their property, either privately-held or collectively-owned
property, to which citizens had occupancy rights under the Communist
system. Enactment of property legislation has proceeded in both
entities under pressure from the international community. Registration
of property claims is largely complete in the Federation and underway
in the RS. However, resolution of claims and implementation of
decisions is extremely slow in both entities, and few claims were
resolved during the year. The political leadership at all levels in
both entities continues to obstruct minority returns by delaying needed
reforms and refusing to implement decisions. The situation is
particularly bad outside of Sarajevo canton. In particular, cases
requiring evictions are subject to political manipulation and
obstruction at every phase.
Throughout the country, membership in the political party
affiliated with one's ethnic group was considered the surest way to
obtain, retain, or regain employment, especially in the management of
socially owned enterprises (see Section 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; this right was respected partially
in the Federation and in the western RS, but less so in the eastern RS.
Within the Federation press freedom was restricted more severely in
Croat-majority areas. Some progress was made in establishing
independent media in some Federation cantons and in the RS,
particularly in Banja Luka. The primary restraints on press freedom are
control of the principal media by governing political parties and, in
the case of newspapers, the unwillingness of Governments in either
entity to provide access to kiosk networks under their control. Party-
controlled media--particularly Croatian state radio and television--are
the dominant electronic media and information source in Croat-majority
areas of the Federation. Most media continued to be noticeably biased.
The ruling SDA party largely controls the Dnevni Avaz newspaper,
which enjoys wide distribution in the Federation. Some opposition and
independent newspapers operate in the Bosniak-majority areas of the
Federation and in the RS, principally in Banja Luka. Oslobodjenje and
Vecernje Novine are the leading independent dailies, and Dani and
Slobodna Bosna are the most influential independent magazines in the
Federation. One of the few independent magazines in the RS is Reporter,
a weekly published by a former foreign correspondent of the Belgrade-
based independent Vreme, while Nezavisne Novine is an independent
newspaper published in the western RS. Also in the RS, the Social-
Liberal Party publishes an opposition magazine, Novi Prelom, and the
Social Democratic Party publishes a daily newspaper.
Early in the year, authorities in Gradacac allegedly forced
journalists to submit articles for review to a municipal office before
they could be published.
There is only one high capacity printing facility, Oko, in the
Federation, and it is aligned closely with the newspaper Dnevni Avaz,
which is backed by the ruling Bosniak SDA party. In June Oko delayed
printing an issue of the magazine Dani which included a confidential
Sarajevo internal affairs ministry document about government
connections to criminals and the mafia. The official reason given for
the delay in printing was damage to the printing press. However, in the
meantime the internal affairs office publicly released some of the
information in the article, i.e., a list of 14 criminals known to be
residing in Sarajevo canton. In the RS, the state-owned printing
company Glas Srpski also has a virtual monopoly. According to the
editor in chief of the daily and weekly newspaper Nezavisne Novine,
before the newspaper was to publish an unfavorable article about
indicted war criminal Zeljko Raznjatovic (``Arkan''), he received
threats from Raznjatovic who reportedly was tipped off about the
article by Glas Srpski. The day the article appeared street vendors who
were selling the newspaper allegedly were beaten by Arkan supporters,
who also stole all that day's issues.
It was difficult for independent and opposition media in the RS to
gain access to the government-controlled kiosk distribution system. The
same was true of some areas of the Federation, particularly in Croat-
controlled regions. In addition, the ruling parties exerted economic
pressure by refusing to allow state-owed companies to advertise in the
independent media. Some independent media in the two entities, for
example, Dani and Reporter, assist in the distribution of each other's
publications in their respective entities.
On October 22, a car bomb attack on independent daily Nezavisne
Novine editor in chief Zeljko Kopanja in Banja Luka resulted in the
loss of his legs. The RS Interior Ministry and the Banja Luka police
opened investigations into the case, but there were no results by
year's end.
In May unknown assailants in Mostar allegedly beat two Croatian
journalists from Rijeka and accused them of publishing unfavorable
articles for the Croatian opposition newspaper Novi List about
Herzegovina politics and crime.
The Independent Media Commission (IMC), established by the High
Representative in 1998, is empowered to regulate broadcasting and other
media in the country. In this capacity, the IMC licenses broadcasters,
manages and assigns spectra for broadcasting, sets licensing fees, and
enforces adherence to the code of practice. The IMC has broad authority
to punish violations to the code of practice. It may issue warnings,
impose fines, suspend or terminate licenses, seize equipment, and shut
down operations of any broadcaster or media outlet in violation of the
code of practice. The IMC issued numerous fines for violations of
broadcasting standards by stations in both entities.
In July the High Representative determined that the Governments of
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the constituent entities had failed to take
appropriate action to reform the broadcasting system. As a result, the
High Representative imposed a series of laws and amendments
restructuring the broadcasting system. These decisions provided for the
liquidation of the current broadcaster, Radio Television Bosnia and
Herzegovina (RTV BiH). In its place, OHR established a state-wide
public broadcasting corporation, the Public Broadcasting System of
Bosnia and Herzegovina (PBS BiH), which is to produce and broadcast at
least 1 hour of news programming for radio and television. This
programming is to focus on issues of statewide interest and joint
institutions. The three constituent peoples of the country and other
minority groups are to be represented in the system's administrative
and editorial structures. PBS BiH is to represent the country in all
international broadcast organizations.
The July decision also established Radio Television of the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RTV FBiH) as the public
broadcasting company of the Federation. RTV FBiH is to broadcast on two
stations, one offering primarily Croatian-language programming and one
offering Bosnian-language programming. RTV FBiH is required to provide
programming for other minority groups in their own languages. The High
Representative's decision specifies that ``programming must be based on
truth, must respect human dignity and different opinions and
convictions, and must promote the highest standards of human rights,
peace and social justice, international understanding, protection of
democratic freedoms and environment protection.'' The OHR appointed 14
of the 21 members of the Board of Governors and imposed the remaining 7
members who were to have been chosen by Parliament. As a result, there
was no SDA influence on the Board. However, the SDA tried to obstruct
the Board's activities by pressuring the political and business
interests of board members.
Croat-controlled areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina are covered by
Croatian State Television (HRT). The three HRT channels come into the
country by means of an over-the-border terrestrial broadcasting
satellite, and an extensive rebroadcasting operation managed by the
Mostar-based, Zagreb-controlled Erotel company. HRT's news programs and
editorials frequently criticize the Dayton Accords. A December 1998
decision by the IMC was intended to terminate the direct rebroadcast of
the HRT by requiring that RTV BiH and Croat television broadcasters
establish a Federation television system that meets the needs of all
BiH citizens. However, availability of the HRT and satellite broadcasts
were unchanged at year's end.
Citing the RS government's lack of progress on an acceptable
broadcasting law, in August the High Representative imposed a set of
amendments to the RS broadcasting law. These amendments required Serb
Radio Television (SRT) to change its name to Radio Television of
Republika Srpska (RTRS). The High Representative required RTRS to
comply with the country's broadcasting laws, regulations made by the
IMC or its successor, and the laws of the RS. RTRS is required to
provide timely, unbiased programming for all citizens of the RS.
Finally, the OHR ordered that the RTRS Board of Governors was to
consist of: ``six members representing independent journalism, the
legal profession, the economic sector, the academic community, the
syndicate of the Republika Srpska, and the employees of the RTRS,
taking into account the cultural and linguistic diversity of the
citizens of the Republika Srpska.'' RTRS restructuring is still in
process. For the most part, the RTRS now adheres to IMC standards, a
dramatic improvement over previous years. On November 5, RS Prime
Minister Milorad Dodik and his cabinet decided to remove RTRS director
Andelko Kozomara for his alleged hard-line bias and named Slavisa
Sabljic as acting director. However, only the RTRS Board of Governors,
and not the RS Government, has the right to replace the General
Director.
In April several associations of journalists from both entities
agreed to an OHR-sponsored press code setting out the rights and
responsibilities of journalists. The code includes articles prohibiting
ethnic, gender or other discrimination and encouraging accurate and
objective reporting.
In July the High Representative, citing the failure of the State
and entity level Governments to ensure protection of journalists'
freedom of expression, suspended ``the applicability of imprisonment as
a sanction under the provisions concerning libel and defamation.'' On
September 2, the amendment decriminalizing slander and libel was
published in the official gazette. There were no reports of journalists
being tried for slander since the law was imposed by the OHR. The
possibility of imprisonment for slander and libel was used to threaten
journalists, and authorities apply slander laws selectively to punish
opponents.
For example, in June the municipal court of Sarajevo sentenced the
editor in chief of Slobodna Bosna, Senad Avdic, to 3 months in prison
and 1 year suspended sentence on charges of slander against former
Zenica-Doboj canton minister of the interior, Semsudin Mehmedovic.
However, on August 20, Avdic was acquitted of one charge of slander
against former mayor of Prijedor Sead Cirkin. Avdic faces a total of 12
charges of slander from various articles regarding corruption in the
Federation.
Despite this case, OHR's July decision to impose a law
restructuring the media, if fully implemented, was expected to decrease
political influence in broadcasting, improve objectivity, and generally
increase freedom of expression in Bosnia. To date, the relevant
authorities have not yet fully implemented the restructuring. The PBS
BiH and the RTV FBiH existed only on paper at year's end. However, the
RTRS is broadcasting under its new name.
The international donor-supported television Open Broadcast Network
(OBN) provides independent news and public affairs programming. The
international community launched the OBN to be a cross-entity
broadcaster and source of objective news. OBN can be seen by 80 percent
of the population. The OBN still is working to improve its broadcast
range. However, only a minority of viewers cite the OBN as their key
source of news compared to TV BIH, the HRT, and the RTRS.
Other independent television outlets include TV Hayat, Studio 99,
OBN Banja Luka affiliate Alternative TV (ATV), and Independent TV (NTV)
also out of Banja Luka, and several small TV stations scattered around
the country. These broadcasters were originally municipal stations.
They have not yet been fully privatized, and their legal ownership
status remains unclear.
In May the mayor of Zenica told the editor in chief of RTV Zenica
that he would lose his job unless several other of the station's
editors were dismissed. However, the situation was resolved after the
editors sent a protest letter to the OHR and informed it of their
situation.
In April the OHR endorsed the decision by the IMC to rescind the
license of Kanal S, which is based in Pale. Observers noted the
channels inflammatory broadcasting, prior to the IMC's decision. At
year's end, Kanal S was back on the air after fully complying with all
IMC demands.
In November the IMC ordered the private station Erotel TV to stop
broadcasting. Mostar-based Erotel TV retransmits programs from state-
run Croatian Television and was operating without a license for 2 years
before the IMC's decision.
Radio broadcasting in the Bosniak-majority areas of the
Federation--particularly in Sarajevo, Zenica, and Tuzla--is diverse.
Opposition viewpoints are reflected in the news programs of independent
broadcasters. Independent or opposition radio stations broadcast in the
RS--particularly in Banja Luka and Trebinje. Nezavisni Radio, Nezavisna
Televizija, and Radio Pegas report a wide variety of political
opinions. Local radio stations broadcast in Croat-majority areas, but
they are usually highly nationalistic. Local Croat authorities do not
tolerate opposition viewpoints. Independent Studio 88 was launched in
Mostar in July. The station will cover both sides of the ethnic divide,
the first multi-ethnic broadcaster in Herzegovina.
After the announcement of the Brcko decision in March, angry crowds
destroyed the offices of independent Radio Osvit.
In October the IMC ordered a 90-day closure of a Bosnian Croat
radio station in Mostar after it broadcast incendiary calls for the
city's Croat residents to take to the streets protesting SFOR raids on
municipal offices which were undermining the Dayton Accords. As a
result, some 200 students threw rocks and bottles at SFOR troops (see
Section 1.c.).
While some foreign journalists who represent recognized media were
able to travel freely to most areas of the country, others encountered
difficulties. Local police and security officials in the RS and west
Mostar harassed local and foreign journalists associated with
opposition parties or minority ethnic groups.
Academic freedom was constrained. In the Federation, Serbs and
Croats complained that SDA party members receive special treatment in
appointments and promotions at the University of Sarajevo. The
University of Banja Luka limits its appointments to Serbs. All
institutions suffer from a lack of resources and staff, as well as the
legacy of the Communist period. The University of Mostar remains
divided into eastern and western parts, reflecting the continued ethnic
divide in the city. However, the East Mostar University, despite
persisting reports of ethnic discrimination, has significant ethnic
diversity in its student body and staff. The staff and student body of
West Mostar University is much more homogenous, reflecting, as least in
part, the desire of most Croats to work and study in a Croat-dominated
area.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, authorities imposed
some limits on this right in practice. Opposition political parties
enjoyed greater latitude in staging rallies and campaigning than they
had during the 1996 national elections. However, there were still
instances in which incumbents attempted to use their positions to
hinder the activities of opposition parties.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and a wide
range of social, cultural, and political organizations functioned
without interference; however, authorities imposed some limits on this
right and indirect pressure constrained the activities of some groups.
Although political party membership was not forced, many viewed
membership in the leading party of any given area as the surest way for
residents to obtain, regain, or keep housing and jobs in the state-
owned sector of the economy.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, including private and public worship, and in general,
individuals enjoyed this right in their religious majority areas.
However, the efforts of individuals to worship in areas in which they
are an ethnic/religious minority were restricted, sometimes by societal
violence. Some incidents resulted in damage to religious edifices and
cemeteries.
In July the Human Rights Chamber determined that the Government of
the RS had denied the right of the Muslim community to freedom of
religion by refusing to allow the reconstruction of mosques destroyed
in the war. The Chamber specifically established that the Muslim
community had property rights to 15 sites and that the community had
the right to enclose the properties. According to the decision, the
Government of the RS may not allow other construction on these sites
and must issue any construction permits necessary to rebuild mosques on
seven of the sites (see Section 4). However, there were reports that
local authorities in the RS were obstructing attempts to rebuild
mosques, particularly the Ferhadija Central Mosque in Banja Luka.
In a positive development, Muslims were able to celebrate Bajram,
an important religious holiday, on January 19 in the mosque in Prozor-
Rama for the first time since the war. About 200 Muslims attended the
service without incident. The local Bosnian Croat police force provided
security.
Catholic priests are able to hold Mass in the RS without incident.
In the case of a large Mass, Catholic Church officials work with RS
local officials to obtain necessary permits.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for ``the
right to liberty of movement and residence'' and freedom of movement,
including across the IEBL, continued to improve; however, some limits
remained in practice. The IPTF and SFOR completed the dismantling of
all permanent police checkpoints, greatly enhancing freedom of
movement. However, for most minorities movement across the IEBL and
into areas dominated by other ethnic groups remained somewhat limited
and cautious in practice. The eastern RS remained under hard-line
control and unwelcoming to a minority presence.
Freedom of movement improved significantly with the introduction of
universal license plates in 1998. The new plates do not identify the
vehicles as being registered in predominantly Bosniak, Bosnian Serb, or
Bosnian Croat areas. The U.N. Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(UNMIBH) reported that in the first week after the inauguration of the
new plates, about 4,000 vehicles crossed the IEBL.
Statistics on refugee returns remained difficult to obtain. Between
the end of the war and the end of the year, 350,000 persons who left
the country had returned. More than 160,000 returned from Germany
alone, due to the German Government's policy of actively pressuring
refugees to return to Bosnia. Most of those returning from Europe were
unable to return to their prewar homes. Efforts by hard-line Croats to
resettle returning refugees to consolidate the results of ethnic
cleansing have ceased for the most part. Although the return figures
are much less exact for those returning from other places within the
country, the UNHCR estimated that approximately 296,000 IDP's returned
to their prewar homes between the end of the war and the end of the
year. While different refugee organizations provide different estimates
on the numbers of minority returns, they all agree that the rate of
minority returns in 1999 was probably twice that of 1998.
The UNHCR ``open cities'' initiative, begun in 1997, linked
economic assistance to cooperation on minority return (positive
conditionality) and helped the UNHCR's effort to break down the
influence of ethnic separatists.
Several factors prevented an even larger number of returns,
including the hard-line obstruction of implementation of property
legislation, political pressure to remain displaced in order to
increase ethnic homogeneity of the population in a specific area, the
lack of an ethnically neutral curriculum in public schools, and
insecurity caused by the NATO campaign in Kosovo (see Section 5).
The February 1998 Sarajevo Declaration was intended to showcase
Sarajevo as a model city in terms of tolerance. The declaration was to
provide for improvements in areas that hindered return: Legislation,
housing, security and public order, employment, and education, with a
goal of 20,000 minority returns for the canton during 1998. The level
of returns so far has been disappointing. By year's end, the UNHCR
announced that nearly 20,000 minority returns had occurred in Sarajevo
canton after nearly 2 years. Although the rate of evictions in Sarajevo
was increasing at year's end, the processing of property claims and
evictions was still very slow.
During 1998 the Federation army unlawfully took control of 4,000
former Yugoslav military (JNA) apartments that had been abandoned and
repaired by a Dutch company. Prewar residents continue to wait to
return to these, while authorities encourage occupants to start the
purchasing process. After inadequate action by local authorities,
several of these cases were brought before the Human Rights Chamber. No
returns have taken place to former JNA apartments. The military has
attempted to evict legal occupants. In some cases the military
prevented soldiers from being evicted, at times using force, and
stopped prewar owners from reoccupying their apartments.
The continued influence of ethnic separatists in positions of
authority also hindered minority returns. Much of Croat-controlled
Herzegovina and the eastern RS remained resistant to minority returns.
Displaced persons living in those areas, even those who privately
indicated interest in returning to their prewar homes, frequently were
pressured to remain displaced, while those who wished to return were
discouraged, often through the use of violence (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.). The increased number of ethnically integrated police forces
helped improve the climate for return, but security in general remained
inadequate in many areas.
In May a group of Serbs in Kotor Varos blocked the road to prevent
Bosniaks from returning to the town. Earlier the municipal assembly
voted unanimously against the return of Bosniaks.
The continued depressed state of the economy throughout the country
and the consequent lack of employment opportunities for returnees
remained a serious obstacle to a significant number of returns. As a
result, most minority returnees were elderly. This presented a new
burden for receiving municipalities. Younger minority group members,
who depend on adequate wages from employment to support families,
generally remained displaced, especially in cases where they had
managed over the past 6 years to find work.
On April 14, the OHR cancelled the permanent occupancy rights of
individuals who acquired apartments during and immediately following
the war in both entities. These individuals can remain temporary
occupants of their apartments only until the prewar occupant applies to
return to that apartment. Previously, permanent occupancy rights
blocked effectively the return of minorities who left during or
immediately after the war, since they were granted to persons who
occupied these ``abandoned'' residences.
In June the mayor of Berkovici in the RS unsuccessfully attempted
to impede the return of 60 Bosniaks by declaring their return illegal.
Local government officials continue to obstruct minority returns to
Drvar. On July 3, the canton 10 interior minister instructed the local
police to expel all returnees who failed to change their registration
from their previous temporary residence to Drvar and failed to obtain
identification cards within 10 days. The action was an attempt to
harass returnees since authorities also hindered returnees' attempts to
register. Residents without identification cards are not entitled to
social benefits and their freedom of movement can be restricted.
Expulsion also is illegal; the maximum legal penalty for failure to get
an identification card is a fine. The OHR recommended that Serb returns
to Drvar be slowed temporarily as a result of this incident.
Government leaders in both the RS and the Federation often have
used a variety of tactics, including public statements, to inhibit the
return of IDP's (see Section 1.c.).
Officially, the Government grants asylum and refugee status in
accordance with international standards. At times the Government
cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. In October 1998, the Bosnian Council of Ministers
issued an instruction on temporary admission of FRY refugees from the
province of Kosovo. This entitled needy refugees from these areas to
free accommodation, food, primary medical care, and education. In May
after the NATO campaign began against the FRY, the Council of Ministers
extended these protections to refugees arriving from all parts of the
FRY.
Some 13,000 Kosovar Albanians entered the country in the 12 months
before the NATO air campaign began on March 24. After March 24, 8,700
additional Kosovar Albanians entered the country, along with 25,000
Muslims from the Sandzak region of Serbia. Additionally, about 35,000
other refugees from Serbia and the FRY entered the country after March,
of whom the vast majority were Serbs formerly displaced from Croatia
and Bosnia during the 1991-95 war. As of October 1, roughly 9,000
Kosovar Albanians, 11,000 Sandzakis, and 22,000 of these Serbs were
estimated to remain in the country as refugees. The Kosovar Albanians
and the Sandzakis are in the Federation and the Serbs are in the RS.
Nearly all are in private accommodations.
UNHCR and OSCE monitors heard reports from refugees of numerous
human rights violations perpetrated by RS police. These violations
included harassment, beatings, and extortion of money (see Section
1.c.). Refugees also reported incidents of RS police confiscating and
destroying refugees' documents. There were no reports of the forced
return of persons to a place where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Even though a permanent election law is not yet in place, the
Dayton Accords commit the parties to ``ensure that conditions exist for
the organization of free and fair elections, in particular a
politically neutral environment'' and to ensure the right to ``vote in
secret without fear or intimidation.'' These rights were respected in
the national and entity elections in 1998, which were the most fair and
pluralistic since the Dayton Accords were signed. Voter turnout was
over 70 percent with over 83 political parties, independent candidates,
coalitions, and alliances competing for office. The OSCE released a
draft of the election law in December that would transfer
responsibilities for running elections to the Government.
However, continued party control of the media and security
apparatus precluded full citizen participation without intimidation,
especially in Bosnian Croat areas and parts of the RS. To varying
degrees, all major parties seek to exclude other parties in areas they
control. This was especially true in areas controlled by the SDS or the
HDZ. However, observers believe that recent changes to the media law in
the RS and the new media law in the Federation may improve the
situation somewhat (see Section 2.a.).
The 1998 elections were relatively free and fair, but resulted in
the election of a hard-line SRS President, Nikola Poplasen. Poplasen
refused to nominate a candidate for prime minister with sufficient
support in the RS Assembly to form a government, including the
candidate with the most support, current Prime Minister Milorad Dodik.
This episode eventually sparked a confrontation with the High
Representative in which Poplasen was removed from office on March 5. In
announcing the dismissal, then High Representative Carlos Westendorp
said that Poplasen had ``acted against democratic principles and abused
the authority of the Office of President by refusing to consult the
parties and coalitions represented by the National Assembly in order to
nominate the prime minister.'' Immediately after Poplasen's dismissal,
Vice President Sarovic refused to take his place because Sarovic did
not accept the legitimacy of the High Representative's decision. At
year's end, Sarovic was attempting to assume the powers of the
Presidency, but was told by the High Representative that this would not
be permitted.
Implementation of the 1998 elections at the national and entity
levels was far less difficult than implementation of municipal election
results. The 1997 municipal election results were implemented in June
when the Srebrenica municipal assembly met and approved a government.
The government was certified by the OSCE.
Also on March 5, but unrelated to Poplasen's dismissal, Roberts B.
Owen, arbitrator for the Brcko Arbitral Tribunal, announced a final
award, whereby the entire prewar Brcko municipality was to become a
``self-governing neutral district,'' which would belong to both
entities. The award delegates to the district's internationally
appointed supervisor the responsibility for deciding when the district
would begin to govern itself under a new district statute. Until then
the supervisor retained ultimate authority over the district. The final
disposition of this region was a highly sensitive issue, since the
region of Brcko connects the eastern and western sections of the RS. A
democratically-elected, multiethnic local government is to administer
the district under the direct oversight of the Brcko supervisor. Until
new laws are issued or existing laws adapted, the supervisor retains
discretion as to which laws, Federation or RS, are to apply in Brcko. A
new district statute was issued by the supervisor on December 7, and a
district-wide multiethnic police force was to be established officially
in January 2000. Demilitarization of the Brcko district was underway
and scheduled to be completed by the end of February 2000. On August
18, the Brcko Tribunal issued an annex to the final award, clarifying
implementation of the award. In particular, it established the
citizenship status of district residents and confirmed the right of
transit by military forces of both entities. It also directed the
supervisor to address such issues as taxation, law enforcement,
district management, and composition of the district assembly.
Women generally were underrepresented in government and politics,
although a few women, such as the former President of the RS, have
occupied prominent positions. In the three legislatures, women were
underrepresented seriously. To address this concern, the OSCE election
rules required parties to include no fewer than 3 members of each
gender among the top 10 names on their candidate lists. In the state-
level House of Representatives (lower house), 12 of 42 deputies are
women. There are no women in the state-level House of Peoples (upper
house), whose representatives are appointed by the entity legislatures.
In the Federation legislature, 21 of 140 deputies in the House of
Representatives are women, and 7 of 72 deputies in the House of Peoples
are women. In the RS unicameral legislature, 18 of 83 deputies are
women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The authorities generally permitted outside investigations of
alleged human rights violations. International and local NGO's involved
in human rights appear to operate somewhat freely. The OHR reports that
foreign government and NGO human rights monitors were able to travel
without restriction in all areas of the country. International
community representatives were given widespread and for the most part
unhindered access to detention facilities and prisoners in the RS as
well as in the Federation.
While monitors enjoyed relative freedom to investigate human rights
abuses, they were rarely successful in persuading the authorities in
all regions to respond to their recommendations. Monitors'
interventions often met with delays or outright refusal.
The caseload of the Human Rights Chamber and the Office of Human
Rights Ombudsperson, two institutions created under Annex 6 of the
Dayton Accords, expanded during the year. Decisions of the Chamber are
final and cannot be appealed to the Constitutional Court. During the
year, the Chamber's caseload increased to 3,449 registered cases; and
the Chamber issued 294 final case decisions. While governmental
cooperation with the Chamber is still weak, there was noticeable
improvement during the year. Both Federation and RS officials complied
with several decisions, including reinstating returning residents to
Yugoslav National Army apartments (JNA) and payment of compensation
awards. These successes were the result of OHR cooperation in
monitoring authorities' responses and coordinating intervention in
cases in which the authorities failed to meet their obligations to
cooperate.
Cooperation with the ICTY in The Hague is a key factor in the
implementation of the Dayton Accords and the establishment of respect
for human rights. In 1998 RS Prime Minister Dodik altered the RS policy
of defiance of the Tribunal and the Dayton Accords by instructing his
officials to cooperate with the ICTY. He also offered office space in
Banja Luka to the ICTY. His actions helped to reduce the behind-the-
scenes political influence of former wartime RS President Radovan
Karadzic and his SDS allies. During the year, RS authorities
facilitated the ICTY's investigation in Srebrenica. However, a majority
of the 31 ICTY public indictees who remain at large reportedly live in
the RS, some allegedly in Prijedor and Foca. RS authorities made no
effort to arrest these indictees.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The parties agreed in the Dayton Accords to reject discrimination
on such grounds as sex, race, color, language, religion, political or
other opinion, national or social origin, or association with a
national minority. Nevertheless, there were many cases of
discrimination.
Women.--Accurate statistics on violence against women, including
spousal abuse and rape, are not available. Throughout the country, rape
and violent abuse are considered criminal offenses. However, domestic
violence usually was not reported to the authorities, and a sense of
shame reportedly prevents some victims of rape from coming forward to
complain to authorities. There are laws that prohibit rape in both the
Federation and the RS. Spousal rape and spousal abuse are also illegal
in the Federation. There are no available estimates of the extent of
violence against women.
Trafficking in women from the former Soviet Union for purposes of
forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
It is illegal to run a brothel in Bosnia, but local police have
focused primarily on women engaged in prostitution rather than
procurers or those managing the brothels. As a result, women who have
been coerced or forced into prostitution have little recourse.
Authorities generally treat prostitution as a minor misdemeanor
regarding the woman involved, but employers and customers do not face
charges. Women convicted of prostitution can be fined, imprisoned for
60 days, or deported. It is estimated that there are some 700 brothels
in the RS and some 300 in the Federation, where some 15,000 prostitutes
work. Police officials in Brcko have been removed from office for
involvement in prostitution.
There is little legal or social discrimination against women, and
women hold a few of the most responsible positions in society, serving
as judges, doctors, and professors. However, a male-dominated society
prevails in both entities, particularly in rural areas, with few women
in positions of real economic power or political power.
Women have been discriminated against in the workplace in favor of
demobilized soldiers. Anecdotal evidence indicates that women and men
receive equal pay at socially owned enterprises but not necessarily at
private businesses. Women are entitled to 12 months' maternity leave
and to work no more than 4 hours per day until a child is 3 years old.
However, women in all parts of the country encounter problems with
regard to the nonpayment of maternity leave allowances and the
unwarranted dismissal of pregnant women and new mothers. The
International Human Rights Law Group and local NGO's organized seminars
and information campaigns to raise awareness of the issue, and the
Tuzla cantonal assembly passed a resolution to pay women all maternity
leave allowance debts since 1998. A woman with underage children cannot
be forced to do shift work.
Children.--The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child is
incorporated by reference in the Dayton Accords and has the effect of
law in both entities. The end of the fighting brought a major
improvement in the human rights of children. During the war nearly
17,000 children were killed, 35,000 wounded, and over 1,800 permanently
disabled.
Children suffer from an extreme paucity of social services.
Disabled children lack sufficient care and educational opportunities.
Education is compulsory through the age of 15 in both the Federation
and the RS. The most serious issue is the ethnic division of the
education system. Students in minority areas frequently face a hostile
environment in schools that do not provide an ethnically neutral
setting. At times minority children are barred from attending school at
all. Local education officials excuse these abuses by claiming that
minority children should have their own schools and curricula.
Obstruction by politicians and government officials has slowed
international efforts to remove discriminatory material from textbooks
and enact other needed reforms.
In February the International Human Rights Law Group issued a
report finding that segregation and discrimination were entrenched in
Bosnian schools, particularly in religious education. For example, in
Sarajevo only Muslim religion classes were offered in public schools,
which denied children of other faiths the practical opportunity to
study their own religious traditions in school. Since the beginning of
the school year, ethnic divisions in schools have become more apparent.
In an effort to block returns to the area, municipal officials in
Capljina, Stolac, and Bugojno refused to allocate space in public
schools to allow minority children to be taught under their own
curriculum, in direct defiance of a directive of the High
Representative. There is concern among the international community that
this situation may further harden existing prejudices and ethnic
hatreds.
There was no societal pattern of abuse against children.
Nonetheless, they continue to suffer disproportionately from the
societal stress of the postwar era. Trafficking in girls for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
People With Disabilities.--The Federation Government is required by
law to assist disabled persons to find employment and to protect them
against discrimination. In the RS discrimination against the disabled
also is prohibited by law. Currently there are few jobs available, and
thousands of newly disabled victims entered the job market after the
war. The Government has limited resources to address the special needs
of the disabled. There are no legal provisions mandating that buildings
be made accessible to the physically disabled. There are a number of
international NGO's that assist the disabled in the country.
Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are identified
closely in the country. The Interreligion Council, established in 1997
and composed of the main leaders of the country's four major religious
communities--Muslim, Serbian Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Jewish--
continued its efforts to promote national reconciliation. The OSCE and
the OHR facilitated many interfaith meetings at the local level as
well.
However, throughout the country, religious minorities felt pressure
and were intimidated by the ethnic/religious majority.
Catholic priests have frequently been able to hold Mass in the RS
without incident. In the case of a large Mass, Catholic officials work
with RS local officials to obtain necessary permits. On December 13, a
group of young men attacked a group of Catholic priests led by
Archbishop Vinko Cardinal Pulic on their way to celebrate Mass in
Derventa. One member of Pulic's party was injured, but the service took
place as planned. There was no known government involvement in this
attack. A demonstration delaying Pulic's departure from the same church
occurred in 1998.
None of the mosques in the RS destroyed during the war have been
rebuilt or repaired, despite requests from the Muslim community for
reconstruction (see Section 2.c.). Religious minorities throughout the
country at times faced interference from the authorities in their right
to worship freely. However, Catholic priests reported that they were
able now to conduct masses in the RS with little or no problems.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Claimed ``ethnic differences''
were used to justify the war and remain a powerful political force in
the country. Although some politicians still support the concepts of a
``Greater Serbia'' and a ``Greater Croatia,'' mixed communities exist
peacefully in a growing number of areas, including Sarajevo and Tuzla.
The SDS, HDZ, and to a lesser extent the primarily Bosniak SDA, sought
to manipulate the movement of persons and the access to housing and
social services that they control to ensure that the ethnic groups with
which they are associated consolidate their position in their
respective geographic regions. Some hard-line local authorities in the
eastern RS sought to keep information regarding the right to return and
conditions in return sites from reaching displaced persons in their
areas, so as to dissuade them from attempting to return to their former
homes.
In December 1998, the RS passed new property legislation
establishing a claims process at the municipal level. The law went into
effect when it was published in the official gazette on February 10. On
April 13, the High Representative imposed several amendments and
indicated that more were needed to make the law effective. The High
Representative also imposed a 6-month extension of the June 15 deadline
to file claims on socially-owned apartments, and on December 10 issued
a further extension of 4 months. The new deadline was set for April 19,
2000. In addition, the OHR issued on October 27 a series of decrees
amending a number of property laws in both entities to provide all
citizens just and equal protection of their property rights, which is
considered essential in order for IDP's to return home.
Despite hopeful signs in some areas, harassment and discrimination
against minorities continue throughout the country, often centering on
property disputes. These problems include desecration of graves, damage
to houses of worship, throwing explosive devices into residential
areas, harassment, dismissal from work, threats, assaults, and, in some
cases, killings (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
According to the 1997 report of the Federation Human Rights
Ombudsman, ``Equality before the law is not observed in the everyday
practice of state authorities that decide on the rights and obligations
of the citizens.''
Bosnian Serb and Croat politicians seek to increase the ethnic
homogeneity of the population in areas they control by discouraging
IDP's of their own ethnicity from returning to their prewar homes if
they would be in the minority there. Hard-liners also encourage members
of their groups currently living in areas where they are minorities to
move to areas where their ethnic group is the majority. For example,
hard-line Bosnian Croats have discouraged Croat returns to central
Bosnia and have actively recruited Croats still living there to
resettle in Herzegovina. This effort sparked an open dispute among
Bosnian Croats, and the Catholic Bishop of Banja Luka publicly
criticized the practice.
Although the new RS Government is on record as supporting the right
to return, it continues to obstruct returns at all levels. Bosniak
authorities appear tacitly to support some Bosniak resettlement
efforts, including resettlement of returnees, in ``strategic'' areas of
the Federation where Bosniaks are in the minority.
In some cases, opponents of refugee returns employed violence,
including sporadic house burnings, and orchestrated demonstrations in
an effort to intimidate returnees. While incidents of violence have
decreased due to improved security and freedom of movement, other forms
of discrimination have not. In particular, discrimination in employment
and education are now key obstacles to sustainable returns. Widespread
firing of ethnic minorities during and after the war has not been
reversed in many cases. Recently there have been more cases of
employment discrimination based on political affiliation.
Throughout the country, membership in the political party
affiliated with one's ethnic group was considered the surest way to
obtain, retain, or regain employment, especially in the management of
socially owned enterprises. Membership was also influential in
obtaining or keeping housing (see Section 2.b.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Federation and RS Constitutions
provide for the right of workers to form and join labor unions. Both
the Federation and the RS have a union organization. There are informal
links between the two unions, and there have been some very preliminary
and initial steps towards merging the two under one banner. Workers in
the RS or the Federation are not prohibited from joining the union in
the entity where they are a minority. However, the membership in the RS
is overwhelmingly Serb and the membership in the Federation is
overwhelmingly Bosniak. Bosnian Croats have informal labor
organizations in areas where they are the dominant ethnic group, but
generally are represented by the federation union.
Unions have the right to strike, but there were few strikes during
the year because of the economic devastation and joblessness caused by
the war throughout much of the Federation. However, on October 25, some
8,000 demonstrators attended a labor rally in Sarajevo to protest
nonpayment of salaries and pensions in addition to other social issues.
Some of the protest's organizers claimed that government officials and
managers of state firms threatened workers with the loss of their jobs
if they attended the rally.
Unions may affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There was
little collective bargaining in labor-management negotiations during
the year. In both the RS and the Federation workers have the right to
collective bargaining, and the law prohibits antiunion discrimination.
There were no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits servitude or forced labor, including that performed by
children; however, women and girls were trafficked for the purpose of
forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.). Despite rumors that work camps
exist in isolated areas, investigations have not turned up any
corroborating evidence.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children in the
Federation and in the RS was 16 years. Children sometimes assisted
their families with farm work and odd jobs. Children are covered under
the Constitution's prohibition of servitude or forced labor, and such
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage in the
Federation was $46 (80 KM). In the RS, the monthly minimum wage was $34
(60 KM). The minimum wages were insufficient to provide for a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. Many workers still had
claims outstanding for salaries earned during the war but were being
paid in full only for current work. Similarly, many pensioners had
outstanding claims.
There are no legal limits on the number of hours in the workweek.
Overtime pay is not required by law.
In March the RS Government began paying most government salaries
and pensions in convertible marks (KM). However, private employers
continue to pay salaries in Yugoslav dinars. This allows employers to
purchase dinars at the black market rate but pay employees at the much
lower official rate, usually pocketing the difference. As a result,
some workers in the RS suffer a significant reduction in their
purchasing power.
Due to the high level of taxes levied on employers, many persons
are forced to work outside the government benefits and tax system. The
Government levies taxes equaling up to 80 percent of an employee's
salary to pay for health and pension benefits. Unfortunately many
employees do not receive these benefits even if their employers do
contribute to their government plans.
Occupational safety and health regulations generally were ignored
because of the demands and constraints imposed by an economy devastated
by war. Neither entity has completed passage of new laws to enforce
international worker rights standards.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons, and trafficking in women from the
former Soviet Union for the purpose of forced prostitution is a serious
problem. The country is an origin, transit, and destination point for
women and girls trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution. A
significant number of women are manipulated or coerced into situations
in which they work in brothels in conditions close to slavery. The
country is extremely vulnerable to trafficking in persons, since it has
weak laws, border controls are almost nonexistant, and the police are
easily bribed. As many as 9,000 trafficked women may be working in the
country.
It is illegal to run a brothel, but local police have focused
primarily on women engaged in prostitution rather than procurers or
those managing the brothels. As a result, women who have been coerced
or forced into prostitution have little recourse. Authorities generally
treat prostitution as a minor misdemeanor against the woman involved,
but employers and customers do not face charges. Women convicted of
prostitution can be fined, imprisoned for 60 days, or deported. In the
fall, the OHR issued directives governing police raids on brothels to
ensure that trafficked women found were provided assistance. The
country's deportation laws permit local police to release trafficked
individuals in neighboring jurisdictions or across the border in
Croatia. Police in Bihac, Gradacac, and Tuzla have broken up
trafficking rings in recent years and deported the women. In one case
of deportation, after a cantonal court in Zenica in the Federation
ordered the removal of six prostitutes from the canton, local police
took them to Doboj in the RS. Reportedly they all later appeared for
sale at the Arizona Market in Ravne Brcko. It is estimated that there
are some 700 brothels in the RS and some 300 in the Federation, where
some 15,000 prostitutes work. Brothel operators reportedly earn $50
(100 DM) per hour per woman; while in some cases women reportedly
receive as little as $13 (25 DM) per month for personal expenses and
are forced to find other money (often through begging) for essentials,
including condoms. Other prostitutes reportedly earn $100 (200 DM) per
month. Police throughout the Federation have arrested and deported
Russian and Ukrainian women working as prostitutes. Organized crime
elements control the trafficking business. Police officials in Brcko
have been removed from office for involvement in prostitution, and
there are allegations that police officers in other cities also may be
involved.
Women are trafficked to the country from other East European
countries and countries of the former Soviet Union, including the
countries of Central Asia. The majority of trafficked women come from
Ukraine, but also from Romania, Moldova, Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan. The main route into the country for trafficked women was
from the FRY. Some are brought in by traffickers specifically to work
in the country's brothels. Others for a variety of reasons are stranded
or abandoned by traffickers en route to other countries. Women
trafficked to the country usually are promised jobs as secretaries,
waitresses, or dancers in Western countries and wages of $1,500 (3,000
DM) per month. Some women often are trafficked to Croatia to work as
prostitutes there or then trafficked to other countries. Others are
sold to middlemen or to brothel operators in the country, often at the
Arizona Market in Ravne Brcko. The price is usually $1,500 (3,000 DM)
per woman, and women often are expected to repay their ``owners'' this
amount out of their ``share'' of their earnings.
The Government has done little to combat the problem of
trafficking. However, various international organizations and NGO's,
both local and foreign, are addressing the issue. The Swedish NGO
Kvinna Till Kvinna provides financial assistance to a shelter that
houses trafficked women while they await return to their countries of
origin. During the year, 50 trafficked women were repatriated from the
country with NGO assistance.
The women received airline tickets home and $150 to assist them
with reintegration into their home country. The returnees also are
urged to contact the local Organization for International Migration
offices in their home country for follow-up counseling. The IPTF works
with local police forces to free trafficked persons and to crack down
on traffickers. There were two arrests of traffickers to date, in
Bijeljina and Brcko.
______
BULGARIA
Bulgaria is a parliamentary republic ruled by a democratically
elected government. President Petar Stoyanov of the Union of Democratic
Forces (UDF) began a 5-year term of office in January 1997 following
his election in late 1996. UDF leader Ivan Kostov currently serves as
Prime Minister. The judiciary is independent but suffers from
corruption and continues to struggle with structural and staffing
problems.
Most internal security services are the responsibility of the
Ministry of the Interior, including the Central Service for Combating
Organized Crime, the National Security Service (civilian intelligence),
internal security troops, border guards, and special forces. Although
government control over the police is improving, it still is not
sufficient to ensure full accountability. The Special Investigative
Service (SIS), reduced in size by a recent reorganization, is a
judicial branch agency and therefore not under direct government
control. Some members of the police committed serious human rights
abuses.
The post-Communist transition economy continued to be heavily
dependent on state enterprises, many of them unprofitable, although the
growing private sector now accounts for over 60 percent of economic
activity. Most persons are employed in the industrial and service
sectors; key industries include food processing, chemical and oil
processing, metallurgy, and energy. Principal exports are agricultural
products, cigarettes and tobacco, chemicals, and metal products.
Following a severe financial, economic, and political crisis in 1996
and early 1997, a reformist government introduced a successful
macroeconomic stabilization program. The program quickly stabilized the
economy and cut the triple digit inflation of 1996-97 to less than 1
percent in 1998. Inflation grew to 6.2 percent in 1999. The economy
grew by 3.5 percent in 1998 and by 2.5 percent in 1999. The Government
has placed a great deal of emphasis on attracting foreign investment
and has promised far-reaching structural reforms, although the
privatization process has not moved forward as quickly as hoped. The
annual per capita gross domestic product of $1,500 provides a
relatively low standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, problems remained in some areas, while there were
improvements in a few others. Police used questionable lethal force
against five suspects. Security forces beat suspects and inmates and
often arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Reforms designed to
increase accountability have improved the Government's control over the
security forces; however, its control remains incomplete. Problems of
accountability persist and inhibit government attempts to end police
abuses. Conditions in some prisons were harsh, and pretrial detention
often is prolonged, although this situation improved somewhat during
the year. The judiciary is underpaid, understaffed, and has a heavy
case backlog; corruption is a serious problem. The Government infringed
on citizens' privacy rights. There were reports of police abuse of
journalists. Constitutional restrictions on political parties formed on
ethnic, racial, or religious lines effectively limit participation for
some groups. Police, local government authorities, and private citizens
continued to obstruct the activities of some nontraditional religious
groups, although there was some improvement in their treatment by
central government authorities. Violence and discrimination against
women remained serious problems. Discrimination against the disabled
and religious minorities is a problem. Discrimination and societal
violence against Roma were serious problems, resulting in two deaths.
Because of a lack of funds, the social service system did not assist
homeless and other vulnerable children adequately, notably Romani
children. Security forces harassed, physically abused, and arbitrarily
arrested and detained Romani street children. Child labor was a
problem. Trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, in five cases, police officers
used questionable lethal force against citizens, one of whom was a
member of the Romani minority. There was one report of a death in
custody.
The Ministry of Interior Act regarding the use of firearms by law
enforcement officials permits them to use firearms to apprehend persons
committing crimes or who have committed crimes, even if the crimes are
only minor. Law enforcement officers also may use firearms to stop the
escape of a person who has been arrested for any crime.
On January 29, Tencho Vasev was shot and killed by border police
near Novo Selo while trying to cross the Bulgarian-Greek border
illegally. An investigation into the case was completed on May 28. On
June 14, the Military Prosecutor's office prepared an indictment
against the officer responsible for the shooting. The case was ongoing
at year's end.
On May 13, Nikolai Filipov was shot and killed by police officers
during an attempted car theft near Pravets. Filipov died from a gunshot
wound to the head. The use of lethal force in this instance was ruled
legal self defense by the Military Prosecutor's office after an
investigation.
On June 6, a 28-year-old criminal suspect, Gancho Vuchkov, was shot
and killed while trying to escape police in Sofia. Police were carrying
out a warrant for Vuchkov's arrest in connection with a series of car
thefts. Following a car chase and an exchange of gunfire with police,
Vuchkov was shot in the temple. A relative of Vuchkov who reportedly
arrived on the scene soon after the shooting and saw the body, alleges
that Vuchkov was killed after police apprehended him and not while in
pursuit. The case was under investigation at year's end.
On June 14, Oleg Georgiev was shot and killed by border police
during an attempt to cross the border near the town of Kulata in the
southwest.
On September 21, Kostadin Sherbetov was found dead in his cell in a
district police station in Sofia. Earlier that day, guards from a
private security firm that protects schools in Sofia detained Sherbetov
on suspicion of pedophilia and turned him over to police. An ambulance
was called to the police station, and doctors established that
Sherbetov had died. According to his forensic medical certificate, he
suffered from several broken ribs and numerous bruises. The chief
secretary of the Ministry of Interior admitted that Sherbetov was a
victim of violence but contended that the policemen and guards deny any
involvement in the abuse. The Military Prosecutor's Office launched a
preliminary investigation into four police officers.
The investigation into the 1998 shooting death case of Tsvetan
Kovatchev was reopened in June after legal wrangling resulted in a
repeal of the Military Prosecution's initial ruling in January that the
use of force was justified.
In July charges were brought against the police officer involved in
the 1998 fatal shooting of Yordan Yankov. The police officer was
sentenced to a term of 15 years in prison and fined approximately
$6,000 (Lev 11,000) to be paid to Yankov's family. An appeal to reduce
the sentence is likely.
The 1998 case of Staniela Bugova was on appeal following sentencing
in the fall of the police officer involved in the shooting to 2\1/2\
years. The sentence was upheld in one appeal; this was the last
opportunity for appeal in the case.
There were no further developments in the 1997 beating death case
of Mincho Simeonov Surtmachev. The case was still under appeal at
year's end. Pending appeal, the two police officers involved remain in
custody serving sentences of 7 years and 4 years. The case also
resulted in the firing of the chief of the Dobrech police precinct.
Two 1997 cases were dismissed. The Military Prosecutor's office
dismissed the Georgi Biandov case in 1998 and ruled that police acted
within their authority. The 1997 death of Elin Karamanov also was
dismissed by the Military Prosecutor's office in June 1997, and the
dismissal was confirmed on review by the Chief Military Prosecutor in
September 1997 on the grounds that the use of lethal force was legal.
The Military Prosecutor's office sentenced in February 1998 the
police officer involved in the 1997 death-in-custody case of Stefan
Stanev to 2\1/2\ years. The case is pending appeal.
The 1996 murder case of former Prime Minister Andrei Lukanov
remains unsolved. The investigation was ongoing at year's end, with
several suspects arrested and released during the year. On June 1,
authorities arrested Yurii Lenev in connection with the murder of
Lukanov and reportedly beat him before he was taken to the SIS
detention facility. Lenev's family members reported that when they were
permitted to see him finally on June 12, his bruises from the beating
still were visible. The Military Prosecutor's Office opened an
investigation into this case, but no progress was made by year's end.
Angel Vasiliev was extradited from the Czech Republic in September.
According to press reports, Vasiliev is suspected of having paid
$100,000 for the murder of Lukanov. Before his death, Lukanov
criticized the Socialist Party's special treatment of the Orion group,
to which Vasiliev's construction company belongs and which is suspected
of misappropriating funds from several banks.
There were two instances of members of the Romani ethnic minority
being killed by private citizens. An incident of racial violence
resulted in the beating death of a Romani woman at the hands of teenage
boys. In another incident, a trespassing Romani boy was shot by a
private citizen (see Section 5).
The 1996 case of Anguel Zabchikov, a 17-year-old Romani boy who
died in police custody, was still ongoing at year's end, pending a
hearing before the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.
In February four policemen were convicted of murdering an ethnic
Turk during a protest against the forced assimilation campaign in May
1989; the highest sentence meted out was 2\1/2\ years.
There was no progress in the trial concerning the notorious death
camps set up by the Communists after they took power in 1944.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution expressly prohibits torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, despite this prohibition,
police commonly beat criminal suspects and members of minorities, at
times to extract false testimony. In particular, security forces
physically abuse street children, the majority of whom are Roma.
The Human Rights Project (HRP) reported that on January 17, a
police officer in Pleven harassed and beat Stefka Madjarova. After
ordering her to leave the market where she was selling her goods, the
police officer demanded her identification. He then ordered Madjarova
to follow him to a police station at the market where she was beaten
with a club. Madjarova was struck on the legs and has forensic evidence
(a medical certificate) for the injuries that she sustained. There were
three witnesses on the scene. A complaint has been filed with the
Regional Military Prosecutor's Office in Pleven.
In January two policemen beat Rom Kiril Nikolov Spasov from Russe
and forced him to give false testimony.
On July 22, police officers in Pavlinkeni reportedly beat two Roma,
Atanas Assenov and Assen Assenov, who had been detained and left a
third Rom, Anton Assenov, who had been shot earlier by a private
security guard without medical attention for several hours. The private
security guard accused the Roma and their companions of stealing fruit
and reportedly shot at them when they tried to escape, wounding one Rom
in the back of his head. When police arrived and called an ambulance,
the emergency medical technicians reportedly refused to treat him. The
police officers detained the Roma and took them to the Pavlinkeni
regional police department, where they reportedly beat Atanas and
Assen. Anton reportedly was left outside the police department in a
horse cart for several hours, after which the police called another
ambulance, and he received medical treatment. The Roma filed complaints
against the police officers and security guard involved. The Military
Prosecutor's office on November 16 declined to initiate a criminal
proceeding on the matter.
On September 8, three police officers beat a Romani woman, Tanya
Borissova, outside of the labor bureau in Pazardzhik. A large number of
Roma had assembled outside the bureau to obtain information about jobs.
Three police officers beat Borissova after claiming that she had pushed
one of them. They arrested her, and that same day the Pazardzhik
district court sentenced her to 5 days in custody for ``minor
hooliganism.''
On October 2, a police officer in a police car approached a group
of five Roma--Lilyan Zanev, Spas Berkov, Nedyalko Zanev, Simeon Zanev,
and Roumyana Berkova--gathered on the outskirts of Pleven and
questioned them. Another police car with two officers joined the first,
and the three beat the five Roma with truncheons for approximately 30
minutes and told the Roma that they suspected them of intending to rob
nearby homes. One Rom obtained a medical certificate documenting his
injuries and filed a complaint with the regional military prosecutor's
office in Pleven.
In July authorities arrested parliamentary deputy Tsvetelin Kanchev
of the Euroleft Party for kidnaping, beating, robbing, and blackmailing
persons in his district of Zlatiza. His trial began in November, and
several persons who were involved in the beatings were set to testify.
In March the Military Prosecutor's office closed the investigation
into the 1998 mass police raid of a Romani neighborhood in the village
of Mechka, citing the impossibility of positively identifying the
individuals involved. The March 1998 case of Rossen Alekov who
reportedly was beaten by police was closed in June 1998, when the
Military Prosecutor's office declined to initiate a criminal
investigation.
There were reports of police abuse of journalists (see Section
2.a.).
According to Ministry of Interior (MOI) data, 40 cases of police
brutality were confirmed for the period January 1 to July 22. The
police generally have refused to make investigative reports available
to the public. The MOI statistics reflect only those complaints
registered by the alleged victims. Human rights monitors report that
they receive many more complaints from persons who are too intimidated
to lodge an official complaint with the authorities.
Reports continue that criminal suspects in police custody run a
significant risk of being mistreated. The Bulgarian Helsinki Committee
(BHC) conducted a survey in prisons in January and found that 51
percent of interviewed prisoners reported that police officers used
physical force against them during arrest; 53 percent reported
mistreatment at police stations. Romani prisoners reported being abused
more frequently than other prisoners. Very seldom are allegations of
police abuse properly investigated nor are the offending officers
consistently punished. In particular, the Military Prosecutor's office
has not investigated incidents of alleged police abuse thoroughly or
expeditiously. In a shift from previous years, human rights observers
were granted access to SIS detention facilities for the first time in
February. Observers still are prohibited from interviewing detainees in
the SIS facilities, unlike in regular prisons.
Crime and corruption remained primary concerns of the Government
during the year. The criminal justice system is in a time of
transition. New legislation was enacted in late 1998 intended to
improve and streamline the criminal justice process, which has long
been an acknowledged problem. The new law, whose provisions all were to
be enacted by January 1, 2000, was to reorganize and reallocate
authorities among police, the SIS, prosecutors, and judges, and devolve
greater authority to regional authorities. The full details of the
plan's implementation and its effectiveness in achieving real reform
remain to be seen.
There have been unconfirmed reports of local or police involvement
in trafficking in persons (see Section 6.f.).
Conditions in some prisons are harsh and include severe
overcrowding, inadequate lavatory facilities, and insufficient heating
and ventilation. The SIS's parallel network of jails and prisons, newly
transferred as of December to Justice Ministry control under recent
legislative changes, contains many of the harshest detention
facilities. Credible sources reported numerous cases of brutality
committed by prison guards against inmates. However, there were no more
reports during the year of prisoners being placed in solitary
confinement after complaining about their treatment. The BHC reports
that the Government has taken vigorous and effective action to combat
the tuberculosis outbreak reported last year, much reducing this
problem. Justice Ministry information for 1999 indicates a 40 percent
decrease in tuberculosis infections from 1998 figures. The BHC further
reports that nutritional deficiencies which had exacerbated this
problem also have been improved. The process by which prisoners may
complain of substandard conditions or of mistreatment does not appear
to function effectively.
The Government cooperated with requests by independent observers to
monitor conditions in prisons and detention facilities. The European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) inspected a number of
prisons and detention facilities during the year. Human rights
observers reported that several of the country's worst detention
facilities were closed down by the Government prior to the CPT visit
and remain closed.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides for protection against arbitrary arrest and detention;
however, police often arbitrarily detain and arrest street children,
the majority of whom are Roma.
The Constitution provides for access to legal counsel from the time
of detention. However, a survey of prisoners conducted by the BHC found
that 54 percent of prisoners complained that they had no lawyer present
during preliminary investigations. Police normally obtain a warrant
from a prosecutor prior to apprehending an individual; otherwise, in
emergency circumstances police may detain individuals for up to 24
hours on their own authority; however, authorities must rule on the
legality of such detention by the end of that time period. If the
person is released without being charged before the 24-hour period
elapses, there is no judicial involvement in the case. Human rights
observers charge that police commonly handle minor offenses by
arresting the suspect, beating him, and releasing him within the 24-
hour period. Defendants have the right to visits by family members, to
examine evidence, and to know the charges against them. Charges may not
be made public without the permission of the Prosecutor General. In the
interests of a speedy trial, investigations now are prescribed by law
to last no more than 2 months under normal circumstances, although this
period may be extended to 6 months by the head regional prosecutor, and
up to 9 months by the Prosecutor General. In practice, persons often
have been detained for 1 to 2 years without a conviction. It is not
unusual for cases to be returned by the prosecutors or judges for
further investigation. This generally restarts the clock, although some
recent court interpretations have directed that the time limits should
apply cumulatively to all the investigation periods on a given case.
Under the terms of a 1997 amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure,
pretrial detention can last no more than 1 year or, if the alleged
offense is punishable by over 15 years' imprisonment, life
imprisonment, or capital punishment, no more than 2 years. Spurred by
the new law and by decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, the
Government starting in August for the first time released a number of
pretrial detainees whose detentions had exceeded the limit and
announced its intention to abide by these limits from that point on.
Typically if a judge returns a case to the prosecutors for further
work, the clock is restarted on the time limit, although this process
has not been tested yet thoroughly in the courts.
Data confirm that the Government made progress in reducing the
number of pretrial detainees during the year. According to the Ministry
of Justice, as of June 30, 646 inmates were in pretrial detention,
which represents a 35 percent drop from 993 in mid-1998. The number of
persons on trial as of that date was 1,616--an almost 18 percent drop
from 1,960 in 1998. (Defendants are categorized as ``on trial'' after
their cases have been sent first to a trial judge, even though the
judge may have sent the case back to the prosecutors and SIS for
further investigation.) As of June 30, there were 8,669 convicted
prisoners in the prison system. Thus the total inmate population in the
prison system was 10,931. These figures do not include persons
incarcerated in the separate SIS detention facilities, for which
current data have not been made available. As of June 30, 1998, the SIS
had 3,257 detainees, of whom 842 were in pretrial detention.
In the event of a conviction, the time spent in pretrial detention
is credited toward the sentence. The Constitution provides for bail,
and some detainees have been released under this provision, although
bail is not used widely.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the Constitution, the
judiciary is granted independent and coequal status with the
legislature and executive branch; however, the judiciary continues to
struggle with problems such as low salaries, understaffing, antiquated
procedures, corruption, and a heavy backlog of cases. Partly as a
legacy of communism and partly because of the court system's structural
and personnel problems, many citizens have little confidence in the
judicial system. Human rights groups complain that local prosecutors
and magistrates sometimes fail to pursue vigorously crimes committed
against minorities. Many observers believe that reforms are essential
to establish a fair and impartial, as well as efficient, judicial
system.
The court system consists of regional courts, district courts, and
Supreme Courts of Cassation (civil and criminal appeal) and
Administration. The Constitutional Court, which is separate from the
rest of the court system, is empowered to rescind legislation that it
considers unconstitutional, settle disputes over the conduct of general
elections, and resolve conflicts over the division of powers between
the various branches of government. Military courts handle cases
involving military personnel (including police personnel) and some
cases involving national security matters. The Constitutional Court
does not have specific jurisdiction in matters of military justice.
Local observers contend that organized crime influences the
prosecutor's office. Few organized crime figures have been prosecuted
to date, but in 1997 the Government made the battle against organized
crime a priority and reformed the Penal Code to that end. The Ministry
of Interior has requested and received assistance from Western
countries in its efforts to close legal loopholes and strengthen
enforcement capabilities against criminal economic groupings engaged in
racketeering and other illegal activities.
In December 1998, a reformulated Supreme Judicial Council
overturned its predecessor's appointment of a new Prosecutor General in
a controversial move that nonetheless was approved by the
Constitutional Court. It then named a new Prosecutor General, who has
moved to strengthen the prosecutor's office with a view toward
increasing the country's low prosecution rate.
A draft law on a new criminal procedure code was passed by the
National Assembly in the fall of 1998. The aim of the new law is to
reform the judiciary and remove the more cumbersome aspects of its
functioning, such as the long delays created by the referral of cases
back and forth between different offices. It also increases executive
branch oversight of judges and prosecutors. All of the provisions of
the new law are to become effective by January 1, 2000. Under the new
procedure, the role of the SIS was curtailed, and most investigators
were assigned to work directly for local prosecutors, while the
National Police Service also is to take a larger role in
investigations. However, before this system can become effective, the
Government must assure that magistrates, and especially investigators,
receive the appropriate training--a need of which senior officials are
acutely aware.
Despite recommending its own dissolution in December 1998 when it
announced that Bulgaria had made sufficient progress in democracy and
human right to no longer require monitoring, the Observation Committee
of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe nonetheless
restated its concerns about inadequate safeguards for the independence
of the judiciary in the country.
Judges are appointed by the 25-member Supreme Judicial Council and,
after serving for 3 years, may not be removed except under limited,
specified circumstances. The difficulty and rarity of replacing judges
virtually regardless of performance often has been cited as a hindrance
to effective law enforcement. The 12 justices on the Constitutional
Court are chosen for 9-year terms as follows: One-third are elected by
the National Assembly, one-third appointed by the President, and one-
third elected by judicial authorities.
The Constitution stipulates that all courts shall conduct hearings
in public unless the proceedings involve state security or national
secrets. There were no reported complaints about limited access to
courtroom proceedings. Defendants have the right to know the charges
against them and are given ample time to prepare a defense. The right
of appeal is provided for and is used widely. Defendants in criminal
proceedings have the right to confront witnesses and to have an
attorney, provided by the state if necessary in serious cases.
Human rights observers consider ``Educational Boarding Schools''
(formerly known as ``Labor Education Schools'') to which problem
children can be sent as little different from penal institutions.
However, since the schools are not considered prisons under the law,
the procedures by which children are confined in these schools are not
subject to minimal due process. Human rights observer groups such as
the Bulgarian Lawyers for Human Rights criticize this denial of due
process. Children sometimes appear alone despite the requirement that
parents must attend hearings; the right to an attorney at the hearing
is prohibited expressly by law. Decisions in these cases are not
subject to judicial review, and children typically stay in the
Educational Boarding Schools for 3 years or until they reach majority
age, whichever occurs first. In late 1996, the Parliament enacted
legislation that provided for court review of sentencing to such
schools, set a limit of a 3-year stay, and addressed other problems in
these institutions (see Section 5). Some observers dismiss this court
review provision as a formality, since the child is not present to
speak on his or her own behalf (nor is the defense lawyer or the
child's parents).
There was no progress in a case begun in 1993 relating to the
forced assimilation and expulsion of ethnic Turks in 1984-85 and 1989.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home, the right to choose one's place of work and residence, and the
freedom and confidentiality of correspondence, and government
authorities generally respect these provisions.
One nongovernmental organization (NGO) complained that the Minister
of Interior's discretionary authority to authorize telephone wiretaps
without judicial review is excessive, although it is unknown to what
extent this authority is employed. It is also alleged that warrants to
investigate suspects' private financial records sometimes are abused to
give police broad and openended authority to engage in far-ranging
investigations of a suspect's family and associates. There are regular,
albeit not conclusive or systematic, reports of mail, especially
foreign mail, being delayed and/or opened.
Traffickers in persons use threats against women's families and
family reputations to ensure obedience (see Section 6.f.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice. The Electronic Media Bill was adopted
by the National Assembly in October 1998. In November 1998, President
Stoyanov vetoed the bill because of provisions concerning the structure
of the National Council on Radio and Television, the ban on airing
commercial advertisements during prime time, minority language
programming, and the funding of Bulgarian National Television (BNT) and
Bulgarian National Radio (BNR). The National Assembly accepted all of
the revisions forwarded by the President with the exception of the
proposed lifting of the ban on primetime advertising. In June the
Constitutional Court considered a motion from opposition Members of
Parliament (M.P.'s) concerning the constitutionality of 60 provisions
of the bill and found all of them to be constitutional except the one
concerning the means of collecting television fees. The M.P.'s
complained that the National Council for Radio and Television, a quasi-
governmental body that governs national media and regulates private
broadcasters, was too vulnerable to political manipulation by the
ruling party of the day.
Among media professionals and the broader public, the belief
persists that the Government exerts an unduly large influence on the
media though official channels, i.e., the Radio and Television Council,
and unofficially by influencing advertisers not to use media outlets
that are too critical of government policy or officials. While such
claims are widely made and believed, little hard evidence exists to
document concrete examples of government intimidation of editors or
their broadcasters.
A variety of newspapers are published freely by political parties
and other organizations representing the full spectrum of political
opinion. Journalists frequently color their reports to conform with the
views of the political parties or economic groups that own their
respective newspapers. However, the leading opposition newspaper Douma
was forced to suspend publication on June 18 because it was unable to
pay the more than $100,000 (Lev 180,000) it owed the State Printing
House. Publication resumed on July 22, after a new investor bought a 51
percent stake in the newspaper. While the leader of the Bulgarian
Socialist Party, which sponsors the newspaper, believed that the
printing house's action against the newspaper was politically
motivated, the new majority owner declared that the newspaper's
suspension had been strictly an economic problem.
There were repeated reports of police abuse of journalists. In July
Darin Kirkov took photographs of Varna municipal workers tearing down
illegal buildings, and police officers destroyed Kirkov's film.
Interior Minister Bogomil Bonev swiftly responded to the incident with
an order specifically banning police violence against journalists. On
June 28, unidentified assailants stabbed and beat Aleksei Lazarov who
works for the independent weekly Kapital; however, they did not rob
Lazarov. Lazarov suffered a broken leg and multiple knife wounds. The
Bulgarian National Combat Service Against Organized Crime opened an
investigation into the incident, but there was no progress in the case
at year's end. On July 7, unidentified assailants attacked Svetla
Asenova, a layout editor for the Computer World weekly. Asenova was
beaten and robbed, and as a result hospitalized with a skull fracture.
According to the NGO Human Rights Watch, at least 11 violent attacks
were carried out against media representatives in 1998, including
physical assaults and bombings of newspaper offices. Attempts to
intimidate journalists investigating corruption were thought to be the
motivation for the attacks.
Libel is punishable under the Criminal Code. In July Parliament
passed an amendment to the Penal Code changing the punishment for libel
from imprisonment to the imposition of a fine of up to about $16,200
(Lev 30,000)--a heavy fine in the Bulgarian context. A convicted
journalist failing to pay the fine would then face imprisonment. It is
the firm conviction of several human rights organizations, as well as
the majority of the journalist community, that prosecutors use their
authority to curb free expression in the press, particularly when such
expression is critical of prosecutors. In recent years this law has
been used sparingly, but there have been two cases in the last 3 years
in which reporters have been convicted of libel and sentenced to prison
terms or large fines. In January the outgoing Prosecutor General Ivan
Tatarchev initiated a criminal investigation of Tatiana Vaksberg of
Radio Free Europe for ``insulting state authority'' and offending
Tatarchev's ``honor and dignity,'' after she broadcast a commentary
critical of Tatarchev. Charges were filed against Tatarchev, and the
case was still pending at year's end. The Parliamentary Assembly of the
Council of Europe Observation Committee visited the country in 1998 and
expressed continuing concern that media independence still remained at
risk and disappointment that libel and slander remained criminal
offenses. However, the Committee also was abolished on its own
recommendation based on the country's progress towards achieving human
rights standards.
Only the two state-owned national television channels have
nationwide coverage. In July the Government initiated procedures to
license a private national television station. Should this occur, the
private station will be in direct competition with the remaining state
television entity (to be renamed Public Television). To date, plans for
BNT to broadcast in Turkish have not been implemented. However, local
affiliates of BNR have been broadcasting limited programming in Turkish
in areas where there are sizable Turkish-speaking populations.
Television and radio news programs on the state-owned media present
opposition views, but opposition members claim that their activities
and views are given less broadcast time and exposure than the those of
the ruling party. There are no formal restrictions on programming. Both
television and radio provide a variety of news and public interest
programming.
There are more than 30 independent radio stations (both local and
regional). The licensing procedure for both commercial and public radio
and television operators started in 1998, but the process has seen
chronic delays. As a result, all private electronic media are operating
currently without a license. Owners of private radio stations have
expressed concern that the authorities intentionally were delaying the
process in order to exert censorship leverage prior to the October
local elections. Some private radio stations still complain that the
strength of their transmission is restricted unduly, with the result
that they cannot compete fully with national (state-owned) radio. All
transmission facilities are owned by the central Government.
Foreign government radio programs such as the British Broadcasting
Corporation, Deutsche Welle, Radio Free Europe, and the Voice of
America have good access to commercial radio frequencies.
Private book publishing remained unhindered by political
considerations.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. The authorities require
permits for rallies and assemblies held outdoors, but most legally
registered organizations routinely were granted permission to assemble.
Vigorous political rallies and demonstrations were a common occurrence
and generally took place without government interference.
The Government has undertaken to respect the rights of individuals
and groups to establish freely their own political parties or other
political organizations; however, there are constitutional and
statutory restrictions that limit the right of association and
meaningful participation in the political process. For example, the
Constitution forbids the formation of political parties along
religious, ethnic, or racial lines and prohibits ``citizens'
associations'' from engaging in political activity. This provision is
designed to prevent the development of parties based on a single ethnic
or other group that could prove divisive for national unity by stirring
up ethnic tension for political purposes. Nonetheless, the mainly
ethnic Turkish Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) is represented in
Parliament. The other major political parties generally accept the
MRF's right to participate in the political process. In August the
Supreme Administrative Court ruled that the Ilinden-Pirin United
Macedonian Organization (OMO)--an ethnic-Macedonian organization--be
registered to participate as a political party in municipal elections
in October. The Court overruled the decision of the Central Commission
for Local Elections, which failed to register the group on August 25.
The decision of the Supreme Administrative Court was final and could
not be appealed. On February 12, a Sofia municipal court first
registered the group. In March a group of 61 M.P.'s petitioned the
Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the group's
registration. The Court declined to rule on the case before the October
local elections.
The Constitution also prohibits organizations that threaten the
country's territorial integrity or unity, or that incite racial,
ethnic, or religious hatred. The Government has refused since 1990 to
register a self-proclaimed Macedonian rights group, OMO-Ilinden (not
the same organization as the similarly named Ilinden-Pirin OMO noted
above), on the grounds that it is separatist. There were no reports of
any prosecutions for simple membership in this group.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the Government restricts this right in practice for
some non-Orthodox religious groups. The legal requirement that groups
whose activities have a religious element register with the Council of
Ministers remained an obstacle to the activity of some religious
groups, such as the Unification Church and the Church of the Nazarene
(which has tried repeatedly to register for more than 5 years), prior
to or in the absence of registration. Furthermore several municipal
governments established local registration requirements for religious
groups, despite the lack of clear legal authority to do so. In some
cases, local authorities used the lack of registration as a pretext for
interference against some groups and employed arbitrary harassment
tactics against others. In 1998 the ability of a small number of
religious groups to conduct services freely came under attack, both as
a result of action by local government authorities and because of
public intolerance. Such reports subsided during the year.
Jehovah's Witnesses finally received central government
registration in October 1998, after a lengthy delay. A member of
Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to serve in the military was sentenced
to a prison term in 1998 and was imprisoned from December 1998 until
March 1999. He was released due to a presidential pardon. A new law
providing for a civilian alternative to military conscription went into
effect on January 1. However, the alternative civilian service requires
double the time commitment of military service. According to Human
Rights Watch, police also have arrested children and adult members of
Jehovah's Witnesses for distributing religious tracts, and detained
other members of Jehovah's Witnesses for proselytizing.
Some observers note with concern a tendency by certain
municipalities to enact regulations that may be used to limit religious
freedoms if a perceived need arises. For example, a regulation passed
by Sofia municipality in February forbids references to miracles and
healing during religious services, a provision that many fear may be
employed as a pretext to ban or interrupt services by charismatic
evangelical groups. The regulation cites a Communist-era law dating
from 1949, which is technically still in effect and which forbids
foreigners from proselytizing and administering religious services in
the country. The decree, although subsequently modified in response to
NGO objections, is still criticized by religious rights groups as
containing provisions that are either discriminatory or ambiguous and
open to abuse. Other municipalities have enacted similar regulations.
In January the city council in Burgas refused to register the local
branch of Jehovah's Witnesses, despite the fact that they were
registered by the central Government. The council asked the group to
prove that they had not been banned in any European Union country in
order to be registered. The 1949 law also has been criticized in its
own right as an outmoded potential impediment to free religious
activity. However, despite the law's continued technical validity,
foreign missionaries can and do receive permission to proselytize in
the country, and many have noted a marked improvement in both
governmental and societal attitudes since the start of 1998. A new law
on religious activity currently is being drafted but has not yet been
moved to the floor of the National Assembly for a vote.
In June the city of Plovdiv fined an Austrian citizen about $300
(Lev 500) for proselytizing on behalf of Jehovah's Witnesses, on the
grounds that the Church was not registered with the city. However, many
observers dispute the legal authority of municipal governments to
require local registration.
Members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(Mormons) reported several incidents of harassment by police and by
local authorities, with police interrupting services to demand
passports and registration documents for the Church and its members.
For example, in July police officers in Stara Zagora interrupted a
Mormon religious service and demanded to see the identification
documents of those who were present. The officers claimed that the
Church's registration was out of date. Mormon missionaries reported
several incidents of police harassment.
There were instances of police interference with religious groups'
worship services and of their ``streetboarding'' efforts (in which the
groups erect a signboard and invite passersby to learn more about the
denomination's precepts).
On May 21 in Plovdiv, police interrupted the streetboarding
activities of missionaries of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints (LDS Church), claiming that the Church must have registered with
the municipal government to operate in the city, although there is no
legal basis for such a requirement.
On July 11 in Stara Zagora, three police officers interrupted a
service of the LDS Church by demanding that church officials and
parishioners present their identification documents.
On July 15 in Burgas, several LDS missionaries again were
interrupted in their streetboarding activities by several police
officers, citing unspecified laws against it. Police confiscated the
signboard.
In March a schoolteacher in Gabrovo who is a member of a
Pentecostal church resigned from her job. She claimed that she was
intimidated into resigning as a result of her religious beliefs. Her
lawsuit against the school currently is pending.
The Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the
``traditional'' religion. The Government provides financial support for
the Bulgarian Orthodox Church and other denominations it considers to
be ``traditional.'' Along with the Orthodox Church, the Muslim,
Catholic, and Jewish minority religious communities generally are
perceived as maintaining a long-standing place in Bulgarian society and
hence benefit from a relatively high degree of tolerance, as well as
some government financial support.
For most registered religious groups there were no restrictions on
attendance at religious services or on private religious instruction. A
school for imams, a Muslim cultural center, university-level
theological faculties, and religious primary schools operated freely.
In December the Ministry of Education announced that schools would
begin offering classes on Islam in 2000 in regions with a significant
Muslim minority. Since 1997, religious classes on the Bible have been
available to students whose parents approve such instruction. Bibles
and other religious materials in the Bulgarian language were imported
freely and printed on most occasions, and Muslim, Catholic, and Jewish
publications were published on a regular basis.
Although previously during compulsory military service most Muslim
conscripts were placed in construction units rather than serving in
combat-role military units, late in the year the Government ended this
practice and abolished such construction battalions (see Section 5).
There were no indications that the Government discriminated against
members of any religious group in making restitution to previous owners
of properties that were nationalized during the Communist regime. The
Government in general has supported actively property restitution for
the legally recognized organization representing the Jewish community,
although the return of two lucrative commercial Jewish communal
properties continues to encounter administrative obstacles and legal
challenges.
At the Department of Theology of Sofia University, all students are
required to present a certificate of baptism from the Orthodox Church,
and married couples must present a marriage certificate from the Church
in order to enroll in the Department's classes. It remains impossible
for non-Orthodox applicants to be admitted to the Department of
Theology.
The Government refused to recognize an alternative Patriarch
elected by supporters in 1996, and the schism that opened in the
Orthodox Church in 1992 continued, despite the death of this
alternative Patriarch in April. The Government nevertheless encouraged
the feuding factions to heal their prolonged rift. By year's end, these
efforts had not met with success.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement within the country and the right to leave it, and these rights
are not limited in practice, with the exception of border zones where
access is limited for nonresidents (the border zones extend 1.2 to 3
miles inward from each border). Every citizen has the right to return
to the country, may not be forcibly expatriated, and may not be
deprived of citizenship acquired by birth.
The Government grants asylum or refugee status in accordance with
the standards of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Law on Refugees, which went into
effect August 1, regulates the procedure for granting refugee status as
well as the rights and obligations of refugees. The Agency for
Refugees, formerly the National Bureau for Territorial Asylum and
Refugees, is charged with following this procedure and cooperating with
the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
The Government provides first asylum. However, during the Kosovo
crisis, the Government's definition of first asylum became very narrow.
Although the Government initially expressed its willingness to
temporarily shelter 5,000 Kosovar refugees, it soon proved reluctant to
accept more than the approximately 200 Kosovar Albanians who had
arrived by mid-April. Citing economic difficulties, the desire to avoid
ethnic and religious conflicts within its own borders, and the priority
accorded to potential ethnic Bulgarian refugees, the Government pledged
to accept only those refugees who expressed an explicit desire to come
to Bulgaria. According to Prime Minister Kostov, first asylum applied
only to those refugees who came to the country directly (passing
through Serbia proper to do so) and not those who first arrived in the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Thus instead of
accepting refugees from the over-crowded FYROM camps, the Government
established and ran a refugee camp in FYROM. The Government also
provided FYROM with medical facilities, prefabricated houses, portable
showers, and meal sites.
In recent years, domestic and international human rights
organizations have expressed concern over the Government's handling of
asylum claims and reported that there may have been cases in which bona
fide refugees were turned away at the border. No such cases were
reported during the year. However, because NGO's lack institutionalized
access to the country's borders, it is often difficult for them to
monitor the Government's handling of asylum cases. For the first 6
months of the year, the Ministry of Interior reported that 803 persons
applied for refugee status. Authorities granted 60 applicants refugee
status, while 295 were granted temporary humanitarian status for either
6 months or 1 year.
The Agency for Refugees reports that, from its inception in 1993
until June 30, a total of 3,637 persons applied for asylum. Of these
applications, 930 were accepted, 248 refused; for 683 applicants the
procedure was terminated (usually because the applicant could not be
found). Citizens from Afghanistan and Iraq generally constitute the
majority of asylum seekers, but during the first half of the year, the
majority were citizens of Serbia-Montenegro, including the province of
Kosovo. Domestic and international human rights organizations complain
that the adjudication process is slow, but the UNHCR notes that the
Agency for Refugees has begun a major restructuring project to reduce
the adjudication time to a period of 3 months. The restructuring
project itself is expected to take 4 years. In 1997 and 1998, the
UNHCR, in cooperation with an NGO, opened three transit centers near
the Greek, Turkish, and Romanian borders and assisted the Government
with opening a small reception center in Banya. During the Kosovo
crisis, the Bulgarian Red Cross also set up emergency refugee centers
in Pirin. Plans to open a reception center at the Sofia airport
continue to be delayed due to a lack of funding. However, the UNHCR
currently is working on plans to open a transit center in Kapitan
Andreevo, on the border with Turkey.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government and head of
state through the election of the President and of the members of the
National Assembly, although the constitutional prohibition of parties
formed on ethnic, racial, or religious lines has the effect of
circumscribing access to the political party process for some groups
(see Section 2.b.), particularly those Roma who have expressed a desire
to create their own party. Suffrage is universal at the age of 18.
No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in
government and politics; however, they are underrepresented. Women hold
just under 11 percent of the seats in the current Parliament. However,
a number of women hold elective and appointive office at high levels,
including three cabinet-level posts and several key positions in
Parliament. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and the leader of the
United Democratic Forces parliamentary group (the dominant party in the
Government) are both women.
No legal restrictions hinder the participation of minorities in
politics, apart from the prohibition of ethnically, racially, or
religiously based parties. However, while ethnic Turks' representation
in the National Assembly is close to commensurate with their share of
population, there were only two Romani Members of Parliament; an
improvement over 1998, when there were none. Both groups are
underrepresented in appointed governmental positions, especially
leadership positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigations of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic and international human rights groups operate freely,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials, especially local officials, occasionally are
reluctant to provide information or active cooperation. Local human
rights groups now are permitted to visit the SIS detention facilities
to which they previously were denied access.
Legislation reportedly is pending to establish the post of human
rights ombudsman, but to date the position has not been created.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for individual rights, equality, and
protection against discrimination; however, in practice discrimination
still exists, particularly against Roma and women.
Women.--Domestic abuse is a serious and common problem, but there
are no official statistics on its occurrence. The Animus Association
(AA), an NGO that offers assistance and support to female victims of
violence, estimates that one in five women suffers from spousal abuse.
Spousal rape is a crime, but it rarely is prosecuted. Currently, the
law exempts from state prosecution certain types of assault if
committed by a family member, and the Government does not assist in
prosecuting crimes of domestic assault unless the woman has been killed
or injured permanently. Courts and prosecutors tend to view domestic
abuse as a family rather than criminal problem, and in most cases,
victims of domestic violence take refuge with family or friends rather
than approach the authorities. Police are not allowed to intervene in
cases of domestic abuse, even if a woman calls them seeking protection
or assistance. No government agencies provide shelter or counseling for
victims. While the municipality of Sofia promised a building to the AA
2 years ago to use as a shelter for abused women, it has yet to follow
through on its promise. However, the NGO Nadya De Center provides
shelter to battered women. The courts prosecute rape, although it
remains an underreported crime because some stigma still attaches to
the victim. The maximum sentence for rape is 8 years; convicted
offenders often receive a lesser sentence or early parole.
Ministry of Interior figures reveal that during the first half of
the year, 300 rapes and 60 attempted rapes were reported.
During the year, the AA reported 1,049 cases of domestic violence,
105 cases of sexual violence, and 59 cases of trafficking in women. The
actual incidence of each form of violence is certainly much higher, as
these represent those cases in which the victim (or, in some
trafficking cases, an overseas women's group) was willing and able to
contact the AA. The association also operates a 24-hour hot line for
women in crisis that is staffed by the association's 12 full-time
professional therapists.
In 1997 the Government enacted a law against trafficking in women,
and trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem (see Section
6.f.).
Local observers believe that sexual harassment is a problem; it is
not currently illegal.
Many of the approximately 30 women's organizations are closely
associated with political parties or have primarily professional
agendas. Some observers believe that women's organizations tend to be
associated with political parties or professional groups because
feminism has negative societal connotations. Of those organizations
that exist mainly to defend women's interests, the two largest are the
Women's Democratic Union in Bulgaria, heir to the group that existed
under the Communist dictatorship, and the Bulgarian Women's
Association, which disappeared under communism but now has reemerged
with chapters in a number of cities.
The Constitution forbids privileges or restrictions of rights on
the basis of sex, and women are not impeded from owning or managing
businesses, land, or other real property and do not suffer from
discrimination under inheritance laws. However, women face
discrimination both in terms of job recruitment and the likelihood of
layoffs. Official figures show the rate of unemployment for women to be
higher than that for men. Women are much more likely than men to be
employed in low-wage jobs requiring little education, and the
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB) reports
that the average woman's salary is 68 percent of that earned by the
average male. Statistics show that women are equally likely to attend
universities, but they have less opportunity to upgrade their
qualifications and generally end up in lower-ranking and lower-paying
positions than their male counterparts. Fewer girls than boys are
attending schools, especially among minorities. Women generally
continue to have primary responsibility for child rearing and
housekeeping even if they are employed outside the home. Since 80
percent of employed women work in the lowest-paying sectors of the
labor force, they often must work at two jobs in addition to their
household duties in order to provide for their families. Female-headed
households frequently live below the poverty line. There are liberal
provisions for paid maternity leave; however, these actually may work
against employers' willingness to hire and retain female employees.
This is especially noticeable in higher-paying positions in the private
sector, where many women with engineering degrees are compelled to work
as secretaries.
No special government programs seek to address economic
discrimination or integrate women better into the mainstream of society
and the economy.
Children.--The Government generally is committed to protecting
children's welfare but, with limited resources, falls short in several
areas. It maintains, for example, a sizable network of orphanages
throughout the country. However, many of the orphanages are in
disrepair and lack proper facilities. Government efforts in education
and health have been constrained by serious budgetary limitations and
by outmoded social care structures. The Constitution provides for
mandatory school attendance until the age of 16. However, fewer girls
than boys are attending school, especially among minorities.
Credible sources report that there is no provision for due process
of law for Romani and other juveniles when they are detained in Labor
Education Schools run by the Ministry of Education. Living conditions
at these reform schools are poor, offering few medical, educational, or
social services. The Labor Education School at Slavovitsa has been the
target of the harshest criticism. Generally, staff members at many such
institutions lack the proper qualifications and training to care for
the children adequately. Degrading and severe punishment, such as the
shaving of a child's head, reduction in diet, severe beatings, and long
periods of solitary confinement, are common at the schools. In 1996 the
Ministry of Education acknowledged problems at the schools and
attributed the cause to a lack of funding. In late 1996, Parliament
enacted legislation providing for court review of sentencing to such
schools and addressing other problems in the reform school system (see
Section 1.e.).
The vast majority of children are free from societal abuse,
although some Romani children are frequent targets of skinhead violence
and arbitrary police detention; the homeless or abandoned were
particularly vulnerable. Family or community members forced some Romani
minors into prostitution. Police made little effort to address these
problems. Some observers believe that there is a growing trend toward
the use of children in prostitution, burglaries, and narcotics
distribution. Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
People With Disabilities.--Disabled persons by law receive a range
of financial assistance, including free public transportation, reduced
prices on modified automobiles, and free equipment such as wheelchairs.
However, as in other areas, budgetary constraints mean that such
payments occasionally fall behind. Disabled individuals have access to
university training and to housing and employment, but architectural
barriers are a great hindrance in most older buildings. For example,
there are no elevators in schools or universities. Problems of general
unemployment and economy undermine initiatives aimed at advancing equal
opportunity for the disabled. According to the director of the
Rehabilitation and Social Integration Fund, 82 percent of the disabled
are unemployed.
Labor laws intended to protect the interests of the disabled and
create greater employment opportunity sometimes have a mixed effect. On
one hand, the law provides incentives for small firms to hire disabled
workers. For example, the Bureau of Labor pays the first year's salary
of a disabled employee. On the other hand, workers with disabilities
are entitled to shorter working hours, which often leads to
discrimination against them in hiring practices. According to the law,
any enterprise employing more than 50 persons must hire a certain
number of disabled workers (between 3 and 10 percent, depending on the
industry). Those who fail to do so must pay a fine, the proceeds of
which go to a fund for the disabled. Nevertheless, due to low fines and
delays in the judicial system, collection rates are extremely low.
Effective in July students with disabilities must pay the
university's initial application fee but are exempt from semester fees
if accepted. In February a Day Center for Social Rehabilitation and
Integration of the Disabled was opened. Built on land granted by the
municipality of Sofia and with financial donations, the facility is the
first of its kind to be fully equipped to address the needs of the
disabled. In May the city of Russe received with foreign assistance two
vehicles for use in transporting disabled persons. Recent public works
have taken the needs of persons with disabilities into account. In July
one of Sofia's main arteries underwent construction to add ramp access
to sidewalks. Sofia's new subway system also was designed with
wheelchair access to stations. Nevertheless, enforcement of a 1995 law
requiring improved structural access for the disabled has lagged in
existing, unrenovated buildings.
Policies and public attitudes prevalent during the Communist era,
which separated mentally and physically disabled persons, including
very young children, from the rest of society have persisted. Some
complain that the effective segregation of disabled children into
special schools has lowered the quality of their education. However, in
a recent positive development, construction of a training and
rehabilitation center for disabled youth in Pomorie began in September.
The center aims to improve the overall physical and intellectual state
of disabled youth and to encourage them to acquire new skills and
participate more actively in the social life of the country.
Religious Minorities.--Discrimination, harassment, and general
public intolerance of `'nontraditional'' religious minorities (i.e.,
the great majority of Protestant Christian religions) remained a
problem, although the number of reported incidents decreased during the
year. Strongly held suspicion of evangelical denominations among the
Orthodox populace is widespread and pervasive across the political
spectrum and has resulted in discrimination. Often cloaked in a veneer
of ``patriotism,'' intolerance of the religious beliefs of others
enjoys widespread popularity. Such mainstream public pressure for
containment of ``foreign religious sects'' inevitably influences
policymakers. Nevertheless, there were fewer reported incidents of
harassment of religious groups during the year as society appeared to
have become more accepting of previously unfamiliar religions.
Certain religions, including both groups denied registration and
those officially registered, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, faced
discriminatory practices (see Section 2.c.), as did other groups,
which, despite full compliance with the law, were greeted with
hostility by the press, segments of the public, and certain government
officials.
Non-Orthodox religious groups, including Jehovah's Witnesses, the
Church of God, and the Emmanuel Bible Center, have been affected
adversely by societal attitudes. Numerous articles in a broad range of
newspapers as well as television documentaries, drew lurid and
inaccurate pictures of the activities of non-Orthodox religious groups,
attributing the breakup of families and drug abuse by youths to the
practices of these groups and alleging that evangelicals were drugging
young children.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Turks constitute almost
10 percent of the population. In the 1992 census, 3.7 percent of the
population identified itself as Romani; however, the real figure
probably is closer to 6 or 7 percent, since many persons of Romani
descent tend to identify themselves to the authorities as ethnic Turks
or Bulgarians. Ethnic Bulgarian Muslims or ``Pomaks'' are a distinct
group of Slavic descent, constituting 2 to 3 percent of the population,
whose ancestors converted from Orthodox Christianity to Islam. Most are
Muslim, although a number have become atheists or converted back to
Christianity. These are the country's largest minorities. There are no
restrictions on speaking Turkish in public or the use of non-Slavic
names.
Voluntary Turkish-language classes in public schools, funded by the
Government, continued in areas with significant Turkish-speaking
populations, although some observers complained that the Government was
discouraging optional language classes in areas with large
concentrations of Muslims. The Ministry of Education has estimated that
approximately 40,000 children now study Turkish. Some ethnic Turkish
leaders, mainly in the MRF, demanded that Turkish-language classes be
made compulsory in areas with significant ethnic Turkish populations,
but the Government has resisted this effort.
In May representatives of the MRF and mayors in the Kurdzhali
region called for the region's governor, Plamen Ivanov, to be dismissed
for his reported threats against some Turkish mayors in the region. The
representatives and mayors believed that Ivanov's actions would cause
ethnic tensions in the region to escalate. Prime Minister Kostov
launched an investigation into the complaints against Ivanov.
Cooperation among Romani groups generally improved following
agreement on the new government Program for Social Integration of Roma,
adopted in April. Under the plan the Government created Roma Expert
Committees, under the rubric of the National Council on Ethnic and
Demographic Issues. The Committees consist of Roma representatives
appointed by the various Romani NGO's which are members of the Council.
The Committees (Discrimination, Media, Social Policy, Housing,
Education, Health, Culture, and Economy) are to work with their
counterpart Ministries of the Government to implement the program. The
Discrimination Committee is the centerpiece of the new effort. The
Discrimination Committee is to study EU countries' experience in
antidiscrimination legislation and practice, after which it is to
propose changes in the Penal Code, the Penal Procedure Code, and law
enforcement regulations. Eventually, the Discrimination Committee is to
become a permanent legislative branch agency, designed to review
legislation for discriminatory provisions. It also is to be empowered
to impose sanctions against discriminatory practices in the country and
is to have regional offices in each of the country's 28 administrative
districts. However, the Government has not implemented any of the
legislation required to enact the program.
Attacks by private citizens on Roma continued. On January 16,
several assailants beat Rom Blago Atanassov from Ghelemenko, and he
died later as a result of his injuries. The district prosecutor in
Pazardjik opened an investigation into the incident, which led to an
indictment against the suspected perpetrators. The case did not go to
trial by year's end. On June 15, four teenage boys were involved in the
beating death of a 33-year-old Romani beggar, Nadezhda Dimitrova. The
Sofia city prosecutor's office launched an investigation into the
murder, but there were no results at year's end. The boys are not known
to have any connection to organized hate groups.
In February 16-year-old Rom Nikolai Georgiev was shot while
trespassing with several other children on private property in an
affluent neighborhood near Sliven. Accounts differ about whether the
children were caught in the act of theft or merely seeking shelter from
inclement weather. Georgiev was shot in the leg, either by the
homeowner or a security guard, and later bled to death before receiving
any medical assistance. The case is currently under investigation.
Police harass, physically abuse, and arbitrarily arrest Romani
street children (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). There was one arrest in
the 1998 attack on eight Romani boys by skinheads in Sofia. Little
progress has been made in other cases of violence against Roma during
previous years, and these largely remain in the investigatory phase.
As individuals and as an ethnic group, Roma faced high levels of
discrimination. The Romani population clearly occupies the bottom rung
of society. Roma encounter difficulties applying for social benefits,
and rural Roma are discouraged by local officials from claiming land to
which they are entitled under the law disbanding agricultural
collectives. Many Roma and other observers made credible allegations
that the quality of education offered to Romani children is inferior to
that afforded most other students. For example, the country has 34 all-
Roma schools; according to one estimate, only one-half of all students
at these schools attend class regularly and only about 10 percent
successfully graduate. The Government has been largely unsuccessful in
attracting and keeping many Romani children in school. Many Romani
children arrive relatively unprepared for schooling; many of them are
not proficient in the Bulgarian language. Poverty has led to widespread
school truancy as many children in Romani ghettos cannot afford shoes
or basic school supplies and instead turn to begging, prostitution, and
petty crime on the streets. Lack of effective government infrastructure
and programs and economic and social factors thus combine to deprive
increasing numbers of Romani youths of an education and a better
future. Early indications are that some recent initiatives undertaken
by the Government and by Romani NGO's are achieving some small
successes in mitigating these problems, for example by providing free
lunches and subsidizing textbook and tuition costs.
Workplace discrimination against minorities continued to be a
problem, especially for Roma. Employers justify such discrimination on
the basis that most Roma have only elementary training and little
education.
Previously it had been common for ethnic Turkish and Romani
conscripts to be shunted into military construction battalions during
compulsory military service. This practice raised serious concerns both
of discrimination and forced labor, particularly since the units
sometimes accepted commercial construction contracts in addition to
military construction projects. However, late in the year, the
Government carried through on its commitment to abolish the
construction battalions and eliminated this problem. There are only a
few ethnic Turkish, Pomak, and Romani officers in the military, and an
insignificant number of high-ranking officers of the Muslim faith.
Ethnic Turkish politicians maintain that, although their
community's popularly-elected representation in the National Assembly
is roughly commensurate with its size, ethnic Turks are
underrepresented significantly in appointed positions in the state
administration.
Several thousand persons, mainly in the southwest, identify
themselves as ethnic Macedonians, most for historical and geographic
reasons. Members of the two organizations that purport to defend their
interests, OMO-Ilinden and TMO-Ilinden, are believed to number in the
hundreds (see Section 2.b.). The Government does not recognize
Macedonians as a distinct ethnic group, and the group is not enumerated
in official government statistics.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of all workers to form or join trade unions of their own choice,
and this right apparently was exercised freely. Estimates of the
unionized share of the work force range from 30 to 50 percent. This
share continues to shrink as large firms lay off workers, and most new
positions appear in small, nonunionized businesses.
The two largest trade union confederations are the Confederation of
Independent Trade Unions of Bulgaria (CITUB) and Podkrepa, which
together represent the overwhelming majority of organized workers. The
Government does not control the CITUB, the successor to the trade union
controlled by the former Communist regime. Podkrepa, an independent
confederation created in 1989, was one of the earliest opposition
forces but is no longer a member of the UDF, formerly the main
opposition party, now in the Government. Following legislative changes
in 1998, which mandated a census of the labor force and created minimum
qualifications for labor union recognition, none of the other, much
smaller labor organizations which previously had been represented in
the National Tripartite Coordination Council were able to qualify.
Other labor organizations retain the prospect of future recognition if
they succeed in attracting more members and expanding their
institutional structures.
Doctors, dentists, and some unions expressed dissatisfaction with a
new union structure that they claim the Government imposed upon them in
1998, an action which some maintain violates an ILO convention.
The 1992 Labor Code recognizes the right to strike when other means
of conflict resolution have been exhausted, but ``political strikes''
are forbidden. Workers in essential services (primarily the military
and the police) also are subject to a blanket prohibition against
striking, although such workers on occasion held an ``effective
strike'' in which they stop or slow their activities for 1 or 2 hours.
On most occasions, the Government generally does not interfere with
legal labor strikes, and several work stoppages took place.
On May 27, thousands of workers from the metalworking, machine
building, and arms industries marched through Sofia to protest factory
closures and the falling standard of living. In December workers from
the VMZ arms plant in Sopot blocked the road between Sofia and Bourgas
to protest wage arrears and management's plans to lay off one-third of
its workers.
The Podkrepa labor union has complained that an amendment to a 1990
law, passed in March 1998, facilitated the Government's ability to
declare a strike illegal. Under this new amendment, workers no longer
have the right to appeal when a strike is declared illegal. Podkrepa
maintains that this provision is unconstitutional and violates an ILO
convention.
The Labor Code's prohibitions against antiunion discrimination
include a 6-month period for redress against dismissal as a form of
retribution. However, there is no mechanism other than the courts for
resolving complaints, and the burden of proof in such a case rests
entirely on the employee.
No restrictions limit affiliation or contact with international
labor organizations, and unions actively exercise this right.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
institutes collective bargaining, which was practiced nationally,
regionally, and on the local level. The legal prohibition against
striking for key public sector employees weakens their bargaining
position; however, these groups were able to influence negotiations by
staging protests and engaging in other pressure tactics without going
on strike. Labor unions have complained that while the legal structure
for collective bargaining was adequate, many employers failed to
bargain in good faith or to adhere to agreements that were concluded.
Labor observers viewed the Government's enforcement of labor contracts
as inadequate.
In several instances an employer was found guilty of antiunion
discrimination, but the employers appealed the decisions. The backlog
of cases in the legal system delayed further action, effectively
postponing, perhaps indefinitely, redress of workers' grievances.
The same obligation of collective bargaining and adherence to labor
standards prevails in the six export processing zones, and unions may
organize workers in these areas.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). There also have
been other reports of such practices. In 1997 the BHC issued a report
on the use of forced child labor to make articles for sale at the
Slavovitsa Boys' Reform School. An investigation by the Ministry of
Education into this practice is under way. Many observers had argued
that the previous practice of shunting minority and conscientious
objector military draftees into work units that often carried out
commercial construction and maintenance projects was a form of
compulsory labor; however, the Government abolished these construction
battalions late in the year (see Sections 2.c. and 5).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code sets the minimum age for employment at 16
years; the minimum age for dangerous work is set at 18. Employers and
the Ministry of Labor and Social Policy (MLSP) are responsible for
enforcing these provisions. Child labor laws are enforced well in the
formal sector, but some observers believe that children increasingly
are exploited in certain industries (especially small family-owned
shops, family farms, construction, and periodical sales) and by
organized crime (notably for prostitution and distribution of
narcotics). According to a survey conducted by the MLSP in 1998, more
than 50,000 children under the age of 16 are believed to be employed
illegally in the country. Dr. Zhelyasko Hristov, president of the CITUB
labor union, estimated the total number of illegally employed children
as at least twice that number. In April the first-ever fine was imposed
on an employer of illegal child labor. Underage employment in the
informal and agricultural sectors is believed to be increasing as
collective farms are broken up and the private sector continues to
grow. In addition, children are known to work on family-owned tobacco
farms, and local NGO's reported children working on nonfamily-owned
farms for meager monetary or in-kind wages (e.g., food).
Forced and bonded labor by children also is forbidden by law;
however, trafficking in young girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a problem, and there also have been other reports of
its use (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The national monthly minimum
wage is approximately $37 (Lev 67), which is not enough to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. Nonpayment of wages
and wage payments in arrears continue to be a problem with certain
employers, although the Government has declared the amelioration of
this problem a top priority. The Constitution stipulates the right to
social security and welfare aid assistance for the temporarily
unemployed, although in practice such assistance is often late.
The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours with at
least one 24-hour rest period per week. The MLSP is responsible for
enforcing both the minimum wage and the standard workweek. Enforcement
generally is effective in the state sector (although there are reports
that state-run enterprises fall into arrears on salary payments to
their employees if the firms incur losses) but is weaker in the
emerging private sector.
A national labor safety program exists, with standards established
by the Labor Code. The Constitution states that employees are entitled
to healthy and nonhazardous working conditions. The MLSP is responsible
for enforcing these provisions. Conditions in many cases worsened due
to budget stringencies and a growing private sector that labor
inspectors do not yet supervise effectively. Protective clothing is
often absent from hazardous areas (goggles for welders, helmets for
construction workers, etc.), since employers often imply that payment
for such measures would have to be deducted from the overall budget
used to pay workers' wages. The overall standard of living of workers
stabilized in 1998 after suffering a severe downturn during the
economic crisis of late 1996 and early 1997. The pervasive economic
crisis and imminent, long-overdue privatizations continue to create a
heightened fear of unemployment, leading to a reluctance on the part of
workers to pursue wage and safety demands. In a positive sign, new
legislation passed in during the year mandated that employers set up
joint employer/labor health and safety committees to monitor workplace
conditions. These committees are starting to be organized at many
workplaces. The effectiveness of these committees is not yet apparent.
Under the Labor Code, employees have the right to remove themselves
from work situations that present a serious or immediate danger to life
or health without jeopardizing their continued employment. However, in
practice refusal to work in situations with relatively high accident
rates or associated chronic health problems would result in the loss of
employment for many workers.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--In 1997 the Government enacted a law
against trafficking in women; however, trafficking in women and girls
is a serious problem. A 1997 amendment to the Penal Code on trafficking
in women introduced longer prison sentences (to existing kidnaping
penalties already in force) in those cases where the victim is under 18
years of age, is offered to another person for sexual abuse, or is
trafficked abroad for sexual abuse. However, no suspected traffickers
have been brought to trial, possibly because victims are afraid to
confront their former criminal controllers when there are no
government-sponsored programs to assist or protect victims of
trafficking. Some judges and prosecutors also report that they feared
reprisals from organized crime figures. The Government created two
police units specifically to address the problem of trafficking in
persons. One is part of the border police and the other is in the
Ministry of Interior's organized crime fighting agency. High-level
Ministry of Interior officials cooperated closely with foreign
governments and the International Organization for Migration to support
a research project and information campaign to combat trafficking.
La Strada, a Netherlands-based NGO, reports that Bulgarian women
constitute one of the largest groups of victims of forced prostitution
in Western and Central Europe. Approximately 10,000 Bulgarian women
currently may be involved in international trafficking operations. This
is a very lucrative business for Bulgarian criminal organizations, and
there have been unconfirmed reports of local or police involvement in
trafficking in some areas. Victims of trafficking range from those who
were duped into the belief that they would have good and respectable
employment, to those who expected to work as prostitutes but were
unprepared for the degree of violence and exploitation to which they
would be subjected. A factor contributing to the high number of
trafficking victims from the country is the high unemployment rate
among young women who face limited opportunities in a relatively
patriarchal society. Furthermore, because it may be very difficult for
young women to obtain visas to work in Western Europe, false job
agencies that promise to simplify the process can be very successful in
luring trafficking victims. The process of transforming girls into
prostitutes generally takes place before they even leave the country.
The women typically are taken to a large town, isolated, beaten, and
subjected to severe physical and psychological torture. Some
trafficking victims from countries to the east are kept in Bulgaria for
several weeks where they are subjected to psychological and physical
abuse to make them more submissive before they are shipped to their
destination points. Once the women leave the country, their identity
documents are taken away, and they find themselves forced to work as
prostitutes in cities across Europe. Victims report that traffickers
took away their passports and visas, forced them to stay illegally in
countries, and made them more vulnerable to prosecution in foreign
countries. The women may be required to pay back heavy financial debts
to the agency that helped them depart the country, leaving them in
virtual indentured servitude. Traffickers punish women severely for
acts of disobedience. Some victims have returned to the country with
numbers branded into their skin. Traffickers also use threats against
the women's families and family reputations to ensure obedience.
According to some reports, some 3,500 women are trafficked to Poland,
thousands to the Netherlands and the Czech Republic, while others are
trafficked to Germany, Belgium, Canada, Serbia-Montenegro, Romania,
Hungary, FYROM, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey. The northeast and
southwest border regions are where most trafficking occurs, since women
are sent more easily to former Socialist countries with less strict
visa requirements. In 1998 Polish authorities deported 44 women, who
were working as prostitutes, most from Bulgaria. In Poland there is a
growing market for young girls, as young as 12 or 13 years old, due to
the perception that younger prostitutes are less likely to have
sexually transmitted diseases. Commonly girls are given 15 condoms at
the start of the day and told to make use of all of them before
returning. At a rate of $10 (40 PLN) per sexual encounter, the girls
are expected to bring back $150 (600 PLN). If they do not, they are
beaten and sent out again the next day. Women reportedly have been
trafficked into Bulgaria from the former Soviet Union and FYROM, also
for forced prostitution. The country is also a transit point for
traffickers bringing women to Greece.
The AA reported 59 cases of trafficking in women during the year.
Technical and bureaucratic obstacles hamper governmental assistance
to female victims of violence. Many victims of trafficking and forced
prostitution are too young to have worked previously; the lack of
previous work experience disqualifies them from receiving social
security assistance. If they are runaways with no registered address to
which they can return, they are ineligible for humanitarian assistance.
Victims are not encouraged to file complaints, as there is no mechanism
in place to protect witnesses. Furthermore, societal attitudes and
prevailing moral stigmas tend to ensure that their situation is either
unmentioned or criticized. There is one NGO-sponsored 24-hour hot line
for women in crisis, including victims of trafficking, with trained
volunteers as well as professional therapists to counsel victims. The
NGO also coordinates with government agencies and other NGO's to find
assistance for trafficking victims.
During the year the Government showed encouraging signs of taking
this problem more seriously by confronting it in a multiagency effort,
but this campaign remained in its early stages at year's end.
______
CROATIA
The Republic of Croatia is in principle a constitutional
parliamentary democracy, with a powerful presidency. President Franjo
Tudjman was reelected in 1997 to a second 5-year term in an election
that observers considered ``fundamentally flawed.'' President Tudjman
and the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) had maintained power
since independence in 1991 by using the party's majority position to
deny opposition parties the ability to compete on free and equal terms
in elections. The HDZ agreed in November to hold new parliamentary
elections in January 2000. President Tudjman died in December, and
Parliament Speaker Vlatko Pavletic was named acting President until
presidential elections, which were scheduled to be held by February
2000. The President serves as head of state and commander of the armed
forces, chairs the influential National Defense and Security Council,
nominates the Prime Minister who leads the Government, and approves
certain appointments in local and regional government. During the year,
the extensive constitutional powers of the presidency, the blurring of
the roles and functions of the HDZ party with those of the government
and the presidency, HDZ control of television and the continuing
concentration of power within the one-party central Government combined
to make the country's nominally democratic system in reality
authoritarian. However, on January 3, 2000 the ruling HDZ party lost
generally well-conducted parliamentary elections to an opposition
coalition. The judiciary is nominally independent; however, it suffers
from political influence and bureaucratic inefficiency.
The Ministry of Interior oversees the civilian national police, and
the Ministry of Defense oversees the military and military police. The
national police have primary responsibility for internal security but,
in times of disorder, the Government may call on the army to provide
security. The civilian authorities generally maintain effective control
of the professional security forces, although the police sometimes
committed serious human rights abuses.
The transition to a market-based, free enterprise economy is
proceeding slowly. While agriculture is mostly in private hands and the
number of small enterprises is increasing, industry and media
enterprises are largely either still controlled by the State or
deliberately were transferred in nontransparent, noncompetitive
processes to individuals sympathetic to the ruling party. Unemployment
remained high at 19 percent, and much higher in the areas affected by
the war, and the standard of living for most of the population has yet
to recover to prewar levels. The economy showed underlying weakness
throughout the year in most industrial sectors, particularly in
banking, which continued to be characterized by very low liquidity and
serious losses due to bad loans, which in turn have caused bank
closures, squeezing hundreds of thousands of depositors, employees, and
small entrepreneurs.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although
improvement was noted in certain areas, serious problems continued in
others. The Government's conduct of the flawed 1995 elections seriously
limited citizens' right to change their government peacefully, although
it agreed to hold parliamentary elections in January 2000 according to
provisions of the Constitution. Police occasionally beat persons. The
Government did not always respect due process provisions for arrest and
detention. Lengthy pretrial detention is a problem, especially for
ethnic Serbs indicted for war crimes. The judicial system is subject to
political influence, and the court system suffers from such a severe
backlog of cases that the right of citizens to address their concerns
in court is impaired seriously. Cases of interest to the ruling party
are processed expeditiously, while others languish in court, further
calling into question the independence of the judiciary. The courts
sometimes deny citizens fair trials. The Government at times infringed
on citizens' privacy rights.
The Government restricted press freedom, using the courts and
administrative bodies selectively to shut down or restrain newspapers,
radio, and television stations critical of the Government or simply
outside of its control. A new telecommunications law, passed in June,
in part addressed the concerns of independent radio and television
broadcasters, however the HDZ party was to retain considerable
influence over the administrative councils and the government-owned
radio and television broadcaster for several years. Parliament failed
to pass legislation governing the conduct of state-owned television and
radio, resulting in campaign coverage for parliamentary elections held
in January 2000 that blatantly favored the ruling HDZ party. Government
intimidation including libel charges induced self-censorship by
journalists; some 900 criminal and civil cases against journalists were
ongoing, with legal costs for defendants mounting. There were incidents
of overt censorship of the electronic media. The Government at times
restricted freedom of assembly and circumscribed freedom of association
with a law that prohibited groups from forming unless expressly
authorized to do so by means of an intrusive registration process,
although there were no reports that the Government used this law to
hinder any organization during the year. The Government used the
manipulation of laws, harassment, economic pressure, and its almost
total control of the electronic media to control the political process.
The Government's record of cooperation with international human rights
and monitoring organizations was mixed: It cooperated with some
requests from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY) but refused to comply with others, including the
ICTY's search for evidence on alleged crimes committed during the
Croatian military operations ``Flash'' and ``Storm'' in 1995, and its
request to conduct a field investigation in the country. The
implementation of government programs promulgated in 1998 for the
return to the country of refugee citizens (mostly ethnic Serbs) and the
restitution of their homes proceeded very slowly in many areas because
of local government intransigence, unhelpful influence at the national
level, and bureaucratic and legal confusion.
Violence and discrimination against women remained problems. The
Government discriminates against Muslims. Ethnic minorities,
particularly Serbs as well as Roma, faced continued serious
discrimination. Government commitments to foster reconciliation among
ethnic groups have not been met. While some progress was made, ethnic
tensions in the formerly occupied areas reignited during the year.
Abuses including ethnic-motivated harassment, assaults, and murders
continued to occur. Police performance was generally satisfactory, but
in many cases where the victim was an ethnic Serb, the police either
did not investigate thoroughly or failed to take effective action
against the criminal activity. There were continued departures of
ethnic Serb citizens from the Danubian region (Eastern Slavonia). Poor
economic conditions were a key reason for these departures and the
Government did very little to encourage economic development in the
region. Moreover, the Government not only failed to take steps to
ensure a peaceful reintegration of the area, it often stoked tensions
over exhumations of missing persons and housing for returnees, thereby
compounding the region's problems. Housing and employment regulations
were administered in a manner biased against ethnic Serbs. There were
occasional instances of trafficking in women through the country.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials.
There were three ethnically motivated killings of ethnic Serbs
during the year (see Section 5).
Of the many major crimes committed by both sides during the
conflict, the Government has been much more vigorous in the prosecution
of those committed by ethnic Serbs than those committed by ethnic
Croats. It has been only reluctantly cooperative regarding possible war
crimes associated with the Croatian military operations ``Flash'' and
``Storm'' in 1995. In April the Croatian Helsinki Committee released a
report stating that at least 410 Serb civilians died during the August
1995 operation ``Storm.'' A September report issued by the Government
indicated that criminal charges have been brought in 3,978 cases
associated with ``Flash'' and ``Storm.'' However, this number has not
been confirmed independently by the ICTY, only 13 of these cases
resulted in substantial prison sentences, and none of those convicted
were senior officers. In September the Government refused to submit to
the jurisdiction of the ICTY regarding these operations unless the ICTY
were to convene a special chamber to rule on the issue. In August one
(of two) ICTY indictees was transferred to the Hague. The extradition
of the second indictee still was pending at year's end due to his poor
health (see Section 4). In the Danubian region, five ethnic Serbs were
convicted in May of war crimes in the ``Sodolovci'' case on very weak
evidence; however, the Supreme Court reversed their convictions in
November. Croatian military and paramilitary members involved in
murders in Pakracka Poljana in 1991 were acquitted or sentenced to time
served (see Section 1.e.).
Progress was made on the exhumation and identification of bodies at
a number of sites in the Danubian region. Throughout the country, the
bodies of 3,129 victims have been exhumed from mass and individual
graves since the war (see Section 1.b.).
Dinko Sakic, commander of Croatia's Jasenovac concentration camp in
1944, was convicted in October of crimes against humanity and sentenced
to 20 years' imprisonment, the maximum sentence. Sakic was extradited
from Argentina in 1998.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
Government figures in December showed that 1,658 persons (mostly
ethnic Croats) still were missing in cases unresolved from the 1991-95
military conflict. However, this number does not reflect an additional
approximately 900 persons (mostly ethnic Serbs) believed to be missing
from 1995, which were reported to the Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) or to international organizations. There
has been significant progress on the recovery and identification of the
remains of ethnic Croats; however, efforts to identify persons reported
missing after mid-1995 (primarily ethnic Serbs) were hampered by
political and bureaucratic obstacles. Progress was made on the
exhumation and identification of bodies at a number of sites in the
Danubian region (eastern Slavonia), including a well in Vukovar where
10 female bodies were located in August and a site in Ilok where 30
bodies were recovered in September. Throughout the country, 3,129
victims have been exhumed from mass and individual graves since the
war, 81 percent of whom have been identified, and 53 percent of whom
were civilians. At a March conference with government officials from
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the FRY, the Government agreed to set up a
subcommission on missing persons for the Danubian region and to hold
regular meetings with FRY officials on missing persons. In December the
Danubian subcommission finally became operational. There were no
subsequent bilateral meetings with FRY officials after March in part
due to the disruption caused by the NATO campaign in Kosovo.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, maltreatment, or cruel
or degrading punishment; and there were occasional credible reports
that police beat persons and that these cases were not always
investigated properly.
According to press reports in August, ethnic Croatian police
officers in the Baranja region beat Roma. According to a Roma rights
nongovernmental organization (NGO), in one incident an ethnic Croatian
police officer allegedly beat a Rom and threatened him at gunpoint. The
Rom reportedly filed a complaint against the officer.
In April during tense contract negotiations with Croatian
railroads' management, the vice president of the Locomotive Engineers
Union reportedly was beaten severely with metal bars by unknown
assailants (see Section 6.a.).
According to press reports, in June an opposition Socialist
Worker's Party head reported that unidentified assailants hit him in
the head with a gun, for which he was hospitalized. According to the
individual, this was the fourth or fifth such attack he suffered in the
previous 12 months.
Ethnic minorities reportedly were beaten by unknown assailants in
the Danubian region (see Section 5). According to press reports,
unknown persons threw bombs at Romani houses in Vardarci. Roma
allegedly reported the incidents to police, but no suspects were found.
Full control of the police in the Danubian region reverted to the
Government in 1998, and the role of police monitoring was assumed by
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The
OSCE reported that overall police performance was satisfactory. Leaders
of the ethnic Serb community observed that the police generally
conducted themselves well, and that in the Danubian region it was the
judiciary that was more often responsible for failures in the legal
system. Lack of police training and occasionally fear by police to
carry out their duties were ongoing problems. In some cases,
particularly where the victim of a crime was an ethnic Serb, police
investigations were not thoroughly conducted. In the Danubian region
monitors noted that police occasionally called ethnic Serbs to police
stations for ``voluntary informative talks,'' which amounted to brief
warrantless detentions intended to harass Serb citizens.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. Jails are
crowded, but not excessively so, and family visits and access to
counsel are generally available, albeit not consistently at all phases
of the criminal proceedings (see Section 1.d.).
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
contains the provision to protect the legal rights of all accused
persons, but the Government does not always respect due process
provisions for arrest and detention. Police normally obtain arrest
warrants by presenting evidence of probable cause to an investigative
magistrate. Police may carry out arrests without a warrant if they
believe a suspect might flee, destroy evidence, or commit other crimes.
Such cases are not uncommon. The police then have 24 hours in which to
justify their decision before a magistrate. Inspectors working under
the auspices of the Ministry of Finance (the so-called ``financial
police'') do not require a warrant in order to enter premises and
examine records, actions that can lead to the unilateral shutdown of
the organization in question in advance of any due process (see Section
2.a.).
Detainees must be given access to an attorney of their choice
within 24 hours of their arrest; if they have none and are charged with
a crime for which the sentence is over 10 years' imprisonment, the
investigative magistrate appoints the defense counsel. The
investigative magistrate must, within 48 hours of the arrest, decide
whether sufficient cause exists to hold a person in custody pending
further investigation. Investigative detention usually lasts from a few
days to a few weeks, but the Supreme Court may extend the deadline (for
a total period of not more than 6 months) in exceptional cases. Once
the investigation is complete, detainees are released on their own
recognizance pending trial, unless the crime is a serious offense, the
accused are considered a public danger, or the court believes that they
may flee.
However, persons held under investigation sometimes were denied the
right to have an attorney present during all parts of the investigative
stage or appeal of investigative detention. During the year, suspects
were allowed greater access to attorneys during the investigative
stage, and fewer complaints were noted. In practice detainees generally
are bound over for investigation unless it is clear that no case exists
against them. There have been several cases of lengthy pretrial
detention, including individuals who are awaiting the prosecutor's
appeal of their acquittal. While there are provisions for posting bail
after charges are brought, the practice is not common. The
International Committee of the Red Cross in September counted 72 ethnic
Serbs in detention for acts related to the conflicts in 1991-95; of
these only 37 had received final convictions, while the rest were in
various stages of their judicial processes.
The arrest in June of former intelligence official Miroslav
Separovic appeared to be politically motivated; Separovic allegedly
leaked state secrets to the press that resulted in a newspaper article
on politically motivated fixing of soccer matches by intelligence
agents. The charges against Separovic were dropped in August (see
Section 2.a.).
The Government's application of the 1996 amnesty act for rebel
Serbs remained problematic. Confusion arose from the fact that the
Government initially issued a list of 13,575 persons who were given
amnesty from indictments for rebellion during the military conflict,
absent the appearance of new and credible evidence of war crimes, as
well as a list of 25 individuals who were indicted for war crimes.
During the year, the Government issued at least 91 new war crimes
indictments, both individual and collective, for ethnic Serbs whose
names appear on the amnesty list, claiming that they were based upon
new and credible evidence. However, international monitors questioned
the credibility of the evidence and the transparency of the process. In
several cases, charges were reworded so that offenses that were
eligible for amnesty were reinstated either as war crimes or common
crimes. These indictments were issued without previously agreed-upon
notification to the ICTY. In March the Government claimed that the list
of persons amnestied had grown to 18,314; however, the identities of
the 4,739 additions to the list were not announced. These events
created great uncertainty among ethnic Serbs, because some who wished
to return to the country were unwilling to do so until they knew that
they would not be arrested, and others who believed themselves
amnestied later were arrested.
In separate cases in April and July, Serb police officers in Borovo
Selo and in Ilok (both in the Danubian region) were arrested for war
crimes dating to 1991 and 1993 respectively, despite the fact that both
previously were cleared for police duty by the Ministry of Interior.
The Government indicated that there was new evidence justifying their
arrests. In September both still were detained pending trial. In
addition, in at least five other cases, ethnic Serb police officers in
the region fled to the FRY when they learned that they were the subject
of investigations. NGO's noted that even a small number of such
apparently political cases created serious uncertainty among the 700
Serb police officers in the region. The appeal of Milos Horvat
(sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for genocide in 1997 based on what
international monitors described as questionable standards of evidence)
was heard by the Supreme Court in December 1998, 18 months after it was
filed. In a June decision, the Supreme Court rejected Horvat's appeal
of his conviction and also rejected the prosecutor's appeal of the 5-
year sentence as too short.
The Constitution prohibits the exile of citizens. In 1998 the
Government established procedures by which Croatian Serb refugees who
fled the country in 1995 might regulate their citizenship status,
obtain citizenship documentation, return to Croatia, and reclaim their
property. Implementation of these procedures is moving forward;
however, progress has been slow and uneven (see Section 2.d.). During
the year, 8,625 persons who were refugees in the FRY and Bosnia-
Herzegovina were able to return to Croatia. Government figures indicate
that overall since the conflict, of approximately 250,000 ethnic Serbs
who fled their homes, 33,000 have returned from abroad and 27,000 have
returned to their homes after being displaced within the country. An
October survey by the U.N. High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR)
estimated that the actual number of Serb returnees may be much higher
than these government figures indicate. In a positive development, the
Government opened a full-time consulate in Banja Luka, Bosnia-
Herzegovina to facilitate documentation for citizens in Bosnia. The
UNHCR and NGO's reported that the Croatian Embassy in Belgrade
experienced lengthy delays in providing citizenship and travel
documents to citizens (overwhelmingly ethnic Serbs) wishing to return
to Croatia. Ethnic Serbs within Croatia requiring documentation also
report persistent difficulties and delays, and contradictory
requirements by local officials charged with issuing documents.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is nominally
independent; however, it suffers from political influence. In practice
bureaucratic inefficiency mars the system; the court system has a
backlog of over 1 million cases.
The judicial system consists of municipal and district courts, the
Administrative Court, and the Supreme Court. The independent
Constitutional Court both determines the constitutionality of laws,
governmental acts, and elections and serves as the court of final
appeal for individual cases. A parallel commercial court system
adjudicates commercial and contractual disputes. The State Judicial
Council (consisting of a president and 14 members) is a body
independent of both the judiciary and the Ministry of Justice charged
with both the appointment and discipline, including removal, of judges,
court presidents, and public prosecutors. The upper house of Parliament
nominates persons for membership on the Council, and the lower house
elects the members for 8-year terms. The 11 judges of the
Constitutional Court are elected for 8-year terms in the same manner,
while all other judges are appointed for life.
Judges are prohibited by the Constitution from being members of any
political party. Nonetheless, the HDZ party wielded considerable
influence over the judiciary, and critics charged that the State
Judicial Council (whose members were appointed by the HDZ-dominated
Parliament) was a political tool of the executive branch. While the
Council is authorized to act independently in the appointment and
review of judges, it occasionally has defied Constitutional Court
rulings. Moreover, the terms of 8 of the 11 Constitutional Court
justices expired in December, and the HDZ reached an agreement with the
opposition parties to replace them with judges selected for their
political loyalties rather than professional merit. For example,
hardline HDZ supporter Vice Vukojevic who is known for his nationalist
rhetoric was appointed to the Constitutional Court in December. Several
prominent lawsuits to annul the new appointments to the Court on
technical grounds were rejected. Observers believe that this agreement
could yield a new court that is less independent and less qualified
than the previous court. The outgoing president of the Constitutional
Court publicly criticized the process by which the new court judges
were selected and noted that none of those chosen were career judges.
The severe shortage of judges prevalent in recent years was
reduced. However, a greater problem was that many of the newly
appointed judges were inexperienced and did not consistently apply the
rule of law. While the ruling HDZ party may not have intervened
directly in judicial deliberations, the newly hired judges were
appointed by, and often were sympathetic to, the HDZ. Judges at times
made decisions in a nontransparent manner seemingly at odds with the
evidence or the law. The judicial system suffers from a massive
backlog, estimated at 750,000 to more than 1 million cases, some dating
back 30 years or more. Cases involving average citizens may drag on for
years, while criminal libel suits or other cases affecting high-level
government officials are heard within weeks under ``urgent
proceedings'' (see Section 2.a.). According to the president of the
Association of Croatian Judges, the Government failed to provide the
financial means necessary for the regular operation of the courts. The
case backlogs in Zagreb, Rijeka, and Split are compounded by government
cutbacks on telephone, gas, water, and electricity throughout the
country.
Although the Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial
and a variety of due process rights in the courts, the courts sometimes
denied citizens fair trials. Local authorities often refused to
implement court decisions. For example, little or no progress was made
in numerous cases of illegal evictions in which the legal owner had a
positive court decision, yet was unable to gain access to his property.
Judicial decisions overwhelmingly favored ethnic Croats in property
claims involving returning refugees and displaced persons.
Approximately 22 percent of all claims submitted to a court were
decided in favor of a non-Croat claimant. In those cases in which the
court ruled in favor of a non-Croat, only a handful of judicial orders
for the eviction of a Croat occupant of a Serb-owned home have ever
been carried out by the police (see Section 1.f.). Many of these cases
involve either current or former members of the Croatian military or
police forces, and local authorities refuse to act against them on
behalf of the rightful owner. The only recourse for the defendant is to
return to court to demand implementation of the first decision, a time-
consuming and costly procedure that still may not result in
implementation. Despite an April Constitutional Court ruling
overturning a Zagreb city decree that had restricted public protests in
the city, local officials continued to enforce the decree until a new
law was passed in October (see Section 2.b.). Cases in the Danubian
region (Eastern Slavonia) in which the plaintiff was an ethnic Croat
were heard and decided in a matter of days or weeks, and judicial
orders were carried out expeditiously, sometimes at the expense of the
legal rights of Serbs. However, cases in which the plaintiff was an
ethnic Serb often dragged on for months or years.
The Government continued to apply questionable legal standards in
the implementation of the general amnesty adopted in 1996. There was
credible evidence that crimes for which persons should have received
amnesty were recategorized as either common crimes or war crimes (see
Section 1.d.).
In May two cases starkly highlighted the contrasting treatment of
ethnic Serb and ethnic Croat war crimes defendants. The county court in
Osijek in the Danubian region convicted five ethnic Serbs (the
``Sodolovci group'') of crimes against civilian populations for
participating in artillery attacks against civilian targets in 1991 and
1992 and sentenced them to terms of imprisonment ranging from 8 to 15
years. The indictments were for a generalized series of attacks, and
the evidence did not conclusively connect the defendants to the
attacks. The case focused on the fact that the defendants were members
of a unit known to have been active in the area in the given time
period. During the course of the trial Justice Minister Zvonimir
Separovic visited the Osijek county court, discussed ``current legal
issues'' with the president of the court, Petar Klajic, and other
judges, and made public statements asserting that the court system
would not be subject to foreign pressure. Only 2 days after Separovic's
visit, the court handed down its verdict. The verdict was criticized
sharply in the ethnic Serb community. In November the Supreme Court
overturned the verdicts and freed the defendants. Also in May, six
ethnic Croats were released in the ``Pakracka Poljana'' case (four were
acquitted and two convicted of minor offenses and sentenced to time
served) for crimes against Serbs in Western Slavonia in 1991. This was
the first major war crimes case brought against ethnic Croats for
actions against Serbs. The judgements were reached despite a 1997
newspaper interview by defendant Miroslav Bajramovic in which he
personally admitted to killing 70 Serbs in Pakracka Poljana and also
implicated other defendants as well as Tomislav Mercep, a well-known
hardline political figure who was never charged. Although Bajramovic's
alleged crimes were well-known to the Government, charges were brought
against him only in response to public criticism over the newspaper
interview. The interview was not introduced as evidence during the
trial, nor was any real effort made to obtain evidence or secure
witness testimony to support the charges.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--At times the Government infringed on these rights. The
Constitution declares the home inviolable. Only a court may issue a
search warrant, which must state the justification for the search.
Police may enter a home without a warrant or the owner's consent only
if necessary to enforce an arrest warrant, apprehend a suspect, or
prevent serious danger to life or property. While the authorities
generally complied with these norms, there were notable exceptions in
which the Government did not respect private property in practice.
Despite developing a mechanism by which property could, in theory, be
restored to the original owner, the Government failed to implement this
program vigorously. Furthermore, there are no provisions for those
individuals, primarily citizens of Serb ethnicity, who lost tenancy
rights to their dwellings during the war to return to their previous
homes.
There were many press reports and claims by a number of prominent
figures that authorities authorized an extensive campaign of
wiretapping against the independent media, opposition political
figures, and others (see Section 2.a.). Leaks indicated the use of
wiretapping by government intelligence services. In February the weekly
Nacional reportedly filed charges against head of the Office for the
Protection of the Constitutional Order and/or the Minister of Interior
Ivan Penic for wiretapping and illegal surveillance activities of its
journalists. An opposition Member of Parliament who was another alleged
target of surveillance called for the President's intervention in the
matter, the resignation of Interior Minister Penic, and the creation of
a commission to investigate the work of the intelligence services.
Penic reported that the Ministry of Interior began an investigation
into these allegations of illegal surveillance activities. In December
after claims that the intelligence services had bugged the offices or
telephone of acting President and Speaker of the Parliament Vlatko
Pavletic, a parliamentary commission concluded that this was not the
case. However, Paveletic called for a curtailment of the conditions
under which the intelligence services legally may use wiretaps. Later
that month former Croatian Intelligence Service Director Miroslav
Separovic published the names of more public figures who he claims were
monitored illegally by the intelligence services at the request of HDZ
hardliners. The list includes opposition members as well as HDZ
members.
Despite a 1997 Constitutional Court ruling that several elements of
the Law on the Temporary Takeover of Specified Property (LTTP) were
unconstitutional, the vast majority of Serb property owners who fled
homes that were later occupied by ethnic Croats remained unable to
access their property. A 1998 program for the return of refugees and
displaced persons, which included mechanisms for property restitution
and reconstruction, was implemented very slowly and only a handful of
cases of property restitution were recorded by year's end, as both
national and local authorities declined to take steps to displace
temporary occupants in favor of the original owners, as stipulated in
the return program. Further, only a handful of claims by ethnic Serbs
for reconstruction have been considered. Despite orders from the
national Government, local authorities (including local housing
commissions) often did not take steps to regulate permits authorizing
or revoking occupancy rights or to initiate lawsuits against
individuals who refused to vacate occupied premises, a situation that
remained largely unchanged throughout the year. Numerous returning
ethnic Serb displaced persons and refugees continued to remain shut out
of their homes, although in many cases the occupier's house had been
reconstructed and there was no impediment to his return. In general in
such cases, the Government failed to furnish reconstructed houses with
basic utilities. Housing commissions were often purposefully
dysfunctional, failed to resolve housing cases, and ignored judicial
decisions. In Knin the housing commission resolved less than one dozen
property disputes and allowed a 500-case backlog to accumulate. One of
the very few cases of ``multiple occupancy'' (in which a family
occupies more than one home, thus preventing rightful homeowners from
returning) that was resolved during the year occurred in the Sisak area
where an ethnic Croat kept his dog in the otherwise empty home of an
ethnic Serb. Local authorities refused to evict the dog until July,
after U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and other
Western diplomats personally raised the issue with the highest levels
of the Government. Cases of disregard for the Government's return
program and its legal provisions were common.
Throughout the year, the OSCE and local human rights organizations
reported forcible evictions of ethnic Serbs from Croat-owned homes
without receiving alternative accommodations on an almost weekly basis.
Police response was mixed, due in part to conflicting instructions from
higher authorities. Despite direct intervention from senior government
officials to halt the evictions and clarify police instructions,
homeowners were allowed to harass occupants until they were, in effect,
forced to leave. In many cases, the actions of local political
officials in the Danubian region called into question their
impartiality. The housing commissions in the Danubian region (where
temporary occupants were overwhelmingly ethnic Serb) were more active
and effective in returning property to the original homeowners than
were housing commissions in other regions (where the temporary
occupants were primarily ethnic Croats). In Beli Manistir, OSCE
officials and an NGO noted that an unofficial housing commission,
headed by the deputy mayor and supported by the local police,
improperly evicted several ethnic Serbs. Materials to repair and
reconstruct war-damaged housing were being distributed in a manner that
discriminated against Serbs, and villages where Serbs were a majority
were being reconstructed at a slower pace than Croat-majority villages,
despite the adoption in 1998 of a reconstruction program which aimed to
ensure nondiscriminatory provision of such assistance.
An ongoing problem was the continued occupation of homes belonging
to Croatian Serbs by refugees from neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina and
the FRY, as well as ``priority category'' ethnic Croat citizens, i.e.,
active duty or former members of the military, widows, and orphans.
Ethnic Croats wishing to return to the Danubian region also were unable
to return to homes occupied by Serbs. Many Serb returnees were unable
to move into looted and devastated homes that the Government defined as
habitable. Of the total 7,123 applications for repossession of property
recorded by the government Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees
(ODPR) at the end of August, less than one-fourth were listed as
returned to their owners.
No progress was made to resolve the thousands of cases of citizens
(mostly ethnic Serbs) who, due to their absence for more than 6 months
during the war, lost their occupancy rights. Ethnic Serbs were affected
disproportionately because no mechanism existed by which they could
return to the country in order to claim their property or because they
had lived in the occupied parts of the country and missed the chance to
purchase their previous apartments.
There were no reports that the Ministry of Defense arbitrarily
revoked the tenancy rights of individuals who had lived in their
apartments for decades. Split resident Hasim Begovic fully recovered
his apartment late in the year.
Incidents of grenade attacks against property and arson related to
housing disputes were reported during the year (see Section 5).
The Constitution provides for the secrecy and safety of personal
data, and this provision generally was respected. Unlike previous
years, there were no further reports during the year that requests made
by ethnic Serbs to return to their original homes in the formerly
occupied areas were used by individuals to vandalize or in some cases
destroy the property in order to prevent the Serbs from returning.
There were persistent reports to international organizations, although
fewer in number than in 1998, that local housing commissions allowed
authorizations for temporary accommodation to be transferred among
temporary users, thus keeping a residence occupied even after the
original owner's intention to return was known.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of thought and expression, specifically including freedom of
the press and other media, speech, and public expression, as well as
the free establishment of institutions of public communication;
however, the Government restricted these rights in practice. The
Government controls or influences much of the print media, controls or
influences most of the electronic media (in particular, television),
and influences and manipulates the judiciary. All this, combined with
the Government's continued harassment--through job loss or banishment
from the airwaves, overt censorship, intimidation, and criminal
prosecution--of those journalists who criticized the ruling HDZ party,
stifled many of these freedoms in practice. The Government maintained
an unofficial campaign of harassment of the independent media
throughout the year, and more than 300 criminal and 600 civil
prosecutions of journalists are ongoing, many brought by government
officials or their close relatives or associates. The law gives the
public prosecutor the right to appeal an acquittal, thereby potentially
exposing journalists to double jeopardy. There continued to be reports
of government wiretapping of some independent journalists (see Section
1.f.). The new telecommunications law, passed on June 30, created
opportunities for independent media, most notably by allowing local
independent radio and television broadcasters to ``network,'' or
jointly produce and broadcast national programming, for 5 hours per day
to compete with state-run television. However, the Government continued
to control and manipulate the regulatory framework and the licensing of
radio and television. In particular, the ruling party retained the
ability to select the members of the managing council and the Council
for Radio and Television for 3- to 5-year terms, and these members are
to set prices and grant concessions through procedures that are still
arbitrary and nontransparent.
Despite continued domestic and international protest, the
Government took no steps to revise articles of the Penal Code that
authorize the criminal prosecution of journalists who publish ``state
secrets'' or insult the honor or dignity of the President, the Prime
Minister, the Speaker of Parliament, or the Chief justices of either
the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court. Individuals may
criticize the Government, although not always without reprisal. On May
6, a Zagreb court indicted four employees of Zagrebacka Banka for
leaking confidential bank documents to the press in 1998. The court
also indicted the reporter who wrote the article, which contained
details about the undisclosed bank accounts of Ankica Tudjman, the wife
of the President. There continued to be over 900 libel lawsuits against
journalists and publishers, the majority continuing from previous
years, filed by both government officials and private parties. The HDZ-
sponsored laws, both criminal and civil, that permitted these suits
were adopted in recent years amid criticism that they were overly
broad. The HDZ has taken no action to amend or modify the laws. While
defendants sometimes prevailed in such suits, the libel laws remained
problematic because defending such cases represented a significant and
ongoing financial and personal hardship for them. The Zagreb county
court once again acquitted Davor Butkovic, editor of the weekly Globus,
of criminal liability in March, ending his legal battle, which included
a Government appeal of an earlier acquittal in 1998, leading to a
``double jeopardy'' trial for the weekly.
There are currently some 70 lawsuits (20 criminal cases and 50
civil cases) filed against the publishers of the independent satirical
weekly Feral Tribune, with potential damages exceeding $2 million (14
million kuna) and an unspecified amount of legal and court costs
involved.
The ruling party and businesspersons with close ties to it
continued to maintain a virtual monopoly on printing and distribution
of magazines and newspapers. Acute financial difficulties stemming from
poor overall economic conditions created ongoing difficulties for the
media. The distributor Tisak reached the point of insolvency, failing
to pay publications, particularly independent publications, thus
threatening their financial stability. The Tisak debt to independent
weekly Nacional alone was over $500,000 (nearly 4 million kuna). A
government bailout plan had not been implemented at year's end. The
slow pace of the judicial process (see Section 1.e.) makes it extremely
difficult for these publications to seek timely redress of their
payment difficulties in the courts. Journals and publications also
complained that they had little control over where their publications
were sent, with large quantities at times being sent to remote
villages, leaving the bigger, urban markets undersupplied.
In July the editor in chief of the Nacional stated that the
independent print media, including Nacional, were under attack from the
Government, which aimed to marginalize or eliminate independent media
in the period prior to the parliamentary elections. Government
harassment of Nacional intensified after the weekly ran a June article
alleging that the Government rigged the Croatian soccer championship on
orders from President Tudjman. The Ministry of Interior then launched
an investigation of Nacional employees suspected of publishing a
``state secret'' and ordered police searches of Nacional offices and
the homes of editor in chief Ivo Pukanic and his parents. In June
authorities arrested Nacional's editor for his role in publishing
alleged state secrets. On June 9, authorities arrested former Croatian
Intelligence Service Director Miroslav Separovic for allegedly leaking
``state secrets'' about the soccer matches; authorities dropped the
charges against Separovic in August (see Section 1.d.). Pukanic also
was subjected to public death threats from the national soccer team's
coach as a result of the soccer expose.
Police surveillance of journalists reportedly continued, with
Nacional claiming that its journalists were under constant surveillance
and that both their home and office telephones were tapped (see Section
1.f.).
On February 25, two unknown assailants beat a reporter and a
photographer from the independent daily Jutarnji List. The two
journalists had been taking photographs of a new house under
construction that belonged to Assistant Defense Minister General
Marinko Kresic for which allegedly he did not have a permit. The
authorities arrested two suspects, and a military police spokesman
denied that the attackers could have been members of that force.
The ruling HDZ party's control of the national electronic media
continued to be pervasive and blatant. The HRT is the only national
network and is the main source of news for 88 percent of the
population. It broadcasts on three national television and radio
channels. Technically under the control of Parliament, the HRT was, in
practice, run by the ruling HDZ Party. The Government controlled the
state network through the HRT Council which, like the
Telecommunications Council, also was dominated by the HDZ. The HRT
Council directly supervised operations and editorial content of state-
run radio and television, effectively restricting access by opposition
parties to criticize government policies (see Section 3). During the
year, the growing realization that the HDZ might lose the upcoming
parliamentary elections, fueled by polls showing the HDZ trailing,
caused HDZ hardliners to consolidate their grip on the HRT. HRT
coverage of the election campaign often was biased in favor of the HDZ
party, but it improved noticeably over previous elections. A new HRT
council was named in February, with a chairman who was a member of the
HDZ party presidency, a new editor in chief who was a member of the HDZ
main committee, and two new assistants who were HDZ hardliners.
In August the HRT announced that the news program One Plus One,
which was subject to government censorship since mid-1998, would be
cancelled. HRT also cancelled the respected programs of Ivo Loncar and
Mirjana Rakic, the latter to be replaced with a progovernment
commentator. The HRT took the program off the air on January 19 for a
program it planned to broadcast which allegedly would incite ``social
disorder and violence'' (the program included a pensioner's statement
that an opposition party leader should be hung, among other things).
The Telecommunications Council awarded the license for a fourth
national channel to Nova TV whose owners are identified closely with
the HDZ party. During the year, the much anticipated reform of the HRT
law did not occur. This legislation would be a key step for reform of
electronic media and overall democratization. The electronic media's
HDZ bias continued to be a concern, although inflammatory language in
the media that was designed to exacerbate ethnic tensions has decreased
in recent years.
Both public and private radio and television stations coexist. The
June Telecommunications Law permitted ``networking'' by independent
broadcasters to achieve national coverage. Revenue collection also is
skewed greatly in favor of the HRT, which receives subsidies from
government taxes on television (accounting for some two-thirds of the
HRT's gross annual revenues), as well as some 80 percent of advertising
revenue. These subsidies create an unfair advantage for the HRT over
any independent television station that tries to compete, since the
independents' ability to purchase programming, etc., is far less than
that of the HRT. Similar problems exist in radio broadcasting. The
enforcement arm of the Ministry of Finance, the financial police, often
has been used by the Telecommunications Council to shut down stations
deemed too critical of the Government, but there were fewer reports of
such problems during the year. Journalists who sought reform of the HRT
from within routinely were silenced and in many cases taken off the air
while still on the HRT payroll.
Government censorship also influenced the independent media. On
January 29, the Ministry of Traffic, Communications, and Maritime
Affairs shut down Adriatic Television (ATV), a Split-based county-
licensed television station. The official reason was that ATV had not
paid its annual licensing fee of approximately $35,000 (217,000 kuna).
However, opposition leaders and independent media observers speculate
that the station was closed because opposition Croatian Social Liberal
Party leader Drazen Budisa was scheduled to appear on a local program,
titled, ``Censorship.'' The National Association of Independent
Television Stations and Forum 21 (an association of independent
broadcast journalists) protested the decision and noted that while
nonpayment is a legal basis for shutting down a station, the decision
was unfair since the economic crisis and high licensing fees were
destroying the independent electronic media. In February the editor in
chief and his deputy of a local radio station in Varazdin were fired by
the station's owners, functionaries of the HDZ party, after an
interview with a Western diplomat was broadcast. In addition, on the
day that an independent television station in Split planned to air a
program with an appearance by an opposition politician, it was pulled
off the air for nonpayment of its annual licensing fees. The station's
director, an HDZ member, later cancelled the program.
Foreign newspapers and journals were available in larger urban
areas throughout the country, although their high cost (about three
times the price of local newspapers) made them expensive for most
persons.
While academic freedom generally is respected, scholars reported
that they were reluctant to speak out on political issues. Some
scientists state that the government exerted subtle pressure on them
through its control of research funds. In June the Dean of the Faculty
of Philosophy at the University of Zagreb banned a panel discussion
organized by a student group on the escalation of violence in the
country, ostensibly because the panel discussants were not members of
the academic community and because current political issues were not to
be discussed at the university because its autonomy must be preserved.
The Dean stated that such events would continue to be banned in the
future.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly; however, the Government at
times exercised arbitrary control to restrict this right during the
year, although there were fewer incidents of such reports. The
Government restricted this right by denying some groups access to
Zagreb's main square and other gathering places. The lack of a clear
policy to regulate such events and address questions of security and
inconvenience, and the fact that HDZ party rallies and other public
events have been staged regularly at these sites in the past, combined
to make the government actions appear partisan and nontransparent. A
new law on assembly that passed in October was only slightly less
restrictive, since it permitted assembly for registered demonstrations
at approved locations but did not make transparent the process for
approving or denying such registration. However, this law was not
applied in a way that noticeably favored the HDZ Party nor were those
critical of the Government singled out for denial of permission to
assemble, particularly in the period before the January 2000
parliamentary elections.
Numerous rallies and demonstrations took place throughout the
country during the year, many of which were led by workers protesting
poor social conditions and pay. On February 16, some 2,000 workers
marched in Zagreb. When the group spontaneously decided to march to the
square in front of the parliament building, where demonstrations are
prohibited, they were met by some 200 police officers. Several police
officers were injured, one seriously, in the ensuing scuffle. On March
31, the Constitutional Court overturned the law on peaceful assembly
that had granted local governments the authority to decide the location
of public gatherings. Public gatherings still must be approved in
advance, but may only be restricted for security reasons, as decided by
the Ministry of Interior. However, local officials continued to enforce
the law, and denied access to strategic places in the city. In April
shortly after the Constitutional Court's ruling, Zagreb authorities
charged a prominent union leader with a misdemeanor for organizing a
protest in front of a government building. On June 8, textile workers
from Duga Resa were blocked from protesting in Zagreb by a large cordon
of policemen brought into the city from all over the country.
Approximately 500 police blocked the protesters' passage through side
streets to prevent them from reaching the main government square.
The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
legislation adopted in 1997 increased the Government's ability to
restrict this right, although there were no reports that the Government
used this law to hinder any organization during the year. The 1997 Law
on Associations gives the Government broad powers to prevent the
founding of an association and to monitor all aspects of an association
once founded. There were no reports of the Government abusing this law
against associations or NGO's during the year, but several NGO's
observed that the mere process of registering is an intrusive and
unnecessary form of governmental oversight. All associations of at
least 10 persons must register their activities. An association's
activities may be suspended administratively based on only a ``well-
founded'' suspicion that the group's activities contravene the
Constitution or the law. Until such time as the association proves
itself innocent in a court of law, the Government can keep it closed
indefinitely and dispose of its assets. The reregistration process is
proceeding only slowly, and many local and international NGO's faced
bureaucratic obstacles. According to the law, in the absence of any
formal notification to the contrary, an NGO is to consider itself
reregistered. However, without written confirmation of registration
from the Ministry of Administration, NGO's face significant obstacles
in their day-to-day functioning. Reports of harassment by the
``financial police'' (Finance Ministry officials who do not require a
warrant in order to enter premises and examine records which can lead
to the unilateral shutdown of the organization in question in advance
of any due process) were fewer than in the past. In Osijek a human
rights NGO was audited after its director took a new position with
another NGO, for which President Tudjman had publicly expressed
animosity. In a positive development, the Government established an
office for NGO's that disbursed funding of approximately $1 million (7
million kuna).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
conscience and religion and free public profession of religious
conviction, and the Government respects these rights in practice. No
formal restrictions are imposed on religious groups, and all religious
communities are free to conduct public services and to open and run
social and charitable institutions. Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodox
Christianity, and Islam are major faiths, and there is a small Jewish
community.
Croatian Protestants from a number of denominations and foreign
clergy and missionaries actively practice and proselytize.
While there is no official state religion, approximately 85 percent
of the population are Catholic, and the dividing line between the Roman
Catholic Church and the State often had been blurred in the past. The
ruling HDZ party periodically attempted to identify itself more closely
with the Catholic Church. However, the Church more frequently sought an
independent role for itself on political issues and was at times openly
critical of the prevailing political climate. However, the Church has
taken advantage of HDZ support to work actively to strengthen its
influence elsewhere, such as in public schools. The head of the
Catholic Church, Archbishop Josip Bozanic, was active in publicly
promoting reconciliation and the return of refugees. In March the
Archbishop met with Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and
in May he made a strong public challenge to the Government during his
homily at a Statehood Day Mass attended by President Tudjman. In
November the Croatian Catholic Bishops' Conference issued a statement
calling on the faithful to participate in the December parliamentary
elections and to overcome the ``old, intolerant one-party mentality''.
Religion and ethnicity are closely intertwined in society, but the
majority of incidents of discrimination are motivated by ethnicity
rather than religion (see Section 5). There were persistent reports of
vandalism to Serb Orthodox cemeteries. The Ministry of Defense employed
19 Catholic priests to tend to Catholics in the military, but employed
no Orthodox Christian or Muslim clergy. The Government requires that
religious training be provided in schools, although attendance is
optional. Schools are allowed to offer classes in minority religions if
they fill the necessary quota of minority students. However, lack of
resources, minority students, and qualified teachers generally impeded
catechism in minority faiths, so the Catholic catechism was the one
predominately offered. According to numerous reports, although not
obligatory, students felt pressured to attend religious training. In a
positive development in September, the Government instructed public
schools that reached the minimum quota of Muslim students to sign work
contracts with Muslim instructors. In the past, Muslim teachers were
not paid by the Government while Catholic teachers were. Jewish
officials noted that basic information provided to students about
Judaism is inaccurate, and their offers to improve the material went
unheeded. There were several cases in which individual missionaries had
difficulty in obtaining missionary visas, but it was unclear whether
this was due to religious discrimination or bureaucratic inefficiency
and failure by missionaries to fulfill all of the necessary
requirements. Missionaries do not operate registered schools, but the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints provides free English
lessons, often followed by religious instruction. The Muslim community
has a secondary school in Zagreb; however, the Ministry of Education
refuses to recognize the diploma from this school. Although in recent
years the Government had discriminated against a particular group of
Muslims in the issuance of citizenship documents, the Government began
granting citizenship to them during the year. In the area of Topusko
(in the region formerly occupied by rebel Serbs) most cases have been
resolved of the approximately 2,500 Muslims who for several years were
unable to obtain citizenship because their period of residency was
interrupted by the military conflict.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution generally provides for
these rights, with certain restrictions. All persons must register
their residence with the local authorities. Under exceptional
circumstances, the Government legally may restrict the right to enter
or leave the country if necessary to protect the ``legal order, health,
rights, or freedoms of others.''
While there are no reports that the Government revoked citizenship
for political reasons, the failure to act expeditiously to verify the
citizenship of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Serbs who fled the
country after the military actions in 1995 is an ongoing and serious
concern. The Government in 1998 adopted procedures by which these
individuals could confirm their citizenship and return to Croatia;
however, the effects of this step were minimized by continued slow and
uneven implementation. The Joint Working Group was superceded in 1998
by the Returns Coordination Committee, which was not very active during
the year, although observers believe that it could prove useful in
facilitating returns. There were no reports of cases during the year of
deportation proceedings against male members of mixed marriages
involving Muslims. In a positive step, in July the Government opened a
full-time consulate in Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina and expanded
consular operations in Belgrade, Serbia to process citizenship
applications which are being filed at the rate of approximately 500 per
week. While the wait time in Belgrade for a decision on an application
improved somewhat late in the year, it was still as long as 3 months in
some cases.
A significant number of internally displaced persons remain,
although not all of these persons are under the Government's direct
care. While the government reported in September some 77,000 persons
(50,000 internally displaced and 27,000 refugees, mostly from Bosnia-
Herzegovina and the FRY) with refugee or displaced person status, this
number does not reflect fully an additional 140,000 former refugees who
have become citizens of Croatia.
International monitors and NGO's assess that the rate of ethnic
Serb departures from the Danubian region was somewhat less than in past
years. However, monitors had difficulty tracking the departures because
in January the Government stopped sharing relevant data. The ethnic
Serb population in the region fell from a prewar number of 70,000 to
about 50,000 at year's end. Approximately 60,000 persons displaced by
the conflict fled to the Danubian region from other areas of the
country, but most of these have since returned home or moved to the
FRY. About 3,000 displaced persons remain in the region. An estimated
40,000 persons in the region have emigrated because of poor economic
conditions combined with discrimination directed at ethnic Serbs. The
number of Croatian Serbs emigrating to the United Kingdom surged to
several hundred per month by mid-year, many of whom were assessed to be
economic migrants. Apparently concerned that its citizens could lose
visa-exempt travel privileges in Europe, the Government attempted to
disrupt the emigration. In addition to continuing to issue only one-
time travel documents rather than passports to refugees returning from
the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were persistent reports of
harassment of departing Serbs by officials at Zagreb airport, including
delaying passengers until they missed their flights. In November the
United Kingdom imposed a visa requirement on Croatians entering that
country. Ethnically motivated incidents directed at ethnic Serbs
included verbal and legal harassment, forcible evictions, beatings, and
three murders. During the year in the Danubian region, international
monitors recorded 1,017 cases of ethnically motivated intimidations and
housing disputes. This figure included approximately 61 physical
assaults (see section 5). Within the region, half of all reported
incidents were reported in the area of Vukovar alone. The village of
Berak (on the outskirts of Vukovar) was the scene of numerous incidents
against Serbs during the year, especially after Croat returnees began
demonstrating in May over the issue of missing persons. In the Danubian
region, where ethnic Serbs were exempted from military service, there
were occasional reports that local officials refused to issue passports
to ethnic Serbs unless they could provide evidence of their military
service.
Official government policy was that all citizens were free to
return to their homes of origin throughout the country. However, in
practice ethnic Serbs who departed during the military conflict and
have since returned faced open discrimination and numerous bureaucratic
obstacles in order to regain their property and the financial and
health benefits to which all returnees are entitled under the law. In
September, the OSCE reported that ethnic Serb refugees were generally
able to return to the country but generally were not able to repossess
their property. Half of all property repossession cases have been in
the Danubian region where the Government's return program has been
implemented selectively and where the majority of property claimants
were ethnic Croats returning from other areas of the country. Incidents
of beatings and even arson and bombing attacks against Serbs were
reported, albeit less frequently than in the previous year (see
Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.f., and 5). Discrimination towards ethnic Serbs
was apparent at all levels of the return process. During the year, over
70 percent of returns by internally displaced persons were to the
Danubian region, and these returnees were overwhelmingly ethnic Croats.
In December the Law on Expelled Persons and Refugees was amended so
that some of its discriminatory measures were removed. However, earlier
in the year the Government enacted an interpretation of the law that
favored temporary occupiers of property over refugees wishing to return
to their property. In addition, the Government failed to act to
eliminate language in the Law on Areas of Special State Concern and the
Law on Reconstruction that discriminates against ethnic Serbs, despite
a commitment to change these laws by September 1998.
The OSCE assessed that while the organized return process worked
well, persons returning outside this process were not always treated
fairly. Systems established between the Government Office for Displaced
Persons and Refugees (ODPR) and the UNHCR worked well. The ODPR
processed an average of over 450 return applications per week and
closely coordinated with the UNHCR to receive returnees (overwhelmingly
ethnic Serbs) from the FRY and Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the
Government did not provide benefits and entitlements consistently in a
timely manner to returnees. Of particular concern were the growing
number of persons intending to return whose cases were deferred because
their prewar homes were occupied by settlers or had been destroyed. The
Government did not encourage actively the return of citizens who did
not have arrangements for alternative accommodation.
There were persistent reports that humanitarian and reconstruction
assistance was not distributed fairly by government agencies. The
Government allowed free access to all displaced persons by domestic and
international humanitarian organizations and permitted them to provide
assistance. However, the Government at times accused international
organizations of bias in providing assistance only to ethnic Serb
returnees.
The Government cooperates with the UNHCR and other humanitarian
organizations assisting refugees. Although the Government has not yet
passed legislation to implement the provisions of the 1951 U.N.
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol,
the Government formed a working group with the UNHCR to develop such
legislation in 1999. The ODPR reported that the Government granted
first asylum to 29,000 persons from the various parts of the former
Yugoslavia as of September and that it was supporting financially
another 100,000 displaced persons (not counting displaced ethnic Serbs
in the Danubian region). Faced with the refugee crisis in Kosovo, the
Government, in consultation with the international community, agreed to
accept up to 5,000 Kosovar refugees and had begun to do so when the
crisis ended. However, the UNHCR reported one instance in which a
Kosovar Albanian was refouled to the FRY where he was mistreated by
authorities. The Government later acknowledged its mishandling of the
case. On April 11 border guards refused entry to 18 Kosovar Albanian
asylum seekers on the grounds that they lacked the proper
documentation, and there were other reports of Kosovar Albanians being
expelled to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Government's conduct of the flawed 1995 elections seriously
limited the right of citizens to change their government. All citizens
over 18 years of age have the right to vote by secret ballot. The
President, elected for 5 years, exercises substantial power, authority,
and influence but is limited constitutionally to two terms. Parliament
comprises the (lower) House of Representatives and the (upper) House of
Counties. During the year, the HDZ held a majority in both houses, and
often the role of the HDZ as a political party was blurred with the
role of the Government. The HDZ continued to wield and expand its
direct and indirect control over many aspects of public life including
television and the press, banking, privatization, and the economy.
However, on January 3, 2000 the ruling HDZ party lost parliamentary
elections to an opposition coalition. In December President Tudjman,
who was serving his second 5-year term, died in office. Tudjman was
reelected President in June 1997 in an election judged to be
``fundamentally flawed'' and ``free but not fair'' by the OSCE.
Elections to replace him were scheduled by February 7, 2000. During the
year, the President's extensive powers, the HDZ's dominance, the
Government's influence over the judiciary, and its control of the media
combined to make the country's nominally democratic system in reality
authoritarian.
The Government made some progress in addressing issues raised by
the OSCE and other international organizations that have documented the
flaws in the electoral system and criticized the 1997 presidential
elections. The electoral law was based primarily on the compromise
worked out in negotiations in May between the six largest opposition
parties and the ruling HDZ party, although the final law reflected some
changes made by the HDZ. Electoral laws previously had infringed
directly on the right of citizens to change their government. The new
electoral law passed by Parliament in October reduced the number of
seats reserved for diaspora voters (some 2 percent of the population)
from a fixed quota of 12 seats in Parliament (or some 10 percent of
seats) to a nonfixed quota, which assigns diaspora voters a number of
seats proportional to their share of the total electorate. In the 1995
elections, 90 percent of diaspora voters voted for the ruling HDZ.
However, the law reduced the number of seats in Parliament reserved for
the Serb minority. In addition, the Citizenship Law and electoral
legislation grants citizenship, and thereby the franchise, based purely
on ethnic grounds to ethnic Croats abroad with no genuine link to the
country. Meanwhile the Government failed to ensure that Croatian Serbs,
who fled in 1995 and who wish to assume the responsibilities of
Croatian citizenship, were able to document their Croatian citizenship
in order to vote and ultimately to return. The new election law also
made provisions for independent monitoring by NGO's, the establishment
of multiparty election commissions, and the elimination of separate,
higher thresholds for coalitions.
In addition to the Government's interpretation and implementation
of laws to suit the ruling party's agenda, the Government used its
control of the electronic media to control the political process.
Despite the May agreement to transform public radio and television into
truly free and independent media, the June telecommunications law made
only minor changes and the HDZ retained control over Croatian State
Radio and Television throughout the year. Senior HDZ members were
members of the board of directors of the state television network.
Their influence not only restricted the ability of opposition parties
to criticize government policies and activities, but limited the
opposition's ability to fully engage the Government and the public in
an open political dialog (see Section 2.a.).
Although there were no legal restrictions on participation by women
or minorities in the political process, they are underrepresented in
government and politics. There were only small numbers of women in
Parliament, the executive branch, and the courts. In the Parliament
that was dissolved in November, 4 of 68 upper house members and 11 of
127 lower house members were women.
The election law required minority representation in Parliament,
with proportional representation for any minority that made up more
than 8 percent of the population. No minority met that criterion.
However, representation for the Serb minority was based on government
estimates of the number of Serbs who fled the country between 1991 and
1995 and the assumption that they would not return. There were three
lower house seats allocated to the Serb minority, and two Serb members
were appointed to the upper house. However, the election law passed by
the HDZ-dominated Parliament in October reduced the number of seats
reserved for minorities in the Parliament from seven to five and of
these, reduced the number of seats reserved for ethnic Serbs from three
to one (less than 1 percent of the seats in the lower house), despite
the fact that ethnic Serbs constitute approximately 6 percent of the
country's population. Of the four remaining seats, one is reserved for
the Italian minority, one for the Hungarian minority, one for the Czech
and Slovak community, and one for the combined Russian, Jewish, German,
Austrian, and Ukrainian minorities. There were no Muslim
representatives in Parliament despite the fact that in the most recent
census (1991) the country's 40,000 Muslims were the second largest
minority after the Serbs, and the new election law did not reserve any
minority seats for Muslims. Amendments to the Constitution passed by
the HDZ-dominated Parliament in 1997 and adopted in 1998 excluded
Muslims as a recognized minority (see Section 5).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups throughout the country were able to work to
prevent abuses and bring their concerns to the attention of local and
central authorities, as well as to the attention of domestic and
international media. The government-appointed Ombudsman met
periodically with human rights representatives; the response of other
ministries varied. Human rights groups reported that, while they may
have received responses to specific cases, the Government generally
failed to remedy the underlying institutional problems that were the
root cause of many of the cases. For example, numerous NGO's repeatedly
raised the issue of the government's failure to issue instructions to
ministries and local authorities to implement the Law on Convalidation
adopted in October 1997 (which would allow documents issued in the
formerly occupied areas to be recognized or ``convalidated'' by
government offices--see Section 5). In a positive development, a number
of NGO's, the largest being Citizens Organized to Monitor Elections
(GONG) and Voice 99 (Glas 99), were active in organizing preelection
informational campaigns.
Under the law, it is difficult for NGO's to solicit contributions
or donations to support their work. This is due in part to the fact
that there is no tax benefit to donors. The NGO also must pay tax on
contributions classified as income. Thus, many human rights groups rely
on international donations and government funding to continue their
work. Another problem is the public perception of human rights
organizations. Senior government officials promoted the view that any
criticism of the State or the ruling party was disloyal, engendering
suspicion of NGO's among the general population.
International organizations, including the European Community
Monitoring Mission (ECMM), the OSCE, and the UNHCR among others,
operated freely in Croatia, and there were no reported instances of
monitors being denied visas or the ability to move freely around the
country. However, in the spring and summer there were a series of
burglaries at offices of the OSCE, the UNHCR, and the Norwegian Refugee
Council offices throughout the country, during which computers were
stolen. In August the UNHCR and the OSCE requested an investigation
amid press reports that government intelligence services may have
conducted the burglaries. At year's end, the Government had not
responded to this request and no arrests had been made. Officials of
international organizations noted that the burglaries had a chilling
effect on all international and nongovernmental organizations. While
international organizations reported an overall satisfactory level of
cooperation with officials in Zagreb, they also noted a lack of follow
through on central government commitments by local authorities. OSCE
police monitors operated in the Danubian region, monitoring the
performance of the multiethnic police force. While cooperation
generally was satisfactory, there were several incidents in which local
police refused monitors' requests to review or fully investigate cases.
As with local NGO's, the Government generally failed to respond
substantively to international NGO reports of human rights abuses and
tended to treat any specific case brought to its attention as an
isolated incident.
Although the Government in general cooperated with international
organizations and NGO's, especially in the spring and summer, these
organizations again found themselves targets of criticism in the state-
controlled press claiming that they were discriminating against Croats
and in favor of ethnic Serbs in the distribution of humanitarian
assistance. Some government officials, both at the national and local
levels, fueled this negative attitude toward international
organizations and NGO's with unhelpful statements calling for the
Government to react strongly to what was viewed as inappropriate
meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. In September the
president of a human rights organization in Zagreb received a
threatening letter allegedly from members of the Croatian Party of
Rights (HSP), after the organization had criticized the HSP for
fomenting ethnic tensions. The Ministry of Interior referred the case
to the police for investigation. There were no results of the
investigation available at year's end.
The government-appointed Ombudsman addressed cases brought to his
attention by the international community and local NGO's. However, the
office continued to be weak, due to the small size of its staff and the
Ombudsman's lack of legal authority to rectify problems directly. The
Ombudsman was occasionally helpful in the analysis of legislation
deemed to be detrimental to human rights causes. While the Government
was perhaps somewhat more responsive to the Ombudsman than to NGO's,
the overall response by the Government to the underlying problems
raised by the Ombudsman remained unsatisfactory.
Committees in the Parliament and in the Government were tasked
specifically with human and minority rights issues. Both met
periodically throughout the year to discuss topics and legislation
within their purview; however, neither played an active role in
promoting human rights during the year. The government committee failed
to meet with a leading human rights NGO despite a previous agreement to
do so.
The Government's record of cooperation with the ICTY was mixed
during the year. In July a newspaper published the minutes of an
October 1998 meeting of the government office for cooperation with
ICTY, which revealed high-level discussions of a government strategy to
obstruct the work of the ICTY. While the Government tried to minimize
the importance of the minutes, calling them ``merely internal
discussions,'' the ICTY Chief Prosecutor noted that they perfectly
described the Government's actual behavior. In August the President of
ICTY reported the country's noncooperation to the U.N. Security
Council. In November the Tribunal's Chief Prosecutor reported to the
U.N. on Croatia's noncooperation. A few days later the Government
refused an ICTY request to provide support and cooperation for a
proposed field investigation in the country. The investigation was
postponed. In a positive development, the Government transferred ICTY
indictee Vinko Martinovic (also known as ``Stela'') as well as some
requested documents to The Hague in August, albeit under pressure from
the international community. However, at year's end the extradition of
Mladen Naletilic (also known as ``Tuta'') had not been carried out due
to Naletilic's poor health. ICTY requested the extradition of both
Martinovic and Naletilic in December 1998. The Government failed to
comply with a number of ICTY evidentiary requests, some dating to 1996.
The Government has been particularly uncooperative in cases involving
possible war crimes committed by Croats, and it has resisted ICTY
requests for information regarding possible war crimes committed during
and subsequent to operations ``Flash'' and ``Storm'' in 1995. Moreover,
government officials welcomed persons who had been indicted by the ICTY
for war crimes. In May Justice Minister Separovic headed a delegation
which met Zlatko Aleksovski, an ethnic Croat convicted by the ICTY for
crimes against prisoners of war, upon his return to the country. In
September military officers participated in a ceremony in Siroki
Brijeg, Bosnia-Herzegovina that included ICTY indictees among those
being honored.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution specifies that individuals shall enjoy all rights
and freedoms, regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth,
education, social status, or other attributes. It adds that members of
all national groups and minorities shall have equal rights. While the
majority of these rights are observed in practice, serious deficiencies
continued with regard to equality among various national/racial/ethnic
groups, particularly Serbs and Roma. The Constitution provides for
special ``wartime measures'' in case of need, but states that
restrictions shall be appropriate to the nature of the danger and may
not result in the inequality of citizenship with respect to race,
color, sex, language, religion, or national or social origin.
Women.--Although the Government collected only limited statistics
on the problem, informed observers believed that violence against
women, including spousal abuse, remained common. One NGO that operated
a hot line and support services for women assessed that spousal abuse
continued to be a large and unrecognized problem. Alcohol abuse and
poor economic circumstances for veterans of the military conflict were
cited as contributing factors. In June a government commission on
equality indicated to NGO's that it would recommend that the Government
track statistics on violence against women; however, at year's end it
had not yet done so.
Amendments to the Penal Code which went into effect in 1998 removed
violence perpetrated within the family (except against children) from
the categories of crimes to be prosecuted automatically by the state
attorney. The victim now must file a request to prosecute, thereby
severely curtailing efforts by health care workers and police to act on
suspected cases of violence in the home. In May the Constitutional
Court upheld the constitutionality of this procedure. The nonpartisan
Parliamentary Women's Caucus promised to seek amendments of these laws,
but at year's end had not yet done so.
Based on anecdotal evidence, it is likely that some women were
trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Sexual harassment is a violation of the penal code section on abuse
of position, but is not specifically included in the employment law.
NGO's reported that in practice, women generally did not resort to the
penal code for relief for fear of losing their jobs. In a positive
development, the labor union of the Pliva pharmaceutical company signed
a collective agreement that specifically forbids sexual harassment.
The law does not discriminate by gender. However, in practice women
generally hold lower paying positions in the work force. Government
statistics from previous years showed that, while women constituted
roughly 50 percent of the work force, they occupied few jobs at senior
levels, even in areas such as education and administration where they
were a clear majority of the workers. Considerable anecdotal evidence
has suggested that women hold by far the preponderance of low-level
clerical and shopkeeping positions, as well as primary and secondary
school teaching jobs. Women reportedly are often among the first to be
fired or laid off. NGO's and labor organizations reported a practice in
which women received short-term work contracts renewable every 3 to 6
months, creating a climate of job insecurity for them. While men
occasionally suffered from this practice, it was disproportionately
used against women to dissuade them from taking maternity leave.
Legislation was passed during the year limiting the use of short-term
work contracts to a maximum of 3 years.
While there is no national organization devoted solely to the
protection of women's rights, many small, independent groups were
active in the capital and larger cities. One of the most active was
B.a.B.e. (``Be Active, Be Emancipated'').
Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children.
Education is mandatory through age 14. Schools provide free meals for
children, subsidized daycare facilities are available in most
communities even for infants, medical care for children is free, and
the Labor Code authorizes 1 full year of maternity leave and 3 years'
leave for women with twins or more than two children.
The majority of students continue their education to the age of 18,
with Roma being the only group reporting any notable exception. The
Government blamed the problems of Roma largely on linguistic and
cultural differences that make their integration in schools difficult.
Romani children face some discrimination and problems, due largely to
these cultural and linguistic barriers at school. The Government's
commitments to children suffered from less funding than in the past, as
other priorities took a larger portion of government resources.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People With Disabilities.--No legislation mandates access to
buildings or government services for people with disabilities, and
access to such facilities is often difficult. While people with
disabilities face no openly discriminatory measures, job opportunities
generally are limited. Special education also is limited and poorly
funded.
Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity were closely related,
and religion frequently was used to identify and single out non-Croats
for discriminatory practices (see Section 2.c.). This close
identification of religion with ethnicity caused religious institutions
to be targets of violence. There were persistent reports throughout the
country of the damage and defacement of Serbian (Orthodox) cemeteries
with an estimated six such incidents in the Danubian region in November
and December alone. In August attackers with stones broke windows at
the home of Mufti Sevko Omerbasic, the head of the Islamic community in
the country. In September one person was detained as the investigation
continued.
In Cakovec the memorial plaque at the site of the synagogue
destroyed during the Hungarian occupation in World War II was
desecrated in the first week of August. The plaque later was rehung.
The police were searching for the perpetrators but have detained no
suspects. The Jewish community in Cakovec was decimated during World
War II and the synagogue was torn down.
The Government announced in March that it planned to restore a
memorial at Jasenovac to the victims killed at that concentration camp
during World War II. Retreating Serb forces destroyed the memorial and
looted the camp museum in 1995. Premier Zlatko Matesa announced during
his visit to the camp in March that the restoration of the memorial was
part of the Government's ``policy of reconciliation.''
In October the Parliament approved the appointment to the
Constitutional Court of hardliner Vice Vukojevic, who is known for
leading a parliamentary commission established in 1991 to determine the
number of persons killed in concentration camps run by the country's
Fascist Ustasha during World War II. Vukojevic's commission provided
very low estimates of the number of Croatians, including Jews, killed
in all Croatian concentration camps; these estimates contradict all
credible scholarship on the subject. The commission's report was
criticized by the President of the Parliament, the press, and the
director of the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Jerusalem. Faced with such
criticism, the lower house of Parliament decided to return the report
to the commission to be ``completed.''
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Constitutionally, ethnic
minorities enjoy the same protection as other self-identified ethnic
and religious groups; however, in practice a pattern of open and severe
discrimination continues against ethnic Serbs and, at times, other
minorities in a wide number of areas, including the administration of
justice, employment, housing, and freedom of movement. The Government
often maintained a double standard of treatment based on ethnicity.
Members of minority groups in principle have equal constitutional
protections with Croat citizens, and their ethnic rights are provided
for in the preamble to the Constitution. However, the Government's
definition of what constitutes a minority group is discriminatory. In
1998 the Parliament decided to omit Muslims, Albanians, and Slovenes
from those minorities listed in the Constitution on the grounds that
they are not considered indigenous groups. Muslims are currently the
second largest minority group in the country after Serbs, and some
observers argue that their elimination from the Constitution may deny
them rights stipulated in the (albeit partially suspended)
Constitutional Law on the Rights of Ethnic and National Communities or
Minorities. Government committees established in 1997 to promote
reconciliation and trust between Croats and Serbs were not effective.
The OSCE assessed that there was a lack of political will to carry out
the program, and that its organizational structures were either
inoperative or nonexistent.
There were three ethnically motivated killings, which were
symptomatic of ethnic tensions in the formerly occupied areas that
discouraged persons from returning to areas where they would be a
minority. In May in Marinci in the Danubian region a 59-year-old Serb
resident was shot and killed by a Croat who maintained that he had
fired in self-defense. The suspect was released on bail. At year's end
an indictment had been issued in the case but no trial date was set. In
August a 39-year-old Serb resident of Berak in the Danubian region was
beaten to death reportedly by a gang of Croats. Local police arrested
one suspect, who was in custody and indicted at year's end, but no
trial date was set in the case. In November in Tenja in the Danubian
region, a 60-year-old ethnic Serb resident was shot to death by a local
Croat who was arrested soon thereafter. According to international
monitors, both the police and the judiciary worked effectively on the
case. On December 29, the suspect pled guilty to the crime and was
sentenced to 10 years in prison. The OSCE assessed that a surge of
violence in Berak, which included anti-Serb protests in May, an attack
on a Serb police officer, and numerous instances of harassment, caused
two-thirds of the village's Serb families to flee. In August anti-Serb
demonstrations occurred in nearby Sotin. Both the Sotin demonstrations
and the protests in Berak were motivated by the desire to pressure
Serbs to provide information about ethnic Croats missing since the war.
The Government not only failed to take concerted action to reduce these
tensions, but Justice Minister Zvonimir Separovic stoked an already
tense climate during two visits to the region when he called for vigils
to continue.
Intimidation and violence against Serbs continued in the Danubian
region during the year, especially in the spring, in Borovo, Beli
Manistir, Cakovci, Sotin, and Mirkovci. In August a human rights NGO
wrote to the Prime Minister about the atmosphere of increasing fear
among Serb returnees in Knin in the southern region of the country.
Incidents included destruction of crops and physical assaults,
including the case of a 75-year-old woman who watched as her Bosnian
Croat neighbors slaughtered her livestock with a chainsaw and the
unsolved October arson of 10 haystacks that belonged to ethnic Serb
returnees. The Helsinki Committee noted that the mayor of Knin failed
to intervene to prevent such incidents. The mayor in April stated that
Serb returns must be halted until all Croat war veterans could obtain
housing, a plan that would violate Croatia's refugee return act. While
the number of Serb returnees to the Knin area doubled to approximately
7,000 during the year, only a handful were able to return to their own
homes, because the local housing commissions did not evict Bosnian
Croats occupying their property.
The Constitution provides the legal basis and rights for education
in the languages of national minorities and communities. The well-
documented pattern of the discriminatory application of laws and
administrative regulations was also evident in education. For example,
in textbooks the history of the former Yugoslavia has been omitted in
favor of a more nationalistic Croat interpretation, and new textbooks
have tended to use derogatory adjectives in reference to minorities. In
addition, apart from the Danubian region, there are still very few
classes for Serb pupils that follow the approved Serbian school
program. Serb students countrywide continued to use materials and
follow the curriculum of the Croat students.
The Law on Citizenship distinguishes between those who have a claim
to Croatian ethnicity and those who do not. The ``Croatian people'' are
eligible to become citizens of the country, even if they were not
citizens of the former Socialist Republic of Croatia, as long as they
submit a written statement that they consider themselves Croatian
citizens. Non-ethnic Croats must satisfy more stringent requirements
through naturalization in order to obtain citizenship, even if they
were previously lawful residents of Croatia in the former Yugoslavia
(see section 1.d.). This double standard led to discrimination in other
areas, in particular the right to vote (see section 3). While an
application is pending, the applicant is denied rights such as social
allowances, including medical care, pensions, free education, and
employment in the civil service. Denials were frequently based on
Article 26 of the Citizenship Law (which stipulates that citizenship
can be denied to persons otherwise qualified for reasons of national
interest) and Article 8 (which requires that a person's actions
demonstrate that they are ``attached to the legal system and customs of
Croatia'' and that they have maintained a permanent residence on the
territory of Croatia for the 5 years preceding the application for
citizenship). Persons returning under the Government's return program
without citizenship status were denied returnee status and associated
social benefits. These denials frequently were based on laws
stipulating that citizenship can be denied for reasons of national
interest and that a person's actions must demonstrate ``attachment to
the legal system and customs of Croatia'' and that the person must have
resided in the country for the 5 years preceding the application.
Unemployment among Serbs has been significantly higher than the
national average (see Section 6.b.).
Committees established in 1997 to promote reconciliation between
Croats and Serbs failed to initiate and carry out concrete programs
that would contribute significantly to the peaceful reintegration of
populations. Anto Djapic of the Croatian Party of Rights (HSP) mounted
an aggressive campaign using ultranationalist rhetoric against the
return of ethnic Serbs and cooperation with the ICTY war crimes
tribunal. In inflammatory speeches given wide coverage in the state-
controlled press, Djapic suggested that the HSP would organize
``intervention'' squads against ethnic Serb returnees and would charge
Serb politicians with war crimes. There was no strong government effort
to criticize or distance itself from these statements.
Property destruction and other forms of harassment often arose from
disputes between home occupiers of one ethnicity and returning
homeowners of another. OSCE monitors reported a decrease in the number
of ethnically motivated incidents over previous years, but verbal and
legal harassment, forcible evictions, and assaults occurred regularly
(see Section 2.d.). During the year in the Danubian region,
international monitors recorded 1,017 cases of ethnically motivated
intimidations and housing disputes. This figure included approximately
61 physical assaults and several incidents of grenade throwing onto
property. In cases throughout the country, regardless of ethnicity,
incidents of looting by the person occupying a home upon his or her
departure were common. Police responses were often inadequate due to
conflicting instructions on how to handle disputes over housing. The
bias of some local officials and the inability of police to rectify the
problems underlying the harassment caused many incidents to go
unreported.
Despite the adoption in October 1997 of legislation that would
allow the recognition of legal and administrative documents issued by
the rebel Serb para-state, this legislation was not put into practice
because several ministries failed to adopt implementing instructions.
For example, ethnic Serbs who lived in the occupied regions must have
applied for welfare benefits within 1 year of the law's passage.
However, 1 year later many Serbs who had fled were still unable to
return to Croatia and thus unable to apply. In August one NGO providing
legal assistance had files on 9,000 unresolved convalidation cases in
Osijek alone. Without the convalidation conferred by the law, citizens
(almost exclusively ethnic Serbs) were unable to resolve a wide range
of problems including pensions, disability insurance, unemployment
benefits, the recognition of births, deaths, and marriages, and even
confirmation of time served in prison. This made resumption of a normal
life almost impossible for this group (see Section 4). Serb property
owners displaced by the Law on the Temporary Takeover of Specified
Property in favor of ethnic Croat refugees remained unable to access
their property, despite the 1998 program for returns, which mandated
multi-ethnic ``housing commissions'' to implement property restitution.
A lack of alternative housing in many areas and the lack of political
will to evict ethnic Croat occupiers without alternative housing in
favor of Serb homeowners resulted in only a handful of restituted
properties outside of the Danubian region (see Section 1.f.).
Although in recent years the Government had discriminated against a
particular group of Muslims in the issuance of citizenship documents,
the Government began granting citizenship to them during the year (see
Section 2.d.).
The situation of other minority groups--Slovaks, Czechs, Italians,
and Hungarians--did not reflect discrimination to the same extent as
that of the Serb community. There were NGO and press reports of
incidents of police officers beating Roma. According to press reports
in August, ethnic Croatian police officers in the Baranja region beat
Roma. In one incident an ethnic Croatian police officer allegedly beat
a Rom and threatened him at gunpoint. The Rom reportedly filed a
complaint against the officer with no known result. In another incident
police officers reportedly assaulted two Roma, whom they had caught
fishing illegally. Roma continued to face discrimination and failure by
the Government to respond to their complaints. In September a human
rights NGO reported that the persecution of Roma in the Danubian region
increased over the past 2 years. Incidents cited included assaults,
harassment, and destruction of homes by ethnic Croats who blame the
Roma for remaining in the region while it was under Serbian occupation.
Before the war, 10,000 Roma lived in the region, but only 1,500 remain
with thousands fleeing to the FRY since the Government regained control
of the area in 1998. According to a Roma rights NGO, in the village of
Popovac in the Danubian region where some 30 families lived before the
war, only 3 remain after numerous incidents of violence and
intimidation, including at attack on a Romani police officer in 1998.
There are persistent reports of police intimidation.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers are entitled to form or
join unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. There is
an active labor movement with one major and four minor national labor
federations and independent associations of both blue- and white-collar
members. Approximately 64 percent of workers are members of unions of
one type or another. In general unions are independent of the
government and political parties.
The law prohibits retaliation against strikers participating in
legal strikes. Workers only may strike at the end of a contract or in
specific circumstances mentioned in the contract. More importantly, the
Supreme Court has ruled that workers may not strike for nonpayment of
wages, a continuing problem that is likely to grow if the economy sinks
deeper into recession. The only recourse in the event of nonpayment is
to go to court--a process that may take several years.
When negotiating a new contract, workers are required to go through
mediation before they can strike. Labor and management choose the
mediator together. If they cannot agree, the Labor Law calls for a
tripartite commission of labor, business, and government
representatives to appoint one. However, nearly 4 years after this law
became effective, the tripartite commission still had not established
the required list of mediators, and union requests for their
appointment have gone unanswered. In fact the commission has not met
for over 1 year. In practice, both unions and managers often ignore the
mediation process and deal directly with each other when a conflict
arises. Arbitration is never mandatory but can be used only if both
sides agree. Only after submitting to mediation and formally filing a
statement that negotiations are at an impasse is a strike legal. If a
strike is found to be illegal, any participant can be dismissed, and
the union held liable for damages, although no strikes were found to be
illegal during the year.
The right to strike is provided for in the Constitution with these
limitations and with additional limits on members of the armed forces,
police, government administration, and public services. Strikes
occurred fairly frequently and increasingly without government
sanction. A September strike at a food processor near Vukovar over
unpaid wages and unfulfilled government promises brought Serbs and
Croats together, a rare instance of ethnic cooperation in the Danubian
region. Authorities continued to refuse to permit demonstrations in
Zagreb's main square or the square in front of Parliament. On February
16, some 2,000 workers marched in Zagreb, protesting the bankruptcy of
the Diona retail food chain. When the group spontaneously decided to
march to the square in front of the parliament building, where
demonstrations are prohibited, they were met by some 200 police
officers. Several police officers were injured, one seriously, in the
ensuing scuffle (see Section 2.b.). On December 2, more than 1,000
employees of the Nama department store chain protested in Zagreb to
demand payment of back wages. Government officials had announced on
December 1 that the Croatian Privatization Fund only had enough money
to pay half of the amount due to some 2,000 employees of the Nama
chain.
After more than 5 years of negotiations, representatives of the
five Croatian trade union confederations signed an agreement in July
dividing Communist-era trade union office space. A 1998 law, however,
transferred title of all union property to the government until an
agreement among the unions can be approved by parliament. Union leaders
in May contended that land registers demonstrate a government plan to
confiscate the property permanently. The unions appealed to the
International Labor Organization (ILO); in September a decision was
still pending.
Unions may affiliate freely internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is protected by law and practiced freely. The Labor Code
governs collective bargaining contracts, protection for striking
workers, and legal limitations on the ability of employers to conduct
``lockouts'' during labor disputes.
The transition to private enterprise and a free market economy kept
labor unions under pressure at the same time that they were making
progress towards establishing themselves as genuine trade unions,
representative of their members rather than the Government. General
unemployment remained the most significant hurdle, hovering at about 19
percent for most of the year. However, in some war-affected areas the
figure was as high as 80 to 90 percent. Over 100,000 workers (10
percent of the workforce) failed to receive their salaries on time.
When salary payments are not made, payments into the social welfare
system lag as well, thereby denying workers health coverage.
The Labor Code directly deals with antiunion discrimination issues.
It expressly allows unions to challenge firings in court. However,
according to persistent reports, ethnicity was used as grounds for
dismissal. An individual's ability to rectify a grievance is severely
limited by the already overburdened court system, where cases languish
for months or years before they are resolved (see Section 1.d.).
The Government occasionally employs coercion or other questionable
methods to induce striking employees to return to work. For example,
the management of Croatian railroads routinely interviews workers,
often with a policeman present, about their intentions before, during,
and after short-term strikes that are frequently called by the railway
union. In April during tense contract negotiations with Croatian
railroads' management, the vice president of the Locomotive Engineers
Union was beaten severely with metal bars by unknown assailants. In
June when the Tourism and Catering Trade Union initiated a strike at
two tourist companies over mismanagement and nonpayment of wages,
Minister of Tourism Herak warned the union's president that she would
be slandered publicly if the strikes continued.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there generally were no
reports of these practices; however, there were occasional instances of
women trafficked through the country for the purpose of forced
prostitution (see Section 6.f.). While legislation does not explicitly
cover children, the constitutional ban provides blanket coverage in
this area, and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is the agency charged with
enforcing the ban on coerced or forced labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for the employment of children is 15
years, and it is enforced by the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare.
Under the Constitution, the provisions of which the Government
enforces, children may not be employed before reaching the legally
determined age and are not allowed to perform work that is harmful to
their health or morality. There is no reported pattern of abuse of
child labor. Workers under the age of 18 are entitled to special
protection at work and are prohibited from heavy manual labor and night
shifts. Education is free, universal, and mandatory up to the age of
14. Children generally finish secondary school at a minimum, and a high
proportion go on to university. The broad constitutional prohibition
against forced or compulsory labor encompasses the case of children,
and there were no reports of its use.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In March the government signed a
collective bargaining agreement establishing a minimum wage of about
$211 (1,500 kuna) per month. While the initial document was signed on
behalf of only a portion of the work force, the Government extended the
agreement to cover all full-time workers nationwide. The Government
Bureau of Statistics estimated that the average net monthly wage was
approximately $425 (3,039 kuna), which is not sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family.
National regulations provide for a 42-hour workweek including a 30-
minute daily break, a 24-hour rest period during the week, and a
minimum of 18 days of paid vacation leave annually. Workers receive
time-and-a-half pay for any hours worked beyond 42. Most unions,
however, have negotiated a 40-hour workweek.
Health and safety standards are set by the government and are
enforced by the Ministry of Health. In practice industries are not
diligent in meeting standards for worker protection. It is common, for
example, to find workers without hardhats at construction sites and
equipment with safety devices removed. Workers can in theory remove
themselves from hazardous conditions at work. Workers would have
recourse to the courts in a situation where they felt that they had
been wrongfully dismissed for doing so.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Laws can be used to prosecute
traffickers in persons, and trafficking in persons was not a
significant problem during the year. There is little information
available on trafficking, although U.N. officials tracking the issue
regionally indicate that Croatia is a lesser source, transit, and
destination country for some women trafficked to other parts of Europe
for forced prostitution. International police monitors did not report
any individual cases of trafficking in persons during the year.
However, there were reports of women trafficked through Bosnia-
Herzegovina to Croatia, where they remain to work as prostitutes or are
trafficked on to other destinations. One NGO reported six cases of
trafficking during the year.
______
CYPRUS
Prior to 1974, Cyprus experienced a long period of intercommunal
strife between its Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. In response
the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) began peacekeeping
operations in March 1964. The island has been divided since the Turkish
military intervention of 1974, following a coup d'etat directed from
Greece. Since 1974 the southern part of the island has been under the
control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. The northern part
is ruled by a Turkish Cypriot administration. In 1983 that
administration proclaimed itself the ``Turkish Republic of Northern
Cyprus'' (``TRNC''), which is recognized only by Turkey. The two parts
are separated by a buffer zone patrolled by the UNFICYP. A substantial
number of Turkish troops remain on the island. In both the government-
controlled area and in the Turkish Cypriot community democratic
principles generally are respected. Glafcos Clerides was reelected
president of the Republic of Cyprus in February 1998; in 1995 Turkish
Cypriots reelected Rauf Denktash as their leader. The judiciary is
independent in both communities.
Police in the government-controlled area and in the Turkish Cypriot
community are responsible for law enforcement. Police forces operating
in the government-controlled area are under civilian control, while
military authorities direct Turkish Cypriot police forces. In general
the police forces of both sides respect the rule of law, but instances
of police abuse of power continued.
Both Cypriot economies operate on the basis of free market
principles, although in each community there are significant
administrative controls. The government-controlled part of the island
has a robust, service-oriented economy, with a declining manufacturing
base and a small agricultural sector. Tourism and trade generate 21
percent of gross domestic product and employ 27 percent of the labor
force. In 1998 per capita income was approximately $13,600, inflation
was 2.2 percent, and unemployment was 3.3 percent. Growth in 1998 rose
to 5 percent, compared with 2.3 percent in 1997. The Turkish Cypriot
economy, which is handicapped significantly by an economic embargo by
the Greek Cypriots, relies heavily on subsidies from Turkey and is
burdened by an overly large public sector. It, too, is basically
service-oriented but has a relatively smaller tourism and trade base--
accounting for 16 percent of gross domestic product and employing 10
percent of the work force--and a larger agricultural sector. In 1998
per capita income in the north was approximately $4,000, and inflation
was 66 percent. The economy in the north grew 5.3 percent in 1998
compared with 3.8 percent in 1997.
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus generally respected
citizens' human rights; however, instances of police brutality
continued to be a problem.
The Turkish Cypriot authorities generally respected human rights;
however, police abuse of suspects' and detainees' rights continued to
be a problem. The authorities also continued to restrict freedom of
movement. Since December 1997, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have
banned most bicommunal contacts between Turkish Cypriots and Greek
Cypriots, including previously frequent meetings in Nicosia's buffer
zone. They sometimes attempted to prevent Turkish Cypriots from
travelling to bicommunal meetings off the island as well. In 1998
Turkish Cypriot officials also instituted a new, higher fee system for
``visas'' at the main Nicosia checkpoint, making it more expensive for
both sides to cross the buffer zone. The Turkish Cypriot authorities
have taken some steps to improve the conditions of Greek Cypriots and
Maronites living in the territory under their control, but the
treatment of these groups still falls short of Turkish Cypriot
obligations under the Vienna III Agreement of 1975.
Violence against women and trafficking in women for forced
prostitution remained problems in both areas.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
Turkish Cypriot authorities still have not conducted a credible
investigation of the 1996 murder of a prominent leftist Turkish Cypriot
journalist, Kutlu Adali, who wrote articles critical of Turkey's role
in the north and particularly on the role of the Turkish military and
of policies that allowed large numbers of Turkish workers into the
north.
In 1996 Turkish Cypriot civilian police killed a Greek Cypriot
demonstrator who entered the U.N. buffer zone, and the police
participated in the beating death of another. Again, there has not been
any significant investigation by Turkish Cypriot authorities of the
killings. The family of one of the deceased filed a case against Turkey
in the European Court of Human Rights, which declared the case
admissible in June.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Both the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the
basic law governing the Turkish Cypriot community specifically prohibit
torture, the law in both communities prohibits such practices, and the
authorities generally respect these provisions in practice; however,
there continue to be instances of Cypriot police brutality against
suspects in detention, mostly involving non-Cypriots. One officer is on
trial in connection with the October 1998 beating of illegal immigrant
detainees by members of a special police unit (see Section 2.d.).
Official action still is pending against the Cypriot police
involved in a 1995 case of torture of a suspected Turkish Cypriot drug
smuggler, Erkan Egmez. Egmez was released and returned to the north. He
filed a complaint against the Cypriot Government with the European
Commission of Human Rights, and the Commission ruled it admissible in
1998.
The Commission also agreed in January 1998 to investigate
complaints by nine Turkish Cypriots that Greek Cypriot police
mistreated them in 1994 and expelled them to the north. The
complainants allege that they were threatened with death if they
returned to the south and that Greek Cypriot police were responsible
for the death of one complainant's son, who returned to the south later
in 1994. The Cypriot Government denies all of the charges; the
Commission took oral evidence in the case in Nicosia in September 1998.
In all of its cases, the Commission's admissibility ruling makes no
judgment on the merits of the individual case.
While there were no public allegations of police brutality in the
Turkish Cypriot community, there were credible reports of pervasive
police abuse of power and routine harsh physical treatment of detainees
(see Section 1.d.).
Prison conditions in general meet or exceed minimum international
standards. Persons incarcerated in jails in the south on minor charges
reportedly are mixed with more hardened, violent criminals.
The Cypriot government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities permit
prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Republic of Cyprus
police respect laws providing for freedom from arbitrary arrest and
detention. Judicially issued arrest warrants are required. No one may
be detained for more than a day without referral of the case to the
courts for extension of the period of detention. Most periods of
investigative detention do not exceed 8 to 10 days before formal
charges are filed. Attorneys generally have access to detainees; bail
is permitted. The Government of Cyprus claims the right to deport
foreign nationals for reasons of public interest whether or not they
have been charged with or convicted of a crime.
Some abuses of power occur at the hands of the Turkish Cypriot
police, generally at the time of arrest. Suspects often are not
permitted to have their lawyers present when testimony is being taken,
a right provided under the Turkish Cypriot basic law. Suspects who
demand the presence of a lawyer are threatened routinely with stiffer
charges or even physically intimidated. A high percentage of
convictions in the Turkish Cypriot community are obtained with
confessions made during initial police interrogation under these
conditions. According to credible reports, the police also routinely
abuse their authority to hold persons up to 24 hours before having to
go before a judge. Police officers use this tactic against persons
believed to have behaved in a manner deemed insulting to the officer.
The suspects then are released within 24 hours without charges having
been filed.
Exile is prohibited specifically by the Constitution and by the
basic law governing the Turkish Cypriot community and is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is legally
independent of executive or military influence in both communities, and
it is independent in practice.
On both sides, most criminal and civil cases begin in district
courts, from which appeals are made to Supreme Courts. No special
courts exist for security or political offenses.
Cyprus inherited many elements of its legal system from the United
Kingdom, including the presumption of innocence, the right to due
process, and the right of appeal. Throughout Cyprus, a fair public
trial is provided for in law and accorded in practice. Defendants have
the right to be present at their trials, to be represented by counsel
(at government expense for those who cannot afford one), to confront
witnesses, and to present evidence in their own defense.
On the Turkish Cypriot side, civilians deemed to have violated
military zones or military regulations are subject to trial in a
military court. These courts consist of one military and two civilian
judges and a civilian prosecutor. Members of the Turkish Cypriot bar
have complained that civilian judges tend to defer to their military
colleagues in such hearings.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Both the Cyprus Constitution and the basic law
governing the Turkish Cypriot community include provisions protecting
the individual against arbitrary interference by the authorities, and a
judicial warrant is required for a police official to enter a private
residence. Although authorities on both sides generally respected these
provisions in practice, police on both sides on occasion have subjected
members of the other community resident in their area to surveillance
(see Section 5).
The Turkish Cypriot authorities restrict the ability of Greek
Cypriots and Maronites living in the north to change their housing at
will (see Section 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of speech and of the press
are provided for by law, and these rights are respected in practice
throughout the island. The proliferation of party and independent
newspapers and periodicals in both communities enables ideas and
arguments to circulate freely. Opposition papers frequently criticize
the authorities. Several private television and radio stations in the
Greek Cypriot community compete effectively with the government-
controlled stations. Since 1997 seven private radio stations have
operated in the Turkish Cypriot community, in addition to two smaller,
university-run stations, and four private television stations.
International broadcasts are available without interference throughout
the island, including telecasts from Turkey and Greece.
In 1998 Turkish Cypriot officials filed a number of court actions
against newspapers and journalists, alleging that certain articles
``damaged the prestige of the state.'' Five complaints against one
newspaper were consolidated into one action, and a trial was held. In
December the court ruled that the newspaper was liable and fined it
approximately $215,000 (120 billion Turkish lira). The same newspaper
also faces charges for a 1998 story alleging that Turkish Cypriot
soldiers assaulted a Turkish Cypriot family after a dispute over
housing.
Intermittent restrictions were imposed on the ability of some
journalists to cross the buffer zone to cover news events. The Cypriot
Government denied entry to the south for visiting Turkish journalists
who arrived in Cyprus through ports of entry in the north; in
retaliation, Turkish Cypriot authorities sometimes required Greek
Cypriot journalists to purchase a ``visa'' to enter the north, which
the journalists refused to do. Current Turkish Cypriot policy, while
applied inconsistently, is to permit Greek Cypriot journalists
travelling as a group to cover events in the north without paying a
crossing fee, but not to allow Greek journalists unless they pay the
fee. Individual Greek Cypriot journalists usually also must pay the
fees.
Academic freedom generally is respected throughout the island.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The freedom to
hold meetings, associate, and organize is protected by law, and the
Government respects these rights in practice.
Although Turkish Cypriot authorities also generally respected these
rights, they imposed restrictions on bicommunal meetings (see Section
2.d.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion generally is
respected. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus recognizes five
religions that are exempt from taxes and receive government subsidies.
Other religions may register routinely as nonprofit organizations and
receive tax exemptions, but not subsidies. In the Turkish Cypriot area,
no religion is recognized in the basic law, but Islamic institutions
receive tax exemptions and subsidies through the Wakf religious trust;
no other church receives exemptions or subsidies. Although missionaries
have the legal right to proselytize in both communities, missionary
activities are monitored closely by the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church
and by both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot authorities.
Turkish Cypriots residing in the southern part of the island and
non-Muslims in the north are allowed to practice their religions.
Restrictions on the right of Greek Cypriots resident in the north to
visit Apostolos Andreas monastery were eased in 1998. They now may
visit the monastery without restriction. Maronites may not visit
certain religious sites in the north located in military zones.
Armenians may not visit any religious sites in the north. A Greek
Cypriot request to replace a retiring Orthodox priest in the north has
been pending for more than 2 years.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
enjoy freedom of movement within their respective areas. Both
authorities respect the right to travel abroad and to emigrate. Turkish
Cypriots have difficulty traveling to most countries because travel
documents issued by the ``Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'' are
recognized only by Turkey. Most Turkish Cypriots use Turkish travel
documents instead.
The Republic of Cyprus authorities discourage travel to the
northern part of the island. They permit only day travel by tourists to
the north, sometimes arbitrarily refuse permission to non-Cypriots to
cross to the north, and pressure foreigners working in Cyprus not to
cross to the north. They have declared that it is illegal to enter
Cyprus except at authorized entry points in the south, effectively
barring entry into the government-controlled area by foreigners who
have entered Cyprus from the north. Following the 1994 murder of the
director of a Greek Cypriot association supporting Kurds in Turkey, the
Greek Cypriot authorities placed significantly tighter controls on the
movement of Turkish Cypriots to the south. Institutions and individuals
sponsoring visits of Turkish Cypriots to the government-controlled area
must notify the police in advance and provide them with an exact
itinerary.
Turkish Cypriot authorities generally allow visits to the north by
persons who initially enter Cyprus in the south, but they have denied
entry to persons of Turkish Cypriot origin who enter Cyprus in the
south. Previously, visitors of Greek Cypriot or Armenian origin, or
even persons having Greek or Armenian names, faced considerable
difficulties entering the north. In 1995 the Turkish Cypriot
authorities instituted a policy under which foreign nationals of Greek
Cypriot origin would be permitted to visit the Turkish Cypriot-
controlled area. However, implementation of the procedures remains
inconsistent.
In 1998 the Turkish Cypriot leadership instituted a system of
``visa'' fees at the main Nicosia checkpoint. In addition to requiring
substantially higher fees (approximately $24 [15 pounds sterling] for
Greeks and Greek Cypriots, and $6.50 [4 pounds sterling] for Turkish
Cypriots travelling to the south), the plan requires Greeks and Greek
Cypriots to obtain a formal ``TRNC visa'' to visit the north. Maronites
pay a lesser fee--$6.50 (4 pounds sterling) per visit if over age 18,
or $48 (30 pounds sterling) for an annual family pass. Greek Cypriots,
Maronites, and other non-Turkish Cypriots permanently residing in the
north can obtain a monthly crossing permit for approximately $16 (10
pounds sterling). The new system initially reduced overall crossings,
especially for Maronites visiting from the south, for whom travel
previously had been free. However, the number of Maronites crossing
from the south increased in 1999. Requests to cross into the north must
be submitted 48 hours in advance.
Following an agreement in 1997 on reciprocal visits to religious
sites, a number of visits occurred during the year. The Cypriot
Government permitted over 1,200 Turkish Cypriots to make a pilgrimage
to a Moslem shrine in the south in March, and allowed another 1,300 to
travel in June. In April a group of approximately 1,300 Greek Cypriots
visited the Apostolos Andreas monastery in the north. In August almost
1,000 Greek Cypriots traveled to the monastery, and in November another
group of 1,700 visited as well.
In 1996 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled 11 to 6
that Turkey committed a continuing violation of the rights of a Greek
Cypriot woman by preventing her from going to her property located in
north Cyprus. The ruling reaffirmed the validity of property deeds
issued prior to 1974. The Court also found in this case that ``it was
obvious from the large number of troops engaged in active duties in
northern Cyprus that the Turkish army exercised effective overall
control there. In the circumstances of the case, this entailed Turkey's
responsibility for the policies and actions of the `TRNC.' '' In July
1998 the Court ordered Turkey to pay the woman approximately $915,000
in damages and costs by October 28, 1998. The Turkish Government stated
that it cannot implement the Court's decision, which it contends is a
political decision, and argued that the land in question is not Turkish
but is part of the ``Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.'' The Council
of Europe (COE) during 1999 continued to call on the Turkish Government
to comply with the Court's decision. In October the COE Committee of
Ministers' Deputies voted to deplore Turkey's lack of compliance. A
number of similar cases have been filed with the ECHR.
Turkish Cypriot authorities in the past had approved most
applications for Turkish Cypriots to participate in bicommunal meetings
in the U.N.-controlled buffer zone, but on December 27, 1997, they
suspended Turkish Cypriot participation in these meetings, pending a
reevaluation of bicommunal activities. The ``suspension'' soon became
an effective Turkish Cypriot ban on bicommunal contacts on Cyprus.
Whereas in 1997 thousands of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots
participated in bicommunal events, in which mixed groups met to discuss
such topics as the environment, family violence, management techniques,
business operations, and legal questions, the Turkish Cypriot ban
halted almost all of those contacts. In addition to the ending of
bicommunal events in the buffer zone, Turkish Cypriots may not visit
the south for bicommunal contacts and Greek Cypriots may not visit the
north for such contacts (unless they purchase a Turkish Cypriot
``visa''). Turkish Cypriot authorities also attempted to interfere with
some bicommunal events taking place outside Cyprus by prohibiting civil
servants from participating. Enforcement of the policy has been
inconsistent, with some public officials permitted to attend off-island
bicommunal events. Private citizens have been allowed to travel to off-
island bicommunal events.
Restrictions on the approximately 600 Greek Cypriots and Maronites
living in the north were eased in recent years. Turkish Cypriot
authorities usually grant the applications of Greek Cypriot residents
in the north to visit the government-controlled area. The limit on
visits to the south was extended in 1998 from 15 days per month to a
total of 6 months per year. The applicants must return within the
designated period or risk losing their right to return and to keep
their property, although this rule rarely is enforced in practice.
Turkish Cypriot authorities also eliminated the previous monthly limit
on visits by close family relatives of Greek Cypriots resident in the
north (it was once per month until 1996 and twice per month
thereafter). A limit on overnight stays also was dropped. Greek
Cypriots visiting from the south still may not travel in the north in
their personal vehicles but must use taxis or buses and pay the
crossing fee.
Similar restrictions exist for visits by Maronite residents of the
north to the government-controlled area, but they are applied much more
loosely than restrictions on Greek Cypriots, and Maronite travel is
relatively free. However, Maronite residents also must pay the required
crossing fees.
While in the past Turkish Cypriot authorities permitted school
holiday and weekend visits to the north only by children under the ages
of 16 (male) and 18 (female), the age limits for Maronite students and
female Greek Cypriot students were lifted entirely in 1998. Male Greek
Cypriot students still may visit the north only until age 16, since
they are eligible for Greek Cypriot military service at age 17 and
therefore are considered to be possible Greek Cypriot soldiers by the
Turkish Cypriot authorities. Students pay a lower fee to cross the
buffer zone, approximately $3.00 (2 pounds Sterling).
According to regulations announced in October 1998, the Turkish
Cypriot authorities no longer require Greek Cypriots or Maronites
residing in the north to obtain police permits for internal travel in
the north. They may use private vehicles registered and insured in the
north. Implementation of the new policy has been inconsistent but
appears to be improving.
Although asylum legislation remains pending in the legislature, the
Government of Cyprus regularly grants de facto first asylum. However,
in 1998 and 1999 there were several instances in which groups of
illegal immigrants attempting to reach Western Europe instead landed on
Cyprus after their overcrowded vessels encountered problems at sea. The
largest such group numbered over 100 persons, all of whom applied for
political asylum after arriving in June 1998. After several months of
detention in a hotel, during which representatives of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) interviewed the immigrants, only 23
were granted asylum, and a large group was transferred to a jail. Most
of those who did not receive asylum were deported against their will in
late 1998 and early 1999. Prior to that, in October 1998, a special
police unit was filmed by local television cameras kicking and beating
the detainees with batons, while stopping a protest during which the
detainees burned their bedding. An examination of the immigrants,
mostly Africans, by a forensic pathologist revealed that most were
injured, some seriously. The Attorney General ordered investigations
into both incidents, and charges were brought against the officer in
charge. His trial on charges of dereliction of duty opened in September
and continued at year's end.
With the increasing number of illegal immigrants finding their way
to Cyprus in small boats, the Government of Cyprus is receiving a
growing number of asylum appications: 300 to 400 per year. These cases
are referred to the local UNHCR office for evaluation. If applicants
meet the criteria for refugee status, they are permitted to remain and
are given temporary work permits. However, applicants generally are not
granted permanent resettlement rights: The Government claims that it
already has enough responsibilities in caring for those displaced after
the 1974 Turkish intervention. Applicants are permitted to remain until
resettlement in another country can be arranged. In both the north and
the south, authorities cooperated with U.N. refugee authorities. The
UNHCR is developing improved procedures for dealing with asylum seekers
in the north, and is aware of two such cases in the north during the
year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Multiparty political systems exist throughout Cyprus. Under the
Republic's Constitution, political parties compete for popular support
actively and without restriction. Suffrage is universal, and elections
are held by secret ballot. Elections for the office of president are
held every 5 years; in February 1998 President Clerides won reelection
to a 5-year term. Elections for members of the House of Representatives
are held every 5 years or less.
The Turkish Cypriots living in northern Cyprus elect a leader and a
representative body every 5 years or less; in December 1998 they chose
a new ``National Assembly.'' In 1995 Turkish Cypriot voters elected
Rauf Denktash as their leader in elections deemed by observers to be
free and fair.
Under the 1960 Constitution, voting took place on a communal basis.
Therefore, since the breakdown in 1963 of bicommunal governing
arrangements, and since the 1974 de facto partition of the island,
Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area are barred
from voting there, although they may travel to the north to vote in
elections. Similarly, Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north
are barred by law from participating in Turkish Cypriot elections. They
are eligible to vote in Greek Cypriot elections but must travel to the
south to exercise that right. They also may choose their own village
officials, but those elected are not recognized by the Government of
Cyprus.
In both communities, women face no legal obstacles to participating
in the political process. While clearly underrepresented in government,
they hold some cabinet-level, judicial, and other senior positions. In
the House of Representatives, women hold 4 of 56 seats; in the
``National Assembly'' in the north, women hold 4 of 50 seats.
In addition to their normal voting rights, the small Maronite,
Armenian, and Latin (Roman Catholic) communities also elect special
nonvoting representatives from their respective communities.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Organizations in both parts of the island consider themselves human
rights groups; however, they generally are concerned with alleged
violations of the rights of their community's members by the other
community. Groups with a broad human rights mission include
organizations promoting awareness of domestic violence and others
concerned with alleged police brutality.
No restrictions prevent the formation of human rights groups.
Representatives of international human rights organizations have access
throughout the island.
The United Nations, through the autonomous tripartite (United
Nations, Greek Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot) Committee on Missing Persons
in Cyprus (CMP), is attempting to resolve the missing persons dilemma
that remained from the intercommunal violence beginning in 1963-64 and
the events of July 1974 and afterwards. The CMP has made little
progress. However, in November the CMP met formally for the first time
since early 1996 and agreed in principle to resume investigations in
2000. In July 1997 the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities agreed to collect and share information on missing persons
by the end of September 1997, outside of the CMP process. The
information finally was exchanged in January 1998. Further progress has
been delayed due to Turkish Cypriot reluctance to proceed without a
full accounting first of who may have been killed in internal Greek
Cypriot fighting in July 1974 prior to the landing of Turkish forces on
Cyprus. In June and July the Government of Cyprus conducted exhumations
of gravesites in the south that may contain the remains of persons
missing since 1974. One previously unidentified Greek Cypriot has been
identified through DNA testing; DNA testing continues on additional
remains.
A report by the European Commission of Human Rights, released in
September, held Turkey responsible for violations of human rights in
Cyprus stemming from the 1974 Turkish military intervention. The result
of a complaint by the Government of Cyprus, the report rejected the
Turkish argument that the ``TRNC'' is an independent state and instead
ruled that it is ``a subordinate local administration of Turkey
operating in northern Cyprus.'' Turkey was held responsible for
continuing human rights violations against Greek Cypriots missing since
1974, and their surviving relatives, and for violations concerning the
homes and properties of displaced Greek Cypriots from 1974, as well as
for violations of the rights of Greek Cypriots still living in north
Cyprus. The report was to be referred to the European Court of Human
Rights for a binding decision, a process that may take several years.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Legislation in both communities provides for protection against
discrimination based on sex, religion, or national, racial, or ethnic
origin. While each community generally respects such laws, significant
problems remain with the treatment of the Greek Cypriots and Maronites
living in the north and, to a lesser extent, with the treatment of
Turkish Cypriots living in the government-controlled area.
Women.--Spousal abuse in the Greek Cypriot community is receiving
increasing attention, and the problem is believed to be significant. A
1994 law aimed at making spousal abuse easier to report and prosecute
initially had little effect because key provisions were unfunded and
unimplemented. Progress was made in implementation during the year,
with all cases reported to the police being referred to the courts and
measures taken to ensure that such cases are treated as serious
criminal charges, not simply as family disputes. Many suspected cases
of domestic violence still do not reach the courts, largely because of
family pressure and the wife's economic dependence on her husband. An
organization formed to address the domestic abuse problem reported 747
cases during the year, compared with 718 cases in 1998, with 83.6
percent of the reported victims women, 12.9 percent children, and 3.5
percent men. A shelter for battered women opened in late 1998. Very few
cases tried in the courts result in convictions. Little public
discussion of domestic violence occurs in the Turkish Cypriot
community, although a report issued by the ``Women's Research Center''
described such violence as common. A women's shelter opened in 1994.
Domestic violence cases are rare in the Turkish Cypriot legal system,
since they often are considered a ``family matter.''
Republic of Cyprus law forbids forced prostitution. However,
credible reports continue that women, generally East Asian or Eastern
European night club performers, are trafficked and forced into
prostitution in both communities (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
The Greek Cypriot press frequently reported on the mistreatment of
some maids and other foreign workers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.e.).
Throughout Cyprus women generally have the same legal status as
men. In a significant step, Greek Cypriot women married to foreign
husbands for the first time were given the right to transmit
citizenship to their children automatically in new legislation passed
in December 1998. Previously they were required to apply for Cypriot
citizenship for their children, while Greek Cypriot men could transmit
citizenship to their children automatically.
In July 1998, a Turkish Cypriot law on marriage and divorce went
into effect, which provided for more equal treatment of husbands and
wives. Under the law, the man no longer is considered legally the head
of the family and does not have the exclusive right to decide the
family's place of residence. The wife may retain her surname but must
add the husband's surname. Turkish Cypriot women may now marry non-
Moslem men. In cases of divorce, the court decides on a fair
distribution of the family's assets, with each partner assured a
minimum of 30 percent. In dividing assets, the judge must take into
account which partner is receiving custody of the children and provide
sufficient means to support them.
Legal provisions in both communities requiring equal pay for men
and women performing the same job are enforced effectively at the white
collar level, but Turkish Cypriot women employed in the agricultural
and textile sectors routinely are paid less than their male
counterparts.
Children.--Both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot authorities
demonstrate a strong commitment to children's welfare. There is no
difference in the health care and educational opportunities available
to boys and girls. Free education through age 15 is compulsory in both
communities.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--In Cyprus generally, disabled persons do
not appear to be discriminated against in education or the provision of
state services. In the Greek Cypriot community, disabled persons who
apply for a public sector position are entitled to preference if they
are deemed able to perform the required duties and their qualifications
equal those of other applicants. Legislation also mandates that new
public building and tourist facilities provide access for the disabled,
although little has been done to enforce this law. In the Turkish
Cypriot community, regulations require businesses to employ 1 disabled
person for every 25 positions they fill, although enforcement is
inconsistent. While awareness of the issue is increasing, the Turkish
Cypriot community has not yet enacted legislation to mandate access for
the disabled to public buildings and other facilities.
Religious Minorities.--Greek Cypriots living in the north report
that unused Orthodox churches continue to be vandalized. Turkish
Cypriots complain that unused mosques in the south have been treated
similarly. A previously unknown Greek Cypriot nationalist organization
claimed responsibility for an arson attack on a mosque in the south in
August. Damage was light, and the authorities pledged to repair the
damage and increase protection of Muslim sites. No one has been
arrested for the attack.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Both the Government of Cyprus
and the Turkish Cypriot administration have constitutional or legal
bars against discrimination. The basic agreement covering treatment of
Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north and Turkish Cypriots
living in the south remains the 1975 Vienna III Agreement. This
agreement provides for voluntary transfer of populations, free and
unhindered access by the UNFICYP to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living
in the north and Turkish Cypriots living in the south, and facilities
for education, medical care, and religious worship.
Some of the approximately 300 Turkish Cypriots living in the
government-controlled area face difficulties in obtaining
identification cards and other government documents, especially if they
were born after 1974. Turkish Cypriots also appear to be subjected to
surveillance by the Greek Cypriot police. However, they make few formal
complaints to the UNFICYP. A number of Turkish Cypriots who worked in
the government-controlled area but did not live there lost their jobs
following the 1996 killing of two Greek Cypriots in the buffer zone.
The Cyprus Government, which stated that it could not ensure the safety
of the Turkish Cypriot workers, provided 6 months of unemployment
benefits to those living in the mixed Greek Cypriot-Turkish Cypriot
village of Pyla, but no one has been rehired.
UNFICYP access to Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north
remains limited. Despite recent improvements in living conditions for
Greek Cypriots and Maronites, no Greek-language educational facilities
for Greek Cypriot or Maronite children in the north exist beyond the
elementary level. Parents thus are forced in many instances to choose
between keeping their children with them or sending them to the south
for further education (in which case Turkish Cypriot authorities no
longer allow them to return permanently to the north). All textbooks
sent from the south to the Greek Cypriot schools must be screened by
Turkish Cypriot authorities, causing lengthy delays and shortages of
up-to-date texts. Both Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the north
are unable to change their housing at will. Although the Vienna III
Agreement provides for medical care by a doctor from the Greek Cypriot
community, only care by a doctor registered with Turkish Cypriot
authorities is permitted. Additional telephones have been installed for
Greek Cypriots living in the north, although they, like Turkish
Cypriots, must pay higher, ``international'' fees to call the south.
In May a Maronite house in the village of Asomatos was demolished
by the Turkish military. Military officials indicated that the action
was an error and promised to rebuild the house. However, it had not yet
been rebuilt by year's end. Maronites still lack some public services
available in most other Turkish Cypriot areas.
In 1998 Turkish Cypriot authorities announced that they were
reviewing legislation banning Greek Cypriots and Maronites in the north
from bequeathing real property to heirs residing in the south. Such
property would no longer be seized by the Turkish Cypriot authorities
but would be taken into temporary custody pending probate of the will.
Implementation of this policy has been slow, and it is not yet possible
to determine its future effectiveness.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except for members of
the police and military forces, have the legal right to form and join
trade unions of their own choosing without prior authorization. In the
government-controlled area, police officers also have the right to join
associations that have the right to bargain collectively, although not
to strike. More than 70 percent of the Greek Cypriot work force belong
to independent trade unions. Approximately 50 to 60 percent of Turkish
Cypriot private sector workers, and all public sector workers, belong
to labor unions.
In the Turkish Cypriot community, union officials allege that
various firms have been successful in establishing ``company''
organizations and then applying pressure on workers to join these
unions. Officials of independent labor unions also have accused the
Turkish Cypriot authorities of creating rival public sector unions to
weaken the independent unions. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) had not yet acted on these complaints by year's end.
In both communities, trade unions freely and regularly take stands
on public policy issues affecting workers and maintain their
independence from the authorities. Two of the major trade unions, one
in each community, are affiliated closely with political parties. Both
of the other major unions are independent.
All workers have the right to strike, and several strikes occurred.
However, in the northern part of the island, a 1978 court ruling gives
employers an unrestricted right to hire replacement workers in the
event of a strike, thereby limiting the effectiveness of the right to
strike. Authorities of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot
communities have the power to curtail strikes in what they deem to be
``essential services,'' although this power rarely is used.
Unions in both parts of Cyprus are able to affiliate with
international trade union organizations, although Greek Cypriot unions
sometimes object to the recognition of Turkish Cypriot unions formed
after 1963.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Trade unions
and confederations by law are free to organize and bargain collectively
throughout Cyprus. This right is observed in practice in the
government-controlled area, and most wages and benefits are set by
freely negotiated collective agreements. However, Greek Cypriot
collective bargaining agreements are not enforceable. In instances when
such agreements are believed to have been infringed, the Ministry of
Labor is requested to investigate the claim. If the Ministry is unable
to resolve the dispute, the union may call a strike to support its
demands.
In the Turkish Cypriot community, where inflation exceeded 60
percent during the year, wage levels are reviewed several times a year
for both the private sector and public sector workers, and a
corresponding cost-of-living raise is established. A special commission
composed of five representatives each from organized labor, employers,
and the authorities conducts the review. Union leaders contend that
private sector employers are able to discourage union activity because
the enforcement of labor and occupational safety regulations is
sporadic, and penalties for antiunion practices are minimal. As in the
Greek Cypriot community, parties to a dispute may request mediation by
the authorities.
Small export processing zones exist in the port of Larnaca and in
Famagusta, but the laws governing working conditions and actual
practice are the same as those outside the zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and
this prohibition generally is observed. However, there were credible
reports that foreign women were forced into prostitution (see Sections
5 and 6.f.). Foreign maids and illegal foreign workers allegedly are
subject to the nonpayment of wages and the threat of deportation (see
Section 6.e.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--In both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities,
the minimum age for the employment of children in an ``industrial
undertaking'' is 16 years of age. Turkish Cypriots may be employed in
apprentice positions at the age of 15. There are labor inspectors in
both communities. However, in family-run shops it is common to see
younger children working after school, and according to press reports,
children as young as 11 or 12 years of age work in orchards during
their school holidays in the Turkish Cypriot community. Laws prohibit
forced and bonded child labor, and these laws are enforced effectively
in both communities (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legislated minimum wage in
the Greek Cypriot community, which is reviewed every year, is
approximately $470 (257 Cyprus pounds) per month for shop assistants,
practical nurses, clerks, hairdressers, and nursery assistants (rising
to $509 [278 Cyprus pounds] after 6 months' employment). This amount is
insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. All other occupations are covered under collective bargaining
agreements between trade unions and employers within the same economic
sector, and the wages set in these agreements are significantly higher
than the legislated minimum wage. The legislated minimum wage in the
Turkish Cypriot area, while subject to frequent review because of high
inflation, was approximately $256 (138 Cyprus pounds) per month as of
September. This amount is insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Unskilled workers typically earn about
$380 (205 Cyprus pounds) per month, which is barely adequate to support
a family.
In the Greek Cypriot community, the standard workweek in the
private sector averages 39 hours for white-collar workers and 38 hours
for blue-collar workers. In the public sector, it is 38 hours during
the winter and 35 hours in the summer. In the Turkish Cypriot
community, the standard workweek is 40 hours in the winter and 35 hours
in the summer. Labor inspectors effectively enforce these laws.
Reports on the mistreatment of maids and other foreign workers are
frequent in the Greek Cypriot press. These reports usually involve
allegations that maids, often from East or South Asia, were treated
inhumanely by their employers or fired without cause in violation of
their contracts. Many women do not complain to authorities, fearing
retribution from their employers. Those who do file charges run the
risk of being fired and then deported.
A significant percentage of the labor force in the north consists
of illegal workers, mostly from Turkey. According to some estimates,
such illegal workers constitute as much as 25 percent of the total work
force. There are frequent allegations that these workers are subject to
mistreatment, including nonpayment of wages and threats of deportation.
In recent years, steps were taken to improve health and safety
standards in the workplace in the government-controlled area. In 1997 a
law took effect that harmonized health and safety standards with those
in the European Union (EU). The law incorporates EU principles and
standards for health and safety in the workplace and complies fully
with the 1981 ILO Convention on occupational health and safety. A
second 1997 law requires employers to provide insurance liability
coverage for work-related injuries.
Occupational safety and health regulations are administered
sporadically at best in the Turkish Cypriot area. In both areas,
factory inspectors process complaints and inspect business in order to
ensure that occupational safety laws are observed. Workers in the
government-controlled area can remove themselves from dangerous work
conditions without risking loss of employment. Turkish Cypriot workers
who file complaints do not receive satisfactory legal protection and
may face dismissal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--New legislation that would make
trafficking a felony was under consideration in the Cypriot legislature
at year's end; it would also provide for support for victims. A new law
also was under consideration at year's end in the Turkish Cypriot
``National Assembly'' that would regulate the hiring of women in
nightclubs but would not prohibit trafficking. A holdover from British
preindependence law currently makes it illegal in both communities to
procure a woman for prostitution, although the crime is only a
misdemeanor. Corruption among law enforcement and immigration personnel
has been the primary obstacle to effective policing in both
communities.
During the year, credible reports continued that women were
trafficked into both communities for the purpose of prostitution.
Agents in Eastern Europe recruited young women for prostitution in the
Greek Cypriot community. The women entered either illegally after
authorities were bribed or on temporary 3-month work permits. They then
sometimes were forced to surrender their passports or forced to stay
beyond the period of their work permits and in some cases were not paid
their full salaries. The authorities arrested nightclub operators for
profiting from prostitution, and the Government made some effort to
protect women who bring complaints against employers by allowing them
to remain to press charges or facilitate their return home. However,
many of the women are reluctant to press charges, fearing retaliation
by employers or deportation. A similar pattern exists of recruiting and
hiring of East European women to work in nightclubs in the Turkish
Cypriot community, and reports persist of restrictions on nightclub
workers, such as confiscation of their passports by employers.
______
CZECH REPUBLIC
The Czech Republic is a constitutional parliamentary democracy with
a bicameral Parliament. Following elections in June 1998, Prime
Minister Milos Zeman formed a minority Government comprising almost
exclusively members of his left-of-center Social Democratic Party. The
Parliament elects the President for a 5-year term. President Vaclav
Havel was reelected in January 1998 by a narrow margin and remains an
internationally recognized advocate of human rights and social justice.
Although the country essentially has completed the reform of political
structures initiated after the 1989 ``Velvet Revolution,'' some
institutions are still in a state of transformation. The judiciary is
independent legally but is hampered by structural and procedural
deficiencies and a lack of resources.
The Ministry of the Interior oversees the police. The civilian
internal security service, known as the Security and Information
Service (BIS), is independent of ministry control but reports to
Parliament and the Prime Minister's office. Police and BIS authorities
generally observe constitutional and legal protection of individual
rights in carrying out their responsibilities. However, some members of
the police committed human rights abuses.
The economy is market-based, with over two-thirds of gross domestic
product (GDP) produced by the private sector. The economy recently has
contracted as the transition to a full market economy stalled because
of unfinished structural reforms, including industrial restructuring,
privatization, modernization of the commercial code, and transparency
in decisionmaking. The sharpest recession in the country's history
occurred in 1998 when the economy contracted by 2.7 percent. Inflation
has been brought down sharply in recent years, while unemployment
reached 8 percent and was expected to reach double-digit levels by 2000
as long overdue industrial restructuring was implemented. The work
force is employed primarily in industry, retail trade, and
construction. Leading exports are machinery and transport equipment,
and intermediate manufactured products. GDP per capita in 1998 reached
approximately $5,500.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, problems remain in several areas. Occasional police violence
remains a problem. Lengthy pretrial detention and long delays in trials
are problems, due to a lack of resources for the judicial system. There
is some violence and discrimination against women. Discrimination and
sporadic skinhead violence against the Romani community remain
problems. Trafficking in women and children is a problem. In January
the Government formed a Human Rights Council, headed by the
Commissioner for Human Rights, to advise the Government on human rights
issues and prepare legislative proposals for improving human rights in
the country.
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In February police launched an investigation into the 1945 murder
of 30 Sudeten Germans in Tocov, a small town outside of Karlovy Vary.
In November police ended the investigation after they were unable to
find any persons who could confirm the testimony of German witnesses or
who could remember the names of those Czechs who allegedly carried out
the murders.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, and there were no
reports of such practices; however, police occasionally use excessive
force and abuse their authority. In April the Czech Helsinki Committee
released a report that documented widespread police violence.
Police were criticized for a forcible intervention on May 1, when
they pushed approximately 300 anarchists away from a demonstration
route planned by an equally large group of skinheads. Although the
skinhead rally was registered legally with city authorities and the
anarchist demonstration was not, some human rights activist leaders and
commentators questioned the action as a form of police protection for
neo-Nazis. In June police were criticized for failing to control
demonstrators at the ``Global Street Party,'' a demonstration of some
5,000 anarchists and radical environmentalists, when fringe groups
deviated from the planned route and attacked a television station,
restaurant franchises, and a Western embassy building.
The police force has been restructured significantly, and many new
officers have been recruited since the 1989 revolution. Nevertheless,
public approval ratings for police remain low, and corruption remains a
problem. During the year, 345 members of the national police force were
charged with criminal offenses, half of which were committed off duty.
These include cases of police corruption, which can and do result in
prosecutions. The most common offense cited was policemen fining
motorists for traffic offenses and then keeping the money. The April
Czech Helsinki Committee report also documented corruption and
discrimination against women during recruitment of officers (see
Section 5). Police sometimes failed to take sufficient action in cases
of threats or attacks against Roma.
In March authorities charged a police officer in Ostrov for making
racial insults against a group of Roma. The same officer was sentenced
to a 1-year suspended sentence for wearing a swastika in public in
1998. However, he was suspended from the police force only after he
made racial insults.
The investigation of a special police unit alleged to have used
excessive force to contain a group of anarchists and radical
environmentalists rioting in downtown Prague in 1998 is ongoing. In
November an official from the police force's investigative office said
that up to four officers could face charges of abuse of power and
unwarranted use of force in connection with the incident.
The case of a Brno city police officer charged with using excessive
force to break up a late night party outside a theater in 1995 still
was awaiting a formal court decision at year's end. In the meantime,
the officer continues to serve on the police force but faces suspension
or other internal disciplinary action if convicted.
The trial of three Communist-era investigators charged with
torturing political prisoners in the 1950's is currently before the
District Court in Uherske Hradiste. In May two former police officials
were sentenced to 3\1/2\ and 3 years for their part in the police
intervention against demonstrators on November 17, 1989; they appealed
the decision, which still was pending at year's end.
The Office for the Documentation and Investigation of the Crimes of
Communism (UDV--see Section 1.e.) continued to investigate cases of
torture and misconduct from the Communist era.
Skinhead violence against Roma and other minorities remained a
problem (see Section 5).
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. There is
overcrowding in some prisons; as of August the prison system was at 118
percent of capacity. As of December, there were 23,054 prisoners in the
country. There are 9,890 prison guards, or 1 guard for every 4
prisoners. Attorney and family visits are permitted. The authorities
follow these guidelines in practice.
The Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law forbids
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this
prohibition in practice. Police may hold persons without charge for up
to 48 hours, during which time they have the right to counsel. The lack
of experienced police investigators and qualified judges, together with
a still evolving legal environment, have contributed to a backlog of
court cases. The Ministry of Justice estimates that 400 judges are
needed to fill vacant positions. Pretrial detention may last legally as
long as 4 years for cases considered ``exceptionally grave'' under the
Criminal Code. Pretrial detention for most crimes may last as long as 2
or 3 years, with mandatory judicial review intervals beginning at the
end of the first 6 months of detention. If the court does not approve
continued detention during a judicial review, the suspect must be
released. In practice few pretrial detainees are held for longer than 2
years. The law does not allow bail for certain serious crimes. A
suspect may petition the appropriate investigating authorities at any
time for release from detention. The average length of pretrial
detention is now 5 months and 21 days. At year's end, the number of
pre-trial detainees was 6,919, about one-third of the total prison
population.
The law prohibits exile, and the Government observes this
prohibition in practice.
Since 1993 local courts and foreign police have expelled to
Slovakia ``Slovaks'' without proper citizenship or residency papers.
Some of these expulsions involve ``Slovak'' Roma who have never been in
Slovakia. By the first half of 1997 (latest available statistics) a
total of 851 ``Slovaks'' had been expelled administratively or
judicially by the authorities. A February 1998 presidential amnesty
(which was expected to affect three-quarters of all expulsion sentences
issued between January 1, 1993 and February 2, 1998) granted amnesty to
those receiving expulsion sentences for crimes in which the punishment
is less than 5 years' imprisonment. However, according to one
nongovernmental organization (NGO) that follows this issue, some courts
have not implemented this amnesty. Courts have not imposed expulsion
sentences since the implementation of a new citizenship law, which
allows ``Slovaks'' and others to legalize their status.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and it is impartial and independent in practice.
Judges are not fired or transferred for political reasons. The
Judiciary is hampered by structural and procedural deficiencies and a
lack of resources.
The court system consists of district, regional, and high courts.
The Supreme Court is the highest court of appeal. In addition, the
separate Constitutional Court has final authority for cases concerning
the constitutionality of legislation.
The law stipulates that persons charged with criminal offenses are
entitled to fair and open public trials. They have the right to be
informed of their legal rights and of the charges against them, to
consult with counsel, and to present a defense. The state provides
lawyers for indigent defendants in criminal and some civil cases
through the Bar Association. All defendants enjoy a presumption of
innocence and have the right to refuse to testify against themselves.
They may appeal any judgments decided against them. The authorities
observe these rights in practice.
The 1991 lustration law, passed to prevent Communist-era
collaborators from enjoying senior government responsibilities,
continues to bar many former Communist Party officials, members of the
people's militia, and suspected secret police collaborators from
holding a wide range of elective and appointive offices for 5 years,
including appointive positions in state-owned companies, academia, and
the media. In 1995 Parliament extended this legal constraint to the
year 2000, overriding a veto by President Havel. Some private employers
also have required applicants to produce lustration certificates
proving noncollaboration. By August the special government office
handling lustration requests processed approximately 6,000 lustration
certificates at the request of individuals, bringing the total since
1991 to 366,000. During the year, some 2.7 percent of applicants did
not receive confirmation of a clear record because of suspected
collaboration, a slightly lower percentage than the overall average of
3.2 percent since 1991. Those who did not receive confirmation of a
clear record may file a civil suit against the Interior Ministry for a
charge similar to slander. In the period from mid-October 1996 to
September 1997, 31 such suits were filed. Of these 31 suits, about half
of those decided to date were ``fully successful,'' and another quarter
were ``partially successful,'' although more recent data are not
available.
Defenders of the lustration law argue that individuals who
systematically destroyed the lives of others in order to gain
advantages for themselves within the Communist system should not be
entrusted with high state responsibilities. However, the law has been
criticized for violating human rights principles prohibiting
discrimination in employment and assigning collective guilt. It also
has been criticized because the screening process is based on the
records of the Communist secret police, which many believe are
incomplete or unreliable. Citizens unjustly accused of collaboration
may suffer diminished career prospects and damaged personal
reputations. The 1997 Agenda 2000 report by the European Union notes
the law's continuing existence with some concern.
Some actions taken by state authorities and the Communist Party
during the 1948-1989 Communist regime are being investigated as
criminal acts under a 1993 law by a government office (UDV) established
for this purpose. The UDV was established in 1995 and is an independent
part of the Czech Police Office of Investigations. The UDV is empowered
to launch and conduct prosecutions and propose filing suits to state
attorney's offices. In investigations of 2,116 cases under its
jurisdiction, it has recommended action against 79 individuals, with 49
ending in criminal charges. Sentences were handed down in eight cases.
By year's end, charges were dropped in 320 of the pending cases for
various reasons, including lack of evidence, amnesty, or death of the
accused. In addition, three cases had reached the trial phase and are
to be decided in the next few months. The UDV also is working with
Charles University to prepare ``moral trials'' to discuss crimes whose
offenders cannot be punished due to their death or the expired statute
of limitations on the cases. It targets primarily cases of: Torture
(see Section 1.c.); border shootings; treason connected with the 1968
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia; state persecution of opponents
of the Communist regime; and investigation of Czech authorities who
negligently allowed exposure of citizens to hazardous waste after the
nuclear accident in Chernobyl. Although the statute of limitations for
many of the Communist-era crimes under investigation by the UDV was set
to expire in 2000, Parliament voted in December to suspend the statue
of limitations for serious crimes committed during the Communist regime
and enabled the UDV to continue investigating these cases. In late
August, a prosecutor for the UDV asked the Prosecutor General to indict
former Communist officials Milos Jakes and Jozef Lenart. The two were
to be charged with high treason for attending a meeting at the Soviet
Embassy in Prague on the day after the 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion and
for discussing the creation of a new ``workers' and farmers' ''
government; they were not indicted by year's end. In December the
Supreme Court ruled that a criminal case against a Communist-era judge
should be reopened. A district court ruled earlier that Pavel Vitek,
who was one of the judges in a show trial against seven persons who
were accused falsely of murdering Communist officials in 1951, could
not be tried for his role in the case because the statute of
limitations had expired. However, the Supreme Court ruled that Vitek
could be tried for aiding and abetting murder.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Electronic surveillance, the tapping of telephones,
and the interception of mail require a court order; government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions in practice, and
violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
In February and March armed police in Rokycany conducted several
searches without warrants of Romani homes, after local Romani activists
sent a letter to the mayor protesting racial discrimination. The house
of the son of prominent Roma rights activist Ondrej Gina also was
searched. The Roma filed complaints against the police for these
searches. In November Rokycany authorities charged Gina with inciting
racial hatred and damaging the city's reputation (see Section 2.a.).
On December 27, former Health Minister Ivan David alleged that a
bugging device was installed in his office a few months prior to his
resignation on December, although he produced no evidence to
substantiate his claim.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Individuals can and do speak out on political issues and
freely criticize the Government and public figures. A wide variety of
newspapers, magazines, and journals, owned by a variety of Czech and
foreign investors, are published without government interference. The
press and broadcast media continue to operate under outdated and
insufficient laws, which are now in the process of being replaced by
legislation conforming to European Union norms. A Communist-era law
against ``defamation of the Republic'' was revoked in 1997.
The electronic media are independent. There are 3 national
television stations, 1 public and 2 private, and more than 60 private
radio stations in addition to Czech Public Radio. The leading
television channel, Nova, is privately owned, although a widely
publicized dispute about the channel's ownership and alleged fraud and
serious commercial misconduct by the license holder is now the subject
of international arbitration. Citizens also have access to foreign
broadcasts via satellite, cable, and the Internet.
A nine-member Television and Radio Council has limited regulatory
responsibility for policymaking and answers to the parliamentary media
committee, which exercises broad oversight of the Council and must
approve its members. The Council can issue and revoke radio and
television licenses and monitors programming. The Council was
criticized widely during the year for its lack of initiative and
ineffective action in addressing a high profile ownership dispute at
the country's largest private television channel.
In April Amnesty International placed the country on its blacklist
of countries that violate freedom of speech and expression because of
the criminal arrest of reporter Zdenek Zukal in 1998. Zukal faces three
charges of criminal libel for reporting that police had provided false
information in their investigation of high-level corruption in Olomouc.
Zukal had been charged originally with slander for publishing documents
he knew--or should have known--to be forgeries. Local authorities later
changed the charge to false accusation 1 day before a planned
presidential pardon; the new charges still were pending at year's end.
In November the mayor and city council of Rokycany formally pressed
charges against the prominent national Romani leader Ondrej Gina for
remarks that he allegedly published about the mayor and the city on an
Internet site about alleged discrimination against Roma. Local police
concluded that these remarks constituted a criminal act and turned the
case over to the state prosecutor for action. The major and city
council argued that Gina's remarks were malicious enough to constitute
``defamation of the Czech nation'' and ``harm to the reputation of the
city of Rokycany at home and abroad.'' The charges against Gina include
slander, assault on a public office, and inciting racial discord. The
case was still pending at year's end.
Earlier in the year, Rokycany police conducted a search without a
warrant of the home of Gina's son, after Gina sent a letter to the
mayor protesting racial discrimination (see Section 1.f.).
On June 23, a Prague court prohibited Tomas Kebza, deputy chairman
of the rightwing Republican Youth Party and editor of the weekly
Republika, from publishing for 10 years for his two articles that
contained anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi views and that were aimed at
suppressing the rights of other citizens (see Section 5).
In May the Government approved a press bill, which was criticized
strongly by media experts. The most controversial provision, which
would require the press to present responses from persons or parties
who believe that their reputations have been sullied by media reports,
even if the information was correct, was later removed. Opponents of
the measure maintained that this provision would create an unfair
burden on the press and represented an unwise regulation of free
expression. In December the amended version of the bill was approved by
the lower house of Parliament but returned to the Senate for further
changes. Those modifications are still pending. International NGO's and
the Council of Europe, which criticized the legislation, are to
continue monitoring this process closely.
In May the Parliament passed a freedom of information act that was
to take effect on January 1, 2000. The law provides for freedom of
access to information under the control of state and local authorities
as well as other institutions affecting the rights of citizens.
The law provides for academic freedom but forbids activities by
established political parties at universities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of persons to assemble peacefully, and the
Government respects this right in practice, although it may restrict
assemblies that promote hatred and intolerance, advocate suppression of
individual or political rights, or otherwise would jeopardize the
safety of the participants. Police generally do not interfere with
spontaneous, peaceful demonstrations for which organizers lack a
permit. Police arrested some skinheads at a May 1 rally (see Section
5).
The law forbids political party activity at universities (see
Section 2.a.).
The Constitution provides for the right of persons to associate
freely and to form political parties, and the Government respects this
right in practice. Either the Government or the President may submit a
proposal to the Supreme Court calling for a political party to be
disbanded; during the year the Supreme Court cancelled the
registrations of six parties that existed only on paper. The
cancellations, part of a policy begun by the 1998 interim government to
maintain an active registry, were mere formalities, as the
organizations in question had ceased to exist in practice.
Organizations, associations, foundations, and political parties are
required to register with local officials or at the Interior Ministry,
but there is no evidence that this registration is either coercive or
withheld arbitrarily. Prime Minister Zeman has called periodically for
the Interior Ministry to reexamine or cancel the official registrations
of skinhead organizations and others propagating racial hatred or
fascism, but no action has been taken to date.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice. The State
subsidizes all religions that are registered officially with the
Ministry of Culture. There are 21 state-recognized religions. To
register a church must have at least 10,000 adult members permanently
residing in the country. For any churches that the World Council of
Churches already has recognized, only 500 adult members permanently
residing in the country are necessary. Churches registered prior to
1991 are not required to meet these conditions. The Jewish community,
which numbers only a few thousand, constitutes one such exception. One
group, the Unification Church (UC), was denied registration in January
when the Department of Churches determined that it had obtained the
required proof of membership by fraud; the UC is contesting the
decision in court. Unregistered religious groups, such as the small
Muslim minority, may not own community property legally, although they
are otherwise free to assemble and worship in the manner of their
choice. Their members can and do issue publications without
interference.
Missionaries for various religious groups, including the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints and Jehovah's Witnesses, are present
in the country and proselytize without hindrance. In March and May
respectively, the Government established two church-state commissions
to improve church-state relations. One is a ``political'' commission
with the presence of all parties currently in Parliament, and the
second is a ``specialist'' commission composed of experts including
lawyers, economists, and church representatives. The commissions advise
the Government on church-state relations, the status of churches and
methods of their financing, and church-related property questions.
A court in Jicin stripped a woman who was a former member of
Jehovah's Witnesses of guardianship of her 6-year-old daughter, for
allegedly not taking her daughter to the doctor but instead to
Jehovah's Witnesses meetings and for preventing her from socializing
with other children. The court granted custody to the father and
allowed the mother to see her daughter for only 6 hours per month.
Further details about the case and the role of the mother's former
religious affiliation in the court's decision are not available.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of movement
to travel domestically and abroad, as well as for emigration and
repatriation, and the Government respects these provisions in practice.
Czechs who emigrated during the period of Communist rule frequently
return to visit or live. A law passed in September permits such persons
to regain Czech citizenship without having to relinquish a foreign
citizenship that they acquired during that time. Citizenship is not
revoked for political reasons.
The law includes provisions for granting refugee and asylee status
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. A legal and institutional framework is
in place for the processing of refugees and asylees, although the
current law is under revision to close a few gaps. The Government
provides first asylum and cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. The Czech Republic is both a transit and destination country
for migrants. The Government fully funds an integration program to
assist those granted refugee status in locating housing and receiving
other social assistance. A reception center, three camps, and six
integration centers are provided for recognized refugees. As of August,
the Government granted citizenship to 3,200 former citizens of Slovakia
and 564 former citizens of other countries; however, the new
citizenship law passed in September is expected to enable thousands
more ``Slovaks'' to become citizens (see Section 5). In April the
Government established temporary protection status for Kosovar Albanian
refugees and opened 7 humanitarian centers to house 825 refugees
relocated from overcrowded camps in Albania and the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia. According to estimates by the UNHCR, there were
between 2,000 and 3,000 more unregistered Kosovar Albanians in the
country who were staying in hotels along the border with Germany and
were waiting to be smuggled into that country. By fall most of these
refugees returned to Kosovo at their own request.
In the last 8 years, 21,824 asylum applications were filed, of
which 1,857 received formal refugee status for resettlement. As of
December 1, 62 persons had received refugee status out of a total of
6,489 applications. A total of 17,877 foreigners have requested asylum
in the country since 1990, and 1,817 (approximately 10 percent)
qualified for asylum status. Citizens from Afghanistan, the former
Yugoslavia, India, Sri Lanka, and Iraq submitted the most asylum
requests during the year. In addition, migrants from economically
disadvantaged countries in Central and Eastern Europe often enter the
country to take up illegal residency or in transit to the West. In 1998
border police had prevented a record 44,000 illegal entry attempts,
which more than doubled the average of the preceding 3 years. During
the first half of the year, 15,400 illegal migrants were stopped at the
borders, many of whom were citizens of the former Yugoslavia.
A growing concern is the smuggling of large groups of refugees and
economic migrants into and across the country, which lacks specific
laws criminalizing alien smuggling. Organized rings promoting illegal
employment abroad operate with impunity, freely advertising their
services in dozens of local papers and on the Internet. In spite of
existing legislative gaps, the police are taking action against large-
scale trafficking rings under organized crime statutes. The authorities
are working with neighboring countries to tighten border controls. In
December Parliament passed new legislation on residence and visas. The
new law restricts considerably previous rules for change of status and
extension of stay and requires visas in advance for everyone but
tourists. In January military observation patrols were instigated along
the Czech-Slovak border to enhance police efforts. In June a record 91
illegal migrants were caught crossing the Czech-Slovak border on foot.
An organized crime investigation involving Czech-German police in April
broke up an international ring believed to have smuggled thousands of
persons over the past 5 years. Police arrested 43 suspects, and an
additional 9 were arrested in Germany. Illegal migrant groups in these
cases were composed primarily of persons from Ukraine, Iraq,
Afghanistan, the former Yugoslavia, and Sri Lanka, many of whom claimed
asylum in the Czech Republic. There were no reports of the forced
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government by democratic means, and citizens exercise this right in
practice through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis
of universal suffrage. Citizens above the age of 18 are eligible to
vote by secret ballot in nationwide and local elections. Opposition
groups, including political parties, function openly and participate
without hindrance in the political process. Citizens may join political
organizations or vote for the political party of their choice without
government interference. Some persons, predominantly Roma, who were
enfranchised citizens under the former Czechoslovakia, were unable to
obtain Czech citizenship at the time of the split with Slovakia,
despite birth or long residency in the Czech Republic. They lacked
voting and other rights due to restrictions under the existing
citizenship laws. However, the new citizenship law passed in September
is expected to remedy the situation for thousands of such persons (see
Section 5).
The Government of Prime Minister Milos Zeman took office in August
1998. The Government consists almost exclusively of members of the
Prime Minister's left-of-center Social Democratic party, the first
nonrightist government since 1989. In addition to the largest
opposition party, (former Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus' Civil Democratic
Party), which has agreed to tolerate and support the Government, the
opposition consists of the Communist Party and a coalition of four
small center-right parties. The Constitution mandates elections to
Parliament at least every 4 years, based on proportional representation
in eight large electoral districts. To enter Parliament, a party must
obtain 5 percent of the votes cast in the election. The President is
elected by Parliament and serves a 5-year term. The President has
limited constitutional powers but may use a suspense veto to return
legislation to Parliament, which then can override that veto by a
simple majority.
There are no restrictions, in law or in practice, on women's
participation in politics; however, they are underrepresented, and
relatively few women hold high public office. None of the 16 cabinet
ministers in the Government at year's end were women. The 200-member
Chamber of Deputies has only 29 female deputies, including 1 deputy
speaker. There are 9 female senators in the 81-member Senate. The
President of the Senate, elected in December 1998, is a woman.
No seats are reserved in either house for ethnic minorities.
Slovaks, of whom there are an estimated 300,000, are almost all
"Czechoslovaks" who elected to live in the Czech Republic after the
split. For the most part, these Slovaks define their interests in the
context of Czech politics, not along ethnic lines; there is no Slovak
party in Parliament.
Most of the estimated 200,000 to 250,000 Roma have not been fully
integrated into Czech political life (see Section 5). Roma themselves
have been unable to unite behind a program or set of goals to advance
their interests within the democratic structures of the country. Few
Roma serve in local government structures, although some have been
appointed to advisory positions in government ministries. There is
currently one representative of Romani background in the Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction, and
government officials generally are cooperative and responsive to their
views. The best-known human rights groups are the Czech Helsinki
Committee and the Tolerance Foundation (an umbrella organization);
there are also many single-issue groups.
On July 8, Parliament passed the final legislation needed to create
a $14 million (500 million Czech crowns) endowment to be used by 39
NGO's that work on issues of social welfare, health, culture,
education, human rights protection, and the environment.
In September 1998, U.N. Human Rights Commission expert Petr Uhl was
appointed to a newly created position as Commissioner for Human Rights.
The Human Rights Commissioner serves as head of the government
Committee for Nationalities and of the Interministerial Commission for
Romani Community Affairs, established in 1997 (see Section 5). In
January a Council for Human Rights was established with 10
representatives of government ministries and 10 human rights activists.
The Council for Human Rights was created to advise the Government on
human rights issues and propose legislation to improve the observation
of human rights in the country.
In December the Parliament passed legislation mandating the
establishment of the office of the ombudsman, which was to be created
in 2000. The legislation provides for Parliament to select an ombudsman
for a 6-year term from a pool of candidates nominated by the President
and the Senate.
In each house of Parliament there is a petition committee for human
rights and nationalities, which includes a subcommittee for
nationalities. A government-sponsored Council for Nationalities advises
the Cabinet on minority affairs. In this body, Slovaks and Roma have
three representatives each; Poles and Germans, two each; and Hungarians
and Ukrainians, one each. There is also a government commission staffed
by members of the NGO and journalist communities that monitors
interethnic violence.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for the equality of citizens and
prohibits discrimination. Health care, education, retirement, and other
social services generally are provided without regard to race, sex,
religion, disability, or social status. In practice Roma face
discrimination in such areas as education, employment, and housing.
Women.--The actual extent of violence against women is unknown;
however, some studies by experts indicate that it likely is common.
Public debate about it is rare, despite the efforts of womens' groups
to focus public attention on the problem. In late 1998, the Government
introduced a comprehensive awareness and prevention program designed to
address issues of trafficking, abuse, and violence against women. ROSA,
an NGO that helps women in trouble, estimates that 1 in 10 women in
domestic situations suffer from emotional or physical abuse, and that
30 percent of the abusers are university educated. The press
occasionally reported on the problem of violence against women and
trafficking in prostitutes. A 1998 research study conducted by Prague's
Sexological Institute indicated that 13 percent of women are forced
into sexual intercourse under threat of violence. Spouses or partners
are responsible for 51 percent of rapes, with an additional 37 percent
of the attacks committed by men known to the victims. Only 12 percent
of rape victims are attacked by complete strangers. According to police
statistics, there were 675 rapes reported countrywide in 1998, although
researchers at the Institute estimate that only 3.3 percent of rape
victims report the crime to the police. Approximately 80 percent of
criminal rape cases are solved. Gender studies experts reported that
women were ashamed to report rape or speak about it, and that the
police were not equipped to help, either by attitude or training.
However, to improve police responsiveness and prosecution efforts, the
Ministry of Interior started training officers in protocols for
investigating family violence and sexual crime cases in 1998.
According to Elektra, a help center for abused women, rape victims
can seek psychological help through any help line or crisis center.
Crisis centers that help rape victims include White Circle of Safety,
an association for crime victims that provides free psychiatric and
legal help, and Riaps, a help line that counsels persons who experience
any kind of trauma. A total of 54 state supported shelters with 771
beds accept women who have been raped or abused in most major cities
and towns, and local NGO's provide medical and social assistance to
women. According to NGO's, the situation has improved in recent years,
but there still are not enough shelter spaces to meet the demand.
Legislation does not address spousal abuse specifically; however,
the Criminal Code covers other forms of domestic violence. An attack is
considered criminal if the victim's condition warrants medical
treatment (incapacity to work) for 7 or more days. If medical treatment
lasts less than 7 days, the attack is classified as a misdemeanor and
punished by a fine not exceeding approximately $100 (3,000 Czech
crowns--approximately one-fourth of the average monthly wage). Repeated
misdemeanor attacks do not impose stricter sanctions on the abuser. The
police are training specialist personnel to deal with domestic
violence; however, they do not yet engage in regular contact with
welfare and medical services. However, in 1998 the Police Academy and
secondary police schools introduced, into both the introductory and
continuing education curriculums, instructional material to improve the
identification and investigation of domestic violence and sexual abuse
cases and to sensitize police to the treatment of victims.
Forced prostitution (pimping) is illegal; prostitution is not,
although local communities have the right to regulate it and enforce
restrictions. The Interior Ministry estimates that up to 25,000 persons
currently earn a living from the sex industry. Prostitution and erotic
businesses are particularly prevalent in the border regions with
Germany and Austria, where international vehicular traffic is heaviest.
Trafficking in prostitutes is forbidden by law, and trafficking in
women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
The media rarely mention the issue of sexual harassment. There are
no legal definitions or laws prohibiting sexual harassment.
The Czech language has no standard term to express ``sexual
harassment.'' One NGO monitoring this problem reported that the lack of
sensitivity on this issue does not mean that sexual harassment does not
exist; rather, some inappropriate or offensive behaviors may be too
common for comment. In a 1995 study by the Sociology Institute, 43
percent of women reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment
in the workplace during their career. A study by the Defense Ministry
in 1996 found that nearly half of female soldiers experienced
harassment on duty. The concerns of women's groups over workplace
sexual harassment often are ignored or dismissed. However, during the
year a university student became the first woman in the country to win
a sexual harassment suit.
Women are equal under the law and in principle receive the same pay
for the same job. Women represent roughly half of the labor force,
though they are employed disproportionately in professions where the
median salary is relatively low. Women's median wages lag behind those
of men by roughly 25 percent, although the gap is narrowing. Women
enjoy equal property, inheritance, and other rights with men. The
unemployment rate for women now exceeds that for men by more than one-
third, and a disproportionately small number of women hold senior
positions. In April the Czech Helsinki Committee released a report
documenting police discrimination against women during recruitment of
officers.
A 1991 employment law bans discrimination on the basis of sex;
however, in practice employers remain free to consider sex, age, or
even attractiveness when making hiring decisions, since this does not
necessarily constitute ``discrimination'' under current legal
interpretation. Employers often use openly such factors as age, sex,
and lifestyle in their employment solicitations.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
welfare through its programs for health care, compulsory education
through age 15 (through age 14 in special schools), and basic
nutrition. Girls and boys enjoy equal access to health care and
education at all levels.
Child abuse and trafficking in children (see Section 6.f.)
continued to receive press attention during the year. In February a
British former disc jockey and three other foreigners went on trial on
charges of pedophilia. If convicted, they face up to 8 years in prison
or up to 15 years if the court finds exacerbating circumstances. A
March press report indicated that Central Europe is becoming more
popular as a destination for pedophiles due to its convenient location
and low risk of sexually transmitted disease. Some experts estimate
that the number of visits to the country, primarily by West Europeans,
for the purpose of abusing children has increased 20 percent since
1997. Dissemination of child pornography, whether by print, video, CD-
rom, or the Internet is a criminal act. These laws are enforced; in
January police in Decin brought charges against a man who placed an
advertisement on the Internet offering child pornography on CD-rom. He
was convicted and sentenced to 1 year in prison. Court convictions
against persons guilty of child sex abuse are reported routinely in the
media.
Since 1990 the number of reported cases of child abuse roughly
doubled; this increase appears to be the result of increased awareness
of the problem and more effective police training and action. Laws
criminalize family violence, physical restraint, sexual activity, and
other abuse of a minor. A Children's Crisis Center was established in
1995 and is 70 percent state supported. The Fund for Endangered
Children estimates that the total number of children suffering from
physical, psychological and sexual abuse is 20,000 to 40,000, but only
about one-tenth of such cases are registered by the police. About 50
children die each year as a result of abuse and violence within the
family. According to NGO's, there are approximately 10,000 children
living in institutional settings and 4,000 foster families supported by
the Government and various NGO's.
Romani children often are relegated to ``special schools'' for the
mentally disabled and socially maladjusted. Both a government program
and various private initiatives exist to prepare Romani children for
mainstream schools. In June the European Roma Rights Center (ERRC)
filed a lawsuit with the Constitutional Court on behalf of 12 Romani
families in Ostrava, alleging that the disproportionate number of
Romani children in special schools constitutes de facto racial
segregation throughout the educational system.
People with Disabilities.--The disabled suffer disproportionately
from unemployment, and the physically disabled experience difficulty in
obtaining access to buildings and public transport. Access to education
can be a problem, due to the lack of barrier-free access to public
schools, although there is at least one barrier-free school in each
district. Although access is improving, many buildings and public
transportation remain inaccessible to those in wheelchairs. In Prague
19 metro stations (nearly 50 percent of the total) and 2 bus lines are
now accessible by the disabled. A 1994 Economic Ministry regulation
requires architects to ensure adequate access for the disabled in all
new building projects, as well as in older buildings undergoing
restoration. This regulation is applied in practice. However, the
Government has not mandated access for the disabled to other buildings.
Businesses in which 60 percent or more of the employees are disabled
qualify for special tax breaks. Numerous NGO's support social
assistance programs to diminish the disadvantages faced by the
disabled. For example, as of June Nadace Charty 77 had contributed more
than $44,000 (1.5 million Czech crowns) to institutions and individuals
to purchase rehabilitative aids and special fittings for wheelchairs
not covered by insurance. These NGO's report that, although problems
persist, the situation of the disabled is receiving more attention and
is vastly improved from only a few years ago. The integration of the
disabled into society has not been the subject of significant policy or
public debate.
Religious Minorities.--On June 23, a Prague court prohibited Tomas
Kebza, deputy chairman of the rightwing Republican Youth Party and
editor of the weekly Republika, from publishing for 10 years for two
articles that contained anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi views and that were
aimed at suppressing the rights of other citizens (see Section 2.a.).
On November 1, Minister of Interior Vaclav Grulich reported that
the Ministry sent letters to two extremist organizations warning them
that they were violating human rights. The Patriotic Front and the
National Alliance had 30 days to respond to the Ministry in writing.
The two organizations held a demonstration in Prague on October 28, at
which the National Alliance leader told those gathered that the
Holocaust was `'an invention.''
On December 20, in a display on the struggles of the extremist
rightwing Republican Party that was hung in front of the local party
headquarters in Decin, photographs of President Havel, Prime Minister
Zeman, Civic Democratic Party leader Klaus, and Freedom Union chairman
Jan Ruml were labeled ``Jewish Free Masons and Murderers of the Czech
Nation.'' The exhibit also included a list of ``Jews and Jewish Half-
Breeds'' in politics that included the names of Havel, Zeman, and
Klaus. The list was removed a few days later.
In March one young man in Trutnov was sentenced to 18 months in
prison for his role in the 1998 desecration of 41 tombstones in a
Jewish cemetery. The courts sentenced three other youths arrested in
connection with the same incident to suspended sentences of 18 months.
In February police in Plzen arrested 12 leaders, producers, and
distributors of racist, Fascist, and anti-Semitic materials. Police
confirmed the existence of over 20 underground magazines with small
circulations propagating fascism, racism, and anti-Semitism.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--After ethnic Slovaks, the
largest minority is the Romani population, officially estimated to
number between 200,000 and 250,000. Roma live throughout the country
but are concentrated in the industrial towns along the northern border,
where many eastern Slovak Roma were encouraged to settle in the homes
of Sudeten Germans transferred to the West more than 40 years ago.
Roma suffer disproportionately from poverty, unemployment,
interethnic violence, discrimination, illiteracy, and disease. They are
subject to popular prejudice, as is affirmed repeatedly by public
opinion polls. Nearly one-quarter of the respondents in a February
opinion poll admitted to racial intolerance, while 16 percent said that
they were intolerant of other nationalities. A court case charging
editors of a Republican Party magazine (leaders of this extreme
rightwing party espouse virulently anti-German and anti-Romani
policies) with publishing offensive statements against Roma was filed
with a Prague district court in January 1998 and was still before the
court at year's end.
The State funds television and radio programs for Roma on public
stations and also supports Romani press publications. There is one
full-time Romani anchorman on Czech Television. During the year, more
and better information on Romani issues was becoming available in the
mainstream press and other sources. To improve media reporting on
Romani issues, a Romani journalism course was established in the
College of Publicity, and the first graduates finished in February.
There has been a Department of Romani Language Studies at Charles
University in Prague since 1991, and additional university-level Romani
language study programs exist in Usti nad Labem and Brno.
However, efforts by NGO's and individuals in the health and
education fields to improve living conditions for the Roma have had
only minimal impact, sometimes due to the attitudes or intransigence of
local authorities. Romani leaders themselves have had limited success
in organizing their local communities, which often are disunited and
where many are reluctant to foster contacts with the majority.
Members of skinhead organizations and their sympathizers most often
perpetrate interethnic violence. Roma are the most likely targets of
such crimes, although other ``dark-skinned'' individuals come under the
same attacks. During the first 6 months of the year, 238 persons were
charged with ``racially motivated'' crimes. An estimated 5,000 to 6,000
skinheads are active in the country. The Documentation Center for Human
Rights recorded 1,500 racially-motivated attacks over the past 8 years,
in which nearly 30 persons died. In 1998 police recorded a total of 138
``racially motivated crimes,'' nearly half of which were committed by
juveniles. However, police and courts sometimes are reluctant to
classify crimes against Roma as racially motivated, and the actual
figures likely are higher.
In January six skinheads were charged with committing a racially
motivated attack in 1998 on a 63-year-old disabled Romani man at the
Havlickuv Brod railway station.
On July 17, a group of skinheads attacked a 27-year-old Rom in a
bar in Jesenik with pool cues, pool balls, and other objects, as they
shouted racial epithets at him. Police charged six persons involved in
the attack with defamation of race and disturbing the peace. According
to a local Romani NGO, there were more than 10 racially motivated
attacks in Jesenik during the year, but the police did not investigate
most of them.
On August 4, three skinheads attacked Jana Chalupova and Jakub
Polak in a restaurant near the district court of Karvina, where Polak
was representing the family of a Rom who was killed by skinheads in
1998. Chalupova is the head of public relations for the President's
administration.
On August 27, some 30 skinheads attacked several Romani homes in a
village near Jaromerice nad Rokytnou, which resulted in injuries to 2
Roma and damage to several cars and houses. The raid lasted
approximately 1 hour, and the skinheads threw bricks and stones at the
Roma. The police launched an investigation into the attack and charged
12 persons with rioting, property damage, and violence, although they
were not charged with racially motivated crimes.
On November 20, some 30 skinheads attacked between 60 and 70 Roma
in a restaurant in Ceske Budejovice; 6 persons were injured. Police
subsequently charged 23 skinheads with racially motivated violence;
they now face sentences of up to 3 years in prison.
On January 11, a court charged a 21-year-old student from Plzen
with disseminating Fascist propaganda. The student had created an
Internet web site with Fascist symbols and a photograph of a youth
giving the Hitler salute. The student was convicted of promoting racial
discord and unlawful limitation of the rights and freedoms of other
citizens.
On February 20, police in Holoubkov detained six members of
Sturmpionier-Battalion 43, a new paramilitary group that vowed to honor
the legacy of the Nazi Wehrmacht.
Police continued to investigate a November 1998 incident that
occurred in the city of Hodonin, during which a group of skinheads
brutally attacked an elderly American citizen for apparently defending
a young Rom whom the skinheads were harassing while dining in the same
restaurant. After exchanging words with the man, the skinheads waited
for him outside, and after a short chase, attacked him and left him
seriously injured and unconscious on the ground. The incident was
captured by the security cameras of a nearby gasoline station. Charges
later were filed against the main attacker, and the local district
court is scheduled to hear the matter in early 2000.
In February the High Court in Prague confirmed the sentences of two
men involved in the 1997 racially motivated murder of Romani mother
Helena Bihariova; in 1998 one received 8\1/2\ years in prison for
murder, and the second received 15 months for breach of the peace,
after his sentence was reduced from 6\1/2\ years. Also in February, the
Justice Minister filed a complaint against the High Court for annulling
the convictions, on technical grounds, of three skinheads found guilty
in a retrial in 1998 of murdering Tibor Danihel in 1995. Authorities
detained 11 suspects for terrorizing Romani residents in Domazlice in
1997. A court later acquitted 10 of the suspects, while the remaining
suspect was convicted of disturbing the peace (he later was pardoned
during a general presidential amnesty and is now free.)
In January a district court in Prague acquitted Miroslav Sladek,
the leader of the extreme rightwing Republican Party, of charges of
inciting racial and ethnic hatred, on the grounds that his statements
are protected by freedom of speech provisions in the law. His party
espouses virulently anti-Roma and anti-foreigner policies.
In February a court sentenced former mayor and current city council
member of Obrnice Jan Hrabak to 6 weeks in jail or a fine of $850
(30,000 Czech crowns) for using racial epithets against a Rom in 1998.
There was no progress in the case of the 1998 death of Milan Lacko;
the court's 1998 verdict was not appealed during the year, and the case
appears to be closed. However, the skinheads convicted for attacking
Lacko now are facing additional charges for appearing at the trial
wearing swastikas and for making racial jokes and insults to the media
and members of the victim's family in the courthouse. The case is
scheduled to be decided in early 2000.
Prime Minister Zeman consistently called for the cancellation of
the official registration of groups sympathetic to the skinhead
movement, but no action has been taken to date. A February police raid
in Plzen led to the arrest of 12 skinhead leaders, distributors, and
producers of Nazi materials. The raid also netted piles of Fascist and
racist materials, including membership lists, indicating that the group
was part of a large, well-organized movement with ties to the United
Kingdom, Sweden, Hungary, and Slovenia. Those arrested were charged
with dissemination of Fascist propaganda, an offense with a maximum
penalty of 8 years in prison. The raid was executed prior to a planned
skinhead rally in Line, near Plzen, and forced the cancellation of the
event. The case did not go to trial by year's end. On May 1, hundreds
of skinheads held a rally on a small island in Prague, and police
arrested a few dozen of the skinheads. Government officials criticized
city officials for permitting the rally. Also in May, police carried
out a series of raids on racist and rightwing extremist groups. Police
interrogated some 100 persons and arrested 1 person on charges that
included promoting a group that seeks to suppress human rights and
freedoms.
There were also occasional Roma-instigated assaults on local law
enforcement personnel during the year. In January two Romani men from
Bilina were sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment with a 2-year
probation, and 12 months' imprisonment with a 5-year probation for
physical assault on police officers. Local Romani organizations
generally criticized these attacks and offered their assistance in the
investigations. In November three Roma who assaulted policemen in Usti
nad Labem in 1998 were sentenced to 16 months in jail for a racially
motivated crime.
Racial and ethnic tensions and discrimination in society were the
subject of increased media attention during the year. Even when federal
authorities have spoken out on these issues, local attitudes often have
proven impervious to change. In June the local city council in Usti nad
Labem voted to proceed with its long-delayed decision to construct a 6-
foot high, 195-foot long wall between a primarily Romani apartment
complex and its residents' neighbors across the street. Authorities
modified the plan to include a children's playground and repave the
street, but the Government again criticized the construction of the
wall as a symbol of segregation and approved a plan to refer the matter
to Parliament should the city council proceed with its plan. In August
the city announced that it was proceeding immediately with
construction, but the district government ordered the construction
stopped, citing discrepancies in the building permit. In October the
city ignored this and proceeded with construction. The wall was built
overnight on October 13, with about 80 police officers present to
prevent any violence. Mayor Ladislav Hruska described the wall as a
``symbol of law and order.'' On October 18, the Government appointed
Deputy Minister of Interior Pavel Zarecky as its special mediator to
resolve the issue of the wall. In November the Government negotiated
the removal of the wall after it agreed to give the city government
$85,000 (3 million Czech crowns) to improve social conditions in the
town. However, the city council announced that it would use a portion
of the money to buy up the houses of Czech neighbors who refused to
live next to the Roma. ``Now it will be a real ghetto,'' commented
Timor Bada, a local Roma activist.
The Government has been wrestling over plans to remove a pig farm
in Lety from the site of a World War II Romani concentration camp and
build a memorial in its place. A team headed by the Human Rights
Commissioner officially recommended the farm's removal and a public
collection to finance it, but the Government in April decided against
taking action due to budgetary constraints. A January public opinion
poll showed that 11 percent of respondents were willing to participate
in financing the Lety project, and less than one-quarter of those
polled were aware that Roma were persecuted under the Nazi regime. Some
Romani organizations and the Czech Helsinki Committee protested the
Government's decision and in May began an international boycott of
Czech pork organized by the Romani National Congress. On May 18, the
Government agreed to spend $28,600 (1 million Czech crowns) on
improvements to the monument in Lety. During World War II, 327 Roma,
including 241 children, died in the camp. The pig farm was built on the
site in 1974.
Roma wishing to integrate face practical difficulties in the areas
of employment and education. A government-commissioned report estimated
unemployment among Roma at 70 percent, with many unemployed Roma
subsisting on government support or earnings from illegal activities.
Some employers refuse to hire Roma and ask local labor offices not to
send Romani applicants for advertised positions. Many Roma are
qualified only for low-paying jobs as manual laborers, since very few
complete secondary education. A higher than average share of the Romani
population applies for partial or full disability pensions due to the
occurrence of advanced-stage malignant diseases resulting from the
neglect of preventive health practices or the lack of available medical
care in areas with above-average Romani populations. In April the Human
Rights Commissioner unveiled a 12-point proposal to combat
discrimination and ``give advantage to Romani firms in placing public
orders.'' The proposal was being considered by the Government at year's
end.
The integration of Romani children into mainstream schools
frequently is impeded by language and cultural barriers. Official
estimates indicate that less than 20 percent of the Romani population
completed the ninth grade, and less than 5 percent completed high
school. A significant number of Romani children are transferred at an
early age to ``special schools'' for the mentally disabled and socially
maladjusted. According to unofficial government estimates, Romani
children make up 60 percent or more of pupils placed in these special
schools, although Roma constitute less than 3 percent of the
population. Some Romani parents do not send their children to school
regularly due to a fear of violence, the expense of books and supplies,
or the lack of a strong cultural emphasis on education among some Roma.
In June 12 Romani families filed suit in the Constitutional Court to
protest the ``de facto segregation'' of Romani children into special
schools. The lawsuit requested the establishment of a compensatory
educational fund, an end to racial segregation within 3 years, and the
development of an educational reform plan. However, the Constitutional
Court rejected the complaint in November and stated that it did not
have the power to order the Ministry of Education to create programs to
end racial discrimination. The Ministry of Education later took steps
independently to implement some of the recommended changes. In December
the Parliament approved legislation allowing qualified Romani students,
previously relegated to the special schools, to return to attend
mainstream secondary or upper-level public schools. The legislation was
drafted by Parliament's sole Romani representative and constituted a
significant step in opening access to higher education to the Romani
minority.
In 1993 the Government created the framework for a number of year-
long programs (so-called zero grades) to prepare disadvantaged youths
for their first year in school. Many districts with high concentrations
of Roma participate in the program, which is funded solely by local
authorities. Nearly 90 zero grades were open during the year, and
another educational initiative continued placing Romani ``assistant
teachers'' into the primary and special school system. Their function
is to help teachers communicate with Romani pupils and encourage
cooperation between schools and Romani parents. There are now 62 Romani
assistant teachers in the school system. Some districts tracking local
Romani students report that up to 70 percent of the children who attend
zero-grade training successfully enter and remain in mainstream
schools. During the year, the Education Ministry began using joint
Romani-Czech language textbooks in 60 elementary schools to help
overcome the barrier in the early school years between Romani children
and non-Romani speaking teachers. Local NGO's support additional
studies and private initiatives to prepare Romani children for
mainstream schools. Some Roma refuse to cooperate with compulsory
vaccinations for children or are refused treatment by general
practitioners who have full quotas of subsidized patients. In 1998 the
Labor Ministry created and filled 58 district-level positions (out of
81 districts nationwide) with ``Roma advisors'' or ``Roma assistants''
to advise local authorities on Romani issues. Eventually 20 Roma were
placed in the 58 available positions, and many have made a significant
contribution to their community. However, some Romani leaders, while
conceding the difficulties in finding educationally qualified or
trained Romani applicants to fill these positions, expressed regret
that only a third eventually were filled by Roma.
Roma also face discrimination in housing and other areas of
everyday life. Despite constitutional prohibitions on discrimination, a
civil law framework to implement these provisions has not been
incorporated into specific offenses under the Criminal Code. Some
restaurants, pubs, and other venues refuse service to Roma and post
signs prohibiting their entry. In July 2 discos in Plzen denied entry
to 5 Romani students, prompting a boycott of the clubs by over 600
students at West Bohemia University. The club owners eventually
apologized. In some cases, local authorities intervened to have such
signs removed, although in a 1998 retrial a Rokycany pub owner was
acquitted of refusing to serve Romani patrons in 1996. The state
attorney appealed the verdict, and the case was heard during the year;
a decision is expected in early 2000. In October the Hotel Imperial in
Ostrava agreed to pay an out-of-court settlement of $715 (25,000 Czech
crowns) to three Roma who it refused to serve in 1998. In October press
reports revealed that certain unemployment offices regularly mark the
records of persons who appear to be Roma with the letter ``R.'' The
findings of a subsequent government inquiry into the matter suggested
that the problem was not as widespread as originally reported; however,
authorities still took steps to prevent this practice in the future,
including updated instructions and clarification of existing policy
from the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs regarding the
administration of databases and personal records, and more frequent
audits by Ministry officials at the regional employment offices.
Moreover, press accounts during the year revealed that Czech Airlines
marked the names of persons believed to be Roma with the letter, ``G,''
for ``gypsy,'' supposedly to alert authorities in the United Kingdom
about potential asylum seekers. Officials in the United Kingdom denied
ever requesting such information from the airline. The practice
reportedly was discontinued at mid-year.
In June approximately 100 residents of the town of Krnov signed a
petition against Roma, complaining that they are noisy on the street,
listen to loud music, make messes, and spoil the neighborhood. In
August residents of the Horni Kosovo district in Jihlava also were
collecting signatures for an anti-Roma petition, and there were reports
of a similar petition drive in Znojmo in the spring.
Beginning in 1997, when over 1,200 Roma submitted applications for
refugee status in Canada and the United Kingdom, Romani families have
continued to emigrate. At the end of 1998, 70 percent of the applicants
(737) in Canada were granted asylum. An additional 171 asylum seekers
applied in 1998. The numbers applying to the United Kingdom have
increased substantially in spite of the fact that most of these
requests are denied. By year's end, Romani applicants had filed over
1,790 requests for asylum, a record. Because this number represents
only those requests filed by the ``head of the household'' (one
application per family), the actual number of Romani asylum seekers for
the year is estimated to be between 6,000 and 7,000. Roma from the
Czech Republic also filed record numbers of asylum applications in
Finland and Belgium. Human Rights Commissioner Uhl noted that an
estimated 10,000 Czech Roma have emigrated in the last 3 years. In July
a four-person Romani family reportedly was granted asylum in France.
The Government and some local municipalities began implementing
programs designed to deal with drug addiction and crime prevention in
the Romani community during the year. Since these programs still are at
different stages of implementation, their initial effectiveness is
uncertain.
The Interministerial Commission for Romani Community Affairs was
created in 1997 to analyze government measures proposed by individual
ministries, to collect information and to inform the Romani community
about government activities, to allocate grants to supplementary
programs for the Romani community, and to deal with issues covering
housing, education, and discrimination. In December 1998, the
Commission was expanded to include 12 government representatives and 12
Romani representatives, as well as the Commissioner for Human Rights
and his deputy. The revamped Commission has taken an increasingly
active role in resolving disputes between Romani communities and their
non-Romani neighbors in towns such as Usti nad Labem and Rokycany, as
well as promoting positive initiatives. Other government initiatives
have included the organization of a team of specialized ``Romani-
inspectors,'' who are authorized to penalize shop and restaurant owners
who refuse service to Roma, and increased training and seminar activity
to promote understanding and tolerance. There also was an active effort
underway during the year to identify, train, and recruit qualified Roma
to serve in law enforcement. The national police academy introduced a
course in Romani language and culture, which was designed to facilitate
police officers' improved communication and response to the Romani
communities in their precincts.
In February the Cabinet submitted to Parliament a draft law to
allow former Czechoslovak citizens who have lived in the country since
1993 to claim citizenship by simple declaration. This bill was created
to remedy the de facto stateless situation of some Czech Roma, who were
estimated to number between 10,000 and 20,000 persons. The bill passed
both houses of Parliament and was signed into law on September 23. The
law also regularizes the status of children in foster care who lacked
citizenship or permanent residency status. However, the law only
provides for citizenship for those who have resided primarily in the
country since 1993. Certain persons who went abroad for extended
periods, including some asylum seekers and those expelled from the
country by authorities, may face added difficulty in filing for
citizenship under the new law. Nor does the law provide benefits to
those who were denied citizenship and benefits between 1993 and 1999.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
right to form and join unions of their own choice without prior
authorization, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Union membership continued to decline during the year.
Most workers are members of unions affiliated with the Czech-
Moravian Chamber of Trade Unions (CMKOS). The CMKOS is a democratically
oriented, republic-wide umbrella organization for branch unions. It is
not affiliated with any political party and carefully maintains its
independence.
Workers have the right to strike, except for those whose role in
public order or public safety is deemed crucial. The law requires that
labor disputes be subject first to mediation and that strikes take
place only after mediation efforts fail.
During the year, there were strikes in the transportation and
equipment manufacturing sectors, as well as a significant coal miners'
strike in which a large group of workers refused to leave the mines
until their demands for new wage and job security negotiations were
met. The miners stayed underground in protest for 2 days before the
issue was resolved. There were also several demonstrations in front of
Parliament and government headquarters protesting the growing problem
of nonpayment of wages by some large manufacturing firms.
Unions are free to form or join federations and confederations and
affiliate with and participate in international bodies. This freedom
was exercised fully.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining, which generally is carried out by
unions and employers on a company basis. The scope for collective
bargaining is more limited in the government sector, where wages are
regulated by law.
There are 11 free trade zones. Their workers have and practice the
same right to organize and bargain collectively as other workers in the
country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and
it generally is not used; however, trafficking in women and children
for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code stipulates a minimum working age of 15
years, although children who completed courses at special schools
(schools for the mentally disabled and socially maladjusted) may work
at the age of 14. These prohibitions are enforced in practice. The law
prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government
effectively enforces this prohibition (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets minimum wage
standards. In July the Government increased the minimum wage from
approximately $108 (3,250 Czech crowns) per month to $115 (3,600 Czech
crowns), the second raise in 6 months. The monthly average is
approximately $375 (11,600 Czech crowns) per month. Average net wages
are 2.1 times as high as official sustenance costs. The minimum wage
provides a sparse standard of living for a worker and family, although
allowances are available to families with children. Retraining efforts,
carried out by district labor offices, seek to provide labor mobility
for those at the lower end of the wage scale. The enforcement of
minimum wage standards was not an issue during the year.
The law mandates a standard workweek of 42\1/2\hours. It also
requires paid rest of at least 30 minutes during the standard 8- to
8\1/2\hour workday, as well as annual leave of 3 to 4 weeks. Overtime
ordered by the employer may not exceed 150 hours per year or 8 hours
per week as a standard practice, although the local employment office
may permit overtime above this limit. The Labor Ministry enforces
standards for working hours, rest periods, and annual leave.
Government, unions, and employers promote worker safety and health,
but conditions in some sectors of heavy industry are problematic,
especially those awaiting privatization. Industrial accident rates are
not unusually high. The Office of Labor Safety is responsible for
enforcement of health and safety standards. Workers have the right to
refuse work endangering their life or health without risk of loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific laws prohibit trafficking in
women and children, and trafficking in women and girls for the purpose
of forced prostitution is a problem. Law enforcement officials report
that the Czech Republic is both a transit and destination country for
traffickers in women from farther east. Organizing prostitution or
pandering also is illegal and punishable by a prison term of up to 8
years, with a term of up to 12 years if the victim is under the age of
15. (Adults can be prosecuted for engaging in sexual activity with a
minor under the age of 15.) There have been numerous convictions of
traffickers as a result of proactive investigative efforts on the part
of law enforcement officers. The Czech Police Organized Crime Division
includes a Unit on Trafficking in Persons, established in 1995, which
cooperates with other nations to enforce these laws.
A May raid in Chomutov led to the arrest of 4 gang members and the
release of 27 Ukrainian women who had been forced into prostitution by
the gang. A March raid in Spain broke up an international ring that
trafficked Czech and Slovak women into prostitution.
The full extent of trafficking in children is unknown; however,
convictions of child sex offenders are reported routinely in the media.
For example, the conviction of a British national for pedophilia was
covered widely during the year, as were the cases of several German
citizens who were detained in cities near the Czech-German border and
who reportedly had traveled regularly to the country for the purpose of
soliciting sexual activity from adolescents (particularly young Roma).
Following these incidents, police personnel took measures to prevent
this type of ``sexual tourism'' more effectively. Police enhanced
patrols in high-risk areas, enforced curfew-type policies more
actively, and raised public awareness of the issue through the media.
______
DENMARK
Denmark is a constitutional monarchy with parliamentary democratic
rule. Queen Margrethe II is Head of State. The Cabinet, accountable to
the unicameral Parliament (Folketing), leads the Government. A Social
Democrat-led minority coalition remains in power following a narrow
election victory in 1998. The judiciary is independent.
The national police have sole responsibility for internal security.
The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security
forces.
Denmark has an advanced, market-based industrial economy. One-half
of the work force is employed in the public sector. The key industries
are food processing and metalworking. A broad range of industrial goods
is exported. The economy provides residents with a high standard of
living.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
instances of individual abuse. Trafficking in women is a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c.Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this
prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The judicial system consists of a series of local and regional
courts, with the Supreme Court at the apex.
The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent
judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
the press, and the Government respects this right in practice. An
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a democratic political
system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press, including
academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice. It also
provides for an official state religion, the Evangelical Lutheran
Church, which is subsidized by the Government. The Evangelical Lutheran
faith is taught in public schools, but students may withdraw from
religious classes with parental consent. The government does not
require that religious groups be licensed, but the state's permission
is required for religious ceremonies, for example, weddings, that have
civil validity.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The law provides for the granting of refugee or asylum status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum and provided
it to approximately 2,300 persons in the first 6 months of 1999, and to
approximately 5,700 persons in 1998. There were no reports of the
forced expulsion of refugees to a country where they feared persecution
or of those having a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage.
The territories of Greenland (whose population is primarily Inuit)
and the Faroe Islands (whose inhabitants have their own Norse language)
have elected democratically home rule governments with powers
encompassing all matters except foreign affairs, monetary affairs, and
national security. Greenlanders and Faroese are Danish citizens with
the same rights as those in the rest of the Kingdom. Each territory
elects two representatives to the Folketing.
Women are active in government and politics at both the local and
national levels. In the current Government, 7 of 20 Government
ministers are women, as are 67 of the Parliament's 179 members. Aside
from two parliamentarians of mixed ancestry (both from Greenland),
ethnic minorities are not represented in the Government, although they
are represented in local politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are cooperative and responsive to
their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Government's operations and extensive public services do not
discriminate on the basis of any of these factors. The law prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex, and the Government enforces it
effectively. Discrimination on the basis of race is covered by two
laws, which prohibit racial slander and denial of access to public
places on the basis of race. The rights of indigenous people are
protected carefully.
Women.--An umbrella nongovernmental organization reports that in
1998, women's crisis shelters were contacted approximately 9,000 times,
compared with 9,961 times in 1997. A total of 1,934 women stayed at
shelters during 1998, compared with 1,623 women in 1997. There were 150
reported rapes in the first 6 months of 1999, compared with 418 in
1998.
The law requires equal pay for equal work, but some wage inequality
still exists. The law prohibits job discrimination on the basis of sex
and provides recourse, such as access to the Equal Status Council, for
those so affected. Women hold positions of authority throughout
society, although they are underrepresented at the top of the business
world. Women's rights groups effectively lobby the Government in their
areas of concern, such as wage disparities and parental leave.
The problem of trafficking in women for the purpose of
prostitution, particularly from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia,
remained a focus of government concern during the year (see Section
6.f.).
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The Ministries of Social Affairs, Justice,
and Education oversee implementation of programs for children.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children. In 1997 the
Folketing passed legislation that banned the physical punishment of
children by adults, including their parents.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. Building regulations require special facilities for the
disabled in public buildings built or renovated after 1977 and in older
buildings that come into public use. The Government enforces these
provisions in practice.
Indigenous People.--The law protects the rights of the inhabitants
of Greenland and the Faroe Islands. Greenland's legal system seeks to
accommodate Inuit customs. Accordingly, it provides for the use of lay
persons as judges and sentences most prisoners to holding centers
(rather than to prisons) where they are encouraged to work, hunt, or
fish during the day. Education in Greenland is provided to the native
population in both the Inuit and Danish languages.
In August the High Court ruled that the government unjustly
resettled Greenland Inuits in 1953 in order to accommodate the
expansion of a U.S. Air Force base in northwest Greenland. The Court
ordered the Government to pay compensation to the displaced
Greenlanders and their descendants. The compensation is substantially
less than the defendants sued for, and the case was under appeal to the
Supreme Court at year's end. In September the office of Prime Minister
Poul Nyrup Rasmussen issued a joint declaration with the home rule
chairman of Greenland apologizing for the way the decision on the
resettlement was reached and the manner in which it was carried out.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The inflow of ethnically and
racially diverse refugees and immigrants provoked a degree of tension
between Danes and immigrants (mostly Iranians, Palestinians,
Pakistanis, and Sri Lankans until late 1992; refugees are now
overwhelmingly from Somalia or the former Yugoslavia). In response to
publicity concerning the involvement of foreigners in street crime and
allegations of social welfare fraud committed by refugees, Parliament
passed tighter immigration laws in June 1998, which took effect on
January 1. Family reunification is now more difficult, and immigrants
and refugees can no longer acquire permanent residence by living in the
country for 18 months; rather they must now reside for 3 years and
demonstrate that they have integrated into society. Additionally, they
receive a special integration allowance that is 20 percent lower than
the social benefits that a citizen receives. Critics claim that this
provision violates the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees.
Incidents of racial discrimination and racially motivated violence
occur but are rare. The Government effectively investigates and deals
with cases of racially motivated violence.
In November Copenhagen experienced some of its worst rioting in
years. The rioters were protesting a High Court decision to expel a 23-
year-old Turkish citizen. Although not a Danish citizen, the individual
grew up and has close family in Denmark, including a wife and child.
The Court ordered the expulsion for life to take effect immediately
after a 3-year jail term for armed robbery.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law states that all workers,
including military personnel and the police, may form or join unions of
their choosing. Approximately 80 percent of wage earners belong to
unions that are independent of the Government and political parties.
All unions except those representing civil servants or the military
have the right to strike.
Unions may affiliate freely with international organizations, and
they do so actively.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers and
employers acknowledge each other's right to organize. Collective
bargaining is protected by law and is widespread in practice. The law
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers against union members
and organizers, and there are mechanisms to resolve disputes. Employers
found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to reinstate
workers fired for union activities. In the private sector, salaries,
benefits, and working conditions are agreed upon in biennial or
triennial negotiations between the various employers' associations and
their union counterparts. If the negotiations fail, a national
conciliation board mediates, and its proposal is voted on by management
and labor. If the proposal is rejected, the Government may force a
legislated solution on the parties (usually based upon the mediators'
proposal). The agreements, in turn, are used as guidelines throughout
the public as well as the private sector. In the public sector,
collective bargaining is conducted between the employees' unions and a
government group, led by the Finance Ministry.
Labor relations in Greenland are conducted in the same manner as in
Denmark. Greenland's courts are the first recourse in disputes, but
Danish mediation services or the Danish Labor Court also may be used.
There is no umbrella labor organization in the Faroes, but
individual unions engage in periodic collective bargaining with
employers. Disputes are settled by mediation.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or bonded
labor, by adults or children is prohibited by law, and this prohibition
is enforced effectively by the Government.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for full-time employment is 15 years. A
1996 change in the work environment law tightened employment rules for
those under 18 years of age and set a minimum of 13 years of age for
any type of work. The law is enforced by the Danish Working Environment
Service (DWES), an autonomous arm of the Ministry of Labor. Export
industries do not use child labor. Forced and bonded child labor is
prohibited and does not occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No national minimum wage is
mandated legally, but national labor agreements effectively set a wage
floor. The lowest wage paid is currently about $12 (80 kroner) per
hour, which is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. The law provides for 5 weeks of paid vacation per
year. A 37-hour workweek is the norm, established by contract, not by
law. However, the law requires at least 11 hours between the end of one
work period and the start of the next.
The law also prescribes conditions of work, including safety and
health; the duties of employers, supervisors, and employees; work
performance; rest periods and days off; and medical examinations. The
DWES ensures compliance with labor legislation. Workers may remove
themselves from hazardous situations or weapons production without
jeopardizing their employment rights, and legal protections cover
workers who file complaints about unsafe or unhealthy conditions.
Similar conditions of work are found in Greenland and the Faroes,
except that the workweek is 40 hours. As in Denmark, the workweek is
established by contract, not by law.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--In January the Ministry of Justice
asked the State Attorney to evaluate the need for new laws against the
import and exploitation of women.
The problem of trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution
remained a focus of government concern during the year. Of particular
concern is the importation of women from Eastern Europe and Southeast
Asia who, lured by the prospect of higher wages and a better life, find
themselves forced into a life of prostitution by individuals, suspected
of being part of organized crime, who brought them into the country. No
concrete statistics are available as to how many women are involved in
prostitution. The Minister of Justice's plans, announced in 1998, to
convene a commission in March 1999 to look into the problem were
dropped without explanation.
______
ESTONIA
Estonia is a parliamentary democracy. With its statehood widely
recognized as continuous for more than 70 years, Estonia regained its
independence in 1991 after 50 years of Soviet occupation. The
Constitution, adopted by referendum in 1992, established a 101-member
unicameral legislature (State Assembly), a prime minister as Head of
Government, and a president as Head of State. The judiciary is
independent.
Efforts to develop and strengthen a Western-type police force
committed to procedures and safeguards appropriate to a democratic
society are proceeding, with police leadership actively working to
professionalize the force. The police, who are ethnically mixed, are
subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Corrections personnel
are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice. The security service,
called Security Police, is subordinate to the Interior Ministry but
also reports to the Prime Minister. Police and corrections personnel
continued to commit human rights abuses.
Estonia has a market economy. Reflecting the extent of post-1992
reforms, the Government started accession negotiations with the
European Union. Services, especially financial and tourism, are growing
in importance compared to historically more prominent light industry
and food production. The privatization of firms, including small,
medium, and large-scale enterprises, is virtually complete. The
Government is working on privatizing the remaining state-owned
infrastructure enterprises. The growth of the economy has slowed, with
an estimated increase of gross domestic product (GDP) of about 0.4
percent in 1999. Although prices continue to rise, incomes are rising
faster than inflation. Per capita GDP is about $3,677 per year. Two-
thirds of exports (textiles, food products, wood, and timber products)
now are directed to Western markets. Unemployment remained fairly low
overall (unofficially about 8 percent), but it was significantly higher
in rural areas.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
and the large noncitizen community; however, problems remained in some
areas. The major human rights abuses continued to be mistreatment of
prisoners and detainees and the use of excessive force by the police.
Prison conditions are poor. The deadline for noncitizens to file for
permanent residency expired in 1996, after being extended twice. An
undetermined number of noncitizens still have not filed for residency.
By mid-year 18,000 of 19,000 noncitizen former Soviet military
personnel had received temporary residence permits. Processing of
applications for alien passports continued. By year's end, most
applicants for alien passports had received them. The Government
continued to issue temporary travel documents and to accept officially
invalid former Soviet internal passports for identification in
emergency situations, such as registering births and deaths.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In 1998, President Lennart Meri created an international commission
for research into crimes against humanity perpetrated in the country
from 1940-91. The commission began work in January and held three
formal meetings during the year. In November the Commission authorized
sending an investigator to study materials in the Russian and German
archives addressing this era.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices; however, there continued
to be credible reports that police used excessive force and verbal
abuse during the arrest and questioning of suspects. Punishment cells
(``kartsers'') continued to be used, in contravention of international
standards.
Prison conditions remained poor, although there were some
improvements. A lack of funds and trained staff continued to be a
serious problem. Overcrowding in the antiquated Tallinn Central Prison
persisted. The percentage of prisoners suffering from tuberculosis was
much higher than in the general population. The Government has
refurbished some prison buildings. Modest gains were made in hiring new
prison staff and retaining existing personnel. Work and study
opportunities for prisoners increased slightly as the Government
implemented new programs. The Government is considering new regulations
that would reduce significantly the number of persons incarcerated and
thereby alleviate overcrowding. During the year, 341 prisoners had been
released in the calendar year under the Government's early release
program for prisoners. Unlike previous years, there were no reports of
prisoners killed by other prisoners.
The Government has drafted but not yet implemented a multiyear plan
to refurbish and restructure all the country's prisons and to close the
Tallinn Central Prison.
The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and
laws forbid arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government
generally observes these prohibitions. Under the Constitution, warrants
issued by a court are required to make arrests. Detainees must be
informed promptly of the grounds for the arrest and given immediate
access to legal counsel. If a person cannot afford counsel, the State
will provide one. A person may be held for 48 hours without formally
being charged; further detention requires a court order. A person may
be held in pretrial detention for 2 months; this term may be extended
to a total of 12 months by court order. Police rarely violate these
limits. As of year's end, 1,392 of the 4,528 persons held in prisons
were awaiting trial.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution establishes an
independent judicial branch, and the judiciary is independent in
practice. The judiciary operates through a three-tier court system:
rural and city courts; district courts; and the State Court (which
functions as a supreme court). The district and state courts are also
courts for ``constitutional supervision.'' At the rural and city
levels, court decisions are made by a majority vote with a judge and
two lay members sitting in judgment. All judges and lay judges must be
citizens. The President nominates and the State Assembly confirms the
Chief Justice of the State Court. The Chief Justice nominates State
Court judges who are subject to confirmation by the State Assembly. He
also nominates the district, city, and rural court judges who are then
appointed by the President. Judges are appointed for life.
The role of the Chancellor of Justice and the ombudsman have been
combined under legislation passed by Parliament in February. Parliament
rejected a proposal for an independent ombudsman. The ombudsman is to
handle complaints by private citizens against state institutions; the
Chancellor has started such work.
The Constitution provides that court proceedings shall be public.
Closed sessions may be held only for specific reasons, such as the
protection of state or business secrets, and in cases concerning
minors. The Constitution further provides that defendants may present
witnesses and evidence as well as confront and cross-examine
prosecution witnesses. Defendants have access to prosecution evidence
and enjoy a presumption of innocence.
The Government continued to overhaul the country's criminal and
civil procedural codes. An interim Criminal Code that went into effect
in 1992 basically revised the Soviet Criminal Code by eliminating, for
example, political and economic crimes. The Code of Criminal Procedure
was adopted in 1994.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law requires a search warrant for the search and
seizure of property. During the investigative stage, warrants are
issued by the prosecutor upon a showing of probable cause. Once a case
has gone to court, warrants are issued by the court. The Constitution
provides for secrecy of the mail, telegrams, telephones, and other
means of communication. Police must obtain a court order to intercept a
person's communications. Illegally obtained evidence is not admissible
in court.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government respects
constitutional provisions providing for freedom of speech and of the
press. The media routinely carry out probing and thorough investigative
reporting. Foreign newspapers and magazines are widely available. All
newsprint, printing, and distribution facilities are private companies.
There are four major national Estonian language and two Russian
language dailies, in addition to important weeklies. In a widely
reported 1997 case, a well-known journalist was tried and convicted for
insulting the spouse of a prominent politician in a newspaper interview
and received a fine. All levels of the judiciary upheld the sentence.
The European Court of Human Rights agreed in 1998 to hear the case, and
it was still pending at year's end.
The Law on Language prohibits the use of any foreign language on
all public signs, advertisements, and notices, including election
posters. The prohibition on campaign posters written in other than
Estonian resulted in protests by one political party.
State and public broadcast media, including one nationwide
television channel (Estonian Television/ETV), continued to receive
large government subsidies. Although the State once assured that these
subsidies would continue, some officials called during the year for the
combination of ETV and Estonian radio, along with a simultaneous
reduction in their budgets by 50 percent. In 1998 Estonian Television
(ETV) agreed not to broadcast commercials in return for annual
subsidies from the commercial television stations; however, early in
the year the agreement collapsed and state television again began to
carry commercials, placing it in competition with commercial channels
for advertising revenue.
The Estonian Broadcasting Council fired the general director of
ETV, Toomas Lepp, on December 13 stating that Lepp was discharged
because of management failures, financial difficulties at ETV, and
Lepp's ``undisciplined'' behavior. Lepp said that his discharge had
political motivation and was illegal, and he said that he would protest
to the Arbitration Board. At year's end, the issue was unresolved.
There are several major independent television and radio stations.
Several Russian-language programs, mostly produced in Estonia, are
broadcast over state and private television channels. The Government
played a key role in encouraging Russian language programs on state
television. These Russian programs include highly professional talk
shows and comprehensive news broadcasts. However, government budget
cuts initiated during the year reduced the budget of ETV's Russian-
language department by 30 to 40 percent, reducing the department's
ability to create self-produced programs. Russian state television and
Ostankino programs are widely available via cable.
The country still lacks a law on freedom of information. The
governmental expert committee has worked out a draft law, but it has
become an object of criticism. Neither journalists nor parliamentarians
agree with the draft law. At year's end, Parliament had not passed the
freedom of information bill.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to assemble freely, but noncitizens are
prohibited from joining political parties, although they may form
social groups. Permits for all public gatherings must be obtained 3
weeks prior to the date of the gathering. The authorities have wide
discretion to prohibit such gatherings on public safety grounds but
seldom do so. There were no reports of government interference in mass
gatherings or political rallies.
The Constitution provides for the right of free association, and
the Government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
The 1993 Law on Churches and Religious Organizations requires all
religious organizations to have at least 12 members and to be
registered with the Interior Ministry and the Board of Religion.
Leaders of religious organizations must be citizens with at least 5
years' residence in the country.
The majority of citizens are nominally Lutheran, but following
deep-seated tradition there is wide tolerance of other denominations
and religions. Persons of varying ethnic backgrounds profess Orthodoxy,
including communities of the descendants of Russian Old Believers who
found refuge in Estonia in the 17th century. The Estonian Apostolic
Orthodox Church (EAOC), independent since 1919, subordinate to
Constantinople since 1923, and exiled under the Soviet occupation,
reregistered under its 1935 statute in August 1993. Since then, a group
of ethnic Estonian and Russian parishes preferring to remain under the
authority of the Russian Orthodox Church structure imposed during the
Soviet occupation has insisted that it should have claim to the EAOC
name. Representatives of the Moscow and Constantinople Patriarchates
agreed in May that the Moscow Patriarchate would register under a new
name. In June the State and the Moscow Patriarchate reached a tentative
agreement over the use of Nevski Cathedral and Kuremae Monastery. The
Moscow Patriarchate agreed to allow the monastery to be registered as
state property, after which the State would either donate or rent the
property back to the Moscow Patriarchate. Throughout the dispute, free
worship has occurred in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law permits free movement within the
country, and it is honored in practice. The law also provides for the
right of foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation for citizens.
Passports serve as identification but do not have to be carried at all
times. There are no exit visas.
In 1993 Parliament enacted a Law on Aliens that defines an alien as
a person who is not a citizen of Estonia, that is, a citizen of another
country or a stateless person. The majority of noncitizens are ethnic
Russians. The law provided a 1-year period during which noncitizens who
came to Estonia prior to July 1, 1990, and were permanent residents of
the former Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, could apply for
temporary residence permits. They also could apply for permanent
residence at the same time. Following delays and confusion in
implementation as well as criticism by international human rights
observers, the application deadline was extended by a year, until July
12, 1995. By that date the vast majority of aliens--327,737 of the
estimated 370,000--had filed applications. The Government extended the
registration period until April 30, 1996. An indeterminate number of
noncitizens--estimates ranged from 20,000 to 50,000--still had not
registered. In 1997 the Government began a campaign to register this
group of aliens, pledging not to take any measures against them. By
September 1998, some 2,000 had come forward. In 1997 the Government
proposed and Parliament approved an amendment to the aliens law that
allowed those who had applied for residence by July 12, 1995, to change
temporary residence permits to permanent ones. This law was implemented
in September 1998, 2 years earlier than the original act envisioned.
There were complaints about the slow pace with which the Government
was processing residence applications for some 19,000 Russian military
pensioners. The process was complicated by the lack of Russian-provided
passports in which to affix the permits. An estimated 35 percent of the
first group of military pensioners missed the deadline to present their
passports for residence permits. Technically, the Citizenship and
Migration Board could move to have them deported. However, by mid-year
no recommendations to deport any persons had been made. The Government
is moving on a case-by-case basis to solve the outstanding issues. By
September, out of some 19,000 persons who applied, the Government
issued 17,000 temporary residence permits to retired Russian
servicemen. Approximately 2,200 retired Russian servicemen have
submitted applications to extend their residency. The Government
refused residence to 22 former members of the Soviet military forces.
No restrictions are placed on the right of noncitizens to foreign
travel, emigration, or repatriation, although some noncitizens complain
of delays in obtaining travel documents. The Government began issuing
temporary travel documents valid for a single departure and reentry
into the country to resident aliens in 1994. To accommodate the entry
visa requirements of other countries, the validity period of the
document was extended in 1994 from 6 months to 2 years. In late 1994,
the Government began issuing alien passports, which are issued to
resident aliens not in possession of any other valid travel document.
Such aliens included: (1) persons who are designated as stateless; (2)
foreign citizens who lack the opportunity to obtain travel documents
from their country of origin or from another state; (3) persons who
file for Estonian citizenship and pass the language examination if
required; and (4) aliens who are permanently departing Estonia. The
Government plans to expand the classes of noncitizens eligible for
alien passports. It already has approved their issuance to noncitizens
intending to study abroad and has agreed to issue them to former
military personnel who cannot or do not want to take out Russian
citizenship. By year's end, approximately 216,000 persons had applied
for alien passports and 190,190 passports had been issued.
The Government deported a relatively small number of illegal
aliens, usually those caught in criminal acts. By September 18 illegal
aliens were held as internees, pending deportation or a court order
granting them residence. Internees are held in a wing of a regular
prison. In July Finland and Estonia entered into a cooperation
agreement to construct a new facility for illegal aliens and asylum
seekers in East Viru county.
In 1997 Parliament passed a refugee law that brought domestic
legislation into conformity with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol and also in 1997 amended
several social security acts to provide refugees with social benefits
identical to those of citizens. In February Parliament passed
amendments to the refugee law that delegated authority from the
Government to the Citizenship and Migration Board, clarified the
refusal of refugee status, and established a state registry for asylum.
In accordance with one of the articles contained in these amendments,
starting on October 1 temporary residence permits could be granted to
persons whose applications for a residence permit are based on an
international agreement. The program began as scheduled, and as of
October 13, 43 persons had applied for asylum of whom 33 still were
waiting for a reply. All 10 of the applications that had been processed
were turned down by the Citizenship and Migration Board on the grounds
that the applicants did not fulfill the criteria for refugee status as
defined in the 1951 U.N. Convention.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government. In March free
and fair elections to the Parliament were held. The new Government is a
coalition of the Pro Patria, Moderate, and Reform Parties. Among the
deputies are four ethnic Russians. Indirect presidential elections were
held in 1996. When the Parliament failed to muster the required two-
thirds majority to elect the President, an Electoral Assembly
consisting of Members of Parliament and representatives of local
governments convened and reelected the incumbent, Lennart Meri.
Local elections were held in October. According to legislation,
resident noncitizens and those who have lived permanently in the area
for at least 5 years preceding the election can vote but cannot run for
office. The local elections were free and fair. All candidates had
certified that they knew Estonian sufficiently to be able to function
in local government.
The 1992 Citizenship Law readopted the 1938 Citizenship Law.
According to that law, anyone born after 1940 to a citizen parent is a
citizen by birth. The parent does not have to be an ethnic Estonian.
The Government estimates that under this provision some 80,000 persons
not ethnically Estonian have obtained citizenship. The law included
requirements for naturalization, such as a 2-year residency
requirement, to be followed by a 1-year waiting period, as well as
knowledge of the Estonian language. According to Max van der Stoel, the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) High
Commissioner on National Minorities, over 200,000 persons experienced a
reduction in status to that of resident alien. Citizenship is provided
to those who were citizens in 1940 and their descendants, not to those
who moved to Estonia during occupation (resident aliens).
In 1995 Parliament adopted a Citizenship Law revising the 1992 law
and combining into one statute provisions regarding citizenship that
were scattered among several pieces of legislation. It extended the
residency requirement for naturalization from 2 to 5 years and added a
requirement for knowledge of the Constitution and the Citizenship Law.
Persons who had taken up legal residence in the country prior to July
1, 1990, are exempt from the 5-year legal residence and 1-year waiting
period requirements. The law allows the Government to waive the
language requirement but not the civic knowledge requirement for
applicants who have Estonian language elementary or higher education,
or who have performed valuable service to Estonia. In December 1998,
Parliament approved legislation that amended the citizenship law to
grant citizenship to stateless children born after February 26, 1992 to
legally resident stateless parents (upon the parents' or guardians'
application). The President proclaimed the law in December 1998, and it
went into effect on July 12. As of September 2, parents had applied for
citizenship for 34 such children.
On October 1, the Government dropped the immigration quota on the
issuance of residence permits to those noncitizens who settled in the
country prior to July 1, 1990, and who have not departed the country
subsequently.
By law the following classes of persons are ineligible for
naturalization: those filing on the basis of false data or documents;
those not abiding by the constitutional system or not fulfilling the
laws; those who have acted against the State and its security; those
who have committed crimes and have been punished with a sentence of
more than 1 year or who have been repeatedly brought to justice for
felonies; those who work or have worked in the intelligence or security
services of a foreign state; or those who have served as career
soldiers in the armed forces of a foreign state, including those
discharged into the reserves or retired. (The latter includes spouses
who have come to Estonia in connection with the service member's
assignment to a posting, the reserves, or retirement.) A provision of
the law allows for the granting of citizenship to a foreign military
retiree who has been married to a native citizen for 5 years.
Between 1992 and August 1, 108,383 persons received citizenship
through naturalization. The vast majority of these persons, 87,712,
were naturalized by the end of 1996. In 1997 the Russian embassy
reported that some 120,000 persons had obtained Russian citizenship;
however, the Embassy declined to supply the Government with a list. The
number of Russian citizens may be lower since the Russian Embassy does
not appear to keep records of those who die or leave the country. The
Government reported that by August 1 it had issued 144,631 residence
permits to foreign nationals. As of August, the Government also had
issued 35,816 permanent and 16,180 temporary residence permits.
While some officials in the Russian Government and in the local
Russian community continued to criticize the citizenship law as
discriminatory, the OSCE as well as numerous international fact-finding
organizations, including the Finnish Helsinki Committee, confirm that
the Citizenship Law conforms to international standards.
Bureaucratic delays and the Estonian language requirement are also
cited as disincentives for securing citizenship. The Government has
established language-training centers, but there is a lack of qualified
teachers, financial resources, and training materials. Some allege that
the examination process, which 75 to 90 percent pass, is arbitrary.
There are no legal impediments to women's participation in
government or politics. However, women are underrepresented in
government and politics. There are 18 women among the 101 members of
Parliament. Two ministers are women. There are four ethnic Russian
deputies in Parliament. At year's end, the law was amended to place
language requirements on Members of Parliament; Russian speakers
protested.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not restrict the formation or functioning of
human rights organizations. In response to allegations of poor
treatment of ethnic minorities, the President established a Human
Rights Institute, which first convened in 1992. The purpose of the
Institute is to monitor human rights in the country and to provide
information to the international community. It investigates reports of
human rights violations, such as allegations of police abuse and
inhuman treatment of detainees. In 1997 the Institute established an
information center in the heavily ethnic Russian town of Kohtla-Jarve.
In addition because of tensions surrounding the adoption of the
Elections Law and the Aliens Law in 1993, the President established a
roundtable composed of representatives of Parliament, the Union of
Estonian Nationalities, and the Russian speaking population's
Representative Assembly. An analogous but independent roundtable meets
in the county of East Virumaa. In addition with initial funding from
the Danish government, a nongovernmental legal information center in
Tallinn provides free legal assistance to individuals--citizen and
noncitizen alike--seeking advice on human rights-related issues.
Because of repeated Russian allegations of human rights violations
among the noncitizen population, both the OSCE mission in Estonia and
the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities have declared that
they could not find a pattern of human rights violations or abuses in
the country. The Government in 1998 addressed two outstanding
recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,
by simplifying the civic knowledge portion of the naturalization
process and passing legislation to grant automatic citizenship to
children born after February 26, 1992 to resident stateless persons
upon parental application. There are also at least 10 nongovernmental
organizations devoted to developing and implementing local programs to
assist the integration of non-Estonians into society.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, disability, language, social status, or for any other reason.
The Government reports that no court cases charging discrimination have
been filed. Two court cases begun in 1998 are pending but have not come
to trial, regarding allegations of racial hatred fomented by a leader
of a Russian military pensioners' group in northeast Estonia. The
pensioners' leader organized an unauthorized assembly in the city of
Sillamae and claimed that the human rights of the Russian pensioners in
the region were abused by the Government. There are no regulations on
how deaf or blind persons are to take the language or citizenship
tests.
Women.--Violence against women, including spousal abuse, was the
subject of increasing discussion and media coverage. According to
women's groups and law enforcement officials, family violence is not
pervasive. Rape and attempted rape occur relatively infrequently.
During the year, there were reports of 50 rapes and 3 attempted rapes,
compared with 53 rapes and 14 attempted rapes for 1998. However,
studies show that 40 percent of crime in the country goes unreported,
including domestic violence. Even when the police are called, the
abused spouse often declines to press charges.
Both the Center of Women Citizens and a roundtable of women's
organizations were established in 1998. Women have the same legal
rights as men and legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work.
Nevertheless, although women's average educational level was higher
than that of men, their average pay was lower, and the trend did not
seem to be improving. There continue to be female- and male-dominated
professions. Women constitute slightly more than half of the work
force. They also carry major household responsibilities.
Children.--The Government's strong commitment to education is
evidenced by the high priority that it gives to building and
refurbishing schools. The Government provides free medical care for
children and subsidizes school meals. In 1992 the Government adopted a
Law on Child Protection patterned after the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child.
There is no societal pattern of child abuse, but a 1995 research
project conducted by the nongovernmental Estonian Union for Child
Welfare on children and violence at home found that a significant
proportion of children had experienced at least occasional violence at
home, in schools, or in youth gangs. In the first 7 months of the year,
police registered 10 cases of sexual abuse--7 female victims and 3 male
victims. In the same time period, there were 54 cases of procurement
for prostitution of victims younger than age 16. Also in the first 7
months of the year, there were no rape cases in which the victim was
younger than 14.
People with Disabilities.--While the Constitution contains
provisions to protect disabled persons against discrimination, and both
the State and some private organizations provide them with financial
assistance, little has been done to enable the disabled to participate
normally in public life. There is no public access law, but some effort
to accommodate the disabled is evident in the inclusion of ramps at
curbs on new urban sidewalk construction. Public transportation firms
have acquired some vehicles that are accessible to the disabled, as
have some taxi companies. There are no regulations on how deaf or blind
persons are to take the language or citizenship tests.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The OSCE mission in Estonia,
established in 1993, continued to promote stability, dialog, and
understanding among communities. The President's Roundtable, also
established in 1993, is composed of Members of Parliament,
representatives of the Union of Estonian Nationalities, and the
Representative Assembly of the Russian Community; it continued to work
toward finding practical solutions to problems of noncitizens. The
analogous but independent roundtable that met in the northeastern part
of the country (see Section 4) worked on similar issues.
The Law on Cultural Autonomy for citizens belonging to minority
groups went into effect in 1993. The tradition of protection for
cultural autonomy dates from a 1925 law. Some noncitizens termed the
law discriminatory, since it restricts cultural autonomy only to
citizens. The Government replied that noncitizens can participate fully
in ethnic organizations and that the law includes subsidies for
cultural organizations.
The population is slightly less than 1.5 million. Ethnic Russians
total approximately 29 percent, and nonethnic Estonians total
approximately 37 percent. During the years of the country's forced
annexation by the Soviet Union, large numbers of non-Estonians,
predominantly ethnic Russians, were encouraged to migrate to Estonia to
work as laborers and administrators. These immigrants and their
descendants now compose approximately one-third of the total
population; about 40 percent of them were born in Estonia.
Approximately 8 percent of the population of the pre-1940 Republic was
ethnic Russian.
Some noncitizens, especially Russians, continued to allege job,
salary, and housing discrimination because of Estonian language
requirements. Russian government officials and parliamentarians echoed
these charges in a variety of forums. In March 1998, the Government
accepted a Russian Government proposal to establish a high-level
commission to examine all aspects of bilateral relations. One of the
subgroups of the commission would examine the humanitarian aspects of
the Russian minority in Estonia and possibly of the Estonian minority
in Russia. By year's end, the commission had been established, but it
had not met.
Other than for land ownership, the 1993 Law does not distinguish
between citizens and noncitizens for purposes of business or property
ownership. A 1996 law on land ownership further liberalized land
ownership by foreigners; such ownership now is restricted only in
certain strategic areas. All legal residents of Estonia may participate
equally in the privatization of state-owned housing.
Estonian language requirements for those employed in the civil
service went into effect in 1993. As originally passed, the Law on
Public Service required state employees to be proficient in Estonian by
the end of 1995. In December 1995, Parliament amended the Law on Public
Service to allow noncitizen local and national government employees
without adequate Estonian to continue working until February 1, 1997.
No noncitizens were to be hired after January 1, 1996. This amendment
reflected the Government's awareness that in some sectors, the number
of employees with inadequate Estonian remained high. On February 9, the
Parliament again amended the Law on Language, requiring that all public
servants, service personnel, and sole proprietors must be able to use
the Estonian language. While the Government is to establish regulations
pertaining to and describing the level of proficiency, the actual
proficiency is to be determined through examination. Non-Estonian
citizens who have obtained at least primary education proficiency in
the language are exempted from the requirement to pass a language
examination. On July 27, the Government issued the implementation
decree for the amendments to the language law regarding public sector
employees as well as those employed in the medical profession. The
implementing decree for private sector workers was expected in October,
but it was not issued by year's end.
In May 1997, 3 policemen were dismissed for not knowing sufficient
Estonian; earlier in 1997, 11 policemen were dismissed for not filing
for Estonian citizenship by the established deadline. Also in 1997,
five prosecutors and two judges were dismissed for presenting forged
certificates regarding their knowledge of Estonian; two have been
restored to their positions; criminal charges against one judge were
dropped. At the end of 1998, a total of 300 police officers had been
dismissed because of their poor command of Estonian and failure to
acquire citizenship, and they have not been rehired.
The language office liberally grants extensions to persons who can
explain their failure to meet the requisite competence level in 4
years. Estonian language training is available; however, some claim
that it is too costly. Some Russian representatives have asked for free
language training. They have charged also that the language requirement
for citizenship is too difficult. There has been a proposal to make the
language requirement less rigorous. The examination fee for either
language test--for employment or citizenship--is 15 percent of the
monthly minimum wage, although it is waived for the unemployed.
Legislation and a government decision provide that, in districts
where more than one-half of the population speak a language other than
Estonian, the inhabitants are entitled to receive official information
in that language.
All residents, whether or not they are citizens, can complain
directly to the State Court about alleged violations of human or
constitutional rights. The State Court justices review each case and
have decided in favor of complainants. All decisions are in Estonian
but if a complaint is received in a language other than Estonian
(usually Russian) the court provides a complimentary translation.
Two court cases begun in 1998 are pending but have not come to
trial; they concern allegations of racial hatred fomented by a leader
of a Russian military pensioners' group in northeast Estonia.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to form and join a union or employee association. The Central
Organization of Estonian Trade Unions (EAKL) came into being as a
wholly voluntary and purely Estonian organization in 1990 to replace
the Estonian branch of the official Soviet labor confederation, the
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. The EAKL has 65,000 members.
Another trade union, the Organization of Employee Unions, split from
the EAKL in 1993 and has 45,000 members. A central union of food
processing and rural workers was established in 1997. About one-third
of the country's labor force belongs to one of the three labor
federations.
The right to strike is legal, and unions are independent of the
Government and political parties. The Constitution and statutes
prohibit retribution against strikers. There was a strike by metal
workers in Viljandi during the year.
Unions may join federations freely and affiliate internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While Estonian
workers have the legally acquired right to bargain collectively,
collective bargaining is still in its infancy. According to EAKL
leaders, few collective bargaining agreements have been concluded
between management and workers of a specific enterprise. However, the
EAKL has concluded framework agreements with producer associations,
which provide the basis for specific labor agreements, including the
setting of the minimum wage. The EAKL also was involved with developing
the country's post-Soviet era Labor Code covering employment contracts,
vacation, and occupational safety. The Labor Code prohibits antiunion
discrimination, and employees have the right to go to court to enforce
their rights. In 1993 laws covering collective bargaining, collective
dispute resolution, and shop stewards were enacted.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor although it does not specifically
prohibit forced and bonded labor by children (see Section 6.d.). The
Labor Inspections Office effectively enforces this prohibition.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution forbids forced or bonded labor. The
Government ratified the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child,
which bans forced child labor. The statutory minimum age for employment
is 16 years. Minors 13 to 15 years of age may work provided they have
the written permission of a parent or guardian and the local labor
inspector. The work may not endanger the minor's health or be
considered immoral, cannot interfere with studies, and must be included
on a Government-prepared list. Government authorities effectively
enforce minimum age laws through inspections. There were no reports of
forced or bonded labor by children in enterprises (see Section 6.c.);
however, there were instances of families forcing their children to
engage in peddling or begging.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government, after
consultations with the EAKL and the Central Producers Union, sets the
minimum wage. The monthly minimum wage is $86 (1,250 Estonian crowns).
The minimum wage is not sufficient to provide a worker and family with
a decent standard of living. About 5 to 6 percent of the work force
receive the minimum wage. The average monthly wage in the second
quarter was about $310.
The standard workweek is 40 hours, and there is a mandatory 24-hour
rest period. According to EAKL sources, legal occupational health and
safety standards are satisfactory, but they are extremely difficult to
achieve in practice. The National Labor Inspection Board is responsible
for enforcement of these standards, but it has not been very effective
to date. In addition the labor unions have occupational health and
safety experts who assist workers to bring employers in compliance with
legal standards. Workers have the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, the existing criminal codes regarding kidnaping
and extortion are used to address this problem. There were reports of
trafficking of women during the year, including a case where women were
transported to serve in the sex industry in Germany.
17ESTON
IA____
FINLAND
Finland is a constitutional republic with an elected head of state
(President), a Parliament, a head of government (Prime Minister), and
an independent judiciary.
The security apparatus is controlled effectively by elected
officials and supervised by the courts.
Finland has a mixed economy, primarily and extensively market
based.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. The Government is taking serious
steps to address the problem of violence against women.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
observes this prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The judiciary consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme
Administrative Court, and the lower courts. The President appoints
Supreme Court justices, who in turn appoint the lower court judges.
The law provides for the right to fair public trial, and the
judiciary vigorously enforces this right. Local courts may conduct a
trial behind closed doors in juvenile, matrimonial, and guardianship
cases, or when publicity would offend morality or endanger the security
of the state. In national security cases, the judge may withhold from
the public any or all information pertaining to charges, verdicts, and
sentences. The law provides for sanctions against violators of such
restrictions.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices. Government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
the press, and the Government respects this right in practice. An
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press,
including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Nontraditional religious groups freely profess and propagate their
beliefs. Such groups are eligible for some tax relief (e.g., they may
receive tax-free donations), provided they are registered with the
Government as religious communities. Some 87 percent of the population
belongs to two state churches, the Lutheran and the Orthodox. All
citizens belonging to one of these state churches pay, as part of their
income tax, a church tax. These church taxes are used to defray the
costs of running the state churches. Those who do not want to pay the
tax must notify the tax office.
Such groups as Jehovah's Witnesses and the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints have been active in Finland for decades. In
December 1998, the Ministry of Education turned down the application of
the Finnish Association of Scientologists to be registered as a
religious community. This was the first time that an applicant had been
denied church status. The Scientologists' application was pending for
nearly 3 years while the Government awaited additional information that
it had requested from the Association. The Association acknowledged
that it had not responded to the Government's request. The Education
Ministry's decision can be appealed to the Supreme Administrative
Court. The Scientologists have not yet done so, but they have indicated
that they may begin the process anew and reapply for recognition as a
church.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
Approved refugees and asylum seekers are processed directly for
residence. The issue of the provision of first asylum has never arisen.
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of persons with a valid
claim to refugee status.
In 1998 1,272 persons applied for asylum, up from 973 in 1997.
During 1998 the Directorate of Immigration processed 866 asylum
applications. It granted asylum to 7 persons and residence permits to
372 persons and rejected the applications of 240 persons. Also in 1998,
247 asylum seekers withdrew their applications. In 1999 from January 1
to July 31, 1,851 asylum applications were submitted. Government
officials attribute this increase in the number of asylum applicants to
the fighting in Kosovo and to the sudden arrival in the country of
Romani asylum seekers from Slovakia during June and July. In July the
Government imposed a visa regime on Slovak citizens; the requirement
was lifted in November. Most of the Roma subsequently withdrew their
applications after the Government denied the applications of several
hundred initial applicants on the grounds that most had first transited
Hungary, the Czech Republic, or Sweden en route to Finland.
In 1997 the Government issued guidelines aimed at creating a more
coherent immigration and refugee policy rather than dealing with
immigration and asylum matters on a case-by-case basis. A revised
aliens' code went into effect on May 1 that makes it easier to obtain
asylum and facilitates family reunification. On May 1, a law
establishing procedures for receiving asylum seekers, as well as
promoting the integration of immigrants into society, also went into
effect (also see Section 5).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
Women are fairly well represented in Government. There are 74 women
in the 200-member Parliament, and 8 in the 18-member Cabinet. The
Foreign Minister and the Speaker of the Parliament are women. In 1995
Parliament passed quota legislation for all state committees,
commissions, and appointed municipal bodies, requiring a minimum of 40
percent membership from each sex.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, age,
origin, language, religion, conviction, opinion, or disability, and the
Government effectively enforces these provisions.
Women.--Police statistics for 1998 record 2,708 cases of domestic
violence, 208 more than the previous year. Of the victims, 2,182 were
women and 526 were men. A total of 463 cases of rape were reported to
the police in 1998, compared with 468 in 1997. During the period from
January to September 1999, 424 cases of rape were reported. During the
1988-97 period, an average of 395 cases of rape were reported each
year. Government experts report that as many as half of all rape cases
may go unreported.
The annual number of calls to the police relating to domestic
violence is not centrally compiled but is estimated at 10,000 to
12,000. Shelter officials state that the figure represents less than
half of the number of actual incidents. Most of the persons seeking
shelter are women between 25 and 35 years of age, either married or in
a common-law relationship. Nearly one-third are immigrants.
The law provides for stringent penalties for violence against
women; the police and the courts vigorously enforce this provision.
The Union of Shelter Homes as well as the municipalities maintain
homes all over the country for female, male, adult, and child victims
of violence. The total number of shelters is around 55. Many of the
people served by the shelters are women with small children fleeing
abusive husbands. Increasing numbers of elderly persons--the parents of
abusive (usually male) offspring--have sought safety in the shelters.
Generally the conditions that cause both young and old to avail
themselves of the shelters are alcohol-related. Studies show that the
opening of a shelter in an area brings cases of family violence into
the open. The concept of family violence includes negligence in care,
psychological violence, and economic abuse. The Union of Shelter Homes
introduced a special program to alert persons from other cultures to
the possibilities of getting help from the authorities in a society
where they lack a natural support network.
A study published in 1998 indicated that the typical victim of
family violence is a young woman between 18 and 24 years of age who is
married or is living in a common-law relationship. The study concluded
that every fifth married woman or woman involved in a common-law
relationship has suffered from violent behavior at the hands of her
partner. The study also concludes that as many as 40 percent of all
women over the age of 15 have experienced some form of family violence.
(The study considers psychological and verbal abuse as ``violence.'')
The government-established Council for Equality coordinates and
sponsors legislation to meet the needs of women as workers, mothers,
widows, or retirees.
The Constitution calls for the promotion of equality of the sexes
in social activities and working life, the latter particularly in the
determination of remuneration. In 1985 the Parliament passed a more
detailed comprehensive equal rights law that mandates equal treatment
for women in the workplace, including equal pay for ``comparable''
jobs. In practice comparable worth has not been implemented because of
the difficulty of establishing criteria, but the Government, employers,
unions, and others continue to work on implementation plans. Women's
average earnings are 81 percent of those of men, and women still tend
to be segregated in lower paying occupations. While women individually
have attained leadership positions in the private and public sectors,
there are disproportionately fewer women in top management jobs.
Industry and finance, the labor movement, and some Government
ministries remain male dominated. Some 60 percent of physicians are
women. Women serve in the military. The Government's Equality Ombudsman
monitors compliance with regulations against sexual discrimination. Of
the 78 complaints processed by the Ombudsman between January 1 and June
30, 17 cases were established as violations of the law.
In 1997 the Government began a special program to promote women's
equality during the period from 1997 to 1999. This program consists of
30 projects, one of which focuses on violence against women and
domestic violence. The project against violence offers support,
nationwide, to women in need and to men who wish to combat their own
tendencies to resort to violence. This project is regarded as the most
significant component of the women's equality program, in that it has
helped break the taboo about the subject.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. There is no pattern of societal abuse of
children, and the national consensus supporting children's rights is
enshrined in law.
People with Disabilities.--Although since the 1970's the law has
required that new public buildings be accessible to people with
physical disabilities, many older buildings remain inaccessible. No
such law applies to public transportation, but each municipality
subsidizes measures to improve accessibility to vehicles. Local
governments maintain a free transport service that guarantees 18 free
trips per month for a disabled person. The deaf and the mute are
provided interpretation services ranging from 120 to 240 hours
annually. The Government provides subsidized public housing to the
severely disabled.
Indigenous People.--Sami (Lapps), who constitute less than 0.1
percent of the population, benefit from legal provisions protecting
minority rights and customs. Sami language and culture are supported in
the Constitution and financially by the Government. The Sami receive
subsidies to enable them to continue their traditional lifestyle, which
revolves around reindeer herding. Sami have full political and civil
rights and are able to participate in decisions affecting their
economic and cultural interests.
In 1998 the President issued instructions on implementing a
European Union directive on the use of minority and regional languages.
The directive's purpose is to ensure that the use of minority languages
is permitted in school, the media, dealings with administrative and
judicial authorities, economic and commercial life, and cultural
activities. The Sami language belongs to the category of a minority
language used regionally.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In recent years, concern has
arisen about increasing expressions of racist and xenophobic behavior.
The Government is trying to address this problem through an in-depth,
ongoing study of attitudes toward different ethnic groups. The
government study examines discrimination in working life, looks into
popular attitudes toward foreigners, and charts the attitudes of those
authorities involved in immigration affairs--the police, teachers,
social workers, border guards, and employment office personnel. The
popular attitudes survey found that half of those interviewed
acknowledged some feelings of xenophobia or prejudice.
Two government-sponsored legislative initiatives are aimed at
improving the situation of noncitizens. On May 1, a law promoting the
integration of immigrants into society and establishing procedures for
receiving asylum seekers went into effect. A revised aliens' code also
went into effect on May 1 (see Section 2.d.). In addition to these
legislative initiatives, the Government in 1997 issued policy
guidelines for promoting tolerance and combating racism.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
rights of trade unions to organize, to assemble peacefully, and to
strike, and the Government respects these provisions. About 87 percent
of the work force is organized. All unions are independent of the
Government and political parties. The law grants public sector
employees the right to strike, with some exceptions for the provision
of essential services. In the first half of the year there were 28
strikes, only 1 of which was not a wildcat strike.
Trade unions freely affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective
bargaining agreements usually are based on income policy agreements
between employee and employer central organizations and the Government.
The law protects workers against antiunion discrimination. Complaint
resolution is governed by collective bargaining agreements as well as
labor law, both of which are adequately enforced.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and this prohibition is observed
in practice. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
adults, and such practices do not exist. The Government enforces this
prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see
Section 6.c.). Youths under 16 years of age cannot work more than 6
hours a day or at night, and education is compulsory for children from
7 to 16 years of age. The Labor Ministry enforces child labor
regulations. There are virtually no complaints of the exploitation of
children in the work force.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated minimum
wage, but the law requires all employers--including nonunionized ones--
to meet the minimum wages agreed to in collective bargaining agreements
in the respective industrial sector. These minimum wages generally
afford a decent standard of living for workers and their families.
The legal workweek consists of 5 days not exceeding 40 hours.
Employees working shifts or during the weekend are entitled to a 24-
hour rest period during the week. The law is enforced effectively as a
minimum, and many workers enjoy even stronger benefits through
effectively enforced collective bargaining agreements.
The Government sets occupational health and safety standards, and
the Labor Ministry effectively enforces them. Workers can refuse
dangerous work situations without risk of penalty.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not explicitly prohibit
trafficking in persons, but existing statutes concerning procuring and
illegal aliens can be used in such cases.
Finland is becoming a destination country for trafficked women,
according to an OSCE report.
______
FRANCE
France is a constitutional democracy with a directly elected
president and National Assembly and an independent judiciary.
The law enforcement and internal security apparatus consists of the
Gendarmerie, the national police, and municipal police forces in major
cities, all of which are under effective civilian control. Members of
those police forces committed some human rights abuses.
The highly developed, diversified, and primarily market-based
economy provides residents with a high standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide a means of dealing with
individual instances of abuse. There were instances of unwarranted use
of lethal force and the abuse of detainees, particularly foreigners, by
law enforcement officers. Long delays in bringing cases to trial and
lengthy pretrial detention are problems. Violence and threats against
ethnic and religious minorities continued to decline. The Government
has taken important steps to deal with violence against women and
children. Women continue to face wage discrimination.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials.
Law enforcement officers have used excessive force--particularly
directed against immigrants--resulting in deaths, although there is no
evidence of a pattern of such abuses.
In January a judge initiated an investigation into the November 20,
1998 death of 26-year-old Mohammed Ali Saoud in Toulon. Saoud, who had
a history of mental illness, died following police intervention in a
violent domestic disturbance. After a struggle, the police succeeded in
physically restraining him. Saoud lost consciousness and the police
called a medic, but the medic could not revive him. An autopsy
determined that Saoud died from a fractured skull. The police had fired
rubber bullets at Saoud to subdue him, and Saoud's mother said that the
police kicked and hit him while he was on the ground. The judicial
investigation was opened in response to requests by Saoud's family and
the Human Rights League, a French nongovernmental organization (NGO).
The investigation continued at year's end.
An investigating judge is considering manslaughter charges against
the police officer who shot and killed 17-year-old Habib Mohamed while
he attempted to steal a car on December 13, 1998 in Toulouse. After
being shot, Mohamed allegedly staggered away and later was found dead
by a passerby. The police officers involved reportedly failed to follow
Mohamed or to follow required procedures to report that their weapons
were fired.
In August the judge investigating the December 1997 fatal shooting
of 16-year-old Abdel-Kader Bouziane changed her investigation of one of
the police officers involved from manslaughter to murder. A second
police officer remains under investigation for manslaughter. The police
claimed self-defense when they fired at Bouziane's car as it approached
them head-on, shooting him when he attempted to break through a
roadblock near Fontainbleau. Ballistics experts stated that the shots
were fired after Bouziane's vehicle passed through the roadblock.
On December 10, the Court of Assizes in the department of Rhone
convicted the police officer who fired the fatal shot in the December
1997 shooting in Lyon of Fabrice Fernandez of manslaughter, and
sentenced him to 12 years in prison. In March the chambre d'accusation
(the prosecuting chamber of the criminal court) had confirmed an
investigative judge's 1998 decision to increase the charge to murder.
The officer had been removed from the police force in January 1998.
In October 1997, the public prosecutor declined to bring charges
against the gendarmes who killed two homeless men who were robbing a
store in Machecoul (Loire-Atlantique). The public prosecutor decided
that the gendarmes had not used excessive force and an investigating
judge agreed.
In December 1997, the appeals court in Aix-en-Provence overturned
the decision that the border police officer who shot and killed 8-year-
old Serbian refugee Todor Bogdanovic in 1995 acted in self-defense.
Border police were accused of using excessive force in attempting to
halt a convoy of refugees that ran a border checkpoint. The case was
passed on to the Court of Assizes on a charge of manslaughter, and the
officer was acquitted in December 1998.
In November 1997, the gendarme who shot and killed Franck Moret was
released by the correctional court in Valence, prompting the family of
the deceased to appeal the judgment. In July 1998, the appeals court
overturned the decision of the correctional court and sentenced the
officer to an 18-month suspended prison term. The officer has appealed
the court's decision.
On September 23, 1998, the Court of Cassation refused the appeal of
a ruling that no grounds for prosecution existed, by the family of
Ibrahim Sy, a Senegalese youth who was shot and killed by a gendarme in
1994.
An administrative inquiry was opened into the 1991 death of 18-
year-old Aissa Ihich, who allegedly was beaten by police officers and
subsequently died of an asthmatic attack because he allegedly was
refused medication. In June the chambre d'accusation decided that three
police officers and one doctor involved in the case should be tried
before a correctional court.
In May the Court of Cassation sent a new report to the Prime
Minister, which described the Government's involvement in the case of
the Algerians who were beaten, shot, and thrown into the Seine river
during a 1961 protest in Paris. The report, based on a detailed review
of the judiciary archives, concluded that 48 Algerians died on the
night of October 17, 1961. In May 1998, the Interior Ministry had
concluded that it was likely that ``dozens'' of persons had died;
government authorities at the time of the incident had stated that only
three persons were killed. In May Prime Minister Lionel Jospin's office
announced that government archives on the incident would be opened to
historians; at year's end, both the national archives and the archives
of the city of Paris were open to the public.
In May the authorities arrested Corsican nationalists Didier
Maranelli, Alain Ferrandi, Pierre Alessandri, and Marcel Istria for the
February 1998 killing of Corsican Prefet Claude Erignac. According to
press reports, only Istria has denied any participation in the killing.
Yvan Colonna, who is presumed to have fired the shots that killed
Erignac, was still at large at year's end, and was believed to be
hiding somewhere on the island. The investigation continued at year's
end.
On September 15, a court convicted 21 persons and sentenced them to
between 6 months and 10 years in prison; the defendants were members of
a network that provided logistical support in Paris, Lyon, and Lille
for a group which in 1998 a court found to be responsible for a 1995
wave of bombings in Paris that killed 8 persons and injured over 170
others.
There were no developments in the case of two Iranian nationals
suspected of killing Reza Mazoulman, an Iranian deputy education
minister under the Shah, in Paris in 1996. The investigation continued
at year's end.
On March 10, a special Court of Assizes issued guilty verdicts and
imposed life sentences on six Libyan nationals (including the brother-
in-law of Libyan dictator Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi), who were tried in
absentia for the 1989 bombing of UTA flight 772. According to press
reports in July, Libya paid approximately $33 million (211 million
francs) to France to compensate the families of the 170 persons killed.
On May 20, German national Hans-Joachim Klein, who was arrested in
September 1998 for murder and attempted murder in a 1975 hostage taking
at OPEC headquarters in Vienna, was extradited to Germany.
In June a court rejected the appeal by Ilich Ramirez Sanchez,
a.k.a. ``Carlos the Jackal,'' of a December 1997 conviction in which he
had received a life sentence for a 1975 murder in Paris of two French
secret agents and their informer. On January 15, the chambre
d'accusation of the Paris Court of Appeal decided not to prosecute him
for a 1974 bombing of a Paris drugstore which killed 2 persons and
wounded 34 others. However, in mid-December the Court of Cassation set
aside the Court of Appeal's decision and reopened the case.
On May 19, a Paris court acquitted Bob Denard, a 70-year-old
soldier of fortune, and Dominique Malacrino of charges that they killed
President Ahmed Abdallah of the Comoros in 1989.
On September 1, an investigating judge decided that Nazi war
criminal Alois Brunner should be tried in absentia on charges of crimes
against humanity. Brunner previously was sentenced to death in absentia
by a French military court in 1954, but vanished and was believed to
have been living in Syria. According to press reports, in 1992 the
Damascus publication Lettre d'Orient announced that Brunner had died,
but Syrian authorities and Brunner's ex-wife and daughter refused to
confirm or deny the report. The chambre d'accusation is to review the
investigating judge's decision to determine whether Brunner should be
tried by the Court of Assizes.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities
punish officials who employ them. However, there were credible reports
that law enforcement officers used excessive force, particularly
against immigrants. Isolated instances of police abuse occurred, but
there is no evidence of a pattern.
On July 28, the European Court of Human Rights decided unanimously
that France violated two articles of the European Convention on Human
Rights in the case of Ahmed Selmouni, a Moroccan-Dutch drug smuggling
suspect, who was arrested in November 1991. France was found guilty of
violating Article 3, the prohibition against torture, and Article 6,
the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. Selmouni had been
arrested without incident by police officers in Paris, but he was
beaten numerous times during his subsequent detention. The public
prosecutor in France began an investigation of the police officers in
February 1992. In December 1992, Selmouni was convicted of various drug
charges, and he is serving a 13-year prison term. In February 1993,
Selmouni lodged his own complaint against the police officers and asked
to join the prosecutor's proceedings as a civil party. These
proceedings resulted in the conviction of five police officers in March
on various charges of assault. The officers' original sentences ranged
from 3 to 4 years and were reduced on appeal in July to range between
10 and 18 months. Four of the police officers had their reduced
sentences completely suspended. Only the supervisory officer, whose
sentence was reduced from 4 years to 18 months (with 15 months
suspended), actually served any time in prison. The officers remained
in their positions with the police force until the commencement of
their trial in February. The supervisory officer is not required to
return to prison because he already had served the unsuspended portion
of his sentence (3 months) during provisional detention. The European
Court of Human Rights ruled that the over 6-year delay in the
processing of Selmouni's complaint (some aspects of which are still
being considered by the French courts) violated his right to a hearing
within a reasonable time. The court also ruled that the physical abuse
of Selmouni was ``inflicted intentionally for the purpose of making him
confess to the crime which he had been suspected of committing.'' It
caused ``severe pain and suffering and had been particularly serious
and cruel.'' The court concluded that ``such conduct had to be regarded
as acts of torture.''
The United Nations Human Rights Committee expressed concern in July
1997 about the number and gravity of allegations of mistreatment of
detainees by law enforcement officials and the unnecessary use of force
and firearms which resulted in a number of deaths. According to the
Committee, such mistreatment was more often prevalent in cases of
foreign detainees. The Committee also cited lengthy proceedings
involving law enforcement officers and investigations of alleged human
rights violations by law enforcement officials that ``lacked vigor'' as
potential problems. Additionally, the European Committee for the
Prevention of Torture (CPT), an organ of the Council of Europe, in a
June 1998 report criticized the National Police forces of Paris,
Marseille, and Montpellier for the mistreatment and poor conditions of
detainees in police stations. Most of the complaints came from persons
of North African or African origin.
The Government is in the process of instituting certain judicial
and administrative reforms that address mistreatment of detainees by
law enforcement officials. One such reform currently being debated in
the Parliament, known as the ``presumption of innocence'' bill, would
require a senior judge, rather than an investigating judge, to review
decisions on pretrial detention. In addition, under the bill most
detainees would have the right to see their lawyer 1 hour after being
detained by the police (as compared with 20 hours under the current
law). A second reform, also being debated in the Parliament, is the
creation of a national commission on security ethics to oversee the
actions of police officials and to investigate complaints of police
abuse from witnesses or victims.
In April an unauthorized beach restaurant was burned, reportedly by
members of a secret antiterrorist police unit. The event led to the
dismissal and arrest of the prefet for Corsica, Bernard Bonnet, under
whose authority the unit operated. Bonnet was incarcerated briefly and
then released. A judicial investigation of the unit's activities, and
Bonnet's role in its direction, continued at year's end.
An administrative investigation into a March 1997 incident in which
riot police beat a few dozen persons demonstrating against the National
Front (FN) in Marseille continued at year's end. To keep the anti-FN
demonstrators away from their FN counterparts, the police, according to
eyewitnesses, allegedly used excessive force by beating demonstrators
and using tear gas grenades.
On July 2, the authorities arrested Mauritanian army Captain Ely
Ould Dah in Montpellier, where he was attending a training course at a
French army college. The arrest was in response to accusations by two
Mauritanian refugees living in France, who alleged that Dah is
responsible for torture inflicted upon them when they were soldiers in
Mauritania in 1990 and 1991 and were suspected of taking part in an
attempted coup d'etat against Mauritanian President Maaouya Ould Taya.
Dah was arrested pursuant to a complaint filed by the International
Federation of Human Rights Leagues and the French League of Human
Rights under the International Convention Against Torture. The
authorities detained him for questioning; the Montpellier Court of
Appeal released him on September 29, but required that he remain in the
country. The investigation continued at year's end.
There were numerous bombings in Corsica throughout the year. Many
of these attacks were not politically motivated; however, several
attacks were made against symbols of the French state (such as police
stations, customs offices, and tax offices) or against financial
institutions that Corsican separatists view as harmful to the economic
interests of Corsicans. Such attacks usually occurred when offices were
closed, and there were no deaths or injuries reported during the year.
Prison conditions generally exceed minimum international standards.
However, public debate continued on the adequacy of prison conditions.
Some observers continued to criticize prisons for not providing inmates
with adequate light, sleeping space, blankets, meals, outdoor exercise,
and medical care. There were 201 deaths of persons in custody in 1998,
including 118 suicides. (There were 203 deaths of persons in custody in
1997 and 125 suicides). The 1998 report of the French international NGO
International Observer of Prisons (IOP) noted that despite the
implementation of preventive policies at 11 sites, suicide continued to
be the leading cause of death of imprisoned inmates. Other deaths
resulted from poor medical care and supervision of prison personnel.
The report also criticized incidents of brutality, particularly against
prisoners of African origin, by prison officials--incidents that
resulted in the number of disciplinary sanctions against surveillance
personnel increasing threefold.
In Grasse during the night of December 31, 1997, seven inebriated
prison guards severely beat eight inmates of African origin, of whom
three were minors, strangling one. In June a correctional Court
convicted three of the prison guards, and gave them each a 3-month
suspended sentence.
The Government is in the process of considering a draft code of
ethics for prison guards and is forming a working group, to be chaired
by the head of the Court of Cassation, to make recommendations for
additional administrative oversight of the actions of prison officials.
Observers have criticized the current oversight mechanism as being
ineffective because there is no external administrative oversight
outside of the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for both
prison administration and the discipline of prison officials.
In its 1998 report reflecting conditions in 1996, the CPT found
that police holding cells did not satisfactorily accommodate prisoners'
needs. For example, police prison cells frequently had inadequate
natural light, sleeping space, and blankets. In addition, prisoners
received inadequate meals, outdoor exercise and medical care, according
to the CPT. In July the Government announced plans to improve prison
conditions by renovating five existing prisons and building six new
ones.
In an attempt to reduce prison overcrowding, a December 1997 law
called for experimentation with the ``electronic bracelet'' in 1998 for
inmates serving less than a 1-year sentence or for those finishing
their sentences. The IOP report also highlighted a increase in the
number of minors incarcerated in 1997.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes these
prohibitions.
The judicial system has been criticized by credible sources for its
inability to process suspects quickly. Some suspects spend many years
in prison before a trial even starts. According to the Prison
Administration, as of January 1, 20,610 of the 53,055 persons held in
jails and prisons were awaiting trial. A system of bail exists.
As part of heightened security concerns during the visit of Iranian
President Mohammad Khatami to Paris at the end of October, police
briefly detained and then released several dozen Iranian activists,
including members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, which had been
responsible for previous violent incidents in France.
The six resident non-French Muslims detained in 1994 by police on
suspicion of supporting Algerian terrorists are believed to have been
tried in the ``Chalabi network'' case in October 1998, or released.
The law prohibits exile, and it does not occur.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
There is a system of local courts, 35 regional courts of appeal,
and the highest criminal court, the Court of Cassation, which considers
appeals on procedural grounds only.
The judicial system has been criticized by credible sources for its
inability to process suspects quickly (see Section 1.d.).
On December 14, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that
France violated Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in
the case of Faouzi Khalfaoui. Khalfaoui was required to present himself
to be taken into custody by law enforcement officials the day before
consideration of his case by the Court of Cassation if he wished that
court to consider his appeal. The European Court of Human Rights ruled
that such a procedure violated Khalfaoui's right to a fair trial.
In case of serious crimes, investigating judges detain suspects for
questioning and direct the criminal investigation that occurs before a
case is tried. In some cases this procedure has resulted in lengthy
detentions of suspects before they are tried. The chambre d'accusation
reviews the investigating judge's investigation to determine whether
the charge established by the investigating judge is appropriate. The
Court of Assizes investigates and decides cases involving the most
serious offenses.
On January 22, the Paris Court of Appeal confirmed the sentences of
those convicted in the October 1998 ``Chalabi network'' trial.
According to press reports, the sentences of the 3 main defendants were
reduced to 8 years from the 10 years requested by the prosecutor.
Fifty-one of the 138 defendants were acquitted of the charge of
criminal conspiracy. However, 20 of those 51 were sentenced for related
offenses. A total of 31 persons were acquitted of all offenses.
Attorneys for the accused, as well as the NGO League of Human Rights,
continued to criticize the fairness of the proceedings due to the
``circus'' atmosphere of the mass trial. In addition, on November 9,
the European Court of Human Rights ruled that France violated the human
rights of one of the defendants, Ismail Deboubb, due to his lengthy
pretrial detention. Although Deboubb ultimately was convicted and
sentenced to 6 years in prison, he spent over 4 years in detention
before being tried. The European Court of Human Rights found that he
was not tried within a reasonable time, in accordance with the European
Convention on Human Rights.
In September 1998, Omar Raddad, the Moroccan gardener accused and
convicted of brutally killing his employer in 1994, was released from
prison on conditional terms after having served 4 years and several
months of his 18-year sentence, which was reduced by President Jacques
Chirac in 1996. Raddad and his attorneys continued to insist that the
court in Nice denied him an adequate and fair trial. According to
Raddad's attorney, immigration officials expelled a key witness for his
defense because the witness did not have proper residence papers.
Raddad's attorney submitted a motion for a retrial in January, which
was pending at year's end.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
In April 1998, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin called for an
individual examination of each wiretapping case deemed inappropriate by
the National Commission for the Regulation of Wiretapping (NCRWT).
According to press reports, the judge investigating the matter nearly
had completed his case-by-case investigation by year's end, and is
expected to submit his findings to the public prosecutor's office in
early 2000. According to the most recent report compiled by the NCRWT,
the number of wiretaps by police authorities remained constant in 1998.
The limit on the number of wiretaps established by the Prime Minister
in 1997 did not change during the year, and according to the NCRWT, the
actual number of wire taps during 1998 was below that limit.
Wiretapping is legally recognized as a right of the government, but its
improper use during former President Francois Mitterrand's tenure led
to Jospin's action.
Debate continues over whether Muslim girls have the right to wear
headscarves in public schools (see Section 2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
On January 21, the European Court of Human Rights decided that that
France had violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (on freedom of expression) in the case of publishing director
Roger Fressoz and journalist Claude Roire of the newspaper Le Canard
Enchaine. The September 27, 1989 issue of the newspaper carried an
article written by Roire with reproductions of incriminating tax forms
belonging to Jacques Calvet, chairman of Peugeot motor company. The
public prosecutor brought charges of theft, breach of professional
confidence, and handling of unlawfully obtained goods against Roire and
Fressoz. Clavet joined the proceeding as a civil party and claimed
damages. The Minister for Budget also joined the proceeding as a party
and added further allegations of unlawful removal of government
documents and breach of professional confidence. On June 17, 1992, the
Paris criminal court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the
tax forms had been sent to Roire in an anonymous envelope and that the
source could not be determined. In March 1993, the Court of Appeals
reversed the criminal court's decision, finding that the defendants
knowingly handled documents that were the result of a breach of
professional confidence. In April 1995, the Court of Cassation
dismissed the defendants' appeal. Fressoz and Roire took the case to
the European Court of Human Rights, and on January 21 the court ruled
that their actions were protected by the freedom of expression
contained in the European Convention on Human Rights, and that the
decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Court of Cassation
constituted a breach of the Government's obligation to abide by the
Convention. The court ordered the Government to pay Fressoz and Roire
approximately $1,670 (10,001 francs) in monetary damages and
approximately $10,000 (60,000 francs) for costs and expenses.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for the separation of
church and state and for freedom of religion, and the Government
generally respects this right in practice. However, the Government took
some actions during the year that affected religious minorities that it
describes as ``sects.''
Religious groups may register as ``associations cultuelles''
(associations of worship) or as ``associations culturelles'' (cultural
associations); religious groups normally register in both of these
categories. Associations in these two categories are subject to certain
management and financial disclosure requirements. An association of
worship is exempt from taxes, but can organize only religious
activities; it may not operate a school, print publications, or employ
a board president. A cultural association is a type of for-profit
association whose goal is to promote the culture of a certain group;
although not exempt from taxes, it may receive government subsidies for
its cultural and educational operations (such as schools). Religious
groups must apply with the local prefecture to be recognized as an
association of worship and therefore receive tax-exempt status under a
1905 statute. The prefecture, upon reviewing the documentation supplied
regarding the association's purpose for existence, then can grant that
status. However, the prefecture can decide to review a group's status
if the association receives a large donation or legacy that comes to
the attention of the tax authorities. If the prefecture determines that
the association is not in fact in conformity with the 1905 law, its
status can be changed, and it can be required to pay a 60 percent tax
rate on present and past donations.
For historical reasons, contrary to practice in the rest of the
country, the Jewish, Lutheran, Reformed (Protestant), and Roman
Catholic religions in three departments of Alsace and Lorraine enjoy
special legal status. Adherents of these four religions may choose to
have a portion of their income tax allocated to their church in a
system administered by the central Government.
The State subsidizes private schools, including those that are
church affiliated. Central or local governments also own and provide
upkeep for other religious buildings constructed before 1905, the date
of the law separating church and state.
Some religious minorities have experienced problems with the
wearing of special religious clothing. For example, debate continues
over whether denying some Muslim girls the right to wear headscarves in
public schools constitutes a violation of the right to practice their
religion, and there has been no definitive national decision on the
issue. In 1989 the highest administrative court, the Conseil d'Etat,
ruled that the ``ostentatious'' wearing of these headscarves violated a
law prohibiting proselytizing in schools. In 1994 the Ministry of
Education issued a directive that prohibits the wearing of
``ostentatious political and religious symbols'' in schools; however,
the directive does not specify the ``symbols'' in question, leaving
school administrators considerable authority to do so. In 1995 the
Conseil d'Etat affirmed that simply wearing a headscarf does not
provide grounds for exclusion from school and subsequently struck down
some decisions to expel girls for wearing headscarves. On June 18, the
Government Commissioner recommended that the administrative court
repeal its October 1998 expulsion decision regarding a girl less than
10 years of age who refused to remove her headscarf. The Government
Commissioner stated that no threat to public order was posed and that
the school administrator was incompetent to make the definitive
decision.
According to the press reports, in January teachers at a junior
high school in Normandy refused to teach Muslim students with
headscarves. Also that month, the press reported that Interior Minister
Jean Pierre Chevenement said that headscarves often mark women as
inferior to men, and make their integration into French society more
difficult. In September the Government upheld a decision to expel two
Muslim girls from their junior high school after they wore scarves in
class. In October the Conseil d'Etat reaffirmed a ban on headscarves in
public schools.
The Government's response to some minority groups that it views as
``sects'' or ``cults'' has been to continue to encourage public
caution. In 1995 after the release of poisonous gas in the Tokyo,
Japan, subway by the Aum Shinrikyo cult, the National Assembly formed a
parliamentary commission, also known as the Gest or the Guyard
Commission, to study so-called ``sects.'' In 1996 the Commission issued
a report that defined sects as groups that place inordinate importance
on finances; cause a rupture between adherents and their families; are
responsible for physical as well as psychological attacks on members;
recruit children; profess ``anti-social'' ideas; disturb public order;
have ``judiciary problems;'' and/or attempt to infiltrate organs of the
State. Government officials have stated that ``sects'' are
``associations whose structure is ideological and totalitarian and
whose behavior seriously oppresses fundamental liberties as well as
social equilibrium.'' (These attributes are in addition to specific
criminal behavior prohibited by law.) The Commission's report
identified 173 groups as sects, including Jehovah's Witnesses and the
Church of Scientology. The report was prepared without the benefit of
full and complete hearings regarding the groups identified on the list.
Groups were not told why they were placed on the list, and, because the
document exists as a commission report to the National Assembly, there
is no mechanism for changing or amending the list short of a new
National Assembly commission inquiry and report.
The ensuing publicity contributed to an atmosphere of intolerance
and bias against minority religions. Some religious groups reported
that their members suffered increased intolerance after having been
identified on the list. A number of individuals who belong to groups on
the list continued to report discrimination during the year--for
example, the loss of a job or the denial of a bank loan--which they
believe occurred because of their affiliation with a ``sect.'' In a
November 1998 report, the International Helsinki Federation criticized
the identification of the 173 groups, which it stated ``resulted in
media reports libeling minority religions, the circulation of rumors
and false information, and incitement of religious intolerance.'' The
Commission's findings also led to calls for legislative action to
restrict the activities of sects, which the Government rejected on
grounds of religious freedom. Instead, the Justice Ministry issued a
directive to all government entities to be vigilant against possible
abuses by sects, and all government offices were instructed to monitor
potentially abusive sect activities.
In 1996 the Government created an interministerial working group on
sects (known as the Observatory on Sects) to analyze the phenomenon of
sects and to develop proposals for dealing with them. The working
group's final report in 1996 made several proposals, including the
granting of legal standing to organizations that oppose sects; a
modification of the law requiring associations to divulge information
regarding the sources and management of their finances related to their
effort to obtain tax-exempt status; a limit on the allocation of public
campaign funds in order to limit public financial support for small
fringe groups; the creation of a representative in each prefecture to
provide information on sects to local officials; the creation of a
permanent commission at the European Union level to reinforce
international cooperation in controlling sect activities; and measures
to restrict group members' entry into professional training programs.
In October 1998, the Government issued a new decree disbanding the
Observatory on Sects and creating an ``Interministerial Mission to
Battle Against Sects'' (mission interministerielle de lutte contre les
sectes). Although the decree instructs the commission to ``analyze the
phenomenon of sects,'' it does not define what is meant by the term
``sect,'' or how sects differ from religions. The Interministerial
Mission also is charged with serving as a coordinator of periodic
interministerial meetings, at which government officials are to
exchange information and coordinate their actions against sects.
The Interministerial Mission continued to carry out its mandate
during the year. However, publication of the Mission's 1999 report was
delayed. According to press reports, this delay was due to government
reservations about the content of the report, which reportedly
advocated new legislation aimed at abolishing a number of so-called
``dangerous sects.'' The Prime Minister's office, as well as some
prominent government figures, publicly opposed such measures, citing
concerns about the constitutional provision for ``freedom of
conscience.''
In December 1998, the National Assembly debated and passed a
proposal that would allow two specific antisect groups, both classified
as ``public utilities,'' to become parties to court actions involving
sects. During the year the Senate passed a version of the same bill;
the proposed legislation was sent back to the National Assembly for
further consideration.
In December 1998, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular urging
state prosecutors to cooperate with the Interministerial Mission in
bringing actions against sects.
Also in December 1998, the National Assembly created a new
parliamentary commission to study the way that sects are financed. On
June 18, the Commission released its report, based on questionnaires
sent to groups listed as ``sects'' in the 1995 Gest Commission report.
The questionnaires, which were sent out in March, requested detailed
information about the finances of these groups, including donations,
investments, financial activities, and other sources of income. The
report focused on multinational groups, especially Jehovah's Witnesses
and Scientologists. The stated basis of concern was that these groups
may use excessive or dishonest means to obtain donations, which then
are transferred out of the country and beyond the reach of French tax
authorities. The report also raised questions about volunteers, who
should be compensated under the law for providing free labor to ``for
profit'' organizations.
Some observers are concerned about the scrutiny with which tax
authorities have examined the financial records of some religious
groups. The Government currently does not recognize Jehovah's Witnesses
or the Church of Scientology as qualifying religious associations for
tax purposes, and therefore subjects them to a 60 percent tax on all
funds they receive.
In January 1996, the tax authorities began an audit of the French
Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, and in May 1998, the tax
authorities formally assessed the 60 percent tax against donations
received by Jehovah's Witnesses from September 1992 through August
1996. In June 1998, tax authorities began proceedings to collect the
assessed tax, including steps to place a lien on the property of the
National Consistory of Jehovah's Witnesses. The total amount claimed
(including taxes, penalties, and interest) is over $50 million (300
million francs). According to the International Helsinki Federation's
1998 report, Jehovah's Witnesses ``have been singled out for close
scrutiny.'' The tax proceedings continued at year's end.
The authorities previously took similar action against the Church
of Scientology. Tax claims asserted in 1994-95 against several
Scientology churches forced them into bankruptcy. In the case of the
Paris church the Ministry of Finance refused to grant the church
authorization to import funds to pay the claimed taxes even though the
church offered to pay the total amount of all taxes assessed, a
percentage of which would have come from outside the country.
Subsequently, in December 1997, the Government filed legal action for
the claimed amount against the former officers of the Paris church and
against the Church of Scientology International (a California nonprofit
organization). The hearing in this legal action was deferred pending a
decision regarding a 1998 administrative claim filed with the Conseil
d'Etat by the Paris church that the Minister of Finance acted
improperly in refusing to allow the church to import funds to pay the
assessed taxes. In January the Conseil d'Etat requested the advice of
the European Court of Justice, and was awaiting a response at year's
end.
In July 1997, a Court of Appeals in Lyon recognized Scientology as
a religion in its opinion in the conviction of Jean-Jacques Mazier, a
former leader of the Scientologists, for contributing to the 1988
suicide of a church member. In response the Minister of the Interior
stated that the court had exceeded its authority and that the
Government does not recognize Scientology as a religion. The Government
appealed the Court of Appeals decision, but on June 30, the Court of
Cassation rejected the Government's appeal, but the Court stated that
it lacked the authority to decide if Scientology was a religion.
There have been a number of court cases against the Church of
Scientololgy, which generally involved former members who sue the
Church for fraud, and sometimes for the practice of medicine without a
license. A September case in the Marseilles Correctional Court received
wide media attention after judicial officials admitted that 3\1/2\ tons
of documents pertaining to the case had been destroyed by mistake. In
November the court found a former local leader of the Church of
Scientology and four other Church employees guilty of fraud for
swindling money from former members. The court sentenced the local
leader to 2 years in prison, of which 18 months were suspended and the
remaining 6 months served prior to sentencing, and a fine of
approximately $16,700 (100,000 francs). The other four members received
suspended sentences; charges against two other persons were dropped.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The law includes provisions for the grant of refugee/asylee status
in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In 1998 the Government
began implementing a new law that addresses both asylum requests and
illegal aliens. The Government provides first asylum. During the year,
the Government accepted approximately 6,500 persons from Kosovo; these
persons were not allowed to file asylum applications, and are expected
to return to Kosovo. In 1998 the Government received 22,375 requests
for asylum and issued 4,342 refugee certificates (a document issued to
successful asylum applicants). The Government generally cooperates with
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. There were no reports of the
forced return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women in
politics or government, but they remain significantly underrepresented
in public offices, especially at the national level. Eleven of 28
cabinet members, 5.9 percent of senators, and 10.9 percent of deputies
in the National Assembly are women. The European Union Parliament
includes a larger French female presence--40 percent of the country's
elected representatives are female. To increase women's participation,
some parties have established quotas for them on electoral lists or in
party management. The President and the Prime Minister continued
discussions on modernizing the country's political institutions,
including measures to encourage a greater number of women in political,
social, and public positions.
On June 28, a joint session of both the Senate and the National
Assembly approved a constitutional amendment on the principle of
``equal access of men and women to electoral mandates and elective
functions.''
The citizens of the ``collective territory'' of Mayotte and the
territories of French Polynesia, Wallis and Futuna, and New Caledonia
determine their legal and political relationships to France by means of
referendums, and they elect deputies and senators to the French
Parliament, along with the overseas departments.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of local and international human rights
organizations operate freely, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally
cooperative and responsive to their views. The National Consultative
Commission on Human Rights (NCCHR)--which has nongovernmental as well
as government members--also monitors complaints and advises the
Government on policies and legislation. It is an independent body in
the Office of the Prime Minister.
In December 1998, the Parliamentary Commission released its final
report on government actions in Rwanda during the genocide of 1994. The
Commission was convened in response to press allegations that France
supplied arms to the Hutu-dominated Rwandan army forces, which used
them in the genocide committed against Tutsis in violation of the May
1994 U.N. Security Council embargo forbidding such sales. The report
was critical of France's overall involvement in Rwanda, but it cleared
the Government of any direct implication in the 1994 genocide.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Statutes ban discrimination based on race, religion, sex, ethnic
background, or political opinion, and the Government effectively
enforces them.
Women.--The Penal Code prohibits rape and spousal abuse, and law
enforcement authorities vigorously enforce these laws; however,
violence against women remains a problem. The Ministry of Interior has
reported that in 1998 there were 7,828 rapes and 12,809 instances of
other criminal sexual assault. The Government sponsors and funds
programs for women who are victims of violence, including shelters,
counseling, and hot lines. Numerous private associations also assist
abused women.
Trafficking in women occurs (see Section 6.f.). Prostitution is
legal; acting as a pimp is not. A government agency, the Central Office
on the Treatment of Human Beings (OCRTEH), deals with trafficking in
women, prostitution, and pimping.
The law requires that women receive equal pay for equal work, but
this requirement is often not the reality. Reports by various
governmental and nongovernmental organizations indicate that men
continue to earn more than women, and unemployment rates continue to be
higher for women than for men. For example, a report released on
September 2 by National Assembly Deputy Catherine Genisson indicates
that in the 5,000 largest French firms, the average difference in
salary between men and women is 27 percent. A study prepared for the
Ministry of Employment, which was made public on August 11, indicates
that in March 1998 (the month the study was completed) the unemployment
rate for women was 14 percent versus 11 percent for men.
The law prohibits sex-based job discrimination and sexual
harassment in the workplace. Thus far these laws have encountered
difficulties in implementation. Women's rights groups criticize the
scope of the law as narrow and the fines and compensatory damages as
often modest. For example, the law limits sexual harassment claims to
circumstances where there is a supervisor-subordinate relationship but
fails to address harassment by colleagues or a hostile work
environment.
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The Ministry for Family Affairs oversees
implementation of the Government's programs for children.
There are strict laws against child abuse, particularly when
committed by a parent or guardian. In 1998 there were approximately
19,000 reported cases of mistreatment (physical violence, sexual abuse,
mental cruelty, or severe negligence) of children. Of these cases,
approximately 5,000 involved reports of sexual abuse. Special sections
of the national police and judiciary are charged with handling these
cases. The Government provides counseling, financial aid, foster homes,
and orphanages, depending on the extent of the problem. Various
associations also help minors seek justice in cases of mistreatment by
parents.
Some immigrants from countries where female genital mutilation
(FGM) is customary subject their children to this practice, which is
widely condemned by international health experts as damaging to both
physical and psychological health. Authorities prosecute FGM cases
under the provisions of the Penal Code, which states that acts of
violence towards children that result in mutilation shall be tried in
the highest criminal court. Since 1993 the Government and private
associations have undertaken a campaign to inform immigrants that FGM
is contrary to the law and would be prosecuted.
On February 17, a Paris court sentenced a Malian woman, Hawa Greou,
to 8 years in prison for performing FGM on 48 girls between the ages of
1 month and 10 years. The jury also convicted 27 parents, who received
suspended sentences ranging from 3 to 5 years' imprisonment. Most were
from Gambia, Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal. The case attracted
significant public attention because it was brought by a victim,
Mariatou Koita, age 23, who told a judge in 1995 that Greou performed
FGM on her and her sisters when they were children.
In the fall, high school students again conducted demonstrations
for better schools and more teachers; the demonstrations were not as
extensive as those in 1998.
People With Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. A 1991 law requires new public buildings to be
accessible to the physically disabled, but most older buildings and
public transportation are not accessible.
Religious Minorities.--According to the annual NCCHR report on
racism and xenophobia, released in the spring, the downward trend since
1992 continues in the number of threats or attacks against Jews. There
were a total of 81 threats and 1 act of violence in 1998 compared with
85 threats and 3 acts of violence in 1997.
On October 21, the Court of Cassation upheld a Bordeaux court's
1998 conviction of Maurice Papon for his actions as secretary general
of the Prefecture of Gironde from 1942 to 1944. Papon was found guilty
of complicity in committing crimes against humanity for his role in the
deportation of hundreds of Jews to Nazi concentration camps during the
World War II German occupation. The Bordeaux court had sentenced him to
10 years' imprisonment; however, he had not been detained because he
had appealed to the Court of Cassation, and just before that court's
ruling, Papon fled from his home. His failure to appear resulted in an
automatic rejection of his appeal. On October 22, he was arrested in
Switzerland and returned to France; he was in prison at year's end.
According to press reports, his lawyer intends to take the case to the
European Court of Human Rights.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Anti-immigrant sentiments
sparked incidents including occasional attacks on members of the large
Arab/Muslim and black African communities. The annual NCCHR report
noted a continuing decrease in the number of reported incidents of
racist violence and threats--84 threats were reported in 1998, a
decrease from 121 in 1997. The number of reported incidents of racist
violence increased to eight in 1998 from five in 1997. There were no
deaths due to racist violence in 1998, compared with one death in 1997.
The Government strongly condemns such actions and attacks and has
strict antidefamation laws. Government programs attempt to combat
racism and anti-Semitism by promoting public awareness and bringing
together local officials, police, and citizen groups. There are also
antiracist educational programs in some public school systems.
The annual NCCHR report expressed concern about a possible trend
toward increased tolerance by the public for racist propaganda and
racial speech. The Commission suggested that the Government take action
to strengthen the law to address the problem of racist propaganda and
speech, and that public political figures take every opportunity to
speak out strongly against racism.
According to the 1998 public opinion poll reported in the annual
NCCHR report, 10 percent of those polled admitted to being ``rather
racist,'' 28 percent admitted to being ``a little racist,'' 24 percent
said they were ``not very racist,'' 36 percent said they were ``not at
all racist,'' and 2 percent had no response.
The Ministry of Labor estimated that in 1998 approximately 5,300
persons between the ages of 16 and 18 and 5,500 persons between the
ages of 13 and 16 applied for French nationality under the new law that
went into effect on September 1, 1998. The Government's High Council on
Integration reported that 13,764 persons between the ages of 16 and 18,
and 11,781 persons between the ages of 13 and 16 applied during the
first half of 1999.
Romani asylum seekers often remain in the country after their
claims have been denied. They do not have official papers, which limits
their access to health care and education. They often live in crowded
conditions without proper sanitary facilities. According to an NGO
report, on July 19, police expelled approximately 100 Romanian Roma
from a camp near Paris. Also according to NGO reports, on August 12, a
mayor in Tonnoy ordered a roughly 3-foot ditch dug along the front and
side of one Romani camp. The law allows Roma to use public land for up
to 8 days, and makes the local authorities responsible for providing
water and sanitation.
The Administrative Court in Nantes continued to consider the June
1998 appeal of Moroccan national Khaddouj Tahir at year's end. In
November 1997, Tahir was refused naturalization because she wore a
hejab veil during her final interview. Naturalization officials stated
that ``her garments showed a refusal to integrate into the French
community.'' According to the law, applicants for naturalization must
demonstrate their assimilation into French society as well as their
loyalty to the French nation.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for freedom
of association for all workers. Trade unions exercise significant
economic and political influence, although less than 10 percent of the
work force is unionized. Unions have legally mandated roles (as do
employers) in the administration of social institutions, including
social security (health care and most retirement systems), the
unemployment insurance system, labor courts, and the Economic and
Social Council, a constitutionally mandated consultative body.
Unions are independent of the Government, and most are not aligned
with any political party. However, many of the leaders of the General
Confederation of Labor and its unions belong to the Communist Party.
Workers, including civil servants, are free to strike except when a
strike threatens public safety. One-fourth of all salaried employees
work for the Government. The number of workdays lost to strike action
in the private sector remained at or near postwar lows until the end of
the year, when the number of strikes increased. Most of the widely
publicized national strikes or protests occurred in the public sector
or affected state-owned companies, and were called principally over
implementation of the 35-hour workweek, salaries, privatization or
reorganization plans, and working conditions (of which hours, staffing,
and personal security were the primary issues). Teachers and health
care workers mounted several strikes and protests over pay, personnel
levels, and government efforts to reform the health and educational
systems. Public transportation workers in Paris and other cities struck
repeatedly in support of demands related to the implementation of a 35-
hour workweek or the deployment of additional security personnel to
deal with violence directed at transportation personnel. Railway
workers also mounted strikes in support of demands related to the 35-
hour workweek. Firemen and rescue workers throughout the country
mounted sporadic strikes to support demands to reclassify their work as
dangerous and thus allow them to retire early. In September violent
demonstrations broke out in the overseas territory of Guadeloupe
following the arrest of a union official for attacking police and
threatening the life of another union official. In the French Caribbean
island of Martinique, steadily deteriorating relations between
employers and unions led to a wave of strikes that culminated in worker
disruption of activities at the main harbor and airport in October.
The law prohibits retaliation against strikers, strike leaders, and
union members, and the Government effectively enforces this provision.
Unions can freely join federations and confederations, including
international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers,
including those in the three small export processing zones, have the
right to organize and bargain collectively. The law strictly prohibits
antiunion discrimination; employers found guilty of such activity are
required to correct it, including the reinstatement of workers fired
for union activities.
A 1982 law requires at least annual bargaining in the public and
private sector on wages, hours, and working conditions at both plant
and industry levels but does not require that negotiations result in a
signed contract. In case of an impasse, government mediators may impose
solutions that are binding unless formally rejected by either side
within a week. If no new agreement can be reached, the contract from
the previous year remains valid. Over 90 percent of the private sector
work force are covered by collective bargaining agreements negotiated
at national or local levels. Trilateral consultations (unions,
management, and government) also take place on such subjects as the
minimum wage, the duration of the legal workweek, temporary work,
social security, and unemployment benefits. Labor tribunals, composed
of worker and employer representatives, are available to resolve
complaints.
The law requires businesses with more than 50 employees to
establish a works council, through which workers are consulted on
training, working conditions, profit sharing, and similar issues. Works
councils, which are open to both union and nonunion employees, are
elected every 2 years.
The Constitution's provisions for trade union rights extend to the
country's overseas departments and territories.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law, and
the Government effectively enforces this provision.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--With a few exceptions for those enrolled in certain
apprenticeship programs or working in the entertainment industry,
children under the age of 16 may not be employed. Generally, work
considered arduous or work between the hours of 10 p.m. and 5 a.m. may
not be performed by minors under age 18. Laws prohibiting child
employment are enforced effectively through periodic checks by labor
inspectors, who have the authority to take employers to court for
noncompliance with the law. The law prohibits forced or bonded child
labor, and the Government effectively enforces this prohibition (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The administratively determined
minimum wage, revised whenever the cost-of-living index rises 2
percentage points, is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family. The hourly wage was changed to $6.57 (40.72
francs) as of July 1. The legal workweek is 39 hours, with a minimum
break of 24 hours per week. Overtime work is restricted to 9 hours per
week.
In December Parliament adopted a law establishing the principles
that would guide implementation of a reduction of the legal workweek to
35 hours, starting in 2000, for firms with more than 20 employees.
Firms with less than 20 employees are expected to have until January
2002 to adjust to the new law.
The Ministry of Labor has overall responsibility for policing
occupational health and safety laws. Standards are high and effectively
enforced. The law requires each enterprise with 50 or more employees to
establish an occupational health and safety committee. Over 75 percent
of all enterprises, covering more than 75 percent of all employees,
have fully functioning health and safety committees. Workers have the
right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations.
f. Trafficking in persons.--The law prohibits the trafficking of
persons. The Penal Code prohibits facilitating prostitution by another
person, and associated activities, including acting as an intermediary
for persons who prostitute themselves. Penalties are significantly
higher if a minor is involved, or if the activity is accompanied by
violence. The Government enforces these laws vigorously. However,
trafficking in women occurs.
France is primarily a transit point for trafficked women rather
than a source or destination. The Office for the Repression of
Trafficking in Humans (OCRTEH), located within the Ministry of the
Interior, reported that in 1998 the authorities dismantled 16
international trafficking rings, and charged 518 persons with
trafficking or pimping. According to OCRTEH, nearly a third of female
victims of trafficking were foreigners, and the number of minors who
were victims remained constant from 1996 to 1998. Law enforcement
authorities believe that women transiting France come primarily from
Eastern Europe and go to Africa or South America.
______
GEORGIA
Georgia declared independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.
Multiparty parliamentary elections followed a military coup in 1992
that ousted the elected government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia and brought
Eduard Shevardnadze to power as head of a provisional government. The
civil war and separatist wars that followed weakened greatly central
government authority, not only in separatist Abkhazia and Ossetia, but
also in other areas of the country, and the extent of central authority
and control remain in question. The 1995 Constitution provides for an
executive branch that reports to the President and a legislature. In
1995 Eduard Shevardnadze was elected President, and a parliament was
selected in elections described by international observers as generally
consistent with democratic norms, except in the autonomous region of
Ajara. Local elections were held for the first time in November 1998.
Parliamentary elections were held on October 31, which the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) characterized as a ``step
toward Georgia's compliance with OSCE commitments''. The President
appoints ministers with the consent of the Parliament. The Constitution
provides for an independent judiciary; however, it is subject to
executive pressure.
Internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia that erupted in
the early 1990's are still unresolved. Cease-fires are in effect in
both areas, although sporadic incidents of violence occur in Abkhazia.
These conflicts, together with problems created by roughly 283,000
internally displaced persons (IDP's), pose a significant threat to
national stability. In 1993 Abkhaz separatists won control of Abkhazia,
and most ethnic Georgians--a large plurality of the population--were
expelled or fled the region. In 1994 Russian peacekeeping forces
representing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) deployed in
the conflict area with the agreement of the Government and the Abkhaz
separatists. The Georgian and Abkhaz sides have yet to conclude an
agreement on the return of IDP's to the Gali region. A limited number
have returned on their own. As a result of fighting in May 1998, almost
all of the 53,000 Georgian IDP's who had returned to the Gali region of
Abkhazia fled again. Approximately 17,000 Georgian IDP's returned to
the Gali region for the harvest during the year, and many are expected
to remain. A Russian peacekeeping force also has been in South Ossetia
since 1992. Repatriation to South Ossetia has been slow. The Government
has no effective control over Abkhazia or much of South Ossetia. Almost
no IDP's have returned to other parts of Abkhazia, although ethnic
Svans continue to inhabit the Kodori River valley, part of the former
Abkhaz Soviet Socialist Republic that remains under nominal government
control.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI) and Procuracy have primary
responsibility for law enforcement, and the Ministry of State Security
(MSS, formerly the KGB) plays a significant role in internal security.
In times of internal disorder, the Government may call on the MOI or
the army. Elected civilian authorities do not maintain adequate control
over the law enforcement and security forces. Members of the security
forces committed serious human rights abuses, although the number
decreased slightly from the previous year.
The Government made efforts to develop a market-based economy.
Agriculture represents approximately 30 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP). Per capita GDP in 1998 was estimated to be $3,330. The
World Bank estimated that 11 percent of the population were under the
poverty level. The economy grew during the year, although at a much
lower rate than in the previous year. Monetary policy continued to be
tight and the exchange rate was relatively stable. However, there was a
growing fiscal deficit, as revenue collection continued to be very low.
Government salaries and pensions were still in arrears. Key exports are
manganese, wine, mineral water, and agricultural products.
The Government's human rights record was uneven and serious
problems remain in some areas. Police and security forces continued to
torture, beat, and otherwise abuse prisoners and detainees, force
confessions, and fabricate or plant evidence. Several deaths in custody
were blamed on security force abuse or prison conditions. Local human
rights groups reported that these abuses declined again during the
year, continuing a trend begun in 1998; however Human Rights Watch
reported no substantial improvement. Authorities allegedly continued to
use arbitrary arrest and detention. Corruption was pervasive. Although
prison conditions remain inhuman and life threatening, most government
promises of reforms remain unfulfilled. The Ministry of Justice gained
formal jurisdiction over the prison system from the Ministry of
Interior; however the MOI retains a significant role in prison staff
and investigations. Senior government officials acknowledged serious
human rights problems, especially those linked to law enforcement
agencies, and sought international advice and assistance on needed
reforms. However, while structural reforms designed to improve respect
for human rights were passed by Parliament, law enforcement agencies
were slow to adapt their practices to democratic norms, and impunity
remains a problem.
A new Criminal Code was passed in June. The Criminal Procedures
Code, passed in November 1997, underwent substantial amendment in the
spring in response to complaints by security forces, and their previous
powers--which involved abuse of prisoner rights--essentially were
restored. Prolonged pretrial detention remains a problem. The judiciary
is subject to pressure and corruption and does not always ensure due
process; judicial reform efforts have been aimed at creating a more
independent judiciary. There were lengthy delays in trials; however,
there were some improvements in the judiciary during the year. As a
result of the Law on Common Courts, many corrupt and incompetent judges
were removed from the bench and replaced by judges who passed a
qualifying exam and vetting process. Law enforcement agencies and other
government bodies illegally interfered with citizens' right to privacy.
The press generally was free, but there were instances of government
constraint on some press freedoms. The Government limited freedom of
assembly for supporters of the political movement founded by former
Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia, and security forces continued to
disperse some peaceful rallies violently. Government officials and
politicians infringed upon freedom of religion. Violence and
discrimination against women are problems.
Georgia's accession to the Council of Europe in April led to new
legislation giving the Ministry of Justice jurisdiction over the prison
system from the Ministry of the Interior, although the latter will
continue to staff the facilities.
Increased citizen awareness of civil rights and democratic values
and the continued evolution of civil society provided an increasingly
effective check on the excesses of law enforcement agencies. The number
of independent nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued to
increase, as did their ability to speak out for, and defend the rights
of, individual citizens. However, international observers noted that
most of this growth is concentrated in Tbilisi and that the regions
still have weak NGO communities. Criticism from the press and the NGO
community played an important role in reducing the incidence of
prisoner abuse.
There was little information available on the human rights
situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia due to limited access to these
regions.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government agents.
The Government stated that 57 prisoners died in prison and 9
prisoners died in pretrial detention during the year. Human rights
NGO's and press allege physical abuse, torture, and inhuman prison or
pretrial detention conditions contributed to deaths in pretrial
detention. The authorities attributed the majority of these deaths to
illness. Authorities also attributed nine such deaths to suicide,
including that of Ivane Kolbaya, who on March 22 fell to his death from
a fifth floor window of the Ministry of Interior while being questioned
about his alleged involvement in a theft. An international human rights
NGO brought this case to the Government's attention, as well as four
others, including the 1998 death of Gulchora Dursunova and the 1997
deaths of Akaki Iacobashvili and Eka Tavartkiladze. In May the National
Security Council requested that the Procuracy determine the legality of
the decisions made in these cases and the Procuracy upheld all the
decisions. However, the Procuracy was continuing to investigate
Kolbaya's death at year's end. On December 4, Zaza Tsitsilashvili
allegedly threw himself to his death from the sixth floor of the
Ministry of Interior. The case is under investigation. Family members,
however, say his corpse showed evidence of being beaten.
Killings were committed by elements on either side of the
separatist conflict in Abkhazia, including by partisan groups and by
Abkhaz separatists. The partisan groups in the past have received
government support and training; however, the Government claims that it
can no longer control the partisans. The number of incidents decreased
from the previous year. Killings and other abuses on either side of the
conflict are not being investigated, prosecuted or punished.
Nuzgar Levasha, Deputy Energy Minister in Gamsakhurdia's government
was found apparently beaten to death following a peaceful demonstration
in December 1998. Levasha's death was investigated and deemed a suicide
by the authorities.
b. Disappearance.--On September 28, Manana Gamsakhurdia, the wife
of the former president, alleged that she was kidnaped by three men a
few days earlier. She returned unharmed. NGO sources claimed that she
was escorted from the city to prevent an anticipated demonstration. No
investigation has taken place.
In mid-October, gunmen, apparently with criminal motives, seized
six U.N. observers and their translator as they were delivering aid in
Abkhazia; they were released a few days later.
On September 8, a prisoner exchange took place in which the Abkhaz
returned 10 Georgians, including 9 fisherman abducted off the coast of
Abkhazia on April 3, in exchange for 3 Abkhaz militiamen and 1 resident
citizen of Abkhazia.
Georgian and Abkhaz commissions on missing persons reported that
the fate of over 1,000 Georgians and several hundred Abkhaz who
disappeared as a result of the war in Abkhazia still is unknown. No
progress was made in determining their whereabouts. The International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) cooperated in the effort through its
Red Cross message system. Georgian partisan groups active in Abkhazia
periodically took hostages, usually to exchange for captured
compatriots. The Government has claimed consistently that it was unable
to control them and asserted that the partisans in reality are bandits
numbering no more than 20 to 30 individuals.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however,
members of the security forces continued to torture, beat, and abuse
prisoners and detainees, usually to extract confessions. According to a
local human rights group, there was again a slight decline in the
incidence of such abuse. This group attributed the reduction to a more
open society, increased intolerance of police misconduct, greater
public awareness of civil rights, and increased pressure from the
international community. However, one prominent human rights
organization claims the authorities are simply better at hiding their
abuse. Serious abuses and police misconduct continue and corruption and
criminality, such as the fabrication or planting of evidence, remain
problems.
The most serious incidents of abuse occur in the investigative
stage of pretrial detention when suspects are interrogated by police.
According to human rights observers, those who suffer such abuse are
held routinely for lengthy periods in pretrial detention to give their
injuries time to heal (see Section 1.e.).
Police misconduct was worse outside of Tbilisi, where awareness of
laws and citizens' rights is lower and human rights NGO's are less
active.
Impunity remains a problem. Although in the past a number of
policemen were arrested or disciplined for physical abuse, none were
arrested during the year. Recent changes to the Criminal Procedures
Code weakened a detainee's ability to substantiate claims of such
abuses (see Section 1.e.). Accountability tended to occur only in
extreme cases, such as those resulting in death, and even then it is
rare (see Section 1.a.). For example, in January 1998, Giga Shukashvili
was detained in the Gldani district police station where allegedly he
was beaten severely and coerced into signing false testimony about a
theft. The following day, he was transferred to the main police
department of Tbilisi and placed in a room with six or more inmates. He
claims that these persons were police informers who allegedly beat him
over the course of 18 days. Although the Procuracy continues to
investigate his case, Shukashvili stated that he was detained again in
May in an attempt to intimidate him into withdrawing his complaint.
Domestic human rights advocates reported that the use of torture,
such as electric shock, to extract confessions diminished somewhat.
However Human Rights Watch reported that mistreatment and physical
abuse of detainees continued to be rampant.
In the past, security forces have tortured some defendants in
politically sensitive cases, such as members of the former Gamsakhurdia
government and members of the paramilitary Mkhedrioni (see Section
1.e.). Local human rights observers reported that abuse most commonly
occurred in two pretrial detention facilities, Isolator 5 in Tbilisi
and the pretrial facility in Kutaisi. Isolator 5, in the basement of
the Ministry of the Interior headquarters, was the facility in which
detainees suspected of a serious crime or whose cases had political
overtones were incarcerated. According to local human rights observers,
despite calls by senior law enforcement officials for investigators to
show restraint, many persons who were detained in Isolator 5 afterwards
reported that they were beaten or otherwise abused. Often the threat of
incarceration in this facility was sufficient to induce a confession.
In contrast to those arrested in connection with the 1995 assassination
attempt on President Shevardnadze, those arrested on May 22 for
plotting against the Government and those arrested for the 1998
assassination attempt against President Shevardnadze reportedly were
not mistreated. None of the suspects reported any severe physical
torture being employed during the investigation. Human rights observers
also noted that the Procuracy collected evidence in addition to
confessions for use in the court proceedings. The families and state-
appointed advocates of the defendants had limited access to them.
Government officials acknowledged that members of the security
forces in the past beat and abused prisoners and detainees on a routine
basis. Government officials continued to claim that a lack of proper
training, poor supervision of investigators and guards, and lack of
equipment often resulted in abuse. For example investigators in the
past were trained to obtain confessions rather than use physical
evidence to assemble a case. After law enforcement agencies expressed
concern that the safeguards contained in the new Criminal Procedures
Code (see Section 1.e.) would make it difficult for them to combat
crime, amendments to the code in May and June reinstated many of their
powers.
International and local human rights observers expressed concern
that corruption is related to the number of police officers nationwide.
Although the Government officially employed only approximately 35,000
policemen, these observers estimated that in reality the numbers
employed may have reached 80,000. The Government was unable to pay the
salaries for the police force. Consequently, police solicited bribes
from the general population, especially motorists. The period between
an arrest and a bail hearing was another opportunity for solicitation.
Police reportedly approached the suspect's family and offered to drop
charges in exchange for a bribe.
Members of Parliament's Committee on Human Rights and Ethnic
Relations and local human rights groups independently investigated
claims of abuse. Despite fear of retaliation, there was a 100 percent
increase in claims filed; however, fear prevented many from filing
claims and not all claimants followed their claims all the way through
to trial. The National Security Council's human rights advisor also had
a mandate to investigate claims of abuse. In 1995 the Constitution
mandated a Human Rights Defender, or ombudsman. The first ombudsman
took office in November 1997, but resigned in August to run for
Parliament. During his tenure, the ombudsman focused his attention on
social and economic rights and was not active in defending individuals
from abuse by law enforcement agencies (see Section 4). No replacement
has been named.
Members of the security forces beat members of religious minorities
(see Section 2.c.).
Prison authorities admitted that conditions are inhuman and life
threatening in many facilities. They blamed inadequate cell space,
medicine, and food on a lack of resources. The President pardoned 1,500
prisoners in April and 1,700 in October as a means of alleviating
overcrowding. Observers still consider the prisons overcrowded. The
lack of proper sanitation, exercise, medical care, and food posed a
serious threat to the life and health of prisoners.
The prison mortality rate reportedly was high; however, human
rights NGO's claim that authorities kept the rates artificially low by
releasing prisoners who are terminally ill. Additionally, monitors said
that deaths of prisoners without families usually went uncounted. Most
of the deaths during the year were attributed officially to medical
causes, usually tuberculosis. In one case, a prisoner reportedly
weighing just 66 pounds was released from a Rustavi prison; he died
within 3 days. Officials determined the cause of illness and death to
be tuberculosis. According to the ICRC, tuberculosis is widespread in
the prison system. In recognition of this fact, the ICRC continued a
joint program with the authorities begun in 1997 to reduce the
incidence of the disease. However, torture and physical abuse of
prisoners also played a role in such deaths in custody.
Government plans announced in 1995 to build new prison facilities
remained unfulfilled.
In accordance with requirements stipulated by the Council of
Europe, the Parliament passed a new law on prisons on July 22 that
transferred responsibility for the prisons from the Ministry of
Interior to the Ministry of Justice. The law was to take effect January
1, 2000. While many human rights observers were optimistic that the
division of responsibilities will improve conditions, they also had
serious concerns. Although the Ministry of Justice is to be responsible
for overall administration of the prison system, an amendment permits
the Ministry of Interior's personnel to continue to staff the
facilities. Other legislation also permits the Ministry to conduct
operative investigations among inmates to gather evidence for trials
without judicial approval. Local and international human rights
observers claimed that such investigations often employ torture.
The ICRC had full access to detention facilities, including those
in Abkhazia, in accordance with its customary procedures, which include
meetings with detainees without the presence of third-party observers
and regular repetition of visits. The OSCE mission, whose mandate
includes prison visits, reported bureaucratic delays but no serious
problems in obtaining access to visit prisoners and detainees. However,
local human rights groups reported that they still encountered
obstacles in visiting detainees, especially in cases with political
overtones. In April a local NGO signed an agreement with the Government
granting access to pretrial detention facilities; however, by year's
end it had not received such access.
The conflict in the neighboring Russian region of Chechnya affected
the situation in Georgia. For example, in August Russian warplanes
strayed across the border and dropped cluster bombs on the Georgian
village of Zemo Omalo, wounding three persons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
includes provisions to protect citizens against arbitrary arrest and
detention; however, authorities frequently violated these provisions.
The Constitution provides for a 9-month period of maximum pretrial
detention, mandated court approval of detention after 72 hours, and
restrictions on the role of the prosecutor (see Section 1.e.). The
Soviet Criminal Code was amended to implement these constitutional
safeguards and was superseded in 1997 by the Criminal Procedures Code.
These amendments were generally, although not always, observed, as
prosecutors continued to maintain undue influence over criminal
procedures. A new Criminal Code was enacted in June.
Judges issue warrants and detention orders, and suspects must be
charged within 3 days. Pretrial investigatory detention is limited to 9
months in accordance with the Constitution, instead of 18 months as
allowed by the old Soviet code. Judges may extend pretrial detention by
3-month intervals up to 9 months. Human rights NGO's stated that the
amendments to the old Soviet code made the pretrial detention period
less arbitrary. Despite the reduction of the limit from 18 to 9 months,
there was a slight increase in the number of individuals in pretrial
detention. As of October 15, there were 8,529 prisoners serving
sentences, and 2,137 held in pretrial detention.
A new Criminal Procedures Code, along with other legislation to
implement constitutional protections and restrict the powers of the
Procuracy and the police, was passed by Parliament in 1997, but
implementation was delayed until May (see Section 1.e.). Following
enactment of the new Criminal Code in June, the Criminal Procedures
Code was amended substantially in July. A number of amendments sought
to harmonize the Criminal Procedures Code with the new Criminal Code.
However, many human rights monitors were concerned that several
amendments adversely affected due process. Before these amendments were
enacted, a defendant could complain directly to the court prior to a
trial regarding abusive actions committed by the police or the
Procuracy during a criminal investigation and could request a forensic
medical examination. Now a defendant can file a complaint of abusive
investigation only with the Procuracy.
According to observers, including the OSCE and the Association of
Former Political Prisoners for Human Rights, police continued
frequently to treat individuals in their custody with brutality;
however, correct legal procedures were observed more often. Police
often failed to inform detainees of their rights and prevented access
to family members and lawyers. Authorities often held prisoners who
were tortured and abused in pretrial detention for lengthy periods in
order to give their injuries time to heal (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
There were no cases of forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the judiciary often does
not exercise full independence. In the past the courts often were
subject to pressure and corruption and did not always ensure due
process. It is still unclear whether judicial reform altered the
deference judicial authorities frequently showed the executive branch,
particularly at lower levels of the court system. Investigators
routinely plant or fabricate evidence and extort confessions in direct
violation of the Constitution. Judges generally are reluctant to
exclude evidence obtained illegally over the objection of the
Procuracy. Local human rights observers also report widespread judicial
incompetence and corruption, including the payment of bribes to
investigators, prosecutors, and judges, which also leads to denial of
justice. However, several trial attorneys and local NGO's in Tbilisi
reported that some cases were being handled in a fairer and more
expeditious manner than in 1998. However, progress outside of Tbilisi
was not as marked. Caseloads increased and judges' salaries, despite a
pay raise, remained inadequate. Pressure from extensive family and clan
networks was extensive.
The 1997 Law on the Courts was designed to enhance judicial
independence. Under this law, the country established a three tier
court system. Implementation of the law was slow and was completed only
during the year. At the lowest level are district courts, which hear
routine criminal and civil cases. At the next level are regional courts
of appeal, which serve as appellate courts for the district courts;
they started functioning in May. The regional courts also try major
criminal and civil cases, review cases, and either confirm verdicts or
return cases to the lower courts for retrial. It was envisioned that
the Supreme Court, the highest level, which in the absence of regional
courts tried major cases, eventually would act exclusively as a higher
appellate court. However, the Supreme Court remains the court of first
instance for capital crimes and appeals from the Central Election
Commission.
The separate Constitutional Court was created in 1996. Its mandate
includes arbitrating constitutional disputes between the branches of
government and ruling on individual claims of human rights violations.
The Court chose to interpret this latter function narrowly, agreeing to
rule only on cases in which the complainant alleged that the violation
was sanctioned by law. The Court only considers one case at a time.
Since its inception in September 1996, 118 cases have been filed with
the court. Of these cases, 82 were heard, and decisions were reached in
approximately 50 percent of the cases, while the remaining 50 percent
were dismissed. The Court's rulings demonstrated judicial independence.
Administration of the court system was transferred from the
Ministry of Justice to the Council of Justice in 1997. The Council has
12 members, 4 selected from within each branch of government. The law
established a three-part testing procedure for current and prospective
judges to be administered by the Council. The testing procedure was
designed to reduce judicial incompetence and corruption. The
Constitutional Court ruled in November 1998 that sitting judges could
not be removed, thereby hampering the Government's attempts at judicial
reform. The Parliament responded with a law stating that judges' terms
would not be renewed beyond 2001 if they did not take and pass the
examination, thereby observing the decision of the Constitutional
Court, yet forcing the judges to qualify themselves through
examination.
The first judges' examination was administered in March 1998. A
total of five examinations were administered as of year's end and some
250 judges passed. Only 13 judges passed the last examination in
September. A total of 176 judges passed both the exam and the vetting
process and replaced judges who had not.
Supreme Court justices also were required to take the examination,
but resisted the requirement, arguing that it was an infringement on
judicial independence and that, since they were confirmed by
Parliament, they already are subject to public scrutiny and review. The
Court's new Chief Justice, the former Minister of Justice, appointed 12
new justices, 10 of whom had passed the judicial exams.
According to the Constitution, a detainee is presumed innocent and
has the right to a public trial. A detainee has the right to demand
immediate access to a lawyer and to refuse to make a statement in the
absence of counsel. The detaining officer must inform the detainee of
his rights and must notify the detainee's family of his location as
soon as possible. These rights mark a significant departure from legal
practice of the Soviet era; however, they are not fully observed in
practice. Defense attorneys often have difficulty obtaining permission
from investigators to visit clients. Investigators seldom inform
individuals of their rights. There were lengthy delays in trials.
During the year, the Tbilisi City Council decided to initiate a project
with a local NGO that would create a system by which lawyers would be
placed in Tbilisi police stations to advise detainees of their rights
without charge. However, another organization brought suit to halt the
implementation of the project. The suit was thrown out, and the project
was being implemented by year's end, although intermittently due to
lack of funding. However, participating lawyers complained that there
was low public awareness of the program and that local police
authorities were limiting their access to detainees. For example, one
lawyer witnessed police beating a detainee; when she began to question
the police, she was pushed out of the room. When representatives from
NGO's and the Government arrived at the station, the police chief
denied that any beating had occurred. While the district prosecutor
promised to investigate the case, there had been no investigation by
year's end. The Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and National
Minorities also created a card listing a citizen's rights in case of
arrest. By year's end, it distributed 25,000 or 31,000 printed cards to
students, NGO's, and visitors to the Committee.
The legislation required to implement constitutional protections
was passed by Parliament in 1997. The implementing legislation included
the Criminal Procedures Code and the Law on the Procuracy. These laws
were designed to create a legal system with adversarial trials by
reducing the powers of the Procuracy, increasing the rights of defense
attorneys, and enhancing the independence and authority of the
judiciary. However, the amendments to the Criminal Procedures Code
adopted this summer weakened many of these provisions. Under Soviet
law, prosecutors were vested with powers greater than those of judges
and defense attorneys. Prosecutors continued to direct criminal
investigations, supervise some judicial functions, and represent the
State in trials. Trials were not conducted in an adversarial manner.
Most criminal trials continued to follow the Soviet model and, in many
cases, prosecutors continued to wield disproportionate influence over
outcomes.
The Soviet system of state-employed criminal defense attorneys
began to break down in 1998. Individuals who could afford to pay were
able to obtain the attorney of their choice in both criminal and civil
cases. In instances where defendants were unable to afford legal
counsel, attorneys were assigned to a case upon the recommendation of
the Procurator's Office by the Office of Legal Assistance, a part of
the state-controlled Bar Association. In certain cases, defendants were
pressured to accept a state-appointed attorney. The Procuracy not only
had control over state-appointed lawyers, it also determined whether a
defendant's request to change lawyers was granted.
International and local human rights groups agreed that there were
political prisoners but disagree about the number, giving estimates
ranging from 10 to 200. A number of these individuals--members of the
Mkhedrioni, Gamsakhurdia supporters, and state security personnel--
committed criminal acts and were tried and sentenced on criminal
grounds, although they may have had political objectives. According to
some local observers, there are some Gamsakhurdia supporters who never
took up arms and should be considered political prisoners. Several,
including Valter Shurgaia, Zviad Dzidziguri, and Zaur Kobalia, were
still in prison at year's end. These individuals--political leaders of
Gamsakhurdia's movement--were tried and convicted on poorly
substantiated charges of treason, banditry, and illegal possession of
weapons. They are serving sentences ranging from 7 to 12 years.
President Shevardnadze pardoned about 10 political prisoners during the
year, including former National Guard commander Tengiz Kitovani and
Nicholas Kvezereli. The latter was convicted, along with Jaba
Ioseliani, of the 1995 assassination attempt on the President. Two
others who were imprisoned for attempting to assassinate Shevardnadze
also were released. The 1998 trial of Ioseliani, the head of the
Mkhedrioni, and 14 other alleged conspirators in the 1995 assassination
attempt on President Shevardnadze was characterized by the same
violations found in other recent trials with political overtones. The
Government consistently violated due process both during the
investigation and the trial. Torture, use of forced confessions,
fabricated or planted evidence, denial of legal counsel, and expulsion
of defendants from the courtroom took place. Ten of the defendants
claimed to have been beaten or tortured and coerced to confess during
the investigative stage of the case. According to local human rights
groups, four of the defendants were tortured seriously, including
former Security Service Captain Guram Papukashvili. Despite the claims
of torture, the judge in the case allowed the confessions to be entered
as evidence. The court-appointed physician who inspected the defendants
claimed that too much time had passed to establish whether the
defendants had been tortured. The alleged conspirators were held in
pretrial detention for 27 months before the trial began, well in excess
of even the Soviet legal limit. According to local human rights groups,
the delay was meant to give their injuries time to heal, reportedly a
common practice on the part of the law enforcement agencies (see
Section 1.c.). There were increasing calls domestically for President
Shevardnadze to issue a general amnesty for those convicted for their
actions, including acts involving violence, during the period of civil
war and social chaos from 1991 to 1995.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution forbids the tapping of telephones and
other forms of interference in an individual's private life without
court approval or legal necessity. However, in practice law enforcement
agencies and other government bodies, especially the Ministry of
Communications, monitored private telephone conversations without
obtaining court orders. The Government stated that state security
police and state tax authorities sometimes entered homes and places of
work without prior legal sanction in emergency cases as permitted by
the Criminal Procedures Code. Police regularly stopped and searched
vehicles without probable cause to extort bribes (see Section 1.c.).
The high level of unregulated police misconduct and corruption
undermined public confidence in Government, especially the law
enforcement agencies.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the 1991
press law provide for freedom of the press and new laws further support
this freedom; however, although the independent press was increasingly
active, the Government constrained some press freedoms. According to
journalists, security and law enforcement authorities attempted to
intimidate the press through public comments and private admonitions.
The new Administrative Code enacted in June contains a freedom of
information section that provides for public access to government
meetings and documents. Journalists lacked effective legal protection,
a circumstance that hindered investigative journalism. The Civil Code
and other legislation make it a crime to insult the honor and dignity
of an individual and place the burden of proof on the accused.
Some 200 independent newspapers are in circulation. The press
increasingly served as a check on government, frequently criticizing
the performance of high-level officials. Increasingly, independent
newspapers have been replacing the government-controlled press as the
population's source of information; the leading independent daily
newspaper, ``Alia,'' has a national circulation nearly 20 percent
higher than the government-controlled daily. However, observers report
that this seems to be mostly a Tbilisi-based phenomenon and that
independent newspapers continue to struggle in the regions. Several
newspapers are serious and reputable sources of information. High
printing costs and general poverty, especially in the countryside,
limited the circulation of most newspapers to a few hundred or a few
thousand. The Government finances and controls one newspaper (which
also appears in
Russian-, Azeri- and Armenian-language versions) and a radio and
television network with a national audience; they reflect official
viewpoints.
Most persons continued to get their news from television. The
Government's monopoly on broadcast news was broken when Rustavi-2, a
member of the independent television network TNG, emerged in 1998 as an
important alternative to state television after successfully resisting
2 years of government attempts to shut it down. In addition to Rustavi-
2, there are seven independent television stations in Tbilisi. An
international NGO that works with the press estimated that there were
up to 30 regional television stations. While these stations were
ostensibly independent, the lack of advertising often forced them to
depend on local government officials for support. Some regions, such as
Samtskhe-Javakheti and Kutaisi, had a relatively independent press.
Rustavi-2 had a network of 15 stations, 5 of which broadcast Rustavi-
2's evening news program daily. Independent newspapers and television
stations continued to be harassed by state tax authorities. Stations
continued to practice self-censorship, especially in regions where
local government is strong.
The trial of two journalists from the independent newspaper Orioni
who reported in April 1998 allegations of homosexuality and sexual
harassment in the armed forces was postponed indefinitely in 1998. At
that time, government and military officials reportedly responded by
threatening the reporters with arrest, demanding the names of sources,
and filing a civil lawsuit that charged defamation. One of the two
journalists, Amiran Meskheli, was detained for allegedly having evaded
military service. He subsequently was conscripted and assigned to the
unit on which he had reported. Human rights monitors considered this
action a transparent attempt at intimidation and filed a lawsuit to
overturn his conscription. Meskheli remained out on bail at year's end.
In May 1998, the independent newspaper Kavkasioni published
allegations of graft and misconduct by the Abkhaz government-in-exile,
a quasi-official body that claims to be the genuine government of
Abkhazia and to speak for refugees from Abkhazia. In July 1998, two
members of the Abkhaz government-in-exile filed a defamation suit
against Kavkasioni. The newspaper's appeal against an adverse 1998
decision by the court had not been heard by year's end.
Academic freedom is respected widely.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to peaceful assembly without prior permission
from the authorities; however, both the national Government and local
governments restricted the right in practice. A 1997 law on freedom of
assembly requires political parties and other organizations to give
prior notice and obtain permission from local authorities if they
intend to assemble on a public thoroughfare. Members of the local NGO
community believe that the law violates the Constitution and sought to
have it overturned by the Constitutional Court. However the Court
refused to hear the case, explaining that a test case must be brought
before it in order for it to consider the challenge, e.g., an
individual must prove that he has been harmed by this law. Most permits
for assembly are granted without arbitrary restriction or
discrimination, although this is not the case for Zviadists, supporters
of former President Gamsakhurdia. Extreme Zviadists never have accepted
any successor to the Gamsakhurdia Government as legitimate and
frequently held demonstrations demanding that the present Government
resign. The Government viewed the frequent public rallies of the
Zviadists as a threat because of the publicity they generated for
themselves and against the Government. The police broke up one of their
rallies held in May. A hunger strike involving several hundred people
and conducted in the shell of Gamsakhurdia's burnt-out villa in Tbilisi
since mid-June was not disturbed and continued at year's end.
Leila Tsomaia and Tamila Nikoldaze, Zviadists who were arrested,
tried, convicted, and incarcerated on charges of civil disorder for
attempting to stage a rally in front of Tbilisi University in 1997,
were pardoned and released from prison in March.
Over the course of the year, the police broke up rallies or
gatherings held by various evangelical Protestants or watched while
others disrupted the rallies. Local authorities several times denied
permission to Jehovah's Witnesses to conduct open-air rallies (see
Section 2.c.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respected this right in practice. Authorities granted
permits for registration of associations without arbitrary restriction
or discrimination.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and the Government generally respected this right in practice.
However, local police and security officials harassed foreign
missionaries and, in some localities, several evangelical Christian
organizations.
The Constitution recognizes the special role of the Georgian
Orthodox Church in the country's history without further defining it,
but also stipulates the independence of the Church from the State. The
Georgian Orthodox Church has lobbied Parliament and the Government for
laws that would grant it special status and restrict the activities of
missionaries from ``nontraditional'' religions. Various draft laws,
some modeled on the Russian law on religion, have been rejected by
Parliament.
Certain members of the Georgian Orthodox Church and the public see
Protestant evangelical groups as a threat to the Church and Georgian
cultural values, a perception that some politicians played upon during
the election campaign. Local police and security officials at times
harassed foreign missionaries and non-Georgian Orthodox congregations
or did not intervene when others harassed them. For example, on May 29,
the police violently broke up a public prayer meeting of the Assembly
of God in the Gldani district of Tbilisi, beating a number of members,
pushing a 60-year-old woman to the ground and screaming threats of
murder. Prior to the subsequent civil trial, Ministry of Interior
officials repeatedly harassed the pastor and his adherents. At the
trial on August 16, the judge ruled that the police had not violated
the individuals' constitutional rights. The group filed an appeal and
incurred further harassment from law enforcement authorities. On August
29, a riot allegedly instigated by the police broke out at one of the
organization's churches. Some members were beaten and the police
confiscated some members' documents, forcing the victims to retrieve
them at the police station.
According to press reports, public services by four evangelical
Protestant congregations in Tbilisi were brought to a halt in August as
a result of hostility from the police and radical Orthodox activists.
The churches have not been able to resume public services, because the
police confiscated the documentation they needed to rent appropriate
premises, although they continue to hold small-scale services in
private apartments. The police raided three Tbilisi meeting places in
late August, halting services then in progress at two of them. Only two
Protestant churches, the Baptist Church, and the World of Life,
continue to hold services in Tbilisi.
Local police chiefs in Gori and Kaspi tried to prevent Jehovah's
Witnesses from conducting open air meetings in Gori and Kaspi in May
and June. However, the meetings took place, in one case because a large
crowd already had gathered, and in the other because of the
intervention by a central government official.
Customs and security officials impounded six tons of religious
materials being imported by Jehovah's Witnesses on April 23. The
materials, some damaged, were not released until early July and then
only after the intervention of the National Security Council official
responsible for human rights. Representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses
traveled to where the materials were impounded with a letter
authorizing their release in hand. However, local officials and a
gathering of demonstrators, including a Georgian Orthodox priest,
prevented the release. The representatives returned to Tbilisi. The
central Government retrieved the materials and brought them to Tbilisi.
On October 17, a Jehovah's Witnesses worship service in the Gldani
section of Tbilisi with 120 parishioners was attacked violently by
members of a religious sect. The Gldani police refused to intervene.
Sixteen persons were injured in the attack. On December 25, the case
was forwarded to the Gldani prosecutor's office for criminal charges.
A nationalist Member of Parliament brought a civil suit in late
April to ban Jehovah's Witnesses, arguing that the organization is
anti-Orthodox, antistate, and antinational. Appeals by the Jehovah's
Witnesses to an appellate court and then to the Supreme Court
contending that the suit is groundless were refused. The Supreme Court
stated that the lower court first must hear the case. On November 29,
the lower court judge remanded the issue to an academic study group to
study the literature of Jehovah's Witnesses. An opinion from the group
was expected in early 2000.
Two textbooks were refused licenses due to the disapproval of the
Georgian Orthodox Church. By law all school textbooks must be approved
by the Ministry of Education, in consultation with various ministries
and the office of the Patriarch. In one case, the office of the
Patriarch vetoed the textbook, and the Ministry of Education therefore
refused to grant the license. In the other, the Ministry of Education
granted the license, but a committee of concerned Orthodox parents,
which the office of the Patriarch publicly acknowledged was its
creation, successfully sued the Ministry of Education to rescind the
license.
The Catholic Church and the Armenian Apostolic Church have been
unable to secure the return of churches closed during the Soviet
period, many of which later were given to the Georgian Orthodox Church.
A prominent Armenian church in Tbilisi remained closed. The Armenian
Apostolic Church, the Catholic Church, and Protestant denominations
have had difficulty obtaining permission to construct new churches,
reportedly in part as a result of pressure from the Georgian Orthodox
Church. However, a new Catholic church opened during the year. The tax
code grants tax exemptions only for the Orthodox Church and not for any
other religion.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution, the 1993 Law on
Migration, and other legislation generally provide for these rights
and, with some exceptions, the Government generally respected them in
practice. Registration of an individual's place of residence no longer
was required, nor were internal passports. Old Soviet passports bearing
``propiskas'' (proof of legal residence in a particular locality) were
accepted as proof of identity because passports and identification
cards are expensive and difficult for many members of the electorate to
obtain, especially in poorer and more remote rural areas.
In principle the Government respected the right of repatriation;
however, approximately 275,000 Akhiskha or Meskhetians (primarily
Muslims) who were expelled from southern Georgia to Central Asia by
Stalin in the 1940's still faced both official and public opposition to
their return, as many were concerned that the Meskhetians' return to
the Samtske-Javakheti region would upset the ethnic balance in this
mostly ethnic-Armenian populated region. Many of the Meskhetians were
expelled a second time from Central Asia when the Soviet Union broke
up.
In 1996 President Shevardnadze issued a decree authorizing the
return of 1,000 Meskhetians per year for 5 years. The decree has never
been implemented, and to date only a few hundred Meskhetians have
returned in recent years, none as a result of the decree; all came as
illegal immigrants. The Government has provided housing for most of
them, but because they were to be the subject of a separate law, not
yet passed, they were deprived early in 1998 of their refugee status
and, consequently, of their housing subsidy. Many now live without any
regularized status.
In December 1997, Parliament passed a law entitled, ``Recognizing
Georgian Citizens as Political Victims and Social Protection of the
Repressed.'' This law, intended to rehabilitate victims of the Soviet
era, specifically excluded the Meskhetians, whom it identified as the
subject of a separate law, not yet drafted. Observers believed that the
Parliament would adopt such a law in 1999; however, they failed to do
so.
On March 14, a presidential decree was issued to address the
Meskhetian issue. It established a State Commission on the Repatriation
and Rehabilitation of the Population Deported from Southern Georgia. In
connection with its accession to the Council of Europe on April 27, the
Government undertook to begin the process of Meskhetian repatriation
within 3 years. In July the Government announced that it had granted
citizenship to 36 Meskhetians.
The 1994 quadripartite agreement between Russia, Georgia, Abkhazia,
and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on repatriation in
Abkhazia called for the free, safe, and dignified return of displaced
persons (IDP's) and refugees to their homes. The Abkhaz separatist
regime prevented virtually any official repatriation and unilaterally
abrogated the agreement in late 1994. From 1994 to May 1998, an
estimated 53,000 of the 283,000 IDP's and refugees from Abkhazia
returned spontaneously, most to the southern part of the Gali district.
In May 1998, the unstable security situation in Gali deteriorated into
open warfare between the Abkhaz militia and Georgian partisans and MOI
troops. The partisans were routed and, in the aftermath, almost all of
the Georgian returnees fled once again as their homes were burned and
looted by the Abkhaz.
In January the Abkhaz separatists unilaterally invited IDP's to
return to Gali starting March 1, but did so in the absence of measures
acceptable to the Georgian Government for ensuring their safe return
and security. The move did not affect significantly the return of IDP's
to Gali, who continued to travel back and forth to Gali to tend their
property. An estimated 17,000 IDP's returned to Gali after their
expulsion in May 1998.
The 1992 ethnic conflict in South Ossetia also created tens of
thousands of IDP's and refugees. Ethnic Georgians from South Ossetia
fled to Georgia proper and Ossetians from South Ossetia and other
Georgian regions largely fled to Russia. In 1997 UNHCR began a program
to return IDP's and refugees to their homes. Both sides created
obstacles that slowed the return. There were about 24,000 Ossetian
refugees living in North Ossetia. To date about 370 Ossetian families
from Russia have returned, the majority to South Ossetia. The South
Ossetian separatists continued to obstruct the repatriation of ethnic
Georgians to South Ossetia, although approximately 170 families
returned. For political reasons, South Ossetia continued to press for
the return of all Ossetian refugees to South Ossetia rather than to
their original homes in other Georgian regions. In 1997 the Government
publicly recognized the right of Ossetian refugees to return to their
homes in Georgia but took little action to facilitate their return.
Persistent opposition by Georgian authorities, especially at the local
level, over the return of illegally occupied homes has prevented the
organized return of Ossetian refugees to Georgia proper. In the
reporting period, approximately 53 Ossetian refugee and IDP families
returned to South Ossetia proper.
Following the outbreak of hostilities in Chechnya in September, the
country accepted 5,161 registered refugees from that region as of
year's end. Most were women and children.
The Government acceded to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, there is no
effective law concerning the settlement of refugees or the granting of
political asylum, including first asylum. Parliament passed an asylum
law in March 1998, but it is not fully consistent with international
standards as set out in the U.N. Convention.
According to the UNHCR, only two asylum cases were processed by the
Government during the year, none in 1998 and one in 1997.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution and the 1995 parliamentary and presidential
election laws provide citizens with the right peacefully to change
their government, and citizens exercised this right in elections in
1992, 1995, and in the fall. A democratically elected president and
parliament govern most of the country.
Parliamentary elections were held on October 31. Thirteen electoral
blocs and 34 political parties fielded candidates for 150 proportional
and 75 majoritarian seats. The Citizens' Union of Georgia (CUG),
chaired by President Shevardnadze, won an outright majority.
International observers judged the elections throughout the country to
be generally fair; however, a number of irregularities were noted,
including restrictions on freedom of movement, which on occasion
prevented political parties and observers from exercising their rights.
A second round was held on November 14, which OSCE observers described
as well conducted in some districts but marred with irregularities in
others. The OSCE cited in particular intimidation of members of
precinct election commissions and instances of ballot stuffing in
Tbilisi, Abasha, and Chkhorotsku. In the Autonomous Republic of Ajara,
dominated by Ajaran Supreme Chairman Aslan Abashidze, fraud was
widespread. There was no voting in these elections in the separatist
regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which remain outside government
control. Ten members of parliament from Abkhazia elected in 1992 had
their terms extended.
The local governments elected in November 1998 were expected to
have more authority over how local government is run, but inadequate
funding, corruption, and the absence of legislative guidelines made it
difficult for them to exercise authority. The opposition criticized the
Government and the ruling CUG for retaining the power to appoint the
mayors of the largest cities and regional chairmen, who were not always
from the area they serve.
The division of power between the central and local governments
remained a key issue in the country's transition to democracy. The
degree of actual autonomy to be exercised by the ``Autonomous Ajaran
Republic'' was at the center of this debate during the year. Ajara's
postindependence relationship to the rest of the country still was
undefined and, in matters such as elections, Ajara's authorities
claimed that regional laws took precedence over national laws. The
Revival Party, the dominant political party in Ajara led by Aslan
Abashidze, the President of the Autonomous Ajaran Republic, boycotted
the national Parliament for much of the year in a dispute with the CUG
over the degree of autonomy in Ajara. It took part in the October 31
parliamentary elections as the major opponent to Shevardnadze's CUG.
The Government was reluctant to challenge interference in the local
electoral process by the Ajaran authorities because it sought to avoid
encouraging threats of separatism in this ethnically Georgian, but
historically Muslim, region.
The Ajaran government, along with much of the opposition, alleged
that widespread fraud occurred in the 1995 presidential and
parliamentary elections. Serious violations were noted in Ajara in
these elections as well. Ajara did not allow international or domestic
observation of its local elections held in 1996. It criticized as
undemocratic the Government's refusal to allow directly elected local
officials and announced that local officials in Ajara would be elected
directly. In the November 1998 local elections, the mayor of Batumi was
elected by a direct vote, in contrast to the other major cities of
Georgia. In the October parliamentary elections, international and
domestic observers reported various forms of intimidation and abuses in
Ajara, as well as outright fraud.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics; however,
women's NGO's took an active role in the parliamentary election season,
engaging candidates in discussions about issues of concern to their
memberships. In the 235-seat Parliament, women were represented poorly
both in the 1995 and October 31 cycles, with only 17 and 16 women being
elected respectively. Under the current administration elected in 1995,
only two women held ministerial posts. Representation of national
minorities decreased in the new Parliament from 16 members to 13
members; there were 6 ethnic Armenian representatives and 4 ethnic
Azeris in the new Parliament. Women constituted over half the members
of political parties in the October elections. Armenians in 1995
constituted 11 percent of the population as a whole, with some
concentration in Samtskhe-Javakheti, while Azeris made up 3.8 percent
of the population, with concentration in the Marneuli district.
``Presidential elections'' were held in Abkhazia on October 3.
International organizations, including the U.N. and the OSCE declared
them illegal. Georgian authorities criticized them as having no legal
basis, as they had the Abkhaz local elections of March 1998, on the
basis that a majority of the population has been expelled from the
region.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally respected the right of local and
international organizations to monitor human rights but continued to
restrict the access of local human rights groups to some prisoners (see
Section 1.c.).
There were a number of increasingly credible local organizations
that monitor human rights. Those local human rights groups that are
extensions of partisan political groups have little credibility or
influence. Local human rights NGO's report that the Government was more
responsive over the year. They continued to view the Parliamentary
Committee on Human Rights as the most objective of the Government's
human rights bodies. The National Security Council's Human Rights
Adviser facilitated the positive resolution of some human rights
matters, including those of Jehovah's Witnesses.
The constitutionally mandated Office of Public Human Rights
Defender, or ombudsman, was created in 1995. The first ombudsman, a
former head of the State Revenue Service and a former MOI official, was
appointed to the position in November 1997. He disappointed both local
and international human rights groups. He resigned in August to run in
the parliamentary elections for an opposition party. While in office he
chose to focus the office's attention on social and economic issues,
especially the status of the country's refugees, rather than on
defending political and civil rights, according to local human rights
groups. Local human rights groups claimed that the ombudsman's agenda
was dictated to him by the executive branch. They charge that the
ombudsman has legal standing with the Constitutional Court and could
have brought individual violations of human rights to the court for
consideration. However, he did not choose to do so, and the NGO
community now is seeking this status for itself in order to gain access
to detention centers, which they currently are being denied. NGO's can,
and did, bring suits to courts of the first instance on behalf of
persons whose rights have been abused. As of year's end, no new
ombudsman had been appointed.
In 1997 the UNHCR and the OSCE mission established a joint human
rights office in Sukhumi, Abkhazia to investigate security incidents
and human rights abuses. The office, which has operated sporadically
because of fluctuating security conditions, provides periodic findings,
reports, and recommendations. Its influence appears to be marginal.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution recognizes the equality of all citizens without
regard to race, language, sex, religion, skin color, political views,
national, ethnic, or social affiliation, origin, social status, land
ownership, or place of residence. The Government generally respected
these rights. The Constitution provides for Georgian as the state
language. As a practical matter, the approximately 400,000 Armenians
and 300,000 Azeris prefer to communicate in their own languages or in
Russian, while the Abkhaz, Ossetian, and Russian communities prefer to
use Russian. None are impeded from doing so. Both Georgian and Russian
are used for interethnic communication.
Women.--According to a poll conducted in 1998 by the NGO Women for
Democracy, younger women reported that spousal abuse occurs with some
frequency and, as it is a social taboo to go to the police or otherwise
to raise the problem outside the family, it is reported or punished
only rarely. Spousal abuse is reportedly one of the leading causes for
divorce. Police did not always investigate reports of rape. A local
NGO, with the help of an international NGO, opened a shelter for abused
women in the spring of 1998. The Government established a hot line for
abused women, but provided no other services. There are no laws that
specifically criminalize spousal abuse or violence against women.
Sexual harassment was reportedly a problem in the workplace and was not
investigated.
Kidnappings of women for the purpose of marriage sometimes occurred
in rural areas, although the practice was declining. If an eager or
spurned suitor holds his intended fiance as a hostage for more than 24
hours, her family considers her to be no longer suitable for marriage
except to her kidnaper. If she consents to marriage, the incident is
considered part of a traditional courtship ritual; if not, future
marriage may become problematic. In such cases, the woman occasionally
is raped.
The Civil Code gives women and men equal inheritance rights.A
number of women's NGO's, including the women's group of the Georgian
Young Lawyer's Association and Women for Democracy, promote women's
rights. NGO's supported last year's poll of women conducted by Women
for Democracy, which found a gap between the perceptions of older and
younger women. Older women tended to view their place in traditional
society as an honored one, but younger women were less sanguine. They
reported that although there were no real barriers to a professional
life or to a good education, discrimination and harassment in the
workplace were problems. Younger women also reported that the economic
balance had shifted in their favor, as many traditionally male jobs
disappeared due to the depressed economy. Women's access to the labor
market was improving but remained primarily confined, particularly for
older women, to low-paying and low-skilled positions, often without
regard to high professional and academic qualifications. A study
released in 1999 reported that women were paid 78 percent of men's
wages in the public sector and 67 percent of men's wages in the private
sector. Reportedly, men were given preference in promotions. While some
efforts have been made within specific programs, the Government had no
active efforts focused on women's issues.
Children.--Government services for children were extremely limited.
The 1995 Health Reform Act withdrew free health care for children over
the age of 3 years. While education is officially free, many parents
were unable to afford books and school supplies, and most parents have
to pay for their children's education.
There was no societal pattern of abuse of children, but difficult
economic conditions broke up some families and increased the number of
street children. The private voluntary organization, Child and
Environment, noted a significant rise in homeless children following
the collapse of the Soviet Union. It estimated that there were
currently more than 2,500 street children in Tbilisi due to the
inability of orphanages and the Government to provide support. The
organization opened a shelter in 1997. The Ministry of Education opened
a second shelter in July 1998. However, even together, the two shelters
can accommodate only a small number of the street children. Outside of
Tbilisi, even in areas of acute need such as Kutaisi, Zugdidi, and
Batumi, no such facilities or services existed. The children
increasingly survive by turning to criminal activity, narcotics, and
prostitution. Despite a cultural tradition of protecting children, the
Government took little official action to assist street children due to
a lack of resources.
The lack of resources negatively affected orphanages as well. In
all orphanages, children received inadequate food, clothing, education,
and medical care; facilities lacked heat, water, and electricity. The
adult staff was paid poorly and had many months of unpaid wages. The
staff often diverted money and supplies provided to the orphanages for
its own use.
People with Disabilities.--There is no legislated or otherwise
mandated provision requiring accessibility for the disabled. The Law on
Labor has a section that includes the provision of special discounts
and favorable social policies for those with disabilities, especially
disabled veterans.
Many of the state facilities for the disabled that operated in the
Soviet period were closed because of lack of government funding. Most
disabled persons are supported by family members or by international
humanitarian donations.
Religious Minorities.--The Georgian Orthodox Church argued that
foreign Christian missionaries should confine their activities to non-
Christian areas. Foreign missionaries continued to report some
incidents of harassment in rural areas and small towns on the part of
Orthodox priests and their supporters, local police, and security
officials (see Section 2.c.).
There was no pattern of anti-Semitism. Jewish leaders attributed
isolated acts of anti-Semitism, including the publication of anti-
Semitic newspaper articles and the destruction of Jewish communal
property, to general instability and disorder. Sixty gravestones at the
Jewish cemetery in Tbilisi were destroyed in December, 1998. No
suspects were identified. The case was suspended for lack of evidence.
The Jewish community experienced delays in the return of property
confiscated during Soviet rule. A court ordered a former synagogue,
rented from the Government by a theater group, to be returned to the
Jewish community in 1997. The theater group refused to comply and
started a publicity campaign with anti-Semitic overtones to justify its
continued occupation of the building. In December 1997, President
Shevardnadze promised Jewish leaders that the synagogue would be
returned before the celebration of 2600 years of Jewish settlement in
Georgia, September 9, 1998. However, the President's order was not
enforced and the building remained in the hands of the theater group.
According to an NGO report, the district court ruled again on February
25 that the synagogue building must be returned to the Jewish community
and ordered the city to find other premises and provide compensation
for the theater company. However, the case was appealed and as of the
end of the year had not been heard. The building was not returned by
year's end.
On October 17, a Jehovah's Witnesses worship service in the Gldani
section of Tbilisi with 120 parishioners was attacked violently by
members of a religious sect. The Gldani police refused to intervene.
Sixteen persons were injured in the attack. On December 25, the case
was forwarded to the Gldani prosecutor's office for criminal charges.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally
respected the rights of members of ethnic minorities in nonconflict
areas but limited self-government and played a weaker role in ethnic
Armenian and Azeri areas (see Section 3). The Government reportedly
provided less funding for schools in these areas than in other parts of
the country. Instruction in non-Georgian languages was permitted.
Lack of knowledge of Georgian limited educational and professional
opportunities for minorities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1997 Law on
Trade Unions provide for the right of citizens to form and join trade
unions. The Law on Collective Agreements was passed in 1997.
The principal trade union is the Amalgamated Trade Unions of
Georgia (ATUG). The ATUG is the successor to the official union that
existed during the Soviet period. The union broke from the central
Soviet labor union in 1989. Its present structure was established in
1992, after the union had resisted efforts first by the Gamsakhurdia
government and later by the State Council to bring the union under
government control. The ATUG consists of 33 sectoral unions.
Representatives to the ATUG congress elected its leadership indirectly
for a period of 5 years in 1995.
The organization officially claims 850,000 members but acknowledges
that the number of active, dues-paying members is considerably lower.
The union has no affiliation with the Government and receives no
government funding. During the year, the union saw its primary role as
defending the economic and social interests of workers, a departure
from its Soviet predecessor, which was essentially an administrative
body concerned with property and finance rather than with worker
rights. The ATUG supported public sector strikes by teachers, medical
service employees, and energy sector workers. In each case, the issue
was unpaid wages. On December 23, the ATUG led a demonstration in front
of the State Chancellery, demanding that back wages and pensions be
paid. The State Minister met with leaders and promised to meet with
unions again in January to resolve the problem.
On January 31, President Shevardnadze signed a decree ordering all
governmental agencies to consult and negotiate with unions. By year's
end no ministry had honored this decree.
However, over the past two years, the ATUG has been engaged in a
battle to reacquire union property first from the Government and then
from the courts.
In 1991-92, the then-acting president of the trade union, Joseph
Katsitadze, transferred two trade union properties to the Government,
which transferred them to the Ministry of Defense. On July 15, 1998,
the Constitutional Court ruled that the ATUG was the legal owner of the
properties and should get them back. However by year's end, the ATUG
still had not regained possession of either property.
On March 10, the Mtatsminda district court transferred ownership of
all ATUG property to the newly formed Free Trade Union of Georgia.
Katsitadze, the former acting president of the ATUG in 1991-92,
organized and headed this union. The court upheld his claim that the
ATUG was an illegitimate successor of the Soviet-era Confederation of
Independent Trade Unions of Georgia. The ATUG appealed the decision. On
November 30, the Supreme Court threw out the decision of the Mtatsminda
court on procedural grounds. The case was remanded to the regional
court to be retried.
In 1998 the ATUG brought suit against the Interior Ministry for
illegally firing 220 employees in the MOI's visa office. The suit was
to be decided on a case-by-case basis. As of year's end the Supreme
Court ruled that one female employee was to be reinstated, but the MOI
refused to do so.
There are no legal prohibitions against affiliation and
participation in international organizations. The ATUG worked closely
with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right To Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution and the Law on Trade Unions allow workers to organize and
bargain collectively, and this right is respected. The law prohibits
discrimination by employers against union members. Employers may be
prosecuted for antiunion discrimination and be made to reinstate
employees and pay back wages. The Ministry of Labor investigated
complaints but was not staffed to conduct effective investigations.
In the spring and fall, the Free Trade Union of Teachers of Georgia
conducted a number of successful actions for the payment of back wages
in Kutaisi.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor and provides for sanctions against
violators, and there were no reports of its use except for trafficking
in women for the purpose of prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The
Government prohibits forced or bonded labor by children and there were
no reports of its use.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--According to current legislation, the minimum age for
employment of children is 16 years; however, in exceptional cases, the
minimum age can be 14 years. The Ministry of Labor enforced these laws,
and generally they were respected. The Government prohibits forced and
bonded labor by children and enforced this prohibition effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The state minimum wage was
raised in the fall to $10.80 (20 lari) a month. There is no state-
mandated minimum wage for private sector workers. The minimum wage is
not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. In general, salaries and pensions were insufficient to meet
basic minimum needs for a worker and family.
The law provides for a 41-hour workweek and for a weekly 24-hour
rest period. The government workweek often was shortened during the
winter due to the continuing energy crisis. The Labor Code permits
higher wages for hazardous work and permits a worker in such fields to
refuse duties that could endanger life without risking loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws concerning
trafficking in women.
Information on trafficking is difficult to obtain. Georgia is both
a source and a transit country for trafficking in women. Often Russian
women come to Georgia, get a Georgian passport and then are sent
primarily to Greece or Turkey.
______
GERMANY
The Federal Republic of Germany is a constitutional parliamentary
democracy; citizens periodically choose their representatives in free
and fair multiparty elections. The head of the Federal Government, the
Chancellor, is elected by the Bundestag, the first chamber of
Parliament. The powers of the Chancellor and of the Parliament are set
forth in the Basic Law (Constitution). The 16 states enjoy significant
autonomy, especially as concerns law enforcement and the courts,
education, the environment, and social assistance. The judiciary is
independent.
Law enforcement is primarily a responsibility of state governments,
and the police are organized at the state level. The jurisdiction of
the Federal Criminal Office is limited to counterterrorism,
international organized crime, especially narcotics trafficking,
weapons smuggling, and currency counterfeiting. Police forces in
general are well trained, disciplined, and mindful of citizens' rights,
although there were instances of police abuse.
A well-developed industrial economy provides citizens with a high
standard of living.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
instances of individual abuse. However, instances of police abuse
continued, especially involving foreigners. Societal violence and
harassment directed at foreign residents continued. However, crimes
against foreign residents continued to decline, decreasing by 25
percent in the first 10 months of the year, compared with the same
period of 1998. Anti-Semitic incidents also continued to decline, by 27
percent during the first 9 months of the year, compared to the same
period in 1998. The Government is taking serious steps to address the
problem of violence against women and children. Women continue to face
some wage discrimination in the private sector, as do members of
minorities and foreigners. Trafficking in women and girls is a serious
problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials.
An investigation is ongoing in the case of Aamir Ageeb, a Sudanese
asylum seeker, who died on May 28 during a deportation flight while in
the custody of Federal Border Police. The Border Police apparently
handcuffed the man, put a helmet on his head, and forced his head
downward during takeoff because he was resisting deportation violently.
After Ageeb stopped struggling, officers pulled him upright, removed
the helmet, and noticed that he was not breathing; doctors on board
were unable to revive him.
In September authorities in Austria located two members of the Red
Army Faction, Horst Ludwig Meyer and Andrea Klump, who were wanted for
the 1986 murder of Siemens manager Karl Heinz Beckurts, the 1989 attack
on Deutsche Bank President Alfred Herrhausen, and other terrorist acts.
On September 15, Austrian authorities detained Klump and shot and
killed Meyer during the arrest attempt. Klump is likely to be
extradited to Germany.
On September 1, Michael Steinau and Bernhard Falk, members of a
leftwing terrorist organization, the Anti-Imperialist Cell (AIZ), were
convicted on four charges of attempted murder and sentenced in
connection with a series of 1995 bombing attacks against the homes of
German politicians and the Peruvian Honorary Consulate in Duesseldorf.
Falk was sentenced to 13 years and Steinau to 9 years. The two men also
are suspected in the 1994 attacks against the Christian Democratic
Union and Free Democratic Party offices.
The trial of Yasser Mohammed Shraydi, Ali Chanaa (alias Alba), his
former wife, Verena Helga Chanaa (a German national), and his wife's
sister, Andrea Haeusler (also a German), in the case of the April 1986
bombing of the Berlin discotheque La Belle, which began in 1997, is not
expected to reach a verdict for at least 2 years. The attack killed 1
Turkish citizen and 2 U.S. citizens and injured 230 persons. The trial
continued at year's end.
German courts continued to try individuals involved in the shooting
deaths of East Germans who attempted to flee to West Germany before the
fall of the Berlin Wall. In December the Federal Court of Justice
rejected former East German Politburo member Egon Krenz's appeal; he
was sentenced to 6\1/2\ years in prison for his role in East Germany's
shoot-to-kill policy at the East-West German border. Krenz appealed to
the Federal Constitutional Court, where the case remained at year's
end. His appeal before the European Court for Human Rights also is
still pending. Also convicted with Krenz and sentenced to three years
in prison were Gunter Schabowski and Gunter Kleiber. Schabowski is
serving his sentence while Kleiber was granted a suspension of his
incarceration due to ill health.
Alfons Gotzfried, an ethnic German who immigrated to Germany from
Kazahkstan in 1991, was accused of being an accessory in the murder of
70,000 persons, mostly Jews, at the Majdanek Concentration Camp during
World War II. Gotzfried admitted after the war that he took part in the
mass shooting of 500 Jews at the camp. Although he was convicted for
National Socialist crimes and was sentenced to 25 years of hard labor
in the Soviet Union, he faced trial and possible reimprisonment in
Germany since he was not convicted in a German court and since there
was no treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and the former
Soviet Union covering such crimes. In May Gotzfried was tried,
convicted, and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment by a court in
Stuttgart. However, he was not required to serve his prison sentence
because of his advanced age (he is in his late 80's) and because he
served time in a Soviet gulag for the same crime.
German courts have tried several alleged war criminals to ease the
caseload of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia in The Hague, including a Duesseldorf court's sentencing of
Maksim Sokolovic in November, and a Bavarian state court's sentencing
of Djurdadj Kusljic in December for crimes committed in Bosnia in 1992
(see Section 4).
In February an Algerian asylum seeker died after he reportedly was
attacked and chased by skinheads in Guben (see Section 5).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and the authorities
generally respect these prohibitions; however, there continue to be
instances of excessive use of force by the police, especially against
foreigners. Amnesty International published a report in July that found
that police treatment of foreigners in custody showed ``a clear pattern
of abuse.'' The Council of Europe issued a report in May on
mistreatment of foreigners at the Frankfurt am Main airport, following
allegations of authorities' excessive use of force during enforcement
of removal orders. Based on medical reports, the report confirmed that
in February 1998 an Iranian suffered injury during removal, although
the Government could not verify that the injury was a result of his
treatment by border police. The alien reported that border police
officers punched and kicked him and squeezed his genitals while he was
handcuffed.
He reported that after he was placed on an airplane and attempted
to escape, border guards beat him again. A complaint was filed against
the officers involved, and in September the case was dropped since the
charges could not be substantiated. The Iranian was deported in
December 1998 after an appeal was upheld. The report cites two other
cases of alleged abuse at the airport. In July 1997 border guards
allegedly beat a Turkish citizen while handcuffed, and in June 1997
border guards allegedly beat a Turkish citizen while in handcuffs and
shackles prior to his deportation. During 1997 and the first half of
1998 eight investigations were launched against border guards at the
airport for alleged physical abuse of foreigners while performing their
official duties.
The Government prosecutes police who mistreat persons in custody.
For example, in May 1998, a Frankfurt (Oder) Brandenburg court
sentenced 3 police officers from Bernau for physically mistreating
Vietnamese detainees in 11 cases between the summer of 1993 and the
summer of 1994. In addition, the three police officers were suspended
from duty in 1994 after initial charges were filed and subsequently
were banned from any future work as police officers. A fourth officer
had to pay a fine of $3,330 (DM 5,400) for failing to stop the
mistreatment of the detainees. The Attorney General's office appealed
the sentence for being insufficient. The case was pending at year's
end.
A bomb exploded on March 9 at the Saarbruecken Community College
where there was a controversial exhibit documenting military atrocities
during World War II; it caused no injuries but damage was estimated at
over $1 million (DM 1.89 million) (see Section 5).
Some protests by Kurds in February after the detention of Abdullah
Ocalan turned violent, resulting in police injuries (see Section 2.b.).
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Basic Law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes this
prohibition. A person can be arrested only on the basis of an arrest
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority, unless the person is
caught in the act of committing a crime, or the police have strong
reason to believe that the person intends to commit a crime. Any person
detained by police must be brought before a judge and charged by the
day after the arrest. The court then must issue an arrest warrant
stating the grounds for detention or order the person's release. Police
often detain known or suspected right and leftwing radicals for brief
periods when the police believe such individuals intend to participate
in illegal or unauthorized demonstrations. For example, in August
police detained about 25 persons suspected of heading for illegal
rallies to mark the 11th anniversary of the death of Rudolf Hess (see
Section 5). The rules governing this type of detention are different in
each state, with authorized periods of detention ranging from 1 to 14
days, provided judicial concurrence is given within 24 hours of initial
apprehension.
If there is evidence that a suspect might flee the country, police
may detain that person for up to 24 hours pending a formal charge. The
right of free access to legal counsel has been restricted only in the
cases of terrorists suspected of having used contacts with lawyers to
continue terrorist activity while in prison. Only judges may decide on
the validity of any deprivation of liberty. Bail exists but seldom is
employed; the usual practice is to release detainees unless there is
clear danger of flight outside the country.
The Basic Law prohibits exile, and the Government does not use
forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Basic Law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The court system is highly developed and provides full legal
protection and numerous possibilities for judicial review. Ordinary
courts have jurisdiction in criminal and civil matters. There are four
levels of such courts (local courts, regional courts, higher regional
courts, and the Federal Court of Justice), with appeals possible from
lower to higher levels. In addition, there are four types of
specialized courts: Administrative, labor, social, and fiscal. These
courts also exist on different levels, with the possibility for appeal
to the next higher level.
Separate from these five branches of jurisdiction is the Federal
Constitutional Court, which is not only the country's supreme court but
an organ of the Constitution with special functions defined in the
Basic Law. Among other things, it reviews laws to ensure their
compatibility with the Constitution and adjudicates disputes between
constitutional organs on questions of competencies. It also has
jurisdiction to hear and decide claims based on the infringement of a
person's basic constitutional rights by a public authority.
The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial
process, although court proceedings are sometimes delayed due to ever
increasing caseloads.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, of
Correspondence.--The Basic Law prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
In September a teacher in Lower Saxony was barred from wearing a
headscarf in the classroom. In July 1998, the authorities supported the
decision of the Stuttgart school district not to hire a Muslim woman
for a teaching position in a public school because she wore a
traditional headscarf. The case was pending at year's end (see Section
2.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Basic Law provides for freedom
of the press, and the Government respects this right in practice. An
independent press, an effective judiciary, and a functioning democratic
political system combine to ensure freedom of speech and of the press,
including academic freedom. Propaganda of Nazi and other proscribed
organizations, as well as statements endorsing nazism, are illegal.
The authorities seek to block what they consider dangerous material
on the Internet. The Teleservices Law of 1997 bans access to prohibited
material (for example, child pornography and Nazi propaganda). The
law's implications regarding the possible liability of Internet service
are not yet clear. In May 1998, a Munich court sentenced the former
head of Compuserve's German operations to 2 years' probation and fined
him $60,000 (DM 100,000) for distributing pornographic materials on the
Internet. In November a Munich appeals court overturned the conviction.
The court found that the accused was not in a position to shut down
incriminated newsgroups permanently and therefore could not be charged
with complicity in the distribution of illegal materials. However, the
law still holds managers liable if they do not take sufficient action
against prohibited Internet content.
In June French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen was found guilty of
inciting hatred--a criminal offense--at a public appearance in Munich
in 1997 for referring to the gas chambers as a detail in history. Le
Pen was fined several thousand marks. He did not appeal. In September a
French appeals court confirmed the Munich verdict. In November
Frederick Toben, a German-born Australian Holocaust revisionist, was
sentenced to 10 months in prison (7 months already served were applied
to that sentence) for denying the Holocaust or that Nazis killed
millions of Jews. He was released from a Mannheim prison after posting
a bond. Toben is the director of the Adelaide Institute, which
questions the reality and scope of the Holocaust.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Permits must be obtained for open-air public rallies and
marches. Authorities can, and occasionally do, deny such permits due to
concern for public safety or to prevent outlawed organizations from
holding public assemblies. For example, rallies and marches by neo-
Nazis and rightwing radicals commemorating the death of Nazi official
Rudolf Hess are banned routinely.
After the detention of Abdullah Ocalan, Kurdish sympathizers staged
massive and at times violent protests in at least 10 cities on February
16. Authorities reported clashes with protesters in Duesseldorf,
Leipzig, Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Hamburg, resulting in
police injuries. Protesters stormed and occupied many diplomatic
buildings, and police officers made numerous arrests. Israeli security
personnel shot and killed four Kurds who were storming the Israeli
Consulate General in Berlin (see Section 5).
The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
respects this right in practice. The Basic Law permits the banning of
organizations whose activities are found to be illegal or opposed to
the liberal democratic order as established by the Basic Law. A party
that has participated in an election can be outlawed only by the
Federal Constitutional Court. Other organizations may be banned by the
federal or state governments; legal recourse against such decisions is
possible. A 1950's ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court outlawed
a neo-Nazi and a Communist party. A number of other organizations that
authorities generally classify as rightwing or leftwing, foreign
extremist, or criminal, are banned. State governments may outlaw only
organizations that are active solely within their state, with
activities crossing state boundaries coming under federal jurisdiction.
Although authorities banned a number of organizations in 1998, no
further organizations were banned during the year. In addition, several
hundred organizations were under observation by the federal and state
Offices for the Protection of the Constitution (OPC). The OPC's are
charged with examining possible threats to the democratic system; they
have no law enforcement powers, and OPC monitoring by law may not
interfere with the organizations' continued activities.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Basic Law (Constitution) provides for
religious freedom, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Most religious organizations are treated as nonprofit associations and
therefore enjoy tax-exempt status. In order to grant this status,
state-level authorities must find that the organization operates on a
nonprofit basis and contributes socially, spiritually, or materially to
society.
Church and state are separate, although historically a special
partnership exists between the State and those religious communities
that have the status of a ``corporation under public law.'' If they
fulfill certain requirements, including an assurance of permanency,
minimum size of the organization, and an indispensable loyalty to the
State, organizations may request that they be granted ``public law
corporation'' status, which, among other things, entitles them to levy
taxes on their members that are collected by the State for the church.
All public law corporations do not avail themselves of this privilege.
The decision to grant public law corporation status is made at the
state level. The Berlin state government has denied Jehovah's Witnesses
public law corporation status. State governments also subsidize various
institutions affiliated with such public law corporations, such as
church-run schools and hospitals. State subsidies also are provided to
some religious organizations for historical and cultural reasons.
Many religions and denominations have been granted public law
corporation status. Among them are the Lutheran and Catholic Churches
and Judaism, as well as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, Seventh-Day Adventists, Mennonites, Baptists, Methodists,
Christian Scientists, and the Salvation Army. Jehovah's Witnesses are
appealing to the Constitutional Court an April 1993 decision of the
Berlin state government that had denied the church public law
corporation status. In 1997 the Federal Administrative Court in Berlin
upheld the Berlin state government's decision. The Court concluded that
the group did not offer the ``indispensable loyalty'' towards the
democratic state ``essential for lasting cooperation'' because, for
example, it forbade its members from participating in public elections.
The group does enjoy the basic tax-exempt status afforded to most
religious organizations.
In September the Lower Saxony ministry of education barred a
teacher in Lower Saxony from wearing a headscarf in the classroom. She
filed suit against the ruling. The case continued at year's end. In
July 1998, the Baden-Wuerttemberg minister of education supported the
decision of the Stuttgart school district not to hire a Muslim woman
for a teaching position in a public school because she wore a
traditional headscarf. The minister took the position that the scarf
was a political symbol of female submission rather than a religious
practice prescribed by Islam. The minister permitted the woman to
conduct the practice teaching required for her degree, but argued that
allowing a teacher to wear a headscarf on the job would violate the
religious and political neutrality legally required of all civil
servants, including teachers. She is now a teacher at a Berlin public
school for Muslims, where she is allowed to wear a headscarf. The case
was pending at year's end (see Section 1.f.).
The Church of Scientology remained under scrutiny by both federal
and state officials who contend that it is not a religion but an
economic enterprise. According to representatives of the Church of
Scientology, while the public debate over the Church's status and
operations has diminished somewhat in intensity compared to previous
years, instances of governmental bias and discrimination remain.
Authorities sometimes sought to deregister Scientology organizations
previously registered as nonprofit associations and require them to
register as commercial enterprises. In 1997 the Federal Administrative
Court in Berlin declared that a registered nonprofit association,
religious or otherwise, could engage in entrepreneurial activities as
long as these were only supplementary and collateral to its nonprofit
goals, and sent an appeal concerning the deregistration of a
Scientology organization in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg back to a
lower level for further review. In December the Stuttgart
administrative court ruled that Baden-Wuerttemberg could not deregister
the Church of Scientology as an ideological nonprofit organization,
stating that Scientology's activities could not be classified as
commercial if such activities were used to accomplish the
organization's ideological purposes. In August the city of Munich
revoked the nonprofit status of the local Scientology organization. In
June the Munich administrative court rejected an appeal by the Church
of Scientology and upheld the November 1995 decision by the city of
Munich to deprive the Scientology-affiliated Celebrity Center Munich of
its status as a nonprofit organization. The city had argued that the
center allegedly was brainwashing and financially exploiting its
members. However, the court ruled that the only relevant point was
whether the purpose of the center was to make money. During a March
visit to the country by a lawyer for the Church of Scientology,
officials in the Foreign Ministry refused to engage in a dialog with
the Church and decided not to meet with the attorney. According to
officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Charge of the
German Embassy in a western country met with a Scientology
representative in 1996, but no tangible progress resulted from the
meeting. Therefore government officials concluded that it was not
worthwhile to meet with Scientology representatives again, since they
do not believe that the Church has changed those practices that the
Government finds unacceptable. Moreover, federal government officials
believe that this issue is primarily one for the states to handle.
Some government officials allege that Scientology's goals and
methods are antidemocratic and call for further restrictions on
Scientology-affiliated organizations and individuals. For example,
during a March meeting with a lawyer representing the Church of
Scientology and members of the working group on Scientology in the
Hamburg interior ministry, Hamburg state officials expressed their
belief that the Church is a criminal organization with a totalitarian
ideology. In 1997 authorities of the federal and state OPC's placed
Scientology under observation for 1 year because of concerns raised by
some offices that there were indications that Scientology may pose a
threat to democracy. Under the observation decision, OPC officials seek
to collect information, mostly from written materials and firsthand
accounts, to assess whether a ``threat'' exists. More intrusive methods
would be subject to legal checks and would require evidence of
involvement in treasonous or terrorist activity. Federal OPC
authorities stated that no requests had been made to employ more
intrusive methods, nor were any such requests envisioned. In 1998
federal and state OPC's agreed to continue the observation of
Scientology. One state, Schleswig-Holstein, did not agree to implement
such observation, since its constitution does not permit such activity.
Observation by state OPC's, with the exception of Schleswig-Holstein,
continued at year's end. No criminal charges have been brought against
Scientology by the Government. Scientology filed a suit in Berlin to
enjoin the Berlin Interior Ministry from the alleged practice of
bribing members of Scientology to ``spy'' on other members. The case
continued at year's end.
Most major political parties continued to exclude Scientologists
from membership, arguing that Scientology is not a religion but a for-
profit organization whose goals and principles are antidemocratic and
thus incompatible with those of the political parties. However, there
has been only one known instance of enforcement of this ban.
In June 1998, the commission established in 1996 to investigate
``so-called sects and psycho-groups,'' including Scientology, presented
its final report to Parliament. The report concluded that these groups
did not pose a threat to society and state; however, it called upon the
Government to introduce legislation for consumer protection in the
``psycho-market'' and highlighted the need for the Government to inform
the public about dangers to health and property posed by psycho-cults
and groups. Particular emphasis was placed on Scientology because it
allegedly pursued policies of ``misinformation and intimidation'' of
its critics, according to the report. The report did not classify
Scientology as a religion, but as a profit-oriented psycho-group with
totalitarian internal structures and undemocratic goals. The commission
contended that there were concrete indications that Scientology was a
political extremist organization, and recommended to Parliament that
observation of Scientology continue. The report also recommended that
because of its derogatory connotation the term ``sect'' should be
avoided, and that instead the designation ``new religious and
ideological communities and psycho-groups'' be used.
The interministerial group of mid-level federal and state officials
that exchanges information on Scientology-related issues continued its
periodic meetings. The group published no report or policy compendium
during the year and remains purely consultative in purpose.
Between 1996 and 1998 a number of states published pamphlets
warning of alleged dangers posed by so-called sects and ideological
groups, including the Church of Scientology. The brochures are provided
to the public free of charge. The Bavarian interior ministry provides
two brochures, released in 1998, warning against the Church of
Scientology. ``The Scientology System'' and ``Scientology: An Anti-
Constitutional Movement'' warned about alleged hard-sell methods by the
Church and asserted that Scientology was striving for world power. The
Bavarian interior minister asserted that the Church even was ordering
the commission of criminal acts and compared its psychological methods
to those of the former East German secret police. The Hamburg OPC
published ``The Intelligence Service of the Scientology Organization,''
which outlines its claim that Scientology tried to infiltrate
governments, offices, and companies, and that the Church spies on its
opponents, defames them, and ``destroys'' them. The government of
Schleswig-Holstein published brochures detailing initiatives directed
against such groups, including Scientology, as well as what it sees as
the legal basis for public action against these groups. Lower Saxony's
Office of Youth Protection booklet on such groups describes Scientology
as a multinational combine rather than a religion and claims that
Scientology has a rigid hierarchy and that it severely punishes its
members if they violate its codes; and Mecklenburg Vorpommern also
publishes a booklet describing various groups, among them Scientology.
Scientologists continued to report discrimination, alleging both
government-condoned and societal harassment because of their church
affiliation. A number of state and local government offices share
information on individuals suspected of being Scientologists. ``Sect-
filters,'' statements by individuals that they are not affiliated with
Scientology and which, in practice, are not applied to members of other
groups, are used by some state, local, and federal agencies, businesses
(including major international corporations), and other organizations
to discriminate against Scientologists in business and social dealings.
The Federal Ministry of Economics imposed the use of sect filters on
companies bidding for contracts to provide training courses. Some state
governments also screen companies bidding contracts relating to
training and the handling and processing of personal data. The Federal
Property Office has barred the sale of some federal real estate to
Scientologists, noting that the Federal Finance Ministry has urged that
such sales be avoided, if possible. Scientologists assert that business
firms whose owners or executives are Scientologists, as well as artists
who are church members, faced boycotts and discrimination, sometimes
with state and local government approval. Other church members reported
employment difficulties, and, in the state of Bavaria, applicants for
state civil service positions must complete questionnaires detailing
any relationship they may have to Scientology. The questionnaire
specifically states that the failure to complete the form will result
in the employment application not being considered. Bavaria identified
some state employees as Scientologists and required them to complete
the questionnaire. Some of those employees refused and filed complaints
with the Labor and Administrative Courts. The cases are pending.
However, according to Bavarian and federal officials, no one in Bavaria
lost a job, was denied employment, or suffered any infringement of
rights by public officials or entities solely because of association
with Scientology. Bavarian officials also contended that a
Scientologist was teaching in a Munich public school and that another
Scientologist was a member of the Bavarian Ministry of Culture. During
the year, Hamburg city officials expressed public concern about
Microsoft Windows 2000, because one of its software functions was
developed by a company whose chief executive officer is a
Scientologist. The Bavarian interior ministry warned against
overreacting to such concerns.
In a well-publicized court case, a higher social court in
Rheinland-Pfalz ruled in January that a Scientologist was allowed to
run her au pair agency, for which the state labor ministry had refused
to renew her license in 1994, solely based on her Scientology
membership. The judge ruled that the question of a person's reliability
hinges on the person herself and not on her membership in the Church of
Scientology. The ruling is under appeal by the state labor office. No
damages had yet been awarded by year's end.
Scientologists continued to take grievances to the courts. Legal
rulings have been mixed. In recent years, some individuals who had been
fired because they were Scientologists took their employers to court
for ``unfair dismissal.'' Several reached out of court settlements with
employers.
Scientology held exhibitions in Munich, Stuttgart, and Hamburg to
explain the Church to citizens. Although Scientologists reported that
the exhibitions were a success, Scientology encountered serious
difficulties in renting space in major hotels and convention centers.
In some cases reservations were cancelled because hotels said that they
feared a loss of business if they allowed Scientology to rent
exhibition space.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to move anywhere
within the country, to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to repatriate,
without restrictions that violate human rights.
For ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
the Basic Law provides both for citizenship immediately upon
application and for legal residence without restrictions. Through 1999
other persons could apply for citizenship (and with it the right of
unrestricted residence) if they met certain requirements, including
legal residence for at least 10 years (5 if married to a German),
renunciation of all other citizenships, and a basic command of the
language. Authorities may use discretion in granting naturalization to
persons who have resided in the country for 10 years; however, a new
provision is to be enacted on January 1, 2000 granting persons who have
resided in the country 8 years the right to naturalization upon
application. Long-term legal residents often opt not to apply; they
receive the same social benefits as do citizens, and after 10 years of
legal residency they are entitled to permanent residence.
The Basic Law and subsequent legislation provide for the right of
foreign victims of political persecution to attain asylum and
resettlement. The Government cooperates with the office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees.
During the year asylum applications dropped to their lowest level
since the amendment of the asylum law in 1993, when the criteria for
granting asylum were tightened. There were 95,113 applications for
asylum (down 3.6 percent from 1998). The acceptance rate was 3 percent,
and 4.5 percent were granted a limited suspension of deportation
orders.
Persons coming directly from any country that officials designate
as a ``safe country of origin'' cannot normally claim political asylum
but may request an administrative review of their applications while in
Germany. Persons entering via a ``safe third country''--any country in
the European Union or adhering to the Refugee Convention--are also
ineligible for asylum.
The law limits legal recourse against denials of asylum
applications. Critics argue that few countries can assuredly be
designated as ``safe third countries'' and that the law unjustly fails
to allow applicants to rebut such designations. While the law permits
appeals against designations of ``safe countries of origin,'' critics
protest that the 48-hour period allotted for hearings is too brief.
However, the Constitutional Court upheld the constitutionality of the
amendments in 1996.
During the first half of the year, more foreigners arrived in the
country than departed: 319,608 arrivals (up 16 percent over 1998)
compared to 235,918 departures (down 19 percent).
State authorities continued to repatriate Bosnian refugees, unless
they qualified for an extension of stay on certain humanitarian
grounds. Some national officials, the UNHCR, and domestic refugee
support organizations have cautioned that the refugees' place of origin
and ethnicity should be given careful consideration in the
implementation of returns. During the year, certain states (Bavaria)
resumed the deportation of refugees from the Republika Srpska region of
Bosnia on the grounds that conditions there had improved. The Bavarian
interior ministry also gave local offices for foreigners discretion to
deny resident permits to refugees ``suspected'' of abusing repatriation
programs to other countries. Munich city officials began requiring
refugees claiming to be victims of torture or violence to provide some
proof of their claims in order to remain in the country. Since 1992
320,000 Bosnian refugees lived in Germany under ``temporary
protection'' (first asylum), and another 25,000 applied for asylum.
During the year, an estimated 21,000 refugees returned to Bosnia
voluntarily (compared with 92,000 during the same period in 1998).
According to unofficial estimates, approximately 65,000 Bosnian
refugees remained in the country at year's end. Among those are an
estimated 20,000 who are considered to be unable to return, due
primarily to their traumatized state. However, even those refugees who
left Germany ``voluntarily'' were subjected to tremendous pressure. If
they did not leave on their own they could have been deported,
permanently excluded from reentering the country, and had all their
property confiscated, excluding clothing and suitcases. The
overwhelming majority of Bosnians legally residing in the country have
limited residence permits with no enforceable right to have these
permits extended. Once their residence permits expire, foreigners are
liable to arrest and incarceration for up to 6 weeks pending a final
decision regarding deportation. The Federal Government pays Bosnian
refugees who choose to leave the country between $765 and $2,550 (DM
1,350 and DM 4,500) to aid in travel and resettlement costs. Many
states provide additional resettlement funds.
With the increase in tensions in Kosovo, German states ceased the
deportation of Kosovar Albanians in September 1998 but began
deportations again in November 1999. In April the Government stopped
processing asylum applications from Kosovar Albanians, effectively
granting them a temporary stay in the country. Authorities began
processing applications again in October. The Federal Government
evacuated from the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over 14,720
Kosovar Albanian refugees to Germany during the spring. A total of
9,600 of these refugees voluntarily returned to Kosovo. The rest remain
in asylum and refugee centers. An additional 15,000 war refugees from
Kosovo who came to Germany through their own means were granted
temporary protection, and there are a total of 180,000 Kosovar
Albanians in the country. In November authorities began deportations of
Kosovar Albanians, especially those serving prison sentences for
criminal convictions. In November the Annual Conference of Federal and
State Interior Ministers agreed to begin the return of ``considerable''
numbers of Kosovar Albanians in spring 2000.
An investigation is ongoing into the death of a Sudanese asylum
seeker who died during a deportation flight while in the custody of
Federal Border Police (see Section 1.a.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Basic Law provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections. The government is elected
on the basis of universal suffrage and secret balloting. Members of the
Parliament's first chamber, the Bundestag, are elected from a mixture
of direct-constituency and party-list candidates. The second chamber,
the Bundesrat, is composed of delegations from state governments.
The law entitles women to participate fully in political life, and
a growing number are prominent in the Government and the parties.
Slightly under 31 percent of the members of the Federal Parliament are
female. Women occupy 5 of 15 Federal Cabinet positions. On the Federal
Constitutional Court, 5 of the 16 judges are women, including the Chief
Justice. All of the parties have undertaken to enlist more women. The
Greens/Alliance 90 Party requires that women constitute half of the
party's elected officials; both party cochairpersons are female, as are
57.5 percent of the party's federal parliamentary caucus members. The
Social Democrats have a 40-percent quota for women on all party
committees and governing bodies. The Christian Democrats require that
30 percent of the first ballot candidates for party positions be women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
German courts have tried several alleged war criminals to ease the
caseload of the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia
in The Hague. In November a Duesseldorf court sentenced Maksim
Sokolovic, a Bosnian Serb and resident of Germany, to 9 years in prison
for crimes committed in Bosnia in 1992. In December a Bavarian state
court sentenced Djurdadj Kusljic to life in prison after he was
convicted for the murder of six Muslims in Bosnia in 1992 (see Section
1.a.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits denial of access to housing, health care, or
education on the basis of race, religion, disability, sex, ethnic
background, political opinion, or citizenship. The Government enforces
the law effectively.
Women.--While violence against women occurs and almost certainly is
underreported, it is prohibited by laws that are enforced effectively.
Societal attitudes toward such violence are strongly negative, and
legal and medical recourse is available. Police statistics on rape,
including attempted rape, showed a 19 percent increase to 7,914 cases
in 1998 from 6,636 cases in 1997. However, in 1998 for the first time
statistics on spousal rape, which is illegal, were included in these
figures, making comparisons with previous years difficult.
The Government conducted campaigns in the schools and through
church groups to bring public attention to the existence of such
violence and proposed steps to counter it. The Federal Government has
supported numerous pilot projects throughout the country. There are,
for example, 387 ``women's houses'', including 116 in the East, where
victims of violence and their children can seek shelter, counseling,
and legal and police protection.
Trafficking in women and forced prostitution also are forbidden by
law; however, trafficking in women and girls is a serious problem (see
Section 6.f.). In recent years, the Federal Ministry for Women and
Youth commissioned a number of studies to gain information on violence
against women, sexual harassment, and other matters, producing, for
example, a special report on violence against women in 1995. More
recently, the Ministry's public information poster campaign to combat
violence against women and discriminatory behavior has been highly
visible in schools, official buildings, and public spaces.
Union contracts typically identify categories of employment in
which participants are to be paid less than 100 percent of the wage of
a skilled laborer covered by the same contract. Women are
disproportionately represented in these lower-wage scale occupations.
In June the Government adopted a national platform of action,
``Women and Occupation,'' which called for regulations to promote the
equality of women and men in the workplace, including equal opportunity
plans with binding quotas for women in employment and vocational
training within the jurisdiction of the federal administration; greater
representation of women in political advisory councils, in which women
now make up 12.7 percent of representatives; a mandatory government
report on the development of earnings and the economic situation of
women during every legislative period; measures to promote vocational
training of women in information technology and engineering
professions; and the promotion of female entrepreneurs through
government grants and participation in regional projects earmarked for
women.
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. Public education is provided and is
mandatory through the age of 16.
The Government recognizes that violence against children is a
problem requiring its attention. Police figures indicate that there
were 16,596 cases of sexual abuse of children in 1998, a 1.7 percent
decrease from 16,888 in 1997. Officials believe that the number of
unreported cases may be much higher. The Child and Youth Protection Law
stresses the need for preventive measures, and the Government has taken
account of this in stepping up its counseling and other assistance.
The Criminal Code was amended in 1993 and in December 1997 to
further protect children against pornography and sexual abuse. For
possession of child pornography, the maximum sentence is 1 year's
imprisonment; the sentence for distribution is 5 years. The 1993
amendment made the sexual abuse of children by German citizens abroad
punishable even if the action is not illegal in the child's own
country.
People With Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against the
disabled in employment, education, or in the provision of other state
services. The law mandates several special services for disabled
persons, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice. The
disabled are entitled to assistance to avert, eliminate, or alleviate
the consequences of their disabilities and to secure employment
commensurate with their abilities. The Government offers vocational
training and grants for employers who hire the disabled. The severely
disabled may be granted special benefits, such as tax breaks, free
public transport, special parking facilities, and exemption from radio
and television fees.
The Federal Government set guidelines for the attainment of
``barrier-free'' public buildings and for modifications of streets and
pedestrian traffic walks to accommodate the disabled. All 16 states
have incorporated the federal guidelines into their building codes, and
98 percent of federal public buildings follow the guidelines for a
``barrier-free environment.''
Religious Minorities.--Anti-Semitic acts continued to decline,
decreasing 28 percent, with 433 incidents reported in the first 9
months of 1999, compared with 552 in the same period in 1998. These
incidents included, in part, 314 cases of the distribution of anti-
Semitic materials or the display of symbols of banned organizations, 27
cases of desecration of cemeteries, and 12 cases of bodily injury. For
example, on October 4, the Berlin Jewish cemetery was desecrated; 103
headstones were overturned and 25 headstones were broken. The attack
was the single largest act of desecration since the end of World War
II. However, police did not classify the act as an ``anti-Semitic act''
since no swastikas or anti-Semitic tracts were found in the cemetery.
On October 4, swastikas were painted on the Bertolt Brecht memorial in
downtown Berlin. On October 5, swastikas were found painted on the
Holocaust memorial at the Putlitz Bridge in Moabit. The overwhelming
majority of the perpetrators of anti-Semitic acts were frustrated,
largely apolitical youths and a small core of rightwing extremists.
In June French politician Jean-Marie Le Pen was found guilty of
inciting hatred in 1997 for referring to the gas chambers as a detail
in history, and in November Australian Holocaust revisionist Frederick
Toben was sentenced to 10 months in prison for slander and for
insulting the memory of the deceased (see Section 2.a.).
During the year the International Commission on Holocaust-Era
Insurance Claims worked to establish a plan for European insurance
companies to pay Holocaust-era life insurance claims. The companies had
refused to pay many legitimate claims during and after World War II. In
August the Commission announced agreement on payment of claims at the
rate of approximately 10 times the face value of policies. A claims
process was expected to begin on January 31, 2000. Representatives of
claimants appear to be satisfied with the proposed solution to this
long outstanding issue, although some details of the program remain
undecided.
Scientologists continued to report instances of societal
discrimination (see Section 2.c.).
There was no progress during the year in the investigation of the
1998 bombing of the grave of Heinz Galinski, chairman of the Jewish
Community of Berlin until his death in 1992.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The number of antiforeigner
crimes continued to decline, decreasing 25.6 percent in the first 10
months of the year, compared with the same period in 1998. However,
skinhead attacks on foreigners increased in the eastern part of the
country during the year. Also, in March the Government announced that
rightwing extremism was on the rise and reaching more persons through
the use of the Internet and skinhead rock groups whose songs have
racist lyrics. There were a total of 1,193 xenophobic crimes reported
in the first 10 months of the year, compared with 1,498 such crimes
during the same period in 1998. Of these, 256 were violent attacks,
including 231 cases of attacks on persons and 25 cases of arson. Among
the total number of xenophobic crimes reported were 278 cases of the
distribution of materials or the display of symbols of banned
organizations. The percentage of such crimes was significantly higher
in the eastern states. As in previous years, most of these offenses
were directed against foreign residents.
Perpetrators of antiforeigner violence were predominantly young,
male, and low in socioeconomic status; they often committed such acts
spontaneously and while inebriated. Some offenders were rightwing
extremists, such as neo-Nazis and ``skinheads.'' However, many could
best be described as rightwing-oriented, having loose, if any,
practical or ideological ties to extremist groups. Other perpetrators
were apolitical. The Federal OPC reported that 53,600 persons belonged
to far-right organizations in 1998, an increase of 14 percent from
48,400 in 1997, including 8,200 persons described as violent, an
increase from 7,600 in 1997.
In February Farid Guendoul, an Algerian asylum seeker, died after
he reportedly was attacked and chased by skinheads in the eastern town
of Guben. Guendoul was at a disco with friends when a group of neo-Nazi
skinheads arrived and an altercation broke out. Guendoul and his
friends fled the disco but the neo-Nazis pursued them in cars. Guendoul
threw himself through a glass door of an apartment building to escape
the skinheads who were yelling, ``Foreigners out!'' Guendoul bled to
death. When police officers arrived on the scene, they arrested
Guendoul's African friend and held him for 8 hours before realizing
their mistake. Swastikas were painted next to the door where Guendoul
died, 2 days after the incident. Authorities arrested 11 neo-Nazis on
charges of manslaughter and breach of the peace. Their trial began in
June and continued at year's end. In 1998 there were 93 racist attacks
in the state of Brandenburg, where Guben is located, including several
attacks that led to severe injury.
Some state governments, particularly in eastern Germany,
established special commissions to deal with incidents of antiforeigner
violence.
The federal and state governments were committed firmly to
combating and preventing rightwing violence and continued to search for
more effective law enforcement measures, as well as measures aimed at
the societal roots of extremist crimes. Police in the eastern states
continued to move toward reaching standards of effectiveness
characteristic of police in the rest of Germany and demonstrated
greater coordination in preventing illegal rightwing and neo-Nazi
activities.
On March 9, a bomb exploded at the Saarbruecken Community College,
where a controversial exhibit documenting German military atrocities
during World War II was being displayed. There were no injuries
reported, but damages were estimated at $1 million (DM 1.89 million).
The exhibit had been the focus of criticism by veterans' groups and
rightwing extremists who believe that it portrays all servicemen as
coconspirators in Nazi war crimes. Rightwing protests, often violent,
frequently have surrounded the traveling exhibit since its opening
several years ago. However, the exhibit was withdrawn after a number of
photographs were proven not to depict German soldiers (see Section
1.c.).
On January 31, police arrested 10 extreme rightists in Berlin after
authorities broke up a party commemorating the 66th anniversary of
Adolf Hitler's accession to power. According to the authorities, those
who were arrested had illegal neo-Nazi paraphernalia. During the raid
on what police described as a ``conspiratorial music event'' that was
attended by approximately 300 extreme rightists, three police officers
were injured.
In November 1998, the Magdeburg memorial to Roma and Sinti murdered
during the Nazi era was desecrated, only 2 days after it was unveiled.
Isolated attacks targeting Turkish establishments and individuals
occurred. Although some attacks were linked to rightwing perpetrators,
most were attributed to intra-Turkish political or private disputes,
but none were directly attributable to the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK). Several trials of PKK members were nevertheless under way.
Following the arrest in March of Turkish PKK leader Abdullah
Ocalan, a group of Kurdish protesters tried to storm the Israeli
Consulate General in Berlin. Israeli guards shot and killed three
Kurds, and a fourth died later of his injuries (see Section 2.b.).
Jewish and Kurdish leaders in Germany worked together with Berlin
police to investigate the incident.
Resident foreigners and minority groups continued to voice credible
concerns about societal and job-related discrimination. Unemployment
affects foreigners disproportionately, though this in part is due to
the sometimes inadequate language skills or nontransferable
professional qualifications of the job seekers. The Federal Government
and all states have established permanent commissions to assist
foreigners in their dealings with government and society.
In January border guards refused entry to two groups of Czech and
Slovak Roma because they did not have the required amount of money per
day, $29 (DM 50), for entry. However the majority of persons crossing
the border allegedly were not required to prove that they had the
required sum. The Federal Border Police state that, in view of the visa
free transits prevailing at this border, persons not in possession of
bank or credit cards routinely are required to show they that have the
minimum necessary financial means for their intended stay.
In September the rightwing German People's Union (DVU) won 5.3
percent of the vote in the Brandenburg state election. It is now
represented in the eastern states of Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt,
where it won 13 percent in April 1998. These victories triggered a
debate about whether eastern Germany was susceptible to extremist
views. However, it appeared that support for the party came primarily
from protest voters who were frustrated with the mainstream parties'
inability to deal with the issues of crime and unemployment. The DVU
lost elections in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern and in Thueringen. The
overwhelming majority (62 percent) of rightwing extremists now live in
eastern Germany although only one-fifth of the overall population
resides there. Of the approximately 8,200 rightwing extremists who are
classified as ``prone to violence'' (according to federal statistics),
47 percent live in the East.
In 1997 the Government pledged to protect and foster the languages
and cultures of the national and ethnic minorities that have lived
traditionally in Germany (e.g., Sorbs, Danes, Roma, Sinti, and
Frisians). In July 1998, the Saxony state government passed a law to
protect the Sorb minority, and the Hesse government recognized Romani
as a minority language.
Although the Government has recognized the Sinti and Roma as an
official ``national minority'' since 1995, the Federal Interior
Ministry and individual states have thus far resisted including Romani
among the languages to be protected and cultivated under the European
Charter on Regional and Minority Languages. During the year, the Hesse
government had indicated its willingness to meet the obligations of the
Charter to protect Romani, although the other states have not yet
followed suit. According to the Chairman of the Central Council of
German Sinti and Roma, the Sinti/Romani minority is the only one of the
national minorities recognized by the Government that does not have any
unique legal protection, political privilege, or reserved
representation in certain public institutions. According to the
chairman, opinion polls indicated that 60 percent of Germans opposed
protected status for Sinti and Roma, and public statements of
government officials and the media continued to perpetuate prejudice
against Sinti and Roma.
The state of Saxony passed a new law in July to protect the Slavic
Sorb minority. The law grants Sorb status to the broadest possible
spectrum of residents living near the Polish border. The law, together
with the recently negotiated agreement between Saxony and Brandenburg,
also ensures the Sorb community a steady flow of state financing for
educational and cultural activities through the newly established
Foundation for the Sorb Nation. Saxony and Brandenburg contribute $4.23
million (DM 8 million) each annually to the foundation, and the Federal
Government contributes $8.47 million (DM 16 million). At the time of
the agreement it was expected that the federal contribution would be
lowered to $4.23 million (DM 8 million) by 2007.
In May Parliament approved a new citizenship law that allows
children born to legal foreign residents to become citizens. Children
can retain both their parents' nationality and a German passport until
the age of 23, when they must choose one or the other. The law also
decreases the period of residence in the country required for foreign
residents to earn the right to naturalization from 15 years to 8 years.
The law was approved by the Bundesrat and was scheduled to go into
effect on January 1, 2000. The law was the subject of considerable
public debate.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The right to associate freely, choose
representatives, determine programs and policies to represent workers'
interests, and publicize views is recognized and freely exercised. Some
32.1 percent of the total eligible labor force belong to unions. The
German Trade Union Federation (DGB) represents 81.4 percent of
organized workers.
The Basic Law provides for the right to strike, except for civil
servants (including teachers) and personnel in sensitive positions,
such as members of the armed forces. In the past, the International
Labor Organization (ILO) has criticized the Government's definition of
``essential services'' as overly broad. The ILO was responding to
complaints about sanctions imposed on teachers who struck in the state
of Hesse in 1989 and, earlier, the replacement of striking postal
workers by civil servants. In neither case did permanent job loss
result. The ILO continued to seek clarifications from the Government on
policies and laws governing the labor rights of civil servants.
Compared with previous years, strike activity declined further in
1998. Only 4,000 workers participated in strikes, and only 16,000 work
days were lost. There were no notable strikes during the year.
The DGB participates in various international and European trade
union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Basic Law
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively, and this
right is widely exercised. Due to a well-developed system of autonomous
contract negotiations, mediation is uncommon. Basic wages and working
conditions are negotiated at the industry level and then are adapted,
through local collective bargaining, to particular enterprises.
However, some firms in eastern Germany have refused to join
employer associations, or have withdrawn from them and then bargained
independently with workers. Likewise, some large firms in western
Germany withdrew at least part of their work force from the
jurisdiction of employer associations, complaining of rigidities in the
industrywide, multicompany negotiating system. However, they have not
refused to bargain as individual enterprises. The law mandates a system
of works councils and worker membership on supervisory boards, and thus
workers participate in the management of the enterprises in which they
work. The law thoroughly protects workers against antiunion
discrimination.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Basic Law
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including forced or bonded child
labor, and there were no reports that it occurred, apart from
trafficking in women and forced prostitution.
A number of lawsuits have been filed by former slave and forced
laborers seeking compensation for their suffering during the Nazi era.
In February corporations pledged to create a compensation fund for
those persons used as forced and slave labor during World War II. On
December 17, the Government, representatives of seven interested
nations whose nationals had been subjected to slave and forced labor,
class action lawyers, and a number of German companies agreed that the
Government and the corporations would pay $5.2 billion (DM 10 billion)
to a foundation. Once established, the foundation is to make payments
to Nazi-era public and private sector forced and slave laborers as well
as to all those who suffered at the hands of German companies during
this period. In addition, a portion of this amount is to be used to
establish a future fund to support Holocaust remembrance, education,
international understanding, and the interests of heirs and survivors
of Nazi injustice. Further negotiations are to be conducted in 2000 to
determine the allocation of the funds among various classes of
claimants. At the earliest, it was expected that payments could be made
in late 2000.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Federal law generally prohibits the employment of children
under the age of 15, with a few exceptions: those 13 or 14 years of age
may do farm work for up to 3 hours per day or may deliver newspapers
for up to 2 hours per day; and those 3 to 14 years of age may take part
in cultural performances, albeit under stringent curbs on the kinds of
activity, number of hours, and time of day. The Federal Labor Ministry
effectively enforces the law through its Factory Inspection Bureau.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated or
administratively determined minimum wage. Wages and salaries are set
either by collective bargaining agreements between unions and employer
federations or by individual contracts. Covering about 90 percent of
all wage- and salary-earners, these agreements set minimum pay rates
and are legally enforceable. These minimums provide an adequate
standard of living for workers and their families. The number of hours
of work per week is regulated by contracts that directly or indirectly
affect 80 percent of the working population. The average workweek for
industrial workers is 36 hours in western Germany and about 39 hours in
the eastern states.
Federal regulations limit the workweek to a maximum of 48 hours.
Provisions for overtime, holiday, and weekend pay vary depending upon
collective bargaining agreements.
Foreign workers are protected by law and generally receive
treatment equal to that of German workers. However, foreigners who are
employed illegally, particularly in the construction industry in
Berlin, are especially susceptible to substandard wages. Wage
discrimination also affects legal foreign workers to some extent. For
example, seasonal workers from Eastern Europe who come to Germany on
temporary work contracts often receive wages below normal German
standards. Furthermore, workers from other European Union countries
sometimes are employed at the same wages that they would receive in
their home country, even if the corresponding German worker would
receive a higher wage.
An extensive set of laws and regulations on occupational safety and
health incorporates a growing body of European Union standards. These
provide for the right to refuse to perform dangerous or unhealthy work
without jeopardizing employment. A comprehensive system of worker
insurance carriers enforces safety requirements in the workplace. The
Labor Ministry and its counterparts in the states effectively enforce
occupational safety and health standards through a network of
government organs, including the Federal Institute for Work Safety. At
the local level, professional and trade associations--self-governing
public corporations with delegates both from the employers and from the
unions--oversee worker safety.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and forced
prostitution are forbidden by law; however, trafficking in women and
girls is a serious problem. The laws against trafficking in women were
modified in 1992 and 1998 to deal more effectively with problems
stemming from the opening of Germany's eastern borders; trafficking in
persons is punishable by up to 10 years in prison. Germany is a
destination and transit country for trafficked women. Estimates vary
considerably on the number of women and girls trafficked to and through
the country, ranging between 2,000 and 20,000 per year. Most
trafficking victims are women and girls between the ages of 16 and 25
who are forced to work as prostitutes. According to police statistics,
less than one-half of one percent of trafficking victims are men or
boys. Of the women trafficked to the country through fake employment
offers, arranged marriages, fraud, and coercive measures, 80 percent
come from eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union,
primarily from Poland, Ukraine, and the Czech Republic. The other 20
percent of trafficking victims come from Southeast Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. The Federal Ministry for Families, the Elderly, Women,
and Youth heads an Interagency Working Group to coordinate the efforts
of state and federal agencies to combat trafficking and to aid victims
of trafficking. According to statistics from the Federal Criminal
Office, authorities initiated criminal proceedings or charges of
trafficking in persons against 751 persons in 1998. The Federal
Ministry for Families, the Elderly, Women, and Youth has lobbied states
successfully to provide victims of trafficking who have been detained
by police 4 weeks to leave the country, rather than face immediate
deportation. The 4-week grace period allows the victims time to decide
whether to cooperate with police on investigations of those suspected
of trafficking. Those who cooperate, although they are very few in
number, are granted a temporary stay for at least part of the
proceedings and may be eligible for witness protection, although there
is no formal nationwide program to protect such witnesses. In three
cases during recent years, the children of women in the witness
protection program were brought to the country to prevent possible
retaliation against them due to the mother's testimony. However,
protection ends once the case is concluded. Trafficking victims who
cannot afford to pay for their return tickets home may be eligible for
state and federal funds for transportation and some pocket money. The
Government funds the publication of a brochure that provides
information on residency and work requirements, counseling centers for
women, health care, warnings about trafficking, and information for
sex-industry workers that is printed in 13 languages and distributed by
NGO's and German Consulates abroad. State authorities provide funding
for NGO's to counsel and care for victims of trafficking. For example,
the city of Berlin provides about $260,000 (DM 500,000) annually for
two NGO's that care for and counsel trafficked women. The city provides
an additional $155,000 (DM 300,000) annually to women's shelters for
trafficked women in the city. The Federal Government provided about $1
million (DM 1.95 million) between 1997 and 2000 to fund six counseling
centers for women from Central and Eastern Europe.
______
GREECE
Greece is a constitutional republic and multiparty parliamentary
democracy in which citizens choose their representatives in free and
fair elections. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) holds the
majority of parliamentary seats, and its leader, Constantine Simitis,
has been Prime Minister since 1996. The New Democracy Party is the main
opposition party. The judiciary is independent.
The national police and security services are responsible for
internal security. Civilian authorities maintain effective control of
all security forces. The police and security services are subject to a
broad variety of restraints. Some members of the police and security
forces nevertheless committed human rights abuses.
Greece has a market economy with a large public sector that
accounts for some 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Residents
enjoy a relatively advanced standard of living. Structural adjustment
funds from the European Union (EU) account for approximately 4 percent
of the country's GDP.
The Government respected the human rights of most citizens;
however, problems remained in some areas, although there was some
progress in others. Security force personnel sometimes abused suspects,
residents, and illegal aliens. The Government continued to take
corrective action to relieve severe overcrowding and harsh living
conditions in some prisons. Police sweeps resulted in the temporary
detention of immigrants under often squalid conditions. There are legal
limits on the freedom of association of ethnic minorities. Religious
leaders acknowledged further general improvement in government
tolerance, but some restrictions on freedom of religion persisted:
police continued to detain members of non-Orthodox religions for
proselytizing. Alternative service for conscientious objectors now is
available, although under conditions more onerous than those
experienced by military draftees. The Government sometimes placed human
rights monitors, including foreign diplomats, non-Orthodox religious
groups, and minority groups under surveillance. Violence against women
and trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution are
problems. Discrimination against ethnic minorities remained a problem,
although at a lower level than the previous year. The Government
formally recognizes only the Muslim minority specified in the 1923
Treaty of Lausanne.
Although it reaffirmed individuals' right of self-identification,
the Government still refuses to acknowledge formally the existence of
non-Muslim groups, principally the Slavophones, under the term
``minority.'' As a result, some individuals who define themselves as
members of a minority find it difficult to express their identity
freely and to maintain their culture, although problems in this area
decreased somewhat during the year.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government
officials.
The case of a Romani man killed by police in Partheni,
Thessaloniki, in 1998 was not resolved by year's end. A trial of the
policemen involved was pending 18 months later.
The 1998 case of a foreign student killed by a policeman is pending
before a police disciplinary board. The accused police officer was
charged with intentional homicide, and a trial was pending at year's
end.
There was no resolution of the cases of seven doctors accused of
manslaughter in 1998 in connection with the case of an alleged hostage-
taker in an Athens hospital or of a policeman who in 1996 shot and
killed a Romani man at a roadblock in Livadia.
In April a woman was killed by a bomb at the Athens
Intercontinental Hotel.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically forbids torture, and a 1984
law (which has never been invoked) makes the use of torture an offense
punishable by a sentence of 3 years' to life imprisonment; however,
security force personnel occasionally abused suspects during arrest and
interrogations and abused resident and illegal aliens. The police also
abused Roma (see Section 5).
In August a man on Rhodes accused three policemen of beating him
while in custody. The three accused officers were charged and await a
trial hearing.
The 1998 case of three policemen who allegedly beat two Romani
teenagers was pending trial at year's end (see Section 5). The 1996
case of five police officers who beat an Iraklion man remains pending.
Immigrants--mostly Albanian citizens--accused the security forces
of physical, verbal, and other mistreatment (including the confiscation
and destruction of their documents), particularly during police sweeps
in May, June, and July to apprehend illegal immigrants. The detainees
were held in squalid conditions. In June an Albanian citizen required 6
days of hospitalization after police reportedly beat him in Athens. The
man's identity papers reportedly were confiscated. Also in June, an
Albanian citizen reported that the police beat him badly, and that they
also shouted ethnic and religious epithets at him, while another
alleged that the police shot him in his apartment. At year's end, these
cases were still under investigation by the Government.
Numerous anarchist and terrorist groups attacked a wide spectrum of
targets, mostly commercial property, during the year, primarily to
protest the NATO action in Kosovo. The firebombing of vehicles, drive-
by shootings of buildings, and bombings at commercial establishments,
mostly late at night, were widespread. A foreign company's office and a
consulate in Thessaloniki were the targets of attempted bombings, as
were the residences of the Dutch and German Ambassadors in Athens.
In October the Ministry of Public Order opened a Bureau of Internal
Affairs to investigate cases of police misbehavior.
Conditions in some prisons remained harsh due to substantial
overcrowding and outdated facilities. As of September, the Ministry of
Justice reported that the total prison population was 7,511 (of whom
3,388 were foreigners), while the total capacity of the prison system
was 4,542.
Non-EU illegal aliens awaiting deportation at the Drapetsona police
detention center in Piraeus staged several hunger strikes to protest
what was described by a human rights organization as a ``lack of
adequate exercise, lack of natural daylight, insufficient toilet and
bathing facilities, severely limited access to medical treatment, and
no access to social services.'' Poor conditions also were reported at
the two other detention centers for illegal aliens.
The Ministry of Justice continued its program to improve prison
conditions and expand capacity. A new center for the rehabilitation of
narcotics addicts opened late in the year and admitted its first 100
inmates. The center is designed to house 350 inmates and is to
cooperate with an organization for combating narcotics (OKANA) to
provide detoxification and rehabilitation for inmates.
The Government is inconsistent in permitting prison visits by
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
requires judicial warrants for all arrests, except during the actual
commission of a crime, and the law prohibits arbitrary arrest orders;
the authorities respected these provisions in practice. The police must
by law bring persons who are arrested on the basis of a warrant or
while committing a crime before an examining magistrate within 24
hours. The magistrate must issue a detention warrant or order the
release of the detainee within 3 days, unless special circumstances
require a 2-day extension of this time limit.
Defendants brought to court before the end of the day following the
commission of a charged offense may be tried immediately, under an
``expedited procedure.'' Although legal safeguards, including
representation by counsel, apply in speedy procedure cases, the short
period of time may inhibit defendants' ability to present an adequate
defense. Defendants may ask for a delay to provide time to prepare
their defense, but the court is not obliged to grant it. The expedited
procedure was used in less than 10 percent of misdemeanor cases; it
does not apply in felony cases.
The effective maximum duration of pretrial detention is 18 months
for felonies and 9 months for misdemeanors. Defense lawyers assert that
pretrial detention is exceedingly long and overused by judges. A panel
of judges may grant release pending trial, with or without bail.
Pretrial detainees made up 31 percent of those incarcerated,
contributing to overcrowding, according to government sources. A person
convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced to 2 years' imprisonment or
less may, at the court's discretion, pay a fine instead of being
imprisoned.
In the early summer, the police conducted large-scale sweeps and
temporarily detained large numbers of foreigners under often squalid
conditions while determining their residence status (see Section 5).
Exile is unconstitutional, and no cases have been reported since
the restoration of democracy in 1974. In a significant step, the
Government in 1998 repealed Article 19 of the Citizenship Code, which
permitted it to revoke the citizenship of Greek citizens of non-Greek
ethnic origin who traveled outside Greece. Between 1955 and 1998,
according to then-Minister of Interior Papadopolous, some 60,000
citizens had lost their citizenship under the old law. The new law was
not applied retroactively. About 400 individuals who had lost their
citizenship in the past under Article 19 continued to reside in Greece.
Following the repeal of Article 19, most of these individuals were
issued identification documents characterizing them as stateless, but
they were permitted to apply to reacquire Greek citizenship. Most of
these 400 persons had not had their applications adjudicated by year's
end (also see Section 2.d.).
Article 20 of the Citizenship Code, which permits the Government to
strip citizenship from those who ``commit acts contrary to the
interests of Greece for the benefit of a foreign state,'' remained in
force. In the past, this article affected Greek citizens abroad who
asserted a ``Macedonian'' ethnicity. There were no reports of Article
20 being invoked by the Government during the year (also see Section
2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
independence of the judiciary, and it is independent in practice.
The judicial system includes three levels of civil courts, (first
instance, appeals, and supreme) and three levels of criminal courts
(first instance--divided into misdemeanor and felony divisions,
appeals, and supreme), appointed judges, and an examining magistrate
system, with trials by judicial panels.
The Constitution provides for public trials, unless the court
decides that privacy is required to protect victims and witnesses or
the cases involve national security matters. Defendants enjoy a
presumption of innocence, the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, the right to present evidence and call witnesses, the right of
access to the prosecution's evidence, the right to cross-examine
witnesses, and the right to counsel. Lawyers are provided to defendants
who are not able to afford legal counsel only in felony cases. Both the
prosecution and the defense may appeal.
Defendants who do not speak Greek have the right to a court-
appointed interpreter. The low fees paid for such work often result in
poor translation. Foreign defendants who depend on these interpreters
frequently complain that they do not understand the proceedings of
their trials. A non-Greek-speaking Albanian defendant reportedly
received a 12-year prison sentence in a trial in which he had no
interpreter; the case was under appeal at year's end.
The legal system does not discriminate on the basis of sex,
religion, or nationality, with some exceptions: The Ministry of
Education and Religious Affairs may base its decision on ``house of
prayer'' permit applications on the opinion of the local Orthodox
bishop (see Section 2.c.); nonethnic Greek citizens are prohibited
legally from settling in a large ``supervised zone'' near the frontier
(although this prohibition is not enforced in practice); and a 1939 law
(also not enforced in practice) prohibits the functioning of private
schools in buildings owned by non-Orthodox religious foundations.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits invasion of privacy and
searches without warrants, and the law permits the monitoring of
personal communications only under strict judicial controls; however,
these safeguards do not appear to be effective. The security services
continued to monitor human rights groups (see Section 4), non-Orthodox
religious groups, minority group representatives, and foreign diplomats
who met with such individuals. Human rights activists reported
suspicious openings and diversions of mail. As far as is known, the
Government took no steps to stop such practices or to prosecute those
involved.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respected these rights in practice. Legal restrictions on free speech
nevertheless remain in force.
Articles of the Penal Code that can be used to restrict free speech
and the press include Article 141, which forbids exposing the friendly
relations of the Greek state with foreign states to danger of
disturbance; Article 191, which prohibits spreading false information
and rumors liable to create concern and fear among citizens and cause
disturbances in the country's international relations and inciting
citizens to rivalry and division, leading to disturbance of the peace;
and Article 192, which prohibits inciting citizens to acts of violence
or to disturbing the peace through disharmony among them. Those
convicted in the past were allowed to convert their convictions into a
fine of approximately $14 (5,000 drachmae) per day.
In a 1997 case, two journalists were convicted of publishing
classified government documents; their convictions were under appeal at
the Supreme Court at year's end.
In May an editor in Kozani was given on appeal a 5-month suspended
sentence and a fine for insulting the prefect-elect in a 1998 article.
A court of first instance had previously sentenced the editor to longer
jail time and a higher fine. In January another editor, Yannis Tzoumas,
was acquitted on appeal of defaming a government minister, and his 4-
month prison sentence was voided.
On matters other than the question of ethnic minorities, there is a
tradition of outspoken public discourse and a vigorous free press.
Satirical and opposition newspapers routinely attack the highest state
authorities. Members of ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities
freely publish periodicals and other publications, often in their
native language. The Constitution allows for seizure (though not prior
restraint), by order of the public prosecutor, of publications that
insult the President, offend religious beliefs, contain obscene
articles, advocate violent overthrow of the political system, or
disclose military and defense information. However, seizures have been
rare; none occurred during the year.
A dictionary published in 1998 generated several lawsuits from
individuals who found certain definitions offensive. A court in
Thessaloniki ordered the removal of one definition from future editions
of the dictionary and threatened the author with a fine and
imprisonment if he did not comply. In December 1998, the Supreme Court
overturned the lower court's decision, ruling that the definitions were
not offensive and could not be banned.
The Constitution provides that the state exercise ``immediate
control'' over radio and television. Once the state monopoly on radio
and television ended in 1989, numerous private stations began
operations in an essentially unregulated market while the Government
sought to draft and implement legislation on licensing and frequency
allocations. The National Radio and Television Council (NRTC) has a
decisive role in radio licensing but has only an advisory role in
television licensing, where the Ministry of Press and Mass Media has
final authority.
A 1995 law, not yet fully implemented, established ownership and
technical frequency limits on electronic media; the Government and
media outlets disputed application procedures and frequency
allocations. In December the Government introduced draft legislation
designed to legalize stations operating with pending applications; with
more applicants than available frequency spectrum, not all stations
will gain licenses. The Government occasionally shuts stations for
violating intellectual property rights or interfering with civil
aviation, military, and law enforcement transmissions. In December
Channel Station 2000, an Evangelical radio station, was shut down. The
station's owners stated that the closure was because of religious
content (although other non-Orthodox stations continue to operate
unhindered), whereas the Government asserted that the station's
broadcasts sporadically interfered with military channels. State-run
stations tend to emphasize the Government's views but also report
objectively on other parties' programs and positions. Private radio and
television stations operate independently of any government control
over their reporting. Turkish-language television programs are widely
available via satellite in Thrace.
The case of the television station Antenna was resolved against it.
Antenna was appealing a $350,000 (100 million drachmas) fine imposed by
the NRTC in 1997 for allegedly contributing to the suicide of a man
after his exposure on one of its shows.
The case of Radio Isik, a Turkish-language station in Komotini,
charged with operating without a license in 1994 and 1995, was pending
at year's end. The 1998 conviction of Abdulhalim Dede, the Muslim owner
of Radio Isik for illegal construction of a new radio antenna intended
to extend the range of the station, was upheld on appeal in June. The
court reduced the sentence from 8 to 2 months in jail but suspended
enforcement pending Dede's appeal to the Supreme Court.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this
right in practice. Police permits are issued routinely for public
demonstrations, and there were no reports that the permit requirement
was abused.
In January 30,000 demonstrators protested against proposed
government education reforms, at times violently (see Section 5). In
the spring several thousand demonstrators threw stones and gasoline
bombs at the police to protest NATO actions in Kosovo.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, which the
Government respected; however, legal restrictions on the titles of
associations remain involving ethnic minorities (see Section 5).
Government authorities legally recognize the existence of the
Muslim minority, but not other groups officially as ``minorities.''
However, the 1990 Copenhagen document of the then-Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, to which the Government is a
signatory, asserts that ``to belong to a national minority is a matter
of a person's individual choice.'' The Government affirmed an
individual, but not a collective, right of self-identification during
the year.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes the Eastern
Orthodox Church of Christ (Greek Orthodoxy) as the prevailing religion;
it also provides for the right of all citizens to practice the religion
of their choice. The Government respects this right; however, non-
Orthodox groups sometimes face administrative obstacles or legal
restrictions on religious practice. The Constitution prohibits
proselytizing and stipulates that non-Orthodox rites of worship may not
disturb public order or offend moral principles.
The Orthodox Church wields significant political and economic
influence. The Ministry of Education and Religion supervises the
Church, and the Government provides some financial support by, for
example, paying the salaries of clergy, subsidizing their religious
training, and financing the construction and maintenance of Orthodox
Church buildings.
The Orthodox Church is the only religion considered by law to be a
``legal person of public law.'' Other religions are considered ``legal
persons of private law.'' In practice a primary distinction is that
establishment of other religions' ``houses of prayer'' is regulated by
the general provisions of the Civil Code regarding corporations. For
example non-Orthodox churches cannot, as religious entities, own
property; the property must belong to a specifically created legal
entity rather than to the church itself. In practice this places an
additional legal and administrative burden on non-Orthodox religious
community organizations, although in most cases this process has been
handled routinely.
Two laws from the 1930's require recognized or ``known'' religious
groups to obtain house of prayer permits from the Ministry of Education
and Religion in order to open houses of worship. By law the Ministry
may base its decision to issue permits on the opinion of the local
Orthodox bishop. No formal mechanism exists to gain recognition as a
known religion, but Ministry officials state that they no longer obtain
the opinion of the local Orthodox bishop when considering house of
prayer permit applications, that no completed applications were refused
during 1999, and that none were pending at year's end. A tax bill
passed in 1997 created three new taxes on churches and other nonprofit
organizations. Leaders of some non-Orthodox religious groups claimed
that all taxes on religious organizations were discriminatory, even
those that the Orthodox Church has to pay, since the Government
subsidizes the Orthodox Church while other groups are self-supporting.
Approximately 94 to 97 percent of the country's 10 million citizens
are Greek Orthodox. With the exception of the Muslim community (some of
whose rights, privileges, and government obligations thereto are
covered by the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne), the Government does not keep
statistics on the size of religious groups within Greece. Ethnic Greeks
account for a sizeable percentage of most non-Orthodox religions. The
balance of the population is composed of Muslims (officially estimated
at 96,000); Protestants, including evangelicals (who state they are
approximately 30,000), Jehovah's Witnesses (50,000), Latter-Day Saints
(Mormons), Anglicans, Baptists, and nondenominational Christians;
Catholics (approximately 50,000); Jews (approximately 5,000); and
Scientologists (approximately 7,000). Approximately 300 members of the
Baha'i Faith are scattered throughout the country. The majority are
Greek citizens of non-Greek ethnicity.
The privileges and legal prerogatives granted to the Greek Orthodox
Church are not extended routinely to other recognized religions. The
non-Greek Orthodox churches must make separate and lengthy applications
to government authorities on such matters as arranging appointments to
meet with Ministry of Education and Religion officials and gaining
permission to move places of worship to larger facilities. In contrast
Greek Orthodox officials have an institutionalized link between the
church hierarchy and the Ministry that handles administrative matters.
The 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which is still in force, gives Muslims
in Western Thrace the right to maintain social and charitable
organizations (``wakfs'') and provides for the function of muftis to
render religious and some civil services.
The Muslim population, concentrated in Western Thrace with small
communities in Rhodes, Kos, and Athens, is composed mainly of ethnic
Turks but also includes Pomaks and Roma. Mosques operate freely in
Western Thrace and on the islands of Rhodes and Kos.
Differences remain within the Muslim community and between segments
of the community and the Government over the means of selection of
muftis (Islamic judges and religious leaders with limited civic
responsibilities). Under a 1990 presidential decree, which was codified
in a 1991 law, the Government appointed two muftis and one assistant
mufti, all resident in Thrace. The appointments (effective in 1991)
were based on the recommendations of a committee of Muslim notables
selected by the Government. The Government argued that it must appoint
the muftis because, in addition to their religious duties, they perform
judicial functions in many civil and domestic matters under Muslim
religious law, for which the State pays them.
Some Muslims accept the authority of the two officially appointed
muftis; other Muslims, backed by Turkey, have ``elected'' two different
muftis to serve their communities (although there is no established
procedure or practice for ``election''). Three times in 1998, the
Government convicted one of the elected muftis for usurping the
authority of the official mufti; he has appealed. Earlier convictions
(11 over 4 years) against the same individual were upheld on appeal.
All of the respective sentences remain suspended pending appeal. The
other elected mufti, who was convicted in 1991 of usurping the
authority of the official mufti, appealed to the European Court of
Human Rights. In December the Court ruled that the conviction violated
his freedom of religion and self-expression, but it avoided the
question of his legal status as mufti.
Controversy between the Muslim community and the Government also
continues over the management and self-government of the wakfs (Muslim
charitable organizations) regarding the appointment of officials as
well as the degree and type of administrative control. A 1980 law
placed the administration of the wakfs in the hands of the appointed
muftis and their representatives. In response to objections from some
Muslims that this arrangement weakened the financial autonomy of the
wakfs and violated the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, a 1996
presidential decree put the wakfs under the administration of a
committee for 3 years as an interim measure pending the resolution of
outstanding problems. The committee remains in place although the
decree expired in April.
Muslim activists complained that the Government regularly lodges
tax liens against the wakfs although they are in theory tax-free
religious foundations. Legislation to create a national land and
property registry passed in 1996 and upon coming into full effect in
1999 requires the wakfs, as with all property holders, to register all
of their property with the Government. The legislation permits the
Government to seize any property that owners are not able to document;
there are built-in reporting and appeals procedures. To date the
Government has not sought to enforce either the liens or the
registration requirement.
Protestant groups constitute the second largest religious group
after the Greek Orthodox Church. Some groups, such as the evangelicals
and Jehovah's Witnesses, consist almost entirely of ethnic Greeks.
Other groups, such as the Latter-Day Saints and Anglicans, consist of
an approximately equal number of ethnic Greeks and non-Greeks. Non-
Greek citizen clergy reported difficulty renewing their visas during
the period covered by this report, but these visas eventually were
renewed. As part of new obligations under the Schengen Treaty and the
Treaty of Amsterdam, all non-European Union citizens face a more
restrictive visa and residence regime than they did in the past.
Although Jehovah's Witnesses are recognized as a ``known''
religion, they continued to face some harassment in the form of
arbitrary identity checks (although reduced from 1998), difficulties in
burying their dead, and local officials' resistance to their
construction of churches (which in most cases was resolved quickly and
favorably). In January a European Court of Human Rights case was
resolved when the Government admitted surveillance of an adherent and
promised that it would never conduct surveillance of Jehovah's
Witnesses again.
In previous years the armed forces consistently refused to exempt
Jehovah's Witnesses' clergy from mandatory military service. In 1998 a
law providing an alternative form of mandatory national service for
conscientious objectors took effect. All clergy now are exempt from any
service. The law provides that conscientious objectors may work in
state hospitals or municipal services for 36 months. Conscientious
objector groups generally characterized the legislation as a positive
first step but criticized the 36-month alternative service term, which
is double the regular 18-month period of military service. In one case,
an application was submitted late and the applicant was instructed to
appear for mandatory military service. The applicant appealed this
decision; the results of the appeal are pending.
Jehovah's Witnesses also noted two recent cases in which custody of
a child was awarded to a Greek Orthodox parent, in part due to the fact
that the other parent was a member of Jehovah's Witnesses. In September
1998, an Athens court awarded custody of a child to its father; media
reporting stated that because blood transfusions were prohibited by
Jehovah's Witnesses, should the child need one, the mother might object
and thus endanger the child's health.
Evangelical parishes are located throughout Greece. Members of
missionary faiths report difficulties due to antiproselytizing laws.
Church officials express concern that antiproselytizing laws remain on
the books, although such laws no longer hinder their ministering to the
poor and to children.
According to leaders of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints, the Church has approximately 300 local adherents, about half of
whom are of Greek ethnicity. About 60 foreign missionaries arrive each
year for 2-year terms. Church leaders report that their permanent
members (nonmissionaries) do not encounter discriminatory treatment.
However, the police occasionally detained Mormons and Jehovah's
Witnesses after receiving complaints that individuals were engaged in
proselytizing. According to Mormon leaders, police detain their
missionaries at least once every 2 weeks. The missionaries always are
released the same day without being charged. In most cases, these
Mormons and Jehovah's Witnesses were held for several hours at a police
station and then released with no charges filed. Many reported that
they were not allowed to call their lawyers and that they were verbally
abused by police officers for their religious beliefs. In 1998 the
European Court of Human Rights found the Government in violation of the
European Convention on Human Rights for convicting Protestants of
proselytizing in past cases. There were no proselytizing-related court
cases during the year.
Scientologists, most of whom are located in the Athens area,
practice their faith through the Center for Applied Psychology (KEFE),
a registered nonprofit philosophical organization. According to the
president of the KEFE, the group chose to register as a philosophical
organization because legal counsel advised that the Government would
not recognize Scientology as a religion. In a step toward gaining
recognition as a religion, Scientologists applied for a House of Prayer
permit in October 1998. The application was pending at the Ministry of
Education at year's end.
A 1995 police search of Scientology headquarters revealed a file of
press clippings on Greek opposition to Scientology. The file was
confiscated and 15 KEFE board members subsequently were charged with
``unprovoked factual insult.'' In May an Athens court acquitted the 15
Scientology board members of the charges.
The Bishop of Athens heads the Roman Catholic Holy Synod. CARITAS,
an order of nuns providing charity services, and the Missionaries of
Charity (Mother Teresa's order) also operate in the country. Legal
recognition of the Catholic archdiocese of Athens, earlier denied, was
granted in July.
The Jewish community numbers approximately 5,000 adherents; the
majority are of Greek ethnicity and live in the Athens region. A local
government official opposed the rededication of a synagogue in Hania,
Crete, that was closed during World War II. The synagogue will also
serve as a cultural center. Central government and Greek Orthodox
officials attended the rededication in October.
Religious instruction in Orthodoxy in public primary and secondary
schools is mandatory for all Greek Orthodox students. Non-Orthodox
students are exempt from this requirement. However, Jehovah's Witnesses
have reported some instances of discrimination related to attendance at
religious education classes or other celebrations of religious or
nationalistic character.
The Government took no action to implement or repeal a 1991 law
mandating that citizens declare their religion on new standardized
identity cards based on EU standards, which could be used for internal
EU travel. Current identity cards contain a space for religion that may
be left blank.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution calls for freedom of
movement within and outside the country and the right to return;
however, Muslim leaders asserted that Muslims face administrative
obstacles regarding their voter registration when seeking to change
their legal residence within or to the region of Thrace.
A section of the Citizenship Code, Article 20, permits the
Government to strip citizenship from those who ``commit acts contrary
to the interests of Greece for the benefit of a foreign state.'' While
the law as written applies equally to all Greeks regardless of ethnic
background, to date it has been enforced, in all but one case, only
against citizens who identified themselves as members of the
``Macedonian'' minority. The Government has not revealed the number of
Article 20 cases that it pursued. There were no reports of such cases
during the year. Dual citizens who are stripped of Greek citizenship
under Article 20 sometimes are prevented from entering the country
using the passport of their second nationality.
The Government offers asylum under the terms of the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. It
cooperates with the local office of the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR). In June a presidential decree took effect that
significantly expanded the rights of asylum seekers and brought the law
into compliance with UNHCR minimum standards on asylum procedures.
Individuals recognized as refugees under the terms of the U.N.
convention are eligible for the residence and work permits that are
necessary to settle permanently. In the first 9 months of 1999, 1,130
individuals submitted applications for refugee status; 99 individuals
were recognized as refugees. Of those refused refugee status, 286 were
granted temporary residence on humanitarian grounds until return to
their countries becomes possible.
Reports indicated that the Government at times deported asylum
seekers back to their country of origin before they could submit formal
applications for asylum. In December 1998, the UNHCR criticized the
lack of a coherent, functioning asylum process and the fact that the
Government continued to deport forcibly some potential asylum seekers
back to their country of origin (or to the country from which they
entered Greece) before they could submit formal applications for
asylum. After a 1998 increase, such cases dropped in 1999 as the
Government more effectively patrolled the country's sea and land
borders.
The Government usually does not recognize the concept of first
asylum.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that hundreds of individuals from
Turkey, Iraq, and Iran enter Greece illegally each year; only a small
percentage eventually apply for official refugee status. Some of those
who do not apply remain illegally, often living in government camps
where conditions vary from adequate to very poor. Others proceed to
Western Europe, often applying for asylum there. The Government usually
does not seek out such individuals for deportation; since Greece and
Turkey do not have a readmission agreement, the Government finds it
practically impossible to deport individuals who enter Greece from
Turkey.
Albanian immigrants compose over three-fifths of the alien
population. Deportations of both illegal and legal immigrants, abusive
treatment by police, and inconsistencies and inequities in the way
employers provide wages and benefits were common. In the early summer,
the police conducted large-scale sweeps of neighborhoods populated by
immigrants, temporarily detaining large numbers of individuals under
often squalid conditions while determining their residence status (see
Section 5).
In the last half of 1998, between 300 and 600 Iraqi Kurds set up
camp in a square in central Athens, claiming that the Government was
not providing them adequate assistance. In February the police moved
the Kurds to an abandoned military base outside the city. All but 17 of
the Kurds fled the base and disappeared. They are presumed to be
scattered throughout the Athens area. None has returned to the square.
Through April 15, the Organization for the Employment of Human
Resources (OAED), a government agency, reported that 201,235 illegal
aliens, out of an estimated population of 700,000, applied for legal
status or a ``green card.'' The new program was designed to regularize
the residency status of illegal, often ``economic,'' immigrants. The
green card serves as a residence permit and allows the immigrants to
live and work in the country for a limited period of time. The OAED
estimated that there would be a total of 235,000 illegal aliens
applying for the green card by year's end; 80 percent of the green
cards issued so far are of 1-year duration. A new application is
required to extend the card for an additional year. Holders of a
``white card'' may reside and work legally on a short-term basis while
meeting the other requirements necessary to obtain a green card. Press
reports cite the obstacles of a complex bureaucracy and the
unwillingness of employers to pay social security contributions as
primary reasons for the limited ability of white card holders to
advance to the green card application process. The OAED estimated that
out of a total of 386,000 white card holders in 1998, 186,000 simply
dropped out of the green card application process. Legislation provides
for the green card program to remain in effect until the end of 2001.
Press reports estimated that it would take 3 years just to process the
applications already submitted.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Greece is a multiparty democracy whose Constitution provides for
full political rights for all citizens and for the peaceful change of
governments and of the Constitution. The Government headed by Prime
Minister Constantine Simitis of the Panhellenic Socialist Movement
(PASOK) won in free and fair elections in September 1996. Parliament
elects the President for a 5-year term. Voting is mandatory for those
over age 18, but there are many conditions that allow citizens not to
vote, and penalties are not applied in practice. Members of the
unicameral 300-seat Parliament are elected to maximum 4-year terms by
secret ballot. Opposition parties function freely and have broad access
to the media.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although no
legal restrictions hinder their participation. Women held 2 ministerial
positions in the Government and only 1 of 29 subministerial positions.
Of the 300 members of Parliament, 17 were women.
While the Government generally respects citizens' political rights,
there are occasionally charges that it limits the right of some
individuals to speak publicly and associate freely on the basis of
their self-proclaimed ethnic identity, thus impinging on the political
rights of such persons. However, in the 1996 parliamentary elections,
three Muslim deputies were elected in Thrace, one each from PASOK, New
Democracy, and the Coalition of the Left. Romani representatives report
that local authorities sometimes deprive Roma of the right to vote by
refusing to register them. However, Romani activists also report that
some municipalities encourage Roma to register. Municipalities can
refuse to register Roma who do not fulfill basic residency
requirements, which many Roma have trouble meeting.
In 1996 the Government transferred responsibility for oversight of
all rights provided to the Muslim minority under the Treaty of Lausanne
(including education, zoning, administration of the wakfs, and trade)
from elected local governors to a government-appointed regional
administrative official, the periferiarch of Eastern Macedonia and
Thrace. Some minority members charged that the transfer reduced their
ability to use the democratic process to influence decisions that
affect them. The Government stated that it made the change because the
central authorities could administer Greece's treaty obligations more
effectively.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government allows domestic human rights organizations to
operate, but cooperation with them varies. In principle it does not
prohibit foreign diplomats from meeting with officials and other
citizens, including critics of official policy. However, the security
services on occasion monitor contacts of human rights groups, including
listening in on conversations held between those groups and human
rights investigators and diplomats and questioning contacts (see
Section 1.f.). Monitors view this as a form of intimidation that deters
others from meeting with investigators.
A government ombudsman's office, which opened in 1998, by the end
of August received 855 complaints directly related to human rights
issues, of which 462 were processed. Human rights cases constituted 20
percent of all cases, an increase from 12 percent in 1998.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law irrespective
of nationality, race, language, religious or political belief; however,
government respect for these rights in practice was uneven.
The Government formally recognizes only the ``Muslim minority''
specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, although it stated publicly
in August that members of that minority could identify themselves
individually as belonging to different ethnic groups. However, the
Government failed to acknowledge formally the existence of non-Muslim
ethnic groups, principally Slavophones, under the term ``minority.'' As
a result, some individuals who define themselves as members of a
minority find it difficult to express their identity freely and to
maintain their culture.
Women.--Violence against women and trafficking in women are growing
problems. The incidence of violence against women reported to the
authorities is low; however, Athens' Equality Secretariat, which
operates the only shelter for battered women in Athens, believes that
the actual incidence is ``high.'' According to press and academic
estimates, there were approximately 4,500 cases of rape in 1999.
Reportedly only 6 to 10 percent of the victims contact the police, and
only a small fraction of the cases reaches trial. Conviction rates on
rape charges are low for first time accused, but sentences are harsh
for repeat offenders.
The General Secretariat for Equality of the Sexes (GSES), an
independent government agency, asserts that police tend to discourage
women from pursuing domestic violence charges and instead undertake
reconciliation efforts, although they are neither qualified for nor
charged with this task. The GSES also claims that the courts are
lenient when dealing with domestic violence cases. The GSES, in
cooperation with Ministry of Public Order, conducted three training
courses during the year for police personnel on how to treat domestic
violence victims.
Facilities for battered women and their children exist but often
are staffed inadequately to handle cases properly. A government shelter
(the only residential facility for battered women and their children)
provides relevant services in Athens, including legal and psychological
advice. Battered women also can go to state hospitals and regional
health centers. Late in the year, the GSES opened a new facility in
Pireaus and announced plans to open two other facilities in
Thessaloniki and Epirus soon. There is still no emergency telephone hot
line for abused women to call for help. A joint committee composed of
the GSES, the Ministry of Public Order, the Ministry of Health and
Welfare, and the Ministry of Justice was established during the year to
focus on women's issues.
Prostitution is legal. Prostitutes must register at the local
police station and carry a medical card that is updated every 2 weeks.
While the number of Greek women entering the profession has declined
steadily over the years, according to the police and academic sources,
trafficking in women for prostitution, mostly from the former Soviet
republics, Albania, Bulgaria, and Romania, has increased sharply in
recent years (see Section 6.f.). It is estimated that there are
approximately 20,000 prostitutes.
While national data on arrests of prostitutes is not available,
police and media reports estimate that 1,500 women were arrested for
prostitution during the year, about 5 times the number for the same
period in 1998. Most are foreigners who were apprehended for
noncompliance with legal requirements. Media reports implicated several
police officers as participants in prostitution rings. The local press
alleged on a number of occasions that policemen sometimes accepted
bribes from traffickers or pimps or forced illegal immigrants to have
sex with them and then channelled them into prostitution rings. The
vice squad unit of the police was disbanded temporarily in part as a
result of these allegations.
Trade unions report that lawsuits for sexual harassment are very
rare: according to the unions, only four women have filed such charges
in the past 3 years. In all four cases, the courts reportedly imposed
very lenient civil sentences. The General Confederation of Greek
Workers (GSEE) women's section reports that sexual harassment is a
widespread phenomenon, but that women are discouraged from filing
charges against perpetrators by family members and coworkers.
Women enjoy broad constitutional and legal protections, including
equal pay for equal work. The National Statistical Service's most
recent data (the second quarter of 1998) show that women's salaries in
manufacturing were 70.8 percent of those of men in comparable
positions; in retail sales, women's salaries were 88 percent of those
of men in comparable positions.
Although there are still relatively few women in senior positions,
in recent years women entered traditionally male-dominated occupations
such as the legal and medical professions in larger numbers. However,
women still face discrimination when they are considered for promotions
in both the public and private sectors. According to the women's
section of the GSEE, 58.6 percent of the country's long-term unemployed
are women, while women constitute only 38 percent of the work force.
Women also are underrepresented in labor union decisionmaking centers.
To ameliorate the situation, the GSES established two regional
employment offices for women in Thessaloniki and Patras and plans to
open three more offices.
Children.--The Government is committed to providing adequate basic
health and education services for children. Education is compulsory
through the ninth grade and free through university.
In January thousands of high school students, their teachers, and
trade union supporters demonstrated to protest a government education
reform that would require the students to take exams more frequently
and in more subjects to gain admission to college, academic standards
that had been applied in the past. More than 30,000 protesters blocked
streets in Athens and hurled firebombs at buildings and the police. The
student protests started in November 1998 and continued during the
first 2 months of 1999; they diminished after that. The students also
occupied and refused to leave some schools.
Several government organizations have responsibility for children's
issues. The National Welfare Organization, which has a nationwide
network of offices, is active in the field of child protection.
Legislation in 1998 combined the National Welfare Organization with two
similar entities early in 1999 to provide better services. The services
of the new single organization were regionalized to provide greater
access to child welfare services and funding prioritized according to
regional needs.
Penal law prohibits the mistreatment of children and sets penalties
for violators, while welfare legislation provides for preventive and
treatment programs for abused children and for children deprived of a
family environment; it also seeks to ensure the availability of
alternative family care or institutional placement.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. No national data
exist on the incidence of child abuse; authorities other than police
are not required to report such cases. Past sampling--although without
verified, up-to-date statistics--suggest problems with child and sexual
abuse. In a 10-year clinical study of 200 cases of abused children, the
Institute of Child Health (ICH) reports that 59.5 percent involved
physical abuse, 20 percent involved neglect, and 21 percent involved
children who were not abused at the time but had a history of abuse.
(The study did not cover victims of sexual abuse.) An ICH prevalence
study of child sexual abuse among 740 university students revealed an
incidence rate of 7 percent among boys and 17 percent among girls prior
to age 18. Societal abuse of children in the form of pornography and
child labor is rare. Child prostitution is a growing phenomenon,
particularly in some parts of immigrant communities of central Athens.
Child health specialists say that some social groups, such as Roma and
illegal immigrants, are underserved.
Children's rights advocacy groups claim that the protection of
high-risk children in state residential care centers is inadequate and
of low quality. They cite lack of coordination between welfare services
and the courts, inadequate funding of the welfare system, and poor
staffing of residential care centers as systemic weaknesses in the
treatment of child abuse. To address this problem, two municipal
shelters for battered children opened in Athens during the year. Child
health specialists note that the number of children in residential care
facilities is decreasing, while the number in foster care is rising.
In recent years, the number of street children who panhandle or
peddle at city intersections on behalf of adult family members or for
criminal gangs increased. According to the Ministry of Public Order, 78
percent of these children are Albanian, 12 percent are from other
Balkan countries, and 10 percent are Romani. Early in the year, the
Government implemented measures to combat this phenomenon. The measures
included the institutional placement of children up to 12 years old,
therapeutic consultations with their families, and the deportation of
juveniles 12 to 17 years old. The measures had visible results for only
a very short period. It is widely believed that even those who were
deported managed to return eventually.
People with Disabilities.--Legislation mandates the hiring of
disabled persons in public and private enterprises that employ more
than 50 persons. However, the law reportedly is enforced poorly,
particularly in the private sector. The law states that disabled
persons should number 3 percent of staff in private enterprises. In the
civil service, 5 percent of administrative staff and 80 percent of
telephone operator positions are reserved for disabled persons. Recent
legislation mandates the hiring of disabled persons in
the public sector from a priority list. The disabled are exempt from
the civil service exam. Persons with disabilities have been appointed
to important positions in the civil service.
The Construction Code mandates physical access for disabled persons
to private and public buildings, but this law, too, is enforced poorly.
A 1997 survey showed that over 60 percent of public buildings are not
accessible to persons with mobility problems. Ramps and special curbs
for the disabled have been constructed on some Athens streets and at
some public buildings, and sound signals have been installed at some
city street crossings. Since 1993 the Government has been replacing old
city buses with new ones with stairs specially designed for the
disabled. The new Athens subway lines were designed to provide full
access for the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Non-Orthodox citizens have complained of
being treated with suspicion or told that they were not truly Greek
when they revealed their religious affiliation. Non-Orthodox citizens
have claimed that they face career limits within the military and the
civil service due to their religions. In the military, generally only
members of the Greek Orthodox faith become officers, leading some
members of other faiths to declare themselves Orthodox. Only two Muslim
officers have advanced to the rank of reserve officer.
Claims of discriminatory denial of Muslim applications for business
licenses, tractor ownership, or property construction have diminished
greatly in recent years, and there were no reports of such claims
during the year (see Section 5-National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities).
Members of minority faiths have reported incidents of societal
discrimination, such as local bishops warning parishioners not to visit
clergy or members of minority faiths and neighbors requesting that the
police arrest missionaries for proselytizing.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--An increase in xenophobia
paralleled an increase in the number of of non-Greeks living and
working in the country.
Antiforeigner sentiment is directed mainly at Albanians (who make
up over three-fifths of the alien population). Deportations of both
illegal and legal immigrants, abusive treatment by police, and
inconsistencies and inequities in the way employers issue wages and
benefits are common. In the early summer, the police conducted large-
scale sweeps of neighborhoods populated by immigrants and members of
ethnic minorities, temporarily detaining large numbers of individuals
under often squalid conditions while determining their residence
status. Landlords in Athens and other parts of the country routinely
refuse to rent to Albanians, even to that country's diplomats.
Following the September Athens earthquake, legal permanent residents
(holders of green cards) were not issued earthquake allowances and were
told to wait, despite having all the proper documentation from civil
engineers regarding the damage to their housing.
There are communities that identify themselves as Turks, Pomaks,
Vlachs, Roma, Arvanites (Orthodox Christians who speak a dialect of
Albanian), and ``Macedonians'' or ``Slavomacedonians.'' Most are
integrated fully into society. The Government formally recognizes only
the ``Muslim minority'' specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne,
applying the term to several different ethnic communities. Most of the
Muslim minority (officially estimated to number 96,000) is ethnically
Turkish or Turcophone and lives in Western Thrace. The Muslim minority
also includes Pomaks and Roma. Many Greek Muslims, including Pomaks,
identify themselves as Turks and say that the Muslim minority as a
whole has a Turkish cultural consciousness. While use of the terms
``Tourkos'' and ``Tourkikos'' (``Turk'' and ``Turkish'') is prohibited
in titles of organizations, individuals legally may call themselves
``Tourkos.'' To most Greeks, the words ``Tourkos'' and ``Tourkikos''
connote Turkish identity or loyalties, and many object to their use by
Greek citizens of Turkish origin. The 8-month prison sentence of a
dozen Muslim teachers, convicted in 1996 for using the name ``Turkish
Teachers of Western Thrace'' in a union document, remained suspended
pending appeal. In March an appeals court upheld a 1986 trial court
decision ordering the closure of the ``Turkish Union of Xanthi''
because of the use of the word ``Turkish'' in the organization's name.
The Treaty of Lausanne provides that the Muslim minority has the
right to Turkish-language education, with a reciprocal entitlement for
the Greek minority in Istanbul (now reduced to about 3,000). Western
Thrace has both Koranic and secular Turkish-language schools.
Government disputes with Turkey over teachers and textbooks caused the
secular schools serious problems in obtaining faculty and teaching
materials in sufficient number and quality. Under a 1952 educational
protocol, Greece and Turkey may exchange annually 35 teachers on a
reciprocal basis for service in Istanbul and Western Thrace. Due to the
dwindling needs of the small and aging Greek population in Istanbul, in
recent years the Greek side limited the exchanges to 16 teachers per
country. Complaints from Muslim leaders that Greek bureaucratic
barriers prevented the Turkish teachers from working in Thrace
decreased during the year.
The Government approved 19 Turkish textbooks for use in the secular
Turkish-language schools. Under a 1960 bilateral protocol, Turkey
should provide copies of the approved texts for use in the schools of
Western Thrace. However, the books did not arrive in time for the
beginning of the fall 1999 semester. In January and March, appeals
courts in Thrace acquitted and dismissed cases against Muslim parents
convicted between 1992 and 1994 of destroying government-edited,
Turkish-language textbooks provided to their children in violation,
according to the parents, of the 1960 protocol.
In Western Thrace over 8,000 Muslim children attended Turkish-
language primary schools. An additional 150 attended 2 bilingual middle
schools with a religious curriculum. Approximately 700 attended
Turkish-language secondary schools, and approximately 1,300 attended
Greek-language secondary schools. Many Muslims reportedly went to high
school in Turkey due to the limited number of places in the Turkish-
language secondary schools, which are assigned by lottery. In 1999 the
Government instituted an EU-funded program for teaching Greek as a
second language to Muslim children, primarily in the Greek-language
schools, to improve their academic performance and chance of obtaining
postsecondary education in Greece.
Government incentives encourage Muslim and Christian educators to
reside and teach in isolated villages. However in August in education
reform legislation the Government cancelled the program of incentives
for Christian educators teaching temporarily in minority schools.
Teachers Union representatives complained that the move would
discourage Christians from seeking temporary teaching positions in
minority schools. The law permits the Minister of Education to give
special consideration to Muslims for admission to universities and
technical institutes. Universities and technical institutes are
required to create a certain number of places for Muslim students each
year; 376 spaces were available in 1999. Under this law, 123 Muslim
students entered Greek universities and technical institutes during the
year. Approximately 1,700 other Muslim students entered via the
national examination process open to all Greeks and were attending
universities and technical schools.
The rate of employment of Muslims in the public sector and in
state-owned industries and corporations is much lower than the Muslim
percentage of the population. In Xanthi and Komotini, while Muslims
hold seats on the prefectural and town councils, no Muslims are regular
employees of the prefecture. Muslims in Western Thrace claim that they
are hired only for lower level, part-time work. The Government says
that a lack of fluency in written and spoken Greek and the need for
university degrees for high-level positions limit the number of Muslims
eligible for government jobs.
Public offices in Thrace do their business in Greek; the courts
provide interpreters as needed. The office of the nomarch (governor) in
Rodopi prefecture, where many ethnic Turks live, has Turkish-language
interpreters available.
Claims of the discriminatory denial of Muslim applications for
business licenses, tractor ownership, or property construction
diminished greatly in recent years, and there were no reports of such
claims during the year. However, the provision of basic public services
(electricity, water, and telephones) in Muslim villages lagged behind
that of non-Muslim areas but continued to improve during the year.
Other than in one multicultural elementary education ``pilot
school,'' the Government does not provide instruction in Greek as a
second language to Turcophone children in the Athens area. Muslim
parents report that their children are unable to succeed in school as a
result of this policy. The Government maintains that Muslims outside
Thrace are not covered by the Treaty of Lausanne and therefore do not
enjoy those rights provided by the treaty.
Muslim leaders also asserted that the Government routinely
withholds permission from Muslims seeking to change their legal
residence, which determines where they vote, from rural to urban
communities within Western Thrace or from elsewhere in Greece to
Thrace. They said that permission to change legal residency from
Western Thrace to elsewhere in Greece was granted readily, and charged
that the practice was part of a government policy to encourage Muslim
emigration from the region and to prevent the urban concentration of
Muslims in Thrace.
The Government refuses to acknowledge formally the existence and
``minority'' status of ethnic groups, principally Slavophones, other
than the Muslim minority specified in the Treaty of Lausanne. As a
result some individuals who define themselves as members of a minority
find it difficult to express their identity freely and to maintain
their culture. Northern Greece is home to an indeterminate number
(estimates range widely, from under 10,000 to 50,000 or more) of
citizens who are descended from Slavophones. Some still speak a Slavic
dialect, particularly in Florina province. A small number of them
identify themselves as belonging to a distinct ethnic group, which they
call ``Macedonian,'' and assert their right to minority status. (These
self-described ethnic ``Macedonians'' are hereafter referred to as
``Macedonians.'') Their assertions generate strong objections among the
2.2 million ethnically and linguistically Greek inhabitants of the
northern Greek region of Macedonia, who use the same term to identify
themselves. The Government refuses to recognize the Slavic dialect as
``Macedonian'' and denies that it is a language distinct from
Bulgarian. Members of the minority assert that the Government pursues a
policy designed to discourage use of their dialect. Greek sensitivity
on this issue stems from concern that members of the ``Macedonian''
minority may have separatist aspirations. Greece's dispute with the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia over that country's name
heightened this sensitivity. Complaints of government harassment and
intimidation directed against these persons decreased significantly.
In July three Muslim Members of Parliament and a number of Greek
human rights organizations issued a letter calling on the Government to
recognize legally the right of self-identification for members of all
minorities, including the Muslim and ``Macedonian'' minorities. Senior
government officials in August reaffirmed an individual, but not a
collective, right of self-identification. The Government continued to
maintain officially that the only ``minority'' in Greece is the Muslim
minority specified in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
The General Secretariat for Adult Education (GSAE), a government
agency, estimates the total Romani population to be 150,000 to 200,000.
Nonofficial sources estimate the total at 250,000 to 300,000. Most of
the Roma in Western Thrace are Muslims; elsewhere the majority are
Greek Orthodox. Many Roma are settled permanently, mainly in the Athens
area. Others are either mobile, working mainly as agricultural
laborers, peddlers, and musicians throughout the country or live in
camps. The GSAE reports that the number of Roma who move around the
country is decreasing gradually as families settle mainly into slums
and camps around major cities. There are approximately 70 Romani camps
with a total camp population between 100,000 and 120,000 persons.
Roma frequently face discrimination in employment and in housing,
particularly when attempting to rent accommodations. They experience
police abuse more frequently than some other groups. There was no
progress in the case of two policemen who shot and killed a Rom in
April 1998 in Partheni who refused to stop his car for inspection. The
trial of a policeman accused of beating two Romani teenagers in
Mesolonghi in May 1998 had yet to begin by year's end.
Romani representatives report that some local authorities refuse to
register Roma as residents in their municipalities. Until registered
with a municipality, no citizen can vote or exercise other civic rights
such as obtaining an official marriage, commercial, or driver's
license, or contributing to social security.
Most Roma camps have no running water or electricity, much less
garbage disposal or sewage treatment. Many exist under the harassment
and threat of eviction by local authorities. For example a camp of some
60 Roma just north of Athens was declared illegal several times by
local authorities despite the families' presence there for 10 to 30
years.
The Ministry of Defense allocated land and houses at a former army
camp in Gonou for the Roma of Evosmos, Thessaloniki, to occupy for the
next 5 years. (The 3,500 Roma were evicted in 1998 from their home of
some 30 years and then evicted from 4 other sites in the following 15
days.) However, necessary renovations to the camp had not yet been made
by year's end. Human rights monitors charge that the Government delayed
renovating the camp in reaction to the protests of neighboring
residents who do not want the Roma in their vicinity.
In February the deputy mayor of Aspropyrgos led a group of local
officials in bulldozing and burning the camp of a neighboring
settlement of approximately 100 Roma who had settled on a resident's
private property. Reportedly, 3 days before the incident, the same
local government official ordered the Roma's water supply cut off.
Government policy is to encourage the integration of Roma. The
Prime Minister has designated a member of his staff to coordinate the
efforts of all government ministries having a role in their
integration. Poverty, illiteracy, and social prejudice nevertheless
continue to plague large parts of the Romani population; these problems
are most severe among the Roma who are mobile or who live in slums.
Although the GSAE conducts education and training programs for them,
the illiteracy rate among Roma is estimated at 80 percent. The Ministry
of Education established a system of identity cards designed to permit
students to change schools easily as their parents move and is
developing a system of satellite schools for Romani settlements.
The integration of Roma into social security systems is quite low.
It is estimated that 90 percent of Roma are not insured by the public
social security systems, since they are unable or unwilling to make the
required contributions. Like other qualified citizens, indigent Roma
are entitled to free health care. However, their access to health care
at times is hindered by the fact that their encampments are located far
from public health facilities.
The Ministry of Health and Welfare continued work on projects to
address the chronic problems of the Roma community. The projects
include training courses for civil servants, policemen, and teachers to
``increase sensitivity to the problems of the Roma,'' the development
of teaching materials for Roma children, and the establishment of youth
centers in areas close to Roma communities. The Ministry already has
established six such centers.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the law provide
for the right of association. All workers, with the exception of the
military, have the right to form or join unions. Police have the right
to form unions but not to strike.
Approximately 26 percent of workers (nearly 650,000 persons) are
organized in unions. Unions receive most of their funding from a
Ministry of Labor organization, the Workers' Hearth, which distributes
mandatory contributions from employees and employers. Workers,
employers, and the state are represented in equal numbers on the board
of directors of the Workers' Hearth. Approximately 10 public sector
unions have dues-withholding provisions in their contracts, in addition
to receiving Workers' Hearth subsidies.
Over 4,000 unions are grouped into regional and sectoral
federations and 2 umbrella confederations, 1 for civil servants and 1,
the General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), for private sector
employees. The GSEE and the Civil Servants' Confederation (ADEDY)
announced in 1998 that they would merge in 2000. Unions are highly
politicized, and there are party-affiliated factions within the labor
confederations, but day-to-day operations are not controlled by
political parties or the Government. There are no restrictions on who
may serve as a union official.
Legal restrictions on strikes include a mandatory period of notice,
which is 4 days for public utilities and 24 hours for the private
sector. Legislation mandates a skeleton staff during strikes affecting
public services, such as electricity, transportation, communications,
and banking. Public utility companies, state-owned banks, the postal
service, Olympic Airways, and the railroads also are required to
maintain a skeleton staff during strikes.
The courts have the power to declare strikes illegal, although such
decisions seldom are enforced. However, unions complain that this
judicial power serves as a deterrent to some of their members from
participating in strikes. The courts declared some strikes illegal
during the year for reasons such as failure of the union to give
adequate advance notice of the strike or the addition of demands by the
union during the course of the strike. However, no striking workers
were prosecuted.
Fewer strikes took place during the year than ever before, and
those that occurred were fairly brief and nondisruptive. Strikes by
public sector employees, including mass transport employees, lasted
between 1 and 5 days and primarily concerned securing timely pay
increases and providing greater job security.
Unions are free to join international associations and maintain a
variety of international affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Legislation
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively in the
private sector and in public corporations. These rights are respected
in practice. There are no restrictions on collective bargaining for
private sector employees.
In 1997 and 1998 civil servants were accorded the right to organize
and bargain collectively with the Ministry of Public Administration.
The civil servants confederation conducted official negotiations with
the Ministry of Interior for the first time in 1999.
In response to union complaints that most labor disputes ended in
compulsory arbitration, legislative remedies were enacted in 1989
providing for mediation procedures, with compulsory arbitration as a
last resort. Legislation in 1992 established a National Mediation,
Reconciliation, and Arbitration Organization and applies to the private
sector and public corporations (the military and civil service
excluded).
Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. The Labor Inspectorate or a
court investigates complaints of discrimination against union members
or organizers. Court rulings have mandated the reinstatement of
improperly fired union organizers. Three free trade zones operate
according to EU regulations. The labor laws apply equally in these
zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits all forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children, and the Ministry of Justice enforces this prohibition;
however, women and girls are trafficked into the country for the
purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The Government may
declare the ``civil mobilization'' of workers in the event of danger to
national security, life, property, or the social and economic life of
the country. The International labor Organization (ILO) Committee of
Experts has criticized this power as violating the standards of ILO
Convention 29 on forced labor. The Government did not resort to civil
mobilization during the year.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment in the industrial sector is
15 years, with higher limits for certain activities. The minimum age is
12 years in family businesses, theaters, and the cinema. These age
limits are enforced by occasional Labor Inspectorate spot checks and
generally are observed. However, families engaged in agriculture, food
service, and merchandising often have younger family members assisting
them, at least part time. The Constitution contains a blanket
prohibition of compulsory labor. Although no specific legislation
explicitly prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, such
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Collective bargaining between
the GSEE and the Employers' Association determines a nationwide minimum
wage. The Ministry of Labor routinely ratifies this minimum wage, which
has the force of law and applies to all workers. The minimum wage of
$21.30 (6,700 drachma) daily and $476.90 (149,730 drachma) monthly,
effective July 1, is sufficient to provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family. The maximum legal workweek is 40 hours in the
private sector and 37\1/2\ hours in the public sector. The law provides
for at least one 24-hour rest period per week, mandates paid vacation
of 1 month per year, and sets limits on overtime.
Legislation provides for minimum standards of occupational health
and safety. Although the GSEE has characterized health and safety
legislation as satisfactory, it charged that enforcement, the
responsibility of the Labor Inspectorate, was inadequate. Recent
legislation places the Labor Inspectorate under a central authority in
compliance with ILO Convention 81. Workers do not have the legal right
to remove themselves from situations that they believe endanger their
health. However, they do have the right to lodge a confidential
complaint with the Labor Inspectorate. Inspectors have the right to
close down machinery or a process for a period of up to 5 days if they
see safety or health hazards that they believe represent an imminent
danger to the workers.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically
criminalize trafficking in persons, but other statutes in the Penal
Code are used to prosecute such cases. Arrests and court cases for
prostitution by unlicensed foreign women, and cases against their
traffickers, reportedly have increased.
Trafficking in women for prostitution in Greece has increased
sharply in recent years. While the Government is stiffening its border
controls, in part because of the EU Schengen Agreement requirements,
there are fissures through which many women are brought into the
country from neighboring Bulgaria, Albania, or the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia.
According to a Panteion University study, 75 percent of foreign
female prostitutes are not told why they are being brought to Greece.
Some women arrive as ``tourists'' or illegal immigrants who seek work
and are lured into prostitution by club owners who threaten them with
deportation. Some women are kidnaped from their homes by their fellow
countrymen and smuggled into Greece where they are ``sold'' to local
pimps. The victims of this practice are often minors. Frequently,
connections exist between illegal prostitution and other criminal
activities.
____
HUNGARY
Hungary is a parliamentary democracy with a freely elected
legislative assembly. Prime Minister Viktor Orban, the leader of the
FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party, heads a coalition Government formed after
elections in May 1998 by FIDESZ, the Independent Smallholders' Party,
and the Hungarian Democratic Forum. The Government respects the
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary.
The internal and external security services report directly to a
minister without portfolio, and the police report to the Interior
Minister. There continued to be credible reports of police abuses,
although their frequency has declined compared with previous years.
Through its macroeconomic policies and extensive privatization, the
Government demonstrated its commitment to the transition to a market
economy. The private sector generates about 80 percent of gross
domestic product. Services, trade, and government employ about 45.5
percent of the labor force. The proportion of the labor force involved
in industry is almost 53 percent. Major exports include manufactured
goods (39 percent) and machinery and transport equipment (50 percent).
An estimated 25 percent of the population live in poverty, with elderly
pensioners, dependent housewives and children, and Roma most affected.
Romani leaders and civic organizations claim that socioeconomic
conditions for the Romani minority have worsened since the change of
regime in 1989.
The Government generally respected the human rights and civil
liberties of its citizens; however, there were problems in some areas.
Although the authorities addressed problems in specific cases, police
continued to use excessive force against suspects. Police also harassed
and abused both Roma and foreign nationals. In practice the authorities
do not always ensure due process in all cases. Prosecutors and judges
may impose what amounts to unlimited pretrial detention, although the
Government expanded legal provisions for the right to fair trial.
Unlike in 1998, there were no reports that police entered private
residences without warrants to check foreigners' identification.
The electronic media are a mix of state-owned and privately owned
radio and television, with private stations dominating audience share
by a wide, and ever-widening, margin. The Government publicly declared
its intention to ``balance'' the media, in order to encourage more
extensive attention to the conservative values and themes that the
Government promotes. Many members of the governing coalition believe
that liberal, opposition-leaning journalists are overrepresented in the
state-owned media. The center-right coalition used its influence over
personnel and advertising decisions to attempt to alter the content of
some news programs broadcast on state media. This led to complaints by
opposition politicians of unfair media treatment. Spousal abuse of
women, sexual harassment, and discrimination in the job market remain
serious problems. Steps were implemented to improve the rights of women
and persons with disabilities. Anti-Semitic and racist attacks
persisted, but the numbers have been declining over the past several
years. Societal discrimination against Roma remains a serious problem.
Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
Trials began in a number of cases of men charged with crimes
against humanity for shooting into crowds of demonstrators with machine
gun fire and for throwing hand grenades, all at the time of the 1956
Revolution. The defendants were tried in 1993. At the time, they were
charged with murder, but acquitted because the 15-year statute of
limitations for such a charge had passed. The new trial became possible
after the Supreme Court overturned the previous verdicts in June,
stating that these cases should be tried as war crimes, which have no
time limit. In these cases, the issue before the courts is whether each
specific individual is guilty of a war crime, an argument that can be
made because a civil war was in progress at the time, and all
defendants were members of the border guards, police, or military.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other such practices. No
known incidents of torture occurred; however, there is an ongoing
investigation into the allegation--made by a confessed mass murderer--
that his confession was obtained under torture. Police abuses
continued, including use of excessive force, beatings of suspects, and
harassment. Police also continued to harass and physically abuse Roma
and foreign nationals. In 1998 2,296 reports of police abuse were
filed. Of these complaints, only 312 resulted in court cases. In 845
cases, no investigation occurred. Many of the cases that did make it
into the court system are still underway, so no accurate data on
convictions are available. Historically, 10 to 15 percent of such cases
result in conviction. Punishments include fines, probation, and the
imposition of suspended sentences. In 1997 the Budapest central
district court sentenced four police officers to 1 to 2\1/2\ years in
prison for the exceptionally severe beating of a detainee under
interrogation. The appeals court suspended the sentences, and three out
of the four officers continue to serve as police officers. According to
a report by the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, persons detained by
police complain of abuse, but very few file official complaints because
they do not expect positive results and fear that the complaint may
affect their cases adversely. Some sources attribute the rise in
numbers of reports of police abuse to a growing willingness to seek
official redress in these instances. The Romani minority community and
dark-skinned foreigners are the most common victims of police abuse,
with Roma bearing the brunt. After a nationally broadcast news program,
carried on a privately owned channel, reported in March on police
brutality in Hajduhadhaz, police arrested and beat a Rom who was
interviewed on the program. Two other Roma who also appeared in the
program went into hiding out of fear of further retaliation. In June
the Ministry of Interior admitted that Hajduhadhaz had the highest
level of reported police violence in the country and that half of the
town's police force was under investigation for allegations of abuse. A
Roma rights organization reported that in Budapest in June, three
police officers beat and kicked a Romani university student as he
walked through a park. When the man told the officers that he would
report their abuse, they beat him further. The Rom filed a lawsuit
against the officers involved. Despite such occurrences, the Ombudsman
for Minority Affairs believes that the situation is, at worst,
remaining constant, and possibly is marginally better.
The police and Interior Ministry are working to change the police's
authoritarian image, and human rights organizations report that police
generally are more cooperative with outside monitoring of police
behavior. However, these efforts are hampered by low salaries and a
lack of physical resources. A 1997 study by the ombudsman's office,
which investigates constitutional violations in the public sector,
condemned police corruption but noted that it was unsurprising that it
existed, given police officers' low pay and poor working conditions.
The ombudsman found that working conditions in the vast majority of
police offices were unsuitable.
Police frequently harass foreign residents, although the former
practice of charging questionable fines for traffic violations to earn
petty cash appears to have ceased, as the law regarding collection of
fines has changed. There were no reports of this kind of activity
during the year. At times, police showed indifference towards
foreigners who have been victims of street crime.
Prisons are overcrowded but meet minimum international standards.
The population of prisons and detention centers as of September was
15,153, or 151 percent of capacity. (This is an increase of almost
1,000 prisoners from the end of 1998.) A further increase in prison
population is expected due to a 1998 change in the law that altered the
meaning of a ``life sentence.'' Previously, this was interpreted as 15
to 25 years; the new law extends the sentence to 20 to 30 years, with
an allowance for an actual sentence of life in prison, on the second
occasion of receiving such a sentence. The average age of prisoners is
now under 30. Between 70 and 80 percent of prisoners earn wages while
in prison, either from work performed in prison, or from work-release
programs. Some programs allow prisoners to spend weekends at home. A
recent change in philosophy led to more efforts to rehabilitate
criminals for their eventual return to normal life. According to
officials, the general health of prisoners declined in the last few
years. The chief ombudsman issued a report on prison conditions and
facilities in 1997 that is expected to lead to the closure of the
Veszprem prison as soon as a new facility is built. The report also
included a survey among prisoners about alleged abuse, which concluded
that abuse by prison personnel was not a problem.
The Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police must inform
suspects upon arrest of the charges against them but may hold them for
a maximum of 72 hours before filing charges. The law requires that all
suspects be allowed access to counsel prior to questioning and
throughout all subsequent proceedings. The authorities must provide
counsel for juveniles, the indigent, and the mentally disabled.
Credible reports suggest that police do not always allow access to
counsel, particularly for minor crimes. Bail is to be available for
citizens as well when a new Criminal Code enters into force in January
2000. It is currently available to foreigners, but rarely is used.
The Police Act permits police to hold suspects in public security
detention (PSD) in cases in which the suspect has no identity papers;
in which blood or urine tests must be performed to determine blood
alcohol content; or if the suspect continues to commit a misdemeanor
offense in spite of prior warning. Suspects may be held in PSD for up
to 24 hours. Such detainees are not always informed of the charges
against them, because such periods of ``short'' detention are not
defined as ``criminal detention'' and so are not considered to be
covered by the Criminal Code.
Pretrial detention, based on a warrant issued by a judge, is
initially limited to 1 year while criminal investigations are in
progress; it may be extended indefinitely on the prosecutor's motion
(provided the judge concurs). According to the new Criminal Procedure
Law, pretrial detention is to be limited to a maximum of 3 years, after
which the case expires automatically if formal charges are not brought.
The lack of a bail system gives tremendous leeway to the judge. In 1996
the average length of pretrial detention was 3 to 6 months, although
nearly 10 percent of detainees were held for periods ranging from 8 to
12 months (most recent figures available). In addition, foreigners
usually are held until their trial since they are considered likely to
flee the country. Roma allege that they are kept in pretrial detention
longer and more frequently than non-Roma (see Section 1.e.). The law
provides for compensation when a detainee is released for lack of
evidence, but the procedure rarely is exercised since detainees must
undertake a complicated legal procedure to pursue their claims. The
Minister of Justice, on behalf of the State, decides on compensation.
The amount depends on the case and can cover the costs of the trial,
attorney's fees, lost wages, and some other miscellaneous sums.
The law does not provide for exile, and it is not employed.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair, although
sometimes slow, process.
Under the Constitution, the courts are responsible for the
administration of justice, with the Supreme Court exercising control
over the operations and judicial procedure of all the courts. There are
three levels of courts. Original jurisdiction in most matters rests
with the local courts. Appeals of their rulings may be made to the
county courts or to the Budapest municipal court, which have original
jurisdiction in other matters. The highest level of appeal is the
Supreme Court, whose decisions on constitutional issues are binding. In
the case of military trials, appeals also may be addressed to the
Supreme Court. A fourth level of courts is to be created when the new
Criminal Procedure Law goes into effect in January 2000. A new court of
appeal is to be inserted between the metropolitan/county court and the
Supreme Court. Established initially in Budapest, Szeged, and Pecs,
these courts are designed to alleviate the current backlog of court
cases and permit lower courts to hear simple cases. Critics of the new
system charge that it would instead slow court procedures and increase
costs. Although passed and signed by Parliament, the Government delayed
indefinitely the implementation of the new level of courts, citing
budgetary constraints. In the fall, Parliament decided to open only one
of these courts in Budapest after January 2002. A National Judicial
Council (NJC) was established in 1997 to nominate judicial appointees
and oversee the judicial budget process. The NJC will also oversee the
implementation of the fourth level of courts.
The Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing the
constitutionality of laws and statutes brought before it. Citizens may
appeal directly to the Constitutional Court if they believe that their
constitutional rights have been violated. Parliament elects the Court's
members for 9-year terms, which may be renewed, although this never has
happened. The retirement age of the Constitutional Court judges is 70
years. Parliament debated lifting the retirement age of judges but made
no decision. No judge or member of the Supreme or Constitutional Courts
may belong to a political party or engage in political activity.
The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and the authorities
respected this right in practice. Counsel is appointed for indigent
clients, but public defenders are paid poorly--less than $5 (1,000 Huf)
for the first hour of the trial and less than $2.50 (500 Huf) for each
additional hour--and do not give indigent defendants priority; lawyers
often meet such clients for the first time at trial.
In selected cases judges may agree to a closed trial to protect the
accused or the crime victim, such as in some rape cases. In October
1998, the victim protection office was established in the Ministry of
the Interior. Under the new Criminal Procedure Law, witnesses (and in
some cases, victims, judges, and translators) are to be protected by
having their personal data kept closed, in a separate location from the
case files. For specially protected witnesses, court appearances are
unnecessary; they are to be questioned personally by the judge. In July
Parliament passed a resolution calling for a new victim protection
plan, which would provide new identities and homes for victims. A bill
must be submitted by December 31, 2001. There is no jury system; hence
judges are the final arbiters. Under the new Criminal Procedure Law,
prosecutors are to have greater influence over their cases. Plea
bargaining, which is known as a ``trial waiver,'' is now available to
prosecutors.
Defendants are entitled to counsel during all phases of criminal
proceedings and are presumed innocent until proven guilty. Judicial
proceedings are generally investigative rather than adversarial in
nature. The public defender system provides generally substandard
service. (There is no public defender's office, as such; private
attorneys may or may not choose to serve in this capacity. Since public
defenders are paid only for the hours spent in trial, little to no
preparation is done and lawyers often meet their clients for the first
time at the trial.)
Military trials follow civil law and may be closed if national
security or moral grounds so justify. In all cases, sentencing must
take place publicly.
Many human rights and Romani organizations claim that Roma receive
less than equal treatment in the judicial process. Specifically, they
allege that Roma are kept in pretrial detention more often and for
longer periods of time than non-Roma. This allegation is credible in
light of general discrimination against Roma; however, there is no
statistical evidence because identifying the ethnicity of offenders is
not allowed under the data protection law. Since the majority of Roma
fall into the lowest economic strata, they also suffer from the lack of
good legal counsel and from unenthusiastic representation.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides that the prosecutor's office may
issue search warrants. Police must carry out house searches in the
presence of two witnesses and must prepare a written inventory of items
removed from the premises. Wiretapping, which may be done for national
security reasons and for legitimate criminal investigations, requires a
court's permission. These provisions appear to be observed in practice.
During the year, there were no publicized reports that police entered
private residences without warrants to check foreigners'
identification.
In August 1998, Prime Minister Orban stated that FIDESZ politicians
and their families were the targets of illegal secret surveillance in
1997. Orban claimed that the investigators, whose identity he did not
reveal, sought damaging information to use in the spring 1998
elections. Opposition (former government) leaders vigorously denied the
accusations. Parliament formed a committee to investigate the matter,
and this committee has met several times with no conclusive result. All
that has been established is that a businesswoman with close ties to
the Socialist Party asked a parliamentary guard to surveil a FIDESZ
Member of Parliament who had attacked her in a speech in Parliament.
The committee's investigation is ongoing.
section 2. respect for civil liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects this right
in practice. However, during the year the FIDESZ-led coalition
Government actively attempted to counterbalance what it considers a
leftwing bias in news coverage through its influence on personnel
decisions within the state-owned media. Nonetheless, a wide variety of
views and opinions is available among the highly competitive print and
broadcast media.
After the transition from communism, the majority of print media
outlets were purchased by foreign publishing companies. In addition,
numerous new publications made the local print market much more
competitive. Political opposition sources claim that this competition
was utilized by the coalition in its attempt to ``balance'' the print
media, some elements of which the Government views as too liberal and
anticoalition. Advertisements from state-owned companies and financial
institutions were awarded to progovernment papers, which also tend to
receive better access to government sources.
Parliament passed a media law in 1995 creating institutions
designed to foster a free and independent electronic media. The law
provided for the creation of nationwide commercial television and radio
and was intended to insulate the remaining public service media from
government control. The National Television and Radio Board (ORTT), the
regulatory agency created by the 1995 Media Law, has continued to
monitor news broadcasts for equal treatment of all political parties.
Several commercial stations were warned publicly by the ORTT during the
year for giving more time to one party over others.
The state broadcast media began the process of laying off
journalists and administrative personnel to reduce their huge payrolls.
Opposition figures accuse them of firing journalists with opposition
views and retaining those who favor the coalition.
Academic freedom generally is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There are
essentially no restrictions on peaceful public gatherings. In general
the Government does not require permits for assembly except when a
public gathering is to take place near sensitive installations, such as
military facilities, embassies, or key government buildings. Police
sometimes may alter or revoke permits, but there is no evidence that
they abuse this right.
Any 10 or more persons may form an association, provided that it
does not commit criminal offenses or disturb the rights of others.
Associations with charters and elected officers must register with the
courts.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and members of all faiths are allowed to practice their
religion freely. There are 79 officially recognized religions. There is
no preferred religion, although not all religions receive state
support. State support is in the form of funds negotiated each year
between the Ministry of Cultural Heritage and the Finance Ministry. In
1998 the four major, or ``historical,'' religions (Catholic, Calvinist,
Lutheran, and Jewish) received $14.2 million (3.2 billion Huf) in
government support. A 1996 law allows citizens to donate 1 percent of
their taxes to any religion, and a 1997 law extended this option by
allowing citizens to donate 1 percent to any religion and 1 percent to
a civil organization or public institution. In 1998 500,000 persons
(about 5 percent of the population) used this provision to donate $4.3
million (1 billion Huf) to religions. In 1997 the Government signed a
treaty with the Vatican to return church property confiscated by the
Communist regime; the treaty also provided for a minimum state payment
(separate from the annual negotiated support) of $7.8 million (1.7
billion Huf). Similar compacts were signed with the country's three
other historical religions in 1998. The Jewish community receives $2.6
million (608 million Huf) and the Calvinist and Lutheran Churches each
are entitled to $4.3 million (1 billion Huf). Religious schools receive
support per child in the same way that state schools do. Religious
orders and schools have regained some property confiscated by the
Communist regime.
In 1997 Parliament established the Jewish Heritage Public
Foundation to provide restitution in the form of life pensions to
17,800 Holocaust survivors born before May 9, 1945. An additional 2,040
persons are to receive pensions automatically when they reach 60 years
of age. In a 1998 agreement with the Jewish community on confiscated
properties, the Government made a compensatory payment of $2.6 million
(608 million Huf) and returned nine properties.
Several synagogues have been built since World War II, generally
replacing older demolished synagogues. The first completely new
synagogue built since the war was constructed in 1998 at a Jewish
summer camp in Szarvas.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on the
movement of citizens within or outside the country, including on the
rights of emigration and repatriation. However, local authorities have
in some cases tried to expel Roma from towns or have taken advantage of
situations (eviction for nonpayment of bills or condemnation of Roma
homes) to relocate and concentrate Romani populations, in effect
creating ghettos. The Government may delay but not deny emigration for
those who have significant court-assessed debts or who possess state
secrets. Those with about $40,000 (over 10 million Huf) in public debt
may be denied travel documents. The Government requires that foreigners
from countries that do not have a visa waiver agreement with Hungary
obtain exit visas each time they leave the country, although blanket
permission sometimes is available.
A total of 5,688 refugees from the former Yugoslavia are registered
in Hungary. Most are in private housing, with only 500 housed in 3
refugee camps, or ``reception centers,'' run by the Office of Migration
and Refugee Affairs (ORMA). In addition to these three government-owned
camps, two additional temporary camps are used through contracts with
the nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) that run them. They have been
operating since 1991 and 1993, largely as a result of the influx of
refugees fleeing the various conflicts and incidents of ethnic
cleansing to the south. The Government estimates that there are as many
as 60,000 immigrants (the vast majority from Romania) living in the
country in unregistered status, although the local office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) believes that this
figure is too high.
The Government provides first asylum and cooperates with the local
office of the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations assisting
refugees. The number of persons who received refugee status increased
from 594 in 1998 (with 2,566 cases pending at year's end) to 1,307 in
the first 8 months of the year, with 4,249 cases pending. (These
figures include both those who were granted refugee status and those
who were ``authorized to stay.'') Of 5,002 applications submitted in
1998 (7,118 persons), 1,077 were Afghan (with an additional 989 Afghans
caught entering the country illegally), and 3,306 were from the former
Yugoslavia. While the high number of Afghan refugees is not unusual,
the significant increase in Yugoslav applicants corresponds with the
onset of the most recent series of crises in Kosovo. In the months
following the cessation of hostilities, many of these applications were
withdrawn, and ORMA authorities believe that many more refugees simply
have gone home. In March 1998, a new law went into effect that lifted
Hungary's geopolitical reservation to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and the Government now
adheres completely to the provisions of this Convention. Under the old
law, the Government only handled claims from European asylum seekers,
and the UNHCR handled all other claims. The increase in caseload
resulting from this change and from events in Kosovo and the resulting
NATO action placed a tremendous strain on the ORMA's resources, leading
to the high number of pending cases and increasing the processing time
per application. Prospective refugees who seek only to transit to
Western Europe are encouraged to return to their countries of
departure. There were approximately 1,700 asylum seekers located in 4
reception centers as of October 1. The Government has been criticized
by NGO's and Western countries for inhuman conditions in detention
facilities and the arbitrary application of asylum procedures. In
February the Parliament's human rights Ombudsman criticized the
conditions in border facilities as ``uncivilized and intolerable.'' In
response to this criticism, the Government agreed to close the worst
facilities; there is an ongoing project to refurbish the border guards'
community shelters. Of the eight currently in operation, three have
been fully refurbished and reopened, and one is expected to reopen
early in 2000. The conditions in these facilities are not good. The
country, which has been dealing with refugee issues on a large scale
for only the past 10 years, has borne a great deal of the refugee
burden resulting from the Kosovo crisis, and the Government has sought
to work with NGO's to improve conditions.
Aliens caught trying to cross the border illegally may apply for
refugee status or are housed temporarily at one of eight border guard
facilities throughout the country pending deportation. At any time
there are between 500 to 600 people in the facilities. Overall, 4,539
illegal aliens were apprehended in the first 8 months of the year.
While police seek the timely deportation of detainees who do not
qualify for refugee status, a shortage of funds and the detainees' lack
of property or documentation, such as passports, often result in
lengthy stays. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens age 18 and over have the right to change their government
through national elections held at least every 4 years. Members of
Parliament are elected through a complex voting procedure for
individuals and party lists. The FIDESZ--Hungarian Democratic Civic
Party heads the coalition with the Smallholders' Party and the
Hungarian Democratic Forum (the latter two parties formed the
government coalition between 1990 and 1994 with the Christian
Democrats, one segment of which later merged with FIDESZ.) The
opposition includes the extreme rightwing Hungarian Justice and Life
Party and two leftwing parties, the Hungarian Socialist Party and the
Free Democrats.
No legal impediments hinder women's participation in government or
the political process, although they are underrepresented in relation
to their percentage of the population; only 33 of 386 parliamentary
representatives are women, and 1 woman serves in the Cabinet. Few women
occupy other leadership positions in the Government or political
parties. Despite the lack of ensured minority representation, there are
several Members of Parliament, including one ethnic German and one
ethnic Slovak, who are members of ethnic minorities; however, none
specifically represents their respective minority populations. There
are no Romani Members of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Numerous human rights organizations operate without government
restriction or interference. Many NGO's report that the Government is
generally responsive to their requests for information. An increasing
number of NGO's are involved in the law-making process. However,
individual police units and prosecutors reportedly are uncooperative at
times, particularly in cases involving Roma or police abuses. There is
also a 21-member parliamentary Committee for Human, Minority, and
Religious rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for individual rights, equality, and
protection against discrimination; however, in practice discrimination
still exists, particularly against Roma. This is due to widespread
prejudice, lack of positive reporting, and lack of opportunity for
advancement.
Women.--Spousal abuse is believed to be common, but the vast
majority of such abuse is not reported, and victims who step forward
often receive little help from authorities. While there are laws
against rape, often it is unreported for cultural reasons. Police
attitudes towards victims of sexual abuse are often reportedly
unsympathetic, particularly if the victim was acquainted with her
abuser. New laws passed in 1997 recognize rape within marriage and
increase the penalties for other sex crimes. Women's rights
organizations claim that 1 woman in 10 is a victim of spousal abuse and
that societal attitudes towards spousal abuse are ``archaic.'' In the
first 8 months of the year there were 2,871 reports of crimes against
family, youth, and sexual morality; there were 4,589 such crimes
reported in 1998. In the first 8 months of 1999 women were the victims
of 67,598 crimes; there were 106,211 such crimes in 1998.
The law does not prohibit sexual harassment in the work place. A
1995 report prepared under the auspices of the U.N. to evaluate
compliance with the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women termed sexual harassment in the workplace as ``virtually
epidemic.'' Women's groups report that there is little support for
efforts to criminalize sexual harassment and that harassment is
tolerated by women who fear unemployment more than harassment. In the
first case of its kind, a woman won a sex discrimination suit against a
potential employer for sex discrimination after the employer advertised
for men only.
Legally, women have the same rights as men, including identical
inheritance and property rights. While there is no overt discrimination
against women, the number of women in middle or upper managerial
positions in business and government remains low, although the number
of women in the police and the military has risen significantly over
the past several years, with significant increase in 1999. Women are
heavily represented in the judiciary and in the medical and teaching
professions. A Women's Representative office was established in the
Ministry of Social and Family Affairs to address women's issues more
effectively.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights.
Education is mandatory through 16 years of age, and employment is
illegal below the age of 15. There is no societal pattern of child
abuse, although NGO's report that neglect and abuse are common in state
care facilities. In 1998 children were the victims of 8,769 crimes. In
the first 8 months of 1999, children were the victims of 5,566 reported
crimes.
People with Disabilities.--Government sources estimate that between
600,000 and 1 million persons (6 to 10 percent of the population) are
disabled. A law that was passed in 1998 requires that all public
buildings be made accessible to the disabled within 10 years. A Council
for the Disabled was established in January, under the chairmanship of
the Minister of Social and Family Affairs. The Council is to serve as
an advisory board to the Government. At present services for the
disabled are limited, and most buildings are not wheelchair accessible.
A 1997 decree requires all companies that employ over 20 persons to
reserve 5 percent of their jobs for the physically or mentally
disabled, with fines of up to 75 percent of the average monthly salary
for noncompliance.
Religious Minorities.--In July two skinhead members of the Arrow
Cross Movement admitted to defacing 15 graves in a Jewish cemetery in
Szombathely. The skinheads painted anti-Semitic graffiti on gravestones
shortly before a Holocaust commemoration was to take place on July 3 in
the cemetery. The desecration was criticized sharply by President
Goncz. On November 10, a municipal court found the two youths guilty
and sentenced one skinhead to 1 year in prison, which was commuted to 3
years' probation, while the second skinhead was sentenced to 8 months
in prison, which was commuted to 2 years' probation.
In August the ``Protocols of the Elder of Zion,'' a notorious anti-
Semitic forgery, was published and available for purchase in a
Hungarian translation for the first time since World War II. The Jewish
community in Nagykoros filed a complaint against the publication with
the Prosecutor General. The publication also was criticized by the
Calvinist Church and the Catholic Church, which expressed concern over
the increasing problem of lack of ``respect and tolerance'' toward
various religious communities. On August 13, the Ministry of National
Cultural Heritage criticized any defamation of religion and announced
that it supported a call by the Confederation of Hungarian Jewish
Communities (MAZSIHISZ) for the publication of a scholarly work in the
country addressing the book's false claims. The Ministry of Culture
later sponsored a lecture and reception to introduce that book.
In November MAZSIHISZ asked the Cabinet to take action against
``Fascist, racist, and anti-Semitic'' outbreaks that were a source of
public concern. The organization objected to the planned rehabilitation
of the country's World War II Prime Minister Laszlo Bardossy, the
desecration of Jewish cemeteries, and the publication of anti-Semitic
books. MAZSIHISZ argued that the law should be changed to prohibit the
denial of the Holocaust. In response to the concerns of the Jewish
Community, Orban tasked an official in the Ministry of Culture to
oversee issues of concern to the Jewish community.
MAZSIHISZ and international Jewish organizations criticized as
unfair a 1998 decision by the Government to provide $128 (30,000 HUF)
each to the heirs of Holocaust victims. In February the president of
MAZSIHISZ said that hundreds of Holocaust survivors were returning
compensation payments to the Government, protesting that the small
amounts were an insult. Previous awards to the heirs of victims
distributed by the Communist regime were $4,255 (1 million Huf). The
Orban Government provided the 30,000 Huf figure as a line item in the
Fiscal Year 1999 budget, stating that this amount was all that could be
paid out without budget imbalances. Opposition parties were seeking to
hold a special parliamentary session on this and other issues, but the
Government was opposed to resolving the issue in this manner. Although
the figure of $128 was accepted originally by the leaders of the Jewish
Community who had negotiated with the Government, it generally is
agreed that the amount is too small, and it is a matter of ongoing
renegotiation. A case is pending against Enrem Kemal arising from two
inflammatory anti-Semitic speeches he made in 1997. Kamal's trial has
been postponed several times since 1997. The trial began in November
and continued at year's end.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The 1993 Law on National and
Ethnic Minorities' Rights recognizes individuals' minority rights, as
well as establishes the concept of collective rights of ethnic
minorities, and states that it is their inalienable collective right to
preserve their ethnic identity. The law also permits associations,
movements, and political parties of an ethnic or national character and
mandates the unrestricted use of ethnic languages. For an ethnic group
to be recognized as such it has to have at least 100 years' presence in
the country, and its members have to be citizens. On this basis,
minority status is granted specifically to 13 national or ethnic groups
(among which Roma are by far the most numerous). Other groups may
petition the Chairman of Parliament for inclusion if they believe that
they fulfill the requirements.
The law considers the establishment of local minority self-
governments a precondition for the enforcement of the rights of ethnic
minorities. For this reason, local minority self-government elections,
in conjunction with local government elections, have been held since
1994. Any of the 13 minorities can set up a minority self-government if
at least 50 valid votes are cast in settlements with fewer than 10,000
inhabitants and if at least 100 votes are cast in larger settlements.
Since ethnicity is not registered officially, voting on minority self-
governments is not limited to the minorities themselves; all the voters
receive a minority ballot in addition to the local government ballot.
The elected local minority self-governments can elect their national
minority self-governments; all 13 minorities have formed national self-
governments.
This model of minority self-government has been criticized mainly
on two grounds: first, several minority representatives have objected
to the fact that members of the majority can vote for minority
candidates and thus influence minority politics. However, no
alternative has been outlined yet since all parties rejected the idea
of registering members of minorities. Second, critics call for an
increase in the competence of the minority self-governments and
considerably more financial resources for them. However, this would
require modification of the law, which is not expected in the near
future.
There were 770 Romani minority self-governments elected in the
local elections in October 1998, a significant increase over the 477
elected self-governments in the first minority elections held in 1994.
The new self-governments began operating in January. Of the 477 elected
in 1994, 396 still are functioning; the discrepancy reflected the
number that ceased functioning between 1994 and 1998 due to a lack of
funds. All of the Romani self-governments elected in 1998 were still
operating. With some funding from the central budget and some
logistical support from local governments, these bodies seek to
influence and oversee matters affecting minorities. The Romani minority
poses a special challenge for the system of national minority self-
governments. In contrast to other minorities for whom the preservation
of their identity and culture is the basic goal, the Roma also have to
contend with the fact that they generally belong to the lowest socio-
economic strata of Hungarian society. Ethnicity and poverty coincide
with Roma; therefore, the Romani self-governments are faced with the
task of improving the lives of their constituents with no additional
resources. The concept of minority self-governments is in itself new,
and policies still are evolving.
In 1995 Parliament appointed an Ombudsman--currently an ethnic
German--specifically charged with defending minority rights.
Roma constitute at least 5 percent of the population, with some
estimates going as high as 9 percent. In view of the higher birth rate
among Roma, compared with the general decline in the Hungarian
population, this percentage is likely to remain constant or grow. This
fact causes concern among a substantial portion of the majority
population. Germans, the second largest minority group, constitute
about 2 percent of the population. Smaller communities of Slovaks,
Croats, Romanians, Poles, Ukrainians, Greeks, Serbs, Slovenes,
Armenians, Ruthenians, and Bulgarians are recognized as ethnic
minorities. A new census is to be conducted in 2000. Ethnicity and
religion are only optional questions, so this may or may not provide a
more accurate estimate of the actual numbers of the minority
populations.
Education is available to varying degrees in almost all minority
languages. There are minority-language print media, and the state-run
radio broadcasts 2-hour daily programs in the mother tongue of major
nationalities, i.e., Romani, Slovak, Romanian, German, Croatian, and
Serbian. State-run television carries a 30-minute program for the
larger minority groups, complemented by 5-minute weekly news bulletins.
Conditions of life for the Romani community are significantly worse
than among the general population. Roma suffer from discrimination and
racist attacks and are considerably less educated, with lower than
average incomes and life expectancy. The unemployment rate for Roma is
estimated to be 70 percent, over seven times the national average. With
unemployment benefits exhausted and social services stretched thin,
Roma often confront desperate situations. The Government plans to
reduce the limit on unemployment benefits from 1 year to 9 months,
which will affect the Romani community disproportionately, with its
high unemployment rate, and exacerbate the poverty of this large
segment of society. This is likely in turn to reinforce negative
stereotypes of Roma as poor, shiftless, and a social burden.
Roma continue to suffer widespread discrimination in education,
housing, and access to public institutions, including restaurants and
pubs. Roma and other civic organizations highlighted the practice of
placing Roma children in remedial education programs designed for
children with mental disabilities or low academic performance,
resulting in a form of de facto segregation. Although the children
could be returned to the regular school system, only a small percentage
return. On September 6, the Minister of Education and the parliamentary
Ombudsman for Minority Rights announced at a press conference that
there is segregation in the country's educational system. The statement
followed the publication of a report by the Ombudsman's office that
found that the high proportion of Romani children in ``special
schools'' for the mentally disabled was a sign of prejudice and a
failure of the public education system. Schools for Roma are more
crowded, more poorly equipped, and in markedly poorer condition than
those attended by non-Roma. Only 1.5 percent of the Romani community
graduate from high school, while 0.001 percent graduate from college or
university. There are programs aimed at increasing these numbers (the
Romaversitas program supports Romani students finishing degrees in
institutions of higher education, and there is a Department of Roma
Studies in the Teachers' Training College in Pecs). Nonetheless, the
impact has yet to be significant. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee
found that there are 132 segregated schools throughout the country. The
Government contests these claims of human rights organizations and
states that the Romani schools are designed to provide intensive help
for disadvantaged children. An interministerial committee was
established in the fall and is led by the Minister of Justice. This
committee was tasked with assigning Romani affairs desk officers in
each ministry. There is currently such a desk officer in the Ministry
of Education, who is himself a Rom.
In what is considered a landmark case, in July 1998 a court ordered
a bar owner in the city of Pecs to pay a $750 fine and take out a
newspaper advertisement apologizing for refusing to serve a Rom.
Local officials have in some cases taken advantage of rules
prohibiting overcrowded, unsafe, or unsanitary housing, or have
punished nonpayment of utility bills by evicting Roma families, among
others, from residences without providing alternative housing as the
law requires. The Government sponsors programs both to preserve Romani
languages and cultural heritage and to assist social and economic
assimilation. Oversight and budgetary control of the Coordination
Council for Roma Affairs and the Office of National Ethnic Minorities
were shifted from the Prime Minister's Office to the Ministry of
Justice. In July the Government published an action plan designed to
improve living conditions in Romani communities, with specific focus on
public health, education, and work training. However, the plan provides
no additional funds; rather, it redistributes already inadequate
resources.
Widespread popular prejudice against Roma continues. Police
commonly abuse them (see Section 1.c.). Foreigners of color reported
harassment by police and at border control checkpoints. The Martin
Luther King Organization (MLKO), which documents assaults on nonwhites,
reports a gradual decrease in the number of such incidents over the
past several years, with three such cases in the first 9 months of the
year. However, MLKO sources believe that many cases go unreported.
In 1997 changes to the Penal Code made it easier to enforce and
stiffen penalties for hate crimes committed on the basis of the
victim's ethnicity, race, or nationality.
On February 14, hundreds of neo-Nazis battled police in a bar in
Budapest after an international gathering of skinheads on February 13
commemorating the end of the 1944-45 siege of Budapest. After a clash
that began when neo-Nazis attacked police officers on routine patrol,
eight police officers were injured and 34 protesters were taken into
custody. Authorities expelled 26 of the foreign neo-Nazis from the
country, and police arrested 8 skinheads (including 2 Hungarian
citizens). On February 25, a court found six of the neo-Nazis guilty of
a ``group attack'' and declared them personae non grata.
On August 29, a group of approximately 30 persons attacked a Romani
family in a village near Nyiregyhaza. The attackers beat male members
of the family, eight of whom were treated in the hospital for injuries.
Local police reported that they interrogated two suspects in the case.
On October 17, a group of skinheads attacked two Roma at a pub in
Kakucs. One Rom suffered serious injuries as a result of the beating.
Local police began an investigation in the case, but no results were
reported by year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor Code recognizes the
right of unions to organize and bargain collectively and permits trade
union pluralism. Workers have the right to associate freely, choose
representatives, publish journals, and openly promote members'
interests and views. With the exception of military personnel and
police officers, they also have the right to strike. Under a separate
1992 law, public servants may negotiate working conditions, but the
final decision on increasing salaries rests with Parliament.
The largest labor union organization is the National Confederation
of Hungarian Trade Unions, the successor to the former monolithic
Communist union, with over 735,000 members. The Democratic League of
Independent Unions and the Federation of Workers' Councils have
approximately 100,000 and 56,000 members, respectively.
On January 4, the Free Union of Railway Workers (one of three major
unions of railway workers) went on strike over a dispute about wage
increases, after the other two unions had signed a contract. The
striking workers returned to work on January 8, after a labor court
ruled that the strike was illegal. The decision was overturned a few
months later by a court of second instance, which ruled that the union
did not have to pay damages.
There are no restrictions on trade union contacts with
international organizations, and unions have developed a wide range of
ties with European and international trade union bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Code
permits collective bargaining at the enterprise and industry level,
although the practice is not widespread and is discouraged actively in
the growing private sector. Labor organizations appear willing to
cooperate with one another, and this is particularly evident in their
relationship in forums such as the National Labor Affairs Council
(OMT), which succeeded the Interest Reconciliation Council in April and
which provides a forum for tripartite consultation among
representatives from management, employees, and the Government. The OMT
discusses issues such as wage increases and the setting of the minimum
wage, which is negotiated centrally within the OMT in order to control
inflation. Individual trade unions and management may negotiate higher
wages at the plant level. The new Government disbanded the Ministry of
Labor and split its work between the Ministry of Economy (covering
policy issues) and the newly created Ministry of Social and Family
Affairs (covering employment issues and responsible for drafting labor-
related legislation). Employers are prohibited from discriminating
against unions and their organizers. The Ministry of Social and Family
Affairs enforces this provision.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and
the Ministry of Social and Family Affairs enforces this prohibition.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children (see
Section 6.c.). The Labor Code forbids labor by children under the age
of 15 and regulates labor conditions for minors (14 to 16 years of
age), including prohibitions on night shifts, hard physical labor, and
guaranteed overtime payments. The National Labor Center enforces these
regulations in practice, and there does not appear to be any
significant abuse of this statute. Education is compulsory through age
16. Roma are far more likely than non-Roma to stop attending school
before age 16. The Government converted the family allowance into a
school attendance allowance in September. This measure was intended to
``force'' children to go to school, but some Romani NGO's fear that
this may be another form of discrimination against Roma, many of whom
live in small villages with no high schools within manageable distance.
Furthermore, the extreme poverty of many Roma makes it difficult for
them to clothe their children appropriately for school. Taking away the
family allowance is thus seen by Roma as punishment for not doing
something they cannot afford, while it is seen by the Government as a
way to provide incentives for greater commitment to education among
Roma and as an effort to end a cycle of poverty in which impoverished
Roma bring up large and illiterate families, whose members themselves
later may become public burdens.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The OMT establishes the legal
minimum wage, which is subsequently implemented by Ministry of Social
and Family Affairs decree. The minimum wage, $95 (22,500 Huf) per
month, is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. This is only 35 percent of the average wage. Many
workers supplement their primary employment with second jobs, and there
are reports that many citizens, while officially earning the minimum
wage, actually make more. Reporting the minimum wage is a way for both
employer and employee to avoid paying higher taxes.
The Labor Code specifies various conditions of employment,
including termination procedures, severance pay, maternity leave, trade
union consultation rights in some management decisions, annual and sick
leave entitlement, and labor conflict resolution procedures. Under the
Code, the official workday is set at 8 hours; however, it may vary
depending upon the nature of the industry. A 24-hour rest period is
required during any 7-day period.
Labor courts and the Ministry of Social and Family Affairs enforce
occupational safety standards set by the Government, but specific
safety conditions generally are not consonant with internationally
accepted standards. The enforcement of occupational safety standards is
not always effective in part due to the limited resources that the
Ministry of Social and Family Affairs and the Ministry of Economics are
able to commit to enforcement. In theory, workers have the right to
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the country was once primarily
a source for women and children trafficked for the purpose of forced
prostitution, it increasingly is a transit and destination point as
well. The penalty for trafficking is between 1 and 5 years in prison;
however, if an organized trafficking ring is involved, the sentence can
be doubled. A recent amendment to the alien law provides for immediate
expulsion from the country of foreign traffickers. The Government has
concluded agreements with 10 European countries to facilitate improved
police cooperation to combat organized crime and trafficking in
persons. However, prosecution of traffickers is difficult since there
is no legislation to protect victims. Parliament passed a resolution in
July that called for a victim protection plan; however, the plan was
not implemented at year's end, nor was it aimed primarily at victims of
trafficking. Branches of a new Victim Protection Office, which provide
psychological support services and legal advocacy for victims,
safeguard their rights, and attempt to minimize the trauma of trials,
began operating in a few towns in the fall. This office does not deal
exclusively or even primarily with victims of trafficking. Many of the
victims of trafficking are brought to the country by organized crime
syndicates, either for work in Budapest's thriving sex industry or for
transit to Western Europe or North America. Russian-speaking organized
crime syndicates are active in trafficking women primarily from Ukraine
and other countries of the former Soviet Union to the European Union
via Hungary.
The International Organization for Migration launched a program
funded by the European Union to raise awareness of the problem of
trafficking and to educate potential victims in November.
______
ICELAND
Iceland is a constitutional republic and a parliamentary democracy
in which citizens periodically choose their representatives in free and
fair multiparty elections. The judiciary is independent.
Elected officials control the police force, which scrupulously
observes and enforces the laws that ensure protection of human rights.
Iceland has a mixed, open economy that provides residents with a
high standard of living. The leading exports, fish and other marine
products, account for almost 70 percent of export revenues. An
abundance of cheap hydroelectric power provides a comparative advantage
for the main manufacturing activity--aluminum smelting. Aluminum is the
second leading export. Growth was expected to exceed 5 percent in 1999.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. Human rights monitors expressed
concern about the Government's frequent use of solitary confinement for
remand prisoners. The Government is taking steps to deal with violence
against women. Some societal discrimination against women persists,
especially in the area of equal pay. Instances of suspected trafficking
in women were reported.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment are prohibited by law and do not occur.
Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
In a February report, the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture (CPT) expressed concern during its visit to the main prison
(Litla Hraun) in Reykjavik in 1998 that nearly all detainees still were
being placed in solitary confinement while their cases were under
investigation. While the average duration of solitary confinement was
between 2 and 3 weeks, the CPT noted that in some cases, solitary
confinement lasted up to 3 months. While in solitary confinement,
prisoners cannot leave their cells, except for short periods of time to
exercise alone or to use the showers, and are not allowed to listen to
the radio, watch television, or receive visitors other than their
lawyers and prison officials. In November the supervising doctor at
Litla Hraun wrote to prison authorities, warning that the mental health
of several prisoners awaiting trial on drug trafficking charges could
be in danger due to the extended time that they were expected to spend
in solitary confinement.
In a preliminary response to the CPT report on September 30, the
Government argued that solitary confinement was absolutely necessary in
some circumstances to keep suspects from tampering with witnesses,
destroying evidence, or hindering the investigation. On the other hand,
it conceded that ``in the vast majority of cases'' incarceration alone
was sufficient to protect the integrity of witnesses and evidence.
However, the Prison and Probation Administration's own statistics show
that solitary confinement was the rule rather than the exception during
the first 9 months of the year: More than 90 percent of the 87 persons
taken into custody were put into solitary confinement at least
initially.
With the closing of the Sudumuli remand prison in 1996, the
Government passed a law in 1998 that allows pretrial detainees to be
incarcerated with the general prison population. Some human rights
monitors claim that this law is inconsistent with the country's
obligations under the European Human Rights Convention and European
prison rules issued by the Council of Europe. Construction of a new
prison in Reykjavik is planned for these detainees.
Juveniles who are 15 years of age or older can be sentenced to
prison terms, but the vast majority of juvenile offenders are given
probation or suspended sentences, or agree to attend a treatment
program instead of going to jail. In the rare instances when juvenile
offenders are incarcerated, they must be confined with the general
adult prison population due to the lack of a separate detention
facility for juveniles. In its February report, the CPT stated that it
was ``very concerned'' about the current situation and recommended that
the Government take ``immediate steps . . . to ensure that juvenile
prisoners are held separately from adults.''
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government
observes this prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution and law provide
for an independent judiciary, and the Government respects this
provision in practice.
There are two levels of courts. The Ministry of Justice administers
the district courts, while the Supreme Court guards its independence
and fairness by administering itself. All judges, at all levels, serve
for life.
The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient judicial
process. Juries are not used, but multijudge panels are common,
especially in the appeals process. Depending on the seriousness of the
charges, a panel can include from three to five judges. Defendants are
presumed innocent. They are provided access to legal counsel of their
own choosing with sufficient time to prepare their defense. For
defendants unable to pay attorneys' fees, the State assumes the cost.
Defendants have the right to be present at their trial, to confront
witnesses, and to participate otherwise in the proceedings. No groups
are barred from testifying, and all testimony is
treated alike. Trials are public and are conducted fairly, with no
official intimidation. Defendants have the right to appeal.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and the
Government generally respect these prohibitions. Violations are subject
to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Although the official state religion is
Lutheranism, the Constitution provides for freedom of religion, and the
Government respects this right in practice. The salaries of Lutheran
ministers are paid by the state. Citizens 16 years of age and above are
presumed to be members of the state church and are required to support
the church by paying a tax, unless they designate another religious
denomination to receive their tax payment. The religion tax payment of
persons who choose not to belong to any specific, organized religious
group goes to the University of Iceland. Religious instruction in
Christianity is required in the public schools, although students may
be exempted.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
Although neither the Constitution nor the law include provisions
for granting refugee or asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, in
practice the Government adjudicates cases in accordance with their
principles. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross, and
other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were no
reports of the forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to
refugee status. In view of the country's geographic isolation and the
lack of direct transportation from any traditional source of refugees,
the question of first asylum rarely arises. However, the Government
reported that 13 individuals arrived during the year and requested
asylum. None was found to qualify for refugee status (several cases
were still under review), but some were granted temporary entry on
humanitarian grounds. Some human rights monitors criticized the arrest
and prolonged detention of a Kurdish asylum-seeker, but the Directorate
of Immigration, which has responsibility for processing applications
for asylum, stated that it had no choice but to turn the individual
over to the police for investigation because he had no identity or
travel documents and refused to cooperate with the authorities.
The Directorate of Immigration, which traditionally was a part of
the national police force, became an independent agency on October 1.
The Directorate is responsible for issuing passports, visas, and
residence permits and for processing applications for asylum, while the
police and customs now have responsibility for manning passport control
points for those coming into and going out of the country. However, the
police and customs are required to consult with the Directorate of
Immigration about individuals arriving without valid visas or passports
before refusing them entry. Human rights monitors say that it appears
that some of the individuals who were refused entry upon arrival at the
international airport during the year were not afforded their legal
right to appeal their denial of admission.
In addition to accepting 20 to 25 UNHCR-designated ``quota''
refugees, the Government admitted 72 Kosovar refugees into the country
during the year. Local government authorities in the towns where
refugees settle take a strong interest in helping them adapt to their
new environment. The Icelandic Red Cross, in cooperation with the
Refugee Council of the Ministry of Social Affairs, developed a support
family program, whereby at least three Icelandic families are enlisted
to assist each refugee or refugee family. The refugees immediately are
granted work permits and assisted in finding jobs. For the first year,
they also are given free housing, utilities, and health care and
receive a stipend so that they can participate in a special half-day
Icelandic language course every day that is designed especially for
them. Refugees generally are successful in assimilating into society,
but their children drop out of school earlier than children of
citizens.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The most recent elections to the Althingi
(unicameral Parliament) were held in May.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, but no legal
or practical impediments hinder their participation. Of the 12
government ministers, 4 are women, and women hold 23 of the 63 seats in
Parliament. The Women's List (WL), an activist feminist political party
whose establishment in 1983 led to a significant increase in the number
of female parliamentarians, joined an electoral alliance with other
left-leaning parties in the May elections. The WL plans to merge
eventually with the other left-leaning political parties to form a
single entity to challenge the more conservative parties. Women's
issues have moved into the mainstream of political debate, and all of
the major political parties now have at least one woman in a prominent
leadership position.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The country's ethnically homogenous population is strongly
egalitarian and opposed to discrimination based on any of these
factors. The law and practice generally reflect this attitude. However,
concern is voiced that the rapidly increasing number of foreigners
being brought into the country to meet the labor shortage in fish
processing and other less desirable occupations could lead to future
problems, especially in the event of an economic downturn. Some 14,000
people of foreign origin now live in the country (approximately 2
percent of the population). During the last half of the year, the
Directorate of Immigration was issuing new residence and work permits
at the rate of more than 200 per month. Many of these ``temporary''
workers come from Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union, and the Directorate of Immigration expects most of them to seek
to remain permanently rather than return to their countries of origin.
Women.--Violence against women continued to be a matter of concern.
A public women's shelter offers counseling and protection to victims of
domestic violence and their children. Approximately 400 women and 150
children came to the shelter during the year, 100 of whom sought
shelter while the rest asked for counseling or information. At a rape
trauma center, 400 women and children seek assistance annually. Both
facilities are financed by national and municipal governments, as well
as by private contributors. The Reykjavik City Hospital emergency ward
has a special staff to care for rape victims. It reports approximately
100 visits per year associated with incidents of sexual abuse.
A police program to train officers in correct interrogation
procedures in rape and sexual abuse cases appears to be addressing
prior concerns that police indifference and hostility to female victims
did not assure proper attention and consideration for victims of such
abuses.
Many victims nevertheless decline to press charges, and even more
forgo trial, fearing publicity in this small, tightly knit society.
With an increasing number of interracial marriages, mostly involving
Icelandic men and Asian women, there is concern that these new Asian
immigrants are not assimilating well into local society. Concern that
these women might be vulnerable to mistreatment led the city of
Reykjavik to begin offering them emergency accommodation and
assistance, which includes information on legal rights, language
training, and an introduction to Icelandic society and norms.
There were indications that some women were trafficked to work as
striptease dancers or prostitutes against their will (see Section
6.f.).
In the labor market, the rate of participation by women is high. In
part this reflects the country's comprehensive system of subsidized day
care, which makes it affordable and convenient for women to work
outside the home. Despite laws that require equal pay for equal work, a
sizeable pay gap continues to exist between men and women. A survey by
a union in Reykjavik showed that women, on average, earned 30 percent
less than men. A 12 percent difference in pay is attributable to the
fact that men work 4.2 more hours per week than women, but the rest of
the gap is unexplained.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights through its well-funded systems of public education
and medical care. School attendance is compulsory through the age of
15. About 85 percent of students continue to upper secondary education,
which is financed completely by the state. The Government provides free
prenatal and infant medical care, as well as heavily subsidized
children's care. In 1994 the government created the Office of the
Children's Ombudsman in the Prime Minister's Office, with a mandate to
protect children's rights, interests, and welfare by, among other
things, exerting influence on legislation, government decisions, and
public attitudes.
There is no societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
In an effort to improve the rate of prosecution of child sexual
abuse and lessen the trauma to the child, the Government in 1998
established the Children's Assessment Center. The objective of the
Center is to create a safe and secure environment where child victims
feel more comfortable talking about what happened to them and are not
subjected to multiple interviews. The Center brings together police,
prosecutors, judges, doctors, and counselors, as well as officials from
the Child Protection Agency of the Ministry of Social Affairs. Prior to
the establishment of the Center, barely half of the cases dealt with by
the Child Protection Agency were sent to the police for investigation,
just a third went to the prosecutor, and only 10 percent ever went to
trial. Now some 75 percent of cases are sent to the police for
investigation, and the authorities anticipate a corresponding increase
in the percentage of cases being prosecuted and sent to trial.
People with Disabilities.--Disabled individuals are not subject to
discrimination in employment, education, or the provision of other
state services. A 1992 law calls for the disabled to have the right to
``all common national and municipal services'' and provides that they
be given assistance to ``make it possible for them to live and work in
normal society with others.'' The law also provides that the disabled
should receive preference for a government job when they are equally
qualified, or more qualified, than regular applicants. Building
regulations updated in 1998 call for public buildings to be accessible.
However, the country's main association for the disabled complains that
the provisions related to building access often are ignored because
there is no penalty for noncompliance. Access to new buildings tends to
be good, while efforts to make old buildings more accessible have
lagged.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers make extensive use of the
right provided by the Constitution to establish organizations, draw up
their own constitutions and rules, choose their own leaders and
policies, and publicize their views. The resulting organizations are
controlled neither by the Government nor by any single political party.
Unions take active part in Nordic, European, and other international
trade union bodies. With the exception of limited categories of workers
in the public sector whose services are essential to public health or
safety, unions have had and used the right to strike for many years.
Approximately 80 percent of all eligible workers belong to unions. No
strikes occurred during the year, but there were a handful of work
stoppages.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Union
membership is not impeded in law or practice. Employers are required to
withhold union dues (1 percent of gross pay) from the pay of all
employees, whether they are members of the union or not. This is
because union dues help support, among other things, an illness fund to
which everyone is entitled.
The various trade unions and management organizations periodically
negotiate collective bargaining agreements that set specific terms for
workers' pay, hours, and other conditions. The current 3-year
collective bargaining agreements expire in February 2000. In recent
years, the Government has played almost no role in the private-sector
collective bargaining process, other than generally to encourage wage
restraint that would help to limit inflation.
Labor courts effectively adjudicate disputes over contracts and
over the rights provided for in the 1938 Act on Trade Unions and
Industrial Disputes, which prohibits antiunion discrimination. By law
employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required to
reinstate workers fired for union activities. In practice the charges
are difficult to prove.
In 1996 the Parliament passed legislation updating the labor laws
and bringing them into compliance with the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
There are no export processing or other special economic zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by law and does not occur; however, some women
reportedly were coerced to work as striptease dancers or prostitutes
(see Section 6.f.), and work permit practices could leave workers
vulnerable to abuse by employers (see Section 6.e.). The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this
prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section
6.c.). The law requires children to attend school until the age of 16
and prohibits the employment of younger children in factories, on
ships, or in other places that are hazardous or require hard labor.
This prohibition is observed in practice. Children 14 or 15 years old
may be employed part time or during school vacations in light,
nonhazardous work. Their work-hours must not exceed the ordinary work-
hours of adults in the same occupation. The Occupational Safety and
Health Administration enforces child labor regulations.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--No minimum wage is mandated
legislatively, but the minimum wages negotiated in the various
collective bargaining agreements apply automatically to all employees
in those occupations, whether they are union members or not. Union
membership is so extensive and effective that labor contracts afford
even the lowest paid workers a sufficient income for a decent standard
of living for themselves and their families.
Workers are protected by laws that effectively provide for their
health and safety as well as for unemployment insurance, paid
vacations, pensions, and reasonable working conditions and hours. The
standard legal workweek is 40 hours. Work exceeding 8 hours in a
workday must be compensated as overtime. Workers are entitled to 10
hours of rest within each 24-hour period and to a day off every week.
Under defined special circumstances, the 10-hour rest period can be
reduced to 8, and the day off can be postponed by a week, in which case
the worker has a right to 2 additional hours off in the following week.
Health and safety standards are set by the Althingi and
administered and enforced by the Ministry of Social Affairs through its
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which can close down
workplaces until safety and health standards are met. Workers have a
collective, not an individual, right to refuse to work in a place that
does not meet the criteria of occupational safety and health. Firing
workers who report unsafe or unhealthy conditions is illegal.
However, in the case of newly arrived foreign workers or refugees
(i.e., those who have been in the country for less than 3 years), human
rights monitors expressed concern that the Government's practice of
issuing the applicable work permit to the employer rather than to the
individual concerned could leave the worker vulnerable to abuse by the
employer.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not specifically
criminalize trafficking in persons; however, a number of provisions in
the Penal Code can be used to prosecute such cases.
Trafficking in women is suspected in connection with the growing
number of foreign women who enter the country to work in striptease
clubs. With the recent opening of several new striptease clubs (there
are now 11 clubs altogether), the police expressed concern about the
500 women who entered the country during the year to work in these
establishments. It is suspected that some of the women--especially
those from Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union--were
coerced to work as striptease dancers or prostitutes against their
will.
Regulation of these clubs has been lacking, in part because
striptease dancers can enter the country and perform without a work
permit for up to a month under an exemption given for ``artists.'' The
Government plans to close this legal loophole.
By year's end, there had been no arrests in connection with these
activities.
______
IRELAND
Ireland is a parliamentary democracy with a long tradition of
orderly transfer of power. The government consists of an executive
branch headed by a prime minister, a legislative branch with a
bicameral parliament, a directly elected president, and an independent
judiciary.
The national police (Garda Siochana) are under the effective
civilian control of the Minister of Justice and have primary
responsibility for internal security. Since the police are an unarmed
force, the army acts in their support when necessary--the latter under
the effective civilian control of the Minster of Defense. Ireland's
principal internal security concern has been to prevent the spillover
of terrorist violence from Northern Ireland. With the signing of the
Belfast Peace Agreement on April 14, 1998, virtually all parties in
Northern Ireland acknowledged the goals of democracy, peace, and
reconciliation. All paramilitary groups, on both sides of the border,
have declared permanent cease-fires, with the exception of the
Continuity Irish Republican Army. There have been allegations that
members of the police committed some human rights abuses.
Ireland has an open, market-based economy that is highly dependent
on international trade. It is a large net recipient of funds from the
European Union (EU) designed to address imbalances in economic
activity. Strong economic growth over the past few years lowered
unemployment to 6.5 percent, the lowest in 30 years. The proportion of
the population in ``consistent poverty'' declined from 15 percent in
1994 to 10 percent in 1997, according to a local research organization.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens. Human rights problems arise primarily from: Instances of
abuse by the police; prison overcrowding and substandard facilities;
the continuation of special arrest and detention authority and the
nonjury court; the occasional censorship of films, books, and
periodicals; violence and discrimination against women; the abuse of
children; and discrimination against asylum seekers and Travellers (an
itinerant ethnic community).
As stipulated in the Belfast Peace Agreement, the Government
published draft legislation in July to establish an independent human
rights commission in 2000, which is to cooperate with a parallel
commission already created in Northern Ireland. The human rights
commissions are to provide information and promote awareness of human
rights, comment on human rights draft legislation referred to them by
the legislatures, make recommendations to the governments on the
adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, and initiate court
proceedings or provide assistance to individuals doing so.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
During the year, the authorities pursued the investigation of the
August 1998 car-bombing in Omagh, Northern Ireland, that killed 29
people and injured 200. The Garda in the Republic of Ireland and the
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland cooperated to make
16 arrests of whom 15 were later released without charge. In February
Colm Murphy was arrested by the Garda and arraigned at the Special
Criminal Court under the auspices of the Offenses Against the State Act
(see Section1.d. and 1.e.). Murphy was charged with conspiracy to cause
anexplosion and membership in an illegal organization and at year's end
was out on bail awaiting trial.
In May the Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains, a joint
body made up of representatives from the Republic and Northern Ireland,
began efforts to locate the remains of nine people, termed the
``disappeared,'' abducted and killed by the Irish Republican Army (IRA)
in the 1970's. Pursuant to joint Irish and British legislation granting
limited immunity to IRA members involved in these acts, information was
given to the Commission by the IRA on the location of the nine bodies.
On May 28, the remains of Eamon Molloy were recovered in a County Louth
graveyard and on June 29, the remains of Brian McKinney and John
McClory were found in County Monaghan. After formal identification by
the authorities, all three bodies were returned to their families.
Efforts to find the other six persons who disappeared were
unsuccessful, and further recovery operations by the Commission were
suspended pending fresh information from the IRA.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and officials generally
did not employ them.
While the mistreatment of persons in police custody is not
widespread, detainees filed a number of cases claiming damages for
injuries sustained while in police custody. The authorities have not
yet taken action in the case of two persons held in connection with the
murder of a police officer in 1996. The pair alleged that they were
severely beaten while in police custody and appeared in court with
physical injuries consistent with their allegations (see Section 4).
Human rights organizations have called for the establishment of an
independent ombudsman or authority to investigate complaints against
the police. It would replace the current statutory board, the Garda
Siochana (Police) Complaints Board, through which the Garda authorities
investigate alleged misconduct by their peers. In 1998 the Board
received 1,400 complaints, an increase from 1,291 complaints in 1997,
including charges of criminal behavior (mistreatment or abuse). Through
a review process conducted in accordance with the 1986 Garda Siochana
(Complaints) Act, the Director of Public Prosecutions directed that
members of the Garda Siochana should be prosecuted in nine of these
complaints.
Ireland has a low incarceration rate (77 inmates per 100,000
population), and the prison regime is generally liberal. However, the
physical infrastructure of many prisons is barely adequate: A number of
facilities suffer from chronic overcrowding, requiring doubling-up in
many single-person cells. Many of the existing prisons are very old,
and many cells do not have toilets or running water. There are no
adequate hospitals on prison grounds; mental health services for
prisoners also are inadequate. Although the new Cloverhill remand
Prison opened in June and the new Mountjoy Women's Prison opened in
September, by year's end both facilities still were unable to accept
inmates because of construction defects. These new facilities are
designed to accommodate a further 1,200 prisoners and thereby help
reduce overcrowding.
Prisoners with complaints of mistreatment by prison officials or
negligence of health and safety due to prison conditions have ready
access to the courts for redress. However, according to the Justice
Department, no allegations of mistreatment of prisoners were leveled
against the Prison Service during the year, and no similar claims were
left outstanding from previous years. The Government continued to
arrest and incarcerate at Portlaoise prison persons involved in
paramilitary activity. Conditions for these inmates are the same, if
not better, than those for the general prison population.
Domestic and international human rights monitors are permitted to
visit prisons without reservation. The Council of Europe's Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CPT) visited prisons in 1998. The CPT's report was under
consideration by the Cabinet, along with the Government's response.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
stipulates that no person shall be deprived of personal liberty without
due process under the law; however, special arrest and detention
authority continued. A detainee has the right to petition the High
Court, which is required to order release unless it can be shown that
the person is being detained in accordance with the law. The 1984
Criminal Justice Act provides for an initial period of detention of 6
hours, with an extension of another 6 hours when a police officer of
the rank of superintendent or above so directs, in cases in which there
are grounds for believing that such detention is necessary for the
proper investigation of an offense. Another extension of 8 hours
overnight is possible, to allow a detainee to sleep.
In cases covered by the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act, the
initial period of detention without charge is 24 hours on the direction
of a police superintendent; detention can be extended another 24 hours.
This act allows police to arrest and detain for questioning anyone
suspected of committing a ``scheduled offense,'' i.e., one involving
firearms, explosives, or membership in an unlawful organization.
Although the stated purpose of the act is to ``prevent actions and
conduct calculated to undermine public order and the authority of the
state,'' it is not restricted to subversive offenses. Therefore, the
police have broad arrest and detention powers in any case involving
firearms. However, under the terms of the decommissioning law enacted
in 1997 in support of the Northern Ireland peace process, proceedings
may not be instituted against persons in relation to any offense that
may be committed in the course of decommissioning illegally held arms
in accordance with an approved arms decommissioning scheme.
The act also provides for the indefinite detention, or internment,
without trial of any person who is engaged in activities that are
``prejudicial to the preservation of public peace and order or to the
security of the state.'' While this power has not been invoked since
the late 1950's, the government could do so by simply issuing a
proclamation.
An amendment to the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act was enacted
in the wake of the Omagh bombing in 1998. The new legislation allows
police to detain suspects in certain crimes, usually involving serious
offenses with firearms or explosives, for 48 hours, with a possible 24-
hour extension if approved by a judge.
The legislation also curtails the right of silence. Under the
amendment, if the accused was informed of the consequences of remaining
silent to questions regarding his whereabouts, associations, or
actions, then the accused's silence may be used as corroboration of
guilt. The accused person's failure to defend against accusations of
membership in an illicit organization also may be used as corroboration
of guilt. However, the accused cannot be convicted based solely on his
refusal to speak.
Membership in or leadership of an illicit organization carries a
possible life sentence under the new amendment (illegal organizations
are defined by the 1939 Offenses Act). The word of a police
superintendent can be used as corroboration of membership. Collecting
information to aid in a serious offense carries a penalty of up to 10
years' imprisonment or a fine.
Withholding information that could prevent a ``serious'' offense or
that could aid in the apprehension or conviction of a perpetrator also
is illegal, with a penalty of up to 5 years' imprisonment and a fine.
Certain provisions of the 1998 amendment to the Offenses Against the
State Act are to expire in June 2000 without specific parliamentary
reauthorization. In May a special independent committee was formed to
review the collective Offenses Against the State Act legislation for
any conflict with certain principles, including legal or human rights
principles. The committee is scheduled to report its recommendations to
the Government in the first half of 2000.
The 1996 Criminal Justice (Drug Trafficking) Act permits detention
without charge for up to 7 days in cases involving drug trafficking.
However, to hold a suspected drug trafficker for more than 48 hours the
police must seek a judge's approval.
Following approval in 1996 of a referendum calling for stricter
bail laws, legislation was enacted in 1997 that allows a court to
refuse bail to a person charged with a serious offense where it is
considered reasonably necessary to prevent the commission of another
serious offense. A schedule of serious offenses is contained in the
bill; the offense must be one that carries a penalty of 5 years'
imprisonment or more. However, as of October, the Justice Minister had
not yet signed a statutory order that would allow the courts to
implement the law's provisions. The lack of accommodations for
prisoners was cited as the reason for the delay.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The judicial system includes a district court with 23 districts, a
circuit court with 8 circuits, the High Court, the Court of Criminal
Appeal, and the Supreme Court. The President appoints judges on the
advice of the Government.
The Director of Public Prosecutions, a state official with
independent status, prosecutes criminal cases. Jury trial is the norm.
The accused generally may choose an attorney. For indigent defendants,
the state assumes the cost of counsel.
However, the Constitution explicitly allows ``special courts'' to
be created when ``ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the
effective administration of justice and the preservation of public
peace and order.'' In 1972, under the 1939 Offenses Against the State
Act, the government set up a nonjury ``Special Criminal Court'' (SCC)
to try ``scheduled offenses'' (see Section 1.d.). Largely a reaction to
the spillover of paramilitary violence from Northern Ireland, the SCC
was justified over the years as addressing the problem of jury
intimidation in cases involving defendants with suspected paramilitary
links. The continued need for the SCC is being kept under review by the
government.
During 1998 the SCC indicted 37 persons and held 21 trials,
compared with 26 indictments and 14 trials in 1997. In addition to
``scheduled offenses,'' the Director of Public Prosecutions can have
any nonscheduled offense tried by the SCC if he believes that the
ordinary courts are inadequate to secure the effective administration
of justice and the preservation of public peace and order and so
certifies in writing.
In lieu of a jury, the SCC always sits as a three-judge panel. Its
verdicts are by majority vote. Rules of evidence are essentially the
same as in regular courts, except that the sworn statement of a police
chief superintendent identifying the accused as a member of an illegal
organization is accepted as prima facie evidence. Sessions of the SCC
are usually public, but the judge may exclude certain persons other
than journalists. Appeals of SCC decisions are allowed in certain
circumstances.
Under the terms of the Belfast Agreement, releases continue of
those imprisoned for crimes related to the terrorist campaign in
Northern Ireland. Prisoners belonging to organizations that have
declared permanent cease-fires and who have committed themselves to
work through peaceful, democratic means are the only ones qualified for
this program. All releases are expected to be completed by May 2000.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Supreme Court affirmed that, although not
specifically provided for in the Constitution, the inviolability of
personal privacy, family, and home must be respected in law and
practice. This ruling is fully honored by the government.
In 1996 the High Court upheld a referendum that removed the ban on
divorce. The government enacted implementing legislation allowing
courts to grant divorces under certain circumstances.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides
individuals with the right to ``express freely their convictions and
opinions.'' However, freedom of the press is subject to the
qualification that it not ``undermine public order or morality or the
authority of the state.'' Publication or utterance of ``blasphemous,
seditious, or indecent matter'' is prohibited. While the press in
practice operates freely, the 1961 Defamation Act (which puts the onus
on newspapers and periodicals accused of libel to prove that defamatory
words are true) and the 1963 Official Secrets Act (which gives the
State wide scope to prosecute unauthorized disclosures of sensitive
government information) are believed to result in some self-censorship.
Broadcasting remains mostly state controlled, but private sector
broadcasting is growing. There are 21 independent radio stations and an
independent television station. However, expanded access to cable and
satellite television is lessening dramatically the relative influence
of state-controlled broadcasting. The Broadcasting Complaints
Commission oversees standards and investigates complaints about
programming. The 1960 Broadcasting Act empowers the government to
prohibit the state-owned radio and television network from broadcasting
any matter that is ``likely to promote or incite to crime or which
would tend to undermine the authority of the state.'' It was on this
basis that the government banned Sinn Fein (the legal political front
of the Irish Republican Army) from the airwaves from 1971 to 1994.
Films and videos must be screened and classified by the Office of
the Film Censor before they can be shown or sold. Distributors pay fees
to finance the censor's office. Under the 1923 Censorship of Films Act,
the censor has the authority to cut or ban any film that is ``indecent,
obscene or blasphemous'' or which tends to ``inculcate principles
contrary to public morality or subversive of public morality.'' As of
October, no theatrical films were banned during the year, but 162
videos were banned, mainly because of their pornographic content.
Decisions of the censor can be appealed to a nine-member appeal board
within 3 months, but neither the censor nor the appeal board is
required to hear arguments or evidence in public or to state the
reasons for its decisions.
Books and periodicals are also subject to censorship. The 1946
Censorship of Publications Act calls for a five-member board to examine
publications referred to it by the customs service or a member of the
general public. It also can examine books (but not periodicals) on its
own initiative. The board can prohibit the sale of any publication that
it judges to be indecent or obscene. As of October, the board had not
banned any books but had banned eight periodicals including the popular
mainstream In Dublin magazine, not for editorial content but for
advertisements for ``massage parlors,'' which were regarded by the
board as solicitations for prostitution. The action caused considerable
controversy and widespread debate. The ban is currently under challenge
in the courts. In 1998 the board banned 15 books and 10 periodicals,
compared with 10 books and 89 periodicals in 1997, and 63 books and 43
periodicals in 1996.
On July 29, Brian Meehan, an ``enforcer'' for a drug-smuggling gang
was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of Veronica Guerin in
1996. Guerin was a journalist who reported on narcotics and organized
crime issues and whose murder was seen as an attempt by criminal
elements to silence press coverage of their activities. The incident
shocked public opinion and led to the adoption of new legislation to
combat narcotics-related crime. Paul Ward was also convicted in
connection with the case in November 1998; John Gilligan is awaiting
extradition from the United Kingdom on the same charge; three other men
have been sentenced on lesser charges related to the Guerin case.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides citizens with the right to ``assemble peaceably and without
arms'' and to form associations and unions; however, it also allows the
State to ``prevent or control meetings'' that are calculated to cause a
breach of the peace or to be a danger or nuisance to the general
public. Under the 1939 Offenses Against the State Act, it is unlawful
to hold any public meeting on behalf of, or in support of, an illegal
organization. Although the government prosecutes and incarcerates
persons for mere membership in a terrorist organization, it allows
meetings and assemblies by some groups that are associated with illegal
terrorist organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the government does not hamper the teaching or practice
of any faith. Even though overwhelmingly Roman Catholic, Ireland has no
state religion. However, most primary and secondary schools are
denominational, and their boards of management are partially controlled
by the Catholic Church. The Government provides equal funding to the
schools of different religious denominations. Although religious
instruction is an integral part of the curriculum, parents may exempt
their children from such instruction. There is no discrimination
against nontraditional religious groups.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There is complete freedom of movement
within the country, as well as freedom to engage in foreign travel,
emigration, and repatriation.
The government enacted a new refugee law in 1996, but it has been
implemented only partially and is currently under review. The law put
into effect the 1990 Dublin Convention, harmonizing European Union
asylum procedures, and it also makes provision for program refugees
(those invited by the state to apply for asylum; in 1999 mostly
Kosovars). The law also expressly forbids the forced return of persons
to a country where they fear persecution.
The Government grants refugee or asylee status in accordance with
the provision of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, and it cooperates with office of the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The government drew up
specific administrative procedures for implementation of the Convention
in consultation with the UNHCR. In 1992 the Supreme Court ruled that
these procedures were binding on the Minister of Justice. However, as
the number of asylum seekers increased (from only 31 in 1990 to 4,446
as of October 1999), these administrative procedures proved inadequate.
In particular there are complaints of long delays and a lack of
transparency in decisions concerning refugee status. Over 7,000 asylum
cases await government action. In 1998 the Department of Justice
upgraded its asylum division by increasing its staff and moving it into
a larger building with more services for asylum seekers. In October the
Government announced that it would join the EURODAC Convention with
other EU member states. The EURODAC Convention limits an asylum seeker
to filing one application throughout the EU, rather than filing
multiple applications in different countries and requires the
fingerprinting of asylum seekers, a step already taken unilaterally by
the authorities.The Government provided first asylum in 400 cases by
October. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution. The increase in the number of
asylum seekers, as well as allegations of racism in dealing with them
and the issue of whether they should be allowed to work, continued to
fuel public debate on immigration (see Section 5).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitutional requirement that parliamentary elections be held
at least every 7 years always has been met. Suffrage is universal for
citizens over the age of 18, and balloting is secret. Several political
parties have seats in the bicameral Parliament. Members of the Dail
(House of Representatives)--the chamber that carries out the main
legislative functions--are popularly elected; in the Seanad (Senate),
most members are elected by vocational and university groups, and the
others are appointed by the Prime Minister. The President is popularly
elected for a 7-year term and is limited to 2 terms. An appointed
Council of State serves as an advisory body to the President.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Although the
President is a woman, only 21 of the 166 deputies in the Dail and 11 of
the 60 senators are women. Of the 15 government ministers, 3 are women,
as are 2 of the 17 junior ministers. Three women sit on the 20-member
High Court; only 1 of the 8 Supreme Court judges is a woman.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally
cooperative and responsive to their views. However, allegations of
mistreatment made by two suspects held in connection with the murder of
a police officer in 1996 were the source of concern on the part of the
Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL), the principal domestic human
rights group. The ICCL indicated in a report issued jointly with
British-Irish Rights Watch in 1997 that its efforts to investigate
these allegations did not receive the cooperation of the police. The
ICCL report said that ``this incident raises serious questions about
the attitude of the Garda (police) authorities toward bona fide human
rights organizations investigating allegations of human rights abuses
in the Republic of Ireland.'' The ICCL report requested that the
Government set up a ``fully independent inquiry, headed by a judge and
with high court powers to summon and question witnesses, to investigate
the treatment of persons arrested in Limerick following Garda McCabe's
murder.'' The ICCL reported no further progress or action by the
authorities on this case in 1999 and recommended that all future police
interrogations or interviews be videotaped to avoid similar incidents.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution, as amended, forbids state promotion of one
religion over another and discrimination on the grounds of religion,
profession, belief, or status. However, until recently few laws
implemented these provisions of the Constitution. In 1998 an amended
Employment Equality Act was passed that outlaws discrimination in
relation to employment on the basis of nine distinct discriminatory
grounds: Gender, marital status, family status, sexual orientation,
religious belief, age, disability, race, and membership in the
Traveller community.
Women.--A 1997 government task force on violence against women
concluded that the problem, in particular domestic violence, is
widespread and that many women believe that existing services are
incapable of responding to their needs. The task force found that many
women believe that the legal system minimizes the seriousness of crimes
committed against them, fails to dispense justice, and makes them feel
at fault for what happened. The task force cited a need to compile more
accurate and comprehensive statistics on the nature and extent of the
problem and issued a series of recommendations that are under
government review.
According to the Dublin Rape Crisis Center, the level of reported
rapes continues to rise. The Center received 7,500 calls between July
1998 and June 1999 (a 5 percent increase over the same period in the
previous year) and concluded that there was disquieting evidence that
rape and sexual assaults--by their very number and frequency--were
dulling the response of the public at large. For the 1998-99 period,
the Center estimated that 28 percent of rape and child sexual abuse
victims reported the crime to police and that 7 percent of these cases
resulted in convictions, with 68 percent of cases still pending. Recent
rape victims and victims raped by a stranger were more likely to have
reported the rape to police. A 1990 act criminalized rape within
marriage and provided for free legal advice to the victim. There are 23
women's shelters in the country, funded in part by the government.
Discrimination against women in the workplace is unlawful, but
inequalities persist regarding pay and promotions in both the public
and the private sectors. Women hold about 43 percent of public sector
jobs but are underrepresented in senior management positions. A
government report, issued in October, found that at least 50 percent of
state-sponsored bodies have no guidelines for dealing with sexual
harassment and no policy on equal opportunity. The 1974 Anti-
Discrimination (Pay) Act, the 1977 Employment Equality Act, and the
amended 1998 Employment Equality Act provide for protection and redress
against discrimination based on gender and marital status. The Equality
Authority, which officially replaced the Employment Equality Agency in
October, monitors their implementation. According to 1998 statistics,
women's earnings have increased more rapidly than men's since 1985,
albeit from a lower starting point. The weekly earnings of women in
industry still averaged only 65 percent of those of men in 1998.
In May a report by the Combat Poverty Agency, based on data from a
1994 national household survey, found that the number of women below
the poverty line (defined as 50 percent of the median household income)
increased both for single women and single mothers between 1987 and
1994.
Working women often are hampered by the lack of adequate childcare
facilities. The 1994 Maternity Protection Act provides a woman 14 weeks
of paid maternity leave and the right to return to her job. In 1998 a
new Parental Leave Act entered into effect, which allows a child's
mother and father each to take 14 weeks of unpaid leave to care for a
child under the age of 5. Although each parent has a separate
entitlement to parental leave, the leave is not transferable, i.e., the
mother cannot take the father's leave or vice versa. Parental leave
does not affect a mother's right to maternity leave.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and health care. Under the 1991 Child Care Act, education is
compulsory for children from 6 to 15 years of age. The act places a
statutory duty on government health boards to identify and help
children who are not receiving adequate care, and it gives the police
increased powers to remove children from the family when there is an
immediate and serious risk to their health or welfare. The Minister of
State (junior minister) for Health has special responsibility for
children's policy, including monitoring the implementation of the Child
Care Act by the eight regional health boards. The 1987 Status of
Children Act provided for equal rights for children in all legal
proceedings.
The sexual abuse of children continued to receive significant media
attention. The Dublin Rape Crisis Center reported that 55 percent of
contacts with its crisis line involved adults disclosing child sexual
abuse during their youth. The Child Trafficking and Pornography Act,
which was passed in 1998, strengthens and updates measures to protect
children from sexual exploitation, including any exchange of
information on the Internet that implies a child is available for sex.
In May Prime Minister (Taoiseach) Bertie Ahern made a public
apology on behalf of the Government and citizens to the victims of
child abuse for a ``collective failure to intervene, to detect their
pain and to come to their rescue.'' The Government also announced the
creation of a special commission to investigate the subject and a $5.4
million (4 million Irish pounds) fund to provide professional
counseling for victims.
People with Disabilities.--The government Commission on the Status
of People with Disabilities issued a report in 1996, following a 3-year
study, with 402 recommendations. The Commission estimated that 10
percent of the population have a disability. Under the 1998 Employment
Equality Act, it is unlawful to discriminate against anyone on the
basis of disability in relation to employment. The 1991 Building
Regulations Act established minimum criteria to ensure access for
people with disabilities to all public and private buildings
constructed or significantly altered after 1992, but enforcement is
uneven. A National Disability Authority (NDA) began operations in
November with a budget of $2.7 million (2 million Irish pounds). The
NDA is to set disability standards, monitor the implementation of these
standards, and engage in research and the formulation of disability
policy.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 25,000 nomadic
persons regard themselves as a distinct ethnic group called
``Travellers,'' roughly analogous to the Roma of continental Europe.
The ``travelling'' community has its own history, culture, and
language. The Travellers' emphasis on self-employment and the extended
family distinguishes them from the rest of society.
Travellers regularly are denied access to premises, goods,
facilities, and services; many restaurants and pubs, for example, will
not serve them. Despite national school rules that provide that no
child may be refused admission on account of social position,
Travellers frequently experience difficulties in enrolling their
children in school. Sometimes they are segregated into all-Traveller
classes. According to 1998 government statistics, of 4,978 Traveller
families, approximately 1,191 live on roadsides or on temporary sites
without toilets, electricity, or washing facilities. Many Travellers
are dependent on social welfare for survival and are unable to
participate in the mainstream economy because of discrimination and a
lack of education.
The 1998 Employment Equality Act outlaws job discrimination against
Travellers. A 1993 task force on the travelling community produced a
comprehensive report in 1995 on various aspects of Travellers' lives,
including education, work, accommodation, health, and discrimination. A
monitoring committee is overseeing implementation of the
recommendations of the report, some of which have resulted in the
formation of special committees in the Departments of Education,
Environment, and Health to examine Traveller difficulties in these
areas.
A 1998 law, entitled the Housing (Traveller Accommodation) Act--
recommended by the 1995 task force--obliges local elected officials to
draw up and implement Traveller accommodation plans on a 5-year basis
and requires Traveller input in the process. In the event of a failure
to agree on a draft plan, county and city managers are responsible for
their adoption and implementation. According to traveller groups, the
act was implemented with mixed results during its first year.
The increasing numbers of asylum seekers, some of whom were
migrating for economic reasons, and the influx of Kosovar refugees
continued to spark public debate over how open society is to new
immigrants and triggered isolated racist incidents. A 1997 EU poll
found that 55 percent of Irish citizens considered themselves racist.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The right to join a union is provided
for by law, as is the right to refrain from joining. About 48 percent
of workers in the private and public sectors are members of unions.
Police and military personnel are prohibited from striking, but they
may form associations to represent themselves in matters of pay,
working conditions, and general welfare. The right to strike is freely
exercised in both the public and private sectors. The 1990 Industrial
Relations Act prohibits retribution against strikers and union leaders;
the Government effectively enforces this provision through the
Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment. In October 27,500
unionized nurses held the largest strike in the country's history in a
dispute with the Government over pay and promotion schemes. At one
point during the 9-day industrial action, 10,000 nurses marched on the
Dail (Parliament) to voice their grievances. In early November, the
strike was resolved with the nurses' approval of a $170 million (125
million Irish pound) settlement package awarding monetary allowances to
certain nurses and creating new senior nursing staff positions. In 1998
the number of workdays lost by strikes decreased significantly from
1997, although the number of industrial disputes increased marginally.
The Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) represents 64 unions in
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. The ICTU is independent
of the government and political parties.
Unions may freely form or join federations or confederations and
affiliate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions
have full freedom to organize and to engage in collective bargaining.
The 1974 Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act and the 1977 Employment Equality
Act make the Employment Equality Agency, now the Equality Authority,
responsible for oversight of allegations of antiunion discrimination.
If the Authority is unable to effect resolution, the dispute goes
before the Labor Court, which consists of one representative each for
the employer and the union, plus an independent chairperson. The 1977
Unfair Dismissals Act provides for various forms of relief in cases
where employers are found guilty of antiunion discrimination, including
the reinstatement of workers fired for union activities.
Most terms and conditions of employment are determined through
collective bargaining, in the context of a national economic pact
negotiated every 3 years by the ``social partners,'' i.e., unions,
employers, farmers, and the government. In November official
negotiations began on a successor to the 3-year ``Partnership 2000''
agreement negotiated among the social partners in 1996, which is
scheduled to expire in the first half of 2000.
The 1990 Industrial Relations Act established the Labor Relations
Commission, which provides advice and conciliation services in
industrial disputes. The Commission may refer unresolved disputes to
the Labor Court, which may recommend terms of settlement and may set up
joint employer-union committees to regulate conditions of employment
and minimum wages in a specific trade or industry.
The export processing zone at Shannon Airport has the same labor
laws as the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced and bonded
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and
does not occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--By law children are required to attend school through the
age of 15. Under the terms of the 1997 Protection of Young Persons Act,
employers may not employ those under the age of 16 in a regular full-
time job. Employers may hire 14- or 15-year-olds for light work on
school holidays, as part of an approved work experience or educational
program, or on a part-time basis during the school year (for children
over the age of 15 only). The act gives effect to international rules
on the protection of young workers drawn up by the International Labor
Organization and the EU; it sets rest intervals and maximum working
hours, prohibits the employment of 18-year-olds for late night work,
and requires employers to keep specified records for their workers who
are under 18 years of age. The law prohibits forced and bonded child
labor, and the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no general minimum wage
law. A 1997 government- commissioned study recommended that a national
minimum wage be established at a rate of approximately $6.00 (4.40
Irish pounds), which at the time equaled two-thirds of the median
industrial wage. The minimum wage is to be adopted in April 2000.
However, the Government has not yet indicated how this wage is to be
calculated, and controversy has arisen between employers and unions
over the issue. Currently several minimum rates of pay apply to
specific industrial sectors, mainly those with lower-than-average
wages. Although the lowest of these minimum wages is not sufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a family of four, low-income
families are entitled to additional benefits such as subsidized housing
and children's allowances.
The standard workweek is 39 hours. Working hours in the industrial
sector are limited to 9 hours per day and 48 hours per week. Overtime
work is limited to 2 hours per day, 12 hours per week, and 240 hours in
a year. The Department of Enterprise, Trade, and Employment is
responsible for enforcing four basic laws dealing with occupational
safety that provide adequate and comprehensive coverage. No significant
complaints arose from either labor or management regarding enforcement
of these laws. Recent regulations provide that employees who find
themselves in situations that present a ``serious, imminent and
unavoidable risk'' may leave without the employer being able to take
disciplinary action.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
ITALY
Italy is a longstanding, multiparty parliamentary democracy.
Executive authority is vested in the Council of Ministers, headed by
the president of the council (the Prime Minister). The Head of State
(President of the Republic) nominates the Prime Minister after
consulting with leaders of all political forces in Parliament. The
current Parliament was elected in free and democratic elections in
April 1996. The judiciary is independent, but critics complain that
some judges are politicized.
The armed forces are under the control of the Minister of Defense.
Four separate police forces report to different ministerial or local
authorities. Under exceptional circumstances, the Government may call
on the army to provide security in the form of guard duty in certain
locations, allowing the Carabinieri (military police under the control
of the Minister of Interior) and local police to perform other duties.
For several years, the army supported the police in Sicily and in the
province of Naples, areas with high levels of organized crime. The army
left Naples at the end of 1997 and Sicily in 1998 but was redeployed to
both during the year. There were a number of credible reports that some
local police and Carabinieri officers committed some abuses.
Italy has an advanced, industrialized market economy, and the
standard of living is high. Small and midsized companies employ from 70
to 80 percent of the work force. Major products include machinery,
textiles, apparel, transportation equipment, and food and agricultural
products. The Government owns a substantial number of enterprises in
finance, communications, industry, transportation, and services, but
privatization is moving forward at a measured pace.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and the judiciary generally provide effective means of
dealing with instances of individual abuse; however, there were
problems in some areas. There were reports of police abuse of
detainees; such accusations are investigated by the judiciary. Prisons
continue to be overcrowded, and the pace of justice remains slow.
Lengthy pretrial detention is a problem. The Government has taken steps
to combat violence against women and child abuse. Societal
discrimination against women and discrimination and sporadic violence
against immigrants and other foreigners continue to be problems. Child
labor persists in the underground economy but is investigated actively;
a special Carabinieri unit in the Labor Inspectorate was created in
July 1997 to augment investigative capabilities. Trafficking in women
and girls to Italy for prostitution and forced labor is a growing
problem. Trafficking to the country in children also is a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government
officials.
On May 20, Massimo D'Antona, a senior adviser to Italy's labor
minister, was shot and killed outside his home in Rome. The terrorist
movement known as the Red Brigades has been linked to the killing. In a
28-page document, they singled out D'Antona because he was a notably
moderate negotiator with the trade unions and a man of the center-left.
The document claimed that ``his neo-corporatist policy shares the aims
of the imperialist bourgeoisie.''
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and cruel or degrading
punishment; however, there were reports of isolated incidents in which
police abused detainees. Amnesty International (AI), the United Nations
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), the United Nations Committee Against
Torture, and the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture regularly assess
the country's judicial and prison system. According to a report issued
by AI in May, there are numerous allegations of deliberately used
excessive violence against individuals detained in connection with
common criminal offenses or in the course of identity checks.
Allegations of mistreatment relate to the time of arrest and first 24
hours in custody and concern both citizens and foreigners, with an
increasing number of women appearing as alleged victims. A high
proportion of the allegations received by AI concern foreign nationals,
with many from Africa, as well as Roma. In May, the United Nations
Committee Against Torture examined Italy's third periodic report on its
implementation of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The committee noted
positive steps taken, but also noted that further action was needed,
such as ending ``censor checks'' on correspondence addressed to
international investigating bodies by prisoners and improving human
rights training for military personnel. AI has made mention that,
although authorities routinely investigate complaints of mistreatment
in detention, some of the investigations lack thoroughness.
In December 1998, an all-party group of more than 64 Members of
Parliament submitted a bill to criminalize torture, as defined in
article 1 of the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and to set up a special
fund for victims of acts of torture. In the same month, the association
Antigone, which is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) that promotes
the rights and guarantees of detainees, monitors the prison system, and
works closely with the European Commission for Prevention of Torture,
promoted a bill to introduce an ``ombudsman for inmates.'' In January,
Antigone created an ad hoc system to monitor the conditions of
detention in prisons. A final report is expected by March 2000. The
association is monitoring some ten leading cases involving allegations
of mistreatment and torture that occurred during the year.
In 1998, a Somali witness who had been heard by the commission
investigating human rights abuses committed during the 1992-93 U.N.
peacekeeping operations in Somalia, was arrested and charged as a
suspect in the 1993 murder of Italian journalist Ilaria Alpi. In July,
he was released due to lack of evidence.
Despite the construction of new prison facilities and judicial
reforms that provided for alternative penalties (such as house arrest
or semi-liberty for those sentenced to less than three years'
imprisonment), the country's prison population of some 52,000 continued
to exceed planned capacity by approximately 15 percent. The Government
recognized that continued prison overcrowding contributes to poor
sanitation and strains the capacity of prison medical systems. While
the percentage of prisoners addicted to illegal drugs (approximately 29
percent) remained constant from 1997 to 1998, the number of HIV
positive inmates dropped from 13.6 to 10 percent in that period.
However, the percentage of AIDS sufferers among HIV positive groups
rose from 5.8 percent to 7.6 percent. A June law decreed that, as of
January 2000, responsibility for inmate health would be shifted from
the Ministry of Justice to the National Health Service, whose higher
standards are expected to provide better prevention and care,
especially for imprisoned drug addicts and those suffering from AIDS.
In a further effort to combat the negative effects of AIDS on the
prison population, parliament passed a law in July prohibiting the
preventive detention or imprisonment of anyone suffering from AIDS or
other serious illnesses for which treatment in prison would be
inadequate. Those accused or judged guilty of crimes are now to be
given a form of house arrest, which may involve treatment at a hospital
or other care facility. In 1998, there were 51 suicides in the
country's prisons.
The Government permits the independent monitoring of prison
conditions by parliamentarians, local human rights groups, the media,
and other organizations.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Detainees are allowed
prompt and regular access to lawyers of their choosing (although
occasional lapses in this general rule have been alleged) and to family
members. If detainees are indigent, the State provides a lawyer. Within
24 hours of being detained, the examining magistrate must decide
whether there is enough evidence to proceed to an arrest. The
investigating judge then has 48 hours in which to confirm the arrest
and recommend whether the case goes to trial. In exceptional
circumstances, usually in cases of organized crime figures, where there
is danger that attorneys may attempt to tamper with evidence, the
investigating judge may take up to 5 days to interrogate the accused
before the accused is allowed to contact an attorney. The U.N. Human
Rights Committee, the treaty monitoring body for the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), recommended that this
5-day period be reduced and that all detainees have access to legal
advice immediately upon arrest. Notwithstanding the procedural rules
and protections that exist, abuses can occur. In March, the Justice
Minister apologized to an illiterate Somali woman, Abade Khalil Mudhir
(also known as Sharifa), who was arrested in Milan in May 1998 and
accused of trafficking children (two minors were traveling with her),
deprived of her children, and kept in prison until December 1998. She
was released when evidence was found proving her innocence.
Preventive detention can be imposed only as a last resort, or if
there is clear and convincing evidence of a serious offense, such as
crimes involving the Mafia, or those related to drugs, arms, or
subversion. In these cases, a maximum of 2 years of preliminary
investigation is permitted. Except in extraordinary situations,
preventive custody is not permitted for pregnant women, single parents
of children under 3 years of age, persons over 70 years of age, or
those who are seriously ill. Preventive custody can be imposed only for
crimes punishable by a maximum sentence of not less than 4 years.
Magistrates' interrogations of persons in custody must be recorded
on audio tape or video tape to be admissible in judicial proceedings.
Prosecutors are required to include all evidence favorable to the
accused in requests for preventive detention. The defense may present
any favorable evidence directly to the court.
There is no provision for bail, but judges may grant provisional
liberty to suspects awaiting trial. As a safeguard against unjustified
detention, panels of judges (liberty tribunals) review cases of persons
awaiting trial and rule whether continued detention is warranted.
However, in view of the three-level court system (see Section 1.e.),
those persons in preventive detention do not include just those
awaiting trial; many such detainees are awaiting the outcome of a first
or second appeal. The Constitution and the law provide for restitution
in cases of unjust detention.
The law prohibits punishment by internal exile or exile abroad.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process.
There are three levels of courts, the lowest of which used to
consist of three subdivisions: the Praetor Court (offenses punishable
by monetary fines or less than 4 years' imprisonment), the Court of
Assizes (offenses punishable by more than 24 years' imprisonment), and
the Tribunal Court (offenses that fall between the jurisdiction of the
Praetor and Assizes Courts). The second level involves two appeals
courts, one for civil cases and one for penal cases. Decisions of the
Court of Appeals can be appealed to the highest court, the Court of
Cassation (Supreme Court) in Rome, but only for reasons related to
correct application of the law, not issues of facts. A law approved in
1998 provided for merging the Praetor and Assizes Courts,
decriminalizing certain provisions in existing law, and other reforms
to restructure and expedite the judicial process. The measure's civil
provisions were implemented in June; changes in criminal proceedings
were to take force on January 2, 2000.
The law provides for trials to be fair and public, and the
authorities observe these provisions. The law grants defendants the
presumption of innocence. Defendants have access to an attorney
sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense and can confront
witnesses. All government-held evidence is normally made available to
defendants and their attorneys. Defendants can appeal verdicts to the
highest appellate court.
Cumbersome procedures slow the pace of justice. The National
Statistical Institute (ISTAT) reported that the average duration of
lower court trials (civil cases) was 3 years and 4 months. The length
of trials varies by region; those in the north are shorter than those
in the south. A 1998 UNHRC report noted that provisions of the ICCPR
concerning promptness of trials were not always respected, citing the
case of 10 police officers charged in 1990 in connection with the 1985
death of a man following severe mistreatment in a police station. Since
1990 the case has been tried, appealed, and retried several times. In
1997 the Court of Cassation ordered another retrial, and the case is
still open. In July, the European Court of Human Rights again
criticized Italy for four cases of lengthy civil trials lasting from 5
to 13 years. Italy had to pay defendants' expenses and damages.
However, in the same month the Council of Europe decided to postpone
decisions concerning the status of the judiciary, following the Justice
Minister's request to give the ongoing restructuring process time to
adjust.
Since 1991 public prosecutors have conducted sweeping
investigations of corruption among the political and economic elites,
and in the judiciary. However, critics complain that some investigating
magistrates are influenced by political or other interests in choosing
targets of inquiry, or fail to show adequate respect for the rights of
suspects. Those making these charges point to judicial processes
brought against former Prime Ministers Giulio Andreotti and Silvio
Berlusconi. Two separate trials, in which prosecutors relied heavily on
testimony by Mafia witnesses (``pentiti'') ended in acquittals for
Andreotti. Further charges by prosecutors who had previously brought
cases against Berlusconi for tax fraud, corruption, and ``cooking the
books'' of his various enterprises drew an angry retort, as Berlusconi
accused them of being ``the armed wing of the left.'' The July 1998
UNHRC report noted that lengthy preventive detention (which in certain
serious offenses is permitted for up to 2 years) may constitute a
violation of the right to a presumption of innocence and the principle
of a prompt and fair trial. However, an April 1998 decision of the
European Court of Human Rights ruled that the 31-month preventive
detention of a person accused of collusion with an organized crime
organization was lawful.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law safeguards the privacy of the home, and the
authorities respect this provision. Searches and electronic monitoring
may be carried out only under judicial warrant and in carefully defined
circumstances. Violations are subject to legal sanctions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and the press, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
does not restrict the right of peaceful assembly, including protests
against government policies, except in cases where national security or
public safety is at risk. Permits are not required for meetings, but
organizers of public demonstrations must notify the police in advance.
Professional associations organize and operate freely. While allowing
general freedom of association, the Constitution and law prohibit
clandestine associations, those that pursue political aims through
force, that incite racial, ethnic or religious discrimination, or that
advocate fascism.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
Government subsidizes several religions through tax revenue collection.
Taxpayers who choose to do so can donate a percentage of their income
tax payment to the Roman Catholic, Adventist, Waldensian, Baptist, and
Lutheran churches, the Assembly of God or the Jewish community. Other
religious groups, including Buddhists and Muslims, have initiated the
procedures necessary to obtain this benefit.
Nontraditional religious groups are free to practice their beliefs
and proselytize, provided that they respect public order and general
moral standards. In August 1997 the Court of Cassation annulled a lower
court decision that Scientology was not a religion, finding that the
lower court was not competent to rule on what constitutes a religion.
The Court of Cassation found further that the issue of whether
Scientology constitutes a religion must be readdressed by another court
of appeal, in accordance with criteria established by the
Constitutional Court.
There is no state religion, but Roman Catholicism is the dominant
one, in the sense that most citizens were born and raised under
Catholic principles, which form part of their culture. Roman Catholic
religious instruction is offered in public schools as an optional
subject. Students who do not opt to attend can elect to take an
alternative course or, in some schools, have a free class period. A
1929 agreement between the Catholic Church and Italy, which was revised
in 1984, accords the Church certain privileges. For example, the Church
can select Catholic religion teachers, whose earnings are paid by the
State. This privilege has led to charges of unconstitutional
discrimination. For example, in February a teacher of religion was
fired by the Curia of Florence for being pregnant while unmarried.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and the Law provide for
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice. Citizens
who leave are ensured the right to return. The Constitution forbids
deprivation of citizenship for political reasons. Parliament has not
yet repealed the XIII transitory provision of the 1946 constitution,
which forbids male heirs of the former king, Umberto I of Savoy, from
entering Italy. For this reason, on December 13 royal descendant
Vittorio Emanuele IV filed a suit in the European Court of Human Rights
in Strasbourg challenging the validity of this constitutional bar.
Political asylum is obtained according to the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees. Amnesty International has noted
that Italy still lacks a specific law on political asylum, but one is
pending before Parliament. The immigration law passed in February 1998
levied high fines and penalties for land, air, and sea carriers that
board passengers without documentation. In 1998, 7,674 persons applied
for asylum, of whom 1,045 were found eligible.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations assisting refugees. It
provides first asylum to refugees fleeing hostilities or natural
disasters. Such refugees are granted temporary residence permits, which
must be renewed periodically and do not ensure future permanent
residence.
According to Caritas, an organization associated with the Catholic
Church's Episcopal Commission, as of November some 24,000 immigrants
``for humanitarian reasons'' held a work permit. Also as of November,
the number of refugees and asylum seekers (including minors) was about
7,700. In the wake of hostilities in Kosovo, Italy agreed to provide
temporary protected status to as many as 10,000 Kosovars who had sought
refuge in Macedonia. Italy airlifted almost 6,000 Kosovars to an
inactive military base in Sicily. Most were returned home after
hostilities ceased in June, while a small minority was to be resettled
in other countries. In the immediate aftermath of the conflict, some
7,000 ethnic Roma entered Italy, of whom 3,500 were granted temporary
protected status before the interior minister rescinded this provision.
The remaining 3,500 Roma are being considered for political asylum on a
case by case basis. However, additional Roma continued to arrive in
southern Italy from the Balkans. In February the Government rescinded
an earlier decree granting humanitarian protection to Somali
immigrants.
The Commission on Foreigners in Italy estimates that hundreds of
thousands of persons live in the country in irregular status. Caritas
sets the number of irregular foreigners (as of December 1998) at
320,000.
After his arrival in Italy in November 1998, Kurdish Workers' Party
(PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan filed a request for political asylum.
Ocalan left Italy in January, but his asylum request remained active
and was processed through normal judicial channels. In October a court
in Rome granted Ocalan political asylum.
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of any person having
a valid claim to refugee status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
There are no restrictions on women's participation in government
and politics; however, they remain under represented. Women hold 6 of
25 cabinet positions, 24 of 325 Senate seats, and 69 of 630 seats in
the Chamber of Deputies. A new association for women, EMILY Italia, was
founded recently to promote increased participation of women in
politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex (except
with regard to hazardous work), religion, ethnic background, or
political opinion, and provides some protection against discrimination
based on disability, language, or social status. However, societal
discrimination persists to some degree.
Women.--Violence against women remains a problem. A 1998 ISTAT
survey (the first one nationwide) reported that at least 9.4 million
women between the ages of 14 and 59 had experienced some form of sexual
violence during their lives. Media reports of violence against women
are common. In its annual report on violence against women, the NGO
Telefono Rosa stated that 55.5 percent of the cases reported nationally
included physical violence, which is an increase of 9.5 percent over
the previous 2 years. An investigation conducted by the Rome police and
Telefono Rosa reported 6,522 cases of domestic violence against women
in Rome in 1997.
Legislation to protect women from physical abuse, including by
family members, was updated and strengthened in 1996. The revised law
makes the prosecution of perpetrators of violence against women easier
and shields women who have been objects of attack from publicity. The
law treats spousal rape the same as any other rape. Law enforcement and
judicial authorities are not reluctant to bring perpetrators of
violence against women to justice, but victims sometimes do not press
charges due to fear, shame, or ignorance of the law. The Telefono Rosa
report noted that the entry of more women into the police force has
contributed greatly to increased cooperation by female victims of
violence. The Government provides a hot line through which abused women
can obtain legal, medical, and other assistance. Women's associations
also maintain several shelters for battered women.
In 1996 a Basilicata court convicted a 40-year-old driving
instructor of raping an 18-year-old student. An appeals court upheld
this conviction in March 1998. In February the Court of Cassation
(which rules on questions of law, not merit) annulled the appeals court
decision, ruling that since it was physically impossible to remove
tight jeans from a woman without her consent, the defendant could not
be convicted of ``rape.'' The Court's ruling attracted widespread press
comment and criticism. Several female Members of Parliament wore jeans
to the Chamber, as a visible symbol of protest.
Telefono Rosa reported that sexual harassment in the workplace
decreased in 1997 and concluded that ad hoc provisions against sexual
harassment in national labor contracts worked as a deterrent in both
the public and private sectors. Nevertheless, at least 728,000 women
report having been victims of workplace harassment at least once in
their lives; 236,000 experienced this problem in the last 3 years.
Trafficking in illegal immigrant women and girls for prostitution
and forced labor is a growing problem (see Section 6.f.).
Women enjoy legal equality with men in marriage, property, and
inheritance rights. Males and females enjoy equal access and treatment
with regard to education, health, and other government services. Many
NGO's actively and effectively promote women's rights. Most are
affiliated with labor unions or political parties.
A number of government offices work to ensure women's rights. The
Ministry for Equal Opportunity is headed by a woman. In addition, there
is an equal opportunity commission in the office of the Prime Minister.
The Labor Ministry has a similar commission that focused on women's
rights and discrimination in the workplace, as well as equal
opportunity counselors who deal with this problem at the national,
regional, and provincial government levels. However, many counselors
have limited resources with which to work.
In February, the European Union directive regulating night work for
women was incorporated into the law, thus amending the 1977 law that
had prohibited night shifts for women. Liberal maternity leave,
introduced to benefit women, adds to the cost of employing them, with
the result that employers sometimes find it advantageous to hire men
instead.
According to research conducted by the CGIL Labor Institute,
women's salaries are 20 percent lower than men's for comparable work.
They are underrepresented in many fields, such as management and the
professions. According to data released by the Minister of Interior,
only 10 percent of the Ministry's work force consists of women. The
National Council for Economy and Labor (CNEL) reports that in 1998, 3
percent of executives in large firms were women, a figure that rose to
5 percent in mid-size firms and 8 percent in small firms. Employed
women are more likely to have a high school diploma (34.7 percent) than
employed men (28.5 percent). The comparable figures for a university
degree are 13.8 percent for women and 9.4 percent for men. The number
of firms created by women has increased 103 percent in 12 years, for a
total of 9.1 million firms. Although women's participation in the work
force is increasing more rapidly than men's, unemployment figures show
that women still are lagging. In 1999 male unemployment was 9.6
percent, while female unemployment was 16.8 percent. Youth unemployment
(ages 15 to 24) was 30.2 percent for men (53.5 in the south) and 39.0
percent for women (66.9 in the south).
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare. As of academic year 1999-2000, schooling
is compulsory for children from age 7 to age 18; those unable (or
unwilling) to follow the academic curriculum may shift to vocational
training at age 15. This reform is intended to reverse the middle and
secondary school dropout rate, which has been high.
Abuse of children is recognized as a societal problem. Social
workers counsel abused children and are authorized to take action to
protect them. The NGO Telefono Azzurro maintains two toll-free hot
lines for reporting incidents of child abuse. Research conducted on
behalf of the Government by a private institute estimated that the
number of minors involved in cases of violence (including prostitution)
was 10,000 to 12,000. There were 1,880 to 2,500 minors who worked as
street prostitutes, of whom 1,500 to 2,300 were trafficked illegal
immigrants (predominantly Albanians, and some Nigerians), many of whom
were forced into prostitution. An estimated 90 percent of violence
against minors is committed within their own families.
In August 1998, Parliament passed a law to combat pedophilia, child
pornography, the possession of pornographic material involving
children, sex tourism involving minors, and trafficking in children
(see also Section 6.f.).
People With Disabilities.--The law forbids discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of state
services. The law requires enterprises with more than 35 employees to
hire the disabled to staff 15 percent of their work force, directs that
public buildings be made accessible to persons with disabilities, and
stipulates a number of specific rights for the disabled. Compliance
with these requirements, however, is still incomplete.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Immigrants and other foreigners
face societal discrimination. Some are subjected to physical attack.
Roma encounter difficulties in finding places to reside. Sedentary Roma
have more success in receiving equal treatment in the workplace and in
the housing market. Nomadic Roma tend to live in camps and to have more
difficulty in these areas. Based on EU figures, a local NGO estimates
that there are approximately 100,000 Roma in the country (0.2 percent
of the population). Data from the municipality of Rome refer to some
5,000 Roma in the city, housed in 35 camps. Neonatal mortality in Roma
camps is four times higher than the national average. Immigrant Roma,
predominantly from states of the former Yugoslavia, often are precluded
from obtaining residence or work permits because they do not possess
valid identity documents from their country of origin, and can be
deported. With no legal source of income available, they often turn to
begging or petty crime. The interests of Roma and other immigrants are
represented by over 130 NGO's, such as Caritas; however, these have
funding difficulties. In March, the United Nations Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) urged the Government to
strengthen its efforts for preventing and prosecuting incidents of
racial intolerance and discrimination against some foreigners and Roma,
as well as of bad treatment of foreigners and Roma in detention.
According to the NGO Racism Survey, in 1997 there were 668 cases of
racial discrimination, violence, and intolerance. On June 21, an angry
mob attacked four Roma camps in Naples and torched their caravans after
a traffic accident that involved a Roma driver and severely wounded two
girls, relatives of a local organized crime boss.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides for the right to
establish trade unions, join unions, and carry out union activities in
the workplace. Some 40 percent of the workforce is organized. Trade
unions are free of government controls and no longer have formal ties
with political parties. The right to strike is embodied in the
Constitution and is frequently exercised. A 1990 law restricts strikes
affecting essential public services such as transport, sanitation, and
health. Nonetheless, during a year in which the overall number of work-
hours lost to labor disputes was relatively low, strikes occurred in
several public service sectors, especially air and ground
transportation.
Unions associate freely with international trade union
organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain
collectively, and these rights are respected in practice. By custom,
although not by law, national collective bargaining agreements apply to
all workers, regardless of union affiliation. The law prohibits
discrimination by employers against union members and organizers. It
requires employers that have more than 15 employees and who are found
guilty of antiunion discrimination to reinstate any workers affected.
In firms with less than 15 workers, an employer must provide the
grounds for firing a union employee in writing. If a judge deems the
grounds spurious, he can order the employer to reinstate or compensate
the worker.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by children, and
generally it does not occur; however, some illegal immigrants and
children were forced into prostitution (see Section 5), and trafficking
in illegal immigrant women for prostitution and forced labor, as well
as trafficking in illegal immigrant children, are problems (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law forbids the employment of children under age 15
(with some limited exceptions). There also are specific restrictions on
employment in hazardous or unhealthful occupations for men under age
18, and women under age 21. The enforcement of minimum age laws is
difficult in the extensive underground economy. Estimates of the number
of child laborers differ, ranging from 30,000 to 300,000 (the most
probable figure may be in the area of 50,000). Most of these cases
involve immigrants, but instances involving Italian children also have
been reported. Illegal immigrant child laborers from Northern Africa,
the Philippines, Albania, and especially China have entered in record
numbers every year since 1989, and the influx from China is rising.
According to the Carabinieri, an estimated 30,000 illegal Chinese work
in sweatshop conditions near Florence, with many minor children working
alongside the rest of their families to produce scarves, purses, and
imitations of various brand name products. Many of these factories are
run by an emerging Chinese mafia in Italy, and are equipped with escape
tunnels to thwart labor inspectors.
Following the U.N.-sponsored Oslo International Conference in
November 1997, the Government, employers associations, and unions
signed a charter in April that included: the extension of compulsory
education; better enforcement of school attendance regulations;
programs to reduce the number of school dropouts; more prompt
assistance to families in financial difficulty; further restrictions on
exceptions to the minimum age law; and cancellation of all economic or
administrative incentives for companies found to make use of child
labor, including abroad. The Prime Minister's office provided a toll-
free telephone number to report incidents of child labor. The footwear
and textile industries have established a code of conduct that
prohibits the use of child labor in their international as well as
national activities, applicable to subcontractors as well. For the
first time, a child labor clause was attached to the national labor
contract in the health sector, whereby the parties committed themselves
not to use surgical tools produced by child labor. The law forbids
forced or bonded labor involving children, and the Government generally
enforces this prohibition effectively; however, some illegal immigrant
children were forced into prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.c.), and
some of them were trafficked (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wages are not set by
law, but rather by collective bargaining agreements. These specify
minimum standards to which individual employment contracts must
conform. When an employer and a union fail to reach an agreement,
courts may step in to determine fair wages on the basis of practice in
comparable activities or agreements.
A 1997 law reduced the legal workweek from 48 hours to 40. Most
collective agreements provide for a 36- to 38-hour workweek. The
average contractual workweek is 39 hours but is actually less in many
industries. Overtime work may not exceed 2 hours per day or an average
of 12 hours per week.
The law sets basic health and safety standards and guidelines for
compensation for on-the-job injuries. For most practical purposes,
European Union directives on health and safety also have been
incorporated into the law. Labor inspectors are from the public health
service or from the Ministry of Labor. They are few in number, given
the scope of their responsibilities. Courts impose fines and sometimes
prison terms for violation of health and safety laws. In 1998 some 60
percent of Rome construction sites were cited for safety violations.
Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous work
situations without jeopardizing their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and girls for
prostitution and forced labor to Italy is a growing problem. With few
exceptions, this crime is perpetrated on vulnerable, illegal
immigrants. The women and girls, usually from Albania, Nigeria, and
Eastern Europe, are reluctant to contact the police for assistance.
According to a 1997 Caritas report, the number of foreign women
involved in prostitution then was around 25,000, a figure that has
increased due to developments in Kosovo. According to the Ministry of
Equal Opportunity, the number of foreign women estimated to be involved
in prostitution varies between 30,000 and 35,000. Of these, Parsec (a
social research institution) estimates that 1,000 to 1,500 were
trafficked forcibly. In December 1997, police broke up a Milan ring
that was holding auctions in which women abducted from the countries of
the former Soviet Union were put on blocks, partially naked, and sold
at an average price of just under $1,000.
A February 1998 immigration law provided women involved in
prostitution with an avenue of escape by granting temporary residence/
work permits to those who turn in their exploiters. However,
regulations implementing this law were not finalized until the summer.
The legislation permits a temporary stay for victimized women. During
this time, victims are provided with shelter, benefits, and services
such as counseling and medical assistance, in cooperation with NGO's.
They also may be permitted to work or study. If the victim agrees to
cooperate with law enforcement and judicial authorities, the residence
permit and services are extended for the length of the criminal
proceedings. As a result of these and related policies, significant
increases in witness testimony and successful prosecution of
traffickers have been reported.
In August 1998, a law was passed to combat abuses against children,
including trafficking in children.
______
KAZAKHSTAN
The Constitution of Kazakhstan concentrates power in the
presidency. President Nursultan Nazarbayev is the dominant political
figure. The Constitution, adopted in 1995 in a referendum marred by
irregularities, permits the President to legislate by decree and
dominate the legislature and judiciary; it cannot be changed or amended
without the President's consent. In January President Nazarbayev was
elected to a new 7-year term in an election that fell far short of
international standards. Previous presidential elections originally
scheduled for 1996 did not take place, as President Nazarbayev's term
in office was extended in a separate 1995 referendum, also marred by
irregularities. Parliamentary elections held in October were an
improvement on the presidential election but still fell short of
international standards. Under the 1995 Constitution, Parliament's
powers are more limited than previously. However, Members of Parliament
(M.P.'s) have the right to introduce legislation and some bills
introduced by M.P.'s have become laws. The judiciary remained under the
control of the President and the executive branch. The lack of an
independent judiciary made it difficult to root out corruption, which
was pervasive throughout the Government.
The Committee for National Security (the KNB, successor to the KGB)
is responsible for national security, law enforcement activities on the
national level, and counterintelligence. It also oversees the external
intelligence service, Barlau. The KNB reports directly to the
President. A new organization, the Agency on the Protection of State
Secrets was established in May and, while not officially part of the
Government, reportedly is directly subordinate to the Prime Minister.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs, which is subordinate to the KNB,
supervises the criminal police, who are poorly paid and widely believed
to be corrupt. Both the KNB and the Interior Ministry Police (MVD)
monitored Government opponents, the opposition press, human rights
activists, and some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), who claimed
that KNB and MVD officials pressured them to limit activities
objectionable to the Government. The KNB continued efforts to improve
its public image by focusing on fighting Government corruption,
religious extremism, terrorism, and organized crime. Members of the
security forces committed human rights abuses.
Kazakhstan is rich in natural resources, chiefly petroleum and
minerals. The Government has made significant progress toward a market-
based economy since independence. After 2 consecutive years of economic
growth (1.1 percent in 1996 and 1.5 percent in 1997) the economy
declined by 2.5 percent in 1998. The Government responded to the
effects of the Russian financial crisis by floating the tenge in April,
effectively devaluing it 60 percent by October. With the fall of the
tenge, inflation reached 12.6 percent for the first 8 months of the
year, compared with 1.9 percent for the same period in 1998. The
average annual wage was approximately $1,000 (down from $1,500 in
1998). The agricultural sector has been slow to privatize. The
Government has privatized successfully small- and medium-sized firms
and most large-scale industrial complexes. However, living standards
for the majority of the population continue to decline. According to
several surveys, in 1998 approximately 35 percent of citizens lived
below the government-defined poverty line of $35 per month, up from 33
percent the previous year.
The Government's human rights record was poor, and serious problems
remain in several areas. The Government severely limited citizens'
right to change their government. The Government barred two opposition
politicians from competing in the January presidential elections on
administrative grounds and harassed opposition candidates in the fall
parliamentary elections. Democratic institutions remain weak. The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) declined to
send observers for the Presidential elections, citing flawed election
preparations. The OSCE sent a full observation mission for the
parliamentary elections after the Government made some reforms to its
electoral law and regulations, but concluded that the elections fell
short of the Government's commitments as an OSCE member. In both
elections, the Government used an electoral law provision to prohibit
some government opponents from running because they previously had been
found guilty of political offenses such as publicly insulting the
President and participating in unauthorized public meetings and
demonstrations. The Government harassed its opponents and appeared
complicit in at least four assaults on perceived opponents during the
presidential campaign. There were reports of official bias and
harassment, but not of violence, during the parliamentary campaign.
The legal structure, including the Constitution adopted in 1995,
does not fully safeguard human rights. Members of the security forces
committed a number of extrajudicial killings, and tortured, beat, or
otherwise abused detainees. Prison conditions remained harsh. The
Government used arbitrary arrest and detention, particularly during the
period prior to the January presidential election, and prolonged
detention is a problem. The judiciary remains under the control of the
President and the executive branch, and corruption is deeply rooted. A
political prisoner, Labor Movement leader Madel Ismailov, was released
in February after serving 1 year in prison for insulting the President.
He attempted to run for Parliament in October but under an April 1998
provision of the election law was disqualified because of his
conviction. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
The Government restricted freedom of speech and of the press. A
July press law placed media issues under the direct control of the
Minister of Information and Social Accord. The Government harassed much
of the opposition media, and government efforts to restrain the
independent media continued, as some opposition newspapers and other
media outlets were ordered to close, forced to sell to progovernment
interests, or brought under pressure by regulatory authorities. The
Government reportedly pressured media not to cover the opposition
during the presidential campaign, and, to a lesser extent, during the
parliamentary campaign. Vague new state secret and media laws, as well
as a similarly vague 1998 national security law, increased pressure on
the media to practice self-censorship. The Government continues to own
and control printing and distribution facilities and to subsidize
publications. Academic freedom is not respected. The Government imposes
significant restrictions on freedom of assembly. Some organizers of
unsanctioned demonstrations were arrested and fined or imprisoned. The
Government imposes significant restrictions on freedom of association,
and complicated and controversial registration requirements hindered
organizations and political parties. The Government sometimes harasses
those it regards as religious extremists. Domestic violence against
women remained a problem. There was discrimination against women, the
disabled, and ethnic minorities. The Government discriminated in favor
of ethnic Kazakhs. The Government limited worker rights; it tried to
limit the influence of independent trade unions, both directly and
through its support for state-sponsored unions, and members of
independent trade unions were harassed. Workers continued to protest
chronic nonpayment of wages. Child labor persists in agricultural
areas. There was anecdotal evidence of trafficking in women.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
According to press reports, a criminal case was brought against a
police sergeant in Makhtaaralsk (Shymkent oblast) for the beating death
of 24-year-old man, Nurzhan Saparov, who was in custody following his
arrest for disturbing the peace. At year's end, reportedly four police
officers were awaiting trial charged with responsibility for his death.
Reports indicate that deaths caused by military hazing persist, and
there is no indication that the numbers of deaths declined during the
year. However, there are some reports that military personnel engaging
in hazing have been prosecuted.
There has been no government action in the 1998 death by beating of
Yalkynzhan Yakupov whose body was found hanging in the Chunja District
police station. There have been no arrests or known government
investigation in the case of a young man killed while in detention in
Almaty in January 1997.
In 1998, 1,290 inmates, more than 1 percent of all prisoners, died
from disease, mostly tuberculosis, aggravated by harsh prison
conditions and inadequate medical treatment (see Section 1.c.). No
figures for deaths in prison were available for 1999.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution states that ``no one must be subject to
torture, violence or other treatment and punishment that is cruel or
humiliating to human dignity;'' however, police tortured, beat, and
otherwise abused detainees sometimes in order to obtain confessions,
and beat protesters. In May and August, the Government publicly
acknowledged and criticized police use of torture. In the first half of
the year, prosecutors brought 20 criminal cases against police officers
for physically abusing detainees, but human rights observers believe
that these cases cover only a small fraction of the incidents of police
abuse of detainees. Human rights observers report that detainees
sometimes are choked, handcuffed to radiators, or have plastic bags
placed over their heads to force them to divulge information. Training
standards and pay for police are very low and individual law
enforcement officials often are supervised poorly.
Members of an Islamic group from Taraz alleged that the authorities
beat 70 group members, including 12 minors, who were detained for
participation in a private religious retreat in July. The beatings
reportedly left one minor with a broken nose and an adult detainee with
broken ribs (see Section 2.c.). In April police in Aralsk reportedly
beat a group of female hunger strikers who were blocking a railway line
to protest nonpayment for 3 years of family social benefits. Three were
hospitalized as a result of the beatings which were reported in the
media on April 21-22. On November 28, in Almaty, two unidentified men
assaulted opposition activist Andrei Grishin, who published a newspaper
article critical of a new museum dedicated to President Nazarbayev
shortly before the incident. The attack apparently was politically
motivated. Law enforcement authorities and anonymous telephone callers
reportedly warned Grishin several times before the assault to stop his
political activities. The assailants, who reportedly told Grishin that
he deserved the attack, cut off Grishin's hair, doused him with oil
paint, and left him unconscious. They did not rob him. No arrests were
made in the case by year's end. Opposition activist Aleksei Martinov
was detained on suspicion of theft of computer parts and was
hospitalized on December 12 after suffering head injuries from a
beating he received while in police detention in Almaty. Martinov filed
a complaint alleging that the police beat him and was released
following his hospitalization.
During the campaign prior to the January 10 presidential election,
several perceived government opponents were assaulted. The attacks
appeared to be politically motivated and, in at least some cases,
sanctioned by the Government (see Section 3). The authorities made no
arrests. There were no reports of such attacks prior to the autumn
parliamentary elections.
Army personnel subjected conscripts to brutal hazing, including
beatings and verbal abuse. The Deputy Chief of the General Staff
reported 17 cases of death due to mistreatment as of mid-1998, a 50
percent decline over the same period in 1997. Reportedly the Government
has taken action occasionally against officials charged with abuses,
levying administrative sanctions such as fines for those found guilty.
The Army launched an aggressive campaign to punish violators of a new
antihazing policy in 1998, but at year's end anecdotal accounts
suggested that hazing had worsened, and there were no official reports
on the problem.
There were claims that authorities committed persons to mental
institutions for political purposes. In May a professor at the Eurasian
University in Astana, Armial Tasymbekov, was committed to a mental
hospital for public drunkenness. He claimed that his incarceration was
motivated politically because KNB officials interrogated him shortly
before his incarceration on the suspicion that he incited his students
to criticize the President in leaflets and graffiti. Tasymbekov was
released later in May and died in August.
Prison conditions remained harsh due to inadequate resources.
According to the Interior Ministry during the year there were
approximately 85,000 prisoners in facilities designed to hold 60,000.
Local human rights observers agreed with these figures. On February 26,
prisoners at a prison in Atyrau reportedly protested mistreatment by
cutting open their stomachs; however, none died. Press reports in March
indicated that five teenagers in a juvenile detention facility in
Almaty cut open their veins to draw attention to harsh treatment.
Overcrowding, inadequate prison diet, and a lack of medical
supplies and personnel contributed to the spread of tuberculosis and
other major diseases. Human rights observers reported that 14,000
prisoners, or about 16 percent of all prisoners, suffered from
tuberculosis. These figures do not differ significantly from official
figures. In September 1998, the official Russian-language newspaper
reported that 12,600 prisoners suffered from tuberculosis. A human
rights NGO reported that the total number of tuberculosis cases
declined by 30 percent during the year as a consequence of improved
treatment, humanitarian aid, and amnesties. In 1997 the Government also
acknowledged that AIDS is becoming a concern. Prison guards, who are
poorly paid, steal food and medicines intended for prisoners. Violent
crime among prisoners is common.
In July the Government passed the first amnesty law since 1996. It
applied to nonviolent offenders who committed crimes as juveniles, had
certain kinds of veteran's status, were seriously ill, or had specified
family responsibilities. According to parliamentary sources, the
objective of the law was to release over 21,000 prisoners within 6
months of its passage. However, Interior Ministry sources said that
only about 15,000 prisoners actually would receive amnesty. The law
also was intended to clear the convictions of approximately 22,000
persons who received suspended sentences and to reduce the sentences of
approximately 7,700 inmates. By year's end, the Interior Ministry
reported that over 15,000 prisoners were released under the amnesty
law, 2,100 of whom suffered from tuberculosis.
Prisoners are allowed one 4-hour visit every 3 months, but
additional visits may be granted in emergency situations. Some
prisoners are eligible for 3-day visits with close relatives once every
6 months. Juveniles are kept in separate facilities.
Human rights monitors wishing to visit prisons must receive
authorization from the MVD (Interior Ministry). The Government
cooperated with the OSCE in a program to improve prison conditions.
Although the Government sometimes created obstacles for those who
requested access to prisons, the local NGO International Bureau for
Human Rights (IBHR) reported that its representatives regularly
received authorization. The IBHR visited men's prisons in addition to
women's and juveniles' prisons during the year. Two international
NGO's, the Dutch Interchurch Aid and Penal Reform International (PRI),
accompanied IBHR on prison visits in Pavlodar during the year. PRI also
visited prisons for juveniles and women in Almaty.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government used
minor infractions of the law, frequently related to unsanctioned
assembly, or manufactured charges to arrest and detain government
opponents arbitrarily, in particular during the period prior to the
presidential election in January. Under the election law, convictions
on such charges allowed the Government to exclude government opponents
from running for president or other public office (see Section 3). In
October 1998, less than a week after the Government called for early
presidential elections, an Almaty court summoned five leading
government opponents with less than 24-hour notice on charges of
participating in a meeting of an unregistered organization called For
Fair Elections. All five--Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Dos Kushim, Irina
Savostina, Petr Svoik, and Mels Yeleusizov--were convicted. Svoik and
Yeleusizov served 3-day jail sentences. The others paid fines. In May a
court in Kostenai fined Communist Party and Pokoleniye (Generation)
Pensioners Movement activist Vladimir Chernyshev for participating in
an unsanctioned rally. He and a group of pensioners had gathered at a
monument to Lenin to commemorate Lenin's birthday (see Section 3). In
September at the request of the Prosecutor General, authorities in
Russia detained Kazhegeldin, the leader of the opposition Republican
People's Party (RNPK), in connection with a corruption investigation.
Following protests from international human rights groups and
Kazakhstani opposition figures, the Prosecutor General dropped his
extradition request, and the Russian authorities released Kazhegeldin
(see Section 3). On December 9, the KNB detained three individuals,
RNPK members, who worked as bodyguards for Kazhegeldin on charges of
possession of illegal weapons and narcotics. At year's end, two of the
three, Pyotr Afanasenko and Satzhan Ibrayev, remained in custody but
had not been charged. The third bodyguard, Vladimir Ruchkin, was
released after 4 days in detention. All three were former KNB employees
who had first served as Kazhegeldin's bodyguards when Kazhegeldin was
Prime Minister. Human Rights and opposition figures alleged that the
detentions were politically motivated. The Government also arbitrarily
arrested, detained, fined, and sometimes imprisoned demonstrators (see
Section 2.b.).
The law sanctions pretrial detention. According to the
Constitution, police may hold a detainee for 72 hours before bringing
charges. The Criminal Code allows continued detention for up to 12
months with the approval of the General Prosecutor of the Republic.
Lower-ranking prosecutors may approve interim extensions of detention.
In practice police routinely hold detainees, with the sanction of a
prosecutor, for weeks or even months without bringing charges, and
prolonged detention is a serious problem. The General Prosecutor's
office acknowledged that law enforcement authorities kept more than
7,000 persons in custody longer than legally allowed in 1998.
Additionally, short (3-hour) and long (72-hour) detentions for
``suspicion'' are used widely.
A bail system exists, but, according to the General Prosecutor's
Office, only 28 out of the 26,598 persons detained in the first 8
months of the year were released on bail.
According to the Constitution, every person detained, arrested, or
accused of committing a crime has the right to the assistance of a
defense lawyer from the moment of detention, arrest, or accusation.
This right generally is respected in practice. Human rights activists
allege that members of the security forces have pressured prisoners to
refuse the assistance of an attorney, sometimes resulting in a delay
before the accused sees a lawyer. The Government's reluctance to
provide a lawyer is partly attributed to a shortage of funds to pay
court-appointed lawyers to which defendants are entitled. Detainees
also may appeal the legality of detention or arrest to the prosecutor
before trial, but in practice most persons refrain from making an
appeal due to fear that they may be punished for doing so. If the
defendant cannot afford an attorney, the Constitution provides that the
State must provide one free of charge. Human rights organizations
allege that many prisoners are unaware of this provision of the law.
Although some lawyers are reluctant to defend clients unpopular with
the Government, there were no reports of attorneys being sanctioned by
the Government for their decisions to defend particular clients.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government does
not use it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Government interference and
pressure compromised the court system's independence throughout the
year--a situation codified in the Constitution's establishment of a
judiciary fully under the control of the President and the executive
branch.
There are three levels in the court system: local; oblast
(provincial); and the Supreme Court. According to the Constitution, the
President proposes to the upper house of Parliament (the Senate)
nominees for the Supreme Court. (Nominees are recommended by the
Supreme Judicial Council, a body that the President chaired until
March. Under constitutional amendments passed in 1998, a presidential
appointee replaced the President as chairperson. Commission members
also include the chairperson of the Constitutional Council, the
chairperson of the Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General, the Minister
of Justice, senators, judges, and other persons appointed by the
President). The President appoints oblast judges (nominated by the
Supreme Judicial Council) and local level judges from a list presented
by the Ministry of Justice. The list is based on recommendations from
the Qualification Collegium of Justice, an institution made up of
deputies from the lower house of Parliament (the Majilis), judges,
public prosecutors, and others appointed by the President.
According to legislation passed in December 1996, judges are
appointed for life, although in practice this means until mandatory
retirement at age 65. The 1995 Constitution abolished the
Constitutional Court and established a Constitutional Council. The
President directly appoints three of its seven members, including the
chairman. The Council rules on election and referendum challenges,
interprets the Constitution, and determines the constitutionality of
laws adopted by Parliament. Under the Constitution, citizens no longer
have the right to appeal directly to a court about the
constitutionality of a government action; this appeal is now the sole
prerogative of the courts. The Constitution states that ``if a court
finds that a law or other regulatory legal act subject to application
undermined the rights and liberties of an individual and a citizen, it
shall suspend legal proceedings and address the Constitutional Council
with a proposal to declare the law unconstitutional.'' However, it does
not grant citizens the right to approach the courts on a constitutional
issue.
Local courts try less serious crimes, such as petty theft and
vandalism. Oblast courts handle more serious crimes, such as murder,
grand theft, and organized criminal activities. The oblast courts also
may handle cases in rural areas where no local courts are organized.
Judgments of the local courts may be appealed to the oblast-level
courts, while those of the oblast courts may be appealed to the Supreme
Court. There is also a military court. Although they do not currently
exist, specialized and extraordinary courts also can be created--for
example, economic, taxation, family, juvenile, and administrative
courts--which would have the status of oblast and local courts.
The Constitution and the law establish the necessary procedures for
a fair trial. Trials are public, with the exception of instances in
which an open hearing could result in state secrets being divulged, or
when the private life or personal family concerns of a citizen must be
protected.
According to the Constitution, defendants have the right to be
present, the right to counsel (at public expense if needed), and the
right to be heard in court and call witnesses for the defense.
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence, are protected from self-
incrimination, and have the right to appeal a decision to a higher
court. Legal proceedings are to be conducted in the state language,
Kazakh, although Russian also may be used officially in the courts.
Proceedings also may be held in the language of the majority of the
population in a particular area.
In most cases, these rights are respected. However, cases involving
government opponents frequently are closed. Courthouse guards did not
allow the public to observe the 1998 trial of five government opponents
on charges of attending a meeting of an unregistered organization (see
Section 1.d.). The 1998 trial of Labor Movement leader Madel Ismailov
for insulting the honor and dignity of the President was closed to the
public and press.
The problem of corruption is evident at every stage and level of
the judicial process. Judges are poorly paid; the Government has not
made a vigorous effort to root out corruption in the judiciary.
According to press reports, judicial positions can be purchased.
Anecdotal evidence stemming from individual cases suggests that judges
solicit bribes from participants in trials and rule accordingly.
In May 1996, the Government instituted a procedure that required
recertification of all judges. Completed in 1998, the process was
intended to ensure that judges are familiar with current law. The
recertification resulted in a significant turnover of personnel,
particularly at the lower levels. Although the recertification process
addressed a legitimate need to improve judicial competence, it was used
in some cases by local governments to remove individual judges for
political reasons. In March the rector of the State Judicial University
alleged that 40 percent of sitting judges were recertified only because
they received copies of the recertification exam prior to taking it.
There was no official response to this accusation.
The new Criminal Code took effect in 1998. Although human rights
organizations considered the new criminal code a step forward, they
raised a number of concerns regarding the code's effect on individual
political and civic rights. The new code extends the maximum term of
imprisonment from 15 to 30 years and gives judges and law enforcement
officials more flexibility in determining appropriate charges.
Previously, after a certain number of civil code violations, a
defendant automatically would be charged with a criminal offense. The
new code also eliminated a number of legal holdovers from the Soviet
period, including public condemnation as a punishment, enforcement of
restrictive passport regulations, and prosecution for vagrancy or a
parasitic way of life.
The Government held one political prisoner who was released in
February upon completion of his 1-year sentence. In 1998 an Almaty
district court sentenced Labor Movement leader Madel Ismailov for
insulting the honor and dignity of President Nazarbayev, a
constitutional offense, during a November 1997 political rally in
Almaty. Ismailov reportedly called President Nazarbayev ``a
scoundrel.'' Ismailov was convicted of the most serious form of
insulting--using the mass media to insult the honor and dignity of the
President--because an independent television station had recorded
Ismailov's offending remark. Ismailov, a resident of Almaty, served his
sentence in a prison in the north Kazakhstan oblast. In an appeal to
the General Prosecutor, lawyers for Ismailov contended that his
imprisonment in the north Kazakhstan oblast violated the Criminal
Executive Code, which stipulates that ``Persons sentenced to
imprisonment should serve out their terms in prisons located on the
territory of the oblast where they lived before their arrest or where
they were sentenced.'' The General Prosecutor took no action on the
appeal prior to Ismailov's release. Ismailov attempted to register as a
candidate for the October parliamentary elections, but was barred under
amendments made to the election decree in April 1998 because of his
criminal conviction (see Section 3).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Despite constitutional protections, the Government
infringed on these rights. The Constitution provides that citizens have
the right to ``confidentiality of personal deposits and savings,
correspondence, telephone conversations, postal, telegraph and other
messages.'' Limitation of this right is allowed ``only in cases and
according to procedures directly established by law.'' However, the KNB
and Ministry of Internal Affairs, with the concurrence of the General
Prosecutor's office, can and do interfere arbitrarily with privacy,
family, home, and correspondence. The law requires the police, who
remain part of the internal security structure, to obtain a search
warrant from a prosecutor before conducting a search, but they
sometimes search without a warrant. The KNB has the right to monitor
telephone calls and mail, but under the law it must inform the General
Prosecutor's office within 24 hours of such activity. Some human rights
observers complained that the Government monitored their movements and
telephone calls (see Section 4). A foreign NGO working to promote
democracy alleged that someone apparently tampered with its e-mail in
November. Also in November, opposition figures alleged that the
Government temporarily closed off direct access through local Internet
service providers to the Eurasia web site, which featured material
critical of the Government. However, they provided no evidence. On
November 25, the Prime Minister signed an order creating a single,
state-run billing center for all telecommunications services. Although
the order called for the center to open on January 1, 2000, it did not
appear at year's end that the center would be ready before the
deadline. The Government presented the creation of the center as an
attempt to ensure that all telecommunications traffic was being taxed
properly. NGO's, opposition figures, and other private citizens
expressed concerns that the Government would use the center to enhance
its monitoring of telecommunications traffic and to control the
availability of information on the Internet. Government officials
denied that this was their intent.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the July
press and media law provide for freedom of speech and of the press;
however, the Government restricted these rights in practice. The new
media law places media issues under the control of the Minister of
Information and Social Accord, and the Government closed or otherwise
harassed much of the independent media. Many journalists practiced
self-censorship. A vaguely written law on national security passed in
1998 gave the Prosecutor General the authority to suspend the activity
of news media that undermine national security.
The new media law reaffirms the constitutional provision for free
speech and prohibits censorship; however, the law's vague language
gives the Government broad discretion to restrict media freedom and
thereby promotes media self-censorship. For example the law prohibits
the mass media from ``undermining state security'' or advocating
``class, social, race, national, or religious superiority'' or ``a cult
of cruelty and violence.'' Under the law, owners, editors,
distributors, and journalists can be held responsible for violations.
The law also requires all media to register with the Government, but it
does not set forth an appeals process if registration is denied.
During the January campaign presidential election, many members of
the independent media reported government pressure not to cover
opposition candidates. Newspapers that tried to cover the opposition
had their print runs seized or delayed, or their access to printing
houses denied. Most media outlets were allowed to cover the full range
of candidates in the October parliamentary elections, but local
officials frequently pressured them to limit coverage of the
opposition.
The Government continued to own and control most printing and
distribution facilities and to subsidize periodicals, including many
that supposedly were independent. The potential for government control
and the widespread belief that the Government was cracking down on
independent media resulted in widespread media self-censorship. The key
subject considered ``off limits'' by journalists was personal criticism
of the President and his family. In November after television news
programs from Russia began reporting that Swiss authorities froze bank
accounts allegedly belonging to the President, the Government blocked
retransmission of Russian television stations for several days.
However, The Globe, a small-circulation Russian-English bilingual
newspaper based in Almaty, published a story about the Swiss bank
accounts with no apparent repercussions. The press generally was
permitted to criticize government decisions, official corruption, and
the powerlessness of the Parliament.
The authorities frequently pressured two avowed opposition
newspapers, Twenty-First Century (XXI Vek) and Soldat (formerly Dat).
Issues of these newspapers sometimes were seized from street vendors.
Printing houses, sometimes acknowledging government pressure,
frequently declined to publish the newspapers. In September, 3 weeks
before the parliamentary elections, a local Almaty court froze the bank
account of Twenty-First Century, leaving it unable to pay its vendors
and employees. The court action was based on a lawsuit brought by a
company reportedly controlled by a son-in-law of President Nazarbayev.
Twenty-First Century lost the lawsuit in November, and at year's end
had not paid the judgment.
The Government closed Dat, then the only Kazakh-language opposition
newspaper, in 1998. The newspaper reappeared early in the year in two
new versions, one of which, Soldat, clearly identified itself as an
opposition newspaper. Kazakhstani printing houses, reportedly under
pressure from the authorities, refused to publish Soldat. In September
two issues of Soldat published in Russia were seized by the customs
police who reportedly claimed that the newspaper needed to pay
additional fees and produce health certificates attesting that the
imported newspapers were free of tuberculosis. The authorities
ultimately released the newspapers after they were outdated, and Soldat
continues to publish.
In Semipalatinsk the tax police harassed the Irtysh newspaper,
which regularly included in its own print run an insert from the
Fahrenheit 451 opposition newspaper. Fahrenheit 451 was unable to
publish on its own because the authorities denied it access to state
publishing houses and pressured the few private ones to refuse to do so
as well. Fahrenheit 451 stopped appearing 1 month before the October
parliamentary election.
The independent newspaper Nachnyem S'ponedelnika, which specializes
in investigative stories about government corruption, was on the verge
of closure at year's end due to defamation lawsuits and government
harassment.
After suffering harassment during 1998, including threats of death
and violence directed against staff members, the newspaper Center lost
many of its advertisers and ceased publication at the end of 1998. The
Government took no apparent action following the assault on Dec 8, 1998
against a visiting German journalist that was regarded as possibly
politically motivated. Criminal charges were brought in October 1998
against Petr Svoik for his newspaper article about relations between
ethnic Russians and Kazakhs. The case was ``suspended indefinitely,''
but has never been dismissed officially.
The Communist Party's national newspaper, which was closed by the
Government in 1997, has not been permitted to resume publication.
About 80 percent of newspapers are subject to direct government
control. The Government runs the newspapers that appear most
frequently, five times a week. There are also a large number of
newspapers that are produced by government ministries, for example,
Kazakhstan Science, which is published by the Ministry of Science. Many
newspapers receive a government subsidy, including about 90 percent of
Kazakh-language newspapers, although most of these would call
themselves independents. Therefore, including newspapers that receive
subsidies, about 80 percent of newspapers are government-influenced.
Each major population center has at least one independent weekly
newspaper. There are 11 major independent newspapers in Almaty.
According to credible observers in the independent press and human
rights community, the Government and its proxies continued to
consolidate media ownership. One of President Nazarbayev's sons-in-law,
Rakhat Aliyev, and his associates reportedly gained control of the
Karavan media group, which includes the largest nongovernment newspaper
in the country, Karavan, as well as KTK television and radio, and the
Franklin Press publishing house. Aliyev is the senior KNB official in
Almaty oblast. The Karavan group reportedly had changed hands several
times since June 1998, when, according to credible media and human
rights observers, the tax authorities coerced the owners of the
independent Karavan media group into selling the group to business
interests closely associated with the President. Aliyev was the head of
the tax police at the time. In late August, it was reported that the
KTK purchased NTK television and was preparing to reorganize the two
into one company. The two stations continued broadcasting separately,
but NTK ended its nightly news program in December.
Newspapers largely or entirely stopped attempting to print outside
the country during the year. However, opposition newspapers or
newspapers that encounter official disapproval as a consequence of
specific stories encounter difficulty gaining access to local printing
presses.
The Government controls nearly all broadcast transmission
facilities. There are 45 independent television and radio stations (17
television stations, 15 radio stations and 13 combined television and
radio stations). Eleven of these are in Almaty. There are only two
government-owned, combined radio and television companies; however,
they represent five channels and are the only stations that can
broadcast nationwide. Regional governments own several frequencies;
however, independent broadcasters have arranged with local
administrations to use the majority of these. An Association of
Independent Electronic Media of Central Asia (ANESMI) exists, but it is
fractured and weak.
There were no reports, as in the previous year, that the Government
threatened not to renew broadcast licenses of out-of-favor independent
stations. There were also no frequency auctions; many members of the
independent media and human rights activists believed that the
Government used the auctions in the past to harass and even eliminate
independent media. The Government continued its discussion of a 50
percent Kazakh language content in broadcasting, and threats of
selective enforcement of this requirement remain a problem. However,
there were no reports during the year of the Government closing
stations or failing to renew their licenses if they were not in
conformity with the 50 percent rule, despite government threats in 1998
to do so.
There was no further action by the Prosecutor General concerning
the legality of the frequencies auction in 1997. Nor was there any
response from the Prime Minister to the Prosecutor's request for a
ruling on the law guiding the auctions. There was no law passed on the
tender procedures during the year.
During the campaign for the January presidential election, many
members of the independent media reported government pressure not to
cover opposition candidates. Media coverage of the campaign for the
October parliamentary elections was extensive and featured all
candidates. A nationally televised 2\1/2\ hour live debate on Khabar
state television featured representatives of the nine registered
parties that were participating in the party-list section of the vote.
Despite these improvements over the presidential election, independent
media around the country reported official pressure to give the
majority of their parliamentary election coverage to the
propresidential Otan party. They also reported that government
authorities told them to limit coverage and to focus on negative news
about the RNPK and Azamat opposition parties, as well as the Orleu
opposition movement. Some television editors claimed that they were
told categorically not to cover certain opposition candidates. Azamat
claimed that state television and radio denied its candidates the free
air time normally available to all candidates. An RNPK candidate,
Twenty-First Century newspaper editor Bigeldy Gabdullin, charged
correctly that his free broadcast was not shown in his home
constituency of Talgar.
The Constitution provides for the protection of the dignity of the
President and the law against insulting the President and other
officials remained on the books. Labor Movement leader Madel Ismailov
served 1 year in prison for violating the law (see Section 1.e.).
Several laws control advertising in the mass media. One law restricts
alcohol and tobacco advertising on television. The new media law
prohibited violence and all ``pornography'' from television broadcasts.
Another law restricts advertising in each issue of a newspaper to 20
percent of the total material. The Minister of Justice and the Minister
of Information have interpreted this law as restricting paid articles,
but not commercial advertisements.
A new law on state secrets entered into force in March. It
criminalized the unauthorized disclosure of a wide range of
information, much of which was vaguely defined and left to the
interpretation of government authorities. The list of state secrets
enumerated in the law included all information about the health and
private life of the President and his family. Also defined as state
secrets were basic economic information such as the volumes and
scientific characteristics of national mineral reserves and the amount
of government debt owed to foreign creditors.
In December the Government announced that beginning in 2000, the
Billing and Telecommunications Tariff Center would restrict Internet
access to government service providers (see Section 1.f.).
Academic freedom is circumscribed. As is the case for journalists,
academics cannot violate certain taboos, such as criticizing the
President and his family. There were widespread credible reports that
universities and schools coerced faculty, students, and the parents of
schoolchildren to sign nominating petitions for the reelection campaign
of President Nazarbayev. There were similar widespread reports that
educational administrators also coerced faculty into joining the
propresidential Otan party. During the campaign for the presidential
election in January, the Al-Farabi national university in Almaty forced
Yelena Nikitenko, an adviser to opposition presidential candidate
Akezhan Kazhegeldin, to resign from the faculty because of her outside
political activities (see Section 3). In May a professor at the
Eurasian University in Astana, Armial Tasymbekov, was committed to a
mental hospital for public drunkenness. He claimed that his
incarceration was motivated politically because KNB officials
interrogated him shortly before his incarceration on the suspicion that
he incited his students to criticize the President in leaflets and
graffiti. Tasymbekov was released later in May and died in August (see
Section 1.c.). Course topics and content generally are subject to
approval by the university administration.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for peaceful assembly; however, the Government and the law
impose significant restrictions. The 1998 law on national security
defined as a threat to national security ``unsanctioned gatherings,
public meetings, marches, demonstrations, illegal picketing, and
strikes'' that upset social and political stability.
According to the law, organizations must apply to the local
authorities for a permit to hold a demonstration or public meeting at
least 10 days in advance, or the activity is considered illegal. In
some cases, local officials routinely issued necessary permits.
However, human rights activists complained that complicated procedures
and the 10-day notification period made it difficult for all groups to
organize public meetings and demonstrations. They reported that local
authorities, especially those outside of the capital, turned down the
majority of applications submitted or refused to allow rallies to take
place in central locations. An April 1998 amendment to the election
decree that bars candidates for public office who have been convicted
within the preceding year of administrative offenses was used against
leading government opponents who participated in unsanctioned meetings
and demonstrations (see Section 3).
There were numerous peaceful, unsanctioned demonstrations by
workers and pensioners protesting difficult economic conditions and the
nonpayment of wages and pensions. For the most part, law enforcement
authorities did not interfere in the demonstrations, and no action was
taken against the individuals who participated. However, pensioners
were arrested occasionally at the peaceful, monthly pensioners'
demonstration in front of the city hall in Almaty.
There were also cases in which the Government arrested, detained,
fined, and sometimes imprisoned the participants and organizers of
unsanctioned rallies. In September Almaty police arrested about a dozen
persons who gathered in front of the Russian embassy to protest the
detention in Moscow of opposition leader Akezhan Kazhegeldin (see
Section 3). Two of the protesters were sentenced to 10 and 5 days in
jail; the rest were fined or received warnings. In May a court in
Kostenai fined Communist Party and Pokoleniye Pensioners Movement
activist Vladimir Chernyshev for participating in an unsanctioned
rally. Chernyshev gathered with a group of pensioners to lay flowers at
a monument to Lenin on Lenin's birthday (see Sections 1.d. and 3). In
April police in Aralsk reportedly beat a group of female hunger
strikers who were protesting nonpayment for 3 years of family social
benefits; the women were blocking a railway line. Three were
hospitalized as a result of the beatings.
The authorities regularly blocked access to conference halls rented
by opposition political parties, candidates, and related groups. A
meeting of political opposition groups was disrupted on October 27 when
participants could not gain access to the auditorium that they rented
at the Academy of Sciences in Almaty. The activists organized the
meeting to protest alleged government manipulation of the October
parliamentary elections and to establish a new unified opposition
front, the Forum of Democratic Forces. The group succeeded in holding
its meeting after moving participants to one of three other locations
that it rented secretly in anticipation of blocked access to its
announced meeting place. On April 10, the new opposition movement Orleu
(Progress) could not gain access to the labor union hall that it rented
for its founding congress in Almaty. Firemen sealed the hall a day
earlier because of purported building code violations. There were
credible allegations that the office of the mayor of Almaty instigated
the fire department action for political reasons.
Madel Ismailov, convicted in September 1997 of ``active
participation in or organization of public disorder'' and sentenced to
1 year of ``corrective labor,'' lost both of his appeals against the
judgment. However, as he was in prison for a year after a conviction
for insulting the President and had no salary during that period, the
corrective labor penalty (which means that a portion of salary is
garnished) was not imposed.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government and the law impose significant restrictions on this right.
Organizations that conduct public activities, hold public meetings,
participate in conferences, or have bank accounts must register
annually with the Government. Registration on the local level requires
a minimum of 10 members and on the national level, a minimum of 10
members in at least 7 of the 14 oblasts. In addition a registration fee
is required, which many groups consider a deterrent to registration.
Many groups had difficulties trying to register with local
officials. The new association called For Fair Elections was registered
on March 1, more than 5 months after filing its registration
application. The law requires the Ministry of Justice to act on
registration applications within 15 days of filing. Five leading
government opponents who participated in the group's October 1998
meeting in Almaty were convicted of participating in a meeting of an
unregistered organization (see Section 3). The organization Russian
Community (Russkaia Obshchina) demonstrated in August to protest
authorities' 2-year denial of national registration, which rendered its
members ineligible to serve as observers at polling stations. The
Government subsequently registered the organization, permitting it to
observe the parliamentary elections.
The Constitution prohibits political parties established on a
religious basis. The Government has refused to register ethnic-based
political parties on the grounds that their activities could spark
ethnic violence. The Constitution bans ``public associations''--
including political parties--whose ``goals or actions are directed at a
violent change of the constitutional system, violation of the integrity
of the republic, undermining of the security of the state (and),
fanning of social, racial, national, religious, class, and tribal
enmity.'' Nonetheless, unregistered parties and movements hold meetings
and publish newspapers. All of the major religious and ethnic groups
have independently functioning cultural centers.
To participate in elections, a political party must register with
the Government. The Government registered 10 parties to participate in
the parliamentary elections in October, including several associated
with government opponents. Under current law, a party must submit a
list of at least 3,000 members from a minimum of 7 oblasts and the
cities of Almaty and Astana. The list must provide personal information
about members, including date and place of birth, address, and place of
employment. For many citizens, submitting such personal data to the
Government is reminiscent of the tactics of the former Soviet KGB and
inhibits them from joining parties. The nationalist Alash Party and the
Social Democratic Party have refused to register on the principle that
they should not have to submit personal information about their members
to the Government. Under the law, members of unregistered parties may
run for elected office as individuals, but not as party members.
In December 1998, leading government opponents headed by former
Prime Minister and disqualified presidential candidate Akezhan
Kazhegeldin began efforts to form the new Republican People's Party.
The group held its first congress in Moscow to avoid government
harassment directed at Kazhegeldin and other members of the opposition
prior to the January presidential election (see Section 3). According
to conference organizers, authorities at the Moscow hotel where the
congress was to have been held denied the group access to conference
facilities on the eve of the meeting. Organizers said that
approximately 10 other Moscow hotels subsequently refused to allow the
group to use conference facilities before organizers found a suitable
location. Organizers of the congress credibly alleged that Kazakhstani
authorities used influence with Russian officials to try to disrupt the
congress. The party was registered by the Government prior to the
parliamentary elections in October and several of its members became
candidates in individual races. The other candidates running against
the President in the January presidential election and against
government-favored candidates in the October parliamentary elections
complained that local officials throughout the country refused to allow
them to rent public halls for political meetings.
The Constitution prohibits foreign political parties and foreign
trade unions from operating. In addition the Constitution prohibits the
financing of political parties and trade unions by foreign legal
entities and citizens, foreign states, and international organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the various denominations worship largely without
government interference; however, the Government sometimes harasses
Islamic and Christian groups whose members it regards as religious
extremists. The Constitution defines the country as a ``secular''
state. It also requires foreign religious associations to carry out
their activities, including the appointment of the heads of religious
associations, ``in coordination with appropriate state institutions.''
However, in general the Government does not interfere with the
appointment of religious leaders or the activities of foreign religious
associations.
Religious organizations, including churches, must register with the
Ministry of Justice in order to receive legal status. Without
registration religious organizations cannot buy or rent real property,
hire employees, obtain visas for foreign missionaries, or engage in any
other legal transactions. Although religious organizations, unlike
other nongovernmental entities, are entitled legally to carry out their
work without government registration, in practice many local officials
insist that they register. Registration requires an application
submitted by at least 10 local citizens and is usually a quick and
simple process. Some religious groups out of favor with the Government
encounter difficulties registering in certain jurisdictions. These
groups include Jehovah's Witnesses and some Korean Protestant groups,
as well as Muslim and Russian Orthodox groups independent of the Mufti
or Orthodox archbishop (the national leaders of Islam and Russian
Orthodoxy). Foreign missionaries require state accreditation. There
were no reports that the Government prohibited the activities of any
religious group whose registration application it turned down.
Foreign missionary activity is authorized under law, but only when
missionaries are accredited by the state. In practice many missionaries
operate without accreditation. Although legally entitled to register
religious organizations, foreign missionaries generally find that they
must list local citizens as founders in order to register their
organizations.
Some foreign missionaries, whose presence is not welcomed by some
Muslim and Orthodox citizens, have complained of occasional harassment
by low-level government officials. In particular evangelical
Protestants working in schools, hospitals, and other social service
institutions have alleged government hostility toward their efforts to
proselytize.
A potential deterioration in the right to religious freedom was
averted at least temporarily when the Government withdrew restrictive
draft amendments to the national law on religion in March. The draft
changes would have imposed burdensome new registration requirements on
religious organizations and otherwise tightened government control of
religion. One provision would have required religious groups that seek
registration to submit certification from locally elected officials
that they were already active for 10 years in the jurisdiction in which
they sought registration. Other provisions would have required
religious organizations that seek registration to submit information
about their creeds and practices, including attitudes toward family and
marriage, education, and members' health. Vaguely written provisions
would have given local officials broad authority to refuse or cancel
the registration of religious organizations deemed a threat to public
order or state security. The Government withdrew the draft legislation
after minority religious groups, human rights advocates, and foreign
observers objected to it.
Government officials frequently expressed concerns about the
potential spread of religious extremism. They pointed especially to the
risk of political Islam spreading north from Afghanistan, Iran,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other states. In September the
National Security Council, which is chaired by the President, created a
commission to develop policies to combat religious extremism. In June
the chief of the KNB named the fight against religious extremism as a
top priority of the internal intelligence service.
On July 14, a group of more than 100 armed special forces and
police raided a camp outside Taraz where a Muslim group was holding a
private religious study retreat. The authorities detained 70 group
members, including, reportedly, a 6-year-old and 11 other minors. Group
members alleged that the authorities beat all 70 detainees in jail. One
minor reportedly suffered a broken nose; another detainee reportedly
suffered broken ribs. Although some government officials publicly
alleged that the group was terrorist, not religious, in nature, the
authorities uncovered no weapons or politically subversive literature
at the camp. All 70 detainees were freed by September. Only one group
leader was charged with a crime (promoting the activities of an
unregistered organization), but he was released under the August
amnesty law (see Section 1.c.).
In September police closed an Islamic school in Karasu village,
near Almaty. The authorities alleged that a Pakistani teacher at the
school was promoting religious extremism and that students were being
kept forcibly at the school. The school was allowed to reopen, but it
was closed again in October.
A campaign by the KNB and the national prosecutor's office to
identify religious extremists led to the arrest and conviction in May
of one alleged Muslim extremist in Atyrau. According to press reports,
Askar Sekerbayev received a 6-month suspended sentence and a fine for
``founding or participating in the activities of an illegal public
organization.'' Sekerbayev reportedly belonged to the Muslim Zhamagat
organization, which, the Government alleged, advocated violence.
In March officials from the national prosecutor's office, in at
least one case accompanied by the KNB, raided the offices of six
legally registered communities of Jehovah's Witnesses in Almaty and
Zhambyl oblasts. In at least one case, the officials reportedly
demanded copies of church correspondence, minutes of religious
meetings, and other documentation. In all the cases, prosecutors
summoned church leaders and required them to provide information about
the organization's aims, religious practices, views on medical
treatment and military service, and other questions. The Government
took no further actions against the organization or its membership
after the raids were publicized.
On May 19, the public prosecutor's office in Almalinskiy district
of Almaty petitioned a city court to ban the Charismatic Evangelic
Church of Christ. The petition was based on the alleged irregularities
in the group's registration, its foreign pastor's legal status, and
alleged violations of the law on family and marriage by the pastor. The
city court dismissed the case on June 17. The prosecutor's office
appealed the decision but lost the appeal.
The Government often invited the national leaders of the two
largest religions, Islam and Russian Orthodoxy, to participate jointly
in state events. Such appearances by the Islamic Mufti and the Orthodox
Archbishop, often in the presence of the President, were intended to
promote religious and ethnic harmony. Some members of other faiths,
including Muslims and Orthodox Christians not affiliated with the Mufti
or Archbishop, criticized the Government's inclusion of the Mufti and
Archbishop in state events as official favoritism and a violation of
the constitutional separation of church and state.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for the right
to emigrate and the right of repatriation; both are respected in
practice. The law on national security prohibits persons who had access
to state secrets through their work from taking up permanent residence
abroad for 5 years after leaving government service. Citizens have the
right to change their citizenship, but are not permitted to hold dual
citizenship.
According to the Constitution, everyone who is legally present on
the territory of the country has the right to move freely on its
territory and freely choose a place of residence except in cases
stipulated by law. This provision formally abolished the ``propiska''
system of residence permits, a holdover from the Soviet era, and
replaced it with a system of registration. However, in practice,
citizens still are required to register in order to prove legal
residence and obtain city services. Registration in most of the country
generally was routine, but it was difficult to register in Almaty due
to its relative affluence and local officials' fears of overcrowding.
The Government can refuse to register a citizen, just as it did under
the propiska system, in order to limit the number of persons who can
move to a certain city or area.
There were a few reports of government efforts to restrict the
movement of foreigners around the country. There were no further
reports of foreigners being detained for wandering into not clearly
marked restricted areas. Likewise, there were no further reports by
foreigners that they were denied access or required to pay exorbitant
entry fees to ostensibly free national parks. The authorities refused
to approve the assignment of foreign aid workers to towns considered
``sensitive.'' Internal visas are no longer required for foreigners
traveling outside Almaty.
An exit visa is required for citizens who wish to travel abroad,
although refusals are rare. There have been reports of some officials
demanding bribes for exit visas. It is usually necessary to meet a
number of bureaucratic requirements before the exit visa is issued. For
example close relatives with a claim to support from the applicant must
give their concurrence. Intending emigrants also must obtain evidence
that they have no outstanding financial obligations. Foreigners must
have exit visas, although they receive them routinely as part of their
entry visa. Foreigners who overstay their original visa, or who did not
receive an exit visa as part of their original visa, must get an exit
visa from the immigration authorities before leaving. Foreigners
staying at least 3 days in the country, regardless of whether they are
staying 3 days in any individual city, must register with the local
visa registry office. Many have complained that the process is
bureaucratically cumbersome. Immigration authorities refused to allow
foreigners without proof of registration to leave the country.
The Government accords special treatment to ethnic Kazakhs and
their families who fled during Stalin's era and wish to return. Kazakhs
in this category are entitled, in principle, to citizenship and many
other privileges. Anyone else, including ethnic Kazakhs who are not
considered refugees from the Stalin era, such as the descendants of
Kazakhs who moved to Mongolia during the previous century, must apply
for permission to return. However, it is the stated policy of the
Government to encourage and assist all ethnic Kazakhs living outside
the country to return, if they so desire.
The Government usually cooperates with the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees. In January the Government ratified the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol;
however, the Government did not pass implementing legislation for the
Refugee Convention by year's end. In February the Government returned
to Chinese authorities three ethnic Uyghurs from China without giving
them an opportunity to request asylum, as provided for in the Refugee
Convention. The UNHCR, human rights observers, and Uyghur activists
believed that the three--Ilyas Zordun, Ali Khudaberdi, and Khamit
Maimat--would have requested asylum if given the opportunity. According
to Amnesty International, ``wanted'' posters in China indicated that
Maimat was sought for ``separatist'' activities. The UNHCR and human
rights groups sought access unsuccessfully to the three Uyghurs during
the 6 months that they were held in isolated detention in Almaty.
Following their return to China, Zordun, Khudaberdi, and Maimat
reportedly were executed. In other cases, the Government allowed the
UNHCR access to detained foreigners.
Following the passage of a 1997 migration law and creation of the
Agency for Migration and Demography, the Government began in 1998 to
register asylum seekers and to determine their status in consultation
with the UNHCR. Ethnic Kazakh migrants are automatically eligible for
citizenship, although the Government has granted citizenship to only
10,000 of the 180,000 Kazakh migrants. Migrants from other Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) countries are not considered to be refugees
as they may travel and settle freely in any CIS country. The Government
has not allowed refugees without passports to register and has
restricted registration largely to refugees from Afghanistan. All non-
CIS citizens are considered to be intending immigrants. However, in
practice, the Government is tolerant in its treatment of local refugee
populations. Only the President can grant political asylum; he is known
to have done so only once since independence in 1991.
The UNHCR estimated that there were approximately 10,000 refugees
in the country (about 6,000 from Tajikistan, 3,000 from Afghanistan,
and 1,000 from other countries, including an increasing number of
Chechens from Russia). By October the Government registered
approximately 1,200 asylum seekers and accorded refugee status to about
two-thirds of them. The Government continues to give priority to the
return of ethnic Kazakhs in order to increase the percentage of Kazakhs
in the overall population and to offset the large-scale emigration of
ethnic Russians and Germans. Since independence approximately 180,000
ethnic Kazakhs, mostly from other CIS countries, Iran, Afghanistan,
Mongolia, Turkey, China, and Saudi Arabia have immigrated. The
Government struggled to find resources for integration programs for
these immigrants, some of whom lived in squalid settings. The problem
of integrating the Kazakh migrants was compounded by the inability of
more than 90 percent of them to obtain the Kazakhstani citizenship to
which theoretically they are entitled by law. Without citizenship, the
migrants are not allowed to own property, open businesses, or conduct
other legal transactions.
Agreements between Kazakhstan and Russia that established broad
legal rights for the citizens of one country living on the territory of
the other and provided for expeditious naturalization for citizens of
one country who moved to the other entered into force in 1997.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for a democratic government; however, in
practice the Government severely limited the right of citizens to
change their government. The Constitution concentrates power in the
presidency, granting the President considerable control over the
legislature, judiciary, and local government. The Constitution cannot
be modified or amended without the consent of the President. In 1995
President Nazarbayev extended his term of office to 2000 by referendum
without a contested presidential election (which, according to the
Constitution then in force, should have been held in 1996).
The President appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet. He has the power to dismiss Parliament and to rule by decree
should he so choose. He appoints judges and senior court officials and
appoints all regional governors. The President also directly appoints
the chairman of the Central Election Commission (CEC) and the members
of the Commission.
President Nazarbayev won a new term in office on January 10 in an
election held nearly 2 years earlier than previously scheduled. The
previous October, the President and the Parliament had passed in 1 day,
without any prior public notice, a series of 19 constitutional
amendments that enabled them 1 day later to call the early presidential
election. Among other changes, the constitutional amendments extended
the presidential term of office from 5 to 7 years and lifted the 65-
year age limit on government service. (President Nazarbayev will be 65
before the end of his 7-year presidential term that began in January.)
The constitutional amendments also extended the terms of Members of
Parliament from 4 to 5 years for the lower house (Majilis), and from 4
to 6 years for the Senate. Government opponents and international
observers criticized the short-notice call of early elections because
it did not leave enough time for the Government to implement promised
electoral reforms and for intending candidates to organize effective
campaigns.
The Government imposed onerous requirements on candidates hoping to
qualify for the presidential ballot. Candidates were required to submit
petitions with approximately 170,000 signatures collected in equal
proportions from at least 11 of the country's 14 regions. They also
were required to pass a Kazakh-language test and to make a
nonrefundable payment of 1,000 times the minimum monthly wage
(approximately $30,000), although an equal sum was then provided to
each registered candidate for campaign expenses. Although three
candidates, in addition to President Nazarbayev, qualified for the
ballot, two of them, Senator Engels Gabassov and Customs Committee
Chairman Gani Kasymov, were known as supporters of the President and
widely believed to be running at government behest.
In October 1998, less than a week after the early presidential
election was called, the Government resorted to a provision of the
presidential decree on elections, passed in May 1998, that prohibited
persons convicted of administrative offenses from running for public
office within 1 year of their conviction. A district court in Almaty
summoned on less than 24 hours' notice 5 leading government opponents--
former Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, former Social Democratic
Party leader Dos Kushim, Pokoleniye Pensioners Movement leader Irina
Savostina, Azamat movement co-chairman Petr Svoik, and Tabigat
Ecological Movement leader Mels Yeleusizov--to face charges of
participating in the October 1998 meeting of an unregistered
organization called For Fair Elections (see Section 2.b.). The court
convicted all five. Despite the judgment against him, Kazhegeldin, the
strongest opposition candidate, applied for registration as a candidate
in the presidential election. The presidentially appointed CEC
disqualified his candidacy under the provision of the presidential
decree on elections that then served as the election law. The Supreme
Court upheld the disqualification. The CEC also used the election law
provision to disqualify the presidential candidacy of Amantai Asylbek,
leader of the Attan antinuclear testing movement, because of the 3-day
jail sentence he received in February 1998 for participating in an
unsanctioned demonstration.
The Government harassed the opposition throughout the presidential
election campaign. According to credible reports, government agents
repeatedly pressured managers of conference facilities to deny access
at the last moment to government opponents who had arranged to use the
facilities for meetings and press conferences. When opposition meetings
and press conferences did take place, electricity at the facilities was
often interrupted. Government attempts to disrupt opposition meetings
appeared to have extended beyond national borders when management of a
Moscow hotel withdrew permission at the last moment for a December 1998
opposition congress (see Section 2.b.). Communist Party leader
Serykbolsyn Abdildin, the only candidate from the ranks of the
preelection opposition who qualified for the presidential ballot,
publicly complained that local officials loyal to the President impeded
his attempts to hold campaign rallies and meetings.
Unsolved assaults on Kazhegeldin and two of his advisers appeared
to have been politically motivated and, government critics alleged,
sanctioned by the Government. In October 1998, two gunshots of unknown
origin were fired near Kazhegeldin on the eve of the press conference
at which he announced his presidential candidacy. Unknown assailants
beat his press spokesman, Amirzhan Kosanov, and one of his public
relations advisers, Yelena Nikitenko (see Section 1.c.). Several days
before the attack, officials of the Al-Farabi national university in
Almaty forced Nikitenko to resign from the faculty because of her
political work. Government officials alleged that the Kazhegeldin
campaign staged all three attacks. Following the announcement of
Kazhegeldin's candidacy, the then first deputy chairman of the KNB held
an unprecedented press conference at which he made admittedly
unsubstantiated allegations of financial malfeasance against
Kazhegeldin. The tax authorities brought an action against Kazhegeldin
during the campaign and, according to credible reports, threatened
actions against other government opponents. At a news conference,
Kazhegeldin supporters showed videotape of police repeatedly pulling
over Kazhegeldin's car for unspecified ``inspections.'' Kazhegeldin
also claimed that border control officials at the Almaty airport tried
to prevent him and his family from taking a flight out of the country.
An attack on a Kazakhstani employee of a foreign embassy also appeared
to be motivated politically and, human rights observers believe,
sanctioned by the Government. In December 1998, three men beat the
employee outside his apartment as the employee returned home. The
employee suffered a cracked rib, some internal injuries, and required
stitches to close wounds near both eyes. The attackers made no attempt
to take the employee's money or other valuables. The absence of robbery
as a motive and the fact that the employee's responsibilities included
assisting embassy officers in contacts with political opposition and
human rights figures suggested that the attack was motivated
politically. At year's end, the authorities had made no arrests in any
of these cases.
The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of
the OSCE announced in December 1998 that it would not meet the
Government's request to send a presidential election observation
mission. In its public explanation, the ODIHR cited concerns about the
exclusion of two opposition candidates, unequal access to the media,
and coerced support for President Nazarbayev. The ODIHR sent a small
election assessment team to report to the OSCE on the full election
process. The assessment team concluded that the presidential election
fell ``far short'' of Kazakhstan's commitments as an OSCE participating
state. It cited, in particular, the exclusion of candidates as an
``infringement on rights of citizens to seek public office;'' the short
duration of the election campaign; obstacles to free assembly and
association; the use of government resources to support President
Nazarbayev's campaign; unequal access to the media; and the flawed
presidential decree that served as the election law.
A newly elected bicameral legislature took office in December. The
lower house (Majilis), consisting of 77 members, was elected directly
in October. Under amendments to the Constitution passed in 1998,
membership in the newly elected Majilis included 10 new seats assigned
proportionally to political parties based on the percentage of votes
they received nationally (with a minimum vote threshold of 7 percent).
As before the other 67 seats were attributed by single mandate
districts. The upper house (the Senate) consists of 39 members, 32 of
whom are elected indirectly by members of oblast and city parliaments;
the President appoints the remaining 7 senators. (The number of Senate
seats was reduced from 42 in accordance with the Government's 1997
decision to reduce the number of oblasts from 19 to 14.) Elections were
held in September for 16 Senate seats. The new election law, passed in
May, requires candidates for both houses to meet minimum age and
education requirements and to pay a nonrefundable registration fee of
25 times the minimum monthly wage (approximately $500--7,000 tenge).
This fee represented a 75 percent decrease over previous registration
fees, which opposition figures, human rights monitors, and the OSCE/
ODIHR considered a barrier to participation. The election law does not
require Majilis candidates to collect a certain number of signatures in
order to be placed on the ballot; however, Senate candidates must
obtain signatures from 10 percent of the members of the local
assemblies in their oblasts in order to be placed on the ballot.
Political parties wishing to compete for the 10 proportionally
allocated seats in the Majilis must be registered nationally and in
two-thirds of the principal administrative jurisdictions (the 14
oblasts, plus the former and new capital cities, Almaty and Astana).
The Constitution mandates that participation in elections is voluntary.
One of the constitutional amendments passed in October 1998 rescinded
the requirement that at least 50 percent of eligible voters participate
in order to make an election valid. Experts had cited the old
requirement as one of the causes of fraud and vote inflation in past
elections.
The legislature cannot exercise oversight over the executive
branch. However, the Parliament has asserted itself with regard to the
budget, for example, in June it rejected budget austerity measures
proposed by the Government. The austerity measures subsequently passed
automatically after the Prime Minister called for and won a confidence
vote in Parliament. (The rules for votes of confidence give the
Government a significant advantage in disputes over legislation with
Parliament. Under the Constitution, a law that is the subject of a
confidence vote automatically passes unless two-thirds of the full
membership of each chamber vote ``no confidence.'' Even when Parliament
votes no confidence, the President has the constitutional option to
dissolve Parliament.) Should Parliament fail to pass within 30 days an
``urgent'' bill brought by the President, the President may issue the
bill by decree. While the President has broad powers to dissolve
Parliament, Parliament can remove the President only for disability or
high treason, and only with the consent of the Constitutional Council,
which largely is controlled by the President.
Although the President has the right to legislate by decree, he
respected the parliamentary procedures laid out in the Constitution. In
June shortly before the Parliament was to adjourn for the summer,
President Nazarbayev asked the Parliament to accord him full
legislative authority in order to pass what he considered pressing
legislation. The President withdrew his request when Parliament agreed
to remain in session in July and take action during that month on 30
pieces of legislation deemed ``urgent'' by the President.
In 1998 the President vetoed a bill which would have established an
independent auditing agency. The bill was reintroduced by Parliament,
passed, and signed into law by the President in November 1998.
The introduction of 10 new parliamentary seats distributed by
party-list vote enhanced the role of political parties, which, with the
exception of the Communists, were previously very weak. The Communist
Party and three propresidential parties--Otan (Fatherland), the Civic
Party, and the Agrarian Party--divided the 10 new party-list seats in
the October parliamentary election. No candidate nominated by a non-
Communist opposition party won a seat in the new Parliament. One member
of the opposition RNPK won a seat after running as an independent
candidate. The RNPK withdrew its party-list slate after two of its
candidates, Akezhan Kazhegeldin and Madel Ismailov, were declared
ineligible. About one-half of the candidates who won ran as
independents. Many of them were former government officials with strong
presumed sympathy for progovernment parties.
Most activities of Parliament remained outside public view. In June
Parliament barred the press and other outsiders from observing the vote
of confidence in the Government. Final totals in the parliamentary vote
of confidence were made public, but not the votes of individual
members. The Parliament invited nongovernmental representatives to
observe at least four meetings. Many draft bills were held closely and
published in the press only after passage and signature by the
President. Constituent relations were virtually nonexistent.
Although an improvement over the January presidential election,
parliamentary elections held in September (for the Senate) and in
October (for the Majilis) were marred by election law deficiencies,
executive branch interference in the electoral process, and a lack of
government openness about vote tabulations. There was strong evidence
of government manipulation of results in some cases. The OSCE mission
sent to observe the elections concluded that the elections were ``a
tentative step'' toward democracy but ``fell short of (Kazakhstan's)
OSCE commitments.'' The OSCE also expressed concern that parliamentary
runoff races were conducted just 2 weeks after first-round voting,
which left no time for the CEC and the courts to act on hundreds of
complaints filed about the conduct of first-round voting and the
campaign.
A new election law, passed by Parliament in May and amended in
June, replaced a presidential decree that had served as the election
law. It lowered candidate registration fees by 75 percent, but failed
to correct other deficiencies of the decree it replaced. The new law
maintained a system of electoral commissions subject to regional and
local government authorities, who appoint commission members. It failed
to incorporate suggestions for creating a more open vote tabulation
process. It also maintained provisions that bar candidates convicted of
administrative offenses from running for office for 1 year.
The CEC issued regulations to ameliorate some of these deficiencies
in time for the parliamentary elections, but the effects were limited.
For example the CEC filled vacant seats on electoral commissions by
lottery among all registered political parties. However, the
initiative, affected only 25 percent of commissions and was limited to
one seat per commission, which usually consist of seven members.
Regulations that clarified the rights of election observers
significantly improved the ability of observers to monitor vote counts
at the precinct level. However, observers could not, in the end, use
the information they obtained to corroborate official results. As of
year's end, the CEC released comprehensive precinct- and district-level
vote tallies for only 1 of 67 single-mandate districts, despite
repeated requests from the OSCE and other observers. With the exception
of the one district for which comprehensive results were released, the
CEC did not issue by year's end the order of finish or final totals for
Majilis candidates who neither won nor qualified for a run-off.
In response to international and domestic criticism of the
exclusion of candidates from the January presidential election, the
Government in June removed attendance at a meeting of an unregistered
organization from the list of administrative offenses. However, more
than 40 other administrative offenses that potentially could disqualify
candidates for public office remained on the books. Among these
offenses were participation in unsanctioned demonstrations or rallies,
an offense that the Government often has used to charge its opponents
(see Section 2.b.). The Government presented rescission of the
administrative offense as a measure to enable the five opposition
leaders convicted of participating in the For Fair Elections meeting to
run for Parliament. Two of the five successfully registered as
candidates. However, the CEC declined to register Akezhan Kazhegeldin
due to a December 1998 administrative conviction for contempt of court.
The conviction arose from Kazhegeldin's failure to respond in person to
the For Fair Elections charge. (Kazhegeldin argued at the time that he
met the law's requirements by sending his attorney.) The chairperson of
the CEC publicly encouraged Kazhegeldin to seek the overturn of his
contempt of court conviction 1 week before the registration deadline
for the parliamentary elections. A successful appeal by Kazhegeldin
would have made him eligible, according to the CEC, to run in the
parliamentary election. Kazhegeldin subsequently wrote to the Supreme
Court requesting that it overturn his contempt conviction, but the
Court ruled that his letter did not constitute a proper legal appeal.
Within a day of the CEC exclusion of Kazhegeldin's candidacy,
Russian authorities detained Kazhegeldin in Moscow at the request of
the Prosecutor General of Kazakhstan. The Government requested
extradition of Kazhegeldin, who was living in exile, in connection with
allegations that he had laundered illicit funds received while serving
as Prime Minister from 1994-97. The investigation of Kazhegeldin, while
possibly grounded in facts, appeared motivated politically. Following
protests from international human rights groups, the Prosecutor General
dropped his extradition request, and the Russian authorities released
Kazhegeldin.
The CEC barred the parliamentary candidacy of Madel Ismailov
because of his February 1998 criminal conviction for insulting the
President (see Section 1.e.). Ismailov had sought to register as a
candidate on the RNPK party list. The election law precludes candidates
convicted of criminal offenses from running for office for 3 years
following their convictions.
A flawed provision in the electoral law was used to disqualify
another RNPK candidate, deputy party chairman Gaziz Aldamzharov, after
he apparently received a majority of votes in an election in Atyrau.
The CEC annulled the second round of the Atyrau election, as well as
two other second-round elections, but gave no specific official reason.
The electoral law precludes all candidates who participated in an
invalidated election from running in a make-up election, regardless of
who was responsible for the violations that led to invalidating the
election. The CEC interpreted this provision to exclude from the 3
rerun elections all of the approximately 500 candidates who ran
unsuccessfully for any Majilis seat in October. Although the CEC did
not announce the specific reason for invalidating the Atyrau election,
the CEC chairperson said in a television interview that district and
precinct electoral officials in Atyrau refused to certify protocols
after a series of disturbances that the chairperson attributed to the
``opposition.'' These disturbances included alleged bomb threats,
alleged falsification of ballots, and the incursion into one polling
station of four masked men who opened and overturned ballot boxes.
Given widespread expectations that Aldamzharov would receive a majority
of votes in Atyrau, unsubstantiated CEC allegations that the
"opposition" disrupted voting in Atyrau appeared contrived.
There were widespread, documented allegations that regional and
local executive authorities (akims) interfered with the parliamentary
elections during the campaign and in the voting process. In one case,
the chief election commissioner for the Ili district (Almaty oblast)
resigned because, he alleged, the district akim ordered him to deliver
a victory for the akim's favored candidate. The commissioner, like most
election officials a government employee, offered to resign from his
full-time government job in addition to his electoral responsibilities.
A significant number of complaints filed in several regions indicated
that akimats and, through them, other employers threatened supporters
of opposition candidates with job loss. In one such case, the akimat of
the capital city, Astana, allegedly threatened to fire more than 20
government employees for their support of a nonfavored candidate. There
were also reports that tax inspectors and the KNB intimidated
opposition candidates, their supporters, and the independent media.
Akimats used government personnel and other resources, including office
space, to campaign for ``favored'' candidates and to distribute
campaign literature for the propresidential Otan party. On first- and
second-round voting days, international and domestic observers found
akimat representatives ``supervising'' the work of putatively
independent precinct electoral commissions in numerous locations
throughout the country.
The failure of the CEC to release most precinct- and district-level
vote tallies undermined the credibility of election results. Evidence
of official vote tampering in several districts exacerbated this
problem. The OSCE observation mission obtained copies of flagrantly
falsified protocols (reports of official results). OSCE observers found
multiple vote protocols prepared in one Almaty polling station. OSCE
and domestic observers reported that precinct officials frequently did
not use official protocol forms to record results in the presence of
observers or filled out the official forms in pencil. District election
officials, especially in first round elections, generally refused to
allow observers to witness the tabulation of results from various
polling stations. Observers' access to district vote tabulations
improved in the second round of voting after the CEC issued new
instructions for preparing protocols and instructed district officials
to cooperate with observers. Nevertheless, the district election
commission in Atyrau refused initially to allow OSCE observers into the
district commission office. District officials ultimately allowed the
observers into their office but subsequently recommended that they
leave because the commission ``could not assure the (observers')
safety.''
The Constitution significantly constrains the independence of the
judiciary. A Constitutional Council replaced the Constitutional Court
in August 1995 when the new Constitution was adopted. The President
appoints three of its seven members, including the chairman. A two-
thirds majority of the Council is required to overrule a presidential
veto. All judges are appointed directly by the President.
According to the Constitution, the President selects governors of
oblasts (the ``akims''), based on the recommendation of the Prime
Minister; they serve at the discretion of the President, who may annul
their decisions.
All adult citizens (at least 18 years of age) have the right to
vote. Membership in political parties or trade unions is forbidden to
members of the armed forces, employees of national security and law
enforcement organizations, and judges.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women and
minorities in politics, but the persistence of traditional attitudes
means that few women hold high office or play active parts in political
life, and in general, women are underrepresented severely in
government. At the end of the year, no women held ministerial
portfolios, though one had ministerial rank and several deputy
ministers were women. There were no female provincial governors
(akims). Of 39 Senate members, 5 are women; of 77 Majilis members, 8
are women.
Although minority ethnic groups are represented in the Government,
Kazakhs hold the majority of leadership positions. Nearly half the
population are non-Kazakhs according to the national census completed
this year. Non-Kazakhs hold 1 of 3 positions as vice premier and head 2
of 14 government ministries. Non-Kazakhs also are underrepresented in
the Majilis and the Senate. In the new Parliament, 8 of 47 current
members of the Senate are non-Kazakhs, and 20 of 77 members of the
Majilis are non-Kazakhs.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Almaty Helsinki Commission and the Kazakhstan International
Bureau for Human Rights and Rule of Law (formerly the Kazakhstan-
American Bureau on Human Rights) are the most active of a small number
of local human rights organizations. They cooperate on human rights and
legal reform issues. Although these groups operated largely without
government interference, limited financial means hampered their ability
to monitor and report human rights violations. In November a fire
destroyed the main office and all the archives of the Bureau for Human
Rights in Almaty. The Almaty fire department concluded that arson was
the probable cause of the fire and referred the case to prosecutors,
who brought no charges before the end of the year. Some human rights
observers complained that the Government monitored their movements and
telephone calls.
The Civil Code requires NGO's to register with the Government, and
most NGO's are registered; however, some continue to operate without
legal standing. Although some government officials made an effort to
work with domestic and foreign NGO's, others persisted in asserting
that foreign NGO's promote instability. Some NGO's chose not to
register because they objected to the requirement of registration in
principle or because they did not have the money to pay the
registration fee. Others believe that they were not eligible to
register because they promoted the interests of one ethnic group or
religion and are considered by some to violate the constitutional ban
on inciting social, racial, national, religious, class, and tribal
enmity. The new Criminal Code that took effect in 1998 criminalized the
activity of NGO's that are not registered. In 1998 five leading
opposition figures were convicted for participating in a meeting of an
unregistered NGO, the For Fair Elections group (see Sections 1.d.,
2.b., and 3).
The Government permitted international and foreign NGO's dealing
with human rights issues to visit the country and meet with local human
rights groups as well as government officials. The International Labor
Organization, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, and the UNHCR have permanent offices in the
country. The OSCE, of which Kazakhstan is a member, opened an office in
Almaty in January. The Constitution forbids ``the financing of
political parties and trade unions by foreign legal entities and
citizens, foreign states and international organizations.'' In January
1998, the Confederation of Free Trade Unions and its leader, Leonid
Solomin, were charged for the second time within a year with violating
these provisions. However, during the year, the Government dropped all
charges in both cases.
The Presidential Commission on Human Rights is a consultative body.
It prepares annual reports to the President that can be released to the
public only with the President's consent. For the first and only time
the Commission made public its annual report to the President by
publishing an expurgated version of its report for 1997 at the end of
1998. The report focused almost exclusively on ``economic and social
rights,'' for example, the right to a decent standard of living. It
concluded that the country consistently abides by human rights
principles and suggested that those who blame the Government for social
problems should realize that individual well-being ultimately is the
responsibility of the individual. The Commission reached out to
independent human rights organizations but made little progress in
establishing itself as an ombudsman. In general the Government tended
to deny or ignore charges of specific human rights abuses that were
levied by human rights monitors and individual citizens. In its report
to the President for 1997, the Commission charged that many domestic
NGO's are oriented towards developed countries' standards and do not
realize that progress towards a market economy and civil society is a
slow, gradual process. It said that NGO's sympathetic to ``left-wing
radicals'' have nothing constructive to offer.
The Presidential Commission on Human Rights and OSCE cohosted a
roundtable discussion on the draft religion law in March.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that ``everyone is equal before law and
court. No one may be subjected to any discrimination for reasons of
origin, social position, occupation, property status, sex, race,
nationality, language, attitude to religion, convictions, place of
residence, or any other circumstances.'' However, the Government does
not enforce this provision effectively on a consistent basis. The
Government has favored ethnic Kazakhs in government employment and,
according to many citizens, in the process of privatizing state
enterprises.
Women.--According to human rights groups, there is considerable
domestic violence against women. A local NGO, the Feminist League,
estimates that hundreds of thousands of women are the victims of
spousal abuse. The Interior Ministry reported that family members or
domestic partners were responsible for about one-third of the nearly
8,500 crimes against women registered in the first half of the year.
During the same period, 81 women were murdered by family members.
Police often are reluctant to intervene in domestic disputes,
considering them to be the family's business, unless they believe that
the abuse is life threatening. The maximum sentence for wife beating is
3 years, but few such cases are prosecuted. A new government commission
on women and family drew attention to the issue of domestic violence.
Law enforcement authorities reported that 288 persons were convicted of
rape in the first 8 months of the year, although the total number of
reported rapes was unavailable. Under the Criminal Procedure Code,
prosecutors can initiate a rape case, absent aggravating circumstances
such as gang rape, only upon the application of the victim. There were
unconfirmed reports that prosecutors sometimes interpreted this
provision to require rape victims to pay for forensic testing, pay the
expenses of prosecution, and personally prosecute rape cases
themselves. The punishment for rape can range from 3 to 15 years. There
is very little coverage of rape in the press, and rapes often go
unreported. There is no law specifically against spousal rape, which is
proscribed under general rape laws.
There was anecdotal evidence of trafficking in women (see Section
6.f.).
There is no legal discrimination against women, but traditional
cultural practices limit their role in everyday society and in owning
and managing businesses or real property. The President and other
members of the Government speak in favor of women's rights, and
official state policy (adopted in 1997) states that constitutional
prohibitions on sex discrimination must be supported by effective
government measures. Women are underrepresented severely in higher
positions in state enterprises and overrepresented in low-paying and
some menial jobs. Women have unrestricted access to higher education.
Approximately 30 women's rights organizations are registered, including
the Feminist League, Women of the East, the Almaty Women's Information
Center, and the Businesswomen's Association.
Children.--The Government is committed in principle to children's
rights, but as in many other areas, budget stringencies and other
priorities severely limit its effectiveness in dealing with children's
issues. Education is mandatory through the 11th grade, although
students may begin technical training after the 9th grade. There is no
societal pattern of abuse against children. Rural children normally
work during harvests (see Section 6.d.).
People with Disabilities.--Citizens with disabilities are entitled
by law to assistance from the State. There is no legal discrimination
against the disabled, but in practice, employers do not give them equal
consideration. There are laws mandating the provision of accessibility
to public buildings and commercial establishments for the disabled, but
the Government does not enforce these laws. Disabled persons are a low
priority for the Government. Mentally ill and mentally retarded
citizens can be committed to institutions run by the State. These
institutions are poorly run and inadequately funded. The NGO,
Kazakhstan International Bureau for Human Rights, confirmed its
previous observation that the Government provides almost no care for
the mentally ill and mentally retarded due to a lack of funds.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to results of the
1999 census, the population of about 16 million consists of
approximately 50 percent Kazakhs and 33 percent ethnic Slavs (Russians,
Ukrainians, Belarusians, and others) with many other ethnic groups
represented. At year's end, details of the census had not been
released, but there has been no public criticism of the announced
ethnic breakdown of the population.
The Government continued to discriminate in favor of ethnic Kazakhs
in government employment, where ethnic Kazakhs predominate, as well as
in education, housing, and other areas. However, the Government has
continued to back away from its ``Kazakhification'' campaign of the
first year of independence (1991-1992). President Nazarbayev has
emphasized publicly that all nationalities are welcome, but many non-
Kazakhs are anxious about what they perceive as expanding preferences
for ethnic Kazakhs. Many ethnic Kazakhs believe that such preferences
are needed to reverse 200 years of discrimination.
Most of the population speaks Russian; only about one-half of
ethnic Kazakhs speak Kazakh fluently. According to the Constitution,
the Kazakh language is the state language. The Constitution states that
the Russian language is used officially on a basis equal with that of
the Kazakh language in organizations and bodies of local self-
administration. Some ethnic Russians believe that Russian should be
designated as a second state language. The Government is encouraging
more education of children in the Kazakh language, but it has done
little to provide Kazakh-language education for adults. A 1997 language
law intended to strengthen the use of Kazakh without infringing on the
rights of citizens to use other languages has not been funded
sufficiently to make Kazakh-language education universal. In 1997 the
Parliament committed itself to compile a list of positions requiring
Kazakh-language fluency but never did so; the Parliament is not working
on such a list.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
provide for basic worker rights, including the right to organize and
the right to strike; however, the Government at times infringed on
worker rights. Activist unions came under government pressure for
holding unsanctioned demonstrations and marches. The courts dissolved
two unions in 1998 for violating laws against unauthorized
demonstrations, marches, and rallies.
In December the President signed into law a new Labor Code,
effective January 1, 2000. Among many other revisions, the new law
provides for individual contracts between an employer and each
employee, but allows ``optional'' collective labor contracts. It also
allows unions to represent an employee in labor disputes, but an
employee may choose other representation. However, during the year the
previous Labor Code remained in force.
Most workers remained members of state-sponsored trade unions
established during the Soviet period, when membership was obligatory.
At most enterprises, the state-sponsored unions continued to deduct 1
percent of each worker's wage as dues. The state unions under the
Communist system were, and for the most part still are, organs of the
Government and work with management to enforce labor discipline and to
discourage workers from forming or joining independent unions.
The law gives workers the right to join or form unions of their
choosing and to stop the automatic dues deductions for the state
unions. The Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTUK, formerly the
Independent Trade Union Center of Kazakhstan) claims membership of
about 250,000; however, the actual number of independent trade union
members is estimated to be much lower. The state-sponsored Federation
of Trade Unions claims 4 million members; however, the figure is
regarded as too high. To obtain legal status, an independent union must
apply for registration with the local judicial authority at the oblast
level and with the Ministry of Justice. Registration is generally
lengthy, difficult, and expensive. The decision to register a union
appears to be arbitrary, with no published criteria. No unions were
registered or denied registration during the year. The two major
independent trade union confederations are registered. Judicial
authorities and the Ministry of Justice have the authority to cancel a
union's registration, as a provincial court did in Kentau in 1998.
The law does not provide mechanisms to protect workers who join
independent unions from threats or harassment by enterprise management
or state-run unions. Members of independent unions have been dismissed,
transferred to lower paying or lower status jobs, threatened, and
intimidated. According to independent union leaders, state unions work
closely with management to ensure that independent trade union members
are the first fired in times of economic downturn.
Unions and individual workers exercised their right to strike
during the year, primarily to protest the nonpayment of wages and in an
attempt to recover back wages owed to workers. Nonpayment of wages
continued to be the priority issue for workers. According to the law,
workers may exercise the right to strike only if a labor dispute has
not been resolved by means of existing conciliation procedures. In
addition the law requires that employers be notified that a strike is
to occur no less than 15 days before its commencement. There were
numerous strikes throughout the country to protest the nonpayment of
wages. In May and June, approximately 60 employees of the Shymkent
phosphor plant conducted a 33-day hunger strike over nonpayment of
wages. The south Kazakhstan oblast akim authorized strikers to picket
in front of his office. One striker reportedly received his full back
pay and others received partial payment. The strike ended after 33 days
when police removed the strikers. Employees of the
Karagandashakhtastroy company in Karaganda reportedly conducted a
hunger strike in April to protest nonpayment of their wages.
Two unions dissolved by court order in 1998 for ``systematically
and flagrantly'' violating laws against unauthorized demonstrations,
marches, and rallies could not legally reconstitute. The unions
represented workers at the Archpolimetal metallurgical plant in Kentau,
who had conducted various actions for several years to protest chronic
nonpayment of wages. Dissolution of the well-known unions led
independent labor leaders to call in 1998 for formation of a new
political party to represent workers interests, but no party was
created. The leader of one of the Kentau unions reported that he had to
leave Kentau because local law enforcement and KNB authorities harassed
him and his family. Several candidates representing government-
sponsored labor unions were elected in the October parliamentary
elections.
As a result of their inability to pay salaries, many enterprises
continued to pay wages in scrip rather than in cash, a practice at odds
with International Labor Organization Convention 95 on the protection
of wages other than in the legal currency without the express consent
of the workers. Enterprise directors claimed that the enterprises were
not being paid in cash by their traditional trading partners in other
parts of the former Soviet Union, which also were experiencing cash
flow difficulties as a result of the general economic crisis. The scrip
often was not accepted at stores or was accepted only at devalued
levels.
Independent unions complain about a provision in the Constitution
that forbids the financing of trade unions by foreign legal entities
and citizens, foreign states, and international organizations. Since
independence in 1991, independent trade unions have received financial
assistance from the AFL-CIO's Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI). Most
of this assistance ended in 1996 when funding was reduced and FTUI now
provides no funding. Independent trade unions have sought new means of
support; some associations of trade unions were able to receive
financing from foreign sources by registering as ``public
organizations'' rather than labor unions.
By law unions freely may join federations or confederations and
affiliate with international bodies. Most independent trade unions
belong to the CFTUK, headquartered in Astana. The Independent Miners
Federation of Kazakhstan and the State Miners' Union of Karaganda are
members of the Miners' International Federation. Unions belonging to
the CFTUK are not members of international federations but are able to
maintain contacts with foreign trade union federations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There are
significant limits on the right to organize and bargain collectively.
Collective bargaining rights are not spelled out in the law, although
in some instances unions successfully negotiated agreements with
management. If a union's demands are not acceptable to management, it
may present those demands to an arbitration commission composed of
management, union officials, and independent technical experts. Unions
routinely appealed to arbitration commissions.
A new labor law passed in November reduced the role of unions by
allowing employers the right to negotiate labor contracts with
individual employees. Previously, the terms of contracts were set by
law and collective bargaining agreements. The new law also gave
employers the right to fire an employee without the consent of the
employee's union.
There is no legal protection against antiunion discrimination.
There are no export processing zones. Several free economic zones enjoy
all the privileges of export processing zones, as well as other tax
privileges and abatements, but labor conditions there appear to be no
different than elsewhere in the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor except ``at the sentence of the court or in the
conditions of a state of emergency or martial law,'' and it is
generally not known to occur; however, in the north some persons still
were required to provide labor or the use of privately owned equipment
with no, or very low, compensation to help gather the annual grain
harvest.
The Constitution does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded
labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. A child under
age 16 may work only with the permission of the local administration
and the trade union in the enterprise in which the child would work.
Such permission rarely is granted. Although the Constitution does not
prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children, there were
no reports of such practices (see Section 6.c.). Abuse of child labor
is generally not a problem; however, child labor is used routinely in
agricultural areas, especially during harvest season.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1997 the Government resumed
setting a minimum wage. The minimum monthly wage was approximately $20
(2,680 tenge) during the last quarter of the year. This amount does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family and fell
far short of the minimum subsistence amount for one person as
calculated in 1998 by the Kazakhstan Institute of Nutrition.
The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours, although most enterprises
maintained a 40-hour workweek, with at least a 24-hour rest period. The
Constitution provides that labor agreements stipulate the length of
working time, vacation days, holidays, and paid annual leave for each
worker.
Although the Constitution provides for the right to ``safe and
hygienic working conditions,'' working and safety conditions in the
industrial sector are substandard. Safety consciousness is low. Workers
in factories usually do not wear protective clothing, such as goggles
and hard hats, and work in conditions of poor visibility and
ventilation. Management largely ignores regulations concerning
occupational health and safety, which are enforced by the Ministry of
Labor and the state-sponsored unions. Workers, including miners, have
no legal right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations
without jeopardy to continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons. Women's rights groups and the International Organization
for Migration report anecdotal evidence of trafficking in women from
the country. In May participants in an OSCE Women in Politics workshop
in Almaty identified trafficking, along with inequality and the
situation of rural women, as issues of critical importance to women in
the country. No observers have tried to quantify the extent of
trafficking, and the Government has no programs to target trafficking
in women.
______
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
The Kyrgyz Republic became an independent state in 1991. Although
the 1993 Constitution defines the form of government as a democratic
republic, President Askar Akayev dominates the Government. Akayev was
reelected in 1995 in an open, multicandidate presidential election,
which was marred, however, by the deregistration of three rival
candidates immediately prior to the vote. Also in 1995, a two-chamber
Parliament was elected for a 5-year term. The Constitution was amended
by referendum in 1996 to strengthen substantially the presidency and
define the role of Parliament. However, the 1996 referendum was marred
by serious irregularities. In October 1998, the Government held a
constitutional referendum that, among other things, reformed the
structure of the Parliament and the national budget process. The
referendum passed by over 90 percent, but again there were a number of
serious irregularities. Elections were held in October 1999 for local
governing councils. The process was flawed but represented an
improvement over the 1998 referendum. Although Parliament has become
increasingly active, and on occasion has blocked presidential
initiatives, it still does not check the power of the President
effectively. The judiciary is dominated by the executive branch.
Law enforcement responsibilities are divided among the Ministry on
Internal Affairs (MVD) for general crime, the Ministry of National
Security (MNB) for state-level crime, and the procurator's office for
both types of crime. Both the MVD and the MNB deal with corruption and
organized crime. These ministries inherited their infrastructure from
their Soviet predecessors. Both appear to be under the general control
of the Government and generally conform their actions to the law.
Border guards are under the full control of the Government. On January
1, the Government assumed responsibility for border control, ending an
agreement with the Russian Federation, whose troops had manned the
border with China. Final withdrawal of Russian border guards occurred
in August, although approximately 160 Russian advisors remain in the
country. Some members of the police committed human rights abuses.
The Kyrgyz Republic is a poor, mountainous country with a rough
balance of agricultural and industrial production. Cotton, tobacco, and
sugar are the primary agricultural exports. The country also exports
hydroelectric power, antimony, mercury, and uranium. The Government has
carried out progressive market reforms. The economy worsened steadily
during the year, and inflation is estimated at over 40 percent. The
U.N. estimates that 55 percent of the population are below the poverty
line. The country faces an external debt of $1.5 billion. Industrial
production remains significantly below preindependence levels. The
level of hardship for pensioners, unemployed workers, and government
workers with salary arrearages continues to be very high. The average
annual salary is $100 (4,200 som). Foreign assistance plays a
significant role in the country's budget.
The Government's human rights record was generally uneven and poor
in some areas. The Government limits citizens' ability to change their
government. There were credible reports of police abuse and brutality.
Prison conditions are very poor, and there were cases of arbitrary
arrest and detention. Executive domination of the judiciary limited
citizens' right to due process, although the judiciary is undergoing
reform. Government supervision of ``village elders' courts'' that it
sanctions outside the regular judicial structure remains uneven, but
abuses such as stoning abated. The Government at times infringes on
freedom of speech and of the press. Authorities at times pressure
journalists who criticize individual members of the Government. The
Government did not use libel laws against the press; however, the
Government uses bureaucratic means to harass and pressure the
independent media and opposition. The Government at times inhibited
freedom of assembly and association; there were serious problems with
political parties' rights to free assembly. The Government deregistered
the Kyrgyz Committee for Human Rights (KCHR) prior to the October 1998
referendum and prohibited subsequent attempts at reregistration.
However, the Government finally reregistered the KHCR in August, and
the group now operates freely. The Government at times infringed on
freedom of religion. Societal discrimination against women persists.
Violence against women is a problem that authorities often ignore, and
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution
also is a persistent problem. Child abuse is a problem, and there is a
growing number of street children. Discrimination against ethnic
minorities and child labor persisted.
Armed insurgents in the country's southern areas along the Tajik-
Kyrgyz border took both Kyrgyz and foreign citizens hostage in the
fall.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
There were no further developments in the January 1998 beating
death by police of Muratbek Sulaimanov.
There were no further developments in the February 1998 beating and
killing by burial alive of Sergei Skromnov by police in the Lenin
region of Bishkek.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances due to action by the Government or domestic groups.
In August several hundred armed ethnic Uzbeks entered the southern
Osh province from Tajikistan and took a number of hostages, including
several government officials and four Japanese geologists. There were
military engagements between the Government and the insurgents, who
identified themselves as members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan,
an organization opposed to the present Uzbekistan Government. At least
one of the hostages died in captivity. The last of the hostages was
released on October 25. Negotiations with the insurgents led to the
eventual release of all remaining Kyrgz and foreign hostages, the last
of whom was released on October 25.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, there
were some credible reports that police used violence against detained
suspects in order to obtain confessions while the suspects in criminal
cases were in pretrial detention. In September police officers
reportedly beat a farmer while trying to recover an unpaid debt; the
farmer remained in jail at year's end.
Police patrols are supervised poorly, are not always paid promptly,
and sometimes commit crimes. Supervision of conditions for pretrial
detainees is poor, and abuses sometimes occur. Police sometimes used
ill-defined charges to arrest persons (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
In the past, local elders' courts have exceeded their authority by
trying major crimes, using torture to extract confessions or even
levying capital punishment. However, abuses such as stoning and death
sentences have abated, and there were no reports of such action during
the year (see Section 1.e.).
Prison conditions (including overcrowding, food shortages, and lack
of heat and other necessities) are very poor, due to limited budget
resources. Those detained by the MNB rather than the MVD are kept in an
MNB facility; after conviction, they go to a regular prison. The 1994
Criminal Procedure Code is based on the Soviet-era Criminal Procedure
Code and established the right for attorney-client visits of unlimited
number and duration. In practice, however, an attorney must obtain
official permission for every visit. Prison visits by family members
are at the discretion of the investigator during the investigation
phase. After conviction family members may visit regularly.
In principle nonfamily visitors seldom are permitted. However, some
citizens, including local human rights activists, claim that they
usually can obtain official permission for a visit through personal
connections.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Judicial system
continues to operate, in many cases, under Soviet laws and procedures,
and authorities generally respect these provisions in practice;
however, there were a few cases of arbitrary arrest and detention. The
procurator's office determines who may be detained, arrested, and
prosecuted. The MNB, the MVD, and the General Procurator carry out
investigations. Since 1990 persons arrested or charged with crimes have
the right to a defense counsel, who is required to visit the accused
within the first 3 days of incarceration. However, sometimes the
accused first sees the defense counsel only at the trial.
The Criminal Code permits the procurator to detain suspects for 72
hours before releasing them or charging them with a crime. The
procurator must issue an arrest warrant before a person can be
detained. If a suspect is charged, the procurator must advise defense
counsel immediately. The accused usually remains in detention while the
procurator investigates and prepares the case for trial. The procurator
has discretion to keep the accused in pretrial detention for up to 1
year, but there are conditions for provisional release before trial.
After 1 year, the procurator must release the accused or ask Parliament
to extend the period of detention. Since independence, there have been
no known instances in which Parliament has been asked to extend a
detention.
The MNB monitored the Uighur community (a Turkic people native to
western China) closely. In the past they arrested Uighurs on ill-
defined charges, including false documents and concealed weapons
charges (see Section 2.d.).
In the summer, police fined two parliamentary deputies who were
discussing politics with citizens in a public place and charged them
with holding an illegal gathering (see Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 3).
Three deputies in the National Assembly were arrested in June on
charges ranging from embezzlement to assaulting a tax inspector. Many
of the charges were at least 2 years old. Several parliamentarians made
statements criticizing the arrests. While it was not clear that these
charges were politically motivated, there have been other cases against
deputies that were.
In September police systematically rounded up hundreds of ethnic
Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Afghans in the cities of Jala-Abad and Bishkek on
the pretext of passport checks, holding them in custody for up to 2
days.
The Government does not employ forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, despite extensive reforms in the court
system and a large body of new law, court operations have not become
independent of the executive branch, which continues to dominate the
judiciary.
Cases originate in local courts; they may move to appeals courts on
the district or regional level and finally to the Supreme Court.
Separate courts of arbitration handle civil disputes, and traditional
elders' courts handle low-level crime in rural areas.
The procurator brings cases to court and tries them before a judge
and two people's assessors (pensioners or citizens chosen from labor
collectives).The accused and the defense counsel have access to all
evidence gathered by the procurator. They attend all proceedings, which
are generally public, and are allowed to question witnesses and present
evidence. All members of the court have equal rights. Anyone in the
courtroom may question witnesses. Witnesses do not always recapitulate
their evidence in court; instead they affirm or deny their statements
in the procurator's files.
The court compares the facts as presented by the procurator and the
defense, and in most cases makes its decision after receiving all
available information in each case. The court may render one of three
decisions: innocent; guilty; or indeterminate, that is, the case is
returned to the procurator for further investigation. In 1996 the
Constitutional Court ruled that only the defense has the right of
appeal. The decision of a court to return a case to the procurator for
further investigation may not be appealed, and accused persons are
returned to the procurator's custody, where they may remain under
detention.
The law allows only government attorneys to represent defendants in
criminal cases, while private attorneys are prohibited in criminal
court. Often, the attorneys are seen to skew cases toward the
Government's interests, and there are complaints that detainees did not
have the right to a fair trial.
The procurator, not the judge, is in charge of criminal
proceedings. Thus the courts are widely perceived as a rubber stamp for
the procurator and for high-ranking government officials and not as the
protectors of citizens' rights. In addition very low judges' salaries
have led to a well-grounded view among lawyers and citizens that all
but a very few scrupulously honest judges are open to bribes.
Local elders' courts are found in almost every oblast and region.
They exercise their authority by trying petty crimes, such as robbery,
hooliganism, or theft. In the past, local elders' courts have exceeded
their authority by trying major crimes, using torture to extract
confessions or even levying capital punishment. However, abuses such as
stoning and death sentences have abated, and there were no reports of
such action during the year. Local elders' courts are under the
supervision of the procurator's office, but they may not receive close
oversight due to the fact that many such courts are located in remote
regions, which makes monitoring difficult.
The Government has introduced several judicial reform measures,
including a proposal to establish an independent judicial budget,
creation of judicial judgment enforcement procedures, and independent
judicial training. Generally accepted international practices,
including the presumption of the innocence of the accused, have been
introduced. Judges do not hold positions for life. As provided in the
Constitution, terms for judges range from 15 years for Constitutional
Court judges to 3 years for first-term local judges. In 1993 a new
system of court administration was introduced, and sitting judges are
being tested on their knowledge of the law and new civil codes. The
first round of testing was completed in the fall of 1996; the next was
carried out during the fall when new judicial appointments were made.
If judges fail these tests, they may be disqualified from holding
office. The process appears to have increased judicial professionalism,
and a number of judges have been removed due to poor performance on the
exams. Some removals appear to have been subjective, but most lawyers
and judges consider the system to be a fair measure of competence.
The appointment of ethnic Kyrgyz to key positions in the judicial
system has led to charges by non-Kyrgyz that the system is arbitrary
and unfair and that the courts treat Kyrgyz more leniently than members
of other groups. Although systematic discrimination is not clearly
evident, allegations that it exists are credible in some cases. There
are also complaints by Uzbeks, and even by ethnic Kyrgyz, that the
southern portion of the country is underrepresented in the judiciary.
Economic crimes such as tax evasion, embezzlement, and theft of
government property, including that of electric power, are common.
Prosecution for these crimes is relatively rare and sometimes appears
to be directed at opponents of the Government. Legislators in the past
have used their parliamentary immunity to avoid being brought to court.
However, the October 1998 referendum included an amendment that limited
immunity to official acts only. In June three Members of Parliament
(M.P.'s) were arrested in or near the parliament building for
misappropriation of state property, abuse of power, and tax evasion
(see Section 1.d.). The three were awaiting trial at year's end.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits unlawful entry into a home
against the wishes of the occupant and states that a person's private
life, privacy of correspondence, and telephonic and telegraphic
communications are protected. The law and procedures require the
General Procurator's approval for wiretaps, searches of homes,
interception of mail, and similar acts. A change in the law in 1995
weakened these protections by allowing the procurator to give approval
for searches over the telephone; thus no written proof exists to verify
that the search was approved. Furthermore, in certain cases, law
enforcement officers first may carry out a search and then get approval
within 24 hours. If approval is not given, any evidence seized is
inadmissible in court.
Organizaitonal structures responsible for violations during the
Soviet era have remained largely in place; however, there were no
reports of violations of citizens' privacy. There were concerns by
citizens active in politics or human rights issues that the privacy of
their communications was violated, but evidence to that effect is not
available.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for certain
freedoms of speech and of the press; however, the Government at times
infringed on these rights. In July police in Naryn oblast fined two
parliamentary deputies for discussing politics informally with citizens
in a public place; the deputies were charged with holding an illegal
gathering (see Sections 1.d., 2.b., and 3).
The 1992 law on the mass media provides for freedom of speech and
the mass media, and outlines registration procedures. It identifies
prohibited material: Government and commercial secrets; material
advocating war, violence, or intolerance toward ethnic or religious
groups; desecration of national norms, ethics, and symbols, such as the
national seal, flag, or anthem; pornography; and encroachment on the
honor and dignity of a person. Two laws related to the media, On
Guarantees and Free Access to Information and On the Protection of the
Professional Activities of Journalists, were adopted in December 1997.
The Government did not close any newspapers or electronic media
during the year, nor were any journalists arrested or imprisoned as a
direct result of journalistic activities, although several faced civil
``honor and dignity'' charges in court cases brought by
parliamentarians or other public figures.
All media must register with the Ministry of Justice and wait for
ministry approval before beginning to operate. The media law states
that the registration process requires 1 month. During the year, there
were no reports concerning media organizations that could not register
in a timely manner.
Libel is a criminal, not a civil, action. The Government attempted
at the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1998 to amend the Criminal Code
to remove libel; however, its efforts were defeated in Parliament by an
overwhelming majority. As a result of the October 1998 referendum, the
Constitution now includes language that precludes Parliament from
passing laws that infringe on free speech. As of year's end, there had
been no implementing legislation for this amendment.
There are approximately 40 to 50 independent newspapers and
magazines, including some with local, not national, standing. There are
also several hours daily of independent television and radio
broadcasting. However, state television, radio, and government
newspapers receive government subsidies, which permit the Government to
influence media coverage. Additionally, the State's printing house,
Uchkun, is the only newspaper publisher in the country.
During the first half of 1998, all television and radio stations
were to be registered (licenses) with the newly established National
Agency for Communications (NAC) or reregistered if they had a
registration with the NAC's predecessor, the Committee on Frequencies,
which was under the direction of the Prime Minister. The NAC requires
extensive paperwork for registration, including copies of documents on
education and training received by the staff and specifications of the
equipment used.
Many independent television and radio stations have received
licenses. Among them were Pyramid, Independent Bishkek Television,
(NBT), Vostochnaya Strana (VOSST), Asia Center, Open Channel, and
Europa Plus. The registration fee ranges from approximately $100 to
$150 (4,000 to 6,000 soms). Licenses issued are valid for 3 to 7 years
(the duration of validity was determined by the NAC based on its
evaluation of a company's viability). Other independent television and
radio companies are in the process; of reregistration, including Osh
Television, Mezon Television, Radio Almaz stations in Bishkek and Osh,
and several others successfully registered during the year.
There are two television stations in Osh that broadcast in Uzbek:
Osh Television (some programs) and Mezon Television (all programs). The
latter was founded by the Mezon Uzbek Ethnic Center to serve the needs
of the large Uzbek population of Osh. Although Osh television has a
license to broadcast, a dispute continues over which channel it can
use; the NAC attempted to require the station to change its frequency
by year's end. The Association of Journalists lobbied against this
change, indicating that it was unfair as no other broadcaster had to
change frequencies, was not justified technically, and was a financial
hardship to Osh television. The Government granted a reprieve allowing
the station to continue broadcasting on its current frequency until
June 2000.
Licensing has been complicated for nongovernment broadcasters. In
August 1998, the NAC notified licensees of a new government regulation
providing that those holding licenses pay for all expenses connected
with carrying out supervisory functions under the license agreements.
Additionally, since mid-August 1998, the nongovernment electronic media
began receiving standard notices from the NAC, signed by its director
Orozaly Kaiykov, stating that the obligation to broadcast in the state
language was not being fulfilled and that broadcasters were relying
mainly on foreign music and programming. Despite an extended series of
meetings in 1998 between the NAC and media officials, these issues,
which the media view as a form of censorship, were not resolved. The
NAC did not press the point beyond the Kaiykov declaration throughout
the year.
In August the popular independent daily newspaper Vecherny Bishkek
faced closure stemming from allegations that the newspaper's owner,
Aleksander Kim, was guilty of tax evasion. Kim stated that the multiple
inspections began after the newspaper carried interviews with several
opposition politicians, including potential candidates in the 2000
presidential elections. Although the Government clearly used the tax
issue to pressure Kim, the matter was complicated by a dispute within
the newspaper for control. The militia and the tax authorities harassed
Kim and his staff, but at year's end the newspaper continued to
publish. The efforts of the Government to investigate the newspaper on
charges of tax evasion and to probe the legitimacy of the purchase of
the newspaper's building are continuing.
On the night of April 24, state security officers raided the new
offices of the independent Kyrgyz language newspaper Asaba and erased
all of its computer files. After an investigation, MNB claimed that the
erased files were due to a compute virus, not a break-in. In August
1998, Asaba was evicted from its offices after renting space there for
32 years, and the MVD took over the building.
In March the newspaper Utro Bishkeka lost a defamation of character
lawsuit to three deputies of the Parliament, and was forced to pay a
total of approximately $1,700 (60,000 soms). In April the newspaper Res
Publica was found guilty of defamation of character in a private suit
brought by the president of the State Television and Radio Corporation
and fined approximately $6,5000 (230,000 soms).
The Morals Commission, a presidentially appointed body of newspaper
editors, university rectors, religious leaders, and public figures, was
tasked in 1998 with reviewing the print and broadcast media as well as
videos and other activity to determine whether their content was
pornographic or violent in nature. Upon finding that an item was
pornographic, the Commission was charged with requesting legal action
to be taken against organizations and individuals violating its
``decency precepts.'' In September 1998, the Morals Commission
suspended three newspapers, Kartama-Digest, Limon, and Pajshamba. There
were indications that the suspensions were motivated politically. Since
the suspensions, only Limon has continued to publish, under an
agreement that it will eliminate its pornographic content; however,
this action was reduced drastically its circulation and economic
viability. Although the Morals Commission was closed by presidential
decree in January, a criminal case against Limon still is pending.
In December 1998, Parliament passed a law on advertising that
limits the amount of advertising to 20 percent in print media and to 25
percent in broadcast media. This legislation may affect the revenue of
the independent media.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides citizens with the right to assemble freely; however, while the
Government generally respects this right, officials, including those at
local levels, sometimes use regulations that require registration of
rallies and demonstrations to inhibit the exercise of this right. The
law requires official written permission for holding assemblies,
rallies, and demonstrations.
Permits are required for public marches and gatherings but are
routinely available. Rallies and demonstrations are held regularly in
front of the Government Building and in other places. Throughout the
year, several peaceful protests were held outside the President's
office. Those demonstrating included pensioners, political and human
rights activists, and ethnic groups living in the country such as
Uighurs and Kurds.
The Constitution provides for the right of association; however,
while the Government generally respects this right, at times local
authorities have inhibited it in practice. In June and July, local
authorities in both Issyk Kul and Naryn oblasts disallowed several
public meetings for representatives of the People's Party of Kyrgyzstan
(see Seciton 3). Naryn oblast police arrested and fined parliamentary
deputies who were discussing politics informally with citizens in a
public place. They were charged with holding an illegal gathering (also
see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 3.).
The 1991 Law on Public Organizations, which includes labor unions,
political parties, and cultural associations, requires registration of
these organizations with the Ministry of Justice. Excessive caution by
some officials is a contributing element for the delay some
organizations experience in registering. Ultimately, all organizations
have been able to register, with the exception of an Uighur
organization with the stated goal of creating an independent Uighur
state in northwest China. The organization did not renew its attempt to
register during the year.
In June Parliament passed a new law on nongovernmental
organizations. This law separates NGO's from political parties, labor
organizations, and religious organizations, and lowers the required
number of members for registration. It also provides a tax exemption
for grant recipients. The President signed this law into effect as of
year's end.
In October 1998, the Ministry of Justice revoked the registration
of the KHRC on the grounds that its registration application contained
falsified documents. The revocation came while the chairman of the KHRC
was lobbying against the October referendum to change the Constitution
to privatize land and limit parliamentarians immunity in criminal
cases. Subsequently, the KHRC was invited to reregister, but its
chairman declined to do so at that time. In February the KHRC attempted
to reregister but was denied due to alleged irregularities in its
application. A few days later, another organization with the same name
and headed by Sardarbek Botaliyev, an adversary of the KHRC's leader,
Ramazan Dyryldayev, was registered by the Ministry of Justice. On June
11, a court administrator and a militia captain demanded that all KHCR
office equipment and furniture be transferred to the new organization.
However, in August the Government reregistered the original KHRC, and
the group now operates freely.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution and the law provide for
freedom of religion and the right of all citizens to choose and
practice their own religion; however, the Government at times infringes
on these rights. The Government does not support any one religion and
expressly forbids the teaching of religion (or atheism) in public
schools.
In 1996 the Government created a State Commission on Religious
Affairs, officially in order to promote religious tolerance, protect
freedom of conscience, and oversee laws on religion. The Commission
quickly became active and has overseen the registration of over 300
religious institutions, of which 210 are Christina denominations. In
1997 the President signed a decree that required all religious
organizations to register with the Commission. Under the new
regulations, each congregation must register separately. As previously,
if a group wishes to own property, open bank accounts, and otherwise
engage in contractual activities, it must become a legal entity by
registering with the Ministry of Justice. In practice the Ministry has
never registered a religious organization without prior registration by
the Commission. There were no known instances during the year of the
Commission refusing attempts by religious groups to register, although
registration has been slow on occasion.
In June law enforcement officials broke up a Baptist service in
Kyzyl Kiya, in the south. Several of the participants had crossed the
border illegally from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and subsequently were
returned to their countries. The religious commission stated that the
religious group had not been registered, although it had been invited
to do so several times, and that it was not associated with other
Baptist churches, all of which have been registered.
Religious leaders note with concern that the Commission frequently
uses the term ``national security'' in its statements. For example the
Commission has expressed some concern about the destabilizing presence
of Reverend Moon's Unification Church. The Unification Church currently
is not active in the country, but it has a presence through the charity
organization of Reverend Moon's wife. Religious leaders also worry that
traditional religious groups could use references to ``preserving
interconfessional accord'' to prevent smaller churches from
registering. Both Christians and Muslims have expressed concern about
the State's apparent intention to play a more intrusive role in
religion. Ethnic Kyrgyz Christian congregations appear to face special
barriers, as do some Muslim congregations with foreign support. A small
Jewish congregation meets in Bishkek without a rabbi. The group also
organizes informal cultural studies and humanitarian services, chiefly
food assistance for the community's elderly.
A Roman Catholic Church in Bishkek functions unhindered. The
Seventh-Day Adventist Church operates six churches in Bishkek, as well
as several elsewhere in the country, without apparent hindrance.
Muslim leaders complain that the Commission on Religious Affairs
makes decisions about religious events without consulting them. The
Government considers radical Islam, whose followers it labels
``Wahhabis,'' a threat to the country's stability. In late 1997 and
throughout 1998, the Government intensified its campaign against
orthodox Islamic believers. Anti-Wahhabi activities apparently abated
during the year.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--In general government policy allows free
travel within and outside the country; however, certain Soviet-era
policies continue to complicate internal migration, resettlement, and
travel abroad. Under the Soviet-era law still in force, citizens need
official government permission (a ``propiska'') to work and settle in a
particular area of the country. Strictly speaking, the propiska affords
the right to reside in a given city or region. In addition home and
apartment owners legally can sell their property only to buyers with
such permission. In practice many employers traditionally have refused
to provide employment to any applicant residing illegally. However,
this law has not been enforced recently. Persons now move within the
country, purchase homes, and sell businesses without hindrance.
There is no law on emigration. Administrative procedures permit
movement of persons; however, citizens who apply for passports must
present a letter of invitation from the country they intend to visit or
to which they intend to immigrate. In August a presidential decree
stated that exit visa requirements would be abolished by October 1 and
the law was implemented fully by year's end. Citizens can now travel
abroad without an exit visa; however, some travelers may still be
required to present a letter of invitation to validate their passport
for international travel for their first trip abroad. After validation
of the passport, travel is unrestricted. A Soviet-era law prohibits
emigration within 5 years of working with ``state secrets.'' No one is
believed to have been barred from emigration under this statute during
the year.
Emigrants are not prevented from returning to the country, and
there is reportedly a small but steady flow of returnees.
The armed militants who crossed the border into southern Kyrgyzstan
from Tajikistan, caused an estimated 5,000 Kyrqyz citizens to flee from
their homes and left them internally displaced. All returned to their
homes after the fighting ended.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees.
The issue of first asylum did not arise during the year.
As of June, there were 13,240 refugees in the country. Of these 693
were from Afghanistan, and the remainder were from Tajikistan. Of the
latter, about 80 percent were ethnic Kyrgyz, mostly from the Tajik
cities of Murgab and Jirgital.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to countries
where they feared persecution or expulsion of those having valid claim
to refugee status. During the year, there were no forced repatriation
of Uighurs. The UNHCR assisted approximately 2,500 Tajik refugees to
return to Tajikistan during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, but in practice citizens' ability to do so is
limited.
The Constitution mandates presidential elections every 5 years.
There is a two-term limit. The President was reelected to a second term
in 1995 in a multicandidate election marred by irregularities.
Parliamentary elections also are held every 5 years. In 1995 citizens
elected a new Parliament in elections marred by irregularities. In 1996
a referendum was held that amended the Constitution to redistribute
power within the Government. The referendum violated the Constitution
in force at the time and the Law on Referendums. Voter apathy was high
and turnout was low. The results were reminiscent of the Soviet era,
with a reported turnout of 98 percent. Ballot stuffing was rampant, and
family voting apparently was widespread.
The October 1998 constitutional referendum on land privatization,
the structure of the Parliament, and the budget process also was marred
by serious irregularities. The Government's claim that 96 percent of
voters participated in the referendum was not in accord with
participation rates witnessed by local and international observers.
Observers also noted the persistent problem of family voting. The
Government designed the ballot so that voters had to vote either in
favor of all five amendments or against all five. This procedure
created a dilemma for voters who were opposed to the provision for the
privatization of land, which was very unpopular, but favored the other
four, less controversial amendments. The referendum further enhanced
the power of the executive at the expense of the legislature.
The amendments approved in the 1996 referendum strengthened the
formal power of the President and his advisers, who dominate the
Government. The Parliament and the judiciary tend to be subordinate to
the executive branch but show increasing signs of independence, such as
the overriding of presidential vetoes by Parliament. In comparison with
1996, when the Parliament passed 66 laws, it passed 158 laws in 1997
(of which the President signed only 143), and 159 laws in 1998, all of
which the President signed. In 1999 Parliament adopted 184 laws, of
which the President signed 160. Parliament overrode a presidential veto
when the President refused to sign an amendment to the election code
which did not shorten the minimum registration period of time that
political parties must be registered in order to participate in
elections from 1 year to 6 months. In December 1997, Parliament delayed
passage of the 1998 budget bill until reaching a compromise with the
executive branch. The Parliament also delayed approval of the 1999
budget until reaching a compromise with the Government. The
overwhelming majority of local government officials are still appointed
by the President, but the first elections for local legislative bodies
were held on October 17. The elections were flawed but were an
improvement over the 1998 referendum.
In January 1998, President Akayev named two M.P.'s to executive
positions. Both members continued to serve as deputies after they had
assumed their new positions, which is a violation of the Constitution.
However, one of them eventually left his executive position, and the
other resigned from Parliament.
Political parties remain weak. There are 27 registered political
parties. None of the winners of parliamentary by-elections in 1997 or
1998 had a party affiliation, and parties nominated very few
candidates. Of the M.P.'s, fewer than half (46 of 105) claim party
affiliation. There are 12 parties represented in Parliament, but voting
seldom proceeds along strict party lines.
In June and July, local authorities in both Issyk Kul and Naryn
oblasts disallowed several public meetings for representatives of the
People's Party of Kyrgyzstan, one of the largest opposition parties.
The officials set up roadblocks at the entrance to Karakol and did not
permit the party representatives access to the city. Later, government
authorities cited a law that requires 10 days' notice for public
meetings. At year's end, the People's Party was considering an appeal.
In Naryn oblast, two parliamentary deputies discussing politics
informally with citizens in a public place were brought to court and
charged with holding an illegal gathering; subsequently, they were
fined (also see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 2.b.). In the summer,
President Akayev pressed to reduce the minimum registration period to
allow political parties to participate in elections from 1 year to 6
months. Parliament declined to adopt his proposal. Parliament also
passed a bill in October allowing all parties that have undergone the
minimum registration period to participate in the February 2000
parliamentary elections.
Women and most ethnic minorities are underrepresented in government
and politics. Only 3 of 105 parliamentary deputies are women. The only
senior female executive branch official is the Minister of Justice. The
Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court also is a woman. A woman's
group has been formed to recruit, advise, and campaign for female
candidates in the next parliamentary elections. Russians and Uzbeks are
underrepresented in government positions, although Boris Silayev, an
ethnic Russian, is currently the First Deputy Prime Minister.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups generally operated without
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases, and government officials sometimes were responsive
to their views. However, the Government deregistered the KHRC (an
active organization that began protest activity during the campaign
prior to the October 1998 referendum), immediately before the
referendum (see Section 2.b.). After international protests, the KHRC
was reregistered on August 19.
Activists sometimes allege that harassment originates within
government circles.
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
opened an office in Bishkek in January, and the Government generally
supports its activities.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for the rights and freedom of individuals
and prohibits discrimination, including on the basis of language. The
Government expresses a strong commitment to protecting the rights of
members of all ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups, as well as
those of women, but in practice has a mixed record.
Women.--Research conducted in 1996 on violence against women showed
a noticeable increase in such incidents since independence. Activists
note that rape is becoming more common. It is not clear if the
incidence of rape or just the reporting of such attacks is becoming
more common, but authorities often ignore such attacks. Government
statistics indicate that annually there are 400 to 450 crimes against
women, but many crimes never are reported due to psychological
pressures, cultural restrictions, and apathy by law enforcement
officials. The Government has not devised a program to deal with this
problem, and the number of shelters of battered women is not increasing
to meet the need. One shelter of relatively long standing in Tokmok
still is searching for appropriate funding or a sponsor. The Umut
(Hope) Center opened in January 1997 to provide basic protection as
well as psychological, legal, and medical counseling for battered women
and girls. For example during the 3 years of its activity, the Umut
Center has organized biweekly discussions and training for women to
advise and counsel them about their rights. It provides 10 days of
emergency shelter, clothing, and meals for battered women as well as
employment counseling and legal services. In 1998 the director
attributed the rise in the number of women visiting the shelter to the
country's severe economic crisis, which has led to increased violence
against women; 62 percent of women visiting the shelter are unemployed.
Among those in the shelter, 92 percent are unemployed. Umut has
received grants from the Soros Foundation and other foreign sources
during the year.
In June 1997, the NGO Tendesh opened a crisis center in Naryn with
a hot line to support women affected by violence. It provides
psychological, legal, and medical assistance. Another center (Sezim)
opened in April 1998 in Bishkek with a staff of lawyers, psychologists,
and doctors, and operates a crisis hot line for the public. Staff
members conduct training, debates, and seminars on women's rights and
family planning.
Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a growing problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
The law gives equal status to women, and they are well represented
in the work force, in the professions, and in institutions of higher
learning. Women are prominent in law, medicine, accounting, and
banking. They also play an active role in the rapidly growing
nongovernment sector. Nonetheless, recently deteriorating economic
conditions have had a severe effect on women, who are more likely than
men to lose their jobs. It is estimated that women account for 60
percent of the unemployed. Women with children under the age of 16
account for 67 percent of unemployed women. Women make up the majority
of pensioners, who have felt the negative effects of the country's
economic downturn as inflation has eroded pensions, which often are
paid late. Women's groups express general concern about the situation
of rural women. There are approximately 100 women's advocacy NGOs
operating in the country with 20 located in rural areas. With the end
of communism, traditional attitudes toward women are reasserting
themselves strongly in the countryside, where women are relegated to
the role of wife and mother, and educational opportunities are
curtailed. Data indicate that women are becoming less healthy, more
abused, less represented in government, less able to work outside the
home, and less able to dispose of their earnings independently.
Family law prohibits divorce during pregnancy and while a child is
younger than 1 year. A special expert counsel under the State
Commission on Family, Women, and Youth Issues reviewed all legislation
for a gender perspective and submitted its recommendations to
Parliament. The findings demonstrate that while women's rights are
supported by legislation, the principle of women's equality is not
always observed.
The women's advocacy NGO community is becoming increasingly
organized. As a result of conferences held in 1999 an appeal was sent
to the Government, Parliament, journalists, NGO's, and international
organizations in support of women's rights.
Children.--The socioeconomic situation does not effectively ensure
decent living conditions for all children. Basic needs for shelter,
food, and clothing seldom are met. After independence vaccine-
preventable diseases such as diphtheria, polio, and measles reemerged.
A range of serious nutrition-related problems affects a large number of
children, especially in rural areas. Traditional social safety measures
are now inadequate to cope with the social pressures that affect
families, and in major cities, children regularly are observed begging
or selling cigarettes. There are increasing reports of abandonment due
to parents' lack of resources to care for children.
Education is compulsory for the first 9 years, and the country has
a 97 percent literacy rate. However, the educational system has
suffered material and financial hardships, and conditions continue to
deteriorate due to an acute shortage of budgetary and material
resources.
Human rights groups and the Kyrgyz Children's Fund (KCF) monitor
the condition of children. Human rights groups note that children who
are arrested usually are denied lawyers. Police often do not notify
parents of the arrest, and neither parents nor lawyers generally are
present during questioning, despite laws to the contrary. Children
often are intimidated into signing confessions, and sometimes are
placed in cells with adult criminals to frighten them.
The KCF is concerned about the growing number of street children,
many of whom have left home because of abusive or alcoholic parents.
Although numbers are hard to estimate, a 1-day sweep in 1997 through
Bishkek led to a count of 700 children of school age working during
school hours. Such sweeps are conducted two to three times each year
and about 30 to 70 children are found to be working. Similar conditions
also exist in other urban centers, as well as in the countryside. The
KCF has opened two shelters, one in Bishkek (for approximately 30
children) and one in Osh, to provide food, clothing, and schooling to
such children. The Ak Zhol (Bon Voyage) center founded by a Dutch
organization and UNICEF in 1996 was closed in August 1998, due to a
lack of funds.
The forced marriage of underage girls has become more common, and
the authorities often ignore this practice. Cultural traditions and
social structures discourage victims from going to the authorities.
Children in rural areas commonly are called upon to pick crops as
needed on their family farms.
People with Disabilities.--The Government passed the Law on Social
Protection of Invalids in 1991 and adopted amendments in October 1998.
The amendments provide for convenient access to public transportation
and parking for the disabled; subsidies for mass media sources that
make their services available to the hearing or visually impaired; and
free plots of land to construct a home.
Social facilities for the mentally disabled are strained severely,
as budgets have fallen and workloads remain heavy. In one program
facilitated by foreign volunteers, local high school students have
begun to visit special institutions, such as those for the mentally
disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are reported complaints
of discrimination in the treatment of citizens who are not ethnic
Kyrgyz. The most recent statistical data reflect the following ethnic
percentages: 61.2 percent are Kyrgyz; 14.9 percent are Russians; 14.4
percent are Uzbeks; 1.1 percent are Tatars; 0.3 percent are Germans;
and others are 8.1 percent. Members of the minorities allege
discrimination in hiring, promotion, and housing. They complain that
government officials at all levels favor ethnic Kyrgyz.
Russian-speaking Kyrgyz citizens (those who do not speak Kyrgyz)
also allege that a ceiling exists in government employment that
precludes their promotion beyond a certain level. The representation of
ethnic Kyrgyz at senior and intermediate levels of government is
disproportionately high, giving credence to perceptions that career
opportunities in government are limited for those who are not ethnic
Kyrgyz. There also were complaints about discrimination against non-
Kyrgyz in the judicial system (see Section 1.e.).
The Constitution designated Kyrgyz as the state language, but it
provides for preservation and equal and free development of Russian and
other languages used in the country. In 1996 Russian also was declared,
by presidential decree, an ``official'' language for some purposes.
However, lawyers and other officials noted that no legislation referred
to official languages, so the status of Russian was no clearer than
previously. However, increasingly Kyrgyz is replacing Russian, and the
Government has announced that by 2002 all government documents are to
be in Kyrgyz. In 1997 a draft law declaring Russian an official
language was declared constitutional by the Constitutional Court.
However, to date, the law has been stymied in Parliament. Nevertheless,
as a result of these efforts to improve the status of Russian, as well
as difficult economic conditions in Russia, Russian emigration has
declined significantly, with some ethnic Russians returning. University
education is carried out largely in Russian (although Kyrgyz
instruction is available in some departments in some universities,
where textbooks are available), so that Russian-language capability
remains an important skill for those who wish to pursue higher
learning.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 Labor Law provides for the
right of all workers to form and belong to trade unions, and there is
no evidence that the Government has tried to obstruct the formation of
independent unions. The Federation of Trade unions of the Kyrgyz
Republic, the successor to the formal official union, remains the only
trade union umbrella organization in the country, although unions are
not required to belong to it. The Federation forms one part of a
bilateral commission, along with the Cabinet. Each year the two parties
sign an agreement on ``cooperation.'' There is one small independent
union, the Union of Entrepreneurs and Small Business Workers, whose
membership reached approximately 80,000. Precise numbers for the
Federation's membership are not available, but it is significantly
larger than other unions.
The Federation has been critical of government policies, especially
privatization, and their effect on working class living standards. The
Federation still regards itself as being in a process of transition,
during which it is adjusting its relations with the Government, with
other unions in the countries of the former Soviet Union, and with
other foreign unions. Growing numbers of smaller unions are not
affiliated with the umbrella organization.
The law calls for practices consistent with international
standards.
While the right to strike is not codified, strikes are not
prohibited. There were no retaliatory actions against strikers, nor
were there instances of abuse generally directed at unions or
individual workers. There were small strikes of short duration by
teachers and bus drivers.
The law permits unions to form and join federations and to
affiliate with international trade union bodies. Since independent
unions are still in their infancy, no meaningful affiliation with
international trade union bodies has taken place.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
recognizes the right of unions to negotiate for better wages and
conditions. Although overall union structure and practice are changing
only slowly from those of the Soviet era, there is growing evidence of
active union participation in state-owned and privatized enterprises.
The Government sets the minimum wage, and then each employer sets its
own wage level.
The law protects union members from antiunion discrimination, and
there were no recorded instances of discrimination against anyone
because of union activities.
There are Free Economic Zones (FEZ's) that can be used as export
processing zones. The minimum wage law does not apply to the
approximately 3,000 workers in ordinary FEZ's.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law forbids
forced or compulsory labor, as well as forced or bonded labor by
children, and generally it does not occur; however, women and girls are
trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 18 years. Students are
allowed to work up to 6 hours per day in summer or in part-time jobs
from the age of 16. The law prohibits the use of child labor (under the
age of 16); the Ministry of Education monitors enforcement. However,
families frequently call upon their children to work to help support
the family, and many children work as beggars and street vendors (see
Section 5). Forced and bonded labor by children is prohibited and
generally does not occur; however, girls are trafficked for the purpose
of forced prostitution (see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government mandates a
national minimum wage at a level theoretically sufficient to assure a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. The legal minimum
wage is about $2.50 (100 soms) per month. In practice this wage is
considered insufficient to ensure a decent standard of living for a
worker and family, and therefore industries and employers set the
actual minimum wage as a multiple of the national minimum wage. The
Federation is responsible for enforcing all labor laws, including the
law on minimum wages. Minimum wage regulations largely are observed.
However, enforcement of labor laws is nonexistent in the growing
underground economy. Market forces help wages in the unofficial sector
to keep pace with official wage scales.
The standard workweek is 41 hours, usually within a 5-day week. For
state-owned industries, there is a mandated 24-hour rest period in the
workweek.
Safety and health conditions in factories are poor. Despite the
recent improvement in economic growth, the previous deterioration in
enforcement of existing regulations continued to hamper investment to
improve health and safety standards. A 1992 law established
occupational health and safety standards, as well as enforcement
procedures. Besides government inspection teams, trade unions are
assigned active roles in assuring compliance with these measures, but
the previous economic deterioration in the country has made the
compliance record of businesses uneven. Workers have the legal right to
remove themselves from unsafe working conditions, and workers who
choose not to work in an unsafe environment may find employment
elsewhere. In practice refusal to work in situations with relatively
high accident rates or associated chronic health problems could result
in loss of employment, but only if informal methods of resolution
failed.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and girls, mostly
to Turkey and the United Arab Emirates, for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a growing problem. Several media articles have raised
public awareness. The Ministry of Tourism and Sports monitors all
reported cases of trafficking in women. However, there are reports that
officials may receive bribes in exchange for forged travel documents
for the women. Russian border guards operating on the Tajik borders
also allegedly were complicit in trafficking.
______
LATVIA
Latvia is a parliamentary democracy, which regained its
independence in 1991 after more than 50 years of occupation by the
Soviet Union. The Prime Minister, as chief executive, and the Cabinet
are responsible for government operations. The President, as Head of
State, is elected by the Parliament (Saeima). The Saeima elected Vaira
Vike-Freiberga to a 4-year term in June. The October 1998 elections for
the 100-seat Parliament and the national referendum for amending the
Citizenship Law to meet European standards were free and fair. The
judiciary is independent but not well-trained, efficient, or free from
corruption.
The security apparatus consists of: The national police and other
services, such as the Special Immigration Police and the Border Guards,
who are subordinate to the Ministry of Interior; municipal police under
local government control; the military Counterintelligence Service and
a protective service under the Ministry of Defense; and the National
Guard, an element of the national armed forces, which also assists in
police activities. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective
control of the security forces. The Constitution Protection Bureau
(SAB) is responsible for coordinating intelligence activities. However,
Interior Ministry forces, municipal police, and intelligence personnel
sometimes acted independently of central government authority. Some
members of the security forces, including police and other Interior
Ministry personnel, committed human rights abuses.
The economy is oriented toward the private sector. Almost all
agricultural land is farmed privately. Three large enterprises
(shipping, telecommunications, and energy) are schedule to be
privatized, but had not been by year's end. The currency remained
stable and traded freely; unemployment was 10 percent, up from 8.6
percent in 1998; and annual inflation was 1.9 percent, down from 2.8
percent in 1998. Per capita gross domestic product was approximately
$2,612, continuing its increase that began in 1996.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
and the large resident noncitizen community; however, problems remained
in certain areas. An inebriated policeman killed two persons. Members
of the security forces, including the police and other Interior
Ministry personnel, sometimes used excessive force; police and prison
officers beat and mistreated detainees and inmates. In most instances,
the Government took disciplinary measures against those responsible.
Prison conditions remained poor. The inefficient judiciary did not
always ensure the fair administration of justice. Women are
discriminated against in the workplace. Domestic violence, trafficking
in women (including minors), and child prostitution and abuse, are
significant problems.
In March the National Rights Office (NHRO) established an advisory
council, which includes representatives from human rights
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). In April NHRO director Olafs
Bruvers survived a vote of no confidence in the Saeima but the office
continues to suffer from poor funding and a lackluster image. In July
newly elected President Vike-Freiberga returned the proposed new
language law to the Parliament for additional review, citing the law's
inconsistency with the country's international obligations. The revised
law, which met these standards, was passed on December 9.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There we no reports
of political killings.
In March a member of the security police shot and killed two
persons and injured three other persons during a bar fight in Jelgava.
In October he was sentenced to 20 years in prison; he appealed to the
Supreme Court, and at year's end, the appeal was pending (see Section
1.c.).
On April 20, a regional court convicted two soldiers based in
Aluksne of manslaughter after they beat a local resident to death
during a street brawl in August 1998. One soldier received a 3-year
prison sentence and the other a 1-year sentence. Three others
subsequently received lesser sentences. An additional four soldiers
were disciplined administratively and fined by the armed forces.
In 1997 unknown assailants shot and killed Janis Riba, the leader
of the ultranationalist group Aizargi. Riba's followers claimed that
the killing was politically motivated; others speculated that rivals
within the ultranationalist movement committed the murder. A police
investigation continued at year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there were
credible reports that police and prison personnel beat and mistreated
prison inmates.
Several incidents were reported in which police officers shot
civilians, including one incident in Jelgava in March when an officer
under the influence of alcohol killed two persons and wounded three
others in a bar (see Section 1.a.). Criminal charges were filed against
the police officer. No military hazing incidents were reported during
the year.
Prison conditions remained poor, although human rights groups noted
some improvements during the year. Prison cells often are overcrowded
severely. Inadequate sanitation facilities, persistent shortages of
blankets and medical care, and insufficient lighting and ventilation
are common problems, as is the shortage of resources in general.
Detainees complain that they are subject to physical and psychological
intimidation by prison guards. Most jails badly need renovation. The
Government has taken some steps to upgrade certain facilities. Ministry
of Interior personnel stated that prisoners accused of crimes spend an
average of 1 year in prison before trial, but many have been there much
longer. Human rights groups are alarmed by the increasing number of
drug-resistant tuberculosis cases in the prisons, and the government
has received assistance from several foreign organizations to address
this problem. the government also has stated its intention to continue
renovations as rapidly as its limited finances allow and has embarked
on a program to upgrade the prison guard force by replacing the
draftees who now perform such duties with full-time professional
guards. As of January 2000, the prisons are scheduled to be
administered by the Justice Ministry.
In conjunction with the Soros Foundation and the NHRO, the Ministry
of Interior continued its programs for educating police officers in
human rights matters. In June a local NGO established a free legal
advisory service for prisoners and others who believe that they were
victims of police abuse (see Section 4).
Detention facilities for asylum seekers improved with the opening
of Mucinieki center in November 1998 (see Section 2.d.).
The situation for some imprisoned children, who are not always
separated from adults, remained poor. Children as young as 14 years of
age were kept in unsanitary conditions, and suffered from diseases and
deprivation. Both boys and girls are subject to violence and possible
sexual abuse. Educational facilities are poor or nonexistent.
The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law requires the
prosecutor's office to make a formal decision whether to charge or
release a detainee within 72 hours after arrest. Charges must be filed
within 10 days of arrest. There were no known instances of arbitrary
arrest. The responsibility for issuing arrest warrants was transferred
from prosecutors to the courts in 1994. No detainee may be held for
more than 18 months without the prosecutor presenting the case to the
defendant and the court. Detainees have the right to have an attorney
present at any time. These rights are subject to judicial review but
only at the time of trial. There were credible reports that these
rights are not always respected in practice, especially outside of
Riga.
The law prohibits forced exile, and there were no reports of its
use.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government generally respects this
provision in practice. However, the courts must rely on the Ministry of
Justice for administrative support, and the judiciary is not well
trained, efficient, or free from corruption.
The Supreme Court does not have a clearly established right to rule
on the constitutionality of legislation or its conformity with the
country's international obligations; however, in 1997 a constitutional
court was set up to fulfill these functions. The seven-judge panel is
authorized to hear cases at the request of state institutions (the
President, Cabinet, Prosecutor, Supreme Court, local governments, or
one-third of Saeima members) but not of individuals or courts. A
project is currently underway to expand the jurisdiction of the
Constitutional Court to include referrals from lower courts.
The Government continues to reform the judicial system. In 1995 it
completed the establishment of regional courts to hear appeals of lower
court decisions. For more serious criminal cases, two lay assessors
join the professional judge on the bench. Corruption in the judicial
system reportedly is widespread. In 1997 the judges appointed to
preside over the trial of the president of the collapsed Bank Baltija,
Aleksander Lavent, resigned from the case, citing alleged political
pressure from the Government. The accusation came after the judges
released Lavent to house arrest following a heart attack that he
suffered in the courtroom on the first day of the trial. In December
1998, the courts determined that Lavent had recovered his health, and
he was returned from house arrest to prison. The trial of Lavent and
his alleged accomplices resumed briefly in the fall, but it was
suspended again at year's end.
Most judges have inadequate judicial training, and the court system
is too weak to enforce many of its decisions. A major difficulty in
enforcing court decisions is the lack of an effective bailiff or
sheriff system. In April a new criminal law went into force, which
allows for more availability of alternative punishments, including
community service.
Court decisions are not published systemically, nor is there a
centralized index for those that are published. Trials may be closed if
state secrets might be revealed or to protect the interests of minors.
All defendants have the right to hire an attorney, and the State will
lend funds to destitute defendants for this purpose. Defendants have
the right to read all charges, confront all witnesses, and may offer
witnesses and evidence to support their case. They may also make
multiple appeals of adverse verdicts.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law requires that law enforcement authorities have
a judicial warrant in order to intercept citizens' mail, telephone
calls, or other forms of communication. The laws protecting privacy
apply to citizens and noncitizens equally. There were no credible
reports of the unsanctioned taping of the telephone conversations of
public officials.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice. The 1991 Press Law prohibits
censorship of the press or other mass media. Most newspapers and
magazines are privately owned. Newspapers in both Latvian and Russian
publish a wide range of criticism and political viewpoints.
A large number of independent television and radio outlets
broadcast in both Russian and Latvian, and the number of people
receiving satellite television broadcasts continued to increase.
The Law on the Media, revised in October 1998, contains a number of
restrictive provisions regulating the content and language of
broadcasts. No less than 51 percent of television broadcasts must be of
European origin, of which 40 percent should be in the Latvian language.
However, these provisions are not always implemented. In addition
foreign investment may not exceed 20 percent of the capital in
electronic media organizations.
On November 9, the Riga District Court announced guilty verdicts
against 10 former Soviet soldiers from the special forces unit OMON who
participated in attacks on government buildings and the headquarters of
Latvian Television in 1991. Seven of the men received suspended
sentences of between 1 and 4 years and probation of up to 3 years; the
other three were not sentenced. Five other former OMON officers have
been charged; they are presumed to be in Russia and are expected to be
tried in absentia.
There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for peaceful assembly, and the authorities may not prohibit
public gatherings; however, organizers of demonstrations must provide
advance notice to local authorities, who may change the time and place
of public gatherings for such reasons as fear of public disorder. In
January 1997, the Saeima passed legislation on public demonstrations
that requires protesters to remain specified distances from foreign
missions, the Saeima, the Prosecutor's office, and certain other public
institutions. While the law purports to imitate Western European
statutes, independent human rights organizations in Latvia find its
provisions contradictory and confusing. Numerous public meetings and
political demonstrations took place without government interference,
including a reunion of the Latvian Legion (veterans of the German army
in World War II), commemorations of the Red Army victory in World War
II, protests against the proposed language law by Russians celebrating
the 200th anniversary of the birth of Pushkin, trade union marches
against the new pension law, and demonstrations in front of NATO
embassies against NATO actions in Kosovo.
The Constitution provides for the right to associate in public
organizations; however, the Law on Registering Public Organizations
bars the registration of Communist, Nazi, or other organizations whose
activities would contravene the Constitution. On March 11, the
Parliament rejected a proposal by a parliamentary group that would have
allowed noncitizens who are permanent residents of the country to form
political parties. However, noncitizens can join and form political
parties, but there must be at least 200 citizens in the party and at
least half of the total membership must be citizens. More than 40
political parties are officially registered. Noncitizens are prohibited
from forming political organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
Although the Government does not require the registration of religious
groups, the 1995 Law on Religious Organizations accords religious
organizations certain rights and privileges only if they register.
Under this law, the Justice Ministry has registered over 1,000
religious congregations, including congregations of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints, whose previous lack of official
registration had created difficulties in obtaining visas and residence
status. Any citizen or permanent resident included in the inhabitant's
register may register a religion. However, asylum seekers, foreign
embassy staff, and those in the country temporarily or in special
status cannot register a religious organization. Churches denied
registration include the Latvian Free Orthodox Church, the Church of
Christian Scientists, and the Rock of Salvation Church.
Foreign evangelists and missionaries are permitted to hold meetings
and to proselytize, but the law stipulates that only domestic religious
organizations may invite them to carry out such activities. Foreign
religious denominations have criticized this provision.
The Law on Education stipulates that religious education may be
provided to students in public schools on a voluntary basis only by
representatives of Evangelical Lutheran, Roman Catholic, Old Believer,
Jewish, Baptist, and Orthodox religious organizations. Students at
state-supported national minority schools may also receive education in
the religion ``characteristic of the national minority.'' Other
denominations may provide religious education in private schools only.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no obstacles to freedom of
movement within the country, departure from it, or repatriation of
citizens. Latvia has readmitted noncitizens who claimed refugee status
in a foreign country, or who voluntarily abandoned their permanent
residence, and then decided to return to the country to live and work.
Noncitizens who left the country as refugees based on Soviet-era
persecution have no difficulty returning on foreign refugee travel
documents for business reasons or for family visits. The Government
also extends protections to noncitizen residents who travel abroad.
The 1995 Law on the Status of Former Soviet Citizens stipulates
that registered permanent resident noncitizens enjoy the rights to
establish and change residences, travel abroad, and return to the
country. Noncitizens can be granted amnesty. However, certain rights
are denied to noncitizens. Noncitizens are prohibited from working as
private detectives, armed guards, or certified attorneys. Noncitizens
may own land in urban areas without undue complications but in rural
areas only under complex procedures. The law also provides for the
issuance of a noncitizen travel document verifying these rights. In
April 1997 the CID began issuing a more secure aliens' passport to
noncitizens. The slow pace in issuing aliens' passports led to public
protests in March 1998, after which the Government took steps to sped
the process. The CID was renamed the Citizenship and Migration Affairs
Office and was reorganized in an effort to make it more streamlined and
efficient. The NHRO and other human rights groups have noted its
improved performance. The Government also completed the gradual phasing
out of former Soviet external passports, which are no longer valid for
travel to and from Latvia as of December 31, 1998.
As of September 1, 11 asylum seekers were housed at the Mucinieki
refugee center. At the Olaine detention center, which does not house
asylum seekers, 23 aliens await a determination of their immigration
status. An additional 33 persons, mostly criminal aliens, are housed at
the Gaizina center. Twenty of these persons staged a hunger strike in
April 10 to protest the poor living conditions. The situation at
Gaizina remains of concern. The Government is attempting to move this
center to better facilities.
The Government works closely with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refuges, and the law on Asylum Seekers and Refuges complies with all
provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. Special immigration police and border
guards units are to help prescreen asylum requests. Decisions from the
Citizens and Migration Affairs Office can be appealed to an asylum
appeals board in the Ministry of Justice.
The issue of provision of first asylum did not arise during the
year and never has arisen.
According to statistics provided by the immigration police during
the year, 1,541 aliens were detained for questioning. Of those, 222
were deported and 122 departed voluntarily. The Government has
approached Russia and Belarus about concluding refugee readmission
agreements, the lack of which poses a major barrier to effective
control of the eastern border. However, at year's end, the arrangements
had not been concluded.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government. There were free
and fair elections for Parliament in 1998, and in June the Parliament
elected a national president. In the 1998 election, candidates from 6
of the 21 participating parties, representing a broad political
spectrum, won Saeima seats, and 72 percent of eligible voters
participated. Concurrently, 68 percent of the electorate participated.
Concurrently, 68 percent of the electorate participated in a popular
referendum on revising the Citizenship Law.
The election law prohibits persons who remained active in the
Communist Party or various other pro-Soviet organizations after January
13, 1991, or who worked for such institutions as the KGB from seeking
elected office. It also let stand provisions preventing noncitizens
from voting in local elections.
On December 15, the Supreme Court upheld a regional court decision
that the extreme Russian nationalist of the Equal Rights movement and
Riga city council deputy Tatyana Zhdanok was not eligible to run for
public office due to her Communist past. the Riga City Council annulled
her election, but Zhdanok said that she would appeal the decisions and
accused the prosecutor's office of fabricating evidence that she was
engaged actively in the Communist Party after January 13, 1991.
In June the Parliament fulfilled its constitutional responsibility
to elect an individual to serve as president. The Saeima chose Vaira
Vike-Freiberga freely in a secret ballot.
Following the restoration of independence in 1991, citizenship was
accorded immediately only to those persons who were citizens of the
independent Latvian Republic in 1940 and their direct descendants.
After independence the status of approximately 670,000 persons changed
from citizens of the Soviet Union to noncitizen residents in Latvia.
Owing to the Russification policy pursued during the Soviet era, ethnic
Latvians constitute 56 percent of a total population of 2.5 million,
and 78 percent of citizens. Ethnic Latvians do not constitute a
majority in seven of the eight largest cities. Citizens of other ethnic
origins number approximately 400,000, of which almost 300,000 are
Russian.
The 1998 Latvian Citizenship Law includes a Latvian language and
residence requirement for those seeking to naturalize, as well as
personnel. the law requires applicants for citizenship to renounce
previous non-Latvian citizenship, to have knowledge of the Constitution
and Latvian history, and to pledge allegiance to Latvia. At present,
according to Naturalization Board figures, nearly 95 percent of
applicants pass the citizenship tests on the first attempt.
In addition the October 1998 referendum brought the law into
compliance with Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) standards. Children of noncitizens born after August 1992 are
entitled to citizenship upon application.
International observers, including the resident OSCE mission,
credit the Government with establishing a competent and professional
Naturalization Board with offices throughout the country to implement
the law. In the estimation of the NHRO, the OSCE, and various NGO's,
the Board has sought to apply the law fairly. Since the removal of the
restrictive naturalization ``windows'' in November 1998, the number of
citizenship applicants has increased significantly. Nearly as many
persons applied for citizenship from late 1998 to October as in the
previous 3 years combined. According to the Naturalization Board,
13,031 noncitizens submitted naturalization applications in the past 11
months. In contrast 13,814 persons applied for citizenship between
January 1995 and November 1998. Overall, 19,728 of the country's
640,000 noncitizens have naturalized since the process began in 1995.
The Naturalization Board still is processing another 7,000
applications. More than 66 percent of applicants are women; 21 percent
of all applicants are in their forties.
International experts, government officials, and domestic human
rights monitors agreed that Latvia must continue to place high priority
on and devote sufficient resources to implementing the citizenship law
in a fair and impartial manner, as well as seek ways to expedite
naturalization and promote social integration. Working with the
European Union and the U.N. Development Program, the Government also
has implemented a long-term nationwide Latvian Language teaching
program for adults and children in non-Latvian schools.
There are no ethnic restrictions on political participation.
Nonethnic Latvians, including ethnic Russians and the First Roma deputy
in the Saeima, serve in various elected bodies. Noncitizen residents
(the majority of whom are ethnic Russians) may not vote in local or
national elections. Women still generally are underrepresented in
government and politics. There are 20 women in the 100-member Saeima.
One woman is a member of the Cabinet of Ministers. For the first time,
the President of the country is female.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A growing number of NGO's devoted to research and advocacy on human
rights issues, including prison conditions and women's and children's
rights, operate without government restriction. Several organizations
deal with issues of concern to local noncitizens and other nonethnic
Latvians, presenting them to the courts and the press.
The Government demonstrated a willingness to engage in dialog with
NGO's working on human rights issues. The Government continued to
implement its national program for the protection and promotion of
human rights, which was adopted in 1995 based on the recommendations of
key international organizations. A resident OSCE mission continued to
operate with a mandate to ``address citizenship issues and other
related matters.''
The NHRO remained an independent institution with a mandate to
promote human rights, provide information on human rights, inquire into
individual complaints, and initiate its own investigate into alleged
violations. However, its reputation has been tarnished badly by
infighting between its permanent director, Olafs Bruvers, and members
of his staff; by charges from international institutions, including its
primary funder, the U.N. Development Program, that the Office has
become inefficient and politicized; and by calls from international
critics and domestic policymakers, including the Prime Minister and
Foreign Minister, that Bruvers step down. In April Bruvers survived a
vote of no confidence in the Saiema.
In June a foreign-funded local NGO received a grant to begin to
operate a legal assistance center for those complaining of human rights
abuses. The staff visits prisons and provides free legal counseling and
representation to those who seek assistance in cases of police abuse
(see Section 1.c.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
According to the 1922 Constitution, all citizens are equal under
the law. In October 1998, the Saeima passed amendments to the
Constitution, granting constitutional protections to fundamental human
rights. The amendments supersede provisions of the 1991 Constitutional
Law, which had served in the interim, and contain constitutional
provisions for the exercise of the freedoms of speech, religion,
association, the press, and other basic liberties. The amendments also
provide protections from discrimination regardless of race, sex,
religion, language, or disability. Only citizens can vote or hold
government office. There are some restrictions on land purchases by
noncitizens.
Women.--Despite legal protections, international observers and
human rights groups are growing increasingly concerned about problems
facing women. Although no overall statistics are available, sources
indicate that domestic violence against women, often connected with
alcohol abuse, is a significant and underreported problem. Women who
are victims of abuse often seem to be uninformed about their rights and
reluctant to seek redress through the justice system. Human rights
groups assert that the legal system, including the courts, tends to
downplay the seriousness of domestic violence and that the police are
sometimes reluctant to make arrests in such cases.
There are no shelters designed specifically for battered or abused
women. There is one shelter in Riga where homeless women with children
may reside for up to 2 months. Likewise, there are no specific rape or
assault hot lines; however, there are two crisis hot lines managed by
NGO's.
Police do not compile figures for domestic violence as a distinct
category. Instead, episodes are placed under more general categories
such as assault or battery. However, police figures on rape show a
decrease in rape cases over the past 3 years. During the year, 69 cases
were reported.
Both adult and child prostitution are widespread, often linked to
organized crime, and abetted by economic problems. Prostitution in Riga
is increasing, and trafficking in women for prostitution abroad also is
increasing (see Section 6.f). Although there is no official estimate of
the number of prostitutes, unofficial figures suggest that 10,000 to
15,000 persons work as prostitutes. The NHRO reports that adult
prostitutes have no legal protections. Engaging in prostitution is
technically against the law; however, generally neither the prostitutes
nor their clients are prosecuted. There are no state institutions to
assist prostitutes. However, the private Latvian Center for Gender
Problems provides medical help and social support for prostitutes.
Sexual harassment of women in the workplace is reportedly common.
Cultural factors tend to discourage women from coming forth publicly
with complaints of abuse.
Women possess the same legal rights as men. The Labor Code
prohibits women from performing ``hard jobs or jobs having unhealthy
conditions,'' which are specified in a list agreed upon between the
Cabinet and labor unions. Moreover, the code bans employment
discrimination. In reality women frequently face hiring and pay
discrimination, especially in the emerging private sector. According to
the Central Statistics Bureau, the number of women in the lower income
brackets exceeds that of men by 75 percent, while men outnumber women
two to one in upper income levels. It is not unusual to see employment
advertising that specifically seeks men. Women apparently have not
brought any discrimination suits before the courts. The Ministry of
Welfare has designated a one-person office with responsibility for
gender issues.
Women's advocacy groups are growing in size and number. They are
involved in finding employment for women, lobbying for increased social
benefits, assisting victims of domestic abuse,and opposing the hazing
of military recruits.
Children.--In June 1998, the Government adopted the Law on the
Rights of the Child. In March the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the
first annual National Program for the Improvement of the Situation of
Children. The program included state funds for implementation. In
December the Cabinet adopted the National Program for Preventing Sexual
Violence Against Children for 2000-04. The National Center for the
Protection of the Rights of the Child will supervise its
implementation.
Evidence suggests that abandonment and child abuse, including
sexual abuse, are relatively widespread, as is child prostitution. An
estimated 12 to 15 percent of prostitutes are considered juveniles,
that is, between the ages of 8 and 18. Although in theory the
Constitution and the Law on the Rights of the Child protect children,
these rights only are enforced sporadically in the case of child
prostitutes. Schooling is mandatory and free through the ninth grade,
that is, between the ages of 7 and 16. Despite the existence of laws on
mandatory education, truancy is widespread and growing. A few
children's advocacy groups are active, particularly in lobbying for
legislation to protect children's rights and for increased welfare
payments for children.
The Law on the Right of the Child and the constitutional provisions
on children are based on Western European models and provide various
protections, including health care and legal protections against
physical abuse. However, resources are not adequate to enforce
observance of these provisions.
Although legislation has long provided for the establishment of
special institutions for the rehabilitation and vocational training of
juvenile offenders, the Government has made only sporadic efforts to
reduce the number of juveniles who are housed in adult prison
facilities, but who have committed relatively minor offenses.
There is no societal problem of abuse of children. Law enforcement
authorities have won court suits to remove children from abusive
parents and secured convictions in child molestation cases.
Trafficking in young girls for forced prostitution abroad is
increasing (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--Part Two of the Constitution protects
the disabled against discrimination; the 1992 Law on the Medical and
Social Protection of Disabled provides for their right of access to
public facilities. Provisions in the Labor Law and other laws protect
the disabled from bias in the workplace and from job discrimination. In
June 1998, the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a framework document
entitled ``Equal Opportunity for Everyone.'' The document is designed
to coordinate the efforts of all branches of government in assisting
the disabled. The Government supports special schools for disabled
persons. It does not enforce uniformly a 1993 law requiring buildings
to be accessible to wheelchairs, and most building are not. However,
some larger cities, including Riga and Ventspils, have undertaken an
extensive wheelchair ramp building program at intersections.
Religious Minorities.--There was no progress reported in
apprehending the perpetrators of the 1995 bombing of a Riga synagogue.
In April 1998, another bomb exploded at the synagogue, causing
considerable property damage. Then President Ulmanis, the Prime
Minister, and others condemned the bombing and enlisted the assistance
of foreign experts in the investigation. The Government also fired the
State Police chief and other ranking police and Ministry of Interior
officers for failing to protect the synagogue. In June 1998, two youths
were arrested for painting anti-Semitic slogans on a wall opposite the
synagogue. The youths were charged with hooliganism, but the Prosecutor
returned the case to the police for further investigation, which
remained pending at year's end. In 1998 there also were incidents in
Liepaja and other locations in which Jewish monuments were defaced. In
April an explosive device left at the Jewish Holocaust memorial at
Rumbula just outside the city of Riga caused minor damage. Police have
not yet identified the culprits.
In 1998 a politician belonging to Latvia's largest nationalist
party, For Fatherland and Freedom, republished a Nazi era, anti-Semitic
book, ``The Horrible Year.'' (The book also appeared for sale in the
party's bookstores in Riga, although party leaders claimed that they
had not authorized its sale there.) The Government criticized the
contents of the book and its reissuance and called on the State
Prosecutor's office to investigate whether the book's publication
violated the law. It subsequently was determined that technically it
did not. Nevertheless, the leadership of For Fatherland and Freedom
expelled the publisher of the book from the party.
In July then President Guntis Ulmanis convened the first meeting of
the Latvian Historical Commission. Historians from five western
countries attended. The Commission established four task forces to
study key historical developments of World War II and the postwar
period. These are: the Holocaust; the first Soviet occupation; the Nazi
occupation, excluding the Holocaust; and the second Soviet occupation.
Mechanisms are being established for historians to hold seminars with
Latvian history teachers to improve teaching at the secondary level
about the Holocaust.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Of the country's more than 2.5
million inhabitants, approximately 1.1 million persons are of non-
Latvian ethnicity, including more than 765,000 ethnic Russians, 100,000
ethnic Belarusians, almost 70,000 ethnic Ukrainians, and more than
60,000 ethnic Poles. More than 70 percent of Latvia's inhabitants are
citizens, including nearly 400,000 persons who belong to national or
ethnic minorities. There are approximately 687,000 noncitizens, of
which an estimated 65 percent are Russian; 12 percent, Belarusian; 9
percent, Ukrainian; and smaller percentages of Poles, Lithuanians,
Jews, Roma, Germans, Tatars, Estonians, and Armenians.
The law provides for the basic human rights of noncitizens. It
provides noncitizens who have been permanent residents continuously
since July 1, 1992 with the rights to change residence, leave and
return, and invite close relatives to join them for the purpose of
family reunification. The law also provides for the issuance of travel
documents reflecting these rights. It also requires the registration of
noncitizens regardless of their housing status, helping to resolve
cases of persons previously unregistered because they lived in former
Soviet military or dormitory housing. The country's housing patterns
now are based on private, rather than communal, ownership of property;
no new cases involving this provision of the law were reported during
the year. However, the Government has maintained the Soviet-era
practice of requiring the holder's ethnicity to be printed in the
passport. Groups such as Roma and Belarusians have complained that,
because the passport is a basic form of identification in the country,
this requirement has opened them to various forms of discrimination
based on ethnicity.
In May 1998, the Cabinet of Ministers amended the regulations that
distinguished between citizens and noncitizens in calculating social
benefits. Various laws still prohibit the employment of noncitizens in
certain categories. These include restrictions on noncitizen employment
as armed guards, private detectives, and certified attorneys. The NHRO
found most of these practices to be consistent with the international
standards and practices that allow a state to limit government
employment, political participation, and some property rights to those
persons who are citizens.
On July 8, the Saeima passed revisions to the Language Law. The
most controversial points in the Language Law, which did not meet
international standards, were articles requiring that all public events
be held in Latvian and that all billboards and signs in public places
be displayed in Latvian only. President Vike-Freiberga sent the law
back to the Saeima for revision on July 14. The revised law, which met
international standards, was passed on December 9. OSCE experts worked
closely with the Saeima on revisions to the Language Law that would
bring it to international standards.
Some ethnic Russians also have complained of discrimination
resulting from the property laws, which allow individual noncitizens to
own rural land only under complicated procedures. Moreover, noncitizens
were given fewer privatization certificates (which can be used to
purchase shares of stock and to privatize apartments and land) than
were citizens. However, the law allows land ownership by companies in
which noncitizens own shares. The local Russian media and the Russian
Government also voiced concern about acts of vandalism against Soviet
army war memorials and cemeteries. There was no progress in the
investigation of the April 1998 bomb near the Russian Embassy or the
anti-Russian statements published by the For Fatherland and Freedom
party. In July 1998, the police arrested Vilis Linins, the chief
ideologue of the ultranationalist ``Thundercross'' organization, which
was suspected of terrorist attacks against Soviet memorials and other
targets. Linins was charged with sabotage and illegal possession of
explosives and was awaiting trial at year's end. The two persons killed
in the blast were the bombers. The ``Thundercross'' organization no
longer exists.
For the time being, the Government has agreed to continue using
Russian as the language of instruction in public schools where the
pupils are primarily Russian speakers. It also supports schools in
eight other minority languages. However, under the revised Education
Law, the Government has begun to implement a bilingual education
program at the elementary school level. The goal of this program is to
facilitate the eventual transition to Latvian language secondary
schools by the year 2004. Although all non-Latvian-speaking students in
public schools are supposed to learn Latvian and to study a minimum
number of subjects in Latvian, there are shortages of qualified
teachers.
Most state-funded university education is in Latvian, and incoming
students whose native language is not Latvian must pass a Latvian
language entrance examination. However, there are several private
institutions offering higher education in Russian.
Throughout the year, the Board of Naturalization sponsored a ``town
meeting'' process to discuss the Government's proposed action plan for
social integration, presented by the Integration Council, composed of
representatives of the country's various ethnic groups. The revised
plan was approved by the Government in December. The report is
scheduled to be followed by specific programs to promote social
integration, including extensive language training programs.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Law on Trade Unions mandates that
workers, except for the uniformed military, have the right to form and
join labor unions of their own choosing. Union membership is currently
about 30 percent of the work force. Free elections for union leadership
are held every 4 years. In general the trade union movement is
undeveloped and still in transition from the Socialist to the free
market model.
The law does not limit the right to strike. There were several
protests by trade unions during the year, including a major protest
against the pension reform, which was attended by over 2,000 persons.
The trade unions organized the collection of signatures for the planned
referendum on the pension law. The remaining state-owned enterprises
(shipping, energy, and telecommunications) have not faced strikes, wage
payment arrears, or any major labor problems in recent years. Almost
all other businesses now are owned privately. The law bans dismissal of
employees who have invoked the right to strike. There have been no
reported cases of such dismissals.
Unions are free to affiliate internationally and have established
contacts with European labor unions and international labor union
organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Labor unions
have the right to bargain collectively and are largely free of
government interference in their negotiations with employers. The law
prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers. However,
some emerging private sector businesses threaten to fire union members.
These businesses usually provide better salaries and benefits than are
available elsewhere. The Government's ability to protect the right to
organize in the private sector is weak.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, including by children, and it generally is
not practiced. Inspectors from the Ministry of Welfare's State Labor
Inspection Board or Inspectorate enforce this ban. However, trafficking
in women (including minors) for prostitution abroad is increasing (see
Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The statutory minimum age for employment of children is 15
years, although children between the ages of 13 and 15 years may work
in certain jobs outside of school hours. The law restricts employment
of those under the age of 18; for example, by banning night shift or
overtime work. Children are required to attend school until age 16.
Schooling is free until age 18. State authorities are lax in their
enforcement of child labor and school attendance laws. There generally
is no evidence of forced or bonded labor involving children, which is
prohibited by law (see Section 6.c.); however, trafficking in young
girls for prostitution abroad is increasing (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government raised the
monthly minimum wage to about $86 (50 Lats), far below the amount that
trade union officials describe as the bare minimum for survival. The
Labor Code provides for a mandatory 40-hour maximum workweek with at
least one 42-hour rest period weekly, 4 weeks of annual vacation, and a
program of assistance to working mothers with small children. The laws
establish minimum occupational health and safety standards for the
workplace, but these standards frequently are ignored. Workers have the
legal right to remove themselves from hazardous work situations, but
these standards also frequently are ignored in practice.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although there are no specific laws
prohibiting trafficking in persons, the Government uses laws against
prostitution, pornography, and illegal transport of persons across
borders to fight such abuses.
There were instances of trafficking in women for purposes of forced
prostitution. Prostitution is increasing in Riga, and there is evidence
that trafficking in women (including minors) for prostitution abroad
also is increasing. The country is primarily a source or transit
country rather than a destination. On May 18, representatives from
youth health centers met at the Nongovernmental Organization Center in
Riga to discuss problems related to sexual abuse and trafficking. The
Government participates in the Council of Baltic Sea States task force
on organized crime, which is addressing the trafficking of persons.
______
LIECHTENSTEIN
The Principality of Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy and
a parliamentary democracy. The reigning Prince is the head of state;
all legislation enacted by the popularly elected Parliament (Landtag)
must have his concurrence. The Parliament elects and the Prince
appoints the members of the Government and of the independent
judiciary.
The Interior Ministry effectively oversees the regular and
auxiliary police forces. There is no standing military force.
Liechtenstein has a prosperous, highly industrialized, free-
enterprise economy with a vital service sector. It participates in a
customs union with Switzerland and uses the Swiss franc as its national
currency. A member of the European Economic Area (EEA), its 32,000
citizens enjoy a very high standard of living. Unemployment was only
1.7 percent during the year.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. The Government is working to
eliminate societal discrimination against women.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel punishment, and
there were no reports of the use of such methods.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides for
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities honor
these provisions. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must bring
suspects before an examining magistrate, who must either file formal
charges or order release. The law grants suspects the right to legal
counsel of their own choosing, at no cost if they are indigent. Release
on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the examining
magistrate has reason to believe the suspects are a danger to society
or will not appear for trial.
There is no provision for exile, and it does not occur.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary. The judicial system has three tiers: Lower
court, high court, and Supreme Court. In addition an Administrative
Court hears appeals against government decisions. Also, the State Court
protects the rights accorded by the Constitution, decides on conflicts
of jurisdiction between the law courts and the administrative
authorities, and acts as a disciplinary court for members of the
Government.
The Constitution provides for public trials and judicial appeal,
and the authorities respect these provisions.
The Constitution authorizes the Prince to alter criminal sentences
or pardon offenders. However, if the offender is a member of the
Government and is sentenced for a crime in connection with official
duties, the Prince can take such action only if the Parliament requests
it.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for personal liberty and for
the inviolability of the home, postal correspondence, and telephone
conversations. No violations were reported. Police need a judicial
warrant to search private property.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--An independent press, an effective
judiciary, and a democratic political system combine to ensure freedom
of speech and of the press. Two daily newspapers are published, each
representing the interests of one of the two major political parties,
as is one weekly newsmagazine. One state and one private television
station broadcast, along with a private radio station, and residents
freely receive radio and television broadcasts from neighboring
countries. An information bulletin is also issued by the third party
(Freie Liste) represented in Parliament.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly and association, and the authorities
do not interfere with these rights in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government does not hamper the teaching or practice
of any faith. The relationship between the Government and the Catholic
Church currently is being redefined, and a new agreement is scheduled
for 2002. The Government contributes to the Catholic Church, as well as
to other denominations. The finances of the Catholic Church are
integrated directly into the budgets of the national and local
governments. Catholic or Protestant religious education is compulsory
in all schools, but the authorities routinely grant exemptions for
children whose parents request them.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens have unrestricted freedom to
travel in the country, to emigrate, and to return.
The Government cooperates with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees.
The Government provides first asylum, but the country's lack of an
airport or international train station means that it receives few
requests. However, since passage of an asylum law in 1998, the number
of requests increased. Those persons who enter from Austria without
permission still are returned to Austrian authorities in accordance
with a bilateral agreement.
In view of the situation in Kosovo, in April the Government decided
that children under age 20 and spouses of guest workers from Kosovo
could enter the country on request. By September the Government granted
temporary protective status to 426 Kosovar refugees. In September the
Government set May 31, 2000, as the deadline for their repatriation. In
coordination with the Swiss Federal Office for Refugee Matters, the
Government grants financial and material aid to those who return to
Kosovo voluntarily; by September 210 refugees already indicated their
willingness to return.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
Liechtenstein is a constitutional monarchy and a parliamentary
democracy. The monarchy is hereditary in the male line. The 25-member
unicameral legislature is elected every 4 years. Suffrage is universal
for adults over age 20, and balloting is secret. Political parties
operate freely. Citizens regularly vote on initiatives and referenda.
Women are underrepresented in politics and government, although
since gaining the right to vote in 1984, a growing number have been
active in politics. A woman, the Foreign Minister, is one of the five
members of the Cabinet, and another is a Member of Parliament. Women
serve on the executive committees of the major parties. In June women's
organizations, political parties, and the Government's Bureau for the
Promotion of Equal Rights for Women and Men held a convention to
promote the greater participation by women in politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
International and domestic human rights groups operate without
government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on
human rights cases. Government officials are cooperative and responsive
to their views.
The sole local human rights organization, Justitia et Pax, is an
informal group of about 10 persons who monitor prison conditions and
assist foreign workers with immigration matters.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, sex,
language, or social status, and the authorities respect these
provisions. The law also prohibits public incitement to violence or
public agitation or insult directed against a race, people, ethnic
group, or state.
Women.--Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) estimate that one in
five women is a victim of physical or psychological violence. There is
one shelter, which in 1998 provided refuge for 19 women, only 5 of whom
were citizens, and 24 children. Annual government financing for the
shelter is about $170,000 (250,000 Swiss francs). The law prohibits all
forms of domestic violence, and the Government vigorously enforces the
law.
NGO's assume that as in neighboring countries trafficking in women
occurs, but no specific cases have been documented (see Section 6.f.).
Societal discrimination still limits opportunities for women in
fields traditionally dominated by men. On the aggregate level, men earn
more than women. However, it is unclear if this fact represents overt
discrimination. In accordance with a 1992 constitutional amendment
mandating equality for women, Parliament amended a significant number
of laws to provide for equality of treatment. Among other things,
Parliament revised the citizenship law, the employment law, the law on
labor conditions, the tax law, and the divorce law. The process of
amending laws is almost complete. In March Parliament also passed a new
law on equal opportunity for women and men. The new law is designed to
eliminate discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace and to
create conditions that allow both women and men to combine work and
family. In April the Government approved an action plan to promote
equal opportunity and to create conditions that allow both men and
women to combine work and family. Measures include: Raising public
awareness about the new law; improving programs and infrastructure for
traditional and single-parent families, such as affordable housing and
childcare; promoting educational and career opportunities for women;
and raising recognition for work in the home to the same level as for
work outside the home.
Three women's rights groups are active. Their chief concerns are
public affairs, information, legal counseling, lobbying, and other
political activities.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The Government provides compulsory, free,
and universal primary school education for children of both sexes for 9
years, normally until the age of 16.
The Government supports programs to protect the rights of children
and matches contributions made to the four NGO's monitoring children's
rights. A children and youth service belonging to the Office for Social
Services oversees the implementation of government-supported programs
for children.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
People with Disabilities.--Although the law does not expressly
prohibit discrimination against people with disabilities, complaints of
such discrimination may be pursued in the courts. Amendments to the law
on insurance for the disabled, which were intended to improve the
economic situation of disabled persons, came into force in 1997.
The Government requires that buildings and government services be
made accessible for people with disabilities, but in general they are
not, particularly old buildings.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In its 1998 security report,
the Government confirmed the existence of a small number of rightwing
extremists, consisting of about 20 skinheads between the ages of 20 and
30, and about as many followers of a slightly younger age. A government
survey of 700 youths conducted during the year indicated that
approximately 20 percent of youths expressed ambivalence toward or
sympathy for extremist views, while 4 percent were actual supporters.
Incidents of violence increased during the year, according to the
survey.
In September the Government presented measures to Parliament
designed to curtail racial prejudice and discrimination against
foreigners. The proposed law would make it a punishable crime to
produce or distribute racist propaganda, deny the Holocaust, engage in
racist or religious discrimination, deny services to a particular
group, and support racist organizations financially. Violations would
be punishable with a maximum 2-year prison sentence; repeat offenders
could be sentenced to 3-years' imprisonment.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers, including foreigners,
are free to associate, join unions of their choice, and select their
own union representatives. Due to the country's small size and
population, only one trade union operates, representing about 13
percent of the work force. However, the sole trade union looks after
the interests of nonmembers as well. It is a member of the World
Confederation of Labor but is represented on an ad hoc basis by a Swiss
union.
Workers have the right to strike except in certain essential
services. No strikes were reported during the year. The law does not
provide specific protection for strikers. Employers may dismiss
employees for refusing to work; such dismissals may be contested. In
1997 the Government incorporated European Economic Area guidelines into
its domestic labor law. These guidelines require that, among other
things, employers consult in cases of projected mass dismissals and
submit employment contracts in written form.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right of workers to organize and bargain collectively.
However, collective bargaining agreements are generally adapted from
ones negotiated by Swiss employers and unions.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of violations.
Except by implication, the law does not specifically forbid forced and
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
NGO's assume that trafficking in women occurs, but there were no
reports of specific cases (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Government does not specifically prohibit forced and
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur
(see Section 6.c.). The law generally prohibits the employment of
children under 16 years of age. However, exceptions may be made, for
the limited employment of youths at least age 14 and for those who
leave school after completing their 9 years of compulsory education.
Children ages 14 and older may be employed in light duties for not more
than 9 hours a week during the school year and 15 hours a week at other
times.
Inspections are adequate. No employers have been fined or
imprisoned for violations of the law. The Government devotes adequate
resources and oversight to child labor policies. The Department for
Worker Safety of the Office of the National Economy effectively
supervises compliance with the law.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage. The Government estimates that the number of working poor
increased slightly in recent years, from a base of 7.9 percent in 1994.
The law sets the maximum workweek at 45 hours for white-collar workers
and employees of industrial firms and sales personnel, and 48 hours for
all other workers. With few exceptions, Sunday work is not allowed.
Workers over age 20 receive at least 4 weeks of vacation; younger ones,
at least 5 weeks.
The law sets occupational health and safety standards, and the
Department for Worker Safety of the Office of the National Economy
effectively enforces these provisions. The law provides for a hearing
in cases in which workers remove themselves from dangerous situations.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons.
NGO's assume that as in neighboring countries trafficking in women
occurs, but no specific cases have been documented.
______
LITHUANIA
Lithuania is a parliamentary democracy, having regained its
independence in 1990 after more than 50 years of forced annexation by
the Soviet Union. The Constitution, adopted by referendum in 1992,
established a 141-member unicameral legislature, the Seimas; a directly
elected president, who functions as Head of State; and a government
formed by a prime minister and other ministers, appointed by the
President and approved by the Seimas. The Government exercises
authority with the approval of the Seimas and the President. The
Conservatives prevailed in the 1996 parliamentary elections, followed
by the Christian Democrats. The two parties formed a coalition
government (the first in Lithuania's history). In February 1998,
independent candidate Valdas Adamkus was elected President by a narrow
margin. Following the resignation of Prime Minister Gediminas Vagnorius
in May, the Seimas endorsed the 14-member Cabinet of Prime Minister
Rolandas Paksas, a member of the ruling Conservative Party, to carry
out the amended program of the Government. Paksas resigned in October
due to his opposition to a government oil privatization contract. Prime
Minister Andrius Kubilius was sworn into office in November. The
judiciary is independent.
A unified national police force under the jurisdiction of the
Interior Ministry is responsible for law enforcement. The State
Security Department is responsible for internal security and reports to
Parliament and the President. The police committed a number of human
rights abuses.
Since independence Lithuania has made steady progress in developing
a market economy. Over 40 percent of state property, in addition to
most housing and small businesses, has been privatized. Trade is
diversifying and expanding both to the West and the East. The largest
number of workers are employed in agriculture (21 percent). Major
exports include textile and knitwear products, timber and furniture,
electronic goods, food, and chemical and petroleum products. In July
the Government reported a new low for deflation of 0.5 percent. Per
capita gross domestic product (GDP) in 1998 was $2,876. During the
first quarter of the year, real GDP reportedly fell by 5.7 percent, and
unemployment increased to 7.4 percent.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, problems remain in some areas. Police on occasion beat
detainees and abuse detention laws. The Government is making some
progress in bringing police corruption under control. Prison conditions
remain poor, and prolonged detention in a small number of cases is
still a problem. State media continue to be subject to political
interests. Violence and discrimination against women and child abuse
are serious problems. There were a number of anti-Semitic incidents
during the year. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution is a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In September 1998, the President formed the International
Commission to Investigate the Crimes of Nazi and Soviet Occupation
Regimes in Lithuania. The Commission includes historians, human rights
representatives, representatives of international Jewish organizations,
and lawyers from Lithuania and a number of foreign countries. The
Government allotted $37,500 (150,000 Litas) to establish a full-time
working secretariat for the Commission. The secretariat was formed by
October and the first research group of the Commission began to work in
December.
In August a court found six persons guilty of complicity in the
January 1991 coup attempt. The defendants were former leaders and
officials of the Lithuanian Communist Party and were sentenced to
prison terms of from 3 to 12 years for crimes including premediatated
acts of murder and inflicting serious bodily harm. Defense lawyers
appealed the verdict, but at year end the courts had not considered the
appeal.
Formal charges have been brought against alleged war criminals
Aleksandras Lileikis and Kazys Gimzauskas. After being stripped of his
U.S. citizenship in May 1996 for concealing his World War II
activities, Lileikis returned to Lithuania. He is accused of acts of
genocide committed when he headed the security police of the Vilnius
district under Nazi control. Gimzauskas, who had served as Lileikis's
deputy, returned to Lithuania in 1993. After his appointment in
February 1997, Prosecutor General Kazys Pednycia actively investigated
the case and prepared to prosecute Lileikis by the end of June 1997.
However, the law stipulates that the accused has a right to a fair,
public trial and that the trial cannot proceed if the defendant's
health precludes his or her appearance in court. In February when a
panel of doctors found that both defendants physically were unable to
stand trial, the court stopped their trials indefinitely. On June 29,
the Prosecutor General's Office of Special Investigations filed
genocide charges against Vincas Valkavickas, who returned to Lithuania
in June. The Prosecutor's Office also brought charges against Petras
Bernotavicius. In July the prosecutor launched a criminal investigation
into the activities of Kazys Ciurinskas. The prosecutor also
investigated Antanas Gudelis, an Australian citizen. In July the
General Prosecutor's Office also appealed to the public for more
information on persons under investigation for genocide.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
There is a growing problem of women being forced or sold into
prostitution by organized crime figures. Their families often believe
that they have disappeared or have been kidnapped (see Section 6.f.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution specifically forbids torture, and there
were no reports of its use; however, police sometimes beat or otherwise
physically mistreat detainees. The local press reported that incidents
of police brutality are becoming more common. In many instances, the
victims reportedly are reluctant to bring charges against police
officers due to fear of reprisals. According to the Ministry of
Interior, during the first 6 months of the year, four police officers
were charged with abuse of power and one officer was sentenced. In 1998
four officers were charged and three were sentenced for the same crime.
The Interior Ministry states that district police inspectors are
the most negligent in the force. To strengthen the integrity of the
police, the Inspectorate General of the Interior Ministry was given
administrative autonomy in May 1997. In March the Inspectorate General
was reorganized into an office of the Inspector General, and some
functions of the Inspectorate were delegated to the internal
investigations division at the police department. The Inspector General
cannot investigate abuses on his own authority but can act only on the
order of the Minister.
In the past, noncommissioned military personnel committed human
rights abuses, despite efforts to quash hazing--a practice inherited
from the former Soviet armed forces. As living conditions improve for
military personnel, there has been a significant reduction in human
rights violations committed by noncommissioned officers, and during the
year there were no reports of such abuse. During the first half of the
year, six criminal case were brought against conscripts and officers
for systematic degrading treatment (one case) and breach of discipline
involving violence (five cases). According to the Ministry of National
Defense, most trauma inflicted on conscripts is psychological rather
than physical. The Ministry believes that a lack of professionalism
among noncommissioned officers--rather than ethnic, regional, or social
factors--is a primary factor in cases of hazing, and it is working
actively to improve the skills and judgment of such officers. In May
the Seimas approved the new disciplinary statute of the armed forces,
and the military police formed by the law of October 1998 is charged
with maintaining discipline in the armed forces. The disciplinary
statute provides procedures for investigation of disciplinary offences,
assures the right to appeal, and lists the types of punishments.
Prison conditions are poor. Due to limited resources, most prisons
are overcrowded and poorly maintained. One local human rights group
claims that the administration of prison institutions does not do
enough to prevent violence among prisoners. The country is attempting
to reform its prison system with international assistance and the
Seimas is reviewing a new criminal code; however, progress has been
very slow. As of November, new hygiene norms came into effect to
establish the required space for each convict as well as to assure
healthy and safe conditions. On the recommendation of the Seimas
Ombudsman, some detention facilities were closed temporarily due to
unsatisfactory conditions. The Seimas allotted the prisons department
$30.7 million (123 million Litas) for 14 correctional institutions. As
of July, there were 12,291 prisoners (550 women, 201 juveniles) and
1,887 detainees (98 women, 159 juveniles).
Human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisons. A human
rights monitor of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly
visited the country in July and expressed surprise that the country had
failed to make any progress in reforming its penal system in the past
year and a half.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides that no person may be arbitrarily arrested or detained;
however, there were instances of prolonged detention. Police may detain
a person for up to 48 hours based upon reliable evidence of criminal
activity. Under a law passed in June 1998, a judge also must approve
the detention. At the end of that period, police must decide whether to
make a formal arrest, and a magistrate must approve an arrest warrant.
The authorities have 10 days to present supporting evidence. Once a
suspect is charged formally, prosecutors may keep the suspect under
investigative arrest for up to 2 months before taking the suspect to
court. In exceptional cases, investigative arrest may be extended by a
further 6 to 9 months with the written approval of the Prosecutor
General. The Constitution provides for the right to an attorney from
the moment of detention.
In an effort to cope with the rise in violent organized crime in
1993, Parliament passed the Preventive Detention Law pertaining to
persons suspected of being violent criminals. The law was passed as a
temporary measure and was repealed in June 1997. The effect of the law
was to give prosecutors and investigators additional time to conduct an
investigation and file formal criminal charges against the detainee.
The Law on the Prevention of Organized Crime, passed in July 1, 1997,
allows for the application of preventive measures on a person who by
his actions might ``restrict the rights and freedoms of other persons,
creates conditions for the emergence and development of social and
economic preconditions of organized crime, or poses a threat to public
security.'' The Government is addressing concerns that periods of
detention were excessive.
There is no provision for exile, nor is it practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the judiciary is independent in practice.
The Constitution and the 1994 Law on Courts established a four-tier
court system: the Supreme Court; the Court of Appeals; district courts;
and local courts. The local courts are tribunals of first instance for
all cases that are not assigned to some other court by law. The Supreme
Court's Senate of Judges, consisting of the Supreme Court chairman, the
division chairmen, and other members of the Supreme Court, rules on the
decisions by domestic courts that violate the European Convention on
Human Rights. The Constitution also established the Constitutional
Court and allowed for specialized courts for administrative, labor,
family, and other purposes.
The administrative courts began functioning on May 1. The main
function of administrative courts is to investigate the legality and
validity of administrative acts and conflicts in the sphere of public
administration and taxation. The creation of administrative courts
completes the national court reform, a process that started in 1995.
The Ministry of Justice is moving towards a system of specialization of
judges in district and local courts according to the types of cases.
New criminal and civil codes, and codes of civil and criminal
procedure are being drafted. The Government planned to submit the
drafts of three codes to the Seimas for consideration in the fall;
however, by year's end they had not been approved. The main drafting
principle was compliance with the requirements of the European
Convention on Basic Human Rights and Freedoms, taking into account the
jurisprudence of the European Human Rights Commission and European
Court of Human Rights.
The Constitutional Court, at the request of the President, members
of the Seimas, the Government, or the judiciary, reviews the
constitutionality of laws and other legal acts, as well as that of
actions by the President and the Cabinet. The Constitutional Court's
authority to issue the final word on subjects within its jurisdiction
is unquestioned; it is the country's ultimate legal authority with no
further appeal of its rulings.
The Law on Commercial Arbitration, adopted in April 1996, provided
for the establishment of arbitration institutions and the abolition of
the economic court (abolished in 1998). The law provides for private
dispute resolution by an arbitrage tribunal, either organized by a
permanent arbitrage institution or by the parties themselves.
The Prosecutor General exercises an oversight responsibility
through a network of district and local prosecutors who work with
police investigators--employed by the Ministry of the Interior--in
preparing the prosecution's evidence for the courts.
The Constitution provides defendants with the right to counsel. In
practice the right to legal counsel is abridged by the shortage of
trained advocates, who find it difficult to cope with the burgeoning
numbers of criminal cases brought before the courts. Outside observers
have recommended the establishment of a public defender system to
regularize procedures for provision of legal assistance to indigent
persons charged in criminal cases. By law defense advocates have access
to government evidence and may present evidence and witnesses. The
courts and law enforcement agencies generally honor routine, written
requests for evidence.
Government rehabilitation of over 50,000 persons charged with anti-
Soviet crimes during the Stalin era led to reports in 1991 that some
persons who allegedly were involved with crimes against humanity during
the Nazi occupation had benefited from this rehabilitation. A special
judicial procedure was established in 1997 to examine each case in
which an individual or organization raised an objection that a
rehabilitated person may have committed a crime against humanity.
During the year, the Supreme Court overturned the rehabilitations of 32
persons.
Parliamentarian Audrius Butkevicius, former Minister of National
Defense, was arrested in October 1997 and charged with several counts
of corruption. According to the Lithuanian Human Rights Association,
the case was based on false information from the State Security
Department. Butkevicius's pretrial detention was prolonged without the
decision of a judge. The parliamentary Ombudsman said that there were
many similar cases and confirmed that the authorities had violated the
law. Typically, he wrote, judges and prosecutors wrongly interpret the
law to mean that pretrial detention would be expanded automatically
when a case was submitted to a court of law. On November 18, 1998,
Butkevicius received a 5\1/2\-year prison sentence, a fine of $12,500
(50,000 Litas), and confiscation of half of his property. On May 12,
the Supreme Court rejected Butkevicius's appeal. Butkevicius's lawyers
appealed to the European Court of Human Rights, and in September the
Court agreed to review the case; but it had not been resolved by year's
end.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy,
and the Government generally respects this right in practice. The
authorities do not engage in indiscriminate or widespread monitoring of
the correspondence or communications of citizens. However, with the
written authorization of a prosecutor or judge, police and the security
service may engage in surveillance and monitoring activities on grounds
of national security. Except in cases of hot pursuit or the danger of
disappearance of evidence, police must obtain a search warrant signed
by a prosecutor before they may enter private premises.
However, it is widely assumed that law enforcement agencies have
increased the use of a range of surveillance methods to cope with the
expansion of organized crime. There is some question as to the legal
basis for this police surveillance, but there are no known legal
challenges to such surveillance.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice.
Prior restraint over either print or broadcast media and
restrictions on disclosure are prohibited, unless the Government
determines that national security is involved. The Parliament adopted a
media law in 1996 that introduced an element of self-regulation but
postponed a difficult decision on advertising of tobacco products.
Under the 1996 law, the media created a special ethics commission and
an ombudsman to check libel cases and other complaints. This ombudsman
was later established by the Seimas.
The independent print media are flourishing, including a wide range
of newspapers and magazines. Radio and television are a mix of state
and private stations. State television and radio are in the process of
being transformed into public television, independent financially from
the Government.
There are no restrictions on academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the rights of peaceful assembly and association, and the
Government respects them in practice.
The Communist Party of Lithuania and other organizations associated
with the Soviet regime continue to be banned.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government generally respects this provision in
practice. The Law on Religious Communities and Associations was passed
in 1995. It grants religious communities, associations, and centers
property rights to prayer houses, homes, and other buildings. Article 5
of this law mentions nine religious communities that have been declared
"traditional" by the law and therefore are eligible for governmental
assistance: Latin Rite Catholics; Greek Rite Catholics; Evangelical
Lutherans; Evangelical Reformers; Orthodox; Old Believers; Jews; Sunni
Muslims; and Karaites. Additionally this year the Hasidic Chabad
Lubavich community was recognized as a traditional religious group and
was granted the status of a traditional religious community. All other
foreign religious workers must obtain work permits, and they face
difficult bureaucratic requirements to obtain residence permits from
officials who regard them as representatives of cults and sects. These
religious workers complain of unofficial harassment. There are no
restrictions on the activities of other religious communities.
There is no law for the return of communal property and no action
to develop such a law. Although the Justice Ministry prepared
legislation to liberalize the restitution of property to religious
institutions, at year's end, no parliamentary action was taken. The
Catholic community has been more successful in having property returned
than the Jewish community; an agreement between Jewish community
leaders and the WJRO signed in 1995 has never been implemented.
However, some religious property including 26 synagogues has been
returned to the Jewish community.
The law provides for the restitution of private property to
citizens, but the deadline for filing claims has passed. A number of
successful claims have been made, and others still are pending. Lack of
funds for compensation and protracted bureaucratic obstacles are the
primary problems preventing the return of private property. The
Government has taken no action on the problem of heirless (community)
property and has no plans to do so.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Under the law, citizens and permanent
residents are permitted free movement within the country and the right
to return to the country, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. There are no restrictions on foreign travel.
In 1997 the Law on Refugee Status came into effect, allowing for
the first formal grant of refugee status to qualified applicants, in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 1998 Law on Legal
State of Aliens came into effect on July 1.
There is a registration center for migrants and asylum seekers in
the town of Pabrade, where 77 illegal immigrants were registered by
year's end. With fewer refugees in residence, during the year the
center was able to redirect funds towards improving living conditions.
A modern, well-equipped refugee reception center for asylum seekers
opened in 1997 in the town of Rukla. By August it had approximately 160
residents and is intended to help integrate into society those persons
granted refugee status. As of August, of 2,272 refugees initially
settled at the Pabrade center since 1997, over 1,905 eventually were
deported.
Lithuania continued its efforts to stop illegal migrants by
negotiating readmission agreements with Russia and Belarus, the two
countries used by most migrants to reach Lithuania. No progress has
been made in negotiating readmission agreements and border agreements
still have not been ratified. The Government cooperates with the office
of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. The issue of the provision of
first asylum did not arise during the year. There were no reports of
the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Of 141 seats in the Seimas, 71 are elected directly
and 70 are elected through proportional representation. Only those
parties that receive more than 5 percent of the total ballots (or 7
percent for coalitions) are allowed representation in the Parliament.
While there are no legal restrictions on women's participation in
politics or government, they are underrepresented in political
leadership positions. There were 24 female parliamentarians out of 137
members (with 4 seats vacant); there is 1 female minister in the 15-
member Cabinet. The Cabinet also includes one Jew, four Poles and one
Russian.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Most government authorities cooperate with local nongovernmental
organizations and actively encourage visits by international and
nongovernmental human rights groups. A key exception in the past was
the Ministry of Interior, which continually refused to release
information on police brutality and statistics on corruption-related
incidents. The Ministry has improved its willingness to share
information on police brutality and statistics on corruption-related
incidents; however, it has done little in releasing statistics or
producing public reports. The Association for the Defense of Human
Rights in Lithuania is an umbrella organization for several small human
rights groups, all of which operate without government restriction.
In 1994 the Government established the Department of International
and Human Rights within the Ministry of Justice, which monitors law and
legal practice to determine whether these are in accord with
Lithuania's international obligations.
Section 5. Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, disability, or ethnic background; however, discrimination
against women in employment and other areas persists.
Women.--Abuse of women at home is reportedly common, especially in
connection with alcohol abuse by husbands, but institutional mechanisms
for coping with this problem only slowly are being formed. A women's
shelter funded in part with Norwegian assistance is now in operation.
According to one sociological survey published in 1997, 20 percent of
women reported experiencing an attempted rape, while another 33 percent
reported having been beaten at least once in their lives. During the
first 6 months of the year, 108 rapes were reported. Official
statistics on the incidence of abuse of women in the home are not filed
separately from other categories of assault. Persons convicted of rape
generally receive sentences of from 3 to 5 years in prison.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
The Constitution provides for equal rights for men and women;
however, women continue to face discrimination. Official policy
specifies equal pay for equal work. The Law of Realization on Equal
Rights and Opportunities for Women and Men came into effect on March 1.
The Office of the Ombudsman for Equal Opportunities of Women and Men
was established May, and the Seimas appointed lawyer Ausra Burneikiene
as Ombudsman. The Ombudsman's office is an independent public
organization, accountable to the Seimas, which oversees the
implementation of the law and investigates complaints concerning
violations of gender discrimination and sexual harassment. Generally,
men and women receive the same pay for comparable work, but women are
underrepresented significantly in some professions and in the
managerial sector as a whole. Women are underrepresented in businesses.
Significant inequalities in society based on gender continue, and there
are still very conservative views about the role of women. During the
year, the Ministry of Education and Science abolished preferential
university entrance criteria for men and women. During the year, the
Equal Opportunities Ombudsman also closely followed admission
examinations to high schools. The Ombudsman received no complaints
based on gender discrimination.
Children.--The Ministries of Social Security and of the Interior
share official responsibility for the protection of children's rights
and welfare. By the end of April, the Minister of Justice appointed 85
judges in the district courts for hearings in juvenile criminal cases
and cases related to children's rights (adoption and paternity
matters). Starting in 1994, the Children's Rights Service of the
Ministry of Social Security (also known as the Children's Rights
Protection Council) began to take on many of the functions formerly
handled by the Interior Ministry and its subordinate police officers
throughout the country, thereby focusing more attention on the social
welfare needs of children. This service registers and cares for
children in abusive and dysfunctional families, and had registered
34,379 children in 1998.
Child abuse is a problem. Child abuse in connection with alcohol
abuse by parents is a serious problem. The prevalence of authoritarian
values in family upbringing has discouraged more active measures
against child abuse; however, the press has reported increases in
cruelty to children, including sexual abuse, intentional starvation,
beatings, and murder. Authorities reported that two children were
killed by their parents in 1998; however, the media widely reported on
five cases during the year. However, no department or organization
collects information on child abuse. Moreover, there are no specific
criminal codes for child pornography, sexual abuse, or sex tourism.
There is one rehabilitation center in the country for children who have
been abused sexually.
The Penal Code provides for terms of from 1 to 4 years'
imprisonment for exploiting children in the production of pornography.
One case was brought during the year; however, there was no result in
the case by year's end. Penalties for violence and cruel behavior
against underage persons were made stricter during the year, providing
for imprisonment terms of from 1 to 2 years. Trafficking in girls for
the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--The 1991 Law on Integrating Disabled
People provides for a broad category of rights and public benefits to
which disabled people are entitled legally. Legal provisions for access
to buildings for the disabiled are in place but are not widely
enforced; the vast majority of public buildings remain inaccessible to
the disabled.
More than 350,000 disabled persons live in the country--10,000 of
them children. During 1998 Parliament allotted approximately $35
million (140 million Litas) for persons with disabilities, including
$20 million (80 million Litas) for institutions caring for such
persons, $6.8 million (27.3 million Litas) for various specific
programs, and $5.8 million (23.4 million Litas) for orthopedic
assistance programs. A project in Kaunas to build an apartment building
for persons with disabilities has not been completed due to a lack of
funds and to the fact that the pending privatization of the state
institution that was to have supervised the project is still not
complete. A center for deaf children and a program for children with
special orthopedic problems have been created.
Religious Minorities.--Jewish community leaders expressed their
concern regarding desecration of several cemeteries and the Holocaust
Memorial at Paneriai. Although authorities responded promptly in such
cases, no witnesses were found and no charges were brought. A certain
level of anti-Semitic sentiment persists in the country. For example on
the eve of Hitler's birthday, a flag with a swastika was raised at the
center of Klaipeda port and Nazi graffiti appeared on a wall of a
Jewish community building. The mayor of the city said that anti-Semitic
attacks by pro-Fascist youths could not be tolerated and appealed to
the State Security Department for action; however, the perpetrators
were not apprehended. The Penal Code provides for a sentence of
imprisonment from 2 to 10 years for incitement of racial or national
hatred or incitement of violence against foreigners. However, the
Ministry of Justice has no statistics on how many cases, if any, were
brought under this provision of the law.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Minority ethnic groups--
including Russians, Poles, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Tatars, and
Karaites--make up roughly 20 percent of the country's citizens.
Many non-ethnic Lithuanian public sector employees were required to
attain a functional knowledge of Lithuanian within several years,
although the authorities have been granting liberal extensions of the
time frame in which this competence is to be achieved. As of August,
314 persons took a language test for acquiring citizenship and 298
persons passed the test successfully. During the first half of the
year, 354 persons were naturalized (compared with 550 in 1998). There
is no documented evidence of job dismissals based on the language law.
The authorities have indicated that the intent of the law is to apply
moral incentives to learn Lithuanian as the official language of the
State; they have asserted that no one would be dismissed solely because
of an inability to meet the language requirements.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the 1991 Law on
Trade Unions recognize the right of workers and employees to form and
join trade unions. The Law on Trade Unions formally extends this right
to employees of the police and the armed forces, although the
Collective Agreements Law of 1991 does not allow collective bargaining
by government employees involved in law enforcement and security
related work.
In 1990 the Lithuanian branch of the Soviet Union's All-Union
Central Council of Trade Unions, including 23 of 25 trade unions,
renamed itself the Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CFTU) and began
asserting increased independence from its Soviet parent organization.
In 1993 the CFTU joined eight other unions that also had been part of
the All-Union Central Council to form the Lithuanian Trade Union Center
(LTUC).
The Lithuanian Workers' Union (LWU) was formed in 1990 as an
alternative to the CFTU. Unlike the CFTU/LTUC, the LWU was an early
supporter of Lithuanian independence from the Soviet Union and actively
sought Western free trade union contacts. The LWU claims a dues-paying
membership of 78,000 organized in 35 regional groupings.
The Law on Trade Unions and the Constitution provide for the right
to strike, although public officials providing essential services may
not do so. There were no major strikes during the year.
There are no restrictions on unions affiliating with international
trade unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Collective
Agreements Law provides for collective bargaining and the right of
unions to organize employees, although several provisions reportedly
hinder the establishment of new union organizations. Probably as a
result of the discrediting of labor unions during Soviet period, only
10 percent of enterprises have trade unions. Collective negotiations
regarding labor relations, including wages, are not very widespread.
Workers often present their own case against their employer.
Negotiations are more common in enterprises that have trade unions.
According to the law, unions, in order to be registered, must have
at least 30 founding members in large enterprises or have a membership
of one-fifth of all employees in small enterprises. Difficulties
commonly arise in state enterprises in which employees are represented
by more than one union. LWU officials charge that managers in some
state enterprises discriminate against LWU organizers and have on
occasion dismissed employees in retribution for their trade union
activities. The LWU also charges that the judicial system is slow to
respond to LWU grievances regarding dismissals from work. LWU
representatives claim that state managers sometimes prefer the CFTU/
LTUC over LWU unions as collective bargaining partners.
In general trade union spokesmen say that managers often determine
wages without regard to trade union preferences, except in larger
factories with well-organized trade unions. The Government issues
periodic decrees that serve as guidelines for state enterprise
management in setting wage scales. The LWU and the LTUC engage in
direct collective bargaining over wages at the workplace level. Wage
decisions increasingly are being made at the enterprise level, although
government ministries still retain some control over this sphere in
state-owned enterprises. The LWU reports that it supplements its
bargaining efforts with active lobbying in government ministries that
own enterprises.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
specifically prohibits forced labor by all, including children, and
this prohibition generally is observed in practice; however,
trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution
is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age for employment of children without
parental consent is 16 years; with the written consent of parents, it
is 14 years. Complaints about infringement of child labor regulations
generally are referred to local prosecutors who investigate the charges
and take legal action to stop violations. Child labor problems appear
to be rare.
The Constitution specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children, and this prohibition generally is observed in practice;
however, girls are trafficked for the purpose of forced prostitution
(see Section 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Constitution provides for
every person's right to receive just payment for work.
As of December, the legal minimum wage was $107.50 (430 Litas) per
month. The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family. The average wage in the public sector is $280
(1,122 Litas) per month, compared with $215 (861 Litas) in 1997. The
Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Social Security periodically
adjust the minimum wage. Every 3 months these government bodies must
submit their minimum wage proposals to the Seimas, which has the right
to approve or revise the minimum wage level. Enforcement of the minimum
wage is almost nonexistent, in part because the Government does not
want to exacerbate unemployment.
The 40-hour workweek is standard, with a provision for at least one
24-hour rest period. For a majority of the population, living standards
remain low. The poorest households spend 70 percent of their income on
food, compared with 36 percent in wealthier households.
The Constitution provides that workers have the right to safe and
healthy working conditions. The State Labor Inspection Service, which
the law established, is charged with implementing the Labor Safety Law,
which went into effect in 1993. In the first half of the year, the
Labor Inspection Service received more than 2,000 complaints, of which
more than half were confirmed to be true; 95 percent of complaints
involve abuses of labor laws, while only 5 percent deal with working
conditions. The largest abuses include illegal employment (working
without a written contract), not paying wages for more than several
months, and time off.
The 1993 Labor Safety Law sets out the rights of workers facing
hazardous conditions and provides legal protection for workers who file
complaints about such conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution was a problem. In July 1998, the Seimas passed the
Law on the Amendment to the Penal Code, which provides for criminal
liability for persons who engage in trafficking in persons for purposes
of sexual abuse.
The country is a source, transit point, and destination for
trafficking in women. Women from Belarus, Russia (Kalingrad District),
Latvia, and the Lithuanian countryside are trafficked to major cities.
Some are trafficked further to Western Europe and elsewhere. Germany,
Israel, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Austria are major destinations,
based on the figures of women subsequently deported from these
countries to Lithuania.
A number of women, some underage, have been enticed or forced into
prostitution and sold abroad by organized crime figures. Many are lured
by deceptive offers of seemingly innocent jobs as household helpers,
bar dancers, or waitresses. Women also are tricked into prostitution
through false marriage advertisements. Their families often are unaware
of their predicament and believe that they have disappeared or been
kidnaped. However, it is difficult to determine what percentage were
enticed or coerced and how many departed voluntarily. Reportedly, 70
percent of those returned to Lithuania as deportees said that they knew
what type of work they were going to undertake.
There were three cases involving trafficking in persons brought
during the year. In November the Klapeida port police arrested four
persons suspected of trafficking in women. Criminal charges were
brought based on the accounts offered by witnesses. At year's end,
there had been no court hearing. Law enforcement officials complain
that victims of such crimes do not approach the police or they refuse
to provide information about the circumstances of trafficking and sale.
There are no specific government assistance programs for victims of
trafficking; however, the police offer to provide protection for
witnesses. The media report extensively on trafficking in persons. A
local NGO, Missing Persons' Families Support Center, received a grant
from a foreign government during the year to implement an awareness
campaign on trafficking in persons.
______
LUXEMBOURG
Luxembourg is a constitutional monarchy with a democratic,
parliamentary form of government. The role of the Grand Duke is mainly
ceremonial and administrative. The Prime Minister is the leader of the
dominant party in the popularly elected Parliament. The Council of
State, whose members are appointed by the Grand Duke, serves as an
advisory body to the Parliament. The judiciary is independent.
The government effectively controls the security apparatus, which
consists of the police and gendarmerie.
Luxembourg has a prosperous market economy with active industrial
and service sectors. The standard of living and the level of social
benefits are high.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
individual instances of abuse.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards. The
Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes
these prohibitions.
Judicial warrants are required by law for arrests except in cases
of hot pursuit. Within 24 hours of arrest, the police must lodge
charges and bring suspects before a judge. Suspects are given immediate
access to an attorney, at government expense for indigents. The
presiding judge may order release on bail.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government respects this
prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The independent judiciary is headed by the Supreme Court, whose
members are appointed by the Grand Duke. Defendants are presumed
innocent. They have the right to public trials and are free to cross-
examine witnesses and to present evidence. Either the defendant or the
prosecutor can appeal a ruling; an appeal results in a completely new
judicial procedure, with the possibility that a sentence may be
increased or decreased.
In response to a 1995 decision by the European Court of Human
Rights, the government established an administrative court system to
review citizen challenges to legislation.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice.
In August the newly formed coalition Government promised
legislation to reform an 1869 press law that requires journalists to
reveal confidential sources. This commitment follows a 1998 case in
which police searched the offices of a journalist who published a story
alleging corruption on the part of the Interior Minister, but who
declined to reveal his source. The stated goal of the new legislation
is to find an appropriate balance between protecting journalists'
sources and avoiding abuses. The 1869 law also is being challenged
before the European Court of Human Rights.
Print media are privately owned. Television broadcasting rights,
previously held exclusively by the privately owned national radio and
television company, were extended in 1997 to a regional cable
television company. The Government issues licenses to private radio
stations. Radio and television broadcasts from neighboring countries
are freely available.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is
no state religion, but the State pays the salaries of Roman Catholic,
Protestant, and Jewish clergy, and several local governments maintain
sectarian religious facilities. Two additional religious institutions--
the Anglican Church and an Islamic congregation--requested government
funding and were awaiting a decision by the Department of Religion at
year's end.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees and
provides first asylum. The law provides for the granting of refugee or
asylee status in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not
expel those having a valid claim to refugee status, and there were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution.
The Government received 2,930 requests for refugee status and 2,255
requests for asylum through the end of November. This represents a
significant increase over the 1,709 total requests for refugee and
asylum status that were received in 1998. During the year, 4,548
refugees were in the country, the vast majority from the former
Yugoslavia. The Government began to apply the 1993 Dublin Convention
and in November repatriated 36 refugees to Italy, their country of
entry into the European Union (EU). The Government committed itself not
to repatriate refugees to their country of origin during the winter and
to provide financial and administrative assistance to the returning
refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Luxembourg is a multiparty democracy. Suffrage is universal for
citizens 18 years of age and above, and balloting is secret. National
parliamentary elections are held every 5 years.
Women are active in political life. Of 60 members of Parliament, 10
are women, as are 4 members of the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction.
Government officials are cooperative and responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits racial, sexual, or social discrimination, and the
Government enforces these provisions. Blatant societal discrimination
occurs only rarely.
Women.--In 1998 women's shelters provided refuge to 421 women and
453 children. Women's organizations report that the increase over 1997
levels was almost entirely due to refugees from the former Yugoslavia.
Information offices set up to respond to women in distress reported
receiving a total of 4,752 telephone calls in 1998. Neither society nor
the government is tolerant of violence against women, and the
government prosecutes persons accused of such crimes. The government
funds organizations providing shelter, counseling, and hot lines.
Women enjoy the same property rights as men. In the absence of a
prenuptial agreement, property is divided equally upon the dissolution
of a marriage.
The law mandates equal pay for equal work, and the Ministry for the
Promotion of Women has a mandate to encourage a climate of equal
treatment and opportunity. However, according to government reports,
women are paid from 9 to 25 percent less than men for comparable work,
depending on the profession. The differences are least in the highest
paid professions and more substantial at lower salary levels. To date
there have been no work-related discrimination lawsuits in the courts.
Women constitute 38 percent of the work force.
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The law mandates school attendance from the
ages of 4 to 16. Schooling is free through the secondary level, and the
Government provides some financial assistance for postsecondary
education.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. A physicians'
organization estimates that approximately 200 cases of child abuse are
treated in hospitals each year that result in legal proceedings. This
group is working to reform judicial procedures to permit videotaped
testimony in court proceedings and the testimony of child
psychiatrists, as well as the coordination of hospital records in child
abuse cases. In May the Government set up a hot line for young persons
in distress; by the end of the year it had received 183 calls.
In May the Government passed a comprehensive new law dealing with
the sexual exploitation of children. The law increases penalties for
adults who traffick in children, facilitate child prostitution, or
exploit children through pornography. The law also extends the
country's criminal jurisdiction over citizens and residents who engage
in such activities abroad. No such trafficking was reported during the
year.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
people with disabilities in employment, education, and the provision of
other state services. The law does not directly mandate accessibility
for the disabled, but the government pays subsidies to builders to
construct ``disabled-friendly'' structures. Despite government
incentives, only a modest proportion of buildings and public
transportation are modified to accommodate people with disabilities.
The Government helps disabled persons obtain employment and
professional education. Businesses and enterprises with at least 25
employees by law must fill a quota for hiring disabled workers and must
pay them prevailing wages. The quotas are fixed according to the total
number of employees; employers who do not fulfill them are subject to
sizable monthly fines. The Government provides subsidies and tax breaks
for employers who hire the disabled. There have been no known
complaints of noncompliance with the disability laws.
Despite strong legal protections, the Government acknowledged that
laws establishing quotas for businesses that employ over 25 persons are
not applied or enforced consistently, and there is a particular problem
in the case of persons with mental disabilities. The Government is
reviewing the effectiveness of the disability legislation, particularly
the provisions that establish quotas. To attempt to remedy the problems
of the mentally disabled, the Government established a pilot program
through which it supports a private organization that owns and runs a
children's amusement park. This park employs persons with mental
disabilities, whose salaries are paid entirely by the Government.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although noncitizens constitute
approximately 35 percent of the total population, antiforeign incidents
are infrequent. Resident citizens of EU member states have the right to
vote and run in municipal elections. In May the Parliament enacted
legislation to allow noncitizen EU nationals to be employed in certain
public sector jobs. The Government promotes the integration of
foreigners in society by providing support to private organizations for
educational campaigns, cultural fairs, and publications.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers have the right to
associate freely and choose their representatives. About 57 percent of
the working population belong to a trade union. Membership is not
mandatory. Unions operate free of governmental interference. The two
largest labor federations are linked to, but organized independently
of, major political parties. The law prohibits discrimination against
strike leaders, and a labor tribunal deals with complaints.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, except for
government employees such as the police, armed forces personnel, and
hospital workers providing essential services. Legal strikes may occur
only after a lengthy conciliation procedure between the parties. The
Government's National Conciliation Office must certify that
conciliation efforts have ended for a strike to be legal.
On January 19-20, employees of the state railroad company, CFL,
went on strike to oppose pension reform proposals announced by the
Government. No illegal strikes took place during the year.
Unions maintain unrestricted contact with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for and protects collective bargaining, which is conducted in
periodic negotiations between centralized organizations of unions and
employers. Enterprises having 15 or more employees must have worker
representatives to conduct collective bargaining. Enterprises with over
150 employees must form joint works councils composed of equal numbers
of management and employee representatives. In enterprises with more
than 1,000 employees, one-third of the membership of the supervisory
boards of directors must be employee representatives.
The law provides for adjudication of employment-related complaints
and authorizes labor tribunals to deal with them. A tribunal can fine
an employer found guilty of antiunion discrimination, but it cannot
require the employer to reinstate a worker fired for union activities.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor by children and adults, and it is not known
to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits the employment of children under the age
of 16 and requires all children to remain in school until the age of
16. Apprentices who are 16 years old must attend school in addition to
their job training. The Government prohibits forced and bonded child
labor and enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
Workers under the age of 18 have additional legal protection,
including limits on overtime and the number of hours that can be worked
continuously. The Ministries of Labor and Education effectively monitor
the enforcement of child labor and education laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law provides for minimum
wage rates that vary according to the worker's age and number of
dependents. The minimum wage for a single worker over the age of 18 is
$7.32 (278 francs) per hour. Supporting a family is difficult on the
minimum wage, but most employees earn more than the minimum.
The law mandates a maximum workweek of 40 hours. Premium pay is
required for overtime or unusual hours. Employment on Sunday is
permitted in continuous-process industries (steel, glass, and
chemicals) and for certain maintenance and security personnel; other
industries have requested permission for Sunday work, which the
government grants on a case-by-case basis. Work on Sunday, allowed for
some retail employees, must be entirely voluntary and compensated at
double the normal wage; employees must be given compensatory time off
on another day, equal to the number of hours worked on Sunday. The law
requires rest breaks for shift workers and limits all workers to a
maximum of 10 hours per day including overtime. All workers receive at
least 5 weeks of paid vacation yearly, in addition to paid holidays.
The law mandates a safe working environment. An inspection system
provides severe penalties for infractions. The Labor Inspectorate of
the Ministry of Labor and the Accident Insurance Agency of the Social
Security Ministry carry out their inspections effectively.
No laws or regulations specifically guarantee workers the right to
remove themselves from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to
continued employment, but every worker has the right to ask the Labor
Inspectorate to make a determination, and the Inspectorate usually does
so expeditiously.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--In May the Government passed a law that
criminalizes trafficking in persons and increases the penalties for
adults who traffick in children.
In March the Minister of Justice told Parliament that the
Government was unaware of any trafficking rings operating in the
country. His statement followed allegations by two prominent
politicians--including Luxembourg's European Commissioner, Viviane
Reding--that the country serves as a transit point for trafficking in
women. According to the authorities, no arrests or prosecutions were
made for trafficking in persons during the year. Moreover, local
agencies assisting women in distress knew of no clear-cut cases of
trafficking in women.
______
FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, which became independent
following the breakup of Yugoslavia, is a parliamentary democracy led
by a coalition government. It has a popularly elected president. In
multiparty parliamentary elections held in October and November 1998,
opposition parties defeated parties of the governing coalition in
voting that international observers concluded was conducted fairly and
reflected the will of the electorate. International observers
considered the conduct of the first round of voting for president on
October 31, 1999 to be satisfactory; however, there were allegations of
fraud and ballot stuffing in the second round on November 14, and the
Supreme Court ordered a rerun in most of the country's ethnic Albanian
polling stations, which was conducted on December 5. That final round
also was marred by irregularities; however, international observers
concluded that these likely did not affect the final outcome, and
resulted in the election of President Boris Trajkovski. The judiciary
is generally independent.
The Ministry of Interior oversees the uniformed police, criminal
police, border police, and the state intelligence service. Municipal
police chiefs are responsible to the Ministry of Interior, not to
municipal leaders. The Ministry is under the control of a civilian
minister; a parliamentary commission oversees operations. The Ministry
of Defense shares with the border police responsibility for border
security. Some members of the police occasionally committed human
rights abuses.
The economy is in transition from Yugoslav-style communism to a
market-based system. Most firms are privatized, big money-losing
enterprises are being restructured, and inflation has been held below 4
percent in recent years. The economy improved substantially after the
lifting of the Greek embargo and the suspension of sanctions against
Serbia, both in 1995, before which the gross domestic product had
fallen an estimated 50 percent. Growth resumed slowly in 1996 and
continued at about a 5 percent rate until the outbreak of the Kosovo
crisis in the spring of 1999. The crisis cut many firms off from
customers in Serbia and made the transportation of goods to and from
other parts of Europe more difficult and expensive. The overall
economic effects of the Kosovo crisis are not yet clear, but the
initial impact on the economy was quite negative. Unemployment is high;
the gray economy is large. Some workers receive their pay weeks or
months late.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. Police on
occasion abused suspects and prisoners, in particular Roma and refugees
from Kosovo. Arbitrary arrest and detention are problems. The
Government is working to end the practice of police compelling citizens
to appear for questioning, pursuant to a 1997 law; however, incidents
involving the use of such practices still occur. Another 1997 law
imposes some limitations on religious practices. Societal
discrimination against minorities, including Roma, ethnic Albanians,
ethnic Turks, and ethnic Serbs, is a problem. Ethnic minorities
continued to make progress in securing more representation in state
institutions, although ethnic Macedonians still hold a
disproportionately high number of positions. Violence and
discrimination against women remain problems; trafficking in women and
girls for prostitution is also a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings. During a December
1998 police raid on the home of an ethnic Albanian suspect believed to
have stockpiled illegal arms, the suspect's father was killed by police
gunfire. A government inquiry cleared the police of any wrongdoing, but
the incident remained controversial. In November according to press
reports Czech police detained on drug charges a Macedonian citizen who
also was being questioned in connection with the 1995 assassination
attempt against then-President Kiro Gligorov, which resulted in two
other deaths and a number of injuries. There were no further
developments in the Government's inquiries into police actions during
1997 demonstrations in which three persons died.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances attributed to government agents.
According to Catholic Relief Services (CRS), a Kosovar refugee at
the Stenkovec I camp disappeared from the camp in June. CRS camp
administrators believe that the refugee had served as a policeman in
Kosovo, and that the Kosovo Liberation Army or other persons from
Kosovo were responsible for his disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such treatment and punishment;
however, police occasionally used excessive force during the
apprehension of criminal suspects, and they occasionally abused
prisoners, especially members of ethnic minorities. In September and
October 1998, six individuals suspected of arms smuggling were
arrested, and family members complained of cruel treatment of the
suspects. The individuals were tried and convicted early in the year,
in a trial that was monitored closely by international observers and
reportedly was conducted fairly.
There are credible reports of occasional police violence against
Roma, including beatings during arrest and while in detention. Roma
rights organizations also complain of police harassment of Roma and
accuse the police of reinforcing patterns of societal discrimination by
consistently siding with ethnic Macedonian citizens in any disputes
involving Roma.
Human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) received reports
of police beatings and harassment of Kosovar refugees, particularly
those refugees not living in camps. There were reports that refugees
were beaten when crossing the border or traveling throughout the
country (see Section 2.d.). On May 10, Kosovar Albanian refugees in a
camp held a protest in response to an incident in which they believed
that police officers beat two refugees without provocation, although
international camp administrators on the scene did not confirm the
protesters' version of the original incident. On June 25, special
police officers entered the Stenkovec I camp and detained three
refugees suspected of participating in the disappearance of another
camp resident (see Section 1.b.). According to CRS officials, after the
three were transported to a police station, they were interrogated and
roughed-up before being released.
According to Amnesty International, police officers frequently
stopped Kosovar refugees and questioned them in an intimidating manner
about their reasons for leaving Kosovo.
Ethnic Albanian Kosovars in the country were involved in a number
of anti-Roma incidents, at least one of which required the intervention
of the police to help rescue a group of Roma from a mob in a refugee
camp (see Section 5). According to press reports, in August eight
ethnic Albanians beat two of their Romani neighbors in Radusa, after an
incident in which an ethnic Albanian shouted epithets at Romani
children. The ethnic Albanians threatened the Roma and told them to
move away from the village. The Roma fled but returned 2 weeks later
after local police promised to protect the family and to charge their
assailants.
On May 19, a small bomb exploded in an ethnic Albanian neighborhood
in Skopje, which wounded two persons. The authorities did not announce
any suspects in the case.
During the December 5 rerun of the second round of voting in
presidential elections, police intervened 23 times to stop skirmishes
among voters (see Section 3). According to the Ministry of Interior, at
least 9 persons were injured, and authorities filed charges against 14
persons.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and
the Human Rights Ombudsman. The Government agreed to allow the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons under
procedures which the ICRC finds acceptable, but has not yet agreed to
commit to those procedures in a binding, written agreement with the
ICRC.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The Constitution states that a person must be
arraigned in court within 24 hours of arrest. The maximum length of
pretrial detention was increased in 1998 from 90 to 180 days by
constitutional amendment. The accused is entitled to contact a lawyer
at the time of arrest and to have a lawyer present during police and
court proceedings. According to human rights observers and criminal
defense attorneys, police sometimes violate the 24-hour time period
within which a suspect must be arraigned and deny immediate access to
an attorney. Although the law requires warrants for arrests, this
provision frequently is ignored, and it is not uncommon for a warrant
to be issued some time after an arrest.
The Government has not yet ended completely the practice of police
compelling citizens to appear at police stations through an
``invitation'' for ``informative talks.'' Although a law on criminal
procedures was passed in 1997 that states that police cannot force
citizens to appear for these sessions without presentation of a court
order, the practice continued to be applied on occasion. Roma rights
organizations accuse the police of arbitrarily arresting and detaining
Roma, and there are credible reports of such police actions.
The police initiated a series of raids on businesses in the summer,
seized records, and briefly detained some 20 enterprise directors and
officers to question them on charges of corruption and failure to pay
taxes. Almost all of the individuals who were questioned or whose
offices were raided were connected to opposition political parties, and
the raids were widely viewed as having been politically motivated. The
Government publicly defended itself against media criticism of its
actions by releasing information on the alleged crimes under
investigation, but by year's end no charges were brought against the
subjects of the raids. A similar police raid in December against the
director of a company involved in a dispute with the Government
resulted in another media outcry and the suspension by the Ministry of
Interior of the local chief of police who conducted the operation.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice, although the court system is still developing and is
sometimes inefficient and slow.
The court system is three tiered and comprises municipal courts,
district courts, and a Supreme Court. A Constitutional Court deals with
matters of constitutional interpretation.
The Constitutional Court has a mandate to protect the human rights
of citizens but has not taken action in any case in this area. In
addition the Constitution provides for a public attorney to protect the
constitutional and legal rights of citizens when violated by bodies of
state administration and other agencies with public mandates. The
Office of the People's Ombudsman was created and became functional in
1997 (see Section 4).
Trials are presided over by judges appointed by the Republican
Judicial Council (an independent agency) and confirmed by Parliament.
The judges are assisted by two members of the community who serve
essentially as consulting jurors, although the judge has the final
word. Court hearings and the rendering of verdicts are open to the
public except in some cases, such as those involving minors and those
in which the personal safety of the defendant is concerned. Trials
cannot be televised, pursuant to the Criminal Procedure Code, although
the court can in certain cases authorize the presence of television and
film cameras.
Four ethnic Albanian municipal officers who were jailed for crimes
related to events in Gostivar and Tetovo in 1997 considered themselves
political prisoners. However, all four were freed early in the year as
part of a wider grant of amnesty by the new Government. Most
international observers believe that the amnesty was aimed specifically
at release of the four officials. The group, which included the mayors
of Tetovo and Gostivar, had been jailed for failure to obey a
Constitutional Court order to remove Albanian flags from municipal
buildings; rioting had followed their arrests.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and
government authorities generally respect these prohibitions.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice.
Several daily newspapers are published in Skopje, as well as
numerous weekly or periodical political and other publications. Most
towns and municipalities have local newspapers. Government-subsidized
newspapers in the Albanian and Turkish languages are published and
distributed nationally by the leading news publishing house. The
Government subsidizes some other newspapers and magazines. The process
of granting media subsidies is not transparent, leading to charges of
political bias in government support for the independent media. Several
privately owned publications have a wide distribution throughout the
country, and some are considered to be oriented toward opposition
political parties. The media that remain partially state-owned are
government oriented but report opposition press conferences and
statements and in general provide coverage of the major opposition
parties. The leading newspaper publisher is still partially government
owned and controls one of only two modern, high-speed printing
facilities in the country, as well as many newspaper kiosks. Following
the parliamentary elections in late 1998, influence over this publisher
passed to the new Government. International monitors noted that the
media provided generally unbiased coverage of the full spectrum of
political debate. However, several media outlets were criticized for
their clear bias in favor of one political party.
Distributors of foreign newspapers and magazines must obtain the
permission of the Ministry of Interior. All such requests during the
year were approved. Foreign newspapers, including those from
neighboring countries, are available throughout the country.
A 1998 case involving an assault on a journalist, the editor of a
large circulation opposition-oriented weekly magazine, remains
unsolved.
State-run Macedonian radio and television is in countrywide
competition with two private television stations and one private radio
station that are licensed to broadcast nationally. The state broadcast
media also face the competition of dozens of small independent local
radio and television stations throughout the country. The Broadcast
Council issues licenses to broadcasters, in a process that
international observers consider generally meets international norms.
License fees collected from private broadcasters are supposed to help
subsidize the state-run system, but collections are inconsistent.
Individuals and opposition political groups may criticize the
Government publicly without reprisal. However, in January state radio
commentator Gorica Popova was demoted after she expressed her personal
view in a radio broadcast about several foreign guests whom the
Government invited to the country in order to honor a controversial
interwar hero. The media do not appear to practice self-censorship due
to fear of government reprisal. The Government does not censor books
and other publications, nor does it censor films.
The Government respects academic freedom. Because higher education
is not available in the Albanian language (except for teacher
training), some ethnic Albanians claim that they do not have complete
academic freedom. They want to see the currently unauthorized Albanian-
language Tetovo University gain legal status so that they can study in
their mother tongue at the university level (see Section 5).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally respects
this right in practice. Advance notification of large meetings is
optional; political and protest rallies occur regularly without major
incident. Religious gatherings, if they occur outside of specific
religious facilities, must be approved in advance by the Ministry of
Interior and can only be convened by registered religious groups (see
also Section 2.c.).
Three ethnic Albanian rally organizers arrested in 1998 for
inciting racial and ethnic hatred were released soon after their
arrest, and no further legal action was taken against them.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right in practice. Political parties
and organizations are required to register with a court. More than 40
political parties are registered, including ethnically based parties of
Albanians, Turks, Serbs, and Roma.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
The 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Groups limits some aspects of
religious practice; however, the law does not appear to be enforced
consistently. While only the Macedonian Orthodox Church is mentioned by
name in the Constitution, it does not enjoy official status.
The 1997 Law on Religious Communities and Groups designates the
Macedonian Orthodox Church, the Islamic community, and the Roman
Catholic Church as ``religious communities,'' while all other religions
are designated ``religious groups.'' However, despite the difference in
designation, there is no legal difference between the two categories.
The law places some limitations on religious practices. For
example, only a citizen may found a religious group. The law also
stipulates that anyone carrying out religious work be registered with
the Government's Commission on Religious Communities and Groups.
The Government requires that religious groups be registered. The
1997 Law on Religious Communities and Religious Groups contained a
number of specific requirements for the registration of religious
groups that were struck down by the Constitutional Court during the
year. Consequently, there was considerable confusion over which
procedures still applied, and several foreign religious bodies
experienced delays in their efforts to register. During the year, the
Government acted to make the remaining requirements more transparent,
but the process remained slow and cumbersome. At least one
international Protestant church was granted legal registration, and
several others are at some stage of the process. One Islamic group
withdrew its 1998 application for registration but continues to operate
openly without taking further steps toward legal registration. The
Government has not taken any enforcement actions against the group. In
1998 the Government rejected the application for registration of
another Islamic group headquartered in another country. An Islamic Roma
group applied for registration in 1998, and the Government rejected its
application on technical grounds. The group resubmitted its
application, and the Government granted the group legal registration.
The total number of registered religious groups and communities is 19.
Religious gatherings, if they occur outside of specific religious
facilities, must be approved in advance by the Ministry of Interior and
can only be convened by registered religious groups.
The refusal of the Serbian Orthodox Church to recognize the self-
proclaimed Macedonian Orthodox Church has led to difficulties for
ethnic Serbs who wish to worship in their own church. On several
occasions in 1998 the Government refused Serbian Orthodox priests
permission to enter the country because of the recognition issue. Due
in part to the intervening Kosovo crisis, no Serbian Orthodox priests
attempted to enter Macedonia for religious purposes during the year. In
December a delegation from the Macedonian Orthodox Church traveled to
Istanbul to consult with Orthodox leaders on ways to end the impasse
with the Serbian Orthodox Church.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are permitted free movement
within the country as well as the right to leave and return. These
rights may be restricted for security, public health, and safety
reasons, but are respected fully in practice.
Citizenship in the old Yugoslav system was national, but all
records and processing were at the level of the individual republics,
so some residents at the time of independence had Yugoslav citizenship
that became citizenship in other newly independent former republics.
For about the first year of independence, beginning with the adoption
of the Constitution in November 1991, any Yugoslav citizen who had
legal residence (of any duration) in the republic could acquire
citizenship by simple application. The Law on Citizenship adopted in
November 1992 established new procedures for conferring citizenship,
and under its transitional provisions citizenship was granted
essentially automatically to any legal resident who applied before
November 1993. Despite this 2-year window of opportunity for residents
to become citizens by simple application, several thousand residents
did not regularize their status before November 1993. Some of these
persons, and others who arrived in the country later, have complained
that the provisions of the Law on Citizenship that followed the
transition period are too restrictive and have prevented them from
obtaining citizenship. For example, after the transition period the law
required applicants for naturalization to have 15 years of residency.
The law also affects many Roma who wish to become citizens,
particularly with regard to difficulties they encountered in
establishing residence and meeting requirements of a regular income.
During the year, the 15-year residence requirement was lowered to 10
years, in conformity with the Council of Europe Convention on
Citizenship; the new residency requirements are to become effective
within about 1 year, following the passage of enabling legislation. New
procedures instituted in 1998 have made the citizenship application
process considerably more transparent; the Macedonian Helsinki
Committee has full access to all files, and the office within the
Ministry of Interior that processes the cases works closely with the
U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe mission in Skopje.
Ethnic Albanians constitute a disproportionately high number of
emigrants, due to stronger familial ties outside the country and
longstanding economic relationships in other countries.
The Kosovo crisis created an enormous refugee movement into the
country between late March and mid-summer and severely strained the
country's ability to provide asylum. Prior to the start of the NATO air
campaign, approximately 15,000 Kosovar refugees had been allowed to
enter the country quietly as ``tourists'' and reside in local
communities. This pretense that there were no refugees in the country
was undermined by the arrival of an additional 335,000 or more ethnic
Albanian Kosovars in the weeks following the start of the air campaign.
This total represented about one-sixth of the county's own population
and quickly overwhelmed the Government's ability to deal effectively
with immigration controls, border security, or humanitarian support.
The refugees also created strong political strains between the
country's ethnic Macedonian majority and its ethnic Albanian minority.
Ethnic Albanian Macedonians were motivated strongly to provide
immediate asylum to all ethnic Albanians fleeing Kosovo. However, as
long as the outcome of the crisis remained in doubt, many ethnic
Macedonians feared that the refugees might be stranded outside of
Kosovo--significantly and perhaps permanently altering the country's
ethnic balance. Despite these apprehensions and domestic political
tensions, the Government generally responded well to the refugee
crisis, and met its international obligations regarding the provision
of asylum. Occasionally the accumulated political and resource
pressures on the Government resulted in severe restrictions on the
reception of new waves of arriving refugees. Reports that authorities
forced some Kosovar Albanians back into Kosovo could not be confirmed.
The Government on several occasions closed the border crossing points
for hours at a time and often did not staff crossing points with
sufficient personnel to keep new arrivals moving quickly to safety. At
times the Government slowed down the processing of refugees and refused
to admit ethnic Albanians who lacked passports. In one incident, border
police turned back a train carrying dozens of refugees because they
reportedly lacked ``proper documentation.'' International relief
officials publicly said that the Government's actions endangered lives
by processing refugees too slowly. The worst episode was at the
beginning of the crisis, when the initial wave of refugees arrived at
the Blace border crossing point in late March; tens of thousands of
refugees piled up at the border in an unhealthy, filthy, and severely
overcrowded area, while the Government and the international community
rushed to build camps to absorb them. Media and NGO reports of deaths
among refugees at Blace vary widely. Medicins sans Frontieres, the one
international medical aid organization that was allowed continuous
presence among the Blace refugees from the beginning of the crisis,
confirmed three deaths and heard credible but unverified accounts of up
to another eight deaths. In its efforts to clear the Blace border
crossing point at the end of the first week of April, the Government
arranged with the Government of Albania for the transfer of
approximately 15,000 refugees by bus to Albania. However, the transfer
was not coordinated with the UNHCR and created much controversy because
of international observers' doubts that it had been voluntary in all
cases. In early April, almost 2,000 refugees were bussed out of Blace
to the Skopje airport and flown to camps in Turkey in a humanitarian
airlift that the Government did not coordinate with the UNHCR. The
Government generally worked closely with the UNHCR, NATO, other
governments, and with NGO's to establish and operate camps to shelter
and support the refugees properly. However, at first the UNHCR and
international NGO's were denied access to refugees at the border
crossing area (see Section 4). Once camps were established, there were
several incidents of friction between refugees and the Macedonian
police who were assigned to secure and protect the camps. Some camp
residents complained that the police used excessive or unnecessary
force on occasion, although international camp managers generally
reported police behavior to be acceptable. According to human rights
NGO's, there were incidents of police beating, harassment,
interrogation, and intimidation of refugees. These abuses most often
affected refugees not living in the camps and refugees who were
crossing the border or traveling throughout the country (see Section
1.c.). On May 10, Kosovar Albanian refugees in a camp held a protest in
response to an incident in which they believed that police officers
beat two refugees without provocation, although international camp
administrators on the scene did not support the protesters' version of
the original incident. On June 25, special police officers entered the
Stenkovec I camp and detained three refugees suspected of participating
in the disappearance of another camp resident. According to CRS
officials, after the three were transported to a police station, they
were interrogated and roughed up before being released.
Most refugees returned to Kosovo following the cessation of
fighting. Approximately 8,000 remained in the country at year's end,
and the Government believes that there may be about an equal number of
unregistered refugees. The last refugee camp closed at the end of the
year, and all registered refugees were living either with host families
or in collective centers. The Government is working with the UNHCR and
other organizations to resolve and resettle these remaining refugee
cases. Government officials admitted some 2,000 new Romani refugees
fleeing Kosovo in August and September. However, in late September
officials denied entry to some 300 Roma at the border. By the end of
September, the Government reversed its decision and admitted another
461 Roma. Romani refugees staying in camps protested camp conditions
several times in August and September and refused to cooperate with
Albanian-language interpreters.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. The country's third parliamentary elections were
held in October and November 1998 and resulted in an opposition victory
and a peaceful change of government. The unicameral Parliament governs
the country. The Prime Minister, as head of government, is selected by
the party or coalition that can produce a majority in the Parliament.
He and the other ministers may not be Members of Parliament. The Prime
Minister is formally appointed by the President, who is head of state,
Chairman of the Security Council, and commander in chief of the armed
forces.
The Government was accused by opposition leaders and the media of
harassing members of the opposition prior to the October presidential
elections. In the summer, police initiated a series of raids on
businesses and charged some 20 enterprise directors with corruption and
failure to pay taxes. Almost all of the enterprise directors singled
out for this treatment belong to an opposition party (see Section
1.d.).
On October 31, the first round of balloting in the presidential
election was held. There were six candidates on the ballot, who
represented every major political party, including both ethnic Albanian
parties. International observers reported that the conduct of the first
round was satisfactory, and the candidates who received the most votes
advanced to the second round. The ruling VMRO (Internal Macedonian
Revolutionary Organization) candidate Trajkovski gained the majority of
the votes cast in round two on November 14, but the opposition SDSM
(Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia) candidate claimed fraud and
appealed the results. International observers agreed that
irregularities occurred in some areas, and the Supreme Court ruled that
round two should be rerun in 230 polling precincts, all of which are
predominantly ethnic Albanian. The voting held on December 5 was as
flawed as the previous round, according to international monitors, who
reported numerous incidents of ballot stuffing and other problems in
some polling stations. Trajkovski again gained the majority of votes
cast, and the SDSM filed a list of complaints of irregularities.
Claiming that the Government was incapable of conducting a fair vote in
the contested precincts, the SDSM later withdrew those complaints and
did not press for another repeat of the voting. President Trajkovski
was sworn into office on December 15.
Although no formal restrictions exist on the participation of women
in politics and government, they are severely underrepresented in these
areas. The Government has two female ministers and two female vice
presidents with the rank of minister. In the Parliament, 9 of 120
members are women, an increase from only 4 women in the previous
Parliament. In Muslim communities, especially among more traditional
ethnic Albanians, some women are in effect not enfranchised, due to the
practice of family/proxy voting, through which men vote on behalf of
the women in their families (see Section 5).
A number of political parties represent the interests of
minorities, including ethnic Albanians, ethnic Turks, ethnic Serbs, and
Roma. Two ethnic Albanian parties and the Roma party have members in
the Parliament; the ruling government coalition includes one of the two
major ethnic Albanian parties, as well as the Romani party. The
Parliament includes 25 ethnic Albanian members, 1 Macedonian Muslim, 1
Rom, and an indeterminate, small number of Vlachs. Minorities
nonetheless maintain that political structures continue to be biased
against them. Partly to address these concerns, the electoral law
includes elements of proportional representation. A total of 35 of the
120 parliamentary members are chosen on the basis of proportionality,
while the other 85 members are elected in single-member districts. Some
ethnic Albanians and Roma complain that discrimination against them in
citizenship decisions effectively disenfranchises them (also see
Section 2.d.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally is responsive to the concerns of human
rights groups. Human rights groups and ethnic community representatives
meet freely with foreign representatives without government
interference. Several independent forums for human rights exist and
operate freely, but their activities have not been prominent. In 1998
and 1999 one such forum, with the support of the human rights
ombudsman, widely distributed an information card for citizens on basic
human rights; another group provided similar cards to all police
officers, outlining citizens' rights.
The office of the ombudsman, established in 1997, has yet to be
called upon by the citizenry in any significant way. Most complaints
filed with the office do not relate to human rights issues.
The Government allows independent missions by foreign observers.
The Kosovo crisis led many international NGO's to establish new offices
in the country, staffed by scores of international workers; many of
these organizations have a strong interest in human rights issues. The
Government has been generally cooperative in its dealings with these
and other international organizations concerning such issues. However,
when the country first was flooded with Kosovar refugees in late March
and early April, the Government initially insisted that all aid be
distributed by local NGO's, particularly the Macedonian Red Cross,
which lacked sufficient resources to perform the task adequately. For
days the UNHCR and most nonmedical international NGO's were denied full
access to refugees at the border crossing; this needlessly complicated
the provision of assistance and resulted in additional delays in
providing food, water, and shelter. Also, the UNHCR was denied access
to the Radusa camp until April 10 (see Section 2.d.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens
regardless of their sex, race, color of skin, national or social
origin, political or religious beliefs, property, or social status.
However, societal discrimination against ethnic minorities and the
protection of women's rights remain problems.
Women.--Violence against women, especially in the family setting,
is common. Criminal procedures are available to victims of rape,
including limited legal recourse in the case of marital rape. Cultural
norms discourage the reporting of such violence, and criminal charges
on grounds of domestic violence are very rare. Public concern about
violence against women is not evident in the media, although some
women's groups are working to raise awareness of the issue. Shelters
for victims of spousal abuse are operated by NGO's. A hot line remains
open but has limited hours.
Trafficking in women and girls for prostitution and pornography is
a problem (see Section 6.f.). Traffickers have recruited women from
other countries, especially Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine, to work as
prostitutes in several towns.
Sexual harassment of women in the workplace is a problem, but no
statistics are available to indicate its scope. Maternity benefits are
good, with 9-months' paid maternity leave. Women also retain the right
to return to their jobs for 2 years after giving birth.
The Constitution provides that women possess the same legal rights
as men. Macedonian society, in both the Muslim and Christian
communities, is strongly patriarchal, and the advancement of women into
nontraditional roles is limited. Women are underrepresented severely in
the higher levels of the private sector, although some professional
women are prominent. Women from some parts of the ethnic Albanian
community do not have equal opportunities for employment and education,
primarily due to traditional and religious constraints on their full
participation in society. In Muslim communities, especially among more
traditional ethnic Albanians, some women are in effect not
enfranchised, due to the practice of family/proxy voting, through which
men vote on behalf of the women in their families (see Section 3).
Women's advocacy groups include the Humanitarian Association for
the Emancipation, Solidarity, and Equality of Women; the Union of
Associations of Macedonian Women; and the League of Albanian Women.
Children.--The Government is committed to the rights and welfare of
children but in some areas is limited by resource constraints.
Education is compulsory through the eighth grade, or to the age of 15
or 16. At both the primary and secondary levels, girls in some ethnic
Albanian communities are underrepresented in schools. The Government
encourages ethnic minority students, especially girls, to enroll in
secondary schools. Medical care for children is adequate but is
hampered by the generally difficult economic circumstances of the
country and by the weak national medical system.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
People With Disabilities.--Social programs to meet the needs of the
disabled exist to the extent that government resources allow.
Discrimination on the basis of disability is forbidden by law. No laws
or regulations mandate accessibility for disabled persons.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population of 2.2 million
is composed of a variety of national and ethnic groups, mainly
Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Roma, Serbs, and Vlachs. All citizens
are equal under the law. The Constitution provides for the protection
of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity of
minorities, including state support for education in minority languages
through secondary school and the official use of ethnic minority
languages in areas where ethnic minorities make up a majority of the
population.
Ethnic tensions and prejudices are present in society. The
Government is committed to a policy of peaceful integration of all
ethnic groups into society but faces political resistance and continued
popular prejudices regarding the means to achieve this goal (hiring
quotas, affirmative action in school admissions, education in minority
languages, etc.).
Representatives of the ethnic Albanian community, by far the
largest minority group with 23 percent of the population according to
government statistics, are the most vocal in charging discrimination.
The underrepresentation of ethnic Albanians in the military and police
is a major grievance in the community. Despite government efforts to
recruit more ethnic Albanians, the police force remains overwhelmingly
Slavic Macedonian, even in areas where the ethnic Albanian population
is large. Members of ethnic minorities constitute 8.7 percent of the
law enforcement officers of the Ministry of the Interior; in the
primarily ethnic Albanian cities of Tetovo and Gostivar the respective
figures are 17 percent and 12 percent. To raise the percentage of
ethnic minority police officers, the Government for several years has
set a recruiting quota of 22 percent for enrolling minority students at
the police secondary school. Attrition has kept the graduating classes
from retaining that percentage of ethnic minorities.
The military continues efforts to recruit and retain minority
officers and cadets. The military is composed mostly of short-service
conscripts, drawn from all ethnic groups. The proportion of ethnic
Albanians in the ranks is estimated to be about 25 percent, but the
proportion is significantly lower in the officer corps. Of junior
officers, about 9 percent are from ethnic minorities, while about 15
percent of cadets at the military academy are from ethnic minorities.
Ethnic Albanians constitute about 8 percent of Ministry of Defense
civilian employees. The Deputy Minister of Defense and one of a total
of eight general officers are ethnic Albanians.
The Constitution provides for primary and secondary education in
the languages of the ethnic minorities. Primary education is available
in Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, and Serbian. Albanian-language
education is a crucial issue for the ethnic Albanian community; it is
seen as vital for preserving Albanian heritage and culture. Almost all
ethnic Albanian children receive 8 years of education in Albanian-
language schools. The number of ethnic minority students who receive
secondary education in their mother tongues is increasing, and was
about 15 percent during the year, up from 14 percent the previous
school year. Still, only about half of ethnic minority students go on
to high school, partly because of the lack of available classes in
minority languages at the secondary level and partly because the
traditional nature of parts of Albanian society leads many families in
rural areas to see no need to educate their children, particularly
girls, beyond the eighth grade.
At the university level, ethnic minorities are underrepresented,
but there has been much progress in increasing the number of ethnic
minority applicants and students since independence in 1991. There are
eased admission requirements for minorities at the universities in
Skopje and Bitola for up to 23 percent of entering places, although the
quota has not always been filled. In 1991 there were 302 ethnic
minority students attending university; in 1998 there were 1,073. The
latter figure represents about 16 percent of all university students.
Most university education is conducted in the Macedonian language;
there is Albanian-language university education only for students at
Skopje University's teacher training faculty, for students studying to
be teachers at Albanian-language primary and secondary schools. An
obstacle to increasing university attendance of ethnic Albanians and
Roma, especially for girls, is their low but slowly increasing
enrollment in secondary education.
Demands for the legalization of an unofficial Albanian-language
university in Tetovo continue. In 1995 the issue led to a violent clash
between demonstrators and police, during which 1 ethnic Albanian
demonstrator was killed and about 30 persons were injured. Since then
the Government tacitly has allowed the university--which it considers
to be illegal--to function without giving it any official recognition.
In the 1998 parliamentary elections the issue of Albanian-language
university education was debated constructively, but the question has
not retained a high profile recently, due in part to the Kosovo crisis.
At year's end, the Prime Minister announced that the Government had
approved a plan to be implemented in 2000 to extend further the use of
the Albanian language in higher education.
The new Government met one major demand of the ethnic Albanian
community by agreeing to change the 15 year residence requirement for
naturalization to 10 years (see Section 2.d.). Enabling legislation is
being processed to complete that change. The new Government has
continued previous governments' positions that reject demands for
legalizing use of the Albanian language in dealings with the central
Government and in the Parliament and for allowing official use of the
Albanian flag.
Ethnic Turks, who make up about 4 percent of the population, also
complain of governmental, societal, and cultural discrimination. Their
main complaints center on Turkish-language education and media. One
continuing dispute has been over the desire of parents who consider
themselves Turkish to educate their children in Turkish despite the
fact that they do not speak Turkish at home. The Education Ministry
refuses to provide Turkish-language education for them, noting that the
Constitution provides for education in the mother tongues of
minorities, not in foreign languages. Some parents have hired teachers
of their own, although this kind of private education is not authorized
legally.
Ethnic Serbs, who constitute about 2 percent of the population,
also complain about discrimination and their inability to worship
freely in the Serbian Orthodox Church.
The normally quiet relations between Roma and other citizens were
strained during the year as a result of dislocations of Roma caused by
the Kosovo crisis. According to the 1994 census, there were 43,700 Roma
in the country (2.2 percent of the population). Romani leaders claim
that the 1994 census seriously undercounted the actual number of Roma.
There were incidents of police and societal violence against Roma (see
Section 1.c.). Ethnic Albanian Kosovars in the country were involved in
a number of anti-Roma incidents, at least one of which in June required
the intervention of the police to help rescue a group of Roma from a
mob in a refugee camp. About 6,000 Roma fled Kosovo and took up
residence in the country. They left not only because of the direct
dangers of the conflict, but also because of the hostility of ethnic
Albanian Kosovars, who widely consider the Roma to have supported the
Serbs and to have committed theft and other crimes against ethnic
Albanians during the crisis. The new Roma arrivals initially were
sheltered in a refugee camp (about 2,000 persons) and under host family
arrangements (about 4,000) that were underwritten by the international
relief community. By year's end, all of the Romani refugees were
staying with host families or in collective centers. The presence of
these Romani refugees is not popular among ethnic Albanians, who
largely share the view of the ethnic Albanian Kosovars concerning both
Roma and Serbs. Ethnic Macedonians also express irritation at the new
arrivals, many of whom settled in Skopje, and some of whom established
themselves at busy traffic intersections to beg, wash car windows, or
sell small items. The Macedonian Roma already tended to occupy the
lowest economic rung of society, and the new arrivals added to the
ranks of the very poor. Optional Romani-language education has been
offered at several primary schools since 1996, but there has been
limited demand and no pressure for a more extensive curriculum.
According to Romani community leaders, up to 10 percent of Romani
children never enroll in school, and of those who do, 50 percent drop
out by the fifth grade, and only 35 to 40 percent finish the eighth
grade. There is some Romani-language broadcasting.
In July the Government repealed a law that banned Bulgarian
language books. The law had been used in previous years also to ban
some books from Albania.
There are also a number of ethnic Macedonian Muslims and Bosnian
Muslims in the country. Some ethnic Macedonian Muslims contend that
they are identified too closely with ethnic Albanians, most of whom are
also Muslim, and with whose policies the ethnic Macedonian Muslims
often disagree.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to form trade unions, but this right is restricted for members of
the military, police, and civil service. Independent trade unions have
been allowed to organize since 1992, when an Association of Independent
and Autonomous Unions was formed. However, there is still a national
trade union. The Confederation of Trade Unions of Macedonia is the
successor organization to the old Communist labor confederation. It
maintains the assets of the old unions and is the Government's main
negotiating partner, along with the Chamber of the Economy, on labor
issues. While its officers may tend to oppose strikes because of the
legacy of the past, they appear to be genuinely independent of the
Government and committed to the interests of the workers they
represent.
The total number of strikes during the year was approximately 150,
which included many protest work stoppages of a few hours or less. The
reasons for the strikes included demands for overdue pay, workers'
objections to government changes in management personnel at some state-
owned entities, and objection to various decisions related to
privatization. Strikes were generally small and confined to company
grounds, although in September striking workers at a government-owned
smelting plant blocked a major highway for several hours, protesting
government plans to close the plant if a private purchaser or partner
could not be found. Most strikes were calm and well organized and
passed without serious incident.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The
Constitution implicitly recognizes employees' right to bargain
collectively, a concept that nonetheless is still in its infancy.
Legislation in this area has yet to be passed by Parliament.
An export processing zone is being developed with the advice and
financial support of Taiwan. No date has been set for the beginning of
operations.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Legal prohibitions
against forced labor, including that performed by children, are
observed in practice.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The constitutional minimum age for employment is 15 years.
Children legally may not work nights or more than 40 hours per week.
Education is compulsory through grade eight, or to the ages of 14 or
15. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is responsible for
enforcing laws regulating the employment of children. The law prohibits
forced or bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The average monthly wage in June
was about $164 (9,532 denars). The minimum wage is by law two-thirds of
the average wage; however, it was not sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. By comparison an average
month's worth of food for a family of four in 1998 cost $184 (9,566
denars). This economic situation meant that few workers could support a
family on their wages alone. Many households are dual-income, and many
persons take on additional work, often in the gray market.
Yugoslavia had extensive laws concerning acceptable conditions of
work, including an official 42-hour workweek with a minimum 24-hour
rest period and generous vacation and sick leave benefits. The
Government adopted many of these provisions, including the workweek and
rest period. However, high unemployment and the fragile condition of
the economy led many employees to accept work conditions that do not
comply with the law. Small retail businesses in particular often
require employees to work far beyond the legal limits.
The Constitution provides for safe working conditions, temporary
disability compensation, and leave benefits. Although laws and
regulations on worker safety remain from the Yugoslav era, they are not
enforced strictly. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare is
responsible for enforcing regulations pertaining to working conditions.
Under the law, if workers have safety concerns, employers are
obliged to address dangerous situations. Should an employer fail to do
so, employees are entitled legally to leave the dangerous situation
without losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking for the purpose of
prostitution is prohibited specifically by law. However, trafficking in
women and girls for prostitution and pornography is a problem. The
country is a source, transit, and destination point for trafficking in
persons. Trafficking in persons for the purpose of illegal immigration
is not prohibited specifically by law but is covered by immigration
regulations. Traffickers have recruited women from other countries,
especially Bulgaria, Russia, and Ukraine, to work as prostitutes in
several towns. Women are trafficked through the country on their way to
West European countries, especially Italy. There are no reliable
estimates of the number of victims of trafficking in the country.
______
MALTA
Malta is a constitutional republic and parliamentary democracy. The
chief of state (President) appoints as the head of government (Prime
Minister) the leader of the party that gains a plurality of seats in
the quinquennial elections for the unicameral legislature. The
judiciary is independent.
A civilian commissioner, under the effective supervision of the
Government, commands the police.
The economy is a mixture of state-owned and private industry, with
tourism and light manufacturing as the largest sectors, and it provides
residents with a moderate to high standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with instances of individual abuse. An independent judiciary upholds
the Constitution's protections for individual rights and freedoms.
Domestic violence is a problem, and societal discrimination against
women persists, but the Government has taken steps to address both
issues.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits inhuman or degrading punishment
or treatment. There were no reports that officials employ them.
Prison conditions meet minimal international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
law provide for freedom from arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and
the Government observes this prohibition. The police may arrest a
person for questioning on the basis of reasonable suspicion but within
48 hours must either release the suspect or lodge charges. Arrested
persons have no right to legal counsel during this 48-hour period.
Persons incarcerated pending trial are granted access to counsel. Bail
normally is granted.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent of
the executive and legislative branches. The Chief Justice and 16 judges
are appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister;
judges serve until the age of 65, and magistrates serve until the age
of 60.
The highest court, the Constitutional Court, interprets the
Constitution and has original jurisdiction for cases involving human
rights violations and allegations relating to electoral corruption
charges. The two courts of appeal hear appeals from the civil court,
court of magistrates, special tribunals, and from the criminal court,
respectively. The criminal court, composed of a judge and nine jurors,
hears criminal cases. The civil court first hall hears civil and
commercial cases that exceed the magistrates' jurisdiction; the civil
court second hall offers voluntary jurisdiction in civil matters. The
court of magistrates has jurisdiction for civil claims of less than
$1,000 (400 Maltese liri) and for lesser criminal offenses. The
juvenile court hears cases involving persons under 16 years of age.
The Constitution requires a fair public trial before an impartial
court. Defendants have the right to counsel of their choice or, if they
cannot pay the cost, to court-appointed counsel at public expense.
Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence. They may confront
witnesses, present evidence, and have the right of appeal.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution protects the privacy of the home and
prohibits electronic surveillance. The Government respects these
provisions. Police officers with the rank of inspector and above may
issue search warrants based on perceived reasonable grounds for
suspicion of wrongdoing. Reportedly only the Home Affairs Minister and
the Prime Minister may issue warrants for telephone tapping, and then
only in drug-related cases.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. However, the 1987 Foreign Interference Act bans
foreign participation in local politics during the period leading up to
elections. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
Diverse views are expressed in four daily newspapers, six weeklies,
and five Sunday editions. A total of 6 television stations, a
commercial cable network, and 18 radio stations function freely.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The
state-supported religion is Roman Catholicism. The Government and the
Catholic Church participate in a foundation that finances Catholic
schools. The Church transferred nonpastoral land to this foundation as
part of the 1991 Ecclesiastical Entities Act. Students in government
schools may decline instruction in Catholicism.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not arbitrarily
restrict movement within the country, foreign travel, or emigration. A
court order may prohibit the departure from the country of anyone who
is the subject of a formal complaint alleging nonfulfillment of a legal
obligation, such as the nonpayment of a debt or nonsupport of an
estranged spouse.
The Government cooperates with the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Since 1992 it has granted
temporary refugee status and protection to over 1,000 persons. The
Government admitted 107 Kosovar refugees from May until their August
return to Kosovo. At year's end, the UNHCR considered 164 immigrants to
be refugees and another 214 to be applicants. The Government grants
temporary protective status to such persons pending their resettlement
in third countries; it normally does not grant permanent refugee status
to anyone or accept anyone for resettlement. A proposed law introduced
in December would expand access to social services and employment for
recognized refugees. The authorities expel or repatriate persons they
deem to be economic migrants. However, the Government did not force the
return of any persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens exercise this right in multiparty elections held every 5
years by secret ballot on the basis of universal suffrage for those 18
years of age or over. In the 1998 election, 96 percent of the
electorate voted.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the
September 1998 elections, six women were elected to Parliament, three
in each party, and one received a ministerial post. The Government has
taken steps to include more women in civil service and other government
positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Various human rights groups and persons operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are generally cooperative and
responsive to their views
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and law prohibit discrimination related to race,
place of origin, political opinion, color, creed, or sex. The
Government respects this prohibition. Alleged victims of discrimination
may apply directly to the Constitutional Court for relief, although few
have done so recently.
Women.--No widespread pattern of family violence against women is
apparent, but continuing reports of such incidents make plain that the
problem exists. During the first 9 months of 1999, 263 cases of
domestic violence were reported, and 11 cases of rape were reported to
the police. A special police unit and several voluntary organizations
provide support to victims of domestic violence. For women who are
threatened or physically abused, the Government also maintains an
emergency fund and subsidizes shelter beds. During the year 111 women
used the shelters.
The Government set up a hot line in 1996 to assist victims of abuse
through counseling and through referrals to legal assistance and
shelters. A committee was set up during 1998 to review existing family
legislation and propose amendments dealing with domestic violence. Its
proposals are being considered by the Ministry of Social Policy.
Prostitution is a serious offense under the law, and heavy
penalties are reserved for organizers. Rape and violent indecent
assault carry sentences of up to 10 years. The law treats spousal rape
the same as any other rape. Divorce and abortion are not legal.
The Constitution provides that all citizens have access, on a
nondiscriminatory basis, to housing, employment, and education. While
women constitute a growing portion of the work force, they are
underrepresented in management. Cultural and traditional employment
patterns often direct them either into traditional ``women's jobs''
(such as sales clerk, secretary, bank teller, teacher, or nurse) or
into better paying jobs in family-owned businesses or select
professions (i.e., academia or medicine). Therefore, women generally
earn less than their male counterparts, and many leave employment upon
marriage.
Women's issues are handled by the Department of Women's Rights
under the Minister of Social Policy. The Minister is a prominent member
of the Government who is also Deputy Prime Minister and the Nationalist
Party's deputy leader. Legislation enacted in 1993 granted women
equality in matters of family law, and a 1991 constitutional amendment
committed the government to promote equal rights for all persons
regardless of sex. The Government has taken steps to ensure that
legislation is gender neutral to the degree possible. Redress in the
courts for sexual discrimination is available. The Government's policy
on gender abandoned the concept of introducing gender-based quotas in
the civil service. An internal study and a proposal to increase the
representation of women in the public sector is under consideration by
the Commonwealth Secretariat.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and health care. It provides compulsory, free, and universal
education and free health care for children through age 16. The
Government voices concern for children's rights and welfare but
addresses those concerns within family law. The Government plans to
adjust the law, as necessary, in view of its signature of the European
Convention on the Exercise of Children's Rights in February.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. The number of
reported cases of child abuse has grown as public awareness has
increased, but it is not clear whether the number of incidents actually
has increased. For the first 9 months of 1999, 545 cases of child abuse
were reported.
People with Disabilities.--The law provides for rights for the
disabled. The 1969 Employment of Disabled Persons Act led to greater
employment of disabled persons in government agencies. The 1992
Structures Act requires accessibility to public buildings for people
with physical disabilities. Overall government and private sector
efforts to advance the status of disabled persons are uneven. As of
2000, private development project plans must include access for the
disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 2,000 men of
Algerian or Tunisian origin are married to Maltese women. This
community has a mosque and a separate school; an application is pending
with the Government for a dedicated cemetery.
Owners of some bars and discos reportedly discourage or prohibit
darker skinned persons from entering.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to associate
freely and to strike, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. Only noncivilian personnel of the armed forces and police are
prohibited from striking. There are 35 registered trade unions,
representing about 50 percent of the work force. Although all unions
are independent of political parties, the largest, the General Workers'
Union, is generally regarded as having close informal ties with the
Labor Party.
Under the Industrial Relations Act of 1976, the responsible
minister may refer labor disputes either to the Industrial Tribunal (a
government-appointed body consisting of representatives of government,
employers, and employee groups) or to binding arbitration. The
International Labor Organization Committee of Experts objects to a
provision of the act that permits compulsory arbitration to be held at
the request of only one of the parties, but neither unions nor
employers appear to object to this provision. In practice a striking
union can ignore an unfavorable decision of the Tribunal by continuing
the strike on other grounds. Three disputes were referred to the
Tribunal during the year.
There is no prohibition on unions affiliating internationally.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are
free, in law and practice, to organize and bargain collectively. Unions
and employers meet annually with government representatives to work out
a comprehensive agreement regulating industrial relations and income
policy.
Under the Industrial Relations Act, an employer may not take action
against any employee for participation or membership in a trade union.
Complaints may be pursued through a court of law, through the
Industrial Tribunal, or through the Commission Against Injustices (a
government-appointed body composed of representatives of the government
and the opposition); but most disputes are resolved directly between
the parties. Workers fired solely for union activities must be
reinstated.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
bans forced labor, and it does not occur.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Government prohibits forced and bonded child labor and
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.). The law
prohibits the employment of children younger than the age of 16. This
injunction is generally respected, but some underage children are
employed during summer months, especially as domestics, restaurant
kitchen help, or vendors. The Department of Labor enforces the law
effectively, but it is lenient in cases of summer employment of
underage youths in businesses run by their families.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The weekly legal minimum wage is
$108 (43.25 Maltese liri) for persons under age 17; $111 (44.47 Maltese
liri) for 17-year-olds; and $118 (47.38 Maltese liri) for persons age
18 and over. Additionally, a mandatory bonus of $10.58 (4.23 Maltese
liri) per week is paid. This minimum wage structure provides a decent
standard of living for a worker and family with the addition of
government subsidies for housing, health care, and free education. Wage
Councils, composed of representatives of government, business, and
unions, regulate work-hours; for most sectors the standard is 40 hours
per week, but in some trades it is 43 or 45 hours per week.
Government regulations prescribe a daily rest period, which is
normally 1 hour. The law mandates an annual paid vacation of 4
workweeks plus 4 workdays. The Department of Labor effectively enforces
these requirements.
Enforcement of the 1994 Occupational Health and Safety (Promotion)
Act is uneven, and industrial accidents remain frequent. Workers may
remove themselves from unsafe working conditions without jeopardy to
their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically prohibits
trafficking in persons, although traffickers may be prosecuted under
the Immigration Act for unlawful entry or unregulated status.
There were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from
the country.
______
MOLDOVA
Moldova gained its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991 and
in 1994 adopted a constitution that provides for a multiparty
representative government with power divided among a president,
cabinet, parliament, and judiciary. President Petru Lucinschi began his
4-year term in 1997. Prime Minister Ion Sturza began his term in March
and led a proreform coalition government until he was dismissed by a
vote of no confidence on November 9. The Communist Party, with 40
members of Parliament, along with 9 centrist and 9 far-right
independent members of Parliament approved a new government led by
Dumitru Braghis on December 21. Three center and center-right parties
hold the remaining 44 seats in Parliament. International observers
considered the 1996 presidential and 1998 parliamentary elections to be
free and fair, but authorities in the separatist Transnistrian region
interfered with citizens' ability to vote. The Constitution provides
for an independent judiciary; while the executive branch has exerted
undue influence on the judiciary, there were indications during the
year that judicial independence was increasing.
The country remains divided, with mostly Slavic separatists
controlling the Transnistrian region along the Ukrainian border. This
separatist regime has entered into negotiations with the national
Government on the possibility of a special status for the region.
Progress in resolving the ongoing conflict has been blocked by the
separatists' continuing demands for ``statehood'' and recognition of
the country as a confederation of two equal states. The Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Russian Federation,
and Ukraine act as mediators. The two sides generally have observed the
cease-fire of 1992, which ended armed conflict between them, but other
agreements to normalize relations often have not been honored. A
Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, enjoys local autonomy in the
southern part of the country. The Gagauz elected a new governor
(bashkan) and 35 deputies to their popular assembly in free and fair
elections in September.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs has responsibility for the police.
The Ministry of National Security controls other security organs,
including the border guards. The Constitution assigns to Parliament the
authority to investigate the activities of these ministries to ensure
that they comply with existing legislation. Some members of the
security forces committed a number of human rights abuses.
The country continued to make progress in economic reform.
International observers viewed the Governments of former Prime Minister
Sturza and Prime Minister Braghis as strongly proreform. The economy is
largely based on agriculture. Citizens and foreigners can buy and sell
land at market prices. However, foreigners cannot buy agricultural
land, nor can agricultural land be resold for a period of 5 years. Over
800 of approximately 1,000 large collective farms have applied for the
Government's land privatization program. To date approximately 250,000
landowners have received title to almost 800,000 plots of land. The
leading exports are foodstuffs, wine, tobacco, clothing, and footwear.
The gross domestic product (GDP) is estimated officially at about $444
per capita but may be considerably underestimated because of
underreporting for tax purposes. The officially reported median salary
is $24 per month. According to government statistics about 80 percent
of the population lives below the poverty level and 10 percent of the
rural population has a per capita income of less than one-quarter of
that level. A majority of citizens cannot afford to buy fish, meat,
milk and other dairy products on a regular basis. The GDP decreased by
8.6 percent in 1998 and was projected to decline by 5 percent in 1999.
A program privatizing state-owned enterprises and real estate based on
vouchers issued to all citizens is complete. The exchange rate suffered
two sharp drops early in the year as a result of the 1998 Russian
economic crisis but remained stable for most of the year. The average
monthly inflation rate was about 3 percent. The country has
considerable foreign debt. The economic situation is worse in
Transnistria.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, there were problems in some areas. The police occasionally
beat and otherwise abuse detainees and prisoners. Prison conditions
remain harsh, with attempts to improve them hampered by lack of
funding. While the executive branch has exerted undue influence on the
judiciary, there were indications during the year that judicial
independence was increasing. It is widely believed that security forces
monitor political figures, use unauthorized wiretaps, and at times
conduct illegal searches. The Constitution potentially limits the
activities of the press, political parties, and religious groups.
Journalists practice self-censorship. The law also imposes restrictions
on some religious groups. Societal discrimination and violence against
women persist. Trafficking in women and girls is a significant problem.
Addressing a minority concern, the Constitution allows parents the
right to choose the language of education for their children.
The Transnistrian authorities continue to be responsible for
abuses, including questionable detentions, harassment of independent
media, restrictions on freedom of religion, and discrimination against
Romanian/Moldovan speakers.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of politically motivated killings either in Moldova or its
separatist region.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman,
or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there were credible
reports that police sometimes beat and abuse prisoners or suspects.
A businessman alleged that his brother was kidnaped by the police
for 3 days in July. The police reportedly tortured him, then released
him after charging him with drunkenness and resisting arrest. The
businessman also charged that this was a case of racketeering and
involved persons from the prosecutor's office as well as the police.
The Prosecutor's Office announced in mid-December that physical assault
charges were pending against three police officers, but at year's end,
there was no investigation into the racketeering charges.
On June 23, violent clashes took place between police and members
of the General Federation of Trade Unions protesting wage arrears in
Chisinau's central square. Authorities reportedly arrested 13
protesters, 2 of whom required hospitalization (see Section 6.a.).
Conditions in most prisons remain harsh, with serious overcrowding.
Cell sizes do not meet local legal requirements or minimum
international standards. Conditions are especially harsh in prisons
used to hold persons awaiting trial or sentencing. These prisons suffer
from overcrowding, bad ventilation, and a lack of recreational and
rehabilitation facilities. Conditions for those serving sentences are
only marginally better. The incidence of malnutrition and disease,
especially tuberculosis, is high in all facilities. Abuse of prisoners
by other prisoners or by jailers themselves, ostensibly for
disciplinary reasons, has been reduced by the dismissal or retirement
of some of the worst offending guards; however, the practice likely
continues at diminished levels. The Ministry of Justice administers the
prison system. Attempts to improve prison conditions are frustrated by
a lack of financing.
Human rights monitors are permitted to visit prisons.
Requests by human rights monitors to inspect prisons in
Transnistria have been refused.
After questionable trials, four ethnic Moldovans are serving
sentences in Transnistria for alleged terrorism-related crimes (see
Section 1.e.). At the end of July, one of the four sent a letter to the
press claiming to be on his 77th day of a hunger strike and alleging a
number of abuses by the Transnistrian authorities. A member of the OSCE
mission visited the prisoner in mid-July and observed that he did not
appear to be in imminent danger. At year's end, he still was claiming
to be on a hunger strike. The wives of all four complained that they
were not able to visit in December, although they were allowed to send
food. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visited these
prisoners in 1992 and 1993 in Tiraspol but later was denied visitation.
The ICRC was negotiating with Transnistrian officials at year's end to
visit these prisoners with an international medical team.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The former Soviet Code
on Penal Procedure remains in force with some amendments, and
authorities respect its provisions. Prosecutors issue arrest warrants.
Under the Constitution, a suspect may be detained without charge for 24
hours. The suspect normally is allowed family visits during this
period. The 24-hour time limit is not always respected, especially if a
person is arrested late on a Friday or on a weekend. If charged, a
suspect may be released pending trial. There is no system of bail, but
in some cases, in order to arrange release, a friend or relative may
give a written pledge that the accused would appear for trial. Suspects
accused of violent or serious crimes generally are not released before
trial. The Constitution permits pretrial arrest for an initial period
of 30 days, which may be extended up to 6 months. In exceptional cases,
Parliament may approve extension of pretrial detention on an individual
basis of up to 12 months. The accused has the right under the
Constitution to a hearing before a court regarding the legality of his
arrest. According to figures provided by the Ministry of Justice at
year's end, of a prison population of 9,449, 2,839 persons were held in
confinement awaiting trial (these statistics do not include persons
held in Transnistria).
According to the Constitution, a detained person must be informed
immediately of the reason for his arrest and must be made aware of the
charges ``as quickly as possible.'' The accused has the right to a
defense attorney throughout the entire process, and the attorney must
be present when the charges are brought. Many lawyers point out that
access to a lawyer generally is granted only after a person has been
detained for 24 hours. If the defendant cannot afford an attorney, the
State requires the local bar association to provide one. Because the
State is unable to pay ongoing legal fees, defendants often do not have
adequate legal representation.
The Transnistrian authorities have imposed a state of emergency
that allows law enforcement officials to detain suspects for up to 30
days, reportedly without access to an attorney. There were no reports
that Transnistrian authorities used this provision during the year.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; while the executive branch has exerted undue
influence on the judiciary, there were indications during the year that
judicial independence was increasing. Many observers believe that
arrears in salary payments also make it difficult for judges to remain
independent from outside influences and free from corruption. Since
1997 prosecutors have the right to open and close investigations
without bringing the matter before a court, which gives them
considerable influence over the judicial process. The Constitution
provides that the President, on the nomination of the Superior Court of
Magistrates, appoints judges for an initial period of 5 years. They may
be reappointed for a subsequent 10 years, after which they serve until
retirement age. This provision for judicial tenure is designed to
increase judicial independence.
The judiciary consists of lower courts of the first instance, five
appellate courts (tribunals), a Higher Court of Appeals, a Supreme
Court, and a Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court supervises and
reviews the activities of the lower courts and serves as a final court
of appeal.
By law defendants in criminal cases are presumed innocent. In
practice prosecutors' recommendations still carry considerable weight
and limit the defendant's actual presumption of innocence. Trials
generally are open to the public. Defendants have the right to attend
proceedings, confront witnesses, and present evidence. Defense
attorneys are able to review the evidence against their clients when
preparing cases. The accused enjoys a right to appeal to a higher
court. Because of a lack of funding for adequate facilities and
personnel, there is a large backlog of cases at the tribunal and Higher
Appeals Court levels. Court decisions involving the restitution of
salary or a position are not always implemented.
To date no pattern of discrimination has emerged in the judicial
system. The Constitution provides for the right of the accused to have
an interpreter both at the trial and in reviewing the documents of the
case. If the majority of the participants agree, trials may take place
in Russian or another acceptable language instead of Romanian/Moldovan.
There continue to be credible reports that local prosecutors and
judges extort bribes for reducing charges or sentences. In January a
judge in the Chisinau economic court was arrested for allegedly
accepting a bribe to reduce a fine against a firm. He was convicted and
sentenced to 10 years in prison. Prosecutors occasionally use
bureaucratic maneuvers to restrict lawyers' access to clients.
The Constitutional Court showed signs of increasing independence
during the year. It reviewed 139 cases, almost twice its caseload of 71
for 1998. The Court found unconstitutional 21 laws, 8 parliamentary
decisions and regulations, and 24 government acts. The Court took a
decisive step towards independence when it ruled in November that only
Parliament, not the President, could amend the Constitution with a
referendum.
There were no reports of political prisoners outside Transnistria.
In Transnistria, four ethnic Moldovans, members of the ``Ilascu
Group,'' (one of whom, Ilie Ilascu, is an elected member of the
Moldovan Parliament but has never been able to take his seat) remain in
prison following their conviction in 1993 for allegedly killing two
separatist officials. International human rights groups raised serious
questions about the fairness of the trial; local organizations alleged
that the Moldovans were prosecuted solely because of their membership
in the Christian Democratic Popular Front, a Moldovan political party
that favors unification with Romania. Family members have been allowed
access. The OSCE was permitted to visit one of the prisoners in July.
In July the European Court of Human Rights began examining Ilascu's
case and in November ordered the Government to file a response by
February 2000. International organizations pressured the Transnistrian
authorities to retry the ``Ilascu Group;'' in July the Transnistrians
issued a moratorium on capital punishment, which in effect suspended
implementation of Ilascu's death sentence.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Prosecutors issue search warrants. In some instances
searches are conducted without warrants. Courts do not exclude evidence
that was obtained illegally. There is no judicial review of search
warrants. The Constitution specifies that searches must be carried out
``in accordance with the law'' but does not specify the consequences if
the law is not respected. It also forbids searches at night, except in
the case of flagrant crime.
It is widely believed that security agencies continue to use
electronic monitoring of residences and telephones without proper
authorization. By law the prosecutor's office must authorize wiretaps
and may do so only if a criminal investigation is under way. In
practice the prosecutor's office lacks the ability to control the
security organizations and police and prevent them from using wiretaps
illegally.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and the law
provide for freedom of speech and of the press, although with some
restrictions. The Government does not abridge freedom of speech, and
the print media express a wide variety of political views and
commentary. National and city governments subsidize a number of
newspapers, but political parties and professional organizations,
including trade unions, also publish newspapers. Most newspapers have a
circulation of less than 5,000.
Although the number of media outlets that are not owned and
operated publicly by the State or a political party is growing, most of
these ``independent'' media are still in the service of a political
movement, commercial interest, or foreign country, and secure large
subsidies from these sources. There are several independent radio
stations, including a religious one, with some rebroadcasting from
Romania and Russia. There are three independent television stations in
the Chisinau area and one in the city of Balti. The Government owns and
operates several radio stations and a television channel that covers
most of the country. A number of local governments, including Gagauzia,
operate television and radio stations. The Association of Electronic
Press was founded in September. The Association of Independent Press
was founded in July 1997.
The Constitution restricts press freedoms, forbidding ``disputing
or defaming the State and the people'' and political parties that
``militate'' against the country's sovereignty, independence, and
territorial integrity. These restrictions lack implementing legislation
and are not invoked. The civil code includes an article that allows
public figures to sue for defamation without distinguishing between
their private and public persons. Criticism of public figures has
resulted in a number of lawsuits, and as a consequence, journalists
practice self-censorship. In cases where suits have been filed against
journalists and media organs, the plaintiffs usually lose. There is no
freedom of information legislation, and journalists and ordinary
citizens often have difficulty obtaining information from government
organizations.
The Government does not restrict foreign publications. However,
Western publications do not circulate widely since they are very
expensive by local standards. Russian newspapers are available, and
some publish a special Moldovan weekly supplement. The country receives
television and radio broadcasts from Romania and Russia. A small number
of cable subscribers receive a variety of foreign cable television
programs.
Of the two major newspapers in Transnistria, one is controlled by
the regional authorities and the other by the Tiraspol city government.
There are also independent newspapers in Tiraspol and the northern
Transnistrian city of Ribnitsa. The latter two criticize the regime
from time to time and have been harassed by the separatist authorities.
Other print media in Transnistria do not have large circulations and
appear only on a weekly or monthly basis. Nonetheless, some of them
also criticize local authorities. The one independent television
station is trying to enlarge its broadcast radius, but currently it is
producing less than 10 hours of programming per week. Resistance to
this move comes from the local official Transnistrian television
station, which previously had enjoyed a virtual monopoly of advertising
revenues. Most Moldovan newspapers do not circulate in Transnistria.
Circulation of all print media in Transnistria is hampered by the
closed nature of society. The independent newspaper in Tiraspol
effectively was shut down from January to August through repeated
confiscations by the Transnistrian authorities. Authorities did not
present search warrants or court orders for these confiscations. After
a number of legal proceedings in which Transnistrian courts ruled the
interventions illegal and fined the Ministry of State Security and
intervention by the OSCE, the newspaper began to publish again in
August, although with a sharply limited circulation and under a
modified name. The repeated confiscations of the newspaper created
serious financial difficulties for its editors. The Ribnitsa newspaper
almost was put out of business by two costly libel suits by local
officials.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right to peaceful assembly, and authorities respect
this right in practice. Mayors' offices issue permits for
demonstrations; they may consult the national government if a
demonstration is likely to be extremely large. A protest in June turned
violent, with 13 persons arrested and 2 reportedly hospitalized. The
Minister of Internal Affairs stated that the protest threatened public
order.
The Constitution states that citizens are free to form parties and
other social and political organizations, and authorities respect this
right in practice. Private organizations, including political parties,
are required to register, but applications are approved routinely. The
Constitution forbids parties that ``militate against the sovereignty,
independence, and territorial integrity of Moldova.'' A total of 26
parties have met the requirement of the October 1998 law for 5,000
members and are registered officially.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government generally permits the free
practice of religion; however, a 1992 law on religion that codifies
religious freedoms contains restrictions that could--and in some
instances did--inhibit the activities of some religious groups. The law
provides for freedom of religious practice, including each person's
right to profess his religion in any form. It also protects the
confidentiality of the confessional, allows denominations to establish
associations and foundations, and states that the Government may not
interfere in the religious activities of denominations. The procedures
for registering a religious organization are the same for all groups.
The Salvation Army registered in October 1998, after having been denied
registration in 1996 on technical grounds. Jehovah's Witnesses were
unable to register in Tiraspol in 1997 and have not attempted to
register subsequently.
The law on religion as amended to legalize proselytizing--in
principle bringing the legislation in line with the European Convention
on Human Rights--went into effect in June. However, the law on religion
explicitly forbids ``abusive proselytizing.'' Abusive is defined as
``an attempt to influence someone's religious faith through violence or
abuse of authority.'' Although some Protestant groups were concerned
that the previous prohibition on proselytizing could inhibit their
activities, the Government has not taken legal action against
individuals for proselytizing.
Although Eastern Orthodoxy is not designated in the law on religion
as the official religion, it continued to be a strong religious force
and exerted significant influence. In 1992 a number of priests broke
away from the Moldovan Orthodox Church, which is subordinate to the
Moscow Patriarchate, in order to form the Bessarabian Orthodox Church.
The Bessarabian Orthodox Church, which sees itself as the legal and
canonical successor to the pre-World War II Romanian Orthodox Church in
Bessarabia (the part of Moldova between the Dniester and Prut Rivers),
subordinated itself to the Bucharest Patriarchate of the Romanian
Orthodox Church. The Government consistently has refused to register
the Bessarabian Church, citing unresolved property claims and stating
that the Bessarabian Church is a ``schismatic movement.'' The issue has
political overtones, since it raises the question whether the Orthodox
Church should be united and oriented toward Moscow or divided with a
branch oriented toward Bucharest. In 1997 the Supreme Court overturned
an appeals court decision affirming the right of the Bessarabian Church
to be registered. However, the Supreme Court's decision was based on a
procedural issue, rather than on the merits of the case. The
Bessarabian Church appealed the case to the European Court in 1998. In
March a Council of Europe Monitoring Committee Report noted that the
nonregistration of the Church was one of the Government's failures in
honoring its commitments to the Council. Then-Prime Minister Sturza
announced in September that it had been a mistake not to register the
Bessarabian Church, and that his Government was ready to reconsider the
issue.
In May a group of about 500 Orthodox Christians led by 4 to 6
priests attacked a small group of Baptists in the village of Mingir,
injuring 3 persons, and partially destroying a Baptist church that was
under construction. The Baptists claimed that the village mayor was the
leader of the group and was involved personally in the injuries and
destruction, a charge the mayor denied. Someone in the crowd threw
stones and hit a Baptist member who tried to photograph the incident.
The Government is investigating the case, but there were no
developments at year's end. A spokesman for the Orthodox Church
reportedly expressed regret for the act of violence but blamed it on
``abusive proselytizing by the Baptist Church.'' The Baptists also
claimed that they had been denied construction permits wrongfully in
some villages (also see Section 5).
In January 1998, authorities in Transnistria cancelled the
registration of Jehovah's Witnesses. Repeated attempts by Jehovah's
Witnesses to reregister have been denied or delayed. Transnistrian
officials burned a number of shipments of religious tracts based on the
fact that the group was not registered properly. According to local
leaders of Jehovah's Witnesses, several members were questioned by
local state security officers but always have been released within 1
hour.
The Church of the Living God has been denied registration in five
towns in Transnistria. Baptist leaders have complained that they are
not allowed to distribute religious literature or organize public
meetings in Transnistria.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel
within the country, and there are no closed areas. Citizens generally
are able to travel freely; however, there are some restrictions on
emigration. Close relatives with a claim to support from the applicant
must give their concurrence. The Government also may deny permission to
emigrate if the applicant had access to state secrets. However, such
cases are very rare, and none were reported during the year.
Travel between Transnistria and the rest of the country is not
prevented. There are regularly scheduled buses and trains. However, the
separatist authorities often stop and search incoming and outgoing
vehicles. The Moldovan Government in May established fixed and mobile
``fiscal posts'' to control smuggling of untaxed goods from
Transnistria.
Moldova is not a party to the 1951 United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government
has no processing procedures for potential refugees resident in the
country. The issue of providing first asylum has never arisen formally.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared prosecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have voted in multiparty presidential and parliamentary
elections since December 1996. International observers considered the
elections to be free and fair, but Transnistrian authorities have
interfered with citizens' ability to vote in all these elections. These
elections represent further progress in the transition to a democracy.
The Constitution adopted in 1994 provides for the division of power
among the popularly elected President, the Cabinet, the Parliament, and
the judiciary. The President, as Head of State, in consultation with
the Parliament, appoints the Cabinet and the Prime Minister, who
functions as the head of government. However, a minister can be
dismissed only with the assent of the Prime Minister. Some observers
believe that the Constitution does not define adequately how executive
powers are to be shared between the President and the Prime Minister.
The President called a May referendum to create a stronger presidency.
Based on a positive response, the President proposed an initiative to
revise portions of the Constitution in August, and it was under public
discussion. The proposal would create a ``presidential republic'' with
more power in the hands of the chief executive. Two groups of
parliamentarians presented alternative constitutional amendments to
create a ``parliamentary republic.'' This controversial issue was part
of the November government crisis.
The Constitution states that citizens are free to form parties and
other social-political organizations. However, a controversial article
states that those organizations that are ``engaged in fighting against
political pluralism,'' the ``principles of the rule of law,'' or ``the
sovereignty and independence or territorial integrity'' of the country
are ``unconstitutional.'' Small parties that favor unification with
neighboring Romania have charged that this provision is intended to
impede their political activities.
A new law on administrative and territorial reform went into effect
in January and reduced the number of administrative districts from 42
to 12. These new districts included the municipality of Chisinau, the
Gagauz autonomous region, and the Transnistrian region. Citizens voted
for mayors and newly created district and municipal councils in May
elections.
Twenty-three parties and a number of independent candidates
participated in the campaign (see Section 2.b.). Although the parties
in Parliament won most of the posts, a leftist party, not in
Parliament, gained several positions in the north, and independents
were elected throughout the country. Transnistrian authorities did not
allow citizens to vote in their region. The Gagauz did not participate
in the May elections but held separate elections in September for
governor (bashkan) and 35 deputies to its popular assembly. Besides
electing a new governor, the Gagauz region also elected 26 newcomers to
the popular assembly.
In 1991 separatist elements, assisted by uniformed Russian military
forces in the area and led by supporters of the 1991 coup attempt in
Moscow, declared a ``Dniester Republic'' in the area of the country
that is located between the Dniester River and Ukraine. Fighting flared
briefly in 1992 but ended after Russian forces intervened, and a truce
has held since. Russian, Ukrainian, and OSCE mediators have attempted
to encourage the two sides to reach a settlement that preserves
Moldovan sovereignty and independence while granting a measure of
autonomy to Transnistria. In 1997 the Transnistrian authorities signed
a Memorandum of Understanding with the Government that encompasses
these objectives. However, since then further negotiations have been
inconclusive, and there was no significant progress towards a
settlement by year's end.
There are no restrictions in law or practice on the participation
of women or minorities in political life. However, women generally are
underrepresented in leading positions both in government and political
parties. Women hold only 8 of 101 parliamentary seats. All female
parliamentarians formed a ``club'' in September to unite efforts to
improve the social condition of women and children. The Association of
Moldovan Women, a social-political organization, competed in the 1998
parliamentary elections but was unable to gain parliamentary
representation. Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Gagauz minorities
are represented in Parliament, with deputies elected from nationwide
party lists rather than local districts. Debate takes place in either
the Romanian/Moldovan or Russian language, with translation provided.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several local human rights groups exist. The local Helsinki Watch
Organization maintains contacts with international human rights
organizations, as does the Helsinki Citizens Assembly. Human rights
groups operate without government interference.
Citizens may appeal to the European Court in Strasbourg if they
believe that their rights have been violated or that Moldovan laws are
not in accordance with the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. However, most citizens are
unaware of the convention and their rights to legal remedies in
general.
Parliament passed the Law on Parliamentary Advocates in October
1997, which created three positions of parliamentary advocates
(ombudsmen) and established an independent center for human rights.
Parliament appointed the three advocates, with equal rights and
responsibilities, in February 1998 for a 5-year term. Parliamentary
advocates are empowered to examine claims of human rights violations,
advise Parliament on human rights issues, and have the right to appeal
to the Constitutional Court for review of legislation. The advocates
oversee the operation of the center, which opened in April 1998 with
the support of the U.N. Development Program. Of the approximately 1,000
complaints handled by the center in its first year, the majority
involved economic issues or were otherwise outside the competency of
the center.
The Government has supported the work of the OSCE, which has had a
mission in the country since 1993 to assist in efforts to bring about a
resolution of the separatist conflict. The OSCE participates in the
Joint Control Commission--composed of Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, and
Transnistrian members--which reviews violations of the cease-fire
agreement. The mission generally enjoys access to the ``security zone''
along the river dividing the separatist-controlled territory from the
rest of the country.
The Government has cooperated with the ICRC in the past, permitting
visits to prisoners from the 1992 conflict (since released). The
Transnistrian separatist authorities previously have not allowed the
ICRC access to the four members of the original ``Ilascu Group'' who
have remained in prison since 1993. Transnistrian authorities in August
agreed in principle to allow the ICRC to visit the Ilascu Group, though
details of the visit had not been finalized at year's end. The OSCE
visited one of the prisoners in July (see Section 1.e.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that persons are equal before the law
regardless of race, sex, disability, religion, or social origin. There
are remedies for violations, such as orders for redress of grievances,
but these are not always enforced.
Women.--Spousal violence is known to occur, although there are no
reliable statistics on the problem. A prominent women's rights advocate
asserts that one-half of women are victims of domestic violence. The
Government supports educational efforts, usually undertaken with
foreign assistance, to increase public awareness of this problem and to
train public officials and law enforcement officials in how to address
domestic violence. Women abused by their husbands have the right to
press charges; husbands convicted of such abuse may receive prison
sentences (typically up to 6 months). The First Lady and the mayor of
Chisinau initiated a project in October to open a women's shelter in
Chisinau. The city donated a former kindergarten to a private
organization to operate the shelter, and a member of Parliament was
named as executive director of the organization. A private organization
operates a confidential service to provide support to abused spouses,
including a hot line for battered women. According to knowledgeable
sources, women generally do not appeal to police or the courts for
protection against abusive spouses because they are embarrassed to do
so and are not convinced that the authorities would react positively,
as the police generally do not consider spousal abuse a serious crime.
Through September the Ministry of Internal Affairs recorded 150 cases
of rape or attempted rape, a slight decrease from the same period in
1998. Women's groups believe that the numbers of rapes and incidents of
spousal abuse are underreported.
Trafficking in women is a very serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
The law provides that women shall be equal to men. However,
according to statistics, women have been affected disproportionately by
growing unemployment. By law women are paid the same as men for the
same work, although they still are victimized by societal
discrimination. There are a significant number of female managers in
the public sector and in banking. The president of the country's
largest bank is a woman.
Children.--There is extensive legislation designed to protect
children, including extended paid maternity leave and government
supplementary payments for families with many children. Ten years of
basic education are compulsory, followed by either technical school or
further study leading to higher education. The health system devotes
extensive resources to child care. Although child abuse does occur
occasionally, no special problems came to light during the year. There
are no statistics on child abuse. Child support programs suffered from
inadequate funding.
Homeless children live in the streets of Chisinau and other large
urban areas, although current reliable information on the number is not
available. Estimates were as high as 1,000 in 1998. Trafficking in
girls is a very serious problem (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--There is no legal discrimination against
persons with disabilities. However, there are no laws providing for
access to buildings, and there are few government resources devoted to
training persons with disabilities. The Government does provide tax
advantages to charitable groups that assist the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Tension between Eastern Orthodox supporters
and Protestant groups continued. In May a group of about 500 Orthodox
Christians and from 4 to 6 priests attacked a small group of Baptists
in the village of Mingir, injuring 3 persons and partially destroying a
Baptist church that was under construction. The Baptists allege that
the same priests were instigators of a number of other conflicts in the
region (also see Section 2.c.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The population is about 4.3
million, of which 65 percent are ethnic Moldovans. Ukrainians (14
percent) and Russians (13 percent) are the two largest minorities. A
Christian Turkic minority, the Gagauz, lives primarily in the southern
regions of the country. The Gagauz are largely Russian-speaking and
represent about 3.5 percent of the population. Official statistics put
the Roma population at 11,600, although estimates from the OSCE and
Roma nongovernmental organizations range from 50,000 to 200,000.
The 1990 citizenship law offered an equal opportunity to all
persons residing in the country at the time of independence to adopt
Moldovan citizenship. The OSCE's Office of Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights described the law as very liberal. The law permits dual
citizenship on the basis of a bilateral agreement, but no such
agreements are in effect.
Implementation of language testing by 1994, which was called for in
the 1989 language law, has not yet begun. According to the law, a
citizen should be able to choose which language to use in dealing with
government officials or commercial entities. Officials are obligated to
know Russian and Romanian/Moldovan ``to the degree necessary to fulfill
their professional obligations.'' Since many Russian speakers do not
speak Romanian/Moldovan (while educated Moldovans speak both
languages), they argued for a delay in the implementation of the law in
order to permit more time to learn the language. Parliament has
postponed implementation indefinitely. Addressing a minority concern,
the Constitution provides parents with the right to choose the language
of instruction for their children.
In October the Parliament approved the Government's decision to
grant ``district'' status to Taraclia, a region in the south with a 64
percent ethnic Bulgarian majority. The vote reversed the results of the
territorial-administrative reform begun in January, which had
eliminated Taraclia's district status and subsumed it under a region
where Bulgarians would no longer constitute a majority. Voters in the
Taraclia district approved a referendum in January not to be included
in the larger district, with 88 percent of eligible voters
participating and 92 percent voting in favor of the referendum.
However, in the separatist Transnistrian region discrimination
against Romanian/Moldovan speakers continued. State schools are
required to use the Cyrillic alphabet when teaching Romanian. Many
teachers, parents, and students objected to the use of the Cyrillic
script to teach Romanian. They believe that it disadvantages pupils who
wish to pursue higher education opportunities in the rest of the
country or Romania. (Cyrillic script was used to write the Romanian
language in Moldova until 1989, since ``Moldovan,'' as it was then
called, was decreed officially during the Soviet era to be a different
language from Romanian, which is written in the Latin alphabet. The
1989 language law reinstituted the use of the Latin script.) As a
result of an agreement between the Government and the separatist
authorities, eight schools in the separatist region obtained permission
in 1996 to use the Latin alphabet, with salaries and textbooks to be
supplied by the Moldovan Ministry of Education. These schools are
considered private schools by the local authorities. They must pay rent
for their facilities and meet local curriculum requirements, building
codes, and safety standards. The Government has no budgetary provisions
for the high rents asked for these facilities. As a result, classes
were held in local homes or run in shifts in the few available
buildings.
After delaying its opening and threatening to keep it closed, the
separatist authorities allowed the Romanian Language School (Latin
alphabet) in Tiraspol to open in September without restriction from the
authorities. The school is running three to four shifts per day to
accommodate the number of students.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1990 Soviet law on trade unions
enacted by Moldova's then-Supreme Soviet remains in effect and provides
for independent trade unions. Laws passed in 1989 and 1991, which give
citizens the right to form all kinds of social organizations, also
provide a legal basis for the formation of independent unions. The 1994
Constitution states that any employee may found a union or join a union
that defends workers' interests. However, there have been no known
successful attempts to establish alternate trade union structures
independent of the successor to the previous official organizations
that were part of the Soviet trade union system.
The successor organization is the General Federation of Trade
Unions (GFTU). The GFTU's continuing role in managing the state
insurance system and its retention of former official union
headquarters and vacation facilities provide an inherent advantage over
any newcomers who might wish to form a union. However, its industrial
or branch unions are becoming more independent entities; they maintain
that their membership in the GFTU is voluntary and that they can
withdraw if they wish. Virtually all employed adults are members of a
union.
Government workers do not have the right to strike, nor do those in
essential services such as health care and energy. Other unions may
strike if two-thirds of the members vote for a strike in a secret
ballot. There were several labor actions for payment of wage arrears,
including a number of strikes by teachers, health care workers, and
spouses of police officers in various parts of the country. In June
violent clashes occurred between members of the GFTU protesting wage
arrears and police officers in Chisinau, resulting in the arrest of 13
protesters, including 2 who were hospitalized (see Section 1.c.). The
government avoided more serious strikes when it pledged regular
payments of salaries and pensions after a July meeting with the GFTU.
The Government made some salary and pension payments but was unable to
eliminate all arrears by year's end.
Unions may affiliate and maintain contacts with international
organizations. The GFTU became a member of the International
Confederation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law, which
is based on former Soviet legislation, provides for collective
bargaining rights. However, wages are set through a tripartite
negotiation process involving government, management, and unions. The
three parties meet and negotiate national minimum wages for all
categories of workers. Then, each branch union representing a
particular industry negotiates with management and the government
ministries responsible for that industry. They may set wages higher
than the minimum set on the national level and often do, especially if
the industry in question is more profitable than average. Finally, on
the enterprise level, union and management representatives negotiate
directly on wages. Again, they may set wages higher than negotiators on
the industry level.
There were no reports of actions taken against union members for
union activities. The 1990 Soviet law on trade unions provides that
union leaders may not be fired from their jobs while in leadership
positions or for a period after they leave those positions. There were
no reports of such firings this year.
There are not export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced and compulsory labor, and it generally is not known to
occur; however, trafficking in women is a very serious problem (see
Section 6.f.). The Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children, and there were no reports that it occurred, except
for instances of trafficking in girls (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for unrestricted employment is 18 years.
Employment of those between the ages of 16 and 18 is permitted under
special conditions, including shorter workdays, no night shifts, and
longer vacations. The Ministry of Labor, Social Protection, and the
Family is primarily responsible for enforcing these restrictions and
the Ministry of Health also has a role. Child labor is not used in
industry, although children living in rural areas often assist in the
agricultural sector. Ten years of education are compulsory. The
Government specifically prohibits forced and bonded labor by children,
and there were no reports that it occurred, except in instances of
trafficking in girls (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is a legal minimum monthly
wage of $1.64 (18 Moldovan lei), but this is used primarily as a basis
for calculating pensions, scholarships, and fines. The average monthly
wage of approximately $27 (300 Moldovan lei) does not provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. The lowest wages are in the
agricultural sector, where the monthly average is approximately $11
(120 Moldovan lei). Due to severe budgetary constraints, the Government
and enterprises often do not meet payrolls for employees. The
Constitution sets the maximum workweek at 40 hours, and the Labor Code
provides for at least 1 day off per week.
The State is required to set and check safety standards in the
workplace. The unions within the GFTU also have inspection personnel
who have a right to stop work in the factory or fine the enterprise if
safety standards are not met. Further, workers have the right to refuse
to work, but they may continue to draw their salaries if working
conditions represent a serious threat to their health. However, in
practice the depressed economic situation has led enterprises to
economize on safety equipment and generally to show less concern for
worker safety issues. Workers often do not know their rights in this
area.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although no statistics are available,
trafficking in women and girls is a very serious problem, especially to
Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Israel. Moldova is a source country for
women and girls. Women and girls reportedly are trafficked to Italy and
Greece through Romania, Serbia-Montenegro, and Albania. There is no law
prohibiting trafficking and it cannot be prosecuted under other
statutes. The Government lacks legislation and the means to halt
traffickers, who technically commit no crimes within the country. The
large profits of the trafficking industry allow traffickers to exploit
opportunities for the corruption of officials.
Women and girls accept job offers in other countries, ostensibly as
dancers, models, nannies, or housekeepers. Then traffickers take their
passports, require them to ``repay'' a sizeable sum, and force them
into sexual bondage.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs announced in December that is had
uncovered a network trafficking children between Moldova and
Uzbekistan. According to the Ministry, 18 children, most of them under
1 year of age, were sold in Tashkent during 1998 and 1999 and the
average price for the children was between $2,000 and $3,000. The
Ministry of National Security stopped a similar ring that was
trafficking children between Moldova and Israel in 1995. Apart from a
documentary shown on state television on the problem, the Government
has taken few steps to prevent the trafficking of women. Several
nongovernmental organizations made efforts, with foreign assistance, to
combat the problem through information campaigns and job training for
women. A local NGO has started a project to create a program in public
schools that would educate young women about the dangers of
prostitution and to establish a hot line for those in need of advice.
The NGO also is organizing seminars to train law enforcement officials,
social workers, and journalists on how to handle the problem of
trafficking.
______
MONACO
Monaco is a constitutional monarchy in which the sovereign Prince
plays a leading role in governing the country. The Prince appoints the
four-member Government, headed by a Minister of State chosen by the
Prince from a list of candidates proposed by France. The other three
members are Counselors for the Interior (who is usually French), for
Public Works and Social Affairs, and for Finance and the Economy. Each
is responsible to the Prince. Legislative power is shared between the
Prince and the popularly elected 18-member National Council. There are
in addition three consultative bodies, whose members are appointed by
the Prince: The 7-member Crown Council; the 12-member Council of State;
and the 30-member Economic Council, which includes representatives of
employers and trade unions.
In addition to the national police force, the ``Carabiniers du
Prince'' carry out security functions. Government officials control
both forces.
The principal economic activities are services and banking, light
manufacturing, and tourism.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. The Constitution distinguishes
between those rights that are provided for all residents and those that
apply only to the approximately 5,000 residents who hold Monegasque
nationality. The latter enjoy free education, financial assistance in
case of unemployment or illness, and the right to vote and hold
elective office. Women traditionally have played a less active role
than men in public life, but this is changing; women currently hold
both elective and appointive offices.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them. Prison conditions meet or
exceed minimum international standards, and the Government permits
visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution bars
arbitrary arrest. Arrest warrants are required, except when a suspect
is arrested while committing an offense. The police must bring
detainees before a judge within 24 hours to be informed of the charges
against them and of their rights under the law. Most detainees are
released without bail, but the investigating magistrate may order
detention on grounds that the suspect might either flee or interfere
with the investigation of the case. The magistrate may extend the
initial 2-month detention for additional 2-month periods indefinitely.
The magistrate may permit family members to see detainees.
The Government does not exile its own nationals forcibly. However,
sometimes it expels non-Monegasque nationals who are in violation of
residency laws or who have committed minor offenses, such as disorderly
conduct.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the 1962 Constitution, the
Prince delegated his judicial powers to an independent judiciary. The
law provides for a fair, public trial, and the authorities respect
these provisions. The defendant has the right to be present and the
right to counsel, at public expense if necessary. As under French law,
a three-judge tribunal considers the evidence collected by the
investigating magistrate and hears the arguments made by the
prosecuting and defense attorneys. The defendant enjoys a presumption
of innocence and the right of appeal.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the individual's right
of privacy in personal and family life, at home, and in correspondence,
and the Government respects these rights in practice.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of expression is provided
for by the Constitution, and the authorities respect this right in
practice. However, the Monegasque Penal Code prohibits public
denunciations of the ruling family, a provision that the media respect
in practice. Several periodicals are published. Foreign newspapers and
magazines circulate freely, including French journals that specifically
cover news in the Principality. Foreign radio and television are
received without restriction. Stations that broadcast from the
Principality operate in accordance with French and Italian regulations.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides citizens with the rights of peaceful assembly and association.
Outdoor meetings require police authorization, which is not withheld
for political or arbitrary reasons. Formal associations must be
registered and authorized by the government.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Roman Catholicism is the state religion.
The law provides for the free practice of all religions, and the
Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Residents move freely within the country
and across its open borders with France. Monegasque nationals enjoy the
rights of emigration and repatriation. They can be deprived of their
nationality only for specified acts, including naturalization in a
foreign state. Only the Prince can grant or restore Monegasque
nationality, but he is obliged by the Constitution to consult the Crown
Council on each case before deciding.
The government implements the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. In light of its bilateral
arrangements with France, the government does not grant political
asylum or refugee status unless the request also meets French criteria
for such cases. The number of cases is very small. There were no
reports of forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to refugee
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government.
Authority to change the government and to initiate laws rests with
the Prince. The 1962 Constitution cannot be suspended, but it can be
revised by common agreement between the Prince and the elected National
Council. The Prince plays an active role in government. He names the
Minister of State (in effect, the Prime Minister) from a list of names
proposed by the French government. He names as well the three
Counselors of Government (of whom the one responsible for the interior
is usually a French national). Together the four constitute the
government. Each is responsible to the Prince.
Only the Prince may initiate legislation, but the 18-member
National Council may propose legislation to the government. All
legislation and the adoption of the budget require the Council's
assent. Elections for National Council members, which are held every 5
years, are based on universal adult suffrage and secret balloting. Both
political parties currently are represented on the Council. There is
one independent member.
The Constitution provides for three consultative bodies. The seven-
member Crown Council (composed exclusively of Monegasque nationals)
must be consulted by the Prince on certain questions of national
importance. He may choose to consult it on other matters as well. The
12-member Council of State advises the Prince on proposed legislation
and regulations. The 30-member Economic Council advises the government
on social, financial, and economic questions. One-third of its members
come from the trade union movement, and one-third from the employers'
federation.
Women are active in public service. The Mayor of Monaco, one member
of the Crown Council, four members of the National Council, and four
members of the Economic Council are women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
While the Government imposes no impediments to the establishment or
operation of local groups devoted to monitoring human rights, no such
groups have been formed. Outside groups have not sought to investigate
human rights conditions.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides that all Monegasque nationals are equal
before the law. It differentiates between rights that are accorded
nationals (including preference in employment, free education, and
assistance to the ill or unemployed) and those accorded all residents
(e.g., freedom of religion and inviolability of the home).
Women.--Reported instances of violence against women are rare.
Marital violence is strictly prohibited, and any woman who is a victim
may bring criminal charges against her husband. Women are fairly well
represented in the professions; they are less well represented in
business. The law governing transmission of citizenship provides for
equality of treatment between men and women who are Monegasque by
birth. However, women who acquire Monegasque citizenship by
naturalization cannot transmit it to their children, whereas
naturalized male citizens can.
Children.--The government is fully committed to the protection of
children's rights and welfare and has well-funded public education and
health care programs. There is no societal pattern of abuse of
children.
People with Disabilities.--The government mandated that public
buildings provide access for the disabled, and this has been largely
accomplished.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers are free to form unions, but
fewer than 10 percent of workers are unionized, and relatively few of
these reside in the Principality. Unions are independent of both the
government and the Monegasque political parties. The Monegasque
Confederation of Unions is not affiliated with any larger labor
organization but is free to join international bodies.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike in conformity
with relevant legislation. However, government workers may not strike.
Strikes are rare. The first strike in several years occurred in 1996,
when the Monegasque Confederation of Unions organized a 1-day work
stoppage by bank, transportation, and factory employees.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the free exercise of union activity. Agreements on working
conditions are negotiated between organizations representing employers
in a given sector of the economy and the respective union. Antiunion
discrimination is prohibited. Union representatives can be fired only
with the agreement of a commission that includes two members from the
employers' association and two from the labor movement. Allegations
that an employee was fired for union activity may be brought before the
Labor Court, which can order redress, such as the payment of damages
with interest.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Such practices,
involving either adults or children, are prohibited by the
Constitution, and they are not known to occur among adults or children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years; those
employing children under that age can be punished under criminal law.
Special restrictions apply to the hiring, work times, and other
conditions of workers 16 to 18 years old. The Constitution prohibits
forced and bonded child labor, and the government enforces this
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The legal minimum wage for full-
time work is the French minimum wage plus 5 percent, i.e., currently
approximately $6.90 (42.76 French francs) per hour. The 5 percent
adjustment is intended to compensate for the travel costs of the three-
quarters of the workforce who commute daily from France into the
Principality. The minimum wage is adequate to provide a decent living
for a worker and family. Most workers receive more than the minimum.
The legal workweek is 39 hours. Health and safety standards are fixed
by law and government decree. These standards are enforced by health
and safety committees in the workplace and by the government Labor
Inspector.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
THE NETHERLANDS
The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary
legislative system. Executive authority is exercised by the Prime
Minister and Cabinet representing the governing political parties
(traditionally a coalition of at least two major parties). The
bicameral Parliament is elected through free and fair elections. The
judiciary is independent.
Regional police forces are primarily responsible for maintaining
internal security. The police, the royal constabulary, and
investigative organizations concerned with internal and external
security effectively are under civilian authority.
The market-based economy is export oriented and features a mixture
of industry, services, and agriculture. Key industries include
chemicals, oil refining, natural gas, machinery, and electronics. The
agricultural sector produces fruit, vegetables, flowers, meat, and
dairy products. Living standards and the level of social benefits are
high. Unemployment is 3-percent; however, long-term unemployment,
particularly among ethnic minorities, remains a problem.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. Problems include violence and
discrimination against women, child abuse, trafficking in women and
children, and discrimination against minorities. The Government is
taking steps to deal with all of these problems.
Aruba and the Netherlands Antilles, which are two autonomous
regions of the kingdom, also feature parliamentary systems and full
constitutional protection of human rights. In practice respect for
human rights in these islands generally is little different from that
in the European Netherlands. The two Caribbean Governments have taken
measures to address past reports of police brutality, but the islands'
prison conditions remain substandard.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them.
Following a visit to the country, the Council of Europe's Committee
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CPT) published a report in 1998 that noted that it did not
find any torture and few incidents in which officials did not treat
arrested or detained persons correctly. The CPT made a positive
assessment of the facilities at most police stations and at detention,
secure psychiatric, and asylum centers. However, in March the
Government rejected the CPT's recommendation that detainees at one
maximum security prison be allowed better access to medical and
recreational facilities, since the prison houses serious offenders who
previously have escaped.
The Government took steps in the fall to facilitate the filing of
complaints about police behavior, to create uniform complaint
procedures, and to ensure that complaints are assessed by an
independent committee.
A government-funded police professionalization program, as well as
the establishment of a grievance committee, have contributed
significantly to countering incidents of police brutality in both the
Netherlands Antilles and Aruba. No new incidents were reported, nor
have there been any allegations of torture.
Prison conditions in the Netherlands meet minimum international
standards, and the Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
In other reports, the CPT has urged the Governments of the
Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and Aruba to improve the
``inhuman'' conditions in Curacao's Koraal Specht prison and in cell
blocks at the police stations on the islands of St. Maarten, Bonaire,
and Aruba. The CPT's criticism focused on overcrowding, extremely poor
sanitary conditions, poor food, and insufficient ventilation. The
Committee also criticized widespread corruption and the mistreatment of
prisoners by guards at Koraal Specht. The CPT's most recent report
criticized the absence of any major improvement in conditions at the
Koraal Specht prison.
The Dutch Government repeatedly offered financial assistance to the
Government of the Netherlands Antilles for the construction of a new
juvenile wing, a maximum security facility, and other improvements at
Koraal Specht. The Government also sent experts on prison organization
and the training of guards. While acknowledging that more work needs to
be done, Koraal Specht prison officials point to progress in improving
conditions (prisoners now have mattresses, hygiene and food have
improved, and construction has begun on a small new wing to relieve
overcrowding). At the request of the Antillean Government, the CPT
again visited Koraal Specht in January. In March it issued another
critical report, which called for early improvements. On March 19, the
Dutch Government concluded an agreement with the Antillean Government
on the prison complex's renovation within 3 years. In September the
Antillean Government contracted for the construction of a new facility
at the prison complex that is expected to be ready by July 2000. The
Dutch Government is prepared to contribute financially to the prison's
renovation.
The Governments of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba allow access
by nongovernmental organizations to prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes this
prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic Code. A pyramidal
system of cantonal, district, and appellate courts handles both
criminal and civil cases. The Supreme Court acts as the highest
appellate court and ensures the uniform interpretation of the law. In
criminal trials, the law provides for a presumption of innocence and
the right to public trial, to counsel (virtually free for low income
persons), and to appeal. The law provides for the right to a fair
trial, and the independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions, and violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. State
subsidies are provided to religious organizations that maintain
educational facilities.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The law provides for the granting of asylum or refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates with the
office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. There were no reports
of the forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to refugee
status. The Government does not provide first asylum as such, but most
asylum seekers (88 percent in 1998), except those who obviously came
from a ``safe country of origin'' or stayed for some time in a ``safe
third country,'' are permitted to apply for resident status. Some of
those (about 19 percent in 1998) whose applications eventually are
denied nonetheless are permitted to stay temporarily on humanitarian
grounds or as long as their country of origin is considered unsafe.
The focus of the Government's asylum policy is to protect genuine
refugees while excluding economic refugees and illegal immigrants. In
the early 1990's, the government adopted several measures to curb the
relatively high influx of asylum seekers. This policy initially
resulted in the desired decrease, but as other countries adopted even
stricter laws, the influx rose again to 45,217 in 1998, a 31 percent
increase over 1997. A new series of harsher rules adopted in 1998 aims
to discourage economic refugees at all stages of the asylum process, by
means of a stricter intake, accelerated processing of asylum requests,
limited appeal procedures, and a denial of social assistance to asylum
seekers who are screened out.
The Justice Ministry estimates on the basis of interviews with
applicants that two-thirds of asylum seekers came to the country
through alien smuggling organizations.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
No restrictions in law or in practice hinder the participation of
women and minorities in government and politics. Women are nevertheless
underrepresented in politics: A total of 54 of the 150 members of the
second chamber of Parliament are women, as are 4 of the 15 cabinet
ministers. However, the two Deputy Prime Ministers are women. The
Government pursues an active policy to promote the participation of
women in politics and public administration.
Although a minority, women also hold positions in the parliaments
and cabinets of the Netherlands Antilles and Aruba.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Human rights groups operate without government restriction,
investigating and publishing their findings. Government officials are
very cooperative and responsive to their views.
In view of its longstanding tradition of hosting international
legal tribunals, the Government facilitated the trial of two Libyans
accused of the bombing of PanAm flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which
killed 270 persons. By agreement among the parties, the Government
provided Camp Zeist to the United Kingdom as an extraterritorial venue
for the trial, which began in April and is being conducted under
Scottish law.
The Netherlands also hosts the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia and the headquarters for the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution bans discrimination on the basis of any of these
factors or on sexual orientation or political preference. The
Government generally is effective in enforcing these provisions. Under
the Equal Treatment Act, complainants may take offenders to court under
civil law.
Women.--A 1998 study reported that about 211,000 women are victims
of violence by their former and present partners each year; about
50,000 of these are subjected to severe violence. In addition to the
personal suffering, this form of violence against women costs society
about $175 million (332 million guilders) per year in hospitalization
and absence from work.
The Government supports programs to reduce and prevent violence
against women. Battered women find refuge in a network of 48
government-subsidized women's shelters offering the services of social
workers and psychologists. In addition battered women who leave their
domestic partners become eligible for social benefits, which include an
adequate basic subsidy as well as an allowance for dependent children.
Nongovernmental organizations also advise and assist women who are
victims of sexual assault. Since 1991 marital rape has been a crime and
carries the same penalty as nonmarital rape. Spousal abuse carries a
one-third higher penalty than ordinary battery.
In addition to helping victims of sexual abuse, the Government has
pursued an active prevention campaign through commercials and awareness
training of educators. A recent evaluation showed that, on average,
two-thirds of the population was positively influenced by the campaign.
Prostitution is legal, and since October the law no longer treats
``organizing the prostitution of somebody else'' as a crime when done
with the consent of the prostitute. However, any form of forced
prostitution remains punishable. All brothels now require licenses
issued by local governments with strict conditions to be observed by
brothel owners. The Government's assumption is that by decriminalizing
prostitution, licensing brothel operators, and improving working
conditions and health care for prostitutes, while at the same time
prohibiting the employment of minors and illegal immigrants,
prostitution would be less susceptible to criminal organizations
trafficking in women and children. An additional advantage is that the
licensing system would make prostitution more transparent and easier
for the police to monitor. Between 20,000 and 30,000 individuals are
employed in prostitution. It is estimated that half of all prostitutes
originate from non-European Union countries and are residing illegally
in the country. Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
prostitution remains a problem, which the Government is giving priority
to fighting (see Section 6.f.).
The law requires employers to take measures to protect workers from
sexual harassment; research shows that about 245,000 women, or 6.6
percent of the female working population, are confronted with sexual
intimidation in the work place each year. The Government funds an
ongoing publicity campaign to increase awareness of the problem. As the
largest employer, it has taken measures to counter harassment among
civil servants, for example, in the police force.
Women increasingly are entering the job market, but traditional
cultural factors and inadequate day care facilities tend to discourage
them--especially women with young children--from working. The
participation of women in the labor market increased significantly in
the last 25 years, from 34 percent of the working-age female population
in the mid-1970's to 54 percent in 1999. This percentage is expected to
rise further. However, about 42 percent of women hold part-time jobs.
In 1998 the government established favorable conditions for part-time
employment by adopting a law that prohibits employers from treating
part-time workers differently from those in full-time jobs.
Women often are underemployed and have less chance of promotion
than their male colleagues. They often hold lower level positions than
men, mostly because of their part-time status. According to the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, the difference in earnings
between men and women remains at 24 percent. Some women nevertheless
are making steady progress by moving into professional and high-
visibility jobs.
In 1988 the Government started affirmative action programs for
women. Collective labor agreements usually include one or more
provisions to strengthen the position of women. Legislation mandates
equal pay for equal work, prohibits dismissal because of marriage,
pregnancy, or motherhood, and provides the basis for equality in other
employment-related areas. A legislatively mandated Equal Treatment
Commission actively pursues complaints of discrimination in these areas
as well as allegations of pay discrimination.
The social welfare and national health systems provide considerable
assistance to working women with families. Women are eligible for 16
weeks of maternity leave with full pay. The Parental Leave Law that
requires employers to allow new mothers and fathers to work 20 hours a
week for up to 6 months was made more flexible in 1997. The new law
allows parents to take (unpaid) full-time leave during 3 months and to
extend the leave over a period longer than 6 months to care for
children up to 8 years old. Persons working fewer than 20 hours per
week also will be entitled to parental leave.
Children.--The Government works to ensure the well-being of
children through numerous well-funded health, education, and public
information programs. The Council for the Protection of Children,
operated through the Ministry of Justice, enforces child support
orders, investigates cases of child abuse, and recommends remedies
ranging from counseling to withdrawal of parental rights. In addition
the Government has set up a popular hot line for children and a network
of pediatricians who track suspected cases of child abuse on a
confidential basis. There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
An estimated 50,000 children are victims of child abuse each year,
although only approximately 15,000 formal reports of child abuse are
registered. As a result of abuse, 40 children died in 1998. The U.N.
Commission on Childrens' Rights recently questioned the Government
about its performance in this area. In particular the United Nations
questioned the long waiting list for assistance to abused children.
Approximately 7,000 abused children are on the waiting list.
International sex tourism involving the abuse of minor children is
prosecutable. Since 1996 several Dutch citizens have been tried and
convicted for the abuse of minors in other countries. The age of
consent is 16. The prosecution of adults for sex with minors between
the ages of 12 and 16 only occurs when a complaint is filed by an
interested party. The new prostitution bill imposes heavier penalties
on prostitution activities involving minors. The maximum sentence will
be raised from 1 to 6 years.
Trafficking in female African youths for the purpose of
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
The maximum penalty for child pornography was raised in 1996 from 3
months' to 4 years' imprisonment, 6 years in the event of financial
gain, and the maximum fine was more than tripled. New legislation
allows for provisional arrest, house searches, and criminal financial
investigations. Moreover the authorities no longer must prove that a
person possesses child pornography for the purpose of distribution or
public display. The Supreme Court ruled that the mere possession of
child pornography is sufficient cause for prosecution. For the first
time, in 1998 a suspect was convicted and sentenced solely on this
ground.
The discovery of a major child pornography case in July resulted in
stricter enforcement of antichild abuse legislation and the allocation
of additional resources to enforcement efforts. It also underscored the
absence of appropriate legislation to fight the dissemination of child
pornography over the Internet. The Government believes that
international cooperation is required to deal effectively with the
latter problem but nevertheless began a national offensive against
child pornography on the Internet. The police now are monitoring the
Internet in a large, year-long pilot project, and four suspected
pornographers were arrested in late 1998.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. Local governments increasingly mandate access to public
buildings for the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--There were a number of complaints about
anti-Semitism on Internet sites set up by Dutch citizens.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The integration of racial and
ethnic minorities into the social and cultural mainstream remains a
difficult problem.
The Government pursues an active campaign aimed at increasing
public awareness of racism and discrimination. The Constitution
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and nationality and
allows those who claim that they have been discriminated against to
take alleged offenders to court under civil law. In 1997 the
prosecution norms for discrimination were tightened. Penalties were
raised for discrimination by political parties, companies, and
institutions, because organizational discrimination was considered more
dangerous than discrimination by individuals. The police were required
to report any complaint of discrimination meticulously. Any policeman
guilty of discrimination now risks disciplinary measures as well as
criminal legal proceedings. According to the latest statistics, in
1997, 112 persons or organizations were tried on discrimination
charges. These included 37 labor disputes, 20 cases of defamation, and
11 consumer disputes.
Racially motivated incidents ranged from racist pamphlets and
painted slogans to bomb threats, harassment, physical abuse, and
destruction of property. However, no officially recorded incidents of a
life-threatening nature were directed against ethnic minorities. The
National Bureau to Fight Racial Discrimination was founded in July.
This Bureau is to collect nationwide statistics on incidents of
discrimination. Local antidiscrimination bureaus previously collected
such data, but their registration methods differed and the resulting
data were incomplete. Due to startup problems, the National Bureau had
not yet produced new data; however, incomplete data suggest a further
increase in complaints. The Equal Opportunities Committee also reported
an increase in complaints about discrimination. These increases were
attributed to wider knowledge of the complaints process, as well as to
changes in societal attitudes.
Immigrant groups face some discrimination in housing and
employment. These groups, concentrated in the larger cities, suffer
from a high rate of unemployment. The Government has been working for
several years with employers' groups and unions to reduce minority
unemployment levels to the national average. As a result of these
efforts, in recent years the rate of job creation among ethnic
minorities was higher than among the general population. Unemployment
among ethnic minorities nevertheless is still about three times as high
as within the native population.
The 1998 Act on the Stimulation of Labor Participation by Ethnic
Minorities is intended to increase job opportunities for ethnic
minorities. It requires employers with a work force of over 35 people
to register their non-Dutch employees. Employers are to strive for a
composition of their work force that reflects the regional working
population. They must submit their annual social action plans,
including recruitment targets, to the regional labor bureaus. The Labor
Inspectorate oversees implementation of the law.
The privately run Discrimination on the Internet Registration
Center recorded 121 complaints in 1998 about discriminatory statements,
racial discrimination, or anti-Semitism on the Internet. Most
statements were removed voluntarily by the authors at the Center's
request. In one case, the Center requested that criminal proceedings be
initiated; such a request is still under review in 20 other cases. In
July two rightwing extremists were convicted for incitement to hatred
and discrimination on the Internet. This was the first time that
discrimination on the Internet resulted in a conviction.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Membership in labor unions is open to
all workers including armed forces personnel, the police, and civil
service employees. Workers are entitled to form or join unions of their
own choosing without prior government authorization, and unions are
free to affiliate with national trade union federations. This right is
exercised freely.
Unions are free of control by the Government and political parties.
Union members may and do participate in political activities.
All workers have the right to strike, except for most civil
servants who have other institutionalized means of protection and
redress. Industrial relations are very harmonious, and strikes are
infrequent. In 1998 some 33 labor days per 1,000 workers were lost,
mostly over union demands for higher pay and a 36-hour workweek. There
is no retribution against striking workers.
About 28 percent of the work force is unionized, but union-
negotiated collective bargaining agreements are usually extended to
cover about three-quarters of the work force. The white-collar unions'
membership is the fastest growing.
The four union federations are active internationally, without
restriction.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is recognized and well established.
Discrimination against workers because of union membership is illegal
and does not occur.
Collective bargaining agreements are negotiated in the framework of
the ``Social Partnership'' developed between trade unions and private
employers. Representatives of the main union federations, employers'
organizations, and the government meet each autumn to discuss labor
issues, including wage levels and their relation to the state of the
economy and to international competition. The discussions lead to a
central accord with social as well as economic goals for the coming
year. Under this umbrella agreement, unions and employers in various
sectors negotiate sectoral agreements, which the government usually
extends to all companies in the sector.
Antiunion discrimination is prohibited. Union federations and
employers' organizations are represented, along with independent
experts, on the Social and Economic Council. The Council is the major
advisory board for the government on policies and legislation regarding
national and international social and economic matters.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited by the
Constitution and generally does not occur; however, trafficking in
women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem
(see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
this prohibition is enforced effectively (see Section 6.c.). The
minimum age for employment is 16 years, and for full-time work it is
conditioned on completion of the mandatory 10 years of schooling. Those
still in school at the age of 16 may not work more than 8 hours per
week. Persons under the age of 18 are prohibited by law from working at
night, overtime, or in areas dangerous to their physical or mental
well-being. Anyone working more than 4.5 hours per day is entitled to a
30-minute break. The laws are effectively enforced by the tripartite
Labor Commission, which monitors hiring practices and conducts
inspections.
The Government takes a leading role in the international campaign
against child labor in developing countries. The main labor federation,
together with the U.N. Children's Fund and several nongovernmental
organizations, also started a campaign against the sale of products
suspected of being made through child labor and for a ``trademark'' for
clothing made without child labor.
Holiday work and after-school jobs are tied to very strict rules,
which are set in the work-time act, the Child Labor Regulation (for
young people under 16 years), and the Working Conditions Decree.
Observance of the rules is overseen by the Social Ministry's Labor
Inspection office. Although child labor is banned, an increasing number
of children work for pay during holidays. The parents of such children
are to be reported officially by labor inspectors, and the Public
Prosecutor may decide to prosecute the parents for violating the ban on
child labor. In 1997 some 20 employers were cited for employing
children under age 13 to do holiday work.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage for adults is
established by law and can be adjusted every 6 months to changes in the
cost-of-living index. Over the last few years, the statutory minimum
wage has been pegged to the average wage in collective labor contracts.
The gross minimum wage is about $1,172 (2,345 guilders) per month. For
workers earning the minimum wage, employers currently pay $3,750 a year
(6,000 guilders) in premiums for social security benefits, which
includes medical insurance. Only 3 percent of workers earn the minimum
wage because collective bargaining agreements, which normally are
extended across a sector, usually set a minimum wage well above the
legislated minimum. The Government, unions, and employers have taken
measures to increase the number of minimum wage jobs and to decrease
employers' social payments in order to lower the cost of hiring new
workers and to create more jobs, especially for the long-term
unemployed.
A reduced minimum wage applies to young people under the age of
23--one of the demographic groups with the highest rate of
unemployment--intended to provide incentives for their employment. This
wage ranges from 34.5 percent of the adult minimum wage for workers 16
years of age to 85 percent for those 22 years of age. The legislated
minimum wage and social benefits available to all minimum wage earners
provide an adequate standard of living for workers and their families.
Although the law establishes a 40-hour workweek, the average
workweek for those with full-time jobs is 37.5 hours. This workweek is
the result of agreements reached in collective bargaining on shorter
workweeks, often in conjunction with more flexible working hours. This
combination makes it possible to adapt shorter working hours to the
specific situation in a particular business or branch of industry.
Working conditions, including comprehensive occupational safety and
health standards set by law and regulations, are monitored actively by
the tripartite Labor Commission. Enforcement is effective. Workers may
refuse to continue working at a hazardous work site. The Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs also monitors standards through its Labor
Inspectorate.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The maximum sentence for trafficking in
persons is 6 years. In cases involving minors, severe physical
violence, or organized trafficking, the maximum sentence is 10 years.
Article 250 of the Criminal Code prohibits trafficking in persons,
which is defined as bringing another person into prostitution by means
of force or another act of violence; or by abusing authority ensuing
from an actual relationship, circumstance, or by misrepresentation; or
by undertaking any action that the perpetrator knows, or could
reasonably suspect, may bring another into prostitution.
The country is a major destination for trafficked women. An
estimated 20,000 persons per year are trafficked into the country,
according to government officials. In July 44 persons were arrested in
connection with a large trafficking network that used the Netherlands
as a transit point between Italy and Scandinavia. In August four more
persons were arrested in an unrelated case involving the trafficking of
women from Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and Romania for prostitution in a
border region; a number of other networks were dismantled in border
regions during the first half of the year. Some 230 persons were
arrested for trafficking in 1998, compared with 139 in 1997 and 89 in
1996.
The Government has an active policy to combat trafficking in
persons. High-priority government measures include a more aggressive
prosecution policy as well as closer international cooperation. A
number of police forces have established special units to deal with the
problem. The Government distinguishes between alien smuggling and
trafficking in persons.
According to the Justice Ministry, some 20,000 to 30,000 persons
work in prostitution, about half of them from non-EU countries who are
residing illegally in the country. The Dutch Foundation Against
Trafficking in Women estimates that each year between 2,500 and 3,000
women and girls are brought into the country for the purpose of
prostitution, primarily from Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Far East.
In 1998 a ruling was obtained under the Aliens Law to prevent
illegal residents, who may have become victims of trafficking, from
being expelled before investigations are completed. A victim is allowed
time (3 months) to consider pressing charges. Victims who do so are
allowed to stay in the country until the judicial process is completed.
During this period, the victim receives legal, financial, and
psychological assistance. In special circumstances, a residence permit
is granted on humanitarian grounds. After completion of the judicial
process, illegal prostitutes returning to their native countries are
eligible for temporary financial assistance.
African women make up a sizeable portion of the estimated 15,000
foreign women working as prostitutes in the country. According to the
authorities, the most widely used ploy for African women is the
fraudulent use of special asylum procedures for minors, who are
virtually ensured entry. Although most such women are not actually
under age 18, all claim to be. In the absence of any identification,
these claims at least initially are accepted. Once at the open-door
asylum center, they settle down for a few days before disappearing only
to turn up later as prostitutes in the country or elsewhere in Europe.
Traffickers use tried and tested techniques on these African women,
such as threatening their families back home and indebtedness (they
begin at brothels owing their employers their purchase price of $20,000
to $30,000). Recent reports that traffickers also exploit their
traditional religious and spiritual beliefs and use ``Voodoo'' measures
as a method of control are questioned by one academic study.
______
NORWAY
Norway is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy
with King Harald V as the Head of State. It is governed by a prime
minister, cabinet, and a 165-seat Storting (Parliament) that is elected
every 4 years and cannot be dissolved. The judiciary is independent.
The national police have primary responsibility for internal
security, but in times of crisis, such as internal disorder or natural
catastrophe, the police may call on the armed forces for assistance. In
such circumstances, the armed forces are always under police authority.
The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the security
forces.
Norway is an advanced industrial state with a mixed economy
combining private and public ownership that provides a high standard of
living for residents. The key industries are oil and gas, metals,
engineering, shipbuilding, fishing, and manufacturing (including fish
processing equipment). The leading exports are oil and gas,
manufactured goods, fish, and metals. During the year, 79 percent of
workers were in the service sector (including public service), and 14
percent were in the manufacturing sector.
The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens, and
the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing with
individual instances of abuse. Violence against women and abuse of
children are problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
In January prosecutors dismissed the case against former Mossad
agent Mike Harari for the killing of Moroccan citizen Achmed Bouchikhi
at Lillehammer in July 1973. Under orders to kill suspected Palestine
Liberation Organization agent Ali Hassan Salameh, Mike Harari and his
Mossad group mistook Bouchikhi for Salameh and killed the wrong man.
State Attorney Lasse Quigstad said that the case was dismissed due to
lack of evidence.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices, and there were
no reports that officials employed them.
The practice of indefinite imprisonment (often in the form of
solitary confinement) of suspects during the investigation of criminal
cases has been criticized repeatedly, most recently in September, by
the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of Torture.
Depending on the nature of the alleged crime, the police presently can
hold suspects in solitary confinement even prior to charges being
filed, subject to varying degrees of restrictions on communications and
visits. In response to this criticism, the Ministry of Justice
commissioned two working groups to study how to speed up the judicial
process in order to avoid long-term solitary confinement. These groups
are to report their recommendations by June 2000. In addition the
Attorney General recently introduced new restrictions on the use of
solitary confinement for pretrial detainees.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes
this prohibition.
European human rights organizations criticized the Government's use
of indefinite solitary confinement for pretrial detainees (see Section
1.c.). The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government observes
this prohibition in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The court system consists of the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court
Appellate Court (committee), superior courts, county courts for
criminal cases, magistrate courts for civil cases, and claims courts.
Special courts include the Impeachment Court (made up of
parliamentarians), the Labor Court, Trusteeship Courts, Fishery Courts,
and land ownership severance courts.
All courts, which date to laws passed in the 11th century, meet
internationally accepted standards for fair trials, including providing
counsel to the indigent. The law provides for the right to a fair
trial, and an independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Both the Constitution and the law prohibit such
practices, government authorities generally respect these prohibitions,
and violations are subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, and the Government respects this right in
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
The state church is the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Norway,
which is supported financially by the State, and to which 93 percent of
the population nominally belong. The Constitution requires that the
King and one-half of the Cabinet belong to this church. The
relationship between the church and the State is increasingly debated
by the public. The Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act
permits prospective employers to ask applicants for employment in
private or religious schools, or in day care centers, whether they
respect Christian beliefs and principles.
In July the Government suspended two priests in the Church of
Norway and asked the courts for approval legally to terminate their
priesthood due to insubordination and disloyalty. The priests openly
had refused to accept religious and spiritual guidance from their
bishop, with whom they were in disagreement on a number of social
issues (such as gay rights). Some church and lay leaders questioned the
state Church's decision to ask government prosecutors to pursue this
case, rather than handle it less formally through ``church
discipline.'' The Alta district court had not issued a ruling in this
case by year's end.
Other denominations operate freely. A religious community is
required to register with the Government only if it desires state
support, which is provided to all registered denominations on a
proportional basis in accordance with membership. In 1995 the
Parliament introduced the subject ``religious knowledge and education
in ethics'' into the national school system. The class teaches the
ethical values of Christianity, as well as Christian beliefs and the
main features of Christianity. All children must attend this mandatory
class; there are no exceptions for children of other faiths.
Organizations for atheists as well as Moslem communities have contested
the legality of forced religious teaching, but the Oslo city court
twice has ruled against their arguments. The case was appealed to a
higher court and is expected to ultimately go to the Supreme Court.
Workers belonging to minority denominations are allowed leave for their
religious holidays.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government grants refugee or asylee status in
accordance with the the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
During the year, the Government granted asylum to 181 persons,
temporary collective residency permits to 7,957 Kosovars, individual
residency permits to 2,609 persons, and asylum as U.N. quota refugees
to 1,480 persons. Immigration authorities rejected 3,300 asylum
applications. In addition 1,542 persons received residency status
through a family reunification program. In July the Government
implemented a mandatory visa requirement for all Slovak citizens due to
an influx of 130 Slovak Roma claiming refuge in the country; the
authorities do not believe that the situation in Slovakia calls for
such protection of the Roma. The Government lifted the mandatory visa
requirement for a short period in November, before reimposing it in
December.
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of those having a
valid claim to refugee status or of persons being forcibly returned to
countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their Government
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage.
No restrictions in law or practice hinder the participation of
women in government or in politics generally. A female Prime Minister
served for 9 of 10 years between 1986 and 1996. The current Prime
Minister appointed women to lead 9 of the 18 ministries. Women hold 60
of the 165 seats in Parliament (36.4 percent), chair 4 of 12 standing
committees in Parliament, and lead 3 of the 6 main political parties. A
woman heads the Parliament.
In addition to participating freely in the national political
process in 1997, Norwegian Sami (formerly known as Lapps) elected their
own constituent assembly, the Sameting, for the third time. Under the
law establishing the 39-seat body, it is a consultative group which
meets regularly to deal with ``all matters which in [its] opinion are
of special importance to the Sami people.'' In practice the Sameting
has been most interested in protecting the group's language and
cultural rights and in influencing decisions on resources and lands
where Sami are a majority.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials are very cooperative and responsive
to their views.
When the Government took office in 1997, the Prime Minister
appointed a Minister of Development, Cooperation, and Human Rights.
Based on previous human rights reports, in December the Government
presented a White Paper/Action Plan to the Parliament on human rights
in Norway and internationally. The White Paper identifies human rights
violations both in Norway and abroad and proposes how the Government
would work to improve its own human rights record as well as assist
other countries in improving theirs. The report lists 16 areas for
special attention domestically, including the practice of indefinite
detention of suspects in criminal cases (often in solitary
confinement). The White Paper presently is being processed by the
Parliament, which is expected to revise and vote on it by June 2000.
None of the measures in the plan would be implemented until after
Parliamentary approval.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, disability, language, or social status, and the Government
enforces this prohibition in practice.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. In 1997 there were
approximately 30,000 contacts by telephone by women with crisis action
centers and 4,360 overnight stays by women at shelters. The police
believe that increases in reported rapes and domestic abuse in recent
years have been largely due to greater willingness among women to
report these crimes. The police vigorously investigate and prosecute
such crimes. They also instituted special programs to prevent rape and
domestic violence and to counsel victims. Public and private
organizations run several shelters that give battered women an
alternative to returning to a violent domestic situation.
The rights of women are protected under the 1978 Equal Rights Law
and other regulations. According to that law, ``women and men engaged
in the same activity shall have equal wages for work of equal value.''
An Equal Rights Council monitors enforcement of the law, and an Equal
Rights Ombudsman processes complaints of sexual discrimination. In 1997
there were 101 written complaints and 485 telephone complaints to the
gender equality Ombudsman. Women filed 50 percent of the complaints,
men 18 percent, and organizations 32 percent.
In 1995 the Parliament adopted a harassment amendment to the
Working Environment Act, which states that ``employees shall not be
subjected to harassment or other unseemly behavior.''
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of
education and medical care. The Government provides education for
children through the postsecondary level. There is no difference in the
treatment of girls and boys in education or health care services. An
independent Children's Ombudsman Office, within the Ministry of
Children and Families, assures the protection of children in law and in
practice.
Due to abuse or neglect of various degrees, 23,500 children (2.1
percent of children up to the age of 17) were assisted by welfare
services in 1998. The level of assistance ranged from protective
custody, extra financial help, or simply guidance and support for their
parents.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. The law mandates access to buildings for people with
disabilities, and the Government enforces these provisions in practice.
Indigenous People.--Apart from a tiny Finnish population in the
northeast, the indigenous Sami constituted the only significant
minority group until the influx of immigrants during the 1970's. In
recent years, the Government has taken steps to protect Sami cultural
rights by providing Sami language instruction at schools in their
areas, radio and television programs broadcast or subtitled in Sami,
and subsidies for newspapers and books oriented toward the Sami. In a
rare political statement in October at the opening of the third Sami
Parliament, King Harald V publicly apologized to the Sami people for
repression under Norwegian rule. In 1997 the Government created the
position of Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Local Government and
Regional Affairs to deal specifically with Sami issues. In 1997 the
portfolio of Deputy Minister Johanne Gaup (herself of Sami origin) was
extended to include issues pertaining to other minorities and
immigrants.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
right to associate freely and to strike. The Government changed its
wage negotiating process in 1996, shifting negotiations from the
national to the local and company level. There were 36 strikes in 1998
at the national, regional, local, and company levels, involving 27,000
workers. All strikes were settled through negotiations or compulsory
arbitration.
The Government has the right, with the approval of the Parliament,
to invoke compulsory arbitration under certain circumstances. The
Government came under increasing criticism in 1995 for resorting to
compulsory arbitration too quickly during strikes. In addition this
procedure, which was also invoked several times in the 1980's,
particularly in the oil industry, was criticized repeatedly by the
Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization, which
argued that the situations were not a sufficient threat to public
health and safety to justify invoking compulsory arbitration. The
Supreme Court is reviewing a case that will allow it to rule on whether
the national process in this regard violates the country's
international commitments.
With membership totaling about 60 percent of the work force, unions
play an important role in political and economic life and are consulted
by the Government on important economic and social problems. Although
the largest trade union federation is associated with the Labor Party,
all unions and labor federations are free of party and government
control. Unions are free to form federations and to affiliate
internationally. They maintain strong ties with such international
bodies as the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All workers,
including government employees and military personnel, exercise the
right to organize and bargain collectively. Collective bargaining is
widespread, with most wage earners covered by negotiated settlements,
either directly or through understandings which extend the contract
terms to workers outside of the main labor federation and the
employers' bargaining group. Any complaint of antiunion discrimination
would be dealt with by the Labor Court, but there have been none in
recent years.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor is
prohibited by law and does not exist. The Government prohibits forced
and bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it
occurred. The Directorate of Labor Inspections (DLI) ensures
compliance. Domestics, children, or foreign workers are not required to
remain in situations amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Children 13 to 18 years of age may be employed part time
in light work that will not adversely affect their health, development,
or schooling. Minimum age rules are observed in practice and enforced
by the DLI. Education is compulsory for 9 years. School is mandatory
until the 10th grade; most children stay in school at least until the
age of 18. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by
children, and there were no reports that it occurred (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Normal working hours are
mandated by law and limited to 37\1/2\ hours per week. The law also
provides for 25 working days of paid leave per year (31 days for those
over age 60). A 28-hour rest period is mandated legally on weekends and
holidays. There is no specified minimum wage, but wages normally fall
within a national scale negotiated by labor, employers, and the
government. Average income, not including extensive social benefits, is
adequate to provide a worker and family with a decent living.
The 1977 Workers' Protection and Working Environment Act provides
for safe and physically acceptable working conditions for all employed
persons. Specific standards are set by the DLI in consultation with
nongovernmental experts. According to the act, environment committees
composed of management, workers, and health personnel must be
established in all enterprises with 50 or more workers, and safety
delegates must be elected in all organizations. Workers have the right
to remove themselves from situations that endanger their health. The
DLI ensures effective compliance with labor legislation and standards.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No law specifically criminalizes
trafficking in persons, but existing labor and immigration statutes may
be used in such cases.
Norway is becoming a destination country for trafficked women,
according to an OSCE report.
____
POLAND
Poland is a parliamentary democracy based on a multiparty political
system and free and fair elections. Executive power is shared by the
Prime Minister, the Council of Ministers, and, to a lesser extent, the
President. The Parliament is bicameral (Senate and Sejm). The
Government, elected in October 1997, is a two-party coalition composed
of center-right Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS)--itself a broad
coalition anchored by the Solidarity labor union--and its junior
partner, the centrist Freedom Union (UW), also with origins in
Solidarity. The judiciary is independent but inefficient.
The internal security forces and the armed forces are subject to
effective civilian control by the Government. Since 1996 the civilian
Minister of Defense has had clear command and control authority over
the military chief of the general staff as well as oversight of
military intelligence. This element of civilian control was reinforced
further by a recent restructuring of the Ministry of Defense and
general staff undertaken as part of the country's entry into NATO.
Civilian participation in the Ministry of Defense has been broadened by
a competitive hiring process that mandates civilian control of selected
positions.
The country has made a successful transition to a free market
economy. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth slowed to less than 4
percent during the year. This was in part due to slow growth in the
country's export markets, Europe and Russia. Inflation has been reduced
steadily, from double-digits in 1997 to 8.6 percent in 1998 and about
9.8 percent in 1999. Unemployment at the end of 1998 was in single
digits for the first time since the transition from communism began but
increased again to about 13 percent in 1999. Since 1989 most small and
medium-sized state-owned enterprises have been privatized, and the
current Government has launched privatizations of major state-owned
enterprises such as the insurance, telephone, airline, power
generation, petroleum refining, steel, coal, and banks. Significant
reforms are underway in other sectors as well, including pensions,
health, decentralization of government, and education. Still to be
addressed are the agriculture sector, a major part of the economy
(employing more than 25 percent of the labor force), and lagging
development in rural areas.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, problems remain in some areas. Prison conditions are generally
poor. A cumbersome legal process, poor administration, and an
inadequate budget hamper the court system. Court decisions frequently
are not implemented, particularly those of the administrative courts,
and simple civil cases can take as long as 2 or 3 years. As a result,
public confidence in the judicial system is lacking. Many poorly paid
prosecutors and judges have left public service for more lucrative
employment. The threat of organized crime has provoked legislative
responses that raise questions regarding the right to privacy. The
Government maintains a large number of wiretaps without outside review.
There are some marginal restrictions in law and in practice on
freedom of speech and of the press. With few exceptions, the new
Criminal Code provides protection for journalists' sources. Spousal
abuse continues to affect many women. Women continue to experience
serious discrimination in the labor market and are subject to various
legal inequities as a consequence of paternalistic laws. Child
prostitution is a problem. There were incidents of desecrations of
graves in Jewish cemeteries, and anti-Semitic graffiti was sprayed on a
Jewish community center. There is some societal discrimination and
violence against ethnic minorities. The Government has worked
constructively toward resolving issues of concern to the Jewish
community. Although the right to organize unions and bargain
collectively largely was observed, some employers violated worker
rights provided for by law, particularly in the growing private sector.
Trafficking in women and children in, to, and from the country is a
problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
In January 1998 a police officer was charged with the beating death
of 13-year-old Przemek Czaja following a basketball game in the Baltic
Coast city of Slupsk. The boy's death, caused when local police charged
a group of sports fans, touched off 4 nights of riots and caused scores
of additional injuries. The officer was sentenced in May to 6 years in
prison. Appeals have been filed in the case.
A police officer indicted in connection with the shooting deaths of
two unarmed civilians and the wounding of another in Brodno, a suburb
of Warsaw, continues to await trial. The officer was suspended from the
police force and was charged with excessive use of force. The trial was
scheduled to begin in October.
In April 1998, a provincial court in Lublin sentenced the former
Lomazy police chief to 15 years in prison in connection with the 1997
shooting death of a 19-year-old man who was held for police
questioning. This ruling subsequently was overturned in the appeals
court, and a new trial began in September in the local district court.
Trials related to extrajudicial killings during the Communist
period continued during the year. A new trial began in a Katowice
appeals court in October in the case of 22 riot policemen accused of
killing miners during the Communist martial law era after a 1998
appeals court decision annulled their acquittals. On September 28, the
decision of a district court was upheld in the case of the appeal of
two officers convicted in 1997 of the 1983 Communist era beating death
of Grzegorz Przemyk. One officer was sentenced to 2 years in prison for
participating in the beating, and the other officer was found not
guilty of attempting to destroy the file in the case. In November the
Supreme Court ordered a new trial for former Communist leader Wojciech
Jaruzelski and nine other officials who allegedly ordered police to
shoot workers during the 1970 riots in Gdansk. The Court ruled that the
trial that began in the Gdansk provincial court should be started over
in the Warsaw district court. No new trial date was set. On December 9,
lawyers representing miners submitted a motion requesting the retrial
of former Communist Interior Minister Czeslaw Kiszczak for his role in
the pacification of the Wujek mine, but a Katowice district court did
not rule on the motion by year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Criminal Code prohibits torture, and there were no
reported incidents of it; however, on several occasions during the year
police used force to disperse protesters who became violent or to break
up illegal roadblocks (see Section 2.b.).
In June 1998, a Gdansk court indicted 11 riot policemen for their
participation in the October 1997 beating of soccer fans attending a
match in the town of Gdynia. The officers' activities, which took place
before, during, and after the match, both at the stadium and at a
nearby bar, were captured on videotape. A civil case against the
officers, launched by the father of one of the teenage victims, also is
pending. Both civil and criminal cases stemming from the incident were
pending at year's end.
There was no progress during the year on the appeal filed after an
Olsztyn court granted the appeal of two Szczytno police officers in
December 1998 who had been found guilty of beating two men detained in
September 1996.
In the case of three police officers in Bytom who were arrested and
charged with the rape of seven underage detainees in 1994, one officer
was sentenced to 4 years and 6 months in prison, while the other two
received 3-year sentences.
Prison conditions are still generally poor, according to reports by
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). Many facilities are old, in
disrepair, and overcrowded. According to a July 1998 report by the
National Penitentiary Authority, the prison system is in urgent need of
additional funding. Of 156 detention facilities, 100 require
considerable renovation. At the same time, the National Penitentiary
Authority's annual budget continued to fall; it has declined by
approximately 34 percent since 1991. The Ombudsman for Human Rights
complained about the safety of prisoners, noting that inmates are often
the victims of violent attacks by other prisoners. Civil litigation
against the prison administration in the 1996 case of an 18-year-old
mentally retarded boy who was beaten and sodomized by fellow inmates is
to be considered by the Bydgoszcz district court in February 2000. The
Ombudsman also has suggested that the prison population be reduced,
including by decriminalizing certain offenses, pointing out that the
ratio of prisoners to rehabilitation officers is very poor.
The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes
this prohibition. Courts rather than prosecutors issue arrest warrants.
The law allows a 48-hour detention period before authorities are
required to bring a defendant before a court and an additional 24 hours
for the court to decide whether to issue a pretrial detention order.
During this period, access to a lawyer normally is limited. Once a
prosecutor presents the legal basis for a formal investigation, the law
provides for access to counsel. Detainees may be held in pretrial
detention for up to 3 months and may challenge the legality of an
arrest through appeal to the district court. A court may extend this
pretrial confinement period every 3 months for up to 18 months until
the trial date. Bail is available, and most detainees are released on
bail pending trial.
The Government does not employ forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. However, the judiciary remains inefficient and lacks
resources and public confidence.
The Government is restructuring the court system in order to
streamline and accelerate the legal process. At present there is a
four-tiered court and prosecutorial structure. The courts consist of
regional, provincial, and appellate divisions, as well as a Supreme
Court. These tiers are subdivided further into five parts: Military,
civil, criminal, labor, and family. Regional courts are courts of first
instance, while appellate courts are charged solely with appeals.
Provincial courts have a dual responsibility, handling appeals from
regional courts while enjoying original jurisdiction for the most
serious types of offenses. Appellate courts handle appeals tried at the
provincial level, and the Supreme Court handles appeals only about
questions of law. The prosecutorial system mirrors the court structure
with national, provincial, appellate, and regional offices.
Judges are nominated by the National Judicial Council and appointed
by the President. They are appointed for life and can be reassigned but
not dismissed, except by a court decision. The Constitutional Tribunal
rules on the constitutionality of legislation. In October
Constitutional Tribunal decisions became final and binding, after a 2-
year interim period following the entry into force of the new
Constitution during which a two-thirds majority in the Sejm could
overrule its decisions.
The court system is cumbersome, poorly administered, overstaffed,
and underfunded. There are numerous inefficiencies, most notably the
fact that many districts have more criminal judges than prosecutors.
These factors contribute to a lack of public confidence. Many effective
judges and prosecutors have left public service for the more lucrative
private sector. Court decisions frequently are not implemented.
Bailiffs normally ensure the execution of civil verdicts such as damage
payments and evictions. However, according to some observers, they are
underpaid, subject to intimidation and bribery, and have a mixed record
of implementing court decisions. Civil and administrative rulings
against public institutions such as hospitals often cannot be enforced
due to a lack of funds. Simple civil cases can take as long as 2 to 3
years before resolution, and the pretrial waiting time in criminal
cases can be several months. The backlog and the costs of legal action
appear to deter many citizens from using the justice system at all,
particularly in civil matters such as divorce. The long wait for
routine court decisions in commercial matters is an incentive for
bribery and corruption.
All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. At the
end of a trial the court renders its decision orally and then has 7
days to prepare a written decision. A defendant has the right to appeal
within 14 days of the written decision. Appeals may be made on the
basis of new evidence or procedural irregularities.
Criminal cases are tried in regional and provincial courts by a
panel consisting of a professional judge and two lay assessors. The
seriousness of the offense determines which is the court of first
instance. Once formal charges are filed, the defendant is allowed to
study the charges and consult with an attorney, who is provided at
public expense if necessary. Once the defendant is prepared, a trial
date is set. Defendants are required to be present during trial and may
present evidence and confront witnesses in their own defense. Since
1995 prosecutors have had the authority to grant witnesses anonymity at
trial if they express fear of retribution from the defendant. This law,
designed to help combat organized crime, impairs defendants' right to
confront their accusers. In 1996 reforms were made that provide for a
two-level appeal process in most civil and criminal matters;
previously, citizens enjoyed access only to a one-step appeal process.
Trials are normally public. However, the courts reserve the right
to close a trial to the public in some circumstances, such as divorce
cases, trials in which state secrets may be disclosed, or cases whose
content might offend ``public morality.'' The courts rarely invoke this
prerogative.
The new Criminal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure went into
effect in September 1998. However, a March 1998 ruling by the European
Court of Human Rights already may necessitate changes. The Court
unanimously ruled that a provincial appellate court's examination of
the verdict in the presence of the prosecutor, but not the defendant or
his representative, infringed on the European Convention on Human
Rights provisions concerning fair trial.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right to privacy of
correspondence; however, the Government maintains, without outside
review, a large number of wiretaps. There is no legislation that
provides for the general right to privacy. However, a 1998 law
prohibits the collection of information about a person's ethnic origin,
religious convictions, health condition, political views, or membership
in religious, political, or trade union organizations. The law allows
for certain exceptions, specifically, the gathering of information
without a person's permission by courts, hospitals, or organizations if
the information pertains to their members. All exceptions are subject
to some restrictions. A few continuing practices (such as a requirement
to fill out ``creed'' or ``nationality'' items in some questionnaires)
became illegal, effective April 30. Violators of these provisions are
subject to imprisonment for up to 3 years.
In response to the growing threat of organized crime and money
laundering, Parliament permitted the police and intelligence services
to monitor private correspondence and to use wiretaps and electronic
monitoring devices in cases involving serious crimes, narcotics, money
laundering, or illegal arms sales. Under the Criminal Code, the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior, both political
appointees, must authorize these investigative methods. In emergency
cases, the police may initiate an investigation that utilizes wiretaps
or the opening of private correspondence at the same time that they
seek permission from the ministers. Estimates on the number of
wiretapping devices installed annually at the request of the police
vary widely; however, a high-ranking public prosecutor in 1998 put the
number at 4,000. After interventions by the human rights Ombudsman, the
Prosecutor General curtailed the number of warrants for wiretapping.
Levels are now reportedly back at pre-1998 levels, over 4,000.
Parliamentarians and human rights groups expressed concern about
the lack of control over this type of surveillance. There is no
independent judicial review of surveillance activities, nor is there
any control over how the information derived from these investigations
is used. A growing number of agencies have access to wiretap
information, and the Police Code allows electronic surveillance to be
used for the prevention of crime as well as for investigative purposes.
As is the case under the Criminal Code, police must obtain permission
from the Ministers of Justice and Interior before initiating wiretap
procedures.
In September 1997, the special Sejm Committee on Security Services
announced that the Office of State Protection (UOP) ``may have'' acted
illegally against rightwing politicians in 1993, allegedly carrying out
activities such as the forging of documents in order to discredit
rightwing parliamentary candidates. After further investigation, the
Warsaw prosecutor's office announced in August that it was
discontinuing the investigation, having concluded that the UOP had not
violated the law. In October one of the alleged victims in the case
announced that he would appeal the discontinuation of the case.
The law forbids arbitrary forced entry into homes. Search warrants
issued by a prosecutor are required in order to enter private
residences. In emergency cases, when a prosecutor is not immediately
available, police may enter a residence with the approval of the local
police commander. In the most urgent cases, in which there is no time
to consult with the police commander, police may enter a private
residence after showing their official identification. There were no
reports that police abused search warrant procedures.
A law on ``lustration'' or vetting went into effect in November
1998. The law is designed to expose former government officials and
parliamentarians who collaborated with the Communist-era secret police,
and it bans from office for 10 years those caught lying about their
past. The law requires officials to provide sworn affidavits concerning
their possible cooperation with the secret police; a public interest
spokesman then verifies the affidavits and brings suspected cases of
misrepresentation before the lustration court, a special three-judge
panel created during the year whose decisions may be appealed. The law
was judged constitutional by the Constitutional Tribunal, but human
rights groups and some opposition politicians have expressed concern
that the procedures may be unfair, in view of the likelihood that
records were subject to loss or tampering. Critics of the law have
charged that lustration has created a ``witch-hunt'' atmosphere in
which leaks of the names of potential investigative targets and
protracted investigations have destroyed the principle of the
presumption of innocence and violated the ``moral rights'' of the
accused.
In June 1998, the Constitutional Tribunal ruled unconstitutional a
1997 draft law envisioning the possible removal from service of judges
proven to have violated judicial independence by issuing unjust
verdicts between 1944 and 1989 at the request of the Communist
authorities. Disciplinary proceedings against the judges in question
were to be initiated by the Minister of Justice, the presidents of the
appellate or regional courts, the National Judiciary Council, or
individuals who felt wronged by court verdicts. In December 1998, the
Sejm addressed the issue that concerned the Constitutional Tribunal and
adopted amendments to the law requiring that procedures against accused
judges be initiated before December 31, 2002. The law went into effect
in January.
Men are not permitted to marry without parental permission until
the age of 21, whereas women may marry at the age of 18 (see Section
5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects this
right; however, there are some marginal restrictions in law and
practice. Nonetheless, the press is vigorous and independent.
The new Criminal Code states that an individual who ``publicly
insults or humiliates a constitutional institution of the Republic of
Poland'' is subject to a fine or imprisonment of up to 2 years, while
an individual who insults a public functionary is subject to a fine or
imprisonment of up to 1 year. In December the trial began in Elblag in
the case of Andrzej Lepper, who was accused of insulting Prime Minister
Jerzy Buzek and state officials in January. Prosecutors charge that
during a road blockade in Nowy Dwor Gdanski, Lepper called Buzek's
cabinet a ``government of national betrayal, a government of
dilettantes, traitors to Poland.'' He is said to have called the Prime
Minister and another political leader ``bandits and criminals.''
President Aleksander Kwasniewski's case against Zycie for accusing him
of contacts with Russian spies was ongoing at year's end. This
provision of the Criminal Code also can be used by individual citizens
and businesses ``to protect their good name.'' In March 1998, Network
Twenty One, which sells Amway products, and seven of its employees used
the provision to prevent the broadcast, showing, or copying of a 1-hour
documentary critical of the company and its practices. When Public
Television Channel One announced plans to broadcast the film, Network
Twenty One took the matter to court and won a temporary restraining
order. Many leading journalists and media figures criticized the
court's decision as a form of censorship. Since that time, the
controversy has led to several different cases. Although a regional
court in Lodz acquitted the filmmakers of Network Twenty One's charges,
several complicating factors are still at issue in ongoing litigation
and appeals. The documentary will not be broadcast until all current
litigation on the matter is concluded.
In Szczecin the Bryza housing company brought suit against the
weekly Nowy Kurier, due to a series of articles involving the firm's
business practices. Bryza charged the newspaper with defaming its
``good name'' and asked the court to prohibit the newspaper from
printing critical articles on the company or gathering any information
on it. A Szczecin district court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on
both of these points in July. Several other cases decided during the
year follow the precedent set in the Bryza case.
The case against talk show host Wojciech Cejrowski, charged with
publicly insulting President Kwasniewski, was postponed several times
before being decided against the defendant April 1998. It since has
been appealed and still was pending decision at year's end. Also
pending was a 1995 case against presidential candidate Leszek Bubel for
violating a section of the Penal Code that prohibits acts that
``publicly insult, ridicule, and deride the Polish nation, the Polish
Republic, its political system, or its principal organs.'' Bubel had
claimed publicly that a former head of the presidential Chancellery
protected a group of criminals.
In January the European Court of Human Rights ruled in the case in
which a Polish court had convicted a journalist of verbally insulting
two municipal guards in 1992. The Court ruled that the verdict in the
case did not constitute a breach of Article 10 of the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
There was no progress during the year in the ongoing investigation
into the case of Mikolaj Siwicki for publishing an allegedly hate-
mongering book that could damage the nation's interests.
The new Criminal Code also stipulates that offending religious
sentiment through public speech is punishable by a fine or a 3-year
prison term. In 1995 a provincial court charged presidential candidate
Leszek Bubel with violating this article by publishing a pamphlet
containing anti-Semitic ``humor.'' A verdict still is pending. In July
the Warsaw district court revoked the 1998 decision of prosecutors not
to start proceedings against the leftist newspaper Trybuna for
insulting Pope John Paul II in one of its articles. In 1997 Tadeusz
Rydzyk and All-Polish Youth director Roman Giertych, both acting on
behalf of the Council for the Coordination of the Defense of the
Dignity of Poland and Poles, originally filed charges against Trybuna
for its alleged insults of the Pope. Rydzyk and Giertych were offended
particularly by the characterization of the Pope as a ``boorish
vicar,'' by the reference to one of his statements as ``dirty and
mumbling,'' and by the suggestion that he used his position to make
slanderous statements. In April 1998, the Warsaw prosecutor's office
decided to drop the case. Subsequently some 1,500 persons appealed to
the Warsaw district court to reopen the case.
The State Secrets Act allows for the prosecution of citizens who
publish or otherwise betray state secrets. Human rights groups
criticize this law, since it restricts the right of free speech of
private citizens.
The new Criminal Code regulates the protection of journalistic
sources. The code grants news sources absolute protection, except in
cases involving national security, murder, and terrorist acts. Pursuant
to the law, statutory provisions are applied retroactively if their
terms are beneficial to the accused. Journalists who refused to divulge
sources prior to the new code's enactment also can avoid sanctions by
invoking ``journalistic privilege.''
There is no restriction on the establishment of private newspapers
or distribution of journals; private newspapers and magazines flourish.
There was no progress in the ongoing privatization of RUCH, a national
network of newspaper kiosks.
The National Radio and Television Broadcasting Council (KRRiTV) has
broad powers in monitoring and regulating programming on radio and
television, allocating broadcasting frequencies and licenses, and
apportioning subscription revenues to public media. In order to
encourage the KRRiTV's apolitical character, the nine KRRiTV members
are obliged legally to suspend any membership in political parties or
public associations. However, they are chosen for their political
allegiances and nominated by the Sejm, the Senate, and the President
following political bargaining, thus raising potentially serious
questions about the independence of broadcasting oversight from
political influence. In the fall, the program director of the
Television Information Agency resigned and charged that he was put
under political pressure by the Polish Peasant Party (PSL). He claimed
that supporters of the PSL on his staff were giving disproportionate
coverage to the party's activities.
The broadcasting law stipulates that programs should not promote
activities that are illegal or against state policy, morality, or the
common good. The law, whose constitutionality has been confirmed by the
Constitutional Tribunal, requires that all broadcasts ``respect the
religious feelings of the audiences and in particular respect the
Christian system of values.'' This provision never has been used as a
means of censorship, although the restrictions theoretically could be
used as such.
Private television broadcasters operate on frequencies selected by
the Ministry of Communications and auctioned by the KRRiTV. The first
auction in 1994 gave Polsat Corporation and some smaller local and
religious stations licenses to broadcast, while additional licenses
were granted to TVN and Nasza Telewizja in 1997. Private radio
flourishes on the local, regional, and national levels alongside public
radio.
The Government owns 2 of the 3 most widely viewed television
channels and 17 regional stations, as well as 5 national radio
networks. PAP, the national wire service, was privatized partially in
December 1997, and a five-member supervisory board is preparing the
service for full privatization. Although public television remains the
major source of news and information, satellite television and private
cable services (domestic and foreign) are widely available. Cable
services carry the main public channels, Polsat, local and regional
stations, and a variety of foreign stations.
The law on radio and television requires public television to
provide direct media access to the main state institutions, including
the presidency, ``to make presentations or explanations of public
policy.'' The President and the Prime Minister have complained
occasionally of the other's abuse of the access privilege. Both public
and private radio and television provide coverage of all ranges of
political opinion.
Books expressing a wide range of political and social viewpoints
are widely available, as are foreign periodicals and other publications
from abroad.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Permits are not necessary for public meetings but are
required for public demonstrations; demonstration organizers must
obtain these permits from local authorities if the demonstration might
block a public road. For large demonstrations, organizers also are
required to inform the local police of the time and place of their
activities and their planned route. Every gathering must have a
chairperson who is required to open the demonstration, preside over it,
and close it. In several instances there were clashes between police
and demonstrators during the year. Some of these involved roadblocks
set up by farmers to protest the Government's agricultural policies. In
some cases when police moved in to disperse the roadblocks, conflict
ensued. For example, in August between 50 and 123 policemen and between
5 and 20 civilians were injured in the town of Bartoszyce when police
forcibly removed an illegal roadblock set up by protesting farmers. Two
of the most controversial confrontations between police and
demonstrators occurred during the summer, when in June 50 policemen and
4 trade unionists were injured in clashes in front of the National
Defense Ministry building and when in August police used rubber bullets
to disperse farmers who were occupying the provincial administrative
office building in Olsztyn (see Section 1.c.).
Beginning on January 22, as many as 8,000 farmers raised roadblocks
at more than 100 locations around the country to protest the
Government's failure to improve the country's agricultural sector. On
January 25, violent clashes occurred in Lubliniec, where police used
water cannons and tear gas to break up the roadblock but retreated
after the farmers shot streams of liquid manure at the officers. In
Nowy Dwor Gdanski there were injuries among both police officers and
protesting farmers after the police used water cannons to disperse the
farmers, and the farmers responded with gasoline bombs. On February 8,
after 2 weeks of disruptive farmers' protests, the Government and three
agricultural unions reached a preliminary agreement on government steps
to address short-term problems in the agricultural sector. However, the
small radical farmers' union, Samoobrona, rejected the agreement and
called for farmers to continue blocking roads. On February 8 and 9,
police officers cleared the fewer than 10 remaining roadblocks. At one
roadblock outside of Warsaw, police reportedly used rubber bullets,
tear gas, and a water cannon to disperse protesters, injuring two
police officers and one farmer.
In May farmers again set up roadblocks at some 90 locations
throughout the country to protest agricultural policies. Police
officers used force in eight locations to clear the protesters from the
roads. Violent clashes occurred in Nowy Dwor Gdanski, where several
protesters and police officers were hospitalized. The protests ended
after the Government signed an agreement with the farmers on minimum
state prices for grain.
In June about 50 policemen, 4 trade unionists from the Lucznik arms
factory in Radom, and 1 photographer were injured in clashes in front
of the National Defense Ministry building. Some 500 police officers
used water cannons and rubber bullets to pacify about 800 demonstrating
workers when they started to remove barriers guarding the entrance to
the building and began to throw paving stones, heavy screws, and eggs
at police. The Nasz Dziennik photographer was hit in the eye with a
rubber bullet and as result had to have the eye removed. An
investigative commission set up by the Ministry of the Interior later
ruled that the force used by police was justified and in accordance
with the law. The commission's report found that 4 police officers
fired a total of 42 shots with rubber bullets, and it advised that
regulations governing the use of rubber bullets be made more precise.
There are no provisions that regulate the distance from which police
may fire rubber bullets at persons.
In August approximately 400 farmers occupied the provincial
administrative office building in Olsztyn. The farmers, who were armed
with wooden boards and chains, barricaded the front door of the
building, while the regional governor locked himself in his office. The
farmers became violent, and conflict erupted when police moved in to
remove them by force. Some 13 police officers and 6 farmers were
injured during the clash. In initial statements and press reports
police insisted that they had used only batons to disperse the
protesters, but later the fact emerged that they had fired rubber
bullets as well.
On August 19, police used batons, tear gas, a water cannon, and
rubber bullets to break up an illegal roadblock by farmers in
Bartoszyce. The farmers, who were protesting against the Government's
agricultural policies, refused to cooperate with police and became
violent when police attempted to disperse them. Police were hit by
paving stones thrown from the crowd of bystanders as the officers used
batons, a water cannon, and tear gas to disperse the rioting farmers.
Police finally used rubber bullets to restore peace. Some 83 police
officers and a dozen civilians were injured during the clash.
Prosecutors opened an investigation into the incident.
In July 1998, a parade to be held as part of the first gay pride
festival was called off after Warsaw municipal authorities denied
approval, arguing that it was not a cultural event. Gay rights
activists view the denial as discrimination.
The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
generally respects this right in practice. Private associations need
government approval to organize and must register with their district
court. The procedure essentially requires the organization to sign a
declaration that commits it to abide by the law. However, in practice
the procedure is complicated and may be subject to the discretion of
the judge in charge.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. Citizens
enjoy the freedom to practice any faith they choose. Religious groups
may organize, select, and train personnel, solicit and receive
contributions, publish, and engage in consultations without government
interference. There are 14 religious groups in the country whose
relationship with the State is governed by specific legislation and 140
other religious communities. The legislation outlines the internal
structure of the religious groups, their activities, and procedures for
property restitution. There are no government restrictions on
establishing and maintaining places of worship. More than 95 percent of
Poles are Roman Catholic, but Eastern Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and
much smaller Protestant, Jewish, and Muslim congregations meet freely.
Although the Constitution provides for the separation of church and
state, a crucifix hangs in both the upper and lower houses of
Parliament. State-run radio broadcasts Catholic Mass on Sundays, and
the Catholic Church is authorized to relicense radio and television
stations to operate on frequencies assigned to the Church, the only
body outside the KRRiTV allowed to do so.
Religious communities may register with the Government, but they
are not required to do so and may function freely without registration.
Although the Constitution gives parents the right to bring up their
children in compliance with their own religious and philosophical
beliefs, religious education classes continue to be taught in the
public schools at public expense. While children are supposed to have
the choice between religious instruction and ethics, the Ombudsman's
office states that in most schools ethics courses are not offered due
to financial constraints. Catholic Church representatives are employed
to teach religious classes in the schools. Such classes constitute the
vast majority of all religious education classes offered, since the
population of the country is approximately 95 percent Catholic.
However, parents can request religious classes in any of the religions
legally registered, including Protestant, Orthodox, and Jewish
religious instruction. Such non-Catholic religious instruction exists
in practice, although it is not common, and the Ministry of Education
pays the instructors. Priests receive salaries from the state budget
for teaching religion in public schools.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although the Constitution does not
address freedom of movement, the Government does not restrict internal
or foreign travel. Citizens who leave the country have no trouble
returning. There are no restrictions on emigration.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. There were no reports of the forced repatriation of persons
with a valid claim to refugee status. Foreigners recognized as refugees
under the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol are granted full refugee status and permission to
remain permanently. According to UNHCR figures, 2,864 individuals
applied for refugee status during the year. Of the total number of
applications awaiting decision (including applications carried over
from 1998), 46 were approved, 2,404 were rejected, and 762 were
otherwise discontinued.
A law on immigration signed by the President in 1997 took effect in
December of that year. Human rights organizations generally view the
Aliens Act as positive. The law gives all prospective refugees access
to a procedure for adjudicating refugee status and establishes an
independent board to which prospective refugees can appeal negative
status decisions by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This board has
been fully operational since January, and refugee advocates noted that
it serves as an impartial and independent adjudicator of appeals. The
law does not recognize the concept of first asylum or any other form of
temporary protection.
A 1998 Helsinki Foundation Report, drafted after extensive
monitoring of eight of the country's major border crossings, provided a
generally favorable assessment of the country's treatment of refugees.
While critical of the general unavailability of interpreters and
informational leaflets printed in different languages, the report
points out that border officials were acquainted with the contents of
the aliens law, particularly those provisions relating to the
application for refugee status, and were well prepared for their
duties. During the year, the Government cooperated with the UNHCR and
the Polish NGO Caritas in a new program monitoring portions of the
country's eastern and western borders from offices in Bialystok and
Zgorzelec. The UNHCR reports that the Government has been cooperative
as the offices monitor relevant issues such as tracking asylum seekers.
Although some observers had criticized the authorities for using
deportation centers in place of refugee centers (when the latter are
full), as well as for long delays in the initial review of refugee
status applications, the Government no longer uses deportation centers
as refugee centers, and the UNHCR received no complaints about the
Government's handling of refugee processing.
In April 1998, responsibility for the administration of the program
that helps refugees integrate into society was transferred from the
Office for Migration and Refugee Affairs at the Ministry of Internal
Affairs to the Department of Social Assistance at the Ministry of
Labor. The Ministry of Labor, in turn, passed responsibility for the
program's implementation to authorities at the local level but
initially failed to provide local officials with the information or
personnel resources necessary to carry out the task effectively.
Advocates for refugees complained that as a result of the transfer, the
program ground to a halt in 1998 and left many recently recognized
refugees without even the basic necessities of daily life. The
Government cooperated with the UNHCR in the latter half of 1998 and in
1999 to become better informed about possible solutions to the
situation, by taking part in visitors' programs in which government
officials traveled to Western countries to study different integration
techniques. The results are inconclusive thus far.
The UNHCR expressed concern during the year over the fate of
unaccompanied children seeking asylum in the country. It urged that
procedures and practices concerning the appointment and maintenance of
supervisors and guardians for minors be improved.
In June 1998, the Warsaw High Administrative Court ruled in favor
of a petitioner who was denied refugee status in January of the same
year. The Ministry of Internal Affairs had refused the petitioner's
application on the grounds that it had not been submitted ``upon''
crossing the border (as required under Article 37 of the Aliens Act),
but 2 days later. The High Court declared this original ruling invalid,
noting that the article fails to define a specific time period and that
neither the Aliens Act nor the administrative code concerning the
documentation of aliens addresses the legal consequences of failing to
submit a refugee status application at the border. This ruling turned
out to be less far-reaching than advocates for refugees had hoped, and
the Ministry of Internal Affairs refused some subsequent cases on the
same grounds in 1998 and 1999. However, in September the Court issued
an oral decision that observers believe may compel the Ministry to
accept a broader definition of the time limits involved in the
application process.
The UNHCR noted that the Government handled the Kosovo refugee
crisis very effectively. It accepted 1,048 refugees, paid for their
support, and housed them primarily in former dormitories and hostels.
Although refugee advocates noted a slow start by the Government in
mobilizing supplies, it rapidly increased aid and coordinated necessary
equipment. Although there is no humanitarian status law that allows
refugees to remain in the country in temporary protective status, the
UNHCR noted the Government's flexibility in finding alternative visa
solutions. Refugees were given 1-year temporary-resident visas
entitling them to work legally while in the country.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right and ability to change their government
peacefully. This right is provided for in the Constitution and exists
in practice. Poland is a multiparty democracy in which all citizens 18
years of age and older have the right to vote and to cast secret
ballots. A permanent, democratic constitution entered into force in
1997.
Executive power is divided between the President and a government
chosen by the Sejm, or lower house of Parliament. There is also an
upper house (the Senate). The Constitution provides for parliamentary
elections at least every 4 years. The President, elected for 5 years,
has the right, in certain very limited cases and after seeking the
opinion of the Speakers of the Sejm and the Senate, to shorten the
Sejm's term of office. Whenever the Sejm's term of office is shortened,
the Senate's term automatically is shortened as well. Parliament may
impeach the President.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Only 13
percent of parliamentarians are women, while 2 of the 23 cabinet
ministers are women. The Speaker of the Senate is the only female
parliamentary leader, and none of the leaders of the nation's largest
political parties are women.
Two members of the German minority party are Members of Parliament.
The electoral law exempts ethnic minority parties from the requirement
to win 5 percent of the vote nationwide in order to qualify for seats
in individual districts.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials generally are cooperative and
responsive to their views.
The Helsinki Foundation, a major NGO, conducts human rights
investigations without government interference. Members of the
Foundation report that the Government displays a generally positive and
helpful attitude towards human rights investigations. However, some
domestic NGO's believe that a hostile regulatory climate is developing
in parts of the government bureaucracy.
The Office of the Commissioner for Civil Rights Protection (the
Ombudsman), established in 1987, is the Government's watchdog for human
rights. The Ombudsman's office is an effective, independent body with
broad authority to investigate alleged violations of civil rights and
liberties. The Ombudsman registers each reported case and files
grievances, where appropriate, with the relevant government office. He
has no legislative authority and is sworn to act apolitically. The
Government cooperates with his office.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that ``no one shall be discriminated
against in political, social, or economic life for any reason
whatsoever.'' The Government attempts to ensure that these provisions
are observed; however, violence and societal discrimination against
women and ethnic minorities persist.
Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. Women's
rights advocates report that unofficial statistics are similar to those
of previous years, though there are no recent comprehensive surveys. In
1996 some 9 percent of women polled by the Public Opinion Research
Center admitted to being beaten repeatedly by their husbands. Women's
organizations assert that the number of women suffering from domestic
abuse is probably much higher. They explain that battered women usually
refuse to admit abuse even to themselves. Violence against women
remains hidden, surrounded by taboos and accompanied by shame and
guilt, particularly in small towns and villages. Government and police
statistics do not differentiate between male and female victims of
violence. Police intervene in cases of domestic violence, and husbands
can be convicted for beating their wives. In 1998 the police in
cooperation with the State Agency for Solving Alcoholic Problems
introduced the so-called ``blue card,'' a record-keeping system
designed to better document incidents of spousal abuse. Sentences for
abuse of family members range from 3 months to 5 years, or from 2 to 10
years if the victim attempts suicide as a result of the abuse. However,
statistics suggest that a large majority of convictions result in
suspended sentences. According to NGO's the courts often treat domestic
violence as a minor crime, pronounce lenient verdicts, or dismiss
cases. A seminar on combating violence against women organized by the
Women's Rights Center in March came to a similar conclusion on the
topic. Former victims of violence participating in the seminar
complained about investigations that dragged on for several months
(although this is a common complaint for nearly all types of court
cases), as well as about procedures that were intimidating, unfamiliar,
and unfriendly. According to the latest Women's Rights Center report,
there has been significant progress in awareness of the issue of
violence against women. It has become more visible in the media, and an
increasing number of NGO's are addressing the problem. The U.N.
Development Program currently is developing a program in cooperation
with the Government's Plenipoteniary for Family Affairs to prevent
family violence by opening centers to assist families with violence
problems and training people working with victims of family violence.
However, the Women's Rights Center criticized the program and argued
that it will fail to empower women who are victims of domestic
violence.
The law has no provision for restraining orders to protect battered
women against further abuse. For example, in divorce cases courts
frequently grant a divorce but do not issue a property settlement,
sending the woman back to live with the abusive husband. This problem
is exacerbated by a lack of alternative housing in the country. Women's
advocacy groups also have complained about the small number of state-
supported shelters for battered women.
According to police statistics, the frequency of rape is
decreasing. During the year, there were 2,029 cases reported, compared
with 2,174 in 1998 and 2,250 in 1997. NGO's report that women often are
unwilling to report the crime, so these figures are likely deceiving.
NGO's estimate that the number of actual rapes is ten times higher than
reported statistics suggest.
Trafficking in women is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Public discussion of the problem of sexual harassment is relatively
new, but women increasingly are talking about the problem and speaking
out against it. According to statistics released by the Public Opinion
Research Center in June, 28 percent of women admitted to being
harassed. While laws specifically addressing sexual harassment do not
exist, social awareness is increasing, as are mechanisms with the
potential to deal with the problem. For example, the new Criminal Code
states that persons who take advantage of a position of power in a
relationship to gain sexual gratification may be sentenced to up to 3
years in prison. According to a Supreme Court advisory opinion, such a
relationship can occur between employers and employees, between
supervisors and subordinates, or between teachers and students.
However, this provision can be used only when sexual harassment occurs
between a supervisor and an individual in a subordinate position. It
may not be used when harassment occurs between persons of equal rank.
The Constitution provides for equal rights regardless of sex and
grants women equal rights with men in all areas of family, political,
social, and economic life, including equal compensation for work of
similar value. However, in practice women frequently are paid less for
equivalent work, mainly hold lower level positions, are discharged more
quickly, and are less likely to be promoted than men. According to the
1998 government statistical bulletin, men have a higher employment rate
(59 percent) than women (39 percent), and women have a higher
unemployment rate (12 percent) than men (9 percent). Despite a
generally higher level of education, women earn on average 30 percent
less than men. In August the U.N. Human Rights Commission expressed its
concern about the situation and agreed that women are discriminated
against in the labor market.
Women are employed in a wide variety of professions and
occupations, and a number of women occupy high positions in government
and in the private sector. Although clauses in social insurance law had
limited child sick care benefits only to women, since June, both men
and women have the right to child sick care. The new pension law passed
in late 1998 did not change the mandatory earlier retirement for women
at age 60 (65 for men). As a result women get about 60 percent of the
average pension that men receive. The law does not address equality in
hiring practices (there are no legal penalties for discriminatory
behavior in this area), and advertisements for jobs frequently indicate
a gender preference. Although women have access to a number of
previously forbidden careers since the Labor Code was modified in 1996,
they still are prevented from working underground or in jobs that
require heavy lifting. In March the Parliament failed to approve the
proposed law on equal status that would have remedied some of these
inequalities. Apart from the Constitution there is no other legal
provision for equal rights for women.
The Ombudsman for Human Rights monitors the rights of women within
the broader context of human rights. Observers note that the broad
scope of the office's mandate dilutes its ability to function as an
effective advocate of women's issues. Within the Cabinet, in 1997 the
government Plenipotentiary for Family Affairs replaced the government
Plenipotentiary for Women and the Family, a change that many women's
rights groups perceived as an example of discrimination. There are
several women's rights NGO's. Among the most notable are the Polish
Foundation for Women and Family Planning and the Women's Rights Center.
These groups are active advocates of gender equality and advance their
goals through research, monitoring, and publishing. There are several
church-sponsored women's advocacy organizations, but their cooperation
with other women's NGO's is limited.
As of January 1, women have the same right as men to transmit
citizenship to their foreign-born spouses.
Children.--The Constitution extends some state protection to the
family and children and provides for the appointment of an ombudsman
for children's rights. However, an ombudsman had not been appointed,
since Parliament passed legislation that was awaiting the President's
signature at year's end. Education is mandatory until age 18, and
public schools are free of charge. The Government sponsors some health
programs targeted specifically at children, including a vaccination
program and periodic checkups conducted in the schools. However, in
reality budget shortfalls prevent complete implementation of these
programs. There are no procedures in schools to protect children from
abuse by teachers; in fact, the teachers' work code provides legal
immunity from prosecution for the use of corporal punishment in
classrooms.
There were reports in 1998 that prostitution among 12- and 13-year-
olds was increasing. Violence against children is illegal. A provision
of the new Criminal Code threatens those who physically or
psychologically abuse a juvenile with a prison sentence of 3 months to
5 years. If the victim attempts suicide the sentence is increased, as
it is if the perpetrator is found to have acted with extreme cruelty.
Abuse rarely is reported, and convictions for child abuse are even more
rare. There is no societal pattern of abuse of children; however,
trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
Young men and women are treated unequally in terms of the age of
majority. Men and women reach majority at the age of 18 under the Civil
Code. However, a young woman can reach majority at the age of 16 if she
has entered into marriage with the consent of her parents and the
guardianship court. In addition, men are not permitted to marry without
parental consent until the age of 21, whereas women may do so at the
age of 18. Lawmakers' rationale for this difference in treatment is the
assumption that it is better that men entering compulsory military
service not be encumbered with families.
People with Disabilities.--There were approximately 5 million
disabled persons in 1996, and the number is expected to reach 6 million
by the year 2010. In 1995 the Central Bureau of Statistics (GUS)
reported that 17 percent of disabled persons able to work are
unemployed. Advocacy groups claim that the percentage is much higher.
GUS data from 1997 indicate that 57 percent of the disabled have no
more than an elementary school education, compared with 30 percent of
those without disabilities and that only 3.5 percent have a university
education, compared with 7.7 percent of the nondisabled.
The Constitution provides for aid to disabled persons ``to ensure
their subsistence, professional training, and social communication,''
and a number of laws protect the rights of the disabled. However,
implementation falls short of rights set forth in the legislation.
Public buildings and transportation generally are not accessible to the
disabled. Current law provides only that buildings ``should be
accessible.''
The law creates a state fund for the rehabilitation of the disabled
that derives its assets from a tax on employers of over 50 persons,
unless 6 percent of the employer's work force are disabled persons.
While the fund has adequate resources, its management has encountered
difficulties, including frequent changes in leadership. According to
press reports, the fund has 4,000 grant applications pending. In
addition, the fund by law cannot be used to assist disabled children,
that is, persons under 16 years of age.
A 1996 law allows individuals from certain disability groups to
take up gainful employment without the risk of losing their disability
benefits. Previously, disabled individuals from those groups lost their
benefits once they began to work.
Religious Minorities.--Current law places Protestant, Catholic,
Orthodox, and Jewish communities on the same legal footing, and the
Government attempted to address the problems that minority religious
groups face. Among the most important of these problems is the issue of
restitution. These laws allow for the return of churches and
synagogues, cemeteries, and community headquarters, as well as
buildings that were used for other religious, educational, or
charitable activities. The laws included time limits for filing claims;
in several cases the deadlines have expired, and no additional claims
may be filed. However, restitution commissions (composed of
representatives of the government and the religious community) are
continuing to adjudicate previously filed claims. The Government
established four separate commissions to process the claims of the
Catholic, Lutheran, and Orthodox Churches, and the Jewish community. A
fifth commission to handle the claims of other religious groups was not
yet active at year's end.
The time limit for applications by the Catholic Church expired in
December 1991. As of the summer, 2,285 of the 3,038 claims filed by the
Church had been concluded, with 1,028 claims settled by agreement
between the Church and the party in possession of the property (usually
the national or a local government), 834 properties were returned
through decision of the Commission on Property Restitution, which rules
on disputed claims, 412 claims were rejected, and 11 cases were likely
to go to court. Claims by the local Jewish community (whose deadline
for filing claims under the 1997 law governing relations with the
Government expires in 2002) are being filed slowly. Only some 418
claims had been filed by the end of November, mainly because the
country's Jewish community lacks the information and financial
resources to prepare claims more quickly. Of the 379 claims for which
procedures had begun, the commission on property restitution considered
264; 78 cases were closed; and in 55 cases, ownership was transferred
to Jewish communities, who also have received some $650,000 (2.5
million PLN) in compensation for properties that could not be returned.
In other cases the commission directed the parties to reach a
settlement or submit new documentation. As of early 1999, Lutheran
claims for 1,200 properties had resulted in 288 cases being closed with
the return of the properties in question (the deadline for filing such
claims was July 1996). Some 75 of the 189 properties claimed by the
Orthodox Church have been returned (the deadline for filing such claims
was August 1993).
However, laws on religious property do not address the private
property of any group. In September the Government's council of
Ministers approved a draft reprivatization law. The original draft,
which would permit former Polish citizens no longer living in the
country to file claims for property they or their families owned, was
amended by a Sejm committee in December to require claimants to possess
current Polish citizenship and to have resided in the country for the
past 5 years. These changes effectively would make it impossible to
address the claims of many Poles and Jews living abroad. The Government
remains opposed to the committee's changes and is to seek approval of
the bill's original version when the issue is considered by the full
Sejm.
Anti-Semitic feelings persist among certain sectors of the
population, occasionally manifesting themselves in acts of vandalism
and physical or verbal abuse. However, it is not always clear that
vandalism of graves is anti-Semitic in nature. Police note that every
year there are numerous incidents of vandalism at Catholic cemeteries.
For example, in March vandals desecrated graves at a Catholic cemetery
in Bytom, in some cases uprooting stone cross gravestones and
transplanting them upside down. Moreover, surveys in recent years show
a continuing decline in anti-Semitic sentiment, and avowedly anti-
Semitic candidates fare very poorly in elections.
In March 1998, a controversy arose over the ``Pope's Cross,''
located on the grounds of a former Carmelite convent in Oswiecim
adjacent to the Auschwitz concentration camp museum. The cross
originally adorned the altar at a mass conducted by Pope John Paul II
near Birkenau in 1979 and was erected at the site of the Carmelite
mission in 1989. After the Plenipotentiary for Relations with the
Jewish Diaspora announced in 1998 that the cross would be removed, as
disrespectful of the Jewish legacy at Auschwitz, a large group of
government and nongovernment leaders went on record as opposing the
removal of the cross. Two radical rightwing groups also emerged that
opposed the plan. Throughout 1998 and the first half of 1999, radical
nationalist anti-Semites erected dozens of additional crosses outside
Auschwitz, despite the opposition of the country's bishops. In May the
Parliament passed a government-sponsored law to protect the sites of
all the former camps in the country. The Government consulted with
international Jewish groups in preparing the law, which gave the
Government the power it needed to resolve the issue of the ``new
crosses.'' After the arrest of the self-proclaimed leader of one of the
groups for possessing explosives and making public threats in late May,
local authorities removed the crosses--except for the ``Pope's
Cross''--to a nearby Franciscan monastery, under the supervision of the
local Bishop. Later they sealed off the site to prevent the erection of
additional crosses. On November 8, the Oswiecim district court ruled in
favor of the Ministry of Treasury's suit to regain legal possession of
the gravel pit adjacent to the former Auschwitz concentration camp,
where the new crosses had been erected.
In January vandals damaged or destroyed 57 gravestones in the
Jewish cemetery in Krakow. Vandals had attacked the same cemetery in
October 1998. After the first incident police officers increased their
patrols of the cemetery. Police promised additional, special protection
after the second incident to prevent further attacks. In May the
cemetery was vandalized again when unidentified perpetrators overturned
30 gravestones and set fire to the main door of the preburial house.
However, the chairman of the local Jewish community called this an act
of hooliganism, not anti-Semitism, since in the weeks preceding the
attack vandals had smashed gravestones and otherwise damaged two nearby
Catholic cemeteries. The chairman also noted the cooperation of the
Krakow city police with the Jewish community to improve the security of
the cemetery. In June the cemetery was attacked yet again when vandals
painted crosses on several tombstones and on the preburial house. This
incident appears to have been motivated by anti-Semitism, since members
of the Jewish community received telephone calls linking the graffiti
to the recent removal of crosses that were placed near the
concentration camp at Auschwitz.
In July unknown vandals sprayed swastikas and anti-Semitic graffiti
on the Jewish community headquarters in Bielsko-Biala. According to the
mayor of Bielsko-Biala, city police officers were ordered to guard the
building after the attack and an investigation was opened into the
case; however, there were no results by year's end. Anti-Semitic
graffiti was painted on several monuments in the Tarnow Jewish cemetery
in August. In September vandals attacked several tombs in the Warsaw
Jewish cemetery, leaving satanic graffiti and damaging a number of
monuments. The vandalism immediately was criticized by the chief of the
Prime Minister's Chancery.
Investigations continued in the May 1998 desecration of graves in
the Warsaw Jewish cemetery and the July 1998 vandalism of a plaque
commemorating Jewish Holocaust victims in Rzeszow. No charges have been
filed to date, and the Rzeszow case is still under investigation. In
the case of the 1997 beating of a 14-year-old Jewish boy in Gdansk, the
defendant received a 4-year suspended sentence. The attack may have
been linked to a sermon by controversial Gdansk priest Henryk Jankowski
warning against the presence of Jews in the Government.
The publication of a booklet by an Opole University professor
Dariusz Ratajczak denying the Holocaust triggered severe public
criticism in March and April. The booklet was self-published (a total
of 230 copies), and as soon as it became aware of the publication, the
University banned its distribution on school property, criticized its
contents, and suspended the professor pending further disciplinary
action. Ratajczak's trial began on November 16 on charges of violating
the law on the preservation of national memory, which took effect on
January 1, for disseminating the Auschwitz lie. On December 7, the
Opole district court acquitted him and ruled that the ``social threat''
posed by the book was low, given the low number of copies, and that in
the book's second edition and in Ratajczak's public appearances he
criticized the revisionist views of historians who deny the Holocaust.
In April during the 11th March of the Living from Auschwitz to
Birkenau to honor victims of the Holocaust, several hundred Poles
joined about 2,000 marchers from Israel and other countries. This was
the largest participation of Polish citizens in the event to date.
Government officials participating in the march included approximately
12 Members of Parliament, the province's governor, and Oswiecim's mayor
and city council chairman. Polish school children, Boy Scouts, the
Polish-Israeli Friendship Society, and the Jewish Students Association
in Poland also participated in the march.
There is some public concern about the growth of groups perceived
to be ``sects'' and the influence of nonmainstream religious groups,
especially in the wake of press reports of the deaths of a few young
persons in circumstances suggesting cult activity.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The law provides for the
educational rights of ethnic minorities, including the right to be
taught in their own language. However, controversy has arisen over the
publishing of Lithuanian textbooks. In February 1998, the Lithuanian
Ambassador to Poland, Antanas Valionis, complained to Polish Minister
of Education Miroslaw Handke that since 1991, 172 editions of textbooks
in Polish had been published in Lithuania while only 4 textbooks in
Lithuanian had been published in Poland since 1989. Valionis also noted
that during 1997 Lithuania, despite significantly more modest financial
resources, published 27 different textbooks for the 20,000 Polish
pupils in Lithuania, while Poland published only 3 for Lithuanian
pupils in Poland. There are approximately 800 ethnic Lithuanian
students in 18 schools of various levels ranging from preschool to high
school and vocational school. Some controversy continued during the
year, but the two Governments continue to negotiate on issues related
to minorities in their respective countries.
The Romani community, numbering around 40,000, faced
disproportionately high unemployment and was hit harder by economic
changes and restructuring than were ethnic Poles, according to its
leaders. The national Government does not discriminate overtly against
Roma; however, some local officials have been known to discriminate by
not providing services in a timely manner or at all. Some schools have
experimented with separate special classes for Romani children, stating
that because of economic disadvantage, language barriers, and parental
illiteracy, Romani children are behind their non-Romani counterparts
when starting school. There have been occasional incidents of skinheads
clashing with Roma. In response to what its leaders felt was a
threatening atmosphere around them, a Roma community near Tarnow
announced in July that it planned to form ``self-defense units'' within
the community. At year's end, nothing had come of the plan.
In the 1998 case of a 14-year-old Romani girl from Bytom who was
injured when a skinhead threw a Molotov cocktail into the apartment
where she was sleeping, a suspect is awaiting trial.
The small Ukrainian and Belarusian minorities occasionally
experience petty harassment and discrimination. Individuals of African,
Asian, or Arab descent continue to experience verbal abuse or other
types of aggression, including physical abuse. In March a student of
South Asian origin studying in Katowice reported that he had been
assaulted by three skinheads who called him ``czarny'' (``black'' in
Polish) and ``nigger'' while pushing him around. In June a student of
Korean descent was assaulted from behind and knocked unconscious in
Krakow in what he considered to be a racially motivated attack.
In December the Government announced plans for television channels
nationwide to broadcast a public service announcement propagating
friendly attitudes toward refugees and foreigners in the country. A
well known Polish actor was featured in the project.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides that all civilian
workers, including military employees, police, and frontier guards have
the right to establish and join trade unions of their own choosing. The
law sets minimum size requirements for establishing a trade union: 10
persons may form a local union, and 30 may establish a national union.
Unions, including interbranch national unions and national interbranch
federations, must be registered with the courts. A court decision
refusing registration may be appealed to an appeals court. In 1999 the
number of officially registered national-level unions remained at about
360, about the same as in 1998. No precise data exist on work force
unionization, although the trend continues to be downward. Recent
studies suggest that only some 13 percent of workers belong to a union.
As a rule, newly established small- and medium-sized firms were
nonunion, while union activity in most cases carried over into
privatized (former state-owned) enterprises. The Independent
Selfgoverning Trade Union (NSZZ) Solidarity has a verified regular
dues-paying membership of about 1 million. Small spin-offs from
mainstream Solidarity include the rival factions Solidarity '80, August
'80, and the Christian Trade Union Solidarity (Popieluszko). There are
no reliable estimates of their membership.
The other principal national unions are those affiliated with the
All-Poland Trade Union Alliance (OPZZ), the formerly Communist-aligned
confederation established in 1984 as the sole legal alternative to
then-outlawed NSZZ Solidarity, and its teachers' affiliate, the Polish
Union of Teachers (ZNP). The OPZZ reports that its membership has
dropped by more than 50 percent in recent years to about 3 million, but
this figure is unverified, and independent sociological surveys suggest
that its regular dues-paying membership is considerably less than
Solidarity's; a recent survey found that Solidarity represents some 6.3
percent of all Polish workers while the OPZZ represents only 3.6
percent, (one estimate put OPZZ membership at roughly 700,000 to
800,000 workers). According to a study by the State Labor Inspectorate,
out of some 27,000 local union organizations, Solidarity had 13,500
organizations, the OPZZ had 11,000 organizations, and Solidarity '80
had 770 organizations.
The law on collective bargaining, in force since 1994, does not
require union membership figures to be verified or based on dues-paying
members in order for unions to be considered ``representative''
negotiating partners for management and government. Solidarity
protested some unions' (largely OPZZ affiliates) participation in
negotiations with the Government on the grounds that their membership
figures remain unproved.
Most trade unions were active in politics at all levels. Scores of
union activists were parliamentarians, and several became senior
government officials. Solidarity plays a key role in political life.
With 62 deputies, 27 senators, dozens of ministers, governors, and
other senior national and local officials, the union serves as the
backbone of the ruling AWS coalition. The OPZZ has 42 deputies, about
one-quarter of the opposition Democratic Left Alliance caucus.
Unions have the right to strike except in ``essential services.''
However, labor leaders complain that the 1991 Act on Collective Dispute
Resolution prescribes an overly lengthy process before a strike may be
called. Employers consider the law too lenient, since it allows only
one-quarter of the work force to vote to call a strike. As a result, as
many as 60 to 90 percent of strikes called in recent years have been
technically ``illegal'' because one or both of the sides did not follow
each step exactly as required by law. Labor courts act slowly on
deciding the legality of strikes, while sanctions against unions for
calling illegal strikes, or against employers for provoking them, are
minimal. Arbitration is not obligatory and depends on the agreement of
disputing parties. Unions allege that laws prohibiting retribution
against strikers are not enforced consistently, and that fines imposed
as punishment are so minimal that they are ineffective sanctions to
illegal activity. Workers who strike in accordance with the law retain
their right to social insurance but not to pay. However, if a court
rules a strike ``illegal,'' workers may lose social benefits, and
organizers are liable for damages and may face civil charges and fines.
The social partners (unions, employers, and the Government) continued
to work out ambiguities in dispute resolution mechanisms in the new
Labor Code, which went into effect in 1996, and which represented a
major overhaul of Communist-era labor regulations.
The number of strikes in the first 6 months of the year remained
relatively low and dropped to 25 from 31 in the same time period in
1998. However, significant work stoppages, hunger strikes, and
demonstrations, some violent, took place in the mining, health,
armaments, and agricultural sectors at various times throughout the
year. In February the All-Poland Doctors' Trade Union, which claims to
represent 70 percent of health care workers, launched a 10-day
nationwide strike to protest low spending on health care. The union
promised to continue providing emergency, oncological, pediatric,
gynecological, and maternity care during the strike. On November 19,
between 20 and 50 percent of teachers participated in a protest against
low wages and low funding for education.
Unions have the right to join labor federations and confederations
and to affiliate with international labor organizations. Independent
labor leaders reported that these rights were observed in practice.
Solidarity is a full member of the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions, the World Confederation of Labor, and the European Trade
Union Confederation.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1991 Law on
Trade Unions created a favorable environment for trade union activity.
However, labor leaders report that the 1991 law has not prevented
employers from discriminating against workers who attempt to organize
or join unions, particularly in the growing private sector. The law
also has not prevented employer harassment of union members for labor
activity.
The 1991 law provides for parties to take disputes first to labor
courts, then to the Prosecutor General, and, in the last resort, to the
Supreme Court. In a typical year, Solidarity takes several thousand
cases to labor courts, several hundred to the Prosecutor General, and
dozens to the Supreme Court for resolution. In an overwhelming majority
of these cases, the courts ordered employers to correct practices or
reinstate dismissed workers or unions to reimburse employers for
activity found to be illegal. However, penalties are minimal and are
not an effective deterrent.
Enterprise-level collective bargaining over wages and working
conditions increasingly characterized the labor relations system. Labor
and management are adapting their relationship to the demands of a
market economy, but experience in modern labor relations is still in
its early stages. Many enterprises rolled over agreements concluded in
earlier years.
Since its formation in early 1994, the Tripartite Commission
(unions, employers, Government), currently chaired by Labor Minister
Longin Komolowski, has become the main forum that determines national-
level wage and benefit increases in such politically sensitive areas as
the so-called budget sector (health, education, and public employees),
while rendering opinions on pension indexation, energy pricing, and
other important aspects of social policy. The Commission serves as an
important forum in which the social partners air differences, discuss
grievances, and often negotiate agreements before problems erupt into
social conflict.
Many disputes arose because of the weakness of the employer side of
the union/employer/Government triangle. Key state sector employers
(largely in heavy industry and the budget sector) still were unable to
negotiate independently with organized labor without the extensive
involvement of central government ministries to which they are
subordinate, although the Government repeatedly stated that its
intention was not to be drawn into labor disputes. This weakness
complicated and politicized the Government's labor relations system.
Claiming that the Government was refusing seriously to discuss labor
issues with it, the OPZZ suspended participation in the Commission in
April.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor
does not exist, except for prisoners convicted of criminal offenses,
and otherwise is prohibited by law, including that performed by
children. There were no reports of forced or compulsory labor by
children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law contains strict legal prescriptions about the
conditions in which children may work. The Labor Code forbids the
employment of persons under the age of 15. Those between the ages of 15
and 18 may be employed only if they have completed primary school and
if the proposed employment constitutes vocational training and is not
harmful to their health. The age requirement rises to 18 years if a
particular job might pose a health danger.
Child labor is not a problem, although the State Labor Inspectorate
reported that increasing numbers of minors now work, and that many
employers violate labor rules in employing them (by underpaying
workers, paying them late, etc.). Inspectors found violations on stud
farms, in restaurants, and, in some instances, in small private sector
businesses and factories.
The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor, the
unions, and employers' organizations negotiate a revised national
minimum wage every 3 months. The minimum monthly wage in state-owned
enterprises is approximately $162.50 (650 PLN), which constitutes no
real increase over the 1998 amount. This amount was insufficient to
provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living in view of
rising prices. A large percentage of construction workers and seasonal
agricultural laborers from the former Soviet Union earn less than the
minimum wage. The large size of the informal economy and the small
number of state labor inspectors make enforcement of the minimum wage
very difficult. As long as unemployment remains high, workers often
agree to inferior working conditions and lower pay in order to find or
keep their jobs.
The standard legal workweek is 42 hours, which allows 6- or 7-hour
days, including at least one 24-hour rest period. The law requires
overtime payment for hours in excess of the standard workweek.
The Labor Code defines minimum conditions for the protection of
workers' health and safety. Provisions are strict and extensive, and
trade unions have the right to stop production or extract a worker from
dangerous working conditions without jeopardy to the worker's continued
employment. However, enforcement is a major problem, because the Labor
Inspectorate is unable to monitor the state sector sufficiently, much
less the private sector, where a growing percentage of accidents take
place. In addition, there is a lack of clarity concerning which
government or legislative body has responsibility for enforcing the
law.
In the 41,286 work-related accidents reported during the first 6
months of the year, 226 individuals were killed and 589 seriously
injured. The Government's Central Statistical Office reported that most
accidents were in the public sector, while most serious accidents were
in the private sector, where proportionally more deaths also occurred.
Solidarity contends that the problem lies not in the law, which
establishes safe standards, but in enforcement, because employer
sanctions for illegal behavior are minimal. Standards for exposure to
chemicals, dust, and noise are exceeded routinely. Workers may remove
themselves from dangerous working conditions without losing their jobs,
but there were reports that fears of such loss prompted some to stay on
the job.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and children is
illegal, and several specific provisions in the Criminal Code address
this problem; however, it is a problem. The law prohibits forcing
individuals into prostitution, trafficking in human beings, and
pimping. Those convicted of trafficking in women or children face a
prison term of between 3 and 10 years. The Criminal Code also mandates
a sentence of 1 to 10 years for anyone convicted of luring others into
prostitution abroad. However, incidents of trafficking to and through
the country are on the rise, and the country is a source, destination,
and transit point for traffickers. According to police statistics,
there were 70 cases (18 of trafficking and 52 of luring women into
prostitution abroad) reported in the country in 1998. These cases
involved a total of approximately 200 women of Polish and other
nationalities. Authorities believe the actual number of Polish women
trafficked abroad over the last few years to be much higher. Unofficial
estimates suggest that over 20,000 Polish women were trafficked abroad
in the last few years. Prosecutions are rare because most victims are
hesitant to turn to the authorities due to shame and fear of reprisals.
Polish women are trafficked to Western Europe, particularly Germany,
Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and Spain, and to Israel. Poland also is
serving more frequently as a destination and transit country for women
trafficked from the east, particularly Romania, Bulgaria, and the
former Soviet Union. Women from these countries often are forced into
prostitution in Poland, then many are sent on to Western Europe and
Israel. There is increasing ``1-day'' or ``weekend'' trafficking along
the border of Poland with Germany, in which traffickers transport women
and children across the border for forced prostitution and then return
them to the origin or transit country. According to unofficial
estimates, approximately 3,000 foreign women ``work'' as prostitutes in
Poland, in most cases under the control of international criminal
networks. The NGO La Strada estimates that 3,500 Bulgarian women were
trafficked into Poland and currently are forced to work as prostitutes.
In 1998 authorities deported 44 women, most from Bulgaria, who were
working as prostitutes. There is a growing market for young girls, as
young as 12 or 13 years old, due to the perception that younger
prostitutes are less likely to have sexually transmitted diseases. Most
victims come from backgrounds that are characterized by poverty and
lack of opportunity. Traffickers also range from individuals working
for their own profit, to organized crime groups, which treat women as
one of a diversified group of commodities. Once the women and girls are
brought to Poland, traffickers take away their passports and force them
into prostitution to work off their debts and earn back their travel
documents. Women and girls who resist are raped, beaten, or confined
with minimal food and water until they comply. According to the NGO La
Strada, in some cases girls have been killed for resisting traffickers'
demands. Recently official awareness of this issue has increased, and
while prosecution remains rare, at least one case in recent years
resulted in the trafficker receiving the maximum sentence. However,
there are no government assistance programs or shelters to assist
victims of trafficking. NGO's have reported cases in which trafficked
persons upon return to the country were interrogated, fined, or even
jailed for using false documents or leaving the country illegally.
In May the Department of Justice organized an international
symposium on trafficking in women and children in Legionowo. Government
officials and NGO representatives from Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia
met to discuss ways to address this growing problem.
______
PORTUGAL
The Portuguese Republic is a constitutional democracy with a
President, a Prime Minister, a Parliament freely elected by secret
ballot in multiparty elections, and an independent judiciary.
Internal security is primarily the responsibility of the Ministries
of Justice and Internal Administration. Security forces are controlled
by, and responsive to, the government. They occasionally committed
human rights abuses.
Portugal has a market-based economy. An increasing proportion of
the labor force is employed in services, while employment in
agriculture continues to decline and has been static or declining
slightly in the industrial sector.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens;
however, there were problems in a few areas. Credible reports continued
that security personnel occasionally beat detainees. Prison conditions
remained poor. There are lengthy delays in trials. Violence against
women, trafficking in women, discrimination against Roma, and child
labor are problems.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
The inspector general of internal administration (IGAI), the
inspecting authority for the police forces, worked with Amnesty
International (AI) in its 1998 investigations into the excessive use of
force by the police (see Section 1.c.).
An inmate reportedly died as a result of beatings by prison guards
in Vale de Judeus in 1997 (see Section 1.c.).
IGAI also cooperated in the ongoing investigation into the death of
Olivio Almada, whose body was found in the Tagus River in Lisbon in
October 1996. Almada was last seen in the company of three police
officers, but the police had no record of his arrest. An investigation
resulted in no criminal charges against the officers concerned, but
disciplinary proceedings then began because the initial investigation
determined that Almada had been detained illegally.
Three PSP officers were convicted on criminal charges related to
the death in custody in 1996 of Carlos Areujo. The officers appealed
the verdict, and their case remains in the appeals process.
Disciplinary proceedings against the officers were deferred until after
the criminal case is resolved.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids torture, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, and the use of evidence obtained under torture
in criminal proceedings; however, credible but infrequent reports
continued that police and prison guards beat and otherwise abused
detainees, particularly non-Europeans.
In late 1997, two police officers were accused of having violated
sexually a female drug addict in 1994. The supervisors of the officers
initially delayed the opening of an investigation, but in December 1997
the divisional commander in Lisbon suspended the officers and ordered
an investigation, which was still in progress at year's end.
In April Amnesty International released a report covering the last
6 months of 1998, which noted the mistreatment of prisoners and
excessive use of force by the police. In September 1997, Marcelino
Soares, a 17-year-old inmate at the Caxias prison, reportedly was
beaten and confined to an isolation cell for 3 days by guards for
complaining that prison authorities had blocked visits by his brother.
Allegations of beatings also were made against guards at the Vale de
Judeus prison; such beatings reportedly caused the death of inmate
Francisco Antonio Cordeiro in September 1997. Internal inquiries into
these two cases proved inconclusive and were closed; criminal inquiries
continue in the Soares case.
AI also brought to the IGAI's attention allegations that a Sintra
police officer used electroshock torture. The subsequent investigation
found that the allegations against the officer were true, and also
established the complicity of two other officers. Separation was
recommended for one of the officers by a preliminary inquiry, and
deliberations of the police disciplinary council continue. The two
other officers were suspended from duty. A criminal inquiry was also in
progress.
Justice Ministry investigators confirmed that the gendarmerie, the
Republican National Guard (GNR), used excessive force against
protestors during a demonstration by farmers in Ourique in September.
Allegations of police misconduct during a January street festival in
Lisbon were under investigation.
Prison conditions continue to be poor; overcrowding continues to be
the main problem. Health issues are also of increasing concern. In
February the health services director of the Bureau of Prisons reported
that 7 out of every 10 convicts entering the prison system were
infected with AIDS, Hepatitis B, or Hepatitis C. An estimated 20
percent of the prison population is infected with AIDS. Tuberculosis is
also on the rise. Prison health services, with staffing at 1970's
levels in vastly different conditions, have difficulty coping with the
current situation.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
Human rights organizations reported no difficulties in gaining access
to inmates at detention facilities.
An independent ombudsman, chosen by the Parliament, investigates
complaints of mistreatment by the police and prison authorities. IGAI
also conducts internal investigations in cases of alleged mistreatment.
Police officers receive training in human rights and proper
investigative procedure. However, nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)
have been critical of the slow pace of police investigations in general
and internal investigations by the police in particular.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides protection against arbitrary arrest and detention, and the
Government respects its provisions in practice.
Under the law, an investigating judge determines whether an
arrested person should be detained, released on bail, or released
outright. A person may not be held more than 48 hours without appearing
before an investigating judge. Investigative detention is limited to a
maximum of 6 months for each suspected crime. If a formal charge has
not been filed within that period, the detainee must be released. In
cases of serious crimes, for example, murder or armed robbery, or of
more than one suspect, investigative detention may last for up to 2
years and may be extended by a judge to 3 years in extraordinary
circumstances. A suspect in investigative detention must be brought to
trial within 18 months of being charged formally. If a suspect is not
in detention, there is no specified period for going to trial. A
detainee has access to lawyers; the state assumes the cost if
necessary.
Exile is illegal and is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and
impartial.
The court system, laid out in the Constitution, consists of a
Constitutional Court, a Supreme Court of Justice, and judicial courts
of first and second instance. There is also a Supreme Court of
Administration, which deals with administrative and tax disputes, and
which is supported by lower administrative courts. An audit court is in
the Ministry of Finance.
All trials are public except those that may offend the dignity of
the victim, such as in cases of sexual abuse of children. The accused
is presumed innocent. In trials for serious crimes, a panel of three
judges presides. For lesser crimes, a single judge presides. At the
request of the accused, a jury may be used in trials for major crimes;
in practice, requests for jury trials are extremely rare.
The judicial system provides citizens with a fair legal process.
However, it has been much criticized for a large backlog of pending
trials resulting from inefficient functioning of the courts. Frequent
criticism of this backlog nonetheless did not result in any specific
actions by the Government during the year. The extremely slow pace of
the judicial system was cited as contributing to a violation of Article
6 of the European Convention on Human Rights in a March report from the
European Court of Human Rights.
In March 1998, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the
Ministry of Justice to pay a fine to the plaintiff in a civil case in
the town of Torres Vedras. The case involved a real estate company
trying to regain its operating authority after a declaration of
insolvency. The case was delayed for 6 years. This was the second time
such a judgment was made against the judicial system.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution forbids such practices, and the
Government respects these provisions in practice. Violations are
subject to effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Freedom of speech and the press is
provided for in the Constitution, and the Government respects these
rights in practice.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the authorities generally respect these
provisions.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects these rights in practice. The
Roman Catholic Church is the dominant religion; it receives tax
exemptions and other privileges unavailable to other denominations.
Although the overwhelming majority of citizens are Roman Catholic,
other religions practice freely.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution and laws provide for
these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
The law provides for granting refugee or asylee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. Persons who qualify as refugees
are entitled to residence permits. There were no reports of the forced
expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee status. However, the
Government almost never rules that an asylum seeker has a ``valid''
claim. A new law attempts to distinguish among political, humanitarian,
and temporary refugees, but the Government continues to maintain that
the majority are economic refugees using Portugal as a gateway to the
other European Union ``Schengen'' Countries. The Government took in
approximately 2,000 refugees from Kosovo during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections on the basis of universal
suffrage. Portugal is a multiparty parliamentary democracy.
Women and minorities have full political rights and participate
actively in political life. However, they are underrepresented in
government and politics. Women head the Ministries of Health and of
Environment. There are 46 female members in the 230-member Parliament.
Race is rarely an issue in politics; persons of minority origin have
achieved prominence in politics. Some persons advocate laws mandating
female quotas on political party lists, but such legislation has not
been passed. Some political parties nevertheless adopted their own
internal quotas.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of local and international groups operate freely,
investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.
Government officials generally are cooperative, although most groups
complain of slow investigations or remedial actions.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution forbids discrimination based on ancestry, sex,
language, origin, religion, political or ideological convictions,
education, economic situation, or social condition, and the Government
enforces these prohibitions.
Women.--Domestic and other violence against women is reportedly a
common but hidden problem for which few seek legal recourse. In 1996
(latest statistics available), charges were filed in 136 rape cases and
2,329 cases of other violence against women. The law provides for
criminal penalties in cases of violence by a spouse, and the judicial
system shows no apparent reluctance to prosecute suspects accused of
abusing women. Changes to the Penal Code in 1998 granted prosecutors
the ability to file charges independent of the victim when prosecution
is judged ``in the victim's interest.'' Traditional societal attitudes
discourage many battered women from recourse to the judicial system.
A toll-free hot line for victims of domestic violence has operated
since November 1998, from 9 a.m. to midnight 7 days a week. In its
first 6 months of operation, approximately 64 percent of the calls
related to acts of physical violence, while 30 percent related to
psychological concerns. The majority of callers (66 percent) were
themselves victims. Women between the ages of 25 and 35 accounted for
about 29 percent of the calls, while about 31 percent were women
between the ages of 35 and 45. Although calls came from all over the
country, the vast majority came from the large urban centers of Lisbon
and Porto.
Parliament addressed the issue of domestic violence several times
during the year. A system of ``safe houses'' for victims of domestic
violence was created. Educational campaigns for the public and
specialized training for the police were strengthened. The creation of
domestic violence units in the police, and of a new domestic violence
category in the Attorney General's report on crime, were mandated.
Perpetrators of domestic violence now can be barred from contact with
their victims, and in extreme cases, the police can order the immediate
expulsion of a perpetrator from the victim's dwelling. The law also
calls for the development of new programs to teach anger management to
the perpetrators of domestic violence and to assist victims with the
professional development necessary to live independent lives.
Trafficking in women for the purposes of forced prostitution
continues to be problem (see Section 6.f.). Prostitution is linked
closely to other types of organized crime, especially international
narcotics trafficking. Specific legislation prohibits forced
prostitution and trafficking in human beings. The Nest, an NGO,
operates economic and social recovery programs for prostitutes.
The Civil Code provides for full legal equality for women. Sexual
harassment, a problem that continues to gain public attention, is
covered in the Penal Code as a sex crime, but only if perpetrated by a
superior and in the workplace. As in the case of violence, socially
ingrained attitudes discourage many women from taking advantage of the
legal protection available.
The Commission on Equality in the Workplace and in Employment, made
up of representatives of the government, employers' organizations, and
labor unions, is empowered to examine, but not adjudicate, complaints
of sexual harassment but receives few. It does review numerous
complaints of discrimination by employers against pregnant workers and
new mothers, who are protected by law.
Women increasingly are represented in university student bodies,
business, science, and the professions. A gap remains between male and
female salaries. Women earn the majority of university degrees.
Children.--A 9-year period of education is compulsory. A study by
the European Commission indicated that only 50 percent of children
receive preschool education. To counter this problem, the Ministry of
Education instituted a pilot project on early childhood education in
the Algarve region in 1997. This program proved successful. More
teachers were hired, new schools were constructed in remote areas, and
the law now calls for attendance at preschool before entry into the
first grade. However, there is a serious gap between spaces available
in preschools and the number of children seeking admission, especially
in the case of private institutions. During the 1998-99 school year
207,109 children attended preschool. It is estimated that that number
increased to 220,000 for the current (1999-2000) school year).
The National Children's Rights Commission is charged with
implementing the principles of the International Convention on the
Rights of the Child. The Commission operates under the aegis of the
High Commissioner for the Promotion of Equality and of the Family and
includes representatives from the Ministries of Justice, Health,
Education, and Solidarity, as well as from leading NGO's. The quasi-
independent Institute for the Support of Children organized a network
of 48 NGO's dedicated to helping at-risk youth. The University of
Minho's Institute for the Study of Children is a research center
dedicated solely to the study of children's issues. The Institute for
the Support of Children organizes public awareness programs, serves as
an information clearinghouse for NGO's working on childrens' issues,
and promotes legislation protecting children's rights. It provides
telephone and in-person counseling, intervention, and prevention
services in cases of child abuse and neglect. It also operates services
assisting the at-risk youth known as ``criancas da rua''--``street
kids.''
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children, although child
labor remains a problem (see Section 6.d.).
Following the uncovering of a pedophile ring in Madeira in 1997,
the Parliament passed a law in 1998 that enlarged the definition of
pedophilia to include the consumers of child pornography as well as the
producers.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or the provision of other
state services. Their access to public facilities is mandated by
legislation, which generally is complied with. However, no such
legislation covers private businesses or other facilities.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The principal minority groups
are immigrants, legal and illegal, from Portugal's former African
colonies. There is also a resident Romani population of approximately
40,000 persons, who are the subject of some discrimination.
In March the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination conducted a periodic review of the Government's
obligations under the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In its report, the Committee
expressed concern about racial discrimination and xenophobia in the
country, including violence against blacks, Roma, immigrants, and
foreigners--frequently perpetrated by skinheads. While acknowledging
efforts by the Government to combat such acts, the Committee urged that
the law be extended to prohibit all racist groups.
The law permits victims and antiracism associations to participate
in race-related criminal trials by lodging criminal complaints,
retaining their own lawyers, and calling witnesses. In August the
Parliament approved a new set of antiracism laws, reiterating
antidiscrimination sections in the Constitution and the Penal Code. The
new laws prohibit and penalize racial discrimination in housing,
business, and health services. They also provided for the creation of a
new Commission for Equality and Against Racial Discrimination to work
alongside the high commissioner for immigration and ethnic minorities.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers in both the private and
public sectors have the right to associate freely and to establish
committees in the workplace to defend their interests. The Constitution
provides for the right to establish unions by profession or industry.
Trade union associations have the right to participate in the
preparation of labor legislation. Strikes are permitted by the
Constitution for any reason, including political causes; they are
common and generally are resolved through direct negotiations. The
authorities respect all provisions of the law on labor's rights.
Two principal labor federations exist. No restrictions limit the
formation of additional labor federations. Unions function without
hindrance by the Government and are associated closely with political
parties.
There are no restrictions on the ability of unions to join
federations or of federations to affiliate with international labor
bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions are free
to organize without interference by the Government or by employers.
Collective bargaining is provided for in the Constitution and is
practiced extensively in the public and private sectors.
Collective bargaining disputes usually are resolved through
negotiation. However, should a long strike occur in an essential sector
such as health, energy, or transportation, the Government may order the
strikers back to work for a specific period. The Government rarely has
invoked this power, in part because most strikes last only 1 to 3 days,
but the law was invoked in one transport strike in 1998. The law
requires a ``minimum level of service'' to be provided during strikes
in essential sectors, but this requirement is applied infrequently.
When it is applied, minimum levels of service are established by
agreement between the Government and the striking unions, although
unions have complained, including to the International Labor
Organization (ILO), that the minimum levels were set too high. When
collective bargaining fails, the Government may appoint a mediator at
the request of either management or labor.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, and the authorities
enforce this prohibition in practice. The General Directorate of Labor
promptly examines complaints.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including by children, is prohibited and generally does not occur.
Specific legislation prohibits trafficking in persons; however,
trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum working age is 16 years. There are instances
of child labor, but the overall incidence is small and is concentrated
geographically and sectorally. The greatest problems are reported in
Braga, Porto, and Aveiro and tend to occur in the clothing, footwear,
construction, and hotel industries. The Government prohibits forced and
bonded child labor and enforces this prohibition effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
The Government has worked actively to eliminate child labor and
created a multiagency body, the National Commission to Combat Child
Labor (CNCTI) in 1996 to coordinate those efforts. In 1997 the CNTCI
expanded its efforts by enhancing cooperation with NGO's, establishing
regional commissions and local intervention teams, and expanding its
public education campaign. The Ministry of Education also has increased
its budget allocated to alternative education plans for students in
danger of dropping out of school.
The Commission is joined in its efforts by two NGO's, the National
Confederation of Action on Child Labor (CNASTI) and the Institute of
Support for Children (IAC). With the assistance of regional
commissions, the CNCTI works through local intervention teams on public
awareness measures to prevent child labor and on a case-by-case basis
with school dropouts and with minors found to be working.
In a first-of-its-kind study, conducted in conjunction with the ILO
in October 1998, the Government polled 26,500 families, with separate
questionnaires for parents and children, to try to measure the
incidence of child labor. According to this survey, as many as 20,000
to 40,000 children under the age of 16 may be engaged in some form of
labor. The majority of these cases consist of daily chores on family
farms, which do not prevent school attendance. However, the study
estimates that as many as 11,000 children may be working for nonfamily
employers, a figure that represents 0.2 percent of the labor force.
More studies are planned.
The key enforcement mechanisms of labor laws falls to labor
inspectors, and the number of cases has fallen significantly over the
past several years as a result of these government efforts and a move
towards a higher technology industrial base (with a corresponding need
for higher skilled labor). The number of child labor cases detected by
the inspectors fell from 341 to 167 over the last 4 years. Additional
reductions may require fundamental social changes. Government officials
are concerned that child labor continues in the home, where inspections
are prohibited without a search warrant. Also, child labor among
migrant agricultural workers appears to be facilitated by parents who
are paid for every box of produce picked. These conditions make it
difficult to root out child labor through increased enforcement alone;
the authorities believe that public education measures also are needed
over the longer term.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage legislation covers
full-time workers as well as rural workers and domestic employees ages
18 years and over. For 1999 the monthly minimum wage was approximately
$326 (61,300 escudos). Along with widespread rent controls, basic food
and utility subsidies, and phased implementation of an assured minimum
income, the minimum wage affords a basic standard of living for a
worker and family. According to the latest figures available (October
1997), the average monthly wage was $777 (136,300 escudos). With
respect to income distribution, average wages ranged from a high of
$2,316 (405,300 escudos) per month for managers to $587 (102,700
escudos) per month for manual laborers. Only 9.2 percent of the work
force received the minimum wage.
Employees generally receive 14 months' pay for 11 months' work: the
extra 3 months' pay are for a Christmas bonus, a vacation subsidy, and
22 days of annual leave. The maximum legal workday is 8 hours, and the
maximum workweek is 40 hours. There is a maximum of 2 hours of paid
overtime per day and 200 hours of overtime per year, with a minimum of
12 hours between workdays. The Ministry of Employment and Social
Security monitors compliance through its regional inspectors.
Employers legally are responsible for accidents at work and are
required by law to carry accident insurance. An existing body of
legislation regulates safety and health, but labor unions continue to
argue for stiffer laws. The General Directorate of Hygiene and Labor
Security develops safety standards in harmony with European Union
standards, and the General Labor Inspectorate is responsible for their
enforcement. However, the Inspectorate lacks sufficient funds and
inspectors to combat the problem of work accidents effectively. A
relatively large proportion of accidents occurs in the construction
industry. Poor environmental controls in textile production also cause
considerable concern.
While the ability of workers to remove themselves from situations
where these hazards exist is limited, it is difficult to fire workers
for any reason. Workers injured on the job rarely initiate lawsuits.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Specific legislation prohibits
trafficking in persons. Under the Penal Code, trafficking in persons is
punishable by 2 to 8 years' imprisonment.
However, trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
prostitution continues to be a problem. International trafficking rings
take Portuguese women abroad, often to Spain, and bring foreign women
to Portugal. The Portuguese women involved tend to be from poorer areas
and are often, but not always, drug users. Women from Brazil and from
Lusophone Africa also are involved, as are women from non-Lusophone
countries such as Senegal.
Russian Mafia organizations are present in the country in
increasing numbers, largely as the networks behind the trafficking in
Eastern European women. One such network reprotedly sells Moldovan and
Ukrainian women for the equivalent of around $4,000 each. The
authorities broke up one such ring during the year that was headed by a
nuclear scientist from the former Soviet Union.
______
ROMANIA
Romania is a Constitutional democracy with a multiparty, bicameral
parliamentary system. Prime Minister Radu Vasile is the Head of
Government, and President Emil Constantinescu, who was elected
directly, is the Head of State. The judiciary is a separate branch of
the Government; however, in practice the executive branch exercises
influence over the judiciary, although there were signs of increasing
judicial independence during the year.
Several different security forces are responsible for preserving
law and order and protecting against external threats. The laws that
established these organizations are somewhat vague, and their security
responsibilities overlap. All security and intelligence organizations
operate under the authority of civilian leadership. The Ministry of
Internal Affairs supervises the national police, which have primary
responsibility for security, and the border guards. Some police
officers committed serious human rights abuses.
Romania is a middle-income developing country in transition from a
centrally planned economy to a market economy. The private sector
accounted for about 60 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and
employed 56.6 percent of the work force, primarily in agriculture and
services. Although privatization is under way government ownership
remains dominant in heavy industry. From 1997-98, 2,571 companies were
privatized; 3,626 were included on the privatization list for 1999, and
about half of those were privatized by year's end. The economy grew
slowly before a contraction of 6.6 percent in 1997. GDP per capita in
1998 was about $1,682. GDP for the first half of 1999 was down 3
percent compared with the same period in 1998. Exports rose 4.2 percent
from 1996 to 1997 and dropped in 1998 1.6 percent from 1997. Inflation
decreased from 151.4 percent in 1997 to 40.6 percent in 1998. The
inflation rate for 1999 was approximately 56 percent. Official
statistics significantly understated economic activity because of the
size of the informal economy.
The Government generally respected the rights of its citizens;
however, several serious problems remained. Some police officers
continued to beat detainees; and in several cases such beatings
reportedly led to deaths. The Government investigated police officers
suspected of abuse and in some cases indicted those accused of criminal
activities in military courts. However, investigations of police abuses
are generally lengthy and inconclusive and rarely result in prosecution
or punishment. While some progress has been made in reforming the
police, cases of inhuman and degrading treatment continue to be
reported. The Government promised important modifications to the
Criminal Code, but no such changes were made by year's end. The
Government improved the poor living conditions in prisons and
implemented vocational training programs; however, overcrowding remains
a serious problem. The judiciary remains subject to executive branch
influence, although there were signs of increasing influence during the
year. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious
problems. There is a large number of impoverished and apparently
homeless children in large cities. Societal harassment of religious
minorities still remains a problem and religious groups not officially
recognized by the Government sometimes complain that they receive
discriminatory treatment from the authorities. Discrimination against
Roma continued. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution was a problem.
The Ombudsman's Office, which was established in 1997, consolidated
its activities and is now fully operational with a staff of 70 persons.
The Office registered 4,372 complaints by year's end, up from 2,985 in
1998 and 1,168 in 1997. The Ombudsman's role is not fully clear to the
public yet. Many complaints were rejected because they related to
problems with the judiciary and not the administration.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--APADOR-CH, a
nongovernmental organization (NGO) affiliated with the International
Helsinki Federation, reported several cases of police brutality and
beatings, including several leading to death.
On September 24, Aurel Uluiteanu of Barcanesti, County Iialomita,
was taken to the Urziceni court because several villagers had accused
him of disturbing the public order. Uluiteanu succeeded in escaping
from the court and returned home. The following morning the deputy
chief of police went to Uluiteanu's house, found him hiding, and led
him to the police station. In the afternoon, Uluiteanu's parents were
informed that their son had died at the police station. Uluiteanus's
father later found out that the deputy police chief and several young
men in the village had ``turned the police station into a pub'' on
September 25 and tortured and beaten his son to death. The case is
under investigation; meanwhile, a policeman and a civilian involved in
the case were arrested.
On September 9, a police officer took Cristian-Venus Dumitrescu and
his sister, Gianina, from their home in Craiova and drove to the Dolj
county police inspectorate. The police officer did not show them any
document to justify the arrest. At the station, the police told
Dumitrescu that he was charged with having robbed a Korean citizen in
complicity with three other young men. Dumitrescu's sister said that
she saw her brother several hours after he was interrogated and that he
was very red in the face. He told his sister that he was threatened
with 15 years in jail and that if he could no longer take what was
happening to him, he would commit suicide. Later in the day, he
complained to his girlfriend that he was kicked in the liver; his face
also was swollen. En route to the police lockup, followed by his
alleged accomplices, Dumitrescu threw himself out of a third floor
window onto the paved alley below, resulting in his death. The police
did nothing to prevent this event. The case is under investigation.
On July 23, the police in Bucharest shot and killed Sevastian
Apostol, a Rom who was trying to flee a bar where he had a serious
conflict with the owner and other clients. While in the getaway taxi,
police shot at the car and killed Apostol, shooting him in the back.
The case is under investigation.
In its 1999 annual report, Amnesty International cited numerous
reports of torture and mistreatment. In one case, a man died of
suspicious circumstances, apparently as a result of mistreatment. In
August, Elinoiu Toader was assaulted by a police officer in front of a
store in Nereju, Vrancea county. The officer then reportedly instructed
the storeowner to take Toader behind the building and to beat him all
over his body. The following morning, Toader died in his sister's
house. In the course of the investigation, a witness allegedly was
beaten to induce him to sign a statement that Toader had died as a
result of alcohol abuse. At least two other witnesses were similarly
threatened. An autopsy stated that Toader had suffered three fractured
ribs.
A Bucharest newspaper reported that a police officer shot and
killed an unarmed Rom on October 27, during a police raid on a group of
cigarette smugglers.
In 1996 Gabried Carabuelea died after 3 days in police custody,
during which he reportedly was beaten severely. After initially ruling
that there were no grounds for an indictment of the police, the
military prosecutor's office reopened its investigation; however, in
March the prosecutor's office dropped the case based on allegedly
insufficient evidence.
According to the Government, the chief of police in Valcele was
indicted in June for the illegal use of his weapon in the 1996 killing
of Mircea-Muresul Mosor, a Rom from Comani who was shot and killed
while in police custody. A lower court found the police officer not
guilty, but the prosecutor's office appealed the verdict in May; the
superior court's decision was pending at year's end. The military
prosecutor's office during the year reopened the investigation into the
case of Istvan Kiss, an ethnic Hungarian allegedly beaten to death by
police in 1995. In June the prosecutor's office found the death to be
accidental and did not file charges.
In several earlier cases of deaths in custody or deaths reportedly
due to police brutality, investigations and trials still are dragging
on, years later.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman or
degrading punishment or treatment, and these prohibitions generally
were respected in practice; however, there were credible reports that
police beat detainees and improperly used firearms.
APADOR-CH, an NGO affiliated with the International Helsinki
Federation, reported several cases of police brutality and beatings,
including several leading to death (see Section 1.a.).
In its 1999 annual report, Amnesty International cited numerous
reports of torture and mistreatment, including one case that resulted
in death. Also, in seeking to cover up the death of Elinoiu Toader, a
witness allegedly was beaten to induce him to sign a statement that
Toader had died as a result of alcohol abuse. At least two other
witnesses were similarly threatened (see Section 1.a.).
Roma NGO's claimed that police used excessive force against them.
In one case such force reportedly resulted in death (see Section 1.a.).
On April 30, Constantin Buzatu of Craiova reportedly was assaulted
by a number of individuals, all but one of whom were plainclothes
policemen. Buzatu's efforts to lodge a complaint were rejected, and he
was told that he could bring a civil complaint against the one
assailant who was not a police officer.
In April 1998, a policeman with whom he had refused to share a pool
game beat Nicolae Iloaie of Tandareni. Iloaiei was hospitalized for 90
days. When he asked for a certified medical report for the forensic
laboratory, the physician in charge refused to issue it. The case is
under investigation. In August 1998, Fitzeg Sebastian, a student at the
Catholic Theological College in Bucharest and his older friend were
arrested as burglars while inquiring in an unfamiliar neighborhood
about a distant relative. The boys were not informed of their rights
nor allowed to explain their presence in the neighborhood. They were
taken to the police precinct where they were beaten and forced to give
a statement. The case was closed after the police reached a financial
settlement with the family. In May 1998, Marian Ciulei from Brasov was
shot in the leg by a policeman while he was running from a
confrontation in a discotheque. The case is under investigation.
In April 1998, the Government responded to the 1997 report of the
U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The Special Rapporteur received
allegations of torture and mistreatment of detainees by the police. The
Government in its response promised in 1998 to make modifications to
the Criminal Code and to detention regulations, but no such
modifications had been made by year's end.
Judicial cases involving military personnel and the police are
tried in military courts. Local and international human rights groups
criticize this system, claiming that the military prosecutor's
investigations are unnecessarily lengthy and often purposefully
inconclusive, and that some military prosecutors sometimes block proper
investigation of alleged police abuses. The Government declined to
provide updated information on cases of alleged police abuse from 1998
and 1997.
The prison system is improving slowly as efforts increase to bring
prisons in line with minimum international standards. The 1999 prison
budget increased 24 percent over 1998; however, a supplementary $160 (3
million lei) request in the 1999 budget for prison administration was
rejected by Parliament. There are now 33 detention institutions.
Nevertheless, overcrowding remained a serious problem. As of June, in
the units subordinated to the Directorate General of Prisons
Administration there were 53,125 persons, almost 20,000 over the legal
capacity of 33,272 persons. A modern penitentiary opened in January in
Bucuresti-Rahova that houses 1,400 inmates. Each eight-person cell is
equipped with a shower, toilet, and two basins. Medical facilities were
modernized in some prisons, and inmates were allowed to exercise
outside their cells.
In May a law providing for alternative sentences for minor offenses
went into effect. The law provides for community service instead of a
prison sentence and is aimed at reducing the prison population.
Human rights organizations continued to report the abuse of
prisoners by other prisoners and prison authorities. Prisons continued
to use the ``cell boss'' system, in which some prisoners are designated
to be in semiofficial charge of other prisoners. However, prison guards
wore firearms only when guarding prisoners working outside the prison,
correspondence was no longer opened routinely, and inmates had the
right to telephone calls. Prison authorities introduced some vocational
training programs to assist inmates' future integration into society. A
probation pilot program financed by the Open Society Foundation opened
in Iasi at the end of 1998 to provide such assistance to minors and
other young first offenders. Two additional probation centers began
operations during the year in Gaesti and Tichilesti.
The Government permitted visits by human rights monitors, and
several NGO's made such visits.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law forbids the
detention of anyone for more than 24 hours without an arrest warrant
from a prosecutor, who may order detention for up to 30 days, and
authorities generally respect this provision in practice. Detention can
be extended past the 30-day limit only by a court ruling. Detainees
have the right to apply for bail and may ask for a hearing before a
judge. Such a request must be granted within 24 hours.
Police often do not inform citizens of their rights. The law
requires the authorities to inform arrestees of the charges against
them and of their right to an attorney at all stages of the legal
process. Police must notify defendants of this right in a language they
understand before obtaining a statement. However, the prosecutor's
office may delay action on a request for a lawyer for up to 5 days from
the date of arrest.
Under the law, minors detained by police and placed under guard in
a center for the protection of minors are considered by judicial
authorities to be in detention or under arrest if their age is more
than 16, or, if aged between 14 and 16, they have consciously committed
a crime. However, since the Penal Code does not apply to minors in
these centers until their cases are referred to a prosecutor, police
are permitted to question them without restriction and may hold those
suspected of criminal offenses for up to 30 days in such centers. This
law appears to be in conflict with the Constitution, and both Amnesty
International and local human rights groups have called on the
Government to change it.
According to APADOR-CH, the Interior Ministry issued new
instructions on detention in August that would, among other things,
provide for the confidentiality of discussions between detainees and
their lawyers.
There were no political detainees during the year.
Exile was not used as a means of punishment.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Under the terms of a 1992 law, the
judicial branch is independent of other government branches; however,
it remains subject to influence by the executive branch, but there were
increasing signs of judicial independence during the year. Although
members of the Senior Council of Magistrates, which controls the
selection, promotion, transfer and sanctioning of judges, are appointed
by Parliament from a list provided by the courts and prosecutorial
offices represented on the council, the Justice Minister may avoid the
appointment of members he does not want by simply keeping them off the
agenda.
The 1992 law reestablished a four-tier legal system, including
appellate courts, which had ceased to exist under Communist rule.
Defendants have final recourse to the Supreme Court or, for
constitutional matters, to the Constitutional Court. The 1992 law that
reorganized the judicial system divided the Prosecutor General's office
into 16 local offices (paralleling the appeals court structure) and
established an office at the Supreme Court; the law also curtailed
certain powers of the Prosecutor General, including the right to
overturn court decisions and bypass appeals courts by going directly to
the Supreme Court.
The law provides for fair public trial and the presumption of
innocence. The Penal Code requires that an attorney be appointed for a
defendant who cannot afford legal representation or is otherwise unable
to select counsel. In practice, the local bar association provides
attorneys to the indigent and is compensated by the Ministry of
Justice. Either a plaintiff or a defendant may appeal. These provisions
of the law are respected in practice. The law provides that confessions
extracted as a result of police brutality may be withdrawn by the
accused when brought before the court.
In a notable case in January, a criminal appeals court ruled
against miners' union leader Miron Cozma and overturned the
Government's implicit deal to protect Cozma from prosecution for his
role in a miner's strike.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--During the year there were no reported instances of
interference with individual citizens' right to privacy.
The Constitution provides for protection against the search of a
residence without a warrant, but this protection is subordinate to
``national security or public order.'' The 1992 National Security Law
defines national security very broadly and lists as threats not only
crimes such as terrorism, treason, espionage, assassination, and armed
insurrection but also totalitarian, racist, and anti-Semitic actions or
attempts to change the existing national borders. Security officials
may enter residences without proper authorization from a prosecutor if
they deem a threat to national security ``imminent.''
The Constitution states that the privacy of legal means of
communication is inviolable; thus, the Romanian Intelligence Service
(SRI) is prohibited legally from engaging in political acts (for
example, wiretapping on behalf of the Government for political
reasons). However, the law allows the security services to monitor
communications on national security grounds after obtaining
authorization. The law requires the SRI to obtain a warrant from the
``public prosecutor specially appointed by the General Public
Prosecutor'' in order to carry out intelligence activities involving
``threats to national security.'' It may engage legally in a wide
variety of operations to determine if a situation meets the legal
definition of a threat to national security, or to prevent a crime.
Legislation that would permit citizens access to secret police
files kept by the Communist government was passed by the lower chamber
of Parliament in early October. Under the law, any Romanian or foreign
citizen who had Romanian citizenship after 1945 is entitled to access
his file. As subsequently resolved by the mediation committee,
Securitate files (the Communist-era secret police) are to remain in
custody of the intelligence service (SRI), which is to decide whether
to grant access to files based upon the justification given by the
requester. The bill was passed by the Senate and signed into law by
President Constantinescu in the fall.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides
for freedom of expression and prohibits censorship, it limits the
bounds of free expression by prohibiting ``defamation of the country''
and ``offense to authority;'' the Government respected the
constitutional provisions in practice.
An amended Penal Code passed by Parliament in 1996 rectified many
of the shortcomings of the former, Communist-era code. However, the new
version is criticized by human rights organizations and professional
journalists for retaining jail terms for those convicted of libel or
slander, including journalists. Despite official promises that jail
terms would be removed from penalties for libel and calumny, Parliament
has yet to amend the relevant sections of the Penal Code. Consequently,
Articles 205 and 206 concerning libel and calumny and Articles 237 and
238 concerning offense to authority and defamation of character are
still in force.
Many libel suits continued to be brought against journalists under
these provisions. In January a Bucharest court suspended a jail
sentence passed on two journalists from the independent daily Monitorul
de Iasi by a lower court in Iasi in 1998. However, the Bucharest court
upheld the hefty ``moral damages'' awarded to the plaintiffs, to be
paid by the Monitorul group. The General Prosecutor appealed the
sentence with the Supreme Court. In a separate case in late September,
the European Court of Human Rights made a groundbreaking ruling in
favor of a journalist convicted to a suspended jail sentence for
calumny in 1994. The European Human Rights Court found that the
decisions of the Romanian court violated Article 10 of the Human Rights
Convention concerning freedom of speech. Domestic media supported the
ruling and defined it as precedent-setting for the many libel and
calumny suits.
The Government failed to rescind the prohibitions on ``defamation
of the nation'' and ``defamation of public officials'' used to harass
and punish journalists who report governmental or bureaucratic
corruption. Several journalists were arrested and tried during the year
for reporting on corruption by local government officials. Journalists
who were investigating corruption cases were also targets of violence.
Marian Tudor, a journalist for the Journalul de Constanta, was attacked
and thrown from a moving train on September 23 as he was traveling to
deliver to the printer the draft of an article that described an
illicit business deal. The assailants took the draft.
Independent media continued to grow in an increasingly competitive
market. Several hundred daily and weekly newspapers are published.
Several private television stations broadcast nationwide, with the
largest reaching approximately 20 percent of the rural and 80 percent
of the urban market. There are 72 private television stations and 162
private radio stations. Approximately 2.8 million households were wired
for cable, giving significant portions of the population access to both
private and foreign broadcasts. While Romanian State Television (RTV)
and Radio Romania remained at year's end the only national broadcasters
capable of reaching the bulk of the rural population, independent
stations continued to enlarge their coverage throughout the country by
over-the-air, cable, and satellite transmissions. In mid-July the
National Audiovisual Council (CAN) awarded a French media group a
license for a private radio nationwide broadcasting operation. If
established, such an operation would break Radio Romania's monopoly as
the only national radio station.
The 1994 law establishing a Parliament-appointed Board of Directors
for RTV was implemented in June 1995.
Foreign news publications may be imported and distributed freely,
but high costs, relative to domestic publications, limit their
circulation.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, and the Government respected that
right in practice. The law on public assembly provides for the right of
citizens to assemble peacefully while unarmed, but states that meetings
must not interfere with other economic or social activities and may not
be held near locations such as hospitals, airports, or military
installations. Organizers of demonstrations must inform local
authorities and police before the event. Authorities may forbid a
public gathering by notifying the organizers in writing within 48 hours
of receipt of the request. The law prohibits the organization of, or
participation in, a counterdemonstration held at the same time as a
scheduled public gathering.
The law forbids public gatherings to espouse Communist, racist, or
Fascist ideologies or to commit actions contrary to public order or
national security. Unauthorized demonstrations or other violations are
punished by imprisonment and fines.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Political parties gain
legal status if they have at least 10,000 members. (The minimum
membership required was increased in 1996 in order to reduce the number
of small parties.) Associations may be granted legal status with proof
of only 20 founding members and over 200 supporting members.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for religious
freedom, and the Government generally does not impede the observance of
religious belief. However, several denominations continued to make
credible allegations that low-level government officials and Romanian
Orthodox clergy impeded their efforts at proselytizing. The press
reported several instances when adherents of minority religions were
prevented by others from practicing their faith, and local law
enforcement authorities did not protect them. Members of religious
communities not officially recognized by the Government during the year
again accused government officials of harassment--allegations denied by
the Government. Proselytizing that involves denigrating recognized
churches is perceived as provocative.
Under the provisions of a 1948 decree, the Government recognizes 14
religions; only the clergy of these recognized religions are eligible
to receive state financial support. The number of adherents each
religion had in the last census determines the proportion of the budget
each recognized religion receives. Representatives of minority
religious groups dispute the 1992 census results, claiming that census
takers in some cases argued with citizens over their religious
affiliation or simply assigned an affiliation in some cases even
without inquiring about religious affiliation.
The Romanian Orthodox Church, to which approximately 86 percent of
the population nominally adhere, predominates. The official
registration of religious associations is extremely slow because of
bureaucratic delays; in this regard, smaller religious groups have
criticized the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs for its
obstructionist tactics in favor of the Romanian Orthodox Church.
Members of some religious minorities complain that the revised law on
cults, if enacted, would not recognize their status as religious
groups.
The Government requires religious groups to register and
establishes the criteria for registration. In order to be recognized as
a religion, groups must register with the State Secretariat for
Religious Affairs and present a list with the names, age, identity card
numbers, addresses, and signatures of their followers. The State
Secretary of Religions and the President must approve all registration
applications. Representatives of religious groups that sought to
register after 1990 allege that the registration process is arbitrary,
changeable, and unduly influenced by the Romanian Orthodox Church.
Applicants assert that they do not receive clear instructions
concerning the requirements and allege that often the time frame in
which a decision on their application has to be made is not respected
by the State Secretary of Religions.
The Government registers religious groups that it does not
recognize as ``independent religions'' either as religious and
charitable foundations or as cultural associations.
In July an Orthodox priest in Bihor obtained from the superior
court in Bihor an order to stop the construction of a Baptist church,
claiming that its proximity to an Orthodox cemetery was ``hurting the
faithful's traditional Orthodox feelings.''
The Catholic Church of the Byzantine Rite, or Greek Catholic
Church, which suffered discrimination in years past from the Romanian
Orthodox Church and the State Secretariat for Religious Affairs, made
progress in 1998 in recovering some of its former properties. Little
progress was made with regard to the restitution of church properties
during 1999. The Greek Catholic Church was disbanded by the Communists
in 1948 and forced to merge with the Romanian Orthodox Church. The
latter received most of its properties, including over 2,000 churches
and other facilities. Since 1990 Greek Catholics have recovered a
number of their churches. However, in Bixad, Satu Mare county, despite
a government decision of 1992, the Greek Catholic Church in August
could not take possession of the buildings which belonged to a Greek
Catholic monastery because of opposition by local residents led by
Orthodox priests. A similar incident took place in July in Sercaia,
Brasov county, when Greek Catholics were driven out of a Greek Catholic
church, usually kept locked by the Orthodox Church, by Orthodox priests
aided by local police. In Ardud, Satu Mare county, where the Orthodox
priest and a large number of believers had switched to the Greek
Catholic Church, Orthodox officials did not allow Greek Catholics to
enter the church despite a protocol providing for joint use of the
facility and two court rulings upholding their right to use the church.
The congregation was holding services in the open air from August until
year's end.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places no restrictions on
travel within the country, except for certain small areas reserved for
military purposes. Citizens who wish to change their place of work or
residence do not face any official barriers. The law stipulates that
citizens have the right to travel abroad freely, to emigrate, and to
return. In practice, citizens freely exercise these rights.
The 1996 refugee law implemented the provisions of the 1951 United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol. This legislation established a refugee office in the Interior
Ministry to receive, process, and house asylum seekers. 807
applications for asylum were received in the first 6 months of the
year.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations. In mid-1998, the
Interior ministry and the Labor Ministry began funding programs to
assist asylum seekers and refugees. Financial support provided by the
Government (reimbursable loans for a period of 6 to 9 months) is
minimal, usually not enough to cover basic needs. The Government
provides temporary accommodation in only a few locations; more
facilities are to open as funds are made available. Programs for
integrating refugees into society are developing slowly. An increasing
number of transiting illegal migrants regard the country as a
springboard to the West.
There were no reports during the year of the forced return of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
Government through periodic and free elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
In the wake of the 1996 democratic general elections, the
Government coalition formed by the Romanian Democratic Convention (CDR)
and the Union of Social Democrats (USD) joined forces with the
Hungarian Democratic Union of Romania (UDMR). These parties, along with
a number of smaller constituent parties, make up the governing
coalition.
No legal restrictions hinder the participation of women in
government or politics, but societal attitudes are a significant
impediment, and women are underrepresented significantly in government
and politics. Women hold only 5.9 percent of the seats in Parliament.
There is one female cabinet member.
The Constitution and electoral legislation grant each recognized
ethnic minority one representative in the Chamber of Deputies, provided
that the minority's political organization obtains at least 5 percent
of the average number of valid votes needed to elect a deputy outright
(1,784 votes in the 1996 elections). Organizations representing 15
minority groups elected deputies under this provision in 1996. Ethnic
Hungarians, represented by the UDMR, obtained parliamentary
representation through the normal electoral process. Roma are
underrepresented in Parliament because of low Roma voter turnout and
internal divisions that worked against the consolidation of votes for
one candidate, organization, or party. They have not increased their
Parliamentary representation beyond the one seat provided through the
Constitution and electoral legislation.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic human rights monitoring groups include the Romanian
Helsinki Committee (APADOR-CH), the independent Romanian Society for
Human Rights (SIRDO), the League for the Defense of Human Rights
(LADO), the Romanian Institute for Human Rights, and several issue-
specific groups such as the Young Generation of Roma and the Center for
Crisis Intervention and Study, also a Romani NGO. Other groups, such as
political parties and trade unions, continued to maintain sections
monitoring the observance of human rights. These groups, as well as
international human rights organizations, functioned freely without
government interference.
The Government cooperates with local and international monitoring
groups, although some offices are slow to respond to inquiries. Local
human rights monitoring agencies have found it difficult to obtain
statistics concerning police abuses. The General Inspectorate of
Police, which is responsible for investigating such abuses, responds
unevenly to inquiries from monitors. Often victims are reluctant to
come forward, and the Government does not promote transparency in this
regard.
With the aim of protecting citizens against abuses or capricious
acts of public officers, the Ombudsman's office envisioned under the
1991 Constitution was instituted by law in March 1997, and its first
appointee, Paul Mitroi, took office in June 1997. However, due to a
lack of office space, the office began working at normal capacity only
at the beginning of 1998; by the end of August 1999, it had received
over 2,000 complaints. The office is registering these complaints and
is obliged by law to provide an initial response within a year of the
date they were recorded. It deals not just with human rights but with
all facets of citizens' interaction with the Government.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution forbids discrimination based on race, nationality,
ethnic origin, language, religion, sex, opinion and political
allegiance, wealth, or social background. However, in practice the
Government does not enforce these provisions effectively, and women,
Roma, and other minorities are subject to various forms of extralegal
discrimination. Homosexuals reportedly have been the victims of police
brutality.
Women.--Violence against women, including rape, continued to be a
serious problem. Both human and women's rights groups credibly reported
that domestic violence is common, and a September report by the U.N.
Children's Fund (UNICEF) emphasized that violence against women in the
workplace is not uncommon as their subordinate position exposes them to
greater risk. According to UNICEF, the country has an average of 108
sexual incidents per 1,000 women and 41 assaults per 1,000 women. Under
a government pilot project begun in 1997, a shelter for victims of
domestic violence opened in Bucharest in 1997. The shelter can
accommodate only four persons. It received 490 calls for help during
1998 on a hot line, and registered 230 walk-in victims. Prosecution of
rape is difficult because it requires both a medical certificate and a
witness, and a rapist can avoid punishment if he marries the victim.
There is no specific legislation dealing with spousal abuse or rape,
and successful prosecution of spousal rape is almost impossible. Police
are often reluctant to intervene in instances of domestic violence.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution
continues to be a growing problem. Several domestic prostitution rings
are active (see Section 6.f.).
The Constitution grants women and men equal rights. However, in
practice the Government does not enforce these provisions, nor do the
authorities focus attention or resources on women's issues.
Few resources are available for women who experience economic
discrimination. Despite existing laws and educational equality, women
have a higher rate of unemployment than men, occupy few influential
positions in the private sector, and earn lower than average wages. In
1996 the Government created a department in the Ministry of Labor and
Social Protection to advance women's concerns and family policies. This
department organizes programs for women, proposes new laws, monitors
legislation for sexual bias, targets resources to train women for
skilled professions, and addresses the problems of single mothers,
especially in rural areas. In 1998 this department organized with the
U.N. Development Program a series of conferences on ``promoting gender
politics.'' An ombudsman was created within the department for child,
woman and family protection in 1998, but the total budget for women's
programs for the year was less than $75,000 (1.4 billion lei).
Children.--The Government administers health care and public
education programs for children, despite scarce domestic resources.
International agencies and NGO's supplement government programs in
these areas. However, living conditions in all child care institutions
very seriously deteriorated during the year for financial and
administrative reasons. Inspectors who visited institutions and
identified humanitarian needs at the request of the European Union
Commission reported that while conditions were not equally bad in all
institutions, the general situation in the summer could only be
described as unacceptable in terms of basic infrastructure as well as
hygiene, medical care, nutrition, and general assistance. According to
official statistics, there were 33,000 orphans in state institutions,
and the number of institutionalized children reportedly has increased
by 20 percent since 1989.
There was no perceptible societal pattern of abuse against
children. Nevertheless, large numbers of impoverished and apparently
homeless, but not necessarily orphaned, children were seen on the
streets of the larger cities. The Government does not have statistics
defining the scope of the problem. NGO's working with children remained
particularly concerned about the number of minors detained in jail and
prison. These NGO's continued to seek alternative solutions, such as
parole for juveniles. Because time served while awaiting trial counts
as part of the prison sentence but does not count towards time to be
served in a juvenile detention center, some minors actually requested
prison sentences.
The sexual exploitation of children continued to attract press
attention, and the police staged a few high-publicity arrests of
foreign pedophiles. Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced
prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). Other issues, such as
adequate legislation to protect children, received less attention. The
law does not outlaw pedophilia expressly. Instead, pedophiles are
charged with rape, corporal harm, and sexual corruption.
People With Disabilities.--Difficult economic conditions and
serious budgetary constraints contributed to very difficult living
conditions for those with physical or mental disabilities. Many
disabled persons cannot make use of government-provided transportation
discounts because public transport does not have facilitated access.
The law does not mandate accessibility for the disabled to buildings
and public transportation. According to official statistics, there were
98,000 disabled children living in state institutions.
Religious Minorities.--Most mainstream politicians publicly have
criticized anti- Semitism, racism, and xenophobia. However, the fringe
press continued to publish anti-Semitic harangues. The Romanian
Orthodox Church has attacked the ``aggressive proselytism'' of
Protestant and neo-Protestant groups.
In October a court sentence, Mihai Bogdan Antonescu, editor of the
weekly Atac la persoana, to a 2-year suspended sentence for publishing
articles that were intended to spread intolerance toward Jews.
On September 13, Romanian Television reported that unknown
perpetrators recently desecrated two tombstones in the Galati Jewish
cemetery. In early November, vandals destroyed more than 50 tombstones
in 2 Jewish cemeteries in Transylvania.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Department for the
Protection of National Minorities has the responsibility to monitor the
specific problems of persons belonging to ethnic minorities, to
establish contacts with minority groups, to submit proposals for draft
legislation and administrative measures, to maintain permanent links
with local authorities, and to investigate complaints.
Ethnic Hungarians, numbering more than 1.6 million, constitute the
largest and most vocal minority, and their UDMR party holds 36 seats in
the Parliament. Many of the issues addressed in the Romanian-Hungarian
treaty of 1996 were implemented. Progress was made on economic issues,
high-level visits, and infrastructure improvements such as border
crossings. A government decree on Hungarian-language minority education
was enacted and went into force in 1999. The decree permits students in
state-funded primary and secondary schools to be taught in their own
language, with the exception of secondary school courses on the history
and geography of Romania.
The Romani population, officially estimated by the Government at
approximately 400,000, is estimated by the European Commission to
number between 1.1 and 1.5 million. No cases of ethnically-motivated
violence against Roma people were reported. However, Romani groups
complain of routine police brutality, prejudice, and racial harassment
at the local level. Although those who were involved in 1993 incidents
in Hadareni, in which three Romani persons died in a house burning,
were sentenced to terms in prison in 1998, the court rulings have not
become final as yet because of appeals. The Romanian daily Ziua
reported on September 7 that the Office for the Fund for Social
Security and Health in Iasi banned from the Iasi county hospital Roma
who cannot afford to pay for their medical treatment and cannot prove
that they have medical insurance provided by the State. An NGO, Liga
Pro Europa, sent a letter expressing concern to the Department for the
Protection of National Minorities on September 2. In response, the
Department opened an investigation on October 7 and requested the
Ministry of Health to do the same. As of November 29, the ban on Roma
had not been withdrawn. Some steps have been taken toward establishing
an institutional framework to improve the conditions of the Roma, but
in practice little progress has been made. The Department for the
Protection of National Minorities and a working group of Roma
associations set up by the Roma community signed an agreement for
drafting a strategy for the protection of the Roma minority. Meanwhile,
the Romani population continues to be subject to societal
discrimination.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers except public employees
have the right to associate freely, engage in collective bargaining,
and form and join labor unions without previous authorization.
Limitations on the right to strike apply only to industries that the
Government considers critical to the public interest and to other
public employees. No workers may be forced to join or withdraw from a
union, and union officials who resign from elected positions and return
to the regular work force are protected against employer retaliation.
The majority of workers are members of about 18 nationwide trade union
confederations and smaller independent trade unions.
Union members complain that unions must submit their grievances to
government-sponsored conciliation before initiating a strike, and they
are frustrated with the courts' propensity to declare illegal the
majority of strikes on which they have been asked to rule. Past studies
indicated that the labor legislation adopted in 1991 falls short of
International Labor Organization (ILO) standards in several areas,
including the free election of union representatives, binding
arbitration, and the financial liability of strike organizers. Although
the 1991 legislation supports collective bargaining as an institution,
the contracts that result are not always enforceable in a consistent
manner. Unions representing a wide range of economic sectors carried
out strikes during the year, often protesting wage levels that did not
keep pace with the rate of inflation. While most of these strikes ended
with government promises to improve wages and working conditions, union
leaders complain that these agreements frequently are not implemented.
In January striking coal miners from the Jiu Valley launched a march on
Bucharest to protest mine closures. Due to previous violent miners'
demonstrations the Government denied them permission to march to
Bucharest. Defying the government decision, the miners continued on and
attacked law enforcement officials. However, the Government succeeded
in restoring order, and the perpetrators of the violence were arrested
and tried.
The Government has not followed up on a 1995 ILO recommendation to
the previous Government to rescind all measures taken against suspended
union leaders involved in a 1993 strike by railway locomotive
engineers. Only 2 of the 10 engineers fired in 1993 were offered their
old jobs back; most of the others were offered retirement pensions. The
union leaders, who defied a supreme court ruling to suspend the strike
for 170 days, were fired by the national railway company when the
strike ended.
The law stipulates that labor unions should be free from government
or political party control, a provision that the Government has honored
in practice. Unions are free to engage in political activity and have
done so.
Labor unions may form or join federations and affiliate with
international bodies. The National Confederation of Trade Unions-Fratia
and the National Union Bloc are affiliated with the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions and the European Trade Union
Confederation. The Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions of Romania
is affiliated with the World Labor Confederation. Representatives of
foreign and international organizations freely visit and advise
domestic trade unionists.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
the legal right to bargain collectively, but collective bargaining
efforts are complicated by continued state control of most industrial
enterprises and the absence of independent management representatives.
Basic wage scales for employees of state-owned enterprises are
established through collective bargaining with the Government (see
Section 6.e.).
Antiunion discrimination is prohibited by law.
Labor legislation is applied uniformly throughout the country,
including in the four free trade zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection generally
enforces this prohibition; however, trafficking in women and girls for
the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years, but children
as young as the ages of 14 or 15 may work with the consent of their
parents or guardians, although only ``according to their physical
development, aptitude, and knowledge.'' Working children under the age
of 16 have the right to continue their education, and the law obliges
employers to assist in this regard. The Ministry of Labor and Social
Protection has the authority to impose fines and close sections of
factories to ensure compliance with the law, which it enforces
effectively. The Constitution prohibits forced and bonded child labor,
and the Government generally enforces this provision; however,
trafficking in girls is a problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f. ).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Most wage rates are established
through collective bargaining at the enterprise level. However, they
are based on minimum wages for specific economic sectors and categories
of workers that the Government sets after negotiations with industry
representatives and the labor confederations. Minimum wage rates
generally are observed and enforced. Again during the year, the minimum
monthly wage, an equivalent of about $60.00 (1.1. million lei), did not
keep pace with inflation and did not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Prices for utility services such as
water and heating have risen dramatically. However, basic foodstuffs
and pharmaceutical products are still subject to price ceilings.
Housing is no longer subsidized.
The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours or 5
days, with overtime to be paid for weekend or holiday work or work in
excess of 40 hours. It also includes a requirement for a 24-hour rest
period in the workweek, although most workers receive 2 days off. Paid
holidays range from 18 to 24 days annually, depending on the employee's
length of service. The law requires employers to pay additional
benefits and allowances to workers engaged in particularly dangerous or
difficult occupations.
Some labor organizations lobby for healthier, safer working
conditions on behalf of their members. However, neither the Government
nor industry, which is still mostly state owned, has the resources
necessary to improve significantly health and safety conditions in the
workplace. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection has established
safety standards for most industries and is responsible for enforcing
them. However, it lacks sufficient trained personnel for inspection and
enforcement, and employers often ignore its recommendations. Although
they have the right to refuse dangerous work assignments, workers
seldom invoke it in practice, appearing to value increased pay over a
safe work environment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women is an
underreported but persistent problem. The law is vague and outdated and
does not address trafficking directly. Those involved in trafficking
may be prosecuted for such offenses as prostitution and procurement,
falsifying documents, assisting individuals to cross borders illegally,
blackmail, forced labor, or illegal deprivation of freedom.
Romania is both a source and a transit country for trafficked women
and girls. The full extent of the problem is not known, since neither
the Government nor NGO's maintain statistics on this issue. The only
official data are for the number of individuals prosecuted for
prostitution and procurement. The number has been increasing since
1997, but this phenomenon seems to be due to an increased awareness of
the problem among law enforcement officials rather than an increase in
the activities themselves. NGO's that work with women's issues agree
that several thousand women are trafficked to other countries each
year. International Organization for Migration representatives in
Bucharest report that they process two cases a month involving women
trafficked to other countries who wish to return home. No separate
statistics exist for children trafficked to other countries.
It is estimated that there are between 20,000 to 22,000 illegal
immigrants, and that part of this total is a result of illegal
trafficking. According to official statistics, 28 groups who tried to
illegally transit the country were discovered in 1998. Women reportedly
were trafficked to Turkey, the Netherlands, and other West European
countries, as well as other former Communist countries, like Poland. In
1997 the Government of Turkey deported some 7,000 Romanian women.
Authorities in the Netherlands broke up a trafficking ring late in the
year that victimized some women from Romania.
In May police in Braila reportedly summoned women suspected of
traveling to Turkey to engage in prostitution and threatened them with
arrest and public exposure of their activities if they refused to
surrender their passports. Police then confiscated their passports, and
prevented the women from leaving the country. Several domestic
prostitution rings are active.
______
RUSSIA
Politically, economically, and socially, Russia continues to be a
state in transition. While constitutional structures are well defined
and democratic in conception, democratic institution building continues
to face serious challenges, often due to significant limitations on the
State's financial resources. The 1993 Constitution establishes a
government with three branches and checks and balances, although it
provides for a strong executive. The executive branch consists of an
elected president and a government headed by a prime minister. There is
a bicameral legislature (Federal Assembly), consisting of the State
Duma and the Federation Council, and a judicial branch. Both the
President and the legislature were selected in competitive elections
judged to be largely free and fair, with a broad range of political
parties and movements contesting offices. President Boris Yeltsin was
elected in 1996, and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin took office in
August. A more centrist-leaning Duma was elected on December 19 in
elections that were judged by international observers to be largely
free and fair, although preelection manipulation of the media was a
problem. On December 31, President Yeltsin resigned and Prime Minister
Putin became Acting President. A presidential election is scheduled for
March 2000. The judiciary, although still seriously impaired by a lack
of resources and corruption, has shown signs of limited independence.
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), the Federal Security
Service (FSB), the Procuracy, and the Federal Tax Police are
responsible for law enforcement at all levels of government throughout
the Russian Federation. The FSB has broad law enforcement functions,
including fighting crime and corruption, in addition to its core
responsibilities of security, counterintelligence, and
counterterrorism. The FSB operates with only limited oversight by the
Procuracy and the courts. The military's primary mission is national
defense, although it has been employed in local, internal conflicts for
which it was prepared inadequately, and is available to control civil
disturbances. More recently, internal security threats in parts of the
Russian Federation have been dealt with by militarized elements of the
security services. These same organizations are tasked with domestic
law enforcement. Many members of the security forces, particularly
within the internal affairs apparatus, continued to commit human rights
abuses.
The economy has performed better than expected following the August
1998 financial crisis and the sharp devaluation of the ruble.
Industrial production reached its 1997 level again in March and
continues to grow. Gross domestic product (GDP) growth for the year was
estimated at 1.5 percent, substantially higher than previously
expected. At year's end, GDP was estimated at $75 billion (1.84
trillion rubles) for the first 6 months of the year. GDP per capita for
the first 6 months of the year was $85 (2,086 rubles) per month. The
inflation rate for the first 11 months of the year was 34.8 percent and
was not expected to exceed 40 percent by year's end. Growth in
industrial production is aided by high world prices for commodities
such as oil, gas, and nickel. The ruble's devaluation also has given
domestic producers a significant cost advantage over imported goods.
However, greatly reduced domestic demand limits the scope of economic
recovery. Real incomes shrank significantly during the year, and wage
arrears continued to increase. Average wages were $66 (1,717 rubles)
per month in October 1999, compared with $68 (1,123 rubles) per month
in October 1998. Real consumer spending is still 11 percent below the
1997 average. Lack of investment also inhibits sustained economic
growth. Although the ruble devaluation in August and September 1998
made Russian assets inexpensive, foreign investment has not increased.
Domestic investment is being funded mainly from retained earnings. The
ailing banking system also hampers domestic investment. The 1998 crash
reduced the total assets in commercial banks by 52 percent. The public
is wary of the private banking system, preferring to keep its money in
state-owned Sberbank, where deposits have grown by 50 percent. The
government statistics office estimates that the informal economy--
barter and hidden commercial activity designed to avoid heavy tax and
regulatory burdens--accounts for 24 percent of GDP. However, other
authoritative sources believe it to be much higher. Corruption
continues to be a dominant, negative factor in the development of
commercial relations. Official unemployment was 11.7 percent in
October, but actual unemployment was estimated at approximately 23
percent, with significant regional variation.
The Government's human rights record remained uneven, and worsened
in some areas. Government forces killed numerous civilians through the
use of indiscriminate force in Chechnya, and security officials'
beatings resulted in numerous deaths. There were credible reports--and
government officials admitted--that law enforcement and correctional
officials tortured and severely beat detainees and inmates, and
government forces reportedly raped civilians following the battle for
the Chechen town of Alkhan-Yurt. Prison conditions continue to be
extremely harsh and frequently are life threatening. According to human
rights groups, between 10,000 and 20,000 detainees and prison inmates
die in penitentiary facilities annually, some from beatings, but most
as a result of overcrowding, inferior sanitary conditions, disease, and
lack of medical care. The Government has made little progress in
combating abuses committed by soldiers, including ``dedovshchina''
(violent hazing of new recruits). Military justice systems consistent
with democratic practices remain largely underdeveloped. During the
year, the military procuracy reported decreases in the number of
reported crimes and hazing incidents. Existing laws on military courts,
military service, and the rights of service members often contradict
the Constitution, federal laws, and presidential decrees, elevating
arbitrary judgments of unit commanders over the rule of law. There were
reports of military officers and units sending soldiers to the front
lines in Chechnya as punishment instead of using the military justice
system. Such incidents reportedly were being investigated by military
procurators.
Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems. Police and other
security forces in various parts of the country continued their
practice of targeting citizens from the Caucasus and darker-skinned
persons in general for arbitrary searches and detention on the pretext
of fighting crime and enforcing residential registration requirements.
Police corruption also remains a problem. Lengthy pretrial detention
remained a serious problem. Institutions such as the Ministry of
Internal Affairs have begun to educate officers about safeguarding
human rights during law enforcement activities through training
provided by other countries, but remain largely unreformed and have not
yet adopted practices fully consistent with standards of law
enforcement in a democratic society. While the President and the
Government have supported human rights and democratic practice in
statements and policy initiatives, they have not institutionalized the
rule of law required to protect them. Most abuses occur at lower
levels, but government officials do not investigate the majority of
cases of abuse and rarely dismiss or discipline the perpetrators.
The Government made little progress in the implementation of
constitutional provisions for due process, fair and timely trial, and
humane punishment. In addition, the judiciary often was subject to
manipulation by central and local political authorities and was plagued
by large case backlogs and trial delays. However, there were
indications that the law is becoming an increasingly important tool for
those seeking to protect human rights. Nonetheless, serious problems
remain. For example, the case of Aleksandr Nikitin, a retired Soviet
Navy captain and environmental reporter, continued to be characterized
by serious violations of due process, and there are credible charges
that the FSB's case against him was politically motivated. St.
Petersburg judge Sergey Golets found Nikitin not guilty on charges of
treason and espionage in December after the FSB for the eighth time
filed espionage charges against Nikitin in July.
Authorities continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights.
Government technical regulations that require Internet service
providers to invest in equipment that enables the FSB to monitor
Internet traffic caused serious concern. While the Government generally
respected freedom of the press, significant systemic problems
persisted, and there were continued reports of government pressure on
the media. Private media, which flourished through the first half of
1998, came under increasing stress in the months after the August 1998
financial crisis. Faced with major financial difficulties, many media
organizations saw their already tenuous autonomy erode during the year.
Federal, regional, and local governments continued to exert pressure on
journalists by: Selectively denying access to information (including,
for example, statistics theoretically available to the public) and
filming opportunities; demanding the right to approve certain stories
prior to publication; prohibiting the tape recording of public trials
and hearings; withholding financial support from government media
operations that exercised independent editorial judgment; attempting to
unduly influence the appointment of senior editors at regional and
local newspapers and broadcast media organizations; and removing
reporters from their jobs and bringing libel suits against them.
Foreign and Russian journalists were frequent victims of kidnapings for
ransom by criminals in Chechnya and throughout the northern Caucasus.
The Federal Government took steps to mitigate the potentially
discriminatory effects of the 1997 religion law, and religious
organizations, despite the severe limitations of the beleaguered
judicial system, are winning some important court cases. By July
religious groups reported that they were reregistering their local
organizations successfully, although problems persisted in some
regions. However, there are numerous reports that religious
organizations either were denied registration or experienced long
delays in reregistration, as local authorities sought to obstruct the
activities of religious groups. On November 23, the Constitutional
Court upheld the provision of the 1997 religion law that requires
religious organizations to prove 15 years of existence in the country
in order to be registered. However, the Court also ruled that religious
organizations that were registered before the passage of the 1997
religion law are not required to prove 15 years' existence in the
country in order to be registered. Religious organizations and human
rights experts have suggested repeatedly that the law be amended to
extend the period for reregistration, to prevent a scenario in which a
large number of religious organizations are left unregistered and
therefore legally vulnerable to closure by court order after year's
end. No extension was implemented as of December 31.
While the Federal Government promised to implement measures to
discourage local authorities from attempting to close unregistered
religious organizations, critics of the law fear that at least some
religious organizations may be forced to close. Discriminatory
practices at the local level are attributable to the increased
decentralization of power, as well as to government inaction and
discriminatory attitudes that are held widely in society. In addition,
some regional governments have passed laws and decrees since 1994 that
restrict the activities of minority religious groups, some of which
have been subject to harassment as a result. Societal discrimination,
harassment, and violence against members of religious minorities
remained a problem. Although there were improvements in some areas,
there were continued reports of religious violence in the Northern
Caucasus and several serious anti-Semitic incidents.
Despite constitutional protections for citizens' freedom of
movement, the Government places some limits on this right, and some
regional and local authorities (most notably the city of Moscow)
restrict movement through residence registration mechanisms. These
restrictions, though successfully challenged in court, remain largely
in force and are tolerated by the Federal Government. The presence of
these restrictions, which increased following terrorist bombings in
September, demonstrated the continued obstacles to the enforcement of
judicial rulings. In September Moscow authorities expelled some 500
residents of the Caucasus from the city.
Government human rights institutions are still weak and lack
independence but are becoming more active. Although Human Rights
Ombudsman Oleg Mironov was not known previously for expertise in human
rights, he has taken an increasingly active and public role in
promoting human rights, speaking out on the religion law, the rights of
psychiatric patients, and electoral rights. Mironov has established an
office with 150 staff members, who are responsible for investigating
human rights complaints and promoting human rights education. Activists
report that the Presidential Human Rights Commission, chaired by
Vladimir Kartashkin, was relatively inactive during the year. With few
exceptions, human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's)
documented and reported on human rights violations without governmental
interference or sanctions. However, some local officials harassed human
rights monitors and, in some cases, arrested them. Violence against
women, trafficking in women and young girls, and abuse of children
remain problems, as does discrimination against women and religious and
ethnic minorities. There are some limits on worker rights, and there
were reports of instances of forced labor.
Chechen separatists also committed abuses, including the killing of
civilians.
The 1997 Khasavyurt Accord established an uneasy peace in Chechnya
following the 1994-96 conflict. However, on August 8, the status quo
was broken when armed groups from Chechnya carried out an insurgent
raid on neighboring Dagestan. Deadly terrorist bombings throughout
Russia, allegedly the work of Chechens, were cited by the Government
along with insurgent attacks in Dagestan as justification to launch a
brutal assault on Chechnya to reassert federal control. Russian troops
launched a full-scale attack on Chechen separatists in Chechnya
starting in September, shelling cities, killing numerous civilians, and
displacing hundreds of thousands of persons.
On February 3, Chechen republic president Maskhadov announced the
suspension of constitutional law and declared a state of Islamic
Shari'a law in the region. According to press reports, a shura
(council) of prominent figures came into being on February 10 to help
oversee Shari'a law. In the process, the Maskhadov government stripped
the region's legislature of most of its responsibilities and abolished
the region's vice presidency.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed political killings by agents of the Government; however, an
undetermined number--between 10,000 and 20,000--of detainees and prison
inmates died, some from beatings by security officials, but most due to
harsh conditions in detention (see Section 1.c.).
During the conflict in Chechnya in the fall, the military used
indiscriminate force against areas containing significant civilian
populations, resulting in numerous deaths (see Section 1.g.). On
November 25, drunken soldiers opened fire on a Chechen kiosk and killed
one woman, Larisa Titiyeva, and injured two others. Authorities in both
the army and the Interior Ministry together with local authorities were
investigating the case at year's end.
In December human rights NGO's and some pro-Moscow Chechen
authorities alleged that government forces carried out extrajudicial
killings in the village of Alkhan-Yurt in Chechnya. According to these
allegations, government forces engaged in a looting spree in Alkhan-
Yurt after they captured the village from Chechen fighters in early
December. According to some accounts, government troops killed between
19 and 41 civilians through mid-December. The Ministry of Defense at
first denied that there were extrajudicial killings in Alkhan-Yurt but
later announced that the Chief Military Procurator's office was
investigating the incident (see Section 1.g.).
Human rights NGO's and press organizations reported that up to 40
Ingushetiya-bound internally displaced persons (IDP's) were killed in a
convoy attack on December 3 near Goity, southwest of Groznyy. Survivors
of the incident reported that the assailants, who were masked, wore
Russian armed forces uniforms. Some survivors claimed that the
assailants were government troops. However, government officials
publicly denied such suggestions and claimed that Chechen fighters
carried out the attack as a provocation. At least one government
official claimed that the site of the convoy attack was not under
federal government control at that time.
According to unconfirmed press reports, police in the Nogai okrug
killed two Nogais (see Section 5).
A number of government officials were murdered. Some of these
killings appear to have been politically motivated, while the majority
were linked to private financial or commercial dealings. A number of
law enforcement officials also were killed as a result of their
attempts to stem crime.
On April 9, in St. Petersburg local Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia (LDPR) leader Gennadiy Tuganov was murdered near his home on the
Griboyedova channel embankment. While the LDPR considered the killing
to be a political murder, many observers believed that it was business-
related.
On October 20, St. Petersburg legislative assembly deputy Viktor
Novoselov was killed when a bomb was detonated on top of his car.
Novoselov's driver also was injured as a result of the bombing. Press
sources speculated that the murder was politically motivated since
Novoselov was set to testify at a hearing later that day about the date
of gubernatorial elections, and his testimony might have proved
embarrassing to St. Petersburg administration officials.
In December prior to the Duma elections, a campaign worker for
former St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak was killed by unknown
assailants.
According to an international labor organization report, on January
27 unknown assailants murdered Gennady Borisov, a leader of the Vnukovo
Airlines Technical and Ground Personnel Union, at the entrance to his
apartment. Earlier that month, Borisov and other labor activists began
picketing the airline headquarters to protest their not being paid for
4 months. Borisov also reportedly was monitoring alleged illegal
practices involving the company's shares (see Section 6.a.).
Politically related violence at times resulted in death and
injuries. For example, in April and May the republic of Karachayevo-
Cherkesiya (in the northern Caucasus) held its first presidential
elections in post-Soviet history. The campaign period and elections
were filled with incidents of violence aimed at the major candidates,
as well as a high number of election irregularities that strongly
suggested electoral fraud. The ensuing victory of Vladimir Semenev,
which was upheld by local authorities, renewed the protests that now
threaten the republic's territorial integrity. On September 7, eight
persons were wounded and one died as a result of injuries during
clashes between supporters of Semenev and his rival Cherkessk mayor
Stanislav Derev (see Sections 1.c., 3, and 5).
On November 23, the supreme court of Kalmykiya found Sergey Vaskin
and Vladimir Shanukov guilty of the June 1998 murder of Kalmykiya
newspaper editor Larisa Yudina. Both men were sentenced to 21 years in
prison. A third man, Sergey Lipin, received a lesser sentence for
concealing information about the crime. The trial began in July.
Yudina's murder was widely believed to be regional government
retribution for her news stories investigating high-level corruption in
the republic and criticizing Kalmykiya president Kirsan Ilyumzhinov
(see Section 2.a.). In his August 16 Duma confirmation hearing, Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin testified that the FSB continues to investigate
who may have ordered the killing.
In July 1998, the Ministry of the Interior announced that four
hired killers who were apprehended in the Kyrgyz Republic had confessed
to the August 1997 killing of St. Petersburg deputy mayor Mikhail
Manevich. Media reports at the time of Manevich's murder suggested that
Manevich, who was chairman of the city property committee, was killed
by individuals whose financial interests were threatened by his
property privatization program. The person or persons who ordered the
murder have not been identified. The FSB has expressed confidence in
its ability to solve Manevich's murder, but former St. Petersburg mayor
Anatoliy Sobchak said that he no longer believed that the murder would
be solved.
In January authorities arrested a sixth person from the Ministry of
Defense, Deputy Chief of the Special Paratroopers' Detachment Major
Konstantin Mirziayev, in connection with the 1994 murder of journalist
Dmitriy Kholodov. In July Kommersant Daily reported that the Procurator
General charged three officers of the airborne troops, one former
officer, and another man in the case. A trial is expected in military
court in the spring 2000.
No one has been charged yet in the November 1998 murder of State
Duma Deputy Galina Starovoytova, who was murdered in what press reports
characterized as a professional killing. Press reports at the time of
the murder suggested that Starovoytova was killed to prevent her from
revealing information on official corruption. Duma Deputy Yuliy Rybakov
sent an official inquiry to the FSB, which replied that a politically-
motivated murder is still the main scenario that it is investigating.
There has been no progress in the investigation of the 1995 murder
of Russian Public Television (ORT) Director Vladislav Listyev. However,
ITAR-TASS reported in March that investigators believe that his murder
may have been connected with the division of the ORT's advertising
market.
Reports of violence continue in the Northern Caucasus. On February
20, an explosion in Makhachkala, the capital of Dagestan, killed one
person and narrowly missed a group of Russian soldiers. On March 21, a
bomb in downtown Groznyy killed one person and injured eight others in
an apparent attempt to kill Chechen president Maskhadov. According to
press reports, the bombing was the fourth attempt to kill Maskhadov
since he became president in 1997. Chechen officials later claimed that
the bombing was aimed, in conjunction with the Gennadiy Shpigun
kidnaping, at destabilizing the political environment and discrediting
the government (see Section 1.b.).
On March 19, an explosion in the central marketplace of the North
Ossetian regional capital of Vladikavkaz killed at least 53 persons and
injured about 100 more. Russian media reports attributed the explosion
to a bomb. President Yeltsin and North Ossetian president Aleksandr
Dzasokhov both criticized the explosion as an attempt to destabilize
the republic and the Northern Caucasus region as a whole. President
Yeltsin sent then-Interior Minister Sergey Stepashin to Vladikavkaz and
ordered then-Prime Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to launch an
investigation into the bombing.
Since the Vladikavkaz marketplace bombing, a wave of similar
attacks unsettled the situation in North Ossetia. In May three bombs in
the Sputnik military housing compound killed 4 persons and injured 15.
On June 3, an antitank mine killed one person and injured two others
near the Baku-Novorossisk oil pipeline.
On May 23, gunmen injured Danilbek Tamkaev, an adviser to Chechen
president Maskhadov, and killed his brother when they shot at his car
in Groznyy. On May 25, a bomb hit the car of Chechen mufti Akhmad-hadji
Kadyrov in Groznyy and killed five of his bodyguards.
On August 31, an explosion at the Manezh shopping center in Moscow
resulted in the death of 1 person and injuries to 40 more. On September
4, a powerful car bomb exploded on a military base in Buynaksk, a town
in central Dagestan. The bomb was detonated near a military housing
facility, and as many as 64 persons were killed and 145 were injured.
Most of the victims were family members of officers serving in the
region. On September 9, an explosion leveled an apartment complex in
Moscow and killed 94 persons. Early in the morning of September 13, a
bomb blast destroyed an apartment building in Moscow, killing at least
118 persons. On September 14, authorities arrested two men in
connection with the bombing and were seeking another three suspects. In
the following week, authorities detained more than two dozen suspects,
detained illegal residents and aliens, and confiscated over 6 tons of
explosives, drugs, and weapons. Government officials implied that
Chechnya-based Islamic extremist groups were responsible for the
bombings but have not presented any evidence or pressed charges against
any individuals by year's end. Human rights activists argued that the
authorities detained and discriminated against persons from the
Caucasus in conducting their investigation (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
On November 3, Moscow police reported that they had filed charges
against a suspect in the bombings who they believed was loyal to
militants in Chechnya.
Religious figures also were kidnaped, tortured, and killed during
the year (see Sections 1.b., 1.c., and 5).
In January Chechen field commander Salman Raduev told reporters
that he had ordered the April 1997 railway bombing in Pyatigorsk that
killed 2 persons and injured 20, but that the 2 Chechen women on trial
in Stavropol for the bombing were not those responsible and had
confessed only after being tortured by authorities. An FSB spokesman
denied these claims.
On February 24, the Supreme Court countermanded the decision of a
Moscow oblast court in the 1995 murder and kidnaping of legislator
Sergey Skorochkin. The Supreme Court returned the case to the Moscow
court for a new trial. In November 1998, a jury found four suspects not
guilty and two others guilty only of kidnaping. In December 1998, the
Moscow oblast procurator's office appealed the Moscow oblast court
sentence.
On April 20, the Moscow Military Court began hearing the case
against Valeriy Radchikov, former chair of the Russian Fund of Invalids
of the War in Afghanistan, and 2 alleged accomplices, in the November
1996 Kotlyakovo cemetery bombing that left 14 persons dead and about 30
wounded. At the hearing the two accomplices recanted their previous
testimony against Radchikov, which they said had been made under
pressure from the police and the procuracy. When the Court questioned
Radchikov, he claimed that an investigator from the Procurator
General's office had pressured him to incriminate former Prime Minister
Viktor Chernomyrdin, former presidential administration head Anatoliy
Chubays, and former federation council chairman Vladimir Shumeyko.
There has been no resolution to the December 1998 beheading of four
foreign telecommunications workers, whom kidnapers had been holding
hostage in Chechnya for 2 months (see Section 1.b.). Chechnya's deputy
procurator general told Interfax in March that his office had finished
an investigation of the case, arrested four unnamed suspects, and
passed their cases to the republic's supreme Shari'a court. He also
claimed that another four unnamed suspects in the case already had been
sentenced to death. For his part, then-Interior Minister Stepashin
charged in a January interview that Arbi Barayev--a prominent Chechen
warlord--was involved in the case.
Meanwhile, no formal charges have been filed in the investigation
into the December 1996 attack on the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) compound in Novyy Atagi, Chechnya, during which six ICRC
workers were killed and one was wounded.
There were no developments in the 1998 murder of St. Petersburg
city official Yevgeniy Agarev, although the investigation into the case
reportedly continues. There were no developments in the 1998 murders of
Deputy Representative of the Russian Federation to the Chechen republic
Akmal Saidov, Dagestani mufti Said-Mukhamed Abubakarov, or Chechen
official Shadid Bargishev, the 1996 murder of U.S. businessman Paul
Tatum, or in the 1990 murder of Orthodox priest Aleksandr Men.
Chechen separatists killed a number of civilians (see Section
1.g.). There were credible Russian press reports that Chechen
separatists tortured and killed a number of civilians (see Section
1.c).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of government involvement
in cases of politically motivated disappearances. Kidnaping frequently
is used by criminal groups in the Northern Caucasus, some of which may
have links to elements of the former insurgent forces. The main
motivation behind such cases apparently is ransom, although some cases
have political or religious overtones (see Section 5). Many of the
hostages were being held in Chechnya. The Chechen interior ministry's
chief of staff said in August that the ministry registered 76 kidnaping
cases in the first half of the year but added that the real number of
cases was higher. Otherwise, there were no reports of disappearance as
a precursor to a political killing, although a number of persons
remained missing at year's end.
On February 23, Chechen president Maskhadov's adviser on relations
with ethnic Russians, himself a Russian, was kidnaped in Groznyy.
On March 5, unknown assailants abducted Major-General Gennadiy
Shpigun--the Interior Ministry's special envoy to Chechnya--from his
airplane at Groznyy airport. Although the motives behind Shpigun's
kidnaping are unclear, Russian press reports indicate that his role in
the 1994-96 Chechen war earned him much local animosity. Although
Chechen law enforcement officials later claimed to have issued arrest
warrants for six unnamed assailants, Shpigun remains missing.
U.S. missionary and university instructor Herbert Gregg was
kidnaped in the Dagestan capital of Makhachkala in November 1998. The
kidnapers tortured Gregg and cut off one of his fingers during his
captivity in order to extort ransom (see Section 5). In January
Dagestani law enforcement officials told the Russian press that they
had arrested four unnamed suspects in connection with the Gregg case.
Russian and Ingush interior ministry troops later freed Gregg on June
29. Other religious figures also were kidnaped (see Sections 1.a. and
5).
Geraldo Cruz Ribero, a New Zealander and ICRC medical
administrator, was kidnaped in the Kabardino-Balkariya capital of
Nalchik on May 15. Russian and Ingush interior ministry forces freed
Ribero late in July. A Russian Interior Ministry official told
reporters that his counterparts had arrested four persons--three
Chechens and a resident of Kabardino-Balkariya--in connection with the
kidnaping.
According to press reports, in December authorities arrested
Salavdi Abdurazakov, a Chechen who is suspected of organizing the 1997
kidnaping of five Russian television journalists in Chechnya.
Abdurazakov reportedly was sent to Moscow immediately for judicial
proceedings.
Chechen authorities frequently have claimed that they are fighting
kidnapers actively. New Chechen laws call for jail terms or public
executions of kidnapers.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture, violence, and other
brutal or humiliating treatment or punishment; however, there are
credible reports that law enforcement personnel regularly use torture
to coerce confessions from suspects, and that the Government does not
hold most of them accountable for these actions. For the most part, the
Government does not hold perpetrators accountable for these actions.
There are also a few claims of abuse of psychiatry by authorities.
Institutions such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs have begun to
educate officers about safeguarding human rights during law enforcement
activities through training provided by other countries but remain
largely unreformed and have not yet adopted practices fully consistent
with law enforcement in a democratic society.
Prisoners' rights groups, as well as other human rights groups,
have documented numerous cases in which law enforcement and
correctional officials tortured and beat detainees and suspects. An
Amnesty International researcher has described the practice of torture
as ``widespread.'' Numerous press reports indicate that the police
frequently strike persons based on little or no provocation or use
excessive force to subdue those whom they arrest. Observers noted that
persons attempting to vandalize a foreign consulate in St. Petersburg
on two separate occasions in March and May were beaten severely with
fists, feet, and nightsticks by police. Reports by refugees, NGO's, and
the press suggest a pattern of beatings, arrests, and extortion by
police against persons with dark skin, or who appeared to be from the
Caucasus, Central Asia, and Africa (see Sections 2.d. and 5). Police
also have used excessive force in dealing with demonstrators. In
September after terrorist bombings in Moscow, law enforcement officers
detained and beat persons from the Caucasus. Police also increasingly
targeted defense lawyers for harassment, including beatings and
arrests, and intimidated witnesses (see Section 1.e.). Police plant
drugs and other false evidence as pretexts for arrests, arrest and
detain persons based on their political views and religious beliefs,
and conduct illegal searches of homes (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and
2.c.). Police extort money from suspects, their friends, and their
relatives (see Section 1.d.). Government forces in Chechnya killed
numerous persons and injured many others. In one incident in November,
government troops opened fire on doctors and other medical staff at a
psychiatric hospital, injuring three persons (see Sections 1.a. and
1.g.). According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped
civilian women in Chechnya in December in the village of Alkhan-Yurt
and in other villages.
In October Ministry of Justice troops stormed the Vyborgskyi paper
mill in Leningrad oblast and opened fire on workers who had barricaded
themselves in the factory's administration building. The workers were
protesting the mill's new foreign ownership. Minister of Justice Yuriy
Chayka admitted to the Duma later that month that the troops' actions
were ``lawful in form, but digressed from the law in content'' (see
Section 6.c.).
According to Human Rights Watch's (HRW) report on torture in Russia
released in November, torture by police officers usually occurs within
the first few hours or days of arrest and usually takes one of four
forms: Beatings with fists, batons, or other objects; asphyxiation
using gas masks or bags (sometimes filled with mace); electric shocks;
or suspension of body parts (e.g. suspending a victim from the wrists,
which are tied together behind the back). Allegations of torture are
difficult to substantiate because of lack of access to medical
professionals, and because the techniques used often leave few or no
permanent physical traces. The HRW research appears to support the
conclusions reached in Amnesty International's 1997 report on torture.
Amnesty International also reported the use of ``press-camera,'' a
system whereby violent prisoners are coopted by guards and used to
control or punish other prisoners. The coopted prisoners are permitted
to torture prisoners (sometimes to gain confessions) or deal with
``difficult'' prisoners. The ``crucifixion of Christ'' involves the
victim being secured in a spread-eagle position to either a metal cot
or prison bars, to which powerful electric shocks are applied. These
allegations have been corroborated by other credible sources.
Torture is forbidden by Article 21 of the Constitution; however,
since ``torture'' has never been defined in a subsequent law or the
Criminal Code, it is difficult to charge perpetrators. Police only can
be accused of ``exceeding'' granted authority, a far milder violation
of the Criminal Code.
Research conducted by HRW indicates that the country's justice
system encourages police to resort to torture and hampers an adequate
defense of the accused. Law enforcement organs are expected to meet an
unreasonably high 80 percent target rate for solving crimes, despite
the loss of experienced officers and underfunding since the breakup of
the Soviet Union. The official rate for crimes solved in 1998 was 74.4
percent; experts consider a 30 to 40 percent rate to be consistent with
democratic practices and international standards for due process.
Sergey Pashin, a judge in a Moscow appeals court, has stated
repeatedly that in the cases that come before him, confessions often
have been beaten out of suspects. He also charged that ``witnesses''
often have been beaten to force them into testifying, when in fact they
may have no knowledge of the case. As Pashin told the press in the
fall, he estimates that out of 1,200 official torture complaints
received in the country annually, only 20 criminal investigations are
opened, and only 3 or 4 go to trial. In a letter to then-Minister of
Internal Affairs Stepashin in the fall of 1998, Human Rights Ombudsman
Mironov reported that 50 percent of prisoners with whom he spoke
claimed to have been tortured. In April 1998, the Permanent Human
Rights Chamber, an advisory presidential committee, concluded that
torture was ``common'' among representatives of the Ministry of
Interior, and that it was ``widespread and systematic,'' especially in
the pretrial stages of law enforcement. Yakov Pister, head of the
administration of the Procurator General's office, testified to the
Chamber that the Criminal Code has no definition of torture, and that
no statistics were gathered on the use of torture. He blamed police
reliance on torture as a means of gathering evidence on a lack of
professional training. HRW researchers confirm that no centralized
information on torture is available in the country, and that regional
human rights groups are able to document cases in some regions but not
others.
HRW noted that the quality of criminal investigations is low and
that they can drag out endlessly. Assuming that they are aware of their
rights under the law, defendants often are not granted access to
defense attorneys or to medical treatment. Pretrial detention
conditions are so miserable that defendants sometimes confess simply to
be moved to relatively easier prison conditions. Retractions of
extorted confessions usually are ignored. The accused can spend many
months or even years in pretrial detention because the current criminal
procedure code allows judges to send cases back for investigation an
unlimited number of times.
Caucasus Press reported on June 22 that authorities beat and
arrested 14 Azerbaijani citizens in Moscow in June. The newspaper
Express reported that day that some 34 Azerbaijanis were beaten and
arrested as a part of a police search for 6 prisoners who escaped from
an Irkutsk penal colony.
The Moscow Times reported on September 1, that the local
procurator's office has been unaccountably slow to resume investigation
of the case of Aleksey Mikheyev, who jumped out of a third-story window
to escape torture by Nizhniy Novgorod police in September 1998.
Mikheyev, now paralyzed from the waist down as a result of his fall,
said that he was tortured repeatedly with electric shocks. He was
forced to confess to the murder and rape of a young woman (who turned
up 2 days after the torture occurred); police also attempted to extract
confessions to five other unsolved murders.
In April 1998, Olga Smirnova testified before the Human Rights
Chamber of the President's Political Consultative Council that she had
been raped and beaten over the course of a 10-day detention in 1994 at
a Moscow police station. Police were trying to force her to testify as
a witness in a criminal case of which she had no knowledge. She said
that she tried three times to file a complaint with the district
procurator's office, but that her complaint was rejected each time.
Valeriy Abramkin of the Moscow Center for Promotion of Criminal Justice
Reform (MCPCJR) said that the Moscow procurator's office finally
ordered an investigation into the case, but as of the end of 1998 it
had not been completed. Although the MCPCJR continues to follow this
case, no new information was available as of September 1.
Under the Operation Clean Hands program, created in 1995, MVD
officials continued to work to combat police crime. By the end of 1998,
more than 34,000 citizen complaints had been lodged against police
officers. Over 2,100 cases have been initiated against police
personnel. Of that number, 922 were group crimes and 127 included
civilian perpetrators.
Various abuses against military servicemen, including but not
limited to the practice of ``dedovshchina'' (the violent, sometimes
fatal, hazing of new junior military recruits for the armed services,
MVD, and border guards), continued during the year. Press reports
citing serving and former military personnel, the Military Procurator's
Office, and NGO's monitoring conditions in the military indicate that
this mistreatment often includes extortion of money or material goods
in the face of the threat of increased hazing or actual beatings. Press
reports also indicate that this type of mistreatment has resulted in
permanent injuries and deaths among servicemen. Soldiers often do not
report hazing to either unit officers or military procurators due to
fear of reprisals, since officers in some cases reportedly tolerate or
even encourage such hazing as a means of controlling their units. There
are also reports that officers in some cases use beatings to discipline
soldiers whom they find to be ``inattentive to their duties.''
According to the Central Military Procuracy, there were 818
reported cases of military commanders assaulting their subordinates in
1998, an increase of 100 percent over the previous year. In July the
Main Military Procurator's Office (MMPO) reported a 40 percent increase
in bribe-taking in the first half of the year, compared with the same
period for 1998, while abuse of military position or authority
increased by 23 percent. Half of such cases involved physical violence.
In general, incidents of brawling increased roughly 23 percent and
hooliganism, or disorderly conduct, increased 17 percent. However, the
MMPO also recorded a 14 percent drop in reported crimes during the
year, and a 10 percent decrease in reports of hazing. In part, the
reductions were attributed to a reported decline of roughly 30 percent
in military service evasion. Offenses against military service declined
about 28 percent, and premeditated murder dropped 22 percent.
Specifically noted were some 20 criminal investigations aimed at
general officers and admirals on charges of graft. The MMPO also
reported that it opened over 14,000 investigations of allegations of
abuse of office during the year, 11,000 of which went to trial.
Both the Soldiers' Mothers Committee and the MPPO also have noted
an increase in the number of reports about ``non-statutory relations''
in which officers or sergeants physically assault or demean their
subordinates. This tendency commonly is attributed to stressful
conditions throughout the military and to the widespread placement of
inexperienced reserve officers, on active duty for 2 years, in primary
troop leadership positions. In 1998 every second draftee expressed
concern that his life, health, or sanity would be threatened during the
period of military service by such incidents.
In the navy, investigations reportedly uncovered about 20 incidents
of nonstatutory treatment of sailors since the beginning of the year,
just on the aircraft carrier cruiser ``Admiral Kuznetsov.'' Similar
activity, including the theft of military hardware and weapons by
sailors seeking to escape hazing, reportedly was uncovered on the heavy
nuclear cruiser (and flagship) ``Petr Velikiy.''
Other reported abuses of military personnel included the practice
by officers and sergeants of ``selling'' soldiers, most often linked to
units in the Northern Caucasus Military District. The 10-year-old
Committee for the Protection of the Rights of Servicemen and Their
Families has worked actively throughout the Northern Caucasus region,
successfully rescuing 42 ethnic Bashkiri conscripts who were sold by
NCO's and officers, but has been reluctant to act on behalf of ethnic
Russian captives or soldiers from other ethnic groups. One person
reportedly was held for 7 years. The Committee also reports that in
many instances, the army apparently was not even aware officially that
these men had been abducted from their units. There were also reports
of military officers and units sending soldiers to the front lines in
Chechnya as punishment instead of using the military justice system.
Such incidents reportedly were being investigated by military
procurators (see Section 1.e.).
There were similar incidents in the armed forces of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. In June 44 ministry soldiers in the Far East went
absent without leave after enduring repeated systematic abuse and
beatings not only by senior servicemen, but by officers as well.
Military investigators determined that 20 of these soldiers had
injuries of varying severity and also found that over 50 conscripts
from the same small garrison had illnesses caused by neglected
injuries. Among those implicated were the unit commander, chief of
staff, the deputy commander for personnel, the deputy commander for
supply, and the unit's medical officer.
The MMPO continues to cooperate with the Soldiers' Mothers
Committee to investigate allegations of abuse and recently established
telephone and postal ``hot lines'' to receive reports directly from
soldiers. Nonetheless, the Soldiers' Mothers Committee believes that
the majority of hazing incidents and assaults are not reported, due to
fear of reprisals, indifference of commanders, and deliberate efforts
to cover up such activity.
According to the armed forces' Medical Service, approximately 45
percent of those committing or attempting suicide were driven to it by
either physical abuse or the often inhuman conditions of military
service. Nonpayment of wages was also a factor, particularly in cases
of suicide among officers. The Mothers' Rights Foundation and the
Soldiers' Mothers Committee believe that many of those who reportedly
committed suicide were driven to do so by violent hazing or abuse. The
Soldiers' Mothers Committee believes that the vast majority of hazing
incidents are never reported. In incidents brought to the attention of
the military or civilian authorities, the Soldiers' Mothers Committee
reported in 1997 that in 60 percent of the cases there was an official
finding that abuse had taken place, and that some disciplinary action
was taken as a result.
The deteriorating quality of the armed forces, cited as the main
reason for the breakdown in discipline, is aggravated by negligence of
selection committees during the conscription process. In one Moscow-
region unit cited by the Soldiers' Mothers Committee, 46 percent of the
newly arrived conscripts had physical or psychological health problems,
which should have exempted them from military service. The rise in the
number of draftees unfit for military service also allegedly is
contributing to crime within the armed forces. Draft evasion is common,
including the reported ``purchase'' of unwarranted medical deferments
by potential conscripts otherwise ineligible for one of the many
categories of legal deferment. The Military Procuracy continued its
antidraft evasion efforts and cracked down on conscription abuses
during the year. In January and February, these efforts resulted in the
detention of 1,633 servicemen absent without leave. Those who turn
themselves in voluntarily and have a ``good reason'' for being absent
without leave are given reduced sentences, with the assistance of the
military procurator's office.
Degrading and substandard living conditions persist throughout the
military, principally due to insufficient funding. As of April, the
number of armed forces personnel without housing was 93,400, and a
further 43,200 need housing on military bases.
Despite the acknowledged seriousness of the problem, the military
leadership has made only superficial efforts to implement substantive
reforms in training, education, and administration programs within
units to combat abuse, at least in part due to lack of funding and the
leadership's preoccupation with urgent reorganizational issues and the
fighting in Chechnya.
There is still no law providing for the constitutional right to
alternative civilian service, and the proposal for all-volunteer armed
forces has been put off indefinitely, in the face of the current
economic crisis and the Government's inability to sufficiently raise
military pay. Although some regional authorities are attempting to
introduce alternative service programs, national legislation necessary
to implement the constitutional right to alternative service has yet to
be passed by the Duma. Without such legislation there is no legal basis
for any current alternative service program, beyond the constitutional
language itself. As a result, the courts often rule against the
individual based upon the legal requirements relating to military
service.
The systematic abuse of psychiatry as a form of punishment during
the Soviet-era has ended. However, human rights groups charge that
psychiatric hospitals continue to conceal their archives and their
practices. Further, authorities apparently occasionally still abuse the
practice of psychiatry for other purposes: In St. Petersburg, six
members of Sentuar, a local Scientologist organization, were
hospitalized forcibly in June for a 3-week psychiatric evaluation. The
Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with several human
rights organizations, has criticized the use of psychiatry in
``deprogramming'' victims of ``totalitarian sects.'' In such cases,
authorities use pseudo-psychological and spiritual techniques to
``treat'' persons who had been members of new religious groups (see
Section 2.c.).
Yuriy Savenko, Head of the Independent Psychiatric Association of
Russia (originally formed during the Soviet era when psychiatric
hospitals were used to punish dissidents), told Time magazine in 1998
that military, police, and state security agencies often use internal,
closed-door tribunals to deal with whistle-blowers by sending them to
psychiatric institutions. He said that ``more and more'' policemen and
military and intelligence officers sought out his organization after
they had been labeled mentally ill.
There were credible Russian press reports that Chechen separatists
tortured a number of civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
Politically motivated violence also occurred. In October according
to the St. Petersburg police two activists from Stepashin's campaign to
the State Duma were assaulted in connection with their electoral
activities. Their injuries did not require hospitalization (see Section
3).
On August 3, in Yekaterinburg, the apartment of independent
television company Channel Four Plus President Igor Mishin was
destroyed by a bomb. Mishin, who was not in the apartment at the time
of the explosion, reportedly had rejected requests by gubernatorial
candidates to ``alter the company's position'' in their favor, instead
maintaining an independent posture in covering the elections. No
arrests were made in this incident by year's end (see Section 2.a.).
On February 2, a bomb seriously injured a paratrooper in Dagestan.
On April 24, a bomb exploded outside a building housing two Western
consulates in Yekaterinburg. While no one was injured, the building was
damaged severely. On June 22, a bomb exploded near the Ministry of
Interior in Moscow. On June 28, an antipersonnel mine injured 11
persons in Vladikavkaz.
After the Karachayevo-Cherkesiya supreme court ruled the results of
the May 16 presidential election valid, supporters of Cherkessk mayor
Stanislav Derev (who had received 20 percent of the vote) attacked the
jeep of former commander in chief of ground forces Vladimir Semenev
(who had received more than 70 percent of the vote). On the night of
September 8-9, three explosions, reportedly grenades, went off near the
homes of Semenev supporters. On the night of September 14-15, after
ethnic Karachay president Semenev was inaugurated, two Karachay-owned
cafes were bombed. On October 11, an aide to President Semenev was
injured seriously during an attempted murder, but it cannot be
confirmed whether this attack was politically motivated (see Sections
1.a., 3, and 5).
Ingush president Ruslan Aushev issued an official protest early in
July on behalf of ethnic Ingush refugees trying to return to the
Prigorodnyy district of North Ossetia. Up to 70,000 Ingush refugees
fled the Prigorodnyy and Vladikavkaz areas in 1992, when interethnic
fighting broke out between Ossetian and Ingush inhabitants. According
to Russian media reports, just over 10,000 of the refugees have been
able to return so far. According to a June report by the Ingush branch
of the Memorial human rights group, ethnic Ingush refugees have faced
systematic harassment while trying to return to the Prigorodnyy
district (see Section 2.d.).
Incidents of societal violence apparently based on religious belief
also occurred. For example, according to press reports, in August
between 10 and 15 youths burst into a Moscow Hare Krishna temple,
beating followers and giving at least 1 person a head laceration severe
enough to require hospitalization. In May two bombs exploded near a
Moscow synagogue, and in July the director of a Jewish cultural center
was stabbed (see Section 5). An unexploded bomb was discovered in
another Moscow synagogue in July. Religious figures also were kidnaped,
tortured, and killed in the Northern Caucasus (see Sections 1.a. and
5).
Prison conditions are extremely harsh and frequently life
threatening. The penitentiary system is administered centrally from
Moscow by the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice, the
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of
Education all maintain penitentiary facilities.
Conditions for detainees and prisoners in most government
facilities remain extremely harsh, particularly in pretrial detention
facilities (SIZO's) where overcrowding is rampant and the authorities
frequently employ physical abuse and torture to coerce confessions.
Most detainees face extremely harsh and even life-threatening
conditions. Russian news agencies reported in June 1998 that Procurator
General Yuriy Skuratov had written to then-Minister of Interior
Stepashin that human rights are ``systematically and massively
violated'' in the nation's prisons. According to the MCPCJR, the 1998
economic crisis worsened underfunding for prisons. Some prison
directors have been forced to find unusual solutions in order to feed
their inmates, such as using prison labor to run small businesses.
According to the 1995 law On the Detention of Those Suspected or
Accused of Committing Crimes, inmates must be provided with adequate
space, food, and medical attention. Although most of the law's
provisions went into effect at the end of 1996, the authorities were
not able to ensure compliance, due in part to lack of funds, most
judges' failure to use the option of bail, and a very large prison
population.
The country's penal institutions remain extremely overcrowded.
According to the MCPCJR's analysis of government statistics during the
year, the total number of persons held by the penitentiary system in
May was 1,038,000, up from 1,009,863 in January 1998. The number of
detainees in the 191 pretrial detention centers went up from 275,000 in
January of 1999 to 285,600 over the first 4 months of the year.
According to May data, 731,400 convicts are held in correctional labor
colonies (ITK's). The January 1999 MCPCJR analysis showed that pretrial
detention centers are overcrowded on the average 2.3 times over
capacity, i.e., 2.3 persons are being held in space designed for 1. On
average SIZO detainees have 5.2 square feet per person, compared with
12 square feet per person required by law. (Statutory space
requirements for other penal facilities range from 6 to 15 square
feet.) In May 85,000 persons had no personal sleeping spots in SIZO's.
In one example, a Volgograd SIZO accommodated 4,800 detainees in a
space designed for 1,500, averaging 1.2 square feet per person in
communal cells. Similarly, in 1998 a SIZO in the Urals held 8,000
persons in facilities designed for 3,500. According to 1998 data, in
``Kresty,'' St. Petersburg's largest SIZO, 5 to 15 prisoners were held
in cells that were built 100 years ago to hold 1 prisoner. The
situation is less severe in ITK's. As of January, ITK's were only 1.1
times over planned capacity, and correctional labor colonies for
prisoners serving life sentences were only 1.05 times over capacity.
Special facilities exclusively for women are filled to 1.5 times of
capacity, according to a study financed by Penal Reform International.
In 1998 the occupancy rate for the overall penitentiary system was 112
percent. As of January, there were 39,800 women held in correctional
labor colonies, according to the MCPCJR.
Under such conditions, prisoners sleep in shifts, and there is
little, if any, room to move within the cell. In most pretrial
detention centers and prisons, there is no ventilation system. Poor
ventilation is thought to contribute to cardiac problems and lowered
resistance to disease. Cells are stiflingly hot in summer (up to 40
degrees centigrade, or 104 degrees Fahrenheit, according to the MCPCJR)
and dangerously cold in winter. Prisoners report that matches cannot be
lit in many SIZO cells during the summer because of a lack of oxygen.
Health, nutrition, and sanitation standards in penal facilities
remain low due to a lack of funding. Head lice, scabies, and various
skin diseases are prevalent. This situation was aggravated by the
country's economic crisis and resulting budgetary problems. The MCPCJR
reported that in the first half of 1998, actual government budget
disbursement for food for prisoners was $23 (142 rubles) per prisoner
per month. This amount represented 63 percent of the Government's
guideline of $36 (225 rubles) per prisoner per month. After the August
1998 financial crisis, this sum shrank to $0.88 (22 rubles) per
prisoner per month, and some regions received no money at all in August
and November 1998. Prisoners and detainees typically rely on families
to provide them with extra food.
According to statistics provided by the MCPCJR, the 1998 planned
federal budget allocated $1.25 billion (at the precrisis exchange rate,
or 7.8 billion rubles), or 61 percent of what was required by the penal
system. Only $983 million (at the precrisis exchange rate, or 5.9
billion rubles), or 46 percent of required funding actually was
granted. Even if the budgeted allocations for 1999 were disbursed in
full, they only would provide 60 percent of the amount needed for
maintenance of penal institutions. Many penal institutions also
supplement significantly their budget allocations with income from
prison labor. In many cases, prisoners produce much of their own food.
Increased funding appears very unlikely.
According to the MCPCJR, conditions in penal facilities vary among
the regions. Some regions offer assistance in the form of food,
clothing, and medicine. The Saratov oblast administration, concerned
with the tuberculosis crisis in facilities located there, fully funded
the tuberculosis-related medicinal needs of prisoners, according to the
MCPCJR. Other support is offered by NGO's and religious groups.
Inmates in the prison system suffer from inadequate medical care.
In March the Human Rights Chamber again stated that over 10,000
prisoners and detainees die each year. In August 1998, Yuriy
Shcherbanenko, a senior official of the Procurator General's office,
told colleagues at a conference that the level of medical services in
prisons was far below international standards and even elementary
sanitary norms. Every year 10,000 persons die in prisons, he said.
Common causes of death in prisons include typhoid, cardiovascular
diseases, and tuberculosis.
Detention facilities have infection rates of tuberculosis far
higher in than the population at large. Tuberculosis in the general
population and especially in prisons is considered by health and human
rights experts to be not only a national, but an international, health
threat. In June 1998, the Government's main sanitary doctor, Gennadiy
Onishchenko, told journalists that tuberculosis rates in the prisons
were five times the national average. The MCPCJR reports that as of
January, 92,000 detainees had tuberculosis in the active form. Each
year an estimated 35,400 prisoners contract tuberculosis. Due to a
shortage of space in specialized tuberculosis care facilities, about
2,000 infected inmates live among healthy prisoners. Another 15,000 are
kept in isolated sections of regular penal institutions. HIV/AIDS
infection rates also are a source of concern. The MCPCJR reported that
as of January, 2,300 prisoners (compared with 2,000 in September 1998)
were infected with HIV, the virus that causes AIDS. Space shortages do
not allow for separate facilities for prisoners with AIDS. Then-Justice
Minister Pavel Krasheninnikov said in October 1998 that the number of
HIV-infected inmates increased 500 percent since September 1997.
The tuberculosis epidemic in prisons became particularly urgent in
mid-1998, when doctors drew attention to the presence of a new
multidrug resistant form of tuberculosis, known as MDR-TB, in the
country. They said that the strain was concentrated primarily among
prison inmates. As of March, approximately 20,000 prisoners with
tuberculosis were infected with a multidrug-resistant strain. In 1998
Doctors without Borders, Medical Emergency Relief International, and
the Public Health Institute of New York sent a joint letter to
President Yeltsin warning that the country had become ``an
international incubator of a new illness.'' Alexander Goldfarb,
director of the Soros Foundation's anti-tuberculosis program in the
country, stated in August 1998 that in recent years the supply of anti-
tuberculosis drugs seldom met more than 20 to 25 percent of prison
requirements. Prison personnel often administered incorrect dosages of
medicine, encouraging the development of drug-resistant strains of
tuberculosis. Currently about 12 percent of tuberculosis infected
inmates have a multidrug resistant strain that is especially difficult
to cure.
Statistics on the number of detainees and prisoners who were killed
or died and on the number of law enforcement and prison personnel
disciplined for use of excessive force are not released publicly. While
reliable figures are extremely difficult to establish, Russian human
rights groups have in the past estimated that between 10,000 and 20,000
detainees and prison inmates die each year in penitentiary facilities.
Some die due to beatings, but most as a result of overcrowding, poor
sanitary conditions, or lack of medical care. The Ministry of Internal
Affairs does not break down its statistics to specify how many of the
21,000 personnel dismissed were punished for abusing detainees or
convicts. The Procuracy General receives approximately 1,000 complaints
of torture per year. The HRW 1999 report on torture quotes a procuracy
official as saying that this figure ``does not reflect the number of
such incidents.'' The press often reports on innocent individuals
mistreated, injured, or killed in various SIZO's; some of the reported
cases include habitual abuse by the same officers.
Violence among inmates, including beatings and rape, is common.
There are elaborate inmate-enforced caste systems in which informers,
homosexuals, rapists, rape victims, child molesters, and others are to
be ``untouchable'' and treated very harshly, with little or no
protection from the prison authorities.
There are five basic forms of custody in the criminal justice
system: Police detention centers, pretrial detention (SIZO's),
correctional labor colonies (ITK's), prisons designated for those who
violate ITK rules, and educational labor colonies (VTK's).
Responsibility for operating the country's penal facilities falls under
the Ministry of Justice's Main Directorate for Execution of Sentences
(GUIN). Conditions in police station detention centers vary
considerably but as a rule are harsh. In most cases, detainees are not
fed and have no bedding, sleeping place, running water, or toilet.
Suspects awaiting completion of criminal investigation, trial,
sentencing, or appeal are confined in pretrial facilities (SIZO's). The
GUIN has 178 SIZO's. Convicts on occasion are imprisoned in SIZO's
because there is no transport to take them elsewhere. Conditions in
SIZO's remain extremely harsh; they fall far short of minimum
international standards and pose a serious threat to life and health.
Cells are overcrowded and prisoners must sleep in shifts due to
insufficient numbers of beds.
The 1997 Amnesty International Report on Torture in Russia noted
that ``torture and ill-treatment occur at all stages of detention and
imprisonment,'' but most often was reported in pretrial detention.
These conditions have not improved. In February 1998, then-Justice
Minister Stepashin admitted that ``the pretrial detention centers are
the most serious problem'' in the prison system. Vyacheslav Budnov, the
Interior Ministry official in charge of prisons was quoted in 1998 as
saying that ``this is a Russian paradox.'' Persons incarcerated in
detention centers ``have not gone to trial, but they are living in
worse conditions than those already sentenced.''
Correctional labor colonies (ITK's) hold the bulk of the nation's
convicts. According to January statistics of the MCPCJR, there are
719,500 convicts (of whom 39,800 are female) incarcerated in the ITK's.
According to the MCPCJR, conditions in the ITK's are better than in
SIZO's and prisons only to the extent that there is fresh air. In the
122 timber correctional colonies, where hardened criminals serve their
time, beatings, torture, and rape by guards are common.
The country's ``prisons''--distinct from the labor colonies or
ITK's--are actually penitentiary institutions for those who repeatedly
violate the relatively lax rules in effect in ITK's. Conditions in many
prisons are extremely harsh. Although they are not as crowded as
SIZO's, guards reportedly severely discipline prisoners to break down
resistance. Prisoners sometimes are humiliated, beaten, and starved.
Educational labor colonies for juveniles (VTK's) are facilities for
juveniles from 14 to 20 years of age. The MCPCJR's January statistics
indicate that there are 20,000 persons in the 63 educational colonies.
Conditions in VTK's are significantly better than in ITK's, but
juveniles in VTK's and juvenile SIZO cells suffer from beatings,
torture, and rape. The MCPCJR reports that such facilities have a poor
psychological atmosphere and lack educational and vocational training
opportunities. Many of the juveniles are from orphanages, have no
outside support, and are unaware of their rights.
The President's Commission for Prison Reform monitors prison
conditions and has prepared recommendations and legislation for reform.
None of these efforts has led to any demonstrable progress.
The formal transfer of responsibility for managing the MVD's prison
facilities to the Ministry of Justice on September 1, 1998 fulfilled
one of Russia's obligations as a member of the Council of Europe.
Neither government officials nor human rights activists expected this
transfer to improve conditions in the near future, but, as the Moscow
office of Human Rights Watch noted, the transfer was an improvement
because it took the prisons ``out of the hands of those whose main
concern is to have good statistics on the number convicted.'' MVD
official Vyacheslav Bubnov reportedly estimated that it would take at
least 7 to 10 years before conditions approached European standards.
Bubnov estimated that transfer of control to the Ministry of Justice
would provide 20 percent of the solution to improving conditions at
prisons, but that the rest was dependent on increased funding. In view
of the Government's serious budgetary problems, increased funding
appeared unlikely.
In recognition of the inhuman conditions present in detention
facilities, on June 18, the State Duma passed an amnesty bill intended
to free an estimated 94,000 prisoners in the course of 6 months,
beginning on June 22. The amnesty was intended to grant freedom to
prisoners held for minor crimes and for first-time offenders,
specifically veterans of military service in defense of the Motherland,
pregnant women, women with children, invalids, tuberculosis-infected
prisoners, minors, and senior citizens. In order to qualify for
amnesty, prisoners in most categories must be serving sentences of 5
years or less. The amnesty also included persons recently sentenced and
tried. Prison activists and prison officials said that they did not
expect that the amnesty would resolve fully the ongoing prison
overcrowding crisis. The numbers of prisoners increased by 42,000 in
just the first 4 months of the year; therefore, even a 94,000-person
decrease would not alter the overall numbers. Moreover, some persons
believe that the amnesty conditions are too demanding; the newspaper
Noviye Izvestiya cited estimates by the GUIN that only 35,000 prisoners
actually qualify for the amnesty. Human Rights Watch pointed out that
without a change in the policy of the Procurator's Office of placing
persons in detention and arresting them for minor crimes, in view of
the time needed to obtain a court hearing there would not be any major
improvement in the prison situation.
At a March 19 joint hearing at the Human Rights Chamber of the
President's Political Consultative Council, the Ministry of Justice,
the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Supreme Court, and the Procuracy
General developed a plan to address the ``critical'' state of the
national penal system. The proposals forwarded to the Government and
the State Duma included provisions such as another amnesty and changes
in the Criminal Code, which could yield a prison population decrease of
400,000 over 1 year.
Prison reform activists, prison experts, independent observers, and
Duma deputies agree that the country's Criminal Code is at the root of
the penal system problems. According to Valeriy Borshchev, the country
has the largest percentage of its population in jail in the world. The
1999 MCPCJR report states that for every 100,000 persons in the
country, 760 are imprisoned.
According to the MCPCJR, Aleksandr Zubkov, Deputy Director of GUIN
in the Ministry of Justice, stated that the only way to reduce the
prison population is to change the Criminal Code. The Criminal Code is
too severe and allows unjustifiably wide use of custody as a measure of
restraint (as opposed to bail or release on the prisoner's own
recognizance). According to a MCPCJR report during the year, Sergey
Vitsin, deputy chairman of the Presidential Council on Judicial and
Legal Reform commented that the Criminal Code does not distinguish
between petty theft and larger-scale thefts and robberies. In an
example cited by the MCPCJR during the year, one person was sentenced
to 3\1/2\ years in prison for stealing three chickens and 2 kilograms
of meat.
Theft is the leading reason for incarceration and detention in the
country. The director of the Pskov SIZO reported according to a 1999
MCPCJR report that 53 percent of his detainees are charged with theft.
As an example, he told of a 16-year-old who had already spent 2 months
in a Pskov SIZO simply for stealing some margarine, pasta, and bread.
The MCPCJR reports that of the 21,000 minors incarcerated in the
country, 52 percent are charged with theft and similar petty crimes.
Custody is used systematically as the only means of restraint. The
MCPCJR called for more use of alternatives to custody, such as bail and
house arrest. Moreover, the MCPCJR reported that detainees spend too
long in pretrial detention, in many cases as long as 3 years or more.
The Ministry of Justice concurs with the MCPCJR that limits must be
placed on time in detention awaiting trial.
Moscow-based human rights groups make frequent visits to the
prisons in the Moscow area, but they have neither the resources nor a
national network to investigate conditions in all 89 regions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain problems. The Constitution provides that the arrest,
taking into custody, and detention of persons suspected of crimes are
permitted only by judicial decision. However, the Constitution's
transitional provisions specify that these provisions do not take
effect until a new criminal procedure code is adopted. The new Criminal
Code that was passed in 1995 went into effect at the beginning of 1997.
Under the 1997 code the maximum sentence for all offenses increased
from 15 years to 30 years. Criminal proceedings continue to be governed
both by the new 1997 Criminal Code and the Soviet Criminal Procedure
Code, adopted in 1960.
There are credible reports from throughout the country that police
detain persons without observing mandated procedures and fail to issue
proper protocols of arrest or for confiscated property. Moscow city law
enforcement authorities frequently detained persons unlawfully for
alleged violations of registration requirements, especially in response
to the terrorist bombings in September, when authorities detained some
2,000 persons and deported more than 500, according to NGO's. Police
officers reportedly planted drugs or ammunition on some of these
persons as a pretext for arrest (see Section 2.d.). Local authorities
throughout the country detain members of religious minority groups,
especially the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, for brief
periods of time, although formal charges seldom are filed (see Section
2.c.).
In the absence of measures to implement the procedural safeguards
contained in the Constitution, suspects often were subjected to uneven
and arbitrary treatment by officials acting under the current Criminal
Procedure Code and presidential decrees. The code gives procurators
authority to issue an order of detention without a judge's
authorization and, if police believe that the suspect has committed a
crime or is a danger to others, to detain him for up to 48 hours
without a warrant.
The Constitution and the Criminal Procedure Code provide that
detainees are entitled to have a lawyer present from the time of
detention, during questioning following detention, and throughout
investigation up to and including the formal filing of charges. This
procedure generally is followed in practice. The MCPCJR reports that
detainees are given the opportunity to have access to a lawyer in
accordance with their rights. However, the Center notes that the high
cost of legal fees and the poor quality of court-appointed public
defenders for those lacking the funds to engage counsel effectively
deny the majority of suspects competent legal representation. As a
result, many prisoners do not exercise this right because they believe
it useless.
For example, Articles 47-49 of the Criminal Procedure Code provide
that in certain cases the court, investigator, or procurator is to
provide the suspect with an advocate free of charge if the suspect
cannot afford one. A president of a collegium of advocates must appoint
a lawyer within 24 hours after receiving such a request. However,
lawyers (advocates) try to avoid these cases since the Government does
not in fact reimburse them for this work as it is supposed to do. As a
result, in many cases indigent defendants receive little or no
assistance during the investigation stage of the case, and such in-
court assistance as they do receive may be rendered by poorly trained
lawyers. Sometimes the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning
cannot be exercised even when the suspect can afford to pay for a
lawyer. Human rights NGO's report that in many cases investigators deny
access to a lawyer by various means, including restrictions on the time
when the suspect can see his lawyer (which may mean that the lawyer has
to wait in line for days to get a meeting with the client).
A 1997 presidential decree allows police to detain persons
suspected of ties to organized crime for up to 10 days without bringing
charges. The law overturned two previous presidential decrees (of 1994
and 1996) that allowed detention for up to 30 days. The 1997 decree
also instructed the Government to submit to the Duma a draft federal
law on preventing vagrancy and social rehabilitation of the homeless.
However, according to Duma and NGO sources there is not yet any such
law under consideration.
The Criminal Procedure Code specifies that only 2 months should
elapse between the date an investigation is initiated and the date the
file is transferred to the procurator so that the procurator can file
formal charges against the suspect in court. However, investigations
seldom are completed that quickly. Some suspects spend 18 months or
longer in detention under harsh conditions in a SIZO while the criminal
investigation is conducted. The MCPCJR reports terms of pretrial
detention extending up to 3 years, with the average ranging from 7 to
10 months. However, in some extreme cases the MCPCJR reports detention
periods of up to 5 years due to financial constraints and poor
investigative and court work.
The Code provides that a prosecutor may extend the period of
criminal investigation to 6 months in ``complex'' cases. If more time
is required in ``exceptional'' cases, the Procurator General personally
can extend the period up to 18 months. Extensions of the investigation
period often are issued without explanation to the detainee. Until the
investigation is completed, the suspect is under the jurisdiction of
the Procurator's office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. There is
no procedure for a suspect to plead guilty during the investigative
period, although if a suspect informs the investigator that he is
guilty, the period of the investigation usually is shorter than if he
maintains his innocence. Suspects frequently fear exercising their
right to request judicial review of their detention due to fear of
angering the investigating officer.
There also were credible reports that persons have been detained
far in excess of the permissible periods for administrative offenses,
in some cases so that police officials could extort money from friends
or relatives. The situation has improved somewhat since the issuance of
a presidential decree in 1997 that annulled a previous decree that had
allowed for 30-day detentions. However, the practice of detaining
individuals in excess of permissible periods is still not uncommon, and
this often is done for the purpose of extorting money.
The use of bail is rare, even if suspects are not flight risks or
have not been charged with violent crimes. This aggravates overcrowding
in pretrial detention and, due to delays in bringing cases to trial,
results in many suspects remaining in pretrial detention for longer
than the maximum penalty they might face if convicted.
Delays also plague the trial stage. Although the Criminal Procedure
Code requires court proceedings to begin no more than 14 days after the
judge issues an order designating the location of the trial, congestion
in the court system frequently leads to long postponements. Some
suspects actually serve the equivalent of their sentences while
awaiting trial. Judges often do not dismiss cases involving improper
investigations or indictments, particularly if the procurator's case
has political support or the case is controversial. Instead, such cases
often are returned to the procurator for further investigation.
Some authorities have taken advantage of the system's procedural
weaknesses to arrest persons on false pretexts for expressing views
critical of the Government. Human rights advocates in the regions have
been charged with libel, contempt of court, or interference in judicial
procedures in cases with distinct political overtones. Others have been
charged with other offenses and held either in excess of normal periods
of detention or for offenses that do not require detention at all (see
Section 4).
Under the 1993 Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on
Legal Assistance in Civil, Family, and Criminal Affairs, persons with
outstanding warrants can be detained for periods of up to 1 month while
the Procurator General investigates the nature of outstanding charges
against the detainee. This system is reinforced informally but
effectively by collegial links among senior law enforcement and
security officials in the various republics of the former Soviet Union.
Human rights groups allege that this network is employed to detain
opposition figures from the other former Soviet republics without
actual legal grounds.
In August Vladivostok environmental scientist Vladimir Soifer filed
a complaint in Vladivostok municipal court alleging that in early July
the FSB confiscated a large number of documents from his apartment,
which was not covered by its warrant and not documented in the FSB's
official record of the search (see Section 2.a.).
Authorities detained or arrested a number of other environmental
activists during the year. In October Vladimir Slivyak, director of the
antinuclear organization Eco-Defense, announced at a press conference
that Moscow police detained and questioned him for a few hours in
September about his possible involvement in the August bombing of the
Manezh shopping center in Moscow. One of Slivyak's coworkers reportedly
had been framed on charges of drug possession. Natalya Minonova of
Chelyabinsk also was detained and questioned by police officers in
September as she and four other activists were on their way to city
hall to deliver a letter protesting the potential import of spent
nuclear fuel into the country. Authorities charged all five with
hooliganism. Reportedly authorities told another activist in Voronezh
to report to the police station for an ``informal conversation'' on the
topic of an antinuclear camp near the Novo-Voronezh nuclear power plant
and threatened him with drug possession charges if he failed to appear.
In November disarmament researcher Igor Sutyagin of the USA Canada
Institute was detained on suspicion of espionage. No information about
the specific charges was made public.
Based on this series of cases and the Nikitin and Pasko cases from
previous years, environmentalists both in the country and abroad
criticize the FSB for its active campaign of harassment, especially of
environmental activists critical of past government abuses.
St. Petersburg judge Sergey Golets ruled on December 29 that
Aleksandr Nikitin, an environmentalist and retired Soviet Navy captain,
was not guilty of charges of espionage and treason. Although
prosecutors are expected to appeal the decision, legal observers
believe that the legal foundations of the ruling were sound and believe
that it may provide an important precedent in combating abuses by the
FSB.
Nikitin's case was characterized by serious violations of due
process. There were credible charges that his detention was politically
motivated. The FSB detained Nikitin in St. Petersburg in February 1996
on suspicion of espionage and revealing state secrets, crimes
punishable by up to 20 years in prison. Nikitin had been working with
Bellona, a Norwegian environmental NGO, on the publication of a report
detailing the hazards posed by nuclear waste generated by the Northern
Fleet, in which Nikitin had served. In December 1996, Nikitin was
released from pretrial detention but was restricted to the St.
Petersburg city limits.
Indictments cited classified decrees that were made available to
Nikitin's defense team only at the beginning of the trial, which
finally commenced in October 1998, nearly 3 years after Nikitin's
detention. On October 29, 1998, the judge in the case returned the
indictment to the prosecution for further investigation, as there was
insufficient evidence to support the charges. Although Nikitin's
defense claimed a qualified victory, this did not constitute an
acquittal. The FSB was given another opportunity to solidify its case
against Nikitin. On February 2, the Supreme Court upheld the St.
Petersburg court's October 1998 decision to return the case to the FSB
for further investigation. An eighth indictment filed against Nikitin
in July is almost identical to the previous seven, according to
Nikitin's lawyer. The trial against Nikitin resumed on November 23 in
St. Petersburg. In his December 29 ruling, Judge Golets argued that the
secret decrees used to charge Nikitin violated every citizen's right to
access to the law and therefore was not binding under the Constitution.
Moreover, according to the ruling, investigators failed to adhere to
the Criminal Code during the investigation and violated Nikitin's
constitutional rights.
In July after 20 months in pretrial detention, military journalist
and active-duty officer in the Pacific Fleet Grigoriy Pasko was
sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment for misuse of office but immediately
was released under the prisoner amnesty. Pasko originally was charged
with treason and espionage after conducting freelance reporting on
radioactive contamination and passing to Japanese media a videotape of
Russian Pacific Fleet sailors dumping radioactive waste in the Sea of
Japan. Both Pasko and the military procurator intend to appeal the
decision to the Supreme Court, and Pasko announced on July 22 his
intention to appeal his case to the European Court of Human Rights.
Nikitin's defense attorney said that Pasko's conviction is legally
dubious, as the charge is based on a military code of conduct that
technically has not been in force since 1990, although the military
continues to enforce it internally. The trial was marked by a number of
irregularities, including the judge's decision to remove one of Pasko's
defense attorneys for contempt of court. Also a key witness recanted
his earlier testimony, which he said had been made under pressure from
investigators. As of year's end, Pasko resides in Moscow, unable to
work as a journalist for Russian media in either the Far East or
Moscow. The Committee to Protect Journalists and the Glasnost Defense
Fund observed that, while the verdict was better news than expected,
the case is still a powerful disincentive to investigative reporting.
In September press reports described Moscow authorities' use of the
mass detentions of persons who appeared to be from the Caucasus as part
of ``Operation Whirlwind,'' the authorities' program to stem terrorism
in response to the September bombings in Moscow (see Sections 1.a. and
5).
No new cases of arrest of human rights activists were documented
during the year, although the Moscow Helsinki group stated that three
human rights monitors participating in its regional reporting program
were harassed (also see Section 4). No progress was reported during the
year in the case of Yuriy Shadrin of Omsk, who was arrested in November
1996 on several unrelated charges. Released on December 31, 1996,
Shadrin remains subject to arrest and trial. The same is true for Yuriy
Padalko of Irkutsk, who was arrested in 1992 on what Human Rights Watch
called ``presumably trumped-up charges of libel, hooliganism, and other
offenses.''
Larisa Kharchenko, a housing adviser to former St. Petersburg mayor
Anatoliy Sobchak, was detained in July 1997 in connection with a
corruption case involving the former mayor. She was held incommunicado
for 17 days and then charged with bribery and abuse of office. Her
lawyer contended that the authorities do not have a case against her
and that she was kept in jail and deprived of medical care in order to
force her to testify against Sobchak. Kharchenko was released in mid-
December 1997 but was instructed to stay in St. Petersburg pending
further developments in her case. Doctors determined that, along with
other medical complications, she had suffered a stroke while detained
and classified her as legally disabled. No trial date was set for
Kharchenko in 1998 or 1999. According to Sobchak, Kharchenko has left
the country.
St. Petersburg authorities arbitrarily detained Scientologists for
psychiatric evaluation (see Section 2.c.).
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and there are signs of limited independence;
however, the judiciary does not yet act as an effective counterweight
to other branches of government. The development of an independent
judiciary continued. A 1996 law separated the courts of general
jurisdiction from the Ministry of Justice and placed them under a
separate agency, the Judicial Department, which is under the
supervision of the Supreme Court. Although not entirely functional, the
Department has assumed primary administrative and financial
responsibilities for court management previously held by the Ministry
of Justice. Reformers who sought to create the Department felt that the
Ministry was not zealous enough in defending the interests of the
judiciary, especially on budget matters. In the 1998 and 1999 budgets,
the Department was funded independently of the Ministry. Judges remain
subject to some influence from the executive, military, and security
forces, especially in high profile or political cases. The judiciary
still lacks sufficient resources and is subject to corruption.
The judiciary is divided into three branches: The courts of general
jurisdiction, subordinated to the Supreme Court; the arbitration court
system, under the High Court of Arbitration; and the Constitutional
Court. Civil and criminal cases are tried in courts of primary
jurisdiction, courts of appeals, and higher courts. The general court
system's lowest level is the municipal court, which serves each city or
rural district and hears over 90 percent of all civil and criminal
cases. The next level of courts of general jurisdiction are the
regional courts. At the highest level is the Supreme Court. Decisions
of the lower trial courts can be appealed only to the immediately
superior court unless a constitutional issue is involved. The
arbitration court system consists of both city or regional courts as
well as appellate circuit courts subordinated to the High Court of
Arbitration. A 1998 federal law provides for new judicial officers--
justices of the peace, or magistrates--several thousand of whom are
expected to begin serving in 2000. This new category of judicial
officer is to be elected or appointed at the regional level. It is not
yet clear whether justices of the peace are to form separate courts or
to serve directly under the courts of first instance. Magistrates are
to consider administrative and criminal cases, for which the maximum
sentence does not exceed 2 years, and civil cases whose claims do not
exceed a certain sum of money.
Low salaries and scant prestige make it difficult to attract
talented new judges and contribute to the vulnerability of existing
judges to bribery and corruption. Judges have received some incremental
salary increases aimed at improving the quality of judges and raising
the retention rate. Although judges' pay has improved, working
conditions remain poor, and support personnel continue to be underpaid.
In its 1998 budget the Government called for cutting spending on
the court system by 26 percent. This was despite appeals by the
Federation Council (upper house of Parliament) and leading judges, as
well as presidential orders issued in July 1998, which had instructed
the Government to make the ``normal functioning of the judicial
system'' a priority. In response, the Supreme Court launched a legal
challenge to the budget cuts with the Constitutional Court. On July 17,
1998, the Constitutional Court struck down the article in the 1998
budget that authorized the Government to reduce spending on the
judicial system. The Court cited Article 124 of the Constitution, which
stipulates that the federal budget must provide for the ``complete and
independent'' functioning of the judiciary. Despite this decision,
courts were not funded fully in the current fiscal year. However, the
Duma and Federation Council passed and President Yeltsin signed by
February the Law on the Financing of the Courts, which makes receipt of
the judiciary's budget independent of the Ministry of Finance.
Cuts in the judicial system's budget raised concerns over the
permanence of gains made in recent years in judicial independence. For
example, according to the Constitution, courts should be financed only
by the Federal Government. But because of federal budget cuts, district
courts often seek additional funds from their local governments,
leaving them more vulnerable to pressure from local politicians. A 1997
survey of 250 judges, conducted by the University of Toronto, found
that about half were receiving financial aid from local governments.
Many courts now lack adequate funding to cover such basic expenses as
electricity, telephone charges, and postage. Because of unpaid debts,
many courts lost their telephone and electricity service. Without money
to mail subpoenas, courts often are forced to hold trials without key
witnesses. A human rights organization reported that in Bryansk in
November and December 1998 all courts closed and put signs on the doors
saying that the closure was due to lack of funds. These and other kinds
of disruptions in the work of courts are common throughout the country.
Progress was made during the year to improve the financing of the
court system. In February a federal law on the financing of the courts
of general jurisdiction provided for a mechanism to ensure that the
courts received money allocated to them in the budget. The Council of
Judges of the Russian Federation noted that as of October 1, the courts
received 100 percent of the amount allocated to that date, compared to
the only 47 percent of the budgeted amount that the courts received
during the same period in 1998. Moreover, the 2000 budget is to
increase funding for the judicial system and to fund it entirely out of
the federal budget, so that courts are no longer dependent on local or
regional authorities for funding.
Judges are subject to physical intimidation and bribery. Judges
have been murdered in Moscow, Irkutsk, and Yekaterinburg, although
there were no reports of judges who were murdered during the year. As
judges generally bear responsibility both for reaching a verdict and
handing down a sentence, they are logical targets for intimidation. In
January 1998, then-Prime Minister Chernomyrdin signed a decree that
allowed judges to apply for permission to carry firearms. Many judges
reportedly took advantage of the decree. In July chair of the
Primorskiy kray arbitration court Tatyana Loktionova announced that
Primorskiy kray governor Yevgeniy Nazdratenko had been interfering in
the court's activities. She reported that she and her colleagues feared
for their personal safety. The governor has blamed the court for
bankrupting the region's enterprises and destroying its economy and
persuaded then-Prime Minister Putin to authorize an internal
investigation of the arbitration court for possible illegal conduct.
In October then-Prime Minister Putin signed a decree providing for
the establishment of the new Academy of Justice, the country's first
judicial branch training organization.
The Criminal Code provides for the court to appoint a lawyer if the
suspect cannot afford one. The Society for the Guardianship of
Penitentiary Institutions often is called upon by judges to provide
legal assistance for suspects facing charges and trial without any
representation. This society operates primarily in Moscow, although it
uses its connections throughout the country to appeal to legal
professionals to represent the indigent. However, in many cases the
indigent receive little legal assistance, because funds are lacking to
pay for trial attorneys for them, and public defenders are poorly
trained.
Because the right to a lawyer during pretrial questioning often is
not exercised (see Section 1.d.), many defendants recant testimony
given in pretrial questioning, stating that they were denied access to
a lawyer or that they were coerced into giving false confessions or
statements. Nevertheless, human rights monitors have documented cases
in which convictions were obtained on the basis of testimony that the
defendant recanted in court, even in the absence of other proof of
guilt.
In March the Supreme Court found Articles 218 and 220 of the
Criminal Procedure Code unconstitutional. This finding permits defense
attorneys to appeal the actions of the procuracy and investigative
officials to a court, even during pretrial stages of criminal
proceedings. The unconstitutional articles had restricted the
conditions for pretrial appeals of the procuracy's actions and allowed
appeals only to a supervising procurator, not a court.
In the 80 regions where adversarial jury trials have not yet been
introduced, criminal procedures are weighted heavily in favor of the
prosecutor. The judge or panel of judges conducts the trial by asking
questions based on a prior review of the evidence. Reports indicate
that in practice, the constitutionally mandated presumption of
innocence often is disregarded. Judges are known to return poorly
developed cases to the prosecution for additional investigation rather
than risk confrontation with powerful prosecutors. Moreover, in certain
cases the Criminal Procedure Code allows them to do so with no
limitation on the number of times the case can be investigated. The
Constitutional Court partly addressed this issue in an April 20
decision and held that part of the article of the Code providing for
this practice was unconstitutional. This practice of repeatedly
returning cases for further investigation greatly increases the time
that defendants spend in SIZO's (see Section 1.c.).
Adversarial jury trials, at the option of the accused in cases
where there is a risk of a criminal penalty of 15 years or more, were
introduced in 1993 and 1994 in nine regions, encompassing 23 percent of
the population. In February the Constitutional Court held that in order
for the death penalty to be applied, the accused must be given a trial
by jury. The Court expressly stated that the death penalty could not be
imposed anywhere until trial by jury was available everywhere. Since
jury trials currently are provided in only nine regions, and funds to
expand them throughout the country still are lacking, the decision in
effect makes nearly impossible the legal imposition of the death
penalty in the country. Despite plans to expand jury trials to 12 new
regions, as of December the Department of Judicial Reforms of the State
Legal Administration of the President failed to do so due to lack of
funds. In December 1998, press reports indicated that the Ryazan
governor and Ryazan duma chairman reported to the Supreme Court and the
Presidential Administration that they had suspended the practice of
trial by jury primarily due to the high cost of such trials. The trials
reportedly cost the region between $2,400 and $3,900 (50,000 and 80,000
rubles) per year. A council of local judges appealed to the Procurator
General and the Federation Council to overturn the decision of the
Ryazan authorities.
The Ministry of Justice reports that 538 cases involving 772
persons were tried by jury in 1998. Of these, 165 resulted in
acquittals. Defense attorneys, defendants, and the general public
reportedly favor jury trials and the more adversarial approach to
criminal justice. Prosecutors and law enforcement officials continue to
prefer trial by judges and the inquisitorial system.
The heads of several lawyers' associations reported during the year
that defense lawyers increasingly were the target of police harassment,
including beatings and arrests. Dmitriy Baranov, vice president of the
Association of Lawyers of Russia, in an interview with the newspaper
MK-Yug (the southern edition of Moskovskiy Komsomolets) said that
during the last year or two, defense lawyers were increasingly targets
of police harassment. For example, in Rostov he said that there were a
number of attempts to coerce lawyers into giving testimony against
their clients. Professional associations at both the local and federal
levels report that such abuses are increasing throughout the country.
They charge that police are trying both to intimidate defense attorneys
and to cover up their own criminal activities.
There also were instances in which the right to due process and a
fair trial were violated. For example, the arrest, detention, and
September 1998 trial of Krasnodar human rights activist Vasiliy Chaykin
was marked by numerous serious legal procedural violations. Chaykin was
denied access to a lawyer of his choice for 1 month after his arrest.
The rape charges against Chaykin rested on the testimony of nine young
women, five of whom recanted the statements that they made to
investigators, saying that they had been coerced by the investigating
officer. The judge reportedly did not allow the court secretary to
record these charges of police intimidation. Instead he threatened the
young women with criminal action for giving false testimony; finally,
all witnesses agreed to confirm their previous statements. Protests by
the defense attorney about these procedures were ignored and not
recorded by the court secretary. During the trial, Chaykin requested
medical help, but the judge rejected his plea, and Chaykin suffered a
heart attack several days later. The trial was postponed until Chaykin
recovers. Chaykin was released on April 17 but remains restricted to
his city of residence. As of year's end, there were no reports of
developments in this case.
There were reports of military officers and units sending soldiers
to the front lines in Chechnya as punishment instead of using the
military justice system. Such incidents reportedly were being
investigated by military procurators (see Section 1.e).
There was no reported progress in the 1997 case of the beating of
defense attorney Oleg Kolesnikov.
On February 3, Chechen president Maskhadov declared Shari'a
(Islamic law) to be in effect in the republic of Chechnya. Maskhadov
signed several decrees stipulating that all local legislation be
brought into line with the Koran and Shari'a regulations. Maskhadov
ordered the Chechen legislature and the Council of Muftis to draft a
Shari'a constitution within 1 month's time (also see Section 2.c.).
Maskhadov's action apparently was a political response to pressure from
Islamist rivals.
Authorities in Chechnya continued their efforts to establish a new
criminal code based on the Islamic Shari'a code. Although the code has
not been enacted formally, elements of Shari'a law already have been
cited in court decisions, and Shari'a punishments reportedly have been
imposed.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Authorities continued to infringe on citizen's privacy
rights. The Constitution states that officials can enter a private
residence only in cases prescribed by federal law or on the basis of a
judicial decision. It permits the Government to monitor correspondence,
telephone conversations, and other means of communication only with
judicial permission. It prohibits the collection, storage, utilization,
and dissemination of information about a person's private life without
his consent. Legislation to implement these provisions was passed as
part of the country's new criminal code, which provides for criminal
penalties. However, problems still remain, and no one has ever been
convicted of violating those safeguards. In 1995 legislation was passed
that gave broad authority for the FSB to utilize domestic surveillance
and to conduct searches of private residences, with only limited
oversight by the courts and the procuracy. These measures remain in
force. There were reports of electronic surveillance by government
officials and others. Moscow police reportedly entered residences
without warrants during checks for illegal residents of the city (see
Section 2.d.). Vladivostok environmental scientist Vladimir Soifer
reported that the FSB confiscated personal correspondence, not covered
by the warrant, during a July search of his apartment.
A senior official told a newspaper in November 1997 that the
problem of abuse by governmental agencies was aggravated because the
list of government agencies authorized to carry out wiretaps and
undercover operations has been expanded and now includes, for example,
tax authorities. He also noted that while the law provides that the
Prosecutor General's office must authorize wiretaps and other
undercover operations by state agencies, it does not allow
prosecutorial oversight once those operations have begun.
Internet experts and right-to-privacy advocates say that
interagency technical regulations called SORM-2 (SORM is the Russian
acronym for System for Operational Investigative Measures), which were
issued by the Ministry of Communications, the FSB, the Federal Agency
of Government Communications and Information, and other agencies,
present a serious threat to privacy rights and violate the Civil Code,
the Constitution, and international norms. SORM-2 is an amendment to
SORM telecommunications regulations. The original SORM, issued in 1995,
granted security services the power to monitor all telecommunications
transmissions for investigative purposes. The original SORM required a
warrant to carry out such monitoring, in accordance with the
Constitution and other provisions of the law. SORM-2 extends to the FSB
the same kind of monitoring power over Internet communication as it did
for telecommunication, but without ensuring judicial oversight.
Internet service providers are required to install, at their own
expense, a device that routes all Internet traffic to an FSB terminal.
Those providers that do not comply with the requirements face either
loss of their licenses or denial of their license renewal. While SORM-2
framers claim that the regulation does not violate the Constitution or
the Civil Code because it still requires a court order, right to
privacy advocates say that there is no mechanism to ensure that a
warrant is obtained before the FSB accesses private information. There
appears to be no mechanism to prevent unauthorized FSB access to
Internet traffic without a warrant.
The first Internet service provider charged with refusing to comply
with SORM-2, Bayard-Slavia Communications, and the St. Petersburg human
rights organization Citizens' Watch filed complaints with the Volgograd
procuracy in July. In enforcing SORM-2, the Volgograd FSB required
providers to provide the FSB with a list of their subscribers and
further information upon request. The Volgograd FSB charged Bayard-
Slavia three times during the year with noncompliance. Bayard-Slavia
Communications has demanded reversal of administrative noncompliance
charges against it and confirmed its readiness to provide the required
assistance to the FSB if a court orders it to do so. Citizens' Watch
demanded the reversal of the Ministry of Communications order requiring
SORM-2 compliance. Both complaints request that the FSB comply with the
Constitution and the Civil Code.
Allegations continue to circulate that officers in the special
services, including authorities at the highest levels of the MVD and
the FSB, have used their services' power to gather ``kompromat''
(compromising materials) on political and public figures as political
insurance and to remove rivals. Similarly, persons in these agencies,
both active and retired, have been accused of working with commercial
or criminal organizations for the same purpose.
There are credible reports that regional branches of the FSB
continue to exert pressure on citizens employed by Western firms and
organizations, often with the goal of coercing them into becoming
informants.
Government forces in Chechnya looted valuables and foodstuffs from
houses in regions that they controlled (see Section 1.g.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The indiscriminate use of force by government
forces in the conflict with separatist elements in Chechnya resulted in
widespread civilian casualties and the displacement of up to 200,000
persons, the vast majority of whom sought refuge in Ingushetiya.
Estimates vary of the total number of civilian casualties caused by
bombs and artillery used by government forces. The number of civilian
casualties cannot be verified, and figures vary widely from several
hundred to several thousand. Government officials argue that they are
employing ``high precision'' tactics against separatist and terrorist
targets in Chechnya. However, a wide range of reporting indicates that
government forces are relying mainly on unguided rockets and other low
precision weapons.
In September and early October, government forces launched air and
artillery attacks against numerous Chechen villages along the
republic's eastern border with Dagestan in the territory controlled by
Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev. Basayev led attacks in Dagestan
in July and August and was believed to have retreated to this region in
Chechnya. Villagers living in the region under attack claimed that they
were not supporters of Basayev.
Attempts by government forces to gain control over Chechnya's
capital, Groznyy, were characterized by indiscriminate use of air power
and artillery, which destroyed numerous residential and civilian
buildings. Up to 140,000 Russian military and security personnel in the
Northern Caucasus region were involved in the current conflict in
Chechnya, far more than during the 1994-96 conflict in Chechnya. On
September 24, government aircraft reportedly bombed a bus with refugees
near Samashki, resulting in the deaths of eight persons. Human Rights
Watch confirmed that on September 27, Russian aircraft allegedly bombed
a school and residential areas in Staraya Sunzha, a suburb of Groznyy,
killing 7 civilians and wounding another 20, including schoolchildren.
Human Rights Watch confirmed an attack by Russian airplanes on Urus-
Martan, 15 miles south of Groznyy, on October 3, which resulted in the
deaths of 27 civilians. On October 5, a government tank fired on a bus
near Chervlyonnaya, reportedly killing some 28 civilians. According to
NGO reports, on October 7, government troops attacked the village of
Elistanzhi, killing some 48 civilians. On October 21, explosions killed
scores of civilians in Groznyy's downtown market and a local hospital.
Western press organizations reported at least 60 civilian deaths
and 200 persons injured, although Chechen government officials claimed
that at least 118 persons died and more than 400 were injured. Russian
officials offered contradictory explanations for the explosions; some
denied any government complicity and blamed Chechen separatists.
However, Ministry of Defense officials claimed on October 22 that
special forces units had attacked a weapons market, but without using
artillery or air power. The ICRC reported that two-thirds of Groznyy's
150,000 residents fled the city as a result of the military campaign.
On October 27, government forces subjected Groznyy to the heaviest
attacks up to that point as government aircraft bombed the city and
killed dozens of Chechens. Chechen defense officials claimed that 116
persons were killed in the attacks that day. Also on October 27,
government forces shelled the village of Samashki, killing at least 5
persons and injuring dozens. On November 1, government troops that had
taken positions in a psychiatric hospital near Samashki overnight
opened fire on the doctors and other medical staff who reported to work
that morning, resulting in injuries to three staff members. Troops
prevented hospital staff from returning to care for their patients for
several days, and the condition of the hospital's patients remains
unknown. On November 16, government troops surrounded and shelled two
large towns near Groznyy, Achkhoy-Martan, and Argun. The attacks
prompted criticism from international human rights organizations for
indiscriminate attacks against civilian settlements.
According to human rights NGO's, government troops raped civilian
women in Chechnya in December in the village of Alkhan-Yurt and in
other villages.
Early in December, government forces airdropped a series of
leaflets over Groznyy that warned civilian residents and rebel fighters
to leave the city. In one leaflet directed at Chechen fighters, the
command of the Combined Group of Federal Forces in the Northern
Caucasus warned that any persons remaining in Groznyy after December 12
would be destroyed by air and artillery strikes. Amid international
criticism of the leaflets, government officials later qualified the
leaflets' language and denied that they had imposed an ultimatum on the
city's inhabitants.
According to human rights NGO's, Government troops looted all
valuables and foodstuffs from homes in regions that they controlled,
particularly Sernovodsk, Ermolovskiy, and in the Naurskiy district.
Refugees returning to their homes in Chechnya in late November
discovered that they had been stripped by government soldiers.
On October 29, a government aircraft bombed a convoy of five
vehicles with ICRC markings, according to ICRC officials. The bombing
occurred at Shami-Yurt, west of Groznyy, and resulted in the deaths of
at least 25 civilians and injuries to some 70 persons.
Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen, representing the European
Union Presidency, carried out a humanitarian fact finding visit to
Ingushetiya on October 30. In late November, U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees Sadako Ogata visited Chechnya and Ingushetiya. Norwegian
Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek, Chairman in Office for the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), visited the
region, as agreed to by the Government at the OSCE summit in November.
However, Vollebaek was not able to travel to Russian-controlled
territory of northern Chechnya.
International organizations estimate that the internally displaced
population as a result of the conflict fluctuated between 170,000 and
240,000, as individuals continued to cross back into Chechnya to check
on their property or shop in markets. Reliable information on the
number and status of displaced persons within Chechnya was especially
difficult to obtain, due to heavy fighting and limited outside access
to the region. As of early November, as many as 170,000 were estimated
to be displaced within Chechnya and without access to humanitarian
assistance.
At various points during the conflict authorities restricted the
movement of internally displaced persons (IDP's) fleeing Chechnya. In
late October human rights groups reported that IDP's from Chechnya were
not being permitted to move from Ingushetiya to North Ossetia.
According to some reports by NGO's, border guards were permitting only
ethnic Russians to cross into Ingushetiya. According to the Russian
press, some displaced persons were being transported by bus back to
parts of Chechnya that were under Russian government control. On
November 3, government forces opened a crossing on the Chechnya-
Ingushetiya border and allowed approximately 3,500 persons to enter. As
many as 40,000 refugees had been stranded for more than 1 week at the
border, where reportedly a line of refugees stretched almost 12 miles.
Refugees at the border had been living in the open, often without
access to food or water. Government forces were not allowing anyone,
including medical personnel, access to refugees in the line waiting to
cross into Ingushetiya, and several refugees died while waiting to
cross, reportedly due to heart failure (also see Section 2.d.). Russian
border guards and police officers on the border between Chechnya and
North Ossetia reportedly required Chechen refugees to pay money to
enter North Ossetia, at one crossing point demanding $40 (1,000 rubles)
for men and $20 (500 rubles) for women. According to the U.N. High
Commissioner for Human Rights, the authorities prevented medical
supplies for Chechen hospitals from entering Chechnya.
Russian media coverage of events in Chechnya was limited and
uneven. Journalists and editors appeared to be exercising self-
censorship and avoiding subjects embarrassing to the Government (see
Section 2.a.). Since the war resumed, federal authorities--both
military and civilian--limited journalists' access to war zones and
confiscated reports and equipment, citing threats to the safety of
reporters. Since November additional accreditation--besides the usual
Foreign Ministry accreditation--is required for entry to the region. In
some cases, foreign journalists publicly complained that military
officials in the northern Caucasus region made it excessively difficult
for them to receive local press accreditation.
Chechen separatists also committed abuses. According to unconfirmed
reports, separatists killed civilians who would not assist them, used
civilians as human shields, forced civilians to dig fortifications, and
prevented refugees from fleeing Chechnya. In particular, Russian
officials reported in December that they had unearthed evidence of mass
killings by Chechen fighters in Naurskiy raion. Government officials
and some local residents claimed that the fighters singled out Russian-
speaking residents for execution in October, just after the resumption
of government ground combat operations in Chechnya. In addition, human
rights NGO's reported that Chechen fighters on November 28 fired upon
unarmed civilians who were trying to maintain a neutral zone in Gekhi,
southwest of Groznyy. According to local residents, at least five
civilians were wounded in the attack.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, while the Government
generally respects these provisions, reports of government pressure on
the media continue, particularly when coverage deals with corruption or
criticizes a political official. Federal, regional, and local
governments continued to exert pressure on journalists by: Selectively
denying access to information (including, for example, statistics
theoretically available to the public) and filming opportunities;
demanding the right to ``clear'' certain stories prior to publication;
prohibiting the tape recording of public trials and hearings;
withholding financial support from government media operations that
exercised independent editorial judgment; attempting to influence
unduly the appointment of senior editors at regional and local
newspapers and broadcast media organizations; removing reporters from
their jobs; and bringing libel suits against journalists. Private
media, which flourished through the first half of 1998, came under
increasing stress in the months after the August 17, 1998 financial
crisis. Faced with major financial difficulties, many media
organizations saw their autonomy further erode during the year.
The Glasnost Defense Foundation (GDF), an NGO that tracks
violations of the rights of journalists in the countries of the former
Soviet Union, estimates that some 300 lawsuits and other legal actions
were brought by government agencies against journalists and
journalistic organizations during the year, the majority of them in
response to unfavorable coverage of government policy or operations. In
most of these cases, a government body or an individual (often with
links to a figure in power) accused journalists of damaging its (or his
or her) ``reputation and honor.'' For example, then-Deputy Prime
Minister Yuriy Maslyukov announced publicly in March that he was
seeking an investigation by the Procurator General of Nezavisimaya
Gazeta for articles suggesting that he and his staff embezzled $130
million (approximately 3 billion rubles). As in 1998, judges rarely
found for the journalists; in the majority of cases, the Government
succeeded in either intimidating or punishing the journalist.
Typically, judges seemed unwilling to challenge powerful federal and
local officials. Stiff fines for journalists were a common result of
these proceedings; jail terms occasionally were handed down, as well.
Such rulings served to reinforce the already significant tendency
toward self-censorship. Not infrequently, journalists were attacked
physically; at least 10 persons died under circumstances that were
presumed to be related in some way to their work as journalists. In
1998 the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) came to regard
journalism as the country's ``most dangerous profession.'' Based on the
record of violations of the rights of journalists during the year, the
situation did not improve.
The financial dependence of most major media organizations on the
Government, or one or more of several major financial-industrial
groups, continued during the year to undermine editorial independence
and journalistic integrity in both the print and broadcast media. The
concentration of ownership of major media organizations--already a
serious threat to editorial independence in 1998--increased during the
year, as the weakest players were forced out of the market, leaving
only the largest media empires (including media outlets owned by the
federal, regional, and local governments) intact and in control of key
media. In particular, government structures, banking interests, and the
energy giants Lukoil and Gazprom continued to dominate the Moscow media
market even as they extended their influence into the regions. The
protracted effects of the 1998 financial crisis exacerbated this
problem during the year, weakening the financial positions of most news
organizations, thereby increasing their dependence on financial
sponsors and, in some cases, the federal and regional governments. As a
result, the media's autonomy and concomitant ability to act as a
watchdog was diminished.
According to the National Press Institute (NPI), a nonprofit
organization dedicated to the development and maintenance of a free
press, private newspapers faced intense pressure from major financial
groups in Moscow and from dominant local business interests to
influence their editorial content.
In key respects, private media organizations across the country
remained dependent on the Government during the year. According to the
GDF, some 90 percent of media organizations continued to rely on state-
controlled concerns for paper, printing, or distribution. Moreover,
journalists continued to depend on local authorities for accreditation
to major news events. Reports of both favoritism toward reporters
associated (or aligned) with the local administration and denial of
access to journalists representing independent media organizations were
widespread. The GDF reports that officials continued to manipulate a
variety of ``instruments of leverage'' (including manipulating the
price of printing at state-controlled publishing houses) in an effort
to apply pressure on private media rivals, noting that, as in 1998,
this practice was more common outside the Moscow area than in the
capital itself. For example, in May the chief of staff of Saratov's
duma threatened to prevent reporters whose stories allegedly insulted
the honor of duma members and staff from covering duma sessions. In
September 1998, Saratov governor Dmitriy Ayatskov signed a special
order stripping journalists of their accreditation if they repeatedly
``distort'' information. In July the editor of Severniy Kurer, the only
independent newspaper in Karelia, was threatened with physical violence
if he refused to transfer his shares in the newspaper to local
entrepreneurs who are reportedly sympathetic to the republic's
administration. Other newspaper staff have come under similar pressure
to sell their shares to this grouping, which already controls over one-
third of the publication's shares.
Independent and semiindependent television stations continued to
develop, and the number of small private radio stations, mostly in the
large cities, continued to increase. However, television companies
faced government economic pressure similar to that experienced by the
print media. Many stations were forced to rely on the State (in
particular, regional committees for the management of state property)
for access to the airwaves and office space.
Private print and broadcast media, like other enterprises, were
vulnerable to unpredictable changes in the policy and practice of tax
collection. (Tax avoidance is extremely widespread both among
commercial enterprises and individuals.) In July top editors of the
Media-Most outlets, which include Independent Television (NTV), Ekho
Moskvy, Segodnya, and Itogi, publicly accused senior officials in the
Yeltsin administration of singling out their organizations for
``punitive'' tax inspections in an effort to ``muzzle the free press.''
The editors, as well as many in the journalistic community, argued that
publications and broadcast operations that reported on the Government
more sympathetically were not targeted for such inspections. The
Presidential Administration has denied repeatedly these allegations.
The disruption of the tax inspections notwithstanding, none of the
Media-Most organizations were forced to shut down; each continues to
operate today and to criticize the Government. The GDF and other media
NGO's have documented independently many other similar cases across the
country.
The private media continue to face more direct challenges from the
Government as well. The Government owns 150 of the 550 television
stations in the country and 18 percent of the 12,000 registered
newspapers and periodicals. The State owns or controls Russian Public
Television (ORT) and Russian Television and Radio (RTR) (two of the
three national television stations), radio stations Mayak and Radio
Rossii, newspapers Rossiyskaya Gazeta and Parlamentskaya Gazeta, and
news agencies ITAR-TASS and RIA-Novosti. At the regional and local
levels, governments operated a much higher percentage of media outlets
than in Moscow; in many cities and towns across the country,
government-run media organizations were the only major source of news
and information, according to the GDF. Thus in a large number of media
markets, citizens effectively received information only from
unchallenged government sources. Officials from the Union of
Journalists reported in April that local authorities around the country
were reorganizing the editorial boards of various publications,
allegedly to make them conform to civil code regulations. However,
after the reorganization the boards are governed by the law on state
employees and not the law on the mass media. In the opinion of the
Union of Journalists, this change makes journalists function as mere
mouthpieces of their editorial boards and circumscribes the
publications' editorial freedom.
On July 6, President Yeltsin signed a decree abolishing the
existing State Press Committee and the Federal Service for Television
and Radio and establishing the Ministry of Press, Television, Radio
Broadcasting, and Mass Communications. The head of the new ministry,
Mikhail Lesin (the former deputy chairman of the Russian State
Television and Radio Company), answers directly to the President. The
decree stipulated that the Ministry's main tasks are to be ``the
development and implementation of a state policy toward the mass
media.'' The Ministry also assumed authority over the registration of
mass media organizations, the regulation of the production and
distribution of audio and video products, and the regulation of radio
and television broadcast frequencies. The decree also suggested that
television stations with nationwide broadcasting licenses may have to
reapply to retain them--a provision seen by many observers as designed
to influence the stations' policies on the eve of the Duma and
presidential elections. This is the second major structural change in
as many years designed to strengthen the hand of the Federal Government
over the mass media; in 1998 the Government established the All-Russia
Television and Radio Company (VGTRK), whose head also answers to the
President. The creation of the VGTRK was part of the Government's
effort to strengthen its control over the state media--and to a certain
extent, to increase its leverage over other, private broadcast
organizations--by consolidating its central and local television and
radio companies into an enlarged and potentially more powerful holding
company. In 1998 the VGTRK began to manage the sites that transmit the
broadcasts of private television channels.
In August after a number of television stations showed footage of
Chechen leaders in their reports on the conflict in Dagestan, the
Ministry warned the companies against ``giving air time to Chechen
field commanders,'' stating that this ``violates Article 4 of the Law
of the Russian Federation on the Mass Media'' (which forbids the
inciting of racial violence or hatred). Days earlier, a city-owned
station in St. Petersburg was issued an almost identical warning for
airing anti-Semitic material (see Section 5). Later that month,
Minister Lesin issued another stern warning to the ORT in connection
with a news report by the station that allegedly displayed ``flagrant
disrespect for the flag of the Russian Federation'' and allegedly
contained ``disrespectful comments about the Russian President.''
Minister Lesin informed the station that ``such violations might lead
to the revocation of the station's broadcasting license.'' In late
August, the Ministry again warned the ORT that it could lose its
broadcasting license, after the ORT broadcast a story about a mass
demonstration in St. Petersburg by supporters of the Union of Right
Forces. In February the newspaper Vremya MN reported that the State
Committee for Publishing advised local authorities to withhold tax
privileges and apply financial pressure to local newspapers that
promote political extremism. According to the newspaper the local
definition of political extremism may vary widely between regions.
On more than one occasion, senior government officials, including
in one case President Yeltsin, voiced ``expectations'' or
``suggestions'' to media representatives and government officials that
clearly were intended to change the way the media operated. After
fighting in Dagestan and Chechnya broke out again in the fall,
journalists apparently practiced self-censorship and provided few
graphic descriptions of the killings and other abuses committed by
Russian troops. Late in December, NTV broadcast limited coverage of
alleged massacres by government forces in Chechnya, including video
footage that showed military trucks loaded with items which government
forces had looted. Despite officials' statements that such coverage was
unpatriotic, the broadcast and print media continued to provide some
information of the war in Chechnya from unofficial sources.
Local governments also applied pressure on media based within their
jurisdictions in the period prior to the December Duma elections. In
August fire authorities carried out a surprise inspection of the
physical plant of the Moscow-based newspaper, Kommersant Daily. The
authorities charged the newspaper with failure to comply with local
fire safety standards and closed the newspaper down for a day.
Kommersant executives appealed directly to Prime Minister Putin for
relief. The Prime Minister intervened on Kommersant's behalf, stating
that he would not allow ``communal regulation of the media,'' and the
newspaper resumed publishing. Immediately after the shutdown,
Kommersant's publishers filed a lawsuit in the Moscow arbitration court
to recover the losses that the paper incurred due to the forced
stoppage. The Court has not yet ruled on this suit. Days later, in a
similar case, Moscow authorities warned editors at another Moscow-based
newspaper, Noviye Izvestiya, that unless the newspaper adhered to
heating system regulations, the municipal government would ``take
action.'' To date the paper continues to publish without disruption.
In August the procurator in Omsk had the private television
transmitter belonging to the station STV-3 impounded after the station
aired accusations of financial impropriety against the deputy
procurator. The procurator's office stripped STV-3 reporters of their
accreditation, conducted an investigation that concluded the
accusations had no merit, and charged those responsible for the story
with slander. After these steps the STV-3 continued to air stories
against the Omsk administration, and the station's transmitter finally
was impounded.
In November vice chairman of the Media-Most conglomerate Igor
Malashenko argued in an interview that the Presidential Administration
was trying to use economic means to close down the NTV during the
parliamentary election campaign. On October 29, state-owned
Vneshekonombank sued the NTV's holding company for immediate payment of
a $42 million loan. On November 2 and 3, Vneshekonombank had 39 Media-
Most bank accounts in 8 banks frozen. Media-Most then agreed to pay
back the loan in full.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty noted in a 1998 report on the
Russian media that the mayor of Moscow, Yuriy Luzhkov, could exert
pressure on distribution companies, on paper suppliers, or on the
corporate parents of ``any media enterprise deemed to be
objectionable,'' and that Luzhkov had used his power ``to ensure a
largely compliant press in his hometown.''
During the year, there were many instances in which authorities
disregarded and challenged the right of journalists to investigate and
publish stories. In early 1998, President Yeltsin signed a decree, On
the List of Information that Constitutes a State Secret, widening the
scope of privileged information that legally could be withheld from the
public. Information pertaining to the development, production, storage,
and disposal of nuclear ammunition, for example, was included
explicitly in the language of the decree, with the result that it has
now become much more difficult--in fact illegal--for citizens residing
near disposal sites to publicize through the media the increased health
risks and environmental degradation. According to this decree,
information on the preparation and conclusion of international
treaties, as well as information in certain economic categories, falls
within the domain of state secrets.
In efforts to control the media, local authorities often passed
laws and issued orders in apparent violation of the Constitution and
federal laws. In April the legislative assembly of the Perm region
passed a law making state subsidies to local media organizations
conditional on ``the amount of news space or broadcast time provided by
the organization for disseminating government information.'' In May
local officials in the Belgorod region refused to register an
independent newspaper, Zvezda, on the basis of an order signed by the
head of the regional administration, Vladimir Gerasimenko, instructing
the administration's information directorate ``to act on behalf of the
administration as the publisher of the region's newspapers.'' According
to Zvezda's editor in chief, Alla Kaverina, the order clearly violates
mass media law; she reported the case to the GDF, but the issue remains
unresolved to date.
Government censorship remained a significant problem during the
year. In May in the central Russian city of Kirov, Valeriy Fokin, the
press secretary of the regional governor, demanded that the local
television station, Channel 9, stop the production of a program
containing criticism of the local duma. Fokin recommended that the
program's writer, Aleksandr Bulakh, ``change the focus'' of the program
and remove any criticism of local authorities. Feeling ``powerless'' to
resist, Bulakh revised the program according to the specifications of
the local administration. In a similar case in June, authorities in the
city of Voronezh denied accreditation to a local version of the Moscow-
based Novaya Gazeta. Galina Shatunova of the Voronezh city
administration stated publicly that the decision was a result of the
newspaper's ``incorrect coverage of the work of the administration.''
At a human rights conference held in St. Petersburg in November, Yuriy
Vdovin of the NGO Citizen's Watch charged that the FSB has played a
role in censorship. He claimed that there have been cases in which
journalists were not able to publish certain items due to the presence
of an FSB ``helper'' in the controlling apparatus of the organization.
In June Svetlana Yanyushkina, editor in chief of MK Samara (a 4-
page supplement to Moskovskiy Komsomolets in Samara), was forced from
her position after she published a series of unflattering articles on
the expansion of the activities of the financial-industrial group
Sibirskiy Alyuminiy. According to journalists in the region, Sibirskiy
Alyuminiy coowner Oleg Deripaska complained about the coverage to the
local administration, arguing that the articles ``damaged the
interests'' of the group. Samara governor Konstantin Titov reportedly
then conveyed his ``displeasure'' to one of the senior managers of the
paper. Officially, Yanyushina then ``offered to resign of her own
volition,'' but journalists familiar with the case insist that she had
no choice in the matter. No further investigation ensued. By the end of
August, Yanyushkina had found work at a television station in Samara.
Journalists publishing critical information about local governments
and influential businesses, as well as investigative journalists
writing about crime and other sensitive issues, continued to be
subjected to threats of physical violence, beatings, and murder (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
A number of independent media NGO's have characterized beatings of
journalists as ``routine,'' noting that those who pursued investigative
stories on corruption and organized crime found themselves at greatest
risk. The press and media NGO's reported 10 killings of journalists,
presumed to be related to the journalistic work of the victims, and
dozens of other bodily assaults on journalists. As was the case in the
12 murders in 1998, police seldom found the perpetrators of crimes
against journalists.
On February 13, Viktor Chertkov, a correspondent at the Yantarniy
kray newspaper in Kaliningrad, was beaten severely in the entrance of
his apartment building by a group of unidentified men; the assailants
also took drafts of the articles he was carrying at the time of the
attack. Chertkov's colleagues linked the incident to his reporting. The
same newspaper reported two other attacks against journalists in
Kaliningrad. On July 1, two persons forced Oleg Altovskiy, a host of
the television program City, into an entryway of an apartment building,
took his camera and tapes, and threatened to kill him because he had
``gone too far in his reports.'' On the same day, Vladimir Sazonov, a
political observer at Kaliningrad's Kaskad newspaper, was hospitalized
with severe head injuries after being attacked. Police investigations
produced no results in either case. The assailants remain at large.
On March 1, in the southern city of Rostov-on-Don, two persons who
introduced themselves as ``employees of the police press service''
visited the home of army journalist Aleksandr Tolmachev and offered him
materials on the subject of corruption in the ranks of senior officials
of the Northern Caucasus Military District. When Tolmachev went outside
to meet the pair, the visitors brutally beat him with iron bars. The
investigative journalist, who probes crimes by high-ranking army
officers, survived a similar attack in 1995. The Rostov-on-Don police
still are investigating the case but have not yet made any arrests.
On March 26, in Yekaterinburg several men attacked Eduard
Khudyakov, a journalist who was working for a local television network.
Khudyakov, who sustained severe knife wounds, believes that the attempt
on his life was related directly to his professional activity as a
journalist. The police launched an investigation and offered a reward
of approximately $10,000 (250,000 rubles) for information leading to
the arrest of the perpetrators. In the same city on April 6, someone
set fire to a vehicle belonging to a local independent television
company, ATN. The culprit broke the window and threw a bottle filled
with flammable liquid into the car. To date, the police have made no
arrests.
In Yekaterinburg masked armed men entered the offices of MK-Ural
and seized all copies of its April 1 edition, which included an
interview with a candidate for the Sverdlovsk duma who was a victim of
a contract killing on March 30. In the interview the candidate, who was
an outspoken opponent of the Uralmash crime group, revealed the name of
a man who previously had tried to have him killed.
On April 1, in the eastern Siberian city of Yakutsk, Sergey
Sarkisov, a photographer at the local newspaper Yakutiya, was
approached by an unidentified man who told Sarkisov to open his camera
and expose the film in it. Sarkisov refused to do so. Later, on the way
to his office, he was attacked by three persons. The assailants took
his camera and ruined the film. No one was arrested in connection with
the attack. In a similar case, on April 2, Mikhail Vyalov, a
photographer working for a local newspaper in the city of Ulyanovsk,
reportedly was beaten by employees of the local FSB as he was trying to
take photos of members of a criminal group who were being apprehended
by the FSB. The FSB denied that the beating took place, alleging
instead that the journalist had ``fallen'' when the FSB was ``checking
his documents.''
On April 5, in Makhachkala, Dagestan, Elmira Kazhayeva, a reporter
working for the newspaper Youth of Dagestan, received anonymous
telephone threats in response to an article she authored exposing
numerous violations of campaign rules on the part of Dagestan duma
deputy Ruslan Ibragimbekov. Kazhayeva earlier had received threats
after the publication of stories on other topics as well.
On May 13, Andrey Lependin, a sports reporter with the newspaper
Voronezhskiy Kuryer, was beaten near his apartment building by three
persons. Prior to the assault, the three first had asked Lependin his
name. Lependin's colleagues link the attack to his reporting about the
financial deals of the Fakel sports club. Valeriy Neneko, the head of
the club, had called the newspaper to complain about the publications.
Later, he reportedly said that if necessary, he would ``communicate
with Lependin in a different way.''
On May 31, after the publication of a series of articles on the
illegal privatization of Sochi's beach resorts, Novaya Gazeta
investigative reporter Sergey Zolovkin learned of a ``contract'' on his
life and that of his daughter. Concerned that local officials had links
to the mafia group that had put out the contract on his life, Zolovkin
asked his head office in Moscow to raise the issue with then-Minister
of the Interior Vladimir Rushaylo. The Ministry reportedly opened an
investigation.
On June 30, Yuriy Stepanov, the managing director of the
independent radio station Lemma, was beaten severely outside his home
in Vladivostok. The attack came after the station broadcast an
interview in which a majority shareholder in shipping company
Vostoktransflot alleged that Primorskiy kray Governor Yevgeniy
Nazdratenko had embezzled from the company. On July 6, unknown persons
forced Stepanov's daughter into a car and threatened her with bodily
harm unless her father changed the station's policy of offering to
broadcast the views of anyone who wanted to do so.
On August 3, in Yekaterinburg, the apartment of independent
television company Channel Four Plus President Igor Mishin was
destroyed by a bomb. Mishin, who was not in the apartment at the time
of the explosion, reportedly had rejected requests by gubernatorial
candidates to ``alter the company's position'' in their favor, instead
of maintaining an independent posture in covering the elections. The
police had made no arrests by year's end.
On August 9, in St. Petersburg, Aleksandr Borisoglebskiy, a well-
known journalist and one of the founders of the 600 Seconds daily
broadcast popular during perestroyka times, was assaulted by bodyguards
at the residence of Damir Shadayev, a rich businessman and
gubernatorial candidate in Leningrad oblast. Borisoglebskiy's cameraman
Vladimir Mishin was assaulted as well. The two journalists approached
Shadayev's residence but did not trespass on his property. In September
Borisoglebskiy was murdered during a fact-finding trip to the Vyborg
pulp and paper plant. In August workers at the plant had protested
attempts by the owners of the plant to replace the management team.
In August Sergey Zhabinskiy, a reporter in Achinsk in Krasnoyarsk
kray, discovered a grenade under his car that was set to explode once
the car was set in motion. He had been receiving death threats since a
story of his that criticized the Achinsk alumina plant appeared on
local television.
On August 30, the editor in chief of the Novosibirsk newspaper
Vesti, Lyubov Loboda, was knifed to death. She had established and
edited the nonpolitical weekly since 1996. An official investigation
was launched under the special supervision of the head of the regional
police authority. At present, investigators have not linked her death
to her work as a journalist, but to date, no other motive has been put
forward. Loboda had received threats at her office before.
There was no progress made in the investigation of the beating
death of Anatoliy Levin-Utkin, deputy editor of Yuridichesky Petersburg
Segodnya, in August 1998.
Journalists maintained and strengthened associations to defend
their rights and monitor governmental abuse.
The country's Northern Caucasus continued to be a dangerous region
for Russian journalists. On May 14, in Karachayevo-Cherkesiya a large
group confronted a film crew of the Respublika television company. The
group demanded the videotape footage of a report that the crew had
produced on the recent republic-wide election; the footage contained
evidence of violations of federal election law and explicit verbal
threats against journalists issued by local officials. Members of the
group severely beat the journalists and destroyed their equipment; they
also took the videotape. In a similar incident in May, supporters of
Vladimir Semenev, one of the candidates in the elections, abducted a
camera crew and seized video material from journalists of Stavropol
state television. After long negotiations, the journalists were freed
on the condition that they ``not film again.'' And on May 29, in the
same region, unknown arsonists set fire to the home of Anna Belskaya,
the editor of the official daily, Den Respubliki. According to
Belskaya's colleagues, the attack was occasioned by the newspaper's
independent commentary on the ongoing political battles in the
republic.
On August 27, five armed men attacked a television center that was
under construction in Nazran in Ingushetiya. The men took one security
official hostage until Ingush police officers freed him. Four of the
assailants escaped and one of was killed reportedly when a grenade he
was carrying exploded.
In the period before the Russian military operations in the
Northern Caucasus intensified, violations of journalists' rights in
Chechnya were at a lower level than their 1997 peak, due in part to the
withdrawal of most news organizations from the region. Kidnapings and
threats against journalists by Chechen rebels were frequent. The
Maskhadov government continued to take actions against opposition
television stations. In addition, Maskhadov imposed a ban in February
on Russian television programming deemed as not conforming to Shari'a
norms. Since the war resumed, federal authorities--both military and
civilian--limited journalists' access to war zones and confiscated
reports and equipment, citing threats to the safety of reporters. Since
November additional accreditation--besides the usual Foreign Ministry
accreditation--is required for entry to the region. In some cases,
foreign journalists publicly complained that military officials in the
northern Caucasus region made it excessively difficult for them to
receive local press accreditation.
The FSB interfered with citizens' right to privacy by monitoring
use of the Internet (see Section 1.f.).
Although the Government generally respects academic freedom, the
case of environmental researcher Vladimir Soifer constitutes an
apparent violation of academic freedom. On July 3, the FSB seized
documents, including personal correspondence, from the Vladivostok
office of Soifer, a prominent physicist who researches marine
radioactive contamination. The search was conducted after the
cancellation of government funds for his research and of his security
clearance for access to his laboratory in March. Soifer filed a
complaint with a Vladivostok procurator, alleging that the FSB failed
to list in its protocol the items that its forces took from his
apartment, such as his external passport. Further, Soifer alleged that
the FSB confiscated personal correspondence, unrelated to his research,
without a warrant. As of September 1, Soifer still was unable to
continue his research and remains in Moscow. The GDF and Human Rights
Watch see this case as part of a larger pattern of harassment of
environmentalists by authorities, which includes the Pasko and Nikitin
cases (see Section 1.d.), and the Moscow directorate of justice's
refusal to register Aleksey Yablokov's ``Ecology and Human Rights''
organization (see Section 2.b.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides citizens with the right to assemble freely, and the Government
respects this right in practice. Organizations must obtain permits in
order to hold public meetings. The application process must begin
between 5 and 10 days before the scheduled event. Citizens freely and
actively protested government decisions and actions. Permits to
demonstrate were granted readily to both opponents and supporters of
the Government.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. Public organizations must
register their bylaws and the names of their leaders with the Ministry
of Justice. In 1995 a registration law was passed specifying that
organizations had until June 1999 to reregister. When the deadline
expired on July 1, some human rights activists expressed deep concern
that an estimated 10,000 NGO's would be vulnerable to possible
``liquidation'' (closure by court order) by local authorities who were
hostile to human rights or opposition political activity. In a move
which human rights activists marked as a potentially serious blow to
freedom of association, in November the Federation Council rejected a
bill that was passed by the Duma to extend the reregistration deadline
by 1 year. To date the Ministry of Justice maintains that there were
not a large number of liquidations, as a result of the passing
deadline. NGO's currently are studying the situation and attempting to
track the number of organizations affected by the deadline. It was
difficult to assess the scope of the problem due to the large number of
registered NGO's that exist only on paper, as well as the large number
of active but unregistered organizations. Ministry of Justice officials
stated publicly, and a few NGO's agreed, that 4 years was sufficient
time for most organizations to reregister, and that obtaining new
registration generally was not difficult. However, there were several
high profile cases in which well-known activists or organizations were
refused reregistration--such as Sergey Grigoriants' Glasnost Foundation
and environmentalist Aleksey Yablokov's Ecology and Human Rights
association--by regional departments of justice on grounds that these
organizations called illegal and discriminatory.
According to press reports, in January a district court in
Bashkortostan banned the Tatar Public Center for allegedly calling for
the secession of a Tatar region from the republic and for the ouster of
republic president Murtaza Rakhimov. The Center's director contends
that it only asked voters not to choose Rakhimov in the 1998 elections,
and that it protested a draft language law that did not designate Tatar
as an official language in the republic (see Section 5).
According to press reports, on July 15, the Ministry of Justice's
regional office in Krasnodar kray denied the registration of the
Association for the Protection of Human Rights on the grounds that the
organization's goal of participating in elections violates the law. The
group, which analyzes whether regional legislation conforms with
federal and international law, had been operating in the region for 5
years.
On August 16, the Moscow City Court upheld the ruling of a
municipal court and the Moscow Directorate of Justice to deny
registration to Ecology and Human Rights, an association led by the
country's leading environmental activist, Aleksey Yablokov. The court's
decision echoed the Directorate of Justice's view that protection of
the environment is the responsibility of the Government and that
``interference of community entities in the activities of the organs of
state authority and its officials is not permitted.'' The organization
is seeking legal assistance in order to seek a solution. Observers have
linked this development to the prosecution of environmental reporters
Pasko and Nikitin (see Section 1.d.), and to FSB harassment of
environmental researcher Vladimir Soifer (see Section 2.a.).
In September Dagestan's parliament passed legislation that outlawed
``Wahhabi'' groups and other organizations it considered extremist.
During the year, federal and Dagestani authorities stepped up their
pressure on what they label as the republic's ``Wahhabi'' Muslim
community. After an incursion on August 7 by Chechen-backed Islamist
guerrillas, Dagestan president Magomedali Magomedov declared that his
government would take a harder line against ``Wahhabism'' (see Section
2.c).
In addition to submitting their bylaws and the names of their
leaders, political parties must present 5,000 signatures and pay a fee
to register. The Constitution and the Law on Elections ban the
participation in elections of organizations that profess
anticonstitutional themes or activities.
On March 30, President Yeltsin signed the law On the Basic
Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens to Participate
in a Referendum (Voting Rights Act) and the federal law on public
associations. These laws stipulate that associations must have charters
that state specifically an intention to participate in elections, and
that they must be registered with the Ministry of Justice 1 year prior
to elections.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, although the Constitution also provides for the equality of
all religions before the law and the separation of church and state, in
practice the Government does not always respect the provision for
equality of religions.
In December 1990, the Soviet Government adopted a law on religious
freedom designed to put all religions on an equal basis. (After the
breakup of the Soviet Union, this law became part of the Russian
Federation's legal code.) The 1990 law forbade government interference
in religion and established simple registration procedures for
religious groups. Registration of religious groups was not required;
however, by registering groups obtained a number of advantages, for
example, the ability to establish official places of worship or benefit
from tax exemptions.
During the early and mid-1990's, many sectors of society,
particularly nationalists and many members of the Russian Orthodox
Church, were disturbed by a sharp increase in the activities of well-
financed foreign missionaries. Many advocated limiting the activities
of what they termed ``nontraditional'' religious groups and what
sometimes were called ``dangerous'' or ``totalitarian'' sects.
In October 1997, the Duma enacted a new, restrictive, and
potentially discriminatory law on religion, which raised questions
about the Government's commitment to international agreements honoring
freedom of religion. Passage of the law prompted concern in the
international community, because for the first time since the breakup
of the Soviet Union, the Government had adopted legislation that could
abridge fundamental human rights. This law replaced the progressive
1990 religion law that had helped facilitate a revival of religious
activity.
The new law ostensibly targeted so-called ``totalitarian sects'' or
dangerous religious cults. However, the intent of some of the law's
sponsors appears to have been to discriminate against members of
foreign and less well-established religions by making it difficult for
them to manifest their beliefs through organized religious
institutions.
The critics of the law believe that the basic assumption behind the
law is that religious groups must prove their innocence and their
legitimacy before gaining the advantages of state recognition. Russian
government officials, including President Yeltsin and then-Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin, pledged that the law on religion would not
result in any erosion of religious freedom in the country. Officials in
the Presidential Administration and the Cabinet of Ministers have
echoed and clarified these commitments during 1998 and the first half
of 1999. They have taken a flexible approach to implementation of some
of the law's most negative aspects and have shown some willingness to
intervene with local authorities in defense of religious rights.
The 1997 law on religion is very complex, with many ambiguous and
contradictory provisions. On its face, the law creates various
categories of religious communities with differing levels of legal
status and privileges. The law distinguishes between religious
``groups'' and ``organizations,'' two mutually exclusive registration
categories, and creates two categories of organizations: ``regional''
and ``centralized.'' A religious ``group'' is a congregation of
worshipers that does not have the legal status of a juridical person,
meaning that it cannot open a bank account, own property, issue
invitations to foreign guests, publish literature, or conduct worship
services in prisons and state-owned hospitals, among other things.
Groups are permitted to rent public spaces and hold services. Moreover,
the law does not purport to abridge the rights of individual members of
``groups.'' For example, a member of a religious group could buy
property for the group's use, invite personal guests to engage in
religious instruction, and import religious material. However, in this
case, the group would not enjoy tax benefits and other rights extended
to religious organizations, such as proselytizing.
The law's most controversial provisions are those that limit the
rights, activities, and status of religious groups existing in the
country for less than 15 years. Groups that can prove their existence
in the country for 15 years have the right to obtain the status of
``local religious organizations.'' Similarly, congregations that had
existed for 15 years when the new law was enacted also are eligible for
registration as an organization. Organizations, both local and
centralized, are considered juridical persons, enjoy tax exemptions,
and are permitted to proselytize, establish religious schools, host
foreign religious workers, and publish literature.
Under the 1997 religion law, representative offices of foreign
religious organizations are required to register with state
authorities. They are barred from conducting liturgical services and
other religious activity unless they have acquired the status of a
group or organization. Although the law officially requires all foreign
religious organizations to register, in practice foreign religious
representatives' offices (those not registered under Russian law) have
opened without registering or have been accredited to a registered
Russian religious organization. However, these representative offices
cannot carry out religious activities and do not have the status of a
religious organization.
A ``centralized religious organization'' can be founded by a
confession that has 3 functioning ``local organizations'' (each of
which must have at least 10 members who are Russian citizens) in
different regions. A centralized organization apparently has the right
to establish affiliated local organizations without adhering to the 15-
year rule. In implementing this provision, the Government has extended
this definition to include a ``registered centralized managing
center.'' Centralized organizations also have been accorded the right
to organize affiliated local organizations, which themselves do not
comply with the 15-year rule.
Critics of the law have claimed that it violates the Constitution's
provision of equality before the law of all confessions. In particular,
many religious groups criticized the law's requirement that religious
groups exist for 15 years before they can qualify for ``organization''
status. Also, many groups feared the consequences of the law's
provisions limiting the actions of foreign religious missionaries.
Representatives of some religions, such as the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-Day Saints (Mormons) and some Pentecostal and charismatic
Christian groups, have said that their activities in the country could
be halted under the law. The law furnishes regional officials with an
instrument that has been interpreted and used by officials at the local
level to restrict the activities of religious minorities.
Human rights activists welcomed a March open letter to the
President and Duma by Human Rights Plenipotentiary Oleg Mironov, in
which he criticized the 1997 religion law and recommended changes to
bring it into accordance with the Constitution and international norms
for religious freedom. (Mironov's office is a government entity created
by the Parliament in 1997 that is dedicated to investigating complaints
of human rights abuses--see Section 4.)
Between February 12 and June 3, 1998, the Government issued three
sets of regulations governing implementation of the new law. While
providing procedural guidelines for registration, the regulations
failed to clarify many key definitional points in the law.
In practice the registration process--which involves simultaneous
registration at both the federal and local levels--has proven for a
number of confessions to be onerous and requires considerable time,
effort, and legal expense. International and well-funded Russian
religious organizations, in particular, began the reregistration
process soon after publication of the regulations governing
reregistration. Russian Pentecostal groups, which have a solid and
growing network of churches throughout the country, sought guidance
from the Ministry of Justice on reregistration as early as November
1997. One of the larger organizations, the Russian Unified Fellowship
of Christians of the Evangelical Faith (which traces its origins back
to the early 1900's) reregistered as a centralized religious
organization by late March 1998. It has since incorporated many
smaller, newer Pentecostal groups within its structure.
According to Ministry of Justice figures, by year's end,
approximately 80 percent or 320 out of 400 religious organizations were
reregistered on the federal level, representing 40 percent of the total
number requiring reregistration. At year's end, the Ministry estimated
that about half of the 16,850 religious organizations still were not
reregistered on the local level.
The Government is attempting to address mounting concerns that a
large number of religious organizations may remain unregistered when
the deadline passes at year's end and be left vulnerable to attempts by
local authorities to restrict their activities. In June the Ministry of
Justice sent to the regional directorates of justice a recommendation
that local religious organizations be reregistered. Another development
may help religious organizations indirectly: on August 2, a
presidential decree was signed which, among other things, clarified the
relationship between the federal Ministry and the regional directorates
of justice, stating that the directorates are ``territorial organs of
the Ministry of Justice.'' Observers and officials view this decree as
a means to help bring insubordinate directorates more in line with
federal policies, although it is unclear what effect this decree had in
practice.
The Duma failed to pass before year's end an amendment to the 1997
religion law that would extend the deadline for registration of
religious organizations by 1 year. It was unclear whether this
development, which leaves approximately half of the total 16,850
organizations exposed to ``liquidation'' (closure by court order),
would result in closures. Duma officials and representatives of the
Ministry of Justice state that the amendment is to be voted on in late
March 2000. On December 31, Deputy Minister of Justice Yevgeniy
Sidorenko reported to the press that the Ministry of Justice sent to
the regional directorates of justice a recommendation that they refrain
from initiating legal proceedings to liquidate any organizations.
As of August, several religious groups report that local
registrations have gone more smoothly, following a June Ministry of
Justice recommendation to regional directorates of justice that local
religious organizations be reregistered. Jehovah's Witnesses reported
on September 1 that the group had registered 188 local organizations in
53 regions and hoped to register a total of 500 by year's end
(Jehovah's Witnesses report a total of 1,000 congregations in Russia,
not all of which require registration). Late in August, the Unification
Church stated that it had registered five local religious
organizations.
The delay in reregistration is due in part to the slow pace at
which the federal Ministry of Justice has disseminated the regulations
and guidelines to local authorities and understaffing both at the
Ministry of Justice and at local levels. In many instances the Ministry
of Justice has asked for additional information and has demanded
changes in the organizational structure and by-laws of some groups to
ensure that they are in conformance with the law. Also, smaller,
minority confessions sometimes feared the registration process, while
others started the process late because they needed to agree internally
on how to register their organizations in conformance with the law. Of
89 regions, 30 have laws and decrees on religion that violate the
Constitution by restricting the activities of religious groups;
presumably they would have to be changed. In the meantime, many local
religious organizations continue to try to seek means of affiliating
themselves with centralized organizations or confessions that can meet
the 15-year rule and provide a protective legal cover. However, some
individual local churches and religious orders, citing their
theological and administrative independence, are reluctant to make
themselves part of a larger organization. Under the new system, such
religious communities face considerable legal disadvantages.
President Yeltsin and other high-ranking officials have stated
consistently that the law would be applied in a liberal, tolerant
manner, thereby preserving religious freedom and the equality of
confessions. They insist that no mainstream religion already operating
in the country would see its activities curtailed as a result of the
new law. The full effect of the law on minority confessions or
religions considered nontraditional is not expected to be clear until
after December 31 (the deadline before which organizations registered
under the old law are required to obtain new registration). To date no
religious organization has ceased operations as a result of the law.
Presidential administration officials have established consultative
mechanisms to facilitate government interaction with religious
communities and to monitor application of the law on religion. However,
a federal government agency in the case of at least one religion has
been responsible for significant restrictions on the activities of a
church. In some areas, foreign Roman Catholic religious workers must
return to their home countries every 3 months in order to renew their
visas, unlike other foreign workers who can apply for multiple-entry
visas or extend their stays.
Despite the Federal Government's efforts to implement the law
liberally and to provide assurances that religious freedom would be
observed, restrictions continued at the local level. The vagueness of
the law and regulations, the contradictions between federal and local
law, and varying interpretations furnish regional officials with a
pretext to restrict the activities of religious minorities.
Discriminatory practices at the local level are attributable to the
increased decentralization of power and the relatively greater
vulnerability of local governments to lobbying by majority religions,
as well as to government inaction and discriminatory attitudes that are
widely held in society.
For example, the Moscow directorate of justice continues to refuse
registration to Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow, despite the precedent
set by the Ministry of Justice's April 30 decision to reregister
Jehovah's Witnesses on the federal level. The directorate has refused
three applications for local registration by Moscow Jehovah's Witnesses
for unclear reasons. Although there is no legal basis to do so, the
directorate may be refusing registration pending resolution of the
outstanding civil case against Moscow Jehovah's Witnesses.
At least one religious organization, the ``Society of Jesus''
(Jesuits), has had difficulty registering at the federal level because
its structure does not fit assumptions underpinning the law's
provisions.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints successfully has
registered 20 local religious organizations but continues to encounter
some problems. After some initial trouble concerning registration of
missionaries residing in the cities of Tolyatti and Novokuybyshevsk in
the Samara region, by November the Church was able to agree with the
Samara directorate of justice to establish registered local
organizations in these cities in order to allow Mormon missionaries to
reside there legally.
During the year the directorate of justice in Chelyabinsk rejected
the local registration application of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints several times, based on the alleged incompatibility
of church activities with federal law.
Even without registration, the Church continued to hold regular
services without incident, although its missionaries have suspended
their door-to-door canvassing and other outreach activities. If the
Church remains unregistered, its missionaries would be forced to leave
the country when their visas expire in December. The directorate of
justice also has rejected the registration applications of the Baptist,
Adventist, and Pentecostal churches in Chelyabinsk on similar grounds.
Since mid-1998 the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints has
been attempting unsuccessfully to be registered locally in Kazan in
Tatarstan. At year's end, the Church's most recent application for
registration was being reviewed according to regulations set out in
Tatarstan's new religion law that was adopted on August 28. Church
representatives argue that because their most recent application
predated the new law by 2 months, it should not be considered under the
new law. Moreover, the Church argues that the republic ministry of
justice's previous cancellation of the Church's registration in
February also was illegal under the 1997 federal religion law, because
a court order is required to liquidate an organization. Tatar
authorities failed to address these complaints adequately by year's
end.
Although it can be a slow and costly process for religious groups,
the judicial system has provided an appeal process for religious
organizations threatened with loss of registered status or
``liquidation'' as a religious organization under Article 14 of the
1997 religion law. Some local churches initially denied local
registration have been registered following successful lawsuits, as in
the case of the Evangelical Lutheran Mission in Khakasiya in November
1998, when the federal Supreme Court overturned the verdict of the
Khakasiya supreme court. In February the supreme court of Khakasiya
rejected the regional procurator's request to nullify the registration
of the Evangelical Lutheran Mission; the procurator plans to appeal the
case. In 1998 a local procuracy opened a civil case against the Word of
Life Pentecostal Church in the Far Eastern city of Magadan under
Article 14 of the 1997 religion law, accusing the Church of using cult
practices to manipulate its members. After a lengthy delay, a Magadan
municipal court finally dismissed the case in May due to insufficient
evidence, a decision that was upheld in June by the Magadan oblast
court. However, the Church fears that the same procuracy soon may try
to open a criminal case. The Word of Life Church also won a court
battle for reregistration in March. A church member employed by the
Government who was threatened with the loss of her job late in 1998 was
still at her post as of June. Church officials report that two other
church members were fired because of their religion, but such
allegations are difficult to prove. Also, tax investigations on two
separate charges continue. Church members reported that negative
stories about them repeatedly appeared in the local state-controlled
press, with no mention of their court victories. Despite these
difficulties, the Word of Life Pentecostal Church continues its normal
activities.
Since 1994 30 of 89 regional governments have passed restrictive
laws and decrees intended to restrict the activities of religious
groups. At the time the 1997 religion law was under discussion, its
proponents argued that it was necessary in order to deal with the many
restrictive local laws. The Federal Government has not challenged
effectively the unconstitutionality of these restrictions, although the
Presidential Administration sent warnings to 30 regions regarding the
unconstitutionality of local laws. Critics contend that the Federal
Government should be more active in reversing discriminatory actions
taken at the local level and, when necessary, reprimanding the
officials at fault. Also according to critics, the federal authorities
need to take action to ensure that regional and local legislation or
other actions do not contradict constitutional provisions protecting
religious freedom. There were reports that some local and municipal
governments prevented religious groups from using venues, such as
cinemas, suitable for large gatherings. In many areas of the country,
government-owned facilities are the only available venues. As a result,
in some instances denominations that do not have their own property
effectively have been denied the opportunity to practice their faith in
large groups. For example, late in April the Moscow northern district
administration gathered theater and assembly hall managers and ordered
them to refuse to lease their facilities to Jehovah's Witnesses. In
August Jehovah's Witnesses nearly were forced to cancel a convention
for 15,000 Witnesses at Moscow's Olympic Stadium, reportedly because
stadium management was under pressure from the Moscow city
administration. The weekend convention also was disrupted briefly by a
telephone bomb threat, but no device was found. Moscow police concluded
that the call was a prank, and did not open a criminal investigation.
The Open Christianity private ecumenical school was evicted from its
premises in St. Petersburg in March after a protracted battle with city
officials about rights to the building, registration of the school, and
the school's taxes. However, it is not clear that the school's
religious orientation was at the root of city administration actions
against it, and local government officials tried to relocate the school
to an alternative site. In the summer of 1998, local officials in
Rostov-on-Don cancelled a rental agreement permitting the Shield of
Faith Pentecostal Church to sponsor a Jesus Festival concert in a
sports complex. The chairman of the city's Department of Cossacks and
Religion refused to permit the event. In June 1998, Canadian evangelist
Viktor Hamm of the Billy Graham Evangelical Association cancelled an
outdoor preaching event in Voronezh after city authorities denied the
local sponsors of the event, the Evangelical Christian-Baptists,
permission to hold the event. In August 1998, according to unconfirmed
reports from religious press sources, authorities in Kasplya, in
Smolensk oblast, closed a Sunday school and prohibited worship services
by the Evangelical Christian-Baptists. In September 1998, city
authorities required a cinema to cancel its rental agreement with the
Shield of Faith congregation. Also in September 1998, the director of
the Moscow Technical College ordered guards not to admit an
unregistered Baptist congregation onto the premises it had rented. The
action allegedly stemmed from an intervention by the Federal Security
Service (FSB), according to unconfirmed reports from religious press
sources.
Some local executive authorities continued to cite the new law or
local laws to obstruct religious groups' activities or to rescind their
existing local registrations. In late 1998, according to the United
Church, its St. Petersburg branch was denied local registration after a
federal court in St. Petersburg started proceedings against the Church.
Reports of harassment and punishment for religious belief or
activity continued. Despite legal registration, members of some
religions, including Protestant groups, Jehovah's Witnesses, and the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, continue to face
discrimination in their ability to rent premises and conduct group
activities. For example, in March local militia troops broke up
services of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints in
Chelyabinsk and interrogated seven missionaries. In April regional
officials forbade the Church from holding services on Easter Sunday and
threatened the church leader with arrest if he assembled his
congregation that day. Nonetheless, the Church held its Easter Sunday
services without incident. Mormon missionaries throughout Russia
frequently are detained for brief periods or asked by local police to
cease their activities, regardless of whether they were actually in
violation of local statutes on picketing (see Section 1.d.). In July
1998, according to unconfirmed reports from religious press sources,
the mayor of Novokuznetsk in Siberia barred Gideons from distributing
New Testaments in schools, although their charter, approved by the
Government, states that they may do so. In August and September 1998,
local authorities and agents from the FSB reportedly harassed,
repeatedly interrogated, and threatened with imprisonment a U.S.
missionary from the Baptist Mid-Missions. FSB agents warned members of
the autonomous Baptist Church affiliated with Baptist Mid-Missions to
stop attending services, according to the Keston News Service.
The country's first judicial proceeding to suspend the operations
of an existing religious organization at the local level continues, as
Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow fight to avoid legal ``liquidation''
under Article 14 of the 1997 religion law. Based on a complaint from
the Committee to Save Youth from Totalitarian Cults (a group that
reportedly has ties to the Russian Orthodox Church), a Moscow municipal
procurator is seeking ``liquidation'' (i.e., termination of the
organization as a legal entity) of the Moscow Jehovah's Witnesses
organization under Article 14 of the 1997 religion law for its alleged
antisocial, antifamily character. In March the trial was suspended
pending review of the case by a panel of court-appointed religious
experts. On June 28, the Moscow city court upheld the decision of the
Golovinskiy municipal court to appoint an expert panel. The expert
panel is reviewing the case but is expected to render a split
recommendation. Meanwhile, Jehovah's Witnesses are preparing a Supreme
Court appeal.
In March in St. Petersburg, Nataliya Ilyina, the mother of a young
mentally disabled woman, brought a second lawsuit against Jehovah's
Witnesses in St. Petersburg's Frunzenskiy municipal court. Ilyina
alleges that the Church psychologically damaged her daughter,
Yekaterina Ilyina. Jehovah's Witnesses lawyer Artur Leontyev said that
he believes that the anticult group Committee for Family and
Personality and also self-described ``sectomania'' expert and Moscow
psychiatrist Fedor Kondratyev are behind the case. The Committee for
Family and Personality filed a lawsuit against the Church in 1997 on
the same grounds, but the Frunzenskiy court ruled in April 1998 that
the Church had not in any way harmed Yekaterina Ilyina, whose mental
disability existed well before she began attending services.
The Khakasiya and Yaroslavl cases form the basis of the
constitutional challenge to the law on religion, filed with the
Constitutional Court in May 1998 by the NGO, the Institute for Religion
and Law. The petition challenges the constitutionality of the law's 15-
year requirement and its limitations on the rights and activities of
confessions that do not meet that requirement. The Constitutional Court
accepted the case for review in November 1998. On November 23, the
Constitutional Court upheld the provision of the religion law that
requires religious organizations to prove 15 years of existence in the
country in order to be registered. However, the Court also ruled that
religious organizations that were registered before the passage of the
1997 religion law are not required to prove 15 years' existence in the
country in order to be registered. The Court also upheld the right of
the Government to place certain limits on the activity of religious
groups in the interests of national security.
Human rights activists contend that only 15 percent of actual
violations of religious freedom are reported. According to various
sources, most citizens, especially those living in the regions, are
still skeptical about the protection of religious freedom and are
reluctant to assert their rights due to fear of retaliation. Federal
authorities did not take sufficient action to reverse discriminatory
actions taken at the local level, or to discipline those officials
responsible. Federal authorities and Moscow human rights activists
often have limited information about what is happening in the regions.
The Vanino Baptist Church and its pastor, Dan Pollard, since March
1998 have fought a lengthy legal battle over registration in the Far
Eastern region of Khabarovsk and obtaining the necessary permits for
Pollard, or his temporary replacement Arthur Bristol, to remain in the
country. Khabarovsk authorities maintained that the Baptist Church did
not meet the 1997 religion law's requirement of over 15 years of
existence and therefore could not be a sponsoring religious
organization. To facilitate reregistration of the Vanino Baptist Church
under the 1997 law, the Vanino Baptist Church and its lawyer negotiated
an agreement to join the Russian Baptist Union. However, the Church's
funding problems, as well as doctrinal differences, ultimately
precluded this arrangement. In May Pollard was refused a visa to return
to the country. Bristol left in September 1998, reportedly due to
harassment, surveillance, and threats.
The Moscow procurator general and approximately 70 members of the
FSB, Federal Tax Police, and local police raided two locations of the
Church of Scientology in Moscow on February 25. According to church
officials, the authorities confiscated documents, including tax records
and priest-penitent privileged counseling records. The raids continued
over 3 days. The tax police say that they are investigating possible
tax evasion and other financial irregularities. Although there were
earlier press reports that two church members were beaten, Western
diplomats received no confirmation of this incident. On October 6, a
Moscow district court revoked the operating license of a social center
affiliated with the Church of Scientology because mistakes were made
allegedly in the center's license application materials in 1993.
Officials for the center acknowledge the mistake, but insist that it
was corrected a few years ago; they intend to appeal the decision. The
ruling was made under the law on social organizations (not the 1997
religion law) and does not appear to affect directly the functioning of
the Church of Scientology. However, church officials believe that the
ruling is part of a broader attack on the Church and its activities.
The Church of Scientology is seeking to reregister both its social
organization and its religious organization.
According to press reports, in April the Stavropol procuracy
expelled eight foreign citizens for spreading Islamic fundamentalism,
which it labeled ``Wahhabism.'' Most of the expellees reportedly were
from Syria.
Property disputes are some of the most frequent complaints cited by
religious groups. For the most part synagogues, churches, and mosques
have been returned to communities to be used for religious services.
The Federal Government has met the requirements of the 1993
presidential decree on communal property restitution, and the decree
continues to guide the ongoing process. According to statistics from
the Ministry of State Property, over 2,000 federally owned properties
have been returned to religious communities since 1989. However,
jurisdiction in most cases is at the regional level, and there is no
centralized source of information on these cases. One Ministry of
Culture official responsible for restitution of religious historical
monuments estimated early in the year that over 3,600 transfers of
religious buildings had occurred at the regional level, and that
approximately 30 percent of property designated for return has been
transferred back to its original owners at both the federal and
regional levels. Nonetheless, there continue to be reports of religious
property that has not been returned. For example, the Church of the
Immaculate Conception in Ryazan still has not been returned to the
local Catholic community. The Moscow Patriarchate has claimed and taken
possession of properties owned by other branches of Orthodoxy and, in
certain cases, property of other religions. In some property disputes,
religious buildings have been ``privatized,'' and there are long delays
in finding new locations for the current occupants, as required by law.
Local authorities often refuse to get involved in property disputes,
which they contend are between private organizations. Even where state
or municipal authorities still have undisputed control of properties, a
number of religious communities continue to meet significant obstacles
when they request the return of religious buildings or when they seek
to acquire land and necessary building permits for new religious
structures. Since February local authorities in Omsk have not responded
to the Mormons' request to lease land, although local church leaders
were continuing their efforts to locate a site.
Some Protestant faiths have suggested that the Russian Orthodox
Church influences the Government regarding land allocated for churches
of other sects. The Jewish community, which has met with some success
on communal property restitution, faces the same obstacles as other
religious communities and has concerns about the return of Torah
scrolls, many of which are in state museum collections.
In its preamble (which government officials insist has no legal
standing), the 1997 religion law recognizes the ``special contribution
of Orthodoxy to the history of Russia and to the establishment and
development of Russia's spirituality and culture.'' It accords
``respect'' to Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and certain
other religions as an inseparable part of the country's historical
heritage. Russian Orthodoxy is considered in conservative nationalist
circles as the de facto official religion of the country. Many Russians
firmly believe that at least nominal adherence to the Russian Orthodox
Church is at the heart of what it means to be Russian.
The Russian Orthodox Church was involved actively in drafting the
1997 law on religion. It has made special arrangements with government
agencies to conduct religious education and to provide spiritual
counseling to Russian military service members. These arrangements do
not appear to be available to other religions. (In particular, Muslim
religious leaders have complained that they are not permitted to
minister to Muslim military service members.) The head of the Moscow
Patriarchate, the Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, participates in
most high-level official events and appears to have direct access to
and influence with officials of the executive branch. The traditional
view that Russian soil is an exclusively ``Orthodox domain'' leads to
frequent criticism and intolerance of foreign religious groups that
proselytize in the country. Many Orthodox Church officials condemn such
``sheep stealing'' when practiced by other Christian churches. Even
well-established foreign religious organizations have been
characterized by the Orthodox leadership as ``dangerous and destructive
sects.''
The Independent Psychiatric Association of Russia, along with
several human rights organizations, has criticized the use of
psychiatry in ``deprogramming'' victims of ``totalitarian sects.'' In
such cases, authorities use pseudo-psychological and spiritual
techniques to ``treat'' persons who had been members of new religious
groups (see Section 1.c.).
St. Petersburg authorities arbitrarily detained six Scientologists
for psychiatric evaluation. In January in St. Petersburg, Vladimir
Tretyak, leader of Sentuar (the local branch of the Church of
Scientology), was accused by St. Petersburg chief psychiatrist Larisa
Rubina of inflicting psychological damage on his coreligionists.
Beginning June 17, six members of Sentuar--Mikhail Dvorkin, Igor
Zakrayev, Irina Shamarina, Svetlana Kruglova, Svetlana Pastushenkova
and Lyudmila Urzhumtseva--were hospitalized forcibly and underwent 3
weeks of criminal psychiatric investigation by order of Boris Larionov,
procurator of the Vyborgskiy administrative district of St. Petersburg.
In televised remarks, Rubina reported their July 8 release and declared
the six mentally competent. Rubina referred to the six as ``the
accused'', despite the fact they were only witnesses in the criminal
case against Tretyak.
Although Jews and Muslims continue to encounter prejudice and
societal discrimination (see Section 5), they generally have not been
inhibited by the authorities in the free practice of their religion.
Other religions, including Buddhism and Shamanism, are practiced in
specific localities where they are rooted in local traditions.
Following anti-Semitic remarks made by Communist Party leaders in
late 1998, President Yeltsin has spoken out repeatedly against anti-
Semitic and extremist attitudes. The Presidential Administration, the
Government, and, in particular, the Russian media reacted immediately
to the Communist Party's expressions of anti-Semitism. Communist Party
leaders accused the press of conducting a smear campaign and threatened
retribution. A December 16, 1998 presidential statement delivered to
the Duma declared that ``any attempt to insult ethnic groups, to limit
the rights of citizens on the basis of origin, will be stopped in
accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Russian
Federation.'' On December 30, 1998, Yeltsin ordered cabinet officials
responsible for law enforcement issues to prepare a comprehensive
federal program against political and religious extremism by March 1.
On February 20, during a speech to the ``Movement for the Support
of the Army'' in Novocherkassk, Duma Deputy and retired General Albert
Makashov made anti-Semitic remarks, following his notable anti-Semitic
statements in the second half of 1998. He reportedly made the comment,
among others, that ``We will be anti-Semites and must be victorious.''
Following the speech, the Rostov regional procurator refused to take
action against Makashov.
During a March meeting with a delegation from the Anti-Defamation
League, then-Prime Minister Primakov publicly promised strong
government action and new legislation to combat anti-Semitism and
extremism, including new draft legislation. Later that month the
Procurator General announced that he would press a criminal case
against Makashov for his repeated openly anti-Semitic public remarks.
However, Makashov cannot be prosecuted unless the Duma votes to lift
his parliamentary immunity. In April the Ministry of Justice concluded
that the Communist Party itself did not violate the law, since the
statements of its members did not reflect the objectives of the party.
The Federal Government states that it has moved forward on its
promised initiatives against extremism and anti-Semitism. In November
1998, the Duma adopted a resolution against public statements damaging
to interethnic relations in the country. In March the Government
presented to the Duma a draft law on combating political extremism and
also is drafting a law on national extremism, although by year's end
the Duma did not pass the law. The Duma is considering a draft law
forbidding ``Nazi symbols and literature.'' Separately, the Procurator
General sent to regional procurators in January instructions to cut off
distribution of any literature or printed material depicting Nazi
symbols, and a letter describing the Moscow city procurator's
experience in combating political extremism. The Government also states
that, in implementing the presidential decree on extremism, it
conducted interagency consultations, beginning in June and continuing
on a quarterly basis, which involve the presidential administration,
the judiciary, law enforcement organs, and experts from outside the
Government. A government review of the implementation of existing laws
against acts of national, racial, and religious hatred revealed that 25
criminal investigations were conducted in 1998, and that in 1999 10
were opened by June. Also, the Moscow city duma adopted a law
forbidding the distribution and display of Nazi symbols in May, and the
Moscow regional duma passed similar legislation in June. However, on
September 2 the Nezavisimaya Gazeta newspaper reported that Moscow
oblast governor Anatoliy Tyazhlov refused to sign the law, saying that
the draft law not only threatened artistic and academic freedom of
expression, but also freedom of religion, as swastikas are displayed by
some religious groups. Regional duma members are working to redraft the
law.
Another prominent public figure who regularly engaged in anti-
Semitic remarks was Krasnodar region governor Nikolay Kondratenko. The
governor's public speeches in the region often contain crude anti-
Semitic remarks and stereotypes and blame Jews and alleged Jewish
conspiracies for the country's problems. For example, Kondratenko has
said that the essence of Russian history is the Russian battle against
Jewish domination. He has blamed ``Zionists'' for the war in Chechnya,
for the destruction of the Communist Party, for attacks on the Russian
Orthodox Church, and for introducing homosexuality in the country. In
addition, there have been credible reports that Kondratenko has urged
the firing of Jewish public employees in the region.
A report issued in October 1997 by the human rights group Memorial
criticized Krasnodar government officials for ``encouraging radical
nationalist groups,'' including the Cossacks, and ``indirectly inciting
them to violence'' against ethnic minority groups in the area. Local
government authorities have sanctioned patrols by Cossack paramilitary
groups in the name of law enforcement. Such groups are not publicly
accountable, and their activities have resulted in abuses (see Section
5).
After his 1996 election, Kondratenko adopted a new regional charter
that declares Krasnodar kray the ``place of residence for the (ethnic)
Russian people.'' He appointed Cossack ``hetman'' Vladimir Gromov as
deputy governor of the region. In April 1997, Kondratenko and Gromov
issued a resolution making Cossack groups subordinate to the regional
government instead of to the State, according to the Center for Human
Rights Advocacy (see Section 5). The Center reported that President
Yeltsin suspended this resolution in September 1997 on the grounds that
it was unconstitutional.
Federal and Dagestani authorities stepped up their pressure on what
they label as the republic's ``Wahhabi'' Muslim community. After an
incursion on August 7 by Chechen-backed Islamist guerrillas, Dagestan
president Magomedali Magomedov declared that his government would take
a harder line against ``Wahhabism.'' In September Dagestan's parliament
passed legislation that outlawed ``Wahhabi'' groups and other
organizations it considered extremist (see Section 2.b.). The Keston
News Service reports that government and religious officials in several
Dagestani districts have wrecked conservative Islamic mosques,
suppressed religious broadcasts, and harassed local conservative
Islamic communities. According to press reports, federal and Dagestani
forces have followed up their initial counterinsurgency efforts with
attacks on Muslim villages that they consider to be ``Wahhabi'' and
that refuse to register their communities and turn in their weapons.
On February 3, Chechen president Maskhadov declared Shari'a
(Islamic law) to be in effect in the republic of Chechnya. Maskhadov
signed several decrees stipulating that all local legislation be
brought into line with the Koran and Shari'a regulations. Maskhadov
ordered the Chechen legislature and the Council of Muftis to draft a
Shari'a constitution within 1 month's time. The legislature also was
stripped of its legislative functions and on February 10 was replaced
with a 34-member shura that has responsibility for ``consulting'' with
the republic's president. The Shura includes several prominent
opposition leaders. According to one expert, the Shura created in
Chechnya is not a traditional Muslim shura run by religious men, but
instead is a council of military men. Maskhadov's action apparently was
a political response to pressure from Islamist rivals (see Sections
1.e. and 3).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides citizens with
the right to choose their place of residence freely; however, some
regional governments continue to restrict this right through
residential registration rules that closely resemble the Soviet-era
``propiska'' (pass) regulations. Although the rules, which came into
effect at the beginning of 1996, were touted as a notification device
rather than a control system, their application has produced many of
the same results as the propiska system.
Although citizens are free to travel within the country, the
Government also imposes registration requirements on domestic travel.
All adults are issued internal passports, which they must carry while
traveling and use to register with local authorities for visits of more
than 3 days (in Moscow it is 24 hours). However, travelers not staying
in hotels usually ignore this requirement.
Citizens must register to live and work in a specific area within 7
days of moving there. Russian citizens changing residence within the
country, as well as citizens of former Soviet republics who decide to
move to Russia, often face enormous difficulties or simply are not
permitted to register in some cities. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and refugee rights NGO's have cited
Stavropol, Krasnodar, Moscow, and St. Petersburg as being the least
open to migrants. The UNHCR reports that the cost of registration is no
longer prohibitive. Permanent registration costs only $0.30 (8 rubles).
Temporary registration is available for periods ranging from 45 days to
6 months and costs $0.16 (4 rubles and 18 kopeks) regardless of the
length of stay.
While federal law provides for education for all children in the
country, regional authorities frequently deny access to schools to the
children of unregistered persons, asylum seekers, and migrants because
they lack residential registration. Similarly, while the Moscow
procurator's office has upheld the right of migrants to receive
publicly available medical care, unregistered persons, migrants, and
asylum seekers frequently are denied these services.
The Government and residents of Moscow and other large cities
defend registration as necessary in order to control crime, to keep
crowded urban areas from attracting even more inhabitants, and to gain
revenue.
The city of Moscow frequently is cited by NGO's for violating the
rights of nonresidents and ethnic minorities, as well as the rights of
those legitimately seeking asylum.
Mayor Luzhkov has been quoted in the past as calling for the
expulsion from Moscow of Chechens and other persons from the Caucasus.
Moscow police, particularly special duty OMON units, conduct frequent
document checks, particularly of persons who are dark-skinned or who
appear to be from the Caucasus or elsewhere. Such checks on many
occasions have involved police entering residences without warrants.
There are many credible reports that police have fined unregistered
persons in excess of legal requirements and have not provided proper
documentation of the fine. According to Human Rights Watch, it is not
unusual for darker-skinned persons to be stopped at random and for
officers to solicit bribes from those without residence permits.
Mayor Luzhkov signed a resolution in 1996 ordering the deportation
of all unregistered persons living in Moscow back to the place where
they last were registered to live. Estimates on the number of
unregistered persons living in Moscow range from 300,000 to 1.5 million
(Moscow has 8.7 million registered residents.) Moscow city authorities
have released no figures on the number of individuals who have departed
``voluntarily'' from Moscow but readily admit that some 20,000 to
25,000 annually are deported against their will. This procedure
consists of being taken to special shelters, checked for criminal
records, then escorted 100 to 150 kilometers out of town. The
authorities complain that these deportations are only temporary
measures because deportees steadily find their way back to Moscow. At
year's end, the resolution was still in effect, and the practice, which
police reportedly use to extort money, continues.
In connection with the bomb explosions in August and September,
which Moscow officials attributed to terrorists from the Northern
Caucasus, Mayor Luzhkov issued an ordinance on September 13 requiring
all temporary residents in Moscow since January 1 to reregister within
3 days with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Reportedly 74,000
temporary residents sought reregistration, of whom approximately 15,500
persons were refused. In order to reregister, residents had to
demonstrate a legitimate place of work, payment of city taxes, and a
legal place of residence. Moscow authorities also restricted the
arrival of new residents to the city and increased road checks and
checks in train stations and marketplaces for these new arrivals. Law
enforcement officials conducted searches of 26,500 apartments, 180
hotels, 415 guest houses, and 548 nightclubs and cafes. Human rights
NGO's claim that authorities detained some 2,000 persons and expelled
some 500 from Moscow (See Section 1.d.).
In August the press reported the story of an amputee named Yuriy
Polyakov, who, along with 14 other homeless men, was rounded up by
Moscow police and dropped off outside the city limits at the town dump.
One homeless man died as he tried to return to Moscow. Polyakov, who
has no legs, attempted to drag himself to the nearest train station and
was later hospitalized with infected leg stumps. A municipal procurator
and the police reportedly are reviewing the incident to determine
whether charges should be pressed against the officers involved.
Doctors Without Borders blamed the incident on Luzhkov's 1996
resolution.
Similar complaints were made in St. Petersburg during the year.
NGO's estimate that the number of homeless persons in St. Petersburg is
anywhere from 12,000 to 3 times that number. The city offers few
services and little support for the homeless, although a 70-bed shelter
is planned. Press reports have claimed since the summer of 1998 that
city police, acting on orders from governor Yakovlev, have been
rounding up homeless persons from train stations, taking them outside
the city limits, and abandoning them in remote, forested areas.
According to press reports, in Krasnoyarsk law enforcement
officials began stricter enforcement of passport and visa regulation
after violence broke out between two Azerbaijani groups in April. The
authorities detained some 400 persons, and of the group, 40 were
arrested for violations of passport regulations. The Moscow Helskinki
Group's (MHG) human rights report, which was published in September,
highlighted restrictions placed by the authorities on Meskheti Turks.
During 1989-90 some 90,000 Meskhetians were forced by ethnic conflicts
to leave the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan. An estimated 60,000
Meskhetians remain in the Russian Federation. More than 13,000 of them
settled in Krasnodar kray, and approximately 700 settled in the
Kabardino-Balkarian republic. Authorities in both regions have denied
the Meskhetians recognition of their Russian Federation citizenship.
According to the provisions of the Constitution, all Meskhetians who
were residing in the country at the time of the collapse of the Soviet
Union are entitled to citizenship. In violation of the Constitution,
authorities in Krasnodar kray and the Karbardino-Balkarian republic
deny the Meskhetians the right to register, and this denial deprives
them of all rights of citizenship. According to press reports, the
13,000 Meskhetian Turks living in Krasnodar, like other ethnic
minorities, are subject to special registration restrictions, for
example, having to register as a ``guest'' every 45 days at a cost of
$12 (180 rubles) or to pay a $27 (400 ruble) fine every time that they
are stopped by local police officers and Cossack irregulars. According
to the MHG, in May 1998 Krasnodar kray authorities initiated an attempt
to compel Meskhetians to emigrate to Turkey. By September 1998, it was
believed that almost 90 families left the region for Turkey.
In February 1998, the Constitutional Court again addressed the
issue, declaring unconstitutional the most restrictive aspects of the
propiska system. It ruled that a city may only ``certify the act of the
free expression of the will of a citizen'' to live there. The city
could not ``grant permission'' or limit where persons choose to live,
nor could it dictate how long a person could live in a particular
place. However, Moscow mayor Luzhkov stated in a March 1998 television
interview that he was refusing to implement the Court's decision. He
announced that he had instructed the city's police to continue to
enforce the old registration regulations.
Luzhkov's actions were clearly illegal, as the Constitution states
that the Constitutional Court's rulings are final and mandatory for all
state officials. In July 1998, the Supreme Court made a ruling that
repealed both temporary and permanent residence permits. Nevertheless,
Moscow city authorities have made clear their intention to oppose the
ruling and, by the end of 1998, seemed to have persuaded the Federal
Government that Moscow merits an exception to such decrees. The federal
authorities have demonstrated little enthusiasm for enforcing the court
rulings. However, the Moscow city regulations have had little if any
impact on the numbers of such persons in Moscow.
Despite constitutional rulings, many local governments have been
resistant and continue to enact regulations that introduce additional
registration requirements. For example, the city of Moscow has shown a
high level of inventiveness in circumventing Constitutional Court
rulings. Following a February 2, 1998 ruling, the city enacted rules
that would not allow officials to refuse citizen registration. However,
the new rules retain a feature that ties registration to the size of
housing and requires the consent of all those registered in an
apartment or house. Basically, as during the Soviet period, only
members of the owner's family can move in. Without consent the
application would not be considered complete. It would not be refused,
nor would it be accepted. Other large cities facing high population
influx and migrant pressures retain similar restrictive regimes.
The Constitution provides all citizens with the right to emigrate.
The Government imposes nominal emigration taxes, fees, and duties. On
average, it takes 3 months to process a passport application, although
it can take much longer if documentation is needed from elsewhere in
the former Soviet Union.
Some liberal principles regarding emigration procedures were
codified formally in the August 1996 law on exit from and entry into
the country. This law abolished the old Soviet requirement that, in
order to emigrate, citizens must receive a stamp permitting ``permanent
residence abroad'' (PMZh)--essentially a propiska for those living
outside the country. The law required the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
through its Office of Visas and Registration (OVIR), to establish
regulations for eliminating this practice within 6 months of the
passage of the law. However, as of September, implementation of the law
(which was to go into effect early in 1997) is still incomplete:
according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), border
guards continue to require a PMZh-like stamp of all emigrants, and the
passport control agency OVIR continues to issue it.
Another feature of the law is the codification of the legal grounds
for denying foreign travel documents to citizens who had access to
state secrets. Under the new law, access to such classified material
can occur only with the consent of the citizen, established in the form
of a written contract that states that the signatory understands that
he has been given access to state secrets and that his ability to
travel abroad may be restricted. The law envisions a maximum period of
delay under normal circumstances of 5 years, and it grants the
interagency Commission on Secrecy the right to add an additional 5-year
term to the period of delay if the Commission finds that a person had
access to particularly sensitive materials. This latter provision has
raised serious concerns among human rights advocates who monitor
arbitrary and excessive powers on the part of the Government to
restrict foreign travel. However, there were no reports that the
provision was applied in a restrictive manner.
If a citizen had access to classified material, police and FSB
clearances are necessary to receive an external passport. Persons
denied travel documents on secrecy grounds can appeal the decision to
an interagency commission chaired by the First Deputy Foreign Minister
(until his promotion in September 1998 to Foreign Minister, this was
Igor Ivanov--hence the commission commonly is referred to as ``the
Ivanov Commission''). The Ivanov Commission cannot rule on whether the
material should or should not be classified, but it can rule on the
legality of travel restrictions imposed and on whether or not the
traveler actually had access to materials requiring a travel
restriction. Since it was established in 1994, the Ivanov Commission
has granted travel permission to approximately 90 percent of
appellants.
Other grounds for denial of the right to travel abroad are military
conscription or assignment to civilian alternative service (although in
fact the Duma has failed to pass legislation implementing the
constitutionally provided right to civilian alternative service), being
under investigation for or serving a sentence for a crime, evasion of a
court-ordered obligation, or providing false information on a passport
application. The requirement that citizens satisfy obligations to
immediate relatives, such as material support for parents, has been
eliminated except for court-ordered obligations, such as alimony
payments. In May the Ministry of Foreign Affairs annulled the passport
of former Procurator General Skuratov for technical reasons, according
to press reports. During the year, Skuratov was engaged in an extended
battle with the Presidential Administration over allegations of
corruption in the administration. According to officials in the
Ministry of Internal Affairs visa department, legislation on
restricting the right to leave the country does not apply to Skuratov
because he is only a witness and was not formally charged or arrested
himself.
Emigrants who have resettled permanently abroad have been able to
visit or repatriate without hindrance. However, visiting emigrants who
departed without first obtaining a PMZh stamp have been stopped at the
border and prevented from departing the country (though they may enter
without difficulty), as they could present neither a nonimmigrant visa
to another country nor evidence of permission to reside legally abroad.
The Supreme Court in August 1998 overturned two Soviet-era
regulations that limited the movement of foreigners within the country.
The Court stated that foreigners no longer have to notify police before
traveling to another part of the country. In addition, the Court ruled
that organizations and private citizens no longer have to report the
visits of traveling foreigners. However, the Court left standing the
threat of deportations for foreigners who violate registration
regulations. Starting in October 1998, the Foreign Ministry no longer
required that Russian visas list the cities that foreigners are allowed
to visit, and this change has been implemented in practice. President
Yeltsin had signed a decree in 1997 that permitted foreigners to move
freely around the country regardless of which cities were listed on
their visas. However, a few local officials continued to enforce the
visa limitation, sometimes denying entrance to foreigners--including
missionaries--they considered undesirable. The Federal Government at
times intervenes in cases of local noncompliance but only on a case-by-
case basis.
Ingush president Ruslan Aushev issued an official protest early in
July on behalf of ethnic Ingush refugees trying to return to the
Prigorodnyy district of North Ossetia. Up to 70,000 Ingush refugees
fled the Prigorodnyy and Vladikavkaz areas in 1992, when inter-ethnic
fighting broke out between Ossetian and Ingush inhabitants. According
to Russian media reports, just over 10,000 of the refugees have been
able to return so far. According to a June report by the Ingush branch
of the human rights group Memorial, ethnic Ingush refugees have faced
systematic harassment while trying to return to the Prigorodnyy
district (see Section 1.c.).
The Government's indiscriminate use of force in Chechnya resulted
in a very large number of internally displaced persons. Up to 200,000
persons were displaced, the vast majority of whom sought refuge in
Ingushetiya (see Section 1.g.). By year's end, the Government with the
assistance of international organizations appeared to have provided for
most of the basic needs of internally displaced persons in Ingushetiya.
At various points during the conflict in Chechnya during the fall,
authorities restricted the movement of refugees fleeing Chechnya. In
late October human rights groups reported that IDP's from Chechnya were
not being permitted to move from Ingushetiya to North Ossetia.
According to the Russian press, some displaced persons were being
transported by bus back to parts of Chechnya that were under Russian
government control. On November 3, Russian forces opened a crossing on
the Chechnya-Ingushetiya border and allowed approximately 3,500 persons
to enter. Thousands of refugees had been stranded for more than 1 week
at the border, where reportedly a line of refugees stretched almost 12
miles. Refugees at the border had been living in the open, often
without access to food or water (see Section 1.g.).
Human rights NGO's and press organizations reported in mid-December
that federal and republic authorities were pressuring refugees to
return from Ingushetiya to Chechnya. According to these reports,
government officials singled out persons from Chechen towns and
districts that were designated as ``safe'' by the Government. According
to some accounts, refugee camp administrators announced that persons
from these areas would no longer receive food rations. Human rights NGO
observers and refugees reported that government authorities without
warning moved up to 40 train wagons that were housing refugees from the
Sputnik camp in Ingushetiya to the Chechen town of Sernovodsk on
December 17 and 18. After international criticism of these actions,
government officials publicly said that they would not pressure or
compel refugees to return to Chechnya. At the same time, authorities
consistently announced their determination to repatriate all refugees
back to Chechnya as soon as possible.
The Government cooperates to a limited extent with the UNHCR and
the IOM. Both organizations assist the Government in developing a
humane migration management system; this includes effective and fair
refugee status determination procedures. As of July 31, the UNHCR had
registered 36,000 asylum seekers who originated from outside the
territories of the former Soviet Union (1,163 were registered in the
period from January 1 to July 31). The UNHCR estimates that only 13,000
of these are active cases, i.e., persons still seeking asylum or
receiving UNHCR assistance. The remainder either have integrated into
Russian society, left the country, or have been resettled or
repatriated.
According to the UNHCR, as of the end of October, the Government
had granted since 1993 refugee status to only 491 persons from outside
the former Soviet Union (including the Baltic states); all but 17 of
those individuals were from Afghanistan. By contrast, the comparable
figure for former citizens of the Soviet Union (mainly ethnic Russians)
who were granted refugee status by the Federal Migration Service (FMS)
is 98,188. The Government acts more expeditiously for the latter group
and applies a more lenient standard.
In July 1997, President Yeltsin signed the federal law Concerning
Changes and Additions to the Law of the Russian Federation Concerning
Refugees. This law offers substantially fewer benefits to refugees than
the original 1993 law it replaced. The earlier law's fairly generous
commitments of integration and social assistance for refugees had been
cited by some observers as discouraging the FMS, which has few
resources to meet this obligation, from adjudicating the cases of
asylum seekers. With the passage of the new law, the FMS had been
expected to expedite its procedures for adjudicating asylum claims.
However, this did not occur. In the first 8 months of the year, the FMS
recognized 68 asylum seekers from countries outside the former Soviet
Union; all but 2 of these persons were from Afghanistan. The UNHCR
reported that the FMS still was declining to grant refugee status to
qualified individuals, based on its decision that such persons were not
refugees. However, the FMS decision making process is considered to be
flawed by many NGO's, and UNHCR officials consider many of those
refused to be in fact refugees.
Despite some progress by the regional branches of the FMS in
adjudicating nonformer Soviet Union asylum claims, there are still
major concerns about the ability and willingness of the Moscow office
to process asylum seekers from outside the former Soviet Union. Human
rights organizations claim that this lack of progress is part of
intentional efforts by the authorities to rid the city of foreign
asylum seekers. Local legislation in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Rostov,
and other major population centers prohibits the settlement of refugees
within these cities.
According to the NGO Civil Assistance Committee, involuntarily
displaced persons and asylum seekers suffer the greatest difficulties
in cities with restrictive registration regulations. Their migrant
registration documents generally are not recognized by the MVD
officials who control registration. They often are subject to
harassment, unauthorized detention, and the payment of bribes.
There were unconfirmed reports that the FMS has attempted to have
asylum seekers unwittingly sign an ``application form'', supposedly to
extend the validity of their registration documents but which instead
renounces their claims for asylum in the country.
A large number of workers and students from Africa and Asia, who
came to work or study in accordance with treaties between their
countries and the former Soviet Union, remain in the country. The
Government has not deported them but encourages their return home.
Their numbers have increased in recent years due to the recent arrival
of persons seeking refugee status.
The UNHCR and Amnesty International are working with the FMS and
border officials to ensure that interviews of potential refugees are
conducted in a timely fashion, that the UNHCR is allowed access to
potential refugees in airport transit lounges, and that deportations of
potential refugees are delayed until cases are adjudicated. Part of the
problem is widespread ignorance of refugee law. To remedy this problem,
FMS officials, lawyers, and judges also are participating in training
sponsored by the UNHCR, the European Union's Technical Assistance for
the Commonwealth of Independent States program, and the Council of
Europe. However, according to the UNHCR, the Government lacks the
political will to grant refugee status and provide a durable solution
for asylum seekers.
The situation of asylum seekers and refugees at Moscow's
Sheremetyevo-2 Airport continues to be of major concern to the UNHCR.
Improperly documented passengers are deported systematically, including
persons who demonstrated a well-founded fear of persecution in their
countries of origin. If a passenger announces that he or she wants
asylum, Aeroflot gives out telephone numbers for the FMS and the UNHCR,
but these numbers are not posted publicly anywhere in the transit zone.
Despite repeated UNHCR recommendations, there are also no signs in the
transit area to advise asylum seekers about the refugee status
determination process at the airport. Undocumented travelers are not
allowed to leave the transit zone and often are returned to the carrier
on which they entered the country. Legally bound to provide food and
emergency medical care for undocumented travelers, the airline returns
them to their point of departure as quickly as possible. (Airlines are
fined if an undocumented passenger is admitted to Russia, but not if
returned to the country of origin.) Human rights organizations allege
that Aeroflot deports hundreds of asylum seekers. Until December 1998,
the FMS Point of Immigration Control (PIC), whose officials are
responsible for processing requests for refugee status, was located
outside of the transit zone, where asylum seekers were unable to reach
it. The PIC now has a fully-equipped office inside the transit zone,
which UNHCR staff also are permitted to use.
The PIC interviews almost exclusively persons referred to it by the
UNHCR. According to the UNHCR, the process is not fair or effective; as
of the end of 1998, the PIC had not yet rendered any decisions in favor
of asylum seekers. As of late 1998, 82 percent of asylum seekers who
managed to contact the UNHCR were deported before the FMS made a
determination of refugee status. The actual number of deportees is
presumed to be higher, as many asylum seekers did not have an
opportunity to contact either the FMS or the UNHCR.
Treatment of asylum seekers in the transit zone can be harsh. The
UNHCR has received reports of physical and verbal abuse of transit
passengers by police officers and Aeroflot employees. Authorities
rarely release passengers from the transit zone, unless there is a
medical emergency. The UNHCR documented one case in early 1998 in which
a woman and a baby, who nearly died, were hospitalized after their
second month spent sleeping on the floor of the poorly-heated transit
zone. The UNHCR was prohibited access to the transit hotel until May
1997 and was allowed only one subsequent visit. The UNHCR reports that
up to 28 passengers are detained in 9 rooms behind an iron door and
barred windows. The average stay in the transit hotel is 2 weeks.
In 1998 and 1999, the UNHCR continued to have occasional problems
obtaining access to visit asylum seekers in the airport's transit zone,
and, with the exception of two visits, was denied regular access to the
transit hotel. Access to transit hotel passengers often is granted to
the UNHCR only hours before deportation, which does not give the UNHCR
or the FMS an adequate opportunity to assess the case.
Armenians evacuated from Baku in the wake of late 1980's ethnic
violence are recognized as refugees, although their credentials require
annual renewal. The vast majority of those evacuated either have
emigrated from Russia or found some way to live in the country.
However, a group of about 1,400 to 2,000 still are housed in the
``temporary quarters'' assigned after the evacuation, usually in Moscow
hotels or workers' dormitories in the greater Moscow area. They are
unable to return to Azerbaijan and are not accepted by Armenia. Since
they lack residency permits for Moscow, they cannot apply legally for
work and effectively are denied the ability to register their children
for public schooling. They have been invited to apply for Russian
citizenship, which would entitle them to the benefits accorded to
Russian forced migrants, but representatives of the community have
stated that they do not believe such a step would improve their
situation materially (although such a step would allow them to
establish legal residence, seek work, and apply for benefits such as
foreign travel passports). They also have rejected offers of relocation
to other regions of the country, because they allege that the
alternative residences that they are offered frequently are not
habitable, still are occupied by others, or simply do not exist. Their
situation remains precarious as the formerly state-owned hotels in
which many reside are privatized and the new owners exert financial and
other pressure on them to depart. A number of eviction orders already
have been served in such cases. The courts are required legally to
appoint a new residence, but have been uneven in meeting this
requirement. According to Human Rights Watch, on August 24,
representatives of the Baku Armenian community met with FMS Director
Vladimir Kalamanov, who promised that they would be issued residence
permits and apartments within 3 months. Activists and refugees were
unanimously skeptical of this promise. In an August 31 follow-up
meeting, the FMS agreed to explore housing options with the mayor's
office.
The Constitution states that the Russian Federation does not permit
the extradition to other states of persons who would be persecuted
there for their political beliefs or for actions (or inaction) that are
not considered a crime in the Russian Federation. However, according to
press reports and the UNHCR, in December the Government deported seven
North Korean refugees to China, in an apparent violation of the Refugee
Convention. The Government of China reportedly returned the seven to
North Korea. Moreover, in the past there were instances in which
opposition figures were deported to countries of the former Soviet
Union to face charges that were political in nature. Under the 1993
Commonwealth of Independent States Convention on Legal Assistance in
Civil, Family, and Criminal Affairs, persons with outstanding warrants
can be detained for periods of up to 1 month while the Procurator
General investigates the nature of outstanding charges against the
detainee. This system is reinforced informally but effectively by
collegial links among senior law enforcement and security officials in
the various republics of the former Soviet Union. Human rights groups
allege that this network is employed to detain opposition figures from
the other former Soviet republics without actual legal grounds.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
The Federal Assembly is composed of two chambers. The lower
chamber, the State Duma, consists of 450 deputies, half elected in
single-mandate constituencies, half by party lists. Approximately 26
political parties and movements participated in the December 19 Duma
elections. The upper chamber, the Federation Council, has 178 members--
the 89 chief executives of regional administrations and the 89
chairpersons of regional legislatures, all of whom are elected.
Regional parliamentary speakers are elected popularly to their seats,
then elected to the speakership by their colleagues. The Constitution
provides the President and the Prime Minister with substantial powers,
which they used to dominate most areas of administration and day-to-day
policy making and to limit the independence of the judicial branch.
However, the opposition of a majority in the Duma has checked
administration initiatives in a number of areas, including basic
changes in property ownership and legal reform.
A democratic election for the President of the Russian Federation
took place in 1996 for the first time in the history of Russia as an
independent state. President Yeltsin was reelected in a generally free
and fair election. Presidential elections are scheduled for March 2000,
as a result of President Yeltsin's December 31 resignation.
On March 30, President Yeltsin signed the law On the Basic
Guarantees of Electoral Rights and the Right of Citizens to Participate
in a Referendum (Voting Rights Act) and the federal law on public
associations. These amendments clarify which political public
associations may participate in elections; add restrictions on
preferential media coverage, donations, and financial or material
support from foreign entities for campaign-related activities;
introduce measures to reduce the number of noncompetitive political
parties and candidates on the ballot, such as financial deposits and
other financial penalties, alongside signature-collection provisions;
increase the level of information available to voters about candidates'
financial and criminal history; introduce provisions allowing
multicandidate constituencies; and add other provisions affecting
federal-level and regional-level elections and referendums. Despite
stricter rules regarding financing and reporting, the new law did not
diminish the importance of money in the December Duma elections.
Changes to the Voting Rights Act affect legislation on both the
federal and regional levels of the Russian Federation. The regionally
oriented Federation Council continued to express its dislike for the
level of detail in the law, but its veto was overridden by the State
Duma in September 1997. In June 1998, the Constitutional Court ruled
against a complaint brought by the Federation Council that alleged that
the Voting Rights Act contradicts the Federal Constitution by not
allowing the regions the right to adapt electoral procedures unique to
their situations. The Constitutional Court also is expected to rule on
Voting Rights Act provisions that pertain to holding referendums, which
may compel lawmakers to reconsider the law.
Human Rights Ombudsman Mironov's office set up a working group to
monitor electoral rights violations as the Central Electoral Commission
prepared for the December Duma elections. In August Mironov called for
legislation to increase the transparency of elections funding.
In elections that were judged by international observers largely to
be free and fair, a more centrist-leaning Duma was elected on December
19. According to the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), the Communist
Party won 24.3 percent of the federal party list votes, the Unity
movement aligned with the Presidential Administration won 23.3 percent,
Fatherland-All-Russia won 13.3 percent, the Union of Right Forces
aligned with the Presidential Administration won 8.5 percent, Vladimir
Zhirinovskiy's bloc won 5.8 percent, and the Yabloko party won 5.9
percent of the vote. Many observers pointed to problems with biased
media coverage of the election campaign. Paid political advertising in
newspapers often is disguised as legitimate news stories. Campaigns pay
under the table for stories favorable to their candidate, which allows
the campaigns to bypass limits on campaign spending. In the fall, media
outlets linked to the Presidential Administration launched an effective
``media war'' against the Fatherland-All-Russia (OVR) party led by
Moscow Mayor Luzhkov and former Prime Minister Primakov. The ORT and
the RTR news programs were filled with negative stories about the OVR,
which by late October resulted in lower popular support for the OVR and
Luzhkov, according to opinion polls. The rival NTV network broadcast
frequent counterattacks against the Presidential Administration. In
late November, the Bashkortostan duma moved to block Sunday evening
news analysis programs broadcast by the ORT and the RTR due to their
strong bias in favor of the Presidential Administration. However,
Bashkortostan president Murtaza Rakhimov met a few days later with
Prime Minister Putin and agreed to resume broadcasting the news
programs (see Section 2.a.).
The campaign was marred by instances of anti-Semitic rhetoric. In
an August 2 debate between Leningrad oblast legislative assembly
candidates in St. Petersburg, Vasily Terenyev, chairman of the anti-
Communist Pro-Workers' Party, blamed ``Zionists'' for the loss of the
Soviet Union's former republics and current secessionist tendencies,
and Aleksandr Vtulkin, chairman of the local Russian National Unity
branch, argued that ``Jewish bureaucrats'' in St. Petersburg would
destroy the Leningrad oblast economy if the two entities were
reintegrated.
In early October, the CEC disqualified two of the top three
candidates on the party list of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy's Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) for failing to list all the vehicles
and property they own. This action voided the entire LDPR list and made
it ineligible to participate in the Duma elections. However, later that
month Zhirinovskiy formed a new party bloc with two minor parties in
order to qualify to compete in the elections, and the new party list
did not include some of the most controversial LDPR candidates. On
November 13, a Moscow district court invalidated the registration of
the Spas, a party bloc led by Russian National Unity leader Aleksandr
Barkashov. The court based its decision on a Ministry of Justice review
of the Spas's registration materials, which found inaccuracies and
false statements.
Elections to local and regional offices continue to be marred in
some cases by interference from federal authorities and less than
democratic practices by incumbent governors. For example, April-May
presidential elections in the republic of Karachayevo-Cherkesiya (in
the Northern Caucasus) sparked intense controversy. In the region's
first presidential elections in post-Soviet history, former commander
in chief of ground forces and ethnic Karachay Vladimir Semenev received
18 percent in the first round of voting and between 75 and 80 percent
in the second round. Stanislav Derev, an ethnic Cherkesiyan and the
expected winner, received 40 percent in the first round but less than
20 percent in the second round. According to press reports, voting
irregularities that primarily affected ethnic Cherkesiyans prevented up
to one-third of the electorate from casting their ballots in the second
round. The local electoral commission reported that it received 1,527
complaints of voting irregularities. The Russian press reported several
arson and grenade attacks against staff members of both candidates
before the run-off elections. The Karachayevo-Cherkesiya supreme court
ruled on August 27 that the election results were valid, sparking
public protests in the region's capital of Cherkessk, which now
threaten the region's territorial integrity. As a result of clashes on
September 4 between supporters of the rival leaders, eight persons were
wounded and one died later as a result of injuries. On September 14,
president Vladimir Semenev was inaugurated despite massive protests in
previous weeks. On October 22, the Supreme Court found the second round
election results to be valid (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
Another seriously flawed election was held in Dagestan on March 7.
Although the law requires republic and local officials to take a leave
of absence from their jobs while campaigning for a seat in the
legislature, two-thirds of the over 400 candidates in Dagestan's
legislative election violated that law. The legislature they sought to
replace included 35 members who were convicted criminals and 5 who are
under investigation. The campaign finance laws in Dagestan also were
circumvented by many candidates who felt that the legal spending limits
were too low (approximately $200, or 5,200 rubles). Candidates paved
roads and fixed apartment building entryways with personal funds but
were not disqualified. Candidates also avoided spending limits by
failing to label widely distributed campaign materials. Most opposition
candidates were denied registration for the elections. Although two
candidates were able to win registration by appealing to the local
courts, many candidates were told that the signatures in support of
their candidacy were forged.
There were reports of politically motivated violence elsewhere the
country. In St. Petersburg on July 22, LDPR supporter Viktor Yashin was
robbed. According to Yashin, the robbers took from his car a suitcase
with lists of voters' signatures for Yuriy Kuznetsov, a gubernatorial
candidate in Leningrad oblast. Kuznetsov is also a member of the LDPR
and a state duma deputy. The electoral commission of Leningrad oblast
registered Kuznetsov as a gubernatorial candidate on August 13.
Anatoliy Yezhelev, former president of the St. Petersburg Union of
Journalists, was assaulted on June 15 in Vsevolozhsk. Yezhelev, age 64,
spent 3 weeks in the hospital. Both Yezhelev and police authorities
link the assault with Yezhelev's participation in the electoral
campaign of Vadim Gustov, one of the two most popular gubernatorial
candidates in Leningrad oblast. Currently Yezhelev continues his work
in the electoral headquarters of Vadim Gustov. In early October, two
activists for Sergey Stepashin's campaign were assaulted, although they
did not require hospitalization. In mid-December a campaign worker for
former St. Petersburg mayor Anatoliy Sobchak was assaulted and killed.
On February 3, Chechen Republic president Maskhadov suspended
constitutional law and declared a state of Islamic Shari'a law in the
region. According to press reports, a shura (council) of prominent
figures came into being on February 10 to help oversee Shari'a law. In
the process, the Maskhadov government stripped the region's legislature
of most of its responsibilities and abolished the region's vice
presidency. On February 10, the legislature was replaced with a 34-
member shura that has responsibility for ``consulting'' with the
republic's president. The Shura includes several prominent opposition
leaders. According to one expert, the Shura created in Chechnya is not
a traditional Muslim shura run by religious men, but instead is a
council of military men. However, on July 12 the Chechen government
announced the formation of a national council to include president
Maskhadov and his rival field commanders. The statement did not explain
the council's role or specify its relationship to the Shura, to which
Maskhadov and his rivals also belong and which has never met. Also in
July, Chechen officials criticized remarks that Russian authorities
made asserting that Duma elections would be held in Chechnya. Chechen
officials contended that the republic would not participate in the
December Duma elections.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. In the
December elections, 32 female deputies were elected to the 450-member
Duma, a decrease from the 46 female deputies in the Duma elected in
1995.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Many domestic and international human rights groups operate freely.
Most groups investigated and publicly commented on human rights issues,
generally doing so without government interference or restrictions.
However, some local officials harassed human rights monitors, going so
far as to arrest and convict them (see Section 1.d.). In 1998 Human
Rights Watch repeatedly criticized the Procurator General's response to
these incidents. With a few notable exceptions, human rights monitors
have worked mostly unhindered by authorities in recent years. No new
cases of arrests or harassment of human rights activists by authorities
were reported in the first half of the year. Several NGO's are
headquartered in Moscow and have branches throughout the country. Some
of the more prominent human rights organizations are the Moscow Center
for Prison Reform, the Society for the Guardianship of Penitentiary
Institutions, the Glasnost Public and Defense Funds, Memorial, the
Moscow Research Center for Human Rights, the Soldiers' Mothers'
Committee, the Mothers' Rights Foundation, and the Moscow Helsinki
Group. Several of these groups are recognized by government and
legislative officials for their expertise in certain fields, and such
groups participate (with varying degrees of success) in the process of
drafting legislation and decrees, such as the draft law on community
monitoring of prison conditions, which passed its first Duma reading in
June. Also, the prominent human rights organization, Memorial, was
expected to play a significant role in elections monitoring.
Various types of regionally-based human rights groups are being
established. Socioeconomic rights groups are the most numerous and
monitor issues such as unpaid wages and benefits. There are fewer
civil-political rights groups, but according to Memorial these are
growing in number. These groups include ``generalist'' organizations
that cover the range of human rights issues and ``specialist''
organizations that cover only one issue. Public legal centers have been
formed, due to the critical lack of legal advice that is available to
the general public. These centers usually are run on a part-time basis
by lawyers who, while they cannot afford to offer trial counsel or
actual legal work, offer advice at no cost on legal rights and recourse
under the law. Resources for human rights work have become even scarcer
after 1998 financial crisis, threatening the work of activists.
Regional groups, which generally receive little if any
international support or attention, reported that local authorities
have obstructed their work and that law enforcement officers have begun
criminal investigations based on fabricated charges against certain
regional human rights groups' leaders (see Section 1.d.). With these
exceptions, criticism of the Federal Government and regional
authorities usually is permitted without hindrance. The threshold
appears to be criticism of a specific political leader in the region
(usually the governor or a senior law enforcement official). Regional
human rights advocates have been charged with such offenses as libel,
contempt of court, and interference in judicial proceedings, along with
other crimes, in cases with distinct political overtones (see Section
1.d.). Local human rights groups have far fewer opportunities to
interact with legislators in developing legislation than their Moscow
counterparts; some are excluded from the process entirely by local
authorities.
The importation of copies of the NGO report ``Russia's Northern
Fleet: Sources of Radioactive Contamination,'' authored in part by
former naval Captain Aleksandr Nikitin (see Section 1.d.), still is
blocked by the FSB. Although the Bellona Foundation received some
reports from St. Petersburg and Moscow that users had difficulty
accessing the Foundation's website, it appears that Russian, English,
and Norwegian versions of the 1996 report on the contamination by the
Northern Fleet are accessible through Russian internet service
providers. Bellona Foundation employees no longer experience
difficulties when applying for visas to enter the country.
Because of the risk of kidnaping and other criminal attacks (see
Section 1.b.), NGO's largely have withdrawn from Chechnya since the
murder of six ICRC personnel in 1996. Chechen authorities generally
have discouraged NGO's from returning to Chechnya, although the motive
for such discouragement appears to be based more on security concerns
than unwillingness to submit to nongovernmental human rights
monitoring.
The Government's human rights institutions lack independence but
appear to be making serious efforts to promote human rights. The
President's Human Rights Commission, now composed primarily of
government officials (unlike the 1993-96 commission under Sergey
Kovalev, which included a large number of human rights activists),
appeared largely inactive during the year. Some human rights groups
continued to complain that the Commission's focus has changed from
advocacy of human rights to defending the Government's policy and that
the Commission has failed to engage well-established human rights
NGO's. Commission chair Vladimir Kartashkin has indicated to the press
that his role is mainly consultative and investigatory, without powers
of enforcement. Although the Commission examined and was often critical
of the Government on various issues during the year, its work does not
appear to have delivered concrete results. On the other hand, the
office of the Russian Federation Human Rights Ombudsman appears to be
working actively to develop its authority and public profile, which may
enable it to promote human rights effectively. Implementing a March
1997 law establishing the position of a human rights ombudsman, after a
lengthy delay, the Duma selected Communist Duma Deputy Oleg Mironov on
May 22, 1998, who in accordance with the law resigned from both the
Party and the Duma after the vote. During the year, Ombudsman Mironov
worked diligently to become an increasingly high-profile government
spokesman on human rights issues, despite earlier criticism by human
rights activists due to his lack of human rights expertise. Although in
1998 his comments to the press tended to focus on violations of
socioeconomic rights, such as wage arrears, he has criticized publicly
anti-Semitic incidents, called for government protection against
``racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism,'' criticized violence and
religious intolerance in Dagestan, and called for strengthened
legislation on campaign funding. In a March open letter, Mironov
proposed amendments to the 1997 religion law to bring it into
compliance with international norms for religious freedom. Mironov's
office has grown to over 150 employees and has several specialized
sections responsible for investigating complaints of human rights
abuses. Based on information available at this time, the effectiveness
of Mironov's office in assisting individual victims cannot be assessed
accurately. However, Mironov continues to expand the scope of his
activities, attempting to promote broader compliance with international
human rights standards. During the summer, Mironov established a
department of human rights education within his office. The staff of
six, headed by Anatoliy Azarov (a former director of the Moscow School
of Human Rights), is planning to develop guidelines and materials for
teaching human rights to the public. The office reportedly has plans to
establish a section on religious freedom. In August Mironov announced a
new annual prize for recognition of outstanding contributions in the
field of human rights, the recipient of which would be selected by a
commission composed of established human rights activists, academics,
scientists, and government officials. Mironov's office also has set up
a working group to monitor violations of electoral rights.
In 1996 President Yeltsin signed a decree entitled, On Certain
Measures of State Support for the Human Rights Movement in the Russian
Federation, which called for a high degree of coordination between
federal structures and the human rights community. Specific measures
laid out in the decree included the creation of three entities: An
interregional human rights center to coordinate human rights
activities; a human rights training center; and a center to publish
human rights literature. In addition, regional administrations were
instructed to establish bodies analogous to the federal Human Rights
Commission. Progress on establishing the bodies has been slow, and
there were some reversals during the year. In direct contravention of
the 1996 presidential decree, new governors elected in Pskov, Irkutsk,
and Chelyabinsk abolished the commissions that had been working
effectively in their regions. By September 1998, there were 58
commissions, compared with 66 in 1997. Of those, only 8 to 10 are
working effectively, according to the Moscow Helsinki Group, compared
with 12 effective commissions in 1997.
In 1996 President Yeltsin established by decree a Political
Consultative Council (PCC) with 12 standing chambers to assist in the
creation of a legal framework for economic and political reforms. It
includes a human rights chamber, headed by Duma Deputy Valeriy
Borshchev, and a legal chamber, headed by Boris Zolotukhin, a former
Duma Deputy. The PCC meets monthly. The Human Rights Chamber includes
representatives of the various Duma factions as well as 10 members of
the human rights NGO community. The Chamber has held hearings on issues
such as conditions in the nation's prisons, the situation of refugees,
and freedom of conscience. The Chamber's hearings on a variety of areas
involving human rights have given greater public exposure to such
problems. However, human rights organizations criticize the Government
for being unresponsive to the Chamber's recommendations. NGO's point
out that the Chamber itself has not been responsible for any
significant human rights improvements or legislation.
Citizens also can file appeals to the European Court of Human
Rights (ECHR) in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations. The
ECHR only can consider cases based on events that occurred after
Russia's May 5, 1998 accession to the Council of Europe. Complainants
first must exhaust all appeals in Russian courts before they can turn
to the European Court. Human Rights Ombudsman Mironov announced in June
that the Government submitted a list of three candidates for the
Russian judge in Strasbourg. The new judge was elected in September.
Various sources reported that the ECHR has received at least 2,000
complaints from Russians, none of which have been scheduled for a
hearing because of the absence of a Russian judge. However, observers
familiar with human rights law point out that a large percentage of
these cases are expected to be rejected because the plaintiffs have not
yet exhausted all their legal options in Russia.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, sex,
religion, language, social status, or other circumstances. However,
both official and societal discrimination still exist.
There were credible reports that homosexuals were attacked or
killed because of their sexual orientation. According to the editor of
a magazine for gays, most gays are reluctant to report crimes against
them to the police because they expect at best indifference or at worst
harassment. Although the press rarely reports crimes against gays, in
one rare exception, an August Kommersant Daily article referred without
providing details to the murder of seven gay men in Chelyabinsk in
1998.
Women.--Domestic violence remains a major problem, as victims
rarely have recourse to protection from the authorities. Police
frequently are reluctant or even unwilling to involve themselves in
what they see as purely domestic disputes. Many women are deterred from
reporting such crimes because of this and because the housing system
makes it difficult either to find housing outside the family dwelling
or to expel an abusive spouse, even after a final divorce action. The
underlying problem that remains is that much of society, including some
leaders in the human rights community, do not acknowledge domestic
violence as a problem or do not believe it to be an area for concern
outside the family.
According to a December 1997 Human Rights Watch report, the
Government reported that almost 11,000 women reported rape or attempted
rape in 1996. In September 1998, a Human Rights Watch Europe researcher
for women's rights estimated that only 5 to 10 percent of rapes are
reported to police. Human Rights Watch further reported that Yekaterina
Lakhova, President Yeltsin's then-adviser on women's issues, estimated
in 1997 that 14,000 women are killed by husbands or family members each
year. However, Human Rights Watch notes that these statistics
underestimate the extent of the problem, due to underreporting of these
crimes by victims. In 1996 the MVD estimated that 80 percent of violent
crimes occurred in the home.
There is a general lack of understanding of this issue in the legal
community and there is no legal definition of domestic violence. Some
forms of battering are addressed in the new Criminal Code but are
defined too narrowly to apply to most cases. There is also a lack of
national political will to consider these issues seriously. Thus far
more than four dozen renditions of a national civil law to address
domestic violence have failed to make any progress through the Duma.
Hospitals and members of the medical profession provide assistance
to women who have been assaulted. However, some doctors are reluctant
to ascertain the details of a sexual assault, fearing that they may be
required to spend long periods in court. While noting that the
Government had begun to address the seriousness of the problem of
violence against women, the 1997 Human Rights Watch report criticized
the Government for failing to afford victims of violence ``the
protection of the law.'' The report also criticized law enforcement
officials for not ensuring effectively that incidents of violence
against women are investigated and prosecuted and for sometimes
obstructing their investigation and prosecution. The report further
noted that the discrepancy ``between the law as written and the law as
applied'' demonstrated the Government's ``failure to fulfill its
international human rights obligations.'' The report also criticized
the Duma for its ``seriously flawed'' drafting of a law on family
violence. It noted that many women's groups had faced considerable
difficulty in gaining access to and commenting on drafts of the law. At
year's end, there were about 40 women's crisis centers in the country,
all founded within the last few years, and their number is growing.
In October 1998, the Government cosponsored an international
conference on domestic violence against women, the first conference on
this subject in the country. Conference participants discussed the root
causes of domestic violence and cooperation among NGO's, academics, and
government officials to address the problem.
Particularly because of lack of adequate employment opportunities,
a significant number of women are victims of international trafficking
for sexual exploitation. Reliable statistics on the number of women
involved are difficult to obtain (see Section 6.f.).
Despite serious problems and difficulties in addressing these
issues, many effective projects are underway. Crisis centers have
formed an association in order to coordinate their efforts better. They
have chosen Marina Pisklakova, the Director of the crisis center ANNA,
as President. The association held its first national conference on
September 23-25 in Moscow. Due to successful collaboration for the
October 1998 joint conference in Moscow, nongovernmental work in the
area is recognized and supported by several government entities.
Women have reported sexual harassment in the workplace, and
anecdotal information suggests that many potential employers seek
female employees who are receptive to sexual relations. The phrase,
``without complexes,'' is used occasionally in job advertisements. Some
firms ask applicants for employment to complete a form including the
abbreviation ``VBO,'' a Russian abbreviation for ``possibility of close
relations,'' to which the applicant is expected to reply ``yes'' or
``no.''
There is credible evidence that women encounter considerable
discrimination in employment. At a 1996 Duma-sponsored roundtable,
representatives of 53 women's associations appealed to the Duma to
improve the legal status of women by creating a council to assess all
draft legislation to ensure that it provides for equal opportunities
for women and men. In their appeal to the Duma, the women's
associations' representatives raised their concerns that women form a
disproportionately high percentage of the officially registered
unemployed, that women are discriminated against in hiring and firing,
that the differences between the salaries of men and women had
increased sharply, and that few women attain senior positions.
Conditions have not improved significantly since the hearings were
held.
Human Rights Watch in a December 1996 report accused the Government
of participating in discriminatory actions against women, contending
that the Government seldom enforces employment laws concerning women.
Employers prefer to hire men, thereby saving on maternity and child
care costs and avoiding the perceived unreliability that accompanies
the hiring of women with small children. In 1996 a change in the Labor
Code prohibited women between the ages of 15 and 49 from being hired
for jobs that are considered to be harmful to their health, including
working on the night shift. Many of these jobs pay more, allow early
retirement, or both. Women continue to report cases in which they are
paid less for the same work that male colleagues perform. There has
been no other recent substantial research in this area. Human Rights
watch notes that the situation for working women may have worsened
after the 1998 financial crisis, as women were more likely to be fired
first.
Job advertisements often specify sex and age groups, and sometimes
physical appearance as well. Government statistics for 1997 showed that
women earn between 69 and 81 percent of men's salaries in 5 of the 10
fields examined, but between 95 to 105 percent of men's salaries in the
remaining 5 sectors. However, these figures do not provide a complete
picture of the problem. Women's average incomes generally are estimated
to be significantly below average male incomes. Professions dominated
by women are much lower paid than those dominated by men. Moscow human
resources managers privately admit that discrimination against women in
hiring is common. Unemployment, at 11.7 percent of the work force in
October, also disproportionately affects women.
In July Ingush president Ruslan Aushev issued a decree permitting
men in the republic to have up to four wives. According to Aushev, the
decision came in response to the republic's demographic situation, and
he appealed to the Duma to make the necessary changes in the family
code.
Children.--The Constitution assigns the Government some
responsibility for safeguarding the rights of children. The State
endeavors to provide, within its limited means, for the welfare of
children. While federal law provides for education for all children in
the country, regional authorities frequently deny access to schools to
the children of unregistered persons, asylum seekers, and migrants
because they lack residential registration (see Section 2.d.).
A new family code regulating children's rights and marriage and
divorce issues came into effect in 1996. Although the President has
stated that government policies to improve the situation of children
were a top priority, progress has been slow. Many Moscow charitable
organizations have established productive relations with the city
government to address the needs of disabled children, as well as other
vulnerable groups.
The position of many children has deteriorated since the collapse
of communism because of falling living standards, an increase in the
number of broken homes, and domestic violence. According to press
reports, 40 percent of all children live below the poverty line. In
1995 Duma Deputy Mariya Gaydash stated that 2 million children under 14
years of age suffer from physical or mental abuse, with as many as
200,000 dying each year from injuries received at home, usually from
parental abuse or neglect. About 50,000 children run away from home
each year, Gaydash asserted, and 2,000 commit suicide. Children on the
street often become dependent on illegal narcotics. To combat the
growing number of children being abducted, police organizations are
establishing programs to protect children.
In August 1998, a group of prominent Russians signed an appeal
calling on the President to take ``energetic measures'' to help the
country's homeless children. According to the Ministry of the Interior,
there were approximately 1 million homeless children on the streets.
The Duma estimated this number to be between 2 and 4 million. Oleg
Zykov, Head of the No to Alcoholism and Drug Abuse Foundation,
estimates that there are about 15,000 street children in Moscow alone.
Other sources suggest that there are as many as 60,000 street children
in the cities of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Many of these children have
come from the regions, only to be sent back to where they came from by
city police. One shelter director complained that young girls from
Chechnya also were returned there, despite the danger to them. Homeless
children often engage in criminal activities, receive no education, and
are vulnerable to drug and alcohol abuse. Some young girls who find
themselves on the street turn to a life of prostitution in order to
survive.
An estimated 50,000 children run away from their homes each year.
Boris Altshuler, director of the Rights of the Child Program at the
Moscow Human Rights Research Center, said that the main reasons
children run away are family violence, financial problems, or social
problems such as drug or alcohol abuse by one or both of the parents.
In Moscow approximately 6,000 children per year are brought to the
Center of Temporary Isolation of Minor Delinquents (COVINA). These
children stay in COVINA for no more than 30 days. During this period,
the child's guardian is located and his or her case is to be
investigated. However, in 90 to 95 percent of these cases, the police
simply return the child to the family or to the institution from which
the child ran away. Altshuler told of a 9-year-old boy who escaped from
his stepfather's beatings 28 times, only to be taken by police to
COVINA and then returned to his stepfather. Many officials see domestic
problems as private and prefer not to interfere.
In St. Petersburg local and international NGO's provide a variety
of services for the homeless. In particular Medecins du Monde (MDM)
supports homeless children with a ``social hotel'' and a medical/social
consultation center that provides medical help, vaccines, and referrals
to hospitals and orphanages. The MDM also organizes specialized
training seminars for medical and social professionals and city
officials engaged in work with homeless youth.
As the former Soviet Union opened to the international community,
attention has focused on the status of orphans and the disabled, who
had been removed from mainstream society and isolated within state
institutions. The segregation of these populations had multiple
repercussions. A complex and cumbersome system was developed to manage
their life-long institutionalization. Three different ministries
(Education, Health, and Labor and Social Development) assumed
responsibility for different age groups and categories of orphans.
Rather than focus on the needs of the child, the system revolves around
the institution itself. Child welfare is easily lost within the
bureaucracy; little clear recourse exists in instances of abuse by the
system. Human rights activists allege that children in state
institutions are provided for poorly (often because funds are lacking),
and in some cases are abused physically by staff.
While there are no comprehensive studies of the effects of the
orphanage system, its costs, and the extent of its problems, several
reports have compiled important information. There is a groundswell of
opinion calling for reform to the child protection system today. Dozens
of NGO's and several professional organizations are trying to improve
the system. Regional governments in certain oblasts have undertaken
reforms.
The available data from a 1997 report from the Ministry of Labor
and Social Development, which is cited often, indicate that there are
approximately 600,000 children registered as orphans in the country. Of
these children, 10 percent are orphans with no parents and 90 percent
are ``social orphans,'' who have at least one living parent who has
given up the child to the State for a variety of reasons. Between 1993
and 1997, the number of registered orphans increased by 30 percent and
the number residing in institutions by 35 percent. Concurrently, the
number of children in foster families increased by 46 percent (most
children are related to the members of their foster families). However,
the number adopted has remained fairly consistent, with an overall
increase of only 2 percent.
Although comprehensive statistics are not available, the prospects
of those who are disabled physically or mentally are extremely bleak.
The label of ``imbetsil'' or idiot, which signifies ``uneducable,'' is
almost always irrevocable. The most likely future is a lifetime in
state institutions. Even the label of ``debil,'' or lightly retarded,
follows a person throughout his or her life on official documents,
creating barriers to employment and housing after graduation from state
institutions. One study conducted by the Rights of the Child program of
the Moscow Research Center for Human Rights, found that, on graduation
from a state institution for the lightly retarded at age 18, 30 percent
of orphans became vagrants, 10 percent became involved in crime, and 10
percent committed suicide. Even for those orphans classified as
``normal,'' life after institutionalization poses serious problems, as
they may lack the necessary social, educational, and vocational skills
to function in society.
Human Rights Watch released in December 1998, ``Abandoned to the
State,'' a highly critical report that documented the dismal conditions
that persist in many, although not all, orphanages. According to the
report, children emerge from the orphanage system undereducated,
physically underdeveloped, inadequately socialized, and unprepared for
life outside an institution. Boris Altshuler, of the Rights of the
Child Program, has said that these problems are caused less by funding
shortages or malfeasance than by inherent defects in the state
orphanage system.
The existing system provides little oversight and no formal
recourse for orphans who have been misdiagnosed as mentally ill or
retarded, abused, or neglected. Facilities to which such children are
remanded frequently use unprescribed narcotics to keep children under
control. Altshuler has called for the establishment of an ombudsman for
the rights of children with the power to enter and inspect children's
facilities at any time of day or night without advance notification.
Since 1998 the Ministry of Labor and Social Development has been
working with the U.N. Children's Fund on a pilot program to establish
regional children's rights ombudsmen. According to the Ministry and the
Rights of the Child NGO, there are now ombudsmen in the cities of
Yekaterinburg and St. Petersburg, in the regions of Novgorod, Kaluga,
and Volgograd, and there are plans to establish new ombudsmen in two
other regions.
Trafficking in children and young girls is a problem, but there are
no reliable estimates of its scope (see Section 6.f.).
People With Disabilities.--The Constitution does not address
directly the issue of discrimination against disabled persons. Although
laws exist that prohibit discrimination, the Government has not
enforced them. The meager resources that the Government can devote to
assisting disabled persons are provided to veterans of World War II and
other military conflicts. Special institutions exist for children with
various disabilities, but do not serve their needs adequately. The
Government does not mandate special access to buildings for the
disabled. The NGO, Society for the Defense of Invalids, is working to
broaden public awareness and understanding of issues concerning the
disabled.
A 1995 law established a requirement that firms with over 30
employees either reserve 3 percent of their positions for persons with
disabilities or contribute to a government fund to create job
opportunities for the disabled. The law also removed language defining
an ``invalid'' as a person unable to work. However, the Government has
not implemented this law. Some persons with disabilities have found
work within factories run by the All-Russian Society for the Disabled,
but the majority are unable to find work and frequently are discouraged
from working rather than subsisting on social benefits.
The December 1998 Human Rights Watch report ``Abandoned to the
State,'' documented the dismal conditions which persist in many
orphanages. The report contains especially dramatic photographs of
severely emaciated children in special state orphanages for the
disabled. Being disabled is still a serious social stigma in the
country, an attitude that profoundly influences how institutionalized
children are treated. Many physically or mentally disabled children are
considered ineducable, even those with only minor birth defects.
According to the report, many disabled children are confined to beds
around the clock or to rooms that are lit, heated, and furnished
inadequately. The children are given only minimal care by low-paid
unskilled workers with no training in the care of the disabled.
Indigenous People.--Until its abolition by presidential decree on
September 22, 1998 (as part of a larger cabinet restructuring), the
Moscow-based State Committee for the Development of the North was
charged with representing and advocating the interests of indigenous
people. With only a small staff, its influence was limited. The
Committee's functions were transferred to the new Ministry for Regional
Affairs and Nationalities, which is directed by the presidential decree
to take ``into account the need for singling out the most important
issues of northern territories'' as one of its priorities. On March 6,
the Duma approved a bill on indigenous ethnic communities, providing
them with support, permitting the creation of self-government bodies,
and permitting them to seek compensation if economic development
threatens their lands. Yeltsin signed the law in April. In some areas,
local communities have organized to study and make recommendations
regarding the preservation of the culture of indigenous people. People
such as the Buryats in Siberia; the Tatar and Bashkiri in the Urals;
the people of the North, including the Enver, Tafarli, and Chukchi; and
others have worked actively to preserve and defend their cultures, as
well as the economic resources of their regions. In this context, some
groups in the far eastern part of the country have criticized the
Federal Government for not developing an overall concept for the
development of indigenous people. Most believe that they are treated
equally with ethnic Russians, although some groups believe that they
are not represented or are underrepresented in regional governments.
According to unconfirmed press reports, in May approximately 1,000
Nogais in Stavropol met and called for the resignation of the regional
and educational administration in the Nogai okrug, after a police
officer reportedly killed two Nogais; no further details were available
about this incident. According to the chairman of the executive of
Birlik, the interregional association of Nogais, Nogais in the
Neftekumsk region reportedly do not enjoy the same rights as other
ethnic groups, and there are no Nogais in the region's administration
or in any law enforcement agencies. According to unconfirmed press
reports, in Karelia Karelians and Vepsians are calling for laws in the
republic to ensure that minorities have sufficient representation in
the republic and local governments. Local Karelian and Vepsian leaders
reportedly blame local authorities for not taking sufficient action to
protect local languages and culture. The principal problems for
indigenous people center on distribution of necessary supplies and
services, particularly in the winter months for those who live in the
far north.
Religious Minorities.--There were many instances of violence in the
Northern Caucasus, some of which had religious motivations. The RIA
news agency and Keston News Service reported in April that Abuzar
Sumbulatov, Chechnya's leading religious affairs official and a
specialist in Islamic law, was kidnaped from his home in Groznyy. No
ransom was demanded and Sumbulatov is presumed dead. The reasons for
the kidnaping are unknown but Keston News service noted that
Sumbulatov, a Muslim, was known for promoting religious tolerance.
Sumbulatov criticized the Moscow Government for attacking Chechen
cultural heritage by destroying university archives, but also accused
former Chechen president Dzhokhar Dudayev's government of deliberately
allowing attacks on Chechnya's ethnic Russians. Sumbulatov's abduction
coincided with several kidnapings of Russian Orthodox and Baptist
clergy in Chechnya and its bordering areas in 1998 and 1999 which,
according to the Keston News Service, suggests that Christians are
being targeted specifically. One kidnaped Baptist pastor later was
found beheaded in March, and another is feared dead. ITAR-TASS reported
in July that Father Zachary, the dean of the Archangel Michael Church,
and two church workers were kidnaped in Groznyy. In March three Russian
Orthodox priests also were kidnaped, two in Chechnya and one in
Ingushetiya, and one later was released. A U.S. missionary was kidnaped
in Dagestan in late 1998 and was released by his abductors in June,
after being tortured in order to extort ransom (see Section 1.b.). The
Russian Baptist Union advised its members in 1998 to leave Chechnya.
Muslims, who constitute approximately 10 percent of the population,
continue to encounter societal discrimination and antagonism in some
areas where they are a minority. In February Murmansk residents
protested the construction of a mosque with a prominent minaret at a
highly visible site.
As foreign or so-called ``nontraditional'' religions in the country
continue to grow, many Russians continue to feel hostility toward these
``foreign sects,'' perhaps influenced by negative reports in the mass
media and public criticism by Russian Orthodox Church officials and
other influential figures. These sentiments appear to have sparked
occasional harassment and even physical attacks. For example, according
to press reports, in August between 10 and 15 youths burst into a
Moscow Hare Krishna temple, beat followers and gave at least one person
a head laceration severe enough to require hospitalization (see Section
1.c.). In Altay in March leaders of local organizations signed a
petition protesting the construction of a Roman Catholic cathedral on
Lake Teletskoye and accusing Catholic missionaries of engaging in
brainwashing. The head of the Altay republican government has pledged
to prevent the construction of a Catholic church in the region. In
April in Chernyakhovsk in the Kaliningrad region, an Adventist pastor
and his wife filed a criminal complaint against the sons of an
influential Orthodox priest after the sons disrupted an Adventist
meeting, beat the pastor's wife, and ripped her clothing in March.
According to the Institute of Religion and Law, the attacker
apologized, and the case eventually was settled out of court. Mormons
and Pentecostals have reported instances in which they may have been
followed, harassed, and, in at least one case, physically struck. On
August 21, an anonymous bomb threat led to the evacuation of 15,000
persons attending a Jehovah's Witnesses convention in Moscow's Olympic
Stadium. There are believed to be more cases of such harassment than
are reported. In several instances during the year, local press outlets
accused Scientologists, Mormons, and Jehovah's Witnesses of espionage,
brainwashing, and other activities that they believed to be harmful to
citizens. A political commentator for the ORT network alleged in a
November broadcast that Moscow Mayor Luzhkov is a Scientologist, as
part of his station's effort to reduce Luzhkov's party's chances in the
December Duma elections (see Section 3).
In February Russian Orthodox Patriarch Aleksiy II called for the
continuation of the struggle against foreign religions, which he
believed were threatening the spiritual health of the nation.
Metropolitan Kirill of Smolensk and Kaliningrad, head of the Russian
Orthodox Church's Department of External Relations, has stated
repeatedly that existing international human rights standards are
``exclusively Western and liberal.'' In an August discussion on
religious tolerance, a representative of the Moscow Patriarchate echoed
this view, asserting that such norms are based on Western standards,
which do not take into account Eastern tradition. In March the Moscow
Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church stated that it considers
the Church of Scientology to be a dangerous sect that can have a
negative impact on individuals and families. A spokesman for the
Patriarchate said that it wanted the activities of the Church of
Scientology to be scrutinized by the appropriate legal entities. These
comments came immediately after Moscow police raided the offices of the
Church of Scientology (see Section 2.c.). In February Russian Orthodox
Metropolitan Kirill criticized Jehovah's Witnesses for their practice
of proselytizing and accused the group of resorting to manipulation and
psychological pressure. Metropolitan Kirill's comments came during the
course of the civil trial against Jehovah's Witnesses in Moscow.
Occasionally, opposition to the dissemination of information came
from religious groups. From time to time, the Russian Orthodox Church
has criticized the press for what it called ``anti-church
publications,'' but stopped short of imposing any church sanctions
against particular authors or editors. However, the Church appealed to
authors of what it considered inaccurate accounts of church history to
``realize the sinfulness of their evil deeds.''
Religious groups frequently complain of discriminatory stories in
the local press. While the scope of the problem is difficult to gauge,
newspapers have published sensational or biased articles criticizing
nontraditional religions.
Following large-scale emigration over the last two decades, between
600,000 and 700,000 Jews remain in the country (0.5 percent of the
total population). While Jewish emigration rates are significantly
lower than in the Soviet period, the number of Jews emigrating to
Israel for economic reasons as well as fear of persecution increased
approximately 70 percent from January 1998 to January 1999. The vast
majority of Jews--80 percent--live in Moscow or St. Petersburg. Jews
continue to encounter societal discrimination, and government
authorities have been criticized for insufficient action to counter it.
In August the Ministry of Press, Television, Radio Broadcasting, and
Mass Communications issued a warning to a city-owned television station
in St. Petersburg for airing anti-Semitic material in violation of the
mass media law's prohibition on inciting racial violence or hatred (see
Section 2.a.). In August St. Petersburg Commissioner for Human Rights
Mikhail Chulaki publicly criticized the program that broadcast the
anti-Semitic material.
Until recently, there was little evidence to suggest that increased
anti-Semitic rhetoric has led to increased violence, but observers in
the country and abroad are watching closely to see if these most recent
events are part of a sustained pattern of intensified anti-Semitism
(see Section 2.c.). There were several reports of major crimes or acts
of intimidation linked to anti-Semitic groups or motives during the
year. The interior of the Jewish synagogue in Novosibirsk was ransacked
and largely destroyed by vandals in March. The vandals painted
graffiti, including the swastika-like symbols and initials of the
ultranationalist Russian National Unity (RNE) organization, on the
interior walls of the synagogue. It was not clear whether the RNE was
responsible for the incident. Neither city nor regional government
officials spoke out against the attack, and no arrests were made in the
case. In May a synagogue in Birobydzhan (the Jewish autonomous region)
reportedly was vandalized by hooligans on two occasions. Also, on May
1, two bombs exploded simultaneously near the Marina Roshcha Synagogue
and the Moscow Choral Synagogue in Moscow. Federal authorities are
unsure whether the attacks were motivated by anti-Semitism, but Jewish
leaders are convinced that they were. Then-Interior Minister Stepashin
announced the next day that the Ministry had formed a joint team with
the FSB to investigate the two bombings. No progress has been reported
in investigations of the May 13, 1998 bombing of the Marina Roshcha
synagogue, which caused extensive property damage and slightly injured
several workers at an adjacent construction site but no congregants.
There were several serious anti-Semitic incidents beginning with
the July 13 stabbing of Jewish Cultural Center director Leopold
Kaymovskiy at the Moscow Choral Synagogue. Kaymovskiy's attacker, 20-
year-old Nikita Krivchun, said that he acted alone but that he
considers Jews ``evil.'' Krivchun was charged with attempted murder for
reasons of national, racial, or religious hatred. On July 25, a bomb
was found in the Bolshaya Bronnaya Lubavitcher synagogue. The bomb was
removed by synagogue workers and later detonated by the FSB, causing
some damage to the synagogue. Moscow Mayor Luzhkov criticized the
bombing and attended a July 29 service at the synagogue. The FSB is
investigating the bomb as a terrorist act. Vandals desecrated six
Jewish graves in Tomsk on August 2. On August 2, President Yeltsin told
visiting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak that the Government would
prosecute anti-Semitic crimes and proposed Israeli-Russian cooperation
on combating anti-Semitism.
The ultranationalist and anti-Semitic RNE paramilitary
organization, led by Aleksandr Barkashov, appeared to extend its
presence beyond its stronghold in the south during 1998. Although
reliable figures on its membership are not available, the RNE claims a
membership of 100,000 in 64 federation chapters, but press reports
estimate its membership at 12,000, and it is registered officially in
22 regions. According to various pollsters, the radical movement
appears to have won some degree of national name recognition and may
enjoy the support of up to 3 percent of the population. According to
press accounts, in Kostroma and Vladimir the RNE has representatives in
regional governments; Tver and Samara oblasts provide resources for RNE
youth groups; and in Voronezh RNE members patrol the streets with local
militias. According to press sources, joint street patrols failed in
Kostroma and Yekatarinburg, where RNE members turned them into
opportunities for petty crime, causing local authorities to cancel the
programs. RNE ``uniformed'' members were increasingly visible during
1998 at political and cultural public gatherings, but their day-to-day
visibility on the streets and in public areas of Moscow had not been as
obvious. However, on January 31 approximately 150 RNE members marched
in Moscow to protest Mayor Luzhkov's ban on holding an RNE congress in
the city in December 1998. The march received a great deal of media
coverage. After the ban on its congress in Moscow, the RNE staged
smaller meetings in 10 other cities, the largest with 300 participants
in Stavropol, according to press reports in March. In Borovichiy the
RNE and another local Fascist group, Mertvaya Voda, were active
according to local Jewish leaders, and desecrated Jewish graves, mailed
death threats to Jews, and hung anti-Semitic posters. The local
Borovichiy duma passed a decree in December 1998 prohibiting RNE
activities and the distribution of its propaganda, and in March 1999
city and law enforcement officials formed a commission to counteract
the RNE's activities and propaganda. In April officials from the
Borovichiy city administration invited the Harold Light Center, a
Jewish NGO, to present a 2-day seminar on combating anti-Semitism and
extremism.
The increased visibility of the RNE and other extremists across the
country prompted government efforts to address the problem of extremism
more forcefully. Moscow authorities banned the RNE from convening a
congress in December 1998, citing the RNE's lack of credentials as a
legally registered public organization at the time. (The Ministry of
Justice twice had denied the RNE's registration.) The RNE subsequently
managed to register but was then stripped of its registration by a
Moscow court in April. However, some observers called the municipal
procuracy's case weak and motivated only by the desire of city
authorities to ban the organization.
Anti-Semitic themes continued to figure prominently in hundreds of
extremist publications, and some politicians made anti-Semitic remarks.
Jewish groups believe that the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation (KPRF) uses anti-Semitism as a political tool to build
populist support. In October and December 1998, KPRF Duma members
Makashov and Ilyukhin made anti-Semitic remarks and called for quotas
limiting the number of Jews in public office. Communist Duma members
blocked a November 4, 1998 Duma motion to censure anti-Semitic remarks
(see Section 2.c.). Some Russian Jews believe that these public
statements may have contributed to increased societal anti-Semitism.
Jewish NGO's claimed that anti-Semitic themes were a factor in
December 6, 1998 legislative assembly elections. A December 17, 1998
article in Novyy Petersburg by Yuriy Shutov, a deputy of the
legislative assembly currently in prison awaiting trial on seven counts
of homicide, stated that Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, the leader of the Yabloko
party, was Jewish. Lvov said that anti-Semitic graffiti all around the
city also were used to smear Yabloko candidate Aleksandr Druz. At an
August 4 roundtable in St. Petersburg, candidates for Leningrad
oblast's legislative assembly publicly used anti-Semitic rhetoric to
argue their positions (see Section 3).
A prominent public figure who regularly used anti-Semitic remarks
was Krasnodar region governor Nikolay Kondratenko (see Section 2.c.). A
report issued in October 1997 by the human rights group Memorial
criticized Krasnodar government officials for ``encouraging radical
nationalist groups,'' including the Cossacks, and ``indirectly inciting
them to violence'' against ethnic minority groups in the area. Local
government authorities have approved patrols by Cossack paramilitary
groups in the name of law enforcement. Such groups are not accountable
publicly, and their activities have resulted in human rights abuses.
For example, in July 1998 Cossacks detained and whipped an Adventist
distributing Bibles in a public park in Anapa in the Krasnodar region.
The Cossacks refused to return the 60 Bibles that they had confiscated
from him. In May Cossacks in Anapa beat a man connected with a Catholic
church in their efforts to stop construction of a new Catholic chapel.
The man was hospitalized as a result of the beating. A local priest had
received a threatening letter signed by the leader of a local Cossack
organization demanding that construction of the chapel cease. The
church had all the necessary permits from local authorities to build
the chapel.
After his 1996 election, Kondratenko appointed Cossack ``hetman''
Vladimir Gromov as deputy governor of the region. In April 1997,
Kondratenko and Gromov issued a resolution making Cossack groups
subordinate to the regional government instead of to the State,
according to the Center for Human Rights Advocacy. According to the
statements of the radical Cossack chieftain Ivan Bezguliy, reported in
the media, he has 44,000 Cossacks at his disposal, ostensibly to
enforce law and order. Estimates of the total number of Cossacks in
Krasnodar are as high as 300,000. The Cossacks' tactics appear designed
to brutalize and intimidate the area's ethnic minorities and to bring
about the group's stated goal of cleansing the area of all nonslavic
Russians.
In July 1998, the presidential Human Rights Commission issued an
official statement that warned that the legalization of the activity of
extremists on the part of a number of local authorities and law-
enforcement agencies under the pretext of ``providing assistance in
restoring law and order'' and in ``the patriotic indoctrination of
youth,'' had become a ``new and dangerous phenomenon.'' This comment
apparently referred to, among other things, the use by authorities in
the Kuban area of the south of Cossack paramilitary units to assist law
enforcement authorities.
In December 1998, the Ministry of Justice launched an investigation
into the reported distribution of anti-Semitic leaflets in Krasnodar
that called on the population to destroy the homes of Jews. The extent
or effectiveness of federal investigations of racial or ethnic
provocations in Krasnodar is thus far unknown. According to press
reports, in June Cossacks in Stavropol threatened to take over law
enforcement functions since they lacked faith in the Government's
ability to protect its citizens after four policemen were killed.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In July 1998, the presidential
Human Rights Commission issued an official statement noting that ``the
increase in the threat of fascism'' was ``taking on visible and ominous
features,'' and that incitement of national, racial, and religious
enmity was ``taking on an increasingly organized nature.'' It noted the
increasing number of extremist groups that advocated racial supremacy
and ``national xenophobia,'' and commented that such groups were moving
with increasing frequency from combat training (under the guise of
sports training) to ``acts of direct terror, hoodlum attacks on persons
of `unwelcome' nationality, the desecration of cemeteries, and
explosions of monuments.'' The statement followed a number of well-
publicized incidents that spring, including several racially motivated
attacks on members of minorities, particularly Asians and Africans.
Attacks generally appeared to be random, inspired by racial hatred, and
carried out by private individuals or small groups, some of whom were
known to local law enforcement authorities for their racial intolerance
or criminal records.
Roma and persons from the Caucasus and Central Asia face widespread
societal discrimination, which often is reflected in official attitudes
and actions. There were reports of police beatings, harassment, and
soliciting bribes of persons with dark skin, or who appeared to be from
the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Africa. In addition, since 1993,
discrimination against persons from the Caucasus and Central Asia
increased concurrently with new measures at both the federal and local
levels to combat crime. Law enforcement authorities targeted persons
with dark complexions for harassment, arrest, and deportation from
urban centers, particularly after the bombings in September in Moscow,
when authorities detained some 2,000 persons and deported more than
500, according to NGO's (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.d.). In Moscow
such persons--including refugees from Africa, persons with dark skin,
or persons who appeared to be from the Northern Caucasus--are subjected
to far more frequent document checks than others and frequently are
detained or fined in excess of permissible penalties, often without
formal documents recording the infraction being drawn up and presented
by police. Reports also suggest a pattern, at least tacitly supported
by city authorities, of extortion and beatings by law enforcement
officials.
On August 11, Ivan Sydoruk, procurator of St. Petersburg, charged
Denis Usov, a local journalist, with extremist nationalist activities.
The charges were based on the views expressed in Usov's article in the
suburban newspaper Rodnoye Kolpino, in which he called for the
population of the Kolpino suburb to ``get rid of blacks'' (persons from
the Caucasus usually are called ``black people''). The article was
published in the summer of 1997. The Kolpino procurator's office
pressed charges against Usov then, but the issue was closed because
Usov managed to prove to the investigator that in the article he meant
black cockroaches, not black people. Sydoruk reopened the issue;
however, according to press reports, Usov plans to insist on a public
trial in order to attract public attention to his views. (Usov also is
a member of Kolpino's municipal council.)
During the year, members of ethnic or racial minorities were the
victims of beatings, extortion, and harassment by ``skinheads'' and
members of other racist and extremist groups. However, arrests seldom
are made in most such attacks, many of which have been reported by
human rights organizations. Many victims, particularly refugees who
lack residence documents recognized by the police, choose not to report
such attacks and report indifference on the part of police. In May
1998, several young white men assaulted a black foreigner at an outdoor
market in Moscow. One of the attackers was charged with hooliganism and
investigated on the more serious charge of inciting racial hatred. In
March he was convicted on the charge of hooliganism and sentenced to 3
years in prison, but he was released in September under a prisoner
amnesty.
In Stavropol kray, the local branch of Aleksandr Barkashov's neo-
Nazi RNE and a parallel organization called Russian Knight claim
support from local leaders, members of the armed services, and law
enforcement officials. The stated goal of the organizations is to
develop Russian youth to establish ``Russian order,'' a vision of a
great Russia with Orthodox values, a goal for which they claim to be
ready to shed blood. The group runs kindergartens in Stavropol and
trains youths of various ages. The group reportedly has several hundred
followers in the kray and claims to have 64 branches throughout the
country and 100,000 members.
The RNE was named by the Presidential Commission on Countering
Political Extremism, created in October 1997, as one of the first two
extremist groups it would investigate. However, in making the
announcement, then-Justice Minister Stepashin, chairman of the
Commission, added that the RNE no longer existed officially, since it
had lost a court case in December 1997 to renew its registration with
the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice twice had denied the
RNE's registration. The RNE subsequently managed to register but then
was stripped of its registration by a Moscow court in April. However,
some observers called the municipal prosecutor's case weak and
motivated only by the desire of city authorities to ban the
organization. The RNE still is active as an unofficial organization.
On January 30, members of the National Bolshevik Party, headed by
right-wing author Eduard Limonov, disrupted a congress of the Russia's
Democratic Choice political organization with chants of ``Stalin-
Beriya-Gulag'' and Nazi salutes. Members of the two parties engaged in
a fistfight, according to the Russian press.
In August after a number of television stations showed footage of
Chechen leaders in their reports on the conflict in Dagestan, the
Ministry of Press, Television, Radio Broadcasting, and Mass
Communications warned the companies against ``giving air time to
Chechen field commanders,'' stating that those actions violate Article
4 of the media law, which forbids incitement of societal violence or
hatred (see Section 2.c.). Human rights activists in St. Petersburg
protested local media broadcasts on the city-owned station that called
for ethnic cleansing and referred to residents of the Caucasus as
``needing extermination.''
The Government reported that in 1998 authorities investigated 25
criminal cases on charges of incitement to national, racial or
religious hatred. As of July, 10 cases have been opened, and courts
have ruled on 9 of them.
Chechen internally displaced persons (IDP's) and the Civic
Assistance Committee for migrants reported that Chechens face great
difficulty in finding lodging in Moscow and frequently are forced to
pay at least twice the usual rent for an apartment. The St. Petersburg
Times in April reported that a similar pattern of discrimination exists
against persons from the Caucasus in St. Petersburg. Although the
housing law forbids discrimination, according to human rights lawyer
Yuriy Shmidt, the chances of a would-be tenant winning a lawsuit are
low because there is no legal precedent.
In February the republican legislature in Bashkortostan passed a
law naming Bashkiri and Russian as its two official languages, but
excluded Tatar. There are more Tatars than Bashkir in the republic, and
Tatars constitute 30 percent of the republic's population. The
legislature of the republic of Tatarstan appealed to the Bashkortostan
legislature to include the language, but the appeal was rejected. On
January 21, some 20 Tatars protested a draft version of the language
law outside the republican legislature, and authorities arrested 7 of
the protesters.
Section 6.Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The law provides workers with the
right to form and join trade unions, but practical limitations on the
exercise of this right arise from governmental policy and the dominant
position of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia
(FNPR), the successor organization to the Communist trade unions.
Although the best estimates are that approximately 63 percent of the
work force are unionized, and approximately 8 percent of union members
belong to independent unions, there are no authoritative data on union
membership. There was no mandatory reregistration of union members
following the Soviet era, during which all workers were registered as
trade union members. Since the onset of the wage arrears crisis,
workers have been unable to transfer dues to their chosen trade union
structures. The Government did not carry out its threat to decertify
the Free Miners' Union (NPG) following that union's protest activities
in July 1998.
The FNPR claims to represent 80 per cent of all workers, largely
dominates the union movement, and thus still provides a practical
constraint on the right to freedom of association. The FNPR inherited
the bulk of the property of its predecessors, including office and
recreational property. The majority of its income comes from sources
other than dues, such as rental income and fees for member services.
Its unions frequently include management as part of the bargaining
unit. The FNPR and other trade union federations act independently on
the national political level, but FNPR unions sometimes are affiliated
closely with local political structures. Political parties often act in
parallel with unions, for example, in calling for a national day of
protest.
Benefits of membership vary depending on union affiliation and
generally discourage the formation of new unions. Various benefits are
provided by the Social Insurance Fund. By arbitrarily deciding who
receives benefits, such as child subsidies and vacations, based on the
politics or affiliation of union members of the federation, FNPR unions
enjoy a privileged position with regard to distribution of state funds
at the municipal, oblast, and federal levels. For example, families
normally would pay 60 percent of the cost of summer camp for children,
while FNPR members would pay only 20 percent.
Court decisions have limited the right of association. In 1998 the
Russian Trade Union of Locomotive Engineers declared its intention to
strike. The Ministry of Railroads filed a court case to have the
planned strike declared illegal. The prosecutor demanded that the court
declare the union's constitution illegal, as it specifically limited
trade union membership to workers and excluded management, in alleged
violation of the International Labor Organization's (ILO) convention on
freedom of association. The court ruled that the union had to change
its constitution to allow managers to join the union. Despite an
official document from the ILO that supported the union's position, the
court has yet to overturn its original ruling.
Plant management and FNPR local unions often work together to
destroy new unions. For instance, the new union Solidarity united 900
of the 2,500 workers at the Samara ball-bearing factory. At the end of
1998, the factory changed hands, and a new director joined forces with
the FNPR against Solidarity, which had grown at the expense of the FNPR
union. Briefings in the director's office included daily updates from
shop floor managers as to the number of employees who had left
Solidarity and rejoined the FNPR local. The incentives for leaving
Solidarity were considerable--avoidance of the threat of dismissal and
possible receipt of a ``cash bonus'' (in the form of a credit, since
there was almost no cash available). In 2 months Solidarity lost 200
members due to this campaign.
All civic organizations founded before 1994 were required to
reregister with the Ministry of Justice. The registration procedure for
other NGO's requires that the local departments of justice check all
articles of charter documents, but for unions, the procedure simply
involves ``notification'' and submission of documents. However,
Department of Justice officials have extended their authority far
beyond the letter of the law and have canceled the registration of a
large number of unions. For example, after submission of documents for
registration, the Sverdlovsk oblast department of justice required that
all founders gather at the department of justice and resign the
founding documents. In another case, despite having filed the proper
forms, the Russian Trade Union of Locomotive Brigades, which has
enjoyed all-Russian status (a term of informal recognition throughout
the country) for more than 5 years, was refused registration in July on
the grounds that local unions were not documented properly. In the
opinion of independent lawyers, these actions contradict the laws
governing union registration and are a direct and illegal attempt to
discourage labor activism.
Court rulings have established the principle that nonpayment of
wages--by far the predominant grievance--is an individual dispute and
cannot be addressed collectively by unions. As a result, a collective
action based on nonpayment of wages is not recognized as a strike, and
individuals are not protected by the labor law's protection against
being fired for participation. Prior to 1999, collective actions were
considered strikes if they concerned violations of a collective
bargaining agreement that specified the time frame for wage payments.
Court decisions throughout the year came to reflect the view that even
these actions did not concern a collective dispute. This ruling called
into question the value of a collective agreement.
As part of bargaining, the right to strike is difficult to
exercise. Most strikes are considered technically illegal, because the
procedures for disputes are exceedingly complex and require
coordination of information from both sides, even before courts are
involved. Strikes may be reviewed by a civil court to establish their
legality. The civil court has the right to order the confiscation of
union property to settle damages and losses to an employer if a strike
is found to be illegal. As a result, an increasing number of strikes
are organized by strike committees, rather than unions. Reprisals for
strikes are common, although strictly prohibited by law. Union leaders
have been followed by the security services, detained for questioning
by police, and subjected to heavy fines, losses of bonuses, and
demotions. Following a strike by dock workers at the Kaliningrad port
over management's refusal to negotiate a collective bargaining
agreement in October 1997, all union members were ``transferred'' to
other brigades that were the last to receive work orders. In order to
move back to a working brigade, workers simply had to resign from the
union. In October the union won a court decision against these
transfers.
In 1995 transportation unions had complained that, because
transportation can be considered an essential service that must be
provided under law, their right to strike was denied. The
Constitutional Court agreed and found that banning industrywide strikes
is unconstitutional, and that each needs to be considered on a case-by-
case basis. However, a subsequent 1995 federal law on collective labor
dispute resolution banned railway strikes. After successful
negotiations with the air traffic controllers' union to avoid a strike,
the Government drafted a regulation that became law in July to ban all
strikes in the air traffic sector.
During the year, there were no prolonged strikes like those that
occurred in recent years. As the Government began to pay salaries and
pensions systematically, the grievance of nonpayment of wages, which
had motivated strikes in previous years, grew less prevalent. According
to official statistics, during the first 11 months of the year there
was a decrease in the number of strikes compared to the same period in
1998. In November some 5,700 workers were on strike at 341
organizations, while in November 1998, some 65,500 workers were on
strike at some 2,135 organizations. In January a national teachers'
strike received considerable publicity and was noteworthy in comparison
to the few minor work slowdowns and stoppages that were scattered in
other sectors.
According to an international labor organization report, on January
27 unknown assailants murdered Gennady Borisov, a leader of the Vnukovo
Airlines Technical and Ground Personnel Union, at the entrance to his
apartment. Earlier that month, Borisov and other labor activists began
picketing the airline headquarters to protest their not being paid for
4 months. Borisov also reportedly was monitoring alleged illegal
practices involving the company's shares (see Section 1.a.).
In October Ministry of Justice troops stormed the Vyborgskyi paper
mill in Leningrad oblast and opened fire on workers who had barricaded
themselves in the factory's administration building. The workers were
protesting the mill's new foreign ownership. Minister of Justice Yuriy
Chayka admitted to the Duma later that month that the troops' actions
were ``lawful in form, but digressed from the law in content'' (see
Section 1.c.).
Unions may freely form federations and affiliate with international
bodies.
b. The Right to Bargain Collectively.--The law provides for the
right of collective bargaining, but this right is not always protected.
The law requires employers to respond to a trade union's initiative and
negotiate with the union; however, the law does not require management
to sign the agreement, even after both sides have signed protocols
approving a draft text. As a result, the right to conclude a collective
agreement is often not protected. In addition, employers often ignore
the requirement to negotiate and refuse to come to the bargaining
table. Various employers successfully refused to negotiate collective
bargaining agreements, particularly for unions not affiliated with the
FNPR. Despite a legal requirement to do so, management also frequently
refuses to provide the financial information demanded by trade unions.
The Ministry of Labor indicates that 5.4 percent of enterprises have
officially registered collective bargaining agreements. It is not
obligatory to register collective agreements, and it is very likely
that there are far more collective agreements than those actually
registered. According to the Ministry of Labor, during the year the
most common causes for strikes, not counting actions over wage arrears,
were the refusal of employers to negotiate or conclude a collective
agreement and the refusal to recognize the union and enter into
negotiations.
A gap in the law, which fails to establish the employer's legal
identity, often makes collective agreements ineffective. Lack of clear
identification of the employer has complicated and delayed tripartite
tariff agreements at the municipal, regional, national, and industrial
levels and has brought their legal validity into question. For example,
in the air traffic controllers' struggle to negotiate a national
compensation agreement, it was unclear who was the employer--the
Federation Aviation Service or the Government Aviation Corporation. As
a result, negotiations dragged out for 2 years, and the Government only
clarified the identity of the employer when faced with a proposed
strike. Even after an agreement is signed, employers often claim that
the ``employer representative'' had not been authorized to represent
the factory involved.
There are no export processing zones. Worker rights in the special
economic zones/free trade zones are covered fully by the Labor Code.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Labor Code
prohibits forced or compulsory labor by adults and children; however,
there were some reports of its use. Soldiers regularly are sent to work
on farms to gather food for their units. There are documented cases of
soldiers being sent by their superior officers to perform work for
private citizens or organizations. There were reports of officers and
sergeants ``selling'' soldiers (see Section 1.c.). Such labor also may
violate military regulations. There were no reports of forced or bonded
labor by children.
According to credible reports in the national media, there are
significant numbers of foreign workers from countries of the former
Soviet Union who are forced to work free or almost free because their
passports are held by firms that brought them into the country. Similar
reports describe North Koreans brought in to work in the construction
and timber industries in the Russian Far East, with salaries remitted
to their Government.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Code prohibits regular employment for children
under the age of 16 and also regulates the working conditions of
children under the age of 18, including banning dangerous, nighttime,
and overtime work. Children may, under certain specific conditions,
work in apprenticeship or internship programs at the ages of 14 and 15.
While in some instances children can be found selling goods on street
corners, accepted social prohibitions against the employment of
children and the availability of adult workers at low wage rates
combine to prevent widespread abuse of child labor legislation.
Homeless children are at risk for exploitation in prostitution or
criminal activities. Other children are used by their parents to lend
credence to their poverty when begging. The mayor of Moscow in August
1998 issued a decree that required enterprises with more than 15
employees either to hire a young intern or disabled person or to
contribute about $59 (1,400 rubles, or the average monthly wage of a
metallurgical worker) per month to the Employment Fund. The absence of
a program to implement the decree encourages the hiring of fictitious
employees to avoid contributing to the Fund. The Government prohibits
forced and bonded labor by children, and there were no reports that it
occurred (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The monthly minimum wage of
$3.33 (83 rubles) is well below the living wage of $38 (950 rubles) per
month, and is insufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. In August 37.7 percent of the population had incomes
below this survival minimum, compared with 21.8 percent 1 year earlier.
However, most workers receive several times the monthly minimum, and
the minimum wage is essentially an accounting reference for calculating
university stipends, pensions, civil service wages, and social
benefits. It is not a number used for real salaries. Enterprises often
use this number to avoid taxation by reporting the number of employees
paid at the minimum wage instead of reporting actual salaries. Various
sources estimate that from 50 to 70 percent of the working population
have extra jobs, the incomes from which are not reported. In addition,
much of the population continues to reside in low-rent or subsidized
housing and receives various social services from enterprises or
municipalities. Dependence on such subsidies, in conjunction with the
residency registration system--illegal but widely practiced--generally
prevents relocation to find work.
The Labor Code provides for a standard workweek of 40 hours, with
at least one 24-hour rest period. The law requires premium pay for
overtime work or work on holidays. Workers have complained of being
required to work well beyond the normal week, that is, 10- to 12-hour
days, of abrogations of negotiated labor agreements, and of forced
transfers. Because of the financial crisis, workers often go without
pay for the normal workweek but are offered cash for overtime work,
which they accept in order to survive.
Nonpayment of wages continues to be the most widespread abuse of
the Labor Code. Wage arrears, which were generally between 3 and 9
months, especially affected workers in the education, medicine,
industry, and energy/coal sectors. Although government salary debt
virtually has been eliminated, the salary debts of enterprise workers
continue to be a problem. Payments to government workers have not been
indexed to account for devaluation of the ruble, and their current
value is about one-quarter of their value when earned. The loss of
purchasing power explains the steady increase of the portion of the
population whose incomes are below the survival minimum. Many
enterprises were forcing employees to take wages in barter, sometimes
in goods with limited appeal. The vast majority of government workers
continue to receive less than the survival level.
Although a small but increasing percentage (perhaps 6 percent) of
workers owed back wages seek relief through the court system, this has
proved to be a lengthy process. Courts often are willing to rule in
favor of employees, but the collection of back wages is difficult.
Courts often insist that cases be filed individually, in contradiction
to the law on trade unions, thereby undercutting union attempts to
include the entire membership in one case. This insistence also makes
the process lengthier and more difficult for the affected workers and
exposes them to possible retaliation. It is widespread practice to
remove the names of workers who win judgments for back wages, but have
not yet received the wages, from the list of those who can buy food on
credit from the company store. At least one appeals court has ruled in
favor of employees who demanded indexation of back wage payments.
The problem of wage arrears is aggravated by limitations on labor
mobility. For various reasons, many workers are not able to move to
other areas of the country in search of work. Many say that they are
constrained economically: Their savings were destroyed by the rampant
inflation of the early 1990's; they have not been paid for periods of 5
to 9 months; and their freedom to move in search of new employment is
limited further by the system of residency permits (see Section 2.d.).
These workers effectively are tied to enterprises that can give them
only credits at the company cafeteria and grocery and the hope of
future salary payments. The knowledge that workers cannot easily move
across regions and find employment has made managers in some one-
factory towns reluctant to lay off workers. Also, due to the inability
of the local Employment Agency to provide benefits or to absorb laid-
off employees from one factory towns, local governors and mayors often
overturn the enterprises' decisions to lay off workers who are not
really working. Other factors, such as the availability of subsidized
housing and cultural ties to locations, also inhibited the movement of
workers. By decriminalizing the nonpayment of wages and by maintaining
the system of residency permits, the Government has restricted even
further the mobility of labor. Approximately 4 million workers were
considered ``underemployed'' due to involuntary leave or curtailed
hours.
The law establishes minimal conditions for workplace safety and
worker health, but these standards are not enforced, as the
Government's efforts in this area did not increase during the year.
Workers wear little protective equipment in factories, enterprises
store hazardous materials in open areas, and smoking is permitted near
containers of flammable substances. As economic activity continued to
decline during the year, funds were not available for safety and health
in the workplace. The pressure for survival displaced concern for
safety. For example, trade union sources have reported that it has
become commonplace for miners to remove the supports from mineshafts
and sell them for scrap metal. Doctors' unions admitted to various
international agencies that health and safety equipment provided to the
hospitals was sold to patients' families, due to the wage arrears
crisis and the fact that even when doctors and nurses are paid on time,
their salaries are below the survival level. A worker at the Uralmash
Machine Building Factory had 6 months of wage arrears and had to work a
second job. When he fainted on the job, doctors associated his loss of
consciousness and consequent injury with malnutrition and exhaustion
from working at his second job. However, union leaders state that if
work were conducted only in accordance with health and safety
regulations, 70 percent of all work would stop.
Workers were still at high levels of risk of industrial accidents
or death. Reliable, recent statistics on accident and death rates for
workers were not available.
The Labor Code establishes workers' right to remove themselves from
hazardous or life-threatening work situations without endangering their
continued employment and entitlements to such compensations as shorter
hours, increased vacations, extra pay, and pension benefits for working
under such conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and young girls is
a problem, but there are no reliable estimates of its scope (also see
Section 5).
Particularly because of a lack of adequate employment
opportunities, a significant number of women are victims of
international trafficking for sexual exploitation. Reliable statistics
on the number of women involved are difficult to obtain. NGO's allege
that Russian organized crime increasingly is involved in trafficking in
women and children, but reliable data are not available. Often, women
respond to advertisements promising well-paying jobs abroad, where they
are forced into prostitution. The Global Survival Network, an
international NGO, completed a comprehensive 2-year study of
trafficking in the former Soviet Union in 1997. The study concluded
that most women being trafficked are unwitting participants who respond
to advertisements while searching for legitimate work. Some government
officials and law enforcement agencies acknowledge that a trafficking
problem exists. However, the belief that women are aware of the risks
involved is still pervasive. NGO's charge that exploited women commonly
are refused help by Russian consular officials abroad. Women reportedly
are trafficked to European Union countries, the Middle East, and the
U.S.
According to credible reports in the national media, there are
significant numbers of foreign workers from countries of the former
Soviet Union who are forced to work free or almost free because their
passports are held by firms which brought them into the country (also
see Section 1.c.).
There were also reports of officers and sergeants ``selling''
soldiers (see Section 1.c.).
______
SAN MARINO
San Marino is a democratic, multiparty republic. The popularly
elected Parliament (the Great and General Council--GGC) selects two of
its members to serve as the Captains Regent (co-Heads of State). They
preside over meetings of the GGC and of the Cabinet (Congress of
State), which has 10 other members (Secretaries of State), also
selected by the GGC. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has
some of the prerogatives of a prime minister. The Government respects
the law's provisions for an independent judiciary in practice.
Elected officials effectively control the centralized police
organization (the Civil Police) and the two military corps (the
Gendarmerie and the Guardie di Rocca).
The principal economic activities are tourism, farming, light
manufacturing, and banking. In addition to revenue from taxes and
customs, the government also derives revenue from the sale of coins and
postage stamps to collectors throughout the world and from an annual
budget subsidy provided by the Italian government under the terms of
the Basic Treaty with Italy.
The legal system extensively provides for human rights, and the
authorities respect them in practice. Although the Parliament and the
Government have demonstrated strong commitment to the protection of
human rights, some laws discriminate against women, particularly with
regard to the transmission of citizenship.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such practices, and there were no
reports that officials employed them.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile, and the Government observes
these prohibitions.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process. The judicial system requires that the country's lower
court judges be non-Sammarinese citizens, with a view to assuring
impartiality.
A local conciliation judge handles cases of minor importance. Other
cases are handled by the non-Sammarinese judges who serve under
contract to the government. The final court of review is the Council of
Twelve, a group of judges chosen for 6-year terms (four replaced every
2 years) from among the members of the GGC.
The law provides for the right to a fair trial, and an independent
judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices. Government
authorities respect these prohibitions, and violations are subject to
effective legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
speech and of the press, and the Government respects these rights in
practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for these rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government respects this right in practice.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice.
The Government cooperates with the Office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations.
Although it does not formally offer asylum to refugees, the government
has given a few individuals de facto asylum by permitting them to
reside and work in the country. The issue of the provision of first
asylum did not arise during the year; nor were there any reports of the
forced repatriation of refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage.
Women who wish to participate in government or politics face no
impediments. In 1974 the first female member was elected to the GGC.
Since then, women have served on the Council as Secretary of State for
Internal Affairs and as Captain Regent. All women's branches of the
political parties have been integrated into the mainstream party
organizations, where women hold important positions.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no domestic human rights organizations, although the
Government does not impede their formation. The Government has declared
itself open to outsiders' investigations of alleged abuses, but there
have been no known requests.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination based on race, religion,
disability, language, or social status, and the authorities respect
these provisions. The law also prohibits some forms of discrimination
based on sex, but vestiges of legal as well as societal discrimination
against women remain.
Women.--The law provides for the protection of women from violence,
and occurrences of such violence, including spousal abuse, are rare.
Several laws provide specifically for the equality of women in the
workplace and elsewhere. In practice there is no discrimination in pay
or working conditions. All careers are open to women, including careers
in the military and police as well as the highest public offices.
However, one law discriminates against women by stipulating that a
woman who marries a foreigner cannot transmit citizenship to her
husband or children, but that a man who marries a foreigner can do so
to both his wife and their children. In a September 12 referendum, the
electorate by a very narrow margin failed to confirm a change to the
law that was approved by Parliament on June 16. The proposed law would
have provided for the transmission of Sammarinese citizenship by women,
but it was narrowly defeated despite support by all political parties.
The Government plans to present a new bill supporting women's equal
rights in transmitting citizenship in the near future.
The referendum also failed to confirm a provision that would revoke
the citizenship of women who acquired citizenship through marriage
after 5 years of divorce if they no longer reside in the country. This
provision was included in the proposed law after the Government had
noted that several young Eastern European women recently had married
significantly older citizens, presumably with the aim of acquiring
citizenship.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public education
and medical care. No differences are apparent in the treatment of girls
and boys in educational or health care, nor is there any societal
pattern of abuse directed against children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no discrimination against
disabled persons in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. A 1992 law established guidelines for easier access to
public buildings, but its implementation is incomplete.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--By law all workers (except the armed
forces but including the police) are free to form and join unions. A
1961 law sets the conditions for establishment of a union. Unions
freely may form domestic federations or join international labor
federations.
Union members constitute about half of the country's work force
(which numbers about 10,300 Sammarinese citizens plus 4,000 Italians
from the country's total population of about 25,000 persons).
Trade unions are independent of the government and the political
parties, but they have close informal ties with the parties, which
exercise strong influence on them.
Workers in all nonmilitary occupations have the right to strike. No
general strikes occurred in at least the last 9 years. However, during
this period some brief sector-wide and company strikes took place.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law gives
collective bargaining agreements the force of law and prohibits
antiunion discrimination by employers. Effective mechanisms exist to
resolve complaints. Negotiations are conducted freely, often in the
presence of government officials (usually from the Labor and Industry
Departments) by invitation from both the unions and the employers'
association. For the last several years, all complaints have been
resolved amicably by a ``conciliatory committee'' composed of labor
union and business association representatives and government
officials.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor, including by children, and the Government
enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
the Government enforces this prohibition (see Section 6.c.). The
minimum working age and compulsory education age ceiling is 16 years.
The Ministry of Labor and Cooperation permits no exceptions. Most
students continue in school until age 18.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Since January 1, the legal
minimum wage has been approximately $1,200 (2.16 million lira) per
month, which affords a decent living for a worker and family. Wages
were generally higher than the minimum.
The law sets the workweek at 36 hours in public administration and
37\1/2\ hours in industry and private business, with 24 hours of rest
per week for workers in either category.
The law stipulates safety and health standards, and the judicial
system monitors them. Most workplaces implement the standards
effectively, but there are some exceptions, notably in the construction
industry.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
SERBIA-MONTENEGRO
Serbia-Montenegro is dominated by Slobodan Milosevic, who continues
to control the country through his role as President of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and more importantly, as President of the
Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)--a dual arrangement proscribed by the
federal Constitution--and his domination of other formal and informal
institutions. Although the SPS lacks majorities in both the Federal and
Serbian Parliaments, it controls governing coalitions and holds the key
administrative positions. Since federal authority is exercised
effectively only over the Republic of Serbia, and even there, not in
Kosovo, the human rights situations in Montenegro and Kosovo are dealt
with in separate annexes following this report. The Milosevic regime
effectively controls the judiciary and respects the country's legal
framework only when it suits the regime's immediate political
interests.
Serbia abolished, in all but name, the political autonomy of Kosovo
and Vojvodina in 1990; all significant decisionmaking since that time
until 1999 had been centralized under the Milosevic regime in Belgrade.
Starting in 1998, republic authorities in Montenegro clearly began to
increase their efforts to assert their authority incrementally in
Montenegro. Milosevic's control over Kosovo ceased in June 1999, when
it came under the authority of the United Nations Interim
Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The Milosevic regime's
oppressive policies toward Kosovo's ethnic Albanians quashed any
prospect of interethnic cooperation and subsequently led to a full-
fledged separatist insurgency that erupted in early 1998. In response
the regime undertook a brutal police and military crackdown against the
separatist insurgents and civilian population in Kosovo. After talks in
February and March 1999 in Rambouillet failed to resolve the matter
diplomatically, Serbian forces continued a full-fledged campaign of
ethnic cleansing against civilians and forced 850,000 Kosovar Albanians
to flee the province, and hundreds of thousands of Kosovar Albanians
were internally displaced. NATO forces began an air campaign against
the Serbian forces and regime on March 24. The NATO campaign succeeded,
forcing Milosevic to withdraw his troops from Kosovo in early June and
allowing refugees and displaced persons to return to Kosovo.
The international community does not recognize the FRY--Serbia-
Montenegro--as the sole successor state to the former Yugoslavia.
Accordingly, the ``FRY'' still is not permitted to take the Yugoslavia
seat in the U.N. or to participate the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or other international organizations and
financial organizations.
As a key element of his hold on power, President Milosevic
effectively controls the Serbian police, a heavily armed force of some
100,000 officers that is responsible for internal security. Milosevic
effectively has destroyed the constitutional role of the Supreme
Defense Council, essentially establishing himself as commander-in-chief
of the Yugoslav Army (VJ), which also was employed in the brutal
campaign prosecuted against the citizens of Kosovo. Serbian police and
military forces committed numerous serious and systematic human rights
abuses, especially in Kosovo.
Economic performance was anemic as a result of general inefficiency
in the economy, corruption, and continued resistance to reform and
privatization, the imposition of strengthened international sanctions
in response to the situation in Kosovo, the country's increased pariah
status following the conflict, its continued exclusion from
international financial institutions, and the damage inflicted on
infrastructure during the conflict with the international community.
Unemployment and underemployment remained high, reaching at least 60
percent, since the Government was unable or unwilling to introduce
necessary restructuring measures. The Government failed to implement
needed sweeping economic reforms, including privatization, which could
help the economy but also could undermine the regime's crony system.
The Government's poor human rights record worsened significantly,
and there were serious problems in many areas. In practice citizens
cannot exercise the right to change their government. Serbian police
were responsible for numerous serious abuses, including extrajudicial
killings, disappearances, torture, brutal beatings, rape, arbitrary
arrest and detention in Kosovo. Impunity for those who commit human
rights abuses remains a serious problem. The judicial system is not
independent of the Government, suffers from corruption, and does not
ensure fair trials. The authorities infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. The Government severely restricted freedom of speech and of the
press, and used overbearing police intimidation and economic pressure
to control tightly the independent press and media. Most journalists
practice self-censorship. The Government restricted freedom of assembly
and association. While under the Constitution citizens have a right to
stage peaceful demonstrations, in practice police seriously beat scores
of democratic opposition protesters throughout the republic of Serbia,
sending many to hospitals. The Government infringed on freedom of
worship by minority religions and restricted freedom of movement. The
Milosevic regime has used its continued domination of Parliament and
the media to enact legislation to manipulate the electoral process. The
most recent electoral manipulation by the regime was in the Serbian
parliamentary and presidential elections in the fall of 1997. The
Federal and Serbian Governments' record of cooperation with
international human rights and monitoring organizations was poor. The
Government routinely hindered the activities of human rights groups.
The Federal Government remained uncooperative with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY): it failed to meet
its obligations under numerous U.N. Security Council Resolutions to
comply fully with the Tribunal's orders, failed to issue visas to allow
ICTY investigators into Kosovo and the rest of Serbia, and failed to
transfer or facilitate the surrender to the Tribunal of persons on
Serbian territory indicted for war crimes or other crimes against
humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Instead, the Milosevic
regime openly harbored indicted war criminals--three of whom the
Government openly acknowledged were present on Serbian territory--and
publicly rejected the Tribunal's jurisdiction over events in Kosovo. In
May Milosevic and four top lieutenants were indicted by the ICTY in
connection with the regime's brutal campaign against the citizens of
Kosovo. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious
problems. Discrimination and violence against ethnic Albanians,
Muslims, Roma, and other religious and ethnic minorities worsened
during the year. Police repression continued to be directed against
ethnic minorities and police committed the most widespread and worst
abuses against Kosovo's 90 percent ethnic Albanian population. Police
repression also was directed against Muslims in the Sandzak region and
other citizens who protested against the Government. The regime limits
unions not affiliated with the Government in their attempts to advance
worker rights. There was some child labor and the country served as a
transit point for trafficking in women and girls.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political violence,
including thousands of killings by police, became a significant problem
in the first 6 months of the year as a result of the conflict in Kosovo
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.g. in Kosovo annex). In addition instances of
apparently politically motivated killings occurred in central Serbia.
In April Slavko Curuvija, the publisher of the independent Belgrade-
based tabloid, Dnevni Telegraf and the news biweekly Evropljanin was
murdered outside his apartment by unidentified assailants. On October
3, a suspicious accident occurred involving a car transporting
prominent Serbian opposition politician Vuk Draskovic. Draskovic's
Serbian Renewal Movement claimed credibly that the incident was an
attempt on his life by the regime. Although Draskovic sustained only
minor injuries, Draskovic's brother-in-law Veselin Boskovic, director
of the Belgrade Directorate for Construction, and three of Draskovic's
bodyguards died in the crash.
VJ troops in Montenegro committed extrajudicial killings (see
Section 1.a. in Montenegro annex).
According to an international human rights NGO, at least five
persons died from abuse in prison during 1998 in Serbia. The number of
deaths from prison abuse during the year was probably significantly
higher.
The Federal Government, in contravention of repeated U.N. Security
Council resolutions, denied investigators from the ICTY access to any
part of Kosovo during the first 6 months of the year and prevented them
from undertaking a thorough and independent investigation into
atrocities committed in Kosovo during 1998 and the first half of 1999,
which fall under the Tribunal's jurisdiction (see Section 4).
In November a Serb police car hit a land mine near the Serbian side
of the border with Kosovo, resulting in three deaths and leaving six
persons injured. In the border region near Kursumlija since June, there
were 16 attacks attributed to Kosovo Liberation Army members (KLA) or
ethnic Albanians, who killed 6 persons (including the 3 policemen) and
wounded 7 others.
b. Disappearance.--There were reports of thousands of
disappearances of individuals from Kosovo during the first six months
of the year (see Section 1.b. of Kosovo annex). Thousands of Kosovar
Albanians reportedly were incarcerated in prisons in Central Serbia
during and following the conflict in Kosovo. Federal and Serbian
government authorities have not cooperated fully with efforts to
account for the missing or allowed the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) or other international organizations access to many
detention facilities, but have released some prisoners in return for
cash payments from relatives. However, the ICRC was allowed to visit
more than 1,600 prisoners.
VJ troops in Montenegro abducted Kosovar refugees (see Section 1.b.
in Montenegro annex).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of
punishment; however, Serbian security authorities regularly and
systematically used torture, beatings in detention, and other forms of
abuse against citizens, especially the ethnic Albanian population in
Kosovo during the first 6 months of the year. Serb security forces
engaged in rape of Albanian women in Kosovo (see Section 1.c. of Kosovo
annex). Aside from the brutal conduct of security forces against the
Albanian Kosovar community, the worst police brutality takes place
during the 3 to 4 day period of incommunicado detention allowed by law.
At least five men died in custody in 1998--all individuals who were in
good health prior to their detention by Serbian police, according to
international human rights groups. It is likely that the number of
deaths in custody during the year was much higher. Evidence of torture
in detention is widespread.
In the first half of the year, in addition to and prior to the
regime's brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing, ethnic Albanians
continued to suffer at the hands of security forces conducting searches
for weapons, ammunition, and explosives. The police, without following
proper legal procedures, frequently extracted ``confessions'' during
interrogations that routinely include the beating of suspects' feet,
hands, genital areas, and sometimes heads. The police use their fists,
nightsticks, and occasionally electric shocks. Apparently confident
that there would be no reprisals, and in an attempt to intimidate the
wider community, police often beat persons in front of their families.
There has been virtually no prosecution of those responsible. According
to various sources, while Kosovo remained under Serbian control, ethnic
Albanians frequently were too terrified to ask police to follow proper
legal procedures--such as having them provide written notice of witness
interrogation. In some cases, Serbian police also used threats and
violence against family members of suspects and held them as hostages
(see Section 1.c. of Kosovo annex).
On July 6, police beat and used tear gas on some 2,000 protesters
who assembled at a police station in Leskovac to call for Milosevic's
resignation and the release of a local television broadcaster, Ivan
Novkovic. Novkovic was detained for broadcasting allegations of
corruption against a regional official and for urging protests that
occurred on July 6 and drew some 20,000 participants (see Section
2.b.). According to media reports on July 8, Leskovac district governor
Zivojin Stefanovic threatened a human rights activist with a gun, and
police detained the activist's brother, who had organized the
demonstrations (see Section 1.d.).
On September 29, riot police in Belgrade used batons and water
cannons to disperse some 30,000 demonstrators who were calling for
greater democracy in the country. Dozens of demonstrators, and several
journalists were injured. Reportedly cameramen for international news
agencies were beaten and their cameras were destroyed. After 8 days of
peaceful protests, police used force after demonstrators started
marching toward the Dedinje district, where Milosevic's residence and
office are located. According to the Interior Ministry, ``hooligans''
attacked police officers with bricks, stones, and sticks and injured
five officers. Police subsequently arrested several members of the
opposition Social Democratic Party in their Belgrade offices, along
with other activists (see Section 2.b.).
On September 30, Belgrade police again used force against
antigovernment protesters. According to press reports, some 50,000
persons demonstrated, and police beat protesters and injured some 30
persons, including a 7-year-old girl, as they tried to disperse the
crowd. According to an official government statement, ``hooligans''
attacked police officers with stones, bricks, and glass bottles, and
police arrested some 21 persons.
On October 13, police officers in Belgrade rushed into a crowd of
demonstrators and beat three persons, including a photographer for a
foreign news agency. According to press reports, police officers beat a
few other persons when a small scuffle broke out.
On October 14, riot police beat some 10 protestors in Nis, who had
gathered along a street in Nis along which buses full of SPS supporters
were to pass. The SPS supporters came to Nis to listen to Serbian
President Milutinovic, who was reopening a bridge that was damaged by
NATO air strikes. Reportedly one protestor was taken away in an
ambulance.
On October 13, some 30 young men attacked antigovernment protestors
in Belgrade and injured at least 5 of them. Some 100 protesters had
gathered in front of a Belgrade hotel, when a few cars stopped, and
young men jumped out of the cars and started beating and kicking the
protesters.
On October 17, a leader of the opposition Democratic Party in
Valjevo reported that a bomb exploded on the balcony of his home and
damaged the entrance to the house.
Prior to the conflict with NATO, prison conditions met minimum
international standards. Nevertheless, according to human rights
monitors based in Belgrade, prison conditions are deteriorating, in
part due to declining state resources. There were few confirmed reports
of the abuse of prisoners once they were sentenced and serving time.
The vast majority of cases of torture occur before detainees are
charged with offenses or during the period between the filing of
charges and the commencement of the trial.
Although the Government generally had permitted prison visits by
human rights monitors with sporadic access often subject to the whim of
local officials, access was poor for much of the year, although it
improved slightly after the conflict. On several occasions, outside
monitors, including representatives of the ICRC, were denied access to
individuals reportedly held by Serbian police, especially draft evaders
and Kosovar Albanians--perhaps several thousand--whom retreating
security forces transferred from Kosovo after hostilities ceased.
However, the ICRC had no access to or information about persons
detained in military detention facilities at year's end. The Government
acknowledged that it held as many as 1,900 Kosovar Albanians in Serbian
jails, most of whom were transferred there from Kosovo in early June
before NATO's arrival in the province. The 1,900 ethnic Albanians, some
200 of whom were released by year's end, were being held in 13
facilities, and all of them were visited by the ICRC at least once
during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Police use of arbitrary
arrest and detention was concentrated primarily in Kosovo and, to a
lesser degree, in Sandzak. Serbian police often apply certain laws only
against ethnic minorities and used force with relative impunity.
Sandzak Muslims as well as Kosovo Albanians were subjected to trumped
up or exaggerated charges, ranging from unlawful possession of firearms
to willfully undermining the country's territorial integrity (see
Section 1.d. of Kosovo annex).
Laws regarding conspiracy, threats to the integrity of the
Government, and state secrets are so vague as to allow easy abuse by
the regime. Two Australian aid workers for Care International and a
local employee were charged with spying in April. Following their
convictions and after serving part of their sentences, the Australians
were released in the fall and the local employee was released in
December. The case was widely regarded as an attempt by the Government
to coerce the Government of Australia to withdraw its support for the
NATO bombing campaign.
Federal statutes permit the police to detain criminal suspects
without a warrant and hold them incommunicado for up to 3 days without
charging them or granting them access to an attorney. Serbian law
separately provides for a 24-hour detention period. The police often
combine the two for a total 4-day detention period. After this period,
police must turn over a suspect to an investigative judge, who may
order a 30-day extension and, under certain legal procedures,
subsequent extensions of investigative detention up to 6 months.
Defense lawyers and human rights workers complained of excessive
delays by Serbian authorities in filing formal charges and opening
investigations. The ability of defense attorneys to challenge the legal
basis of their clients' detention often was hampered further by
difficulties in gaining access to detainees or acquiring copies of
official indictments and decisions to remand defendants into custody.
In some cases, judges prevented defense attorneys from reading the
court file. Investigative judges in Serbia often delegated their
responsibility for carrying out investigations to the police or members
of the state security service and rarely questioned their accounts of
the investigation--even when it was obvious that confessions were
coerced from the accused. Results of such sham investigations then were
used in court to convict defendants on trumped up charges.
Dozens of foreign journalists who were reporting on the beginning
of NATO airstrikes in March were detained by authorities, had their
operations shut down, and were deported (see Section 2.a.).
In July local television broadcaster Ivan Novkovic was detained in
Leskovac for broadcasting allegations of corruption involving a
district official and encouraging citizen protests which occurred on
July 6 and drew some 20,000 participants (see Section 2.b.). Pavic
Obradovic, the brother of Social Democracy leader Vuk Obradovic, was
detained briefly in connection with the protest.
On July 1 police in Novi Sad arrested four members of the
opposition League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina. The four were
distributing leaflets calling on residents to participate in a
demonstration in Uzice on July 2.
On July 1, the Office of the Military Prosecutor issued a warrant
for the arrest of Democratic Party leader Zoran Djindjic for not
responding to the draft call during the Kosovo conflict. Djindjic
instead went into hiding in Montenegro. In early July Djindjic returned
to Belgrade, and in August military prosecutors dropped the draft
evasion charges against him. Also in July, a military court in Uzice
sentenced Goran Vesic, a Democratic Party activist and Belgrade city
councilman, to 2 years in prison for evading the draft and for high
treason. Vesic denied that he had received a draft notice.
On July 8, following several days of protests against the
government in Leskovac, police detained one of the protest's organizers
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). On July 15, a Leskovac court continued
proceedings against nine participants in an antigovernment protest. The
nine were charged with allegedly damaging the home of a pro-Milosevic
official during a recent demonstration.
After police used force against antigovernment protesters in
Belgrade on September 29, police detained several members of the Social
Democratic Party, including Pavic Obradovic, as well as other
opposition activist (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
In December police arrested Teki Bokoshi, an ethnic Albanian
defense attorney, who is defending many Kosovar Albanians detained in
Serbian prisons. Bokoshi was arrested as he was traveling back to
Belgrade after visiting clients in Sremska Mitrovica.
VJ troops in Montenegro detained Kosovar refugees and journalists
(see Section 1.d. in Montenegro annex).
An estimated 1,900 to as many as 7,000 prisoners from Kosovo still
are detained in prisons in Serbia. Following the conflict, the ICRC,
the only international organization with access to Serbian prisons, was
able to secure the release of 166 Kosovar Albanian prisoners on June 27
and 54 prisoners on October 4.
Exile is not permitted legally, and no instances of its use are
known to have occurred. However, the authorities attempted to
ethnically cleanse Kosovo of its ethnic Albanian population in the mass
expulsion of citizens during the spring campaign, during which
authorities confiscated the identity documents of citizens who fled the
province to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and
Albania. Also, the practical effect of police repression in Kosovo and
Sandzak has been to accentuate political instability, which in turn has
limited economic opportunity. As a result, many ethnic Albanians and
Bosniak Muslims went abroad to escape persecution even before the
outbreak of hostilities. In only a few cases could direct links to
police actions be identified.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice, Federal and Serbian courts
largely are controlled by the Government and rarely challenge the will
of the state security apparatus. Judicial corruption is also
widespread. While judges are elected for fixed terms, they may be
subjected to governmental pressure. Serbian authorities frequently deny
fair public trial to non-Serbs and persons whom they believe oppose the
regime. The fraud that followed the November 1996 municipal elections
was perpetrated mainly through the regime's misuse of the judicial
system.
The court system comprises local, district, and supreme courts at
the republic level, as well as a Federal Court and Federal
Constitutional Court to which republic supreme court decisions,
depending on the subject, may be appealed. There is also a military
court system. According to the Federal Constitution, the Federal
Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of laws and
regulations and relies on the constituent republic authorities to
enforce its rulings.
The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia remains in force. Considerable confusion and room for
abuse remain in the legal system because the 1990 Constitution of
Serbia has not yet been brought into conformity with the 1992
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Under federal law,
defendants have the right to be present at their trial and to have an
attorney represent them, at public expense if needed. The courts also
must provide interpreters. The presiding judge decides what is read
into the record of the proceedings. Either the defendant or the
prosecutor has the right to appeal the verdict.
Although generally respected in form, defense lawyers, especially
those representing minority clients, have filed numerous complaints
about flagrant breaches of standard procedure, which they believed
undermined their clients' rights. Even when individual judges admitted
that the lawyers were correct, the courts ignored or dismissed the
complaints.
The Government continues to pursue cases previously brought against
targeted minority groups under the Yugoslav Criminal Code for
jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the country and for
conspiring or forming a group with intent to commit subversive
activities--that is, undermining the ``constitutional order.'' Most of
the cases involved alleged violations under the Federal Penal Code's
Article 136 related to ``association to conduct enemy activity, or
Article 125 concerning ``terrorism.'' There is no clear estimate as to
how many persons remain imprisoned on these charges (see Section 1.d.).
Among the most prominent is the case of Dr. Flora Brovina of Pristina,
who was transferred from Kosovo to Nis in early July, tried and
convicted on such charges, and in December sentenced to 12 years of
incarceration.
Generally, the evidence in such cases was inadequate, and the
defendants largely were denied timely access to their attorneys. In
Kosovo in the first 6 months of the year, Serb judges in the municipal
and district court system reportedly lacked impartiality in trying
ethnic Albanian defendants and much evidence appeared to have been
obtained by authorities through forced confessions of defendants under
duress (see Section 1.e. of Kosovo annex).
Many legal scholars have expressed concern over the Act on Lawyers,
passed in July 1998, which they believe restricted the freedoms of
lawyers and interfered with the independence of lawyers in their
dealings with clients. They believed that the law gives too much
authority to the lawyers' chambers--both at the republic and federal
levels--which the Helsinki Committee alleges would enable the regime to
exercise stricter control over the profession. According to a Serbian
Constitutional Court judge, the law also enabled the regime to
interfere with the lawyer-client relationship, which, even during the
Communist era, was upheld to a greater degree.
Ukshin Hoti, leader of UNIKOMB, a political party that advocates
Kosovo's unification with Albania, was in detention for the entire
year. Hoti was in a Nis jail and was reportedly in poor health. His
lawyers have been denied access to him since February 1998. Hoti was
serving a 4-year sentence in a prison in Nis and was to be released on
May 17. However, the Pristina-based Council for Human Rights was unable
to locate Hoti as of July.
Since 1998 republic-level judges no longer have mandates for life
and are required to seek office periodically through election. This
process involves obtaining Justice Ministry approval for each judge's
candidacy. Local observers fear that the provision in effect makes
judges functionaries of the regime, easily removed if they do not
cooperate.
The Government continues to hold some ethnic Albanians as political
prisoners, with estimates ranging from 1,900 to 7,000.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
Federal law gives republic ministries of the interior sole control over
the decision to monitor potential criminal activities, a power that
routinely is abused. It is widely believed that authorities monitor
opposition and dissident activity, eavesdrop on conversations, read
mail, and wiretap telephones. Access to international e-mail has been
granted exclusively to one server, a company controlled by an associate
of President Milosevic's. Although illegal under provisions of federal
and Serbian law, the federal post office registers all mail from
abroad, ostensibly to protect mail carriers from charges of theft.
Although the law includes restrictions on searches, officials often
ignored them. In Kosovo, prior to the establishment of U.N. authority
over the province, and in Sandzak, Serbian police systematically
subjected ethnic Albanians and Muslims to random searches of their
homes, vehicles, shops, and offices. Police explained their actions by
asserting that they were searching for weapons. The police carried out
scores of such raids on homes, including in areas not affected by the
fighting. Police used threats and violence against family members of
suspects (see Section 1.c.).
Serbian security forces systematically destroyed entire villages in
Kosovo by burning and shelling houses, contaminating water wells, and
killing livestock (see Section 1.g. of Kosovo annex).
A government law requiring universal military service is enforced
only sporadically; it was not enforced vigorously during the year. The
informal practice of the military has been not to call up ethnic
Albanians. However, in Montenegro VJ troops forcibly conscripted youths
(see Section 1.f. of Montenegro annex). Of approximately 100,000 draft
evaders living abroad at the start of the year to avoid punishment, 40
percent were estimated to be ethnic Albanian. This number in part
reflects the large number of conscription-age men in the FRY's Albanian
community. Leaders of Kosovo's Albanian and Sandzak's Muslim
communities maintained that when forced compliance of these groups with
universal military service did occur, it was an attempt to induce young
men to flee the country. According to an amnesty bill passed in 1996,
up to 12,000 young men for whom criminal prosecution for draft evasion
already had started were granted amnesty. Others who did not fall into
this category were told that if they returned to the FRY their cases
would be reviewed on a ``case-by-case'' basis, a policy that has not
inspired confidence among offenders. A law passed in October 1998
stated that draft dodgers who did not report for military service would
forfeit their right to inheritance. In many cases FRY officials have
refused to issue proper travel documents to children born to asylum
seekers (see Section 2.d.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The conflict in Kosovo placed civilian populations
on both sides of the ethnic divide in an unusually vulnerable position.
The excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian police forces
and the Yugoslav Army resulted in widespread civilian casualties, and
the mass forced displacement of up to 1.3 million persons (see Section
1.g. in Kosovo annex).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--Federal law provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Serbian and Federal
Governments severely restricted this right in practice. During the
year, the Milosevic regime continued its unprecedented repression of
these freedoms that it began in 1998.
The regime cracked down on the independent media. On April 11,
Slavko Curuvija, the publisher of Dnevi Telegraf, was shot and killed
by unidentified gunmen outside his apartment building (see Section
1.a.). He had been harassed numerous times by Serbian authorities
during the preceding months; his newspaper had been fined in March, and
he had been sentenced to 5 months in jail for refusing to pay the fine,
although he was still waiting for the results of his appeal at the time
of his murder. Several days before his murder, a commentary that was
broadcast on state television attacked Curuvija and accused him of
supporting NATO's bombing of Serbia. The newspaper was closed down
following Curuvija's death.
The federal and Serbian authorities' efforts at intimidation also
spread to Montenegro, where Miodrag Perovic, head of the independent
weekly Monitor and Antenna M Radio, went into hiding in April to avoid
capture by the VJ. Radio Free Montenegro head Nebojsa Redzic also went
into hiding in May. The army had issued warrants for both men's
arrests.
On September 29, police in Belgrade beat and injured several
journalists who were reporting on antigovernment protests. Cameramen
for international news agencies were beaten and their cameras were
destroyed. Dozens of foreign journalists who were reporting on the
beginning of NATO airstrikes in March were detained by authorities, had
their operations shut down, and were deported.
In July police in Cacak confiscated a tape recording made by a
correspondent for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. The journalist was
covering opposition activities in the town.
The Serbian Government issued a decree in October 1998 that
effectively allowed press censorship. The decree reflected a
recognition of the threat to the regime of the free flow of information
and ideas on issues related to the situation in Kosovo and the
possibility--at that time--of a conflict with NATO. In October 1998, it
later passed a new information law, which incorporated many of the
decree's strict provisions and left the country's independent media
severely constrained. Under the law, private citizens or organizations
can bring suit against media outlets for printing materials not
sufficiently patriotic, or ``against the territorial integrity,
sovereignty, and independence of the country.'' Media outlets also can
be fined for publishing items of a personal nature without the consent
of the individual concerned (an apparent reference to political
cartoons). The rebroadcast of foreign news programs, including from the
British Broadcasting Corporation and the Voice of America, was banned.
Media outlets whose practices do not conform to the new law may be
subjected to exorbitant fines, which must be paid within a 24-hour
period. For example, Radio Pancevo was fined the dinar equivalent of
nearly $40,000 for ``use of state owned frequencies'' in July. The
station was known for its factual, if cautious, reporting on the war in
Kosovo. In March authorities fined the newspapers Glas Javnosti, Danas,
and Blic a total of some $45,000 (Din 770,000) for publishing a
statement by the Belgrade city ``shadow government'' which accused the
city's cultural secretary of responsibility for a decline in the city's
cultural institutions. On September 11, a court fined Cacanski Glas
$13,500 (Din 350,000) on criminal charges for an article which reported
the charges made by opposition leader Vuk Draskovic against a local
financial official. The official concerned earlier won some $22,600 in
damages in a civil suit against Cacanski Glas.
In June, the FRY Parliament passed an amendment to the Law on the
Yugoslav Army that granted the Minister of Defense ``broad powers''
over information and telecommunications for ``the needs of defense.''
The amendment relaxed somewhat the level of control over the media, but
nevertheless envisioned the Government's ability to sanction media that
do not serve ``the needs of reconstruction.'' During the ``State of
War,'' the Serbian Information Ministry and a special military Office
for Information and Morale sought to control editorial content and
commentary by providing the media with regular guidance that included
``approved adjectives'' and terms for use in the printed media. Special
censors were deployed to printing houses to ensure compliance with
guidance.
In January authorities took control of the only regular economic
publication in Serbia, Ekonomska Politika, by installing a government-
approved editor and announcing that it would be a part of the Borba
publishing house. To protest the takeover, 11 of the 15 staff members
of the magazine left and launched a new economic weekly.
Television and radio stations, including the independent city radio
in Nis and STV Negotin, remained shut down during the year, as a result
of the regime's manipulation of confusing regulations governing
frequency allocations. Radio Contact in Pristina was shut down through
June while Kosovo was still under Serbian government administration.
The deliberate vagueness of the relevant laws often is utilized to
penalize independent electronic media outlets. Radio and television
stations are harassed bureaucratically according to their political
orientations. Instead of obtaining long-term licenses to broadcast,
stations receive only 1-year temporary licenses, if they receive a
license at all. The bureaucratic procedures are so difficult that
stations frequently cannot fulfill all of the requirements--leaving
them at the mercy of the regime. For example, under current law, to
obtain a license to broadcast, a station must obtain the approval of a
government ``construction inspector'' for its office space. However, to
obtain a construction inspector's approval, a station needs a broadcast
license. In June VK Radio in Kikinda was closed down twice in 3 days.
Serbian police gave a number of implausible explanations for the
closures.
In addition to license issuance problems, those stations that do
obtain licenses are forced to pay exorbitantly high fees, the
nonpayment of which is enforced selectively by Serbian authorities to
close down those stations that do not adhere to the Government's line.
In January in the city of Cacak, which is controlled by an opposition
mayor and city council, TV Cacak was shut down, even though the station
operators claimed that they had paid for all licenses and fees. There
is speculation that authorities closed the station because it was
rebroadcasting satellite programming from Montenegro, which was funded
by European Union (EU) countries. However, an attempt to confiscate the
station's equipment was thwarted by an angry group of Cacak residents.
The station resumed operations in the fall.
Although there were some independent television and radio stations
operating throughout the country, their broadcasts typically could not
be received beyond the major cities. The only network covering the
entire country is the Serbian State Television and Radio Network RTS.
An estimated one-third of the population of Serbia only receives RTS,
the official voice of President Milosevic. When the NATO campaign
started in March, the Milosevic regime took additional steps to close
down any remaining independent stations that refused to fall in line
with progovernment programming. B92, the main source of independent
news in Belgrade since its founding in 1989, was shut down in late
March. Police detained B92 editor in chief Veran Matic for questioning
and confiscated some of the station's broadcasting equipment. It went
back on the air on April 13, but under new, pro-Milosevic management.
As a result, the entire staff walked out and worked in subsequent
months to establish a new radio station. The new station (renamed B292
since the government-backed B92 still was operating) now broadcasts out
of Studio B, which is run by the opposition party controlled city
government of Belgrade. Prior to the start of the NATO bombing campaign
in March, the general manager of Soko TV in Soko Banja was sentenced to
12 months in jail for displaying a B92 logo on the station's door. Novi
Sad Radio 021 was shut down in April.
According to independent media sources, most journalists practice
self-censorship in an effort to avoid a violation under the media law.
Journalists had been informed that printing anything that was not
true--even an advertisement or a death announcement--could be punished
under the information law. One independent newspaper reported in 1998
that it was publishing half as many articles as usual out of fear of
punishment. The weekly Zrenjanin decided not to report public
statements after it was sued in 1998 for publishing false statements
made at a press conference, since such comments cannot be verified
easily.
In January Dejan Anastasijevic, a well-respected journalist for the
independent weekly Vreme, was brought into a preliminary hearing in a
criminal court. His crime was allegedly ``misinforming'' the public in
a March 1998 article about the Likosane Massacre in Kosovo.
In July a court issued orders for two journalists for Dnevi
Telegraf to report to jail to begin their 5-month sentences for a
December 1998 article they wrote which linked a Serbian deputy prime
minister to a murder. The two originally had been sentenced in March.
Throughout the year, Serbian police systematically intimidated
printing houses to prevent them from printing independent newspapers.
According to the editor of the independent newspaper Glas Javnosti,
authorities shut down the newspaper in the fall after it printed a
pamphlet entitled, ``Changes,'' which was distributed at antigovernment
protests in Belgrade which began on September 21. The newspaper was
published again on October 4, after a 2-day ban by authorities.
However, the authorities' harassment of the independent newspaper
continued with an investigation by the state financial police. The
Ministry of Information also sued publisher Slavoljub Kacarevic of ABC
Grafika (which publishes Glas Javnosti) for printing the pamphlet
without the Ministry's permission.
VJ troops in Montenegro sought to restrict press freedom (see
Section 2.a. in Montenegro annex).
Montenegrin newspaper publishers not friendly to the Belgrade
regime frequently had their newspapers removed from trains and buses
entering Serbia (see Section 2.d.).
In May 1998, the Serbian Parliament passed the new Universities
Law. It severely curtails academic freedom by allowing the Government
to appoint rectors and governing boards and hire and fire deans of
faculties. Deans in turn can hire and fire professors--in effect taking
away tenure and promoting regime loyalists inside the universities. The
law also discourages political activism among students, who were a
mainstay of the antigovernment protests of 1996-97. According to the
Belgrade Center for Human Rights, some 22 professors were fired and 30
were suspended after the law went into effect for refusing to sign new
contracts. In January unknown persons sent threatening letters and made
death threats to six student activists and one professor at Belgrade
University. The students took part in a series of student protests that
took place in 1996 and evidently prompted the crackdown by the
Government. In July the Serbian Ministry of Education began prohibiting
students from Montenegro from enrolling at Belgrade University, where
they traditionally have gone for higher education. Instead, the
university began to give preference for admission to Serb soldiers
returning from Kosovo and their families.
On November 9, police used forced to disperse an antigovernment
demonstration organized by the student opposition movement Otpor in
Belgrade and injured some 50 demonstrators.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Federal and
republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of peaceful assembly
and association; however, the Serbian and Federal Governments restrict
this right. The Government imposed a state of war on the republic at
the start of the conflict in March and lifted it on June 26. However,
an edict prohibiting gatherings and demonstrations remained in force
and was applied stringently by the security forces.
Serb refugees from Kosovo demonstrated in Belgrade on June 21.
Authorities sentenced two leaders of the demonstration to 30 days in
jail. Authorities detained four opposition activists in Novi Sad on
July 2 for handing out leaflets advertising an antigovernment rally.
The activists were part of the League of Social Democrats of Vojvodina,
who were planning a demonstration as part of a series of anti-Milosevic
rallies that week. Police in Uzice banned an antigovernment
demonstration on July 6 and used force to prevent the erection of a
sound system. However, demonstrators overwhelmed the police and
succeeded in setting up speakers. On July 6, police beat and used tear
gas on some 2,000 protesters who had assembled at a police station in
Leskovac to call for Milosevic's resignation and the release of a local
television broadcaster, Ivan Novkovic. Novkovic was detained and
sentenced to 30 days' imprisonment for broadcasting allegations of
corruption against a local official and inciting rebellion in
connection with his urging citizen protests that resulted a July 6
rally with some 20,000 participants. Police in Cacak banned an
opposition demonstration that was planned for July 29 and claimed that
the organizers did not provide the proper paperwork; the organizers
went ahead with the demonstration anyway.
After the conflict in Kosovo ended, democratic opposition groups
became more vocal and organized a series of demonstrations in major
cities throughout Serbia. Fueled by discontent over Serbia's defeat in
the Kosovo conflict, the Alliance for Change, a coalition of democratic
opposition parties, organized rallies demanding elections and
Milosevic's resignation. The first major rally was held on August 19 in
Belgrade, with 100,000 participants. In September additional rallies
were held, which continued for weeks. Security forces were deployed to
numerous locations and reportedly used force to disperse the crowds and
block the demonstrators' advance, especially during the September 29,
September 30, and October 13 demonstrations (see Section 1.c.). There
were also reports of police openly beating correspondents attempting to
cover the demonstrations. Police arrested 21 protestors on September
30. Police in Nis also beat antigovernment protesters on October 14.
Police also blocked the path of protestors in Belgrade on October 4 and
October 6. The Federal and republic level Constitutions provide for
freedom of association; however, the Serbian and Federal Governments
restricted this right. Prior to the most recent Serbian elections, in
the fall of 1997, officials blocked the Coalition Sandzak leader, Dr.
Rasim Ljajic, from forming an alliance with the Kosovo-based Democratic
Reform Party of Muslims, a move that protected regime candidates from
additional competition.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law in both the FRY and Serbia
provides for freedom of religion; however, in practice both the
Government and the legal system provide very little protection for the
religious rights of minority groups.
There is no state religion, but the Milosevic regime gives
preferential treatment, including access to state-run television for
major religious events, to the Serbian Orthodox Church to which the
majority of Serbs belong. The regime subjected religious communities in
Kosovo to harassment (see Section 2.c. in Kosovo annex).
Tensions between the Church elders and the Milosevic regime
intensified during the year, as religious leaders such as Bishop
Artemije repeatedly opposed Serbian government policies and called for
reconciliation with ethnic Albanians. In early June, the Holy Synod of
Bishops called for the resignation of President Milosevic and his
Government, while at the same time asking for the protection of Serb
citizens and holy sites in Kosovo. In late June, Patriarch Pavle
criticized the Government and its actions even further, saying that its
policies were criminal.
A new piece of republic legislation to regulate the actions of
religious communities is reported to be under consideration, but it has
not yet been published. The Minister of Religious Affairs Milovan
Radovanic was quoted as saying, ``through its agencies the State needs
to prevent the activity of destructive and totalitarian religious
sects, diverse psycho-organizations, commercial cults, and other
organizations with asocial influence on the society and family.''
Observers believe that this law could provide the pretext of legitimacy
for the regime to impose even harsher restrictions on the practice of
other religions besides the Serbian Orthodox Church.
Police repression continued to be directed against ethnic and
religious minorities, and police committed the most widespread and
worst abuses against Kosovo's 90 percent ethnic Albanian population.
Police repression also was directed against Muslims in the Sandzak
region. Refugees reported that mosques and religious sites were
attacked or destroyed by Serbian forces in at least 21 villages and
towns in Kosovo in the spring. Religious sites also served as shelter
for ethnic Albanians during the conflict. On March 28, 200 ethnic
Albanians who had sought sanctuary in the Albanian Catholic Church of
Pec were removed and forced by MUP forces to leave town (see Section
2.c. in Kosovo annex).
The Serbian Government made no progress in the restitution of
property that belonged to the Jewish community, despite President
Milosevic's promises to resolve the disputes. The Orthodox and Catholic
Churches have had similar difficulties with the restitution of their
property.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement; however, the Federal and Serbian Governments restrict this
right in practice. The FRY Government makes passports available to most
citizens; however, the authorities have barred FRY citizens from
reentering the country. The Milosevic regime continued to restrict the
right of Kosovar Albanians in the first 6 months of the year, and of
Sandzak Muslims, to travel by holding up the issuance or renewal of
passports for an unusually long period of time. It also reserves the
option of prosecuting individuals charged previously with violating
exit visa requirements (see Section 2.d. in Kosovo annex).
Citizens reported difficulties at borders and the occasional
confiscation of their passports. Ethnic Albanians, Sandzak Muslims, and
Vojvodina Croats frequently complained of harassment at border
crossings. Sandzak Muslims were detained routinely on their arrival at
local airports. There were reports in March that authorities prevented
several buses of Sandzak Muslims seeking refuge in Bosnia and
Herzegovina from leaving the country. Sandzak Muslims who crossed the
border with Bosnia and Herzegovina by car reported that they had to pay
approximately $165 (DM 300) to border guards in order to be permitted
to leave the country. Starting in March police at bus stations and
borders prevented men between the ages of 16 and 50 from leaving the
country since they were subject to military service. There were
numerous reports that border guards confiscated foreign currency or
passports from travelers, as well as occasional complaints of physical
mistreatment. The authorities generally allowed political opposition
leaders to leave the country and return. FRY embassies overseas
generally are considered to apply a double standard in issuing
passports to their citizens; ethnic Serbs have a much easier time
obtaining passports than members of ethnic minorities.
VJ troops in Montenegro restricted freedom of movement (see Section
2.d. in Montenegro annex).
Many inhabitants of Serbia-Montenegro who were born in other parts
of the former Yugoslavia, as well as large numbers of refugees, have
not been able to establish their citizenship in the FRY, leaving them
in a stateless limbo.
The FRY Government has been very slow to issue passports to
refugees. This is a particular problem for asylum-seeking parents. For
example, German authorities issue such children born in Germany a
document certifying their birth. FRY officials in Germany refuse to
issue passports to such children. When these asylum seekers who have
been refused in Germany return to the FRY with their children, the
children travel on the basis of this document. FRY authorities take the
paper at the port of entry and issue a receipt for it. Then the
children have no documentation in a country where documentation is a
basic requirement. In January 1997, a new citizenship law entered into
force, which, when fully implemented, is expected to affect adversely
the rights of many inhabitants, including those born in other parts of
the former Yugoslavia, refugees, and citizens who migrated to other
countries to work or seek asylum.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur for the former Yugoslavia noted in 1997
that the new law would give the Ministry of Interior almost complete
control over the granting of citizenship. The Government served notice
that it plans to limit severely the granting of citizenship to refugees
from the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. The Government also plans to
revise the eligibility status of a large number of persons; refugees
who have been granted citizenship since 1992 may stand to lose their
FRY citizenship if they have acquired the citizenship of a former
Yugoslav republic.
Observers in the Sandzak region also noted that Muslim residents
who were forced to flee to Bosnia from Sandzak in 1992 and 1993 may not
be permitted to return to Serbia, particularly if they obtained Bosnian
passports in the interim. In violation of the Dayton Accords, Muslims
from Sandzak frequently have been harassed on attempting to reenter
Serbia after visits to Sarajevo or elsewhere in the Federation entity
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
As part of its campaign to undermine the reform government in
Montenegro, the Milosevic regime also implemented a commercial blockade
against the FRY's junior republic, a direct violation of the FRY
Constitution's protection of the free flow of goods. Businesses
frequently had their goods confiscated without cause by Serbian police.
Newspaper publishers not friendly to the regime frequently had their
papers removed from trains and buses entering Serbia (see Section
2.a.).
The FRY Government cooperated to a large extent with the Office of
the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assisting
(predominantly Serb) refugees who fled to the FRY from neighboring
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The Government generally cooperates with the UNHCR. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Federal and Serbian Constitutions provide for this right; however,
in practice citizens in Serbia are prevented from exercising it by the
Milosevic regime's domination of the mass media and manipulation of the
electoral process. Through its control of the purse strings of the
Serbian republic, the regime sought to undermine the effectiveness of
the opposition leadership of most major cities.
The most recent Serbian elections, held in the fall of 1997, were
flawed seriously. According to a 1998 study by the Belgrade-based
Center for Free Elections and Democracy, both rounds of the Serbian
presidential elections in September and December 1997 involved
widespread fraud. In the latter campaign, the Center estimated that
500,000 votes were stolen to give the victory for the Serbian
presidency to Milosevic ally Milan Milutinovic. Several disaffected SRS
members charged in the fall of 1998 that the Milosevic regime had
extracted mandates from the Radical Party of Serbia in exchange for
giving the Radical Party a role in the Government.
Earlier, in July 1997, the regime gerrymandered electoral districts
to smooth the way for candidates in the ruling coalition, expanding the
number of districts in Serbia from 9 to 29. Most opposition politicians
charged that changes in the election law, including the redrawing of
districts, were designed specifically to favor the ruling party. The
redistricting was one factor that compelled a number of opposition
parties to boycott the last Serbian elections.
A key figure in the fraud that followed the November 1996 municipal
elections, which was perpetrated mainly through the regime's misuse of
the judicial system, was the president of the First Belgrade Municipal
Court Dragoljub Jankovic, who currently is serving as the Serbian
Justice Minister. Despite the Montenegrin Government's legal rights
under the FRY Constitution, federal authorities under Milosevic's
control by year's end had not recognized the 20 Montenegrin members
delegated to the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly by the
Montenegrin Parliament. The Montenegrins in the federal body, including
the speaker of the upper house, were not changed to reflect the results
of Montenegrin elections. Moreover, in violation of past practice, in
which Montenegrin republic authorities had played a major role in
identifying the federal prime minister, in 1998 Milosevic installed
Momir Bulatovic as Federal Prime Minister and ignored the Montenegrin
Government's wish to have some voice in who was picked for this key
position in the Federal power structure.
No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government
and politics, and women are active in political organizations; however,
they are underrepresented greatly in party and government offices,
holding less than 10 percent of ministerial-level positions in the
Serbian and Federal Governments. An exception is the controversial Mira
Markovic, wife of Federal President Milosevic. She is the leading force
in the neo-Communist Yugoslav Left Party (JUL), through which she
exerts extraordinary and disproportionate influence on policy makers.
No legal restrictions affect the role of minorities in government
and politics, but they are underrepresented, and ethnic Serbs and
Montenegrins dominate the country's political leadership. Few members
of other ethnic groups play any role at the top levels of government or
the state-run economy. Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo refused to take part
in the electoral process at the Serbian republic and federal level,
including most recently in Serbian elections in 1997. They have
virtually no representation in the Serbian republic and FRY government
structures.
Ethnic Albanians' refusal to participate in FRY and Serbian
elections had the practical effect of increasing the political
influence of President Milosevic and his supporters.
Ultranationalist parties, including Milosevic's coalition partner
the Radical Party of Serbia, also took advantage of the ethnic Albanian
boycott to garner representation beyond their numbers.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government formally maintains that it has no objection to
international organizations conducting human rights investigations on
its territory. However, the Serbian regime routinely hindered the
activities of and regularly rejected the findings of human rights
groups. With some exceptions, the Milosevic Government's Federal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs systematically denied visas to
international nongovernmental human rights organizations.
A number of independent human rights organizations operate in the
country, researching and gathering information on abuses, and
publicizing such cases. The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Center and
Center for Antiwar Action researches human rights abuses throughout the
country and, on occasion, elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia. The
Belgrade-based Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia publishes
studies on human rights issues and cooperates with the Pristina-based
Helsinki Committee in monitoring human rights abuses in Kosovo. In
Kosovo the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF)
collects and collates data on human rights abuses and publishes
newsletters. A number of reliable international human rights monitors
reported that one worker of the CDHRF was missing at year's end, and
that all the organization's workers were harassed routinely and
severely, and were distrusted by Serbian authorities during the first 6
months of the year (see Section 4 in Kosovo annex). In the Sandzak
region, two committees monitor abuses against the local Muslim
population and produce comprehensive reports. Most of these
organizations offer advice and help to victims of abuse.
Local human rights monitors (Serbs as well as members of ethnic
minorities) and NGO's worked under difficult circumstances.
Prior to the commencement of hostilities, a number of independent
human rights organizations operated in the FRY, including in Kosovo,
researching and gathering information on abuses, and publicizing such
cases. The Pristina-based Helsinki Committee was active in monitoring
human rights abuses in Kosovo and cooperated with similar organizations
based in Belgrade.
NGO's reported blockages to the delivery of humanitarian
commodities to and throughout Kosovo prior to the outbreak of
hostilities with the international community in March. The Mother
Teresa Society, a local humanitarian aid NGO, reported consistent
harassment and detention of its staff while Serbian authorities
administered the province.
ICRC officials complained in 1998 of difficulties in securing
access to detainees. However, by year's end ICRC officials reported
that access to detainees improved and the organization was able to
facilitate the return to Kosovo of some 200 ethnic Albanian prisoners
who had been removed from Kosovo after hostilities ceased (see Section
1.d.).
During Serbian government administration of Kosovo, several NGO's
and international organizations reported that they were experiencing
unacceptable delays of up to a month or more in obtaining Serbian
government approval of visas for international humanitarian aid workers
for Kosovo.
In October 1998, the Government agreed to the establishment of the
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). By the start of the year, the
KVM had expanded to several hundred international verifiers, including
human rights personnel, who verified civilian aspects of implementation
of U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1199. However, when the
situation in Kosovo further deteriorated in early spring, the KVM
pulled its verifiers out of the province on March 19. Subsequently, as
many as 20 former OSCE KVM local employees were arrested by Pristina
police at the start of the conflict (see Section 4 in Kosovo annex).
As a signatory of the 1995 Dayton Accords that ended the war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro is obliged to cooperate fully
with the ICTY by turning over to the Tribunal the persons on its
territory, who were indicted for war crimes or other crimes against
humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. Nevertheless, the
Milosevic regime repeatedly has ignored the ICTY's orders to transfer
indicted war criminals known to be living in Serbia, in open defiance
of the U.N. Security Council, which created the Tribunal. Not only is
Milosevic himself an indicted war criminal as a result of events in
Kosovo, but in the 6 years since the Tribunal was established, the
Milosevic regime has yet to transfer one Serbian or Bosnian Serb under
indictment to the Hague. Some of those indicted live openly in Serbia,
and others travel freely in and out of Serbia. It is widely believed
that Ratko Mladic, indicted by the Tribunal in 1995 for his command and
responsible role in crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the
Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws and customs of war
committed during the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, continues to
travel in and out of the country.
In addition to the continued violation of its obligations under
repeated U.N. Security Council resolutions and its commitments under
the Dayton Accords, the Milosevic regime's brutal crackdown in Kosovo
prompted calls for the ICTY to conduct investigations into alleged
atrocities committed there. The ICTY's jurisdiction is delineated
clearly under UNSCR 827 of 1993 and many subsequent resolutions.
Nevertheless, the Government also has rejected publicly the Tribunal's
mandate in Kosovo and obstructed all efforts by the ICTY to investigate
allegations of crimes in Kosovo. The Milosevic regime remained
uncooperative, claiming that the violence in Kosovo does not constitute
an ``armed conflict.''
The Milosevic Government's Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs
denied entry visas to investigators from the ICTY who wished to conduct
impartial investigations into allegations of atrocities committed by
Serbian forces and Albanian paramilitary groups in Kosovo.
As a result of their actions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, on
May 26 the ICTY formally indicted as war criminals President Milosevic
and four other senior officials, including Serbian President Milan
Milutinovic, FRY Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, Chief of Staff
of the Yugoslav Army Dragoljub Ojdanic, and Serbian Minister of
Internal Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
While federal and republic-level laws provide for equal rights for
all citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or social
status, and prohibit discrimination against women, in reality the legal
system provides little protection to such groups.
Women.--The traditionally high level of domestic violence
persisted. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family
violence have inadequate resources and are limited in their activity by
social pressure to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of
spousal abuse ever file complaints with the authorities. The Center for
Autonomous Women's Rights in Belgrade offers a rape and spousal abuse
hot line, as well as sponsors a number of self-help groups. The Center
also offered help to refugee women (mostly Serb), many of whom
experienced extreme abuse or rape during the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia. Similar initiatives exist in Kosovo.
The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for
trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
Section 6.f.).
Women do not enjoy status equal to men, and relatively few women
obtain upper level management positions in commerce. Traditional
patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women should be
subservient to the male members of their family, have long subjected
women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly among
minority communities, women are little more than serfs without the
ability to exercise their right to control property and children.
However, women legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work and are
granted maternity leave for 1 year, with an additional 6 months
available. Women are active in political and human rights
organizations. Women's rights groups continue to operate with little or
no official acknowledgment.
Children.--The State attempts to meet the health and educational
needs of children. The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory
schooling. Economic distress has spilled over into both the educational
system and the health care system, adversely affecting children.
Prior to the conflict in Kosovo, the division of Kosovo into
unofficial parallel Serb and Albanian administrative systems resulted
in Serb and ethnic Albanian elementary age children being taught in
separate areas of divided schools, or attending classes in shifts.
Older ethnic Albanian children were attending school in private homes.
The quality of education thus was uneven before the conflict started,
and the tension and division of society in general was replicated to
the detriment of the children.
In late 1998, international observers reported multiple incidents
of police being stationed near schools in Kosovo. Albanian villagers
had claimed that they were intimidated by the police presence and that
consequently children would not return to those schools. Such incidents
continued until hostilities escalated in March, effectively disrupting
the parallel educational system. Ethnic minorities in some cases fear
Serb state-run medical facilities, which results in a low rate of
immunization and a reluctance to seek timely medical attention (see
Section 5 of Kosovo annex).
The country served as a source, transit, and destination point for
trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see
Section 6.f.).
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People With Disabilities.--Facilities for persons with disabilities
are inadequate, but the Government made some effort to address the
problem. The law prohibits discrimination against persons with
disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. The law mandates access to new official buildings, and
the Government enforces these provisions in practice.
Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are so closely
intertwined as to be inseparable. Serious discrimination against, and
harassment of, religious minorities continued, especially in Kosovo and
Serbian Sandzak (see Section 5 of Kosovo annex). There were several
reported incidents of violence against the Catholic minority in
Vojvodina, largely made up of ethnic Hungarians and a smaller Croat
community.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and
Muslims in central Serbia continued to be driven from their homes,
often forcibly, or fired from their jobs on the basis of religion or
ethnicity. Other ethnic minorities, including ethnic Hungarians in
Vojvodina, also allege discrimination. Vojvodina Croats reported no
progress during the year on their demand for separate curriculums in
the schools or programs in the media in the Croatian language. However,
an hour was set aside for programs in Croatian on the local radio
station, Radio Subotica. Vojvodina Hungarians reported that the
Government was eroding the principle of minority language education
during the year, by banning foreign books and moving Hungarian schools
far from the Hungarian population.
The Romani population generally is tolerated, and there is no
official discrimination. Roma have the right to vote, and there are two
small Romani parties in Serbia. However, prejudice against Roma is
widespread. Local authorities often ignore or condone societal
intimidation of the Romani community. Skinheads and police occasionally
violently attacked Roma (see Section 1.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and
police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Unions
are either official (government affiliated) or independent. The total
labor force is approximately 2.3 million. The government-controlled
Alliance of Independent Labor Unions (Samostalni Sindikati) claims 1.8
million members but probably numbers closer to 1 million in reality.
The largest independent union is the United Branch Independent Labor
Unions (Nezavisnost), which has about 170,000 members. Most other
independent unions are sector specific, for example, the Independent
Union of Bank Employees (12,000 members). Due to the poor state of the
economy, over one-half of union workers are on long-term mandatory
leave from their firms pending increases in production. The independent
unions, while active in recruiting new members, have not yet reached
the size needed to enable countrywide strikes. The independent unions
also claim that the Government prevents effective recruiting through a
number of tactics, which include preventing the busing of workers to
strikes, threatening the job security of members, and failing to grant
visas to foreign visitors who support independent unions. Some foreign
union organizers managed to secure visas during the year after long
delays.
The largely splintered approach of the independent unions left them
little to show in terms of increased wages or improved working
conditions. The Nezavisnost union gained new members as a result of its
well-organized and tough bargaining positions during strikes of
teachers and health workers in 1998 but did not lead any strikes in
1999 and focused instead on political action campaigns aimed at raising
workers' political awareness. The official union lost credibility with
some of its members because it ultimately accommodated the Government's
position on these strikes.
The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains
constrained.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While this
right is provided for under law, collective bargaining remains at a
rudimentary level of development. Individual unions tend to be very
narrow and pragmatic in their aims, unable to join with unions in other
sectors to bargain for common purposes. The history of trade unionism
in the country has centered not on bargaining for the collective needs
of all workers but rather for the specific needs of a given group of
workers. Thus, coal workers, teachers, health workers, and electric
power industry employees have been ineffective in finding common
denominators (e.g., job security protection, minimum safety standards,
universal workers' benefits, etc.) on which to negotiate. The overall
result is a highly fragmented labor structure composed of workers who
relate to the needs of their individual union but rarely to those of
other workers. Additionally, job security fears, which stem from the
high rate of unemployment, limited workers' militancy.
The Government still is seeking to develop free trade zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and
generally is not known to occur; however, the country served as a
source, transit, and destination point for trafficking in women and
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years, although in
villages and farming communities it is not unusual to find younger
children at work assisting their families. Moreover, children can be
found in a variety of unofficial ``retail'' jobs, typically washing car
windows or selling small items such as cigarettes, although this
practice apparently is somewhat less widespread, since adults lacking
other options for employment have taken many of these jobs. With an
actual unemployment rate (registered unemployed plus redundant workers
who show up at the workplace but perform only minimal work) in excess
of 60 percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal
sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is
prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur, apart from girls
trafficked through, from, and to the country for the purpose of forced
prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Large government enterprises,
including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies
generally observe minimum wage standards. The monthly minimum wage is
approximately $15 (Din 250 to 500). However, this figure is roughly
comparable to unemployment benefits and (at least theoretically) is
paid to workers who have been placed in a mandatory leave status. The
actual minimum wage is at the low end of the range of average net
salaries, $50 (Din 700 to 1,200). The minimum wage is insufficient to
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The cost
of food and utilities alone for a family of four is estimated to be
$120 (Din 2,150) per month. Private enterprises use the minimum wage as
a guide but tend to pay somewhat higher average wages.
Reports of sweatshops operating in the country are rare, although
some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor
conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little
meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the
enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations,
focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In light of the
competition for employment, and the high degree of government control
over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work
situations without risking the loss of their employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is little information available
on trafficking, although Serbia is a source, transit, and destination
country for women and girls trafficked to other parts of Europe for
forced prostitution. There are laws that could be used to prosecute
traffickers, although apparently there is little government interest in
addressing the problem. Belgrade was becoming a transit point, and to a
lesser extent, a destination point for trafficking in women and girls.
Reportedly women from Russia and Ukraine are trafficked to the country.
There were also reports that women were trafficked through the country
to Bosnia-Herzegovina, where they either stayed and were forced to work
as prostitutes or were trafficked on to other countries.
KOSOVO
Serbia abolished the political autonomy of Kosovo in 1990, and all
significant decisionmaking since that time until June was centralized
under Milosevic in Belgrade. Kosovo, came under the authority of the
United Nations Interim Administrative Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) in June
following the NATO campaign in Kosovo, which began on March 24. U.N.
Security Council Resolution 1244 upheld FRY sovereignty over Kosovo,
but it also called for ``substantial autonomy and meaningful self-
administration for Kosovo.'' Although the peace settlement respects FRY
territorial integrity, the Milosevic regime had no authority in the
province after June 10. Dr. Bernard Kouchner, the Special
Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General, became the chief
administrator of UNMIK. Within UNMIK, the OSCE was given the
responsibility for institution-building, democracy-building, and human
rights. At year's end, there were also two other local ethnic Albanian
established shadow governments operating in Kosovo, neither of which
were recognized by the U.N. The leader of the ``provisional
government'' and former political head of the Kosovo Liberation Army
was Hashim Thaqi; Dr. Ibrahim Rugova headed the Democratic League of
Kosovo (LDK) and was named the ``President'' of the self-proclaimed
``Republic of Kosova'' after shadow elections in 1991. The LDK also
dominated the unofficial parliament. Plans for UNMIK-sponsored
elections were being developed at year's end. The laws of the FRY and
the republic of Serbia initially were in effect, but because the local
population did not recognize the legitimacy of the laws, UNMIK
temporarily adopted the 1989 code. UNMIK was working with local judges
to develop a new legal code. UNMIK created and operates an independent
judiciary, which is experiencing delays due to difficulties finding
proper staff and establishing facilities.
Until June police and military forces under Milosevic maintained
internal security. Beginning in mid-June, troops from all 19 NATO
countries plus 16 non-NATO countries that make up the Kosovo Force
(KFOR), the peacekeeping force in charge of maintaining internal
security and defense against external threats in the province. The
45,000-member force also assists UNMIK's multinational civilian police
corps in its role as uniformed and criminal police. By year's end,
approximately 1,900 of the 4,718 UNMIK police officers authorized for
the task were serving in the province. Half of KFOR's available
manpower is committed to protecting the public, including protecting
ethnic minorities, and some KFOR troops are devoted primarily to border
monitoring activities. Public safety is also a key task for KFOR. On
September 6, the Kosovo Police Academy, run by the OSCE, began training
a class of local police officers in Vucitrn. On September 19, KFOR
helped to establish the Kosovo Protection Corps, a multiethnic civil
emergency service agency that includes a significant number of former
KLA members. The civilian authorities maintain effective control of the
security forces.
The economy was in poor condition even before the NATO airstrikes,
because of mismanagement by federal and Serbian authorities, which had
seized control of all major economic assets. Armed conflict in the
province in the first 6 months of the year resulted in massive
destruction of property, including economic enterprises. According to
various sources, unemployment among the predominately ethnic Albanian
population was estimated at between 40 and 75 percent, and much higher
among the Serb and Romani minorities. The instability of the region,
coupled with the destruction of property records and a weak legal and
regulatory framework, created an uncertain investment climate, which
has deterred investors from injecting much needed capital into the
province. International organizations are establishing programs to
improve the infrastructure and to make the weak economy more viable.
The economy before the conflict had a substantial agrarian sector,
which continues to support a large percentage of the population. Key
industries before the conflict were mining, metallurgy, and related
manufacturing enterprises. Agricultural production and food processing
are also important. Leading exports were energy, refined metals, and
agricultural products. Remittances from relatives abroad and foreign
aid are important sources of national income. A gray economy, which is
widely believed to be involved in illicit activities, also was
significant. While no gross domestic product estimates are available,
the population has a low standard of living.
In the first 6 months of the year, the Serbian Government's
extremely poor human rights record in the province worsened
significantly, and there were serious problems in many areas. In
practice citizens could not exercise the right to change their
government. Serbian police were responsible for numerous serious
abuses, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, torture,
brutal beatings, rape, and arbitrary arrest and detention. Impunity for
those who committed human rights abuses remained a serious problem. The
judicial system was not independent of the Government, suffered from
corruption, and did not ensure fair trials. The authorities infringed
on citizens' privacy rights. The Government severely restricted freedom
of speech and of the press, and used overbearing police intimidation
and economic pressure to control tightly the independent press and
media. Most journalists practiced self-censorship. The Government
infringed on freedom of worship by minority religions and restricted
freedom of movement. The Milosevic regime used its continued domination
of Parliament and the media to enact legislation to manipulate the
electoral process. Ethnic Albanians chose not to participate in
government institutions, and in practice authorities excluded them from
participating in government institutions. The Federal and Serbian
Governments' record of cooperation with international human rights and
monitoring organizations was poor. The Government routinely hindered
the activities of human rights groups. The Federal Government remained
uncooperative with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY). Violence and discrimination against women remained
serious problems. Discrimination and violence against ethnic Albanians,
Muslims, and religious and ethnic minorities worsened during the first
6 months of the year. Police repression continued to be directed
against ethnic minorities, and police committed the most widespread and
worst abuses against Kosovo's 90 percent ethnic Albanian population.
The regime limited unions not affiliated with the Government in their
attempts to advance worker rights. There was some child labor and the
province served as a transit point for trafficking in women and girls.
In the last half of the year, UNMIK adhered to international human
rights standards in its operations; however, some problems remained due
to lingering interethnic tension. Lengthy pretrial detention was a
problem, as were long delays in trials due to difficulties finding
proper staff and establishing facilities. The judiciary was subject to
outside influence. Violence and discrimination against women remained
serious problems. Societal violence and discrimination against ethnic
Serbs and Roma worsened significantly during the last 6 months of the
year. Over 300 civilians were killed and over 1,000 cases of arson
reported, beginning in June. Societal discrimination also targeted
Roma, in retaliation for the group's alleged collusion with Serbs in
the period before and during the war. An estimated 100,000 Serbs and
Roma left the province, fleeing for elsewhere in Serbia or to other
countries. Trafficking in women and girls was a serious problem.
There were reports that former and active KLA members committed
abuses even after the withdrawal of the VJ in June, including killings,
disappearances, torture, rape, and arbitrary detention.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political violence,
including killings by police, was a common occurrence during the first
6 months of the year as a result of the conflict in Kosovo (see Section
1.g.). Serbian forces killed up to 10,000 mostly male ethnic Albanians,
often in brutal fashion. Reports by international observers of the
atrocities committed by Serbian forces prompted an international
response in the form of NATO airstrikes beginning on March 24.
According to a report released by the OSCE in December, the Serbian
security forces' massive assault on the Kosovo Albanian population was
of such a scale as to ``appear directed by strategy not breakdown in
command and control.''
On January 15, Ministry of Interior police officers killed 45
ethnic Albanian civilians in Racak. According to the OSCE KVM, the
killings occurred in such a way that they could not be attributed to
Serbian security forces' efforts to bring KLA insurgents under control.
Neither the federal nor the Serbian authorities brought charges against
the Ministry of Interior (MUP) police officers involved in the
massacres, and Serbian officials claimed that the ethnic Albanians had
``died in combat.''
Starting in mid-January, the OSCE KVM reported regular cases of
killings of ethnic Albanians taking place, mostly in the rural areas of
the province until mid-March, when Serbian forces reportedly
intensified their campaign to include more densely populated areas like
Pristina and Mitrovica. Refugees provided accounts of summary
executions and mass graves at about 500 sites throughout the province.
According to the OSCE, the majority of killings that occurred after
NATO airstrikes began in March were carried out by a mixture of VJ
troops, police officers, and paramilitaries, sometimes in cooperation
with armed Serb civilians. Reports indicate that a common practice
employed by Serb forces was to order unarmed ethnic Albanian men to run
away and then to shoot them; in this way, the murders could be
portrayed as collateral casualties of military operations. Survivors
reported that Serbian forces burned bodies exhumed from mass graves in
an apparent attempt to destroy forensic evidence of war crimes (see
Section 1.b.).
There were numerous deaths in custody in the first 6 months of the
year. For example, on March 8 a Serbian traffic policeman stopped the
car of a 20-year-old ethnic Albanian man in Pristina, forcibly removed
the young man from his car, and took him to Police Station Number 92.
Serbian police officers informed the young man's relatives that he
would be released in a few hours; however the man's father who was
waiting at the police station learned the next day that his son's body
had been found with 33 bullet wounds in Kosovo Polje. An eyewitness
reported seeing the young man's car with numerous bullet holes parked
near Police Station Number 92.
In addition to random executions, Serbian authorities appear to
have targeted Kosovar intellectuals, professionals, and leaders. In
January Enver Maloku, the head of the LDK's Kosovo Information Center,
was shot outside his home by three unknown assailants who immediately
fled the scene. In May Fehmi Agani, who was a lead negotiator for the
ethnic Albanian delegation at Rambouillet, was taken into custody by
Serbian police. Although there are conflicting reports as to the
precise circumstances of his death, it generally is agreed that he was
killed by Serb security forces. The state-run Tanjug news agency blamed
the death on KLA extremists, claiming that they wanted to prevent
additional negotiations between the regime and the Kosovar Albanians.
Few in the international community believe this version, and many have
called for an international investigation into the murder.
Virtually no town or settlement escaped the effects of Milosevic's
campaign of ethnic cleansing, with reports of dozens, if not hundreds
of civilians being murdered in each town.
Serbian forces killed as many as 500 ethnic Albanians in Bela Crkva
by March 28. This included some 46 unarmed ethnic Albanians, 8 men over
the age of 60, and a 13-year-old boy, who were killed by Serbian forces
on March 25. On that date, Serbian forces started shelling the village,
separated the men from the women and children fleeing the village,
forced the men to strip and walk into a river, where they were shot in
the back. Some 16 men survived by hiding in the cold river for several
hours amidst the corpses. On March 28, Serbian forces forced ethnic
Albanians in Kosovo Polje into their homes and then threw hand grenades
inside; civilians also were burned alive in their homes. In Djakovica
Kosovar Albanians were warned to leave by March 29. Of those remaining,
over 300 ethnic Albanians were executed. Some 270 Kosovar Albanians in
Izbica were killed beginning in mid-March, with their bodies, which
reportedly bore signs of torture, then burned. In late March, in the
adjacent villages of Velika Krusa and Mala Krusa, 150 to 160 ethnic
Albanian men who had gathered near a mosque after being removed from
their homes and separated from their families, were shot and then
burned, in an apparent attempt to conceal evidence. On March 30, the
village of Orlate was set on fire after Serb forces executed 200 of the
ethnic Albanian men there. In Pusto Selo Serbian forces executed 106
men on March 31. On April 17, Serbian forces attacked the village of
Staro Cikatovo and killed 23 ethnic Albanian men from the Morina
family; another 4 men were missing and presumed dead. Witnesses claimed
that Serbian forces also killed dozens of ethnic Albanian detainees at
the mine in Staro Cikatovo. Also on April 17, a single Serb police
officer or paramilitary member forced at least 47 persons from the
ethnic Albanian Muqolli family into one room and shot them. The exact
number who died is unknown, although at least 23 children under the age
of 15 were killed. On April 27, Serbian forces separated at least 100
ethnic Albanian men between the ages of 16 and 60 from a refugee convoy
passing through Meja and killed them. In early May, refugees arriving
from Studime described their relatives being killed, with their eyes
gouged out and their noses cut off.
On February 21, the president of the Mother Teresa Society branch
in General Jankovic and his son were killed in front of their house by
unknown assailants.
The FRY, in contravention of repeated U.N. Security Council
resolutions, denied investigators from the ICTY access to any part of
Kosovo in the first 6 months of the year, preventing them from
undertaking a thorough and independent investigation into these and
other atrocities under the Tribunal's jurisdiction that were committed
in the province in 1998-99 (see Section 4).
An unknown number of persons died from abuse in prison during the
first 6 months of the year (see Section 1.c.).
There were reports of many extrajudicial killings by members of the
KLA, including of so-called ethnic Albanian ``collaborators'' and Serb
civilians.
KROR and UNMIK detained some individuals suspected of war crimes in
Kosovo. At year's end, UNMIK was considering setting up a special
tribunal in the province with international judges to try certain war
crimes.
Following the VJ withdrawal in June, UNMIK estimates that an
average of 20 to 30 murders took place each week, down from a high of
114 murders per week in early June. By late November, according to
UNMIK, relatively few murders took place each week. In the 6-week
period of June 12 through July 26, NATO reported that 198 murders took
place. By mid-November, 379 persons had been murdered since NATO's
arrival, including 135 Serbs and 145 ethnic Albanians. Many of the
murders were ethnically motivated, both by Albanians killing Serbs, and
Serbs killing Albanians; however, there were also many criminally and
other non-ethnically motivated murders. Unconfirmed reports described
uniformed KLA members, as well as non-uniformed individuals claiming to
be acting in the name of the KLA, carrying out these killings.
On June 19, three ethnic Serb men in Belo Polje, near Pec, were
shot point blank in the head. Witnesses reported that 10 uniformed KLA
members entered the village in the early evening and executed the 3
men. One other Serb was injured and taken to a hospital. Ethnic
Albanian villagers claimed that the men had belonged to a paramilitary
Serb gang responsible for burning ethnic Albanian homes in the village.
However, Serb residents denied the charges.
In another high profile instance of continuing ethnic violence
after the U.N. assumed responsibility for administering Kosovo, 14
Serbs were found murdered on July 23 in a field near their village of
Malo Gracko, in the Lipljan municipality. They had been shot at close
range. KFOR detained four suspects the following week.
On June 24, KFOR found the bodies of three Serbs in the economics
department at Pristina University. A professor, guard, and cafeteria
manager all had been beaten badly.
There were reports on June 25 of the deaths of several elderly
Serbs in their homes.
On June 29, unknown persons killed four Serb civilians near
Rahovec.
On July 27, one man and one woman were killed in Zitinje when their
car was hit by gunfire.
On September 25, ethnic Albanians attacked a trailer carrying 12
Serbs near Kamenica, which left 1 person dead and 4 persons injured.
On September 28, two grenades exploded in a Serb market area in
Bresje. Three elderly Serbs were killed instantly, while 46 others
suffered minor or critical injuries. KFOR arrested two ethnic Albanians
suspected of the crime. The incident resulted in both Serbs and ethnic
Albanians staging demonstrations and roadblocks, which impeded
transportation lines until KFOR disbanded the groups. (See Section
2.b.)
On October 11, Valentin Krumov, a Bulgarian national assigned to
UNMIK was beaten and shot in the head in a pedestrian area by angry
ethnic Albanians. Krumov, accompanied by two fellow U.N. staff members,
was followed by a group of five or six teenaged Albanians, before he
was asked for the time. When Krumov responded in Serbian, the group
proceeded to beat and kick him. Finally a shot was fired at Krumov's
head, killing him instantly. The U.N. investigated the incident but had
not made any arrests by year's end.
On October 16, one man was killed and one woman was wounded in a
drive-by shooting in Pristina, while under the protection of UNMIK
police. Witnesses reported seeing two unidentified gunmen in a vehicle
not bearing license plates fire the shots. The woman was hospitalized
in critical condition with a bullet lodged in her back. Both victims
were Serbs.
On November 29 during ethnic Albanian celebrations of the Albanian
National Day in Pristina, a crowd blocked the car of three Serb
civilians, set it on fire, and beat the Serbs as they escaped from the
vehicle while hundreds of bystanders watched. Someone in the crowd shot
and killed the 62-year-old Serb man. His 78-year-old mother-in-law was
in a coma, had all of her ribs on her left side broken, and her lung
and spleen ruptured; his 50-year-old wife suffered a broken arm,
dislocated shoulder, five broken ribs, punctured lungs, and a
concussion. UNMIK had one person in custody in connection with this
attack at year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were unconfirmed reports of hundreds of
disappearances before the start of NATO airstrikes in March. During the
airstrikes, that number rose into the thousands, as military-aged
ethnic Albanian men were separated from women and children and taken to
unknown destinations. Serb forces kidnaped and raped numerous women
(see Section 1.c.).
Following the NATO campaign in Kosovo, UNMIK and KFOR gained access
to the province and began a systematic process of locating,
identifying, and exhuming the hundreds of mass graves thought to exist
there. The ICTY, which has received reports of some 11,000 killed, had
identified a total of 529 sites by October and exhumed a total of 2,108
bodies at one-third of the mass grave sites, including one on the
outskirts of Pristina, containing up to 200 bodies, one containing 150
bodies in Drenica in April, and one found in early July in Nogavac,
with 130 corpses in it. Other mass gravesites were found recently
emptied of their contents. Witnesses reported that some villagers were
forced to dig up remains from mass graves and then rebury them in
individual graves, while other corpses were burned, in order to destroy
evidence of mass executions. Moving bodies from mass graves to
individual graves has impeded the location of execution sites and
hampered the ability of forensic investigators to discriminate between
``regular'' graves and graves containing massacre victims. In April
Serbian forces killed ethnic Albanian civilians in a field near Izbica.
After the killings, local ethnic Albanians buried the victims in
individual graves. In early June, Serbian forces during their retreat
from the province destroyed the graves of their victims. According to
ethnic Albanian reports, Serbian forces in Lipljan, probably in early
May, exhumed the bodies of ethnic Albanians who had been killed on
April 18. After moving the bodies to a building in the village, Serbian
forces reportedly ordered the surviving family members to rebury them
in individual graves. Serbian forces exhumed the bodies of at least 50
ethnic Albanians in Glogovac and transported the bodies to the nearby
village of Cikatovo on May 15, according to refugee reports. The bodies
then were reburied in individual graves. Ethnic Albanians reported in
mid-June that Serbian police excavated bodies from a mass grave in
Kacanik and moved them to a local cemetery. Residents indicated that
the bodies might be those persons who were killed by Serbian police in
early April.
UNMIK authorities developed a systematic method of identifying,
exhuming, and cataloging the hundreds of mass gravesites discovered in
the province after the war. These graves contain thousands of bodies of
ethnic Albanian civilians who were reported missing and presumed dead
in 1998 and the first half of the year. Serbian security forces were
responsible for those disappearances.
A number of reliable international human rights monitors reported
that one worker of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights and
Freedoms was missing at year's end (see Section 4).
Dozens of persons were reported missing in the weeks following the
war. It is likely that many were victims of retaliatory acts committed
by ethnic Albanians. The Serbian Orthodox Church reported that 30 Serbs
disappeared from the Pec area since mid-June, and one Serbian Orthodox
priest was abducted by the KLA. On June 29, 19 Serbs were reported
missing from the Serb part of Orahovac.
The fate of hundreds of Serbs and Montenegrins reported missing and
presumed to have been abducted by the KLA or other ethnic Albanian
insurgent fighters was still unknown at year's end. Several Serbs
reported cases of family members--mostly civilians--taken hostage by
separatist fighters and not heard from again, including many reportedly
taken after fighting between police and insurgent forces in the first 6
months of the year. Many of those missing are believed to have been
killed.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of
punishment; however, Serbian security forces regularly and
systematically used torture, beatings in detention, and other forms of
abuse against the ethnic Albanian population in the first 6 months of
the year. In that period, the VJ, MUP, and paramilitary groups combined
to carry out a pattern of abuse that involved intimidation, harassment,
assault, pillage, and shellings. Ethnic Albanians were told to leave
their villages under threat of death, often loaded onto buses or trains
with their travel papers confiscated, and sent to the border, where a
new round of assault, rape, and robbery would take place. Serb security
forces raped ethnic Albanian women and girls. There were police
roundups of ethnic Albanians charged by Serbian authorities with
supporting terrorism. Within the criminal justice system, the worst
police brutality took place during the 3- to 4-day period of
incommunicado detention allowed by law. At least five Albanian males
died in custody during 1998 and the number of deaths in custody during
the first 6 months of the year is believed to be significantly higher.
Evidence of torture in detention is widespread.
Refugee accounts describe incidents of torture that included
maiming, mutilation of the dead, electric shock, throat cutting, eye
gouging, beating on the genitals, cutting off of the breasts, nose,
fingers, hands, and feet, and carving Serbian nationalist symbols onto
parts of the body. The refugees also told of the dead being mutilated.
The U.N. Population Fund reports that a large number of ethnic
Albanian women were subjected to illegal confinement, rape, and other
forms of torture in the first 6 months of the year. Organized and
individual rape of ethnic Albanian women by Serbian forces was
widespread in the first half of the year. Kidnapings and mass rapes
occurred in Djakovica, Pec, and Drenica, where soldiers rounded up
groups of 5 to 30 women in trucks and took them to unknown places. In
Pec the Hotel Karagac was used as a mass rape site, while in Djakovica,
an army camp was used. Numerous ethnic Albanians claim that during
raids by Serbian forces on their villages, young women were gang raped
in homes and on the sides of roads. There were also reports of Serbian
forces removing young women and girls from refugee convoys and raping
them. Women were raped by soldiers for periods of time ranging from
hours to days, with victims bearing lacerations on their chests, arms,
and legs. There were reports of Serbian forces raping ethnic Albanian
women and girls in front of family members, and ethnic Albanian men who
interfered or women who tried to escape were killed.
During one incident of a mass rape in Berlenitz, while some women
and girls were being raped, other pregnant women had their stomachs cut
open with knives, with the fetuses then being skewered by the soldiers'
knives. Young boys present had their throats slit after their ears and
noses were cut off.
Police assaulted, intimidated, harassed, and extorted money from
ethnic Albanians during the first 6 months of the year (see Section
2.d.).
Ethnic Albanians continued to suffer at the hands of security
forces conducting searches for weapons, ammunition, and explosives
early in the year. The police, without following proper legal
procedures, frequently extracted ``confessions'' during interrogations
that routinely included the beating of suspects' feet, hands, genital
areas, or heads. The police used their fists, nightsticks, and
occasionally electric shocks. Apparently confident that there would be
no reprisals, and in an attempt to intimidate the wider community,
police often beat persons in front of their families. There was
virtually no prosecution by Serbian authorities of those responsible,
despite a public commitment from the President of the Government of
Serbia in 1998 to do so and despite repeated demands from the
international community calling on the Milosevic regime to cooperate in
the investigation and prosecution of those responsible. According to
various sources, ethnic Albanians were frequently too terrified to ask
police to follow proper legal procedures--such as having them provide
written notice of witness interrogation. In some cases, Serbian police
also used threats and violence against family members of suspects and
held them as hostages. Local human rights monitors reported that
Serbian police threatened and intimidated doctors working in the
province to prevent them from treating KLA members. According to ethnic
Albanian and foreign observers, the worst abuses against ethnic
Albanians took place not in big towns but in rural enclaves--a pattern
which, according to many observers, increased separatist sentiment and
provided the basis for the strong support for the KLA in these areas.
NGO's reported police searches of NGO vehicles. Harassment,
detention, and violence against aid workers also were reported during
the first 6 months of the year. A number of reliable international
human rights monitors reported that all of the Council for the Defense
of Human Rights and Freedoms workers were harassed routinely and
severely by Serbian authorities in the first 6 months of the year (see
Section 4).
In a country where many of the adult males are armed, the Serbian
Government and police, especially prior to the outbreak of hostilities
with NATO in late March, continued to enforce selectively the laws
regulating the possession and registration of firearms so as to harass
and intimidate ethnic minorities, particularly ethnic Albanians. The
most frequent justification given for searches of homes and arrests was
the illegal possession of weapons. Observers allege that in Kosovo the
police used the pretext of searching for weapons when in fact they also
were searching for hard currency. During the period of Serbian
administration of Kosovo, it was reported that local police authorities
more easily approved the registration of legal weapons for Serbs in the
province and frequently deliberately ignored Serbs' possession of
illegal weapons. In fact, the Serbian police in some cases reportedly
actively promoted the arming of local Serb civilians.
In Cirez 20,000 ethnic Albanians reportedly were used as human
shields against NATO bombings. In Klina 500 civilians were used as
shields in fighting against KLA forces on March 28. In early April, as
many as 700 men were used as human shields in Orahovac, where they were
forced to stand in front of tanks with their hands tied behind their
backs.
The Yugoslav Constitution expressly prohibits torture or inhuman
treatment by the Government, and UNMIK sought to enforce this provision
during the latter half of the year; however, after the introduction of
U.N. authority in the province in June, there continued to be frequent
reports of civilians attacking and abusing members of another
ethnicity.
According to Human Rights Watch, after the withdrawal of Serbian
forces, KLA members tortured ethnic Serbs, ethnic Albanians suspected
of collaborating with the Serb authorities, and Roma, including
beatings of elderly ethnic Serbs. KFOR found a torture chamber in a KLA
dormitory in late August, which contained weapons, ammunition,
explosives, and booby traps.
According to Human Rights Watch, uniformed KLA members participated
in an unspecified number of rapes and murders of Serb and Romani women,
but there is not sufficient evidence to substantiate allegations that
the ethnic Albanian leadership planned such attacks.
There were reports in the second half of the year of KLA self-
appointed local administrators restricting the political rights of
other parties in regions of Kosovo. KLA representatives allegedly
threatened, harassed, and beat LDK members in Prizren and Gnjilane. In
early August, the local LDK office in Gnjilane also was ransacked and
some of its representatives were detained and harassed.
On June 15 a Serbian paramilitary member leaving Gjilan threw a
grenade from his car at a group of ethnic Albanian civilians; 13 were
injured including several children.
On September 25, ethnic Albanians attacked a trailer carrying 12
Serbs near Kamenica, which left 1 person dead and 4 persons injured. On
the same day, a Serb couple was pulled from their vehicle in the
western part of the province and beaten by an ethnic Albanian.
Prison conditions meet international standards. However, prison
conditions have deteriorated in recent years. There were few confirmed
reports of abuse of prisoners by Serbian authorities once they were
sentenced and serving time. The vast majority of cases of torture
occurred before detainees were charged with offenses or during the
period between the filing of charges and the commencement of the trial.
Prior to hostilities, the Serbian Government generally permitted
prison visits by human rights monitors, although access was poor,
sporadic, and subject to the whim of local officials. On several
occasions, outside monitors, including representatives of the ICRC,
were denied access to individuals held by Serbian police. UNMIK and
KFOR permitted prison visits by human rights monitors in the second
half of the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--In the first 6 months of
the year, Serbian police used arbitrary arrest and detention. Serbian
police often applied certain laws only against ethnic minorities and
used force with impunity. Ethnic Albanians were subjected to trumped up
or exaggerated charges, ranging from unlawful possession of firearms to
willfully undermining the country's territorial integrity. According to
Serbian Ministry of Justice statistics, the authorities were in the
process of charging or trying approximately 1,500 persons for
activities related to the Kosovo conflict at the end of 1998. Serbian
authorities still have between 1,900 and 7,000 persons, mostly ethnic
Albanians, in prison in Serbia for activities related to the Kosovo
conflict, and many of these persons likely still were being charged or
tried at year's end.
Federal and Serbian laws regarding conspiracy, threats to the
integrity of the Government, and state secrets were so vague as to
allow easy abuse by the Milosevic regime.
In the first 6 months of the year, federal statutes permitted the
police to detain criminal suspects without a warrant and hold them
incommunicado for up to 3 days without charging them or granting them
access to an attorney. Serbian law separately provided for a 24-hour
detention period. The police often combined the two for a total 4-day
detention period. After this period, police had to turn a suspect over
to an investigative judge, who could order a 30-day extension and,
under certain legal procedures, subsequent extensions of investigative
detention up to 6 months. Serbian police often detained and beat
persons without ever charging them officially and routinely held
suspects well beyond the 3-day statutory period. Bail rarely was
granted.
Serb Police used arbitrary arrest and detention in the province. In
the first half of the year, Serbian authorities shifted from a system
used before the conflict, of bringing inflated charges against ethnic
Albanian individuals as an excuse to detain them, to systematically and
forcibly separating masses of military-aged men from their families.
Mass detention sites were established throughout the province, with at
least 25,000 prisoners detained in them in the spring. Refugees
reported in April that Serbian forces used the Ferro-Nickel factory in
Glogovac as a detention center for a large number of ethnic Albanians.
According to refugees, a cement factory in General Jankovic also was
used temporarily as a detention center for ethnic Albanians. The
detainees reportedly were released in late April. From May 21 to early
June, some 2,000 Kosovar Albanian men entered Albania after being
detained by Serbian forces for 3 weeks in a prison in Smrekovnica near
Srbica. Serbian authorities apparently were looking for KLA members and
sympathizers among the prisoners. While detaining the men, the Serbian
authorities forced them to dig trenches and physically abused many of
them. After interrogations, the detainees were loaded on buses and
driven to Zhure, from where they walked to the border with Albania.
Conditions at these detention sites were poor. Witness reports describe
daily regimens of beatings, overcrowded facilities, little food, no
exercise; and in some cases, persons had to sleep on concrete floors.
When the situation in Kosovo deteriorated and the OSCE KVM pulled
its verifiers out of the province on March 19, as many as 20 former
OSCE KVM local employees were arrested by Pristina police at the start
of the conflict (see Section 4).
Prior to the conflict that commenced in March, defense lawyers and
human rights workers complained of excessive delays by Serbian
authorities in filing formal charges and opening investigations. The
ability of defense attorneys to challenge the legal basis of their
clients' detention often was hampered further by difficulties in
gaining access to detainees or acquiring copies of official indictments
and decisions to remand defendants into custody. In some cases, judges
prevented defense attorneys from reading the court file. Investigative
judges often delegated their responsibility for carrying out
investigations to the police or members of the state security service
and rarely questioned their accounts of the investigation--even when it
was obvious that confessions were coerced from the accused. Results of
such sham investigations were then used in court to convict defendants
on trumped up charges.
After it assumed authority in Kosovo, UNMIK introduced Regulation
1999/2 on August 12. That action permitted law enforcement authorities
to detain a suspect for up to 12 hours, and to ``temporarily remove a
person from a location, or prevent access by a person to a location, to
prevent a threat to public peace and order.'' This regulation was
deemed necessary to control the wave of violence (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.).
Since June UNMIK and KFOR detained hundreds of persons suspected of
committing ethnically motivated violent crimes and arson. All suspects
were held in a temporary detention facility as they waited for their
cases to be reviewed by one of several mobile judicial units, which
decided whether the detainee was to be released or whether his case
would go to trial. By the end of October, 13 criminal trials were
completed, and hundreds of pretrial detention hearings were held, but
the authorities still were working to establish a complete court system
(see Section 1.e.). At the end of October, 210 persons were in KFOR
detention, and 20 to 30 others were arrested and were being detained by
UNMIK police.
As concern grew over the status of prisoners still being held in
Serbia, on September 21 UNMIK created an autonomous commission on
prisoners and detainees, under the auspices of the UNHCR, to
investigate and advocate for prisoners and missing persons. This
commission also established a system for death certificates.
There were reports of KLA abductions and detainings during the year
of journalists, Serbs, and political opponents. On June 18, KFOR troops
released some 15 persons who were held by the KLA in the police station
in Prizren. The victims reported that KLA members beat them (see
Section 1.c.). In early August, the local LDK office in Gnjilane also
was ransacked and some of its representatives were detained and
harassed.
Exile is not permitted legally, and no instances of specific
individuals forced out of the country on the basis of a legal process
are known to have occurred. However, the practical effect of police
repression was to accentuate political instability, which in turn
limited economic opportunity. As a result, over the years, many ethnic
Albanians went abroad to escape persecution, although only in a few
cases could direct links to police actions be identified.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice, in the first 6 months of
the year Federal and Serbian courts largely were controlled by the
Government and rarely challenged the will of the state security
apparatus. Judicial corruption was also widespread. While judges were
elected for fixed terms, they were subjected to governmental pressure.
Serbian authorities frequently denied fair public trials to non-Serbs
and to persons whom they believed opposed the regime.
The court system in the first half of the year consisted of local,
district, and supreme courts at the republic level, as well as the
Federal Court and Federal Constitutional Court, to which republic
supreme court decisions, depending on the subject, could be appealed.
There was also a military court system. According to the Federal
Constitution, the Federal Constitutional Court ruled on the
constitutionality of laws and regulations and relied on the constituent
republic authorities to enforce its rulings.
The Federal Criminal Code of the former Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia remained in force in the first 6 months of the year.
Considerable confusion and room for abuse remained in the legal system
because the 1990 Constitution of Serbia had not yet been brought into
conformity with the 1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia. Under federal law, defendants had the right to be present
at their trial and to have an attorney represent them, at public
expense if needed. The courts also had to provide interpreters. The
presiding judge decided what was read into the record of the
proceedings. Either the defendant or the prosecutor could appeal the
verdict.
Although generally respected in form, during the period of Serbian
administration, defense lawyers in Kosovo filed numerous complaints in
the first half of the year about flagrant breaches of standard
procedure, which they believed undermined their clients' rights. Even
when individual judges admitted that the lawyers were correct, the
courts ignored or dismissed the complaints.
The Government continued to pursue cases previously brought against
targeted minority groups under the Yugoslav Criminal Code for
jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the country and for
conspiring or forming a group with intent to commit subversive
activities--that is, undermining the ``constitutional order.'' Numerous
questionable trials took place during the period of Serbian
administration. Over 90 percent of the cases involved alleged
violations under the Federal Penal Code of Article 136 related to
``association to conduct enemy activity,'' or Article 125 concerning
``terrorism.'' A number of these persons were being tried in absentia.
According to the Ministry of Justice, at the end of 1998 some 1,500
Kosovo Albanians were being charged or tried for crimes related to the
Kosovo conflict. Serbian authorities still have between 1,900 and 7,000
persons, mostly ethnic Albanians, in prison in Serbia for activities
related to the Kosovo conflict, and many of these persons probably
still were being charged or tried at year's end (see Section 1.d.). The
Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights was monitoring
the cases of 1,350 prisoners in the Pec and Prizren regional courts
during the first few months of the year.
Generally, the evidence in these cases was inadequate according to
international organizations and human rights monitors, and the
defendants largely were denied timely access to their attorneys.
According to international civilian verifiers from the OSCE KVM office
in Pec, some 80 laymen worked in the district and municipal courts as
judges, of whom the vast majority were former police officers. Although
there were two courtrooms in the court building, many trials were held
in the offices of the judges on the upper floors where no members of
the public were present. International human rights monitors observed a
lack of impartiality by Serb judges in the municipal and district court
system in the province. They also noted the absence of legal counsel
for the defense, the absence of witnesses or experts during
proceedings, and a failure to provide medical care during proceedings
to defendants obviously in need of immediate attention. Continuing a
common pattern of abuse, independent observers reported that several
defendants met their defense attorneys for the first time only after
the investigative judge already concluded the crucial investigation
stage, while other defendants had defense counsel assigned after they
entered the courtroom. Much evidence appeared to have been obtained by
authorities through forced confessions of defendants under duress.
Other evidence was kept from defense attorneys until just before the
trial. Other international observers monitoring the trials of alleged
terrorists in Pristina complained of irregularities in the process
involving evidentiary standards, the nonuse of native languages, and
the failure to respect the presumption of innocence.
Many legal scholars expressed concern over the Act on Lawyers,
passed in July 1998, which they believed restricted the freedoms of
lawyers and interfered with the independence of lawyers in their
dealings with clients. They believed that the law gave too much
authority to the lawyers' chambers--both at the republic and federal
levels--which the Helsinki Committee alleged would enable the regime to
exercise stricter control over the profession. According to a Serbian
Constitutional Court judge, the law also enabled the regime to
interfere with the lawyer-client relationship, which, even during the
Communist era, was upheld to a greater degree.
UNMIK installed an emergency legal system to prosecute suspected
criminals in response to the vacuum that existed when Serbian military
and police left the province in June. On June 28, by Emergency Decree,
UNMIK appointed seven members to the Joint Advisory Council for
Legislative Matters (JAC), which is composed of three members
representing U.N. organizations, two ethnic Albanians, one Serb, and
one Muslim. The JAC's function is to review and comment upon
applications for candidates to serve in an independent, multiethnic
judiciary. On July 30, 9 judges, including 2 judges in absentia were
sworn in, and another 10 judges and prosecutors were appointed on July
10. By late October, 48 judges and prosecutors were appointed, and at
the end of December UNMIK appointed 300 more judges and prosecutors,
who are expected to be sworn in in early 2000. In September UNMIK
established a Technical Advisory Commission, consisting of Kosovar and
international experts to advise it on the structure and administration
of the judiciary and prosecution service in the province. A joint
Kosovar-U.N. Advisory Judicial Commission also was established in
September to advise the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-
General on matters relating to the appointment of judges and
prosecutors.
The judiciary's task was to try eventually the hundreds of persons
detained by KFOR and UNMIK for murder, looting, and a variety of other
crimes since June, based upon the ``laws applicable in the territory of
Kosovo prior to March 24, 1999'' insofar as they do not conflict with
internationally recognized standards and other UNMIK regulations.
Ethnic Albanian jurists were reluctant to apply what they considered
discriminatory Serbian legal codes. On December 12, UNMIK adopted
Regulation 199/24, which changed applicable law to the law in force in
Kosovo on March 22, 1989. The JAC was working on a new Criminal and
Criminal Procedures Code and consulted with the Council of Europe on
early drafts. At year's end, these codes were being translated.
Two mobile judicial units were formed to conduct pretrial hearings
and investigations and began operations in July. Each unit consists of
two prosecutors, one judge, three secretaries, and two defense lawyers,
to defend those unable to provide for their own counsel. The mobile
unit has the authority to release a suspect or to request that the
judge begin an investigation and hold the suspect until trial.
While every effort was made to move detainees through the system,
the sheer numbers of cases and limited resources available resulted in
long delays before cases could be reviewed. A perpetual logjam exists
in reviewing cases, and to date, few cases actually have gone to trial.
Some individuals remain in prolonged detention without being indicted.
At the end of October, 210 persons were in KFOR detention, and another
20 to 30 individuals were detained by UNMIK police.
Furthermore, there were credible reports that the judiciary was
subject to outside pressure and intimidation, resulting in ethnic
Albanian judges releasing or seeking to release ethnic Albanians
charged with serious crimes, including crimes against Serbs, even if
those individuals had been caught in the act of committing the crime by
KFOR or U.N. security personnel. In early August, two Serb members of
the judiciary were attacked, and additional measures had to be taken to
provide for their safety. By October all seven Serb prosecutors and
judges either resigned or fled the province, due to fear for their
personal safety, complaints of discrimination, or lack of sufficient
compensation.
The Serbian Government continues to hold many, perhaps thousands
of, ethnic Albanians as political prisoners in Serbia.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights
in the first 6 months of the year. Federal law gave republic ministries
of the interior sole control over the decision to monitor potential
criminal activities, a power that was abused routinely. It is widely
believed that authorities monitored opposition and dissident activity,
eavesdropped on conversations, read mail, and wiretapped telephones.
Although illegal under provisions of federal and Serbian law, the
federal post office registered all mail from abroad, ostensibly to
protect mail carriers from charges of theft.
Although the law included restrictions on searches, Serbian
officials often ignored them in the first half of the year. Serbian
police systematically subjected ethnic Albanians to random searches of
their homes, vehicles, shops, and offices, asserting that they were
searching for weapons. According to the Kosovo Council for the Defense
of Human Rights and Freedoms, the police carried out scores of raids on
homes, including in areas not affected by the fighting. Police used
threats and violence against family members of suspects.
In the first 6 months of the year, Serbian security forces
systematically destroyed entire villages by burning and shelling
houses, contaminating water wells, and killing livestock (see Section
1.g.). In the second half of March as the airstrikes began, ethnic
cleansing dramatically accelerated in Kosovo. On March 25, Serbian
forces burned 200 to 600 homes in Djakovica alone and destroyed the
rest of the old city the following day. More than 90 percent of all
ethnic Albanians were expelled from their homes in the province. The
UNHCR estimates that hundreds of thousands of persons remained
internally displaced within the province during the conflict, while
approximately 850,000 persons fled to neighboring areas including
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, FYROM, and Montenegro.
Starting in March, Serbian authorities conducted a campaign of
forced population movement on a massive scale. Ethnic Albanian refugees
and IDP's consistently reported being expelled from their homes by
Serbian forces at gunpoint, in contrast to the fighting during 1998,
when the bulk of the IDP's and refugees fled to escape the crossfire or
to avoid reprisals by Serbian security forces. Many victims were herded
onto trains and other organized transport and expelled from the
province. In addition, Serbian forces expelled the majority of Kosovar
Albanians from urban areas such as Djakovica. Refugees and IDP's
reported that those forced to remain behind were used as human shields.
A government law requiring universal military service was enforced
by Serbian authorities only sporadically and not vigorously in the
first 6 months of the year. The informal practice of the military was
not to call up ethnic Albanians. Of approximately 100,000 draft evaders
living abroad to avoid punishment in 1998, 40 percent were estimated to
be ethnic Albanian. This number in part reflected the large number of
conscription-age men in the FRY's Albanian community. Leaders of
Kosovo's Albanian and Sandzak's Muslim communities maintained that
forced compliance of these ethnic groups with universal military
service was an attempt to induce young men to flee the country.
According to an amnesty bill passed in 1996, up to 12,000 young men for
whom criminal prosecution for draft evasion already had started were
granted amnesty. Others who did not fall into this category were told
that if they returned to the FRY their cases would be reviewed on a
``case by case'' basis, a policy that has not inspired confidence among
offenders. Another law passed in 1998 stated that draft dodgers who did
not report for military service would forfeit their right to
inheritance.
In a related development, under a 1996 agreement with Germany,
ethnic Albanian refugees repatriated to the FRY were not supposed to be
prosecuted for fleeing the draft. However, according to the
Humanitarian Law Center, many returning ethnic Albanians faced
irregular procedures on returning to the FRY. The Center reported many
misdeeds by authorities against asylum seekers who returned, including
physical abuse, threats of imprisonment, deportation, confiscation of
identification cards, and a requirement that persons report to their
local police stations on a daily basis. Returning ethnic Albanians were
detained routinely on their arrival at local airports. In many cases
FRY officials have refused to issue proper travel documents to children
born to asylum seekers.
Since the province came under the authority of UNMIK in June, the
law prohibited such practices, authorities generally respected these
prohibitions, and violations by authorities were subject to effective
legal sanction. However, in the months following the war, abuses were
committed frequently by ethnic Albanian civilians and members of the
KLA. There were frequent reports of men wearing KLA uniforms, or
claiming to be acting in the name of the KLA, entering the private
homes of Serb residents and subjecting them to harassment and
intimidation. Many Serbs left of their own accord along with departing
Serb security forces. There were credible reports that such men also
sought to expropriate property of fellow ethnic Albanians in the name
of the KLA. An estimated 164,000 Serbs and an unknown number of Roma
left the province, many of whom were compelled to flee by the
harassment and intimidation. According to field research conducted by a
Roma NGO in early July, all of the Romani communities it visited had
less than half of their preconflict Roma population. Civilians were
also responsible for the random destruction and arson of private
property.
Respect for property rights proved to be problematic. Many property
records were lost, casting doubt over how current occupants of vacated
properties could remain where they were living, and how owners could
rightfully reclaim their property. UNMIK created a housing and property
directorate that redrafted regulations to laws that previously
discriminated against ethnic Albanians. The directorate also
established a system of permits that would allow squatters to remain in
housing temporarily through the winter, until the rightful owners could
be located.
The UNHCR reported that 50,000 to 90,000 homes in the 2,000
villages of the province were damaged severely or uninhabitable. The
damage is worse in the Western section of the province, with Pec having
lost 40 to 45 percent of its housing. In Djakovica and Mitrovica, the
losses are around 30 percent. In the province overall, some 40 percent
of the schools were destroyed or damaged severely.
Since the end of the conflict, many Serb- and Roma-owned homes were
looted and then burned. Some of the most serious looting and arson
occurred in the districts of Lipljan, Klina, Pec, Istok, and Djakovica.
In Vitomirica by late June Serb houses were looted and burned, while
houses that had ``Albanian house'' written on a wall were left
untouched. Ethnic Albanian returnees occupied some Serb houses.
Especially on the weekend of June 19 and 20, unidentified persons set
fire to Serb-owned homes and looted their properties throughout the
province. KFOR arrested 10 ethnic Albanians near Prizren, suspected of
arson in several Serb villages (see Section 5).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The conflict in Kosovo placed civilian populations
on both sides of the ethnic divide in an unusually vulnerable position.
The excessive and indiscriminate use of force by Serbian police and the
VJ resulted in widespread civilian casualties and the mass forced
displacement of up to 1.3 million persons, both within and outside the
province.
NATO allies, responding to President Milosevic's abuses, stepped up
pressure on the regime in the fall of 1998. In the face of the threat
of NATO air raids, President Milosevic agreed to steps aimed at
mitigating the humanitarian disaster unfolding in the province. He
undertook an obligation to comply fully with the terms of UNSCR 1199
(adopted in September 1998), which included demands that the FRY cease
all action by the security forces affecting the civilian population,
order the withdrawal of security forces used for civilian repression,
cooperate with the ICTY, and allow full and unimpeded access for all
international humanitarian aid organizations to Kosovo, including the
UNHCR and the ICRC. President Milosevic also agreed to allow a NATO air
verification mission to verify compliance with UNSCR 1199 from the air
and to allow 2,000 unarmed civilian ``verifiers'' of the OSCE KVM to
verify compliance on the ground in Kosovo. Agreements establishing
these missions were signed separately by the FRY, with NATO and the
OSCE respectively, in October 1998. In subsequent meetings with NATO
representatives, President Milosevic agreed to specific limits on
Serbian police and the Yugoslav army presence in Kosovo.
It soon became apparent that Milosevic had no intention of
complying fully with these agreements. International diplomatic
observers witnessed Serbian armed forces purposefully destroying
civilian property: police systematically looted, trashed, and burned
villages and shot livestock with the intention of depopulating certain
regions, especially the villages near the border with Albania.
International diplomatic observers and members of intergovernmental
organizations witnessed Serbian security forces torching and
vandalizing homes of ethnic Albanians after fighting between police
forces and insurgents already had ceased in those villages. Over 1,200
residential areas, including over 500 villages, were burned after late
March, and 300 villages burned in the month of April 1999 alone. Most
Serb homes and stores remained intact during the conflict and Serb
civilians in many towns painted a Cyrillic ``S'' on their doors so that
Serbian forces would not attack their homes by mistake. Many
settlements were destroyed totally in an apparent attempt to ensure
that the ethnic Albanian population could not return. Serbian forces
reportedly burned all houses that previously had been rented by the
OSCE in Vucitrn, Stimlje, and Kosovska Mitrovica. Other NGO's reported
that areas that were occupied by Serbian security forces were at high
risk for well water contamination. The security forces used the wells
for waste disposal (i.e., garbage, animal remains, and other
contaminants) when they departed. Numerous credible incidents were
reported in which civilians were seized from intercity buses and held
hostage by both Serbian security forces and Albanian insurgents.
According to the UNHCR, approximately 850,000 persons fled to
neighboring countries and hundreds of thousands were internally
displaced (IDP's) within the country.
Starting in March, Serbian authorities conducted an ethnic
cleansing campaign of forced population movement on a massive scale.
Ethnic Albanian refugees and IDP's consistently reported being expelled
from their homes by Serbian forces at gunpoint, in contrast to the
fighting of 1998, when the bulk of the IDP's and refugees fled to
escape the crossfire or to avoid reprisals by Serbian security forces.
Many victims were herded onto trains and other organized transport and
expelled from the province. In addition, Serbian forces expelled the
majority of Kosovar Albanians from urban areas such as Djakovica.
Refugees and IDP's reported that those forced to remain behind were
used as human shields.
Serbian forces compelled ethnic Albanians to accompany Serbian
military convoys and shield facilities throughout the province.
Beginning in mid-April, Serbian forces used ethnic Albanian men from
refugee columns and forced them to form a buffer zone around Serbian
convoys. Numerous ethnic Albanians claimed to have witnessed and
participated in this activity on the roads between Pec, Djakovica, and
Kosovksa Mitrovica. In at least one instance--Korisa--Serbian forces
intentionally positioned ethnic Albanians at sites that they believed
were targets for NATO airstrikes. In other instances, according to
unconfirmed reports, ethnic Albanians were kept concealed within NATO
target areas to generate civilian casualties that could be blamed on
NATO. Ethnic Albanian reports claimed that Serbian forces compelled
Kosovar Albanian men to wear Serbian military uniforms, likely so that
they would appear to be Serbs to NATO and KLA surveillance.
Serbian forces also disguised themselves as NGO workers to prevent
targeting from NATO aircraft. Refugees claimed that on May 6, Serbian
forces dressed in white hats and jackets with Red Cross and Red
Crescent logos moved with convoys of IDP's between Djakovica and
Brekovac. In order to conceal their military cargo, Serbian forces
covered their wagons with plastic tarpaulins taken from NGO's.
In contrast to 1998, when Serbian security forces attacked small
villages, in the first 6 months of the year Yugoslav army units and
armed civilians joined the police in systematically expelling ethnic
Albanians at gunpoint from both villages and the larger towns of the
province. Many of the places targeted had not been the scenes of
previous fighting or KLA activity. Serbian authorities forced many
refugees to sign disclaimers saying that they were leaving the province
of their own free will. There were numerous reports that Serbian forces
confiscated identity and property documents, including passports, land
titles, automobile license plates, and identity cards, as ethnic
Albanians were forced out of villages or as they crossed the borders
into Albania or FYROM. Physicians for Human Rights reports that nearly
60 percent of respondents to its survey observed Serbian forces
removing or destroying personal identification documents. Victims also
reported that the Serbian forces confiscated their personal belongings
and documentation, including national identity papers, and told them to
take a last look at their surroundings, because they would never return
to the province.
Serbian forces systematically attacked ethnic Albanian physicians,
patients, and medical facilities. Violations of medical neutrality by
Serbian forces include killings, torture, detention, imprisonment, and
forced disappearances of Kosovar physicians. In March and April,
Serbian health care providers, police, and military expelled ethnic
Albanian patients and health care providers from health facilities as
protective cover for military activities. The NGO Physicians for Human
Rights received reports of the destruction of at least 100 medical
clinics, pharmacies, and hospitals.
In addition to the terror tactics employed by Serbian security
forces against the ethnic Albanian civilian population of Kosovo,
credible sources indicated that the Milosevic regime sought to block
some shipments of food into the province prior to the outbreak of
hostilities with the international community. When presented with a
list allegedly prepared by Belgrade authorities of products to be
stopped from entering the province, Serbian police in the province did
not deny the operation but stated that it was part of a countrywide
campaign to stop ``tax avoidance.'' At the same time, the Milosevic
regime compiled at best an uneven record of cooperation and hostility
toward nongovernmental organizations that sought to deliver
humanitarian shipments to the needy in the province. Such shipments
also were intended for IDP's forcibly displaced by the Serbian police
campaign of shelling, looting, and burning ethnic Albanians' homes
after the mid-1998 fighting had concluded.
As a result of the conflict that occurred in the spring, certain
rural areas of the province still are filled with unexploded land
mines. The U.N. Mine Action Coordination Center in Pristina announced
in September that 40 persons had died and 232 others were injured by
accidental explosions of cluster bombs or land mines since the end of
the conflict in June. This was thought to be a conservative estimate,
since many incidents went unrecorded, especially if the victim died
instantly or was treated at a hospital and released.
Separatist fighters and KLA members set up roadblocks and denied
passage to Serbs, including civilians attempting to get to and from
work. Separatist fighters harassed Serbian journalists and took some
hostage. In addition to credible cases in which so-called
``collaborators'' were killed, some ethnic Albanians employed by state-
owned enterprises were threatened.
Despite the presence of UNMIK and KFOR, numerous clashes between
Kosovars and Serbs continued into the fall, occasionally involving KFOR
troops. On August 16, nine mortar rounds were fired from the
countryside around the Serb village of Klokot. Two Serbs were killed
instantly, while five other people were wounded. There were also mortar
attacks on August 10 and 12 on the same village, however no casualties
resulted from the earlier incidents. A mortar attack against the
Serbian village of Donja Budriga took place on September 8, in which
two Serbs were killed and four others injured.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and the Press.--The law provides for freedom
of speech and of the press; however, in the first 6 months of the year
the Federal and Serbian Governments severely restricted this right in
practice.
The Serbian Government issued a decree in October 1998 that
effectively allowed press censorship. The decree reflected a
recognition of the threat to the regime of the free flow of information
and ideas on issues related to the situation in Kosovo and the
possibility--at that time--of a conflict with NATO. In October 1998, it
passed a new information law, which incorporated many of the decree's
strict provisions and left the country's independent media severely
constrained. Under the law, private citizens or organizations could
bring suit against media outlets for printing materials not
sufficiently patriotic, or ``against the territorial integrity,
sovereignty, and independence of the country.'' Media outlets also
could be fined for publishing items of a personal nature without the
consent of the individual concerned (an apparent reference to political
cartoons). The rebroadcast of foreign news programs, including from the
British Broadcasting Corporation and the Voice of America, was banned.
Media outlets whose practices did not conform to the new law could be
subjected to exorbitant fines, which must be paid within a 24-hour
period.
In March authorities imposed the maximum fine of $100,000 (Din 1.6
million) on the Gazete Shqiptare, a Kosovar weekly newspaper and
ordered the Koha Ditore publishing house to stop printing the weekly.
Authorities also froze the newspaper's bank accounts, confiscated all
current issues, and ordered vendors to stop selling the publication.
The staff of the newspaper announced that it would ignore these actions
and continue to publish outside the province. In March authorities also
fined Kosovo Sot $50,000 (Din 800,000) and its publisher and editor
each another $25,000 (Din 400,000), for publishing a new year's
calendar that included pictures of KLA members. Authorities froze
Kosovo Sot's bank accounts, forced it to suspend operations, seized its
current issues, and warned vendors to stop selling the newspaper.
Radio Contact opened in May 1998; however, it was able to broadcast
only for 2 weeks before Serbian authorities shut it down and
confiscated its equipment. The deliberate vagueness of the relevant
laws often was utilized to penalize independent electronic media
outlets. Radio and television stations were harassed bureaucratically
according to their political orientations. Instead of obtaining long-
term licenses to broadcast, stations received only 1-year temporary
licenses, if they received a license at all. The bureaucratic
procedures were so difficult that stations frequently could not fulfill
all of the requirements, which left them at the mercy of the regime.
For example, under then current law, to obtain a license to broadcast,
a station had to obtain the approval of a government ``construction
inspector'' for its office space; however, to obtain a construction
inspector's approval, a station needed a broadcast license.
In addition to license issuance problems, those stations that did
obtain licenses were forced to pay exorbitantly high fees, the
nonpayment of which was enforced selectively by Serbian authorities to
close down those stations that did not adhere to the Government's line.
According to independent media sources, in the first 6 months of
the year, most journalists practiced self-censorship in an effort to
avoid a violation under the media law. Journalists had been informed
that printing anything that was not true--even an advertisement or a
death announcement--could be punished under the information law. One
independent newspaper reported in 1998 that it was publishing half as
many articles as usual, in view of the need to check extensively the
facts in every article.
During the first 6 months of the year, Serbian forces killed,
detained, and beat journalists (see Section 1.a.). For example, in
early May Serbian police arrested Cerkin Ibishi, a journalist for the
newspaper Relindja, in Mitrovica. He was held in two prisons, including
Smerkovnica prison near Mitrovica, before he was released at the end of
May and fled to Albania. Also in May, Halil Matoshi, a journalist for
the weekly Zeri, was taken by Serbian security forces and jailed in
Lipjan. He was removed to a prison in Serbia proper by withdrawing
Serbian forces in June and had not been released by year's end.
In December 1998, Serbia's Ministry of Information issued
threatening letters to five Albanian-language newspapers and magazines
in the province to the effect that they were in violation of the new
public information law. Shortly thereafter, the newspaper Bujku
effectively was closed down. Editors from Koha Ditore, the leading
Albanian-language daily, Zeri, an intellectual Albanian weekly, and
Kosovo Sot, a new Albanian daily, reported that threats against the
Albanian language media, which began with warning letters from the
Serbian Ministry of Information, were escalating. Pressure on the
Albanian-language press became so intense in late February that no
Albanian-language newspapers were in circulation by the outbreak of the
conflict in March. On the first night of the NATO bombing campaign, the
premises of Koha Ditore were destroyed by Serbian forces and a night
watchman was killed. The printing press of the daily Kosovo Sot was
destroyed soon thereafter.
Many of the members of the Kosovar Albanian press attempted to work
in exile during the war. Beginning in January, Radio Contact, Radio 21,
and Koha Ditore Radio all broadcast for approximately 15 minutes per
day through a satellite link provided by the British Broadcasting
Company. During the conflict, Koha Ditore, Kosovo Sot, and Rilindja
restarted their publishing activities in FYROM. However, when they
returned to the province, they found that their offices and facilities
had been destroyed. Serbian authorities had demolished the major
printing houses before the war, and NATO systematically bombed the main
radio-television transmitter that the government-affiliated station,
Radio Television Pristina (RTP), had been using.
UNMIK found it difficult to create a free media environment in a
region that had suffered from 9 years of oppression under the previous
regime and also from the destruction of war. Following the conflict,
UNMIK gained control of the broadcasting towers and frequencies, and
the OSCE established a Department for Media Affairs. The department is
responsible for promoting transparency, openness, fact-based reporting,
and providing a broad spectrum of political institutions access to the
media, as well as access to information for all ethnic groups. One
division of the Media Affairs Department is to serve as a Media
Regulatory Commission for the full range of media in the province. The
media division still was searching for staff to carry out the
regulatory aspect of promoting a free media at year's end. An
Independent Media Council also is to be created to advise and assist
the OSCE in creating a free media environment. Finally, an
international appellate body is to be appointed to review decisions
made by the Media Regulatory Commission. The appellate body also is to
have the function of drafting laws and regulations and presenting them
to provincially elected lawmaking bodies.
Newspapers resumed publishing, and by year's end, there were five
daily newspapers and two weeklies with broad circulation. While
flourishing, the print media often acted irresponsibly, including
publishing inflammatory articles which could incite violence against
political personalities, as well as articles providing names and
addresses of ethnic Albanians who allegedly collaborated with the
Serbian authorities.
KosovaPress, a news agency in Pristina that bills itself as a
``state agency,'' issued a commentary on October 2, which targeted two
leading independent Kosovar Albanian journalists. The author accused
Veton Surroi and Baton Haxhiu, who had urged ethnic Albanians to
exercise tolerance toward Serbs, of being Serbian spies, said that they
``should not have a place in free Kosovo,'' and demanded that they be
sent to the ICTY in the Hague. The news agency distanced itself from
the journalist who wrote the commentary, but it did not issue a
retraction.
The only Serb newspaper in Kosovo, Jedinstvo, had its offices
occupied by Kosovar Albanians in August, and UNMIK advised the
newspaper to suspend printing issues due to the security threat.
Jedinstvo now is published in northern Kosovo and is distributed in
Serbian enclaves. It has two editorial boards, one in Belgrade, Serbia
and another in Zvecan, Kosovo.
In June Radio 21 finally obtained a broadcast license to expand
beyond the Internet, where it previously was confined by the Serbian
regime. It became the first independent Albanian-language electronic
media outlet in the province. A number of private smaller stations also
began operations in both Serbian and Albanian.
Radio Pristina became operational on July 28, broadcasting daily
90-minute segments in Albanian, Serbian, and Turkish. The radio station
has a multiethnic staff, with 12 ethnic Albanian, 6 ethnic Serb, and 6
ethnic Turkish journalists. There are also five ethnic Albanians and
two Serbs serving as technicians. Radio Contact also broadcasts in
Albanian, Turkish, and Bosnian and employs a multiethnic staff.
The OSCE Media Division made progress in reconstructing and
erecting new radio, television, and telecommunication towers for use by
RTP and other independent stations. One tower became fully functional
at the end of October. RTP is to be a province-wide public broadcasting
service protected from political domination.
Djakovica, a local ethnic Albanian radio station, was able to
resume broadcasting in June; Serbian authorities had closed it down 9
years ago.
In the first 6 months of the year, the Federal and Serbian
Governments did not respect academic freedom. UNMIK made efforts to
reestablish schools in the province in the second half of the year
under the principle of complete academic freedom. However, given the
massive destruction of schools during the conflict (some 75 percent
were damaged) and current scarce resources, the pace of rebuilding a
school system for the province was slow.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Federal and
republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of peaceful assembly
and association; however, the Serbian and Federal Governments
restricted this right in the first 6 months of the year. Since June
UNMIK generally respected this right in practice.
There were cases in the last half of the year in which KFOR troops
were called in to break up various blockades and standoffs orchestrated
by members of both Serb and Albanian ethnic groups. Beginning July 7
and lasting for several days, ethnic Albanians took part in a major
demonstration near the bridge that divides Mitrovica between the
northern Serb-inhabited sector and the southern ethnic Albanian sector.
A group of 5,000 ethnic Albanians crossed from the southern side to the
northern side on October 15, to protest a KFOR policy limiting ethnic
Albanian access to the Serb sector. This policy was adopted originally
to protect Serbs residing in the area from ethnic Albanian retaliation.
On August 23, tractors manned by hundreds of ethnic Albanians
formed a blockade of vehicles to prevent Russian peacekeeping troops
from moving into Orahovac. Resentment toward Russians for their support
of the Serbian and Federal Governments during the conflict contributed
to higher levels of tension in Orahovac, where more than 1,000 persons
were killed during the conflict. The area is known to have the highest
concentration of identified mass graves, as well as the largest number
of war crimes suspects still residing in the province. Reports of
persons in Orahovac being shot and burned alive in their houses were
widespread during the conflict.
On September 28, two grenades exploded in a Serb market area in
Bresje (see Section 1.a.). Three elderly Serbs were killed instantly
while 46 others suffered from minor and critical injuries. KFOR
arrested two ethnic Albanians suspected of the crime. Hours after the
attack, a Serb group retaliated by blocking a road leading from
Pristina to Pec in western Kosovo, forcing authorities to create a
detour around Kosovo Polje to maintain the flow of commercial and
humanitarian traffic. Ethnic Albanians in turn responded by forming
their own blockade on the same road and also on the railroad tracks in
Kosovo Polje. KFOR forcibly removed all three blockades in the early
morning hours of October 5. The routes reopened, and KFOR positioned
troops along the route to maintain order.
The Federal and republic level Constitutions provide for freedom of
association; however, the Serbian and Federal Governments restricted
this right in the first 6 months of the year.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law in both the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FRY) and Serbia provides for freedom of religion; however,
in practice both the Government and the legal system provided very
little protection for the religious rights of minority groups in the
first 6 months of the year.
There was no state religion, but in the first 6 months of the year
the Milosevic regime gave preferential treatment, including access to
state-run television for major religious events, to the Serbian
Orthodox Church to which the majority of Serbs belong. The regime
subjected religious communities in the province to harassment. Refugees
reported that mosques and religious sites were attacked or destroyed by
Serbian forces in at least 21 villages and towns in the spring.
Religious sites also served as shelter for ethnic Albanians during the
conflict. On March 28, 200 ethnic Albanians who had sought sanctuary in
the Albanian Catholic Church of Pec were removed and forced by MUP
forces to leave town.
UNMIK respects the right to freedom of religion. In light of
societal violence against properties owned by the Serbian Orthodox
Church, UNMIK authorities took extra steps in the months following the
conflict to ensure that members of all religious groups could worship
safely. KFOR deployed security contingents at religious sites
throughout the province to protect them from further destruction, as
had occurred immediately after KFOR's intervention in June.
However, reflecting the severity of security concerns, Bishop
Artemije, the leading cleric of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo,
declared soon after KFOR entered the province that the city of Prizren
was no longer safe and announced that he, 9 priests, and 200 Serb
civilians would leave for Pristina. Approximately 60 Serb families from
Pristina already had taken refuge with Artemije in a monastery outside
the city.
On June 17, Patriarch Pavle, the leader of the Serbian Orthodox
Church, said in a radio address that he would move temporarily to the
historic center of the Church at Pec and appealed to Serbs in the
province not to leave.
As of December, Serbian Archbishop Artemije reported that more than
80 Orthodox churches had been destroyed, damaged, or desecrated.
Serbian Orthodox priests also were intimidated. One priest was abducted
by the KLA and two other priests in Pristina decided to move to the
Gracanica monastery for safety (see Section 1.b.). Fearing that the
monastery's parish house would be confiscated by KLA, the Church
offered it to the UNHCR to use for relief purposes.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement; however, the Federal and Serbian Governments restricted this
right in practice in the first 6 months of the year. Federal and
Serbian authorities frequently barred FRY citizens from reentering the
country. The Milosevic regime continued to restrict the right of ethnic
Albanians to travel by holding up the issuance or renewal of passports
for an unusually long period of time and reserved the option of
prosecuting individuals charged previously with violating exit visa
requirements. Serbian authorities also sometimes called in ethnic
Albanians for interrogation by state security officers before passports
were renewed. Serbian authorities stopped ethnic Albanian men at
various checkpoints in areas where KLA activity was thought to be
concentrated. In the early months of the year, such men were subjected
to random assaults, intimidation, and harassment. Ethnic Albanians also
reported being accused of a number of violations, including speeding
and lack of proper documentation, after which police would demand
payment before they would allow them to proceed. There were also
reports of police confiscating travel documents at checkpoints, thereby
making freedom of movement impossible within the province.
Starting in March, Serbian authorities conducted a campaign of
forced population movement on a massive scale. Ethnic Albanian refugees
and IDP's consistently reported being expelled from their homes by
Serbian forces at gunpoint, in contrast to the fighting of 1998, when
the bulk of the IDP's and refugees fled to escape the crossfire or to
avoid reprisals by Serbian security forces. Many victims were herded
onto trains and other organized transport and expelled from the
province. In addition, Serbian forces expelled the majority of Kosovar
Albanians from urban areas such as Djakovica. Refugees and IDP's
reported that those forced to remain behind were used as human shields.
Citizens reported difficulties at borders and the occasional
confiscation of their passports. Ethnic Albanians frequently complained
of harassment at border crossings. There were numerous reports that
border guards confiscated foreign currency or passports from travelers,
as well as occasional complaints of physical mistreatment. The
authorities generally allowed political opposition leaders to leave the
country and return. FRY embassies overseas generally were considered to
apply a double standard in issuing passports to their citizens; ethnic
Serbs had a much easier time obtaining passports than members of ethnic
minorities.
Many inhabitants of Serbia-Montenegro who were born in other parts
of the former Yugoslavia, as well as large numbers of refugees, were
not able to establish their citizenship in the FRY, leaving them in a
stateless limbo.
The FRY Government was very slow to issue passports to refugees.
This was a particular problem for asylum-seeking parents. For example,
German authorities issued such children born in Germany a document
certifying their birth. FRY officials in Germany refused to issue
passports to such children. When these asylum seekers who have been
refused in Germany returned to the FRY with their children, the
children traveled on the basis of this document. FRY authorities took
the paper at the port of entry and issued a receipt for it. Then the
children had no documentation in a country where documentation was a
basic requirement. In January 1997 a new citizenship law entered into
force, which, when fully implemented, was expected to affect adversely
the rights of many inhabitants, including those born in other parts of
the former Yugoslavia, refugees, and citizens who migrated to other
countries to work or seek asylum.
After Milosevic withdrew his troops from the province in June, the
UNHCR oversaw the return of some 700,000 Kosovar refugees from
surrounding regions and other countries. Since then, problems with
sufficient housing, property records, and education for the returning
ethnic Albanians remain unresolved.
In Kosovska Mitrovica there were restrictions on freedom of
movement in the second half of the year. Following the withdrawal of
Serbian security forces from the province, many ethnic Serbs from
throughout Kosovo fled to Mitrovica and occupied homes, including those
belonging to ethnic Albanians, in the northern part of that town.
Ethnic Albanians seeking to go back to their homes in the north were
subject to violence and intimidation by ethnic Serbs, who feared the
return of the ethnic Albanian residents would jeopardize their
security. KFOR did not have sufficient resources to guarantee
protection of ethnic Albanians wishing to return to their homes in
north Mitrovica. Some 2,000 ethnic Albanians who continue to live in
north Mitrovica are subject to harassment when they travel throughout
the city or send their children to Albanian-language schools in the
southern part of the city. Ethnic Albanian medical personnel and
patients were forced to leave the major hospital in north Mitrovica,
and ethnic Albanians are not able to attend classes in a campus of
Pristina University located in the northern part of the town. Persons
who cross the Ibar river from south Mitrovica into the north part of
the town are monitored by ethnic Serbs stationed near the bridges, who
are able quickly to call upon other ethnic Serbs to discourage unwanted
visitors. In early November, two female ethnic Albanian police
trainees, along with their U.N. International Police escorts, were
attacked by ethnic Serbs after crossing into north Mitrovica to respond
to a call.
Since ethnic Albanians still hold FRY passports, those wishing to
leave Kosovo again after their repatriation experienced some difficulty
in doing so. Their passports were either invalid or not recognized by
other countries as a result of the conflict. Therefore, UNMIK began
issuing temporary travel documents permitting citizens of the province
to travel until a more permanent solution is created.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Federal and the Serbian Constitutions provide for this right,
but in practice Kosovar Albanians expressed frustration with the
province's status within Serbia through a boycott of the political
system and did not attempt to effect the Government through the
electoral process. The most recent Serbian elections, held in the fall
of 1997, were flawed seriously. Starting in June, the OSCE began
developing an environment that would allow for new political parties to
become more active, with equal access and representation in the media.
Preparations are being made for municipal elections, which are likely
to be held in September 2000, at the earliest. Work is scheduled to
begin by early spring 2000 on a civil register, which is to be used to
create a voter register.
No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government
and politics; however, in the first 6 months of the year, they were
underrepresented greatly in party and government offices. In the first
6 months of the year, women held less than 10 percent of ministerial-
level positions in the Serbian and Federal Governments. In the province
before the conflict, a woman led 1 wing of the Social Democratic Party
of Kosovo, and the LDK had 3 women in its 12-member presidency.
However, according to ethnic Albanian women's groups, those women were
exceptional in their political participation, and few women enter
politics in the province because of a lack of interest, money, and
family support.
No legal restrictions affected the role of minorities in government
and politics in the first 6 months of the year; however, ethnic Serbs
and Montenegrins dominated the country's political leadership. Few
members of other ethnic groups played any role at the top levels of
government or the state-run economy. After 1990 ethnic Albanians
refused to take part in the electoral process at any level, including
the Serbian republic and federal levels. They had virtually no
representation in the Serbian republic and FRY government structures.
Ethnic Albanians' refusal to participate in FRY and Serbian
elections had the practical effect of increasing the political
influence of President Milosevic and his supporters. Ultranationalist
parties, including Milosevic's coalition partner the Radical Party of
Serbia, also had taken advantage of the ethnic Albanian boycott to
garner representation beyond their numbers.
The Kosovo Transitional Council, and advisory council set up by
UNMIK, had twelve members, including representatives of the Serb,
Turkish, and Bosnian minorities. There were no female members. The
Joint Advisory Council on Legislative Affairs had one female member.
There were reports in the second half of the year of KLA self-
appointed local administrators restricting the political rights of
other parties in regions of Kosovo. KLA representatives allegedly
threatened, harassed, and beat LDK members in Prizren and Gnjilane. In
early August, the local LDK office in Gnjilane also was ransacked and
some of its representatives were detained and harassed. In November an
LDK activist in Srbica was killed in what the LDK and some UNMIK
officials believe was a politically motivated murder. The LDK has
complained that KLA-appointed local authorities have removed school
principals and other local officials sympathetic to the LDK.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government of Serbia formally maintained that it had no
objection to international organizations conducting human rights
investigations on its territory. However, during the period of its
administration of Kosovo, the Serbian regime routinely hindered the
activities of human rights groups and regularly rejected their
findings.
Local human rights monitors (Serbs as well as members of ethnic
minorities) and NGO's worked under difficult circumstances during the
first 6 months of the year. A number of reliable international human
rights monitors reported that one worker of the CDHRF was missing at
year's end, and that all of the organization's workers were harassed
routinely and severely by Serbian authorities in the first 6 months of
the year.
NGO's reported several blockages by federal and Serbian authorities
to the delivery of humanitarian commodities in the province, as well as
police searches of NGO vehicles. Harassment, detention, and violence
against aid workers also were reported during the first 6 months of the
year. On February 21, the president of the Mother Teresa Society branch
in the town of General Jankovic and his son were killed in front of
their house by unknown assailants (see Section 1.a.). The next day, in
a separate incident, a Medicens Sans Frontiers vehicle was attacked on
the road between Pristina and Lipjan by a civilian with a rifle. Verbal
harassment ensued before the vehicle was allowed to proceed along the
road. Societal violence contributed to the precarious environment in
which aid workers carried out their duties. On August 15, an anonymous
NGO reported that one of its staff members was the object of a failed
kidnaping attempt. A U.N. worker of Bulgarian nationality was killed by
an angry group of ethnic Albanian teenagers on October 11. Valentin
Krumov reportedly was beaten and shot, when he informed an ethnic
Albanian of the time using the Serbian language (see Section 1.a.).
The Milosevic regime denied visas to international nongovernmental
human rights organizations and to investigators from the ICTY, who
wished to conduct impartial investigations into allegations of
atrocities committed by Serbian forces and ethnic Albanian paramilitary
groups in the province. In October 1998, the Government agreed to the
establishment of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). By the
start of the year, the KVM had expanded to several hundred
international verifiers, including human rights personnel, who verified
civilian aspects of implementation of UNSCR 1199. However, when the
situation in Kosovo further deteriorated, the KVM pulled its verifiers
out of the province on March 19. Subsequently, as many as 20 former
OSCE KVM local employees were arrested by Pristina police at the start
of the conflict.
Prior to the conclusion of hostilities, a number of independent
human rights organizations did operate in the FRY, including in Kosovo,
researching and gathering information on abuses, and publicizing such
cases. The Pristina-based Helsinki Committee was active in monitoring
human rights abuses in the province and cooperated with similar
organizations based in Belgrade. The Council for the Defense of Human
Rights and Freedoms (CDHRF) also collected data on human rights abuses
and published newsletters.
ICRC officials complained in the first half of the year of
difficulties in securing access to detainees. Serbian authorities,
during their administration of Kosovo, failed to allow access to ICTY
investigators to the province, preventing the ICTY from carrying out
independent and objective investigations into crimes within the
Tribunal's jurisdiction. As a signatory to the 1995 Dayton Accords that
ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro is obliged
to cooperate fully with the ICTY by turning over to the Tribunal the
persons on its territory who were indicted for war crimes and other
crimes against humanity under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The
Milosevic regime's brutal crackdown in the province prompted calls for
the ICTY to conduct investigations into alleged atrocities committed
there; and the ICTY subsequently indicted Milosevic and four top
lieutenants for their role in the crackdown. The ICTY's jurisdiction
also is delineated clearly under UNSCR 827 of 1993 and many subsequent
resolutions. The regime so far has been uncooperative, claiming that
the violence in the province does not constitute an ``armed conflict.''
In the last half of the year, UNMIK and the OSCE actively
encouraged the development of civil society, including domestically
based NGO's. Due to the humanitarian crisis that developed after the
war, numerous international organizations set up operations in the
province to provide relief for the thousands of returning ethnic
Albanian refugees, as well as to assist with administration itself. The
UNHCR, UNICEF, the ICRC, Catholic Relief Services, and other
organizations are instrumental in aiding UNMIK authorities with
providing much needed services.
Human rights monitors including the OSCE, the UNHCR, and the
Helsinki Committee were active in documenting abuses that occurred in
the second half of the year.
UNMIK cooperates with the ICTY, and ICTY investigators made
numerous trips to the province since the end of the conflict in June to
investigate alleged war crimes committed there in 1998 and 1999.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
While Federal and republic laws provide for equal rights for all
citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or social
status, and prohibit discrimination against women, in reality the legal
system provided little protection to such groups in the first 6 months
of the year. Following the end of the conflict in June, KFOR and UNMIK
were not able to prevent societal violence against Serbs and Roma
effectively.
Women.--The traditionally high level of domestic violence
persisted. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family
violence have inadequate resources and are limited in their activity by
social pressure to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of
spousal abuse ever file complaints with the authorities. However,
tradition prevents much discussion of the topic of rape among
Albanians, since the act is seen as dishonoring the entire family.
According to the Center for the Protection of Women and Children in
Pristina, rape is not recognized as a crime in Albanian society, making
the subject even more secretive.
The situation for ethnic Albanian women in the province worsened
throughout the first 6 months of the year. Refugee accounts indicate
that systematic and organized rapes took place in Djakovica and Pec;
women were raped by Serbian soldiers in full view of their own
families. The general reluctance to discuss such matters meant that
many more cases likely were not reported.
There were incidents of rape reported throughout the province after
the end of the war. These cases were sporadic and largely attributed to
the acts of ethnic retaliation and general disorder that were common
throughout the province. According to Human Rights Watch, uniformed KLA
members participated in an unspecified number of rapes and murders of
Serb and Romani women, but there is not sufficient evidence to
substantiate allegations that the ethnic Albanian leadership planned
such attacks.
The province served as a source and transit point for trafficking
in women for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.)
Women do not enjoy status equal to men, and relatively few women
obtain upper level management positions in commerce. Traditional
patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women should be
subservient to the male members of their family, have long subjected
women to discrimination. In some rural areas, women often are little
more than serfs without the ability to exercise their right to control
property and children. However, in the first 6 months of the year women
legally were entitled to equal pay for equal work and were granted
maternity leave for 1 year, with an additional 6 months available.
Under UNMIK administration, women are entitled to the same protections,
insofar as they do not conflict with internationally recognized
standards. The lack of job opportunities for women in the province has
reinforced the traditional culture in which women remain at home.
Previously the cost of an education in Kosovo--fees for enrollment
in the parallel system, transportation, clothes, and school supplies--
made families reluctant to send girls to school since the prospect of
future employment was slim.
Women are active in political and human rights organizations.
Women's rights groups continued to operate early in the year with
little or no official acknowledgement, but the conflict destroyed the
province's network of NGO's.
Since UNMIK's establishment in June, the UNHCR established the
Kosovo Women's Initiative (KWI), modeled after the Bosnia Women's
Initiative. The KWI was created to fund and organize efforts related to
promoting women's issues among larger existing groups, which would in
turn encourage participation by smaller local organizations. The KWI
actively sought programs that addressed work in rural communities and
with rural ethnic Albanian migrants in the urban areas. Three large
umbrella organizations are part of the KWI: Oxfam, the Danish Refugee
Council, and Maltesers, a German NGO. Proposals for funding from
smaller international and domestic NGO's specializing in reproductive
health, skills training, and income-generating activities also were
reviewed and accepted.
The Women's Forum was the largest previously existing women's
organization in the province and is known to be the women's arm of the
LDK. Although the group undertakes many humanitarian projects,
beneficiaries of such aid generally have been limited to ethnic
Albanians.
Children.--The State attempts to meet the health and educational
needs of children. The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory
schooling. Early in the year, the continued division of the province
into unofficial parallel Serb and Albanian administrative systems
resulted in Serb and ethnic Albanian elementary age children being
taught in separate areas of divided schools, or attending classes in
shifts. Older ethnic Albanian children were attending school in private
homes. The quality of education thus was uneven before the conflict
started, and the tension and division of society in general was
replicated to the detriment of the children. During the first 6 months
of the year, the conflict and the Serb ethnic cleansing campaign
interrupted education. Since the end of the conflict, schools have
reopened; however, extensive damage to buildings, lack of educational
materials, and persistent electric power problems hindered their
functioning.
In 1998 the U.N. Children's Fund estimated that between 55,000 and
60,000 Albanian children were not in school in the Albanian parallel
educational system because schools were not functioning in Decane,
Klina, Glogovac, Srbica, and Djakovica. Such figures likely were much
higher in the first half of 1999. In late 1998, international observers
reported multiple incidents of police being stationed near schools in
the province. Albanian villagers claimed that they were intimidated by
the police presence and that consequently children would not return to
those schools.
Education for most Kosovar citizens during the first 6 months of
the year was interrupted by the conflict and Serb ethnic cleansing
campaign. Since the end of the conflict, schools have reopened under
UNMIK administration, in collaboration with local authorities.
Extensive damage to many schools, lack of educational materials, and
persistent electric power problems hindered the full functioning of
many schools in the last six months of the year.
The status of education rights has been in flux since the end of
the war in June. UNMIK maintains that all children of all ethnic groups
should receive free and universal education, although the process of
reconstruction of schools was slow in the second half of the year. An
estimated 75 percent of schools were damaged in the province during the
conflict. Schools in Pristina reopened in early September and all other
schools in the province reopened on November 1, with efforts made to
ensure that minority students could attend classes safely. UNMIK
provided security for the openings; however, no Serbs allowed their
children to enroll in schools in Pristina. An exception to the general
goal of minority integration was in Mitrovica, where allowing Serb
children to attend school was postponed due to the unstable security
situation there (see Section 2.d.). Furthermore, the education system
controlled by the shadow government does not provide for Serbian
language instruction.
Economic problems also affected the health care system, adversely
affecting children. The health situation for children remained
particularly poor in the province. Humanitarian aid officials blamed
the high rate of infant and childhood mortality, as well as increasing
epidemics of preventable diseases, primarily on poverty that led to
malnutrition and poor hygiene and to the deterioration of public
sanitation. During the period of Serb administration, ethnic Albanians
in some cases feared Serb state-run medical facilities, which resulted
in a low rate of immunization and a reluctance to seek timely medical
attention. According to the Center for Protection of Women and Children
in Pristina, 63 percent of IDP's in the province were children.
The province served as a source and transit point for trafficking
in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People With Disabilities.--Facilities for persons with disabilities
are inadequate. The law prohibits discrimination against persons with
disabilities in employment, education, or in the provision of other
state services. The law mandates access to new official buildings, and
the Federal and Serbian Government enforced these provisions in
practice in the first 6 months of the year.
Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity in the province are
so closely intertwined as to be inseparable. Serious discrimination
against, and harassment of, ethnic minorities was common in the
province, and the conflict raised ethnic tensions elsewhere in the
country with implications for religious intolerance.
Although UNMIK took extra steps in the months following the end of
the conflict in June to ensure that members of all religious groups
could worship safely, Bishop Artemije, the leading cleric of the
Serbian Orthodox Church in Kosovo, declared that the city of Prizren
was no longer safe and announced that he, 9 priests, and 200 Serb
civilians would leave for Pristina. Approximately 60 Serb families from
Pristina already had taken refuge with Artemije in a monastery outside
the city.
On June 17, Patriarch Pavle, the leader of the Serbian Orthodox
Church, said in a radio address that he would move temporarily to the
historic center of the Church at Pec and appealed to Serbs in the
province not to leave.
As of December, Serbian Archbishop Artemije reported that more than
80 Orthodox churches had been destroyed, damaged, or desecrated. The
monasteries in Vucitrn and Musutiste were destroyed. Serbian Orthodox
priests also were intimidated. The KLA abducted one priest, and two
other priests in Pristina decided to move to the Gracanica monastery
for safety (see Section 1.b.). Fearing that the monastery's parish
house would be confiscated by KLA, the Church offered it to the UNHCR
to use for relief purposes.
The small Albanian Roman Catholic community, largely centered in
the southern and western part of Kosovo, has complained that KLA
members or others acting in the name of the KLA have harassed Catholics
and hindered religious activities on the pretense that Catholics
collaborated with the Serbs during the conflict.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--In the first 6 months of the
year, hundreds of thousands of ethnic Albanians and Muslims in the
province continued to be driven from their homes and fired from their
jobs on the basis of religion or ethnicity (see Sections 1.a., 1.c.,
and 1.g.).
In the second half of the year in previously Serb-dominated areas,
Albanians harassed and intimidated Serbs into leaving (see Sections
1.a. and 1.c.). According to Human Rights Watch, uniformed KLA members
participated in an unspecified number of rapes and murders of Serb and
Romani women during the summer, but there is not sufficient evidence to
substantiate allegations that the ethnic Albanian leadership planned
such attacks. In some communities, the situation became so grave that
KFOR had to provide 24-hour protection to Serbs residing in those
areas.
Particularly sensitive locations include Djakovica and Kosovo
Polje, where large numbers of Roma resided. In addition, Mitrovica
continued to be partitioned between Serbs and ethnic Albanians; and
Serbs still were concentrated only in the northern section of Orahovac.
Despite the presence of UNMIK and KFOR, numerous clashes between
Kosovars and Serbs continued into the fall, occasionally involving KFOR
troops, including a mortar attack on August 16 near the Serb village of
Klokot which killed two Serbs and injured five others (see Section
1.g.).
A series of clashes between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Mitrovica
occurred beginning September 9, in which Serbs fired upon a group of
Albanians who had returned to the area to check on their houses. One
civilian was killed, and at least 10 French KFOR and civilian police
personnel were injured, as well as over 50 Serb and ethnic Albanian
civilians.
On October 11, Valentin Krumov, a Bulgarian national assigned to
UNMIK was beaten and shot in the head in a pedestrian area by angry
ethnic Albanians. Krumov, accompanied by two fellow U.N. staff members,
was followed by a group of five or six teenage Albanians, before he was
asked for the time. When Krumov responded in Serbian, the group
proceeded to beat and kick him. Finally a shot was fired to Krumov's
head, killing him instantly. The U.N. investigated the incident but had
not made any arrests by year's end.
The Romani population generally was tolerated and there was no
official discrimination in the first half of the year. However,
prejudice against Roma was widespread and increased among the ethnic
Albanian population during the conflict and in the last half of the
year. Incidents of societal violence against Roma increased sharply. As
of mid-July, some 3,000 Roma, who had experienced difficulty finding
refuge within the province, fled to a Romani settlement at Konic in
Montenegro. A total of 8,000 Roma fled to various sites in Montenegro.
Roma organizations reported that a total of 100,000 had fled the
province during the conflict but had been recorded by international
NGO's as Kosovar Albanians.
Many Roma who feared for their safety gathered in Kosovo Polje
after the withdrawal of Serbian forces from the province in June. The
Romani community moved from its makeshift, overcrowded, and unsanitary
settlement at a Kosovo Polje school on July 21 to a new camp in Obilic.
The UNHCR organized the move. A community that had numbered over 5,000
at one point, dwindled down to 1,500 at the prospect of an unpopular
move. Roma leaders feared for the safety of the community at the new
camp. Despite KFOR escorts accompanying them during the move, the
refugees were harassed while traveling to the new camp outside of town.
Ethnic Albanian children reportedly threw stones at the IDP's, and once
there, there was a verbal altercation between the Roma and neighboring
ethnic Albanians. The tent city at Obilic is now closed, and those of
its inhabitants who did not go to FYROM or back to their home villages
now live in a renovated, more secure collective dwelling in the village
of Plementina, near Obilic. Some 8,000 Roma are there.
A community that once numbered 100,000 to 150,000 in the province
before the conflict has been reduced sharply. Most Roma have fled to
neighboring countries, by some estimates 10,000 Roma remaining in
Kosovo at year's end.
Serbs displaced from Croatia by the earlier conflict there and
resettled in Kosovo appealed to the UNHCR for protection in July,
although most seemed already to have fled the province at that point.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and
police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. In the
first 6 months of the year, unions were either official (government
affiliated) or independent. The government-controlled Alliance of
Independent Labor Unions (Samostalni Sindikati) was the largest union,
and the largest independent union is the United Branch Independent
Labor Unions (Nezavisnost). Most other independent unions were sector
specific, for example, the Independent Union of Bank Employees. Due to
the poor state of the economy, over one-half of union workers were on
long-term mandatory leave from their firms pending increases in
production. The independent unions, while active in recruiting new
members, have not yet reached the size needed to enable countrywide
strikes. The independent unions also claimed that the Government
prevented effective recruiting through a number of tactics, which
included preventing the busing of workers to strikes, threatening the
job security of members, and failing to grant visas to foreign visitors
who support independent unions. Some foreign union organizers managed
to secure visas during the year after long delays.
The largely splintered approach of the independent unions left them
little to show in terms of increased wages or improved working
conditions. The trade union organizations that existed in the province
in the first 6 months of the year did little to protect the rights of
ethnic Albanian workers and often served as mechanisms for
discrimination against them.
In the second half of the year, UNMIK began actively promoting the
formation of labor organizations to further the rights of workers.
Since the war, labor organizations that include ethnic Albanians
once again have begun to appear. The dominant organization, the
Confederation of Independent Trade Unions of Kosovo, is in the process
of reconstructing itself. Founded in 1990, the confederation initially
included 24 independent unions with approximately 250,000 members.
However, under the Milosevic regime, Serbian authorities regularly
harassed its members, and during the war, its president was killed and
union records were destroyed. The current president is working with the
International Labor Organization (ILO) to establish a Solidarity Center
office in Pristina.
The ability of unions to affiliate internationally remains
constrained, although there are no legal impediments to their doing so.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--While this
right is provided for under law, collective bargaining remained at a
rudimentary level of development. In the first 6 months of the year,
individual unions tended to be very narrow and pragmatic in their aims,
unable to join with unions in other sectors to bargain for common
purposes. The history of trade unionism in the country had centered not
on bargaining for the collective needs of all workers but rather for
the specific needs of a given group of workers. Thus, coal workers,
teachers, health workers, and electric power industry employees had
been ineffective in finding common denominators (e.g., job security
protection, minimum safety standards, universal workers' benefits,
etc.) on which to negotiate. The overall result was a highly fragmented
labor structure composed of workers who relate to the needs of their
individual union but rarely to those of other workers. Additionally,
job security fears, which stem from the high rate of unemployment,
limited workers' militancy.
Since the end of the conflict in June, given the poor state of the
economy and the high unemployment rate, wages barely are paid on time,
let alone subject to negotiation by labor organizations. In time, once
the economy becomes more robust, it is the goal of UNMIK to provide
mechanisms for labor to organize and bargain collectively.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and
generally is not known to occur; however, the province served as a
source and transit point for trafficking in women and girls for the
purpose of forced prostitution.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years, although in
villages and farming communities it is not unusual to find younger
children at work assisting their families. Moreover, children can be
found in a variety of unofficial ``retail'' jobs, typically washing car
windows or selling small items such as cigarettes. With an actual
unemployment rate (registered unemployed plus redundant workers who
show up at the workplace but perform only minimal work) in excess of 60
percent, real employment opportunities for children in the formal
sector are nonexistent. Forced and bonded labor by children is
prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur, apart from girls
trafficked from and through the province for the purpose of forced
prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In the first 6 months of the
year, large government enterprises, including all the major banks,
industrial, and trading companies generally observed minimum wage
standards. The monthly minimum wage was approximately $20 to $40 (Din
250 to 500). However, this figure was roughly comparable to
unemployment benefits and (at least theoretically) is paid to workers
who have been placed in a mandatory leave status. The actual minimum
wage was at the low end of the range of average net salaries, $85 to
$106 (Din 700 to 1,200). The minimum wage was insufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. The cost of food and
utilities alone for a family of four was estimated to be $230 (Din
2,150) per month. Private enterprises used the minimum wage as a guide
but tended to pay somewhat higher average wages.
Since the end of the conflict in the province in June, there was no
effective minimum wage rate, as Albanians refused to recognize the FRY/
Serbian legal code. The average wage was not sufficient to provide a
decent standard of living for a worker and family.
Reports of sweatshops operating in the country are rare, although
some privately owned textile factories operate under very poor
conditions. The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little
meaning in an economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the
enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations,
focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In light of the
competition for employment, and the high degree of government control
over the economy, workers were not free to leave hazardous work
situations without risking the loss of their employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is little information available
on trafficking, although the province is a source and transit point for
women and girls trafficked to other parts of Europe for forced
prostitution. Laws can be used to prosecute traffickers. In April
relief agencies warned that criminal gangs were trying to abduct young
girls from the province and traffick them to Italy and Greece for
forced prostitution. According to one survey, some 37 percent of women
in refugee camps in Kosovo acknowledged being approached by
traffickers. At OSCE meetings in September and October in Vienna,
participants called for the problem of trafficking to be addressed
quickly in Kosovo, before organized criminal elements became well
established there.
MONTENEGRO
Montenegro, despite its status as sister republic to Serbia within
the FRY, continued to make strides in its democratization process.
Montenegro is now a multiparty, multiethnic, parliamentary democracy
under the leadership of President Milo Djukanovic, who was elected in
November 1997. International elections monitors judged those elections
to be free and fair, as were the parliamentary elections in May 1998 in
which Djukanovic's reform coalition won control of the Republican
Assembly (the republic's parliament). At the start of the year,
Montenegro already had established a large degree of de facto
independence from federal authorities, but events during the year
effectively steered the government further away from the federal
control of Milosevic's regime in Belgrade, which the Montenegrin
authorities do not recognize as legitimate. The Government submitted a
proposal on August 5 that would give republic authorities control over
the army on its soil and the right to establish a separate currency.
The government respects the constitutional provisions for an
independent judiciary in practice.
The republic police, under the authority of the Ministry of the
Interior, has primary responsibility for internal security. However,
the Yugoslav Second Army, which has federal jurisdiction in the
republic and is under federal authority, and whose ranks increased from
12,000 to 40,000 during the war, made repeated attempts to usurp
control over the civilian police and the justice system. During the
conflict in Kosovo, the Federal Government declared martial law and
also demanded that the republic police be placed under military
command, a request that the Djukanovic government rejected. The
republic never recognized officially or implemented the state of war
declared by the FRY administration in March.
The economy is in transition from a Communist system to a market-
based system. The republic's tourism-dominated economy suffered as a
result of the NATO air campaign against Serbia. Although Montenegrin
sites were largely unscathed, tourist activity fell sharply. The
government conservatively estimated that during the year the economy
contracted by 13.8 percent, tourism fell by some $60 million (100
million DM), while industry declined by some $75 million (120 million
DM). The federal navy blockaded shipping through the Port of Bar during
the war but reopened the port on May 10. While exempted from some
Western sanctions, the republic was still the object of EU sanctions
until October. Sanctions imposed by Serbia continued at year's end.
Unemployment rose significantly to at least 35.8 percent, the
government faced unexpected budgetary shortfalls, and the government
appealed for new foreign investment. GDP per capita is estimated at
$937 for the year.
The republic government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were some reports of abuses committed by
federal VJ troops stationed in the republic. VJ troops committed
extrajudicial killings, abducted Kosovar refugees, detained Kosovar
refugees and journalists, and sought to restrict press freedom. VJ
troops forcibly conscripted youths and restricted freedom of movement.
Violence and discrimination against women and minorities continued to
be a problem. Throughout the year, there were also reports of
harassment and intimidation of Muslims in the Sandzak region of the
republic. The republic was the destination for an estimated 70,000
IDP's from Kosovo, in addition to some 35,000 refugees still resident
in the republic as a result of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
which together severely taxed the government's resources and
willingness to provide these refugees with sufficient social and
physical protection.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by the government.
However, on April 19, in a drunken rampage VJ reservists under FRY
command killed eight persons, including local citizens and refugees
from Kosovo, in the village of Kaludjerski Laz in Rozaje municipality.
As a result, ethnic Albanian and Muslim local residents, as well as
Kosovar refugees, left the area. The republic police force increased
its manpower there to 1,500 men, effectively defusing the situation.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances by republic authorities. However, on May 15, the VJ
separated 20 men from a convoy of seven busses filled with Kosovar
Albanian refugees, which the VJ prevented from crossing the border from
Montenegro into Albania. The men were released several days later.
c. Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and other cruel forms of
punishment, and there were no reports of such practices being carried
out by the republic government; however, there were frequent reports
that the federal VJ created a climate of intimidation and instability
through its actions. On June 9, government officials submitted a list
of 151 criminal charges against reservists in the VJ for offenses
including unruly behavior, attacking republic police, endangering the
environment, theft, and unlawful detention (see Section 1.d.). The
chief prosecutor for the VJ did not act on the charges.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards.
The Government generally permits prison visits by human rights
monitors, including the ICRC.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest and detention, and the government observes these
prohibitions; however, there were reports that federal VJ troops
arbitrarily detained Kosovar refugees and foreign journalists. During
the conflict, VJ troops stationed in the republic detained dozens of
Kosovar refugees accused of being members of the KLA in a military
prison in Spuz, near Podgorica. During the summer, following the
cessation of hostilities, those held were released after the
Montenegrin government petitioned for their release. The VJ detained
international journalists for periods lasting from several hours to
several days on a regular basis (see Section 2.a.). In April the
military court in Podgorica issued arrest warrants for Deputy Prime
Minister Novak Kilibarda and Minister of Justice Dragon Soc for
allegedly not responding to their draft summons (see Section 1.f). On
June 10, Croatian journalist Antun Masle escaped from a hospital in
Podgorica, where he was held on charges of espionage for several weeks.
Forced exile is prohibited and is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair judicial process.
However, there is a backlog of cases, the system suffers from a lack of
resources, and minor corruption remains a problem.
The court system consists of local, district, and supreme courts at
the republic level. There is also a military court system under the
control of federal authorities.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an
independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law prohibits such practices, and government
authorities generally respect these prohibitions. However, during the
conflict in Kosovo, the FRY Government attempted to draft Montenegrin
citizens into the VJ for service in Kosovo. These notices largely were
ignored and even were protested by the Montenegrin populace. As a
consequence, there were reports that VJ troops broke into houses of
young Montenegrin men and forcibly conscripted them. However, such
efforts were largely ineffective since some 14,000 Montenegrins ignored
the conscription orders and under the law were permitted to remain at
liberty pending judicial action. The military courts also issued arrest
warrants for draft resisters in Podgorica, including Minister of
Justice Dragon Soc and Deputy Prime Minister Novak Kilibarda in April.
However, no action was taken to arrest these government officials by
year's end.
To counteract the draft, the government implemented an ``obligatory
working duty,'' which possible recruits could cite as a reason why they
could not enter into military service. Others simply ignored draft
notices and risked being called before a military tribunal. The
republic government also defied VJ draft orders; the republic police
refused to hold resisters in jail and granted them amnesty. The
drafting campaign yielded little results by mid-May, and the VJ eased
its efforts in the republic. In November the Montenegrin assembly
passed a law granting amnesty to persons who evaded the draft from June
1998 to June 1999. Some 14,000 persons are expected to receive amnesty
as a result of the legislation.
On April 18, VJ troops in Rozaje searched the houses of ethnic
Albanians looking for arms.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the republic government
generally respected this right in practice, despite repeated VJ
attempts to interfere. During the year, the Government continued to
take steps to encourage a freer press by allocating more frequencies to
independent radio stations and reducing the fees charged to them. TV
Elmag, a privately owned television station, 14 municipal radio
stations and 19 private radio broadcasting organizations began or
continued operations during the year. During the war, Montenegrin
authorities and media outlets resisted pressure from the Milosevic
regime and military authorities to stop rebroadcasting Western news
programming; however, in apparent response to the pressure authorities
cut back the nearly continuous rebroadcast of Western newscasts.
Montenegrin authorities resisted VJ demands to take over control of
government television towers. After the war, rebroadcasts of Western
programs continued without restriction.
The Montenegrin government directly impeded free speech in one
instance, on October 20, when it ordered the radio station Radio Free
Montenegro to stop transmitting, because it had not reached an
agreement on broadcasting location and frequency with the Economic
Ministry. However, the editor of the station claimed that this move was
a political decision by President Djukanovic to stifle proindependence
views. Authorities permitted the station to broadcast again on November
15.
The VJ also pressured publishers not to print materials that it
judged to have a negative influence on the war effort. Uniformed and
armed VJ members met with publishers to complain about stories and
broadcasts they found objectionable. TV Elmag, a local news station,
had its frequency reestablished in April. The official reason given for
the temporary reduction in TV Elmag's frequency was its failure to pay
its operating fees for 2 months.
Two independent journalists, Nebojsa Redzic, of Radio Free
Montenegro, and Miodrag Perovic, owner of the Podgorica Monitor, fled
the republic in April and May, after being accused by the VJ of
``impeding the fight against the enemy.'' They were unable to return
safely until the war was over.
The VJ detained international journalists on a regular basis. On
June 10, Croatian journalist Antun Masle escaped from a hospital in
Podgorica, where he had been held on charges of espionage for several
weeks. In April the VJ briefly detained two French journalists on
espionage charges.
On October 2, Ranko Basanovic, a reporter for Dan, was attacked by
unknown assailants outside the newspaper's editorial offices. He was
injured in the head and kidneys. Dan is widely regarded as a mouthpiece
for Yugoslav Federal Prime Minister Momir Bulatovic, who is President
Djukonovic's strongest political rival in Montenegro.
Books expressing a wide range of political and social viewpoints
are available, as are foreign periodicals and other publications from
abroad. However, the supply is limited due to the economic situation
and the relatively small demand.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly and association, and the
government respects this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the government generally respects this right in practice. Reports
of harassment in the Muslim populated Sandzak region indicate that it
was carried out mostly by the VJ.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The republic Constitution provides for
freedom of movement; and the government respects this right in
practice; however, federal authorities operating in the republic often
interfered with this right. On May 15, the VJ prevented seven busses
filled with Kosovar Albanian refugees from crossing the border from
Montenegro into Albania. The VJ separated 20 men from the convoy and
detained them temporarily.
On May 16, the VJ established three checkpoints on the border
between Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, at Ilijino Brdo,
Vracenovic, and Scepan Polje, to prevent military recruits and
reservists from leaving the country, to impede Montenegrin trade, and
to interfere with the delivery of NGO medical supplies. Border
crossings usually are controlled by republic police, and this action
was seen as yet another instance of the federal regime's interference
in the republic and abuse of power. The checkpoints were removed after
the war.
The government cooperated with the UNHCR in assisting IDP's from
Kosovo. The republic government accepted approximately 70,000 IDP's
(well over 10 percent of the republic's population) from Kosovo before
and during the armed conflict there. The international community
contributed financial support to the IDP's in the republic through the
UNHCR and other intergovernmental and nongovernmental humanitarian
organizations. The IDP's largely were confined to camps along the
border, since the border areas contained the largest number of ethnic
Albanian residents of Montenegro who were willing to offer assistance.
Ethnic Albanian children initially were denied access to schools.
However, by year's end, the Government was working with international
organizations on a plan to begin enrolling IDP children.
There was no official mechanism by which refugees or foreign
nationals could establish residency. A new citizenship law was passed
in late October and is in the process of being implemented. The new
law, while stringent in its requirements, provides a legal and
equitable means for persons to acquire Montenegrin citizenship.
The government did not return forcibly IDP's to Kosovo, assisted
with repatriation only after the conflict was over, and did so under
U.N. supervision. There were no reports of the forced return of persons
to a country where they feared persecution during the year.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Montenegrin Constitution provides citizens with the right to
change their government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in
practice with respect to republic institutions, but not with federal-
level institutions. President Djukanovic became in 1998 the first
president popularly elected in free and fair elections. The republic
government invited the OSCE to observe both the presidential elections
in 1997 and the parliamentary elections in 1998. Both elections were
judged to be free and fair. The government enjoys the support of a
multiethnic coalition in the republic assembly.
President Milosevic dominates the FRY political system and was
widely believed to be attempting to consolidate institutional power at
the federal level at the expense of the republics as a result of his
move in 1997 from the Serbian republic-level presidency to the federal
presidency. This move precipitated tensions with authorities in
Montenegro, who were intent on protecting the republic's authority for
self-government. By manipulating power within the Federation based on
the comparative size of the Serbian and Montenegrin populations and
economies, President Milosevic has been able to circumscribe the
Montenegrin government's and citizenry's capacity for independent
action and ability to influence the Federal Government. In the months
following the crisis in Kosovo, growing dissatisfaction in the republic
prompted President Djukanovic and members of his administration to call
for a review of the republic's role in the Federation. Concern over
possible coup attempts that might be orchestrated by the Milosevic
regime against the elected government in Podgorica led the republic
government to demand more control and greater distance from the Serb
dominated FRY regime.
In August Djukanovic called for the current federation structure to
be revised into a confederation, and for the federal governing bodies
to be dissolved. Djukanovic also threatened that he would hold a
popular referendum on independence, if the republic's needs were not
addressed.
Despite the Montenegrin government's legal rights under the FRY
Constitution, federal authorities under Milosevic's control throughout
the year continued not to recognize the 20 Montenegrin members
delegated to the upper chamber of the Federal Assembly by the
Montenegrin Parliament. The Montenegrins in the federal body, including
the Speaker of the upper house, were not changed to reflect the results
of 1998 Montenegrin parliamentary elections. Moreover, in violation of
past practice, Milosevic installed Momir Bulatovic as Federal Prime
Minister and ignored the Montenegrin Government's wish to have some
voice in who was picked for this key position in the federal power
structure. Milosevic's antidemocratic control over federal courts was
demonstrated when the Federal Constitutional Court ruled against the
Montenegrin government late in the year in disallowing the Montenegrin
Authorities' attempt to select all 20 Montenegrin representatives to
the Federal Assembly's Chamber of the Republics. The ruling was a
complete reversal of a 1994 decision, which allowed Milosevic's ruling
coalition in Serbia at the time to name all 20 Serbian representatives
to the upper chamber while he was the President of the Serbian
republic.
No legal restrictions exist on women's participation in government
and politics; however, they are underrepresented greatly in party and
government offices. There are no female ministers in the government,
but there are five deputy ministers and three members of parliament.
No legal restrictions affect the role of minorities in government
and politics, but they are underrepresented, and ethnic Montenegrins
and Serbs dominate the republic's political leadership. Ethnic
Albanians participate in the political process, and their parties,
candidates, and voters participated to a large degree in the last
elections. The area of the republic primarily inhabited by ethnic
Albanians was established as a separate voting district in the 1998
parliamentary elections and, in proportion to the region's population,
five representatives were elected to the Parliament from the district.
Ethnic Albanian parties captured two of the seats, with the multiethnic
program of the pro-Djukanovic Coalition capturing the other three
seats. Several ministerial and deputy ministerial positions in the
coalition government are held by ethnic Albanians and Muslims.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
without government restriction, and republic officials generally are
cooperative and responsive to their views. Local NGO's include the
Montenegrin Helsinki Committee, the Center for Democracy and Human
Rights, and S.O.S., a support group for abused women and children. In
addition, several international organizations work with the UNHCR, the
ICRC, and the Montenegrin Government to deal with the humanitarian
situation that developed along the border with Kosovo. The republic
government also invited the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission to set up
an office in Podgorica. The Montenegrin government pledged in July to
cooperate with the ICTY and apprehend persons indicted for war crimes
found in the republic. In November justice minister Soc confirmed that
authorities had detained Veselin Vlahovic, who is wanted for war crimes
committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Bosnian officials announced that
they planned to seek Vlahovic's extradition and try him in Sarajevo, as
permitted by the ICTY.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
While federal and republic laws provide for equal rights for all
citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, or social status, and
prohibit discrimination against women, in reality the legal system has
made little progress in providing protection to such groups.
Women.--The traditionally high level of domestic violence
persisted. The few official agencies dedicated to coping with family
violence have inadequate resources and are limited in their activity by
social pressure to keep families together at all costs. Few victims of
spousal abuse ever file complaints with the authorities. Tradition
prevents much discussion of the topic of rape among ethnic Albanians,
since the act is seen as dishonoring the entire family.
The country served as a transit point for trafficking in women and
girls for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
Women do not enjoy status equal to men in the republic, and few
women hold upper level management positions in government or commerce.
Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that women
should be subservient to the male members of their family, have long
subjected women to discrimination. In some rural areas, particularly
among minority communities, women are little more than serfs without
the ability to exercise their right to control property and children.
However, women legally are entitled to equal pay for equal work and
between 1 year and 18 months of maternity leave. Women are active in
human rights and women's organizations.
Children.--The government attempts to meet the health and
educational needs of children, but insufficient resources at times
impede this goal. The educational system provides 8 years of mandatory
schooling. When IDP's began arriving from Kosovo in 1998, the republic
government initially refused to extend this educational benefit to
Kosovar Albanians. However, after having consulted with and received
promises of assistance from international organizations, the government
announced late in the year that displaced children soon also would be
allowed to attend school. Although ethnic Albanian children have access
to instruction in their native tongue, the government came under
criticism for not also developing a curriculum in which ethnic
Albanians could learn about their own culture and history.
The country served as a transit point for trafficking in girls for
the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.).
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--Facilities for the disabled are
inadequate. The law prohibits discrimination against the disabled in
employment, education, or in the provision of state services. The law
mandates access to new official buildings, and the government enforces
these provisions in practice.
Religious Minorities.--Religion and ethnicity are so closely
intertwined as to be inseparable. Discrimination exists on a societal
level, but reports of harassment in the Muslim populated Sandzak region
were concentrated primarily in the spring, during the conflict with
NATO and the deployment of the VJ into the region. Incidents generally
were limited to verbal and physical harassment.
Prompted at least in part by an increasing drive for political
independence, an autocephalic Orthodox Church was established in
Montenegro in the late 1980's. The Church, which has not been
recognized by any existing Orthodox community either within or outside
the country, has claimed holdings of the Serbian Orthodox Church in
Montenegro. The Serbian Orthodox Church remains the most widespread
faith in Montenegro and has rejected the property claims. The
Montenegrin Orthodox Church currently holds services in secular
buildings or outdoors. Although there is no official contact between
the competing Churches, authorities have balanced the two Churches
without provoking conflict. However, violence broke out late in the
year when on November 21 Serbian Orthodox Father Dragan Stanisic
reportedly hit Montenegrin Orthodox Metropolitan Mihajlo in the face
during a confrontation on a road near Cetinje. According to press
reports, Father Stanisic's followers then attacked Metropolitan
Mihajlo's car, although Stanisic denies that the incident ever
occurred. Approximately 250 persons demonstrated against the incident
in Cetinje, and authorities called up riot police and reinforcements to
prevent further incidents. Seventh-Day Adventists and Jehovah's
Witnesses are officially registered religions in the republic. However,
their followers report that their efforts to build and renovate church
buildings have been impaired by persons they believe to be loyal to the
local Serbian Orthodox Church.
Ethnic Minorities.--In January the government began a pilot program
in ethnic Albanian communities, which devolved extensive authority,
including taxation, to locally elected officials. An Albanian
Democratic Union member also was appointed to the post of Minister of
Minorities to ensure that equal representation and opportunities would
exist for all ethnic groups. However, societal discrimination against
minorities exists. Throughout the year, there were also reports of
harassment and intimidation against Muslims in the Sandzak region, as
well as harassment of Kosovar refugees carried out by the VJ during the
spring (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., and 1.f).
The Romani population is tolerated, and there is no official
discrimination. However, prejudice against Roma is widespread. Local
authorities often ignore or condone societal intimidation of the Romani
community. Skinheads occasionally violently attacked Roma (see Section
1.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers except military and
police personnel have the legal right to join or form unions. Both
official, government-affiliated unions and independent unions exist.
Because the independent labor movement largely is fragmented and access
to international labor organizations is limited, there have been little
tangible results in the form of improved conditions and higher wages.
Another factor impeding the collective bargaining power of the workers
was the poor condition of the economy, in which high unemployment gave
the employers the upper hand in setting wages and work conditions, as
workers competed for whatever jobs existed.
Unions may affiliate with international labor organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--This right is
provided for under law, but collective bargaining remains at a
rudimentary level of development. Instead of attempting to make
progress on the collective needs of all workers, negotiations generally
center on advancing the needs of a specific group of workers. Job
security fears prevail, as a result of the high unemployment rate, and
these fears limit the groups' militancy.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor,
including that performed by children, is prohibited by law and
generally is not known to occur; however, the republic served as a
transit point for trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The official minimum age for employment is 16 years,
although in farming communities, it is not unusual to find younger
children assisting their families. Moreover, children can be found in a
variety of unofficial ``retail'' jobs, typically washing car windows or
selling small items such as cigarettes. The high unemployment rate,
exacerbated by the conflict in Kosovo, ensures that there is little
demand for child labor in the formal sector. Forced and bonded labor by
children is prohibited by law and generally is not known to occur,
apart from girls trafficked through the republic for the purpose of
forced prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Large government enterprises,
including all the major banks, industrial, and trading companies
generally observe the minimum wage standard, which is approximately $20
to $40 (Din 250 to 500). However, this figure is comparable to
unemployment benefits or wages paid to those on mandatory leave. The
actual minimum wage for workers in active status is closer to $85 to
$106 (Din 700 to 1,200). Although firms actually pay slightly higher
than these wages, this amount is insufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family. The cost of food and
utilities alone for a family of four is estimated to be $230 (Din
2,150) per month.
The official workweek, listed as 40 hours, had little meaning in an
economy with massive underemployment and unemployment.
Neither employers nor employees tended to give high priority to the
enforcement of established occupational safety and health regulations,
focusing their efforts instead on economic survival. In view of the
competition for employment, and the high degree of government control
over the economy, workers are not free to leave hazardous work
situations without risking the loss of their employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically forbids
trafficking in persons. There is little information available on
trafficking, although the republic is a source for women and girls
trafficked to other parts of Europe for forced prostitution. Recently
six women who were victims of trafficking were returned to Ukraine.
______
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
The Slovak Republic became an independent state in 1993, following
the dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR). Its
Constitution provides for a multiparty, multiethnic parliamentary
democracy, including separation of powers. The first direct
presidential elections were held in May and were declared fair and free
by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)/
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). Prime
Minister Mikulas Dzurinda took office after parliamentary elections in
the fall of 1998. Slovakia chose to carry over the entire body of CSFR
domestic legislation and international treaty obligations, which still
are being renewed or updated. The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, some critics allege that the Ministry
of Justice's logistical and personnel authority allows it to exert some
influence on the judicial system.
The national police, which fall under the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Interior, are the primary law enforcement agency. In
addition to domestic law enforcement, they also have responsibility for
border security. The Slovak Information Service (SIS), an independent
organization reporting directly to the Prime Minister, is responsible
for all civilian security and intelligence activities. A parliamentary
commission composed of legislators from ruling and opposition parties
oversees the SIS. Civilian authorities generally maintain effective
control of the security forces. Police committed some human rights
abuses.
Slovakia continued to make progress in the transition from a
command-based to a market-based economy, with more than 85 percent of
gross domestic product (GDP) now generated by the private sector. The
economy is largely industrial, with only 7 percent of GDP generated by
agricultural production. Major exports are iron and steel products,
audio and video equipment, machinery and transport equipment, plastic
materials, paper products, apparel, petroleum products, and organic
chemicals. GDP growth slowed from 4.4 percent at the end of 1998 to 1.8
percent in the third quarter of the year, partly in response to
government austerity measures adopted in January and May to deal with a
chronic current account deficit. Inflation increased to 14.2 percent
for the year, largely due to increases in regulated prices. The slowing
in growth and high current account deficits are largely the result of a
failure under the previous government to implement structural reforms,
such as financial sector privatization and industrial restructuring.
Real GDP per capita was approximately $3,800 at the end of 1998, the
last date for which statistics are available, providing most of the
population with an adequate standard of living. Unemployment was more
than 18 percent, reaching almost 35 percent in some areas. A
disproportionate number of unemployed are Roma, who face exceptional
difficulties in finding and holding jobs, partly as a result of
discrimination.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the human rights situation improved during the year;
however, problems remained in some areas. There was one possible
extrajudicial killing by police, and police on occasion beat and abuse
Roma. Authorities on occasion infringed on citizens' privacy rights;
however, the practice of using the SIS under the former government to
conduct surveillance of many political figures, journalists, and their
spouses has been eliminated. The absence of government intimidation
removed the pressure on journalists to practice self-censorship. Media
monitors report that government politicization of the state-owned
electronic media has been nearly eliminated; however members of the
press reported that some figures close to the Government pressured
state-owned Slovak Television (STV) to report government activities
positively. Discrimination and violence against women remain problems.
Abuse of children and discrimination against the disabled are problems.
Roma faced societal discrimination, and the police sometimes failed to
provide adequate protection against attacks on them by skinheads or to
investigate such cases vigorously. Skinhead attacks on Roma increased
during the year. Some anti-Semitic incidents occurred, and limited
societal discrimination against the Hungarian minority persists, mainly
in regions where only small numbers of the ethnic Hungarian minority
reside. There were instances of trafficking in women and girls.
During the year, the Dzurinda Government corrected some abuses of
the previous government, initiated investigations into some serious
crimes, and created the position of special government commissioner for
Roma issues in the Office of Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights and
Minorities. Deputy Prime Minister Pal Csaky continued the dialog that
he had opened with religious and ethnic minorities late in 1998 but
came under increasing criticism for concentrating on the problems of
the ethnic Hungarian minority rather than the Roma minority. The
Parliament also created a special Parliamentary Advisory Committee for
Roma Issues in February and in July passed a minority language law.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government officials. However, a
police officer allegedly shot a 21-year-old Rom while he was being
interrogated for allegedly stealing a bicycle in Poprad in the north
central region of the country in August. The case is currently under
investigation, and the police officer involved was suspended during the
investigation. The Commissioner for Romani Affairs, Vincent Danihel,
complained in August that he was not satisfied with the police
officer's explanation of the death, i.e., that the Rom had shot himself
with the gun of the officer who was questioning him. Danihel pointed
out that if the explanation were true, the officer violated regulations
by interrogating the Rom alone with a gun accessible to him.
There was no progress during the year in the investigation of the
1996 death of Robert Remias. There has been widespread press
speculation that elements of the security services were involved in the
death.
In January Jan Ducky, the former Economy Minister under the
previous Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar and head of the national gas
distribution monopoly, was killed in the lobby of his apartment
building. Meciar's party, the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
(HZDS), believes that the killing was the result of political
intolerance. The authorities filed charges against Ducky a week prior
to his killing for financial mismanagement and illegal property
transfers while at the gas monopoly. Interior Minister Ladislav Pittner
stated that Ducky may have been killed to prevent his testimony on the
Meciar government's reported financial misdeeds. Authorities arrested a
Ukrainian citizen on charges of murder in the case by year's end.
On November 16, Minister of Justice Jan Carnogursky established a
department for the documentation of crimes committed by the Communist
regime. The department is to conduct interviews and gather evidence on
the regime's acts of violence and persecution against its citizens.
Skinhead violence against Roma increased during the year but did
not lead to any confirmed cases of death, unlike the previous year.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits such practices; however, police
on occasion beat Roma. In January police officers reportedly raided a
Roma settlement in Kosice, injuring 16 Roma, including women. In
October during a raid on a Romani community in Zehra, police allegedly
used excessive force as they detained nine Roma on charges of
hooliganism. During the incident, police shot a 13-year-old Romani boy
with a plastic bullet, and he was hospitalized as a result of his
injury. An investigation is under way. Police reportedly use pressure
and threats to discourage Roma from pressing charges of police
brutality (see Section 1.e.).
Credible sources say that the police sometimes tolerate violence
against Roma by not investigating attacks against them in a timely and
thorough manner (see Sections 1.e. and 5). Some police also infringe on
the rights of Roma to social benefits and housing (see Section 2.d.).
Roma in Vrable continue to lodge complaints against local law
enforcement officer Roman Frajka for allegedly attacking teenage Romani
boys. To date there have been no official charges brought against him.
Residents of Asian origin complain that police fail to investigate
skinhead attacks against them as well.
Interior Minister Pittner released a report in January attesting to
the SIS's influence over the Ministry of Interior under Meciar,
especially over the investigative and criminal police sections.
The 1995 case of the violent abduction of the former President's
son, Michal Kovac Jr., to Austria, during which he was tortured,
remains unsolved. The new Government actively reinvestigated the case
in which former SIS personnel are alleged to be implicated. On February
26, the police arrested two former high-ranking officers of the SIS. On
February 25, the Parliament lifted parliamentary immunity from former
Interior Minister Gustav Krajci, enabling his formal prosecution for
his involvement in thwarting the referendum on NATO entry and direct
presidential elections. On April 9, Parliament lifted immunity from
former SIS head Ivan Lexa in five of the seven cases in which he
allegedly was implicated, and subsequently he was placed in preliminary
detention. However, he was released later on the decision of a regional
court, and the Constitutional Court concurred that amnesties granted to
Krajci and a second official involved in the case, Jaroslav Svechota,
by former Prime Minister Meciar largely could shield them from
prosecution. Lexa also had been charged with obstruction of justice in
connection with the investigation of bombs that were set off at an
opposition rally in 1997, and his prosecution continued at year's end.
Skinhead violence against Roma and other minorities remained a
problem (see Section 5).
Unknown assailants attacked a labor union official in October (see
Section 6.a.).
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the Government observes
these prohibitions.
A person accused or suspected of a crime must be given a hearing
within 24 hours and either set free or remanded by the court. During
this time, the detainee has the right to an attorney. If remanded by a
court, the accused is entitled to an additional hearing within 24
hours, at which the judge either sets the accused free or issues a
substantive written order placing the accused in custody. Investigative
detention may last up to 2 months and may be extended. The total length
of pretrial detention may not exceed 1 year, unless the Supreme Court
extends it, after determining that the person constitutes a serious
danger to society.
Pretrial detainees constituted roughly 25 percent of the total
prison population, and the average pretrial detention period was 7.2
months. The law allows family visits and provides for a court-paid
attorney if needed. A system of bail exists. Noncitizens may be
detained for up to 30 days for the purposes of identification.
Detainees have the right to see an attorney immediately and should be
notified of this right; however, one nongovernmental organization (NGO)
reports that not all detainees are notified of their rights.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government observes this
prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
courts that are independent, impartial, and separate from the other
branches of government; however, some critics allege that the
dependence of judges upon the Ministry of Justice for logistical
support, the granting of leave requests, and other services undermines
their independent status. Also, the Ministry of Justice can demote
presidents and vice presidents of the courts for any reason, although
they remain judges, and it has done so. Although not specified in
legislation, in practice the Association of Judges now nominates
presidents of courts, and the Ministry of Justice to date has accepted
all of the nominations. This practice increases the independence of the
judicial branch.
The court system consists of local and regional courts, with the
Supreme Court as the highest court of appeal except for constitutional
questions. There is a separate Constitutional Court--with no ties to
the Ministry of Justice--that considers constitutional issues. In
addition there is a separate military court system, the decisions of
which may be appealed to the Supreme Court and the Constitutional
Court. Under the Constitution, the President appoints Constitutional
Court judges to 7-year terms based upon parliamentary nominations.
Parliament elects other judges, based on recommendations from the
Ministry of Justice, and can remove them for misconduct.
Persons charged with criminal offenses are entitled to fair and
open public trials. They have the right to be informed of the charges
against them and of their legal rights, to retain and consult with
counsel sufficiently in advance to prepare a defense, and to confront
witnesses. Defendants enjoy a presumption of innocence and have the
right to refuse to testify against themselves. They may appeal any
judgment against them. Human rights monitors continued to charge that
police are reluctant to take the testimony of witnesses to skinhead
attacks on Roma (also see Sections 1.c. and 5). Furthermore, they
reported that police used the device of countercharges or threats of
countercharges to pressure Roma victims of police brutality to drop
their complaints. Human rights monitors reported that medical doctors
and investigators cooperated with police by refusing to describe
accurately the injuries involved, and that lawyers often were reluctant
to represent Roma in such situations, for fear that this would have a
negative effect on their practice.
In November Chairman of the Constitutional Court Milan Cic
announced that politicians were pressuring the Constitutional Court in
the case of former Deputy Head of the SIS Jaroslav Svechota. Cic
complained that some political leaders expected the Court to rule in
accordance with their written ``recommendations,'' which could threaten
the Court's independence. Svechota's case before the Court concerns
amnesty issued by the previous government. When the Court ruled in his
favor, the prosecution of individuals involved in the Kovac Jr. case
was halted (see Section 1.c.).
Credible sources claim that it is increasingly difficult for
citizens who are not economically advantaged to obtain noncriminal
legal representation. Therefore it is becoming more difficult for some
who may have had their rights infringed upon to take further action.
According to one NGO leader, even the Chamber of Advocates, the
professional organization that approves bar appointments and serves as
an advocate for lawyers, encouraged its members to avoid accepting
clients who could be considered disadvantaged.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law provides for these rights, but the authorities
sometimes infringed upon them. The Criminal Code requires police to
obtain a judicial search warrant in order to enter a home. The court
may issue such a warrant only if there is a well-founded suspicion that
important evidence or persons accused of criminal activity are present
inside, or if there is some other important reason. Police must present
the warrant before conducting the house search or within 24 hours after
the search.
Roma activists have alleged that police have upon occasion entered
their premises without a search warrant.
The 1993 police law regulates wiretapping and mail surveillance for
the purposes of criminal investigation, which may be conducted on the
order of a judge or prosecutor only in cases of extraordinarily serious
premeditated crimes or crimes involving international treaty
obligations. Although it is clear that the SIS no longer participates
in illegal activities on the scale that it did under the previous
government, some Romani activists allege that their telephones were
tapped and that they have been placed under surveillance, particularly
when large numbers of Roma applied for political asylum in Finland and
Norway during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice. The print media are free and
uncensored, and unlike the previous year, individuals now report that
they feel able to criticize the Government without fear of reprisal.
Newspapers and magazines regularly publish a wide range of opinions
and news articles. The politicization of state-owned broadcast media,
which was a significant problem under the previous government, no
longer is evident. There were no reported cases of journalists being
intimidated or threatened in attempts to influence their reporting.
However, the press reported a number of allegations that individuals
associated with the current Government pressured state-owned Slovak
Television (STV) to favor government interests in political reporting.
In August Democratic Party (DS) Vice Chairman Peter Zajac said that the
DS was ``concerned with attempts by some politicians to interfere with
the public character of Slovak Television.'' There were other reports
that government supporters influenced STV management to block perceived
criticism.
The potential for political interference exists because STV is
reliant on government funds. However, STV officials assert that
government officials do not threaten retaliation if the STV does not
report the news to the Government's liking.
Shortly after the May presidential elections, the NGO Memo, which
had monitored election coverage, issued a report indicating that the
STV and TV Markiza both had given a disproportionate amount of
broadcast time to the winning candidate, Rudolf Schuster, who was
supported by the Government. According to Memo, TV Markiza's coverage
of other candidates was largely negative. The Slovak Council for Radio
and Television Broadcasting fined TV Markiza and required it to
broadcast a notice that it had violated the law. In November the
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Broadcasting Council to fine
TV Markiza more than $23,000 (1 million SK) for broadcasting a speech
by Prime Minister Dzurinda in the 48-hour period prior to the
presidential election, when campaigning is prohibited (see Section 3).
On February 26, 26 journalists from the STV were fired by the new
STV management due to their alleged biased reporting on behalf of
former Prime Minister Meciar during his term in office. These
journalists claim that they were fired due to their political beliefs
and have pursued their case with human rights advocates. However, a
number of these groups did not take up their case, because they do not
believe that the journalists were fired for political reasons.
The Government did not use libel laws to suppress criticism of
political or other leaders. In June former President Kovac won a libel
suit against former editor in chief of the opposition Slovenska
Republika, Jan Smolec, for publishing several false statements and
slanderous articles that were aimed at damaging Kovac's personal and
professional reputation. However, Slovenska Republika paid only
approximately $7,500 (SK 300,000) of the $12,500 (SK 500,000) that it
is required to pay in damages. The Government does not use tax laws or
allocations of newsprint or advertising revenue to suppress criticism
of political and other leaders or the expression of viewpoints not
favored by the Government.
In June authorities charged Slovenska Republika editor in chief
Jaroslav Reznik with violating the press law by publishing state
secrets. In January Reznik had published an article about
reorganization of the SIS, which included the names of the new SIS
division directors. The crime is punishable by up to 3 years in prison
or a ban on publishing. However, the case was closed after Reznik
argued that the daily newspaper SME published the list before Slovenska
Republika.
Three boards appointed by majority vote of Parliament supervise
radio and television broadcasting. The Slovak Television Council and
the Slovak Radio Council establish broadcasting policy for state-owned
television and radio. The Slovak Council for Radio and Television
Broadcasting issues broadcast licenses and administers advertising laws
and some other regulations. The Radio and Television Council has made
significant progress in fostering the spread of private broadcasting,
for which it has issued 27 radio and 78 television and cable television
licenses. TV Markiza, a private company with a signal covering two-
thirds of the country, is the most watched station.
The Government does not censor books, films, or plays or limit
access to the Internet.
Money has been reallocated to minority groups for the publication
of minority language newspapers.
The law provides for academic freedom, and the Dzurinda Government
took steps to reverse the restrictions on academic freedom that existed
under the previous government. The Government no longer intervenes in
the administration and funding of institutions of higher education, nor
does it approve all professors' appointments. Many of the school
administrators who were appointed based solely on political favoritism
during the previous regime have been replaced. The practice of
diverting money from the older, then pro-opposition, universities
largely has been reversed. However, the use of bribery by some students
to increase their chances for acceptance into some more prestigious
faculties is widely believed to result in unequal access for
economically disadvantaged students.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice.
Registration is not required, but under existing law, only registered
churches and religious organizations have the explicit right to conduct
public worship services and other activities, although no specific
religions or practices are banned or discouraged by the authorities in
practice. In order to register as a church, a religious organization
must collect the signatures of 20,000 persons with long term residency
in the country. The State provides financial benefits, including
subsidies for clergy and office expenses, only to the 15 registered
churches and religious organizations.
On February 1, police arrested two former high officials in the SIS
for involvement in the 1995 effort to discredit the chairman of the
Slovak Bishops Conference. Allegedly the SIS framed the Bishop for
selling religious art for personal gain. If convicted, former Chief of
the SIS Counterintelligence Unit Jaroslav Svechota and Deputy Director
of the Surveillance Unit Robert Beno would face sentences of between 5
and 12 years in jail.
By law churches and religious organizations could apply for the
return of their property that had been confiscated by the Communist
government; the deadline for these claims was December 31, 1994. The
property was returned by the State, by municipalities, by state legal
entities, and under certain conditions even by private persons. The
main obstacles to the resolution of outstanding restitution claims are
the Government's lack of financial resources, due to its austerity
program, and bureaucratic resistance on the part of those entities
required to vacate restitutable properties. While the Orthodox Church
reported that six of the seven properties on which it had filed claims
already had been returned, the Catholic Church and the Federation of
Jewish Communities (FJC) reported lower rates of success.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government respects them in practice.
According to a legal rights NGO, although the law requires state
administrators to register all citizens, some local police officers
refused to give a registration stamp to Romani citizens, which prevents
them from receiving social benefits and housing. In March a Roma rights
NGO filed a complaint with the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg against city councils in Nagov and Rokytovce for passing
regulations in 1997 prohibiting Roma from moving to the town and
threatening to expel them. In April the two cities repealed the
regulations in response to government pressure (see Section 5).
The law includes provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in
accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government cooperates
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian
organizations in assisting refugees. During the year, 1,320 persons
applied for asylum. Of these cases and cases held over from previous
years, 2 were granted citizenship, 27 were accepted as refugees, 176
claims were rejected, 1,034 persons terminated their cases, and the 349
cases were pending at year's end. Authorities granted 205 persons from
Kosovo temporary protection during the year.
There were no reports of the forced expulsion of those having a
valid claim to refugee status; however, some refugee claimants had
difficulty in gaining access to initial processing.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government
through the periodic free election of their national representatives.
Citizens over the age of 18 are eligible to vote, and voting is by
secret ballot. The Constitution reserves certain powers to the
President as Chief of State (directly elected by the citizens), but
executive power rests with the Prime Minister. Legislative power is
vested in the National Council of the Slovak Republic (Parliament). The
country was without a president for over 1 year until June 12, when
Rudolf Schuster was inaugurated as the country's first directly elected
president. On January 14, Parliament amended the Constitution to allow
for direct elections of the President, who previously had been elected
by the Parliament. Until Schuster's inauguration, the majority of the
President's powers were delegated to the Prime Minister, and the rest
to the Speaker of Parliament, in accordance with the Constitution.
The two-round direct presidential elections were held in May. OSCE
observers monitored the elections and found them free of fraud. Voter
turnout was 75 percent.
Domestic and international observers and the media monitoring NGO
Memo criticized Prime Minister Dzurinda for a speech he gave on
national television after the moratorium on campaigning had begun, 2
days before the elections. During this speech he encouraged citizens to
visit the polls and make the democratic choice, which was seen by many
as a call for citizens to vote for Schuster. The Radio and Television
Broadcasting Council fined TV Markiza for broadcasting the speech and
required it to broadcast a notice that it had violated the law (see
Section 2.a.).
On March 1, authorities charged former Minister of Interior Gustav
Krajci with abuse of power and forgery of ballots in the 1997
referendum on direct presidential elections. As Deputy Chairman of the
Central Election Commission, Krajci allegedly deleted from the
referendum ballot the question on holding direct elections for
president and marked the new ballot with the Commission's official
stamp, without notifying the Commission of the change.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 2
female ministers, 1 of the 9 Constitutional Court judges appointed in
November is a woman, and women hold 21 seats in the 150-member
Parliament.
The large ethnic Hungarian minority, whose coalition gained 15
seats in Parliament in the September 1998 elections, is well
represented in Parliament and the government. One ethnic Hungarian sits
on the Constitutional Court. Roma are not represented in Parliament,
but a Rom holds the newly created position of Government Commissioner
for Roma Issues.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of domestic and international human rights groups operate
without government restriction, investigating and publishing their
findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally are
cooperative and responsive to their views. A 1996 law, requiring NGO's
and foundations to reregister and have substantial financial resources
in order to operate, eliminated some foundations, primarily dormant
groups. However, no organization was denied registration or faced any
other major problem in continuing to operate. The impact of another law
setting limits on allowable administrative expenses has not created
significant problems. Many NGO representatives believed that the
previous Meciar government was hostile to NGO's. In contrast, the
Dzurinda Government appointed many NGO representatives to government
positions. However, some NGO leaders allege that the current Government
at times is unresponsive to their requests.
In November 1998, the Government created the position of Deputy
Prime Minister for Human and Minority Rights. The new Deputy Prime
Minister, Pal Csaky, a member of the Party of the Hungarian Coalition,
immediately opened a dialog with religious and minority groups.
However, Minister Csaky has come under increasing criticism from the
Romani community for spending the majority of his time dealing with
issues concerning Hungarians. Many Roma leaders have called for his
resignation in response to what they claim is his unwillingness and
inability to address Roma problems.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination and provides for the equality of
all citizens. However, enforcement is uneven, with different minority
groups reporting that their members often receive no government
assistance with complaints about discrimination. Health care,
education, retirement benefits, and other social services are provided
regardless of race, sex, religion, disability, language, or social
status.
Women.--Violence, particularly sexual violence against women,
remains a serious and underreported problem. According to Ministry of
Interior statistics, both domestic and public violence against women
has been increasing: 1,000 cases of public violence were registered in
1997, compared with 276 in 1985. Domestic violence in 1997 included
2,656 cases, compared with 1,874 in 1995 when statistics first were
kept. One NGO's regional research showed that 38 to 40 percent of women
were victims of domestic violence. Police estimate that two-thirds of
female rape victims fail to report their cases. Police treat spousal
abuse, other violence against women, and child abuse in the same way as
other criminal offenses; sections in the Criminal Code specifically
address rape, sexual abuse, and trafficking in women.
Legislation has not yet recognized and specified the term domestic
violence. There is one consulting center for abused women in the
country. There is no shelter for battered women, but several NGO's
continue to advocate the idea strongly. However, there is a family
shelter for victims of child and spousal abuse. In the view of some
NGO's, the lack of relevant data on domestic violence is used by police
authorities to downplay the extent of domestic violence.
As a result of amendments to the Criminal Code that took effect in
1994, prostitution is not illegal. However, the code prohibits
activities related to prostitution, such as renting apartments for
conducting prostitution, spreading sexually transmitted diseases, or
trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution. Trafficking in
women is a problem, and the Government views it with concern (see
Section 6.f.).
Women are equal under the law. They have the same property,
inheritance, and other legal rights as men. However, discrimination
against women remained a problem. According to sociological studies,
women receive approximately 85 percent of men's wages for similar work.
However, the definition of similar work is not defined precisely. For
example, women may have fewer years' experience on the job due to time
spent out of the work force raising a family.
In December 1997, the Gender Center for Equal Treatment of Men and
Women was founded. The Center is an independent NGO that cooperates
with the U.N. Development Program and the Government. The Government's
Coordinating Committee for Women's Affairs (including NGO's) drafted a
national action plan for women that was adopted by the Government in
September 1997. The plan presents a thorough analysis of the situation
of women and proposes specific measures to resolve existing problems in
the next decade, including reducing violence against women, protecting
women's health, and reducing women's economic disadvantages. In
contrast to the past, a number of organizations emerged in the past 10
years promoting women's issues and interests.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
rights and welfare through its system of public education and medical
care. The Ministry of Labor oversees implementation of the Government's
programs for children. The Constitution, the law on education, the
Labor Code, and the system of assistance payments to families with
children each provide in part for children's rights. Education is
compulsory for 9 years, or until the age of 15.
Abuse of children remains a problem and is underreported. Experts
from various state institutions dealing with child abuse claim that
there are significant discrepancies between official figures on child
violence and the actual situation. A recent survey of over 7,000
children conducted by an NGO offering resources to abused children
indicated that 12 percent of children are victims of sexual abuse,
while 20 percent are victims of physical abuse. According to available
police statistics, child beating and sexual abuse are on the rise.
NGO's expect this trend to continue and worsen as the economic
situation declines. In 1997 there were 1,083 reported cases of crimes
against children. Among the most frequent crimes committed against
children are: Nonpayment of child support, sexual violence, and
beatings.
Youth criminality has increased as well. Children under the age of
15 reportedly committed 226 crimes in 1990. In 1998 this number rose to
4,980. Juveniles (15 to 18 years of age) committed 5,191 crimes in
1998. According to the Ministry of Justice, 3,027 juveniles were
convicted of crimes during 1998. Child prostitution is not addressed
specifically in the Criminal Code, but is covered by more general
provisions in the law. The Penal Code was amended on September 1 to
include a provision outlawing child pornography.
The U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), several NGO's, and other
institutions dealing with children's issues have called for amendments
to the law on families, particularly the part on relations between
parents and children. UNICEF also has recommended creation of an
ombudsman's office that would defend children's rights. There are two
regional emergency hot line numbers for abused children and one
counseling help line.
Existing legislation appears to place emphasis on parents over
children's rights. Current legislation allows parents to place their
child in a state-run institution for abandoned children, and as long as
contact is maintained once every 6 months, the child remains in the
custody of the parents and cannot be adopted.
NGO leaders claim that existing legislation protects aggressors
before victims. If a husband or wife is guilty of child and/or spousal
abuse it is often the victim who is forced to leave the family home.
Furthermore, if children who are victims of physical or sexual abuse
seek assistance or treatment, their parents must be informed.
People with Disabilities.--The Constitution and implementing
legislation provide for health protection and special working
conditions for mentally and physically disabled persons, including
special protection in employment relations and special assistance in
training. A 1994 decree provides incentives to employers who create a
``sheltered'' workplace (i.e., a certain percentage of jobs set aside
for the disabled). The law also prohibits discrimination against
physically disabled individuals in employment, education, and the
provision of other state services. Nevertheless, experts report
discrimination in the accessibility of premises and access to education
(especially higher education). Although not specifically required by
law, another 1994 government decree mandates accessibility for new
building construction. The decree provides for sanctions but lacks a
mechanism to enforce them. A spokeswoman for an NGO dealing with the
disabled said in 1997 that due to pressure from a number of NGO's,
accessibility has been improving--particularly regarding new
construction. NGO's complained that other legislation, including the
provision of jobs for the disabled, while on the books, often is
ignored.
Religious Minorities.--Despite an order by former Prime Minister
Meciar to withdraw a controversial history book entitled the ``History
of Slovakia and the Slovaks'' by Milan Durica, it remains available in
schools. The book has been widely criticized by religious groups and
the Slovak Academy of Sciences for gross inaccuracies and distortions,
particularly in its portrayal of wartime Slovakia and the deportation
of Jews and Roma.
Despite protests by the FJC, Slovak National Party members and the
official Slovak cultural organization Matica Slovenska continued their
efforts to revise the history of the pro-Nazi wartime Slovak state and
to rehabilitate its leader Jozef Tiso. On March 14, a marginal
nationalist party, Slovak National Unity (SNU), held a rally to
commemorate the 60th anniversary of the wartime Slovak state. The rally
was attended by approximately 300 persons, including a number of
skinheads. The police kept the event under tight control to prevent any
violence. Chairman of the SNU Stanislav Panis in his tribute to Tiso
appealed to the Government to make March 14 an official national
holiday. Anti-Fascist and anti-Tiso protesters concurrently held a
counterdemonstration on another Bratislava square. The Young Democratic
Left organizers criticized Tiso's regime, racism, and extremism.
On March 14, the Dzurinda Government released a statement in which
it underlined that the current republic is not a successor of the
wartime Slovak state, which was totalitarian and antidemocratic. The
statement added that the Government considers the 1944 Slovak National
Uprising against the wartime Tiso state one of the most significant
events in putting the country back on the democratic track, and that
the Government is committed to fight against any expression of
intolerance, racism, nationalism, and xenophobia. However, the Slovak
National Party also issued a statement in which it said that the
anniversary of the wartime Slovak state marked ``the most important
step in the modern history of the Slovak nation.''
The official Slovak cultural organization Matica Slovenska and the
Confederation of Political Prisoners commemorated the 1939-1945 Slovak
state at a meeting in which they emphasized the significance of March
14 as a symbol of Slovak statehood. Unlike previous years, prominent
government officials did not attend.
On July 17, the FJC in Slovakia expressed its concern over the
desecration of the monument to Holocaust victims located in the old
city in Bratislava. Unknown culprits smashed and broke the marble base
of the monument. There are no suspects in the case.
In May 1998, the Supreme Court upheld a prior verdict that the
publisher of Zmena weekly had to publish an apology to the honorary
chairman of the FJC for abusing his person and offending his religious
feelings. The apology still was not published by year's end.
On November 3, Parliament passed legislation compensating Slovak
citizens who were deported to German controlled concentration camps
during World War II on the basis of their nationality, race, or
religion. For each month of deportation, those eligible are to receive
a cash sum of $75 (SK 3,000), plus a $.75 (SK 30) addition to their
monthly pension. Direct heirs of deceased victims, who at the time of
deportation were minors, are entitled to a lump sum of up to
approximately $2,500 (SK 100,000). The legislation disqualifies the
nearly 700 Slovak Jewish survivors from southern Slovakia, which was
under Hungarian control during World War II, because they received
compensation from the Hungarian Government.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides
minorities with the right to develop their own culture, receive
information and education in their mother tongue, and participate in
decisionmaking in matters affecting them. The Government continued to
provide funding for cultural, educational, broadcasting, and publishing
activities for the major ethnic minorities, but at greatly reduced
levels. However, there is no comprehensive law against discrimination.
The largest minority is the ethnic Hungarian minority. It is
concentrated primarily in southern Slovakia, with a population
registered at 567,756 (150,000 of whom are thought to be Roma who speak
Hungarian and choose to declare themselves as ethnic Hungarian). Most
ethnic Hungarians and ethnic Slovaks living in mixed areas continued to
coexist peacefully, but in recent years there have been occasional
expressions of anti-Hungarian sentiments by Slovak nationalists. In
1998 the Government and the Government of Hungary signed an
implementation agreement for their 1996 bilateral treaty, which called
for the establishment of commissions to deal with the treatment of
ethnic minorities, and the commissions were established on February 8.
On July 11, Parliament passed a minority language law providing for
the use of minority languages in official activities, and President
Schuster signed the law on July 20. According to the law, in places
where a minority group constitutes at least 20 percent of the
population, the minority language can be used in contacts with
government officials. The law was deemed acceptable by the OSCE High
Commissioner on National Minorities and the European Union. The law was
passed by a vote of 70 to 18 in Parliament. However, all members of the
Hungarian coalition voted against the law because they felt that it did
not ensure that the provisions in the new law would take precedence
over the existing state language law. Furthermore, the Hungarian
minority felt that a more comprehensive law was necessary, and that
this law did not protect the use of Hungarian in cultural and
educational activities.
The Parliament created a special Parliamentary Advisory Committee
for Roma Issues in February.
On March 5, at a rally held by the opposition Slovak National Party
(SNS) and HZDS, SNS chairman and mayor of Zilina Jan Slota appealed to
participants to resist Hungarian irredentism and chauvinistic policies
and accused the Government of giving over 444,600 acres of land to the
Hungarians. He also uttered inflammatory remarks about Roma, whom he
accused of ``stealing, robbing, and looting.'' There was a motion in
Parliament to strip Slota of his parliamentary immunity in order to
prosecute him for making such public statements, but the motion did not
pass.
During a November 9 ceremony at the grave of Hungarian national
hero Gyorgy Lahner in the village of Necpaly, SNS deputy chairman
Vitazoslav Moric and several other SNS members interrupted the
proceedings by singing Slovak nationalist songs and shouted insults at
participants. The Hungarian Ambassador to Slovakia was in attendance at
the ceremony.
On January 13, Parliament amended three laws to permit bilingual
recordkeeping at schools with Hungarian or other minority language
instruction. As a result of these changes, the Ministry of Education
was able to order some 55,000 bilingual report cards for elementary and
high schools that were planned for distribution at midterm in the
semester. The Ministry ordered report cards in both Hungarian/Slovak
and Ukrainian/Slovak versions.
Roma constitute the second largest ethnic minority, estimated to
number up to 300,000 citizens, although the Government officially
reports 89,434 Roma. Police on occasion beat Roma, and in one case
during the year allegedly shot a Rom during questioning at the police
station (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). They suffer disproportionately
from high levels of poverty and unemployment. Credible reports by human
rights monitors indicated that Roma continued to suffer from
discrimination in employment, housing, schooling, and the
administration of state services. Discrimination is most severe in the
eastern part of the country, where unemployment is higher and the
Romani population is larger.
Among Roma living in settlements in the east, the unemployment rate
is nearly 100 percent. In urban areas in the east, incidents of Roma
being denied admission to certain hotels, restaurants, and swimming
facilities are widely reported. According to press reports,
unemployment offices identify Roma in their records by placing an ``R''
next to their name in the register. The General Director of the
National Labor Bureau ordered an end to this practice after complaints
from human rights organizations and the head of the Department for
Human Rights and Minorities. Romani children disproportionately are
placed in special schools for the mentally retarded in many cases due
to their insufficient knowledge of the Slovak language. On August 18,
the Government increased the budget for the office of Special
Government Commissioner for Roma Issues Vincent Danihel. It also
allocated about $375,000 (approximately 15 million SK) for special
projects aimed at improving the situation of Roma, including
``Headstart'' programs for Roma in 10 schools; training for Roma and
non-Roma mayors, local government officials, and police officers;
publication of two Romani textbooks in Slovak, Hungarian, and the
Romani language; public television programs to educate the public about
the Romani minority; support for the Kosice Roma secondary art school;
and support for regional Roma cultural centers, social advisory bodies,
and health care programs. On September 28, the Cabinet approved a new
program, ``The Strategy of the Slovak Republic for the Solution of the
Problems of the Roma Minority,'' for addressing issues of the Romani
minority. While many Romani leaders and experts on Roma issues believe
that the strategy is a positive step, they also criticized it for
lacking specific proposals, being formulated with limited input from
Roma, and not allocating sufficient resources.
During the year, approximately 4,680 Slovak citizens applied for
asylum in West European countries. In July over 1,600 Roma applied for
political asylum in Finland, followed by smaller migrations to Norway,
Denmark, Switzerland, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Austria for the
same purpose. This resulted in July in the Finnish and Norwegian
Governments imposing 4-month suspensions of their visa waiver
agreements with Slovakia, which elapsed by year's end. On November 30,
Denmark also imposed a temporary entry visa requirement, to be lifted
after the wave of Romani immigrants decreased. By year's end there were
no official reports that any of these asylum cases had been adjudicated
successfully. Many Romani families who return after applying for asylum
in West European countries were not able to return to their apartments
because they owed city authorities back rent. These families then were
housed in temporary quarters provided through the social benefits
system. The children of these families faced difficulties in enrolling
in school because they did not have permanent addresses. Romani
activists believe that as a result of these ongoing housing and
education problems, these families were likely to leave the country
again and apply for asylum in another country.
A Rom, Marion Bily, was elected mayor of Petrova in the November
1998 local elections. However, immediately after the elections non-Roma
members of the city council initiated a petition and gathered enough
signatures to call new elections. Bily was prevented from taking
office, and the former mayor remained in office until new elections
were held. These elections were held in late September, and Bily was
not reelected.
President Schuster commented during a trip to Berlin on November 29
that Roma are ``profiting from state help but are neither willing nor
capable of assuming responsibility for the improvement of their own
situation.'' Miroslav Lacko from the Office for the Protection of
Romani Rights criticized the President's statements.
Skinhead violence against Roma was a serious problem, and human
rights monitors reported that police remain reluctant to take action.
Police also beat Roma and infringe on their rights to social benefits
and housing (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). According to the Office of
Legal Protection (KPO), there were more attacks on Roma during the year
compared to 1998, and these cases received more media attention.
However, the authorities tended to tolerate such attacks and accepted
them as ``normal.'' In almost no case did the police categorize the
incidents as racially motivated. In fact, a Banska Bystrica court ruled
in May that a crime that was committed by a skinhead against a Rom
could not be racially motivated since they are of the same race.
On June 11, a Romani student waiting for a bus in Banska Bystrica
was attacked by skinheads. After passersby did little to assist him, he
was admitted to the hospital for medical treatment for his injuries. He
filed a complaint against the perpetrators, and the judge of the
district court classified the case as infliction of bodily harm rather
than a racially motivated assault. The Rom appealed the decision to a
regional court, which confirmed the district court's ruling. The Rom
appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, but no decision was made in
the case by year's end.
In June a group of Romani citizens including a 6-year-old child
were visiting a restaurant in Kamenec pod Vtacnikom. A group of
skinheads attacked the Roma with large sticks. The owner of the
restaurant refused to allow them to telephone the police while the
skinheads were still present but did allow them to use the telephone
after they left. The police initiated an investigation into the case,
but there was no further progress by year's end.
On July 12, a Romani citizen was attacked by three men with large
sticks in Ziar nad Hronom and suffered a brain concussion, which
required him to be hospitalized for 21 days. The three men then
attempted unsuccessfully to break into a Roma apartment and broke all
of the windows. The men were charged with rioting and creating physical
harm, but the crime was not classified as racially motivated.
On May 7, 1998, 16-year-old Rom Branislav Baranyi was attacked and
beaten by a non-Romani adult in Lucenec while attempting to intervene
in a fight between his Romani friend and an intoxicated non-Romani
adult. Branislav Baranyi suffered a concussion and lost three teeth as
a result of the attack. On May 7, 1998, Baranyi's father filed a
complaint against the alleged attacker, but a policeman reportedly
refused to issue a confirmation of the complaint. He then filed a
complaint with the prosecutor's office in Lucenec, which passed it on
to the regional office. On August 28, 1998, that same regional office
charged Branislav Baranyi with disorderly conduct and attacking the
non-Roma who allegedly had initiated the fight. Before the first
hearing, the lawyer representing Baranyi lodged a formal objection
against the regional court in Banska Bystrica, based on the fact that
one of the judges was a relative of one of the defendants. The
objection was sustained and the case against Baranyi was transferred to
a municipal court in Zvolen. No further information was available in
the case at year's end.
In December a 21-year-old Rom was beaten by two skinheads in Car.
Immediately following the incident several Roma retaliated and attacked
the skinheads in a local pub instead of going to the police; they
claimed that the police had been unresponsive to their complaints in
the past.
In September in Kosice skinheads reportedly distributed racist
materials to the mailboxes of Romani families, and racist materials
also were distributed in Trebisov.
There was no progress during the year in a number of cases of
violence against Roma in 1998.
In March a Romani human rights NGO filed a complaint in the
European Court of Human Rights against regulations passed in 1997
preventing Roma from entering or residing in Nagov and Rokytovce, after
attempts to overturn the decrees in Slovak courts failed. In April the
two cities repealed the regulations in response to government pressure
(see Section 2.d.). Starting in late 1998, authorities in Jelsava
refused to grant residence permits to Roma who bought homes with the
intention of moving there. However, in early 1999, the mayor of Jelsava
issued the residence permits. A public opinion poll conducted in
November found that only some 2 percent of those polled would accept
Roma as neighbors, while some 87 percent said that they would dislike
having Romani neighbors. A December poll indicated that some 60 percent
of those polled would support measures that would segregate the Romani
population.
On June 6, a British citizen of Indian origin was assaulted by
skinheads in Bratislava. He was hospitalized with serious injuries. The
results of the investigation are pending.
On July 21, two British citizens of Asian origin were assaulted by
skinheads at a Bratislava pub. They escaped without serious injuries.
On July 26, one Chinese diplomat and another Chinese citizen were
attacked by a group of eight skinheads in Bratislava. One of the
victims required hospitalization for a brain concussion and head and
chest injuries. On August 20, authorities charged three skinheads in
the attack, one with assault and a racially motivated crime, the other
two with hooliganism. The three face prison sentences ranging from 6
months to 3 years. Reportedly one of the skinheads is the son of a
high-ranking police officer in Bratislava.
On October 10, four assailants attacked a 39-year-old Vietnamese
man at the train station in Prievidza. The victim sought medical
treatment for injuries to his face and head. Police were investigating
the incident, although there were no witnesses.
During the most recent census (1991), 14,000 citizens registered
themselves as Ukrainians, and 17,000 registered themselves as
Ruthenians. However, the statistical office does not differentiate
between Ruthenian and Ukrainian and records 32,747 persons in the
Ruthenian/Ukrainian ethnic group. The current Government also considers
the Ruthenian and Ukrainian minorities as a single group. However,
about 50,000 persons listed Ruthenian as their native language in the
1991 census. Ruthenians disagree that they are Ukrainians, and that
their language is only a Ukrainian dialect. In September 1998, Slovak
State Radio started broadcasting a long-promised daily regional program
for the Ruthenian minority in Presov. However, after the 1998
parliamentary elections this broadcasting was discontinued, and the
broadcast is now in Ukrainian. However, there is a television broadcast
in Ruthenian on STV, which is aired once every 2 months. In addition,
the Ruthenian minority receives state funding to publish a biweekly
newspaper in Ukrainian. A representative of the Ruthenian Revival
Organization stated that Ruthenian language instruction is provided in
two schools in the northeast. There is an Institute for Minority
Languages at Presov University in the northeast. Two instructors at the
Institute teach Ruthenian culture and language.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to form and join unions, except in the armed forces.
Approximately 45 percent of the work force is unionized. Most unions
are independent of the Government and political parties but lobby those
entities in order to gain support for union positions on key labor
issues.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike, and there are no
restrictions on this right. The National Statistical Office officially
reported no strikes during the year.
However, an increasing number of strike alerts and unofficial
strikes were reported during the year. Many of these actions
anticipated layoffs or protested the nonpayment or partial payment of
salaries due to restructuring of the company or insolvency.
On September 25, the Confederation of Trade Unions (KOZ) sponsored
an antigovernment demonstration that was attended by approximately
40,000 labor sympathizers to protest the Government's failure to meet
its 20 demands.
On November 9, the KOZ blocked major intersections in five cities
to protest the Government's failure to increase wages and reduce taxes
and unemployment.
On December 8, the KOZ held a protest in response to the
Government's draft budget for 2000.
Local unions also held strike alerts. On November 10, workers held
a 15-minute warning strike at PPS Detva Holding to protest a planned
layoff of 500 employees. On November 18, almost 60 percent of schools
joined a 1-hour strike alert sponsored by the Education Union to
protest the Government's failure to fulfill its promises in education
policy.
There were no instances of retribution against strikers or labor
leaders. However, on October 22, unknown assailants attacked textile
union vice president Otto Kremer. Labor leaders alleged that the attack
was retribution for his assisting workers at the Pratex Cadca factory
in the northwest region of the country in recovering unpaid wages.
Relevant legislation on collective bargaining prohibits the dismissal
of workers legally participating in strikes. However, according to this
law, a strike is legal and official only if it is for the purpose of
collective bargaining; if it is announced in advance; and if a list of
strike participants is provided. If the strike is not considered to be
official, strikers are not ensured protection.
Unions are free to form or join federations or confederations and
to affiliate with and participate in international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining. Following the September 1998
parliamentary election the KOZ decided to reenter tripartite
negotiations with employers and the Government. However, unions have
expressed dissatisfaction with the Government, claiming that it has not
included them in important decisionmaking and does not give adequate
attention to their demands. The KOZ held a public demonstration on
September 25 and threatened a general strike if the Government
continued to be unresponsive to its demands.
The law on citizens' associations prohibits discrimination by
employers against union members and organizers. Complaints may be
resolved either in collective negotiations or in court. If a court
rules that an employer dismissed a worker for union activities or for
any reason other than certain grounds for dismissal listed in the Labor
Code, the employer must reinstate the worker. There were no reports of
abuses targeted against unions or workers.
The 1996 Customs Act regulates free customs zones and customs
warehouses. Firms operating in such zones must comply with the Labor
Code; to date there have been no reports of special involvement by the
trade unions. No special legislation governs labor relations in free
trade zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Both the
Constitution and the employment act prohibit forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, and generally there were
no reports of violations; however, trafficking in women and girls for
the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.). The
Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs, and Family, as well as district and
local labor offices, have responsibility for enforcement.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law sets the minimum employment age at 15 years.
Children must remain in school for 9 years, or until the age of 15,
although it is not enforced strictly, particularly for the Romani
minority. Workers under the age of 16 may not work more than 33 hours
per week; may not be compensated on a piecework basis; may not work
overtime or night shifts; and may not work underground or in specified
conditions deemed dangerous to their health or safety. Special
conditions and protections, though somewhat less stringent, apply to
young workers up to the age of 18. The Ministry of Labor enforces this
legislation. There were no reports of violations. The law and the
Constitution prohibit forced and bonded child labor, and the Government
generally enforces these prohibitions effectively; however, trafficking
in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage in 1999 was $86
(SK 3,600) per month. Even when combined with special allowances paid
to families with children it did not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. The Ministry of Labor is responsible
for enforcing the minimum wage. No violations were reported. The
standard workweek mandated by the Labor Code is 42.5 hours, although
collective bargaining agreements have achieved reductions in some cases
(most often to 40 hours). For state enterprises the law requires
overtime pay up to a maximum of 8 hours per week, and 150 hours per
year, and provides 5 weeks of annual leave. Private enterprises can
compensate their employees for more hours of overtime than stipulated
by the law. There is no specifically mandated 24-hour rest period
during the workweek. The trade unions, the Ministry of Labor, and local
employment offices monitor observance of these laws, and the
authorities effectively enforce them.
The Labor Code establishes health and safety standards that the
Office of Labor Safety effectively enforces. For hazardous employment,
workers undergo medical screening under the supervision of a physician.
They have the right to refuse to work in situations that endanger their
health and safety and may file complaints against employers in such
situations. Employees working under conditions endangering their health
and safety for a certain period of time are entitled to paid
``relaxation'' leave in addition to their standard leave.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law specifically prohibits
trafficking in persons; however, there were instances of trafficking in
women and girls. The country is a source country, a transit country,
and a destination country for such victims of trafficking. According to
the Ministry of Interior, there have been 11 documented cases of Slovak
women being forced into prostitution in other countries or foreign
women being forced into prostitution in Slovakia. The problem receives
very little public attention, and therefore it is likely that there are
more cases than those that are documented.
A new report issued by the Ministry of Interior's report on
trafficking states that the country is only a transit country for
persons being trafficked mainly to Austria, the Czech Republic, and
Germany for the purpose of forced prostitution. There were four
prosecuted cases of forced prostitution in 1998 and nine cases in 1999.
There were also reports of Slovak women being trafficked to Western
Europe with promises of work as models, waitresses, and au pairs. Their
passports were allegedly confiscated, and they were allegedly forced to
work in adult entertainment clubs or as prostitutes. According to the
report, 3 cases of trafficking were prosecuted in 1998 and 11 in 1999.
Some women from Russia and Ukraine reportedly are trafficked
through the country on their way to countries such as Turkey, Greece,
Italy, Germany, and Serbia, where they are forced to work as
prostitutes. According to a report on trafficking in women issued by
the Swedish National Criminal Investigation Department in March, women
from Slovakia work in Sweden as prostitutes. In four 1998 court cases
involving women trafficked to Sweden, some women came from Slovakia,
among other countries. Although previously Slovakia was primarily a
source country, increasingly women from less prosperous eastern
countries (including the Russian Federation, Belarus, Ukraine, Romania,
and Bulgaria) find themselves trafficked through and to Slovakia.
______
SLOVENIA
Slovenia is a parliamentary democracy and constitutional republic.
Power is shared between a directly elected president, a prime minister,
and a bicameral legislature. Since Slovenia's independence with the
breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991, free, fair, and open elections have
characterized the political system. In 1997 elections were held to
elect both a president and representatives to Parliament's upper house.
The Government respects constitutional provisions for an independent
judiciary in practice.
The police are under the effective civilian control of the Ministry
of the Interior. By law the armed forces do not exercise civil police
functions.
The country has made steady progress toward developing a market
economy. As of 1998, ``social property'' no longer exists, although
sales of the remaining large state holdings have not occurred as
rapidly as planned. Trade has been diversified toward the West and the
growing markets of Central and Eastern Europe. Manufacturing accounts
for most employment, with machinery and other manufactured products
constituting the major exports. Labor force surveys put unemployment at
7.5 percent, but registration for unemployment assistance was 14.5
percent. Inflation was 7.9 percent in 1998, while real gross national
product grew 3.9 percent. The currency is stable, fully convertible,
and backed by substantial reserves. The economy provides citizens with
a good standard of living.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and the judiciary provide effective means of
dealing with individual instances of abuse. An ombudsman deals with
human rights problems, including citizenship cases. Some 5,000 to
10,000 non-Slovene (former Yugoslav) residents had been without legal
status since independence in 1991, some due to the Government's slow
processing of their original applications, and others because they had
never applied. However, in August the Government passed legislation
that offered legal permanent resident status to such persons. These
minorities reported some discrimination.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and inhuman treatment
as well as ``humiliating punishment or treatment,'' and there were no
reports of such treatment.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards and were not
the subject of complaint by any human rights organization.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors and
the media.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest or deprivation of liberty, and the
Government respects these provisions in practice.
The authorities must advise detainees in writing within 24 hours,
in their own language, of the reasons for the arrest. Until charges are
brought, detention may last up to 6 months; once charges are brought,
detention may be prolonged for a maximum of 2 years. Some 26 percent of
the average prison population of 1,100 inmates are in pretrial
detention at any given time. The law also provides safeguards against
self-incrimination. These rights and limitations are respected in
practice.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice.
The judicial system comprises district courts, regional courts, a
court of appeals, an administrative court, and the Supreme Court. A
nine-member Constitutional Court rules on the constitutionality of
legislation. Judges, elected by the State Assembly (Parliament) on the
nomination of the Judicial Council, are constitutionally independent
and serve indefinitely, subject to an age limit. The Judicial Council
is composed of six sitting judges elected by their peers and five
presidential nominees elected by the Parliament.
The Constitution provides in great detail for the right to a fair
trial, including provisions for: Equality before the law, presumption
of innocence, due process, open court proceedings, the right of appeal,
and a prohibition against double jeopardy. Defendants by law have the
right to counsel, without cost if need be. These rights are respected
in practice, although the judicial system is so burdened that justice
is frequently protracted. In some instances, criminal cases have
reportedly taken 2 to 5 years to come to trial. The problem is not
widespread, and defendants are released on bail except in the most
serious criminal cases.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the protection of
privacy, ``personal data rights,'' and the inviolability of the home,
mail, and other means of communication. These rights and protections
are respected in practice, and violations are subject to effective
legal sanction.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of thought, speech, public association, the press, and other
forms of public communication and expression. Lingering self-censorship
and some indirect political pressures continue to influence the media.
The press is now a vigorous institution emerging from its more
restricted past. The major media do not represent a broad range of
political or ethnic interests, although there is an Italian-language
television channel as well as a newspaper available to the ethnic
Italian minority who live on the Adriatic Coast. Hungarian radio
programming is common in the northeast where there are approximately
8,500 ethnic Hungarians. Bosnian refugees and the Albanian community
have newsletters in their own languages.
Four major daily and several weekly newspapers are published. The
major print media are supported through private investment and
advertising, although the national broadcaster, RTV Slovenia, enjoys
government subsidies, as do cultural publications and book publishing.
Seven local television channels are available, four of which are
independent private stations. Numerous foreign broadcasts are available
via satellite and cable. All major towns have radio stations and cable
television. Numerous business and academic publications are available.
Foreign newspapers, magazines, and journals are widely available.
In theory and practice, the media enjoy full journalistic freedom.
However, for over 40 years the country was ruled by an authoritarian
Communist political system, and reporting about domestic politics may
be influenced to some degree by self-censorship and indirect political
pressures.
The election law requires the media to offer free space and time to
political parties at election time. Television networks routinely give
public figures and opinion makers from across the political spectrum
access via a broad range of public service programming.
The Constitution provides for autonomy and freedom for universities
and other institutions of higher education. There are two universities;
each has numerous affiliated research and study institutions. Academic
freedom is respected, and centers of higher education are lively and
intellectually stimulating.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the rights of peaceful assembly, association, and
participation in public meetings, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. These rights can be restricted only by an act of
Parliament in circumstances involving national security, public safety,
or protection against infectious diseases.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. No person
can be compelled to admit his religious or other beliefs. There are few
formal requirements for recognition as a religion by the Government.
Religious groups, including foreign missionaries, must register with
the Ministry of the Interior. Registration entitles such groups to
value added tax rebates on a quarterly basis. All groups in the country
report equal access to registration and tax rebate status. Foreign
missionaries (including a Mormon mission) and religious groups
(including Hare Krishna, Scientology, and Unification organizations)
operate without hindrance.
The appropriate role for religious instruction in the schools
continues to be an issue of debate. The Constitution states that
parents are entitled ``to give their children a moral and religious
upbringing. . .'' Before 1945 religion was much more prominent in the
schools, but now only those schools supported by religious bodies teach
religion.
The Roman Catholic Church was a major property holder in the
Kingdom of Yugoslavia before World War II. After the war, much church
property--church buildings and support buildings, residences,
businesses, and forests--was confiscated and nationalized by the
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After Slovenian independence
in 1991, Parliament passed legislation calling for denationalization
(restitution or compensation) within a fixed period. However, a
subsequent change of government in 1992 led to a virtual standstill in
denationalization proceedings for several years. As of June, only one-
third of all cases had been adjudicated at the initial administrative
level, although these represent about half of all nationalized and
confiscated property.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides that each
person has the right to freedom of movement, to choice of place of
residence, to leave the country freely, and to return. Limitations on
these rights may be made only by statute and only where necessary in
criminal cases, to control infectious disease, or in wartime. In
practice citizens travel widely and often.
The Constitution provides for a right of political asylum for
foreigners and stateless persons ``who are persecuted for their stand
on human rights and fundamental freedoms.'' The Government cooperates
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and other
humanitarian organization in assisting refugees. The Government
provides first asylum (or ``temporary protection'') to refugees but on
a very limited basis in recent years. There were no reports that the
Government forcibly returned any refugees against their will to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides that elections should be held at least
every 4 years. Citizens have the right to change their government,
voting by secret ballot on the basis of universal suffrage. Slovenia
has a mixed parliamentary and presidential system. The President
proposes a candidate to the legislature for confirmation as Prime
Minister, after consultations with the leaders of the political parties
in the Parliament.
No restrictions hinder the participation of women or minorities in
politics. However, women are underrepresented in politics. Of the 90
Members of Parliament, 8 are women, while 1 of 19 cabinet ministers is
a woman. The Prime Minister's Office has an active agency for
monitoring and promoting the participation by women in public life.
The Constitution stipulates that the Italian and Hungarian ethnic
communities each are entitled to at least one representative in the
Parliament, regardless of their population.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Independent human rights monitoring groups promote respect for
human rights and freedoms and freely investigate complaints about
violations. The Government places no obstacles in the way of
investigations by international or local human rights groups.
An independent ombudsman appointed by Parliament deals with human
rights problems, including so-called ``economic rights.'' The incumbent
is regarded as fair, but he lacks the power to enforce his opinions. In
addition Parliament has been criticized as a major factor in the slow
progress of property restitution (``denationalization''), casting doubt
on the ombudsman's ability to alter the pace of the process. The
ombudsman criticized the Government for the slow pace of legal and
administrative proceedings, in criminal and civil, as well as in
denationalization cases.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law, and the
Government observed this provision in practice. According to the 1991
census, the population is approximately 2 million, of whom 1.7 million
are ethnic Slovenes and the remainder are persons of 23 other
nationalities. There were some 50,000 Croats, 48,000 Serbs, 27,000
Muslims, 8,500 Hungarians, and 3,000 Italians.
The Constitution provides special rights for the ``autochthonous
Italian and Hungarian ethnic communities,'' including the right to use
their own national symbols, enjoy bilingual education, and benefit from
other privileges. It also provides for special status and rights for
the small Romani community, which are observed in practice.
Women.--The awareness of spousal abuse and violence against women
is on the rise. In 1998 83 men were charged with rape. Although 1,559
persons were charged with inflicting some degree of bodily harm in
1998, no breakdown of victims by sex is available. In 1998 10,021
misdemeanor charges of ``endangering safety in a private place'' were
filed. Although no breakdown of victims is available by sex for 1998,
records from previous years indicate that at least 40 percent, or
approximately 4,000 cases, involved domestic disputes where women were
threatened. Three shelters are available for battered women, which are
partially funded by the State. The shelters operate at capacity (about
40 beds combined) and turn away numerous women every year. In cases of
reported spousal abuse or violence, the police actively intervene, and
criminal charges are filed.
Equal rights for women are a matter of state policy. There is no
official discrimination against women or minorities in housing, jobs,
education, or other walks of life. Under the Constitution, marriage is
based on the equality of both spouses. The Constitution stipulates that
the state shall protect the family, motherhood, and fatherhood.
In rural areas, women, even those employed outside the home, bear a
disproportionate share of household work and family care because of a
generally conservative social tradition. However, women frequently are
encountered in business and in government executive departments.
Equal pay for equal work for men and women is the norm. Although
both sexes have the same average period of unemployment, women still
are found more often in lower paying jobs. On average women's earnings
are 85 percent of those of men.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
welfare through its system of public education and health care. Free
public education is provided through age 15.
The Constitution stipulates that children ``enjoy human rights and
fundamental freedoms consistent with their age and level of maturity.''
Moreover, special protection from exploitation and maltreatment is
provided by statute. Social workers visit schools regularly to monitor
for any incidents of mistreatment or abuse of children.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--The disabled are not discriminated
against, and the Government has taken steps to facilitate access to
social and economic opportunities. In practice modifications of public
and private structures to ease access by the handicapped continue
slowly but steadily.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Minorities make up about 12
percent of the population; most are nationals of the former Yugoslavia.
Ethnic minorities face a complex reality. ``Autochthonous'' groups in
general are provided special rights and protection by the Constitution.
Three of these groups--Italians, Hungarians, and Roma--are singled out
in the Constitution for special treatment, and the first two are
assigned representation in Parliament. Other ``autochthonous'' groups
include some 500 ethnic Germans and under 100 Jews.
However, ``new minorities''--ethnic Serbs, Croats, Kosovar
Albanians, and non-autochthonous Roma from Kosovo and Albania--are
unprotected by special provisions of the Constitution and face some
societal and governmental discrimination. Many of these 5,000 to 10,000
non-Slovene citizens of the former Yugoslavia migrated internally to
Slovenia during the decades leading up to independence because of the
economic opportunities. Most opted not to take up Slovene citizenship
during a 6-month window in 1991-92 and have been living in the country
as essentially stateless persons since then, while others were without
residence status because of slow processing of their applications by
the Government. In August Parliament passed legislation that addressed
the problem of these persons by offering them permanent resident
status; a 6-week window for applications closed at year's end.
The Roma are best characterized as a set of groups rather than as
one community. Some have lived in the country for hundreds of years,
while others are very recent migrants. A lack of cohesion prevented the
Romani communities from taking advantage of their special
constitutional status, although the Government also failed to fully
implement the special legislation on Romani status called for in
Article 65 of the Constitution.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution stipulates that
trade unions, their operation, and their membership shall be free and
provides for the right to strike. Virtually all workers, except police
and military personnel, are eligible to form and join labor
organizations. In 1993 the Parliament for the first time passed
legislation restricting strikes by some public sector employees.
However, after government budget-cutting, some public sector
professionals (judges, doctors, and educators) became increasingly
active on the labor front.
Labor has two main groupings, with constituent branches throughout
the country. A third, much smaller, regional labor union operates on
the Adriatic coast. Unions are formally and actually independent of the
Government and political parties, but individual union members hold
positions in the legislature. The Constitution provides that the state
shall be responsible for ``the creation of opportunities for employment
and for work.''
There are no restrictions on unions joining or forming federations
and affiliating with like-minded international union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The economy is
in transition from the former Communist system, which included some
private ownership of enterprises along with state-controlled and
``socially owned'' enterprises. In the transition to a fully market-
based economy, the collective bargaining process is undergoing change.
Formerly, the old Yugoslav Government had a dominant role in setting
the minimum wage and conditions of work. The Government still exercises
this role to an extent, although in the private sector wages and
working conditions are agreed annually in a general collective
agreement between the ``social partners.'' The labor unions and the
Chamber of Economy. There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
Export processing zones exist in Koper, Maribor, and Nova Gorica.
Worker rights in these zones are the same as in the rest of the
country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor, including that performed by children, and
there were no reports of forced labor by adults or children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Children must
remain in school until through the age of 15. During the harvest or for
other farm chores, younger children do work. In general, urban
employers respect the age limits. The law prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children, and there were no reports of its use (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage is $325 (59,150
tolars) per month, which provides a decent standard of living for the
average worker and family. The workweek is 40 hours. In general
businesses provide acceptable conditions of work for their employees.
Occupational health and safety standards are set and enforced by
special commissions controlled by the Ministries of Health and Labor.
Workers have the right to remove themselves from unsafe conditions
without jeopardizing their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in persons.--The law on ``enslavement'' prescribes
criminal prosecution for a person who ``brings another person into
slavery or a similar condition, or keeps another person in such a
condition, or buys, sells or delivers another person to a third party''
or brokers such a deal. Sentences for enslavement convictions range
from 1 to 10 years' imprisonment. Persons also can be prosecuted for
pimping or pandering ``by force, threat or deception,'' the penalty for
which ranges from 3 months' to 5 years' imprisonment or, in cases
involving minors or forced prostitution, 1 to 10 years' imprisonment.
There were no prosecutions for trafficking in persons in 1998; in
1997, three persons were successfully prosecuted.
______
SPAIN
Spain is a democracy with a constitutional monarch. The Parliament
consists of two chambers, the Congress of Deputies and the Senate. Jose
Maria Aznar of the Popular Party (PP) became Prime Minister, with the
title President of the Government, when his party won national
elections in 1996. New elections are scheduled for March 12, 2000. The
Government respects the constitutional provisions for an independent
judiciary in practice.
There are three levels of security forces. The National Police are
responsible for nationwide investigations, security in urban areas,
traffic control, and hostage rescue. The Civil Guard polices rural
areas and controls borders and highways. Autonomous police forces have
taken over many of the duties of the Civil Guard in Galicia, Catalunya,
and the Basque country. The security forces are under the effective
control of the Government. The security forces also maintain
anticorruption units. Some members of the security forces committed
human rights abuses.
The economy is market based, with primary reliance on private
enterprise. Although a number of public sector enterprises remain in
key areas, the Government's policy has been to privatize as many of
them as possible. The economy grew during the third quarter at a 3.7
percent annual rate. Inflation at year's end was 2.9 percent, due
primarily to higher energy costs. Unemployment in the third quarter was
15.45 percent, continuing its downward trend.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas, including cases
of police brutality, lengthy pretrial detention, and delays in trials.
The Government investigates allegations of human rights abuses by the
security forces and punishes those found guilty of such abuses;
however, investigations are often lengthy and punishments light.
Violence and discrimination against women were problems. Incidents of
racism and rightwing violence against minorities and discrimination
against Roma were also problems. There were instances of forced labor
and child labor. Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
prostitution was a problem.
Throughout the year there were ongoing judicial proceedings related
to the involvement of former government officials in the Antiterrorist
Liberation Groups (government-sponsored death squads known by their
acronym, GAL), which killed 27 persons between 1983 and 1987, including
10 persons with no connection to the Basque terrorist group, ETA, the
ostensible target of the GAL.
ETA announced in late November that it would end its self-declared
14-month-old cease-fire and warned that armed attacks could resume
quickly. Low level street violence, threats, and intimidation continued
in the Basque country. No one died during the year as a result of these
acts. Ongoing arrests by Spanish and French authorities of ETA
terrorists did not precipitate a return to the type of deadly violence
and kidnapings characteristic of ETA's actions before the cease-fire.
In June elections, several ETA terrorists were elected to
provincial parliaments in the Basque country and the regional
parliament in neighboring Navarra, all on the ticket of Euskal
Herritarrok (EH), the legal political wing of ETA, also known as Herri
Batasuna (HB).
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
No developments were reported in the following cases from past
years: The March 1997 case of a Moroccan boy who allegedly was shot in
the back by a Civil Guard officer; the appeal of police officer Antonio
Barrioneuvo's conviction in the 1996 killing of Portuguese citizen
Manual Abreu Silva; the deaths of eight prison inmates under suspicious
circumstances in 1996-97 (see Section 1.c.); and the mid-1980's cases
of alleged killings by security forces of Roman Onaederra, Mikel
Zabaltza, Robert Caplanne, and a tramp and two drug addicts
On March 10, Judge Jose Luis Gonzalez Armengol sentenced Jose Luis
Morcillo Pinillos to prison for his role in the November 20, 1984, GAL
killing of Santiago Brouard, a member of HB. On March 12, three others
were ordered jailed for allegedly collaborating in the murder: Julian
Sancristobal (former State Security Director), Jose Amedo (former
Police Commissioner), and Rafael Masa (former Lieutenant Colonel in the
Civil Guard). They were accused of having planned and financed the
operation with state funds. Masa had just been allowed to return to the
Civil Guard after he had been expelled for 4 years for his role in the
Linaza torture case, which was opened in 1981. Sancristobal and Masa
were released on July 23 after each posted bond in the amount of
$66,670 (10 million pesetas).
The appeals remain pending of former Interior Minister Jose
Barrionuevo and former Secretary of State Security Rafael Vera for
their convictions in connection with the kidnaping of French citizen
Segundo Marey in 1983.
Amedo also was set free in July, due to his decision to cooperate
with the investigations into the Marey and Brouard GAL cases. In a July
confession, Amedo reportedly described a December 1983 meeting at which
the decision to kill Brouard was made. The meeting allegedly took place
near the site where Marey was being held and was attended by several
police and antiterrorism officials, including Sancristobal, Mohand
Talbi (a GAL mercenary), Francisco Alvarez (a former commander of an
antiterrorist unit), and Miguel Planchuelo (former Chief of Police of
Bilbao). Amedo also allegedly said that Sancristobal and Talbi kidnaped
Marey. On July 28, Judge Armengol issued a preliminary indictment
charging that Sancristobal paid Pinillos $33,333 (5 million pesetas)
from Ministry of Interior funds to carry out Brouard's killing.
On August 2, Judge Baltazar Garzon set September hearing dates for
Amedo, Alvarez, and Sancristobal, as well as former Chief of Operations
in the CESID (national intelligence agency) Juan Alberto Perote and
former policeman Michel Dominguez. They have to enter pleas with regard
to the 1985 killings in France of four Basques in the Monbar case. On
September 25, 1985, Lucien Mattei and Pierre Frugoli (French
mercenaries hired by the GAL), shot and killed Agustin Irazustabarrena,
Ignacio Asteasuinzarra, Sabino Etxaide, and Jose Maria Etxaniz in a bar
in Bayona, France, which was frequented by Basque nationals. Frugoli
and Mattei were convicted and sentenced in France for their
participation in the crime.
On March 17, Miguel Brescia Guillen went on trial, accused of
driving the truck in the GAL case in which Christian Matxicotte (a
French pastor) and Catherine Brion were killed on February 17, 1986, in
the southern French town of Bidarraya. The prosecutor is requesting
that the National High Court sentence Guillen to 66 years' imprisonment
for his role in this crime. On September 13, 1994, Guillen allegedly
collected $200,000 (30 million pesetas)--from whom is not clear--to
keep quiet and not implicate others. Witnesses at his trial testified
that Guillen spoke of his involvement in this case and one other to
them on numerous occasions.
Several organizations are dedicated to the needs and concerns of
victims of terrorism, among them the Association of Terrorism Victims
(AVT). This organization was founded in 1981 and currently serves 1,300
families by providing legal and psychological counseling, publishing a
monthly magazine, and carrying out various other activities. Government
funding consists of $40,000 (6 million pesetas), provided annually by
the Ministry of Defense.
A bill to compensate ETA victims and their families was passed into
law on September 16. Entitled ``Law of Solidarity with the Victims of
Terrorism,'' the law recognizes the suffering and sacrifice of ETA's
victims as well as of those of the GAL. The total amount of
compensation is expected to be approximately $333 million (50 billion
pesetas), to be paid by the State. The amount of compensation is to be
determined by the gravity of the injury suffered. Relatives of a
deceased victim are to receive around $153,333 (23 million pesetas).
Victims who became invalids are to receive $433,333 (65 million
pesetas).
The Spanish extradition request for former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet remained under judicial review in the United Kingdom. Judge
Baltazar Garzon sought to try Pinochet for his involvement in the
disappearance of 600 Spaniards under Chilean and Argentinian
dictatorships in the 1970's and 1980's. In November Garzon issued an
international arrest warrant for former Argentine junta Generals
Leopoldo Galtieri and Jorge Videla, Admiral Emilio Massera, and 95
lower ranking military officers. The indictments are in connection with
human rights abuses that took place during Argentina's 1976-83 ``dirty
war,'' when over 15,000 persons were killed or disappeared.
On December 2, indigenous Guatemalan leader Rigoberta Menchu filed
a criminal suit in a Spanish court against eight former military and
civilian leaders for human rights abuses committed during the internal
conflict. The suit alleges that the defendants, including retired
General Efrain Rios Montt, former President and retired General
Fernando Lucas Garcia, former de facto President Oscar Humberto Mejia
Victores, and others were responsible for ``crimes against humanity,''
including genocide, torture, and terrorism. The suit cites three cases:
The 1980 assault on the Spanish Embassy in which over 30 persons died,
the killing of Menchu's mother and her two siblings, and the killing of
4 Spanish priests over the course of the conflict. On December 18,
Spanish Judge Guillermo Ruiz Polanco accepted Menchu's suit. Attorneys
for Mejia Victores later filed criminal charges in Guatemala against
Menchu, accusing her of treason, violating the Constitution, and
failing to report a crime (for filing charges in Spanish court.)
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
On March 11, a local policeman in Olot (Catalunya) was arrested
after confessing to the November 1992 kidnaping of pharmacist Maria
Angels Feliu. Feliu was held for ransom for 492 days. Civil Guard
investigators believe that corrupt police, one of whom died in 1997,
may have been involved. The Civil Guard cited its investigation as
proof that the police were not above the law. A total of three persons
have been jailed in connection with the case, and the Civil Guard
believes that as many as nine persons may have been involved.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits such acts; however, suspects charged
with terrorism routinely assert that they have been abused during
detention, and other detainees sometimes make similar charges. The
Government investigates allegations of torture and also permits outside
parties to investigate them. In April Amnesty International wrote to
the Minister of the Interior to reiterate its concerns about
allegations of torture and mistreatment during incommunicado detention.
On March 4, the newspaper El Pais reported that a prosecutor in
Barcelona had asked for a year in prison and 2\1/2\ years' suspension
for two policemen after they undressed a suspect in the police station
and submitted him to humiliating treatment on April 29, 1998. The
police claimed that it was a legitimate body cavity search. No
developments were reported in the November 1998 case of two policemen
in Melilla who were charged with raping a Moroccan girl.
No progress was apparent in the complaint filed against the police
in the beating of Ivan Gonzalez in September 1997. The National Court
of Vizcaya found the three policemen charged with raping Brazilian
tourist Rita Margarete in August 1995 not guilty, and this decision was
confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court. On June 22, Interior Minister
Jaime Mayor Oreja assured the Congress of Deputies that the police were
investigating all possibilities. He admitted that there was a
possibility that the police were covering up facts in the case.
No developments were reported in the trial that began in November
1998 of six members of the Civil Guard who were accused of torturing
three suspected ETA members in 1992.
There were several developments in the case of Kepa Urra, a member
of ETA who accused three members of the Civil Guard of torture in 1992.
The three were convicted by the National High Court of Vizcaya in
November 1997. On appeal to the Supreme Court, their prison sentences
were reduced from 4 years to 1 year. However, the Court did not alter
the 6-year suspension from the Civil Guard to which the lower court
also had sentenced them. A suspension of this length usually means
automatic expulsion from the Civil Guard. One of the convicted Civil
Guard members, Manuel Sanchez Corbi, meanwhile was selected for
promotion, despite the fact that one of the conditions for promotion is
that a candidate not have a conviction for a deliberate criminal act.
On July 23, the Council of Ministers partially pardoned all three Civil
Guard members. Corbi, Jose Maria de las Cuevas, and Antonio Lozano
Garcia are to be allowed to continue working for the Civil Guard. The
Council reduced their suspensions from 6 years to 1 month and a day. On
August 3, the pardon was published in the State's Official Bulletin,
and the Ministry of the Interior confirmed that once Corbi's suspension
expires, he is to be promoted to the rank of captain.
On February 20, seven police officers in Madrid were found guilty
of illegally detaining, humiliating, and torturing a family in 1990.
The two principal offenders were sentenced to 6 months in jail and were
suspended from the police force for 7 years. The other officers were
given lesser jail sentences, but all were suspended for 6 to 7 years,
including the officer who ordered the family released in an attempt to
cover up the crimes. The officers were also ordered to pay the victims
thousands of dollars in compensation.
In one of the most notorious GAL cases, on July 29 the national
High Court denied the appeals of Enrique Dorado and Felipe Bayo, who
were accused of torturing and kidnaping Jose Antonio Lasa and Jose
Ignacio Zabala. Both remain in custody, pending their appeal to the
Supreme Court.
The Basque terrorist group ETA announced on November 28 that its
self-imposed cease-fire, declared in September 1998, effectively would
be ended as of December 3. At least two subsequent attempts by ETA to
carry out attacks were frustrated. The first occurred shortly before
Christmas when the authorities discovered two vans, each containing
approximately 2,200 pounds of explosives, with timers attached. The
intended target or targets of the van bombs was unknown. The police and
the press continued to report ETA youth criminal activity during the
year, including the use of Molotov cocktails to set fire to homes,
businesses, cars, and political party offices in a continuing campaign
of intimidation in the Basque country. Between ETA's September, 1998,
cease-fire declaration and the end of July, 220 violent actions were
undertaken by organizations believed to be associated with ETA in the
Basque and Navarra regions. Official records also indicate that during
the same timeframe, 119 threats were made against public officials,
judges, policemen, prosecutors, and businessmen. No deaths were
reported from these actions or threats. In March the widow of a PP
councilman previously killed by ETA received a package bomb in the
mail. She thought that the package was suspicious and therefore sought
help from the authorities, who disarmed the device.
In April a bomb damaged the basilica in the Valley of the Fallen
tomb where General Francisco Franco is buried. The police said that a
small Marxist group called October First Anti-Fascist Resistance Group
claimed responsibility for the bast.
Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
In March 1998 the General Council of Judicial Power announced the
opening of an investigation into 31 cases of alleged abuse and
negligence by prison officials in 1996 and 1997. The investigating
committee promised to scrutinize in particular eight inmate deaths
ostensibly caused by mismanagement and negligence, including the
failure by prison officials to give prompt medical attention to a
prisoner who suffered from chronic heart problems and the suicide of an
inmate whose treatment for drug addiction was interrupted by his
transfer to a prison lacking drug counseling facilities. Another death
under investigation is that of a San Sebastian inmate whose official
cause of death is listed as a barbiturate overdose despite the presence
of lesions on the back, neck, and thighs of his body and the refusal of
the doctors who conducted the autopsy to certify a drug overdose as the
cause of death.
Basque activists continued to demand that all imprisoned ETA
terrorists be moved to prisons in the Basque region or the adjacent
autonomous region, Navarra. This demand was supported by two nonbinding
resolutions in the Parliament, one in late 1998 and the other early in
the year. On September 7, the Government announced that, despite ETA's
indefinite cancellation of its talks with the Government, the
Government would move 105 ETA prisoners to prisons in or nearer the
Basque country. Since the announcement by ETA of its unilateral truce
on September 16, 1998, 180 Basque prisoners, including ETA terrorists
and members of HB, ETA's political party, were released from jails.
Another 135 have been moved to prisons nearer to their homes. A total
of 85 ETA prisoners currently are held in prisons in the Basque
country. The total number of ETA prisoners has declined from 535 to
405, although 50 new prisoners were added since the cease-fire.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors,
including the Council of Europe's Committee for the Prevention of
Torture.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention, and the authorities respect
these provisions in practice.
A suspect may not be held for more than 72 hours without a hearing
except in cases involving terrorism, in which case the Penal Code
permits holding a suspect an additional 2 days without a hearing and
the possibility of incommunicado detention, provided that a judge
authorizes such action. Some powerful voices are calling for these
provisions of the Penal Code to be modified. The press reported in July
that in a speech Judge Baltazar Garzon, best known for his involvement
in the case of General Pinochet, called for the reform of detention
procedures, especially with regard to suspected terrorists. Garzon
believes that the provisions of the code allowing suspected terrorists
to be detained for 72 hours incommunicado and an additional 48 hours
prior to appearing before a judge are too harsh.
At times pretrial detention can be lengthy. By law suspects may not
be confined for more than 2 years before being brought to trial, unless
a further delay is authorized by a judge, who may extend pretrial
custody to 4 years. In practice pretrial custody is usually less than 1
year. However, criticism is heard in legal circles that some judges use
``preventive custody'' as a form of anticipatory sentencing.
The law on aliens permits detention of a person for up to 40 days
prior to deportation but specifies that it must not take place in a
prison-like setting.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and the Government respects this
provision in practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the judiciary is independent in practice.
The judicial structure consists of local, provincial, regional, and
national courts with the Supreme Court at its apex. The Constitutional
Court has the authority to return a case to the court in which it was
adjudicated if it can be determined that constitutional rights were
violated during the course of the proceedings. The National High Court
handles crimes such as terrorism and drug trafficking. The European
Court of Human Rights is the final arbiter in cases concerning human
rights.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair public trial, and
the authorities respect this right in practice. There is a nine-person
jury system.
Defendants have the right to be represented by an attorney (at
state expense for the indigent). They are released on bail unless the
court believes that they may flee or be a threat to public safety.
Following conviction, defendants may appeal to the next highest court.
The law calls for an expeditious judicial hearing following arrest.
However, the AVT and others have criticized delays in the judicial
process, which can result at times in lengthy pretrial detention (see
Section 1.d.), and delays in trials. In cases of petty crime, suspects
released on bail sometimes wait up to 5 years for trial.
Human rights groups such as the Association Against Torture and
members of the press complain that many persons convicted of offenses
constituting violations of human rights avoided sentencing by
prolonging the appeals process and that sentences for persons convicted
of such offenses are unduly light. According to Amnesty International,
custodial sentences of less than 1 year and a day customarily are not
served in such cases.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the privacy of the home
and correspondence. Under the Criminal Code, government authorities
must obtain court approval before searching private property,
wiretapping, or interfering with private correspondence. The
antiterrorist law gives discretionary authority to the Minister of the
Interior to act prior to obtaining court approval in ``cases of
emergency.''
In 1998 national intelligence agency (CESID) wiretaps were
discovered at the Vitoria headquarters of the pro-ETA political party
HB. The scandal forced the provincial CESID directors in Vizcaya,
Alava, and Pamplona to resign and compelled the Minister of Defense to
develop a plan to establish greater judicial oversight of CESID
operations.
On March 9, seven members of CESID were put on trial for illegally
tapping mobile phones of public officials and private citizens between
1984 and 1990. The two principal defendents were former Director of
CESID, Emilio Alonso Manglano, and former Chief of Operations Colonel
Juan Alberto Perote. Four of the five other defendents are employed
still by CESID. Government ministers, congressmen, businessmen,
journalists, and the King were among the victims of these wiretaps.
Perote blamed Jose Manuel Navarro Benavente, former Chief of the
electronic surveillance section of CESID, who died in a traffic
accident 2 months before the trial. The trial ended in May with the
conviction of both Manglano and Perote. Both were sentenced to 6 months
in prison for their role in the wiretapping scandal, but neither is
expected to actually serve time. Both are appealing their convictions
to the Supreme Court.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
provisions in practice. Opposition viewpoints, both from political
parties and nonpartisan organizations, are aired freely and widely
reflected in the media.
The regional government of Cataluyna did not renew the broadcasting
licenses of three Catholic radio stations, claiming that their renewal
applications did not take seriously the Catalan language element. The
stations had never in the past had problems with their license
renewals. The Church announced in May that it would take the regional
government to court over the issue.
The pro-ETA political party Herri Batasuna continued to criticize
the 1997 conviction of 23 members of its National Committee for
collaboration with an armed band as a violation of its members' freedom
of speech. Each of the convicted HB officials was sentenced to 7 years'
imprisonment and a $3,733 (560,000 pesetas) fine in connection with
their decision to distribute a videotape made by ETA during HB's 1996
election campaign. One of the prisoners, Jon Cruz Idigoras, was freed
in May due to poor health, and in July, three others had their penal
grade reduced. On July 20, the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of
HB/EH's motion to free the rest of the former HB National Committee
members. In its ruling, the Court argued that the punishment specified
in the Penal Code for collaboration with an armed band is
disproportionately harsh relative to the crime and is therefore
unconstitutional. Within hours of the Court's decision, the remaining
HB National Committee members were freed.
The pro-ETA newspaper Egin and its affiliated radio station (Egin
Irratia) have been closed since July 1998. Gara--another pro-ETA
newspaper--has since emerged. The investigation into Egin's alleged
subordination of its editorial line and hiring practices to ETA's
command and the use of coded classified ads to coordinate ETA strategy
is still ongoing. In a preliminary ruling issued on July 27, the
National High Court ruled that Egin and its affiliated radio station
could remain closed only until September 1. The Court argued that
present circumstances did not dictate the continued closure of Egin. On
August 6, Judge Baltazar Garzon decided to allow Egin and its
affiliated radio station to reopen as of October but maintained
judicial control over the various financial enterprises from which Egin
gets its funding.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. There is
no state religion, although Catholicism is the predominant religion and
receives some government funding. Jews, Muslims, and Protestants have
official status, and receive some support from the Government. Other
recognized religions, such as Jehovah's Witnesses and Mormons, are
covered by constitutional protections but receive no assistance.
Religions not officially recognized as such are treated as cultural
associations. Religious courses are offered in public schools but are
not mandatory.
There are some allegations that the Government discriminates
against non-Catholic religions, principally by not providing all
privileges accorded to the Catholic Church to other churches.
In May Parliament approved a nonbinding resolution calling on the
Government to reinforce measures against the activity of destructive
``sects.'' A 1989 law on sects already had authorized the police to
investigate their activities, and a special unit was created for that
purpose. The resolution was preceded by press accounts of a death under
unusual circumstances of a member of Jehovah's Witnesses and the arrest
of the leader of a group called The Orientation in April.
Also in April, a Helsinki Human Rights Federation report criticized
the Government for discrimination against ``new religions.''
The regional government of Cataluyna refused to renew three local
radio broadcasting licenses of the Catholic Church (see Section 2.a.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel within and
outside the country, to emigrate, and to repatriate, and the Government
respects these rights in practice.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations, including the
Spanish Committee for Assistance to Refugees (CEAR), in assisting
refugees and asylum seekers. Under a 1994 law, asylum requests are
adjudicated in a two-stage process with the Office of Asylum and
Refugees (OAR) making an initial decision on the admissibility of the
application for processing. An interagency committee called the
Interministerial Committee for Asylum and Refuge (CIAR) examines the
applications admitted for processing. The CIAR includes representatives
from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Labor, Foreign Affairs, and a
nonvoting member of the UNHCR. The decision of the CIAR in each case
must be approved by the Minister of the Interior.
The 1994 law eliminated the distinction between asylum status and
refugee status. This distinction was eliminated to prevent applicants
from drawing out judicial proceedings by applying first for refugee
status and then for asylum, if the former was denied.
The UNHCR advises the authorities throughout the process.
Applicants for asylum have the right to have their applications sent
immediately to the local office of the UNHCR. The authorities are not
bound by the judgment of the UNHCR in individual cases, but they often
reevaluate decisions with which the UNHCR does not agree. Appeals of
rejection at either stage may be made to the National High Court, and
appeals of the National High Court's decisions may be made to the
Supreme Court.
Asylum requests may be made from outside as well as within the
country. From outside anyone can request asylum from a Spanish
diplomatic or consular representative. Illegal immigrants are permitted
to apply for asylum. Those who lack visas or permission to enter may
apply at the border or port of entry. The applicant in such cases may
be detained until a decision is made regarding the admissibility for
processing of the application. In cases of persons who apply inside the
country, this decision must be reached within 2 months, but in cases of
persons who apply at a port of entry this period is reduced to 72
hours. The period for filing an appeal in such cases is 24 hours. The
Ombudsman (see Section 4) has challenged the legality of this form of
detention before the Constitutional Court, and a final decision is
pending. The Court has issued a preliminary decision in which it ruled
that this form of detention does not deprive the detainee of his
liberty. This provisional decision allowed the Government to continue
to detain applicants without modifications to its detention procedures.
Applicants have the right under law to free legal assistance
regardless of where they are when they apply for asylum. This
assistance is available from the first step in the process through any
appeals of unfavorable decisions. The applicant also has the right to
the assistance of translators and interpreters, and the OAR admits
documents in any language without requiring an official translation.
A total of 6,764 persons requested asylum in 1998 (latest figures
available), a 36 percent increase over the number who requested asylum
in 1997. Of the total number of applicants, 2,794 were admitted for
first screening, and 3,780 were denied further proceedings as a result
of the first review of their application. Only 206 persons were
accorded permanent refugee status, and 491 were admitted for
humanitarian reasons. The CIAR proposed that 236 persons be accorded
permanent refugee status and 758 be allowed to stay for humanitarian
reasons. There has been a steady drop in the number of those granted
asylum in the past 5 years, since 1,287 applicants were granted asylum
in 1993.
The Ombudsman expressed his concern over the high percentage of
applications not admitted for processing (68.5 percent in 1997 and 56.6
percent in 1998). However, many persons apply with falsified documents
and are rejected early in the process. Many such applicants come from
politically stable but economically impoverished countries.
The Government's practice of substituting temporary admittance for
humanitarian reasons for granting asylum also has been criticized. The
former status includes some restrictions on access to the labor market
and welfare payments, although it does grant the applicant residency
and work permits. Another concern is that in some cases individuals
whose asylum requests were turned down may have been expelled while
their appeals were still in progress, although no statistics are
available. The law allows the applicant a 15 day grace period in which
to leave the country if refugee status is denied. Within that time
frame, the applicant may appeal the decision, and the court of appeal
has the authority to prevent the initiation of expulsion procedures,
which normally begin after the 15th day.
There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a country
where they feared persecution.
The country continues to face a wave of illegal immigrants, mostly
coming from North Africa. Illegal immigrants generally seek entrance
through Spain's two enclaves on the north African coast, Ceuta and
Melilla, as well as through attempted crossings by boat from the
African continent to either peninsular Spain proper or the Canary
Islands. Authorities say that under ``normal'' circumstances, they
intercept no more than 30 percent of those who enter coming across the
Straits of Gibraltar. In response the Government is resorting to a mix
of tighter border controls, liberalized treatment for those who already
have established themselves in society, and increased international
coordination.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Spain is a multiparty democracy with open elections in which all
citizens 18 years of age and over have the right to vote by secret
ballot. At all levels of government, elections are held at least every
4 years. In the 1996 national elections, the Popular Party ended 13
years of Socialist (PSOE) rule, and Jose Maria Aznar became Prime
Minister. National elections are due to be held again on March 12,
2000.
Governmental power is shared between the central government and 17
regional ``autonomous communities.'' Local nationalist parties give
political expression to regional linguistic and cultural identities.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
they are increasing their participation in the political process. Four
female cabinet ministers were in the current Government, but two of
them left during the year when they were promoted to higher profile
positions in the European Union and the Senate. They were replaced by
men, leaving only two female ministers in the 19-member Cabinet.
The number of female candidates for the national Parliament
increased in the 1996 national elections. Although the President of the
256-member Senate is a woman, only slightly over 10 percent of the
Senate's current members are women. The 350-member Congress of Deputies
has 72 female representatives (22 percent of the total). In the 1999
European Parliament elections, both the PP and PSOE placed women at the
top of their lists. On the PSOE list, 50 percent of the candidates were
women.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A number of nongovernmental human rights groups, including the
Human Rights Association of Spain in Madrid and the Human Rights
Institute of Cataluyna in Barcelona, operate freely without government
interference. The Government cooperates readily with international
organizations, international nongovernmental human rights groups, and
independent national groups investigating allegations of human rights
abuses.
The Constitution provides for an Ombudsman, called the ``People's
Defender,'' who as part of his duties actively investigates complaints
of human rights abuses by the authorities. The Ombudsman operates
independently from any party or government ministry, must be elected
every 5 years by a three-fifths majority of the Congress of Deputies,
and is immune from prosecution. He has complete access to government
institutions and to all documents other than those classified for
national security reasons.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens. In
1995 the Parliament modified the Penal Code to make it a crime to
``incite, publicize, or otherwise promote abuse or discrimination of
people or groups'' because of race, ethnicity, nationality, ideology,
or religious beliefs. The Ombudsman received approximately 24,000
complaints in 1998, an increase of 6,000 compared with 1997. The
majority of the complaints pertained to education and social services,
although some pertained to discrimination, domestic violence, and
mistreatment by law enforcement agencies.
Women.--Sexual abuse, violence, and harassment of women in the
workplace continued to be problems. During the first 8 months of the
year, 27 women died at the hands of their husbands or former husbands,
according to the Government. Most of these deaths occurred during legal
separation proceedings. During the same period, 15,495 women filed
complaints against their husbands or partners. However, experts believe
that only 10 percent of violent acts against women are reported to the
authorities. Abused women filed 19,621 complaints in 1998, 3,000 more
than in 1997. The Women's Institute, which is part of the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs, consulted with 104,856 women concerning
domestic violence and legal aid in 1998 compared with 86,893 in 1997.
Some nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) estimate that from 600,000
to 800,000 cases of domestic abuse occur each year.
In 1998 the Government unveiled a 3-year, $60 million (9 billion
pesetas) ``Plan Against Domestic Violence.'' The plan criminalizes the
violation of restraining orders and the infliction of psychological
violence and calls for a quadrupling of the number of offices that
assist victims and an expansion of medical and legal services. Other
provisions of the plan include: The development of public awareness
campaigns in the media and in the schools; the establishment of a
domestic abuse database to streamline judicial investigations;
increased access of victims to public housing; and greater linkage
between medical, police, legal, and counseling services in order to
promote an integrated approach to treating victims. Women's rights'
advocates, while acknowledging that the plan incorporated many of their
demands, expressed disappointment with several of its omissions. The
Federation of Separated and Divorced Women criticized the plan as
lacking in specifics, particularly its public sensitization campaigns.
According to the Federation, the plan's key shortcoming is that it
fails to make the issuance of a restraining order automatic upon filing
a complaint. Currently, a restraining order is issued only after a
guilty verdict. To date, the Government has invested over $15.2 million
(2.288 billion pesetas) in the plan. Since the plan was approved, 9
special services units and 54 Civil Guard units staffed by 110 women
have been created to assist battered women. There are special sections
in the police department to deal with violence against women, which are
staffed by trained female officers, and there are approximately 25
shelters for battered women. There are 54 official centers in all for
mistreated women. A toll-free hot line advises women where to go for
government shelter or other aid if mistreated. Also under the plan,
during the year, 9,500 state security officers, judges, social workers,
and educators attended 300 courses offered by the Government on human
rights with a particular focus on battered women.
In November 1998, Amalia Gomez (General Secretary for Social
Affairs, in the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs) and Concepcion
Dancausa (Director of the Women's Institute, also in the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs) launched a campaign to sensitize the general
public to the problem of domestic violence. The Women's Institute
financed the campaign with $146,666 (22 million pesetas). The NGO
Confederation of Neighborhood Associations (CAVE) is spearheading the
campaign. This organization is composed of over 3,000 various
neighborhood associations that aim to make women aware of how to combat
domestic violence. In addition the Civil Guard, National Police, and
CAVE signed an agreement to hire 10,000 women to staff centers where
battered women can seek advice.
On February 23, the Parliament approved the text of a law that
would allow for an ``immediate'' divorce upon conviction of a husband
for domestic violence. The socially conservative political parties (PP
and nationalist parties) tended to favor this bill. Womens' groups and
the more left-of-center political parties (PSOE and NI) opposed the
bill, due to concern that a woman's right to divorce her abusive
husband would be dependent on an inefficient legal system that often
takes years to complete a single criminal proceeding.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution, primarily
from Latin America and Eastern Europe, appears to be growing (see
Section 6.f.).
A 1989 law prohibits sexual harassment in the workplace, but very
few cases have been brought to trial under this law. Meanwhile the
number of women in the labor market is increasing steadily. The
Government recognizes the difficulties faced by women in the work
place. According to a decree approved by the Government in October
1998, employers no longer have to pay social security benefits to
someone filling in for a worker on leave either for maternity, adopting
children, or in other similar circumstances. Previously, companies
hired substitutes for only 10 percent of workers on maternity leave.
The Government hopes to raise this figure to 25 percent. A ministerial
order to increase women's presence in sectors in which they currently
are underrepresented provides a 2 year reprieve from paying social
security taxes to employers who hire women in these sectors. The 1999
National Employment Action Plan gives priority to battered women who
search for employment.
The Minister of Social Affairs reports that women constitute 43
percent of the work force. However, according to the Taxation Agency
(Agencia Tributaria) and its 1997 report ``Employment, Salaries and
Pensions'' completed by the Institution of Fiscal Studies, women hold
only 18 percent of better paying positions. The female unemployment
rate, at about 30 percent, is roughly double the male unemployment
rate. Women outnumber men in the legal, journalistic, and health care
professions but still play minor roles in many other fields.
Discrimination in the workplace and in hiring practices persists. A
1998 study of 100 labor union contracts revealed that 38 contracts
failed to use gender-neutral language, 22 employed gender-specific job
titles resulting in the imposition of discriminatory wage differentials
(i.e., the salary of a male secretary, ``secretario,'' is 13 percent
higher than that of a ``secretaria'' in one food processing industry
contract), and only 17 addressed the problem of sexual harassment.
While the law mandates equal pay for equal work, a 1997 report by the
Economic and Social Affairs Council shows that women's salaries still
remain 27 percent lower than those of their male counterparts. The
Council states that women are more apt to have temporary contracts and
part-time employment than men. The National Association of Rural Women
and Families (ANFAR) reported in 1995 that 80 percent of rural women
are not employed formally but instead aid their husbands in farming or
fishing. ANFAR reported that these women lack titles to family
enterprises and do not receive the same social security benefits as the
male head of household. Official unemployment statistics show that the
rate for men was 16 percent and for women was 28 percent in 1997.
In 1998 the Parliament unanimously approved a nonbinding resolution
urging the Government to calculate the value of nonrenumerated work
performed each year and include this value in an adjunct Gross Domestic
Product account. This would include domestic and volunteer work as well
as unpaid work in family businesses and farming operations, the
majority of it done by women.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
welfare through well-funded and easily accessed programs of education
and health care. Education is compulsory until age 16 and free until
age 18. The Constitution obligates both the State and parents to
protect children, whether or not born in wedlock. The Ministries of
Health and Social Affairs are responsible for the welfare of children
and have created numerous programs to aid needy children. Numerous
NGO's exist to further children's rights. For example the school help
program for the protection of children has a team of experts who work
with educators to help identify abused or abandoned children in the
classroom.
The 1995 Law of the Child gives legal rights of testimony to minors
in child abuse cases; it also obliges all citizens to act on cases of
suspected child abuse and, for the first time, sets out rules regarding
foreign adoptions. Under the Penal Code, children under the age of 18
are not considered responsible for their actions and cannot be sent to
prison.
A new law extended parental leave for fathers from 4 to 10 weeks.
A 1996 penitentiary law lowered the maximum age that a child can
remain with an incarcerated mother from 6 to 3 years. When the children
reach their third birthday, they are sent to live with relatives or are
placed in an institution. Some prisons have special units for mothers
with children under age 3. They usually include a kindergarten,
psychological support, and ways for children to get out of prison
regularly. Family groups with children under the age of 3 can now stay
together in cases where both parents are convicts.
People With Disabilities.--The Constitution calls for the State to
provide for the adequate treatment and care of the disabled, ensuring
that they are not deprived of the basic rights that apply to all
citizens. The law aims to ensure fair access to public employment,
prevent disability, and facilitate access to public facilities and
transportation. The national law serves as a guide for regional laws;
however, levels of assistance and accessibility differ from region to
region and have not improved in many areas.
The 1996 Penal Code continues to allow parents or legal
representatives of a mentally disabled person to petition a judge to
obtain permission for the sterilization of that person. In 1994 the
Constitutional Court held that sterilization of the mentally infirm
does not constitute a violation of the Constitution. In practice many
courts have authorized such surgery. Religious groups continue to
protest this ruling.
The labor market reform laws of 1997 and 1998 worked out between
the Government, labor, and management provided for incentives to hire
individuals from groups underrepresented in the work force, such as the
disabled. In the 1998 agreement, the Government agreed to partially
subsidize the costs of hiring the disabled for part-time work.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Public opinion surveys indicate
the continued presence of racism and xenophobia, which result in
discrimination against minorities. In a survey of 13- to 19-year-old
Madrid students conducted in 1998 by the University Complutense in
Madrid, 48 percent admitted to having anti-immigrant feelings, 51
percent blamed immigrants for increased drug use and crime, and 52
percent thought that immigrants took jobs away from Spaniards.
According to the survey, 14 percent would favor expelling immigrants,
and 11 percent would vote for an ultranationalist political leader
similar to Jean-Marie Le Pen in France. However, another study claims
that 65 percent of citizens do not believe that immigrants cause
unemployment among Spaniards to be higher than it would be were the
immigrants not present. The same number opposes discrimination and
xenophobia and favors the integration of immigrants into society.
On January 25, the Council of Europe cited a resurgence in
nationalism, sometimes violent, which manifested itself in intolerance
towards Roma, Africans, and Arabs. The Council recommended that the
Government modify the Constitution to better provide for the equality
of minority groups.
Roma continue to suffer discrimination in jobs, schools, and
housing. The Ombudsman's Office issued a manifesto in March that called
for the end of prejudice and discrimination against Roma. According to
a report issued by the NGO Gypsy Presence, the largest Roma-rights NGO,
as many as 1 million Roma may live in the country. The organization
estimates that half of this population is under 16 years of age and
two-thirds are under the age of 25. The report states that one-third of
Roma families are not economically self-sufficient. Romani activists
attribute the high incidence of Romani informal sector employment in
agriculture and peddling (an estimated 75 to 80 percent) to
discrimination and historical marginalization. Although the Madrid High
Court of Justice struck down a city ordinance prohibiting peddling,
Gypsy Presence reports that local authorities continue to find ways to
enforce the ban. According to the organization, several other
municipalities have enacted similar statutes, and this has been
detrimental to the economic welfare of many Roma. Romani women suffer
even more acute difficulties when seeking employment, since employers
are reluctant to hire women from ethnic groups with high birth rates.
A 1998 study found that only 35 percent of Romani children are
fully integrated into the educational system. Approximately 60 percent
of Romani children do not complete primary school, and only very few
progress to middle school and beyond. According to a Gypsy Presence
report, one-fifth of teachers describe themselves as anti-Roma, and
one-fourth of students say that they would like to see Roma expelled
from school. Truancy and dropout rates among Roma are very high, and
Romani parents, over 80 percent of whom are functionally illiterate,
often do not see the value of an education or are unaware of the
educational opportunities for their children.
An unofficial government tendency to prioritize non-Romani squatter
resettlement over Romani resettlement has led to an increasing
proportion of Roma in shantytowns; Roma went from constituting 55
percent of the shantytown population in 1975 to constituting 95 percent
of the squatter population in 1990.
In Madrid various encampments of recently arrived Roma occupy
abandoned industrial areas. Some of these tent communities house up to
200 families. On February 17, the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF)
criticized the lack of schooling for 200 children living in a camp in
Malmea in the Fuencarral district of Madrid, which housed 350 Romanian
immigrants. In March the municipal government responded to UNICEF's
criticisms by providing shower facilities, vaccinations, and a plan to
educate the children of the camp. However, on July 8, local authorities
bulldozed the camp and relocated the inhabitants temporarily to a camp
in Camino de San Roque, near a national highway. The authorities
decided to resettle these immigrants in four camps. Critics charge that
the camps are not suitable, since one is located in an abandoned
railyard, two are near an incinerator, and the other is near a toxic
waste processing plant. However, two of the camps already constructed
had shower facilities, electricity, lavatories, and kitchen facilities.
The authorities decided that the camps would be gated, and all
residents would have to carry identity cards to enter. These steps were
taken to ensure that no immigrants join the original group resettled
from Malmea. After 3 months in the new camps, local social services
personnel planned to assess how well the Roma had integrated themselves
into society. Those who succeeded sufficiently at integrating would be
resettled into apartment blocks; the rest would be sent back to
Romania. The political party Izquierda Unida (IU), NGO's, and the
European Parliamentarian Rosa Diez of the PSOE criticized the camps.
Diaz asked the European Union's Council of Ministers to look into the
matter. In August 200 of the 350 recently arrived Roma left the San
Roque camp and relocated to Valencia, Alicante, and Barcelona, thereby
losing their right to be resettled.
A shooting incident in the village of Albaladejo in early May
illustrated the problems that even economically successful Roma can
face. According to an NGO, the victim in the case was Juan Jose Garcia
Garcia, who at one time was accused of drug dealing and assaulting
Civil Guards but was acquitted of both charges. However, Civil Guards
continued to harass him, often stopping him for identity checks or not
wearing a seatbelt. In 1996 the mayor of Albaladejo, Juan Angel Rodado
Rubio, tried to close down Garcia's horse stable, claiming that it did
not comply with sanitary standards. A subsequent veterinary inspection
showed that the stable was operating in accordance with the law.
According to Gypsy Presence, after being refused service at a bar,
Garcia arranged to meet an employee of the bar, who later appeared at
the appointed place with a another man, shot Garcia, and left him for
dead. Garcia was able to contact his wife by cellular phone, and help
arrived in time to save him. He has not yet recovered fully from his
wounds. After the two assailants were apprehended, the residents of
Albaladejo turned out in force to protest their incarceration and
petition for their release. The mayor often led the demonstrations. In
late June, the Provincial Court of Villanueva de los Infantes, which is
responsible for the case, freed the two accused after they posted bond
in the amount of $3,333 and $2,666 (500,000 and 400,000 pesetas
respectively). Garcia and his family left Albaladejo.
Quasi-organized rightwing youth groups (called ``skinheads'' by the
press) continued to commit violent acts throughout the year,
terrorizing minorities. According to a report by the NGO Movement
Against Intolerance, which the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
helped prepare, the number of persons involved in ultrarightist groups
has more than quintupled since 1995: at least 10,400 citizens are known
to be involved in such groups, and the actual number could be as high
as 20,800.
An NGO urged the Government to halt neo-Nazi activites in the
formerly deserted village of Los Pedriches in the southeast. Foreign
neo-Nazis were said to be organizing camps in the village. The
authorities were monitoring the situation closely.
In July there were antiimmigrant demonstrations in Ca n'Anglada, a
predominantly immigrant neighborhood in Terrasa, a suburb of Barcelona.
Maghrebi immigrants were attacked by skinheads, themselves the
descendents of immigrants from the less developed south of Spain in the
1950's and 1960's. These earlier migrants successfully integrated
themselves into Catalan society, something they claim that the
Maghrebis have failed to do. The inhabitants of Terrasa complain that
the Maghrebi immigrants sexually harass their daughters and women.
However, officials of the Catalan regional government stated that no
complaints of sexual harassment or rape have been filed against members
of the Moroccan community. In the worst of the incidents, a Moroccan
youth was stabbed on July 14. He was taken to the hospital and listed
in critical condition upon arrival. During a television interview, one
skinhead called for Maghrebi immigrants to be killed and openly
displayed a knife. The police detained 11 skinheads. In a July 20
statement, national government spokesperson Josep Pique characterized
the occurrences in Terrasa as extremely worrying and called for
tolerance.
In two other high profile cases, a mosque was set on fire in
Gerona, as was a building in Banolas that housed approximately 20
immigrants from Senegal and The Gambia. Both incidents took place on
July 19. The fire in Banolas was the third such suspicious incident in
that month. A local store and another apartment block previously were
set on fire. In a separate incident, three immigrants were hurt when a
fire was set at their house in Gerona. To date the police have not
detained any suspects in these cases.
A language or dialect other than Castillian Spanish is used in 6 of
the 17 autonomous communities. The Constitution stipulates that
citizens have ``the duty to know'' Castillian, which is the ``official
language of the state,'' but it adds that other languages also can be
official under regional statutes and that the ``different language
variations of Spain are a cultural heritage which shall . . . be
protected.''
The Law of the Catalan Language, approved by the Catalan regional
legislature (Generalitat) in 1998, stipulates the use of Catalan as the
official language in local government and administrative offices,
regional courts, publicly owned corporations, and private companies
subsidized by the Catalan regional government. Spanish-speaking
citizens are provided with the right to be dealt with by public
officials in Spanish. The legislation also establishes minimum quotas
for Catalan-language radio and television programming. Many activists
in Catalunya's Spanish-speaking community criticized the law for
discriminating against Spanish-speaking citizens and imposing
``linguistic hegemony'' on a diverse population. Lawsuits regarding
specific applications of this law are pending in various courts. Both
Galicia and Valencia have laws stating the duty of the Government to
``promote'' their regional languages in schools and at official
functions.
The debate continued over the extent to which the Basque language
(Euskera) should be promoted. The Union of Basque-Speaking Lawyers,
affiliated with the pro-ETA HB political party, intensified its
campaign against the use of translation services in trials of Basque-
speaking citizens.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except those in the
military services, judges, magistrates, and prosecutors, are entitled
to form or join unions of their own choosing.
Under the Constitution, trade unions are free to choose their
representatives, determine their policies, represent their members'
interests, and strike. They are not restricted or harassed by the
Government and are independent of political parties. A strike in
nonessential services is legal if its sponsors give 5 days' notice. Any
striking union must respect minimum service requirements negotiated
with the respective employer. The right to strike was interpreted by
the Constitutional Court to include general strikes called to protest
government policy. There were 632 strikes in 1998, a decrease of 53
from 1997. The number of striking workers in 1998 was 680,500, an
increase of 29,900 on the previous year. The number of workdays lost to
strikes in 1998 was 1,280,900, a decrease of 555,900 on the previous
year.
Unions are free to form or join federations and affiliate with
international bodies and do so without hindrance.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A 1980 statute
provides for the right to organize and bargain collectively. Trade
union and collective bargaining rights were extended in 1986 to all
workers in the public sector except military personnel. Public sector
collective bargaining in 1990 was broadened to include salaries and
employment levels, but the Government retained the right to set these
if negotiations failed. Collective bargaining agreements are widespread
in both the public and private sectors; in the latter they cover 60
percent of workers, notwithstanding that only about 15 percent of
workers are actually union members.
The law prohibits discrimination by employers against trade union
members and organizers. Discrimination cases have priority in the labor
courts. The law gives unions a role in controlling temporary work
contracts to prevent the abuse of such contracts and of termination
actions. Unions nonetheless contend that employers discriminate in many
cases by refusing to renew the temporary contracts of workers engaging
in union organizing.
More than one-third of all employees are under temporary contracts.
Labor regulations and practices in free trade zones and export
processing zones are the same as in the rest of the country. Union
membership in these zones is reportedly higher than the average
throughout the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited, and the law
is enforced effectively; however, there were instances of trafficking
in women who were forced into prostitution (see Section 6.f.). In July
the Madrid police detained three Chinese restaurant owners for
employing eight undocumented workers and forcing them to work in slave-
like conditions. Press reports on July 25 referred to undocumented
workers in shoe factories in Valverde. According to the reports, just
under 10 percent of the workers in some of Valverde's 50 shoe factories
are hired in accordance with the law. The reports added that some
workers earn as little as 67 cents (100 pesetas) per hour. Pedro Lazo,
one of the factory owners, admitted that between 10 and 20 percent of
the firms in Valverde use illegal hiring practices.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for Employment
of Children.--The statutory minimum age for the employment of children
is 16 years. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs is primarily
responsible for enforcement. The minimum age is enforced effectively in
major industries and in the service sector. It is more difficult to
enforce on small farms and in family-owned businesses, where some child
labor persists. Legislation prohibiting child labor is enforced
effectively in the special economic zones. The law also prohibits the
employment of persons under the age of 18 at night, for overtime work,
or in sectors considered hazardous. The law prohibits forced or
compulsory labor by children, and it is enforced effectively (see
Section 6.c.).
In August 1998 the U.N. Children's Fund called for an investigation
into child labor on tomato farms in Badajoz. According to Red Cross
personnel providing assistance to migrant farm workers there, over 200
children under the age of 16, the majority Portuguese citizens, worked
10-hour days and earned less than $14 (2,000 pesetas) per day. Many of
the children were less than 10 years old.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum wage was set in
December 1999 for 2000 and is $14.16 (2,356 pesetas) per day or $424.80
(70,680 pesetas) per month. This represents a 2 percent increase
compared with 1999. The legal minimum wage for workers over 18 years of
age is considered sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for
a worker and family. The rate is revised every year in line with the
consumer price index and is enforced effectively by the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs.
The law sets a 40-hour workweek with an unbroken rest period of 36
hours after each 40 hours worked. Workers enjoy 12 paid holidays a year
and a month's paid vacation.
Government mechanisms exist for enforcing working conditions and
occupational health and safety rules, but bureaucratic procedures are
cumbersome and inefficient. Safety and health legislation is being
revised to conform to European Union (EU) directives. The Law to
Prevent Labor Risks was passed in 1995 as the foundation for the
completion of the rest of the EU directives. The National Institute of
Safety and Health in the Ministry of Labor and Social Security has
technical responsibility for developing labor standards, but the
Inspectorate of Labor has responsibility for enforcing the legislation
through judicial action when infractions are found. Workers have firm
legal protection for filing complaints about hazardous conditions, but
easily replaced temporary workers may be reluctant to use this
protection due to fear of losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law provides for sentences of up to
3 years' imprisonment and a fine for trafficking in persons.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution,
primarily from Latin America and Eastern Europe, appears to be growing.
At least three such rings were broken up during the year. One ring was
run by Russians and Azerbaijanis and involved trafficking women from
Eastern Europe. Another, which police in Castilla-La Mancha broke up in
mid-July, brought women to the country from Africa, Europe, and South
America. In August police in Andalucia detained 51 persons and broke up
a ring that trafficked women from Brazil, Colombia, and Ecuador. In all
these cases, women were promised jobs and given the necessary documents
to enter the country. Upon arrival their documents were seized, and
they were taken to alternative clubs and forced to have up to 10 sexual
encounters per day.
Most women apprehended in raids are Latin Americans who entered the
country legally as tourists (most from countries whose citizens do not
require visas), but who began working as prostitutes instead. Profits
in the sex industry are 10 times higher than those in other occupations
commonly filled by migrants (waitresses, maids, etc.). Nonetheless,
officials concede that significant numbers of women are trafficked to
Spain by eastern European Mafia groups that ruthlessly exploit their
victims. A Chinese gang, which forced migrants to submit to abortions,
was apprehended. Media attention to the issue of international
trafficking in women has encouraged NGO's and others to demand
protection for victims. A draft law, which would provide permanent
residency and social benefits for victims of trafficking and other
undocumented migrants who provide testimony against their oppressors,
has sparked controversy. Press accounts state that authorities detained
163 pimps and freed 865 foreigners from abusive situations in the first
half of the year. The half-year figures surpass the totals for all of
1998. However, they fall far short of reaching the estimated 20,000
foreign women whom authorities suspect are involved in the sex
industry.
The region around Barcelona is one of the prime destinations for
trafficked women. Most of them work in truck stops or private clubs. A
total of 1,387 such places are registered by Catalan authorities, and
at least an equal number operate without formal permits.
______
SWEDEN
Sweden is a constitutional monarchy and a multiparty parliamentary
democracy. The King is Chief of State. The Cabinet, headed by the Prime
Minister, exercises executive authority. The judiciary is independent.
The Government effectively controls the police, all security
organizations, and the armed forces.
Sweden has an advanced industrial economy, mainly market based, and
a high standard of living, with extensive social welfare services.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens, and the law and judiciary provide effective means of dealing
with individual instances of abuse. The Government has longstanding
programs to deal with violence against women and abuse of children and
took steps against trafficking in women. Neo-Nazi violence increased
during the year.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by the government.
A trade union official was killed and his office building burned
down in October after he exposed a colleague as a neo-Nazi (see Section
5).
Two policemen were killed by self-confessed neo-Nazis during a bank
robbery in May (see Section 5).
Due to a lack of new evidence, the director of the Public
Prosecution Authority halted the investigation into a 1995 case in
which a man died in police custody. After a disagreement over the post-
mortem findings, the Prosecutor General requested the opinion of the
National Board of Health and Welfare, which was pending at year's end.
The case remains under review by the Prosecutor General.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) remain very interested in the
case.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits these abuses, and the authorities
generally respect such prohibitions. Complaints of the excessive use of
force by the police are infrequent. Thorough investigations have
produced no evidence of a systemic problem. Typically, police officers
found guilty of abuse are suspended or otherwise disciplined.
After a September clash between police and demonstrators, 10
complaints of use of excessive force were lodged against the police.
Protesters did not obtain a permit for the demonstration, and the
police arrested 243 persons--mostly youths--after bottles and rocks
were thrown.
In 1998 four policemen were fired after being found guilty of
committing crimes at work (mostly the use of excessive force). Between
January 1997 and June 1998, 12 cases of excessive use of force resulted
in disciplinary or criminal sanctions against police.
The police suspect that neo-Nazis were responsible for the June
bombing of the car of a journalist who reported on neo-Nazi activity
(see Section 5).
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, and the
Government permits visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arrests are by warrant.
The police must lodge charges within 6 hours against persons detained
for disturbing the public order or considered dangerous, and within 12
hours against those detained on other grounds. The law requires
arraignment within 48 hours. The time between arrest and the first
court hearing may be extended to 96 hours for detainees considered
dangerous, likely to destroy evidence, or likely to flee. In cases
involving more than one individual and in the case of foreigners,
courts can and do order continued detention for 2 weeks at a time while
police are investigating. Such detentions can be protracted,
particularly in drug cases. Other than such dangerous suspects,
detainees routinely are released pending trial. Bail as such does not
exist. If a person files for bankruptcy and refuses to cooperate with
the official investigation, a court may order detention for up to 3
months, with judicial review every 2 weeks.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
The court system is composed of three levels of courts: district
courts, a court of appeals, and a Supreme court. All criminal and civil
cases are heard first in district court regardless of the severity of
the alleged crime.
The Constitution provides for the right to a fair trial, and an
independent judiciary vigorously enforces this right.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law limits home searches to investigations of
major crimes punishable by at least 2 years' imprisonment. The
authorities respect this provision. Normally the police must obtain
court approval for a search or a wiretap. However, a senior police
official may approve a search if time is a critical factor or the case
involves a threat to life. A parliamentary committee each year reviews
all electronic monitoring. An April Ministry of Justice report on the
use of wiretapping is under review by the Government. Since only one
request for a wiretap has been denied in recent years, NGO's argue that
there is insufficient judicial oversight of this procedure.
In 1997 journalistic investigations focused attention on the
country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization. The majority of
persons sterilized were disabled either mentally or physically. Such
operations were known for years to have taken place under pre-World War
II legislation, most of them without force. It initially was reported
that between 1934 and 1976, 62,888 forced sterilizations were carried
out, 95 percent of them on women. In 1999 a government-appointed
commission concluded that approximately 10,000 to 15,000 of these
sterilizations were forced. The commission was to give priority to the
question of damages to victims and also look into the possible
existence of other categories of victims. The commission concluded its
inquiry in May, and Parliament decided that month to pay damages of
approximately $21,000 (175,000 krona) to each victim. Those compensated
earlier with $6,000 (50,000 krona) are to receive the additional
$15,000 (125,000 krona) without having to apply. Since the 1980's, the
Government received 130 claims for compensation; it provided
compensation in 17 instances, noting formal errors committed in these
cases. Each of the 17 persons compensated received approximately $6,000
(50,000 krona). Ministers expressed regret and astonishment over the
practice and how long it continued.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and the press, and the Government respects these
provisions in practice. Most newspapers and periodicals are privately
owned. The Government subsidizes daily newspapers, regardless of
political affiliation. Broadcasters operate under a state concession.
Until a few years ago, the State had a monopoly over ground-based
broadcasting, but a variety of commercial television channels (one
ground-based and several via satellite or cable) and several commercial
radio stations now exist.
The Government may censor publications containing national security
information. A quasi-governmental body excises extremely graphic
violence from films, television programs, and videos.
Criticism of child pornography is widespread, and the debate on the
legality of ownership of pornographic material continued. A new law
criminalizing the possession and handling of child pornography came
into effect on January 1, 1999. It also is illegal to publish or
distribute such material. The Queen remains a strong and popular
advocate of children's rights and an active opponent of child
pornography.
The police suspect that neo-Nazis were responsible for the June
bombing of the car of a journalist who reported on neo-Nazi activity
(see Section 5).
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly, and the Government respects
this right in practice. Police require a permit for public
demonstrations. The authorities routinely grant such permits, with rare
exceptions to prevent clashes between antagonistic groups or due to
insufficient police resources to adequately patrol an event.
In an isolated incident, police refused an Amnesty International
request to demonstrate outside an embassy in July. Authorities cited
insufficient police resources as a justification for refusing the
request.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government respects this right in practice. A debate began during the
year over the possible criminalization of neo-Nazi organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government does not hamper the practice or teaching
of any faith.
The country has maintained a state (Lutheran) church for several
hundred years, supported by a general ``church tax'' (although the
Government routinely grants exemptions). However, in 1995 the Church of
Sweden and the Government agreed to a formal separation, effective in
2000, but the Church still is to receive some state support.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for free movement
within, from, and to the country for citizens, and the Government
respects these rights in practice.
The law and regulations incorporate the precepts in the 1951 U.N.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
They are also consistent with the European Union's (EU) Dublin
Convention. The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees; it also provides first asylum. In keeping with international
agreements, the Government now reviews applications for asylum more
thoroughly than before. The number of applications for asylum or
residence permits increased in 1998 to 12,844 (from 9,623 in 1997).
Applicants included 3,843 Iraqi citizens, 3,466 citizens of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (95 percent of whom were Kosovar Albanians), and
1,331 citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Through July 6,046 persons sought
asylum. The Government approved 7,066 applications in 1998; of these
4,980 were for humanitarian reasons. Nearly 11 percent of the country's
population is foreign born.
The Government carries out expeditious returns of asylum seekers
from EU countries or from countries with which there are reciprocal
return agreements. In many cases asylum seekers were deported within 72
hours of arrival, and NGO's were critical of their lack of access to
legal counsel. To remedy this the Government is experimenting with
pilot programs at selected border crossings to provide expeditious
legal assistance. Most of these are cases of persons who passed through
or have asylum determinations pending in other EU countries.
Applications can remain under consideration for long periods of time
with applicants in uncertain status. Because of the appeals process in
the courts, cases can extend for several years. These cases are few in
number.
The principal complaint of NGO's is that the country lacks a
transparent process for making decisions in asylum cases. They maintain
that the asylum procedures lack rules to guide the conduct of
authorities to ensure legal protection for asylum seekers. The
procedures accord great discretion to individuals in decisionmaking
positions. According to the NGO's, the decisionmakers use arbitrary,
unspecified, and inconsistent criteria. NGO's are particularly critical
of the unclear burden of proof and the lack of an appeals process to an
independent court.
In 1998 the U.N. Committee Against Torture found merit in four
complaints against the Government for seeking to return asylum seekers
to countries where they faced risk of torture. In all of the cases the
asylum seekers eventually were granted permanent residence on other
grounds. The Government conducted a review of the safety of countries
that are considered safe third countries. NGO's also raised the issue
of insufficient protection for returnees to countries without a
reciprocal return agreement. While these countries provide safe asylum,
they are often reluctant to accept asylum seekers deported from
European countries. Despite the Government's review, late in the year
the authorities ordered the deportation of two Iranian asylum seekers
to Tehran. The deportation was halted after the U.N. Committee Against
Torture decided to review both cases to determine if the individuals
would face torture if returned to Tehran.
Between April and August, 3,752 Kosovar Albanian refugees were
granted temporary residence permits, initially valid for 11 months. By
September 1,000 of the refugees had returned to Kosovo. Sweden has
accepted over 100,000 refugees from the former Yugoslavia. The
Government provides grants to Bosnians to travel to their homeland in
order to determine if they wish to be repatriated. It also provides
financial incentives for returnees, but there is no forced
repatriation. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to
a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. Citizens exercised this right most recently in
September 1998. Elections to the 349-member unicameral Parliament are
held every 4 years. Noncitizen residents have the right to participate
in local (city and county) elections.
Women participate actively in the political process and Government.
They constitute 43.6 percent of the Parliament and 55 percent of the
Cabinet. The governing Social Democratic Party largely kept its pledge
to place women in half of all political appointments at all levels.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several private organizations actively monitor issues such as the
impact of social legislation, anti-immigrant or racist activities, and
the condition of the indigenous Sami population. The official ombudsmen
publicize abuses of state authority and may initiate actions to rectify
such abuses. Government agencies are in close contact with a variety of
local and international groups working in the country and abroad to
improve human rights observance.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights for all citizens, and
the Government respects this provision.
Women.--There were 20,516 reported cases of assault against women
(excluding rape) in 1998, compared with 19,093 in 1997. Most involved
spousal abuse. In three-quarters of the assaults, the perpetrator was
an acquaintance of the victim. Reported abuse against women occurs
disproportionately in immigrant communities. On average 33 murders of
women and girls are reported each year, half of them by men closely
related to the victim. The number of reported rapes of persons over age
15 was 1,386 in 1998, compared with 1,050 in 1997. The law does not
differentiate between spousal and nonspousal rape.
Trafficking in women from Russia and the Baltics for purposes of
forced prostitution increased in recent years (see Section 6.f.). The
purchase or attempted purchase of sexual services was made illegal as
of January 1.
The Government has longstanding programs to deal with violence
against women. The law provides complainants protection from contact
with their abusers, if so desired. In some cases, the authorities help
women obtain new identities and homes. Since 1994 the Government has
provided electronic alarms or bodyguards for women in extreme danger of
assault. Both national and local governments provide monetary support
to volunteer groups that provide shelter and other assistance to abused
women. The authorities strive to apprehend and prosecute abusers.
Typically, the sentence for abuse is a prison term or psychiatric
treatment. However, women complain about short sentences and the early
release of offenders.
The law prohibits sexual harassment. During 1998 the law was
amended to specify clearly employer responsibility to prevent and--if
applicable--to investigate sexual harassment in the workplace and to
formulate and post a specific policy and guidelines for the workplace.
Employers who do not investigate and intervene against harassment at
work can be obliged to pay damages to the victim. As with other forms
of discrimination, women and men may take complaints to the courts or
to their unions. To combat gender discrimination in the longer term,
the equal opportunities act requires all employers, both in the public
and private sector, actively to promote equal opportunities for women
and men in the workplace. Employers with a minimum of 10 employees must
prepare an annual equal opportunities plan.
Under the country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization,
thousands of persons were sterilized forcibly between 1934 and 1976.
The majority of those sterilized were disabled either mentally or
physically, and 95 percent were women. In May Parliament decided to pay
damages in such cases (see Section 1.f.).
The Government actively promotes heightened awareness of the need
for gender equality by supporting conferences and seminars for
employers in the private and public sectors. The Government believes
that it implemented the recommendations from the 1995 U.N. Women's
Conference in Beijing through changes in the law and new legislation. A
law entered into force on January 1 that prohibits buying or even
soliciting sexual services; convictions are subject to fines or prison
terms of up to 6 months.
The law requires employers to treat men and women alike in hiring,
promotion, and pay, including equal pay for comparable work. According
to Statistics Sweden, women's salaries were 83 percent of men's
salaries in 1997. Considering differences in age, education, and
occupational groups between men and women, the adjusted result is on
average 93 percent of men's salaries. (A 1998 U.N. Development Program
study reported that women's salaries averaged about 78 percent of men's
salaries.) The equal opportunities ombudsman, a public official,
investigates complaints of gender discrimination in the labor market.
Women and men also may pursue complaints through the courts. A third
option, and by far the most common, involves settling allegations using
the employee's labor union as mediator. In 1998 74 women and 17 men
registered gender discrimination cases with the equal opportunities
ombudsman. In 1998 three cases were taken to court. In the past, many
of these cases involved salary discrimination. In 1998 20 cases were
settled by mediation, 31 were withdrawn, and 35 were dropped. The
remainder are pending.
All employers with more than 10 employees must prepare an annual
equality plan, including a survey of pay differences between male and
female employees. The equal opportunities ombudsman reviews these
plans.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its well-funded systems of public
education and medical care. The Government provides compulsory, free,
and universal primary school education for children for 9 years. It
also provides free medical and dental care for all children up to the
age of 16 (19 for dental care). Parents receive some $1,000 per year
for each child under 16 years of age. An official children's ombudsman
monitors the Governments' programs.
The Government allocates funds to private organizations concerned
with children's rights. An NGO, Children's Rights in Society, offers
counseling to troubled youngsters. The Government remains active
internationally in efforts to prevent child abuse.
Although the physical abuse of children appears relatively
uncommon, the public and authorities remain concerned by consistent
data indicating an increase over the past several years. The number of
reported cases for children under the age of 15 rose to 5,642 in 1998,
up from 5,263 in 1997. The number of reported cases of sexual abuse of
children under the age of 15 was 2,756 in 1998 and 2,412 in 1997. The
U.N. Children's Committee criticized the Government, stating that it
provides less protection for the children of immigrant and
disadvantaged groups.
The law prohibits parents or other caretakers from abusing children
mentally or physically in any way. Parents, teachers, and other adults
are subject to prosecution if they physically punish a child, including
slapping or spanking. Children have the right to report such abuses to
the police. The authorities respect these laws, and the usual sentence
is a fine combined with counseling and monitoring by social workers.
However, if the situation warrants, authorities may remove children
from the home and place them in foster care. Foster parents virtually
never receive permission to adopt long-term foster children, even in
cases where the parents are seen as unfit or seek no contact with the
child. Critics charge that this policy places the rights of biological
parents over the needs of children for security in permanent family
situations.
Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is widely condemned by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health, is illegal, as is preparing and conspiring to
perform such mutilations. Sentences can vary between 2 and 4 years'
imprisonment. The failure to report such mutilation is also illegal
under current laws. No cases have been reported under this law.
People with Disabilities.--With one exception, there are no
specific laws prohibiting discrimination against persons with
disabilities, and considerable efforts are made to ensure that the
disabled enjoy equal opportunities. A new act that prohibits
discrimination against disabled persons in the workplace came into
force in May. Since 1994 the country has had an ombudsman for
disability issues. The Government provides disabled persons with
assistance aimed at allowing them to live as normal a life as possible,
preferably outside an institutional setting. This support may include a
personal assistant for the severely disabled, plus improvement of the
workplace's accessibility to wheelchairs. Government assistance also
encompasses services such as home care or group living. Regulations for
new buildings require full accessibility, but the Government has no
such requirement for existing public buildings. Many buildings and some
public transportation remain inaccessible. Deaf children have the right
to education in sign language. The parents of disabled children and
disabled workers under the age of 65 receive financial assistance every
7 years to buy a car adapted to the person's disability.
Under the country's pre-1976 practice of forced sterilization,
thousands of persons were sterilized forcibly between 1934 and 1976.
The majority of those sterilized were disabled either mentally or
physically (see Section 1.f.). In May Parliament decided to pay damages
in such cases.
Indigenous People.--The country counts at least 17,000 Sami
(formerly known as Lapps) among its 8.85 million inhabitants (Sami
organizations place that number somewhat higher, 25,000 to 30,000). In
1994 Sweden was the last of the Nordic countries to allow formation of
a Sametinget, or Sami Parliament, as an advisory body to the
Government. Under the current Government, Sami issues fall under the
Ministry of Agriculture.
The Sami continue a protracted struggle for recognition as an
indigenous people under a variety of international agreements, such as
International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169. Historically,
the government resisted granting the Sami such rights. For example Sami
children had no right to education in their native language until the
provision of such education to immigrant group children under a 1977
law forced the Government to grant Sami at least equal treatment. As a
result of such education, northern Sami dialects have enjoyed a recent
renaissance. However, Sami dialects in the southern portions of
traditional Sami lands now may have too few native speakers to survive
as living languages. In 1997 the Government initiated an inquiry into
whether the country could ratify ILO Convention 169. The inquiry was
published in May and concluded that the country could ratify the
convention, but that this should not be done until a number of steps
relating to Sami land rights are taken.
In 1994 the Government removed from the Sami the right to control
hunting and fishing activities on Sami village lands, permitting
instead totally unlimited hunting and fishing activity on all
government property. Sami leaders continued to protest this change
during the year.
Some Sami state that they face discrimination in housing and
employment on an individual basis, particularly in the southern
mountain regions.
Religious Minorities.--The Government is taking proactive steps to
combat anti-Semitism by increasing awareness of Nazi crimes and the
Holocaust. Under its living history project, the Government provides
educational material on the Holocaust to schoolchildren and families
throughout the country. The media are also active in publicizing and
condemning neo-Nazi activity.
The only anti-Semitic incident of note during the year involved an
assault by neo-Nazi teenagers on a Jewish musical conductor in July.
The teenagers involved were tried and incarcerated.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Approximately 11 percent of
Sweden's population is foreign born. ``Skinhead'' and neo-Nazi related
violence increased during the year. Three known neo-Nazis were arrested
in connection with the May shooting death of two police officers during
the course of a bank robbery. A trade union official was killed in
October after exposing a colleague as a neo-Nazi. Police strongly
suspect neo-Nazi perpetrators in the June bombing of the car of a
freelance journalist who had written extensively on neo-Nazi activity
in the country.
These incidents led to a strong public reaction in favor of a
tougher stance against these groups. The four largest daily newspapers
mounted a campaign to discredit them by publishing the names and photos
of 62 neo-Nazis and featuring editorials against their activities.
Neo-Nazi activity in the past rarely was lethal or appeared well
organized and was directed mostly at immigrants. Since 1994 persons
arrested and charged for racially motivated attacks received relatively
harsh sentences. Although the Government does not compile national
statistics on such acts, in recent years there have been approximately
100 violent incidents with racist overtones annually. However, cases
during 1999 were notable for the fact that they targeted white, native,
non-Jewish citizens.
Most estimates place the number of active neo-Nazis at fewer than
2,000, and there appears to be little popular support for their
activities or sentiments. Many citizens doubt whether such youth
actually embrace neo-Nazi ideology, and the Government supports
activities by volunteer groups working against racism. The Government
investigates and prosecutes race-related crimes, although in many
clashes between Swedish and immigrant youth gangs, authorities judge
both sides to be at fault. Neo-Nazi groups operate legally, but serious
discussion is taking place about outlawing such groups. The Supreme
Court has ruled that it can be illegal to wear xenophobic symbols or
racist paraphernalia. Rightwing groups, which have and exercise the
right to demonstrate, are not permitted to display signs and banners
with provocative symbols at their rallies.
The ombudsman for racial discrimination reported in August that
racial discrimination in the workplace is increasing. The report stated
that 21 percent of persons interviewed claim to have experienced racial
or ethnic discrimination in hiring practices.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The work force is approximately 80
percent unionized. Career military personnel, police officers, and
civilian government officials, as well as private sector workers in
both manufacturing and service industries, are organized. Most business
owners belong to counterpart employer organizations.
Unions and employer organizations operate independently of the
Government and political parties (although the largest federation of
unions has always been linked with the largest political party, the
Social Democrats). The law protects the freedom of workers to associate
and to strike, as well as for employers to organize and to conduct
lockouts. Within limits protecting the public's immediate health and
security, public employees also enjoy the right to strike. These laws
are fully respected and are not challenged.
Unions have the right to affiliate with international bodies. They
are affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions and the European Trade Union Confederation among others.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Management-
labor cooperation tends to be excellent and nonconfrontational. Labor
and management, each represented by a national organization by sector
(for example retailers and engineering industries), negotiate framework
agreements every 2 to 3 years. More detailed company-level agreements
put such framework agreements into effect at the local level. New
framework agreements were signed during 1998 with most valid until
2001. In contrast with the recent past, most agreements with labor
unions now provide for a degree of individualized pay, including merit
bonuses.
The law provides both workers and employers with effective
mechanisms for resolving complaints. The vast majority of complaints
are resolved informally. The law protects union officials and members
from dismissal or reprisals for official union activities. In some
instances, unions even demand collective agreements regardless of the
views and union status of employees. The Government is studying ways to
strengthen the system of public mediation. Very few strikes took place
during 1998--four legal and seven illegal--lasting half a day to a few
days and involving few individuals.
Agreement was reached in 1997 between 12 employer associations and
8 unions representing 800,000 manufacturing employees on steps to
prevent strikes and lockouts, such as requiring serious wage
negotiations to start 3 months before a collective agreement expires
and appointing a mediator if an agreement has not been reached after 2
months. As a result of this agreement, wages increased during 1997 by
2.5 to 3 percent following negotiations. This cooperation continued in
1998 and led to wage increases of approximately 3.7 percent.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, and the authorities effectively enforce
this ban. The law prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, and
the Government enforces this prohibition effectively.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Compulsory 9-year education ends at age 16, and the law
permits full-time employment at that age under the supervision of local
authorities. Employees under age 18 may work only during the daytime
and under supervision. During summer and other vacation periods,
children as young as 13 years may work part time or in ``light'' work
with parental permission. Union representatives, police, and public
prosecutors effectively enforce this restriction. The law prohibits
forced and bonded labor by children, and the Government enforces this
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage law. Wages are set by collective bargaining contracts, which
nonunion establishments usually observe as well. Even the lowest paid
workers can maintain a decent standard of living for themselves and
their families through substantial benefits (such as housing or day
care support) provided by social welfare entitlement programs. However,
cutbacks in these programs have made it harder for some workers to make
ends meet, particularly low-paid single women with children.
The standard workweek is 40 hours or less. Both the law and
collective bargaining agreements regulate overtime and rest periods.
For workers not covered by a labor agreement, the law stipulates a
limit for overtime at 200 hours a year, although exceptions may be
granted for key employees with union approval; some collective
bargaining agreements put the limit at 150 hours. The law requires a
rest period after 5 hours of work but does not stipulate a minimum
duration; in practice it is usually 30 minutes. The law also provides
all employees with a minimum of 5 weeks of paid annual leave; labor
contracts often provide more, particularly for higher ranking private
sector employees and older public service workers. In 1997 the
Government passed a new labor law making it easier for employers to
hire workers for limited periods, as well as empowering local unions to
agree to exceptions to last-in, first-out laws.
Currently the focus of concern regarding health and safety is on
the psychosocial aspect. Occupational health and safety rules are set
by a government-appointed board and monitored by trained union
stewards, safety ombudsmen, and, occasionally, government inspectors.
These standards are very high, making workplaces both safe and healthy.
Safety ombudsmen have the authority to stop unsafe activity immediately
and to call in an inspector. An individual also has the right to halt
work in dangerous situations in order to consult a supervisor or safety
representative.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit such
trafficking, although traffickers are prosecuted under other statutes.
A March report by the authorities set out a baseline on the extent of
trafficking in 1998 after a survey of local police and the courts. A
total of 5 traffickers and 12 women were involved in 4 court cases
during 1998. Only one case was completed with a conviction. In all four
cases, the traffickers were resident immigrants. The women involved
came from Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. The
women are typically recruited by their countrymen who advertise in
their local newspapers for work as cleaners or babysitters. Other women
were ``purchased'' from traffickers and brought into the country. The
report noted that considerable additional information available to the
police suggests that the problem of trafficking is more widespread than
the four court cases indicate
A 1998 study by the Foundation Women's Forum (FWF) indicated that
there are very few organizations in the EU that monitor trafficking,
but that those opposed to prostitution recognize the need for greater
efforts. The FWF applied for an EU grant to work further on this
problem.
______
SWITZERLAND
Switzerland is a constitutional democracy with a federal structure.
The bicameral Parliament elects the seven members of the Federal
Council, the highest executive body, whose presidency rotates annually.
Because of the nation's linguistic and religious diversity, the Swiss
political system emphasizes local and national political consensus and
grants considerable autonomy to individual cantons. Voters approved a
new constitution in April. The judiciary is independent.
The armed forces are a civilian-controlled militia based on
universal military service for able-bodied males. There is virtually no
standing army apart from training cadres and a few essential
headquarters staff. Police duties are primarily a responsibility of the
individual cantons, which have their own distinct police forces that
are kept under effective control. The National Police Authority has a
coordinating role and relies on the cantons for actual law enforcement.
There were allegations of occasional abuses by police.
Switzerland has a highly developed free enterprise, industrial, and
service economy strongly dependent on international trade. The standard
of living is very high.
The Government generally respects human rights, and the law and
judiciary provide effective means of dealing with individual instances
of abuse. There continue to be allegations by nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) of occasional police harassment directed against
foreigners, particularly asylum seekers, including arbitrary detention.
The Government is continuing to take serious steps to address violence
against women. Trafficking in women for forced prostitution increased.
Some laws still tend to discriminate against women. There continue to
be reports of verbal abuse against foreigners by private citizens.
The new Constitution approved by voters in April provided for new
protection for citizens' rights, including the principle of equal
opportunity for the disabled and the right to strike.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
Human rights groups strongly criticized police for the death of 27-
year-old Palestinian Khaled Abuzarifeh, who died while being extradited
in March. He was in the custody of three police officers who were
escorting him to a plane for forced repatriation. The causes of his
death are still unknown. NGO's consider current investigations of the
case to be insufficiently independent.
On May 1, a military court convicted a former Rwandan mayor for
crimes committed during the 1994 genocide, including murder (taking
part in the massacre of Tutsis), attempted murder, incitement to
murder, and war crimes. Fulgence Niyonteze, the former mayor of the
town of Mushubati, sought asylum in Switzerland in 1994 and was
arrested in 1996. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution proscribes such practices, and there were
no reports of violations. There were allegations by NGO's and some
individuals of occasional police harassment of foreigners, particularly
asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.).
In January the Geneva Prosecutor General dismissed a criminal
complaint lodged against Geneva police by Nigerian human rights
activist Clement Nwankwo. He had accused the police of assaulting him
on the street and subjecting him to degrading treatment in a police
station following his arrest in 1997. While acknowledging that Nwankwo
had been a victim of abuse of power, the Prosecutor General concluded
that disciplinary sanctions imposed on three officers following an
administrative inquiry were sufficient punishment. In 1998 the Supreme
Court rejected Nwankwo's final appeal against his conviction for
resisting the police at the time of the arrest, thus putting an end to
all judicial proceedings. Nwankwo received no compensation, and the
disciplinary actions against the three police officers were dropped
without explanation. In October 1998, Nwankwo lodged a petition against
Switzerland with the European Commission of Human Rights, claiming
violation of two articles of the European Convention for the Protection
of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms.
Swiss NGO's believe that the Nwankwo case underscores overall
problems with police treatment of foreigners, especially asylum seekers
in Geneva and perhaps elsewhere. The cantonal government took measures
in response to the incident, including launching an administrative
inquiry into the conduct of the three police officers involved. The
police successfully appealed the reprimand and warning that were
imposed as a result of the inquiry. In 1998 the NGO Association for the
Prevention of Torture organized a special seminar for police officers
in Geneva. The Federal Government and the Canton of Geneva are expected
to finance publication of a special brochure aimed at increasing
respect for and awareness of the rights of all persons in custody. The
brochure is to be distributed throughout the country.
In 1997 following its examination of Switzerland's third periodic
report, the U.N. Committee Against Torture expressed concern about
``frequent allegations of ill-treatment'' inflicted in the course of
arrests and police custody and a lack of independent mechanisms in the
cantons to provide certain legal protections such as the possibility,
``especially for foreigners,'' to contact their family or a lawyer in
case of arrest and to be examined by an independent doctor on entering
police custody, after each interrogation, and before being brought
before an investigating magistrate or being released. The Committee
recommended the introduction of mechanisms to receive complaints of
mistreatment by police officers against suspects and for the
harmonization of the 26 different cantonal codes of penal procedure,
``particularly with regard to the granting of fundamental guarantees in
the course of police custody.'' In addition the Committee recommended
that the authorities pay ``the greatest possible attention'' to the
handling of cases of violence attributed to police officers in order to
ensure the opening of investigations and, in proven cases, the
imposition of possible sanctions. Responding to committee
recommendations, in 1998 a team of experts appointed by the Federal
Office of Justice presented a preliminary study identifying possible
characteristics of a future federal-level code of penal procedures that
would replace the cantonal codes. The study recommends granting
fundamental protections to detainees in police custody, including the
introduction of a legal right to inform relatives or third parties of
their arrest. However, the committee did not recommend a provision for
access to a lawyer from the time of arrest. The Federal Office of
Justice is expected to issue a draft code in 2001.
Prison conditions meet minimum international standards, although
some NGO's complain of prison overcrowding. The Government has taken
measures to improve prison conditions and address overcrowding.
Brazilian national Luis Felipe Lourenco had been living illegally
in the country and was arrested in 1998 by police in Geneva on charges
of theft of a credit card. He allegedly was beaten by prison guards
while in custody. The guards reportedly waited 2 hours before
transporting Lourenco to the hospital, where he was diagnosed with a
perforated lung and damage to his spinal cord. The Brazilian Embassy
reportedly asked the authorities to look into the incident. Inquiries
are ongoing, but there has been no official report. Amnesty
International criticized the police for brutality in its 1999 annual
report. Lourenco claims to be partially paralyzed as a result of the
injuries that he suffered at the hands of prison guards. The prison
administration claimed that Lourenco's injuries were incurred when he
threw himself against a door.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The legal prohibitions
on arbitrary arrest and detention are respected fully at all levels of
government. The cantons are responsible for handling most criminal
matters, and their procedures vary somewhat from canton to canton. In
general a suspect may not be held longer than 48 hours without a
warrant of arrest issued by an investigative magistrate. However,
asylum seekers and foreigners without valid documents may be held for
up to 96 hours without an arrest warrant. Some NGO's alleged that the
authorities arbitrarily detained asylum seekers (see Section 2.d.). A
suspect has the right to choose and contact an attorney as soon as the
warrant is issued; the State provides free counsel for indigents in
most situations. Investigations are generally prompt, even if in some
cases investigative detention may exceed the length of sentence.
Release on personal recognizance or bail is granted unless the
magistrate believes the person is dangerous or will not appear for
trial. Any lengthy detention is subject to review by higher judicial
authorities. In 1998 about one-third of all prisoners were in pretrial
detention, and the average length of such detention was 1 week.
The law prohibits forced exile, and the Government does not use it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and efficient
judicial process.
All courts of first instance are local or cantonal courts. Citizens
have the right to appeal to a higher instance court and ultimately to
the Federal Court.
Minor cases are tried by a single judge, difficult cases by a panel
of judges, and murder (or other serious cases) by a public jury. Trials
usually are held expeditiously. The Constitution provides for public
trials in which the defendant's rights are fully respected, including
the right to challenge and to present witnesses or evidence.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Cantonal laws regulate police entry into private
premises. These regulations differ widely from canton to canton, but
all prohibit such practices without a warrant. All government
authorities respect these provisions, and violations are subject to
effective legal sanction.
Journalistic reports of pre-1970's instances of forced
sterilization of women led parliamentarians in 1997 to ask the Federal
Council to write a report on the practice as well as the legal,
medical, historical, and social policy background of forced
sterilization, in view of a projected tutelage law that is to include
regulations concerning sterilization of mentally disabled persons.
Parliament decided against issuing such a report. Forced sterilization
was not ordered by the Federal Government. However, one cantonal
government adopted such a law in 1928, which was abrogated in the
1970's. Women's organizations apparently made no public statements
about the reports.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government respects these
rights in practice. An independent press, an effective judiciary, and a
functioning democratic political system combine to ensure freedom of
speech and of the press, including academic freedom. The authorities
may legally restrict these freedoms for groups deemed to be a threat to
the State, but no groups were restricted during the year. In addition,
an article of the Penal Code criminalizes racist or anti-Semitic
expression, whether in public speech or in printed material.
Parliamentary immunity protects parliamentarians from prosecution
for acts that relate to their government position. However, the legal
commission of the Council of States has proposed its abolishment
following an incident in which a national councilor, Rudolf Keller,
made anti-Semitic remarks and could not be prosecuted for breaking the
antiracism law because of his parliamentary immunity.
The nationwide broadcast media are government-funded but possess
editorial autonomy. Private and foreign broadcast media operate freely.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for these rights, and the Government respects them in
practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for complete
freedom of religion, and the Government respects this right in
practice. There is no single state church, but all cantons support at
least one of the three traditional denominations--Roman Catholic, Old
Catholic, or Protestant--with public funds. In all cantons, an
individual may choose not to contribute to church funding. However, in
some cantons, private companies are unable to avoid payment of the
church tax. A religious organization must register with the Government
in order to receive tax-exempt status. There have been no reports of a
religious group applying for the ``church taxation'' status that the
traditional three denominations enjoy.
Foreign missionaries must obtain a ``religious worker'' visa to
work in the country. Requirements include proof that the foreigner
would not displace a citizen from doing the job, that the foreigner
would be financially supported by the host organization, and that the
country of origin of religious workers also grants visas to Swiss
religious workers.
Religion is taught in public schools. The doctrine presented
depends on which religion predominates in the particular state.
However, those of different faiths are free to attend classes for their
own creeds during the class period. Atheists also are allowed to be
excused from the classes. Parents also may send their children to
private (parochial) schools or teach their children at home.
Due to increasing public concern over certain groups, especially
Scientology, the Government in 1997 asked an advisory commission to
examine Scientology. The commission published its findings in 1998.
According to the report, there is no basis at present for special
monitoring of Scientology, since it does not represent any direct or
immediate threat to the security of the country. However, the report
stated that Scientology had characteristics of a totalitarian
organization and had its own intelligence network. The commission also
warned of the significant financial burden imposed on Scientology
members and recommended reexamining the issue at a later date.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Under the Constitution and the law,
citizens are free to travel in or outside the country, to emigrate, and
to repatriate. Non-Swiss convicted of crimes may receive sentences that
include denial of reentry for a specific period following completion of
a prison sentence.
Switzerland traditionally has been a haven for refugees, but public
concern over the exceptionally high number of asylum seekers entering
the country in the wake of the Balkan war generated pressure on the
Government to tighten its policy regarding their acceptance. In the
first half of the year, 18,000 Kosovar Albanians sought asylum, raising
the number of refugees from the former Yugoslavia to 65,000.
In a June referendum, voters approved a revision of the asylum law
that had been passed by Parliament in 1998. The revised legislation
includes collective admission for victims of violence and authorizes
the Federal Council to grant them temporary protective status. It also
simplifies and accelerates the process of applying for asylum. At the
same time, the law is designed to curtail misuse of the asylum
regulations and to enable more rapid repatriation of uncooperative
refugees or those who enter the country without identity papers. The
Government may refuse to process the application of an asylum seeker
who cannot credibly justify not having identity papers. In such a case
the applicant must submit an appeal to reactivate consideration of the
application within 24 hours. NGO's contend that such a short time span
does not constitute an effective remedy and therefore violates the
European Convention on Human Rights.
Some human rights organizations have charged the authorities with
abuses in connection with the implementation of a 1995 law aimed at
asylum seekers or foreigners living illegally in Switzerland who are
suspected of disturbing the public order or avoiding repatriation. In
particular, these groups have alleged instances of abuse by police,
including arbitrary detention as well as denial of access to
established asylum procedures at the country's two main airports. They
also charge that police officers use the law to detain or harass asylum
seekers who were not suspected of having disturbed public order. Under
the law, police actions are subject to judicial oversight and the
Federal Court has overturned many cases in which it believed that there
was insufficient regard for the rights of asylum seekers and
foreigners. While NGO's claim that the situation with regard to
arbitrary detention has improved, they contend that the denial of
access to asylum procedures at the two airports is increasing.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in
assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum. The Federal
Office for Refugees estimated that in July the total number of asylum
applicants and temporary residents living in the country was 110,000.
Some 20,000 applications (64 percent more than for the same period in
1998) were submitted by June alone, according to the Federal Office for
Refugees. Refugees whose applications are rejected are allowed to stay
temporarily, if their home country is experiencing war or insurrection.
The Government denies having forced persons to return to countries
where they have a well-founded fear of persecution and insists that
each case is examined carefully. However, NGO's including the well-
known Augenauf organization have accused the Government of sometimes
expelling rejected asylum seekers even though conditions in their
native country remain unfavorable.
In December the Government apologized for its asylum policy during
World War II, in which thousands of Jewish refugees were refused entry
to the country (see Section 5).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully (at local, cantonal, and federal levels), and
citizens exercise this right in practice through periodic, free, and
fair elections held on the basis of universal suffrage. In addition
initiative and referendum procedures provide unusually intense popular
involvement in the legislative process. On April 18, voters approved a
new Constitution.
Women were disenfranchised until 1971 at the federal level, but
since then their participation in politics has continued to expand. In
December 1998, Parliament elected Ruth Dreifuss as the first female
President. Women occupy 55 of the 246 seats in the Parliament, 2 of 7
seats in the Federal Council (Cabinet), roughly one-fourth of the seats
in the cantonal government executive bodies, and one-fifth of the seats
in the communal executives. However, in 1995 and 1996 voters rejected
two local initiatives designed to reserve a fixed percentage of
elective seats for women. In 1997 the Federal Court declared invalid
another local initiative with the same purpose. A vote on an initiative
to mandate equal gender representation in all federal institutions is
scheduled to take place in 2000.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A large number of international and domestic human rights groups
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials are
cooperative and generally responsive to their views.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and laws prohibit discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, religion, language, or social status. The Government
generally enforces these prohibitions effectively, although a few laws
tend to discriminate against women. The new Constitution includes
provisions for equal rights for the disabled and for minorities.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. According to a
government-funded study on domestic violence, one-fifth of all women
suffer in their lifetimes at least once from physical or sexual
violence, and about 40 percent suffer from psychological or verbal
abuse.
The law prohibits wife beating and similar offenses. Spousal rape
is a crime in the Penal Code. Victims of violence can obtain help,
counseling, and legal assistance from specialized agencies or from
nearly a dozen hot lines sponsored privately or by local, cantonal, and
national authorities. Cantonal police have specially trained units to
deal with violence against women, and victims legally are entitled to
be heard exclusively by female police officers and judges. An estimated
680 women and 730 children took refuge in 14 women's shelters across
the country during 1998. Those in charge of the shelters estimate that
nearly as many were denied access due to a lack of space and limited
funding.
The difficulty in gathering information about the number of
prosecuted, convicted, or punished spouse abusers stems in part from
the fact that legal cases are handled by each canton and data are often
not up-to-date. According to 1998 police criminal statistics, 320 men
were investigated for rape offenses; in 1997, the last year for which
data are available, 92 men were sentenced for rape.
The Federation of Women's Organizations and numerous other women's
NGO's have heightened public awareness of the problem of violence
against women. In 1998 two government-supported women's organizations
that fight for equal gender rights jointly conducted the first national
campaign against violence in relationships. This campaign received
extensive media coverage.
Prostitution is legal; however, working without a valid work permit
is illegal. The Penal Code criminalizes sexual exploitation and
trafficking in women; however, trafficking in women is a problem (see
Section 6.f).
Although the Constitution prohibits all types of discrimination,
and a 1981 amendment provides equal rights, equal treatment, and
equivalent wages for men and women, a few laws still tend to
discriminate against women. In 1996 a new federal law on equal
opportunity for women and men came into force. The law includes a
general prohibition on gender-based discrimination and incorporates the
principle of ``equal wages for equal work.'' The law also includes
provisions aimed at eliminating sexual harassment and facilitating
access to legal remedies for those who claim discrimination or
harassment. The Supreme Court has ruled that in a divorce settlement
the primary wage earner must be left with sufficient income to remain
above the poverty level. Since the man is the primary wage earner in
most marriages, when the income is too low to support both parties it
is usually the wife who must go on welfare.
The Federal Office for Equal Opportunities for Men and Women and
the Federal Commission on Women work to eliminate all forms of direct
and indirect discrimination. As a follow-up to the Fourth World
Conference on Women, held in 1995 in Beijing, China, in June a federal
level interdepartmental working group issued an action plan that
outlined strategic goals and measures to improve the situation of
women. These include measures in the areas of education, health,
violence against women, the workplace, human rights, the media, and the
environment. For example, the plan calls for financial support for
child care facilities at colleges and universities to enable a larger
number of women to obtain a higher education; continued education and
support for specialists in the area of addiction prevention for women;
and ongoing analysis and data collection on the issue of wage
differences between men and women.
On average women earn 20 to 30 percent less than men. Researchers
have found that discriminatory behavior by employers accounts for 40
percent of the overall wage gap between men and women. Women also are
promoted less often than men. Individual cases of denial of equal pay
for equal work are subject to the new law. In 1996, the most recent
year for which data are available, 27.7 percent of the women between
the ages of 15 and 61 were not in the work force; of those in the work
force, only 46 percent worked full-time. Women hold over 80 percent of
all part-time jobs.
Press reports of pre-1970's instances of forced sterilization of
women remained a matter of concern (see Section 1.f.).
The law prohibits women from working during the first 8 weeks after
the birth of a child. The law does not provide for compensation;
however, 72 percent of working women have negotiated maternity benefits
with their employers. In June voters rejected a proposal in a
referendum for 14 weeks of paid maternity leave at 80 percent of their
salary for working women. The Parliament had passed legislation in
December 1998 providing maternity insurance--as mandated by the
Constitution--after 50 years of deliberation. Hundreds of persons
demonstrated to protest the vote. President Ruth Dreifuss said that the
defeat reflected a combination of fear of adding a new social benefit
and indifference to the plight of new mothers, especially low-income
mothers. However, many of the working women who have negotiated
maternity benefits with their employers receive benefits beyond those
in the proposed law.
In its 1998 review of the Government's 1996 Report on the
Implementation of the U.N. Covenant for Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, the U.N. Committee for Human Rights criticized continuing
discrimination against women in Switzerland. The Committee noted that
despite the existence of legislation against discrimination, de facto
discrimination against women and ethnic minorities continues to exist
in various areas. This is especially true in the labor market, where a
disproportionate number of women and minorities occupy lower paid and
part-time jobs. As a result, women suffer from poverty more often than
men. The Committee also expressed concern about the level of domestic
violence against women, which authors of a Government study estimate at
over 100,000 cases per year.
Children.--Despite the fact that the Government has no special
program for children and that there is no special governmental office
for children's matters, the Government demonstrates its strong
commitment to children's rights and welfare through a well-funded
public education system and medical care.
The federal and cantonal governments, as well as about 80 NGO's
that defend children's rights, have devoted considerable attention in
recent years to child abuse, especially sexual abuse. For convicted
perpetrators of the latter, the law provides for imprisonment of up to
15 years. In 1997 amendments to the federal Penal Code came into effect
that provide for an increase in the statute of limitations in cases of
child abuse from 5 to 10 years. In severe cases of sexual abuse, the
statute is to begin to take effect only when the victim turns 18. There
is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
To combat child pornography on the Internet, the Federal Office for
Police provides an Internet monitoring service on its worldwide web
page. Individuals who find pornographic material involving children are
asked to contact the Federal Office via electronic mail. According to
the Penal Code, the production, possession, distribution, or showing of
hard pornography are punishable with fines or prison sentences. Any
pornography involving children falls into this category. In March an
NGO published the first compilation of cases of child pornography and
prostitution in the country. The study cited 60 cases. Most of the
victims were girls between 13 and 17 years of age.
With respect to child abuse abroad, the law provides for
prosecution only if the act is considered a crime in the country in
which it took place. Experts have proposed making such acts punishable
in Switzerland regardless of where the crime took place, but there was
no legislative action on the problem during the year.
Parliament's ratification of the U.N. Convention on Children's
Rights included five reservations, the most important of which
concerned children of migrant seasonal workers who are not
automatically permitted to join their parents. Children of foreigners
working as migrant laborers are only permitted to visit on tourist
visas for a period of 3 months at a time. After 3 months, they must
return to their homeland for 1 month. The Government is reexamining the
necessity of these reservations and is expected to include its
conclusions in its next report to the Committee on Children's Rights,
which is due in 2000.
People with Disabilities.--There are strong legal prohibitions
against discrimination directed at disabled persons in employment,
education, and the provision of other state services. Advocates for the
disabled have called for new measures to ensure greater protection for
their rights, including easier access to buildings and public
transportation. However, the Government has not mandated that buildings
or transportation facilities be made accessible. In 1996 a Member of
Parliament proposed legislation to amend the Constitution to provide
equality of opportunity for the disabled. In April voters approved a
new Constitution, which contains an article that provides for equal
opportunities for the disabled.
In a June referendum, voters defeated a proposal to abolish pension
benefits to the partially disabled.
A 1995 law exempts disabled men from the tax imposed on those who
have not fulfilled their military duty.
Religious Minorities.--In response to the issue of Holocaust era
assets, the Government and private sector initiated a series of
measures designed to shed light on the past, provide assistance to
Holocaust victims, and address claims to dormant accounts in Swiss
banks. The Independent Commission of Experts under Professor Jean-
Francois Bergier, charged with examining the country's wartime history
and its role as a financial center, issued its report in December and
found that there are more than 24,000 documented rejections of asylum
seekers during the World War II period, including a large number of
Jewish refugees, who were refused asylum even after authorities were
aware of the dangers they faced from the Nazis. The Federal Council
issued a statement repeating its previous apology for policy errors
made during World War II and stating that its asylum policy ``was
marred by errors, omissions, and compromises.'' Also in December, the
Independent Committee of Eminent Persons under Paul Volcker released
its report on ``dormant accounts of victims of Nazi persecution in
Swiss banks.'' The report represents the culmination of a 3-year
investigation into the fate of victims' accounts. The Volcker report
recommended that the Swiss Federal Banking Commission publish about
26,000 account holder names, based on their probable or possible
identity as Holocaust victims. The report also made recommendations on
the means of resolving claims by victims of Nazi persecution or their
heirs, and the appropriate treatment of dormant accounts in the future.
The Swiss Special Fund for Needy Holocaust Victims received
approximately $190 million (SFR 273 million) in contributions from the
private sector and the Swiss National Bank. By September the Fund had
allocated but not yet distributed 92 percent of the initial
contribution to Holocaust survivors in Israel, Australia, Germany,
Latin America, and Eastern Europe. On March 31, the Government's World
War II task force became the Switzerland-World War II Office; the
office remains engaged in supporting progress on resolving Holocaust
assets issues. A $1.25 billion settlement of the class action lawsuit
filed in the United States against Swiss banks was announced in August
1998, and formally completed in January. A New York court is expected
to receive a final proposed plan of allocation and distribution by the
end of April 2000. A judge is to consider the plan and any comments at
a hearing scheduled for May 30, 2000.
In March the Swiss National Bank released a report that stated that
its officials ignored warnings that they were buying looted Nazi gold.
The bank has contributed approximately $70 million (SFR 110 million) to
the Swiss Special Fund for Needy Holocaust Victims.
Two Swiss insurance companies participate in the ongoing efforts by
the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims to
establish a formula and just sum for compensating Holocaust victims or
their families for policies they held.
The Federal Council unsuccessfully sought legislation during the
year to establish a solidarity fund, which would assist victims of
human rights violations, including those who suffered in the Holocaust.
It would create the fund through the sale of gold reserves recently
declared ``excess.'' However, the proposal is controversial among some
groups in parliament.
In the context of the discussions over Nazi gold and Holocaust era
assets, anti-Semitic slurs reportedly still remain a problem.
Government officials, including the President, have spoken frequently
and publicly against anti-Semitism. From 1995 when the law was enacted
to April, the cantons have reported 41 convictions for violating the
antiracism law to the Federal Department of Justice. Sentences for
convictions under the antiracism law included cases of several months'
conditional prison terms and a $3,378 (SFR 5000) fine. The Human Rights
Watch Organization Augenauf was among the NGO's that expressed concern
over the continued existence of anti-Semitic sentiment.
In November 1998, the Federal Commission against Racism released a
report on anti-Semitism in the country, which expressed concern that
the recent controversy over the country's role during World War II had
to some extent opened the door to expressions of latent anti-Semitism.
At the same time, the Commission described the emergence of strong
public opposition to anti-Semitism, and credited the Federal Council
with taking a ``decisive stand'' against anti-Semitism. The Commission
also proposed various public and private measures to combat anti-
Semitism and encourage greater tolerance and understanding. In its
initial response to the report, the Federal Council pledged to
facilitate implementation of the Commission's recommendations. In
December the creation of a center for tolerance in Bern was announced
officially. The center is to develop school curriculum materials
designed to teach historical lessons, show the possible manifestations
of racism and xenophobia, and promote tolerance.
The parliamentary immunity of a national councilor who made anti-
Semitic remarks led to a proposal that such immunity be abolished (see
Section 2.a).
In the country's highest court refused a Church of Scientology
appeal to strike down a municipal law that barred persons from
approaching others on the street using ``deceptive or dishonest
methods.'' The court ruled that a Basel law, prompted by efforts to
curb Scientology, involved an intervention in religious freedom, but
did not infringe on it.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to NGO statistics,
there were 73 reported attacks against foreigners/minorities in the
first 7 months of the year, compared with 70 for the first half of
1998. These figures include instances of verbal and written
``attacks'', which are much more common than physical assaults.
Investigations of these attacks are conducted effectively and lead, in
most cases, to the arrest of the persons responsible. Persons convicted
of racist crimes are commonly sentenced to from 3 days' to 3 years'
imprisonment with a fine of up to approximately $27,000 (SFR 40,000).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers, including foreigners,
have the freedom to associate freely, to join unions of their choice,
and to select their own representatives. The Government does not hamper
the exercise of these rights. About one-quarter of the work force is
unionized.
The right to strike is legally recognized and freely exercised, but
a unique labor peace under an informal agreement between unions and
employers--in existence since the 1930's--has meant fewer than 10
strikes per year since 1975. The new Constitution provides specific
protection for the right to strike. There were no significant strikes
during the year.
Unions are independent of the Government and political parties, and
laws prohibit retribution against strikers or their leaders. Unions can
associate freely with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--By law workers
have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the law
protects them from acts of antiunion discrimination. The Government
fully respects these provisions. Periodic negotiations between employer
and worker organizations determine wages and settle other labor issues
at the local, or infrequently, at the industry sector level. Nonunion
firms generally adopt the terms and conditions fixed in the unions'
collective bargaining.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Although there is no
specific constitutional or statutory ban on forced or compulsory labor
in general, and on child labor in particular, such practices generally
are not known to occur; however, trafficking in women for forced
prostitution increased.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 15 years,
and children are in school up to this age. Children over 13 years of
age may be employed in light duties for not more than 9 hours per week
during the school year and 15 hours otherwise. The employment of youths
between the ages of 15 and 20 is strictly regulated; they cannot work
at night, on Sundays, or in hazardous or dangerous conditions. The
State Secretariat for Economic Affairs effectively enforces the law on
working conditions.
The Government does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded
labor by children, although such prohibitions are implicitly included
in the Labor Act. Such forms of labor are not believed to occur (see
Section 6.c.).
Government officials inspect companies that employ children after
having received complaints. Every year a few employers are fined or
receive conditional imprisonment for violations of the law.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage. The lowest wages fixed in collective bargaining are generally
adequate to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. However, in January the Swiss Association of Trade Unions
released a study that found that 60,000 full-time workers (or 3.4
percent) fall below the poverty line, defined as earning less than
approximately $15,500 (SFR 22,900), which is half of the median wage.
The 1964 Labor Act established a maximum 45-hour workweek for blue-
and white-collar workers in industry, services, and retail trades, and
a 50-hour workweek for all other workers. The law prescribes a rest
period during the workweek. Overtime is limited by law to 260 hours
annually for those working 45 hours per week and to 220 hours annually
for those working 50 hours per week.
The law protects legal and illegal foreign workers. However,
illegal foreign workers are not covered by mandatory health insurance
in case of illness or accident. Wage discrimination against foreign
workers is not permitted.
The Labor Act and the Federal Code of Obligations contain extensive
regulations to protect worker health and safety. There have been no
reports of lapses in the enforcement of these regulations, but the
degree to which enforcement is effective is unclear. In 1998 voters
approved a new labor law designed to increase flexibility in the
workplace and to remove restrictions on women working at night. A
worker may leave a dangerous assignment without penalty.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Penal Code criminalizes sexual
exploitation and trafficking in persons. According to September press
reports, police officials are concerned over a growing number of
foreign women subject to abuse in sex trafficking rings. In the past,
victims came from Thailand, parts of Africa, or South America; recently
an increasing number of women come from Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, and
other states of the former Soviet Union. Many victims are forced to
work in salons or clubs to pay for the cost of their travel and forged
documents, and find themselves in a state of dependency. Traffickers
sometimes seize victims' passports. Generally the victims do not read,
write, or speak the country's languages, and are afraid to seek help
from the authorities.
Since 1905 the Government has had an office to combat trafficking
of girls for the purpose of commercial sexual exploitation. Over the
years this office has evolved to include all forms of trafficking in
persons. The Federal Office for Police has a human trafficking office
as part of the criminal intelligence unit. In 1998 the Government
institutionalized the exchange of information on trafficking in persons
with NGO's. The Department of Foreign Affairs recently launched
programs intend to combat trafficking from Eastern Europe. In order to
confront modern forms of trafficking in women, especially via the
Internet, the federal police have increased the number of their agents.
In 1997 four persons were convicted of trafficking in women and 13 were
convicted of sexual exploitation; and in 1997-98 police uncovered a
large Thai trafficking organization. Its leader was arrested, tried,
and convicted.
Prostitution is legal; however, working without a valid work permit
is illegal. Women arrested for illegal prostitution are deported
rapidly. There is no witness protection program for victims, and many
victims are afraid to cooperate with police. The federal police are
working with cantonal authorities to encourage them to provide delayed
deportation and counseling to victims, in order to encourage them to
testify. In March the Government introduced new visa requirements for
applicants in four South American countries--Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador,
and Bolivia. The Office for Equality between Men and Women has a
program to educate visa applicants in their native countries about the
dangers of falling victim to traffickers and their common methods.
______
TAJIKISTAN
Tajikistan is ruled by an authoritarian regime that has established
some nominally democratic institutions. President Emomali Rahmonov and
a clique of fellow natives of the Kulyab region continued to dominate
the Government; however, Rahmonov's narrow base of support limited his
control of the entire territory of the country. Rahmonov won reelection
as President in November elections that were flawed seriously and were
neither free nor fair. As part of the peace accords that ended the
civil war, members of the opposition took approximately one-third of
the high level positions in the Government. Although the Constitution
was adopted in 1994 and amended in September, political decisionmaking
normally takes the form of power plays among the various factions
formerly on one side or the other during the civil war that now make up
the Government. The legacy of civil war continued to affect the
Government, which was faced with problems of demobilizing and
reintegrating former opposition troops and maintaining law and order as
rival armed factions competed for power. The Constitution provides for
an independent judiciary; however, it is not independent in practice.
The Ministries of Interior, Security, and Defense share
responsibility for internal security, although the Government actually
relies on a handful of commanders who use their forces almost as
private armies. Some regions of the country remained effectively
outside the Government's control, and government control in other areas
existed only by day, or at the sufferance of local opposition
commanders. The soldiers of some of these commanders are involved in
crime and corruption. The Russian Army's 201st Motorized Rifle
Division, part of a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)
peacekeeping force established in 1993, remained in the country and
continued to have a major influence on political developments. Some
members of the government security forces and government-aligned
militias committed serious human rights abuses.
The economy is a state-controlled system making a difficult
transition to a market-based one. Most of the work force is engaged in
agriculture, part of which remains collectivized. Government revenue
remains highly dependent on state-controlled cotton production. The
small industrial sector is dominated by aluminum production (another
critical source of government revenue), although most Soviet-era
factories operate at a minimal level, if at all. Small-scale
privatization is over 60 percent complete, but medium- to large-scale
privatization still is stalled. Many, but not all, wages and pensions
are being paid. The country is poor, with a per capita gross national
product of approximately $182 according to government sources; other
estimates are lower. The failure of the Soviet economic system has been
accompanied by a rise in narcotics trafficking and other forms of
corruption. This development has led to clear disparities of income
between the vast majority of the population and a small number of
former progovernment and opposition warlords, who control most of the
criminal sectors of the economy.
The Government's human rights record remained poor, and the
Government continued to commit serious abuses. The Government limits
citizens' right to change their government and prevented free and fair
elections. The November presidential elections were flawed seriously.
Some members of the security forces were responsible for killings and
tortured, beat, and frequently abused detainees. These forces were also
responsible for threats, extortion, looting, and abuse of civilians.
Certain battalions of nominally government forces operated quasi-
independently under their leaders. Impunity remains a problem and the
Government prosecuted few of the persons who committed these abuses.
Prison conditions remained harsh and life threatening. The Government
continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as arresting
persons for political reasons. Lengthy pretrial detention remained a
problem. Basic problems of rule of law persist. There are often long
delays before trials, and the judiciary is subject to political and
paramilitary pressure. The authorities infringed on citizens' right to
privacy.
The Government continued to restrict severely freedom of speech and
of the press, and essentially controls the electronic media. The
Government denies opposition access to state-run radio and television;
however, opposition newspapers begun in 1998 continued to publish, and
a number of small television stations were operated by nongovernmental
organizations. Journalists practice self-censorship. The Government
restricts freedom of assembly and association by exercising strict
control over political organizations; it banned two opposition parties
and prevented another from being registered. The Government prevented
all but one opposition candidate from registering for the presidential
election. There are some limits on freedom of religion, and there are
some restrictions on freedom of movement. The Government still has not
established a human rights ombudsman position, despite a 1996 pledge to
do so. Violence against women is a problem, as is discrimination
against women, the disabled, and religious and ethnic minorities. Child
labor is a problem. There were some instances of forced labor,
including by children. Trafficking in women is a problem.
Some former opposition troops committed serious abuses, including
killings and abductions. There were credible reports that opposition
units threatened, extorted, and abused the civilian population.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were a number
of extrajudicial killings; however, it was difficult to estimate the
number or to attribute responsibility in many cases. Some killings were
committed by competing government forces for varying motives, both
political and economic.
Harsh prison conditions and lack of food and adequate medical
treatment resulted in a significant number of deaths of prisoners while
in custody (see Section 1.c.).
A number of local officials, businessmen, and professional figures
were killed during the year, for a variety of political, economic, and
ethnic reasons. Tolib Boboev, an official of the banned opposition
Party of Popular Unity, was killed by masked gunmen while visiting the
home of his son on January 2. Socialist Party leader and parliamentary
human rights commission chairman Safarali Kenjaev was shot and killed
by unidentified gunmen outside his home in Dushanbe on March 30; two
bodyguards and his driver also were killed. At the time of his death,
it was widely speculated that Kenjaev planned to run in the
presidential elections. Ministry of Interior press center chief
Jumakhona Khotami also was shot and killed near Dushanbe (see Section
2.a.). In addition a number of high-ranking figures associated with
various competing paramilitary factions were killed. In most cases,
suspects have not been identified. The competence of the investigations
and their independence from official interference was questioned. A
number of apparent murders essentially were concealed, with official
news noting only that the individual died.
A major serving with the Russian border guards was shot and killed
in Dushanbe on November 25. In October and November, two senior Tajik
military officials were murdered.
Both the Government and the opposition used land mines during the
civil war. Some unmarked mine fields in the Karetegin Valley probably
killed innocent civilians. The Government also has laid numerous
minefields along the border with Afghanistan, although the primary
victims are believed to be border infiltrators. Some killings were
committed by former opposition forces, and others by independent
warlords answering to neither the Government nor the opposition.
In the case of the 1998 killings of four United Nations personnel
in the Karateqin Valley, the Government tried and convicted three
individuals arrested for the killings in late 1998, and executed them
early in the year.
In January warlord Ravshan Gafurov confessed to the shooting of
leading opposition and former journalist figure Otakhon Lafiti on
September 22, 1998; Gafurov also confessed to 25 other murders. In
December the Government announced the name of the individual who
murdered prominent academician Muhammad Osimi in 1996 and said that he
had fled the country.
There were no developments in the 1997 killings of several Russian
servicemen, or in the 1996 murder of the Mufti of Tajikistan.
b. Disappearance.--There were a number of disappearances during the
year. The taking of hostages for revenge or for bargaining purposes
remained a common occurrence. Political pressure and a lack of
professional resources hamper police efforts to investigate
disappearances.
The 5-year-old nephew of opposition presidential candidate Davlat
Usmon was kidnaped from his parents' home several days before the
presidential election; he was recovered unharmed on the outskirts of
Dushanbe a day later.
Forces aligned with the opposition were involved closely with the
Uzbek militants who took Japanese and Kyrgyz nationals hostage in
Kyrgystan, then brought them into Tajikistan, where eventually they
were released.
There were no developments in the 1996 disappearance of Zafar
Rahmonov, the opposition cochairman of the Joint Commission on Cease-
fire Observation.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture; however, the Government uses it
in practice. Security officials, particularly those in the Ministry of
Interior, regularly beat detainees in custody and use systematic
beatings to extort confessions. There were credible allegations that
security forces illegally detained, mistreated, and beat members of
opposition parties or their relatives (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.).
Impunity remains a serious problem, and the Government prosecuted few
of the persons who committed these abuses. However, several security
officials were convicted of abuses in Kurghanteppa during the year.
The Government has acknowledged that the security forces were
corrupted by criminal elements and that most citizens chose to keep
silent in the face of official mistreatment rather than risk
retaliation by the police. In the southern region of Shaartuz, the
Tajik Border Forces (TBF) control much of the drug trade, and the local
population has made numerous complaints of harassment and human rights
abuses committed by the TBF.
In November two individuals identifying themselves as Ministry of
Interior officials apprehended former Kabul University professor
Nurshahi Shahkur, an Afghan national living in Dushanbe. They took him
to the Ministry of Interior building, where they tortured and beat him
in an apparent extortion attempt. A doctor later certified that Shahkur
was tortured, and the Afghan Embassy in Dushanbe raised the issue with
the Government. In December three masked men attacked Mukhiddin
Idizoda, deputy editor of the opposition newspaper Nadzhot (see Section
2.a.).
There were a number of shootings, bombings, and terrorist attacks
that resulted in nonlethal injuries and serious property damage. A
number of civilians were injured in fighting between rival paramilitary
factions that broke out repeatedly in Dushanbe, often in crowded areas
such as the Green Bazaar. An October bomb blast in Dushanbe's central
department store, the TsUM, injured three persons.
Prison conditions remain harsh and life threatening. Prisons
generally are overcrowded, unsanitary, and disease-ridden, producing
serious threats to many prisoners' health. This problem reflects in
part the self-funded status of most prisons, under which before 1992
prisoners grew much of their own food or made goods for sale. The
general collapse of governmental programs and of the economy also meant
the virtual disappearance of these programs. Some food production has
resumed, but it is still inadequate. Some prisoners die of hunger.
Family members are allowed access to prisoners only after a guilty
verdict, in accordance with the law.
There was no official action against government forces for the
deaths of 26 prisoners when they retook Khojand prison in 1997.
Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, the brother of a political opponent of the
President, was arrested in May 1997 on narcotics charges that appear
fabricated and sentenced to death in 1998. Despite appeals for clemency
based on a diagnosis of terminal cancer, Abdullojonov remained in
prison and claimed to have been denied proper medical treatment.
Government sources say that he was executed early on in the year,
although other sources maintain that he simply died in prison of
cancer.
The Government has invariably denied requests by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to make prison visits in a manner
consistent with the ICRC's standard modalities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued
to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. The Criminal Code has not
been amended significantly since independence, and it therefore retains
many of the defects inherited from Soviet times. The Government claims
that revision of the Criminal Code is a high priority, but due to the
size and complexity of the code, the small parliamentary staff, and
limited time in session for the Majlisi Oli (parliament), progress has
been slow. There is no projected completion date, and there has been no
indication of progress toward a comprehensive revision of the Criminal
Code. However, during the year, the law was changed to increase
punishment for crimes such as rape, theft, and illegal drug use. The
system allows for lengthy pretrial detention and provides few checks on
the power of procurators and police to arrest persons. Public order,
which broke down during the civil war, has yet to be restored fully,
and the virtual immunity from prosecution of armed militia groups has
eroded further the integrity of the legal system.
Police legally may detain persons without a warrant for a period of
72 hours, and the procurator's office may do so for a period of 10 days
after which the accused must be charged officially. At that point, the
Criminal Code permits pretrial detention for up to 15 months. The first
3 months of detention are at the discretion of the local procurator,
the second 3 months must be approved at the regional level, and the
Procurator General must sanction the remaining time in detention. The
Criminal Code maintains that all investigations must be completed 1
month before the 15-month maximum in order to allow the defense time to
examine government evidence. There is no requirement for judicial
approval or for a preliminary judicial hearing on the charge or
detention. In criminal cases, detainees may be released and restricted
to their place of residence pending trial. Once a case is entered for
trial, the law states that it must be brought before a judge within 28
days. However, it is common for cases to be delayed for many months
before trial begins. There is no provision for bail, and lengthy
pretrial detention is a problem.
The Government made politically motivated arrests, and there are
credible allegations of dozens of cases of illegal government detention
of members of opposition political parties or their relatives. In most
cases, the security officers, principally personnel from the Ministry
of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Security, do not obtain arrest
warrants and do not bring charges. Those released sometimes claimed
that they were mistreated and beaten during detention (also see Section
1.c.).
Opposition sources maintain that security forces detained dozens of
persons unlawfully without charge. Since the law precludes visits to
persons in pretrial detention, it is not possible to assess these
allegations. There could be as many as several hundred political
detainees, but the absence of ICRC or other access to these persons
makes any estimate uncertain.
Militia troops detained Abdurahman Karimov, chairman of the Party
of Justice-Seekers, in October, holding him incommunicado for 10 days
before finally releasing him.
In response to a May 4 appeal by the Commission for National
Reconciliation, President Rakhmonov charged senior government officials
with drafting a decree on terminating criminal proceedings against
opposition fighters and granted amnesty to those already sentenced for
their actions during the civil war. Human Rights Watch reported that by
December, the Government had granted amnesty to approximately 5,000
United Tajik Opposition (UTO) fighters.
Border Force units routinely take family members of deserters
hostage and hold them until the deserters return to duty.
The Constitution states that no one can be exiled without a legal
basis; no laws have been passed so far setting out any legal basis for
exile. There were no reports of forced exile. Some opponents of the
Government are in self-imposed exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1994 Constitution states that
judges are independent and subordinate only to the Constitution and the
law, and prohibits interference in their activities; however, in
practice the political leadership and, in many instances, armed
paramilitary groups directly influence judicial officials at all
levels. Under the Constitution, the President has the right, with
confirmation by the Parliament, both to appoint and to dismiss judges
and prosecutors. Judges at the local, regional, and republic level are
for the most part poorly trained and lack understanding of the concept
of an independent judiciary. Bribery of prosecutors and judges appears
to be a common practice.
The court system, largely unmodified from the Soviet period,
includes city, district, regional, and national levels, with a parallel
military court system. Higher courts serve as appellate courts for the
lower ones. The Constitution establishes additional courts, including
the Constitutional Court, which began to function in 1997.
According to the law, trials are public, except in cases involving
national security or the protection of minors. The court appoints an
attorney for those who do not have one. Defendants may choose their own
attorney but may not necessarily choose among court-appointed
defenders. In practice arrested persons often are denied prompt, and in
some cases any, access to an attorney.
There was no information during the year concerning Bahrom Sodirov,
who was charged in the February 1997 kidnaping of the Minister of
Security, 5 UNMOT personnel, and 11 others. Sodirov was arrested soon
after the hostages were released. His trial from which observers were
barred, was suspended in late 1997 and has not resumed.
The procurator's office is responsible for conducting all
investigations of alleged criminal conduct. According to the law, both
defendant and counsel have the right to review all government evidence,
to confront witnesses, and to present evidence and testimony. No groups
are barred from testifying, and all testimony theoretically is given
equal weight, regardless of the ethnicity or gender of the witness.
Ministry of Justice officials maintain that defendants benefit from the
presumption of innocence, despite the unmodified Soviet legal statute,
whichpresumes the guilt of all persons brought to trial. In practice,
bringing charges tends to suggest guilt to most citizens.
The Government holds political prisoners, including opposition
party activists, although estimates of the number of prisoners vary
widely. The Government and the Tajik opposition exchanged multiple
lists of prisoners of war and political prisoners for exchange as a
result of the 1997 inter-Tajik talks in Moscow. By November the
Government had released all UTO prisoners, with the exception of six
individuals, named on lists submitted by the UTO, of whom the
Government claimed no knowledge. The Government accepted the UTO's 1998
claim that it released all POW's that it held.
Abdulhafiz Abdullojonov, whose arrest and unfair trial in 1997 were
politically motivated, remained a political prisoner until his
mysterious death early in the year (see Section 1.c.).
On December 28, a court in the city of Khujand imposed death
sentences on two participants in the failed November 1998 coup headed
by former army colonel Mahmud Khudoberdiev. A further 25 Khudoberdiev
supporters received prison sentences ranging from 9 to 21 years. The
trial was closed to the public and held without publicity.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the
home and prohibits interference with correspondence, telephone
conversations, and postal and communication rights, except ``in cases
prescribed by law;'' however, the authorities continued to infringe on
citizens' right to privacy. Except for some special circumstances,
police may not enter and search a private home without the approval of
the procurator. When they do enter and search without prior approval,
they must then inform the procurator within 24 hours. Police also are
permitted to enter and search homes without permission if they have
compelling reason to believe that a delay in obtaining a warrant would
impair national security. There is no independent judicial review of
police searches conducted without a warrant.
Government forces beat and arrested the relatives of members of
opposition parties (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Security forces also
detained relatives of deserters in order to compel deserters to return
to duty (see Section 1.d.).
In some cases, the security services apparently prevented members
of banned political parties from finding employment; others were fired
or demoted when they refused to join the ruling party (see Section 3).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government severely
restricts this right in practice. Journalists, broadcasters, and
individual citizens who disagree with government policies cannot speak
freely or critically. The Government exercises control over the media
both overtly through legislation and less obviously through such
mechanisms as ``friendly advice'' to reporters on what news should not
be covered. The Government also controlled the printing presses and the
supply of newsprint and broadcasting facilities, and subsidizes
virtually all publications and productions. Editors fearful of
reprisals exercise careful self-censorship. .
The number of local newspapers is increasing, but only a handful of
them attempt to cover serious news. Several are organs of political
parties or blocs. The Government exerted pressure on newspapers
critical of it, particularly the newspaper Jumbesh, which published the
views of the UTO and other opposition parties. The Government printing
press has refused to print this newspaper since mid-October.
The two opposition newspapers that began publication in 1998,
Mujahed (Voice of the Mujahad) and Muzhda (Good News) are no longer
published. Najot, the new official paper of the Islamic Renaissance
Party, began weekly publication in October.
On July 4, Ministry of Interior press center chief Jumankhon Hotami
was shot and killed near Dushanbe, according to family members, who
also said that on at least one occasion he had fallen out of favor with
members of the Government for going too far into his research on the
drug trade, which resulted in the temporary suspension of his
television program on the subject (see Section 1.a.). Three armed,
masked men attacked Mukhiddin Idizoda, deputy editor of the opposition
newspaper Nadzhot, near his home on December 27. The newspaper is
funded by the opposition Islamic Renaissance Party (see Section 1.c.).
Sergei Sitkovskii, a Russian national working for the newspaper
Tojikiston, was killed in a car accident in September. He was preparing
an article on narcotics trafficking at the time and papers were removed
from his person at the scene of the accident. The Government has stated
that the case is closed.
According to a November Human Rights Watch report, no independent
radio stations have licenses to operate, and the newspapers of most
opposition political parties are unable to publish. Independent
television stations continued to experience administrative and legal
harassment, and access to the state-run media by opposition politicians
is virtually nonexistent. There is one government-run television
network; its several local stations cover regional and local issues
from an official point of view. There are 36 nongovernmental television
stations, not all of which are operating at any one time and only a
handful of which can be considered genuinely independent. Some have
independent studio facilities and do not have to use official studios.
To obtain licenses, independent television stations must work through
two government agencies, the Ministry of Communications and the State
Committee on Radio and Television. At every stage of the very time
consuming bureaucratic process, there are high official and unofficial
fees. The news agency Asia-Plus continued to wait for the broadcasting
license for which it had applied earlier, but at year's end, it had not
received a license.
Access to the Internet is limited, in part, by state control. A
single company holds a government-granted monopoly on Internet access
services. As a result of its high fees and limited capacity, access to
information over the Internet is out of reach for most citizens.
Academic expression is limited principally by the complete reliance
of scientific institutes upon government funding, and in practical
terms by the need to find alternate employment to generate sufficient
income, leaving little time for academic writing.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of peaceful assembly; however, the Government
restricts this right in practice and exercises strict control over
organizations and activities of a political nature. Nonpolitical
associations, such as trade unions, are allowed to meet. Registered
organizations must apply for a permit from the local executive
committee in order to organize legally any public assembly or
demonstration. Sometimes this right is honored, but the Government
subsequently has been known to take reprisals against organizers.
Because fear of reprisal is so widespread, public assemblies or
demonstrations of a political nature were rare during the year.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice by exercising strict
control over organizations and activities of a political nature.
Although freedom of association is permitted for nonpolitical
associations (including trade unions), this right is circumscribed
further by the requirement in the law on nongovernmental associations
that all organizations first must register with the Ministry of
Justice. This process often is slowed by the requirement to submit
documents in both Russian and Tajik. The Ministry of Justice's
verification of the text inevitably delays the granting of
registration. Once registered, an organization may apply for a permit
to hold a public assembly or demonstration.
There are six political parties registered with the Government. The
Party of Popular Unity was banned in December 1998, and the Agrarian
Party was banned in April; the Government refused its request to
reregister in October. The Party of Economic and Political Revival of
Tajikistan was banned in March because of insufficient membership. The
Party of Justice and Progress has not been banned, but the Government
denied it registration. Several months after lifting the ban on the
Democratic Party (Almaty platform), the Government banned the
Democratic Party (Tehran platform), ostensibly on the grounds of
insufficient membership.
In May 1998, the Parliament passed a law prohibiting the creation
of political parties with a religious orientation. The opposition UTO,
international organizations, and foreign governments strongly
criticized the law for violating the spirit and the letter of the 1997
peace agreement. In June 1998, President Rahmonov established a Special
Conciliation Commission to resolve the dispute, which proposed
compromise language for the law, banning political parties from
receiving support from religious institutions. A new version of the law
including the compromise language was passed in November 1998.
Subsequently, parties of religious character are permitted to register;
however, only one such party, the Islamic Renaissance Party, has done
so.
The leadership of opposition parties reported threats and
harassment of party members by the authorities. In some cases, members
of banned political parties were unable to find employment, apparently
at the direction of security services; others were fired or demoted
when they refused to join the People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan,
the ruling party (see Section 1.f.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
however, there are some exceptions. According to the Law on Freedom of
Faith, the Committee on Religious Affairs under the Council of
Ministers registers religious communities and monitors the activities
of the various religious establishments. While the official reason
given to justify registration is to ensure that religious groups act in
accordance with the law, the practical purpose is to ensure that they
do not become overly political. President Rahmonov has defended
secularism aggressively and occasionally criticized Islam as a
political threat. In 1997 the Government subordinated the Council of
the Islamic Center to the Committee on Religious Affairs; however, the
observant Muslim community apparently did not object to this step.
Although unregistered, recently organized religious communities,
such as Baha,i and Hare Krishna groups function with no
apparent formal restriction.
In May 1998, Parliament passed a law prohibiting the creation of
political parties with a religious orientation. The UTO, the largest
component of which is the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP), along with
international organizations and foreign governments, strongly
criticized the law for violating the June 1997 peace agreement, which
included a government commitment to lift the ban on member parties of
the UTO. Subsequently, the amendments to the Constitution approved by
the September referendum authorized political parties with a religious
orientation.
Aside from the registration requirement, there are few official
constraints on religious practice, but government officials sometimes
issue extrajudicial restrictions. For example, the mayor of Dushanbe
prohibited mosques from using microphones for the five-times-daily call
to prayer. There are also reports that some local officials have
forbidden members of the Islamic Revival Party from speaking in mosques
in their region. However, this restriction is more a reflection of
political rather than religious differences. In Isfara, following
allegations that a private Arabic language school was hosting a
suspected Uzbek terrorist, the authorities imposed restrictions on
private Arabic language schools (to include restrictions on private
Islamic instruction). These restrictions appear to be based on
political concerns, but the effect on private religious instruction is
also clear.
The Government imposed restrictions on the number of pilgrims
allowed to go on the Hajj in 1998. Individuals were not permitted to
travel in a personal vehicle; persons were required to travel by
government-owned transportation, primarily buses. There were regional
quotas on the number of pilgrims, which led to corruption as places
were sold. Comparable restrictions continued during the year.
Missionaries are not restricted legally and proselytize openly;
however, the Government's fear of Islamic terrorists prompts it to
restrict visas for Muslim missionaries.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights; however, the Government imposes some restrictions on them.
The Government has stipulated that both citizens and foreigners are
prohibited from traveling within a 15-mile zone along the republic's
borders with China and Afghanistan without permission from the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs. This restriction is not always enforced along the
western part of the border with Afghanistan, but a special visa
generally is required for travelers, including international workers
and diplomats, to Gorno-Badakhshan. Travel to border areas in the
southwest is not restricted significantly, except occasionally at the
border, which is closed intermittently by one side or the other.
The Ministry of Security inhibits freedom of travel by requiring
citizens who wish to travel abroad to obtain an exit visa. This process
sometimes includes lengthy interviews. The Ministry of Security
sometimes withholds or delays exit visas when it believes that other
ministries or NGO's are infringing upon its jurisdiction and have not
adhered to its formalities for foreign travel.
Residents of Dushanbe and those travelers who wish to remain longer
than 3 days are supposed to register with central authorities, and
regulations require registration at the local Ministry of Interior
office upon arrival and departure from a city. However, these
regulations largely are ignored in practice. There are no legal
restrictions on changing residence or workplace.
There is no law on emigration. Persons who wish to migrate within
the former Soviet Union notify the Ministry of Interior of their
departure. Persons who wish to emigrate beyond the borders of the
former Soviet Union must receive the approval of the relevant country's
embassy in order to obtain their passport. Persons who settle abroad
are required to inform the Tajikistan embassy or Tajikistan interests
section of the nearest Russian embassy or consulate.
Persons who wish to return to Tajikistan after having emigrated may
do so freely by submitting their applications to the Tajikistan embassy
or Tajikistan interests section of the nearest Russian embassy or
consulate. The Government adjudicates requests on a case-by-case basis.
There is no indication that persons, other than those who fled
Tajikistan for political reasons after the civil war, are not permitted
to return freely. Some persons currently active with the Tajik
opposition, whose travel documents expired, at times have had
difficulty obtaining new documents permitting them to return.
A number of persons remained internally displaced as a result of
the civil war, but their total number was difficult to estimate. The
UNHCR no longer has estimates on the number of internally displaced
persons (IDP's). These persons live throughout the country and are not
concentrated in a single geographic area. The Government provides
protection and modest assistance, and it actively cooperates with
international organizations to resettle them. Resettlement is
voluntary; IDP's are not returned forcibly to dangerous conditions.
The Constitution provides for the grant of asylum to persons who
have entered the country seeking protection, in accordance with U.N.
refugee criteria.
Under the 1994 refugee law, a person granted refugee status is
provided with the right to work and to move freely throughout the
country. The Central Department of Refugee Affairs under the Ministry
of Labor has responsibility for the registration of refugees.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees.
The Government provides first asylum (and provided it to 1,766 Afghans
and 5 Iraqis from the beginning of the year until the fall). However,
the U.N. does not have statistics on the number of refugees remaining
in the country after receiving asylum because the majority of such
persons use the country as a transit point en route to Western Europe.
There were unverifiable reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution: part of a large group of Uzbeks
(comprising a guerilla force loyal to militant Islamist Juma Namangani
and approximately 1,000 dependent family members) reportedly was sent
in buses back to Uzbekistan. Later, the Government allowed the
remainder of Namangani's forces and their dependents to cross the
border into Afghanistan. On August 27, the chairman of the security
council, Amirkul Azimov, announced that all the Uzbek citizens living
in the Karategin valley had left the country.
The Central Department of Refugee Affairs (CDR), under the Ministry
of Labor, handles the registration of Afghan refugees in accordance
with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
Tajikistan's 1994 Law on Refugees. An unresolved problem stems from the
unofficial government policy of denying official status to Afghan
spouses of returning Tajik refugees. The UNHCR has aided their
admission to the country (avoiding their being jailed as illegal
immigrants); however, their legal status remains uncertain. There were
no cases during the year.
Following the signing of the 1997 peace accords, all Tajik refugees
from northern Afghanistan who wished to return, as well as thousands
from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), returned to
Tajikistan. There was incremental progress during the year in returning
occupied houses to their original UTO fighter owners. However, problems
remain, but they are almost entirely in the Khatlon region.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides for the right of citizens to change their
government; however, the Government limits the right of citizens to
change their government peacefully and freely. In practice President
Rahmonov's Government remained dominated by a clique from the Kulyab
region, although 30 percent of government positions (including the post
of first deputy prime minister) were allocated to members of the UTO in
accordance with the 1997 peace agreement. Although the peace accords
called for parliamentary elections in 1998, the Commission for National
Reconciliation has not yet completed necessary preliminary work, and
the elections have not yet been held. Some opposition party activists
remain either jailed or in self-exile abroad.
Members of the current Majlisi Oli took office in 1995 after
elections marked by numerous irregularities, such as voter intimidation
and ballot-box stuffing. The Majlisi Oli is not considered a truly
independent parliament, although a number of its members nevertheless
belong to parties or groups that oppose the Government vigorously on
specific issues.
The results of a September referendum on amendments to the
Constitution likely reflected overall public opinion accurately. The
amendments concerned extending the length of the presidential term from
5 to 7 years; permitting political parties with religious orientation;
and replacing a part-time, unicameral parliament with one that was
full-time and professional. The Government announced that 91.55 percent
of the electorate voted and that 71.79 percent approved the amendments.
However, the conduct of the referendum was flawed in numerous ways.
Observers noted voters casting ballots for others not present, there
was a lack of ballot secrecy, and there were cases of unprofessional
conduct on the part of polling station staff. Eyewitnesses reported
that voter turnout was substantially lower than official statistics
indicated, and perhaps did not reach 50 percent.
The Government's handling of preparations for the November
presidential elections cast doubt on the possibility that there could
be a peaceful transfer of power through genuinely free and fair
elections. Candidates had to contend with a cumbersome registration
process requiring them to obtain large numbers of signatures during a
short period of time. Only President Rahmonov, who used his political
apparatus throughout the country for this purpose, probably ahead of
time, was able to do so by the deadline. Prospective opposition
candidates complained that local, progovernment administrators
prevented them from gathering signatures. Days before the election, an
apparently arbitrary Supreme Court decision allowed one of the three
aspiring opposition candidates, Economics and Foreign Economic
Relations Minister Davlat Usmon of the Islamic Renaissance Party, to
register. Although Davlat announced that he would boycott the election
unless the other two opposition figures also were allowed to run, the
Central Election Commission included his name on the ballot. Davlat
told journalists in Dushanbe on November 7 that he believed the outcome
of the election was rigged and that only 20 to 30 percent of voters had
participated. President Rahmonov enjoyed a virtual monopoly over mass
media access, and there were obvious irregularities in the operation of
polling places, such as multiple voting by pro-Rahmonov supporters. The
Government claimed that 98 percent of the electorate voted and that 96
percent of those voting supported Rahmonov; the claim lacked
credibility.
On December 3, government and opposition representatives on the
Commission for National Reconciliation reached agreement on the number
of deputies to be elected to each chamber of the new parliament; the
lower chamber is to consist of 63 deputies and the upper chamber is to
have 33 senators.
There are no formal barriers to women's participation in the
electoral process; however, they are underrepresented in government and
politics. Since the removal of Soviet-era quotas the number of female
deputies has declined. At year's end, there were five female deputies
in the Parliament, one female deputy serving as deputy prime minister,
one female deputy chairman of the Parliament, one female minister, and
several female deputy ministers.
While ethnic Uzbeks make up some 25 percent of the total
population, they are underrepresented in the political system.
President Rahmonov's Government actively has sought to keep ethnic
Uzbek leaders, such as Colonel Mahmud Khudoberdiev, out of political
life.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government's record on dealing with international and
nongovernmental investigation of alleged human rights abuses was mixed.
Fear of persecution by government or paramilitary elements tended to
discourage citizens from forming their own human rights organizations,
although the Government did not block the registration of local NGO's
dealing with human rights; several such organizations exist. The
Government did not prevent actively citizens or government officials
from participating in international and local seminars sponsored by the
OSCE, the ICRC, United Nations agencies, NGO's, and foreign governments
on such topics as the rule of law, an independent judiciary, and
international humanitarian law. Discussion at such seminars, including
those held in Tajikistan, at times was critical of the Government.
The international human rights group Human Rights Watch/Helsinki
operates without government restriction, investigating and publishing
its findings on human rights cases. Government officials are generally
cooperative in dealing with the organization; however, they are not
responsive to its views.
Although the Government agreed in 1998 to establish a national
human rights institution and ombudsman position with OSCE financial
support, it decided in 1996 to establish such functions itself.
However, thus far no institution or ombudsman position has been
established.
Within the Parliament, the Committee on Legislation and Human
Rights is charged with monitoring human rights violations; however,
like the rest of the Parliament, it is not independent in practice.
The OSCE mission in Dushanbe continues to monitor human rights
issues with the help of its several field offices. However, these field
offices experienced varying levels of cooperation with local
authorities. The OSCE opened field offices in Gharm and Khojand
following Government permission to do so and now has five field offices
in the country. The Government continued to refuse the ICRC
unconditional access to prisons in accordance with standard ICRC
modalities, despite letters received in the past from senior government
officials that such access would be forthcoming and further efforts by
the ICRC during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for the rights and freedoms of every
person regardless of nationality, race, sex, language, religious
beliefs, political persuasion, social status, knowledge, and property.
It also explicitly states that men and women have the same rights.
However, in practice there is discrimination as a result of cultural
traditions and the lingering hostilities from the 1992 civil war.
Women.--Wife beating is a common problem. In both urban and rural
areas, many cases of wife beating go unreported and many of those cases
reported are not investigated. There is a widespread reluctance to
discuss the issue or provide assistance to women in abusive situations.
In addition abduction of young women, who are raped or forced to marry
their abductors, is widely reported.
The Criminal Code prohibits rape; however, it is widely believed
that most cases are unreported, and the problem is believed to be
growing, particularly in urban areas. The threat of rape often is used
to coerce women. There are no special police units for handling these
cases. One rape crisis center was established by a local NGO in
Dushanbe in 1993. The situation is exacerbated by a general decline in
public order, so that in many cities, including Dushanbe, women
exercise particular care in their movement, especially at night.
The law prohibits keeping brothels, procuring, making, or selling
pornography, infecting another person with a venereal disease, and
sexual exploitation of women; however, prostitutes operate openly at
night in certain urban areas.
There are credible reports of trafficking in women (see Section
6.f.).
There have been reports of physical harassment of women by
conservative Muslims in rural areas for not wearing traditional attire.
According to the law, women have equal rights with men. Articles in
the Criminal Code protect women's rights in marriage and family
matters. Girls often are pressured to marry men that they do not choose
themselves, and illegal polygamy is increasingly common.
Traditionally there has been a high level of female participation
in the work force and in institutes of higher learning. There is no
formal discrimination against women in employment, education, or
housing, and in urban areas women can be found employed throughout
government, academic institutes, and enterprises. Some women hold the
same jobs as men, although not in equal numbers. Women officially
receive the equal pay for equal work, but this regulation is not always
the case in practice. However, divorce rates in urban areas are
comparatively high, and women tend to carry the burden of child-rearing
and household management, whether married or divorced. In rural areas,
women tend to marry younger, have larger families, and receive less
university education than women in cities. In rural and traditional
areas, women receive less education in general, often leaving school
after the eighth year. Due to the prevalence of large families, women
in rural areas are also much less likely to work outside the home.
Inheritance laws do not discriminate against women; however, in
practice, inheritances may pass disproportionately to sons.
Children.--The Government's lack of financial resources left it
unable to fulfill its extensive commitments to children's rights and
welfare, and the government social security network for child welfare
appeared to continue to deteriorate. Women are provided 3 years of
maternity leave and monthly subsidies for each child; health care is
free. Education is compulsory until age 16; however, the law is not
enforced. Public education is intended to be free; however, a lack of
resources has caused the public school system to deteriorate to the
point at which it barely functions. Parents who can afford to do so
send their children to private schools (a number of which have been
founded since the end of the Soviet period), or join together in groups
that hire teachers to give their children lessons for a fee. Public
education is intended to be universal; however, a significant number of
school-age children--possibly as high as 20 or 25 percent in some
areas--work instead of attending school. The old Soviet practice, which
is now illegal, of closing high schools at cotton harvest time and
putting the students to work in the field continues in some areas.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--The 1992 Law on Social Protection of
Invalids stipulates the right of the disabled to employment and
adequate medical care. However, in practice the Government does not
require employers to provide physical access for the disabled.
Financial constraints and the absence of basic technology to assist the
disabled result, in practice, in high unemployment and widespread
discrimination. There is no law mandating accessibility for the
disabled. There are facilities for the mentally disabled; however,
funding is limited and the facilities are in poor condition. Several
international NGO's provide limited assistance to persons with
disabilities.
Religious Minorities.--Baha'i and Hare Krishna groups experience
only limited prejudice. A prominent 88-year-old member of Dushanbe's
Baha'i community was killed in his home in September. Members of the
Baha'i community believe that he was killed because of his religion,
since none of his personal possessions were taken from the murder
scene. Police made no arrests, although militant Islamists aligned with
Iran are considered likely perpetrators.
Some Muslim leaders occasionally have expressed concern that
minority religious groups undermine national unity.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Uzbeks make up
approximately a quarter of the population but are substantially
underrepresented in official positions. The number of Uzbek language
newspapers, television broadcasts, and schools has declined
significantly since 1992. With the exception of the trilingual (Tajik/
Uzbek/Russian) school structure, the Uzbek language has no official
status. Although the Government permits a daily Uzbek radio broadcast,
broadcast time is dominated by Tajik and Russian language programs. A
weekly television broadcast in Uzbek ceased in August.
In practice Russian is the language of interethnic communication
and widely used in government. Ethnic Russians and related Russian
speakers, for example, Ukrainians, make up less than 2 percent of the
population. While the Government repeatedly has expressed its desire
for the ethnic Russian and Slavic population to remain, economic
conditions provide little incentive for them to do so, and some local
Russians and other Slavs perceive an increase in negative social
attitudes toward them. A Slavic university and a Russian high school
operate in Dushanbe with Russian as the language of instruction, but
also include Tajik and Uzbek students. An agreement ratified by the
Russian Duma in December 1996 allows for dual Russian and Tajik
citizenship.
Tensions persist between ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks in some areas;
government officials have organized meetings at the local level to
resolve conflicts; however, the authorities apparently have not
arrested or prosecuted suspects in murders of ethnic Uzbeks in July
1998. Since the signing of the peace treaty in 1997, there have been
multiple murders of ethnic Uzbeks in the Panj district. As a result of
these attacks, some ethnic Uzbek families have moved to other locations
in the district where Uzbeks predominate or to neighboring CIS
countries.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Law on Social Organization and
the Law on Trade Union Rights and Guarantees both provide all citizens
with the right of association, including the right to form and join
associations without prior authorization, to organize territorially,
and to form and join federations.
The Federation of Trade Unions, a docile holdover from the Soviet
era, remains the dominant labor organization, although it has since
shed its subordination to the Communist Party. The Federation consists
of 20 professional trade unions and claims 1.5 million members,
virtually all nonagricultural workers. The separate, independent Trade
Union of Non-State Enterprises has registered unions in over 3,000
small and medium-sized enterprises, totaling about 37,000 employees
(according to 1998 figures). Many of the enterprises in which these two
organizations are nominally present are not functioning because of the
general economic depression, and the membership of both has declined as
a result. The Council of Ministers formally consults both organizations
during the drafting of social welfare and worker rights legislation.
The Law on Tariff Agreements and Social Partnerships mandates
arbitration before a union legally may call a strike. Depending on the
scale of the labor disagreement, arbitration can take place at the
company, sector, or governmental level. In the event that arbitration
fails, unions have the right to strike, but both labor unions have
disavowed publicly the utility of strikes in a period of deepening
economic crisis and high unemployment and have espoused compromise
between management and workers.
There were no official, union-sanctioned strikes, nor were there
any wildcat strikes (which last occurred in 1996).
The law provides citizens but not unions with the right to
affiliate freely with international organizations, including
international labor organizations. It does not prohibit unions from
affiliating with international organizations; however, there are no
unions with international affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is codified in the Law on Trade Union
Rights and Guarantees, the Law on Social Partnerships and Collective
Contracts, and the Law on Labor Protection. Employees, members of the
trade union, and management participate in collective bargaining at the
company level. Negotiations involving an industrial sector include
officials from the relevant ministry and members of the union's
steering committee for that particular sector. As the economic
situation worsens, it is becoming increasingly difficult for
enterprises to engage in effective collective bargaining.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination, the use of sanctions to
dissuade union membership, and the firing of a worker solely for union
activity. Any complaints of discrimination against a labor union or
labor union activist are considered first by a local labor union
committee and, if necessary, raised to the level of the Supreme Court
and investigated by the Ministry of Justice. The law compels an
employer found guilty of firingan employee based on union activity to
reinstate the employee.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor, except in cases defined in the law; however, it
persists in some cases. No labor laws have been passed since the
adoption of the Constitution in 1994. Neither the Law on Labor
Protection nor the Law on Employment, both predating the present
Constitution, specifically prohibits forced or compulsory labor. The
Soviet practice of compelling students to pick cotton was banned
officially in 1989; however, high school students in some regions still
are sent to the fields to pick cotton, particularly in the Leninabad
area, sometimes with compensation. Residents of state or collective
farms still may be required to pick cotton, although wages usually are
not paid and these institutions no longer provide the services they
once did.
The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children; however, apart from traditional participation by children in
family agricultural or home craftsman work, such practices are not
known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--According to labor laws, the minimum age for the
employment of children is 16, the age at which children also may leave
school legally. With the concurrence of the local trade union,
employment may begin at the age of 15. By law workers under the age of
18 may work no more than 6 hours a day and 36 hours per week. However,
children as young as 7 years of age can perform household-based labor
and participate in agricultural work, which is classified as family
assistance. Many children under 10 years of age work in the bazaars or
sell newspapers or consumables on the street. Trade unions are
responsible for reporting any violations in the employment of minors.
Cases not resolved between the union and the employer may be brought
before the Procurator General, who may investigate and charge the
manager of the enterprise with violations of the Labor Code.
The law prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, and such
practices generally do not occur, apart from family-based work (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The President, on the advice of
the Ministry of Labor and in consultation with trade unions, sets the
minimum monthly wage. The nominal minimum wage per month (effective in
January) was approximately $1.50 (2,000 Tajik rubles). This rate fell
far short of providing a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. The Government recognizes this problem and has retained certain
subsidies for workers and their families at the minimum wage. Although
the Government adopted a wage indexation law in 1993 and inflation has
been high, the law has not been implemented.
Although slightly improved, the economy remained extremely weak
during the year, with a majority of industrial operations standing
idle. As factories and enterprises either remained closed or were shut
down, workers were laid off or furloughed for extended periods.
Some establishments, both governmental and private, compensated
their employees in kind with food commodities or with the products
produced by the enterprise. The employee could then sell or barter
those products in local private markets.
The legal workweek for adults (over age 18) is 40 hours. Overtime
payment is mandated by law, with the first 2 hours of overtime to be
paid at 1\1/2\ times the normal rate and the rest of the overtime hours
at double time.
The Government has established occupational health and safety
standards, but these fall far below accepted international norms, and
the Government does not enforce them in practice. The enforcement of
work standards is the responsibility of the State Technical Supervision
Committee under the Council of Ministers. While new statistics were not
available, it is virtually certain, given the continuing economic
decline, that 1993 statistics, which reported that over one-fifth of
the population worked in substandard conditions, greatly underreported
the number working in those conditions. Workers can leave their jobs
with 2 months' notice, but, given the bleak employment situation, few
choose to do so. The Law on Labor Protection provides that workers can
remove themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons. There are credible reports of trafficking in women,
particularly among groups involved in the narcotics trade with
Afghanistan (see Section 5). Although such trafficking is illegal, the
Government has taken no significant action against it.
______
TURKEY
Turkey is a constitutional republic with a multiparty Parliament,
the Turkish Grand National Assembly, which elects the President. In
1993 it elected Suleyman Demirel President for a 7-year term. After
April parliamentary elections, Bulent Ecevit's Democratic Left Party
(DSP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) led by Devlet Bahceli, and
former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz's Motherland Party (ANAP) formed a
new Government in June with Ecevit as Prime Minister. The military
exercises substantial, but indirect, influence over government policy
and actions--and politics--in the belief that it is the constitutional
protector of the State. The Government generally respects the
Constitution's provisions for an independent judiciary; however,
various officials acknowledge the need for legislative changes to
strengthen its independence.
For over 15 years, the Government has engaged in armed conflict
with the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), whose goal originally
was the formation of a separate state of Kurdistan in southeastern
Turkey. A state of emergency, declared in 1987, continues in five
southeastern provinces that faced substantial PKK terrorist violence.
The Parliament in November lifted the state of emergency in Siirt
province. The level of violence decreased substantially compared with
the previous year. The state of emergency region's governor has
authority over the provincial governors in the five provinces, and six
adjacent ones including Siirt, for security matters. Under the state of
emergency, this regional governor may exercise certain quasi-martial
law powers, including imposing restrictions on the press, removing from
the area persons whose activities are deemed detrimental to public
order, and ordering village evacuations. The state of emergency decree
was renewed in five provinces (Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Sirnak, Tunceli,
and Van) for 4 months in November.
The Turkish National Police (TNP) have primary responsibility for
security in urban areas, while the Jandarma (gendarmerie) carry out
this function in the countryside. The armed forces, in support of the
police and particularly the Jandarma, carry out operations against the
PKK in the state of emergency region, thereby serving an internal
security function. These operations declined in number as the terrorist
threat ebbed. Although civilian and military authorities remain
publicly committed to the rule of law and respect for human rights,
members of the security forces, including police ``special teams,''
other TNP personnel, village guards, and Jandarma committed serious
human rights abuses.
The Government passed a series of long-awaited economic structural
and fiscal reforms. These developments bolstered the Government's
launch of a 3-year disinflationary program designed to rectify income
disparities. The export-oriented market economy contracted during the
year, due to the disinflationary program, the aftermath of the Russian
financial crisis of 1998, a slump in tourism revenues, and the impact
of the August 17 earthquake. A slight recovery was apparent by year's
end. Trade in manufactured goods, predominantly oriented toward the
European Union, remained resilient overall. Textiles, iron, and steel
continued to lead exports, but electronics, autos, and processed foods
featured more prominently. The Government made substantial progress
toward international pipeline agreements to ship Caspian Basin oil and
gas to world markets through the Caucasus and Turkey. Inflation was
slightly higher than in 1998, and income disparities between the top
and bottom population segments grew. Corruption in public procurement
continued to be a focus of public attention.
Serious human rights abuses continued; however, the Ecevit
Government adopted measures designed to improve human rights and some
officials participated in a broad public debate on democracy and human
rights. Extrajudicial killings continued, including deaths due to
excessive force and deaths in detention due to torture. There were few
reports of mystery killings and disappearances of political activists;
however, the authorities failed to adequately investigate past
disappearances. Torture, beatings, and other abuses by security forces
remained widespread, at times resulting in deaths. Police and Jandarma
often employed torture and abused detainees during incommunicado
detention and interrogation. The lack of universal and immediate access
to an attorney and long detention periods for those held for political
crimes are major factors in the commission of torture by police and
other security forces. With the decrease in operations and detentions
in the southeast, there were fewer reported cases of abuse; however,
the proportion of cases in which abuse occurred remained at high
levels.
The rarity of convictions and the light sentences imposed on police
and other security officials for killings and torture continued to
foster a climate of impunity that remained the single largest obstacle
to reducing torture and prisoner abuse. Investigations and trials of
officials suspected of abuses continued to be protracted and
inconclusive. Important cases dating back several years continued
without resolution, including: Appeals in the cases of police officers
charged with the 1996 death of journalist Metin Goktepe, 10 police
officers from Manisa charged with torturing 16 persons in 1995, and
action against police and security personnel charged with beating to
death 10 prisoners during a prison disturbance in Diyarbakir in 1996.
Prison conditions remained poor. In September armed clashes between
prisoners and prison officials resulted in the killing of 10 prisoners.
The police and Jandarma continued to use arbitrary arrest and
detention. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trials continued to
be problems. Prosecutions brought by the Government in State Security
Courts (SSC's) reflect the legal structure, which protects state
interests over individual rights. The Government infringed on citizens'
privacy rights.
Limits on freedom of speech and of the press remained a serious
problem. Authorities banned or confiscated numerous publications and
raided newspaper offices, encouraging self-censorship on reporting on
the southeast. Security forces at times beat journalists. Police and
the courts continued to limit freedom of expression by using
restrictions in the 1982 Constitution and several laws, including the
1991 Anti-Terror Law (disseminating separatist propaganda), Article 159
of the Criminal Code (concerning insults to Parliament, the army,
Republic, or judiciary), Article 160 (insulting the Turkish Republic),
Article 169 (aiding an illegal organization), Article 312 (incitement
to racial, ethnic or religious enmity), the Law to Protect Ataturk, and
Article 16 of the Press Law. Parliament during the year passed two new
laws, on combating criminal organizations and on prosecuting civil
servants, that contain provisions allowing prosecutions for certain
types of speech. Parliament in August also passed a law suspending for
3 years the sentences of writers and journalists convicted of crimes
involving freedom of expression through the media. By the end of the
year, at least 25 journalists, authors, or political party officials
who had published articles were released, and as many as hundreds more
had their trials halted. However, they are subject to reimprisonment if
they commit a similar crime within a 3-year period. The Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ) reported that at least 18 journalists
nevertheless remained imprisoned at year's end compared with 25 in
1998. Human rights observers and some released writers criticized the
suspension of sentences law because it did not apply to crimes
committed through speech and because the conditions for the suspension
amount to censorship.
Some members of the country's political elite, bureaucracy,
military, and judiciary claim that the state is threatened by both
``reactionaries'' (Islamists) and ``separatists'' (Kurdish
nationalists) and continued to call for concrete steps--many involving
potential curbs on freedom of expression--to meet these threats.
Prosecutors, courts, and the police continued to take actions against
those accused of challenging the secular nature or unity of the state,
generally on the basis of the constitutional restrictions on freedom of
expression. Government pressure on the legal but pro-Kurdish People's
Democracy Party (HADEP) continued. The authorities detained 47 HADEP
members who led a hunger strike after PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan's
November 1998 flight from Syria. Party leaders allege that many were
tortured or beaten; all were released after several months' detention.
HADEP politicians asserted that, especially before the April elections,
they were the object of arbitrary arrests and harassment designed to
hurt their election chances. Following the elections and a drop in PKK
terrorist violence in the summer, government pressure on HADEP eased
somewhat, although some HADEP officials still faced harassment, court
cases, and hostility from some security officials. In December police
raided HADEP party offices in seven provinces.
The National Security Council, a powerful, constitutionally
mandated advisory body to the Government composed of equal numbers of
senior military officers and civilian ministers, continued to urge the
Government to offer no concessions in the fight against the perceived
threat of radical Islam, described the armed forces as the
constitutionally mandated ``fist'' protecting secularism, and accused
Islamist media of extremism and undermining the State. However,
following the killing of a prominent secular journalist in October, the
military and political leadership resisted calls to crack down on
Islamists. Istanbul mayor and prominent Islamist political leader Recep
Tayyip Erdogan was released after serving 4\1/2\ months of a 10-month
sentence for a 1998 conviction on charges of promoting religious enmity
and threatening the unity of the state. He is banned permanently from
politics.
Both the HADEP and the Islamist Fazilet parties, whose predecessors
had been closed, were the subjects of closure cases during the year for
alleged anticonstitutional activities. Both cases were pending at
year's end, and elected officials of both parties remained in office in
full exercise of their functions. The moderate pro-Kurdish Democratic
Mass Party (DKP) was closed in February. Amendments passed by
Parliament in August make it more difficult to prove allegations of
anticonstitutional activities and close political parties.
The state of emergency governor, courts, police, and the state
broadcasting oversight body denied the Kurdish population, the largest
single ethnic group in the southeast, use of its language in election
campaigning, education, broadcasting, and in some cultural activities,
such as weddings. Printed material in Kurdish is legal. However, the
police continue to interfere with the distribution of some newspapers,
and the governor of the emergency region banned some Kurdish-language
newspapers in that mainly Kurdish-speaking area. Kurdish music
recordings are widely available, but bans on certain songs and singers
persist. Radio and television broadcasts in Kurdish are illegal and in
practice rarely occur, with the exception of a station that is widely
believed to be broadcast from a military base. Some radio stations,
especially in the southeast, play Kurdish music. The Government's
broadcast monitoring agency mostly tolerates this practice but has
closed down some stations for playing politically oriented, banned
Kurdish music.
The police and Jandarma continued to limit freedom of assembly and
association. The police harassed, beat, abused, and detained a large
number of demonstrators. For example the Saturday Mothers, who held
weekly vigils in Istanbul for more than 3 years to protest the
disappearances of their relatives, discontinued their gatherings in
March in the face of ongoing police harassment, abuse, and detention of
the group's members.
The Government continued to impose some restrictions on religious
minorities and at times imposed some limits on freedom of movement. The
Government continued to harass, intimidate, indict, and imprison human
rights monitors, journalists, and lawyers for ideas that they expressed
in public forums. The Diyarbakir branch of the leading human rights
nongovernmental organization (NGO), the Human Rights Association (HRA),
remained closed; other NGO branches have been closed, temporarily or
indefinitely, especially in the southeast. Former HRA president Akin
Birdal was jailed in June on charges of inciting hatred and enmity in
nonviolent statements he made about the Kurdish problem and torture,
but in late September was released for 6 months on medical grounds. In
December the Ankara State Security Court sentenced 10 persons,
including a former Jandarma sergeant, and acquitted 6 others in the
1998 attempted murder of Birdal. There were some signs of a growing
tolerance for human rights monitors, journalists, and lawyers: State
Minister Irtemcelik and President Demirel met with NGO's, and the
office of the HRA in Van reopened in October after being closed for 5
years.
Spousal abuse remains a serious problem, and discrimination against
women persisted. Some abuse of children, discrimination against
religious and ethnic minorities, and child labor remained serious
problems. There are some restrictions on worker rights. Trafficking in
women and girls to Turkey for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem.
The situation in the southeast remained a serious concern. The
Government has long denied the Kurdish population, located largely in
the southeast, basic political, cultural, and linguistic rights. Past
cases of extrajudicial killings went unsolved, and the police and
Jandarma tortured civilians. The state of emergency authority abridged
freedom of expression and put pressure on HADEP. The number of
villagers forcibly evacuated from their homes since the conflict began
is estimated credibly to be approximately 560,000.
In February the Government captured PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. In
June he was tried in a State Security Court on the charge of treason
through trying to separate part of the country from government control
(i.e., sedition) and sentenced to death. His sentence was upheld in
November, and the case is pending before the European Court of Human
Rights. Human rights observers, including the U.N. High Commissioner
for Human Rights (UNHCHR), raised several due process concerns in the
Ocalan case, including his initial 9 to 10 days of incommunicado
detention, the limited access of Ocalan's lawyers to private
consultations with their client and to written material included in the
prosecution's case, and the harassment and threats directed toward
Ocalan's lawyers. After his capture and trial, Ocalan called for PKK
members to leave Turkey and commit themselves to a peaceful resolution
of the Kurdish problem.
The new Ecevit Government adopted a series of initiatives during
the year designed to improve human rights conditions. They included:
Removing military judges from the State Security Courts; increasing
maximum, although not minimum, sentences for torture or for falsifying
a medical record to hide torture; calling for prosecutors to make
unscheduled inspections of detention sites; making it more difficult to
close political parties; suspending for 3 years the sentences or court
cases of dozens of journalists and writers, provided they do not commit
a similar offense; imposing a time limit on supervisors to decide
whether civil servants, including security forces, can be prosecuted;
and allowing prosecutors to begin immediately collecting evidence of
alleged abuse by security officials.
Senior judicial figures, the President, other politicians, and
private citizens participated in a wide-ranging public debate on
amending the 1982, postmilitary coup-era Constitution in order to allow
greater individual liberties. Due to major developments in the fight
against PKK terrorism, public discussion of options for dealing with
the Kurdish problem became more vigorous than ever. In October the
State Minister for Human Rights convened a broad roundtable discussion
with NGO's, professional associations, and parliamentary bodies.
The State Minister for Human Rights, who is also the coordinator
for the High Council for Human Rights, and the Minister of Justice led
the Government's effort to implement legislative and administrative
reforms. The armed forces continued to emphasize human rights in
training for its officers and noncommissioned officers. Human rights
groups attributed a general reduction in human rights violations by
military personnel to this effort. Human rights education in primary
schools is mandatory; it is an elective in high schools.
The PKK continued to commit abuses as part of its violent 15-year
campaign against the Government and civilians, mostly Kurds. In the
first half of the year, PKK terrorists committed random killings and
attacks throughout Turkey to protest Ocalan's capture. Terrorist acts
attributed to the PKK included a suicide bomb attack in Adana in July,
which injured 17 persons, and an Istanbul department store bombing in
March that killed 13 persons. Although there was a brief resurgence of
PKK terrorist acts following the June sentencing of PKK leader Ocalan
to death, a lower rate of PKK terrorist acts was recorded during the
summer and fall than in the previous year. In recent years military
pressure significantly reduced the PKK's effectiveness, and some PKK
members--though not all--are heeding Ocalan's call for an end to the
armed struggle and PKK withdrawal from Turkey. Violence declined to the
point where the public's freedom to travel at night is no longer
restricted in parts of the southeast.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Credible reports of
political and extrajudicial killings by government authorities
continued, although accurate figures were unavailable. The Human Rights
Foundation (HRF) Documentation Center reported a number of deaths of
detainees under suspicious circumstances, many as an apparent result of
torture. There were at least 12 deaths in detention during the year,
according to human rights organizations and press reports. In March
trade unionist Suleyman Yeter died while in custody at the Istanbul
security directorate political police center. According to the HRF, the
official autopsy report states that he died ``because of pressure on
the neck'' and that there were bone fractures and bruises. Yeter was a
plaintiff in an ongoing trial of eight police officers who allegedly
had tortured and raped detainees in 1997. In August two Van police
officers allegedly kicked a 14-year-old street vendor to death; the
autopsy revealed swelling around the child's brain and liver consistent
with battery. No court case has been opened against the officers. Other
cases in which security forces apparently committed extrajudicial
killings include the death of an alleged narcotics trafficker under
suspicious circumstances while in detention in Istanbul in September;
the death in March, allegedly from torture, of villager Salih
Karaaslan, near Sirnak; the alleged torture death of Alpaslan Yelden in
Izmir in July, for which a police inspector was suspended pending
investigation (and another inspector who testified in the case had been
under suspension for a previous torture violation); and the death of a
16-year-old ordinary male prisoner, whose relatives said had resisted
rape by prison guards. More than a dozen civilians were shot to death
either after not heeding a ``stop warning'' during arrest or commission
of a crime or in accidental shootings by police, Jandarma, and in four
cases by the military. More than 40 persons--mainly children or
military personnel--were killed by mines in the southeast. The courts
undertook investigations of most alleged extrajudicial killings; only a
few yielded concrete results.
Human rights monitors credibly reported that government forces used
excessive force, sometimes resulting in deaths, during some raids on
criminals or alleged terrorist and militant safe houses. A house raid
in August in Izmir left three persons dead. In October the police in
Adana entered the wrong apartment during a raid and shot occupant Murat
Bektas to death in front of his wife and son. The police were unable to
substantiate their charge that the man was armed. In January the
Constitutional Court annulled for a year part of the 1996 Provincial
Authority law allowing security officers to ``fire directly and without
hesitation'' at persons who ignore a warning to stop. The Court's
judgment requires that a new provision be passed within a year.
In September Jandarma killed 10 prisoners and seriously injured
many others in Ankara's Central Prison during a clash following
attempts by prison administrators to search and transfer some prisoners
(see Section 1.c.).
In the 12 deaths in detention reported by human rights
organizations and media reports during the year, 3 cases led to arrests
or trials of police or other law enforcement personnel. The number of
arrests and prosecutions in such cases remained low compared to the
incidents of deaths in detention, and convictions remained rare.
Punishments, when handed down, were generally minimal. Jurisdictional
questions, efforts by the police leadership to protect officers,
prosecutors' failure to investigate and bring charges, and the failure
of courts to hand down appropriate sentences were all obstacles to
resolving the problem of apparent security force impunity for such
deaths.
In cases of extrajudicial killings by police, Jandarma or prison
guards, at least 30 trials were begun during the year or continued from
previous years, some relating to events back to 1991.
No investigation has been opened into the 1998 death in custody of
18-year-old HADEP member Hamit Cakar, who allegedly was beaten to death
by Diyarbakir police during a raid on HADEP offices. An initial autopsy
noted bruises on Cakar's body and blood in his lungs, consistent with
battery. In January seven police officers charged in the 1998 death of
an accused burglar in police custody in Gaziantep were released on bail
and continue on active duty.
According to the Turkish National Police (TNP), no one is to be
prosecuted in the case of the death in custody in 1997 of university
student Burhanett Akdogu. According to the TNP, Akdogu committed
suicide. Two State Security Court prosecutors agreed and found in June
that there was no need for prosecution.
In May the Afyon Penal Court convicted six policemen and sentenced
them to 7\1/2\ years' imprisonment for ``unintentional murder/
manslaughter'' in the case of journalist Metin Goktepe, who was killed
in 1996. It acquitted five others. The Goktepe family appealed the
verdict and is pursuing a civil court case. Before the final trial
session, families and friends of Goktepe attempted an unauthorized
march to the court. The police blocked the demonstration, and rocks
were thrown at the police, who then used their batons to drive the
crowds back to their buses. Several persons were hurt, including
Goktepe's mother and three police officers. Goktepe, a correspondent
for the left-wing newspaper, Evrensel, died from wounds inflicted while
in detention in Istanbul in 1996. Police initially denied that he was
detained, then later said that he died from a fall. Following large
public demonstrations and parliamentary criticism over the
circumstances of his death, an investigation led to the arrest of 48
officers. In 1997 the courts decided to try separately 11 of the police
officers for premeditated murder; 5 were convicted of manslaughter in
1998, while the remaining 6 were acquitted. However, the Court of
Appeals subsequently overturned both the convictions and the acquittals
and sent the case back to the Afyon court. The other 37 officers, who
were charged with excessive use of force in controlling the
demonstration, were acquitted due to lack of evidence, because the
court could not determine which police officers may have beaten
detainees and which did not. The detainees have asked for an appeal,
but no court date has been set.
The trial of 29 Jandarma soldiers and 36 antiterror police officers
charged with manslaughter in the 1996 beating deaths of 10 prisoners
while quelling a prison disturbance in Diyarbakir continued throughout
the year. A separate case against prison officials exists; for this
case, indictments (for excessive use of force) were based only on
identifications by wounded prisoners of who injured them. Two-thirds of
the indictments were dismissed, since the slain prisoners could not
identify their own killers.
The trial continued of 20 police officers who used lethal force
during 1995 incidents that led to the deaths of 19 people in Gazi,
Istanbul; one police officer is under arrest in the case. The trial
continued in Istanbul of policeman Abdullah Bozkurt for the 1994
shooting and killing of Vedat Han Gulsenoglu. A suspect was arrested in
1998 for the 1993 killing of journalist Ugur Mumcu. The suspect's court
case is proceeding. In the 1995 killing of Sinan Demirtas, one police
officer was convicted and sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment and seven
others were acquitted in November 1998. There were no developments in
the 1994 killing of Faik Candan and the 1992 killing of Yucel Ozen.
In June six Aydin police officers, including the deputy security
director and the antiterrorism department director, were convicted of
torturing student Baki Erdogan to death in police custody in 1993,
given 5\1/2\-year sentences, and barred from public service for life.
The ruling came during a retrial of the case, after an appellate court
in December 1998 had overturned the original convictions.
In December the Istanbul Penal Court found five antiterror police
guilty of the death of five persons during a 1993 raid on a coffee
house. The court sentenced them to death but then used a variety of
provisions of the Penal Code to reduce the sentence to 3 years, 10
months, and 20 days in prison.
The European Court of Human Rights in May found that Turkey had
violated the right to life of an individual who was killed in a 1990
security force operation in Siirt province and that the state had
failed to undertake an effective investigation of the case. In July the
Court also found that Turkey had violated an individual's right to life
and right to an effective remedy by failing to conduct an effective
investigation into his 1993 murder but did not conclude that the man
had been killed by security forces or with their connivance.
In the southeast, mystery killings, especially politically
motivated killings in which the assailant's identity is unknown,
decreased significantly since 1995 and remained at relatively low
levels during 1999; exact statistics are unavailable. There were no
reported mystery killings of high-profile, pro-Kurdish figures in the
southeast, and few reported killings of pro-Kurdish politicians,
journalists, or lawyers. The HRA reports a nationwide total of 212
unsolved killings, including killings for apolitical reasons or
attributed to terrorism. In August two Sirnak village guards were found
with multiple bullet wounds, cigarette burns, and broken necks and
limbs. The victims' relatives said that the bodies were found in an
area where security forces were operating and alleged that the two were
killed on orders of the local Jandarma. In September a HADEP official
in Adana was shot and killed by two unidentified assailants; while the
motive was unclear, HADEP does not believe that there is a political
connection. In October a prominent secular journalist was killed by a
bomb in front of his home in Ankara, presumably by a terrorist
organization.
The PKK continued to commit politically motivated killings,
primarily in rural southeast Anatolia. Victims included soldiers, state
officials such as Jandarma, state-paid paramilitary village guards and
family members, young villagers who refused to be recruited, and PKK
guerrillas-turned-informants. According to the Government, during the
year 220 security officials and 118 civilians died in terrorist
incidents, and 961 PKK members were killed by security forces (see
Section 1.g.). These figures show a decline from 1998, when 243
soldiers and Jandarma, 10 police officers, 114 village guards, and 132
civilians were killed.
The PKK has not murdered any teachers since 1996. Bomb attacks
attributed to the PKK in the first half of the year took the lives of
dozens of persons; one such attack occurred in a crowded shopping area
in Istanbul in March and killed 13 civilians. Although there was a
brief resurgence of PKK terrorist acts following the June sentencing of
PKK leader Ocalan to death, a lower rate of PKK terrorist acts was
recorded during the summer and fall than in the previous year.
Turkish Hizbullah, an Islamist terrorist group (not related to
Lebanese Hizballah), continued to target civilians in the southeast and
may be responsible for many mystery killings, including prominent
Islamist feminist Konca Kuris. The Government attributed 17 murders
during the year to Hizbullah. Some human rights monitors in the
southeast accused the Government of arming and supporting the group in
the 1980's to target the PKK and its sympathizers. It now generally is
believed that Hizbullah has operated autonomously since the mid-1990's.
Far-left armed groups, such as Revolutionary Left (Dev Sol/DHKP-C)
and the Turkish Workers and Peasants' Liberation Army (TIKKO),
continued to commit acts of terrorism. In June two DHKP-C militants
were killed in a shoot-out with police while attempting to launch a
rocket attack in Istanbul. One of the militants was identified as being
responsible for previous attacks and several police deaths.
b. Disappearance.--Accurate statistics on the disappearance of
those previously under detention, or seen being taken into custody by
security forces or law enforcement officials, are hard to confirm.
However, the HRF notes that the number of such disappearances increased
slightly to 36 in 1999, compared with 29 in 1998 and 66 in 1997. In
September Aydin Esmer disappeared as he was returning to his home in
Kulp, Diyarbakir province, from Kizilagac village in Mus province,
according to Amnesty International (AI). AI noted that a military
operation took place in the area the same day. Esmer had been detained
and allegedly tortured at the Kulp Jandarma station several times since
1993. In November Omer Cinar disappeared after leaving his workplace in
the Gunesli district of Istanbul; the authorities told his family that
he was not in custody, according to Human Rights Watch (HRW).
There have been no developments in the 1998 disappearances from
Izmir of editors Neslihan Uslu, Hasan Aydogan, Metin Andac, and Mehmet
Mandal. Neither the 1997 disappearances of Ilyas Eren and 73-year-old
Fikri Ozgen, allegedly taken into custody by plainclothes police, nor
the 1996 case in which at least five bodies were found near Baharli,
were resolved. However, according to the HRA, Burhan Aktas, who
disappeared in 1997, was determined to be living in Germany.
The European Court of Human Rights in July ruled against Turkey in
the case of Ahmet Cakici, who disappeared in 1993 after being taken
into custody by security forces and tortured during an unacknowledged
detention. The Court found that Turkey had violated Cakici's right to
life, subjected him to torture, and deprived him of his rights to
liberty and to an effective remedy, the latter by failing to conduct an
effective investigation.
In the face of persistent police harassment and abuse, the
``Saturday Mothers'' stopped meeting publicly in March (see Section
2.b.). The group, primarily women, had gathered for several years to
protest the disappearance of their relatives.
The Government made efforts to investigate and explain some
reported cases of disappearance. The Ministry of Interior operates the
Bureau for the Investigation of Missing Persons, which is open 24 hours
a day. During the year 59 applications were filed seeking information
on missing persons. Of these, seven persons were located, an additional
two were determined to be in prison, and two were found dead. Most
families of persons who disappeared hold the Government and security
forces responsible and consequently avoid contact with the government
office. AI criticizes the Bureau's findings for falling short of the
thorough and impartial investigations required in accordance with
international standards. The Ankara police operate a telephone number
through which the public can obtain information about detainees, gun
registration, and other police-related matters.
The U.N. Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances,
reporting on its September 1998 visit, noted that the total number of
disappearance cases was relatively low, and had decreased since 1994.
The report cautioned that its assessment did not exclude the
possibility of security force involvement, and it urged the Government
to improve the practices of its security forces. The report noted that
most disappearances followed arrests in homes and detentions that were
denied by authorities and that some disappearances occurred during
raids conducted by Jandarma or village guards. The report recommended
that the Government fully implement measures to address promptly
allegations concerning disappearances, reduce the number of
disappearances, and eliminate impunity. In particular it recommended
amending regulations concerning pretrial and incommunicado detention in
cases referred to the State Security Courts in order to ensure the
right of all detainees to have prompt access to their families and
lawyers.
The PKK has made a practice of kidnaping young men or threatening
their families as part of its recruiting effort. These activities and
abductions by PKK terrorists of local villagers and state officials
were becoming less frequent as the PKK's capabilities in the southeast
were reduced by ongoing government military pressure and calls by its
captured leader Ocalan for the PKK to withdraw from its former
operating areas in Turkey.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, the security
forces continue to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse persons
regularly. Despite the Government's cooperation with unscheduled
foreign inspection teams, public pledges by successive governments to
end the practice, and new government initiatives designed to address
the problem, torture continues to be widespread.
Human rights attorneys and physicians who treat victims of torture
say that most persons detained for or suspected of political crimes
usually suffer some torture at the hands of police and Jandarma during
periods of incommunicado detention before they are brought before a
court; ordinary criminal suspects also report frequent torture and
mistreatment by police. The HRF estimates the number of credible
applications for torture at its five national treatment centers to be
approximately 700 in 1999, compared with 673 in 1998. They believe that
these numbers underrepresent the actual number of persons tortured
while in detention or prison. Human rights advocates believe that
thousands of detainees were tortured during the year in the southeast,
where the problem is particularly serious, but that only 5 to 20
percent report torture because they fear retaliation or believe that
complaints are futile. Although the percentage of detainees subjected
to torture remained about the same as in 1998, several advocates
reported a reduction in the number of torture victims in the southeast
during the year. They attribute the decrease to fewer detentions;
reduced PKK violence, which has eased treatment by security officials;
better-educated security officers; and increased concern about the
problem from many sources. The reductions do not appear to be uniform
throughout the region. Human rights monitors report no improvement in
some provinces, while others note a decrease around cities but not in
more rural areas of the province. All report that torture remains
widespread in the southeast.
Human rights monitors report that because the arresting officer is
responsible for interrogating the suspect, some officers may resort to
torture to obtain a confession that would justify the arrest. They say
that police who resort to such practices generally beat detainees for
ordinary crimes who do not confess and stop if they cannot get a
confession. However, when beatings of suspects detained under the Anti-
Terror Law do not produce information and confessions, interrogators
shift to electric shock, cold water from high-pressure hoses, and other
methods. Observers say that security officials often use the torture of
political detainees simply to express anger and to intimidate the
detainees.
Human rights monitors say that security officials increasingly use
methods that do not leave physical traces, such as beating with
weighted bags instead of clubs or fists. Commonly employed methods of
torture reported by the HRF's treatment centers include: Systematic
beatings; stripping and blindfolding; exposure to extreme cold or high-
pressure cold water hoses; electric shocks; beatings on the soles of
the feet (falaka) and genitalia; hanging by the arms; food and sleep
deprivation; heavy weights hung on the body; water dripped onto the
head; burns; hanging sandbags on the neck; near-suffocation by placing
bags over the head; vaginal and anal rape with truncheons and, in some
instances, gun barrels; squeezing and twisting of testicles; and other
forms of sexual abuse. In some cases, multiple torture methods (e.g.,
hanging and electric shocks) are employed at the same time. Female
detainees often face sexual humiliation and, less frequently, more
severe forms of sexual torture. After being forced to strip in front of
male security officers, female detainees often are touched, insulted,
and threatened with rape. Other methods used are forced prolonged
standing, isolation, loud music, witnessing or hearing torture, being
driven to the countryside for a mock execution, threats to detainees or
their family members, and insults.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture conducted investigations at
the invitation of the Government in late 1998. He reported that while
torture was practiced systematically and on a widespread scale through
the mid-1990's, there were ``notable improvements'' since 1997. These
improvements were due in his opinion to shorter periods of
incommunicado detention and less brutal torture methods used in some
places, such as less use of falaka, electric shocks, and rape, possibly
connected with shorter periods of detention in 1997 and 1998. However,
he noted that torture and abuse still are practiced by law enforcement
officials--pervasively in numerous places around the country--but that
the Government was committed to improving its record and bringing its
law enforcement and administration of justice up to international
standards. He found that long periods of incommunicado detention and a
climate of impunity among law enforcement officials--two elements under
the Government's control--continued to contribute to the use of
torture.
Allegations of torture throughout the country continued during the
year, but mostly in the southeast. In October Dr. Zeki Uzun, a
gynecologist who volunteers with the HRF Izmir Treatment and
Rehabilitation Center, was taken into custody during a raid on his
private clinic by antiterror police. Uzun allegedly was subjected to
beatings, near suffocation, death threats, and other methods of torture
during his 6 days in custody. Although the Medical Association provided
an alternative medical report establishing that torture was inflicted
on Uzun, the official medical report provided after his detention
stated that he was not subjected to torture. According to the HRF, the
official medical report was given to Uzun without a medical
examination. Uzun is accused of supporting and providing treatment to
members of terrorist organizations. In public statements, the HRF and
the Izmir Chamber of Doctors asserted that Uzun's reports documenting
torture were the reason for his arrest and torture. They also said that
the police inspected and took patient records from his office.
In October nine persons, two under the age of 18, were detained for
``distributing aid material without permission'' in the region
devastated by the recent earthquake and allegedly tortured. In June
many of approximately 50 villagers detained by Jandarma in Kahraman
Maras province said that they were tortured, severely beaten, forced to
eat human excrement, suspended by their arms tied behind their backs,
and sprayed with pressurized water, according to AI. Charges were filed
against 32 of the villagers for supporting the PKK and 1 was charged
with PKK membership; 17 were released. In Sirnak 27 persons stated that
they were tortured in July while detained after house raids; the doctor
who substantiated their claims allegedly was threatened by Jandarma to
give a report of ``good health'', even though some of the detainees had
broken arms. Cevat Soysal, a high-ranking member of the PKK, was
captured in July in Moldova. He claimed that he was subjected to
electric shock, forced to lie naked on ice, sprayed with cold
pressurized water, and deprived of sleep when brought to Turkey; he is
seeking redress at the European Court of Human Rights. HADEP official
Mazaffer Cinar was interrogated in incommunicado detention for 8 days
at Siirt police headquarters on suspicion of supporting the PKK.
According to HRW, he said that he was beaten, his testicles were
pulled, he was suspended by his arms, he was hosed with cold
pressurized water, and his wife was threatened with rape. Filiz Celik,
charged with being a member of the PKK, reportedly was tortured in
detention while pregnant; in July her baby was born dead in an Istanbul
prison. In August 22-year-old Medine Oncel jumped out of a window
rather than be taken into detention again by the antiterror police; her
family claims that she was severely beaten and sexually abused during
her 10-day stay at a detention center in November 1998. Oncel, along
with numerous members of HADEP, was detained for participating in a
hunger strike in support of Ocalan.
Government officials admit that torture occurs, but deny that it is
systematic. The Ecevit Government, which took office in June, made
preventing acts of torture a priority. In August Parliament passed
legislation lengthening sentences for those convicted of torture from 5
to a maximum of 8 years; however, the measure did not increase minimum
sentences. The Government in August adopted a program of seminars by
NGO's and government institutions on human rights. The program targets
all civil servants with law enforcement responsibilities, as well as
social workers and primary and secondary school students. The
Government was in regular dialog with the Council of Europe's Committee
for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) and accepted unannounced visits by
the CPT, most recently in February when it visited PKK leader Ocalan in
prison.
Regulations on detention and arrest procedures introduced in
October 1998 were supplemented by a June directive from Prime Minister
Ecevit against torture, which reminded security forces of the new code
and called for public prosecutors to make unscheduled inspections of
places of detention. The Prime Minister asked for reports every 3
months on this process; these reports are not public. According to the
Government, prosecutors have made more than a thousand visits to
detention sites, resulting in investigations against 14 security
officers and the opening of court cases against 6 of them. Provincial
prosecutors began unannounced inspections of police stations in
October. Although some provincial authorities said that the inspections
uncovered no deficiencies, others admitted that they led to
improvements in practices in some provinces. Some human rights
observers question prosecutors' ability to influence police practices.
Private attorneys and human rights monitors report uneven
implementation of 1997 reforms granting immediate access by attorneys
to those arrested for common crimes and access after 4 days of
detention for those detained under the Anti-Terror Law. No immediate
access to an attorney is provided for under the law for persons whose
cases fall under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts, such as
persons charged with drug trafficking, smuggling, and crimes under the
Anti-Terror law. The lack of early access to an attorney is a major
factor in the occurrence of torture by police and security forces.
State-employed doctors give all medical exams for detainees. The
Government maintains that medical examinations occur once during
detention and a second time before either arraignment or release.
However, the examinations generally are exceedingly brief and informal,
often lasting less than a minute. In some cases doctors were brought
reports to sign, but no examinees. Former detainees assert that some
medical examinations take place too long after the event to reveal any
definitive evidence of torture. Lawyers contend that medical reports--
their only basis for filing a claim of torture--are not placed
regularly in prisoners' files.
Citing security reasons, members of security and police forces
often stay in the examination room when physicians are examining
detainees, resulting in the intimidation of both the detainee and the
physician. According to the Medical Association and other human rights
observers, the presence of a security officer--at times the one
allegedly responsible for torture--can lead physicians to refrain from
examining detainees, perform cursory examinations and not report
findings, or report physical findings but not draw reasonable medical
inferences that torture occurred. In one case during the year the
courts accepted alternative medical reports from private doctors that
contradicted official claims that torture did not occur.
New legislation passed in August increased the jail sentences and
fines for medical personnel who falsify reports to hide torture, those
who knowingly use such reports, and those who coerce doctors into
making them. The heaviest penalties are for those who supply false
reports for money. In practice there are few such prosecutions.
In June the Supreme Honor Board of the Medical Doctors Union
suspended for a month the licenses of six doctors from the Tekirdag
region near Istanbul after finding that they had falsified reports to
conceal evidence of torture and allowed police officers to be present
during examinations. In 1998 the nongovernmental Medical Association
suspended the license of Dr. Nur Birgen, a government-employed forensic
expert, for twice falsifying medical reports to hide evidence of
torture. When another doctor appealed to Dr. Birgen's state employer to
implement the suspension, the prosecutors opened a case against him for
insulting Dr. Birgen. Dr. Cumhur Akpinar was acquitted in December of
charges, filed in January, that he aided an illegal armed organization
by preparing exaggerated forensic reports. In March Dr. Eda Guven was
acquitted of abuse of duty after issuing medical reports documenting
injuries sustained by two detainees interrogated in 1997 by Jandarma in
Aydin province; her acquittal was upheld by the Court of Appeals in
May.
The investigation, prosecution, and punishment of members of the
security forces for torture or other mistreatment is rare. According to
the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Torture, very few allegations lead to
prosecution, and few prosecutions lead to conviction. He reported that
in Istanbul, for example, from 1996 to 1998 the chief public prosecutor
brought 245 cases of torture or mistreatment by security forces, which
resulted in only 15 convictions, with the longest sentence being 3
years. Nationally, between 1995 and 1997, 313 police officers were
prosecuted for torture; as of the end of 1998 there were no
convictions, over half had been released, and the other cases were
pending. Accused officers usually remain on duty pending a decision,
which can take years.
According to the Government, judicial action taken during the year
against police charged with torture or mistreatment resulted in 34
convictions, 164 acquittals, and 48 ongoing prosecutions.
Administrative decisions determined that no trial was needed in 146
other cases and that no cases needed to be opened against 55 other
officers accused of abuse. During the year 708 police also were given
administrative punishments, such as suspensions, for torture or
mistreatment. In addition 11 Jandarma were prosecuted during the year,
resulting in 3 convictions, 6 acquittals, and 2 ongoing trials. During
the past 5 years, two military personnel have been prosecuted for
torture; one was acquitted, and the trial of the other individual
continued.
The failure to enforce domestic and international bans on torture
fosters a climate of official impunity that encourages the systematic
abuse of detainees. Detainees state that prosecutors ignore their
claims of abuse during interrogation; prosecutors often belittle such
claims or contend that detainees injure themselves to accuse falsely
the security forces.
Legal, administrative, and bureaucratic barriers impede
prosecutions and contribute to the low number of convictions for
torture. The Government in December replaced an Ottoman-era civil
servant prosecution law, which was widely viewed as an extrajudicial
obstacle to prosecuting security officials for the abuse of power
because it required prosecutors to obtain permission from special
provincial administrative boards before initiating prosecutions against
any public employee for actions while carrying out official duties. The
boards were slow, dispersed accountability, and were perceived as not
sufficiently transparent. The new law now authorizes prosecutors to
begin collecting evidence immediately to substantiate claims of torture
by security officials. It also establishes a 30-day deadline, with a
possible 15-day extension, for a civil servant's supervisor to decide
whether that employee can be prosecuted (or whether the employee is to
be disciplined otherwise). However, the new law still protects civil
servants, including police or prison guards, from direct prosecution
unless their superiors grant permission to investigate them. This
provision has been widely criticized. Many jurists, including the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and human rights observers
said that the new law still falls short of the needed reform. The new
law also allows prosecutors to open investigations against persons
suspected of falsely accusing a civil servant based on ``enmity, hatred
or slandering.'' This provision was used in December against a defense
lawyer who stated that a medical record confirmed that security
officials tortured his client (see Section 4).
Under the Criminal Procedures Law, prosecutors may initiate
investigations of police or Jandarma officers suspected of torturing or
mistreating suspects. In cases where township security directors or
Jandarma commanders are accused of torture, the prosecutor must obtain
permission to initiate an investigation from the Ministry of Justice,
because these officials are deemed to have a status equal to that of
judges. Finally, in the state of emergency regions, any lawsuit
directed at government authorities must be approved by the state of
emergency governor. Approval is rare.
In December the Iskenderun, Hatay, chief public prosecutor, citing
lack of evidence, dropped charges against two Iskenderun antiterror
police accused of sexually harassing, raping with a truncheon, and
torturing two female high school students while they were in police
custody in March. There were several medical reports issued in the
highly publicized case, but only an informal medical assessment by two
doctors indicated torture. The girls' attorneys said that they would
appeal the decision.
In Elazig the public prosecutor decided against indicting 30
soldiers and warders for allegedly torturing a prisoner in 1998.
The appeal by police officers of their 1-year suspended sentences
for torturing Songul Yildiz in 1997 continues in Istanbul. However, her
conviction on charges of PKK membership was overturned by the Court of
Appeals; the Istanbul SSC is retrying her case. In the case of Hatun
Temizalp, who alleged in a State Security Court that she was tortured
in detention in 1997, the TNP antiterror department said that
administrative investigations of the police found no cause for bringing
charges.
The Government provided additional information on the case of then
2\1/2\-year-old Azat Tokmak, who the Istanbul Chamber of Doctors
certified in April 1998 was tortured in 1996. The Fatih prosecutor's
office, citing a medical report that found no indication of
mistreatment when Azat was brought to an Istanbul nursery, decided in
July 1998 that there was not sufficient evidence to pursue the case.
A case began in April against 12 policemen accused of torturing
``peace train'' detainees in 1997 (see Section 4).
The following torture cases remained unresolved. In June the Court
of Appeals General Council overturned the second acquittal verdict of
10 policemen, including one police chief, charged with torturing 14
teenagers in Manisa in 1995; they based this decision on another Court
of Appeals decision. The appellate court again found that the students
had exhibited evidence of physical and psychological torture while
under detention. In November the Court of Appeals Chief Prosecutor
turned down the police officers' application for a review of that
judgment, and the Supreme Court sent the case back for retrial. The
Manisa court in December held a preliminary hearing in the retrial, but
postponed the main hearing until February 2000 in order to record the
testimonies of the police officers, who remain on active duty.
Responding to a written question from Parliament, the Interior Minister
in the summer defended the police officers accused in the case and said
that the investigation at the time showed that they were ``flawless.''
At the same time, the students' own case continues in Izmir, after the
Court of Appeals overturned the January 1997 convictions of 10 of the
students on charges of belonging to an illegal leftist organization; 4
other students originally were acquitted. The Medical Doctor's Union
Central Council Supreme Honorary Board suspended 10 doctors from
practicing for from 3 to 6 months, on the grounds that they had
provided false medical reports on the Manisa victims.
In February the Court of Appeals overturned the conviction and life
sentence of Gulderen Baran who, along with four other individuals, was
arrested in 1995 in Istanbul on charges of membership in a terrorist
organization. Baran sustained serious physical damage to her arms while
in police custody, and four police officers subsequently were charged
for mistreatment. Two police officers were sentenced in 1997 to 10
months in prison and a 2-month ban from public service. There were no
known developments in the cases of the police officers.
There were no developments in the cases of Kelekcier, Altinbas,
Uzuner, and Kartal.
Police regularly harass, beat, and abuse demonstrators (see Section
2.b.). Police also harass, beat, and abuse journalists (see Section
2.a.).
Prison conditions remain poor. With some exceptions (i.e., for
high-profile political prisoners, or those with gang connections)
prisons remain plagued by overcrowding, underfunding, and very poor
administration. Despite the existence of separate juvenile facilities,
juveniles and adults sometimes are incarcerated together, and most
prisons lack adequate medical care for routine treatment or even
medical emergencies. Families often must supplement the poor quality
food. Prisons are run on the ward system. In some cases, prisoners with
similar ideological views are incarcerated together and indoctrinate
and punish their own, resulting in gang and terrorist group domination
of entire wards. Past efforts to introduce a restrictive cell system
were criticized by prisoners, attorneys, and human rights groups alike,
who view the ward system as a more humane form of incarceration.
In September Jandarma killed 10 prisoners and seriously injured
many others in Ankara's Central Prison during a clash following
attempts by the administration to search and transfer some prisoners
from a ward run by Dev-Sol and TIKKO adherents. Prisoners throughout
the country briefly protested, holding hostages and refusing to be
counted. Human rights lawyers alleged that forensic reports show that
prisoners were shot at close range. In December inmates and security
forces violently clashed in Metris Prison in Istanbul, after Jandarma
tried to search and transfer some members of the Islamic Great East
Raiders Front to another prison. Throughout the year, many small-scale
hunger strikes broke out to protest prison conditions and poor
treatment by guards at many institutions.
Human rights observers estimate that at any given time, at least
one-quarter of those in prison are awaiting trial or the outcome of
their trial. The Parliament's Human Rights Commission completed a
thorough review in 1998 of prison conditions throughout the country;
however, before the report could be published the Commission's
composition changed after the April elections. The Commission is
reviewing its report, providing updated, comparative data, and plans to
present it to Parliament.
The Government permits prison visits by international
organizations, such as the European Committee to Prevent Torture and
the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture, but only rarely allows such
visits by members of local NGO's, except in their capacity as lawyers.
It denied permission to some officials of foreign governments to visit
prisons during the year.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention continued to be problems. To take a person into custody, a
prosecutor must issue a detention order, except when suspects are
caught committing a crime. The maximum detention period for those
charged with individual common crimes is 24 hours, which may be
extended by a judge to a maximum of 7 days; this period is longer for
groups. In the state of emergency area, the use of a prosecutor's
detention order is in practice extremely rare.
Under the Criminal Code, those detained for individual common
crimes are entitled to immediate access to an attorney and may meet and
confer with an attorney at any time. In practice legal experts assert
that the authorities do not always respect these provisions, and that
most citizens do not exercise this right, either because they are
unaware of it, or because they fear possibly antagonizing the
authorities. The court consistently provides attorneys only to minors
or deaf-mutes who cannot represent themselves. By law a detainee's next
of kin must be notified as soon as possible after arrest. In criminal
and civil cases this requirement is observed.
In state security cases, the pretrial detention period without
charge is longer, and the law provides for no immediate access by an
attorney. The lack of early access by an attorney is a major factor in
the continued use of torture by security forces. Persons detained for
individual crimes under the Anti-Terror Law must be brought before a
judge within 48 hours. Those charged with crimes of a collective,
political, or conspiratorial nature may be detained for an initial
period of 48 hours, extended for up to 4 days at a prosecutor's
discretion and, with a judge's nearly automatic permission, for up to 7
days in most of the country and up to 10 days in the southeastern
provinces under the state of emergency. Attorneys are allowed access
only after the first 4 days.
Private attorneys and human rights monitors reported uneven
implementation of these regulations, especially attorney access. AI
asserts that lawyers rarely are permitted adequate access to their
clients, even after the fourth day, although they may be allowed to
exchange a few words during a brief interview in the presence of
security officers. According to the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
the secretive nature of arrests and detentions often leaves the
detainee's lawyer and family members with no information about the
detention, and police often refuse to disclose the place of detention
or even the fact that the detainee is being held. The October 1998
regulations on detention and arrest procedures exempt the authorities
from the obligation to inform relatives in the case of state security
detentions. In addition legal limits on detention periods at times are
circumvented by subjecting a detainee to successive charges or
falsifying detention records. The police maintain 24-hour detention
monitoring bureaus that are required to record detentions on computers,
but AI reports an increase in unregistered detentions since 1997.
According to the HRA, in the state of emergency region the police
detain, beat, and then release groups after the maximum period of
detention in order to intimidate them.
Once formally charged by the prosecutor, a detainee is arraigned by
a judge and allowed to retain a lawyer. After arraignment the judge may
release the accused upon receipt of an appropriate assurance, such as
bail, or order him detained if the court determines that he is likely
to flee the jurisdiction or destroy evidence. The decision concerning
early access to counsel in such cases is left to the public prosecutor,
who often denies access on the grounds that it would prejudice an
ongoing investigation. Although the Constitution specifies the right of
detainees to request speedy arraignment and trial, judges have ordered
that some suspects be detained indefinitely, sometimes for years. Many
such cases involve persons accused of violent crimes, but there are
cases of those accused of nonviolent political crimes being kept in
custody until the conclusion of their trials.
On several occasions, the police beat and detained peaceful
demonstrators (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). The police also beat and
detained journalists (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.) and members of
political parties (see Section 3). During a September protest over
prison conditions, officers beat the chair of Istanbul's HRA branch
(see Section 4). Authorities detained 47 HADEP members who led a hunger
strike after Ocalan's November 1998 flight from Syria. Twenty men were
detained in October when they joined women in a peaceful protest over
the rule banning head coverings at universities (see Section 2.c.).
During the November summit of the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, police detained for several
hours at least five young children and held them in police headquarters
in contravention of the law, which requires that all detained children
be transferred immediately to the prosecutor's office.
The Government does not use forced external exile. It retains the
authority to authorize internal exile (see Section 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and in practice the general law courts generally
act independently of the executive and legislative branches; however,
various officials acknowledge the need for legislative changes to
strengthen the judiciary's independence. The Constitution prohibits
state authorities from issuing orders or recommendations concerning the
exercise of judicial power; however, in practice the Government and
National Security Council periodically issue announcements or
directives about threats to the State, which could be interpreted as
instructions to the judiciary. The High Council of Judges and
Prosecutors, which is appointed by the President and includes the
Minister of Justice, selects judges and prosecutors for the higher
courts and is responsible for oversight of those in the lower courts.
Some observers assert that the composition of the High Council
undermines the independence of the judiciary, despite the
Constitutional provision for security of tenure, because the High
Council effectively controls the career paths of judges through
appointments, transfers, promotions, and other matters, and its
decisions are not subject to review. Various government and judicial
officials during the year discussed the need to adopt legislative
changes to strengthen the independence of the judiciary.
The judicial system is composed of general law courts, military
courts, the State Security Courts (SSC's), and a Constitutional Court,
the nation's highest court. The High Court of Appeals hears appeals for
criminal cases, including SSC's, while the Council of State hears
appeals of administrative cases or those between government entities.
Most cases are prosecuted in the general law courts, which include
civil, administrative, and criminal courts. Public servants can be
tried only after administrative approval from the governor or
subgovernor, which are centrally appointed positions.
The Constitutional Court examines the constitutionality of laws,
decrees, and parliamentary procedural rules and hears cases involving
the banning of political parties. If impeached, ministers and prime
ministers would be tried in the Constitutional Court as well. However,
the Court may not consider ``decrees with the force of law'' issued
under a state of emergency, martial law, or in time of war.
Military courts, with their own appeals system, hear cases
involving military law, members of the armed forces, and civilians who
are accused of impugning the honor of the armed forces or undermining
compliance with the draft. The editor in chief of the radical Islamist
newspaper Akit, Murat Balibey, who was sentenced in July 1998 by a
military court to 14 months imprisonment for ``insulting the military''
in a newspaper article, was released in September under the law
allowing the suspension of sentences for journalists.
SSC's sit in eight cities and try defendants accused of crimes such
as terrorism, gang-related crimes, drug smuggling, membership in
illegal organizations, and espousing or disseminating ideas prohibited
by law, such as those ``damaging the indivisible unity of the state.''
These courts may hold closed hearings and may admit testimony obtained
during police interrogation in the absence of counsel. During the year,
the SSC's dealt mainly with cases under the Anti-Terror Law and section
312 of the Criminal Code. Human rights observers cite prosecutions of
leaders of the political Islamic movement, nonviolent political leaders
associated with the Kurdish issue, and persons who criticize the
Government's practices as evidence that the SSC's often serve a
primarily political purpose.
Until mid-1999, the SSC's were composed of panels of five members:
Two civilian judges, one military judge, and two prosecutors. A 1998
ruling by the European Court of Human Rights found that the presence of
a military justice on the SSC's was inconsistent with relevant European
conventions. In June the Government amended the Constitution and passed
legislation to replace the military judge with a civilian judge. These
courts may hold closed hearings and may admit testimony obtained during
police interrogation in the absence of counsel. SSC verdicts may be
appealed only to a specialized department of the High Court of Appeals
dealing with crimes against state security.
In February the Government brought PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan to
Turkey to stand trial for treason, as the creator of a separatist
terrorist organization responsible for over 30,000 deaths. He stood
trial in a special sitting of the Ankara State Security Court on the
secure prison island of Imrali. Ocalan was held in incommunicado
detention for 9 to 10 days before the trial. His lawyers were not
allowed adequate access to private consultations with their client or
to pertinent documents. They also complained that they were harassed
and that police abused at least six of them after one court session, an
allegation the police denied. The trial was the subject of
unprecedented public attention, and foreign observers, including
diplomats and some members of NGO's, were allowed to attend. Families
of those killed by the PKK and their attorneys also attended. Ocalan
was allowed to read uninterrupted and lengthy statements in his
defense. In June Ocalan was sentenced to death. His sentence was upheld
in November by the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals chief
prosecutor in December refused to reconsider it. Carrying out the death
sentence still requires action and approval by the Justice Ministry,
the Council of Ministers, Parliament, and the President. After the
appellate court ruling in November, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) asked the Government to take all necessary steps to ensure that
the death penalty is not carried out before the Court is able to
complete its judicial processes; Ocalan's case is pending before the
ECHR.
The trial of 25 Diyarbakir lawyers charged in 1993 and 1994 for
aiding and abetting the PKK, and in a few cases with membership in a
terrorist organization, continued at the Diyarbakir SSC. The
defendants, 16 of whom complained of torture and mistreatment while
held in incommunicado detention after their arrests, are free pending
trial. Human rights monitors believe that their prosecution is intended
to punish them for representing clients unpopular with the Government
and for calling attention to human rights violations in the southeast.
The law gives prosecutors far-reaching authority to supervise the
police during an investigation. Prosecutors complain that they have few
resources to do so, and many have begun to call for ``judicial police''
who could help investigate and gather evidence. Human rights observers
and Ministry of Justice officials note that problems can arise from the
fact that the police report to the Interior Ministry, not to the
courts.
Defense lawyers do not have equal status with prosecutors. In State
Security Courts and for other charges, such as insulting the President
or ``defaming Turkish citizenship,'' defense attorneys may be denied
access to files that the state asserts deal with national intelligence
or security matters. Attorneys defending controversial cases have been
subject to spurious legal charges, such as accusations that they are
couriers for clients who are alleged terrorists. Hasan Dogan, a
respected Malatya attorney who frequently defends suspects in SSC
cases, was acquitted in March of all 1997 charges by an informer that
he was a member of the PKK or assisted the organization; however, the
appeals court reversed his acquittal in December, and he awaits
sentencing.
Prosecutors are charged with determining which law has been broken
and objectively presenting the facts to the court. There is no jury
system; a judge or a panel of judges decides all cases. Trials for
political crimes or torture frequently last for months or years, with
one or two hearings scheduled each month. Proceedings against security
officials often are delayed because officers do not submit promptly
statements or attend trials. Illegally gathered evidence may be
excluded by law. However, this rarely occurs and then only after a
separate case determining the legality of the evidence is resolved. In
practice a trial based on a confession allegedly coerced under torture
may proceed and even conclude, before the court has established the
merits of the torture allegations.
By law the Bar Association must provide free counsel to indigents
who make a request to the court, except for crimes falling under the
scope of the SSC's. An Izmir Bar Association study showed that in
practice, only a tiny percentage of defendants have lawyers. Bar
associations in large cities, such as Istanbul, have attorneys on call
24 hours a day. Costs are borne by the Association. Defense lawyers
generally have access to the public prosecutor's files only after
arraignment.
In law and in practice, the legal system does not discriminate
against minorities. Legal proceedings are conducted solely in Turkish
with some interpreting available; however, some defendants whose native
language is not Turkish may be disadvantaged seriously.
Turkey recognizes the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights. In 1999 Turkey lost all 18 cases in which it was a party, most
of which pertained to free expression crimes that occurred in the early
1990's, and was fined nearly $3 million (1.69 trillion lira).
There is no reliable estimate of the number of political prisoners.
The Government claims that alleged political prisoners are in fact
security detainees, who were convicted of being members of, or
assisting, the PKK or other terrorist organizations.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the inviolability of a
person's domicile and the privacy of correspondence and communication;
however, at times the Government infringed on these rights. With some
exceptions, government officials may enter a private residence or
intercept or monitor private correspondence only after the issuance of
a judicial warrant. These provisions generally are respected in
practice outside the state of emergency region. If delay may cause harm
to the case, prosecutors may authorize a search. Searches of private
premises may not be carried out at night, unless the delay would be
damaging to the case or the search is expected to result in the capture
of a prisoner at large. Other exceptions include persons under special
observation by the security directorate general, places anyone can
enter at night, places where criminals gather, places where materials
obtained through the commission of crimes are kept, gambling
establishments, and brothels. A new law against gangs includes a
provision allowing for wider legal wiretapping. The law states that a
court order is needed to carry out a wiretap. However, in an emergency
situation, a prosecutor can grant permission. The wiretap can last only
3 months, with two possible extensions of 3 months each.
In the provinces under emergency rule, the regional state of
emergency governor empowers security authorities to search without a
warrant residences or the premises of political parties, businesses,
associations, or other organizations. The Bar Association maintains
that it is not constitutional for security authorities in these
provinces to search, hold, or seize without warrant persons or
documents. Six provinces remain under ``adjacent province'' status,
which authorizes the Jandarma to retain security responsibility for
municipalities as well as rural areas and grants the provincial
governor several extraordinary powers. Due to the improved security
situation, the use of roadblocks in the southeast decreased.
With the diminution of PKK terrorism, the formerly widespread
practice of evacuating villages to prevent their giving aid to the PKK
decreased substantially, although some village evacuations continued
(see Section 1.g.).
Some elements of society complain that a ban on the wearing of
religious head coverings in government offices, other state-run
facilities, and universities interfered with citizens' religious
observance (see Sections 2.b. and 2.c.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Since 1984 the PKK has waged a violent terrorist
insurgency in southeast Turkey, directed against both security forces
and civilians, mainly Kurds whom the PKK accuses of cooperating with
the state. The police, the Jandarma, village guards, and the armed
forces in turn have waged an intense campaign to suppress PKK
terrorism, targeting active PKK units as well as persons they believe
support or sympathize with the PKK. In the process, both government
forces and PKK terrorists committed human rights abuses against each
other and against noncombatants. According to President Demirel's year-
end address, since 1984, 25,139 PKK members, 5,882 security force
members, and 5,424 civilians lost their lives in the fighting.
In an effort to deny the PKK logistical support, the Jandarma
during the year occasionally rationed food and other essentials in some
rural areas in the emergency region. Security forces returned to
evacuated villages and burned homes, to deny them to the PKK, and have
shot livestock, burned forests and orchards, or denied villagers
permission to harvest fields.
With the waning of PKK activity in the southeast, security forces
evacuated fewer villages than in previous years. The Government's
stated purposes for the evacuations were to protect civilians or
prevent PKK guerrillas from obtaining logistical support from the
inhabitants. Villagers and other observers alleged that the security
forces evacuated them for refusing to participate in the paramilitary
village guard program.
The exact number of persons forcibly displaced from villages in the
southeast since 1984 is unknown. Human rights NGO's tend to attribute
most rural-urban migration to evacuations, whereas some persons move to
escape the violence or conflict-caused economic depression, or to
pursue opportunities in western cities. Government statistics tend to
minimize the number of persons who left against their will. Observers
agree that 3,000 to 4,000 villages and hamlets have been depopulated.
The Government reported that through 1999 the total number of those
evacuated was 362,915 persons, from 3,236 villages and hamlets, of whom
26,481 have been resettled with government assistance in 176 villages
and hamlets. Another 61,987 have applied to return. A figure given by a
former Member of Parliament from the region--560,000--appears to be the
most credible estimate of those forcibly evacuated. However, observers
in the region estimate that the total number of displaced persons is
approximately 800,000, and a few NGO's put the number as high as 2
million. A parliamentary committee investigated the situation in the
southeast and concluded in 1998 that, among other things, the State was
partly responsible for the displacements and that it had failed to
adequately compensate villagers who had lost their homes and lands in
the region. The European Court of Human Rights often ruled in favor of
villagers who sued over forcible evacuations, and the Government
continued to pay assessed damages. The major urban center of Diyarbakir
has nearly tripled in size over 10 years, adding nearly 600,000 new
residents. Regional officials report that flows of migrants nearly
stopped during the year due to waning PKK activity in the countryside.
Government programs to deal with and compensate the forcibly
evacuated villagers remain inadequate, as is assistance to those who
have resettled in urban areas. Many migrants continue to live in
overcrowded, unhealthful conditions with little opportunity for
employment. Local and provincial officials made some efforts to address
the basic needs of migrants. In several provinces, officials provided
looms for use by unemployed women. The Government then purchased the
women's rugs for resale on the open market. The Government provides
literacy, childcare, basic family health care, and vocational training
classes for some displaced women.
The Government noted that some displaced persons chose to resettle
in urban areas and are receiving assistance there. There is a
government-funded ``emergency support program'' to expedite
resettlement in the southeast. The funds are used for rebuilding houses
and roads, as well as for animal husbandry and beekeeping programs.
Credible allegations were made that serious abuses by security
forces during the course of operations against the PKK continued. The
Government organizes, arms, and pays a civil defense force in the
region known as the village guards. In principle local villagers'
participation in this paramilitary militia is voluntary, but in
practice they often have been caught between the two sides. If the
villagers agree to serve, the PKK may target them and their villages.
If the villagers refuse to participate, government security forces may
forcibly evacuate their villages on security grounds or not allow them
to return to their villages after evacuations. Village guards have a
reputation for being the least trained and disciplined of the
Government's security forces and have been accused repeatedly of drug
trafficking, rape, corruption, theft, and human rights abuses.
Inadequate oversight and compensation have contributed to this problem.
There were credible allegations of Jandarma protecting village guards
from prosecution for various crimes. In addition to the village guards,
Jandarma and police ``special teams'' are viewed as those most
responsible for abuses.
The Government's state of emergency, renewed in Diyarbakir,
Hakkari, Sirnak, Tunceli, and Van provinces for 4 months in November,
imposes stringent security measures in those five southeastern
provinces. The regional governor for the state of emergency may censor
news, ban strikes or lockouts, and impose internal exile. The decree
provides for doubling the sentences of those convicted of ``cooperating
with separatists.'' Informants and convicted persons who cooperate with
the State may receive rewards and reduced sentences. Only limited
judicial review of the state of emergency governor's administrative
decisions is permitted.
In August Parliament passed legislation allowing members of
terrorist organizations (and criminal gangs) to apply over a 6-month
period for amnesty or reductions in sentences, as long as they provide
useful information that helps lead to the dissolution of the
organization. The number of persons who applied for the amnesty is
estimated to be at least 500, most of whom already were in prison,
although exact figures are not available. According to press reports,
many of the applicants have obtained reductions in their sentences or
release.
Although schools remained open in most urban centers in the
southeast, rapid migration led to severe overcrowding of city schools
and chronic teacher shortages. In contrast to the national average of
45 children per classroom, there are typically 60 to 90 children per
classroom in eastern and southeastern provinces, and as many as 80 to
100 in Diyarbakir. In the state of emergency region, 450 schools have
been closed, although none were closed during the year. Past PKK
policies, such as murdering village teachers, exacerbated the situation
(see Section 1.a.). Although the Government continues to build boarding
schools in the region's larger towns, these new schools have not filled
the gap. Despite a longstanding tradition of boarding schools in the
rural areas of the country, some ethnic Kurdish leaders expressed
concern that the Government constructed boarding schools, rather than
rebuild local schools, in order to accelerate the process of Kurdish
assimilation.
Turkish ground forces with air support conducted several operations
during the year in northern Iraq against the PKK. The Turkish
Government maintained that it targeted only PKK fighters in northern
Iraq and that it respected the right of civilians in these operations.
The Kurdistan Democratic Party cooperated with the Turkish Government
in shutting down PKK facilities in northern Iraq. Local observers in
northern Iraq, including NGO and other foreign humanitarian workers,
reported no incidents of collateral damage or civilian casualties from
these operations.
The PKK suffered severe setbacks during the year, especially
following the arrest, forced return to Turkey, and trial of its leader
Abdullah Ocalan, and his subsequent death sentence. After his arrest
and incarceration in February, the PKK carried out repeated suicide
bomb attacks throughout the country; these included a suicide bomb
attack in Adana in July, which injured 17 persons, and an Istanbul
department store bombing that killed 13 persons. PKK attacks against
civilians, military, and law enforcement personnel in the southeast
continued but declined in number. There was a lower rate of PKK
terrorist acts during the summer and fall than in the previous year.
The PKK claimed that it was withdrawing from the conflict and would
take a nonviolent path to political change. The evidence was not
conclusive that a PKK withdrawal from Turkey had occurred; reports
indicated that while some PKK members heeded Ocalan's call for an end
to the armed struggle and PKK withdrawal from Turkey, others did not.
The authorities disputed that a meaningful withdrawal was underway.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government continued
to limit these freedoms. The Constitution leaves open the possibility
of restrictions to these freedoms on the basis of national security-
related considerations, and the Criminal Code provides penalties for
those who ``insult the President, the Parliament, and the Army.''
Numerous other provisions in various laws restrict freedom of
expression to one degree or another: Those most frequently employed
include Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law (disseminating separatist
propaganda) and Article 312 of the Criminal Code (incitement to racial
or ethnic enmity). In addition prosecutors rely on Article 159 of the
Criminal Code (concerning insults to Parliament, the army, Republic, or
judiciary), Article 60 (insulting the Turkish Republic), Article 169
(aiding an illegal terrorist organization), the law to protect Ataturk
(no. 5816), and Article 16 of the Press Law to limit freedom of
expression. The new law enacted to counter criminal organizations
includes an article that permits the prosecution of journalists for
``promoting'' the activities of criminal organizations, and the new
civil servant prosecution law includes an article allowing prosecutions
against those who falsely accuse public employees based on ``enmity,
hatred or slandering.'' While prosecutors bring dozens of such cases to
court each year, judges dismiss many charges brought under these laws.
Domestic and foreign periodicals that provide a broad spectrum of
views and opinions, including intense criticism of the Government, are
widely available. While overall readership of the local press is not
large for a country of 65 million inhabitants, the newspaper business
is extremely competitive.
Electronic media reach nearly every adult, and their influence,
particularly that of television, is correspondingly great. According to
the Government's Directorate General of Press and Information, in
addition to the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television Corporation,
there are 230 local, 15 regional, and 20 national private television
stations, and 1,044 local, 108 regional, and 36 national radio
stations. Other television and radio stations broadcast without an
official license. The increasing availability of satellite dishes and
cable television allows access to foreign broadcasts, including several
Turkish-language private channels. Internet use is growing and faces no
government restrictions; in fact, some banned newspapers can be
accessed freely on the Internet. Government censorship of foreign
periodicals is very rare.
In September the Government passed legislation suspending for 3
years the sentences of those convicted of freedom of expression crimes
in the media, such as journalists, writers, and party officials who
published articles. The Islamist opposition party Fazilet challenged
the constitutionality of the law, because it did not apply to those who
committed similar crimes through speech. Esber Yagmurdereli, for
example, remained imprisoned because his conviction in 1998 was for a
speech he gave at a 1991 HRA meeting. The law led to the release of
over 25 persons, and the suspension of hundreds of trials. Charges are
dropped if the journalist or writer does not commit the same crime
again during the 3-year period; if a second offense is committed during
this time, the suspension is revoked. Human rights advocates are
concerned that the conditions for the suspension amount to censorship.
Although the suspension of ongoing trials prevents new convictions,
some journalists and writers objected to the fact that it also prevents
possible acquittals, so they have no opportunity to clear their name or
to fight bans imposed on their written work.
The law makes it illegal for broadcasters to threaten the country's
unity or national security and limits the private broadcast of
television programs in languages other than Turkish. The High Board of
Radio and Television (RTUK), created in 1994 to regulate private
television and radio frequencies, monitors broadcasters and sanctions
them if they are not in compliance with relevant laws. Parliament
elects the RTUK members (divided between ruling and opposition parties)
and provides its budget. Although nominally independent, the RTUK is
subject to some political pressures.
The RTUK penalizes private radio and television stations for the
use of offensive language, libel, obscenity, instigating separatist
propaganda, or broadcasting programs in Kurdish. Throughout the year,
the RTUK penalized at least a dozen different television stations,
usually by suspending their broadcasts for a day, for noncompliance
with broadcast regulations. Channel 6, which criticized the
Government's response to the devastating August 17 earthquake, was
given a week's suspension on the grounds that its reports hurt
confidence in, and fueled anger against, the State. This decision is
under appeal, and the suspension had not yet occurred by year's end.
RTUK decisions may be appealed to the provincial Administrative Court
and then to the Council of State. The RTUK suspended a comparable
number of radio broadcasters, for periods ranging from 1 day to 1 year,
usually for violating laws prohibiting the broadcast of ``terrorist
organization declarations.'' The radio station FOREKS was banned from
broadcasting for 30 days for relaying a May British Broadcasting
Corporation program on Kurdish issues. Reporters Sans Frontieres
reported that 2,378 days of suspension were imposed on broadcasters
during the year.
Despite the Government's restrictions, the media criticize
government leaders and policies daily. Lively debates on human rights
and government policies were stimulated by several events, including
Constitutional Court President Sezer's call in March for lifting
restrictions on freedom of expression, including on language rights;
Appeal Court President Selcuk's observation in September that the
Constitution enjoyed ``almost zero'' legitimacy and should be replaced;
the implications of the February capture of Ocalan for resolving the
Kurdish issue; the Government's response to the August earthquake; and
the European Union's designation of Turkey as a candidate member in
December. Nevertheless, persons who write or speak out on highly
sensitive topics, such as the role of religion in politics and society,
the role of the military, some Kurdish issues, or the PKK, risk
prosecution.
Government Decree 430 gives the Interior Ministry, upon the request
of the state of emergency regional governor, the authority to ban
distribution of any news viewed as misrepresenting events in the
region. In the event that a government warning is not obeyed, the
decree provides for a 10-day suspension of operations for a first
offense and 30 days for subsequent offenses. This and other pressures,
such as RTUK suspensions, led to the self-censorship of news reporting
on some issues. Some journalists say that there was less self-
censorship by reporters and editors on sensitive issues than in the
previous year, and the nature of debate on such issues as the Kurdish
question and changing the Constitution appeared to support this
assessment.
SSC prosecutors ordered the confiscation of numerous issues of
leftist, Kurdish nationalist, and pro-PKK periodicals and banned
several books on a range of topics. For example Nadire Mater's well-
received book based on interviews of soldiers who fought in the
southeast was banned in June. In September the Government began a trial
against Mater and her publisher on charges that they insulted the
military with their book. Prosecutors closed numerous journals or
suspended their operations during the year. For example the Istanbul
SSC stopped the printing of Ozgur Gelecek for a month in June and
confiscated an edition of the Islamist paper Akit for ``provoking
enmity and hatred against the state'' in September. The police
frequently raid offices of small leftist publications. The leftwing
newspaper Evrensel was banned in January, and the pro-Kurdish Ozgur
Bakis was banned in April, within the state of emergency region,
although it was available elsewhere in the country and via the
Internet. Distributors of Evrensel and Ozgur Bakis outside the state of
emergency region claim regular harassment and the confiscation of their
newspapers by the police. In April the governor of Siirt province
closed the local weekly Guney for printing material offensive to the
dignity of the State.
In a highly publicized ruling in May, the Istanbul State Security
Court sentenced Cumhuriyet columnist Oral Calislar to 13 months in jail
for disseminating separatist propaganda in a book he wrote based on
previously published interviews of Ocalan and Kemal Burkey, head of the
Socialist Party of Kurdistan. Calislar planned to appeal. His sentence
was suspended under the September law suspending sentences.
Andrew Finkel, a contributor to several Western media outlets and a
former columnist for Sabah, was charged in June with ``insulting the
military'' for a 1998 article he wrote for Sabah. The charge stemmed
from one line that contrasted the army with an ``army of occupation.''
Finkel's trial was suspended under the September law; Finkel publicly
objected to being deprived of the opportunity to clear his name.
An appellate court in December upheld the sentences against 9
persons, including some students, who in 1996 unfurled banners in
Parliament saying, ``No to Tuition.'' They were convicted of membership
in an illegal organization and given sentences ranging from 10 months
to 8 years.
Journalists, including those from mainstream and Western media,
were harassed periodically and subjected to police abuse while covering
stories, particularly in the southeast. In February in Diyarbakir eight
motorcycle police officers beat a cameraman for the mainstream NTV
television station until he was unconscious. The police beat the
cameraman and one other journalist with gun butts and ran over them
with motorcycles. Earlier in the month a correspondent for Reuters was
expelled from Diyarbakir. In April police in Istanbul beat with rifle
butts three reporters from the daily Star, who were covering street
skirmishes. In June police in Mardin province briefly detained a
Turkish correspondent for several western media outlets. In September
several police officers hit a photojournalist with the daily Radikal
who was covering a banned demonstration in Istanbul. During the
November review conference of the OSCE in Istanbul, several journalists
working at leftist or pro-Kurdish publications were detained either
from the premises of their publications or as they left the conference.
Some of them alleged mistreatment at the hands of police.
In December Hasan Guzel, head of the small Rebirth Party and an
outspoken former Education Minister, began serving a 1-year sentence
for inciting religious and ethnic enmity based on a controversial 1997
speech.
The Government continued to restrict the free expression of ideas
by individuals sympathetic to some Islamist, leftist, and Kurdish
nationalist or cultural viewpoints. HADEP political candidates were not
allowed to enter certain areas of the state of emergency region during
the election campaign, nor allowed to use Kurdish music.
Abdurrahman Dilipak, a veteran columnist with the Islamist daily,
Akit, faced multiple new charges during the year for articles
criticizing the Government's policy, especially on religious head
coverings and the alleged activities of a military group that
reportedly monitors political Islam in Turkey.
Former Chairman of the HRA Akin Birdal, jailed in June for free
expression crimes, was released in September from prison for 6 months
on medical grounds but faces other charges related to previous speeches
(see Section 4). Erol Yarar, former chairman of the Islamist
Businessmen's Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen
(MUSIAD), was convicted in April of promoting racial, ethnic, and
religious enmity (Article 312 of the Penal Code) for a speech he made
in October 1997. His 1-year sentence and fine were suspended for 5
years.
Imprisoned since 1993, author Ismail Besikci was released in
September under the law suspending the sentences of journalists. His
79-year sentence on over 50 charges was based on his articles on
Kurdish issues. He faced at least 50 more similar charges, some of
which may be subject to suspension.
Poet Yilmaz Odabasi, released from prison in September under the
law suspending sentences, was sent back to prison in December for
``insulting the court.'' During the hearing that led to his earlier
imprisonment, he told the court ``I am ashamed to be in the same era
and country as you.'' Since that statement was not made in the media,
he cannot benefit from the suspension of sentences law again.
Haluk Gerger served 10 months in prison in 1998 for an article
published in the pro-Kurdish Ozgur Gundem and is now out of the country
but faces imprisonment for two other convictions for similar articles.
Can Yucel, sentenced to over 1 year's imprisonment for ``insulting the
President,'' died in September. Editorial cartoonist Dogan Guzel was
sentenced to 16 months' imprisonment in 1998 for insulting the state
and armed forces but was released in September under the law suspending
sentences.
The 10-month sentences of Sanar Yurdatapan, a well-known musician
and spokesman for freedom of expression, and two other members of a
``peace working group,'' for insulting the military, were reversed by
the Court of Appeals. Two other trials, based on articles Yurdatapan
wrote about the military were suspended.
Istanbul Mayor Recep Tayyip Erdogan was released from prison in
July after serving his 4\1/2\-month sentence for a speech he made in
1997 that was deemed to have ``incited ethnic, racial, and religious
enmity,'' based on Article 312 of the Penal Code. His sentence, which
was reduced from 10 months, includes a lifetime ban from politics.
Some HADEP members, including three religion experts, convicted of
writing articles in a 1997 edition of the HADEP bulletin that incited
``racial, ethnic, and religious enmity,'' were released under the law
suspending sentences of journalists. Others remain in jail. Imprisoned
former Democratic Party (DEP) Member of Parliament Leyla Zana's
conviction on this charge was suspended under the same law, but she
continues to serve a 15-year term for another conviction. Dozens of
similar cases against former DEP Chairman Hatip Dicle (a fellow
prisoner with Zana) for writing articles were suspended; however, he
remains in prison serving terms for other convictions.
Former political science professor Yalcin Kucuk, arrested in 1998
when he returned from self-imposed exile, remains in jail on charges of
belonging to an illegal organization; several cases against him
continue. Many other convictions for crimes committed through
publication were suspended under the September law, including the
sentences of novelist Yasar Kemal, convicted in 1995, and 1,080 writers
who supported him.
Dogu Perincek, chairman of the Workers' Party, served 11 months in
prison on a sentence for illegal possession of classified state
documents, assisting a terrorist organization, and possession of
unlicensed firearms. By law he had to resign his political position as
chair of the Labor Party but was reelected during the year. He now
faces two other convictions, a 1-year imprisonment for a 1994 speech
delivered at the HRA general convention and a fine for slandering
former Prime Minister Tansu Ciller. In December a prosecutor dropped
charges against Perincek for ``assisting a terrorist organization.''
Playwright Mehmet Vahi Yazar, who was sentenced in 1998 to 24 years
in prison for ``insulting the military,'' was retried and his sentence
was reduced to 11 years; the sentences of the four actors who performed
his play were changed to 5 years, but they all were released in
consideration of time served. The suspended sentence and fine imposed
on a publisher and translator for Pencere Publishing who published a
Turkish translation of a controversial German book were upheld.
Journalist Ragip Duran was released in January after serving a sentence
related to an article he wrote.
A total of 114 intellectuals and human rights activists were
sentenced in April to a year in prison each, on charges of ``separatist
propaganda,'' for signing a 1993 declaration calling for a peaceful
solution to the Kurdish conflict, according to the Anatolian and
Reuters news agencies.
Kurdish-language cassettes and publications are available
commercially, although the periodic banning of particular cassettes or
singers continued. Human rights monitors reported isolated cases of
police detention of singers and others at weddings where Kurdish music
was played. The Economist magazine reported that police detained Ali
Aktas, a popular Kurdish folk singer, in September after he sang
Kurdish songs at a concert to benefit earthquake victims. He was
interrogated for 10 hours at Diyarbakir police headquarters and accused
of singing political songs, which he denied. The Kurdish-language
weekly Azadiya Welate still is banned in the state of emergency region,
and some 10 other publications were available only on an infrequent
basis. Potential customers are afraid to purchase Kurdish-language
materials because the possession of such items may be interpreted as
evidence of PKK sympathies. Kurdish-language broadcasts of news,
commentary, or discussion are illegal throughout the country. Kurdish
music is played on radio and television programs with certain
restrictions. Which Kurdish songs can be played in the emergency zone
and adjacent areas is regulated closely. The state of emergency
regional governor frequently bans Kurdish recordings that may be played
legally elsewhere in the country. Stations that play Kurdish songs not
on the limited play list risk temporary bans or closure. Radio stations
that mix small amounts of Kurdish songs into their predominantly
Turkish broadcasting appear to face fewer problems. Kurdish music was
banned from use in campaigning during the election period.
Pro-PKK MED-TV was banned in the United Kingdom after pro-Ocalan
terrorist incidents in Europe. Its successor, MEDYA-TV, broadcasts in
Kurdish from Europe and can be received via satellite dish in the
southeast. Another station, Kurdistan-TV, is based in northern Iraq and
also can be received via satellite in the southeast.
In July the European Court of Human Rights ruled on 13 cases
dealing with freedom of expression cases in which the plaintiffs were
jailed or fined for books, articles, or statements that they wrote or
published on mainly Kurdish issues. The plaintiffs were convicted in
those cases either for ``inciting ethnic hatred'' or ``disseminating
propaganda against the indivisibility of the state'' or, in one case,
for ``revealing the identity of officials responsible for combating
terrorism.'' The Court found that the Government violated the
applicants' right to freedom of expression in 11 of these 13 cases;
denied applicants in 9 cases the right to have their cases heard by an
independent and impartial tribunal because of the presence of military
judges on the State Security Courts; and in 1 case violated the
prohibition against no punishment without law. In a separate ruling in
September, the ECHR found that the government violated a publisher's
freedom of expression in 1989 when it convicted him of ``inciting
ethnic hatred'' by publishing the second edition of a book entitled,
``A Testimony to Life--Diary of a Death Under Torture.''
A group of Turkish and Kurdish academics, politicians, and
intellectuals (TOSAV) continued to hold discussions on the situation of
the Kurds and possible solutions to Turkey's problems. Despite minor
police attention, TOSAV explored explicitly nonviolent solutions within
a democratic context. The authorities completed an inconclusive
investigation of TOSAV for potential ``separatist'' connections and in
March confiscated TOSAV's publication entitled ``Document of Mutual
Understanding.''
The Mesopotamian Cultural Center, a corporation established to
promote Kurdish language and culture, continued limited operations
despite a lack of official permission. Officials alleged that the
organization is linked to the PKK. The group's centers in the southeast
(Diyarbakir, Urfa, and Van) were shut down, while its centers elsewhere
remained open but with very reduced activities.
Although the Kurdish Culture and Research Foundation (Kurt-Kav)
remained open, it was not allowed to resume Kurdish-language classes
and remained under close police attention. Its current projects include
scholarships for students to study Kurdish in Sweden and return to
teach Kurdish in Turkey.
Academic freedom otherwise generally is respected; however, there
is believed to be some self-censorship on sensitive topics.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government often
restricted this right in practice. The authorities may deny permission
if they believe that a gathering is likely to disrupt public order.
Significant prior notification of gatherings is required, and the
authorities may restrict meetings to designated sites.
In March the Saturday Mothers group decided to discontinue its
weekly public gatherings in Istanbul due to police harassment and
abuse. Since May 1995, the group, primarily women, held weekly vigils
in which they read press announcements about relatives who inexplicably
disappeared. Starting in August 1998 the police responded aggressively
to each week's gathering by detaining and, on multiple occasions,
beating participants. The group stated that such treatment continued
through March. The police stated that the group demonstrated illegally
for 3 years and that members of illegal organizations had infiltrated
the gatherings (see Section 1.b.).
Demonstrations over the right to wear Islamic-style head coverings
while studying at state universities turned violent in May at Malatya's
Inonu University; over 50 persons, including several police officers,
were injured. Charges of attempting to change the constitutional order
by force were brought against 51 persons; the maximum penalty is death.
Their trial and those of 24 others in connection with the incident
began in June (also see Section 2.c.).
In March 2,474 participants in celebrations of the Kurdish holiday
of Nevruz were detained in 11 provinces; the authorities announced
ahead of time that most Nevruz celebrations would not be allowed. The
HRA reported that approximately 200 persons were injured, including
several police officers. In contrast to previous years, events on
``World Peace Day'' (September 1) were low-key and largely peaceful,
with minimal police interference.
A week after the September killings of prisoners in Ankara prison,
the police detained and beat a group trying to read a press statement
in a public place in Istanbul. Among the detainees were the president
of the HRF Istanbul branch and relatives of the dead prisoners. The
next day, several dozen persons attempting to send telegrams to the
President, Prime Minister, and Minister of Justice to protest the
prison deaths were beaten and then detained briefly. Dr. Alp Ayan, a
psychiatrist with the HRF Izmir Treatment and Rehabilitation Center,
and Gunseli Kaya, who also works at the center, were among 68 persons
being tried for ``holding an unauthorized demonstration'' for
participating in the funeral procession of one of the prisoners killed
in September. Ayan, Kaya, and 12 others were being held in detention
pending their trials. Dr. Veli Lok, another representative of the Izmir
HRF, made a statement in October that the purpose of the prosecutions
of his colleagues might be to punish them for documenting torture and
treating torture victims. He is being prosecuted under the Press Law
for ``disclosing opinions about the decisions of remand by the
courts.''
In October ``Mothers for Peace'' delegations coming from
Diyarbakir, Istanbul, Izmir, and Antalya were stopped by the police
outside Ankara and turned back, according to the HRF.
During the November OSCE summit in Istanbul, antiriot police beat,
with truncheons and fists, and kicked 10 university students who
attempted to read a press statement critical of the summit. One student
told HRW that the beating grew worse on a minibus used to transport the
detainees to the antiterror branch of the Besiktas police headquarters.
The students are being prosecuted for holding an illegal demonstration.
In a separate event during the summit, police forcibly dispersed a
crowd that gathered to present a joint press statement prepared by
human rights organizations and labor unions. Of 115 persons detained
during the gathering and later released, 112 were charged with
organizing and participating in an illegal demonstration.
Six school children, between the ages of 12 and 14, went on trial
in December in Istanbul for holding an ``unauthorized demonstration''
in 1998. The children held a sign that said ``We Want Teachers'' during
a rally after no teachers came to school that day and previous days.
In December police using truncheons forcibly dispersed a
demonstration organized in Diyarbakir to mark the 51st anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Two days later police in
Istanbul, Konya, Kocaeli, Urfa, Erzurum, Kirikkale, Samsun, and Bursa
disrupted a ``human chain'' demonstration and detained as many as 300
participants.
The Security Administration in November issued a directive calling
on police to keep the use of force in dispersing demonstrations to a
minimum.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, but
associations and foundations must submit their charters for government
approval, a lengthy and cumbersome process. The European Court of Human
Rights in December found that the Government violated the right to
freedom of association of the former members of the Freedom and
Democracy Party (OZDEP), which was dissolved in 1993 (see Section 3).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Turkey as a
secular state and provides for freedom of belief, freedom of worship,
and the private dissemination of religious ideas, and the Government
generally observed these provisions in practice; however, it imposed
some restrictions on religious minorities and on religious expression
in government offices and state-run institutions, including
universities.
The Government oversees religious facilities and education through
its Directorate of Religious Affairs (``Diyanet''). Religious
officials, including imams, are civil servants, and the operation of
the country's more than 70,000 mosques is regulated by the Directorate
of Religious Affairs. Religious minorities, established under the
Lausanne Treaty in 1923, and their affiliated churches, monasteries,
and religious schools are regulated by a separate government agency,
the Office of Foundations (Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu). The ``Vakiflar,''
an institution dating back to the Ottoman Empire, approves the
operation of churches, monasteries, synagogues, schools, and charitable
religious foundations, such as hospitals and orphanages.
The population is about 99 percent Muslim, primarily Sunni. In
addition to the country's Sunni majority, an estimated 12 million
Alawis (an offshoot of Shi'a Islam) freely practice their faith and
build ``Cem Houses'' (Alawi places of worship). Some Alawis allege
discrimination in the form of failure to include any Alawi doctrines or
beliefs in religious instruction classes. Alawis also charge that there
is a Sunni bias in the Religious Affairs Directorate and claim that the
Directorate tends to view the Alawis as a cultural rather than a
religious group. However, some Sunni Islamic political activists charge
that the secular state favors and is under the influence of the Alawis.
The Government periodically allocates funds to the Alawi community as
well as funding Sunni activities. However, there are no government-
salaried Alawi religious leaders, in contrast to Sunni religious
leaders.
The military and judiciary, with support from the country's secular
elite, continued to wage a private and public campaign against Islamic
fundamentalism, which they view as a threat to the secular republic
(see Section 3).
Tarikats (Sufi religious orders) and other mystical Sunni Islamic,
quasi-religious, and social orders were banned in the 1920's but
largely were tolerated until the 1997 call by the National Security
Council for strict enforcement of the ban against Tarikats as part of
its campaign against Islamic fundamentalism. In January five members of
the Aczimendi Brotherhood were convicted and imprisoned for criticizing
the secular state and advocating the imposition of Shari'a law.
However, despite the expressions of concern by official bodies such as
the National Security Council, prominent political and social leaders
remain associated with Tarikats.
Although the country is secular, religious and moral instruction in
state primary and secondary schools is compulsory for Muslims. Upon
written verification of their non-Muslim background, minorities
considered by the Government to be covered by the 1923 Lausanne Treaty
(Greek, Armenian, and Jewish) are exempted by law from Muslim religious
instruction; they may hold their own classes. Syriac and other
Christians whom the Government does not consider to be an official
Lausanne Treaty minority are not exempted. Non-Muslim students who wish
to attend such courses may do so with parental consent.
In accordance with a 1997 law, which made 8 years of secular
education compulsory, new enrollments in the first 8 years of the
Islamic imam-Hatip schools (in existence since 1950) were stopped,
although children already in those classes were allowed to finish their
grades. The imam-Hatip schools were very popular among conservative and
Islamist Turks as an alternative to secular public education. Under the
law, students may pursue study at imam-Hatip high schools upon
completion of 8 years in the secular public schools. Students who
complete primary school may study the Koran in government-sponsored
schools. The Government does not permit private Koran classes.
By law religious services may take place only in designated places
of worship. Non-Muslim religious services often take place in
nondesignated places of worship. The Roman Catholic Church in Ankara,
for example, is confined to diplomatic property but has not sought
property to construct a church recently.
Minority religions considered by the Government not to be
recognized under the Lausanne Treaty may not acquire additional
property for churches (beyond those predating the establishment of
modern Turkey). Religions recognized by the Government under the
Lausanne Treaty (Greek Orthodox, Armenian Christian, and Jewish) can
regain lost property if there is a community need, but if they cannot
maintain existing property, it may revert to the Vakiflar. Government
authorities do not interfere in matters of doctrine pertaining to
minority religions, nor do they restrict the publication or use of
religious literature. While the Government does not recognize the
ecumenical nature of the Greek Orthodox Patriarch, it acknowledges him
as head of the Turkish Greek Orthodox community and does not interfere
with his travels or other ecumenical activities.
Bureaucratic procedures and considerations relating to historic
preservation at times have impeded repairs to religious facilities.
Restoration or construction may be carried out in buildings and
monuments considered to be ``ancient'' only with authorization of the
Regional Board on the Protection of Cultural and National Wealth.
In February 1998, the Syriac Christian community and government
officials reached an understanding that the Syriacs could resume
renovation of the Dayrul Umur monastery in Midyat in compliance with
government standards for preservation of historical sites. Authorities
had halted the renovation in 1997. In April the Syriac Christians
received written government approval of their technical plans for the
renovation, which was well under way at year's end.
Under the law, religious buildings that become ``extinct'' (because
of prolonged absence of clergy or lay persons to staff local religious
councils or for lack of adherents) revert to government possession.
Some non-Muslim minorities, particularly the Greek Orthodox community
and, to a lesser extent, the Jewish community, the Armenian Orthodox
community, and the shrinking Syriac Christian community have lost the
use of houses of worship and other facilities. During the year an
Armenian Church in Hatay province was deemed by authorities to be no
longer in community use and is to revert to the Vakiflar. If such
minorities can demonstrate a renewed community need, they may apply
legally to recover such properties.
The authorities monitor the activities of Eastern Orthodox Churches
and their affiliated operations. The Ecumenical Patriarchate in
Istanbul consistently expressed interest in reopening the seminary on
the Island on Halki in the Sea of Marmara. The seminary has been closed
since 1971 when the state nationalized most private institutions of
higher learning. Under current restrictions, including a citizenship
requirement, religious communities remain unable to train new clergy.
However, coreligionists from outside the country have been permitted to
assume leadership positions.
There are no known estimates of the number and religious
affiliation of foreign missionaries in the country. Many prosecutors
regard proselytizing and religious activism on the part of evangelical
Christians, and particularly Islamists, with suspicion, especially when
such activities are deemed to have political overtones. No law
explicitly prohibits proselytizing or religious conversions; however,
religious groups that proselytize occasionally are subject to
government restrictions or harassment. The police sometimes arrest
proselytizers for disturbing the peace; courts usually dismiss such
charges. If the proselytizers are foreigners, they may be deported, but
generally they are able to reenter the country easily. In September
members of a group of Protestant worshipers in Izmir were detained and
released without charges for leading an unlicensed church service in a
private apartment; a similar incident occurred in Istanbul in October.
Some Turkish Christians state that they encounter harassment from
authorities and society because they have converted to Christianity.
Several human rights monitors and members of the Islamist Virtue
Party (Fazilet) complained that the Government increasingly enforced a
50-year-old ban on the wearing of religious head garments in government
offices and other state-run facilities. Hundreds of women who wear head
coverings have lost their jobs in the public sector as nurses and
teachers. During the year 312 teachers, including 180 student teachers,
lost their jobs for wearing head coverings. Women who wear head
coverings also have been prohibited from registering for university
courses since 1998, and 47 professors and university administrators
were dismissed for wearing or supporting the wearing of head garments.
The armed forces regularly dismiss individuals whose official files
reflect participation in Islamist fundamentalist activities. Cases
related to such dismissals are pending at the European Court of Human
Rights.
Hundreds of persons were detained or arrested for organizing
protests at the beginning of the school year against the prohibition
against wearing head coverings. For example a May demonstration
protesting Inonu University's ban on headscarves drew thousands of
protesters and turned violent, resulting in more than 200 arrests;
several police officers were injured. In June 75 defendants went on
trial in the Malatya SSC for protesting Inonu University's ban on
headscarves: 51 defendants, including 4 women, faced the death penalty
on charges of attempting to change the constitutional order by force;
54 of the 75 defendants, including some who face the death penalty, are
free pending the outcome of the trial. The charges stem from the May
riots (see Section 2.b.).
The case of Merve Kavakci, a newly elected Member of Parliament
from the Fazilet Party who sought unsuccessfully to be sworn in to
Parliament on May 2 wearing an Islamist-style headscarf, highlighted
the continuing dispute over the ban on religious-style clothing in
official settings. Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, President Demirel, and
the National Security Council criticized her actions as a challenge to
the secular State. The mainstream press was also critical, but the
Islamist-oriented media defended her actions. The personal controversy
over Kavakci's right to wear a headscarf in Parliament became largely
moot after Kavakci was stripped of Turkish citizenship for failing to
notify authorities that she had acquired a foreign nationality. She
subsequently lost her parliamentary privileges, although not her
elective office since Parliament did not vote to remove her. At year's
end the case remained open to legal review, and the general issue of
headscarves in Parliament remains unresolved.
In May the Government filed an indictment seeking the closure of
the Islamist Fazilet Party (see Section 3).
Although religious affiliation is listed on national identity
cards, there is no official discrimination.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally enjoy freedom of
movement domestically and the freedom to travel abroad; however, at
times the Government limited some of these rights. The Constitution
provides that a citizen's freedom to leave may be restricted only in
the case of a national emergency, civic obligations (military service,
for example), or criminal investigation or prosecution. As the security
situation continues to improve in the southeast, security officials
decreased use of roadblocks and vehicle and passenger searches.
In October the Government did not allow a group of demonstrators to
enter Ankara (see Section 2.b.).
Although there has been no legal internal exile for 12 years, since
1990 the state of emergency region's governor in the southeast has had
the authority to ``remove from the region,'' for a period not to exceed
the duration of the state of emergency (in place for 14 years),
citizens under his administration whose activities ``give an impression
that they are prone to disturb general security and public order.''
During the year, the governor transferred civil servants who were seen
as a threat to security, civil servants engaged in union activities,
and doctors reporting torture. In October, for example, 37 members of
the teachers' union Egitim-Sen in Batman province reportedly were
deported from the province on orders of the governor. The union's
members in southeastern provinces frequently are alleged to be involved
in subversive activities. The national chairman of HADEP was prevented
from entering the emergency region during the party's preelection
campaign season, and some other HADEP officials were prevented from
entering certain villages.
Turkey hosts an estimated 16 persons from Russia and 5 from the
former Yugoslavia who are given residence permits on grounds of
temporary refuge, with no resettlement provided by the Government. An
additional estimated 1,671 persons from Bosnia-Herzegovina and 384 from
Kosovo are granted a special temporary ``guest'' status. Because there
are no visa requirements, thousands of Iranians remain in Turkey for
extended periods.
When Turkey ratified the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which has the force of
domestic law, it exercised the option of accepting the Convention's
obligations only with respect to refugees from Europe. Although it has
not lifted subsequently the geographic limit of its treaty obligation,
since 1994 the Government grants temporary asylum to all those
recognized as refugees. The government screens applicants for asylum
and refers cases it considers bona fide to the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees. If the UNHCR believes that a non-European asylum-seeker
meets refugee criteria, the case is submitted to other countries for
resettlement. European refugees are given temporary residence permits,
renewable until they achieve a permanent status.
Furthermore, the UNHCR intervenes with government officials if it
disagrees with their negative decisions about individual asylum claims.
An appeal may be lodged within 15 days of a negative decision by the
authorities. After the appeal procedure, rejected applicants are issued
a deportation order that may be implemented after 15 days. There were
6,605 asylum seekers during the year; the authorities rejected the
asylum applications of some 809 persons.
A regulation obliges asylum seekers to apply within 10 days
(changed from 5 in early 1999) of arrival and submit proof of identity
in order to be eligible. The time limit for registration in the
Government's asylum program is implemented strictly and remains an
obstacle to the full access of asylum seekers to refugee status
determination procedures. During the year, no refugees were returned to
a country where they feared persecution, compared with 15 in 1998 and
continuing a steady decline since 1995; the number of asylum seekers
returned decreased from 49 in 1998 to 46, according to the UNHCR. The
obstacles inherent in the Government's asylum procedures lead to many
refugees being considered as ``illegals.'' In 1998 the UNHCR considered
that there were 83 refugees not registered with the Government; as of
the end of 1999 there were approximately 80. The UNHCR and government
authorities continue to work to resolve this problem and to find ways
to allow such cases to qualify for the Government's asylum program.
If they comply with the asylum regulation's requirements, asylum
seekers are registered by the government and processed for eligibility
determination. Since 1997 administrative courts have ruled that failure
to submit an asylum claim within a fixed time limit could not be a
reason not to address the application or grant asylum. The UNHCR has no
information on discrimination by the Government on the basis of
nationality. The UNHCR maintains a branch office in Ankara and field
offices in Istanbul, Silopi, Van, and Agri.
The mass influx of nearly 18,000 Kosovars during the year was
deemed to come under the 1994 asylum regulation. The Government allowed
Kosovars to enter the country freely and de facto has allowed them
``first asylum''--to stay until they repatriate or resettle
voluntarily. It established and operated a temporary refugee camp for
about half of those who came. Almost all Kosovars left by the end of
the year. The Government worked to prevent similar mass influxes from
Iraq but allows some individuals and families to settle in or transit
Turkey en route to permanent resettlement in Europe.
The UNHCR held inconclusive talks with the Government aimed at
improving reception for refugees at the Iraqi border, to ensure that
those who cross the border have access to the asylum process. Beginning
in September 1998, approximately 50 to 60 officials received UNHCR-
sponsored training in Antalya, Ankara, and Van, and some participants
went on study trips to Canada and Spain. The UNHCR works with local
partners such as the Turkish Red Crescent Society; the Association for
Solidarity with Asylum Seekers and Migrants; and the Anatolian
Development Foundation to integrate refugees into society.
Turkey continues to be a transit and departure point for illegal
migrants and asylum seekers of various nationalities en route to
Europe, who travel in small groups utilizing land routes, boats and
ships.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice.
Turkey has a multiparty parliamentary system, in which national
elections are held at least every 5 years, with mandatory universal
suffrage for all citizens 18 years of age and over. More than 30
political parties are active (most of them minuscule), 5 of which are
represented in Parliament. Parliament elects the President as head of
state every 7 years or when the incumbent becomes incapacitated or
dies.
In addition to these bodies, in accordance with the Constitution,
the National Security Council (NSC), which includes both military and
civilian government leaders, plays a significant role in shaping
government policy.
The Government neither coerces nor forbids membership in any
political organization; however, the Chief Public Prosecutor may bring
cases seeking the closure of political parties before the
Constitutional Court, which may close them down for unconstitutional
activities. The Chief Public Prosecutor opened cases to close two
significant parties, Fazilet and HADEP, alleging that they were centers
of illegal activities.
In January the Government filed a motion with the Constitutional
Court to close HADEP. The Chief Public Prosecutor accused HADEP of
threatening the unity of the Turkish State, saying that it was
controlled by the PKK. The closure could lead to the banning of some
HADEP leaders from politics. The case was pending before the
Constitutional Court at year's end. In August Parliament amended the
political parties law to establish a higher standard of proof in such
closure cases.
Government pressure against HADEP continued. HADEP party officials
claim that actions by the Government, in particular the state of
emergency region governor, hindered HADEP rallies and activities in the
period leading up to the April parliamentary elections and restricted
HADEP's ability to reach its constituents. According to HADEP, the
governor communicated his decision to cancel permission for a large
rally in Diyarbakir 20 minutes before the rally was due to begin,
leading to mass confusion and the detention of hundreds of supporters.
HADEP's national chair was prevented from entering the mainly Kurdish
state of emergency region during the election period, and some HADEP
officials were barred from entering certain villages during that period
(see also Section 2.d.). Following the elections and a drop in PKK
terrorist violence in the summer, government pressure on HADEP eased
somewhat: Some HADEP rallies were allowed to proceed without police
interference, the HADEP national president was allowed to tour the
southeast, HADEP mayors were allowed to perform their official duties
without interference, and an Ankara State Security Court lifted
restrictions on travel abroad against three HADEP mayors. However, some
officials still faced harassment, court cases and hostility from some
security officials. The year ended with police raids on HADEP offices
in seven provinces. Some HADEP officials have been barred for years
from international travel.
The military and judiciary, with support from the country's secular
elite, continued to wage a private and public campaign against Islamic
fundamentalism, which they view as a threat to the secular republic. In
June the National Security Council urged the new Government to offer no
concessions in the fight against the perceived threat of radical Islam.
The chief of the armed forces General Staff in September made a public
statement criticizing Islamist media portrayals of the armed forces as
hostile to religion and describing the armed forces as the
constitutionally mandated ``fist'' protecting secularism.
In May the Government filed an indictment seeking closure of the
Islamist Fazilet Party for promoting antisecular activity and for
representing the ideologies of the banned Refah Party. The indictment
also calls for banning Fazilet's leaders from politics for 5 years and
stripping its Members of Parliament of their seats. The case was
pending before the Constitutional Court at year's end.
Islamist leader Fethullah Gulen came under intense scrutiny and
investigation for allegedly plotting to take over the Government after
video recordings of a speech he gave were broadcast in June on
television. Prominent Islamist political leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
former mayor of Istanbul, was released from prison in July (see Section
2.a.), although he remains banned from politics for life. In March an
Ankara SSC prosecutor filed charges against a group of Islamist
politicians, many of whom were members of the Refah Party, which was
banned in 1998. They were charged with attempting to impose a
``religious order'' in contravention of article 146.1 of the Penal Code
(forcibly trying to change the constitutional order); the charges carry
the death penalty. The case continued at year's end.
The Democratic Mass Party (DKP) was closed in February by the
Constitutional Court on the grounds that its party program, which
defends Kurdish rights, included provisions ``against the indivisible
integrity of the State.'' The case was brought by the Chief Public
Prosecutor. Since the decision had not yet been published officially by
year's end, party members were in legal limbo and could not form join
another party.
The European Court of Human Rights in December found that the
Government had violated the right to freedom of association of the
former members of the Freedom and Democracy Party (OZDEP), which was
dissolved in 1993, less than a year after it was founded, on the
grounds that its program sought to undermine the territorial integrity
and secular nature of the State (see Section 2.b.).
Reports continued of corruption and the abuse of power in the
security forces, including ties with illegal organizations. The
previous Yilmaz government publicly committed to investigate
corruption; however, its failure to make tangible progress was
criticized. Trials linked to these charges began in 1998, involving
former Interior Minister Mehmet Agar and Member of Parliament Sedat
Bucak, but were halted in April when both were elected to the new
Parliament and gained automatic legal immunity (which had been lifted
by the previous Parliament).
There are no legal restrictions on political activity by women, the
Constitution calls for equal political rights for men and women, and
many women are active politically; however, women are underrepresented
seriously in government and politics: there are only 22 women in the
550-seat Parliament. There are no female ministers in Prime Minister
Ecevit's 35-member cabinet and no female governors.
There are no legal restrictions on political activity by
minorities; however, some minorities are underrepresented in government
and politics.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The nongovernmental Human Rights Association has branches
nationwide and claims a membership of about 20,000 persons. In 1990 the
HRA established the Human Rights Foundation, which operates torture
rehabilitation centers in Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul, Diyarbakir, and
Adana and serves as a clearinghouse for human rights information. Other
domestic NGO's include the Istanbul-based Helsinki Citizens Assembly,
the Ankara-based Turkish Democracy Foundation, human rights centers at
a number of universities, and Mazlum-Der, the Organization of Human
Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed Peoples, which especially monitors
Islamist issues.
The HRA's Diyarbakir branch remains closed for the third successive
year. The HRA's Mardin branch was ordered closed for 3 months in
January and the Gaziantep branch for 3 months in July. Its branches in
Bursa, Sanliurfa and Van reopened, and the HRA also opened three new
offices. Authorities indefinitely closed Mazlum-Der's Sanliurfa and
Malatya branches in January and May, respectively. The Mersin Migrants'
Association (Goc-Der), which was shut down in 1998, remains closed.
Despite the outreach of key government officials to the NGO
community, human rights monitors, as well as lawyers and doctors
involved in documenting human rights violations, continued to be
harassed, particularly by security officials, for their legitimate
activities. The Government used detention, prosecution, intimidation,
harassment, and formal closure orders against human rights monitors. In
June police raided the headquarters, branch offices, homes, and offices
of the leadership of Mazlum-Der. According to Mazlum-Der, the searches
were carried out under an Interior Ministry search warrant on the
grounds that the NGO ``works against the republican regime.'' Its
headquarters were searched again in August, and its bank accounts
frozen, on the grounds that it was collecting aid illegally for
earthquake victims.
The harassment of lawyers involved in political cases in the
southeast remained at approximately the same level as in 1998, but was
substantially lower than in the mid-1990s, primarily because of the
increased number of attorneys willing to defend politically sensitive
cases and greater mutual support within the profession. Harassment by
the security apparatus is less frequent and the methods used are less
extreme. Several defense lawyers have noted that some judges and
prosecutors are playing a positive role in trying to protect attorneys
from harassment. However, attorneys still face criminal charges and
other harassment, particularly if they defend clients accused of
terrorism or illegal political activity, pursue torture cases, or seek
prompt access to their clients (which police often view as
interference).
During the year, there were several cases in which attorneys were
charged with various offenses (such as acting as couriers for members
of illegal organizations or insulting government officials), detained,
searched, or threatened. In Elazig a case was opened in December
against an attorney after he publicly stated that a medical report
showed that his client had been tortured by security officials. The
case was opened under a provision of the new civil servants prosecution
law, which prohibits making false accusations against public employees
based on ``enmity, hatred or slandering.''
After review, in September the Diyarbakir SSC repeated its previous
decision to convict Dr. Seyfettin Kizilkan, the former president of the
southeast Chamber of Doctors and director of Diyarbakir's largest state
hospital, for ``assisting and sheltering an illegal organization''
after police allegedly found bomb materials and PKK documents in his
home. Dr. Kizilkan and his associates maintain that the police planted
the evidence; he remains free pending an appeal of the verdict. The
case against Dr. Zeki Uzun, accused of aiding illegal organizations by
providing medical reports and treatment, continued at year's end. Dr.
Cumhur Akpinar was acquitted in December on similar charges (see
Section 1.c.).
Former HRA Chairman Akin Birdal was jailed in June on a conviction
for inciting hatred and enmity in a 1996 public statement. In
September, citing medical reasons stemming from injuries Birdal
sustained during a May 1998 attempt on his life, the Government
suspended Birdal's sentence for 6 months and released him for that
period; however, Birdal faces many other charges. In February a Bursa
penal court acquitted him of charges of ``insulting the army'' during a
television appearance in 1997. In April the Court of Appeals upheld a
guilty verdict against Birdal, but in December a prosecutor dropped
charges against him for ``assisting a terrorist organization.'' In a
separate ruling in December, the Diyarbakir SCC acquitted Birdal and
several other HRA officials for ``disseminating separatist propaganda''
in connection with speeches they made in 1996. The SSC prosecutor
appealed the verdict. Birdal still is required to serve 10 months for
two other confirmed convictions.
In December the Ankara SSC sentenced 10 persons and acquitted 6
others in the attempted murder of Birdal. A former Jandarma sergeant,
the presumed ringleader, and one other man accused of ordering and
organizing the attack both received 19-year sentences. The two men who
fired at Birdal received sentences of 19 and 12 years respectively, and
two others received 19- and 10-year sentences for establishing a gang
(the ``Turkish Vengeance Brigade'') to commit the crime. Two more
persons, who were convicted of weapons charges and gang activities,
received sentences of 9 years and 20 months respectively, while two
others received 10-month suspended sentences.
Police failed to protect HRA Chairman Husnu Ondul in November when
he was attacked in his office by 30 to 40 members of a group known as
the ``Families of the Martyrs,'' mainly relatives of soldiers who died
in the conflict with the PKK. Ondul called out to police officers
waiting outside the offices for help, but the officers replied that
they would need permission from their superiors to intervene. An
officer posted inside the HRA offices (since the attack on Birdal) said
he telephoned for help but could not do anything against such a large
crowd.
The trial of 25 Diyarbakir lawyers entered its sixth year at the
Diyarbakir SSC, with prosecutors in October calling for significant
sentences against some of the defendants, who were charged in 1993-94
with ``aiding and abetting the PKK'' and ``membership in an illegal
terror organization.'' No credible evidence has been presented in 6
years. Other allegations in the indictment include legal behavior such
as filing a petition with the European Commission of Human Rights.
Sixteen of the lawyers alleged that they were tortured while in
incommunicado detention after their arrests. The lawyers are free
pending trial. Human rights monitors believe that their prosecution is
intended to punish them for representing clients unpopular with the
Government and publicizing human rights violations in the southeast.
All seven members of the Diyarbakir branch of the HRA were
acquitted in May of charges that they aided the PKK. The trial, which
began in 1995, focused mainly on the publication of the booklet
``Emergency Situation--1992.''
Legal proceedings against some of the organizers of the September
1997 ``Musa Anter peace train'' ended in 1998, when the organizers were
acquitted. A case against 12 policemen accused of torturing peace train
detainees began in April.
Representatives of diplomatic missions who wish to monitor human
rights are free to speak with private citizens, groups, and government
officials. Security police routinely place such official visitors in
the southeast under visible surveillance in an effort to intimidate
those they meet, although legitimate protection concerns were also an
important consideration. Visiting foreign government officials and
legislators were able to meet with human rights monitors.
Representatives of international governmental organizations were able
to visit Leyla Zana and Akin Birdal in prison, in accordance with
Turkey's international obligations, although officials representing
foreign governments were denied permission for such visits.
The State Minister for Human Rights, as chair of the High Council
for Human Rights, continued to investigate human rights abuses and to
reach out to NGO and community leaders. The Council, composed of
representatives from the Justice, Interior, Education, Health, and
Foreign Affairs Ministries (along with representatives of the security
forces), met regularly to review the human rights situation, advise the
Government on steps for improvement, and draft appropriate legislation.
In September State Minister for Human Rights Irtemcelik met with the
head of the Human Rights Foundation and then organized a wider meeting
in October with human rights groups, professional organizations, and
the parliamentary bodies that make up the High Council.
President Demirel met in December with human rights monitors from
the southeast.
Parliament established a Human Rights Commission in 1991 to oversee
compliance with the human rights provisions of domestic law and
international agreements, investigate alleged abuses, and prepare
reports. Most recently the Commission undertook a review of prison
conditions in light of the September riots (see Section 1.c.). The U.N.
Special Rapporteur for Torture visited the country in late 1998 (see
Section 1.c.).
A report by the European Commission of Human Rights, released in
September, held Turkey responsible for violations of human rights in
Cyprus stemming from the 1974 Turkish military intervention. The
Government of Turkey denied its responsibility. The report was to be
referred to the European Court of Human Rights for a binding decision,
a process that may take several years.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution proclaims Turkey to be a secular state, regards
all citizens as equal, and prohibits discrimination on ethnic,
religious, or racial grounds; however, discrimination remains a problem
in several areas. The Government officially recognizes only Eastern
Orthodox, Armenian Apostolic, and Jewish adherents as minorities
covered under the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne.
Women.--Spousal abuse is serious and widespread. According to the
Family Research Institute in the Prime Minister's Office, beating in
the home is one of the most frequent forms of violence against women.
Despite 1998 legislation making spousal abuse illegal, the Institute
continues to note complaints of beatings, threats, economic pressure,
and sexual violence. In a survey of 12 provinces, physical abuse
reportedly occurred in roughly 30 percent of families. There are 9
shelters and 6 consultation centers for battered women; in addition,
the Child Protection and Social Services Agency provides services to
victims of domestic violence through its 19 social centers.
Spousal abuse, although now illegal, still is considered an
extremely private matter, involving societal notions of family honor.
Few women go to the police, who in any case are reluctant to intervene
in domestic disputes and frequently advise women to return to their
husbands. Citizens of either sex may file civil or criminal charges for
abuse but rarely do so.
Laws and ingrained societal notions make it difficult to prosecute
sexual assault or rape cases. ``Honor murders''--the killing by
immediate family members of women who are suspected of being unchaste--
continue in rural areas, and among recent immigrants to cities, but may
have declined due to greater public, especially media, attention.
However, laws still exist that reduce the sentence for killings that
are ``provoked,'' and because of further reductions for juvenile
offenders, observers note that young male relatives often are
designated to perform the killing.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
The Government issued a new regulation in late 1998, prohibiting
the traditional practice of ``virginity testing,'' unless requested by
a woman. The regulation appears to have led to a decrease in the
practice but does not carry sanctions against the person conducting the
testing.
Some laws still discriminate against women. The Civil Code
prohibits granting gender-based privileges or rights but retains some
discriminatory provisions concerning marital rights and obligations.
Because the husband is the legal head of household, he is authorized to
choose the domicile and represents the conjugal unit. As parents,
husband and wife exercise joint child rearing rights, but when they
disagree, the husband's view often prevails. Women's groups have
lobbied to change the Civil Code provision that the husband is the
legal head of household. A single woman who gives birth to a child out
of wedlock is not considered automatically to be the legal guardian of
her child: a court decision may be required. Divorce law requires that
the divorcing spouses divide their property according to property
registered in each spouse's name. Because in most cases property is
registered in the husband's name, this provision can create
difficulties for women who wish to divorce. Under inheritance laws, a
widow generally receives one-fourth of the estate, her children the
rest.
The literacy rate for women is 78 percent, compared with 94 percent
for men, but in rural areas the rate can be as low as 50 percent for
women. Men must serve in the army, and if they do not know how to read
they are taught upon entry.
Particularly in urban areas, women continue to improve their
position, including in the professions, business, and the civil
service; however, they continue to face discrimination to varying
degrees. Women constitute nearly 50 percent of the work force but hold
less than 10 percent of managerial-level positions. Women generally
receive equal pay for equal work in the professions, business, and
civil service jobs, although a large percentage of women employed in
agriculture and in the trade, restaurant, and hotel sectors work as
unpaid family help. Women may take the examination required to become
governors or subgovernors; several have been appointed subgovernors.
Independent women's groups and women's rights associations continue
to increase in number, such as the Association to Support Women
Candidates (Kader); ``The Flying Broom'' women's advocacy group; the
Turkish Women's Union; and the Foundation for the Evaluation of Women's
Labor. The concept of lobbying for women's rights, including greater
elected representation, is gaining momentum. Women continue to be very
active in ongoing debates between secularists and Islamists, especially
with respect to the right to choose whether to wear religious head
coverings in public places, such as government offices and
universities.
Children.--The Government is committed to furthering children's
welfare and works to expand opportunities in education and health,
including a further reduction in the infant mortality rate. The State
Minister for Women's and Family Issues oversees implementation of the
Government's programs for children.
Government-provided education through the age of 14 or the eighth
grade is compulsory. Traditional family values in rural areas place a
greater emphasis on advanced education for sons than for daughters; the
relatively new 8-year compulsory education requirement (implemented in
1998) was expected to allow more girls to continue their education. In
practice in rural Anatolia, the literacy rate for girls is very low,
and many do not complete primary school. The literacy rate for boys,
most of whom complete primary school, is higher. Some continue on to
high school, for which they generally must travel or live away from
home (see Section 1.g.).
Although the law provides special safeguards for children in police
custody, police officers and prosecutors frequently circumvent or
ignore these provisions. The law stipulates that the state prosecutor
or a designated assistant should carry out interrogations of minors and
that minors must be provided with lawyers; however, in practice police
and prosecutors often deny minors access to lawyers and fail to inform
parents. Children and juveniles detained under the Anti-Terror Law also
often are held for up to 4 days in incommunicado detention.
Children have suffered greatly from the cycle of violence in the
southeast. The migration--forced or voluntary--of many families, past
terrorism against teachers, and school closings in the southeast have
uprooted children and moved them to cities that are hard pressed to
find the resources to provide basic, mandatory services such as
schooling. Many cities in the southeast are operating schools on double
shifts, with as many as 100 students per classroom (see Section 1.g.).
The Government has built regional boarding schools to help combat this
problem, but these are insufficient.
Instances of child beating and abuse are reported more frequently
than in previous years, according to women's groups. The increase
likely is attributable to greater public awareness of the problem.
Trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--Few laws exist regarding accessibility
to buildings and public transportation. Certain categories of employers
are required to hire disabled persons as 2 percent of their employee
pool, although there is no penalty for failure to comply.
Religious Minorities.--Jews and numerous Christian denominations
freely practice their religions and report little discrimination in
daily life. However, some incidents still occur, and extremist groups
or individuals target minority communities from time to time. Isolated
incidents of desecration of Jewish and Greek Orthodox cemeteries were
reported. No arrests have been made in the case of the 1998 arson
attack on the Orthodox Museum at Saint Therapon or the December 1997
bombing of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul.
No laws prohibit religious conversion. Nonetheless, individuals
contemplating conversion often face family and community pressures, and
proselytizing remains socially unacceptable. Some members of religious
minorities claim that they have limited career prospects in government
or military service as a result of their religious affiliation.
There are no non-Muslim senior officers in the military, according
to a senior military official, because non-Muslims do not apply to
attend the military academy and officers must be graduates.
Many religious minority members, along with many in the secular
political majority of Muslims, fear the possibility of rising Islamic
extremism and the involvement of even moderate Islam in politics.
Islamist journals frequently publish anti-Semitic material.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution does not
recognize the Kurds as a national, racial, or ethnic minority, although
they are in fact the country's largest ethnic and linguistic minority.
There are no legal barriers to ethnic Kurds' participation in political
and economic affairs, and many Members of Parliament and senior
officials and professionals are Kurds; however, Kurds who publicly or
politically assert their Kurdish identity or publicly espouse using
Kurdish in the public domain, including a parliamentarian who listed
``Kurdish'' as one of his foreign languages, risk public censure,
harassment, or prosecution.
Kurds who are long-term residents in industrialized cities in
western Turkey were in many cases assimilated into the political,
economic, and social life of the nation, and much intermarriage has
occurred over many generations. Kurds currently migrating westward
(including those displaced by the conflict in the southeast) bring with
them their culture and village identity, but often little education and
few skills.
Since 1991 private spoken and printed communications in Kurdish are
legal; however, the use of minority languages, including Kurdish, in
television and radio broadcasts, by political parties, and in schools
is restricted by a plethora of laws and even articles of the
Constitution; these restrictions are invoked arbitrarily. Television
and radio stations in the southeast occasionally play Kurdish music,
although authorities have imposed restrictions on some songs. The State
of Emergency regional governor frequently bans Kurdish recordings that
may be played legally elsewhere in the country. Kurdish is widely
spoken on the streets, especially in the largely Kurdish southeast, and
Kurdish music recordings reportedly were widely available there despite
some being banned. Materials dealing with Kurdish history, culture, and
ethnic identity are available but continue to be subject to
confiscation and prosecution under the ``indivisible unity of the
state'' provisions of the Anti-Terror Law (see Section 2.a.). Such
confiscations were rare during the year.
The Government circumscribes the activities of organizations such
as the Mesopotamian Cultural Center (MKM), a corporation with branches
in several cities that was established to promote Kurdish language and
culture (see Section 2.a.). There is police pressure against their
activities, especially in the southeast, and local officials monitor
and often interrupt their cultural events. MKM branches report that
they were prevented from selling Kurdish-language music cassettes and
warned against organizing cultural events.
The Ministry of Education tightly controls the curriculum in
schools (except foreign-language schools not part of the Turkish
system). The small numbers of Greek-language students have little
opportunity to continue their education in Turkey, and consequently
many go to Greece, often never to return.
The Romani population is extremely small, and no incidents of
public or government harassment directed against them were reported.
Extremist groups or individuals target minority communities from time
to time.
In October a pipe bomb exploded, causing damage to the Greek
Minority High School in Istanbul.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers, except police and military
personnel, have the right to associate freely and form representative
unions. This right encompasses civil servants, including
schoolteachers.
The Constitution stipulates that no one shall be compelled to
become or remain a member of, or withdraw from, a labor union. The law
states that unions and confederations may be founded without prior
authorization based on a petition to the governor of the province of
the prospective union's headquarters. Unions are independent of the
government and political parties. They must obtain official permission
to hold meetings or rallies and must allow police to attend their
conventions and record the proceedings. The Constitution requires
candidates for union office to have worked 10 years in the industry
represented by the union. The Supreme Court in 1998 banned the DISK-
affiliated union in the leather sector, Deri-Is, because it violated
this article in the Constitution and prohibited it from appealing to a
higher court. It applied to the European Court of Human Rights for
redress. The International Labor Organization (ILO) Committee on
Freedom of Association has stated that this provision is extremely
prejudicial to the interests of the trade unions and has urged that it
be repealed.
Just over 13 percent of the total civilian labor force (15 years of
age and above) is unionized. The labor force numbers around 23 million,
with approximately 46 percent employed in agriculture. There are four
confederations of labor unions: The Turkish Confederation of Workers
Unions (Turk-Is); the Confederation of Turkish Real Trade Unions (Hak-
Is); the Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions (DISK); and the
National Confederation (Misk). There are also 3 public employees unions
and 27 independent unions. Unions and their officers have a statutory
right to express their views on issues directly affecting members'
economic and social interests.
Prosecutors may ask labor courts to order a trade union or
confederation to suspend its activities or to go into liquidation for
serious infractions, based on alleged violation of specific legal
norms. However, the Government may not dissolve a union summarily.
The constitutional right to strike is restricted. For example, the
Constitution does not permit strikes among civil servants, workers
engaged in the protection of life and property, and those in the mining
and petroleum industries, sanitation services, national defense, and
education. The right to strike is suspended for the first 10 years in
the 9 free trade zones (see Section 6.b.).
Collective bargaining is required before a strike. The law
specifies the steps that a union must take before it may strike or
before an employer may engage in a lockout. Nonbinding mediation is the
last of those steps. A party that fails to comply with these steps
forfeits its rights. Unions are forbidden to engage in secondary
(solidarity), political, or general strikes, or in slowdowns. The
employer may respond to a strike with a lockout but is prohibited from
hiring strikebreakers or using administrative personnel to perform jobs
normally done by strikers. Article 42 of Law 2822, governing collective
bargaining, strikes, and lockouts, prohibits the employer from
terminating workers who encourage or participate in a legal strike. In
sectors in which strikes are prohibited, disputes are resolved through
binding arbitration.
The Government has the statutory power under Law 2822 to suspend
strikes for 60 days for reasons of national security or public health
and safety. Unions may petition the Council of State to lift such a
suspension. If this appeal fails, and the parties and mediators still
fail to resolve the dispute, the strike is subject to compulsory
arbitration at the end of the 60-day period. The ILO's Committee of
Experts and the Committee on the Application of Standards regard the
Government's application of Law 2822 as too broad, and they have called
on the Government to limit recourse to compulsory arbitration to
essential services in the strict sense of the term. The Government
asserts that the law does not contradict the Committees' principles.
From January through November there were 2 strikes in the public
sector involving 67 workers at 3 job sites and 32 strikes in the
private sector involving 3,216 workers at 53 job sites. During the same
period there were also 4 lockouts in the private sector involving 931
workers.
Workers and civil servants throughout the country answered a call
by the Labor Platform and held a general strike in August to protest
the draft social security bill and the constitutional amendment
enabling international arbitration. Workers clashed with police when
they tried to enter Ankara's main square. Some were injured slightly
when police dispersed the crowd. A few workers were detained.
Government officials criticized labor leaders for escalating tensions
and accused them of misleading the public.
After several meetings of the Economic and Social Council (ESK) at
which top union leaders and government representatives failed to reach
an agreement on the proposed change to the national retirement age
(from 43 to 60 for men and from 38 to 58 for women), trade unions
staged peaceful demonstrations in major cities on July 6 to protest
government draft legislation on social security. The legislation passed
in September, amid widespread protests by labor leaders.
Textile firms avoided strike action by some 70,000 textile workers
on January 12, when employers agreed to a 45 percent pay increase for
the first half of 1999 and an additional 30 percent raise for the
second half. However, 9,000 to 11,000 textile workers belonging to the
DISK union struck for a day on January 12. The strike ended when DISK
signed an agreement with employers containing the same wage increases.
Some labor union members faced government limits on freedom of
speech and assembly (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.), while some civil
service organizations continued to demonstrate for the right to strike
and for higher salaries. Legislation providing the right to strike for
civil servants was introduced in the last parliamentary session but was
not adopted. Civil servants currently have the right to organize and
engage in collective bargaining.
All defendants were acquitted in the trial, begun in 1996, against
Turk-Is Chairmanship Council officials who were charged with violating
the associations law when Turk-Is announced support for political
parties during the 1995 election. No action has been taken in a second
trial against Turk-Is officials charged with holding illegal
demonstrations in 1995 to protest a deadlock in collective bargaining.
With government approval, unions may and do form confederations and
join international labor bodies, as long as these organizations are not
hostile to Turkey, or to freedom of religion or belief. The
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), of which
Turk-Is had been an affiliate for years, approved DISK as an affiliate
in 1992; Hak-Is became a member in 1997.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--All industrial
workers have the right to organize and bargain collectively, and most
industrial and some public sector agricultural workers are organized.
The law requires that, in order to become a bargaining agent, a union
must represent not only 50 percent plus 1 of the employees at a given
work site, but also 10 percent of all the workers in that particular
industry. This 10 percent barrier has the effect of favoring
established unions, particularly those affiliated with Turk-Is, the
confederation that represents nearly 73 percent of organized labor.
The Ministry of Labor reportedly manipulated membership figures to
prevent unions from acquiring bargaining rights or to rescind such
rights. The ICFTU reports that, as a result of the law, workers in many
sectors of economic activity are not covered by a collective agreement.
The ILO has called on Turkey to rescind this 10 percent rule,
stating that it violates ILO Convention 98, which Turkey ratified in
1952. However, both Turk-Is and the Turkish Employers' Organization
favor retention of the 10 percent rule, since each confederation has an
established membership area and does not want the status quo upset. In
1994 the government informed the ILO Committee on the Application of
Standards that the Ministry of Labor and Social Security proposed to
remove the 10 percent numerical restriction and that it had
communicated its proposal to the social partners. The ILO took note of
the government's statement that it continued to study removal of this
requirement despite objections from employer and worker organizations.
However, since then the Government has taken no further action.
The law on trade unions stipulates that an employer may not dismiss
a labor union representative without rightful cause. The union member
may appeal such a dismissal to the courts, and if the ruling is in the
union member's favor, the employer must reinstate him and pay all back
benefits and salary. These laws generally are applied in practice.
The ILO has urged the Government to take the necessary measures to
ensure that workers have effective protection against antiunion
discrimination. Some private sector employers continued to try to
eliminate unions. The DISK trade union confederation reports that since
January 1996 some 40,000 trade union members were fired.
The continuing state of emergency in the southeast has resulted in
restrictions on labor organizations in five provinces. A law enacted in
1984 provides for the establishment of free trade zones, which are
intended to attract domestic and especially foreign investment and
promote international trade. There are nine such zones operating in
Mersin, Antalya, the Aegean region, Trabzon, Istanbul (2), Eastern
Anatolia, Mardin, and Rize. Union organizing and collective bargaining
are permitted in the zones. However, the right to strike is suspended
for the first 10 years of operation of a particular business in the
zone. In the meantime, labor disputes that cannot be settled by the
parties are subject to compulsory arbitration. Workers inside the zones
are paid in foreign exchange rather than Turkish currency, giving them
a hedge against inflation.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
statutes prohibit compulsory labor, including that performed by
children, and the Government generally enforces these provisions in
practice; however, trafficking in women and girls for the purpose of
forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution and labor laws forbid the full-time
employment of children younger than age 15, with the exception that
those 13 and 14 years of age may engage in light, part-time work if
enrolled in school or vocational training. The Constitution also
prohibits children from engaging in physically demanding jobs such as
underground mining and from working at night. The Ministry of Labor
effectively enforces these laws only in large-scale industrial and
service sector enterprises.
Child labor is widespread. According to a September report
published by the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, 8.5 percent of
children between the ages of 6 and 14 years were engaged in some form
of economic activity and 23.9 percent were engaged in domestic labor.
Child labor is used most often in small-sized enterprises. According to
official data, 87 percent of working children are employed by small-
sized enterprises having 1 to 9 workers, 7 percent work in medium-size
enterprises (10 to 24 workers), and 6 percent are employed by large-
scale enterprises (more than 25 workers).
In practice many children work because families need the
supplementary income. An informal system provides work for young boys
at low wages, for example, in auto repair shops. Girls rarely are seen
working in public, but many are kept out of school to work in
handicrafts, especially in rural areas. The bulk of child labor occurs
in rural areas and often is associated with traditional family economic
activity, such as farming or animal husbandry. It is common for entire
families to work together to bring in the harvest.
The gradual elimination of child labor is a national priority. The
seventh 5-year development plan commits the Government to enact
legislation to restrict further child labor and to adopt legislation to
conform with relevant international conventions. The Government
recognizes the serious problem of child labor and works with the ILO to
document its extent and to determine solutions.
The Ministry of Labor, the ILO's International Program on the
Elimination of Child Labor (IPEC) government partner, actively has been
combating child labor since 1992, when it established a child labor
unit and trained Ministry of Labor inspectors specifically in child
labor issues. In 1996 the government and the ILO signed an agreement to
extend the IPEC program until December 2001.
With the introduction in 1998 of the 8-year compulsory education
program (previously, 5 years were compulsory), the Government expected
the number of child workers to be reduced significantly, since children
are required to attend school until age 14. Small enterprises prefer
child labor because it is cheaper and provides practical training for
the children, who subsequently are preferred for future employment in
the same workplace. If children employed in these businesses are
registered with a Ministry of National Education training center, they
go to the center once a week for training, and the centers are obliged
by law to inspect their workplaces. Currently there are 318 centers
located in 80 cities. These centers provide apprenticeship training in
86 occupations. Only 22.8 percent of working children take advantage of
these schools.
Labor inspectors only cover areas that are defined in the labor
laws. Many children are working in areas that are not covered by labor
laws, such as agriculture or the informal economy, and are therefore
beyond the reach of the inspectorate.
The Constitution prohibits compulsory labor, including that
performed by children, and the laws generally are enforced; however,
trafficking in girls for the purpose of forced prostitution is a
problem (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor is obliged
legally to set minimum wages at least every 2 years through a minimum
wage board, a tripartite government-industry-union body. In recent
years, it has done so annually. However, during the year there were two
adjustments: The nominal minimum wage was increased in January by 30
percent and again in July by 20 percent, compared with an annual
inflation rate of nearly 69 percent. Public workers who are part of
collective labor agreements also received an inflation-indexed increase
and a 5 percent prosperity rate increase. The monthly gross minimum
wage rates, which became effective in August, were approximately $199
(93.06 million lira) for workers over age 16, and $177 (79.56 million
lira) for workers under 16.
The minimum wage does not provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. It would be difficult for a single worker, and
impossible for a family, to live on the minimum wage without support
from other sources. Most workers earn considerably more. Workers
covered by the Labor Law, who constitute about one-third of the total
labor force, also receive a hot meal or a daily food allowance and
other fringe benefits that, according to the Turkish Employers'
Association, make basic wages alone account for only about 37.3 percent
of total compensation.
The Labor Law sets a 45-hour workweek, although most unions have
bargained for fewer hours. The law prescribes a weekly rest day and
limits the number of overtime hours to 3 a day for up to 90 days in a
year. The Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor effectively
enforces wage and hour provisions in the unionized industrial, service,
and government sectors, which cover about 12 percent of workers.
The law mandates occupational health and safety regulations, but in
practice the Government does not carry out effective inspection and
enforcement programs. Law 1475 allows for the shutdown of an operation
if a five-person committee, which includes safety inspectors, employee,
and employer representatives, determines that the operation endangers
workers' lives. In practice financial constraints, limited safety
awareness, carelessness, and fatalistic attitudes result in scant
attention to occupational safety and health by workers and employers
alike. The law sets out procedures under which workers may remove
themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The Government deals with the problem
of trafficking in persons through laws relating to prostitution and
illegal immigration. The Ministries of Justice and the Interior are
responsible for the problem, and the police, especially the immigration
and organized crime authorities, enforce antitrafficking laws. Under
the Penal Code, it is illegal to abduct and detain a woman or child.
However, this law relates more to the old custom of kidnaping a bride,
in which punishment is suspended if adbuctor and abductee get married.
A further provision prohibits enticement to prostitution; however,
penalties are light (up to 2 year's imprisonment). A further article of
the Penal Code makes it a crime to send a prostitute from one place to
another by force or fraud. These laws are the only statutes relevant to
trafficking in persons.
Turkey is a major destination and transit country for trafficking
in women and girls for the purpose of forced prostitution. The
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and domestic NGO's
stated that most trafficked women in the country are from Albania,
Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine. Arrests (and in most cases,
deportations) of nationals from Moldova, Romania, and Ukraine rose from
6,700 in 1998 to approximately 11,000 in 1999. In 1997 alone, the
country deported 7,000 Romanian women. African and Asian women use the
country as a transit point to other countries in Europe.
Organized crime groups appear to be the primary trafficking
organizations. The Ministry of the Interior's organized crime
department is responsible for combating trafficking problems. According
to NGO's, victims of trafficking remain without assistance and the
trafficking cycle continues. Many women and girls come to the country
believing that they have legitimate work as models, entertainers,
governesses, or translators. In some cases, girls from Romanian
orphanages have been kidnaped. One NGO reported in the fall of 1998
that there were three or four hotels in a single block in Istanbul
where women were housed and allowed out only in a group under guard to
go to work as prostitutes in private clubs. Other NGO's reported that
some groups of women deported were robbed in Bulgaria and forced to
work as prostitutes there. Some of the recruitment in source countries
was done by former prostitutes, who appeared to the victims of
trafficking to be recruiting for legitimate work.
Once in the country, the trafficked women and girls are in debt
bondage to their traffickers, who are members of the Mafia (mainly
Russian). Women who attempt to escape often are beaten, gang-raped, or
killed. Since 1997 there has been more transit activity through the
country to Western Europe, perhaps stemming from the fact that the
Government banned casinos that year. The Government addressed this
problem with laws relating to illegal migration and unregistered
prostitution; registered prostitution is legal.
Reportedly there is almost no trafficking in Turkish women or
girls. There were no reports of trafficking in children for the purpose
of forced labor; legislation in this area addresses the issue (see
Section 6.d.).
At year's end, there was little interagency cooperation in dealing
with the problem of trafficking. According to a leading women's NGO,
Ka-Der, representatives from the Ministries of Interior, Justice, and
Health, among other ministries and NGO's, met in October to discuss the
issue of trafficking. The group was not formalized and did not meet
again.
The Government does not provide any formal protection, aid, or
education to victims of trafficking. Since the women being trafficked
are not usually from Turkey, preventive education is less applicable.
The country has nine government-funded women's shelters for a
population of 65 million people; there are no NGO-run women's shelters.
The shelters are open to women regardless of citizenship.
In 1998 and 1999, teams from Ukraine and Moldova filmed educational
documentaries designed to discourage women and girls from coming to
Turkey. The IOM reports that the teams received extensive cooperation
from the authorities, especially from the police, and filmed graphic
stories about the situation of female trafficking victims.
______
TURKMENISTAN
Turkmenistan, a one-party state dominated by its president and his
closest advisers, made little progress in moving from a Soviet-era
authoritarian style of government to a democratic system. The flawed
December parliamentary elections and the passage of a law exempting
President Saparmurat Niyazov from term limits were further backward
steps. Niyazov, head of the Turkmen Communist Party since 1985 (renamed
the Democratic Party in 1992) and President of Turkmenistan since its
independence in 1991, legally may remain in office until his death.
Niyazov retained his monopoly on power, and the Democratic Party, the
renamed Communist Party, retained its monopoly on power; the Government
registered no parties during the year and continued to repress all
opposition political activities. Emphasizing stability and gradual
reform, official nation-building efforts focused on fostering Turkmen
nationalism and the glorification of President Niyazov. The 50-member
unicameral Parliament (Mejlis) has no genuinely independent authority,
and in practice the President controls the judicial system.
The Committee on National Security (KNB) has the responsibilities
formerly held by the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB); namely,
to ensure that the regime remains in power through tight control of
society and discouragement of dissent. The Ministry of Internal Affairs
directs the criminal police, which works closely with the KNB on
matters of national security. Both forces committed serious human
rights abuses.
Turkmenistan is largely a desert with cattle and sheep raising,
intensive agriculture in irrigated areas, and huge oil and gas
reserves. Its economy remains dependent on central planning mechanisms
and state control, although the Government has taken a number of small
steps to make the transition to a market economy. Agriculture,
particularly cotton cultivation, accounts for nearly half of total
employment. Gas, oil and gas derivatives, and cotton account for almost
all of the country's export revenues. The Government is proceeding with
negotiations on construction of a new gas export pipeline across the
Caspian Sea, through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Turkey, and also is
considering shipments through Iran and Afghanistan.
The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor. The
Government continued to commit serious human rights abuses, and the
authorities in particular severely restricted political and civil
liberties. Citizens do not have the ability to change their government
peacefully. One political prisoner died in custody under suspicious
circumstances. Security forces continued to beat and otherwise mistreat
suspects and prisoners, and prison conditions remained poor and unsafe.
Both the criminal police and the KNB operate with relative impunity and
abuse the rights of individuals as well as enforce the Government's
policy of repressing political opposition. Arbitrary arrest and
detention, prolonged pretrial detention, unfair trials, and
interference with citizens' privacy remained problems. In January
following a commitment by President Niyazov in May 1998, the Government
released dissident Gulgeldi Annaniyazov. The Government severely
restricts freedom of speech and does not permit freedom of the press.
The Government completely controls the media, censoring all newspapers
and rarely permitting independent criticism of government policy or
officials. The Government restricts freedom of assembly and
association. The Government imposes restrictions on nonregistered
religious groups. The law on religion, amended most recently in 1996,
reaffirmed a number of important religious freedoms but also tightened
government control of religious groups. The requirement that religious
organizations have at least 500 Turkmen citizens as members in a given
locality to be registered legally has prevented all but Sunni Muslims
and Russian Orthodox Christians from legally establishing themselves.
The Government imposes some restrictions on freedom to travel abroad.
Domestic violence against women is a problem, and women experience
societal discrimination. The Government generally gave favored
treatment to men over women and to ethnic Turkmen over minorities.
In January the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) opened an office in Ashgabat.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--In September
political prisoner and Russian citizen Khoshali Garayev was found
hanged in his cell in the maximum security prison in Turkmenbashi. The
Government has rejected requests from the Russian Government and
international human rights organizations for an investigation into the
suspicious nature of Garayev's death (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The 1992 Constitution makes torture or other cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment illegal; however, there were widespread
credible reports that security officials frequently beat criminal
suspects and prisoners and often used force to obtain confessions.
There were credible reports that political prisoners are singled out
for cruel treatment. Security forces also used denial of medical
treatment and food, verbal intimidation, and placement in unsanitary
conditions to coerce confessions. Members of Jehovah's Witnesses
reportedly were beaten while in police custody in September (see
Section 2.c.).
Prison conditions are poor, and prisons are unsanitary,
overcrowded, and unsafe. Food is poor, and infectious diseases are
rampant. Facilities for prisoner rehabilitation and recreation are
extremely limited. Some prisoners have died due to overcrowding,
untreated illnesses, and lack of adequate protection from the severe
summer heat.
In September a political prisoner was found hanged in his cell
under suspicious circumstances (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.).
The Government does not permit unrestricted independent monitoring
of prison conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The Constitution states that citizens ``have
the right to freedom of belief and the free expression thereof and also
to obtain information unless it is a state, official, or commercial
secret.'' However, in practice, those expressing views critical of or
different from those of the Government have been arrested on false
charges of committing common crimes (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
In November the Government sentenced Parahat Yklimov, the brother
of Sapar Yklimov, a former government official who lives outside the
country, to 11 years' imprisonment for financial misconduct. Prior to
his arrest, he reportedly had been warned that his brother should cease
his political activities abroad. His family reportedly was told by
internal security organizations that he would be released if his
brother returned to the country.
In November the Government arrested Ramil Galimov, a member of a
Jehovah's Witness group in Kizyl-Arvat who has dual Russian-Turkmen
citizenship. After imprisoning him for 2 weeks, the Government
reportedly forced him to leave on a train for Russia but retained his
Turkmen passport.
The precise number of political detainees held at year's end was
unknown. Pretrial detainees are held 6 to 8 months on the average.
According to government sources, more than 22,000 persons were released
from prison under presidential amnesties in January, February, and
March (see Sections 1.e and 3). Among those amnestied during the year,
the Government reportedly set free 700 jailed foreigners. Foreign
diplomats received credible reports that prison officials requested
bribes to implement releases under these amnesties.
Forced exile was not known to have occurred during the year. In
November President Niyazov announced plans to deport to remote areas
any government officials who were found to have committed crimes.
President Niyazov proposed that the officials, accompanied if they
desired by their families, would work off their sentences in exile.
Almost all prominent political opponents of the Government have chosen
to move to either Russia, Sweden, Norway, or the Czech Republic for
reasons of personal safety; none returned this year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for
judicial independence; however, in practice, the judiciary is not
independent. The President's power to select and dismiss judges
subordinates the judiciary to the Presidency. The President appoints
all judges for a term of 5 years. The appointments are without
legislative review, except for the Chairman (Chief Justice) of the
Supreme Court, and the President has the sole authority to remove
appointees from the bench before the completion of their terms.
The court system has not been reformed since the Soviet era. It
consists of a Supreme Court, 6 provincial courts (including 1 for the
city of Ashgabat only), and, at the lowest level, 61 district and city
courts. A Supreme Economic Court hears cases involving disputes between
state-owned enterprises and ministries, and, increasingly, commercial
disputes. The Government abolished all military courts in 1997.
Criminal offenses committed by members of the armed forces now are
tried in civilian courts under the authority of the Office of the
Prosecutor General.
The law provides for the rights of due process for defendants,
including a public trial, the right to a defense attorney, access to
accusatory material, and the right to call witnesses to testify on
behalf of the accused. In practice authorities often deny these rights,
and there are no independent lawyers, with the exception of a few
retired legal officials, available to represent defendants. When a
person cannot afford the services of a lawyer, the court appoints one.
A person may represent himself in court.
Lower courts' decisions may be appealed, and the defendant may
petition the President for clemency. The President released over 22,000
inmates from prison in connection with general amnesties in January,
February, and March (see Section 1.d. and 3.). In practice adherence to
due process is not uniform, particularly in the lower courts in rural
areas. Even when due process rights are observed, the authority of the
government prosecutor vis-a-vis the defense attorney is so great that
it is very difficult for the defendant to receive a fair trial. The
Government denied foreign diplomats access to several supposedly open
court proceedings.
At year's end, the Government held at least two political prisoners
(Mukhametkuli Aimuradov and Pirimguli Tanrykuliev). In January the
Government released Gulgeldi Annaniyazov and Gurbanmuran Mammetnazarov
as part of a general amnesty. They were the two remaining political
prisoners held in connection with a July 12, 1995 demonstration over
living conditions, in which several thousand persons participated.
Annaniyazov was in grave physical condition in May 1998 and his release
fulfilled an earlier commitment by President Niyazov for his release.
Mammetnazarov had been sentenced to an additional 1 year in May 1998
for possession of narcotics found in his prison cell. In September
Russian citizen Khoshali Garayev, one of two persons convicted in
secret before the Supreme Court in 1995 for antigovernment activities
and planning terrorist actions against government officials, was
discovered hanged in his cell at the maximum security prison in
Turkmenbashi. The Government rejected all requests for an investigation
into the circumstances surrounding Garayev's death. In December 1998,
he and Mukhamedkuli Aimuradov were sentenced to additional concurrent
terms of 18 years for allegedly attempting to escape from this prison.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the right of protection
from arbitrary interference by the State in a citizen's personal life;
however, government authorities violate this right. There are no legal
means to regulate the conduct of surveillance by the state security
apparatus, which regularly monitors the activities of opponents and
critics of the Government. Security officials use physical
surveillance, telephone tapping, electronic eavesdropping, and the
recruitment of informers. Critics of the Government, and many other
people, report credibly that their mail is intercepted before delivery.
The Government no longer restricts citizens' ability to obtain
foreign newspapers. A wide variety of Russian and Western newspapers
are available.
In the past, the authorities have dismissed children from school
and removed adults from their jobs because of the political activities
of relatives. Internal security organizations reportedly pressured
relatives of a former government official who left the country to
convince him to return (see Section 1.d.). The relatives of a democracy
advocate convicted on charges of embezzlement lost a government job and
access to the state-run university (see Section 2.b.). The authorities
also threaten supporters of opposition political movements with loss of
employment and homes (see Section 2.b.). During the year, the
Government forced many citizens from their homes on short notice in
order to make way for urban renewal and renovation projects. Some of
those who built homes without formal government permission were not
offered alternate accommodations despite their length of occupancy or
degree of hardship. Citizens evicted from homes built with formal
permission could claim compensation only if they posted a bond worth 15
percent of the value of their destroyed home. Compensation generally
fails to equal the value of the property taken.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
right to hold personal convictions and to express them freely; however,
in practice, the Government severely restricts freedom of speech and
does not permit freedom of the press. Criticism of the Government can
lead to personal hardship, including loss of opportunities for
advancement and employment.
The Government completely controls radio and television; it funds
almost all print media. The Government censors newspapers and uses
Turkmen language newspapers to attack its critics abroad; the Committee
for the Protection of State Secrets must approve prepublication
galleys. The two nominally independent newspapers established in 1997
under presidential decree, Adalat (Justice) and Galkynysh (Revival),
are no longer even nominally independent. Russian-language newspapers
from abroad are available by subscription, and some Russian and other
foreign newspapers are also available in several Ashgabat hotels.
Owners of satellite dishes have access to foreign television
programming, and Internet access is available as well; however,
satellite dishes and Internet access remain so expensive that they are
out of reach for the average citizen.
The tri-language daily Ashgabat has dropped its English and Russian
sections in June and now is printed in Turkmen only. The Government
also ended the publication of Golos Turkmenbashi, the Russian language
daily in the city of Turkmenbashi, the city with the highest
concentration of ethnic Russians in the country.
In order to regulate printing and copying activities, the
Government ordered in February 1998 that all publishing houses and
printing and copying establishments obtain a license and register their
equipment.
The Government prohibits the media from reporting the views of
opposition political leaders and critics, and it never allows even the
mildest form of criticism of the President in print. Criticism of
government officials sanctioned by the President is commonplace. The
Government has subjected those responsible for critical foreign press
items to threats and harassment.
In January the Government arrested human rights and democracy
advocate Vyacheslav Mamedov for remarks on a Russian radio broadcast
attributed to him that were critical of the Government's treatment of
ethnic Russians. Mamedov was released in February but remains under
investigation, and his unregistered nongovernmental organization was
shut down. In February the Government deported a Moscow-based human
rights researcher, Aleksandr Petrov of Human Rights Watch, for
distributing a human rights report critical of the Government; in March
it detained and deported Russian writer Nikolai Mitrokhin, the coauthor
of the report (see Section 4).
On January 29, officers of the National Security Committee broke up
an Ashgabat gathering of journalists at which participants were
expected to announce the formation of an Independent Journalists'
Association. The officers recorded the names of those in attendance and
detained five organizers of the meeting.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty correspondent Yoshan Annakurbanov
left the country in August 1998 while under investigation for allegedly
attempting to smuggle ``military secrets'' out of the country and now
lives abroad. In July the government-controlled press attacked him for
his continued Radio Liberty reports critical of the Government. In
December the Government seized his home and fired his relatives from
their jobs at the state television and radio company.
Intellectuals have reported that the security organs have
instructed them to praise the President in their art and have warned
them not to participate in receptions hosted by foreign diplomatic
missions. The Minister of Culture attends rehearsals of all theater
productions to ensure that they do not contain antigovernment or
antipresidential content. The Ministry of Culture must approve plays
before they open to the public.
The Government also restricts academic freedom. It does not
tolerate criticism of government policy or the President in academic
circles, and it discourages research into areas it considers
politically sensitive, such as comparative law, history, or ethnic
relations. The government-controlled Union of Writers has in the past
expelled members who have criticized government policy; libraries have
removed their works.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
allows for peaceful assembly; however, the Government restricts this
right in practice. It does not permit peaceful demonstrations organized
by alleged critics and in 1995 dispersed the first peaceful protest
rally in years (see Section 1.e.), and convicted a number of persons
for their participation. Permits are required for public meetings and
demonstrations. There were reports of spontaneous demonstrations, for
example over bread prices, in the past, but there were no reports of
demonstrations during the year.
The Constitution allows for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. Unregistered organizations
with political agendas are not allowed to hold demonstrations or
meetings. No political groups critical of government policy have been
able to meet the requirements for registration. The Government uses
laws on the registration of political parties to prevent the emergence
of potential opposition groups. At present the only registered
political party is the Democratic Party, the former Turkmen Communist
Party.
Social and cultural organizations without political aims are
allowed to function, but often have difficulty registering. During the
year, the Government reportedly registered only seven nongovernmental
organizations, all of which involved sports clubs. Theoretically,
citizens have the freedom to associate with whomever they please.
However, the authorities have fired or threatened to fire supporters of
opposition movements from their jobs, removed them from professional
societies, and even threatened them with the loss of their homes. In
addition some citizens with links to foreigners are subject to official
intimidation. In July the Government arrested former parliamentarian
and democracy advocate Pirimguli Tanrykuliev on charges of embezzlement
after he discussed forming a new political party with Western
diplomats. On August 14 the Government convicted him, sentenced him to
8 years in prison, and stripped him of his medical credentials. Shortly
before his arrest, his daughter lost her government job and his
youngest son was removed from the list of those accepted into the
state-run university.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and does not establish a state religion; however, the
Government imposes restrictions on some religious groups. Citizens are
overwhelmingly Muslim, but Islam does not play a dominant role in
society, in part due to 70 years of Soviet rule. The Government pays
the salaries of Muslim clerics.
There is no state religion, but a modest revival of Islam has
occurred since independence. The Government has incorporated some
aspects of Muslim tradition into its efforts to define a Turkmen
identity, and it gives some financial and other support to the Council
on Religious Affairs, which plays an intermediary role between the
government bureaucracy and religious organizations rather than actively
promoting interfaith dialog.
While it affirms a number of important religious freedoms, the Law
on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations, which was amended
in 1995 and again in 1996, also provides for significant government
control of religion. Religious congregations are required to register
with the Government and must have at least 500 Turkmen citizens over
the age of 18 as adherents to be registered. This requirement has
prevented all but Sunni Muslims and Russian Orthodox Christians from
setting up legal religious organizations. Moreover, the Government
applies this 500-member standard on a local and regional basis. For
example, a representative of a major Christian religious group was told
in 1998 that the group would have to have 500 adherents in Ashgabat to
be registered there, and another 500 in the city of Turkmenbashi to be
registered there.
This restriction also has caused problems for a number of minority
religions, including the Baha'i Faith, which was registered by the
Government in 1994 only to be deregistered in 1997 when the threshold
was raised to 500 adherents. Members of the Baha'i Faith have been
prevented from conducting services since 1997 and have been questioned
by internal security representatives for holding private prayer
meetings in their homes. The local Baha'i community in Ashgabat was
able to open its center for 1 day in March to celebrate the Faith's
Nowruz (spring) holiday. In January the Armenian community in
Turkmenbashi applied to local authorities to use a church appropriated
during the Soviet era as a cultural center pending registration as a
religious organization; but at year's end, it has not yet received any
reply. In May President Niyazov promised to permit registration of
almost all religious groups by September but the Government took no
action by year's end. No new religious groups were registered and,
despite promises by senior officials, the Halk Maslahaty (People's
Council) did not reduce the 500 person threshold.
While protected by law, proselytizing by ``foreign'' (that is,
other than Russian Orthodox or Sunni Muslim) religious groups can incur
official displeasure. Government permission is required for any mass
meetings or demonstrations for religious purposes. The Government also
restricts the travel of clergy or members of religious groups to the
country. Islamic religious literature is distributed through the
mosques. Orthodox churches are permitted to offer religious literature.
Unregistered religious groups face government harassment if they
attempt to meet or distribute religious literature. Bibles shipped by
the Seventh-Day Adventists in 1998 from neighboring Uzbekistan were
confiscated at the border. According to the Brussels-based NGO Human
Rights Without Frontiers, government authorities called in more than
100 citizens for questioning during the first week of May, apparently
in connection with a mounting crackdown against local Christians and
churches. The citizens reportedly were interrogated about their
contacts with various foreign-nationality Christians residing in the
country.
In June representatives of internal security organizations visited
the Baha'i center in Ashgabat as part of the Government's attempt to
control the activities of unregistered religious groups and warned its
members not to distribute religious materials. In June, July and
August, congregations of Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, and
Pentecostalists were harassed by government officials, who seized
religious materials and instructed them to discontinue their
activities, threatening them if they did not. In August Shageldi
Atakov, a member of the Baptist faith, was sentenced to 4 years in
prison and fined $12,000 (an astronomical sum considering average wages
in the country amount to $30 a month) for an alleged illegal transfer
of automobiles in 1994. Atakov denied the charges and claimed that he
was being imprisoned because of his religious beliefs. Atakov
reportedly was beaten severely by an officer while in prison.
In September representatives of internal security organs, including
the KNB, attempted to break up a peaceful meeting of the Seventh-Day
Adventist congregation in Ashgabat. The congregation later paid a fine
for meeting illegally. On November 13, a demolition team sent by the
Ashgabat mayor's office began tearing down a recently completed
Seventh-Day Adventist church. Two days earlier the pastor of the
congregation had received written notice that demolition would begin
after a week; the building's destruction was part of a Government plan
for the neighborhood. In September local police and KNB officers in
Geok-Depe arrested two members of Jehovah's Witnesses for discussing
the Bible with fellow citizens. After 3 days of interrogation, which
reportedly included beatings, the two were sentenced to 15 days'
imprisonment. Upon their release, they were told to renounce their
faith and warned not to tell human rights organizations about their
treatment while under government custody. In December the Government
reportedly deported one member of Jehovah's Witnesses to Russia. On
December 17, police and KNB agents arrested three members of an
unregistered Baptist congregation in Ashgabat, whom the Government then
threatened to deport. Shageldy Atakov was incarcerated for his
religious beliefs.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some restrictions
on freedom of movement. The Government generally does not restrict
movement within the country, although travel to southern border zones
is controlled tightly. Citizens still carry internal passports. These
documents are used primarily as a form of identification, rather than
as a means of controlling movement. Residence permits are not required,
although the place of residence is registered and noted in passports.
The Government uses its power to issue passports and exit visas as
a general means of restricting international travel. The Government
does not allow its citizens to travel outside the country without
official permission. Any citizen who wishes to visit a foreign country
must obtain an exit visa, which can take up to 5 weeks to process.
Although not new, this policy became more onerous in June when the
country withdrew from the visa agreement of the Commonwealth of
Independent States. The official reason given by the Government for
this action was to secure the country's borders against foreign
criminal elements. Most citizens are permitted to emigrate without
undue restriction.
The government-funded Council of World Turkmen provides assistance
to ethnic Turkmen abroad who wish to return to the country and apply
for citizenship; however, the Government discourages immigration by
ethnic Turkmen living in Iran, Iraq, Turkey, and other countries.
Immigration of non-Turkmen from other areas of the former Soviet Union
is discouraged by the unofficial policy of favoring employment of
ethnic Turkmen.
The law includes provisions for the granting of refugee and asylee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The 1997 Law
on Refugees establishes the procedure and conditions for recognizing
refugee status and sets the legal, economic, and social rights of
refugees. The country currently provides first asylum if the person is
recognized under the mandate of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). The Government has granted refugee or asylee status to some
ethnic Turkmen from Afghanistan and has allowed some Tajik refugees and
migrants to reside in the country. The Government cooperates with the
UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations that assist refugees. There
were no confirmed reports of forced expulsion of those having a valid
claim to refugee status. There have been unconfirmed reports of small
numbers of refugees being forcibly returned by individual border
guards. However, according to the UNHCR, there is no clear pattern of
abuse or forced expulsion of refugees, with the exception of such low-
level harassment.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have no real ability to effect peaceful change in the
Government and have little influence on government policy or
decisionmaking. The 1992 Constitution declares Turkmenistan to be a
secular democracy in the form of a presidential republic. It calls for
the separation of powers between the various branches of government,
but vests a disproportionate share of power in the Presidency. In
practice President Niyazov's power is absolute, and the country remains
a one-party state. Despite the appearance of decisionmaking by
consensus, most decisions are made at the presidential level. In his
address to the Halk Maslahaty in July 1998, President Niyazov called
for local councils and village leaders to have greater power and
authority to deal with local issues. However, in reality, even local
leaders are selected and dismissed by the President. In December the
Halk Maslahaty proposed and the newly elected Mejlis (Parliament)
approved a law making an exception to the constitutionally mandated
maximum of two 5-year terms for the President, but only for Niyazov, as
the country's first president.
In November 1998, the President announced a major letter-writing
campaign in which any Turkmen citizen who had a complaint could write
directly to him. As a result of this campaign, the President received
almost 140,000 letters. The Government stated that most of the letters
contained complaints about the criminal justice and prison systems. As
a result of this campaign, the President released over 22,000 persons
from prison (see Section 1.d and 1.e.).
In the 1992 presidential election, the sole candidate was
Saparmurat Niyazov, the incumbent and nominee of the Democratic Party.
The Government announced the election barely a month before voting day,
giving opposition groups insufficient time to organize and qualify to
submit a candidate. A 1994 national referendum extended the President's
term to 2002, obviating the need for the scheduled presidential
election in 1997. According to the official results, 99.9 percent of
those voting cast their ballots to extend his term. The policy of the
Democratic Party, according to its leadership, is to implement the
policy of the President. In August the Government changed the national
oath to require that citizens swear personal allegiance to President
Niyazov in particular, rather than just to the presidency as a general
institution.
The 50-member Mejlis routinely supports presidential decrees, and
as yet has no genuine independence, although it has taken several
measures to become a more professional body. For example it discusses
and amends draft legislation, including key bills such as civil and
criminal codes. In the 1994 Mejlis elections, no opposition
participation was permitted. The Government claimed that 99.8 percent
of all eligible voters participated. President Niyazov promised in 1998
that the parliamentary elections scheduled for December for a
reconstituted Mejlis would be ``free and fair'' and conducted on a
``wide democratic basis.'' However, the elections held in December were
seriously flawed. Although there were at least two candidates for each
Mejlis seat, every candidate was selected by the Government, and there
was virtually no open discussion of the issues. The Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the OSCE declined
to send an observation or limited assessment mission for the elections.
In its public explanation, ODIHR cited serious concerns that the broad
electoral framework in the country fell short of its OSCE commitments.
The Government claimed that 98.9 percent of eligible voters
participated. Diplomatic observers noted many empty polling stations,
extensive use of mobile ballot boxes, and numerous instances of family
voting.
There are no legal restrictions on the participation of women or
minorities in the political process; however, they are underrepresented
in government and politics. Thirteen members of the newly elected
Mejlis are women, although women constitute over 50 percent of the
population. Women serve as the Deputy Chairman for Textiles and Foreign
Trade, Minister of Textiles, Minister of Education, and Prosecutor
General. No women serve as provincial governors. Minorities are
represented in the Government, although preference is given to ethnic
Turkmen. The Mejlis consists of 48 ethnic Turkmen, 1 ethnic Russian,
and 1 ethnic Uzbek.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no local human rights monitoring groups, and government
restrictions on freedom of speech, press, and association would
preclude any effort to investigate and criticize publicly the
Government's human rights policies. Several independent journalists
based in Russia report on these issues in the Russian press and have
contact with international human rights organizations. On numerous
occasions in the past, the Government has warned its critics against
speaking with visiting journalists or other foreigners wishing to
discuss human rights issues. Early in the year, the Government deported
two Moscow-based human rights researchers (see Section 2.a.).
On January 6, President Niyazov signed a decree establishing a
human rights commission that he heads. The commission oversees the work
of law enforcement agencies, the military, and the judiciary, but it
appears to have little real authority. The commission is subordinate to
the National Institute for Democracy and Human Rights under the
President, which completed its third year of operation in October. Its
mandate is to support the democratization of the government and society
and to monitor the protection of human rights. The Institute maintains
four full-time staff members to receive and resolve citizen complaints
of arbitrary action. Two-fifths of the approximately 2,500 complaints
received by the institute during the year concerned abuses by law
enforcement and security organizations, the judicial process, and
judges. In general the Institute conducts a study of the complaint and
returns its findings to the individual and the organizations involved.
However, the Institute is not an independent body, and its ability to
obtain redress is limited by government interests.
In January the OSCE opened an office in Ashgabat.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights and freedoms for all,
independent of one's nationality, origin, language, and religion. It
further specifies equal rights before the law for both men and women.
There is no legal basis for discrimination against women or religious
or ethnic minorities. However, cultural traditions and the Government's
policy of promoting Turkmen nationalism limit the employment and
educational opportunities of women and nonethnic Turkmen.
Women.--Anecdotal reports indicate that domestic violence against
women is common, but no statistics are available. The subject is not
discussed in society. There are no court cases available and no
references to domestic violence in the media. One unofficial group to
support battered women operates in Ashgabat.
There were some reports of trafficking in women from the country to
the Persian Gulf and Turkey (see Section 6.f.).
Women are underrepresented in the upper levels of state-owned
economic enterprises and are concentrated in the health care and
education professions and in service industries. Women are restricted
from working in some dangerous and environmentally unsafe jobs. Under
the law, women enjoy the same inheritance and marriage rights as men.
However, in traditional Turkmen society, the woman's primary role is as
homemaker and mother, and family pressures often limit opportunities
for women to enter careers outside the home and advance their
education. Religious authorities, when proffering advice to practicing
Muslims on matters concerning inheritance and property rights, often
favor men over women.
There is only one officially registered women's group, which is
headed by the Deputy Chairperson of the Mejlis and dedicated in honor
of the President's mother. The Government has no program specifically
aimed at rectifying the disadvantaged position of women in society, as
it does not acknowledge that women suffer discrimination.
Children.--The Government's social umbrella covers the welfare
needs of children. In September the Government cut the number of years
of basic education from 10 to 9 years; however, children now in their
eighth, ninth, or tenth year of education will be unaffected. There is
little difference in the education provided to girls and boys. The
Government has not taken effective steps to address the environmental
and health problems that have resulted in a high rate of infant and
maternal mortality.
Class sizes in the country are increasing rapidly, facilities are
deteriorating and funds for textbooks and supplies are decreasing. The
Ministry of Education (MED) announced last spring that the number of
students per class is to be raised from 30 to 45. Wages for teachers
and administrators are in arrears in many districts; this, added to the
fact that salaries are low, has caused some teachers to leave the field
and seek jobs in the private sector, leaving classrooms overcrowded.
Bribery has become a main component of the admission process at
prestigious departments in universities. Although officially free,
admission to many faculties at Turkmen State University in Ashgabat
reportedly costs between $2,000 and $4,000. Paying bribes for good
grades is also a common practice. Furthermore, MED has discouraged
schools from having contacts with NGO's and international
organizations.
During the annual cotton harvest, some schools in agricultural
areas are closed and children as young as 10 years of age work in the
cotton fields for up to 2 months (see Section 6.d.). Other than this
activity, there is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
People with Disabilities.--Government subsidies and pensions are
provided for those with disabilities, although the pensions are
inadequate to maintain a decent standard of living. Those capable of
working are generally provided with jobs under still-valid
preindependence policies that virtually guarantee employment to all.
According to existing legislation, facilities to allow access by the
disabled must be included in new construction projects. However,
compliance is inconsistent and most older buildings are not so
equipped. Care for the mentally retarded and mentally ill is provided
on the local level. Mentally retarded and mentally ill children are
placed in boarding schools, with educational and future employment
opportunities if their condition is mild. Adults with disabilities
requiring institutionalization are kept primarily in ``psycho-
narcological'' hospitals in Geok-Depe, Bekrova, and Kakha and in theory
provided with food, clothing, and medical care.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution provides for
equal rights and freedoms for all citizens. Turkmen comprise
approximately 77 percent of the population of about 4.7 million;
Uzbeks, 9 percent; and Russians, 7 percent. There are smaller numbers
of Kazakhs, Armenians, Azeris, and many other ethnic groups. Since
independence, the country has not experienced ethnic turmoil.
As part of its nation-building efforts, the Government has
attempted to foster Turkmen national pride, in part through its
language policy. The Constitution designates Turkmen as the official
language, and it is a mandatory subject in school, although it is not
necessarily the language of instruction.
The Constitution also provides for the rights of speakers of other
languages to use them. Russian remains in common usage in government
and commerce. However, the President has criticized the widespread use
of Russian. In accordance with his wishes, Russian language usage in
newspapers was cut back sharply during the year. In June the Government
switched one of the Russian language daily newspapers to Turkmen and
reduced daily Russian news broadcasts on state-run television to 30
minutes. In October the state radio ceased entirely its daily 15-minute
Russian language news broadcast. Nonethnic Turkmen employees at
government ministries reportedly were given until December to learn
Turkmen. Non-Turkmen fear that the designation of Turkmen as the
official language places their children at a disadvantage educationally
and economically. They complain that some avenues for promotion and job
advancement are no longer open to them. Only a handful of non-Turkmen
occupy high-echelon jobs in the ministries, and there are reports that
managerial positions were closed to non-Turkmen.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Turkmenistan has inherited the Soviet
system of government-controlled trade unions. There are no legal
guarantees entitling workers to form or join unions. The Colleagues
Union is the only legal central trade union federation permitted, and
it claims a membership of 1.3 million; its member unions are divided
along both sectoral and regional lines. Unions may not form or join
other federations.
While no law specifically prohibits the establishment of
independent unions, there are no such unions, and no attempts were made
to register an independent trade union during the year.
The law neither prohibits nor permits strikes and does not address
the issue of retaliation against strikers. Strikes are extremely rare
and no strikes were known to have occurred during the year.
There is no information available on union affiliation with
international unions. Turkmenistan joined the International Labor
Organization in 1993.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law does
not protect the right to collective bargaining. In practice in the
state-dominated economy, the close association of both the trade union
and the state-owned enterprise with the Government seriously limits
workers' ability to bargain, and workers often go months without pay or
receive their paychecks late.
The Ministry of Economics and Finance prepares general guidelines
for wages and sets wages in health care, culture, and some other areas.
In other sectors, it allows for some leeway at the enterprise level,
taking into account local factors. The Government determines specific
wage and benefit packages for each factory or enterprise.
The law does not prohibit antiunion discrimination by employers
against union members and organizers, and there are no mechanisms for
resolving such complaints.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor; however, there were reports of trafficking in
women (see Section 6.f.), and children work in cotton harvesting in
rural areas (see Section 5). The Government prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children and generally enforces this prohibition effectively,
with the exception of cotton harvesting in rural areas (see Section 5).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 16 years; in
a few heavy industries, it is 18 years. The law prohibits children
between the ages of 16 and 18 years from working more than 6 hours per
day (the normal workday is 8 hours).
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and
generally enforces this prohibition effectively, with the exception of
cotton harvesting in rural areas (see Section 6.c.). A 15-year-old
child may work 4 to 6 hours per day but only with the permission of the
trade union and parents. This permission rarely is granted. Violations
of child labor laws occur in rural areas during the cotton harvesting
season, when teenagers work in the fields and children as young as 10
years of age sometimes help with the harvest.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage. In
December the Government raised the average wage in the state sector to
approximately $77 (400,000 manats) per month at the official rate.
While the Government subsidizes the prices of many necessities and
provides others free of charge, this wage falls short of the amount
required to meet the needs of an average family. Most households are
multigenerational, with several members receiving salaries, stipends,
or pensions. Even so, many people lack the resources to maintain an
adequate diet, and meat is a luxury for most citizens.
The standard legal workweek is 40 hours with 2 days off.
Individuals who work fewer hours during the week or are in certain
high-level positions may also work on Saturdays.
The country inherited from the Soviet era an economic system with
substandard working conditions--one in which production took precedence
over the health and safety of workers. Industrial workers often labor
in unsafe environments and are not provided proper protective
equipment. Some agricultural workers are subjected to environmental
health hazards. The Government recognizes that these problems exist and
has taken some steps to address them, but it has not set comprehensive
standards for occupational health and safety. Workers do not always
have the right to remove themselves from work situations that endanger
their health or safety without jeopardy to their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The International Office of Migration
reports anecdotal evidence of trafficking in women from Turkmenistan,
particularly to Turkey and Arab countries in the Persian Gulf. Although
there does not appear to be a large-scale problem, no reliable
statistics are available. The Government does not have programs in
place to combat trafficking in persons; however, in November the
Government and the International Organization on Migration hosted a 1-
day seminar on illegal migration during which trafficking in women was
discussed in detail.
______
UKRAINE
Ukraine is governed by a directly elected president and a
unicameral parliament, the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council), which is
elected partially according to proportional representation and
partially by direct constituency mandate. Incumbent President Leonid
Kuchma was reelected after two rounds of voting on October 31 and
November 14. While there were some irregularities during the election
campaign and during the balloting, almost all observers agreed that the
election results reflected the will of the electorate. Despite numerous
flaws and irregularities, previous national elections in 1998 and 1994
generally reflected the will of the electorate. The President appoints
the Cabinet and controls government operations. Although the
Constitution mandates an independent judiciary, the courts are funded
through the Ministry of Justice, are subject to political interference
and corruption, and are inefficient.
The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the Ministry of Internal
Affairs (which controls the various police forces), and the Ministry of
Defense all have equal responsibility for internal security and report
to the President through the Cabinet. The National Bureau of
Investigation, established by presidential decree in 1997 but never
fully funded, was abolished in a government reorganization in December.
The armed forces largely have remained outside of politics. While
civilian authorities generally maintain effective control of the
security forces, institutional government corruption sometimes can lead
to their improper use. The SBU and other government agencies have
interfered indirectly in the political process through criminal
investigations of politicians, journalists, and influential
businessmen. Members of the security forces committed human rights
abuses.
Ukraine is making a difficult transition from a centrally planned
to a market-based economy. The private sector has continued to grow and
now represents a substantial portion of the economy. Nevertheless, the
country remains in a serious economic crisis, due to the absence of the
critical level of reform needed to generate sustained economic growth.
Industrial output has suffered years of sharp decline. Reform,
particularly in the agricultural sector, has stagnated; however, at
year's end the President signed a far-reaching decree on agricultural
reform. According to official statistics, about half the work force is
employed formally in manufacturing, with the balance divided between
services and agriculture; however, in reality many industrial
enterprises have reduced or stopped production. Exports are diversified
and include metals, chemicals, sugar, and semifinished goods. The
annual per capita gross domestic product for 1999 was approximately
$1,000. However, millions of employees go months without being paid,
and most individuals derive a significant proportion of their income
from the shadow economy. Annual inflation is expected to remain at the
1998 level of about 20 percent. Investment remains at low levels, with
many potential investors discouraged by rampant corruption, onerous
taxation, and arbitrary licensing practices. Unemployment has affected
women disproportionately. Wealth is concentrated among the political
elite and directors of state-dominated sectors such as metals, oil, and
gas.
Ukraine's human rights record during the year was mixed; there was
limited progress in some areas; however, serious problems persisted.
Members of the military killed soldiers during violent hazing
incidents, and there were some reports of possibly politically
motivated killings. Police and prison officials regularly beat
detainees and prisoners, and there were numerous instances of torture,
sometimes resulting in death. The beating of conscripts in the army by
fellow soldiers was common and sometimes resulted in death. Prison
conditions are harsh and life threatening. There were instances of
arbitrary arrest and detention. Lengthy pretrial detention in very poor
conditions was common, and detainees often spent months in pretrial
detention for violations that involved little or no prison time if
convicted. Long delays in trials are a problem. The Government rarely
punishes officials who commit abuses. The SBU, police, and Prosecutor's
Office have drawn domestic and international criticism for their
failure to take adequate action to curb institutional corruption and
abuse in the Government. Many high-profile corruption cases have been
dropped, ostensibly because of lack of incriminating evidence. Anti-
corruption legislation has been enforced selectively, mostly against
government opponents and low-level officials. Political interference
and corruption affect the judicial process. The judiciary is
overburdened, inefficient, and lacks sufficient funding and staff.
These factors undermine citizens' right to a fair trial. The criminal
justice system has been slow to reform due to both lack of government
effort and strained economic resources. The State continued to intrude
in citizens' lives and infringe on their privacy rights. The Government
partially limited and increasingly interfered with freedom of the press
during the year, most notably in the run-up to the October presidential
elections. Government authorities interfered in the election process
and stepped up pressure on the media through tax inspections and other
measures. The national broadcast media came under particular pressure.
While the print media reflected the full political spectrum, there were
tendencies toward self-censorship. There were some limits on freedom of
assembly, and there were some instances of restrictions on freedom of
association. Limitations on nonnative religious organizations
constrained freedom of religion. The Government took steps to return to
religious groups properties expropriated during the Soviet era. Some
limits on freedom of movement, most notably the registration or
``propiska'' system, remained. The Government took steps to support the
return and resettlement of exiled Tatars in Crimea. The SBU monitored
the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) during the
election campaign. Violence against women and children; trafficking in
women and girls; discrimination against women; societal anti-Semitism;
and discrimination against religious, racial, and ethnic minorities are
problems. The Government discourages some workers from organizing
unions, and forced labor in the form of women and girls trafficked for
sexual exploitation is a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by government agents; however, the
pervasiveness of corruption, connections between government officials
and organized crime, and the political activities of organized crime
figures often blurred the distinction between political and criminal
acts. Politicians, politically connected businessmen, and journalists
were victims of possibly politically motivated--and sometimes fatal--
attacks.
No 1999 official statistics for contract killings are available,
but some such killings may have been politically motivated. In February
the manager of security forces for the independent television station
STB was murdered in the stairwell of his apartment building in an
apparent contract killing. In May chairman of the regional arbitration
court Borys Vihrov and director of local television station Ant Igor
Bondar were shot and killed in Odessa.
Abuse of prisoners and detainees, and harsh prison conditions,
sometimes led to death (see Section 1.c.). According to revised
government statistics, in 1998 there were 1,901 deaths in prison and
detention facilities, many due to harsh conditions. There were reports
that police beat persons at alcohol corrective treatment centers,
sometimes killing them (see Section 1.c.).
Members of the military killed soldiers during violent hazing
incidents (see Section 1.c.). According to a government official, in
1998 10 to 12 military personnel were beaten to death, and a total of
20 to 30 died as an indirect result of injuries sustained from hazing.
The Government made no known progress in resolving a number of the
high profile killings of past years. There was no progress in resolving
the 1998 murders of former director of the National Bank Vadym Hetman;
deputy head of the Crimean government Aleksandr Safontsev; the mayor of
Shakhtersk; or the campaign manager of a Kiev mayoral candidate. Nor
was there progress in resolving the 1997 murders of the governor of the
Razoolnensky district; the Crimean deputy minister of tourism and
resorts; prominent businessman Arkadiy Tabachnyk; or the bombing of the
intensive care unit in Simferopol.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The 1996 alleged kidnapping of the former speaker of the Crimean
legislature was discovered by investigators to have been staged. The
1994 disappearance of Myhailo Boichyshyn, a prominent leader of the
Popular Movement of Ukraine party, remains unsolved.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, police and
prison officials regularly beat detainees and prisoners, and there were
numerous reports of such abuse. Amnesty International (AI) and other
human rights groups continued to receive regular reports that Berkut
(special militia units or riot police) troops beat and tortured inmates
as part of regular training exercises. The media report that police
subject detainees to the ``swallow,'' in which the detainee is placed
on his stomach and his feet are tied to his hands behind him, forcing
his back to arch. Another abuse is the ``baby elephant,'' in which a
gas mask is placed on the prisoner's head and the flow of oxygen slowly
reduced. A human rights group from Cherkassy reported that in May a
detainee died from injuries sustained during police torture using a
method called the ``monument,'' in which a prisoner is suspended from
his hands on a rope and beaten. Requesting an attorney often leads to a
worse beating, and detainees may be beaten until they waive their right
to one. There is no effective mechanism for registering complaints
about mistreatment or for obtaining redress for such actions. Prisoners
may address complaints to the Human Rights Ombudsman, and that office
has received widespread reports of torture in pretrial detention.
However, the Ombudsman has no enforcement authority, and the Government
made little effort during the year to end such practices or to punish
officials who committed or abetted such abuses. According to the Office
of the Human Rights Ombudsman, most of the complaints that it received
centered on human rights violations by law enforcement personnel. In
July a human rights group complained that the Ombudsman failed to
investigate whether special police units beat prisoners during regular
exercises in jails. Instead, the Ombudsman forwarded the petition to
the penal administration. On December 1, the Parliament passed an
amendment to the Criminal Code that prescribes up to 15 years'
imprisonment for torture.
Police also abused Roma, particularly in the Transcarpathian
region, and harassed and abused dark-skinned persons (see Section 5).
Police also harassed journalists and refugees (see Sections 2.a. and
2.d.).
In April 1998, the Government created a penal department to oversee
reform of the penal system and to serve as the administrative center of
the penal system. The new department originally was placed under the
oversight of the Ministry of Interior but was given the status of an
independent government agency by presidential decree in March. However,
human rights groups report that this change in status has not affected
its practices. The Government failed to punish prison and police
officials who committed or condoned violence against prisoners. Police
corruption also remains a serious problem.
Several politically active individuals were wounded in violent
attacks. On October 2, leading presidential opposition candidate
Natalia Vitrenko was lightly wounded (and others more seriously hurt)
in a murder attempt when two grenades were thrown at her during a visit
to Kryvyi Rih in the southeast. More than 30 persons were injured in
the explosions, including members of Vitrenko's campaign staff, and 17
were hospitalized, 2 of them with critical injuries. Local police
detained two suspects, one of whom allegedly is linked to the local
campaign headquarters of Socialist Party presidential candidate Moroz.
In April senior official of the Kiev municipal government Mykola
Pidmogylny was shot and wounded seriously outside his house. On August
27, unknown assailants beat up Hennadiy Fomenko, head of Socialist
Party leader Moroz's election headquarters in Luhansk oblast
(province). The local police reported that they did not believe that
the attack was motivated by politics. However, Moroz supporters alleged
that the incident, which coincided with the visit of President Kuchma
to Luhansk, was an attempt by the local government to intimidate the
opposition. In October a Rada deputy for the Communist Party was beaten
after attending a campaign event for Communist Party candidate Petro
Symonenko in Donetsk, and a Symonenko campaign official was attacked
and seriously wounded in Kiev, according to another Rada deputy. On
November 23, Vinnytsia mayor and former parliamentarian and Vinnytsia
oblast governor Dmytro Dvorkis was shot and wounded by unknown gunmen
in Vinnytsia.
Many members of the press were hurt in violent incidents throughout
the year. In February Sergey Korenev, a cameraman for the independent
television station STB, was attacked in Lviv by unknown assailants, who
also stole his equipment and videotapes. On March 3, two masked
individuals broke into the Kiev residence of Dmitro Dahno, the
commercial director of STB, assaulted him and his wife, threatened them
with a knife, and held them for more than 1 hour. The two men searched
the apartment, apparently looking for documents, while ignoring money
and other valuables. In June in Odesa unknown individuals beat Ihor
Hrinstein, a journalist for the local Odesa television company Odesa-
Plus and host of its news program Oko. Hrinstein linked the beating to
Oko's policy of criticizing local authorities and giving broadcast time
to Rada deputies who oppose President Kuchma. Hrinstein is the latest
of several Odesa journalists who have been beaten allegedly in
connection with their reporting.
In January the office of the Tatar Assembly Mejlis was firebombed
in Simferopol. No suspects were identified, but Tatars blamed Russian
chauvinists. On May 23, a bomb exploded in the office of local
Communist Party leader Leonid Hrach in Simferopol, Crimea. The
explosion did not result in any casualties. Hrach called the act a
provocation intended to exacerbate tensions between leftists and
Crimean Tatars, who had been picketing the government building in
Simferopol. At a press conference in June Socialist Party leader Moroz
reported that his party's headquarters in Dnipropetrovsk had been
destroyed by fire. On August 14, during a meeting between presidential
candidate and former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk and local residents
who had lost their savings in pyramid schemes, the chief of the local
police department ordered that the building be evacuated because of an
anonymous bomb threat. No bomb was found and Marchuk accused the
presidential administration of being behind the incident.
There were continued reports of harsh conditions and violence
against conscripts in the armed forces. Senior officers reportedly
required malnourished recruits to beg for food or money. Senior
conscripts often beat recruits, sometimes to death (also see Section
1.a.). Punishment administered for committing or condoning such
activities did not serve as an effective deterrent to the further
practice of such abuses. Between 1991 and 1998, 450 soldiers were
convicted of violent harassment of their colleagues; and approximately
200 military personnel were prosecuted in 1998 for violent hazing (10
to 12 conscripts were beaten to death and 20 to 30 died from injuries
related to hazing). The press reported the conviction of three soldiers
in late 1998 for violent hazing of their colleagues at the Defense
Ministry Headquarters.
Disputes between religious groups at times resulted in violence.
For example, in April there was a violent scuffle between supporters of
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the entourage
of Patriarch Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev
Patriarchate)--see Section 5.
There was no improvement during the year in prison conditions,
which are harsh, life-threatening, and do not meet minimum
international standards. Prison officials intimidate and mistreat
inmates. Due in part to the severe economic crisis, prisons and
detention centers are severely overcrowded and lack adequate sanitation
and medical facilities. At the request of the President, the Parliament
endorsed in July a mass amnesty that released 40,000 inmates, due to
overcrowding. Because the country lacks a well-developed system of
suspended sentences, and the law does not differentiate between
misdemeanors and felonies, at least one-third of inmates were convicted
of only minor violations.
Conditions in pretrial detention facilities routinely fail to meet
minimum international standards. Inmates sometimes are held in
investigative isolation for extended periods and subjected to
intimidation and mistreatment by jail guards and other inmates.
Overcrowding is common in these centers. For example, the pretrial
detention center in Kiev, which was constructed to hold 2,850 persons,
houses 3,500. According to official statistics, as of June, the prison
population was 223,900 (including 42,600 persons in pretrial custody),
twice that of 1992.
According to official sources, information on the physical state of
prison walls and fences as well as pretrial detention blocks is
considered to be a state secret. However, the press reports freely
about harsh prison conditions. In 1998 there were 1,901 deaths in
prisons and detention facilities, which was more than 3 times the death
rate of the general population. Poor sanitary conditions result in
deaths from diseases such as tuberculosis and dysentery, and there are
frequent incidents of murder by fellow inmates and suicide.
Conditions in the Interior Ministry's Corrective Labor and
Treatment Centers for Alcoholics (LTP's), where violent alcoholics are
confined forcibly by court decision, differ little from those in
prisons. Virtually no treatment is available. According to 1998
statistics, 12 LTP's with some 3,800 inmates continued to operate. The
Government has not lived up to its earlier commitment to hand the LTP's
over to the Health Ministry. Police have the right to take forcibly any
person appearing drunk in public to special sobering centers. Human
rights groups report cases of police mistreatment, robbing, or beating
of detainees, occasionally to death, at such centers. In August the
Government issued a decree directing the closure of such centers by
2000.
The Government continued to allow prison visits by diplomatic
representatives and human rights monitors; however, these groups
reported that it had become more difficult to obtain access to prisons.
Cases were reported in which prisoners were not permitted
correspondence and family visits were allowed only once per year.
Prisoners may complain to the Ombudsman about the conditions of
detention, but human rights groups reported that inmates were punished
for initiating complaints.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain problems. The law provides that authorities may detain
a suspect for 3 days without a warrant, after which an arrest order
must be issued. The Constitution stipulates that only courts may issue
arrest warrants, but under its transitional provisions, the
Prosecutor's Office retains the right to issue search and arrest
warrants until 2001. The maximum period of detention after charges have
been filed is 18 months, but the law does not limit the aggregate time
of detention before and during a trial. The law permits citizens to
contest an arrest in court or appeal to the prosecutor. The
Constitution requires immediate notification of family members about an
arrest, but this action often is not taken in practice.
By law a trial must begin no later than 3 weeks after indictment,
but this requirement rarely is met by the overburdened court system.
Months may pass before a defendant finally is brought to trial, and the
situation did not improve during the year. Complicated cases can take
years to go to trial. Although the 1996 amendment to the Criminal
Procedures Code provides for bail, it is used rarely. Restrictions on
travel outside of a given area sometimes are employed. Accused persons
usually are held without bail in pretrial detention for several months.
As of June, there were 223,900 prisoners, 42,600 of whom were persons
held without bail in pretrial detention. The Constitution provides
compensation for unlawful or arbitrary arrest, detention, or
conviction, but there are no known cases in which this provision was
invoked. Reports indicate that this inaction is a result of lack of
faith in the judiciary, rather than the absence of unlawful or
arbitrary detentions.
The law stipulates that a defense attorney be provided without
charge to the indigent from the moment of detention or the filing of
charges, whichever comes first. There are insufficient numbers of
defense attorneys to protect suspects from unlawful, lengthy
imprisonment under extremely poor conditions. Although the concept of
providing attorneys from the state system remains in principle, public
attorneys often refuse to defend indigents for the low government fee.
While in custody, a suspect or a prisoner is allowed by law to talk
with a lawyer in private; however, human rights groups report that the
client-attorney privilege occasionally is denied by prison or
investigative officials. To protect the defendant, each investigative
file must contain a document signed by the defendant attesting that the
charges against him, his right to an attorney, and his right not to
give evidence against himself or his relatives have been explained to
him. An appeals court may dismiss a conviction or order a new trial if
this document is missing. As defendants increasingly became aware of
their rights, they insisted on observance of these procedures. However,
many persons still were unaware of these safeguards.
The Government occasionally charges persons who are openly critical
of the Government (usually opposition politicians or editors/
journalists from the opposition press) on criminal libel or tax evasion
charges (see Section 2.a.). On January 15, Ministry of Internal Affairs
officials arrested Volodymyr Yefremov, editor in chief of the
Dnipropetrovsk oblast council newspaper Sobor and held him for 2 days.
Yefremov was charged with abuse of office for alleged financial
improprieties that reportedly came to light during a spot check on the
newspaper's financial activities. Observers believe the arrest to have
been politically motivated since the oblast council was headed by
presidential rival Pavlo Lazarenko before he became prime minister, and
Lazarenko was known to have contributed substantially to the
newspaper's finances. On February 25, Peter Hois, the editor of the
Uzhgorod newspaper Rio, was detained for 2 days for criminal libel in
connection with statements that were never printed. The newspaper was
to publish a statement by one of the newspaper's investors accusing
various Rada deputies of abusing their positions. However, although
Hois edited the original statement and deleted the specific names and
accusations, the Prosecutor General still used the original text as the
basis for Hois's arrest (see Section 2.a.).
On May 19, police officers in Mukachevo detained some 70 persons,
primarily Roma, in a local market for illegal trading. After being kept
in an overcrowded police bus for approximately 1 hour, the detainees
were forced to wash the police department automobiles and to perform
yardwork around the police station, while they were abused verbally by
police officers. The detainees were held for 2 days, and none of the
Roma was charged formally with a crime. On May 24, 16 of the Roma filed
complaints against the police officers. On July 7, five police officers
in Mukachevo detained three Romani women in a market, after they did
not produce their identification documents. The officers took the women
to the police station, where they ordered them to clean the station and
threatened to lock them in cells if they refused to cooperate. When a
leader of a Romani NGO arrived at the station and demanded an
explanation, the women were released. The women wrote letters
complaining about their treatment to the regional director of the
Ministry of Interior and the regional prosecutor general.
In May three Baptist ministers were arrested in Kegichevka, as they
were beginning a ``tent mission.''
Police also arbitrarily detain persons for extensive document
checks and vehicle inspections (see Section 1.f.).
Official corruption is widespread. The Government apparently
enforced anticorruption statutes selectively for political ends. While
anticorruption statutes are applied increasingly against lower-level
officials, such enforcement reportedly is lacking against high-level
officials. A number of people arraigned on criminal and corruption
charges claimed that they were victimized because of their support to
the fugitive former prime minister and government opponent Pavlo
Lazarenko. Former government officials Petro Shkudun, Mykola Syvulsky,
and Vasyl Koval all claimed that their cases were politically motivated
by their links to Lazarenko. As of October, the first two were out on
bail, and the latter was in custody pending trial on corruption
charges.
In March four Uzbeks, two of them Uzbek oppositionists, were
detained in Kiev and deported without a hearing to Uzbekistan, where
they were convicted of terrorism and subversion and sentenced to 15
years. They were denied access to an attorney (see Section 2.d.).
The law does not provide for exile as a punishment, it does not
exist in the law, and the Government does not use it.
e. Denial of a Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice, the judiciary is subject
to considerable political interference from the executive branch and
also suffers from corruption and inefficiency. The courts are funded
through the Ministry of Justice, which allows the Government to
influence the judicial process. The presidential administration also
reportedly continues the old Soviet tradition of weighing in by
telephone directly with justices.
The establishment of an independent judicial system provided for in
the Constitution still awaits the passage of implementing legislation.
As a result, the judiciary continues to operate according to Soviet
principles. Most judges and prosecutors were appointed during the
Soviet era, and court officials are attuned closely to the Government's
interests. The High Judicial Council, which approves the appointment of
judges and disciplines judges, consists primarily of senior executive
branch representatives including the Prosecutor General and the
Chairman of the State Security Service. Human rights lawyers claim that
the judiciary is not free from government influence, particularly at
the regional and local levels. For example, court chairmen are
appointed directly by the executive and wield considerable influence
over the outcome of a case through case assignments, control of staff
and promotions, and control of social benefits available to judges.
Court chairmen reportedly deliberately overburden independent-minded
judges with too many cases and then instigate disciplinary actions
against them for not completing their casework. There are credible
reports that court chairmen regularly followed executive instructions.
The Ministry of Justice and court chairmen also control judges'
housing. Judges whose rulings are not in accord with the executive
branch are provided with apartments far from city centers or are
ignored altogether when new apartments become available.
The judiciary lacks sufficient staff and funds, which engenders
inefficiency and corruption. The court system receives all its funding
from the Ministry of Justice. Budgetary funds allocated by the
Government in 1999 covered only half of the judiciary's requirements
for the year. In June the Supreme Court challenged in the
Constitutional Court the legality of the Government's practice of
arbitrarily limiting the judiciary's budget. In its petition, the
Supreme Court complained that the district courts received only 51
percent of required funding, military courts 33 percent, and oblast
courts 62 percent. In July the Constitutional Court ruled that the
Government's practice of limiting the judiciary's budget was
unconstitutional. This attempt by the Government to cut the judiciary's
budget, and similar attempts in recent years, demonstrated clearly the
dependence of the court system on the executive and the Government's
willingness to make use of that dependence.
The authority and independence of the judicial system also are
undermined by the poor record of compliance with court decisions in
civil cases. Provisions calling for criminal punishment for
noncompliance with court decisions rarely are used. Compliance is
particularly poor if the decision clashes with government interests.
The Prosecutor General, Head of the Supreme Court, chairmen of regional
courts, and the chairmen of the Kiev municipal court (or the deputies
of these officials) can suspend court decisions, which leads to
interference, manipulation, and corruption.
Many local observers regard the Constitutional Court as the
country's most independent judicial body. Human rights groups state
that overall the Constitutional Court has maintained a balance of
fairness, despite some indication in 1998 that it may have had a
propresidential bias.
The 1996 Constitution provides for a thorough restructuring of the
court system, to be accomplished by 2001, including the introduction of
appellate courts; however, pending the passage of the required enabling
legislation on the law on the judiciary, the court system still is
organized along Soviet lines, with the exception of the Constitutional
Court.
The court system consists of the Constitutional Court, general
jurisdiction courts, and arbitration/commercial courts. General
jurisdiction courts and arbitration courts are organized according to
three levels: District courts; regional courts; and the Supreme Court
and Supreme Arbitration Court. General jurisdiction courts are divided
into criminal and civil sections. Military courts only hear cases
involving military personnel.
The Constitutional Court consists of 18 members, appointed for 9-
year terms in equal numbers by the President, the Parliament, and the
Congress of Judges. It is the ultimate interpreter of legislation and
the Constitution and determines the constitutionality of legislation,
presidential edicts, cabinet acts, and acts of the Crimean Autonomous
Republic. The President, at least 45 Members of Parliament, the Supreme
Court, the Human Rights Ombudsman, and the Crimean legislature can
request the Constitutional Court to hear a case. Citizens may apply to
the Constitutional Court through the Human Rights Ombudsman, although
in practice the Ombudsman has yet to exercise this right. In some
limited cases, the Constitutional Court can interpret law for
individual citizens, when the applying citizen provides compelling
proof that a constitutional provision is violated, or that it is
interpreted differently by different government bodies. However, of
some 8,000 such petitions only 4 were accepted for review as of
January.
Under the current court system, cases are decided by judges who sit
singly, occasionally with two public assessors (``lay judges'' or
professional jurors with some legal training), or in groups of three
for more serious cases. The Constitution provides for public,
adversarial trials, including a judge, public assessors, state
prosecutor, defense, and jury (when required by law). With some
qualifications, these requirements are upheld in practice. However,
implementing criminal procedure legislation establishing juries has not
been adopted. Complicated cases can take years to go to trial. In the
interim, defendants usually wait in pretrial detention. The 1996
amendment to the Soviet-era Criminal Procedures Code provides for bail,
but to date it has been used rarely (see Section 1.d.).
Organized crime elements also are widely alleged to influence court
decisions. The Justice Ministry reported that in 1997 135 judges were
disciplined, 22 dismissed, and 5 prosecuted for bribery. No higher
court judge has been disciplined to date. Criminal elements routinely
use intimidation to induce victims and witnesses to withdraw or change
their testimony. The law requires that a special police unit protect
judges, witnesses, defendants, and their relatives. However, it has not
yet been formed, and trial participants are vulnerable to pressure.
There is a witness protection law, but it is in abeyance because of
lack of funding.
Prosecutors, like the courts, also are organized into offices at
the rayon, oblast, and republic levels. They are responsible ultimately
to the Prosecutor General, who is appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Parliament for a 5-year term. Regional and district
prosecutors are appointed by the Prosecutor General.
Although by law prosecutors and defense attorneys have equal
status, in practice prosecutors are much more influential. The
procuracy, in its pretrial investigative function, acts in effect as a
grand jury. A prosecutor may initiate investigation through his own
office or conduct investigations initiated by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs or the SBU. Prosecutors also have the right to issue warrants
without court approval and to suspend court decisions, thus effectively
placing the procuracy above the courts in the legal hierarchy. In
several cases the procuracy has used its judicial review powers to
annul court decisions unfavorable to the presidential administration's
economic or political interests and ordered the case reexamined by a
different court. The office of the Prosecutor General practices
selective prosecution and initiates investigations against the
political or economic opponents of the President and his allies. The
Prosecutor General ignores parliamentary and court requests for
investigations into high-ranking persons if the accused is a
presidential ally.
The Constitution considerably curtails the prosecutor's authority,
limiting it to prosecution, representing the public interest in court,
oversight of investigations, and implementation of court decisions.
However, in the absence of new criminal and criminal procedure codes to
implement constitutional restrictions, the transitional provisions of
the Constitution permit the prosecutor's office to conduct
investigations and oversee general observance of the law. In November
1997, the Constitutional Court interpreted the procuracy law, ruling
that citizens can dispute prosecutors' decisions in court.
The Constitution includes procedural provisions to ensure a fair
trial, including the right of a suspect or witness to refuse to testify
against himself or his relatives. However, pending passage of
legislation to implement these constitutional provisions, a largely
Soviet-era criminal justice system remains in place. While the
defendant is presumed innocent, conviction rates have changed little
since the Soviet era. Nearly all completed cases result in convictions.
According to official statistics, in the first half of 1999, there
were 114,600 convictions, between 36 and 39 percent of which resulted
in prison sentences. A total of 494 defendants were acquitted, which is
up 11 percent from the corresponding period last year. However, as
judges frequently send cases unlikely to end in conviction back to the
prosecutor for ``additional investigation'' (which usually leads to the
dropping of the case), these statistics are somewhat misleading.
Additionally, evidence indicates that suspects often bribe court
officials to drop charges before cases go to trial, to lessen
sentences, or to commute them.
The Dnipropetrovsk trial of former government opponent Leopold
Taburiansky, who spent several months in pretrial detention in 1996 for
repeatedly holding unauthorized demonstrations on behalf of duped
clients of pyramid schemes, has been suspended indefinitely. Human
rights groups believe that this illustrates a pattern of government use
of such suspended criminal cases against opponents or their close
associates to silence critics.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
Although the Constitution requires that courts issue search warrants,
this provision has not yet been implemented, and prosecutors continue
to issue search warrants. The SBU may conduct intrusive surveillance
and searches without a warrant, with the consent of the Prosecutor
General, who nominally oversees this function of the SBU. However, the
extent to which the Prosecutor General utilizes his authority to
monitor SBU activities and to curb excesses by security officials is
unknown. The Constitution provides citizens with the right to examine
any dossier on them in possession of the SBU and to sue for physical
and emotional damages incurred by an investigation. However, this right
does not exist in practice, because the necessary implementing
legislation has not been passed.
Some remnants of Soviet control mechanisms persist. There are no
probable cause statutes, and police officials and militia personnel
have the right to stop persons and vehicles arbitrarily to initiate
extensive document checks and vehicle inspections. Police may detain a
person arbitrarily for up to 3 hours to verify identity. There have
been reports that police sometimes abused this right. For example,
police detained the local leader of the opposition Socialist Party in
Cherkassy for an identity check to disrupt a local leftist
demonstration in August.
Journalists whose news reports are critical of the Government or
who covered opposition politicians reported that frequently they were
followed by SBU agents and that their telephones were wiretapped (see
Section 2.a.).
Under the current ``propiska'' registration system, all internal
passports contain a stamp indicating residence and matrimonial status
(see Section 2.d.). The Government has indicated its intent to
eliminate the propiska system, but little progress has been made to
date.
The Law on Public Organizations prohibits members of the police,
SBU, and armed forces from joining political parties. Prior to the
March 1998 parliamentary elections, mass--perhaps coerced--enrollment
of public sector and government employees augmented the ranks of
progovernment parties, particularly the People's Democratic Party (see
Section 2.b).
There were no reported cases of political abuse of psychiatry;
however, the press and human rights groups have reported several cases
of abuse of psychiatry for economic reasons. Persons involved in
property, inheritance, or divorce disputes were diagnosed wrongfully
with schizophrenia and confined to psychiatric institutions. The
disputes often entail the corruption of psychiatric experts and court
officials. The country still uses Soviet classifications of mental
illness and has no law on psychiatric practice. Persons diagnosed with
mental illness may be confined and treated forcibly, declared not
responsible for their actions, and stripped of their civil rights
without being present at the hearings or notified of the ruling. A new
law on psychiatry was stalled in Parliament after having been passed on
first reading in 1998. In the meantime, the 1988 old Soviet psychiatric
regulation remains in force (there are some 1.2 million registered
psychiatric patients in the country). Within 3 days after forcible
confinement to a hospital a patient must be examined by three doctors.
Patients (including convicted prisoners) subsequently must be examined
by the senior regional psychiatric commission within half a year.
According to the Ukrainian Psychiatric Association, the Health Care
Ministry has not always cooperated with human rights groups attempting
to monitor abuse of psychiatry.
A presidential decree issued in June required that all
communication companies and Internet providers be licensed, and that
their equipment be fitted for wiretapping (implicitly by the security
services). However, this decree was blocked by Parliament in September
(see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution and a 1991 law
provide for freedom of speech and of the press; however, in practice
the Government partially limits freedom of the press through tax
inspections, libel cases, subsidization, and intimidation of
journalists that leads many to practice self-censorship. The Government
owns or controls most of the national radio and television channels;
however, there is a wide variety of newspapers and periodicals
available, which espouse different political points of view, and
individuals can and frequently do criticize the Government without
reprisal. Government attempts to control the press are reported by the
media.
The print media, both independent and government-owned, demonstrate
a tendency toward self-censorship on matters sensitive to the
Government. Private newspapers have been established and are free to
function on a purely commercial basis, although very few turn a profit.
However, they are subject to various pressures, such as control of
access to affordable state-subsidized newsprint; dependence on
political patrons who may facilitate financial support from the State
Press Support Fund; close scrutiny from government officials,
especially at the local level; and politically motivated visits by tax
inspectors. In 1997 the President issued a decree on support of the
press that requires the Cabinet to draw up a list of publications
needing government support, including those published by central and
local governments, public organizations, associations, unions,
educational institutions, and newspaper employees. The journalistic
community believed that this decree was intended to control the press
by supporting loyal members. The dependence of much of the press on
government patronage has inhibited criticism particularly at the local
level. The State Committee for Information Policy has warned some
periodicals against fomenting ethnic tensions and conducting antistate
propaganda and has applied to the Prosecutor's Office to open
investigations into those newspapers. However, no newspapers are known
to have been prosecuted as a result.
The Committee on Protection of State Secrets enjoys broadly defined
powers over all media. In 1997 the Cabinet adopted a regulation that
further defined state secrets to include information on executions, the
state of prisons, pretrial detention blocks, and centers for the
forcible treatment of alcoholics. (The ``state of prisons'' refers to
the physical state of the prison walls and fences, not prison
conditions.) The press is able to report about harsh prison conditions
without any inhibition. Journalists report that, in general, the
Committee has not interfered with their activities (see Section 1.c.).
The Government, both central and local, regularly targeted
opposition newspapers with unannounced tax inspections or fire and
building code inspections. Prior to the October 31 presidential
election, the Government forced at least one opposition newspaper,
Polytyka, to close. The June closure, following protracted litigation
and government harassment for allegedly violating secrecy statutes, was
Polytyka's fourth closure in 13 months. Between March and June the
newspaper also was forced to change printing houses seven times.
Government officials have initiated more than 20 criminal and civil
libel cases against Polytyka's editor, Oleg Lyashko, asking for more
than $40 million (220 million hryvnia) in damages. In one of two
criminal libel cases pending against Lyashko for slandering the
President and his staff, Lyashko was acquitted on December 23. The
court stated that there was no evidence that a crime had been committed
and that the preliminary investigation had been biased. However, on
December 28 Prosecutor General Mikhaylo Potebenko announced the
suspension of Lyashko's acquittal. The case reportedly was to be
reconsidered in 2000. In September a deputy regional governor requested
prosecution of the local Socialist Party newspaper Pravilny Vybor for
the alleged defamation of the President and regional governor following
publication of reports critical of the Government. In the summer, Lviv
oblast authorities subjected the anti-Semitic newspaper Za Vilnu
Ukrainu to tax inspections, fire inspections, eviction notices, the
cutting of its telephone lines, and police harassment. The harassment
began after the newspaper announced its support for presidential
candidate and former Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk. Den, another
newspaper that supports Marchuk, was subjected to 25 tax inspections
between January and July.
Kievskiye Viedomosti suspended publication on February 21, citing
lack of funds, after months of government pressure against it. The
newspaper's accounts had been frozen since October 1998 for alleged
lease contract violations. Kievskiye Viedomosti resumed publication on
April 22 under new management. Presidential ally Hrihoriy Surkis bought
the newspaper and replaced its editor.
On June 1, the Parliament adopted a resolution on the media calling
for investigations into all complaints of harassment of non-state media
outlets by the Tax Inspectorate, the Prosecutor General's Office, or
the presidential administration.
Government officials also frequently use criminal libel cases or
civil suits based on alleged damage to a ``person's honor and
integrity'' to punish critics. Article 7 of the Civil Code allows
anyone, including public officials, to sue for damages if circulated
information is untrue or insults a person's honor or dignity. Article
125 of the Criminal Code prescribes imprisonment of up to 3 years for
libel. There is no distinction between private individuals and public
officials (except for the President), nor is there a limit to the
amount of damages that may be awarded. Consequently, any journalist who
publishes an article critical of a public official risks being sued for
damages. Additionally, the Prosecutor General can file criminal libel
charges. According to Ministry of Justice statistics, 123 persons were
convicted in 1998 for criminal libel. Of these, seven cases resulted in
prison sentences. According to the Union of Journalists of Ukraine,
journalists lose two of every three cases against them in the courts.
Journalists complain that because the law does not limit damages, it
can be used to drive opposition newspapers out of business.
On occasion fines were so large that accounts were frozen and
equipment confiscated by the Tax Inspectorate to enforce payment. It is
clear that a large number of libel and personal dignity suits are
motivated politically. Moreover, even when the actions of the Tax
Inspectorate are overturned by subsequent court decisions, the damage
to the newspapers' finances can be irreparable. Their accounts remain
frozen until all appeals are completed. Independent newspapers face
further financial pressure as they try to compete with propresidential
newspapers, which are sold at a price significantly below cost.
Newspapers aligned with the presidential administration reportedly
often are financed by wealthy presidential allies. The threat of
multiple lawsuits for large amounts of money also was used to pressure
owners of opposition newspapers to sell their shares to their political
opponents.
On February 25, Peter Hois, the editor of the Uzhgorod newspaper
Rio, was detained for 2 days for criminal libel in connection with
statements that were never printed. The newspaper was to publish a
statement accusing various Rada deputies of abusing their positions.
However, Hois deleted the specific names and accusations, but the
Prosecutor General used the original text as the basis for Hois's
arrest (see Section 1.d.).
Journalists sometimes were subjected to physical attack related to
their professional activities. Some journalists reported threats of
arrest or assaults when investigating crime and official corruption
(see Section 1.c.). The intermeshing of organized crime and many public
officials makes it difficult to assess whether these attacks and
threats were motivated politically.
Despite government pressure and media self-censorship, the variety
of newspapers and periodicals on the market, each espousing the view of
its respective sponsor, provides a variety of opinion. Foreign
newspapers and periodicals circulate freely.
The broadcast media, the primary source of news and information for
most citizens, are either state-owned or, in the case of private
stations, subject to pressure from the Government, which took steps
during the year to strengthen its control over this sector. In 1998 the
Government handed over state-owned broadcasting and transmission
facilities from the Derzhteleradio (State Committee for Television and
Radio) directly to the Information Ministry (later reorganized as the
State Committee for Information Policy). The President and the
Parliament each appoint half of the members of the National Council for
Television and Radio Broadcasting, which issues licenses and allocates
broadcasting time. However, as of October, President Kuchma had not
named his half of the eight-member National Television and Radio
Council. The Rada named its four members, but the President claimed
that the vote was conducted with procedural irregularities. The
inability of the Council to achieve a quorum provided the Government
with virtually unchallenged control over media licensing prior to the
presidential election.
Other state agencies took advantage of the lack of a working
Council to harass opposition stations. For example, the frequency of
arbitrary tax inspections increased considerably without a working
council. The State Electro-Communications Inspectorate increased the
fees for broadcast frequencies tenfold in the early summer without the
prior approval of the Council. Fee increases disproportionately affect
independent stations, since state channels are permitted to ignore
payment of their frequency fees. The law entitles private and foreign
companies to obtain a license to establish and operate their own
transmission facilities.
Prior to the October 31 presidential election, the Government
stepped up pressure on the broadcast media, using tax inspections and
other measures, and forced at least five local television stations
(four in the Crimea and one in Dnipropetrovsk) to close. Numerous
sources charge that the administration has used government agencies,
particularly the Tax Inspectorate, to pressure the opposition media and
businesses supporting its political opponents. During the year, the
independent television station STB, one of the more balanced and
independent media outlets, faced increasing harassment by government
entities and was threatened with closure if it did not cede financial
and editorial control to presidential supporters. In February and March
STB staff members suffered various attacks: A cameraman was beaten and
his equipment and videotapes stolen; masked individuals assaulted the
station's commercial director and his wife in his home; the president
of the board of directors received telephone threats; and burglars
robbed the home of the station's news director, stealing videotapes,
computer disks, and documents (see Section 1.c.). In March
Ukrcreditbank, which is controlled by an ally of President Kuchma,
announced a lawsuit of approximately $1.3 million (5 million hryvnia)
against STB for an expose the station ran on a factory privatization in
which the bank played a role. On May 28 and June 7, the Ukrainian
Frequency Supervision Agency ordered STB to discontinue the satellite
uplink for broadcasting programming to its regional affiliates. STB
ignored the order, which would have resulted in the loss of half of its
viewers, since it did not believe that the order was legal. On August
26, the State Tax Administration froze STB's bank accounts for failure
to pay sufficient taxes. This action caused serious financial hardship
for the station, and it was forced to cancel its political programming.
As of October, STB had changed its programming to take a more pro-
Kuchma approach but continued to suffer from official pressure.
On March 9, the Dnipropetrovsk oblast transmission center, acting
on instructions from the regional directorate of the State Electronic
Communications Inspection, ceased broadcasting Channel 11, one of the
city's more popular local television stations. The center claimed that
Channel 11 did not have proper documentation or appropriate permits. On
orders from an oblast official, the broadcast antenna on the station's
roof was removed and its journalists were told to vacate the station's
premises, allegedly without a warrant. The station resumed broadcasting
on March 18 after it was acquired by Viktor Pinchuk, a Rada deputy,
unofficial presidential advisor, and owner of the country's largest and
most influential daily, Fakty.
On July 26, the State Electronic Communications Agency ordered a
state-owned broadcast center to cease transmitting the signals of four
independent Crimean television companies, including the popular Black
Sea television station, reportedly because the broadcast center lacked
the proper permits. The four stations believe that the move was
intended to prevent coverage of opposition presidential candidates.
The presidential campaign saw a marked imbalance in coverage of
candidates on national television and radio channels (except the STB
television channel). Opposition presidential candidates received very
limited and often negative coverage at the national level. Opposition
candidates had more success in obtaining access to smaller local and
regional television channels. According to a Rada-sponsored media
monitoring group, President Kuchma appeared on national television more
than twice as often as any other candidate. On July 28, three leading
contenders, Yevhen Marchuk, Oleksandr Moroz, and Oleksandr Tkachenko,
publicly charged that their supporters had been harassed and
intimidated and that media outlets had been closed to restrict coverage
of their campaigns. Despite vehement protests from the Rada, in May the
state-controlled National Television and Radio Company suspended live
radio broadcasts of parliamentary sessions, which had been broadcast
since 1990. (Of the 15 presidential candidates, 13 were Members of
Parliament.) Radio broadcasts of Rada sessions resumed in early October
on a small, private Kiev station.
There is no known government censorship of books, film, or theater.
While major universities are state owned, they operate for the most
part under full autonomy. However, academic freedom is an
underdeveloped and poorly understood concept. Nepotism and bribery
reportedly are common during entrance exams and also influence the
granting of degrees. Administrators of universities and academic and
research institute directors possess the power to silence colleagues by
denying them the ability to publish, withholding pay and housing
benefits, or directly terminating them. This atmosphere tends to limit
the spirit of free inquiry. Restrictions by the Communications Ministry
on the mailing of scientific documents also have caused concern.
The State Secrets Committee maintains offices for the protection of
state secrets in state scientific and research institutes, including
those not conducting any classified research. An April 1998
presidential edict allows only government-designated contractors to
provide Internet access at state institutions that have such censorship
offices. Human rights groups fear that this may limit the freedom of
information for universities and scientific research institutes.
Another presidential decree in June required that all communication
companies and Internet providers be licensed and that their equipment
be fitted for wiretapping (implicitly by the security services).
However, this decree was blocked by Parliament in September (see
Section 1.f.).
All private and religiously affiliated universities operate without
any reported state interference or harassment.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
and law provide for freedom of assembly, and the Government generally
respects this right in practice; however, there were some instances in
which this right was restricted. The 1988 law on public assembly
circumscribes freedom of assembly by stipulating that organizations
must apply for permission to their respective local administration at
least 10 days before a planned event or demonstration. The Criminal
Code prescribes up to 6 months in prison, 1 year of corrective labor,
or a fine for repeatedly staging unauthorized demonstrations. The 1996
Constitution requires that demonstrators merely inform the authorities
of a planned demonstration in advance; however, authorities insist that
all demonstrations meet the restrictive requirements of the 1988 law.
Under the 1988 law, demonstrators are prohibited from inciting violence
or ethnic conflict and from calling for the violent overthrow of the
constitutional order. In practice unlicensed demonstrations are common,
and most but not all occur without police interference, including fines
or detention; however, there were no reports of cases of interference
during the year. In March the leader of a pro-Russian group in
Dnipropetrovsk was jailed for 3 days for repeatedly holding
unauthorized pro-Russian demonstrations.
The Dnipropetrovsk trial of former government opponent Leopold
Taburiansky, who spent several months in pretrial detention in 1996 for
repeatedly holding unauthorized demonstrations on behalf of duped
clients of pyramid schemes, has been suspended indefinitely. Human
rights groups believe that this illustrates a pattern of government use
of such suspended criminal cases against opponents or their close
associates to silence critics. Communist groups complain that the
authorities fail to punish Ukrainian nationalist groups who harass them
during their demonstrations. Ukrainian nationalist groups in turn
complain that the authorities do not protect them from harassment by
Communist groups.
The Constitution, law, and government regulations restrict freedom
of association to varying degrees. These restrictions generally apply
to organizations that are considered dangerous, such as those which
advocate violence or racial and religious hatred, or which threaten the
public order or health.
A government requirement that a political party have
representatives in at least half of the country's regions in order to
register officially has limited the ability of Russian, Crimean, Tatar,
and Romanian groups to organize (see Section 3).
The Ministry of Justice, with the Prosecutor General's consent, has
the authority to warn, fine, or suspend operations of political parties
for illegal operations. Suspension can be for up to 3 months and can be
extended for 6 months upon the Ministry's request.
In 1998 the Constitutional Court invalidated the 1993 Crimean law
on citizens' associations, thus outlawing regional Crimean parties. A
1992 law on public organizations prohibits the State from financing or
materially supporting political parties. According to this law,
political parties may not receive funds from abroad or maintain
accounts in foreign banks. The law prohibits police authorities,
members of the SBU, and armed forces personnel from joining political
parties.
Prior to the 1998 parliamentary elections, mass--perhaps coerced--
enrollment of public sector and government employees augmented the
ranks of progovernment parties, particularly the People's Democratic
Party (see Section 1.f.).
Freedom of association also is restricted through a strict
registration requirement that lends itself to political manipulation
and corruption; however, in practice such regulations seldom are
employed to restrict this freedom. Groups must register with the
Government to pursue almost any purpose. The Ministries of Internal
Affairs, Justice, Economy, and Foreign Economic Relations, as well as
the State Committees on Religion and Broadcasting and other government
bodies have registration functions and used this power to limit freedom
of association (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
For example, after almost a year of attempting to register as a
national organization, a Luhansk-based group for the protection of gay
rights finally succeeded in registering in November. According to group
representatives, local officials indicated that the group was not
registered because it was a gay rights group.
Groups must be registered with the Government to engage in almost
any activity, whether commercial, political, religious, or
philanthropic. Unregistered groups are prohibited from opening bank
accounts, acquiring property, or entering into contracts.
The registration law gives the Government the right to inspect the
activities of all registered groups. This law requires that a party
specify all its activities in its charter, but the party is not
required to notify authorities of all its meetings. A change in the
group's charter necessitates reregistration.
A registered group may not duplicate any function or service that
the Government is expected to provide. For example, human rights
lawyers who wish to represent prisoners are prohibited from
establishing an association because the Government is required by the
Constitution to provide lawyers for the accused. However, this
requirement is not always enforced. In the mid-1990's, AI was refused
registration under the pretext that human rights protection is the
function of the State. It continued to apply and eventually was
registered. Lack of registration has several important disadvantages.
Unregistered groups are prohibited from having bank accounts, acquiring
property, or entering into contracts.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution and the 1991 Law on
Freedom of Conscience and Religion provide for separation of church and
state and the right to practice the religion of one's choice; the
Government generally respects these rights in practice, with the
exception of some nonnative religions, which experienced difficulties
registering, buying, or leasing property. The Government generally
permits religious organizations to establish places of worship and to
train clergy. The Government has continued to expedite allotment of
land plots for construction of new houses of worship and to return
religious buildings and sites to their former owners.
Although the Government's protection of religious freedom had
deteriorated for nonnative religious organizations (defined as all
organizations other than Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Jewish) in
recent years, nonnative religions reported less difficulty in obtaining
visas and registering during the year. The Government does not
discriminate against individual believers of nonnative religions, but
their organizations faced ongoing difficulty in carrying out their
activities during the year. However, through burdensome licensing
requirements and informal means, local authorities restricted nonnative
religions as well as Christian denominations other than Greek Catholic
and Orthodox. The Government took steps to return to religious groups
properties expropriated during the Soviet era.
A 1993 amendment to the 1991 Law on the Freedom of Conscience and
Religion restricts the activities of nonnative, foreign-based,
religious organization. The amendment narrowly defines the permissible
activities of members of the clergy, preachers, teachers, and other
foreign citizen representatives of foreign-based religious
organizations. They may preach, administer religious ordinances, or
practice other canonical activities ``only in those religious
organizations which invited them to Ukraine and with official approval
of the governmental body that registered the statutes and the articles
of the pertinent religious organization.'' Although the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints had complained in 1998 that this
restriction prevented the transfer of its missionaries between cities,
during the year church leaders reported no difficulties in transferring
missionaries between cities.
All religious organizations are required by the 1991 religion law
to register with the State Committee on Religious Affairs. If a group
chooses to register as a national organization it must register with
the central office of the State Committee for Religious Affairs, and
each of its local groups must register with the local office of the
State Committee in the region where they are located. Those groups that
choose to register as local organizations must register only with the
regional office of the State Committee. This status is necessary to own
property or carry out many economic activities, such as publishing
religious materials or opening bank accounts. This process is supposed
to take not more than 1 month (or 3 months in cases in which either the
central or regional Committee decides that an expert opinion is
necessary to determine the legitimacy of a group applying for
registration). However, this requirement often is not met. The regional
offices also supervise the compliance of religious organizations with
the provisions of the law. Some nonnative religious organizations
credibly reported that, especially at the local or regional levels,
officials of the State Committee refused to register their
organizations for protracted periods, thus effectively delaying their
activities and limiting freedom of association (see Section 2.b.).
However, there were fewer reports than in prior years of nonnative
religious groups experiencing such registration problems.
Native religious organizations, especially the Orthodox church in
the central, southern, and eastern regions of the country and the Greek
Catholic Church in the west, exerted significant political influence at
the local and regional levels and pressured local officials not to
register nonnative religious organizations or to allow them to rent or
purchase property. Each of the two dominant denominations, within their
respective spheres of influence, also reportedly pressured local
officials to restrict the activities of the other.
The ongoing dispute among competing Orthodox Christian
administrative bodies claiming to be ``the Ukrainian Orthodox Church''
remained deadlocked. The Government has been unable to stop
disagreements between the Orthodox believers and Greek Catholics in the
western part of the country, where the two communities are contentious
and often engage in bitter disputes over church buildings and property
in over 600 localities. The Kiev Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church
complained of harassment by local authorities in the predominantly
Russian-speaking eastern region of the country, while the Moscow
Patriarchate of the Orthodox Church complained that local governments
turned a blind eye to the appropriation of its churches in the
Ukrainian-speaking western region. In April Patriarch Filaret of the
Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kiev Patriarchate and his followers were
assaulted by supporters of the Moscow Patriarchate in Mariupol (see
Section 5). A planned tour of the country by the Moscow Patriarchate
was canceled at the request of President Kuchma due to security
concerns.
According to the State Committee for Religious Affairs, the
transfer of most places of worship back to their original owners
according to a 1992 decree on restitution was nearing completion at
year's end. In 1996 and 1997, 105 buildings were returned; in 1998 92
were returned; and in 1999 103 were returned. There still were about
380 former houses of worship that were used for nonreligious purposes,
but 275 of them were not claimed by religious groups. In the fourth
quarter of the year, local authorities in the oblasts of
Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, Zakarpatia, Lviv, Mykolayiv, Odesa, Poltava,
Sumy, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi, as well as in Sevastopol, returned 42
former houses of worship to religious groups.
Numerous Jewish congregations have negotiated successfully with
local authorities for worship space. In 1996 a Kiev arbitration court
decided in favor of transferring the title of the former Kiev Central
Synagogue, which in Soviet times was used as a puppet theater, to a
Chabad Hasidic congregation. By December 1997, the puppet theater had
vacated the building, and in the spring of 1998 the building reopened
once again as a synagogue. The decision set an important precedent for
the judiciary's role in religious property restitution. According to
Jewish community representatives, progress on restitution was frozen
for the first few months of the year but resumed thereafter at a rate
satisfactory to Jewish community leaders. For example, a synagogue was
returned in Poltava oblast in the fourth quarter of the year.
The pace of restitution of Christian churches has slowed in recent
years, since the buildings that remain in state possession tend to be
prime properties currently being used as museums, concert halls, or
city halls. All religions have enjoyed equal opportunity to regain
control over former community property. Problems in obtaining
restitution result from inadequate legislation, bureaucratic inertia,
and the difficulty of locating alternative quarters for current
occupants. In February a presidential order instructed all local
governments to complete the handover of former religious property
whenever possible by the end of the year and banned privatization of
religious communities' property. The Committee attributed delays in
returning other properties to lack of funds and the difficulties
involved in finding alternative space for current users.
Nonetheless, a number of religious properties were returned to
Christian churches during the year. Of the 42 houses of worship
returned in the fourth quarter of the year, the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church received 20 buildings. In particular the Assumption Monastery in
Donetsk oblast received several structures. The Kiev Patriarchate
received four churches, including one of national architectural
importance in Berezhany, Ternopil oblast. Authorities transferred 16
former cathedrals to the Greek Catholic Church and 4 to Roman Catholic
parishes. A Lutheran church also was returned in Ternopil oblast.
In May authorities arrested three Baptist ministers (see Section
1.d.).
The Government made significant efforts during the year to ensure
that pilgrims of the Bratslav Hasidic sect were able to visit the tomb
of their founding rabbi in the city of Uman on the occasion of the
Jewish New Year.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and with some limits, the Government respects them in practice.
However, the Government has not yet fulfilled its pledge to abolish
mandatory registration--the ``propiska'' system--and to replace it with
an informational residence register (see Section 1.f.). Regulations
impose a nationwide requirement to register at the workplace and place
of residence in order to be eligible for social benefits, thereby
complicating freedom of movement by limiting access to certain social
benefits to the place where one is registered. For example, persons who
move to other regions for work in the private sector may be denied
formal access to free medical care and other services provided by the
State. Residence without registration carries a fine under the
administrative code, but this provision rarely is enforced. Human
rights groups reported an increasing number of cases of persons being
stripped of their residence registration, evicted from their homes, and
made homeless through criminal fraud or court error. Police also
arbitrarily detain persons for extensive document checks and vehicle
inspections (see Section 1.f.).
An August 1998 regulation requiring foreigners to obtain special
permits to visit areas within 18 to 30 miles of the border was
rescinded in April. In September the governor in Donetsk oblast
declared restrictions on foreign travel for directors of enterprises
owing wage arrears; however, the restrictions have not been enforced.
Citizens who wish to travel abroad are able to do so freely. Exit
visas are required for citizens who intend to take up permanent
residence in another country. There were no known cases of exit visas
being denied during the year. The Government may deny passports to
individuals in possession of state secrets, but denials may be
appealed. A lapse in an Israeli-Ukrainian student exchange agreement
during the year led to concerns about the ability of several hundred
Ukrainian students to travel overseas for study in Israel. While
negotiations continued between the Ukrainian and Israeli Governments
over the renewal of the lapsed exchange agreement, the Ukrainian
Government took steps to ensure that the students in question could
travel to Israel.
Citizenship law provides the right to citizenship for all
individuals who were born or lived in the country before independence
and to their descendants who lived outside the country as of November
13, 1991. In order to be eligible, persons must not be citizens of
other countries and must submit their application by the year 2000.
Dual citizenship is not recognized. A 1997 amendment to the citizenship
law also provides the right to citizenship for deported victims of
political oppression, such as the Crimean Tatars. Refugees can acquire
citizenship if they have lived legally in the country for 5 years and
can communicate in the Ukrainian language. Since independence over 1.5
million Ukrainians have returned to the country, while over 1 million
persons, mostly ethnic Russians, have left the country.
The Government has not supported a foreign-funded program to
facilitate the travel to Ukraine of some emigrants who qualify for
resettlement as refugees. Approximately 260,000 Crimean Tatars have
returned from exile to Crimea, mainly from Central Asia. As of August,
192,700 of them had acquired Ukrainian citizenship. Crimean Tatar
leaders have complained that their community has not received adequate
assistance in resettling and that an onerous process of acquiring
citizenship has excluded many of them from participating in elections
and from the right to take part in the privatization of land and state
assets. However, the 1997 amendment to the citizenship law waives some
of the usual residence and language requirements for returning
deportees and expedites the acquisition of citizenship. The amendment
facilitates the acquisition of citizenship by Crimean Tatars who were
deported victims of political oppression. It allows deported persons,
including Crimean Tatars, to acquire Ukrainian citizenship without a
mandatory 5-year term of residence in the country and without Ukrainian
language proficiency. On July 13, the Rada further amended the
citizenship law to allow deported persons or their descendents living
in the country for 5 years to acquire automatically Ukrainian
citizenship without having to renounce any foreign citizenship they may
possess. Previously Crimean Tatars had difficulty obtaining documents
from Uzbekistan to confirm that they had relinquished their Uzbek
citizenship.
The 1993 Law on Refugees governs the treatment of refugees and
entitles refugees to all the benefits accorded to citizens. The
Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), and refugee status initially is given for a 3-month term and
is subject to further extension. As of October, 3,500 persons (70
percent of whom are Afghans) had been granted refugee status. A
commitment has been made to award refugee status to all Afghans who
arrived in the country before 1995. Under the new citizenship law,
legally registered refugees can apply for citizenship after 5 years of
permanent residence. Under the refugee law, refugees are entitled to
material assistance. The Cabinet decided to start allocating funds in
the 1999 national budget for payment of refugee pensions and small
allowances for indigent refugees, plus transportation fare to a refugee
center. In cooperation with the UNHCR in 1997, the Government
established a refugee receiving center for 200 persons in Vinnytsya.
The Government plans to open four other centers elsewhere; however, no
additional center has as yet been opened.
Instances of police harassment of certain categories of refugees
appear to have diminished during the year.
According to the State Committee for Nationalities and Migration,
the Government has a first asylum policy. This means that persons who
travel directly from their home country to Ukraine as refugees are
assured refugee status. However, there were some problematic cases
during the year. In March four Uzbeks, including two exiled Uzbek
oppositionists, reportedly were arrested without a warrant, were denied
counsel, and were deported forcibly to Uzbekistan without a hearing,
despite protests by human rights groups. On August 18, a court in
Uzbekistan sentenced the four to between 8 and 15 years in prison for
insulting the president and conspiracy against the constitution, in all
but one case. The four released a statement on August 17, in which they
claimed that they had been tortured and forced to give false testimony.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the right and the ability to change the government
peacefully. The Constitution provides universal suffrage for citizens
at least 18 years of age, and for periodic elections every 4 years for
the Parliament and every 5 years for the President. A presidential
election was held on October 31 and November 14. Parliamentary
elections took place in 1994 and in March 1998.
Power is divided between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. Although nominally independent, the judicial branch in
practice is influenced heavily by the executive (see Section 1.e.). The
President appoints the Prime Minister, who appoints the remainder of
the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, as well as certain other appointments,
such as the Prosecutor General, is subject to parliamentary approval.
The Constitution grants the President limited power to pass binding
decrees and directives that have the power of law.
International observers noted violations of election day procedures
in both the October 31 voting and the November 14 runoff in the
presidential elections, with more numerous and serious violations
occurring in the second round of voting. However the violations
reportedly were not widespread or systematic. The most serious problems
were imbalanced media coverage and the coordinated and inappropriate
involvement of government officials in both rounds of the election on
behalf of President Kuchma. The Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) also was concerned over pressure exerted
on voters in prisons, hospitals, and educational institutions on behalf
of President Kuchma. A representative of the Parliamentary Assembly of
the Council of Europe declared that the elections were ``far from fair
and democratic.'' OSCE observers noted unauthorized persons, including
SBU officers, present in polling stations, especially during the runoff
election, and had reports of militia involvement in campaigning. After
the first round of voting, three regional administrators were
dismissed, allegedly for failing to produce sufficient votes for
President Kuchma in their districts. After the second round of voting,
President Kuchma dismissed two oblast governors and six raion
(regional) heads in those regions were Kuchma received fewer votes than
Communist Party rival Symonenko. Very high voter turnouts, particularly
in western districts, aroused suspicion of ballot stuffing on President
Kuchma's behalf in the second round of voting. However, observers
concluded that it was unlikely that these problems significantly
altered the final outcome of the election, in view of President
Kuchma's 18-point margin of victory.
In the preelection period, various forms of government pressure on
the media served to limit the independence of the press (see Section
2.a.). The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe found that
state media coverage of the presidential campaign was biased strongly
in favor of President Kuchma. In the period prior to the October 31
presidential election the Government allegedly used government
agencies, especially the Tax Inspectorate, to disrupt or eliminate the
businesses of political opponents prior to the elections. Presidential
candidate Yevhen Marchuk reported that police ordered a meeting with
voters evacuated in Luhansk in August citing an anonymous bomb threat
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.). Other candidates reported difficulty
renting meeting halls, closure of their local campaign offices by
government officials, confiscation of campaign vehicles, and pressure
on employees from directors of state-owned enterprises. Many opposition
presidential candidates complained that the SBU overstepped its mandate
and interfered in the campaign to the benefit of President Kuchma.
These reports appear credible. There are confirmed reports that the SBU
monitored NGO's engaged in nonpartisan political activity (see Sections
1.f. and 4). In August several Rada deputies released what appeared to
be a secret SBU document addressed to an aide to President Kuchma. The
document was an analysis of which publications and television and radio
stations supported which presidential candidate in Mykolayiv oblast.
Supporters of opposition presidential candidates were beaten by unknown
assailants and one local campaign headquarters was burned down (see
Section 1.c.).
Presidential candidate Oleksandr Moroz complained after the first
round of voting about the presidential administration's dominance over
the media and the illegal involvement of state officials in Kuchma's
campaign. In response to this complaint, the Supreme Court declared on
November 13 that it does not have the right to question the decision of
the Central Election Committee or to declare an election null and void
but that it could only order recounts in specific polling stations.
Women are active in political life but hold a disproportionately
small percentage of offices. Women hold 28 of the 450 seats in the
Rada. Only two women hold ministerial posts. The 18-member
Constitutional Court has 2 female members.
Jews are well represented among the political elite and hold
several parliamentary seats. Many Crimean Tatars are unable to
participate fully in the political process, primarily due to
citizenship problems (see Section 2.d.). The government requirement
that a political party have representatives in at least half of the
country's regions in order to register officially has limited the
ability of Russian, Crimean Tatar, and Romanian minority groups to
organize (see Section 2.b.).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of domestic and international human rights groups
operate without government restriction, investigating and publishing
their findings on human rights cases. Government officials generally
are cooperative and responsive to their views. However, human rights
groups reported more difficulties in investigating penal conditions,
which are a significant human rights concern. There are confirmed
reports that the SBU monitored NGO's engaged in nonpartisan political
activity during the presidential election campaign (see Section 3).
In January 1998, the President signed the law creating the
Parliamentary Commissioner on Human Rights, which is a constitutionally
mandated independent human rights ombudsman. Parliament elected the
first Ombudsman in April 1998. The Human Rights Ombudsman serves a 5-
year term and, in principle, is invested by law with very broad powers.
The extent of the Ombudsman's independence has not been established,
and the Ombudsman's office has not yet released any reports.
The law provides the Ombudsman with unrestricted and unannounced
access to any public official, including the President; unrestricted
access to any government installation; and oversight of implementation
of human rights treaties and agreements to which the country is a
party. However, the law provides no penalties for those who obstruct
the Ombudsman's investigations, nor does it create sufficient
enforcement authority for the Ombudsman. The law required the
Government to submit amendments to existing laws to provide the legal
framework for the operation of the Ombudsman's office. The Ombudsman's
office itself drafted some 70 amendments to this effect, but those
amendments had not been enacted at year's end. All citizens and current
residents can address their concerns to the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman
also serves as the intermediary between citizens and the Constitutional
Court, since citizens cannot address the Court directly. During the
year, the Ombudsman made combating trafficking in persons a priority
and personally traveled overseas to accompany women who were victims of
trafficking back to the country (also see Section 6.f.).
Citizens have the right to file appeals with the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg about alleged human rights violations.
According to one human rights expert, some 13,000 appeals were made to
the Court in 1998 and some 200 cases were accepted by the Court for
review.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, and other grounds; however, due in part to the absence of an
effective judicial system, the Government does not enforce these
provisions effectively. The Government has not prosecuted anti-Semitic
acts under the law forbidding the sowing of interethnic hatred.
Women.--Violence against women is reportedly pervasive. While new
statistics compiled by the U.N. Development Program show that the
number of reported rapes and attempted rapes decreased during recent
years, surveys indicate that the majority of rapes and other cases of
physical abuse go unreported. Past surveys by women's groups indicated
that between 10 and 15 percent of women had been raped, and over 25
percent physically abused, in their lifetimes.
The Criminal Code outlaws rape and ``forced sex with a materially
dependent person,'' which may allow prosecution for spousal rape.
Spousal abuse also is illegal, but authorities often pressure women not
to press charges against their husbands. Separate statistics on
prosecutions for wife beating or on average sentences are not
available. In 1997, the last year for which statistics are available,
1,510 criminal cases were opened for rape, 822 for sexual abuse, and 3
for sexual compulsion. Information on convictions was not available.
Violence against women does not receive extensive media coverage,
despite the efforts of human rights groups to highlight the problem.
Hot lines, shelters, and other practical support for victims of abuse
are practically nonexistent, although there are some shelters run by
private organizations. In 1998 Kiev municipal authorities opened the
country's first state-funded women's center. The Government announced
plans in 1998 to establish a network of shelters throughout the country
but by year's end it had not yet begun to implement these plans.
Ukraine is an important source country of girls and women
trafficked to Central and Western Europe and the Middle East for sexual
exploitation (see Section 6.f.). An April 1998 amendment to the
Criminal Code imposes harsh penalties for--among other offenses--
trafficking in human beings, including for sexual exploitation and
pornography; however, the effectiveness of this step has not yet been
established. The authorities rarely prosecute men for engaging women in
the rapidly growing sector of sexually exploitative work.
Women's groups reported that there was widespread sexual harassment
in the workplace, including coerced sex. Apart from the law that
prohibits forced sex with a ``materially dependent person,'' which
applies to employees, there are inadequate legal safeguards against
harassment. In the only known case of prosecution for sexual harassment
in the workplace, Pravda Ukrayiny editor Oleksandr Horobets was
convicted in May of sexual harassment of a subordinate and sentenced to
7 months' confinement. However, the fact that Horobets was the editor
of an opposition newspaper calls into question the motives of the
procuracy in prosecuting the case (see Section 2.a.).
Labor laws establish the legal equality of men and women, including
equal pay for equal work, a principle that generally is observed.
However, the economic crisis has harmed women disproportionately. Women
are much more likely to be laid off than men. Women constitute
approximately 60 percent of the unemployed population, and as much as
90 percent of newly unemployed persons. Industries that are dominated
by female workers are also those industries with the lowest relative
wages and the ones that are most likely to be affected by wage arrears
problems.
The Constitution and the Law on Protection of Motherhood and
Childhood prohibit the employment of women in jobs that are hazardous
to their health, such as those that involve heavy lifting. However,
despite implementation of a government program to combat dangerous
labor, these laws remain poorly enforced. The Ministry of Labor
estimated that 15 percent of working women are employed at hazardous
jobs. Furthermore, human rights groups maintained that management
selectively conforms to the law only as necessary to lay off or fire
female workers. Many women's rights advocates fear that the law may be
used to bar women from the best paying blue-collar jobs. By law
pregnant women and mothers with small children enjoy paid maternity
leave until their children reach the age of 3. However, this benefit is
a disincentive for employers to hire women for responsible or career
track jobs.
Few women attain top managerial positions in state and private
industry. According to government statistics, 69.2 percent of the
country's 213,000 state administration jobs are held by women,
including 45.2 per cent of the managerial positions. However, of the
highest ``first'' and ``second'' category offices, only 5.6 percent in
central or local governments are filled by women. (These numbers do not
include the ``power ministries''--the Ministries of Defense, Internal
Affairs, Foreign Affairs, and the SBU, which have substantially more
male employees at all levels.)
Educational opportunities for women generally have been, and
continue to be, equal to those enjoyed by men.
Children.--The Government is committed publicly to the defense of
children's rights, but the deep economic crisis severely limits its
ability to ensure these rights. The low priority that both the public
and the Government attach to children's rights is reflected in the
absence of groups that aggressively promote children's rights. For
example, the widely acknowledged problem of growing violence and crime
in and outside schools, especially the notoriously violent vocational
schools, largely is ignored by the public and the Government.
Free, universal education is compulsory until the age of 15.
However, the public education system has deteriorated as a result of
government financial disarray. Teachers often go unpaid for months.
Increasing numbers of children from poor families drop out of school,
and illiteracy, which was previously very rare, has become a problem.
Health care is provided equally to girls and boys, but economic
problems have worsened the overall quality of the health care system.
There were increased cases of homeless children, who usually fled
poor orphanage or poor domestic conditions. Although statistics are
unavailable, drug use and child prostitution among these children are
widespread and received substantial media attention during the year.
Several charity groups were formed to assist these children, but they
have not been able to reduce the problem. In 1997 the All-Ukrainian
Committee for Protection of Children released survey results that
reveal that every fifth or sixth child of both sexes under age 18
suffers from sexual harassment (including every third girl), and every
tenth girl is raped.
Deteriorating conditions in the state orphanages led the Government
to encourage families to provide foster homes for orphans and to
facilitate the establishment of private, government-supervised
orphanages. Currently, there are 75 such orphanages with some 800
children. Public concern over the fate of children adopted by
foreigners led to a 1997 amendment to the adoption law, which provided
for thorough examination of each case and follow-up monitoring of the
children's well-being. To curb illegal adoption, an April 1998
amendment to the Criminal Code prescribed up to 15 years' imprisonment
for trafficking in children and illegal adoption (see Section 6.f.).
However, there had been no known successful cases of its application by
year's end.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
the disabled, but the Government has done little to support programs
targeted at increasing opportunities for the disabled. The law mandates
access to buildings and other public facilities for the disabled, but
it is enforced poorly.
Religious Minorities.--On April 30, a violent scuffle took place in
the southeastern city of Mariupol between supporters of the Ukrainian
Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate) and the entourage of Patriarch
Filaret of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kiev Patriarchate). Filaret
had come to Mariupol to consecrate a cross erected on the future site
of a Kiev Patriarchate church. Although initial press reports indicated
that Filaret was beaten severely and hospitalized, it later became
known that he had escaped with only very minor injuries. The
Patriarch's aide, Father Superior Dymytryi, and a local Kiev
Patriarchate priest, Father Volodymyr, were taken to the hospital with
concussions and minor injuries. Several members of the local Kiev
Patriarchate parish also were beaten and taken to the hospital. At a
press conference on May 6, Filaret showed videotape that confirmed much
of his version of the April 30 events. It showed a group of Filaret's
opponents pulling down a new cross installed at the construction site
of the new church. At the conference he accused Donetsk regional
authorities of complicity in the scuffle and of actively supporting the
Moscow Patriarchate.
Anti-Semitism exists on an individual and societal basis. However,
the central Government generally discouraged it. Some ultranationalist
groups and newspapers continued to publish and distribute anti-Semitic
tracts regularly. Anti-Semitic publications also are imported from
Russia and distributed without the necessary state license.
Presidential candidate Yuriy Karmazin, who according to polls was
supported by less than 1 percent of voters, complained during his
candidacy of ``Jewish control of the media.'' However, during the year
President Kuchma repeatedly and publicly spoke about the need for the
peaceful coexistence of ethnic and religious groups. Also during the
year, authorities opened a criminal case against the editor of the
Lviv-based newspaper Idealist for fomenting interethnic hatred.
Moreover, the Procuracy warned certain publications against publishing
anti-Semitic material. Early in the year, the Shimon Dubnov Ukrainian
Academy of Jewish History and Culture filed suit against the
nationalist newspaper Vechirniy Kiev for publishing anti-Semitic
diatribes about the Academy's collection of scholarly articles,
``Judeophobia Against Ukraine,'' which was published in 1998. The case
still was pending at year's end.
Anti-Semitic incidents continue to occur but, according to local
Jewish organizations, have declined in number over recent years and
were concentrated in western regions of the country.
During the year, there were no arrests made in the 1997 firebombing
of the Kharkiv Israeli cultural center, nor have there been any
prosecutions for the desecration of Jewish cemeteries in 1997.
There were occasional statements by Ukrainian Orthodox Church
officials (both Moscow and Kiev Patriarchates) denouncing the spread of
nonnative religions and sharply criticizing their missionary
activities. Evangelical Christian missionaries reported some instances
of societal discrimination against members of their churches, such as
salary cuts, layoffs, and public criticism for betraying ``native
religions''.
Native religious organizations, especially the Orthodox Church and
the Greek Catholic Church, pressured local and regional officials not
to register nonnative religious organizations or to allow them to rent
or purchase property. Both these denominations also reportedly
pressured officials to restrict the activities of the other (see
Section 2.c.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Frequent harassment of racial
minorities is a problem. Police officials routinely detain dark-skinned
persons for arbitrary document checks. In addition, there were
increased reports of racially motivated violence against persons of
African and Asian heritage. Representatives of these groups claimed
that police officials routinely ignored, and sometimes abetted,
violence against them.
Roma face considerable societal discrimination. Opinion polls have
shown that among all ethnic groups, the level of intolerance is highest
toward Roma. In the Transcarpathian region in particular, Roma continue
to be subject to violence and abuse by police (see Section 1.c.).
The Constitution provides for the ``free development, use, and
protection of the Russian language and other minority languages in
Ukraine.'' This compromise builds on a 1991 law on national minorities,
which played an instrumental role in preventing ethnic strife by
allowing individual citizens to use their respective national languages
in conducting personal business and by allowing minority groups to
establish their own schools. Nonetheless, some pro-Russian
organizations in eastern Ukraine complained about the increased use of
Ukrainian in schools and in the media. They claim that their children
are disadvantaged when taking academic entrance examinations, since all
applicants are required to take a Ukrainian language test.
In Crimea Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar minorities credibly complain
of discrimination by the Russian majority and demand that Ukrainian and
Tatar languages be given equal treatment to Russian. According to Tatar
leaders, unemployment is as high as 50 percent in their community. In
January the office of the Tatar Assembly Mejlis (the unofficial Tatar
parliament) was firebombed in Simferopol. No suspects were identified,
but Tatars blamed Russian chauvinists. On May 18, some 35,000 Tatars
demonstrated in Simferopol on the 55th anniversary of Stalin's
deportation of the Tatars to Central Asia for official recognition of
the Mejlis, Tatar representation in the Crimean parliament, and
official status for the Tatar language. That same day President Kuchma
created a presidential Tatar Advisory Committee that includes all
members of the Mejlis. Tatar protestors then erected a tent camp in
front of the Crimean government building. On May 24, the Tatars took
down their tents after Crimean prime minister Serhiy Kunitsyn agreed to
their demands for the creation of a council to represent Tatar
interests in the Crimean government, for the right of Tatars returning
from Central Asia to own land, and for the creation of Tatar schools.
While the Crimean government, pleading insufficient funds, did not
assent to requests from the Crimean Tatar community for assistance in
reestablishing its cultural heritage through Tatar language
publications and educational institutions, the central Government is
working with the UNHCR, OSCE, and the International Organization for
Migration on support for the Crimean Tatar community.
Of the 260,000 Crimean Tatars who have returned to the country from
exile in Central Asia, some 67,000 still lack citizenship. Crimean
Tatar leaders have complained that their community has not received
adequate assistance in resettling, and that the onerous process of
acquiring citizenship has excluded many of them from participating in
elections and from the right to take part in the privatization of land
and state assets (see Section 2.d.).
Romanians are calling for university-level instruction in Romanian
or the establishment of a Romanian technical college. There are 86
Romanian-language schools in the Chernivtsi oblast.
Rusyns (Ruthenians) are calling for status as an official ethnic
group in the country. At a congress held in Uzhhorod on June 27,
representatives of the Rusyn community called for Rusyn-language
schools, a Rusyn-language department at Uzhhorod University, and for
Rusyn to be included as one of the country's ethnic groups in the 2001
census. According to Rusyn leaders, more than 700,000 Rusyns live in
the country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to join trade unions to defend ``professional, social and
economic interests.'' Under the Constitution, all trade unions have
equal status, and no government permission is required to establish a
trade union. The 1992 Law on Citizens' Organizations (which includes
trade unions) stipulates noninterference by public authorities in the
activities of these organizations, which have the right to establish
and join federations on a voluntary basis. In principle all workers and
civil servants (including members of the armed forces) are free to form
unions. In practice the Government discourages certain categories of
workers, for example, nuclear power plant employees, from doing so. A
new trade union law designed to replace Soviet-era legislation was
adopted by Parliament and signed into law by the President in
September.
The successor to the Soviet trade unions, known as the Federation
of Trade Unions (FPU), has begun to work independently of the
Government and has been vocal in advocating workers' right to strike.
The FPU has supported the protests of miners and other professions over
unpaid wages. However, as during the Soviet era, most FPU affiliates
work closely with management. Following President Kuchma's 1998
appointment of the head of the FPU-affiliated coal miners' union to be
director of the national coal monopoly, the FPU ended support for
striking miners. Enterprise managers are free to join the FPU. In 1997
the FPU leadership created a political party, the All-Ukrainian Party
of Workers, which is virtually indistinguishable from the FPU.
Independent unions now provide an alternative to the official
unions in many sectors of the economy. The Independent Miners' Union of
Ukraine (NPGU), unions representing pilots, civil air traffic
controllers, locomotive engineers, aviation ground crews, and other
unions operate either independently or within one of three national
confederations. While exact membership is unknown, estimates for
independent union membership range from 100,000 to 300,000, while
estimates for FPU-affiliated unions range from 17 to 23 million
members. Independent unions have claimed unsuccessfully a share of the
former Soviet trade unions' huge property and funds, especially the
social insurance benefits fund, a Soviet-era legacy traditionally
controlled by the official unions.
Independent unions claimed that the new trade union law is more
restrictive than the old Soviet legislation. To acquire national
status, a union must have representation in more than half of the 14
regions of Kiev, or at one-third of the enterprises in a regionally
based sector, or have a majority of union members in the sector.
National status and registration confer the right to acquire space,
property, to maintain bank accounts, and to enter legally binding
agreements. These new requirements are likely to make it difficult for
miners and sailors to organize. Another contentious requirement is
mandatory registration by the Justice Ministry. Registration determines
participation of a union in the national collective bargaining
agreement with the Government, as well as membership on the Social
Insurance Fund Board (see Section 6.b.). Independent unions are
concerned that the Justice Ministry could deny registration to unions
seen as undesirable. Additionally, management no longer is obligated to
provide free accommodation and telephone lines to unions. However, the
law gives unions a say in labor safety and division of newly built
housing.
The Constitution provides for the right to strike ``to defend one's
economic and social interests.'' The Constitution states that strikes
must not jeopardize national security, public health, or the rights and
liberties of others. The law does not extend the right to strike to
members of the procuracy, judiciary, armed forces, security services,
law enforcement agencies, and public servants. However, a 1998 Law on
Labor Disputes Resolution extends the right to strike to employees of
``continuing process plants,'' for example, metallurgical factories,
provided that they give 15 days' advance notice of their intent to
strike. The law prohibits strikes that jeopardize life or health, the
environment, or that can hinder disaster, accident, or epidemic-related
operations.
The law does not prohibit specifically strikes based on political
demands. The law prohibits strikes based on demands to change the
constitutional order, state borders, or the administrative division of
the country, as well as on demands that infringe on human rights. The
Government has relied on the prosecutors and the courts to deal with
strikes that it considered illegal. The law does not extend the
immunity from discipline or dismissal to strikers who take part in
strikes that later are declared illegal by the courts. A union that
organizes an illegal strike is liable for strike-inflicted losses.
In February 500 nuclear plant workers camped in tents outside the
country's 5 nuclear power plants to protest their unpaid wages and to
demand that the Government allocate more money to the nuclear power
industry. At that point wage arrears for nuclear power plant employees
totaled $42 million (150 million hryvnia), according to an atomic
energy workers' union. The press reported on February 18 that six coal
miners protesting wage arrears cut their wrists as a suicide threat in
Lukansk oblast. In August the Independent Miners' Trade Union
threatened to suspend coal supplies starting in September unless the
Government began to pay back wages owed to miners. At that time some
2,000 coal miners were on strike in the Donetsk region and hundreds of
spouses and children of miners were protesting in Luhansk. Union
leaders reported that wage arrears to miners totaled more than $435
million (2 billion hryvnia) as of August.
There are no official restrictions on the right of unions to
affiliate with international trade union bodies. The NPGU is a member
of the Federation of Chemical, Energy, Mine, and General Workers'
Union.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Law on
Enterprises states that joint worker-management commissions should
resolve issues concerning wages, working conditions, and the rights and
duties of management at the enterprise level. Overlapping spheres of
responsibility frequently impede the collective bargaining process. The
Government, in agreement with trade unions, establishes wages in each
industrial sector and invites all unions to participate in the
negotiations. The Law on Labor Disputes Resolution, which came into
force in March 1998, provides for the establishment of an arbitration
service and a National Mediation and Reconciliation Service to mediate
labor disputes. However, these services have not yet been established.
The manner in which the collective bargaining law is applied
prejudices the bargaining process against the independent unions and
favors the official unions (affiliates of the FPU). Most workers never
are informed that they are not obligated to join the official union.
Renouncing membership in the official union and joining an independent
union can be bureaucratically onerous and typically is discouraged by
management. The collective bargaining law prohibits antiunion
discrimination. Under the law, disputes should be resolved by the
courts. There have been cases in which such disputes have not been
settled in a fair and equitable manner.
Under the new trade union law, an independent union also can be
removed easily from the collective bargaining process at the enterprise
level. Under the old law, if several unions at an enterprise failed to
agree on joint representation, the bigger union (i.e., the FPU)
represented labor in the bargaining process. The new law failed to
repair this grievance.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the Labor Code prohibit forced and compulsory labor, and it generally
is not known to occur; however, the country is a major source of girls
and women trafficked for sexual exploitation (see Section 6.f.). The
Government does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by
children; however, there were no reports of such practices, apart from
victims of traffickers. The country is an important source of girls and
women trafficked for sexual exploitation (see Section 6.f.).
Human rights groups described as compulsory labor the common use of
army conscripts and youths in the alternative service for refurbishing
and building private houses for army and government officials. In 1998
student groups protested against a presidential decree obliging college
and university graduates, whose studies have been paid for by the
Government, to work in the public sector at government-designated jobs
for 3 years or to repay fully the cost of their education. Students
described the decree as an anticonstitutional attempt to introduce
compulsory labor, as the Constitution provides for free choice of job
and one's agreement to work. The Government stated that the decree
would cover only students who entered higher education institutions in
1997 and thereafter. The extent of enforcement of the decree is
unknown. However, human rights groups reported complaints from medical
and law students that they had been forced to accept government-
assigned jobs for 3 years in repayment for the cost of their education
or not receive their diplomas.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum employment age is 17; however, in certain
nonhazardous industries enterprises may negotiate with the Government
to hire employees between 14 and 17 years of age, with the consent of
one parent. The Constitution provides for general secondary education.
School attendance is compulsory to the age of 15, a regulation
vigorously enforced by the Ministry of Education. However, since the
Soviet era the number of dropouts has increased significantly, mostly
because of rising poverty. The Criminal Code prescribes up to 5 years
in prison for involving children in criminal activities, drinking,
begging, prostitution, gambling, or other exploitation. The Government
does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but
there were no reports that it occurred, apart from victims of
traffickers (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The minimum monthly wage and
pension is about $16.37 (73.7 hryvnia), and the officially reported
average monthly wage is about $34.55 (155.5 hryvnia), which does not
provide a decent standard of living for a worker and family. Moreover,
millions of persons go unpaid for many months because of shrinking
budget revenue. As of October, the official poverty line is about
$26.30 (118.3 hryvnia) per month, which does not correspond to the real
subsistence level. It is estimated that some 50 percent of the
population officially lives below that line, although the practice of
underreporting sources of income is widespread. On September 17, the
Rada adopted a new minimum old age pension of $12.22 (55 hryvnia), but
the President vetoed it on October 1, stating that the budget could not
fund such pensions.
The Labor Code provides for a maximum 40-hour workweek, a 24-hour
period of rest per week, and at least 24-days of paid vacation per
year. Stagnation in some industries, for example, defense,
significantly reduced the workweek for some categories of workers.
The law contains occupational safety and health standards, but
these frequently are ignored in practice. Lax safety standards and
aging equipment caused many serious accidents, resulting in over 18,000
persons injured and 913 killed in work-related accidents during the
first half of the year. According to the Coal Mining Ministry, in the
first half of the year there were 12 major mine accidents in which
11,152 persons were injured. During the first 7 months of this year,
190 miners were killed in mining accidents. In theory workers have a
legal right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
jeopardizing continued employment. In reality, however, independent
trade unionists reported that asserting this right would result in
retaliation or perhaps dismissal by management.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The country is a major source country
of women and girls trafficked to Central and Western Europe and the
Middle East for sexual exploitation. The International Organization for
Migration estimated in 1998 that 100,000 citizens had been trafficked
abroad for this purpose since 1991. Italian officials estimate that at
least 30,000 Ukrainian women are employed in Italy; and between 1991
and 1997 Israeli authorities deported 1,500 Russian and Ukrainian women
who had been trafficked there. The Parliament passed an amendment to
the Criminal Code in April 1998 that imposes harsh penalties for--among
other offenses--trafficking in human beings, including for sexual
exploitation and pornography. Also, during the year the Government
established special police units to investigate trafficking crimes.
However, the effectiveness of these steps has not yet been established.
In June the Human Rights Ombudsman established a National Coordinating
Council for the Prevention of Trafficking in Human Beings. The
organization has yet to demonstrate its effectiveness. Trafficking is
becoming a higher priority for law enforcement agencies, but these
agencies often lack the financial and personnel resources to combat
well established criminal organizations that run trafficking
operations.
The authorities do not prosecute routinely men for engaging women
in the rapidly growing sector of sexually exploitative work. There were
several recent cases of criminal prosecution on such charges; however,
the sentences were not severe. In September two women were sentenced to
5-year suspended sentences and fined about $150 (680 hryvnia) for
trafficking women to brothels in the former Yugoslavia. A man in
Kherson was given a suspended sentence and a fine for engaging women in
prostitution in September. In March authorities in Sevastopol arrested
three individuals on suspicion of selling some 200 young women and
girls to be used as forced labor in night clubs or as prostitutes in
Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. In August police in the Netherlands
arrested a Ukrainian man along with three Dutch citizens for their role
in a major network trafficking in women.
The four were accused of forcing women from Eastern Europe and
countries of the former Soviet Union to work in sex clubs in the
southern part of the Netherlands. Some of the trafficked women were
from Ukraine, according to authorities.
NGO's claim that the local militia receives bribes in return for
ignoring this problem. Moreover, some reports alleged that local public
officials abetted or assisted organized criminal groups in trafficking
women abroad.
Women who are trafficked out of the country often are recruited by
firms operating abroad and subsequently are taken out of the country
with legal documentation. Once abroad the women find the work to be
very different from what was represented to them initially.
The Government, primarily due to lack of funds, is unable to assist
victims effectively. Some NGO's, such as the domestic NGO La Strada,
began offering some support services for victims of trafficking but
also suffered from a shortage of funds. With foreign assistance, three
regional trafficking prevention centers have been established in
Donetsk, Lviv, and Dnipropetrovsk. The centers offer job-skill
training, run telephone hot lines, and serve as referral centers for
health, legal, and psychological counseling. La Strada hotlines served
700 women from June 1998 through January.
In August authorities in the Netherlands arrested a Ukrainian
national and three Dutch nationals for trafficking women to sex clubs
in the southern Netherlands from Ukraine, Belarus, Poland, and Romania.
In September the Cabinet of Ministers adopted a national program
for the prevention of trafficking in women and children, involving 20
ministries, local governments, international organizations, donors, and
domestic and international NGO's. The program is to combat trafficking
as well as to assist victims. However, severe budget restraints may
limit the ability of the Government to implement the program
effectively. The Ombudsman made trafficking a priority (see Section 4).
The Ministry of Education approved a curriculum on trafficking
prevention and awareness in all high schools.
Public concern over the fate of children adopted by foreigners led
to a 1997 amendment to the adoption law, which provided for thorough
court examination of each case and follow-up monitoring of the
children's well-being. To curb illegal adoption, an April 1998
amendment to the Criminal Code prescribed up to 15 years' imprisonment
for trafficking in children and illegal adoption. However, there have
been no known successful cases of its application (see Section 5).
______
UNITED KINGDOM
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is a
longstanding constitutional monarchy with a democratic, parliamentary
government. A lower legislative chamber (the House of Commons), the
center of parliamentary power, is elected in periodic multiparty
elections. An upper chamber (the House of Lords), with the power to
revise and delay implementation of laws, is made up of hereditary and
life peers and senior clergy of the established Church of England. In
October, in the first stage of the Government's program to reform the
upper chamber, the House of Lords agreed to remove all but 92 of its
hereditary peers (life peers and clergy remain). The next step will be
based on the recommendations of a royal commission, which is expected
to issue its report in January 2000. There is an independent judiciary,
but Parliament may overrule its decisions through legislation.
Throughout the country, police forces are responsive to, and under
the effective control of, civilian officials. Since 1996 the
intelligence agency MI-5 has had the authority to act in support of
other law enforcement agencies in the prevention and detection of
serious domestic crime. The police force in Northern Ireland has had a
more complex and controversial role, due to the special and difficult
circumstances in the region with respect to law and order. In some
areas of Northern Ireland, because of the continuing threat of
violence, army units operate to reinforce the Northern Ireland police
force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). Some members of the police
force committed human rights abuses.
A highly developed, diversified, market-based economy provides most
residents with a high standard of living. Certain geographic areas,
particularly older industrial areas including parts of Northern
Ireland, suffer from higher than average unemployment rates. In
addition, unemployment tends to be higher among some demographic
groups, such as youth and racial minorities, and in Northern Ireland,
among Catholics. The government provides comprehensive social welfare
services, including a national health system, housing and family
benefits, and heavily subsidized higher education.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its
citizens; however, there were problems in some areas. The police
occasionally abused detainees. In February the inquiry into the death
of black teenager Stephen Lawrence released its report, concluding that
the investigation in the case--which led to the acquittal of five
suspected attackers--was marred by a combination of professional
incompetence and institutional racism by the London police. Prison
overcrowding remains a problem, and the number of prison suicides rose
to nearly a hundred. There are some limits on freedom of assembly and
association related to the security situation in Northern Ireland. The
Government continued to take steps to combat violence against women.
Societal discrimination against women, nonwhite minorities, and the
Traveller (nomadic) community are problems, as are child abuse and
occasional societal violence against minorities. The Government took
steps to improve worker rights.
In Northern Ireland, political parties participated in a review of
the Good Friday Agreement from September through November. Based on the
results of this review, the parties nominated candidates to an
Executive (Cabinet) for the elected Assembly on November 29, and
Parliament devolved power to the new Assembly and Executive on December
2. The power-sharing Executive included representatives from the four
major political parties (two unionist and two nationalist/republican),
although the two ministers from the conservative unionist Democratic
Unionist Party boycotted meetings, including the inaugural meeting of
the executive, because it included the republican Sinn Fein party. Part
of the review involved specifying procedures for the decommissioning of
paramilitary weapons under the aegis of the Independent International
Commission for Decommissioning (IICD). Although both the Provisional
Irish Republican Army and the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF) appointed
interlocutors to the IICD, by year's end, apart from the token weapons
handover by a loyalist splinter group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force
(LVF) in December 1998, none of the major paramilitary organizations
had verifiably decommissioned any weapons.
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (HRC) began operations
on March 1 and concentrated its efforts on internal organization.
Although human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) criticized
the new body's lack of investigative powers, the Human Rights
Commission received 114 applications for assistance and made an
additional 66 informal inquiries. The Northern Ireland Fair Employment
Commission, Equal Opportunities Commission, Commission for Racial
Equality, and Disability Council were amalgamated into the Equality
Commission in October. The Government's Northern Ireland Office
appointed 21 members to the Commission in August.
The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland
(commonly referred to as the Patten Commission after its chairman,
former Hong Kong Governor Chris Patten) called in its September report
for a ``new beginning'' to policing in Northern Ireland. Notable
recommendations include a reduction in the size of the force to a
little over one-half of its current strength of 13,500; a change in
name to the Police Service of Northern Ireland; a scheme to increase
recruitment of Catholics to the force; and the introduction of a
central Policing Board, which will include members from the political
parties that make up the Executive of the Northern Ireland Assembly.
The recommendations provoked strong criticism by the unionist
community.
A review of the structure, management, and funding of the criminal
justice system in Northern Ireland continued during the year. A report
from the Government originally was scheduled for release in October but
subsequently was postponed until early 2000. Nationalists, especially
republicans, criticized the delay.
In support of the Good Friday Agreement, the Government continued
during the year to release prisoners affiliated with paramilitary
organizations that maintain a cease-fire. As of Dceember, 310
paramilitary prisoners, including 157 republicans and 143 loyalists
(and 10 ``others'') were paroled under the 1998 Northern Ireland
(Sentences) Act, commonly referred to as the early release program. As
of July 31, there were 14,631 British troops in Northern Ireland, the
lowest level since the 1970's.
Several paramilitary dissident groups in Northern Ireland engaged
in acts of violence aimed at disrupting the peace process. However, the
majority of the violence in Northern Ireland resulted from republican
and loyalist paramilitary groups that continued to engage in
``punishment'' attacks on victims who lived in areas under their
influence. The Northern Ireland Office reported 73 shootings and 132
assaults in paramilitary style attacks during the year, compared with
72 shootings and 136 assaults recorded in 1998. Churches and religious
organizations in Northern Ireland, both Catholic and Protestant, were
the object of 72 sectarian attacks during the year.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
from:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings by the Government.
The Police Complaints Authority (PCA), an independent watchdog
organization, opened an inquiry into the death of Roger Sylvester, a
black man who died in January after being restrained by police officers
in north London under the Mental Health Act. He was taken to a hospital
for assessment and suffered respiratory failure. A post mortem exam did
not establish the cause of death.
In October the police in London shot and killed Henry Stanley while
he was walking home from a pub, when they mistook the table leg he was
carrying for a sawed-off shotgun. Stanley's family is campaigning for a
public inquiry into the incident instead of the internal police
investigation being conducted.
The Annual Report of the Police Complaints Authority reported that
deaths in police custody increased to 65 during the 12 months ending in
March 1999, compared with 53 during the same period the previous year.
The report states that 21 of the deaths occurred because of natural
causes, 26 were due to alcohol or drugs, and 18 were suicides. The PCA
supports the abolition of the offense of ``being drunk and incapable''
and recommends that drunks be dealt with by nurses and paramedics
rather than by the police. According to the Home Office, the number of
deaths in police custody in England and Wales during the calendar year
was 68; in Scotland it was 6.
There were a number of deaths in custody in prison due to suicide
and natural causes (see Section 1.c.).
In April a policemen was indicted for murder after the shooting
while on duty of James Ashley. Ashley, who was unarmed, was shot and
killed during a raid on his home in East Sussex in 1998.
In April the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) concluded that the
evidence was insufficient to prosecute the police officer who killed
IRA member Dairmuid O'Neill, who was shot in a 1996 police raid during
a counterterrorism operation in England.
In October 1997, a policemen was acquitted of the murder of unarmed
car thief David Ewin, whom he shot and killed at close range in 1995.
This was the officer's third trial since the incident in 1995: One
trial was aborted and the second jury was unable to agree on a verdict.
The three police officers charged with manslaughter in the death of
Richard O'Brien in 1994 were acquitted in July. An earlier inquest
found that O'Brien was killed unlawfully by asphyxiation when he died
following his arrest for being drunk and disorderly in 1994.
The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is assisting the
family of Jim McDonnell in pursuing a formal inquest into his death in
1996 in Northern Ireland's Maghaberry Prison. Fellow prisoners charged
that prison staff beat him.
In August a government inquiry by Judge Gerald Butler into the
handling of deaths in police custody highlighted failings of the Crown
Prosecution Service. The inquiry scrutinized the separate cases of
Shiji Lapite and Richard O'Brien, who both died in police custody after
being arrested in 1994. Butler recommended that all decisions
concerning death in custody cases should be made by a clearly
identified senior person; decisions not to prosecute should be sent for
reconsideration by senior Treasury counsel; and all cases be sent to
central casework, the CPS department that specializes in complex cases.
He urged the CPS to consider publishing its reasons when it decided not
to prosecute police officers. The NGO Inquest, which campaigns for
relatives of persons who die in custody, urged that a body completely
independent of the police be set up to investigate complaints involving
officers.
In 1998 the Government established a new judicial inquiry into the
events of January 30, 1972--``Bloody Sunday''--when 14 unarmed civil
rights demonstrators in Londonderry were killed by British soldiers,
but for which no member of the security forces ever was held
accountable. The inquiry gathered testimony and evidence from victims,
journalists, and government officials. However, controversy plagued the
inquiry's proceedings, particularly over the issue of anonymity for the
soldiers. The inquiry originally decided not to grant anonymity to
soldiers testifying unless they could show that they were at risk of
reprisal. However, a July 29 decision by the Court of Appeal upheld an
earlier divisional court ruling that granted soldiers anonymity in the
inquiry's proceedings. Preliminary hearings on procedural issues
commenced on September 27; the formal hearings are scheduled for April
2000.
In April in 3 bombings in London, 3 persons were killed and over
100 wounded. The attacks apparently were motivated by racism and
homophobia. On April 17, a nail bomb exploded in south London, injuring
over 30 persons at a busy street market in the ethnically diverse
Brixton neighborhood. A week later another nail bomb injured several
persons in the Brick Lane neighborhood of east London, which has a
large Bangladeshi population. On April 30, a third nail bomb detonated
in a central London gay bar, killing 3 persons and wounding over 70
more. The police stated that all three attacks were believed to be
linked and carried out by antiminority and homophobic rightwing
extremists. David Copeland, a 22-year-old white engineer, was arrested
on May 1 in a London suburb and subsequently charged with all three
bombings. The police discounted earlier claims of responsibility made
by two rightwing extremist groups, indicating that they believed that
Copeland acted alone. Copeland's trial was pending at year's end.
In February the inquiry into the 1993 death of black teenager
Stephen Lawrence released its report, concluding that the investigation
in the case--which led to the acquittal of five suspected attackers--
was marred by a combination of professional incompetence and
institutional racism by the London police (see Section 5).
Under the criteria of the 1998 Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act,
the Government determined that the five main paramilitary groups were
abiding by a cease-fire. The two major republican paramilitary groups
observing a cease-fire are the Provisional Irish Republican Army and
the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA). On the loyalist side, the
three groups maintaining a cease-fire include: The Ulster Defence
Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF), the Ulster Volunteer
Force (UVF), the Loyalist Volunteer Force. Despite the fact that these
groups are considered to maintain a cease-fire, killing and wounding by
both republican and loyalist groups in Northern Ireland continued. In
addition, republican and loyalist splinter groups continued terrorist
activities during the year.
The Provisional IRA was widely blamed for four deaths during the
year. On January 27, former IRA member turned informer Eamon Collins
was found dead near his house in Newry, County Armagh. Also in Newry,
two reputed drug dealers, Brendan ``Speedy'' Fegan, and Paul ``Bull''
Downey were found murdered on May 9 and June 13 respectively. A fourth
man, Charles Bennett, was found dead in West Belfast on July 30. While
the IRA never commented on these murders, media reports and the police
attributed the crimes to them.
Loyalist paramilitaries were blamed for the car bomb death of
lawyer Rosemary Nelson on March 15. Nelson, a lawyer known for taking
on high-profile civil rights cases, had claimed that as early as 1997
the RUC made death threats against her. Cognizant of the controversy
surrounding Nelson's case, within days of the murder the RUC invited
the detective chief constable of Kent to oversee the murder inquiry and
requested outside technical assistance. The RUC eventually appointed
the Deputy Chief Constable of Norfolk Colin Port to take overall
command of the investigation in April.
A week after Nelson's death, a leaked report from the Independent
Commission for Police Complaints (ICPC) about the RUC's own 1997
investigation into Nelson's claims raised doubts about the RUC's
impartiality. This report did not address the veracity of Nelson's
original claims of death threats by the RUC. However, it did judge that
the RUC's efforts to investigate those claims were inadequate. After
learning of the ICPC's objections to the RUC's initial handling of the
case in 1998, the chief constable of the RUC appointed an officer from
the Metropolitan Police to take over the investigation in August 1998.
The ICPC deemed this officer's subsequent investigation satisfactory
and forwarded it to the director of public prosecutions. However, the
appointment has not satisfied many nationalists, nor some outside
groups.
The RUC's central role in the murder inquiry and the circumstances
surrounding Nelson's death prompted calls from the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, the European
Parliament, nationalist politicians, human rights groups, and the
Northern Ireland Law Society for an independent inquiry into Nelson's
murder. To date no arrests have been made.
Although no group claimed responsibility, dissident loyalists were
blamed for the shooting death of loyalist Frankie Curry on March 17 in
the Shankill area of Belfast, as well as the pipe bomb murder of
Portadown resident Elizabeth O'Neill on June 5.
A total of 24 arrests were made in Ireland and Northern Ireland
during 1999 in connection with the 1998 bombing in Omagh that killed 29
persons--for which the Real IRA claimed responsibility--but only one
person was charged with involvement in the bombing.
Some unionist politicians and many human rights groups continue to
call for an independent investigation into the December 1997 murder of
Billy ``King Rat'' Wright, leader of the LVF, in the high security Maze
Prison by members of the INLA. Wright's father insists that the murder
``was state orchestrated and state sanctioned.'' The facts of the
murder call into question the prison's security standards: the killers
were housed in a separate wing of the prison but still were able to
enter the area where Wright was incarcerated. The perpetrators had
weapons smuggled to them and specific knowledge of Wright's movements.
In March the suspect arrested for the 1997 murder of Robert Hamill
in Portadown was acquitted for the killing but found guilty of a minor
offense. Hamill's case received widespread attention because four RUC
officers in a nearby vehicle did not act while Hamill was beaten to
death by a mob. The trial judge expressed concerns about the inaction
of the police but concluded that their early intervention could not
have saved Hamill. Human rights groups argue that the RUC had
intervened successfully in similar circumstances in the past. Moreover,
they charge that the RUC's failure to intervene made identification and
thus prosecution of the murderers more difficult.
In June the RUC arrested William Stobie for involvement in the 1989
murder of Patrick Finucane, a respected legal counsel. The arrest was a
result of the third round of independent investigations by the Deputy
Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, John Stevens. In March the RUC
chief constable had invited Stevens to initiate another investigation
as a result of information about allegations of security force
collusion in Finucane's murder originally presented to the Northern
Ireland Office by a human rights organization. Human rights
organizations are concerned that Stevens's two previous inquiries were
not made public and continue to call for an investigation of evidence
that they say supports charges of collusion in Finucane's murder
between government officials and loyalist paramilitary groups.
During his June court appearance, Stobie claimed that at the time
of Finucane's death, he was an RUC informant and had warned the police
of a ``hit'' by the UDA, although it is unclear whether or not he knew
Finucane was the target. Stobie already was arrested once in 1991 on a
weapons charge for which he was acquitted subsequently. Three other
persons were arrested during the current inquiry, two of whom were
released without charge, while the third was charged with minor
offenses.
In September the family of Peter McBride won a judicial review
against the British Army board that allowed Scots Guards Jim Fisher and
Mark Wright to rejoin their regiment. Fisher and Wright were convicted
for the 1992 murder of Peter Mcbride and released from incarceration to
rejoin their regiment in 1998. Because of the ruling, the British Army
board now has to reconsider its decision to reinstate the soldiers.
Coroners do not have the power to compel those suspected of
involvement in extrajudicial killing to testify at inquests, and
relatives of the deceased receive no advance disclosure of evidence. In
Northern Ireland, coroners by law are permitted to inquire only into
``how''--that is ``by what means''--the deceased died, rather than into
the broad circumstances of death. Human rights groups argue that this
narrow definition shields wrongdoers, including soldiers and police
officers, and unnecessarily keeps family members from learning the
truth of the circumstances regarding their relative's death.
During the year, information provided by the IRA led to the
discovery of the bodies of three persons who disappeared in the 1970's
(see Section 1.b.).
In July following the earlier agreement to convene a Scottish court
in The Hague to try the Lockerbie bombing suspects, the Libyan
Government accepted responsibility for the 1984 death of policewoman
Yvonne Fletcher. Fletcher was killed by gunfire from inside the Libyan
People's Bureau in London as she policed a demonstration outside the
building. The Libyan Government paid compensation to Fletcher's family
in November.
In April Nazi war criminal Anthony Sawoniuk, age 78, was found
guilty of murdering 18 Jews in 1942 in Domachevo, Belarus, and was
given 2 life sentences. He was the first man to be prosecuted
successfully under 1991 war crimes legislation.
Former Chilean President Augusto Pinochet remained under house
arrest. Spanish Judge Baltazar Garzon sought to extradite and try
Pinochet for his involvement in the disappearance or torture of 600
Spaniards under Chilean and Argentinian dictatorships in the 1970's and
1980's. In March the Law Lords, the highest court, decided that
Pinochet did not enjoy immunity from charges of international crimes of
torture and conspiracy to torture committed after December 8, 1988,
when the international torture convention became binding on Spain, the
United Kingdom, and Chile. Pinochet's extradition hearing then began in
September, and on October 8 a magistrate ruled that Pinochet could be
extradited to Spain to stand trial on 35 charges of torture and
conspiracy to torture. Pinochet appealed the magistrate's decision. In
October the Chilean Government requested that the UK Government allow
Pinochet to return to Chile because of his age and poor health. In
response UK Home Secretary Jack Straw ordered an independent medical
examination of Pinochet, which was pending, along with Pinochet's legal
appeal, at year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The Commission for the Location of Victims' Remains was established
jointly by the British and Irish Governments in May for the purpose of
facilitating the location of remains of victims of paramilitary
violence. The commission obtained information from the IRA that led to
the discovery in the Republic of Ireland of the remains of three
persons (Eamon Molloy, Brian Mckinney, and John McClory) who
disappeared in the mid-1970's. Information on the location of other
remains proved inaccurate, and in September the commission decided to
``pause'' searches for an additional 12 known persons who had
disappeared to allow the IRA to ``re-examine'' possible sites.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law forbids torture and other cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment; however, police occasionally abused detainees.
Human rights organizations report that such abuse, while not
widespread, is a matter of serious concern. The NGO Inquest states that
injuries and illnesses result more often from neglect or misdiagnosis
than from physical attack, although incidents of police brutality have
occurred (see Sections 1.a. and 5). Detainees who claim physical
mistreatment have the right to an immediate medical examination. A
trial judge must examine such a claim. Confessions obtained by abusive
treatment are not admissible in court, and judges can exclude even
voluntary confessions. However, human rights organizations claim that
confessions obtained by abusive treatment regularly are found
admissible in the Diplock courts in Northern Ireland.
Complaints of sexual harassment and some criminal conduct within
the London Metropolitan Police Service continued. Fewer than a hundred
cases are under investigation, and police officials remain committed to
rooting out abusive treatment and corruption.
Although originally intended to replace the Independent Commission
for Police Complaints as early as 1998, the Police ombudsman-designate
was not appointed by the Northern Ireland Office until October and is
not to assume authority over complaints against the police until
September 2000. The police ombudsman is to investigate independently
complaints in Northern Ireland filed against the police or referred to
him by the RUC chief constable, the Police Authority of Northern
Ireland, or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. The ombudsman
is to supervise automatically cases involving death or serious injury
and may direct the chief constable and the Director of Public
Prosecutions to bring charges against police officers.
Unlike the ICPC, which must rely on the Complaints and Discipline
Branch of the RUC to provide investigators, the ombudsman is to recruit
an independent investigative staff.
The ICPC reported that it received 2,301 complaints during the
year. Of the 2,774 cases it completed during the year, 6 percent led to
informal disciplinary action or formal criminal charges.
In a series of public and private meetings throughout Northern
Ireland, The Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland
(the Patten Commission) gathered testimony in order to evaluate the
future of policing structures and arrangements in Northern Ireland. The
Commission's goal was to recommend proposals that would ensure that the
police service in Northern Ireland enjoys widespread support from the
community as a whole. Both sides of the community generally recognized
the qualifications of the members of the commission. The Commission
published its recommendations on September 9. It calls for the RUC to
be depoliticized and includes restoring some measure of local control
of the police, increasing the number of Catholic officers (who now make
up only 8 percent of the force), and significantly reducing the size of
the force. Unionists reacted negatively to the prospect of substantive
changes to the RUC, and many were particularly critical of Patten's
recommendation to change the name and symbols of the force. On the
other hand, human rights groups, while applauding his human rights-
based approach, pointed out that no mechanism was included in Patten's
recommendations that would hold accountable any serving RUC officers
who might have committed human rights abuses.
The independent assessor of military complaints continued
coordinating investigations into complaints of abuses committed by the
army. During the year, 31 formal and 541 informal complaints were
received, primarily for harassment or abuse. In his 1998 annual report,
the independent assessor expressed concern that neither he nor the new
police ombudsman had oversight over complaints about soldiers arresting
terrorist suspects independently from the police.
The independent commissioner for holding centers in Northern
Ireland made irregular, unannounced visits to holding centers in order
to observe interrogations and interview detainees. There were over 190
visits to the Northern Ireland's 3 holding centers during the year by
the commissioner and his deputy, compared with 176 each in 1998 and
1997. The number of complaints, generally for verbal harassment or
``technical assault,'' dropped substantially.
The police in Northern Ireland continued to use plastic bullets to
quell civil disturbances. However, given the relative quiescence of the
summer marching season (see Section 2.d.), their actual use was
negligible. The RUC reported that only 1 plastic bullet was fired
during the first 2 weeks of July, compared with 837 in the same period
in 1998 and 2,510 in 1997. The RUC reported that an additional five
plastic bullets were fired at members of a crowd throwing firebombs at
police patrols in Lurgan on August 14. In total the security forces
fired 111 plastic bullets during the year, compared with 1,299 in 1998.
According to RUC rules, plastic bullets should be aimed below the rib
cage; nevertheless, medical studies confirmed that serious head and
upper body injuries have resulted from plastic bullet use in the past.
Plastic bullet use in Northern Ireland is criticized severely by
human rights monitors, although the European Court of Human Rights
ruled in 1984 that using them to quell serious riots did not contravene
the European Convention on Human Rights. The U.N. Committee Against
Torture, the European Parliament, Human Rights Watch, and other NGO's
have called for a ban on their use. The Government considered
alternatives but stated that most options were found to be either more
dangerous or inaccurate. In July the Home Secretary approved guidelines
recommended by the Association of Police Officers on the use of plastic
bullets in public order situations. The guidelines did not eliminate
the use of plastic bullets; but in a change from past practice in
Northern Ireland where the RUC was permitted to use plastic bullets to
defend property, preserve the peace, or prevent or detect crime, the
new guidelines specified that plastic bullets were to be used only in
cases of serious risk to life or injury. After conducting its own
investigation, the Patten Commission also did not recommend the banning
of plastic bullet use, although it encouraged the use of alternative
crowd control measures.
Human rights activists continued to call for the closure of all
holding centers, including the Castlereagh Holding Center, because of
persistent complaints of police impropriety in the interrogation
process. (The independent commissioner for holding centers for Northern
Ireland also has recommended the closing of the Castlereagh Holding
Center because of the facility's poor physical state.) In January audio
recording equipment was introduced to supplement the video recording
equipment installed in 1998 for use during interrogation sessions in
all three Northern Ireland holding centers. Human rights groups have
criticized the fact that the video and audio recordings are not
produced through one synchronized system and therefore have diminished
value in verifying the content of a given interrogation session. In
December the RUC announced the closure of the Castlereagh Holding
Center effective at year's end. Both the Gough and Strand Road Holding
Centers remained open.
In August the Director of Public Prosecutions decided not to bring
charges against any RUC officers involved in the case of David Adams,
who was assaulted during his arrest and initial incarceration at the
Castlereagh interrogation center in 1994. Adams later was sentenced to
25 years for conspiracy to murder. In 1998 a Belfast court awarded
Adams $48,000 (30,000 pounds) for exemplary damages. Following this
court decision, an independent inquiry into Adams's treatment was
initiated by the assistant chief constable of Strathclyde. On the basis
of this report, the DPP declined to pursue charges against any of the
officers involved.
The police harassed Travellers and members of other minorities. In
February black motorist Carl Josephs lost his suit against the West
Midlands police for harassment. He was stopped 34 times in 2 years
while driving. The jury found against him on the charge that officers
had conspired against him, but he was awarded $2,600 (1,000 pounds) in
damages for unlawful arrest. In April the Home Secretary ordered the
police to recruit 8,000 officers from ethnic minorities within 10
years. A December report by an academic researcher that was
commissioned by the London Metropolitan Police revealed that Asians (in
the UK the term usually refers to south Asians, mostly Indians and
Pakistanis) are more likely to stopped and searched for drugs than
whites or blacks. The report warned that the police risk alienating a
generation of young Asians by misusing their stop and search powers.
Through June 30, the armed forces registered a total of 61 internal
harassment complaints. This number represents a significant decrease
over past years. Of these 32 were for sexual harassment, 14 for racial
harassment, and 15 for bullying or other harassment. A complaint
procedure was implemented fully in 1997. Service personnel also have
the right to submit complaints to employment tribunals. In March 1998
the services entered into a 5-year partnership agreement with the
Commission on Racial Equality (CRE) to promote racial equality
practices.
Both loyalist and republican paramilitary groups in Northern
Ireland continued to intimidate or carry out ``punishment'' attacks on
victims who lived in areas under paramilitary influence. The attacks
often were carried out to settle scores within paramilitary groups and
often, but not exclusively, targeted members who broke ranks. Such
orders of expulsion and vigilante attacks also were targeted against
those who engaged in so-called antisocial activities, such as drug
dealing and carjacking. Paramilitary groups used these methods to
maintain or extend their control and influence in their respective
communities. The attackers beat their victims with iron pipes, baseball
bats, sledgehammers, and spiked clubs and shot victims in the knees and
legs. During the year, the RUC recorded a total of 206 casualties as a
result of paramilitary style attacks. This includes 73 shootings (47
loyalist, 26 republican) and 132 assaults (91 loyalist, 42 republican).
Human rights groups say that these figures underreport the true number
of casualties because many of the victims feel too intimidated to
report paramilitary punishment attacks.
Prison conditions generally met minimum international standards. In
the chief inspector of prisons' annual report, published in April,
overcrowding, the poor quality of local prisons, and prison maintenance
were identified as continuing problems despite an increase in
resources. The prison population in England and Wales decreased in July
by 1.2 percent over the same period the previous year. The home
detention curfew program, administered by the electronic monitoring
unit of the Home Office, began operations on January 28, and as of
August 11, 8,794 offenders availed themselves of it. The program is
considered a success by the Prison Service, with fewer than 5 percent
of offenders recalled to prison.
The Prison Service reported 148 deaths of prisoners in England and
Wales during the year, compared with 131 such deaths in 1998. Of these
deaths, 91 were self-inflicted (83 in 1998) and 57 were due to natural
causes (45 in 1998). The Scottish Prison Service reported 21 deaths in
custody in 1999: 12 suicides and 9 from natural causes. The Prison
Service implemented policy changes in an attempt to curb the number of
prisoner suicides and continues to develop suicide prevention
strategies. The NGO Prison Reform Trust endorsed the measures taken by
the Prison Service.
Human rights groups have been particularly critical of special
security units (SSU's), which are used to hold prisoners deemed to pose
an exceptional risk of escape. Citing small group isolation, the lack
of adequate exercise, work, educational opportunities, and natural
daylight, as well as strict enforcement of noncontact visits through a
glass barrier, human rights groups have condemned SSU imprisonment as
violating international standards. A 1996 government inquiry concluded
that prolonged incarceration could lead to mental illness. The
Government took steps during the year to address these concerns.
According to the Prison Service, inmates in SSU'S now are provided with
details of their cases and security category. Regular health checks
have not revealed deterioration in the health of these prisoners. Once
a prisoner is no longer classed as an ``exceptional risk,'' he is moved
out of the SSU. According to the NGO Prison Reform Trust, while in
theory prolonged incarceration could lead to mental illness, there were
no current cases in which this had occurred. At year's end, nine
prisoners remained in SSU's; none was imprisoned for Northern Ireland
terrorist-related crimes.
Separate and distinct prison regimes exist for Northern Ireland and
Scotland, administered through the Northern Ireland office and the
Scottish Office.
The number of female prisoners continued to rise. According to an
August Home Office report, women now commit 20 percent of all crime,
and the number of women sent to prison doubled in the past 6 years. The
Women's Policy Group of the Prison Service undertook a special review
of the needs of mothers in prison and published its findings in July.
Its lengthy list of recommendations was based on the premise that a
mother and baby unit in prison would allow the mother-baby relationship
to develop while safeguarding and promoting the child's welfare. In
December the Prison Service announced that it was accepting the
majority of the recommendations in full, resulting in new procedures
governing admission to the units and published standards for their
management. These changes are to come into effect in early 2000.
Faced with a large increase in the number of asylum seekers, the
Government housed approximately half of immigration detainees in
regular prisons, where they normally are held separately from convicted
prisoners and prisoners awaiting trial. According to human rights
groups, 28 regular prisons house some immigration detainees. The chief
inspector for prisons for England and Wales repeatedly has called upon
the Home Office to establish specific guidelines for the treatment of
asylum seekers in detention centers and prisons, as no such guidelines
currently exist. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and
other groups cite a lack of specialized skills among regular prison
officials in dealing with immigration detainees. The UNHCR regularly
visits detention centers and has excellent relations with the
Government and detention center officials; however, it criticizes the
Government's ``expectation of noncompliance'' by asylum seekers.
The Prison Service stated that three prisoners were convicted in
May of offenses related to the situation in Northern Ireland. The
requests by all three for repatriation to the Republic of Ireland are
under consideration. Since the prisoners committed their offenses after
the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, they are not covered by its
provisions for the early release of prisoners.
The Government permits human rights monitors to visit prisons and
immigration detention centers.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The authorities can and
often do make arrests or detain suspects without judicial warrants,
especially in Northern Ireland, when they believe that they have
reasonable cause to suspect wrongdoing. The 1994 Criminal Justice and
Public Order Act allows police officers to stop and search vehicles and
pedestrians if a police officer of at least superintendent rank (or a
chief inspector if no superintendent is available) ``reasonably
believes'' it is expedient to do so to prevent acts of violence. The
authorization is limited to a 24-hour period but is renewable under
certain circumstances.
The 1991 Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act (EPA) permits a
soldier on duty, a member of the Royal Irish Regiment, or a police
officer to arrest and detain for up to 4 hours ``a person who he has
reasonable grounds to suspect is committing or is about to commit any
offense.'' Provisions for indefinite internment without trial were
eliminated in the 1998 reauthorization of the EPA.
The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act (PTA) allows
the police to arrest without a warrant anywhere in the country persons
they have reason to suspect of being involved in terrorism. The
authorities may detain such persons (even those under the age of 18)
for up to 48 hours without legal representation or judicial review.
Suspects may be interrogated during this time, and confessions obtained
may be used in subsequent court proceedings. Under the PTA, detainees
are granted the right to have lawyers present during interrogation in
England or Wales, but not in Northern Ireland. Detention without charge
may be extended up to a further 5 days on the authority of the Home
Secretary, or in Northern Ireland, the Secretary of State for Northern
Ireland. Extensive PTA detention powers were held in breach of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which led to a derogation by the
government in 1988 (see Section 1.e.).
The PTA is the most reviewed piece of legislation in the United
Kingdom. It expires every 2 years and, due to the changing security
situation, is amended or altered to account for those changes.
Nevertheless, critics charge that the annual review is superficial and
insist that the PTA should be repealed. In November the Government
introduced a new Prevention of Terrorism Bill intended to replace the
PTA and Northern Ireland emergency laws. It covers foreign-based as
well as domestic groups and introduces a new and wider definition of
terrorism that was criticized by some for being too broad. Debate on
the bill is to continue in 2000.
In England, Scotland, and Wales suspects arrested without warrants
must be released within 24 hours (or 36 hours if a serious offense is
involved) unless brought before a magistrates' court or arrested under
PTA provisions. The court may authorize extension of detention by 36
hours and on further application by another 24 hours, versus the 48-
hour scheme extant in Northern Ireland (see Section 1.e.).
Defendants awaiting trial have a statutory right to bail unless
there is a risk that they would abscond, commit an offense, interfere
with witnesses, or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, or unless
they were on bail when the alleged offense was committed. Defendants
who are remanded in custody are protected by statutory custody time
limits, which restrict the period for which they can be held while
awaiting trial to a maximum of 182 days, unless the court grants an
extension. At year's end, 24,622 defendants were awaiting trial, of
whom 5,882 were in custody. Of those in custody, 4,973 had been
awaiting trial for less than 24 weeks, while 188 had been waiting
longer than 48 weeks. Fewer defendants were awaiting trial and fewer of
those were in custody compared with 1998; the breakdown by time
awaiting trial was virtually identical. The 1998 Crime and Disorder Act
includes measures to reduce delays in criminal proceedings by
introducing procedural reforms and further limiting the time allowed
for the prosecution of cases.
The law gives administrative detention power to immigration
officers. There is no time limit to such detention and no right to have
it reviewed by a court. At any given time, approximately 750 asylum
seekers are detained (less than 1 percent of all asylum seekers). They
are detained either in immigration detention centers or in regular
prisons (where they are normally held separately from convicted
prisoners and those awaiting trial). Occasionally they are held in
police cells, if for no more than 48 hours and pending removal from the
country or transfer to another accommodation (see Section 1.c.). At the
end of June, 680 asylum detainees were being held.
Approximately 16 percent of them had been held continuously for
less than 1 month, 38 percent for 2 to 6 months, 23 percent for 6 to 12
months, and 7 percent for more than 12 months. Unlike those accused of
criminal offenses, asylum seekers are given no written statement about
why they were detained, although the practice is to provide them with
updates on the status of their claims and the time required for their
adjudication. Asylum seekers do not have an automatic right to apply
for bail, and bail application, which can be made to immigration
appellate authorities, requires a relatively high level of surety. The
Home Office states that detention is used only where there are good
grounds to anticipate noncompliance with the terms of temporary
admission and that the practice affects less than 1 percent of asylum
seekers at any given time.
The Government does not use exile (also see Section 2.d.).
Paramilitary organizations in Northern Ireland continued to
threaten individuals and families to compel them to leave the province.
It is difficult to get an accurate count of those who have left
Northern Ireland under threat from a paramilitary group. Estimates of
the number of people who fled into exile since the signing of the Good
Friday Agreement range as high as 800. A local NGO that assists many of
those under threat reported 314 cases through June. Of those cases, 71
left the immediate area of threat, 38 left their city of residence, and
29 left Northern Ireland. In 80 cases, further investigation revealed
that no threat existed, and in 17 cases intervention by the agency
lifted the threat. Over half of these persons were over the age of 25,
and most were unemployed.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent and
provides citizens with a generally fair and efficient judicial process.
There are several levels of courts. The vast majority of criminal
cases are heard by magistrates' courts, which are managed by locally
based committees. Their decisions may be appealed to the Crown Court,
which also hears criminal cases requiring a jury trial, or to the High
Court. Crown Court convictions may be appealed to the Court of Appeal,
which may in turn refer cases involving points of law to the House of
Lords. The Appellate Committee of the House of Lords (which consists of
senior judges and is functionally distinct from the legislative arm) is
the final court of appeal. The Criminal Cases Review Commission (CCRC)
operates as an additional appellate body to investigate suspected
miscarriages of justice in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland. It
considers cases after the judicial appeals process is exhausted and
where there is significant new evidence that casts doubt on the
conviction. In Scotland similar appeals may be made to the Scottish
Office.
The law provides for a fair trial, and the authorities respect and
enforce the law in this regard. Defendants enjoy a presumption of
innocence until proven guilty, the right to question witnesses against
them, and the right to appeal to successively higher courts.
The 1998 Human Rights Act is to take effect in October 2000,
bringing the European Convention on Human Rights into British law (see
Section 4). Under this law all public bodies must act in a manner
compatible with the convention. The law provides citizens with the
right to take alleged violations of the convention into British courts.
The United Kingdom derogated from Article 5(3) of the convention,
dealing with prompt resolution of a case after arrest or detention.
NGO's criticize the derogation, which also applies to the Human Rights
Act.
To date no one in Northern Ireland has been arrested or detained
under the 1998 Criminal Justice (Terrorism and Conspiracy) Act. Under
this legislation, the testimony of a senior police officer is
considered prima facie evidence of a suspect's membership in a
proscribed terrorist organization. The act also criminalizes a
conspiracy in the United Kingdom to commit terrorist acts outside the
country. The act also allows for the seizure of property of a person
convicted of membership offenses under the act, if used in furtherance
of the activities of the organization. Human rights organizations
express concern that the act violates certain fundamental rights, such
as the right to silence and the rights to freedom of expression and
association.
Under the 1994 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, judges have
the power to instruct juries that they may draw an inference of guilt
from a defendant's refusal to answer questions during interrogation or
trial, although no conviction can be based solely on such an inference.
Human rights groups and the U.N. Human Rights Committee sharply
criticize this provision, which they consider an abrogation of the
right against self-incrimination. A similar provision is in effect in
Northern Ireland. Based on a 1996 European Court of Human Rights
judgment, the 1999 Criminal Evidence (Nothern Ireland) Order codifies
guidelines issued by the Attorney General that prohibited the drawing
of inference from silence when a suspect is questioned before being
permitted access to an attorney.
Indigent defenders have the right to free counsel of their choice,
with some exceptions. Criminal proceedings must be held in public
except those in juvenile court and those involving public decency or
security. In a trial under the Official Secrets Act, the judge may
order the court closed, but sentencing must be public.
In Northern Ireland, special ``emergency'' restrictions affect due
process. Under the 1991 Northern Ireland Emergency Provisions Act
(EPA), trials for certain terrorist-related offenses are tried
automatically in ``Diplock courts'' without a jury unless they
specifically are ``scheduled out'' to ordinary jury courts. Diplock
courts were established to avoid cases being heard by juries that might
make decisions along sectarian lines, as well as to protect jurors from
intimidation by terrorists. If judges decide to convict, they must
justify the decision in a document that becomes part of the court
record. An appellate court may overturn the decision on either factual
or legal grounds. Through March 25 persons had been tried in Diplock
courts; 23 persons either pled or were found guilty. The Diplock courts
have been widely criticized by human rights groups, as well as various
U.N. committees. The 1998 EPA increased the number of scheduled
offenses that may be assigned at the Attorney General's discretion, for
trial by jury. This was expected to reduce the number of cases
considered by Diplock courts, but given the overall decrease in the
incidence of offenses, it is difficult to assess the impact of this
change.
The EPA does not exclude the use of uncorroborated confessions,
which in Northern Ireland may, and have been, used as the sole basis
for conviction. Additionally, the EPA permits the police to prevent any
suspected terrorist from contacting legal counsel for up to 48 hours
after arrest under certain circumstances, at the request of a police
officer with the minimum rank of superintendent. After a detainee has
asked to see a lawyer and has done so, this period is renewable in
subsequent 48-hour periods until the detainee is charged or released.
Human rights groups have criticized these provisions, arguing that a
detainee is most likely to need counsel in the first few hours; lack of
counsel during that time makes false or coerced confessions and the
abuse of detainees more likely. According to the Northern Ireland
Office, through September, 270 requests for access to lawyers were
made, 19 of which were delayed.
The 1996 Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act reduced defense
lawyer's access to potential evidence held by the prosecution,
including information as to how the evidence was collected. According
to the Committee on the Administration of Justice, a local NGO, this
practice may be contrary to U.N. guidelines on the role of prosecutors.
Lawyers' groups in Northern Ireland and elsewhere expressed serious
concern about threats of death and serious physical injury directed
against defense lawyers by prison guards, relayed to them by their
prisoner clients. Solicitors continue to lodge complaints against the
RUC but say that little is done to address their complaints.
In January the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Independence of
Lawyers and Judges issued a followup to his 1998 report, calling upon
the Government to conduct an independent and impartial investigation
into the murder of solicitor Patrick Finucane. The U.N. Special
Rapporteur also accused the RUC of ``complete indifference'' to
allegations of lawyer harassment and reiterated his conclusion that
there was prima facie evidence of military or RUC collusion in
Finucane's murder (see Section 1.a.). In his January report to the U.N.
Human Rights Commission, the U.N. Special Rapporteur expressed concerns
about the RUC's impartiality in investigating Rosemary Nelson's murder
and further stressed his recommendation for an independent inquiry into
Patrick Finucane's murder.
His previous 1998 report recommended that the government conduct
independent and impartial investigations of all threats to legal
counsel and, where there is a specific physical threat, that it provide
the necessary protection, investigate the threat and bring the guilty
party to justice. The Special Rapporteur also recommended that lawyers
lodge formal complaints and that the RUC organize training seminars for
police officers. Also according to the Special Rapporteur, the Bar
Council and the Law Society should be more vocal in their defense of
solicitors subject to harassment and intimidation and begin a dialog
with the RUC on how best to address the problem.
In response to the U.N. Special Rapporteur's report, the chief
constable denied that the RUC was indifferent to the allegations of
collusion. Upon receipt of the complaints mentioned in the report, he
said that he approached the Law Society of Northern Ireland to open a
channel of communication.
A review of the structure, management, and funding of the criminal
justice system in Northern Ireland continued through the year. A report
from the Government was scheduled for release in October but was
postponed until early 2000
In support of the Good Friday Agreement, the Government continued
during the year to release prisoners affiliated with paramilitary
organizations that maintain a cease-fire. As of September, 292
paramilitary prisoners, including 149 republicans and 133 loyalists
(and 10 ``others'') were paroled under the 1998 Northern Ireland
(Sentences) Act, commonly referred to as the early release program. As
of July 31, there were 14,631 British troops in Northern Ireland, the
lowest level since the 1970's.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Warrants normally are required for a police search of
private premises; however, under the 1991 EPA members of the armed
forces or the police in Northern Ireland may enter and search ``any
premises for the purpose of arresting a person for an arrestable
offense, but only if he or she has reasonable grounds for believing
that the person being sought is on the premises.'' The Northern Ireland
courts have interpreted the requirement for ``reasonable'' grounds
broadly. The government compensates persons whose houses or property
have been damaged during house searches.
The fear of intercommunal violence has, over the years, led to a
pattern of increasingly segregated communities in Northern Ireland.
Protestant and Catholic families have moved away from mixed or border
neighborhoods. This pattern continued despite the Good Friday
Agreement's approval in referenda.
In Northern Ireland, although paramilitary attacks on the homes and
families of police and politicians decreased significantly, the
security forces believe that paramilitary groups continue to conduct
surveillance and target police and politicians.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Strongly held common-law
tradition, an independent press, and a democratic political system
combine to secure freedom of speech and of the press. Viewpoints
critical of the government are well represented. The print media are
dominated by a handful of national daily newspapers, all privately
owned and independent (although often generally aligned with a
political party). About half the electronic media are run by the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which is funded by the
government but enjoys complete editorial independence. Corporations
under renewable government license run the remainder.
In April a leading BBC television personality, Jill Dando, was shot
and killed in London. Dando anchored a program that helped track down
leading criminals.
In April the Independent Television Commission, which regulates
broadcasters, permanently revoked the license of MED-TV, a pro-Kurdish
station that broadcast programs ``which included inflammatory
statements encouraging acts of violence in Turkey and elsewhere,''
according to the Commission.
Press organizations and human rights groups continued to criticize
the 1981 Contempt of Court Act, which allows courts to order a
journalist to disclose a source if it is deemed to be in the interests
of justice. The 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act also contains
provisions that compel journalists to give evidence in cases where
police can prove it is necessary to their investigation. The Official
Secrets Act, another law cited by journalists as unduly restrictive,
prohibits the defense that the information is already in the public
domain or that its publication is in the public interest.
A 1997 White Paper (a proposed policy paper drafted in preparation
for legislation) on freedom of information asserted that the Government
would introduce legislation that would allow widespread public access
to official information and documents, require public organizations to
regularly publicize data, and improve individual access to personal
information. In May the Government published its draft freedom of
information bill.
Members of Parliament, NGO's, the press, and campaigners for
freedom of information widely criticized the bill, primarily because of
the number of blanket exemptions to the release of information. In July
two select committee reports called for substantial improvements to the
bill. During the second reading of the bill in the House of Commons in
December, criticism of the bill continued.
In connection with the Patrick Finucane investigation in Northern
Ireland, local newspaper editor Ed Moloney was ordered by a Belfast
court in August to turn over notes from a 1990 interview with William
Stobie, who was charged in June with the murder of Finucane. Moloney
refused and was facing charges of contempt of court and obstruction of
justice. In October the High Court in Belfast quashed the lower court
request. Human rights groups point out that the decision will be of
little assistance to journalists in the future because the High Court
ruled that Moloney's notes were not of material assistance to the
investigation, not that Moloney, as a journalist, had a right to
protect his sources.
Academic freedom is respected.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for the right of peaceful assembly, but that right is limited routinely
where it would impose a cost on public convenience.
In Northern Ireland the annual ``marching season'' posed
significant problems for the Government since the right of assembly
conflicted with the concerns of local residents in some communities who
perceived the marches as the celebration of Protestant ``triumphs'' in
historical battles. The 1998 Public Processions (Northern Ireland) Act
transferred responsibility for ruling on disputed parades from the RUC
to the newly established Parades Commission. Of the 3,200 parades held
in 1999, the Parades Commission imposed route restrictions on 203; 38
of those parades were related to the Drumcree situation.
Although tensions were high during the period prior to the Drumcree
parade in Portadown on July 4, the massive security presence, the use
of parade marshals, and general restraint among the marchers allowed
the parade to take place relatively peacefully. Most of the summer
marching season was quiet, with the notable exception of the Apprentice
Boys' Siege of Derry parade on August 14. During a smaller associated
parade in Belfast, police struggled with protesters who refused to end
a sitdown protest across the path of an Apprentice Boys march. Trouble
continued later that day in Londonderry, when security forces and
nationalist protesters clashed during a security operation designed to
separate nationalist crowds and Protestant marchers. In the late
evening, long after the parade had ended, several businesses in the
center of the city were looted and burned.
The law provides for freedom of association, but that right is
limited. Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland may proscribe any organization that is involved
in, promotes, or encourages terrorism connected to Northern Ireland. In
March the Government banned two Northern Ireland Protestant
paramilitary groups, the Orange Volunteers and the Red Hand Defenders,
for their continuing involvement in sectarian violence. Membership in
proscribed paramilitary groups is punishable by up to 10 years'
imprisonment. Supporting paramilitary groups is also an imprisonable
offense, as is wearing clothing that arouses a reasonable suspicion
that the wearer belongs to or supports a proscribed organization.
Although some human rights organizations do not object to the law,
others argue that it violates fundamental rights of freedom of
association and expression.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Governmental policy and general practice
ensure freedom of religion for traditional and nontraditional
worshippers. Despite the existence of state religions (the Anglican
Church of England and the Presbyterian Church of Scotland), members of
all faiths and denominations enjoy freedom of worship. The new Human
Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of religion. Those who
believe that their freedom to worship has been abrogated have the right
to appeal to the courts for relief.
The 1988 Education Reform Act requires that government schools hold
a daily act of nondenominational Christian worship. A parental right of
withdrawal exists for children who do not wish to participate, and
safeguards exist for teachers who do not wish to participate in or
conduct religious education. The act provides for alternative
collective worship for other faiths. Teachers' organizations have
called for government review of the act.
Although not enforced, blasphemy with respect to Christian beliefs
is still technically illegal. Several religious organizations, in
association with the Commission for Racial Equality, are attempting to
either abolish the law or expand it to protect all faiths.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy freedom of movement
within the country and in foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation.
In 1997 the Home Secretary revoked all exclusion orders preventing
individuals linked to terrorism in Northern Ireland from traveling to
Great Britain. When the Prevention of Terrorism Act was renewed in
1998, it did not include provisions for exclusion orders. However, the
Home Secretary has the power to activate other statutes implementing
exclusion orders at any time.
The Government cooperates closely with the UNHCR and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. First asylum is
provided under a temporary protection process started in 1992. The
number of asylum seekers entering Britain rose on a monthly basis, and
at year's end, 102,870 applications were outstanding, compared with
64,770 applications outstanding a year earlier. Under the first asylum
program, successful applicants are given 6 months' ``leave to enter the
country'' on arrival. They then can apply for an automatic 3\1/2\-year
extension of their stay and may apply for refugee status at any time.
Such applications are considered in accordance with the criteria set
out in the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.
Some asylum seekers are detained while the Government reviews their
cases (see Section 1.d.); some are detained in regular prisons (see
Section 1.c.).
The Asylum and Immigration Act of 1996 broadened the right of
appeal for failed asylum seekers, introduced provisions to deter
abusive asylum applicants and illegal entrants, and imposed
restrictions on persons subject to immigration control seeking
employment, housing, and social security benefits. Of decisions taken
on asylum applications during the first 6 months of 1999, 32 percent
recognized the applicant as a refugee and granted asylum, and 7 percent
granted ``exceptional leave to remain'' but refused asylum. The
remainder were refused.
In late 1998 the Government introduced a visa requirement for
Slovak citizens in response to the large number of Slovak Roma who
sought asylum. The Government maintains that the Roma are economic
migrants, not true refugees. In October Prime Minister Blair wrote to
Czech Republic Prime Minister Milos Zeman expressing concern at the
large number of Roma from the Czech Republic seeking asylum in the
country.
Following its 1998 White Paper, the Government passed its
Immigration and Asylum Bill in November to modernize and integrate the
immigration and asylum system. Among other things, it is designed to
streamline the right of appeal and create new support arrangements for
asylum seekers, strengthen immigration law enforcement powers, and
reform detention arrangements.
There were no reports that persons were forced to return to
countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Citizens have the right to change their government and freely
exercise that right. The government is formed on the basis of a
majority of seats in the House of Commons, which are contested in
elections held at least every 5 years.
Participation in the political process is open to all persons and
parties. All citizens 18 years of age and older may vote. As in the
rest of the country, Northern Ireland has city and district councils,
but with fewer powers. England and Wales also have county councils. The
Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly opened on July 1. These
devolved bodies assumed control over matters of regional importance
such as education, health, and some economic matters. Foreign affairs
and defense continue to be the responsibility of the central
government. After a review of the Good Friday Agreement from September
through November, power was devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly
on December 2.
The remaining UK Overseas Territories have an aggregate population
of approximately 160,000. They enjoy varying degrees of self-government
on the British model, with appointed governors.
Women and minorities face no legal constraints on voting or holding
office, but women are underrepresented in government and politics: they
constitute 18 percent of the Members of the House of Commons and nearly
16 percent of those in the House of Lords. A total of 27 Members of
Parliament have identified themselves as being members of minority
ethnic groups.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights issues and cases. Government officials are generally cooperative
and responsive to their views.
A number of international nongovernmental human rights
organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,
are based in the country. The Government cooperates fully with
international inquiries into alleged violations of human rights.
The 1998 Human Rights Act incorporated the provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. The main
provisions of the act are to be implemented in October 2000, although
some provisions already have taken effect. The act is to take effect
first, in practice, in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Under the
terms of the devolution legislation, the devolved institutions do not
have the power to do anything that is incompatible with the
convention's provisions.
In January the Home Office created a human rights task force made
up of representatives of the government and NGO's to coordinate
publicity, guidance, and training in preparation for the act's
implementation. Proceedings under the Human Rights Act can be brought
only by victims of a breach of convention rights by a public authority.
The human rights unit of the Home Office is developing and is to carry
out human rights policy and legislation.
The Government has not created a human rights commission but has
not ruled out doing so in the future. According to the NGO, Article 19,
the Human Rights Act's lack of provision for a commission or
commissioner makes implementation difficult. In Northern Ireland a
commission was established as an outcome of the peace process. While
cases may still be taken to the European Court of Human Rights, all
domestic remedies must be exhausted first.
Section 5. Discrimination based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Race Relations Act of 1976 prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, nationality, or national or ethnic origin and
outlaws incitement to racial hatred. These protections were extended to
Northern Ireland in 1997. However, some groups continued to experience
official and societal discrimination.
Employment discrimination on the grounds of religious or political
opinion was outlawed specifically in Northern Ireland by the Fair
Employment Act. The Fair Employment and Treatment Order of 1998, which
took effect in January, extends the prohibition on discrimination to
goods, facilities, services, and premises. Discrimination on the basis
of religion only is illegal in Great Britain when its effect is to
discriminate against a member of a minority ethnic group. The
government respects and enforces all antidiscrimination laws, which
concentrate on employment and the supply of goods and services.
The Northern Ireland Fair Employment Commission, Equal
Opportunities Commission, Commission for Racial Equality, and
Disability Council were amalgamated into the Equality Commission in
October. The Northern Ireland Office appointed 21 members to the
Commission in August.
In April 3 persons were killed and over 100 wounded in 3 bombings
in London. A man was arrested and charged with all three bombings, one
of which was carried out in a central London gay bar on April 30 and
apparently was motivated in part by homophobia (see Section 1.a.).
In September a government report concluded that the fire service
was institutionally racist, sexist, and homophobic. The report, carried
out by the fire service inspectorate, found prejudice throughout the
overwhelmingly white male service. The Home Office gave the fire chiefs
18 months to implement the report's recommendations for stronger
leadership and cultural changes in order to improve equality and
fairness in the service.
Women.--Violence against women continues to be a problem. In August
a government report, ``Living Without Fear,'' indicated that one in
four women experience domestic violence at some stage in their lives,
that reported incidents of rape have more than tripled over the past 10
years, that two women per week are killed by their current or former
partners, and that women fear personal attack more than any other
crime. Since the paramilitary cease-fires, reports of violence against
women in Northern Ireland have increased.
Surveys also indicate that domestic violence is the violent crime
the least likely to be reported to the police. The law provides for
injunctive relief, personal protection orders, and protective exclusion
orders (similar to restraining orders) for women who are victims of
violence. The Government provides shelters, counseling, and other
assistance for battery or rape and offers free legal aid to battered
women who are economically reliant on their abusers. The government
actively prosecutes perpetrators of domestic violence. The 1997
Protection from Harassment Act provides for prison sentences of up to 5
years for convicted stalkers. Provisional figures indicate that the act
has been effective in assisting some women in challenging violence.
Also in ``Living Without Fear,'' the Government outlined its long-
term goals in eliminating violence against women, including plans to
modernize legislation on sex offenses and reform the Offences Against
the Person Act. The report summarizes government actions in protection,
justice, prevention, and training. However, no legislative reforms were
passed by year's end. The NGO, Change, welcomed the tone of the
publication and its explicit references to violence against women as a
crime, its plans for significant future research, and its 5-year
commitment to making a real impact on women's lives.
Criminal action for sexual harassment cases must be prosecuted
under assault legislation since no law specifically prohibits sexual
harassment. Women's groups have complained that civil suits concerning
sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of gender sometimes
take up to 3\1/2\ years to appear before an industrial tribunal.
The law provides for equal opportunity between the sexes, but women
experience some discrimination in practice. The 1975 Sex Discrimination
Act, as amended in 1986, prohibits both direct and indirect
discrimination in training, housing, and the provision of goods and
services, as well as in employment. Women have equal rights regarding
property and divorce. According to the Government's Equal Opportunities
Commission (which supports persons who bring discrimination cases
before industrial tribunals and courts and produces guidelines on good
practice for employers), significant progress has been made towards
equal opportunity for women since the Commission was established in
1975. The introduction of the national minimum wage in April, effective
in August, was an important change in the effort to equalize pay.
However, according to the Commission, women working full time earn
approximately 20 percent less than their male counterparts in similar
positions. NGO's indicated that progress towards equality of pay for
equal work was the single largest problem confronting women, citing
only an 8 percent increase in relative pay in the past 25 years.
In August the Government announced some maternity benefits reforms
and provisions for unpaid parental leave that came into effect in
December. A national child care strategy was set up to increase child
care places, and in April the Government increased child benefits.
Women's issues within the Government are represented at the cabinet
level by the Minister for Women, who heads up the women's unit, which
engages in dialog with women and advises the government but has no
authority for direct action.
Children.--The government demonstrates its strong commitment to
children's rights and welfare through its systems of public education
and medical care. The government provides free, compulsory education to
age 16 and further education to age 18 if the student so desires.
While there is no societal pattern of abuse directed against
children, indications are, despite a lack of reliable data, that child
abuse is nevertheless a problem. Since the paramilitary cease-fires,
reports of violence against children in Northern Ireland have
increased.
Concern and publicity surrounding pedophiles is growing. As part of
a government drive to protect the young from child abusers, previously
secret registers of pedophiles are to be available to any employer who
runs an organization where persons under age 18 could be at risk
(schools, children's homes, or voluntary organizations). In addition
suspected child abusers and convicted pedophiles are banned from
working with children under the new Protection of Children Act, which
was passed in July. Childcare organizations must consult a list before
offering anyone a job, paid or otherwise, and it is illegal for them to
hire anyone named on it.
Various laws covering England and Wales stipulate that children
have the right to apply for court orders, to give or withhold consent
for medical treatment (for those capable of making an informed
decision), to make complaints to the relevant local authority, to have
their ethnic, linguistic, and religious background considered in
decisions affecting them, to have reasonable contact with their
families (usually applied in a circumstance where there was abuse), and
in general to be consulted regarding their desires.
In July the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act was enacted,
creating the sentence of referral to a youth offender panel for first-
time young offenders who plead guilty and providing greater protection
to vulnerable witnesses (children, the disabled, or the fearful).
Under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the police can arrest and
detain children as young as 10 years old for up to 7 days.
In December the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the human
rights of two young boys had been violated by the intimidating nature
of their 1993 trial in Crown Court. The boys were 10 years old when
they murdered 2-year-old Jamie Bulger in 1993. The ruling will require
sweeping changes in the way courts treat juveniles charged with murder
or manslaughter and ends the role of the Home Secretary in setting
minimum sentences for children.
Several recent court cases involving incidents of spanking or
hitting again have raised the issue of parents' right to hit, following
a European Court of Human Rights ruling in 1998 that a 9-year-old boy's
rights were violated by his stepfather's caning. The 1998 School
Standards and Framework Act extended the ban on corporal punishment in
state schools to private schools and nursery schools. Child welfare
groups have called for the outlawing of all corporal punishment of
children.
People with Disabilities.--The 1995 People with Disabilities
Discrimination Act outlaws discrimination against disabled persons in
the provision of access to public facilities by employers of more than
15 workers, service providers (apart from those providing education or
running transport vehicles), and anyone selling or renting property.
The 1993 Education Act imposes specific duties on local education
authorities to make provision for the special educational needs of
disabled children. The Disability Rights Commission (DRC) Act, passed
in July, sets up a body whose functions include keeping the Disability
Discrimination Act under review, assisting disabled people in bringing
legal action, and promoting good practices among service providers. The
DRC also has the power to conduct formal investigations.
Rights Now, a consortium of over 70 disability organizations
campaigning for laws to end discrimination on the grounds of
disability, reported that employers were 6 times more likely to turn
down a disabled person for a job than a nondisabled applicant with the
same qualifications.
Government regulations require that all new buildings meet the
access requirements of all persons with impaired mobility. In 1992 the
government promulgated similar regulations for sensory-impaired
persons, and regulations require that all taxis be wheelchair
accessible by 2000. However, while generally improved, access to many
buildings remains inadequate. Many buildings and train stations are so
old that they do not have elevators. According to the NGO Scope, 94
percent of polling stations in the 1997 election had one or more
disability access problems. As of September, stage two of the 1995
Disability Discrimination Act came into effect, requiring that all
businesses accommodate disabled customers. Adaptations must be
``reasonable,'' bearing in mind the circumstances and size of the
business. For example, a restaurant chain might be expected to print a
braille version of its menu while a small neighborhood cafe might
simply have a waiter read a menu aloud for a blind person.
Religious Minorities.--According to the Community Security Trust,
the number of anti-Semitic incidents in Britain during the year was
412, compared with 385 in 1998. Public manifestations of anti-Semitism
are confined largely to the political fringe, either far right or
Islamist.
A London Muslim cleric, Sheikh Omar Bakri Muhammad, said in October
that playwright Terence McNally is the subject of a death edict for his
portrayal of Jesus as a homosexual in his play ``Corpus Christi.''
Despite government efforts and the lowering of the overall
unemployment rate in Northern Ireland, the unemployment rate for
Catholic men persists at twice that of Protestant men.
The 1989 Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Act, as amended, aims
to end even unintentional or indirect discrimination in the workplace,
and a public tribunal adjudicates complaints. All public-sector
employers and all private firms with over 10 workers must report
annually to the Equality Commission on the religious composition of
their work force and must review their employment practices at least
once every 3 years. Noncompliance can bring criminal penalties and the
loss of government contracts. Victims of employment discrimination may
sue for damages. Although critics of the act asserted that its targets
and timetables are too imprecise, most leaders of the Catholic
community regard it as a positive step.
While the active recruitment of Catholics by the Northern Ireland
civil service produced rough proportionality in overall numbers, the
service acknowledges that Catholics remain significantly
underrepresented in its senior grades. Service-wide employment cutbacks
thus far have hampered efforts to overcome the imbalance. Government
efforts to increase the recruitment of Catholics into the RUC
(currently 92 percent Protestant) and related security jobs in Northern
Ireland have been hampered by IRA killings and death threats, as well
as by widespread antipathy in the Catholic community to the security
forces. Despite recruitment efforts, the percentage of Catholic
officers in the police force has not changed significantly.
During the summer marching season, arsonists attacked several
Orange halls and Protestant churches around the province.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Despite legal prohibitions
against race discrimination, persons of African and Afro-Caribbean,
South Asian, or Middle Eastern origin and Travellers face occasional
acts of societal violence and some discrimination. Incitement to racial
hatred is a criminal offense punishable by a maximum of 2 years'
imprisonment. The Government strictly enforces the laws and regulations
in this area.
In April 3 persons were killed and over 100 wounded in 3 bombings
in London. A white man was arrested and charged with all three attacks,
two of which were directed at ethnic minority neighborhoods (see
Section 1.a.).
The government-appointed but independent Commission for Racial
Equality provides guidelines on good practice, supports persons taking
court action under the Race Relations Act of 1976, and may initiate its
own court action. After investigating a complaint, the CRE may issue a
notice requiring that the discrimination be stopped. The CRE then
monitors the response to its notice for 5 years.
Repeated claims of police misconduct in the case of Stephen
Lawrence, a black youth stabbed to death in south London in 1993, led
to a 1998 inquiry into police actions during the investigation of
Lawrence's murder. During the inquiry testimony, the London police
admitted that there were serious flaws in the investigation, and they
began to review and modify their methods of dealing with racially
motivated crimes. The inquiry resulted in a widely noted report that
was released in February. The report stated that the investigation was
marred by fundamental errors, including a combination of professional
incompetence, institutional racism, and a failure of leadership by
senior officers. The sweeping report made 70 recommendations for
changes in police practices.
The report served as an acceptance of the many flaws and failures
involved in the case. No one was charged with the crime. The five white
males accused of the crime cannot be charged again due to ``double
jeopardy'' laws. Debate continues over possible changes to certain
aspects of these laws, another recommendation of the February report.
After a yearlong review of the conduct of the Lawrence case, the Police
Complaints Authority recommended that five detectives face disciplinary
charges. Four of these officers already were retired when the PCA
announced its findings. The only officer to face charges was found
guilty of two counts of neglect of duty and verbally reprimanded.
As a result of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, the police instituted
new training and community relations programs and pledged to improve
overall public confidence and service. The Home Secretary ordered
Scotland Yard to review investigative procedures in all unsolved
alleged racist murders in London. Other chief constables have
recognized that institutional racism exists within their forces. The
Stephen Lawrence inquiry encouraged debate on the existence and depth
of racism in society and how to deal with it.
A December report commissioned by the London Metropolitan Police
showed that proportionately more blacks than whites are stopped and
searched by police. Home Office figures showed that blacks were six
times more likely to be stopped by police than whites. The report also
highlighted increasing drug searches of young Asians (see Section
1.c.).
In January the police acknowledged that Michael Menson, a black
musician found on fire in the street in 1997, was the victim of a
racist attack. The Race and Violent Crime Task Force, established as a
result of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, reopened the case, originally
treated as a suicide, in December 1998. In December 1999, two men were
convicted of killing Menson, and the ringleader was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Police are pursuing formal complaints from the Menson
family against the officers who initially investigated Menson's death.
In June the Police Complaints Authority apologized to the Reel
family for ``weaknesses and flaws'' in the original investigation into
the death of Ricky Reel, a young Asian found drowned in the Thames
River in 1997. The PCA report was not made public. His family believes
that Reel was the victim of a racial attack and claimed that police
failed to investigate the crime properly. The police launched a new
investigation under the Race and Violent Crime Task Force. In August
Reel's mother made a joint appeal with the police for information about
two white men suspected of racially abusing Reel on the night he
disappeared. In November an inquest jury rejected the original verdict
of accidental death and returned an open verdict in the Reel case.
Travellers, nomadic populations consisting of Roma, Irish, and
``new'' Travellers, estimated to number some 100,000 persons,
experience marginalization, educational discrimination, and police and
societal harassment greater than that of the settled population,
according to human rights groups. U.N. Committees on both the Rights of
the Child and the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have expressed
similar concerns. In August 1997 the Government passed the Race
Relations (Northern Ireland) Order, which for the first time gave
specific legal protection to minority ethnic groups there, including
the Traveller community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to form and
join unions, and the Government respects this right in practice. A new
Employment Relations Act--enacted by Parliament and signed into law in
July--established the country's first procedures for statutory (as
distinct from voluntary) union recognition.
Unions are free of government control. The new Employment Relations
Act affords significant new protection to union organizing efforts and,
for the first time, confirms the statutory right to strike. The act
sets minimum employment standards for the first time in labor law. It
also abolished the posts of ``commissioner for the rights of trade
union members'' and the ``commissioner for protection against unlawful
industrial action.'' Created by previous governments, both offices were
widely interpreted as politically motivated attempts to undermine the
organized labor movement. However, much detail is left to implementing
legislation (not expected to be completed before April 2000).
Unions participate freely in international organizations
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is longstanding and widespread, covering about 35 percent of
the work force. Under the new Employment Relations Act, labor-
management contracts are now enforceable in the courts.
Under the new act, unions can now file a request for recognition,
identifying the proposed bargaining unit, to a revamped Central
Arbitration Committee (CAC). The act covers employers with more than 20
workers and encompasses an estimated two-thirds of all workplaces.
Once the CAC determines the appropriate bargaining unit, it
assesses whether a union is likely to have majority support. If union
members already make up a majority of the bargaining unit, the CAC can
issue a declaration that the union is recognized for collective
bargaining without a ballot. In those instances where the CAC orders a
ballot (typically, when the majority of bargaining unit employees are
not already union members), the employer must cooperate by providing a
list of names and giving the union access to the workplace to campaign.
Unions win recognition when a majority of those voting agree, including
at least 40 percent of those in the bargaining unit.
Although the act encourages voluntary agreements between employers
and unions, the CAC can, if necessary, impose a legally binding
procedure for bargaining about pay, hours, and holidays.
Workers are protected against dismissal or other retaliation for
campaigning or voting for or against recognition. Unions no longer are
required to name their members when initiating a strike ballot, to
minimize opportunities for retaliation. The bill also prohibits the
compilation of lists of union members and labor activists for use by
employers and employment agencies. This is aimed at ``blacklists,'' as
operated in the past. Dismissed strikers are able to claim unfair
dismissal if fired within 8 weeks of when an employee first undertook a
legal strike.
Union members are protected against ``being subject to any
detriment'' due to union activity or membership. This protection goes
further than the previous language of ``action short of dismissal taken
against him as an individual.'' Heretofore, it was legal for employers
to withhold fringe benefits otherwise available to nonunion employees.
At the same time, the new act retains key policies implemented by
previous governments, notably ballots and notice before strikes,
abolition of the closed shop, secondary boycotts, and prohibition
against mass picketing.
There are no export processing zones. The new Employment Relations
Act also extends its protection to contract and part-time workers in an
attempt to close loopholes that previously allowed some employers to
evade labor regulations. Foreign workers are protected to the full
extent of the law.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor, including that performed by children, is prohibited and is not
practiced, although the ILO has raised questions about the situation in
privatized prisons.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--School attendance until age 16 is compulsory. Children
under age 16 are not permitted to work in an industrial enterprise
except as part of an educational course. Forced and bonded child labor
is prohibited, and the Government effectively enforces this prohibition
(see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The country's first minimum wage
went into effect on April 1 and benefited some 10 percent of the work
force directly. It is $5.76 (3.60 pounds) for adults and $5.12 (3.20
pounds) for youth. This does not provide a decent standard of living
for most workers with families, but other elements of the welfare state
fill the gap. In particular the working families' tax credit and
disabled person's tax credit--both implemented on October 5, 1999--are
designed to ensure a working family a weekly income of $320 (200
pounds), which constitutes a living wage. It is estimated that some 1.5
million of the poorest households benefit from the new minimum wage.
The Government introduced a new working time directive in October
1998 to bring domestic legislation into compliance with the European
Union's 48-hour workweek. Implementing regulations still are being
developed, with considerable public input.
The Health and Safety at Work Act of 1974 stipulates that the
health and safety of employees not be placed at risk. In practice the
act is being updated and modified constantly. The Health and Safety
Executive effectively enforces regulations on these matters and may
initiate criminal proceedings in appropriate cases. Workers'
representatives actively monitor enforcement of the act. Workers can
remove themselves from hazardous conditions without risking loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--No laws specifically criminalize
trafficking in persons. The police have had success in prosecuting
traffickers under other laws, such as those against pimping and living
off of immoral earnings. A Home Office review of sexual offenses laws,
to be completed in June 2000, is considering whether there should be
specific laws that address trafficking. Under the 1999 Immigration and
Asylum Act, persons found importing illegal immigrants can be fined
$3,600 (2,000 pounds).
Trafficking in persons is a growing problem. A Home Office report
on trafficking in women, expected to be issued in the spring of 2000,
will address the problem. In February three Lithuanians were jailed for
3 years on charges of living off of immoral earnings by controlling
four prostitutes they brought from Lithuania. In October and December,
members of a Chinese gang were found guilty of false imprisonment and
conspiracy to blackmail for bringing about 500 persons from China and
then making them effectively into slaves. This ended a series of trials
dating back to June 1998, in which 19 gang members were jailed for a
total of 200 years.
______
UZBEKISTAN
Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state with limited civil rights. The
Constitution provides for a presidential system with separation of
powers between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. In
practice President Islam Karimov and the centralized executive branch
that serves him dominate political life. Chosen president in a 1991
election that most observers considered neither free nor fair, Karimov
had his stay in office extended to 2000 by a 1995 plebiscite.
Parliament subsequently voted to make the extension part of Karimov's
first term, thus making him eligible to run again in 2000. The
executive branch dominates the Oliy Majlis (Parliament), which consists
only of members of parties that support the President. Despite
constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary, the executive
branch heavily influences the courts in both civil and criminal cases.
There is effective civilian control over the military. The Ministry
of Interior (MVD) controls the police. The police and other MVD forces
are responsible for most normal police functions. The National Security
Service (NSS)--the former KGB--deals with a broad range of national
security questions, including corruption, organized crime, and
narcotics. The police and the NSS committed numerous serious human
rights abuses.
The Government has stated that it is committed to a gradual
transition to a free market economy. However, continuing restrictions
on currency convertibility and other government measures to control
economic activity have constrained economic growth and led
international lending organizations to suspend or scale back credits.
The economy is based primarily on agriculture and agricultural
processing; the country is a major producer and exporter of cotton. It
is also a major producer of gold and has substantial deposits of
copper, strategic minerals, gas, and oil. The Government has made some
progress in reducing inflation and the budget deficit, but government
statistics understate both, while overstating economic growth. There
are no reliable statistics on unemployment, which is believed to be
high and growing. The Government is taking some modest steps to reduce
the host of formal and informal barriers that constrain the nascent
private sector.
The Government's poor human rights record worsened, and the
Government continued to commit numerous serious abuses.
Citizens cannot exercise their right to change their government
peacefully. The Government has not permitted the existence of an
opposition party since 1993. Election laws restrict the possibility of
any real opposition parties arising or mounting a campaign. Minor
changes enacted in August to the presidential, parliamentary, and local
election laws did not ensure that future elections would be free and
fair.
There were credible reports that security forces committed
killings. Security force mistreatment resulted in the deaths of several
citizens in custody. Police and NSS forces beat, tortured, and harassed
persons. The security forces arbitrarily arrested or detained human
rights activists, pious Muslims, and other citizens on false charges,
frequently planting narcotics, weapons, or forbidden literature on
them. Prison conditions are poor, and detention can be prolonged.
Police and NSS forces infringed on citizens' privacy, including the use
of illegal searches and wiretaps. Those responsible for documented
abuses rarely are punished.
After five terrorist bombs exploded near government targets in
Tashkent on February 16, security forces launched a particularly wide-
ranging campaign of arrests and intimidation against all those whom the
Government perceived as a threat. Among those arrested and tried were
some persons with close links to avowed Islamist Uzbeks abroad who, the
Government believes, were responsible for the bombings. However, other
victims of the crackdown included members of the secular opposition,
human rights activists, and hundreds, perhaps thousands, of overtly
pious Muslims and members of Islamist political groups. While it is not
possible to estimate the number of those arrested, observers believe
that the scale surpasses any previous such action. Some human rights
activists assert that tens of thousands of persons were arrested and
remain in custody.
The judiciary does not always ensure due process and often defers
to the wishes of the executive branch. The Government severely limits
freedom of speech and the press, and an atmosphere of repression
stifles public criticism of the Government. Although the Constitution
expressly prohibits it, press censorship continues, and the Government
sharply restricts citizens' access to foreign media. A new decree
requires all Internet service providers to route their connections
through a government server. The primary purpose of this measure,
according to the Government, is to prevent access to what the
Government considers harmful information. The Government limits freedom
of assembly and association. The Government continues to ban
unauthorized public meetings and demonstrations. A new law improves the
formal legal framework for the formation, registration, and operation
of nongovernmental organizations; however, the Government also
continues to deny registration to opposition political parties as well
as to other groups that might be critical of the Government. For
example the Ministry of Justice repeatedly has denied the application
for registration of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan (HRSU) and
the Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU) have
repeatedly applied for registration, citing technical deficiencies.
Unregistered opposition parties and movements may not operate freely or
publish their views. The Government limits freedom of religion. The
Government harassed and arrested hundreds of Islamic leaders and
believers on questionable grounds, citing the threat of extremism. The
Government tolerates the existence of minority religions but places
strict limits on religious activities. Although the Government
registered nearly 150 minority religious communities by year's end,
several others were prevented from registering by local officials.
There were cases in which university authorities expelled female
students for wearing Islamic dress.
The Government continues to voice rhetorical support for human
rights, but does not ensure these rights in practice. Although the
election, religion, and media laws contain elements that theoretically
support human rights, in reality the Government does not respect such
provisions. The Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, which was formed
in 1997, reports that it is assisting hundreds of citizens in
redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve allegedly
unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police. The
ombudsman's office issued reports identifying the most serious types of
violations of human rights by government officials; however, most of
the successfully resolved cases appear relatively minor.
Domestic violence against women is a problem, and despite a
constitutional prohibition, there continues to be significant
traditional societal discrimination against women. Trafficking in women
and girls for the purposes of prostitution occurs.
Workplace discrimination against some minorities persists. There
are some limits on worker rights.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political killings; however, security forces
committed several killings. Security force mistreatment resulted in the
deaths of several prisoners in custody.
On June 25, a Human Rights Watch representative viewed the body of
Farkhod Usmanov, who was arrested on June 14 for the possession of a
leaflet from the Islamic political group Hezbut Tahrir (Party of
Liberation). The bruises and other markings on the body suggested that
Usmanov, son of a well-known imam, died from torture while in custody.
Officials claimed that he died of heart failure. Akhmadhon Turakhanov
died in custody on June 19, reportedly because prison authorities
refused to treat his diabetes. Turakhanov was a member of the
unregistered Birlik Democratic Movement and the unregistered
Independent Human Rights Organization of Uzbekistan. Although
Turakhanov was not religious, officials accused him of being an Islamic
extremist and charged him with hooliganism and conspiracy against the
constitutional order. There were unconfirmed but credible reports of at
least 13 other deaths by torture or beating. In one case, a man from
Nukus, Azim Khodjaev, allegedly was beaten to death at a then-secret
prison in Karakalpakstan in mid-July because he would not reveal the
whereabouts of his sons whom the police were seeking. According to
witnesses in Nukus, his body was bruised and missing its fingernails.
Authorities gave the cause of death as heart failure.
Between August and early October, Uzbek security forces provided
assistance to the Kyrgyz Government in dealing with an incursion into
Kyrgyzstan from Tajikistan by a group of armed ethnic Uzbek militants.
As part of the operations against the militants, a number of air
strikes were carried out against their positions in southern
Kyrgyzstan. In the first of these on August 15, the Uzbek Government
acknowledged that its air force had responded to a direct request from
the Kyrgyz. This incident resulted in no casualties. A subsequent
strike on August 29 reportedly caused the accidental deaths of up to 12
noncombatants in a Kyrgyz village; however, the Uzbek Government never
admitted responsibility for this incident, and its involvement remains
unconfirmed.
The Government conducted no further investigation of the death in
custody on October 30, 1998, of outspoken Muslim cleric Qobil Muradov.
There were no reported developments in the 1995 killing of Bokhtiar
Yakubov, a witness linked to an opposition activist.
On February 16, 5 bombs detonated in downtown Tashkent and killed
16 persons. The perpetrators are believed to have been terrorist
members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) or related groups.
At year's end, the Government reported that it tried and convicted 128
persons in connection with this attack; 11 were sentenced to death. The
first trial of 22 suspects in June was open to journalists and
international observers, but subsequent trials were closed and held in
secret. In a March 30 bus hijacking, terrorists killed three law
enforcement agents. In November four forest rangers and three police
officers were killed by a group of IMU members that they encountered in
a mountainous region near Tashkent. In the subsequent manhunt, 3 police
special forces officers and 15 suspected insurgents were killed.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
It is now widely believed that Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, missing since
March 5, 1998, fled the country to avoid arrest and was not abducted by
security forces. There were no reported developments in the 1995
disappearance of Imam Abduvali Mirzaev, the 1997 disappearance of his
assistant, Nematjon Parpiev, or the 1992 disappearance of Aboullah
Utaev, leader of the Uzbekistan chapter of the outlawed Islamic
Renaissance Party (IRP). Most independent observers believe that the
three missing Islamic activists are either dead or in NSS custody.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although the law prohibits these practices, police
routinely beat and otherwise mistreat detainees to obtain confessions.
Both police and the NSS used beatings and harassment against citizens.
Six citizens convicted for their links to the outlawed Erk
Democratic Party and its leader Mohammed Solikh released a statement in
August alleging that their captors tortured and beat them during 5
months of incommunicado detention from late-February to mid-July, in
order to force them to sign incriminating statements. Police methods
included use of electric shocks, near suffocation, and beatings with
rubber sticks and plastic bottles filled with water. One of the
defendants, noted writer Mamadali Makhmudov, released a separate
statement, saying that police threatened to rape his wife and daughters
in his presence before killing him.
Police detained, arrested, beat, and harassed members of various
religious groups, including hundreds of Muslims and at least two groups
of evangelical Christians (see Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
Police routinely planted false evidence on citizens to justify
arrests or extort bribes (see Section 1.d.).
Prison conditions are poor, and worse for male than for female
prisoners. Due to limited resources, prison overcrowding is a problem.
Human rights activists reported that the incarceration of 10 to 15
people in cells designed for 4 is common. Tuberculosis and hepatitis
are endemic in the prisons, making even short periods of incarceration
potentially deadly. Reportedly there are severe shortages of food and
medicines. Political and religious prisoners often are not allowed
visitors or any other form of contact with family and friends. There is
a new prison complex in a remote area of the Republic of Karakalpakstan
near the city of Jaslik. The Government has allowed family visits to a
single facility in that area that houses 250 prisoners. Although
prisoners are treated well prior to visits by relatives, conditions at
the facility are reported to be poor, and as many as 17 prisoners
allegedly died from mistreatment since May. There are rumored to be
additional prison facilities nearby housing a large but unknown number
of inmates. It appears that most of the prisoners transferred to Jaslik
were convicted for their participation in unauthorized Islamic groups.
In August police prevented a Human Rights Watch representative who
attempted to view the complex from entering the area. The Government
operates labor camps, but little is known about them; however,
conditions of incarceration have been reported to be less severe than
in prisons.
Akhmedin Turakhanov died in custody, reportedly due to prison
authorities' refusal to treat his diabetes (see Section 1.a.).
The Government does not permit prison visits by human rights
monitors such as the International Committee of the Red Cross.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces
continued to arrest and detain individuals arbitrarily, without warrant
or just cause. A Soviet-era detention law provides that police may hold
a person suspected of committing a crime for up to 3 days. At the end
of this period, the detained person must be declared officially a
suspect, charged with a crime, or released. A person officially
declared a suspect may be held for an additional 3 days before charges
are filed. A prosecutor's order is required for arrests but not for
detentions prior to the filing of charges. In practice these legal
protections frequently are ignored. In some cases, police circumvent
the rules by claiming that the detainee is being held as a potential
witness and not as a suspect; there are no regulations concerning the
length of time witnesses may be detained. A court date must be set
within 15 days of arrest (or filing of charges) and the defendant may
be detained during this period. A defendant may not have access to
counsel while in detention but only after the first interview with an
investigator. Once the trial date is set, detainees deemed not to be
violent may be released on their own recognizance pending trial. No
money need be posted as bond, but in such cases the accused usually
must sign a pledge not to leave the city. In practice this procedure
rarely is used. During the period between arrest and trial, defendants
are almost always kept in pretrial detention, which has been known to
last as long as 2 years.
In ordinary criminal cases, the police generally are capable of
identifying and arresting only those reasonably suspected of the crime.
However, both the police and NSS are far less discriminating in cases
involving perceived risks to national security. In the immediate
aftermath of the February explosions in Tashkent, police arbitrarily
detained hundreds of those whose religious or political inclinations
made them suspect in the eyes of the security forces (also see Section
2.c.). The majority of those detained were released after questioning
and detention that lasted as long as 2 months. Prosecutors have brought
charges against 128 persons in connection with the bombings, and at
year's end 11 had been sentenced to death.
Police routinely plant small amounts of narcotics, weapons,
ammunition, or Islamic literature on citizens either to justify arrest
or to extort bribes. The most frequent victims of this illegal practice
are suspected members of nonofficial Islamic organizations such as
Hezbut Tahrir. The first of numerous alleged Hezbut Tahrir members
tried during the year was sentenced on May 14. The authorities
convicted 11 of the 12 defendants--whose average age was 26--of
possession of narcotics or weapons that their families claim were
planted by the arresting officers. Most also were convicted of
conspiracy against the constitutional order. They were sentenced to an
average of 12 years in prison. Subsequent sentences against Hezbut
Tahrir members were even harsher. The total numbers of those either
tried and convicted or still in pretrial detention are unknown, but
human rights activists contend that there are well over 1,000 and
perhaps several thousand. Many of those in detention are political
detainees. Police also allegedly have planted drugs on four persons in
two Christian denominations in order to arrest them.
In the crackdown after the bombings, it was common for police to
arrest, hold, beat, and even try family members of the suspects that
the police actually were seeking (also see Section 1.f.). There were
numerous reports of individuals surrendering to police in order to save
their families. Police detained the wife, mother, brother, uncle, and
brother-in-law of missing Imam Abidkhon Nazarov within a month of the
bombing. While Nazarov's mother was released after brief questioning,
his wife was held for 10 days (ostensibly for resisting the police) and
the three males ultimately were given prison terms. Nazarov's brother
Umarkhon was sentenced in Namangan to 11 years in prison on May 20. On
the same day, his brother-in-law Abdurashid Nasriddinov also was
sentenced to 11 years and his uncle Akhmadali Salamov to 4 years. All
allegedly possessed extremist religious literature. The men allegedly
were beaten during pretrial detention and repeatedly asked the
whereabouts of the imam. Similarly, the police arrested three brothers
of exiled Democratic Opposition leader Mohammed Solikh (see Sections
1.c. and 3).
Police detained, arrested, beat, and harassed various religious
groups (see Sections 1.c. and 2.c.).
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Although the Constitution provides
for an independent judicial authority, the judicial branch takes its
direction from the executive branch and has little independence in
practice. Under the Constitution, the President appoints all judges for
5-year terms. They may be removed for crimes or failure to fulfill
their obligations. Power to remove judges rests with the President,
except for Supreme Court judges, whose removal also must be confirmed
by Parliament.
The system of courts of general jurisdiction is divided into three
tiers: district courts; regional courts; and the Supreme Court. In
addition a Constitutional Court is charged with reviewing laws,
decrees, and judicial decisions to ensure their compliance with the
Constitution. Military courts handle all civil and criminal matters
that occur within the military. There is a system of economic courts on
the regional level that deals with economic cases between judicial
legal entities.
Decisions of district and regional courts of general jurisdiction
may be appealed to the next level within 10 days of ruling. The
Criminal Code has reduced the list of crimes punishable by death to
murder, espionage, and treason, eliminating the economic crimes
punishable by death in the former Soviet code. Officially, most court
cases are open to the public but may be closed in exceptional cases,
such as those involving state secrets, rape, or young defendants.
However, except for the first trial in June, all trials of those
suspected of involvement in the February 16 terrorist bombings were
closed to international observers and the public on security grounds.
In similar fashion, many trials of alleged Islamic extremists have been
closed.
State prosecutors, called ``procurators,'' play a decisive role in
the criminal justice system. They order arrests, direct investigations,
prepare criminal cases, and recommend sentences. If a judge's sentence
does not agree with the prosecutor's recommendation, the prosecutor has
a right to appeal the sentence to a higher court. (There is no
protection against double jeopardy.) Judges whose decisions have been
overturned on more than one occasion may be removed from office.
Consequently, judges rarely defy the recommendations of prosecutors. As
a result, defendants usually are found guilty.
Uzbekistan still uses the Soviet practice of trial by a panel of
three judges: one professional judge and two lay assessors who serve 5
year terms and are selected from workers' collectives. The judge
presides and directs the proceedings. However, in practice, judges
often defer to the Government and its prosecutors on legal and other
matters. Defendants have the right to attend the proceedings, confront
witnesses, and present evidence. The State provides a lawyer without
charge, but by law the accused also has the right to hire an attorney.
In practice the right to an attorney often is violated and there are
numerous examples of denial of the right to counsel. In a July 13
trial, human rights activist Mahbuba Kasimova was denied the right to
hire her own attorney. She was invited to a meeting with the judge that
day only to discover when she arrived at the courthouse that she would
be tried immediately. She requested to have her attorney present, but
her request was denied; she was provided a court-appointed lawyer for
the trial, which lasted only 3 hours before the judge sentenced her to
5 years in prison (see Section 4). On appeal the judge rejected the
argument that she had been denied right to counsel, ruling that the
state-appointed lawyer had represented her. In addition Human Rights
Watch reported that several families of those accused in connection
with the February 16 bombings hired their own defense lawyers, but the
lawyers were denied access to their clients, both before and during the
trial.
In practice most defense lawyers are unskilled at defending their
clients. Courts often do not allow all defense witnesses to be heard,
and written documents are given more weight than courtroom witnesses.
In the first trial of those accused of involvement in the terrorist
bombings, defense attorneys argued only that the defendants were sorry
for their crimes and did not dispute the procurator's version of
events.
The Constitution provides a right of appeal to those convicted, but
such proceedings usually are formalistic exercises that confirm the
original conviction. For example the appeal of Mahbuba Kasimova on
August 17 lasted only 45 minutes, and the judge did not permit
testimony. Kasimova was not allowed to be present at the appeal.
Authorities arrested and tried unfairly relatives of suspects and
members of opposition groups (see Sections 1.d. and 3).
In September HRSU released a list of 505 ``possible political
prisoners,'' many of whom are political dissidents, human rights
activists, or Hezbut Tahrir members who can be regarded as political
prisoners. Many of them were associated with the Birlik or Erk
opposition organizations in the early 1990's. Others were involved in
independent Islamic activities. Many were convicted of nonpolitical
offenses such as tax evasion, misappropriation of funds, or illegal
possession of narcotics or firearms (also see Section 2.c.). It is
widely believed that in the latter cases, arresting officers planted
the incriminating material. The Government has rejected explicitly that
any of the 162 individuals on an earlier HRSU list are political
prisoners and denies that any prisoners held in the country can be
classified as ``political.''
Abdurauf Gafurov, an Islamic activist imprisoned since 1996, was
scheduled for release in May 1998; however, his sentence was extended
for an additional 3 years based on testimony from fellow prisoners. He
was amnestied and released in
October.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Authorities infringe on these rights. By law only a
prosecutor may issue a search warrant or authorize electronic
surveillance. There is no provision for a judicial review of such
warrants. Security agencies routinely monitor telephone calls and
employ surveillance and wiretaps in the cases of persons involved in
opposition political activities.
The religion law (see Section 2.c.) prohibits private teaching of
religious principles. There have been reports of students being
expelled from or harassed and forced to leave various universities and
secondary schools for wearing traditional Islamic dress. Human Rights
Watch issued a report in October 1999 describing 28 confirmed cases
from 1997 and 1998. In addition a group of 15 female students from
Fergana State University claimed that they were forced to leave school
in March (see Section 2.c.). Police arrested a number of men who wore
beards, a traditional sign of Islamic piety (see Sections 1.d. and
2.c.).
Police arrested, detained, and beat family members of suspects that
they were seeking (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 2.c.).
The Government does not allow general distribution of foreign
newspapers and other publications. However, two or three conservative
Russian newspapers and a variety of Russian tabloids and lifestyle
publications are available. There is a modest selection of other
foreign periodicals available in Tashkent's major hotels, and
authorized groups can obtain foreign periodicals through subscription.
Although publication of local editions of many foreign publications,
including newspapers such as Izvestia and Pravda, remains suspended,
Moscow editions of Izvestia, Pravda, and other Russian papers currently
are sold in newstands. The authorities do not permit rebroadcast of
Russian programming that is critical of the Government (see Section
2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides
for ``freedom of thought, speech, and convictions,'' the Government
continues to limit these rights severely.
A 1991 law against ``offending the honor and dignity of the
President'' limits the ability to criticize the President. Ordinary
citizens remain afraid to express views critical of the President and
the Government in public. The 1998 mass media law formally provides for
freedom of expression, protects the rights of journalists, and
reiterates the constitutional ban on censorship. Nonetheless, several
articles of the law, and the lack of due process provided for in their
implementation, allow the Government to use the law to silence critics.
One provision makes journalists responsible for the accuracy of the
information contained in their news stories, potentially subjecting
them to prosecution.
Another law permits authorities to close media outlets without a
court judgment. Yet another prohibits stories that incite religious
confrontation and ethnic discord. Finally, the law prohibits the
registration of organizations whose purposes include subverting or
overthrowing the constitutional order (see Section 2.b.).
All media outlets must be registered by a 17-member
interdepartmental government commission. A media organization must
provide information about intended content or programming, sources of
funding, means of distribution, technical capabilities, founders, and
sponsors. The media outlets registered by January 1 as required by law
but paid higher annual fees and conformed to certain technical
standards. Information remains very tightly controlled. Although the
Constitution prohibits censorship, it is widely practiced and the
Government tolerates little, if any, criticism of its actions. The last
opposition newspaper to be published was that of the Erk Democratic
Party, which has been banned within the country since 1993 but is
published sporadically abroad.
There are no private publishing houses, and government approval is
required for all publications. Newspapers may not be printed without
the approval of the Committee for the Control of State Secrets. All
newspapers are printed by state-owned printing houses, which refuse to
print any newspaper whose editor does not confirm that the Committee
has cleared the issue a few hours before being submitted. Journalists
who want to ensure that their work is published practice self-
censorship.
The Uzbekistan Information Agency cooperates closely with the
presidential staff to prepare and distribute all officially sanctioned
news and information. Nearly all newspapers are government-owned and
controlled; the key newspapers are organs of government ministries.
Private persons and journalist collectives may not establish newspapers
unless they meet the media law's standards for establishment of a
``mass media organ,'' including founders acceptable to the Government.
Two private newspapers (one in Samarkand and one in Tashkent) are
permitted to operate without censorship. They have no editorial content
and consist of advertising, horoscopes, and similar features.
Limited numbers of foreign periodicals are available, but the
Government does not allow the general distribution of foreign
newspapers (see Section 1.f.).
Four state-run channels that fully support the Government and its
policies dominate television broadcasting. A cable television joint
venture between the state broadcasting company and a foreign company
broadcasts the Hong Kong-based Star television channels, including the
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Deutsche Welle, and Cable News
Network world news, to Tashkent and a few other locations. Access to
cable television is beyond the financial ability of most citizens.
There are between 30 and 40 privately owned local television
stations and 3 privately owned radio stations. Generally, broadcasters
practice self-censorship and enjoy some leeway in reporting critically
on local government. Samarkand Independent Television, which operates
four channels, is known for such reporting. However, it is clearly
sensitive to political concerns from the Government and concentrates on
nonpolitical news, yet it denies that it is censored formally.
In late November, the Government denied the annual reregistration
of two independent television stations and suspended their licenses.
One, in Urgench, allegedly failed to take required security measures;
the other, in Guliston, allegedly had substandard equipment. Officials
claimed that there was no political element to these decisions and that
registration would be reconsidered when the stations comply with the
regulations. Foreign observers noted that these two stations are among
the most independent of the commercial stations and interpreted the
closings as a warning to other broadcasters not to upset the Government
during the election season. The Urgench station, which now has filed a
suit against the Government for damages, also had lost its registration
temporarily in 1997, allegedly for technical violations of regulations.
It was believed widely at the time that the real reason for the 1997
closure was that the owner had been a member of the Erk political
party.
Enforcement of the registration and licensing requirements can be
strict, and the Government's implementation of the media law does not
function smoothly. Because the registration committee meets irregularly
and because regulations require annual reregistration, up to one half
of independent television stations have been forced to operate with
expired licenses, meaning the Government could shut them down at any
time. Owners reportedly believe that the Government intentionally
delays registration in order to ensure that the stations broadcast
nothing unfavorable.
Private radio and television broadcasters formed an independent
professional association in 1998 (ANESMI). The association resisted
both generous incentives and heavy pressure from the Government to
elect the Government's candidate as chairman. Government officials
openly threatened members of the group and the opposition candidate who
was elected. Since that time, the Government has denied arbitrarily the
group's registration application on four occasions since its founding,
twice during the year. Ministry of Justice officials reportedly advised
the group privately that it never would be registered. The lack of
registration effectively restricts ANESMI's ability to attract
international funding and operate legally.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and the Voice of America are not
permitted to broadcast from within the country, despite the
Government's 1992 contractual agreement to allow this activity. The
Government allows both organizations to have correspondents in the
country. The BBC world service was required to broadcast on a very low
FM frequency that most radios would not be able to receive, and then
only after the BBC agreed in June to self-censorship. It is permitted
to broadcast only 2 hours per day: 1 hour in Uzbek 5 days per week; 30
minutes in Uzbek the other 2 days; and 30 minutes in Russian 7 days per
week.
On February 5, the President signed a decree directing all Internet
service providers to route their connections through a state-run
server. The avowed main purpose of this directive was to prevent the
transmission of what the State considers as harmful information,
including material advocating or facilitating terrorism, material
deemed hostile to the constitutional order, and pornography. By year's
end, the Government had connected all but four providers, but did not
yet possess the equipment and expertise necessary to complete
implementation of the decree. Government officials said that they
foresaw connecting the remaining providers and introducing content
filtering during 2000.
The Government has granted academic institutions a degree of
autonomy, but freedom of expression still is limited. Most institutions
are modernizing their curriculums, but find up-to-date textbooks too
costly.
According to press reports, the Ministry of the Interior announced
on June 18 that police had detained a large number of Hezbut Takhrir
leaflet distributors in Tashkent. The leaflets severely criticized
President Karimov and propagated a Muslim teaching banned in the
country. Other arrests of leaflet distributors occurred throughout the
year. A group of 15 female students at Ferghana State University were
harassed and ultimately forced to leave school over the issue of
religious dress (see Sections 1.f. and 2.c.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly; however, it also states
that the authorities have the right to suspend or ban rallies,
meetings, and demonstrations on security grounds. In practice the
Government restricted the right of peaceful assembly. The Government
must approve demonstrations but does not grant permits to demonstrators
routinely. In November a group of 30 to 40 veiled Moslem women gathered
in front of the office of the Tashkent hokim (local governor) to
protest the incarceration of their relatives. The police ordered them
to disperse after refusing their request to meet with the hokim. Some
members of the group report that they have been under intermittent
surveillance since that time. A peaceful demonstration of approximately
1,000 residents of Jizzak, that was held in May to protest an economic
policy measure taken by local authorities, occurred without government
interference.
The Constitution provides for the right of freedom of association,
but the Government limits the exercise of this right by refusing to
register opposition political parties and movements. The Constitution
places broad limitations on the types of groups that may form and
requires that all organizations be registered formally with the
Government in accordance with procedures prescribed by law. A 1996
analysis by foreign legal observers concluded that, while the Law on
Political Parties provides theoretical protections for minority parties
and permits a wide range of fund raising, it also gives the Ministry of
Justice broad powers to interfere with parties and to withhold
financial and legal support to those opposed to the Government. There
are no registered opposition parties (see Section 3).
In the early 1990's, the Government repeatedly denied the attempts
by the Birlik Movement and Erk Party to register. Harassment by
security forces drove the leaders of these organizations into voluntary
exile. These organizations made no attempt to register during the year,
reportedly because their remaining adherents were afraid of government
reprisals.
Many of the activists not already imprisoned or exiled were victims
of the latest wave of repression (see Section 3).
The Constitution and a 1991 amendment to the law on political
parties ban parties of a religious nature. Authorities cited these
measures in denying registration to the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP)
in 1992. In the early 1990's, opposition activists announced the
formation of the Adolat-True Path Party but never pursued formal
registration, claiming that their members were afraid of government
reprisals.
The Law on Public Associations as well as the Law on Political
Parties prohibits registration of organizations whose purpose includes
subverting or overthrowing the constitutional order, as well as
organizations whose names already are registered. In the past,
officials have used the latter provision to block human rights NGO's
and independent political parties from registering by creating another
NGO or party with the identical name; however, the authorities did not
take such action during the year.
The Government has refused to register two of the major independent
human rights organizations. The Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan
(HRSU), a group with close ties to exiled opposition figures, has
sought registration unsuccessfully since 1992. The Independent Human
Rights Organization of Uzbekistan (IHROU), headed by longtime human
rights activist Mikhail Ardzinov, held its founding convention and
filed registration papers in 1997, but the Government has not yet
formally approved or denied the application. In both cases, the
Government claims that the registration applications were not made
properly and need to be resubmitted. Neither the HRSU nor the IHROU
resubmitted applications during the year; there was no indication that
they would be registered. The Government's repeated refusals to
register these organizations appear politically motivated. The
Government has approved the registration of only one human rights NGO,
the Committee for Protection of Individual Rights, which was formed
with government support in 1996.
The process for government registration of NGO's and other public
associations is also difficult and time consuming, with many
opportunities for obstruction. Although unregistered organizations
often can disseminate literature, hold meetings, and use letterhead
stationery without government interference, they do not exist legally
and have no real access to the media or government.
A law on nongovernmental, noncommercial organizations passed in
April provides a relatively benign legal framework for their
registration and functioning. In particular the requirements for
registration are simpler than they had been under previous legislation.
However, the law contains several vaguely worded provisions that, in
practice, may result in arbitrary enforcement of decisions harmful to
NGO's. The real effect of the law depends on the implementing
regulations, which had not yet been promulgated by year's end.
Nonpolitical associations and social organizations usually may
register, although complicated rules and a cumbersome government
bureaucracy often make the process difficult. Some evangelical churches
(see Section 2.c.) found it difficult to obtain registration or
reregistration.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion and for the principle of separation of religion and state;
however, in practice, the Government only partially respects these
rights. The Government perceives unofficial Islamic groups or mosques
as extremist threats and outlaws them. During the year, the Government
arrested hundreds of members of such groups and sentenced them to
between 15 and 20 years in jail. The Government also restricts recently
arrived religions that either the Government does not understand or
that proselytize. However, the Government permits persons affiliated
with mainstream religions, including approved Muslim groups, Jewish
groups, the Russian Orthodox Church, and various other denominations,
such as Catholics and Lutherans, to worship freely. Despite the
principle of separation of church and state, the government-controlled
Spiritual Directorate for Muslims (the Muftiate) funds some Islamic
religious activities.
In May 1998, the Parliament passed two laws that restrict religious
activity. The Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations
provides for freedom of worship, freedom from religious persecution,
separation of church and state, and the right to establish schools and
train clergy. However, the law also restricts religious rights that are
judged to be in conflict with national security, prohibits
proselytizing, bans religious subjects in school curriculums, prohibits
private teaching of religious principles, forbids the wearing of
religious clothing in public by anyone other than clerics, and requires
religious groups to obtain a license to publish or distribute
materials. The law also requires that all religious groups and
congregations register and provides strict criteria for their
registration. In particular it stipulates that each group present a
list of at least 100 Uzbek citizen members compared with the previous
minimum of 10 to the local Ministries of Justice. This provision
enables the Government to ban any group simply by denying its
registration petition. Government officials designed the law to target
Muslims worshiping outside the system of state-organized mosques. As of
year's end, the Government registered 1,831 religious congregations and
organizations, 1,664 of which were Moslem. An additional 335
applications were denied, 323 of which were from Moslem groups.
The number of officially sanctioned mosques is significantly
increased from the 80 or so permitted during the Soviet era, but has
decreased from the 4,000 that reportedly opened after the country
gained independence.
There were a variety of reasons that churches could not register.
Some could not meet the requirement of having 100 Uzbek citizen
members, while others could not afford the registration fees. The most
frequent problem is determining a satisfactory legal address. In order
to register, groups must report in their charter a valid juridical
address, but local officials frequently contend that a building does
not meet fire or building codes, has a disputed title, or other
problems.
A presidential commission created in August 1998 may grant
exemptions to the Religious Law's strict requirements and register
groups that have not been registered by local officials. Through
November 1, the commission granted exemptions to 51 such groups,
including congregations with fewer than 100 Uzbek members. However, no
formal procedures or criteria have been established to bring a case
before this commission. In August the Government registered 20 minority
religious groups that had been having difficulty being registered by
local officials.
The second law passed in May 1998 consisted of a series of
revisions to the criminal and civil codes, which stiffened the
penalties for violating the religious law and other statutes on
religious activities. It provided for punishments for activities such
as organizing a banned religious group, persuading others to join such
a group, and drawing minors into a religious organization without the
permission of their parents. The Criminal Code was amended again in May
with two changes that affected religious freedom. The changes draw a
distinction between ``illegal'' groups (which are those not registered
properly) and ``prohibited'' groups (which are banned). The first
measure makes it a criminal offense punishable by up to 5 years in
prison to organize an illegal religious group or to resume the
activities of such a group (presumably after being denied registration
or ordered to disband), or to participate in the activities of such a
group (punishable by up to 3 years in prison. The second measure sets
out stiff penalties up to 20 years in prison and confiscation of
property for organizing or participating in the activities of religious
extremist, fundamentalist, separatist, or other prohibited groups.
Although authorities tolerate many Christian evangelical groups,
government officials often harass those that openly try to convert
Muslims to Christianity. Although the distribution of religious
literature by duly registered central offices of religious
organizations is legal, missionary activity and proselytizing is not,
and the requirements for establishing such central offices are
burdensome (only five have been registered to date). The Government is
often intolerant of those groups that officials believe are cults;
engage in missionary activity; or otherwise do not conform to the
requirements of the religion law.
Although authorities tolerate many Christian evangelical groups,
the Government often harasses those that openly try to convert Muslims
to Christianity. Some evangelical churches found it difficult to obtain
registration and reregistration. Among those religious groups whose
applications for legal registration have not been approved are a number
of Jehovah's Witnesses congregations throughout the country, the
International Protestant Church of Tashkent, a Baptist congregation in
Urgench, the Full Gospel Pentecostal Church in Nukus, and Seventh-Day
Adventist congregations in Akhangaran and Almalyk. Government officials
stated that many of the unregistered groups could not meet the
requirement of 100 Uzbek members. They added that Jehovah's Witnesses
were denied because they proselytize and do not recognize secular
authority, and that another unregistered group, the Reformed Baptists,
simply refused to register.
On the other hand, the Committee on Religious Affairs has approved
the registration of 167 minority religious groups including 32 Russian
Orthodox, 23 Baptist, 26 Pentecostal (``Full Gospel''), 10 Seventh-Day
Adventist, 47 Korean Christian, 8 Jewish, 5 Bahai, 2 Jehovah's Witness
and 2 Krishna Consciousness. Several of these congregations had fewer
than the required 100 members but received exemptions from the
requirement. The Roman Catholic Monsignor reports that his church has
received permission to operate, but that formal registration was
pending the resolution of some difficulties regarding documentation.
Denis Podorozhny's Word of Faith Pentecostal Church near Tashkent,
which lost its registration in 1998, was reregistered.
On numerous occasions, the Government restricted the right to
religious freedom through use of the religion law and other statutes.
Police have often broken up meetings of unregistered groups. Pastors or
group leaders can be subject to fines or even imprisoned.
For example as many as 10 Jehovah's Witnesses congregations have
been fined for illegal gatherings, dissemination of printed matter, or
missionary activity. A judge of the city court of Karshi said on state
television on March 28 and 30, that Jehovah's Witnesses was a dangerous
sect bent on usurping government power. One member of Jehovah's
Witnesses, Sergei Brazgin of Uchkuduk, was arrested on February 22,
shortly after police broke up a Bible reading in his home. Police
declared a Bible discussion in which he participated on February 14, to
be an illegal activity. He was subsequently sentenced to 2 years in
prison on three counts of illegal religious activity but released on
August 20. Press reports indicate that a Christian was arrested in June
after reportedly giving out several Christian tracts in the Karakalpak
language at an airport. Reportedly, he was fined but not imprisoned.
In March authorities in Nukus arrested Pastor Rashid Turibayev of
the unregistered Karakalpak Full Gospel Christian Church and his
associates, Farkhad Yangibayev and Yasif Tarashev. Police allegedly
planted narcotics on them to justify the arrests. The court convicted
all three on June 9. Turibayev was convicted of the narcotics charge as
well as three counts of violating the religious law and sentenced to 15
years in prison. His associates were sentenced to 10 years each for
narcotics but were not charged with religious offenses. Turibayev
previously had been sentenced to 2 years of hard labor in May 1997 for
leading illegal church services, but subsequently he was amnestied and
released. Na'il Asanov of the Bukhara Church of Christ was arrested in
May after police allegedly planted narcotics on him. He was sentenced
on June 30 to 5 years in prison. Pastor Ibrahim Yusupov of an
unregistered Tashkent Christian church was sentenced on June 24 to 1
year in prison for proselytizing.
Central government officials, as well as many Christian leaders,
view these and other incidents of harassment as isolated cases of local
officials misapplying the law.
On August 20, the President pardoned and ordered the release of
Brazgin, Asanov, Yusupov, and Turibayev and his two colleagues.
There were reports that since their release, certain church members
continued to be harassed. Pastor Turibayev of the Karakalpak Full
Gospel Christian Church is heading his church again. However, the
Church is not yet registered and the prosecutor has threatened to
confiscate it. Local militia summoned Turibayev twice at the end of
September to question him further regarding his alleged possession of
drugs. The militia also failed to return Turibayev's passport, claiming
that it was lost. The lawyer for released Jehovah's Witnesses prisoner
Sergei Brazgin reportedly said that after his release from prison,
Brazgin remained under permanent pressure from the local police.
On October 10, the police raided the annual harvest celebration at
a Baptist Church in the city of Karshi (the church is one of several
Baptist congregations that due to religious conviction had not
attempted to register). The police detained and beat many of the
participants. Authorities sentenced two of the group's organizers to 10
days incarceration and were forced to pay fines. The Government
investigated the incident and some officials acknowledge that the
Karshi police acted improperly; however, no disciplinary action had
been taken against the officers involved by year's end.
The most serious abuses of the right to religious freedom were
committed against Muslim believers. While tolerant of moderate Muslims,
the Government seeks to control the Islamic hierarchy and is intolerant
of Islamic groups that attempt to operate outside the state-controlled
system. The Government seeks to control the content of imams' sermons,
and the volume and substance of published Islamic materials. At the
beginning of 1998, the Government ordered the removal of loudspeakers
from mosques in order to prevent the public broadcasting of morning and
evening calls to prayer. The Government closed several hundred
nonauthorized mosques during 1998. Although the Government has not
closed additional mosques, loudspeakers remain banned.
The Government is determined to prevent the spread of ultra-
conservative or extremist varieties of Sunni Islam, which it labels
``Wahhabbism'' and considers destabilizing. President Karimov
frequently has declared the Government's intention to rid the country
of Wahhabists and underground Islamic groups such as Hezbut Tahrir,
which it views as extremist. The Government considers such groups as
political and security threats and represses them severely. Hezbut
Tahrir members admit that they desire an Islamic government but deny
that they advocate violence. Dissident Islamic figures deny that they
are extremists and claim that they are being persecuted for their
unwillingness to support the Government. Speaking on state television
on April 4, Interior Minister Zakirdjon Almatov said that young Uzbek
men who have embraced radical Islam in certain countries abroad can
avoid punishment if they voluntarily turn themselves in to authorities.
Almatov added that any who fail to do so would be punished severely,
and that their fathers also would be held legally responsible.
The security forces have detained and harassed Muslim leaders for
perceived acts of insubordination and independence. Islamic activist
Abdurauf Gafurov, whose sentence was extended by 3 years in 1998, was
finally released in October. In 1996 the government-appointed mufti
fired a number of independent clerics and closed their mosques. The
Andijon Friday mosque, where Imam Abduvali Mirzaev (see Section 1.b.)
formerly preached, has been closed since mid 1995.
A leading independent Muslim cleric, Imam Abidkhon Nazarov, has
been missing since March 5, 1998, when dozens of police and security
agents raided and searched his home. Although his family claims that
the security services abducted him, the Government and many observers
believe that he fled to avoid arrest.
Since Imam Abidkhon Nazarov disappearance, the Government has
persecuted his family harshly (see Section 1.d.). In February just
after the terrorist bombing in Tashkent, authorities detained Nazarov's
wife, Minnura Nasretdinova, for 10 days on charges of hooliganism. An
associate of Nazarov's, Mukhtabar Akhmedova, was arrested and sentenced
on March 4 to 10 days' imprisonment for assaulting an undercover police
officer who had broken into her courtyard and confiscated her computer
and other office equipment. In March Nazarov's brother, Umarkhon
Nazarov, his uncle, Ahmadali Salomov, and his brother-in-law,
Abdurashid Nasretdinov, were arrested and charged with planning a coup
d'etat. On May 20, his brother Umarkhon was sentenced in Namangan to 11
years in prison, and his uncle Akhmadali Salamov and brother-in-law
Abdurashid Nasriddinov each were sentenced to 4 years in prison. Police
reportedly planted Islamist literature on the Nazarov relatives in
order to justify their arrest and beat them during interrogation. At
present, all male members of Nazarov's close family are in prison.
Human rights observers believe that their only real offense was being
related to Nazarov.
On January 8, a Tashkent court sentenced Oqihon Ziehanov and four
other alleged ``Wahhabist'' associates of missing Imam Abidkhon Nazarov
to between 2 to 12 years on a variety of charges including possession
of narcotics and ammunition. Two of the defendants were convicted of
conspiring to overthrow the constitutional order. The defendants
claimed credibly that the police had planted the narcotics and
ammunition and that the cases against them had been fabricated. In mid-
year four of the five defendants reportedly were transferred to the new
prison facility near Jaslik, Karakalpakstan (see Section 1.c.).
The arrest of Nazarov's relatives, the January conviction of
Oquilhon Ziehanov and four other associates of Nazarov, and the
December 1998 conviction of 15 alleged followers of Mirzaev were
characteristic of the Government's campaign, waged through much of the
1990's, to rid the country of so-called Wahabbists.'' Several human
rights observers reported that prison officials confiscated all Korans
and religious literature and banned prayer in the prisons.
Several persons arrested for religious reasons apparently died from
mistreatment in custody. On June 14, police arrested Farkhod Usmanov
for possession of a Hezbut Tahrir leaflet. Usmanov apparently was
beaten or tortured to death in custody. Usmanov was the son of former
Iman Nosir-Kori Usmanov. According to Human Rights Watch, after holding
him incommunicado for 11 days, officials returned his body, which
showed bruises and injuries, to his family on June 25, claiming that he
had died of heart failure.
Akhmadhon Turahonov died in custody on June 19, reportedly because
prison authorities refused to treat his diabetes. Thrahonov was a
member of the Birlik Democratic Movement and a human rights activist,
and was not religious. Officials nonetheless accused him of being a
Wahhabist and charged him with hooliganism and conspiring to overthrow
the Constitution. In addition to these three cases, there were
unconfirmed reports of at least five other deaths by torture or
beating.
An outspoken Muslim cleric, Qobil Muradov, apparently was beaten to
death in prison on October 30, 1998. His body showed severe bruising,
his teeth were knocked out, and his collarbone and several ribs were
broken. Officials alternately claimed that he had fallen accidentally
from a wall and that other prisoners had beaten him. Like many persons
whom the Government considers to be enemies he was arrested for
possession of narcotics, which probably were planted on him by police.
He had not been tried at the time of his death.
According to press reports in June, Ministry of Interior police
arrested several dozen persons in Tashkent for distributing Hezbut
Tahrir leaflets allegedly ``propagating an extremist Muslim teaching''
that was banned.
There were no reported developments in the 1995 disappearance of
Imam Abduvali Kori Mirzaev; the 1997 disappearance of his assistant,
Nematjon Parpiev; or the 1992 disappearance of Aboullah Utaev, leader
of the outlawed Islamic Renaissance Party.
The February Tashkent bombings prompted the Government to
reinvigorate its campaign against Islamic fundamentalism. Although no
group claimed responsibility for the bombings, the President blamed
Islamic extremist groups. He said that up to 3,000 youths had been
corrupted by studying Islam at foreign madrassas (Muslim religious
schools), where they may have received terrorist training. He pledged
to bring charges against these persons--and against their fathers--if
they did not confess and repent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. By
the end of April, the Government claimed, over 1,000 had taken
advantage of this offer.
As after the Namangan murders, from February to April, police
detained, without due process, scores of those whose religious piety
made them suspect in the eyes of the security services. The majority of
those detained were released after questioning and detention that
lasted as long as 2 months. On June 28, the Supreme Court sentenced six
men to death for their role in the bombings. Prison sentences were
handed out to 16 others.
Beginning in April the Government launched a series of unannounced
trials throughout the country of members of Hezbut Tahrir. Police
allegedly planted narcotics and weapons on many of them in order to
justify arrest (also see Section 1.c.). By year's end, the Government
had arrested at least 1,500 and the number convicted was believed to
exceed 1,000. The total number in pretrial detention is unknown but
could be several hundred. Human rights activists contend that the
number is over 1,000 (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Most defendants have
acknowledged membership in the group but claim that they believe in
peaceful change. Others appear not to be members of the group but to
have been caught in the net because of their religious piety. While the
Government has not charged that Hezbut Tahrir was involved in the
bombings, group members usually are accused of acting to overthrow the
constitutional order and of belonging to a prohibited religious
organization. Police also allegedly planted drugs on various members of
Christian denominations in order to arrest them.
The Government does not consider this repression to be directed
against religious freedom itself but instead against those who desire
to overthrow the secular order. However, authorities are highly
suspicious of those who are more pious than is the norm: frequent
mosque attendees; bearded men; and veiled women. In practice this
approach results in mistreatment of many devout Muslims for their
religious beliefs.
In 1999 Human Rights Watch compiled a list of 28 confirmed cases
from 1997 and 1998 in which university and secondary school students
have been expelled for wearing religious dress (see Section 1.f.).
Several of these students from Tashkent's Oriental Studies Institute
brought suit in civil court to be reinstated but were unsuccessful. A
further group of 15 female students at Ferghana State University were
harassed and ultimately forced to leave school in March.
Synagogues function openly; Hebrew education (long banned under the
Soviets), Jewish cultural events, and the publication of a community
newspaper take place undisturbed.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for free
movement within the country and across its borders, and the Government
generally respected these rights. Citizens must have permission from
local authorities in order to resettle in a new city. The Government
rarely grants this permission to those who wish to move to Tashkent.
The Government requires citizens to obtain exit visas for foreign
travel, or emigration, but grants these permits routinely. All citizens
have a right to a passport, and the Government does not restrict this
right. The new passports serve as both internal identity cards and,
when properly certified, as external passports. Every citizen must
carry such a document when traveling inside or outside the country.
Police occasionally confiscate these documents, severely restricting a
person's right to travel.
Movement within the country of foreigners with valid visas
generally is unrestricted. However, visitors require special permission
to travel to certain areas, such as Termez, on the Afghan border.
Several Uzbek human rights activists were able to leave and reenter
the country without encountering problems from the Government. However,
in October the Government did not issue promptly an exit visa to human
rights activist Tolib Yakubov, and prevented him from attending an OSCE
Review Conference prior to the Istanbul Summit. Yakubov subsequently
received a visa and left and reentered the country without difficulty.
The Government also confiscated the passport of human rights activist
Mikhail Ardzinov on June 25, restricting his freedom of movement within
the country and preventing him from attending international
conferences.
The law on citizenship stipulates that citizens do not lose their
citizenship if they reside overseas. However, since Uzbekistan does not
provide for dual citizenship, those acquiring other citizenships lose
Uzbek citizenship. If they return to the country as foreign citizens,
they are subject to foreign visa regulations. In practice the burden is
on returning individuals to prove to authorities that they have not
acquired foreign citizenship while abroad. There were reports during
the year that some ethnic Russians attempting to return after residing
abroad were denied residence permits and new passports.
There is no law concerning the rights of refugees and asylum
seekers, and the Government does not recognize the right of first
asylum. The Government does not adhere to the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Protection of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government
considers asylum seekers from Tajikistan and Afghanistan to be economic
migrants, and such individuals are subject to harassment and bribe
demands when seeking to regularize their status. They may be deported
if their residency documents are not in order. However, the Government
agreed in August that it would not force those who have received U.N.
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) mandate refugee status to leave
the country. Prior to that decision, the Supreme Court denied Afghan
mandate refugee Mohammed Tahir permission to remain in the country. The
UNHCR had acted as an advocate for Tahir in order to test refugee
policy.
The country hosts populations of ethnic Koreans, Meskhetian Turks,
Germans, Greeks, and Crimean Tartars deported to Central Asia by Stalin
during World War II. These groups enjoy the same rights as other
citizens. Although they are free to return to their ancestral
homelands, absorption problems in those countries have slowed that
return. The UNHCR estimates that there are 30,000 Tajik and 8,000
Afghan asylum seekers. The UNHCR completed reregistration of refugee
cases in March and reported that there are now 852 mandate refugees and
269 registered cases of asylum requests pending.
According to the UNHCR there were 11 cases of forced repatriation
(6 to Kazakhstan and 5 to the Kyrgyz Republic).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
While the Constitution provides for this right, in reality citizens
cannot change their government through peaceful and democratic means.
The Government severely represses opposition groups and individuals and
applies strict limits on freedom of expression. No opposition groups
participated in government or were allowed to function legally.
The Government is highly centralized and is ruled by a strong
presidency. President Karimov, formerly the first secretary of the
Communist Party in Uzbekistan under Soviet rule, was elected in a
limited multicandidate election in 1991. A 1995 Soviet-style referendum
and subsequent parliamentary decision extended Karimov's term until
2000. President Karimov and the executive branch retain control through
sweeping decree powers, primary authority for drafting legislation, and
control of virtually all government appointments, most aspects of the
economy, and the security forces.
Most government officials are members of the People's Democratic
Party of Uzbekistan (PDP), formerly the Communist Party and still the
country's largest party. However, the party as such does not appear to
play a significant role in the Government, and the President resigned
his chairmanship of the party in 1996. There are four other parties;
however, these were created with government assistance and are loyal to
President Karimov. All five parties participated in the December
elections to the Oliy Majlis (Parliament), during which 93 percent of
the electorate cast their vote. However, parties that competed in the
parliamentary elections, as well as the numerous independent
candidates, were congenial to the Government and did not represent a
real choice for voters.
Because the voters lacked a choice, the OSCE and many international
observers concluded that the December legislative elections fell short
of adherence to accepted standards of free and fair elections. Local
and regional hokims (governors)--who are appointed by the president--
exerted a strong influence on the selection of candidates and the
conduct of campaigns. Nearly half (110 out of 250) of those elected
were not from party lists but were either hokims themselves or were
nominated by the hokims' local assemblies. Only 16 of the 250 winning
candidates had been nominated by citizens' initiative groups. These
candidates generally were allowed on the ballot only if they were
approved by the hokims.
The Oliy Majlis is constitutionally the highest government body. In
practice despite assistance efforts by international donors to upgrade
its ability to draft laws independently, its main purpose is to confirm
laws and other decisions drafted by the executive branch rather than to
initiate legislation.
New laws governing the conduct of parliamentary and presidential
elections, as well as a law creating a Central Election Commission,
came into effect in 1998. These laws, combined with the 1997 law on
political parties, make it extremely difficult for opposition parties
to come into being, to nominate candidates, and to campaign. The
procedures to register a candidate are burdensome and the Central
Election Commission has authority to deny registration. For example a
presidential candidate is prohibited from campaigning before being
registered, but must present a list of 150,000 signatures in order to
be registered. The Central Election Commission must deny registration
of presidential candidates who are found to ``harm the health and
morality of the people.'' The consensus among independent observers,
including national and local party leaders, as well as the business,
religious, press, and NGO communities, indicates that the race for
president was stacked in favor of incumbent President Karimov. The 1998
statutes deleted a previous provision allowing recourse to the Supreme
Court to candidates whose parties are denied registration. The Ministry
of Justice has the right to suspend parties for up to 6 months without
a court order.
Citizens initiative groups of 100 members or more may nominate
candidates to the Parliament by submitting signatures of at least 8
percent of the voters in the electoral district. Other interest groups
are forbidden from participating in campaigns and candidates may meet
with voters only in forums organized by precinct election commissions.
The 1998 laws repeal the right of parties to fund their candidates'
campaigns directly. Instead, parties must turn over all campaign money
to the Central Election Commission, which then distributes the funds
equally among the candidates. Only the Central Election Commission may
prepare and release presidential campaign posters. In August the
Parliament enacted minor modifications to the election laws, but these
have little practical effect.
According to the Law on Political Parties, judges, public
prosecutors, National Security Service officials, servicemen, foreign
citizens, and stateless persons (among others) cannot join political
parties. However, the law is less clear regarding membership in
unregistered organizations. By law the Government prohibits formation
of parties based on religion or nationality; those that oppose the
sovereignty, integrity, and security of the country and the
constitutional rights and freedoms of citizens; or those which promote
war or social, national, or religious hostility; religious political
organizations; and political organizations that seek to overthrow the
Government, or sow national or racial hatred. Moreover, the Government
has refused to register democratic political opposition organizations.
Membership in unregistered political organizations is not forbidden
officially, but membership in unregistered organizations with a
prohibited goal or premise is forbidden.
The Government continues to persecute members of unregistered,
political opposition groups using methods such as, arbitrary arrest,
conviction on falsified charges, surveillance, and loss of employment.
The leaders of the two largest unregistered opposition groups in the
country--Mohammed Solikh of the Erk Democratic Party and Abdurakhim
Polat of the Birlik Democratic Movement--were forced into exile in the
early 1990's. After the February bombings, persecution of members of
these groups intensified. The Government repeatedly has accused Erk
leader Solikh, who ran against Karimov for the presidency in 1992, of
being a leader of the terrorist plot behind the bombings. On August 18,
a Tashkent court convicted four Erk members and one Birlik member of
conspiracy to overthrow the constitutional order, of membership in
illegal organizations, and of insulting the President. The Erk members
included noted writer Mamadali Makhmudov, Yusup Razimuradov, and two
brothers of Mohhamed Solikh (Rashid and Muhammed Bekhjanov). The Birlik
member, Kobil Diarov, was arrested in Kiev along with his acquaintance
Nigmat Sharifov, who was not affiliated with any political organization
but sentenced to 8 years in prison. Muhammed Bekhjanov was sentenced to
15 years; Rashid Bekhjanov to 12 years; Mamadali Makhmudov to 14 years;
Yusup Ruzimuradov to 15 years; and Kobil Diarov to 12 years. The
Supreme Court upheld the Court's decision on appeal in November.
Dozens of Erk and Birlik activists reported that after the bombings
they were subjected to various forms of harassment: frequent
surveillance; restrictions on movement; searches of their homes;
lengthy police interrogations; and, occasionally, detentions. In July
the son of Erk party secretary Atanazar Aripov was taken by police from
in front of a Western embassy and detained for over 18 hours before
being released.
Traditionally, women participate much less than men in government
and politics and they are underrepresented in these fields. Before the
December elections, 21 of 250 deputies in the Parliament were women,
and there are 17 in the new Parliament. In the Government prior to the
December election, there were 2 women (both with the rank of deputy
prime minister) among 28 members of the Cabinet; 1 was charged
specifically with women's issues.
There are 9 ethnic Russians (down from 14), 1 Korean, and 1
Armenian elected to the current Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government restricts and harasses local nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) working on human rights and refuses to register
the country's two main human rights organizations.
Security forces continue to persecute human rights activists and
the Government still refuses to register the country's two main human
rights organizations. The chairman of the HRSU, Abdumannob Polat, lives
in voluntary exile. Neither the IHROU nor the HRSU resubmitted
applications to register during the year; there was no indication that
they would be registered.
On May 12, police arrested Ravshan Hamidov, a houseguest of Mahbuba
Kasimova, a member of the IHROU and of the Birlik Democratic Movement.
During their search of Hamidov's belongings in Kasimova's house, police
allegedly planted narcotics, a grenade, and literature linking him to
the Islom Lashkarlari religious extremist organization. Hamidov has
family ties to leaders of Birlik. Immediately after the arrest,
Ministry of the Interior officials interrogated Kasimova for several
days. On one occasion, the investigators organized a citizens' assembly
headed by the deputy hokim (mayor) of Tashkent, Shukrat Jalilov, at
which she was accused falsely of supporting religious extremists and
advocating the creation of an Islamic state. In front of relatives of
victims of the February bombings, she was accused of moral complicity
in the deaths of those victims. Ignoring the constitutionally mandated
presumption of innocence, newspaper, television, and radio coverage of
the event echoed the accusations.
In a 3-hour trial on July 13, a Tashkent court convicted Kasimova
of harboring a criminal, although her husband was the owner of the
house and Hamidov had not yet been tried (and therefore technically
could not be considered a criminal). The prosecutor argued that
Kasimova should have known that Hamidov was wanted by police, although
his arrest was not based on a previous arrest warrant but on the
alleged discovery of contraband (see Section 1.e.). In July Kasimova
was sentenced to 5 years in prison; on August 17, after a 45-minute
appeal hearing, the judge confirmed the original sentence.
On June 25, police detained IHROU head Mikhail Ardzinov for
questioning. Ardzinov has alleged that the police beat him twice during
the episode. Although the Government denies beating Ardzinov, a
reliable medical expert confirmed that he was beaten severely. Police
also ransacked Ardzinov's apartment, confiscating his passport, papers,
and office equipment. At year's end, Ardzinov reported that the
Government had not returned his property.
On July 10, police took into custody IHROU member Ismail Adylov and
held him incommunicado for 72 hours before confirming his whereabouts
to his family. Police allegedly planted 100 Hezbut Tahrir leaflets
among his effects to justify the arrest, although Adylov is known not
to be religious. On September 29, a remote regional court sentenced
Adylov, who has a kidney ailment, to 6 years in prison for allegedly
possessing incriminating papers. Reporters and the defendant's family
were not allowed to attend the 2-day trial; his appeal was denied on
October 26.
In September 1998, authorities arrested Muidin Kurbanov, a member
of HRSU's Jizzak chapter. Police beat him repeatedly and questioned him
about his organization and about Imam Obidhon Nazarov. On the basis of
fabricated charges, a judged sentenced him, without a lawyer or
prosecutor present, to 3 years in prison. In January Kurbanov was
released from prison under a presidential decree; however, authorities
in Jizzak continued to harass him and threatened to charge him with
membership in the Islamic organization Hezbut Tahrir.
One international human rights group, Human Rights Watch, has
permission to operate in the country and has had an office in Tashkent
since 1996. The group operates independently and has no affiliation
with the Government.
After years of opposition and delay, the Government registered one
human rights NGO in 1996. The registered NGO, the Committee for
Protection of the Rights of Individuals, was formed with the support of
the Government, but has ties to opposition figures as well. Some
sources affiliated with other groups have questioned its independence
from the Government; it has had no recent success in investigating or
correcting abuses.
Since 1997 there has been a human rights ombudsman's office
affiliated with the Parliament. The ombudsman may make recommendations
to modify or uphold decisions of state agencies, but the
recommendations are not binding. The ombudsman is prohibited from
investigating disputes within the purview of courts. The ombudsman
replaced the parliamentary human rights commissioner, who had
insufficient trained staff to carry out in-depth investigations of
human rights violations and did not vigorously pursue allegations
against the police and security forces. The office of the ombudsman
increased its staff and received authorization to open regional offices
throughout the country. The ombudsman issues reports identifying the
most serious types of violations of human rights by government
officials. The office claims that it has assisted hundreds of citizens
in redressing human rights abuses, the majority of which involve
allegedly unjust court decisions and claims of abuse of power by police
and local officials. While most of the successfully resolved cases
appear relatively minor, at least one during the year involved a
capital crime. Ulugbek Usunov was convicted erroneously of murder in
1998--after 20 months of pretrial detention. Since the prosecutor and
judge handled the case poorly, an intervention by the ombudsman
succeeded in getting the court decision reversed and Usunov released.
During the year, the ombudsman met twice with a consultative committee
of Uzbek officials and foreign observers.
The National Human Rights Center of Uzbekistan, created by
presidential decree in October 1996, has as its purpose to educate the
population and government officials about the principles of human
rights and democracy. The center's chief activity is to hold seminars
and training, and it is not involved in human rights advocacy. The
center has worked closely with international organizations such as the
United Nations Development Program and the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The Government is willing to discuss human rights matters with
organizations such as the OSCE, as well as with foreign embassies. The
U.N. has not sent human rights commission members or special
rapporteurs to the country. In 1996 the Government announced its
willingness to hold an open dialog with international human rights
NGO's, and held several high-level discussions with representatives of
Human Rights Watch during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Both the Constitution and the 1992 law on citizenship prohibit
discrimination on the basis of sex, religion, language, or social
status; however, societal discrimination against women persists.
Women.--Spousal abuse is common, but both local activists and the
police say they have no statistics. At a September seminar on domestic
violence, representatives of NGO's with crisis centers reported that
the number of women seeking assistance is growing rapidly. Wife beating
is considered a personal family affair rather than a criminal act, and
thus such cases usually are handled by family members or elders within
the community (mahalla) and rarely come to court.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution occurs,
particularly to the Persian Gulf and Turkey (see Section 6.f.).
Prostitution within the country is a growing problem stemming from the
worsening economic situation.
Due to tradition, women, particularly in rural areas, usually marry
before age 20, bear many children, and confine their activities to
within the family. In rural areas, women often find themselves working
in the cotton fields during the harvest season. However, women are not
impeded formally from seeking a role in the workplace. The barriers to
equality for women are cultural, not legal, and women who open
businesses or seek careers are not hindered legally.
Although the law prohibits discrimination against women,
traditional cultural and religious practices limit their role in
everyday society. For these reasons, women are underrepresented
severely in high-level positions. In 1995 President Karimov issued a
decree on measures to increase the role of women in society,
particularly extending their participation in state and social
administration and coordinating the activities of ministries and social
organizations as they relate to women's issues. In this connection, a
deputy prime minister position was created in 1995 charged with
furthering the role of women in society. The edict also created heads
of women's affairs in the autonomous republic of Karakalpakstan,
regions, cities, and districts. The Ministry of Finance was ordered to
allocate the necessary funds to finance these new positions and working
bodies, but the groups complained their budgets were not sufficient.
Government-controlled women's committees were formed in most regions in
1995, but most are underfunded and play only a minor role in improving
the condition of women.
The President declared 1999 to be the year of the woman. In April
the Government promulgated a law extending additional rights to women;
it reduced the workweek to 35 hours for female employees of the State
and reduced the optional retirement age for women to 54 years (after 20
years of employment). Government-sponsored activities also included a
series of seminars, newspaper articles, public service announcements,
and television programs that increased awareness of women's issues.
Several dozen NGO's address the needs of women. The Businesswomen's
Association in Tashkent, in addition to providing resources and
information about developing small enterprises, operates a store that
sells clothing and crafts. A center in Tashkent conducts seminars on
sexual harassment, domestic violence, and the legal rights of women.
Another center in Samarkand operates a crisis hot line and provides
educational services on alcoholism, sexually transmitted diseases, and
family counseling.
Depressed because of their low social status, some women and girls
resort to suicide by self-immolation. There are no reliable statistics
on the extent of this problem, since most cases go unreported. However,
representatives of women's groups have observed an increase in self-
immolation, which remains the most frequent form of suicide for women
in desperate circumstances. After marriage many women or girls move
into the husband's home, where they occupy the lowest rung on the
family social ladder. A conflict with the husband or mother-in-law, who
by tradition exercises complete control over the young bride, usually
is the stimulus for suicide.
A 1997 research study indicates that the number of women enrolling
in higher education is diminishing; for example, women's enrollment in
the finance and banking institute dropped from 65 percent in 1991 to
about 25 percent in 1997. Cutbacks in government funding to
universities and the need for families to fund a higher percentage of
educational costs leaves many families in the position of being able to
fund the education of only one child, either a son or a daughter. The
report states that university faculty ``steer'' women into occupations
traditionally performed by females and suggests that administrators may
practice a policy of deliberately barring entrance to women in some
fields.
Children.--The Constitution provides for children's rights, stating
that parents are obliged to support and care for their children until
they reach majority at age 18. Traditional Uzbek values reinforce the
cohesion of families; in most cases, several generations of a family
live together. In theory the State provides free universal primary
education and health care. In practice shortages and budget
difficulties mean that some services must be paid privately. The State
grants monetary allowances to families based on their number of
children. The country has a very high birthrate; over one-half of the
population is under the age of 15.
Nine years of formal schooling are compulsory, and the average
length of schooling is over 11 years. The U.N. Development Program
reports that 100 percent of children complete secondary school.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children. Trafficking in
girls for the purpose of prostitution occurs (see Section 6.f.).
People with Disabilities.--One of the country's first laws, adopted
only 2 months after independence in 1991, provided support for the
disabled. This law was aimed at ensuring that the disabled have the
same rights as other citizens. However, little effort is made to bring
the disabled into the mainstream. The State cares for the mentally
disabled in special homes. The Government has not mandated access to
public places for the disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Government statistics dating
from 1992 show that the population of approximately 23 million is about
71 percent Uzbeks, 8 percent Russians, 5 percent Tajiks, 4 percent
Tatars, and 3 percent Kazakhs, with many other ethnic groups
represented. The statistics may underestimate the actual number of
ethnic Tajiks. The figures also do not include many ethnic Tajiks whose
mother tongue was Uzbek. Moreover, some Tajiks choose for a variety of
reasons to declare themselves to be ethnic Uzbeks.
Ethnic groups other than Uzbeks, particularly Russians frequently
complain that job opportunities are limited for them. Senior positions
in the government bureaucracy and business generally are reserved for
ethnic Uzbeks, although there are numerous exceptions to this rule.
The 1992 citizenship law does not impose language requirements for
citizenship. Nonetheless, the language issue remains very sensitive.
Uzbek has been declared the state language, and the Constitution
requires that the President speak Uzbek. However, the language law
provides for Russian as ``the language of interethnic communication.''
Russian is widely spoken in the main cities, and Tajik is widely spoken
in Samarkand and Bukhara. The 1989 language law originally required
that Uzbek would be the sole method of official communication by 1998,
but subsequently was modified and now stipulates no specific date. The
Government also is in the process of replacing the Cyrillic alphabet
with the Latin alphabet. However, realizing the difficulties for Uzbeks
and minorities alike, the Government has delayed the full transition to
both the Uzbek and the Latin alphabet to 2005.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The 1992 law on unions specifically
provides that all workers have the right voluntarily to form and join
unions of their choice, and that trade unions themselves may
voluntarily associate territorially or sectorally. Membership in trade
unions is optional. The law also declares all unions independent of the
State's administrative and economic bodies (except where provided for
by law), and states that trade unions should develop their own
charters, structure, and executive bodies and organize their own work.
However, in practice the overall structure of trade unions has not
changed significantly since the Soviet era. Independence has eliminated
subordination to Moscow but has not altered the centralized trade union
hierarchy, which remains dependent on the Government. No
``alternative'' central union structures exist.
A few new professional associations and interest groups have been
organized, such as a union of entrepreneurs, a union of renters, and an
association of private physicians and pharmacists. Registered
professional associations for judges and lawyers formed in 1997; both
organizations were quasi-governmental. An association of broadcasters
formed in 1998 has failed to gain government registration (see Section
2.b.). The main activity of all registered associations is professional
development. They do not license members and have no formal role in
advocating the interests of members in relation to the Government.
According to the law, the Council of the Federation of Trade Unions
(CFTU) has a consultative voice in the preparation of all legislation
affecting workers and is entitled to draft laws on labor and social
issues. Trade unions are described legally as organizations that defend
the right to work and to protect jobs. They have lost their previous
role in state planning and in the management of enterprises. The
emphasis now is on the unions' responsibility for ``social protection''
and social justice--especially unemployment compensation, pensions, and
worker retraining.
The trade union law does not mention strikes or cite a right to
strike. However, the law does give the unions oversight for both
individual and collective labor disputes, which are defined as those
involving alleged violations of labor laws, worker rights, or
collective agreements.
There were few reports of strikes. This circumstance likely
reflects the absence of truly representative trade unions, as the
standard of living fell and growing unemployment raised social
tensions. The absence of labor activism also reflects the Communist
legacy of docility in the face of authority. However, both union and
government officials assert that the lack of strikes reflects general
support for the Government's policies and common interest in social
stability.
The 1992 law on unions provides that unions may choose their own
international affiliations; however, none have done so.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Trade unions
may conclude agreements with enterprises. Privatization is still in its
very early phase. As a result, there is no experience with negotiations
that could be described as adversarial between unions and private
employers. The State is still the major employer, and the state-
appointed union leaders do not view themselves as having conflicts of
interest with the State.
The Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Finance in consultation
with the CFTU, set the wages for various categories of state employees.
In the small private sector, management establishes wages or negotiates
them with those who contract for employment.
The law forbids discrimination against union members and their
officers.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
specifically prohibits forced labor, except as legal punishment or as
may be specified by law. The law does not specifically prohibit forced
and bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to
occur. However, large-scale compulsory mobilization of youth and
students (by closing schools) to help with the cotton harvest
continues. Student labor is paid poorly, and students sometimes must
pay for their food. Adults, including teachers and passersby in
automobiles and busses, similarly are forced into the harvest effort.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.-- The minimum working age is 16 years; 15-year-olds can
receive state permission to work, but have a shorter workday. In rural
areas, younger children and the elderly often help to harvest cotton
and other crops (see Section 6.c.). The Labor Ministry has an
inspection service, which is responsible for enforcing compliance with
these and other regulations governing employment conditions, and
enforces them effectively.
The law does not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by
children, and such practices are not known to occur, except for
compulsory mobilization for the cotton harvest (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Labor, in
consultation with the CFTU, sets the minimum wage. As of September 1,
it was about $10 (1,750 som) per month. The minimum wage is not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. The standard workweek is set at 41 hours and requires a 24-hour
rest period. Some factories apparently have reduced work hours in order
to avoid layoffs. Overtime pay exists in theory but is not always paid.
Pay arrearages of 3 to 6 months are not uncommon for workers in
state-owned industries. The problem appears to be growing.
The Labor Ministry establishes occupational health and safety
standards in consultation with the unions. There is a health and safety
inspectorate in the Ministry. The local press occasionally published
complaints about the failure of unions and government authorities to do
enough to promote worker safety. Although written regulations may
provide adequate safeguards, workers in hazardous jobs often lack
protective clothing and equipment. Workers can leave jobs that are
hazardous without apparent jeopardy to continued employment; however,
in practice, high rates of underemployment make this step difficult
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There no laws relating specifically to
trafficking in persons. Trafficking in women and girls for the purpose
of prostitution occurs, particularly to the Persian Gulf and Turkey.
However, there are no reliable statistics on this problem, and it does
not seem to be carried out on a large scale (see Section 5).
Anecdotal reports from NGO's indicate that the number of young
women forced into prostitution abroad is growing. The Government has
not acknowledged the problem publicly, but has taken some measures to
combat it. According to NGO representatives, the police force in
Samarkand formed a special unit on trafficking in women in 1998, but
the unit's effectiveness is hampered by a lack of resources. Border
guards at airports were directed to give more scrutiny to unaccompanied
young women traveling to Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and South
Korea; they are authorized to deny such women permission to leave the
country. There is no government program to educate or assist potential
victims; however, the State University for World Economy and Diplomacy
sponsored a series of lectures on domestic violence and trafficking in
women during the year.
NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
----------
ALGERIA
President Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected in April to a 5-year
term. Bouteflika spent most of the last 2 decades outside the country,
but previously had served as Foreign Minister. The President is the
constitutional head of state, appoints and dismisses the Prime Minister
and cabinet ministers, and may dissolve the legislature. The military
establishment strongly influences defense and foreign policy.
Bouteflika was regarded throughout the election campaign as the
candidate most favored by the dominant security establishment and the
most likely winner. At the end of the campaign, the other six
candidates withdrew, credibly charging massive fraud by the military,
and Bouteflika was elected easily, although with a turnout as low as 30
percent. In June 1997, Algeria held its first parliamentary elections
since January 1992 and elected the first multiparty Parliament in
Algerian history. The cancellation of the 1992 elections, which the
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was poised to win, suspended the
democratization process and a transition to a pluralistic republic, and
escalated fighting, which still continues, between the security forces
and armed insurgent groups seeking to overthrow the Government and
impose an Islamic state. The presidential election campaigns during the
year were marked by increased openness; however, international
observers and political parties pointed out numerous problems with the
conduct of the elections. A September 16 national referendum, which
asked citizens whether they agreed with Bouteflika's peace plan (which
includes an amnesty program for the extremists fighting to overthrow
the Government), was free of charges of fraud, and Bouteflika's peace
plan won a reported 98 percent majority, with a reported 85 percent
turnout. Bouteflika is not affiliated formally with any political party
but he has the parliamentary support of a four-party coalition for his
peace plan. The Government does not always respect the independence of
the judiciary.
The Government's security apparatus is composed of the army, air
force, navy, the national gendarmerie, the national police, communal
guards (local police), and local self-defense forces. All of these
elements are involved in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
operations and are under the control of the Government. The security
forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
The economy is slowly developing from a state-administered to a
market-oriented system. The Government has implemented stabilization
policies and structural reforms. However, privatization of state
enterprises has just begun and there has been little progress on reform
of the banking and housing construction sectors. The state-owned
petroleum sector's output represented about a quarter of national
income and about 96 percent of export earnings during the year.
Noncompetitive and unprofitable state enterprises constitute the bulk
of the non-hydrocarbon industrial sector. The agricultural sector,
which produces grains, fruit, cattle, fibers, vegetables and poultry,
makes up 10 to 12 percent of the economy. Algeria is a middle-income
country; annual per capita income is approximately $1,600. Officially,
about 30 percent of the working-age population is unemployed, and about
70 percent of persons under the age of 30 cannot find adequate
employment. Some earn a living from petty smuggling or street peddling
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although there
were improvements in a few areas, serious problems remain. Citizens do
not have the effective right to change their government peacefully. The
security forces committed extrajudicial killings, routinely tortured or
otherwise abused detainees, and arbitrarily arrested and detained, or
held incommunicado, many individuals suspected of involvement with
armed Islamist groups; however, there were no reports of new
disappearances during the year in which the security forces were
suspected. Security forces usually reach the sites of massacres too
late to prevent or halt civilian casualties. Their failure to intervene
in a timely manner led to claims that the security forces are
indifferent to or complicit in the massacres. Prison conditions are
poor. Prolonged pretrial detention and lengthy trial delays are
problems, although the practice of detention beyond the legal limit
appears to be less frequent. Although the Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, executive branch decrees restrict some of the
judiciary's authority. The authorities do not always respect
defendants' rights to due process. Illegal searches and infringements
on citizens' privacy rights also remained problems. There was no overt
censorship of information; however, while the print media is relatively
free, news media practiced self-censorship. Newspapers reported
frequently on terrorist violence and on surrenders under the amnesty
program, about which there was a wide range of views expressed in the
media. The independent press commented openly and regularly on the
presidential elections and other significant issues. In some cases,
newspapers represented specific political and economic interests.
Electronic media continued to express only government policy. The
Government also continued to restrictfreedom of speech, press,
assembly, association, and movement, although to a lesser degree than
in previous years. During the April presidential election, the
candidates who ultimately withdrew from the election credibly reported
irregularities, such as government ballot-box stuffing through
manipulation of military votes. During the 1997 legislative, municipal,
and provincial elections, there were credible reports of
irregularities, such as government harassment of opposition-party
observers and fraud in vote-tally procedures. The Family Code limited
women's civil rights, and societal discrimination and domestic violence
against women remained serious problems. Child abuse is a problem.
Amazigh ethnic, cultural, and linguistic rights continue to be an
issue, although these concerns are represented by at least two
political parties represented in Parliament. Child labor is a problem.
Although the number of security incidents involving armed groups
and terrorists decreased significantly and became more localized in the
first several months of the year, compared with the same period in
1998, these opposition forces committed numerous serious abuses and
killed thousands of civilians. Furthermore, such abuses and killings
increased in the second half of the year. Armed terrorists continued
their widespread campaign of insurgency, targeting government officials
and families of security-force members, as well as those whose
lifestyles they considered to be in conflict with Islamic values.
Increasingly the killing appeared to be related to opposition to the
amnesty program. Several hundred terrorists have availed themselves of
the amnesty program so far, and the armed groups have become smaller,
but a hard-core opposition force remains.
Armed groups killed numerous civilians, including infants, in
massacres and with small bombs. Bombs left in cars, cafes, and markets
killed and maimed persons indiscriminately. Some killings also were
attributed to revenge, banditry, and land grabs. There were estimates
that as many as 3,000 civilians, terrorists, and security force members
died during the year in domestic turmoil. After his election, President
Bouteflika acknowledged that a more accurate accounting of the number
of persons killed during the past 8 years placed the total at about
100,000. Armed terrorists particularly targeted women; there were
numerous instances of kidnaping and rape.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government
maintains that the security forces resort to lethal force only in the
context of armed clashes with terrorists. The Government also contends
that, as a matter of policy, disciplinary action is taken against
soldiers or policemen who are guilty of violating human rights. Human
Rights Watch and other groups claim that security forces failed to
intervene in some situations to prevent or halt massacres of civilians.
In December one person died of a heart attack the day after being
beaten by police who had responded to a terrorist attack in the town of
Dellys. The case received considerable print media attention, and the
government-funded National Observatory for Human Rights (ONDH)
investigated the incident. As a result, several police officers were
arrested (see Section 1.c.).
Progovernment militias also killed civilians during the year. There
was at least one successful prosecution--of militia members who were
involved in a revenge killing in Tizi Ouzou in the first half of the
year. There were no other reported prosecutions of such cases.
On November 22, prominent FIS leader Abdelkader Hachani, who had
spoken out in favor of peace and reconciliation, was shot and killed in
Algiers. On December 13, authorities arrested Fouad Boulemia, who had
the murder weapon in his possession. At year's end, it was unclear who
was responsible for the killing.
Armed groups targeted both security-force members and civilians. In
many cases terrorists randomly targeted civilians in an apparent
attempt to create social disorder. Increasingly the killing of
civilians appeared to be a result of opposition to President
Bouteflika's amnesty program, and to facilitate the theft of goods
needed by the armed groups. Terrorist tactics included the use of small
bombs, and creating false roadblocks outside the cities by using stolen
police uniforms, weapons, and equipment. Killings of civilians tended
to be in smaller numbers per incident than in past years, although
there were a few large-scale massacres. For example in early
January,terrorists slashed the throats of 22 persons in the town of
Oued Al-Aatchaane, 240 miles southwest of Algiers. Terrorists cut the
throats of 34 villagers in three separate attacks on the night of
January 31. Rebels cut the throats of 19 persons in El-Merdja, 9 in
Saharidji, and 6 in Telassa, all in the western province of Chlef. Most
of the victims were women and children. Armed men killed 12 persons in
an overnight massacre southwest of Algiers in early February. In March
members of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) reportedly killed nine members
of two families in Ain Defla, southwest of Algiers. In early April,
rebels killed 22 government soldiers in an ambush near Blida. In mid-
April, rebels killed 10 civilians in Mascara province, 187 miles west
of Algiers. On June 4, terrorists reportedly killed at least 19 members
of the same family in Bou Hamitage. In mid-June, an armed group killed
14 persons in a village south of Algiers. On August 15, terrorists
stopped a bus in Beni Ounif and killed 29 passengers after stealing
their belongings. On October 7, armed rebels slashed the throats of 8
persons from the same family and kidnaped a teenage girl in the town of
Douira, 25 miles west of Algiers. On November 16, terrorists killed 19
persons in the province of Chlef. In mid-December, armed rebels killed
11 soldiers and wounded 10 others in an attack on a military convoy.
There was an increase in such attacks in December; that month coincided
with the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, during which terrorists
historically have increased their attacks. On December 25, militants
opened fire on vehicles at a roadblock 50 miles west of Algiers,
killing 28 persons. Terrorists also killed and injured numerous persons
with bombs (see Section 1.g.).
b. Disappearance.--There were credible reports of disappearances
occurring over a period of several years, many of which involved the
security forces; however, there were no such reports during the year.
In September 1998, the Ministry of Interior established an office in
each district to accept cases from resident families of those reported
missing. However, credible sources state that those committees have not
provided any useful information to the families of the disappeared. The
Government's official human rights organization stated that by
September, the Ministry of Interior had agreed to investigate 4,300
cases, of which 300 had been closed, by providing families information
about persons who had disappeared. However, there were no prosecutions
of security-force personnel that stemmed from these cases. Families of
the missing persons, defense attorneys, and local human rights groups
insist that the Government could do more to solve the outstanding
cases. The Government asserts that the majority of reported cases of
disappearances involve either terrorists disguised as security forces
or former armed Islamist supporters who went underground to avoid
terrorists' reprisals.
In March Amnesty International stated that more than 3,000 persons
had disappeared since 1993 after being detained by security forces. AI
stated that some died in custody from torture or were executed, but
that many others reportedly were alive. Local nongovernmental
organization (NGO) sources state that a few of the disappeared have
been released from captivity by the security forces, but that there has
been no public information about these cases, due to the fear of
reprisal on the part of those released. Human rights activists assert
that a number of the persons who disappeared still are alive in the
hands of the security forces, but offer no evidence to support this
assertion.
Terrorist groups kidnaped hundreds of civilians, including family
members of security-force members. The mutilated corpses of such
victims were found later in some cases. However, in many instances the
victims disappeared and the families were unable to obtain information
about their fate. Armed Islamist groups kidnaped young women and kept
them as sex slaves (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
c. Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Both the Constitution and legislation ban torture and
other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however, according to
local human rights groups and defense lawyers, the police resort to
torture when interrogating persons suspected of being involved with, or
having sympathies for, armed insurgency groups. There were several
credible reports of torture at the Algiers police facility, called
Chateau Neuf.
Police beatings of detainees continue to be a common practice.
However, there were no reports that police applied electric shocks to
sensitive body parts and sexually molested female prisoners, as had
been reported in previous years. Many victims of torture hesitate to
make public such allegations due to fear of government retaliation.
Accusations of torture are made routinely by those accused of
involvement in terrorist activities. The Interior Ministry and the ONDH
have stated publicly that the Government would punish those persons who
violated the law and practiced torture, but they have notrevealed
whether any individuals accused of torture have ever been investigated
or punished.
In December a terrorist bomb killed and injured police in the town
of Dellys. Within hours security forces rounded up and detained more
than 100 persons of both sexes and a variety of ages. Police officers
beat many of the detainees and threw them into the crater made by the
terrorist bomb. One of the mistreated persons died of a heart attack
the next day. A senior regional police commander ordered the police to
stop these actions. In response to complaints from the mistreated
persons, the authorities suspended several police officers from duty
and opened criminal proceedings against them.
There were no reports that security forces personnel were
responsible for rapes during the year.
Police used force against protesters in April, wounding several
persons (see Section 2.b.).
Armed terrorist groups committed numerous abuses, such as
beheading, mutilating, disemboweling, and dismembering their victims,
including infants, children, and pregnant women. These groups also used
bombs that killed and injured persons (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.)
These terrorists also committed dozens of rapes of female victims, many
of whom were murdered thereafter. There were also frequent reports of
other young women being abducted, raped for weeks at a time, and
effectively held as sex slaves for the use of leaders and members of
the group (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
Prison conditions are poor, and prisons are very overcrowded.
According to human rights activists, cells often contain several times
the number of prisoners for which they originally were designed.
Medical treatment for prisoners is available, but is severely limited.
Prisoners also report a lack of food and reading material.
In general the Government does not permit independent monitoring of
prisons or detention centers. However, in October the Government
allowed the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit
prisons and open an office in Algiers. The ICRC did not visit military
prisons or FIS leaders in prison or under house arrest.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the security forces
continued to arrest arbitrarily and detain citizens. Human rights
activists state that this practice diminished during the year. The
Constitution stipulates that incommunicado detention in criminal cases
prior to arraignment may not exceed 48 hours, after which the suspect
must be charged or released. According to the 1992 Antiterrorist Law,
the police may hold suspects in prearraignment detention for up to 12
days; they also must inform suspects of the charges against them. In
practice the security forces generally adhered to this 12-day limit
during the year.
The chairman of the Government's human rights body reported to the
press in 1998 that it had proof that some detainees were held in a
secret place of detention. In October the chairman claimed that he was
misquoted, and several defense attorneys also stated that they doubted
that such a place of detention exists.
FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from prison in 1997,
remains under house arrest and is allowed to receive visits only from
members of his family (see Section 2.d.), although he made numerous
press statements and conducted interviews while under house arrest.
Jailed oppositionist and FIS vice president Ali Belhadj, who had been
held incommunicado from 1992 until 1998, is allowed contact with
members of his family, who speak to the press on his behalf.
The 1992 Antiterrorist Law suspended the requirement that the
police obtain warrants in order to make an arrest. During the year, the
police made limited use of this law. However, according to defense
attorneys, police who execute searches without a warrant routinely fail
to identify themselves as police. Requests that they do so likely will
result in abuse by the police. Unlike in 1998, there were no reports of
the police arresting close relatives of suspected terrorists in order
to force the suspects to surrender. Police and communal guards
sometimes detain persons at checkpoints (see Section 2.d.).
Prolonged pretrial detention was a problem. Persons accused of
crimes sometimes did not receive expeditious trials. Hundreds of state
enterprise officials who were arrested on charges of corruption in 1996
remained in detention.
Under the state of emergency, the Minister of Interior is
authorized to detain suspects in special camps that are administered by
the army. In 1995 the Government announced that it had closed the last
camp and released the 641 prisoners there. There were subsequent
allegations that the camp still existed and that some of the prisoners
were rearrested later; however, local human rights activists and NGO's
now state that they have no evidence that these camps continue to
exist. They note that the Government continues to keep some former
prisoners under surveillance and requires them to report periodically
to police.
Forced exile is not a legal form of punishment and is not known to
be practiced. However, there are numerous cases of self-imposed exile
involving former FIS members or individuals who maintain that they have
been accused falsely of terrorism as punishment for openly criticizing
government policies. One such case involves Ali Bensaad, a professor at
the University of Constantine, who remains in exile in Germany after he
was sentenced to death in absentia by the courts for allegedly being a
party to a terrorist act.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, in practice the Government does not
always respect the independence of the judicial system. In November
President Bouteflika named a commission to review the functioning of
the judiciary and to recommend ways to improve it.
The judiciary is composed of the civil courts, which try
misdemeanors and felonies, and the military courts, which have tried
civilians for security and terrorism offenses. There is also a
Constitutional Council that reviews the constitutionality of treaties,
laws, and regulations. Although the Council is not part of the
judiciary, it has the authority to nullify laws found unconstitutional.
Regular criminal courts try those individuals accused of security-
related offenses, but there have been very few trials. Some observers
had maintained that, as a result of the 1995 abolition of the special
security courts, long-term detentions without trial had increased
because security forces were reluctant to release suspects to ordinary
criminal courts. However, long-term detention appeared to decrease
somewhat during the year.
According to the Constitution, defendants are presumed innocent
until proven guilty. They have the right to confront their accusers and
may appeal the conviction. Trials are public, and defendants have the
right to legal counsel. However, the authorities do not always respect
all legal provisions regarding defendants' rights, and continue to
violate due process. Some lawyers do not accept cases of individuals
accused of security-related offenses, due to fear of retribution from
the security forces. Defense lawyers for members of the banned FIS have
suffered harassment, death threats, and arrest.
There are no credible estimates of the number of political
prisoners; some estimate the number to be several thousand. An unknown
number of persons who could be considered political prisoners were
serving prison sentences because of their Islamist sympathies and
membership in the FIS. There are credible estimates that the Government
released 5,000 political prisoners after Bouteflika's election.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--Authorities frequently infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the home,
but the state of emergency authorizes provincial governors to issue
exceptional warrants at any time. Security forces entered residences
without warrants. Security forces also deployed an extensive network of
secret informers against both terrorist targets and political
opponents. The Government monitors the telephones of, and sometimes
disconnects service to, political opponents and journalists (see
Sections 2.a. and 3).
Armed terrorists occasionally entered private homes either to kill
or kidnap residents or to steal weapons, valuables, or food. After
massacres that took place in their villages, numerous civilians fled
their homes. Armed terrorist groups consistently used threats of
violence to extort money from businesses and families across the
country.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law.--
Armed groups were responsible for numerous, indiscriminate,
nonselective killings. Terrorists left bombs at several markets and
other public places during the year, killing and injuring dozens of
persons. In rural areas, terrorists continued to plant bombs and mines,
which most often were targeted at security force personnel. For example
in March terrorists exploded a bomb in Khemis Miliana, which killed
four persons.
In May a bomb exploded in Algiers, killing one person and injuring
five others. Also in May, a bomb exploded near a movie theater in
downtown Algiers, injuring 17 persons. In August a bomb exploded in a
town 160 miles south of Algiers, killing 6 persons and injuring 61. On
November 6, five military officers were killed and six others were
wounded in an attack at a cafe in Boumerdes province. There was an
increase in such attacks in December; that month coincided with the
Islamic holy month of Ramadan, during which terrorists historically
have increased their attacks. In December a terrorist bomb killed and
injured police in the town of Dellys (see Section 1.c.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech; however, the Government restricts this right in
practice. A 1990 law specifies that freedom of speech must respect
``individual dignity, the imperatives of foreign policy, and the
national defense.'' The state of emergency decree gave the Government
broad authority to restrict these freedoms and to take legal action
against what it considered to be threats to the State or public order.
However, the Government did not strictly enforce these regulations, and
the independent press reported regularly on security matters without
penalty. Reporting by government-controlled press organs frequently
included deflated numbers of civilians and government forces killed,
inflated terrorist casualty counts, and inflated terrorist surrenders
under the amnesty program. These discrepancies were noted frequently in
independent newspapers. No restrictions on journalists were lifted
during the year as a result of Parliament's review in 1998 of a 1997
government directive.
In March 1994, the Government issued an interministerial decree
that independent newspapers could print security information only from
official government bulletins carried by the government-controlled
Algerian Press Service (APS). Compliance with the government directive
varied among independent newspapers, but the trend toward increased
openness about security-force losses continued during the year, and the
Government continued to provide the press with more information than in
the past about the security situation. Journalists deliberately did not
report on current possible abuses by security forces to avoid
difficulties with the Government, although there was significant
coverage of NGO activity aimed at publicizing such abuses committed in
the past. The Ministry of Health continued to forbid medical personnel
from speaking to journalists. The Government's definition of security
information often extended beyond purely military matters to encompass
broader political affairs. In 1995 FIS officials who had been freed
from detention in 1994 received direct orders from the Justice Ministry
to make no further public statements. This ban remains in force. In
general, journalists exercised self-censorship by not publishing
criticism of specific senior military officials.
There were no reports during the year that the Government put
journalists under ``judicial control.'' In previous years, the
Government used this practice to harass journalists who wrote offending
articles by requiring the journalists to check in regularly with the
local police and preventing them from leaving the country. According to
a Europe-based NGO that specializes in press freedom, the Government
did not harass journalists under criminal defamation statutes during
the year, as had been its practice in the past.
There were no newspapers allied with Islamist political parties in
print, due to government pressure; however, legal Islamist political
parties have access to the existing independent press, in which they
express their opinions freely.
The Government maintains an effective monopoly over printing
companies and newsprint imports. There was no abuse of this power to
halt newspaper publications during the year, and at least one new
newspaper started publication.
The Government continued to exercise pressure on the independent
press through the state-owned advertising company, which was created in
1996. All state-owned companies that wish to place an advertisement in
a newspaper must submit the item to the advertising company, which then
decides in which newspapers to place it. In an economy in which state
companies' output and government services still represent approximately
two-thirds of national income, government-provided advertising
constitutes a significant source of advertising revenue for the
country's newspapers. Advertising companies tend to provide significant
amounts of advertising to publications with a strong anti-Islamist
editorial line and to withhold advertising from newspapers on political
grounds, even if such newspapers have large readerships or offer cheap
advertising rates.
President Bouteflika stated in November that the media should
ultimately be at the service of the State. Radio and televisionremained
under government control, with coverage biased in favor of the
Government's policies and its party, the National Democratic Rally
(RND). Parliamentary debates are televised live. Satellite-dish
antennas are widespread, and millions of citizens have access to
European and Middle Eastern broadcasting.
Many artists, intellectuals, and university educators fled the
country after widespread violence began in 1992; however, some began to
return in significant numbers during the year, at least for visits.
There was a growing number of academic seminars and colloquiums, which
occurred without governmental interference. The Government occasionally
interfered in seminars that were political or economic in content (see
Section 2.b.). University workers and students staged several strikes
over low salaries, inadequate housing, and large classes (see Section
6.a.).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of assembly; however, the 1992 Emergency Law and
government practice sharply curtail it. Citizens and organizations must
obtain a permit from the appointed local governor before holding public
meetings. The Government canceled at least one public rally sponsored
by a group affiliated with an opposition political party. The
Government banned street protests on the eve of President Bouteflika's
swearing-in ceremony and, on April 16, police used force in central
Algiers and in two other cities against protesters demonstrating
against Bouteflika's election. Police used batons and charged
protesters. Police wounded at least 20 persons in Algiers, and
suppressed similar demonstrations in Tizi Ouzou and Bajaia. The
Government occasionally interfered with formal NGO meetings during the
year. In July it prevented a meeting on human rights, and denied entry
into the country of one of the meeting's participants. Various groups
held meetings and seminars without licenses, in which government
officials participated. Other unlicensed groups continued to be active,
including groups dedicated to the cause of the disappeared, who also
continued to hold regular demonstrations outside government buildings.
The Constitution provides for the right of association, but the
1992 Emergency Law and government practice severely restrict it. The
Interior Ministry must approve all political parties before they may be
established (see Section 3). The Interior Ministry licenses all
nongovernmental associations and regards all associations as illegal
unless they have licenses. It may deny a license to, or dissolve, any
group regarded as a threat to the existing political order. After the
Government suspended the parliamentary election in 1992, it banned the
FIS as a political party, and the social and charitable groups
associated with it. Membership in the FIS remains illegal, although at
least one former FIS leader announced publicly that he intended to form
a cultural youth group.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution declares Islam to be the
state religion but prohibits discrimination based on religious belief,
and the Government generally respects this right in practice. Islam is
the only legal religion, and the law limits the practice of other
faiths; however, the Government follows a de facto policy of tolerance
by not inquiring into the religious practices of individuals.
The law prohibits public assembly for purposes of practicing a
faith other than Islam. However, there are Roman Catholic churches,
including a cathedral in Algiers, which is the seat of the Archbishop,
that conduct services without government interference. In 1994 the size
of the Jewish community diminished significantly, and its synagogue has
since been abandoned. There are only a few smaller churches and other
places of worship; non-Muslims usually congregate in private homes for
religious services.
Because Islam is the state religion, the country's education system
is structured to benefit Muslims. Education is free to all citizens
below the age of 16, and the study of Islam is a strict requirement in
the public schools, which are regulated by the Ministry of Education
and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Private primary and secondary
schools are not permitted to operate.
The Government appoints preachers to mosques and gives general
guidance on sermons. The Government monitors activities in mosques for
possible security-related offenses. The Ministry of Religious Affairs
provides some financial support to mosques and has limited control over
the training of imams.
Conversions from Islam to other religions are rare. Because of
safety concerns and potential legal and social problems, Muslim
converts practice their new faith clandestinely. The Shari'a (Islamic
law)-based Family Code prohibits Muslim women from marrying non-
Muslims, although this regulation is not alwaysenforced. The code does
not restrict Muslim men from marrying non-Muslim women.
Non-Islamic proselytizing is illegal, and the Government restricts
the importation of non-Islamic literature for widespread distribution.
Personal copies of the major works of other religions, such as the
Bible, may be brought into the country. Occasionally, such works are
sold in local bookstores in Algiers. However, many vendors refuse to
sell these works due to fear of reprisal by Islamic extremists, and, to
a lesser extent, because of government policy. The Government also
prohibits the dissemination of any literature that portrays violence as
a legitimate precept of Islam.
Under both Shari'a and Algerian law, children born to a Muslim
father are Muslim, regardless of the mother's religion. Islam does not
allow conversion to other faiths at any age.
In 1994 the Armed Islamic Group declared its intention to eliminate
Jews, Christian, and polytheists from Algeria. The GIA has not yet
retracted that declaration and, as a result, the mainly foreign
Christian community tends to curtail its public activities.
The country's 8-year civil conflict has pitted self-proclaimed
radical Muslims against moderate Muslims. Approximately 100,000
civilians, terrorists, and security forces have been killed during the
past 8 years. Extremist self-proclaimed Islamists have issued public
threats against all ``infidels'' in the country, both foreigners and
citizens, and have killed both Muslims and non-Muslims, including
missionaries. During the year, terrorists continued attacks against the
Government, moderate Muslims, and secular civilians. The majority of
the country's terrorist groups do not, as a rule, differentiate between
religious and political killings (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration and Repatriation.--The law provides for freedom of domestic
and foreign travel, and freedom to emigrate; however, the Government at
times restricts these rights. In the spring, the Government allowed
travel abroad by representatives of organizations pursuing information
on relatives who allegedly ``disappeared'' due to the actions of the
security forces. These organizations were hosted by human rights NGO's
and held public discussions on those who disappeared. There were no
reports of the Government placing journalists under ``judicial
control,'' as had been the case in the past (see Section 2.a.).
The Government does not allow foreign travel by senior officials
from the banned FIS. FIS president Abassi Madani, who was released from
prison in 1997, remains under house arrest (see Section 1.d.). The
Government also does not permit young men who are eligible for the
draft and who have not yet completed their military service to leave
the country if they do not have special authorization; this
authorization may be granted to students and to those individuals with
special family circumstances. The Family Code does not permit married
females under 19 years of age to travel abroad without their husband's
permission. The code also prohibits unmarried females below the age of
19 or males below the age of 18 to travel abroad without their father's
permission.
Under the state of emergency, the Interior Minister and the
provincial governors may deny residency in certain districts to persons
regarded as threats to public order. The Government also restricts
travel into four southern provinces, where much of the hydrocarbon
industry and many foreign workers are located, in order to enhance
security in those areas.
The police and the communal guards operate checkpoints throughout
the country. They routinely stop vehicles to inspect identification
papers and to search for evidence of terrorist activity. They sometimes
detain persons at these checkpoints.
Armed groups intercept citizens at roadblocks, using stolen police
uniforms and equipment in various regions to rob them of their cash and
vehicles. According to press reports, armed groups sometimes killed
groups of civilian passengers at these roadblocks.
The Constitution provides for the right of political asylum, and
the Government occasionally grants asylum. The Government cooperates
with the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. It
also provided first asylum. For example, it cooperates with the UNHCR
on programs to help refugee Sahrawis, the former residents of the
Western Sahara who left that territory after Morocco took control of it
in the 1970's. The Government also has worked with international
organizations that help the Tuaregs, a nomadic people of southern
Algeria and neighboring countries. Therewere no reports of the forced
return of persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the effective ability to change their
government peacefully. The strong prerogatives of the executive branch,
supported by the entrenched power of the military and the bureaucracy,
prevent citizens from exercising this right. The withdrawal of six
presidential candidates amidst credible charges of fraud, and the
election of President Bouteflika highlighted the continued dominance of
the military elite in the process of selecting political leadership.
President Bouteflika was elected in an April 15 presidential
election, but the election was seriously flawed by the withdrawal 1 day
before of all the other candidates, who charged that the military
already had begun to implement plans to produce a fraudulent Bouteflika
victory. Until those allegations surfaced, the campaign had been
conducted fairly, with all candidates widely covered in both state-
owned and private media. The conduct of the campaign--although
regulated as to the use of languages other than Arabic, and as to the
timing, location and duration of meeting--was free, and all candidates
traveled extensively throughout the country. One potential candidate
was denied the ability to run because the Electoral Commission
determined that he could not prove that he had participated in
Algeria's war of independence against France, a legal requirement for
candidates for President. With the withdrawal of the other candidates
and the absence of foreign observers, it was impossible to make an
accurate determination of turnout for the election, but it was
apparently as low as 30 percent; the Government claimed a 60 percent
turnout.
Under the Constitution, the President has the authority to rule by
decree in special circumstances. The President subsequently must submit
to the Parliament for approval decrees issued while the Parliament was
not in session. The Parliament has a popularly elected lower chamber,
the National Popular Assembly (APN), and an upper chamber, the National
Council, two-thirds of whose members are elected by municipal and
provincial councils. The President appoints the remaining one-third of
the National Council's members. Legislation must have the approval of
three-quarters of both the upper and lower chambers' members. Laws must
originate in the lower chamber.
In June 1997, Algeria held its first elections to the APN since
elections were canceled in January 1992, and elected the first
multiparty Parliament in the country's history. Candidates representing
39 political parties participated, along with several independent
candidates. Under a system of proportional representation, the
government party, the National Democratic Rally, won 154 seats,
followed by the Islamist party Movement for the Society of Peace (MSP),
with 69 seats, the National Liberation Front (FLN), with 64 seats, the
Islamist party An-Nahdah, with 34 seats, the Amazigh (Berber)-based
Socialist Forces Front, with 20 seats, and the Amazigh-based Rally for
Culture and Democracy, with 19 seats. Independent candidates won 11
seats, the Workers Party won 4 seats, and 3 other small parties won a
combined total of 5 seats. In their final report, neutral observers
stated that, of 1,258 (of the country's 35,000) voting stations that
they assessed, 1,169 were satisfactory, 95 were problematic, and 11
were unsatisfactory. In November 1997, the provincial election
commissions announced the results of their adjudication of the appeals
filed by various political parties. The RND lost some seats but
remained the overall victor in the Assembly elections.
In 1997 the appointed previous legislature, the National Transition
Council (CNT), changed the law that regulates political parties. Under
the controversial law, parties require official approval from the
Interior Ministry before they may be established. To obtain approval, a
party must have 25 founders from across the country, whose names must
be registered with the Interior Ministry. A party headed by one of the
six presidential candidates who withdrew from the April elections
registered in September. No party may seek to utilize religion, or
Amazigh or Arab heritage, for political purposes. The law also bans
political party ties to nonpolitical associations and regulates party
financing and reporting requirements.
The more than 30 existing political parties represent a wide
spectrum of viewpoints and engage in activities that range from holding
rallies to printing newspapers. The Government continues to ban the FIS
as a political party (see Section 2.b.). With the exception of the
Government's party, the RND, the political parties sometimes encounter
difficulties when dealing with local officials, who hinder their
organizational efforts. The Government monitors private telephone
communications, and sometimes disconnects telephone service to
political opponents for extended periods (see Section 1.f.). Opposition
parties have very limited access to state-controlledtelevision and
radio, although the independent press publicizes their views.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. The new
Cabinet, named December 24, has no female members; the previous
government included two women. Eleven of the 380 members of the lower
house of Parliament are women. About 25 percent of judges are women, a
percentage that has been growing in recent years. In September
President Bouteflika appointed the first-ever female provincial
governor. A woman heads a workers' party, and all the major political
parties except one had women's divisions headed by women.
The Amazighs, an ethnic minority centered in the Kabylie region,
participate freely and actively in the political process. Two major
opposition parties originated in the Amazigh-populated region of the
country: The Socialist Forces Front and the Rally for Culture and
Democracy. These two parties represent Amazigh political and cultural
concerns in the Parliament and media. The two Amazigh-based parties
were required to conform with the 1997 changes to the Electoral Law
that stipulate that political parties must have 25 founders from across
the country.
The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, do not play an important
role in politics, due to their small numbers, estimated in the tens of
thousands, and their nomadic existence.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The most active independent human rights group is the Algerian
League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADDH), an independent
organization that has members throughout the country. The LADDH is not
allowed access to the authorities or to prisons beyond the normal
consultations allowed between a lawyer and a client. The less active
Algerian League for Human Rights (LADH) is an independent organization
based in Constantine. The LADH has members throughout the country who
follow individual cases. Human rights groups report occasional
harassment by government authorities in the form of obvious
surveillance and cutting off of telephone service.
There is an Amnesty International chapter in the country, but it
does not work on cases in Algeria. In November President Bouteflika
publicly invited Amnesty International and other human rights NGO's to
visit the country.
The National Observatory for Human Rights was established by the
Government in 1992 to report human rights violations to the
authorities. It prepares an annual report with recommendations to the
Government.
The Government has a national ombudsman, who reports annually to
the President (see Section 5).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on birth, race,
sex, belief, or any other personal or social condition. A national
ombudsman receives individual complaints and presents an annual report
to the President. Provincial representatives are designated to accept
individual grievances and to make them known to the authorities. Most
such complaints concerned bureaucratic unresponsiveness and lack of
jobs and housing. Women continue to face legal and social
discrimination.
Women.--Women's rights advocates assert that spousal abuse is
common, but there are no reliable studies regarding its extent. Spousal
abuse is more frequent in rural than urban areas, especially among
less-educated persons. There are no specific laws against spousal rape.
Rape is illegal, and in principle a spouse could be charged under the
law. However, there are strong societal pressures against a woman
seeking legal redress against her spouse for rape, and there are no
reports of the law being applied in such cases. Battered women must
obtain medical certification of the physical effects of an assault
before they lodge a complaint with the police. However, because of
societal pressures, women frequently are reluctant to endure this
process. There are no adequate facilities offering safe haven for
abused women. Women's rights groups have experienced difficulty in
drawing attention to spousal abuse as an important social problem,
largely due to societal attitudes. There are several rape crisis
centers run by women's groups, but they have few resources. In August
1998, the Government released figures that indicated that the
whereabouts of 319 women remain unknown and that there were 24 reports
by women of rape. Most human rights groups believe that the actual
number is much higher. There is a rape crisis center that specializes
in caring for women who are victims of rape by terrorists.
Some aspects of the law, and many traditional social practices,
discriminate against women. The 1984 Family Code, based in large part
on Shari'a, treats women as minors under the legal guardianship of a
husband or male relative. For example, a woman must obtain a father's
approval to marry. Divorce is difficult for a wife to obtain except in
cases of abandonment or the husband's conviction for a serious crime.
Husbands generally obtain the right to the family's home in the case of
divorce. Custody of the children normally goes to the mother, but she
cannot enroll them in a particular school or take them out of the
country without the father's authorization.
The Family Code also affirms the Islamic practice of allowing a man
to marry up to four wives, although this rarely occurs. A wife may sue
for divorce if her husband does not inform her of his intent to marry
another woman prior to the marriage. Only males are able to confer
citizenship on their children. Muslim women are prohibited from
marrying non-Muslims; Muslim men may marry non-Muslim women (see
Section 2.c.).
Women suffer from discrimination in inheritance claims; in
accordance with Shari'a, women are entitled to a smaller portion of an
estate than are male children or a deceased husband's brothers. Females
under 19 years of age cannot travel abroad without their husbands' or
fathers' permission (see Section 2.d.). However, women may take out
business loans and are the sole custodians of their dowries. Legally,
if not always in practice, women have exclusive control over any income
that they earn themselves, or assets that they bring into a marriage.
While social pressure against women pursuing higher education or a
career exists throughout the country, it is much stronger in rural
areas than in major urban areas. Women constitute only 8 percent of the
work force. Nonetheless, women may own businesses, enter into
contracts, and pursue opportunities in government, medicine, law,
education, the media, and the armed forces. Although the 1990 Labor Law
bans sexual discrimination in the workplace, the leaders of women's
organizations report that violations are commonplace. Labor Ministry
inspectors do little to enforce the law.
There are numerous small women's rights groups. Their main goals
are to foster women's economic welfare and to amend aspects of the
Family Code, although no such amendments have been enacted. During the
year, Islamic extremists often specifically targeted women. There were
numerous instances of women being killed and mutilated in massacres. As
many as 80 percent of the victims of massacres were women and children.
Armed terrorist groups reportedly kidnaped young women and kept them as
sex slaves for group leaders and members (see Sections 1.a., 1.b.,
1.c., 6.c., and 6.f.).
Children.--The Government is committed in principle to protecting
children's human rights. It provides free education for children 6 to
15 years of age, and free medical care for all citizens--albeit in
often rudimentary facilities. The Ministry of Youth and Sports has
programs for children, but these face serious funding problems. Legal
experts maintain that the Penal and Family Codes do not offer children
sufficient protection. Hospitals treat numerous child abuse cases every
year, but many cases go unreported.
Child abuse is a problem. Laws against child abuse have not led to
notable numbers of prosecutions against offenders. NGO's that
specialize in care of children cite an increase in domestic violence
aimed at children, which they attribute to the ``culture of violence''
developed during the years since 1992 and the social dislocations
caused by the movement of rural families to the cities to escape
terrorist violence. Those NGO's have educational programs aimed at
reducing the level of violence, but lack funding.
People with Disabilities.--The Government does not mandate
accessibility to buildings or government services for the disabled.
Public enterprises, in downsizing the work force, generally ignore a
law that requires that they reserve 1 percent of their jobs for the
disabled. Social security provides for payments for orthopedic
equipment, and some nongovernmental organizations receive limited
government financial support. The Government also attempts to finance
specialized training, but this initiative remains rudimentary.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--TheAmazighs are an ethnic
minority, centered in the Kabylie region. Amazigh nationalists have
sought to maintain their own cultural and linguistic identity while the
Government's Arabization program continues. The law requires that
Arabic be the official language and requires, under penalty of fines,
that all official government business be conducted in Arabic. The law
also requires that Arabic be used for all broadcasts on national
television and radios for dubbing or subtitling all non-Arabic films,
for medical prescriptions, and for communications equipment. In
September President Bouteflika stated that the Amazigh language would
never be an official language. As part of the National Charter signed
in 1996, the Government and several major political parties agreed that
the Amazigh culture and language were major political components of the
country's identity.
There are professorships in Amazigh culture at the University of
Tizi Ouzou. The government-owned national television station broadcasts
a brief nightly news program in the Amazigh language. Amazighs hold
influential positions in government, the army, business, and
journalism.
The Tuaregs, a people of Amazigh origin, live an isolated, nomadic
existence and are relatively few in number.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right to establish
trade unions of their choice. About two-thirds of the labor force
belong to unions. There is an umbrella labor confederation, the General
Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA) and its affiliated entities, which
dates from the era of a single political party. The UGTA encompasses
national syndicates that are specialized by sector. There are also some
autonomous unions, such as syndicates for Air Algeria pilots (SPLA),
airport technicians (SNTMA), and teachers (CNEX).
Workers are required to obtain government approval to establish a
union. The 1990 Law on Labor Unions requires the Labor Ministry to
approve a union application within 30 days. The Autonomous Syndicates
Confederation (CSA) has attempted since early 1996 to organize the
autonomous syndicates, but without success. The application that the
CSA filed with the Labor Ministry still was pending at year's end,
although the CSA continues to function without official status. The law
prohibits unions from associating with political parties and also
prohibits unions from receiving funds from foreign sources. The courts
are empowered to dissolve unions that engage in illegal activities. The
labor union organized by the banned FIS, the Islamic Syndicate of
Workers (SIT), was dissolved in 1992 because it had no license.
Under the state of emergency, the Government is empowered to
require workers in both the public and private sectors to stay at their
jobs in the event of an unauthorized or illegal strike. According to
the 1990 Law on Industrial Relations, workers may strike only after 14
days of mandatory conciliation, mediation, or arbitration. The law
states that arbitration decisions are binding on both parties. If no
agreement is reached in arbitration, the workers may strike legally
after they vote by secret ballot to do so. A minimum level of public
services must be maintained during public sector service strikes.
On several occasions during the year and at several university
campuses in the capital and other cities, university workers and
students went on strike to protest low salaries, inadequate housing,
and large classes. These strikes sometimes ended with minor concessions
by the Government. In August the national airline workers also went on
strike for higher wages.
Unions may form and join federations or confederations, affiliate
with international labor bodies, and develop relations with foreign
labor groups. For example, the UGTA has contacts with French unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for collective bargaining for all unions, and the Government
permits this right in practice. The law prohibits discrimination by
employers against union members and organizers, and provides mechanisms
for resolving trade union complaints of antiunion practices by
employers. It also permits unions to recruit members at the workplace.
The Government has established an export processing zone in Jijel.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is incompatible with the Constitution's provisions on individual
rights. The Penal Code prohibits compulsory labor, including by
children, and the Government generally enforces the ban effectively.
Armedterrorist groups reportedly kidnap young women and keep them as
sex slaves (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 16 years. Inspectors
from the Ministry of Labor enforce the minimum employment age by making
periodic or unannounced inspection visits to public-sector enterprises.
They do not enforce the law effectively in the agricultural or private
sectors. Economic necessity compels many children to resort to informal
employment, such as street vending. The Government prohibits forced and
bonded labor by children and generally enforces this prohibition (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The law defines the overall
framework for acceptable conditions of work but leaves specific
agreements on wages, hours, and conditions of employment to the
discretion of employers in consultation with employees. The Government
fixes by decree a monthly minimum wage for all sectors; however, this
is not sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker
and family. The minimum wage is $90 (6,000 dinars) per month. Ministry
of Labor inspectors are responsible for ensuring compliance with the
minimum wage regulation; however, their enforcement is inconsistent.
The standard workweek is 40 hours. There are well-developed
occupation and health regulations codified in a 1991 decree, but
government inspectors do not enforce these regulations effectively.
There were no reports of workers being dismissed for removing
themselves from hazardous working conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons.
Armed terrorist groups frequently kidnaped young women, raped them
for weeks at a time, and kept them as sex slaves for group leaders and
other members (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., 1.c., 5, and 6.c.).
______
BAHRAIN
Bahrain is a hereditary emirate with few democratic institutions
and no political parties. The Al-Khalifa extended family has ruled
Bahrain since the late 18th century and dominates all facets of its
society and government. The Constitution confirms the Amir as
hereditary ruler. The current Amir, Shaikh Hamad Bin Isa Al-Khalifa,
succeeded his father, Shaikh Isa Bin Salman Al-Khalifa, who died on
March 6. Shaikh Hamad governs the country with the assistance of his
uncle as Prime Minister, his son as Crown Prince, and an appointed
cabinet of ministers. In 1975 the Government suspended some provisions
of the 1973 Constitution, including those articles relating to the
National Assembly, which was disbanded and never reconstituted.
Citizens belong to the Shi'a and Sunni sects of Islam, with the Shi'a
constituting over two-thirds of the indigenous population. However,
Sunnis predominate politically and economically because the ruling
family is Sunni and is supported by the armed forces, the security
services, and powerful Sunni and Shi'a merchant families. The political
situation was calm during the year; there were incidents of political
unrest in 1998, but there has not been significant unrest since 1996.
There are few judicial checks on the actions of the Amir and his
Government, and the courts are subject to government pressure.
The Ministry of Interior is responsible for public security. It
controls the public security force (police) and the extensive security
service, which are responsible for maintaining internal order. The
Bahrain Defense Force (BDF) is responsible for defending against
external threats. It did not play a role in internal security during
the year. Security forces committed serious human rights abuses.
Bahrain has a mixed economy with government domination of many
basic industries, including the important oil and aluminum sectors.
Possessing limited oil and gas reserves, the Government is working to
diversify its economic base, concentrating on light manufacturing and
the services sectors, particularly banking, financial services, and
consulting. The Government has used its modest oil revenues to build a
highly advanced transportation and telecommunications infrastructure.
Economic growth is highly dependent on global oil prices, but the
economy remains stable. The Government encouraged private national and
international investment and moved to privatize some of its state-run
industries. Bahrain is a regional financial and business center.
Tourism, particularly via thecauseway linking Bahrain to Saudi Arabia,
is also a significant source of income. Citizens enjoy a high standard
of living.
There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human
rights record; however, the situation improved measurably during the
year. The Government continued to deny citizens the right to change
their government; however, the political situation improved due to the
sharp decrease in political and civil unrest, and an effort by the new
Amir to develop relations with the Shi'a community. Unlike the previous
year, there were no extrajudicial killings by security forces; however
security forces continued to torture, beat, and otherwise abuse
prisoners. Impunity remains a problem; there were no known instances of
any security forces personnel being punished for human rights abuses
committed either during the year or in any previous year. The
Government continued to use arbitrary arrest and detention,
incommunicado and prolonged detention, and involuntary exile; however,
one of the new Amir's first official acts was to pardon or release over
400 prisoners and detainees, and exiles. In November and December the
Amir pardoned a combined total of approximately 400 prisoners and
detainees, some of whom had been detained for political reasons. The
judiciary remains subject to government pressure, and there are limits
on the right to a fair public trial, especially in the security court.
The Government continued to infringe on citizens' privacy rights. The
Government imposed some restrictions on freedom of speech and of the
press and restricted freedom of assembly and association. The
Government also imposes some limits on freedom of religion and
movement. Violence against women and discrimination based on sex,
religion, and ethnicity remain problems. The Government restricts
worker rights, and there were instances of forced labor.
The new Amir took some steps to improve the treatment of the Shi'a
population. For example in December the Amir stated that all citizens
are ``equal before the law'' and allowed Shi'a to apply for jobs in the
BDF and the Ministry of the Interior for the first time in 4 years. In
early July, the Amir pardoned Shi'a spiritual leader Abdul Amir Al-
Jamri, who had been in prison since 1996. The Amir also allowed greater
access by members of international human rights groups during the year,
including visits by Middle East Watch, Human Rights Watch, and Amnesty
International.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
There were no investigations or prosecutions of any security forces
personnel for alleged extrajudicial killings committed in 1998 or
earlier years.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment
or punishment are prohibited by law; however there are credible reports
that prisoners often are beaten, both on the soles of their feet and
about the face and head, burned with cigarettes, forced to endure long
periods without sleep, and in some cases subjected to electrical
shocks. The Government has difficulty in rebutting allegations of
torture and of other cruel, inhuman, or degrading practices because it
permits incommunicado detention and detention without trial. There were
no known instances of officials being punished for human rights abuses
committed either during the year or in any previous year.
Opposition and human rights groups allege that the security forces
sometimes threaten female detainees with rape and inflict other forms
of sexual abuse and harassment on them while they are in custody. These
allegations are difficult to confirm or deny.
Prisons generally meet minimum international standards. Local
defense attorneys report that their clients continued to receive
improved care and treatment. In addition the release of hundreds of
detainees from jail, perhaps as many as 788, (seeSection 1.d.) and the
reduced number of arrests during the year, eased overcrowding. At the
Government's invitation, the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) continued the series of visits to prisons that it started in
late 1996.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The Constitution states that ``no person shall
be arrested, detained, imprisoned, searched or compelled to reside in a
specified place * * * except in accordance with the provisions of the
law and under the supervision of the judicial authorities.'' However,
in practice, in matters regarding arrest, detention, or exile, the 1974
State Security Act takes precedence. Under the State Security Act,
persons may be detained for up to 3 years without trial for engaging in
activities or making statements regarded as a threat to the broadly
defined concepts of national harmony and security, and the Government
continued to arrest and detain citizens arbitrarily. The scope of the
State Security Act extends to any case involving arson, explosions, or
attacks on persons at their place of employment or because of the
nature of their work. Detainees have the right to appeal such
detentions after a period of 3 months and, if the appeal is denied,
every 6 months thereafter from the date of the original detention.
Government security forces used the State Security Act during the
year to detain persons deemed to be engaging in antigovernment
activities, including persons who attempted to exercise their rights of
free speech, assembly, and association, or other rights. Activities
that also may lead to detention, questioning, warning, or arrest by the
security forces include: Membership in illegal organizations or those
deemed subversive; painting antigovernment slogans on walls; joining
antigovernment demonstrations (see Section 2.b.); possessing or
circulating antigovernment writings; preaching sermons considered by
the Government to have an antigovernment political tone; and harboring
or associating with persons who committed such acts. However, there was
greater tolerance of certain activities during the year, and the number
of persons detained was less than in 1998.
In addition to overseeing the security service and police, the
Ministry of Interior also controls the Office of the Public Prosecutor,
whose officers initially determine whether sufficient evidence exists
to continue to hold a prisoner in investigative detention. The Ministry
is responsible for all aspects of prison administration. In the early
stages of detention, prisoners and their attorneys have no recourse to
any authority outside the Ministry of Interior. The authorities rarely
permit visits to inmates who are incarcerated for security-related
offenses and such prisoners may be held incommunicado for months, or
sometimes years. However, prisoners detained for criminal offenses
generally may receive visits from family members, usually once a month.
At the beginning of the year, security forces were estimated to
have held over 1,300 persons in detention for security-related
offenses. During the year, some were arrested, released, and then
arrested again. At year's end, the total number of persons detained was
substantially reduced; however, as many as 1,000 persons still remained
in detention. During the year, the Government pardoned as many as 400
persons detained in connection with antigovernment activities. One of
the new Amir's first official acts was to pardon or release over 400
detainees, prisoners, and exiles. In November the Amir pardoned an
additional 200 prisoners and detainees, some of whom had been detained
for political reasons. In December the Amir pardoned another group of
195; the Government publicly stated in December that the Amir pardoned
788 prisoners and detainees since his accession in March.
Abdul Amir Al-Jamri, a prominent Shi'a cleric, longtime opposition
activist, and one of the original 14 signers of the 1994 petition to
the Amir calling for the restoration of the National Assembly, was
convicted and sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment on July 7 after
having been detained since January 1996, but he was pardoned by the
Amir on July 8. Several other Shi'a clerics who were associated with
Al-Jamri and were arrested at the same time, Abdul Wahab Hussein,
Hassan Mushaimaa, Hassan Sultan, and Haji Hassan Jarallah, remain in
jail. One of the clerics arrested with Al-Jamri died in detention in
1997; the Government stated that he died of natural causes.
Abdul Jahil Abdula Khadim, a shop owner, remained in detention at
year's end. He was detained in 1998 after a young man who worked in his
store died from police mistreatment. Most of theyoung men detained in
July and October following antigovernment demonstrations reportedly
were released.
While the authorities reserve the right to use exile and the
revocation of citizenship to punish individuals convicted or suspected
of antigovernment activity, there were no reports of exile orders
issued during the year. In the past, the Government has revoked the
citizenship of persons that it considered to be security threats. The
Government considers such persons to have forfeited their nationality
under the Citizenship Act of 1963 because they accepted foreign
citizenship or passports, or engaged in antigovernment activities
abroad. Bahraini emigre groups and their local contacts have challenged
this practice, arguing that the Government's revocation of citizenship
without due process violates the Constitution. The Amir pardoned 32
exiles during the year. According to the emigre groups, as many as 450
citizens continue to live in exile. This total includes both those
prohibited from returning to Bahrain and their family members who live
abroad with them voluntarily.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the courts are subject to government
pressure regarding sentencing and appeals.
The civil and criminal legal system consists of a complex mix of
courts, based on diverse legal sources including Sunni and Shi'a
Shari'a (Islamic law), tribal law, and other civil codes and
regulations. The 1974 State Security Act created a separate, closed
security court system, which has jurisdiction in cases of alleged
antigovernment activity.
The Bahrain Defense Force maintains a separate court system for
military personnel accused of offenses under the Military Code of
Justice. Military courts do not review cases involving civilian,
criminal, or security offenses.
Defense attorneys are appointed by the Ministry of Justice and
Islamic Affairs. Some attorneys and family members involved in
politically sensitive criminal cases complain that the Government
interferes with court proceedings to influence the outcome or to
prevent judgments from being carried out. There are also periodic
allegations of corruption in the judicial system.
In past cases, the Amir, the Prime Minister, and other senior
government officials have lost civil cases brought against them by
private citizens; however, the court-ordered judgments are not always
implemented expeditiously. Members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family are
well represented in the judiciary and generally do not excuse
themselves from cases involving the interests of the Government.
A person arrested may be tried in an ordinary criminal court or, if
recommended by the prosecution, in the Security Court. Ordinary civil
or criminal trial procedures provide for an open trial, the right to
counsel (with legal aid available when necessary), and the right to
appeal. Criminal court proceedings generally do not appear to
discriminate against women, children, or minority groups. However,
there is credible evidence that persons accused of antigovernment
crimes and tried in the criminal courts were denied fair trials. Those
accused are not permitted to speak with an attorney until their
appearance before the judge at the preliminary hearing. Trials in the
criminal courts for antigovernment activities are held in secret.
Security cases are tried in secret by judges on the Supreme Court
of Appeals, sitting as the Security Court. Family members usually are
not permitted in the court until the final verdict is rendered.
Procedures in the security courts do not provide for even the most
basic safeguards. The Security Court is exempt from adhering to the
procedural protections of the Penal Code. Defendants may be represented
by counsel, but they seldom see their attorneys before the actual day
of arraignment. Convictions may be based solely on confessions and
police evidence or testimony that may be introduced in secret. The
defense cannot review the evidence against the defendant prior to trial
proceedings. Defense lawyers complain that they rarely are given
sufficient time to find witnesses. There is no right to judicial review
of the legality of arrests. There is no judicial appeal of a State
Security Court verdict, but the defendant may request clemency from the
Amir. The Security Court tried one individual, Abdul Amir Al-Jamri,
during the year.
The number of political prisoners is difficult to determine because
the Government does not release data on security cases; however, the
total is believed to be less than 100. Such cases are not tried in open
court, and visits to prisoners convicted of security offenses are
restricted strictly. The Government denies that there are any political
prisoners and claims that all inmates incarcerated for committing
security offenses were convicted properly of subversive acts such as
espionage, espousing or committing violence, or belonging to terrorist
organizations.
In accordance with tradition, the Government releases and grants
amnesty to some prisoners, including individuals imprisoned for
political activities, on major holidays. The Government reported that
the Amir pardoned over 788 prisoners and detainees since his accession
in March, although it was uncertain how many of these were political
prisoners rather than common criminals (see Section 1.d.). The
prisoners were expected to be released in small groups over the course
of several months.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--During the year, the Government infringed on citizens'
right to privacy, using illegal searches and arbitrary arrests as
tactics to control political unrest, although reports of such
violations of citizens' rights to privacy continued to decline. Under
the State Security Law, the Ministry of Interior is empowered to
authorize entry into private premises without specific judicial
intervention. Telephone calls and personal correspondence are subject
to monitoring. Police informer networks are extensive and
sophisticated.
There were reports that security forces entered private homes
without warrants and took into custody residents who were suspected of
either participating in, or having information regarding,
antigovernment activities. While conducting these raids, security
forces confiscated, damaged, or destroyed personal property for which
owners were not compensated by the Government. Security forces also set
up checkpoints at the entrances to villages, requiring vehicle searches
and proof of identity from anyone seeking to enter or exit. Whenever
possible the Government jams, either in whole or in part, foreign
broadcasts that carry antigovernment programming or commentary. A
government-controlled proxy prohibits user access to Internet sites
considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for the
right ``to express and propagate'' opinions; however, citizens are not
in practice free to express their public opposition to the Government
in speech or writing, although there was some improvement during the
year. Press criticism of ruling family personalities and of government
policy regarding certain sensitive subjects--such as sectarian unrest
and the dispute with Qatar over the Hawar islands--is strictly
prohibited. However, after the new Amir assumed power on March 6, the
Government allowed the press somewhat greater latitude. The Amir stated
in his December 16 National Day speech that the press and public have a
duty to question the Government about developments in the country. Some
sensitive issues, such as criticizing the services offered by the
Ministries of Interior and Defense and discussing the state budget,
which were forbidden in the past, are now being addressed in the local
press. In July and August, the local press published two comments
criticizing the Ministry of Interior's policy toward the ``bidoon,''
(the indigenous stateless population of mostly Persian-origin Shi'a
upon whom the Government has not conferred citizenship or the right to
hold passports). In August columnists criticized the Ministry of
Finance for not informing the public of the effect of the increase in
oil prices on the State's budget and national income.
Local press coverage and commentary on international issues is
open, and discussion of local economic and commercial issues also is
relatively unrestricted. Many individuals express critical opinions
openly on domestic political and social issues in private settings but
do not do so to leading government officials or in public forums.
The Information Ministry exercises extensive control over all local
media. Newspapers are owned privately, but they routinely exercise
self-censorship of stories on sensitive topics. The Government does not
condone unfavorable coverage of its domesticpolicies by the
international media and occasionally has revoked the press credentials
of offending journalists. Because the Ministry controls foreign
journalists' residence permits, unfavorable coverage could lead to
deportation. However, there were no reports that the Government revoked
press credentials during the year. The Government generally afforded
foreign journalists access to the country and did not limit their
contacts.
The State owns and operates all radio and television stations.
Radio and television broadcasts in Arabic and Farsi from neighboring
countries and Egypt can be received without interference. However,
international news services, including the Associated Press, United
Press International, and Agence France Presse, sometimes complain about
press restrictions. The Cable News Network is available on a 24-hour
basis by subscription, and the British Broadcasting Corporation World
News Service is carried on a local channel 24 hours a day free of
charge. However, the Government generally jams, wholly or partially,
foreign broadcasts that carry antigovernment programming or commentary
(see Section 1.f.).
Most senior government officials, ruling family members, and major
hotels use satellite dishes to receive international broadcasts, as do
well-to-do private citizens. Access to satellite dishes and the
importation or installation of dishes no longer require prior
government approval (see Section 3).
Access to the Internet is provided through the National Telephone
Company (BATELCO). A government-controlled proxy prohibits user access
to sites considered to be antigovernment or anti-Islamic; e-mail access
to information is unimpeded, although it may be subject to monitoring
(see Section 1.f.).
Although there are no formal regulations limiting academic freedom,
in practice academics try to avoid contentious political issues.
University hiring and admissions policies appear to favor Sunnis and
others who are assumed to support the Government rather than focusing
on professional experience and academic qualifications; however, there
was some improvement in hiring qualified individuals in a
nondiscriminatory manner during the year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Despite the
Constitution's provision for the right of free assembly, the Government
prohibits all public political demonstrations and meetings and controls
religious gatherings that may take on political overtones. Permits are
required for most other public gatherings, and permission is not
granted routinely. Unauthorized public gatherings of more than five
persons are prohibited by law. The Government monitors gatherings that
might take on a political tone and frequently disperses such meetings.
The Constitution provides for the right of free association;
however, the Government restricts this right. The Government prohibits
political parties and organizations. Some professional societies and
social and sports clubs traditionally have served as forums for
discreet political discussion, but they are restricted by law from
engaging in political activity. Only the Bahraini Bar Association is
exempt from the regulations that require that the constitutions of all
associations include a commitment to refrain from political activity.
The Bar Association successfully had argued that a lawyer's
professional duties may require certain political actions, such as
interpreting legislation or participating in a politically sensitive
trial. In January 1998, after the Bar Association sponsored a lecture
in which prodemocracy speakers publicly attacked the Government, the
Government told current board members that they would not be allowed to
stand for reelection. Although the decision has not been reversed, the
Bar Association continues to operate without hindrance. Other organized
discussions and meetings no longer are discouraged actively.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The population is overwhelmingly Muslim,
and the Constitution states that Islam is the official religion;
however, while the Constitution also provides for freedom of religion,
the Government does not tolerate political dissent from religious
groups or leaders, and subjects both Sunni and Shi'a Muslims to
governmental control and monitoring. Shi'a constitute over two-thirds
of the indigenous population. Most world religions are represented in
the country, and their followers generally practice their faith
privately without interference from the Government. Christians and
other non-Muslims including Jews,Hindus, and Baha'is practice their
religion freely, maintain their own places of worship, and display the
symbols of their religion. There are no registration requirements for
religious organizations.
Bibles and other Christian publications are displayed and sold
openly in local bookstores that also sell Islamic and other religious
literature. Some small groups worship in their homes. Notable
dignitaries from virtually every religion and denomination visit the
country and frequently meet with the Government and civic leaders.
Religious tracts of all branches of Islam, cassettes of sermons
delivered by Muslim preachers from other countries, and publications of
other religions are readily available.
However, proselytizing by non-Muslims is discouraged, anti-Islamic
writings are prohibited, and conversions from Islam to other religions,
while not illegal, are not tolerated well by society.
Both Sunni and Shi'a Muslims are subject to governmental control
and monitoring. During the year, there were no reports that the
Government closed any mosques or Ma'tams (Shi'a community centers) as
it did the previous year to prevent religious leaders from delivering
political speeches.
The High Council for Islamic Affairs is charged with the review and
approval of all clerical appointments within both the Sunni and Shi'a
communities and maintains program oversight for all citizens studying
religion abroad. Public religious events, most notably the large annual
commemorative marches by Shi'a, are permitted but are monitored closely
by the Government. There are no restrictions on the number of citizens
permitted to make pilgrimages to Shi'a shrines and holy sites in Iran,
Iraq, and Syria. However, due to conditions in Iraq, very few citizens
make pilgrimages there. Stateless residents who do not possess Bahraini
passports often have difficulties arranging travel to religious sites
abroad. The Government monitors travel to Iran and scrutinizes
carefully those who choose to pursue religious study there.
The new Amir took some steps to improve the treatment of the Shi'a
population. For example in June the Amir stated that all citizens are
``equal before the law'' and allowed Shi'a to apply for jobs in the BDF
and the Ministry of the Interior for the first time in 4 years. In
early July, the Amir pardoned Shi'a spiritual leader Abdul Amir Al-
Jamri, who had been in prison since 1996. Several other clerics
associated with Al-Jamri remain in jail (see Section 1.d.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government imposes some limits on
these rights. Citizens are free to move within the country and change
their place of residence or work. However, passports may be denied on
political grounds. Approximately 3 percent of the indigenous
population, the ``bidoon,'' or stateless persons, mostly Persian-origin
Shi'a, do not have passports and cannot obtain them readily, although
they may be given travel documents as Bahraini residents (see Section
5). The Government occasionally grants citizenship to resident non-
Bahrainis who are Sunni Muslims, mostly from the Arabian Peninsula and
Egypt.
Citizens living abroad who are suspected of political or criminal
offenses may face arrest and trial upon return to the country. Under
the 1963 Citizenship Law, the Government may reject applications to
obtain or renew passports for reasonable cause, but the applicant has
the right to appeal such decisions before the High Civil Court. The
Government also has issued temporary passports, valid for one trip a
year, to individuals whose travel it wishes to control or whose claim
to Bahraini nationality is questionable. A noncitizen resident,
including a bidoon of Iranian origin, also may obtain a Bahraini
laissez-passer (travel documents), usually valid for 2 years and
renewable at Bahraini embassies overseas. The holder of a laissez-
passer also requires a visa to reenter the country.
Although the Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner
for Refugees to the maximum extent possible, it has not formulated a
formal policy regarding refugees, asylees, or first asylum. The
Government usually does not accept refugees due to its small size and
limited resources. However, in practice refugees who arrive are not
repatriated to countries from which they have fled. Many Iranian
emigres who fled Iran after the Iranian revolution have been granted
permission to remain in the country, but they have not been granted
citizenship.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right peacefully to change their
government or their political system, and the Government controls
political activity. Since the dissolution of the National Assembly in
1975, there have been no formal democratic political institutions. The
Prime Minister makes all appointments to the Cabinet. All other
government positions are filled by the relevant ministries. About one-
third of the cabinet ministers are Shi'a Muslim, although they do not
hold security-related offices. The Government appeared to be more open
to criticism during the year; however, it continues to view most
substantive reform as a threat to stability and has taken only halting
steps to expand political participation. The ordinary citizen may
attempt to influence government decisions through submission of
personal written petitions and informal contact with senior officials,
including appeals to the Amir, the Prime Minister, and other officials
at their regularly scheduled public audiences, called majlises.
In 1992 the Amir established by decree a Consultative Council
(Majlis Al-Shura). Its 40 members are divided between Sunni and Shi'a
(21 Shi'a, 19 Sunni) and are appointed by the Amir. They are selected
to represent major constituent groups, including representatives from
the business, labor, professional, and religious communities. There are
no members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family or religious extremists in
the Majlis. In addition to legislation submitted for its review by the
Cabinet, the Majlis may initiate debate independently on nonpolitical
issues. The Majlis also may summon cabinet ministers to answer
questions, but its recommendations are not binding on the Government.
The Majlis held its seventh session from October 1998 to May, and began
a new session on October 6.
During the year, the Majlis debated a number of contentious social
and economic issues, including unemployment, privatization, child care,
and education reform, and drafted proposals on these and other subjects
for government consideration. According to the Speaker of the Majlis,
the Government responded favorably to all but one of the Majlis's
recommendations by incorporating them into legislation or by taking
other appropriate actions.
Women are underrepresented greatly in government and politics;
there are no women in the Majlis or at the ministerial levels of
Government. The majority of women who choose to work in government are
in a support capacity, and only a few have attained senior positions
within their respective ministries or agencies.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no local human rights organizations. Because of the
restrictions on freedom of association and expression, any independent,
domestically based investigation or public criticism of the
Government's human rights policies faces major obstacles. Several
political opposition movements in exile report on the human rights
situation. These include the Damascus-based Committee for the Defense
of Human Rights in Bahrain, the London-based Bahrain Freedom Movement,
the Beirut-based Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, and the
Copenhagen-based Bahrain Human Rights Organization. These groups are
composed of small numbers of emigres living in self-imposed exile and
reportedly receive funding from sources hostile to the Government.
The Government maintains that it is not opposed to visits by bona
fide human rights organizations. During the year, the Government
allowed increased access by international human rights organizations.
During the year, Middle East Watch and Human Rights Watch
representatives visited the country, and in June the Government
received a delegation from Amnesty International, which issued a brief
statement that noted that it was invited by the Government but was not
allowed to meet with all persons to whom it requested access. In 1996
the Government invited the ICRC to undertake visits to the country's
prisons. The visits continued throughout the year and, while the ICRC
has maintained its usual standards of confidentiality regarding its
findings, credible reports indicate that conditions throughout the
penal system have improved.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality, equal opportunity, and the
right to medical care, welfare, education, property, capital, and work
for all citizens. However, in practice these rights are protected
unevenly, depending on the individual's social status, ethnicity, or
sex.
Women.--Violence against women occurs, but incidents usually are
kept within the family. In general there is little public attention to,
or discussion of, the problem. During the year, a few articles appeared
in the local press discussing violence against women and the need for
laws to defend women who are abused. No government policies explicitly
address violence against women. Women's groups and health care
professionals state that spouse abuse is common, particularly in poorer
communities. There are very few known instances of women seeking legal
redress for violence. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the courts are
not receptive to such cases.
It is not uncommon for foreign women working as domestic workers to
be beaten or sexually abused. Numerous cases have been reported to
local embassies and the police. However, most victims are too
intimidated to sue their employers. Courts reportedly have allowed
victims who do appear to sue for damages, return home, or both.
Shari'a governs the legal rights of women. Specific rights vary
according to Shi'a or Sunni interpretations of Islamic law, as
determined by the individual's faith, or by the court in which various
contracts, including marriage, have been made.
While both Shi'a and Sunni women have the right to initiate a
divorce, religious courts may refuse the request. Although local
religious courts may grant a divorce to Shi'a women in routine cases,
occasionally Shi'a women seeking divorce under unusual circumstances
must travel abroad to seek a higher ranking opinion than that available
in the country. Women of either branch may own and inherit property and
may represent themselves in all public and legal matters. In the
absence of a direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit all property. In
contrast, Sunni women--in the absence of a direct male heir--inherit
only a portion as governed by Shari'a; the balance is divided among
brothers, uncles, and male cousins of the deceased.
In divorce cases, the courts routinely grant Shi'a and Sunni women
custody of daughters under the age of 9 and sons under age 7, although
custody usually reverts to the father once the children reach those
ages. In all circumstances except mental incapacitation, the father,
regardless of custody, retains the right to make certain legal
decisions for his children, such as guardianship of any property
belonging to the child, until the child reaches legal age. A noncitizen
woman automatically loses custody of her children if she divorces their
citizen father.
Women may obtain passports and leave the country without the
permission of the male head of the household. Women are free to work
outside the home, to drive cars without escorts, and to wear the
clothing of their choice. Women increasingly have taken jobs previously
reserved for men. The Labor Law does not discriminate against women;
however, in practice, there is discrimination in the workplace,
including inequality of wages and denial of opportunity for
advancement. Women constitute over 20 percent of the work force. The
Government has encouraged the hiring of women, enacted special laws to
promote female entry into the work force, and is a leading employer of
women. The Labor Law does not recognize the concept of equal pay for
equal work, and women frequently are paid less than men. Generally,
women work outside the home during the years between secondary school
or university and marriage. Some women complain that admissions
policies at the National University are aimed at increasing the number
of male students at the expense of qualified female applicants,
especially Shi'a women. Nevertheless, women make up the majority of
students at the country's universities.
There are women's organizations that seek to improve the status of
women under both civil and Islamic law. Some women have expressed the
view that, despite their participation in the work force, women's
rights are not advancing significantly and that much of the lack of
progress is due to the influence of Islamic religious traditionalists.
However, other women desire a return to more traditional values and
support calls for a return to traditional Islamic patterns of social
behavior.
Children.--The Government often has stated its commitment to the
protection of children's rights and welfare within the social and
religious framework of this traditional society. It generally honors
this commitment through enforcement of its civil and criminal laws and
extensive social welfare network. Public education for children below
the age of 15 is free. While the Constitution provides for compulsory
education at the primary levels, authorities do not enforce attendance.
Limited medical services for infants and preadolescents are provided
free of charge.
The social status of children is shaped by tradition and religion
to a greater extent than by civil law. Child abuse is rare, as is
public discussion of it; the preference of the authorities always has
been to leave such matters within the purview of the family or
religious groups. The authorities actively enforce the laws against
prostitution, including child prostitution, procuring, and pimping.
Violators are dealt with harshly and can be imprisoned, or, if a
noncitizen, deported. In some cases, authorities reportedly return
children arrested for prostitution and other nonpolitical crimes to
their families rather than prosecute them, especially for first
offenses. There were no reports of child prostitution during the year.
Some legal experts have called on the Government to establish a
separate juvenile court. However, other citizens insist that the
protection of children is a religious, not a secular, function and
oppose greater government involvement. Independent and
quasigovernmental organizations such as the Bahraini Society for the
Protection of Children and the Mother and Child Welfare Society play an
active part in protecting children by providing counseling, legal
assistance, advice, and, in some cases, shelter and financial support
to distressed children and families.
In 1998 there were numerous arrests and detentions of juveniles
during the year in connection with the political unrest. These children
generally were released without charges within several days of their
arrests. However, those juveniles charged with security offenses
received the same treatment as adult prisoners, that is, incommunicado
detention and trial before a State Security Court. There were very few
reports of arrests and detentions of juveniles during the year, and
these persons were released.
People with Disabilities.--The law protects the rights of the
disabled and a variety of governmental, quasigovernmental, and
religious institutions are mandated to support and protect disabled
persons. The regional (Arabian Gulf) Center for the Treatment of the
Blind is headquartered in Bahrain, and a similar Center for the
Education of Deaf Children was established in 1994. Society tends to
view the disabled as special cases in need of protection rather than as
fully functioning members of society. Nonetheless, the Government is
required by law to provide vocational training for disabled persons who
wish to work and maintains a list of certified, trained disabled
persons. The Labor Law of 1976 also requires that any employer of over
100 persons must engage at least 2 percent of its employees from the
Government's list of disabled workers; however, this commitment cannot
be verified. The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs works actively to
place the disabled in public sector jobs, such as in the public
telephone exchanges. The Government's housing regulations require that
access be provided to disabled persons. Greater emphasis has been given
in recent years to public building design that incorporates access for
the disabled; however, the law does not mandate access to buildings for
persons with disabilities.
Religious Minorities.--Although there are notable exceptions, the
Sunni Muslim minority enjoys a favored status. Sunnis receive
preference for employment in sensitive government positions and in the
managerial ranks of the civil service. While the defense and internal
security forces are predominantly Sunni, Shi'a citizens now are allowed
to hold posts in these forces; however, they do not hold significant
positions. In the private sector, Shi'a citizens tend to be employed in
lower paid, less skilled jobs.
Educational, social, and municipal services in most Shi'a
neighborhoods, particularly in rural villages, are inferior to those
found in Sunni urban communities. In an effort to remedy societal
discrimination, the Government has built numerous subsidized housing
complexes open to all citizens on the basisof financial need. In order
to ease both the housing shortage and strains on the national budget,
in 1997 the Government revised its policy in order to permit lending
institutions to finance mortgages on apartment units.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--A group of approximately 9,000
to 15,000 persons, mostly Shi'a of Persian-origin, but including some
Christians, are stateless. Commonly known as bidoon, they enjoy less
than full citizenship under the 1963 Citizenship Act. Many are second-
or third-generation residents whose ancestors emigrated from Iran.
Although they no longer claim Iranian citizenship, most have not been
granted Bahraini citizenship. Without citizenship these individuals
officially are unable to buy land, start a business, or obtain
government loans, although in practice many do. The law does not
address the citizenship rights of persons who were not registered with
the authorities prior to 1959, which creates a legal problem for such
persons and their descendants and results in economic and other
hardships. The Government maintains that many of those who claim to be
bidoon are actually citizens of Iran or other Gulf states who have
chosen voluntarily not to renew their foreign passports. Bidoon and
citizens who speak Farsi rather than Arabic as their first language
also face significant social and economic obstacles, including
difficulty finding employment.
The Amir stated in his December 16 national day speech that he was
committed to giving citizenship to ``every qualified person.'' There
were reports that several bidoon families received citizenship after
waiting 20 years.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The partially suspended 1973
Constitution recognizes the right of workers to organize; however,
independent trade unions do not exist. The Constitution provides for
``freedom to form associations and trade unions on national bases and
for lawful objectives and by peaceful means,'' in accordance with the
law, and states that ``no person shall be compelled to join or remain
in any association or union.''
In response to labor unrest in the mid-1950's, 1965, and 1974, the
Government passed a series of labor regulations, which allow the
formation of elected workers' committees in larger companies. Worker
representation is based on a system of Joint Labor-Management
Committees (JLC's) established by ministerial decree. Three JLC's were
created in 1998, bringing the total to 19.
The JLC's are composed of equal numbers of appointed management
representatives and worker representatives elected from and by company
employees. Each committee is chaired alternately by the management and
worker representative. The selection of worker representatives appears
to be fair. Under the law, the Ministry of Interior may exclude worker
candidates with criminal records or those deemed a threat to national
security, but the Government has not taken such action in recent years.
The elected labor representatives of the JLC's select the 11
members of the General Committee of Bahrain workers (GCBW) established
by law in 1983, which oversees and coordinates the work of the JLC's.
The Committee also hears complaints from Bahraini and foreign workers
and assists them in bringing their complaints to the attention of the
Ministry of Labor or the courts. In 1998 elections were held for 3-year
terms for representatives to the GCBW. Workers from a variety of
occupations were elected to the body, including Sunni and Shi'a
Muslims, foreign workers, and one woman. These elections, which were by
secret ballot, appeared to be free and fair.
Although the Government and company management are not represented
on the GCBW, the Ministry of Labor closely monitors the body's
activities. It approves the GCBW's rules and the distribution of the
GCBW's funds. The JLC-GCBW system represents nearly 70 percent of the
island's indigenous industrial workers, although both the Government
and labor representatives readily admit that nonindustrial workers and
foreign workers clearly are underrepresented in the system. The
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs supports the formation of JLC's in
all public and private sector companies that employ more than 200
workers.
Although foreign workers constitute 67 percent of the work force,
they are underrepresented in the GCBW. Foreign workers participate in
the JLC elections, and five foreign workerscurrently serve on JLC's.
However, none sits on the board of the GCBW. It is a long-term goal of
both the Government and the GCBW to replace foreign workers with
citizens throughout all sectors of the economy and to create new jobs
for citizens seeking employment.
The Labor Law is silent on the right to strike, and there were no
strikes during the year. Actions perceived to be detrimental to the
``existing relationship'' between employers and employees or to the
economic health of the State are forbidden by the 1974 Security Act.
There were no recent examples of major strikes, but walkouts and other
job actions have been known to occur in the past without governmental
intervention and with positive results for the workers.
Internationally affiliated trade unions do not exist. The GCBW
represents workers in the Arab Labor Organization, but does not belong
to any international trade union organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--As in the case
of strikes, the Labor Law neither grants nor denies workers the right
to organize and bargain collectively outside the JLC system. While the
JLC's are empowered to discuss labor disputes, organize workers'
services, and discuss wages, working conditions, and productivity,
workers have no independent, recognized vehicle for representing their
interests on these or other labor-related issues. Minimum wage rates
for public sector employees are established by Council of Ministers'
decrees. Private businesses generally follow the Government's lead in
establishing their wage rates.
There are two export processing zones. Labor law and practice are
the same in these zones as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by law; however, in practice the labor laws apply
for the most part only to citizens, and abuses occur, particularly in
the cases of domestic workers and those working illegally. The law also
prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the Government enforces
this prohibition effectively.
In some cases, foreign workers arrive in the country under the
sponsorship of an employer and then switch jobs, while continuing to
pay a fee to their original sponsor. The Government has announced its
intention to stop this illegal practice, which makes it difficult to
monitor and control the employment conditions of domestic and other
workers; however, it took no substantive action during the year.
Labor Law amendments passed in 1993 stiffened the penalties for job
switching to include jail sentences of up to 6 months for the sponsor
of every illegally sponsored worker. In such cases, the workers
involved are likely to be deported as illegal immigrants after the case
is concluded. During the summer and fall of 1998, the Government
conducted an amnesty program under which undocumented foreign workers
were permitted either to legalize their status or leave the country
without penalty. As many as 38,000 workers opted to participate in the
amnesty program; there was no amnesty in 1999.
The sponsorship system leads to other abuses as well. There are
numerous reports that employers withhold salaries from their foreign
workers for months, even years, at a time, and may refuse to grant them
the necessary permission to leave the country. The Government and the
courts generally work to rectify those abuses brought to their
attention, but the fear of deportation or employer retaliation prevents
many foreign workers from making complaints to the authorities.
Labor Laws do not apply to domestic servants. There are credible
reports that domestic servants, especially women, sometimes are forced
to work 12- or 16-hour days, given little time off, and are subjected
to verbal and physical abuse.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 14 years of age.
Juveniles between the ages of 14 and 16 may not be employed in
hazardous conditions or at night and may not work more than 6 hours per
day or on a piecemeal basis. Child labor laws are enforced effectively
by Ministry of Labor inspectors in the industrial sector; child labor
outside that sector is monitored less well, but it is not believed to
be significant outside family operated businesses, and even in that
sector it is not very widespread.Some children work in the market areas
as car-washers and porters. While the Constitution calls for compulsory
education at the primary levels, authorities do not enforce attendance
(see Section 5). The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and
the Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Minimum wage scales, set by
government decree, exist for public sector employees and generally
afford a decent standard of living for a worker and family. The minimum
wage for the public sector is $278.25 (105 dinars) a month. Wages in
the private sector are determined on a contract basis. For foreign
workers, employers consider benefits such as annual trips home and
housing and education bonuses as part of the salary.
The Labor Law, enforced by the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs, mandates acceptable conditions of work for all adult workers,
including adequate standards regarding hours of work (maximum 48 hours
per week) and occupational safety and health. The Ministry enforces the
law with periodic inspections and fines routinely imposed on violators.
The press often performs an ombudsman function on labor problems,
reporting job disputes and the results of labor cases brought before
the courts. Once a complaint has been lodged by a worker, the Ministry
of Labor opens an investigation and often takes remedial action. The
Fourth High Court has jurisdiction over cases involving alleged
violations of the Labor Law.
Complaints brought before the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs
that cannot be settled through arbitration must, by law, be referred to
the court within 15 days. In practice most employers prefer to settle
such disputes through arbitration, particularly since the court and
labor law generally are considered to favor the employee.
The Labor Law specifically favors citizens over foreign workers and
Arab foreigners over other foreign workers in hiring and firing.
Because employers include housing and other allowances in their salary
scales, foreign workers legally can be paid lower regular wages than
their citizen counterparts, although they sometimes receive the same or
a greater total compensation package because of home leave and holiday
allowances. Western foreign workers and citizen workers are paid
comparable wages, with total compensation packages often significantly
greater for the former. Women are entitled to 60 days of paid maternity
leave and nursing periods during the day. However, women generally are
paid less than men.
In 1993 the Government strengthened the Labor Law by decree of the
Amir, announcing that significant fines and jail sentences would be
imposed upon private-sector employers who fail to pay legal wages. This
law applies equally to employers of citizens and foreign workers and is
intended to reduce abuses against foreign workers who sometimes have
been denied legal salaries (see Section 6.c.). The law provides equal
protection to citizen and foreign workers, but all foreign workers
still require sponsorship by citizens or locally based institutions and
companies. According to representatives of several embassies with large
numbers of workers in the country, the Government generally is
responsive to embassy requests to investigate foreign guest worker
complaints about unpaid wages and mistreatment. However, foreign
workers, particularly those from developing countries, often are
unwilling to report abuses for fear of losing residence rights and
having to return to their native countries. Sponsors are able to cancel
the residence permit of any person under their sponsorship and thereby
block them for 1 year from obtaining entry or residence visas from
another sponsor, although the sponsor may be subject to sanctions for
wrongful dismissal. Foreign women who work as domestic workers often
are beaten or sexually abused (see Section 5).
Under the Labor Law, workers have the right to remove themselves
from dangerous work situations without jeopardy to their continued
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
______
EGYPT
According to its Constitution, Egypt is a social democracy in which
Islam is the state religion. The National Democratic Party (NDP), which
has governed since its establishment in 1978, has used its entrenched
position to dominate national politics, and it maintains an overriding
majority in the popularly elected People's Assembly and the partially
elected Shura (Consultative) Council. President Hosni Mubarak was
reelected unopposed to a fourth 6-year term in a national referendum
held in September. The Cabinet and the country's 26 governors are
appointed by the President and may be dismissed by him at his
discretion. The judiciary is independent; however, there is no
appellate process for verdicts issued by the military or State Security
Emergency courts.
There are several security services in the Ministry of Interior,
two of which are involved primarily in combating terrorism: The State
Security Investigations Sector (SSIS), which conducts investigations
and interrogates detainees; and the Central Security Force (CSF), which
enforces curfews and bans on public demonstrations, and conducts
paramilitary operations against terrorists. The President is the
commander-in-chief of the military; the military is a primary
stabilizing factor within society but generally does not involve itself
in internal issues. The use of violence by security forces in the
campaign against suspected terrorists appeared more limited than in
previous years. The security forces committed numerous serious human
rights abuses.
Egypt is in transition from a government-controlled economy to a
free market system. The Government continued its privatization program,
although key sectors of the economy remain under government control.
Agriculture remains the largest employer and is almost entirely in
private hands. The tourism sector generates the largest amount of
foreign currency. Petroleum exports, Suez Canal revenues, and
remittances from approximately 2 million Egyptians working abroad are
the other principal sources of foreign currency. These income sources
are vulnerable to external shocks. Over the past decade, the Government
has enacted significant economic reforms, which have reduced the budget
deficit, stabilized the exchange rate, reduced inflation and interest
rates significantly, and built up substantial reserves. However, export
growth has lagged behind the growth in imports, which has resulted in
an increase in the merchandise trade deficit to $12 billion for the
year 1998-99.
Several government policies enacted during the year, including
restrictive trade decrees and foreign exchange rationing, led observers
to question whether the Government can sustain its current exchange
rate policy and interest rates. President Mubarak reshuffled the
Cabinet in October to address these problems and to institute more
coherent economic policies and accelerated reforms. Continued progress
in economic development depends primarily upon implementation of a wide
range of structural reforms. The per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) is about $1,100 per year. Official statistics place 34.4 percent
of wage earners in the agricultural sector, and knowledgeable observers
estimate that perhaps 3 to 5 percent of those engage in subsistence
farming. The annual population increase is 2.1 percent. Adult literacy
rates are 63 percent for males and 34 percent for females.
The Government continued to commit numerous serious human rights
abuses, although its record again improved somewhat over the previous
year, mainly due to a decrease in terrorist activity by Islamic
extremists. The ruling NDP dominates the political scene to such an
extent that citizens do not have a meaningful ability to change their
government.
The Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981, continues
to restrict many basic rights. The security forces continued to arrest
and detain suspected members of terrorist groups. In fighting the
terrorists, the security forces continued to mistreat and torture
prisoners, arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, hold detainees in
prolonged pretrial detention, and occasionally engage in mass arrests.
In actions unrelated to the antiterrorist campaign, local police
killed, tortured, and otherwise abused both criminal suspects and other
persons. The Government took disciplinary action against police
officers accused of abusing detainees, including prosecution of several
offenders, but it did not pursue most cases or seek adequate
punishments. In August the public prosecutor reopened and expanded an
investigation into police brutality and torture that took place during
a 1998 police investigation of a double murder in the largely Coptic
village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate.
Prison conditions remain poor. The Ministry of Interior released
more than 1,000 political detainees, bringing the total number of
detainees released since 1998 to more than 6,000. The use of military
courts to try civilians continued to infringe on a defendant's right to
a fair trial before an independentjudiciary. During the year, the
Government referred 3 cases involving 148 civilian defendants to the
military court system. Twenty of these defendants are leaders of the
Muslim Brotherhood. They were arrested in October on charges of illegal
political activity. Most observers believe that the Government is
seeking to block Muslim Brotherhood participation in the elections to
professional syndicates and the People's Assembly. The Government used
the Emergency Law to infringe on citizens' privacy rights. Although
citizens generally express themselves freely, the Government partially
restricts freedom of the press. The Government significantly restricts
freedom of assembly and association. The Government places restrictions
on freedom of religion. Despite difficulties due to an inadequate legal
framework and periodic government harassment, a number of local human
rights groups are active. Although the Government does not recognize
them legally, it allows these groups to operate openly.
Domestic violence against women is a problem. Although the
Government enforces the 1996 decree banning the practice of female
genital mutilation (FGM), many families persist in subjecting their
daughters to the traditional practice. Women and Christians face
discrimination based on tradition and some aspects of the law.
Terrorist violence against Christians has been a problem in recent
years. There were no reports of terrorist attacks against Christians
during the year; however, a Christian priest in Mahalla and a Christian
priest in Dairout were attacked by individual extremists. Child labor
remains widespread despite government efforts to eradicate it. Abuse by
employers continues, and the Government does not enforce the law
effectively. The Government limits workers' rights.
In contrast to the previous year, and for the first time in 10
years, there were no reports of terrorist incidents.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings; however, police committed extrajudicial
killings, and such killings also may have occurred in certain
antiterrorist operations.
In August The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR)
reported the deaths of five criminal suspects in police custody during
the year: Ahmad Mahmoud Mohamed Tammam, Hany Kamal Shawky, Said Sayyed
Abd Al-Aal, Hamdy Ahmad Mohamed Ahmad Askar, and Amr Salim Mohamed (see
Section 1.c.). The Ministry of Interior responded to the EOHR's inquiry
about these cases, and noted that the Public Prosecutor charged a
security official with premeditated murder in one instance (see Section
1.c.).
The London-based Islamic Observation Center reported that Mahmoud
Agami Muhalhel Muawad died on October 21 in Damanhour prison as a
result of poor conditions. Muawad's older brother, Sayyed Agami
Muhalhel Muawad, was convicted in absentia in April by a military court
and sentenced to 10 years in prison for membership in the terrorist
group, the ``Jihad Group of Egypt'' (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). The
press reported the following deaths due to police torture: Ahmad
Mahmoud Ali Abdallah, who died on November 1 as a result of torture in
a Cairo police station; Sharif Abd Al-Galil Sharaf, who died on
December 2 after being detained and tortured in a police station in the
governorate of Sharkiya; and Mohamed Ahmad Ibrahim, who died after
being detained in a police station in Alexandria late in the year (see
Section 1.c.).
During the year, the public prosecution referred to court the case
of five security officials accused of premeditated murder in the 1998
death in detention of Waheed Al-Sayyid Ahmad. A court date was not set
by year's end. The public prosecution took no action on the case of
Gamal Mohammed Abdallah Mustafa, who died as a result of police torture
in 1998. The public prosecution took no action on the case of a
businessman who died in 1997 in the governorate of Galoubiya,
reportedly as a result of police torture (see Section 1.c.).
In antiterrorist campaigns, security forces killed four members of
the ``Islamic Group of Egypt'' (IG), including Farid Salim Abdel Qader
Kidwani, who was the leader of the IG's military wing. The security
forces reportedly raided an IG hideout in Giza on September 7. The four
IG members were killed in an exchange of gunfire. On August 1, a
resident of Assiyut governorate shot and killed a member of the
security forces. The gunman subsequently was shot and killed by
security forces. Although there were some reports that this exchange
was a terrorist incident, local observers attribute the incident to a
dispute over cattle theft. There were no reports of killings
ofrelatives of suspected extremists by security forces in apparent
vendettas.
According to press reports, in October a State Security Emergency
court began the trial of four members of a terrorist group from the
upper (southern) Egyptian city of Dairout who were accused of murder
and attempted murder of policemen and Christians in the early 1990's.
The trial was postponed until December, then later postponed again
until February 2000. There was no information available about the
identities of the defendants and the specific charges against them (see
Sections 1.e. and 5.).
According to reports released by the Land Center for Human Rights,
during the year, 64 persons died and 324 were wounded in land disputes,
including conflicts over demarcation lines, water rights, and cattle
theft. The Land Center also reported 265 arrests related to land
disputes. These incidents took place in rural areas, primarily in upper
(southern) Egypt.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
The Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners reported
six new cases of persons who disappeared between 1989 and 1998. The
Center learned that 3 of the 19 persons reported missing in 1998 are in
prison. The EOHR continues to investigate 30 previously reported
disappearances. The EOHR has provided these names to the U.N. Committee
on Disappearances, but the Government reportedly has denied any
involvement in these cases.
On February 22, an appeals court in Cairo ordered the Ministry of
Interior to pay Bahaa Al-Amary, the wife of former Libyan Foreign
Minister Mansur Kikhiya, $30,000 (100,000 Egyptian pounds). Kikhiya's
family sued the Government following reports that he had been kidnaped
from Cairo by Libyan agents, taken to Libya, and executed there in
1994. The court awarded the sum as compensation for the Ministry of
Interior's inability to protect a foreign dignitary on Egyptian soil.
The Ministry of Interior appealed the decision to the Court of
Cassation. The case is pending.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits the infliction of ``physical or
moral harm'' upon persons who have been arrested or detained; however,
torture and abuse of detainees by police, security personnel, and
prison guards is common.
Under the Penal Code, torture of a defendant or giving orders to
torture are felonies punishable by temporary hard labor or 3 to 10
years' imprisonment. If the defendant dies, the crime is one of
intentional murder punishable by a life sentence at hard labor. Arrest
without due cause, threatening death, or using physical torture is
punishable by temporary hard labor. The use of cruelty against persons
by relying on one's position is punishable by imprisonment of no more
than 1 year or a fine of no more than $65 (125 Egyptian pounds).
Victims may bring a criminal or civil action for compensation against
the responsible government agency. There is no statute of limitations
in such cases.
Despite these legal safeguards, there were numerous credible
reports, including statements by government officials, that security
forces tortured and mistreated citizens. Reports of torture and
mistreatment at police stations remain frequent. According to a
newspaper interview published in June, Interior Minister Habib Al-Adly
said that human rights were ``an important component of state
practices,'' and that he was seeking ``to restore the necessary level
of security discipline.'' He stated that it was necessary to restore
the confidence of citizens in the ``competence'' of the security
services, and to restore ``the positive relationship'' between citizens
and the security services. In August it was reported in the press that
the Public Prosecutor instructed his subordinates to avoid the use of
physical or psychological violence during the interrogation of
suspects.
However, while the Government has investigated torture complaints
in criminal cases and punished some offending officers, the punishments
do not conform with the seriousness of the offense. Government
officials have stated that administrative punishments can be severe
enough to prevent further career advancement, and that some police
officers have chosen to face criminal charges instead. The Government
has stated that it would not disclose further details of
individualcases of police abuse for fear of harming the morale of law
enforcement officers involved in counterterrorism operations.
Human rights groups believe that the SSIS continues to employ
torture. Torture takes place in SSIS offices, including its
headquarters in Cairo, and at Central Security Force camps. Torture
victims usually are taken to an SSIS office where they are handcuffed,
blindfolded, and questioned about their associations, religious
beliefs, and political views. Torture is used to extract information,
coerce the victims to end their antigovernment activities, and deter
others from such activities.
Egyptian human rights groups and victims reported a number of
torture methods that are employed by state security personnel and the
police. Detainees frequently are stripped; hung by their wrists with
their feet just touching the floor or forced to stand for prolonged
periods; doused with hot or cold water; beaten; forced to stand
outdoors in cold weather; and subjected to electrical shocks. Some
victims, including female detainees, report that they have been
threatened with rape.
While the law requires security authorities to keep written records
of detained citizens, human rights groups report that such records
often are not available, not found, or that the police deny any
knowledge of the detainee when inquiries are made about specific cases,
effectively blocking the investigation of torture complaints.
In January the Human Rights Center for the Assistance of Prisoners
released a report called ``The Price of Dignity: Torture in Egypt is a
Judicial Reality.'' The report presents a random sample of 190 cases of
torture from the period 1982 to 1997. All of the cases involve a
civilian defendant who successfully sued the Ministry of Interior for
compensation for torture inflicted by state security forces or police
during detention. For the 190 sample cases cited, the Interior Ministry
was ordered to pay a total of $260,000 (877,000 Egyptian pounds) in
awards ranging from $150 (500 Egyptian pounds) to $10,300 (35,000
Egyptian pounds).
In August the EOHR reported that five criminal suspects died during
the year while in police custody, and provided eyewitness accounts of
police torture of these persons. According to the EOHR, Hamdy Ahmad
Mohamed Askar died on February 16 in Al-Mansoura general hospital,
where he had been transferred following detention at a police station
in Mansoura Governorate. Said Sayyed Abd Al-Aal died on April 17 in a
police station in Giza. Hany Kamal Shawky died on April 21 in a police
station in Cairo. Amr Salim Mohamed died on July 17 in a police station
in the governorate of Galoubiya. Ahmad Mahmoud Mohamed Tammam died on
July 21 in a police station in Giza.
In response to the EOHR's inquiry about these cases, the Ministry
of Interior stated that Askar had been transferred to the hospital
because of respiratory problems, and noted that the forensics evidence
conflicts with eyewitness accounts of Askar's treatment. According to
the Ministry, Abd Al-Aal died from circulatory failure in a hospital.
The Ministry reported that the Public Prosecutor charged a security
official in Cairo with premeditated murder following the death of
Shawky. The Ministry stated that a forensic report indicated that
Mohamed died from pleural effusion and circulatory failure, and noted
that Mohamed's father said that his son was suffering from pneumonia.
The Islamic Observation Center, based in London, reported that
Mahmoud Agami Muhalhel Muawad died on October 21 in Damanhour prison
``as a result of the deteriorating conditions of Egyptian prisons.''
Muawad was the younger brother of Sayyed Agami Muhalhel Muawad, who was
convicted in absentia in April by a military court and sentenced to 10
years in prison for membership in the terrorist group the Islamic Jihad
of Egypt (see Sections 1.a. and 1.e.). The press reported that Ahmad
Mahmoud Ali Abdallah was arrested on October 30 and died on November 1
at the Rod Al-Farag police station in Cairo from torture. Abdallah's
family claimed that the police forced them to bury his body, which
revealed evidence of torture. In December the press reported that 16-
year-old Mohamed Ahmad Ibrahim died after police tortured him in the
Al-Raml police station in Alexandria. Ibrahim's family complained to
the office of the public prosecutor about bruises on their son's body.
The press also reported that police in Minya Al-Kamh in the governorate
of Sharikiya tortured to death Sharif Abd Al-Galil Sharaf. Sharif
reportedly was arrested on November 13 and beaten so badly that he fell
into a coma. He was taken to a hospital where he died on December 2.
In May the Public Prosecutor in Sohag announced that the medical
evidence did not support allegations of police torture and mistreatment
of 15 suspects from the village of Al-Kush in the governorate of Sohag
in 1998 (see Sections 2.a., 2.c., and 4). The Sohag Public Prosecutor
dismissed the charges against thepolice officers. The 15 suspects were
detained during a 1998 murder investigation and subsequently filed an
official complaint. There was no evidence to substantiate a newspaper
report that the Government compensated the four implicated officers,
and the minister of Interior denied the report. The officers were
transferred during the investigation and have not been reassigned to
Al-Kush. In August the newly appointed national Public Prosecutor
reopened and expanded the investigation of police conduct in Al-Kush.
According to the EOHR and other groups, during the incident, the police
detained hundreds of citizens, including relatives of suspects, women,
and children. Local observers reported that police tortured and
mistreated dozens of these detainees. The public prosecution is
interviewing 989 Al-Kush residents about the incident.
During the year the public prosecution referred to court the case
of five security officials accused of premeditated murder in the 1998
death of Waheed Al-Sayyid Ahmad, who allegedly died as a result of
police torture. A court date was not set by year's end. The public
prosecution took no action on the case of Gamal Mohammed Abdallah
Mustafa, who died as a result of police torture in 1998. The public
prosecution took no action on the case of a businessman who died in
1997 in the governorate of Galoubiya, reportedly as a result of police
torture. The public prosecution continued to investigate the torture of
Mohammed Badr Al-Din Gomah in 1996 by 13 members of the Alexandria
police force. The appeal of a 1-year sentence of a police officer
convicted of engaging in torture in 1994 is pending.
A December 31 dispute escalated into violent exchanges between
Christians and Muslims in the south (see Section 5.).
Prison conditions remain poor. Government authorities reported the
renovation or construction of 14 prisons during the past 5 years.
Nonetheless, human rights groups report that overcrowding and unhealthy
conditions continue. Cells are poorly ventilated, food is inadequate in
quantity and nutritional value, drinking water often is polluted, and
medical services are insufficient. These conditions contribute to the
spread of disease and epidemics. The use of torture and mistreatment in
prisons continues to be common.
In August the Public Prosecutor ordered his subordinates to visit
prisons under their jurisdiction randomly at least once a month. He
also instructed them to inspect prison records and to investigate
complaints raised by prisoners. Inspections began after the
announcement.
Relatives and lawyers often are unable to obtain access to prisons
for visits. Prisons in Abu Zaabal, Tora, and Al-Fayoum remain closed to
visits. In response to 10 separate cases filed by the Human Rights
Center for the Assistance of Prisoners, an administrative court issued
10 rulings on December 14, directing the Interior Ministry to open the
Tora prison to visits. The Center has filed 33 additional cases within
the past 2 years requesting visits to other closed prisons. These cases
are pending before the court. However, human rights groups report that
visits have been refused at several prisons. At others restrictions
have been placed on visits to prisoners incarcerated for political or
terrorist crimes, limiting the number of visits allowed each prisoner,
and the total number of visitors allowed in the prison at any one time.
In principle human rights monitors are allowed to visit prisoners
in their capacity as legal counsel; however, in practice they often
face considerable bureaucratic obstacles that prevent them from meeting
with prisoners. The Government does not permit the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--As part of the
Government's antiterrorist campaign, security forces conducted mass
arrests and detained hundreds of individuals without charge. Police
also at times arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. Under the
provisions of the Emergency Law, which has been in effect since 1981,
the police may obtain an arrest warrant from the Ministry of Interior
upon showing that an individual poses a danger to security and public
order. This procedure nullifies the constitutional requirement of
showing that an individual likely has committed a specific crime to
obtain a warrant from a judge or prosecutor.
The Emergency Law allows authorities to detain an individual
without charge. After 30 days, a detainee has the right to demand a
court hearing to challenge the legality of the detention order and may
resubmit his motion for a hearing at 1-month intervals thereafter.
There is no maximum limit to the length of detention if the judge
continues to uphold the legality of the detention order, or if the
detainee fails to exercise his right to a hearing.
In addition to the Emergency Law, the Penal Code also gives the
State broad detention powers. Under the Penal Code, prosecutors must
bring charges within 48 hours or release the suspect. However, they may
detain a suspect for a maximum of 6 months, pending investigation.
Arrests under the Penal Code occur openly and with warrants issued by a
district prosecutor or judge. There is a system of bail. The Penal Code
contains several provisions to combat extremist violence. These
provisions broadly define terrorism to include the acts of ``spreading
panic'' and ``obstructing the work of authorities.''
During the year, security forces and police arrested at least 249
persons allegedly associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist
opposition organization. In August security forces arrested about 2
dozen students at Cairo and Zagazig Universities who were suspected of
Muslim Brotherhood membership. The EOHR alleged that the security
forces harass politically affiliated students at the beginning of each
academic year (see Section 2.a.). In October and November, security
forces arrested 26 alleged members of the Muslim Brotherhood in the
Delta region and 8 in Minya. Four more suspected members were arrested
in Qena in December. An unknown number of Muslim Brotherhood members
who were arrested during the year reportedly were released later.
On October 20, security forces arrested and detained 20
professional leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and accused them of
membership in an illegal group and incitement against the Government.
The Government referred the case to the military courts. The first
hearing was held on December 25 and the next was scheduled for January
12, 2000. The arrests and trial before the military courts coincided
with preparations for elections to the boards of professional
syndicates and to the People's Assembly (see Section 1.e.).
In January Mahmoud Mohamed was arrested and detained for more than
30 days by security forces after he sent a telegram to President
Mubarak asserting that he would not support Mubarak in the presidential
referendum held in September. After the media publicized the story,
Mubarak ordered Mohamed's release.
In March six members of the Tagammu opposition party were arrested
by security forces, following a meeting in Cairo, for possessing
pamphlets that criticized the draft labor law. Three of the six were
released immediately; the other three were questioned and released
after they paid bail (see Sections 2.a. and 6.a.). Also in March, Fathy
Abu Al-Ezz was detained briefly for publishing an article in a company
newspaper that explained why he would not vote for President Mubarak
(see Section 2.a.). In October state security forces arrested Fathy Al-
Masri and detained him for over 15 days for possessing a pamphlet that
criticized the prohibition of medical services in a nonemergency
situation by a hide tanning company. He was released in November (see
Sections 2.a. and 6.e.).
There were a few unconfirmed reports that several converts to
Christianity were subjected to harassment by the security services,
including temporary detention (see Section 2.c.).
Human rights groups reported that hundreds, and according to one
report, thousands, of persons detained under the Emergency Law have
been incarcerated for several years without charge. The courts have
ordered the release of several of these detainees, but prison officials
reportedly have ignored the orders. The Ministry of Interior frequently
reissues detention orders to return detainees to prison. In April the
Ministry of Interior reported that it had released 1,200 political
detainees described as ``repentant extremists.'' This group included
persons who had served their sentences but had remained in detention,
and persons who had never been charged or tried. The release brought
the total number of detainees released in the past 2 years to more than
6,000. Following the releases, revised prison population estimates
indicate that there are 10,000 prisoners who are registered and serving
sentences and approximately 12,000 political detainees.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent;
however, cases involving national security or terrorism may be handled
by military or State Security Emergency courts, in which constitutional
protections may not be observed. The Constitution provides for the
independence and immunity of judges and forbids interference by other
authorities in the exercise of their judicial functions. The President
appoints all judges upon recommendation of the Higher Judicial Council,
a constitutional body composed of senior judges and chaired by the
president of the Court of Cassation. The Council regulates judicial
promotions and transfers. In the last few years, the Government has
addedlectures on human rights and other social issues to its training
courses for prosecutors and judges.
There are three levels of regular criminal courts: Primary courts,
appeals courts, and the Court of Cassation, which represents the final
stage of criminal appeal.
The judicial system is based on the Napoleonic tradition; hence,
there are no juries. Misdemeanors that are punishable by imprisonment
are heard at the first level by one judge and at the second level by
three judges. Felonies that are punishable by imprisonment or execution
are heard in criminal court by three judges. Appeals of rulings are
heard by the Court of Cassation.
A lawyer is appointed at the court's expense if the defendant does
not have one. The appointment of lawyers is based on a roster chosen by
the bar association; however, expenses are incurred by the State. Any
denial of this right is grounds for appeal of the ruling. However,
detainees in certain high security prisons alleged that they were
denied access to counsel or that such access was delayed until trial,
thus denying counsel the time to prepare an adequate defense. A woman's
testimony is equal to that of a man's in court. There is no legal
prohibition against a woman serving as a judge, although in practice no
women serve as judges (see Section 5).
Defense lawyers generally agree that the regular judiciary respects
the rights of the accused and exercises its independence. In the past,
criminal court judges have dismissed cases in which confessions were
obtained by coercion. However, while the judiciary generally is
credited with conducting fair trials, under the Emergency Law, cases
involving terrorism and national security may be tried in military or
State Security Emergency courts, in which the accused do not receive
all the constitutional protections of the civilian judicial system.
In 1992 following a rise in extremist violence, the Government
began trying cases of persons accused of terrorism and membership in
terrorist groups before military tribunals. In 1993 the Supreme
Constitutional Court ruled that the President may invoke the Emergency
Law to refer any crime to a military court. This use of military and
State Security Emergency courts under the Emergency Law has deprived
hundreds of civilian defendants of their constitutional right to be
tried by a civilian judge.
The Government defends the use of military courts as necessary in
terrorism cases, maintaining that trials in the civilian courts are
protracted and that civilian judges and their families are vulnerable
to terrorist threats. Some civilian judges have confirmed their fear of
trying high visibility terrorism cases because of possible reprisal.
The Government claims that civilian defendants receive fair trials in
the military courts and enjoy the same rights as defendants in civilian
courts.
However, the military courts do not ensure civilian defendants due
process before an independent tribunal. While military judges are
lawyers, they are also military officers appointed by the Minister of
Defense and subject to military discipline. They are not as independent
or as qualified as civilian judges in applying the civilian Penal Code.
There is no appellate process for verdicts issued by military courts;
instead, verdicts are subject to a review by other military judges and
confirmation by the President, who in practice usually delegates the
review function to a senior military officer. Defense attorneys have
complained that they have not been given sufficient time to prepare
defenses and that judges tend to rush cases involving a large number of
defendants.
During the year, the Government referred three groups of civilian
defendants to the military courts. A military court tried 107 suspected
members of the Jihad group in Egypt. Of these defendants, known as the
``Returnees from Albania,'' 60 were tried in absentia. On April 18 the
court sentenced nine defendants to death; all nine were tried in
absentia and are believed to reside outside of Egypt. The court also
sentenced 11 to life imprisonment at hard labor and 67 to prison
sentences ranging from 1 to 15 years. The court acquitted 20
defendants. In the second case, a military court tried 21 suspected
members of the Islamic Group in Egypt. On June 17, the court sentenced
1 defendant to life imprisonment, and 19 defendants to prison sentences
ranging from 5 to 25 years. One defendant was acquitted. On October 27,
the state security prosecutor announced that a third case involving 20
professional leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood would be referred to a
military court. The Muslim Brotherhood leaders were arrested on October
20 and charged with belonging to an illegal group. The first hearing
was held on December 25 and the next was scheduled for January 12,
2000. The arrests and trial before the military courts coincided with
preparations for elections to the boards ofprofessional syndicates and
to the People's Assembly (see Section 1.d.).
The State Security Emergency courts share jurisdiction with
military courts over crimes affecting national security. The President
appoints judges to these courts from the civilian judiciary upon the
recommendation of the Minister of Justice and, if he chooses to appoint
military judges, the Minister of Defense. Sentences are subject to
confirmation by the President but may not be appealed. The President
may alter or annul a decision of a State Security Emergency court,
including a decision to release a defendant.
On March 8, the State Security Emergency courts issued judgments in
2 cases involving 26 defendants who were charged with terrorist acts.
One case involved 24 members of the Islamic Group; the second involved
2 members of the group known as ``Redeemed from Hell.'' A third trial,
involving 14 Islamic Group members before a State Security Emergency
court, began in July, resumed December 17, then was postponed until
February 2000. According to press reports, in October a State Security
Emergency court began the trial of four members of a terrorist group
from the upper (southern) city of Dairout who were accused of murder
and attempted murder of policemen and Christians in the early 1990's.
The trial was postponed until December, then again until February 28,
2000. There was no information available about the identities of the
defendants and the specific charges against them (see Sections 1.a. and
5).
There are no reliable statistics on the numbers of political
prisoners, but the total may approach 100; observers estimate that the
number of political detainees may be in the thousands (see Section
1.d.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for the sanctity and secrecy
of homes, correspondence, telephone calls, and other means of
communication; however, the Government used the Emergency Law to
infringe on these rights. Police must obtain warrants before
undertaking searches and wiretaps. Courts have dismissed cases in which
warrants were issued without sufficient cause. Police officers who
conduct searches without proper warrants are subject to criminal
penalties, although penalties seldom are imposed. However, the
Emergency Law abridges the constitutional provisions regarding the
right to privacy. The Emergency Law empowers the Government to place
wiretaps, intercept mail, and search persons or places without
warrants. Security agencies frequently place political activists,
suspected subversives, journalists, foreigners, and writers under
surveillance, screen their correspondence (especially international
mail), search them and their homes, and confiscate personal property.
The Ministry of Interior has the authority to stop specific issues
of foreign-published newspapers from entering the country on the
grounds of protecting public order; it exercises this authority
sporadically (also see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government partially
restricts these rights. Citizens openly speak their views on a wide
range of political and social issues, including vigorous criticism of
the Government.
The Government owns stock in the three largest daily newspapers,
and the President appoints their editors-in-chief. Although these
newspapers generally follow the government line, they frequently
criticize government policies. The Government also enjoys a monopoly on
the printing and distribution of newspapers, including those of the
opposition parties. The Government used its monopolistic control of
newsprint to limit the output of opposition publications. The newspaper
Al-Dustur, which in 1998 lost its government permission to print,
ceased to exist.
Opposition political parties publish their own newspapers but
receive a subsidy from the Government and, in some cases, subsidies
from foreign interests as well. Most newspapers are weeklies, with the
exception of the dailies Al-Wafd, Al-Araby, and Al-Ahrar, and the
semiweekly of the Islamist-oriented Socialist Labor Party, Al-Shaab.
All have small circulations. Opposition newspapers frequently publish
criticism of the Government. They also give greater prominence to human
rights abuses than the state-run newspapers. All party newspapers are
required by law to reflect the platform of their party. In September
the Government rejected a request by the Arab Egypt Socialist
opposition party to reissue the party newspaper, Misr.The Government
cited the party's failure to publish the newspaper continuously.
The Constitution restricts ownership of newspapers to public or
private legal entities, corporate bodies, and political parties. There
are numerous restrictions on legal entities that seek to establish
their own newspapers, including a maximum of 10 percent on individual
ownership. In January 1998, the People's Assembly approved a law that
requires newspapers managed by joint stock companies to obtain the
approval of the Prime Minister prior to publishing. Given government
restrictions, a joint stock company is the only feasible incorporation
option for publishers. In February the Government revoked the license
of the newspaper Sawt Al-Umma, citing the publisher's violations of
joint stock company regulations. In July a publisher contested before
an administrative court the Prime Minister's refusal to act on his
request for approval of a joint stock company formed to publish the
newspaper Al-Karama. Also in July, a higher court upheld a lower
court's decision to withdraw a license from the publisher of Al-Siyasa,
ruling that the publisher is a limited liability company, not a joint
stock company.
The Press Law, the Publications Law, and the Penal Code govern
press issues. The Penal Code stipulate fines or imprisonment for
criticism of the President, members of the Government, and foreign
heads of state. The Supreme Constitutional Court agreed in November
1998 to review the constitutionality of those articles of the Penal
Code that specify imprisonment as a penalty for journalists convicted
of libel. The case is pending. In October the Public Prosecutor charged
editor Mohamed Hassan Al-Banna and journalist Fouad Fawaz of the weekly
newspaper Al-Khamis with insulting Libya's leader, Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi.
A court date has not yet been set.
Because of the difficulties in obtaining a license in Egypt,
several publishers of newspapers and magazines developed for the
Egyptian market have obtained a foreign license. Most of these
publications are printed in the free trade zone. Those newspapers and
magazines published under a foreign license may be distributed with
government permission. However, the Department of Censorship in the
Ministry of Information has the authority to censor or halt
distribution of publications printed in the free trade zone under a
foreign license. During the year, the Ministry censored several
articles of the English-language weekly, the Middle East Times. The
Government continues to refuse to grant a visa to the weekly's
publisher, Thomas Cromwell, but cited reasons unrelated to his position
as a journalist for the action. The Ministry also prohibited
distribution of one edition of the English-language biweekly, the Cairo
Times. During the year the Center for Human Rights and Legal Assistance
organized a legal challenge to the constitutionality of the Information
Ministry's censorship of these publications. The Supreme Constitutional
Court has agreed to hear the case, but had not yet set a court date by
year's end.
The Press and Publication Laws ostensibly provide protection
against malicious rumor-mongering and unsubstantiated reporting.
Financial penalties were increased substantially in 1996 when relevant
provisions of the Penal Code were revised, but the judicial process
remains long and costly, creating a bar to realistic legal recourse for
those wrongly defamed. In recent years, opposition party newspapers
have, within limits, published articles critical of the President and
foreign heads of state without being charged or harassed. The
Government continues to charge journalists with libel.
In 1996 the People's Assembly approved a revised Press Law
following criticism of a more restrictive revision that had been
approved in 1995. The People's Assembly also revised certain articles
in the Penal Code pertaining to libel and slander. In addition in 1997
the supreme Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional Article 195
of the Penal Code under which an editor in chief could have been
considered criminally responsible for libel contained in any portion of
the newspaper. The Court ruled that the correct standard of
responsibility should be ``negligence.'' This lesser standard
subsequently was applied by the courts.
In August a criminal court convicted three journalists from the
opposition daily newspaper Al-Shaab of libeling Youssef Wally, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture. Editor in chief Magdy
Hussein, reporter Salah Bedewi, and cartoonist Essam Hanafi were
sentenced on August 14 to 2 years in prison and each fined $6,000
(20,000 Egyptian pounds). A fourth Al-Shaab journalist, Adel Hussein,
was convicted of libel and fined the same amount. On December 5, the
Court of Cassation ordered a retrial of the case before a different
circuit of the criminal court. The sentences against all four were
suspended and, on December 6, the Public Prosecutor ordered the release
of thethree detained defendants. The date for the new trial was not set
by year's end.
The courts acquitted seven journalists in six cases during the
year. In three cases involving four journalists, the courts fined each
$3,000 (10,000 Egyptian pounds). In September journalist Ashraf Ayoub
of the Ahali weekly newspaper was sentenced in absentia for libel to 1
year's imprisonment. Ayoub's defense is appealing the conviction.
According to statistics compiled by the EOHR during the year, and
covering the period from the enactment of the 1996 Press Law through
July, the Public Prosecutor has referred 117 cases to a court of
misdemeanors, 55 cases to a criminal court, and 3 cases to a military
court. Of these, 52 are pending. Of those adjudicated, 4 resulted in
prison sentences.
On occasion, based on authority granted to him by law, the Public
Prosecutor may issue a temporary ban on the publication of news
pertaining to cases involving national security and order so as to
protect the confidentiality of the cases. The length of the ban is
based on the length of time required for the prosecution to prepare its
case. In May the Public Prosecutor banned publication of news related
to the case of an employee of the Ministry of Culture accused of
embezzlement and corruption. The Public Prosecutor also temporarily
banned news related to an investigation of vice among movie actresses.
On April 7, the People's Assembly approved several restrictive
amendments to the Law of Public Mobilization, which was enacted in
1960. The amendments increase the penalties applicable to individuals
who disclose information about the State during emergencies, including
war and natural disasters. The new penalties include fines up to $1,700
(6,000 Egyptian pounds) and prison sentences up to 3 years. The EOHR
characterized the change as an additional obstacle to freedom of
information.
In 1998 the People's Assembly approved a law that prohibits current
or former members of the police from publishing work-related
information without prior permission from the Interior Minister.
In March Fathy Abu Al-Ezz was detained by state security following
publication in a company newsletter of an article written by Abu Al-Ezz
that explained why he would not vote for President Mubarak in the
presidential referendum held in September. He was released after paying
bail in the amount of $60 (200 Egyptian pounds).
In December 1998, a state security prosecutor charged EOHR
secretary-general Hafez Abu Se'da and EOHR attorney Mustafa Zidane with
violating Article 102 of the Penal Code, which relates to deliberate
dissemination of false information or inflammatory propaganda that
harms public security or public interests. The charges were based on an
EOHR report that was critical of police conduct during a 1998 murder
investigation in Sohag. Abu Se'da also was charged with accepting
foreign funds without government permission. The state security
prosecutor alleged that the EOHR had accepted $25,000 from the British
Embassy in Cairo to publish the critical report. In fact, the money was
provided by the British Embassy on behalf of the Human Rights Committee
in the British House of Commons to support a women's legal aid project
begun in 1995. The British Government had been supporting this EOHR
project since 1996. On December 25 and 26, the state security
prosecutor questioned EOHR chairman Abdel Aziz Mohamed about the
organization's use of the British money. The outstanding charges
against Abu Se'da and Zidane have not been dropped (see Sections 1.d.,
2.c., and 4).
Various ministries legally are authorized to ban or confiscate
books and other works of art upon obtaining a court order. The Islamic
Research Center at Al-Azhar University has legal authority to censor,
but not to confiscate, all publications dealing with the Koran and
Islamic scriptural texts. In recent years the Center has passed
judgment on the suitability of nonreligious books and artistic
productions. During the year, the Center ruled in favor of distribution
of the book ``My Father Adam: The Story of the Creation Between Legend
and Reality,'' written by Abdel Sabour Shahine. However, an Islamist
lawyer sued the Sheikh of Al-Azhar and several other senior Islamic
figures in an effort to block publication of the book. The trial was
set for January 20, 2000.
The Ministry of Information owns and operates all domestic
television and radio stations. The Government refuses to license
private broadcast stations or to privatize the State's broadcast media.
In addition to public television, the Government also offers several
pay-for-view television channels. Government control and censorship of
the broadcast media is significant.
In 1995 an administrative court ruled that the sole authority to
prohibit publication or distribution of books and other works of art
resides with the Ministry of Culture. This decision invalidated a 1994
advisory opinion by a judiciary council that had expanded Al-Azhar's
censorship authority to include visual and audio artistic works. The
same year, President Mubarak stated that the Government would not allow
confiscation of books from the market without a court order, a position
supported by the then-Mufti of the Republic, who is now the Grand Imam
of Al-Azhar.
There were no court-ordered confiscations during the year. An
appeal to the Court of Cassation by author Ala'a Hamed is pending.
Hamed previously was convicted for the alleged pornographic content of
his book ``The Bed.''
The Ministry of Interior regularly confiscates leaflets and other
works by Muslim fundamentalists and other critics of the State. In
March six members of the Tagammu opposition party were arrested by
security forces following a meeting in Cairo to discuss opposition to
draft labor legislation. They were charged with possessing publications
that disturb public order and security. (They were carrying pamphlets
criticizing the draft labor law.) Three of the six members were
released immediately. The other three were questioned and released
following payment of bail in the amount of $170 (500 Egyptian pounds)
each (see Sections 1.d. and 6.b.). In October security forces detained
Fathy Al-Masri for over 15 days for possession of a pamphlet called
``The Right to Medical Services in a Nonemergency Situation.'' He was
charged with possessing publications that disturb public order and
security. Al-Masri was protesting the medical policy of a private
company. He was released in November (see Sections 1.d. and 6.e.).
The Ministry of Interior also has the authority, which it exercises
sporadically, to stop specific issues of foreign-published newspapers
from entering the country on the grounds of protecting public order
(also see Section 1.f.). The Ministry of Defense may ban works about
sensitive security issues. The Council of Ministers may order the
banning of works that it deems offensive to public morals, detrimental
to religion, or likely to cause a breach of the peace.
Plays and films must pass Ministry of Culture censorship tests as
scripts and as final productions. However, many plays and films that
are highly critical of the Government and its policies are not
censored. The Ministry of Culture also censors foreign films that are
to be shown in theaters, but it is more lenient when the same films are
released in video cassette format. Government censors ensure that
foreign films made in Egypt portray the country in a favorable light.
Censors review scripts before filming, are present during filming, and
have the right to review the film before it is sent out of the country.
An appeals court is scheduled to review in February 2000 the case
against the film ``Birds of Darkness.'' The plaintiffs charge that it
is insulting to lawyers. Two related cases against the movie were
dropped in 1997.
Moderate Muslims and secularist writers still are subject to legal
action by Islamic extremists. Cairo University professor Nasr Abu Zeid
and his wife continue to live abroad following the 1996 Court of
Cassation ruling that affirmed lower-court judgments that Abu Zeid is
an apostate because of his controversial interpretation of Koranic
teachings. However, the Supreme Constitutional Court agreed in 1998 to
review the constitutionality of the 1996 ruling. No court date had been
set by year's end. The definition of appropriate books for class use,
library use, or sale in the university bookstore continued to be
debated at the American University of Cairo.
The Government does not restrict directly academic freedom at
universities. However, some university professors claim that the
Government tightened its control over universities in 1994 by a law
authorizing university presidents to appoint the deans of the various
faculties. Under the previous law, faculty deans were elected by their
peers. The Government has justified the measure as a means to combat
Islamist influence on campus. The EOHR alleged that security forces
harass politically affiliated students at the beginning of each
academic year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
significantly restricts freedom of assembly. Under a 1923 law, citizens
must obtain approval from the Ministry of Interior before holding
public meetings, rallies, and protest marches. The Interior Ministry
selectively obstructs meetings scheduled to be held on private property
and university campuses (also see Section 4).
During the year the Government prohibited the Cairo Institute for
Human Rights from holding a conference on the subject ofhuman rights in
the Arab world. The Government also prohibited the Association for the
Independence of the Judiciary from holding a conference on the subject
of the future of the judiciary in the Arab world (see Section 4).
The Government significantly restricts freedom of association. In
June the Government approved a new law pertaining to the formation,
function, and funding of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) and
private foundations. On November 28, the Minister of Social Affairs
issued the executive regulations to the law, and asserted that the
regulations reflect the Government's commitment to support civil
society. The regulations, which are to govern implementation of the
law, specify a wide range of permissible NGO activities, including in
the area of human rights. They also facilitate registration of NGO's
and the receipt of financial donations. However, critics charge that
the law and regulations place unduly burdensome restrictions on NGO's.
Observers claim that it is too soon to assess the implementation of the
law and its impact on NGO's.
Since 1985 the Government has refused to license the Egyptian
Organization for Human Rights and the Arab Organization for Human
Rights (AOHR) on grounds that they are political organizations.
Nevertheless, in general both continue to operate openly (see Section
4). Following approval of the new NGO law, the Government stated that
it would award a license to the EOHR. By year's end, the EOHR had not
applied for status as an NGO under the new law. Under 1993 legislation
on professional syndicates, an association must elect its governing
board by at least 50 percent of its general membership. Failing a
quorum, a second election must be held in which at least 30 percent of
the membership votes for the board. If such a quorum is impossible, the
judiciary may appoint a caretaker board until new elections can be set.
The law was adopted to prevent well-organized minorities, specifically
Islamists, from capturing or retaining the leadership of professional
syndicates. Members of these syndicates have reported that Islamists
have used irregular electoral techniques such as physically blocking
polling places and limiting or changing the location of polling sites.
In October the Court of Cassation upheld an earlier court decision to
lift the government sequestration of the bar syndicate.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
belief and the practice of religious rites; however, the Government
places clear restrictions on this right. Most Egyptians are Sunni
Muslims. Approximately 10 percent of the population, numbering more
than 6 million persons, belong to the Coptic Orthodox Church. There are
other small Christian denominations, as well as a Jewish community that
numbers approximately 200 persons. For the most part, members of the
non-Muslim minority worship without harassment and maintain links with
coreligionists abroad.
Under the Constitution, Islam is the official state religion and
primary source of legislation. Accordingly, religious practices that
conflict with Islamic law are prohibited. In most matters of family
law, including marriage, divorce, alimony, and child custody,
Christians are subject to canon law. In cases of family law disputes
involving a marriage between a Christian woman and a Muslim man,
Islamic law applies. The children of such marriages must be raised as
Muslims. Muslim women are prohibited from marrying Christian men.
While neither the Constitution nor the Civil and Penal Codes
prohibit proselytizing, Christians who proselytize have been arrested
on charges of violating Article 98f of the Penal Code, which prohibits
citizens from ridiculing or insulting heavenly religions or inciting
sectarian strife. There were no such reports during the year; however,
one Christian who was engaged in proselytizing activities was detained
briefly by state security forces. Some Christians complained that the
Government is lax in protecting Christian lives and property (see
Section 5).
There are no legal restrictions on the conversion of non-Muslims to
Islam. However, Muslims may face legal problems if they convert to
another faith. In the past, authorities have charged a few Muslim
converts to Christianity under article 98f of the Penal Code. There
were no reports of such arrests during the year; however, there were a
few unconfirmed reports that several converts to Christianity were
subjected to harassment by the security services, including temporary
detention.
In other cases involving conversion from Islam to Christianity,
authorities have charged converts with violating laws prohibiting the
falsification of documents. In such instances, converts, who fear
government harassment if they officially register the change from Islam
to Christianity, have altered their identification cards and other
official documentsthemselves to reflect their new religious
affiliation. There were no confirmed reports of individuals detained or
charged under these laws during the year. In 1997 human rights activist
Mamdouh Naklah filed suit seeking removal of the religious affiliation
category from identification cards. The court referred the case to the
state commissioner's office, which has not yet issued an opinion.
An 1856 Ottoman decree still in force requires non-Muslims to
obtain what is now a presidential decree to build a place of worship.
In addition, Interior Ministry regulations issued in 1934 specify a set
of 10 conditions that the Government must consider prior to issuance of
a presidential decree permitting construction of a church. These
conditions include the location of the proposed site, the religious
composition of the surrounding community, and the proximity of other
churches. The Ottoman decree also requires the President to approve
permits for the repair of church facilities. In response to strong
criticism of the decree, President Mubarak in 1998 delegated to
governors the authority to approve permits for the repair of church
facilities. In December the President acted again and issued a new
decree that made the repair of all places of worship subject to a 1976
civil construction code. This decree, which superseded the decree
issued in 1998, is significant because it places churches and mosques
on equal footing before the law, and in intended to facilitate church
repairs. However, notwithstanding these initiatives, the approval
process for church construction and repair remains time-consuming and
insufficiently responsive to the wishes of the Christian community.
Although President Mubarak has approved all requests for permits that
have been presented to him (reportedly a total of more than 250 during
his 18-year tenure), Christians maintain that the Interior Ministry
delays--in some instances indefinitely--submission to the President of
their requests. They also maintain that security forces have blocked
them from utilizing permits that have been issued.
During the 1990's, the Government increased the number of building
permits issued to Christian communities to an average of more than 20
per year, compared with an average of 5 permits issued annually in the
1980's. During the year, the Government approved 39 permits for church-
related construction, including 2 permits for the construction of a new
church, 34 permits for churches previously constructed without
authorization, and 3 permits for the construction of additional church
facilities. The Government reported that governors issued more than 200
permits for church-related repair during the year. However, the
Government was unable to provide a breakdown by governorate; unofficial
reports from the governorates vary. In January 1996, human rights
activist Mamdouh Naklah filed suit challenging the constitutionality of
the Ottoman decree. In 1998 an administrative court referred Naklah's
case to a state body of legal experts. This decision was considered a
setback, as the body is not required to issue an opinion expeditiously
and its opinions are not binding. The body had not issued an opinion in
the case by year's end. As a result of these restrictions, some
communities use private buildings and apartments for religious
services.
In 1952 the Government seized approximately 1,500 acres of land
from the Coptic Orthodox Church and transferred title to the Ministry
of Awqaf, which is responsible for administering religious trusts. In
1996 Awqaf Minister Hamdy Zaqzouq established a committee to address
the issue. Based on the committee's recommendations, more than 800
acres have been returned to the Church since 1996. The committee
continues to study the return of the remaining disputed property.
The Government continued its efforts to extend legal controls to
all mosques, which by law must be licensed. The Government appoints and
pays the salaries of the imams who officiate in mosques, and proposes
themes for and monitors sermons. In September the Awqaf minister
announced that the Government now controls 46,000 mosques and 12,000
zawaya (``corner'' mosques, or mosques located within a multipurpose
building). In an effort to combat Islamic extremists, the Government
has announced its intention to bring all unauthorized mosques under its
control by 2000. There are an estimated 70,000 mosques.
In July a state security court in Alexandria convicted 14 persons
of heresy against Islam. The lead defendant, Mohamed Ibrahim Mahfouz,
was sentenced to 5 years in prison for claiming that he speaks directly
to God and is at times transformed into God or the Prophet Mohamed.
Seven of his followers were sentenced to 3 years in prison. Six of his
followers were sentenced to 1 year in prison. Five other defendants
were acquitted.
On November 11, the state security prosecutor arrested 50 persons
in Cairo suspected of heresy against Islam. On November 15, the state
security prosecutor released 30 of the detainees and is investigating
charges of heresy against Islam andinsulting Islam against the
remaining 20. The lead defendant, a woman named Manal Wahid Mana'a, is
accused of attempting to establish a new Islamic sect. She claims that
the Prophet Mohamed speaks to her.
In August the Public Prosecutor reopened and expanded an
investigation into police torture of mostly Christian detainees that
took place during a 1998 police investigation of a double murder in the
largely Coptic village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate. The trial of
Shayboub William Arsal, the man accused of murdering two Al-Kush
residents in August 1998, began during the year. A court conducted
hearings on the case on December 4 and 6. The next hearing was
scheduled for January 2000. Related charges of witness tampering raised
by the public prosecution in 1998 against Bishop Wisa and Arch-Priest
Antonius have not been dropped.
In 1960 Baha'i institutions and community activities were banned by
presidential decree and all community properties, including Baha'i
centers, libraries, and cemeteries, were confiscated. The ban on Baha'i
institutions has never been rescinded.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens and foreigners are free to
travel within Egypt except in certain military areas. Males who have
not completed compulsory military service may not travel abroad or
emigrate, although this restriction may be deferred or bypassed.
Unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their
fathers to obtain passports and travel; married women require the same
permission from their husbands. Citizens who leave the country have the
right to return.
The Constitution provides for the grant of political asylum and
prohibits the extradition of political refugees. There were no reports
of the forced return of persons to a country where they feared
persecution. Egypt grants first asylum for humanitarian reasons or in
the event of internal turmoil in neighboring countries. The Government
cooperates with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Asylum seekers generally are screened by UNHCR
representatives, whose recommendations regarding settlement are
forwarded to the Ministries of Interior and Foreign Affairs for final
determination. The Government permits accepted refugees to live and
work in Egypt, but not to acquire citizenship, except in rare cases.
During the year, the Government accepted approximately 6,400 persons,
including more than 2,500 Somalis and 2,400 Sudanese. Although there is
no pattern of abuse of refugees, the Government temporarily detained
during random security sweeps some refugees who earlier had been
accorded protection status. Following intervention by the UNHCR, the
refugees were released.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The ruling National Democratic Party dominates the 454-seat
People's Assembly, the Shura Council, local governments, the mass
media, labor, the large public sector, and controls the licensing of
new political parties, newspapers, and private organizations to such an
extent that, as a practical matter, citizens do not have a meaningful
ability to change their government.
In September President Hosni Mubarak was elected unopposed to a
fourth 6-year term in a national referendum. According to official
results he received 94 percent of the vote. The referendum followed the
constitutionally-mandated nomination by the People's Assembly. Under
the Constitution, the electorate is not presented with a choice among
competing presidential candidates.
More than 100 losing candidates in the fall 1995 legislative
elections filed complaints in the administrative courts, alleging
ballot-rigging and other irregularities. The courts agreed with most of
these claims. Although the judiciary has the authority to determine
whether or not irregularities took place, it does not have the
authority to remove an elected member of the People's Assembly, a right
that the Assembly claims solely for itself, citing the concept of
parliamentary sovereignty. The Assembly did not call for any new by-
elections in response to the courts' judgments.
The People's Assembly debates government proposals, and members
exercise their authority to call cabinet ministers to explain policy.
The executive initiates almost all legislation. Nevertheless, the
Assembly maintains the authority to challenge or restrain the executive
in the areas of economic and social policy, but it may not modify the
budget except with the Government's approval. The Assembly exercises
limited influence in the areas of security and foreign policy, and
retains littleoversight of the Interior Ministry's use of Emergency Law
powers. Many executive branch initiatives and policies are carried out
by regulation through ministerial decree without legislative oversight.
The military budget is prepared by the executive and not debated
publicly. Roll-call votes in the Assembly are rare. Votes generally are
reported in aggregate terms of yeas and nays, and thus constituents
have no independent method of checking a member's voting record.
The Shura Council, the upper chamber of Parliament, has 264
members. Two-thirds of the members are elected popularly and one-third
are appointed by the President. One half of the Shura seats are up for
reelection or reappointment every 3 years. In 1998 the NDP won all 88
seats up for election. One Coptic Christian, from Alexandria, won a
seat. The President made 47 appointments (including an additional 3
over the 44 open seats to replace deceased members). Those appointed
included nine women, eight Coptic Christians, and two members of
opposition parties.
There are 13 recognized opposition parties. The law empowers the
Government to bring felony charges against those who form a party
without a license. New parties must be approved by the Parties
Committee, a semiofficial body that includes a substantial majority of
members from the ruling NDP and some members from among the independent
and opposition parties. Decisions of the Parties Committee may be
appealed to the civil courts. During the year the Committee refused the
applications of three parties. These rejected parties filed an appeal
of the Committee's decision. Three other applications are pending
before the committee. During the year, a court rejected six of eight
pending appeals by parties whose applications previously were denied,
including the appeal of the Egyptian Wasat party. Two appeals still are
pending.
According to the law, which prohibits political parties based on
religion, the Muslim Brotherhood is an illegal political organization.
Muslim Brothers are known publicly and openly speak their views,
although they do not explicitly identify themselves as members of the
organization. They remain subject to government pressure (see Section
1.d.). Some have served in the Assembly as independents or as members
of other recognized parties.
Women and minorities are underrepresented in government and
politics. The Constitution reserves 10 Assembly seats for presidential
appointees, which the President traditionally has used to assure
representation for women and Coptic Christians. Five women but no Copts
were elected in 1995; of the 10 presidential appointments, 6 were Copts
and 4 were women. The ruling NDP nominated no Coptic candidates in the
1995 parliamentary elections. Two women and 2 Copts serve among the 32
ministers in the Cabinet.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government has refused to license local human rights groups as
private entities under Law 32 of 1964 (see Section 2.b.). Since the
EOHR's establishment in 1986, the Government has refused to license the
organization on the grounds that it is a political organization and
duplicates the activities of an existing, although moribund, human
rights group. However, in June the Government approved a controversial
new law pertaining to the formation, functioning, and funding of
nongovernmental organizations and private foundations (see Section
2.b.). In November the Minister of Social Affairs issued executive
regulations to the new law. These regulations, which are to guide
implementation of the new law, explicitly cite human rights as a
permissible NGO activity. However, critics charge that the law and
regulations place unduly burdensome restrictions on NGO's. The
Government also announced its intention to license the EOHR; however,
the EOHR did not apply for status as an NGO under the new law by year's
end.
On December 25 and 26, the state security prosecutor questioned
EOHR chairman Abdel Aziz Mohamed about charges brought by the state
security prosecutor in 1998, following the EOHR's publication of a
report critical of police conduct in the village of Al-Kush in Sohag
governorate (see Sections 1.c., 2.a., and 2.b.). The charges included
allegations that Abu Se'da accepted foreign funds without government
permission. The state security prosecutor alleged that the EOHR had
accepted $25,000 from the British Embassy in Cairo to publish the
critical report. In fact, the money was provided by the British Embassy
on behalf of the Human Rights Committee in the British House of Commons
to support a women's legal aid project begun in 1995. The British
Government had been supporting this EOHR project since 1996. The state
security prosecutor has not dropped the outstanding charges against Abu
Se'da and EOHR attorney Mustafa Zidane.
The AOHR, the EOHR's parent organization, has a longstanding
request for registration as a foreign organization with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. The Ministry has not approved the request thus far,
stating that the issue is dependent on the outcome of efforts within
the league of Arab states to establish a human rights body.
Despite years of nonrecognition, the EOHR and other groups
sometimes obtain the cooperation of government officials. The
Government allows EOHR field workers to visit prisons in their capacity
as legal counsel, to call on some government officials, and to receive
funding from foreign human rights organizations. However, many local
and international human rights activists have concluded that government
restrictions on NGO activities have inhibited significantly reporting
on human rights abuses.
During the year the Government prohibited the Cairo Institute for
Human Rights from holding a conference on the subject of human rights
in the Arab world. The Government also prohibited the Association for
the Independence of the Judiciary from holding a conference on the
subject of the future of the judiciary in the Arab world. On occasion,
human rights organizations have found requests for conference space
turned down for ``security reasons'' or reservations later canceled for
``maintenance reasons.'' Other human rights organizations registered as
corporations to avoid the obstacles posed by Law 32 (see Section 2.b.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality of the sexes and equal
treatment of non-Muslims; however, aspects of the law and many
traditional practices discriminate against women and Christians.
Women.--Domestic violence against women is a significant problem
and is reflected in press accounts of specific incidents. According to
a national study conducted in 1995 as part of a comprehensive
demographic and health survey, one of every three women who have ever
been married has been beaten at least once during marriage. Among those
who have been beaten, less than half have ever sought help. Smaller,
independent studies confirm that wife-beating is common. In general,
neighbors and extended family members intervene to limit incidents of
domestic violence. Due to the value attached to privacy in the
country's traditional society, abuse within the family rarely is
discussed publicly. Spousal abuse is grounds for a divorce, but the law
requires the plaintiff to produce eyewitnesses, a difficult condition
to meet. Several NGO's offer counseling, legal aid, and other services
to women who are victims of domestic violence. These activists believe
that in general the police and the judiciary consider the ``integrity
of the family'' more important than the well-being of the woman. The
Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs runs more than 150 family
counseling bureaus nationwide, which provide legal and medical
services.
The punishment for rape ranges from 3 years in prison to life
imprisonment at hard labor, and the Government prosecutes rapists. If a
rapist is convicted of abducting his victim, he is subject to
execution; however, there were no reports of the execution of rapists.
During the year, the Government abolished an article of the Penal Code
that permitted a rapist to be absolved of criminal charges if he
married his victim. However, marital rape is not illegal. Although
reliable statistics regarding rape are not available, activists believe
that it is not uncommon, despite strong social disapproval. When
``honor killings'' (a man murdering a female relative for her perceived
lack of chastity) occur, perpetrators generally receive lighter
punishments than those convicted in other cases of murder.
Prostitution and sex tourism are illegal, but known to occur.
The law provides for equality of the sexes; however, aspects of the
law and many traditional practices discriminate against women. By law,
unmarried women under the age of 21 must have permission from their
fathers to obtain passports and to travel; married women of any age
require the same permission from their husbands (see Section 2.d.).
Only males may confer citizenship. In rare cases, this means that
children who are born to Egyptian mothers and stateless fathers are
themselves stateless. A woman's testimony is equal to that of a man's
in the courts. There is no legal prohibition against a woman serving as
a judge, although in practice no women serve as judges. The Court of
Cassation agreed to hear in January 2000 the case of attorney Fatma
Lashin, who is challenging the Government's refusal to appoint her as a
public prosecutor. (To become a judge, one must first serve as a public
prosecutor.)
Laws affecting marriage and personal status generally correspond to
an individual's religion. A 1979 liberalization of the Family Status
Law, which strengthened a Muslim woman's rights to divorce and child
custody, was repealed in 1985 after the Supreme Constitutional Court
ruled that the use of a presidential decree to implement the law was
unjustified.
Under Islamic law, non-Muslim males must convert to Islam to marry
Muslim women, but non-Muslim women need not convert to marry Muslim
men. Muslim female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's
inheritance, while Christian widows of Muslims have no inheritance
rights. A sole female heir receives half her parents' estate; the
balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir inherits
all his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs face strong social
pressure to provide for all family members who require assistance;
however, this assistance is not always provided.
Women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law,
academia, the arts, and, to a lesser degree, business. Labor laws
provide for equal rates of pay for equal work for men and women in the
public sector. According to government figures, women constitute 17
percent of private business owners and occupy 25 percent of the
managerial positions in the four major national banks. Social pressure
against women pursuing a career is strong, and some women's rights
advocates say that a resurgent Islamic fundamentalist trend limits
further gains. Women's rights advocates also point to other
discriminatory traditional or cultural attitudes and practices such as
female genital mutilation and the traditional male relative's role in
enforcing chastity and chaste sexual conduct.
A number of active women's rights groups work in diverse areas,
including reforming family law, educating women on their legal rights,
promoting literacy, and combating FGM.
Children.--The Government remains committed to the protection of
children's welfare within the limits of its budgetary resources. Many
of the resources for children's welfare are provided by international
donors, especially in the field of child immunization. Child labor is
widespread, despite the Government's commitment to eradicate it (see
Section 6.d.).
The Government provides public education, which is compulsory for
the first 8 academic years (typically until the age of 15). The
Government treats boys and girls equally at all levels of education.
The Government enacted a Child Law in 1996. The law provides for
privileges, protection, and care for children in general. Six of the
law's 144 articles set advantageous rules for working children (see
Section 6.d.). Other provisions include: A requirement for employers to
set up or contract with a child care center if they employ more than
100 women; the right of rehabilitation for disabled children; a
prohibition on sentencing defendants between the ages of 16 and 18 to
capital punishment, hard labor for life, or temporary hard labor; and a
prohibition on placing defendants under the age of 15 in preventive
custody, although the prosecution may order that they be lodged in an
``observation house'' and be summoned upon request.
The Government remains committed to eradicating the practice of
female genital mutilation, which is widely condemned by international
health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health.
Despite strong government and community efforts to eradicate FGM,
government and private sources agree that it is common. Traditional and
family pressures remain strong; a study conducted in 1995 places the
percentage of women who have ever been married who have undergone FGM
at 97 percent. In February the Population Council released the results
of a 1997 survey of Egyptian adolescents, which found that 86 percent
of girls between the ages of 13 and 19 had undergone FGM. FGM generally
is performed on girls between the ages of 7 and 10, with equal
prevalence among Muslims and Christians.
The Court of Cassation issued a decision in 1997 that upheld the
legality of the decree banning FGM issued in 1996 by the Minister of
Health and Population Planning. In addition to enforcing the decree,
the Government supports a range of efforts to educate the public. A
discussion of FGM and its dangers has been added to the curriculum of
the school system. The Government broadcasts television programs
criticizing the practice. Government ministers are outspoken in
advising citizens to cease the practice, and senior religious leaders
also support efforts to stop it. The Sheikh of Al-Azhar, the most
senior Islamic figure in the country, and the leader of the Coptic
Christian community, Pope Shenouda, have stated repeatedly that FGM is
not required by religious doctrine.However, illiteracy impedes some
women from distinguishing between the deep-rooted tradition of FGM and
religious practices. A number of NGO's also work actively to educate
the public about the health hazards of the practice.
People With Disabilities.--There are approximately 5.7 million
disabled persons, of whom 1.5 million are disabled severely. The
Government makes serious efforts to address their rights. It works
closely with U.N. agencies and other international aid donors to design
job-training programs for the disabled. The Government also seeks to
increase the public's awareness of the capabilities of the disabled in
television programming, the print media, and in educational material in
public schools.
By law, all businesses must designate 5 percent of their jobs for
the disabled, who are exempt from normal literacy requirements.
Although there is no legislation mandating access to public
accommodations and transportation, the disabled may ride government-
owned mass transit buses without charge, are given priority in
obtaining telephones, and receive reductions on customs duties for
private vehicles.
Religious Minorities.--The Constitution provides for equal public
rights and duties without discrimination due to religion or creed. For
the most part, these constitutional protections are upheld by the
Government. However, discrimination against Christians exists. There
are no Christians serving as governors, university presidents, and
deans. There are few Christians in the upper ranks of the security
services and armed forces. Although there was improvement in a few
areas, government discriminatory practices include: Suspected
statistical underrepresentation of the size of the Christian
population; bias against Christianity and Coptic history in the
educational curricula; limited or biased coverage of Christian subjects
in the media; failure to admit Christians into public university
training programs for Arabic language teachers (because the curriculum
involves study of the Koran); discrimination against Christians in the
public sector; and discrimination against Christians in staff
appointments to public universities.
The approximately 6 million Coptic Christians have been the objects
of occasional violent assaults by the Islamic Group and other
terrorists. However, there were no reports of terrorist attacks against
Christians during the year. In incidents unrelated to terrorism, a
Christian priest in Mahalla and a Christian priest in Dairout were
attacked by individual extremists in August and September,
respectively. The assailant in the first incident was charged with
attempted murder and the case was referred to a criminal court. No
trial date was set by year's end. The assailant in the Dairout case was
determined to be mentally unstable and remains in custody. The
Government provided the priests with medical care. The Public
Prosecutor charged Ahmad Fergally Ahmad Nasir and Ibrhaim Fergally
Ahmad Nasir with premeditated murder after the Nasir brothers shot and
killed a monk on September 2 in Assiyut governorate following a land
dispute. The monk was affiliated with a monastery that rents thousands
of acres of agricultural land to local tenants; the Nasir brothers were
tenants on the land. The Public Prosecutor appealed the September 21
verdict of a criminal court that ruled that the Nasir brothers were
guilty of an ``attack leading to death'' and sentenced them to 7 years
in prison. The Public Prosecutor is seeking a conviction for
premeditated murder. The case is pending before an appeals court. A
December 31 dispute between a Christian shop owner and a Muslim
customer in the village of Al-Kush in Sohag governorate escalated into
violent exchanges between Christians and Muslims (see Section 1.c.).
According to press reports, in October a State Security Emergency
court began the trial of four members of a terrorist group from the
upper (southern) city of Dairout accused of murder and attempted murder
of policemen and Christians in the early 1990's. The trial was
postponed until December, then later postponed again until February
2000. There was no information available about the identities of the
defendants and the specific charges against them by year's end (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.e.).
Some Christians have alleged that the Government is lax in
protecting Christian lives and property. Security forces arrest
extremists who perpetrate violence against Christians, but some members
of the Christian community do not believe that the Government is
sufficiently vigorous in its efforts to prevent attacks. They also
maintain that the Government does little to correct nonviolent forms of
discrimination, including its own.
There were reports of forced conversions of Coptic girls to Islam.
Reports of such cases are disputed and often includeinflammatory
allegations and categorical denials of kidnaping and rape. Observers,
including human rights groups, find it extremely difficult to determine
whether compulsion was used, as most cases involve a Coptic girl who
converts to Islam when she marries a Muslim boy. According to the
Government, in such cases the girl must meet with her family, with her
priest, and with the head of her church before she is allowed to
convert. However, there are credible reports of government harassment
of Christian families that attempt to regain custody of their
daughters, and of the failure of the authorities to uphold the law
(which states that a marriage of a girl under the age of 16 is
prohibited, and between the ages of 16 and 21 is illegal, without the
approval and presence of her guardian) in cases of marriage between an
underage Christian girl and a Muslim boy.
There is no legal requirement for a Christian girl or woman to
convert to Islam in order to marry a Muslim. If a Christian woman
marries a Muslim man, she is excommunicated by the Coptic Church.
Ignorance of the law and social pressure, including the centrality of
marriage to a woman's identity, often affect her decision. Family
conflict and financial pressure also are cited as factors. In addition
conversion is a means of circumventing the legal prohibition on
marriage between the ages of 16 and 21 without the approval and
presence of the girl's guardian. Most Christian families would object
to a daughter's wish to marry a Muslim. If a Christian girl converts to
Islam, her family loses guardianship, which transfers to a Muslim
custodian, who is likely to grant approval. The law is silent on the
matter of the acceptable age of conversion.
Anti-Semitism in the Egyptian press is found in both the government
press and in the press of the opposition parties. The Government has
criticized anti-Semitism and advised journalists and cartoonists to
avoid anti-Semitism. There have been no violent anti-Semitic incidents
in recent years directed at the tiny Jewish community.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers may join trade unions but are
not required to do so. A union local, or workers' committee, may be
formed if 50 employees express a desire to organize. Most union
members, about 27 per cent of the labor force, are employed by state-
owned enterprises. The law stipulates that ``high administrative''
officials in government and the public sector may not join unions.
There are 23 trade unions, all required to belong to the Egyptian
Trade Union Federation (ETUF), the sole legally recognized labor
federation. The International Labor Organization's Committee of Experts
repeatedly has emphasized that a law that requires all trade unions to
belong to a single federation infringes on freedom of association. The
Government has shown no sign that it intends to accept the
establishment of more than one federation. The ETUF leadership asserts
that it actively promotes worker interests and that there is no need
for another federation. ETUF officials have close relations with the
NDP, and some are members of the People's Assembly or the Shura
Council. They speak vigorously on behalf of worker concerns, but public
confrontations between the ETUF and the Government are rare. Disputes
more often are resolved by consensus behind closed doors.
The labor laws do not provide adequately for the rights to strike
and to engage in collective bargaining. Even though the right to strike
is not provided, strikes occur. The Government considers strikes a form
of public disturbance and therefore illegal.
In March six members of the Tagammu opposition party were arrested
by state security forces following a meeting in Cairo to discuss
opposition to draft labor legislation. They were charged with
``possessing publications that disturb public order and security'' for
carrying pamphlets that criticized the draft labor law. Three of the
six were released immediately. The other three were questioned and
released following payment of bail in the amount of $170 (500 Egyptian
pounds) each (see Section 1.d. and 2.a.)
An increasing number of strikes took place in the public sector and
at privatized companies during the year, mainly over issues of wage
cuts and dismissals. From the period January to October, 28 strikes
occurred. Most of the strikes took place in Alexandria, Cairo, and the
delta (northern Egypt), the country's industrial centers. Most of the
strikes occurred in public-sector companies and lasted for 1 day. Each
strike involved hundreds of workers, and in several instances more than
a thousand workers were involved. Ten strikes occurred in January
alone. Bonuses and incentives tied to the previous year's production
typically are disbursed in January, and failure todisburse the bonuses
often leads to a strike. ETUF or government officials successfully
mediated most of the strikes.
Some unions within the ETUF are affiliated with international trade
union organizations. Others are in the process of becoming affiliated.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Under the law,
unions may negotiate work contracts with public sector enterprises if
the latter agree to such negotiations, but unions otherwise lack
collective bargaining power in the state sector. Under current
circumstances, collective bargaining does not exist in any meaningful
sense because the Government sets wages, benefits, and job
classifications by law.
Firms in the private sector generally do not adhere to such
government-mandated standards. Although they are required to observe
some government practices, such as the minimum wage, social security
insurance, and official holidays, they often do not adhere to
government practice in non-binding matters, including award of the
annual Labor Day bonus.
Labor law and practice are the same in Egypt's six export
processing zones (EPZ's) as in the rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor; however, the Criminal Code authorizes sentences
of hard labor for some crimes. Although the law does not prohibit
specifically forced and bonded labor by children, such practices are
not known to occur (see Section 6.d.). Domestic and foreign workers
generally are not subject to coerced or bonded labor. During the year
the Government successfully resolved one sensationalized incident of
forced domestic labor involving a foreign resident employer.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Under the 1996 Child Law (see Section 5), the minimum age
for employment is 14 in nonagricultural work. Provincial governors,
with the approval of the Minister of Education, may authorize seasonal
work for children between the ages of 12 and 14, provided that duties
are not hazardous and do not interfere with schooling. Preemployment
training for children under the age of 12 is prohibited. It is
prohibited for children to work for more than 6 hours a day. One or
more breaks totaling at least 1 hour must be included. Children are not
to work overtime, during their weekly day off, between 8 p.m. and 7
a.m., or for more than 4 hours continuously. Education is compulsory,
free, and universal for the first 8 academic years (typically until the
age of 15).
In general the Government does not devote adequate resources and
oversight to child labor policies. Statistical information on the
number of working children is difficult to obtain and often out of
date. A comprehensive study prepared by the Government's statistical
agency in 1988 indicated that 1.309 million children between the ages
of 6 and 14 are employed. In November the Minister of Social Affairs
reportedly stated that 1 million children participate in agricultural
labor. Government studies also indicate that the concentration of
working children is higher in rural than urban areas. Nearly 78 percent
of working children are in the agricultural sector. However, children
also work as domestics, as apprentices in auto repair and craft shops,
in heavier industries such as construction, in brick-making and
textiles, and as workers in tanneries and carpet-making factories.
While local trade unions report that the Ministry of Labor adequately
enforces the labor laws in state-owned enterprises, enforcement in the
private sector, especially in family-owned enterprises, is lax. Many of
these children are abused and overworked by their employers, and the
restrictions in the Child Law have not improved conditions due to lax
enforcement on the part of the Government. There are no records of
cases in which an employer was fined or imprisoned.
Although the law does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded
labor by children, such practices are not known to occur (see Section
6.c.).
e. Acceptable conditions of work.--For Government and public sector
employees, the minimum wage is approximately $34 (about 116 Egyptian
pounds) a month for a 6-day, 42-hour workweek. The minimum wage, which
is set by the Government and applied nationwide, is enforced
effectively by the Ministry of Administrative Development. The minimum
wage does not provide for a decent standard of living for a worker and
family; however, base pay commonly is supplemented by a complex system
of fringe benefits and bonuses that may double or triple a worker's
take-home pay. The minimum wage also isbinding legally on the private
sector, and larger private companies generally observe the requirement
and pay bonuses as well. Smaller firms do not always pay the minimum
wage or bonuses.
The Ministry of Labor sets worker health and safety standards,
which also apply in the export processing zones; however, enforcement
and inspections are uneven. In October state security forces arrested
Fathy Al-Masri and detained him for 15 days for possessing a pamphlet
entitled ``The Right to Medical Services.'' The pamphlet was prepared
in response to an administrative bulletin announcing a prohibition on
nonmedical emergency services issued by the General Director for
Medical Services for the Al-Nasr hide tanning company (see Sections
1.d. and 2.a.).
The law prohibits employers from maintaining hazardous working
conditions, and workers have the right to remove themselves from
hazardous conditions without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits prostitution and sex
tourism.
There were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from
the country.
______
IRAN *
The Islamic Republic of Iran was established in 1979 after a
populist revolution toppled the Pahlavi monarchy. The Constitution
ratified after the revolution by popular referendum established a
theocratic republic and declared as its purpose the establishment of
institutions and a society based on Islamic principles and norms. The
Government is dominated by Shi'a Muslim clergy. The Head of State,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution
and has direct control of the armed forces, internal security forces,
and the judiciary. Mohammad Khatami was elected to a 4-year term as
President in a popular vote in February 1997. A popularly elected 270-
seat (to be increased by 20 seats in 2000) unicameral Islamic
Consultative Assembly, or Majles, develops and passes legislation. All
legislation passed by the Majles is reviewed for adherence to Islamic
and constitutional principles by a Council of Guardians, which consists
of six clerical members, who are appointed by the Supreme Leader, and
six lay jurists, who are appointed by the head of the judiciary and
approved by the Majles. The Constitution provides the Council of
Guardians with the power to screen and disqualify candidates for
elective offices based on an ill-defined set of requirements, including
the candidates' ideological beliefs. The judiciary is subject to
government and religious influence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The United States does not have an embassy in Iran. This report
draws heavily on non-U.S. Government sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several agencies share responsibility for internal security,
including the Ministry of Intelligence and Security, the Ministry of
Interior, and the Revolutionary Guards, a military force that was
established after the revolution. Paramilitary volunteer forces known
as Basijis, and gangs of thugs, known as the Ansar-e Hezbollah (Helpers
of the Party of God), who often are aligned with specific members of
the leadership, act as vigilantes, and are released into the streets to
intimidate and threaten physically demonstrators, journalists, and
individuals suspected of counter-revolutionary activities. Both regular
and paramilitary security forces committed numerous, serious human
rights abuses.
Iran has a mixed economy that is heavily dependent on export
earnings from the country's extensive petroleum reserves. The
Constitution mandates that all large-scale industry, including
petroleum, minerals, banking, foreign exchange, insurance, power
generation, communications, aviation, and road and rail transport, are
to be owned publicly and administered by thestate. Large charitable
foundations called bonyads, most with strong connections to the
Government, control the extensive properties and businesses
expropriated from the former Shah and figures associated with his
regime. The bonyads exercise considerable influence in the economy, but
do not account publicly for revenue and pay no taxes. Basic foodstuffs
and energy costs are subsidized heavily by the Government. Oil exports
account for nearly 80 percent of foreign exchange earnings. Private
property is respected; however, economic performance is affected
adversely by government mismanagement and corruption, although
performance improved somewhat during the year due to the worldwide
increase in oil prices. Unemployment was estimated to be at least 25
percent, and inflation was an estimated 25 percent.
The Government's human rights record remained poor; although
efforts within society to make the Government accountable for its human
rights policies intensified, serious problems remain. The Government
restricts citizens' right to change their government. Systematic abuses
include extrajudicial killings and summary executions; disappearances;
widespread use of torture and other degrading treatment, reportedly
including rape; harsh prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and
detention, and prolonged and incommunicado detention. Perpetrators
often committed such abuses with impunity. The Government in May
prosecuted a senior police official for torture, reportedly for the
first time since the revolution; however, he was cleared of most
charges and resumed his duties. The judiciary suffers from government
and religious influence, and does not ensure that citizens receive due
process or fair trials. The Government uses the judiciary to stifle
dissent and obstruct progress on human rights. The Government infringes
on citizens' privacy rights, and restricts freedom of speech, press,
assembly, and association. The Government closed numerous reform-
oriented publications during the year and brought charges against
prominent political figures and members of the clergy for expressing
ideas viewed as contrary to the ruling orthodoxy. However, the Ministry
of Culture and Islamic Guidance blunted these efforts by continuing to
issue licenses for the establishment of newspapers and magazines, many
of which challenged openly government policies and individual members
of the leadership. The Government restricts freedom of religion.
Religious minorities, particularly Baha'is, continued to suffer
repression by conservative elements of the judiciary and security
establishment. Thirteen Jews in the cities of Shiraz and Isfahan were
arrested in February and March on suspicion of espionage on behalf of
Israel, an offense punishable by death. The Government failed to abide
by internationally recognized standards of due process in the case. The
Government restricts freedom of movement. There were reports early in
the year that mobs attacked and killed numerous Afghan refugees. The
selection of candidates for elections effectively is controlled by the
Government. Intense political struggle continued during the year
between a broad popular movement that favored greater liberalization in
government policies, particularly in the area of human rights, and
certain hard-line elements in the government and society, which view
such reforms as a threat to the survival of the Islamic republic. In
many cases, this struggle is played out within the Government itself,
with reformists and hardliners squaring off in divisive internal
debates. Government agents were implicated in the murders in late 1998
of several prominent political dissidents.
The Government restricts the work of human rights groups and
continues to deny entry to the country to the U.N. Commission on Human
Rights Special Representative for Human Rights in Iran. Violence
against women occurs, and women face legal and societal discrimination.
The Government discriminates against religious and ethnic minorities
and restricts important workers' rights. Child labor persists.
Vigilante groups, with strong ties to certain members of the
Government, enforce their interpretation of appropriate social behavior
through intimidation and violence.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government was
responsible for numerous extrajudicial killings. Human rights groups
reported that security forces killed at least 20 persons while
violently suppressing demonstrations by Kurds that occurred in the wake
of the February arrest of Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader
AbdullahOcalan in Turkey (see Sections 1.c., 2.b., and 5). Human Rights
Watch reported at least four student deaths on July 8, when government-
sanctioned agitators attacked a student dormitory during protests in
Tehran (see Sections 1.c. and 2.b.).
Citizens continued to be tried and sentenced to death in the
absence of sufficient procedural safeguards. In 1992 the domestic press
stopped reporting most executions; however, executions continue in
substantial numbers, according to U.N. and other reporting. The U.N.
Special Representative cited an estimated 138 executions from January
through mid-August, most of which were reported in the media. The
Government has not cooperated in providing the Special Representative
with a precise number of executions carried out in Iran. Exiles and
human rights monitors allege that many of those executed for criminal
offenses, such as narcotics trafficking, are actually political
dissidents. Supporters of outlawed political organizations, such as the
Mujahedin-e Khalq organization, are believed to make up a large number
of those executed each year. A November 1995 law criminalized dissent
and applied the death penalty to offenses such as ``attempts against
the security of the State, outrage against high-ranking Iranian
officials, and insults against the memory of Imam Khomeini and against
the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.'' U.N. representatives,
including the U.N. Special Representative on Human Rights in Iran, and
independent human rights organizations, continue to note the absence of
procedural safeguards in criminal trials. Harsh punishments are carried
out, including stoning and flogging (see Section 1.c.). Article 102 of
the Islamic Penal Code details the methods authorities should follow
when conducting a stoning: ``the stoning of an adulterer or adulteress
shall be carried out while each is placed in a hole and covered with
soil, he up to his waist and she up to a line above her breasts.''
According to press accounts, a man was stoned to death in April in the
town of Babol, which borders the Caspian Sea. He was alleged to have
killed three of his own sons. Prior to the stoning, he received 60
lashes. The first stone was cast by the judge who sentenced him to
death. The law also allows for the relatives of murder victims to take
part in the execution of the killer.
The Government's investigation into the murder of several prominent
Iranian dissidents and intellectuals in late 1998 continued throughout
the year. The case involved the murders, over a 2-month period from
October to December 1998, of prominent political activists Darioush and
Parvaneh Forouhar and writers Mohammad Mokhtari and Mohammad Pouandeh.
Political activist Pirouz Davani disappeared in the same time period
and has never been found (see Section 1.b.). In February after several
senior figures of the leadership blamed the disappearances and murders
on ``foreign hands,'' it was revealed that active-duty agents of the
Ministry of Intelligence had carried out the killings. Minister of
Intelligence Qorban Ali Dori-Najafabadi and several of his senior
deputies resigned their posts following these revelations.
Supervision for the case was placed in the hands of the Military
Prosecutor's office. In June the Prosecutor's Office released an
initial report on the investigation, identifying a cell from within the
Ministry of Intelligence led by four ``main agents'' as responsible for
the murders. The leader among the agents reportedly was a former Deputy
Minister of Intelligence, Saeed Emami, who, the government stated, had
committed suicide in prison by drinking a toxic hair removal solution
several days prior to release of the government's June report. The
report also indicated that 23 persons had been arrested in association
with the murders and that a further 33 were summoned for interrogation.
The Government released no names beyond the four main suspects and none
of the suspects that it claimed to have arrested had faced trial for
their alleged involvement by year's end.
Frustration over the slow pace of the murder investigation and
doubt about the government's willingness to follow the case to its
conclusion were frequent topics of criticism of the Government
throughout the year, particularly by those advocating greater adherence
to the rule of law by the Government. Reform-oriented journalists and
prominent cultural figures declared publicly their demands for a full
accounting in the case and speculated that responsibility for ordering
the murders lay much higher within the Government than with the four
agents. Such speculation in the newspaper Salaam led, in part, to its
closure in July by the Government, which set off student demonstrations
that became widespread street riots (see section 2.b.). The U.N.
Special Representative, in his September report, urged the Government
to hasten the investigation, noting that the rule oflaw, declared to be
an objective of President Khatami's administration, required no less.
One organization reported eight deaths of evangelical Christians at
the hands of the authorities in the past 10 years (see Section 2.c.).
Late in the year, an investigative reporter alleged that officials
within the Intelligence Ministry were responsible for the murders of
three prominent evangelical ministers in 1994, a crime for which three
female members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization had been convicted
(see Section 2.c.).
Numerous Sunni clerics have been murdered in recent years, some
allegedly by government agents (see Section 2.c.).
The Government announced in September 1998 that it would take no
action to threaten the life of British author Salman Rushdie, or anyone
associated with his work, ``The Satanic Verses.'' The announcement came
during discussions with the United Kingdom regarding the restoration of
full diplomatic relations. Several revolutionary foundations and a
number of Majles deputies within Iran repudiated the Government's
pledge and emphasized the ``irrevocability'' of the fatwa, or religious
ruling, by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, calling for Rushdie's murder.
The 15 Khordad Foundation raised the bounty it earlier had established
for the murder of Rushdie.
The Istanbul Court of Appeal upheld in 1998 the conviction of an
Iranian national for complicity in the 1996 murder of Zahra Rajabi and
Ali Moradi, who were both associated with the National Council of
Resistance (NCR), an exile group that has claimed responsibility for
several terrorist attacks within Iran. The U.N. Special Representative
reported in 1998 that Italian security authorities continued their
investigation into the 1993 killing in Rome of Mohammad Hossein Naghdi,
the NCR's representative in Italy.
b. Disappearance.--No reliable information is available on the
number of disappearances. In the period immediately following arrest,
many detainees are held incommunicado and denied access to lawyers and
family members.
Pirouz Davani, a political activist who disappeared in late 1998
along with several other prominent intellectuals and dissidents who
later were found murdered, remains unaccounted for and is believed to
have been killed for his political beliefs and activism.
A Christian group reported that between 15 and 23 Iranian
Christians disappeared between November 1997 and November 1998 (see
Section 2.c.). Those who disappeared reportedly were Muslim converts to
Christianity whose baptisms had been discovered by the authorities. The
group that reported the figure believes that most or all of those who
disappeared were killed.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution forbids the use of torture; however,
there are numerous, credible reports that security forces and prison
personnel continue to torture detainees and prisoners. Some prison
facilities, including Tehran's Evin prison, are notorious for the cruel
and prolonged acts of torture inflicted upon political opponents of the
Government. Common methods include suspension for long periods in
contorted positions, burning with cigarettes, sleep deprivation, and,
most frequently, severe and repeated beatings with cables or other
instruments on the back and on the soles of the feet. Prisoners also
have reported beatings about the ears, inducing partial or complete
deafness, and punching in the eyes, leading to partial or complete
blindness.
Stoning and flogging are prescribed expressly by the Islamic Penal
Code as appropriate punishment for adultery (see Section 1.a.).
Security forces forcefully suppressed demonstrations by Kurds in
the wake of the February arrest of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey
(see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and 5).
On July 8, the Government and other individuals acting with the
consent of the authorities, used excessive force in attacking a
dormitory during student protests in Tehran, includingreportedly
throwing students from windows. Approximately 300 students were injured
in the incident (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 2.b.).
A trial was opened in May against Brigadier General Gholam-reza
Naqdi, a senior Tehran police official, and several associates, who
were accused of using torture to coerce confessions during the 1998
trial of former mayor of Tehran Gholam Hossein Kharbaschi. It
reportedly was the first prosecution of a government official for
torture since the 1979 revolution. The charges were based on the
accusations of numerous Tehran municipality officials and district
mayors that authorities had used torture to coerce admissions of guilt
and statements that implicated the former mayor. The trial of Naqdi was
conducted in closed session before a military court. Naqdi was cleared
of most charges and resumed his duties with the Tehran police force.
In June the official government news agency reported a meeting of
the Islamic Human Rights Committee to discuss measures for the
prevention of torture. There was no known public report on the results
of that meeting. In August President Khatami was quoted in public
remarks as criticizing the use of torture. He defended the rights of
prisoners as a legitimate concern based on ``Islam and human
conscience.''
Prison conditions are harsh. Some prisoners are held in solitary
confinement or denied adequate food or medical care in order to force
confessions. Female prisoners reportedly have been raped or otherwise
tortured while in detention. Prison guards reportedly intimidate family
members of detainees and torture detainees in the presence of family
members. The U.N. Special Representative reported receiving numerous
reports of prisoner overcrowding and unrest. He cited a reported figure
of only 8.2 square feet (2.5 square) of space available for each
prisoner.
The Government does not permit visits to imprisoned dissidents by
human rights monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, these practices
remain common. There is reportedly no legal time limit on incommunicado
detention, nor any judicial means to determine the legality of
detention. Suspects may be held for questioning in jails or in local
Revolutionary Guard offices. Although reliable statistics are not
available, international observers believe that between scores and
hundreds of citizens are imprisoned for their political beliefs.
The security forces often do not inform family members of a
prisoner's welfare and location. Prisoners also may be denied visits by
family members and legal counsel. In addition, families of executed
prisoners do not always receive notification of the prisoner's death.
Those who do receive such information reportedly have been forced on
occasion to pay the Government to retrieve the body of their relative.
In February and March, 13 Jews were arrested by security forces in
the cities of Isfahan and Shiraz. Among the group were several
prominent rabbis, teachers of Hebrew, and their students, one a 16-
year-old boy. By year's end, judicial authorities had not clarified the
charges against the detainees or allowed them access to defense
counsel. The delay in clarification of charges appeared to violate
Article 32 of the Constitution, which states in part that in cases of
arrest ``charges with the reasons for accusation must, without delay,
be communicated and explained to the accused in writing, and a
provisional dossier must be forwarded to the competent judicial
authorities within a maximum of 24 hours so that the preliminaries to
the trial can be completed as swiftly as possible.'' The investigation
reportedly has centered around charges of espionage on behalf of
Israel, an offense punishable by death. Governments around the world
criticized the arrests and called for the safe treatment of the
detainees, who have been allowed only sporadic family visits and
deliveries of kosher food (see Section 2.c.).
As many as 1,500 students were detained in the wake of student
protests on July 8, and subsequent riots (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and
2.b.).
Numerous publishers, editors and journalists either were detained,
jailed, fined, or prohibited from publishing theirwritings during the
year (see Section 2.a.). The Government appeared to follow a policy of
intimidation, based on such tactics, toward members of the media that
it considers to pose a threat to the current system of Islamic
government.
Adherents of the Baha'i Faith continue to face arbitrary arrest and
detention. The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a
small number of Baha'is in detention at any given time. According to
the U.N. Special Representative and Baha'i groups, at least 12 Baha'is
are in prisons, including 5 who were convicted of either apostasy or
``actions against God'' and sentenced to death. In March the four
remaining detainees from the 1998 raid on the Baha'i Institute of
Higher Learning were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging
from 3 to 10 years (see Section 2.c.).
The Government enforced house arrest and other measures to restrict
the movements and ability to communicate of several senior religious
leaders whose views on political and governance issues are at variance
with the ruling orthodoxy. Several of these figures dispute the
legitimacy and position of the current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei. The clerics include Ayatollah Seyyed Hassan Tabataei-Qomi,
who has been under house arrest in Mashad for more than 14 years;
Ayatollah Mohammad Shirazi, who remains under house arrest in Qom; and
Ayatollah Ya'asub al-Din Rastgari, who has been under house arrest in
Qom since late 1996. Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, the former
designated successor of the late Spiritual Leader, Ayatollah Khomeini,
and an outspoken critic of the current Supreme Leader, remains under
house arrest and heightened police surveillance (see Section 2.a.). The
followers of these and other dissident clerics, many of them junior
clerics and students, reportedly have been detained in recent years and
tortured by government authorities.
Throughout the year, Iran and Iraq exchanged prisoners of war
(POW's) and the remains of deceased fighters from the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq
war, adding to the large number of Iraqi POW's returned by Iran in
1998. However, a final settlement of this issue between the two
governments was not achieved, despite predictions by Iranian government
officials in late 1998. A June 1998 press report described joint Iran-
Iraq search operations to identify the remains of those missing in
action.
The Government does not use forced exile, but many dissidents and
ethnic and religious minorities leave the country due to a perception
of threat from the Government.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The court system is not
independent and is subject to government and religious influence. It
serves as the principal vehicle of the State to restrict freedom and
reform in the society.
There are several different court systems. The two most active are
the traditional courts, which adjudicate civil and criminal offenses,
and the Islamic Revolutionary Courts, which were established in 1979 to
try offenses viewed as potentially threatening to the Islamic Republic,
including threats to internal or external security, narcotics crimes,
economic crimes (including hoarding and overpricing), and official
corruption. A special clerical court examines alleged transgressions
within the clerical establishment, and a military court investigates
crimes committed in connection with military or security duties by
members of the army, police, and the Revolutionary Guards. A press
court hears complaints against publishers, editors, and writers in the
media. The Supreme Court has limited authority to review cases.
The judicial system has been designed to conform, where possible,
to an Islamic canon based on the Koran, Sunna, and other Islamic
sources. Article 157 provides that the head of the judiciary shall be a
cleric chosen by the Supreme Leader. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi resigned
as the head of the judiciary in August and was replaced by Ayatollah
Mahmoud Hashemi Shahrudi. The head of the Supreme Court and Prosecutor
General also must be clerics.
Many aspects of the prerevolutionary judicial system survive in the
civil and criminal courts. For example, defendants have the right to a
public trial, may choose their own lawyer, and have the right of
appeal. Trials are adjudicated by panels of judges. There is no jury
system in the civil and criminal courts. If a situation is not
addressed by statutes enacted after the 1979 revolution, the Government
advises judges to give precedence to their own knowledge and
interpretation of Islamiclaw, rather than rely on statutes enacted
during the Shah's regime.
Trials in the Revolutionary Courts, where crimes against national
security and other principal offenses are heard, are notorious for
their disregard of international standards of fairness. Revolutionary
Court judges act as prosecutor and judge in the same case, and judges
are chosen for their ideological commitment to the system. Pretrial
detention often is prolonged and defendants lack access to attorneys.
Indictments often lack clarity and include undefined offenses such as
``antirevolutionary behavior,'' ``moral corruption,'' and ``siding with
global arrogance.'' Defendants do not have the right to confront their
accusers. Secret or summary trials of 5 minutes are not unknown. Others
are show trials that are intended merely to emphasize a coerced public
confession. In 1992 the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights concluded
that ``the chronic abuses associated with the Islamic Revolutionary
Courts are so numerous and so entrenched as to be beyond reform.'' The
Government has undertaken no major reform of the Revolutionary Court
system since that report.
The legitimacy of the Special Clerical Court (SCC) system was a
subject of wide debate throughout the year. The clerical courts, which
were established in 1987 to investigate offenses and crimes that are
committed by clerics, are overseen directly by the Supreme Leader, are
not provided for in the Constitution, and operate outside the domain of
the judiciary. In particular critics alleged that the clerical courts
were used to prosecute certain clerics for expressing controversial
ideas and for participating in activities outside the area of religion,
including journalism. In November former Interior Minister and Vice
President Abdollah Nouri was sentenced by a branch of the SCC to a 5-
year prison term for allegedly publishing ``anti-Islamic articles,
insulting government officials, promoting friendly relations with the
United States,'' and providing illegal publicity to dissident cleric
Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri in the pages of Khordad, a newspaper
that was established by Nouri in late 1998 and closed at the time of
his arrest. Nouri used the public trial to attack the legitimacy of the
SCC (see Section 2.a.).
In April a branch of the SCC convicted Hojjatoleslam Mohsen
Kadivar, a Shi'a cleric and popular seminary lecturer, to 18 months in
prison for ``dissemination of lies and confusing public opinion'' in a
series of broadcast interviews and newspaper articles. Kadivar
advocated political reform and greater intellectual freedom and
criticized the misuse of religion to maintain power. In an interview
published in a newspaper, Kadivar criticized certain government
officials for turning criticism against them into alleged crimes
against the State. He also observed that such leaders ``mistake
themselves with Islam, with national interests, or with the interests
of the system, and in this way believe that they should be immune from
criticism.'' He also allegedly criticized former Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Khomeini and demonstrated support for dissident cleric
Ayatollah Montazeri. Kadivar's trial was not open to the public.
In July the SCC banned the daily newspaper Salaam and indicted its
publisher, Mohammad Mousavi Khoeniha, on charges of ``violating Islamic
principles,'' ``endangering national security,'' and ``disturbing
public opinion.'' Khoeniha, a cleric, later was sentenced to a 5-year
jail term. The charges involved the publication by Salaam of documents
related to the unsolved murders of dissident intellectuals in late
1998, which indicated a possible connection to senior officials in the
plotting of the murders. The closure of the newspaper led to peaceful
protests by students at Tehran University that later grew into
widespread rioting after aggressive countermeasures were taken by
security forces (see Section 2.b.).
It is difficult for many women to obtain legal redress. A woman's
testimony is worth only half that of a man's, making it difficult for a
woman to prove a case against a male defendant.
The Government frequently charges members of religious minorities
with crimes such as ``confronting the regime'' and apostasy, and
conducts trials in these cases in the same manner as is reserved for
threats to national security. Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, who resigned as
head of the judiciary in August, stated in 1996 that Baha'i Faith was
an espionage organization. Trials against Baha'is have reflected this
view (see Section 2.c.).
Independent legal scholar and member of the Islamic clergy
Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was convicted by the SCC in
1998 for his outspoken criticism of the treatment of women under the
law, was released from prison in early in the year; however, the
Government banned him from performing any clerical duties for 5 years.
Human Rights groups outside Iran noted reports that Saidzadeh's 1998
sentence also included a prohibition on publishing. He has ceased
authoring a monthly column on legal issues, many focusing on the rights
of women, since the time of his detention.
In December authorities rearrested former Deputy Prime Minister and
longtime political dissident Abbas Amir-Entezam after an interview with
him was published in an Iranian newspaper. Amir-Entezam has spent much
of the past 20 years in and out of prison since being arrested on
charges of collaboration with the United States following the seizure
of the U.S. embassy in Tehran by revolutionary militants in 1979. In
his original trial, Amir-Entezam was denied defense counsel and access
to the allegedly incriminating evidence that was used against him
gathered from the overtaken U.S. Embassy. Since then he has appealed
for a fair and public trial, which has been denied him. He has been a
frequent victim of torture in prison; he suffered a ruptured eardrum
due to repeated beatings, and kidney failure resulting from denial of
access to toilet facilities, and an untreated prostate condition. He
reports having been taken on numerous occasions before a firing squad,
told to prepare for death, only to be allowed to live.
No estimates are available on the number of political prisoners.
However, the Government often arrests, convicts, and sentences persons
on questionable criminal charges, including drug trafficking, when
their actual ``offenses'' are political.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that ``reputation, life,
property, (and) dwelling(s)'' are protected from trespass except as
``provided by law;'' however, the Government infringes on these rights.
Security forces monitor the social activities of citizens, enter homes
and offices, monitor telephone conversations, and open mail without
court authorization.
Organizations such as the Ansar-e Hezbollah, a movement of hard-
line vigilantes who seek to enforce their vision of appropriate
revolutionary comportment upon the society, harass, beat, and
intimidate those who demonstrate publicly for reform or who do not
observe dress codes or other modes of correct revolutionary conduct.
This includes women whose clothing does not cover the hair and all of
the body except the hands and face, or those who wear makeup or nail
polish. Ansar-e Hezbollah gangs also have been used to destroy
newspaper offices and printing presses, intimidate dissident clerics,
and disrupt peaceful gatherings (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.). Ansar-e
Hezbollah cells are organized throughout the country and linked to
individual members of the country's leadership.
Vigilante violence includes attacking young persons believed too
``un-Islamic'' in their dress or activities, invading private homes,
abusing unmarried couples, and disrupting concerts or other forms of
popular entertainment. Authorities occasionally enter homes to remove
television satellite dishes, or to disrupt private gatherings where
unmarried men and women socialize, or where alcohol, mixed dancing, or
other forbidden activities are offered or take place. Enforcement
appears to be arbitrary, varying widely with the political climate and
the individuals involved. Authorities reportedly are vulnerable to
bribes in some of these circumstances.
In 1998 security forces conducted a nationwide raid of more than
500 homes and offices owned or occupied by Baha'is suspected of having
connections to the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning (see Section
2.c.). During the raids, instructional materials, office equipment, and
other items of personal property were confiscated. The effort
apparently was designed to disrupt the operation of the Institute,
which serves as the only alternative source of higher education for
most Baha'is, who are denied entry to the state-controlled university
system.
Prison guards intimidated family members of detainees (see Section
1.c.). Iranian opposition figures living abroad reported harassment of
their relatives in Iran.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, except when published ideas are ``contrary to
Islamic principles, or are detrimental to public rights;'' however, the
Government restricts freedom of speech and of the press in practice.
Since the election of President Khatami, the independent press,
especially newspapers and magazines, has played an increasingly
important role in providing a forum for an intense debate regarding
reform in the society. However, basic legal safeguards for freedom of
expression are lacking, and the independent press has been subjected to
arbitrary enforcement measures by elements of the Government, notably
the judiciary, which see in such debates a threat to their own hold on
power.
Newspapers and magazines represent a wide variety of political and
social perspectives, some allied with particular figures within the
Government. Many subjects of discussion are tolerated, including
criticism of certain government policies. However, the 1995 Press Law
prohibits the publishing of a broad and ill-defined category of
subjects, including material ``insulting Islam and its sanctities'' or
``promoting subjects that might damage the foundation of the Islamic
Republic.'' Generally prohibited topics include fault-finding comment
on the personality and achievements of the late Leader of the
Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini; direct criticism of the current Supreme
Leader; assailing the principle of velayat-e faqih, or rule by a
supreme religious leader; questioning the tenets of certain Islamic
legal principles; sensitive or classified material affecting national
security; promotion of the views of certain dissident clerics,
including Grand Ayatollah Ali Montazeri; and promotion of rights or
autonomy of ethnic minorities.
Oversight of the press is carried out in accordance with a press
law that was enacted in 1995. The law established the Press Supervisory
Board, which is composed of the Minister of Islamic Culture and
Guidance, a Supreme Court judge, a Member of Parliament, and a
university professor who is appointed by the Minister of Islamic
Culture and Guidance. The Board is responsible for issuing press
licenses and for examining complaints filed against publications or
individual journalists, editors, and publishers. In certain cases, the
Press Supervisory Board may refer complaints to the courts for further
action, including closure. The Press Court hears such complaints. Its
hearings are conducted in public and feature the presence of a jury
that is composed of clerics, government officials, and editors of
government-controlled newspapers. The jury is empowered to recommend to
the presiding judge the guilt or innocence of defendants and the
severity of any penalty to be imposed, although these recommendations
are not binding legally. In at least two cases during the year (against
the newspapers Jame-eh Salem and Adineh), recommendations made by Press
Court juries for relatively lenient penalties were disregarded by the
presiding judge in favor of harsher measures, including closure.
Perhaps because the judgments of the Press Courts have not been viewed
as sufficiently strict by some government officials, alleged violations
of the Press Law increasingly were referred to the Revolutionary and
Special Clerical Courts, in which defendants enjoy fewer legal
safeguards (see Section 1.e.).
Two notable amendments to the 1995 Press Law were circulated in the
Parliament during the year. The first would curtail severely the
current freedoms held by the independent press, including by making
individual journalists--and not their publishers--personally liable for
violations of the Press Law, and by requiring the directors of
publications to reveal to the Government their sources for the articles
they publish. The amendment was opposed by Minister of Culture and
Islamic Guidance Ataollah Mohajerani during parliamentary debate. It
requires further parliamentary examination before implementation. In
August another amendment apparently directed at the independent press
was proposed, which would define a new class of ``political offenses,''
including the ``exchange of information with foreign embassies,
diplomatic representatives, media, and political parties, that may be
determined to put national interests in jeopardy.'' This amendment was
submitted to the Cabinet for further discussion, and reportedly remains
pending there. The U.N. Special Representative noted in his October
report that ``passage of these two pieces of new legislation, both
apparently opposed by those most concerned, would constitute a major
defeat for the right of free expression.''
Public officials frequently levy complaints against journalists,
editors, and publishers, and even rival publications. Thepractice of
complaining about the writings of journalists crosses ideological
lines. Offending writers are subject to trial, with fines, suspension
from journalistic activities, and imprisonment all common punishments
on findings of guilt for offenses ranging from ``fabrication'' to
``propaganda against the State'' to ``insulting the leadership of the
Islamic Republic.''
Police raid newspaper offices, and Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs attack
the offices of liberal publications and bookstores without interference
from the police or prosecution by the courts.
The country's record on freedom of expression was mixed during the
year. It remained the central issue of the struggle between hard liners
and political reformers in society. The Government continued its policy
of issuing licenses for new publications, many of which engaged in open
criticism of certain government policies. However, opponents of such
openness continued their assault, begun in 1998, on the relative
freedom enjoyed by the independent press since the election of
President Khatami. In March then-head of the judiciary Mohammad Yazdi
addressed reform-oriented journalists and the issue of press freedom in
a Friday prayer sermon broadcast throughout the country, stating that
there ``is no freedom for you to write and say anything you like. Our
people do not want such freedom if it is against the tenets of Islam.
Do not come out tomorrow and ask why you were not warned in advance. Do
not cry out when we arrest someone.''
As an example of the division within the various branches of the
Government on this issue, the Majles conducted impeachment hearings in
April against Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance Ataollah
Mohajerani. Mohajerani is viewed as a major force within the Government
for greater press and academic freedom. Among the charges brought
against Mohajerani were that his Ministry had failed to prevent the
publishing of material that ``insulted Islamic sanctities,'' and that
``propagated corruption and obscenity.'' However, the hearing was
viewed as a more general attack on the policy of press liberalization
at the Ministry during Mohajerani's tenure. The motion failed by a vote
of 135-121 and Mohajerani continued in his position.
Numerous publications were banned or suspended during the year. The
U.N. Special Representative reported 40 complaints against publications
in the period from January to August. Many of the leading publications
that represented the views of the reform movement were ordered closed
during the year, including Salaam, Rah-e No, Jame'eh Salem, Iran-e
Farda, Adineh, Neshat, and Khordad. In March the magazine Zan (Woman)
was ordered closed by a Revolutionary Court for publishing part of a
New Year's greeting to the citizenry from the former Empress, Fara
Pahlavi, who is living in exile, and for printing a cartoon satirizing
an aspect of Shari'a (Islamic law) that is currently in effect, under
which the ``blood money'' that is paid to the family of a murdered
woman equals half that paid to the family of a murdered man.
Several individual editors and publishers were arrested and fined
for alleged violations of the Press Law. At the same time, the
Government continued to issue licenses for the creation of such
publications. In one such case, a leading reformist daily, Neshat, was
ordered closed in September, and its editor, Mashallah Shamsolvaezin,
was arrested on charges concerning the publication in Neshat of an
article that called for the abolition of the death penalty. However,
his arrest was not carried out by the authorities until November, and
in the intervening period, Shamsolvaezin obtained a new license and
oversaw the creation and publication of a new daily newspaper, Asr-e
Azadegan, which assumed the same reform orientation that had
characterized Neshat.
The Government monitors carefully the statements and views of
Iran's senior religious leaders to prevent disruptive dissent within
the clerical ranks. In November 1997, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri,
a cleric formerly designated as the successor to Iran's late Spiritual
Leader Ayatollah Khomeini, called into question the authority of the
current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, criticizing his increasing
intervention in government policy. The comments sparked attacks by
Ansar-e Hezbollah mobs on Montazeri's residence and a Koranic school in
Qom run by Montazeri. The promotion of Montazeri's views were among the
charges brought against clerics Mohsen Kadivar and Abdollah Nouri at
hearings of the Special Clerical Court during the year.
The press reported throughout the year that several persons were
jailed for expressing support for Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. In October
it was reported that Akbar Tajik-Saeeki, identified as the prayer
leader at a Tehran mosque, was jailed by the SpecialCourt for the
Clergy for signing a petition that protested the continued detention of
Grand Ayatollah Montazeri. Support for Montazeri was also one of the
charges included in the wide-ranging indictment of former Interior
Minister Abdollah Nouri (see Section 1.e.).
The 134 signatories of the 1994 Declaration of Iranian Writers,
which declared a collective intent to work for the removal of barriers
to freedom of thought and expression, remain at risk. In July the
Association of International Writers, known by its acronym PEN,
released a statement noting that authorities had never solved the
murders of signatories Ahmad Mirallai, Ghafar Hosseini, Ahmad Modhtari,
Mohammad Jafar Pouyandeh, Ebrahim Zalzadeh, and Darioush and Parvaneh
Forouhar, nor the disappearance in late 1998 of Pirouz Davani. PEN had
reported in October 1998 that Declaration signatories Mohammad
Pouyandeh, Mohammad Mokhtari, Houshang Golshiri, Kazem Kardevani, and
Mansour Koushan were questioned by a Revolutionary Court in connection
with their attempts to convene a meeting of the Iran Writer's
Association. Mokhtari and Pouyandeh subsequently were murdered, while
signatory Mansour Koushan reportedly fled to Norway.
The Government directly controls and maintains a monopoly over all
television and radio broadcasting facilities; programming reflects the
Government's political and socio-religious ideology. Because newspapers
and other print media have a limited circulation outside large cities,
radio and television serve as the principal news source for many
citizens. Satellite dishes that receive foreign television broadcasts
are forbidden; however, many citizens, particularly the wealthy, own
them. In May the Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance stated in
public remarks that the Government might support an easing of the
satellite ban. However, Supreme Leader Khamenei, who makes the ultimate
determination on issues that involve radio and television broadcasting,
quickly criticized any potential change as amounting to ``surrender''
to Western culture, effectively ending any further debate of the idea.
The Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance is charged with
screening books prior to publication to ensure that they do not contain
offensive material. However, some books and pamphlets critical of the
Government are published without reprisal. The Ministry inspects
foreign printed materials prior to their release on the market.
Legal scholar Hojatoleslam Sayyid Mohsen Saidzadeh, who was
convicted by the SCC in 1998 for his outspoken criticism of the
treatment women under the law, was released from prison early in year;
however, the Government banned him from performing any clerical duties
for 5 years and prohibited him from publishing (see Section 1.e.).
The Government effectively censors Iranian-made films, since it is
the main source of funding for Iranian film producers, who must submit
scripts and film proposals to government officials in advance of
funding approval. However, such government restrictions appear to have
eased since the election of President Khatami.
President Khatami announced in September 1998 that the Government
would take no action to threaten the life of British author Salman
Rushdie, or anyone associated with his work ``The Satanic Verses.''
However, his remarks were repudiated by other parties, including the 15
Khordad Foundation, which claims to have financed a bounty for the
murder of Rushdie (see Section 1.a.).
Academic censorship persists. In his 1996 interim report, the U.N.
Special Representative noted the existence of a campaign to bring about
the ``Islamization of the universities,'' which appeared to be a
movement to purge persons alleged to ``fight against the sanctities of
the Islamic system.'' Government informers who monitor classroom
material reportedly are common on university campuses. Admission to
universities is politicized; all applicants must pass ``character
tests'' in which officials screen out applicants critical of the
Government's ideology. To obtain tenure, professors must cooperate with
government authorities over a period of years. Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs
disrupt lectures and appearances by academics whose views do not
conform with their own. In October a newspaper announced that a post-
graduate philosophy course taught by Professor Abdolkarim Soroush at
Tehran University was canceled due to threats to set fire to the
classroom by unidentified persons.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
permits assemblies and marches ``provided they do not violate the
principles of Islam;'' however, in practice the Government restricts
freedom of assembly and closely monitors gatherings to ensure that they
do not constitute uncontrolled antigovernment protest. Such gatherings
include public entertainment and lectures, student gatherings, labor
protests, funeral processions, and Friday prayer gatherings. A
significant factor for groups in deciding whether to hold a public
gathering is whether it would be opposed by the quasi-official Ansar-e
Hezbollah, which uses violence and intimidation to disperse such
assemblies.
The Government forcefully suppressed demonstrations by Kurds in the
wake of the February arrest of PKK leader Abudullah Ocalan in Turkey.
Security forces reportedly killed 20 persons and made several hundred
arrests (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 5).
On July 8, students at Tehran University who were protesting
proposed legislation by the Majles that would limit press freedoms and
the Government's closure of a prominent reform-oriented newspaper, were
attacked by elements of the security forces and Ansar-e Hezbollah
thugs. Police forces reportedly looked on and allowed repeated attacks
against the students and their dormitory. Human Rights Watch reported
that, according to witnesses, at least 4 students were killed in the
assault on the dormitory, 300 were wounded, and 400 were taken into
detention. The demonstrations continued to grow in subsequent days to
include many nonstudents. Looting, vandalism, and large-scale rioting
began and spread to cities outside Tehran. Student groups attempted to
distance their organizations from these later acts, which they blamed
on government-sanctioned agitators. The Government intervened to stop
the rioting and announced a July 14 counter-demonstration of regime
loyalists and off-duty government workers, many of whom were bussed in
from other cities for the demonstration.
In the aftermath of these events, the Government took action
against members of the security forces for their violent assault on the
student dormitory, and against student leaders, demonstrators, and
political activists, whom it blamed for inciting illegal behavior. In
August the commander of the security forces, General Hedayat Lotfian,
was summoned before the Parliament to explain the role of his officers
in the dormitory raid. He reportedly announced that 98 officers were
arrested for their actions. In September the head of the Tehran
Revolutionary Court, Hojatoleslam Gholamhossein Rahbarpour, was quoted
as saying that 1,500 students were arrested during the riots, 500 were
released immediately after questioning, 800 were released later, and
formal investigations were undertaken against the remaining 200. He
also announced that four student leaders were sentenced to death by a
Revolutionary Court for their role in the demonstrations. He gave no
details of the court proceedings against the four, which apparently
were conducted in secret.
The Government arrested the leaders of the Iran Nations Party in
the aftermath of the July demonstrations. The party is a secular
nationalist movement that predates the revolution and is viewed as a
threat by certain elements of the Government. The party was accused of
inciting rioters and of encouraging disparaging slogans against
``sacred values.'' The former head of the Iran Nations Party, Darioush
Forouhar, was murdered along with his wife in late 1998 by agents of
the Iranian intelligence service (see Section 1.a.).
The Government limits freedom of association. The Constitution
provides for the establishment of political parties, professional
associations, Islamic religious groups, and recognized religious
minorities, provided that such groups do not violate the principles of
``freedom, sovereignty, and national unity,'' or question Islam as the
basis of the Islamic Republic. President Khatami has repeatedly
declared as a major goal the development of civil society. A newspaper
reported in June that the Article Ten Commission, a government body
responsible for reviewing applications for the establishment of
political parties, guilds, societies, and nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's), released figures indicating that as of April, ``85 political,
115 specialized, and 26 religious minority organizations and
associations'' were active in the country.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricts freedom of
religion. The Constitution declares that the ``official religion of
Iran is Islam and thesect followed is that of Ja'fari (Twelver)
Shi'ism,'' and that this principle is ``eternally immutable.'' It also
states that ``other Islamic denominations are to be accorded full
respect,'' and recognizes Zoroastrians, Christians, and Jews (Iran's
pre-Islamic religions) as the only ``protected religious minorities.''
Religions not specifically protected under the Constitution do not
enjoy freedom of religion. This situation most directly affects the
nearly 350,000 followers of the Baha'i Faith, who effectively enjoy no
legal rights.
The central feature of the country's Islamic republican system is
rule by a ``religious jurisconsult.'' Its senior leadership, including
the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, the President, the head of the
Judiciary, and the Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
(Parliament), is composed principally of Shi'a clergymen.
Religious activity is monitored closely by the Ministry of
Intelligence and Security (MOIS). Adherents of recognized religious
minorities are not required to register individually with the
Government, although their community, religious, and cultural
organizations, as well as schools and public events are monitored
closely. Baha'is are not recognized by the Government as a legitimate
religious group; rather, they are considered an outlawed political
organization. Registration of Baha'i adherents is a police function.
Evangelical Christian groups are pressured by government authorities to
compile and hand over membership lists for their congregations.
Evangelicals have resisted this demand. Non-Muslim owners of grocery
shops are required to indicate their religious affiliation on the front
of their shops.
The population is approximately 99 percent Muslim, of which 89
percent are Shi'a and 10 percent are Sunni (mostly Turkmen, Arab,
Baluch, and Kurd living in the southwest, southeast, and northwest).
Baha'i, Christian, Zoroastrian, and Jewish communities compose less
than 1 percent of the population. Sufi Brotherhoods are popular, but
there are no reliable figures available to judge their true size.
The U.N. Special Representative for Human Rights in Iran noted in
his September 1998 report frequent assertions that religious minorities
are, by law and practice, barred from being elected to a representative
body (except to the seats in the Majles reserved for minorities, as
provided for in Article 64 of the Constitution) and from holding senior
government or military positions. Members of religious minorities are
allowed to vote, but they may not run for President. All religious
minorities suffer varying degrees of officially sanctioned
discrimination, particularly in the areas of employment, education, and
housing (see Section 5).
The Government allows recognized religious minorities to conduct
religious education of their adherents. This includes separate, and
privately funded Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian schools. These
schools are supervised by the Ministry of Education, which imposes
certain curriculum requirements. With few exceptions, the directors of
these private schools must be Muslim. Attendance at these schools is
not mandatory for recognized religious minorities. All textbooks used
in course work must be approved for use by the Ministry of Education,
including religious texts. Religious texts in non-Persian languages
require approval by the authorities for use. This requirement imposes
sometimes significant translation expenses on minority communities.
Recognized religious minorities may provide religious instruction in
non-Persian languages but often come under pressure from the
authorities when conducting such instruction in Persian. In particular,
evangelical Christian and Jewish communities have suffered harassment
and arrest by authorities for the printing of materials or delivery of
sermons in Persian.
Recognized religious minorities are allowed by the Government to
establish community centers and certain cultural, social, sports or
charitable associations which they finance themselves. This does not
apply to the Baha'i community which, since 1983, has been denied the
right to assemble officially or to maintain administrative
institutions. Because the Baha'i Faith has no clergy, the denial of the
right to form such institutions and elect officers has threatened its
existence in Iran.
University applicants are required to pass an examination in
Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive instruction
in Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious
minorities to higher education. Applicants for publicsector employment
similarly are screened for their knowledge of Islam.
Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system,
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits, and incurring
heavier punishments than Muslims. Muslim men are free to marry non-
Muslim women, but the opposite does not apply. Marriages between Muslim
women and non-Muslim men are not recognized.
The Government is highly suspicious of any proselytizing of Muslims
by non-Muslims and can be harsh in its response, in particular against
Baha'is and evangelical Christians. The Government regards the Baha'i
community, whose faith originally derives from a strand of Islam, as a
``misguided'' or ``wayward'' sect. The Government has fueled anti-
Baha'i and anti-Jewish sentiment in the country for political purposes.
The Government does not ensure the right of citizens to change or
replace their religious faith. Apostasy, specifically conversion from
Islam, can be punishable by death.
Although Sunni Muslims are accorded full respect under the terms of
the Constitution, some Sunni groups claim discrimination on the part of
the Government. In particular, Sunnis cite the lack of a Sunni mosque
in Tehran and claim that authorities refuse to authorize construction
of a Sunni place of worship in the capital. Numerous Sunni clerics have
been murdered in recent years, some allegedly by agents of the regime.
For example, Human Rights Watch reported in 1998 the killing of Sunni
prayer leader Molavi Imam Bakhsh Narouie in the province of Sistan va-
Baluchistan in the southeast. This led to protests from the local
community, which believed that government authorities were involved in
the murder.
There were no reports of heightened repression by the authorities
of Sufi religious practices during the year, as had been reported by
Sufi organizations outside the country in previous years.
The largest non-Muslim minority is the Baha'i Faith, estimated at
nearly 350,000 adherents throughout the country. The Baha'i Faith
originated in Iran during the 1840's as a reformist movement within
Shi'a Islam. Initially it attracted a wide following among Shi'a
clergy. The political and religious authorities of that time joined to
suppress the movement, and since then the hostility of the Shi'a clergy
to the Baha'i Faith has remained intense. Baha'is are considered
apostates because of their claim to a valid religious revelation
subsequent to that of the Prophet Mohammed. The Baha'i Faith is defined
by the Government as a political sect historically linked to the Shah's
regime and, therefore, as counterrevolutionary, and characterized by
its espionage activities for the benefit of foreign entities,
particularly Israel. Historically at risk in Iran, Bahai's often have
suffered increased levels of persecution during times of political
ferment. Baha'is also faced discrimination under the Shah.
Baha'is may not teach or practice their faith or maintain links
with coreligionists abroad. The fact that the Baha'i world headquarters
is situated in what is now the state of Israel (established by the
founder of the Baha'i Faith in the 19th century in what was then
Ottoman-controlled Palestine) exposes Baha'is to government charges of
``espionage on behalf of Zionism,'' in particular when Bahai's are
caught communicating with or addressing monetary contributions to the
Baha'i Faith headquarters.
Broad restrictions on Baha'is appear to be geared to destroying
them as a community. They repeatedly have been offered relief from
persecution in exchange for recanting their faith. Baha'i marriages are
not recognized by the Government, leaving Baha'i women open to charges
of prostitution. Children of Baha'i marriages are not recognized as
legitimate and, therefore, are denied inheritance rights. Baha'i sacred
and historical properties have been confiscated systematically. Baha'is
are not allowed to bury and honor their dead in keeping with their
religious tradition, while many historic Baha'i gravesites have been
confiscated, and in some cases, desecrated or destroyed. In October
1998, three Baha'is were arrested in Damavand, a city north of Tehran,
on the grounds that they had buried their dead without government
authorization.
Ruhollah Rowhani, a Baha'i, was executed in July 1998 after having
served 9 months in solitary confinement on a charge of apostasy, which
arose from his allegedly having converted aMuslim woman to the Baha'i
Faith. The woman concerned held that her mother was a Baha'i and she
herself had been raised a Baha'i. Mr. Rowhani was not accorded a public
trial, and no sentence was announced prior to his execution.
Two other Baha'is, Sirus Zabihi-Moghaddam and Hadayat Kashefi-
Najafabadi, were tried alongside Rowhani and later sentenced to death
by a revolutionary court in Mashad for the exercise of their faith.
Unofficial reports received by Baha'i groups outside the country in
March indicated that the death sentences against Zabihi-Moghaddam and
Kashefi-Najafabadi had been lifted. The two remain in prison and there
is no confirmation of a new sentence.
Baha'i group meetings and religious education, which often take
place in private homes and offices, are curtailed severely. Public and
private universities continue to deny admittance to Baha'i students, a
particularly demoralizing blow to a community that traditionally has
placed a high value on education. Denial of access to higher education
appears aimed at the eventual impoverishment of the Baha'i community.
In September 1998, authorities began a nationwide operation to
disrupt the activities of the Baha'i Institute of Higher Learning, also
known as the ``Open University,'' which was established by the Baha'i
community shortly after the revolution to offer opportunities in higher
education to Baha'i students who had been denied access to the
country's high schools and universities. The Institute employed Baha'i
faculty and professors, many of whom had been dismissed from teaching
positions by the Government as a result of their faith, and conducted
classes in homes or offices owned or rented by Baha'is. In the assault,
which took place in at least 14 different cities, 36 faculty members
were arrested, and a variety of personal property, including books,
papers, and furniture, either were destroyed or confiscated. Government
interrogators sought to force the detained faculty members to sign
statements acknowledging that the Open University now was defunct and
pledging not to collaborate with it in the future. Baha'is outside the
country report that none of the 36 detainees would sign the document.
All but four of the 36 subsequently were released.
In March Dr. Sina Hakiman, Farzad Khajeh Sharifabadi, Habibullah
Ferdosian Najafabadi, and Ziaullah Mirzapanah, the four remaining
detainees from the September 1998 raid, were convicted under Article
498 of the Penal Code and sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to
10 years. In the court verdict, the four were accused of having
establishing a ``secret organization'' engaged in ``attracting youth,
teaching against Islam, and teaching against the regime of the Islamic
Republic.'' According to Baha'i groups outside Iran, the four were
science instructors. In October Baha'i groups outside the country
reported that all four were released from prison. There was no
explanation for the release.
The Government appears to adhere to a practice of keeping a small
number of Baha'is in arbitrary detention, some at risk of execution, at
any given time. There were at least 12 Baha'is reported to be under
arrest for practicing their faith at year's end, 5 under sentence of
death.
Baha'is regularly are denied compensation for injury or criminal
victimization. Government authorities claim that only Muslim plaintiffs
are eligible for compensation in these circumstances. Baha'is are
prohibited from government employment (see Section 5).
In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative reported the existence of a
government policy directive on the Baha'is. According to the directive,
the Supreme Revolutionary Council instructed government agencies to
block the progress and development of the Baha'i community, expel
Baha'i students from universities, cut the Baha'is' links with groups
outside Iran, restrict the employment of Baha'is, and deny Baha'is
``positions of influence,'' including those in education. The
Government claims that the directive is a forgery. However, it appears
to be an accurate reflection of current government practice.
In his 1996 report to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance recommended
``that the ban on the Baha'i organization should be lifted to enable it
to organize itself freely through its administrative institutions,
which are vital in the absence of a clergy, so that it can engage fully
in its religious activities.'' In response to the Special Rapporteur's
concernswith regard to the lack of official recognition of the Baha'i
Faith, government officials stated that Baha'is ``are not a religious
minority, but a political organization that was associated with the
Shah's regime, is against the Iranian Revolution, and engages in
espionage activities.'' The Government asserted to the Special
Representative that, as individuals, all Baha'is were entitled to their
beliefs and protected under other articles of the Constitution as
Iranian citizens.
The Christian community is estimated at approximately 117,000
according to government figures. Of these the majority are ethnic
Armenians and Assyro-Chaldeans. Protestant denominations and
evangelical churches also are active, although nonethnically based
groups report a greater degree of restrictions on their activities.
Authorities have become particularly vigilant in recent years in
curbing what is perceived as increasing proselytizing activities by
evangelical Christians, whose services are conducted in Persian.
Conversion of a Muslim to a non-Muslim religion can be considered
apostasy. Government officials have reacted to this perceived activity
by closing evangelical churches and arresting converts. Members of
evangelical congregations are required to carry membership cards,
photocopies of which must be provided to the authorities. Worshipers
are subject to identity checks by authorities posted outside
congregation centers. Meetings for evangelical services have been
restricted by the authorities to Sundays, and church officials have
been ordered to inform the Ministry of Information and Islamic Guidance
before admitting new members to their congregations.
Evangelical church leaders are subject to pressure from authorities
to sign pledges committing them not to evangelize Muslims or to allow
Muslims to attend church services. Evangelical communities in Iran
report a heightened sense of fear from authorities in the period since
the murders of three prominent Iranian evangelical ministers in 1994,
Reverends Tatavous Michaelian, Mehdi Dibaj, and Haik Hovsepian Mehr.
Three female members of the Mujahedin-e Khalq organization were
convicted for the murders of the three ministers; however, many
observers believe that authorities played a role in the killings. Late
in the year, a prominent investigative journalist raised new questions
about the guilt of the three women convicted of the 1994 murders,
alleging that the real murderers may have been officials within the
Intelligence Ministry linked to the deaths of several prominent
dissidents in late 1998 (see Section 1.a.).
One organization reported 8 deaths of evangelical Christians at the
hands of authorities in the past 10 years, and between 15 and 23
disappearances in the year between November 1997 and November 1998.
Oppression of evangelical Christians continued during the year.
Christian groups reported instances of government harassment of
churchgoers in Tehran, in particular against worshipers at the Assembly
of God congregation in the capital. Instances of harassment cited
included conspicuous monitoring outside Christian premises by
Revolutionary Guards to discourage Muslims or converts from entering
church premises and demands for presentation of identity papers of
worshipers inside. Iranian Christians International (ICI) detailed the
cases of Alireza and Mahboobeh Mahmoudian, converts to Christianity and
lay leaders of the Saint Simon the Zealot Osgofi Church in Shiraz, who
were forced to leave the country permanently in June 1998 after
continued harassment by the authorities. The ICI reported that Alireza
Mahmoudian had lost his job because of his conversion and had been
beaten repeatedly by Basiji and Ansar-e Hezbollah thugs on the orders
of government officials from the Ministry of Islamic Guidance. His
wife, Mahboobeh, also had been the subject of intimidation, principally
through frequent and aggressive interrogation by government officials.
Estimates of the size of the Iranian Jewish community vary from
25,000 to 40,000. These figures represent a substantial reduction from
the estimated 75,000 to 80,000 Jews who resided in the country prior to
the 1979 Revolution.
While Jews are a recognized religious minority, allegations of
official discrimination are frequent. The Government's anti-Israel
policies, coupled with a perception among radicalized Muslim elements
in Iran that Jewish citizens support Zionism and the State of Israel,
create a threatening atmosphere for the small Jewish community. Jewish
leaders reportedly are reluctantto draw attention to official
mistreatment of their community due to fear of government reprisal.
Some outside Jewish groups cite an increase in anti-Semitic
propaganda in the official and semi-official media as adding to the
pressure felt by the Jewish community. One example cited is the
periodic publication of the anti-Semitic and fictitious Protocols of
the Elders of Zion, both by the Government and by periodicals
associated with hard-line elements of the regime. In 1986 the Iranian
Embassy in London was reported to have published and distributed the
Protocols in English. The Protocols also were published in serial form
in the country in 1994 and again in January. On the latter occasion
they were published in Sobh, a conservative monthly publication
reportedly aligned with the security services.
There appears to be little restriction or interference with
religious practice or education, but Jews were eased out of government
positions after 1979. Jews are permitted to obtain passports and to
travel outside the country; however, with the exception of certain
business travelers, they are required by the authorities to obtain
government clearance (and pay additional fees) before each trip abroad.
The Government appears concerned about the emigration of Jews and
permission generally is not granted for all members of a Jewish family
to travel outside the country at the same time.
In February and March, 13 Jews were arrested in the cities of
Shiraz and Isfahan. Among the group were several prominent rabbis,
teachers of Hebrew, and their students. The charges centered on alleged
acts of espionage on behalf of Israel, an offense punishable by death.
The Government claimed that several non-Jews also were arrested as part
of the same operation. The judicial authorities did not reveal any
evidence to support the continued detention of the 13 Jews, and no
indictments were made. Governments around the world criticized the
arrests and called for the safe treatment of the detainees, who were
allowed only sporadic family visits and deliveries of kosher food.
Credible bases for the charges appeared weak, but may relate to the
reported occasional business travel of several of the detainees between
Iran and Israel. Attempts by relatives and Jewish community leaders to
gain clarification of the charges and assurances of due process were
not successful. Jews in Iran reportedly are reluctant to protest or
speak out publicly on the matter due to fear of government reprisal.
None of the detainees were granted access to counsel, after nearly a
year in jail.
Human Rights Watch reported the death in May 1998 of Jewish
businessman Ruhollah Kakhodah-Zadeh, who was hanged in prison without a
public charge or legal proceeding. Reports indicate that Kakhodah-Zadeh
may have been killed for assisting Jews to emigrate. As an accountant,
Kakhoda-Zadeh had provided power-of-attorney services for Jews
departing the country.
The Government restricts the movement of several senior religious
leaders, some of whom have been under house arrest for years (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.d.), and often charges members of religious
minorities with crimes such as drug offenses, ``confronting the
regime,'' and apostasy (see Section 1.e.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some restrictions
on these rights. Citizens may travel to any part of the country,
although there have been restrictions on travel to Kurdish areas during
times of occasional heavy fighting. Road blocks and security checks are
common on routes between major cities. Citizens may change their place
of residence without obtaining official permission. The Government
requires exit permits (a validation stamp placed in the traveler's
passport) for draft-age males and citizens who are politically suspect.
Some citizens, particularly those whose skills are in short supply and
who were educated at government expense, must post bonds to obtain exit
permits. The Government restricts the movement of certain religious
minorities and of several religious leaders (see Sections 1.d. and
2.c.).
Citizens returning from abroad sometimes are subject to search and
extensive questioning by government authorities for evidence of
antiregime activities abroad. Cassette tapes, printed material, and
personal correspondence and photographs are subject to confiscation.
The Government permits Jews to travel abroad, but often denies them
the multiple-exit permits normally issued to other citizens. The
Government normally does not permit all members of a Jewish family to
travel abroad at the same time. Baha'is often experience difficulty
getting passports. Women must obtain the permission of their husband,
father, or other living male relative in order to obtain a passport.
Married women must receive written permission from their husbands
before embarking on a trip outside the country.
The law contains provisions for granting refugee status in
accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government generally cooperates
with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. Although the
Government generally provides first asylum, the Government increased
pressure on some refugees to return to their home countries,
particularly as the economy has worsened.
The country hosts a large refugee population. The Government and
the UNHCR estimate that there are approximately 1.4 million Afghan
refugees in the country. Of this total, about 21,200 are accommodated
in refugee camps administered by the Government. The rest subsist on
itinerant labor, often moving from place to place within the country.
The UNHCR reported that from 1992 through August 1998, 568,671 Afghans
were repatriated voluntarily to Afghanistan with the assistance of the
UNHCR. The same report also estimated that within the same period, an
estimated 1 million Afghans in Iran returned independently to their
country. There were reports in late 1998 and early in the year of a
surge in the numbers of Afghans forcibly repatriated to their country
by government officials and military personnel. Reasons cited were a
worsening economic situation and anger over the murders in August 1998
of nine Iranian diplomats and journalists stationed at the Iranian
Consulate in the Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif. There also were reports
during this period of civilian mob attacks against groups of Afghan
refugees, which resulted in numerous deaths. Afghan refugees who do not
reside in official refugee camps increasingly are denied basic services
from the State, including health services, education for their
children, and housing. Refugee groups report that Afghans live in
extreme poverty in groups of makeshift communities on the outskirts of
villages.
The UNHCR estimates that there are about 580,000 Iraqi Kurdish and
Arab refugees in the country. Many of these Iraqi refugees originally
were expelled by Iraq at the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war because of
their suspected Iranian origin. In many of these cases, both the Iraqi
and Iranian Governments dispute their citizenship, rendering many of
them, in effect, stateless. Other Iraqi refugees arrived following
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Although the Government claims to host more than 30,000 refugees of
other nationalities, including Tajiks, Bosnians, Azeris, Eritreans,
Somalis, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, it has provided no information
about them or allowed the UNHCR or other organizations access to them.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The right of citizens to change their government is restricted. The
Supreme Leader, the recognized Head of State, is selected for a life
term by the Assembly of Experts. The Supreme Leader may also be removed
by the Assembly of Experts. The Assembly itself is restricted to
clerics, who serve an 8-year term and are chosen by popular vote from a
list approved by the Government. There is no separation of state and
religion, and clerics dominate the Government. The Government represses
any attempts to separate state and religion, or to alter the State's
existing theocratic foundation. The selection of candidates for
elections effectively is controlled by the Government.
The Constitution provides for a Council of Guardians composed of
six Islamic clergymen and six lay members who review all laws for
consistency with Islamic law and the Constitution. The Council also
screens political candidates for ideological, political, and religious
suitability. It accepts only candidates who support a theocratic state;
clerics who disagree with government policies also have been
disqualified.
Regularly scheduled elections are held for the President, members
of the Majles, and the Assembly of Experts. Mohammad Khatami, a former
Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance who was impeached in 1992 by
the Majles for ``liberalism'' and``negligence,'' was elected President
in May 1997. The Interior Ministry estimated that over 90 percent of
the eligible population voted in that election. During the campaign,
there was considerable government intervention and censorship. For
example, the Council of Guardians reviewed 238 candidates, including a
woman, but allowed only 4 individuals to run. Three were clerics; all
were men. Khatami won nearly 70 percent of the vote, with his greatest
support coming from the middle class, youth, minorities, and women. The
election results were not disputed, and the Government did not appear
to have engaged in fraud.
The Government in 1997 nullified results from the 1996 Majles
elections in several districts, including Malayer, Astara, and Isfahan.
Elections were held in the fall of 1998 for the 86-member Assembly
of Experts. The Council of Guardians disqualified numerous candidates,
which led to criticism from many observers that the Government
improperly predetermined the election results.
In February elections for nationwide local councils were held for
the first time since the 1979 revolution. Government figures indicated
that roughly 280,000 candidates competed for 130,000 council seats
across the nation. Women were elected to seats in numerous districts.
The Councils do not appear to have been granted the autonomy or
authority that would make them effective or meaningful local
institutions; doing so could be viewed as a threat to the control of
the central Government.
Vigorous parliamentary debates take place on various issues. Most
deputies are associated with powerful political and religious
officials, but often vote independently and shift from one faction to
another.
Women are underrepresented in government. They hold 13 of 270
Majles seats. There are no female cabinet members. In 1997 President
Khatami appointed the first female vice president (for environmental
protection) since the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Masoumeh Ebtekar,
following his inauguration. Minister of Islamic Culture and Guidance
Ataollah Mohajerani appointed a second woman to a senior post, Azam
Nouri, when he chose her in 1997 as his Deputy Minister for Legal and
Parliamentary Affairs. President Khatami appointed a woman to serve as
Presidential Adviser for Women's Affairs.
Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians elect deputies to specially
reserved Majles seats. However, the UN Special Representative noted in
his September report frequent assertions that religious minorities are,
by law and practice, barred from being elected to a representative body
(except to the seats in the Majles reserved for minorities), and from
holding senior government or military positions. Religious minorities
are allowed to vote, but they may not run for president.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government continued to restrict the work of local human rights
groups. The Government denies the universality of human rights and has
stated that human rights issues should be viewed in the context of a
country's ``culture and beliefs.''
Various professional groups representing writers, journalists,
photographers, and others attempt to monitor government restrictions in
their field and harassment and intimidation against individual members
of their professions. However, their ability to meet, organize, and
effect change is curtailed severely by the Government.
International human rights NGO's such as Human Rights Watch (HRW)
and Amnesty International, are not permitted to establish offices or
conduct regular investigative visits to Iran. Human Rights Watch
reported that it was able to send its researcher, an Iranian national,
to Iran during the year, but that other HRW staff members and
representatives of other human rights NGO's were denied visas.
The ICRC and the UNHCR both operate in the country. However, the
Government did not allow the U.N. Special Representative for Human
Rights in Iran to visit the country during the year. He was last
allowed entry into Iran to gather information for his yearly report in
1996. However, the Special Representativecorresponded with government
officials during the year, and received several replies to his
correspondence.
Islamic Human Rights Commission (IHRC) was established in 1995
under the authority of the head of the judiciary, who sits on its board
as an observer. In 1996 the Government established a human rights
committee in the Majles. Most observers believe that these bodies lack
independence. The U.N. Special Representative published statistics
provided by the IHRC indicating that in the period from March 1998 to
March 1999, 1,051 files were opened on the basis of complaints received
by the organization. Of those the highest number of complaints were
related to the judiciary. Of a total of some 3,000 currently active
files, approximately 1,000 were related to women and women's issues.
The Special Representative urged that the statistics in the reports of
the IHRC be broken down further and that positive trends and best
practices be publicized, and that a national action plan for human
rights be developed.
In January a newspaper quoted Mohammad Zia'i Far, secretary of the
IHRC, as calling for greater information from government authorities
regarding the government's investigation into the murders of prominent
dissidents and intellectuals in late 1998 (see section 1.a.). The press
also reported that the IHRC sought permission from the Special Court
for the Clergy to visit imprisoned cleric Mohsen Kadivar in Evin Prison
in March (see Section 1.e.). The request reportedly was never answered.
In 1998 Ziaei-Far reportedly complained about the use by police of
``special detention centers'' to conduct coercive interrogations of
detainees (see Section 1.c.) and acknowledged widespread human rights
violations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
In general the Government does not discriminate on the basis of
race, disability, language, or social status. The Government does
discriminate on the basis of religion and sex.
Women.--Although reported cases of spousal abuse and violence
against women occur, the statistics on such reports are not available
publicly. Abuse in the family is considered a private matter and seldom
is discussed publicly. In May the President's Advisor on Women's
Affairs was quoted in the press as stating that ``one cannot claim that
violence against women does not take place in Iran.'' The Special
Representative noted in his September report the ongoing development by
the Government of a ``National Action Plan'' to address violence
against women, which reportedly is to include ``legal and judicial
measures, a public information campaign, establishment of a women's
police college, and an organization for defending women in peril as
well as victims of violence.'' There was no indication when this plan
would be complete.
Women have access to primary and advanced education; however,
social and legal constraints tend to limit their professional
opportunities. Women are represented in many fields of the work force,
and the Government has not prevented women from entering many
traditionally male-dominated fields, including medicine, dentistry,
journalism and agriculture. Women's entry into these and other fields
was necessitated by the by loss of male lives in the 1980-88 war
between Iran and Iraq. However, many women choose not to work outside
the home. A 1985 law enacted by the Government instituted 3 months of
paid maternity leave, and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing
mothers to feed their babies. Pension benefits for women were
established under the same law, which also decreed that companies
hiring women should provide day-care facilities for young children of
female employees.
The State enforces gender segregation in most public spaces, and
prohibits women mixing openly with unmarried men or men not related to
them. Women must ride in a reserved section on public buses and enter
public buildings, universities, and airports through separate
entrances. Women are prohibited from attending male sporting events,
although this restriction does not appear to be enforced universally.
While the enforcement of a conservative Islamic dress codes has varied
with the political climate since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in
1989, what women wear in public is not entirely a matter of personal
choice. Women are subject to harassment by the authorities if their
dress or behavior is considered inappropriate, and may be sentenced to
flogging or imprisonment for such violations. The law prohibits the
publication of pictures of uncovered women inthe print media, including
pictures of foreign women. There are penalties for failure to observe
Islamic dress codes at work (see Section 6.a.).
Discrimination against women is reinforced by law through
provisions of the Islamic Civil and Penal Codes, in particular those
sections dealing with family and property law. Shortly after the 1979
revolution, the Government repealed the Family Protection Law, a
hallmark bill that was adopted in 1967, which gave women increased
rights in the home and workplace, and replaced it with a legal system
based largely on Shari'a practices. In 1998 the Majles approved a bill
that mandated segregation of the sexes in the provision of medical
care. The bill provided for women to be treated only by female
physicians and men by male physicians and raised questions about the
quality of care that women could receive under such a regime,
considering the current imbalance between the number of trained and
licensed male and female physicians and specialists.
The minimum legal age of marriage for women is 9, although marriage
at that age is rare. All women, no matter the age, must have the
permission of their father or a living male relative in order to get
married. The law allows for the practice of Siqeh, or temporary
marriage, a Shi'a custom in which a woman or a girl can become the wife
of a married or single Muslim male after a simple and brief religious
ceremony. The Siqeh marriage can last for a night or as little as 30
minutes. The bond is not recorded on identification documents, and,
according to Islamic law, men may have as many Siqeh wives as they
wish. Such wives are not granted rights associated with traditional
marriage.
The Penal Code includes provisions that mandate the stoning of
women and men convicted of adultery (see Sections 1.a and 1.c.). Under
legislation passed in 1983, women have the right to divorce, and
regulations promulgated in 1984 substantially broadened the grounds on
which a woman may seek a divorce. However, a husband is not required to
cite a reason for divorcing his wife. In 1986 the Government issued a
12-point ``contract'' to serve as a model for marriage and divorce,
which limits the privileges accorded to men by custom and traditional
interpretations of Islamic law. The model contract also recognized a
divorced woman's right to a share in the property that couples acquire
during their marriage and to increased alimony rights. Women who
remarry are forced to give up to the child's father custody of children
from earlier marriages. In 1998 the Majles passed a law that granted
custody of minor children to the mother in certain divorce cases in
which the father is proven unfit to care for the child (the measure was
enacted because of the complaints of mothers who had lost custody of
their children to former husbands with drug addictions and criminal
records.) Muslim women may not marry non-Muslim men. The testimony of a
woman is worth only half that of a man in court (see Section 1.e.). A
married woman must obtain the written consent of her husband before
traveling outside the country (see Section 2.d.).
Children.--Most children have access to education through the 12th
grade (it is compulsory to age 11), and to some form of health care.
There is no known pattern of child abuse.
People With Disabilities.--There is no available information
regarding whether the Government has legislated or otherwise mandated
accessibility for the disabled. However, the Cable News Network
reported in 1996 on the harsh conditions in an institution for retarded
children who had been abandoned by their parents. Film clips showed
children tied or chained to their beds, in filthy conditions, and
without appropriate care. It is not known to what extent this
represents the typical treatment of the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Members of all religious minorities suffer
varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly
in the areas of employment, education, and housing. Applicants for
public-sector employment are screened for their adherence to Islam. The
law stipulates penalties for government workers who do not observe
``Islam's principles and rules.'' Religious minorities cannot serve in
the army, the judiciary, and the security services. Article 144 of the
Constitution states that ``the Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran
must be an Islamic army,'' whichis ``committed to an Islamic
ideology,'' and must ``recruit into its service individuals who have
faith in the objectives of the Islamic Revolution and are devoted to
the cause of achieving its goals.'' Muslims who convert to Christianity
also suffer discrimination. Apostasy, or conversion from Islam to
another religion, is punishable by death.
The Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian, and Baha'i minorities suffer
varying degrees of officially sanctioned discrimination, particularly
in the areas of employment, education, and public accommodations (see
Section 2.d.). For example, members of religious minorities are
generally barred from becoming school principals. Muslims who convert
to Christianity also suffer discrimination. Apostasy, or conversion
from Islam to another religion, may be punishable by death.
University applicants are required to pass an examination in
Islamic theology. Although public-school students receive instruction
in Islam, this requirement limits the access of most religious
minorities to higher education. Applicants for public sector employment
similarly are screened for their adherence to Islam.
Religious minorities suffer discrimination in the legal system,
receiving lower awards in injury and death lawsuits, and incurring
heavier punishments than Muslims.
Sunni Muslims encounter religious discrimination at the local
level, as do practitioners of the Sufi tradition. Muslims who convert
to Christianity also suffer discrimination.
Jewish groups outside Iran noted that the arrest of 13 Jewish
individuals in February and March coincided with an increase in anti-
Semitic propaganda in newspapers and journals associated with hard-line
elements of the Government (see Section 2.c.). They also note that the
Shirazi Jewish community, one of the oldest remaining Jewish
communities outside Israel, had been under close observation by
government authorities prior to the arrests and had been warned by the
authorities against certain activities, such as the publication in
Persian of scriptures and guidelines for the treatment of kosher foods.
In 1993 the U.N. Special Representative Reported the existence of a
government policy directive to block the progress of Baha'is (see
Section 2.c.).
Properties belonging to the Baha'i community as a whole, such as
places of worship and graveyards, were confiscated by the Government in
the years after the 1979 revolution and, in some cases, defiled.
Baha'is are prevented from enrolling in universities. Other Government
restrictions have eased; Baha'is currently may obtain ration booklets
and send their children to public elementary and secondary schools.
Thousands of Baha'is who were dismissed from government jobs in the
early 1980's receive no unemployment benefits and have been required to
repay the Government for salaries or pensions received from the first
day of employment. Those unable to do so face prison sentences (see
Sections 1.d. and 2.c.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Kurds seek greater autonomy
from the central Government and continue to suffer from government
discrimination. The Kurds' status as Sunni Muslims serves as an
aggravating factor in their relations with the Shi'a-dominated
government. These tensions predate the Islamic revolution. Kurds often
are suspected of harboring separatist or foreign sympathies by
government authorities. These suspicions have led to sporadic outbreaks
of fighting between the government and Kurdish groups. Human Rights
Watch reported in September 1997 that in the wake of the Gulf War and
the creation of an autonomous Kurdish zone in northern Iraq, Iranian
authorities increased their military presence in Kurdish areas of Iran,
which often led to human rights abuses against Kurds. Abuses included
destruction of villages, forced migrations, and widespread mining of
Kurdish property. In 1994 Iranian government agents killed Dr. Abdul
Rahman Gassemlou, a representative of the Kurdish Democratic Party of
Iran in Vienna.
In the wake of the February arrest of Kurdish Workers Party leader
Abdullah Ocalan in Turkey, Iranian Kurds demonstrated in numerous
cities in Iranian Kurdistan. In several instances, security forces
suppressed the demonstrations by force. Human rights groups reported at
least 20 deaths in the violence and several hundred arrests (see
Sections 1.a.,1.c., and 2.b.).
Azeris are well integrated into the Government and society, but
complain of ethnic and linguistic discrimination. The Government
traditionally has viewed Azeri nationalism as threatening, particularly
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of an
independent Azerbaijan.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Labor Code grants workers the
right to establish unions; however, the Government does not allow
independent unions to exist. A national organization known as the
Worker's House, founded in 1982, is the sole authorized national labor
organization. It serves primarily as a conduit for the Government to
exert control over workers. The leadership of the Worker's House
coordinates activities with Islamic labor councils, which are made up
of representatives of the workers and one representative of management
in industrial, agricultural, and service organizations of more than 35
employees. These councils also function as instruments of government
control, although they frequently have been able to block layoffs and
dismissals.
In 1991 the Government published a new Labor Code that allowed
employers and employees to establish guilds. The guilds issue
vocational licenses and help members find jobs.
The Government does not tolerate any strike deemed to be at odds
with its economic and labor policies. In 1993 the Parliament passed a
law that prohibits strikes by government workers. It also prohibits
government workers from having contacts with foreigners and stipulates
penalties for failure to observe Islamic dress codes and principles at
work. Nevertheless, strikes occur, and apparently in increasing numbers
as the economy has worsened. A European-based labor organization that
follows Iranian labor issues reported 181 protests and strikes by
workers in the period from March 1998 to March 1999. These reportedly
included strikes and protests by oil, textile, electrical
manufacturing, and metal workers, and by the unemployed.
Newspapers reported in May an ``unauthorized rally'' by thousands
of workers over the Government's labor policies and the poor economy.
Instances of late or partial pay for government workers are reportedly
common.
There are no known affiliations with international labor
organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers do not
have the right to organize independently and negotiate collective
bargaining agreements. No information is available on mechanisms used
to set wages. It is not known whether labor legislation and practice in
the export processing zones differ from the law and practice in the
rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Penal Code
provides that the Government may require any person who does not have
work to take suitable employment; however, this does not appear to be
enforced regularly. This provision has been criticized frequently by
the International Labor Organization (ILO) as contravening ILO
Convention 29 on forced labor. There is no information available on the
Government's policy on forced and bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Labor Law prohibits employment of minors under 15
years of age and places special restrictions on the employment of
minors under age 18. Education is compulsory until age 11. The law
permits children to work in agriculture, domestic service, and some
small businesses. By law women and minors may not be employed in hard
labor or, in general, night work. Information on the extent to which
these regulations are enforced is not available. There is no
information available on the Government's policy on forced and bonded
labor by children (see Section 6.c.). A 1985 law provides for 3 months
of paid maternity leave, and 2 half-hour periods per day for nursing
mothers to feed their babies.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code empowers the
Supreme Labor Council to establish annual minimum wage levels for each
industrial sector and region. It is not known if the minimum wages are
adjusted annually or enforced. The Labor Code stipulates that the
minimum wage should be sufficient to meet the living expenses of a
family and should take inflation into account. Under current poor
economic conditions, many middle-class citizens must work two or even
three jobs to support their families. The daily minimum wage was raised
in March 1997 to $2.80 (8,500 rials). This wage apparently is not
sufficient to provide a decent standard of living for a worker and
family. Information on the share of the working population covered by
minimum wage legislation is not available.
The Labor Code establishes a 6-day workweek of 48 hours maximum,
with 1 weekly rest day, normally Fridays, and at least 12 days of paid
annual leave and several paid public holidays.
According to the Labor Code, a Supreme Safety Council, chaired by
the Labor Minister or his representative, is responsible for promoting
workplace safety and health. The Council reportedly has issued 28
safety directives, and oversees the activities of 3,000 safety
committees established in enterprises employing more than 10 persons.
Labor organizations outside Iran allege that hazardous work
environments are common in Iran, and result in thousands of worker
deaths per year. It is not known how well the Ministry's inspectors
enforce regulations. It is not known whether workers may remove
themselves from hazardous situations without risking the loss of
employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, there were no reports that persons
were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
IRAQ *
Political power in Iraq lies exclusively in a repressive one-party
apparatus dominated by Saddam Hussein and members of his extended
family. The provisional Constitution of 1968 stipulates that the Arab
Ba'th Socialist Party governs Iraq through the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC), which exercises both executive and legislative
authority. President Saddam Hussein, who is also Prime Minister,
Chairman of the RCC, and Secretary General of the Regional Command of
the Ba'th Party, wields decisive power. Saddam Hussein and his regime
continued to refer to an October 1995 nondemocratic ``referendum'' on
his presidency, in which he received 99.96 percent of the vote. This
``referendum'' included neither secret ballots nor opposing candidates,
and many credible reports indicated that voters feared possible
reprisal for a negative vote. Ethnically and linguistically, the Iraqi
population includes Arabs, Kurds, Turkomen, Assyrians, Yazidis, and
Armenians. Historically, the religious mix is likewise varied: Shi'a
and Sunni Muslims (both Arab and Kurdish), Christians (including
Chaldeans and Assyrians), and Jews (most of whom have emigrated). Civil
uprisings have occurred in recent years, especially in the north and
the south. The Government has reacted against those who oppose it--or
even question it--with extreme repression. The judiciary is not
independent, and the President may override any court decision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The United States does not have diplomatic representation in
Iraq. This report draws to a large extent on non-U.S. Government
sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Government's security apparatus includes militias attached to
the President, the Ba'th Party, and the Interior Ministry. The security
forces play a central role in maintaining the environment of
intimidation and fear on which government power rests. Security forces
committed widespread, serious, and systematic human rights abuses.
The Government owns all major industries and controls most of the
highly centralized economy, which is based largely on oil production.
The economy was damaged by the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, and Iraq has
been under U.N. sanctions since its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. As a
result, the economy has been stagnant. Sanctions ban all exports,
except for oil sales under U.N. Security Council Resolution 986 and
subsequent resolutions (the ``oil-for-food'' program). Under the
program, Iraq also is permitted, under U.N. control, to import food,
medicine, and other humanitarian goods for essential civilian needs, as
wellas spare parts for the oil sector. The Government continued to
interfere with the international community's provision of humanitarian
assistance to the populace by placing a higher priority on importing
industrial items and expensive, sophisticated medical equipment, rather
than basic food and medicine, by diverting goods to benefit the regime,
and by restricting the work of U.N. personnel and relief workers. The
Security Council passed resolution 1284 in December which, among other
things, permits Iraq to export as much oil as required to meet
humanitarian needs under the U.N. oil-for-food program.
The Government's human rights record remained extremely poor.
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
Government continued to execute summarily perceived political opponents
and leaders in the Shi'a religious community. Reports suggest that
persons were executed merely because of their association with an
opposition group or as part of a continuing effort to reduce prison
populations. The Government continued to be responsible for
disappearances and to kill and torture persons suspected of--or related
to persons suspected of--economic crimes, military desertion, and a
variety of other activities. Iraqi military operations continued to
target Shi'a Arabs living in the southern marshes. Security forces
routinely tortured, beat, raped, and otherwise abused detainees. Prison
conditions are poor. The authorities routinely used arbitrary arrest
and detention, prolonged detention, and incommunicado detention, and
continued to deny citizens the basic right to due process. The
judiciary is not independent. The Government continued to infringe on
citizens' privacy rights. The Government has made use of civilians,
including small children, as ``human shields'' against military
attacks.
The Government severely restricts freedom of speech, press,
assembly, association, religion, and movement. The U.N. Commission on
Human Rights Special Rapporteur for Iraq, Max van der Stoel, who
resigned in October, confirmed in his February and October reports that
these freedoms do not exist, except in some parts of the north under
the control of Kurdish factions. Human rights abuses remain difficult
to document because of the Government's efforts to conceal the facts,
including its prohibition on the establishment of independent human
rights organizations, its persistent refusal to grant visits to human
rights monitors, and its continued restrictions designed to prevent
dissent. Denied entry to Iraq, the Special Rapporteur based his reports
on the Government's human rights abuses on interviews with recent
emigres from Iraq, interviews with opposition groups and others that
have contacts inside Iraq, and on published reports. The Special
Rapporteur concluded that the political and legal orders were ``not
compatible with respect for human rights,'' and that it entailed
``systematic and systemic violations throughout the country, affecting
virtually the whole population.'' Violence and discrimination against
women are common. The Government neglects the health and nutritional
needs of children, and discriminates against religious minorities and
ethnic groups. The Government restricts worker rights, child labor
persists, and there were instances of forced labor.
Kurdish groups committed abuses against civilians in the north.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Government
committed numerous political and other extrajudicial killings. The
Government has a long record of executing perceived opponents. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur, the international media, and other groups all
report a heightened number of summary executions in Iraq since 1997,
assertions that are supported in detail by several sources in Iraq. The
Special Rapporteur has stated that ``the country is run through
extrajudicial measures.'' The list of offenses requiring a mandatory
death penalty has grown substantially in recent years and now includes
anything that could be characterized as ``sabotaging the national
economy,'' including forgery, as well as smuggling cars, spare parts,
material, heavy equipment, and machinery. The Special Rapporteur also
noted that membership in certain political parties is punishable by
death, that there is a pervasive fear of death for any act or
expression of dissent, and that there are recurrent reports of the use
of the death penalty for such offenses as ``insulting'' the President
or the Ba'th Party. ``The mere suggestion that someone is not a
supporter of the President carries the prospect of the deathpenalty,''
the Special Rapporteur stated. Government killings occurred with total
impunity and without due process.
The regime periodically eliminated large numbers of political
detainees en masse. During the year, the Special Rapporteur continued
to receive reports referring to a ``prison cleansing'' execution
campaign taking place in Abu Ghraib and Radwaniyah prisons. Opposition
groups alleged that all political prisoners with sentences of more than
15 to 20 years were subject to summary execution. Opposition groups,
including the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI), the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), the Iraqi National Congress
(INC), and others with a network inside the country provided detailed
accounts of summary executions, including the names of hundreds of
persons killed.
In mid-January, Saddam Hussein's son Qusay Hussein ordered the
execution of three senior military officers. According to Shi'a
opposition sources, 27 members of the Fedayeen Saddam were executed in
January. Authorities delivered the bodies to the families on the
festival of Eid Al-Fitr (the end of the holy month of Ramadan). On
February 23, officers suspected of plotting a coup were executed.
Amnesty International reported that seven high-ranking officers who
commanded Iraqi forces during the Gulf War were executed in March.
Scores of persons also were tortured, then summarily executed, on
suspicion of participating in demonstrations in Basra on March 17. The
executions reportedly were carried out under the direct supervision of
senior government authorities, including Ali Hassan Al-Majid, Ahmed
Ibrahim Hamash, and Abdul Baqi Al-Saadoon. Authorities executed a 70-
year-old blind man and seven of his eight sons early in the year after
announcing that the eighth son, who had fled the country, was suspected
in the 1996 attempt on the life of Uday Hussein, Saddam Hussein's
oldest son. Another suspect and the suspect's father also were arrested
and executed. The families of those executed were required to recover
the bodies one-by-one over a 10-day period. The houses of those
executed were demolished several days later (see Section 1.f.). In
April 58 political prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib Prison, and an
additional 26 were killed there in August. In August security forces
executed five young men from areas of Kirkuk where antiregime leaflets
were distributed (see Section 1.d.). The Center for Human Rights of the
Iraqi Communist Party reported the September execution of 11 political
dissidents held since the March 1991 uprising following the Gulf War.
On October 12, 123 prisoners were executed at Abu Ghraib prison. Of
that number, 19 were held and executed due to their political beliefs.
The remaining 104 were executed for common crimes. A senior retired
officer and two other serving officers reportedly were executed on
November 22 on charges of treason and conspiracy. Retired Major General
Abd Al-Karim Al-Hamadani was said to have criticized the central
Government for the country's involvement in the war with Iran and
invasion of Kuwait. No information was disclosed concerning the
accusations against Lieutenant Colonel Falah Hamdan Al-Dulaymi and
Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Battah Al-Dulaymi. The Iraqi Communist Party
reported in December that 40 military officers were executed by firing
squad on the orders of Ali Hassan Al-Majid (often referred to as
``Chemical Ali'' for his role in the chemical weapon mass murder of
Kurds in the 1980's). Sources inside Iraq reported in March that 93
prisoners had been executed at Radhwaniyah prison in November 1998. A
further 96 political detainees, including 22 military officers, plus an
additional 23 prisoners charged with common crimes such as theft, were
executed at Abu Ghraib prison in December 1998.
The Government's motive for so many summary executions--estimated
to be between 2,500 and 3,000 since 1997--is not known, although
intimidation of the population and reduction of prison populations
often are reported. There are persistent reports that Uday Hussein has
remained active in carrying out extrajudicial killings. As in previous
years, there were numerous credible reports that the regime continued
to execute persons thought to be involved in plotting against Saddam
Hussein or the Ba'th Party. These executions included high-ranking
civilian, military, and tribal leaders. For example, five Republican
Guard officers accused of preparing to kill Qusay Hussein reportedly
were executed in November. Colonel Ibrahim Jasim, Lieutenant Colonel
Abd Al-Sattar Khalaf, Captain Ali Husayn, Captain Dauwd Muhammad, and
Captain Umar Abd Al-Razzaq Al-Baydi were killed by a firing squad on
November 29. A sixth alleged coconspirator, retired General Muhammad
Qasim, reportedly committed suicide by drinking poison.
The Special Rapporteur received detailed information concerning
what he has called ``political killings,'' described as thepreplanned
killings of individuals carried out by government agents. Following the
1998 killings of two internationally respected religious scholars,
Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Mirza Ali Al-Gharawi, age 68, and Ayatollah
Sheikh Murtada Al-Burujerdi, age 69, the Special Rapporteur expressed
his concern in a letter to the Government that the murders might be
part of a systematic attack by Iraqi officials on the independent
leadership of Shi'a Muslims in Iraq. The Government did not respond and
the attacks continued. On January 6, Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir
Hussain Al-Najafi and members of his seminary were attacked while
performing religious duties. A grenade thrown at them killed three
persons. Although wounded, Al-Najafi survived the attack.
On February 19, for the third time in less than 12 months, another
leading Shi'a cleric and two of his sons were killed. Ayatollah
Mohammad Sadeq Al-Sadr and his sons, Hojjatue Al-Islam Al-Sayyid
Mostafa Al-Sadr and Al-Sayyid Mu'ammai Al-Sadr, were shot in a car as
they left a prayer session (see Section 2.g.). Al-Sadr's death was
widely attributed to the Government because he was killed immediately
after leading Friday prayers, despite an order not to do so issued by
the Central Euphrates Region Military Governor and Revolutionary
Command Council member Mohammad Hamza Al-Zubeidi. Shortly before he was
killed, the Ayatollah spoke against government restrictions on
religious freedom. He also had been interrogated by the security
services on several occasions.
Several weeks later, the Government executed 12 persons who were
allegedly responsible for the deaths of the clerics. One of those
executed, after purportedly having confessed to the February murder of
Al-Sadr, reportedly had been in detention since the end of December
1998. According to a report submitted to the Special Rapporteur in
September, another of Al-Sadr's sons, Sayyid Muqtada Al-Sadr, was
arrested later in the year along with a large number of theological
students who had studied under the Ayatollah. Nineteen followers of Al-
Sadr reportedly were executed toward the end of the year, including
Sheikh Muhammad Al-Numani, Friday imam Sheikh Abd-Al-Razzaq Al-Rabi'i,
assistant Friday imam Kazim Al-Safi, and students from a religious
seminary in Al-Najaf.
In October the regime reportedly executed novelist Hamad Al-
Moukhtar at Abu Ghraib prison after he spent several months in jail. A
group of exiled dissident writers, including poet Sa'adi Youssef and
literary critic Yassin Al-Nassir, said Moukhtar was arrested after he
held a funeral for Al-Sadr.
Another killing believed to be politically motivated included that
of Intelligence Chief Rafa Daham Mujawwal Al-Tikriti, Saddam Hussein's
second cousin and the former Iraqi ambassador to Turkey. Rafa died
October 11, 3 days after he was removed from his post. Government
explanations for his death included both that he had died in a car
crash and that he had suffered a heart attack. Some opposition sources
said Rafa was killed for failing to protect information about Iraq's
military deals with Russia, although others asserted that Rafa's
reputed rivalry with Uday Hussein was a factor that led to his death.
The Government apparently revived its prior use of thallium
poisoning as a means of killing political opponents. Although not
widely used in recent years, the use of slow-acting poisons such as
thallium (a radioactive substance that can be dissolved in drinking
water) was a preferred method of political killing in the late 1980's
and early 1990's. Observers attributed the August 29 death of Iraq's
chief architect Husam Bahnam Khuduri and the August attempted murder of
Salahadeen University president Hamed Idris to political plots. Khuduri
had extensive knowledge about the construction of Saddam's palaces,
tunnels, and bunkers. While the official obituary did not state a cause
of death, acquaintances reported that Khuduri showed signs of being
under the effect of slow-acting poison during the days before he died.
Similarly, Salahadeen University president Idris, long active in human
rights circles, also developed signs of the effects of a slow-acting
poison in August. Laboratory tests conducted outside Iraq confirmed the
presence of thallium in his system. Because the attempted murder of
Idris occurred outside of central government control in northern Iraq,
he was able to obtain medical attention, and he survived. Other
suspected thallium-poisoning cases include those of former Security
director Abd Al-Rahman Ahmad Al-Duri, who reportedly was dying of
thallium poisoning in December, and former Security director Taha Al-
Ahbabi (Al-Duri's successor), who died mysteriously in 1998.
Construction engineer Hasin Aslan was tortured to death in December
due to suspicion that he tried to smuggle palace tunnelplans out of the
country, according to a report by the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI).
Reports of death due to poor prison conditions continued (see
Section 1.c.). Many persons who were displaced forcibly still live in
tent camps under harsh conditions, which results in many deaths (see
Sections 2.d. and 5).
As in previous years, the regime continued to deny the widespread
killings of Kurds in northern Iraq during the ``Anfal'' Campaign of
1988 (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). Both the Special Rapporteur and
Human Rights Watch have concluded that the Government's policies
against the Kurds raise issues of crimes against humanity and
violations of the 1948 Genocide Convention.
Political killings and terrorist actions continued in northern
Iraq. For example, Farhat Farag, a Kurdish political activist in the
Revolutionary Communist Party, was killed in front of his home in
Sulaymaniyah on October 17. Abdullah Mushir Panhani, a member of the
Iranian Communist Party Komala, was abducted and shot on October 22,
and his body was left on the streets of Irbil. An attempt on the life
of Sulaymaniyah University professor Suhayb Amin Hawzheen failed in
December. The perpetrators were unknown at year's end.
Many Assyrian groups reported a series of bombings in Irbil in
December 1998, and in January and December. On December 15, a bomb
killed 60-year-old Habib Yousif Dekhoka in front of his store (see
Sections 1.g. and 5).
On June 19, the Assyrian International News Agency (AINA) reported
that the partially decomposed body of Helena Aloun Sawa, a 21-year-old
Assyrian woman missing since early May, was discovered by a shepherd in
a shallow grave near Dohuk dam. Her family reportedly suspected that
she was raped. Sawa was a housekeeper for Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) Political Bureau member Izzeddin Al-Barwari. Reporting that the
KDP offered no assistance in searching for Sawa and that Al-Barwari had
intimidated the family into not pursuing an investigation, AINA
concluded that the murder ``resembles a well-established pattern'' of
complicity by Kurdish authorities in attacks against Assyrian
Christians in northern Iraq. It reported that Sawa had been coerced
into working for Al-Barwari to restore to her family a KDP pension that
had been suspended arbitrarily. The pension had been awarded because of
the recognition of Sawa's father as a KDP martyr after he was killed in
the uprising against the Iraqi regime in 1991.
However, on June 21, a spokesperson for the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) announced that the Dohuk police Homicide Division and
the Dohuk General Security Department were investigating the Sawa
murder. A subsequent KRG statement indicated that there did not appear
to be a ``political or racial'' motive. The KRG noted that the Al-
Barwari family had reported last seeing Sawa when she left Dohuk on her
way to a vacation at her family village in the Nerwa O Rakan area, and
that Al-Barwari had been in Damascus, Syria at the time. Nevertheless,
Al-Barwari was suspended from official KDP duties pending the
conclusion of the investigation. At the end of June, KDP President
Massoud Barzani decided to appoint a three-member commission to further
investigate the killing. No results of that investigation were reported
by year's end.
b. Disappearance.--The Special Rapporteur continued to receive
reports of widespread disappearances. In some cases, individuals have
disappeared while in government custody. For example, the status of six
members of the Assyrian community of Baghdad, arrested in October 1996,
is unknown. Hundreds still are missing in the aftermath of the brief
Iraqi military occupation of Irbil in August 1996. Many of these
persons may have been killed surreptitiously late in 1997 and
throughout 1998, in the reported ``prison-cleansing'' campaign (see
Section 1.a.). Thirty-three members of the Yazidi community of Mosul,
who were arrested in July 1996, still are unaccounted for. Sources
inside the country reported the existence of special prison wards that
hold individuals whose whereabouts, status, and fate may not be not be
inquired into (see Section 1.c.).
The Government continued to ignore the more than 15,000 cases
conveyed to it in 1994 and 1995 by the United Nations, as well as
requests from the Governments of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the
whereabouts of those missing from Iraq's 1990-91 occupation of Kuwait,
and from Iran on the whereabouts of prisoners of war that Iraq captured
in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war.
The United Nations has documented over 16,000 cases of persons who
have disappeared. According to the Special Rapporteur, there continued
to be a high number of disappearances reported to the United Nations.
The majority of the 16,496 cases known to the Special Rapporteur are
persons of Kurdish origin who disappeared during the 1988 Anfal
Campaign. He estimated that the total number of Kurds who disappeared
during that period could reach the tens of thousands. Human Rights
Watch estimates the total at between 70,000 and 150,000, and Amnesty
International at more than 100,000. The second largest group of cases
known to the Special Rapporteur consist of Shi'a Muslims, who were
reported to have disappeared in the late 1970's and early 1980's as
their families were expelled to Iran due to their alleged Persian
ancestry.
In a 1997 report, Amnesty International documented the repeated
failure by the Government to respond to requests for information about
persons who have disappeared. The report detailed unresolved cases
dating from the early 1980's through the mid-1990's, particularly the
disappearances of Aziz Al-Sayyid Jassem, Sayyid Muhammad Sadeq Muhammad
Ridha Al-Qazwini, Mazin Abd Al-Munim Al-Samarra'i, the six Al-Hashimi
brothers, the four Al-Sheibani brothers, and numerous persons of
Iranian descent or of the Shi'a branch of Islam. The report concludes
that few of these victims became targets of the regime for any crime;
rather, they were arrested and held as ``hostages'' in order to force a
relative, who may have escaped abroad, to surrender. Others were
arrested due to their family link to a political opponent or simply due
to their ethnic origin (also see Section 1.f.).
The Special Rapporteur and several human rights groups continued to
request that the Government provide information about the 1991 arrest
of the late Grand Ayatollah Abdul Qasim Al-Khoei and 108 of his
associates. The Ayatollah died while under house arrest in Al-Najaf.
Other individuals who were arrested with him have not been accounted
for, and the Government refuses to respond to queries regarding their
status. Similarly, Amnesty International identified a number of
Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr's aides who were arrested in the weeks prior to
his killing in February (see Sections 1.a., 1.d., and 1.g.). Their
whereabouts remain unknown. In its November report, Amnesty
International identifies eight aides of Al-Sadr who disappeared.
The Government failed to return, or account for, a large number of
Kuwaiti citizens and citizens of other countries who were detained
during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. Government officials, including
military leaders known to have been among the last to see the persons
who disappeared during the occupation, have refused to respond to the
hundreds of outstanding inquiries about the missing. Of 609 cases of
missing Kuwaiti citizens under review by the Trilateral Commission on
Gulf War Missing, only 3 have been resolved. The Government denies
having any knowledge of the others and claims that any relevant records
were lost in the aftermath of the Gulf War. Iran reports that 5,000
Iranian prisoners from the Iran-Iraq War are unaccounted for by Iraq.
In addition to the tens of thousands of reported disappearances,
human rights groups reported during the year that the Government
continued to hold thousands of other Iraqis in incommunicado detention
(see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 1.e.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, the security
services routinely and systematically tortured detainees. According to
former prisoners, torture techniques included branding, electric shocks
administered to the genitals and other areas, beating, pulling out of
fingernails, burning with hot irons, suspension from rotating ceiling
fans, dripping acid on the skin, rape, breaking of limbs, denial of
food and water, extended solitary confinement in dark and extremely
small compartments, and threats to rape or otherwise harm family
members and relatives. Evidence of such torture often was apparent when
security forces returned the bodies of mutilated torture victims to
their families. There are persistent reports that the families are made
to pay for the costs of the execution. Iraqi refugees who arrive in
Europe often reported instances of torture to receiving governments,
and displayed scars and mutilations to substantiate their claims.
Amnesty International noted that Iraqi authorities have failed to
investigate these reports.
The Special Rapporteur continued to receive reports that arrested
persons routinely are subjected to mistreatment, including prolonged
interrogations accompanied by torture, beatings, and various
deprivations. For some years, the Special Rapporteur has expressed
concern about cruel and unusual punishments prescribed by the law,
including amputations and brandings. The Special Rapporteur received a
report that six members of a commando unit that was accused of looting
had their hands amputated by order of Uday Hussein in August 1998. An
army deserter who also was involved in the alleged banditry was ordered
to be punished in the same manner.
The Special Rapporteur, human rights organizations, and opposition
groups continued to receive reports of women who suffered from severe
psychological trauma after being raped while in custody. The security
forces allegedly raped women who were captured during the Anfal
Campaign and during the occupation of Kuwait. The Government has never
acknowledged these reports, conducted any investigation, or taken
action against those who committed the rapes.
A former Iraqi international soccer player stated in August that he
and his teammates had been tortured on Uday Hussein's orders for not
winning matches. Sharar Haydar Mohamad Al-Hadithi, who played for Iraq
in international tournaments including in the 1988 Seoul Olympics, said
that he was subjected to beatings on the soles of his feet, dragged
shirtless through a gravel pit, then made to jump into sewage to cause
infection. He also was subjected to sleep deprivation and beatings
during periods of detention in the infamous Al-Radwaniya prison. His
claims of brutality were supported by Uday Hussein's former private
secretary and press spokesman Abbas Janabi who described watching
members of the national soccer team being forced to kick a concrete
ball on the grounds of Al-Radwaniya prison after they failed to qualify
for the 1994 World Cup.
KDP forces reportedly entered Assyrian villages on different
occasions and beat villagers (see Section 2.d.). Assyrian groups
reported several instances of mob violence by Muslims against
Christians in the north in recent years (see Section 5).
Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding is a serious problem. In
May 1998, Labor and Social Affairs Minister Abdul Hamid Aziz Sabah
stated in an interview that ``the prisons are filled to five times
their capacity and the situation is serious.'' Sabah was dismissed from
his post after the interview, and the government-owned daily newspaper
Babel reiterated the Government's longstanding claim that it holds
virtually no prisoners. It is unclear to what extent the mass
executions committed pursuant to the ``prison cleansing'' campaign have
reduced overcrowding (see Section 1.a.).
Certain prisons are notorious for routine mistreatment of
prisoners. Abu Ghraib prison, west of Baghdad, may hold as many as
15,000 persons, many of whom reportedly are subjected to torture. Al-
Rashidiya prison, on the Tigris River north of Taji, reportedly has
torture chambers. The Al-Shamma'iya prison, located in east Baghdad,
holds the mentally ill and reportedly is the site of both torture and
disappearances. The Al-Radwaniyah detention center is a former
prisoner-of-war facility near Baghdad and reportedly the site of
torture as well as mass executions (see Section 1.a.). This prison was
the principal detention center for persons arrested following the civil
uprisings of 1991. Human Rights Watch and others have estimated that
Radwaniyah has held more than 5,000 detainees. A multistory underground
detention and torture center reportedly was built under the general
military hospital building close to the Al-Rashid military camp on the
outskirts of Baghdad. The Center for Human Rights of the Iraqi
Communist Party stated that the complex includes torture and execution
chambers. A section reportedly is reserved for prisoners in a
``frozen'' state: that is, those whose status, fate, or whereabouts may
not be inquired into.
Hundreds of Fayli (Shi'a) Kurds and other citizens of Iranian
origin, who had disappeared in the early 1980's during the Iran-Iraq
war, reportedly are being held incommunicado at the Abu Ghraib prison.
According to a report received by the Special Rapporteur in 1998, these
persons have been detained for close to 2 decades in extremely harsh
conditions without specific charges or trials. The report states that
many of these detainees had been used as experimental subjects in
Iraq's outlawed chemical and biological weapons programs.
Reports of deaths due to poor conditions in prisons and detention
facilities also continued during the year. According to the U.N.
Special Rapporteur, many prisoners in Amarah province were reportedly
near death because of lack of adequate food and health care.
The Government does not permit visits by human rights monitors.
Iraqi Kurdish regional officials reported that prisons in the three
northern provinces were open to the International Committee for the Red
Cross (ICRC) and other international monitors. Regular and consistent
improvement in conditions were observed on their weekly prison visits,
ICRC officials stated. The Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) reported that they had reached agreement for
the mutual release of political prisoners; however, no such release
occurred.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution and the
Legal Code explicitly prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention; however,
the authorities routinely engaged in these practices. The Special
Rapporteur continued to receive reports of widespread arbitrary arrest
and detention, often for long periods of time, without access to a
lawyer or the courts. As indicated in the November Amnesty
International report entitled ``Iraq: Victims of Systematic
Repression,'' many thousands of persons have been arrested arbitrarily
in recent years because of suspected opposition activities or because
they are related to persons sought by the authorities. Those arrested
often are taken away by plainclothes security agents who offer no
explanation or produce no warrant to the person or family members (see
Section 1.f.). No legal representation or access by an arrested
person's family is permitted. In most cases, family members do not know
the whereabouts of those detained and do not make inquiries due to fear
of reprisal. Many persons are taken away in front of family members who
hear nothing further until days, months, or years later, when they are
told to pick up the often-mutilated corpse of their loved one. There
were also reports of the widespread practice of holding family members
and close associates responsible for the alleged actions of others (see
Sections 1.d. and 1.f.).
Mass arbitrary arrest and detention often occurs in areas where
antigovernment leaflets have been distributed. For example, on August
14, following the August 12 distribution of antiregime leaflets by
unknown persons in several districts of Kirkuk, security forces raided
homes in the area and took away the young men in the families. Three
days later, five of those detained were executed and their bodies were
returned to their families.
Other arrests have no apparent basis. For example, on July 28,
Ahlam Khadom Rammahi, a housewife who left Iraq in 1982, traveled from
London using her British passport to visit her mother, whom she had not
seen since 1982 and who was ill. Authorities arrested Rammahi on August
5. No reason was stated for the arrest, nor were her family members
told of her whereabouts. Amnesty International reported that Ahlam was
released September 7 as a result of international pressure. She managed
to rejoin her family in the United Kingdom thereafter. According to
international human rights groups, numerous foreigners arrested
arbitrarily in previous years also remain in detention.
Following assaults by the Government on the Shi'a residents of the
Al-Thawra district in Baghdad, more than 600 residents reportedly were
arrested in security sweeps (see Section 1.g.).
In September Uday Hussein reportedly jailed four members of the
Iraqi National Students Union for not carrying out his orders to take
action against students known for their criticism of the situation in
the country (see Sections 2.a. and 6.a.).
The Government reportedly continued to target the Shi'a Muslim
community for arbitrary arrest and other abuses. In the weeks preceding
the February 19 killing of Ayatollah Sadeq Al-Sadr and two of his sons,
many of Al-Sadr's aides were arrested and their whereabouts remain
unknown (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). Hundreds more reportedly were
arrested and the houses of many demolished in the weeks following the
killing (see Section 1.g.). According to a report submitted to the
Special Rapporteur in September, the later arrests included Sayyid
Muqtada Al-Sadr, surviving son of Ayatollah Al-Sadr. Amnesty
International reported that those arrested prior to the killing
included: Sheikh Awus Al-Khafaji, Sheikh As'ad Al-Nassiri, Sheikh Ahmad
Al-Nassiri, Sheikh Al-Sayyid Adnan Al-Safi, Sheikh Ala Al-Baghdadi,
Sheikh 'Aqil Al-Mussawi, Sheikh Tahsin Al-Abbudi, and Sayyid Hazem Al-
A'raji.
In the large-scale assaults against Shi'a reported by several
sources throughout the year (see Section 1.g.), many thousands of
persons reportedly were arrested arbitrarily. The Human Rights
Organization in Iraq (HROI) reported that 1093 persons were arrested in
Basrah in June alone (see Section 1.g.). The Government also continued
the forced internal relocation of Shi'a populations from the south to
the north, and other minority groups such as Kurds, Assyrians and
Turkomen, to Kurdish-controlled territory in the north (see Sections
1.f., 2.d., and 5). Thousands of Gulf War refugees who sought haven in
Baghdad were relocated forcibly to their home provinces (see Sections
1.f. and 2.d.).
Although no statistics are available, observers estimate the number
of political detainees to be in the tens of thousands, some of whom
have been held for decades.
The Government announced in June a general amnesty for Iraqis who
had left the country illegally or were exiled officially for a
specified time, but failed to return after the period of exile expired
(see Section 2.d.). No Iraqis are known to have returned to the country
based upon this amnesty. An estimated 1 to 2 million self-exiled
citizens are fearful of returning to Iraq.
2e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent,
and there is no check on the President's power to override any court
decision. The Special Rapporteur and international human rights groups
all observed during the year that the repressive nature of the
political and legal systems precludes application of the rule of law.
Numerous laws lend themselves to continued repression, and the
Government uses extrajudicial methods to extract confessions or coerce
cooperation with the regime.
There are two parallel judicial systems: The regular courts, which
try common criminal offenses, and the special security courts, which
generally try national security cases but also maytry criminal cases.
In addition to the Court of Appeal, there is the Court of Cassation,
which is the highest court.
Special security courts have jurisdiction in all cases involving
espionage and treason, peaceful political dissent, smuggling, currency
exchange violations, and drug trafficking. According to the Special
Rapporteur and other sources, military officers or civil servants with
no legal training head these tribunals, which hear cases in secret.
Authorities often hold defendants incommunicado and do not permit
contact with lawyers. The courts admit confessions extracted by
torture, which often serve as the basis for conviction. Many cases
appear to end in summary execution, although defendants may appeal to
the President for clemency. Saddam Hussein may grant clemency in any
case that suits his political goals. There are no Shari'a (Islamic law)
courts as such. Regular courts are empowered to administer Islamic law
in cases involving personal status, such as divorce and inheritance.
Procedures in the regular courts theoretically provide for many
protections. However, the regime often assigns to the security courts
cases which, on their merits, would appear to fall under the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Trials in the regular courts are
public, and defendants are entitled to counsel, at government expense
in the case of indigents. Defense lawyers have the right to review the
charges and evidence brought against their clients. There is no jury
system; panels of three judges try cases. Defendants have the right to
appeal to the Court of Appeal and then to the Court of Cassation.
The Government shields certain groups from prosecution for alleged
crimes. For example, a 1990 decree grants immunity to men who commit
``honor crimes,'' that is, kill female family members for a perceived
lack of chastity (see Section 5). A 1992 decree grants immunity from
prosecution to members of the Ba'th Party and security forces who kill
anyone while in pursuit of army deserters. Unconfirmed but widespread
reports indicate that this decree has been applied to prevent trials or
punishment of government officials.
The personal whim of Saddam Hussein or one of his sons supersedes
any legal proceedings. For example, according to a November Amnesty
International report, Uday Hussein had a security guard's right hand
cut off in front of other staff members at the National Olympic
Committee's headquarters in 1996. The guard was accused when some
sports equipment was missing from a warehouse while he was on duty
outside the building. The amputation was carried out without a trial.
When the equipment was located in another warehouse 3 weeks later, Uday
Hussein reportedly ordered that the guard be compensated with $300
(500,000 dinars).
Because the Government rarely acknowledges arrests or
imprisonments, and families are afraid to talk about arrests, it is
difficult to estimate the number of political prisoners. Many of the
tens of thousands of persons who disappeared or were killed in recent
years originally were held as political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government frequently infringed on citizens'
constitutional right to privacy, particularly in cases allegedly
involving national security. The law defines security offenses so
broadly that authorities effectively are exempt from the legal
requirement to obtain search warrants, and searches without warrants
are commonplace. The regime routinely ignored constitutional provisions
designed to protect the confidentiality of mail, telegraphic
correspondence, and telephone conversations. The Government
periodically jammed news broadcasts from outside the country, including
those of opposition groups. The security services and the Ba'th Party
maintain pervasive networks of informers to deter dissident activity
and instill fear in the public.
Interior Minister Muhammad Zamam Abdul Razzak announced on November
28 that more than 4,000 families (approximately 24,000 individuals)
that sought refuge in Baghdad after the 1991 Gulf War, were expelled
from the city, and that more expulsions were likely. Most of those
expelled had come to Baghdad from the governates of Wasit (in the
east), Maysan and Dhi Qar (in the south), and Al-Qadisiyah (in the
center of the country).
In Kirkuk the regime periodically sealed off entire districts and
conducted day-long, house-to-house searches, evidently aspart of its
``Arabization'' campaign to harass and expel ethnic Kurds and Turkomen
from the region (see Sections 2.d. and 5). Government officials also
take hostage children from families of minority groups to intimidate
their families into leaving their home regions (see Sections 1.d.,
2.d., and 5).
The authorities systematically hold family members and close
associates responsible for the alleged actions of others (see Sections
1.a., 1.b., 1.d., and 1.g.) For example, Amnesty International reported
that plainclothes security forces abducted 70-year-old lawyer Ibrahim
Amin Al-'Azzawi from his home on March 23, reportedly in connection
with the detention of his son-in-law, Riyadh Baqer Al-Hilli, who was
taken away the evening before on suspicion of involvement with
antigovernment activities. Ibrahim was executed on July 11, despite
reports that he was not involved with opposition activity.
As part of its policy, the authorities demolished the houses and
detained and executed family members of Shi'a who protested government
actions (see Section 1.g.).
Early in the year, a 70-year-old blind man and seven of his eight
sons were executed after the eighth son fled the country (see Section
1.a.).
The Special Rapporteur noted that ``guilt by association'' is
facilitated by administrative requirements imposed on relatives of
deserters or other perceived opponents of the regime. For example,
relatives who do not report deserters may lose their ration cards for
purchasing government-controlled food supplies, be evicted from their
residences, or face the arrest of other family members. Relatives often
even do not inquire about the whereabouts of arrested family members
due to fear of being arrested themselves. Conscripts are required to
secure a guarantor to sign a document stating that the named conscript
would not desert military service and that the guarantor would accept
personal responsibility if the conscript deserted. The Supreme Council
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq reported in October and December
that authorities denied food ration cards to families that failed to
send their young sons to the ``Lion Cubs of Saddam'' compulsory
weapons-training camps (see Section 5).
In the fall, the Special Security Office reportedly increased
efforts to intimidate the relatives of opposition members. Relatives of
citizens outside the country who were suspected of sympathizing with
the opposition were forced to call the suspected opposition members to
warn them against participating in the October Iraqi National Congress
assembly in New York. The London Sunday Telegraph reported in August
that the 21-year-old daughter of London-based defector and former
Republican Guard commander General Mohammed Ali Ghani was arrested in
Baghdad and was being held to coerce Ghani to kill senior opposition
leader Ayad Alawi, who was also in London. Iraqi agents reportedly
threatened to torture Ghani's daughter if he failed to comply. Ghani
attempted suicide, but survived. He later distanced himself from
opposition circles, the newspaper reported.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law In
Internal Conflicts.--As in previous years, the armed forces conducted
deliberate artillery attacks against Shi'a civilians and large-scale
burning operations in the southern marshes. In 1991 and 1992, the Gulf
War allies imposed ``no-fly zones'' over northern and southern Iraq
respectively. The no-fly zones continued to deter aerial attacks
against the marsh dwellers in southern Iraq and the residents of
northern Iraq, limiting the Government to ground-based assaults.
Military operations against Shi'a civilians, particularly in
southern Iraq, continued throughout the year. Sheikh Awas, imam of the
Nasiriyah city mosque, was arrested on January 14, according to a
report from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq.
When Awas did not appear to lead Friday prayers the next day, his
deputy went to the Nasiriyah security directorate to plead for Awas's
release. Soon afterward, hundreds of Shi'a congregation members marched
on the security directorate to demand Awas's release. Security forces
allegedly opened fire on the unarmed crowd with automatic weapons and
hand grenades. Five persons were killed, 11 wounded, and 300 arrested.
Following the February 19 killing of Ayatollah Mohammad Sadeq Al-
Sadr and his sons (see Section 1.a.), there were widespreadreports of
military assaults on protesters in areas of Baghdad heavily populated
by Shi'a, and in cities with a Shi'a majority such as Karbala,
Nasiriyah, Najaf, and Basra, in which hundreds of persons were killed.
While a funeral for Al-Sadr was prohibited, spontaneous gatherings of
mourners took place in the days after his death. Novelist Hamad Al-
Moukhtar reportedly was executed after several months in prison
following his detention for holding a funeral for Al-Sadr (see Section
1.a.). Government security forces used excessive force in breaking up
these illegal gatherings. For example, in the impoverished Shi'a
district of Al-Thawra in Baghdad, a crowd of tens of thousands was
attacked by government security forces using automatic weapons and
armored vehicles, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 25
mourners (although estimates ranged up to 400) including, according to
one report, the imam of the Al-Thawra mosque. Fifty persons reportedly
were wounded seriously and about 250 persons were arrested, including
15 religious scholars. In a related incident, 22 persons reportedly
were killed in the Shu'la district of Baghdad. Afterwards, more than
600 Shi'a residents of Al-Thawra reportedly were arrested arbitrarily
in security sweeps (see Section 1.d.).
Outside Baghdad ``illegal'' assemblies of Shi'a took place in most
of the major cities of the south in reaction to the Al-Sadr killing,
according to many Shi'a sources. Ali Hassan Al-Majid, the military
``supergovernor'' for southern Iraq, reportedly declared martial law
throughout the region. On February 20, 22 persons reportedly were
killed in the Suq As-Shuyukh area of Nasiriyah when security forces
attempted to disperse mourners from three mosques who gathered in the
marketplace. When the crowds could not be forced to disperse, the army
reportedly surrounded the city and shelled its center, which killed 17
more persons. Shi'a sources reported that 10 to 20 armored personnel
carriers then entered the city, sealed off the marketplace, and caused
a stampede within the crowd, which resulted in further injuries and
deaths.
Other Shi'a sources report that on the same day, the city of Najaf
was surrounded by government troops. The news of Al-Sadr's death and
government suppression of mourning activities incited demonstrations in
Karbala and Basra. Several Shi'a sources report that in Amara, Sheikh
Ali As-Sahalani, the imam of the Majar Al-Kabir mosque, was shot and
killed along with other mourners; the enraged crowd then reportedly
seized control of the city for a short period of time. Nine
demonstrators reportedly were executed in Ramadi. The chief Shi'a
clerics of Basra and Nasiriyah reportedly were arrested to prevent them
from leading religious gatherings.
The Iraqi Communist Party and other Shi'a groups reported large-
scale protests in Basra in March when Government authorities sought to
prevent Shi'a gatherings by forbidding Friday prayer gatherings.
According to these reports, security forces under Ali Hassan Al-Majid
attacked the marchers, which resulted in many deaths and detentions,
including 70 persons who were detained in the Abu Sakhair region of
Basra, 100 in the Hayaniyh district, 40 in the Dor Ad-Dubat area, 85 in
the Jumhuriya district, and an unspecified number in the Khamasiya
district. A large number of those detained reportedly were executed
summarily under the direct supervision of senior government officials,
including Al-Majid and Basra governor Ahmed Ibrahim Hamash. Opposition
sources reported that Al-Majid ordered the execution of 180 persons on
March 21 and 56 persons on March 23. The Special Rapporteur reported
that many of those executed were buried in a mass grave in Buresiyya
district, about 12 miles from Basra. As part of its policy, the
authorities demolished the houses and detained the family members of
protesters (see Section 1.f.).
In Najaf 15 persons reportedly were wounded and hundreds arrested
in early April while they commemorated the 40-day anniversary of Al-
Sadr's death; such a commemoration is a traditional Islamic religious
observance. On April 16, dozens of unarmed protesters (some reports
indicate hundreds) allegedly were killed in street gatherings in the
Al-Thawra district of Baghdad after the Security Services prohibited
Shi'a worshipers from attending Friday prayers. After the closure
announcement, a large unarmed crowd reportedly gathered at the entrance
of the Hikmat mosque in the Jawadir section of Thawra, which was
guarded by Ba'th party members. At the same time, a smaller group--in
which some individuals were armed--gathered in the Sharkat neighborhood
nearby. When shooting began between security forces and the Sharkat
group around noon, the Ba'th Party members fired on the unarmed group
at the Hikmat mosque. The SCIRI reports that regime forces later opened
fire atanother crowd that had formed outside the Abbas Mosque near the
Al-Thawra Children's Hospital. Thousands of Shi'a men reportedly were
arrested in security sweeps in Basra that month.
From May 19 to May 27, the Al-Fatah Al-Mubaeen forces of the
Special Republican Guards and the Ba'th Party militia under the command
of Aziz Salih Al-Noman, reportedly conducted operations in the Jazirah
region of Kut, Amarah, and Nasiriyah provinces. The local resistance
forces reported that it repelled the attack. On June 5, the village of
Al-Maeil in Meisah province reportedly was attacked and 15 houses were
destroyed. The HROI reported that 1,093 persons were arrested in June
in Basra alone.
Numerous opposition sources reported that tanks from the Hammourabi
Republican Guards Division attacked the towns of Rumaitha and Khudur in
late June and well into July, after residents protested the systematic
maldistribution of food and medicine to the detriment of the Shi'a. The
military cut off the water and electricity supplies and surrounded the
town. Fourteen villagers were killed, over a hundred were arrested, and
40 homes reportedly were destroyed. According to the SCIRI, 160 homes
in the Abul Khaseeb district near Basra were destroyed. The Government
also returned the bodies of executed family members who were arrested
in the March protests in Basra. In some instances, all the male
children from a family reportedly were arrested and killed, even though
not all took part in the protests. Authorities razed 160 homes in the
village of Al-Masha following tribal assaults against security forces.
The security forces came under attack when they attempted to arrest
persons they believed were involved in the Basra uprisings. In
September authorities reportedly conducted a large-scale campaign of
arrests in and around Baghdad and other cities following attacks on
party officials and the appearance of antiregime slogans written on
walls of schools and official institutions. Reports of government
assaults on cities continued throughout the year.
The practice of the security services to force large numbers of
Shi'a inhabitants of the southern marshes to relocate to major southern
cities and to areas along the Iranian border probably is connected to
the destruction of villages. Special Rapporteur van der Stoel described
this practice in his February report, and added that many other persons
were transferred to detention centers and prisons in central Iraq,
primarily in Baghdad.
The military also continued its water-diversion and other projects
in the south. Observers gave little credence to the Government's claim
that the drainage is part of a land reclamation plan to increase the
acreage of arable land and spur agricultural production. Hundreds of
square miles have been burned in military operations. The U.N. Special
Rapporteur has noted the serious detrimental impact that draining the
marshes has had on the culture of the Shi'a marsh Arabs. The SCIRI
claims to have captured government documents that detail the
destructive intent of the water-diversion program and its connection to
``strategic security operations,'' economic blockade, and ``withdrawal
of food supply agencies.''
In addition the regime's diversion of supplies in the south limited
the Shi'a population's access to food, medicine, drinking water, and
transportation. According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur and opposition
sources, thousands of persons in Nasiriyah and Basra provinces were
denied rations that should have been supplied under the U.N. oil-for-
food program. In these provinces and in Amarah province, access to food
allegedly is used to reward regime supporters and silence opponents.
Shi'a groups report that, due to this policy, the humanitarian
condition of Shi'a in the south continued to suffer despite a
significant expansion of the oil-for-food program.
The Government continued to ``Arabize'' certain Kurdish areas, such
as the urban centers of Kirkuk and Mosul, through the forced movement
of local residents from their homes and villages and their replacement
by Arabs from outside the area (see Sections 2.d. and 5).
Landmines in the north, mostly planted by the Government before
1991, continued to kill and maim civilians. Many of the mines were laid
during the Iran-Iraq War; however, the army failed to clear them before
it abandoned the area. The mines appear to have been planted
haphazardly in civilian areas. Landmines are also a problem along the
Iraq-Iran border throughout central and southern Iraq. There is no
information on civilian casualties or the efforts, if any, to clear old
mine fields in areas under the central Government's control. According
to reports by theU.N. Office of Project Services, the Mines Advisory
Group, and Norwegian Peoples Aid, over 3,000 persons have been killed
in the three northern governates since the 1991 uprising. The Special
Rapporteur repeatedly has reminded the Government of its obligation
under the Land Mines Protocol to protect civilians from the effects of
mines. Various nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) continued efforts
to remove land mines from the area and increase awareness of the mine
problem among local residents. In December 1998, the Government
declared that mine-clearing activity was subversive and ordered NGO
workers performing such activity to leave Iraq. On April 26, a New
Zealander working for the U.N. mine-clearing program in the north was
shot and killed by an unknown assailant who first asked for water and
then fired three times at close range.
After the 1991 Gulf War, victims and eyewitnesses described war
crimes perpetrated by the Iraqi regime--deliberate killing, torture,
rape, pillage, hostage-taking, and associated acts--as directly related
to the Gulf War. Many governments continue to urge the U.N. Security
Council to establish an international commission to study evidence of a
broader range of war crimes, as well as crimes against humanity and
possible genocide. Human Rights Watch and other organizations have
worked with various governments to bring a genocide case at the
International Court of Justice against the Government for its conduct
of the Anfal campaign against the Kurds in 1988.
The regime continued its intermittent shelling of villages in the
Kurdish administered north. Some deaths were reported.
No hostilities were reported between the two major Iraqi Kurdish
parties in de facto control of northern Iraq. During the year, the KDP
reportedly imposed a blockade on Assyrian villages, and later entered
the villages and beat villagers (see Sections 1.c. and 2.d.). The
Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan agreed
in September 1998 to unify their administrations. Little progress was
made toward implementing the 1998 agreement.
Many Assyrian groups reported a series of bombings in December
1998, and January and December 1999. Assyrian groups criticized the
investigation into these crimes by the Kurdish authorities (see
Sections 1.a. and 5).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press ``in compliance with the
revolutionary, national, and progressive trend;'' however, in practice
the Government does not permit freedom of speech and of the press to
exist, and does not tolerate political dissent in areas under its
control. The Special Rapporteur stated that the Government had
``effectively eliminated'' the freedoms of thought, expression,
association, and assembly, and that citizens lived ``in a climate of
fear'' in which whatever they said or did, particularly in the area of
politics, involved ``the risk of arrest and interrogation by the police
or military intelligence.'' He noted that ``the mere suggestion that
someone is not a supporter of the President carries the prospect of the
death penalty.''
The Government and the Ba'th Party own all print and broadcast
media, and operate them as propaganda outlets. They generally do not
report opposing points of view that are expressed, either domestically
or abroad. A Freedom House report rated Iraqi press freedom at 98 out
of a possible 100 points with 0 being the most free and 100 being the
most controlled. Several statutes and decrees suppress freedom of
speech and of the press, including: Revolutionary Command Council
Decree Number 840 of 1986, which penalizes free expression and
stipulates the death penalty for anyone insulting the President or
other high government officials; Section 214 of the Penal Code, which
prohibits singing a song likely to cause civil strife; and the 1968
Press Act, which prohibits the writing of articles on 12 specific
subjects, including those detrimental to the President, the
Revolutionary Command Council, and the Ba'th Party.
According to the Special Rapporteur, journalists are under regular
pressure to join the Ba'th party and must follow the recommendations of
the Iraqi Union of Journalists, headed by Uday Hussein. According to
Iraqi sources, Uday Hussein dismissed hundreds of union members who had
not praised Saddam Hussein and the regime sufficiently or often enough
(see Section6.a.). At the same time, the value of awards granted to
writers who praised Saddam Hussein increased. According to a September
report, Uday Hussein jailed at least four leaders of the Iraqi National
Students Union for not carrying out his orders to take action against
students known for their criticism of the situation in the country (see
Sections 1.d. and 6.a.). Also in September, journalist and Baghdad
University professor Hachem Hasan was arrested after declining an
appointment as editor of one of Uday Hussein's publications (see
Section 1.d.). The Paris-based Reporters Sans Frontieres sent a letter
of appeal to Uday Hussein; however, Hasan's fate and whereabouts remain
unknown.
The Ministry of Culture and Information periodically holds meetings
at which general guidelines for the press are provided. Foreign
journalists must work from offices located within the ministry building
and are accompanied everywhere they go by ministry officers, who
reportedly restrict their movements and make it impossible for them to
interact freely with citizens. Many Western news services are
represented in Baghdad by bureaucrats who are based in the Ministry of
Information and Culture.
Books may be published only with the authorization of the Ministry
of Culture and Information. The Ministry of Education often sends
textbooks with proregime propaganda to Kurdish regions; the Kurds
routinely remove propaganda items from the books. In October 1997, the
Minister of Education stated that he had ``warned these cliques that we
hold them responsible'' for altering the books.
The Government regularly jammed foreign news broadcasts (see
Section 1.f.). Satellite dishes and fax machines are banned, although
some restrictions reportedly were lifted toward the end of the year.
The penalty for possessing a satellite dish reportedly was an
indefinite term of imprisonment in solitary confinement and
confiscation of all household effects. However, in mid-November the
Government announced that ownership of satellite dishes would be
permitted and that certain accredited journalists would be permitted to
use fax machines.
In northern Iraq, many independent newspapers have appeared over
the past 7 years, as have opposition radio and television broadcasts.
The absence of central authority permits significant freedom of
expression, including criticism of the regional Iraqi Kurdish
authorities; however, most journalists are influenced or controlled by
various political organizations. Although the rival Kurdish parties in
northern Iraq, the PUK and KDP, state that full press freedom is
allowed in areas under their respective control, in practice neither
effectively permits distribution of the opposing group's newspapers and
other literature.
The Government does not respect academic freedom and exercises
strict control over academic publications. University staff are hired
and fired depending on their support for the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government restricts
this right in practice. Except in Kurdish-controlled northern areas,
citizens legally may not assemble other than to express support for the
regime. The Government regularly orchestrates crowds to demonstrate
support for the regime and its policies through financial incentives
for those who participate and threats of violence against those who do
not. Widespread military and paramilitary attacks on persons who
violated restrictions on peaceful assembly were reported throughout the
year (see Section 1.g.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. The Government controls
the establishment of political parties, regulates their internal
affairs, and monitors their activities. The political magazine Alef-Be,
which is published by the Ministry of Culture and Information, reported
in December that two political groups would not be permitted to form
parties because they had an insufficient number of members. The
magazine reprinted conditions necessary to establish political parties,
which include the requirement in a 1991 law that a political group must
have at least 150 members over the age of 25. A new law also stipulates
that new parties must ``take pride'' in the 1958 and 1968 revolutions,
which created the republic and brought the ruling Ba'th party to power.
Several parties are outlawed specifically, and membership in them is a
capital offense. A1974 law prescribes the death penalty for anyone
``infiltrating'' the Ba'th Party.
In contrast, in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, numerous
political parties and social and cultural organizations exist.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion; however, the Government severely restricts this right in
practice. Islam is the official state religion. The Government's
registration requirements for religious organizations are unknown.
The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs monitors places of
worship, appoints the clergy, approves the building and repair of all
places of worship, and approves the publication of all religious
literature.
According to conservative estimates, over 95 percent of the
population is Muslim. The (predominantly Arab) Shi'a Muslims constitute
a 60 to 65 percent majority, while Sunni Muslims make up 30 to 35
percent (approximately 18 to 20 percent are Sunni Kurds, 12 to 15
percent are Sunni Arabs, and the rest are Sunni Turkomans). The
remaining approximately 5 percent consist of Christians (Assyrians,
Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenians), Yazidis, and a small number
of Jews.
New political parties must be based in Baghdad and are prohibited
from having any ethnic or religious character. The Government does not
recognize political organizations that have been formed by Shi'a
Muslims or Assyrian Christians. These groups continued to attract
support despite their illegal status. There are religious
qualifications for government office; candidates for the National
Assembly, for example, ``must believe in God.''
Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni Arabs
traditionally have dominated economic and political life. Arabs holding
Sunni religious beliefs are at a distinct advantage in all areas of
secular life, including civil, political, military, and economic. Shi'a
and Sunni Arabs are not distinct ethnically. Shi'a Arabs have supported
an independent Iraq alongside Sunni Arabs since the 1920 Revolt, many
joined the Ba'th Party, and Shi'a formed the core of the Iraqi Army in
the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.
The Government has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of
murder, summary execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the
religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim
population, and has sought to undermine the identity of minority
Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and Yazidi groups.
Despite supposed legal protection of religious equality, the regime
has repressed severely the Shi'a clergy and those who follow the Shi'a
faith. Forces from the Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), General
Security (Amn Al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos
(Fedayeen Saddam), and the Ba'th Party have murdered senior Shi'a
clerics, desecrated Shi'a mosques and holy sites (particularly in the
aftermath of the 1991 civil uprising), arrested tens of thousands of
Shi'a, interfered with Shi'a religious education, and prevented Shi'a
adherents from performing their religious rites. Security agents
reportedly are stationed at all the major Shi'a mosques and shrines and
search, harass, and arbitrarily arrest worshipers.
The following government restrictions on religious rights remained
in effect during the year: Restrictions and outright bans on communal
Friday prayer by Shi'a; restrictions on the loaning of books by Shi'a
mosque libraries; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a programs on
government-controlled radio or television; a ban on the publication of
Shi'a books, including prayer books and guides; a ban on funeral
processions other than those organized by the Government; a ban on
other Shi'a funeral observances such as gatherings for Koran reading;
and the prohibition of certain processions and public meetings that
commemorate Shi'a holy days. Shi'a groups report that they captured
documents from the security services during the 1991 uprising, which
listed thousands of forbidden Shi'a religious writings. Security forces
reportedly still were encamped in the shrine to Imam Ali at Al-Najaf,
one of Shi'a Islam's holiest sites, and at the former Shi'a theological
school in Al-Najaf; they have been there since 1991.
In June several Shi'a opposition groups reported that the
Government instituted a new program in the predominantly Shi'a
districts of Baghdad that used food ration cards to restrict where
individuals could pray. The ration cards, part of the U.N. oil-for-food
program, reportedly are checked when the bearer enters a mosque and are
printed with a notice of severe penalties for those who attempt to pray
at an unauthorized location. Shi'a sources outside the country who
reported this new policy believe that it is aimed not only at
preventing unauthorized religious gatherings of Shi'a, but at stopping
Shi'a adherents from attending Friday prayers in Sunni mosques, which
many pious Shi'a have turned to since the closure of their own mosques.
Shi'a groups reported numerous instances of religious scholars
being subjected to arrest, assault, and harassment in 1998 and during
the year, particularly in the internationally renowned Shi'a academic
center of Najaf. This followed years of government manipulation of the
Najaf theological schools. Amnesty International reported that the
Government systematically deported tens of thousands of Shi'a (both
Arabs and Kurds) to Iran in the late 1970's and early 1980's, on the
basis that they were of Persian descent. According to Shi'a sources,
religious scholars and Shi'a merchants who supported the schools
financially were prime targets for deportation. In the 1980's, during
the Iran-Iraq war, it was widely reported that the Government expelled
and denied visas to thousands of foreign scholars who wished to study
at Najaf. After the 1991 popular uprising, the Government relaxed some
restrictions on Shi'a attending the schools, perhaps hoping that this
would deflect popular revulsion over arrests and executions of
religious leaders. Instead, the revival of the schools appears greatly
to have exceeded the Government's expectations, and has helped to bring
traditional Shi'a piety into even greater contrast with the abuses of
the regime. This led to an increased government crackdown on the Shi'a
religious establishment, including the requirement that speeches by
imams in mosques be based upon government-provided material that
attacked fundamentalist trends. A campaign of arrests in Mosul against
fundamentalist trends was reported in September.
The apparently systematic campaign by the Government to eliminate
the senior Shi'a religious leadership through murder, summary execution
and disappearances continued during the year, including the February 19
murder of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Sadiq As-Sadr, the country's
senior Shi'a religious leader (see Sections 1.a. and 1.g.).
The security forces have used the symbolism of religious holidays
to underscore the impunity with which they operate. For example, in
January, 27 members of the elite Fedayeen Saddam security forces
reportedly were executed in Amara for conspiring with the Shi'a-based
opposition forces. Their bodies reportedly were delivered to their
families on Eid Al-Fitr, one of the most important holidays of the
Islamic year (see Section 1.a.).
The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with
religious pilgrimages, both of Iraqi Muslims who wish to make the Hajj
to Mecca and Medina and of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims who
travel to holy sites in Iraq.
The Government has used Iraqi pilgrims who wish to make the Hajj to
Mecca--a religious duty of all Muslims who can undertake it--as pawns
in a test of wills with the United Nations. In 1998 the U.N. Sanctions
Committee offered to distribute vouchers for travel and expenses to
pilgrims making the Hajj, but the Government rejected this offer. The
Sanctions Committee offered to disburse funds to cover Hajj-related
expenses through a neutral third party. The Government again rejected
the opportunity. In both years the Government insisted that these funds
would be accepted only if they were paid in cash to the Iraqi central
bank in violation of U.N. sanctions. As a result, in both 1998 and
1999, no Iraqi pilgrims were able to take advantage of the available
funds. According to press reports, only 4,000 Iraqi pilgrims made the
Hajj in 1999, despite the availability of 22,000 spaces for Iraqis.
During the year, the Government flew several planeloads of elderly
Hajj pilgrims to Saudi Arabia without advance notification. Simple
approval procedures established by the U.N. Sanctions Committee allow
flights for religious and humanitarian purposes to originate from and
return to Iraq, provided that advance notification is given to regional
air controllers and coalition military aircraft about such a flight.
The Government chose to ignore these safety procedures, and sent the
Hajj flights without any notification.
Twice each year--on the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram
and 40 days later in the month of Safar--Shi'a pilgrims from throughout
Iraq and around the world travel to the Iraqi city of Karbala to
commemorate the death there centuries ago of the Imam Hussein. The
Government for several decades has interfered with these ``Ashura''
commemorations by preventing processions on foot into the city. In both
1998 and during the year, violent incidents were reported between Iraqi
pilgrims on one side and Ba'th party members and security forces
enforcing the ban on the other.
In past years, the Government has denied visas to many foreign
pilgrims for the Ashura. During the year, it attempted to profit from
the pilgrimages. Shi'a pilgrims reported being charged $900 for bus
passage and food from Damascus to Karbala, a trip that would normally
cost about $150. The Government reportedly had added a $600 surcharge
for foreign pilgrims in addition to the $100 visa fee and a requirement
to exchange $50 into Iraqi dinars.
The Special Rapporteur and others reported that the Government has
engaged in various abuses against the country's 350,000 Assyrian and
Chaldean Christians, especially in terms of forced movements from
northern areas (see Section 2.d.) and repression of political rights.
Most Assyrians live in the northern governates, and the Government
often has suspected them of ``collaborating'' with Iraqi Kurds. In the
north, Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians.
Military forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988
Anfal Campaign and reportedly tortured and executed many Assyrians.
Both major Kurdish political parties have indicated that the Government
occasionally targets Assyrians, as well as ethnic Kurds and Turkmen, in
expulsions from Kirkuk, where it is attempting to Arabize the city (see
Section 2.d.).
The Constitution does not provide for a Yazidi identity. Many
Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, although some
would define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct
from Muslim Kurds. However, the Government, without any historical
basis, has defined the Yazidis as Arabs. There is evidence that the
Government has compelled this reidentification to encourage Yazidis to
join in domestic military action against Iraqi Muslim Kurds. Captured
government documents included in the 1998 Human Rights Watch report
``Bureaucracy of Repression: The Iraqi Government in its Own Words,''
describe special all-Yazidi military detachments formed during the
1988-89 Anfal campaign to ``pursue and attack'' Muslim Kurds. However,
the Government does not hesitate to impose the same repressive measures
on Yazidis as on other groups. For example, 33 members of the Yazidi
community of Mosul, arrested in July 1996, still are unaccounted for
(see Section 2.b.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts movement within
the country of citizens and foreigners. Persons who enter sensitive
border areas and numerous designated security zones are subject to
arrest. Police checkpoints are common on major roads and highways.
The Government requires citizens to obtain specific government
authorization and expensive exit visas for foreign travel. Citizens may
not make more than two trips abroad annually. Before traveling abroad,
citizens are required to post collateral, which is refundable only upon
their return. There are restrictions on the amount of currency that may
be taken out of the country. Women are not permitted to travel outside
the country alone; male relatives must escort them (see Section 5).
Prior to December, each student who wished to travel abroad was
required to provide a guarantor who would be liable if the student
failed to return. In December authorities banned all travel for
students (including those in grade school), canceled spring and summer
holidays, and enrolled students in compulsory military training and
weapons-use courses.
In what appeared to be an effort to lure Iraqis living abroad back
to the country, government radio announced in June an amnesty for Iraqi
teachers who left the country illegally after the Gulf War. Shortly
thereafter the Revolutionary Command Council decreed a general amnesty
for all Iraqis who either had left the country illegally or who had
failed to return after being exiled and the period of exile had expired
(see Section 1.d.). The decree stated that ``charges of illegal
departure, forging official documents towards this purpose, and
disrupting public duties that were pressed before the issuance of
thisdecree shall be dropped effective immediately.'' In October Justice
Minster Shabib Al-Maliki announced that authorities may seize assets
belonging to Iraqis living outside the country who did not return in
response to the amnesty decree. A special ministerial committee was
formed to track and monitor Iraqis inside the country who received
money from relatives abroad.
A new travel law that took effect in November placed additional
penalties on citizens who attempt to leave the country illegally. Under
the law, a prison term of up to 10 years and ``confiscation of movable
and immovable property'' is to be imposed on anyone who attempts to
leave illegally. Similar penalties face anyone found to encourage or
assist persons banned from travel, including health care professionals,
engineers, and university professors.
The Government restricts foreign travel by journalists, authors,
and all employees of the Information ministry. Security authorities
interrogate all media employees, journalists, and writers who travel
outside the country.
In September journalist and Baghdad University professor Hachem
Hasan was arrested at the crossing point on the boarder with Jordan as
he attempted to leave the country after declining Uday Hussein's
appointment of him as editor of one of Uday Hussein's publications.
Hassan was charged with using a forged passport to flee abroad,
although he reportedly had a valid passport. His fate is unknown.
Three Ba'th party officials reportedly were arrested on November 4,
and their homes were ransacked by security forces. Opposition sources
said that the three were arrested for planning to leave the country
with their families, although the Government alleged that the officials
were in possession of television satellite dishes. The penalty for such
possession is severe (see Section 2.a.).
The Government consistently politicizes and interferes with
religious pilgrimages, both of Iraqi Muslims who wish to make the Hajj
to Mecca and Medina and of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims to holy
sites in Iraq (see Section 2.c.).
Foreign spouses of citizens who have resided in Iraq for 5 years (1
year for spouses of government employees) are required to apply for
naturalization as Iraqi citizens. Many foreigners thus become subject
to travel restrictions. The penalties for noncompliance include, but
are not limited to, loss of the spouse's job, a substantial financial
penalty, and repayment of any governmental educational expenses. The
Government prevents many citizens who also hold citizenship in another
country, especially the children of Iraqi fathers and foreign-born
mothers, from visiting the country of their other nationality.
The U.N. Secretary General estimates that there are more than half
a million internally displaced persons remaining in the three northern
provinces (Irbil, Dohuk, and Suleymaniyah), most of whom fled
government-controlled areas in early 1991 during the uprising that
followed the Gulf War. As reported by the Special Rapporteur, the
Government continued its ``Arabization'' policy by discriminating
against and forcibly relocating the non-Arab population, including
Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians living in Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, and
other districts. Most observers view the policy as an attempt to
decrease the proportion of non-Arab citizens in the oil-rich Kirkuk
region, and thereby secure Arab demographic control of the area.
Kurdish grade school teachers and low-ranking civil servants are
reassigned systematically outside of Kirkuk province, which has been
renamed Al-Ta'mim (``Nationalization''). The Revolutionary Command
Council has mandated that new housing and employment be created for
more than 300,000 Arab residents who have been resettled in Kirkuk,
while new construction or renovation of Kurd owned property reportedly
is prohibited. Non-Arabs are not permitted to sell their homes, except
to Arabs, nor register or inherit property.
As part of the Arabization process, the Government continued to
deport Kurdish and Turkomen families. Regional Kurdish authorities
report that between January and November, 362 families (a total of
2,166 individuals) were deported from Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sinjar, and
other areas, and expelled to Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq. They
calculate that since 1991, a total of 15,620 households (92,740
persons) have been displaced. Those expelled are not permitted to
return. The Special Rapporteur reported that citizens who provide
employment, food or shelter to returning or newly arriving Kurdsare
subject to arrest. In order to encourage departure and prevent
displaced persons from returning, the Government reportedly has mined
the area around Kirkuk, and has declared it a military and security
zone. Roads into the area are fortified with military checkpoints.
Those being deported are required to sign a ``request,'' which
includes the phrase ``I signed this form of my own free will.'' The
procedure followed by security forces to evict and deport non-Arab
citizens is described by Amnesty International in its November report.
Citing a government decree, Amnesty International reported that the
expulsion process includes the confiscation of all family property and
food ration cards issued under the UN oil-for-food program, and the
detention of one family member to ensure a lack of resistance. Once in
northern Iraq, the majority are resettled in camps with basic supplies
such as tents, blankets, and food that is supplied by the PUK, KDP, and
U.N. agencies.
The Government has undertaken a so-called ``Nationality Correction
Campaign'' as part of the process of Arabization. Some deportees are
permitted to remain in their homes if they relinquish their Kurdish or
Turkomen identity and register themselves as Arab.
The Government denies that it expels non-Arab families.
According to the Special Rapporteur, security forces continued to
relocate Shi'a inhabitants of the southern marshes to major southern
cities. Many have been transferred to detention centers and prisons in
central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad, or even to northern cities like
Kirkuk, as part of the Government's attempt to ``Arabize''
traditionally non-Arab areas (see section 5).
In November, the Government reportedly expelled from Baghdad
approximately 24,000 persons who had sought refuge in the city after
the 1991 Gulf war (see Section 1.f.).
The Government does not provide first asylum or respect the rights
of refugees. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), hundreds of thousands of Iraqi refugees remain abroad. Apart
from those suspected of sympathizing with Iran, most fled after the
Government's suppression of the civil uprising of 1991; others are
Kurds who fled the Anfal Campaign of 1988. Of the 1.5 million refugees
who fled following the 1991 uprisings, the great majority, particularly
Kurds, have repatriated themselves to northern Iraq in areas where the
allied coalition has prohibited overflights by Iraqi aircraft.
The KDP and PUK reiterated their September 1998 agreement to begin
returning to their rightful homes the many thousands of persons that
each had expelled as a result of intra-Kurdish fighting in the three
northern provinces; however, no effort to implement the agreement was
begun during the year.
Approximately 12,000 Turkish Kurds who have fled civil strife in
southeastern Turkey remain in northern areas controlled by the central
Government. The UNHCR is treating these displaced persons as refugees
until it reaches an official determination of their status.
According to AINA reports, on August 25, the KDP imposed a blockade
on eight Assyrian villages in the Nahla area east of Aqra. ICRC
monitors in northern Iraq reportedly intervened on the villages'
behalf, and the blockade was lifted. During the night of August 27, KDP
forces reportedly reentered the village of Kash Kawa, rounded up the
villagers, and publicly beat two of them. The KDP allegedly suspected a
connection between the village and the Kurdistan Workers Party, with
whom the KDP often has fought. AINA reported a similar night raid by a
dozen members of the KDP forces on the village of Belmat on September
10. The KDP media quoted village leaders and the mayor of Aqra, denying
that any such blockade or village raids occurred. The ICRC confirmed
that it intervened with the KDP after receiving an Assyrian request and
that the KDP withdrew from the villages thereafter. AINA reported that
armed KDP members entered Assyrian Patriotic Party (APP) headquarters
in Dohuk on October 21 and forced its closure. APP offices were allowed
to reopen 4 days later.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Although
the Government has taken steps to increase theperception of democracy,
the political process still was controlled firmly by the State. The
1995 ``referendum'' on Saddam Hussein's presidency was not free and was
dismissed as a sham by most international observers. It included
neither voter privacy nor opposing candidates, and many credible
reports indicated that voters feared possible reprisal for a negative
vote. A total of 500 persons reportedly were arrested in Karbala,
Baghdad, and Ramadi provinces for casting negative ballots, and a
member of the intelligence services reportedly was executed for
refusing to vote for the President.
Various media began publishing reports on a multiparty system after
Saddam Hussein instructed officials in October to consider the
formation of new political parties, a state council, and a new
constitution. A Ministry of Culture and Information magazine reported
in December that the two groups that attempted to form a party were
refused for having an insufficient number of members (see Section
2.b.).
There are strict qualifications for electoral candidates; by law
the candidates for the National Assembly must be over 25 years old and
``believe in God, the principles of the July 17-30 revolution, and
socialism.'' Out of the 250 seats, 160 deputies reportedly belong to
the Ba'th Party, 60 are independent, and 30 are appointed by Saddam
Hussein to represent the northern provinces. According to the Special
Rapporteur, the Ba'th Party allegedly instructed a number of its
members to run as nominally ``independent'' candidates.
Full political participation at the national level is confined to
members of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, who are estimated to
constitute about 8 percent of the population. The political system is
dominated by the Party, which governs through the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC). The council is headed by President Saddam Hussein.
However, the RCC exercises both executive and legislative authority.
The RCC overshadows the National Assembly, which is completely
subordinate to it and the executive branch.
The President wields decisive power over all instruments of
government. Almost all important officials are either members of Saddam
Hussein's family or are family allies from his home town of Tikrit.
Opposition political organizations are illegal and severely
suppressed. Membership in certain political parties is punishable by
death (see Section 2.b.). In 1991 the RCC adopted a law that
theoretically authorized the creation of political parties other than
the Ba'th Party. However, in practice the law is used to prohibit
parties that do not support Saddam Hussein and the Government. New
parties must be based in Baghdad and are prohibited from having any
ethnic or religious character.
The Government does not recognize the various political groupings
and parties that have been formed by Shi'a Muslims, as well as Kurdish,
Assyrian, Turkomen, and other Iraqi communities. These political groups
continued to attract support despite their illegal status.
Women and minorities are underrepresented in government and
politics. The law provides for the election of women and minorities to
the National Assembly; however, they have only token representation.
In northern Iraq, all central government functions have been
performed by local administrators, mainly Kurds, since the Government
withdrew its military forces and civilian administrative personnel from
the area after the 1991 uprising. A regional parliament and local
government administrators were elected in 1992. This parliament last
met in May 1995. The two major Kurdish parties in de facto control of
northern Iraq, the KDP and the PUK, battled one another from 1994
through 1997. In September 1998, they agreed to unify their separate
administrations and to hold new elections in July. The cease-fire held
throughout the year; however, reunification measures were not
implemented and no election was held.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not permit the establishment of independent
human rights organizations. Citizens have established several human
rights groups abroad and in northern areas not undergovernment control.
Monitors from foreign and international human rights groups are not
allowed in the country.
The Government operates an official human rights group that
routinely denies allegations of abuses.
The Government harassed and intimidated relief workers and U.N.
personnel throughout the country, maintained a threat to arrest or kill
relief workers in the north, and staged protests against U.N. offices
in the capital (see Sections 1.g. and 2.a.).
As in previous years, the Government did not allow the U.N. Special
Rapporteur to visit Iraq, nor did it respond to his requests for
information. The Government continued to defy various calls from U.N.
bodies to allow the Special Rapporteur to visit the southern marshes
and other regions.
In April and again in November, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
criticized the ``systematic, widespread, and extremely grave violations
of human rights'' by the Government, which resulted in ``all-pervasive
repression and oppression sustained by broad-based discrimination and
widespread terror.''
For the seventh consecutive year, the Commission called on the U.N.
Secretary General to send human rights monitors to ``help in the
independent verification of reports on the human rights situation in
Iraq.'' The U.N. Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities made a similar request. The Government
continued to ignore these calls for the entry of monitors.
The Special Rapporteur nonetheless was able to gather more
evidence, in part due to interviews with current and past government
officials, which shed new light on the systemic nature of human rights
violations. He dispatched members of his staff to Kuwait, Jordan, and
other locations to interview victims of government human rights abuses.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution and the legal system provide for some rights for
women, children, and minorities; however, in practice the Government
systematically violates these rights.
Women.--Domestic violence against women occurs but little is known
about its extent. Such abuse customarily is addressed within the
tightly knit family structure. There is no public discussion of the
subject, and no statistics are published. Spousal violence constitutes
grounds for divorce and criminal charges; however, suits brought on
these charges are believed to be rare. Men who kill female family
members for ``immoral deeds'' may receive immunity from prosecution for
such ``honor crimes'' under a 1990 law (see Section 1.e.).
The Special Rapporteur has noted that there is an unusually high
percentage of women in the Kurdish areas, purportedly caused by the
disappearances of tens of thousands of Kurdish men during the Anfal
Campaign. The Special Rapporteur has reported that the widows,
daughters, and mothers of the Anfal Campaign victims are dependent
economically on their relatives or villages because they may not
inherit the property or assets of their missing family members.
Evidence concerning the Anfal Campaign indicates that the
Government killed many women and children, including infants, by firing
squads and in chemical attacks.
The Government claims that it is committed to equality for women,
who make up about 20 percent of the work force. It has enacted laws to
protect women from exploitation in the workplace and from sexual
harassment; to permit women to join the regular army, Popular Army, and
police forces; and to equalize women's rights in divorce, land
ownership, taxation, and suffrage. It is difficult to determine to what
extent these protections are afforded in practice. However, reports
indicate that the application of these laws has declined as Iraq's
political and economic crisis persists. Women are not allowed to travel
outside the country alone (see Section 2.d.).
Children.--The Government claims that it has enacted laws to
require education for girls. No information is available on whether the
Government has enacted specific legislation to promote the welfare of
children. However, the Special Rapporteur and several human rights
groups have collected a substantial body of evidence pointing to the
Government's continuing disregard for the rights and welfare of
children. The evidence may include government officials taking children
from minority groups hostage in order to intimidate their families to
leave cities and regions where the regime wishes to create a Sunni Arab
majority (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.).
The Government's failure to comply with relevant U.N. Security
Council resolutions has led to a continuation of economic sanctions.
There were widespread reports that food and medicine that should have
been made available for the general public were stockpiled in
warehouses. The executive director of the U.N. office in charge of the
oil-for-food program confirmed such reports at a press conference in
May. He stated that of the $570 million worth of medicines and medical
supplies that had arrived in Iraq through the oil-for-food program in
the previous 2 years, only 48 percent had been distributed to clinics,
hospitals, and pharmacies. The Government management of the oil-for-
food program did not take into account the special requirements of
children between the ages of 1 and 5, despite the U.N. Secretary
General's specific injunction that the Government modify its
implementation procedures to address the needs of this vulnerable
group. On August 12, the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) issued the
results of the first surveys of child and maternal mortality in Iraq
that have been conducted since 1991. The surveys were carried out
between February and May in cooperation with the Government in the
southern and central regions, and in cooperation with the local Kurdish
authorities in the north. The surveys revealed that in the south and
center, home to 85 percent of the population, children under 5 years
old are dying at more than twice the rate that they were a decade ago.
In contrast mortality rates for children under 5 years old in the
nongovernment-controlled north dropped in the period from 1994 to 1999.
The Special Rapporteur criticized the Government for ``letting innocent
people suffer while [it] maneuvered to get sanctions lifted.'' Had the
Government not waited 5 years to adopt the oil-for-food program in
1996, he stated in October, ``millions of innocent people would have
avoided serious and prolonged suffering.''
Government authorities failed to take advantage of available
resources for the benefit of the country's citizens, and used some
resources to enrich themselves at the expense of vulnerable sectors of
the population. For example, on August 11, the Kuwaiti coast guard
seized a shipment that was leaving Iraq carrying, among other items, 75
cartons of infant powder and 25 cartons of infant feeding bottles. The
captain of the boat confessed that he previously had committed six
similar violations.
For the sixth year, the Government held 3-week training courses in
weapons use, hand-to-hand fighting, rappelling from helicopters, and
infantry tactics for children from 10 to 15 years of age. Camps for
these ``Saddam Cubs'' operated throughout the country. Senior military
officers who supervised the course noted that the children held up
under the ``physical and psychological strain'' of tough training for
as long as 14 hours each day. Sources in the Iraqi opposition report
that the army found it difficult to recruit enough children to fill all
of the slots in the program. Families reportedly were threatened with
the loss of their food ration cards if they refused to enroll their
children in the grueling course. The Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq reported in October that authorities were denying
food ration cards to families that failed to send their young sons to
Saddam Cubs compulsory weapons-training camps. Similarly, authorities
reportedly withheld school examination results to students unless they
registered in the Feddayin Saddam organization.
People with Disabilities.--No information is available on the
Government's policy towards the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Iraq's cultural, religious, and linguistic
diversity is not reflected in the country's political and economic
structure.Various segments of the Sunni Arab community, which itself
constitutes a minority of the population, effectively have controlled
the Government since independence in 1932. Shi'a Arabs, the religious
majority of the population, have long been economically, politically,
and socially disadvantaged. Like the Sunni Kurds and other ethnic and
religious groups in the north, the Shi'a Arabs of the south have been
targeted for particular discrimination and abuse.
Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by
Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Non-Arabs are denied equal
access to employment, education, and physical security. Non-Arabs are
not permitted to sell their homes except to Arabs, nor to register or
inherit property. The Government continued to relocate forcibly the
non-Arab population, including Kurds, Turkmen, and Assyrians living in
Kirkuk, Sinjar, and other districts (see Sections 1.f. and 2.d.).
Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a distinct
ethnic group as well as the descendants of some of the earliest
Christian communities. These communities speak a distinct language
(Syriac), preserve important traditions of Christianity in the east,
and have a rich cultural and historical heritage that they trace back
over 2,000 years. Although these groups do not define themselves as
Arabs, the Government, without any historical basis, defines Assyrians
and Chaldeans as such, evidently to encourage them to identify with the
Sunni-Arab dominated regime.
The Government does not permit education in languages other than
Arabic and Kurdish. Public instruction in Syriac, which was announced
under a 1972 decree, has never been implemented. Thus, in areas under
government control, Assyrian and Chaldean children are not permitted to
attend classes in Syriac. In areas of northern Iraq under Iraqi Kurdish
control, classes in Syriac have been permitted since the 1991 uprising
against the Government. By October 1998, the first groups of students
were ready to begin secondary school in Syriac in the north; however,
some Assyrian sources reported that regional Iraqi Kurdish authorities
refused to allow the classes to begin. Details of this practice (for
example, the number of students prepared to start secondary courses in
Syriac and the towns where they were located) were not available, and
Kurdish regional authorities denied that they engaged in such a
practice. There were no reports of elementary school instruction in
Syriac being hindered in northern Iraq. In November the Kurdistan
Observer reported that the central Government had warned the
administration in the Kurdish region against allowing Turkmen,
Assyrian, or Yazidi minority schools.
Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob violence by
Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years. Assyrians
continue to fear attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party, a Turkish-
based terrorist organization that operates against indigenous Kurds in
northern Iraq. The Christians often feel caught in the middle of intra-
Kurdish fighting. In December 1997, six Assyrians died in an attack
near Dohuk by the PKK. Some Assyrian villagers have reported being
pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as part of a campaign
by indigenous Kurdish forces to deny the PKK access to possible food
supplies.
Many Assyrian groups reported a series of bombings in Irbil in late
1998 and early and late 1999. On December 9, 1998, Nasreen Shaba and
her 3-year-old daughter Larsa Toma were killed when a bomb exploded on
the doorstep of their home in the Terawa section of the city. Later the
same month, bombs exploded at the front door of Salman Toma Khoshaba in
the Al-Iskan area and in front of a convent in the Al-Mal'ab area. On
January 6, a bomb exploded at the door of Father Zomaya Yusip in the
7th-of-Nisan area. No one was killed in these three subsequent
incidents. On December 15, a bomb killed 60-year-old Habib Yousif
Dekhoka in front of his store in Irbil after several months of threats
and one prior attempt. Although the bombings have not been linked to
any particular faction or group, Assyrians believe that they are part
of a terror campaign designed to intimidate them into leaving northern
Iraq. The Assyrian Democratic Movement, the Assyrian Patriotic Party,
and other groups have criticized the investigation into these incidents
conducted by the Kurdistan Regional Government. There were no reported
arrests by year's end.
In June the Assyrian National News Agency reported a ``well-
established pattern'' of complicity by Kurdish authorities in attacks
against Assyrian Christians in northern Iraq (see Section 1.a.).
Citizens considered by the Government to be of Iranian origin must
carry special identification and often are precluded from desirable
employment. Over the years, the Government has deported hundreds of
thousands of citizens of Iranian origin.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions independent of
government control do not exist. The Trade Union Organization Law of
1987 established the Iraqi General Federation of Trade Unions (IGFTU),
a government-dominated trade union structure, as the sole legal trade
federation. The IGFTU is linked to the Ba'th Party, which uses it to
promote party principles and policies among union members.
Workers in private and mixed enterprises, but not public employees
or workers in state enterprises, have the right to join local union
committees. The committees are affiliated with individual trade unions,
which in turn belong to the IGFTU.
In September Uday Hussein reportedly dismissed hundreds of members
of the Iraqi Union of Journalists for not praising Saddam Hussein and
the regime sufficiently (see Section 2.a.). Also in September, Uday
Hussein reportedly jailed at least four leaders of the Iraqi National
Students Union for failing to carry out his orders to take action
against students known for their criticism of the situation in the
country (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
The 1987 Labor Law restricts the right to strike. No strike has
been reported over the past 2 decades. According to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the severe restrictions on the
right to strike include penal sanctions.
The IGFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of
Arab Trade Unions and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation
of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
bargain collectively is not recognized. Salaries for public sector
workers (the majority of the employed) are set by the Government. Wages
in the much smaller private sector are set by employers or negotiated
individually with workers. Government workers frequently are shifted
from one job and work location to another to prevent them from forming
close associations with other workers. The Labor Code does not protect
workers from antiunion discrimination, a failure that has been
criticized repeatedly by the Committee of Experts of the International
Labor Organization (ILO).
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Compulsory labor
theoretically is prohibited by law; however, the Penal Code mandates
prison sentences, including compulsory labor, for civil servants and
employees of state enterprises accused of breaches of labor
``discipline,'' including resigning from a job. According to the ILO,
foreign workers in Iraq have been prevented from terminating their
employment to return to their native countries because of government-
imposed penal sanctions on persons who do so. There is no information
available on forced and bonded labor by children.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The employment of children under age 14 is prohibited,
except in small-scale family enterprises. Children reportedly are
encouraged increasingly to work in order to support their families
because of the country's harsh economic conditions. The law stipulates
that employees between the ages of 14 and 18 work fewer hours per week
than adults. Each year the Government enrolls children as young as 10
years of age in a paramilitary training program (see Section 5). There
is no information available on forced and bonded labor by children (see
Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There was no information
available on minimum wages.
Theoretically, most workers in urban areas work a 6-day, 48-hour
workweek. Hours for government employees are set by the head of each
ministry. Working hours for agricultural workers vary according to
individual employer-employee agreements. Occupational safety programs
are in effect in state-run enterprises. Inspectors theoretically
inspect private establishments, but enforcement varies widely. There is
no information on workers' ability to remove themselves from work
situations that endanger their health or safety, or on those who
complain about such conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There was no information available on
whether trafficking in persons is prohibited, or whether it occurs.
______
ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
Israel \1\ is a parliamentary democracy with a multiparty system
and free elections. There is no constitution; a series of ``basic
laws'' provide for fundamental rights. The legislature, or Knesset, has
the power to dissolve the Government and limit the authority of the
executive branch. Labor and One Israel party leader Ehud Barak was
elected Prime Minister in May and took office in July at the head of a
broad centrist coalition Government. The judiciary is independent, but
in the past, frequently has acquiesced with the Government's position
in security cases; however during the year it ruled against the
Government in several major security-related cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The human rights situation in the occupied territories is
discussed in the annex appended to this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since its founding in 1948, Israel has been in a state of war with
most of its Arab neighbors. It concluded a peace treaty with Egypt in
1979, with Jordan in 1994, and a series of agreements with the
Palestinians beginning in 1993. As a result of the 1967 war, Israel
occupied the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the Golan
Heights. The international community does not recognize Israel's
sovereignty over any part of the occupied territories. Throughout its
existence, Israel has experienced numerous terrorist attacks.
An historic process of reconciliation between Israel and its
neighbors began with the Madrid Conference in 1991 and continued with
the September 1993 signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of
Principles (DOP). In September 1995, Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) signed the Interim Agreement on the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip, which provided for the election and
establishment of a Palestinian self-governing authority, transfer of
civil authority, Israeli redeployment from major Palestinian population
centers in the West Bank, security arrangements, and cooperation in a
variety of areas. In January 1997, Israel and the PLO concluded the
Hebron Agreement, which established security arrangements for the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian-populated areas of
Hebron, and set out a road map for mutual implementation of other
Interim Agreement commitments. In October 1998, Israel and the PLO
signed the Wye River Memorandum, which, among other things, called for
the continuation of the process of Israeli further redeployments in the
West Bank. The implementation of the Wye River Memorandumwas frozen by
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's Government in December 1998.
Following Ehud Barak's election as Prime Minister, and the formation of
a broad, centrist, coalition Government, Israel and the PLO signed the
Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum on September 4. The Sharm el-Sheikh
Memorandum laid out a comprehensive roadmap for the implementation of
Israel's further redeployments in the West Bank, the release of
Palestinian prisoners, and the resumption of permanent status
negotiations.
Internal security is the responsibility of the General Security
Service (GSS--also known as Shin Bet, or Shabak), which is under the
authority of the Prime Minister's office. The police are under the
authority of the Minister of Internal Security. The Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) are under the authority of a civilian Minister of Defense.
The IDF includes a significant portion of the adult population on
active duty or reserve status and plays a role in maintaining internal
security. The Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee in the Knesset
reviews the activities of the IDF and the GSS.
Israel has an advanced industrial economy, and citizens enjoy a
high standard of living, with a per capita income of $17,000.
Unemployment among citizens rose to 9.1 percent by year's end, but was
substantially higher in the country's peripheral regions and among
lower-skilled workers. Along with rapid economic growth in recent
years, there has been an increase in income inequality. The
longstanding gap in levels of income between Jewish and non-Jewish
citizens continues. Regional income disparities appear to be growing,
with unemployment in some areas reaching more than double the national
average. A heavy reliance on foreign workers, principally from Asia and
Eastern Europe, is a source of social problems. Such workers generally
are employed in agriculture and the construction industry and
constitute about 10 percent of the labor force. Since the
implementation of an economic stabilization plan in 1985, Israel has
moved gradually to reduce state intervention in the economy. The
Government has been committed to market-oriented structural reforms,
especially deregulation and rapid privatization of the economy. Despite
the Government's continued dominant role in the economy, individuals
generally are free to invest in private interests and own property. The
Government owns and manages 77 percent of the country's land area, and
as a matter of policy it does not sell land. The Jewish National Fund
(JNF), an organization established in 1897 for the purchase and
management of land for the Jewish people, owns 8 percent of the
country's land area, including a considerable amount transferred
directly from the Government, and manages another 8 percent on behalf
of the Government. The JNF's statute prohibits the sale or lease of
land to non-Jews, although exceptions sometimes are made. Foreigners
and citizens of all religions are allowed freely to purchase or lease
land in the remaining 7 percent of Israel.
The Government generally respects the human rights of its citizens,
and the law and judiciary provide citizens with means of dealing with
individual instances of abuse. Israel's main human rights problems have
arisen from its policies and practices in the occupied territories, and
from its fight against terrorism. The redeployment of the IDF from
major Palestinian population areas in the West Bank in December 1995,
and its previous withdrawal from Gaza and Jericho, reduced
significantly the scope of these problems. Moreover, the overall human
rights situation continued to improve during the year, in part due to
the lack of major terrorist attacks, which reduced the overall level of
tension as well as the number of security-related arrests. Israeli
security forces abused Palestinians suspected of security offenses.
However, a landmark decision by the High Court of Justice in September
prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices, including violent
shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions, sleep deprivation
for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme
temperatures. Following the ruling, there were no credible reports of
such abuse by the security forces. However, the Government continued to
detain without charge Palestinians, some of them for lengthy periods,
although the number decreased significantly during the year. Detention
and prison conditions, particularly for Palestinian security detainees
held in Israel, improved, but do not meet minimum international
standards in some cases. In September the Government acknowledged that
it trains, debriefs, and pays the salaries of the Lebanese
administrators and staff of the Al-Khiam prison in Israel's self-
declared ``security zone'' in southern Lebanon where guards allegedly
committed abuses. Under the terms of the September Sharm el-Sheikh
Memorandum, the Government released 350 Palestinian security prisoners.
In previous years, the Government responded to terrorist and
security incidents by periodically detaining hundreds of Palestinians
without charge and tightening existing restrictionson the movement of
persons (and sometimes goods) across borders with the West Bank and
Gaza and between PA-controlled areas inside the West Bank (i.e.,
closure, which has been in effect to varying extents since 1993). The
overall improvement in the security situation led to a significant
reduction in such arrests and there were fewer prolonged security-
related closures. However, the Government imposed closure on Hebron
after settlers were shot and injured in separate shooting attacks in
January and August.
The Government took few tangible steps to address violence and
discrimination against women, although several court cases have set
important precedents regarding certain types of discrimination. The
Government made little headway in reducing institutionalized legal and
societal discrimination against Israel's Christian, Muslim, and Druze
citizens, who constitute just over 20 percent of the population, but do
not share fully the rights provided to, and obligations imposed on, the
country's Jewish citizens. As part of their efforts to address the
problem, some government officials publicly acknowledged significant
discrimination against Israel's non-Jewish citizens; however, no
specific steps were taken by year's end.
Trafficking in women for the purpose of prostitution is a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--One Palestinian,
Sadi Sager, died in custody during the year (see Section 1.c.).
During the year, one Israeli was killed and over 52 were wounded in
terrorist attacks carried out by Palestinian groups or individuals
seeking to halt the Middle East Peace Process.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Laws and administrative regulations prohibit the physical
abuse of detainees; however, security forces abused, and in some cases,
tortured Palestinians suspected of security offenses, and lawyers for
security prisoners continued to file numerous challenges to the use of
torture. However, a landmark decision by the High Court of Justice in
September prohibited the use of a variety of abusive practices,
including violent shaking, painful shackling in contorted positions,
sleep deprivation for extended periods of time, and prolonged exposure
to extreme temperatures. Following the ruling, there were no credible
reports of such abuse by the security forces. The High Court
categorically rejected the Government's contention that these practices
were ``moderate physical pressure,'' and therefore permissible under
the law, though the Court left open the possibility that such practices
might be acceptable if specifically authorized by new legislation.
Prior to the High Court's decision, laws and administrative
regulations prohibiting the physical abuse of detainees were not
enforced in security cases. The head of the GSS was empowered by
government regulation to authorize security officers to use ``moderate
physical and psychological pressure'' (which includes violent shaking)
while interrogating detainees. These practices often led to excesses
(see Section 1.c. of the annex).
In 1996 the Government presented draft legislation to define the
basis for and limits of GSS activities. This legislation was rejected
by the Knesset's Law and Constitution Committee in 1998 because it gave
the GSS too broad a role in ``preserving democracy.'' That proposed
legislation made no reference to the use of physical pressure in
interrogations. Following the High Court's decision in September, some
government officials called for the passage of legislation that would
authorize the use of the methods banned by the court. At year's end, no
action appeared likely. In November the Attorney General issued revised
guidelines that denied blanket immunity from prosecution for
interrogators. These guidelines left open the possibility that the
State might decline to prosecute interrogators who used prohibited
methods in cases of extreme urgency.
Conditions vary in incarceration facilities in Israel and the
occupied territories, which are administered by the Israeli Prison
Service (IPS), the IDF, or the national police. IPS prisons, which
generally house Israeli citizens convicted of common crimes, usually
meet minimum international standards. In general, IPS inmates are not
subject to physical abuse by guards, food is adequate, and prisoners
receive basic necessities. Inmates receive mail, have television sets
in their cells, and receive regular visits. Prisoners receive wages for
prison work and benefits for good behavior. Many IPS prisons have drug
treatment, educational, and recreational programs. The IPS has
established an investigatory committee to look into charges of violence
by guards against inmates.
Since the closure in 1995 of the main IDF detention camps in the
occupied territories, all security detainees (i.e., those detained and
held without charge by security forces) from the occupied territories
who are held for more than a few days are transferred to facilities
within Israel. During the year, security detainees usually were held in
IDF camps in Israel, but also in IPS facilities and in special sections
of police detention facilities. Prisoners incarcerated for security
reasons are subject to a different regimen, even in IPS facilities.
They often are denied certain privileges given to prisoners convicted
on criminal charges. Security detainees include some minors. Detention
camps administered by the IDF are limited to male Palestinian detainees
and are guarded by armed soldiers. The total number of Palestinian
prisoners and administrative detainees held by Israel, approximately
2,233 at the beginning of the year, fell to 1,354 by year's end. The
number of administrative detainees (held without charge or trial)
varied between 77 and 16 during the year, and stood at 18 at year's
end. One of these detainees has been held without charge or trial since
1994. Under the terms of the September Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum, the
Government released 350 Palestinian security prisoners.
In September terrorists placed bombs in neighborhoods in Haifa and
Tiberias causing minimal civilian injuries and killing the
perpetrators. In November a bombing in Netanya injured 33 persons.
In June a demonstration against the demolition of an Israeli Arab-
owned house in Lod led to a confrontation between protesters and
police, who reacted with excessive force. Between 8 and 20 persons were
injured, including Arab Israeli Member of Knesset, Azmi Bishara, who
was hospitalized briefly after being hit in the shoulder by a rubber
bullet (see Section 2.b.). There were no further incidents of this kind
during the year.
Conditions in IDF detention camps have been criticized repeatedly
over the years. Conditions at the Russian Compound, which houses a
combination of security and common prisoners and detainees in
Jerusalem, were criticized in 1997 as ``not fit to serve as lock-up''
by High Court of Justice President Aharon Barak. Conditions in other
IDF facilities have improved in some respects. For example, inmates are
given more time for exercise outside their cells. Nevertheless,
recreational facilities remain minimal, and there are strict
limitations on family visits to detainees. Visits were prevented during
closures of the borders with Gaza and the West Bank.
Conditions at some national police detention facilities can fall
below minimum international standards. Such facilities are intended to
hold criminal detainees prior to trial but often become de facto
prisons. Those held include some security detainees and some persons
who have been convicted and sentenced. Inmates in the national police
detention facilities often are not accorded the same rights as
prisoners in the IPS. Moreover, conditions are worse in the separate
facilities for security detainees maintained both in police facilities
and in IPS prisons.
In 1996 the Government began a reform program for the country's
detention facilities. Thus far, improvements in prison conditions have
been limited in scope. Continued problems include dilapidation and
overcrowding, which was aggravated by the closure of IDF detention
facilities in the occupied territories in 1995. New legislation that
took effect during 1997 provided for the right to live in conditions
that would not harm the health or dignity of the detainee, access to
adequate health care, the right to a bed for each detainee, and access
to exercise and fresh air on a daily basis. The Government took steps
towards implementing this legislation during the year, though problems
remain.
Children's rights groups have expressed particular concern over the
separate sections of holding facilities set aside for thedetention of
children. Overcrowding, poor physical conditions, lack of social
workers, and denial of visits by parents are among the key problems. In
addition to some Israeli minors held in criminal cases, there are
juveniles among Palestinian detainees. Children's rights activists have
recommended the construction of a separate detention facility for
children.
One Palestinian, Sadi Sager, died in custody after having been
detained with neither charges nor trial for three months; human rights
organizations alleged that the 21-year-old was denied proper medical
care for a pre-existing heart condition, which was exacerbated by poor
prison conditions (see Section 1.c.). All incarceration facilities are
monitored by various branches of the Government, by members of the
Knesset, by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and by
human rights groups. While monitoring is judged to be effective
overall, in some instances human rights groups were denied timely
access to specific detainees, usually Palestinians held without charge
or trial for alleged security offenses (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
In September the Government acknowledged that it trains, debriefs,
and pays the salaries of the Lebanese administrators and staff of the
Al-Khiam prison in Israel's self-declared ``security zone'' in southern
Lebanon where guards allegedly committed abuses.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest of citizens, and the Government generally observes
this prohibition. Defendants are considered innocent until proven
guilty and have the right to writs of habeas corpus and other
procedural safeguards. However, a 1979 law permits detention without
charge or trial, which is used in security cases. The Minister of
Defense may issue a detention order for a maximum of 1 year. Within 24
hours of issuance, detainees must appear before a district judge who
may confirm, shorten, or overturn the order. If the order is confirmed,
an automatic review takes place after 3 months. Detention orders were
confirmed in all cases during the year. Detainees have the right to be
represented by counsel and to appeal detention orders to the High Court
of Justice; however, the security forces may delay notification of
counsel with the consent of a judge. According to human rights groups
and legal experts, there were cases in which a judge denied the
Government's request to delay notification of counsel. At detention
hearings, the security forces may withhold evidence from defense
lawyers on security grounds. The Government also may seek to renew
administrative detention orders. However, the security services must
``show cause'' for continued detention, and, in some instances,
individuals were released because the standard could not be met.
In felony cases, a district court judge may postpone for 48 hours
the notification of arrest to the detainee's attorney. The postponement
may be extended to 7 days by the Minister of Defense on national
security grounds or by the police inspector general to conduct an
investigation. Moreover, a judge may postpone notification for up to 15
days in national security cases.
New legislation took effect in 1997 that more narrowly defined the
grounds for pretrial detention and reduced to 24 hours the length of
time a person may be held without charge. Children's rights activists
have recommended separate legislation to define when and how a child
may be arrested and how long children may be detained.
Most of the protections afforded by law are not extended to
Palestinian detainees, who fall under the jurisdiction of military law
even if they are detained in Israel. With IDF redeployment in the West
Bank, detention centers there were closed in 1995. As a result, all
Palestinian detainees held for longer than 1 or 2 days are incarcerated
in Israel (see Section 1.d. of the annex).
At year's end, the Government held 1,354 Palestinians in custody.
Those held were a mixture of common prisoners, administrative
detainees, and security detainees. The Government continues to deny the
ICRC access to two Lebanese citizens, Sheikh Mustafa Dirani (held
without charge since 1994) and Sheikh Obeid (held without charge since
1989). The High Court of Justice ruled in May 1998 that the Government
is entitled to continue holding them for use in a possible exchange of
hostages to obtain the return of an Israeli who still may be held by
hostile forces. The High Court's ruling stressed that national security
needs take precedence over the detainees' individual rights under
Israeli and international law. At year's end, the Government detained
16other Lebanese citizens; eleven have completed prison sentences of up
to 10 years but still are being held without charge.
Six Iraqis, held since they attempted to enter Israel illegally
from Jordan, were released from detention by order of the High Court in
November (though their movement was restricted to a kibbutz, which
agreed to be responsible for their conduct).
The law prohibits forced exile of citizens, and the Government does
not use it.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision.
However, in the past, the judiciary routinely acquiesced to the
Government's position in security cases. The landmark High Court of
Justice ruling in September (see Section 1.c.) marked a major change in
this practice. The judiciary provides citizens with a fair and
efficient judicial process.
The judicial system is composed of civil, military, religious,
labor relations, and administrative courts, with the High Court of
Justice as the ultimate judicial authority. The High Court of Justice
is both a court of first instance (in cases involving government
action) and an appellate court (when it sits as the Supreme Court).
The law provides for the right to a hearing with representation by
counsel, and authorities observe this right in practice. A planned
regional and national system of public defenders operated by the
Ministry of Justice was inaugurated in 1996 with the opening of a Tel
Aviv office, although that office has suffered serious budget
shortages. A substantial percentage of criminal cases are tried with no
legal representation for the defendant.
All nonsecurity trials are public except those in which the
interests of the parties are deemed best served by privacy. Cases
involving national security may be tried in either military or civil
courts and may be partly or wholly closed to the public. The Attorney
General determines the venue in such cases. The prosecution must
justify closing the proceedings to the public. Adult defendants have
the right to be represented by counsel even in closed proceedings but
may be denied access to some evidence on security grounds. Under the
law, convictions may not be based on any evidence denied to the
defense. In addition, convictions may not be based solely on a
confession by the accused, although in practice security prisoners have
been sentenced on the basis of the coerced confessions of both
themselves and others.
The legal system often imposes far stiffer punishments on
Christian, Muslim, and Druze persons than on Jewish citizens. For
example, human rights advocates claim that Palestinians and Arab
Israelis convicted of murder usually receive life sentences, while
Jewish Israelis often receive significantly shorter sentences. To the
extent that Palestinians are tried in Israeli courts, they receive
harsher punishments than Jewish Israelis.
There were no reports of political prisoners during the year.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Privacy of the individual and the home generally are
protected by law; however, authorities interfere with mail and monitor
telephone conversations. In criminal cases, the law permits wiretapping
under court order; in security cases, the order must be issued by the
Ministry of Defense. Under emergency regulations, authorities may open
and destroy mail on security grounds.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Violence continued in northern Israel, related to
attacks in southern Lebanon. According to various reports, an estimated
50 Hizballah guerrillas, 13 Israeli soldiers, 27 Lebanese civilians,
and 2 Israeli civilians were killed in south Lebanon and northern
Israel during the year, as Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian guerrillas
on one hand, and Israeli forces and the SLA on the other, engaged in
attacks. For example, on June 22 Hizballah launched rocket attacks
against northern Israel in retaliation for IDF shelling of a Lebanese
village, killing 2 Israeli civilians. Israeli forces conducted repeated
air strikes and artillery barrages on Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian
guerrilla targets. Israeli forces also sometimes targeted civilian
infrastructure inside Lebanon. On June 24, 9 Lebanese were killed and
50 to 80 wounded in Israeli air raids, which alsotargeted civilian
infrastructure, including electric power transformer stations and power
lines in the Beirut area, Baalbek, and Bint Jubayl, and bridges along
the main coastal highway at Damour, Sidon, and Tyre.
In south Lebanon, there is an average of two or three attacks daily
against IDF/SLA military positions and a similar number of IDF or SLA
counterattacks.
The Israeli-Lebanese Monitoring Group continued to deal with
violations of the April 1996 understanding between Israel, Lebanon, and
Syria, which precludes the targeting of civilians or the use of
civilian-populated areas from which to launch attacks.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law provides for freedom of
the press, and the Government generally respects this right in
practice. The law authorizes the Government to censor any material
reported from Israel or the occupied territories regarded as sensitive
on national security grounds. A censorship agreement signed in 1996
between the Government and media representatives continued the trend of
liberalization of the Government's censorship regime. The agreement
provides that military censorship is to be applied only in cases
involving national security issues that have a near certainty of
harming the country's defense interests, and it now applies to all
media organizations in Israel, including all newspapers. All media
organizations can appeal the censor's decision to the High Court of
Justice. Moreover, a clause abolishes the authority of the censor to
shut down a newspaper for a censorship violation and eliminates the
ability of the office of the censor to appeal a decision against it.
News printed or broadcast abroad may be reported without censorship,
which permits the media to run censored stories that have appeared in
foreign sources.
Emergency regulations prohibit anyone from expressing support for
illegal organizations. On occasion in the past, the Government has
prosecuted persons for speaking or writing on behalf of terrorist
groups. No such cases were filed during the year, and there were public
discussions about the scrapping of emergency regulations.
Individuals, groups, and the press freely address public issues and
criticize government officials and policies. Laws prohibit hate speech
and incitement to violence; however, the Attorney General has concluded
that such speech, for the most part, is nearly impossible to prosecute
successfully. Nevertheless, during the year, police vigorously
investigated individuals under anti-incitement codes.
All newspapers are privately owned and managed. Newspaper licenses
are valid only for Israel; separate licenses are required to distribute
publications in areas in the occupied territories still under Israel's
authority. Nineteen daily newspapers are published in Israel. There are
about 90 weekly local newspapers and more than 250 periodical
publications.
Directed by a government appointee, the quasi-independent Israel
Broadcast Authority (IBA) controls television Channel 1 and Kol Israel
(The Voice of Israel) radio, both major sources of news and
information. Privately-owned Channel 2 Television, the first commercial
television channel, is operated by three franchise companies. There are
13 private radio outlets. The Second Television and Radio Authority, a
public body, supervises both Channel 2 and the country's 14 privately
owned regional radio stations. Five cable television companies operate
under franchises granted by government councils. The cable systems
carry both domestic and international television networks, including
some from Europe and countries throughout the Arab world.
In May the Government set up a task force to attempt to close down
the estimated 150 pirate radio stations operating out of Israel and the
West Bank.
Many international publications are available.
The Government respects academic freedom.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for the right of assembly, and the Government generally respects this
provision in practice.
In June a demonstration against the demolition of an Israeli Arab-
owned house in Lod led to a confrontation between protesters and
police, who reacted with excessive force. Between 8 and 20 persons were
injured, including Arab Israeli Member of Knesset, Azmi Bishara, who
was hospitalized briefly after being hit in the shoulder by a rubber
bullet (see Section 1.c.). There were no further incidents of this kind
during the year.
The law provides for the right of association, and the Government
generally respects this provision in practice. After the Hebron
massacre in 1994, the Cabinet invoked the 1948 Ordinance for the
Prevention of Terror to ban the ultranationalist Kach and Kahane Chai
organizations, a ban that remains in effect. The decision provides for
imprisonment for anyone belonging to, or expressing support for, either
organization.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The law provides for freedom of religion,
and the Government generally respects this right. Approximately 80
percent of citizens are Jewish. Muslims, Christians, Druze, and members
of other religions make up the remaining 20 percent. Each recognized
religious community has legal authority over its members in matters of
marriage and divorce. Secular courts have primacy over questions of
inheritance, but parties, by mutual agreement, may bring cases to
religious courts. Jewish and Druze families may ask for some family
status matters, such as alimony and child custody in divorces, to be
adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts.
Christians only may ask that child custody and child support be
adjudicated in civil courts as an alternative to religious courts.
Muslims have no recourse to civil courts in family-status matters.
Legislation passed in 1996 allows the rabbinical courts to sanction
either party who is not willing to grant a divorce.
Many Jews object to the Orthodox Jewish religious authorities'
exclusive control over Jewish marriage, divorce, and burial. These
authorities do not recognize marriages or conversions to Judaism
performed in Israel by Conservative or Reform rabbis. These issues have
been a source of serious controversy within society, particularly in
recent years, as thousands of Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet
Union have brought with them family members not recognized as Jewish by
Orthodox authorities.
Many Jews who wish to be married in secular or non-Orthodox
religious ceremonies do so abroad. The Ministry of Interior recognizes
such marriages.
During the year, the High Court issued two important rulings on
religious issues. Until a January High Court ruling, Reform and
Conservative rabbis could not hold seats on the powerful municipal
religious councils. In January the High Court ordered the Haifa and
Jerusalem Religious Councils to meet with their Conservative and Reform
members. In February the High Court ordered the Knesset to legislate a
solution to a suit challenging military draft exemptions for yeshiva
students. Large peaceful demonstrations followed the rulings.
The Government provides proportionally greater financial support to
institutions in the Jewish sector compared with those in the non-Jewish
sector, i.e., Muslim, Christian, and Druze. In 1998 the High Court of
Justice ruled that the budget allocation constituted ``prima facie
discrimination'' but that the plaintiff's petition did not provide
adequate information about the religious needs of the various
communities. The Court refused to intervene in the budgetary process on
the grounds that such action would invade the proper sphere of the
legislature.
Missionaries are allowed to proselytize, although the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints voluntarily refrains from
proselytizing under an agreement with the Government. A 1977 anti-
proselytizing law prohibits anyone from offering or receiving material
benefits as an inducement to conversion; however, there have been no
reports of its enforcement.
Bills that would have further restricted proselytizing were
introduced and passed their preliminary readings in 1997 and 1998 with
the support of some government ministers; however, no further action
was taken before the dissolution of the Knesset following the May
elections. They are not expected to be enacted if reintroduced in the
Knesset. Christian and other evangelical groups assert that the draft
bills were discriminatory and served to intimidate Christian groups.
Evangelical Christian and other religious groups complained that
the police have been slow to investigate incidents of harassment,
threats, and vandalism directed against their meetings, churches, and
other facilities apparently by two ultraorthodox groups knownas Yad
L'achim and Lev L'achim. For example, Jehovah's Witnesses assert that
police did not adequately investigate a series of violent attacks on
their members and facilities; members of this religious group filed
over 75 complaints with police during the year for incidents ranging
from assault to verbal harassment. The police have increased their
level of attention to these matters during the latter half of the year,
and there was a marked decline in the number of incidents. Nonetheless,
despite the large number of outstanding complaints, many accompanied by
considerable details concerning the identity of the alleged attackers,
there were no arrests or indictments of the perpetrators.
On July 20, the Baptist House Center in Jerusalem was vandalized by
unknown assailants who spread tar on the front and along the sides of
the building, as well as defacing the entrance to the sanctuary.
The Government has recognized Jewish holy places under the 1967
Protection of Holy Sites Law. The Government states that it also
protects the holy sites of other faiths, and that it has provided funds
for some holy sites of other faiths.
A 1995 High Court of Justice ruling allows small numbers of Jews
under police escort to pray on the Temple Mount, which is the location
of two Muslim holy places and also the site of the First and Second
Jewish temples.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for these rights, and
the Government respects them in practice for citizens, except with
regard to military or security zones or in instances where citizens may
be confined by administrative order to their neighborhoods or villages.
The Government continued to restrict the movements of two Jewish
settlers living in the occupied territories who belonged to extremist
Kach or Kahane Chai groups, through the use of administrative orders
issued by the IDF central command (see Section 2.d. of the annex).
Citizens are free to travel abroad and to emigrate, provided they
have no outstanding military obligations and are not restricted by
administrative order. During the year, the Government generally
continued to permit Muslim citizens to make the Hajj. However, for
security reasons, the Government imposes some restrictions on its
Muslim citizens who perform the Hajj, including requiring that they be
over the age of 30. The Government does not allow persons to return if
they leave the country without formal permission. The Government
justifies these restrictions on the grounds that Saudi Arabia remains
officially at war with Israel and that travel to Saudi Arabia therefore
is considered subject to security considerations.
Christian, Muslim, or Druze women who have married men from Arab
states or the West Bank or Gaza have complained about losing their
Israeli citizenship and right to reenter Israel.
The Government welcomes Jewish immigrants, their families, and
Jewish refugees, on whom it confers automatic citizenship and residence
rights under the Law of Return. This law does not apply to non-Jews or
to persons of Jewish descent who have converted to another faith. Other
than the Law of Return and the family reunification statutes, which
mainly apply to non-Jews who fled Israel in 1948-49, Israel has no
immigration law that provides for immigration to the country, or for
political asylum or refugee status. The law does allow individuals to
live in Israel as permanent residents.
The Government cooperates with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees. The Government does not provide asylum to
refugees from states with which Israel remains in a state of war. The
issue of first asylum did not arise during the year. There were no
reports of the forced return of persons to a country where they fear
persecution. Six Iraqis were released from detention by order of the
High Court in November (see Section 1.d.).
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The law provides citizens with the right to change their government
peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice through
periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of universal
suffrage for adult citizens. The last national elections were held in
May.
Israel is a parliamentary democracy with an active multiparty
system in which a wide range of political views are represented.
Relatively small parties, including those whose primary support is
among Israeli Arabs, regularly win seats in the Knesset. Elections are
by secret ballot.
While there are no legal impediments to the participation of women
and minorities in government, they are underrepresented. Women hold 15
of 120 Knesset seats, compared with 9 female members in the previous
Knesset. There are 11 Arabs and 2 Druze in the Knesset; most represent
parties deriving their support largely or entirely from the Arab
community. Of the Knesset's 12 committees, 2 (including the Committee
on the Status of Women) are chaired by a woman. There are two women in
the Cabinet, and one Arab Deputy Minister. Three women, and one Arab
serve on the 14-member High Court of Justice.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
A wide variety of human rights groups operate without government
restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human
rights cases. Government officials generally cooperate with
investigations.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex or marital
status. The law also prohibits discrimination by both government and
nongovernmental entities on the basis of race, religion, political
beliefs, and age. Local human rights groups are concerned that these
laws often are not enforced, either as a result of institutionalized
discrimination, or because resources for implementing those laws, or
mechanisms for their enforcement, sometimes are lacking.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. There continued to be
action, both in and out of government, to reduce violence against women
in Jewish and Arab communities. The Government has allocated minimal
funds for a special campaign to combat such violence. Groups that focus
on domestic violence include a committee established by the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs that includes Jewish and Arab nongovernmental
organizations (NGO's) as well as government representatives, and a
coalition of human rights organizations. Approximately 17 women were
killed by their husbands or other male relatives during the year.
According to the most recent estimates, some 200,000 women suffer from
domestic violence each year, and some 7 percent of these are abused on
a regular basis. According to press reports that appeared in 1998, an
estimated 60,000 women were assaulted sexually or abused in 1997. Only
a small percentage of victims complained to the police. An estimated 60
percent of victims were age 18 or under.
Arab human rights advocates also have formed a coalition to raise
public awareness of so-called family ``honor killings,'' a term
commonly used for the murder of a female by a male relative for alleged
misconduct. At least 3 of the 17 women killed during the year by male
relatives were killed in family ``honor'' cases.
The Government supports 10 shelters for battered women, including 1
exclusively for Christian, Muslim, and Druze women and 1 for both non-
Jewish and Jewish women. Women's rights advocates consider this number
inadequate.
According to the 1991 Domestic Violence Law, a district or
magistrate court may prohibit access by violent family members to their
property. Women's groups cooperate with legal and social service
institutions to provide women's rights education. While sentences
handed down to men convicted of rape have increased in recent years,
women's rights activists argue that the penalties are not sufficiently
harsh.
Civil rights groups also expressed concern about the occurrence of
physical attacks by religious Jews, particularly in Jerusalem, against
women whom they consider to be dressed immodestly in public. On July
20, several women were attacked by religious Jews in Jerusalem; police
arrested three persons in connection with this assault.
Prostitution per se is not illegal; however, the operation of
brothels and organized sex enterprises is outlawed. Trafficking in
women is a significant problem (see Section 6.f.). Women's advocacy
groups report that women routinely receive lower wagesfor comparable
work, are promoted less often, and have fewer career opportunities than
their male counterparts. Despite 1996 legislation that provides for
class action suits and requires employers to provide equal pay for
equal work, including important side benefits and allowances, women's
rights advocates charged that deep gaps remained.
Legislation in 1993, reinforced by a 1994 ruling of the High Court
of Justice, has increased the percentage of women on the boards of two-
thirds of government-owned companies. However, their numbers remain low
overall. One study reported that in 1996 women made up more than 30
percent of the boards in only 39 of 118 government-owned companies.
The adjudication of personal status law in the areas of marriage
and divorce is left to religious courts, where Jewish and Muslim women
are subject to restrictive interpretations of their rights (see Section
2.c.). Under personal status law, a Jewish woman is not allowed to
initiate divorce proceedings without her husband's consent;
consequently there are hundreds of so-called ``agunot'' in the country
who cannot remarry or have legitimate children because their husbands
either have disappeared or refused to grant a divorce.
Legislation passed in 1995 broadened the civil sanctions made
available to rabbinical courts in cases where a wife has ample grounds
for divorce--such as abuse--but the husband refuses to agree. However,
in some cases rabbinical courts have failed to invoke these sanctions.
In addition, there have been cases in which a wife has failed to agree
to a divorce, but a husband has been allowed to remarry; this
permission is not given to wives. Such imbalances have been used by
husbands to extort concessions from their wives in return for agreeing
to a divorce. Rabbinical courts also may exercise jurisdiction over and
issue sanctions against Jewish non-Israeli persons present in Israel.
Religious law can be even more restrictive for Muslims: some
Islamic law courts have held that Muslim women may not request a
divorce, but that women may be forced to consent if a divorce is
granted to a man.
Jewish women are subject to the military draft, but have been
barred from combat positions. In response to a High Court of Justice
ruling, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) since 1996 has permitted women to
enter pilot training. At year's end, two women had completed initial
training and were progressing through the IAF advanced flight training
program. This would qualify women for combat aviation positions. A
recent IAF ruling allows female flight surgeons to participate in
combat rescue missions. In addition, the IAF permitted women to begin
serving as flight mechanics for combat helicopter patrols in November.
Children.--The Government is committed to the rights and welfare of
children. However, in practice resources sometimes are insufficient,
particularly with respect to low-income families. Education is
compulsory to age 15, or until the child reaches the 10th grade,
whichever comes first. Government ministries, children's rights groups,
and members of the legislature often cooperate on children's rights
issues. The Government provides an extensive health care program for
children. There is a broad network of mother and child clinics, which
provide prenatal care as well as postnatal follow-up.
The Government has legislated against sexual, physical, and
psychological abuse of children and has mandated comprehensive
reporting requirements. Although there has been a sharp increase in
reported cases of child abuse in recent years, activists believe that
this is largely due to increased awareness of the issue rather than a
growing pattern of abuse. There are five shelters for children at risk.
The Ministry of Justice formed a committee with police and NGO
representatives that is attempting to assess the scope of child
prostitution. Children's rights activists estimate that there may be
several hundred prostitutes among the nation's children, and they warn
that the phenomenon is unlikely to be eradicated until the social
problems that give rise to it--including child abuse and schools that
give up too readily on dropouts--are addressed.
NGO's in the field of children's welfare concentrate their efforts
on public education, on promoting the concept of children's rights as
citizens, on improving legal representation for minors, and on
combating the problems of poverty, which are most notable for the
Bedouin children of the south. There has been concern about the
children of the country's growing population of foreign workers, many
of whom reside in the country illegally. Children of such families,
believed to number in thethousands, exist in a legal and social limbo,
without access to schools or adequate health services.
Privately funded children's rights information centers have been
established in some communities, and the Government assists in funding
additional centers in other cities.
People With Disabilities.--The Government provides a range of
benefits, including income maintenance, housing subsidies, and
transportation support for disabled persons, who constitute about 10
percent of the population. Existing antidiscrimination laws do not
prohibit discrimination based on disability, and these citizens
continue to encounter difficulties in areas such as employment and
housing. A law requiring access for the disabled to public buildings is
not widely enforced. There is no law providing for access to public
transportation for the disabled. A 1996 law extended disability
assistance for deaf children from the age of 14 to maturity. An
extended strike/demonstration this year led to a significant increase
in government spending in support of the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Tensions between secular and religious
elements of Israeli society continued to grow during the year. The non-
Orthodox Jewish community in particular has complained of
discrimination and intolerance (see Section 2.c.).
Evangelical Christian and other religious groups also suffered
verbal abuse, assaults, and vandalism apparently by two ultraorthodox
Jewish groups known as Yad L'achim and Lev L'achim (see Section 2.c.).
In civic areas where religion is a determining criterion, such as the
religious courts and centers of education, non-Jewish institutions
routinely receive less state support than their Jewish counterparts.
The status of a number of Christian organizations with representation
in Israel heretofore has been defined by a collection of ad hoc
arrangements with various government agencies. Several of these
organizations seek to negotiate with the Government in an attempt to
formalize their status.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government does not provide
Israeli Arabs, who constitute 20 percent of the population, with the
same quality of education, housing, employment, and social services as
Jews. In addition, government spending is proportionally far lower in
predominantly Arab areas than in Jewish areas. As part of their efforts
to address the problem, some government officials publicly acknowledged
significant discrimination against Israel's non-Jewish citizens. The
Government appointed an Arab citizen to the board of the Israel Land
Authority in November. This marks the first representation of non-Jews
on this body. Israeli-Arab organizations have challenged the 1996
``Master Plan for the Northern Areas of Israel,'' which listed as
priority goals increasing the Galilee's Jewish population and blocking
the territorial contiguity of Arab villages and towns, on the grounds
that it discriminates against Arab citizens; the current Government
continues to use this document for planning in the Galilee.
Relative to their numbers, Israeli Arabs are underrepresented in
the student bodies and faculties of most universities and in higher
level professional and business ranks. Well-educated Arabs often are
unable to find jobs commensurate with their level of education. Arab
Ph.D.'s suffer the greatest problems in this regard. A small number of
Israeli Arabs have risen to responsible positions in the civil service,
generally in the Arab departments of government ministries. In 1994 a
civil service commission began a 3-year affirmative action program to
expand that number, but it had only modest results. Arab citizens
comprise only 6.2 percent of the civil service and less than one
percent of the positions in the four senior-most civil service grades.
The Government has allocated only very limited resources to enforce
landmark 1995 legislation prohibiting discrimination in employment.
Several ministers publicly called for increased Arab representation in
the civil service in August, as well as for the reduction of employment
discrimination in the private sector. In June an Israeli contractor was
denied permission to hire four Bedouin workers. The contractor was
instructed to hire foreign workers who received the required permits
within an hour. Late in the year, after publicity revealed that El Al,
the Israeli national airline, employed no Arab Israeli cabin crew
members, in spite of numerous applications, the airline hired its first
Arab Israeli flight attendant and committed to hiring more.
In practice, Israeli Arabs are not allowed to work in companies
with defense contracts or in security-related fields. The Israeli Druze
and Circassian communities are subject to the military draft, and
although some have refused to serve, the overwhelming majority accepts
service willingly. Some Bedouin and other Arab citizens who are not
subject to the draft serve voluntarily. Those who do not serve in the
army have less access than other Israelis to those social and economic
benefits for which military service is a prerequisite or an advantage,
such as housing, new-household subsidies, and government or security-
related industrial employment. Under a 1994 government policy decision,
the social security child allowance for parents who did not serve in
the military and did not attend a yeshiva (including Arabs) was
increased to equal the allowance of those who had done so.
Israeli Arab groups allege that many employers use the prerequisite
of military service to avoid hiring non-Jews. For example, in 1997 a
Haifa employment agency ran ads seeking Arabic-speaking telephone
operators and listed military service as a prerequisite. An Israeli
Arab group noted that there was no clear justification for this
requirement, and it threatened to file a civil suit under a law
prohibiting employment discrimination, and defining requirements
unrelated to actual work as discriminatory. The employment agency
eventually agreed to change the advertisement and run it again.
The Government has yet to fulfill its commitment to resolve the
legal status of unrecognized Arab villages. Eight villages have been
recognized officially since 1994, but nearly 100 more, of varying size
and with a total population of nearly 70,000 persons, remain in limbo.
Such villages have none of the infrastructure, such as electricity,
water, and sewers, provided to recognized communities. Private efforts
have supplied some unrecognized villages with water, and the courts
have ordered the provision of limited health and education services. Of
the eight villages that have been recognized, the Government has yet to
actually update the regional master plans or provide infrastructure
such as water and electricity. In 1998 the High Court of Justice
ordered the Ministry of Education to provide electricity to schools in
several unrecognized villages in the Negev.
Arab children make up about a quarter of the public school
population, but government resources for them are less than
proportionate to those for Jewish children. Many schools in Arab
communities are dilapidated and overcrowded, lack special education
services and counselors, have poor libraries, and have no sports
facilities. Arab groups also note that the public school curriculum
stresses the country's Jewish culture and heritage.
Israeli-Arab students also are not eligible to participate in a
special education program to provide academic assistance to students
from disadvantaged backgrounds. A petition was filed with the High
Court of Justice in May 1997 charging that the Ministry of Education's
refusal to provide this program to Israeli-Arab students was
discriminatory. The Attorney General's office agreed that the policy
constituted impermissible discrimination but asked for 5 years to
expand the program to Israeli-Arab students. The petitioners rejected
this proposal as being too slow. The court held hearings on the case
twice during 1998.
Unresolved problems of many years' standing also include claims by
Arab groups that land expropriation for public use has affected the
Arab community disproportionately; that Arabs have been allowed too
little input in planning decisions that affect their schools and
municipalities; that mosques and cemeteries belonging to the Islamic
Waqf (religious endowment) have been expropriated unjustly for public
use; and that successive governments have blocked the return to their
homes of persons displaced in the early years of the country's history.
The Government has yet to agree with the pre-1948 residents of the
northern villages of Bir Am and Ikrit, and their descendants, regarding
their long-time demand to be allowed to rebuild their houses; in the
meantime, permission has been given to Jewish settlements to increase
their land holdings in the disputed areas.
In 1991 the Government launched Operation Solomon, which airlifted
14,000 Ethiopian immigrants to Israel. Due to language and educational
barriers and cultural differences, many immigrants have had a difficult
time adjusting to life in their new home and many immigrants from
Ethiopia currently live in poverty. There were occasional reports of
societaldiscrimination during the year; however, there were far fewer
reports than in previous years.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers may join and establish labor
organizations freely. Most unions belong to Histadrut (the General
Federation of Labor in Israel), or to a much smaller rival federation,
the Histadrut Haovdim Haleumit (National Federation of Labor). These
organizations are independent of the Government. Histadrut members
democratically elect national and local officers, and officials of its
affiliated women's organization Na'amat, from political party lists of
those already in the union. Plant or enterprise committee members are
elected individually.
During the year, the Histadrut administration continued its drastic
reshaping of the labor federation, including further reductions in
staff and services, as Histadrut shifted its concentration to those
areas directly related to employment. At year's end, membership--which
once reached 1.65 million persons--stood at about 650,000.
The right to strike is exercised regularly. Unions must provide 15
days' notice prior to a strike unless otherwise specified in the
collective bargaining agreement. However, unauthorized strikes occur.
Strike leaders--even those organizing illegal strikes--are protected by
law. If essential public services are affected, the Government may
appeal to labor courts for back-to-work orders while the parties
continue negotiations. There were a number of strikes in both the
public and private sectors during the year by employees protesting the
effects of privatization. Worker dismissals and the terms of severance
arrangements were often the central issues of dispute.
Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip who work in Israel
may not join Israeli trade unions or organize their own unions in
Israel. Palestinian trade unions in the occupied territories are not
permitted to conduct activities in Israel (see Section 6.a. of the
annex). However, nonresident workers in the organized sector are
entitled to the protection of Histadrut work contracts and grievance
procedures. They may join, vote for, and be elected to shop-level
workers' committees if their numbers in individual establishments
exceed a minimum threshold. Palestinian participation in such
committees is minimal.
Labor laws apply to Palestinians in East Jerusalem and to the
Syrian Druze living on the Golan Heights.
Unions are free to affiliate with international organizations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Israeli workers
fully exercise their legal rights to organize and bargain collectively.
While there is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion
discrimination, the law against discrimination could be cited to
contest discrimination based on union membership. No antiunion
discrimination has been reported.
Nonresident workers may not organize their own unions or engage in
collective bargaining, but they are entitled to be represented by the
bargaining agent and protected by collective bargaining agreements.
They do not pay union membership fees, but are required to pay a 1
percent agency fee, which entitles them to union protection by
Histadrut's collective bargaining agreements. The Ministry of Labor may
extend collective bargaining agreements to nonunionized workplaces in
the same industrial sector. The Ministry of Labor also oversees
personal contracts in the unorganized sectors of the economy.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor, specifically including child forced labor,
and neither citizens nor nonresident Palestinians working in Israel
generally are subject to this practice; however, women are trafficked
for the purpose of prostitution, including forced prostitution (see
Section 6.f.). Civil rights groups charge that unscrupulous employers
often take advantage of illegal workers' lack of status to hold them in
conditions amounting to involuntary servitude (see Section 6.e.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Children who have attained the age of 15 years, and who
are liable to compulsory education under the Compulsory Education Law,
may not be employed unless they work as apprentices under the
Apprenticeship Law. Notwithstanding these provisions, children who are
at least 14 years old may be employed during official school holidays.
Employment of those 16 to 18 years of age is restricted to ensure time
for rest and education.
There are no reliable data on illegal child workers. They are
concentrated among Israel's Arab population and its most recent Jewish
immigrants. Illegal employment is found primarily in urban, light-
industrial areas. Children's rights groups have called for more
vigorous enforcement of child labor laws, combined with a parallel
effort to deal with the causes of illegal child labor. The Government
specifically prohibits forced child labor, and it generally does not
occur (see Section 6.f.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--Legislation in 1987 established
a minimum wage at 45 percent of the average wage, calculated
periodically and adjusted for cost of living increases. At year's end,
the minimum wage was about $700 (roughly 2,800 new Israeli shekels) per
month. The minimum wage often is supplemented by special allowances and
is generally sufficient to provide a worker and family with a decent
standard of living. Union officials have expressed concern over
enforcement of minimum wage regulations, particularly with respect to
employers of illegal nonresident workers, who sometimes pay less than
the minimum wage.
By law the maximum hours of work at regular pay are 47 hours a
week, 8 hours per day, and 7 hours on the day before the weekly rest,
which must be at least 36 consecutive hours and include the Sabbath. By
national collective agreements, the private sector established a
maximum 45-hour workweek in 1988. The public sector moved to a 5-day,
42\1/2\ hour workweek in 1989, while the military adopted it in 1993.
Employers must receive a government permit to hire nonresident
workers from the occupied territories, certifying that no citizen is
available for the job. All Palestinians from the occupied territories
are employed on a daily basis and, unless they are employed on shift
work, are not authorized to spend the night in Israel. At the end of
1998, the Government was considering a change in this provision to
allow Palestinian workers to remain overnight for a week at a time.
Palestinians without valid work permits are subject to arrest.
Nonresident workers are paid through the Employment Service of the
Ministry of Labor, which disburses wages and benefits collected from
employers. The Ministry deducts a 1 percent union fee and the workers'
required contributions to the National Insurance Institute (NII), the
agency that administers the Israeli social security system,
unemployment benefits, and other benefits. Despite these deductions,
Palestinian workers are not eligible for all NII benefits. They
continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel and the
bankruptcy of a worker's employer. They do not have access to
unemployment insurance, general disability payments, low-income
supplements, or child allotments. By contrast, Israeli settlers in the
occupied territories who work in Israel have the same benefits as other
Israeli workers. The International Labor Organization (ILO) has long
criticized this inequality in entitlements. The Government agreed to
transfer the NII fees collected from Palestinian workers to the
Palestinian Authority, which is to assume responsibility for all the
pensions and social benefits of Palestinians working in Israel.
Implementation of this change is still under way.
There was increased public debate over the role in the workplace
and society of foreign workers, who are estimated to number 200,000 or
more, perhaps half of them undocumented and employed illegally. The
majority of such workers come from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia,
and most are employed in the construction and agricultural sectors. The
law does not allow such workers citizenship or permanent residence. As
a result, they and their families live in a legal and social limbo.
Government deportations of such workers take place without benefit of
due process.
Along with union representatives, the Labor Inspection Service
enforces labor, health, and safety standards in the workplace, although
resource constraints affect overall enforcement. Legislation protects
the employment rights of safety delegateselected or appointed by the
workers. In cooperation with management, these delegates are
responsible for safety and health in the workplace.
Workers do not have the legal right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations without jeopardy to continued employment.
However, collective bargaining agreements provide some workers with
recourse through the work site labor committee. Any worker may
challenge unsafe work practices through government oversight and legal
agencies.
6.f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women for the purpose
of prostitution has become a significant problem in recent years.
According to a study by the Israel Women's Network, every year hundreds
of women from the former Soviet Union are brought to Israel by well-
organized mafia networks and forced through violence and threats to
work illegally as prostitutes.
There are no laws against trafficking in persons. Prostitution per
se is not illegal; however, the operation of brothels and organized sex
enterprises is outlawed. According to press reports, brothels are
ubiquitous despite being illegal, and police officials estimate that
there are 25,000 paid sexual transactions every day.
THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES
(including areas subject to the jurisdiction of the palestinian
authority)
Israel occupied the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and East
Jerusalem during the 1967 War. The West Bank and Gaza Strip now are
administered to varying extents by Israel and the Palestinian Authority
(PA). Pursuant to the May 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement and the September
1995 Interim Agreement, Israel transferred most responsibilities for
civil government in the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank to the
PA, while retaining responsibility in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for
external security; foreign relations; the overall security of Israelis,
including public order in the Israeli settlements; and certain other
matters. Negotiations to address the permanent status issues including
Jerusalem, borders, settlements, refugees, water, and other matters
convened for an initial session in May 1996, lapsed for several years,
and resumed late in the year pursuant to the September Sharm el-Sheikh
Memorandum.
Pursuant to the agreements signed between the PLO and Israel, the
PA by 1996 had full or partial control over most major Palestinian
population centers in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. In 1998 and during
the year, Israel implemented further redeployments, in partial
fulfillment of its obligations under the Interim Agreement, the Wye
River Memorandum, and the Sharm el-Sheikh Memorandum.
Israel and the Palestinian Authority have varying degrees of
control and jurisdiction over the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Israel
continues to control certain civil functions and is responsible for all
security in portions of the occupied territories categorized as Area C,
which includes the Israeli settlements. In areas known as Area B, the
PA has jurisdiction over civil affairs and shares security
responsibilities with Israel. The PA has control over civil affairs and
security in Area A. The PA also has jurisdiction over some civil
affairs in Area C. Accordingly, this report discusses the policies and
practices of both the Israeli Government and the PA in the areas where
they exercise jurisdiction and control.
Israel continues to exercise civil authority in some areas of the
West Bank through the Israeli Ministry of Defense's Office of
Coordination and Liaison, known by the Hebrew acronym MATAK,which
replaced the now defunct Civil Administration (CIVAD). The
approximately 170,000 Israeli settlers living in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip are subject to Israeli law and are treated better by Israeli
authorities than are Palestinians. The body of law governing
Palestinians in the Israeli-controlled portions of the territories
derives from Ottoman, British Mandate, Jordanian, and Egyptian law, and
Israeli military orders. Laws and regulations promulgated by the PA
also are in force. The international community considers Israel's
authority in the occupied territories to be subject to the Hague
Regulations of 1907 and the 1949 Geneva Convention relating to the
Protection of Civilians in Time of War. The Israeli Government
considers the Hague Regulations applicable and states that it observes
the Geneva Convention's humanitarian provisions.
In January 1996, Palestinians chose their first popularly elected
Government in democratic elections, which generally were well-
conducted. The 88-member Council and the Chairman of the Executive
Authority were elected. The PA also has a cabinet of 30 ministers. PA
Chairman Yasir Arafat continues to dominate the affairs of government
and to make major decisions. Most senior government positions in the PA
are held by individuals who are members of, or loyal to, Arafat's Fatah
faction of the PLO. The Council meets regularly and discusses a range
of issues significant to the Palestinian people and the development of
an open, democratic society in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Political
commentators and members of the Council complain that it does not have
sufficient influence on policy or the behavior of the executive. The PA
judiciary is subject to executive influence.
Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza Strip consist of
the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF); the General Security Service (GSS or
Shin Bet); the Israeli National Police (INP); and the paramilitary
border police. Israeli military courts try Palestinians accused of
committing security crimes in Israeli-controlled areas. Members of the
Israeli security forces committed human rights abuses.
The Palestinian Police Force (PPF) was established in May 1994 and
includes the Palestinian Public Security Force; the Palestinian Civil
Police; the Preventive Security Force (PSF); the General Intelligence
Service, or Mukhabarat; the Palestinian Presidential Security Force;
emergency services and rescue; and the Palestinian Coastal Police.
Other quasi-military security organizations, such as the military
intelligence organization, also exercise de facto law enforcement
powers. Palestinian police are responsible for security and law
enforcement for Palestinians and other non-Israelis in PA-controlled
areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Israeli settlers in the occupied
territories are not subject to PA security force jurisdiction. Members
of the PA security forces committed human rights abuses.
The economy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is small, poorly
developed, and highly dependent on Israel. The economy relies on
agriculture, services, and to a lesser extent, light manufacturing.
Israel restricts the movement of persons and products into Israel and
Jerusalem from the West Bank and Gaza. In addition, since 1993 Israel
has applied ``closures,'' or enhanced restrictions, on the movement of
persons and products for lengthy periods following terrorist attacks.
Israel enforced its closure policy less stringently than it did in
1998. Palestinians and their vehicles require permits to cross from the
West Bank or Gaza into Israel and Jerusalem. Many West Bank and Gaza
workers are employed at day jobs in Israel and Jerusalem, making their
employment vulnerable to disruption. On occasion, Israel imposes a
tightened version of closure in the wake of terrorist incidents, and
when it believes that there is an increased likelihood of terrorist
attacks or unrest in the occupied territories. Comprehensive, tightened
closures also were instituted during major Israeli holidays. During
these times, Israel cancels all travel permits and prevents
Palestinians--even those with valid work permits--from entering Israel
or Jerusalem. Israel imposed 15 days of tightened, comprehensive
closure during the year; this represents a decrease in comprehensive
closure days compared with the previous year. In past years, in
response to changes in the security environment, the Israeli Government
also periodically prohibited most travel between certain towns and
villages within the West Bank (an ``internal'' closure), hampering the
flow of goods and persons; however, this did not occur during the year.
Palestinians who travel between some cities in the West Bank must pass
through Israeli-controlled checkpoints where they sometimes are
subjected to verbal and physical harassment by Israeli security
personnel.
Both Israel and the PA were responsible for serious human rights
abuses; however, while there were several marked improvements in
Israel's human rights record in the occupied territories, the PA's
human rights record worsened in several areas. Israelisecurity forces
committed a number of human rights abuses during the year. Several
Palestinians were killed in violent confrontations with Israeli
security units, who at times used live ammunition against Palestinian
demonstrators and shot at demonstrators or individuals
indiscriminately. Israeli security forces abused Palestinians suspected
of security offenses. However, a landmark decision by the Israeli High
Court of Justice in September prohibited the use of a variety of
abusive practices, including violent shaking, painful shackling in
contorted positions, sleep deprivation for extended periods of time,
and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures. Following the ruling,
there were no credible reports of such abuse by the security forces.
Prison conditions are poor, and Israeli authorities arbitrarily arrest
and detain persons. Prolonged detention, limits on due process, and
infringements on privacy rights remained problems. Israeli authorities
placed some limits on freedom of assembly and movement.
PA security forces committed numerous serious human rights abuses
during the year. PA security officials committed abuse, and in some
cases torture, against prisoners and detainees. Palestinian security
forces killed three persons in violent confrontations. PA security
forces used excessive force, and in some cases, live ammunition against
Palestinian demonstrators and shot at demonstrators and individuals
indiscriminately. Two other Palestinians died in PA custody. PA police
officials claim that Ramadam Abu Shahin died in June after being
accidentally shot during interrogation. Muhammad Ahmed Shreiteh died in
PA police custody in Hebron. Family members alleged that he was
tortured while in custody; the PA did not perform an autopsy or
investigate his death. Due largely to the decrease in terrorist attacks
during the year, PA security forces made fewer arrests than in previous
years; however, there continue to be credible accounts of torture and
abuse of prisoners and detainees. PA prison conditions are very poor.
PA security forces arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and prolonged
detention is a problem.
Lack of due process is a problem. The courts are inefficient, lack
staff and resources, and do not ensure fair and expeditious trials. The
PA executive and security services frequently ignore or fail to carry
out court decisions. Lack of due process is a serious problem in the
PA's state security courts. PA security forces infringed on citizens'
right to privacy. Although the PA claims to respect its citizens' right
to express themselves freely, it limited freedom of speech and of the
press. The PA continued to harass, detain, and abuse journalists. PA
harassment led many Palestinian commentators, reporters, and critics to
practice self-censorship. The PA placed some limits on freedom of
assembly and association. Violence against women and ``honor killings''
persist. Societal discrimination against women and the disabled is a
problem. Child labor is a problem.
During the year, one Palestinian died in an attack perpetrated by
Israelis, while Israeli civilians, including settlers, harass and
attack Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In general,
settlers are not prosecuted for these acts and rarely serve prison
sentences when convicted of a crime against Palestinians.
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip continued to harass,
abuse, and attack Israelis, especially settlers. Extremist Palestinian
groups and individuals, including the militant Islamic Resistance
Movement (HAMAS) and the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), continued their
efforts to undermine the authority of the PA and halt progress in the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process by wounding Israelis in 3 attacks in
the occupied territories and Israel.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Members of the
Israeli security forces killed three Palestinians at military
checkpoints and roadblocks inside the occupied territories. In these
cases, Israeli authorities stated that the individuals were shot after
failing to obey orders to halt. Palestinians dispute these accounts and
charge that Israeli soldiers used excessive and unnecessary force.
On June 3, Israeli soldiers shot and killed Alla Yusef Mahmud Abu
Sharkh at the Samu checkpoint near Hebron while he allegedly was trying
to avoid stopping at the checkpoint.
On October 1, Khader Shaleh 'Afaneh Badwan was shot and killed by
Israeli police personnel in Jerusalem while trying to escapepolice in a
stolen car. Palestinian bystanders claim that police shot Badwan after
he already had surrendered; Israeli police personnel say that they are
investigating the incident.
On October 25, an IDF soldier shot and killed Musa Faiz Helail, a
souvenir vendor, at Rachel's Tomb, a Jewish religious site in
Bethlehem. The IDF soldier said that he shot Helail because he was
attempting to stab him. Palestinian bystanders dispute this claim and
assert that Helail did not try to harm the soldier.
Israeli security units also shot and killed three Palestinians who
they state were engaged in acts of terrorism. On January 13, Israeli
undercover police shot and killed a suspected Palestinian terrorist in
a shootout south of Hebron in which an Israeli policeman also died. A
Palestinian and an Israeli policeman also were wounded in the
confrontation. In December Israeli security forces shot and killed two
members of HAMAS in a Beit Awa shootout.
During the year, violent clashes between Palestinian demonstrators
and Israeli security forces resulted in two Palestinian deaths and a
number of wounded. IDF regulations permit the use of both rubber-coated
metal bullets and live ammunition only when a soldier's life is in
immediate danger, to halt fleeing suspects, to disperse a violent
demonstration, or to fire on an ``individual unlawfully carrying
firearms.'' According to policy, soldiers should direct fire at the
legs only and may fire at a fleeing suspect only if they believe that a
serious felony has occurred and they have exhausted other means to
apprehend the suspect. It is forbidden to open fire in the direction of
children or women, even in cases of severe public disorder, unless
there is an immediate and obvious danger to a soldier's life. Israeli
soldiers and police sometimes used live ammunition or rubber-coated
metal bullets, which can be lethal, in situations other than when their
lives were in danger and sometimes shot suspects in the upper body and
head.
On January 6, Israeli soldiers in Hebron shot and killed Bader
Qawasmeh with live ammunition during a curfew in the Israeli-controlled
section of the town. IDF soldiers say that they shot Qawasmeh by
accident and that they believed that the toy gun he was playing with
was real.
On January 26, Israeli policemen shot and killed Zaki Nur Al-Din
`Ubayd during a clash between soldiers and Palestinians who were
protesting the demolition of a house in an East Jerusalem neighborhood.
`Ubayd reportedly was shot in the upper body with a rubber-coated metal
bullet.
In May Mahmud Abu Hajar, 18, died from gunshot wounds sustained in
March 1994. Israeli soldiers had shot Hajar in the head during a
confrontation and he had been in a coma since that time.
One Palestinian security detainee died in an Israeli prison after
suffering a heart attack (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of the Israel
report).
Palestinian security forces shot and killed three Palestinians
during confrontations this year. On March 10, Palestinian security
forces shot and killed Ala Jumaa Al-hams, age 17, and Khamis Mahmoud
Salama, age 17, during riots in the Gaza Strip; Palestinians were
protesting the fact that the PA security court sentenced one security
official to death and two others to long prison terms for killing
another PA security official (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.). Human rights
organizations charged that PA security forces used excessive force.
Palestinian security forces wounded between 40 and 70 other Palestinian
demonstrators during confrontations the following day (see Section
1.c.).
During the year, two Palestinians died in PA custody. On June 27,
23-year-old Ramadan Abu Shahin of Nablus was shot and killed while
being interrogated by Palestinian police at a police station in the
West Bank town of Anabta; Abu Shahin was arrested at a PA roadblock
because he was riding in a stolen car. PA officials say that in the
course of their interrogation, Abu Shahin began pushing a police
officer, who pushed him back while holding an AK-47 assault rifle.
According to PA officials, the rifle accidentally went off, killing
Shahin (see Section 1.c.). In December a PA military court found the
police officer guilty of murder and sentenced him to 8 years in prison.
On October 4, 33-year-old Muhammad Ahmad Shreiteh died in PA
custody in Hebron. According to prison officials, he died of a heart
attack; however, family members alleged to one human rights
organization that he was tortured while in PA police custody. The PA
did not perform an autopsy and PA officials did not respond to human
rights organizations' queries about the death (see Section 1.c.).
On February 26, Colonel Ahmad Atiyah Abu-Mustafa of Gaza was
executed after the PA's state security court convicted him of raping a
young boy. Human rights groups criticized the court's decision for
ignoring due process (see Section 1.e.).
On February 11, Dr. Naeelah Hamdan Aied Garaeen was stabbed to
death near the Old City of Jerusalem, possibly by an unidentified
``serial stabber'' who had killed a number of Palestinians in Jerusalem
over the past few years. Later that same day, an unidentified
Palestinian stabbed an Israeli bank guard in East Jerusalem, possibly
in retaliation (see Section 1.c.).
During the year, the Palestinian Authority's state security court
sentenced Jamil Munir Jadallah to life in prison for killing two
Israelis in 1998. His lawyer complained that he had not had sufficient
time to prepare his case.
On January 13, one undercover Israeli border policeman was killed
and one was wounded in a shootout near Hebron with members of the
radical HAMAS group. One HAMAS terrorist was killed and one was wounded
in the confrontation.
In July an Israeli military court sentenced Salem Sarsour, a member
of HAMAS to three consecutive life terms in prison for the 1998 killing
of an elderly rabbi and for wounding dozens of soldiers and civilians
in two grenade attacks.
b. Disappearance.--Two Palestinians who disappeared under
suspicious circumstances in 1997 remained unaccounted for during the
year. Shafiq Abdul Wahhab, a suspected land dealer, disappeared in 1997
and his whereabouts remain unknown. The PA established a committee in
1997 to investigate his disappearance but has failed to locate him.
Taysir Hmiadan Ziyadi, a Palestinian who married an Israeli woman in
1992 and received an Israeli identification card in 1996, disappeared
in July 1997 during a trip to the Gaza Strip. His whereabouts remain
unknown.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Israeli laws and administrative regulations prohibit the
physical abuse of detainees; however, Israeli security forces abused,
and in some cases tortured, Palestinians suspected of security
offenses, and lawyers for security prisoners continued to file numerous
challenges of the use of torture. However, a landmark decision by the
Israeli High Court of Justice in September prohibited the use of a
variety of abusive practices, including violent shaking, painful
shackling in contorted positions, sleep deprivation for extended
periods of time, and prolonged exposure to extreme temperatures.
Following the ruling, there were no credible reports of such abuses by
security forces. The High Court categorically rejected the Israeli
Government's contention that these practices were ``moderate physical
pressure,'' and therefore permissible under the law, though the Court
left open the possibility that such practices might be acceptable if
specifically authorized by new legislation.
Prior to the High Court's decision, Israeli laws and administrative
regulations prohibiting the physical abuse of detainees were not
enforced in security cases (see Section 1.c. of the Israel report). The
head of the GSS was empowered by government regulation to authorize
security officers to use ``moderate physical and psychological
pressure'' (which includes violent shaking) while interrogating
detainees. These practices often led to excesses.
Most convictions in security cases before Israeli courts are based
on confessions. A detainee may not have contact with a lawyer until
after interrogation, a process that may last days or weeks. The
Government does not allow International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC)
representatives access to detainees until the 14th day of detention.
This prolonged incommunicado detention contributes to the likelihood of
abuse. Detainees sometimes claim in court that their confessions are
coerced, but judges rarely exclude such confessions. It is likely that
some Palestinian detainees fail to make complaints either from fear of
retribution or because they assume that such complaints would be
ignored. During the year, there were no known cases in which a
confession was thrown out because of improper means of investigation or
interrogation.
Israeli authorities also sometimes treat Palestinians in an abusive
manner at checkpoints, subjecting them to verbal and physical
harassment.
Israeli soldiers killed and wounded several Palestinians at
checkpoints (see Section l.a.).
Israeli security forces shot and injured over a dozen Palestinians
during confrontations. In March Israeli soldiers shot and wounded two
Palestinians in Nablus who were protesting the uprooting of Palestinian
olive trees.
On April 10, Israeli security forces shot and wounded two Gazan
fisherman; the security forces charged that they were fishing in a
prohibited zone and disobeyed orders to stop their boat.
In June Israeli security forces shot and wounded 15 Palestinians in
the West Bank and 2 in the Gaza Strip during the ``days of rage''
demonstrations protesting Israeli settlement activity in the occupied
territories (see Section 2.b.).
In July IDF soldiers shot and wounded nine Palestinians who stoned
an Israeli military outpost in the Gaza Strip.
On November 20, Israeli soldiers shot and wounded 10 Palestinians
in the West Bank during a protest organized by the Fatah Youth
Organization to call for the release of Palestinian prisoners (see
Section 2.b.).
The PA does not prohibit by law the use of torture or force against
detainees. Human rights monitors report that PA security forces were
responsible for torture and widespread abuse of Palestinian detainees.
Such abuse generally took place after arrest and during interrogation.
In 1995 the Gaza civil police commander issued to police officers in
the West Bank and Gaza a directive forbidding torture during
interrogation and directing the security forces to observe the rights
of all detainees. However, the directive does not have the force of
law; Palestinian security officers have not been issued formal
guidelines on the proper conduct of interrogations. The PA lacks
adequate equipment to collect and use evidence, and convictions are
based largely on confessions. The high premium put on confessions
heightens the possibility of abuse.
PA security officials abuse prisoners by threatening, hooding,
beating, and tying detainees in painful positions, forcing them to
stand for long periods of time, depriving them of sleep and food, and
burning detainees with cigarettes and hot instruments. Palestinians
also alleged that they had been violently shaken while in PA custody.
International human rights monitoring groups have documented widespread
arbitrary and abusive conduct by the PA. Human rights groups say that
use of torture is widespread and not restricted to those persons
detained on security charges. Human rights groups state that those
Palestinians who are suspected of belonging to radical Islamic groups
are more likely to be treated poorly. In August Sami Naufal, a leader
of the Islamic National Salvation Front, was arrested and detained for
a week. He reportedly was beaten, denied sleep, held in painful and
awkward positions, and beaten on the feet. In March General
Intelligence forces arrested, detained, and physically abused a 15-
year-old boy after his father escaped from prison (see Section 1.d.).
During the year, two Palestinians died in PA custody. In one case,
family members claim that the prisoner died after being tortured (see
Section l.a.). Despite its promises to do so, the PA has failed to
publicize the results of its investigations or to release the findings
of its investigations to diplomats or human rights organizations.
In March Palestinian security forces wounded 40 to 70 Palestinian
demonstrators during riots in the Gaza Strip (see Sections 1.a. and
2.b.).
During the year, there were several allegations that corrupt PA
security officials abused their authority and detained persons in order
to extort money from them and their families (see Sections 1.d. and
1.e.).
In November two signatories of a petition that accused the PA of
corruption and failing to win significant gains from the peace process
(see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.) were attacked. One of the signatories was
attacked and wounded by unidentified assailants and the other was
beaten by members of the General Intelligence Organization. The
director of a human rights organization who signed a statement
supporting the petition was subsequently hit on the head with a stone
by unknown assailants.
Israeli settlers harass and threaten Palestinians in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip. Human rights groups received several dozen reports
during the year that Israeli settlers in the West Bank beat
Palestinians and destroyed the property of Palestinians living or
farming near Israeli settlements. For example, in December unidentified
assailants threw a carpenter's file out of a building owned by
settlers; the file pierced the skull of Hamad Diyis as he walked by. In
general, settlers are not prosecuted for these crimes and rarely serve
prison sentences even when convicted of a crime.
Palestinians continued to harass, abuse, and attack Israelis,
especially settlers. While overall harassment of Israeli civilians by
Palestinians was lower than in previous years, several Israelis were
injured when Palestinians stoned Israeli cars in the West Bank and
Gaza. During the year, members of extremist Palestinian groups attacked
and wounded several Israelis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, including
shooting at Israeli motorists.
On January 4, an unidentified Palestinian shot at a bus carrying
school teachers from the Kiryat Arba settlement to Hebron, wounding two
women.
In January some Palestinians threw two firebombs at an Israeli
police station to protest government approval of the construction of
housing units for Jews in a Palestinian-populated Jerusalem
neighborhood.
On February 11, a Palestinian man stabbed and wounded an Israeli
bank guard in East Jerusalem, possibly in retaliation for the killing
of a Palestinian earlier in the day (see Section 1.a.).
On August 3, two Jewish settlers were shot and wounded in Hebron by
an unidentified Palestinian.
On October 30, an unidentified Palestinian gunman near the West
Bank village of Tarqumiyah shot at a bus transporting Israeli tourists,
injuring five persons, including children.
Prison conditions in Israeli facilities are poor. Facilities are
overcrowded, sanitation is poor, and medical care is inadequate.
Palestinians inmates held strikes and protests in support of a number
of causes and to protest prison conditions throughout the year.
Palestinians in Israeli prisons also held several strikes to protest
detention without trial, limits on visits by family members or lawyers,
and abuse by prison officials. In some Israeli prisons, authorities now
allow Palestinian prisoners to shower every day, whereas in the past
they were only allowed to bathe once every several days.
One Palestinian prisoner died in Israeli custody during the year
due to a heart attack (see Section 1.a. and Sections 1.a. and 1.c. of
the Israel report).
Israel permits independent monitoring of prison conditions,
although human rights groups and diplomats sometimes encounter
difficulties gaining access to specific detainees.
Prison conditions in PA facilities continue to be very poor. In
many cases, facilities are overcrowded, and very old, dilapidated, and
neglected. Food and clothing for prisoners is inadequate and must be
supplemented by donations from families and humanitarian groups.
Palestinian inmates held periodic strikes and protests throughout the
year in support of a number of causes and to protest prison conditions
and the practice of administrative detention. In some PA prisons, an
effort is made to house religious prisoners together. Male and female
inmates are housed separately.
During the year, two Palestinians died in PA custody (see Section
1.a.).
The PA permits independent monitoring of its prisons, although
human rights groups and lawyers encountered difficulties arranging
visits or gaining access to specific detainees. Human rights
organizations say that their ability to visit PA jails and detention
centers varies depending on which security organization controls the
facility. Human rights organizations say that the police, Preventive
Security Force, and Mukhabarat were generally cooperative in allowing
them to inspect facilities and visit prisoners and detainees. However,
they said that the Military Intelligence Organization was less
responsive to such requests. Human rights monitors say that prison
authorities are sometimes capricious in permitting them access to PA
lock-ups and they rarely are permitted to see inmates while they are
under interrogation. In June human rights groups complained that the
Gaza police commander temporarily banned them from visiting clients in
PA prisons.
Pursuant to an agreement signed in September 1996, the ICRC
conducts prison visits but can be denied access to a detainee for 14
days. If abuses occur, they frequently happen during this 2-week
period.
Some PA security organizations, including the General Intelligence
Organization in the West Bank and the police, have appointed officials
to act as liaisons with human rights groups. These officers claim that
they meet with human rights organizations and members of the diplomatic
community to discuss human rights cases.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Israeli authorities
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. Any Israeli policeman or border
guard may arrest without warrant a person who has committed, or is
suspected of having committed, a criminal or security offense in the
occupied territories, except for areas under exclusive PA control.
Israeli soldiers also may arrest without warrant Palestinians and
hold them for questioning for the same reasons. Most of these arbitrary
arrests and detentions are for alleged security offenses. Persons
arrested for common crimes usually are provided with a statement of
charges and access to an attorney and may apply for bail. However,
these procedures sometimes are delayed.
Israeli authorities have issued special summonses for security
offenses; however, there were no reports that this occurred during the
year. Israeli military order 1369 stipulates a 7-year prison term for
anyone who does not respond to a special summons delivered to a family
member or posted in the MATAK office nearest the suspect's home
address. There were no reports during the year that anyone was
convicted of failing to respond to a summons. Bail rarely is available
to those arrested for security offenses. Although Israeli law does not
allow Israelis under the age of 16 to be tried as adults, Israeli
courts treat Palestinians over the age of 12 as adults. Defense for
Children International (DCI) reported that 220 Palestinian minors were
arrested and detained in Israeli prisons during the year, and that at
year's end, there were 75 minors in Israeli prisons.
Israeli authorities may hold persons in custody without a warrant
for 96 hours; they must be released unless a warrant is issued.
Prearraignment detention can last up to 11 days for Palestinians
arrested in the occupied territories and up to 8 days for minors and
those accused of less serious offenses. Authorities must obtain a court
order for longer administrative detentions--up to 6-months from the
date of arrest. At hearings to extend detention for interrogation
purposes, detainees are entitled to be represented by counsel, although
the defense attorney often is not allowed to see or hear the evidence
against his client. Detainees either are released at the end of the
court-ordered detention or sent to administrative detention if they are
not indicted. If there is an indictment, a judge may order indefinite
detention until the end of the trial. Israeli regulations permit
detainees to be held in isolation during interrogation. Detainees have
the right to appeal continued detention.
Although a detainee generally has the right to consult with a
lawyer as soon as possible, in security cases authorities may delay
access to counsel for up to 15 days. Higher-ranking officials or judges
may extend this period. Access to counsel is denied routinely while a
suspect is being interrogated, which sometimes can last several weeks.
Authorities must inform detainees of their right to an attorney and
whether there are any orders prohibiting such contact.
A number of factors hamper contacts by Palestinians in Israeli
prison and detention facilities with their lawyers, families, and human
rights organizations. The Israeli Government routinely transfers
Palestinians arrested in Israeli-controlled areas of the occupied
territories to facilities in Israel, especially the prison in Ashkelon
and the military detention center in Megiddo, near Afula. Israeli
authorities have been known to schedule appointments between attorneys
and their detained clients, only to move the clients to another prison
prior to the meetings. Authorities reportedly use such tactics to delay
lawyer-client meetings for as long as 90 days. Palestinian lawyers also
have trouble traveling to see their clients during Israeli-imposed
closures. Israel requires Palestinian attorneys to acquire permits to
enter Israel to see their clients held in prisons there. Human rights
groups say that Palestinian lawyers from the Gaza Strip have a harder
time obtaining these permits than their West Bank counterparts and that
they are denied entry into Israel more frequently than WestBank
lawyers. Relatives of Palestinian prisoners also complain that
sometimes they only learn that visitation rights are canceled when they
arrive at the prison following a trip of many hours from the occupied
territories.
Family access to Palestinian prisoners improved during the year.
Nevertheless, male family members between 16 and 40 years of age, and
any family members with security records, are still barred from
visiting relatives in facilities in Israel. The ICRC reported that it
was easier than in previous years for families to visit inmates in
Israeli jails and detention centers in part because Israel imposed
fewer days of ``tightened closure'' on the occupied territories.
Israeli authorities claim that they attempt to post notification of
arrest within 48 hours. Nevertheless, Palestinian suspects often are
kept incommunicado for longer than 48 hours. Even if an arrest becomes
known, it is often difficult to get information on where a detainee is
being held or whether he has access to an attorney. Palestinians
generally locate detained family members through their own efforts.
Palestinians can check with a local ICRC office to determine whether it
has information on the whereabouts of a family member. A senior officer
may delay for up to 12 days notification of arrest to immediate family
members and attorneys. A military commander may appeal to a judge to
extend this period in security cases for an unlimited time.
Evidence used at hearings for administrative detentions is secret
and unavailable to the detainee or his attorney. During hearings to
appeal detention orders, the detainee and defense lawyer are required
to leave the courtroom when secret evidence is presented. Israeli
authorities maintain that they are unable to present evidence in open
court because doing so would compromise the method of acquiring the
evidence. In July 1998, the High Court of Justice ruled that judges,
rather than military officials, can renew administrative detention
orders beyond a 6-month period. Detainees may appeal detention orders,
or the renewal of a detention order, before a military judge, but their
chances for success are very limited. During the year, some succeeded
in persuading the courts to shorten their detentions.
The overall number of Palestinian prisoners and administrative
detainees in Israeli jails fell for the third straight year.
Human rights organizations attribute this drop to the continuing
absence of major terrorist attacks; in the past, Israeli officials
arrested hundreds of Palestinians suspected of terrorist links after
major terrorist attacks. In addition, Israel released 350 Palestinian
security prisoners pursuant to its obligations under the Sharm el-
Sheikh Memorandum. At year's end, 1,354 Palestinian prisoners and
detainees were incarcerated in Israeli prisons, military detention
centers, and holding centers, a decrease from 1,634 in 1998. According
to the Government, 18 Palestinians were in administrative detention at
year's end, compared with 83 at the end of 1998. Several have been held
for more than 1 year.
Many Palestinians under administrative detention during the past 3
years have had their detention orders renewed repeatedly without
meaningful chance of appeal. In July the Israeli Government released
the longest-serving Palestinian from administrative detention. Usama
Barham, a West Bank Palestinian, was arrested in September 1993 for his
affiliation with the terrorist Palestine Islamic Jihad organization and
had been held in continuous administrative detention. His release
followed an intense effort by human rights organizations and Israeli
activists.
PA security forces arbitrarily arrested and detained persons. The
PA does not have a uniform law on administrative detention, and
security officials do not always adhere to the existing laws in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. Laws applicable in Gaza, which do not apply
to the West Bank, stipulate that detainees held without charge be
released within 48 hours. These laws allow the Attorney General to
extend the detention period to a maximum of 90 days during
investigations. Human rights organizations and the PA Ministry of
Justice assert that PA security officials do not always adhere to this
regulation. Prevailing law in the West Bank allows a suspect to be
detained for 24 hours before being charged. The Attorney General may
extend the detention period.
The PA Chairman, Yasir Arafat, has not signed the Basic Law and
other laws passed by the Palestinian Council (PC) since 1996, which
were designed to limit executive branch abuses and to delineate
safeguards for citizens. This lack of safeguards has contributed to the
tendency of PA security forces to refuse to carry out High Court orders
to release detainees.
In some cases, the High Court of Justice ordered the release of
prisoners detained for years without trial, and PA security forces
released the prisoners several months or a year later. In November
1997, the High Court ordered the release of HAMAS activist Mahmud
Muslah; Muslah remained in detention at year's end. In February the
High Court ordered the release of Wa'el Farraj, who has been detained
without charges since 1996; Farraj remained in detention at year's end.
PA security forces illegally held 14-year-old Yasser Allan Wahidi
in detention for 53 days before releasing him on January 17.
According to the Palestinian Independent Commission for Citizens
Rights, the High Court ordered approximately 60 detainees released
during the year. Of these, only a handful were released from jail.
Human rights groups estimate that the PA has held approximately 150
prisoners for more than a year without charge, and that the total
number of Palestinians in PA jails reached 842 by year's end.
In January nearly 70 detainees in the PA-run Jneid Prison staged a
hunger strike to protest being held for an extended period of time
without charge or trial. In February hundreds of Palestinians held
demonstrations in Nablus, Hebron, and Gaza to demand the release of
administrative detainees in PA prison facilities (see Section 2.b.).
Palestinian security forces sometimes detained or placed under
house arrest the relatives of alleged security criminals. On March 2,
the General Intelligence Forces arrested and detained for 20 days 15-
year-old Bilal Yehya Al-Ghoul after his father, held for terrorist
activity, escaped from a Gaza prison. The minor reported that he was
subjected to abuse and torture during his detention (see Section 1.c.).
Lawyers and PA judicial officials acknowledge that, in
contravention of the law, PA security services sometimes arrest and
detain persons without informing judicial officials. During the year,
there were allegations that PA security officials in Gaza arrested and
detained Palestinians in order to extort money from them and their
families. A Gazan gold merchant, accused of fraud and tax evasion, was
detained by security officials without trial for weeks and finally
released only after he paid a large ``fine'' that was levied by a state
security court (see Section 1.e.).
PA authorities generally permit prisoners to receive visits from
family members, attorneys, and human rights monitors, except for
prisoners held for alleged security offenses. PA security officials do
not always permit lawyers to see their clients. In principle detainees
may notify their families of their arrest, but this is not always
permitted.
Human rights organizations report that lawyers sometimes were
denied access to their clients during the year. The Society for the
Protection of Human Rights and the Environment (LAW) and the
Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) reported that they were
denied access to clients detained in Gaza prisons because of their
reports about human rights violations committed by PA officials against
detainees (see Section 4).
PA security services have overlapping or unclear mandates that
often complicate the protection of human rights. Under existing law in
the West Bank, only the PA's civil police force is authorized to make
arrests. In practice all security forces are known to detain persons at
various times. The operating procedures and regulations for the conduct
of PA security personnel in the various services still are not well
developed and have not yet been made fully available to the public.
There are many detention facilities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
administered by the overlapping PA security services, a situation that
complicates the ability of families, lawyers, and even the Ministry of
Justice to track detainees' whereabouts. Security services, including
Preventive Security, General Intelligence, Military Intelligence, and
the Coast Guard have their own interrogation and detention facilities.
In general these services do not, or only sporadically, inform families
of a relative's arrest. Most PA security officers remain ignorant of
proper arrest, detention, and interrogation procedures, as well as
basic human rights standards. Human rights groups continue to provide
basic human rights training to PA security services. During the year,
human rights groups provided training to representatives of all the PA
security services, including the PA Military Intelligence Service.
During the year, at least 250 PA security officials participated in
human rights courses, bringing the total number of security officials
who have graduated from human rights courses to more than 1,550since
the PA's establishment in 1994, according to human rights groups.
PA security forces continued to harass and arbitrarily arrest and
detain journalists, political activists, and human rights advocates,
who criticized the PA and its policies. A number of journalists were
arrested and detained and newspapers and television stations were shut
down for expressing views or covering topics unacceptable to the
Palestinian Authority (see Section 2.a.).
In November PA security forces arrested eight persons and placed
two under house arrest who were signatories of a petition that accused
the PA of corruption and failing to win significant gains from the
peace process. The PA did not arrest the nine members of the
Palestinian Council who also signed the petition and enjoyed
parliamentary immunity (see Section 2.a.). On December 19, the PA
released six of the signatories; however, 2 remained in detention at
year's end.
Neither the Israeli Government nor the PA forcibly deported any
Palestinians from the occupied territories during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Israeli law provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects this provision.
However, in the past, the Israeli judiciary routinely acquiesced to the
Government's position in security cases. The landmark Israeli High
Court ruling in September (see Section 1.c.) marked a major change in
this practice. Palestinians accused by Israel of security offenses in
Israeli-controlled areas of the occupied territories are tried in
Israeli military courts. Security offenses are defined broadly and may
include charges of political activity, such as membership in outlawed
organizations. Charges are brought by military prosecutors. Serious
charges are tried before three-judge panels; lesser offenses are tried
before one judge. Defendants have the right to counsel and to appeal
verdicts to the Court of Military Appeals, which may accept appeals
based on the law applied in the case, the sentence, or both. The right
of appeal does not apply in all cases and sometimes requires court
permission. The Israeli military courts rarely acquit Palestinians of
security offenses, but sentences sometimes are reduced on appeal.
Trials sometimes are delayed for several reasons: Witnesses,
including Israeli military or police officers, do not appear; the
defendant is not brought to court; files are lost; or attorneys fail to
appear, sometimes because they have not been informed of the trial date
or because of travel restrictions on Palestinian lawyers. These delays
add pressure on defendants to plead guilty to minor offenses; if they
do, an ``expedited'' trial may be held, in which a charge sheet is
drawn up within 48 hours and a court hearing scheduled within days.
By law most Israeli military trials are public, although access is
limited. Diplomats are allowed to attend military court proceedings
involving foreign citizens, but there have been delays in gaining
admission. Most convictions in military courts are based on
confessions. Evidence that is not available to the defendant or his
attorney may be used in court to convict persons of security offenses.
There is frequently no testimony provided by Palestinian witnesses
either for or against Palestinians on trial. Israeli authorities
maintain that this is due to the refusal of Palestinians to cooperate
with the authorities. Physical and psychological pressures and reduced
sentences for those who confess can induce security detainees to sign
confessions. Confessions usually are given in Arabic but translated
into Hebrew for the record because, authorities maintain, many Israeli
court personnel speak Arabic but few read it. Palestinian detainees
seldom read Hebrew and therefore often sign confessions that they
cannot read.
Crowded facilities and poor arrangements for attorney-client
consultations in prisons hinder legal defense efforts. Appointments to
see clients are difficult to arrange, and prison authorities often fail
to produce clients for scheduled appointments.
Israeli settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip accused of
security and ordinary criminal offenses are tried under Israeli law in
the nearest Israeli district court. Civilian judges preside, and the
standards of due process and admissibility of evidence are governed by
the laws of Israel, not military orders. Settlers convicted in Israeli
courts of crimes against Palestinians regularly receive lighter
punishment than Palestinians convicted in Israeli courts of similar
crimes against either Israelis or other Palestinians.
There were no reports that the Israeli Government held political
prisoners.
The PA courts are inefficient, lack staff and resources, and as a
result often do not ensure fair and expeditious trials, and the PA
executive and security services frequently ignore or fail to carry out
court decisions.
The PA inherited a court system based on structures and legal codes
predating the 1967 Israeli occupation. In the civil court system, cases
initially are tried in courts of first instance. There are two appeals
courts, one located in Gaza City and the other in Ramallah, which
handle appeals from the lower courts. The appeals courts also function
as the Palestinian High Court. The decisions of the High Court are not
always respected by the executive or enforced by the Palestinian
security agencies. In 1995 the PA established state security courts in
Gaza and the West Bank to try cases involving security issues. Three
military judges preside over each court. A senior police official heads
the state security court in Jericho, and three judges preside over it.
There is no right of appeal, but the PA Chairman reviews the court's
findings and he may confirm or reject the decision. The PA Ministry of
Justice has no jurisdiction over the state security courts, which are
subordinate only to the Chairman.
One death sentence was carried out in February (see Section 1.a.),
but serious questions were raised about lack of due process in the
case. In February a Palestinian Colonel was executed after the PA's
state security court convicted him of raping a young boy. Human rights
groups criticized the decision; they complained that the trial lasted
for less than two hours, the defendant did not have sufficient time to
prepare his defense, there was no appeals process, and the charges were
ill-defined. They also charged that the court had based its decision on
public opinion and popular pressure rather than the dictates of law.
Other Palestinians convicted by the state security courts received
sentences ranging from several years in prison to life in jail with
hard labor.
In November Khalid Al-Qidreh was appointed Prosecutor General of
the state security courts. Human rights organizations criticized the
appointment, saying that it helped institutionalize the controversial
court system. They also criticized Al-Qidreh's appointment because he
had been dismissed as PA Attorney General in 1997 because of
allegations of corruption.
The Gaza legal code derives from British Mandate law, Egyptian law,
and PA directives and laws. Pre-1967 Jordanian law applies in PA-
controlled areas of the West Bank. Bodies of law in the Gaza Strip and
West Bank have been modified substantially by Israeli military orders.
According to the Declaration of Principles and the Interim Agreement,
Israeli military decrees issued during the occupation theoretically
remain valid in both areas and are subject to review pursuant to
specific procedure. The PA states that it is undertaking efforts to
unify the Gaza and West Bank legal codes, but it has made little
progress. Human rights advocates claim that the PA's judiciary does not
operate consistently.
The court system in general is recovering from years of neglect;
many of the problems predate PA jurisdiction. Judges and staff are
underpaid and overworked and suffer from a lack of skills and training.
Court procedures and record keeping are archaic and chaotic. The
delivery of justice is often slow and uneven. The ability of the courts
to enforce decisions is extremely weak, and there is administrative
confusion in the appeals process. A heavy caseload exacerbates these
systemic problems.
The PA Ministry of Justice appoints all civil judges for 10-year
terms. The Attorney General, an appointed official, reports to the
Minister of Justice and supervises judicial operations in both the Gaza
Strip and West Bank. In June Zuhair Sourani was appointed Attorney
General and Radwan Al-Agha was appointed Chief Justice. Both positions
had been vacant for over a year. In September, Arafat decreed that the
Chief Justice had the authority to appoint all judges in the West Bank.
Human rights organizations and judicial officials criticized the
decision, saying it contravened existing law, which stipulated that a
judicial council was responsible for appointing judges. West Bank
judges held a short-lived strike to protest Arafat's decision.
In November Abd Al Latif Abd Al Fattah, who was convicted of
complicity in the torture death of a Palestinian detainee, was
appointed as a public prosecutor. In 1998 a PA military court had
convicted Abd Al Fattah, then the head of the Mukhabarat's
interrogation section in Jericho, of ``negligence'' for failing to
provide timely medical care to Walid Qawasmi, who died inMukhabarat
custody. While in detention, Qawasmi, who was detained for ``security
reasons'', suffered a blow to the head that caused a cerebral
hemorrhage and death. Human rights groups viewed the appointment as a
sign of the PA's lack of commitment to fostering rule of law in the
occupied territories. Fourteen human rights organizations petitioned
Arafat to rescind the appointment. In December Abd Al Fattah reportedly
was reassigned to the office of the Prosecutor General of the state
security courts.
Human rights organizations say the PA's state security courts fail
to afford defendants due process. The PA usually ignores the legal
limits on the length of prearraignment detention of detainees suspected
of security offenses. Defendants often are brought to court without
knowledge of the charges against them or sufficient time to prepare a
defense. They typically are represented by court-appointed lawyers, who
often are not qualified. Court sessions often take place on short
notice in the middle of the night and without lawyers present. In some
instances, security courts try cases, issue verdicts, and impose
sentences in a single session lasting a few hours.
In March a state security court sentenced a security official to
death for killing another security official. Human rights groups
criticized the proceedings because the accused had inadequate legal
representation, the judges were incompetent, and the court ignored
exculpatory evidence. The sentence was not carried out.
During the year, the state security courts adjudicated cases that
fell far outside the scope of the courts' original mandate. In addition
to ``security'' cases, the courts have on occasion dealt with tax cases
and economic crimes, such as smuggling. In January PA Chairman Arafat
ratified a state security court decision that found a Gazan, Hisham
Rabah Al-Hitu, guilty of tax irregularities. The court sentenced Al-
Hitu to 7 years imprisonment with hard labor, ordered him to pay a fine
of $1.25 million (5 million NIS) to the PA treasury for ``sabotaging
the national economy,'' and to forfeit his family estate. The
Palestinian Independent Commission for citizens' rights criticized the
referral of tax irregularities cases to the state security courts as a
``flagrant encroachment on the mandate and jurisdiction of the regular
judiciary.'' A Gazan gold merchant, accused of fraud and tax evasion,
was detained by security officials without trial for weeks and finally
released only after he paid a large ``fine'' that was levied by a state
security court (see Section 1.d.).
Several prominent Gazan businessmen agreed to pay ``fines'' or
``taxes'' to the PA Ministry of Finance reportedly due to fear of being
tried and convicted in a state security court.
There were no reports during the year that persons were convicted
for their political beliefs. In 1997 the PA Attorney General
acknowledged that the PA held at least 100 political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Israeli military authorities in areas of the West Bank
under their control may enter private Palestinian homes and
institutions without a warrant on security grounds when authorized by
an officer of the rank of lieutenant colonel or above. In conducting
searches, the IDF has forced entry and sometimes has beaten occupants
and destroyed property. Israeli authorities say that forced entry may
occur lawfully only when incident to an arrest and when entry is
resisted. Authorities say that beatings and arbitrary destruction of
property during searches are punishable violations of military
regulations, and that compensation is due to victims in such cases. The
Israeli Government states that it does not keep consolidated
information on the claims against the Ministry of Defense for damages
resulting from IDF actions.
Israeli authorities did not demolish any Palestinian residences for
security reasons during the year; it demolished one in 1998 and eight
in 1997. Israeli security forces may demolish or seal the home (owned
or rented) of a Palestinian suspected of terrorism without trial;
however, they did not do so during the year. The decision to seal or
demolish a Palestinian's house is made by several high-level Israeli
officials, including the coordinator of the MATAK (formerly CIVAD) and
the Defense Minister. Residents of houses ordered demolished have 48
hours to appeal to the area commander; a final appeal may be made to
the Israeli High Court. A successful appeal generally results in the
conversion of a demolition order to sealing. After a house is
demolished military authorities prohibit the owner from rebuilding or
removing the rubble. Israelis suspected ofterrorism are subject to
Israeli law and do not face the threat of home demolition.
In the Gaza Strip and PA-controlled areas of the West Bank, the PA
requires the Attorney General to issue warrants for entry and searches
of private property. These requirements frequently are ignored by
Palestinian security services. PA police searched homes without the
consent of their owners. In some cases, police forcibly entered
premises and destroyed property.
In July and October the PA attempted to ban Gazan workers from
working in Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. The PA claimed that
Palestinian workers should not be allowed to expand Jewish settlements
in Gaza and imposed a strike on Gazan day laborers. The PA stopped
short of using force to prevent workers from entering the settlements;
however, some laborers reported that they feared retribution by the
authorities (see Section 2.d.).
PA security forces sometimes detained or placed under house arrest
the relatives of alleged security criminals (see Section 1.d.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Israeli Government generally
respects freedom of speech in the occupied territories but prohibits
public expressions of support for Islamic extremist groups, such as
HAMAS and other groups dedicated to the destruction of Israel.
Continuing a policy it began in 1994, the Israeli Government did not
enforce its prohibition on the display of Palestinian political
symbols, such as flags, national colors, and graffiti, acts that are
still punishable by fines or imprisonment.
Overall, Israeli censorship of specific press pieces continued to
be low. Israeli authorities monitor the Arabic press based in Jerusalem
for security-related issues. Military censors review Arabic
publications for material related to the public order and security of
Israel. Reports by foreign journalists also are subject to review by
Israeli military censors for security issues, and the satellite feed
used by many foreign journalists is monitored.
Israel often closes areas to journalists when it has imposed a
curfew or closure. Israeli authorities have denied entry permits to
Palestinian journalists traveling to their place of work in Jerusalem
during closures of the territories.
The IDF requires a permit for publications sold in the occupied
territories still under its control. Publications may be censored or
banned for content deemed anti-Semitic or anti-Israeli. Possession of
banned materials is punishable by a fine and imprisonment. During the
year, Israel refused to allow publications, including newspapers, into
the Gaza Strip on the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, when Israel
tightened its closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The PA limited freedom of speech and of the press, although it
professes to tolerate varying political views and criticism. In a
number of instances during the year, the PA took steps to limit free
expression, particularly in regards to human rights issues and
allegations of corruption. Press freedom in PA controlled areas is
subject to a 1995 press law that does not adequately protect the press.
PA security services further stifle the independence of the press by
shutting down media outlets, banning publication or broadcast of
material, and periodically harassing or detaining media members (see
Section 1.d.). Palestinian commentators and human rights groups say
that as a result, the practice of self-censorship by journalists is
widespread.
In November PA security forces arrested eight persons and placed
two under house arrest for signing a petition that accused the PA of
corruption and failing to win significant gains from the peace process.
The PA did not arrest the nine members of the Palestinian Council who
also signed the petition and enjoyed parliamentary immunity. In
December the PA released six of the signatories from detention;
however, two remained in detention at year's end (see Section 1.d.).
In May the PA detained three editors of the Islamist Al-Risaleh
newspaper after it published an article on police corruption. One of
the editors, Ghazi Hamad, had been arrested earlier and held for
several days for writing an article about alleged PA mistreatment of a
Palestinian detainee.
In July PA police officials in Ramallah twice summoned Maher Alami,
a West Bank journalist to inform him that his newspaperarticles that
were critical of the PA had angered the PA Chairman.
On August 5, PA officials arrested and detained human rights
activist and commentator Iyad Sarraj after he published a newspaper
article criticizing the PA's treatment of human rights organizations.
He later was released, but PA authorities temporarily confiscated his
passport.
In September police personnel arrested and held for several days
four journalists after they reported unflattering stories about PA
police officers. Human rights organizations charged that police
personnel lacked the proper arrest warrants and that the arrests
threatened freedom of the press.
In December the Palestinian Authority called the economics editor
of Al-Quds newspaper in for questioning following the publication of a
front-page article criticizing the PA Monetary Authority's takeover of
the Palestine International Bank. The editor was released after
questioning; however, the newspaper then published an article
retracting some of its criticisms from the previous day.
On April 26, the PA closed the Amal television station in Hebron
for nearly 3 weeks after it broadcast a controversial program on Islam.
On May 17, PA officials closed the Al-Ru'ah television station in
Bethlehem indefinitely after it aired a program that security officials
said could cause tensions between Christians and Muslims.
On September 15, members of the Preventive Security Force (PSF) in
Ramallah arrested television talk-show host Maher Adisouki shortly
after he allowed a caller on his television program to criticize the
PA's failure to persuade Israel to free all Palestinian prisoners held
in Israeli jails. The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human
Rights and the Environment complained that the arrest warrant was not
executed properly. Adisouki was held in PSF custody for 20 days. He
alleged that during his incarceration he was forced to stand for
several days with a dirty rag over his eyes and that he was beaten and
threatened. PSF officials say that Adisouki was detained for security
reasons, not because of the views expressed on his program, and they
deny that he was mistreated.
Israeli-imposed closures, while less restrictive than in previous
years, nevertheless disrupted the operations of West Bank and Gaza
universities, colleges, and schools during the year. Students and staff
had difficulty traveling to educational institutions in cities and
towns closed or put under curfew by Israeli authorities.
Prior to November, Gaza students routinely were denied travel
permits to attend West Bank universities. However, the November opening
of the southern safe passage route between Gaza and the West Bank
afforded Gazan students greater ability to pursue their education at
West Bank educational institutions.
The PA has authority over all levels of education in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip and it controls the budgets of all public colleges. The
PA did not interfere with education in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
during the year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Israeli
Government places some limits on freedom of assembly. Israeli military
orders ban public gatherings of ten or more persons without a permit.
Since the 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles, Israel has
relaxed enforcement of this rule except in cases of Palestinian
demonstrations against land seizures or settlement expansions.
Israeli security forces killed two Palestinian demonstrators and
wounded about 2 dozen during the year (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). In
June Israeli security forces shot and wounded 15 Palestinians in the
West Bank and 2 in the Gaza Strip during the ``days of rage''
demonstrations protesting Israeli settlement activity in the occupied
territories (see Section 2.b.). On November 20 Israeli soldiers shot
and wounded 10 Palestinians at a protest organized by Fatah Youth in
Ramallah (see Section 1.c.).
On May 27, Israeli security officials detained and later released
Palestinian protesters participating in a demonstration against the
construction of housing for Jews in a Palestinian neighborhood in East
Jerusalem.
The PA imposes some formal limits on freedom of assembly; however,
while it requires permits for rallies, demonstrations, and large
cultural events, these permits rarely are denied. InGaza police
approval is required for ``political'' meetings at several specific
large meeting halls. Written permission also is required for buses to
transport passengers to attend political meetings. In West Bank cities,
the PA requires permits for outdoor rallies and demonstrations and
prohibits calls for violence, a display of arms, and racist slogans,
although this is not always enforced.
In February hundreds of Palestinians held demonstrations in Nablus,
Hebron, and Gaza to demand the release of administrative detainees in
PA prison facilities (see Section 1.d.). In March hundreds of
Palestinians protested the Palestinian court's decision to sentence one
Palestinian security official to death and two to long prison terms for
the killing of another Palestinian security official. Palestinian
police shot and killed two protesters during the demonstrations (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.e.).
Private Palestinian organizations are required to register with the
Israeli authorities in areas under Israeli control, though some operate
without licenses. The authorities permit Palestinian charitable,
community, professional, and self-help organizations to operate unless
Israeli authorities view their activities as a security problem. In
previous years, Israeli authorities have forced some Palestinian
organizations in East Jerusalem to close because of alleged links to
the PA.
The PA reportedly placed some limits on freedom of association.
There were periodic complaints during the year from Palestinian
political parties, social and professional groups, and other NGO's that
the PA tried to limit their ability to act autonomously (see Section
4).
In March 1996 Yasir Arafat outlawed the armed wings of several
Palestinian political groups, including Islamic opposition groups.
While it is not illegal to belong to the non-military components of
Islamic opposition groups, during times of heightened security concern
the Authority has harassed and even detained members of the political
parts of these organizations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Israeli law provides for freedom of
worship, and the Government generally respects this right in practice;
it does not ban any group on religious grounds. It permits all faiths
to operate schools and institutions. Religious publications are subject
to the Publications Laws.
No PA law protects religious freedom; however, the PA generally
respects freedom of religion. In past years, there have been
allegations that several converts from Islam to Christianity at times
are subject to societal discrimination and harassment by PA officials.
The PA states that it investigates such complaints, but it has not
shared or publicized the results of these investigations with any
outside party. However, there was no pattern of PA discrimination and
harassment against Christians (see Section 5).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Occupied Territories, Foreign
Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Israeli Government places
limits on freedom of movement. Israel requires that all West Bank and
Gaza residents obtain permits to enter Israel and Jerusalem. However,
Israel often denies applicants permits with no explanation, and does
not allow effective means of appeal. In the past, Palestinian officials
with VIP passes, including PA cabinet officials and members of the
Palestinian Council, were subjected to long delays and searches at
Israeli checkpoints in the West Bank, even though they were traveling
on special passes issued by Israel; however, there were no reports that
this occurred during the year. In general Palestinians in the West Bank
and Gaza Strip find it difficult to obtain permits to work, visit,
study, or obtain medical care in Israel. Palestinian residents of
Jerusalem sometimes are prohibited by Israeli officials from entering
PA-controlled areas of the West Bank, and they require written permits
from Israel to travel to the Gaza Strip. Prior to the November opening
of the safe passage route, residents of the Gaza Strip rarely were able
to obtain permission to travel to the West Bank, or residents of the
West Bank to enter the Gaza Strip; this was even true of residents of
the West Bank and Gaza Strip who regularly received permission to enter
Israel. Israeli authorities permit only a small number of Gazans to
bring vehicles into Israel and sometimes do not permit West Bank
vehicles to enter Jerusalem or Israel. It is also difficult for
Palestinians married to Jerusalem residents, but not themselves
Jerusalem residents, to obtain permission to live there. A Palestinian
with a West Bank identification card, for example, must apply to the
Israeli Government for permission to live with his or her Jerusalem
resident spouse in Jerusalem. The IsraeliGovernment occasionally issues
limited-duration permits and also issues a limited number of Jerusalem
identification cards as part of its Family Reunification Program.
Except for senior PA officials, and those using the safe passage to the
West Bank, Palestinians of all ages crossing between the Gaza Strip and
Israel are not permitted to travel by car across the main checkpoint.
Instead, they must travel along a narrow walkway almost a mile long.
Israelis moving into and out of the Gaza Strip are permitted to use
their cars.
In November Israel and the PA implemented arrangements in the 1995
Interim Agreement to establish a safe passage route across Israel
between the Gaza Strip and the southern West Bank. Negotiations are
ongoing regarding the establishment of a safe passage route between the
Gaza Strip and the northern West Bank. The safe passage route
facilitates the movement of Palestinians between the West Bank and the
Gaza Strip to work, study, and visit, and alleviates some of the
problems associated with freedom of movement for Palestinians. However,
some Palestinian human rights groups criticized the safe passage
agreement because they believe it maintains certain limits on freedom
of movement. As of the end of November, a total of 15,000 Palestinians
received approval to use the safe passage route and 2,900 applicants
were refused permits to use the route.
Israel continues to apply its policy, begun in 1993, of closure of
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip following terrorist attacks; however,
Israel eased its closure policy during the year. On occasion Israel
also imposed a tightened version of closure in the wake of terrorist
incidents and when it believed that there was increased likelihood of
terrorist attacks or unrest in the occupied territories. During these
times, Israel tends to cancel all travel permits and prevents
Palestinians, even those with valid work permits, from entering Israel
or Jerusalem. In the past, tightened closures severely hampered the
flow of food, medicine, students, doctors, and patients into and out of
the occupied territories, and seriously disrupted commercial activity.
Israel imposed tightened closures before Israeli holidays, when
officials claimed that an increased potential for terrorist attacks
against Israelis existed, after security incidents in the occupied
territories, and in anticipation of Palestinian unrest. In the past,
Israel also imposed ``internal'' closures, which prohibited
Palestinians from traveling between West Bank towns and villages;
however, there were no ``internal'' closures during the year. Israel
imposed tightened overall closure for a total of 15 days during the
year. Even in the absence of internal closures, Palestinians who travel
between some cities in the West Bank must pass through Israeli-
controlled checkpoints where they sometimes are subjected to verbal and
physical harassment by Israeli security personnel.
Israel imposed a closure on Hebron for a number of days after
settlers were shot and injured in separate shooting attacks in January
and August (see Section 1.c.). In both instances it placed the Israeli-
controlled section of the downtown under curfew, confining large
numbers of Palestinians to their homes while Israelis were generally
free to move about. Following a terrorist attack in January that
wounded two Israeli settlers, Israel placed checkpoints on major roads
leading into Hebron and prevented Palestinians from moving in or out of
the city. This closure and accompanying curfew imposed on residents in
the Israeli-controlled section of the downtown area lasted for 7 days
and interfered with Palestinians' ability to attend school, travel, and
conduct business.
Israel also imposed a closure on the West Bank and Gaza for
security reasons prior to and during several Jewish holidays during the
year.
For 4 days in June and July, Israeli security forces prevented
Palestinian officials from passing through checkpoints on the outskirts
of Nablus in response to PA officials' refusal to allow Israeli
settlers access to the yeshiva at Joseph's tomb, a site holy to both
Jews and Muslims.
During part of the year, the IDF prevented Palestinians from
walking on part of Shuhada Road in Hebron, while allowing Israeli
settlers access to this road; however, in November this road was opened
to Palestinians.
In September 1998 Israel began implementing a ``continuous
employment program'' that allows selected Palestinian workers who have
been approved by the Ministry of Defense and who are married, are over
28 years old, and have worked in Israel a long time, to enter Israel to
work in the event of a tightened closure. Under this program, these
workers can renew their entry permits within a few days, rather than
within the several days to weeks that previously was the case.
The Israeli Government continued to restrict the movements of two
Jewish settlers living in the occupied territories who belonged to the
extremist Kach or Kahane Chai groups, through the use of administrative
orders issued by the IDF central command.
The Israeli Government requires all Palestinian residents in areas
under its control to obtain permits for foreign travel and has
restricted the travel of some political activists. Bridge-crossing
permits to Jordan may be obtained at post offices without a screening
process. However, some East Jerusalem Palestinians hesitate to travel
due to fear of losing their residency permits. Palestinian males
between the ages of 16 and 25 who cross into Jordan must remain outside
the occupied territories for 9 months. Restrictions on residence,
reentry, and family reunification only apply to Palestinian residents
of the occupied territories.
Palestinians who live in the part of Jerusalem that was occupied
during the 1967 War generally do not accept Israeli citizenship. They
are, therefore, issued a residence permit or Jerusalem identification
card by the Israeli Government. Israel applies the 1952 Law of
Permanent Residency and its 1974 amendments to Jerusalem identification
card holders. This law stipulates that a Jerusalem resident loses the
right of residence if the resident leaves Israeli territory for more
than 7 years, acquires the nationality of another country, or acquires
permanent residence in another country. Such persons are permitted to
return only as tourists and sometimes are denied entry. The Israeli
Government does not apply these same restrictions to Israeli citizens.
Invoking the 1952 law as legal justification, the Israeli Interior
Ministry has stripped residency rights from hundreds of East Jerusalem
Palestinians. In recent years, the pace of revocations increased as the
Ministry applied restricted policies, including a ``center of life''
test to determine whether Palestinians were eligible to retain their
identification cards. The Ministry's policy has been the subject of
numerous lawsuits, including one considered by the High Court of
Justice during the year. In October the newly appointed Minister of
Interior, Natan Sharansky, announced that the Ministry would no longer
apply the ``center of life'' criteria used previously to revoke the
residency rights of East Jerusalem Palestinians. There reportedly were
no identification card revocations after October. During the year,
there were 394 revocations compared with 788 revocations in 1998.
Israeli authorities also place restrictions on family
reunification. Most Palestinians who were abroad before or during the
1967 War, or who have lost their residence permits for other reasons,
are not permitted to reside permanently with their families in
Jerusalem or the occupied territories. Foreign-born spouses and
children of Palestinian residents also experience difficulty in
obtaining permission to reside with their family members. However, at
the beginning of the year the Israeli Government raised the quota for
family reunification applications from 1,200 to 2,400 in the West Bank.
Israeli security authorities single out young (often unmarried)
Palestinian males for more stringent restrictions than other
Palestinians, citing them as more likely to be security risks. They
generally are prohibited from working in Israel.
The PA issues passports and identification cards for Palestinians
residing in the West Bank and Gaza. Bearers of Palestinian passports do
not need special exit permits from the PA, but when leaving through Ben
Gurion Airport they do require permits in order to transit Israel to
reach the airport.
Palestinians who hold Jerusalem identification cards, issued by the
Israeli Government, must obtain travel documents from the Israeli
Government to travel abroad. Human rights groups report that
Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem often do not apply for Israeli
travel documents because they fear that their application might prompt
a reexamination of their residency status and lead to the revocation of
their identity cards. On request, the Jordanian Government also issues
travel documents to West Bank Palestinians, including those resident in
formerly Jordanian-controlled East Jerusalem. Palestinians who wish to
travel to Jordan must leave their Israeli identification documents with
Israeli authorities at the Allenby Bridge. There is also a requirement
that Jerusalem Palestinians have a special permit to cross the Allenby
Bridge, available for $40 (125 NIS) from the Ministry of Interior.
Palestinians who are residents of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip are
not allowed to cross between Israel and Jordan at the Sheikh Hussein or
Arava crossings.
Palestinians who reside in the West Bank or Gaza are required by
Israel to exit and enter with a Palestinian passport. When Israel
tightened its closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip during the year,
the Government at times restricted the entry and departure of
Palestinians, even those with passports from other countries.
In July and October, the PA attempted to ban Gazan workers from
working in Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip. The PA claimed that
Palestinian workers should not be allowed to expand Jewish settlements
in Gaza and imposed a strike on Gazan day laborers. The PA stopped
short of using force to prevent workers from entering the settlement;
however, some laborers reportedly feared retribution by the authorities
(see Section 1.f.).
The issues of refugees and borders are matters to be discussed
between Israel and the PA in permanent status negotiations.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Palestinian residents of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem
chose their first popularly-elected government in 1996. They elected an
88-member Council and the Ra'ees (President or Chairman) of the
Executive Authority of the Council. Yasir Arafat won almost 89 percent
of the vote in a two-person race for Chairman. Some 700 candidates ran
for Council seats. Council members were elected in multimember
electoral districts. As many as 35 of the elected members were
independent candidates or critics of Arafat and his Fatah faction.
International observers concluded that the election could reasonably be
regarded as an accurate expression of the will of the voters, despite
some irregularities. During the year, the Council debated numerous
draft laws and resolutions. Some members of the Council complained of
its relative lack of power in relation to the executive branch of
government.
Municipal elections were tentatively scheduled to be held in June;
however, they did not take place.
Most Palestinians in Jerusalem do not recognize the jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Jerusalem. Only a very small percentage of
Jerusalem's Palestinian population vote in the municipal council
elections. No Palestinian resident of Jerusalem sits on the City
Council.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 5
women in the 88-member Council, and 1 woman serves in a ministerial-
level position.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Many local groups--Israeli, Palestinian, and international--
monitored the Israeli Government's human rights practices. The Israeli
Government cooperates with human rights organizations; officials
normally agree to meet with human rights monitors. The Israeli
Government permits human rights groups to publish and hold press
conferences. There were no reports during the year that the Israeli
Government harassed human rights workers.
Local human rights groups, most of which are Palestinian, as well
as several international human rights organizations, monitored the PA's
human rights practices. The PA generally cooperates with these
organizations and PA officials usually meet with their representatives.
Several Palestinian human rights organizations work behind the scenes
with the PA to overcome abusive practices in certain areas. They also
publish criticism if they believe that the PA is not responding
adequately to private entreaties. Human rights groups state that the PA
is generally cooperative when dealing with certain kinds of human
rights issues; however, human rights organizations reported that they
sometimes were denied access to detainees in Palestinian prisons during
the year. LAW and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR)
reported that they were denied access to clients detained in Gaza
prisons because of their reports on the violations of the human rights
of detainees (see Section 1.d.).
Other human rights groups, including the ICRC and the Palestinian
Independent Commission for Citizens' Rights, visited PA prisons and
detention centers on a regular basis. However, PA officials are said to
be less responsive to queries on the PA's policies towards and
treatment of members of Islamist opposition groups.
During the year, Palestinian nongovernmental organizations
repeatedly called on the PA to ratify a law passed by the Palestinian
Council (PC) in December 1998, which would governthe NGO's activities
and their relations with the PA. Ratification of the law was held up
due to the PA's attempts to replace the Ministry of Justice with the
Ministry of Interior as the agency responsible for the administration
of NGO's. At year's end, passage of the law appeared imminent.
The ICRC operates in the PA areas under the terms of a memorandum
of understanding signed in September 1996 between the ICRC and the PLO.
The memorandum accords the ICRC access to all detainees held by the PA
and allows regular inspections of prison conditions. In accordance with
the agreement, the ICRC conducted routine visits of PA-run prison
facilities and to PA-held prisoners throughout the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Under the complex mixture of laws and regulations that apply to the
occupied territories, Palestinians are disadvantaged under Israeli law
and practices compared with the treatment received by Israeli settlers.
This includes discrimination in residency, land use, and access to
health and social services.
Women.--The problems of rape, domestic violence, and violence
related to ``family honor'' have gained greater attention in the
Palestinian community, but public discussion generally remains muted.
Victims often are encouraged by relatives to remain quiet and are
themselves punished or blamed for the ``shame'' that has been brought
upon them and their families. In 1988 a 14-year-old girl who was raped
subsequently was beaten to death by her uncle and brother to
``protect'' family honor. The girl's brother was awaiting trial on
murder charges. Women's groups seek to educate women on these problems,
but women's rights advocates claim that few resources are available to
shelter the victims of violence because women's shelters are not
accepted culturally in Palestinian society. They also maintain that
society has not been receptive to providing counseling or outreach
services to victims of problems that these advocates see as more
widespread than is acknowledged. According to women's groups, there are
no reliable data on the incidence of violence against women. Spousal
abuse, sexual abuse, and ``honor killings'' occur, but societal
pressures prevent most incidents from being reported and most cases are
handled within the families concerned, usually by male family members.
In prior years, leaders of HAMAS threatened and tried to intimidate
Palestinian women who were involved in programs aimed at empowering
women and helping abused women; there were no reports that this
occurred during the year.
Palestinian women in both the Israeli- and PA-controlled areas of
the occupied territories endure various forms of social prejudice and
repression within their own society. Because of early marriage, girls
frequently do not finish the mandatory level of schooling. Cultural
restrictions sometimes prevent women from attending colleges and
universities. While there is an active women's movement in the West
Bank, attention has shifted only recently from nationalist aspirations
to issues that greatly affect women, such as domestic violence, equal
access to education and employment, and laws concerning marriage and
inheritance.
A growing number of Palestinian women work outside the home, where
they tend to encounter discrimination. There are no special laws
providing for women's rights in the workplace. Women are
underrepresented in most aspects of professional life. Despite the fact
that there is a small group of women who are prominent in politics,
medicine, law, teaching, and NGO's, women for the most part are
underrepresented seriously in the decisionmaking positions in these
fields.
Personal status law for Palestinians is based on religious law. For
Muslim Palestinians, personal status law is derived from Shari'a
(Islamic law) and ecclesiastical courts rule on personal status issues
for Christians. In the West Bank and Gaza, Shari'a pertaining to women
is part of the Jordanian Status Law of 1976, which includes inheritance
and marriage laws. Under the law, women inherit less than male members
of the family do. The marriage law allows men to take more than one
wife, although few do so. Women are permitted to make ``stipulations''
in the marriage contract to protect them against divorce and questions
of child custody. However, only an estimated 1 percent of women take
advantage of this section of the law, leaving most women at a
disadvantage when it comes to divorce or child custody.
Children.--The Israeli Government's permit policies also affect
Palestinian schools. In June the Israeli Government issued a stop-
workorder to an Area C Palestinian school that was trying to build new
bathrooms for its 600 students; the school had no usable facilities. In
this case, Palestinian school officials did not apply for a building
permit because they believed that they would not receive one. During
the year, there were ongoing negotiations about the Hope Flowers school
in Bethlehem. Parts of the school, including the kitchen, were built
without a permit and the Israeli Government issued orders to demolish
these parts. However, due to the high profile of the case, the
Government did not demolish any parts of the school by year's end.
The PA requires compulsory education up to 12 years of age.
However, early marriage frequently prevents girls from completing the
mandatory level of schooling. Currently British Mandate, Jordanian, and
military laws, from which West Bank and Gaza law is derived, offer
protection to children under the Labor and Penal Codes. Existing laws
designed to protect children, such as a law that sets the minimum
employment age, are not always enforced. While there is no juvenile
court system, judges specializing in children's cases generally sit for
juvenile offenders. In cases where the child is the victim, judges have
the discretion to remove the child from a situation deemed harmful.
However, the system is not advanced in the protection afforded
children.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children among
Palestinians.
People With Disabilities.--There is no mandated accessibility to
public facilities in the occupied territories under either Israeli or
Palestinian authority. Approximately 130,000 Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza are disabled. Some Palestinian institutions care for and
train disabled persons; however, their efforts are chronically
underfunded. Many Palestinians with disabilities are segregated and
isolated from Palestinian society; they are discriminated against in
most spheres, including education, employment, transportation, and
access to public buildings and facilities.
Religious Minorities.--There are periodic allegations that a small
number of Muslim converts to Christianity in the Palestinian community
sometimes are subject to societal discrimination and harassment by PA
officials. The PA states that it investigates such complaints, but it
has not shared or publicized the results of these investigations with
any outside party. However, there was no pattern of PA discrimination
and harassment against Christians (see Section 2.c.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Labor affairs in the West Bank came
under Palestinian responsibility with the signing of the Interim
Agreement in September 1995. Until a new law being drafted by PA
authorities comes into effect, labor affairs in the West Bank are
governed by Jordanian Law 21 of 1965, as amended by Israeli military
orders, and in Gaza by PA decisions. The law permits workers to
establish and join unions without government authorization. The earlier
Israeli stipulation that all proposed West Bank unions apply for a
permit no longer is enforced. Israeli authorities previously have
licensed about 35 of the estimated 185 union branches now in existence.
Following a process to consolidate trade unions in the West Bank, there
are now 12 trade unions there.
Palestinian workers in Jerusalem are governed by Israeli labor law.
They are free to establish their own unions. Although the Government
restricts Jerusalem unions from joining West Bank trade union
federations, this restriction has not been enforced. Palestinian
workers in Jerusalem may belong simultaneously to unions affiliated
with West Bank federations and the Israeli Histadrut Labor Federation.
West Bank unions are not affiliated with the Israeli Histadrut
Federation. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza who work in Israel
or Jerusalem are not full members of Histadrut, but they are required
to contribute 1 percent of their wages to Histadrut. Negotiations
between Histadrut and West Bank union officials to return half of this
fee to the Palestinian Union Federation were completed in 1996, but
funds have yet to be transferred.
Palestinians who work in Israel are required to contribute to the
National Insurance Institute (NII), which provides unemployment
insurance and other benefits. Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza
are eligible for some, but not all, NII benefits. According to the
Interim Agreement, Palestinians working in Israel and Jerusalem
continue to be insured for injuries occurring in Israel, the bankruptcy
of a worker's employer, and allowances for maternity leave. The Israeli
Government has transferred the NII fees collected from West Bank and
Gazan workers to the PA, which is to assume responsibility for their
pensions and social benefits.
There are outstanding cases of Palestinian workers who have
attempted to sue their Israeli employers for non-payment of wages but
are unable to travel to the relevant courts because they are unable to
receive the proper permits.
The great majority of West Bank unions belong to the Palestinian
General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU). The PGFTU was involved in
the completion of the negotiations with Histadrut regarding workers'
fees. The reorganization of unions under the PGFTU is intended to
enable the West Bank and Gaza unions to better represent the union
members' interests; the reorganization had not yet been finalized at
year's end.
An estimated 88,000 workers in the West Bank are members of the
PGFTU, the largest union bloc, which consists of 12 trade unions in the
West Bank and 8 in Gaza. The organization has 43,455 members in Gaza.
The PGFTU estimates actual organized membership, i.e., dues-paying
members, at about 30 percent of all Palestinian workers.
No unions were dissolved by administrative or legislative action
during the year. Palestinian unions that seek to strike must submit to
arbitration by the PA Ministry of Labor. If the union disagrees with
the final arbitration and strikes, a tribunal of senior judges
appointed by the PA decides what, if any, disciplinary action is to be
taken. There are no laws in the territories that specifically protect
the rights of striking workers. In practice, such workers have little
or no protection from an employer's retribution.
The PGFTU has applied for membership in the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--A majority of
workers in the occupied territories are self-employed or unpaid family
helpers in agriculture or commerce. Only 35 percent of employment in
the territories consists of wage jobs, most with the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), the PA, or in municipalities.
Collective bargaining is protected. Labor disputes are adjudicated by
committees of three to five members in businesses employing more than
20 workers.
Existing laws and regulations do not offer real protection against
antiunion discrimination.
One industrial zone is in operation in the Gaza Strip and others in
the West Bank are being developed.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--PA law does not
prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor, including by
children, but there were no reports of such practices during the year
(see Section 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum working age in the West Bank and Gaza is 14
years. Most observers agree that a significant number of Palestinian
children under the age of 16 years work. Many children under the age of
12 are engaged in some work activities. Most of this employment is
believed to involve work on family farms, in family shops, or as urban
street venders. Some employment of children also is reported to occur
in small manufacturing enterprises, such as shoe and textile factories.
The law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory labor by
children, but there were no reports of its use (see Section 6.c.).
The PA's capacity to enforce existing laws is limited. It has only
40 labor inspectors to inspect an estimated 65,000 enterprises. The
International Labor Organization and UNICEFare working with the PA to
study the nature and extent of the problem and to develop the capacity
to enforce and update child labor laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is currently no minimum
wage in the West Bank or Gaza Strip. The average wage for full-time
workers appears to provide a worker and family with a decent standard
of living.
In the West Bank, the normal workweek is 48 hours in most areas; in
Gaza the workweek is 45 hours for day laborers and 40 hours for
salaried employees. There is no effective enforcement of maximum
workweek laws.
The PA Ministry of Labor is responsible for inspecting work places
and enforcing safety standards in the West Bank and Gaza. The Ministry
of Labor states that new factories and work places meet international
health and safety standards but that older ones fail to meet minimum
standards. In October a fire in an unlicensed workshop in Hebron where
cigarette lighters were being assembled killed 14 workers, all of them
young women. The fire illustrated the prevalence of sweatshops in the
PA and unregulated labor practices. There is no specific legal
protection afforded workers that allows them to remove themselves from
an unhealthy or unsafe work setting without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the occupied territories.
______
JORDAN
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy that
was ruled by King Hussein bin Talal from 1952 until his death in
February. On February 7, King Hussein's eldest son, Crown Prince
Abdullah bin Hussein, acceded to the throne. The Constitution
concentrates a high degree of executive and legislative authority in
the King, who determines domestic and foreign policy. In the King's
absence, a regent, whose authority is outlined in the Constitution,
assumes many of these responsibilities. The Prime Minister and other
members of the Cabinet are appointed by the King and manage the daily
affairs of government. The Parliament consists of the 40-member Senate,
appointed by the King, and the 80-member Chamber of Deputies, which is
elected every 4 years. The lower house asserts itself only
intermittently on domestic and foreign policy issues. The 1997
parliamentary elections were marred by reports of registration
irregularities, fraud, and restrictions on the press and on campaign
materials. According to the Constitution, the judiciary is independent
of other branches of government; however, in practice it is susceptible
to political pressure and interference by the executive.
General police functions are the responsibility of the Public
Security Directorate (PSD). The PSD, the General Intelligence
Directorate (GID), and the military share responsibility for
maintaining internal security and have authority to monitor the
activities of persons believed to be security threats. The security
forces continue to commit human rights abuses.
Jordan has a mixed economy, with significant but declining
government participation in industry, transportation, and
communications. The country has few natural resources and relies
heavily on foreign assistance and remittances from citizens working
abroad. The economy continues to suffer from chronically high
unemployment. As part of its reenergized economic reform program, the
Government has removed subsidies on several staple goods, lifted price
controls on others, and streamlined government budget practices. Price
controls remain on bread, pharmaceuticals, and a small number of other
staple items. In mid-year, the sales tax was increased from 10 percent
to 13 percent. Wages remained stagnant and continued to erode the
purchasing power of most citizens. Exporters have not yet found
adequate replacement markets for those lost as a result of U.N.
sanctions against Iraq. Additional trade with Iraq under the ``oil for
food'' resolution has not affected the economy significantly. High
expectations that significant markets woulddevelop in the West Bank,
Gaza, and Israel following the 1994 signing of the Jordan-Israel peace
treaty have not been realized. Per capita gross domestic product in
1998 was approximately $1,553.
There continued to be significant problems in the Government's
human rights record. Citizens do not have the right to change their
government, although they may participate in the political system
through political parties and parliamentary elections. Other human
rights problems include police abuse and mistreatment of detainees;
allegations of torture; arbitrary arrest and detention; lack of
accountability within the security services; prolonged detention
without charge; lack of due process of law and interference in the
judicial process; infringements on citizens' privacy rights; harassment
of members of opposition political parties and the press; and
significant restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and
association. The 1998 Press and Publications Law placed major
restrictions on the ability of journalists and publications to function
and report freely; however, the 1999 Press and Publications Law, which
became effective on October 16, reduced these restrictions somewhat.
The Government imposes some limits on freedom of religion, and there is
official and societal discrimination against adherents of the Baha'i
Faith. Early in the year, the evangelical Christian community reported
an increased incidence of governmental harassment. There are some
restrictions on freedom of movement. Violence against women,
restrictions on women's rights, and societal discrimination against
women are problems. The law still allows for reduced punishments for
violent ``honor crimes'' against women for alleged immoral acts. Child
abuse remains a problem, and discrimination against Palestinians
persists. Abuse of foreign servants is a problem.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killings.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings by government
officials.
In May Mahmoud Rashid Qasem Mohammed Ishtayeh died in a hospital
while in police custody. In August his family claimed that he died of
injuries suffered in a beating; however, prison officials maintained
that Ishtayeh died of natural causes. Human rights sources were unable
to uncover any evidence to support the family's claims or refute the
Government's position.
The security services continue to be reluctant to conduct
transparent investigations into allegations of wrongful deaths that
occurred in previous years during police detention.
There was no further investigation of the March 1998 incidents in
which Masaeed tribesmen were killed by security forces. There were no
new developments in the killing of Mohammad Al-Khattub, who was shot
during an altercation between demonstrators and security forces in
February 1998. A subsequent government investigation stated that Al-
Khattub was killed by demonstrators; however, the media cited alleged
witness accounts that he had been shot by security forces while
fleeing.
There were no developments in the investigation of the police
officers involved in the alleged wrongful deaths of Ismail Suleiman
Ajarmeh, who died in February 1998; Samer Muhammad Ziyad, who died in
June 1997; Younis Mahmoud Abu Dawlah, who died in December 1996; or
Mahmoud Khalifah, who died in June 1995. All four men died while in
government custody.
Women continued to be victims of ``honor killings'' (see Section
5).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearance.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Although the law provides prisoners with the right to
humane treatment, the police and security forces sometimes abuse
detainees physically and verbally during detention and interrogation
and allegedly use torture as well. Allegations of torture are difficult
to verify because security officials frequently deny detainees timely
access to lawyers. The most frequently alleged methods of torture are
sleep deprivation, beatings, and extended solitary confinement.
Defendants in high-profile cases before the State Security Court have
claimed to have been subjected to physical and psychological abuse
while in detention. Government officials deny allegations of torture
and abuse.
Approximately 40 cases of beatings while in police custody were
reported to the Arab Organization for Human Rights. There are believed
to be many more incidents that were not documented.
Periodic detentions of foreign workers continue and allegations of
overcrowded cells and physical abuse by guards persist.
Filipino and other foreign workers who were arrested at their homes
in September and October 1998 subsequently were released. Senior
government officials publicly took responsibility for the incidents;
however, no action was taken against the members of the security forces
who were involved.
Prisons and local police detention facilities are Spartan, and on
the whole are severely overcrowded and understaffed.
Prisoners detained on national security grounds often are kept in
separate prisons maintained by the GID. Conditions in GID facilities
are significantly better than general police detention facilities.
With some exceptions, the ICRC is permitted unrestricted access to
prisoners and prison facilities, including GID facilities and the
recently reopened Al-Jafr prison. However, from late December 1998
through March 8, the ICRC suspended visits to facilities where security
detainees were being held because the authorities refused to give the
ICRC access to one specific detainee. Local human rights monitors are
allowed to visit prisons, but complain that they are required to go
through a lengthy and difficult procedure with the authorities to
obtain permission for such visits.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The security forces
arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. Under the Constitution,
citizens are subject to arrest, trial, and punishment for the
defamation of heads of state, dissemination of ``false or exaggerated
information outside the country that attacks state dignity,'' or
defamation of public officials.
The Criminal Code requires that legal authorities file formal
charges within 10 days of an arrest. However, the courts routinely
grant requests from prosecutors for 15-day extensions as provided by
law. This practice generally extends pretrial detention for protracted
periods of time. In cases involving state security, the authorities
frequently hold defendants in lengthy pretrial detention, do not
provide defendants with the written charges against them, and do not
allow defendants to meet with their lawyers until shortly before trial.
Defendants before the State Security Court usually meet with their
attorneys only 1 or 2 days before their trial.
The Government detains persons, including journalists, for varying
amounts of time for what appear to be political reasons (see Section
2.a.). Human rights sources reported that more than 300 persons were
detained for security reasons throughout the year. This number likely
underestimates the total number of detainees.
In January a student at the Jordan Evangelical Theological Seminary
(JETS) was jailed for 2 weeks and then deported to Egypt. In February a
Sudanese national was jailed for 17 days and then deported to Sudan. In
April a church worker for Campus Crusade for Christ was detained for 5
days and questioned about his religious activities (see Section 2.c.).
On his arrival at Amman's Queen Alia International Airport on May
17, Mohammed Nizami was arrested and charged with ``lese majeste,'' or
slandering the King, stemming from his purported comments on an
Internet ``chat'' site critical of the Government. He was incarcerated
for 18 days and his passport was confiscated. He was released on
$10,000 (7,000 dinars) bail and departed the country without standing
trial (see Section 2.a.).
Upon arrival at Queen Alia International Airport on September 22,
two leaders of the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), Khaled Mishal
and Ibrahim Ghosheh, were detained along with four of their bodyguards
(all six are Jordanian citizens). The bodyguards subsequently were
released. Mishal and Ghosheh were held for 1 month and then expelled
along with two other HAMAS leaders, Izzat Rishuq and Sami Khater (see
Sections 2.b. and 2.d.).
The Government uses the threat of detention to intimidate
journalists into practicing self-censorship (see Section 2.a.).
Typically, a journalist who has criticized a government official or
policy is detained for 5 to 10 days. While in detention, the journalist
may experience abuse (see Section 2.a.). Charges rarely are filed.
Convictions are rare, but proceedings may last several years, with
defendants required to appear in court regularly, only to be informed
that another in a series of continuances has been issued in their case.
In June journalist Shaker Al-Jawhari was summoned to GID
headquarters and then detained overnight. While detained he was
questioned about his political writings, which were critical of the
Government (see Section 2.a.).
In July journalist Senan Shaqdih was detained for 2 weeks, during
which time he was subjected to psychological abuse. He was accused of
publishing items harmful to Jordan's ties with a neighboring country.
He finally was released in August by order of King Abdullah (see
Section 2.a.).
In August editor Abdul Karim Al-Barghouti was detained pending
investigation of the allegation that he slandered Prime Minister
Rawabdeh's son. He was released on bail 4 days later. After his
release, he reported having been treated well (see Section 2.a.).
In September Azzam Yunis, the editor in chief of the independent
newspaper Al-Arab Al-Yawm, was arrested in connection with the
publication of articles by Shiekh Abdul Mun'em Abu Zant, a pro-HAMAS
Islamist and former legislator, and was released on bail the same day.
Laith Shubaylat, who was sentenced in 1998 to 9 months in prison
for inciting riots but refused a pardon claiming that he was not
guilty, was released from prison in October 1998.
There was no further information on Basil Abu Ghoshe, a 21-year-old
man who continued to be detained despite having completed his sentence
in 1998, ostensibly for his own protection against threats from a rival
tribe.
The security services detained approximately 65 persons, described
in the press as ``Islamists,'' during the year; this figure includes 15
persons arrested in December. These detentions were related to
allegations of involvement in terrorist or strictly political
activities.
The Government does not use forced exile routinely; however,
Jordanian HAMAS leaders Khaled Mishal, Ibrahim Ghosheh, Izzat Rishuq,
and Sami Khater were expelled in October (see Sections 2.b. and 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
independence of the judiciary; however, the judiciary is subject to
pressure from the executive branch. A judge's appointment to,
advancement within, and dismissal from the judiciary are determined by
a committee whose members are appointed by the King. The Ministry of
Justice has great influence over a judge's career and often subverts
the judicial system in favor of the executive branch. There have been
numerous allegations that judges have been ``reassigned'' temporarily
to another court or judicial district in order to remove them from a
particular proceeding. In one instance in 1998, in order to avoid a
trial before the regular court of appeals, the Minister of Justice
allegedly formed a special appeals court panel to try several counts
against to an influential member of society who had been charged with
the sale of children to foreign adoptive parents. In February 1998,
Judge Farouk Al-Kilani was forced to retire from the Supreme Court.
Kilani alleged that he was asked to step down because of his
involvement in the High Court of Justice's decision that rejected the
legality of the May 1997 amendments to the Press and Publications Law.
(The Court ruled that the amendments had been approved in an
unconstitutional manner on an emergency basis.) Judges also complain of
unlawful telephone surveillance.
The judicial system consists of several types of courts. Most
criminal cases are tried in civilian courts, which include the appeals
courts, the Court of Cassation, and the Supreme Court. Cases involving
sedition, armed insurrection, financial crimes, drug trafficking, and
offenses against the royal family are tried in the State Security
Court. In 1997 the Parliament passed amendments to the law governing
the State Security Court that effectively extended its mandate
indefinitely. The amendments had been rejected earlier by the lower
house's judicial committee as ``undemocratic'' and contrary to the
principle of judicial independence. Shari'a (Islamic) courts have
jurisdiction over marriage and divorce among Muslims and inheritance
cases involving both Muslims and non-Muslims (see Section 5).
Most trials in the civilian courts are open. Defendants are
entitled to legal counsel, may challenge witnesses, and have the right
to appeal. Defendants facing the death penalty or life imprisonment
must be represented by legal counsel. Public defenders are provided if
the defendant in such cases cannotafford to hire legal counsel. Shari'a
regards the testimony of one man to be equal to the testimony of two
women. This technically applies only in religious courts but, in the
past, has been imposed in civil courts as well, regardless of religion.
The State Security Court consists of a panel of three judges who
may be either civilians or military officers. Sessions frequently are
closed to the public. Defendants tried in the State Security Court
often are held in pretrial detention without access to lawyers,
although they are visited by representatives of the ICRC. In the State
Security Court, judges have inquired into allegations that defendants
were tortured and have allowed the testimony of physicians regarding
these allegations. The Court of Cassation has ruled that the State
Security Court cannot issue a death sentence on the basis of a
confession obtained as a result of torture. Defendants in the State
Security Court have the right to appeal their sentences to the Court of
Cassation, which is authorized to review issues of both fact and law.
Appeals are automatic for cases involving the death penalty.
In the past, defense attorneys have challenged the appointment of
military judges to the State Security Court to try civilian cases as
contrary to the concept of an independent judiciary. Military judges
appear to receive adequate training in civil law and procedure, and
State Security Court decisions are subject to review by the Court of
Cassation.
In the past, the press routinely has carried details of cases tried
before the State Security Court. However, provisions of the 1998 Press
and Publication Law prohibit press coverage of any case that is under
investigation without explicit permission from the authorities. The
1999 Press and Publications Law, which became effective on October 16,
now allows journalists to cover court proceedings ``unless the court
rules otherwise;'' however, this change in the law still has not been
tested.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution requires that security forces obtain
a warrant from the Prosecutor General or a judge before conducting
searches or otherwise interfering with these rights, and the security
services generally respect these constitutional restrictions; however,
in security cases, the authorities sometimes--in violation of the law--
obtain warrants retroactively or obtain preapproved warrants. Security
officers monitor telephone conversations and Internet communication,
read correspondence, and engage in surveillance of persons who are
considered to pose a threat to the Government or national security. The
law permits these practices if the Government obtains a court order.
Judges complain of unlawful telephone surveillance (see Section 1.e.).
In May Mohammed Nizami was arrested for remarks about the Jordanian
Government made in an Internet chat room (see Section 1.d. and 2.a.).
Unlike the previous year, the Government did not block the entry of
foreign publications (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press; however, the Government imposes
some restrictions on these rights.
The 1998 Press and Publications Law, combined with the 1998 Press
Association Law, impose stringent restrictions on the operation of
newspapers. The Government also intimidates journalists to encourage
self-censorship. Private citizens may be prosecuted for slandering the
royal family, the Government, or foreign leaders, and for sowing
sedition. Citizens generally do not hesitate to criticize the
Government openly, but are more circumspect in regard to the King and
the royal family.
The Press Association Law limits the practice of journalism to
Jordan Press Association (JPA) members, potentially excluding dozens of
practicing journalists from the profession. No publishers or
journalists have been cited for violating the law. However, in August
Prime Minister Abdur-Ra'uf Rawabdeh issued an order directing
government offices to cooperate only with JPA members. In October the
JPA voted to expel three of its members, who had traveled to Israel,
for participation in ``normalization'' activities. Such an expulsion
would have prevented these journalists from practicing their
profession. However, the decision was never conveyed formally and,
therefore, was never binding. In November the three men signed
statements in which they asserted that they saw the fight against
normalization with Israel as necessary, and the JPA dropped the matter.
The 1998 Press and Publications Law granted the Government wide
discretionary powers to issue fines, withdraw licenses, and order
shutdowns to control the editorial content of newspapers. The law
prohibited reporting on criminal cases at any stage of the
investigation into any case or crime without prior authorization from
the public prosecutor. Details of court proceedings may not be
published without a court's permission. Violations of this section of
the Press and Publications Law entailed a fine of between $7,000 and
$14,000 (5,000 and 10,000 dinars). The publication of a newspaper or
periodical without a license entails the same fine. However, the 1999
Press and Publications Law, which became effective on October 16,
allows journalists to cover court proceedings ``unless the court rules
otherwise'' and reduces the prescribed fine to between $700 and $1,400
(500 to 1,000 dinars) (see Section 1.e.).
It was illegal under the 1998 Press and Publications Law to publish
news, opinion, information, reports, caricatures, or photos that
disparage the King or the royal family, pertain to the armed forces or
security services, harm national unity, disparage religion, offend an
individual or harm his reputation, disparage the heads of friendly
states, harm the country's relations with other nations, promote
perversion or lead to moral corruption, shake confidence in the
national currency, or feature false news or rumors. However, amendments
that became effective on October 16 removed these specific prohibitions
from the Press and Publications Law. Criminal law still places
significant restrictions on what can be published.
The 1998 Press and Publications Law also provided that those who
seek to obtain a newspaper license must show proof of capital of
$700,000 (500,000 dinars) for a daily newspaper, $140,000 (100,000
dinars) for most other publications, and $7,000 (5,000 dinars) for
specialized publications. The editor in chief of a newspaper was
required under the law to be a citizen and to have 8 years of
experience as a full-time journalist. However, the 1999 Press and
Publications Law reduced these requirements by half.
Persons accused of violating the Press and Publications Law are
tried in a special court for press and copyright cases. Journalists
also are prosecuted for criminal and security violations in connection
with their work. Although a substantial number of cases are dismissed
before trial, many other cases linger for years. The Government
routinely uses detention and prosecution or the threat of prosecution
to intimidate journalists and to encourage self-censorship (see Section
1.d.).
The Penal Code authorizes the State to take action against any
person who incites violence, defames heads of state, disseminates
``false or exaggerated information outside the country that attacks
state dignity,'' or defames a public official.
In June journalist Shaker Al-Jawhari was summoned to GID
headquarters and then detained overnight. While there, he was
questioned about his political writings, which were critical of the
Government (see Section 1.d.).
In July journalist Senan Shaqdih was detained for 2 weeks, during
which he was subjected to psychological abuse. He was accused of
publishing items harmful to Jordan's ties with a neighboring country.
He finally was released by order of King Abdullah in August (see
Section 1.d.).
For a 4-week period starting on July 17, the official government
news agency, Petra, refused to provide news to the Arabic language
daily, Al-Arab Al-Yawm, charging its staff with ``unethical
reporting.''
In August editor Abdul Karim Al-Barghouti was detained pending
investigation of charges of slandering Prime Minister Rawabdeh's son.
He was released on bail 4 days later. After his release, he reported
having been treated well (see Section 1.d.).
In September Azzam Yunis, the editor in chief of the independent
newspaper Al-Arab Al-Yawm, was arrested in connection with the
publication of articles by Sheikh Abdul Mun'em Abu Zant, a pro-Hamas
Islamist and former legislator, and was released on bail the same day.
Radio and television news broadcasts are more restricted than the
print media. The Government is the sole broadcaster of radio and
television programs. The Government has commercial agreements with the
British Broadcasting Corporation, the London-based Middle East
Broadcasting Center, and Radio Monte Carlo that allows it to simulcast
regional programs using local radio transmitters. Jordan Television
(JTV) reports only the Government's position on controversial matters.
International satellite television and Israeli and Syrian television
broadcasts are available and unrestricted.
In May Mohammed Nizami was arrested and charged with ``lese
majeste,'' or slandering the King for allegedly making critical remarks
about the Government in an Internet chat room (see Sections 1.d. and
1.f.).
Unlike the previous year, the Government did not block the entry of
foreign publications (see Section 1.f.).
In a high profile case, Dr. Mustafa Hamarneh was demoted in July
from his position as head of the Center for Strategic Studies at Jordan
University, apparently as a result of his outspoken political views.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
restricts freedom of assembly. Citizens must obtain permits for public
gatherings. The Government granted almost no permits for demonstrations
during the year and denies permits for public protests and rallies that
it determines pose a threat to security.
The Government restricts freedom of association. The Government
requires but routinely grants approval for conferences, workshops, and
seminars.
The Government routinely licenses political parties and other
associations. There are currently 23 licensed political parties.
Membership in an unlicensed political party is illegal. The Government
may deny licenses to parties that it decides do not meet a list of
political and other criteria contained in the Political Parties Law.
The High Court of Justice may dissolve a party if it violates the
Constitution or the Political Parties Law.
Upon arrival at Queen Alia International Airport on September 22,
two leaders of HAMAS, Khaled Mishal and Ibrahim Ghosheh, were detained
along with four of their bodyguards (all six are Jordanian citizens).
The bodyguards subsequently were released. Mishal and Ghosheh were held
for 1 month and then expelled, along with two other HAMAS leaders,
Izzat Rishuq and Sami Khater (see Sections 1.d. and 2.d.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for the
safeguarding of ``all forms of worship and religious rites in
accordance with the customs observed in the Kingdom, unless such is
inconsistent with public order or morality;'' however, the Government
imposes some restrictions on freedom of religion. Citizens may not
always practice the religion of their choice. According to the
Constitution, Islam is the state religion.
Islamic institutions are managed by the Ministry of Religious
Affairs and Trusts, which appoints imams and subsidizes certain
activities sponsored by mosques. Religious institutions, such as
churches that wish to receive official government recognition, must
apply to the Prime Ministry for registration. The Protestant
denominations registered as ``societies'' come under the jurisdiction
of one of the recognized Protestant churches for purposes of family
law, such as divorce and child custody. The Government does not
recognize a number of religions.
Over 90 percent of the population are Sunni Muslim, and
approximately 6 percent are Christian. The Government does not
recognize religious faiths other than the three main monotheistic
religions: Islam; Christianity; and Judaism. In addition not all
Christian denominations have been accorded official government
recognition. Officially recognized denominations include the Greek
Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic (Melkite), Armenian Orthodox,
Maronite Catholic, and the Assyrian, Anglican, Lutheran, Seventh-Day
Adventist, United Pentecostal, and Presbyterian Churches. Other
churches, including the Baptist Church, the Free Evangelical Church,
the Church of the Nazarene, the Assembly of God, and the Christian
Missionary Alliance, are registered with the Ministry of Justice as
``societies'' but not as churches. There are also small numbers of
Shi'a and Druze, as well as adherents of the Baha'i Faith.
The Government does not interfere with public worship by the
country's Christian minority. However, although the majority of
Christians are allowed to practice freely, some activities, such as
proselytizing or encouraging conversion to the Christian faith--both
considered legally incompatible with Islam--are prohibited. Christians
are subject to aspects of Shari'a (Islamic law) that designate how
inheritances are distributed.
The Government does not recognize Jehovah's Witnesses, the Church
of Christ, or the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, but each
of these denominations is allowed to conduct religious services and
activities without interference.
The Government does not recognize the Baha'i Faith as a religion
but does not prohibit the practice of the faith. However, Baha'is face
both official and societal discrimination. The Government does not
record the bearer's religion on national identity cards issued to
Baha'is, nor does it register property belonging to the Baha'i
community. Adherents of the Baha'i Faith are considered as Muslims for
purposes of family and inheritance law. Unlike Christian denominations,
the Baha'i community does not have its own court to adjudicate personal
status and family matters. Baha'i personal status matters are heard in
Shari'a courts.
Non-Jordanian Christian missionaries operate in the country but are
subject to restrictions. Christian missionaries may not proselytize
Muslims. In late 1998 and early 1999, foreign Christian mission groups
in the country complained of increased bureaucratic difficulties,
including refusal by the Government to renew residence permits. One
couple affiliated with the Anglican Church was accused of converting a
Muslim minor to Christianity and ordered to leave the country. The
couple stated that the minor in question had been attending their
church for several months before they met him.
The Jordan Evangelical Theological Seminary (JETS), a Christian
training school for pastors and missionaries, applied in August 1998
for a permit to purchase land on which to construct a seminary and
campus. In April permission was granted to purchase the land on the
condition that JETS register and receive accreditation from the
Ministry of Education. Pending such registration, authorities suspended
renewal of the residence permits of all of the seminary's foreign
students (who come from 14 foreign countries), and 2 members of the
faculty. As a result of their association with the JETS, noncitizen
Arab Muslim students have been deported or asked to leave the country.
For his participation in the school, Iraqi national Hakim Ismael was
jailed in December 1998 for approximately 2 weeks in a cell with 30 to
40 other inmates, many of whom had been accused of common crimes.
Following his incarceration, Ismael was released and advised to leave
the country. In January another JETS student, Mahoud Ali Mabrouk, was
jailed for 2 weeks and then deported to Egypt (see Section 1.d.). In
February a Sudanese national, Alaa El Din Ali, was jailed for 17 days
and then deported to the Sudan (see Section 1.d.).
In November 1998, the authorities ordered the closure of the
regional office of ICI, an educational branch of the U.S.-based
Assemblies of God churches, for an alleged violation of the health
code. Although an Amman court later found the citation to have no basis
in law, the ICI regional director was nevertheless ordered to vacate
the premises, from which Christian literature was distributed. In
February 1999, the ICI regional director, a 9-year resident in the
country, reapplied for a residence permit as an Assemblies of God
missionary but his application initially was denied; no reason was
given for the denial. The missionary's residence permit later was
issued in May.
In April a church worker with Campus Crusade for Christ (or Life
Agape) was detained on the campus of the University of Jordan while
leading a Bible study session for a small group of students. He was
taken to a GID detention center where he was held for 3 days,
questioned about his religious activities, and told to provide the
names of individuals who had attended religious events with him. He was
denied an opportunity to contact his family. After 3 days, he was
transferred to a detention facility in Amman and held in a small cell
with 40 other detainees, who all shared one toilet. The religious
worker was released 2 days later after signing a statement that he
would cease his ``controversial'' religious activities. He has since
been barred from entering the university's campus.
The Government notes individuals' religions (except for Baha'is) on
the national identity card and ``family book'' (a national registration
record issued to the head of every family that serves as proof of
citizenship) of all citizens.
The Constitution provides that congregations have the right to
establish schools for the education of their own members ``provided
that they comply with the general provisions of the law and be subject
to the control of government in matters relating to their curricula and
orientation.''
Shari'a is applied in all matters relating to family law involving
Muslims or the children of a Muslim father, and all citizens, including
non-Muslims, are subject to Islamic legal provisions regarding
inheritance. All minor children of a male citizen who converts to Islam
are automatically considered to be Muslim. Adult children of a male
Christian who has converted to Islam become ineligible to inherit from
their father if they do not themselves convert to Islam. In cases where
a Muslim converts to Christianity, the act is not recognized legally by
the authorities, and the subject continues to be treated as a Muslim in
matters of family and property law, and the minorchildren of a male
Muslim who converts to Christianity continue to be treated as Muslims
under the law.
The law prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing Muslims.
Conversion to the Muslim faith by Christians is allowed; however, a
Muslim may not convert to another religion. Muslims who convert to
other faiths complain of social and government discrimination. The
Government does not recognize fully the legality of such conversions.
Under Shari'a converts are regarded as apostates and legally may be
denied their property and other rights. However, this principle is not
applied. Converts from Islam do not fall under the jurisdiction of
their new religion's laws in matters of personal status and still are
considered Muslims under Shari'a, although the reverse is not true.
Shari'a prescribes a punishment of death for conversion; however, there
is no equivalent statute under national law.
The Political Parties Law prohibits houses of worship from being
used for political party activity. The law was designed primarily to
prevent Islamist parliamentarians from preaching in mosques.
Religious instruction is mandatory for all Muslim students in
public schools. Christian and Baha'i students are not required to
attend courses in Islam.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The law provides for the right of
citizens to travel freely abroad and within the country except in
designated military areas; however, there are some restrictions on
freedom of movement. The law requires that all women, including foreign
women married to citizens, obtain written permission from a male
guardian--usually their father or husband--to apply for a Jordanian
passport. Authorities enforce requests from fathers to prevent their
children from departing the country, even when the children are
traveling with their mothers.
Jordanians with full citizenship receive passports that are valid
for 5 years. Most Palestinians living in Jordan are citizens and
receive passports that are valid for 5 years. However, approximately
150,000 Palestinian residents--most refugees or children of refugees
who arrived from Gaza after 1967--do not qualify for citizenship. They
receive 2-year passports valid for travel only. (In the period
following the country's administrative and legal disengagement from the
West Bank in 1988, Palestinians residing in the West Bank received 2-
year passports valid for travel only, instead of 5-year Jordanian
passports.) In 1995 King Hussein announced that West Bank residents
without other travel documentation again would be eligible to receive
5-year passports. However, the Government has stressed that these
passports are for travel only and do not connote citizenship, which
only can be shown by presenting one's ``national number,'' a civil
registration number accorded at birth or upon naturalization to persons
holding citizenship. The national number is recorded on national
identity cards and in family registration books, which are issued only
to citizens.
Following a successful lawsuit in 1997 by a West Bank resident who,
prior to 1988, had held a Jordanian passport (the authorities had
refused to issue the plaintiff a new passport), the authorities began
to issue 5-year Jordanian passports to those who are deemed to be
noncitizens of Palestinian origin. However, such residents do not enjoy
the rights of citizens because they have no national number. All
Palestinians must obtain permits from the Ministry of the Interior for
travel between Jordan and the Israeli-occupied territories. Such
permission is granted routinely.
The Constitution specifically prohibits the deportation of
citizens. However, the Government expelled four leaders of HAMAS,
Khaled Mishal, Ibrahim Ghosheh, Izzat Rishuq, and Sami Khater, all four
of whom are citizens (see Sections 1.d. and 2.b.).
There is no law or statute that provides for the granting of
refugee status to asylum seekers. The Government generally cooperates
with the office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The
UNHCR must resettle refugees in other countries. However, in April
1998, the Ministry of Interior signed a memorandum of understanding
with the UNHCR concerning the status and treatment of refugees. Under
the agreement, the Government admits asylum seekers, including those
who have entered the country clandestinely, and respects the UNHCR's
eligibility determinations under the refugee definitions set forth in
the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol. The agreement provides protection against the forcible
return of refugees from the country, and recognizes the legal
definition of a refugee as set forth in the U.N. Convention. Since 1996
the UNHCR has held regular seminars to train law enforcement officials
in international refugee law, including specialized courses
forpolicewomen. The Government provides first asylum. According to
UNHCR figures, 48,588 persons have sought asylum through the UNHCR, and
in approximately 6,000 cases (approximately 14 percent), applicants
have been accorded refugee status.
The Government estimates that over 180,000 Iraqis reside in the
country. Since 1991 thousands of Iraqis have applied for refugee status
and received legal and material assistance from the UNHCR. During the
year, 8,633 persons applied for, and 1,174 were accorded, refugee
status. The UNHCR also received applications for refugee status during
the year from Sudanese, Syrian, and Libyan asylum seekers.
For one school year (1998-99), Iraqi children were permitted to
enroll in school regardless of their status. However, for the 1999-00
school year, the Government reverted to its previous policy of denying
Iraqi children admittance to school unless they were residents of the
country or recognized as refugees by the UNHCR.
Over 1.5 million Palestinian refugees are registered in Jordan with
the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA). The
UNRWA counts another 800,000 Palestinians as either displaced persons
from the 1967 war, arrivals following the 1967 war, or returnees from
the Gulf between 1990 and 1991.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the ability to change their government. The
King has sole discretionary authority to appoint and dismiss the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet, to dissolve Parliament, and to establish
public policy. Appointments made by the King to high government posts
do not require legislative approval. Executive power is vested in the
King (or, in his absence, in the Regent), who exercises his power
through his ministers in accordance with the provisions of the
Constitution.
The Parliament is composed of the 40-member Senate, appointed by
the King, and the popularly elected 80-member Chamber of Deputies. The
Parliament is empowered by the Constitution to initiate legislation,
and it can approve, reject, and amend legislation proposed by the
Cabinet. A group of 10 senators or deputies may submit draft bills for
consideration; however, in practice legislation is initiated and
drafted by the Cabinet of Ministers and submitted by the Government to
the Parliament for its consideration. Opposition Members of Parliament
have complained that attempts by members of the lower house to initiate
legislation receive no response from the Government. The King proposes
and dismisses extraordinary sessions of Parliament and may postpone
regular sessions for up to 60 days. By law if the Government amends or
enacts a law when Parliament is not in session, it must submit the law
to Parliament for consideration during the next session; however, this
does not always occur.
The Electoral Law and the distribution of parliamentary seats
deliberately favor electorates in rural and southern Jordan, regions
with populations known for their traditional, pro-Hashemite views.
Over 500 candidates competed in the 1997 parliamentary elections,
despite a boycott by Islamist and other parties. There were many
reports of registration irregularities and fraud on the part of
candidates. Restrictions on the press and on campaign materials also
had a negative effect on the campaign, which elicited much debate over
the fairness of the Electoral Law and its implementation. Voter turnout
was significantly lower in most urban areas than in rural areas.
Centrist candidates with ties to major tribes dominate the Parliament.
The municipal elections in July featured the participation of the
parties that had boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections; however,
low voter turnout necessitated a second day of balloting. The process
generally was regarded as free and fair.
The so-called one-man, one-vote amendment to the Electoral Law was
ratified by Parliament in 1997, nearly 4 years after it was first
enacted by royal decree. The amendment allows voters to choose only one
candidate in multiple-seat districts. In the largely tribal society,
citizens tend to cast their first vote for family members, and any
additional votes in accordance with their political leanings. As a
result, the amendment in practice has tended to limit the chances of
some nontribal candidates, including women, to be elected.
Women have the right to vote, and women's groups encourage women to
vote and to be active in the political process; however, they are
underrepresented at the local and national level. There is one female
minister. There are three female senators, but no women hold seats in
the Chamber of Deputies.
Of the 80 seats in the lower house, 9 are reserved for Christians,
6 for Bedouins, and 3 for the Circassian or Chechen ethnic minorities.
The Palestinian community, estimated to be slightly over half of
the total population, is not represented proportionately in the
Government and legislature. Only 7 of 24 ministers, 7 of 40 senators,
and 11 of 80 lower house deputies are of Palestinian origin. The
electoral system gives greater representation to areas that have a
majority of inhabitants of non-Palestinian origin.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Domestic and international human rights groups investigate
allegations of human rights abuses and publish and disseminate findings
critical of government policy. However, the Press and Publications Law
has restricted the publication of information about the military and
security services, which, in effect, prevented the publication by
domestic groups of reports alleging torture and other abuses committed
by the security services. The 1999 amendments to the Press and
Publications Law removed these specific restrictions, but restrictions
still exist in the penal code.
The local chapters of the Arab Organization for Human Rights (AOHR)
and the Jordanian Human Rights Organization (JHRO) are registered with
the Government. The AOHR has drawn public attention to alleged human
rights abuses and a range of other political issues and has pressed the
Government to bring formal charges against political detainees or to
release them promptly. It asserts that the Government responds to only
about 10 percent of the complaints that it submits on behalf of
individuals who allegedly were subjected to human rights violations by
the authorities.
The ICRC generally is permitted full and unrestricted access to
detainees, including those held by the GID and the military
intelligence directorate. However, for 2 months during the year, the
ICRC was not allowed to visit one specific prisoner who was detained by
the GID (see Section 1.c.). As a result, the ICRC suspended its visits
to GID detention facilities during that period. After the GID relented,
the ICRC resumed visits to GID detainees.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social status
Although the law does not distinguish between citizens on the basis
of race, women, minorities, and others are treated differently under
the law and face discrimination in employment, housing, and other
areas.
Women.--Violence against women is common. Reported incidents of
violence against women do not reflect the full extent of the problem.
Medical experts acknowledge that spousal abuse occurs frequently.
However, cultural norms discourage victims from seeking medical or
legal help and frustrate an objective assessment of the extent of such
abuse.
Abused women have the right to file a complaint in court against
their spouses for physical abuse but in practice familial and societal
pressures discourage them from seeking legal remedies. Marital rape is
not illegal. NGO's, such as the Jordanian Women's Union, which has a
telephone hot line for victims of domestic violence, provide assistance
in such matters. Wife beating is technically grounds for divorce, but
the husband may seek to demonstrate that he has authority from the
Koran to correct an irreligious or disobedient wife by striking her.
The Criminal Code allows leniency for a person found guilty of
committing a ``crime of honor,'' a euphemism that refers to a violent
assault with intent to murder against a female by a male relative for
alleged sexual misconduct. Law enforcement treatment of men accused of
``honor crimes'' reflects widespread unwillingness to recognize the
abuse involved or take action against the problem. Sixteen such murders
were reported during the year in which the victims were shot,
strangled, stabbed, bludgeoned, and run over with vehicles. Human
rights monitors believe that many more such crimes were committed but
not documented as honor crimes. Moreover, most crimes of honor are not
reported by the press. The actual number of honor crimes is believed to
be significantly higher. One forensic medical examiner estimated that
25 percent of all murders committed in the country are honor crimes.
The police regularly imprison women who are potential victims of honor
crimes for their own protection. There were up to 50 women
involuntarily detained in this form of ``protective custody'' during
the year.
According to Article 340 of the Penal Code, a ``crime of honor''
defense may be invoked by a defendant accused of murder who ``surprises
his wife or any close female relative'' in an act of adultery or
fornication, in which case the perpetrator of the ``honor crime'' is
judged not guilty of murder. Although few defendants can meet the
stringent requirements for a crime of honor defense, that is, the
defendant personally must have witnessed the female victim engaging in
sexual relations, most avoid trial for the crime of murder, being tried
instead on the charge of manslaughter, and even those convicted of
murder rarely spend more than 2 years in prison. (In contrast to honor
crimes, the maximum penalty for first-degree murder is death, and the
maximum penalty for second-degree murder is 15 years.) Such defenses
commonly also rely on the male relative having acted in the ``heat of
passion'' upon hearing of a female relative's alleged sexual
transgression, usually without any investigation on the part of the
assailant to determine the veracity of the allegation before committing
the assault. Defenses in these cases fall under Article 98 of the Penal
Code. Women may not invoke these defenses for murdering a male relative
under the same circumstances, nor may they use them for killing men who
attempt to rape, sexually harass, or otherwise threaten their
``honor.''
On February 6, Hussein Suleiman ran over his pregnant sister Malak
Suleiman three times with his pickup truck. According to his own
testimony, he wanted to make sure that his sister was dead so that he
could ``cleanse his family honor.'' On July 27, he was sentenced to 1
year in prison.
On February 10, after providing bail for her release from prison,
Maha Walid's father, brother, and uncle took her to the back yard of
their home. They argued about her alleged ``immoral behavior.'' Her
uncle then shot her in the head and handed the gun to her father, who
shot her twice, fired the gun into the air, and shouted that he had
``cleansed his honor.'' On July 12, the three men were sentenced to 5
months each for the crime.
In June one judge broke with tradition and refused to accept the
``heat of passion'' defense in an honor crime case. The court sentenced
Khalil Mohammad to 15 years in prison for the murder of his wife,
rejecting his plea that he had killed her in a fit of fury, ``because
he already knew about her behavior in the past and did not kill her.''
In December the National Committee to Eliminate ``Crimes of Honor''
presented leaders of the upper and lower houses of the Parliament with
a petition signed by 15,000 citizens demanding an end both to crimes of
honor and the legislation that protects perpetrators of such crimes.
The lower house rejected in November a government-supported
amendment that would have eliminated Article 340; however, the Senate
approved the same measure in December. The amendment was returned to
the lower house for reconsideration. If the lower house again rejects
the measure, the two houses would meet in joint session to settle the
issue.
Women experience legal discrimination in matters of pension and
social security benefits, inheritance, divorce, and the value of court
testimony. A woman's testimony is worth only half that of a man (see
Section 1.e.). The Government provides men with more generous social
security benefits than women. The Government continues pension payments
of deceased male civil servants to their heirs but discontinues
payments of deceased female civil servants.
Under Shari'a female heirs receive half the amount of a male heir's
inheritance, and the non-Muslim widows of Muslim spouses have no
inheritance rights. A sole female heir receives half of her parents'
estate; the balance goes to designated male relatives. A sole male heir
inherits all his parents' property. Male Muslim heirs have the duty to
provide for all family members who need assistance. Under Shari'a men
are able to divorce their spouses more easily than women. Marriage and
divorce matters for Christians are adjudicated by special courts for
each denomination. Married women are ineligible for work in the
diplomatic service, and, until recently, most women in the diplomatic
corps automatically were assigned to administrative positions. There
are five female judges in the country.
The law requires a married woman to obtain her husband's permission
to obtain a passport (see Section 2.d.). Married women do not have the
legal right to transmit citizenship to their children. Furthermore,
women may not petition for citizenship for their non-Jordanian
husbands. The husbands themselves must apply for citizenship after
fulfilling a requirement of 15 years continuous residence. Once the
husbands have obtained citizenship, they may apply to transmit the
citizenship to their children. However, in practice such an application
may take years and, in many cases, citizenship ultimately still may be
denied to the husband and children. Such children become stateless and
lack the rights of citizen children, such as the right to attend school
or seek othergovernment services. Civil law grants women equal pay for
equal work, but in practice this law often is ignored.
Social pressures discourage many women from pursuing professional
careers. Nonetheless, women have employment opportunities in many
professions, including engineering, medicine, education, and the law.
Women constitute approximately 14 percent of the work force and 50
percent of university students. Women's groups stress that the problem
of discrimination is not only one of law, but also of women's lack of
awareness of their rights or unwillingness to assert those rights. The
U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization reported in 1995 that women who
work in agriculture average 15-hour days and earn less than men. The
Jordanian chapter of the Business and Professional Women's Club gives
seminars on women's rights and assists women in establishing small
businesses. Members of the royal family work actively to improve the
status of women.
Children.--The Government is committed to children's rights and
welfare in the areas of education and health. However, government
efforts in these areas are constrained by limited financial resources.
Education is compulsory until age 15, but children who do not attend
school or attend infrequently are not considered truant. The law
prohibits corporal punishment in schools; however, such punishment is
known to occur. For one school year (1998-99), Iraqi children were
permitted to enroll in school regardless of their status. However, for
the 1999-00 school year, the Government reverted to its previous policy
of denying Iraqi children admittance to school unless they were
residents of the country or recognized as refugees by the UNHCR (see
Section 2.d.).
The Government safeguards some children's rights, especially
regarding child labor. Although the law prohibits children under the
age of 16 from working, child vendors work the streets of Amman (see
Section 6.d.). The Ministry of Social Development has a committee to
address the problem and in some cases removes the children from the
streets, returns them to their families or to juvenile centers, and may
provide the families with a monthly stipend. However, the children
often return to the streets. Declining economic conditions have caused
the number of these ``street children'' to increase steadily over the
last 10 years. Selling newspapers, tissues, small food items, or gum,
these street vendors, along with the other children who pick through
trash dumpsters to find recyclable cans to sell, are sometimes the sole
source of income for their families.
Although the problem is difficult to quantify, social and health
workers believe that there is a significant incidence of child abuse in
families, and that the incidence of child sexual abuse is significantly
higher than reported. The law specifies punishment for abuses against
children. Rape or sodomy of a child under 15 years of age carries the
death penalty.
Illegitimate children are entitled to the same rights under the law
as legitimate children. However, in practice they suffer severe
discrimination in a society that does not tolerate adultery. Most
illegitimate children become wards of the State or live a meager
existence on the fringes of society. In either case, their prospects
for marriage and gainful employment are limited. Furthermore,
illegitimate children who are not acknowledged legally by their fathers
are considered stateless and are not given passports or identity
numbers.
People with Disabilities.--High unemployment in the general
population restricts job opportunities for disabled persons, estimated
by the Ministry of Social Development to number 100,000. Eighty percent
of disabled citizens receive monetary assistance from the Government.
The Government passed legislation in 1993 requiring future public
buildings to accommodate the needs of the disabled and to retrofit
existing public buildings, but implementation has been slow. Since 1993
the Special Education Department of the Ministry of Social Development
has enrolled approximately 10,000 mentally and physically disabled
persons in public and private sector training courses. It has placed
approximately 400 disabled persons in public and private sector jobs.
The law requires that 2 percent of the available jobs be reserved for
the physically disabled. Private organizations and members of the royal
family actively promote programs to protect and advance the interests
of the disabled.
Indigenous People.--The country's indigenous people, nomadic
Bedouin and East Bank town dwellers, traditionally have been the
backbone of popular support for the Hashemite monarchy. As a result,
they generally have enjoyed considerable influence within the political
system. They are represented disproportionately in senior
military,security, and civil service jobs. Nevertheless, many Bedouin
in rural areas are severely disadvantaged economically.
Religious Minorities.--In general Christians do not suffer
discrimination. Christians hold government positions and are
represented in the media and academia approximately in proportion to
their presence in the general population, which is estimated at 6
percent. Baha'is face some societal and official discrimination. Their
faith is not recognized officially, and Baha'is are classified as
Muslims on official documents, such as the national identity card.
Christian and Baha'i children in public schools are not required to
participate in Islamic religious instruction.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government granted
citizenship to all Palestinians who fled to Jordan in the period after
the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, and to a large number of refugees and
displaced persons who arrived as a result of the 1967 war. However,
most refugees who fled Gaza after 1967 are not entitled to citizenship
and are issued 2-year passports valid for travel only. In 1995 King
Hussein announced that West Bank residents without other travel
documentation would be eligible to receive 5-year Jordanian passports.
However, the Government has stressed that these passports are for
travel only and do not connote citizenship (see Section 2.d.).
Palestinians residing in Jordan, who make up about 60 percent of the
population, suffer discrimination in appointments to positions in the
Government and the military, in admittance to public universities, and
in the granting of university scholarships.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers in the private sector and in
some state-owned companies have the right to establish and join unions.
Unions must be registered to be considered legal. The law prohibits
union membership for noncitizens. Over 30 percent of the work force are
organized into 17 unions. Although union membership in the General
Federation of Jordanian Trade Unions (GFJTU), the sole trade
federation, is not mandatory, all unions belong to it. The Government
subsidizes and audits the GFJTU's salaries and activities. Union
officials are elected by secret ballot to 4-year terms. Although the
Government cosponsors and approves the timing of these elections, it
does not interfere in the choice of candidates.
Labor laws mandate that workers must obtain permission from the
Government in order to strike. Unions generally do not seek approval
for a strike, but workers use the threat of a strike as a negotiating
tactic. Strikes are prohibited if a labor dispute is under mediation or
arbitration. If a settlement is not reached through mediation, the
Ministry of Labor may refer the dispute to an industrial tribunal by
agreement of both parties. The tribunal is an independent arbitration
panel of judges appointed by the Ministry of Labor. The decisions of
the panel are binding legally. If only one party agrees, the Ministry
of Labor refers the dispute to the Council of Ministers and then to
Parliament. Labor law prohibits employers from dismissing a worker
during a labor dispute.
In July in protest over a recent contract between the Pepsi-Cola
Company and The Food Workers Union, 255 of Pepsi's approximately 1,200
employees staged an illegal strike. The company issued two warnings to
the workers and then dismissed them. After the Minister of Labor
intervened, the company reinstated all but 115 of the employees and
offered a severance package to the rest. After this agreement, the
Ministry of Labor continued to urge the company to reinstate the
remaining fired employees.
In August the Jordan Cable and Wire Company laid off 20 of its 220
workers. In protest 100 other employees staged an illegal strike. A
week later the company fired an additional 72 employees from among the
strikers. Also in August, following an intervention from the Ministry
of Labor, the company reinstated the 72 strikers. In November the Labor
Court ruled that the initial 20 layoffs were illegal and ordered the
company to reinstate those employees. The company had not done so at
year's end.
The GFJTU belongs to the Arab Labor organization, the International
Confederation of Arab Trade Unions, and to the International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU).
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Unions have,
and exercise, the right to bargain collectively. The Constitution
prohibits antiunion discrimination, but the ICFTU claims that the
Government does not protect adequately employees from antiunion
discrimination and that the Governmenthas dismissed public-sector
employees for political reasons. Workers may lodge complaints of
antiunion discrimination with the Ministry of Labor, which is
authorized to order the reinstatement of employees discharged for union
activities. There were no complaints of antiunion discrimination lodged
with the Ministry of Labor during the year.
The national labor laws apply in the free trade zones in Aqaba and
Zarqa. Private sector employees in these zones belong to one national
union that covers both zones and have the right to bargain
collectively.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
forbids compulsory labor except in a state of emergency such as war or
natural disaster, and it generally is not practiced; however, foreign
domestic servants often are subject to coercion and abuse, and in some
cases work under conditions that amount to forced labor (see Section
6.e.). The law does not prohibit specifically forced or compulsory
labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Labor law forbids children under the age of 16 from
working full time except as apprentices. At age 13, children may begin
part-time training for up to 6 hours a day, with night work prohibited.
Ministry of Labor inspectors have the authority to enforce laws on
child labor, but in practice, enforcement often does not extend to
small family businesses that employ underage children. Education is
compulsory to age 15. Families in remote areas frequently keep school-
age children at home to work. Child vendors work on the streets of
Amman (see Section 5). The law does not prohibit forced or compulsory
labor by children specifically, but such practices are not known to
occur (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--On October 2, the Government
implemented a national minimum wage of $114 (80 dinars) per month for
all workers except domestic servants and those in the agricultural
sector. Workers earning the minimum wages find it difficult to provide
a decent standard of living for their families. The Government
estimates that the poverty level is at a monthly wage of about $125 (89
dinars) per month for a family with 7.5 members. A study completed by
the Ministry of Labor in July found that 18.7 percent of the population
live at or below the poverty level; 1.5 percent live in ``abject''
poverty, defined by the Government as $58 (40.5 dinars) per month for a
family with 7.5 members. The Government provides minimal, assistance to
45,000 indigent families.
The law prohibits most workers from working more than the customary
48 hours per week. Hotel, restaurant, and cinema employees may work up
to 54 hours per week. Workers may not work more than 16 hours in any
continuous period or more than 60 hours of overtime per month.
Employees are entitled to 1 day off per week.
Labor law does not apply to domestic servants, who do not have a
legal forum to address their labor grievances and have no standing to
sue in court for nonpayment of wages. Abuse of domestic servants, most
of whom are foreign, is widespread. Imprisonment of maids and illegal
confiscation of travel documents by employers is common. Complaints of
beatings, insufficient food, and rape generally are not reported to
officials by victims, who fear losing their work permits and being
returned to their country. Domestic servants generally are not given
days off and frequently are called upon to work at any hour of the day
or night.
The law specifies a number of health and safety requirements for
workers, including the presence of bathrooms, drinking water, and first
aid equipment at work sites. The Ministry of Labor is authorized to
enforce health and safety standards. The law does not require employers
to report industrial accidents or occupational diseases to the Ministry
of Labor. Workers do not have a statutory right to remove themselves
from hazardous conditions without risking the loss of their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Although the law does not specifically
prohibit trafficking in women, the practice is not known to occur. A
1926 law specifically prohibits trafficking in children. There were no
reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
KUWAIT
Amir, or princes, from the Al-Sabah family have ruled Kuwait in
consultation with prominent community figures for over 200 years. The
Constitution, adopted in 1962 shortly after independence, provides for
an elected national assembly. It also permits the Amir to suspend its
articles during periods of martial law. The Amir twice suspended
constitutional provisions, from 1976-81 from 1986-92, and ruled
extraconstitutionally during these periods. The National Assembly
resumed functioning after the 1992 elections. In May the Amir once
again dissolved Parliament. However, in contrast to prior dissolutions,
this act was followed by constitutionally mandated elections, which
took place in July. The Constitution and law provide for a degree of
judicial independence, but the Amir appoints all judges, and renewal of
many judicial appointments is subject to government approval.
The Ministry of Interior supervises the security apparatus,
including the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and Kuwait State
Security (KSS), two agencies that, in addition to the regular police,
investigate internal security-related offenses. Members of the security
forces committed a number of human rights abuses.
Richly endowed with oil, during the year the country's estimated
per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was approximately $11,584. The
decline in per capita GDP from previous years reflects a significant
increase in resident foreign workers and lower oil revenues. The
estimated 1998-99 budget deficit was $6.3 billion. Budget sources
projected a $6.9 billion deficit for the current fiscal year prior to
recent significant increases in world crude oil prices. Despite its
stated emphasis on an open market, the Government continues to dominate
the local economy through direct expenditures and government-owned
companies and equities. The Government has initiated a program of
disposing of its holdings of stock in private companies. According to
government statistics, 92 percent of the indigenous work force is
employed by the Government. Foreigners constitute 98 percent of the
private sector work force.
There continued to be problems in the Government's human rights
record; while there were some improvements in a few areas, the
situation worsened in others. Citizens cannot change their head of
state. Although under the Constitution the National Assembly must
approve the Amir's choice of Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir),
this authority is limited; if the National Assembly rejects the Amir's
nominee, the Amir then submits three names from which the assembly must
choose the new Crown Prince. The Government bans formal political
parties, and women do not have the right to vote or seek election to
the National Assembly. On November 23, the Parliament vetoed on
constitutional grounds the Amir's May decree, which sought to give
women the right to vote, to seek election to the National Assembly
beginning with the parliamentary election scheduled for 2003, and to
hold cabinet office. On November 30, identical legislation that was
introduced by Members of Parliament was defeated by a two-vote margin.
A law promulgated in 1998 bans primaries previously conducted by
religious sects and tribes. Some police and members of the security
forces abuse detainees during interrogation. Prisons remain
overcrowded; however, the Government began renovating existing
facilities and building a new maximum security prison. The Amir
commuted the sentences of 306 prisoners on February 25, Kuwait's
national day, including those of the 8 remaining Jordanians, who were
held as state security prisoners. The judiciary is subject to
government influence, and foreign residents often claim that courts are
biased in favor of citizens. The Government infringes on citizens'
privacy rights in some areas. Security forces occasionally monitor the
activities of individuals and their communications. Men must obtain
government approval to marry foreign-born women. The Government uses
informal censorship, and journalists practice self-censorship. The
Government restricts freedom of assembly and association. The
Government places some limits on freedom of religion and movement. The
Government prevents the return of stateless persons who have strong
ties to the country. Deportation orders may be issued by administrative
order, and between 110 and 120 persons are estimated to be held in
detention facilities, some for up to 3 to 6 months. In May the
Government announced a crackdown on unlicensed branches of
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's). violence and discrimination
against women are problems. Discrimination against noncitizens
persists. The Government restricts some worker rights. The Labor Law
does not protect domestic servants regardless of citizenship. Unskilled
foreign workers suffer from the lack of a minimum wage in the private
sector, from failure to enforce the Labor Law, and at times physical
abuse; some work under conditions that, in effect, constitute
indentured servitude.
Although the Government has not found a solution to the human
rights problems of the approximately 110,000 stateless personsresiding
in Kuwait known as the ``bidoon,'' (the term means ``without'') in June
it introduced a new program that would naturalize approximately 11,000
bidoon and give permanent residency to the remainder; the program is
scheduled to be completed by June 2000. While this program is a
positive step, it still leaves the remaining 100,000 bidoon in a
legally precarious position.
Executive and legislative leaders continued to strengthen political
institutions by resolving major disagreements within the framework of
the Constitution and without recourse to extrajudicial measures.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
There were no developments in the investigations into the
extrajudicial killings that occurred during the chaotic period after
Kuwait's liberation from Iraqi occupation in February 1991.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
There have been no developments since 1994 in the cases of
disappearance that occurred following the country's liberation in 1991.
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Iraqi
authorities have not yet accounted for 608 Kuwaitis and residents of
Kuwait, including 8 women, who were taken prisoner during Iraq's
occupation of Kuwait; 10 more missing prisoner of war cases were added
by the ICRC during the year. The Government of Iraq has refused to
comply with U.N. Security Council Resolution 687, which stipulates the
release of the detainees. Iraq denies that it holds Kuwaiti detainees
and in February ceased participating in ICRC-sponsored talks on their
fate.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture; however, there
continue to be credible reports that some police and members of the
security forces abuse detainees during interrogation. Reported abuses
include blindfolding, verbal threats, stepping on toes, and slaps and
blows. Police and security forces were more likely to inflict such
abuse on noncitizens, particularly citizens of other non-Gulf Arab
nations and Asians, than on citizens.
The Government states that it investigates all allegations of abuse
and that it has punished at least some of the offenders. However, the
Government does not make public either the findings of its
investigations or what, if any, punishments are imposed. This omission
creates a climate of impunity, which diminishes deterrence against
abuse.
Defendants have the right to present evidence in court that they
have been mistreated during interrogation. However, the courts
frequently dismiss abuse complaints because defendants are unable to
substantiate their complaints with physical evidence. Members of the
security forces routinely decline to reveal their identity during
interrogation, a practice that further complicates confirmation of
abuse.
An estimated 7,000 unskilled Egyptian workers rioted in Kuwait City
on October 30-31. Riot police used tear gas to disperse the crowd and
made numerous arrests. There were no serious injuries; however, there
were reports of isolated instances of the use of excessive force by
police (see Section 6.e.).
Prison conditions, including conditions for those held for security
offenses, meet minimum international standards in terms of food, access
to basic health care, scheduled family visits, cleanliness, and
opportunities for work and exercise. Continuing problems include
overcrowding and the lack of availability of specialized medical care.
Approximately 1,300 persons are serving sentences or awaiting trial in
the central prison. An estimated additional 250 prisoners are being
held at the state security facility in Shuwaikh, which also operates as
a deportation center.
Following charges of corruption at the central prison in 1998,
prison officials were punished and the senior prison official lost his
position.
The Ministry of Interior maintained oversight of central prison
officials during the year, but there were no new charges of corruption.
The Government reopened Talha prison in 1998, and it is now being
used as a prison for persons convicted of civil crimes and those
awaiting trial, some of whom subsequently are processed for
administrative deportations. Since its reopening, Talha has not been
criticized by human rights groups for prisoner mistreatment. The
Government also began construction of a new maximum-security facility.
The National Assembly's Human Rights Committee closely monitored
prison conditions throughout the year, and the Government allowed the
ICRC access to all detention facilities.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
provides for freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention; however, the
Government occasionally arbitrarily arrests and detains persons. There
also were incidents of prolonged detention.
Police officers must obtain an arrest warrant from state
prosecutors before making an arrest, although in misdemeanor cases the
arresting officer may issue them. Security forces occasionally detain
persons at checkpoints in Kuwait City (see Section 2.d.).
Under the Penal Code, a suspect may not be held for more than 4
days without charge. Security officers sometimes prevent families from
visiting detainees during this confinement. After 4 days, prosecutors
must either release the suspect or file charges. If charges are filed,
prosecutors may remand a suspect to detention for an additional 21
days. Prosecutors also may obtain court orders for further detention
pending trial.
Dr Ahmed Al-Baghdadi, a prominent professor and journalist, was
detained in October for 2 weeks for an article that he published in
1996. On October 18, Salafi Islamist Ahmed Al-Ali was detained for 1
day for making inflammatory antiregime comments. In both cases, the
charges were brought by private citizens and were handled in accordance
with the law (see Section 2.a.).
During the election campaign, five parliamentary candidates were
arrested and charged with unlawful slander against the Government. One
of the candidates was sentenced to 6 months in prison (see Sections
2.a. and 3).
In October police arrested up to 2,500 persons in connection with
riots by foreign workers (see Section 6.e.).
Of the estimated 2,100 persons serving sentences or pending trial
at the security prison or the state security facility in Shuwaikh,
approximately 170 are being held on security grounds.
The Government may expel noncitizens (including bidoon, that is,
stateless residents of Kuwait, some of whom are native born or long-
term residents), if it considers them security risks. The Government
also may expel foreigners if they are unable to obtain or renew work or
residency permits. Between 110 and 120 persons are estimated to be held
in detention facilities, some of them pending deportation. Some of
these detainees have been held for up to 3 to 6 months. Many
deportation orders are issued administratively, without the benefit of
a trial. However, the Government does not return deportees to their
countries of origin forcibly, allowing those who object to remain in
detention. This practice leads to prolonged detention of deportees,
particularly Iraqis, who do not wish to return to their own countries.
It also plays a role in the complex problem faced by bidoon deportees,
who essentially remain in detention because their stateless condition
makes the execution of the deportation order impossible.
The Talha deportation center, which had been criticized in previous
years by human rights groups, reopened in 1998. However, there were no
allegations of the prolonged detention of deportees in the facility
during the year.
The law protects citizens from exile, and there were no reports of
this practice.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution states that
``judges shall not be subject to any authority;'' however, the Amir
appoints all judges, and renewal of many judicial appointments is
subject to government approval. Judges who are citizens have lifetime
appointments, but the Government also employs many noncitizens as
judges. These noncitizen judges work under 1- to 3-year renewable
contracts, which undermines their independence. The Ministry of Justice
may remove judges for cause, but it rarely does so. Foreignresidents
involved in legal disputes with citizens frequently complain that the
courts show a pro-Kuwaiti bias.
The regular court system tries both civil and criminal cases. The
Court of Cassation is the highest level of judicial appeal. Sunni and
Shi'a Muslims have recourse to courts of their respective denominations
for family law cases; however, there is no Shi'a appellate court. Shi'a
cases are referred to the Sunni court on appeal.
Defendants have the right to confront their accusers and appeal
verdicts. The Amir has the constitutional power to pardon or commute
all sentences. Defendants in felony cases are required by law to be
represented in court by legal counsel, which the courts provide in
criminal cases. In misdemeanor cases, defendants have the right to
waive the presence of legal counsel, and the court is not required to
provide counsel to indigent defendants.
Both defendants and prosecutors may appeal court verdicts to the
High Court of Appeal, which may rule on whether the law was applied
properly as well as on the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Decisions of the High Court of Appeal may be presented to the Court of
Cassation, which conducts a limited, formal review of cases to
determine only whether the law was applied properly.
In the regular court system there are no groups, including women,
who are barred from testifying or whose testimony is given lesser
weight. However, the Islamic courts, which have jurisdiction over
family law, apply Shari'a (Islamic law), which states that the
testimony of two women equals that of one man.
There were no reports of political prisoners. The Government
continues to incarcerate persons convicted of collaboration with Iraq
during the occupation. By law such collaboration is a felony. Most of
the persons convicted in the Martial Law Court in 1991 and the Special
State Security Court, which was abolished in 1995, did not receive fair
trials. In February the Amir freed the remaining eight Jordanians
convicted previously by the martial law and state security courts. At
year's end, 50 persons (29 Iraqis, 17 bidoon and 4 Palestinians)
convicted by these now abolished courts remained in prison.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution provides for individual privacy and
sanctity of the home; however, the Government infringes on these rights
in some areas. The police must obtain a warrant to search both public
and private property unless they are in hot pursuit of a suspect
fleeing the scene of a crime or if alcohol or illegal narcotics are
suspected on the premises. The warrant may be obtained from the State
Prosecutor or, in the case of private property, from a judge. In May an
Amiri decree was issued that gives the police under warrant the right
to conduct searches for illegal firearms by neighborhood. The National
Assembly rejected the decree during its fall session; no similar
legislation was introduced to take its place. The security forces
occasionally monitor the activities of individuals and their
communications.
By law men must obtain government approval to marry foreign-born
women. Although the Government may advise against marriage to a foreign
national, there are no known cases of the Government refusing
permission to marry. The Government advises women against marrying
foreign nationals, and it forbids marriage between Muslim women and
non-Muslim men.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, printing, and publishing ``in accordance with the
conditions and manner specified by law,'' and, with a few exceptions,
citizens are free to criticize the Government at public meetings and in
the media; however, journalists practice self-censorship. Several laws
empower the Government to impose restrictions on freedom of speech and
the press. During the year, several court cases effectively weakened
these laws by striking down punitive sentences that accompanied earlier
convictions; however, the application of these laws persisted
throughout the year. The Government, through the Ministry of
Information, practices informal censorship by placing pressure on
individual publishers and editors believed to have ``crossed the line''
in attacking government policies and discussing issues deemed offensive
to Islam, tradition, or the interests of the State.
During the election campaign, five parliamentary candidates were
arrested and charged with unlawful slander against the Government. One
of the candidates was sentenced to 6 months in prison (see Section 3).
Newspapers are privately owned and free to publish on most social,
economic, and political issues; they frequently criticize government
policies and officials, including the Crown Prince. The only prohibited
subjects are the Amir and attacks on Islam.
The Government ended prepublication censorship in 1992, but
journalists still censor themselves. The Press Law prohibits the
publication of any direct criticism of the Amir, official government
communications with other states, and material that serves to ``attack
religions'' or ``incite people to commit crimes, creates hatred, or
spreads dissension among the populace.''
In order to begin publication of a newspaper, the publisher must
obtain an operating license from the Ministry of Information.
Publishers may lose their licenses if their publications do not appear
for 6 months. This 6-month rule prevents publishers from publishing
sporadically--it is not used to suspend or shut down existing
newspapers. Individuals also must obtain permission from the Ministry
of Information before publishing any printed material, including
brochures and wall posters. The Government does not censor foreign
journalists and permits them open access to the country.
In January the Court of Appeals reduced an unusually strong
sentence against the daily newspaper Al-Qabas, which had been accused
of publishing an item that was deemed blasphemous and insulting to
Islam. The appeals court issued a nominal fine to the Al-Qabas editor
in chief and dismissed the 6-month jail term, to which he had been
sentenced by a lower court. In a related case, the Court of Appeals
also imposed a nominal fine while dismissing the jail sentence on a
second journalist who had been charged for having criticized the office
of the public prosecutor by alleging irregularities in its handling of
an embezzlement case. The Constitutional Court rejected the Al-Qabas
countersuit that the Press Law was unconstitutional, and the Court of
Appeals did not rule on the constitutionality of the Press Law, holding
that it has no jurisdiction in such cases.
A journalist was held for several days for questioning by police in
February following his return from Israel, where he had conducted
interviews with several Israeli officials. Charges were not brought
against the journalist and the case subsequently lapsed.
In July the Kuwait reporting office of the Qatar based Al-Jazeerah
satellite television station was reopened after a month's closure. The
office initially was closed after a talk show broadcast that featured a
telephone caller from another country who repeatedly made insulting
comments about the Amir.
The Government closed the daily newspaper Al-Seyassah on October 18
for 5 days for publishing inflammatory comments made by Salafi Islamist
Hamed Al-Ali. Al-Ali was detained for 1 day and then released on bail
pending an investigation into his remarks (see Section 1.d.).
The Government owns and controls the radio and television
companies. The Government does not inhibit the purchase of satellite
dishes, which are widely available. Citizens with such devices are free
to watch a variety of programs, including those that broadcast from
Israel and Iraq. Kuwaitis freely watched Al-Jazeera during the closure
period of its local office.
The Ministry of Information censors all books, films, videotapes,
periodicals, and other imported publications deemed morally offensive.
In 1998 the Ministry announced plans to censor the Internet; however,
it indicated that the methods of enforcement and technical issues must
still be worked out. The Ministry has censored political topics as well
and does not grant licenses to magazines with a political focus. The
General Organization of Printing and Publishing controls the printing,
publishing, and distribution of informational materials.
Dr. Ahred Al-Baghdadi, a prominent professor and journalist, was
sentenced on October 4 to 4 weeks in prison for ``defaming the
established beliefs and rites of the Islamic faith.'' Al-Baghadi was
convicted for stating that ``the Prophet had failed in spreading the
message of Islam in his early years in his home town of Makkad'' in an
article published in 1996. Al-Baghdadi was convicted under a law that
prohibits insults to Islam after charges against him were brought by a
private citizen, as provided by the law. The Amir pardoned Al-Baghdadi
after he served 2 weeks of his 4-week sentence (see Section 1.d.).
On October 9, another professor and journalist, Dr. ShamlanAl-Issa
was questioned by government authorities concerning an interview that
he gave in September in which he refused to accept the implementation
of Shari'a as the sole basis of law. Al-Issa also was charged by a
private citizen with defaming Islam; however, the Government found no
basis to the claim and the charges were dropped.
There is no government censorship of university teaching, research,
or publication. However, academics are subject to the same restraints
as the media with regard to criticism of the Amir or Islam.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
affirms the right to assembly; however, the Government restricts this
right in practice. Public gatherings must receive prior government
approval, as must private gatherings of more than five persons that
result in the issuance of a public statement. Political activity is
confined to informal, family-based, almost exclusively male social
gatherings known as diwaniyas. Practically every male adult, including
the Amir, hosts or attends diwaniyas, at which every possible topic is
discussed. The diwaniya contributes to the development of political
consensus and official decisionmaking.
The Constitution affirms the right of association; however, the
Government restricts this right in practice. The Government bans
political parties. Several informal blocs, acting much like parties,
exist and were active during the July National Assembly elections. The
Government has made no effort to constrain these groupings, which are
organized on the basis of common ideological goals. Many may be
categorized as ``opposition'' groups.
All nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) must obtain a license
from the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. The Government uses its
power to license as a means of political control. The Ministry has
registered 52 NGO's, including professional groups, a bar association,
and scientific bodies. These groups receive government subsidies for
their operating expenses. Their members must obtain permission from the
Ministry before attending international conferences. However, since
1985 the Ministry has issued only three licenses. The Ministry has
disapproved other license requests on the grounds that previously
established NGO's already provide services similar to those proposed by
the petitioners (see Section 4).
In May the Government announced a crackdown on unlicensed branches
of NGO's, whose activities it previously had overlooked, including
unlicensed branches of Islamic charities, and required that they cease
operations by mid-September. The crackdown was taken in accordance with
a 1993 decree that ordered unregistered NGO's to cease activities.
Subsequently, the Council of Ministers announced that the Ministries of
Social Affairs and Awqaf (religious affairs) would undertake a study to
determine how best to organize existing NGO's and the fate of
unlicensed NGO's; the 1993 decree has not been challenged legally.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion; although the
Constitution provides for freedom of religion, the Government places
some limits on this right. The Constitution also provides that the
State protect the freedom to practice religion in accordance with
established customs, ``provided that it does not conflict with public
policy or morals.'' The Constitution states that Shari'a (Islamic law)
is ``a main source of legislation.''
The procedures for registration and licensing of religious groups
are unclear. The Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs has official
responsibility for overseeing religious groups. Nevertheless, in
reality officially recognized churches must deal with a variety of
government entities, including the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor
(for visas and residence permits for pastors and other staff) and the
Kuwaiti Municipality (for building permits). While there reportedly is
no official government ``list'' of recognized churches, seven Christian
churches have at least some sort of official recognition that enables
them to operate openly. These seven churches have open ``files'' at the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor, allowing them to bring in the
pastors and staff necessary to operate their churches. Further, by
tradition three of the country's churches are recognized widely as
enjoying ``full recognition'' by the Government and are allowed to
operate compounds officially designated as churches: the Catholic
Church (which includes two separate churches); the Anglican Church; and
the National Evangelical Church of Kuwait (Protestant). The other four
churches reportedly are allowed to operate openly, hire employees,
invite religious speakers, etc. without interference from the
Government, but their compounds are, according to government records,
registered only as private homes. The churches themselves appear
uncertain about the guidelines or procedures for recognition. Some have
argued thatthese procedures purposely are kept vague by the Government
to maintain the status quo. All other churches and religions have no
legal status but are allowed to operate in private homes.
The procedures for registration and licensing of religious groups
also appear to be connected with government restrictions on NGO's,
religious or otherwise. In 1993 all unlicensed organizations were
ordered by the Council of Ministers to cease their activities, but this
order has never been enforced. However, since that time, all but three
applications by NGO's have been frozen. There were reports that in the
last few years at least two groups have applied for permission to build
their own churches, but the Government has not responded to their
requests.
There are many other Christian denominations in the country, with
tens of thousands of members, which, while not recognized legally, are
allowed to operate in private homes or in the facilities of recognized
churches. Members of these congregations have reported that they are
able to worship without government interference, provided that they do
not disturb their neighbors and do not violate laws regarding assembly
and proselytizing.
Members of religions not sanctioned in the Koran, such as Hindus,
Sikhs, Baha'is, and Buddhists, may not build places of worship but are
allowed to worship privately in private homes without interference from
the Government.
Shi'a are free to conduct their traditional forms of worship
without government interference. However, members of the Shi'a
community claim that the Government has not approved the construction
of Shi'a mosques in recent years.
The Government prohibits missionaries from proselytizing among
Muslims; however, they may serve non-Muslim congregations. The law
prohibits organized religious education for religions other than Islam,
although this law is not enforced rigidly. Informal religious
instruction occurs inside private homes and on church compounds without
government interference. However, there were reports that government
``inspectors'' periodically visit public and private schools outside of
church compounds to ensure that no religious teaching other than Islam
takes place.
The Government does not permit the establishment of non-Islamic
publishing companies or training institutions for clergy. Nevertheless,
several churches publish religious materials for use solely by their
congregations. Further, some churches, in the privacy of their
compounds, provide informal instruction to individuals interested in
joining the clergy.
A private company, the Book House Co., Ltd., is permitted to import
significant amounts of Bibles and other religious materials for use
solely among the congregations of the country's recognized Christian
churches. The Book House Co. has an import license to bring in such
materials, which also must be approved by government censors. There
have been reports of private citizens having non-Islamic religious
materials confiscated by customs officials upon arrival at the airport.
Although there is a small community of Christian citizens, a law
passed in 1980 prohibits the naturalization of non-Muslims. However,
citizens who were Christians before 1980 (and children born to families
of such citizens since that date), are allowed to transmit their
citizenship to their children.
According to the law, a non-Muslim male must convert to Islam when
he marries a Muslim woman if the wedding is to be legal in Kuwait. A
non-Muslim female does not have to convert to Islam to marry a Muslim
male, but it is to her advantage to do so. Failure to convert may mean
that, should the couple later divorce, the Muslim father would be
granted custody of any children.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government places some limits on
freedom of movement. Citizens have the right to travel freely within
the country and to change their work place as desired. Unmarried women
21 years old and over are free to obtain a passport and travel abroad
at any time. However, married women who apply for passports must obtain
their husbands' signature on the application form. Once she has a
passport, a married woman does not need her husband's permission to
travel, but he may prevent her departure from the country by placing a
24-hour travel ban on her. He can do this by contacting the immigration
authorities. After this 24-hour period, a court order is required if
the husband still wishes to prevent his wife from leaving the country.
All minor children must have their father's permission to travel
outside of the country. Citizens are free to emigrate and to return.
Security forces in Kuwait City occasionally set up checkpoints where
they may detain individuals. The checkpoints are mainly forimmigration
purposes and are used to apprehend undocumented aliens.
The Government has the right to place a travel ban on any citizen
or foreigner who has a legal case pending before the courts. The
Government restricts the ability of members of NGO's to attend
conferences abroad (see Section 2.b.).
A serious problem exists in the case of the bidoon, stateless
persons of mainly Iraqi or Iranian descent, who resided in Kuwait prior
to the Iraqi invasion. Some bidoon have had residency ties to Kuwait
for generations. Others entered the country during the oil boom years.
There are an estimated 110,000 bidoon, down from a prewar level of
220,000. The bidoon problem remains the subject of nearly continuous
press commentary and political discussion. While many citizens count
bidoon among their family members, a significant number believe that
bidoon should not be eligible for citizenship and the benefits that it
conveys. The Government maintains that many bidoon are concealing their
true citizenship in order to remain in Kuwait, become citizens, and
enjoy the generous benefits provided to citizens. The Government has
made only limited progress towards solving the longstanding issue of
the bidoon. In June the Government introduced a program to naturalize
an estimated 11,000 bidoon. As part of this program, the remaining
bidoon would be granted permanent residency status provided that they
reveal their actual nationalities, although most claim to have no other
nationality. The Government does not wish the return of the bidoon who
departed the country during the 1990-91 Gulf War and frequently delays
or denies issuing them entry visas. This policy imposes serious
hardships, including family separations.
Despite the highly publicized reconciliation with Yemen, Sudan, and
Jordan, which supported Iraq during the war, the Government generally
maintained its postwar policy of limiting the presence of persons from
countries that supported Iraq, and there was no significant increase in
the number of these countries' nationals living in the country. The
number of such residents is now only about 10 percent of its prewar
total. The Government instituted a policy in 1996 to route the
residence permit renewals of these nationals through the State Security
Service. While the rate of renewal denials has declined over the last
year for these nationals, many, such as Palestinians and Iraqis, have
no country to which they may return, or have fears of persecution upon
return (see Section 5).
While the Government permits the ICRC to verify if deportees object
to returning to their countries of origin, it detains those with
objections in the state security detention facility in Shuwaikh until
they either change their mind or succeed in making alternative
arrangements for travel to another country (see Section 1.d.).
There is no legislation governing refugees, asylees, or first
asylum, and no clear standard procedure for processing a person's claim
to be a refugee. The Constitution prohibits the extradition of
political refugees. The Government states that it does not deport
anyone who claims a fear of persecution at home, but it often keeps
such persons in detention rather than granting them permission to live
and work in the country. The U.N. High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR)
maintains an office in the country and has access to refugees in
detention. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens cannot change their head of state. Although under the
Constitution the National Assembly must approve the Amir's choice of
Crown Prince (that is, the future Amir), this authority is limited. If
the Assembly rejects the Amir's nominee, the Amir then submits three
names from which the Assembly must choose the new Crown Prince. Women
and citizens naturalized for less than 20 years may not vote or seek
election to the National Assembly. In November the Parliament vetoed
the Amir's May decree on constitutional grounds. The decree had given
women the right to vote, to seek election to the National Assembly
beginning with the parliamentary election scheduled for 2003, and to
hold cabinet office. Shortly thereafter, identical legislation was
introduced by Members of Parliament. By a narrow two-vote margin, the
bill was defeated. Members of parliament are prevented constitutionally
from submitting similar legislation until the following session, which
is scheduled to begin in October 2000. The Government may introduce
similar or identical legislation at any point. Women's rights activists
used the occasion of International Women's Day (March 8) to attempt to
register as voters in two districts; they were unsuccessful. Members of
the armed forces, police, and other uniformed personnel of the Ministry
of Interior are prohibited from voting.
Under the Constitution, the Amir holds executive power and shares
legislative power with the National Assembly. The Prime Minister
presides over a 16-member cabinet. In accordance with the practice of
the ruling family (but not specifically the Constitution), the Prime
Minister always has been the Crown Prince. The Constitution empowers
the Amir to suspend its provisions and to rule by decree. The Amir
dissolved the National Assembly from 1976-81, and in 1986 the Amir
effectively dissolved the Assembly by suspending the constitutional
provisions on the Assembly's election. The Assembly remained dissolved
until 1992, when elections were held. Members serve 4-year terms, and
National Assembly elections have been held on schedule. The elections
have been conducted freely and fairly among the minority of citizens
who are permitted to vote. Since the Government prohibits political
parties, Assembly candidates must nominate themselves. Nonetheless,
informal political groupings are active in the Assembly. The
Constitution empowers the National Assembly to overturn any Amiri
decrees made during the dissolution, and the Assembly has done so in
some cases.
In May the Amir dissolved the National Assembly in response to the
political gridlock that emerged between Parliament and the Government.
The Amir scheduled elections to take place 2 months later as specified
in the Constitution; past dissolutions of the National Assembly (1976
and 1981) were followed by extended periods of extraconstitutional rule
without the required elections.
Although the election campaign generally was free and fair, five
parliamentary candidates were arrested and charged with unlawful
slander against the Government. Four of those arrested received nominal
fines, had their cases postponed, or were acquitted. While the
candidates were not required to withdraw from the election, the fifth
candidate withdrew, subsequently was convicted of the charges in July,
and was sentenced to 6 months in prison (see Section 1.d.).
In 1998 the National Assembly passed legislation that bans
primaries previously conducted by religious sects and tribes. The
National Assembly's objective in passing this legislation was to
eliminate the process by which candidates were withdrawn from elections
and votes concentrated on the remaining candidates from these groups.
The Government attempted to enforce the ban on tribal primaries
during the July elections. As a result, charges were filed against
several hundred citizens. The Public Prosecutor also sought to lift the
immunity of two newly elected Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) in order
to charge them with violating the ban on tribal primaries. During its
fall session, the National Assembly declined to lift the parliamentary
immunity of the two charged M.P.'s.
Women are disenfranchised and have little opportunity to influence
government.
Members of the Shi'a minority generally are underrepresented in
high government positions. There is only one Shi'a member of the
Cabinet, the Minister of Commerce. Six of 50 National Assembly members
are Shi'a, as is the armed forces chief of staff.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government continued its practice of preventing the
establishment of local human rights groups by not approving their
requests for licenses (see Section 2.b.). It also continued to restrict
the ability of NGO members to attend conferences abroad (see Sections
2.b. and 2.d.). In May the Government announced a crackdown on
unlicensed branches of NGO's (see Section 2.b.).
Their members must obtain permission from the Ministry before
attending international conferences. However, since 1985 the Ministry
has issued only three licenses. The Ministry has disapproved other
license requests on the grounds that previously established NGO's
already provide services similar to those proposed by the petitioners
(see Section 4).
In May the Government announced a crackdown on unlicensed NGO's,
whose activities it previously had overlooked, including unlicensed
branches of Islamic charities, and required that they cease operations
by mid-September.
The Government permits international human rights organizations to
visit the country and to establish offices. Several organizations
conduct fieldwork and report excellent communication with and
reasonable cooperation from the Government.
The National Assembly has an active Human Rights Committee, which
takes testimony from individuals about abuses,investigates prison
conditions, and makes nonbinding recommendations for redress. Despite
its designation as an advisory body, the Human Rights Committee has
shown that, in practice, it is able to mobilize government agencies to
address egregious human rights problems.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on race, national
origin, language, or religion. However, laws and regulations
discriminate in some cases against women and noncitizens, who face
widespread social, economic, and legal discrimination.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. According to some
local experts, domestic abuse of women occurs in an estimated 15
percent of all marriages. Each of the country's 50 police stations
receives approximately 1 to 2 complaints of spousal abuse each week,
although this figure may be understated. Of the complaints received,
approximately 60 percent involve spousal abuse of noncitizen women. The
police and the courts generally seek to resolve family disputes
informally and may ask the offending spouse to sign a statement
affirming that he agrees to end the abuse. The police refer serious
cases to the Psychiatric Department at the Ministry of Health. The
courts have found husbands guilty of spousal abuse. There have been
isolated instances of ``honor'' crimes; however, there is no provision
in the Criminal Code that allows for leniency in such cases.
Some employers physically abuse foreign women working as domestic
servants, and there are continuing reports of rape of these women by
male employers. The local press gives the problem considerable
attention, and both the police and the courts have taken action against
employers when presented with evidence of serious abuse. In August a
Sri Lankan maid died after being beaten by her Kuwaiti employers.
Police arrested her employers and after further investigation the case
was sent to court for trial; action was still pending at year's end. In
another case, a charge of murder was brought against a Kuwaiti woman
who beat her Indian maid to death. The employer admitted to beating her
maid in the past, but not to the point of injuring her. Foreign-born
domestic employees have the right to sue their employers for abuse, but
few do so due to both fear of deportation and fear that the judicial
system is biased against them. The Government has designated a police
station to investigate complaints and provide some shelter for runaway
maids.
Runaway servants often seek shelter at their country's embassy for
either repatriation or a change in employers. At times during the year,
the Philippine and Sri Lankan embassies each sheltered as many as 150
women. Although most of these women sought shelter due to contractual
or financial problems with their employers, many also alleged physical
and sexual abuse. The Sri Lankan, Indian, and Philippine embassies all
continue to report the steady occurrence of physical abuse and
mistreatment involving domestic servants.
Women experience legal and social discrimination. Women are denied
the right to vote (see Section 3). Their testimony is not given equal
weight to that of males in the Islamic courts (see Section 1.e.).
Married women require their husbands' permission to obtain a passport
(see Section 2.d.). By law only men are able to confer citizenship;
therefore, children born to Kuwaiti mothers and stateless fathers are
themselves stateless. The Government forbids marriage between Muslim
women and non-Muslim men (see Section 1.f.). Inheritance is governed by
Islamic law, which differs between Sunni and Shi'a. In the absence of a
direct male heir, Shi'a women may inherit all property while Sunni
women inherit only a portion, with the balance divided among brothers,
uncles, and male cousins of the deceased.
Women traditionally are restrained from choosing certain roles in
society, and the law restricts women from working in ``dangerous
industries'' and trades ``harmful'' to health. However, almost all
citizens work for the State in office jobs and women are allowed into
most areas of the bureaucracy, including even oil well firefighting
units. Educated women maintain that conservative religious trends limit
career opportunities. Nonetheless, an estimated 33 percent of women of
working age are employed. The law promises ``remuneration equal to that
of a man provided she does the same work.'' This promise is respected
in practice. Women work as doctors, engineers, lawyers, bankers, and
professors. A few have been appointed to senior positions in the
Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Planning, the Foreign Ministry,
and the state-owned Kuwaiti Petroleum Corporation. However, there are
no female judges or prosecutors.
In cases of divorce, the Government makes family entitlement
payments to the divorced husband, who is expected by law and custom to
provide for his children even though custody of minor children usually
is given to the mother. The law discriminates against women married to
foreign men. Such women are not entitled to government housing
subsidies, which are available to male citizens. The law also requires
women to pay residence fees for their husbands and does not recognize
marriage as the basis for granting residency to foreign-born husbands.
Instead, the law grants residency only if the husband is employed. By
contrast Kuwaiti men married to foreign-born women do not have to pay
residency fees for their spouses, and their spouses' right to residency
derives from marriage.
Polygyny is legal and is more common among tribal elements of the
population. A husband is obliged to inform his first wife that he is
taking a second wife. The husband is obligated to provide the first
wife a separate household if that is her preference. It is the second
wife's choice to get married. A first wife who objects to a second
marriage can request a divorce, but the court's determination of
divorce and child custody would be made on grounds other than the fact
of the second marriage itself.
There are several women's organizations that follow women's issues,
among the most active of which are the Women's Socio-Cultural Society
and the Women's Affairs Committee.
Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children.
Both boys and girls receive a free education to the university level.
The Government provides free health care and a variety of other
services to all children.
Marriage of girls under the age of 17 is uncommon among the urban
population, but remains a practice of the Bedouins in outlying areas.
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no institutionalized
discrimination against disabled persons in employment, education, or in
the provision of state services. Legislation passed by the National
Assembly in 1996 mandates accessibility for the disabled to all
facilities frequented by the public, and provides an affirmative action
employment program for the disabled. However, this law has not been
implemented fully. The Government pays extensive benefits for disabled
citizens, which cover transportation, housing, job training, and social
welfare.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government's failure to
improve the plight of the 110,000 bidoon remains a significant problem.
The bidoon have been the objects of hostile government policy since the
mid-1980's. Since 1985 the Government has eliminated the bidoon from
the census rolls, discontinued their access to government jobs and free
education, and sought to deport many bidoon. In 1993 the Government
decreed that bidoon males no longer would be allowed to enlist in the
military service. Those presently in the armed forces gradually are
being replaced, although approximately 700 bidoon sons of citizen
mothers were allowed to enlist during the year. The Government does not
issue travel documents to bidoon routinely, and if bidoon travel
abroad, they risk being barred from returning to the country unless
they receive advance permission from the immigration authorities.
Marriages pose special hardships because the offspring of male bidoon
inherit the father's undetermined legal status.
The Government introduced in June a program to naturalize an
estimated 11,000 bidoon. The remaining bidoon (approximately 100,000)
would be granted permanent residency status. Naturalization and
assignment of permanent residency began with the onset of the program
and are scheduled to be completed in June 2000. This program would
confer citizenship on those persons who were accounted for in the 1965
census but were over the age of 21 and whose parents naturalized, or
who had a Kuwaiti mother and a non-Kuwaiti father who was absent. Those
bidoon not accounted for by the 1965 census either personally or
through a parent would be given civil identification cards and
permanent residency that would grant them the right to work and to
receive medical and educational benefits.
The Government claims that it issues a residency visa and legal
status to any bidoon who presents a passport, regardless of the country
of issuance. This has led some bidoon to acquire passports from
countries with which they have no affiliation, but which have liberal
``economic citizenship'' programs, although this practice has declined
sharply since 1997. There were no reports during the year that the
Government denied residency visas to bidoon who obtained passports or
that it unilaterallydecided the nationality of any stateless residents
without a hearing.
Since the end of the Gulf War, government policy has been targeted
against workers from those nationalities whose leaders supported Iraq,
especially Palestinians, Jordanians, and Yemenis. The Government has
argued that during the Iraqi occupation, many of these workers'
governments sided with the Iraqi forces. The Government has delayed or
denied the issuance of work and residency permits to persons in these
groups, and in many cases has hindered those workers who are permitted
to reside in the country from sponsoring their families to join them.
Many of these nationals also have resorted to the purchase of third
country passports in order to gain entry to, or legalize their status
in, the country. A government policy to route the residency visas of
these nationals through the State Security Service had led to a sharp
increase in renewal denials in the period immediately after the war
(see Section 2.d.). During the year, diplomatic relations were restored
with Yemen, Sudan, and Jordan; however, the Government generally
maintained its postwar policy of limiting the presence of nationals
from countries that supported Iraq, and there was no significant
increase in the number of those countries' nationals living in the
country (see Section 2.d.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Workers have the right, but are not
required, to join unions. Nonetheless, the Government restricts the
right of association by prohibiting all workers from freely
establishing trade unions. The law stipulates that workers may
establish only one union in any occupational trade, and that the unions
may establish only one federation. The International Labor Organization
(ILO) long has criticized such restrictions.
Approximately 50,000 persons (less than 5 percent) of a total work
force estimated at 1,233,000 are organized in 14 unions, 12 of which
are affiliated with the Kuwait Trade Union Federation (KTUF), the sole
legal trade union federation. A proposed new labor law, which did not
pass in 1998 and was the source of a KTUF complaint to the ILO that
year, still had not been enacted by year's end. The KTUF took no
further action during the year on its complaint. The Bank Worker's
Union and the Kuwait Airways Workers Union, which consist of
approximately 4,500 workers, are independent of the KTUF. The
Government has shown no sign that it would accept the establishment of
more than one legal trade union federation. The law stipulates that any
new union must include at least 100 workers, of whom at least 15 must
be citizens. Both the ILO and the International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions have criticized this requirement because it discourages
unions in sectors that employ few citizens, such as the construction
industry and the domestic sector.
The Government's pervasive oversight powers further erode union
independence. The Government subsidizes as much as 90 percent of most
union budgets, may inspect the financial records of any union, and
prohibits any union from engaging in political or religious activities,
which are defined vaguely. The law empowers the courts to dissolve any
union for violating labor laws or for threatening ``public order and
morals.'' Such a court decision may be appealed. The Amir also may
dissolve a union by decree. By law the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labor is authorized to seize the assets of any dissolved union. The ILO
has criticized this aspect of the law. Although no union has been
dissolved, the law subordinates the legal existence of the unions to
the power of the State.
Approximately 1,027,000 foreign workers are employed in the
country. They constitute over 80 percent of the work force but only
about 10 percent of the unionized work force. The Labor Law
discriminates against foreign workers by permitting them to join unions
only after 5 years of residence, although the KTUF states that this
requirement is not enforced and that foreigners may join unions
regardless of their length of stay. In addition the law stipulates that
foreigners may participate only as nonvoting members. Unlike union
members who are citizens, foreign workers do not have the right to
elect their leadership. The law requires that union officials must be
citizens. The ILO has criticized the 5-year residency requirement and
the denial of voting rights for foreign workers.
The law limits the right to strike. It requires that all labor
disputes must be referred to compulsory arbitration if labor and
management cannot reach a solution (see Section 6.b.). The law does not
have any provision ensuring strikers freedom from any legal or
administrative action taken against them by the State. However, the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has proved responsive to sit-ins
or protests by workers who face obvious wrongdoing by their employers.
In July 1998, 300 Chinese workers struck in protest over delinquent
payment of their salaries. A subsequent investigation revealed that the
Chinese company had not forwarded payment to its employees. In
negotiations held during the year, the Chinese Embassy and the Ministry
of Social Affairs arranged for the employer to pay the workers'
delinquent wages.
Unions may affiliate with international bodies. The KTUF belongs to
the International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the formerly
Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers have
the right to organize and bargain collectively, subject to certain
restrictions (see Section 6.a.). These rights have been incorporated in
the Labor Law and, according to all reports, have been respected in
practice.
The Labor Law provides for direct negotiations between employers
and ``laborers or their representatives'' in the private sector. Most
agreements are resolved in such negotiations; if not, either party may
petition the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor for mediation. If
mediation fails, the dispute is referred to a labor arbitration board
composed of officials from the High Court of Appeals, the Attorney
General's office, and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.
The Civil Service Law makes no provision for collective bargaining
between government workers and their employer. Technically, wages and
conditions of employment for civil service workers are established by
the Government, but in practice, the Government sets the benefit scales
after conducting informal meetings with officials from the civil
service unions. Union officials resolve most issues at the working
level and have regular access to other senior officials.
The Labor Law prohibits antiunion discrimination. Any worker who
alleges antiunion discrimination has the right to appeal to the
judiciary. There were no reports of discrimination against employees
based on their affiliation with a union. Employers found guilty of
antiunion discrimination must reinstate workers fired for union
activities.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced labor ``except in cases specified by law for national
emergency and with just remuneration;'' however, some foreign workers
are treated as indentured servants (see Section 6.e.). The Government
does not prohibit specifically forced and bonded labor by children, but
such practices are not known to occur.
Foreign workers may not change their employment without permission
from their original sponsors unless they have been in the country for
over 2 years. Domestic servants particularly are vulnerable to abuses
from this practice because they are not protected by the Labor Law. In
many cases, employers exercise control over their servants by holding
their passports, although the Government prohibits this practice and
has acted to retrieve passports of maids involved in disputes.
Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled South
Asian workers, live much like indentured servants. They frequently face
poor working conditions and some physical abuse (see Section 6.e.).
Domestic servants who run away from their employers may be treated
as criminals under the law. However, the authorities usually do not
enforce this provision of the law. In some reported cases, employers
illegally withheld wages from domestic servants to cover the costs
involved in bringing them to Kuwait. There are also credible reports of
widespread visa trading, a system by which sponsors agree to extend
their sponsorship to workers outside of the country in exchange for a
fee of $1,500 to $1,800. Middlemen, generally foreigners, use the
promise of Kuwaiti sponsorship to attract workers from economically
depressed countries, taking a commission and remitting the rest to the
nominal Kuwaiti sponsor. Once in Kuwait, such workers are farmed out to
the informal sector or find employment with parties that would
otherwise be unable to sponsor them. However, foreign workers who are
recruited with these traded visas not only face possible prosecution
for being engaged in illegal employment (that is, working for an
employer other than their sponsor) but also leave themselves extremely
vulnerable to extortion by employers, sponsors, and middlemen.
Government efforts to address such abuses have failed to achieve
significant progress.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The legal minimum age is 18 years for all forms of work,
both full- and part-time. Employers may obtain permits from the
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor to employ juveniles between the
ages of 14 and 18 in certain trades. Education is compulsory for
children between the ages of 6 and 15. The Government does not prohibit
forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known
to occur (see Section 6.c.). Some small businessmen employ their
children on a part-time basis, and there have been confirmed reports
that some South Asian and Southeast Asian domestic servants are under
age 18, but that they had falsified their ages in order to enter the
country.
Juveniles may work a maximum of 6 hours a day on the condition that
they work no more than 4 consecutive hours followed by a 1-hour rest
period.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs
and Labor is responsible for enforcing all labor laws. An informal two-
tiered labor market ensures high wages for Kuwaiti employees, most of
whom are in government white collar or business executive positions,
while foreign workers, particularly unskilled laborers, receive
substantially lower wages. There is no legal minimum wage in the
private sector. In the public sector, the effective minimum wage is
approximately $742 (226 dinars) a month for citizens and approximately
$296 (90 dinars) a month for noncitizens. The public-sector minimum
wage provides a decent standard of living for a worker and family.
Wages of unskilled workers in the private sector do not always permit a
decent standard of living for a worker and family. To be eligible to
sponsor family members for residency, government workers must receive a
minimum wage of $1,480 (450 dinars) a month, and private-sector workers
must make at least $2,135 (650 dinars) a month.
The Labor Law establishes general conditions of work for both the
public and the private sectors, with the oil industry treated
separately. The Civil Service Law also prescribes additional conditions
for the public sector. The Labor Law limits the standard workweek to 48
hours with 1 full day of rest per week, provides for a minimum of 14
workdays of leave each year, and establishes a compensation schedule
for industrial accidents. Domestic servants, who are excluded
specifically from the private sector Labor Law, frequently work long
hours, greatly in excess of 48 hours.
The ILO has urged the Government to ensure the weekly 24-
consecutive-hour rest period to temporary workers employed for a period
of less than 6 months and workers in enterprises employing fewer than
five persons. The law pertaining to the oil industry provides for a 40-
hour workweek, 30 days of annual leave, and sick leave. Laws
establishing work conditions are not applied uniformly to foreign
workers.
Employers often exploit workers' willingness to accept substandard
conditions. Some foreign workers, especially unskilled or semiskilled
South Asian workers, live much like indentured servants, are unaware of
their legal rights, and generally lack the means to pursue a legal
remedy. They frequently face contractual disputes, poor working
conditions, and some physical abuse (see Sections 5 and 6.c.). Most are
in debt to their employers before they arrive in the country and have
little choice but to accept the employer's conditions, even if they
contradict the contractual terms. It is not uncommon for wages to be
withheld for a period of months. Many foreign workers are forced to
live in ``housing camps,'' which generally are overcrowded and lack
adequate cooking and bathroom facilities. The workers only are allowed
off the camp compound on company transport or by permission of the
employer. Foreign workers' ability to change their employment is
limited, and, in some cases, employers' possession of foreign workers'
passports allows them to exercise control over such employees (see
Section 6.c.).
The Labor Law discriminates against foreign workers by limiting
their ability to join unions (see Section 6.a.). The KTUF administers
an Expatriate Labor Office, which is authorized to investigate
complaints of foreign laborers and provide them with free legal advice.
However, these services are not utilized widely. Any foreign worker may
submit a grievance to the labor office regardless of union status.
In March approximately 300 Bangladeshi cleaners initiated a protest
over unpaid wages and poor living conditions. The workers, who had not
been paid for 8 months, filed a case against their employer with the
Labor Court of the Ministry of Social Affairs. The case finally was
resolved in August when the workers were repatriated to Bangladesh with
4 months worth of back wages. The repatriations were financed out of
the forfeited employer's deposit with the Ministry of Social Affairs.
An estimated 7,000 unskilled Egyptian workers rioted in the Kleitan
neighborhood of Kuwait City on October 30-31. The riot reportedly was
sparked when an initial altercation between an Egyptian and a
Bangladeshi was broken up by the police and only the Egyptian was
arrested. The initial rioting was suppressed by Ministry of Interior
riot police who used tear gas to disperse the crowd. However, rioting
broke out again the following day, and the riot police backed by
special forces sealed off the neighborhood and restored calm. The
police made up to 2,500 arrests. Most of those arrested were released
the following day. An estimated 20 individuals were detained for a
longer period and subsequently 4 were charged. There were no serious
injuries; however, there were reports of isolated instances of the use
of excessive force.
The Labor Law provides for employer-provided medical care and
compensation to workers disabled by injury or disease due to job-
related causes. The law also requires that employers provide periodic
medical examinations to workers exposed to environmental hazards on the
job, such as chemicals and asbestos. The Government has issued
occupational health and safety standards; however, compliance and
enforcement appear poor, especially with respect to unskilled foreign
laborers. To cut accident rates, the Government periodically inspects
installations to raise awareness among workers and employers, and to
ensure that they abide by the safety rules, control the pollution
resulting from certain dangerous industries, train workers who use new
machines in specialized institutes, and report violations. Workers have
the right to remove themselves from dangerous work situations without
jeopardy to their continued employment, and legal protection exists for
workers who file complaints about such conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
LEBANON
Lebanon is a parliamentary republic in which, based on the
unwritten ``National Pact of 1943,'' the President is a Maronite
Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker of the
Chamber of Deputies a Shi'a Muslim. The Parliament consists of 128
deputies, equally divided between Christian and Muslim representatives.
President Emile Lahoud took office in November 1998 after an election
heavily influenced by Syria. The judiciary is independent in principle
but is subject to political pressure.
Non-Lebanese military forces control much of the country. These
include about 25,000 Syrian troops, a contingent of approximately 2,000
Israeli Army regulars and 1,500 Israeli-supported militiamen in the
south, and several armed Palestinian factions located in camps and
subject to restrictions on their movements. All undermine the authority
of the central Government and prevent the application of law in the
patchwork of areas not under the Government's control. In 1991 the
governments of Syria and Lebanon concluded a security agreement that
provided a framework for security cooperation between their armed
forces. However, an undetermined number of Syrian military intelligence
personnel in Lebanon continue to conduct their activities independently
of the agreement.
In 1989 the Arab League brokered a peace settlement at Taif, Saudi
Arabia, to end the civil war in Lebanon. According to the Taif Accord,
Syrian troops were to be redeployed from their positions in Lebanon's
coastal population areas to the Biqa' Valley, with full withdrawal
contingent upon the fulfillment of other aspects of the Taif Accord and
subsequent agreement by both the Lebanese and Syrian governments.
Although the Syrian Government has refused to carry out this partial
redeployment, strong Syrian influence over Lebanese politics and
decisionmakers makes officials unwilling to press for a complete
withdrawal, and no Lebanese government since the Taif Accord has
requested formally the withdrawal of Syrian forces. The Government's
relationship with Syria does not reflect the will of most Lebanese
citizens.
Israel exerts control in and near its self-proclaimed ``security
zone'' in south Lebanon through direct military action and support for
its surrogate, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). With the tacit support of
the Government, the Iranian-backed Shi'a Muslim faction Hizballah, and,
to a much lesser extent, the Lebanese Shi'a group Amal and some
Palestinian guerrillas continue to be locked in a cycle of attack and
counterattack with Israeli and SLA troops. Palestinian groups operate
autonomously in refugee camps throughout the country. During the year,
the Government continued to consolidate its authority in those parts of
the country under its control and continued to take tentative steps to
exert its authority in the Biqa' Valley and Beirut's southern suburbs.
However, it did not attempt to reassert state control over the
Palestinian camps or to disarm Hizballah and the SLA.
The security forces consist of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF),
which may arrest and detain suspects on national security grounds; the
Internal Security Forces (ISF), which enforce laws, conduct searches
and arrests, and refer cases to the judiciary; and the State Security
Apparatus and the Surete Generale, both of which collect information on
groups deemed a possible threat to state security. The Surete Generale
is responsible for the issuance of passports and residency permits, the
screening and censoring of foreign periodicals, plays, documentaries,
television programs, and movies, and the censoring of those parts that
address national security issues and ``morale.'' The security forces
committed serious human rights abuses.
Before the 1975-90 hostilities, Lebanon was an important regional
financial and commercial center. There is a market-based economy in
which the majority of the private- sector work force is employed in the
services sector, such as banking and commerce. There is a small
industrial sector, based largely on clothing manufacture and food
processing. The annual gross national product is estimated to be
approximately $5,000 per capita. A reconstruction effort, begun in
1992, is moving forward. Substantial remittances from abroad offset the
trade deficit and resulted in a balance of payment surplus.
The Government's overall human rights record was poor, and serious
problems remain, although there were some improvements in a few areas.
The right of citizens to change their Government remains restricted by
the lack of government control over parts of the country, shortcomings
in the electoral system, and Syrian influence. Although the 1996
parliamentary elections represented a step forward, the electoral
process was flawed, as the elections were not prepared or carried out
impartially. Members of the security forces used excessive force and
tortured and abused some detainees. Prison conditions remained poor.
Government abuses also included the arbitrary arrest and detention of
persons who opposed government policies. Lengthy pretrial detention and
long delays in trials are problems, and the courts are subject to
political pressure. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy
rights, and continued surveillance of political activities during the
year. The Government partially limited press freedom by continuing to
restrict radio and television broadcasting in a discriminatory manner.
Journalists practice self-censorship. The Government continued to
restrict freedom of assembly, and imposes some limits on freedom of
association. The Government imposes limits on freedom of movement.
Violence and discrimination against women; abuse of children;
discrimination against Palestinians; forced labor, including by
children; child labor; and the mistreatment of foreign servants are
problems.
Artillery and aerial attacks by the various contending forces in
parts of south Lebanon threaten life and property. These forces
continue to commit abuses, including killings, bombings, and
abductions. The SLA maintains a separate and arbitrary system of
justice in the Israeli-controlled zone, which is independent of
Lebanese central authority. During the year, SLA officials arbitrarily
arrested, mistreated, and detained persons, and regularly expelled
local residents from their homes in the zone. Palestinian groups in
refugee camps maintain a separate, often arbitrary, system of justice
for other Palestinians. Palestinians sometimes may appeal for legal
recourse to Lebanese authorities, often through their agents in the
camps. There were reports that members of the various groups that
control the camps detained their Palestinian rivals and, in some
instances, killed them.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or extrajudicial killings by government
authorities during the year.
The judicial system continues to suffer from a backlog of hearings
into cases of death in custody, some as old as 5 years. These cases
involve some individuals connected to political groups and some accused
of criminal activity. There were no developments in the 1994 death of
Tareq Hassaniyeh, whoallegedly was beaten to death by authorities in
the Bayt Al-Din prison, nor in the 1994 death of Fawzi Al-Racy, who
died while in the custody of the Ministry of Defense. The Government no
longer is pursuing the cases.
On June 8, unidentified gunmen shot and killed four judges at the
Justice Palace in Sidon. The Government did not apprehend the
perpetrators but believes that they belong to the outlawed Palestinian
radical Islamic group ``Esbat Al-Ansar,'' which is led by fugitive
Ahmad Abed Al-Karim Al-Sa'di (also known as Abu Mahjin). The gunmen
were believed to be hiding in the Palestinian refugee camp of Ein Al-
Hilweh at year's end.
In May an official of the Fatah faction of the Palestinian
Liberation Organization (PLO), Amin Kayed, and his wife were killed in
a drive-by shooting near Ein Al-Hilweh.
In August the coordinator of the Islamic Militia Operation in south
Lebanon, Ali Deeb, was killed in Sidon, in a roadside bomb explosion.
A military tribunal sentenced Captain Camille Yared to 10 years in
prison and 4 Lebanese Forces militiamen to death in absentia for
carrying out a 1996 bus bombing in Syria, which killed 11 persons, as
well as other bombings. The court also sentenced 13 other Lebanese
Forces members to 7 years in prison. A court hearing in the appeal made
by the accused is scheduled for February 20, 2000. In June a court
sentenced former Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja' to life in prison,
and three Lebanese Forces militiamen to death in absentia, for killing
former Prime Minister Rashid Karami in 1987 (see Section 1.e.).
A court hearing in the appeal made by the prosecutor's office
regarding the 1976 killing of U.S. Ambassador Francis Meloy, Embassy
officer Robert Waring, and their driver, Zohair Moghrabi has not been
scheduled following a court verdict declaring the suspect, Tawfiq
Mohammad Farroukh, not guilty of murder for his role in the killings.
There were no developments in the 1996 beating death of Akram
Arbeed, who allegedly was attacked while accompanying a candidate in
the 1996 parliamentary election. The case still is pending.
An estimated 50 Islamic resistance guerrillas, 13 Israeli soldiers,
27 Lebanese civilians, and 2 Israeli civilians were killed in south
Lebanon during the year, as Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian guerrillas
on the one hand, and Israeli forces and the SLA on the other, engaged
in recurring violence. For example, on June 22, Hizballah launched
rocket attacks against northern Israel, which killed two Israeli
civilians, in retaliation for Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) shelling of
a Lebanese village. Israeli forces conducted repeated air strikes and
artillery barrages on Hizballah, Amal, and Palestinian targets,
including civilian infrastructure, inside Lebanon. For example, on June
24, 9 Lebanese were killed and 50 to 80 wounded in Israeli air raids,
which also targeted civilian infrastructure, including electric power
transformer stations and power lines in the Beirut area, Baalbek, and
Bint Jubayl, and bridges along the main coastal highway at Damour,
Sidon, and Tyre.
There were over 200 civilian injuries during the year, with most of
the injuries involving minor wounds from shrapnel and broken glass.
Citizens accounted for over 90 percent of the injured and Lebanese
armed groups were responsible for some 23 percent of all injured
civilians.
In south Lebanon, there is an average of two or three attacks daily
against IDF and SLA military positions with a similar number of IDF and
SLA counterattacks.
The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group continued to deal with alleged
violations of the 1996 understanding between Israel and Hizballah not
to target civilians or to launch attacks from civilian-populated areas.
On October 3, one person was killed when a bomb exploded in a
Maronite church in an eastern Beirut suburb. There were no arrests made
in connection with the case by year's end.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances. The Government has taken no judicial action against
groups known to be responsible for the kidnapings of thousands of
persons during the war between 1975 and 1990. In August Prime Minister
Hoss established a military commission to investigate the fate of all
those who disappeared during the war.
The whereabouts of Boutros Khawand, who allegedly was abducted by
Syrian forces in 1992, remain unknown; he is presumed to be held in
Syria (see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Torture is not banned specifically by the Constitution,
and there continued to be credible reports that security forces abused
detainees and, in some instances, used torture. Human rights groups
report that torture is a common practice. There also were credible
reports that military intelligence officials used harsh interrogation
procedures, including torture, on former members of the Lebanese
Forces. Violent abuse usually occurs during the preliminary
investigations that are conducted at police stations or military
installations, where suspects are interrogated in the absence of an
attorney.
In early October at a Greenpeace demonstration in the town of
Selaata, LAF soldiers fired shots over the heads of protesters and beat
them with their rifle butts. President Lahoud criticized the soldiers'
behavior and called for an investigation. The soldiers were reprimanded
officially (see Sections 2.a. and 2.b.).
In June violent clashes broke out between the ISF and angry
residents of Jnah (in the southern Beirut suburbs) after officials from
the Ministry of Displaced Affairs attempted to enter the area to
measure houses and buildings prior to their demolition. Twenty-four
persons, including 4 ISF personnel, reportedly were injured.
Abuses occurred in areas outside the state's authority, including
the Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year that
members of the various groups that control the camps detained their
Palestinian rivals.
In May Fatah official Jamal Dayekh lost both his legs in a booby-
trapped car explosion in Sidon.
Prison conditions are poor and do not meet minimum international
standards. The Ministry of Interior operates 18 prisons with a total
capacity of 2,000 inmates. However, prisons are overcrowded, with a
total population of nearly 5,000. Inmates lack heat, adequate toilet
facilities, and proper medical care. The Government has not budgeted
funds to overhaul the prison system. However, some efforts were made by
other groups to improve conditions in Roumieh prison. For example, the
Bar Association financed the renovation of two prison meeting rooms to
allow lawyers to meet their clients in decent conditions and without
having to obtain prior authorization. Inmates at Roumieh prison
participated in vocational activities such as English-language courses
and embroidery courses in order to provide them with skills upon
release.
The Surete Generale, which mans border posts, operates a detention
facility. Hundreds of foreigners, mostly Egyptians and Sri Lankans, are
detained there pending deportation. They reportedly are held in small,
poorly ventilated cells.
Former Lebanese forces leader Samir Ja'Ja', who is serving four
life sentences for the murders of various political figures during and
after the civil war, is kept in solitary confinement in a basement
prison. He is permitted to exercise and receive occasional visits from
his family and his lawyers. Government officials stated that his
solitary confinement is necessary for his own protection.
Local journalists and human rights organizations had access to
certain prisons during the year. Access to those prisons controlled by
the Ministry of Defense was not given.
Hizballah detains and reportedly mistreats SLA members and
suspected agents at unknown locations. The SLA operates its own
detention facility, Al-Khiam prison, and there are frequent allegations
of torture and mistreatment of detainees. Hizballah and the SLA
occasionally release and exchange prisoners.
Hizballah does not permit prison visits by human rights monitors.
The SLA continued to allow representatives of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and family members of inmates to
visit detainees at Al-Khiam prison.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government uses
arbitrary arrest and detention. The law requires security forces to
obtain warrants before making arrests; however, military prosecutors,
who are responsible for cases involving the military as well as those
involving espionage, treason, weapons possession, and draft evasion,
make arrests without warrants. Arresting officers are required torefer
a subject to a prosecutor within 24 hours of arrest, but frequently do
not do so.
The law requires the authorities to release suspects after 48 hours
of arrest if no formal charges are brought against them. Some
prosecutors flout this requirement and detain suspects for long periods
in pretrial confinement without a court order. The law authorizes
judges to remand suspects to incommunicado detention for 10 days with a
possible extension for an additional 10 days. Bail is available only to
those accused of petty crimes, not to those accused of felonies.
Defendants have the right to legal counsel, but there is no state-
funded public defender's office. The Bar Association operates an office
for those who cannot afford a lawyer, and the court panel has on many
occasions asked the Bar Association to appoint lawyers for defendants.
Security forces continued the practice of arbitrary arrest.
Security forces detained and interrogated scores of citizens,
predominately Christian supporters of ousted General Michel 'Awn, and
of the jailed commander of the Lebanese Forces, Samir Ja'Ja'. These
detentions and searches of homes took place without warrants, and
detainees claim that they were not given access to lawyers. Most
detainees were released after they were forced to sign documents
stating they would abstain from politics.
During the year, the Government launched an anticorruption drive.
Several former senior government officials were arrested on charges of
embezzlement, misuse of power, and bribery. They all were detained for
prolonged periods of time, in violation of the law. Most of those
arrested were released on bail or the charges were dropped. However,
the Minister of Petroleum, who was arrested in March on charges of
embezzlement, remains in detention and has yet to be indicted.
On March 14, authorities detained students from the ``National Free
Current,'' a group that supports 'Awn, for distributing antigovernment
and anti-Syria leaflets (see Section 2.b.).
There were no allegations during the year of the transfer of
Lebanese citizens by Lebanese authorities to Syria. The number of
Lebanese detainees remaining in Syria is uncertain; however, former
President Elias Hrawi estimated that some 210 persons were in Syrian
custody in 1996. Some 90 prisoners reportedly are still in Syrian
jails. In 1997 Syria transferred 121 prisoners, most of whom had been
held in Syrian jails since the outbreak of the Lebanese civil war in
1975, to the Lebanese authorities. Amnesty International (AI) reported
that ``hundreds of Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jordanians have been
arbitrarily arrested, some over 2 decades ago, and remain in prolonged
and often secret detention in Syria.'' According to AI, Syrian forces
operating in Lebanon carried out searches, arrests, and detentions of
Lebanese nationals outside of any legal framework.
The authorities often detain without charge for short periods of
time political opponents of the Syrian and Lebanese governments. Abuses
occurred in areas outside the state's authority, including the
Palestinian refugee camps. There were reports during the year that
members of the various groups that control the camps detained their
Palestinian rivals.
Local militias and non-Lebanese forces continued to conduct
arbitrary arrests in areas outside central government control. The SLA
detains an estimated 140 citizens and an undetermined number of
Palestinians at Al-Khiam prison in the south, although the number
changes daily as persons are detained and others are released. Sheikh
Abbas Mohsen, who was abducted from his home in Kafr Kila in November
1998, remains in detention in Al-Khiam prison.
During the year, 95 prisoners were released from Al-Khiam prison.
The remains of 16 prisoners also were released.
Palestinian refugees are subject to arrest, detention, and
harassment by state security forces, Syrian forces, various militias,
and rival Palestinians.
Israel holds 41 Lebanese citizens, including Sheikh Abed Al-Karim
Obaid and Mustafa Dirani, figures associated with Hizballah.
Exile as a form of punishment is not practiced regularly, although
in 1991 the Government pardoned former army commander General Michel
'Awn and two of his aides on the condition that they depart country and
remain in exile for 5 years. 'Awn was accused of usurping power. He
remains in France.
Former President Amine Gemayel, who has lived in France for the
past 10 years, has not been able to return to Lebanon and still resides
in Paris. Gemayel planned to return to the country butwas warned by the
Government through unofficial channels not to return.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is independent in
principle, but is subject to political pressure. The Constitution
provides for a constitutional council to supervise the
constitutionality of laws and stipulates that judges shall be
independent in the exercise of their duties; however, influential
politicians and Syrian intelligence officers sometimes intervene to
protect their supporters from prosecution.
The judicial system is composed of the regular civilian courts; the
Military Court, which tries cases involving military personnel and
military-related issues; the Judicial Council, which tries national
security offenses, and the tribunals of the various religious
affiliations, which adjudicate family disputes, including marriage,
inheritance, and personal status.
The Judicial Council is a permanent tribunal of five senior judges
that adjudicates threats to national security. On the recommendation of
the Minister of Justice, the Cabinet decides whether to try a case
before this tribunal. Verdicts from this tribunal are irrevocable and
may not be appealed.
The Ministry of Justice appoints judges according to a formula
based on the religious affiliation of the prospective judge. A shortage
of judges has impeded efforts to adjudicate cases backlogged during the
years of internal conflicts. Trial delays also are caused by the
Government's inability to conduct investigations in areas outside its
control. Defendants have the right to examine evidence against them.
The testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man.
The trial of former Lebanese Forces leader Samir Ja'Ja' was
considered by the media and human rights groups to be fair. The
Judicial Council sentenced Ja'Ja' to life in prison and three Lebanese
Forces militiamen to death in absentia for assassinating former Prime
Minister Rashid Karami in 1987. The court also sentenced LAF Brigadier
General Khalil Matar to 10 years in prison for his involvement in the
assassination. The trial was public and the defense had access to all
files and documents. However, following the trial, the military
prosecutor asked the Bar Association to lift the immunity of defense
lawyer Karim Pakradouni. The Government accused Pakradouni of having
contacts with Israel during the civil war. The Association refused the
request, which it considered to be intimidation of Pakradoudni because
of his role as defense counsel in the trial.
On June 8, unidentified gunmen shot and killed four judges at the
Justice Palace in Sidon (see Section 1.a.).
In July the Government began trying some 220 SLA militiamen from
the town of Jezzine who turned themselves over to the Government
following the June SLA withdrawal from Jezzine. The militiamen have
been tried on less serious charges than ``collaboration with the
enemy,'' which carries the death penalty. The average sentence passed
down by the military tribunal was 1 year. Human rights groups and
international nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) believe that the
trials have been fair, procedurally correct, and open.
Hizballah applies Islamic law in areas under its control.
Palestinian groups in refugee camps operate an autonomous and arbitrary
system of justice. The SLA maintains a separate and arbitrary system of
justice.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--While the authorities generally show little interest
in controlling the personal lives of citizens, they readily interfere
with the privacy of persons regarded as foes of the Government. Laws
require that prosecutors obtain warrants before entering houses except
when the army is in hot pursuit of an armed attacker; however, in
practice the law is not respected.
The Government and Syrian intelligence services use informer
networks and monitor telephones to gather information on their
adversaries. The Army Intelligence service monitors the movements and
activities of members of opposition groups (see Section 2.b). The
Government concedes that telephone calls are monitored by security
services, but claims that monitoring occurs only with the prior
authorization of the competent judicial authorities. The joint
parliamentary commission that was formed by the speaker in 1997 to
investigate telephone wiretapping concluded its investigation in 1998,
and itsfindings were made public in September. The report stated that
the monitoring of cellular phone conversations most likely occurs, but
did not confirm the practice.
In September parliamentary hearings were held amid widespread
public debate on the Government's use of electronic surveillance of the
telephone lines of politicians and private citizens. The Speaker of
Parliament, the Minister of Interior, and the Surete Generale Director
General publicly acknowledged that government eavesdropping exists.
Politicians and human rights advocates reported increasing and more
overt government intelligence services' surveillance of political
meetings and political activities across the religious and political
spectrum. In October the Parliament passed a law that authorized
surveillance in national security and law enforcement cases, but banned
its use against ministers and parliamentary deputies.
Militias and non-Lebanese forces operating outside the area of
central government authority frequently have violated citizens' privacy
rights. Various factions also use informer networks and monitor
telephones to obtain information on their adversaries.
On January 8, SLA forces reportedly expelled 25 members of the
Nab'a family, including 16 children, from their home village of Shab'a,
located in Israel's self-declared security zone. On May 4, SLA forces
reportedly expelled three Lebanese citizens from the village of Bint
Jubayl. The SLA also expelled two Lebanese women and four children from
the Shab'a village on July 16.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of the press, but the Government partially limits this right in
practice, particularly by intimidating journalists and broadcasters
into practicing self-censorship. In 1998 the Government rescinded a
total ban on satellite news but continued to ban live satellite
broadcasts of political talk shows and to censor television broadcasts
on a case-by-case basis.
Lebanon has a long history of freedom of opinion, speech, and the
press. Although there were repeated attempts to restrict these freedoms
during the year, daily criticism of government policies and leaders
continued. Dozens of newspapers and hundreds of periodicals are
published throughout the country, financed by various local and foreign
groups. While the press is normally independent, press content often
reflects the opinions of these financial backers.
The Government has several tools at its disposal to control freedom
of expression. The Surete Generale is authorized to approve all foreign
magazines and nonperiodical works including plays, books, and films
before they are distributed in the market. The law prohibits attacks on
the dignity of the Head of State or foreign leaders. The Government may
prosecute offending journalists and publications in the Publications
Court, a special court empowered to try such matters.
Moreover, the 1991 security agreement between Lebanon and Syria
contains a provision that effectively prohibits the publication of any
information deemed harmful to the security of either state. In view of
the risk of prosecution, Lebanese journalists censor themselves on
matters related to Syria.
During the year, the Government did not bring charges against any
newspaper. President Lahoud publicly announced that under his tenure no
charges would be brought against any journalist because of his writings
or opinions. However, the Minister of Information banned a book
entitled ``From Israel to Damascus,'' authored by Robert Hatem, who
made detailed allegations about a former minister and ex-militia
figure's activities during and after the civil war years.
In early October at a Greenpeace demonstration in the town of
Selaata, LAF soldiers fired shots over the heads of the protesters and
beat them with their rifle butts. Journalists' cameras and film were
confiscated. President Lahoud criticized the soldiers' behavior and
called for an investigation. Those soldiers responsible for the abuse
were reprimanded officially by their superiors (see Sections 1.d. and
2.b.).
A court hearing still is pending in the case of An-Nahar journalist
Pierre Attallah, who was charged in absentia in June 1998 for defaming
the judiciary and entering Israel.
In September Marcel Khalife, a leading singer and songwriter, was
accused with insulting Islam for incorporating lines from a poem based
on verses from the Koran into a song he recorded in 1995. An indictment
was issued charging the singer with blasphemy. Most political and
religious leaders, with theexception of the Sunni Mufti, criticized
this action. Khalife was acquitted of the charges on December 15.
In October the Surete Generale informed Lebanese filmmaker Ronda
Shahal Sabbag that 47 minutes would have to be cut from her 90-minute
film, ``Civilisees,'' in order to gain government approval for
screening to general audiences. The Government claimed that the
offending passages contained inappropriate language and scenes that the
censors deemed ``inflammatory'' against Jesus, the Virgin Mary, and
Islam.
The country has a strong tradition of academic freedom and a
flourishing private educational system (a result of inadequate public
schools and a preference for religious community affiliation). Students
exercise the right to form campus associations, and the Government
usually does not interfere with student groups.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, the Government restricts
this right. Any group that wishes to organize a rally must obtain the
prior approval of the Interior Ministry, which does not render
decisions consistently. In December 1998, the Government lifted its
long-standing decree banning all demonstrations. Various political
factions such as Amal, Hizballah, 'Awnists, and supporters of former
Prime Minister Hariri held several rallies.
On March 14, students from the ``National Free Current,'' a group
that supports exiled General Michel 'Awn, distributed antigovernment
and anti-Syria leaflets. The authorities arrested 21 students and
transported them to LAF interrogation centers. The 21 were released
shortly thereafter, but two were referred to the military tribunal and
charged with resisting the security forces. The military later
considered the charge a civil offense and dropped the charges.
In early October, at a Greenpeace demonstration in the town of
Selaata, LAF soldiers fired shots over the heads of soldiers and beat
them with rifle butts. President Lahoud criticized the soldiers'
behavior and called for an investigation (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
The Constitution provides for freedom of association, and the
Government generally respects this right and does not interfere with
the establishment of private organizations; however, the law requires
organizations to obtain from the Ministry of Interior a receipt, which
is essentially a permit, and may be withheld by the Ministry.
The Ministry of Interior scrutinizes requests to establish
political movements or parties and to some extent monitors their
activities. The army Intelligence Service monitors the movements and
activities of members of opposition groups (see Section 1.f.).
Neither Israel nor Syria allows groups considered openly hostile to
operate in areas under their control.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. The State
is required to ensure the free exercise of all religious rites with the
caveat that public order not be disturbed. The Constitution also
provides that the personal status and religious interests of the
population be respected. The Government permits recognized religions to
exercise authority over matters pertaining to personal status such as
marriage, divorce, and inheritance. There is no state religion;
however, politics are based on the principle of religious
representation, which has been applied to every conceivable aspect of
public life.
A group that seeks official recognition must submit its dogma and
moral principles for government review to ensure that they do not
contradict popular values and the Constitution. The group must ensure
that the number of its adherents is sufficient to secure its
continuity. Alternatively, religious groups may apply to obtain
recognition through existing religious groups. Official recognition
conveys certain benefits, such as tax-exempt status and the right to
apply the religion's codes to personal status matters. The Government
requires religious affiliation to be encoded on national identity
cards.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and the Government generally respects them in practice;
however, there are some limitations. Travel to Israel is prohibited by
law but commonly occurs via Israeli-occupied territory in southern
Lebanon. Allmales between 18 and 21 years of age are subject to
compulsory military service and are required to register at a
recruitment office and obtain a travel authorization document before
leaving the country. Husbands can block travel by their wives and minor
children (see Section 5).
The LAF and Syrian troops maintain checkpoints in areas under their
control. In south Lebanon, the Lebanese Army, the Israeli Army, and the
SLA maintain tight restrictions on the movement of people and goods in
and out of Israel's self-declared security zone. In June the SLA
conducted a redeployment and withdrew from some villages in the
district of Jezzine. The Internal Security Forces deployed to the
region and assumed responsibility for maintaining law and order in
Jezzine. Citizens who wish to visit Jezzine are required to obtain a
permit from army intelligence.
There are no legal restrictions on the right of all citizens to
return. However, many emigres are reluctant to return for a variety of
political, economic, and social reasons. The Government has encouraged
the return to their homes of over 600,000 persons displaced during the
civil war. Although some persons have begun to reclaim homes abandoned
or damaged during the war, the vast majority of displaced persons have
not attempted to reclaim and rehabilitate their property. The
resettlement process is slowed by tight budgetary constraints,
shattered infrastructure, political feuds, the lack of schools and
economic opportunities, and the fear that physical security is still
incomplete in some parts of the country.
Most non-Lebanese refugees are Palestinians. The U.N. Relief and
Works Agency (UNRWA) reported that the number of Palestinian refugees
in Lebanon registered with the UNRWA as of June was 370,144. This
figure, which includes only the families of refugees who arrived in
1948, is presumed to include many thousands who reside outside the
country. Most experts estimate the actual number now in Lebanon to be
fewer than 300,000.
The Government issues laissez-passers (travel documents) to
Palestinian refugees to enable them to travel and work abroad. In
January the Government eased the tight travel restrictions that it
previously had imposed on Palestinians resident in Lebanon and those
entering from other countries by revoking a decision that had required
all Palestinian refugees who hold Lebanese travel documents to obtain
entry and exit visas when entering or leaving the country. However, in
March the Government decided to stop issuing visitors' visas to
Jordanian nationals who were born in Lebanon and are of Palestinian
origin.
There are no legal provisions for granting asylum or refugee status
in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The Government does not grant first
asylum; however, the Government grants admission and temporary (6
months) refuge to asylum seekers, but not permanent asylum. There are
nearly 3,600 non-Palestinian refugees (mostly Iraqi Shi'a and Kurds)
residing in Lebanon according to the U.N. High Commission for Refugees
(UNHCR). There have been no known requests for asylum since 1975. The
government cooperates with the offices of the UNHCR and the UNRWA.
There were credible reports of the forced deportation of Iraqi
refugees. The Surete Generale turned over the refugees to the Syrian
authorities, who returned them to northern Iraq.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution states that citizens have the right to change
their government in periodic free and fair elections; however, lack of
government control over parts of the country, defects in the electoral
process, and strong Syrian influence over Lebanese politics and
decisionmakers significantly restrict this right. The 1996
parliamentary elections represented a step forward, but the electoral
process was flawed by serious shortcomings, because the elections were
not prepared or carried out impartially. Government officials
acknowledged some of the electoral shortcomings and pledged to correct
them in future elections.
According to the Constitution, elections for the Parliament must be
held every 4 years. The Parliament, in turn, elects the President every
6 years. The President and Parliament nominate the Prime Minister, who,
with the President, chooses the Cabinet. According to the unwritten
``National Pact of 1943,'' the President is a Maronite Christian, the
Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, and the Speaker a Shi'a Muslim. Since
the National Reconciliation Agreement reached in Taif, Saudi Arabia in
1989, which revised the 6 to 5 ratio of Christian to Muslim seats in
Parliament, there has been a 50-50 balance between Christian and Muslim
Members of Parliament. The Taif Accord also increased the number of
seats in Parliament, andtransferred some powers from the Maronite
President to the Sunni Prime Minister and the religiously mixed
Cabinet.
In May and June 1998, the Government held the first elections at
the local level since 1963. The elections were reasonably free and
fair, and citizens were able to choose their own representatives at the
local level. By-elections were held in May for those localities in
which elections were not conducted in 1998.
In October 1998, the Parliament elected a new President after
amending the Constitution on a one-time basis to permit senior
government officials, including the (then) commander of the army, to
run for office. (The Constitution prohibits senior government officials
from running for president unless they resign at least 2 years before
the election. The amendment provided for a one-time exception to this
provision.) There was substantial criticism of the Syrian role in
influencing Lebanese political leaders in the selection of the
presidential candidate; however, there was broad popular support for
the new President, Emile Lahoud, who took office in November 1998.
Women have the right to vote and there are no legal barriers to
their participation in politics, although there are significant
cultural barriers. Women are underrepresented in government and
politics. No woman has ever held a cabinet position. Three women were
elected to the 128-seat Parliament in 1996.
Palestinian refugees have no political rights. An estimated 17
Palestinian factions operate in Lebanon, generally organized around
prominent individuals. Most Palestinians live in refugee camps
controlled by one or more factions. The leaders of the refugees are not
elected, but there are ``popular committees'' that meet regularly with
the UNRWA and other visitors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Several local human rights groups operate freely without overt
government restriction, including the Lebanese Association for Human
Rights, the Foundation for Human and Humanitarian Rights--Lebanon, and
the National Association for the Rights of the Disabled. Some of these
groups have sought to publicize the detention in Syria of hundreds of
Lebanese citizens, and took credit in part for the release of a number
of Lebanese from Syrian jails during 1998 (see Section 1.d). The Bar
Association and other private organizations regularly hold public
events that include discussion of human rights issues. Some human
rights groups have reported harassment and intimidation by government,
Syrian, and militia forces.
During the year, the Government was more willing than in the past
to discuss human rights problems with foreign governments and NGO's.
The Government has facilitated visits to the country by Amnesty
International representatives to report on Israeli activities in south
Lebanon. The Government permitted a Canadian NGO to provide books and
other related materials to prisoners at the Roumieh detention facility
(see Section 1.c).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution calls for ``social justice and equality of duties
and rights among all citizens without prejudice or favoritism.'' In
practice aspects of the law and traditional mores discriminate against
women. Religious discrimination is built into the political system.
During 1997 the Parliament approved a law giving preferences to the
disabled for employment in government positions. Discrimination based
on race, language, or social status is illegal and is not widespread
among citizens; however, foreign domestic servants often are
mistreated.
Women.--Violence against women is a problem. The press reports
cases of rape with increasing frequency, and cases reported are thought
to be only a fraction of the actual number. There are no authoritative
statistics on the extent of spousal abuse. Most experts agree that the
problem affects a significant portion of the female population. In
general battered or abused women do not talk about their suffering for
fear of bringing shame upon their own families or accusations of
misbehavior upon themselves. Doctors and social workers believe that
most abused women do not seek medical help. The Government has no
separate program to provide medical assistance to battered women. It
provides legal assistance to victims of crimes who cannot afford it
regardless of the gender of the victim. The Lebanese Association for
Combating Violence Against Women, founded in 1994, has been active in
lobbying to improve the socioeconomic condition of women and to reduce
violence against women.
Foreign domestic servants often are mistreated, abused, and even
raped. Asian and African female workers have no legal recourse
available to them because of their low status and isolation from
society (see Section 6.e.).
The legal system is discriminatory in its handling of ``crimes of
honor.'' According to the Penal Code, a man who kills his wife or other
female relative may receive a reduced sentence if he demonstrates that
he committed the crime in response to a socially unacceptable sexual
relationship conducted by the victim. However, beginning in 1991, the
Government began to increase sentences on violent crimes in general and
to seek punishment for men who commit crimes of honor. Instances of
honor crimes are reported in the media.
Women have employment opportunities in government, medicine, law,
academia, the arts, and to a lesser degree, business. However, social
pressure against women pursuing careers is strong in some parts of
society. Men sometimes exercise considerable control over female
relatives, restricting their activities outside the home or their
contact with friends and relatives. Women may own property but often
cede control of it to male relatives for cultural reasons. In 1994 the
Parliament removed a legal stipulation that a woman must obtain her
husband's approval to open a business or engage in a trade. Husbands
may block foreign travel by their wives (see Section 2.d.). The
testimony of a woman is equal to that of a man (see Section 1.e.).
Only men may confer citizenship on their spouses and children.
Accordingly, children born to Lebanese mothers and foreign fathers are
not eligible for Lebanese citizenship. Lebanese widows may confer
citizenship on their minor children.
Religious groups administer their own family and personal status
laws. There are 18 recognized religious groups, each of which differs
in its treatment of marriage, family property rights, and inheritance.
Many of these laws discriminate against women. For example, Sunni
inheritance law gives a son twice the share of a daughter. Although
Muslim men may divorce easily, Muslim women may do so only with the
concurrence of their husbands. There is no law that permits civil
marriages, although such ceremonies performed outside of Lebanon are
recognized by the State. Marriages may be performed only by religious
authorities.
Children.--The plight of children remains a serious concern;
however, the Government has not allocated funds to protect them.
Education is not compulsory and illiteracy rates have reached 37.5
percent. Many children, particularly in rural areas, take jobs at a
young age to help support their families. In lower income families,
boys generally receive more education, while girls usually remain at
home to perform housework.
An undetermined number of children are neglected, abused,
exploited, and even sold to adoption agents. Poor children often are
compelled by their parents to seek employment, and often take jobs that
put their safety at risk, including in industry, car mechanic shops,
and carpentry. Because of their age, wages earned by these children are
not in conformity with labor regulations. There are hundreds of
abandoned children in the streets nationwide, some of whom survive by
begging, others by working at low wages. The Government does not have a
child protection law to remove children from abusive situations, nor do
the NGO's have adequate legislative authority to litigate on behalf of
minor children who are victims of abuse.
Juvenile delinquency is on the rise; many delinquents wait in
ordinary prisons for trial and remain there after sentencing. Although
their number is very small, there is no adequate place to hold
delinquent girls; therefore, they are held in the women's prison in
Ba'abda. Limited financial resources have hindered efforts to build
adequate facilities to rehabilitate delinquents. A prominent private
citizen has agreed to provide land in Junieh to build a juvenile center
for girls, and work is under way. There is also a project to build a
modern juvenile detention facility in Ba'asir. The Government provided
a 161,000 square foot plot and is working with U.N. agencies to arrange
for financial assistance and expertise to construct the facility.
There are neither child welfare programs nor government
institutions to oversee the implementation of children's programs. The
Committee for Children's Rights, formed in 1993 by prominent
politicians and private citizens, has been lobbying for legislation to
improve the condition of children. The Ministry of Health requires the
establishment of health records for every child up to 18 years of age.
People with Disabilities.--Over 100,000 persons sustained
disabilities during the civil war. Care of the disabled generally is
performed by families. Most efforts to secure education, independence,
health, and shelter for the disabled are made by some 100 private
organizations for the disabled. These organizations are relatively
active, although poorly funded.
The heavily damaged cities make few accommodations for the
disabled. Building codes have no requirements for ease of access,
although the Government in its rebuilding projects has constructed
sidewalks in some parts of Beirut allowing access for the disabled. The
private ``Solidere'' project for the reconstruction of downtown Beirut
has self-imposed requirements for disabled access. This project is
widely considered a model for future construction efforts around the
country.
Religious Minorities.--Discrimination based on religion is built
into the system of government (see Section 3). The amended Constitution
of 1990 embraces the principle of abolishing religious affiliation as a
criterion for filling government positions, but few practical steps
have been taken to accomplish this aim. One notable exception is the
Lebanese Armed Forces, which, through universal conscription and an
emphasis on professionalism, has reduced significantly the role of
religious sectarianism in that organization. Each religious group has
its own courts for family law matters, such as marriage, divorce, child
custody, and inheritance.
On October 3, one person was killed when a bomb exploded in a
Maronite church in an eastern Beirut suburb (see Section 1.a.).
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--According to the United
Nations, an estimated 370,000 Palestinian refugees are registered in
Lebanon (see Section 2.d.). Most Palestinian refugees live in
overpopulated camps that have suffered repeated heavy damage as a
result of fighting. The Government generally has prohibited the
construction of permanent structures in the camps on the grounds that
such construction encourages the notion of permanent refugee settlement
in Lebanon. Refugees fear that in the future the Government may reduce
the size of the camps or eliminate them completely.
The Government officially ended its practice of denying work
permits to Palestinians in 1991. However, in practice very few
Palestinians receive work permits, and those who find work usually are
directed into unskilled occupations. They and other foreigners may own
a limited size plot of land but only after obtaining the approval of
five different district offices. The law applies to all foreigners, but
for political, cultural, and economic reasons it is applied in a manner
disadvantageous to Palestinians and, to a lesser extent, Kurds. The
Government does not provide health services to Palestinian refugees,
who rely on the UNRWA and UNRWA-contracted hospitals.
In recent years, Palestinian incomes have declined as the PLO
closed many of its offices in Lebanon, which formerly employed as much
as 50 percent of the Palestinian work force. Palestinian children
reportedly have been forced to leave school at an early age because
U.N. relief workers do not have sufficient funds for education
programs. The U.N. estimates that 18 percent of street children are
Palestinian. Drug addiction and crime reportedly are increasing in the
camps, as is prostitution, although reliable statistics are not
available. In August the Fatah faction of the PLO expanded its
operations in the Ein Al-Hilweh refugee camp by opening security
offices and hiring personnel to maintain order in the camps.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--All workers, except government
employees, may establish and join unions and have a legal right to
strike. Worker representatives must be chosen from those employed
within the bargaining unit. About 900,000 persons form the active labor
force, 42 percent of whom are members of 160 labor unions and
associations. Twenty-two of the unions, with about 200,000 workers, are
represented in the General Confederation of Labor (GLC).
In general the Government does not control or restrict unions,
although union leaders allege credibly that the Government has tried,
in the past, to interfere in elections for union officials.
Palestinian refugees may organize their own unions, but, because of
restrictions on their right to work, few Palestinians participate
actively in trade unions.
Unions are free to affiliate with international federations and
confederations, and they maintain a variety of such affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of
workers to organize and to bargain collectively exists in law and
practice. Most worker groups engage in some form of collective
bargaining with their employers. Stronger federations obtain
significant gains for their members and on occasion have assisted
nonunionized workers. There is no government mechanism to promote
voluntary labor-management negotiations, and workers have no protection
against antiunion discrimination. The Government's ban on
demonstrations (see Section 2.b.) arguable diminishes unions'
bargaining power.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced labor is not
prohibited by law. In the absence of a prohibition against it, children
(see Section 5), foreign domestic servants, and other foreign workers
(see Section 6.e) sometimes are forced to remain in situations
amounting to coerced or bonded labor.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1946 Labor Code stipulates that workers between the
ages of 8 and 16 may not work more than 7 hours a day, with 1 hour for
rest provided after 4 hours. In 1996 the Ministry of Labor amended this
law to define workers under the age of 13 as child labor, in accordance
with international obligations. Children also are prohibited from
working between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m. The code also prohibits
certain types of mechanical work for children between the ages of 8 and
13, and other types for those between the ages of 13 and 16. The Labor
Ministry is responsible for enforcing these requirements, but the
Ministry does not rigorously apply the law. Forced and bonded child
labor is not prohibited and sometimes occurs (see Section 6.c.).
Children between the ages of 10 and 14 constitute 0.6 percent of
the labor force (5,936 children in total), according to the latest
official figures. Most of these child laborers are Lebanese, but some
are Syrian; they work predominantly in the industrial, craft, and
metallurgical sectors. According to a U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF)
study, 60 percent of working children are below 13 years of age and 75
percent earn wages below two-thirds of the minimum wage. Nearly 40
percent of working children work 10 to 14 hours per day, and few
receive social welfare benefits. In addition, approximately 52,000
children between the ages of 15 and 19 are in the active labor force;
they are not eligible for minimum wages until they reach the age of 21.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Government sets a legal
minimum wage, currently about $200 (300,000 Lebanese pounds) per month.
The law is not enforced effectively in the private sector. In theory
the courts could be called upon to enforce it, but in practice they are
not. The minimum wage is insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. Trade unions actively attempt to ensure
the payment of minimum wages in both the public sector and the large-
scale private sector.
The Labor Law prescribes a standard 6-day workweek of 48 hours,
with a 24-hour rest period per week. In practice workers in the
industrial sector work an average of 35 hours a week and workers in
other sectors work an average of 30 hours a week. Foreign domestic
servants, mostly of Asian and African origin, often are mistreated,
abused, and raped. The employment contract for a foreign worker is
signed by a recruitment agency and the employer; workers rarely are a
party to the contract or, if they are a party, do not know what the
contract stipulates because it is written in Arabic. The passports of
foreign domestic workers are confiscated by the recruitment agency or
their employer when the workers arrive at the airport. Foreign domestic
servants are not protected by labor laws. Domestic servants work almost
18 hours per day and, in most cases, do not receive time off for
vacations or holidays. There is no minimum wage for domestic servants;
their average wage is about $100 (150,000 Lebanese pounds) per month.
They have no entitlement to government financial assistance. Many
workers leave their jobs--which is not against the law--but their
employers often report them as thieves to the police in order to locate
them and force them to return. For example, Nina Nilani Moutagala, a
Sri Lankannational, reportedly chose to flee her employer's household
when the opportunity arose because she had been abused and not paid her
salary. She then was accused by her employer of theft. She was tried
and acquitted on the grounds that she could not have left the house
carrying 3 rugs, 6 vases, 4 paintings, 6 crystal chandeliers, and 20
ashtrays, as claimed by her employer. Nonetheless, Nilani spent 3
months in prison.
The law includes specific occupational health and safety
regulations. Labor regulations call on employers to take adequate
precautions for employee safety. Enforcement, the responsibility of the
Ministry of Labor, is uneven. Labor organizers report that workers do
not have the right to remove themselves from hazardous conditions
without jeopardizing their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, the Penal Code stipulates that ``any
person who deprives another of freedom either by abduction or any other
means shall be sentenced to temporary hard labor.'' If forced
prostitution or forced rendering of sexual services occurs as a result
of the abduction, the Penal Code stipulates that the abductor be
sentenced to at least 1 year in prison. There were no reports that
persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
LIBYA *
The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is a dictatorship
that has been ruled by Colonel Mu'ammar Al-Qadhafi (the ``Brother
Leader and Guide of the Revolution'') since 1969, when he led a
military coup to overthrow King Idris I. Borrowing from Islamic and
pan-Arab ideas, Qadhafi created a political system that rejects
democracy and political parties and purports to establish a ``third
way'' superior to capitalism and communism. Libya's governing
principles are derived predominantly from Qadhafi's ``Green Book.'' In
theory Libya is ruled by the citizenry through a series of popular
congresses, as laid out in the Constitutional Proclamation of 1969 and
the Declaration on the Establishment of the Authority of the People of
1977, but in practice Qadhafi and his inner circle control political
power. Qadhafi is aided by extragovernmental organizations--the
Revolutionary Committees and the Comrades Organization--that exercise
control over most aspects of citizens' lives. The judiciary is not
independent of the Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The United States has no official presence in Lybia. Information
on the human rights situation therefore is limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Libya maintains an extensive security apparatus, consisting of
several elite military units, including Qadhafi's personal bodyguards,
local Revolutionary Committees, and People's Committees, as well as the
``Purification'' Committees, which were formed in 1996. The result is a
multilayered, pervasive surveillance system that monitors and controls
the activities of individuals. The various security forces committed
numerous serious human rights abuses.
The Government dominates the economy through complete control of
the country's oil resources, which account for almost all export
earnings and approximately 30 percent of the gross domestic product.
Oil revenues constitute the principal source of foreign exchange. Much
of the country's income has been lost to waste, corruption, and to
attempts to develop weapons of mass destruction and acquire
conventional weapons. Despite efforts to diversify the economy and
encourage private sector participation, the economy continues to be
constrained by a system of extensive controls and regulations covering
prices, credit, trade, and foreign exchange. The Government's
mismanagement of the economy has caused high levels of inflation,
increased import prices, and hampered economic expansion, which has
resulted in a decline in the standard of living for the majority of
citizens in recent years.
The Government's human rights record remains poor. Citizens do not
have the right to change their government. Qadhafi has used
extrajudicial killing and intimidation to control the opposition abroad
and summary judicial proceedings to suppress it at home. Security
forces torture prisoners during interrogations or for punishment.
Prison conditions are poor. Security forces arbitrarily arrest and
detain persons, and many prisoners are held incommunicado. Many
political detainees are held for years without charge. The Government
controls the judiciary, and citizens do not have the right to a fair
public trial or to be represented by legal counsel. The Government
infringes on citizens' privacy rights, and citizens do not have the
right to be secure in their homes or persons, or to own private
property. The Government restricts freedom of speech, press, assembly,
association, and religion. The Government imposes some limits on
freedom of movement. There were reports of mass expulsions of foreign
workers and residents to neighboring countries in 1997. The Government
prohibits the establishment of independent human rights organizations.
Violence against women is a problem. Traditional attitudes and
practices continue to discriminate against women, and female genital
mutilation (FGM) still is practiced in remote areas of the country. The
Government discriminates against and represses certain minorities and
tribal groups. The Government continues to repress banned Islamic
groups and exercises tight control over ethnic and tribal minorities,
such as Amazighs (Berbers), Tuaregs, and Warfalla tribe members. The
Government restricts basic worker rights, uses forced labor, and
discriminates against foreign workers. There have been reports of
slavery and trafficking in persons.
Colonel Qadhafi publicly called for violence against opponents of
his regime after violent clashes between Islamic activists and security
forces in Benghazi in September 1995. Outbreaks of violence between
government forces and Muslim militants had continued to plague eastern
Libya since that time, but appeared to cease by year's end. The
Government encouraged reconciliation with opposition groups during the
year, and invited dissidents living abroad to return to Libya,
promising that they would be safe. However, few opposition figures
returned, and the sincerity of the Government's offer and the
likelihood of reconciliation remain unclear.
In April the Government surrendered the two men suspected of the
1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland. As a result, U.N.
sanctions against Libya were suspended.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Violent clashes
between the security forces and militant Islamist opposition groups
occurred less frequently during the year. In the past, the clashes were
concentrated predominantly in the eastern region and resulted in an
undetermined number of deaths. Since a 1996 prison mutiny in Benghazi
and other attacks against the regime, the Government has maintained
tightened security measures. In the years following the mutiny, the
Government made hundreds of arrests, conducted military operations in
the areas of insurrection, and killed a number of persons. However,
there were no reports of such activities during the year.
The Government uses summary judicial proceedings to suppress
domestic dissent, and has used extrajudicial killings and intimidation
to control the opposition abroad. Prior to 1994, there were reports
that Libyan security forces hunted down and killed dissidents living
abroad (see Sections 1.b. and 2.d.).
A large number of offenses, including political offenses and
``economic crimes,'' are punishable by death. A 1972 law mandates the
death penalty for any person associated with a group opposed to the
principles of the revolution, as well as for other acts such as
treason, attempting to change the form of government by violence, and
premeditated murder. The ``Green Book'' of 1988 states that ``the goal
of the Libyan society is to abolish capital punishment;'' however, the
Government has not acted to abolish the death penalty and its scope has
increased. In 1996 a law went into effect that applies the death
penalty to those who speculate in foreign currency, food, clothes, or
housing during a state of war or blockade, and for crimes related to
drugs and alcohol.
In 1997 two civilians and six army officers were executed: The
civilians by hanging and the army officers by firing squad; at least
five others were given prison sentences, all convicted oncharges of
being American spies, committing treason, cooperating with opposition
organizations, and instigating violence to achieve political and social
goals. The eight executed men were arrested with dozens of others in
connection with a coup attempt by army units composed of Warfalla tribe
members in October 1993. The men were convicted by the Supreme Military
Court and reportedly did not have lawyers for their trial. The
convicted persons allegedly were kept in secret locations and tortured
throughout their incarceration to obtain confessions of criminal
activity.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary
Executions noted in 1996 ``the apparent lack of respect for fair trial
standards in trials leading to the imposition of capital punishment in
Libya.''
Until April Libya was subject to economic and diplomatic sanctions
imposed by the U.N. Security Council in connection with the bombings of
Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland in 1988, which killed 259 persons on
board and 11 persons on the ground, and the bombing of UTA flight 772
over Chad in 1989, which killed 171 persons. These U.N. Security
Council resolutions required that Libya fulfill the following
conditions: Ensure the appearance in a U.S. or Scottish court of those
charged in the Pam Am 103 case; cooperate with U.S., British, and
French investigations into the Pan Am and UTA bombings; pay
compensation; and renounce terrorism and support for terrorism. In
April the Government surrendered the two men suspected of the Pan Am
bombing, which prompted the suspension of U.N. sanctions against Libya.
The suspects are to be tried under Scottish law before a Scottish court
seated in the Netherlands.
In March a French court convicted in absentia the six defendants in
the UTA bombing and sentenced them to life in prison. In July the
Government paid the French Government $31 million to compensate the
victims' families.
In late November, the Government paid compensation to the British
Government for the 1984 killing of British policewoman Yvonne Fletcher
outside the Libyan Embassy in London.
In spite of the Government's violent repression of resistance,
opposition groups continued to stage attacks on Qadhafi and his regime.
b. Disappearance.--The Libyan regime in the past has abducted and
killed dissidents in the country and abroad. Libyan dissident Mansour
Kikhiya disappeared from Cairo, Egypt in 1993. There is credible
information that following his abduction, Kikhiya was executed in Libya
in early 1994. There have been no reports of such abductions or
killings since 1994.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Security personnel reportedly torture prisoners during
interrogations or for punishment. Government agents reportedly
periodically detain and torture foreign workers, particularly those
from sub-Saharan Africa. Reports of torture have been difficult to
corroborate because many prisoners are held incommunicado.
Methods of torture reportedly include: Chaining to a wall for
hours, clubbing, applying electric shock, applying corkscrews to the
back, pouring lemon juice in open wounds, breaking fingers and allowing
the joints to heal without medical care, suffocating with plastic bags,
deprivation of food and water, and beatings on the soles of the feet.
The law calls for fines against any official using excessive force;
however, there are no known cases of prosecution for torture or abuse.
Prison conditions reportedly are poor. While there is insufficient
information to make a clear determination on overall prison conditions,
a mutiny in July 1996 at the Abu Salim prison was caused by inmates
protesting poor conditions. The prisoners went on a hunger strike and
captured guards to protest the lack of medical care, overcrowding, and
inadequate hygiene and diet provided at the facility. Security units
were dispatched to suppress the uprising; as many as 100 persons were
killed by security forces.
The Government does not permit prison visits by human rights
monitors.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Security forces
arbitrarily arrest and detain citizens. By law, the Government may hold
detainees incommunicado for unlimited periods. It holds many political
detainees incommunicado inunofficial detention centers controlled by
members of the Revolutionary Committees. Hundreds of political
detainees, many associated with banned Islamic groups, reportedly are
held in prisons throughout the country (but mainly in the Abu Salim
prison in Tripoli); many are held for years without charge. Hundreds of
other detainees may have been held for periods too brief (3 to 4
months) to permit confirmation by outside observers.
Security forces in 1998 arrested suspected members and sympathizers
of banned Islamic groups and monitored activities at mosques following
the violent clashes in eastern Libya (see Section 1.a.). In June 1998,
at least 100 professionals in Benghazi and several other major cities
were arrested on suspicion of political opposition activities,
specifically support of or sympathy for the Libyan Islamic Group, an
underground Islamic movement that is not known to have used or
advocated violence. Some practicing Muslims have shaved their beards to
avoid harassment from security services. Qadhafi has criticized
publicly Libyan ``mujaheddin'' (generally, conservative Islamic
activists who fought with the Afghan resistance movement against Soviet
forces) as threats to the regime.
The 1994 Purge Law was established to fight financial corruption,
black marketeering, drug trafficking, and atheism. It has been enforced
by the ``Purification'' Committees since June 1996 (see Section 1.f.).
Scores of businessmen, traders, and shop owners have been arrested
arbitrarily on charges of corruption, dealing in foreign goods, and
funding Islamic fundamentalist groups, and dozens of shops and firms
have been closed. As part of the campaign to implement the Purge Law,
the wealth of the middle class and affluent has been targeted as well.
In March 1997, the Libyan General People's Congress approved a law
that provides for the punishment of accomplices to crimes of
``obstructing the people's power, instigating and practicing tribal
fanaticism, possessing, trading in or smuggling unlicensed weapons, and
damaging public and private institutions and property.'' The new law
provides that ``any group, whether large or small,'' including towns,
villages, local assemblies, tribes, or families, be punished in their
entirety if they are accused by the General People's Congress of
sympathizing, financing, aiding in any way, harboring, protecting, or
refraining from identifying perpetrators of such crimes. Punishment
under the Collective Punishment Law ranges from the denial of access to
utilities (water, electricity, telephone), fuels, food supplies,
official documents, and participation in local assemblies, to the
termination of new economic projects and state subsidies.
The Government does not impose exile as a form of punishment. The
Government encouraged Libyan dissidents abroad to return to the country
during the year, and promised to ensure their safety; however, few
returned by year's end, and the sincerity of the Government's offer and
the likelihood of reconciliation remain unclear. Prior to 1994, there
were reports that security forces hunted down and killed dissidents
living abroad (see Section 1.a.). Students studying abroad have been
interrogated upon their return (see Section 2.d.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is not independent
of the Government.
There are four levels of courts: Summary courts, which try petty
offenses; the courts of first instance, which try more serious crimes;
the courts of appeal; and the Supreme Court, which is the final
appellate level.
Special revolutionary courts were established in 1980 to try
political offenses. Such trials often are held in secret or even in the
absence of the accused. In other cases, the security forces have the
power to pass sentences without trial, especially in cases involving
political opposition. The U.N. Special Rapporteur noted in 1996 a lack
of fairness in trials of capital cases (see Section 1.a.). In the past,
Qadhafi has incited local cadres to take extrajudicial action against
suspected opponents.
The private practice of law is illegal; all lawyers must be members
of the Secretariat of Justice.
The Government holds a large number of political prisoners. Amnesty
International estimates that there are hundreds of persons imprisoned
for political reasons.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government does not respect the right to privacy.
Security agencies often disregard the legal requirement to
obtainwarrants before entering a private home. They also routinely
monitor telephone calls.
The security agencies and the Revolutionary Committees oversee an
extensive network of informants. Libyan exiles have reported that
family ties to suspected regime opponents may result in government
harassment and detention. The Government may seize and destroy property
belonging to ``enemies of the people'' or those who ``cooperate'' with
foreign powers. In the past, citizens have reported that the Government
warned members of the extended family of any regime opponent that they,
too, risk the death penalty.
The law passed by the General People's Congress in March 1997
formally codified the Government's previous threats of punishment for
families or communities that aid, abet, or do not inform the regime of
criminals and oppositionists in their midst (see Section 1.d.).
The 1994 Purge Law provides for the confiscation of private assets
above a nominal amount, describing wealth in excess of such
undetermined amounts as ``the fruits of exploitation or corruption.''
In 1996 the Government ordered the formation of hundreds of ``Purge''
or ``Purification'' Committees composed of young military officers and
students. The Purification Committees reportedly seized some
``excessive'' amounts of private wealth from members of the middle and
affluent classes; the confiscated property was taken from the rich to
be given to the poor, in an effort to appease the populace and to
strengthen the Government's power and control over the country. The
activities of the Purification Committees continued during the year.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The authorities tolerate some
difference of opinion in People's Committee meetings and at the General
People's Congress; however, in general they severely limit freedom of
speech. This is especially true with regard to criticism of Qadhafi or
his regime. Infrequent criticism of political leaders and policies in
the state-controlled media is interpreted as a government attempt to
test public opinion or weaken a government figure who may be a
potential challenger to Qadhafi.
The regime restricts freedom of speech in several ways: By
prohibiting all political activities not officially approved, by
enacting laws so vague that many forms of speech or expression may be
interpreted as illegal, and by operating a pervasive system of
informants (see Section 1.f.) that creates an atmosphere of mistrust at
all levels of society.
The State owns and controls the media. There is a state-run daily
newspaper, Al-Shams, with a circulation of 40,000. Local Revolutionary
Committees publish several smaller newspapers. The official news
agency, JANA, is the designated conduit for official views. The regime
does not permit the publication of opinions contrary to government
policy. Such foreign publications as Newsweek, Time, the International
Herald Tribune, Express, and Jeune Afrique are available, but
authorities routinely censor them and may prohibit their entry onto the
market.
Technology has made the Internet and satellite television widely
available in Libya. According to numerous anecdotal reports, both are
accessed easily in Tripoli.
The Government restricts academic freedom. Professors and teachers
who discuss politically sensitive topics face a risk of government
reprisal.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Public assembly
is permitted only with regime approval and in support of the regime's
positions.
Despite these restrictions, members of the Warfalla tribe staged
several informal protests in 1995 to protest the regime's decision to
carry out the death penalty against tribe members involved in the 1993
coup attempt. The Government responded by arresting hundreds of tribe
members and expelling others from the military and security forces. In
January 1997, eight Warfalla tribe members arrested for involvement in
the 1993 coup attempt were executed and at least five others were given
prison sentences for allegedly being American spies (see Section 1.a.).
The last display of public discontent and resentment towards the
Government occurred when a riot broke out over a penalty called at a
soccer match in Tripoli in 1996. The rare instance of public unrest
began when a contentious goal was scored by the team that Qadhafi's
sons supported and the referee called theplay in their favor. The
spectators reportedly started chanting anti-Qadhafi slogans after the
referee made the call and Qadhafi's sons and their bodyguards opened
fire in the air, then on the crowd. The spectators panicked and
stampeded out of the stadium and into the streets, where they stoned
cars and chanted more anti-Qadhafi slogans. The Government officially
admitted that 8 persons died and 39 were injured as a result of the
soccer riots, but there were reports of up to 50 deaths caused by the
gunfire and the stampede of the crowd.
The Government limits the right of association; it grants such a
right only to institutions affiliated with the regime. According to a
1972 law, political activity found by the authorities to be treasonous
is punishable by death. An offense may include any activity that is
``opposed to the principles of the Revolution.''
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government restricts freedom of
religion. The country is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim. In an apparent
effort to eliminate all alternative power bases, the regime has banned
the once powerful Sanusiyya Islamic sect. In its place, Qadhafi
established the Islamic Call Society (ICS), which is the outlet for
state-approved religion, as well as a tool for exporting the Libyan
revolution abroad. The ICS also is responsible for relations with other
religions, including Christian churches in the country. In 1992 the
Government announced that the ICS would be disbanded; however, its
director still conducts activities, suggesting that the organization
remains operational. Islamic groups whose beliefs and practices are at
variance with the state-approved teaching of Islam are banned. Although
most Islamic institutions are under state control, some mosques are
endowed by prominent families; however, they generally follow the
government-approved interpretation of Islam.
According to recent reports, individuals are rarely harassed
because of their religious practices. Members of some minority
religions are allowed to conduct services. Christian churches operate
openly and are tolerated by the authorities. The authorities reportedly
have failed to honor a promise made in 1970 to provide the Anglican
Church with alternative facilities when they took the property used by
the Church. Since 1988 Anglicans have shared a villa with other
Protestant denominations. Christians are restricted by the lack of
churches; there is a government limit of one church per denomination
per city. A resident Catholic bishop, aided by a small number of
priests, operates two churches. In March 1997, the Vatican established
diplomatic relations with Libya, stating that Libya had taken steps to
protect freedom of religion. The Vatican hoped to be able to address
more adequately the needs of the estimated 50,000 Christians in the
country.
d. Freedom of Movement within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government usually does not restrict
the internal movement of citizens, but has imposed blockades on those
cities and regions (primarily in the east) where antigovernment attacks
or movements originate. In 1996 after the escape of some 400
prisoners--during which residents purportedly harbored escapees--the
town of Dirnah was sealed off by government troops and also had its
water and electricity cut off.
The Government requires citizens to obtain exit permits for travel
abroad and limits their access to hard currency. A woman must have her
husband's permission to travel abroad. Authorities routinely seize the
passports of foreigners married to citizens upon their entry into the
country.
The right of return exists. The regime has called on students, many
of whom receive a government subsidy, and others working abroad, to
return to Libya on little or no notice. Students studying abroad have
been interrogated upon their return. Prior to 1994, there were reports
that Libyan security forces hunted down and killed dissidents living
abroad (see Section 1.a.).
The Government has expelled noncitizens arbitrarily (see Section
6.e.). There were reports that in April 1998, the Government accused at
least 10 Tunisians suspected of membership in, or support for, the
Islamist group An-Nadha, which is banned in Tunisia for activities in
opposition of the Tunisian Government, and forcibly returned them to
Tunisia, where they reportedly were subjected to abuse. In 1995 the
Government expelled approximately 1,000 Palestinian residents to signal
its displeasure with the signing of the Interim Agreement between
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization. The Palestinians were
forced to live in makeshift camps along the Egyptian border. The
Government allowed the Palestinians living in the border camps to
return to Libya, but over 200 Palestinians elected to remain, hoping to
travel to the WestBank and Gaza or resettle in Egypt. The governments
of Egypt and Israel refused to accept the Palestinians in 1996, leaving
them stranded in the deteriorating and squalid conditions of the once
temporary border encampments. They were removed forcibly from their
encampments to another location in the country by police and military
authorities in April 1997.
The Government expelled 132 Algerians in November 1997 (see Section
6.e.).
The law does not include provisions for granting asylum, first
asylum, or refugee status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951
U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967
Protocol, and the Government does not grant such status. The U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that by July 1998, there
were approximately 10,000 refugees of concern to the UNHCR in the
country, including some 4,200 Palestinians, 3,543 Somalis, and smaller
numbers of Eritreans, Sudanese, and Ethiopians. The Government
officially contacted the UNHCR liaison officer in Tripoli in 1995 in an
effort to facilitate the repatriation of Arab and African refugees to
their countries of origin. In 1997 the UNHCR assisted in the
repatriation of 886 Eritreans and 152 Ethiopians from Libya.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. Major
government decisions are controlled by Qadhafi, his close associates,
and committees acting in his name. Political parties are banned.
Qadhafi appoints military officers and official functionaries down to
junior levels. Corruption and favoritism, partially based on tribal
origin, are major problems that adversely affect government efficiency.
In theory popular political participation is provided by the
grassroots People's Committees, which send representatives annually to
the national General People's Congress. In practice, the GPC is a
rubber stamp that approves all recommendations made by Qadhafi.
Qadhafi established the Revolutionary Committees in 1977. These
bodies consist primarily of youths who guard against political
deviation. Some Committees have engaged in show trials of regime
opponents; in other cases, they have been implicated in the killing of
opponents abroad. The Committees approve all candidates in elections
for the GPC.
There is no reliable information on the representation of women and
minorities in the Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government prohibits the establishment of independent human
rights organizations. Instead, it created the Libyan Arab Human Rights
Committee in 1989. The Committee is not known to have published any
reports.
The regime has not responded substantively to appeals from Amnesty
International on behalf of detainees. In 1994 the regime characterized
Amnesty International as a tool of Western interests and dismissed its
work as neocolonialist; its representatives last visited Libya in 1988.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution prohibits discrimination based on these factors;
however, the Government does not enforce these prohibitions,
particularly discrimination against women and tribal minorities.
Women.--Although there is little detailed information on the extent
of violence against women, it remains a problem. In general the
intervention of neighbors and extended family members tends to limit
the reporting of domestic violence. Abuse within the family rarely is
discussed publicly, due to the value attached to privacy in society.
The 1969 Constitutional Proclamation granted women total equality.
Despite this legal provision, traditional attitudes and practices
prevail and discrimination against women persists and keeps them from
attaining the family or civil rights formally provided them. A woman
must have her husband's permission to travel abroad (see Section 2.d.).
Although their status is still not equal to that of men, most
observers agree that, with the advent of oil wealth in the 1970's, the
opportunity for women to make notable social progress has increased.
Oil wealth, urbanization, development plans, education programs, and
even the impetus behind Qadhafi's revolutionary government all have
contributed to the creation of new employment opportunities for women.
In recent years, a growing sense of individualism in some segments of
society, especially among the educated young, has been noted. For
example, many educated young couples prefer to set up their own
households, rather than move in with their parents, and view polygyny
with scorn. Since the 1970's, educational differences between men and
women have narrowed.
In general the emancipation of women is a generational phenomenon:
Urban women under the age of 35 tend to have more ``modern'' attitudes
toward life and have discarded the traditional veil; at the same time,
older urban women tend to be more reluctant to give up the veil or the
traditional attitudes towards family and employment. Moreover, a
significant proportion of rural women still do not attend school and
tend to instill in their children such traditional beliefs as women's
subservient role in society.
Employment gains by women also tend to be inhibited by lingering
traditional restrictions that discourage women from playing an active
role in the workplace, and by the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalist
values. Some observers have noted that even educated women tend to lack
self-confidence and social awareness and seek only a limited degree of
occupational and social participation with men.
Children.--The Government subsidizes education (which is compulsory
to age 15) and medical care, and has improved the welfare of children;
however, declining revenues and general economic mismanagement have led
to cutbacks, particularly in medical services. Some nomadic tribes
located in remote areas still practice female genital mutilation (FGM)
on young girls, a procedure that is widely condemned by international
health experts as damaging to both physical and psychological health.
People with Disabilities.--No information is available on the
Government's efforts to assist the disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Arabic-speaking Muslims of
mixed Arab and Amazigh ancestry constitute 97 percent of the
population. The principal non-Arab minorities are Amazighs and blacks.
There are frequent allegations of discrimination based on tribal
status, particularly against Amazighs in the interior and Tuaregs in
the south. The Government has manipulated the tribes to maintain a grip
on power by rewarding some tribes with money and government positions
and repressing and jailing members of various other tribes. The
Government also has attempted to keep the tribes fractured by pitting
one against another.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Independent trade unions and
professional associations are prohibited and workers do not have the
right to form their own unions. The regime regards such structures as
unacceptable ``intermediaries between the revolution and the working
forces.'' However, workers may join the National Trade Unions'
Federation, which was created in 1972 and is administered by the
People's Committee system. The Government prohibits foreign workers
from joining this union.
The law does not provide workers with the right to strike. There
have been no reports of strikes for years. In a 1992 speech, Qadhafi
affirmed that workers have the right to strike, but added that strikes
do not occur because the workers control their enterprises.
The official trade union organization plays an active role in the
International Confederation of Arab Trade Unions and the Organization
of African Trade Union Unity. It exploits international trade union
contacts to engage in propaganda efforts on behalf of the regime. The
Arab Maghreb Trade Union Federation suspended the membership of Libya's
trade union organization in 1993. The suspension followed reports that
Qadhafi had replaced all union leaders, in some cases with loyal
followers without union experience.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense because labor law
requires that the Government must approve all agreements.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--In its 1995 report,
the Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization's
(ILO) stated that ``persons expressing certain political views or views
ideologically opposed to the established political, social, or economic
system may be punished with penalties of imprisonment,'' including ``an
obligation to perform labor.'' The 1995 ILO report also noted that
public employees may be sentenced to compulsory labor ``as a punishment
for breaches of labor discipline or for participation in strikes, even
in services whose interruption would not endanger the life, personal
safety, or health of the whole or part of the population.'' The
Government informed the ILO in 1996 that legislation was enacted to
abolish these provisions and submitted a report to the ILO. The ILO did
not comment on the report.
There have been credible reports that the Government arbitrarily
has forced some foreign workers into involuntary military service or
has coerced them into performing subversive activities against their
own countries. Libyans, despite the Penal Code's prohibition on
slavery, have been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves,
mainly southern Sudanese women and children, who were captured by
Sudanese government troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan (see
Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment of children is 18.
Education is compulsory to age 15. There is no information available on
the prevalence of child labor, or on forced or bonded labor by
children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The labor force is approximately
1.2 million workers (including about 160,000 foreign workers) in a
population of 5.2 million. Wages, particularly in the public sector,
frequently are in arrears. A public wage freeze imposed in 1981 remains
in effect and has eroded significantly real income. There is no
information available regarding whether the average wage is sufficient
to provide a worker and family with a decent standard of living.
The legal maximum workweek is 48 hours. The Labor Law defines the
rights and duties of workers, including matters of compensation,
pension rights, minimum rest periods, and working hours.
The Labor Law does not accord equality of treatment to foreign
workers. Foreign workers may reside in the country only for the
duration of their work contracts, and may not send more than half of
their earnings to their families in their home countries. They are
subject to arbitrary pressures, such as changes in work rules and
contracts, and have little option but to accept such changes or to
depart the country. Foreign workers who are not under contract enjoy no
protection.
In 1997 the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
cited inadequate housing, threats of imprisonment to those accused of
disobeying disciplinary rules, and accusations of causing a variety of
societal problems as some of the problems in the Government's treatment
of foreign laborers.
The Government uses the threat of expulsion of foreign workers as
leverage against countries whose foreign policies run counter to
Libya's. The Government expelled approximately 1,000 Palestinian
residents in late 1995 to signal its displeasure with the agreement
between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, and in 1996,
the regime threatened to expel thousands of Palestinian workers for
political and economic reasons (see Section 2.d.).
Over 130 Algerians were expelled in 1997 (see Section 2.d.).
Labor inspectors are assigned to inspect places of work for
compliance with occupational health and safety standards. Certain
industries, such as the petroleum sector, try to maintain standards set
by foreign companies. There is no information on whether a worker can
remove himself from an unhealthy or unsafe work situation without
risking continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no information available
regarding whether the law prohibits specifically trafficking in
persons.
There have been reports of trafficking in persons. Libyans have
been implicated in the purchase of Sudanese slaves, mainly southern
Sudanese women and children, who were captured by Sudanese government
troops in the ongoing civil war in Sudan.
______
MOROCCO
The Constitution of Morocco provides for a monarchy with a
Parliament and an independent judiciary; however, ultimate authority
rests with the King, who presides over the Council of Ministers,
appoints all members of the Government, and may, at his discretion,
terminate the tenure of any minister, dissolve the Parliament, call for
new elections, and rule by decree. The late King Hassan II, who ruled
for 38 years, was succeeded by his son, King Mohammed VI, on July 23.
Since the constitutional reform of 1996, the bicameral legislature
consists of a lower house, elected through universal suffrage, and an
upper Chamber of Counselors, whose members are elected by various
regional, local, and professional councils. The councils' members
themselves are elected directly. The lower house of Parliament also may
dissolve the Government through a vote of no confidence. In March 1998,
King Hassan named a coalition government headed by opposition socialist
leader Abderrahmane Youssoufi and composed largely of ministers drawn
from opposition parties. Prime Minister Youssoufi's Government is the
first government drawn primarily from opposition parties in decades,
and also represents the first opportunity for a coalition of socialist,
left-of-center, and nationalist parties to be included in the
Government. The November 1997 parliamentary elections were held amid
widespread, credible reports of vote buying by political parties and
the Government, and excessive government interference. The fraud and
government pressure tactics led most independent observers to conclude
that the results of the election were heavily influenced, if not
predetermined, by the Government. The judiciary historically has been
subject to bribery and government influence; however, the Youssoufi
Government is implementing a reform program to develop greater
independence and impartiality.
The security apparatus includes several overlapping police and
paramilitary organizations. The Border Police, the National Security
Police, and the Judicial Police are departments of the Ministry of
Interior, while the Royal Gendarmerie reports to the Palace. Members of
the security forces continued to commit a number of serious human
rights abuses.
Morocco has a mixed economy based largely on agriculture, fishing,
light industry, phosphate mining, tourism, and remittances from
citizens working abroad. Illegal cannabis production, much of which is
destined for Europe, is also a significant economic activity. Economic
growth is highly dependent on agricultural output, and has experienced
wide fluctuations due to a series of debilitating droughts. According
to the Government's statistics, gross domestic product (GDP) grew 6.7
percent in 1998. Due to drought, government estimates for growth in
1999 were 0.6 percent.
There continued to be serious problems in the Government's human
rights record; however, under the direction of the new King, the
Government continued to improve its record in several areas. Citizens
do not have the full right to change their government; however, King
Hassan's appointment of an opposition coalition government for the
first time in 1998 marked a significant step toward increased
democratization. Some members of the security forces occasionally
torture or otherwise abuse detainees and beat protesters, and, despite
significant government efforts, prison conditions remain harsh.
Authorities sometimes ignore legal provisions for due process during
arrest and detention. The judiciary historically has been subject to
corruption and Interior Ministry influence; however, the Government is
implementing judicial reforms in order to increase the level of the
judiciary's independence and impartiality. Despite continued
improvement during the year, particularly with regard to easing media
censorship, the Government continued to restrict freedom of speech and
of the press regarding a few topics that the Government considers
sensitive, and journalists still practice self-censorship on these
topics. The Government limited freedom of assembly and association. In
several incidents over the course of the year, police beat
demonstrators. Moroccan human rights organizations alleged lack of due
process in the trial of some demonstrators for their role in protests
in the Western Sahara in late September and October. There were
unlawful arrests and police abuse, including of persons in detention,
associated with the protests, although most subsequently were released.
The Government limited freedom of religion for non-Muslims. Although
non-Muslim foreigners may practice their religions freely, missionaries
who proselytize face expulsion, and converts from Islam to other
religions continue to experience social ostracism. The Government at
times restricts freedom of movement. Domestic violence and
discrimination against women are common. Teenage prostitution is a
problem in urban centers. Child labor also is a problem, and the
Government has not acted to end the plight of young girls who work in
exploitative and abusive domestic servitude. Amazighs (Berbers) face
cultural marginalization, and continue to press the Government to
preserve their language and culture. Unions are subject to government
interference.
However, there was further progress on some important human rights
issues during the year. In March the Human Rights Minister announced
that the Government's priority was to harmonize local laws on torture
with international treaty obligations. In April the Youssoufi
Government organized the first-ever conference on human rights in the
Arab world. Soon after assuming the throne, King Mohammed VI stated his
own commitment, along with that of the Youssoufi Government, to
advancing respect for human rights, and established a new royal
commission charged to indemnify former political prisoners and their
families. The Minister for Human Rights pledged in May that the
``excesses of the past'' would end. In August the Government announced
a substantial reform advancing prisoner rights and protections, and it
cleared a backlog of unenforced legal judgments during the year. In
September Abraham Serfaty, who had been exiled since 1991, was allowed
to return to Morocco. In November the King relieved of his duties
Interior Minister Driss Basri, who was considered by most observers to
have been the driving force behind years of abuse of citizens by police
and security forces. One immediate effect of Basri's dismissal, most
observers agree, was that the practice of press self-censorship has
diminished considerably. While the Government began to make significant
progress in resolving the fate of those citizens abducted from the
1960's through the 1980's, human rights groups continue to call for
full disclosure of all available information.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings. According to press reports in June,
police in Berrechid arrested mint vendor Abdelaziz Warret, confiscated
his merchandise, and beat him until he fainted. He died later at a
hospital. When his family went to claim the body and to obtain a death
certificate, doctors refused to issue one. No explanation was given for
his arrest. In August a police officer and two military auxillaries
were arrested in connection with the beating death of Farah Mohammed
near the northern city of Oujda. Farah Mohammed was stopped by police
authorities for questioning in connection with contraband trafficking
of fuel across the Moroccan border withAlgeria. Eyewitnesses said that
the police beat and kicked him into unconsciouness at the time he was
detained. He died in police custody. Farah Mohammed's parents lodged an
immediate complaint with gendarmerie authorities as soon as they
learned of their son's death, which led to the immediate arrest of
those police and military auxillary officers allegedly involved in the
beating. The trial in the case was pending at year's end.
Human rights groups allege that poor medical care in prisons
results in unnecessary deaths; however, the Justice Ministry assigned
more doctors to prisons and improved prison health facilities during
the year. In addition the first-ever site visits by members of
Parliament, the press, and human rights groups to inspect prison
conditions took place during the year (see Section 1.c.).
b. Disappearance.--There were no new cases of disappearance for the
fourth consecutive year. While the forced disappearance of individuals
who opposed the Government and its policies occurred over several
decades, the Youssoufi Government, upon taking office, pledged that
such policies would not recur, and that it would disclose as much
information as possible on past cases. Many of those who disappeared
were members of the military who were implicated in attempts to
overthrow the Government in 1971 and 1972. Others were Sahrawis or
Moroccans who challenged the Government's claim to the Western Sahara
or other government policies. Many of those who disappeared were held
in secret detention camps. While the Government in recent years quietly
released several hundred persons who had disappeared, including about
300 such detainees in June 1991, and although in October 1998 it issued
an announcement on those who disappeared, to this day hundreds of
Saharan and Moroccan families do not have any information about their
missing relatives, many of whom disappeared over 20 years ago. No
explanation for their incarceration has ever been provided. Local human
rights monitors have concluded that many others died while at the
notorious Tazmamart prison, which the Government since has closed. The
Government has acknowledged 34 of these deaths and has provided death
certificates to the families of all but 1 of the 34 who died.
In an October 9, 1998 speech, King Hassan II directed that all
human rights cases should be resolved ``within 6 months.'' On October
15, 1998, the Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights (CCDH)
announced the release of information on 112 cases of disappearances.
According to the Council, 56 of the 112 who disappeared were deceased;
family members of 33 of the deceased received death certificates from
the Government. The Council added that eight persons believed to have
disappeared were alive and living abroad, and that four were alive and
in Morocco. Of the remaining 44, the Council stated that it had no
further information. Human rights groups and families pointed out
discrepancies between their lists and those of the Government, asked
the Government for more data about these cases, and demanded full
explanations of the causes and circumstances of these deaths and
disclosure of the identities of those responsible. Some family groups
claim that the Government is not divulging details on at least 50 more
cases. In November 1998, the Council began meetings in various
provinces with groups representing families of persons who had
disappeared in order to collect data on their grievances and to conduct
further research into the fate of those who remain missing. On April 9,
the Council announced that it would indemnify the 112 victims of
politically motivated disappearances. Human rights NGO's disputed the
Council's findings, claiming that they had compiled a list of over 600
potential cases of such disappearances from the 1960's through the
1980's. The NGO's called for the immediate release of all remaining
political prisoners, disclosure of the fate of those whose cases the
Council did not examine, delivery of the remains of the deceased to
their families, compensation for victims and their families, and
punishment for those responsible. The Moroccan Organization for Human
Rights (OMDH) issued a similar communique on June 6. On August 6, King
Mohammed VI established a new royal commission responsible for
increasing the Government's efforts to resolve the issue of those who
had disappeared and to reach an accommodation with former political
prisoners and members of their families. The new commission met with
some family members and local human rights organizations and began to
draw up guidelines for the resolution of issues involving individuals
who had disappeared. There were no developments in the disappearance of
Abdullah Sherrouq, a student who reportedly was detained by security
services on June 22, 1981. After 18 years, his family has been unable
to learn anything of his whereabouts or his fate, despite appeals by
Amnesty International (AI).
Associations that seek information on those who have disappeared,
including a group representing Tazmamart prison survivors, operate
openly and freely, and call upon the Government for full disclosure of
events surrounding cases thatdate back to the 1960's. Several front-
page articles in newspapers affiliated with parties in the governing
coalition called at various times during the year for full disclosure
on all outstanding cases of disappearance. The associations also call
for compensation to families of those who have disappeared, death
certificates and the return of the remains of those who died, and
prosecution of responsible officials. The Government indicated that it
would be more open about providing information in these past cases.
The Government pays a monthly stipend of $550 (5,000 dirhams) to 28
former prisoners who survived 18 to 20 years in solitary confinement
under harsh conditions at Tazmamart prison in connection with the coup
attempts in 1971 and 1972. After their release, the Government
prohibited them from speaking out publicly about their detention. In
exchange the Government gave the former prisoners assurances that it
would help them find jobs and reintegrate them into society; however,
none of them has obtained government assistance in this regard, and
some complain of being denied voter cards and passports.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Government claims that the use of torture has been
discontinued; however, some members of the security forces still
occasionally torture or otherwise abuse detainees. The OMDH filed a
complaint on behalf of some of those who were detained and abused by
the police at the end of September, following several days of protests
over a variety of social grievances in Laayoune in the Western Sahara
(see Sections 1.d., 1.e., 1.f., and 2.b.). There is photographic and
other evidence to substantiate claims that the police systematically
beat some of the persons they had detained in connection with the
protests. An investigation was opened into the charges; however, by
year's end no police officials were charged in connection with the
force used to break up the protests, nor for the beatings inflicted on
some of those detained by the police. Some police officials allegedly
responsible subsequently were transferred and the chief of police in
Laayoune was relieved of his duties there.
To commemorate the U.N. ``International Day for the Support of
Torture Victims,'' the OMDH published a special newspaper in which it
called on the Government to implement legislation that would
criminalize the use of torture and would control the conditions under
which detainees are kept in ``garde a vue'' detention and in prisons.
The OMDH claimed that most cases of torture submitted to the justice
system involved incidents that occurred in front of witnesses or in
public areas. According to the OMDH, torture in detention largely
continues to escape the notice of the judiciary. The OMDH noted that
the implementation of judges' instructions on eliminating the use of
torture has been ``exceedingly slow.'' While the OMDH admitted that the
use of torture has diminished over the years, it claimed that it has
not disappeared. The OMDH alleged in its report that those who commit
such abuses ``do so with impunity in almost all cases.'' The NGO called
on the Government to harmonize domestic law with its responsibilities
under the U.N. Convention Against Torture, to ensure full independence
for the judiciary, and to punish those who resort to torture.
In April the French-language newspaper of the ruling Socialist
Union of Popular Forces (USFP) party, Liberation, published ``An Open
Letter to My Torturer'' by Salah El-Ouadie. The letter is a first-
person account of the torture that Ouadie suffered in detention from
1974 until his release in 1984, when he was issued a royal pardon.
Imprisoned because of his leftist activities, Ouadie addressed his
letter to ``K.Y.,'' who was a police chief in Casablanca's Derb Moulay
Cherif neighborhood. Ouadie related that he remembered the click of his
torturer's heels, his cologne, his voice, as well as the fate of fellow
victims who went mad or died. According to Ouadie, ``K.Y.'' held a
position with the national police, and even represented Morocco in 1996
at a U.N. conference on preventing torture, but was forced to retire by
the Government late in the year.
In incidents over the course of the year, police continued to use
force to disperse several demonstrations by unemployed university
graduates associated with the National Association of Unemployed
Graduates (known by its French acronym, ANDC), and other groups to a
lesser extent. In numerous incidents throughout the country, police
beat demonstrators with batons in order to disperse them (see Sections
1.d., 1.e., and 2.b.). From September 22 to 29 in the Western Saharan
city of Laayoune, police used brutal force to dispel a series of
demonstrations organized by students, unemployed graduates, miners, and
former Sahrawhi political prisoners to protest a variety of social
conditions and grievances. There were reliable reports of further
police brutality in Laayoune over the weekend of October 30 to 31 (see
Sections 1.d., 1.e., 1.f., and 2.b.).
In March 1998, the Ministry of Justice and the prison
administration implemented a law that makes autopsies routine for any
death that occurs in detention, in order to allow allegations of
torture to be disproved. The autopsies take place at the request of the
family, human rights NGO's, or the state prosecutor, and at the order
of a judge. The autopsies were used to disprove three cases that
involved allegations of abuse in 1998.
Prison conditions remain harsh; however, they have improved in
recent years, due in part to reforms undertaken at the suggestion of
the CCDH and the Minister of Justice. On August 25, the Government
promulgated new regulations to implement recent legislation that was
passed to reform the prison system. The new law contains 128 articles
and replaces a royal decree that had governed the prison system since
1915. Among the reforms in the new legislation are provisions mandating
compensation for work performed by prisoners. Prisoners with ``good
conduct'' records also are accorded the right to a furlough to visit
family members during important holiday periods. The new law forbids
the use of handcuffs, manacles, or other devices used for physical
restraint, except as required to restrain violent prisoners and then
only after consultation with prison medical authorities. Procedures
were established to allow the prisons to be inspected by the press and
human rights organizations, and members of both the press and human
rights organizations visited prisons after the procedures were
established in August. Visitors must receive authorization from the
Director of the Prison Administration. Special provisions also accord
women the right to keep their children with them in prison until the
children reach the age of 2, or longer with special permission from the
Ministry of Justice. The new law contains provisions that extend the
function of the prison system beyond that of punishment and
incarceration to include rehabilitation and preparation for a return to
society.
Nonetheless, credible reports indicate that harsh treatment and
conditions continue, often as a result of chronic overcrowding. In 1997
Oukacha Central Prison in Casablanca, which is designed for 5,000
inmates, held 8,831. Human rights groups allege that poor medical care
in prisons results in unnecessary deaths. To address this problem, the
Government provided special funds in the 1998-99 budget for the
renovation of prison facilities, and added doctors and health
facilities to prisons during the year.
In the first visit of its kind Members of Parliament visited Sale
prison on February 10 to investigate prison conditions and allegations
of overcrowding. Their visit followed that of the ``2M'' television
station, which took an exclusive look at prisons in a broadcast in
January. In February the Justice Minister told the French daily
newspaper Le Figaro that ``the time had come for humanity and prison
system reform,'' adding, ``imprisonment does not mean the end of the
right to being respected.'' The Minister acknowledged that there were
problems, noting that the prison system currently holds 50,000 inmates,
despite being designed for 35,000, but added that ``advances have been
considerable.'' In response to the Government's initiatives, the
president of the OMDH observed that there was ``a change of mind-set,''
which has resulted in more transparency in the prison system.
Although the Government generally did not permit prison visits by
human rights monitors in the past, since the tenure of the Youssoufi
Government began there has been close collaboration between the Justice
Ministry and human rights groups on prison visits, which now are
authorized explicitly by law. OMDH members visited prisons several
times throughout 1998 and once in early 1999, and reported that they
were well-received and permitted free and full access to gauge progress
on government efforts to reduce overcrowding, improve medical care, and
provide additional facilities to inmates.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention or Exile.--Legal provisions for due
process have been revised extensively in recent years, although reports
indicate that authorities sometimes ignore them. Although police
usually make arrests in public and during the day, they do not always
identify themselves and do not always obtain warrants. Incommunicado
(``garde-a-vue'') detention is limited to 48 hours, with one 24-hour
extension allowed at the prosecutor's discretion. In state security
cases, the ``garde-a-vue'' period is 96 hours; this also may be
extended by the prosecutor. It is during this initial period, when
defendants are denied access to counsel, that the accused is
interrogated and abuse or torture is most likely to occur. Some members
of the security forces, long accustomed to indefinite precharge access
to detainees, continue to resist the new rules.
Under 1991 changes to the law, the police are obliged to notify a
person's next of kin of an arrest as soon as possible.However, lawyers
are not always informed promptly of the date of arrest, and thus are
not always able to monitor compliance with the ``garde-a-vue''
detention limits. While the law provides for a limited system of bail,
it rarely is granted. However, defendants are sometimes released on
their own recognizance. The law does not provide for habeas corpus or
its equivalent. Under a separate code of military justice, military
authorities may detain members of the military without warrants or
public trial.
Although accused persons generally are brought to trial within an
initial period of 2 months, prosecutors may request up to five
additional 2-month extensions of pretrial detention. Thus, an accused
person may be kept in detention for up to 1 year.
Moroccan human rights organizations made credible allegations that
police authorities unlawfully entered the homes of some Moroccans
during the late hours of October 30 to arrest and detain persons wanted
by the authorities in connection with the protests in the city of
Laayoune in the Western Sahara from September 22 to 29, and and again
on October 30 and 31 (see Sections 1.c., 1.e., 1.f., and 2.b.).
Islamist dissident Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine has remained under
house arrest in Sale since 1989 for refusing to acknowledge the
religious authority of the King (see sections 2.a., 2.c., and 2.d.).
In September an incident involving striking egg-farm workers in the
southern suburbs of Rabat led to 21 arrests. In that incident, the
workers, who damaged farm machinery during their protest, were arrested
after demanding better working conditions and higher wages. The owner
of the farm, a former police commissioner, reportedly called in the
security forces, who charged the strikers with destruction of property
and interfering in the means of production. The 21 workers, 8 of whom
were women, were fined $50 (500 dirhams) and sentenced to prison for
terms ranging from 1 to 7 months (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). In
another strike incident in October police broke up a strike by the
Agadir coastal fishermen's union and arrested four members of the
union's leadership, including the secretary general. The strike was
called to demand social security benefits and higher wages. The four
individuals were tried and, under a statute prohibiting the disruption
of economic activity, found guilty, fined $500 (5000 dirhams), and
sentenced to 1 year in prison (see Sections 2.a. and 6.a.).
Several persons were arrested and sentenced during the year in
connection with their roles in demonstrations that were forcibly
disrupted by police (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., and 2.b.).
There are no known instances of forced exile. Formerly exiled
political dissident Abraham Serfaty returned to Morocco on September
30. Prior to Serfaty's return, on May 4, police at Rabat airport
blocked Serfaty's wife, Christine, a French national, from entering the
country upon her arrival from Paris. The next day, the semiofficial
newspaper Le Matin stated that she was a ``dangerous radical who
propagated the idea of independence for the southern territories of
Morocco.'' However, soon after King Mohammed VI took the throne,
Serfaty, a member of the (now defunct) Communist Party and a supporter
of Saharan independence, who was expelled from Morocco in 1991, was
welcomed back.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; although the courts historically have been
subject to extrajudicial pressures, including bribery and government
influence, the Youssoufi Government is implementing a reform program to
introduce independence and impartiality. During the year, the
Government continued to implement reforms intended to increase judicial
independence. The Justice Minister in April 1998 stated that judicial
reform was his top priority, and addressed the issue of corruption by
disbarring and disciplining a number of judges. With the encouragement
of then-King Hassan and the broad support of the business community,
the Minister also oversaw the creation of a system of commercial courts
for business litigation to boost investor confidence. In March the
Ministry of Justice began to implement a 5-year reform plan that
emphasizes transparency, accountability, and professionalism as top
priorities. During the year, the administrative courts frequently ruled
against local governments that overstepped their authority.
There are four levels in the common law court system: Communal and
district courts, courts of first instance, the Appeals Court, and the
Supreme Court. While in theory there is a single court system under the
Ministry of Justice, other courts also operate, including: The Special
Court of Justice, which handles cases of civil servants who are
implicated in corruption; administrative courts, which deal with the
decisions of thebureaucracy; commercial courts, which deal with
business disputes; and the military tribunal, for cases involving
military personnel and, on certain occasions, matters pertaining to
state security (although state security cases also may fall within the
jurisdiction of the regular court system).
Although there is a single court system for most nonmilitary
matters, family issues such as marriage, divorce, child support and
custody, and inheritance are adjudicated by judges trained in Shari'a
(Islamic law). Judges considering criminal cases or cases in nonfamily
areas of civil law generally are trained in the French legal tradition.
All judges trained in recent years are graduates of the National
Institute for Judicial Studies, where they undergo 3 years of study
heavily focused on human rights and the rule of law. It is not
necessary to be a lawyer to become a judge, and the majority of judges
are not lawyers.
In general detainees are arraigned before a court of first
instance. If the infraction is minor and not contested, the judge may
order the defendant released or impose a light sentence. If an
investigation is required, the judge may release defendants on their
own recognizance. According to reliable sources, cases often are
adjudicated on the basis of confessions, some of which are obtained
under duress.
The Justice Minister has stated that he would attempt to end petty
corruption in the judiciary by increasing judges' salaries and ensuring
punishment for bribe-takers, as well as attempt to end all informal and
inappropriate influences on judicial decisionmaking in the court
system. Nonetheless, the court system remains subject to extrajudicial
pressures. Despite recent increases, salaries for both judges and their
staffs remain modest; as a result, some observers allege that petty
bribery remains a routine cost of court business. In some courts,
especially in minor criminal cases, some observers allege that
defendants or their families must pay bribes to court officers and
judges to secure a favorable disposition.
In August 1997, King Hassan, after a vacancy of 2 years, appointed
a new Minister of Justice, who began to reduce the judiciary's
relationship with the Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, judges
continue to work closely with the Interior Ministry's local network of
officials, or ``caids,'' who serve as members of the judicial police
and often legally are charged with the responsibility of questioning
criminal defendants. Caids frequently prepare the written summary of an
arrest and subsequent interrogation. The summary is admissible in court
as an element of the evidentiary process and can carry great weight
with the judge. After the new Justice Minister's appointment, the
Ministry of Justice began to reassert its authority and control over
judges.
The law does not distinguish political and security cases from
common criminal cases. In serious state security cases, communications
between the Ministry of Interior and the court are more direct. At the
Government's discretion, such cases may be brought before a specially
constituted military tribunal, which is subservient to other branches
of the Government, especially the military and the Ministry of
Interior.
Aside from external pressures, the court system also is subject to
resource constraints. Consequently, criminal defendants charged with
less serious offenses often receive only a cursory hearing, with judges
relying on police reports to render decisions. Although the Government
provides an attorney at public expense for serious crimes (when the
offense carries a maximum sentence of over 5 years), appointed
attorneys often provide inadequate representation.
In May the Justice Minister announced that over the past year the
judicial system had enforced judgments in 60,000 out of 100,000 cases
of civil litigation, which represented significant progress toward
eliminating a persistent backlog.
In December 1998, the OMDH issued a report that assessed the status
of the judiciary. According to the OMDH, the Youssoufi administration
took a series of steps to improve the court system, including rooting
out high-level corruption, naming a new Director for Judicial
Administration at the Justice Ministry, reactivating a Justice Ministry
disciplinary body, publishing that body's deliberations and decisions,
and organizing free and fair elections to that body. Nevertheless, the
OMDH called for additional reforms, including changing laws to reduce
the Justice Minister's right to suspend judges, revamping the Criminal
Code (which the OMDH stated offers insufficient protection for a fair
trial), strengthening the law on civil liberties, and compelling judges
to place their assets in a blind trust. The OMDH also called on the
State to punish those officials guilty of human rights abuses. Finally,
the OMDH noted the lack of resources necessary for documentation
tracking and for court facilities.
The Government continued to hold a number of political prisoners,
although 28 were released in 1998. Prior to the 1998 release, the OMDH
estimated that there were some 60 political prisoners, of whom 50 were
Islamists and the remainder were leftists. Among the 50 alleged
Islamists were 16 members of the ``Group of 26.'' The Ministry of
Interior claimed that there were 55 Islamists serving sentences for
offenses that ranged from arms smuggling to participating in a bomb
attack on a hotel in Marrakech. However, some of these prisoners remain
in prison for having called for an Islamic state in 1983. International
human rights groups' estimates of the number of persons in prison for
advocating independence for the Western Sahara varies from none to 700.
Of the 28 prisoners released in 1998, the AMDH acknowledged that 20
were included on its list of political prisoners; the rest were
Islamists who had committed crimes of murder or robbery, albeit with
political motives. After the release of the 28 prisoners, the AMDH
released a communique in which it noted the continued incarceration of
16 persons whom it considered to be political prisoners. Amnesty
International lists eight persons whom it considers to be political
prisoners.
A group of 14 men who called themselves Islamist political
prisoners issued a communique from prison on June 13. The communique
welcomed the decision to release the 28 political prisoners and to
examine ways to redress the excesses of the past, but noted that the
CCDH's call for a general amnesty for political prisoners did not
benefit many of those who remained in prison. The prisoners called on
the Government to ``implement, without restrictions or conditions, the
CCDH's advisory opinion that calls for the immediate release of all
political prisoners and the total and final end of political detention
in Morocco.''
During and following public demonstrations in Laayoune between
September 22 and 29, more than 150 persons were detained by police
authorities. Most were released within a matter of days; however, 26
persons were tried on criminal charges for actions taken in connection
with the protests and sentenced to imprisonment for periods ranging
from 10 to 15 years. The OMDH claimed that the trial of these persons
was unfair and insisted that the defendants were not provided adequate
legal counsel for their defense. The OMDH also called the sentences
excessive for charges that concerned little more than destruction of
property during the course of the demonstrations (see Sections 1.f. and
2.b.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home or
Correspondence.--The Constitution states that the home is inviolable
and that no search or investigation may take place without a search
warrant, and the law stipulates that a search warrant may be issued by
a prosecutor on good cause; however, authorities sometimes ignore these
provisions. During protests in Laayoune in the Western Sahara in
September and October, police reportedly encouraged local thugs to
break into, loot, and destroy private shops. Following the protests in
October, police unlawfully entered homes to arrest persons associated
with the demonstrations. Human rights NGO's claim that such police
actions created a ``climate of fear'' in the city, forcing some
families to flee the city or change residences nightly to avoid such
police actions (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., and 2.a.).
Government security services monitor certain persons and
organizations, both foreign and Moroccan, and government informers
monitor activities on university campuses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Constitution provides
for freedom of expression, the Government restricts press freedom
regarding a few topics that the Government considers sensitive.
However, newspapers and weeklies from across the political spectrum,
from Socialist to nationalist to Islamist, publish freely.
The Government owns the official press agency, Maghreb Arab Press,
and the Arabic daily Al-Anbaa. The Government also supports two
semiofficial dailies, the French-language Le Matin and the Arabic-
language Assahra. In addition the Government provides subsidies to the
rest of the press through price supports for newsprint and office
space. A 1958 decree grants the Government the authority to register
and license domestic newspapers and journals. Authorities may use the
licensing process to prevent the publication of materials that they
believe cross the threshold of tolerable dissent. Offending
publications may be declared a danger to state security, seized, the
publisher's license suspended, and equipment destroyed. TheMinistry of
Interior may control foreign publications by collecting ``banned''
publications after they have been distributed. In general the
Government does not employ extreme measures, and there were no reports
of the abuse of the Government's licensing authority during the year.
However, the media regularly engages in self-censorship to avoid the
Government's attention and possible sanctions.
The Press Code empowers the Minister of Interior to confiscate
publications that are judged offensive by the Government. Under the
code, the Prime Minister may order the indefinite suspension of a
publication. There were approximately 2,000 domestic and foreign
newspapers, magazines, and journals in circulation. There were no
confirmed cases of seizures of foreign or domestic newspapers or
journals for the second year in a row. In general press articles
containing unflattering material that routinely had been prevented from
circulation in the past were allowed free circulation during the year.
In June the Moroccan weekly Le Journal alleged that the Government
ordered its printer to stop printing the newspaper because the
newspaper decided to print interviews with several controversial
political figures and because it called for the resignation of the
Interior Minister. The printer denied that the Government gave such an
order, explaining that the newspaper was denied the use of the printing
press only because of its unpaid bills. After its failure to use its
usual printer, Le Journal used French printers to continue publishing.
It remains on sale throughout the country and continues to publish
highly controversial and critical stories that previously would have
resulted in its suspension.
The Press Code empowers the Government to censor newspapers
directly by ordering them not to report on specific items or events. In
most past instances, government control of the media generally has been
exercised through directives and ``guidance'' from the Ministry of
Interior. Nonetheless, the Government generally tolerates satirical and
often stinging editorials in the opposition parties' dailies. However,
both law and tradition historically have prohibited criticism on three
topics: The monarchy, Morocco's claim to the Western Sahara, and the
sanctity of Islam. However, with respect to the Western Sahara, several
leading journals published articles in late October and early November
that were highly critical of past government administration of the
territory.
The Government controls Radio-Television Marocaine (RTM)
broadcasts. Another major broadcaster is the French-backed Medi-1,
which operates from Tangier and reaches throughout Morocco and North
Africa. While nominally private and independent, Medi-1 practices self-
censorship, as do other media outlets. The Government owns the only
television stations whose broadcasts can be received in most parts of
the nation without decoders or satellite dish antennas. In 1996 the
Government purchased a majority share in 2M, formerly the country's
sole private station, which can be received in most urban areas. The
ostensible reason for the Government's action was to save 2M from
bankruptcy; the Government now owns 68 percent of 2M stock, and the
Minister of Communication, by virtue of his position, has become the
chairman of the board. A government-appointed committee monitors
broadcasts. Privatization of these stations continued to be a major
topic of political debate during the year, and the Government announced
in 1998 that it was preparing a plan for 2M's resale to the private
sector.
In June a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reporter
accredited to Morocco was denied entry when he attempted to return
through the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, allegedly for failing to present
any proof that he worked for the BBC. After providing sufficient proof,
the reporter was permitted to enter the country. The reporter
subsequently was informed on July 1 by the Ministry of Communication
that his credentials as a journalist had been denied. However, he
subsequently was accredited and continues to reside in Morocco and file
stories. Bziz (also known as Ahmad Sanoussi), a popular humorist, has
been prohibited from performing in Morocco for the past 12 years due to
his satire of those in power; however, in November Bziz appeared in a
government-sponsored television advertisement announcing the Royal
Palace's second annual ``Solidarity Campaign Against Poverty.''
Islamist dissident Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine has remained under
house arrest in Sale since 1989 for refusing to acknowledge the
religious authority of the monarchy (see Sections 1.d., 2.c., and
2.d.). However, Yassine's books and articles are sold without
restriction, and editorials calling for his release are published
without impediment. Yassine's Justice and Charity Organization (JCO)
has an active presence on university campuses and occasionally
organizes protests of his continued house arrest. However, prominent
members of the JCO are subject to constant surveillance and sometimes
are unable to obtain passports and other necessary documents. On April
13, AMDHcriticized the CCDH for not having addressed the Yassine case
in its review of human rights in Morocco.
Dish antennas are available at low cost on the market and permit
free access to a wide variety of foreign broadcasts. Residents of the
north are able to receive Spanish broadcasts with standard antennas.
The Government does not impede the reception of foreign broadcasts or
Internet access.
The universities enjoy relative academic freedom in most areas, but
are barred from open debate on the monarchy, the Western Sahara, and
Islam. Government informers monitor campus activities (see Section
1.f.) and rectors are approved by the Ministry of Interior.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the law also permits the
Government to suppress even peaceful demonstrations and mass
gatherings, and at times police forcibly prevented and disrupted
gatherings during the year. Most conferences and demonstrations require
the prior authorization of the Ministry of Interior, ostensibly for
security reasons.
Throughout the year, many meetings and marches occurred without
government interference; however, police continued to use violent means
to disperse unemployed demonstrators and to prevent several marches by
members of the ANDC, affiliated groups, and, to a lesser extent, others
groups. A court in Fes sentenced two members of the ANDC to 2-month
sentences and $50 (500 dirhams) fines for organizing several ANDC
rallies that authorities disrupted in Fes in January. Also in January,
police blocked marches planned by blind unemployed graduates in Taounat
(near Fes) and Meknes.
Authorities denied permission for a planned February 6 march in
Kenitra to protest U.N. policies toward Iraq. On February 14,
authorities in Fes used force to disperse striking truckers. On
February 15, police stopped blind unemployed graduates when they
attempted to march from Istiqlal party headquarters to the Parliament.
On March 8, security forces in El-Houceima used force to disperse a
protest by unemployed graduates. Unemployed demonstrators camped in
front of the Parliament for several weeks in the spring until
authorities forced them to disperse in an April 24 nighttime operation.
On May 16, a group of 1,000 persons demonstrated in front of
Parliament, calling for the cancellation of instructions issued by the
Ministry of Interior that barred political parties and NGO's from using
government facilities for meetings. As police dispersed the crowd,
clashes broke out with demonstrators. On May 20, ANDC members in
Essaouira organized a march and sit-in at the municipal council
building. Police used violent means to disperse the protesters, and
numerous persons were injured. Police also used force against ANDC
protesters in Beni Mellal on May 22, injuring numerous protesters and
briefly detaining 14. On May 31, police used force to disperse a group
of unemployed doctors and engineers who had been conducting a sit-in at
the Parliament since May 27.
In Tendrara on June 1, police arrested a group of 15 students who
organized a peaceful protest to criticize the corruption of the
president of a local rural commune, as well as to ask for a sewage
system for the town. The 15 students all were released and none were
tried. On June 1 and 11, unemployed blind students attempted to march
on Parliament to demand jobs. Police intercepted them, beat them, put
them in vans, and returned them to the bus station where they had been
staging a sit-in during the previous 8 months. On June 20, police in
Laayoune used force to disrupt a demonstration by 35 persons who were
demanding work. Two persons were injured and two were arrested; the two
arrested were released later.
In September a strike involving egg-farm workers in the southern
suburbs of Rabat resulted in 21 arrests. Striking workers, who damaged
farm machinery during their protest, were arrested after demanding
better working conditions and higher wages. The owner, a former police
commissioner, is believed to have called in the security forces, who
charged the strikers with destruction of property and interfering in
the means of production. The 21 workers, 8 of whom were women, were
fined $50 (500 dirhams) and sentenced to prison for terms ranging from
1 to 7 months (see Sections 1.e and 6.a.). In October police broke up a
strike by the Agadir coastal fishermen's union and arrested four
members of the union's leadership, including the secretary general. The
strike was called to demand social security benefits and higher wages.
The four individuals were tried and, under a statute prohibiting the
disruption of economic activity, were found guilty, fined $50 (500
dirhams), and sentenced to 1 year in prison (see Sections 1.e. and
6.a.).
In what were clearly the worst instances of police excess during
the year, police authorities in Laayoune used brutal force tobreak up
demonstrations organized by students, unemployed graduates, miners, and
former Sahrawi political prisoners between September 22 and September
29. The incident began as a peaceful protest over a variety of social
grievances. There were also credible reports that the Laayoune police
encouraged local thugs in civilian dress to break into, loot, and
destroy shops owned by local Sahrawi residents of the city. The thugs
also reportedly were encouraged to attack local Sahrawi residents. Some
who were detained were subjected to systematic beatings and other forms
of physical coercion. Nearly 150 persons were detained during and just
after the first round of protests in Laayoune in late September. Most
of those detained were released; however, 26 persons were charged and
sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison on charges of destruction of
property during the protests.
The Justice Minister defended the trial process and the sentences
in a statement made on November 8, while he was in Laayoune as part of
a royal commission appointed by Mohammed VI to oversee reforms in the
administration of the territory. The official Moroccan press agency,
MAP, quoted the Minister as saying, ``there has not been any violation
of the law and the trial took place in a normal and sound way and was
based on the confessions of the suspects, who participated in
subversive acts, theft, looting, and violation of the sanctities of
homes.'' By contrast the OMDH was highly critical of the trial. It
stated that the suspects did not receive adequate legal representation
and that the sentences were excessive. The OMDH also filed a complaint
with the local judicial authorities on behalf of some of the persons
who were taken into custody. The complaint alleged that the police
tortured them in order to obtain confessions, and that they were denied
due process.
In the aftermath of the first round of protests in Laayoune, King
Mohammed VI immediately replaced the governor of the province, relieved
the local police chief of his duties, and dispatched military security
forces to the city to help restore order. The local population welcomed
the military security forces, in which it expressed confidence, as
opposed to the police, which it held responsible for creating a
``climate of fear'' in the city. The new royal commission was
dispatched quickly to the city to explain to local residents proposed
new measures to decentralize authority in the region, which would allow
local residents more of a choice in their affairs, and a new election
to choose members to a proposed new royal advisory council on the
Western Sahara.
Despite these prompt actions taken to restore confidence and order
and to lessen tensions, renewed violence broke out on October 30 and
continued into the next day. There were credible reports that police
provoked the violence during the day. Order reportedly was not restored
until the police were withdrawn from neighborhoods on October 31 and
replaced by military security forces. There were further credible
reports that during the late night and early morning hours of October
30 and 31, police authorities unlawfully entered homes to arrest
persons associated with the demonstrations in late September and
earlier that day. Thirty-one persons reportedly were detained. Of
these, 10 persons reportedly were released within 24 hours and the
remainder released within the following 2-week period.
Some members of the commission on the Western Sahara again were
dispatched quickly to Laayoune; however, tensions again mounted in the
city when one commission member, then-Interior Minister Basri, told
local officials that the referendum on the territory's future, to be
held under the auspices of the United Nations (and then scheduled to
take place in the summer of 2000), likely would not occur before 2003.
Following Basri's statement and the second round of excessive police
actions in Laayoune in late October, King Mohammed VI dismissed Basri
on November 9. There were no charges made and no investigation was
initiated into the excessive use of force by the police by year's end,
although the police chief was relieved of his duties and several other
police officials were transferred out of the city.
However, there also were numerous peaceful protests during the
year. For example, unemployed demonstrators held a sit-in at the Rabat
road terminal for 3 months without disruption in the spring. On April
26, 3,000 ANDC members marched peacefully from the Parliament through
the center of Rabat after observing a 2-hour sit-in on the steps of the
Parliament. Security forces were present, but did not intervene. On May
1, labor unions marched through Casablanca to commemorate May Day. On
May 4, police peacefully dispersed ANDC protesters from Parliament. On
November 4, students and unemployed graduates marched peacefully from
the law faculty in Rabat to the Parliament to protest a variety of
social grievances. A similar protest and 6-hour sit-in also occurred
without police interference in Marrakech the previous day.
In March the press reported on an alleged Ministry of Interior
decision to ban all public meetings from government-owned facilities.
Amid protests that such tactics constituted a flagrant violation of the
freedom of expression, the AMDH and the League for the Defense of Human
Rights (LMDH) issued on March 11, a communique that criticized the
Ministry of Interior for its alleged actions. Later the same day,
government spokesman Khalid Alioua stated that the Ministry's decision
had been ``badly interpreted,'' and applied only to meetings in
municipal council and administration buildings, not to the public halls
that routinely are used by unions, parties, NGO's, and other groups. On
April 14, in response to questions in Parliament, then-Interior
Minister Basri maintained that his Ministry had sent to local
authorities ``a telex for internal use following the unauthorized
meeting of a group with an unknown affiliation within a university
building on February 22.'' The Minister added that his goal was ``to
protect campuses from antidemocratic political activism and to ensure
the continuity of public services. Other than that, liberty is the
rule.'' The order was revoked by the Prime Minister's office on
November 5.
After violent police suppression of demonstrations in Rabat in
October 1998, Basri agreed in December 1998 to recognize officially the
jobless demonstrators' association, the ANDC, whose request for
recognition had been pending for 7 years. Basri also agreed to grant
members of the group 5,000 taxi licenses. Members of the ANDC also were
invited by the King to a national conference on unemployment in
December 1998. In June the Ministers of Interior and Employment toured
the regions to instruct walis and governors on how to take steps to
reduce unemployment, and to listen to the needs of the unemployed.
However, despite repeated meetings with the Ministers of Interior and
Employment, the ANDC has not obtained official recognition and the
promised taxi licenses have not been issued.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association; however, the
Government limits this right in practice. Under a 1958 decree, which
was amended substantially in 1973 to introduce restrictions on civil
society organizations, persons wishing to create an organization must
obtain the approval of the Ministry of Interior before holding
meetings. In practice the Ministry uses this requirement to prevent
persons suspected of advocating causes opposed by the Government from
forming legal organizations. Historically, extreme Islamist and leftist
groups have encountered the greatest difficulty in obtaining official
approval. Although there are over 20 active Islamist groups, the
Government has prohibited membership in two, the JCO and Jama'a
Islamia, due to their perceived anti-monarchy rhetoric. Political
parties also must be approved by the Ministry of Interior, which has
used this power to control participation in the political process.
However, individual Islamists are not barred from participating in
recognized political parties. The last known instance in which a
proposed political party failed to receive such approval was in 1996,
when an Islamist group's application was not approved. The group
instead was permitted to present candidates for the 1997 elections
under the banner of an existing party. One Islamist party, the Party
for Justice and Development (PJD--formerly the Popular Democratic
Constitutional Movement), won nine seats in Parliament in the 1997
elections. There was some progress during the year on increasing
freedom of association, including the revocation by the Prime Minister
of a directive that prohibited the use of public spaces for meetings by
associations, political parties, and trade unions. The Prime Minister
also eased requirements for obtaining authorization for meetings in
public areas.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Although the Constitution provides for
freedom of religion, until recently only Islam, Christianity, and
Judaism were tolerated in practice; however, in 1996 a small foreign
Hindu community received the right to perform cremations and to hold
services. Other foreign communities enjoy similar religious privileges.
However, Baha'is face restrictions on the practice of their faith.
Islam is the official religion. Ninety-nine percent of citizens are
Sunni Muslims, and the King bears the title ``Commander of the
Faithful.'' The Jewish community of approximately 5,000 practices its
faith freely and openly, as does the somewhat larger foreign Christian
(Catholic and Protestant) community. The Baha'i community of 350 to 400
persons has been forbidden to meet or participate in communal
activities since 1983.
The Government does not license or approve religions or religious
organizations. The Government provides tax benefits, land and building
grants, subsidies, and customs exemptions for imports necessary for the
observance of the major religions.
Islamic law and tradition call for strict punishment for any Muslim
who converts to another faith. Citizens who convert toChristianity and
other religions sometimes face social ostracism, and in the past a
small number have faced short periods of questioning by the
authorities. Although voluntary conversion is not a crime under the
Criminal or Civil Codes, it remains a crime under religious law, and
few citizens make such a distinction. Any attempt to induce a Muslim to
convert is illegal. Foreign missionaries either limit their
proselytizing to non-Muslims or conduct their work quietly. The
Government cited the Penal Code prohibition on employing inducements in
order to ``shake the faith'' of a Muslim or to convert him to another
religion in most cases in which courts expel foreign missionaries.
There were no confirmed reports during the year of cases of
foreigners being denied entry into the country at the port of Tangier
because they were carrying Christian materials. There were no confirmed
reports that Christians were arrested or expelled for proselytizing or
displaying non-Muslim religious items during the year, as occurred in
1998.
The Ministry of Islamic Affairs monitors Friday mosque sermons and
the Koranic schools to ensure the teaching of approved doctrine. The
authorities sometimes suppress the activities of Islamists, but
generally tolerate activities limited to the propagation of Islam,
education, and charity. Security forces commonly close mosques to the
public shortly after Friday services to prevent the use of the premises
for unauthorized political activity. The Government strictly controls
authorization to construct new mosques. Most mosques are constructed
using private funds.
The Government provides funds for the teaching of Islam in public
schools, and also provides funds for religious instruction to the
parallel system of Jewish public schools. The Government has funded
several efforts to study the cultural, artistic, literary and
scientific heritage of Moroccan Jews. In May King Hassan II organized
the first meeting of the ``World Union of Moroccan Jews'' in Marrakech.
Since the time of the French protectorate (1912-1956), a small
foreign Christian community has opened churches, orphanages, hospitals,
and schools without any restriction or licensing requirement being
imposed. Missionaries who conduct themselves in accordance with
societal expectations largely are left unhindered. Those whose
proselytizing activities become public face expulsion.
In January a court in Fes convicted 11 men of violating the Penal
Code provision that forbids eating or drinking in public during the
Ramadan fast. The court levied small fines against the men, who
publicly broke their fast the day before the Eid holiday. They did so
to acknowledge publicly only Mecca's (as opposed to the Government's)
authority in ending the fast.
The Government permits the display and sale of Bibles in French,
English, and Spanish, but confiscates Arabic-language Bibles and
refuses licenses for their importation and sale, despite the absence of
any law banning such books. Nevertheless, Arabic Bibles reportedly have
been seen for sale in local bookstores.
There were no reports during the year that the Government summoned
members of the Baha'i Faith for questioning or denied them passports,
as had occurred in previous years.
There are two sets of laws and courts--one for Jews and one for
Muslims--pertaining to marriage, inheritance, and family matters. The
family law courts are run, depending on the law that applies, by
rabbinical and Islamic authorities who are court officials. Parliament
must authorize any changes to those laws. Non-Koranic sections of
Muslim law on personal status are applied to non-Muslim and non-Jewish
persons.
Islamist dissident Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine has remained under
house arrest in Sale since 1989 for refusing to acknowledge the
religious authority of the King (see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and 2.d.). In
October 1998, the Government of Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssouffi
stated that it intended to end Yassine's detention, and an appeal of
Yassine's detention was expected to be heard before the Supreme Court.
In April the Minister of Housing (and number two official in the Prime
Minister's governing party) declared that Yassine's detention could not
continue; however, the Government did not release Yassine from house
arrest by year's end.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement; however, the Government restricts this right in certain
areas. The gendarmerie maintains checkpoints throughout the country, at
which drivers' licenses and vehicle registrations are verified for
validity. Although checkpoints have been maintained in thesame places
for years, the degree of inspections of motorists has relaxed, while
the emphasis on inspecting trucks and buses continues. In addition
while there are continuing allegations that gendarmes demand small
bribes to clear vehicles, press reports indicate that gendarmes found
guilty of such behavior are punished. In October 1998, the Gendarmerie
Royale announced a campaign to combat such abuses within its ranks. On
February 10, a court in Tangier sentenced two gendarmes to 1-year
prison terms for corruption, complicity in smuggling, and aggravated
assault. In the Moroccan-administered Western Sahara, movement is
restricted in areas regarded as militarily sensitive.
The Ministry of Interior restricts freedom to travel outside the
country in certain circumstances. The OMDH and AMDH have compiled lists
of individuals who reportedly have been denied passports or who have
passports but are denied permission to travel. The OMDH lists 20
persons, including Mostapha Farissi, a former political detainee. The
AMDH's list includes 70 persons, many of whom are Islamists. In
addition all civil servants and military personnel must obtain written
permission from their ministries to leave the country. The spiritual
leader of the Islamist JCO, Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine, has remained
under house arrest in Sale since 1989 for refusing to acknowledge the
religious authority of the monarchy (see Sections 1.d., 2.a., and
2.c.).
Moroccans may not renounce their citizenship, but the King retains
the power--rarely used--to revoke it. Tens of thousands of Moroccans
hold more than one citizenship and travel on passports from two or more
countries. While in Morocco, they are regarded as Moroccan citizens.
Dual nationals sometimes complain of harassment by immigration
inspectors.
The Government welcomes voluntary repatriation of Jews who have
emigrated. Moroccan Jewish emigres, including those with Israeli
citizenship, freely visit Morocco. The Government also encourages the
return of Sahrawis who have departed Morocco due to the conflict in the
Western Sahara, provided that they recognize the Government's claim to
the region. The Government does not permit Saharan nationalists who
have been released from prison to live in the disputed territory.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. While Morocco has from time to time provided political asylum
to individuals, the issue of first asylum has never arisen. There were
no reports of forced expulsion of persons with a valid claim to refugee
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change their Government
Constitutional provisions establishing periodic free elections
notwithstanding, citizens do not have the full right to change their
government. The King, as head of state, appoints the Prime Minister,
who is the titular head of government. Constitutional changes in 1992,
retained in the Constitution of 1996, authorize the Prime Minister to
nominate all government ministers, but the King has the power to
replace any minister at will. The Parliament has the theoretical
ability to effect change in the system of government. However, the
Constitution may not be changed without the King's approval. The
Ministry of Interior appoints the provincial governors and local caids
(district administrative officials). Municipal and regional councils
are elected.
The Government of Prime Minister Abderrahmane Youssoufi is the
first government formed from the political opposition since the late
1950's, and his appointment by King Hassan marked a significant step
toward increased democratization. With the support of the monarchy,
Youssoufi, who was sentenced to death in absentia in the 1970's but
subsequently received a royal pardon in 1980, has declared his
intention to modernize the administrative and judicial structures and
to liberalize the economic and political system. Of the 41 cabinet-
level posts in the new Government, only 4 posts were filled by
holdovers from the former Government (Interior, Foreign Affairs,
Justice, and Islamic Affairs), plus the Secretary General of the
Government and the Minister-Delegate for Defense Administration. In
November the King replaced one of the four holdovers, Interior Minister
Driss Basri. In order to develop reforms, the King granted cabinet
ministers a greater degree of responsibility for the management of
their individual portfolios.
Morocco created a bicameral legislature in 1997. Fourteen parties
have members in Parliament, and seven are represented in the governing
coalition. While opposition parties urged in 1996 and 1997 that all
members of Parliament be elected directly by the citizenry, King Hassan
II proposed in 1996 the creation of a bicameral legislature, whereby
all members of the lower chamber would be elected directly by the
citizenry and all members ofthe second chamber indirectly selected by
popularly elected regional, municipal, and professional councils.
In June 1997, Morocco held municipal council elections, followed by
balloting for regional professional councils. In the wake of the June
1997 elections, political parties accused each other of manipulation
and vote-buying, and claimed government intervention on behalf of
candidates. The Election Commission examined numerous petitions during
the course of the electoral season in 1997 and recommended the reversal
of over 60 municipal election results, including in Tangier, Khoribga,
and Oujda, noted irregularities in four parliamentary races in
Casablanca, Chefchaouen, and Fes, and called for the results to be set
aside. The OMDH criticized the prominent role of the Interior Ministry
in the June 1997 elections, as well as the numerous allegations of
vote-buying, both by the Government and political parties, electoral
list manipulation by the Government, and electoral card falsification.
In August 1997, King Hassan II convoked a special session of
Parliament to ratify two laws creating a bicameral assembly, and, in
the same month, Parliament unanimously approved these laws, which
created a 325-seat lower house to be filled by direct elections, and a
270-seat upper house whose members would be elected by various directly
elected professional and regional councils. There were widespread,
credible allegations of vote-buying and government manipulation in the
November 1997 legislative elections. The fraud and government pressure
tactics led most independent observers to conclude that the election
results were heavily influenced, if not predetermined, by the
Government. All opposition parties criticized the Government, and some
called for a boycott of Parliament. Two winners renounced their seats,
alleging unsolicited government interference on their behalf. The
Election Commission concurred that irregularities had occurred in two
Casablanca cases and recommended that new elections be held in those
districts; however, new elections were never scheduled. The Commission
also examined other complaints and recommended new elections in
Chefchaouen and Fes, which took place in 1998.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. There are 2
female secretaries of state in the 41-member Cabinet. There are 2 women
among the 325 members of Parliament's Chamber of Deputies and 2 women
in the 270-seat Chamber of Counselors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are three officially-recognized nongovernmental human rights
groups: The Moroccan Human Rights Organization, the Moroccan League for
the Defense of Human Rights, and the Moroccan Human Rights Association.
A fourth group, the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights (CDDH),
was formed in 1992 by former AMDH members. The Government maintains
close and collaborative relations with all of these groups.
A new NGO, the National Observatory of Moroccan Prisons (ONPM), was
formed in November for the purpose of improving treatment of prisoners.
Created by lawyers, doctors, journalists, former inmates and
entertainment personalities, the ONPM's specific goals are to
facilitate the improvement of living conditions within prisons and to
support penal reform efforts. The ONPM is attempting to enforce the
minimum daily dietary allotment that it claims prisons repeatedly
disregard.
Amnesty International has local chapters in Rabat, Casablanca, and
Marrakech. These chapters participate in AI international letter
campaigns outside Morocco. The Government hosted a visit by AI
secretary general Pierre Sane in June, during which Sane met with
senior government officials and announced that AI would open a regional
office in Morocco and would hold its International Congress in
Marrakech in August. However, in June articles in the French and
Moroccan press asserted that the Government had changed its stance on
hosting the conference, allegedly because of fears that AI delegates
would organize protests in Rabat against the human rights situation in
the Western Sahara.
Prime Minister Youssoufi chairs a human rights commission that
reviews cases of past and present human rights issues. The commission
is composed of members of the Government, including the Ministers of
Justice, Human Rights, and Interior.
The Royal Consultative Council on Human Rights, an advisory body to
the King, counsels the palace on human rights issues, and was the
organization charged by the King to resolve cases related to persons
who had disappeared. The CCDH announced on January 27 that it would
create five working groups to promote the protection of human rights.
They included groups on penal law; prison conditions; communications
with human rights NGO's;inhuman conditions of refugees in Polisario-
controlled camps in Tindouf, Algeria; and economic, social, and
cultural rights.
Human rights Minister Mohammed Aujjar announced in March that it
was the Government's priority to ensure that local laws, particularly
the Code for Public Liberties, be harmonized with the country's
international obligations ``in conformity with the precepts of Islam.''
Aujjar added that the Government's legal reforms to bolster the
freedoms of citizens would take place according to a ``5-year plan.''
For example, the 1935 law permitting the imprisonment of defaulters to
settle their debts to public entities would be annulled.
In April in Casablanca, the Government hosted an international
conference on human rights in the Arab world. The conference, which
included human rights NGO's from throughout the Arab world, examined
the status of human rights in the Arab world and reaffirmed the
universality of human rights principles. The Prime Minister addressed
the gathering and reiterated the Government's commitment to human
rights reforms.
The U.N. Education and Science Council (UNESCO) organized a
conference in February in Rabat on human rights education in the Arab
world. Participants assessed ways to introduce human rights into school
curricula in Arab nations and exchanged ideas on spreading the concept
of human rights education throughout the Arab world. Several government
ministers took part in the proceedings.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Although the Constitution states that all citizens are equal, non-
Muslims and women face discrimination in the law and traditional
practice.
Women.--Spousal violence is common. Although a battered wife has
the right to complain to the police, as a practical matter, she would
do so only if prepared to bring criminal charges. While physical abuse
is a legal ground for divorce, a court only grants it if the woman is
able to provide two witnesses to the abuse. Even medical certificates
are not sufficient. If the court finds against the woman, she is
returned to her husband's home. Consequently, few women report abuses
to the authorities.
The Criminal Code provides for severe punishment for men convicted
of rape or sexually assaulting a woman or a girl. The defendants in
such cases bear the burden of proving their innocence. However, sexual
assaults often go unreported because of the stigma attached to the loss
of virginity. While not provided for by law, victim's families may
offer rapists the opportunity to marry their victims in order to
preserve the honor of the family. The law is more lenient toward men
with respect to crimes committed against their wives; for example, a
light sentence may be accorded a man who murders his wife after
catching her in the act of adultery.
Women suffer various forms of legal and cultural discrimination.
The civil law status of women is governed by the Moudouwana, or Code of
Personal Status, which is based on the Malikite school of Islamic law.
Although the Moudouwana was reformed in 1993, women's groups still
complain of unequal treatment, particularly under the laws governing
marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
In order to marry, a woman generally is required to obtain the
permission of her ``tuteur,'' or legal guardian, usually her father.
Only in unusual circumstances may she act as her own ``tuteur.''
It is far easier for a man to divorce his wife than for a woman to
divorce her husband. Under Islamic law and tradition, rather than
asking for a divorce, a man simply may repudiate his wife outside of
court. Under the 1993 reforms to the Moudouwana, a woman's presence in
court is required in order for her husband to divorce her, although
women's groups report that this law frequently is ignored. However,
human rights activists reported that, in a recent NGO-sponsored test,
officials refused to order a divorce without the wife being present,
despite offers of bribes. Nevertheless, women's groups complain that
men resort to ruses to evade the new legal restrictions. The divorce
may be finalized even over the woman's objections, although in such
cases the court grants her unspecified allowance rights.
A woman seeking a divorce has few practical alternatives. She may
offer her husband money to agree to a divorce (known as a khol'a
divorce). The husband must agree to the divorce and is allowed to
specify the amount to be paid, without limit. According to women's
groups, many men pressure their wives to pursue this kind of divorce. A
woman also may file for a judicial divorce if her husband takes a
second wife, if heabandons her, or if he physically abuses her.
However, divorce procedures in these cases are lengthy and complicated.
In November 1998 the Minister of Islamic Affairs proposed the
institutionalization of additions to the basic marriage contract that
would outline the rights and duties agreed upon between husband and
wife, and permit legal recourse for the enforcement of the contract.
Under the Criminal Code, women generally are accorded the same
treatment as men, but this is not the case for family and estate law,
which is based on the Moudouwana. Under the Moudouwana, women inherit
only half as much as male heirs. Moreover, even where the law provides
for equal status, cultural norms often prevent a woman from exercising
those rights. For example, when a woman inherits property, male
relatives may pressure her to relinquish her interest.
While many well-educated women pursue careers in law, medicine,
education, and government service, few make it to the top echelons of
their professions. Women constitute approximately 35 percent of the
work force, with the majority in the industrial, service, and teaching
sectors. The Government reports that the illiteracy rate for women is
67 percent (and 89 percent in rural areas), compared with 41 percent
for men. Women in rural areas suffer the most from inequality. Rural
women perform most difficult physical labor, and the literacy rate in
the countryside is significantly lower for women than for men. Girls
are much less likely to be sent to school than are boys, especially in
rural areas where the quality of schooling is inferior to urban areas,
and demands on girls' time for household chores often prevent school
attendance. However, women who do earn secondary school diplomas have
equal access to university education.
According to a 1997 government survey, 76 NGO's work to advance
women's rights and to promote women's issues. Among these are the
Democratic Association of Moroccan Women, the Union for Women's Action,
and the Moroccan Association for Women's Rights, which advocate
enhanced political and civil rights, as well as numerous NGO's that
provide shelters for battered women, teach women basic hygiene, family
planning, and child care, and educate illiterate women.
Children.--The law provides for compulsory education for children
between the ages of 7 and 13; however, not all children between these
ages attend school due to family decisions and shortfalls in government
resources, and the Government does not enforce the law. The Government
conducts an annual campaign to vaccinate children against childhood
diseases.
The Government has had difficulty addressing the problem of child
labor (see Section 6.d.). Young girls in particular are exploited as
domestic servants. Teenage prostitution in urban centers has been
estimated in the tens of thousands by NGO activists. The clientelle
comprises both foreign tourists and Moroccans. More young girls than
boys are involved; however, young boys also work as prostitutes (see
Section 6.f.). The practice of adoptive servitude, in which families
adopt young rural girls and use them as domestic servants in their
homes, is prevalent. Credible reports of physical and psychological
abuse in such circumstances are widespread. Some orphanages have been
charged as knowing accomplices in this practice; however, more often
parents of rural girls ``contract'' their daughters to wealthier urban
families and collect the salaries for their work as maids. Adoptive
servitude is accepted socially, has only recently begun to attract
public criticism, and is unregulated by the Government.
Another problem facing orphans of both sexes is their lack of civil
status. In general men are registered at local government offices;
their wives and unmarried children are included in this registration,
which confers civil status. Civil status is necessary to obtain a birth
certificate, passport, or marriage license. If a father does not
register his child, the child is without civil status and the benefits
of citizenship. It is possible for an individual to self-register;
however, the process is long and cumbersome. While any child,
regardless of parentage, may be registered within a month of birth, a
court order is required if registration does not take place in that
time. Abandoned children sometimes receive kafala (state-sponsored
care).
Several NGO's, including the Bayti Association and the Moroccan
League for the Protection of Children, work to improve legal protection
for children and to help at-risk children. There are several shelters
in the major cities that provide food and lodging for street children,
while other NGO's work to reduce the exploitation of street children
and to cure those street children with drug addictions.
People with Disabilities.--A high incidence of disabling disease,
especially polio, has resulted in a correspondingly high incidence of
disabled persons. While the Ministry of Social Affairs endeavors to
integrate the disabled into society, in practice this is left largely
to private charities. However, even nonprofit special education
programs are priced beyond the reach of most families. Typically,
disabled persons are supported by their families; some survive by
begging. The Government continued a pilot training program for the
blind sponsored in part by a member of the royal family. There are no
laws mandating physical changes to buildings to facilitate access by
the disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Constitution affirms, and
the Government respects, the legal equality of all citizens. The
official language is Arabic. Both French and Arabic are used in the
news media and educational institutions. Science and technical courses
are taught in French, thereby precluding the large, monolingual-Arabic-
speaking population from participation in these programs. Educational
reforms in the past decade have stressed the use of Arabic in secondary
schools. Failure to transform the university system similarly
effectively has disqualified many students from higher education in
lucrative fields. This especially is true among the poor, for whom
French training is not always affordable.
Some 60 percent of the population claim Amazigh (Berber) heritage.
Amazigh cultural groups contend that Amazigh traditions and the Amazigh
language (which consists of three dialects) are rapidly being lost.
Their repeated requests to King Hassan II to permit the teaching of
Amazigh languages in the schools led to a 1995 royal speech authorizing
the necessary curriculum changes; however, such changes have not yet
been implemented. Official media broadcast in the Amazigh language for
limited periods each day.
In 1996 a number of Amazigh associations issued a communique
petitioning the Government to recognize their language as an official
language and to acknowledge their culture as a part of Moroccan
society. These associations claimed that the Government refuses to
register births for children with traditional Amazigh names,
discourages the public display of the Amazigh alphabet, limits the
activities of Amazigh associations, and continues to Arabize the names
of towns, villages, and geographic landmarks. The Government thus far
has made no response to the petition, although Prime Minister Youssoufi
acknowledged Amazigh culture as an integral part of Moroccan identity
in a speech before Parliament in April 1998. A full page of a major
national newspaper is devoted on a monthly basis to articles and poems
on Amazigh culture, which are printed in the Amazigh language, although
with Latin script.
On January 29, for the first time ever, the Moroccan Association
for Research and Cultural Exchanges (AMREC), the first Amazigh
association founded in Morocco (in 1967), held its first public
congress. According to the PPS party daily Bayane Al-Youm, AMREC
previously was never able to hold its congress in public. In late
January, Minister of Communication Larbi Messari announced that the
Government would dedicate more hours of television and radio
broadcasting time to news and programming in the Amazigh languages,
which he recognized as part of the ``national heritage.'' In July in
Nador, the Minister of Territorial Management (and number three
official in the ruling USFP party) attended a conference on education
in the Amazigh language. At the meeting, he underlined the necessity to
begin a serious dialog on Amazigh identity, to expand studies of
Amazigh language and culture, and to encourage civil society efforts to
promote Amazigh identity. A professor in Casablanca backed down from
plans to publish a Koran in the Amazigh language due to societal
opposition.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Although workers are free to
establish and join trade unions, the unions themselves are not
completely free from government interference. Perhaps half a million of
the country's 9 million workers are unionized in 17 trade union
federations. Three federations dominate the labor scene: The Union
Marocaine du Travail (UMT), the Confederation Democratique du Travail
(CDT), and the Union Generale des Travailleurs Marocains (UGTM). The
UMT has no political party affiliation. The CDT is affiliated with the
ruling Socialist Union of Popular Forces of Prime Minister Youssoufi,
and the UGTM with the Istiqlal party. It is widely believed that the
Ministry of Interior has informants within the unions who monitor union
activities and the election of officers. Sometimes union officers are
subject to governmentpressure. Union leadership does not always uphold
the rights of members to select their own leaders. There has been no
case of the rank and file voting out its current leadership and
replacing it with another.
Workers have the right to strike and do so. Work stoppages normally
are intended to advertise grievances and last 24 to 72 hours or less.
There were a number of narrowly focused work stoppages during the year.
A strike by Agadir coastal fisherman in the fall, in which they
demanded higher wages and social security benefits, resulted in the
trial and imprisonment for 1 year of the union's secretary general and
three other members. An appellate court upheld the ruling (see Section
1.e.). In September striking workers, including women, were jailed
following a strike, during which property was destroyed, at an egg farm
south of Rabat (see Sections 1.e. and 2.b.).
Unions may sue to have labor laws enforced, and employers may sue
unions when they believe that unions have overstepped their authority.
Unions belong to regional labor organizations and maintain ties
with international trade union secretariats. The UMT is a member of the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is implied in the constitutional
provisions on the right to strike and the right to join organizations.
Trade union federations compete among themselves to organize workers.
Any group of eight workers may organize a union and a worker may change
union affiliation easily. A work site may contain several independent
locals or locals affiliated with more than one labor federation.
In general the Government ensures the observance of labor laws in
larger companies and in the public sector. In the informal economy,
such as in the family workshops-dominated handicrafts sector, employers
routinely ignore labor laws and regulations, and government inspectors
lack the resources to monitor violations effectively.
The laws governing collective bargaining are inadequate. Collective
bargaining has been a longstanding tradition in some parts of the
economy, such as the industrial sector, and is becoming more prevalent
in the service sector, including banking, health, and the civil
service. The wages and conditions of employment of unionized workers
generally are set in discussions between employer and worker
representatives. However, wages for the vast majority of workers are
set unilaterally by employers.
Employers wishing to dismiss workers are required by law to notify
the provincial governor through the labor inspector's office. In cases
where employers plan to replace dismissed workers, a government labor
inspector provides replacements and mediates the cases of workers who
protest their dismissal. Any worker who is dismissed for committing a
serious infraction of work rules is entitled by law to a court hearing.
There is no law specifically prohibiting antiunion discrimination.
Employers commonly dismiss workers for union activities that are
regarded as threatening to employer interests. The courts have the
authority to reinstate such workers, but are unable to enforce rulings
that compel employers to pay damages and back pay. Ministry of Labor
inspectors serve as investigators and conciliators in labor disputes,
but they are few in number and do not have the resources to investigate
all cases. Unions have resorted increasingly to litigation to resolve
labor disputes.
Labor law reform is such a controversial issue that a draft revised
labor code has remained under discussion in parliamentary committee for
numerous years.
Labor law applies equally to the small Tangier export zone. The
proportion of unionized workers in the export zone is about the same as
in the rest of the economy, roughly 5 percent.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by royal decree, and when authorities become aware
of instances of forced labor, courts enforce the decree; however, in
practice the Government lacks the resources to inspect all places of
employment to ensure that forced labor is not being used, and the
practice persists.
The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children, but
does not enforce this prohibition effectively. The practice of adoptive
servitude, in which families adopt young girls and use them as
indentured domestic servants, is socially accepted,and the Government
does not regulate it. Credible reports of physical abuse in such cases
are widespread (see Sections 5, 6.d., and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Abuse of the child labor laws is common. The law prohibits
the employment of any child under 12 years of age. Education is
compulsory for children between the ages of 7 and 13 years, although
not all children attend school. Special regulations cover the
employment of children between the ages of 12 and 16. In practice
children often are apprenticed before age 12, particularly in the
informal handicraft industry. The use of minors is common in the small
family-run workshops that produce rugs, ceramics, wood work, and
leather goods. Children, particularly rural girls, also are employed
informally as domestics and usually receive little or no wages. Safety
and health conditions, as well as wages in businesses that employ
children often are substandard. The law prohibits forced or bonded
labor by children; however, the Government does not enforce the law
effectively (see Section 6.c.). The practice of adoptive servitude is
often characterized by physical abuse (see Sections 5, 6.c., and 6.f.).
The Ministry of Education, in cooperation with the Ministry of Health
and with the support of UNICEF, is pursuing a strategy to ensure basic
education and health services for child workers.
Ministry of Labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing child
labor regulations, which generally are well observed in the
industrialized, unionized sector of the economy. However, the
inspectors are not authorized to monitor the conditions of domestic
servants. The Government maintains that the informal handicrafts sector
is difficult to monitor.
The Government lacks the resources to enforce laws against child
labor, and there is general acceptance of the presumption that, to
properly learn traditional handicraft skills, it is necessary for
children to start working at a young age. In addition many citizens
claim that having children working to learn a craft is better than
having them live on the streets, where they sometimes turn to juvenile
delinquency, including prostitution and substance abuse.
In July 1997, the Government announced a new voluntary labeling
system for carpet exports to certify that no child labor was involved
in production. The system is cosponsored by German rug importers.
However, the Government does not monitor nonparticipating handicraft
producers that violate child labor laws.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The June 1996 general strike led
to negotiations among the Government, the Manufacturers' Association,
and the labor confederations over increasing the minimum wage and
improving health benefits, social benefits, and housing. In August
1996, all three parties agreed to a 10 percent increase in the minimum
wage retroactive to July 1, raising it to approximately $180 (1,800
dirhams) per month in the industrialized sector and to approximately $9
(90 dirhams) per day for agricultural workers. Neither figure provides
a decent standard of living for a worker and family, even with
government subsidies for food, diesel fuel, and public transportation.
Unions continue to appeal unsuccessfully for a minimum wage of
approximately $210 (2,100 dirhams). In many cases, several family
members combine their income to support the family. Most workers in the
industrial sector earn more than the minimum wage. They generally are
paid between 13 and 16 months' salary, including bonuses, each year.
The minimum wage is not enforced effectively in the informal and
handicraft sectors, and even the Government pays less than the minimum
wage to workers at the lowest civil service grades (approximately 8
percent of government workers), although benefits are more generous,
and include transportation, food and housing subsidies, free vacations,
and other nonmonetary remuneration. To increase employment
opportunities for recent graduates, the Government allows firms to hire
them for a limited period through a subsidized program at less than the
minimum wage.
The law provides for a 48-hour maximum workweek with no more than
10 hours worked in any single day, premium pay for overtime, paid
public and annual holidays, and minimum conditions for health and
safety, including a prohibition on night work for women and minors. As
with other labor regulations and laws, these are not observed
universally.
Occupational health and safety standards are rudimentary, except
for a prohibition on the employment of women in certain dangerous
occupations. Labor inspectors attempt to monitor working conditions and
accidents, but lack sufficient resources.
While workers in principle have the right to remove themselves from
work situations that endanger health and safety without jeopardizing
their continued employment, there were no reports of any instances in
which a worker attempted to exercise this right.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; under the Penal Code, perpetrators are
prosecuted either as scam artists, corrupters of minors, or persons who
force others into prostitution.
Forced prostitution is prevalent, particularly in cities with large
numbers of tourists, as well as near towns with large military
installations. In 1998 a case was reported in which a girl allegedly
had been imprisoned for 5 years in a brothel in Hajeb until she escaped
at age 19.
Forced prostitution involving Moroccans also occurs abroad. Early
in the year, a Moroccan woman who had been recruited to be a domestic
servant in Saudi Arabia, escaped a prostitution ring there and informed
police, which led to the arrest of her Moroccan handlers, an extended
family group numbering about 40 persons. This same group of Moroccans
had been involved in organizing similar such activities throughout the
Persian Gulf region.
Teenage prostitution in urban centers has been estimated in the
tens of thousands by NGO activists. The clientelle comprises both
foreign tourists and Moroccans. More young girls than boys are
involved; however, young boys also work as prostitutes (see Section 5).
The practice of adoptive servitude, in which families adopt young
girls and use them as indentured servants, is prevalent and accepted
socially, and the Government does not regulate it. Reports of physical
and psychological abuse in such cases are widespread; reports of sexual
abuse are less frequent. Some orphanages have been charges as knowing
accomplices in this practice; however, more often, parents of rural
girls ``contract'' their daughters to wealthier urban families and
collect their salaries as maids (see Sections 5 and 6.d.).
______
WESTERN SAHARA
The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a
dispute between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario Front, an
organization seeking independence for the region. The Moroccan
Government sent troops and settlers into the northern two-thirds of the
Western Sahara after Spain withdrew from the area in 1975 and extended
its administration over the southern province of Oued Ed Dahab after
Mauritania renounced its claim in 1979. The Moroccan Government has
undertaken a sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara
as part of its long-term efforts to strengthen Moroccan claims to the
territory.
Since 1973 the Polisario Front has challenged the claims of Spain,
Mauritania, and Morocco to the territory. Moroccan and Polisario forces
fought intermittently from 1975 until the 1991 ceasefire and deployment
to the area of a U.N. peacekeeping contingent, known by its French
initials, MINURSO.
In 1975 the International Court of Justice issued an advisory
opinion on the status of the Western Sahara. The Court held that while
some of the region's tribes had historical ties to Morocco, the ties
were insufficient to establish ``any tie of territorial sovereignty''
between the Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco. The Court added
that it had not found ``legal ties'' that might affect the applicable
U.N. General Assembly resolution regarding the decolonization of the
territory, and, in particular, the principle of self-determination for
its people. Most Sahrawis (as most persons living in the territory are
called) live in the area controlled by Morocco, but there is a sizable
refugee population near the border with Morocco, in Algeria, and, to a
lesser extent, in Mauritania. The bulk of the Sahrawi population lives
within the area delineated by a Moroccan-constructed berm, which
encloses most of the territory.
Efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to resolve the
sovereignty question collapsed in 1984 when the OAU recognized the
Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, the civilian arm of the Polisario
Front. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest.
In 1988 Morocco and the Polisario Front accepted the U.N. plan for
a referendum that would allow the Sahrawis to decide between
integration with Morocco or independence for the territory. The
referendum was scheduled for January 1992, but was postponed because
the parties were unable to agree on a common list of eligible voters--
despite the previous acceptance by both parties of an updated version
of the Spanish census of 1974 as the base for voter eligibility. A
complicated formula for determining voter eligibility ultimately was
devised, and in August 1994, MINURSO personnel began to hold
identification sessions for voter applicants.
The initial U.N voter identification effort ended in December 1995
and, after several fruitless efforts to persuade the two parties to
cooperate, the U.N. Security Council formally suspended the
identification process in 1996. The United Nations and friendly
governments continued to urge the two parties to seek a political
solution to the conflict. In March 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi
Annan appointed former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker as his
personal envoy to examine possible approaches for a peaceful
settlement. Baker visited the region, and negotiations between the
Moroccan Government and the Polisario began in May 1997. In September
1997, representatives of Morocco and the Polisario met in Houston in
the United States and consented to a series of compromise agreements on
the 1991 U.N. settlement plan to hold a referendum under U.N. auspices.
According to the Houston Accords, the identification of potential
voters, the referendum campaign, and the vote were to take place by
December 1998; however, operational considerations have now delayed the
scheduled referendum until July 2000.
In August 1998, MINURSO completed identification of voters in all
uncontested tribal groupings. In November 1998, the U.N. Secretary
General visited the region to examine ways of achieving compromise on
several contested elements of the settlement plan in order to move the
referendum process forward. After his consultations, the Secretary
General proposed a series of measures in December 1998 to both parties.
The measures proposed were aimed at establishing procedures among the
parties to allow MINURSO to begin the identification process of three
``contested tribes.'' After agreement between the parties was reached
on the contested tribes, MINURSO began the identification process of an
additional 65,000 potential voters. The identification process of the
three contested tribes was completed in December. Only 4 percent of the
applicants in this phase of the identification process were deemed
eligible to vote in the referendum. Roughly 80,000 appeals also have
been registered by those who were deemed ineligible to vote after the
first round of the identification process. MINURSO had not yet begun to
adjudicate these appeals by year's end. Further appeals are expected
following the completion of the identification process for the
contested tribes.
Since 1977 the Saharan provinces of Layounne, Smara, and Boujdour
have participated in local elections that are organized and controlled
by the Moroccan Government. The southern province of Oued Ed Dahab has
participated in Moroccan- controlled elections since 1983. Sahrawis
whose political views are aligned with the Moroccan Government fill all
the seats allotted to the Western Sahara in the Moroccan Parliament.
The civilian population living in the Western Sahara under Moroccan
administration is subject to Moroccan law. U.N. observers and foreign
human rights groups maintain that Sahrawis have difficulty obtaining
Moroccan passports, that the Government monitors the political views of
Sahrawis more closely than those of Moroccan citizens, and that the
police and paramilitary authorities react especially harshly against
those suspected of supporting independence and the Polisario Front. The
Moroccan Government limits access to the territory, and international
human rights organizations and impartial journalists sometimes have
experienced difficulty in securing admission. After years of denying
that Sahrawis were imprisoned in Morocco for Polisario-related military
or political activity, the Government of Morocco released 300 such
prisoners in 1991. Entire families and Sahrawis who had disappeared in
the mid-1970's were among those released. The Government of Morocco has
failed to conduct a public inquiry or to explain how and why those
released spent up to 16 years in incommunicado detention without charge
or trial.
The former Sahrawi detainees have formed an informal association
whose principal objective is to seek redress and compensation from the
Government of Morocco for their detention. A delegation of this
association met with various government officials, human rights
organizations, members of the press, and diplomatic representatives in
both Rabat and in Layounne during the year. They report that some
progress has been made in gaining government recognition of their
grievances.
In Laayoune in late September, and, to a lesser extent, in late
October, there was a series of peaceful public protests, sit-ins and
demonstrations by groups of miners, students, unemployed graduates, and
former Sahrawi prisoners who were seeking government redress regarding
a variety of social issues ranging from subsidized transportation for
the students to miners' demands for enforcement of a contract dispute
with the government-owned phosphate company. The police used excessive
violence to break up these protests. The police also encouraged gangs
of local thugs to break into and vandalize the homes and places of
business of some the city's Sahrawi residents. The police detained
roughly 150 persons in connection with the demonstrations. Most were
released within 2 weeks. However, 54 persons eventually were charged
with various criminal offenses, and 46 eventually were sentenced to
prison terms ranging from 2 months to 15 years. The Moroccan
Organization for Human Rights (OMDH) released a report criticizing the
violent police action and the judicial process, which resulted in
prison terms for the 46 persons. Attorneys representing the 46
convicted persons on appeal state that in no case did the prosecutors
produce eyewitness testimony against any of the persons charged. The
only evidence presented by the prosecutors was the police report of the
arresting officers. The attorneys also state that in no case did the
police make an arrest on the basis of a legitimate warrant. Searches
also were conducted, sometimes in the middle of the night, without
warrants. Some persons whose homes were searched were also beaten by
police who came to arrest other members of the household. No official
investigation was made into the police's conduct, and no police
authorities were charged with any criminal or civil wrongdoing by
year's end.
After the first round of protests in late September, Morocco's new
King, Mohammed VI, announced that he would revitalize the Royal Council
on Saharan Affairs and ordered the Prime Minister to organize an
election to select local representatives to the Council. The King also
relieved of their duties the powerful governor of the territory and the
chief of police. Following the second round of protests in late October
and other events in Morocco itself, the King dismissed the country's
powerful Interior Minister, Driss Basri, whom many Moroccan observers
held responsible for the policy of overly strict governance in the
territory that helped create the tensions and grievances that
eventually led to the demonstrations in Layounne. The Government began
to respond to the King's initiatives, and several ministerial
delegations were sent to Layounne in October and November to assess the
measures required to restore calm and build confidence between the
authorities and the local population.
A number of other Sahrawis remain imprisoned for peaceful protests
supporting Saharan independence. There are credible reports that 10
Sahrawis were arrested, beaten, and kept in seclusion by Moroccan
authorities in May 1996 following demonstrations in several cities of
the Western Sahara in support of Sahrawi independence. These 10
demonstrators reportedly were sentenced to terms of imprisonment
ranging from 18 months to 7 years.
Kelthoum El-Ouanat and five other Sahrawis were released in May
1996. El-Ouanat had been sentenced to a 20-year term after being
arrested in October 1992 following a demonstration in Smara. Prior to
her trial, she had been held in secret detention for up to 10 months,
during which time she reportedly was beaten, tortured, and sexually
abused. In June 1995, eight Sahrawi youths, arrested for demonstrating
for Sahrawi independence the previous month, were given 20-year
sentences. Then-King Hassan II later commuted these sentences to 1
year, and the eight were released in July 1996, 14 months after having
been taken into custody. The youths report that the Moroccan police
continue to monitor them closely.
The Polisario Front claims that the Moroccan Government continues
to hold several hundred Sahrawis as political prisoners and
approximately 300 prisoners of war (POW's). The Government of Morocco
formally denies that any Sahrawi noncombatants remain in detention. A
committee that represents former Sahrawi prisoners believes that the
Government of Morocco no longer holds any of those Sahrawis who were
detained illegally during the 1970's and 1980's. The committee based
this determination on interviews with family members of individuals who
had been detained during that period. In October 1996, Morocco released
66 Sahrawi combatants who were flown to the Tindouf area of Algeria
under International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) auspices. They
were accompanied by foreign diplomats. The Government of Morocco claims
that 30,000 Sahrawi refugees are detained against their will by the
Polisario in camps around Tindouf. The Polisario denies this charge.
According to credible reports, the number of refugees in Tindouf far
exceeds 30,000, but the allegation that they wish to leave remains
unsubstantiated.
The ICRC reports that the Polisario now holds approximately 1,900
Moroccan POW's. A group of 185 POW's was repatriated to Morocco in a
humanitarian airlift conducted under ICRC auspices in November 1995. In
April 1997, Polisario leaders offered to release 85 Moroccan POW's as a
good will gesture during U.N. envoy Baker's first meetings in Tindouf,
but Morocco and the Polisario could not agree on the conditions of
their release. The Polisario offered to release 191 POW's in November.
Credible sources indicate that the Government of Morocco is prepared to
accept the return of these prisoners, many of whom have been in
detention for more than 20 years. The U.N. settlement plan calls for
the release of all POW's after the voter identification process is
complete.
There were no new cases of disappearance for the third consecutive
year. While the forced disappearance of individuals who opposed the
Government of Morocco and its policies occurred over several decades,
the Government in 1998 pledged to ensure that such policies do not
recur, and to disclose as much information as possible on past cases.
Many of those who disappeared were Sahrawis or Moroccans who challenged
the Government's claim to the Western Sahara or other government
policies. Many of those who disappeared were held in secret detention
camps. While the Government released about 300 such detainees in June
1991, and in October 1998 issued an announcement on those who had
disappeared, to this day hundreds of Sahrawi and Moroccan families do
not have any information about their missing relatives, many of whom
disappeared over 20 years ago (see Section 2.b. of the Morocco report).
Freedom of movement within the Western Sahara is limited in
militarily sensitive areas, both within the area controlled by the
Government of Morocco and the area controlled by the Polisario. Both
Moroccan and Polisario security forces sometimes subject travelers to
arbitrary questioning. There were no reports of detention for prolonged
periods during the year.
There is little organized labor activity in the Western Sahara. The
same labor laws that apply in Morocco are applied in the Moroccan-
controlled areas of the Western Sahara. Moroccan unions are present in
the Moroccan-controlled Western Sahara but are not active. The 15
percent of the territory outside Moroccan control does not have any
major population centers or economic activity beyond nomadic herding.
The Polisario-sponsored labor union, the Sario Federation of Labor, is
not active in the Western Sahara.
A group of phosphate miners participated in the demonstrations in
Layounne in late September and again in late October. They claim that
the government-owned phosphate company has failed to respect a contract
that had been negotiated between the Government of Morocco and former
Spanish authorities in the territory when Spain withdrew from the
territory and relinquished control of the mines to Morocco. The miners
state that they had a series of meetings with officials of the
government-owned phosphate company since the demonstrations in Layounne
in late September but that no agreement was reached about enforcement
of what they believe to be their contractually protected rights.
There were no strikes, other job actions, or collective bargaining
agreements during the year. Most union members are employees of the
Moroccan Government or state-owned organizations. They are paid 85
percent more than their counterparts outside the Western Sahara as an
inducement to Moroccan citizens to live there. Workers in the Western
Sahara are exempt from income and value-added taxes and receive
subsidies on such commodities as flour, oil, sugar, fuel, and
utilities.
Moroccan law prohibits forced labor, which does not appear to exist
in the Western Sahara.
Regulations on the minimum age of employment are the same as in
Morocco. Child labor appears to be less common than in Morocco,
primarily because of the absence of industries most likely to employ
children, such as rug knotting and garment making. A government work
program for adults, the Promotion Nationale, provides families with
enough income that children need not be hired out as domestic servants.
Children in the few remaining nomadic groups presumably work as
shepherds along with other group members.
The minimum wage and maximum hours of work are the same as in
Morocco. However, in practice workers in some fish processing plants
may work as many as 12 hours per day, 6 days per week, well beyond the
10-hour day, 48-hour week maximum stipulated in Moroccan law.
Occupational health and safety standards are the same as those enforced
in Morocco. They are rudimentary, except for a prohibition on the
employment of women in dangerous occupations.
______
OMAN
The Sultanate of Oman is a monarchy that has been ruled by the Al
Bu Sa'id family since the middle of the 18th century. It has no
political parties or directly elected representative institutions. The
current Sultan, Qaboos Bin Sa'id Al Sa'id, acceded to the throne in
1970. Although the Sultan retains firm control over all important
policy issues, he has brought tribal leaders--even those who took up
arms against his family's rule--as well as other notables into the
Government. In accordance with tradition and cultural norms, much
decisionmaking is by consensus among these leaders. In 1991 the Sultan
established the 59-seat Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-Shura,
which replaced an older advisory body. The Government selects Council
members from lists of nominees proposed by each of the 59 wilayats
(regions). After the first national census in 1993, the Sultan expanded
the membership of the new Council to 80 seats. In 1997 it was expanded
further to 82 seats. The Council has no formal legislative powers but
may question government ministers, even during unrehearsed televised
hearings, and recommend changes to new laws on economic and social
policy, which sometimes leads to amendments to proposed decrees. In
December 1997, the Sultan appointed 41 persons as members of the new
Council of State (Majlis Al-Dawla), which with the current Consultative
Council forms the bicameral body known as the Majlis Oman (Council of
Oman). In late 1996, the Sultan promulgated by decree the country's
``Basic Charter'' (also known as the Basic Law), which provides for
citizens' basic rights in writing for the first time. The courts are
subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence.
The internal and external security apparatus falls under the
authority of the Ministry of Palace Office, which coordinates all
intelligence and security policies. The Internal Security Service
investigates all matters related to internal security. The Royal Oman
Police, whose head also has cabinet status, performs regular police
duties, provides security at airports, serves as the country's
immigration agency, and maintains a small coast guard. There are
credible reports that security forces occasionally abuse detainees.
Since 1970 Oman has used its modest oil revenue to make impressive
economic progress and improve public access to health care, education,
and social services. The economy is mixed, with significant government
participation in industry, transportation, and communications. The
Government seeks to diversify the economy and stimulate private
investment.
The Government continues to restrict or deny important human
rights. Human rights abuses include arbitrary arrest, mistreatment of
detainees, prolonged detention without charge, and the denial of due
process. The Government restricts freedom of expression and association
and does not ensure full rights for workers and women. As a practical
matter, citizens do not have the right to change their government.
The 1996 Basic Charter provides for many basic human rights, such
as an independent judiciary, and freedoms of association, speech, and
the press. The Basic Charter states that the Government was to strive
to issue all enabling laws within 2 years of November 1996. This has
not occurred; only certain laws pertaining to the legal code for family
and interpersonal relationships, to judicial reform, and to aspects of
the Finance Ministry, had been enacted by year's end. It is expected
that the implementation period may extend into 2000, and possibly
beyond. There has been no public statement made by the Government
noting the end of the 2-year period since issuance of the Basic Charter
and proposing a new target date for implementation.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Security forces abuse some detainees, particularly during
interrogation. The abuse does not appear to be systematic and often
varies depending upon the social status of the victim, the official
involved, and the location of the incident (for example, whether the
abuse occurs in a rural or an urban area). Despite reported official
efforts to prevent such abuse, incidents still occur. Security
officials sometimes beat detainees but are often careful to conceal
evidence of abuse by employing such tactics as restricting blows to
less-visible areas of the body. Detainees sometimes are left in
isolation with promises of release or improved treatment as a further
means to elicit confessions or information. Although judges have the
right to order investigations of allegations of mistreatment, there is
no recent evidence that any officer has been punished for abusing
detainees. The 1996 Basic Charter, yet to be implemented in this area,
specifically prohibits ``physical or moral torture'' and stipulates
that all confessions obtained by such methods are to be considered null
and void. There were no reports of torture during the year.
Prison conditions appear to meet minimum international standards.
Access to some prisoners is severely restricted.
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The police may obtain
warrants prior to making arrests but are not required by law to do so.
However, the authorities must obtain court orders to hold suspects in
pretrial detention--within 24 hours of arrest, the police are required
to file charges or ask a magistrate judge to order continued detention.
However, in practice the police do not always follow these procedures.
Judges may order detentions for 14 days to allow investigation and may
grant extensions if necessary. There is a system of bail. The 1996
Basic Charter provides for certain legal and procedural rights for
detainees; however, these provisions have yet to be implemented.
Police handling of arrests and detentions constitutes incommunicado
detention in some instances. The police do not always notify a
detainee's family or, in the case of a foreign worker, the worker's
sponsor, of the detention. Sometimes notification is made only just
prior to the detainee's release. The authorities post the previous
week's trial results (including the date of the trial, the name of the
accused, the claim, and the sentence) near the magistrate court
building in Muscat. The police do not always permit attorneys and
family members to visit detainees. Judges occasionally intercede to
ensure that security officials allow such visits.
The Government does not practice exile as a form of punishment. The
1996 Basic Charter prohibits exile; however, the provisions concerning
exile have yet to be implemented.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1996 Basic Charter affirms the
independence of the judiciary; however, the various courts are
subordinate to the Sultan and subject to his influence. The Sultan
appoints all judges, acts as a court of final appeal, and intercedes in
cases of particular interest, especially in national security cases.
However, there have been no reported instances in which the Sultan has
overturned a decision of the magistrate courts or the commercial
courts.
The judiciary comprises the magistrate courts, which adjudicate
misdemeanors and criminal matters; the Shari'a (Islamic law) courts,
which adjudicate personal status cases such as divorce and inheritance,
and which are administered by the Ministry of Justice; the commercial
courts; the Labor Welfare Board; and the Rent Dispute Committee, which
hears tenant-landlord disputes.
The magistrate court system was established by royal decree in 1984
to take over all criminal cases from the Shari'a courts; it is
independent and its president reports directly to the Sultan. Regional
courts of first instance handle misdemeanor cases, which are heard by
individual judges. All felonies are adjudicated at the Central
Magistrate Court in Muscat by a criminal panel made up of the President
of the Magistrate Court and two judges. All rulings of the felony panel
are final except for those in which the defendant is sentenced to
death. Death sentences must be approved by the Sultan.
The Criminal Appeals Panel also is presided over by the President
of the Magistrate Court in Muscat, and includes the court's vice
president and two judges. This panel hears appeals of rulings made by
all courts of first instance. The role of public prosecutor in criminal
cases is carried out by specially trained prosecutors from the Royal
Oman Police (ROP), all of whom are trained as policemen as well as
prosecutors. There are more than 40 ROP prosecutors assigned to ROP
headquarters in Muscat.
The Criminal Code does not specify the rights of the accused. There
are no written rules of evidence, codified procedures for entering
cases into the criminal system, or any legal provision for a public
trial. Criminal procedures have developed by tradition and precedents
in the magistrate courts. In criminal cases, the police provide
defendants with the written charges against them; defendants are
presumed innocent and have the right to present evidence and confront
witnesses. The prosecution and the defense question witnesses through
the judge, who is usually the only person to question witnesses in
court. A detainee may hire an attorney but has no explicit right to be
represented by counsel.
The Government does not pay for the legal representation of
indigents. However, the 1996 Basic Charter affirms both right to
counsel and government-funded legal representation for indigents. These
provisions have yet to be implemented. Judges often pronounce the
verdict and sentence within 1 day after the completion of a trial.
Defendants may appeal jail sentences longer than 3 months and fines
over the equivalent of $1,300 to a three-judge panel. Defendants
accused of national security offenses and serious felonies do not have
the right of appeal.
A State Security Court tries cases involving national security and
criminal cases that the Government decides require expeditious or
especially sensitive handling. Magistrate court judges have presided
over trials in the State Security Court. Defendants tried by the
Security Court are not permitted to have legal representation present.
The timing and the location of the Court's proceedings are not
disclosed publicly. The Court does not follow legal procedures as
strictly as the magistrate courts, although prominent civilian jurists
form the panel. The Sultan has exercised his powers of leniency,
including in political cases.
The Shari'a courts are administered by the Ministry of Justice, and
apply Shari'a law as interpreted under the Ibadhi school of Islamic
jurisprudence. Preliminary courts of first instance are located in each
of the 59 wilayats, and are presided over by a single judge, or qadi.
Appeals of the rulings of the courts of first instance involving prison
sentences of 2 weeks or more or fines greater than $260 (100 rials)
must be brought within 1 month before the Shari'a Court of Appeals in
Muscat. Panels of three judges hear appeals cases. Court of Appeal
rulings themselves may be appealed, within a 1-month period, to the
Supreme Committee for Complaints, which is composed of four members,
including the Minister of Justice and the Grand Mufti of the Sultanate.
In May 1997, the Government promulgated into law the provisions of
the 1996 Basic Charter pertaining to ``family law,'' i.e., law that
falls under the purview of the Shari'a courts. The effect of this new
law has been to regularize the nature of the cases and the range of
corresponding judgments within the Shari'a court system.
The Authority for the Settlement of Commercial Disputes (ASCD),
better known as the commercial courts system, was established by royal
decree in 1981 to decide all cases related to commercial matters.
Subsequent decrees have empowered the commercial courts to decide labor
disputes referred to it by government departments, commercial disputes
to which the Government is a party, and arbitration cases involving
private parties. The ASCD is financially and administratively
independent of the Ministry of Justice and reports directly to the
Minister of Commerce and Industry. The ASCD is made up of the Chairman,
Deputy Chairman, a number of judges appointed by royal decree, and
members of the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Cases are heard
in regional courts for suits involving not more than $26,000 (10,000
rials).
In late November, the Sultan issued several royal decrees to
establish a law on judicial authority and to affirm the independence of
the judiciary as called for in the 1996 Basic Charter. The decrees
formally establish the judiciary as an independent, hierarchical system
composed of a Supreme Court, an appeals court, primary courts (one
located in each region), and, within the primary courts, divisional
courts. Within each of the courts there are to be divisions to handle
commercial, civil, penal, labor, taxation, general, and personal cases
(the latter under Shari'a). The general prosecutor, which currently
falls under the Royal Omani Police Chief Inspector, is to become an
independent legal entity. Implementation of these decrees is expected
to take place during 2000.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The police are not required by law to obtain search
warrants. There is a widespread belief that the Government eavesdrops
on both oral and written communications, and citizens are guarded in
both areas. Citizens must obtain permission from the Ministry of
Interior to marry foreigners, except nationals of the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries. Such permission is not granted automatically.
Delays or denial of permission have resulted in secret marriages within
Oman. Marriages in foreign countries can lead to denial of entry into
Oman of the foreign spouse and prevent a legitimate child from claiming
citizenship rights.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The law prohibits criticism of the
Sultan in any form or medium. The authorities tolerate criticism of
government officials and agencies, but such criticism rarely receives
media coverage. The announced 1996 Basic Charter provides for freedom
of opinion expressed in words, writing, or all other media within the
limits of the law; however, these provisions have yet to be
implemented.
The 1984 Press and Publication Law authorizes the Government to
censor all domestic and imported publications. Ministry of Information
censors may act against any material regarded as politically,
culturally, or sexually offensive. However, journalists and writers
generally censor themselves to avoid government harassment. Editorials
generally are consistent with the Government's views, although the
authorities tolerate some criticism on foreign affairs issues. The
Government discourages in-depth reporting on controversial domestic
issues and seeks to influence privately owned dailies and periodicals
by subsidizing their operating costs.
In late 1997, the Government began to permit the entry onto the
market of foreign newspapers and magazines containing reports or
statements deemed critical of Oman, including articles critical of the
Sultan. The lifting of the boycott against Israel in December 1994
eliminated prohibitions on publications from or about Israel that
otherwise meet censorship standards. However, in August the Ministry of
Information stopped distribution of a London-based Arabic-language
magazine that contained an interview with a representative of the
Israeli trade mission in Oman. Customs officials sometimes confiscate
video cassette tapes and erase offensive material despite the fact that
there are no published guidelines on what is viewed as locally
``offensive.'' The tapes may or may not be returned to their owners.
Government censorship decisions are changed periodically without
apparent reason. There is a general perception that the confiscation of
books and tapes at the border from private individuals and restrictions
on popularnovels have eased somewhat. However, it reportedly has become
more difficult to obtain permission to distribute in the local market
books that censors decide have factual errors about Oman (including
outdated maps).
The Government controls the local radio and television companies.
They do not air any politically controversial material. The Government
does not allow the establishment of privately owned radio and
television companies. However, the availability of satellite dishes has
made foreign broadcast information accessible to the public. The
Government, through its national telecommunications company, provides
full, uncensored Internet access to citizens and foreign residents.
The appropriate government authority, such as Sultan Qaboos
University, the police, or the relevant ministry must approve public
cultural events, including plays, concerts, lectures, and seminars.
Most organizations avoid controversial issues due to fear that the
authorities may cancel their events. Academic freedom is restricted,
particularly regarding controversial matters, including politics.
Professors may be dismissed for going beyond acceptable boundaries.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law does not
ensure freedom of assembly. All public gatherings require government
sponsorship. The authorities do not always enforce this requirement,
and gatherings sometimes take place without formal government approval.
For example, in May 1998 students at a nursing college protesting
widespread food poisoning within the school attempted to march down
Muscat's primary highway to the Ministry of Health; security forces
intercepted and dispersed the students without serious injury.
Regulations implemented in 1994 restricting most types of public
gatherings remain in effect. The 1996 Basic Charter provides for
limited freedom of assembly, but these provisions have not yet been
implemented.
The law states that the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor must
approve the establishment of all associations and their bylaws.
However, some groups are allowed to function without formal
registration. The Government uses the power to license associations to
control the political environment. It does not license groups regarded
as a threat to the predominant social or political views of the
Sultanate. Formal registration of foreign associations is limited to a
maximum of one association for any nationality. The 1996 Basic
Charter's provisions in this area--not yet in effect--regulate the
formation of associations.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion, which is
affirmed by the 1996 Basic Charter. The 1996 Basic Charter provides
that Shari'a is the basis for legislation and preserves the freedom to
practice religious rites, in accordance with tradition, provided that
such freedom does not breach public order. Discrimination against
individuals on the basis of religion or sect is prohibited.
Implementing decrees for the 1996 Basic Charter in this area have not
yet been established.
Most citizens are Ibadhi or Sunni Muslims, but there is also a
minority of Shi'a Muslims. Non-Muslims are free to worship at churches
and temples built on land donated by the Sultan. There are many
Christian denominations, which utilize two plots of donated land on
which two Catholic and two Protestant churches have been built. Hindu
temples also exist on government-provided land. Land has been made
available to Catholic and Protestant missions in Sohar and Salalah.
The Government prohibits non-Muslims from proselytizing Muslims. It
also prohibits non-Muslim groups from publishing religious material,
although material printed abroad may be brought into the country.
Members of all religions and sects are free to maintain links with
coreligionists abroad and undertake foreign travel for religious
purposes. In the past, due to government restrictions on public
gatherings, there had been a curtailment of non-Muslim religious
celebrations. There have been no reports of such curtailments in recent
years.
The police monitor mosque sermons to ensure that the preachers do
not discuss political topics and stay within the state-approved
orthodoxy of Islam. The Government expects all imams to preach sermons
within the parameters of standardized texts distributed monthly by the
Ministry of Awqaf and Religious Affairs.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government does not restrict travel
by citizens within the country except to military areas. Foreigners,
other than diplomats, must obtain a government pass to cross border
points. To obtain a passport and depart the country, a woman must
haveauthorization from her husband, father, or nearest male relative.
However, a woman having an Omani identity card (which also must be
authorized by a male relative) may travel to certain Gulf Cooperation
Council countries without a passport.
Until the promulgation of the Basic Charter, the Government did not
have a policy on refugees or a tradition of harboring stateless or
undocumented aliens. The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits the extradition
of political refugees; however, this provision has not yet been
implemented. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise
during the year. Oman offered temporary refuge to several thousand
Yemenis displaced by a civil war in 1994. They returned to Yemen after
the war. Tight control over the entry of foreigners into the country
effectively has screened out would-be refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Oman is an autocracy in which the Sultan retains the ultimate
authority on all important foreign and domestic issues. The country has
no formal democratic political institutions, and its citizens do not
have the ability peacefully to change their leaders or the political
system.
The Sultan promulgated the country's first defacto written
constitution, known as the Basic Charter, in November 1996. Although it
has immediate force of law, most laws and regulations to implement its
provisions have not yet been enacted; it is expected that this process
may take until 2000 or beyond to be completed. The law does not provide
for political parties or direct elections. Citizens have indirect
access to senior officials through the traditional practice of
petitioning their patrons, usually the local governor, or wali, for
redress of grievances. Successful redress depends on the effectiveness
of the patron's access to appropriate decisionmakers. The Sultan
appoints the governors. The Sultan makes an annual 3-week tour of the
country, accompanied by his ministers. The tour allows the Sultan to
listen directly to his subjects' problems.
In 1991 Sultan Qaboos established a Consultative Council, or Majlis
Ash-Shura. In 1994 he expanded the number of Council seats to 80 from
the original 59, a move that allocated 2 members for districts with a
higher population. Due to the population increase from 1994 to 1997,
the number of seats was further expanded to 82 for the 1997 elections.
The Government selects the Council members from several nominees, both
male and female, who are elected by prominent persons in each district.
In the October 1997 elections, over 50,000 Omani men and women, 3
percent of the total population, were eligible to nominate Council
members in all districts throughout the country. These voters (or
electors) had volunteered for the position, their police records were
checked by the Government, and they were subject to government
approval. If the Sultan decides not to appoint them, the nominees with
the most votes do not win appointment to the Council. The Council has
no formal legislative powers, which remain concentrated in the Sultan's
hands. However, it serves as a conduit of information between the
people and the government ministries. No serving government official is
eligible to be a council member. The Council may question government
ministers in public or in private, review all draft laws on social and
economic policy, and recommend legislative changes to the Sultan, who
makes the final decision. In December 1997, the Sultan announced the
appointment of 41 persons to the new Majlis Al-Dawla (Council of
State). The precise responsibilities of the Council of State and its
relationship to the existing Consultative Council have yet to be
clarified. The Council of State and the Consultative Council together
form the Majlis Oman, or Council of Oman.
The Sultan publicly has advocated a greater role for women in both
the public and private sectors. In the 1997 elections, the Government
selected two women from among the nominees to serve on the Consultative
Council. In December 1997, the Sultan appointed 4 women to the 41-
member Majlis Al-Dawla. In 1999 the Sultan, for only the second time,
appointed a woman to the Oman Chamber of Commerce and Industry (OCCI)
board.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government prohibits the establishment of human rights groups.
The existing restrictions on the freedom of speech and association do
not permit any activity or speech critical of the Government. There
were no known requests by international human rights organizations to
visit.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The 1996 Basic Charter prohibits discrimination on the basis of
sex, ethnic origin, race, religion, language, sect, place ofresidence,
and social class. However, decrees to implement its provisions have not
been promulgated. Institutional and cultural discrimination based on
gender, race, religion, social status, and disability exists.
Women.--There is no evidence of a pattern of spousal abuse although
observers say that allegations of such abuse in the Shari'a courts are
not uncommon. Definitive information is scant and difficult to collect.
Doctors do not have a legal responsibility to report either spouse or
child abuse cases to the courts. Battered women may file a complaint
with the police but more often seek family intervention to protect them
from violent domestic situations. Likewise, families seek to intervene
to keep such problems out of public view. There have been reports that
employers or male coworkers have sexually harassed foreign women
employed in such positions as domestic servants and hospital nurses.
Foreign women employed as domestic servants and garment workers have
complained that their employers have withheld their salaries and that
government officials have been unresponsive to their grievances, due to
investigative procedures that disadvantage the victim. Individuals
known to be abusing domestic servants are not always brought to account
for their actions. In the past, several foreign women have had to ask
their governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse.
Most women live within the confines of their homes. They continue
to face many forms of discrimination. Illiteracy among older women
hampers their ability to own property, participate in the modern sector
of the economy, or even inform themselves of their rights. Government
officials frequently deny women land grants or housing loans and prefer
to conduct business with a woman's husband or other male relative.
Women require permission from a male relative to leave the country (see
Section 2.b.).
Some aspects of Islamic tradition also discriminate against women.
Islamic law favors male heirs in adjudicating inheritance claims. Many
women are reluctant to take an inheritance dispute to court for fear of
alienating the family.
However, since 1970 conditions for women have improved dramatically
in several areas. Whereas in 1970 no schools existed for girls, the
most recent figures available from the Ministry of Education report an
enrollment rate nearing 90 percent for all girls eligible for
elementary school. In the 1997-98 school year, female students
constituted approximately 50 percent of the total number of students
attending public schools. Women constitute roughly half of the 5,000
students at Sultan Qaboos University. In November 600 women and 524 men
received bachelor's degrees as members of the 10th graduating class,
while 3 women and 14 men received master's degrees. The university has
a quota system with the apparent goal of increasing the number of men
studying certain specialties. Reportedly, women are being limited to 50
percent of the seats in the medical department. Restriction on women
studying engineering and archeology were lifted in September 1998. The
quota system is expected to allow women to constitute a majority in
some other departments.
Women also have made gains in the work force. Some educated women
have attained positions of authority in government, business, and the
media. Approximately 30 percent of all civil servants are women; of
these, 59 percent are citizens. In both the public and private sectors,
women are entitled to maternity leave and equal pay for equal work. The
government bureaucracy, the country's largest employer of women,
observes such regulations, as do many private sector employers. Still,
many educated women face job discrimination because prospective
employers fear that they might resign to marry or raise families.
Several female employees in the Government have complained that they
have been denied promotion in favor of less capable men, although this
varies by ministry. Unlike the case in previous years, when government
grants for study abroad were limited almost exclusively to males, such
grants are now awarded based on merit, and in 1999 were divided evenly
between men and women.
Within the Government, women's affairs are the responsibility of
the Ministry of Social Affairs, Labor, and Vocational Training. The
Ministry provides support for women's affairs through support for and
funding of the Oman Women's Association (OWA) and local community
development centers (LCDC's). The OWA consists of 23 chapters with an
active membership of 3,000 women. Typical OWA activities include
sponsoring health or sociological lectures, kindergarten services, and
handicraft training programs. The OWA also provides an informal
counseling and support role for women with divorce-related
difficulties, girls forced to marry against their will, and women and
girls suffering from domestic abuse. The main purpose of the 50 LCDC's
located throughout the country is to encourage women to improve the
quality of life for their families and to improvetheir contributions to
the community. LCDC activities focus on health and sociology lectures,
child care issues, and agricultural and traditional handicraft training
programs.
Children.--The Government has made the health, education, and
general welfare of children a budgetary priority. Primary school
education is free and universal but not compulsory. Most children
attend school through secondary school, to age 18. No significant
sectors or groups within the population are prevented from receiving an
education. The infant mortality rate continues to decline, and
comprehensive immunization rates have risen. There is no pattern of
familial or other child abuse. Government officials have publicly
called for greater awareness and prevention of child abuse. A few
communities in the interior and in the Dhofar region still practice
female genital mutilation (FGM). FGM is condemned widely by
international health experts as damaging to both physical and
psychological health. Experts believe that the number of such cases is
small and declining annually. Oman ratified the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child in 1996 with reservations relating to freedom of
children to choose a religion and government spending limits.
People with Disabilities.--The Government has mandated parking
spaces and some ramps for wheelchair access in private and government
office buildings and shopping centers. Compliance is voluntary, yet
widely observed. Students in wheelchairs have easy access to Sultan
Qaboos University. The Government has established several
rehabilitation centers for disabled children. Disabled persons,
including the blind, work in government offices. While the Government
now charges a small fee to citizens seeking government health care, the
disabled generally are not charged for physical therapy and prosthetics
support.
Religious Minorities.--Some members of the Shi'a Muslim minority
claim that they face discrimination in employment and educational
opportunities. However, some members of this same community occupy
prominent positions in both the private and public sectors.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Citizens of east African origin
complain that they frequently face job discrimination in both the
public and private sectors. Some public institutions reportedly favor
hiring members of one or another regional, tribal, or religious group.
However, no group is banned from employment.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The current law stipulates that ``it
is absolutely forbidden to provoke a strike for any reason.'' The
Government has not yet promulgated a new labor law that was first
drafted by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor in 1994. In the
last quarter of 1996, the Consultative Council recommended some changes
to the draft, but the Government has not yet issued the new law.
Government officials have stated that the new labor law is to be
consistent with international labor standards.
Labor unrest is rare. There have not been any known job actions
within the last 6 years.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The current law
does not provide for the right to collective bargaining. However, it
requires that employers of more than 50 workers form a joint labor-
management committee as a communication forum between the two groups.
The implementation of this provision is uneven, and the effectiveness
of these committees is questionable. In general the committees discuss
such matters as the living conditions at company-provided housing. They
are not authorized to discuss wages, hours, or conditions of
employment. Such issues are specified in the work contracts signed
individually by workers and employers and must be consistent with the
guidelines of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor.
The current law defines conditions of employment for some citizens
and foreign workers. It covers domestic servants and construction
workers but not temporary workers or those with work contracts that
expire within 3 months. Foreign workers constitute at least 50 percent
of the work force and as much as 80 percent of the modern-sector work
force.
Work rules must be approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Labor and posted conspicuously in the workplace by employers of 10 or
more workers. Similarly, any employer with 50 or more workers must
establish a grievance procedure. Regardless of the size of the company,
any employee, including foreign workers, may file a grievance with the
Labor Welfare Board. Sometimes worker representatives file collective
grievances, but most grievances are filed by individual workers. Lower
paid workers use the procedure regularly. Plaintiffs and defendants in
such cases may be represented by legal counsel.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The 1973 Labor Law
prohibits forced or bonded labor by adults or children. Instances of
forced or bonded child labor are unknown. Although the enabling laws
have not yet been implemented, the 1996 Basic Charter affirms that
forced or bonded labor for any person is prohibited. However,
governmental investigative and enforcement mechanisms are lacking.
Foreign workers sometimes find themselves in situations amounting to
forced labor. In such cases, employers withhold letters of release
(documents that release workers from employment contracts), which allow
them to change employers. Without such a letter, a foreign worker must
continue to work for his current employer or become technically
unemployed, which is sufficient grounds for deportation. Many foreign
workers are not aware of their right to take such disputes before the
Labor Welfare Board. Others are reluctant to file complaints for fear
of retribution from unscrupulous employers. In most cases, the Board
releases the worker from service and awards compensation for time
worked under compulsion. Employers face no other penalty than to
reimburse the worker's back wages.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1973 Labor Law prohibits children under the age of 13
from working. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor enforces this
prohibition. However, in practice the enforcement often does not extend
to some small family businesses that employ underage children,
particularly in the agricultural and fisheries sectors. Children
between 13 and 16 years of age may be employed but must obtain the
Ministry's permission to work overtime, at night, on weekends or
holidays, or perform strenuous labor. Child labor does not exist in any
industry. Although primary school education is not compulsory, most
children attend school to age 18.
The law specifically prohibits forced or bonded labor by all
persons (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Ministry of Social Affairs
and Labor issues minimum wage guidelines for various categories of
workers. In July 1998, the Government raised the minimum wage for Omani
workers to about $260 (100 rials) per month, plus $52 (20 rials) for
transportation and housing. Minimum wage guidelines do not apply to a
variety of occupational categories, including small businesses that
employ fewer than five persons, the self-employed, domestic servants,
dependent family members working for a family firm, and some categories
of manual labor. Many foreigners work in occupations that are exempt
from the minimum wage law, and the Government is lax in enforcing
minimum wage guidelines, where applicable, for foreign workers employed
in menial jobs. However, highly skilled foreign workers frequently are
paid more than their Omani counterparts.
The minimum wage is sufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. The compensation for foreign manual
laborers and clerks is sufficient to cover living expenses and to
permit savings to be sent home.
The private sector workweek is 40 to 45 hours and includes a rest
period from Thursday afternoon through Friday. Government workers have
a 35-hour workweek. While the law does not designate the number of days
in a workweek, it requires at least one 24-hour rest period per week
and mandates overtime pay for hours in excess of 48 per week.
Government regulations on hours of employment are not always enforced.
Employees who have worked extra hours without compensation may file a
complaint before the Labor Welfare Board, but the Board's rulings are
not binding.
Every worker has the right to 15 days of annual leave during the
first 3 years of employment and 30 days per year thereafter. Employers
provide many foreign nationals, including domestic servants, with
annual or biannual round-trip tickets to their countries of origin.
All employers are required by law to provide first-aid facilities.
Work sites with over 100 employees must have a nurse. Employees covered
under the Labor Law may recover compensation for injury or illness
sustained on the job through employer-provided medical insurance. The
health and safety standard codes are enforced by inspectors from the
Department of Health and Safety of the Directorate of Labor. As
required by law, they make on-site inspections.
There have been reports that employers or male coworkers have
sexually harassed foreign females employed in such positions as
domestic servants and hospital nurses. Foreign women employed as
domestic servants and garment workers have complained that their
employers have withheld their salaries and that government officials
have been unresponsive to their grievances, due to investigative
procedures that disadvantage the victim. Individuals known to be
abusing foreign domestic servants are not always held accountable for
their actions. In the past, several foreign women have had to ask their
governments' embassies for shelter to escape abuse.
The law states that employers must not place their employees in
situations involving dangerous work. However, the law does not
specifically grant a worker the right to remove himself from dangerous
work without jeopardy to his continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, there were no reports that persons were trafficked
in, to, or from the country.
______
QATAR
Qatar, an Arab state on the Persian Gulf, is a monarchy with no
constitution or political parties. Qatar is governed by the ruling Al-
Thani family through its head, the Amir. The current Amir, Sheikh Hamad
bin Khalifa Al-Thani, took power from his father in June 1995 with the
support of leading branches of the Al-Thani family, and in consultation
with other leading Qatari families. This transition of authority did
not represent a change in the basic governing order. The Amir holds
absolute power, the exercise of which is influenced by religious law,
consultation with leading citizens, rule by consensus, and the right of
any citizen to gain access to the Amir to appeal government decisions.
The Amir generally legislates after consultation with leading citizens,
an arrangement institutionalized in an appointed advisory council that
assists the Amir in formulating policy. In March citizens were
permitted to participate in the election of a national body, the
Central Municipal Council, for the first time. The judiciary is
nominally independent, but most judges hold their positions at the
Government's pleasure.
The country has efficient police and security services. The
civilian security force, controlled by the Interior Ministry, comprises
two sections: The police and the General Administration of Public
Security and the investigatory police (Mubahathat), which is
responsible for sedition and espionage cases. The Interior Ministry has
a special state security investigative unit (Mubahith) that performs
internal security investigations and gathers intelligence. In addition,
there is an independent civilian intelligence service (Mukhabarat).
The State owns most basic industries and services, but the retail
and construction industries are in private hands. Oil is the principal
natural resource, but the country's extensive natural gas resources are
playing an increasingly important role. Rapid development in the 1970's
and 1980's created an economy in which foreign workers, mostly South
Asian and Arab, outnumber citizens by a ratio of 4 or 5 to 1. The
Government has embarked upon a program of ``Qatarization,'' which is
aimed at reducing the number of foreign workers. Many government jobs
are offered only to citizens and private sector businesses are
encouraged to recruit citizens as well.
The Government restricts citizens' rights; however, there was
substantial progress in a few areas. Citizens do not have the right to
change their government; however, the Government's program of gradual
democratic initiatives provided citizens with the opportunity to elect
officials to the Central Municipal Council. Both male and female
citizens were permitted to vote and to run for a seat on the Council.
In addition a constitutional committee was convened in July to draft a
permanent constitution that would provide for parliamentary elections.
Arbitrary detention in security cases, and restrictions on the freedoms
of speech, press, assembly, association, religion, and on workers'
rights, continued to be problems. However, the Government continued to
take some steps to ease restrictions on the practice of non-Muslim
religions. Despite female suffrage, in practice women's rights are
restricted by social customs. Noncitizen workers, who make up a
majority of the residents of the country, face discrimination in the
workplace.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There have been no reported instances of torture for
several years. The Government administers most corporal punishment
prescribed by Islamic law but does not allow amputation.
Prison conditions generally meet minimum international standards.
The Government does not permit domestic human rights groups to
exist, and no international human rights organization has asked to
visit the country or its prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest; however, the police have the discretion to arrest
persons based on a low level of suspicion, and arbitrary detention in
security cases remains a problem. The authorities generally charge
suspects within 48 hours. Suspects generally are presented to the
Attorney General within 24 hours of arrest. The Attorney General
decides whether to hold the suspect up to a maximum of 4 days, after
which time the suspect is presented before the judge, who may order the
suspect released or remanded to custody to await trial. The accused is
entitled to legal representation throughout this process. Suspects who
are detained in security cases generally are afforded access to
counsel; however, they may be detained indefinitely while under
investigation. There were no known recent cases of incommunicado
detention.
In June 1998, the Amir ordered the arrest of Abdulrahman Al-Nuaimi,
a Ministry of Education official who distributed a letter to the press
critical the Amir's decision to allow women to vote and run for office
in the Municipal Council elections. Contrary to reports that he was
released in 1998, Al-Nuaimi remains in custody.
The public trial of persons arrested for involvement in the
February 1996 coup attempt continued. Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Hamad
Al-Thani, who was named as the prime suspect in the coup bid, was
arrested under mysterious circumstances on or about July 23. He remains
in custody following his appearance before the trial judge to answer
charges of plotting to destabilize the regime and revealing military
secrets to foreign powers. Prosecutors have called for the death
penalty for all those accused, including Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Hammad. A
verdict was expected in early December; however, the arrest of Hamad
Bin Jassim Bin Hamad delayed proceedings into 2000.
Involuntary exile has occurred but is rare. There were no reported
cases this year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The judiciary is nominally
independent; however, most judges are foreign nationals who hold
residence permits granted by the civil authorities, and thus hold their
positions at the Government's pleasure. The number of citizen judges is
increasing.
The judiciary deals with the bureaucracies of three ministries.
Civil (or Adlea) courts are subordinate to the Ministry of Justice, and
Shari'a (Islamic law) courts fall under the Ministry of Endowments and
Islamic Affairs. The prosecutors fall under the Ministry of Interior.
There are two types of courts: The civil courts, which have
jurisdiction in civil and commercial matters, and the Shari'a Court,
which has jurisdiction in family and criminal cases. There are no
permanent state security courts; however, although there have been no
cases before these courts since the Amir assumed power, they have not
been abolished formally by law and remain an option. Defendants tried
by all courts have the right to appeal. The original case and the
appeal in Shari'a Court are no longer heard by the same judge, and
procedural loopholes that permitted this practice in the past are to be
closed as part of a pending judicial reform package.
The legal system is biased in favor of citizens and the Government.
A Muslim litigant may request the Shari'a Court to assume jurisdiction
in commercial or civil cases. Non-Muslims are not allowed to bring
suits as plaintiffs in the Shari'a Court; however, they may file suit
in the civil courts. This practice prevents non-Muslim residents from
obtaining full legal recourse. Trials in the civil courts are public,
but in the Shari'a Court only the disputing parties, their relatives,
associates, and witnesses are allowed in the courtroom. Lawyers do not
play a formal role except to prepare litigants for their cases.
Although non-Arabic speakers are provided with interpreters, foreigners
are disadvantaged, especially in cases involving the performance of
contracts.
Defendants appear before a judge for a preliminary hearing within 7
days of their arrest. Judges may extend pretrial detention for 1 week
at a time to allow the authorities to conduct investigations.
Defendants in the civil courts have the right to be represented by
defense attorneys but are not always permitted to be represented by
counsel in the Shari'a court.
Shari'a trials are usually brief. Shari'a family law trials are
often held without counsel. After both parties have stated their cases
and examined witnesses, judges are likely to deliver a verdict after a
short deliberation. Criminal cases are normally tried within 2 to 3
months after suspects are detained. Suspects are entitled to bail,
except in some instances, such as in cases of violent crime. Bail may
be provided by citizens or noncitizens. Foreigners who are charged with
minor crimes may be released to a citizen sponsor. They are prohibited
from departing the country until the case is resolved.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Traditional attitudes of respect for the sanctity of
the home and the privacy of women provide a great deal of protection
against arbitrary intrusion for most citizens and residents. A warrant
must be obtained before police may search a residence or business,
except in cases involving national security or emergencies. Search
warrants are issued by judicial authorities. There were no reports of
unauthorized searches of homes during the year. The police and security
forces are believed to monitor the communications of suspected
criminals, of those considered to be security risks, and of selected
foreigners.
With prior permission, which is usually granted, citizens may marry
foreigners of any nationality and apply for residence permits or
citizenship for their spouses.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Although the Government reduced
restrictions on freedom of speech and of the press in 1996 and
permitted a significant expansion of press freedom, some restrictions
still remain. The Government formally lifted censorship of the media in
1995, and since then the press has been essentially free of government
interference. However, journalists continue to practice self-
censorship, due to real or perceived social and political pressures.
Some journalists reportedly were subjected to pressure by the
Government during the year after they published articles critical of
it. No instance of explicit criticism of any citizen, whether of their
public or private affairs, has been noted in local newspapers.
Television and radio are state-owned, but the privately owned satellite
television channel Al-Jazeera operates freely.
There were no reports of instances of political censorship of
foreign news media or broadcasts of foreign programs on local
television over the past year. The Censorship Office in the Ministry of
Information was abolished (together with theMinistry) in 1996, but
censors still work at broadcast media under the overall supervision of
the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Pornography and expressions
deemed hostile to Islam are subject to censorship, but in practice
censorship is applied irregularly.
In July radio and television call-in programs addressed the
sensitive subject of cash entitlements paid to members of the ruling
Al-Thani family. Citizens expressed disagreement with the system in
public forums, with no evidence of subsequent reprisals. However, one
person did write a letter of retraction to a local newspaper a few days
after her comments.
A Ministry of Education official who wrote a letter critical of the
Amir's decision to allow women to vote and run for office in the
Municipal Council elections remains in custody (see Section 1.d.).
Customs officials screen imported print media, videocassettes, and
other such items for pornography, but have stopped blocking the
importation of non-Muslim religious items.
A growing number of citizens and residents have access to the
Internet, which is provided through the state-owned telecommunications
monopoly. Internet service is censored for pornographic content through
a proxy server, which blocks those web sites containing certain key
words and phrases. A user who believes that a site is censored
mistakenly may submit the web address to the Internet service provider
to have the site reviewed for suitability. The Government is responsive
to these submissions.
Citizens enjoy broad freedom of speech, but are restricted by the
social and family restraints of a very traditional society. There is no
apparent fear of government monitoring of private speech. However, the
larger foreign population does not believe it enjoys the same freedoms
and acts accordingly.
There is no legal provision for academic freedom. Most instructors
at the University of Qatar exercise self-censorship.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
severely limits freedom of assembly. The Government does not allow
political demonstrations.
The Government severely limits freedom of association. The
Government does not allow political parties or membership in
international professional organizations critical of the Government or
of any other Arab government. Private social, sports, trade,
professional, and cultural societies must be registered with the
Government. Security forces monitor the activities of such groups.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The state religion is the conservative
Hanbali school of the Sunni branch of Islam, as interpreted by Muhammad
Ibn Abd Al-Wahab, an 18th century religious reformer who emphasized the
strict observance of religious duties. The Government officially
prohibits public worship by non-Muslims; however, it tolerates and
protects private services conducted in private with prior notification
to the authorities. The Government has indicated, through foreign
diplomats and in meetings with Christian leaders, its long-range
intention to identify and lease parcels of land to the recognized
Catholic, Anglican, and Orthodox communities upon which they would be
permitted to erect churches, albeit without bells or the external
display of crosses. In the meantime, the Government has indicated its
support for the lease of existing villas for use in worship services by
such groups, provided that they obtain the Qatari landlord's approval.
The community of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints
(Mormons) now meets in a villa leased for the express purpose of
worship. The police provide traffic control for authorized Catholic
services, which may be attended by up to 1,000 or more persons at
times. The Government recently began to issue visas to Christian clergy
under foreign embassy sponsorship. There are no restrictions on non-
Muslims providing religious instruction to their children. However,
non-Muslims may not proselytize and conversion from Islam is
theoretically a capital offense. However, there is no record of an
execution for such a conversion since independence.
The Government allows Shi'a Muslims to practice their faith freely;
however, community leaders have agreed to refrain from certain public
practices such as self-flagellation.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no restrictions on internal
travel, except around sensitive military and oil installations. In
general, women do not require permission from male guardians to travel.
However,men may prevent female relatives from leaving the country by
providing their names to immigration officers at ports of departure.
Technically, women employed by the Government must obtain official
permission to travel abroad when requesting leave, but it is not known
to what extent this regulation is enforced. Citizens critical of the
Government face restrictions on their right to travel abroad.
All citizens have the right to return. Foreigners are subject to
immigration restrictions designed to control the size of the local
labor pool. Foreign workers must have the permission of their sponsor
(usually their employer) to enter and depart the country, but their
dependents may leave the country without restriction. Foreign women who
are married to citizens are granted residence permits and may apply for
citizenship; however, they are expected to relinquish their foreign
citizenship.
The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
refugees, asylees, or first asylum. Those attempting to enter
illegally, including persons seeking asylum from nearby countries, are
refused entry. Asylum seekers who are able to obtain local sponsorship
or employment are allowed to enter and may remain as long as they are
employed. A Bahraini Air Force pilot defected to Qatar in 1996, and the
Government stated that he was free to stay, calling him a refugee and
offering him its full protection.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government or the
political system peacefully. The political institutions blend the
characteristics of a traditional Bedouin tribal state and a modern
bureaucracy. There are no political parties or organized opposition
groups. However, in March citizens had the opportunity to choose
officials to the Central Municipal Council in free and fair elections.
The Amir exercises most executive and legislative powers, including
appointment of cabinet members. On March 8, citizens elected a 29-
member Central Municipal Council. For the first time, men and women age
18 and older were permitted both to vote and to run as candidates. The
Council is a nonpartisan body that addresses issues such as street
repair, green space, trash collection, and public works projects. Its
role is to advise the Minister of Municipalities and Agriculture. The
Council cannot change policy on its own.
Under the amended Provisional Constitution, the Amir must be chosen
from and by the adult males of the Al-Thani family.
In November 1998, the Amir announced his intention to form a
constitutional committee to draft a permanent constitution that would
provide for democratic parliamentary elections. The constitutional
committee was inaugurated on July 13 and includes a number of
government officials, academics, and prominent business leaders. The
Amir reiterated in his remarks to the committee members that he expects
their efforts to lead to the establishment of an elected parliamentary
body.
Women have the right to vote and some ran as candidates for the
Central Municipal Council, but none were elected.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not permit local human rights organizations to
exist. No international human rights organizations are known to have
asked to investigate conditions in the country. However, Amnesty
International and foreign embassies were invited to send observers to
sessions of the public trial of those accused in the 1996 coup attempt.
Foreign observers attended the trial sessions held during the year.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Institutional, cultural, and legal discrimination based on gender,
race, religion, social status, and disability exists.
Women.--Violence against women and spousal abuse occur but are not
believed to be widespread. Some foreign domestic servants, especially
those from South Asia and the Philippines, have been mistreated by
employers. According to Shari'a (Islamic law), all forms of physical
abuse are illegal. The maximum penalty for rape is death. The police
actively investigate reports of violence against women. In the last few
years, the Government demonstrated an increased willingness to arrest
and punish offenders, whether citizens or foreigners. Offenders who
arecitizens usually receive lighter punishments than do foreigners.
Abused domestic workers usually do not press charges for fear of losing
their jobs.
The legal system allows leniency for a man found guilty of
committing a ``crime of honor,'' a euphemism that refers to a violent
assault against a female by a male relative for alleged sexual
misconduct; however, such honor killings are rare. In September a
former minister, Ali Saeed Al-Khayareen, killed his two half-sisters
for their alleged sexual misconduct. Al-Khayareen was being held at the
Al-Rayyan detention center, but reportedly was released late in the
year.
The activities of women are restricted closely both by law and
tradition. For example, a woman is prohibited from applying for a
driver's license unless she has permission from a male guardian. This
restriction does not apply to noncitizen women. The Government adheres
to Shari'a in matters of inheritance and child custody. While Muslim
wives have the right to inherit from their husbands, non-Muslim wives
do not, unless a special exception is arranged. In cases of divorce,
Shari'a prevails; younger children remain with the mother and older
children with the father. Both parents retain permanent rights of
visitation. However, local authorities do not allow a noncitizen parent
to take his or her child out of the country without permission of the
citizen parent. There has been a steady increase in the number and
severity of complaints of spousal abuse by the foreign wives of local
and foreign men. Women may attend court proceedings but generally are
represented by a male relative; however, women may represent
themselves.
Women largely are relegated to the roles of mother and homemaker,
but some women are now finding jobs in education, medicine, and the
news media. Women appear to receive equal pay for equal work; however,
they often do not receive equal allowances. These allowances generally
cover transportation and housing costs. Increasingly, women are
receiving government scholarships to pursue degrees at universities
overseas. The Amir has entrusted his second wife, who is the mother of
the Heir Apparent, with the high-profile task of establishing a
university in Doha. In 1996 the Government appointed its first female
undersecretary, in the Ministry of Education. Although women legally
are able to travel abroad alone (see Section 2.d.), tradition and
social pressures cause most to travel with male escorts. There also
have been complaints that Qatari husbands take their foreign spouses'
passports and, without prior approval, turn them in for Qatari
citizenship documents. The husbands then inform their wives that the
wives have lost their former citizenship. In other cases, foreign wives
report being forbidden by their Qatari husbands or in-laws to visit or
to contact foreign embassies.
There is no independent women's rights organization, nor has the
Government permitted the establishment of one.
Children.--The Government demonstrates its commitment to children's
rights through a well-funded, free public education system (elementary
through university) and a complete medical protection program for
Qatari children. However, children of most foreigners are denied free
education and have only limited medical coverage.
Very young children, usually of African or South Asian background,
have been used as jockeys in camel races. Little information is
available on wages and working conditions for these children (see
Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
There is no societal pattern of abuse of children.
People with Disabilities.--The Government has not enacted
legislation or otherwise mandated provision of accessibility for the
disabled, who also face social discrimination. The Government maintains
a hospital and schools that provide high-quality, free services to the
mentally and physically disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Shi'a Muslims fill many positions in the
bureaucracy and are prominent in business. However, they experience
discrimination in employment in some sensitive areas, such as security.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government discriminates
against some citizens of non-Qatari origin. In the private sector, many
citizens of Iranian origin occupy some of the highest positions.
However, they rarely are found in senior decisionmaking positions in
government.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The right of association is strictly
limited, and all workers, including foreigners, are prohibited from
forming labor unions. Despite this restriction, almost all workers have
the right to strike after their case has been presented to the Labor
Conciliation Board and ruled upon. Employers may close a place of work
or dismiss employees once the Conciliation Board has heard the case.
The right to strike does not exist for government employees, domestic
workers, or members of the employer's family. No worker in a public
utility or health or security service may strike if such a strike would
harm the public or lead to property damage. Strikes are rare.
The Labor Law provides for the establishment of joint consultative
committees composed of representatives of the employer and workers. The
committees do not discuss wages but may consider issues such as
organization and productivity, conditions of employment, training of
workers, and safety measures and their implementation.
Since 1995, Qatar has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
rights standards.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Workers are
prohibited from engaging in collective bargaining. In general wages are
set unilaterally by employers without government involvement. Local
courts handle disputes between workers and employers.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor. Three-quarters of the work force are
foreign workers, who are dependent on a single employer for residency
rights. This leaves them vulnerable to abuse. For instance, employers
must give consent before exit permits are issued to any foreign
employee seeking to leave the country. Some employers temporarily
withhold this consent to force foreign employees to work for longer
periods than they wish. The Government prohibits forced and bonded
labor by children and generally enforces this prohibition effectively;
however, some very young children work as jockeys in camel races (see
Sections 5 and 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Minors between the ages of 15 and 18 may be employed with
the approval of their parents or guardians and some children may work
in small, family-owned businesses. However, child labor is rare.
Education is compulsory through the age of 15. Very young children,
usually of African or South Asian background, are used as jockeys in
camel races (see Sections 5 and 6.c. and 6.f.). Little information is
available on wages and working conditions for these children. The
Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children and generally
enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
Minors may not work more than 6 hours a day or more than 36 hours a
week. Employers must provide the Ministry of Labor with the names and
occupations of their minor employees. The Ministry may prohibit the
employment of minors in jobs that are judged dangerous to the health,
safety, or morals of minors. Employers also must obtain permission from
the Ministry of Education to hire a minor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no minimum wage,
although a 1962 law gives the Amir authority to set one. The 48-hour
workweek with a 24-hour rest period is prescribed by law, although most
government offices follow a 36-hours-per-week work schedule. Employees
who work more than 48 hours per week, or 36 hours per week during the
Muslim month of Ramadan, are entitled to overtime pay. This law is
adhered to in government offices and major private sector companies. It
is not observed with respect to domestic and personal employees.
Domestic servants frequently work 7 days per week, more than 12 hours
per day, with few or no holidays, and have no effective way to redress
grievances against their employers.
The Government has enacted regulations concerning worker safety and
health, but enforcement, which is the responsibility of the Ministry of
Energy and Industry, is lax. The Department of Public Safety oversees
safety training and conditions, and the state-run petroleum company has
its own set of safety standards and procedures. The Labor Law of 1964,
as amended in 1984, lists partial and permanent disabilities for which
compensation may be awarded, some connected with handling chemicals and
petroleum products or construction injuries. The law does not
specifically set rates of payment and compensation.
Foreign workers must be sponsored by a citizen or a legally
recognized organization to obtain an entry visa and must have their
sponsor's permission to depart the country. Any worker may seek legal
relief from onerous work conditions, but domestic workers generally
accept their situations in order to avoid repatriation. The Government
also penalizes Qatari employers who violate residence and sponsorship
laws. Some foreign domestics have been mistreated by their employers
(see Section 5).
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no confirmed reports that persons were
trafficked in, to, or from the country during the year.
______
SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia is a monarchy without elected representative
institutions or political parties. It is ruled by King Fahd Bin Abd Al-
Aziz Al Saud, a son of King Abd Al-Aziz Al Saud, who unified the
country in the early 20th century. Since the death of King Abd Al-Aziz,
the King and Crown Prince have been chosen from among his sons, who
themselves have had preponderant influence in the choice. A 1992 royal
decree reserves for the King exclusive power to name the Crown Prince.
Crown Prince Abdullah has played an increasing role in governance since
King Fahd suffered from a stroke in 1995. The Government has declared
the Islamic holy book the Koran, and the Sunna (tradition) of the
Prophet Muhammad, to be the country's Constitution. The Government
bases its legitimacy on governance according to the precepts of a
rigorously conservative form of Islam. Neither the Government nor the
society in general accepts the concept of separation of religion and
state. The Government prohibits the establishment of political parties
and suppresses opposition views. In 1992 King Fahd appointed a
Consultative Council and similar provincial assemblies. The
Consultative Council began holding sessions in 1993 and was expanded in
1997. The judiciary is generally independent but is subject to
influence by the executive branch and members of the royal family.
Police and border forces under the Ministry of Interior are
responsible for internal security. The Mutawaa'in, or religious police,
constitute the Committee to Prevent Vice and Promote Virtue, a
semiautonomous agency that enforces adherence to Islamic norms by
monitoring public behavior. The Government maintains general control of
the security forces. However, members of the security forces committed
human rights abuses.
The oil industry has fueled the transformation of Saudi Arabia from
a pastoral, agricultural, and commercial society to a rapidly
urbanizing one characterized by large-scale infrastructure projects, an
extensive social welfare system, and a labor market comprised largely
of foreign workers. Oil revenues account for around 40 percent of the
gross domestic product (GDP) and 75 percent of government income.
Agriculture accounts for only about 9 percent of GDP. Government
spending, including spending on the national airline, power, water,
telephone, education, and health services, accounts for 24 percent of
GDP. About 40 percent of the economy is nominally private, and the
Government is promoting further privatization of the economy. In 1995
the Government began an aggressive campaign to increase the number of
Saudi nationals represented in the public and private work forces. The
campaign has restricted employment of some categories of foreign
workers by limiting certain occupations to Saudis only, increasing fees
for some types of work visas, and setting minimum wages for some job
categories in order to increase the cost to employers of non-Saudi
labor. In August 1998, the Government announced that Saudi citizens
must constitute at least 5 percent of the work force in private sector
companies by October 1998, an amount that, according to a 1995
ministerial decree, should be 15 percent. The Government's 1997 offer
of a limited amnesty under which illegal residents could depart the
country without penalty was followed up in 1998 and during the year by
a crackdown on illegal workers and the Saudis who employ or house them.
The Government commits and tolerates serious human rights abuses.
Citizens have neither the right nor the legal means to change their
government. Security forces continued to abuse detainees and prisoners,
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons, and facilitate incommunicado
detention; in addition there were allegations that security forces
committed torture. Prolonged detention without charge is a problem.
Security forces committed such abuses, in contradiction to the law, but
with the acquiescence of the Government. Mutawaa'in continued to
intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and foreigners. The Government
infringes on citizens' privacy rights. The Government prohibits or
restricts freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association,
religion, and movement. Other continuing problems included
discrimination and violence against women, discrimination against
ethnic and religious minorities, and strict limitations on worker
rights. The Government disagrees with internationally accepted
definitions of human rights and views its interpretation of Islamic law
as its sole source of guidance on human rights.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings during the year.
In November 1998, several Mutawaa'in attacked and killed an elderly
Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a
traditional Shi'a practice). Mutawaa'in attempts to cover up the
killing were unsuccessful. The Government reportedly is investigating
the incident; however, the Government does not make public the results
of investigations involving its personnel (see Sections 2.c. and 5.).
The investigation of the 1996 Al-Khobar bombing, which killed 19
U.S. servicemen, continued. The Government has not yet issued a report
of its findings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There were credible reports that the authorities abused
detainees, both citizens and foreigners. Ministry of Interior officials
are responsible for most incidents of abuse, including beatings and
sleep deprivation. In addition, there were allegations of torture.
Although the Government has ratified the Convention Against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, it has
refused to recognize the authority of the Committee Against Torture to
investigate alleged abuses. In April 1998, the Government pledged to
cooperate with U.N. human rights mechanisms. However, although the
Government asks for details of reports of torture and other human
rights abuses made by international human rights groups, it does not
permit international observers to investigate them. The Government's
general refusal to grant members of diplomatic missions access to the
Ministry of Interior detention facilities, or allow members of
international human rights groups into the country, hinders efforts to
confirm or discount reports of abuses. The Government's past failure to
criticize human rights abuses has contributed to the public perception
that security forces can commit abuses with impunity.
According to Amnesty International, in April a 70-year-old
journalist reportedly was beaten during interrogation after his return
to the country from Bahrain (see Section 2.a.).
Although the number of reports of harassment by the Mutawaa'in
remained relatively low in comparison with previous years, the
Mutawaa'in continued to intimidate, abuse, and detain citizens and
foreigners of both sexes (see Section l.d.).
The Government punishes criminals according to its interpretation
of Islamic law, or Shari'a. Punishments include flogging, amputation,
and execution by beheading, stoning, or firing squad. The authorities
acknowledged 100 executions during the year, a substantial increase
from 25 in 1998, but less than the 134 reported in 1997. Executions
included 36 men for murder (29 Saudis and 7 foreigners), 40 men for
narcotics-related offenses (2 Saudis and 38 foreigners), 3 men for
gang-related activities (2 Saudis and 1 foreigner), 8 men for rape (7
Saudis and 1 foreigner), 10 men for armed robbery (7 Saudis and 3
foreigners), and 3 women for narcotics-related offenses (all
foreigners). The men were executed by beheading and the women were
executed by firing squad. There were no executions by stoning. In
accordance with Shari'a, the authorities may punish repeated thievery
by amputation of the right hand. There were two reports of multiple
amputations (right hand, left leg) for the crime of highway robbery
during the year. The amputations were carried out against two Saudi
men. Persons convicted of less serious offenses, such as alcohol
related offenses or being alone in the company of an unrelated person
of the opposite sex, sometimes were punished by flogging with a cane.
Prison and jail conditions vary throughout the Kingdom. Prisons
generally meet internationally accepted standards and provide air-
conditioned cells, good nutrition, regular exercise, and careful
patrolling by prison guards. However, some police station jails are
overcrowded and unsanitary. Authorities generally allowed family
members access to detainees.
Boards of Investigation and Public Prosecution, organized on a
regional basis, were established by King Fahd in 1993. The members of
these boards have the right to inspect prisons, review prisoners'
files, and hear their complaints. However, the Government does not
permit human rights monitors to visit prisons or jails. The Government
does not allow impartial observers of any type access to specialized
Ministry of Interior prisons, where it detains persons accused of
political subversion.
Representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) are present at the Rafha refugee camp, which houses
former Iraqi prisoners of war and civilians who fled Iraq following the
Gulf War. According to UNHCR officials, there wasno systematic abuse of
refugees by camp guards. When isolated instances of abuse have surfaced
in the past, the authorities have been responsive and willing to
investigate allegations and reprimand offending guards. The camp
receives a high level of material assistance and is comparatively
comfortable and well run. However, the Government generally confines
refugees to the camp except in the event of approved emigration.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law prohibits
arbitrary arrest; however, officers make arrests and detain persons
without following explicit legal guidelines. There are few procedures
to safeguard against abuse. There have been few cases of citizens
successfully obtaining judicial redress for abuse of the Government's
power of arrest and detention. During the year, a citizen successfully
sued a government official for wrongful imprisonment and was awarded
compensation, while the government official was imprisoned.
In accordance with a 1983 Ministry of Interior regulation,
authorities usually detain suspects for no longer than 3 days before
charging them. However, serious exceptions have been reported. The
regulation also has provisions for bail for less serious crimes. Also,
authorities sometimes release detainees on the recognizance of a patron
or sponsoring employer without the payment of bail. If they are not
released, authorities typically detain accused persons for an average
of 2 months before sending the case to trial or, in the case of some
foreigners, summarily deporting them. There is no established procedure
providing detainees the right to inform their family of their arrest.
The Mutawaa'in have the authority to detain persons for no more
than 24 hours for violations of the strict standards of proper dress
and behavior. However, they sometimes exceeded this limit before
delivering detainees to the police (see Section l.f.). Current
procedures require a police officer to accompany the Mutawaa'in at the
time of an arrest. Mutawaa'in generally complied with this requirement.
During the year, in the more conservative Riyadh district, the number
of reports received of Mutawaa'in accosting, abusing, arresting, and
detaining persons alleged to have violated dress and behavior standards
was the same as in 1998. The Jeddah district also received a similar
number of reports as in the previous year.
In October the Government detained 13 Filipino Christians in
connection with a large prayer service held by their congregation (see
Section 2.c.).
Political detainees who are arrested by the General Directorate of
Investigation (GDI), the Ministry of Interior's security service,
commonly are held incommunicado in special prisons during the initial
phase of an investigation, which may last weeks or months. The GDI
allows the detainees only limited contact with their families or
lawyers.
The authorities may detain without charge persons who publicly
criticize the Government, or may charge them with attempting to
destabilize the Government (see Sections 2.a. and 3). The authorities
in June released Salman Al-Awdah and Safar Al-Hawali, Muslim clerics
who were arrested in September 1994 for publicly criticizing the
Government. Their detention that year sparked protest demonstrations
that resulted in the arrest of 157 persons for antigovernment
activities. All now have been released.
In January the Government released, under its annual Ramadan
amnesty, over 7,000 prisoners and detainees, including over 3,000
foreigners convicted or held for minor offenses.
The total number of political detainees cannot be determined
precisely, but it is estimated at less than 200 persons by
international human rights organizations.
Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of a U.S.
military facility in Saudi Arabia, authorities have detained,
interrogated, and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a
Muslims suspected of fundamentalist tendencies or Iranian sympathies.
The Government reportedly still holds in jail an unknown number of
Shi'a arrested in the aftermath of the bombing. Government security
forces reportedly arrest Shi'a on the smallest suspicion, hold them in
custody for lengthy periods, and then release them without explanation
(see Section 2.c.).
The Government did not use forced exile, and it did not revoke
citizenship for political purposes during the year. However, it
previously has revoked the citizenship of opponents of the Government
who reside outside the country, such as Mohammed Al-Masari (see Section
3) and Osama Bin Ladin, a suspect in organizing terrorist activities,
including the August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The independence of the judiciary
is prescribed by law and usually is respected in practice; however,
judges occasionally accede to the influence of the executive branch,
particularly members of the royal family and their associates, who are
not required to appear before the courts. Moreover, the Ministry of
Justice exercises judicial, financial, and administrative control of
the courts.
The legal system is based on Shari'a. Shari'a courts exercise
jurisdiction over common criminal cases and civil suits regarding
marriage, divorce, child custody, and inheritance. These courts base
judgments largely on the Koran and on the Sunna, another Islamic text.
Cases involving relatively small penalties are tried in Shari'a summary
courts; more serious crimes are adjudicated in Shari'a courts of common
pleas. Appeals from Shari'a courts are made to the courts of appeal.
Other civil proceedings, including those involving claims against
the Government and enforcement of foreign judgments, are held before
specialized administrative tribunals, such as the Commission for the
Settlement of Labor Disputes and the Board of Grievances.
The Government permits Shi'a Muslims to use their own legal
tradition to adjudicate noncriminal cases within their community.
The military justice system has jurisdiction over uniformed
personnel and civil servants who are charged with violations of
military regulations. The Minister of Defense and Aviation and the King
review the decisions of courts-martial.
The Supreme Judicial Council is not a court and may not reverse
decisions made by a court of appeals. However, the Council may review
lower court decisions and refer them back to the lower court for
reconsideration. Only the Supreme Judicial Council may discipline or
remove a judge. The King appoints the members of the Council.
The Council of Senior Religious Scholars is an autonomous body of
20 senior religious jurists, including the Minister of Justice. It
establishes the legal principles to guide lower-court judges in
deciding cases.
Defendants usually appear without an attorney before a judge, who
determines guilt or innocence in accordance with Shari'a standards.
Defense lawyers may offer their clients advice before trial or may
attend the trial as interpreters for those unfamiliar with Arabic. The
courts do not provide foreign defendants with translators. Public
defenders are not provided. Individuals may choose any person to
represent them by a power of attorney filed with the court and the
Ministry of Justice. Most trials are closed. However, in a highly
publicized 1997 case involving two foreign women charged with murder,
the Saudi court conducted preliminary matters and the trial with
relatively open and transparent procedures, including more effective
use of counsel, increased consular presence, and increased family
access.
A woman's testimony does not carry the same weight as that of a
man. In a Shari'a court, the testimony of one man equals that of two
women. In the absence of two witnesses, or four witnesses in the case
of adultery, confessions before a judge almost always are required for
criminal conviction--a situation that repeatedly has led prosecuting
authorities to coerce confessions from suspects by threats and abuse.
Sentencing is not uniform. Foreign residents sometimes receive
harsher penalties than citizens. Under Shari'a, as interpreted and
applied in Saudi Arabia, crimes against Muslims receive harsher
penalties than those against non-Muslims. In the case of wrongful
death, the amount of indemnity or ``blood money'' awarded to relatives
varies with the nationality, religion, and sex of the victim. A
sentence may be changed at any stage of review, except for punishments
stipulated by the Koran. In a case that was known widely but was not
reported in the press, a member of the royal family, who shot and
killed two Mutawaa'in who had entered his property without permission
in October 1998, was allowed to pay ``blood money'' to the family
members of the Mutawaa'in instead of being charged with murder.
Provincial governors have the authority to exercise leniency and
reduce a judge's sentence. In general, members of the royal family, and
other powerful families, are not subject to the same rule of law as
ordinary citizens (see Section 1.a.). For example, judges do not have
the power to issue a warrant summoning any member of the royal family.
The King and his advisors review cases involving capital
punishment. The King has the authority to commute death sentences and
grant pardons, except for capital crimes committedagainst individuals.
In such cases, he may request the victim's next of kin to pardon the
murderer--usually in return for compensation from the family or the
King.
There is insufficient information to determine the number of
political prisoners. The Government does not provide information on
such persons or respond to inquiries about them. Moreover, the
Government conducts closed trials for persons who may be political
prisoners and in other cases has detained persons incommunicado for
long periods while under investigation.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government infringes on these rights. The sanctity
of family life and the inviolability of the home are among the most
fundamental of Islamic precepts. Royal decrees announced in 1992
include provisions calling for the Government to defend the home from
unlawful intrusions. Nonetheless, there are few protections from
government interference with one's privacy, family, home, or
correspondence.
The police generally must demonstrate reasonable cause and obtain
permission from the provincial governor before searching a private
home; however, warrants are not required.
Customs officials routinely open mail and shipments to search for
contraband, including material deemed pornographic and non-Muslim
religious material. Customs officials confiscated or censored materials
considered offensive, including Christian Bibles and religious video
tapes (see Section 2.c.). The authorities also open mail and use
informants and wiretaps in internal security and criminal matters.
Security forces used wiretaps against foreigners suspected of alcohol-
related offenses. Informants (know as ``umdas'') report ``seditious
ideas'' or antigovernment activity in their neighborhoods to the
Ministry of the Interior.
The Government enforces most social and Islamic religious norms,
which are matters of law (see Section 5). Women may not marry non-
Saudis without government permission; men must obtain approval from the
Ministry of Interior to marry women from countries outside the six
states of the Gulf Cooperation Council. In accordance with Shari'a,
women are prohibited from marrying non-Muslims; men may marry
Christians and Jews, as well as Muslims.
Mutawaa'in practices and incidents of abuse varied widely in
different regions of the country, but were most numerous in the central
Nejd region. In certain areas, both the Mutawaa'in and religious
vigilantes acting on their own harassed, assaulted, battered, arrested,
and detained citizens and foreigners (see Section 1.d.). The Government
requires the Mutawaa'in to follow established procedures and to offer
instruction in a polite manner; however, Mutawaa'in did not always
comply with the requirements. The Government has not criticized
publicly abuses by Mutawaa'in and religious vigilantes, but has sought
to curtail these abuses.
Mutawaa'in enforcement of strict standards of social behavior
included the closing of commercial establishments during the five daily
prayer observances, insisting upon compliance with strict norms of
public dress, and dispersing gatherings of women in public places.
Mutawaa'in frequently reproached Saudi and foreign women for failure to
observe strict dress codes, and arrested men and women found together
who were not married or closely related.
Some professors believe that informers monitor comments made in
university classrooms (see Section 2.a.).
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government severely limits
freedom of speech and the press. The authorities do not countenance
criticism of Islam, the ruling family, or the Government. However,
during the year, the authorities again allowed the press some freedom
to criticize governmental bodies and social policies through editorial
comments and cartoons. Persons whose criticisms align them with an
organized political opposition are subject to arrest and detention
until they confess to a crime or sign a statement promising not to
resume such criticisms, which is tantamount to a confession.
The print media are privately owned but publicly subsidized. A 1982
media policy statement and a 1965 national security law prohibit the
dissemination of criticism of the Government. The media policy
statement urges journalists to uphold Islam, oppose atheism, promote
Arab interests, and preserve the cultural heritage of Saudi Arabia. The
Ministry of Information appoints,and may remove, the editors in chief.
It also provides guidelines to newspapers on controversial issues. The
Government owns the Saudi Press Agency (SPA), which expresses official
government views.
Newspapers typically publish news on sensitive subjects, such as
crime or terrorism, only after it has been released by the SPA or when
it has been authorized by a senior government official. Two Saudi-
owned, London-based dailies, Ash-Sharq Al-Awsat and Al-Hayat, are
widely distributed and read in Saudi Arabia. Both newspapers tend to
practice self-censorship in order to comply with government
restrictions on sensitive issues. The authorities continue to censor
stories about Saudi Arabia in the foreign press. Censors may remove or
blacken the offending articles, glue pages together, or prevent certain
issues of foreign publications from entering the market. However, the
Ministry of Information continued to relax its blackout policy
regarding politically sensitive news concerning Saudi Arabia reported
in the international media, although press restrictions on reporting of
domestic news remain very stringent. The Government's policy in this
regard appears to be motivated in part by pragmatic considerations:
Saudi access to outside sources of information, especially the Cable
News Network (CNN) and other satellite television channels, is
increasingly widespread.
According to Amnesty International, in April a 70-year-old
journalist reportedly was beaten during interrogation after his return
to the country from Bahrain (see Section 1.c.).
The Government tightly restricts the entry of foreign journalists
into the Kingdom. The Government owns and operates the television and
radio companies. Government censors remove any reference to politics,
religions other than Islam, pork or pigs, alcohol, and sex from foreign
programs and songs.
There are well over 1 million satellite receiving dishes in the
country, which provide citizens with foreign broadcasts. The legal
status of these devices is ambiguous. The Government ordered a halt to
their importation in 1992 at the request of religious leaders who
objected to foreign programming being made available on satellite
channels. In 1994 the Government banned the sale, installation, and
maintenance of dishes and supporting devices, but the number of dishes
continues to increase and residents legally may subscribe to satellite
decoding services that require a dish.
The Government bans all books, magazines, and other materials that
it considers sexual or pornographic in nature. The Ministry of
Information compiles and updates a list of publications that are
prohibited from being sold in the country. Access to the Internet is
available through Saudi servers or through servers in other Gulf
countries. The Government attempts to block all web sites that it deems
sexual, pornographic, or otherwise offensive or un-Islamic. However,
such web sites are accessible readily from within the country.
The Government censors all forms of public artistic expression and
prohibits cinemas and public musical or theatrical performances, except
those that are considered folkloric.
Academic freedom is restricted. The authorities prohibit the study
of evolution, Freud, Marx, Western music, and Western philosophy. Some
professors believe that informers monitor their classroom comments and
report to government and religious authorities.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
strictly limits freedom of assembly. It prohibits public demonstrations
as a means of political expression. Public meetings are segregated by
sex. Unless meetings are sponsored by diplomatic missions or approved
by the appropriate governor, foreign residents who seek to hold
unsegregated meetings risk arrest and deportation. The authorities
monitor any large gathering of persons, especially of women. The
Mutawaa'in dispersed groups of women found in public places, such as
restaurants. Government policy permits women to attend cultural and
social events at diplomatic chanceries and residences only if they are
accompanied by a father, brother, or husband. However, in practice
police often implement the policy in an arbitrary manner. On many
occasions during the year, authorities actively prohibited women from
entering diplomatic chanceries or residences to attend cultural events
and lectures. However, in May for the second year in a row, authorities
allowed unescorted Saudi women to attend a women-only cultural event
hosted at a diplomatic mission.
The Government strictly limits freedom of association. It prohibits
the establishment of political parties or any type of opposition group
(see Section 3). By its power to license associations, the Government
ensures that groups conform to public policy.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion does not exist. Islam
is the official religion, and all citizens must be Muslims. The
Government prohibits the public practice of other religions. Private
non-Muslim worship is permitted.
Conversion by a Muslim to another religion is considered apostasy.
Public apostasy is a crime under Shari'a and punishable by death.
Islamic practice generally is limited to that of the Wahhabi order,
which adheres to the Hanbali school of the Sunni branch of Islam as
interpreted by Muhammad Ibn Al-Wahab, an 18th century religious
reformer. Practices contrary to this interpretation, such as visits to
the tombs of renowned Muslims, are discouraged.
The Ministry of Islamic Affairs directly supervises, and is a major
source of funds for, the construction and maintenance of almost all
mosques in the country. The Ministry pays the salaries of imams (prayer
leaders) and others who work in the mosques. A governmental committee
is responsible for defining the qualifications of imams. The Mutawaa'in
receive their funding from the Government, and the general president of
the Mutawaa'in holds the rank of cabinet minister. During the year,
foreign imams were barred from leading worship during the most heavily
attended prayer times and prohibited from delivering sermons during
Friday congregational prayers. The Government claims that its actions
were part of its Saudiization plan to replace foreign workers with
citizens.
The Shi'a Muslim minority (roughly 500,000 of nearly 14 million
citizens) lives mostly in the eastern province. Its members are the
objects of officially sanctioned political and economic discrimination
(see Section 5). However, the Government for the first time appointed a
Shi'a ambassador. Prior to 1990, the Government prohibited Shi'a public
processions during the Islamic month of Muharram and restricted other
processions and congregations to designated areas in the major Shi'a
cities. Since 1990 the authorities have permitted marches on the Shi'a
holiday of Ashura, provided that the marchers do not display banners or
engage in self-flagellation. Ashura commemorations took place during
the year, again without incident, as in the previous year. The
Government seldom permits private construction of Shi'a mosques. The
Shi'a have declined government offers to build state-supported mosques
because the Government would prohibit the incorporation and display of
Shi'a motifs in any such mosques.
In November 1998 several Mutawaa'in attacked and killed an elderly
Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a
traditional Shi'a practice). Mutawaa'in attempts to cover up the
killing were unsuccessful. The Government reportedly is investigating
the incident; however, the Government does not make public the results
of investigations involving its personnel (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
The Government reportedly still holds in jail an unknown number of
Shi'a who were arrested in the aftermath of the Al-Khobar bombing.
Government security forces reportedly arrest Shi'a on the smallest
suspicion, hold them in custody for lengthy periods, and then release
them without explanation (see Section 1.d.).
The Government does not permit public non-Muslim religious
activities. Non-Muslim worshippers risk arrest, lashing, and
deportation for engaging in overt religious activity that attracts
official attention. In 1997 for the first time, a senior Saudi leader
stated publicly that the Government does not ``prevent'' private non-
Muslim religious worship in the home. Such private non-Muslim worship
occurs on a wide scale through the country, including on the premises
of several embassies. Other high level Saudi authorities have stated
that the Government's policy allows for private non-Muslim worship and
that the Government does not sanction investigation or harassment of
such private worship services. However, on October 8, the Mutawaa'in
detained 13 Filipino Christians after raiding their worship services
because of reports that two congregations recently had held a prayer
service for 1,000 persons. The detained Christians all were released by
October 31, and were given 4 to 6 weeks to prepare for deportation.
They all were deported by year's end. The Government ascribes some
harassment of private worship services to individuals and organizations
acting on their own authority and in contradiction of government
policy. Representatives of many Christian denominations present in the
country report that the Government is not interfering with their
private worship services.
Proselytizing is illegal. There were two cases during the year in
which the police detained foreign Christian activists. In May the
Mutawaa'in raided the apartment of a Filipino Christian pastor and
detained him for proselytizing. He was released anddeported in July.
Another Filipino was arrested for proselytizing in July and deported in
August.
Persons wearing religious symbols of any kind in public risk
confrontation with the Mutawaa'in. This general prohibition against
religious symbols also applies to Muslims. A Christian wearing a
crucifix or a Muslim wearing a Koranic necklace in public would be
admonished.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government restricts the travel of
Saudi women, who must obtain written permission from their closest male
relative before the authorities allow them to board domestic public
transportation or to travel abroad (see Section 5). In November the
Ministry of Interior announced that preparations are underway to issue
identity cards to women, which presumably will allow them to establish
independent legal identities from men, a prerequisite to securing
greater rights in many areas, including travel; however, no action was
taken on the matter by year's end. Males may travel anywhere within the
country or abroad.
Foreigners typically are allowed to reside or work in Saudi Arabia
only under the sponsorship of a Saudi national or business. The
Government requires foreign residents to carry identification cards. It
does not permit foreigners to travel outside the city of their
employment or change their workplace without their sponsor's
permission. Foreign residents who travel within the country may be
asked by the authorities to show that they possess letters of
permission from their employer or sponsor.
Sponsors generally retain possession of foreign workers' passports.
Foreign workers must obtain permission from their sponsors to travel
abroad. If sponsors are involved in a commercial or labor dispute with
foreign employees, they may ask the authorities to prohibit the
employees from departing the country until the dispute is resolved.
Some sponsors use this as a pressure tactic to resolve disputes in
their favor or to have foreign employees deported. There were numerous
reports of the Government prohibiting foreign employees involved in
labor disputes from departing the country until the dispute was
resolved (see Section 5).
The Government seizes the passports of all potential suspects and
witnesses in criminal cases and suspends the issuance of exit visas to
them until the case is tried or otherwise concluded. As a result, some
foreign nationals are forced to remain in the country for lengthy
periods against their will. The authorities sometimes confiscate the
passports of suspected oppositionists and their families. The
Government actively discourages Shi'a travel to Iran to visit
pilgrimage sites. The Government still punishes Shi'a who travel to
Iran without permission from the Ministry of the Interior, or those
suspected of such travel, by confiscating passports for up to 2 years
(see Section 5).
Citizens may emigrate, but the law prohibits dual citizenship.
Apart from marriage to a Saudi national, there are no provisions for
foreign residents to acquire citizenship. However, foreigners are
granted citizenship in rare cases, generally through the advocacy of an
influential patron.
The 1992 Basic Law provides that ``the state will grant political
asylum if the public interest mitigates'' in favor of it. The language
does not specify clear rules for adjudicating asylum cases. In general,
the authorities regard refugees and displaced persons like other
foreign workers: they must have sponsors for employment or risk
expulsion. Of the 33,000 Iraqi civilians and former prisoners of war
allowed refuge in Saudi Arabia at the end of the Gulf War, none has
been granted permanent asylum in the country; however, the Government
has underwritten the entire cost of providing safe haven to the Iraqi
refugees, and continues to provide excellent logistical and
administrative support to the UNHCR and other resettlement agencies.
At year's end, approximately 27,000 of the original 33,000 Iraqi
refugees had been resettled in other countries or voluntarily
repatriated to Iraq. Most of the approximately 6,000 remaining refugees
are restricted to the Rafha refugee camp. The UNHCR has monitored over
3,000 persons voluntarily returning to Iraq from Rafha since December
1991 and found no evidence of forcible repatriation (see Section 1.c.).
The Government has allowed some foreigners to remain temporarily in
the country in cases where their safety would be jeopardized if they
were deported to their home countries.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not have the right to change their government. There
are no formal democratic institutions, and only a few citizens have a
voice in the choice of leaders or in changing the political system. The
King rules on civil and religious matters within certain limitations
established by religious law, tradition, and the need to maintain
consensus among the ruling family and religious leaders.
The King is also the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince serves as
Deputy Prime Minister. The King appoints all other ministers, who in
turn appoint subordinate officials with cabinet concurrence. In 1992
the King appointed 60 members to a Consultative Council, or Majlis Ash-
Shura. This strictly advisory body began to hold sessions in 1993. In
1997 the King expanded the council to 90 members. There is one Shi'a on
the Council. The Council engages in debates that, while closed to the
view of the general public, provide advice and views occasionally
contrary to the Government's proposed policy or recommended course of
action. The Government usually incorporates the Majlis' advice into its
final policy announcements or tries to convince the council why the
Government's policy is correct.
The Council of Senior Islamic Scholars is another advisory body to
the King and the Cabinet. It reviews the Government's public policies
for compliance with Shari'a. The Government views the Council as an
important source of religious legitimacy and takes the Council's
opinions into account when promulgating legislation.
Communication between citizens and the Government usually is
expressed through client-patron relationships and by affinity groups
such as tribes, families, and professional hierarchies. In theory, any
male citizen or foreign national may express an opinion or air a
grievance at a majlis, an open-door meeting held by the King, a prince,
or an important national or local official. However, as governmental
functions have become more complex, time-consuming, and centralized,
public access to senior officials has become more restricted. Since the
assassination of King Faisal in 1975, Saudi kings have reduced the
frequency of their personal contacts with the public. Ministers and
district governors more readily grant audiences at a majlis.
Typical topics raised in a majlis are complaints about bureaucratic
delay or insensitivity, requests for personal redress or assistance,
and criticism of particular acts of government affecting family
welfare. Broader ``political'' concerns--social, economic, or foreign
policy--rarely are raised. Complaints about royal abuses of power are
not entertained. In general, journalists, academics, and businessmen
believe that institutionalized avenues of domestic criticism of the
regime are closed. Feedback is filtered through private personal
channels and has affected various policy issues, including the Middle
East peace process, unemployment of young Saudi men, and the
construction of new infrastructure.
The Committee for the Defense of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), an
opposition group, was established in 1993. The Government acted almost
immediately to repress it. In 1994 one of its founding members,
Mohammed Al-Masari, fled to the United Kingdom, where he sought
political asylum and established an overseas branch of the CDLR. In
1996 internal divisions within the CDLR led to the creation of the
rival Islamic Reform Movement (IRM), headed by Sa'ad Al-Faqih. Al-
Masari expressed the CDLR's ``understanding'' of two fatal terrorist
bombings of U.S. military facilities in 1995 and 1996 and sympathy for
the perpetrators. The IRM implicitly condoned the two terrorist attacks
as well, arguing that they were a natural outgrowth of a political
system that does not tolerate peaceful dissent. Both groups continue to
criticize the Government, using computers and facsimile transmissions
to send newsletters back to Saudi Arabia.
Women play no formal role in government and politics and are
actively discouraged from doing so. Participation by women in a majlis
is restricted, although some women seek redress through female members
of the royal family.
One of the 90 members of the Majlis Ash-Shura is Shi'a.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no publicly active human rights groups, and the
Government has made it clear that none critical of government policies
would be permitted. Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
reported that they received no responses to their requests for
information or access to the country.
The Government does not permit visits by international human rights
groups or independent monitors. The Government disagrees with
internationally accepted definitions of human rights and views its
interpretation of Islamic law as the only necessary guide to protect
human rights. The Government generally ignores, or condemns as attacks
on Islam, citations of Saudi human rights abuses by international
monitors or foreign governments. However, in April 1998, the Government
provided a 51-page treatise on the functioning of its legal system to
the U.N. Commission on Human Rights and pledged cooperation with U.N.
human rights mechanisms. Early in the year, the Government set up a
human rights office within the International Office Department of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to attempt to monitor conditions within
the country.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
There is legal and systemic discrimination based on sex and
religion. The law forbids discrimination based on race, but not
nationality. The Government and private organizations cooperate in
providing services for the disabled. The Shi'a religious minority
suffers social, legal, and sectarian discrimination.
Women.--The Government does not keep statistics on spousal abuse or
other forms of violence against women. However, based on the
information available regarding physical spousal abuse and violence
against women, such violence and abuse appear to be common problems.
Hospital workers report that many women are admitted for treatment of
injuries that apparently result from spousal violence. Some foreign
women have suffered physical abuse from their Saudi husbands. A Saudi
man can prevent his wife and any child or unmarried adult daughter from
obtaining an exit visa to depart Saudi Arabia (see Section 2.d.). There
were reports during the year that young Saudi men intimidated and
sexually harassed women in public in Jeddah.
Foreign embassies continued to receive many reports that employers
abuse foreign women working as domestic servants. Some embassies of
countries with large domestic servant populations maintain safehouses
to which their citizens may flee to escape work situations that include
forced confinement, withholding of food, beating and other physical
abuse, and rape. Often the reported abuse is at the hands of female
Saudis. In general, the Government considers such cases family matters
and does not intervene unless charges of abuse are brought to its
attention. It is almost impossible for foreign women to obtain redress
in the courts due to the courts' strict evidentiary rules and the
women's own fears of reprisals. Few employers have been punished for
such abuses. There are no private support groups or religious
associations to assist such women.
By religious law and social custom, women have the right to own
property and are entitled to financial support from their husbands or
male relatives. However, women have few political or social rights and
are not treated as equal members of society. There are no active
women's rights groups. Women, including foreigners, legally may not
drive motor vehicles and are restricted in their use of public
facilities when men are present. Women must enter city buses by
separate rear entrances and sit in specially designated sections. Women
risk arrest by the Mutawaa'in for riding in a vehicle driven by a male
who is not an employee or a close male relative. Women are not admitted
to a hospital for medical treatment without the consent of a male
relative. By law and custom, women may not undertake domestic or
foreign travel alone (see Section 2.d.). However, in November the
Ministry of Interior announced that preparations are underway to issue
identity cards to women. Issuance of the cards presumably will allow
women to establish independent legal identities from men, a
prerequisite to securing greater rights in many areas, including
travel, financial transactions, business registrations, publishing,
employment, and, eventually, driving. However, no action on the matter
had been taken by year's end.
In public a woman is expected to wear an abaya, a black garment
that covers the entire body, and also to cover her head and face. The
Mutawaa'in generally expect women from Arab countries, Asia, and Africa
to comply more fully with Saudi customs of dress than they do Western
women; nonetheless, in recent years they have instructed Western women
to wear the abaya and cover their hair. During the year, Mutawaa'in
continued to admonish and harass women to wear their abayas and cover
their hair.
Some government officials and ministries still bar accredited
female diplomats in Saudi Arabia from official meetings and diplomatic
functions.
Women also are subject to discrimination under Shari'a as
interpreted in Saudi Arabia, which stipulates that daughters receive
half the inheritance awarded to their brothers. In aShari'a court, the
testimony of one man equals that of two women (see Section 1.e.).
Although Islamic law permits polygyny, with up to four wives, it is
becoming less common due to demographic and economic changes. Islamic
law enjoins a man to treat each wife equally. In practice such equality
is left to the discretion of the husband. Some women participate in Al-
Mesyar (or ``short daytime visit'') marriages, where the women
relinquish their legal rights to financial support and nighttime
cohabitation. Additionally, the husband is not required to inform his
other wives of the marriage, and any children resulting from such a
marriage have no inheritance rights. The Government places greater
restrictions on women than on men regarding marriage to non-Saudis and
non-Muslims (see Section 1.f.). While Shari'a provides women with a
basis to own and dispose of property independently, women often are
constrained from asserting such rights because of various legal and
societal barriers, especially regarding employment and freedom of
movement.
Women must demonstrate legally specified grounds for divorce, but
men may divorce without giving cause. In doing so, men are required to
pay immediately an amount of money agreed upon at the time of the
marriage, which serves as a one-time alimony payment. Women who
demonstrate legal grounds for divorce still are entitled to this
alimony. If divorced or widowed, a Muslim woman normally may keep her
children until they attain a specified age: 7 years for boys, 9 years
for girls. Children over these ages are awarded to the divorced husband
or the deceased husband's family. Numerous divorced foreign women
continued to be prevented by their former husbands from visiting their
children after divorce.
Women have access to free but segregated education through the
university level. They constitute over 58 percent of all university
students but are excluded from studying such subjects as engineering,
journalism, and architecture. Men may study overseas; women may do so
only if accompanied by a spouse or an immediate male relative.
Women make up approximately 5 percent of the formal work force and
own about 4 percent of the businesses, although they must deputize a
male relative to represent the business. Most employment opportunities
for women are in education and health care, with lesser opportunity in
business, philanthropy, banking, retail sales, and the media. Many
foreign women work as domestic servants and nurses. In 1997 the
Government authorized women to work in a limited capacity in the hotel
industry. Women who wish to enter nontraditional fields are subject to
discrimination. Women may not accept jobs in rural areas if they are
required to live apart from their families. Most workplaces where women
are present are segregated by sex. Contact with male supervisors or
clients is allowed by telephone or facsimile machine. In 1995 the
Ministry of Commerce announced that women would no longer be issued
business licenses for work in fields that might require them to
supervise foreign workers, interact with male clients, or deal on a
regular basis with government officials. However, in hospital settings
and in the oil industry, women and men work together, and in some
instances, women supervise male employees.
Children.--The Government provides all children with free education
and medical care. Children are not subject to the strict social
segregation faced by women, although they are segregated by sex in
schools starting at the age of 7. In more general social situations,
boys are segregated at the age of 12 and girls at the onset of puberty.
It is difficult to gauge the prevalence of child abuse, since the
Government currently keeps no national statistics on such cases. One
major hospital has begun a program to detect, report, and prevent child
abuse. In general, Saudi culture greatly prizes children and initial
studies show that severe abuse and neglect of children appears to be
rare.
Trafficking in children for forced begging persists (see Sections
6.c. and 6.f.).
People With Disabilities.--The provision of government social
services increasingly has brought the disabled into the public
mainstream. The media carry features lauding the accomplishments of
disabled persons and sharply criticizing parents who neglect disabled
children. The Government and private charitable organizations cooperate
in education, employment, and other services for the disabled. The law
provides hiring quotas for the disabled. There is no legislation that
mandates public accessibility; however, newer commercial buildings
often include such access.
Foreign criminal rings reportedly bought and imported disabled
children for the purpose of forced begging (see Sections 6.c. and
6.f.).
Religious Minorities.--Shi'a citizens are discriminated against in
government and employment, especially in national security jobs.
Several years ago the Government subjected Shi'a to employment
restrictions in the oil industry and has not relaxed them. Since the
1979 Iranian revolution, some Shi'a who are suspected of subversion
have been subjected periodically to surveillance and limitations on
travel abroad. Since beginning the investigation of the 1996 bombing of
a U.S. military installation, authorities have detained, interrogated,
and confiscated the passports of a number of Shi'a Muslims, including
Shi'a returning to Saudi Arabia following travel to Iran (see Sections
1.d. and 2.d.).
In November 1998, several Mutawaa'in attacked and killed an elderly
Shi'a prayer leader in Hofuf for repeating the call to prayer twice (a
traditional Shi'a practice). The Government reportedly is investigating
the incident; however, the Government does not make public the results
of investigations involving its personnel (see Sections 1.a. and 2.c.).
Under Saudi law, children of Saudi fathers are considered Muslim,
regardless of the country or the religious tradition in which they may
have been raised. In some cases, children raised in other countries and
in other religious traditions later taken by their Saudi fathers to
Saudi Arabia were reportedly coerced to conform to Islamic norms and
practices.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Although racial discrimination
is illegal, there is substantial societal prejudice based on ethnic or
national origin. Foreign workers from Africa and Asia are subject to
various forms of formal and informal discrimination and have the most
difficulty in obtaining justice for their grievances. For example, pay
scales for identical or similar labor or professional services are set
by nationality such that two similarly qualified and experienced
foreign nationals performing the same employment duties receive varied
compensation based on their nationalities (see Section 6.b.).
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Government decrees prohibit the
establishment of labor unions and any strike activity.
In 1995 Saudi Arabia was suspended from the U.S. Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC) insurance programs because of the
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
rights standards.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is forbidden. Foreign workers comprise about two-thirds of
the work force. There is no minimum wage; wages are set by employers
and vary according to the type of work performed and the nationality of
the worker (see Section 5).
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
prohibits forced or compulsory labor pursuant to a 1962 royal decree
that abolished slavery. Ratification of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Conventions 29 and 105, which prohibit forced labor,
gives them the force of law. However, employers have significant
control over the movements of foreign employees, which gives rise to
situations that sometimes involve forced labor, especially in remote
areas where workers are unable to leave their place of work.
Some sponsors prevented foreign workers from obtaining exit visas
to pressure them to sign a new work contract or to drop claims against
their employers for unpaid salary (see section 2.d.). In another
pressure tactic, some sponsors refused to provide foreign workers with
a ``letter of no objection'' that would allow them to be employed by
another sponsor.
The labor laws do not protect domestic servants. There were
credible reports that female domestic servants sometimes were forced to
work 12 to 16 hours per day, 7 days per week. There were numerous
confirmed reports of runaway maids (see Section 5). The authorities
often returned runaway maids to their employers against the maids'
wishes.
There have been many reports of workers whose employers refused to
pay several months, or even years, of accumulated salary or other
promised benefits. Nondomestic workers with such grievances have the
right to complain before the labor courts, but few do so because of
fear of deportation. The labor system is conducive to the exploitation
of foreign workers because enforcement of work contracts is difficult
and generally favors employers. Labor courts, while generally fair, may
take many months to reach a final appellate ruling, during which time
the employer may prevent the foreign laborer from leaving the country.
An employer also may delay a case until a worker's funds are exhausted
and the worker is forced to return to his home country.
The law does not specifically prohibit forced or bonded labor by
children. Nonetheless, with the rare exception of criminal begging
rings, and the possible exceptions of family businesses, forced or
bonded child labor does not occur (see Section 6.d.). In 1997 the
Government actively sought to eradicate forced child begging. Criminal
rings consisting almost exclusively of foreigners bought and imported
South Asian children for the purpose of forced begging (see Section
6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment is 13 years of age, which
may be waived by the Ministry of Labor with the consent of the
juvenile's guardian. There is no minimum age for workers employed in
family oriented businesses or in other areas that are construed as
extensions of the household, such as farmers, herdsmen, and domestic
servants. The law does not prohibit specifically forced or bonded labor
by children, but it is not a problem, with the rare exception of forced
child begging rings, and possibly family businesses (see Section 6.c.).
Children under the age of 18 and women may not be employed in
hazardous or harmful industries, such as mining or industries employing
power-operated machinery. While there is no formal government entity
responsible for enforcing the minimum age for employment of children,
the Ministry of Justice has jurisdiction and has acted as plaintiff in
the few cases that have arisen against alleged violators. However, in
general children play a minimal role in the work force.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legal minimum wage.
Labor regulations establish a 48-hour workweek at regular pay and allow
employers to require up to 12 additional hours of overtime at time-and-
a-half pay. Labor law provides for a 24-hour rest period, normally on
Fridays, although the employer may grant it on another day. The average
wage generally provides a decent standard of living for a worker and
family.
The ILO has stated that the Government has not formulated
legislation implementing the ILO Convention on Equal Pay and that
regulations that segregate work places by sex, or limit vocational
programs for women, violate ILO Convention 111.
Some foreign nationals who have been recruited abroad have
complained that after their arrival in Saudi Arabia they were presented
with work contracts that specified lower wages and fewer benefits than
originally promised. Other foreign workers reportedly have signed
contracts in their home countries and later were pressured to sign less
favorable contracts upon arrival. Some employees report that at the end
of their contract service, their employers refuse to grant permission
to allow them to return home. Foreign employees involved in disputes
with their employers may find their freedom of movement restricted (see
Section 2.d.). Some female domestic servants often were subjected to
abuse (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
Saudiization is the Government's attempt to decrease the number of
foreigners working in certain occupations and to replace them with
Saudi workers. To accomplish this goal, the Government has taken
several long-term steps, most notably limiting employment in certain
fields to citizens, prohibiting renewal of existing contracts, and
requiring that 5 percent of the work force in private sector companies
be filled by citizen workers. The Government also requires firms to
increase the proportion of citizen workers by 5 per cent each year.
There is a limited number of persons, both influential and otherwise,
who attempted to circumvent the requirements of the law. For example,
employers have altered job descriptions or hired foreigners for
nominally low-level positions but in fact had them fill positions
reserved for citizens. Influential persons effectively may circumvent
the law because the Ministry of Labor is simply unwilling to confront
them.
The ongoing campaign to remove illegal immigrants from the country
has done little to Saudiize the economy because illegalimmigrants
largely work in low-income positions, which most Saudis consider
unsuitable. However, the campaign did improve overall working
conditions for legally employed immigrants in low-income positions. The
Government is carrying out the campaign by widely publicizing its
enforcement of existing laws against illegal immigrants and Saudis
employing or sponsoring illegal immigrants. In addition to deportation
for illegal workers and jail terms and fines for Saudis hiring illegal
workers, the Government announced in 1998 that houses rented to illegal
aliens would be ordered closed. In 1997 the Government offered an
amnesty of several months duration, which allowed illegal immigrants
and their employers or sponsors to avoid the possibility of prosecution
by voluntarily seeking expeditious repatriation. As of September, as
many as 1.1 million persons departed the country under terms of the
amnesty or were deported for violating residence and labor laws in the
past 3 years. During this process, the Government bowed to domestic
pressure and granted grace periods and exemptions to certain categories
of illegal immigrants (such as servants, drivers, and shepherds),
thereby allowing many illegal immigrants to legalize their status
without leaving the country. The effect of the expeditious repatriation
of some illegal immigrants and the legalization of others has been to
improve overall working conditions for legally employed foreigners.
Illegal immigrants generally are willing to accept lower salaries and
fewer benefits than legally employed immigrants. Their departure or
legalization reduced the competition for certain jobs and thereby
reduced the incentive for legal immigrants to accept lower wages and
fewer benefits as a means of competing with illegal immigrants.
Furthermore, their departure or legalization removed a large portion of
the class of persons most vulnerable to abuse and exploitation because
of their illegal status.
Labor regulations require employers to protect most workers from
job-related hazards and disease. Foreign nationals report frequent
failures to enforce health and safety standards. Farmers, herdsmen,
domestic servants, and workers in family operated businesses are not
covered by these regulations. Workers risk losing employment if they
remove themselves from hazardous work conditions.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, the law prohibits slavery and the
smuggling of persons into the country.
According to reports, criminal rings consisting almost exclusively
of foreigners bought and imported South Asian children, including
disabled children. Ring organizers systematically forced the children
to beg in the streets and then confiscated all money that the children
gained. During the year, the authorities arrested some ring organizers
and returned at least 76 children to their own countries.
Early in the year, the Moroccan press reported that a Moroccan
woman who had been recruited to be a domestic servant in Saudi Arabia,
escaped a prostitution ring there and informed police, which led to the
arrest of her Moroccan handlers, an extended family group numbering
about 40 persons. This same group of Moroccans had been involved in
organizing similar such activities throughout the Persian Gulf region.
______
SYRIA
Despite the existence of some institutions of democratic
government, the political system places virtually absolute authority in
the hands of President Hafiz Al-Asad. Al-Asad's election to a fifth 7-
year term was confirmed by a March national referendum, in which he
received 99.9 percent of the vote. Key decisions regarding foreign
policy, national security, internal politics, and the economy are made
by President Asad with counsel from his ministers, high-ranking members
of the ruling Ba'th Party, and a relatively small circle of security
advisers. Although the Parliament is elected every 4 years, the Ba'th
Party is ensured a majority. The Parliament does not initiate laws, but
only passes judgment on and sometimes modifies those proposed by the
executive branch. The judiciary is constitutionally independent, but
this is not the case in the exceptional (state of emergency) security
courts, which are subject to political influence. The regular courts
display independence, although political connections and bribery can
influence verdicts. In general all three branches of government are
influenced to varying degrees by leaders of the Ba'th Party, whose
primacy in state institutions is mandated by the Constitution.
The powerful role of the security services in Government, which
extends beyond strictly security matters, stems in part from the state
of emergency that has been in place almost continuously since 1963. The
Government justifies martial law because of the state of war with
Israel and past threats from terrorist groups. Military Intelligence
and Air Force Intelligence are military agencies, while General
Security, State Security, and Political Security come under the purview
of the Ministry of Interior. The branches of the security services
operate independently of each other and outside the legal system. Their
members commit serious human rights abuses.
The economy is based on commerce, agriculture, oil production, and
government services. There is a generally inefficient public sector, a
private sector, and a mixed public/private sector. A complex
bureaucracy, the still dominant state role in the economy, overarching
security concerns, endemic corruption, currency restrictions, lack of
modern financial services and communications, and a weak legal system
hamper economic growth. The Government has sought to promote the
private sector through investment incentives, exchange rate
consolidation, and deregulation, especially with regard to financial
transactions governing imports and exports. Syria posted a gross
domestic product (GDP) growth rate of negative 4.4 percent in 1997 due
to a slowdown in agricultural output and reduced revenues from oil
exports. This negative trend continued in 1998, with a GDP decrease of
1.2 percent. It was estimated that this trend continued during the
year. A high population growth rate of 3.3 percent continues to erode
whatever economic gains are made. Real annual per capita GDP in 1998
was approximately $800, down from $837 in 1997. However, the Government
has been very successful in controlling the money supply, with
inflation remaining in the 2 percent range in 1998. Wage increases in
the public sector have not kept pace with cost of living increases.
Salaries were last raised in 1994 and average only about $100 per
month. Consequently, the gap between rich and poor continues to widen,
with many public sector workers relying on second jobs to make ends
meet.
The human rights situation remained poor, and the Government
continues to restrict or deny fundamental rights, although there was
continued marginal improvement in a few areas. The Ba'th Party
dominates the political system, as provided for by the Constitution,
and citizens do not have the right to change their government. The
Government uses its vast powers so effectively that there is no
organized political opposition, and there have been very few antiregime
manifestations. Serious abuses include reports of extrajudicial
killings; the widespread use of torture in detention; poor prison
conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged detention without
trial; fundamentally unfair trials in the security courts; an
inefficient judiciary that suffers from corruption and, at times,
political influence; infringement on citizens' privacy rights; denial
of freedom of speech and of the press, despite a slight loosening of
censorship restrictions; denial of freedom of assembly and association;
some limits on freedom of religion; and limits on freedom of movement.
The Government does not allow independent domestic human rights groups
to exist. Violence and societal discrimination against women are
problems. The Government discriminates against the stateless Kurdish
minority, suppresses worker rights, and child labor occurs. A prisoner
amnesty announced in July is believed also to have benefited some
political detainees, including Jordanian citizens.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
On October 20, government forces moved against a residential
compound and boat dock owned by President Asad's brother, Rif'at Al-
Asad. A number of Rif'at's supporters, including military guards, were
sequestered in the compound, and the clash resulted in an unconfirmed
number of deaths, including government forces. The Government
reportedly claimed that the clash was the consequence of enforcing
``legal measures'' that were taken against Rif'at and his supporters
because of ``violations of civil and military laws.''
There were reports of the corporal punishment of army recruits that
led to injury or death.
Three policemen were convicted in 1998 and sentenced to 10 years at
hard labor by the Aleppo criminal court for the torture and killing of
a 50-year-old man accused of heroin dealing, marking the first time
since 1994 that members of the security forces were held accountable
for their actions.
There were no reports of deaths in detention; however, such deaths
have occurred in the past. Previous deaths in detention have not been
investigated by the Government, and the number and identities of
prisoners who died in prisons since the 1980's remains unknown.
In 1998 Lebanon's military prosecutor charged 18 members of the
Lebanese Forces, an outlawed rightwing Christian militia, with carrying
out the December 1996 bombing of a bus in Damascus, which killed at
least 20 persons and wounded dozens of others. Eleven of the 18 persons
charged were in custody. There were no further developments in the case
during the year.
b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed reports of politically
motivated disappearances. Despite inquiries by international human
rights organizations and foreign governments, the Government offered
little new information on the welfare and whereabouts of persons who
have been held incommunicado for years or about whom no more is known
other than the approximate date of their detention, including
Palestinians and Jordanian and Lebanese citizens reportedly abducted
from Lebanon during and after Lebanon's civil war (see Section 1.d.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Despite the existence of constitutional prohibitions and
several Penal Code penalties for abusers, there was credible evidence
that security forces continued to use torture. Former prisoners and
detainees report that torture methods include electrical shocks;
pulling out fingernails; the insertion of objects into the rectum;
beatings, sometimes while the victim is suspended from the ceiling;
hyperextension of the spine; and the use of a chair that bends
backwards to asphyxiate the victim or fracture the spine. Although
torture may occur in prisons, torture is most likely while detainees
are being held at one of the many detention centers run by the various
security services throughout the country, and particularly while the
authorities are trying to extract a confession or information about an
alleged crime or alleged accomplices.
The Government continues to deny the use of torture and claims that
it would prosecute anyone believed guilty of using excessive force or
physical abuse. Past victims of torture have identified the officials
who beat them, up to the level of brigadier general. If allegations of
excessive force or physical abuse are to be made in court, the
plaintiff is required to initiate his own civil suit against the
alleged abuser.
Courts do not order medical examinations for defendants who claim
that they were tortured (see Section 1.e.). There are credible reports
of military corruption and mismanagement. There were reports of the
corporal punishment of army recruits that led to injury or death.
Prison conditions vary but generally are poor and do not meet
minimum international standards for health and sanitation. Facilities
for political or national security prisoners generally are worse than
those for common criminals. The prison in Palmyra, where many political
and national security prisoners have been kept, is widely considered to
have the worst conditions. At some prisons, authorities allow
visitationrights, but in other cases, security officials demand bribes
from family members who wish to visit incarcerated relatives.
Overcrowding and the denial of sufficient nourishment occurs at several
prisons. Some former detainees have reported that the Government
prohibits reading materials, even the Koran, for political prisoners.
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison or
detention center conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. The Emergency Law, which authorizes the
Government to conduct preventive arrests, overrides Penal Code
provisions against arbitrary arrest and detention, including the need
to obtain warrants. Officials contend that the Emergency Law is applied
only in narrowly defined cases. Nonetheless, in cases involving
political or national security offenses, arrests generally are carried
out in secret, and suspects may be detained incommunicado for prolonged
periods without charge or trial and are denied the right to a judicial
determination for the pretrial detention. Some of these practices are
prohibited by the state of emergency, but the authorities are not held
to these strictures.
The Government apparently continues to detain relatives of
detainees or of fugitives in order to obtain confessions or the
fugitive's surrender (see Section 1.f.).
Defendants in civil and criminal trials have the right to bail
hearings and the possible release from detention on their own
recognizance. There is no bail option for those accused of national
security offenses. Unlike defendants in regular criminal and civil
cases, security detainees do not have access to lawyers prior to or
during questioning.
Detainees have no legal redress for false arrest. Security forces
often do not provide detainees' families with information on their
welfare or location while in detention. Consequently, many persons who
have disappeared in past years are believed to be in long-term
detention without charge or possibly to have died in detention. It
appears that the number of such disappearances has declined in recent
years, although this circumstance may be due to the Government's
success in deterring opposition political activity rather than a
loosening of the criteria for detention. Many detainees brought to
trial have been held incommunicado for years, and their trials often
have been unfair (see Section 1.e.).
Pretrial detention may be lengthy even in cases not involving
political or national security offenses. The criminal justice system is
backlogged. Many criminal suspects are held in pretrial detention for
months and may have their trials extended for additional months.
Lengthy pretrial detention and drawn-out court proceedings are caused
by a shortage of available courts and the absence of legal provisions
for a speedy trial or plea bargaining (see also Section 1.e.).
Some Turkomen from among hundreds detained in 1996 still may remain
in detention.
There were reports of large-scale arrests of Syrians and
Palestinian Islamists in late December. Hundreds of persons allegedly
were arrested in the cities of Damascus, Hama, Aleppo, and Homs. Most
of those arrested reportedly were released after signing an agreement
not to participate in political activities, but some may remain in
detention.
A prisoner amnesty announced in July is believed to have benefited
some political prisoners and detainees. While the number of those
released is unknown, Amnesty International (AI) identified six
prisoners held for political reasons who were released. Unconfirmed
reports suggest that as many as 600 prisoners may have been released.
According to AI, hundreds of persons held for political reasons also
were released in 1998. Prior to the 1998 and 1999 releases, the last
significant release of political detainees took place in late 1995.
Most of those arrested in a mass crackdown in 1980 have been released,
but some apparently remain in prolonged detention without charge. Some
union and professional association officials detained in 1980 are
believed to remain in detention (see Sections 2.b. and 6.a.). AI
reported in 1998 that ``hundreds of Lebanese, Palestinians, and
Jordanians have been arbitrarily arrested, some over two decades ago,
and remain in prolonged and often secret detention.''
The number of remaining political detainees is unknown. Estimates
of detainees are difficult to confirm because the Government does not
verify publicly the number of detentions without charge, the release of
detainees, or whether detainees subsequently are sentenced to prison
(see Section 1.e.).
In October 1998, the Jordanian Government asked the Syrian
Government to account for 429 named Jordanian nationals, 239 of whom
Jordan claims have been missing since they entered Syria, and 190 of
whom Jordan claims are Syrian prisoners. Families of missing Jordanians
allege that there are more than 700 Jordanians in Syrian detention. The
press reported that government sources stated that the names provided
by Jordan were being examined and that the Government would respond
officially. To date there has been no published official response.
The Government has exiled citizens in the past, although the
practice is prohibited by the Constitution. There were no known
instances of forced exile during the year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, but the two exceptional courts dealing with
alleged security cases are not independent of executive branch control.
The regular court system displays considerable independence in civil
cases, although political connections and bribery sometimes influence
verdicts.
The judicial system is composed of the civil and criminal courts,
military courts, the security courts, and the religious courts, which
adjudicate matters of personal status such as divorce and inheritance.
The Court of Cassation is the highest court of appeal. The Supreme
Constitutional Court is empowered to rule only on the constitutionality
of laws and decrees; it does not hear appeals.
Civil and criminal courts are organized under the Ministry of
Justice. Defendants before these courts are entitled to the legal
representation of their choice; the courts appoint lawyers for
indigents. Defendants are presumed innocent; they are allowed to
present evidence and to confront their accusers. Trials are public,
except for those involving juveniles or sex offenses. Defendants may
appeal their verdicts to a provincial appeals court and ultimately to
the Court of Cassation. Such appeals are difficult because the courts
do not provide verbatim transcripts of cases--only summaries prepared
by the presiding judges. There are no juries.
Military courts have the authority to try civilians as well as
military personnel. The venue for a civilian defendant is decided by a
military prosecutor. There were continuing reports that the Government
operates military field courts in locations outside established
courtrooms. Such courts reportedly observe fewer of the formal
procedures of regular military courts.
The two security courts are the Supreme State Security Court
(SSSC), which tries political and national security cases, and the
Economic Security Court (ESC), which tries cases involving financial
crimes. Both courts operate under the state of emergency, not ordinary
law, and do not observe constitutional provisions safeguarding
defendants' rights.
Charges against defendants in the SSSC are often vague. Many
defendants appear to be tried for exercising normal political rights,
such as free speech. For example, the Emergency Law authorizes the
prosecution of anyone ``opposing the goals of the revolution,''
``shaking the confidence of the masses in the aims of the revolution,''
or attempting to ``change the economic or social structure of the
State.'' Nonetheless, the Government contends that the SSSC tries only
persons who have sought to use violence against the State.
Under SSSC procedures, defendants are not present during the
preliminary, or investigative, phase of the trial, when the prosecutor
presents evidence. Trials usually are closed to the public. Lawyers are
not ensured access to their clients before the trial and are excluded
from the court during their client's initial interrogation by the
prosecutor. Lawyers submit written defense pleas rather than oral
presentations. The State's case often is based on confessions, and
defendants have not been allowed to argue in court that their
confessions were coerced. There is no known instance in which the court
ordered a medical examination for a defendant who claimed that he was
tortured. The SSSC reportedly has acquitted some defendants, but the
Government does not provide any statistics on the conviction rate.
Defendants do not have the right to appeal verdicts, but sentences are
reviewed by the Minister of Interior, who may ratify, nullify, or alter
sentences. The President also may intervene in the review process.
Accurate information on the number of cases heard by the SSSC is
difficult to obtain, although in recent years hundreds of cases are
believed to have passed through the court annually. Many reportedly
involved charges relating to membership in various banned political
groups, including the Party of Communist Action and the pro-Iraqi wing
of the Ba'th Party. Sentences as long as 15 years have been imposed in
the past. The Government permitted delegates from AI to attend a
session of the SSSC in1997 (see Section 4), but there have been no
visits by human rights nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) since
1997.
The Economic Security Court (ESC) holds trials for alleged
violations of foreign-exchange laws and other economic crimes. The
prosecution of economic crimes is not uniform since some government
officials or business persons with close connections to the Government
likely have violated the country's strict economic laws without
prosecution. Like the SSSC, the ESC does not ensure due process for
defendants. Defendants may not have adequate access to lawyers to
prepare their defenses, and the State's case usually is based on
confessions. Verdicts likely are influenced by high-ranking government
officials. Those convicted of the most serious economic crimes do not
have the right of appeal, but those convicted of lesser crimes may
appeal to the Court of Cassation. A significant prisoner amnesty for
individuals convicted of economic crimes was announced in July.
Theoretically, this amnesty may have benefited thousands of people.
A prisoner amnesty in July is believed to have benefited some
political prisoners and detainees. While the number of those released
is unknown, AI identified six political prisoners who were released,
and there have been unconfirmed reports that the number may be as high
as 600. According to AI, hundreds of persons held for political reasons
also were released in 1998 (see Section 1.d.). The last major releases
of political prisoners and detainees took place in late 1995, with
approximately 2,200 to 3,000 persons believed to have been released.
Some former prisoners reported being required to sign loyalty oaths or
admissions of guilt as a condition of their release.
The Government has released virtually all of those arrested at the
time President Asad took power in 1970. However, at least two persons
arrested during that period may remain in prison, despite the
expiration of one of the prisoners' sentences.
The Government denies that it holds political prisoners, arguing
that, although the aims of some prisoners may be political, their
activities, including subversion, were criminal. However, the Emergency
Law and the Penal Code are so vague, and the Government's power so
broad, that many persons were convicted and are in prison for the mere
expression of political opposition to the Government.
The current number of political prisoners is unknown.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Although laws provide for freedom from arbitrary
interference, the Emergency Law authorizes the security services to
enter homes and conduct searches with warrants if security matters,
very broadly defined, are involved. The security services selectively
monitor telephone conversations and facsimile transmissions. The
Government opens mail destined for both citizens and foreign residents.
It also prevents the delivery of human rights materials. In August
authorities repealed a 5-year ban on entry of Jordanian newspapers
(also see Section 2.a.).
The Government apparently has continued its practice of threatening
or detaining the relatives of detainees or of fugitives in order to
obtain confessions or the fugitive's surrender (see Section 1.d.).
Security checkpoints continue to exist, although primarily in
military and other restricted areas. There are few police checkpoints
on main roads and in populated areas. Generally, the security services
set up checkpoints to search for smuggled goods, weapons, narcotics,
and subversive literature. The searches take place without warrants.
The Government and the Ba'th Party have monitored and tried to restrict
some citizens' visits to foreign embassies and cultural centers.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides citizens
with the right to express opinions freely in speech and in writing;
however, the Government restricts these rights significantly in
practice. The Government strictly controls dissemination of information
and permits no written or individual criticism of the President, the
President's family, the Ba'th Party, the military, or the legitimacy of
the regime. The Government also does not permit sectarian issues to be
raised. Detention and beatings for individual expressions of opinion
that violate these unwritten rules occur frequently.
The Emergency Law allows the Government broad discretion in
determining what constitutes illegal expression. It prohibits the
publishing of ``false information,'' which opposes ``the goalsof the
revolution'' (see Section 1.e.). In the past, the Government has
imprisoned journalists for failing to observe press restrictions. In
1997 two journalists from a government newspaper allegedly were
dismissed after publishing an article that was viewed as insulting to
the Prophet Muhammad. In May a defamation case filed against a
journalist was reported widely in the press. This case was believed to
be the first case in which a journalist was tried for what he had
published; he was cleared of guilt by the court. State security
services are known to threaten local journalists, including with
removal of credentials, for articles printed outside the country.
The Ministry of Information and the Ministry of Culture and
National Guidance censor the domestic and foreign press. They usually
prevent publication or distribution of any material deemed threatening
or embarrassing to the security services or high levels of the
Government. Censorship is usually stricter for materials in Arabic.
Commonly censored subjects include: the Government's human rights
record; Islamic fundamentalism; allegations of official involvement in
drug trafficking; aspects of the Government's role in Lebanon; graphic
descriptions of sex; material unfavorable to the Arab cause in the
Middle East conflict; and material that is offensive to any of the
country's religious groups. In addition most journalists and writers
practice self-censorship to avoid provoking a negative government
reaction.
Recent trends toward a modest relaxation of censorship continued.
The media demonstrated somewhat wider latitude in reporting on regional
developments, including the Middle East peace process. The media
covered some peace process events factually, but other events were
reported selectively to buttress official views. The government-
controlled press continued to publish articles critical of official
corruption and governmental inefficiency. In August authorities
repealed a 5-year ban on entry of Jordanian newspapers (also see
Section 1.f.).
The Government or the Ba'th Party owns and operates the radio and
television companies and the newspaper publishing houses. There are no
privately owned newspapers, although foreign-owned, foreign-published
newspapers circulate relatively freely. The Ministry of Information
scripts the radio and television news programs to ensure adherence to
the government line. The Government does not interfere with broadcasts
from abroad. Satellite dishes have proliferated throughout all regions
and among neighborhoods of all social and economic categories. Internet
access and access to e-mail is limited, although preparations are
underway to provide greater Internet access, starting with foreign
embassies and businesses. However, in mid-year, telephone service at
the offices and residences of several European embassies was cut
briefly, allegedly because these lines had been used to access Internet
providers outside the country. Telephone service was restored in
response to a diplomatic protest by the European embassies to the
Government.
The Ministry of Culture and National Guidance censors fiction and
nonfiction works, including films. It also determines which films may
not be shown at the cultural centers operated by foreign embassies.
The Government restricts academic freedom. Public school teachers
are not permitted to express ideas contrary to government policy,
although authorities allow somewhat greater freedom of expression at
the university level.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Freedom of
assembly does not exist. Citizens may not hold meetings unless they
obtain permission from the Ministry of Interior. Most public
demonstrations are organized by the Government or the Ba'th Party. The
Government applies the restrictions on public assembly in Palestinian
refugee camps, where controlled demonstrations have been allowed.
In December 1998, the Government organized a student march against
U.S. and British air strikes against Iraq. The march became violent and
significant damage was done to diplomatic property.
The Government restricts freedom of association. Private
associations must be registered with the Government in order to be
considered legal. Some groups have not been able to register,
presumably because the Government views them as political, even though
the groups presented themselves as cultural or professional
associations. Unregistered groups may not hold meetings, and the
authorities do not allow the establishment of independent political
parties. The Government usually grants registration to groups not
engaged in political or other activities deemed sensitive.
In 1980 the Government dissolved, and then reconstituted under its
control, the executive boards of professional associations after some
members staged a national strike and advocated an endto the state of
emergency. The associations have not been independent since that time
and generally are led by members of the Ba'th Party, although nonparty
members may serve on their executive boards. Some persons detained in
1980 crackdowns on union and professional association officials may
remain in detention (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government generally respects this right in practice.
The only advantage given to a particular religion by the Constitution
is that which requires the President to be a Muslim. All religions and
religious groups must register with the Government, which monitors fund
raising and requires permits for all meetings by religious groups,
except for worship. Recognized religious groups receive free utilities
and are exempt from real estate taxes and taxes on official vehicles.
Although the law does not prohibit proselytizing, the Government
discourages such activity in practice, particularly aggressive
proselytizing when such activity is deemed a threat to the generally
good relations among religious groups. Foreign missionary groups are
present but operate discreetly. The Government banned Jehovah's
Witnesses as a politically motivated Zionist organization in 1964.
Although Jehovah's Witnesses have continued to practice their faith
privately, the Government arrested several Jehovah's Witnesses as they
gathered for religious meetings in 1997. The few remaining Jews
generally are barred from government employment and do not have
military service obligations. Jews are the only minority group whose
passports and identity cards note their religion.
Officially all schools are government-run and nonsectarian,
although some schools are run in practice by Christian and Jewish
minorities. There is mandatory religious instruction in schools, with
government-approved teachers and curriculums. Religion courses are
divided into separate classes for Muslim and Christian students. Jews
have a separate primary school, which offers religious instruction in
Judaism, in addition to traditional subjects. Although Arabic is the
official language in public schools, the Government permits the
teaching of Armenian, Hebrew, Syriac (Aramaic), and Chaldean in some
schools on the basis that these are ``liturgical languages.''
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Government limits freedom of
movement. The Government restricts travel near the Golan Heights.
Travel to Israel is illegal. On November 13, the Government eased many
of its travel restrictions, which made it easier for most citizens to
travel abroad. Exit visas generally no longer are required for women,
men over 50 years old, and Syrian expatriates. In the past, individuals
have been denied permission to travel abroad on political grounds,
although government officials deny that this practice occurs. The
authorities may prosecute any person found attempting to emigrate or
travel abroad illegally, or who is suspected of having visited Israel.
Women over the age of 18 have the legal right to travel without the
permission of male relatives. However, a husband may file a request
with the Ministry of Interior to prohibit his wife's departure from the
country. The Government's use of police checkpoints has been reduced
(see Section 1.f.).
As of June 30, 374,521 Palestinian refugees were registered with
the U.N. Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) in the country. In general
Palestinian refugees no longer report unusual difficulties travelling
in and out of the country, as was the case in the past. The Government
restricts entry by Palestinians who are not resident in Syria. The
Government does not allow the Palestinian residents of Gaza to visit
Syria.
There are no laws with provisions for dealing with refugees and
asylees in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol. The Government
cooperates on a case-by-case basis with the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations
in assisting refugees. The Government provides first asylum but is
selective about extending protection to refugees; approximately 3,260
persons sought asylum through the UNHCR during the first 8 months of
the year. Although the Government denied any forced repatriation of
those who may have had a valid claim to refugee status, in 1998 it
apparently forcibly repatriated Iraqi, Somali, Algerian, and Libyan
refugees. As of August 31, there were an estimated 21,319 non-
Palestinian refugees in the country, of whom about 3,962 were receiving
assistance from the UNHCR, including 2,503 refugees of Iraqi origin.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Although citizens ostensibly vote for the President and Members of
Parliament, they do not have the right to change their government. The
President has run for election unopposed since taking power in 1970.
Political opposition to his rule is not tolerated. The President and
his senior aides, particularly those in the military and security
services, ultimately make all basic decisions on political and economic
life, with no element of public accountability.
Moreover, the Constitution mandates that the Ba'th Party is the
ruling party and is ensured a majority in all government and popular
associations, such as workers' and women's groups. Six smaller
political parties also are permitted and, along with the Ba'th Party,
make up the National Progressive Front (NPF), a grouping of parties
that represents the sole framework of legal political participation for
citizens. While created ostensibly to give the appearance of a
multiparty system, the NPF is dominated by the Ba'th Party and does not
change the essentially one-party character of the political system.
Non-Ba'th Party members of the NPF exist as political parties largely
in name only and hew closely to Ba'th Party and government policies.
The Ba'th Party dominates the Parliament, which is known as the
People's Council. Although parliamentarians may criticize policies and
modify draft laws, the executive branch retains ultimate control over
the legislative process. Since 1990 the Government has allowed
independent non-NPF candidates to run for a limited allotment of seats
in the 250-member People's Council. The current number of non-NPF
deputies is 83, ensuring a permanent absolute majority for the Ba'th
Party-dominated NPF. Elections for the 250 seats in the People's
Council last took place in 1998.
Persons who have been convicted by the State Security Court may be
deprived of their political rights after they are released from prison.
Such restrictions include a prohibition against engaging in political
activity, the denial of a passport, and a bar on accepting a government
job and some other forms of employment. The duration of such
restrictions may last from 10 years to the remainder of the former
prisoner's life. The Government contends that this practice is mandated
by the Penal Code and has been in effect since 1949.
Women and minorities, with the exception of the Jewish population
and stateless Kurds (see Section 5), participate in the political
system without restriction. Nonetheless, women are underrepresented in
Government. There are 2 female cabinet ministers and 26 female Members
of Parliament.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government does not allow the existence of local human rights
groups. One or two human rights groups once operated legally but
subsequently were banned by the Government.
Amnesty International visited the country for 2 weeks in 1997, the
second major visit by an international human rights organization (after
a Human Rights Watch visit in 1995). AI delegates met with the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Justice, Information, and
Culture; judges from the SSSC as well as the court's prosecutor and
several lawyers; and the secretaries general of the Arab Writers Union
and Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union. These were the first such meetings
held by government officials with an international human rights
organization. There were no further such meetings or visits in 1998 or
1999.
As a matter of policy, the Government in its exchanges with
international groups denies that it commits human rights abuses. It has
not permitted representatives of international organizations to visit
prisons. The Government states that it now responds in writing to all
inquires from NGO's regarding human rights issues, including the cases
of individual detainees and prisoners, through an interagency
governmental committee established expressly for that purpose. Human
Rights Watch reported in 1997 that the Government had not responded to
its request to account publicly for the possibly thousands of citizens
who were executed at Tadmur prison in the 1980's. The Government
usually responds to queries from human rights organizations and foreign
embassies on specific cases by claiming that the prisoner in question
has violated national security laws.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights and equal opportunity
for all citizens. In practice membership in the Ba'th Party orclose
familial relations with a prominent party member or government official
can be important for economic, social, or educational advancement.
Party or government connections can pave the way for entrance into
better elementary and secondary schools, access to lucrative
employment, and greater power within the Government, the military, and
the security services. Certain prominent positions, such as that of
provincial governor, are reserved solely for Ba'th Party members. Apart
from some discrimination against Kurds, there are no apparent patterns
of systematic government discrimination based on race, sex, religion,
disability, language, or social status. However, there are varying
degrees of societal discrimination in each of these areas.
Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no reliable
statistics for domestic violence or sexual assault. The vast majority
of cases go unreported, and victims generally are reluctant to seek
assistance from nonfamily members. There are no laws against spousal
rape. One preliminary academic study suggested that domestic violence
is the largest single reason for divorces, and that such abuse is more
prevalent among the less-educated. It appears to occur more in rural
than in urban areas. Battered women have the legal right to seek
redress in court, but few do so because of the social stigma attached
to such action. The Syrian Women's Federation offers services to
battered wives to remedy individual family problems. The Syrian Family
Planning Association also attempts to deal with this problem. Some
private groups, including the Family Planning Association, have
organized seminars on violence against women, which were reported by
the government press. There are no specifically designated shelters or
safe havens for battered women who seek to flee their husbands.
The Constitution provides for equality between men and women and
equal pay for equal work. Moreover, the Government has sought to
overcome traditional discriminatory attitudes toward women and
encourages women's education. However, the Government has not yet
changed personal status retirement and social security laws that
discriminate against women. In addition some secular laws discriminate
against women. For example under criminal law, the punishment for
adultery and ``honor'' crimes for a woman is twice as severe as for the
same crime committed by a man.
For Muslims, personal status law on divorce is based on Shari'a
(Islamic law) and discriminates against women. For example husbands may
claim adultery as grounds for divorce, but wives face more difficulty
in presenting the same argument. If a woman requests a divorce from her
husband, she may not be entitled to child support in some instances. In
addition under the law, a woman loses the right to custody of boys when
they reach age 9 and girls at age 12.
Inheritance for Muslims is based on Shari'a. Accordingly, women
usually are granted half of the inheritance share of male heirs.
However, Shari'a mandates that male heirs provide financial support to
the female relatives who inherit less. For example a brother who
inherits an unmarried sister's share from their parents' estate is
obligated to provide for the sister's well-being. If the brother fails
to do so, she has the right to sue.
Christians and other religious groups are subject to their
respective religious laws on marriage, divorce, and inheritance.
Polygyny is legal but is practiced only by a small minority of
Muslim men.
A husband may request that his wife's travel abroad be prohibited
(see Section 2.d.). Women generally are barred from travelling abroad
with their children unless they are able to prove that the father has
granted permission for the children to travel.
Women participate actively in public life and are represented in
most professions, as well as in the military. Women are not impeded
from owning or managing land or other real property. Women constitute
approximately 6 percent of judges, 10 percent of lawyers, 57 percent of
teachers below university level, and 20 percent of university
professors.
Children.--There is no legal discrimination between boys and girls
in school or in health care. Education is compulsory for all children,
male or female, between the ages of 6 and 12. According to the Syrian
Women's Union, about 46 percent of the total number of students through
the secondary level are female.
Nevertheless, societal pressure for early marriage and childbearing
interfere with girls' educational progress, particularly in rural
areas, where dropout rates for female students remain high.
The law stresses the need to protect children, and the Government
has organized seminars on the subject of child welfare. Although there
are cases of child abuse, there is no societal pattern of abuse against
children. The law provides for severe penalties for those found guilty
of the most serious abuses against children.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination against
the disabled and seeks to integrate them into the public sector work
force. However, implementation is spotty. Regulations reserving 2
percent of government and public sector jobs for the disabled are not
implemented rigorously. The disabled do not have recourse to the courts
regarding discrimination. No laws mandate access to public buildings
for the disabled.
Religious Minorities.--Although there is a significant amount of
religious tolerance, religion or ethnic affiliation can be a
contributing factor in determining career opportunities. For example
members of the President's Alawi sect hold a predominant position in
the security services and military, well out of proportion to their
percentage of the population. Nevertheless, government policy
officially disavows sectarianism.
There is little evidence of societal discrimination or violence
against religious minorities, including Jews.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The Government generally
permits national and ethnic minorities to conduct traditional,
religious, and cultural activities; however, the Government's attitude
toward the Kurdish minority is a significant exception to this policy.
Although the Government contends that there is no discrimination
against the Kurdish population, it has placed limits on the use and
teaching of the Kurdish language, Kurdish cultural expression, and, at
times, the celebration of Kurdish festivals. Some members of the
Kurdish community have been tried by the Supreme State Security Court
for expressing support for greater Kurdish autonomy or independence.
Although the Asad Government stopped the practice of stripping Kurds in
Syria of their Syrian nationality (some 120,000 persons lost Syrian
nationality under this program in the 1960's), it never restored this
nationality. As a result, those who had their nationality taken away,
and their children, have been unable to obtain Syrian nationality and
passports, or even identification cards and birth certificates. Without
Syrian nationality, these stateless Kurds, who according to UNHCR
estimates number about 200,000 persons, are unable to own land, cannot
be employed by the Government, and have no right to vote. They also
encounter difficulties in enrolling their children in school. Stateless
Kurdish men may not marry Syrian citizens legally.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Although the Constitution provides
for this right, workers are not free to establish unions independent of
the Government. All unions must belong to the General Federation of
Trade Unions (GFTU), which is dominated by the Ba'th Party and is
actually a part of the State's bureaucratic structure. The GFTU is an
information channel between political decisionmakers and workers. The
GFTU transmits instructions downward to the unions and workers but also
conveys information to decisionmakers about worker conditions and
needs. The GFTU provides the Government with opinions on legislation,
organizes workers, and formulates rules for various member unions. The
GFTU president is a senior member of the Ba'th Party. He and his deputy
may attend cabinet meetings on economic affairs. The GFTU controls
nearly all aspects of union activity.
The law does not prohibit strikes, except in the agricultural
sector. Nevertheless, workers are inhibited from striking because of
previous government crackdowns on strikers. In 1980 the security forces
arrested many union and professional association officials who planned
a national strike. Some of those are believed to remain in detention or
have been tried by the State Security Court (see Sections 1.d. and
2.b.).
The GFTU is affiliated with the International Confederation of Arab
Trade Unions.
In 1992 Syria's eligibility for tariff preferences under the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences was suspended because the Government
failed to take steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights
to workers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively does not exist in any meaningful
sense. Government representatives are part of the bargaining process in
the public sector. In state-owned companies, union representatives
negotiate hours, wages, and conditions of employment with
representatives of the employers and the supervising ministry. Workers
serve on the boards of directors of public enterprises.
The law provides for collective bargaining in the private sector,
but any such agreement between labor and management must be ratified by
the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs, who has effective veto power.
The Committee of Experts of the International Labor Organization (ILO)
has long noted the Government's refusal to abolish the Minister's power
over collective contracts.
Unions have the right to litigate disputes over work contracts and
other workers' interests with employers and may ask for binding
arbitration. In practice labor and management representatives settle
most disputes without resort to legal remedies or arbitration.
Management has the right to request arbitration, but this seldom is
exercised. Arbitration usually occurs when a worker initiates a dispute
over wages or severance pay.
Since the unions are part of the Government's bureaucratic
structure, they are protected by law from antiunion discrimination.
There were no reports of antiunion discrimination.
There are no unions in the seven free trade zones. Firms in the
zones are exempt from the laws and regulations governing hiring and
firing, although they must observe some provisions on health, safety,
hours, and sick and annual leave.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--There is no law
prohibiting forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children. There were no reports of forced labor involving children, or
foreign or domestic workers. Forced labor has been imposed as a
punishment for some convicts.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The 1959 Labor Law protects children from exploitation in
the workplace. Independent information and audits on government
enforcement are not available. Although it is not prohibited by law,
there were no reports of coerced or bonded labor (see Section 6.c.) due
to the relative ease with which a work permit may be obtained. The
minimum age for employment is 15 in the public sector and 12 in the
private sector. In all cases, parental permission is required for
children under the age of 16. The law prohibits children from working
at night. However, all these laws apply only to children who work for a
salary. Those who work in family businesses who are not technically
paid a salary--a common phenomenon--do not fall under the law. The
Government claims that the expansion of the private sector has led to
more young children working. Education is compulsory for all children,
male or female, between the ages of 6 and 12.
The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs monitors employment
conditions for persons under the age of 18, but it does not have enough
inspectors to ensure compliance with the laws. The Ministry has the
authority to specify the industries in which children 15 and 16 years
of age may work. The majority of children under age 16 who are working
do so for their parents in the agricultural sector without
remuneration. The ILO report found that 10.5 percent of children under
the age of 18 participate in the labor force, amounting to 4.7 percent
of the total work force. Working hours for youths of legal age to work
do not differ from those established for adults. Children under the age
of 16 are prohibited by law from working in mines, at petroleum sites,
or in other dangerous fields. Children are not allowed to lift, carry,
or drag heavy objects. The exploitation of children for begging also is
prohibited. The Labor Inspection Department performs unannounced spot
checks of employers on a daily basis to enforce these regulations;
however, the scope of these checks is unknown.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Minister of Labor and Social
Affairs is responsible for enforcing minimum wage levels in the public
and private sectors. The minimum wage is $42 (2,115 Syrian pounds) per
month in the public sector, plus other compensation (for example,
meals, uniforms, and transportation). The private sector minimum wage
is $39 (1,940 Syrian pounds) per month in urban areas and$36 (l,790
Syrian pounds) in the countryside. A committee of labor, management,
and government representatives submits recommended changes in the
minimum wage to the Minister. The minimum wage has not been adjusted
since 1994 and does not provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. As a result, many workers take additional jobs or
are supported by their extended families.
The statutory workweek is 6 days of 6 hours each, but in some cases
a 9-hour workday is permitted. The laws mandate one 24-hour rest day
per week. Rules and regulations severely limit the ability of an
employer to dismiss employees without cause. Even if a person is absent
from work without notice for a long period, the employer must follow a
lengthy procedure of trying to find the person and notify him,
including through newspaper notices, before he is able to take any
action against the employee. Dismissed employees have the right to
appeal before a committee of representatives from the union,
management, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, and the
appropriate municipality. Such committees usually find in favor of the
employee. Dismissed employees are entitled to 80 percent of salary
benefits while the dispute is under consideration. No additional back
wages are awarded should the employer be found at fault, nor are wage
penalties imposed in cases where the employer is not found at fault.
The law does not protect temporary workers who are not subject to
regulations on minimum wages. Small private firms and businesses employ
such workers to avoid the costs associated with hiring permanent
employees.
The law mandates safety standards in all sectors, and managers are
expected to implement them fully. In practice there is little
enforcement without worker complaints, which occur infrequently despite
government efforts to post notices on safety rights and regulations.
Large companies, such as oil field contractors, also employ safety
engineers.
The ILO noted in August 1998 that a provision in the Labor Code
that allows employers to keep workers at the workplace for as many as
11 hours a day might lead to abuse. However, there have been no reports
of such abuses. Officials from the Ministries of Health and Labor
inspect work sites for compliance with health and safety standards.
Such inspections appear to be haphazard, apart from those conducted in
hotels and other facilities that cater to foreigners. Rural enforcement
of labor laws is also more lax than that in urban areas, where
inspectors are concentrated. Workers may lodge complaints about health
and safety conditions with special committees established to adjudicate
such cases. Workers have the right to remove themselves from hazardous
conditions without risking loss of employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There are no laws that specifically
prohibit trafficking in persons. Standard labor laws would be applied
in the event of allegations of trafficking. There were no reports that
persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
TUNISIA
Tunisia is a republic dominated by a single political party.
President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali and his Constitutional Democratic
Rally (RCD) party have controlled the Government, including the
legislature, since 1987. This dominance was reaffirmed in an
overwhelming RCD victory in October 24 legislative and presidential
elections. July revisions to the Constitution allowed two opposition
candidates to run against Ben Ali in the presidential elections, the
first multicandidate presidential race in Tunisia's history. Electoral
Code changes also reserved approximately 20 percent of representation
in the Chamber of Deputies for opposition parties (34 of 182 seats), up
from approximately 12 percent (19 of 163 seats) in the previous
Chamber, which was elected in 1994. The President appoints the Prime
Minister, the Cabinet, and the 23 governors. The executive branch and
the President strongly influence the judiciary, particularly in
sensitive political cases.
The police share responsibility for internal security with a
paramilitary national guard. The police operate in the capital and a
few other cities. In outlying areas, their policing duties are shared
with, or ceded to, the national guard. Both forces are under the
control of the Minister of Interior and the President. The security
forces continued to be responsible for serious human rights abuses.
Tunisia has made substantial progress towards establishing an
export-oriented market economy based on manufactured exports, tourism,
agriculture, and petroleum. The per capita gross national product for
1999 was approximately $2,600 while real per capita income grew by 4.5
percent. Over 60 percent of citizens are in the middle class and enjoy
a comfortable standard of living. The Government reported that only 6.2
percent of citizens fell below the poverty line, and over 80 percent of
households owned their own homes. The country has a high level of
literacy, low population growth rates, and wide distribution of basic
health care. The Government devotes over 60 percent of the budget to
social and development goals.
The Government's human rights performance was uneven, and it
continued to commit serious abuses. There are significant limitations
on citizens' right to change their government. The ruling RCD Party is
firmly intertwined with government institutions throughout the country,
making it extremely difficult for opposition parties to compete on a
level playing field; however, there was limited progress toward greater
pluralism. The October presidential and legislative elections marked a
modest step toward democratic development, with opposition presidential
candidates allowed to run for the first time, and opposition parties
generally freer to campaign; however, while observers agree that the
outcome of the elections generally reflected the will of the
electorate, the campaign and election processes greatly favored the
ruling party and there was wide disregard for the secrecy of the vote,
in which Ben Ali won 99.44 percent of the ballots cast for President.
Members of the security forces tortured and physically abused
prisoners and detainees. The Government asserts that police officials
who commit abuses are disciplined, but there have been no documented
cases in which security officials were disciplined for such abuse.
Prison conditions range from Spartan to poor. Security forces
arbitrarily arrest and detain persons. Lengthy pretrial detention and
incommunicado detention are problems. The Government lowered the
maximum incommunicado detention period from 10 to 6 days and required
authorities to notify family members at the time of arrest; most
defense lawyers claim that it is too soon to determine whether the new
provisions are being enforced. On September 22, Tunisian Human Rights
League (LTDH) vice president Khemais Ksila, who was imprisoned in 1998,
received an early parole. The judiciary is subject to executive branch
control, lengthy delays in trials are a problem, and due process rights
are not always observed; however, the Government expanded the right of
appeal and established a commission to oversee the proper
administration of sentences. On November 15, the Government announced
amnesty, parole, and reduced sentences for 4,000 prisoners, 600 of whom
reportedly were political prisoners, including Islamists. The
Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights, including by
intercepting mail and interfering with Internet communication. Security
forces also monitored the activities of government critics and at times
harassed them, their relatives, and associates.
The Government continued to impose significant restrictions on
freedom of speech and of the press, and journalists practice self-
censorship. The Government demonstrated a pattern of intolerance of
public criticism, using criminal investigations, judicial proceedings,
and travel controls (including denial of passports) to discourage
criticism and limit the activities of human rights activists. The
Government continued to use the mandatory prescreening of publications
and control of advertising revenue as a means to discourage newspapers
and magazines from publishing material that it considered undesirable.
The Government regularly seized editions offoreign newspapers
containing articles that it considered objectionable. However, the
Government improved access to the Internet and continued to broadcast a
monthly public affairs program that permitted citizens to debate issues
with government officials. The Government restricts freedom of assembly
and association. The Government limits partially the religious freedom
of members of the Baha'i faith. The Government does not permit
proselytizing. The Government continued to restrict the freedom of
movement of government critics and their family members. The Government
subjected members of the LTDH and other human rights activists to
harassment, interrogation, property loss or damage, and denial of
passports. After an 18-month suspension, the Government renewed contact
with the LTDH, but refused to approve the registration of a new human
rights nongovernmental organization (NGO), the National Council for
Liberties (CNLT) and initiated judicial proceedings against CNLT
members. The Government permitted observers from several international
human rights groups to attend trials of human rights activists. In
November the Government created, within the Prime Minister's office, a
new Minister of Human Rights, Communication, and Relations with the
Chamber of Deputies. Violence against women occurs. The Government
continued to demonstrate its strong support for the rights of women and
children; however, legal discrimination against women continued to
exist in certain areas, such as property and inheritance law, which is
governed by Shari'a (Islamic law), and societal discrimination exists
in areas such as private sector employment. The Government took strong
measures to reduce official discrimination, including adding equal
opportunity for women as a standard part of its audits of all
governmental entities and state-owned enterprises; however, it did not
extend such measures to the private sector.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political killings.
According to a prison report by human rights activist Khemais Ksila
that was published by Amnesty International (AI), Tahar Jelassi died on
July 24 as a result of torture by prison guards for refusing to take
off his clothes during a routine search at Grombalia prison.
There were no developments in the case of former Islamist Tijani
Dridi, who allegedly died in police custody between August 2 and 7,
1998. The Government maintains that Dridi died on July 21 from injuries
sustained the previous day in a motorcycle collision.
There were no developments in the September 1997 case of Ghezala
Hannachi, an elderly woman who, according to human rights activists,
died after police used excessive force against her during a search of
her home. The Government maintained that Hannachi died of natural
causes, did not release the results of the prosecutor's inquiry into
her death, and formally closed the case in 1998.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Penal Code prohibits the use of torture and other
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; however, there
are credible reports that security services used various methods of
torture to coerce confessions from detainees. The forms of torture
included electric shock, submersion of the head in water, beatings with
hands, sticks, and police batons, cigarette burns, and food and sleep
deprivation. Police also reportedly utilized the ``rotisserie'' method:
stripping prisoners naked, manacling their wrists behind their ankles,
and beating the prisoners while they were suspended from a rod. A
report on prison conditions by the CNLT described other forms of
torture, including the falaqa, which consists of suspending a prisoner
by the feet and severely beating the soles of the feet; suspension of a
prisoner from the metal door of his cell for hours on end until the
prisoner loses consciousness; and confinement of the prisoner to the
``cachot,'' a tiny, unlit cell. Ksila and the CNLT both reported cases
in which prisoners committed self-mutilation in Tunisian prisons to
protest conditions and then, as punishment, prison authorities sutured
the prisoners' self-inflicted wounds without anesthesia and put them
into isolation or into ``cachot.'' The attorney of Abdelmounim Belanas
stated that his client, who was arrested on February 21 on allegations
that he belonged to the outlawed Tunisian CommunistWorkers Party
(PCOT), was beaten badly in detention; Belanas stated that he also was
tortured while in prison in 1995. In their July 10-11 trial, in which
they were convicted of PCOT membership, and their August 6 appeal,
Lofti Hammami, Imane Darwiche, and Henda Aroua attempted to testify
about being subjected to torture in 1998 during their detention and
being forced to sign confessions that they were not permitted to read.
In addition Darwiche attempted to testify that prison guards had
attempted to rape her. However, the presiding judges refused to record
references to torture and rape, saying that such statements were
irrelevant to the case. The appeals judge had Darwiche removed from the
courtroom when she persisted in trying to testify about the attempted
rape. Other defendants in the case alleged that they physically were
forced to sign confessions and statements that they were not permitted
to read. In their summary statements (which serve as the trial record),
presiding judges did not comment on these allegations (see Sections
1.d., 1.e, 2.a., 2.b., 4, and 6.a.).
According to Amnesty International and defense attorneys, the
courts routinely fail to investigate allegations of torture and
mistreatment and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under
torture.
In a November 1998 report on Tunisia, the U.N. Committee Against
Torture recommended that the Government reduce the prearraignment
incommunicado detention period from 10 days to 48 hours, noting that
most abuses occur during incommunicado detention. On August 2, in order
to address U.N. concerns, the Government published amendments to the
Penal Code, which adopted the U.N. definition of torture and increased
the maximum penalty for those convicted of committing acts of torture
from 5 to 8 years. The Government also shortened the maximum allowable
period of prearraignment incommunicado detention from 10 to 6 days and
added a requirement that the police notify suspects' families on the
day of their arrest. Although most defense attorneys state that it is
still too early to determine whether the Government enforces the 6-day
maximum detention requirement, one prominent attorney stated that he
believes that the new law usually is enforced only with respect to
common criminals, not political detainees.
In a report published in November 1998 as an alternative to the
Government's report to the U.N. Committee Against Torture, the
International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) stated that
torture was a ``blatant, grave, and systematic'' practice. The report
listed at least 500 cases that occurred between 1990 and 1998,
including at least 30 cases of death during torture. The majority of
these cases occurred between 1990 and 1995. The FIDH reported that the
total number of victims of torture between 1990 and 1998 probably
totaled several thousand, and that government harassment discouraged
victims of torture from filing complaints. The report was prepared in
conjunction with the LTDH and the Committee for the Respect of
Liberties and Human Rights in Tunisia.
Human rights advocates maintain that charges of torture and
mistreatment are difficult to substantiate because government
authorities often deny medical examinations until evidence of abuse has
disappeared. For example, in his July 10-11 and August 6 court
appearances, Lotfi Hammami attempted to testify that judicial
authorities rejected repeated requests for a medical examination after
he allegedly was tortured in 1998. The Government maintained that it
investigates all complaints of torture and mistreatment filed with the
prosecutor's office and noted that alleged victims sometimes publicly
accused authorities of acts of abuse without taking the steps required
to initiate an investigation. Absent a formal complaint, the Government
may open an administrative investigation, but is unlikely to release
the results to the lawyers of affected prisoners. There have been no
documented cases in which security officials were disciplined for such
abuse.
According to defense attorneys and former prisoners, prison
conditions ranged from Spartan to poor and, in some cases, did not meet
minimum international standards. Credible sources reported that
overcrowding continued to be a serious problem, with 40 to 50 prisoners
typically confined to a single 194-square-foot cell and up to 140
prisoners held in a 323 square-foot-cell. A defense attorney reported
that his client was imprisoned in a cell that contained 140 prisoners
who were forced to sleep 3 to a cot. Defense attorneys reported that
prisoners in the Ninth of April prison in Tunis were forced to share a
single water and toilet facility and a single razor with their
cellmates, creating serious sanitation problems.
There were credible reports that conditions and prison rules were
more stringent for political prisoners than for the general prison
population. One credible report has alleged the existence of special
cell blocks and prisons for political prisoners, where they might be
held in solitary confinement for months on end. Another credible source
reported that high-ranking leaders of the illegal An-Nahda Islamist
movement have been held in solitary confinement since 1991.
Othersources alleged that political prisoners regularly were moved
among jails throughout the country, thereby making it more difficult
for the prisoners' families to deliver food to the prisoners. One
prisoner reported that he was moved three times while serving his 6-
month sentence; another reported serving his sentence in 10 different
jails in 3 years. The CNLT report alleged that inmates are instructed
to isolate newly arrived political prisoners and are punished severely
for any contact with them. On the other hand, PCOT defendant Imane
Darwiche reported that guards incited her mentally ill cellmates to
violence against Darwiche, including choking her, spitting on her, and
defecating on her personal effects. Other prisoners, including LTDH
vice president Khemais Ksila, alleged that the authorities limited the
quantity and variety of food that families of political prisoners could
bring to supplement prison fare.
There were no developments in the 1997 deaths in custody of
prisoners Ridha Khemiri and Ahmed Ouafi, who, according to human rights
activists, died because of prison authorities' negligence. The
Government denied these allegations, citing authorities' efforts to
provide medical care, but did not release the results of the autopsies
that it reportedly conducted.
National High Commissioner for Human Rights Rachid Driss, whose
organization is government-funded, has conducted bimonthly, unannounced
prison inspections since 1996. Although Driss has declared that prison
conditions and prisoner hygiene were ``good and improving,'' details of
his inspections have not been made public.
The Government does not permit international organizations or the
media to inspect or monitor prison conditions. The LTDH announced in
its December 14 communique that the Government had granted it
permission to resume prison visits; however, it did not make any visits
by year's end, and the Government's willingness actually to allow such
visits to resume remained uncertain. The LTDH was given permission to
resume visits in 1997 but subsequently was not allowed access to
prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain problems. The law authorizes the police to make
arrests without warrants in the cases of suspected felons or crimes in
progress. In August the Government changed the Penal Code to reduce
from 10 days to 6 the time that the Government may hold a suspect
incommunicado following arrest and prior to arraignment. Another change
requires arresting officers to inform detainees of their rights at the
time of arrest, and requires police to inform detainees' families of
the arrest at the time of the arrest. Although most defense attorneys
state that it is still too early to determine whether the Government is
enforcing the family notification requirement, one prominent attorney
stated that the new law rarely is enforced with respect to either
common criminals or political detainees. Detainees have the right to be
informed of the grounds for arrest before questioning and may request a
medical examination. However, they do not have a right to legal
representation during the 6-day incommunicado detention period.
Attorneys, human rights monitors, and former detainees maintain that
the authorities illegally extend the maximum limit of prearraignment
detention by falsifying the date of arrest. Nizar Chaari, who was
convicted on May 11 of belonging to An-Nahda, was arrested on May 29,
1998, and did not appear before a judge until June 16, 1999 (see
Section 1.e.).
On May 12, the Government detained and then released within 48
hours nine labor activists who circulated a petition during the April
6-8 congress of the Tunisian Trade Union Federation (UGTT) that called
for greater pluralism within the UGTT and threatened to establish a new
syndicate. Another labor activist was detained for the same reasons for
2 days upon his return from Paris on May 22. The Government noted that
the labor activists were detained under suspicion of threatening the
public order and violating the Publications Code, but filed no charges.
In May and June the Government detained briefly and interrogated three
members of the unregistered NGO, the National Council on Liberties,
after they issued statements criticizing the detentions of the labor
activists. In July the Government indicted two of the three, Omar
Mestiri and Moncef Marzouki, for belonging to an illegal organization
(see Sections 1.e., 2.a., 2.d., and 4). In July the Government arrested
Abderraouf Chamarri and later charged him with defamation and the
spreading of false information. The Government subjected the family
members of Islamist activists to arbitrary arrest (see Sections 1.f,
2.a, 2.d, 4, and 6.a.).
Detainees have a right to be represented by counsel during
arraignment. The Government provides legal representation for
indigents. At arraignment the examining magistrate may decide to
release the accused or remand him to pretrial detention. The law
permits the release of accused persons on bail, which may be paid by a
third party. In cases involving crimes for which thesentence exceeds 5
years, or which involve national security, pretrial detention may last
an initial period of 6 months and may be extended by court order for
two additional 4-month periods. For crimes in which the penalties may
not exceed 5 years, the court may extend the initial 6-month pretrial
detention by an additional 3 months only. During this period, the court
conducts an investigation, hears arguments, and accepts evidence and
motions of both parties. In August the Government approved a law that
gives persons indicted for criminal acts the right to appeal their
indictment before the case comes to trial; previously, this right was
granted in civil cases only.
A case proceeds from investigation to a criminal court, which sets
a trial date. There is no legal limit to the length of time the court
may hold a case over for trial, nor is there a legal imperative for a
speedy hearing. Complaints of prolonged detention of persons awaiting
trial were common, and President Ben Ali publicly has encouraged judges
to make better use of release on bail and suspended sentences.
Seventeen students, professors, and labor activists who were sentenced
in July for membership in the illegal PCOT complained that their rights
were violated because their case was not tried until July 10, more than
17 months after their arrest. Defense lawyers maintain that the
Government purposely delayed the trial by preventing 4 of the 17
defendants who were in government custody from appearing in the
courtroom on May 15, the original trial date (see Sections 1.c, 1.e,
2.a., 2.b., 4, and 6.a.). Salowa Souilem and two other persons were
arrested and imprisoned in May 1996; they were not tried until January
28. Souilem and her codefendants were found guilty of belonging to an
extremist Islamic organization, Dawa'a Wa Tabligh, and sentenced to 2
years in prison. However, Souilem and one other defendant were released
on the day of their conviction, with the third released at the
conclusion of his sentence in May. (His time in pretrial detention
counted as part of his sentence.)
Human rights activists reported that security services arbitrarily
imposed administrative controls on former prisoners following their
release from prison. Although the Penal Code contains provisions for
the imposition of administrative controls following completion of a
prison sentence, only judges have the right to order a former prisoner
to register at a police station, and the law limits registration
requirements to 5 years. Human rights activists allege that these
requirements often are unreasonable and prevent former prisoners from
being able to hold a job. One former prisoner, Habib Soltana, a former
navy lieutenant released after serving a 4-year sentence for alleged
membership in An-Nahda, has been required to sign in daily at a local
police headquarters since 1995. Soltana also has been unable to resume
his career in the navy or to obtain a passport. Radhia Aouididi, who
was freed on June 4, was required as part of her original May 1998
sentence to report daily for 5 years to a police station 9 miles from
her village; after a November 25 trial, this requirement was reduced to
a weekly sign-in and notification to police if she leaves her village
(see Sections 1.e., 1.f., and 2.d.). Defense attorneys reported that
some clients must sign in four or five times daily, at times that are
determined only the previous evening. When the clients arrive at the
police station, they may be forced to wait hours before signing in,
making employment impossible and child care difficult. In August the
Government enacted a law proposed by president Ben Ali on March 20 that
establishes a commission designed to oversee the proper administration
of sentences. The same law also allows judges to substitute community
service for jail sentences in minor cases where the sentence would be 6
months or less.
There are likely a sizable number of political detainees, although
there is no reliable estimate due to arbitrary government detention
practices and the lack of publicly available records of arrests.
The Constitution prohibits forced exile, and the Government
observes this prohibition.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, the executive branch and the President
strongly influence the judiciary. In practice the judicial branch is
part of the Ministry of Justice and the executive branch appoints,
assigns, grants tenure to, and transfers judges. In addition the
President is head of the Supreme Council of Judges. This situation
renders judges susceptible to pressure in politically sensitive cases.
The court system comprises the regular civil and criminal courts,
including the courts of first instance; the courts of appeal; and the
Court of Cassation, the nation's highest court; as well as the military
tribunals within the Defense Ministry.
Military tribunals try cases involving military personnel and
civilians accused of national security crimes. A militarytribunal
consists of a civilian judge from the Supreme Court and four military
judges. Defendants may appeal the tribunal's verdict to the Court of
Cassation.
The Code of Procedure is patterned after the French legal system.
By law the accused has the right to be present at trial, be represented
by counsel, question witnesses, and appeal verdicts. However, in
practice judges do not always observe these rights. The law permits
trial in absentia of fugitives from the law. Both the accused and the
prosecutor may appeal decisions of the lower courts. Defendants may
request a different judge if they believe that a judge is not
impartial. The Court of Cassation, which considers arguments on points
of law as opposed to the facts of a case, is the final arbiter.
Trials in the regular courts of first instance and in the courts of
appeals are open to the public. The presiding judge or panel of judges
dominates a trial, and defense attorneys have little opportunity to
participate substantively. Defense lawyers contend that the courts
often fail to grant them adequate notice of trial dates or allow them
time to prepare their cases. Some also reported that judges restricted
access to evidence and court records, requiring in some cases, for
example, that all attorneys of record examine the court record on one
specified date in judges' chambers, without allowing attorneys to copy
material documents. They also complained that the judges sometimes
refused to allow them to call witnesses on their clients' behalf, or to
question key government witnesses. Lengthy delays in trials also are a
problem (see Section 1.d.).
Amnesty International and defense attorneys report that courts
routinely fail to investigate allegations of torture and mistreatment,
and have accepted as evidence confessions extracted under torture (see
Section 1.c.). Defense lawyers and human rights activists complain that
the length of court sessions sometimes prevents reasoned deliberation.
The July 10-11 trial of human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui, 17
codefendants who were in government custody, and 3 defendants who were
in hiding and tried in absentia, continued for 20 straight hours with
only short recesses (see Sections 1.c, 1.d, 2.a., 2.b., 4, and 6.a.).
There is no definitive information on the number of political
prisoners. Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that there might be
hundreds of political prisoners, convicted and imprisoned for
membership in the Islamist group An-Nahda and the Communist Workers
Party, for disseminating information produced by these banned
organizations, and for aiding relatives of convicted members. Reliable
sources estimate that between 1,200 and 2,000 political prisoners were
held in the prisons at the beginning of the year. The Government often
releases prisoners on major national holidays, such as Independence Day
or the anniversary of President Ben Ali's accession to power on
November 7, 1987. On November 5, the Government announced the release
and pardon of thousands of prisoners. Newspapers stated that 4,000
prisoners received either a reduction in their sentences or were
released (some conditionally). Of these 4,000, government sources
stated that 2,600 were released from prison. Reliable human rights
activists and lawyers estimated that approximately 600 political
prisoners were included in those released, and government officials
confirmed that some Islamists were released. Therefore, the number of
political prisoners detained at year's end was estimated to be between
600 and 1,400.
Khemais Ksila, the vice president of the LTDH who was jailed in
1998 for defamation, was released on September 22 after receiving an
early parole (see Sections 2.a., 2.d., and 4). However, the Government
does not provide details on the numbers or types of prisoners released.
Nizar Chaari, who was convicted on May 11 of belonging to An-Nahda, was
released on June 4. Radhia Aouididi, Saida Charbti, and Rachida Ben
Salem were released on June 4; Aoudidi's fiancee (who has refugee
status in France), Ben Salem's husband (who has refugee status in
Holland), and Charbti's husband are accused of belonging to An-Nahda
(see Section 2.d.). On February 16, Mohamed Aouididi (brother of Radhia
Aouididi) and Mohamed Amri (brother of Radhia's fiancee) were released
from prison. Radhia Aouididi, her mother Omssaad, her brother Mohammed,
and Mohammed Amri were acquitted on November 25 for lack of evidence on
charges of association with criminal elements. All defendants were
released from requirements to sign in daily at a police station. Radhia
Aouididi's requirement from her prior conviction was reduced to a
weekly sign-in and notification to police if she leaves her village
(see Section 1.d., 1.f., and 2.d.). Salwa Souilem was released on
January 28, the day of her conviction for belonging to an outlawed
Islamic group, 4 months before the end of her sentence (see Sections
1.d and 1.f.).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The authorities infringed on citizens' privacy rights.
The Constitution provides for the inviolability of the person, the
home, and for the privacy of correspondence, ``except inexceptional
cases defined by law.'' The law requires that the police have warrants
to conduct searches; however, police sometimes ignore the requirement
if authorities consider that state security is at stake or that a crime
is in progress. Human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui claimed that 3
houses of her family members were broken into and ransacked by a group
of approximately 50 security officials on September 3, and that another
2 houses of relatives were ransacked on September 5. Plainclothes
police officers searched the premises without presenting either a
search warrant or any form of identification. According to Nasraoui,
family members who voiced objections during the search were struck and
told that they had no choice but to submit to the search. The
Government stated that security forces were searching for Nasraoui's
husband, Hamma Hammami, who was convicted in absentia in July of
membership in the outlawed Communist Workers' Party but who has been in
hiding since February 1998 (see Sections 2.a and 4.).
Authorities may invoke state security interests to justify
telephone surveillance. There were numerous reports of government
interception of facsimile and computer-transmitted communications. The
law does not explicitly authorize these activities, although the
Government has stated that the Code of Criminal Procedure implicitly
gives investigating magistrates such authority. Many political
activists experience frequent and sometimes extended interruptions of
residential and business telephone and facsimile services. Human rights
activists accuse the Government of using the 1998 Postal Code, with its
broad but undefined prohibition against mail that threatens the public
order, to interfere with their mail and interrupt the delivery of
foreign publications. Local phone, facsimile, and copy shops require
persons to turn over their identification cards when requesting to send
facsimiles. Lawyers and activists stated that the Government has
increased its practice of cutting off telephone service to activists;
telephone service to the offices, homes, and relatives of prominent
human rights lawyers and other activists frequently was cut, sometimes
for long periods.
The security services monitor the activities of political critics,
and sometimes harass, follow, question, or otherwise intimidate their
relatives and associates. Journalist Taoufik Ben Brik alleged that
plainclothes policemen beat him on the street near his house on May 20
and then searched his house without a warrant; the Government denies
any involvement and claims that Ben Brik did not cooperate in police
attempts to investigate the beating (see Sections 1.d, 2.a, and 4.).
Police place journalists who write articles critical of the Government,
or who are active in human rights organizations, under surveillance
(see Section 2.a.). Human rights activists and lawyers also reported
that they were under police surveillance. Lawyer Radhia Nasraoui
complained that police frequently follow and intimidate her children,
and other human rights activists stated that the surveillance of
Nasraoui's family, in-laws, and office increased after Nasraoui's July
conviction for aiding and abetting an illegal organization (see
Sections 2.a. and 4). LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila reported that
he continued to be subjected to government surveillance and harassment
since his release in September. Ksila's telephone service has been cut,
and he reported that his mail was monitored and only bills have been
delivered. On December 17, Ksila's car was rammed by the police
surveillance car that was following him, causing an accident in which
the passenger side of his car was damaged badly. In accordance with the
law for prisoners released on parole, Ksila had no passport at year's
end; his passport was seized in 1996. He also has been unable to work
since 1996. Sihem Bensidrine, publisher and wife of CNLT secretary
general Omar Mestiri, reported that since April her telephone service
was cut, her home was under daily surveillance, her children routinely
were followed and questioned by security police, and her publishing
house was burglarized and ransacked three times, including on December
30, when her computer system and the CD-ROM archives of her not-yet-
published philosophy manuscripts were stolen.
Human rights activists alleged that the Government subjected the
family members of Islamist activists to arbitrary arrest, reportedly
utilizing charges of ``association with criminal elements'' to punish
family members for crimes committed by the activists. Radhia Aouididi,
her mother Omssaad, her brother Mohammed, and Mohammed Amri were
acquitted for lack of evidence on November 25 of charges of association
with criminal elements. All defendants were released from requirements
to sign in daily at a police station. Radhia Aouididi's requirement
from her prior conviction was reduced to a weekly sign-in and
notification to police if she leaves her village (see Sections 1.d.,
1.e., and 2.d.). Mohamed Amri, who was arrested on October 29, 1998 and
freed on February 16, is the brother of political refugee and accused
An-Nahda activist Ahmed Amri. Radhia Aouididi, who was arrested in 1996
for attempting to leave the country on a false passport after her
passport application was denied, and who was released from prison on
June 4, is the fiancee of Ahmed Amri. Mohamed Aouididi had been
arrested on October 30, 1998; he was freed on February 16.Omssaad
Aouididi had been arrested on October 30, 1998 and was released the
same day. Abdel Momen Amri, the father of Ahmed Amri, also was arrested
on October 30, 1998 and released the same day; he was not summoned for
the October 25 trial (see Section 1.d.).
Human rights activists also alleged that the relatives of Islamist
activists who are in jail or living abroad were subjected to police
surveillance and mandatory visits to police stations to report their
contact with relatives. The Government maintained that the Islamists'
relatives were members or associates of the outlawed An-Nahda movement
and that they were correctly subjected to legitimate laws prohibiting
membership in or association with that organization. The Government
also reportedly refused to issue passports to the family members of
some human rights activists.
Human rights activists allege that security services arbitrarily
imposed administrative controls on prisoners following their release
from prison (see Section 1.d.).
Police presence is heavy throughout the country and traffic
officers routinely stop motorists for no apparent reason to examine
their personal identification and vehicular documents. The Government
regularly prohibited the distribution of some foreign publications (see
Section 2.a.). The security services often question citizens seen
talking with foreign visitors or residents, particularly visiting
international human rights monitors and journalists.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of expression and of the press; however, in practice, the
Government restricts freedom of speech and of the press and relies upon
direct and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and encourage a
high degree of self-censorship. The Government also used the Press
Code, which contains broad provisions prohibiting subversion and
defamation, to prosecute individuals who expressed dissenting opinions.
In a November 15 speech, President Ben Ali called for an end to self-
censorship by journalists and a change in the Press Code to eliminate
prison sentences as penalties for some offenses; however, he did not
identify specifically what changes would be made and took no steps to
change the code by year's end. Ben Ali also announced the creation of
the position of Minister of Human Rights, Communication, and Relations
with the Chamber of Deputies. Dali Jazi, a founding member of the LTDH,
was appointed to the position, which is within the Prime Minister's
office.
In July the Government jailed and prosecuted Abderraouf Chamarri
(brother of self-exiled human rights activist Khemais Chamarri) on
charges of defamation and dissemination of false information for a joke
that Chamarri denied making, which linked a former minister to
corruption; the sentence was upheld on appeal on August 10. Chamarri
received a pardon on August 30 after he wrote a personal plea to the
President citing health problems (see Section 1.d.). In June newspaper
critic and composer Mohamed Gharfi was found guilty and fined for a
1998 series of five articles criticizing the organization of the annual
Carthage Cultural Festival. Gharfi's newspaper publisher also was found
guilty, and both verdicts were upheld on appeal. Ten labor union
activists who were detained for 48 hours in May and then released
without charges, allegedly were threatened with prosecution under the
Publications Code after they distributed a petition calling for greater
democracy within the trade union confederation without having submitted
advance copies to the Government (see Sections 1.d. and 6.a.). The 20
students, professors, and labor activists (including 3 fugitives tried
in absentia), who originally were arrested in February and March 1998
after criticizing the Government and its university policies, were
convicted in July of membership in the outlawed PCOT (see Sections
1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.b., 4, and 6.a.).
LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila, who was arrested in September
1997 and convicted in February 1998 on charges of defamation of the
public order, dissemination of false information, and inciting the
public to violence, was released on September 22 after receiving an
early parole (see Sections 1.e., 2.d., and 4). After releasing
communiques criticizing the Government in the name of the unregistered
National Council for Liberties, two CNLT members, Omar Mestiri and
Moncef Marzouki, were indicted in July for belonging to an illegal
organization (see Sections 1.d., 2.d., and 4.). Moncef Marzouki also
was arrested in November and December and charged with defamation,
belonging to an unrecognized organization, causing a public
disturbance, and dissemination of false information for publishing and
distributing two communiques on behalf of the CNLT. The criminal
investigation of ousted Social Democratic Movement (MDS) president
Mohamed Moaada, which opened in December 1997, is ongoing. The
Government did not react to several communiques issued by Moaada
criticizing the Government for human rightsviolations; however, on
November 17, Moaada was placed under house arrest. Moaada was released
from house arrest on December 14 after he began a hunger strike on
November 22. His house reportedly is no longer under security police
surveillance, his telephone service was restored, and he was permitted
to receive visitors again. Several journalists from Al-Fajr, the
publication associated with the outlawed An-Nahda movement, remain in
jail serving sentences that were given out in the early 1990's. The
Government maintains that the arrests, indictments, and convictions
were carried out in full accordance with the law.
Although several independent newspapers and magazines--including
two opposition party journals--exist, the Government relies upon direct
and indirect methods to restrict press freedom and encourage a high
degree of self-censorship. Primary among these methods is ``depot
legal,'' the requirement that printers and publishers provide copies of
all publications to the Chief Prosecutor, Ministry of Interior, and
Ministry of Culture prior to distribution. In July after reviewing the
requisite advance copy, the Government, without explaining its
position, refused to allow the Tunisian Association of Young Lawyers to
distribute its internal bulletin celebrating the centenary of the
Tunisian Bar Association. The Government has refused to allow Amnesty
International's Tunisia chapter to distribute 4,000 textbooks on human
rights written for high school students.
Similarly, distributors must deposit copies of publications printed
abroad with the Chief Prosecutor and various ministries prior to their
public release. While publishers need not wait for an authorization,
they must obtain a receipt of deposit before distribution. On occasion
such receipts reportedly are withheld, sometimes indefinitely. Without
a receipt, publications may not be distributed legally. The Press Code
contains broad provisions prohibiting subversion and defamation,
neither of which is defined clearly. The code stipulates fines and
confiscation for failure to comply with these provisions. The
Government routinely utilized this method to prevent distribution of
editions of foreign newspapers and magazines that contained articles
critical of the country. For example, editions of Le Monde, Liberation,
and Al-Hayat, were embargoed several times throughout the year, and the
French newspaper La Croix is, in effect, permanently banned. On October
21, the Government banned Le Monde, Le Canard Enchaine, L'Observateur,
Le Point, Liberation, and Le Figaro in Tunis for their critical
coverage of the presidential and legislative elections. Frankfurther
Allgemeiner Zeitung and the Financial Times also were banned
periodically since the October 24 elections. The Government also
reportedly withheld ``depot legal'' to remove from circulation books
that it deemed critical of the Government. A book published by French
journalist Jean Daniel was removed from bookstore shelves on April 25
on the grounds that the distributor had not complied with the depot
legal requirement; at the same time, a photograph exhibit organized by
Daniel's wife Michele was canceled and the director of the cultural
center that organized the show was dismissed. The Government stated
that the cultural center director was not dismissed arbitrarily but had
reached retirement age. In addition the Government provided official
texts on major domestic and international events and reportedly
reprimanded publishers and editors for failing to publish these
statements.
The Government also relies on indirect methods, such as newsprint
subsidies and control of public advertising revenues, to encourage
self-censorship in the media. There were credible reports that the
Government withheld advertising orders, a vital source of revenues,
from publications that published articles that the Government deemed
offensive.
The Government exerted further control over the media by
threatening to impose restrictions on journalists, such as refusing
permission to travel abroad, withholding press credentials, and
questioning and imposing police surveillance on journalists who wrote
articles critical of the Government. Members of the security services
also reportedly questioned journalists on the nature of press
conferences and other public functions hosted by foreigners that they
attended. Journalist Taoufik Ben Brik had his passport seized in April,
was beaten, allegedly by plainclothes police, on May 20, and
subsequently was detained and interrogated; his car also was vandalized
in broad daylight. These events all occurred after he published
articles critical of the Government in the French newspaper La Croix
(see Sections 1.d., 1.f., 2.a., and 4.). Other journalists who were
active in human rights organizations reported that they were under
police surveillance for weeks at a time. Visiting foreign journalists
sometimes complain of being followed by security officials.
On May 3, for the second year in a row, the Committee to Protect
Journalists named President Ben Ali as one of its ``10 worst enemies of
the press.'' In July Reporters Sans Frontieres released a paper
entitled ``Censorship: A Keystone of the Ben Ali Regime,'' which states
that ``press freedom is nonexistent in Tunisia.'' Both reports focused
on the presence of a restrictiveatmosphere that leads to self-
censorship and control exercised through advertising revenues. The
Tunisian Newspaper Association remained expelled from the World
Association of Newspapers (WAN). The WAN expelled the Association in
1997 for its failure to oppose repression of freedom of the press.
The Government owns and operates the Tunisian Radio and Television
Establishment (ERTT). The ERTT's coverage of government news is taken
directly from the official news agency, TAP. In May 1998, the ERTT
began broadcasting a live public debate program entitled ``Face to
Face,'' which gave ordinary citizens the opportunity to debate public
affairs issues with government officials. Human rights activists
described the program as progress toward greater freedom of expression.
There are several government-owned regional radio stations and one
national television channel. Bilateral agreements with France and Italy
permit citizens to receive the French television channel France 2 and
the Italian Rai-Uno. However, the Government stopped the broadcast of
France 2 in October because of its critical coverage of the elections.
The Government later announced plans to terminate France 2 service in
Tunisia permanently. It stated that the termination was part of a long-
term plan to provide more broadcast time to Tunisian programming.
Recent estimates put the number of satellite dishes in the country at
well over 100,000. After blocking sales for several years, the
Government instituted regulations in 1996 to govern their sale and
installation.
The Government encouraged greater use of the Internet, lowered
Internet user fees and telephone connection fees in both 1998 and 1999,
and abolished customs duties on computers. By September 1, the
Government reported that 12,000 users were connected to the Internet
(many of which were institutions, thus suggesting a higher number of
individuals with Internet access), approximately double the number a
year earlier. The Government used the Internet widely, with most
government ministries and agencies posting information on readily
accessible web sites. With a goal of 100,000 Internet users by 2001,
the Government actively is connecting schools and universities to the
Internet. However, web sites containing information critical of the
Government posted by international NGO's and foreign governments
frequently are blocked, including a report on Internet use in Tunisia
by Human Rights Watch. The only two Internet service providers in
Tunisia remain under the control of the Tunisian Internet Agency, which
was created in 1996 and which regularly must provide lists of
subscribers to the Government. Human rights activists allege that the
Agency regularly interferes with and intercepts their Internet
communications. The Press Code, including the requirement that advance
copies of publications be provided to the Government, applies to
information shared on the Internet (see Section 4).
The Government limits academic freedom. Like journalists,
university professors indicated that they sometimes practiced self-
censorship by avoiding classroom criticism of the Government or
statements supportive of the An-Nahda movement. Professors alleged that
the Government utilized the threat of tax audits, control over
university positions, and strict publishing rules to encourage self-
censorship. The presence of police on campuses also discouraged
dissent. A 1996 regulation requires professors to inform the Ministry
of Higher Education in advance of any seminars, including the list of
participants and subjects to be addressed. Copies of papers to be
presented in university settings or seminars must be provided to the
Ministry in advance.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly; however, the Government imposes some
restrictions on this right. Groups that wish to hold a public meeting,
rally, or march must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Interior by
applying no later than 3 days in advance of the proposed event, and
submitting the list of participants. The authorities routinely approve
such permits for groups that support government positions, but refuse
permission for groups that express dissenting views. Several
independent NGO's, including the LTDH, the ATFD, and the National
Student Union (UGET) received permission to hold a public meeting in
December at the Africa Meridien hotel in commemoration of the 51st
anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. The first general meeting of human rights activists in the
country in several years was attended by a standing-room-only crowd,
with over 500 attendees representing groups from all over the country.
After prohibiting the Tunisia chapter of Amnesty International from
holding public meetings in September and December 1998, the Government
permitted the chapter to hold a public meeting in Tunis in May.
However, the Government prohibited branch offices from holding meetings
in public space and denied AI permission to hold a public meeting on
November 26 to celebrate Mahmoud Romdhane's reelection to the
International Executive Committee of AI (see Section 4). On December 4,
the police forcibly broke up a peaceful march that was organized by the
UGTT in commemoration of the anniversary of the death of an early
tradeunion activist. The Government routinely granted permits to
opposition political parties to conduct campaign rallies and other
activities, including in public buildings, during the October election
campaigns (see Section 3).
Although the Constitution provides for freedom of association, the
Government restricts this right by barring membership in political
parties organized by religion, race, or region. On these grounds, the
Government prosecutes members of the Islamist movement An-Nahda. Human
rights activists alleged that the Government extended its prosecution
of Islamist activists to include family members who were not
politically active (see sections 1.d. and 1.f.). A criminal
investigation against former MDS opposition party leader Mohamed Moaada
remained open, after he allegedly met with An-Nahda leaders in Europe
in 1997 (see Section 2.a.).
In January the Government pardoned and released seven students who
were arrested in December 1998 for their participation in public
rallies organized by the UGET.
The Government bans organizations that threaten disruption of the
public order and uses this proscription to prosecute members of the
PCOT. In July the courts convicted 17 students, professors, and labor
activists of membership in the PCOT; given sentences ranging from 16
months to 3 years, 11 of those convicted were released in August
because it was determined that their pretrial detention counted as part
of their sentences. PCOT leader Hamma Hammami and two other fugitives,
in hiding since February 1998, were convicted in absentia and given
prison sentences of 9 years and 4 months. Human rights lawyer (and wife
of Hammami) Radhia Nasraoui, indicted in the same case but whose
charges were reduced to misdemeanors on April 12, was given a 6-month
suspended sentence for aiding and abetting an illegal organization (see
Sections 1.c, 1.d., 1.e, 2.a., 4, and 6.e.). AI reported that of the
remaining six students, five were released on November 4 as part of Ben
Ali's presidential pardon (see Section 1.e.).
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Islam as the
state religion and provides for the free exercise of other religions
that do not disturb the public order, and the Government generally
respects this right; however, it does not permit proselytizing and
partially limits the religious freedom of Baha'is. The Government
controls mosques and pays the salaries of prayer leaders. The 1988 Law
on Mosques provides that only personnel appointed by the Government may
lead activities in the mosques.
The Government regards the Baha'i faith as a heretical sect of
Islam and permits its 150 adherents to practice their faith only in
private. The Government reportedly pressures Baha'is to eschew
organized religious activities.
With 1,800 adherents, the Jewish community is the country's largest
indigenous religious minority. The Government ensures the Jewish
community freedom of worship and pays the salary of the Grand Rabbi.
The Government permits the Jewish community to operate private
religious schools and allows Jewish children on the island of Jerba to
split their academic day between secular public schools and private
religious schools. The Government also encouraged Jewish emigres to
return for the annual Jewish pilgrimage to the historic El-Ghriba
synagogue on the island of Jerba.
The nominal Christian community--composed of foreign temporary and
permanent residents and a small group of native-born citizens of both
European and Arab origin--numbers approximately 20,000 and is dispersed
throughout the country. According to church leaders, the practicing
Christian population numbers approximately 2,000 and includes an
estimated 200 native-born ethnic Arab citizens who have converted to
Christianity. In general, the Government does not permit Christian
groups to establish new churches.
The Government views proselytizing as an act against the public
order. Authorities ask foreigners suspected of proselytizing to depart
the country and do not permit them to return. There were no reported
cases of official action against persons suspected of proselytizing.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for these
rights, and persons are free to change their place of residence or work
at will; however, in practice the Government restricts the freedom of
movement and foreign travel of those critical of it.
Amendments to the passport law in October 1998 transferred power
for canceling passports from the Ministry of Interior to the courts;
however, the amended law contains broad provisions that permit passport
seizure on undefined national security groundsand deny citizens the
right either to present their case against seizure or to appeal the
judges' decision. The Ministry of Interior must submit requests to
seize or withhold a citizen's passport through the Public Prosecutor to
the courts.
Human rights monitors complain that the Government arbitrarily
withholds passports from citizens. In July human rights activists
circulated a list of 26 defense lawyers whose passports the authorities
seized. Although throughout the year the Government returned passports
to several prominent activists and lawyers, it continued to withhold
the passports of many other citizens, including Moncef Marzouki,
Mustapha Ben Jaafar, and Siheme Ben Sedrine (see Section 4). On March
26, the passport of Fatma Ksila, wife of jailed LTDH vice president
Khemais Ksila, was stolen in what she believes was a political move
designed to prevent her travel later that day to Geneva to meet with
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson. The Government,
citing laws designed to prevent the trafficking of stolen passports,
stated that Ksila, like other citizens, legally may reapply for a
passport 1 year from the date the passport was stolen. Also during
March, the Government prohibited Ksila's son Zaid from traveling to
Cairo to receive a human rights award in the name of his father; the
Government reported that, because Zaid was a minor, he needed explicit
permission from his father to leave the country. The mother of human
rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui was denied permission to renew her
passport. In accordance with the law concerning prisoners released on
parole, the Government continues to withhold the passport of Khemais
Ksila since his September 22 release (see Section 1.f.). According to
reliable sources, some political dissenters in self-imposed exile have
been prevented from obtaining or renewing their passports in order to
return to Tunisia. However, former Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali and
former Minister of Education and the Economy Achmed Ben Sada, who both
have been in self-exile for many years, recently had their passports
reinstated.
Human rights groups reported that the Government continued to
withhold the passports of the family members of Islamist activists who
live abroad. Radhia Aouididi was freed on June 4, 5 months before the
expiration of her 3-year prison term on a conviction of association
with An-Nahda and November 1996 use of a false passport (after the
Government refused to issue her a passport). Aouididi was informed
after her November 25 acquittal that she would be issued a passport if
she could provide a judge's decision in her trial; however, she claimed
that the court refused her access to copies of the November 25 decision
(see Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 1.f.). Aoudidi's fiance Ahmed Amri, who
lives abroad, is accused of membership in An-Nahda. After being
released on June 4, Rachida Ben Salem and Saida Charbti, both of whose
husbands are political refugees in Europe accused of membership in An-
Nahda, requested passports; the Government denied the requests (see
Sections 1.d., 1.e., and 1.f.).
The Government restricts internal travel during criminal
investigations. Human rights lawyer Radhia Nasraoui was confined to the
greater Tunis area from March 1998 until these restrictions were lifted
with her conviction on charges of aiding an illegal organization in
July; on February 11, Nasraoui was convicted and given a suspended
sentence for violating her travel restrictions when she traveled
without authorization to her mother-in-law's funeral in Sfax (see
Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.a., and 4). Council for National Liberties
member Omar Mestiri remains confined to Tunis pending the outcome of a
criminal trial, which prevents him from reaching his place of
employment outside the city limits (see Sections 1.d, 1.e, 2.a, and 4).
Police routinely stop motorists for no apparent reason to examine
their personal identification and vehicular documents (see Section
1.f.).
The Government cooperates with the office of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in assisting refugees. The
Government acknowledged the UNHCR's determination of refugee status
that was accorded to 200 individuals during the year. Approximately 100
cases await determination by the UNHCR. The Government provides first
asylum for refugees based on UNHCR recommendations. There is no pattern
of abuse of refugees. Although a few refugees were deported during the
year, none were forced to return to countries where they feared
persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides that the citizenry shall elect the
President and members of the legislature for 5-year terms; however,
there still are some significant limitations on citizens' right to
change their government. In October President Ben Ali was reelected for
a third 5-year term in the country's first multiparty presidential
elections in October, winning 99.44 percent of the vote. According to
the Constitution, this is to be his last term in office. The rulingRCD
party won all 148 directly elected seats in the legislative elections.
Observers agree that the outcome of the presidential and legislative
elections generally reflect the will of the electorate; however, the
campaign and election processes greatly favored the ruling party and
there was widespread disregard for the secrecy of the vote. The ruling
RCD party so dominates all levels of political activity that credible
electoral challenges have been extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the
results also reflect the general satisfaction of the vast majority with
President Ben Ali's rule, which derives in large part from his success
in promoting economic and social well-being. Opposition presidential
candidates were allowed to run for the first time and opposition
parties were able to campaign freely within the limits dictated by the
Government; however, given the overwhelming dominance of the RCD, the
playing field for the elections was not level. A presidentially
appointed independent election monitoring group presented a
confidential report to the President on the election process, which
reportedly uncovered numerous irregularities alleged by opposition
parties. President Ben Ali subsequently announced, during his November
15 inauguration ceremony, that he would propose a law to require voters
to enter the voting booth and take copies of all party ballots (not
just the ballot with ruling-party candidates) in order to preserve the
secrecy of the vote.
The RCD party and its direct predecessor parties have controlled
the political arena since independence in 1956. The RCD dominates the
Cabinet, the Chamber of Deputies, and regional and local governments.
The President appoints the Cabinet and the 23 governors. The Government
and the party are integrated closely; the President of the Republic is
also the president of the party, and the party's secretary general
holds the rank of minister.
The Government amended the Constitution and Electoral Code in July
to allow party presidents who have been in office for at least 5 years
and whose parties were represented in the 1994 to 1999 Chamber of
Deputies (and who met other requirements such as age and nationality)
to run in the October presidential elections. These criteria were a
one-time alternative to the more restrictive standing requirement that
candidates for president must receive the endorsement of 30 sitting
deputies or municipal council presidents to be eligible to run, and
paved the way for the first multiparty presidential elections, as
Mohamed Belhaj Amor, secretary general of the Popular Unity Front
(PUP), and Abderrahman Tlili, secretary general of the Union of
Democratic Unionists party (UDU), entered the race.
Both candidates acknowledged flaws in the Electoral Code and
criticized the fact that the narrowly written criteria made only two
persons eligible to run against Ben Ali. At the same time, they stated
that they wanted to advance pluralism by seizing the opportunity to
run. However, after the elections, there were opposition complaints
that, despite some progress in liberalizing the electoral process,
problems remained, especially with regard to protection of the secrecy
of the ballot and the accuracy of the vote totals.
The 182-seat Chamber of Deputies does not function as a
counterweight to the executive branch; rather, it serves as an arena in
which the executive's legislative proposals are debated prior to
virtually automatic approval. Debate within the Chamber is often lively
and government ministers are summoned to respond to deputies'
questions, although heated exchanges critical of government policy are
not reported fully in the press. Regardless of the debate, the Chamber
has a history of approving all government proposals. The Chamber that
emerged from the October parliamentary elections is more pluralistic
than the Chamber in place from 1994 to 1999, as October 1998 changes in
the Electoral Code reserved 20 percent of the seats for the opposition
parties, distributed on a proportional basis to those parties that did
not win directly elected district seats. Now, 5 opposition parties hold
34 of 182 seats, or nearly 19 percent, compared with 4 opposition
parties with 19 of 163 seats, or 12 percent, in the previous
Parliament. The remaining 81 percent of the seats were contested in
winner-take-all, multiseat district races, in which the ruling party
won all 148 directly elected seats, up from 144 in the last Parliament.
Opposition politicians recognized that the electoral changes ensured
them more seats than they could have won in a popular election.
However, they also argue that the winner-take-all, multiseat district
system permanently favors the RCD and essentially freezes the
opposition at the 20 percent level.
All six legally recognized opposition parties fielded parliamentary
candidates in the October elections. The Government provided public
financing to political parties, as called for in legislation adopted in
1997. Under the legislation, each party represented in the Chamber of
Deputies received an annual public subsidy of approximately $54,000
(60,000 dinars), plus an additional payment of $4,500 (5,000 dinars)
per deputy. The Government also provided campaign financing that
corresponded to the number of district lists that each party presented.
Opposition politicians argued that the subsidy system reinforces the
favored position of the rulingparty because its dominance in the
Parliament means that it receives the great majority of the government
funding. Moreover, with funding based on seats in Parliament, the
opposition parties had no interest in forming coalitions against the
RCD, but concentrated instead on competing with each other for the
largest possible share of the 20 percent of seats reserved for the
opposition. During the elections, opposition parties found independent
fund raising impossible, and those that published newspapers or
magazines faced difficulties in obtaining paid advertisers.
Women participate in politics, but they are underrepresented in
senior government positions. Twenty-one of the 182 Deputies elected in
October are women, up from 13 of 163 deputies in the previous Chamber.
The number of women in the Cabinet increased from one to four after
April and November cabinet changes, with two women being appointed full
ministers (the Minister of Environment and Land Management and the
Minister for Women and Family Affairs) and two appointed junior
ministers (the Secretary of State for Housing and the Secretary of
State for Public Health).
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Tunisian Human Rights League is the most active independent
advocacy organization, with branches in many parts of the country. The
organization receives and researches complaints and protests individual
and systemic abuses. After the league published a communique welcoming
the human rights initiatives announced in President Ben Ali's March 20
independence day speech, then Minister of Interior Ali Chaouch met with
LTDH president Taoufik Bouderbala on April 1, the first official
meeting between the League and the Government since the Government
broke off dialog in August 1997. At that time, the Government had
accused the LTDH of prompting members of the International Human Rights
Federation to give inaccurate testimony regarding Tunisia before the
U.N. Human Rights Commission. While pleased with the renewed contact,
LTDH officials reported that the Government had not provided any
written responses to LTDH inquiries since 1994. As a result of the
April 1 meeting, the Government returned the passports of several
lawyers whose cases the LTDH raised with the Government. LTDH
representatives also reported that the Government acceded to league
requests for a thorough medical check-up of then-jailed LTDH vice
president Khemais Ksila (who was released in September) and that a
jailed university student be allowed a face-to-face meeting with her
father. LTDH president Bouderbala reported that informal contacts
between the LTDH and the Government subsequently continued, and that
the Government addressed some league complaints about postimprisonment
administration controls by reducing the frequency of police station
sign-ins by some former prisoners. In June the Government provided the
LTDH with a grant of $23,000 (25,000 dinars), its first direct subsidy
for general LTDH operations in the League's history.
Although the Government permitted the League to hold meetings and a
rally in its offices, it continued to place significant obstacles in
the way of the League's effective operation. LTDH members and other
human rights activists reported government harassment, interrogation,
property loss or damage, unauthorized home entry, and denial of
passports. Local newspapers refused to publish LTDH communiques. After
requests for permission to hold meetings in public spaces were denied
in 1997 and 1998, the LTDH was able to secure a hotel venue for a
December 14 meeting held in conjunction with the Young Lawyers
Association, the ATDF, the Tunisian chapter of Amnesty International,
and the UGET. The meeting featured speakers commenting on the 51st
anniversary of the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. This first general meeting of human rights activists in several
years was attended by over 500 persons representing groups from all
over the country.
LTDH vice president Khemais Ksila, convicted in February 1998 on
defamation charges, was released on September 22 (see Sections 1.e.,
2.a., and 2.d.). Although the Government claims that an investigation
is ongoing, there were no developments regarding the February 12, 1998
ransacking and burglary of the law office of human rights activist
Radhia Nasraoui, which human rights activists believe the security
services carried out. In a case that human rights activists believe was
motivated by authorities' desire to retaliate for her willingness to
defend unpopular clients, Nasraoui was convicted in July and given a 6-
month suspended sentence for aiding and abetting the outlawed Communist
Workers Party (see Sections 1.c., 1.d., 1.e., 2.b., 4, and 6).
On December 15, 1998, several activists applied to the Ministry of
Interior to register a new human rights organization, the Tunisian
National Council for Liberties. On March 2, the Government issued its
refusal to register the CNLT as an NGO, commenting (without providing
details) that the organization didnot comply with the law. The CNLT's
founders filed an administrative appeal asking for reconsideration,
which the Government has not yet acted upon. Although not recognized by
the Government, the CNLT issued statements criticizing government human
rights practices. Government officials stated that, in publishing
communiques in the name of an unregistered NGO, CNLT members violated
the Publications Code (which requires that advance copies be provided
to the Government), belonged to an illegal organization, and threatened
public order. The Government opened a criminal investigation of the
head of the Tunisian Association of Young Lawyers for receiving CNLT
members in his office. The Government detained and interrogated two
CNLT members, Omar Mestiri and Moncef Marzouki, in May, and a third
member in June. In July a court indicted both Mestiri and Marzouki on
charges of belonging to an illegal organization, violating the
Publications Code, and spreading false information; both are currently
out of prison awaiting trial. Marzouki and CNLT member Mustapha Ben
Jaafar, both doctors, allege that the Government prohibits them from
treating patients in retaliation for their human rights activism.
Marzouki also was indicted in November and December and charged with
defamation, belonging to an unrecognized organization, public
disturbance, and dissemination of false information for publishing and
distributing two communiques critical of the Government's harassment of
Omar Mestiri, his wife, Sihem Bensedrine, and former directors of MDS
Mohamed Moaada and Ahmed Khaskoussi. Marzouki's family also claims to
have suffered from Marzouki's activism, and his brother Ali Bedoui was
arrested in January and given a 6-month prison sentence. The Government
stated that Bedoui was arrested for failing to fulfill the requirement
of a previous conviction that he report daily to the police station.
Many CNLT members were unable to obtain passports (see Sections 1.d.,
1.e., 2.a., and 2.d.).
The Arab Institute for Human Rights, headquartered in Tunis, was
founded in 1989 by the LTDH, the Arab Organization for Human Rights,
and the Union of Arab lawyers. It is an information, rather than an
advocacy, organization, and the Government supports its activities.
Amnesty International continued to maintain a Tunisian chapter. Its
members complained that the Tunis office suffered repeated loss of
telephone and facsimile service. Until June telephone information
service provided an incorrect number to those asking for AI's telephone
number; persons who called this number reportedly then were questioned
by Ministry of Interior officials. Persons who were considering joining
AI's Tunisia chapter report being discouraged actively from doing so by
security officials. AI officials reported that they were under periodic
police surveillance. The Government continued to deny entry to a
London-based AI researcher responsible for Tunisian affairs, claiming
that she has an anti-Tunisia bias. The Government refused to allow the
Tunisia chapter of AI to distribute 4,000 books on human rights
education for high school students. The Government permitted AI to hold
a public meeting in Tunis in May; however, it denied requests by branch
chapters in Tunisia to hold public meetings outside the capital. In
November the Government denied a request by the Tunisia chapter of AI
to hold a public meeting in Tunis to celebrate the reelection of
Mahmoud Romdhane to the International Executive Committee of AI.
Throughout the year, the Government permitted observers from AI,
the International Human Rights Federation, and other international
human rights organizations to monitor trials. The observers reported
that the Government permitted them to conduct their work freely.
However, the Government reportedly blocked access to the Internet web
sites produced by some of these organizations and the web site produced
by the Committee to Protect Journalists (see Section 2.a.). Human
rights activists and lawyers complain of frequently interrupted postal
and telephone services.
Human rights offices in certain ministries and a governmental body,
the Higher Commission on Human Rights and Basic Freedoms, address and
sometimes resolve human rights complaints. The Higher Commission
submits confidential reports directly to President Ben Ali. On November
17, the President created a Ministry of Human Rights, Communications,
and Relations with the Chamber of Deputies, which is within the Prime
Minister's office, and appointed LTDH founder Daly Jazi as Minister. On
December 10, Jazi held a conference in which the role of NGO's in
preserving and enforcing human rights was emphasized.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides that all citizens shall have equal rights
and responsibilities and be equal under the law, and the Government
generally upholds these rights in practice. Legal or societal
discrimination is not prevalent, apart from that experienced by women
in certain areas, such as inheritance, which is governed by Shari'a.
Shari'a provides that daughters receive only half the amount left to
sons.
Women.--Violence against women occurs, but there are no reliable
statistics to measure its extent. The Tunisian Democratic Women's
Association operates the country's only counseling center for women who
are victims of domestic violence. The center, located in Tunis, assists
approximately 20 women per month. Instances of rape or assault by
someone unknown to the victim are rare. Battered women first seek help
from family members. Police intervention is often ineffective because
police officers and the courts tend to regard domestic violence as a
problem to be handled by the family. Nonetheless, there are stiff
penalties for spouse abuse. Both the fine and imprisonment for battery
or violence committed by a spouse or family member are double those for
the same crimes committed by an individual not related to the victim.
Women enjoy substantial rights and the Government has made serious
efforts to advance those rights, especially in the areas of property
ownership practices and support to divorced women. The 1956 Personal
Status Code outlawed polygamy. A 1998 presidential decree created a
national fund to protect the rights of divorced women, ensuring that
the State would provide financial support to women whose former
husbands refused to make alimony payments. Legislation requires civil
authorities to advise couples of the merits of including provisions for
joint property in marriage contracts. Nonetheless, most property
acquired during marriage, including property acquired solely by the
wife, still is held in the name of the husband. Inheritance law, based
on Shari'a and tradition, discriminates against women, and women still
face societal and economic discrimination in certain areas, such as
private sector employment. The Government took strong measures to
reduce official discrimination, including adding equal opportunity for
women as a standard part of its audits of all governmental entities and
state-owned enterprises; however, it did not extend such measures to
the private sector.
Women in increasing numbers are entering the work force, employed
particularly in the textile, manufacturing, health, and agricultural
sectors. According to 1994 government statistics, women constituted 25
percent of the workforce; excluding the agricultural sector, they
accounted for 44 percent. Women represent 44 percent of workers in the
industrial sector and 46.1 percent of workers in the health sector.
There are an estimated 2,000 businesses headed by women. Women
constitute one-third of the civil service, employed primarily in the
fields of health, education, and social affairs at the middle or lower
levels. Women represent 60 percent of all judges in the capital and 25
percent of the nation's total jurists. Approximately 43 percent of
university students enrolled in the 1997-98 academic year were women.
The law explicitly requires equal pay for equal work. The Government
has added equal opportunity for women as a standard part of its audits
of all government ministries, agencies, and state-owned enterprises. On
the other hand, while the rate of illiteracy has dropped markedly in
both rural and urban areas, the rate of female illiteracy in all
categories is at least double that of men. Among 10- to 14-year-old
children, 5.5 percent of urban girls are illiterate, compared with 2.2
percent of urban boys, and 27 percent of rural girls, compared with
less than 7 percent of rural boys.
Several active NGO's focus, in whole or in part, on women's
advocacy, or research women's issues, and a cadre of attorneys
represent women in domestic cases. Media attention focuses on women's
economic and academic accomplishments, and usually omits reference to
culturally sensitive issues. The Government funded several studies and
projects designed to improve the role of women in the media.
In a November 17 cabinet reorganization, President Ben Ali created
a separate Ministry for Women and Family Affairs, and included in the
2000 state budget a separate, and relatively large, budget for the
Ministry, in support of its mission to ensure the legal rights and
improve the socioeconomic status of women. The Government supports and
provides funding to the National Women's Union, women's professional
associations, and the Government's Women's Research Center.
Children.--The Government demonstrates a strong commitment to
public education, which is compulsory until age 16. Primary school
enrollment for the 1997-98 scholastic year was roughly the same as the
preceding year; secondary school enrollment showed an 8 percent
increase. The Government reported that 98 percent of children attend
school full-time. The Government offers a maternal and child health
program, providing pre- and post-natal services. It sponsors an
immunization program targeting preschool-aged children, and reports
that over 95 percent of children are vaccinated.
In 1995 the Government promulgated laws as part of a Code for the
Protection of Children. The code proscribes child abuse, abandonment,
and sexual or economic exploitation. Penalties for convictions for
abandonment and assault on minors are severe. There is no societal
pattern of abuse of children. There is a Ministry for Children and
Youths and a Presidential Delegate to Safeguard the Rights and Welfare
of Children.
People with Disabilities.--The law prohibits discrimination based
on disability and mandates that at least 1 percent of the public and
private sector jobs be reserved for the disabled. All public buildings
constructed since 1991 must be accessible to physically disabled
persons. Many cities, including the capital, have begun to install
wheelchair access ramps on city sidewalks. There is a general trend
toward making public transportation more accessible to disabled
persons. The Government issues special cards to the disabled for
benefits such as unrestricted parking, priority medical services,
preferential seating on public transportation, and consumer discounts.
Indigenous People.--The Government estimates that the small Amazigh
minority constitutes less than 3 percent of the population. Some older
Amazighs have retained their native language, but the younger
generation has been assimilated into Tunisian culture through schooling
and marriage. Berbers are free to participate in politics and to
express themselves culturally.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution and the Labor Code
stipulate the right of workers to form unions. The Tunisian General
Federation of Labor is the country's only labor federation. About 15
percent of the work force, including civil servants and employees of
state-owned enterprises, are members, and a considerably larger
proportion of the work force is covered by union contracts. There is no
legal prohibition against the establishment of other labor federations.
A union may be dissolved only by court order.
The UGTT and its member unions legally are independent of the
Government and the ruling party, but operate under regulations that
restrict their freedom of action. The UGTT's membership includes
persons associated with all political tendencies, although Islamists
have been removed from union offices. There are credible reports that
the UGTT receives substantial government subsidies to supplement modest
union dues and funding from the National Social Security Account. While
regional and sector-specific unions operate with more independence, the
central UGTT leadership follows a policy of cooperation with the
Government and its economic reform program. While criminal charges
dating from March 1998 were dropped against dissident labor activist
Abdelmejid Sahraoui on April 2, allowing him to run in UGTT elections,
police physically prevented him from attending the April 6-8 UGTT
congress and elections. Labor activists were among the 21 persons (3 of
whom remain fugitives) convicted in July of defamation, dissemination
of false information, and association with or membership in the illegal
Communist Workers Party (see Sections 1.c, 1.d, 1.e, 2.a., 2.b., and
4). Ten UGTT members (including Sahraoui) were detained for 48 hours in
May after circulating a petition at the April UGTT congress that
criticized the UGTT secretary general and threatened to establish an
alternative labor federation (see Sections 1.d. and 2.a.).
Unions, including those representing civil servants, have the right
to strike, provided they give 10 days' advance notice to the UGTT and
it approves of the strike. However, this advance approval rarely is
sought in practice. There were numerous short-lived strikes over pay
and conditions. While the majority of these technically were illegal,
the Government did not prosecute workers for illegal strike activity,
and the strikes were covered objectively in the press. The
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has characterized the
requirement for prior UGTT approval of strikes as a violation of worker
rights. The law prohibits retribution against strikers, but there have
been cases of employers punishing them nevertheless, which forces the
strikers to pursue costly and time-consuming legal remedies to protect
their rights.
Labor disputes are settled through conciliation panels in which
labor and management are represented equally. Tripartite regional
arbitration commissions settle industrial disputes when conciliation
fails.
Unions are free to associate with international bodies.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right to
organize and bargain collectively is protected by law and observed in
practice. Wages and working conditions are set in triennial
negotiations between the UGTT member unions and employers. Forty-seven
collective bargaining agreements set standards for industries in the
private sector and cover 80 percent of the total private sector
workforce. Each accord is negotiated by representatives of unions and
employers in the area it covered. The Government's role in these
negotiations is minimal, consisting mainly of lending its good offices
if talks appear to be stalled. However, the Government must approve
(but may not modify) the agreements. When approved the agreements set
standards for all employees, both union and nonunion, in the areas that
they cover. The 1999 triennial negotiation extended well beyond the May
deadline, with a few public sector collective bargaining agreements
still not concluded by year's end. The agreements signed provided for
annual wage increases ranging from 4 to 6 percent.
The UGTT also negotiates wages and work conditions of civil
servants and employees of state-owned enterprises.
The law prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. However,
the UGTT is concerned about antiunion activity among private sector
employers, especially the firing of union activists and the use of
temporary workers to avoid unionization. In certain industries, such as
textiles and construction, temporary workers account for a large
majority of the work force. The Labor Code protects temporary workers,
but enforcement is more difficult than in the case of permanent
workers. The UGTT held discussions with the Government on this issue,
but no progress was reported by year's end. A committee chaired by an
officer from the Labor Inspectorate of the Office of the Inspector
General of the Ministry of Social Affairs, and including a labor
representative and an employers' association representative, approves
all worker dismissals.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The law prohibits
forced or compulsory labor by either adults or children, and it is not
known to occur. The Government abolished compulsory labor in 1989.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The minimum age for employment in manufacturing is 16
years. The minimum age for light work in agriculture and some other
nonindustrial sectors is 13 years. The law also requires children to
attend school until age 16. Workers between the ages of 14 and 18 must
have 12 hours of rest per day, which include the hours between 10 p.m.
and 6 a.m. Children between the ages of 14 and 16 may work no more than
2 hours per day. The total time that they spend in school and work may
not exceed 7 hours per day. Inspectors of the Ministry of Social
Affairs examine the records of employees to verify that employers
comply with the minimum age law. Nonetheless, young children often
perform agricultural work in rural areas and work as vendors in urban
areas, primarily during the summer vacation from school.
The UGTT has expressed concern that child labor continues to exist
disguised as apprenticeship, particularly in the handicraft industry,
and in the cases of teenage girls whose families place them as
household domestics in order to collect their wages. There are no
reliable statistics on the extent of this phenomenon; however, an
independent lawyer who conducted a study of the practice concluded that
hiring of underage girls as household domestics has declined with
increased government enforcement of school attendance and minimum work
age laws. The law prohibits forced and bonded child labor, and the
Government enforces this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Labor Code provides for a
range of administratively determined minimum wages, which are set by a
commission of representatives from the Ministries of Social Affairs,
Planning, Finance, and National Economy in consultation with the UGTT
and the Employers' Association. The President approves the commission's
recommendations. On May 1, the industrial minimum wage was raised by
6.32 dinars to $153 (178.880 dinars) per month for a 48-hour workweek
and $134 (156.691 dinars) per month for a 40-hour workweek. The
agricultural minimum wage is $4.71 (5.509 dinars) per day. When
supplemented by transportation and family allowances, the minimum wage
provides for a decent standard of living for a worker and family, but
nothing more, as it covers only essential costs. The Labor Code sets a
standard 48-hour workweek for most sectors and requires one 24-hour
rest period per week.
Regional labor inspectors are responsible for enforcing standards.
They inspect most firms about once every 2 years. However, the
Government often encounters difficulty in enforcing the minimum wage
law, particularly in nonunionized sectors of the economy. Moreover,
more than 240,000 workers are employed in the informal sector, which
falls outside the purview of labor legislation.
The Ministry of Social Affairs has responsibility for enforcing
health and safety standards in the workplace. There are special
government regulations covering such hazardous occupations as mining,
petroleum engineering, and construction. Working conditions and
standards tend to be better in firms that are export oriented than in
those producing exclusively for the domestic market. Workers are free
to remove themselves from dangerous situations without jeopardizing
their employment, and they may take legal action against employers who
retaliate against them for exercising this right.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons; however, it prohibits slavery and bonded labor. There were
no reports that persons were trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is a federation of seven emirates
established in 1971. None has any democratically elected institutions
or political parties. Traditional rule in the emirates generally has
been patriarchal, with political allegiance defined in terms of loyalty
to the tribal leaders. Political leaders in the emirates are not
elected, but citizens may express their concerns directly to their
leaders via traditional mechanisms, such as the open majlis, or
council. In accordance with the 1971 Constitution, the seven emirate
rulers constitute a Federal Supreme Council, the highest legislative
and executive body. The Council selects a President and Vice President
from its membership; the President in turn appoints the Prime Minister
and Cabinet. The Constitution requires the Council to meet annually,
although individual leaders meet frequently in more traditional
settings. The Cabinet manages the Federation on a day-to-day basis. A
consultative body, the Federal National Council (FNC), consisting of
advisors appointed by the emirate rulers, has no legislative authority
but questions government ministers in open sessions and makes policy
recommendations to the Cabinet. Each emirate retains control over its
own oil and mineral wealth, some aspects of internal security, and some
regulation of internal and external commerce. The Federal Government
asserts primacy in matters of foreign and defense policy, some aspects
of internal security, and increasingly in matters of law and the supply
of some government services. The judiciary generally is independent,
but its decisions are subject to review by the political leadership.
Each emirate maintains its own independent police force. While all
emirate internal security organs theoretically are branches of one
federal organization, in practice they operate with considerable
independence.
The UAE has a free market economy based on oil and gas production,
trade, and light manufacturing. The Government owns the majority share
of the petroleum production enterprise in the largest emirate, Abu
Dhabi. The Emirate of Dubai is likewise an oil producer, as well as a
growing financial and commercial center in the Gulf. The remaining five
emirates have negligible petroleum or other resources and therefore
depend in varying degrees on federal government subsidies, particularly
for basic services such as health care, electricity, water, and
education. The economy provides citizens with a high per capita income,
but it is heavily dependent on foreign workers, who constitute at least
80 percent of the general population.
The Government continued to restrict human rights in a number of
areas including the denial of the right of citizens to change their
government and the right to a speedy trial, and limitations on the
freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association. The press
continued to avoid direct criticism of the Government and exercised
self-censorship. Women continue to make progress in education and in
the work force, but some discrimination persists, including
restrictions on their ability to own property. The Government limits
worker rights.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture or degrading treatment,
and there were no confirmed reports of torture. There are consistent
but unconfirmed reports from foreign prisoners of beatings and coerced
confessions by police during initial detention. The Government
conducted internal investigations of these reports, and maintained that
they were groundless. Shari'a (Islamic law) courts frequently impose
flogging (except in Dubai) on Muslims found guilty of adultery,
prostitution, and drug or alcohol abuse. In practice flogging is
administered in accordance with Shari'a so as to prevent major or
permanent injuries. The individual administering the lashing
traditionally holds a Koran under the arm and swings the whip using the
forearm only. According to press accounts, punishments for adultery and
prostitution have ranged from 39 to 200 lashes. Individuals convicted
of drunkenness have been sentenced to 80 lashes.
The Federal Supreme Court ruled in 1993 that convictions in the
Shari'a courts do not necessarily require the imposition of Shari'a
penalties on non-Muslims, but such sentences have been carried out in a
few cases.
In June 1998, a Shari'a court in Fujairah sentenced three Omani
nationals convicted of robbery to have their right hands amputated. The
Fujairah prosecutor's office stated that it did not intend to carry out
the sentence and instead commuted the sentence to a term of
imprisonment.
In central prisons that hold long-term inmates, prisoners are
provided with food, medical care, and adequate sanitation facilities,
but sleep on slabs built into cell walls. Each prisoner is provided
with four blankets. Only some blocks of the central prisons are air-
conditioned during the intense heat and humidity of the summer. The
Government gradually is phasing air conditioning into the prisons.
Currently, prisoners with medical conditions are placed in air-
conditioned rooms during the summer months. Prisoners not under
investigation and not involved in drug cases may receive visitors up to
three times each week and may also make occasional local telephone
calls. In Dubai Emirate, most prisoners are allowed family visits and a
number of telephone calls.
The Government does not permit independent monitoring of prison
conditions.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
prohibits arrest, search, detention, or imprisonment, except in
accordance with the law, and authorities respect these provisions in
practice. The laws of each emirate prohibit arrest or search without
probable cause.
Under the Criminal Procedures Code, the police must report arrests
within 48 hours to the Attorney General, who must determine within the
next 24 hours whether to charge, release, or order further detention
pending an investigation. The Attorney General may order that detainees
be held for up to 21 days without charge. After that time, the
authorities must obtain a court order for further detention without
charge.
Although the code does not specify a right to a speedy trial,
authorities bring detainees to trial in reasonable time. Trials may
last a substantial period of time, depending on the seriousness of the
charges, number of witnesses, andavailability of judges. There is no
formal system of bail, but the authorities temporarily may release
detainees who deposit money or an important document such as a
passport. The law permits incommunicado detention, but there is no
evidence that it is practiced. Defendants in cases involving loss of
life, including involuntary manslaughter, may be denied release in
accordance with the local custom of protecting the defendant from the
victim's aggrieved family. However, bail usually is permitted, after a
payment of ``diya,'' a form of financial compensation for death or
injury cases.
Review of criminal cases by the office of the President in Abu
Dhabi, and bureaucratic delays in processing prisoners or releasing
them, sometimes result in detainees serving additional, unnecessary
time in the central prisons (see Section 1.e.). Some bureaucratic
delays have kept prisoners incarcerated for as long as several months
beyond their court-mandated release dates.
The Constitution prohibits exile, and it is not practiced.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for the
independence of the judiciary; however, its decisions are subject to
review by the political leadership.
There is a dual system of Shari'a and civil courts. The civil
courts generally are part of the federal system and are answerable to
the Federal Supreme Court, located in Abu Dhabi, which has the power of
judicial review as well as original jurisdiction in disputes between
emirates or between the Federal Government and individual emirates.
Courts and other parts of the judicial system in the Emirate of Dubai
tend to maintain independence from the federal system.
The Shari'a courts are administered by each emirate but also are
answerable to the Federal Supreme Court. In 1994 the President decreed
that the Shari'a courts, and not the civil courts, would have the
authority to try almost all types of criminal cases. The decree did not
affect the emirates of Dubai, Umm Al-Qaiwain, and Ras Al-Khaimah, which
have lower courts independent of the federal system.
Legal counsel may represent defendants in both court systems. Under
the new Criminal Procedures Code, the accused has a right to counsel in
all cases involving a capital crime or possible life imprisonment. Only
the Emirate of Dubai has a public defender's office. If the defendant
is indigent, the Government will provide counsel. However, in Dubai the
Government provides indigents counsel only in felony cases. The Supreme
Court ruled in 1993 that a defendant in an appeals case has a
``fundamental right'' to select his attorney and that this right
supersedes a judge's power to appoint an attorney for the defendant.
The right to legal counsel is interpreted to mean that the accused
has access to an attorney only after the police have completed their
investigation. Thus, the police can question accused persons--sometimes
for days or weeks, as in narcotics cases--without the benefit of legal
counsel.
Defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty. There are no
jury trials. A single judge normally renders the verdict in each case,
whether in Shari'a or civil courts; three judges sit for Dubai felony
cases. All trials are public, except national security cases and those
deemed by the judge likely to harm public morality. Most judges are
foreign nationals, primarily from other Arab countries; however, the
Ministry of Justice has trained some citizens as judges and
prosecutors.
Each court system has an appeal process. Death sentences may be
appealed to the ruler of the emirate in which the offense was committed
or to the President of the Federation. Non-Muslims who are tried for
criminal offenses in Shari'a courts may receive civil penalties at the
discretion of the judge. Shari'a penalties imposed on non-Muslims may
be overturned or modified by a higher court.
The Office of the President in the Abu Dhabi Emirate (also known as
the Diwan), following the traditional prerogatives of a local ruler,
maintains the practice of reviewing many types of criminal and civil
offenses (such as alcohol use, drug-related cases, firearm use, cases
involving personal injury, and cases affecting tribal harmony) before
cases are released to the prosecutor's office. The Diwan also reviews
sentences passed by judges and reserves the right to return cases to
the courts on appeal. The Diwan's involvement leads to long delays
prior to and following the judicial process, causing prisoners to
remain in prison after they have completed their sentence. Although
there are reports of intervention by other emirates' rulers in specific
cases of personal interest, intervention does not appear to be routine.
The military has its own court system based on Western military
judicial practice. Military tribunals try only military personnel.
There is no separate national security court system. In Dubai convicted
criminals are eligible for executive pardon, often based on
humanitarian grounds, once they have served at least half of their
sentence.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Constitution prohibits entry into homes without
the owner's permission, except in accordance with the law. Police may
enter homes without a warrant and without demonstrating probable cause;
however, officers' actions in searching premises are subject to review,
and officers are subject to disciplinary action if they act
irresponsibly. Officials other than a police officer must have a court
order to enter a private home. Local custom and practice place a high
value on privacy, and entry into private homes without the owner's
permission is rare. There is no known surveillance of private
correspondence. However, foreigners have received sealed publications,
such as magazines, through the international mail in which pictures of
the naked human figure have been blackened over with a marking pen.
Family law for Muslims is governed by Shari'a and the local Shari'a
courts. As such, Muslim women are forbidden to marry non-Muslims. Such
a marriage may result in the non-Muslim partner being arrested and
tried.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech; however, the Government limits this right in
practice. Most persons especially foreign nationals, refrain from
criticizing the Government in public.
All published material is subject to Federal Law 15 of 1988, which
stipulates that all publications, whether books or periodicals, should
be licensed by the Ministry of Education. The law also governs content
and contains a list of proscribed subjects. Mindful of these
provisions, journalists censor themselves when reporting on government
policy, the ruling families, national security, religion, and relations
with neighboring states. However, following an October interview with
the semiofficial daily newspaper Al-Ittihad, in which Deputy Prime
Minister Sultan Bin Zayid Al-Nahyan stated that uncovering
inefficiencies in government was one of the duties of the press, Al-
Ittihad published a series of articles that criticized unnamed
government officials who allegedly neglected their official duties in
order to attend to their private business interests. With the
encouragement of the Ministry of Information, Al-Ittihad printed
several articles and commentaries late in the year that were critical
of alleged inefficiencies in the delivery of services by the Ministries
of Health and Education.
The abrupt termination in April of the contract of a recently hired
editor of Al-Ittihad followed reported criticism of his failure to
follow tacit government guidelines regarding the reporting of political
issues. No official reason was given for the termination. Also early in
the year, the Abu Dhabi Emirate-owned corporation Emirates Media ceased
publication of the semiofficial English-language daily Emirates News,
apparently for budgetary reasons. In September Emirates Media, which
publishes Al-Ittihad and owns Abu Dhabi's radio and television
stations, issued a directive forbidding all its employees, including
journalists, from speaking with representatives of foreign diplomatic
missions without prior approval. Also in September, Dubai Emirate
announced plans to open a press club as part of its effort to promote
Dubai as a major regional communications hub. The club is intended to
provide facilities for the international press, including access to
uncensored information, and to serve as a site for open discussions
between political and financial figures and journalists.
Many of the local English and Arabic language newspapers are
privately owned but receive government subsidies. Foreign publications
routinely are subjected to censorship before distribution.
All television and radio stations are government owned and conform
to government reporting guidelines. These unpublished guidelines are
not always applied consistently. In July Emirates Media purchased Ajman
Emirate's radio and television stations, which until then had been the
country's only privately owned broadcast outlets. Satellite receiving
dishes are widespread and provide access to international broadcasts
without apparent censorship. Censors at the Ministry of Information and
Culture review imported newspapers, periodicals,books, films, and
videos and ban any material considered pornographic, violent,
derogatory to Islam, supportive of certain Israeli positions, unduly
critical of friendly countries, or critical of the Government or the
ruling families. In June the state telephone and Internet monopoly
substantially lowered Internet prices for the second time in 2 years
and sought to encourage greater use of the Internet. The Internet
monopoly uses a proxy server that appears aimed, in most instances, at
blocking material regarded as pornographic or as promoting radical
Islamic ideologies. The proxy server does not appear, in most cases, to
block news services or political expression unrelated to radical Islam,
or material originating from specific countries. However, the Internet
monopoly solicits suggestions from users regarding ``objectionable''
sites and sometimes has responded by briefly blocking some politically
oriented sites, which were, after an apparent review, later unblocked.
The unwritten but generally recognized ban on criticism of the
Government also restricts academic freedom, although in recent years
academics have been more open in their criticism.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
tightly restricts the freedom of peaceful assembly. Organized public
gatherings require a government permit. Each emirate determines its own
practice on public gatherings. Some emirates are relatively tolerant of
seminars and conferences on sensitive subjects. Citizens normally
confine their political discussions to the numerous gatherings or
majlis, which are held in private homes. There are no restrictions on
such gatherings.
The Government tightly restricts freedom of association.
Unauthorized political organizations are prohibited. All private
associations, including children's clubs, charitable groups, and hobby
associations, must be approved and licensed by local authorities;
however, this requirement is enforced only loosely in some emirates.
Private associations must follow the Government's censorship guidelines
if they publish any material.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution designates Islam as the
official religion, and Islam is also the official religion of each of
the seven emirates. The Constitution also provides for the freedom to
exercise religious worship in accordance with established customs,
provided that it does not conflict with public policy or violate public
morals, and the government generally respects this right in practice.
However, the Government controls all mosques and prohibits
proselytizing. Citizens are predominantly Sunni Muslims, but Shi'a
Muslims also are free to worship and maintain mosques. Most mosques are
government funded or subsidized, and the Ministry of Awqaf and
Religious Affairs ensures that clergy do not deviate from approved
topics in their sermons.
Non-Muslims are free to practice their religion but may not
proselytize publicly or distribute religious literature. The Government
does not recognize all non-Muslim religions. In those emirates that
officially recognize and thereby grant a legal identity to non-Muslim
religious groups, only a limited number of Christian groups are granted
such recognition. While recognizing the difference between Roman
Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant Christianity, the
authorities make no legal distinction between denominations within
these Christian groups, particularly between Protestant denominations.
Several often unrelated Christian congregations are required to share
common facilities because of official limitations on the number of
Christian denominations that are recognized officially. Non-Muslim and
non-Christian religions have no legal identity in any of the emirates.
Partly as a result of emirate policies regarding recognition of non-
Muslim denominations, facilities for Christian congregations are far
greater in number and size than those for non-Christian and non-Muslim
groups, despite the fact that Christians are a small minority of non-
Muslim foreigners.
Major cities have Christian churches, some of which are built on
land donated by the ruling families. A new Catholic church was opened
in Sharjah in 1997 and a new Armenian Orthodox church in 1998, both
with public ceremonies. The Government of Dubai Emirate donated a
parcel of land in Jebel Ali in 1998 for the construction of a facility
to be shared by four Protestant congregations and a Catholic
congregation. Land also was designated in Jebel Ali for the
construction of a second Christian cemetery. Some emirates permit Hindu
and Sikh temples to exist. There are no Buddhist temples; however,
Buddhists, along with Hindus and Sikhs, in cities without public
facilities, conduct religious ceremonies in private homes without
interference. Other religious communities (mostly of foreigners
residing in Dubai and Abu Dhabi) include Ismailis, Parsis, and Iranian
Baha'is. In 1998 Abu Dhabi Emirate donated land for the construction of
a second Christian cemetery nearBani Yas because the existing facility
near Umm Al Nar is nearly full. The Emirate also designated land for
the establishment of the country's first Baha'i cemetery. The
Government permits foreign clergy to minister to expatriate
congregations. Non-Muslim religious groups are permitted to engage in
private charitable activities and to send their children to private
schools. In January Dubai Emirate established a center for the
promotion of cultural understanding aimed at expanding contact between
the citizen and foreign populations. One of the center's goals is to
expose foreigners to aspects of the indigenous culture, including
Islam.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There are no limitations on freedom of
movement or relocation within the country, except for security areas
such as defense and oil installations.
Unrestricted foreign travel and emigration are permitted to male
citizens except those involved in financial disputes under
adjudication. A husband may bar his wife and children from leaving the
country. All citizens have the right to return. There is a small
population of stateless residents, many of whom have lived in the
country for more than one generation. They are Bedouins or the
descendants of Bedouins who are unable to prove that they are of UAE
origin. There is no formal procedure for naturalization, although
foreign women receive citizenship by marriage to a citizen, and anyone
may receive a passport by presidential fiat. Because they are not of
the original tribal groups, naturalized citizens may have their
passports and citizenship status revoked for criminal or politically
provocative actions. Such revocations are rare.
Citizens are not restricted in seeking or changing employment.
However, foreign nationals in specific occupations, primarily
professional, may not change employers without first leaving the
country for 6 months. During 1997 in an effort to liberalize employment
regulations, the Federal Government removed the 6-month ban from some
of these professions. Foreign nationals involved in disputes with
citizen employers may be blacklisted by the employer with immigration
authorities, effectively preventing their return.
The Government has not formulated a formal policy regarding
refugees, asylees, or first asylum. It may detain persons seeking
refugee status, particularly non-Arabs, while they await resettlement
in a third country.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
There are no democratically elected institutions, and citizens do
not have the right to change their government or to form political
parties. Although there are consultative councils at the federal and
emirate levels, most executive and legislative power is in the hands of
the Federal Supreme Council. The seven emirate rulers, their extended
families, and those persons and families to whom they are allied by
historical ties, marriage, or common interest wield most political
power in their respective emirates. Decisions at the federal level are
generally made by consensus of the sheiks of the seven emirates and
leading families.
A federal consultative body, called the Federal National Council,
consists of advisers appointed by the rulers of each emirate. The FNC
has no legislative authority but may question ministers and make policy
recommendations to the Cabinet. Its sessions are usually open to the
public.
The choice of a new emirate ruler falls to the ruling family in
consultation with other prominent tribal figures. By tradition rulers
and ruling families are presumed to have the right to rule, but their
incumbency ultimately depends on the quality of their leadership and
their responsiveness to their subjects' needs. Emirate rulers are
accessible, in varying degrees, to citizens who have a problem or a
request.
Tradition rather than law has limited the political role of women.
Women are free to hold government positions, but there are few women in
senior positions. There are no female members of the FNC. In 1998
President Zayid's wife, Shaykha Fatima, who is chairwoman of the
Women's Federation, announced the Government's intention to appoint a
number of women as special observers at the FNC. These observers are to
learn the procedures of the FNC, and it is expected that some later may
be appointed as members. The observers have not been named yet. In a
magazine interview, Shaykha Fatima stated that women participate in the
preparation of legislation dealing with social issues through
recommendations made by the Women's Federation, and that women are only
``steps away'' from full political participation. At the same time, she
emphasized her view that the eventual appointment of women to the FNC
and othergovernment positions would be ``a responsibility rather than
an honor,'' requiring careful prior preparation. Although the small
Shi'a minority has enjoyed commercial success, few Shi'a Muslims have
top positions in the Federal Government.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no independent human rights groups. Government
restrictions on freedom of the press and public association make it
difficult for such groups to investigate and publicly criticize the
Government's human rights restrictions. A human rights section exists
within Dubai Emirate's police force to monitor allegations of human
rights abuses. Informal public discussions of human rights, press
reports of international human rights forums' activities, and media
coverage of selected local human rights problems, such as foreign
workers' conditions, are increasing public awareness of human rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equality before the law with regard
to race, nationality, religious beliefs, or social status. However,
there is institutional and cultural discrimination based on sex,
nationality, and religion.
Women.--There are reported cases of spousal abuse. Police units are
stationed at major public hospitals so that victims of abuse may file
complaints, or attending physicians may call upon the police to
interview suspected victims of abuse. However, women sometimes are
reluctant to file formal charges for social, cultural, and economic
reasons. When abuse is reported the local police, authorities may take
action to protect women from such abuse. The laws protect women from
verbal abuse or harassment from men, and violators are subject to
criminal action. There continue to be credible reports of abuse of
female domestic servants by some local and foreign employers (see
Section 6.e.).
Prostitution has become an increasingly open phenomenon in recent
years, particularly in Dubai. Although no accurate statistics are
available, substantial numbers of women appear to be arriving from the
states of the former Soviet Union for temporary stays during which they
engage in prostitution and possibly other activities connected with
organized crime. Substantial numbers of prostitutes also appear to come
from Africa and South Asia. During the year, Dubai police established
special patrols in areas frequented by prostitutes in an effort to
control the phenomenon.
Most women play a subordinate role in this family-centered society
because of early marriages and traditional attitudes about women's
activities and are allowed full ownership only of tailor shops and
beauty parlors. Husbands may bar their wives and children from leaving
the country (see Section 2.d.), and a married woman may not accept
employment without her husband's written consent. Islamic law is
applied in cases of divorce. Courts usually grant custody to the father
regardless of the child's age in divorce cases. In most cases involving
children under the age of 7 years, the mother is granted temporary
custody, which then reverts to the father at the age of 7 years. Older
children live with their fathers unless judicial authorities decide
otherwise. A woman who remarries forfeits her right to the custody of
children from a previous marriage. Islamic law permits polygyny.
Women are restricted from holding majority shares in most
businesses. A woman's property is not commingled with that of her
husband. Women who work outside the home do not receive equal benefits,
such as housing, and may face discrimination in promotion. In June
1995, the Cabinet provisionally extended paid maternity leave for
citizen women in the private sector to 3 months at full pay, an
increase from 45 days, and up to 1 year's leave at half pay and a
second year's leave at quarter pay.
Opportunities for women have grown in government service,
education, private business, and health services. According to
government figures, 19.4 percent of the country's work force in 1995
was female. The Federal Government publicly has encouraged women to
join the work force, ensuring public sector employment for all who
apply. According to the available statistics, women constitute 100
percent of nursery school teachers, 55 percent of primary school
teachers, 65 percent of intermediate and secondary school teachers,
54.3 percent of health care workers, and 39.8 percent of all government
employees. Cultural barriers and the lack of economic necessity have
limited female participation. A symposium promoting the rights of women
in the labor force was held in 1996. Participants called forincreasing
rights granted to women including the elimination of the requirement
that a husband give approval before his wife may work.
Women continue to make rapid progress in education. They constitute
over 75 percent of the student body at the National University in Al-
Ain, largely because women, unlike men, rarely study abroad. In 1998
the Government established Zayid University, a second state-run
university, with campuses in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, exclusively for
women.
Women officially are encouraged to continue their education, and
government-sponsored women's centers provide adult education and
technical training courses. The Federal armed forces accept female
volunteers, who may enroll in a special training course that was
started after the Gulf War. The Dubai Police College recruits women,
many of whom are deployed at airports, immigration offices, and women's
prisons. Over 200 women have graduated from the College so far.
The law prohibits cohabitation by unmarried couples. The Government
may imprison and deport noncitizen women if they bear children out of
wedlock. In the event that the courts sentence women to prison for such
an offense, local authorities hold the newborn children in a special
facility until the mother's release and deportation. Children may
remain in this facility longer in the event of a custody dispute. In
Dubai Emirate, unmarried pregnant women must marry the father of the
child; both parties are subject to arrest for fornication.
Children.--The Government is committed to the welfare of children.
Children who are citizens receive free health care and education, and
are ensured housing. A family also may be eligible to receive aid from
the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare for sons and daughters who are
under the age of 18, unmarried, or disabled. There is no pattern of
societal child abuse.
People with Disabilities.--There is no federal legislation
requiring accessibility for the disabled. However, the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs sponsors centers that provide facilities and
services to the disabled. Services range from monthly social aid funds,
special education, and transportation assistance, to sending a team to
the Special Olympics.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Discrimination based on
national origin, while not legally sanctioned, is prevalent (see
Section 2.d.). Employment, immigration, and security policy, as well as
cultural attitudes towards foreign workers, are conditioned by national
origin.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--There are no unions and no strikes.
The law does not grant workers the right to organize unions or to
strike. Foreign workers, who make up the bulk of the work force, risk
deportation if they attempt to organize unions or to strike.
Since July 1995, the UAE has been suspended from the U.S. Overseas
Private Investment Corporation insurance programs because of the
Government's lack of compliance with internationally recognized worker
rights standards.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law does
not grant workers the right to engage in collective bargaining, and it
is not practiced. Workers in the industrial and service sectors
normally are employed under contracts that are subject to review by the
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. The Ministry of Interior's
Naturalization and Immigration Administration is responsible for
reviewing the contracts of domestic employees as part of residency
permit processing. The purpose of the review is to ensure that the pay
satisfies the employee's basic needs and secures a means of living. For
the resolution of work-related disputes, workers must rely on
conciliation committees organized by the Ministry of Labor and Social
Affairs or on special labor courts.
Labor laws do not cover government employees, domestic servants,
and agricultural workers. The latter two groups face considerable
difficulty in obtaining assistance to resolve disputes with employers.
While any worker may seek redress through the courts, this process puts
a heavy financial burden on those in lower income brackets.
In Dubai's Jebel Ali Free Zone, the same labor laws apply as in the
rest of the country.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is illegal and not practiced. However, some unscrupulous
employment agents bring foreign workers to the country under conditions
approaching indenture. The Government prohibits forced and bonded child
labor and enforces this prohibition effectively. In July authorities
acting on information provided by the Pakistani Embassy, located and
repatriated an 8-year-old Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped
to work as a camel jockey. Police reportedly are investigating several
such cases; however, no charges were filed by year's end (See Sections
6.d. and 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Labor regulations prohibit employment of persons under the
age of 15 and have special provisions for employing those 15 to 18
years of age. The Department of Labor enforces the regulations. Other
regulations permit employers to engage only adult foreign workers. In
1993 the Government prohibited the use of children under the age of 15
as camel jockeys and of jockeys who do not weigh more than 99 pounds.
The Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these rules.
However, many sources report that a significant number of camel jockeys
are children under the minimum employment age (see Section 6.f.).
Relevant labor laws often are not enforced, as those who own racing
camels and employ the children come from powerful local families that
are in effect above the law. In 1998 a local newspaper reported the
hospitalization of a 5-year-old, 44-pound (20-kilogram), abandoned
Bangladeshi child who had been used as a jockey and whose leg had been
broken by a camel. Reports of underage camel jockeys continued to
surface in the local press during the year. In July authorities, acting
on information provided by the Pakistani Embassy, located and
repatriated an 8-year-old Pakistani boy who allegedly had been kidnaped
to work as a camel jockey. In August a 4-year-old boy from Bangladesh
who had been used as a camel jockey was found wandering in the desert
after being abandoned there by his handlers. Police reportedly are
investigating several of these cases; however, no charges were filed by
year's end. Otherwise, child labor is not permitted. The Government
prohibits forced and bonded child labor and generally enforces this
prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.). The Government does not
issue visas for foreign workers under the age of 16 years. Education is
compulsory through the intermediate stage, approximately the age of 13
or 14 years.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no legislated or
administrative minimum wage. Supply and demand determine compensation.
However, according to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, there
is an unofficial, unwritten minimum wage rate that would afford a
worker and family a minimal standard of living. The Labor and Social
Affairs Ministry reviews labor contracts and does not approve any
contract that stipulates a clearly unacceptable wage (see Section
6.b.).
The standard workday and workweek are 8 hours per day, 6 days per
week; however, these standards are not enforced strictly. Certain types
of workers, notably domestic servants, may be obliged to work longer
than the mandated standard hours. The law also provides for a minimum
of 24 days per year of annual leave plus 10 national and religious
holidays. In addition manual workers are not required to do outdoor
work when the temperature exceeds 112 degrees Fahrenheit.
Most foreign workers receive either employer-provided housing or
housing allowances, medical care, and homeward passage from their
employers. Most foreign workers do not earn the minimum salary of
$1,090 per month (or $817 per month, if a housing allowance is provided
in addition to the salary) required to obtain residency permits for
their families. Employers have the option to petition for a 6-month ban
from the work force against any foreign employee who leaves his job
without fulfilling the terms of his contract.
The Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs,
municipalities, and civil defense units enforce health and safety
standards. The Government requires every large industrial concern to
employ a certified occupational safety officer. An injured worker is
entitled to fair compensation. Health standards are not observed
uniformly in the housing camps that are provided for foreign workers.
Workers' jobs are not protected if they remove themselves from what
they consider to be unsafe working conditions. However, the Ministry of
Labor and Social Affairs may require employers to reinstate workers who
were dismissed for not performing unsafe work. All workers have the
right to lodge grievances with Ministry officials, whomake an effort to
investigate all complaints. However, the Ministry is understaffed and
underbudgeted; complaints and compensation claims are backlogged.
Rulings on complaints may be appealed within the Ministry and
ultimately to the courts. However, many workers choose not to protest
for fear of reprisals or deportation. The press periodically carries
reports of abuses suffered by domestic servants, particularly women, at
the hands of some employers. Allegations have included excessive work
hours, nonpayment of wages, and verbal and physical abuse.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit specifically
trafficking in persons; however, child smuggling is a crime.
There have been reports in recent years that underage boys are
smuggled into the country and used as camel jockeys. For example, in
1998 a local newspaper reported the hospitalization of a 5-year-old,
44-pound, abandoned Bangladeshi child who had been used as a jockey and
whose leg had been broken by a camel. Reports of underage camel jockeys
continued to appear in the local press during the year. In July
authorities, acting on information provided by the Pakistani Embassy,
located and repatriated an 8-year-old Pakistani boy who allegedly had
been kidnaped to work as a camel jockey. In August a 4-year-old boy
from Bangladesh who had been used as a camel jockey was found wandering
in the desert after being abandoned there by his handlers. There were
reports that in some instances, South Asian boys, generally from
Pakistan and Bangladesh, were smuggled into the country by small,
organized groups. Police reportedly are investigating several of these
cases; however, no charges were filed by year's end.
In 1993 the Government prohibited the use of children under the age
of 15 as camel jockeys and of jockeys who do not weigh more than 99
pounds. The Camel Racing Association is responsible for enforcing these
rules. However, many sources report that a significant number of camel
jockeys are children under the minimum employment age. Relevant labor
laws often are not enforced, as those who own racing camels and use the
children come from powerful local families that are in effect above the
law.
Although no accurate statistics are available, substantial numbers
of women appear to be arriving from the states of the former Soviet
Union for temporary stays during which they engage in prostitution and
possibly other activities connected with organized crime. Substantial
numbers of prostitutes also appear to come from Africa and South Asia
(see Section 5).
______
YEMEN
The Republic of Yemen, comprising the former (northern) Yemen Arab
Republic (YAR) and (southern) People's Democratic Republic of Yemen
(PDRY), was proclaimed in 1990. Following a brief but bloody civil war
in mid-1994, the country was reunified under the Sana'a-based
government. Ali Abdullah Saleh is the President and leader of the
General People's Congress (GPC). He was elected by the legislature to a
5-year term in 1994, and was elected to another 5-year term in the
country's first nation-wide direct presidential election in September,
winning 96.3 percent of the vote. The Constitution provides that the
President be elected by popular vote from at least two candidates
endorsed by Parliament, and the election was generally free and fair;
however, there were some problems, including the lack of a credible
voter registration list. In addition the President was not opposed by a
truly competitive candidate because the candidate selected by the
leftist opposition did not receive the minimum number of votes required
to run from the GPC-dominated Parliament (the other opposition party
chose not to run its own candidate, despite its seats in Parliament).
The President's sole opponent was a member of the GPC.
The first Parliament elected by universal adult suffrage was
convened in 1993. Parliamentary elections were held again in 1997, with
the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), formerly the main party of the PDRY
and a previous coalition partner of the GPC, leading an opposition
boycott. The GPC won an absolute majority in the 1997 Parliament, with
Islaah the only other major party represented. International observers
judged the elections as reasonably free and fair, while noting some
problems with the voting. The Parliament is not yet an effective
counterweight to executive authority, although it increasingly
demonstrates independence from the Government. Real political power
rests with the executive branch, particularly the President. The
judiciary is nominally independent, but is weak and severely hampered
by corruption, executive branch interference, and the frequent failure
of the authorities to enforce judgments.
The primary state security apparatus is the Political Security
Organization (PSO), which reports directly to the President. It is
independent of the Ministry of Interior. The Criminal Investigative
Department (CID) of the police conducts most criminal investigations
and makes most arrests. The Central Security Organization (CSO), a part
of the Ministry of Interior, maintains a paramilitary force. The
civilian authorities do not maintain effective control of the security
forces. Members of the security forces, particularly the PSO, committed
numerous, serious human rights abuses.
Yemen is a very poor country, and over 40 percent of the population
live in poverty. Its embryonic market-based economy, despite a major
economic reform program, remains impeded by excessive government
interference and endemic corruption. Its annual per capita gross
national product (GNP) fell from $325 in 1997 to $260 in 1998, but rose
to $275 in 1999. Agriculture accounts for approximately 22 percent of
GNP, industry for approximately 27 percent, and services for
approximately 51 percent. Oil is the primary source of foreign
exchange. Other exports include fish, agricultural products, cotton,
and coffee. Remittances from citizens working abroad (primarily in
Saudi Arabia) are also important. Remittances were reduced sharply
after Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States expelled up to 850,000 Yemeni
workers during the Gulf War because of the Government's lack of support
for the U.N. coalition. The Gulf states also suspended most assistance
programs, and much Western aid was reduced. Foreign aid has begun to
reemerge as an importance source of income. The unemployment rate is
estimated at 40 percent, and is highest in the southern governorates,
where, prior to unity, most adults were employed by the PDRY
Government.
The Government's human rights record continues to be poor. There
are significant limitations on citizens' right to change their
government. There were instances of extrajudicial killing by some
members of the security forces. Members of the security forces tortured
and otherwise abused persons, and continued to arrest and to detain
citizens arbitrarily, especially oppositionists in the south and other
persons regarded as ``secessionists.'' Prison conditions are poor and
some detainees were held in private prisons not authorized by the
Government. PSO officers have broad discretion over perceived national
security issues. Despite constitutional constraints, they routinely
monitor citizens' activities and search their homes, detain citizens
for questioning, and mistreat detainees. In fact security forces
sometimes countermand orders from the President and the Interior
Ministry. The Government failed to hold members of the security forces
accountable for abuses, although it investigated three security
officers, subsequently convicted them of torturing a prisoner to death,
fired them from their positions, and sentenced them to prison.
Prolonged pretrial detention is a serious problem, and judicial
corruption, inefficiency, and executive interference underminedue
process. The Government continued to implement a comprehensive, long-
term program for judicial reform, but its effect is not yet clear. The
Constitution limits freedom of speech and of the press, and the
Government frequently harassed, intimidated, and detained journalists.
Journalists practice self-censorship. The Government at times limits
freedom of assembly. The Government imposes some restrictions on
freedom of religion. There were some limits on freedom of movement.
Violence and discrimination against women are problems. Female genital
mutilation is practiced on a limited scale, primarily along the coastal
areas of the Red Sea. Although the practice is discouraged publicly,
the authorities do not prohibit it. Discrimination against the disabled
and racial and ethnic minorities, and to a lesser extent, religious
minorities, is a problem. The Government influences labor unions. Child
labor is a problem.
However, the Government continued to take some steps to address
human rights problems. These steps included holding of the country's
first direct presidential election, implementing limited political and
legal reforms, displaying official receptiveness to and support for
donor-funded democracy and human rights programs, and convicting three
security officials for human rights abuses. In June the Government
hosted the first Emerging Democracies Forum, a major international
conference of 16 democratizing countries.
At the invitation of the authorities, delegations from the U.N.
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) and Amnesty International (AI) visited
Yemen in 1998 to observe the human rights situation and make
recommendations. One NGO, Penal Reform International (PRI), conducted a
series of prison reform-related events from September 1998 to February.
The Government continued to implement a comprehensive, long-term
program for judicial reform.
A campaign of bombings--the devices sometimes were little more than
noise bombs--continued throughout the year, particularly in the
southern governorates, although at a far lower rate than in previous
years. Observers attribute the bombings to tribal disputes, religious
extremists, and antigovernment political groups based in the country
and abroad.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Security forces
committed a number of extrajudicial killings. There were no reports
that security forces killed or injured persons at checkpoints during
the year, as had been reported in previous years.
In March forces from the paramilitary police Central Security Unit
(CSU) under the command of Ahmed Nasser al-Dahiri used excessive force
when they intervened to settle a land dispute in the village of Sa'eed
in Al-Baida governorate. The incident began after local police
intervened on behalf of one party and a police officer was killed. The
police claim that the officer was killed by villagers; the villagers
claim that he was a victim of the police's random firing into the
crowd. Later that day, heavily armed CSU reinforcements arrived and
occupied the village for 8 days (see Section 1.c.).
There was credible evidence that security forces killed a prisoner
in detention in late 1997 or early 1998. Wadia al-Shaibani, a 22-year-
old arrested in connection with the July 1997 bombings in Aden,
apparently died after suffering a beating at the Soleyban police
facility in Aden. Government authorities declined to investigate; they
claimed that al-Shaibani committed suicide. The 1996 case of a YSP
activist who died in police custody remained unresolved. The youth had
been arrested following his participation in a peaceful demonstration
in Mukallah. No member of the security forces has been charged in
connection with his death. The Human Rights Committee of the
Consultative Council (an advisory board to the President) in 1998
investigated the death of Wadia al-Shaibani; however, it was unable to
persuade the authorities to investigate the death or to bring charges
against security officials.
In July a court in Tawila in Al-Mahweet governorate convicted the
town's security chief and two police officers of first-degree murder
for torturing to death a teenager taken into their custody on theft
charges in March. All three officials were fired. The security chief
was sentenced to 10 years in jail and fined $19,000 (YR 93,000,000) in
compensation to thevictim's family. The two police officers each were
sentenced to 5 years in jail.
In June 1998, the President established a committee to study the
phenomenon of revenge killings and to make recommendations on how to
combat that problem. There was no news on the committee's work or its
findings at year's end.
Tribal violence resulted in a number of killings and other abuses,
and the Government's ability to control tribal elements remained
limited. In addition tensions between the Government and various tribes
periodically escalate into violent confrontations (see Section 5).
Persons continued to be killed and injured in unexplained bombings
and shootings that occurred during the year. In most cases, it was
impossible to determine who was responsible for such acts or why they
occurred, and there were no claims of responsibility. The Government
accused southern oppositionists of perpetrating some incidents, but the
opposition denied any involvement. Some cases appeared to have
criminal, religious, or political motives; others appeared to be cases
of tribal revenge or land disputes. In August four persons were killed
in a massive explosion, which destroyed Sana'a's largest supermarket.
On December 28, 1998, a group of 16 western tourists was kidnaped
by terrorists in Abyan governorate near Mudiyah. The next day,
government forces surrounded the area and attempted a rescue operation.
Four of the hostages and three of the terrorists were killed. There
were varying reports as to whether the government forces inadvertently
killed any of the hostages in the crossfire. However, at least two
apparently were shot deliberately by the kidnapers. The Government has
stated that its decision to intervene was based on its belief that the
hostages' lives were in immediate danger. The trial of the four
surviving terrorists including Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) leader
Zein Al-Abidine Al-Mihdar (also known as Abu Hassan) began in January,
and in May they were found guilty. Abu Hassan, who during his trial
publicly and repeatedly admitted to all charges against him, a second
Yemeni, Abdallah Al-Jundaydi, and a Tunisian were sentenced to death;
the remaining defendant was sentenced to 20 year's imprisonment. The
Tunisian's sentence was commuted to 20 years at the first appellate
review, and the Supreme Court in October commuted Al-Jundaydi's
sentence to 20 years as well. However, Abu Hassan's death sentence was
upheld by the Supreme Court in October and approved by President Saleh.
He was executed by firing squad on October 17. There were no
allegations of lack of due process in Abu Hassan's trial or during the
subsequent appeal process. The trial of seven additional AAIA members
on terrorism charges began in October, but it had not concluded by
year's end (see Section 1.e.).
b. Disappearance.--Members of the security forces continue to
arrest and detain citizens for varying periods of time without charge
or notification to their families. Many detainees are associated with
the YSP or other opposition parties and are accused of being
``secessionists.'' Most such disappearances are temporary, and
detainees typically are released within weeks or months.
Following an April 1998 opposition demonstration in which two
persons were killed, the authorities rounded up and detained a large
number of demonstrators. The security forces released 14 of the
detainees late in the next month. Other demonstrators were released
soon thereafter. Later in 1998, the Hadramaut primary court announced
that a trial would begin in the case of several oppositionists for
their role in the violence, including Hassan Ba Oum, the leader of the
YSP in Hadramaut governorate and head of the opposition coordination
council; however, no trial was held. Ba Oum's whereabouts were unknown
after the April 1998 demonstrations, and there were reports that he had
disappeared during police custody. These reports turned out to be
false. Ba Oum remained in seclusion for most of the year, communicating
periodically with the press. In October he turned himself in to the
Mukallah prosecutor's office. He was detained for questioning and
released 5 days later without charges being placed against him.
In 1998 at the invitation of authorities, delegations from the
UNHRC and AI visited the country to investigate the whereabouts of
persons who have ``disappeared'' in custody since unification. In 1997
the Government had promised AI that it would look into 27 cases of
persons who died after they reportedly ``disappeared'' while in
government custody during the violence associated with the civil war in
1994. In its follow-up report issued in July, AI criticized the
Government for not keeping this promise. The Government claims that it
responded to AI and passed the results of its investigations to the
UNHRC, but that the information AI provided was inadequate for
effective investigation and conclusive action. AI has received no
credible reports of disappearances in the last 5 years. Both the U.N.
Committee onDisappearances and AI also continue to allege that there
were hundreds of unresolved disappearances dating from the pre-union
period in the former PDRY, particularly from its 1986 civil war. The
Government asserts that it cannot be held responsible for cases that
took place within the former PDRY prior to unity; however, it has set
up a computer database in the Ministry of Foreign Relations to track
disappearances, including those dating from the preunity period.
Some tribes seek to bring their political and economic concerns to
the attention of the Government by kidnaping and holding hostages.
Victims include 21 foreign businessmen, diplomats, and tourists (12
men, 7 women, and 2 children), as well as a much higher number of
citizens. The legal magazine al-Qistas, in a 1998 study that it
conducted on 159 kidnapings perpetrated since unity, found that Sana'a,
Marib, and Shabwa are the areas where a foreigner is most likely to be
kidnaped. Kidnaping victims rarely are injured, and the authorities
generally have been successful in obtaining the negotiated release of
foreign hostages. However, kidnapings continue in part because the
judiciary fails to impose sentences against accused kidnapers.
Moreover, some families linked to kidnapings also are politically or
tribally prominent or have links with such tribes. In most cases the
kidnapings are settled out of court, with no suspects facing trial.
In August 1998, the Government issued by presidential decree a law
that stipulated severe punishments up to and including capital
punishment for persons involved in kidnaping, murder, and banditry.
Persons charged with helping a foreign state or gang in a kidnaping or
theft by force face sentences of 10 to 15 years, subject to doubling if
the instigators are military officers or otherwise employed by the
state. The law was implemented for the first time in Taiz in late 1998,
when a man was tried under the new law, convicted, and executed.
In October the Government announced the establishment of a special
court in Sana'a and a Special Prosecutor to investigate and quickly try
those accused of kidnaping foreigners, sabotaging oil pipelines,
``carjacking,'' and other acts of sabotage.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution is ambiguous on its prohibition of cruel
or inhuman punishment; however, members of the security forces tortured
and otherwise abused persons in detention. Arresting authorities are
known to use force during interrogations, especially against those
arrested for violent crimes. Detainees sometimes are confined in leg-
irons and shackles, despite the passage of a law in 1998 outlawing this
practice.
The Government has acknowledged publicly that torture takes place
but has claimed that the use of torture is not government policy.
Nevertheless, the Government has not taken effective steps to end the
practice or to punish those who commit such abuses. A government
prosecutor has cited illiteracy and lack of training among police and
security officials as reasons for the persistence of the use of undue
force in prisons.
In April Sana'a municipality police arrested Naji Saleh Al-Khowlani
for his alleged involvement in a car theft ring. Al-Khowlani was held
for 2 months, during which time he reportedly was tortured during
regular nightly interrogation sessions in which prison officials would
attempt to elicit a confession and extract information by burning him
with a cigarette lighter. A medical report documented burn marks and
other injuries on Al-Khowlani's body.
In July a court convicted three security force officials of murder
for torturing a teenager to death (see Section 1.a.).
The eight Britons and two Algerians arrested in December 1998 for
possession of illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to commit
terrorist acts in Aden claimed during their trial during the year that
they had been tortured; two of them claimed that they had been abused
sexually (see Section 1.e.).
The trial of seven additional AAIA members on terrorism charges
began in October. Two of the defendants are being tried in absentia,
one has admitted to some of the charges against him, and the remaining
four pled not guilty and claim that the prosecution coerced and
tortured them into making self-incriminating statements and confessions
(see Section 1.e.). The judge issued a ruling prohibiting the
publication of details about the trial.
In 1998 several individuals on trial in Aden in connection with a
series of bombings in 1997 testified publicly that they had been
tortured. One defendant claimed that he had been raped while in
custody. There is credible evidence that one other person arrested in
connection with the same bombings died as a result of beatings
inflicted by security officials. Accordingto eyewitnesses who also
claimed to have been tortured, Wadia al-Shaibani was first beaten in a
criminal security office in Aden, then transferred to the Soleyban
police facility, were he was tortured to death (see Section 1.a.). No
charges have been filed.
In a related case in 1998 in which 31 persons were accused of
conspiracy in Mahra governorate in 1997, several of the suspects
claimed that they had confessed only because they had been tortured.
Defense attorneys asserted the existence of films that would prove
their clients' allegations that they had been beaten, and asked the
judge to view the films. The judge denied this request. In late October
1998, the court sentenced three of the defendants to death, found one
innocent, and sentenced the others to jail for periods ranging from 6
to 10 years (see Section 1.e.).
Some cases of torture by security officials have been referred to
the courts. In July three officials were convicted of torturing a
teenager to death (see Section 1.a.). In November 1998, three officers
from the Criminal Investigation Department of the Interior Ministry
were arrested, tried, and convicted of torturing Khaled Abdul-Bari al-
Qadhi, a witness in a family dispute case. One of the officers, Hisham
al-Ghazali, head of the Interior Ministry's antiterrorism unit, had
been implicated in the abuse of defendants in the 1997 Aden bombing
case. However, in January President Saleh commuted the sentences of all
three officers.
Police used excessive force in March when they intervened to settle
a land dispute in the village of Sa'eed in Al-Baida governorate.
Heavily armed CSU forces occupied the village for 8 days. During this
period, they evicted residents from their homes, looted villagers'
property and livestock, vandalized the village school and mosque, and
filled a small pond that was the village's only source of drinking
water with rocks. Many villagers, including the other party to the land
dispute, fled into the mountains. CSU officers detained eight villagers
until residents that they considered fugitives from justice
surrendered.
Police also used excessive force and abused their authority in
other instances. In May two soldiers were killed and several armed
citizens were injured in 2 days of intense fighting between security
personnel and citizens in the village of Quradah in Taiz governorate.
The confrontation began when armed villagers attempted forcibly to
prevent the carrying out of orders reportedly given by Colonel Abdullah
Al-Qadhi, commander of the Taiz military headquarters, that well water
in Quradah be shared with citizens in the neighboring village of Al-
Marzah. Al-Qadhi had no jurisdiction over water allocation, which is a
civil matter. Security personnel used artillery, bazookas, and heavy
battle equipment to put down the armed protest.
Constitution may be interpreted as permitting amputations in
accordance with Shari'a (Islamic law). There have been no reports of
amputations since 1991. However, a small number of persons who have
been found guilty of theft and sentenced to amputation remain in jail
awaiting the implementation of their sentences. The Shari'a-based law
permits physical punishment such as flogging for minor crimes (for
example, the penalty for the consumption of alcohol is 80 lashes). The
law also provides for the ritual display in public of the bodies of
executed criminals. The ostensible purpose of this practice is to
demonstrate to the families of victims that justice has been served and
to prevent blood feuds between tribes. In August the bodies of two men
executed for raping and then murdering an 11-year-old boy were
displayed publicly in Dhamar governorate.
Prison conditions are poor and do not meet internationally
recognized minimum standards. Prisons are overcrowded, sanitary
conditions are poor, and food and health care are inadequate. Inmates
depend on relatives for food and medicine. Many inmates lack mattresses
or bedding. Prison authorities often exact money from prisoners and
refuse to release prisoners until family members pay a bribe. Tribal
leaders misuse the prison system by placing ``problem'' tribesmen in
jail, either to punish them for noncriminal indiscretions or to protect
them from retaliation or violence motivated by revenge. Refugees,
persons with mental problems, and illegal immigrants sometimes are
arrested without charge and placed in prisons alongside criminals.
Conditions are equally poor in women's prisons, where children are
likely to be incarcerated along with their mothers. By custom and
preference, babies born in prison generally remain in prison with their
mothers. The law requires male members of the families of female
prisoners to arrange their release; however, female prisoners regularly
are held in jail past the expiration of their sentences because their
male relatives refuse to authorize their release due to the shame
associated with their alleged behavior. Female prisoners sometimes are
subjected to sexual harassment and violent interrogation by male police
and prison officials.
In April the chairman of Sana'a governorate's prosecutor's office,
Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba, inspected several illegal prisons operated by
the Sana'a governor's office and sent his findings to the Attorney
General. According to Al-Shaiba's findings, 19 individuals had been
imprisoned beyond their legal sentence; several prisoners were being
detained in handcuffs illegally; numerous individuals were being
detained illegally in connection with civil or commercial cases or
because they had disobeyed a tribal sheikh; and 43 persons from 1
region (Shibam Al-Gharas) were being detained on the same charge
(shooting at a truck). Al-Shaiba informed the Attorney General that he
had requested then-Sana'a governor Naji Al-Sufi to release the
illegally imprisoned individuals, but that the governor had taken no
action. In July Al-Shaiba reported being harassed by then-governor Al-
Sufi. The Attorney General took no action on the findings of the
inspection report. Al-Shaiba took a voluntary leave of absence from his
post and subsequently was transferred to the Judicial Inspection Unit
in the Attorney General's office. Governor Al-Sufi was relieved of his
post in October (see Section 1.e.).
Government participated in a series of events from September 1998
to February that were conducted by Penal Reform International (PRI),
with support from a foreign embassy and the Taiz-based Human Rights
Information and Training Center. These included a 2-day seminar on
penal reform and a week-long prison management training session in
which officials from five prisons participated. The final event of the
program, a wrap-up session that would have brought the participants
together to compare notes and evaluate progress, could not take place
because of unspecified problems that arose between the Government and
PRI. However, donor-government relations on prison reform remain good.
The Ministry of Interior has expressed interest in further cooperation
but has indicated a preference for working with experts with direct
experience in prison management.
The Government tightly controls access to detention facilities by
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), although it sometimes permits
local and international human rights monitors access to persons accused
of crimes. The PSO also does not permit access to its detention
centers. The Government claims that it does not hold political
prisoners.
Early in the year, the Supreme National Committee for Human Rights
visited Sana'a central prison and, after finding that minors were being
incarcerated with adults, arranged for them to be incarcerated
separately in two age groups, 11 to 14 years of age and 15 to 18 years
of age. In October 50 juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an
orphanage run by the Ministry of Social Affairs where they are to
attend school and participate in other activities (see Sections 4 and
5). The Committee also initiated a project to build, with the support
of local businessman, the country's first youth reformatory (see
Section 4).
The Human Rights Committee of the Consultative Council continued to
conduct spot checks of prisons and to arrange for the expeditious
release of persons held improperly.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law provides due
process safeguards; however, security forces arbitrarily arrest and
detain persons. Enforcement of the law is irregular and in some cases
nonexistent, particularly in cases involving security offenses.
According to the law, detainees must be arraigned within 24 hours of
arrest or be released. The judge or prosecuting attorney must inform
the accused of the basis for the arrest and decide whether detention is
required. In no case may a detainee be held longer than 7 days without
a court order. Despite these constitutional and other legal provisions,
arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention without charge are common
practices.
During the year, there was a significant increase in the number of
incidents in which journalists were detained briefly for questioning
concerning articles that they wrote that were critical of the
Government or that the Government considered sensitive (see Section
2.a.).
The law provides detainees with the right to inform their families
of their arrests and to decline to answer questions without an attorney
present. There are provisions for bail. In practice many authorities
abide by these provisions only if bribed. Defense lawyers claimed that
the eight Britons and two Algerians arrested in December 1998 for
possessing illegal weapons and explosives and conspiring to commit
terrorist acts in Aden (see Section 1.e.) were denied their right to
legal counsel. They also contended that defense doctors were not
allowed to examine their clients in order to investigate allegations of
torture and sexual abuse until several months later. The trial
concluded in August, although according to the law, the violation of
the right to counsel should have suspended the case.
Citizens regularly complained that security officials did not
observe due process procedures when arresting and detaining suspects,
particularly those accused of involvement in the bombings and
explosions that continued to occur in the south during the year.
Security forces sometimes detained demonstrators (see Section 2.b.). In
August then-governor of Sana'a Naji al-Sufi reportedly ordered the
arrest of Hafed Fadhil, a lawyer representing the opposing party in a
case involving one of the governor's friends. In September he illegally
detained Judge Mohammed Saad Amer, a member of the Sana'a appeals
court, for 2 days (see Section 1.e.).
In cases where a criminal suspect is at large, security forces
sometimes detain a relative while the suspect is being sought. The
detention may continue while the concerned families negotiate
compensation for the alleged wrongdoing. Arbitration, rather than the
court system, commonly is used to settle cases.
The Government has failed to ensure that detainees and prisoners
are incarcerated only in authorized detention facilities. The Ministry
of Interior and the PSO operate extrajudicial detention facilities. A
large percentage of the total prison population consists of pretrial
detainees. Thousands of persons have been imprisoned for years without
documentation concerning charges against them, their trials, or their
sentences.
While a few cases of those being held without charge have been
redressed through the efforts of local human rights groups (and a few
illegally detained prisoners released), the authorities have done
nothing to investigate or resolve these cases.
Unauthorized, private prisons also exist in tribal areas, where the
Government exercises little authority. Persons detained in these
prisons often are held for strictly personal reasons and without trial
or sentencing.
The Government does not use forced exile. However, at the end of
the 1994 civil war, the Government denied amnesty to the 16 most senior
leaders of the armed, secessionist Democratic Republic of Yemen (DRY)
who fled abroad. Although they were not forced into exile, they are
subject to arrest if they return. The trial of the so-called ``16''
concluded in March 1998 (see Section 1.c.).
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
``autonomous'' judiciary and independent judges; however, the judiciary
is not fully independent, is weak and severely hampered by corruption,
executive branch interference, and the frequent failure of the
authorities to enforce judgments. Judges are appointed by the executive
branch, and some have been harassed, reassigned, or removed from office
following rulings against the Government. For example there are
credible reports that during the year that the presidential appointee,
then-governor of Sana'a, Naji al-Sufi, repeatedly interfered with and
attempted to intimidate members of the judiciary, especially judges who
made rulings that he did not like. In May he ordered police to surround
the house of and arrest Judge Mohammed Bin Ali Luqman, head judge on
the Haraz court in Sana'a governorate. In July he harassed the chairman
of Sana'a governorate's prosecutor's office, Salem Ahmed Al-Shaiba,
after Al-Shaiba reported to the Attorney General that the governor's
office was running illegal prisons (see Section 1.c.). In August he
instructed armed guards to bring Hafed Fadhil, a lawyer representing
the opposing party in a case involving one of the governor's friends,
to the governorate's illegal jail, where he was assaulted by Al-Sufi
and detained for the rest of the day. In September governor Al-Sufi
detained Judge Mohammed Saad Amer, a member of the Sana'a appeals
court, for 2 days. Governor Al-Sufi was relieved of his post in
October, but no legal action was taken against him. Many litigants
maintain, and the Government acknowledges, that a judge's social ties
and susceptibility to bribery sometimes have greater influence on the
verdict than the law or the facts of the case. Many judges are poorly
trained, and some closely associated with the Government often render
decisions favorable to it. The judiciary is hampered further by the
Government's frequent reluctance to enforce judgments.
There are five types of courts: criminal; civil (for example,
divorce and inheritance); administrative; commercial; and military.
All courts are governed by Shari'a. There are no jury trials under
Shari'a. Criminal cases are adjudicated by a judge who plays an active
role in questioning witnesses and the accused. By law the Government
must provide attorneys for indigent defendants. However, in practice
this never occurs; neither the Criminal Code nor the judicial budget
allows for defense attorneys.
By law prosecutors are a part of the judiciary and independent of
the Government. However, in practice prosecutors look upon themselves
as an extension of the police. They do not receive the normal judicial
training that judges do, nor do they practice their legal obligation to
penalize police who delay reporting arrests and detentions.
Defense attorneys are allowed to counsel their clients, address the
court, and examine witnesses. Defendants, including those in commercial
courts, have the right to appeal their sentences. Trials are public.
However, all courts may conduct closed sessions ``for reasons of public
security or morals.'' Foreign litigants in commercial disputes have
complained of biased rulings. However, some foreign companies have won
cases against local defendants and seen the decisions enforced.
In addition to regular courts, the law permits a system of tribal
adjudication. The results of such mediation carry the same weight as
court judgments. Persons jailed under the tribal system usually are not
charged formally with a crime.
Prior to unification, approximately half of the judges working in
southern Yemen were women. However, after the 1994 civil war,
conservative leaders of the judiciary reassigned many southern female
judges to administrative or clerical duties. Although two female judges
continue to practice in Aden, there are no female judges in northern
courts.
The Government continued the program it began in late 1997 to
reform the judiciary. This comprehensive, long-term reform program
intended to improve the operational efficiency and statutory
independence of the judiciary by putting reform-minded personnel into
the courts; forming an inter-ministerial council to oversee the reform
project; publishing a judicial code of ethics; and making the Supreme
Court smaller, more efficient, and less corrupt. Foreign donors have
offered to provide assistance in implementing judicial reform, which
the Government has accepted. However, the reform program's effect is
not yet clear, and there were no major developments during the year.
In February a U.N. Development Program team visited the country to
conduct an assessment that would serve as the basis of a second
judicial reform program, which was scheduled to begin in January 2000
and end in 2002. In March the team noted the Government's willingness
to address longstanding issues of accountability and transparency, and
to implement laws more effectively. The program's goals are to
modernize Ministry of Justice equipment, improve the country's legal
libraries, provide special training for the Attorney General's office,
enhance public awareness of the rule of law, and secure a building for
the Supreme Court. At year's end, the proposed program had not been
funded.
Other judicial reform programs financed by international assistance
are intended to focus on the Ministries of Justice and of Legal and
Parliamentary Affairs and finance training in business and commercial
law for judges; a diagnostic study of judicial education curriculum;
training on drafting of legislation; and a review of the country's
commercial laws to identify and fix gaps or inconsistencies. At year's
end, no date was scheduled for the program to begin.
The security services made several arrests, brought charges, and
put on trial a number of persons alleged to be linked to various
shootings, explosions, bombings, and other acts of violence that
continued throughout the year. Citizens and human rights groups alleged
frequently that the judiciary was not observing due process standards
in these cases.
Arrested in December 1998, eight Britons and two Algerians were
tried from February to August in Aden on charges of possessing illegal
weapons and explosives and conspiring to commit terrorist acts. The 6-
month trial did not meet minimum international standards for due
process. Defense lawyers claimed that the prosecution lacked adequate
evidence and that the defendants were tortured, sexually abused, and
denied access to their lawyers (see Section 1.c.). In early August, the
court sentenced the main suspects, the 18-year-old stepson and 17-year-
old son of Islamic militant Abu Hamza al-Masri, to jail terms of 7 and
3 years, respectively. Yemen has accused al-Mari, head of the London-
based organization Supporters of Shari'a, of involvement with the AAIA,
which has carried out at least one terrorist act in Yemen. Five other
defendants received jail terms ranging from 5 to 7 years. The seven
defendants appealed the verdict. Two of the Britons received 7-month
sentences and were ordered released for time served; another, for
reasons of poor health, was ordered released for time served in early
summer. Their release was delayed because both the defense and the
prosecution appealed the verdicts. The Appeals Court upheld the
verdicts, and the three were released. They returned to the United
Kingdom in October.
The trial of seven additional AAIA members on terrorism charges
began in October. Two of the defendants are being tried in absentia,
one has admitted to some of the charges against him, and the remaining
four pled not guilty and claim that the prosecution coerced and
tortured them into making self-incriminating statements and confessions
(see Section 1.c.). The judge issued a ruling prohibiting the
publication of details about the trial.
The Government claims that it does not hold political prisoners.
Local opposition politicians and human rights activists generally
accept this claim; however, some international human rights groups and
members of the opposition-in-exile dispute the claim.
At the end of the 1994 civil war, the President pardoned nearly all
had who fought against the central Government, including military
personnel and most leaders of the unrecognized DRY. The Government
denied amnesty to the 16 most senior leaders of the DRY (one of whom is
now presumed dead), who fled abroad and who are subject to arrest if
they return. In 1997 and 1998, the so-called ``16'' were tried in
absentia on various charges including forming a secessionist
government, conspiracy, and forming a separate military. All but two
were found guilty, and in March 1998, a judge sentenced five of the
defendants to death and three to 10 years in jail. Six persons received
suspended sentences, and two were acquitted. Many opposition figures
have urged the President to issue an amnesty for those who received
sentences, in the interest of promoting reconciliation between north
and south. The President has stated that it is up to the judicial
system to pass judgment. Defense attorneys have appealed to a higher
court. No judgment has yet been rendered.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Despite constitutional provisions against government
interference with privacy, security forces routinely search homes and
private offices, monitor telephones, read personal mail, and otherwise
intrude into personal matters for alleged security reasons. Such
activities are conducted without legally issued warrants or judicial
supervision. Security forces regularly monitor telephone conversations
and interfere with the telephone service of government critics and
opponents. Security forces sometimes detain relatives of suspects (see
Section 1.d.). Government informers monitor meetings and assemblies
(see Section 2.b.).
The law prohibits arrests between the hours of sundown and dawn.
However, persons suspected of crimes sometimes are taken from their
homes in the middle of the night, without search warrants.
In March security forces occupied the village of Sa'eed in Al-Baida
governorate evicted residents from their homes, looted villagers'
property and livestock, and vandalized the village school and mosque
(see Section 1.a.).
Jews traditionally face social (but not legal) restrictions on
their residence and their employment (see Section 5).
According to a 1995 Ministry of Interior regulation, no citizen may
marry a foreigner without Interior Ministry permission (see Section 5).
This regulation does not carry the force of law, and appears to be
enforced irregularly. However, some human rights groups have raised
concerns about the regulation.
An estimated 5,000 persons use the Internet and 3,540 persons
subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions on
Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions
costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the
Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service
provider. According to Teleyemen (see Section 2.a.), the Government
blocks sexually explicit websites; however, with the exception of
mowj.com, which is the website of the Yemeni National Opposition Front
(MOWJ), it does not block politically oriented websites. For example
Abu Hamza's web page (see Section 1.e.) is not blocked. There are no
indications that Internet usage is monitored by the Government, and
there are no reports that it has ever taken action against Internet
users.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution restricts freedom
of speech and of the press ``within the limits of the law,'' and the
Government influences the media and limits press freedom. Some security
officials attempt to influence press coverage by threatening,
harassing, and detaining journalists. Although most citizens are
uninhibited in their private discussions of domestic and foreign
policies, some are cautious in public, fearing harassment for criticism
of the Government. The Press Law criminalizes ``the humiliation of the
State, the Cabinet, or parliamentaryinstitutions,'' and the publication
of ``false information'' that ``threatens public order or the public
interest.
The relative freedom of the press permitted between unification
(1990) and the civil war (1994) has not been reestablished. An
atmosphere of government pressure on independent and political party
journals continues that was not present before the civil war. The
international human rights group, the Committee to Protect Journalists,
criticized the Government for restrictions, harassment, and arbitrary
detention directed at journalists.
The Ministry of Information influences the media by its control of
most printing presses, by subsidies to certain newspapers, and by its
ownership of the country's sole television and radio outlets. Only one
newspaper, the thrice-weekly Aden independent Al-Ayyam, owns its own
press. The Government selects the items to be covered in news
broadcasts, and often does not permit broadcast reporting critical of
the Government. However, during the presidential election campaign, the
media extensively covered both candidates and reported in full the many
critical comments made by the President's opponent. The Government
televises parliamentary debates but may edit them selectively to delete
criticism.
In 1998 the Government implemented regulations for the 1990 Press
Law. The new regulations specify, among other things, that newspapers
must apply annually to the Government for licensing renewal, and that
they must show continuing evidence of about $4,375 (YR 700,00) in
operating capital. Some journalists welcomed the new regulations,
saying that they were long overdue. Others claimed that they were
designed to drive some opposition newspapers out of business.
Although newspapers are allowed to criticize the Government,
journalists sometimes censor themselves, especially when writing on
such sensitive issues as government policies toward the southern
governorates, relations with Saudi Arabia and other foreign
governments, and official corruption. The penalties for exceeding these
self-imposed limits can be arrest for libel, dismissal from employment,
or extralegal harassment. Some journalists reported being threatened by
security officials to change the tone and substance of their reporting.
Journalists must have a permit to travel abroad, although enforcement
of this restriction is irregular (see Section 2.d.).
During the year there was a significant increase in incidents in
which journalists were detained for questioning for short periods of
time for writing articles that were critical of the Government or that
the Government considered touched on sensitive subjects. For example,
in 1 week in May, six newspapers (Yemen Times, Al-Ayyam, Al-Shoura, Al-
Thawri, Al-Wahdawi, and Al-Haq) were summoned to appear before the
Special Media Court for violating the Press Law. However, most
individual journalists and the Yemeni Journalists Syndicate acknowledge
that there was a decrease during the year in incidents of extralegal
governmental harassment.
Beginning in late December 1998, the Ministry of Information closed
the independent weekly newspaper Al-Ray Al-Amm for 5 months for
publishing an article critical of the Government of Saudi Arabia. The
newspaper reopened in May.
From mid-December 1998 through late January, security officials in
Marib detained Hassan al-Zaidi, a Yemen Times correspondent, and a
German journalist who were investigating the kidnaping of a German
citizen by tribesmen in the region.
In February PSO officials detained Nu'man Qaid Seif, editor in
chief of the opposition Al-Shoura newspaper, for 3 days on the charge
of disseminating false information. Seif had written an editorial on
corruption critical of President Saleh entitled ``The President Is
Urged to Fight Corruption.''
In February the Ministry of Information closed Al-Shoura newspaper,
the newspaper of the Islamist opposition party Union of Popular Forces
(UPF), as well as a new, competing version of the same newspaper. The
second Al-Shoura appeared following an ideological split in the UPF.
Under the Press Law, it is illegal for more than one newspaper to use
the same name. Some journalists allege that the Government financed the
second Al-Shoura in order to create a pretext to shut down the
outspokenly critical original Al-Shoura. A court in April allowed the
original Al-Shoura to resume publication and upheld the suspension of
the second Al-Shoura, but in September an appeals court ordered the
original newspaper to cease publication pending the Supreme Court's
decision as to which faction had the right to Al-Shoura's name. At
year's end the case remained unresolved.
In March security officials imprisoned Abdul Latif Kutbi Omar,
editor in chief of the opposition Rabeta Party-affiliated Al-Haq
newspaper, for 4 days for publishing an article claiming that the
Government had granted the United States the right to operate a
military base on Socotra Island. Some journalistsreport that
authorities suspect Omar of having links to the London-based
secessionist leader Abdul-Rahman al-Jiffri, who fled Yemen in 1994 and
who now heads the Yemeni National Opposition Front (MOWJ) (see Section
1.e.).
In May four masked armed men severely beat Saif al-Hadheri, the
editor in chief of the independent weekly Al-Shumua. A few days prior
to the assault, the newspaper published an editorial on corruption that
directly criticized the Minister of Finance. The Yemeni Journalists
Syndicate and the Committee to Protect Journalists called on the
Minister of Interior to investigate the assault. However, a court
determined that the issue was personal and dismissed the case.
Also in May, the Ministry of Information threatened to close the
Aden weekly Al-Ayyam, the largest-circulating newspaper in the country,
after it published an editorial entitled ``Let's Talk about Unity from
a Social Perspective,'' which criticized the structure of local
government, whereby southern provinces are governed by officials from
the north. The Ministry claimed that the editorial instigated
``national feuds,'' separatism, and harmed national unity. Journalist
Ali Haitham al-Ghareeb was arrested and held for 5 days. Editor Hisham
Ba Sharahil was summoned by state prosecutors and questioned for 4
hours. Ba Sharahil was charged with violating a January court order
banning publication of court proceedings of the trial of a group of
British nationals whom the Government alleged had conspired to commit
acts of terrorism in Yemen; Al-Ayyam had published comments made by the
defense lawyer to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Ghareeb
was sentenced to a 10-month suspended prison term. Ba Sharahil received
a 6-month suspended sentence and a $62.50 (YR 10,000) fine.
In June the Government filed a case against Ahmen al-Ashwal, a
journalist for Al-Wahdawi newspaper, for publishing an article about
corruption in the selection of teachers at Sana'a University. He was
fined $62.50 (YR 10,000).
In June security forces arrested Hassan Bin Husainoon, a journalist
with Al-Haq newspaper, for writing an article entitled ``In Hadramout
there are Non-Unity Practices,'' which alleged that officials in
Hadramout governorate discriminate among residents. In October a court
suspended publication of Al-Haq for 1 month for inciting
``sectarianism'' and ``regionalism,'' and fined editor Abdel Latif Al-
Kutbi $250 (40,000 riyals) and Husainoon and two other journalists,
Ismail Al-Riashi and Abdullah Ilamadi, $62.50 (10,000 riyals).
In August journalist and lawyer Nabil al-Amoudi was brought before
the Abyan preliminary court for writing an article critical of the
Government and the human rights situation in Yemen. The case still was
pending at year's end, but al-Amoudi is not imprisoned.
In August Jamal Ahmed Amer, editor of Al-Wahdawi newspaper and
member of the opposition Nasserite Party, was detained and held
incommunicado for 6 days for writing an article critical of Yemeni-
Saudi Arabian relations. The Minister of Interior personally questioned
Amer by telephone. Al-Wahdawi's editor, Abdelaziz Sultan, also was
called for questioning and interrogated personally by the Minister of
Information. Amer has filed a suit against the Minister of Interior,
which still is pending. Also in August, security officials detained
Jamil al-Samit, a journalist for the Taiz-based official newspaper Al-
Jumhurriyah, for writing an article about the use of excessive force by
the military in putting down a civilian protest in Quradah (see Section
1.a.). He remains imprisoned in Taiz central prison.
In September Al-Ayyam's editor Hisham Ba Sharahil twice was called
to the Aden prosecutor's office for questioning. He first was called in
connection to the publication in August of an interview with Islamic
militant Abu Hamza al-Masri (see Section 1.e.), then was summoned a few
days later, for publication in July of an opposition statement that
allegedly misquoted the Koran.
In October 1998, three journalists from Al-Thawri, the newspaper of
the Yemen Socialist Party, were acquitted of all charges related to the
case brought against them by the Sana'a prosecutor's office in relation
to articles criticizing the Government.
The editor of Al-Shoura, the newspaper of the Islamist opposition
party UPF, stated in August that traditional mediation and a published
apology effectively had ended the case brought against the newspaper by
the Government in 1995. The case involved two journalists who had been
found guilty of slander and character assassination against an
important sheikh, a leader of the Islaah party. The judge ordered that
the newspaper be closed and that the journalists be flogged with 80
lashes, stopped from working for 1 year, and fined$625 (YR 100,000).
The Ministry of Justice suspended this judgment while reviewing its
conformity with law and judicial procedure.
After he died in a traffic accident in June, the Special Media
Court terminated the case that it had filed against Abdul Aziz al-
Saqqaf, the editor of the English-language weekly Yemen Times, for
publishing a story questioning the disposition of government profits
from oil exports. The Yemen Times requested that the case be continued,
arguing that the charges involved the newspaper's journalism, not Al-
Saqqaf personally, but the judge sustained his ruling.
The Yemeni Journalists Syndicate defends freedom of the press and
publicizes human rights concerns. For example in September it sponsored
a symposium on ``Media and Its Role in Spreading a Human Rights
Culture.'' Critics claim that the Syndicate has too many nonjournalist
members who support government policy. In the spring, several
independent and opposition party journalists formed a rival union, the
Committee for the Defense of Journalists, under the leadership of
Hisham Ba Sharahil, the publisher of Al-Ayyam newspaper, to defend more
vigorously journalists harassed by the Government.
Customs officials confiscate foreign publications regarded as
pornographic or objectionable because of religious or political
content. The Ministry of Information routinely delayed the distribution
of international Arabic-language dailies such as Al-Hayat and Al-Sharq
Al-Awsat in an apparent effort to decrease their sales in the country.
For several days in February, the Ministry banned sales of Al-Hayat
because it published a threat from the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army against
foreign ambassadors in Sana'a, and Al-Sharq Al-Awsat because it printed
allegations that Yemen was providing arms to the Aideed faction in
Somalia and supporting Eritrea in that country's war with Ethiopia.
An author must obtain a permit from the Ministry of Culture to
publish a book. Most books are approved, but the process is time-
consuming for the author. The author must submit copies of the book to
the Ministry. Officials at the National Library must read and endorse
the text. It then is submitted to a special committee for final
approval. If a book is not deemed appropriate for publication, the
Ministry simply does not issue a decision. Publishers usually do not
deal with an author who has not yet obtained a permit.
An estimated 5,000 persons use the Internet and 3,540 persons
subscribe to it. The Government does not impose restrictions on
Internet use, but most persons find that equipment and subscriptions
costs are prohibitively high. Teleyemen, a parastatal company under the
Ministry of Telecommunications, is the country's sole Internet service
provider. With the exception of mowj.com, the website of the Yemeni
National Opposition Front, the Government does not block politically
oriented websites (see Section 1.f.).
Academic freedom is restricted somewhat because of the extreme
politicization of university campuses. A majority of professors and
students align themselves with either the ruling GPC party or the
opposition Islaah party. Each group closely monitors the activities of
the other. Top administrative positions usually are awarded to
political allies of these two major parties.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--There are no
constitutional restrictions on the right to assemble peacefully;
however, the Government limited this right in practice. The Government
claims that it bans and disrupts some demonstrations to prevent them
from degenerating into riots and violence. The Government requires a
permit for these purposes, but it issues them routinely. Government
informers monitor meetings and assemblies. Following the demonstrations
of June and July 1998, the Government sent a draft law to Parliament in
September 1998 that would impose significant limitations on the right
to assemble and to demonstrate. The draft law was criticized by many
lawyers, human rights activists, and members of Parliament. The
Parliament continues to withhold action on this proposed law.
In April security authorities banned a rally by the Yemeni
Socialist Party in Al Dali governorate to commemorate the deaths of the
two persons who were killed by police during violent demonstrations in
Mukallah in April 1998. YSP leaders claimed the authorities banned the
demonstration under the pretext that there is no law to regulate
marches and demonstrations.
In July police refused to allow students at Sana'a University to
organize a demonstration to protest the university's system of
administering examinations.
There are no constitutional restrictions on the freedom of
association, and the Government generally respects this right
inpractice. Associations must obtain an operating license from the
Ministry of Labor, usually a routine matter.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Islam is the state religion, and although
followers of other religions are free to worship according to their
beliefs, the Government places some restrictions on religious practice;
it bans proselytizing by non-Muslims and forbids conversions.
Virtually all citizens are Muslims, either of the Zaydi branch of
Shi'a Islam or the Shafa'i branch of Sunni Islam. There are also some
Ismailis in the north. Private Islamic organizations may maintain ties
to pan-Islamic organizations and operate schools, but the Government
monitors their activities.
Most Christians are foreign residents, except for a few families of
Indian origin in Aden. There are several churches and Hindu temples in
Aden, but no non-Muslim public places of worship exist in the former
North Yemen. The Government does not allow the building of new non-
Muslim places of worship without permission. Church services are held
regularly without harassment in private homes or facilities such as
schools. However, security forces occasionally censor the mail of
Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community, ostensibly to
prevent proselytizing.
Christian missionaries operate in Yemen and most are dedicated to
the provision of medical services; others are employed in teaching and
social services.
Under Islam the conversion of a Muslim to another religion is
considered apostasy, a crime punishable by death. There were no reports
of cases in which the crime has been charged or prosecuted by
government authorities.
Nearly all of the country's once sizable Jewish population has
emigrated. There are no legal restrictions on the few hundred Jews who
remain, although there are traditional restrictions on places of
residence and choice of employment (see Section 5).
Following unification of North and South Yemen in 1990, owners of
property previously expropriated by the Communist government of the
former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, including religious
organizations, were invited to seek restitution of their property.
However, implementation of the process, including for religious
institutions, has been extremely limited, and very few properties have
been returned to any previous owner.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--There were some limits on freedom of
movement. In general the Government does not obstruct domestic travel,
although the army and security forces maintain checkpoints on major
roads. There were no reports that security forces killed or injured
persons at checkpoints during the year, as had been reported in
previous years (see Section 1.a.).
In certain areas, armed tribesmen occasionally man checkpoints
alongside military or security officials, and subject travelers to
physical harassment, bribe demands, or theft.
The Government does not obstruct routinely foreign travel or the
right to emigrate and return. However, journalists must have a permit
to travel abroad. Women must obtain permission from a male relative
before applying for a passport or departing the country. Enforcement of
the restrictions on journalists and women is irregular.
Immigrants and refugees traveling within the country often are
required by security officials at government checkpoints to show that
they possess resident status or refugee identification cards.
The law does not include provisions for granting refugee or asylee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. However, the
Government has granted refugee status to some persons and resettled
them.
The Government in 1998 offered first asylum to 13,937 Somalis, who
fled the fighting in that country. This brought the total number of
registered Somali refugees in the country to 57,400. The Government
also cooperated with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in
assisting refugees from Eritrea (2,500 persons), Ethiopia (2,600
persons) and various other countries (150 persons). The Government
permitted the UNHCR to monitor the situation of 2,000 Iraqis in Yemen.
Approximately 47,300 Somali refugees have been integrated into
society and are no longer receiving food or financial assistance from
the UNHCR. However, they still are eligible for medicaltreatment at
UNHCR facilities in Aden and Sana'a. Also, the UNHCR provides small
loans to refugee women who wish to initiate income-generating
activities.
The UNHCR provides food and medical assistance for up to 10,500
Somalis and Ethiopians in a temporary refugee camp at al-Jahin in Abyan
governorate. Children receive schooling in the camp, and adults are
eligible for vocational training. The Government in 1998 approved a new
UNHCR facility to be built at a site in Lahaj governorate, and at
year's end, it was under construction. The UNHCR, in coordination with
the Government, issues identification cards to Somali refugees and
recognized cases of other nationalities.
The UNHCR reports that the Government consults with it prior to
returning illegal immigrants to their countries of origin in order to
avoid the involuntary repatriation of refugees with a credible fear of
persecution. There were no reports of the forced return of persons to a
country where they feared persecution. The UNHCR facilitated the
voluntary repatriation of some Eritrean and Ethiopian refugees, as well
as the voluntary return of 1,659 Somali refugees to areas of Somalia
that are considered safe.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government; however, there are significant limitations in practice. The
Government is by law accountable to the Parliament; however, the
Parliament is not yet an effective counterweight to executive
authority. Decisionmaking and real political power still rest in the
hands of the executive branch, particularly the President. In addition
the Constitution prohibits the establishment of parties that are
contrary to Islam, oppose the goals of the Yemeni revolution, or
violate Yemen's international commitments.
The President appoints the Prime Minister, who forms the
Government. The Cabinet consists of 24 ministers. Parliament is elected
by universal adult suffrage; the first such election was held in 1993.
Ali Abdullah Saleh, the President and leader of the GPC, was
elected to a 5-year term in the country's first nation-wide direct
presidential election in September, winning 96.3 percent of the vote.
The Constitution provides that the President be elected by popular vote
from at least two candidates endorsed by Parliament, and the election
was generally free and fair; however, there were some problems,
including the lack of a credible voter registration list. In addition
the President was not opposed by a truly competitive candidate because
the candidate selected by the leftist opposition coalition did not
receive the minimum number of votes required to run from the GPC-
dominated Parliament (the other opposition party chose not to run its
own candidate, despite its seats in Parliament). The President's sole
opponent was a member of the GPC. There was no significant violence
associated with the election.
International observers judged the 1997 parliamentary elections as
``reasonably free and fair'' despite some problems associated with the
voting.
The President has the authority to introduce legislation and
promulgate laws by decree when Parliament is not in session. Decrees
must be approved by Parliament 30 days after reconvening. In theory if
a decree is not approved, it does not become law; in practice, a decree
remains in effect unless it is later affirmatively rejected by
Parliament. Although the Constitution also permits Parliament to
initiate legislation, to date it has not done so. Parliament generally
is relegated to debating policies that the Government already has
submitted, although it sometimes successfully revises or opposes draft
legislation submitted by the Government. Despite the fact that the
President's party enjoys an absolute majority, Parliament has rejected
or delayed action on major legislation introduced by the Government,
and on occasion it has forced significant modification. The Parliament
also has criticized strongly the Government for some actions, including
the lifting of subsidies that led to widespread violence in June 1998.
Ministers frequently are called to Parliament to defend actions,
policies, or proposed legislation, and parliamentarians are sometimes
sharply critical during these sessions. Parliamentarians and
parliamentary staff attended foreign NGO-sponsored training workshops
designed to increase their independence and effectiveness.
The President is advised by the 58-member Consultative Council, a
board of appointed notables chaired by a former prime minister. The
Council advises the President on a range of issues but has no
constitutional powers.
Formal government authority is centralized in Sana'a; many
citizens, especially in urban areas, complain about theinability of
local and governorate entities to make policy or resource decisions. In
some governorates, tribal leaders exercise considerable discretion in
the interpretation and enforcement of the law. Central government
authority in these areas is often weak.
The multiparty system remains weak. The GPC dominates the
Parliament, and Islaah is the only other party of significance. All
parties must be registered in accordance with the political parties law
of 1991, which stipulates that each party must have at least 75
founders and 2,500 members. Some oppositionists contend that they
cannot organize new parties because of the prohibitively high legal
requirements on the minimum number of members and leaders. Twelve
parties participated in the 1997 elections, compared with 16 in 1993.
The YSP and several smaller parties boycotted the 1997 elections,
leading to lower voter turnout in the south. These same parties also
boycotted the country's first nationwide direct presidential election
in September. There was no significant violence associated with this
election.
The Government provides financial support to political parties,
including a small stipend to publish their own newspapers.
Although women vote and hold office, these rights often are limited
by cultural norms and religious customs; and women are underrepresented
in Government and politics. Two women were elected to the Parliament in
1997 (the same number as in 1993), and an increasing number hold senior
leadership positions in the Government or in the GPC. Many Akhdam, a
small ethnic minority that may be descendants of African slaves, are
not permitted to participate in the political process, mainly due to
their inability to obtain citizenship. There are no longer any credible
reports that members of religious minorities are not permitted to
participate in the political process.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The concept of local nongovernmental human rights organizations is
relatively new, with the first groups forming only in the years since
unification. Several groups held workshops and other activities during
the year without government interference and often with government
support.
The Government cooperates with NGO's, although NGO's complain that
there is a lack of response to their requests from government
officials. The Government's ability to be responsive is limited in part
by a lack of material and human resources. In 1998 the Government
introduced a new draft law for regulating the formation and activities
of NGO's. While more liberal than the law it is designed to replace,
the proposal still contains significant limitations on such
organizations. The Parliament again failed to take any action on the
proposed new law during the year.
Several new NGO's devoted to human rights education and
democratization were formed during the year. The most notable among
them are: Al Nushataa, or ``The Activists,'' a group formed by former
members of the Yemeni Human Rights Organization, whose first activity
was an art show on human rights at the French cultural center; the
Organization of the Defense of Human Rights, a lawyers' group formed by
the attorney and parliamentarian Mohamed Naji Alao; and the National
Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development, an NGO formed in
September by journalist Jamal Awadi. None of these groups is funded by
the Government.
The Taiz-based Human Rights Information and Training Center
(HRITC), perhaps the country's most respected human rights NGO
sponsored training workshops for other NGO's. Several donors have
supported the HRITC. The HRITC, in cooperation with a foreign embassy,
coordinated the series of events conducted by Penal Reform
International from September 1998 to February (see Section 1.c.).
The Yemeni Organization for the Defense of Liberties and Human
Rights, the only NGO without government sponsorship that engages in
human rights advocacy as such, is based in Aden. Although the
organization continued to suffer from a lack of funds, it actively
publicized human rights abuses, particularly in the south, and provided
support to new human rights NGO's.
In June 1998, Penal Reform International (PRI), a London-based NGO,
conducted a fact-finding mission to Yemen. It identified several issues
of concern, including the mistreatment of prisoners, lack of education
and resources for prison officials, and unsanitary and overcrowded
conditions. With the support of a foreign embassy and the HRITC, PRI
organized prison management training workshops and other activities for
prison and security officials from September 1998 to February.
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Parliament of the
European Union, and the Committee to Protect Journalists observe the
country closely. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
maintains a resident representative in Yemen. The Government has given
these groups broad access to government officials, records, refugee
camps, and prisons. The Government had acknowledged some abuses alleged
in a 1997 AI report, and rejected other allegations. AI's follow-up
report, issued in July, criticized the Government for not keeping its
promise to investigate some of these abuses. The Government claims that
it responded to AI, and passed the results of its investigations to the
UNHRC, but that the information AI provided was inadequate for
effective investigation and conclusive action.
The Yemeni Human Rights Organization (YHRO) is a local human rights
group headquartered in Sana'a with branches in seven other cities. It
was founded by the Government, and oppositionists as well as some human
rights experts have viewed its findings as not objective. The head of
the YHRO, a member of the judiciary, was transferred from his post as
head of the Sana'a Court of Appeals to the Dhamar Court of Appeals in
1998. This was seen by some observers as a demotion or an attempt by
the Government to marginalize the judge, who was seen as too
independent on human rights questions.
The Supreme National Committee for Human Rights, which was formed
in 1997 and reports to the Deputy Prime Minister/Minister of Foreign
Affairs, is mandated with ensuring that Yemen meets its obligations
with respect to implementing international human rights conventions and
to look into specific instances of abuse.
In March the Government implemented a series of reforms to
institutionalize and enhance the independence of the committee. These
reforms included the establishment of a general coordinator position
with the rank of Under Secretary; the addition of the Ministers of
Information and of Labor and Vocational Training to the committee, the
allocation of an independent budget and accounting unit, and the
creation of an advisory commission that includes local legal experts,
academics, and human rights activists.
Early in the year, after visiting Sana'a central prison and finding
that minors were being incarcerated with adults, the committee arranged
for them to be incarcerated separately in two age groups, 11 to 14
years of age and 15 to 18 years of age. In October 50 juvenile inmates
were moved from the prison to an orphanage run by the Ministry of
Social Affairs where they are to attend school and participate in other
activities (see Sections 1.c. and 5). The Committee also initiated a
project to build with the support of local businessman the country's
first youth reformatory. In September committee officials traveled to
several governorates to monitor the presidential elections. In October
in the first training of its kind, the committee conducted a series of
human rights workshops for police officers in Sana'a and several other
governorates. The committee plans to continue its human rights training
in 2000. The committee also is studying ways to address the problem of
female prisoners being held longer than their terms.
The committee views education to effect cultural change as its
highest priority. To this end, it sought support from donors during the
year for a project to make human rights a part of secondary school
curriculums. The committee has been less active in looking into
specific cases of abuse. Many persons alleged that it has not followed
up on its stated commitment to investigate allegations of human rights
abuses. For example in 1998 the committee declined to investigate the
case of Wadia al-Shaibani, who reportedly died while in the custody of
security forces in Aden (see Section 1.a.). Instead, it accepted the
official coroner's report of death by suicide. The committee is
hampered by a lack of human and material resources.
The Human Rights Committee of the President's Consultative Council
has had limited success in investigating human rights abuses. However,
members of the Committee expressed frustration at the lack of
subsequent action by the authorities. Its activities were affected
deeply by the death of its chairman, Abdulaziz al-Saqqaf, in an
automobile accident in March. The new chairman is Abu Bakr al-Qirby.
A parliamentary human rights committee has investigated some
reports of human rights abuses. It suffers from lack of official and
financial support and has no authority except to issue reports.
The Committee to Combat Torture is composed of 100 senior
parliamentarians and party leaders, including some opposition members,
but apparently was inactive during the year.
The Center for Future Studies, a think tank affiliated with the
Islaah Party, issues an annual report on human rights practices,
providing a wide-ranging overview of human rights. There is little
followup to the report.
Two delegations from the UNHRC visited in late 1998. One delegation
looked into what progress the Government had made on cases of
``disappearances'' (see Section 1.b.). The other conducted an
assessment of the Government's need for technical assistance,
particularly for the Supreme National Committee on Human Rights.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal in general
rights and duties,'' and that society ``is based on social solidarity,
which is based on justice, freedom, and equality according to the law;
however, discrimination based on race, sex, disability, and, to a
lesser extent, religion, exists. Entrenched cultural attitudes often
prevent women from enjoying equal rights.
Women.--Although spousal abuse is reportedly common, it generally
is undocumented. In Yemen's traditional society, an abused woman would
be expected to take her complaint to a male relative (rather than the
authorities), who should intercede on her behalf or provide her
sanctuary if required. The press and women's rights activists only
recently have begun to investigate or report on violations of women's
rights. During the year, violence against women was the subject of at
least two women's conferences and featured in a cover story of the
human rights magazine, Al-Qistas.
Women face significant restrictions on their role in society. The
law, social custom, and Shar'ia discriminates against women. Men are
permitted to take as many as four wives, although very few do so. By
law the minimum age of marriage is 15. However, the law largely is not
enforced, and some girls marry as early as age 12. In 1998 some
conservative Members of Parliament attempted to eliminate the ``minimum
age'' requirement on the grounds that parents should decide when their
daughters are old enough to marry. Their draft law failed by a large
majority. A 1998 draft law to raise the minimum age of marriage to 18
also failed by a large majority. The law stipulates that the wife's
``consent'' is required; ``consent'' is defined as ``silence'' for
previously unwed women and ``pronouncement of consent'' for divorced
women. The husband and the wife's ``guardian'' (usually her father)
sign the marriage contract; in Aden and some outlying governorates, the
wife also signs. The practice of bride price payments is widespread,
despite efforts to limit the size of such payments.
The law stipulates that the wife must obey the husband. She must
live with him at the place stipulated in the contract, consummate the
marriage, and not leave the home without his consent. Husbands may
divorce wives without justifying their action in court. Women have the
legal right to divorce; however, they must provide a justification such
as nonsupport, impotence, or taking a second wife without her consent.
Following a divorce, the family home and older children often are
awarded to the husband. The divorced woman usually returns to her
father's home, or to the home of another male relative. Her former
husband must continue to support her for another 3 months, since she
cannot remarry until she proves that she is not pregnant.
Women who seek to travel abroad must obtain permission from their
husbands or fathers to receive a passport and to travel. They also are
expected to be accompanied by male relatives. However, enforcement of
this requirement is irregular.
Shari'a-based law permits a Muslim man to marry a Christian or
Jewish woman, but no Muslim woman may marry outside of Islam. Married
women do not have the right to confer citizenship on their foreign-born
spouses; however, they may confer citizenship on children born in Yemen
of foreign-born fathers.
According to a 1995 Interior Ministry regulation, any citizen who
wishes to marry a foreigner must obtain the permission of the Ministry.
A Yemeni woman wishing to marry a foreigner must present proof of her
parents' approval to the Interior Ministry. A foreign woman who wishes
to marry a Yemeni man must prove to the Ministry that she is ``of good
conduct and behavior,'' and ``is free from contagious disease.'' There
are no corresponding requirements for men to demonstrate parental
approval, good conduct, or freedom from contagious diseases. Although
the regulation does not have the force of law and is applied
irregularly, some human rights groups have raised concerns about it.
The Government consistently supports women's rights and the
expansion of the public role of women. The President frequently speaks
publicly about the importance of women's development. During the year,
the Prime Minister mandated that all ministries must promote at least
one woman to the director general level; at year's end only the Justice
and Interior Ministries hadfailed to do so. Several ministries have
several female director generals. With the Government's active support,
bilateral and multilateral donors have initiated long-term (1994-2004)
projects worth $31 million (YR 4.96 billion) aimed at advancing
vocational education and reproductive health for women and girls.
An estimated 76.3 percent of women are illiterate, compared with
approximately 36.6 percent of men. The fertility rate is 6.7 children
per woman. Most women have little access to basic health care. Only
approximately 22 percent of births are attended by trained health-care
personnel. Even where clinics are available, many women do not use them
because their male relatives, or they themselves, refuse to allow a
male doctor to examine them.
In general women in the south, particularly in Aden, are better
educated and have had somewhat greater employment opportunities than
their northern counterparts. However, since the 1994 civil war the
number of working women in the south appears to have declined, due not
only to the stagnant economy but also to increasing cultural pressure
from the north.
The National Women's Committee (NWC), a government-sponsored semi-
independent women's association, promotes female education and civic
responsibility. In September the NWC organized a highly publicized
conference on women's role in the electoral process at which the
President delivered the keynote address. There are numbers of recently
formed NGO's working for women's advancement. These include the Social
Association for Productive Families, which promotes vocational
development for women; the Women and Children's Department of the
Center for Future Studies, which organizes seminars and publishes
studies on women and children; the Woman and Child Development
Association, which focuses on health education and illiteracy; and the
Yemeni Council for Motherhood and Childhood, which provides microcredit
and vocational training to women.
Children.--While the Government has asserted its commitment to
protect children's rights, it lacks the resources necessary to ensure
adequate health care, education, and welfare services for children. The
United Nations Development Program estimates that 30 percent of
children are malnourished. The infant mortality rate is 75 deaths per
1,000 births, down from 105 in 1998.
The law provides for universal free education for 9 years, which is
compulsory, but this provision is not enforced. Many children,
especially girls, do not attend primary school. According to UNICEF's
``Report on Children and Women in Yemen: 1998'' (released in
September), an estimated 45 percent of primary school-age children
(ages 6 to 15) do not attend school. Some rural areas have no schools
for their school-age population. In 1998 to encourage girls' attendance
at school, Parliament passed a law that eliminated school fees and the
requirement of uniforms for girls. According to the UNICEF report,
enrollment of girls in school increased by 4 percent in 1998, but
enrollment of boys declined 10 percent because older boys from poor
families left school to work.
Early in the year, after visiting Sana'a Central Prison and finding
that minors were being incarcerated with adults, the Supreme National
Committee for Human Rights arranged for them to be incarcerated
separately in two age groups, 11 to 14 years old and 15 to 18 years
old. In October 50 juvenile inmates were moved from the prison to an
orphanage run by the Ministry of Social Affairs where they can attend
school and participate in other activities (see Sections 1.c. and 4).
The Committee also initiated a project to build with the support of
local businessman the country's first youth reformatory (see Section
4).
Child marriage is common in rural areas. Although the law requires
that a girl be 15 to marry, it is not enforced, and marriages of girls
as young as age 12 occur. Female genital mutilation (FGM), which is
widely condemned by international health experts as damaging to both
physical and psychological health, is practiced by some citizens.
According to a 1997 demographic survey conducted by the Government,
nearly one-fourth (23 percent) of women who have ever been married have
been subjected to FGM. However, the prevalence of the practice varies
substantially by region. Citizens of African origin or those living in
communities with heavy African influence are more likely to practice
FGM. For example according to the survey, approximately 69 percent of
women living in coastal areas were subjected to FGM, compared with 15
percent in mountainous regions, and 5 percent in the plateau and desert
regions. The procedure is confined mainly to excision, with
infibulation being practiced only among East African immigrants and
refugees. FGM rarely is reported among the Shaf'ai religious sect, and
adherents to the Zaydi sect reputedly do not practice it at all. The
Government's publication of the data on FGM was an important first step
in addressing this problem;however, while some government health
workers and officials actively and publicly discouraged the practice,
the Government has not passed legislation to outlaw it nor have local
women's groups adopted the problem as a major concern.
People with Disabilities.--Persons with mental and physical
disabilities face distinct social prejudices, as well as discrimination
in education and employment. In 1998 the Government mandated acceptance
of disabled students in schools, exempted them from paying tuition, and
required that schools be made more accessible to disabled students, but
it is unclear to what extent these new laws have been implemented.
There is no national law mandating the accessibility of buildings for
the disabled. Some disabled persons are reduced to begging to support
themselves. Mentally ill patients, particularly those who commit
crimes, are imprisoned and even shackled when there is no one to care
for them. Persons with mental problems sometimes are arrested without
charge and placed in prisons alongside criminals (see Section 1.c.).
The ICRC, in cooperation with the Yemeni Red Crescent Society, built
and now staffs separate detention facilities for mentally disabled
prisoners. These facilities are located in Sana'a, Ibb, and Taiz, and
collectively can care for a population of 300 persons.
The Handicapped Society, the country's largest NGO involved in
assisting the disabled, was founded in 1988 and has branches in 13
governorates. Funded by international donors (primarily the Swedish
organization Radda Barnen) and a modest annual grant from the
Government, the Handicapped Society provides rehabilitation assistance
and vocational training, and sponsors cultural and sports activities
for disabled persons. The Ministry of Education has assigned three
teachers to teach students at the disabled-accessible classrooms at the
Society's Sana'a branch. Believing that the needs of disabled women
were not being addressed adequately by the Handicapped Society,
activists in 1998 established with government support the Challenge
Society. The Challenge Society provides 85 disabled females between the
ages of 6 and 30 with medical care, support services, and vocational
training.
Religious Minorities.--Apart from a small but undetermined number
of Christians and Hindus in Aden, Jews are the only indigenous
religious minority. Their numbers have diminished significantly--from
several tens of thousands to a few hundred--due to voluntary
emigration. Although the law makes no distinction, Jews traditionally
are restricted to living in one section of a city or village and often
are confined to a limited choice of employment, usually farming or
handicrafts. Jews may, and do, own real property.
Christian clergy who minister to the foreign community are employed
in teaching, social services, and health care. Occasionally the
security authorities harass such clergy by censoring their mail,
ostensibly to prevent proselytizing (see Section 2.c.). In July 1998, a
gunman murdered three nuns belonging to the Sisters of Charity order in
Hodeidah. The Government immediately arrested the individual, who the
Government declared was deranged. No trial was held and the person was
incarcerated in a psychiatric facility. The attack did not appear to be
part of an organized campaign against Christians or foreigners.
A hospital in Jibla operated by the Baptist Church has experienced
occasional threats and harassment from local Islamic extremists who
feared that the hospital might be used to spread Christianity. There
have been no reports of threats by extremists in several years.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Yemenis with a non-Yemeni
parent, called ``muwalladin,'' sometimes face discrimination in
employment and in other areas. Persons who seek employment at Sana'a
University or admission to the military academy must by law demonstrate
that they have two Yemeni parents. Nonetheless, many senior government
officials, including Members of Parliament and ministers, have only one
Yemeni parent. In some cases, naturalization of the non-Yemeni parent
is sufficient to overcome the ``two-Yemeni parent'' requirement.
A small group of persons claiming to be the descendants of ancient
Ethiopian occupiers of Yemen, who later were enslaved, are considered
the lowest social class. Known as the ``Akhdam'' (servants), they live
in squalor and endure persistent social discrimination.
There were reports by human rights groups that some immigrants of
African origin were having difficulty in securing Interior Ministry
permission to marry Yemeni citizens. An Interior Ministry regulation
requires that marriages of citizens andforeigners be approved in
advance by the Ministry (see also Section 1.f.).
Tribal violence continued to be a problem during the year, and the
Government's ability to control tribal elements responsible for
kidnapings, shootings, and other acts of violence remained limited. A
prominent sheikh was killed in Sana'a in April, reportedly in
connection with a tribal revenge case dating to 1962 between the Abu
Nashtan and Al-Faqih tribes. In May an estimated 250 tribesmen from the
Hashid and Redaa tribes stormed Hodeidah central prison, where
authorities had detained an individual responsible for igniting a blood
feud between the two tribes. In July tribesmen from the Haraz tribe
blocked the Sana'a-Hodeida road, kidnaping drivers and seizing six
trucks belonging to the rival Jaham tribe. Also in July, tribesmen from
the Al-Ahwaj tribe attempted to kill the commander of the Army Corps of
Engineers, who is a member of the rival Abu Luhum tribe. The Hashid and
Khowlan tribes are involved in an ongoing violent feud in which several
persons have been killed. Tensions, which periodically escalate into
violent confrontations, continue between the Government and the Khowlan
and other tribes in Marib.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides that
citizens have the right to form unions. While the Government permits
this right in practice, it also seeks to place its own personnel in
positions of influence inside unions and syndicates. The 1995 Labor Law
(amended in 1997) provides both for the right to form unions and for
the right to strike. However, a strike is not allowed unless a dispute
between workers and employers is ``final'' and ``incontestable'' (a
prior attempt must have been made to settle through negotiation or
arbitration). The proposal to strike must be submitted to at least 60
percent of all concerned workers, of whom 25 percent must vote in favor
of the proposal. Strikes for explicit ``political purposes'' are
prohibited. In practice the law tends to discourage strikes. The law
provides equal labor rights for women, and it confirms the freedom of
workers to associate. The Labor Law does not stipulate a minimum
membership for unions, nor does it limit them to a specific enterprise
or firm. Thus, citizens may associate by profession or trade.
The Yemeni Confederation of Labor Unions (YCLU) remains the sole
national umbrella organization. The YCLU claims 350,000 members in 15
unions and denies any association with the Government, although it
works closely with the Government to resolve labor disputes through
negotiation. Observers suggest that the Government likely would not
tolerate the establishment of an alternative labor federation unless it
believed it to be in its best interest.
By law civil servants and public sector workers, and some
categories of farm workers, may not join unions. Only the General
Assembly of the YCLU may dissolve unions.
There were no strikes during the year.
The YCLU is affiliated with the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions
and the formerly Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The 1995 Labor
Law provides workers with the right to organize and bargain
collectively. The Government permits these activities; however, it
seeks to influence them by placing its own personnel inside groups and
organizations. All collective bargaining agreements must be deposited
with and reviewed by the Ministry of Labor; such agreements exist.
Unions may negotiate wage settlements for their members and can resort
to strikes or other actions to achieve their demands.
The law protects employees from antiunion discrimination. Employers
do not have the right to dismiss an employee for union activities.
Employees may appeal cases of antiunion discrimination to the Ministry
of Labor. Employees also may take a case to the labor courts, which
often are disposed favorably toward workers, especially if the employer
is a foreign company.
There are no export processing zones in operation; an EPZ is
planned for Aden.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, and there were no reports of its
practice. The law does not prohibit forced or bonded labor by children
specifically, but such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor is common, especially in rural areas. Many
children are required to work in subsistence farming because of the
poverty of their families. Even in urban areas, children work in stores
and workshops, sell goods on the streets, and beg. The law does not
prohibit forced or bonded labor by children specifically, but such
practices are not known to occur (see Section 6.c.).
The established minimum age for employment is 15 in the private
sector and 18 in the public sector. By special permit, children between
the ages of 12 and 15 may work. The Government rarely enforces these
provisions, especially in rural and remote areas. The Government also
does not enforce laws regarding 9 years of compulsory education for
children and many school-aged children work instead of attending
school, particularly where schools are not available.
The results of the 1994 national census showed that 231,655
children between the ages of 10 and 14 years, or 6.5 percent of all
children in that age group, were working. Experts believe that the
number has increased since 1994.
After voting in support of the International Labor Organization's
(ILO) basic agreement in May, the Consultative Council adopted the
ILO's Child Labor Strategy to address persistent child labor problems.
A special council, under the leadership of the Minister of Labor, uses
the strategy as a government-wide guideline for enforcing existing
child labor laws and formulating and implementing new laws.
The Ministry of Labor occasionally inspects factories in the major
population areas. Ministry officials state that they lack the resources
to enforce child labor laws more effectively. However, since a great
percentage of the country's underage work force is in the agricultural
sector in remote rural areas, it is difficult for the Government to
protect most child workers.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no established minimum
wage for any type of employment. The Labor Law states that ``it shall
not be permissible that the minimal level of the wage of a worker
should be less than the minimal wages of government civil servants.''
According to the Ministry of Labor, the average minimum wage of civil
servants for 1994-95 was approximately $50 to $62 (yr 8,000 to 10,000)
per month. Private sector workers, especially skilled technicians, do
far better. The average wage does not provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and family. A combination of inflation, the loss of
government-provided subsidies, and a decline in the exchange value of
the national currency continued to erode wages.
The law specifies a 40-hour workweek with a maximum 8-hour workday,
but many workshops and stores operate 10 to 12-hour shifts without
penalty. The workweek for government employees is 35 hours: 7 hours per
day Saturday through Wednesday.
The Ministry of Labor has the responsibility for regulating
workplace health and safety conditions. The requisite legislation for
regulating occupational health is contained in the Labor Law, but
enforcement is nonexistent. Many workers regularly are exposed to toxic
industrial products and develop respiratory illnesses. Some foreign-
owned companies implement higher health, safety, and environmental
standards than the Government requires. Workers have the right to
remove themselves from dangerous work situations and can challenge
dismissals in court.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law prohibits trafficking in
persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in, to,
or from the country.
SOUTH ASIA
----------
AFGHANISTAN *
Afghanistan continued to experience civil war and political
instability for the 20th consecutive year. There was no functioning
central government. The Pashtun-dominated ultra-conservative Islamic
movement known as the Taliban controlled about 90 percent of the
country, including the capital of Kabul, and all of the largest urban
areas. A Taliban edict in 1997 renamed the country the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan, with Taliban leader Mullah Omar as Head of State and
Commander of the Faithful. There is a six-member ruling council in
Kabul, but ultimate authority for Taliban rule rested in Mullah Omar,
head of the inner Shura (Council), located in the southern city of
Kandahar. Former President Burhanuddin Rabbani claimed to be the head
of the Government and controlled most of the country's embassies abroad
and retained Afghanistan's United Nations seat after the U.N. General
Assembly deferred a decision on Afghanistan's credentials another time
in December. Rabbani and his military commander, Ahmed Shah Masood,
both Tajiks, also maintained control of some largely ethnic Tajik
territory in the country's northeast. Masood's forces were within
rocket range of Taliban-held Kabul until late July when the Taliban
summer offensive pushed Masood's forces out of the Shomali plain, north
of Kabul. Commander Masood and commanders under the United Front for
Afghanistan (UFA), also known as the Northern Alliance, defended the
last of the territories held by the Northern Alliance in the north and
center of the country from Taliban attacks. The U.N. Special Envoy to
Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, engaged in extensive discussions with the
Afghan parties and other interested nations until his resignation in
the fall. A group of representatives from the six nations bordering
Afghanistan plus the United States and Russia met in Tashkent,
Uzbekistan in July to seek an end the conflict. During the year, a
process to convene a Loya Jirga, or Grand Assembly of traditional
leaders, which was focused around former King Zahir Shah and based in
Rome, slowly began to take shape. A number of provincial
administrations maintained limited functions, but civil institutions
were rudimentary. There is no countrywide recognized constitution, rule
of law, or independent judiciary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The U.S. Embassy in Kabul has been closed for security reasons
since January, 1989. Information on the human rights situation is
therefore limited.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Taliban remained the country's primary military force.
Taliban members committed numerous serious human rights abuses in
areas they occupied.
Agriculture, including high levels of opium poppy cultivation, was
the mainstay of the economy. During the year, Afghanistan became the
largest opium producer in the world. Lack of resources and the war have
impeded reconstruction of irrigation systems, repair of market roads,
and replanting of orchards in some areas. The presence of millions
landmines and unexploded ordnance throughout the country has restricted
areas for cultivation and slowed the return of refugees who are needed
to rebuild the economy. There was some laying of new mines during the
year, primarily by the Northern Alliance. Trade was mainly in opium,
fruits, minerals, and gems, as well as goods smuggled to Pakistan.
There were rival currencies, both very inflated. Formal economic
activity remained minimal in most of the country, especially rural
areas, and was inhibited by recurrent fighting and by local commanders'
roadblocks in non-Taliban controlled areas. The country is also
dependent on international assistance. Per capita income, based on
World Bank figures, is about $280 per year. Reconstruction was
continuing in Herat, Kandahar, and Ghazni, areas that are under firm
Taliban control. Areas outside of Taliban control suffered from
brigandage.
The overall human rights situation was extremely poor, and the
Taliban continued to commit serious human rights violations. Citizens
were precluded from changing their government or choosing their leaders
peacefully. Taliban forces reportedly were responsible for political
and other extrajudicial killings, including targeted killings, mass
killings, summary executions, and deaths in custody. There were
allegations that Taliban forces were responsible for disappearances.
Prison conditions were poor. Summary justice was common. The Taliban
imposed strict and oppressive order by means of stiff punishments for
crimes in the areas that they controlled. The Taliban's Islamic courts
and religious police, the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and
Suppression of Vice (PVSV), enforced their ultra-conservative
interpretation of Islamic law. They set punishments such as public
executions for adultery or murder, and amputations of one hand and one
foot for theft. For lesser infractions, Taliban militiamen often judged
accused offenders and meted out punishments, such as beatings, on the
spot. The Taliban arbitrarily arrested and detained persons and
infringedon citizens' privacy rights. The United Nations reported in
August that the Taliban used a scorched earth policy during its summer
offensive, including the burning of homes, the killing of livestock,
the uprooting of orchards, and the destruction of irrigation systems
(see Section 1.g.). Many civilians were relocated forcibly by the
Taliban during the offensive. Taliban forces were responsible for the
indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas. Civil war conditions and
the unfettered actions of competing factions effectively limited the
freedoms of speech, press, assembly, association. Freedom of religion
is restricted severely and Taliban members vigorously enforced their
interpretation of Islamic law. Freedom of movement is also limited.
Years of conflict have left approximately 258,600 citizens as
internally displaced persons, while more than 2.6 million of the
country's population of approximately 25.8 million live outside the
country as refugees. Although the continued fighting has discouraged
many refugees from returning to their country, approximately 96,700
returned voluntarily with U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
assistance during the year. All factions have harassed domestic and
international NGO's.
The human rights situation for women was extremely poor. Violence
against women remained a problem throughout the country. Women and
girls were subjected to rape, kidnaping, and forced marriage,
particularly in areas outside of Taliban control. Taliban restrictions
against women and girls remained widespread, institutionally
sanctioned, and systematic. The Taliban imposed strict dress codes and
prohibited women from working outside the home except in limited
circumstances in the health care field and in some humanitarian
assistance projects. The treatment of women and girls in Taliban
controlled areas improved slightly. Although girls were prohibited
formally from attending school, several organizations were able to run
elementary schools and home schools with girls in attendance despite
the formal prohibition. Nonetheless, there was widespread and widely
accepted societal discrimination against women and girls throughout the
country. The Taliban detained persons because of their ethnic origins.
Worker rights were not defined. Child labor persists. There were
reports that the Taliban used forced labor.
Masood's forces and the Northern Alliance members committed
numerous, serious abuses. Masood's forces continued sporadic rocket
attacks against Kabul. Anti-Taliban forces bombarded civilians
indiscriminately. Various factors infringed on citizens' privacy
rights. Armed units of the Northern Alliance, local commanders, and
rogue individuals were responsible for political killings, abductions,
kidnapings for ransom, torture, rape, arbitrary detention, and looting.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, IncludingFreedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--The Taliban forces
committed a large number of political and other extrajudicial killings,
both within the country and in the refugee community in Pakistan.
According to press reports, on January 21, members of the Taliban
killed six persons in Khost when they tried to ban a traditional game.
The local population requested reparations for the deaths. On May 19,
the Taliban reported an attempted uprising in the western city of
Herat; the Taliban stated that eight persons were executed in
connection with the incident. The Northern Alliance claimed that over
50 persons were executed by the Taliban.
On May 9, the Taliban recaptured Yakaolang, in Bamiyan province.
According to reports received by Amnesty International (AI), persons
who remained in the town after its recapture in May later were targets
of systematic killings by the Taliban. Hundreds of men reportedly were
taken away and killed (see Sections 1.b. and 1.g.). On May 9, the
Taliban also recaptured Bamiyan, which previously had changed hands
several times. There were reports that the Taliban carried out summary
executions upon entering the city. Estimates of the number of civilians
allegedly killed varies widely, but Amnesty International reported that
hundreds of men, and in a few instances women and children, were
separated from their families and taken away (see Sections 1.b. and
1.g.).
During the summer, the combat between the Taliban and the Northern
Alliance intensified. On July 28, the Taliban launched a major military
offensive. It was reinforced by 2,000 to 5,000 recruits, many of them
non-Afghans and some below the age of 14. This offensive led to the
capture of most of the Shomali Plainsup to the entrance of the Panjshir
Valley. Dozens of noncombatants were killed in a deliberate manner,
according to Amnesty International. Combatants from neighboring
countries who joined the Taliban forces reportedly contributed to an
increase in the level of atrocities against civilians, particularly
against women (see Section 1.g). In the Bagram area, several groups of
male civilians, ranging from 9 to 23 persons, reportedly were killed by
the Taliban.
According to Amnesty International, over a dozen detainees died
while in Taliban custody between early 1998 and early 1999. They
include two former Nangarhar University lecturers and U.N. agency staff
workers Pohandoy Mohammad Nazir Habibi and Pohanmal Mohammad Hashem
Basharyar. Habibi and Basharyar were active in Afghan intellectual
circles seeking peace through political means. The two men reportedly
were forced into a car in July 1998 by members of the provincial
internal security office. Their bodies were found several days later.
Other detainees reportedly have died in a similar fashion, including
Dagarwal Agha Mohammad, Sher Mohammad, General Solhmal, Abdul Ghani,
Ghadim Shah, and Mohammad Khan Tudai. According to AI, Taliban
officials arrested these persons, all of whom took active roles in
discussions of options for a political settlement. Several days to one
month after arrest, the bodies of these persons were discovered, often
bearing signs of torture, in a field or hanging from tree.
According to an October 1998 report, members of the Turkmen
community also have been arrested by the Taliban, tortured, and killed
in detention, including Agha Mohammad Doktor, a Turkmen military
commander, and Abdul Manan, a respected religious leader from the
northern part of the country.
In 1998 there were credible reports that the Taliban executed large
numbers of civilians during fighting with the National Islamic Movement
of Afghanistan in Faryab province, and that the Taliban engaged in mass
killings in Mazar-i-Sharif in August 1998; ethnic Hazaras and to a
lesser extent ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks reportedly were targeted. An
estimated 2,000 to 5,000 persons reportedly were killed by the Taliban
in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998; the Taliban killed an estimated 500 persons
in its recapture of Bamiyan in September 1998. In November 1998, there
were reports that an estimated 300 civilians, including women and
children, were killed by a Taliban official in the southeastern
province of Zabol; he was reportedly arrested by the Taliban.
Political killings of moderate Afghan leaders residing in Pakistan
continued during the year; many believed that these killings occurred
at the direction of the Taliban. In January in Peshawar, unknown
assailants killed the wife and child of Abdul Haq, a jihad-era
commander and current moderate activist. Apparently, the killers
expected to find Abdul Haq at home. Abdul Haq since has relocated from
Pakistan. On February 10, the daughter of a former adviser to President
Rabbani's Justice Ministry was killed in Pakistan. On April 1, an aide
to Haji Qadir was killed in Peshawar. In July former Afghan senator
Abdul Ahad Karzai, father of moderate activist Hamid Karzai, was killed
outside of a mosque in Quetta, Pakistan. Both the Karzai and Abdul Haq
family killings are widely believed to be part of a wider Taliban
campaign against moderate activists, especially against those
affiliated with the movement supported by former king Zahir Shah.
Several Afghan moderates were killed in Pakistan in 1998, including
Dagarwal Basir, General Nazar Mohammad, Dagarwal Latif, Hashim
Paktyanai, General Shirin Agha; and General Rahim. Over the course of
the year, a number of moderate activists in Pakistan resettled in third
countries, in part as a result of these killings. In response to the
concerns raised by Amnesty International about the killings of Afghan
moderates in Pakistan, Taliban authorities in January denied Taliban
involvement in such killings, stating that ``other groups commit
terrorist acts and violations and put the blame on the Taliban.''
In July 1998, two Afghan U.N. employees were kidnaped and murdered.
The alleged motive for the killings was that the two were former
communists. The Taliban were implicated but denied any role in the
murders. Other former Afghan communists, both in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, also were killed under circumstances that implicated the
Taliban. Mohammad Hashim Paktianai, a cousin of former Afghan Communist
President Najibullah (who was executed by the Taliban when they took
Kabul in 1996), was killed by unidentified gunmen near his home in
Peshawar in November 1998.
The Taliban used swift summary trials and implemented strict
punishments according to Islamic law; the Taliban ordered public
executions, which sometimes took place before crowds of up to30,000
persons at Kabul Stadium. The Taliban also ordered death by stoning for
adultery, and by toppling walls on offenders for homosexual
transgressions; five persons reportedly were killed by this method in
1998 (see Sections 1.c. and 1.e.).
The Taliban have used excessive force against demonstrators. In
December 1998, two students at Nangarhar medical college reportedly
were killed by members of the Taliban when they fired upon a crowd of
students who were protesting their dean's misappropriation of hostel
funds. Taliban leader Mullah Omar ordered an investigation of the
incident, but it is not known whether an investigation took place or
what the results of any investigation may have been.
During the year, Taliban planes bombed cities held by opposition
forces, killing and injuring civilians (see Section 1.g.). Several
cities and areas of Afghanistan in the north, west, and east changed
hands between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance on more than one
occasion; the continued warfare during the year between the Taliban and
Northern Alliance factions resulted in the killings of civilians.
Opposition forces fired rockets into Kabul on a number of
occasions. In many of these attacks, civilians were killed or injured
(see Section 1.g).
In other areas, combatants sought to kill rival commanders and
their sympathizers. The perpetrators of these killings and their
motives were difficult to identify, as political motives often are
entwined with family and tribal feuds, battles over the drug trade, and
personal vendettas. During the year, a long-running feud among Northern
Alliance members led to a number killings of prominent commanders,
including Bahadur in November and Abdul Chesik in December.
On August 25, a truck bomb exploded near the home of Mullah Omar in
Kandahar; seven persons, including three of Mullah Omar's bodyguards,
reportedly were killed. At year's end, it was not clear who was
responsible for the blast. On the November 13, a car bomb destroyed the
vehicle of Taliban official Abdul Hai Mutmain.
Commander Masood on January 24 denied responsibility for the
killing of the governor of Badakhshan, Mowlavi Khairadmand, a former
member of the Hezb-i-Islami, who was killed in November 1998.
There were unconfirmed reports in 1998 that 10 unarmed
demonstrators were killed in Mazar-i-Sharif in March 1998. Forces loyal
to the local Jamiat strongman, Commander Atta, allegedly shot at up to
3,000 pro-peace demonstrators. Atta may have feared that the crowd
intended to storm his headquarters.
In 1998, the U.N. found several mass graves connected with the
massacre of Taliban soldiers near Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997, which
contained evidence consistent with mass executions. Independent
investigations of these mass and other killings, including killings by
the Taliban, were hindered by the continuing warfare and the
unwillingness of local commanders to allow investigators to visit the
areas in question. The Taliban leadership has indicated in several of
these cases that investigations were under way or that investigations
would be permitted. However, according to neutral observers, no real
progress was made by the Taliban in facilitating investigations; mass
and other killings from 1997 and 1998 have not been investigated fully.
By year's end, six U.N. Civilian Affairs Officers were assigned to a
civilian monitoring unit inside the country to help investigate the
atrocities and to serve as an early warning mechanism for human rights
abuses.
In August 1998, Lieutenant Colonel Carmine Calo, an Italian serving
with the United Nations Special Mission, was killed in Kabul. There has
been no investigation of the killing.
There were reports that as many as 2,000 Taliban soldiers were
killed by the Northern Alliance, including the Hazara Hezb-i-Wahdat,
near Mazar-i-Sharif as they retreated from the city in 1997. In
December 1997, a U.N. team found several mass gravesites connected with
the massacre of Taliban soldiers near Mazar-i-Sharif, which contained
evidence consistent with mass executions.
b. Disappearance.--The strict security enforced by the Taliban in
areas under their control has resulted in a decrease in abductions,
kidnapings, and hostage taking for ransom. However, there were
allegations that the Taliban maintained private prisons to settle
personalvendettas and that they were responsible for disappearances in
areas under their control. There were unconfirmed reports that some
Taliban soldiers (often reported to be foreigners) abducted girls and
women from villages in the Shomali plains during fighting in August,
and that women taken in trucks from the area of fighting were
trafficked to Pakistan and to the Arab Gulf states. In 1998 there were
credible reports that the Taliban detained hundreds of persons, mostly
ethnic Hazaras, after the takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif; the whereabouts
of many such persons remained unknown at year's end. There were
unconfirmed reports that some Taliban soldiers abducted girls and women
from Hazara neighborhoods in Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998; the whereabouts of
some of these women also were unknown at year's end (see Section 5).
Some of those who have disappeared are believed to have been killed
after being arrested, but their bodies have not been found (see Section
1.a.). Since 1998 persons who have disappeared in this manner include:
General Abdul Rahman; General Farooq; Moulvi Shabuddin; Waliullah
Dagarwal; General Syed Agha Rayees; Engineer Nabi Shah; and Wolaswal
Ismail.
Abductions, kidnapings, and hostage-taking for ransom or for
political reasons also occurred in non-Taliban areas, but specific
information was lacking. In northern areas, women were at risk of being
raped and kidnaped, according to the U.N. There were unconfirmed
reports that local commanders were kidnaping young women. Some of the
women reportedly then were forced to marry their kidnapers. Others
simply remained missing. To avoid this danger, some families reportedly
sent their daughters to Pakistan or to Iran (see Section 5).
Groups in Russia listed nearly 300 Soviet soldiers formerly serving
in Afghanistan as missing in action or prisoners of war (POW's). Most
were thought to be dead or to have assimilated voluntarily into Afghan
society, though some are alleged to be held against their will. A
number of persons from the former Soviet Union missing from the period
of the Soviet occupation are presumed dead.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Taliban are believed to have used torture against
opponents and POW's. Torture does not appear to be a routine practice
in all cases. The Taliban reportedly beat a number of persons detained
for political reasons between early 1998 and early 1999 (see Section
1.d.).
The Taliban ruled strictly in areas that they controlled,
establishing ad hoc and rudimentary judicial systems, based on their
understanding of Islamic justice. Taliban courts imposed their extreme
interpretation of Islamic law and punishments following swift summary
trials. Murderers were subjected to public executions, a punishment
that at times was inflicted by the victims' families (see Section
1.a.). Thieves were subjected to public amputations of either one hand
or one foot, or both. In 1998 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture
was particularly concerned about the use of amputation as a form of
punishment by Taliban authorities. Adulterers were stoned to death or
publicly whipped with 100 lashes. Those found guilty of homosexual acts
were crushed by having walls toppled over them. During the year, this
punishment was carried out on at least one occasion, although the
victim reportedly survived. In 1998 at least seven such punishments
were reported; five persons died after having walls toppled on them.
Taliban forces threatened and beat women, for what they considered
``immodest dress.'' They threatened and beat men for ``immodest dress''
and for incorrect beard length.
Some of Masood's commanders in the north reportedly used torture
routinely to extract information from and break the will of prisoners
and political opponents.
All Afghan factions are believed to have used torture against
opponents and POW's, though specific information generally is lacking.
Torture does not appear to be a routine practice in all cases.
According to Amnesty International, between April 21 and May 9,
while the Hezb-i-Wahdat held Bamiyan and surrounding areas,
noncombatants suspected of collaborating with the Taliban were targeted
for severe beatings and arbitrary detention.
Prison conditions are poor. Prisoners held by some factions are not
given food, as normally this is the responsibility of prisoners'
relatives, who are allowed to visit to provide them with food once or
twice a week. Those who have no relatives have to petition the local
council or rely on other inmates.Prisoners live in overcrowded,
unsanitary conditions in collective cells.
There are credible reports that torture occurred in prisons under
the control of both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Local
authorities maintain prisons in territories under their control and
reportedly established torture cells in some of them. The Taliban
operate prisons in Kandahar, Herat, Kabul, Jalalabad, Mazar-i-Sharif,
Pul-i-Khumri, Shibarghan, Qala-e-Zaini, and Maimana. The Northern
Alliance maintains prisons in Panjshir and Taloqan, and there also is a
prison in the north at Faizabad, in Badakhshan province. According to
Amnesty International, there have been reports that the Taliban forced
prisoners to work on the construction of a new story on the Kandahar
prison, and that some Taliban prisoners held by Masood were forced to
labor in life-threatening conditions, such as digging trenches in mined
areas.
There were reports that an Afghan human rights organization visited
a Taliban prison in Mazar-i-Sharif in February. Intensified fighting
and poor security for foreign personnel limited the ICRC's ability to
monitor prison conditions, especially in and around Mazar-i-Sharif
after that city fell to the Taliban. However, the ICRC's access
improved toward the end of the year. The ICRC visited approximately
8,000 detainees in 50 different places of detention in 1998.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--With the absence of
formal legal and law enforcement institutions, justice was not
administered according to formal legal codes, and persons were
subjected to arbitrary detention. There are credible reports that both
Taliban and Northern Alliance militia extorted bribes from civilians in
return for their release from prison or to avoid arrest. Judicial and
police procedures varied from locality to locality. Little is known
about the procedures for taking persons into custody and bringing them
to justice. In both Taliban and non-Taliban areas, the practices varied
depending on the locality, the local commanders, and other authorities.
Some areas have a more formal judicial structure than others.
In the spring the Taliban reportedly took approximately 550 persons
in Bamiyan hostage and transferred them to different prisons in Parwan,
Kabul, and Kandahar, according to U.N. reports. Among those arrested
were Sayed Adil Kazimi Paykar from Fatmasti, Natiqi from Kushak, Sheikh
Emami from Surmara, and Sheikh Zaki from Kalu, all members of the
Council for National Understanding and National Unity of Afghanistan
(see Section 1.g.). Amnesty International also reported that the
Taliban have taken children hostage in an effort to compel their
fathers to surrender; the fathers of such children generally are
reported to be political opponents of the Taliban. Children detained in
this manner include Farhad and Mohammad Sheikh-Fardin, sons of Noor
Agha Rooyeen, a member of the Council of National Understanding and
National Unity of Afghanistan; and Abdul Zahir, son of General Golrank,
a former military commander under President Najibullah. The families of
these children have been told that the children would be released when
their fathers surrender to the Taliban.
Amnesty International also reported that as of March up to 200
prominent persons or local community leaders who supported peace
efforts had been arrested in southern and eastern Afghanistan since
early 1998; many reported beatings while in detention. Other estimates
ranged from 25 to 400 persons detained. The majority of them reportedly
were arrested in October 1998, mainly in Jalalabad. Among those
arrested in Jalalabad in October 1998 were Kuhat Khan, a retired
military officer and a Member of Parliament at the time of President
Najibullah; and Bashir Mahmood, a Pashtun founding member of the
Islamic Council for Freedom and Democracy. Some of those detained
allegedly were arrested for planning to carry out a coup or other
activities against the Taliban; however, the arrests appeared to be
aimed at possible opposition figures and included tribal elders,
intellectuals, members of various parties or groups, and persons
associated with prior regimes, particularly that of President
Najibullah. Other persons reportedly detained by the Taliban for their
political activity or past political affiliations included Mohammad
Anwar Sultani, Malik Khan Arab; Dagarwal Mohammad Yasin; Alaghadar
Nisar Ahmad; Abdul Quader Emami; Dagarwal Shah Mahmood Khan; Abdul
Malik; Malik M. Amin; Zairat Gul; Mohammad Nazir; Soleiman Shah;
Lawang; Jan Mohammad; and Rahemi. At least three Afghan staff members
of the United Nations also were arrested. As of February approximately
100 persons were believed to remain in detention.
All factions probably hold political detainees, but no firm numbers
are available. Thousands of prisoners of war are held by the Taliban
and Masood. Masood reportedly holds a number of Pakistanis, along with
several hundred Taliban soldiers, as POW's. Prisoner releases by all
factions occurred during the year, often with the assistance of the
ICRC, sometimes on the occasion of religious holidays. Generally, small
numbers of prisoners were released at any given time. In January, the
Taliban released 250 prisoners held at Pol-e-Charkhi prison on the
occasion of Ramadan, according to press reports. Other prisoners were
released in Kunduz. In February, the Taliban released approximately 70
prisoners from a prison in Mazar-i-Sharif on the recommendation of an
Afghan human rights organization.
On January 15, Commander Masood freed 58 Taliban prisoners during
Ramadan; there were similar releases to mark Ramadan in December. In
February, the International Committee of the Red Cross facilitated
prisoner exchanges between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance that
resulted in the exchange of 62 persons. During 1998 the ICRC registered
almost 4,400 prisoners of war across the country.
There was no information available on forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--With no functioning nationwide
judicial system, many municipal and provincial authorities relied on
some interpretation of Shari'a (Islamic) law and traditional tribal
codes of justice.
The Taliban have Islamic courts in areas under their control to
judge criminal cases and resolve disputes. According to the U.N., the
Taliban assert that there is a lower court and a higher court in every
province, and a Supreme Court in Kabul. In January Mullah Omar
promulgated a decree asking the Supreme Court and military courts not
to interfere with one another, according to press reports. The courts
meted out punishments including execution and amputation, and
reportedly heard cases in sessions that lasted only a few minutes. The
courts reportedly dealt with all complaints relying on the Taliban's
interpretation of Islamic law and punishments as well as traditional
tribal customs (see Section 1.c.). In cases involving murder and rape,
convicted prisoners generally were ordered executed, although relatives
of the victim could instead choose to accept other restitution (see
Section 1.a.). Decisions of the courts were reportedly final. According
to Amnesty International, some judges in these courts were untrained in
law, and at times based their judgments on a mixture of their personal
understanding of Islamic law and a tribal code of honor prevalent in
Pashtun areas.
Defendants do not have the right to an attorney.
Little is known about the administration of justice in the areas
controlled by the Northern Alliance. The administration and
implementation of justice varied from area to area and depended on the
whims of local commanders or other authorities, who summarily execute,
torture, and mete out punishments without reference to any other
authority.
All factions probably hold political prisoners, but no firm
estimates of numbers are available.
f. Arbitrary Interference With Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Interfactional fighting often resulted in the homes
and businesses of civilians being invaded and looted by the opposing
forces--whether victor or loser. Some armed gunmen reportedly acted
with impunity given the absence of any legal protection or a responsive
police force. It was unclear what authority controlled the actions of
the Taliban militiamen who patrolled the streets of cities and towns. A
number of incidents were reported in which Taliban soldiers, persons
masquerading as Taliban, or foreign sympathizers fighting alongside the
Taliban, entered private homes without prior notification or informed
consent. In Kabul the soldiers allegedly searched homes for evidence of
cooperation with the former authorities or for violations of Taliban
religion-based decrees, including the ban on the possession of
depiction of living things (photographs, stuffed animals, dolls, etc.).
Members of the Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of
Vice, the Taliban's religious police, beat individuals on the streets
for infractions of Taliban rules concerning dress, hair length, and
facial hair, as well as for the violation of the prohibition on women
being in the company of men who were unrelated to them. The Taliban
required women to wear a burqa, a tent-like outergarment that covers a
woman from head to toe, when in public (see Section 5). Men are
required to have beards of a certain length or longer, not to trim
their beards, and to wear head coverings. Men whose beards did not
conform to the guidelines on beard length set out by the Taliban were
subject to imprisonment for 10 days and mandatory Islamic instruction.
According to AI, the Taliban have taken children hostage in an effort
to compel their fathers to surrender (see Section 1.d.).
According to press reports, on January 29, members of the Ministry
for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice threatened men in
Kabul with punishment if they did not recite the five daily prayers,
and called upon neighbors to turn in violators.
There were reports that some prisoners of the Taliban, including
the sons of families that had opposed Taliban social restrictions, had
been drafted forcibly and sent to the front. There were also reports
that the Taliban forcibly conscripted or attempted to forcibly
conscript persons in 1997 and 1998; some of these reports were
unconfirmed.
In 1998 the Taliban prohibited satellite dishes, as part of an
effort to ban music, television, and movies (see Section 2.a.); the ban
continued through year's end. However, televisions reportedly are
widely sold, and their use generally is ignored unless reported by a
neighbor.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--The continuing internal conflict resulted in many
instances of the use of excessive force. After a lull in the early part
of the year, the conflict intensified in the northern and central areas
of the country, and much of the fighting during the year took place in
areas inhabited by non-Pashtun minorities.
In late April, the Taliban bombed cities held by the Northern
Alliance, such as Taloqan, Dara-e-Suf, and Jebel-u-Seraj. In September,
the Taliban bombed Taloqan again, resulting in the deaths of civilians,
property damage, and the displacement of residents.
On May 9, the Taliban recaptured Bamiyan. Most of the population
evacuated the city and took refuge in the mountains. The U.N. reported
that 361 infants and 138 adults died as a result of cold and hunger
following their escape to the mountains. According to reports received
by Amnesty International, those who remained in Bamiyan later were
targets of systematic killings (see Section 1.a.). There were reports
of summary executions carried out by the Taliban after they entered the
city. It was estimated by AI that hundreds of men and some women and
children also were taken away by the Taliban after the capture of
Bamiyan. On May 14, the Taliban took Yakaolang, the second largest city
in Bamiyan province. Approximately 150 persons, including women and
children, reportedly were taken captive by Taliban forces from Berson
village and transferred to Parwan province. Hundreds of men, and in
some instances women and children, reportedly were separated from their
families and taken away from Yakaolang (see Section 1.c.). During the
spring offensive, the U. N. estimated that 15 percent of the homes in
Bamiyan province were destroyed systematically and another 21 percent
were damaged heavily. According to the U.N., 66 percent of all cattle
in the area reportedly were killed in the fighting. Household goods,
commercial vehicles, and shops were sold, looted, or destroyed. As a
result of the fighting and destruction, spring planting was not
possible; this led to shortages of food in the province later in the
year.
Most of the civilian population was displaced from the area of the
conflict in Bamiyan province by mid-May. However, 66 percent returned
by August, including Hazaras and Tajiks.
On July 28, the Taliban began a large-scale military offensive
across the Shomali plains north of Kabul. Taliban forces used in the
offensive reportedly included non-Afghans. The initial Taliban
offensive led to the capture of most of the Shomali Plains up to the
entrance of the Panjshir Valley. The Taliban also made gains in the
northern part of the country along the Amu Darya River. However, on
August 5 the Northern Alliance counterattacked and retook most of the
territory lost the previous week. On August 11 the Taliban also
launched a new attack in the Shomali plains north of Kabul.
After the initial offensive failed, the Taliban carried out a
scorched earth policy in the Shomali plain area. Refugees fromthe
Hazarajat area (in the Shomali plain) reported to the U.N. that the
Taliban carried out summary executions of noncombatants, including
women and children; arbitrarily detained persons; forcibly relocated
the civilian population; burned of homes and crops; and used forced
labor. Some of the Taliban field commanders allegedly responsible were
named, including Abdul Wahid Ghorbandi.
The Northern Alliance claimed that 250,000 persons fled the Shomali
plains in August and September and sought refuge in the Panjshir
valley. Other estimates placed the number of persons who fled the
Shomali plains at 100,000 to 150,000 persons, of whom over 50,000
reportedly were relocated by Taliban forces. During a 4-day period in
August, the U.N. estimated that over 20,000 persons fled to Kabul,
bringing the total to 40,000 over a 2-week period. Approximately 800
families reportedly sought refuge in the abandoned Soviet embassy
compound in Kabul; 70 percent of persons taking refuge there were
reported to be women and children. Some families initially relocated to
Jalalabad, but reportedly later were allowed to go to Kabul, where
their needs could more easily be met and which was closer to the homes
they had fled. There were reports that dozens of trucks used to
relocate displaced persons were filled only with women and children,
indicating that adult men may have been separated from their families
by the Taliban. Both men and women reportedly were separated from their
families by the Taliban; according to one international human rights
organization, some 1,000 ethnic Tajik men were separated from their
families during the exodus and detained by the Taliban. The whereabouts
of most of those separated from their families remained unknown at
year's end. The towns of Istalif, Farza, Kalakan and Guldara were
affected most by the offensive; Qarabagh and parts of Bagram were
affected to a lesser degree (see Section 1.a.).
The Taliban claimed that opponents conducted attacks from the homes
of civilians in the Shomali area, making them legitimate military
targets. Later in the year, Taliban leader Mullah Omar criticized the
burning of homes, but no action is known to have been taken against
those responsible for the abuses that occurred during the offensive in
the Shomali plains.
In September the Taliban increased pressure on Northern Alliance
positions north of Kunduz city and to the east of Khanabad in Takhar
province. On September 25, the Taliban launched a major offensive in
northern Kunduz province, near the Tajikistan border. They recaptured
the Amu Darya river port of Sher Khan Bandar and the nearby districts
of Imam Sahib and Dasht-e-Archi.
In August 1998, the Taliban captured Mazar-i-Sharif. There were
reports that as many as 5,000 persons, mostly ethnic Hazara civilians,
were massacred by the Taliban after the takeover of Mazar-i-Sharif. In
September 1998, the Taliban captured Bamiyan; during the fighting an
estimated 200 civilians were killed. There were also credible reports
of a massacre of 45 civilians in a village near Bamiyan by Taliban
commanders in September 1998. Amnesty International reported that the
Taliban massacred 70 Hazara civilians, including children, in
Qezelabad, near Mazar-i-Sharif in 1997. There were also reports that
Taliban forces in Faryab province killed some 600 civilians in late
1997.
In general, independent investigations of alleged killings were
hindered by continuing warfare and the unwillingness of local
commanders to allow investigators to visit the areas in question (see
Section 1.a.). The Taliban denied charges that its forces massacred or
committed atrocities against civilians and claimed that civilian
deaths, if any, resulted from combat.
On April 11, the Northern Alliance began firing rockets on Kabul;
the firing continued sporadically until the Taliban offensive in late
July drove the Northern Alliance out of rocket range. On April 16 heavy
fighting broke out around Khenjan, north of the Salang tunnel in
Baghlan province, as well as in various localities of Faryab province
in the northwest. On April 21 anti-Taliban forces seized the city of
Bamiyan in the central part of the country. Bamiyan is inhabited mainly
by Hazaras, and was the stronghold of the Hezb-i-Wahdat until September
1998. By late October, the Northern Alliance drove the Taliban back
more or less to the positions held earlier in the year.
The discovery of mass graves near Shibarghan in the northern part
of the country in 1997 was widely reported. The graves allegedly
contained 2,000 corpses, reportedly those of Taliban forces captured
near Mazar-i-Sharif in mid-1997 and executed by Northern Alliance
forces.
There were reports that Masood's commanders in the northeast were
``taxing'' humanitarian assistance entering Afghanistan from
Tajikistan, harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid convoys, and
otherwise hindering the movement of humanitarian aid (see Section 4).
Continued warfare also resulted in massive forced displacement of
civilians the (see Section 1.g.). Over the course of the year, it is
estimated that up to 200,000 persons may have fled the fighting. An
estimated 258,600 Afghans remain internally displaced following years
of conflict. More than 2.6 million Afghans are living as refugees in
Pakistan and Iran. A much larger number over the twenty years has
sought refuge abroad. Women and children constituted the majority of
those in need of humanitarian assistance.
Afghanistan is the most heavily mined country in the world,
according to U.N. mine clearing experts. The U.N. estimates that there
are 5 to 7 million landmines and over 750,000 pieces of unexploded
ordnance throughout the country, sown mainly during the Soviet
occupation. Some NGO's estimate that there may be less than 1 million.
The landmines and unexploded ordnance cause deaths and injuries,
restrict areas available for cultivation, and slow the return of
refugees. The mines covered more than an estimated 420 square miles at
year's end, including over 285 square miles of grazing land; over 100
square miles of agricultural land; almost 25 square miles of roads; 7.5
square miles of residential area; and over 2 square miles of irrigation
systems and canals, according to the NGO Halo Trust. From 1995 to 1997
new mines are believed to have been laid over 90 square miles of land,
reportedly mainly by the Northern Alliance in the western provinces of
Badghis and Faryab. Additional newly mined areas have been reported but
not confirmed in the frontline areas north of Kabul, including Parwan,
Kapisa, and the Panjshir Valley, and in the northern provinces of
Kunduz and Takhar in 1999 offensives. These reportedly were laid by the
Northern Alliance in response to the Taliban's late summer offensive.
Taliban leader Mullah Omar reportedly banned the use, production,
trade, and stockpiling of mines in 1998.
An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been killed or wounded by
landmines. Currently, casualties caused by landmines and unexploded
ordnance are estimated at 10 to 12 per day. In some parts of the
country, including in Herat and Kandahar, almost 90 percent of
households are affected by the presence of landmines. Ninety-six
percent of civilian mine and unexploded ordinance casualties are male.
Fifty-three percent occur in the 18 to 40 age group, while 34 percent
of the casualties involve children, according to the U.N.'s Mine Action
Center. Landmines and unexploded ordnance resulted in death in
approximately 30 percent of cases, and in serious injuries and
disability, including amputation and blindness, in approximately 20
percent of cases.
With funding from international donors, the United Nations has
organized and trained mine detection and clearance teams, which operate
throughout the country. Nearly all areas that have been cleared are in
productive use, and approximately 1.53 million refugees and internally
displaced persons have returned to areas cleared of mines and
unexploded ordnance. Nevertheless, the mines are expected to pose a
threat for many years. In 1997 the 4,000 mine clearers suffered from an
accident rate of 1 per week. However, clearance rates and safety have
increased for clearance teams assisted by dogs. U.N. agencies and
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) have instituted a number of mine
awareness campaigns and educational programs for women and children in
various parts of the country, but many were curtailed as a result of
Taliban restrictions on women and girls.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--There are no laws that effectively
provide for freedom of speech and of the press, and senior officials of
various warring factions allegedly attempted to intimidate journalists
and influence their reporting. The few newspapers in the country, all
of which were published only sporadically, were for the most part
affiliated with different factions. Various factions maintain their own
communications facilities. The Taliban selectively ban the entry of
foreign newspapers into their territory. Many foreign books are
prohibited. The Taliban radio station, the Voice of Shariat, broadcasts
religious programming and Taliban pronouncements.
All factions have attempted to pressure foreign journalists who
report on the Afghan conflict. The Taliban initially cooperated with
members of the international press who arrived in Kabul, but later
imposed restrictions upon them. During the year, foreign journalists
were forbidden to film or photograph persons or animals, were not
allowed to interview women, and were required to be accompanied at all
times by a Taliban escort to ensure that these restrictions were
enforced. In 1998 foreign journalists were not permitted into Mazar-i-
Sharif after the Taliban took the city and reportedly massacred as many
as 5,000 persons (see Section 1.g.). However, by year's end, few
journalists cited problems in reporting from Afghanistan.
The Taliban reportedly require most journalists to stay at the
Intercontinental Hotel in Kabul (allegedly for security and economic
reasons). Journalists also reported that the Taliban attempted to
control who could act as drivers and interpreters for them.
In August 1998, Iranian journalist Mahmoud Saremi was killed after
being abducted by Taliban soldiers in Mazar-i-Sharif, along with eight
Iranian diplomats. Saremi was the Afghanistan bureau chief for the
official Iranian news agency, IRNA. Taliban officials stated that those
responsible for Saremi's killing were not acting under official orders
and would be punished; however, no action was known to have been taken
regarding the case by year's end.
The Taliban continue to prohibit music, movies, and television on
religious grounds. In August 1998 television sets, videocassette
recorders, videocassettes, audiocassettes, and satellite dishes were
outlawed in order to enforce the prohibition. However, televisions
reportedly are widely sold, and their use generally is ignored unless
reported by a neighbor.
The Taliban severely restrict academic freedom, particularly
education for girls (see Section 5).
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Civil war,
tenuous security, and likely opposition from local authorities
seriously inhibited freedom of assembly and association.
It is unknown whether laws exist that govern the formation of
associations. Many domestic NGO's continue to operate in the country,
and many international NGO's also continue to operate (see Section 4).
There were reports that the Taliban require NGO's to go through
burdensome registration procedures in order to be allowed to operate,
and attempted to exert control over NGO staffing and office locations,
especially in Kabul.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted
severely, and Taliban members vigorously enforced their interpretation
of Islamic law. Afghanistan's official name, according to both the
Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) and the Northern Alliance (the
Islamic State of Afghanistan), reflects the desire of the factions to
promote Islam as a state religion. Some 85 percent of the population is
Sunni Muslim, and Shi'a Muslims constitute most of the remainder. The
Hazara ethnic group is predominantly Shi'a; Hazaras are among the most
economically disadvantaged persons in the country. The Hazara Shi'a
minority want a national government to give them equal rights as
citizens. There are unconfirmed reports that the Taliban have occupied
and ``cleaned'' Shi'a mosques for the use of Sunnis.
The Taliban sought to impose their extreme interpretation of
Islamic observance in areas that they control. Prayer is mandatory for
all, and those who are observed not praying at appointed times or who
are late attending prayer are subject to beatings. Members of the
Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice, which was
raised to the status of a ministry in May 1998, regularly check
passersby to see that men's beards and apparel meet Taliban
requirements, to ensure that women are dressed in strict traditional
Taliban-approved garb, and to ascertain that women are not in the
company of men who are unrelated to them (see Section 5). There have
been reports that PVSV members in Kabul stopped persons on the street
and quizzed them to determine if they knew how to recite various
Koranic prayers. According to regulations, a man who has shaved or cut
his beard may be imprisoned. Beards must protrude farther than would a
fist clamped at the base of the chin. All students at Kabul University
reportedly are required to have beards in order to study there (no
female students are allowed). There also are credible reports that
Taliban members gave forcedhaircuts to males in Kabul. Enforcement of
Taliban social strictures is much stricter in the cities, especially
Kabul.
The small number of non-Muslim residents in the country may
practice their faith, but may not proselytize. Almost all of the
country's small Hindu and Sikh population, which once numbered about
50,000, has emigrated or taken refuge abroad. There were reports that
Hindus are required to wear a piece of yellow cloth attached to their
clothing to identify their religious identity; Sikhs reportedly were
required to wear some form of identification as well. This rule
allegedly was imposed to spare non-Muslims from the enforcement of
rules that are mandatory for Muslims and from harassment by the PVSV.
Human Rights Watch reported that in September, the Taliban issued
decrees that forbade non-Muslims from building new places of worship;
prohibited non-Muslims from criticizing Muslims; ordered non-Muslims to
identify their homes by placing yellow cloth on their rooftops; and
required non-Muslim women to wear a yellow dress with a special mark.
In November 1998, Taliban officials accepted responsibility for the
defacing of one of two historic statues of Buddha near Bamiyan during
their takeover of that city earlier in the year. The Taliban claimed
that the vandalism was the result of an unauthorized act by one of
their soldiers, and that the statutes were being protected by the
Taliban from further harm. Some Taliban leaders claimed tolerance of
religious minorities, although there reportedly have been restrictions
imposed upon Shi'a Muslims in Taliban-controlled territory. Such
restrictions have not been imposed on a uniform basis.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Although in principle citizens have the
right to travel freely both inside and outside the country, their
ability to travel within the country was hampered by warfare,
brigandage, millions of landmines, a road network in a state of
disrepair, and limited domestic air service, complicated by factional
threats to air traffic. Some Afghans reported difficulty in receiving
necessary permits to leave the country for tourism or business
purposes, while others reported no such difficulty. The Taliban's
restrictions on women further curtail freedom of movement (see Section
5). Despite these obstacles, many persons continued to travel
relatively freely, with buses plying routes in most parts of the
country. However, due to intermittent fighting in various areas,
international aid agencies often found that their ability to travel,
work, and distribute assistance was hampered. International travel
continued to be difficult as both the Taliban and Masood threatened to
shoot down any planes that flew over areas of the country that they
controlled, without their permission.
Commercial trade was impeded in certain non-Taliban areas, as local
commanders and criminals continued to demonstrate their control over
the roads by demanding road tolls and sometimes closing roads. There
were reports in 1998 that some Taliban commanders, who previously
gained popularity by sweeping away the checkpoints that local warlords
used to shake down travelers, were setting up checkpoints themselves
and demanding tolls for passage, but there were no such reports during
the year.
There also have been instances of the forcible expulsion of
individuals on ethnic grounds. During the year, there were reports of
forced expulsions of ethnic Hazaras and Tajiks from areas newly
occupied by the Taliban.
Afghans continued to form one of the world's largest refugee
populations. According to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
about 2.6 million Afghans remain outside the country as registered
refugees: 1.4 million in Iran, 1.2 million in Pakistan, 20,000 in
Russia, 17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the central Asian republics.
Women and children constitute 75 percent of the refugee population. In
addition, there are more than 300,000 Afghans who are internally
displaced following years of fighting. A total of 4,069,000 Afghan
refugees have been repatriated since 1988, with over 1.5 million
returning to Afghanistan in the peak year of 1992. Although the
continued fighting has discouraged many refugees from returning to
their country, 88,000 returned between January and October 1998. As
many as 10,000 Afghans in Iran were repatriated to the country between
December 1998 and January; it is not known how many of these persons
were refugees or how many were repatriated forcibly. Many were
reportedly ethnic Hazara or Tajik. However, by year's end, some 75,000
Afghans reportedly were repatriated forcibly to Afghanistan from Iran,
without a determination as to refugee status.
There was no available information on policies regarding refugees,
asylum, provision of first asylum, or the forced return of refugees.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
There was no functioning central government in the country. The
continuing struggle for political power among the major armed groups
prevented citizens from changing their government or choosing their
leaders peacefully and democratically. Most political changes came
about through shifting military fortunes. No faction held elections or
respected citizens' right to change their government democratically.
The Taliban movement's authority emanates from its leader, Mullah
Omar, who carries the title Commander of the Faithful, and from the
Taliban's military occupation of most of the country. Governmental
functions are exercised through the key Taliban governing body, the
Inner Shura (Council) based in Kandahar, and by ministries based in
Kabul.
The Northern Alliance, headed by nominal President Rabbani, holds
power with de facto Defense Minister Masood as Rabbani's primary
military backer. Rabbani received nominal support from General Dostam,
and a faction of the Shi'a Hazara Hezb-i-Wahdat. Another faction of the
Hezb-i-Wahdat nominally allied with the Taliban early in the year.
Rabbani and Masood control the northeastern, largely Tajik, portion of
the country, including the strategic Panjshir valley north of Kabul.
Discontent with the Taliban's strictures and rural village values
was strong in large, non-Pashtun cities such as Herat, Kabul, and other
northern cities. The Taliban's military successes did not encourage the
group's leaders to engage meaningfully in political dialog with
opponents. Efforts in 1998 to convene a national body of Muslim
scholars (ulema) to discuss the future of the country broke down when
both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance disagreed over the possible
membership and sequence of the talks. Peace talks convened in April
1998 in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan, but broke down quickly. Moderate and
neutral Afghans, mostly living outside of the country, continue their
efforts to organize a traditional Grand National Assembly (Loya Jirga),
and held meetings in Rome in July and November. The former King
supports this process. Another group of moderates met several times
during the year in Cyprus and Tehran.
The United Nations and the international community continued their
efforts to help Afghans reach a political settlement. U.N. Special
Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi announced late in the year that he had ``frozen''
his work as a consequence of the non-responsiveness of Afghanistan's
neighbors.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are many NGO's, both domestic and international, in the
country. Some are based in neighboring countries, mostly Pakistan, with
branches inside Afghanistan; others are based in Afghan cities and
rural areas. The focus of their activities is primarily humanitarian
assistance, rehabilitation, health, education, and agriculture.
All factions harassed domestic and international NGO's. The Taliban
have interfered consistently with the operation of the United Nations
and NGO's. Tactics used have included threatening to impound the
vehicles of NGO's that do not work on projects preferred by the
Taliban, threatening to close projects that do not include Taliban
supervisors or workers, and, in the case of one local NGO, the
detention of its director and the impounding of all of its equipment in
an effort to increase Taliban control of the organization. The Taliban
announced in March 1998 that foreign Muslim women, including U.N.
workers, would be allowed to perform their jobs only if accompanied by
a male relative, a move that hampered NGO and relief operations. The
United Nations withdrew its personnel from southern Afghanistan in late
March 1998 to protest the assault on a U.N. worker by the Taliban
governor of Kandahar province and the interference with its work by the
Taliban. After reaching agreements with local officials, the U.N.
returned to Kandahar in May. In April 1998, Taliban authorities
rejected the participation of a U.N. official on the U.N. team selected
to negotiate with the Taliban on the travel restrictions for foreign
Muslim women and other issues, because he was perceived to be ``anti-
Taliban.'' In June 1998, the Taliban required allNGO's in Kabul to
relocate to a single location in a bomb-damaged former school; those
who refused were threatened with expulsion from the country. However,
the order was not enforced. In November 1998, the U.N. World Food
Program (UNWFP) accused the Taliban of looting 1,364 tons of food,
stealing trucks from the UNWFP's compound in Bamiyan, and occupying
UNWFP offices in Bamiyan and Yakaolang.
In June and July 1998, several Afghan workers for international
NGO's were detained for questioning by the Taliban, but most were
released within a few days. In July 1998, two Afghan U.N. workers were
abducted and killed by unknown assailants; one of the bodies bore signs
of torture. In August 1998, Lieutenant Colonel Carmine Calo, who was
serving with the United Nations Special Mission, was killed in Kabul,
triggering the departure of most foreign U.N. and NGO staff members
from the country.
However, the working environment for the U.N. and humanitarian
community improved somewhat during the year. U.N. and other expatriate
workers began returning early in the year following normalization of
the security environment. However, on June 15 staff members of an
international NGO were detained and beaten by members of the Taliban in
Bamiyan province. After the June incident, Mullah Omar issued an edict
stating that any person causing annoyance to a foreign worker could
face punishment of up to 5 years in prison. However, in November U.N.
properties were targeted in organized demonstrations in several cities
when U.N. sanctions related to terrorism were imposed on the country.
Certain key issues, including the mobility of international female
Muslim staff and access by Afghan women and girls to programs, remain
largely unresolved.
For much of 1998, Northern Alliance and autonomous commanders also
prevented NGO's and international organizations from delivering
humanitarian assistance. There were reports that Masood's commanders in
the northeast were ``taxing'' humanitarian assistance entering
Afghanistan from Tajikistan, harassing NGO workers, obstructing aid
convoys, and otherwise hindering the movement of humanitarian aid.
The Afghan League of Human Rights operated both in Afghanistan and
Pakistan; it produces an annual report. The Cooperation Center for
Afghanistan (CCA) is an Afghan NGO that operated in both Pakistan and
Afghanistan. The CCA maintains an office in Peshawar, where it produces
a monthly newsletter on the Afghan human rights situation. It also
monitors and documents the human rights situation from several offices
in both Taliban-controlled and Northern Alliance-controlled cities. The
National Commission on Human Rights in Afghanistan began operations
during 1998 in Pakistan, conducting seminars on human rights issues,
issuing press statements criticizing specific instances of human rights
abuses, and placing articles in Pashtu and Dari newspapers. The
Afghanistan Commission for Human Rights, founded in 1997 after
discussions with Taliban authorities on Islamic aspects of human
rights, also started activities in Pakistan in 1998, focused on the
plight of Afghan prisoners in Pakistani prisons and on children's
rights. However, the civil war and lack of security continued to make
it difficult for human rights organizations to monitor adequately the
situation inside Afghanistan.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
There is no functioning constitution, and therefore there are no
constitutional provisions that prohibit or protect against
discrimination based on race, sex, religion, disability, language, or
social status. It is not known whether specific laws prohibit
discrimination; local custom and practices generally prevail.
Discrimination against women is prevalent throughout the country. Its
severity varies from area to area, depending on the local leadership's
attitude towards education for girls and employment for women and on
local attitudes. Historically, the minority Shi'a faced discrimination
from the majority Sunni population. There has been greater acceptance
of the disabled as the number of persons maimed by landmines increased,
and the presence of the disabled became more widespread. During the
year, the Taliban on at least one occasion sought to execute a
homosexual by toppling a wall to crush the victim; however, the person
reportedly survived (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
Women.--As lawlessness and interfactional fighting continued in
some areas, violence against women occurred frequently, including
beatings, rapes, forced marriages, disappearances, kidnapings, and
killings. Such incidents generally went unreported and mostinformation
was anecdotal. It was difficult to document rapes, in particular, in
view of the social stigma that surrounds the problem. Although the
stability brought by the Taliban to most of the country acted in
general to reduce violence against women, particularly rapes and
kidnapings, Taliban members continued to threaten or beat women to
enforce the Taliban's dress code for women. There were unconfirmed
reports that the Taliban or foreign ``volunteers'' fighting alongside
the Taliban abducted women during the August military offensive in the
Shomali plains; there were also unconfirmed reports that Taliban
soldiers raped and abducted women from Hazara neighborhoods in Mazar-i-
Sharif in August 1998. The whereabouts of some of these women were
unknown at year's end. The enforced seclusion of women within the home
greatly limited the information available on domestic violence and
marital rape. In a climate of secrecy and impunity, it is likely that
domestic violence against women remained a serious problem.
Women accused of adultery offenses also are subjected to violence.
Adultery is punishable by death through stoning. At least one accused
adulteress was sentenced to 100 lashes in 1998; her sentence was
carried out publicly (see Section 1.c.). One woman convicted of killing
her husband in 1997 was executed publicly by a firing squad in the
Kabul sports area in November.
Overall, the situation of women and girls remained mostly
unchanged, as the Taliban generally continued the application of their
ultra-conservative interpretation of Islamic law.
In 1992 a new government was installed and the previous trend
towards increasing numbers of women working outside of the home was
reversed. Since the advent of the Taliban in 1994, the trend towards
excluding women from employment has intensified.
The treatment of women under Taliban rule has been particularly
harsh, although there was marginal improvement in some areas during the
year. In the areas where they took control, the Taliban initially
excluded women from all employment outside the home, apart from the
traditional work of women in agriculture; women were forbidden to leave
the home except in the company of a male relative. In urban areas, and
particularly after the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, the Taliban forced
almost all women to quit their jobs as professionals and clerical
workers, including teachers, doctors, nurses, bank tellers, and aid
workers. In a few cases, the Taliban relented and allowed women to work
in health care occupations under restricted circumstances. The
prohibition on women working outside of the home has been especially
difficult for the large numbers of widows left by 20 years of civil
war; there are an estimated 30,000 widows in Kabul alone. Many women
reportedly have been reduced to selling all of their possessions and to
begging to feed their families.
However, during the year, restrictions on women's employment
reportedly eased somewhat. The Taliban allowed Afghan women to work in
the medical sector as doctors and nurses, treating other women.
Medicins Sans Frontieres and other international NGO's reported that
they were able to recruit both male and female health care staff
without administrative obstacles, and that the main difficulty faced in
recruitment of medical staff was the lack of qualified female
personnel. However, during the year there were reports that the Taliban
reopened schools for doctors and nurses, and that women were allowed to
attend. A limited number of women were allowed to work for
international agencies and NGO's, but they were not allowed to work in
the offices of their employers; they were required to go directly from
their homes to the project sites on which they worked. A Taliban edict
issued during the year allowed needy widows with no other means of
support to seek employment; but many widows reportedly were unaware of
the change, and there is little work available. Women reportedly were
allowed to claim international assistance directly rather than through
their close male relatives, as a 1997 edict stipulated; the Taliban's
edict had required that international assistance be provided to women
through their close male relatives rather than directly. However, male
relatives still were required to obtain the permission of the Ministry
for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice for female home
based-employment.
Girls were formally prohibited from attending school. Formal
restrictions against the education of girls remain, apart from
instruction provided in mosques, which is mainly religious in content.
However, there are a growing number of girls educated by international
NGO's in formal schools, community-based schools, and home schools (see
Section 5).
Most Afghans lack any access to adequate medical facilities, and
the provision of health care under Taliban rule remains poor. Life
expectancy rates are estimated at 44 years for women and 43 years for
men. In most regions, there is less than one physician per 10,000
persons. Health services reach only 29 percent of the population and
only 17 percent of the rural population. Clean water reaches only about
12 percent of the population. Health care for both men and women was
hampered by the Taliban's ban on images of humans, which caused the
destruction of public education posters and made the provision and
dissemination of health information in a society with high levels of
illiteracy more difficult. Tuberculosis rates for women and maternal
mortality rates are extremely high. However, the Taliban significantly
reduced women's access to health care, although it has since loosened
restrictions somewhat. In 1997 the Taliban announced a policy of
segregating men and women in hospitals; this policy reportedly
continued at year's end. In 1997 in an attempt to centralize medical
care for women, the Taliban also directed most hospitals in Kabul to
cease services to women and to discharge female staff. Services for
women were to be provided by a single hospital still partially under
construction, which resulted in a drastic reduction in access to, and
the quality of, health care for women. Later, women were permitted to
seek treatment from female medical personnel working in designated
women's wards or clinics; since June 1998 they have been permitted to
seek treatment from male doctors only if accompanied by a male
relative. In practice women were excluded from treatment by male
physicians in most hospitals. These rules, while not enforced
universally, made obtaining treatment extremely difficult for most
women, and especially for Kabul's widows, many of whom have lost all
such male family members. Further, even when a woman was allowed to be
treated by a male doctor, he was prohibited from examining her except
if she were fully clothed in Taliban-approved garb, and from touching
her, thus limiting the possibility of any meaningful treatment. The
participants in a 1998 survey of 160 Afghan women reported poor or no
access to health care in Kabul. Most of the participants also reported
a decline in their mental health. However, there were credible reports
that the restrictions on women's health care were not applied in
practice at year's end, and that there were some improvements in access
to health care for women during the year. At year's end, all Kabul
hospitals apart from the military hospital reportedly treated women.
Rabia Balkhi Women's Hospital in Kabul provided a full range of health
services to women, but there was only one maternity hospital in the
country.
The Taliban decreed what women could wear in public. Women in
public spaces were required to wear a burqa, a loose, head-to-toe
garment that has a small cloth screen for vision. While in many,
particularly rural, areas of the country, the burqa was the customary
women's outer garment, the requirement for all women to wear the burqa
represented a significant change in practice for many women,
particularly in urban areas. According to a decree announced by the
religious police in 1997, women found outside the home who were not
covered properly would be punished severely along with their family
elders. In Kabul and elsewhere women found in public who were not
wearing the burqa, or whose burqas did not cover their ankles properly,
reportedly have been beaten by Taliban militiamen. Some poor women
cannot afford the cost of a burqa, and thus are forced to remain at
home or risk beatings if they go out without one.
During the year, there were reports of differences in the
enforcement of the requirement for women to wear the burqa. Enforcement
reportedly was relatively lax in rural and non-Pashtun areas, and there
were reports that some women in Herat and in rural areas cover their
heads with large scarves that leave the face uncovered and have not
faced reprisals. The Taliban's dress code for women apparently is not
enforced strictly upon the nomad population of several hundred thousand
or upon the few female foreigners, who nonetheless must cover their
hair, arms, and legs. Women in their homes must not be visible from the
street; the Taliban require that homes with female occupants have their
windows painted over.
Women were expected to leave their homes only while escorted by a
male relative, further curtailing the appearance and movement of women
in public even when wearing approved clothing. Women appearing in
public without a male relative ran the risk of beatings by the Taliban.
Some observers reported seeing fewer and fewer women on the streets in
Taliban-controlled areas. Women are not allowed to drive, and taxi
drivers reportedly are beaten if they take unescorted women as
passengers. Women only may ride on buses designated as women's buses;
there are reportedly not enough such buses to meet the demand, and the
wait for women's buses can be long. In December 1998, the Taliban
ordered that bus drivers who take female passengers must encase the bus
in curtains, and put up a curtain so that the female passengers cannot
see or be seen by the driver. Bus drivers also were told that they must
employ boys under the age of 15 to collect fares from female
passengers, and that neither the drivers nor the fare collectors were
to mingle with the passengers.
Amnesty International has reported that the Taliban have ordered
the closure of women's public baths.
Women are also forbidden to enter mosques or other places of
worship unless the mosque had separate sections for men and women. Most
women pray at home alone or with other family members. Women also
reportedly have been prohibited from appearing on the streets for
certain periods during the month of Ramadan.
The Taliban's restrictions regarding the social behavior of men and
women were communicated by edicts and enforced mainly by the Ministry
for the Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice. The United Nations
and numerous other interlocutors noted that the edicts are enforced
with varying degrees of rigor throughout the country. The restrictions
were imposed most heavily in urban areas, where women had enjoyed wider
access to educational and employment opportunities before the Taliban
gained control.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women noted after
her September visit some improvements in the status of women, including
the existence of home schools as well as limited primary educational
institutions for girls run by the Religious Ministry in Kabul;
increased access of women to health care; and the permission given for
widows to work. The Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women also
noted continuing violations of the physical security of women and the
practice of lashings and public beatings; violations of the rights to
education, health, employment, freedom of movement, and freedom of
association, and of family rights, including the existence of polygyny
and forced marriage. She also noted that minority women sometimes were
subject to forced displacement and that there were some cases of
trafficking in women and children (see Section 1.f.).
Children.--Local administrative bodies and international assistance
organizations undertook to ensure children's welfare to the extent
possible; however, the situation of children is very poor. Infant
mortality is 250 out of 1,000 births and Medicins Sans Frontieres
reports that 250,000 children per year die of malnutrition. One quarter
of children die before the age of 5. Approximately 45 percent of the
population is made up of children age 14 or under. The Taliban's
restrictions on male-female medical treatment have had a detrimental
effect on children. Physicians for Human Rights has reported that
children sometimes are denied medical care when the authorities do not
let male doctors visit children's wards, which may be located within
the women's ward of a hospital, or do not allow male doctors to see
children accompanied only by their mothers. A UNICEF study also
reported that the majority of children are highly traumatized and
expect to die before reaching adulthood. Some 90 percent have
nightmares and suffer from acute anxiety, while 70 percent have seen
acts of violence, including the killing of parents or relatives.
Taliban restrictions on the movement of women and girls in areas
that they controlled hampered the ability of U.N. agencies and NGO's to
implement effectively health and education programs aimed at both boys
and girls.
The educational sector currently is characterized by limited human
and financial resources; the absence of a national educational policy
and curriculum; the unpreparedness of the authorities to rehabilitate
destroyed facilities; and discriminatory policies banning the access of
females to all levels of education, according to a report by the Gender
Advisor to the U.N. System in Afghanistan. Female literacy is
approximately 4 percent, compared with an overall literacy rate of 30
percent. There have been reports that the ban on women working outside
of the home has hampered the education of boys, since a large
percentage of the country's teachers were women prior the advent of
Taliban rule.
The Taliban have eliminated most of the formal opportunities for
girls' education that existed in areas that they have taken over;
however, some girls' schools still operate in rural areas and some
towns. Some girls also are receiving an education in informal home
schools, which are tolerated to varying degrees by the Taliban
authorities around the country. During the year, there were reports
that the number of children that these home schools reach was
increasing, and that there has been an increase in the attendance of
girls in various educational settings, including formal schools.
However, in June 1998, more than 100 NGO-funded girls' schools and
home-based women's vocational projects were closed by the Taliban in
Kabul. In 1998 the Taliban also stated that schools would not be
allowed to teach girls over the age of 8, that schools teaching girls
would be required to be licensed, and that such schools would be
required to limit their curriculums to the Koran. However, the
Taliban's implementation of educational policy is inconsistent and
varies from region to region, as well as over time.
In September the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women
noted the existence of home schools and also of limited primary
educational institutions for girls run by the Religious Ministry in
Kabul. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women was told
by the Taliban in September that primary education is available to
girls between the ages of 6 and 10, and that this was dispensed in
mosque schools under the Ministry of Religious Affairs. About three-
quarters of the curricula in the Ministry of Religious Affairs schools
reportedly deals with religious and moral subjects. Taliban-sponsored
public schools, at both the elementary and secondary levels, provide
education only to boys, and emphasize religious studies. However,
schools run by NGO's and international donors are mostly open to both
boys and girls.
Despite the limitations on education and the Taliban's restrictions
on female education, approximately 25 to 30 percent of boys were
estimated to be enrolled in school and up to 10 percent of girls were
estimated to attend some form of school, whether NGO-run, mosque
schools, or
home schools, according to UNICEF. This represents a modest increase in
both boys' and girls' school enrollment over the last 5 years. Prior to
the Taliban takeover in 1996, more than 100,000 girls reportedly
attended public school in Kabul in grades kindergarten to 12, according
to a U.N. survey. During the year, approximately 300,000 to 350,000
school-age children attended schools run or funded by various
assistance agencies and NGO's. The Swedish Committee for Afghanistan
(SCA) reported that it served 175,000 students in 567 schools; most
these were formal schools, but 39 were home schools. In a few areas,
over 50 percent of students reportedly were girls. The SCA reported
that 20 percent of the students in its formal schools, mostly located
in rural areas, are girls. Many boys also were being educated in home
schools, because of administrative problems in the Taliban-run schools,
including problems in the payment of teachers' salaries. A high
proportion of the students in Northern Alliance-controlled territory
reportedly were girls. In areas newly captured by the Taliban, such as
Hazarajat, the community successfully petitioned Taliban
representatives to reopen the schools. In Herat, which was captured by
the Taliban in 1995, girls' schools have remained closed except in the
refugee camps maintained by international NGO's. Nonetheless,
approximately 5 percent of girls were enrolled in school in Kandahar;
approximately 20 percent of girls were enrolled in Herat. During the
year, demand for education reportedly is increasing among refugees and
returnees to Afghanistan, but some families have sent girls abroad for
education in order to evade the Taliban's prohibitions on females
attending school.
There have been unconfirmed reports that the Taliban use child
soldiers. There were some cases of trafficking in children (see Section
6.f.).
The Taliban have banned certain recreational activities, such as
kite flying and playing chess. Dolls and stuffed animals are prohibited
due to the Taliban's interpretation of religious injunctions against
representations of living beings.
People with Disabilities.--There are few measures to protect the
rights of the mentally and physically disabled or to mandate
accessibility for them. Victims of landmines continued to be a major
focus of international humanitarian relief organizations, which devoted
resources to providing prostheses, medical treatment, and
rehabilitation therapy to amputees. It is believed that there was more
public acceptance of the disabled because of the increasing prevalence
of the disabled due to landmines or other war-related injuries. There
are reports that disabled women, who need a prosthesis or other aid to
walk, are virtually homebound because they cannot wear the burqa over
the prosthesis or other aid.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--It is estimated that thousands
of members of the ethnic Hazara minority may have been killed by the
Taliban in 1998 (see Section 1.a.).
During the year, there were reports of forced expulsions of ethnic
Hazaras and Tajiks from areas newly occupied by the Taliban.
There were reliable reports that individuals were detained by both
the Taliban and Northern Alliance because of their ethnic origins and
suspected sympathy with opponents. Ethnic Hazara, who are
overwhelmingly Shi'a, reportedly have been targeted for ethnically-
motivated attacks, in particular by the overwhelmingly Sunni and ethnic
Pashtun Taliban forces.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Little is known about labor laws and
practices, although only an insignificant fraction of the work force
has ever labored in an industrial setting. There were no reports of
labor rallies or strikes. Labor rights are not defined, and in the
context of the breakdown of governmental authority there is no
effective central authority to enforce them. Many of Kabul's industrial
workers are unemployed due to the destruction or abandonment of the
city's minuscule manufacturing base. The only large employer in Kabul
is the governmental structure of minimally functioning ministries.
Workers in government ministries reportedly have been fired because
they had received part of their education abroad, or because of
contacts with the previous regimes, although certain officials in
previous administrations still are employed under the Taliban. Others
reportedly have been fired for violating Taliban regulations concerning
beard length.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Afghanistan
lacks a tradition of genuine labor-management bargaining. There are no
known labor courts or other mechanisms for resolving labor disputes.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Little information
is available on forced or compulsory labor, including child labor.
There have been reports that the Taliban forced prisoners to do
construction work at Kandahar prison (see Section 1.c.). There have
been credible reports that Masood forced Taliban prisoners to work on
road and airstrip construction projects. There were some cases of
trafficking in women and children (see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--There is no evidence that authorities in any part of the
country enforce labor laws, if they exist, relating to the employment
of children. Children from the ages of 6 to 14 often work to help
support their families by herding animals in rural areas, and by
collecting paper and firewood, shining shoes, begging, or collecting
scrap metal among street debris in the cities. Some of these practices
expose children to the danger of landmines.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no available
information regarding a statutory minimum wage or the enforcement of
safe labor practices. Many workers apparently are allotted time off
regularly for prayers and observance of religious holidays.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is no available information
regarding legislation prohibiting the trafficking in persons. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women reported that there were
some cases of trafficking in women and children (see Section 5). There
were unconfirmed reports that some Taliban soldiers (often reported to
be foreigners) abducted girls and women from villages in the Shomali
plains during fighting in August, and that women taken in trucks from
the area of fighting were trafficked to Pakistan and to the Arab Gulf
states.
______
BANGLADESH
Bangladesh is a parliamentary democracy, with broad powers
exercised by the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is the
leader of the Awami League, which came to power in 1996 in national
elections deemed to be free and fair by international observers. There
is an active political opposition. Violence is a pervasive feature of
politics, including political campaigns and elections, and elections
frequently are marred by violence, intimidation of voters, and rigging.
The major opposition political parties often boycott or otherwise
absent themselves from Parliament, making it a less effective
deliberative body. The Awami League Government has been accused of
abusing its parliamentary majority to prevent real debate on
legislation and national issues. The higher levels of the judiciary
display a significant degree of independence and often rule against the
Government; however, lower judicial officers fall under the executive,
and are reluctant to challenge government decisions.
The Home Affairs Ministry controls the police and paramilitary
forces, which bear primary responsibility for maintaining internal
security. Civilian authorities' control over the police is weak, and
there is widespread police corruption and lack of discipline. Police
officers committed numerous serious human rights abuses.
Bangladesh is a very poor country. Annual per capita income among
the population of 128 million is less than $300. Slightly more than
half of all children are chronically malnourished. Seventy percent of
the work force is involved in agriculture, which accounts for one-third
of the gross domestic product. The economy is market-based, but the
Government still plays a significant role. The industrial sector is
growing, albeit slowly, based largely on the manufacture of garments
and textiles by privately owned companies. A small wealthy elite
controls much of the private economy, but there is an emerging middle
class. Foreign investment has increased significantly in the gas sector
and in electrical power generation facilities. Foreign aid is still
significant, but has diminished somewhat in relative importance vis-a-
vis increased earnings from exports and remittances from workers
overseas. Efforts to improve governance and economic growth through
reform have been unsuccessful, and were blocked by bureaucratic
intransigence, vested economic interests, endemic corruption, and
political polarization. The Government's commitment to economic reform
is weak. Periodic natural disasters, including a severe flood in 1998,
also hamper development. Despite the flood, the economic growth rate
during the last fiscal year was about 5 percent.
The Government continued to restrict or deny many fundamental
rights, and failed to prevent or punish abuses committed by others.
Police committed a number of extrajudicial killings, and some persons
died in police custody under suspicious circumstances. Police routinely
used torture, beatings, and other forms of abuse while interrogating
suspects. Police frequently beat demonstrators, at times Members of
Parliament (M.P.'s). The Government rarely convicts and punishes those
responsible for torture or unlawful deaths. Prison conditions are
extremely poor for the majority of the prison population. Rape of
female detainees in prison or other official custody is a problem. The
Government continued to arrest and detain persons arbitrarily, and to
use the Special Powers Act (SPA) and Section 54 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, which allow for arbitrary arrest and preventive detention,
to harass political opponents and other citizens by detaining them
without formal charges. The Government filed numerous criminal cases
against opposition leaders and activists; at least some times, these
charges were false. Much of the judiciary is subject to executive
influence and suffers from corruption. A large case backlog slowed the
judicial process, and lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. The
Government sometimes infringed on citizens' privacy rights. Virtually
all journalists practiced some self-censorship. Attacks on journalists
and efforts to intimidate them by government officials, political party
activists, and others, occasionally occurred. The Government limited
freedom of assembly, particularly for political opponents, and on
occasion limited freedom of movement. The Government generally
permitted a wide variety of human rights groups to conduct their
activities, but it continued to refuse to register a local chapter of
Amnesty International. Abuse of children and child prostitution are
problems. Violence and discrimination against women remained serious
problems. Discrimination against the disabled, indigenous people, and
religious minorities was a problem. There was occasional violence
against members of the Ahmadiya religious minority. The Government
continued to limit many worker rights. Some domestic servants,
including many children, work in conditions that resemble servitude,
and many suffer abuse. Child labor and abuse of child workers remained
widespread and serious problems. However, a 1995 agreement has
eliminated about 95 percent of child labor in the export garment
sector, the main exportindustry. Trafficking in women and children for
the purpose of forced prostitution and at times for forced labor
remained serious problems. Both ruling and opposition political parties
and their activists routinely employed violence, causing many deaths
and numerous injuries. Vigilante justice resulted in numerous killings.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed a
number of extrajudicial killings.
Security forces sometimes used unwarranted lethal force. In March
police in Jhenidah shot and killed a student who was part of a village
crowd that was holding five policemen whom the residents accused of
street robbery. On March 14, police officers in Dhaka drowned college
student Mujibur Rahman. Police had searched the Rahman family's house,
purportedly looking for stolen goods. Mujibur Rahman attempted to flee
by boat across a nearby lake after police began to beat his sister,
Shilpi, at the house. Eyewitnesses saw pursuing police in another boat
hit Rahman with bamboo sticks, fling him into the water, then continue
to strike him until he drowned. Authorities took no action against the
police involved in the Jhenidah or Mujibur Rahman incidents. On July 3,
three policemen in Dhaka allegedly severely beat a young man they had
detained, Mohammed Shahjada Tuku, then threw him into a canal where he
drowned. As of year's end, no one was arrested in this case.
According to government figures, 101 persons died in prison and
police custody during the first 9 months of the year (see Section
1.c.).
Most abuses go unpunished, and the resulting climate of impunity
remains a serious obstacle to ending police abuse and extrajudicial
killings. However, in some instances where there was evidence of police
culpability for extrajudicial killings, the authorities took action. In
March four police officers were charged with murder after a body was
found in the rooftop water tank of the Detective Branch in Dhaka. A
police sergeant in Agargaon was arrested and charged in July after he
shot and killed a rickshaw puller.
Court proceedings continued against 13 persons, including 12 police
officers, arrested and charged after a college student in police
custody was beaten to death in July 1998. There was no verdict as of
year's end. However, the Government decided that the July 1998 police
shooting of a female squatter in Satkhira was justifiable self defense
in the face of mob attacks during an eviction protest. A police inquiry
into the shooting deaths of four persons by police after a 1997
opposition rally in Chittagong ruled that the violence had been
provoked by the opposition, and that police exercised restraint.
In 1995 the Government charged former President Hossain Mohammad
Ershad with ordering the 1981 murder of the alleged assassin of
President Ziaur Rahman. Ershad was granted bail in 1997. In late 1998,
immediately after Ershad took a stronger stance against the Government,
the Prime Minister made remarks implying that the Government might
accelerate the case. There were some preliminary court proceedings in
the murder case during the year, and the Government unsuccessfully
requested the High Court to revoke Ershad's bail.
In 1998 a judge convicted and sentenced to death 15 persons for the
1975 murder of then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (father of current
Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina) and several of his family members (see
Section 1.e.). The High Court's review of the death sentences was still
pending at year's end.
The Government continued to imprison eight individuals accused of
perpetrating the November 1975 murders of four senior Awami League
leaders who were then in jail (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.).
Violence, often resulting in killings, is a pervasive element in
Bangladeshi politics (see Sections 1.c. and 3). Supporters of different
political parties, and sometimes supporters of different factions of
one party, often clash with each other and with police during rallies
and demonstrations. Awami Leaque supporters, often with the connivance
and support of the police, violently disrupted rallies and
demonstrations of the opposition parties (see Sections 2.b. and 3),
which resulted in numerous deaths. Opposition parties also used armed
violence and intimidation to disrupt their opponents' gatherings and
rallies, as well as to enforce general strikes (see Section 2.b.).
During the year, 24 persons died in hartal-related violence.
During an opposition-called hartal on February 9, eyewitnesses saw
Maqbul Hossain, an Awami League Member of Parliament (M.P.) for the
Dhanmondi area of Dhaka, lead a procession of vehicles to defy the
strike. According to witnesses, members of Maqbul's motorcade
brandished guns and other weapons openly. When the convoy encountered
two groups of activists from the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP),
the major opposition party, being chased by police, armed men exited
their vehicles, fired shots in the air, and chased the BNP supporters.
Two young men were seized and dragged towards Maqbul Hossain's car,
whereupon M.P. Hossain ordered them to be killed. Members of Hossain's
entourage then shot in the chest at point-blank range one of the men,
BNP activist Sajal Chowdhury; the other was beaten (see Section 1.c.).
About a dozen police officers who were standing nearby in riot gear
made no effort to intervene or to apprehend the gunmen, nor did the
Government later take action against those responsible. However, police
summoned the family of Chowdhury, which filed a murder complaint
against M.P. Hossain and the armed men, for repeated interrogations.
One family member was arrested on criminal charges, then detained under
the SPA after a judge granted him bail (see Section 1.d.). Newspapers
largely did not report the story (see Section 2.a.). Eight persons were
killed in hartal-related violence during the nationwide strike held
February 9-11.
On February 23, during the first day of a 3-day hartal, a rickshaw
pullers' union activist affiliated with the Awami League was killed
when a bomb was thrown at an antihartal procession. A BNP activist also
was killed in Barisal (see Section 3). On February 24, the second day
of the hartal, three more persons were killed, one each in Feni, Pabna,
and Rajshahi (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
In March two persons were killed while making bombs at a ruling
party M.P.'s residence in Sylhet; credible reports state that the bombs
were to have been used in local intra-party conflicts. Police arrested
the M.P. in May for involvement in bomb making. The M.P. was on bail,
and the case remained pending at year's end. On February 16, masked
gunmen shot and killed Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal leader Kazi Aref Ahmed
and five other party officials as they were addressing a public rally
in a village near Kushtia. On March 7, two bombs that exploded in
Jessore killed eight persons attending the performance of the left-
affiliated cultural group Udichi Shilpa Gosthi (see Section 1.c.).
While authorities charged or detained opposition leaders and activists
in both incidents, the identity of the perpetrators remained unclear at
year's end (see Section 1.d.).
One policeman died and eight others were injured on July 7 when
several small bombs were hurled at riot police after an opposition
procession ended in central Dhaka. One man died on July 8 when a brick
was thrown through a bus window. Authorities later initiated a formal
investigation of 150 opposition leaders and activists, including four
M.P.'s; the opposition blamed an agent provocateur from the ruling
party for the bombing incident.
In August BNP activist Chowdhury Shahen Shah was stabbed to death.
The BNP asserts that Awami League activists killed him; police claim
that he was attacked over a family land dispute. Awami League activists
chopped to death a BNP youth front leader in Natore on the first day of
a 60-hour opposition-called hartal that ended on September 15 (see
Section 1.c.). On November 7, during the first day of a 42-hour
opposition-led hartal, a stray bullet, allegedly shot by a police
officer, killed a housewife, and a BNP ward leader was shot and killed
by unidentified assailants (see Section 1.c.).
Violence also is endemic between the student political wings of the
major national parties, and between rival factions within the parties.
Several persons were killed in local factional disputes within the
student wing of the ruling Awami League, including incidents in
Chittagong, Rajshahi, and Sirajganj (see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
There was occasional violence against members of the Ahmadiya
religious minority. For example, on October 8, a bomb exploded during
Friday prayers at an Ahmadiya mosque in Khulna, killing at least six
persons and injuring others (see Sections 1.c. and 5).
Vigilante violence against criminals by private citizens is common.
The Government reported that 20 persons were killed by vigilantes as of
September 30. Authorities rarely arrest and punish those responsible
for vigilante violence. Ten persons were beaten to death by vigilante
mobs in Dhaka and Chittagong in a 1-month period beginning August 3;
authorities charged no one in the deaths. Two men who allegedly
attempted to rob a woman were beaten to death by a mob next to the
National Mosque in downtown Dhaka on August 3. An August 21 editorial
in a proruling party newspaper criticized the spate of killings, and
attributed the phenomenon to the public's lack of faith in the law
enforcement system.
Human rights groups and press reports indicate that vigilante
violence against women who are accused of having committed moral
offenses is common, particularly in rural areas, and sometimes is led
by religious leaders (see Section 5).
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
There were no developments in the 1996 disappearance of Kalpana
Chakma, central organizing secretary of the Hill Women's Federation, an
organization of tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman, or
degrading punishment; however, police routinely employ physical and
psychological torture and other abuse during arrests and
interrogations. Torture may consist of threats, beatings and,
occasionally, the use of electric shock. The Government rarely convicts
or punishes those responsible for torture, and a climate of impunity
allows such police abuses to continue. After several Dhaka policemen
were arrested in 1998 for allegedly beating to death a college student
in police custody (see Section 1.a.), the deputy commissioner of the
Dhaka police detective branch publicly defended the use of physical
coercion against suspects, saying that the practice was necessary in
order to obtain information. Housewife Nasima Begum was beaten after
her arrest under the SPA on April 25, then subjected to harsh
interrogation lasting several days (see also Section 1.d.).
Rape of female detainees in police or other official custody is a
problem. Authorities routinely do not take action against those
responsible, nor do they move to correct the circumstances that promote
such abuses. According to human rights groups and media reports, police
engaged in violence and looting during the July raid of the Tanbazar
and Nimtali red-light districts, allegedly attacking residents as well
as over 40 female human rights activists who were protesting the
eviction. In July the evicted sex workers, who were detained forcibly
in a center for vagrants, alleged that the guards, center employees,
and the vagrants who were staying at the center tortured and raped some
of them because they refused to provide sexual favors (see Section
1.f.). Police also rape women who are not in custody.
On September 14, a police constable allegedly raped a 15-year-old
girl in a government building in Tangail; the girl had been visiting a
relative in an adjacent medical clinic. In addition after women report
that they were raped (or were involved in family disputes), they
frequently are detained in ``safe custody,'' where they endure poor
conditions, and sometimes are raped or otherwise abused (see Sections
1.d. and 5).
According to family members throughout her April and May
imprisonment (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.), police did not permit
Zobaida Rashid, wife of a convicted murderer of Sheikh Mujib Rahman,
access to necessary medications or other health care. Prison guards
slapped and kicked Zobaida occasionally, denied her proper food, and
did not permit other prisoners to talk with her.
The police often employ excessive, sometimes lethal, force in
dealing with opposition demonstrators (see Sections 1.a., 2.b., and 3).
On January 26, during an opposition-enforced hartal, police reportedly
beat a BNP M.P. near the National Press Club in Dhaka; the M.P. was
admitted later to a hospital with head injuries (see Sections 1.a.,
2.b., and 3). On February 9, police did not interfere as an Awami
Leaque M.P. ordered the killings of two BNP activists; one was shot to
death and the other was beaten with a pistol (see Section 1.a.). On
February 11, police shot Shafiul Alam Prodhan, president of the small
opposition party Jatiya Ganotantrik, with pellets in Central Dhaka.
Allegedly, police suddenly launched an attack on the party's prohartal
procession, and shot Prodhan from behind. Police and ruling party
activists also reportedly opened fire on a procession of opposition-
party Jamaat-e-Islami members in downtown Dhaka, wounding three Jamaat
activists and a roadside vendor. During a general strike on May 11,
police beat several senior opposition leaders leading a procession.
Police injured at least 20 persons, including 5 journalists, when they
fired rubber bullets and tear gas. Police also partially stripped one
opposition female demonstrator of her sari. On February 24, in Dhaka, a
rickshaw puller had his arm blown off in front of the National Press
Club; some eyewitnesses said that the bomb came from a bus manned by
antihartal activists, while others said that it came from nearby
prohartal activists. Police apprehended no one in the incident, but
clubbed the bus passengers before letting them go on their way. Police
also beat at least four photographers taking pictures of the incident
(see Section 2.a.).
Police corruption remains a problem and there were credible reports
that police facilitated or were involved in trafficking in women and
children (see Section 6.f.).
Both opposition and ruling parties routinely use actual or
threatened violence to achieve political ends. Violence is a common
feature during rallies, demonstrations, and general strikes. For
example, several persons were killed and over 350 persons of various
parties were injured by gunshots, bombs, stab wounds, and clubs, during
a 3-day hartal in February (see Sections 1.a., 2.b. and 3). On March 7,
two bomb explosions killed 8 persons and injured over 100 persons in
Jessore (see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.).
Some opposition political activities allegedly are staged with the
intent of provoking violent clashes, in order to embarrass the
Government and galvanize public opinion (see Section 2.b.). A September
12 opposition sit-in around the Secretariat, the office complex in
central Dhaka where most government ministries have their headquarters,
ended in police clashes with the opposition when several small bombs
were thrown near police, and police responded with tear gas and rubber
bullets. In addition police beat several BNP leaders, including four
M.P.'s. More than a dozen police members received bomb injuries over
the 3 days. On September 13, after a policeman received a head injury
from a bomb blast, angry police officers chased and beat many nearby
pedestrians, administering a severe beating to one middle-aged man
emerging from a mosque. The opposition claimed that ruling party
provocateurs were responsible for the bombs. During the violence at the
sit-in, and the ensuing 3-day nationwide general strike called by the
opposition, 1 person was killed and at least 300 persons were injured
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.d.). During a November 8 hartal, police fired
rubber bullets at a BNP procession, wounding BNP M.P. Sadeq Hossain
Khoka, former Environment Minister Abdullah Al Noman, and a BNP city
ward commissioner. In addition to several other deaths, newspapers
estimated that more than 80 persons were injured during the hartal (see
Section 1.a.).
During a November 15 parliamentary election in Tangail, at a
polling center voters began to throw stones at security forces, which
then opened fire. Police wounded nine persons, many seriously (see
Section 3).
During the February 16 murder attack of Kazi Aref Ahmed, unknown
gunmen killed 6 persons and injured over 20 others (see Section 1.a.).
The slayings seemingly were part of settling scores between local
splinter political parties which have evolved into gangs.
In October 6 persons were killed and 40 persons were injured when a
bomb exploded inside of a Khulna mosque (see Sections 1.a. and 5).
There was occasional violence against members of the Ahmadiya
religious minority. In January several hundred persons attacked the
Ahmadiya place of worship in Kushtia, beating many devotees and
destroying property (see Section 5).
In rural areas, human rights groups and press reports indicate that
vigilantism against women for perceived moral transgressions occurs,
and may include humiliating, painful punishments (see Sections 1.a. and
5).
Prison conditions are extremely poor for the majority of the prison
population. Official figures indicated that 100 persons died in prison
as of September 30 (see Section 1.a.). According to credible sources,
poor conditions were at least a contributing factor in many of these
deaths. Most prisons are overcrowded and lack adequate facilities.
According to government figures, the current prison population of more
than 60,000 is roughly 250 percent of the official prison capacity. In
some cases, cells are so crowded that prisoners sleep in shifts. A 1998
judicial report noted the poor physical condition of jails and
unhygienic food preparation. The treatment of prisoners in the jails is
not equal. There are three classes of cells: A, B, and C. Common
criminals and low-level political workers generally are held in C
cells, which often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor quality
food. The use of restraining devices on prisoners in these cells is
common. Conditions in A and B cells are markedly better; A cells are
reserved for prominent prisoners.
In general the Government does not permit prison visits by
independent human rights monitors (see Section 4). Government-appointed
committees of prominent private citizens in each prison locality
monitor prisons monthly, but do not release their findings. District
judges also visit prisons monthly, but rarely disclose their findings.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Government continued
to arrest and to detain persons arbitrarily, as well as to use national
security legislation(the SPA) to detain citizens without formal charges
or specific complaints being filed against them. The Constitution
states that each person arrested shall be informed of the grounds for
detention, provided access to a lawyer of his choice, brought before a
magistrate within 24 hours, and freed unless the magistrate authorizes
continued detention. However, the Constitution specifically allows
preventive detention, with specified safeguards, outside these
requirements. In practice, authorities frequently violate these
constitutional provisions, even in non-preventive detention cases. In
an April ruling, a two-judge High Court panel criticized the police
force for rampant abuse of detention laws and powers.
Under Section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, individuals may
be detained for suspicion of criminal activity without an order from a
magistrate or a warrant. Some persons initially detained under Section
54 subsequently are charged with a crime, while others are released
without any charge. According to the Government, 1,329 persons were
detained in Dhaka alone under Section 54 through September 30. In 1998
the Home Minister acknowledged that police abuse Section 54. The
Government sometimes uses Section 54 to harass and to intimidate
members of the political opposition and their families. After a bomb
exploded in Jessore in March, police quickly detained 46 activists of
the Jamaat-e-Islami and its student front, many under Section 54. There
did not appear to be concrete evidence tying those detained to the
crime, and the activists eventually were released (see Sections 1.a.
and 1.c.). In addition police commonly detain opposition activists
prior to and during general strikes without citing any legal authority,
holding them until the event is over. On September 13, police arrested
the one non-M.P. in a prohartal procession of nine BNP leaders. The
police also on occasion detain persons for personal vengeance.
Under the SPA, the Government or a district magistrate may order
anyone detained for 30 days to prevent the commission of an act likely
``to prejudice the security of the country.'' Other offenses subject to
the SPA include smuggling, black market activity, or hoarding. The
Government (or magistrate) must inform the detainee of the grounds for
detention within 15 days, and the Government must approve the grounds
for detention within 30 days or release the detainee. In practice
detainees sometimes are held for longer periods without the Government
stating the grounds for the detention or formally approving it.
Detainees may appeal their detention, and the Government may grant
early release.
An advisory board composed of two persons who have been, or are
qualified to be, high court judges, and one civil servant are supposed
to examine the cases of SPA detainees after 4 months. If the Government
adequately defends its detention order, the detainee remains
imprisoned; if not, the detainee is released. Appellate courts
sometimes order authorities to release SPA detainees after finding that
the Government is unable to justify the detention. If the defendant in
an SPA case is able to present his case before the High Court in Dhaka,
the High Court generally rules in favor of the defendant. However, many
defendants are either too poor or, because of strict detention, are
unable to obtain legal counsel and thereby move the case beyond the
magistrate level. Magistrates are subject to the administrative
controls of the Law Ministry and are less likely to dismiss a case (see
Section 1.e.). Detainees are allowed to consult with lawyers, although
usually not until a charge is filed. They are not entitled to be
represented by a lawyer before an advisory board. Detainees may receive
visitors. While in the past the Government has held incommunicado some
prominent prisoners, there were no known cases of incommunicado
detention during the year.
There is a system of bail for criminal offenses. Bail is granted
commonly for both violent and nonviolent crimes. If bail is not
granted, the law does not specify a time limit on pretrial detention.
Persons arrested under the Women and Children Repression Prevention
Act, which provides special procedures for persons accused of violence
against women and children, cannot be granted bail during an initial
investigation period of up to 90 days. Some human rights groups express
concern that a large number of allegations made under the act are
false, since the non-bailable period of detention is an effective tool
for exacting personal vengeance. According to government figures, 1,968
persons were detained under this act during the first 9 months of the
year.
Prisons often are used to provide ``safe custody'' for women who
are victims of rapes or domestic violence (see Sections 1.d. and 5).
One study conducted by the Bangladesh National Woman Lawyers
Association (BNWLA) found that nearly half of the women in Dhaka's
Central Jail were crime victims being held in safe custody, not
criminals (see Sections 1.c. and 5). While women may consent initially
to this arrangement, it often is difficult for them later to obtain
their release, or to gain access to family or lawyers. One 25-year-old
woman who was freed during the year through the efforts of a human
rights group had agreed to safe custody after being gang raped, then
spent almost4 years in prison while seeking her release. Police
officers sometimes rape women in ``safe custody'' (see Section 1.c.).
A major problem with the court system is the overwhelming backlog
of cases, which produces long pretrial delays. According to an official
of the Law Ministry, almost 800,000 cases were pending in criminal and
civil courts in December. Approximately 44,000 persons, or 73 percent
of the country's prison population, were awaiting trial or under trial.
Government sources report that the period between detention and trial
averages 6 months, but press and human rights groups report some
instances of pretrial detention lasting several years. Trials often are
characterized by lengthy adjournments, which considerably prolong the
incarceration of accused persons who do not receive bail.
The Government cites a significant reduction in the number of
persons held under the SPA as evidence that it is minimizing its use of
the act. According to the Government, 739 persons were under SPA
detention as of August. This was somewhat fewer than the 885 persons
under detention as of July 1998, and a substantial decrease from the
approximately 2,000 persons under SPA detention in mid-1997. According
to the Government, authorities detained 2,586 persons under the SPA
from the beginning of the year through the end of August--1,642 for
terrorism and antisocial activity, 932 for smuggling, and 12 for acts
prejudicial to national security. The Government released 2,307 SPA
detainees during the same period.
There are credible reports from human rights monitors and political
activists that the Awami League Government uses the SPA as a tool to
harass and to intimidate political opponents and others. On April 21,
authorities arrested Zobaida Rashid, the wife of one of the persons
convicted in absentia in November 1998 for the 1975 murder of Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman (father of the current Prime Minister), without a
warrant. Zobaida Rashid had been arrested in 1996 in the Sheikh Mujib
murder case, and there were credible reports of her mistreatment in
custody at the time; in June 1997, the High Court ordered charges
against her dismissed as groundless. After her April arrest, Rashid was
held under the SPA--the Government alleged that Zobaida was plotting to
undermine stability in Bangladesh and create a crisis situation through
attacks on power and water facilities. Her lawyer argued that she
actually was detained because authorities had never accepted the
dismissal of charges against her in the Sheikh Mujib trial. Her family
alleged that she was mistreated while in prison (see Section 1.c.). She
was freed in early June, several days after the High Court ruled her
detention illegal. On February 24, police arrested Neaz Ahmed, the
brother-in-law of Sajal Chowdhury, an opposition activist killed 2
weeks earlier by gunmen linked to a ruling party M.P. (see Section
1.a.). Ahmed was a key witness in the family's murder complaint. He was
charged with offenses ranging from bombing the residence of the Speaker
of Parliament to looting, arson, and rioting. After a judge granted him
bail, the Government detained him under the SPA. He finally was freed
on March 31, after the High Court declared his detention illegal.
Citizens who are not political opponents sometimes also are
detained arbitrarily. Housewife Nasima Begum was arrested under the SPA
on April 25, allegedly for treason and sabotage; credible reports
stated that she was detained as a result of a personal dispute over
property. She was released on May 14 after the High Court ruled the
charges unfounded (see Section 1.c.). A 10-year-old boy was detained
under the SPA on December 22, 1998; police recorded his age as 19 in
jail records. The Home Minister ordered the boy released in early
January, after press reports and a High Court directive to police to
explain the case. On July 24, police forcibly removed 267 sex workers
from two Dhaka brothels, and then detained them without charges and
without allowing them access to legal counsel for several weeks (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.f.). In its April judgment criticizing the police
for abuse of detention powers, the High Court commented that the police
had become a law breaking agency. Most persons detained under the SPA
ultimately are released without charges being brought to trial (see
Sections 1.f. and 2.a.).
The Government sometimes uses serial detentions to prevent the
release of political activists. Saidur Rahman Newton, vice president of
the BNP's student wing, was arrested first on January 6. He was granted
bail six times over the next 6 months, but was detained in prison on
new charges each time.
Numerous court cases have been filed against opposition M.P.'s and
activists, on charges ranging from corruption to murder. In June the
Prime Minister told Parliament that more than 70 current BNP M.P.'s
were under investigation for alleged corruption during the previous
government. Obaidur Rahman, a BNP M.P., remained in prison. Rahman and
two other political figures were arrested in October 1998 for alleged
complicity in the 1975 ``jail killings'' of four senior Awami League
leaders. In July and August the Government suffered reversals when
courts invalidated as legally deficient two government efforts atcharge
sheets (similar to an indictment) in the case. The Government continued
to hold eight persons accused of perpetrating these murders; at year's
end, legal proceedings remained at a preliminary stage due to legal
challenges by defense lawyers.
Some opposition activists were detained or charged in questionable
cases. In April authorities charged 22 persons with the August 1998
murder of Jessore magazine editor Saiful Alam Makul (see Section 2.a.).
All 22 persons are opposition party members, including a former
minister of social welfare and 20 other persons from the BNP.
Journalists and others cited numerous weaknesses in the Government's
case, leading some observers to allege that the charges were a means to
harass the opposition and allow the real murderers to escape.
In July the Government detained two union officials who were
organizing a government strike; after a month, the High Court declared
the detention to be illegal, and they were released (see 6.a.).
It is difficult to estimate the total number of detentions for
political reasons. In some instances criminal charges may apply to the
actions of activists, and many criminals claim political affiliations.
Because of crowded court dockets and magistrates who are reluctant to
challenge the Government, the judicial system does not deal effectively
with criminal cases that may be political in origin. There is no
independent body with the authority and ability to monitor detentions,
or to prevent, detect, or publicize cases of political harassment. Most
such detentions appear to be for short periods, such as several days or
weeks. Defendants in most cases receive bail, but dismissal of wrongful
charges or acquittal may take years.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary; however, under a longstanding ``temporary''
provision of the Constitution, some subordinate courts remain part of
the executive and are subject to its influence. The higher levels of
the judiciary display a significant degree of independence and often
rule against the Government in criminal, civil, and even politically
controversial cases; however, lower level courts are more susceptible
to pressure from the executive branch. There also is corruption within
the legal process, especially at lower levels.
There was tension between the executive and the judiciary during
the year. The Government repeatedly charged that the High Court
indiscriminately granted bail to criminals, crippling efforts to combat
crime. In March the Supreme Court dismissed a contempt of court
petition brought by the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association
against the Prime Minister for remarks she made at a January press
conference. The Prime Minister said that her remarks were
mischaracterized, and apologized for any offense. The Supreme Court's
judgment observed that the Prime Minister's remarks contained gross
factual errors about bail decisions and called into public question the
independence of the judiciary. The judgment noted that the courts were
at a serious disadvantage in responding to such political attacks.
Speaking to Parliament in September, the Home Minister accused High
Court judges of ``sheltering terrorists'' by granting them bail.
The court system has two levels: The lower courts and the Supreme
Court. Both hear civil and criminal cases. The lower courts consist of
magistrates, who are part of the administrative branch of government,
and session and district judges, who belong to the judicial branch. The
Supreme Court is divided into two sections, the High Court and the
Appellate Court. The High Court hears original cases and reviews cases
from the lower courts. The Appellate Court has jurisdiction to hear
appeals of judgments, decrees, orders, or sentences of the High Court.
Rulings of the Appellate Court are binding on all other courts.
Trials are public. The law provides the accused with the right to
be represented by counsel, to review accusatory material, to call
witnesses, and to appeal verdicts. State-funded defense attorneys
rarely are provided, and there are few legal aid programs to offer
financial assistance. In rural areas, individuals often do not receive
legal representation. In urban areas, legal counsel generally is
available if individuals can afford the expense. However, sometimes
detainees and suspects on police remand are denied access to legal
counsel. Trials conducted under the SPA and the Women and Children
Repression Prevention Act are similar to normal trials, but are tried
without the lengthy adjournments typical in other cases.
Persons may be tried in absentia, although this rarely is done. In
November 1998, 15 of the 19 defendants tried for the 1975 killing of
then-President Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (father of current Prime Minister
Sheikh Hasina) and several of his family members were convicted and
sentenced to death, and 4 persons were acquitted. Fourteen of the
defendants were tried in absentia, and 12 of them were convicted. At
year's end, all 15 death sentences were awaiting automatic review by
the High Court. The High Court is to rule simultaneously on appeals
filed by five defendants present in the country. There is no automatic
right to a retrial if a person convicted in absentia later returns.
Absent defendants may be represented by state-appointed counsel (as was
done in the Sheikh Mujibur case), but may not choose their own
attorneys, and, if convicted, may not file appeals until they return to
the country.
A major problem of the court system is the overwhelming backlog of
cases, and trials under way typically are marked by extended
continuances while many accused persons remain in prison (see Section
1.d.). These conditions, and the corruption encountered in the judicial
process, effectively prevent many persons from obtaining a fair trial
or justice. According to one independent sample survey conducted by
Transparency International, more than half of the persons involved in
court cases paid bribes to court officials. Because of the difficulty
accessing the courts and because litigation is time consuming,
alternate dispute resolution by traditional village leaders, which is
regarded by some persons to be more transparent and swift, is popular
in rural communities.
The Government states that it holds no political prisoners, but the
BNP and human rights monitors claim that many opposition activists have
been arrested and convicted under criminal charges as a pretext for
their political activities. It is not clear how many political
prisoners actually are being held (also see Section 1.d).
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The law requires authorities to obtain a judicial
warrant before entering a home; however, according to human rights
monitors, police rarely obtain warrants, and officers violating the
procedure are not punished. In addition the SPA permits searches
without a warrant.
The Government sometimes forcibly resettles persons against their
will. On July 24, police forcibly removed 267 sex workers from a large
brothel district in Tanbazar, Narayanganj. Authorities claimed that the
women wished to be rehabilitated, but credible eyewitness accounts
state that the women refused the offer. The 267 women were confined in
a center for vagrants, where some alleged that they were abused.
Although most women were released from the vagrant houses by year's
end, some continued to be detained at the end of the year (see Sections
1.c.). The July ``rehabilitation'' drive in Tanbazar also caused
several thousand other sex workers to flee the area.
From August 8-11, 1,500 police and paramilitary troops forced more
than 50,000 persons from their homes in six Dhaka slum areas. The
action followed the August 6 murder of one police officer and wounding
of nine others by a criminal gang in one of the slums. On August 7,
authorities decided to demolish 74 Dhaka slums on Government-owned
land. On August 11, the High Court temporarily barred the Government
from continuing with the slum clearance drive after three human rights
organizations argued that the Government had not followed the required
legal process. On August 24, the High Court reversed its restriction,
but urged the Government to adopt a phased approach to slum clearance,
with prior assistance for voluntary resettlement. The Government stated
that it viewed the order as morally, if not legally, binding, and has
not attempted to carry out its earlier plans for large-scale slum
clearance in Dhaka. A September 27 government circular asked all
nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) to cease operations in slum
areas, and to shift their efforts to assisting the Government's
resettlement efforts. NGO's did not respond to the request and the
Government withdrew the circular.
The Government sometimes punishes family members for the alleged
violations of others (see Section 1.c.).
The police Special Branch, National Security Intelligence, and the
Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) employ informers to
report on citizens perceived to be political opponents of the
Government, and conduct surveillance of them. Human rights activists,
foreign NGO's, and journalists report occasional harassment by these
security organizations. After a reporter published a story about the
alleged suicide of an army general in December, the DGFI subjected him
to a 3-hour interrogation.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech, expression, and the press, subject to ``reasonable
restrictions'' in the interest of security, friendly relations with
foreign states, public order, decency and morality, or to prohibit
defamation or incitement to an offense, and with some exceptions, the
Government generally respects these rights. Citizens freely express
criticism of the Government.
The press, numbering hundreds of daily and weekly publications, is
a forum for a wide range of views. While most publications support the
overall policies of the Government, many newspapers report critically
on government policies and activities, including those of the Prime
Minister. In addition to an official government-owned wire service,
there is one privately owned wire service affiliated with a major
international company. A second such service closed early in the year
for financial reasons.
Newspaper ownership and content are not subject to direct
government restriction. However, if the Government chooses, it can
influence journalists through financial means. Government-sponsored
advertising and allocations of newsprint imported at a favorable tariff
rate are central to many newspapers' financial viability. Government-
sponsored advertising is the largest source of revenue for many
newspapers. In allocating advertising through the Department of Films
and Publications, the Government states that it considers circulation
of the newspapers, wage board implementation, objectivity in reporting,
coverage of development activities, and ``attitude towards the spirit
of Bangladesh's War of Liberation.'' Commercial organizations often are
reluctant to advertise in newspapers critical of the Government due to
fear of unspecified governmental or bureaucratic retaliation.
Attacks on journalists and newspapers, and efforts to intimidate
them by government officials, political party activists, and others,
occasionally occur. Such attacks by political activists are common
during times of political street violence, and some journalists also
are injured in police actions (see Section 1.c.). On February 11,
activists from the ruling party ransacked the offices of a newspaper
associated with Jamaat-e-Islami. On February 24, the Jamaat-e-Islami's
Sangbad newspaper was raided by Awami League activists during a hartal,
then subjected to tear gas by police responding to the journalists'
distress call. On May 20, activists from the Jamaat student front threw
stones and issued threats at the Chittagong office of an independent
Bangla daily. On August 30, several gunshots were fired at the offices
of a progovernment Bangla daily just after a procession from the BNP
passed the building. One employee of the newspaper suffered a gunshot
wound. In April authorities charged 22 members of the opposition with
the August 1998 murder of magazine editor Saiful Alam Makul, but there
is doubt that the persons who were charged are guilty of the crime (see
Section 1.d.). When a rickshaw puller had his arm blown off during a
February hartal, police officers beat at least four photographers
taking pictures of the incident (see Section 1.c.).
Virtually all print journalists practice self-censorship to some
degree, and are reluctant to criticize politically influential
personalities in both the Government and the opposition. Many
journalists cite fear of possible harassment, retaliation, or physical
harm as a reason to avoid sensitive stories. For example, when Awami
League M.P. Makbul Hossain ordered the murder of a BNP student activist
on February 9 during an opposition-called hartal, only one newspaper
covered the details of the killing; other newspapers picked up the
story only in a very limited fashion, with very few follow-up stories
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). A February report that detailed rampant
corruption in the December 10, 1998 parliamentary by-election (see
Section 3) received extensive coverage only in the handful of
opposition-affiliated newspapers. In August the High Court directed
four newspapers to show cause why they should not be cited for contempt
for publishing allegedly distorted articles in 1998 regarding the
granting of bail by the Court.
Journalists and others are potentially subject to incarceration as
a result of criminal libel proceedings filed by private parties. Ruling
party M.P.'s filed separate criminal libel suits against several
newspapers after articles were published that the politicians viewed as
false and defamatory. The journalists in all cases received
anticipatory bail from the courts, and none of the cases moved to
trial. Sedition charges filed against a Bangla newspaper in February
1998 remained pending, and those persons accused remained on bail.
Feminist author Taslima Nasreen, whose writings and statements
provoked death threats from some Islamic groups in 1993 and 1994, left
the country for Europe in 1994. Nasreen returned to Bangladesh in
September 1998, and then left the country again in January (see Section
5). The Government provided some protection for Nasreen from possible
threats, and she remained in hiding. During her stay, the Government
made no move to proceed with charges filed against her in 1994 of
intentionally insulting religious beliefs, and a judge ordered
anticipatory bail on a similar case filed in 1994 by a private citizen.
The Government owns and controls radio and television stations,
which do not provide balanced coverage of the news. The activities of
the Prime Minister occupy the bulk of prime time news bulletins on both
television and radio, followed by the activities of members of the
Cabinet. Opposition party news gets little coverage. In its 1996
election manifesto, the Awami League called for the privatization of
the state-controlled media. A government committee subsequently
recommended measures for authorizing private radio and television
broadcasts. No move has been made to grant autonomy to the state-owned
Bangladesh Radio and Television. However, the Ministry of Information
solicited and received bids from parties interested in establishing
private television and radio stations. A private radio station began
operations in March, and the Government approved a private television
station owned by the same person. That television station did not begin
broadcasting by year's end. As a condition of operation, both these
stations are required to broadcast free some government news bulletins
and speeches by the Prime Minister and President.
Foreign publications are subject to review and censorship.
Censorship most often is used in cases of immodest or obscene
photographs, perceived misrepresentation or defamation of Islam, and
objectionable comments about national leaders. The Government banned
the March 20 issue of the West Bengal weekly Desh, which contained a
poem by Taslima Nasreen. On August 12, the Government announced that it
was banning the import, sale, and distribution of the book ``My
Childhood'' by Nasreen. In both cases, the Government bans cited the
likelihood that the material would hurt the feelings and religious
sentiments of the Muslim community and inflame passions.
A government Film Censor Board reviews local and foreign films, and
may censor or ban them on the grounds of state security, law and order,
religious sentiment, obscenity, foreign relations, defamation, or
plagiarism. No films were banned or censored during the year. The
Government does not limit citizens' access to the Internet.
Academic freedom generally is respected by the Government. Teachers
and students at all levels are free to pursue academic assignments
except on extremely sensitive religious and political topics.
The situation on public university campuses remains volatile,
seriously inhibiting the ability of students to receive a university
education and of teachers to teach. Armed clashes between rival student
groups resulted in temporary closures of universities or colleges in
Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Sylhet, and Mymemsingh. In August
students at Jahangirnagar University near Dhaka protested what they
viewed as ineffective responses by the university to deal with campus
violence caused by two rival local factions of the ruling party's
student wing. Violence between student political factions has little to
do with ideological differences, and more to do with extortion rackets
run by nonstudent party activists, including those based on physical
control of dormitories. As a result of widespread violence and campus
closures, it takes on average 6 years or more to earn a 4-year degree.
However, several private universities that were established during the
1990's are not affected by student political violence.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom of assembly, subject to restrictions in the
interest of public order and public health; however, the Government
limits this right on occasion. The Government sometimes prohibits
rallies for security reasons, but many independent observers believe
that such explanations usually are a pretext. Several rallies of Kader
Siddiqi, a dissident ruling party M.P. who later was expelled from the
Awami League, were prohibited in July and August for alleged security
reasons. In December Kader Siddiqi scheduled a Dhaka rally at which he
planned to announce the formation of a new political party. Members of
the Awami League student wing broke up the rally with gunfire, homemade
bombs, and beatings. Subsequently, the Government refused to allow
Siddiqi to hold another rally at a popular Dhaka park, although it
routinely authorized other such rallies. When Siddiqi's followers came
to the park for the rally, police forcefully removed them (see Section
3). Authorities banned an April 3 BNP rally in Rajshahi after the Awami
League also called a rally for the same time and place.
Authorities also permit armed ruling party activists to blockade
roads and take other steps to disrupt opposition events. For example,
ruling party activists placed barricades on several roads into Dhaka on
the morning of September 12, preventing opposition activists from
joining a sit-in around the Secretariat.
Ruling party supporters, often with the connivance and support of
the police, violently disrupted rallies and demonstrations of the
opposition parties. On March 3, Awami League activists attacked a
Jatiya Party rally in Rangpur, injuring 50 persons. Police did not
intervene to stop the violence, and no one was arrested. On May 11,
police forcibly prevented a small group of prohartal processionists,
led by BNP M.P.'s, from reaching the BNP Dhaka headquarters. Police
fired rubber bullets and tear gas, and at one point nearly removed a
female activist's sari (see Section 1.c.). During a September 13-15
hartal, police broke up a BNP procession near the BNP Dhaka
headquarters and briefly detained and beat several party leaders,
including four M.P.'s, (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). Two days later, 33
BNP M.P.'s were allowed to parade and give speeches, but their
supporters were kept away.
Numerous opposition-called hartals took place during the year at
the national or local levels. There were 27 days of hartals during the
year. The opposition called several hartals in January and February to
protest the holding of municipal council elections without taking steps
demanded by the opposition (see Section 3). The strikes included ones
on January 26, February 9-11, and February 23-25. On July 8, the
opposition called a hartal to protest the Government's budget. The
opposition called a hartal from September 13-15 to protest the violent
end to the opposition's September 12 sit-in at the Secretariat (see
Section 1.c.). The opposition also called hartals on November 1,
November 7-9, November 16, November 26, December 5-6, December 13,
December 13-14, December 15, and December 18, and other days.
Many persons died in violence during the numerous hartals, and
hundreds were injured, including opposition activists, police, and many
ordinary citizens (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 3).
Local ruling party groups sometimes also call local general
strikes. An Awami League faction enforced a general strike in
Chittagong on July 8 when its leader was arrested. Party activists
enforce these strikes through threatened or actual violence toward
strikebreakers. Those who are opposed to or neutral toward the strike
are coerced into observing prohibitions against vehicular transport and
normal operation of businesses. Both opposition and ruling party
activists mount processions during general strikes. Police rarely
interfere with ruling party processions on such occasions; police and
ruling party activists often work in tandem to disrupt and to
discourage opposition processions. On May 13, a High Court panel,
acting on its own initiative, affirmed that violence and coercion for
or against general strikes constituted criminal activities, and
directed police to take appropriate action. At the request of the BNP,
the Supreme Court stayed this ruling.
The Constitution provides for the right of every citizen to form
associations, subject to ``reasonable restrictions'' in the interest of
morality or public order, and in general the Government respects this
right. Individuals are free to join private groups, but a local
magistrate must approve public meetings.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution establishes Islam as the
state religion but also stipulates the right to practice the religion
of one's choice, and the Government respects this provision in
practice. However, although the Government is secular, religion exerts
a powerful influence on politics, and the Government is sensitive to
the Muslim consciousness of the majority of its citizens. Approximately
88 percent of the population are Muslim. Some members of the Hindu,
Christian, and Buddhist minorities continue to perceive and experience
discrimination toward them from the Muslim majority (see Section 5).
The law permits citizens to proselytize. However, strong social
resistance to conversion from Islam means that most missionary efforts
by non-Muslims are aimed at Hindus and tribal groups. The Government
allows various religions to establish places of worship, to train
clergy, to travel for religious purposes, and to maintain links with
co-religionists abroad. Foreign missionaries may work in the country,
but their right to proselytize is not protected by the Constitution.
Some missionaries face problems in obtaining visas.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens generally are able to move
freely within the country and to travel abroad, to emigrate, and to
repatriate; however, there were instances in which the Government
restricted these rights. The Government confiscated the passports of
two high-profile members of the opposition Jatiya Party, depriving them
of the right to travel outside the country. In August immigration
officers seized the passport of the party's general secretary, Naziur
Rahman Monzur, as he was at the airport preparing to leave the country
on a personal trip. In December party chairman and former president,
Mohammed Ershad, was at the airport with the Chinese Ambassador
awaiting a flight to China on an official visit. Airport officials
seized his passport. Ershad appealed to the courts for its return. A
hearing was scheduled for January 31, 2000.
The law does not include provisions for granting refugee and asylee
status in accordance with the provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. The
Government generally cooperates with the U.N. High Commission for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. The law does not provide for first asylum or resettlement of
asylum seekers. However, in practice, the Government grants temporary
asylum to individual asylum seekers whom the UNHCR has interviewed and
recognized as refugees, on a case-by-case basis. At the request of the
UNHCR, the Government has allowed about 200 asylum seekers, mostly from
Somalia and Iran, to remain in Bangladesh for several years until they
can arrange their resettlement in another country.
Approximately 300,000 Bihari Muslims live in various camps around
the country; they have remained in the country since 1971 awaiting
settlement in Pakistan. Biharis are non-Bengali Muslims who emigrated
to what formerly was East Pakistan during the 1947 partition of British
India. Most supported Pakistan during Bangladesh's 1971 war of
independence. They later declined to accept Bangladesh citizenship and
asked to be repatriated to Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan
historically has been reluctant to accept the Biharis.
Approximately 260,000 Rohingya refugees (Muslims from the northern
Burmese state of Arakan) crossed into southeastern Bangladesh in late
1991 and 1992, fleeing repression. Since 1992 approximately 238,000
Rohingyas have been repatriated voluntarily to Burma, leaving
approximately 22,000 in two camps administered by the Government in
cooperation with the UNHCR. After blocking further repatriation since
August 1997, Burma allowed repatriation to resume in November 1998, but
at such a slow rate that births in the camps outnumbered repatriations.
The UNHCR urged the Government to allow any refugees who could not
return to Burma to be allowed to work in the country, benefit from
local medical programs, and send their children tolocal schools. The
Government refused these requests, insisting that all Rohingya refugees
must remain in the camps until they return to Burma. In July the
Burmese Foreign Minister visited Dhaka, but the Government was unable
to obtain assurances of concrete Burmese steps to accelerate
repatriation. While some reports indicated that refugees had been
pressured to volunteer for repatriation, UNHCR officials state that
procedures for verifying the voluntariness of repatriation applications
were followed rigorously.
Several thousand more Rohingyas arrived during the year, but recent
arrivals avoided the camps and attempted to settle in the southeastern
areas of the country. The Government effectively denied first asylum to
the new arrivals it encountered by categorizing them as illegal
economic migrants, turned back as many as possible at the border, and
denied UNHCR officials access to those who did enter the country
successfully.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Bangladesh is a multiparty, parliamentary democracy in which
elections by secret ballot are held on the basis of universal suffrage.
M.P.'s are elected at least every 5 years. The Parliament has 300
elected members, with 30 additional seats for women, who are chosen by
Parliament. Under a 1996 constitutional amendment, general
parliamentary elections are presided over by a caretaker government,
led by the most recently retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
Domestic and international observers deemed the last general election,
held in June 1996, to be generally free and fair. The high voter
turnout of 75 percent set a new record.
In June the Government passed legislation that allowed it to delay
by several months elections for the new upazilla (sub-district) level
of government, and for mayor and ward commissioners in four major
cities. The elections had been required to be held in July and
September, respectively. At the end of December, the opposition was
agitating against scheduling upazilla elections and municipal
elections. The Government had not scheduled upazilla elections, and
municipal elections in three of the four cities were tied up in legal
challenges. The city elections in Chittagong were scheduled for January
3, 2000, despite opposition party threats of resistance.
Elections often are marred by violence, intimidation of voters, and
vote rigging. The Government and activists of major political parties
frequently use violence and harassment against political opponents,
practices that intensify in the period prior to elections. On February
22, the Fair Election Monitoring Alliance (FEMA), an independent
umbrella group of NGO's, published its final report on the December 10,
1998 parliamentary by-election in Pabna. The report documented
unchecked harassment of opposition supporters by police and ruling
party activists, concerns about the neutrality of election officials,
unfair use of government resources to campaign for the ruling party
candidate, and lopsided results from several polling stations that
presented prima facie evidence of manipulation. The report concluded
that the numerous irregularities raised doubt that the victory of the
Awami League candidate in the by-election represented the will of the
voters (see Section 2.a.).
Citing problems in the Pabna by-election, the opposition alliance
presented a four-point ultimatum to the Government on January 6,
threatening to boycott upcoming municipal council elections if its
demands were not met. The opposition stated that the demands, including
resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner, were required to ensure
fairness in the elections. The Government did not meet the demands, and
the opposition boycotted the February 23-25 elections. The opposition
called a 3-day nationwide general strike to coincide with the
elections, but did not otherwise obstruct balloting significantly. Some
opposition candidates ran despite the boycott and won. Violence during
the elections resulted primarily from conflict between supporters of
rival ruling party candidates in the elections. The opposition also
boycotted and called a local hartal, but did not otherwise obstruct a
May 10 parliamentary by-election in Meherpur. The by-election was held
to fill the vacancy resulting from the death of the incumbent BNP M.P.
The ruling Awami League expelled its dissident member Kader Siddiqi
after his prolonged criticism of the party and its leadership. After
his expulsion, Siddiqi resigned his seat in Parliament and immediately
began to campaign as an independent candidate to regain his seat in a
by-election. The election was marked by massive fraud and vote rigging,
calling into serious question the purported victory of the Awami League
candidate in preliminary results. However, the Election Commission
refused to certify the election results, and at year's end, the
election dispute still was unresolved, and the parliamentary seat
remained vacant.
Political activists, at the local and national levels, also
reportedly engage in extortion from businesses and individuals.
Under constitutional amendments enacted in 1991, the country
changed from a presidential system to a parliament-led system. The
changes stipulated that an M.P. who resigns from his party or votes
against it in Parliament automatically loses his seat. In practice,
this provision solidifies the control of Parliament by the Government
and the Prime Minister. The lack of democracy within the political
parties that have formed governments since 1991 has resulted in a
concentration of political power in the office of the Prime Minister.
In practice the Prime Minister usually decides on major governmental
policies with little or no involvement by Parliament. Parliament's
effectiveness as a deliberative body is undermined further by the
country's narrow, partisan politics. However, parliamentary standing
committees on government ministries, which were formed in 1998, now are
headed by M.P.'s rather than the ministers concerned, increasing the
committees' effectiveness in overseeing government work.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics. Thirty
parliamentary seats are reserved for women chosen by majority vote in
Parliament; critics charge that these seats act far less to empower
women than to enhance the ruling party's majority. In addition to these
seats, women are free to contest any seat in Parliament. Seven women
were elected in their own right in the 1996 national elections. Seats
are not specifically reserved for other minority groups, such as tribal
people. Of the 300 elected M.P.'s, three are Tribal Buddhists from the
Chittagong Hill Tracts and five are Hindu. The rest are Bengali
Muslims. The Jamaat-I-Islami, the country's largest Islamic political
party, had 18 seats in Parliament after the 1991 elections, but only 3
after the 1996 elections.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
The Government generally permits human rights groups to conduct
their activities. A wide variety of groups publish reports, hold press
conferences, and issue appeals to the Government with regard to
specific cases. While human rights groups often are sharply critical of
the Government, irrespective of the ruling party, they frequently
practice self-censorship, particularly on some politically sensitive
cases and subjects. In past years, the Government has consulted with
human rights groups on some draft legislation and taken their views
into account. However, the Government continues to refuse to register
the Bangladesh Section of Amnesty International, which since 1990 has
applied several times for registration under the Societies Registration
Act. Without this registration, a voluntary organization cannot receive
funding from abroad. Observers attribute the situation to resentment of
criticism of the Government's human rights record by Amnesty
International.
The Government is defensive about international criticism regarding
human rights issues. However, the Government has been open to dialog
with international organizations and foreign diplomatic missions
regarding issues such as the detention of opposition leaders and
trafficking in women and children. At year's end, legislation to
establish a National Human Rights Commission had been submitted to the
cabinet for approval.
The Government has put pressure on individual human rights
advocates in the past, but there were no reports of such incidents
during the year. Such pressure has included long delays in issuing re-
entry visas. Missionaries who advocate human rights have faced similar
problems.
Human rights organizations also report that the Government has put
pressure on them usually in the form of harassment by government
intelligence agencies, and threats from activists of the ruling party.
In the past, some NGO's also have faced attacks organized by Muslim
religious leaders who contend that their activities are ``un-Islamic.''
The Government sometimes has failed to criticize, investigate, and
prosecute perpetrators of these attacks.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution states that ``all citizens are equal before the
law and are entitled to equal protection by the law.'' However, in
practice the Government does not enforce strongly laws aimed at
eliminating discrimination. In this context, women, children, minority
groups, and the disabled often confront social and economic
disadvantages.
Women.--Violence against women is difficult to quantify because of
unreliable statistics, but wife beating appears to be widespread. The
Government, the media, and women's rightsorganizations have fostered a
growing awareness of the problem of violence against women.
Much of the violence against women is related to disputes over
dowries. According to one human rights group, there were 96 dowry-
related killings during the year. Human rights groups and press reports
indicate that incidents of vigilantism against women--sometimes led by
religious leaders--at times occur, particularly in rural areas. These
include humiliating, painful punishments, such as the whipping of women
accused of moral offenses. Some women are disfigured by assailants who
fling acid in their faces. The most common motivation for acid-throwing
attacks against women is revenge by a rejected suitor. There were 130
cases of acid-throwing reported to police in 1998, the last full year
for which statistics are available. Few perpetrators of such
extrajudicial punishments are prosecuted.
The law prohibits rape and physical spousal abuse, but it makes no
specific provision for spousal rape as a crime. The Government has
enacted laws specifically prohibiting certain forms of discrimination
against women, including the Anti-Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980, the
Cruelty to Women Law of 1983, and the Women and Children Repression
Prevention Act of 1995. However, enforcement of these laws is weak,
especially in rural areas, and the Government seldom prosecutes those
cases that are filed. There are five government-run and four private
shelter homes available for use by women who are victims of violence.
These are insufficient to meet victims' shelter needs. As a result, the
Government often holds women who file rape complaints in ``safe
custody,'' usually in prison. ``Safe custody'' frequently results in
further abuses against victims, discouraging the filing of complaints
by other women, and often continues for extended periods, during which
the woman is often unable to gain release (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.).
There is extensive trafficking in women for the purpose of forced
prostitution within the country and to other countries in Asia (see
Section 6.f.).
For the most part, women remain in a subordinate position in
society, and the Government has not acted effectively to protect their
basic freedoms. Literacy rates are approximately 26 percent for women,
compared with 49 percent for men. In recent years, female school
enrollment has improved. Approximately 50 percent of primary and
secondary school students are female. Women often are ignorant of their
rights because of continued high illiteracy rates and unequal
educational opportunities, and strong social stigmas and lack of
economic means to obtain legal assistance frequently keep women from
seeking redress in the courts. Many NGO's operate programs to raise
women's awareness of their rights, and to encourage and assist them in
exercising those rights.
Under the 1961 Muslim Family Ordinance, female heirs inherit less
than male relatives do, and wives have fewer divorce rights than
husbands. Men are permitted to have up to four wives, although this
right rarely is exercised. Laws provide some protection for women
against arbitrary divorce and the taking of additional wives by
husbands without the first wife's consent, but the protections
generally apply only to registered marriages. Marriages in rural areas
often are not registered because of ignorance of the law. Under the
law, a Muslim husband is required to pay his ex-wife alimony for only 3
months, but this rarely is enforced.
Employment opportunities have been stronger for women than for men
in the last decade, which largely is due to the growth of the export
garment industry in Dhaka and Chittagong. Eighty percent of the 1.4
million garment sector workers are women. Programs extending credit to
large numbers of rural women also have contributed to greater economic
power for them. However, women still occupy only a small fraction of
other wage-earning jobs, and hold fewer than 5 percent of government
jobs. The Government's policy to include more women in government jobs
has had limited effect. In recent years, 14.4 percent of all recruits
into government service have been women.
The garment and shrimp processing industries are the highest
employers of women laborers. Forty-three percent of women work in the
agriculture, fisheries, and livestock sectors, but 70 percent of them
are unpaid family laborers. Many women also work as manual laborers on
construction projects, constituting nearly 24 percent of all
manufacturing workers. Women also are found in the electronics, food
processing, beverage, and handicraft industries.
Children.--The Government undertakes programs in the areas of
primary education, health, and nutrition. Many of these efforts are
supplemented by local and foreign NGO's. While much remains to be done,
these joint efforts have allowed the country to make significant
progress in improving health, nutrition, andeducation. For example, the
Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), a domestic NGO, provides
primary education to more than 1.2 million children. The Government
made universal primary education between the ages of 6 and 10 years
mandatory in 1991, but stated that it lacked the resources to implement
the law fully. According to Education Ministry figures, approximately
86 percent of children between the ages of 5 and 10 years are enrolled
in school, including 84 percent of girls. Attendance rates drop
steadily with age, and only about half of all children complete grade
5. To reach the maximum number of children with limited facilities,
most schools have two shifts. As a result, most children spend only 3
hours per day in the classroom. The Government provides incentives for
rural female children between the ages of 12 and 16 to remain in
school. These incentives have been effective in increasing the number
of girls in school.
Because of widespread poverty, many children are compelled to work
at a very young age. This frequently results in abuse of children,
mainly through mistreatment by employers during domestic service
(children who work in domestic service may work in conditions that
resemble servitude) (see Section 6.c.) and prostitution; this labor-
related child abuse occurs commonly at all levels of society and
throughout the country (see Section 6.d.). Reports from human rights
monitors indicate that child abandonment, kidnaping, and trafficking
for labor bondage and prostitution continue to be serious and
widespread problems. There is extensive trafficking of children,
primarily to India, Pakistan, and destinations within the country
largely for the purposes of forced prostitution (see Section 6.f.). The
U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) has estimated that there are about 10,000
child prostitutes in the country. Other estimates have been as high as
29,000. Prostitution is legal, but only for those over 18 years of age
with government certification. However, this minimum age requirement
commonly is ignored by authorities, and is circumvented easily by false
statements of age. Procurers of minors rarely are prosecuted, and large
numbers of child prostitutes work in brothels. The law stipulates a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment for persons found guilty of
forcing a child into prostitution.
People with Disabilities.--The law provides for equal treatment and
freedom from discrimination for the disabled; however, in practice, the
disabled face social and economic discrimination. The Government has
not enacted specific legislation or otherwise mandated accessibility
for the disabled. Facilities for treating the mentally ill or the
retarded are inadequate. Unless a family has money to pay for private
service, a mentally ill person can find little treatment in the
country.
Indigenous People.--Tribal people have had a marginal ability to
influence decisions concerning the use of their lands. The 1997
Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) Peace Accord has been in effect for 2
years, and has ended 25 years of insurgency in the CHT. The situation
in the CHT was peaceful at year's end. Former insurgent leader Shantu
Larma accepted a position as Regional Council Chairman in May, allowing
formation of the long-stalled body to go forward. However, there is
still confusion regarding the overlapping responsibilities of
government bodies with responsibilities in the Hill Tracts. The Land
Commission that is to deal with land disputes between tribals and
Bengali settlers was established during the year, but had not begun
operating. Tribal leaders also have expressed disappointment at the
lack of progress in providing assistance to tribals that left the area
during the insurgency.
Until 1985 the Government regularly allotted land in the CHT to
Bengali settlers, including land that was claimed by indigenous people
under traditional concepts of land ownership. This led to the
displacement of many tribal groups, such as the Chakmas and Marmas.
Bengali inhabitants in the CHT increased from 3 percent of the region's
population in 1947 to approximately 50 percent of the area's population
of 1 million in 1997. In response to the Government's action, the
Shanti-Bahini, a tribal group, had waged a low-level conflict in the
CHT from the early 1970's until the signing of the peace agreement with
the Government in December 1997. During the periods of violence, all
those involved--indigenous tribes, settlers, and security forces--
accused each other of human rights violations. The terms of the 1997
pact provided for a strong local government, consisting of mostly
tribal representatives, including the chairperson; reduction of the
military presence in the CHT region; and a substantial compensation
package for displaced tribal families.
Tribal people in other areas also have reported problems of loss of
land to Bengali Muslims through questionable legal practices and other
means. The Garos, of the Modhupur forest region in north central
Bangladesh, continue to face problems in maintaining their cultural
traditions and livelihoods in theface of deforestation and encroachment
by surrounding Bengali communities. The pressure on the Garo community
has resulted in greater migration to urban areas and to the Indian
state of Meghalaya, threatening the existence of an already small
community estimated at only 16,000 persons. The Government had
indicated in 1995 that it would establish a national park of 400 acres
in the Mymensingh district. Part of the land would be taken from the
Garo tribals. Action still is pending on that proposal. The Government
has not ruled out moving the tribals from the land.
Religious Minorities.--Hindus, Christians, and Buddhists constitute
about 12 percent of the population.
Islamic extremists occasionally have attacked women, religious
minorities, and development workers. The Government sometimes has
failed to criticize, investigate, and prosecute perpetrators of these
attacks. The Ahmadiyas, whom many mainstream Muslims consider
heretical, have been the target of some attacks and harassment. In
January several hundred persons attacked the Ahmadiya place of worship
in Koldiar village in Kushtia. Devotees were beaten, and the place of
worship was ransacked. Following the attack, Ahmadiyas were harassed on
the streets and prevented from praying at their place of worship.
Ahmadiyas alleged that the local police did not intervene to stop these
abuses. According to press reports, the assistant police inspector in
the area was fired and the officer in charge of the police station was
withdrawn for failure to discharge their duties during the incident. At
year's end, Ahmadiyas reported that their mosque was still under the
control of local police and that they have not been allowed to return.
On October 8, a bomb exploded during Friday prayers at an Ahmadiya
mosque in Khulna. Six persons were killed and over 40 others were
injured (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). At approximately the same time,
unexploded bombs were found at a Sunni mosque in Dhaka. On October 10,
two explosive devices were located at the Ahmadiya Central Mosque in
Dhaka. Although police conducted an investigation, no suspects were
arrested or detained. Seven persons were injured on November 12 when a
mob ransacked an Ahmadiya mosque near Natore in western Bangladesh.
According to press reports, the attack was provoked by Muslims from
Dhaka.
Religious minorities are in practice disadvantaged in such areas as
access to government jobs and political office. Selection boards in the
government services often lack minority group representation.
Many Hindus have been unable to recover landholdings lost because
of discrimination in the application of the law, especially the Vested
Property Act. Property ownership, particularly among Hindus, has been a
contentious issue since independence in 1971, when many Hindus lost
land holdings because of anti-Hindu discrimination in the application
of the law. Prior to its 1996 election victory, the Awami League
promised to repeal the Vested Property Act, the law used to deprive
Hindus of their property. However, the Government so far has taken no
action. There have been in past years cases of violence directed
against religious minority communities that also have resulted in the
loss of property. The last such major incidents occurred in 1992,
although there also were some minor incidents of this type during the
period surrounding the 1996 elections. Such intercommunal violence
reportedly has caused some members of religious minorities to depart
the country. According to press reports, in January Muslim youths
smashed a mud-and-straw image of a Hindu goddess as Hindus were
celebrating the festival of Saraswati, causing several hundred Hindus
to flee.
Feminist author Taslima Nasreen left the country in January due to
concerns about her personal security (see Section 2.a.). Some Islamic
groups issued statements protesting her departure after she was allowed
to leave.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right to join unions and--with government approval--the right to form a
union. Approximately 1.8 million of the country's 5 million workers in
the formal sector belong to unions (the total work force is
approximately 58 million). There is a large unreported informal sector,
for which no reliable labor statistics exist.
For a union to obtain and maintain its registration, 30 percent
workplace participation is required. Moreover, would-be unionists
technically are forbidden to engage in many activities prior to
registration, and legally are not protected from employer retaliation
during this period. Labor activists have protested that this
requirement severely restricts workers' freedom to organize, and the
International Labor Organization(ILO) has requested the Government to
amend the 30 percent provision due to the same grounds. The ILO also
has requested the Government to amend legislative provisions that bar
registration of a union that is composed of workers from different
workplaces owned by different employers. About 15 percent of the
approximately 5,450 labor unions are affiliated with 23 officially
registered National Trade Union (NTU) centers. There also are several
unregistered NTU's.
With the exception of workers in the railway, postal, telegraph,
and telephone departments, civil servants, police, and military
personnel are forbidden to join unions. Many civil servants who are
forbidden to join unions, such as teachers and nurses, have formed
associations that perform functions similar to labor unions, that is,
providing for members' welfare, offering legal services, and airing
grievances. However, collective bargaining is prohibited. Some workers
have formed unregistered unions, particularly university employees and
workers in the construction and transport (both public and private)
industries. The Government banned trade union activity in the
Bangladesh Bank, the country's central bank, in early 1998. The ban
followed an incident in which some labor unionists affiliated with the
ruling party's trade union assaulted a senior bank official, after
which there were clashes between members of rival unions. In July and
August, low paid government employees staged protests inside the
Secretariat, the office complex in central Dhaka housing most
ministries. The employees' demands included a significant pay increase
and changes in working hours. When police suppressed the protests,
there were violent clashes, and workers ransacked some offices,
including that of the Labor Minister. Police arrested two officials of
the protesting union for alleged criminal offenses, then detained them
under the SPA. After more than 1 month, the High Court declared the
detention illegal and ordered the two men to be released (see Section
1.d.). The ILO Committee of Experts stated that the Government's
rejections of several applications for registration by trade unions in
the textile, metal, and garment sectors were on unjustified grounds.
There are no legal restrictions on political activities by labor
unions, although the calling of nationwide general strikes (hartals) or
transportation blockades by unions is considered a criminal rather than
a political act and thus forbidden.
While unions are not part of the government structure, they are
highly politicized, and are strongest in state-owned enterprises.
Virtually all the NTU centers are affiliated with political parties,
including one with the ruling Awami League. Some unions are militant
and engage in intimidation and vandalism. Illegal blockades of public
transportation routes by strikers frequently occurred during the year.
Pitched battles between members of rival labor unions occur regularly.
Fighting often is over the control of rackets or extortion payoffs and
typically involves knives, guns, and homemade bombs.
Workers are eligible for membership on their union's executive
staff, the size of which is set by law in proportion to the number of
union members. The Registrar of Trade Unions may cancel registration of
a union with the concurrence of the Labor Court, but no such actions
were known to have been taken during the year.
The right to strike is not recognized specifically in the law, but
strikes are a common form of protest. General strikes are standard
tools of political opposition groups and are used to pressure the
Government to meet political demands (see Section 2.b.). There were no
labor-related nationwide strikes during the year. Workers at Chittagong
port, the country's major harbor, conducted several industrial actions
to protest a proposed privately run port facility, and went on strike
for more than a week in September over a pay dispute. Some employees
organized in professional associations or unregistered unions also went
on strike during the year. University teachers went on strike for short
periods over pay and benefits, as well as the continuing problem of
campus violence. Wildcat strikes are illegal but occur frequently, with
varying government responses. Wildcat strikes in the transportation
sector are particularly common.
The Essential Services Ordinance permits the Government to bar
strikes for 3 months in any sector that it declares essential. This
ban, which generally is obeyed, in the past has been applied to
national airline pilots, water supply workers, shipping employees, and
electricity supply workers. The ban may be renewed for 3-month-periods.
The Government is empowered to prohibit a strike or lockout at any time
before or after the strike or lockout begins and to refer the dispute
to the Labor Court. Mechanisms for conciliation, arbitration, and labor
court dispute resolution were established under the Industrial
Relations Ordinance of 1969. Workers have the right to strike in the
event of a failure to settle. If a strike lasts 30 days or longer, the
Government may prohibit the strike and refer the dispute to the Labor
Court for adjudication. This has not happened since 1993. The ILO has
criticized the provisions ofthe Industrial Relations Ordinance that
require three-quarters of a worker's organization to consent to a
strike and that grant the Government authority to prohibit a strike at
any time if it is considered prejudicial to the national interest or if
it involves a public utility service.
There are provisions in the Industrial Relations Ordinance for the
immunity of registered unions or union officers from civil liability.
Enforcement of these provisions is uneven. In past illegal work
actions, such as transportation blockades, police have arrested union
members under the SPA or regular criminal codes.
There are no restrictions on affiliation with international labor
organizations, and unions and federations maintain a variety of such
links. Trade unionists are required to obtain government clearance to
travel to ILO meetings, but there were no reports that clearances were
denied during the year.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Collective
bargaining is legal only for private sector workers, on the condition
that they are represented by unions legally registered as collective
bargaining agents by the Registrar of Trade Unions. Collective
bargaining occurs on occasion in large private enterprises such as
pharmaceuticals, jute, or textiles but, because of high unemployment,
workers may forgo collective bargaining due to concerns over job
security. Collective bargaining in small private enterprises generally
does not occur. The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
(ICFTU) has criticized the country for what it views as legal
impediments which hamper such bargaining.
Public sector workers' pay levels and other benefits are set by the
National Pay and Wages Commission, whose recommendations are binding
and may not be disputed except on the issue of implementation.
The Registrar of Trade Unions has wide powers to interfere in
internal union affairs. He has the authority to enter union premises
and inspect documents; however, there were no reports during the year
that the Registrar of Trade Unions had abused these powers.
Under the Industrial Relations Ordinance, there is considerable
leeway for discrimination against union members and organizers by
employers. For example, the Ordinance allows the arbitrary transfer of
workers suspected of union activities or termination with payment of
mandatory severance benefits (2 weeks' salary). In practice, private
sector employers usually discourage any union activity, sometimes
working in collaboration with local police. The Registrar of Trade
Unions rules on discrimination complaints. In a number of cases, the
Labor Court has ordered the reinstatement of workers fired for union
activities. However, the Labor Court's overall effectiveness is
hampered by a serious case backlog, and there also have been
allegations that some of its deliberations have been corrupted by
employers.
The country's two export processing zones (EPZ's) are exempted from
the application of the Employment of Labor (Standing Orders) Act of
1965, the Industrial Relations Ordinance of 1969, and the Factories Act
of 1965. Among other things, these laws establish the freedom of
association and the right to bargain collectively, and set forth
occupational safety and health standards. While substitutes for some of
the provisions of these laws have been implemented through EPZ
regulations, professional and industry-based unions are prohibited in
the zones. A small number of workers in the EPZ's have skirted
prohibitions on forming unions by setting up associations. The
Government has not implemented its 1992 commitment to end restrictions
on freedom of association and formation of unions by 1997, and to apply
all sections to labor law in the EPZ's by 2000. No collective
bargaining takes place in the EPZ's. Approximately 84,000 persons are
employed in EPZ's, primarily in the textile and apparel, electronics
component, and leather industries.
An NGO study released in December reported the following practices,
among others, in the Chittagong and Savar EPZ's: Sexual harassment and
abuse, physical abuse, unpaid overtime work, child labor, noncompliance
with minimum wage regulations, lack of information available to workers
about their legal rights, and substandard safety conditions. However,
serious questions were raised about the methodology of the study and of
the reliability of its findings.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including that performed by
children; however, the Government does not enforce this prohibition
effectively. The Factories Act and Shops and Establishments Act, both
passed in 1965, established inspection mechanisms to enforce laws
against forced labor; however, these laws are not rigorously enforced,
partly becauseresources for enforcement are scarce. There is no large-
scale bonded or forced labor; however, numerous domestic servants,
including many children, work in conditions that resemble servitude and
many suffer physical abuse, sometimes resulting in death. In at least
some cases, the Government does bring criminal charges against
employers who abuse domestic servants. There is extensive trafficking
in both women and children, mainly for purposes of forced prostitution,
although in some instances for labor servitude outside of the country
(see Section 6.f.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--There is no law that uniformly prohibits the employment of
children, and child labor is a serious problem. Some laws prohibit
labor by children in certain sectors. The Factories Act of 1965 bars
children under the age of 14 from working in factories. This law also
stipulates that children and adolescents are allowed to work only a
maximum 5-hour day and only between the hours of 7 a.m. and 7 p.m. The
Shops and Establishments Act of 1965 prohibits the employment of
children younger than the age of 12 in commercial workplaces. The
Employment of Children Act of 1938 prohibits the employment of children
under the age of 15 in the railways or in goods' handling within ports.
Coverage and enforcement of these rules is inadequate. Because of
widespread poverty, many children begin to work at a very young age.
According to a 1996 labor force survey by the Government, the country
has 6.3 million working children between the ages of 5 and 14 years who
work for compensation and are not enrolled in school. Also, children
often work alongside other family members in small-scale and
subsistence agriculture. UNICEF and ILO surveys indicate that, of
children 6 to 17 years of age, 21 percent of boys and 4 percent of
girls work in paid employment. Hours usually are long and the pay low,
and the conditions sometimes are hazardous. Children drive rickshaws,
break bricks at construction sites, carry fruit, vegetables, and dry
goods for shoppers at markets, work at tea stalls, and work as
beachcombers in the shrimp industry. Many children work in the beedi
(hand-rolled cigarette) industry, and children under 18 years sometimes
work in hazardous circumstances in the leather industry. Children
routinely perform domestic work. Cases of children being abused
physically and occasionally killed by the head of the household where
they work are reported in the press. In at least some cases, the
Government does bring criminal charges against employers who abuse
domestic servants. Some children are trafficked domestically or
overseas, often for prostitution, and child prostitution is a serious
problem (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). Under the law, every child must
attend school through the fifth grade, or the age of 10 years. However,
the Government continues to maintain that it does not yet have the
resources to implement this law effectively.
Protracted negotiations led to the July 1995 signing of a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Bangladesh Garment
Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA), UNICEF, and the ILO to
eliminate child labor in the garment sector. Under the MOU, the garment
sector was to become child labor free by October 31, 1996, with former
child laborers enrolled in UNICEF-sponsored schools and follow-up
inspections of factories by ILO-managed inspection teams. Under the
program, former child-employees receive a small monthly stipend while
attending school to help replace their lost income. Violations of the
ban on child labor in the garment export sector rose slightly from low
levels as the year progressed, to about 5 percent of factories
inspected. According to ILO inspectors, most factories where violations
were committed had one or two child laborers, and only about 1 percent
of the factories had more than this amount. However, a BGMEA
arbitration committee, which is tasked with imposing fines on violating
factories, functions slowly. The number of children working in
nonexport, or nonfactory garment production, is unknown.
The Government did not grant the Ministry of Labor additional
resources to enforce its commitment as a member of the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation to eliminate hazardous child labor
by 2000, and to eliminate all child labor by 2010; the existing small
corps of labor inspectors continues to be ineffective against all labor
problems because of inefficiency and corruption.
UNICEF is implementing a ``hard-to-reach'' program to provide
education to 350,000 (primarily working) children in urban slum areas.
ILO/IPEC has approximately 24 ongoing programs, the largest involving
3,000 children in hazardous conditions, designed to ensure that
children receive an education, rather than removing children from work.
The Constitution prohibits forced or compulsory labor, including
that performed by children; however, the Government does not enforce
this prohibition effectively, and some children work as domestic
servants in conditions that resemble labor servitude orare trafficked
for the purpose of forced prostitution (see Section 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--There is no national minimum
wage. Instead, the Wage Commission, which convenes every several years,
sets wages and benefits industry by industry. In most cases, private
sector employers ignore this wage structure. For example, in the
garment industry, legal minimum wages are not paid by many factories,
and it is common for workers of smaller factories to experience delays
in receiving their pay, or to receive ``trainee'' wages well past the
maximum 3 months. The average monthly wage of $1.50 to $2.50 per day
(taka 76 to taka 130) is sufficient to provide an individual with a
minimal standard of living, but is not sufficient to provide a decent
standard of living for a worker and family.
The law sets a standard 48-hour workweek with 1 day off mandated. A
60-hour workweek, inclusive of a maximum 12 hours of overtime, is
allowed. The law is enforced poorly in industries such as hosiery and
ready-made garments.
The Factories Act of 1965 nominally sets occupational health and
safety standards. The law is comprehensive but largely is ignored by
employers. For example, there are many fire safety violations in the
garment industry. Many factories are located in structures that were
not designed adequately for industrial use, nor for the easy evacuation
of large work forces. In addition, numerous factories have insufficient
toilet facilities (for example, 1 toilet for 300 employees). Workers
may resort to legal action for enforcement of the law's provisions, but
few cases actually are prosecuted. Enforcement by the Labor Ministry's
industrial inspectors is weak, due both to the low number of labor
inspectors (100 for 300,000 covered establishments), and to endemic
corruption and inefficiency among inspectors. Due to a high
unemployment rate and inadequate enforcement of the laws, workers
demanding correction of dangerous working conditions or refusing to
participate in perceived dangerous activities risk losing their jobs.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There is extensive trafficking in both
women and children, primarily to India, Pakistan, and destinations
within the country, mainly for purposes of forced prostitution,
although in some instances for labor servitude. Some children also are
trafficked to the Middle East to work as camel jockeys.
The number of women and children trafficked is unknown; human
rights monitors estimate that several thousand women and children are
victims of trafficking each year. Most trafficked persons are lured by
promises of good jobs or marriage, and some are forced into involuntary
servitude outside of the country. Seeing no alternative for breaking
the cycle of poverty, parents often willingly send their children away.
Unwed mothers, orphans, and others outside of the normal family support
system also are susceptible. Traffickers living abroad often arrive in
a village and ``marry'' a woman, only to dispose of her upon arrival in
the destination country, where women are sold by their new ``friends,''
or ``usbands'' into bonded labor, menial jobs, or prostitution. Much of
the trafficking and smuggling of persons is conducted by criminal
gangs. The border between Bangladesh and India is porous, especially
around Jessore and Benapole, making illegal border crossings easy.
The law provides severe penalties for trafficking, but few
perpetrators are punished. Human rights monitors also credibly report
that police and local government officials often either ignore
trafficking in women and children for prostitution, easily are bribed
to look the other way, or even are involved in the operation (see
Section 1.c.). According to one anti-trafficking organization, 63
persons were arrested during the year for trafficking. While most of
those arrested were not prosecuted by year's end, 13 persons arrested
previously were convicted for trafficking offenses and sentenced to
life imprisonment. Exact numbers of those arrested are difficult to
obtain as charges against traffickers usually are for lesser crimes,
such as crossing borders without proper documents.
UNICEF has estimated that there are about 10,000 child prostitutes
in Bangladesh; other estimates have been as high as 29,000.
Prostitution is legal, but only for those over 18 years of age with
government certification; however, this minimum age requirement
commonly is ignored by authorities, and is circumvented easily by false
statements of age. Procurers of minors rarely are prosecuted, and large
numbers of child prostitutes work in brothels. The law stipulates a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment for persons found guilty of
forcing a child into prostitution.
The Government has expressed concern about the problem and has
worked with NGO's and international organizations against trafficking,
conducting awareness campaigns, research, lobbying, and rescue and
rehabilitation programs. Some NGO's and international organizations
have been active in addressing the problem. For example, the
Association for Community Development conducted a study on trafficking
issues and conducted workshops and outreach programs aimed at reaching
potential victims of trafficking before they are trafficked. The
Bangladesh National Women Lawyer's Association (BNWLA) conducts
awareness programs, aimed at alerting poor persons to the dangers of
trafficking through leaflets, stickers, and posters. The BNWLA also
provides legal assistance to trafficking victims, and initiates legal
action against traffickers. The BNWLA runs a shelter home for
trafficked women and children that provides health care, counseling,
and training. The Center for Women and Children (CWCS) has networks to
monitor trafficking across the country, conducts awareness meetings,
and has a pilot project to make police aware of the rights of women and
children. Awareness of trafficking is increasing, and it receives
frequent press coverage. Two umbrella organizations of anti-trafficking
NGO's exist, and are seeking to improve coordination and planning of
efforts against the problem.
______
BHUTAN
Bhutan is ruled by a hereditary monarch, King Jigme Singye
Wangchuk, who governs with the support of a National Assembly and a
Council of Ministers; there is no written constitution to protect
fundamental political and human rights. Since ascending to the throne
in 1972, the King has continued efforts toward social and political
modernization begun by his father. In the last few years, Bhutan has
rapidly improved services in education, health care, sanitation, and
communications, with parallel but slower developments of the role of
representatives in governance and decision making. In recent years,
Bhutan has adopted some measures to transfer power from the King to the
National Assembly. The judiciary is not independent of the King.
Approximately two-thirds of the government-declared population of
600,000 is composed of Buddhists with cultural traditions akin to those
of Tibet. The Buddhist majority consists of two principal ethnic and
linguistic groups: the Ngalongs of the western part of the country and
the Sharchops of the eastern part of the country. The remaining third
of the population, ethnic Nepalis, most of whom are Hindus, live in the
country's southern districts. Bhutanese dissident groups claim that the
actual population is between 650,000 and 700,000 and that the
Government underreports the number of ethnic Nepalese in the country.
The rapid growth of this ethnic Nepalese segment of the population led
some in the Buddhist majority to fear for the survival of their
culture. Government efforts to tighten citizenship requirements and to
control illegal immigration resulted in political protests and led to
ethnic conflict and repression of ethnic Nepalese in southern districts
during the late 1980's and early 1990's. Tens of thousands of ethnic
Nepalese left the country in 1991-92, many forcibly expelled.
Approximately 97,000 ethnic Nepalese remain in refugee camps in Nepal
and upwards of 15,000 reside outside of the camps in the Indian states
of Assam and West Bengal. The Government maintains that some of those
in the camps were never citizens, and therefore have no right to
return. In 1998 the Government began resettling Buddhist Bhutanese from
other regions of the country on land in southern districts vacated by
the ethnic Nepalese now living in refugee camps in Nepal. A National
Assembly resolution adopted in 1997 prohibits still-resident immediate
family members of ethnic Nepalese refugees from holding jobs with the
Government or the armed forces. In early 1998, the Government
implemented the resolution, and had dismissed 429 civil servants by
November 1998, when implementation of the resolution was discontinued.
The Royal Bhutan Police, assisted by the Royal Bhutan Army,
including those assigned to the Royal Body Guard, and a national
militia, maintain internal security. Some members of these forces
committed human rights abuses against ethnic Nepalese.
The economy is based on agriculture and forestry, which provide the
main livelihood for 90 percent of the population and account for about
half of the gross domestic product. Agriculture consists largely of
subsistence farming and animal husbandry. Cardamon, citrus fruit, and
spices are the leading agricultural exports. Cement and electricity are
the other important exports. Strong trade and monetary ties link the
economy closely to that of India. Hydroelectric power production
potential and tourism are key resources, although the Government limits
foreign tourist arrivals for reasons of lack of adequate tourist
infrastructure and environmental concerns. Tourist arrivals are limited
by means of pricing policies. Bhutan is a poor country. The gross
national product (GNP) per capita is estimated to be $470.
The Government significantly restricts the rights of the Kingdom's
citizens, and problems remain in several areas. The King exercises
strong, active, and direct power over the Government. Citizens do not
yet have the right to change their government. The Government
discourages political parties, and none operate legally. There were
reports that security forces beat ethnic Nepalese refugees who entered
the country to demonstrate. Arbitrary arrest and detention remain
problems. Judges serve at the King's pleasure, and the Government
limits significantly the right to a fair trial. Criminal cases and a
variety of civil matters are adjudicated under a legal code established
in the 17th century and revised and modernized in 1958 and 1965. In
late 1998, the Government formed a special committee of jurists and
government officials to review the country's basic law and propose
changes. Programs to build a body of written law and to train lawyers
are progressing. For example, the Government sends many lawyers to
India and other countries for legal training. The Government limits
significantly citizens' right to privacy. The Government restricts
freedom of speech, the press, assembly, and association. The Government
launched the country's first indigenous television service in June,
modifying a ban on private television reception that had been in place
since 1989. Citizens face significant limitations on freedom of
religion. In July 1998, the Government initiated steps to renew
negotiations with the Government of Nepal on procedures for the
screening and repatriation of ethnic Nepalese in the refugee camps, and
the two governments held a series of meetings during the second half of
that year. After a 3-year hiatus, ministerial-level bilateraltalks
resumed in September. The Government restricts worker rights.
The Government claims that it has prosecuted government personnel
for unspecified abuses committed in the early 1990's; however, public
indications are that it has done little to investigate and prosecute
security force officials responsible for torture, rape, and other
abuses committed against ethnic Nepalese residents.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
confirmed reports of political or other extrajudicial killings during
the year; however, there were press reports that a prisoner detained
since 1997 died after he was tortured (see Section 1.c.). Human rights
groups allege that Gomchen Karma, a Buddhist monk arrested in October
1997 during a peaceful demonstration in the eastern part of the
country, was shot and killed by a government official. The Government
stated that the shooting was accidental, that the official responsible
has been suspended from duty and charged in connection with the
incident, and that his case was being heard as of the end of 1998.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture and abuse; however, human rights
advocates state that in practice security forces ignore these
provisions. There were reports that numerous ethnic Nepalese refugees
attempting to return to the country were captured by security forces,
beaten, and sent back across the border. Persons holding peaceful
marches from India to Bhutan report that during the year, the police
assaulted them, injuring several demonstrators, and then arrested and
deported all of the marchers to Nepal (see Section 5). Instances of
torture of ethnic Nepalese who attempted to return to the country
occurred in 1996. Refugee newspapers published in Nepal allege that
Nima Gyaltsen, a prisoner detained since 1997 without charge or trial
in Zilnon Namgyeling jail in Thimphu, died after being subjected to
torture during his incarceration. Amnesty International reported that
19-year-old Needup Phuntso was expelled from school in March 1998 and
was tortured by members of the Royal Bhutanese police after his arrest
in Thimphu in July 1998.
Refugee groups credibly claim that persons detained as suspected
dissidents in the early 1990's were tortured by security forces, who
also committed acts of rape. During those years, the Government's
ethnic policies and the crackdown on ethnic Nepalese political
agitation created a climate of impunity in which the Government tacitly
condoned the physical abuse of ethnic Nepalese. The Government denies
these abuses but also claims it has investigated and prosecuted three
government officials for unspecified abuses of authority during that
period. Details of these cases have not been made public, and there is
little indication that the Government has adequately investigated or
punished any security force officials involved in the widespread abuses
of 1989-92. Human rights groups allege that a Buddhist monk arrested in
October 1997, Thinley Oezor Kenpo, was tortured in custody in 1997.
According to Amnesty International, Kenpo was one of 120 persons
arrested for political reasons since 1997 who by December 1998 had been
sentenced to up to 15 years in prison.
Prison conditions are reportedly adequate, if austere. In 1993 the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) began a program of
visits to prisons in the capital, Thimphu. In 1994 a new prison in
Chemgang was opened. Together, these events contributed to a
substantial improvement in conditions of detention over those that
existed until a few years ago. Bhutanese human rights groups active
outside the country maintain that prison conditions outside of Thimphu
remain oppressive.
The Government and the ICRC signed a new Memorandum of
Understanding in September 1998, extending the ICRC prison visits
program for another 5 years. During the same month, an ICRC team
visited 54 inmates in Chemgang central jail and 127 inmates in Thimphu
district jail. The ICRC conducted two prison visits during the year, as
it has done for each of the past six years.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention remain problems. Under the Police Act of 1979, police may not
arrest a person without a warrant and must produce an arrested person
before a court within 24 hours of arrest, exclusive of travel time from
place of arrest. Legalprotections are incomplete, however, due to the
lack of a fully elaborated criminal procedure code and to deficiencies
in police training and practice. Incommunicado detention is known to
occur. Incommunicado detention of suspected militants was a serious
problem in 1991 and 1992, but the initiation of ICRC prison visits and
the establishment of an ICRC mail service between detainees and family
members has helped to allay this problem. Of those detained in
connection with political dissidence and violence in southern areas in
1991-92, 1,685 were ultimately amnestied, 58 are serving sentences
after conviction by the High Court, 9 were acquitted by the High Court,
and 71 were released after serving prison sentences.
Four persons were arrested in February 1997 in Trashi and charged
with involvement in seditious activities. They were convicted by the
High Court and are currently serving prison sentences. Human rights
groups allege that in July and August 1997, the Royal Bhutan Police
(RBP) in and around Samdrup Jongkar town in the east arrested some 50
suspected supporters of a Bhutanese dissident group active outside the
country. The Government states that only 16 persons were arrested
during this period and that they have been charged with involvement in
seditious activities and are awaiting trial. Many were said to be
supporters of one-time Druk National Congress (DNC) and United Front
for Democracy in Bhutan (UFD) leader Rongthong KunleyDorji, who was
arrested in India in April 1997, following the issuance of an
extradition request by Bhutanese authorities. Dorji faces extradition
proceedings in India and possible return to Bhutan to face charges of
fraud, nonpayment of loans, and incitement to violence. The original
Bhutanese extradition request included a third charge, ``anti-national
activities,'' but this was later dropped when it became clear that
Indian law would preclude his extradition to face political charges.
Human rights groups contend that the charges brought against Dorji are
politically motivated and constitute an attempt by the government to
suppress his prodemocracy activities. In June 1998 an Indian court
granted Dorji bail, but placed restrictions on his movements. Dorji's
extradition case still is pending in the Indian courts. According to an
Amnesty International report released during the year, 30 persons were
detained in 1998, most of them on suspicion of being members or
supporters of the DNC.
Amnesty International (AI) has reported that some of those arrested
are feared to be at risk of torture. Bhutanese human rights groups
outside the country claim that the arrests, including those of several
Buddhist monks, are aimed at imposing Ngalong norms on the eastern,
Sharchop community, which has a distinct ethnic and religious identity.
The Government denies that it has such a policy; many government
officials, including both the former Head of Government, Foreign
Minister Jigme Thinley, and the Chief Justice of the High Court Sonam
Tobgye, are Sharchops.
Persons holding peaceful marches from India to Bhutan charge that
during the year, the police assaulted them, injuring several
demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all of the marchers to
Nepal (see Section 5). By one estimate, approximately 100 marchers were
arrested and deported during the year. The Government acknowledged that
58 persons whom it described as ``terrorists'' were serving sentences
at the end of 1998 for crimes including rape, murder, and robbery. It
stated that a total of 134 persons were arrested in connection with the
October 1997 disturbances in the east; of that number, more than one-
half either had been tried and acquitted or had been released after
serving short sentences.
Although the Government does not formally use exile as a form of
punishment, many accused political dissidents freed under Government
amnesties say that they were released on the condition that they depart
the country. Many of them subsequently registered at refugee camps in
Nepal. The Government denies this.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is no written constitution,
and the judiciary is not independent of the King.
The judicial system consists of district courts and a High Court in
Thimphu. Judges are appointed by the King on the recommendation of the
Chief Justice and may be removed by him. Village headmen adjudicate
minor offenses and administrative matters.
Criminal cases and a variety of civil matters are adjudicated under
a legal code established in the 17th century and revised in 1958 and
1965. For offenses against the State, state-appointed prosecutors file
charges and prosecute cases. In other cases, the relevant organizations
and departments of government file charges and conduct the prosecution.
Defendants are supposed to be presented with written charges in
languages that they understand and given time to prepare their own
defense. However, this practice is not always followed, according to
some political dissidents. In cases where defendants cannot write their
owndefense, courts assign judicial officers to assist defendants. There
were reports that defendants receive legal representation at trial, and
that they may choose from a list of 150 government-licensed and
employed advocates to assist with their defense; however, it is not
known how many defendants actually receive such assistance. A legal
education program is gradually building a body of persons who have
received formal training in the law abroad. Village headmen, who have
the power to arbitrate disputes, make up the bottom rung of the
judicial system. Magistrates can review their decisions, each with
responsibility for a block of villages. Magistrates' decisions can be
appealed to district judges, of which there is one for each of the
country's 20 districts. The High Court in Thimphu is the country's
supreme court. Its decisions can be appealed to the King.
Defendants have the right to appeal to the High Court and may make
a final appeal to the King, who traditionally delegates the decision to
the Royal Advisory Council. Trials are to be conducted in open
hearings; however, there are allegations that this is not always the
case in practice.
Questions of family law, such as marriage, divorce, and adoption,
are traditionally resolved according to a citizen's religion: Buddhist
tradition for the majority of the population and Hindu tradition for
the ethnic Nepalese; however, the Government states that there is one
formal law that governs these matters.
Some or all of the approximately 75 prisoners serving sentences for
offenses related to political dissidence or violence, primarily by
ethnic Nepalese during 1991-92, may be political prisoners.
On December 17, the King pardoned 200 prisoners to mark National
Day; all reportedly were released. Among them were 40 persons convicted
of ``anti-national'' offenses, including prominent ethnic Nepalese
dissident and internationally recognized political prisoner Tek Nath
Rizal. Tek Nath Rizal was arrested in 1988 in Nepal and extradited to
Bhutan, where he was held in solitary confinement in Wangdiphodrang
military prison until his 1992 conviction for ``anti-national'' crimes,
including writing and distributing political pamphlets and attending
political meetings. He was convicted under the 1993 National Security
Act, although at the time of his conviction it had not yet been passed.
However, a United Nations Human Rights Commission Working Group on
Arbitrary Detention that visited the country in 1994 at the
Government's invitation determined that Rizal had received a fair trial
and declared his detention ``not to be arbitrary.''
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--There are no laws providing for these rights. The
Government requires all citizens, including minorities, to wear the
traditional dress of the Buddhist majority when visiting Buddhist
religious buildings, monasteries, or government offices, and in schools
and when attending official functions and public ceremonies. According
to human rights groups police regularly conduct house-to-house searches
for suspected dissidents without explanation or legal justification.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Government restricts freedom
of speech and of the press. The country's only regular publication is
Kuensel, a government-run weekly newspaper with a circulation of
10,000. Bhutanese human rights groups state that government ministries
regularly review editorial material and have the power to, and
regularly do, suppress or change content. They allege that the board of
directors nominally responsible for editorial policy is appointed by
and can be removed by the Government. Kuensel, which publishes
simultaneous editions in the English, Dzongkha, and Nepali languages,
supports the Government but does occasionally report criticism of the
King and Government policies in the National Assembly. Nepalese,
Indian, and other foreign newspapers are available.
In 1989 the Government banned all private television reception and
ordered that television antennas and satellite dishes be dismantled.
Many homes in Paro and Thimphu nonetheless have satellite dishes and
receive signals from international broadcasters. In June the Government
introduced locally produced television service with the inauguration of
the Bhutan Broadcasting Service. The service broadcasts 4 hours of
programming daily: 2 hours of locally-produced programming in Dzongkha,
and 2 hours of English-language programming produced outside of the
country (such as from the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and
the Cable News Network (CNN). Late in the year, the Government began
licensing cable operators to provide service in Thimphu and Paro. The
Government radio station broadcasts each day in the four major
languages (Dzongkha,Nepali, English, and Sharchop). The Government
inaugurated the country's first Internet service provider, Druknet, in
June.
English is the medium of instruction in schools and the national
language, Dzongkha, is taught as second language. The teaching of
Nepali as a second language was discontinued in 1990.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Government
restricts freedom of assembly and association. Citizens may engage in
peaceful assembly and association only for purposes approved by the
Government. Although the Government allows civic and business
organizations, there are no legally recognized political parties. The
Government regards parties organized by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the
Bhutan People's Party (BPP) and the Bhutan National Democratic Party
(BNDP)--as well as the Druk National Congress (DNC)--as ``terrorist and
anti-national'' organizations and has declared them illegal. These
parties do not conduct activities inside the country. They seek the
repatriation of refugees and democratic reform.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Government imposes limits on freedom
of religion. The Drukpa branch of the Kagyupa School of Mahayana
Buddhism is the state religion. About two-thirds of the population
practice either Drukpa Kagyupa or Ningmapa Buddhism. The Drukpa branch
is practiced predominantly in the western and central parts of the
country, which are inhabited mainly by ethnic Ngalongs (descendants of
Tibetan immigrants who predominate in government and the civil service,
and whose cultural norms have been declared to be the standard for all
citizens). The Ningmapa school is practiced predominantly in the
eastern part of the country, although there are adherents in other
areas, including the royal family. Most of those living in the east are
ethnic Sharchops--the descendants of those thought to be the country's
original inhabitants. The Government subsidizes monasteries and shrines
of the Drukpa sect and provides aid to about one-third of the Kingdom's
12,000 monks. The Government also provides financial assistance for the
construction of Drukpa Kagyupa and Ningmapa Buddhist temples and
shrines. In the early 1990's, the Government provided funds for the
construction of new Hindu temples and centers of Sanskrit and Hindu
learning and for the renovation of existing temples and places of Hindu
learning. The Drukpa branch enjoys statutory representation in the
National Assembly and in the Royal Advisory Council and is an
influential voice on public policy. Citizens of other faiths, mostly
Hindus, enjoy freedom of worship but may not proselytize. Under the
law, conversions are illegal.
The King has declared major Hindu festivals to be national
holidays, and the royal family participates in them. Foreign
missionaries are not permitted to proselytize, but international
Christian relief organizations and Jesuit priests are active in
education and humanitarian activities. According to dissidents living
outside of the country, the Government restricts the import into the
country of printed religious matter; only Buddhist religious texts are
allowed to enter.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens traveling in border regions are
required to show their citizenship identity cards at immigration check
points, which in some cases are located at a considerable distance from
what is in effect an open border with India. By treaty, citizens may
reside and work in India.
Bhutan is not a signatory to the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees or its 1967 Protocol (See Section 5 regarding
the ethnic Nepalese refugee situation).
The Government states that it recognizes the right to asylum in
accordance with international refugee law; however, it has no official
policy regarding refugees, asylum, first asylum, or the return of
refugees to countries in which they fear persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens do not yet have the right to change their government.
Bhutan is a monarchy with sovereign power vested in the King. In June
1998, the King introduced term limits for his Council of Ministers and
proposed measures to increase the role of the National Assembly in the
formation of his Government. The National Assembly elected a new
Council of Ministers and Government in July 1998 to a 5-year term.
There are elected or partially elected assemblies at the local,
district, and national levels, and the Government claims to encourage
decentralization and citizen participation. Since 1969, the National
Assembly has had the power to remove ministers, who are appointed by
the King, but it has never done so. Political authority resides
ultimately in the King and decisionmaking involves only a small number
of officials. Major decisions are routinely made by officialssubject to
questioning by the National Assembly, but the National Assembly is not
known to have overturned any decisions reached by the King and
government officials.
Political parties do not exist legally, and their formation is
discouraged by the Government as unnecessarily divisive. The Government
prohibits parties established abroad by ethnic Nepalese (see Section
2.b.).
The National Assembly, established in 1953, has 150 members. Of
these, 105 are elected by citizens, 10 are selected by a part of the
Buddhist clergy, and the remaining 35 are appointed by the King to
represent the Government.
The procedures for the nomination and election of National Assembly
members are set out in an amendment to the country's Basic Law proposed
by the King and adopted by the 73rd session of the National Assembly in
1995. It provides that in order to be eligible for nomination as a
candidate for election to the National Assembly, a person must be a
citizen of Bhutan, be at least 25 years of age, not be married to a
foreign national, not have been terminated or compulsorily retired for
misconduct from government service, not have committed any act of
treason against the King, the people, and country, have no criminal
record or any criminal case pending against him, have respect for the
nation's laws, and be able to read and write in Dzongkha (the language,
having different dialects in the eastern and western areas of the
country, spoken by Bhutanese Buddhists).
Each National Assembly constituency consists of a number of
villages. Each village is permitted to nominate one candidate but must
do so by consensus. There is no provision for self-nomination and the
law states that ``no person . . . may campaign for the candidacy or
canvass through other means.'' If more than one village within a
constituency puts forward a candidate, an election is conducted by the
district development committee, and the candidate obtaining a simple
majority of votes cast is declared the winner. Individuals do not have
the right to vote. Every family in a village is entitled to one vote in
elections. The law does not make clear how a candidate is selected if
none achieves a simple majority. It does state, however, that in case
of a tie among the candidates in the election, drawing of lots shall be
resorted to. The candidate whose name is drawn shall be deemed to be
elected.
Human rights activists claim that the only time individual citizens
have any involvement in choosing a National Assembly representative is
when they are asked for their consensus approval of a village candidate
by the village headman. The name put to villagers for consensus
approval by the headman is suggested to him by district officials, who
in turn take their direction from the central Government. Consensus
approval takes place at a public gathering. There is no secret ballot,
according to human rights activists.
The Assembly enacts laws, approves senior Government appointments,
and advises the King on matters of national importance. Voting is by
secret ballot, with a simple majority needed to pass a measure. The
King may not formally veto legislation, but may return bills for
further consideration. The Assembly occasionally rejects the King's
recommendations or delays implementing them, but in general, the King
has enough influence to persuade the Assembly to approve legislation
that he considers essential or to withdraw proposals he opposes. The
Assembly may question government officials and force them to resign by
a two-thirds vote of no confidence. The National Assembly has never
compelled any government official to resign. The Royal Civil Service
Commission is responsible for disciplining subministerial level
government officials and has removed several following their
convictions for crimes including embezzlement.
In June 1998, the King issued a decree setting out several measures
intended to increase the role of the National Assembly in the formation
and dissolution of his Government. The decree, later adopted by the
76th session of the National Assembly, provided that all cabinet
ministers are to be elected by the National Assembly and that the roles
and responsibilities of the cabinet ministries were to be spelled out.
Each cabinet minister is to be elected by simple majority in a secret
ballot in the National Assembly from among candidates nominated by the
King. The King is to select nominees for Cabinet office from among
senior government officials holding the rank of secretary or above. The
King is to award the portfolios of his ministers, whose terms will be
limited to 5 years, after which they must pass a vote of confidence in
the National Assembly in order to remain in office. Finally, the decree
provided that the National Assembly, by a two-thirds vote of no
confidence, can require the King to abdicate and to be replaced by the
next in the line of succession. After adopting the decree, the National
Assembly elected a new Cabinet of Ministers consistent with the decree.
Human rights groups maintain that since only the King may nominate
candidates for cabinet office, their election by the National Assembly
is not a significant democratic reform. TheThe King also removed
himself as Chairman of the Cabinet of Ministers in 1998; Foreign
Minister Jigme Thinley was elected to that position by the National
Assembly for one year, and was replaced by Minister for Health and
Education Sangay Ngedup in July.
Women are underrepresented in government and politics, although
they have made small but visible gains. Three women hold seats in the
National Assembly.
All major ethnic groups, including ethnic Nepalese, are represented
in the National Assembly. There are 16 ``southern Bhutanese'' in the
National Assembly.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are no legal human rights nongovernmental organizations
(NGO's) in the country. The Government regards human rights groups
established by ethnic Nepalese exiles--the Human Rights Organization of
Bhutan, the People's Forum for Human Rights in Bhutan, and the
Association of Human Rights Activists--Bhutan--as political
organizations and does not permit them to operate in the country.
Amnesty International (AI) visited Bhutan in 1992 to investigate and to
report on the alleged abuse of ethnic Nepalese. In late November 1998,
AI again sent a delegation to the country; by year's end, it had not
published a report on the visit.
ICRC representatives continue twice yearly prison visits, and the
Government has allowed them access to detention facilities, including
those in southern districts inhabited by ethnic Nepalese. The chairman
and members of the United Nations Human Rights Commission Working Group
on Arbitrary Detention made a second visit to the country in May 1996
as a follow-up to an October 1994 visit. In addition to meetings with
government officials, members of the working group visited prisons and
interviewed prisoners in Thimphu, Phuntsoling, and Samtse.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
Ongoing government efforts to cultivate a national identity rooted
in the language, religion, and culture of the Ngalong ethnic group
constrain cultural expression by other ethnic groups. In the 1980's and
early 1990's, concern over rapid population growth and political
agitation by ethnic Nepalese resulted in policies and abusive practices
that led to the departure of tens of thousands of ethnic Nepalese, many
of whom were expelled forcibly.
The Government claims that ethnic and gender discrimination in
employment is not a problem. It claims that ethnic Nepalese fill 22
percent of government jobs, which is slightly less than their
proportion of the total population. Bhutanese human rights groups
active outside the country claim that ethnic Nepalese actually make up
about 35 percent of the country's population and that the Government
underreports their number. Women are accorded respect in the traditions
of most ethnic groups; however, persistence of traditional gender roles
apparently accounts for the low proportion of women in government
employment. Exile groups claim that ethnic and gender discrimination is
a problem.
Women.--There is no evidence that rape or spousal abuse are
extensive problems.
There are credible reports by refugees and human rights groups that
security forces raped large numbers of ethnic Nepalese women in the
southern area of the country in 1991 and 1992. According to Amnesty
International, some women were said to have died as a result. In one
independent survey of 1,779 refugee families, 26 percent of the
respondents cited rape, fear of rape, or threat of rape as a prime
reason for their departure from the country. The Government has denied
these reports.
Rape was made a criminal offense in 1953, but that law had weak
penalties and was enforced poorly. In 1993 the National Assembly
adopted a revised rape act with clear definitions of criminal sexual
assault and stronger penalties. In cases of rape involving minors,
sentences range from 5 to 17 years. In extreme cases, a rapist may be
imprisoned for life.
Women constitute 48 percent of the population and participate
freely in the social and economic life of the country. Forty-three
percent of enrollment in school is female, and 16 percent of civil
service employees are women. Inheritance law provides for equal
inheritance among all sons and daughters, but traditional inheritance
practices, which vary among ethnic groups, may be observed if the heirs
choose to forego legal challenges. Dowry is not practiced, even among
ethnic Nepalese Hindus. Among some groups, inheritance practices
favoringdaughters are said to account for the large numbers of women
among owners of shops and businesses and for an accompanying tendency
of women to drop out of higher education to go into business. However,
female school enrollment has been growing in response to government
policies. Women are increasingly found among senior officials and
private sector entrepreneurs, especially in the tourism industry. Women
in unskilled jobs are generally paid slightly less than men.
Polygamy is sanctioned provided the first wife gives her
permission. Marriages may be arranged by partners themselves as well as
by their parents. Divorce is common. Recent legislation requires that
all marriages must be registered and favors women in matters of
alimony.
Children.--The Government has demonstrated its commitment to child
welfare by its rapid expansion of primary schools, health-care
facilities, and immunization programs. The mortality rates for both
infants and children under 5 years have dropped dramatically since
1989, and primary school enrollment has increased at 9 percent per year
since 1991, with enrollment of girls increasing at an even higher rate.
In 1995 the participation rate for boys and girls in primary schools
was estimated at 72 percent, with the rate of completion of 7 years of
schooling at 60 percent for girls and at 59 percent for boys. Children
enjoy a privileged position in society and benefit from international
development programs focused on maternal and child welfare. Amnesty
International reported that at least 23 students, between 7 and 21
years of age, whose relatives had been arrested for supporting the pro-
democracy movement, were expelled from school in eastern Bhutan in
1998. AI also reported that 19-year-old Needup Phuntso was expelled
from school in March 1998 and was tortured by members of the Royal
Bhutanese police after his arrest in Thimphu in July 1998 (see Section
1.c.).
A study by UNICEF found that boys and girls receive equal treatment
regarding nutrition and health care and that there is little difference
in child mortality rates between the sexes. Government policies aimed
at increasing enrollment of girls have increased the proportion of
girls in primary schools from 39 percent in 1990 to 43 percent in 1995.
There is no societal pattern of abuse against children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no evidence of official
discrimination toward people with disabilities but the Government has
not passed legislation mandating accessibility for the disabled.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--Ethnic Nepalese have lived in
the southern part of the country for centuries, and the early phases of
economic development at the turn of the century brought a large influx
of additional ethnic Nepalese. In the late 1980's, concern over the
increase in the population of and political agitation among ethnic
Nepalese prompted aggressive government efforts to assert a national
culture, to tighten control over southern regions, to control illegal
immigration, to expel ethnic Nepalese, and to promote national
integration. Early efforts at national integration focused on
assimilation, including financial incentives for intermarriage,
education for some students in regions other than their own, and an
increase in development funds in the south.
Beginning in 1989, more discriminatory measures were introduced,
aimed at shaping a new national identity, known as Drukpa. Drukpa is
based on the customs of the non-ethnic Nepali Ngalong ethnic group
predominant in the western part of the country. Measures included a
requirement that national dress be worn for official occasions and as a
school uniform, the teaching of Dzongkha as a second language in all
schools, and an end to instruction in Nepali as a second language
(English is the language of instruction in all schools). Also,
beginning in 1988, the Government refused to renew the contracts of
tens of thousands of Nepalese guest workers. Many of these workers had
resided in the country for years, in some cases with their families.
Citizenship became a highly contentious issue. Requirements for
citizenship were first formalized in the Citizenship Law of 1958, which
granted citizenship to all adults who owned land and had lived in the
country for at least 10 years. In 1985, however, a new citizenship law
significantly tightened requirements for citizenship and resulted in
the denaturalization of many ethnic Nepalese. While previously
citizenship was conferred upon children whose father was a citizen
under the 1958 law, the 1985 law required that both parents be citizens
in order to confer citizenship on a child, and that persons seeking to
prove citizenship through their own or their parents' residency in
1958be able to prove residency in the country at that time. In many
cases, persons were unable to produce the documentation necessary, such
as land tax receipts from 1958, to show residency nearly 30 years
before. The law permits residents who lost citizenship under the 1985
law to apply for naturalization if they can prove residence during the
previous 15 years. The Government declared all residents who could not
meet the new requirements to be illegal immigrants.
The 1985 Citizenship Act also provides for the revocation of the
citizenship of any naturalized citizen who ``has shown by act or speech
to be disloyal in any manner whatsoever to the King, country, and
people of Bhutan.'' The Home Ministry, in a circular notification in
1990, advised that ``any Bhutanese nationals leaving the country to
assist and help the anti-nationals shall no longer be considered as
Bhutanese citizens . . . such people's family members living in the
same household will also be held fully responsible and forfeit their
citizenship.'' Human rights groups allege that these provisions were
widely used to revoke the citizenship of ethnic Nepalese who were
subsequently expelled or otherwise departed from the country. Beginning
in 1988, the Government expelled large numbers of ethnic Nepalese
through enforcement of the new citizenship laws.
Outraged by what they saw as a campaign of repression, ethnic
Nepalese mounted a series of demonstrations, sometimes violent, in
September 1990. The protests were spearheaded by the newly formed
Bhutan People's Party (BPP) which demanded full citizenship rights for
ethnic Nepalese, the reintroduction of Nepali as a medium of education
in the south, and democratic reforms. Characterizing the BPP as a
``terrorist'' movement backed by Indian sympathizers, the authorities
cracked down on its activities and ordered the closure of local
Nepalese schools, clinics, and development programs after several were
raided or bombed by dissidents. Many ethnic Nepalese schools were
reportedly turned into Army barracks. There were credible reports that
many ethnic Nepalese activists were beaten and tortured while in
custody, and that security forces committed acts of rape. There were
also credible reports that militants, including BPP members, attacked
and murdered census officers and other officials, and engaged in
bombings. Local officials took advantage of the climate of repression
to coerce ethnic Nepalese to sell their land below its fair value and
to emigrate.
Beginning in 1991, ethnic Nepalese began to leave southern areas of
the country in large numbers and take refuge in Nepal. Many were
forcibly expelled. According to Amnesty International, entire villages
were sometimes evicted en masse in retaliation for an attack on a local
government official. Many ethnic Nepalese were forced to sign
``voluntary migration forms'' wherein they agreed to leave the country,
after local officials threatened to fine or imprison them for failing
to comply. By August 1991, according to NGO reports, 2,500 refugees
were already camped illegally in Nepal, with a steady stream still
coming from Bhutan. The UNHCR began providing food and shelter in
September of that year, and by year's end, there were 6,000 refugees in
Nepal. The number of registered refugees grew to approximately 62,000
by August 1992, and to approximately 80,000 by June 1993, when the
UNHCR began individual screening of refugees. The flow slowed
considerably thereafter; there were no new refugee arrivals from Bhutan
to the camps during the year. As of late 1999, there were approximately
97,000 refugees registered in camps in Nepal, with much of the increase
since 1993 the result of births to residents of the camps. An
additional 15,000 refugees, according to UNHCR estimates, are living
outside the camps in Nepal and India.
Ethnic Nepalese political groups in exile complain that the
revision of the country's citizenship laws in 1985 denaturalized tens
of thousands of former residents of Bhutan. They also complain that the
new laws have been selectively applied and make unfair demands for
documentation on a largely illiterate group in a country that has only
recently adopted basic administrative procedures. They claim that many
ethnic Nepalese whose families have been in the country for generations
were expelled in the early 1990's because they were unable to document
their claims to residence. The Government denies this and asserts that
a three-member village committee--typically ethnic Nepalese in southern
districts--certifies in writing that a resident is a Bhutanese citizen
in cases where documents cannot be produced.
The Government maintains that many of those who departed the
country in 1991-92 were Nepalese or Indian citizens who came to the
country after the enactment of the 1958 Citizenship law but were not
detected until a census in 1988. The Government also claims that many
persons registered in the camps as refugees may never have resided in
the country. A royal decree in 1991 made forcible expulsion of a
citizen a criminal offense. In a January 1992 edict, the King noted
reports that officials had been forcing Bhutanese nationals to leave
the country but stressed that this was a serious and punishable
violation of law. Nevertheless, only three officials were ever punished
for abusing their authority during this period. According to the UNHCR,
the overwhelming majority of refugees who have entered the campssince
screening began in June 1993 have documentary proof of Bhutanese
nationality. Random checks and surveys of camp residents--including
both pre- and post-June 1993 arrivals--bear this out.
A Nepal-Bhutan ministerial committee met seven times between 1994
and 1996, and a secretarial-level committee met twice in 1997 in
efforts to resolve the Bhutanese refugee problem. During 1998, Foreign
Minister Jigme Thinley took office with a mandate to resolve the
refugee issue, and several meetings were held with representatives of
the Nepalese Government, the UNHCR, and NGO's. However, the dialog lost
momentum in 1998 and was suspended by the Bhutanese Government pending
the formation of a new government in Nepal in 1999. After a 3-year
hiatus, the foreign ministers of Nepal and Bhutan met in September in
Kathmandu to resume discussions on the refugee issue.
In March 1996 refugees began a series of ``peace marches'' from
Nepal to Bhutan to assert their right to return to Bhutan. The marchers
who crossed into Bhutan in August, November, and December 1996 were
immediately detained and deported by Bhutanese police. In the December
1996 incident, police reportedly used force against the marchers. Such
marches were also held in 1998 and 1999; the marchers charge that the
police assaulted them during each march, injuring several
demonstrators, and then arrested and deported all marchers. A
resolution adopted by the National Assembly in July 1997 prohibits the
still-resident family members of ethnic Nepalese refugees from holding
jobs with the Government or in the armed forces. Under the resolution,
those holding such jobs were to be involuntarily retired. The
Government made clear that for the purposes of this resolution, family
member would be defined as a parent, a child, a sibling, or a member of
the same household. The Government states that 429 civil servants, many
of them ethnic Nepalese, were retired compulsorily in accordance with
the July 1997 National Assembly resolution, and that the program was
terminated in November. The Government states that those forced to
retire were accorded retirement benefits in proportion to their years
of government service. The Government also began a program of
resettling Buddhist Bhutanese from other regions of the country on land
in the southern part of the country vacated by the ethnic Nepalese now
living in refugee camps in Nepal. Human rights groups maintain that
this action prejudices any eventual outcome of negotiations over the
return of the refugees to the country. The Government maintains that
this is not its first resettlement program and that Bhutanese citizens
who are ethnic Nepalese from the south are sometimes resettled on more
fertile land in other parts of the country.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--Trade unions are not permitted, and
there are no labor unions. Workers do not have the right to strike, and
the Government is not a member of the International Labor Organization.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--There is no
collective bargaining in industry. Industry accounts for about 25
percent of the gross domestic product, but employs only a minute
fraction of the total work force. The Government affects wages in the
manufacturing sector through its control over wages in state-owned
industries.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Government
abolished its system of compulsory labor taxes in December 1995.
Laborers in rural development schemes previously paid through this
system are now paid regular wages. There is no evidence to suggest that
domestic workers are subjected to coerced or bonded labor. The law does
not specifically prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such
practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The law sets the minimum age for employment at 18 years
for citizens and 20 years for noncitizens. A UNICEF study suggested
that children as young as 11 years are sometimes employed with road-
building teams. The law does not specifically prohibit forced and
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur
(see Section 6.c.). The Government provides free and compulsory primary
school education, and 72 percent of the school-aged population is
enrolled. Children often do agricultural work and chores on family
farms. There is no law barring ethnic Nepalese children from attending
school. However, most of the 75 primary schools in southern areas that
were closed in 1990 remain closed today. The closure of the schools
acts as an effective barrier to the ability of the ethnic Nepalese in
southern areas to obtain a primary education.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--A circular effective February 1,
1994, established wage rates, rules and regulations for labor
recruiting agencies, and regulations for payment of workmen's
compensation. Wage rates are periodically revised, and range upward
from a minimum of roughly $1.50 (50 ngultrums) per day for unskilled
and skilled laborers, with various allowances paid in cash or kind in
addition. This minimum wage does provide a decent standard of living
for a worker and family in the local context. The workday is defined as
8 hours with a 1-hour lunch break. Work in excess of this must be paid
at one and one-half times normal rates. Workers paid on a monthly basis
are entitled to 1 day's paid leave for 6 days of work and 15 days of
leave annually. The largest salaried work force is the government
service, which has an administered wage structure last revised in 1988
but supplemented by special allowances and increases since then,
including a 25 percent increase in July 1997. Only about 30 industrial
plants employ more than 50 workers. Smaller industrial units include 69
plants of medium size, 197 small units, 692 ``mini'' units, and 651
cottage industry units. The Government favors a family-owned farm
policy; this, along with the country's rugged geography and land laws
that prohibit a farmer from selling his last five acres and that
require the sale of holdings in excess of 25 acres, result in a
predominantly self-employed agricultural work force. Workers are
entitled to free medical care within the country. They are eligible for
compensation for partial or total disability, and in the event of
death, their families are entitled to compensation. Existing labor
regulations do not grant workers the right to remove themselves from
work situations that endanger health and safety without jeopardizing
their continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The law does not prohibit trafficking
in persons, and there were no reports that persons were trafficked in,
to, or from the country.
______
INDIA
India is a longstanding parliamentary democracy with a bicameral
parliament. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, whose Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) led a 13-party coalition, took office in March 1998 and
heads the Government. The Government lost a parliamentary vote of
confidence on April 17, and new parliamentary elections were held in
September and early October after the President dissolved the lower
house of Parliament in April. President K.R. Narayanan, who was elected
by an electoral college consisting of Members of Parliament and members
of state assemblies, is Head of State and also has special emergency
powers. The judiciary is independent.
Although the 25 state governments have primary responsibility for
maintaining law and order, the central Government provides guidance and
support through the use of paramilitary forces throughout the country.
The Union Ministry for Home Affairs controls most of the paramilitary
forces, the internal intelligence bureaus, and the nationwide police
service; it provides training for senior police officers for the state-
organized police forces. The armed forces are under civilian control.
Security forces committed significant human rights abuses, particularly
in Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeastern states.
India is in a transition from a government-controlled economy to
one that is largely market oriented. The private sector is predominant
in agriculture, most nonfinancial services, consumer goods
manufacturing, and some heavy industry. Economic liberalization and
structural reforms begun in 1991 continue, although momentum has
slowed. The country's economic problems are compounded by rapid
population growth of 1.7 percent per year with a current population of
more than 1 billion. Income distribution remained very unequal, with
the top 20 percent of the population receiving 39.3 percent of income
and the bottom 20 percent receiving 9.2 percent of income. Forty
percent of the urban population and half of the rural population live
below the poverty level.
There continued to be significant human rights abuses, despite
extensive constitutional and statutory safeguards. Serious human rights
abuses included: Political and other extrajudicial killings, including
faked encounter killings and deaths of suspects in police custody
throughout the country and excessive use of force by security forces
combating active insurgencies in Jammu and Kashmir and several
northeastern states; torture and rape by police and other agents of the
Government; poor prison conditions; arbitrary arrest and incommunicado
detention in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast; continued detention
throughout the country of thousands arrested under special security
legislation; lengthy pretrial detention; prolonged detention while
undergoing trial; lengthy delays in trials; occasional limits on
freedom of the press and freedom of movement; harassment and arrest of
human rights monitors; extensive societal violence against women; legal
and societal discrimination against women; female bondage and forced
prostitution; child prostitution and infanticide; discrimination
against the disabled; serious discrimination and violence against
indigenous people and scheduled castes and tribes; widespread
intercaste and communal violence; societal violence against Christians
and Muslims; widespread exploitation of indentured, bonded, and child
labor; and trafficking in women and children.
Many of these abuses are generated by intense social tensions,
violent secessionist movements, and the authorities' attempts to
repress them, and deficient police methods and training. These problems
are acute in Jammu and Kashmir, where judicial tolerance of the
Government's heavy-handed antimilitant tactics, the refusal of security
forces to obey court orders, and terrorist threats have disrupted the
judicial system. The number of insurgency-related killings and acts of
torture in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast by regular security
forces showed no clear improvement from the previous year; this also
was true in the northeast, despite negotiated cease-fires in the
northeast between the Government and insurgent forces and between some
tribal groups. Security forces summarily killed suspected militants and
civilians; with few exceptions, they acted with impunity.
The concerted campaign of execution-style killings of civilians by
Kashmiri militant groups, begun in 1998, continued and included several
killings of political leaders and party workers. Separatist militants
were responsible for numerous, serious abuses, including extrajudicial
executions of members of the armed forces and civilians and other
political killings, torture, and brutality. Separatist militants also
were responsible for kidnaping and extortion in Jammu and Kashmir and
northeast India.
The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces
into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around Kargil
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military campaign to
repel the intrusion resulted in a large number of casualties among
combatants on both sides, as well as some civilian deaths and the
internal displacement of as many as 50,000 persons.
Nearly 100 persons were killed in election-related violence
throughout the country in September and October.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Political killings
by government forces (including deaths in custody and faked encounter
killings) continued at a high level in the state of Jammu and Kashmir
and several northeastern states, where separatist insurgencies
continued. Security forces offered bounties for wanted militants
brought in dead or alive.
The Minister of Home Affairs for Jammu and Kashmir said that
security forces had killed 762 militants in the state as of October.
(Kashmir has been at the center of a territorial dispute between India
and Pakistan since the two nations gained their independence in 1947;
both claim Kashmir.) Kashmiri separatist groups maintain that many such
``encounters'' are faked and that suspected militants offering no
resistance are summarily executed. Statements by senior police and army
officials confirm that the security forces are under instructions to
kill foreign militants rather than attempt to capture them alive. Human
rights groups allege that this is particularly true in the case of
security force encounters with non-Kashmiri militants who cross into
Jammu and Kashmir illegally. Although credible evidence to corroborate
cases and quantify trends is lacking, most observers believe that the
number of killings attributed to regular Indian forces showed no
decrease from the previous year. According to press reports and
anecdotal accounts, those persons killed typically were detained by
security forces, and their bodies, bearing multiple bullet wounds and
often marks of torture, were returned to relatives or were otherwise
discovered the same day or a few days later. For example, on May 15 a
patrol of the Rashtriya Rifles (a regular army unit specially trained
to and assigned to counterinsurgency duty) took two brothers, Abdul
Qayoom and Nazir Ahmed intocustody in Handwara, Jammu and Kashmir. A
few days later, the bodies of the two men were returned to family
members, who were told that they were killed while trying to escape.
NGO's active in Jammu and Kashmir reported that on April 1, Fayaz
Ahmed Bhatt of Anantnag was killed following his arrest by security
forces and that his body was returned to family members by police in
Nishat. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC), a government-
appointed and financed investigative body (see Section 4), directed
that all deaths in encounters immediately be investigated by an
independent agency, but members of the security forces rarely are held
accountable for these killings. The NHRC itself may inquire into
alleged human rights abuses by security forces in Jammu and Kashmir,
but does not have the statutory power to investigate such allegations
if it is not satisfied with the responses to its inquiries. Authorities
generally have not reported encounter deaths that occur in Jammu and
Kashmir to the NHRC. Human rights groups alleged that security forces
summarily executed a number of captured non-Kashmiri militants in Jammu
and Kashmir. During conflicts with armed militants, security forces
allegedly respond indiscriminately to a burst of gunfire.
Soldiers also killed civilians during military counterinsurgency
operations. For example, on August 4, 1998, suspected government-
sponsored counter-militants entered Saalan village, Poonch district,
and summarily executed 19 relatives of a suspected Harkat-ul-Ansar
militant, including 14 children and 2 women. During the year, portions
of the Jammu and Kashmir human rights commission report on this
incident became public; the commission held the army and government-
supported militants responsible. Human rights activists in Jammu and
Kashmir alleged that members of the Rashtriya Rifles shot and killed
Hajra Begum in Fatehpora village, near Baramullah town. Reportedly, the
soldiers went to Begum's home late at night and attempted to rape one
of Begum's daughters. When Begum resisted, the soldiers shot and killed
her and wounded her brother, Bashir Ahmad Rather.
According to an army spokesman, in Jammu and Kashmir security
forces killed 10,727 militants during the 1990's. In November Jammu and
Kashmir governor Girish Chander Saxena said that from 1989-99 militants
killed 8,000 civilians and 2,000 security force members, and that
another 2,600 civilians died in crossfire between security forces and
militant groups. Government figures reveal that 867 civilians, 232
members of the security forces, and 999 militants were killed in Jammu
and Kashmir in 1998. According to the Government, in 1998, 632
civilians, 126 security forces members, and 270 militants were killed
in the northeastern states, and the Government reported 811 total
killings in the northeast during the year.
Impunity has been and remains a serious problem in Jammu and
Kashmir. Security forces have committed thousands of serious human
rights violations over the course of the conflict, including
extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and torture. Despite this
record of abuse, between January 1990 and September 1998, only 295
members of the security forces were prosecuted and punished for any of
these crimes, and no compensation was paid to the victims or their
families, according to the Union Home Ministry. During the same period,
113 members of the security forces were punished for human rights
abuses in the northeastern states. Punishments ranged from reduction in
rank to imprisonment for up to 10 years. According to the NHRC's most
recent report, released in 1998, 259 complaints of alleged human rights
violations by the Border Security Force were registered between January
1990 and March 1997. During the same period, only 31 investigations
into allegations of human rights abuses by members of the army were
completed, resulting in the conviction and sentencing of 81 armed
forces personnel, including 29 officers.
In the past, scrutiny by the NHRC and international human rights
organizations, when permitted, and the persistence of individual
magistrates resulted in somewhat greater accountability for abuses
committed by members of the security forces in Jammu and Kashmir;
however, in July 1998, the Government rejected the NHRC's
recommendations to bring the army and paramilitary forces under closer
scrutiny by allowing the NHRC to investigate complaints of their
excesses. According to a credible Kashmir-based NGO, the killing of
civilians by security forces increased during the year but did not
reach the levels of the mid-1990's. The majority of complaints were
about individual cases; there were no reports of entire villages being
burned by armed forces or of mass killings. The NHRC continues to
receive complaints alleging human rights violations by the security
forces, especially from Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states.
The vast majority of violations by security forces continue to go
uninvestigated and unpunished.
There were many allegations that military and paramilitary forces
in the northeast engage in arbitrary detention, abduction, torture, and
the extrajudicial execution of militants, as well as rape (see Sections
1.c. and 1.g.). TheArmed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958 and the
Disturbed Areas Act of 1976 remained in effect in several states where
active secessionist movements exist, namely, in Jammu and Kashmir,
Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and parts of Tripura. The Disturbed Areas Act
gives police extraordinary powers of arrest and detention, which
according to human rights groups allow security forces to operate with
virtual impunity in areas under the act. The Armed Forces Special
Powers Act of 1958 provides search and arrest powers without warrants.
Human rights monitors allege that, as in Jammu and Kashmir,
government reports of deaths during ``encounters'' between insurgent
groups and security forces in northeastern states actually are staged,
and that those insurgents who were reported dead were killed after
being detained by security forces. More than 25 encounters occurred
between security forces and militant groups during the first 7 months
of the year, leaving 34 militants and 48 members of the security forces
dead in the northeastern states, according to a compilation of
newspaper accounts. For example, in a shootout on February 23 in
Jankhang, Nagaon district, army Major Murli Gangadhar and ``Pratap,''
the area commander of the Kabri National Volunteers militant group were
shot and killed. In Guwahati district, police shot and killed a
National Democratic Front of Bodoland leader at Bhetapara on March 3.
On May 17, the army shot and killed a United Liberation Front of Assam
(ULFA) leader in Darrang district. On August 5, police killed a ULFA
militant, Babul Ingty, alias Putul Teron, who was wanted in connection
with more than 25 cases of murder, kidnaping, and extortion. In Tripura
during the first 8 months of the year, there were at least 9 encounters
between security forces and various militant groups resulting in the
deaths of 55 militants and 24 members of the security forces, according
to a compilation of newspaper articles. On March 3, the army killed
five militants in Chandel district. On March 28, the security forces
killed an ULFA militant in Tinsukia district. In Manipur security
forces shot a Manipur People's Army (MPA) militant and injured two
persons in an encounter near the Manipur-Assam border. On April 12,
five suspected People's Liberation Army (PLA) terrorists were killed in
an encounter with the army in Bishenpur district.
In a positive development, in July the Supreme Court directed the
central Government to explain why it had not acceded to the request of
the NHRC to release records pertaining to the October 1993 killing of
some 60 civilians by security forces in Bijbehara town, Anantnag
district; however, the Government did not respond.
Since 1980 clashes between police and Naxalite Maoist
revolutionaries of the Peoples' War Group (PWG) have occurred in
northwestern Andhra Pradesh. Over the past few years, hundreds of
policemen and suspected Naxalites have been killed, according to press
reports and human rights organizations. According to local human rights
groups, 135 persons were killed in police ``Encounters'' in the first 6
months of the year. Nineteen years of guerrilla-style conflict have led
to serious human rights abuses by both sides. Human rights groups
allege that ``encounters'' often are faked by the police to cover up
the torture and subsequent murder of Naxalite suspects, sympathizers,
or informers. For example, in May police took into custody three
leaders of a radical students union who were suspected of having links
with the PWG. According to human rights groups, the police tortured and
killed two of the students, abandoning their bodies in a forest. The
third student later was released, although he too underwent torture
(see Section 1.c.). In another incident cited by human rights groups,
police arrested, tortured, then killed four of six farmers in a village
in Adilabad district in April (see Section 1.c.). Their bodies were
found in a forest 150 miles away from the village, and the incident was
reported as an ``encounter death.'' After the villagers protested, the
police produced the other two farmers in court as ``suspected
extremists.'' The PWG alleged that police killed three of their
members, Adi Reddy, Santosh Reddy, and Seelam Naresh, in a ``faked
encounter'' in Koyyuru forest, Karnataka, on December 2, and that
another PWG member helped frame them. As further evidence that
``encounters'' often are faked by police, human rights groups also cite
the refusal of police officials to hand over the corpses of suspects
killed in ``encounters,'' which often are cremated before families can
view the bodies. Villagers in PWG-dominated areas complain of regular
harassment and arbitrary detention by police. Police officials rarely
if ever are held accountable for human rights abuses. In 1998 the
Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, a local NGO, documented more
than 100 encounter killings by police in which no perpetrators were
prosecuted. The NHRC is investigating some 285 reported cases of so-
called ``fake encounter deaths'' allegedly committed by the Andhra
police in connection with anti-Naxalite operations. In its 1996-97
report, the NHRC stated that the evidence on record did not reveal that
any prior attempt was made by the police to arrest the deceased
persons. The report observed that in none of these encounters did
police personnel receive any injury, while one or more persons from the
other side died. The Commission further observed that ``no attempt
whatsoever'' was made to ascertain theidentity of the police officers
who fired the weapons that caused the deaths and that no attempt was
made to investigate the circumstances under which the police opened
fire. ``As this appeared to be the pattern of the procedure followed by
the police,'' the report concluded, ``the Commission felt it necessary
to conclude that the procedure followed by them was opposed to law.''
According to the Andhra Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee, the NHRC has
evidence of police culpability in several cases of ``encounter deaths''
involving suspected Naxalites. However, such cases have not been
adjudicated in the courts or have otherwise not been acted on by the
state government. For example, of six cases referred by the Andhra
Pradesh Civil Liberties Committee to the NHRC in 1994, evidence of
police culpability was found in five. The NHRC directed the state
government to investigate the cases; however, action apparently never
was taken by the state. The state government's failure to act
expeditiously in these cases has discouraged local human rights groups
from filing additional ``encounter death'' cases with the NHRC.
The Disturbed Areas Act has been in force in a number of districts
in Andhra Pradesh for over 2 years. Human rights groups allege that
security forces have been able to operate with virtual impunity in
parts of Andhra Pradesh under the act. They further allege that Andhra
Pradesh police officers train and provide weapons to an armed vigilante
group known as the ``Green Tigers,'' whose mission is to combat
Naxalite groups in the state. Little is known about the size,
composition, or activities of this group.
Police also used excessive force indiscriminately against
demonstrators, killing many citizens. For example, in Tirunelveli,
Tamil Nadu 17 persons drowned in a river in July when thousands of
demonstrators ran to escape a police beating. The demonstrators were
demanding government intervention in a labor dispute at a local coffee
estate and the release of 652 estate workers imprisoned after a
previous demonstration (see Section 2.b.). The police reportedly began
to throw rocks at demonstrators, beat them with batons, fired weapons
in the air, and chased the demonstrators into a nearby river. The
police reportedly followed demonstrators into the river and hit some of
them with batons. They also allegedly beat persons attempting to rescue
drowning demonstrators. Leaders of the demonstration alleged that the
autopsies of the victims were flawed, but the state government rejected
their demand for a second post mortem. The state has ordered an
investigation into the incident to be conducted by a retired Supreme
Court judge. By year's end, no progress had been made.
On July 17, police killed two persons at Chhapra and one at
Darbhanga in Bihar after a scheduled entrance exam for the army was
postponed, resulting in a riot. More than 30 persons, including a
senior army officer and a police subinspector, were injured. In
February in Murshidabad district, West Bengal, the Border Security
Force shot and killed two villagers and injured another when a group of
villagers tried to smuggle cattle into Bangladesh.
Throughout the country, numerous accused criminals continue to be
killed in encounters with police. For example, the People's Union for
Civil Liberties (PUCL) in Bihar alleged that police shot and killed
Lallu Singh and Bharat Singh, two unarmed men who had surrendered to
them at Dadpur, Dhagwanpur district, on June 22, 1998. Police contend
that the two persons were planning to commit a ``serious crime,'' and
that they were armed and resisting arrest. However, witnesses to the
killings told the PUCL that the two had surrendered, offered no
resistance, and were shot at point-blank range.
According to the Government, 462 civilians and 106 police officers
died in exchanges of gunfire involving police in 1997. In January the
NHRC directed the government of Uttar Pradesh to pay an interim
compensation of $11,500 (500,250 rupees) each to the families of three
young men killed due to indiscriminate firing by police on the Banaras
Hindu University campus. Two of the victims were students and the third
a former student when the shootings occurred in February 1997.
Security forces also held persons in incommunicado detention; on
occasion, as in the 1996 case of human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi,
such missing persons later were found dead (see Sections 1.b. and 4).
As of December 1997, 55 cases of disappearance and custodial death
still were pending against Border Security Force personnel in Jammu and
Kashmir (see Sections 1.b. and 1.c.).
While extrajudicial killings continued in areas buffeted by
separatist insurgencies, the press and judiciary also continued to give
attention to deaths in police custody. According to the Government, 817
persons died in prisons between January 1 and September 30, 1998, many
from natural causes, in some cases aggravated by poor prison conditions
(see Section 1.c.). Humanrights groups allege that many deaths in
prisons are due to torture.
The NHRC has focused on torture and deaths in custody by directing
district magistrates to report all deaths in police and judicial
custody and stating that failure to do so would be interpreted as an
attempted coverup. Magistrates appear to be complying with this
directive. However, the NHRC has no authority to investigate directly
abuses by the security forces, and security forces therefore are not
required to--and do not--report custodial deaths in Jammu and Kashmir
or the northeast. In 1998 the NHRC ordered the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI) (the central government agency charged with
investigation of serious crimes), to investigate the torture death of
Delhi leather merchant Hari Shankar Pal, who was arrested along with
five other persons and beaten by Hauz Kazi police on December 8, 1997.
After 2 days of abuse, police took Pal to the city's Ram Manohar Lohia
hospital, where he was pronounced dead upon arrival. The results of the
May 1998 CBI investigation were not made public; the station house
officer of the Hauz Kazi police station was transferred to another
duty. In September the NHRC directed the government of Punjab to pay
compensation to the family of Mela Singh, Mansa district, Punjab, who
died in the Lehragaga police station on December 2, 1994. In a
complaint to the NHRC, the victim's wife alleged that the police had
detained her husband illegally for 4 days and that he died in police
custody due to torture. According to credible NGO's, on August 16,
police allegedly tortured Lakhbir Singh Lakha to death in police
custody at a police post in Chohla Sahib in Tarn Taran district,
Punjab. On September 18, Devinder Singh, a young Sikh, died in police
custody at the Ropar police station in Punjab. Devinder Singh was
arrested with his two brothers; all three persons allegedly were
tortured (see Section 1.c.). As of year's end, no one had been held
accountable.
On June 2, the NHRC demanded a response from Delhi police to a
complaint that it received alleging that Raziuddin died April 30 of
torture injuries inflicted in Tihar jail following his arrest by the
crime branch of the Delhi police. The NHRC also received a complaint
alleging that police in Jehanabad village, near Pilibit, Uttar Pradesh,
beat to death 20-year-old Dilshad on May 23, hours after arresting him.
An autopsy was conducted, but instead of returning the body to family
members, the complaint alleged that police had the body cremated on May
24, without the consent of the family. In Haryana six police officers
were suspended and charged with culpable homicide and wrongful
confinement in connection with the death in custody on August 15 of
Mohinder Singh, a 45-year-old employee of the Haryana state electricity
board. Alipur police arrested Singh the same day. His body was brought
to nearby Hindu Rao hospital a few hours later, allegedly bearing marks
of torture. In Gujarat the NHRC demanded information from authorities
regarding the June 25 death of Ganga Nepali, an inmate of Sabarmati
jail. According to the report of a three-member committee established
by the West Bengal government's prisons department, there were 46
custodial deaths in the state in 1995-96, 44 in 1996-97, and 66 in
1997-98. On March 19, for example, the charred body of Pappu Ahmed was
found in the Howrah jail toilet. Jail authorities claim that Ahmed was
a drug addict and had committed suicide. The West Bengal Human Rights
Commission ordered an investigation, questioning how he got matches and
kerosene, and the suicide motive. In May Jagadeesan, a 14-year-old
student who was arrested for causing damage to public property in
Sivaganga district, Tamil Nadu, died from torture injuries inflicted by
police. The Tamil Nadu government ordered an investigation, and the
policemen involved were suspended from active duty.
An army major was arrested in 1998 for the 1996 killing of human
rights monitor Jalil Andrabi. The case still was being heard at year's
end, but human rights workers alleged that the central Government and
Jammu and Kashmir state both were attempting to subvert the judicial
process by withholding evidence. There were no developments in the 1996
killing of human rights monitor Parag Das, who allegedly was killed by
a militant who previously had surrendered and was supported by the
Government (see Section 4.).
Killings and abductions of suspected militants and other persons by
progovernment countermilitants continued as a significant pattern in
Jammu and Kashmir. Countermilitants are former separatist militants who
surrendered to government forces but have retained their arms and
paramilitary organization. Government agencies fund, exchange
intelligence with, and direct operations of countermilitants as part of
the counterinsurgency effort. Countermilitants are known to search
persons at roadblocks (see Section 2.d.) and guard extensive areas of
the Kashmir valley from attacks by militants. The Government, through
its sponsoring and condoning of extrajudicial countermilitant
activities is responsible for killings, abductions, and other abuses
committed by these militant groups. Perhaps as many as 3,000
individuals continue to operate in Jammu and Kashmir, particularly in
the countryside, outsidemajor towns. The Hizbul Mujahideen, a Kashmiri
militant group, told the press in June 1998 that progovernment
countermilitants had killed 350 of its members. According to the
Lashkar-I-Toiba, another militant group, security forces killed 21
members during the year in Jammu and Kashmir; however, this number has
not been confirmed, and comes from one of only many groups in the
state. Precise numbers are unavailable. The Government recruited
countermilitants into the Special Operations Group of the Jammu and
Kashmir police and into the Border Security Force (BSF).
Militant groups in Jammu and Kashmir increasingly targeted members
of the security forces and civilians during the year. On April 29, five
militants forcibly entered the home of Ahad Ganai, in Kreshipora,
Kupwara district, rounded up the residents, and shot them with
automatic weapons, killing eight family members, including children. On
July 13, militants attacked a BSF residential compound in Baramulla
district, killing three BSF troops; two militants also died in the
exchange. On August 10, militants attacked a BSF position in Rajouri
district, killing one BSF soldier and injuring two others. On August
11, militants killed three BSF soldiers and injured three others in
Rajouri district. Militants also carried out attacks on security forces
and civilians that killed numerous persons (see Section 1.g.).
The police, BSF, and army each reported that during the year they
had the highest number of causalities of any year during the past
decade of militancy. The BSF reported that during the year militants
killed over 35 persons, including 5 officers. The police forces
reported that, as of September, 61 policemen had been killed. Army
statistics indicated that during the year over 200 soldiers were killed
in counter-insurgency violence in Jammu and Kashmir. The year's total
number of security force deaths (over 300 according to the Home
Minister) indicates a nearly 50 percent increase above prior years.
During the period of increased militant attacks against the
security forces, there was a parallel decline in massacres of unarmed
civilians in Jammu and Kashmir; however, incidents of mass killings of
civilians still occurred. Between May and July, Muslim militants
carried out four mass killings of Hindu villagers in Jammu and Kashmir.
On July 20, approximately 20 militants entered two houses in the Doda
district of Jammu region, and opened fire with automatic weapons,
killing over 15 Hindu persons, including 3 women and 7 children; one
woman was 75 years old. The militants, identified by a survivor as
belonging to Hizbul-Mujahideen, specifically were targeting five men in
the houses who were members of their local village defense committee
(VDC). In 1998 the state police created dozens of VDC's throughout
Jammu as a means of arming Kashmiri Hindus (Pandits) against attacks by
Muslim militants (see Section 5).
Insurgency and increased ethnic violence took a heavy toll in the
northeast. Extensive, complex patterns of violence continued in many of
the seven northeastern states. The main insurgent groups in the
northeast include two factions of the National Socialist Council of
Nagaland (NSCN) in Nagaland; Meitei extremists in Manipur; the ULFA and
the Bodo security force in Assam; and the ATTF and the NLFT in Tripura.
The proclaimed objective of many of these groups is to secede from of
the country, creating new, independent nations. Their stated grievances
against the Government range from charges of neglect and indifference
to the endemic poverty of the region, to allegations of active
discrimination against the tribal and nontribal people of the region by
the central Government (see Section 5). The oldest of these conflicts,
involving the Nagas, dates back to the country's independence in 1947.
On August 1, 1997, a cease-fire between the Government and the Isak-
Muivah faction of the NSCN (NCSN-IM) entered into effect and largely
has been observed by the Government and all insurgent groups in the
state. During the latter part of the year, the cease-fire was extended
through July 31, 2000. In May underground Naga leaders Isak Chisi Swu
and Thuingaleng Muivah, chairman and general secretary respectively of
the NSCM-IM, visited Nagaland for the first time in 33 years. The
Government asked the NSCM-IM to define the geographical boundary of
``Nagalim'' to enable it to extend the cease-fire zone to these areas.
On August 18, the NSCM-IM killed Dally Mungro, general secretary of the
Khaplang faction of the NSCN, along with two of his associates.
The Kuki and Paite ethnic tribes also entered into a cease-fire in
March 1998, which was signed in the presence of Manipur's chief
minister. Both sides observed the cease-fire, and in October 1998 a
peace accord between them was signed. In 1997 violence between the Kuki
and Paite communities led to hundreds of deaths and the burning of many
homes. Elsewhere in the northeast, the upsurge in Bodo-Santhal ethnic
clashes, which began in April 1998, continued throughout the year. More
than 260,000 persons live under poor conditions in relief camps in
Assam's Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon, and adjoining districts as a result of
the ongoing violence between Bodos and Santhals. Thekillings of ULFA
leaders' family members during the year renewed concerns about the
situation in Assam. There also were encounters between security forces
and the NSCN-Khaplang faction throughout the year.
In Tripura kidnapings committed by militant groups operating in the
state continued to be a problem. For example on March 19 a Communist
Party (Marxist) leader was kidnaped and killed by the National
Liberation Front of Tripura militants. Even after ransom is paid for
captives, many are killed. According to a compilation of newspaper
accounts compiled during the first 8 months of the year, more than 193
persons were killed in insurgency-related violence in Assam; 184 in
Tripura; 88 in Manipur; 7 in Mizoram; 5 in Nagaland; and 4 in
Meghalaya. On March 7, ULFA militants shot and killed a local Congress
Party leader in Assam. On March 26, ULFA militants killed the Assam
state agriculture minister's brother and injured the health minister's
brother. On March 29, ULFA militants shot and killed the nephew of the
public health engineering minister in north Lakhimpur district. On the
same day, an armed group of Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist
Liberation) members shot and killed three members of a rival faction in
retaliation for the earlier murder of some of their members. On May 19,
in south Tripura district, NLFT insurgents hacked to death Halendra
Tripura, a tribal Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPM) leader, and
his brother-in-law, Ananda Mohan Roaja, a senior tribal leader and a
member of the Tripura state legislative assembly. On June 17, suspected
monitors of the Congress and the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity killed CPM
member Sukhlal Debnath in Mohanpur, Sadar subdivision. On July 14,
suspected NLFT militants killed Amar Pal, a CPM leader, and abducted
his nephew in Dhanlekha village in south Tripura (see Section 1.b.). In
August militants belonging to the Isac-Muivah faction of the NSCN-IM
and Mizoram's tribal Hmar People's Conference (HPC) killed at least one
person during a spree of abductions (see Section 1.b.). Three militant
attacks occurred in November, killing numerous persons; these attacks
made use of some unconventional weapons, and in some cases targeted
civilians (see Sections 1.g. and 5).
The kidnaping of NGO environmental monitor Sanjay Ghosh in 1997 and
his death at the hands of his ULFA captors continued to attract wide
public criticism. On August 6, 1997, ULFA confirmed that Ghosh died in
captivity after being ``arrested and tried.'' ULFA still has not
produced Ghosh's body. In June the CBI filed murder charges in
connection with the case against ULFA leader Paresh Arua and 10 other
ULFA members. Groups representing several ethnic tribal peoples in
Assam, including the Santhals, Mundas, Oraons, Gonds, Savars, Bhils,
Koyas, Kharias, Lohars, and Parjas, allege that they have been the
target of systematic violence at the hands of the National Democratic
Front for Bodoland. In Assam surrendered members of the ULFA (Sulfa's)
were labeled as traitors and targeted for murder by ULFA members. On
March 6, ULFA members fired a rocket-propelled grenade at a Guwahati
apartment building housing several Sulfa's; there were minor injuries.
In retaliation for this and other attacks, the relatives of ULFA
members allegedly have been targeted. For example, on March 6, just
hours after the apartment building rocketing, unidentified gunmen
attacked three houses in Guwahati belonging to the relatives of ULFA
members, killing six persons and injuring a 50-year-old woman.
Naxalite Maoist revolutionaries of the PWG killed dozens of
persons, declaring them ``class enemies'' or police informers. On March
3, a group of about 60 armed Naxalites entered Bhimpura village, Bihar,
forcibly entered 25 homes, and murdered 5 persons, including 3 members
of a family. In areas under their control, Naxalites dispense summary
justice in ``People's Courts,'' which in some cases condemn to death
suspected police informers, village headmen, and others deemed to be
``class enemies'' or ``caste oppressors'' (landlords); the Naxalites
also extort money from these groups, as well as businesses. On February
10, the Naxalite PWG killed seven lower caste villagers in Bihar (see
Section 5). On September 4, Naxalite members shot and killed the
superintendent of police in Hyderabad. On September 15, 10 to 15
Naxalite insurgents in Sirpur, Andhra Pradesh shot and killed Paliwai
Purushottam Rao, a member of the Andhra Pradesh legislative assembly,
as well as 3 bodyguards. On December 15, Naxalite extremists belonging
to the PWG hacked to death Madhya Pradesh state minister Likhiram
Kaware, a three-term Congress Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA), as
he slept at his ancestral home in Sonepuri. According to media reports,
the PWG left a note at the murder scene stating that the killing was in
retaliation for police action against group members carried out in
Andhra Pradesh on December 1, in which four extremists were killed.
This is the first known instance in which PWG extremists targeted a
high-level government official. The PWG also use land mines to kill
police (see Section 1.g.), and insurgents use bombs to kill government
officials, police, and civilians. Naxalite violence has plagued Andhra
Pradesh since the early 1980's, and has claimed more than 500 civilian
and police victims since 1996 alone.
In November 1997, an independent commission of inquiry established
by Parliament in 1991 to investigate the May 21, 1991 assassination of
former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi tabled an interim report of its
findings in the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament). The report
pointed to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as clearly
responsible for the assassination but was inconclusive on the question
of whether the LTTE had received assistance in carrying out the murder.
It criticized the then-government for an alleged failure to provide
comprehensive security for the former Prime Minister. On January 28,
1998, a designated lower court in Chennai sentenced to death all 26
persons accused in the assassination. The CBI originally charged 41
persons in the case; 12 since have died, and 3 have evaded capture
(including LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan). Many of those
sentenced, who include both Indian and Sri Lankan nationals, allegedly
played a peripheral role in the assassination plot, but the court
upheld the CBI contention that all of them were aware that they were
conspiring in a common cause. Having heard an appeal of the
convictions, the Supreme Court on May 11 acquitted 19 of the 26 accused
persons and upheld the convictions of 7 persons (see Section 1.d.). It
sustained the death sentence in the case of four of the convicted
persons and changed the sentence of three others to life imprisonment.
The incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces into territory on the
Indian side of the line of control around Kargil and the Indian
military campaign to repel the intrusion resulted in a large number of
casualties on both sides, including civilians (see Section 1.g.).
Nearly 100 persons were killed in election-related violence
throughout the country in September and October (see Sections 1.g. and
4).
Religiously and ethnically motivated violence led to large numbers
of deaths (see Section 5).
Mob lynchings of tribal people occur in many states (see Section
5).
In April security officials reported that 6 Bangladeshis and three
Indians were killed and that over 60 persons were wounded in a border
exchange of mortar rounds and gunfire along the West Bengal-Bangladesh
border. There are about one or two such incidents reported annually.
b. Disappearance.--According to human rights groups,
unacknowledged, incommunicado detention of suspected militants
continued in Jammu and Kashmir; however, the Government has not
released any recent figures.
The Jammu and Kashmir police acknowledged that 1,228 suspected
militants were arrested during 1998 and that an additional 187
surrendered. Of this number, 529 persons were released after
preliminary questioning, 457 persons were charged under special
security laws, and the remaining persons were released at a later stage
of judicial review. In addition the Jammu and Kashmir police stated
that in 1998 it held 514 persons under the Public Safety Act (PSA). The
Jammu and Kashmir Minister of Home Affairs said that 552 militants were
arrested and 62 persons surrendered during the first 9 months of the
year. According to an Amnesty International report that was released
during the year, there are over 800 unsolved disappearances in Kashmir
since 1990. The Government was unable to provide complete statistics
for the number of persons held under special security laws in the
northeast, but acknowledged that 43 persons were in detention under the
National Security Act as of December 31, 1998. Although the Government
allowed the Terrorist and Disruptive Practices (Prevention) Act (TADA)
to lapse in 1995, one credible human rights organization stated that
more than 1,000 persons remained in detention awaiting prosecution
under the law. Several thousand others are held in short-term
confinement in transit and interrogation centers.
Human rights groups maintain that several hundred more persons are
held by the military and paramilitary forces in long-term
unacknowledged detention in interrogation centers and transit camps in
Jammu and Kashmir and in the northeast that nominally are intended for
only short-term confinement. Human rights groups fear that many of
these unacknowledged prisoners are subject to torture and extrajudicial
killing (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). According to one credible NGO,
there were 1,300 writs of habeas corpus pending in the Jammu and
Kashmir High Court at midyear. In March Amnesty International reported
that the fates of between 700 and 800 persons reported missing in Jammu
and Kashmir since 1990 remain unexplained by authorities. The U.N.
Special Rapporteur on Torture reported in 1997 that more than 15,000
habeas corpus petitions have been filed in India since 1990, ``but that
in the vast majority of these cases the authorities had not responded
to the petitions.'' During the year, the Working Group on Enforced or
Involuntary Disappearances of the U.N. Commission on Human
Rightstransmitted 33 newly reported cases of disappearance to the
Government, 14 of which reportedly occurred in 1998. The Government
submitted information on eight cases of disappearance to the Working
Group during the year. In one prominent case in Jammu and Kashmir, the
Government responded to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary, or Arbitrary Executions in 1997 and stated that human rights
monitor Jalil Andrabi was not arrested by security forces, as alleged
by human rights groups, but that he was abducted by ``unidentified
armed persons.'' Andrabi was last seen alive in the presence of
countermilitants and members of the security forces on March 8, 1996,
in Srinagar. Despite the Government's statement, the army in February
1996 identified to a Srinagar court a major with a temporary commission
as the individual primarily responsible for Andrabi's death. Allegedly
security forces dumped Andrabi's body into the Jhelum River. His case
also is the subject of an inquiry by the NHRC. In 1998 an army major
was arrested for the killing of Andrabi. There was no progress in the
case by year's end (see Sections 1.a. and 4). In April 1998, the
Government stated that it would investigate the fate of eight persons
who reportedly disappeared in Jammu and Kashmir during 1997: Fayaz
Ahmad Beigh, Fayaz Ahmad Khan, Abdula Rashid Wahid, Mohammed Ashraf
Dar, Mohammed Afzal Shah, Nisar Ahmad Wani, Manzoor Ahmad Dar, and
Bilal Ahmad Sheikh. By September 1998, the Government could account for
only one of the eight, claiming that Fayaz Ahmad Beigh escaped police
custody on September 9, 1997, and was believed to have crossed the line
of control into Pakistan. By year's end, no new information was
available. As of December 1997, 55 cases of disappearance and custodial
death still were pending against Border Security Force personnel in
Jammu and Kashmir (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
The Government maintains that screening committees administered by
the state governments provide information about detainees to their
families. However, other sources indicate that families are able to
confirm the detention of their relatives only by bribing prison guards.
For example witnesses report that uniformed security forces arrested
Muhammad Ashraf Mir, Bilal Ahmad Mir, Munir Ahmad Mir, and Gulzar Ahmad
Wani on Residency Road, Kashmir valley, on May 4 and took them to an
unknown location. Authorities did not provide any information about the
arrests, despite repeated requests from family members. A program of
prison visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),
which began in October 1995, is designed in part to help assure
communications between detainees and their families. During the year,
the ICRC visited approximately 1,000 detainees in 20 places of
detention. All acknowledged detention centers in Jammu and Kashmir and
Kashmiri detainees elsewhere in the country were visited. However, the
ICRC is not authorized to visit interrogation centers or transit
centers, nor does it have access to regular detention centers in the
northeast (see Sections 1.c. and 4).
In Punjab the pattern of disappearances prevalent in the early
1990's appears to be at an end. Hundreds of police and security
officials were not held accountable for serious human rights abuses
committed during the counterinsurgency of 1984-94. However, steps were
taken against a few such violators. The CBI claims to be pursuing
actively charges against dozens of police officials implicated in the
``mass cremations'' case. Police in the Tarn Taran district secretly
disposed of bodies of suspected militants believed to have been
abducted and extrajudicially executed, cremating them without the
knowledge or consent of their families. The CBI, in its report to the
Supreme Court in December 1996, stated that Punjab police secretly had
cremated over 2,000 bodies in Tarn Taran; of these, 585 bodies had been
identified fully, 274 had been identified partially, and 1,238 were
unidentified. Most reportedly were killed by border security forces
while trying to enter the country from Pakistan, were unidentified
victims of accidents or suicide, or died in clashes between militant
factions. However, 424 persons were apparently militants killed in the
interior of the district, 291 of whom subsequently were identified.
These numbers demonstrate the extent of the bloodshed during those
years and, given the pattern of police abuses prevalent during the
period, credibly include many killed in extrajudicial executions. The
NHRC is seeking to obtain compensation for the families of those
victims whose remains were identified, but the Government has
challenged the NHRC's jurisdiction in the cases. In September 1998, the
Supreme Court upheld the right of the NHRC to investigate the cases. In
August 1998, the Committee for the Coordination on Disappearances in
Punjab (CCDP) member and former Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh
presented the chief minister of Punjab with a list of approximately
3,000 persons who either were missing or had died in encounters with
security forces during the period of unrest in Punjab. Former justice
Singh also announced that the CCDP would form a three-member commission
to investigate the mass cremations. The Commission received little
cooperation from state government authorities and made little progress
during the year (see Section 4).
In August Amnesty International called on the Government to explain
the disappearances and prosecute those responsible. Itexpressed concern
that police in Punjab might be obstructing the judicial inquiry into
the death of human rights monitor Jaswant Singh Khalra. Khalra was
investigating the cremation of unidentified bodies by Tarn Taran
police. Several witnesses observed Punjab police officials arrest
Khalra outside his Amritsar home on September 6, 1995. Police officials
subsequently denied that they had arrested Khalra, and he has not been
seen since. On July 30, 1996, following its investigation, the CBI
identified nine Punjab police officials as responsible for Khalra's
abduction and recommended their prosecution. One of the suspects
subsequently died, reportedly by suicide; none of the others were
charged by year's end. In July 1998, Punjab police arrested Jaspal
Singh Dhillon, another member of the CCDP who was active in the Tarn
Taran investigation, on suspicion of conspiring to free several
convicted Sikh separatists from a Chandigarh jail. He was released on
bail on May 27. These events prompted extended public debate over the
accountability of Punjab police for excesses while suppressing a
violent insurgency. According to human rights monitors in Punjab,
approximately 100 police officials were either facing charges, were
prosecuted, or were under investigation for human rights abuses at
year's end. Early in the year, the Punjab High Court, acting on a
petition by the Punjab police, ordered the suspension of public
hearings conducted by the People's Commission of Enquiry; at year's
end, they had not resumed.
There are credible reports that police throughout the country often
do not file required arrest reports. As a result, there are hundreds of
unsolved disappearances in which relatives claim that an individual was
taken into police custody and never heard from again. Police usually
deny these claims, countering that there are no records of arrest. In
Manipur 14-year-old Yumlembam Sanamacha of Thoubal district has been
missing since his arrest by soldiers on February 12, 1998. The army
reportedly detained him because of his alleged links with insurgent
groups. The All-Manipur Students' Union petitioned the Guwahati High
Court for Sanamacha's release. The Court ordered the army to produce
the boy, but it failed to do so and his whereabouts remain unknown. On
May 5, police in Siliguri, West Bengal, arrested 14-year-old Pinter
Yadav and his 9-year-old cousin. According to local human rights
monitors, the boys were beaten, and when Pinter began to vomit blood he
was taken to a local police station. He has not been seen since, and
efforts by family members to petition police for information were
unsuccessful.
Militants in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast continued to use
kidnapings to sow terror, seek the release of detained comrades, and
extort funds. Sometimes kidnaped persons later were killed (see
Sections 1.a. and 1.g.). According to government figures, there were
634 kidnapings in the northeast during the year. There were no new
developments in the case of the 1995 kidnapings of American, British,
German, and Norwegian nationals, despite police cooperation with
foreign diplomats.
On July 14, suspected NLFT militants killed Amar Pal, a CPM leader,
and abducted his nephew in Dhanlekha village in south Tripura (see
Section 1.a.). On July 31, a Jalpaiguri tea garden owner was kidnaped
in Assam. On August 3, a group of eight rebels reportedly belonging to
the Isac-Muivah faction of NSCN-IM and Mizoram's tribal Hmar People's
Conference (HPC) kidnaped Goutam Roy and Hitesh Puri, both senior tea
executives. On August 4, a gang of five militants, suspected of being
members of NSCN-IM and the Assam-based Muslim United Liberation Tigers
(MULT), kidnaped Debojyoti Sharma, another tea executive and demanded
ransom, to fund their activities. The kidnap victims later were
released. In August militants belonging to the Isac-Muivah faction of
the NSCN-IM and Mizoram's tribal Hmar People's Conference (HPC) killed
at least one person during a spree of abductions (see Section 1.a.).
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The law prohibits torture, and confessions extracted by
force are generally inadmissible in court; however, torture is common
throughout the country, and authorities often use torture during
interrogations. In other instances, they torture detainees to extort
money and sometimes as summary punishment.
In 1997 the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture reported that the
security forces systematically practice torture against persons in
Jammu and Kashmir in order to coerce them to confess to militant
activity, to reveal information about suspected militants, or to
inflict punishment for suspected support or sympathy with militants.
Information is not made public regarding instances of action taken
against security force personnel in Jammu and Kashmir for acts of
torture.
On April 14, 1996, Mohammad Iqbal was arrested by soldiers of the
Rashtriya Rifles and taken to Chhatru Camp, near Kishtwar, Jammu and
Kashmir. His body, bearing marks of torture, was discovered in the
nearby Chhatru river soon thereafter; no onehas been charged in the
case. According to local human rights organizations, on November 3,
1995, Banihal police station officers arrested Ayaz Ahmad Wani of
Bankoot village, Banihal, and tortured him there and in the jail at
Ramban for 5 days. On November 8, 1995, police brought the youth to a
hospital in Ramban with marks indicating torture on his arms, hands,
face, and genitals. He was transferred to the government medical
college in Jammu, where he died of his injuries on November 9, 1995. An
autopsy revealed that he had suffered injuries to his kidneys, heart,
and stomach and that his wrists and feet were broken. The father of the
victim filed a complaint with the NHRC, and on July 18, 1998, the case
was referred to police for investigation. There was no further progress
in the case by year's end. Human rights monitors maintain that there is
a similar pattern of abuse by security forces in the northeast. Police
atrocities against indigenous people include torture (see Section 5).
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture noted in 1997 that methods
of torture included beating, rape, crushing the leg muscles with a
wooden roller, burning with heated objects, and electric shocks.
Because many alleged torture victims die in custody, and others are
afraid to speak out, there are few firsthand accounts, although marks
of torture often have been found on the bodies of deceased detainees.
The U.N. Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Extrajudicial Killings
renewed their requests to visit during the year, but the Government did
not permit them to do so (see Section 4).
The prevalence of torture by police in detention facilities
throughout the country is borne out by the number of cases of deaths in
police custody (see Section 1.a.). Delhi's Tihar jail is notorious for
the mistreatment of prisoners, with 1 of every 11 custodial deaths
occurring there. Police and jailers typically assault new prisoners for
money and personal articles. In addition police commonly torture
detainees during custodial interrogation. Although police officers are
subject to prosecution for such offenses under Section 302 of the Penal
Code, the Government often fails to hold them accountable. Two
kidnaping suspects allege that police tortured them while in detention
in a Calcutta prison in November; the Home Minister denied that the
boys were subjected to anything other than routine interrogation. The
family of one of them asked the NHRC to investigate the allegation; at
year's end, it still was under investigation. According to human rights
groups, in May the Andhra Pradesh police tortured three students who
were suspected of having links with the PWG; two persons died (see
Section 1.a.). In another incident, police tortured six farmers in a
village in Adilabad district in April (see Section 1.a.). According to
human rights NGO's, on September 18, police beat Devinder Singh,
Sapinder Singh, and Karnail Singh, three Sikh brothers, in a police
courtyard in Punjab, apparently to extort a confession from them that
they possessed an assault rifle. Allegedly, their legs were pulled open
to 180 degrees, gasoline was applied to their genitals, and they were
beaten badly. Devinder Singh allegedly died as result of his injuries
(see Section 1.a.).
According to press reports, prison officials used prisoners as
domestic servants and sold female prisoners to brothels (see Sections
6.c. and 6.f.).
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture stated in 1997 that, in
Jammu and Kashmir, torture victims or their relatives reportedly have
had difficulty in filing complaints because local police were issued
instructions not to open a case without permission from higher
authorities. In addition the Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special
Powers Act provides that unless approval is obtained from the central
Government, no ``prosecution, suit, or other legal proceeding shall be
instituted . . . against any person in respect of anything done or
purported to be done in exercise of the powers ``of the act.'' This
provision reportedly allows the security forces to act with virtual
impunity.
There also were incidents in which police beat journalists (see
Section 2.a.) and demonstrators (see Section 2.b.). Police also
committed abuses against tribal people (see Section 5).
The rape of persons in custody is part of the broader pattern of
custodial abuse. Limits placed on the arrest, search, and police
custody of women appear effectively to limit the frequency of rape in
custody, although it does occur on occasion. The NHRC received reports
of only three cases of custodial rape between April 1, 1996, and March
31, 1997. The 24-hour reporting requirement applies to custodial rape
as well as custodial death. However, the requirement does not apply to
rape by policemen outside police stations. NGO's claim that rape by
police, including custodial rape, is more common than NHRC figures
indicate. Although evidence is lacking, a larger number appears
credible, in light of other evidence of abusive behavior by police and
the likelihood that many rapes go unreported due to a sense of shame
and a fear of retribution. In Gujarat a police constable in Vadodara is
facing charges in connection with the rape of a woman while in custody.
There is a pattern of rape by paramilitary personnel in Jammu and
Kashmir and the northeast as a means of instilling fear among
noncombatants in insurgency-affected areas (see Section 1.g.), but is
not included in NHRC statistics because it involves military forces.
Human rights monitors allege that army personnel summoned a woman
and her four daughters from Mangota village, Doda district, Jammu and
Kashmir, to a nearby camp on March 15, where the women were held
captive for 4 days and repeatedly raped. The victims filed a complaint
with Doda police naming Charanjit Sharma, the officer in charge of the
camp, as one of their assailants (see Section 1.g.).
In addition to the 888 complaints of custodial death (700 in
judicial custody and 188 in police custody) and 3 cases of custodial
rape received by the NHRC between April 1, 1996, and March 31, 1997,
1,643 complaints of other police excesses were filed with the NHRC. As
a result of NHRC action during this period, criminal prosecutions were
brought against 144 police officials and 23 civilians and monetary
compensation in amounts ranging from $1,250 (54,375 rupees) to $3,750
(163,125 rupees) were recommended for payment in 55 cases. In its
annual report for the period, the NHRC remarked that over half of the
more than 20,000 complaints that it received ``relate to the conduct of
the police.''
Police corruption undermines efforts to combat trafficking in women
and children (see Section 6.f.).
During the year Human Rights Watch published a report that asserted
that the Maharashtra government was complicit with the Dabhol Power
Corporation (a joint venture of the Enron Corporation, General
Electric, and Bechtel) in numerous human rights abuses. According to
HRW, the Maharashtra government also engaged in a systematic pattern of
suppression of freedom of expression and peaceful assembly coupled with
arbitrary detentions, excessive use of force, and threats.
Religiously motivated violence led to a number of deaths and
injuries as well as damage to property (see Section 5).
Some militants groups in the northeast use rape as a tactic to
terrorize the populace (see Section 5).
Prison conditions are poor. Prisons are severely overcrowded, and
the provision of food and medical care is frequently inadequate.
Prisons operate above capacity, because of thousands of prisoners
awaiting hearings. For example, in West Bengal, Sheikh Feku, an alleged
thief, was released from jail in mid-June after having been in jail for
3 years awaiting trial. Overcrowding in jails also is severe. Delhi's
Tihar jail, with a designed capacity of 3,300 persons, houses 9,000
prisoners. The inspector general of prisons for Karnataka said in June
that Mysore jail, designed to hold 350 inmates, holds 850 persons, and
that Bangalore jail, built for 700 persons, holds 2,500 inmates.
According to the inspector general of prisons, water supply and
sanitation systems in both facilities are in disrepair and medical
facilities are nonexistent, with the result that prisoners must be
taken to government medical institutions for health checks. The states
are waiting for a national jail manual to facilitate reform; however,
aside from providing financial aid to the states, the central
Government has not initiated any standard reforms. The Prison Act of
1894 remains unamended. According to the South Asia Human Rights
Documentation Center, in the poorest states, such as Bihar, where 265
police stations have no lock-up facilities, the lack of prisons led
police to shackle prisoners to trees. An NHRC investigatory team
visiting Meerut jail in Uttar Pradesh in 1998 found some 3,000 inmates
in a facility designed to hold 650 persons. As a result of this and
other jail visits, the NHRC hired a consultant to draft the prison
reform bill to be submitted to the Government. The bill, meant to be
enacted by the national Parliament, encountered opposition from state
governments on the basis that prison management is the responsibility
of the states. The 700 deaths in judicial custody in 1998, occurring in
a prison population of approximately 155,000, many of whom are held for
years, include a large proportion of deaths from natural causes, in
some cases aggravated by poor conditions in prisons (see Section 1.a.).
Deaths in police custody, which typically occur within hours or days of
initial detention, more clearly imply violent abuse. The NHRC has no
authority to investigate abuses by security forces directly, and
security forces in Jammu and Kashmir and the northeast are not required
to report custodial deaths to the Commission.
With the exception of an agreement with the ICRC for visits to
detention facilities in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government does not
allow NGO's to monitor prison conditions (see Section 4).However, 15
states and union territories have authorized the NHRC to conduct
surprise check-ups on jails. Although custodial abuse is deeply rooted
in police practices, increased press reporting and parliamentary
questioning provide evidence of growing public awareness of the
problem. The NHRC has identified torture and deaths in detention as one
of its priority concerns. In 1998 it created a ``Special Rapporteur and
Chief Coordinator of Custodial Justice'' to help implement its
directive to state prison authorities to ensure that medical check-ups
are performed on all inmates. The Commission noted that there is an
alarmingly high incidence of tuberculosis among inmates and that,
according to one study, this was the cause of 79 percent of deaths in
judicial custody.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--During the early 1980's,
the Government implemented a variety of special security laws intended
to help law enforcement authorities fight separatist insurgency, and
there were credible reports of widespread arbitrary arrest and
detention under these laws.
Although the law that had been subject to the most extensive abuse,
the TADA, lapsed in May 1995, 1,502 persons previously arrested under
the act continued to be held as of January 1, 1997, in a number of
states, according to the NHRC's most recent report. A small number of
arrests under the TADA continued for crimes allegedly committed before
the law lapsed. In 1997 the Government asserted that all the TADA cases
would be reviewed. However, few persons have been released as a result
of the review. Criminal cases are proceeding against most of those
still held under the TADA, with more than 3,000 charged under other
laws in addition to the TADA. In 1996 the Supreme Court eased bail
guidelines for persons accused under TADA, taking into account the
large backlog of cases in special TADA courts. On March 23, the state
minister for home affairs told the Jammu and Kashmir state assembly
that 16,620 persons had been detained under the TADA in the state since
1990; of these, 1,640 were brought to trial, and 10 were convicted.
TADA courts use abridged procedures. For example, defense counsel is
not permitted to see witnesses for the prosecution, who are kept behind
screens while testifying in court. Also, confessions extracted under
duress are admissible as evidence.
On May 10, the Tamil Nadu government withdrew the ``Prevention of
Terrorist Activities Act,'' which attempted to resurrect provisions of
the lapsed TADA. Passed by the Tamil Nadu state assembly in May 1998
following a series of terrorist bombings in Coimbatore, the bill was
never signed into law. Similar bills are pending in the Madhya Pradesh
and Andhra Pradesh state assemblies. If enacted they would provide for
special courts to try offenses, place the burden of proof at the bail
stage on the accused, make confessions to a police officer of the rank
of superintendent of police admissible as evidence, extend the period
of remand from 15 to 60 days, and set mandatory sentences for
terrorism-related offenses.
The Constitution provides that detainees have the right to be
informed of the grounds for their arrest, to be represented by counsel,
and, unless held under a preventive detention law, to appear before a
magistrate within 24 hours of arrest. At this initial appearance, the
accused either must be remanded for further investigation or released.
The Supreme Court has upheld these provisions. An accused person must
be informed of his right to bail at the time of arrest and may, unless
he is held on a nonbailable offense, apply for bail at any time. The
police must file charges within 60 to 90 days of arrest; if they fail
to do so, court approval of a bail application becomes mandatory.
The Constitution permits preventive detention laws in the event of
threats to public order and national security. These laws provide for
limits on the length of detention and for judicial review. Several laws
of this type remain in effect.
The National Security Act (NSA) of 1980 permits the detention of
persons considered to be security risks; police anywhere in the country
(except Jammu and Kashmir) may detain suspects under NSA provisions.
Under these provisions the authorities may detain a suspect without
charge or trial for as long as a year on loosely defined security
grounds. The state government must confirm the detention order, which
is reviewed by an advisory board of three High Court judges within 7
weeks of the arrest. NSA detainees are permitted visits by family
members and lawyers and must be informed of the grounds for their
detention within 5 days (10 to 15 days in exceptional circumstances).
According to the Government, 1,163 persons were being held under the
NSA at the end of 1997. The NSA does not define ``security risk.''
Human rights groups allege that preventive detention can be ordered and
extended under the act purely on the opinion of the detaining authority
and after advisory board review. Such a subjective decision cannot be
overturned by any court.
The Jammu and Kashmir Public Safety Act (PSA) of 1978 covers
corresponding procedures for that state. Over half of the detainees in
Jammu and Kashmir are held under the PSA. Jammu and Kashmir police
reported that 514 persons were being held under the PSA as of December
31, 1998. In September and November alone, the Jammu and Kashmir police
arrested 25 members of the Kashmiri separatist All Parties Hurriyat
Conference (APHC). These arrests followed a series of terrorist attacks
in the state for which members of this group allegedly were responsible
(see Sections 1.a., 1.g., and 4). On October 8, Chief Minister Farooq
Abdullah told a public audience that because Hurriyat leaders had
planted land mines, buried hand grenades, and used violence to sabotage
the polls, ``We are going to be very harsh and I am sending them to the
places where they will see no hope.'' Hurriyat leaders were sent to
Jodhpur jail for 3 years. Although prison officials denied the APHC
members legal counsel on October 13, they subsequently granted access
on October 27. On November 15, legal counsel filed a writ petition in
the Kashmir High Court that challenged the constitutionality and
reasonableness of the PSA. The petition also questioned the legality of
the decision to shift the APHC leaders out of the state. In late
October Governor Girjesh Saxena told a foreign delegation that the
state government had sufficient grounds to detain the leaders, but
lacked enough evidence to convict them. The NHRC was asked to take
action on the case. In December Shabir Shah, president of the Jammu and
Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party, was released. At the time of Shah's
release, Amnesty International issued a statement that expressed
concern about the 25 arrested leaders of the APHC and explicitly
suggested that the charges were politically motivated.
On November 27, 1997, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional
validity of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) of 1958. In a
representation made to the NHRC, the South Asia Human Rights
Documentation Center (SAHRDC) asserted that the act's powers were ``too
vast and sweeping and pose a grave threat to the fundamental rights and
liberties of the citizenry of the (disturbed) areas covered by the
act.'' The SAHRDC asserted that the powers granted to authorities under
section 3 of the act to declare any area to be a ``disturbed area,''
and thus subject to the other provisions of the act, were too wide.
Moreover, the SAHRDC noted that section 4(a) of the act empowers any
commissioned officer, warrant officer, noncommissioned officer, or any
other person of equivalent rank in the armed forces to fire upon and
otherwise use force, ``even to the point of death,'' if he believes
that it is necessary for the maintenance of law and order. Further,
section 6 of the act states that ``no prosecution, suit or other legal
proceedings shall be instituted,'' except with the previous sanction of
the central Government ``against any person in respect of anything done
or purported to be done in exercise of powers'' conferred by the act.
The court system is extremely overloaded, resulting in the
detention of numerous persons awaiting trial for periods longer than
they would receive if convicted. Prisoners may be held for months or
even years before obtaining a trial date. According to a reply to a
parliamentary question in July 1994, more than 111,000 criminal cases
were pending in the Allahabad High Court, the most serious case backlog
in the country, of which nearly 29,000 cases had been pending for 5 to
8 years. A statement to Parliament in July 1996 indicated that criminal
and civil cases pending before the country's high courts numbered
nearly 2.9 million in 1995, roughly the same as in 1994 but an increase
from 2.65 million in 1993. According to the Union Home Ministry, the
total number of civil and criminal cases pending for 3 or more years in
all courts throughout the country was 5,116,895 on December 31, 1998.
In its most recent report, the NHRC reported that nearly 80 percent of
all prisoners held between April 1996, and March 1997, were so-called
``under-trials,'' i.e., unconvicted remand prisoners awaiting the start
or conclusion of their trials. In March the chairman of the NHRC stated
that 60 percent of all police arrests were ``unnecessary and
unjustifiable,'' and that the incarceration of those wrongly arrested
accounted for 43 percent of the total annual expenditure on prisons.
For example, the chairman stated that only 10 to 15 percent of inmates
in Delhi's Tihar jail are convicts; the rest are remand prisoners
awaiting trial. The NHRC conducted a campaign to release remand
prisoners awaiting trial for bailable offenses, but who are unable to
afford bail. Through its efforts during the year, 200 such prisoners
were released from Delhi's Tihar jail, 100 from jails in Punjab, and
319 from jails in Tamil Nadu.
In June 1997, Rongthong Kunley Dorji, a Bhutanese dissident, was
placed in judicial custody pending review of an extradition request
from the Government of Bhutan on charges that included political
offenses as well as financial malfeasance. On June 12, 1998, Dorji was
released on bail following the New Delhi High Court's decision to deny
a government appeal and let stand a lower court's order to grant bail
in the case. Dorji still awaits conclusion of his extradition hearing.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--There is an independent judiciary
with strong constitutional safeguards. Under a Supreme Court ruling,
the Chief Justice, in consultation with his colleagues, has a decisive
voice in selecting judicial candidates. The President appoints judges,
and they can serve up to the age of 62 on the state high courts and up
to the age of 65 on the Supreme Court.
Courts of first resort exist at the subdistrict and district
levels. More serious cases and appeals are heard in state-level high
courts and by the national-level supreme court, which also rules on
constitutional questions. State governments appoint subdistrict and
district judicial magistrates. High court judges are appointed on the
recommendation of the federal law ministry, with the advice of the
Supreme Court, the High Court Chief Justice, and the chief minister of
the State, usually from among district judges or lawyers practicing
before the same courts. Supreme Court judges are appointed similarly
from among High Court judges. The Chief Justice is selected on the
basis of seniority.
When legal procedures function normally, they generally assure a
fair trial, but the process is often drawn out and inaccessible to the
poor. Defendants have the right to choose counsel from a bar that is
fully independent of the government. There are effective channels for
appeal at most levels of the judicial system.
The Criminal Procedure Code provides for an open trial in most
cases, but it allows exceptions in proceedings involving official
secrets, trials in which statements prejudicial to the safety of the
state might be made, or under provisions of special security
legislation. Sentences must be announced in public.
Muslim personal status law governs many noncriminal matters
involving Muslims--including family law, inheritance, and divorce. The
Government does not interfere in the personal status laws of the
minority communities, with the result that personal status laws that
discriminate against women are upheld.
In Jammu and Kashmir, the judicial system barely functions due to
threats by militants against judges, witnesses, and their family
members; because of judicial tolerance of the Government's heavy-handed
antimilitant actions; and because of the frequent refusal by security
forces to obey court orders. Courts there are reluctant to hear cases
involving terrorist crimes and fail to act expeditiously on habeas
corpus cases, if they act at all. Similar to 1998, there were a few
convictions of alleged terrorists in the Jammu high court during the
year. Many more accused militants have been in pretrial detention for
years (see Section 1.d.).
Criminal gangs in all four southern states have been known to
attack rivals and scare off complainants and witnesses from court
premises, denying free access to justice. In some cases, accused
persons have been attacked while being escorted by police to the
courts. In July an accused person was killed in Kerala in an explosion
triggered as he passed by with a police escort.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The police must obtain warrants for searches and
seizures. In a criminal investigation, the police may conduct searches
without warrants to avoid undue delay, but they must justify the
searches in writing to the nearest magistrate with jurisdiction over
the offense. The authorities in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam
have special powers to search and arrest without a warrant.
The government Enforcement Directorate (ED) searches, interrogates,
and arrests thousands of business and management professionals
annually, often without search warrants. However, the ED ultimately
convicts very few persons. In 1997 only 28 persons out of thousands
arrested were convicted, according to the Times of India.
The Indian Telegraph Act authorizes the surveillance of
communications, including monitoring telephone conversations and
intercepting personal mail, in case of public emergency or ``in the
interest of the public safety or tranquillity.'' Every state government
has used these powers, as has the central Government.
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Government forces continue to commit serious
violations of humanitarian law in the disputed state of Jammu and
Kashmir.Between 350,000 and 450,000 army and paramilitary forces are
deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. The Muslim majority population in the
Kashmir valley suffers from the repressive tactics of the security
forces. Under the Jammu and Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act, and the Armed
Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act, both passed in July
1990, security forces personnel have extraordinary powers, including
authority to shoot suspected lawbreakers and those persons disturbing
the peace and to destroy structures suspected of harboring militants or
arms.
Civilian deaths caused by security forces appeared to diminish for
the sixth consecutive year in Jammu and Kashmir, although final
statistics for 1999 were not available at year's end. This decrease
apparently is due to press scrutiny and public criticism of abuses in
previous years, the increased training of military and paramilitary
forces in humanitarian law, and a greater respect by commanders for the
rule of law. The improvement has taken the form of increased discipline
and care in avoiding collateral civilian injuries and deaths (i.e.,
deaths in crossfire). The Union Home Ministry was unable to report how
many such deaths occurred during the year but reported that 84 such
deaths occurred in Jammu and Kashmir in 1996-1997. The security forces
have not ceased to abduct and extrajudicially execute suspected
militants, nor have they accepted accountability for these abuses.
However, many commanders' inclination to distance their units from such
practices has led to reduced participation in them and a transfer of
some of such actions to government-supported countermilitants.
According to Kashmiri human rights groups and press reports, on May
9 the police in Srinagar retaliated for the murder of one of their
colleagues by attacking civilians in the crowded residential and
commercial area of the city where the original incident occurred.
Police allegedly cordoned off the area and beat residents, including
members of a wedding party. Human rights groups state that members of
the Rashtriya Rifles entered the village of Chak Doodipora, Handwara
district, Jammu and Kashmir, on April 18 during a search operation. The
soldiers allegedly beat some 2 dozen residents, including women and
children, leaving 12 of them seriously injured. On May 12, a group of
suspected countermilitants invaded the home of a 40-year-old Kupwara
college lecturer, murdering him, his wife, his sister-in-law, and his
3-year-old daughter. According to credible reports, in addition to
harassment during searches and arbitrary arrests (see Section 1.d.)
security forces abduct and sometimes use civilians as human shields in
night patrolling and searching for land mines; the abuses so far have
occurred mostly in the Kupwara and Doda districts. Because of Doda's
inaccessibility, the abuses there allegedly have been underreported
greatly.
The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces
into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around Kargil
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military campaign to
repel the intrusion left 524 Indian soldiers dead and 1,363 wounded,
according to December 1 statistics by Defense Minister George
Fernandes. Earlier Government figures stated that 696 Pakistani
soldiers were killed. A senior Pakistani police official estimated that
approximately 40 civilians were killed on the Pakistani side of the
line of control. However, additional official Pakistani Government
statistics regarding the conflict were not available at year's end.
There was some use of torture during the conflict. On June 10, the
Pakistan army returned the bodies of six Indian soldiers, which bore
evidence of severe torture; however, the ICRC declined an invitation to
conduct an autopsy. The fighting also caused some civilian deaths and
the internal displacement of as many as 50,000 neighboring residents
(see Section 2.d.).
The Kargil conflict resulted in an increased counterinsurgency
campaign, often with repressive offensive measures. According to a
credible government source, as of early December over 450 militants
were killed since the Kargil conflict began. Another credible
government source said that offensive operations after the Kargil
affair yielded 12 to 17 dead militants per day--that the army and
paramilitary Rashtriya Rifles were carrying out major bombing
operations with heavy weapons in both the northern and southern Kashmir
valley.
On September 24, seven persons were killed when police in Surat
opened fire on a crowd that insisted on changing the parade route of a
religious idol through the town. Reportedly, police, fearing an
outbreak of communal violence, prevented the Hindu gathering from
parading through a Muslim neighborhood past a prominent mosque. When
the use of tear gas failed to quell the increasingly restive crowd,
police resorted to firing weapons, according to press accounts. State
authorities ordered an inquiry into the shooting (see Section 5).
Kashmiri militant groups also committed serious abuses. In addition
to political killings, kidnapings, and rapes of politicians and
civilians (see Sections 1.a., 1.b., and 1.c.), insurgents engaged in
extortion and carried out acts of randomterror that killed hundreds of
Kashmiris. Many of the militants are not Indian citizens, but are
Afghani, Pakistani, and other nationalities. Over the last decade, they
have made liberal use of time-delayed explosives, land mines, grenades,
and snipers. In the fall there was a significant upsurge in militant
violence towards security forces, and a tendency to use heavy weapons
such as grenades and rockets. Militants killed and injured numerous
security personnel and destroyed a great deal of security force
property. On July 24, militants fired rockets at a Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF) picket in Doda district, killing one CRPF
policeman. On August 6, militants fired rockets at a Rashtriya Rifles
camp in Kupwara district; five army troops and six militants were
killed, and three soldiers were wounded in the exchange. On August 7,
militants ambushed the convoy of a Rashtriya Rifles colonel in Kupwara
district, killing four soldiers; in four separate rocket attacks
against police and Rastriya Rifles positions in Kupwara, Chadora,
Poonch, and Rajouri districts, militants killed two BSF members and
injured seven persons. On August 13, a rocket attack on a Rastriya
Rifles checkpost in Badgam district killed two soldiers and two
militants. On August 14, in six separate but coordinated rocket and
small arms attacks on Rastriya Rifles positions in Kupwara district,
militants killed eight army personnel and injured 15 persons. On August
12, two marine commandos were killed near Bandipur, Baramula district,
Jammu and Kashmir, when militants detonated a roadside bomb as the
marines' vehicle passed. On September 29, a grenade attack on the Civil
Secretariat in Srinagar killed one policeman and one civilian. On
October 28, two coordinated rocket-propelled grenade attacks against
the civil secretariat and a Border Security Post in Srinagar killed 4
persons and injured 20 others. On November 9, militants killed six
persons during a grenade attack on an army position in Gandherbal. In
addition militants made numerous other attacks and killed and injured
many other persons.
On November 11, a bomb blast aboard a Jammu-Delhi train killed 14
persons and injured 12 others; no group claimed responsibility.
During the period of increased attacks against security forces (see
Section 1.a.), there was a parallel decline in massacres of unarmed
civilians; nevertheless, such attacks continued. Militants carried out
several execution-style mass murders of Hindu (Pandit) villagers in
Jammu and Kashmir (see Section 5). On February 20, Kashmiri militants
killed 20 villagers, including 6 women, 1 girl, and several members of
a wedding party, in 3 coordinated attacks on villages in Udhampur and
Rajouri districts of the Jammu region (see Section 1.a.). The army
stated that the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba militant group was
responsible for the killings, although the army killed the only two
militants identified in the case. Between June 28 and July 1, militants
killed 36 civilians in Jammu and Kashmir. On June 28, 15 Muslims of 2
families, including 7 children and 3 women, were shot and killed by
militants in Poonch district. On June 29, unidentified assailants shot
and killed 12 male Hindu laborers in a village near Anantnag in the
Kashmir valley; the workers were separated from their wives and
children before being summarily executed. On July 1, nine members of
two Hindu families, including three women and a child, were murdered by
militants in Poonch district, near the site of the June 28 killings. On
July 20, some 20 militants entered 2 houses in Doda district and opened
fire with automatic weapons, killing over 15 Hindu persons (see
Sections 1.a. and 5).
Also on July 20, in the Poonch district of Jammu region, militants
killed four members of a government road engineering group who are
believed to have been migrant Hindu laborers from Bihar. Most officials
cited militant anger at the BJP Government over the Pakistani
withdrawal from Kargil as the principal reason for the attacks.
Extremist and terrorist activities in the northeast claimed many
lives. In addition to ambushes, terrorists increasingly resorted to
destroying bridges, laying time bombs on roads and railway tracks, and
in one instance, detonating a bomb in a busy railway station. On April
27, five persons, including three Border Security Force personnel, were
killed when the ULFA blew up their vehicle in Barpeta district, Assam.
On June 22, a bomb exploded in the new Jailpurgiri railway station in
Siliguri, West Bengal, killing 9 persons and seriously injuring 65
others; those persons responsible for the bombing were not identified.
Six policemen and a home guard were killed on June 29 when suspected
Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF) militants blew up two police cars
using a remote-controlled device. On April 15, Naxalite militants
ambushed the vehicle of a Congress Party politician, Sripada Rao, in
Karimnagar, Andhra Pradesh, killing him on the spot. As part of a
series of Naxalite political killings (see Section 1.a.), on September
13, a bomb attack killed five policemen at a police station in
Papannapet, Andhra Pradesh.
Nearly 100 persons were killed in election-related violence
throughout the country in September and October (see Section 3). On
September 7, in the Anantnag district of Kashmir, Ghulam Hyder Noorani,
a BJP parliamentary candidate, was killed by a remote-detonated land
mine, along with two bodyguards. On September 9, militants threw a hand
grenade into a jeep, injuring 11 BJP activists and 2 policemen.
Numerous Hurriyat leaders, who were suspected of the attacks, later
were arrested (see Section 1.d.). Militant groups in the northeast
states of Assam, Tripura, and Manipur, killed persons prior to the
election and fired on polling places and security forces deployed for
the voting. Approximately 15 civilians and 14 security force members
were killed in the northeast as a result of election violence. In
Tripura the NLFT also used land mines, and the NFLT shot and killed
numerous civilians (see Section 5). Violence also marred the elections
in Bihar. On September 18, in the first phase of polling for the Lok
Sabha elections in Bihar, extremists from the Maoist Communist Center
and the People's War, set up land mines in four of the constituencies
on routes leading to polling booths. In Palamau a land mine blew up a
truck carrying police personnel. Near Barhi, Hazaribagh, nine persons
were killed in two bomb incidents (see Sections 1.a. and 3).
During the year, police arrested numerous persons suspected of
involvement in previous terrorist attacks. Charges also were brought
against persons accused of involvement with human suicide bomb attacks
to advance Sikh separatism, as well against dozens of captured
separatist insurgents in Jammu and Kashmir for bombings, killings, and
acts of sabotage.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and the Government generally
respects these rights in practice; however, there are some limitations.
A vigorous press reflects a wide variety of political, social, and
economic beliefs. Newspapers and magazines regularly publish
investigative reports and allegations of government wrongdoing, and the
press generally champions human rights and criticizes perceived
government lapses.
Under the Official Secrets Act, the Government may restrict
publication of sensitive stories; however, the Government sometimes
interprets this broadly to suppress criticism of its policies. Human
rights monitors state that government pressure caused one national
English-language daily to suppress some stories and to transfer a
reporter in 1998. The 1971 Newspapers Incitements to Offenses Act
remains in effect in Jammu and Kashmir. Under the act, a district
magistrate may prohibit the press from publishing material resulting in
``incitement to murder'' or ``any act of violence.'' As punishment the
act stipulates that the authorities may seize newspapers and printing
presses. Despite these restrictions, newspapers in Srinagar regularly
publish militant press releases attacking the Government and report in
detail on alleged human rights abuses. The authorities generally
allowed foreign journalists to travel freely in Jammu and Kashmir,
where they regularly spoke with militant leaders and filed reports on
government abuses. For a week in June, during the confrontation between
Indian forces and Pakistan-backed forces in the Kargil region of Jammu
and Kashmir (see Section 1.g.), journalists were barred from traveling
to the immediate area of the fighting. However, the Government allowed
the acts of violence that occurred in Jammu and Kashmir during the
September and October elections (see Sections 1.g. and 4) to receive
wide coverage. In contrast, during the 1996 and 1998 elections, the
state government banned the publication of any material aimed at
intimidating the electorate.
In May the NHRC directed the Punjab police to submit a report on a
complaint filed by journalist and author Harinder Singh alleging that
police tortured him. Singh is the author of a novel called ``Vanity
Incarnate,'' which is controversial in Punjab because of its portrayal
of Sikh gurus. In his complaint, Singh alleged that after receiving
several death threats he went to police seeking protection. Shortly
thereafter, police allegedly took Singh from his residence, assaulted
him, and subjected him to electric shocks. According to the complaint,
police held Singh for 20 weeks during which time he continuously was
tortured. After being released on bail on April 21, Singh filed a
complaint against police in the Punjab and Haryana High Court. Also in
Punjab, the NHRC in July 1998 called for a CBI investigation into the
1992 abduction of journalist Avtar Singh Mander, who has not been seen
since his disappearance in Jalandhar. Witnesses allege that police
officials picked up Mander, a charge the police deny. A May 1994
investigation by Punjab state authorities found that Mander had not
been taken into custody, and no further effort was made by authorities
to trace his whereabouts.
In Assam the state government has attempted to impede criticism by
filing a number of ``criminal defamation'' charges against journalists.
Police beat Prakash Mahanta, a reporter for the Assamese-language daily
Natoon Samoy, at his home, then arrested and detained him at Nagaon
state police station in 1998. Press freedom campaigners allege that
Mahanta's ``crime'' was to write an article detailing alleged campaign
irregularities by the wife of Assam chief minister Prafulla Kumar
Mahanta. According to news reports, the chief minister denied the
charge and said that Prakash Mahanta had been involved in ``anti-
national'' activities. According to human rights activists, Mahanta was
released and never convicted. In the beginning of the year, the editor
of the Assamese daily Assam Pratidin was arrested and charged.
In October 1998, the Manipur government announced curbs on the
publication of insurgency-related news. The publication of insurgent's
press releases, public invitations to slain militants' funerals, and
calls to boycott Republic Day and Independence Day functions were
prohibited. Penalties for violating the prohibition included arrest and
criminal prosecution of newspaper owners and editors and cancellation
of newspapers' registration. These restrictions continued during the
year.
The Press Council of India is a statutory body of journalists,
publishers, academics, and politicians, with a chairman appointed by
the Government. Designed to be a self-regulating mechanism for the
press, it investigates complaints of irresponsible journalism and sets
a code of conduct for publishers. This code includes not publishing
articles or details that might incite caste or communal violence. The
Council publicly criticizes newspapers or journalists it believes have
broken the code of conduct, but its findings, while noted by the press
community, carry no legal weight.
National television and radio, which are government monopolies,
frequently are accused of having a strong pro-Government bias. However,
international satellite television is widely distributed in middle
class neighborhoods by cable and gradually is eroding the Government's
monopoly on television.
The Government maintains a list of banned books that cannot be
imported or sold in the country; some--like Salman Rushdie's ``Satanic
Verses''--because they contain material government sponsors have deemed
inflammatory.
A government censorship board reviews films before licensing them
for distribution. The board deletes material deemed offensive to public
morals or communal sentiment. Producers of video news magazines also
must submit their products to the board, which occasionally censors
stories that portray the Government in an unfavorable light. The
board's rulings may be appealed and overturned. In March the
Maharashtra government censored the film ``Fire,'' charging that its
depiction of a lesbian relationship offended morals. The decision came
after members of the Hindu fundamentalist Shiv Sena political party
ransacked the theater in which the film was being shown. The film was
not censored in any other state; Shiv Sainiks similarly ransacked a
theater showing the film in Delhi.
Intimidation by militant groups results in a good deal of self-
censorship. Kashmiri militant groups threatened journalists and editors
and even imposed temporary bans on some publications that were critical
of their activities. In August militants just outside Srinagar fired on
a television camera crew. Kashmiri militants attempted to halt cable
television broadcasts in the Kashmir valley during the year, claiming
that they contained ``un-Islamic'' programming. In a concerted year-
long campaign, militants of the Harkat-Ul-Ansar terrorist group
threatened and targeted cable operators in Kashmir with violence. For
example, on December 1 suspected HUA militants hurled a grenade at a
cable operator's shop in Srinagar, injuring three persons. Earlier in
the year, militants fired at a cable operator in Bemina, injuring two
persons, and bombed a cable shop in Zakura, injuring three persons.
In July political parties in favor of the building of the Sardar
Sarovar dam across the Narmada river burned copies of the book ``The
Greater Common Good,'' by novelist Arundhati Roy, which discusses the
socio-environmental costs of the Narmada project (see Section 2.d.).
Facing threats from the youth wings of the BJP and the Congress party,
bookstores in Ahmedabad, Gujurat, also began to remove the book from
their shelves.
Citizens enjoy complete academic freedom, and students and faculty
espouse a wide range of views. In addition to 10 national universities
and about 160 state universities, states are empowered to accredit
locally run private institutions.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for the right of peaceful assembly, and the Government
generally respected this right in practice. The authorities sometimes
require permits and notification prior to holding parades or
demonstrations, but local governments ordinarily respect the right to
protest peacefully, except in Jammu and Kashmir, where separatist
parties routinely are denied permits for public gatherings. During
periods of civil tension, the authorities may ban public assemblies or
impose a curfew under the Criminal Procedure Code.
Srinagar and other parts of Jammu and Kashmir occasionally came
under curfew but more often were affected by strikes called by
militants.
On June 11, police killed 4 fishworkers and injured 13 others when
they opened fire on an anti-shrimp culture protest organized by the NGO
Chilika Matsyajibi Mahasangh in Orissa.
In July 17 persons drowned in a river in Tirunelveli, Tamil Nadu
when thousands of demonstrators ran to escape a police beating. The
demonstrators were demanding government intervention in a labor dispute
at a local tea estate and the release of 652 estate workers who had
been imprisoned after a previous demonstration (see Section 1.a.).
Beginning at midyear, the Government implemented a new requirement
that NGO's secure the prior approval of the Ministry of Home Affairs
before organizing international conferences. Human rights groups
contend that the new requirement provides the Government with
substantial political control of the work of NGO's and is an
abridgement of their freedom of assembly and association. In July three
foreign nationals were denied visas to attend an annual conference on
building civil society; the conference was sponsored by a foreign
university and held in Bangalore. The organizers decided to disregard
the ban and hold it anyway. On the eve of the event, the Australian
chair of the IALC was detained briefly, but the conference nevertheless
was held and the police did not detain anyone else.
The Constitution provides for the right to form associations, and
the Government generally respected this right in practice.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
religion, and the Government respects this right in practice. India is
a secular state in which all faiths generally enjoy freedom of worship;
Government policy does not favor any religious group. However, tension
between Muslims and Hindus, and to a lesser extent between Hindus and
Christians, continues to pose a challenge to the secular foundation of
the State (see Section 5). In addition governments at state and local
levels only partially respect religious freedom.
No registration is required for religions. Legally mandated
benefits are assigned to certain groups, including some groups defined
by their religion.
There are many religions and a large variety of denominations,
groups, and subgroups in the country, but Hinduism is the dominant
religion. According to 1998 government statistics, Hindus constitute
82.4 percent of the population, Muslims 12.7 percent, Christians 2.3
percent, Sikhs 2.0 percent, Buddhists 0.7 percent, Jains 0.4 percent,
and others, including Parsis, Jews, and Baha'is, 0.4 percent.
The Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act makes it an
offense to use any religious site for political purposes or to use
temples for harboring persons accused or convicted of crimes.
The current legal system accommodates minority religions' personal
status laws; there are different personal laws for different religious
communities. Religion-specific laws pertain in matters of marriage,
divorce, adoption, and inheritance. For example, Muslim personal status
law governs many noncriminal matters involving Muslims, including
family law, inheritance, and divorce. The personal status laws of the
religious communities sometimes discriminate against women. Under
Islamic law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife spontaneously and
unilaterally; there is no such provision for women. Islamic law also
allows a man to have up to four wives but prohibits polyandry. Under
the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, a Christian woman may demand divorce
only in the case of spousal abuse and in the case of certain categories
of adultery; for a Christian man, adultery alone is sufficient. In May
1997, the Mumbai High Court recognized abuse alone as sufficient
grounds for a Christian woman to obtain a divorce.
No national law bars proselytizing by Indian Christians. Foreign
missionaries generally can renew their visas, but since the mid-1960's
the Government has refused to admit new resident foreign missionaries.
New arrivals currently enter as tourists on short-term visas. During
the year, as in the past, stateofficials refused to issue permits for
foreign Christian missionaries to enter some northeastern states. In
March several declared missionaries reported that the Government had
instituted a policy of not renewing missionaries' visas. Renewal had
been routine until the institution of this new policy. The policy is
being applied unevenly, as at least one Christian missionary succeeded
in obtaining an extension as late as the fall of 1998. Missionaries and
religious organizations must comply with the Foreign Contribution
Regulation Act (FCRA), which restricts funding from abroad and,
therefore, the ability of certain groups to finance their activities.
The Government is empowered to ban a religious organization if it has
violated the FCRA, has provoked intercommunity friction, or has been
involved in terrorism or sedition. There is no ban on professing or
propagating religious beliefs, but speaking publicly against other
beliefs is considered dangerous to public order, and is prohibited.
In September the Union Home Ministry, after declining to extend his
visa, ordered a 57-year-old American priest to leave the country.
Father Anthony Raymond Ceresko, a teacher at a seminary in Bangalore,
entered the country in 1991 and had been able to renew his residence
permit every year since until this year. Ceresko left the country on
September 17.
In early February, following a series of attacks on Christians, the
office of the director general of police in Gujarat reportedly sent a
circular instructing district officials to collect information about
Christians, including the number of missionaries, their funding
sources, and the ``tricks'' they used to convert persons. After public
criticism of the census, the government of Gujarat stated that it was
being conducted to assist in the protection of Christians and later
expanded it to cover Hindus as well. However, Christians obtained a
court order barring the census. On March 2, the government of Gujarat
withdrew the effort. However, in December the United Christian Forum
for Human Rights and its convener, John Dayal, expressed concern to the
press about a ``survey'' of Christian institutions and missionaries
allegedly being conducted by the Delhi police. Dayal said that police
had been asking the principals of Christian schools, the heads of
Christian-affiliated hospitals, and individuals about their background
and funding sources. Those persons questioned reportedly were asked to
fill out a form ordinarily reserved to take the written statements of
suspected criminals. The Forum complained that ``such surveys tend to
intimidate the sisters, priests, and individuals.''
While the law is meant to protect religious freedom, enforcement of
the law has been poor, particularly at the state and local levels,
where the failure to deal adequately with intragroup and intergroup
conflict and with local disturbances has abridged the right to
religious freedom. In particular, Hindu extremist groups continued to
attack Christians. In many cases, the government response was
inadequate, consisting largely of statements criticizing the violence
against Christians but with few efforts to hold accountable those
persons responsible or to prevent such incidents from occurring (see
Section 5). Throughout the year, the Government generally described the
violence and attacks as a series of isolated local phenomena, in some
states calling for a national debate on conversions, which Hindus had
advocated being banned. On February 19, Muslim imams and Members of
Parliament joined Christian leaders to rally against the Prime
Minister's call for a debate on conversions and to criticize the BJP's
slow response to attacks against Christians. In August a bill was
introduced in Gujarat that would allow harsh punishment to be meted out
to anyone in the state found guilty of converting someone to another
religion through use of force, provision on material benefits, or
fraud. Human rights groups fear that if passed the bill--called the
Gujarat Freedom of Religion Bill, 1999--could be used to restrict the
fundamental right to chose one's religion. At year's end, the bill was
still up for legislative review.
In 1998 and early 1999 there was an unusual and serious outbreak of
societal violence against Christians, apparently sparked by rumors of
``forced conversions'' of Hindus to Christianity (see Section 5). The
Government reacted with statements criticizing the violence against
Christians, but efforts to prevent such incidents from occurring and to
prosecute those responsible at the state and local levels were
inadequate. In early 1999, the Government described the violence as a
series of isolated local phenomena. The Prime Minister on January 4
pledged not to tolerate any further violence against Christians. In
early January, the state government of Gujarat increased police
protection for Christians in the Dangs district, but stated that the
press had blown the recent incidents of violence against Christians out
of proportion. On January 10, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the Dangs
district in Gujarat. However, The positive effect of this gesture was
mitigated by the presence in his entourage of Hindu Jagaran Manch
president Janubhai Pawar, who had been arrested in connection with
violence against Christians that occurred on December 25, 1998. While
in Gujarat, Vajpayee called for a national debate on conversions, which
some Hindu groups had requested be banned. During thesame month, Home
Minister L.K. Advani called for a thorough study to determine by how
much the Christian population in the Dangs area had grown in the last
10 years and what factors had led to violence and anger over alleged
``forced conversions.'' On January 26, President Narayanan made a
televised plea for religious tolerance. On January 30, the anniversary
of the death of Mahatma Gandhi, Prime Minister Vajpayee criticized the
recent attacks, called for religious tolerance, and announced that he
would start a fast to protest the recent violence against Christians
and against low caste Hindus by higher caste Hindus in Bihar. Also on
January 30, Madan Lal Khurana, Minister of Public Affairs and Tourism,
who had been critical of the Government's handling of the recent
attacks, resigned. He claimed that he had been silenced when he tried
to criticize Hindu militants who made anti-Christian statements. In
early 1999 the district superintendent of police and the district
collector were transferred out of the Dangs district, and the governor
of Gujarat was shifted to another state.
On occasion, Hindu-Muslim violence led to killings and a cycle of
retaliation. In some instances, local police and government officials
abetted the violence, and at times security forces were responsible for
abuses. Police on occasion accompanied Hindu fundamentalists who were
responsible for violence (see Section 5). Government officials
allegedly also place bureaucratic roadblocks in front of Christian-
affiliated foreign relief organizations, many of which are not engaged
in religious activities (see Section 4). In a few instances, state
governments investigated and sometimes arrested suspects in cases of
anti-Christian violence. For example, after an Australian missionary
was murdered in Orissa (see Section 5), several suspects were arrested.
In another instance, the Tamil Nadu government ordered the police to
investigate a series of church burnings (see Section 5); however, no
one had been arrested at year's end. In general government response has
been poor with respect to such incidences.
In August the central Home Ministry banned the Biennial Meeting of
the International Anglican Liturgical Consultation (IALC) in Kottayam,
Kerala.
On January 7, the National Commission for Minorities (NCM), a
quasigovernmental body established in 1992 to protect the rights of
religious minorities, sent a team to Gujarat to depose witnesses and
evaluate the Government's response to the recent violence against
Christians. The government of Gujarat reportedly tried to stall the
efforts of the team. The NCM released a report on January 31, which was
critical of the Government's response to the occurrences, stating that
``the communal situation in Gujarat is serious and of alarming
dimensions and there is a pressing need to take extraordinary steps to
prevent it from flaring up further and spreading to other parts of the
country.'' The NCM urged the central Government to invoke Article 355
of the Constitution, which would empower the central Government to
``give direction'' to a state government to ensure compliance with
federal laws, on the grounds that the government of Gujarat had failed
to take adequate measures to check the violence against minorities. The
recommendation was not accepted. On January 13, the NCM chairman,
Professor Tahir Mahmood, said that the NCM had recommended that Hindus
be declared minorities in 5 states--Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab,
Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland, and in the Lakshadweep Union
Territory; this would help the NCM to recognize the problems of Hindus
in those states.
The BJP is one of a number of offshoots of the Rashtriya
Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), an organization that espouses a return to
Hindu values and cultural norms. Members of the BJP, the RSS, and other
affiliated organizations were implicated in incidents of violence and
discrimination against Christians and Muslims. The BJP and RSS express
respect and tolerance for other religions, but the RSS in particular
opposes conversions from Hinduism and believes that all Indians should
adhere to Hindu cultural values. The BJP officially agrees that the
caste system should be eliminated, but many of its members are
ambivalent about this. Most BJP leaders are also RSS members. The BJP's
longstanding cultural agenda includes calls for construction of a new
Hindu temple to replace an ancient Hindu temple that was believed to
have stood on the site of a mosque in Ayodhya that was destroyed by a
Hindu mob in 1992; for the repeal of Article 370 of the Constitution,
which grants special rights to the state of Jammu and Kashmir, India's
only Muslim majority state; and for the enactment of a uniform civil
code that would apply to members of all religions. All of these
proposals are opposed strongly by some minority religious groups.
However, the BJP-led national Government took no steps to implement
these measures and has promised that it would not do so during its
tenure in the Parliament. While at the national level the BJP has
downplayed its Hindu nationalist agenda, some Christian groups have
noted the coincidence of its coming to power and an increase in
complaints of discrimination against minority religious communities.
These groups also claim that BJP officials at state and local levels
have become increasingly uncooperative.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens enjoy freedom of movement
within the country except in certain border areas where, for security
reasons, special permits are required. Under the Passports Act of 1967,
the Government may deny a passport to any applicant who ``may or is
likely to engage outside India in activities prejudicial to the
sovereignty and integrity of India.'' The Government uses this
provision to prohibit the foreign travel of some government critics,
especially those advocating Sikh independence and the violent
separatist movement in Jammu and Kashmir. On September 23, the
Government prevented Mirwais Unmar Farooq and Maulana Mohammad Abbas
Ansari, two members of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference, a Kashmiri
separatist group, from leaving the country to attend a meeting of the
Organization of Islamic Conference. On May 11, the Union Home Ministry
accepted the recommendation of the NHRC and permitted another member of
the APHC to travel abroad for medical treatment.
Vehicle checkpoints, at which Border Security Forces routinely
frisk and question occupants, are a common feature throughout most of
Jammu and Kashmir. It also is common for police to block entry and exit
points in preparation for gathering young males for police lineups.
According to a credible source, these search and cordon operations
seldom yield any results. Nevertheless, these searches tend to focus on
troubled areas, as opposed to the mass searches that were common in the
past.
On June 18, the NHRC received a complaint alleging that more than
4,700 families that were forced to leave their homes in Karwar, north
Kerala, due to planned construction of the navy's Sea Bird Naval Base
were compensated inadequately for their homes.
Human Rights Watch alleged that the Maharashtra government colluded
with the Dabhol Power Corporation to suppress peaceful protests over
the forcible eviction of 2,000 persons from their homes (see Section
1.c.).
In February the Supreme Court lifted its stay on the construction
of the Narmada dam in Madhya Pradesh after the Gujarat government
promised displaced families greater compensation (among other
improvements). However, many human rights advocates and NGO's continued
to allege that the construction of the dam would displace 40,000
families without adequately compensating those who are resettled (see
Section 2.b.). (Opposition to the Narmada project was greatest during
the early 1990's, resulting in prolonged financial and legal stalls.)
Citizens may emigrate without restriction.
Since 1990, more than 235,000 Bangladeshis have been deported, many
from Maharashtra and West Bengal. The occasional deportation of
Bangladeshis judged to have entered the country illegally continued
during the year, but there was no repetition of the systematic roundup
of Bangladeshis for mass deportation that was conducted by the
government of Maharashtra in 1998. The Government estimates that there
are 10 million Bangladeshis living illegally in the country.
The law does not contain provisions for processing refugees or
asylum seekers in accordance with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, nor is there a clear
national policy for the treatment of refugees. The Office of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has no formal status,
but the Government permits the UNHCR to assist certain groups of
refugees (notably Afghans, Iranians, Somalis, Burmese, and Sudanese).
The Government has not permitted the UNHCR to assist other groups
of refugees, including Sri Lankan Tamils to whose camps in Tamil Nadu
the Government has barred access by the UNHCR and NGO's (see Section
4). The Government provides first asylum to refugees, most notably in
recent years to Tibetan and Sri Lankan Tamil refugees. However, this
policy is applied inconsistently. For example, the insistence of some
border authorities on the presentation of passport and visas by those
claiming refugee status occasionally has resulted in individuals or
groups being refused admittance. This has occurred in recent years in
cases involving Chin and Rakhine refugees from Burma and Afghans who
entered the country via Pakistan. Refugees are not required to make
claims in other countries. Cramped and unhygienic conditions are
reported to exist in some of the camps for Sri Lankan Tamils in Tamil
Nadu.
The Government recognizes certain groups, including Chakmas from
Bangladesh, Tamils from Sri Lanka, and Tibetans, as refugees and
provides them with assistance in refugee camps or in resettlement
areas. According to UNHCR and government statistics, there were
approximately 98,000 Tibetans, approximately 70,337 Sri Lankan Tamils
in 131 camps, and perhapsas many as 80,000 Sri Lankan Tamils outside of
the camps living in the country at year's end. The refugees in the
camps are not permitted to work. Many Chakmas from Bangladesh have been
repatriated voluntarily, including all of the estimated 56,000 persons
who had been residing in Tripura. Some 80,000 Chakma permanent
residents remain in Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram; their right to
citizenship has been upheld by the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme
Court's order to extend citizenship to this group was not implemented
by year's end. The UNHCR reports that 14,962 Afghans, 664 Burmese, 189
Iranians, 173 Somalis, 81 Sudanese, and 60 others, including Iraqis and
Ethiopians, were receiving assistance from the UNHCR in the country as
of August 31. Although the Government formally does not recognize these
persons as refugees, it does not deport them. Instead, they received
renewable residence permits or their status was ignored. Increasingly
during the year, some of these groups--Afghans, Iraqis, and Iranians in
particular--were not granted renewal of their residence permits by the
authorities on the grounds that they were not in possession of valid
national passports. Due to financial and refugee-related reasons, many
refugees were unable or unwilling to obtain or renew their national
passports and were, therefore, unable to regularize their status in
India.
The government of Tamil Nadu provides educational facilities to Sri
Lankan Tamil refugee children, and the central Government provides some
assistance and channels assistance from NGO and church groups. The
central Government has, for the most part, denied NGO's and the UNHCR
direct access to the camps. NGO's report refugee complaints about
deteriorated housing, poor sanitation, delayed dole payments, and
inadequate medical care in the Tamil refugee camps. The NHRC has
intervened to uphold the right of several Sri Lankan Tamils detained in
so-called ``special camps'' to remain in the country. The Government
uses these camps to hold suspected members of the LTTE terrorist
organization. Human rights groups allege that inmates of the special
camps sometimes are subjected to physical abuse and that their
confinement to the camps amounts to imprisonment without trial. They
allege that several of those acquitted by the Supreme Court on May 11
of involvement in the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv
Gandhi (see Section 1.a.) remain confined in these special camps.
More than 260,000 Santhals are displaced due to ongoing Bodo-
Santhal violence, and live under poor conditions in relief camps in
Assam's Kokrajhar, Gosaigaon, and adjoining districts (see Section
1.a.).
Ethnic Chins are among the nonrecognized refugees in the
northeastern states, particularly Mizoram. Chins and Chakma refugees
have been targeted by student-led demonstrations protesting their
presence in Mizoram. Recent tensions between security forces and Chin
National Force (CNF) insurgents operating in Burma allegedly have
resulted in the detention, interrogation, and expulsion of some persons
associated with the CNF. Human rights monitors allege that a unit of
the Assam Rifles of the Indian army raided a Chin refugee camp in
Mizoram in July, killing six suspected members of the CNF and
destroying the camp. In Manipur the Manipur Underground attempted to
impose a $3 (130.5 rupees) ``tax'' on all non-Manipuris above the age
of 12 as the price for continued permission for them to live in the
state. The National Liberation Front of Tripura is imposing a similar
tax in Tripura. On March 13, a tribal woman was beaten by fellow
tribals in Udaipur subdivision, Tripura, because she lived in a
``Bengali locality'' (see Section 1.c.). (Tribals reportedly feel
threatened by the influx of Bengali-speaking persons from West Bengal
and Bangladesh, and believed to have regarded her residence as a
betrayal of her people.)
Mizoram human rights groups estimate that some 37,000 Reangs, a
tribal group from Mizoram, which has been displaced due to a sectarian
conflict, presently are being sheltered in four camps in North Tripura;
conditions in their camps are poor and the Tripura government has asked
the central Government to allot funds for their care. In August the
Mizoram government announced its willingness to take back the displaced
Reangs.
The spring and summer incursion of Pakistan-backed armed forces
into territory on the Indian side of the line of control around Kargil
in the state of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indian military campaign to
repel the intrusion forced as many as 50,000 residents of Jammu and
Kashmir from their homes, a number of whom took refuge on the Pakistani
side of the line of control. Many had their homes destroyed and
remained displaced at year's end (see Sections 1.a., 1.c., and 1.g.).
On December 21, the Assam government offered a good will ``safe
passage'' for 11 days to militant groups so that they could visit their
families without fearing arrest; 173 militants mostly belonging to ULFA
accepted the offer. The only strings attached were that the militants
could not carry weapons and that they should inform the police about
their intentions to visit their families.
There were no reports during the year of the forced return of
persons to countries where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
The Constitution provides citizens with the right to change their
government peacefully, and citizens exercise this right in practice
through periodic, free, and fair elections held on the basis of
universal suffrage. India has a democratic, parliamentary system of
government with representatives elected in multiparty elections. A
Parliament sits for 5 years unless dissolved earlier for new elections,
except under constitutionally defined emergency situations. State
governments are elected at regular intervals except in states under
President's Rule, i.e., rule by the central Government.
On the advice of the Prime Minister, the President may proclaim a
state of emergency in any part of the national territory in the event
of war, external aggression, or armed rebellion. Similarly, President's
Rule may be declared in the event of a collapse of a state's
constitutional machinery. The Supreme Court in May 1995 upheld the
Government's authority to suspend fundamental rights during an
emergency. President Narayanan dissolved the lower house of Parliament
on April 17 after the BJP-led government lost a vote of confidence in
the Lok Sabha. Elections were held in September and October. Some 374
million voters, or 62.04 percent of the electorate, cast ballots. The
new Government, a coalition of 13 political parties in the BJP-led
National Democratic Alliance government, was sworn into office under
Prime Minister Vajpayee on October 13.
More than 100 persons were killed in election-related violence in
various parts of the country, predominantly in Kashmir, Tripura, Assam,
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, and Bihar (see Section 1.g.), and there
were localized allegations of voter fraud. Human rights groups reported
that security forces in some parts of Jammu and Kashmir compelled
residents to vote and that at least three persons who refused were
killed. The worst violence occurred during the third phase of voting on
September 18; rioting on that day left 29 dead in Bihar, including 14
policemen, a magistrate and 11 polling officials.
In Jammu and Kashmir, militants committed numerous abuses--many
against civilians--to disrupt voting. On August 29, the Pakistan-based
Al Badr militant group stated that it sent militants into Kashmir with
the explicit aim of disrupting the elections. The night before the
vote, militants reportedly visited several villages warning persons not
to vote. It is believed that the principal reason for the low turnout
(about 14 percent of the electorate) in Kashmir was the militant threat
of violence. In southern Bihar, extremist leftists of the Maoist
Communist Conference (MMC) and the People's War Group (PWG) threatened
to amputate the hands of persons who voted or to kill them; during the
polling-phases, they killed numerous persons (see Section 1.g.).
No legal impediments hinder participation by women in the political
process; however, they are underrepresented in government and politics.
A large proportion of women participates in voting throughout the
country, and numerous women represent all major parties in the national
and state legislatures. There are 67 women among the 790 Members of
Parliament, including the Deputy Speaker of the Upper House, and there
are 6 women in the 69-member Cabinet. The 1993 passage of the
``Panchayati Raj'' constitutional amendments reserved 30 percent of
seats in elected village councils (Panchayats) for women, and this has,
in fact, brought more than 1 million women into the political arena at
the grassroots level. In July 1998 debate over the Women's Reservation
Bill, which was designed to reserve one-third of parliamentary seats
for women, subsided when the bill's formal introduction was prevented
due to opposition from members of both the governing and the opposition
parties. The Women's Reservation Bill was introduced in parliamentary
sessions in November and December 1998, despite strong opposition, but
it was not enacted by year's end.
The Constitution reserves seats in Parliament and state
legislatures for ``scheduled tribes'' and ``scheduled castes'' in
proportion to their population (see Section 5). Indigenous people
participate actively in national and local politics, but their impact
depends on their numerical strength. In the northeastern states,
indigenous people are a large proportion of the population and
consequently exercise a dominant influence in the political process. In
Maharashtra and Gujarat, on the other hand, tribal people are a small
minority and have been unsuccessful in blocking projects that they
oppose.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Independent human rights organizations operate throughout most of
the country, investigating abuses and publishing their findings;
however, in some states and in a few circumstances, human rights groups
face some restrictions. Human rights monitors in Jammu and Kashmir have
been unable to move around the state to document human rights
violations due to fear of retribution by security forces and
countermilitants. Since 1992 several individuals closely involved in
the documentation of violations in Jammu and Kashmir, including lawyers
and journalists, have been attacked and in some cases killed.
International human rights monitors have had difficulty in obtaining
visas to visit the country for investigation purposes. For example,
during the year the authorities continued to deny Human Rights Watch
and Amnesty International permission to visit Jammu and Kashmir;
however, some foreign diplomats gained improved access to some prisons
in Jammu and Kashmir. The Government also continued to deny the U.N.
Special Rapporteurs on Torture and Extrajudicial Killings permission to
visit the country, despite their repeated requests. Moreover, the
police and security forces have targeted human rights monitors for
arrest and harassment. However, in February U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights Mary Robinson was allowed to visit the country. She met
with the Prime Minister, Home Minister, and External Affairs Minister.
On September 27, the Ministry of Home Affairs sent a notice to
several prominent NGO's asking them to justify their status as
nonpolitical organizations under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation)
Act. According to Human Rights Watch, the notice effectively was a
threat to cut off foreign funding. The NGO's, many of which worked on
women's rights, communal violence, and Dalit and tribal issues,
publicly had criticized the policies of the BJP-led Government and the
anti-secular activities of the Sangh Parivar, a collective of rightwing
Hindu organizations of which the BJP is a member.
Several Christian-affiliated (in many cases, non-evangelical)
international relief agencies stated that, during the year, their work
in delivering services to the poor became considerably more difficult
due to threats, increased bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases,
physical attacks on their field workers by Hindu extremists (see
Sections 2.c. and 5).
According to Amnesty International, on January 8, the Orissa
government served a show-cause notice on an NGO that works with tribal
communities in the Rayagada and Koraput districts of the state;
allegedly, in December 1998 a similar letter was written to another NGO
in the region. The notices threatened the organizations with the
withdrawal of official registration and funding on the basis of reports
that they had been involved in criminal activities and had incited
tribal people to violence in an attempt to prevent the establishment of
industrial projects in the district. Allegedly, two more NGO's later
were threatened with withdrawal of funding. There is widespread
opposition to the construction of bauxite mines and aluminum processing
plants in the area where the NGO's are working.
No definitive resolution of the case of abducted and murdered
Kashmir human rights monitor Jalil Andrabi was reached. Human rights
workers alleged that the State was attempting to subvert the judicial
process by withholding evidence (see Sections 1.a. and 1.b.). In Assam
the investigation into the 1996 murder of human rights monitor and
journalist Parag Das has yielded no definitive information on the
identity of his killer. The assailant was allegedly a militant who
previously had surrendered and was supported by the Government (see
Section 1.a.). On June 8, 1998, special operations group personnel of
the Jammu and Kashmir police arrested Ali Mohammad Sheikh, a researcher
for a local human rights organization, in Dalgate, Srinagar. Sheikh
initially was held at the Khanabal, Anantnag special operations group
camp and family members were denied permission to see him. Also in June
1998, the government of Andhra Pradesh issued a directive to faculty
members of state universities not to associate with the Andhra Pradesh
Civil Liberties Committee (APCLC), a well-respected human rights
organization. The state government provided no explanation as to why it
had taken this action. By year's end, there had been no enforcement of
the directive, but it had not been rescinded. On June 8, an agent of
the intelligence wing of the New Delhi police visited and questioned
the director of the South Asia Human Rights Documentation Center about
his appeal for intervention to secure the release of a Kashmiri human
rights monitor and political dissident arrested a few days earlier.
The NHRC and the Manipur state Human Rights Commission both
expressed concern for the safety of Wahengbam Joykumar Singh, a human
rights monitor from Manipur, according to Amnesty International. On
June 28, Joykumar Singh visited the camp of the Assam Rifles, an army
unit, to recover his identity cardtaken from him by soldiers of this
unit the previous day. A unit captain allegedly warned Joykumar Singh
that he would be killed unless he withdrew two complaints of human
rights violations he had filed against members of the unit; Joykumar
Singh reportedly went into hiding shortly thereafter and remained in
hiding at year's end. On April 16, Y. Mani, Vice President of the All
Manipur United Clubs Organization (AMUCO) was taken into custody by a
unit of the Rashtriya Rifles, beaten and threatened with death,
according to Amnesty International. Just prior to the arrest, the AMUCO
had issued a public complaint about human rights violations by security
forces in Manipur. Mani was handed over to the superintendent of police
in Bishenpur district, Manipur, and released on April 17, after the
intervention of the state governor. Delhi High Court requested the
Ministry of External Affairs to respond to a complaint by human rights
monitor and Islamic scholar Iqbal Ahmad Ansari that he had been denied
renewal of his passport and consequently was unable to attend the
Parliament of the World's Religions in South Africa. Ansari alleged
that he applied for passport renewal in August in the regional passport
office in Bareilly, Uttar Pradesh in anticipation of the December 1-8
Parliament in Cape Town, but that the office took no action on his
application despite his repeated requests.
The Government appointed a National Human Rights Commission in 1993
with powers to investigate and recommend policy changes, punishment,
and compensation in cases of police abuse. In addition the NHRC is
directed to contribute to the establishment, growth, and functioning of
human rights NGO's. The Government appoints the members and finances
the operations of the NHRC. The NHRC is seriously understaffed and
prohibited by statute from directly investigating allegations of abuse
involving army and paramilitary forces.
Between April 1996, and March 1997 (the most recent reporting
year), the NHRC received 20,514 new complaints of human rights
violations. At the end of that period, 4,010 complaints awaited
consideration. Of the 16,823 cases considered during the year, 8,048
were dismissed; 2,272 were transmitted to other governmental
authorities for disposition; 528 were concluded, and 5,975 were
pending. In the preceding 12-month period (April 1995 through March
1996), the Commission received 10,195 complaints. The increased number
of complaints in the most recent reporting year is believed to be the
result of the Commission's increased visibility. That trend continued,
and the Commission estimated that it had received more than 70,000
complaints during its 1997-98 reporting year. By the end of the year,
the report for that year still had not been published.
The NHRC has sought to encourage a culture supportive of human
rights by fostering human rights education in schools and universities,
by offering support and encouragement to human rights NGO's, by
supporting training programs for the police, military forces, and
paramilitary forces, and by making recommendations to the central and
the state governments. During the year, the NHRC carried out, with the
assistance of NGO's, a human rights training program for state police
that include stress counseling. The NHRC also has influenced the
legislative process (particularly in advocating abolition of the TADA,
and by proposing prison reform legislation. State human rights
commissions exist in Assam, Manipur, Himachal Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
West Bengal, Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir, Kerala, and
Rajasthan; Uttar Pradesh took legal steps to establish a commission but
has yet to appoint members. In addition special courts to hear human
rights cases have been established in Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and
Andhra Pradesh. The courts in Uttar Pradesh are not functioning, and in
September, the state high court ordered that they be activated; despite
the order, by year's end they were not. The NHRC also encouraged the
establishment of human rights cells in police headquarters in the
states.
The NHRC also was involved in programs to eliminate child labor
(see Section 6).
The state human rights commission established in Jammu and Kashmir
by an act of the state legislature, in 1997, has no power to
investigate independently alleged human rights violations committed by
members of the security forces. Credible human rights monitors say that
the Jammu and Kashmir commission has not yet demonstrated effective,
independent protection of human rights in the state.
A People's Commission that was established in 1998 by retired
Supreme Court Justice Kuldip Singh to highlight the fate of more than
2,000 persons who ``disappeared'' during the period of political unrest
in Punjab received little cooperation from state government
authorities.
The prison visits program in Jammu and Kashmir by the International
Committee of the Red Cross, initiated in October 1995, continued during
the year (see Section 1.c.). ICRCrepresentatives also continued
training police and border security force personnel in international
humanitarian law.
The Government continued to refuse repeated UNHCR requests for
access to the Sri Lankan Tamil refugee camps in Tamil Nadu (see Section
2.d.).
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The traditional caste system as well as differences of ethnicity,
religion, and language deeply divide society. Despite laws designed to
prevent discrimination, other legislation as well as social and
cultural practices have a profound discriminatory impact. According to
the National Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes,
caste clashes are frequent in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu.
Women.--Domestic violence is common. According to a 1996 survey in
Uttar Pradesh, 30 percent of married men acknowledged physically
abusing their wives. Dowry disputes also are a serious problem. In the
typical dowry dispute, a groom's family members harass a new wife whom
they believe has not provided a sufficient dowry. This harassment
sometimes ends in the woman's death, which family members often try to
portray as a suicide or kitchen accident. Although most ``dowry
deaths'' involve lower and middle-class families, the phenomenon
crosses both caste and religious lines. According to National Crime
Records Bureau (NCRB) statistics, 6,006 dowry deaths occurred in the
country in 1997, including 1,786 dowry deaths in Uttar Pradesh, 761 in
Bihar, 550 in Madhya Pradesh, 520 in Andhra Pradesh, 420 in
Maharashtra, 195 in Karnataka, 153 in Tamil Nadu, and 25 in Kerala.
Under a 1986 amendment to the Penal Code, the court must presume
that the husband or the wife's in-laws are responsible for every
unnatural death of a woman in the first 7 years of marriage--provided
that harassment is proven. In such cases, police procedures require
that an officer of deputy superintendent rank or above conduct the
investigation and that a team of two or more doctors perform the post
mortem procedures. According to human rights monitors, in practice
police do not consistently follow these procedures.
The issue of rape has received greater political and social
attention. In Orissa in January, the victim of a 1997 rape in which the
state advocate general Indrajit Roy was charged, was gang raped in
apparent retaliation for her pursuit of charges against Roy. Roy was
forced to resign in August 1998, nearly a year after attempted rape
charges were filed against him. The victim originally had gone to him
seeking assistance in a dowry case against her husband. The media was
very critical of the state government's handling of the case, and the
gang rape was cited as one of the reasons that Orissa Chief Minister
J.B. Patnaik subsequently was forced to resign on February 7. After the
gang rape, the NHRC directed the state's chief of police to provide
police protection to the victim and to submit a full report on the
incident to the Commission. The press consistently reports that such
violence against women is increasing, although local women's
organizations claim that there simply has been increased reporting.
Only 10 percent of rape cases make it through the courts, and police
typically fail to arrest rapists. The NHRC criticized the conduct of an
investigation into a well-publicized kidnaping and rape case in
Rajasthan that occurred during the year. Acting on an anonymous
complaint, the NHRC and local police rescued a 24-year-old woman who
had been held in the Jaipur home of Manohar Lal Sharma for 2 to 3 years
and repeatedly raped; six persons were charged. Police in Jaipur
earlier had reported that they had been unable to locate the woman and
that those persons whom are now accused could not have been involved
because they were from ``respectable families,'' according to press
reports. On October 3, Delhi police constable Deepak Dubey was
dismissed from service, arrested, and charged with raping a sex worker
in the Kamla Market police station. On December 13, Pappan Singh,
Kanji, an Padam Singh, three brothers from Geejgar village, Dausa
district, Rajasthan, allegedly broke into a low caste ``Dalit'' home in
the village, raped a 16-year-old woman, then poured kerosene on her and
set her on fire, causing her to die. Two of the suspects were arrested
and charged with murder and rape; the third, Padam Singh, was being
sought at year's end.
The Union Home Ministry reported that there were 15,452 cases of
rape reported in 1998. According to NCRB statistics for 1997, there
were 15,330 rapes reported that year, 15,617 abductions of women, 6,006
dowry deaths, 36,592 reported cases of torture of women, 30,764 cases
of molestation, and 5,796 cases of sexual harassment. The NCRB recorded
a total of 121,265 crimes against women in 1997, up from the 1996 total
of 115,723. Also in 1997, 678 cases of gang rape were recorded. Gang
rapes often arecommitted as punishment for alleged adultery or as a
means of coercion or revenge in rural property disputes and feuds.
Numerous laws exist to protect the rights of women, including the
Equal Remuneration Act, the Prevention of Immoral Traffic Act, the Sati
(Widow Burning) Prevention Act, and the Dowry Prohibition Act. However,
the Government often is unable to enforce these laws, especially in
rural areas where traditions are deeply rooted. According to press
reports, the rate of acquittal in dowry death cases is high, and
because of court backlogs it takes 6 to 7 years on average to dispose
of such cases.
The country is a significant source, transit point, and destination
for many thousands of trafficked women (see Section 6.f.).
Prostitution is widespread, with an estimated 2.3 million
prostitutes in the country, some 575,000 of whom are children. Many
indigenous tribal women are forced into sexual exploitation. In Assam's
Chars River islands, some women work as prostitutes in exchange for as
little as $0.23 (10 rupees). In 1998 prostitutes began to demand legal
rights, licenses, and reemployment training, especially in Mumbai and
New Delhi. In 1997 Karnataka's government made sexual harassment a
criminal offense.
Higher female mortality at all age levels, including female
infanticide and sex selective termination of pregnancies, accounts for
an increase in the ratio of males to females to 107.9 males per 100
females in 1991, from 104.7 males per 100 females in 1981, and from
102.9 males per 100 females at the turn of the century.
Literacy rates for women are significantly lower than rates for
men; one recent study found that 38 percent of women were literate,
compared with 66 percent of men.
The law prohibits discrimination in the workplace, but enforcement
is inadequate. In both rural and urban areas, women get lower wages
than men for doing the same job. Women experience economic
discrimination in access to employment and credit. This acts as an
impediment to women owning a business and their ascent to managerial
positions within businesses often is slower than that of males. State
governments have supported micro-credit programs for women that have
begun to have an impact in many rural districts.
The personal status laws of the religious communities discriminate
against women. Under the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, a Christian woman
may demand divorce only in the case of spousal abuse and in the case of
certain categories of adultery; for a Christian man, adultery alone is
sufficient. In 1997 the Mumbai High Court recognized abuse alone as
sufficient grounds for a Christian woman to obtain a divorce. Under
Islamic law, a Muslim husband may divorce his wife spontaneously and
unilaterally; there is no such provision for women. Islamic law also
allows a man to have up to four wives but prohibits polyandry.
The Hindu Succession Act provides equal inheritance rights for
Hindu women, but married daughters seldom are given a share in parental
property. Islamic law recognizes a woman's right of inheritance but
specifies that a daughter's share should be only one-half that of a
son.
Under many tribal land systems, notably in Bihar, tribal women do
not have the right to own land. Other laws relating to the ownership of
assets and land accord women little control over land use, retention,
or sale. However, several exceptions exist, as in Ladakh and Meghalaya,
where women may have several husbands and control the family
inheritance. This also is an exception to the prohibition of polyandry.
Thousands of grassroots organizations work for social justice and
the economic advancement of women, in addition to the National
Commission for Women. The Government usually supports these efforts,
despite strong resistance from traditionally privileged groups.
Children.--The Government does not provide compulsory, free, and
universal primary education, and only approximately 59 percent of
children between the ages of 5 and 14 attend school. Of a primary
school-age population of approximately 203 million, about 120 million
children attend school. No significant sectors or groups actively are
excluded, but the economic reality is that children of wealthier
families are more likely to attend school than those of poor families.
According to a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) study
conducted in 1993, the dropout rate from primary school was 34 percent.
A significant gender gap exists in school attendance, particularly at
the secondary level. According to the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF),59
percent of boys and 38 percent of girls were enrolled in secondary
school. Upon taking office in March 1998, the BJP-led Government
pledged to ``implement the constitutional provision (Article 45) of
making primary education free and compulsory,'' promising to increase
gradually ``government and non-government'' spending on education to 6
percent of gross domestic product. The Government further pledged to
present a ``national charter for children,'' to ``take measures to
eliminate child labor,'' and to ensure that ``no child remains
illiterate, hungry, or lacks medical care.'' Budgetary allocations for
this work were not forthcoming, and by the time the Government fell in
April, little had been done to fulfill these pledges. The current BJP-
led Government reiterated its earlier pledge, but little was done to
fulfill it.
The actual percentage of the Union budget spent on education is
approximately 5.9 percent. The state governments also spend on
education, but no comprehensive figure of combined federal-state
expenditure is available. A 1993 study commissioned by the UNDP
estimated that India as a whole devoted about 3.7 percent of gross
national product to education.
Child welfare organizations estimate that there are 500,000 street
children nationwide living in abject poverty.
Child prostitution occurs in the cities, and there are an estimated
575,00 child prostitutes nationwide. Trafficking in children for the
purpose of forced prostitution is a problem (see Section 6.f.).
According to an International Labor Organization estimate, 15
percent of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes are
children.
A group on child prostitution set up by the NHRC includes
representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department
of Women and Child Development, NGO's, and UNICEF. It continued to meet
throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal
prohibitions.
Runaway children, especially in larger cities, are at high risk for
sexually transmitted diseases and HIV. They often work 18- to 20-hour
days, frequently in hazardous conditions (see Section 6.c.), and suffer
sexual and mental abuse. In addition schoolteachers often beat
children.
The Union Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment has set up a
24-hour ``child help line'' phone-in service for children in distress
in nine cities. Run by NGO's with government funding, the child help
line services target street children, orphans, destitutes, runaway
children, and children suffering abuse and exploitation. During one 6-
month period, the help lines received 25,000 calls, including 2,190
seeking medical assistance for children, 1,056 seeking shelter, 138
reporting missing children, and 125 reporting physical or sexual abuse
of children.
In its most recent annual report, the NHRC detailed its efforts to
examine conditions in juvenile homes and to recommend improvements. The
Commission also issued directions to all state governments to report
within 24 hours any instance of death or rape in such institutions. The
Commission reported that it had taken this initiative following receipt
of reports of a young boy's death in such a home in Delhi in 1996.
Speaking in March, NHRC member Justice V.S. Malimath said that cases of
abuse and torture of children confined to juvenile homes had been
reported. In some cases, the Commission had acted to transfer oversight
of homes to private voluntary organizations ``after the (state)
government failed to provide a healthy environment to children in these
homes.''
The Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act of 1929, as amended in
1978, prohibits child marriage, a traditional practice in northern
India. The act raised the age requirement for marriage for girls to 18
from 15 years, but the Government does not enforce it effectively.
According to one report, 50 percent of girls in Bihar, Rajasthan, Uttar
Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh are married at or before age 16. The Union
Home Ministry reported that just 21 cases were registered under the
Child Marriage Restraint (Amendment) Act during 1998. The NHRC, in
consultation with the National Commission for Women and the Department
of Women and Child Development, recommended that a new draft ``marriage
bill'' be enacted to strengthen the prohibitions of the 1929 act. The
NHRC, in its 1996-1997 report, criticized the then-government for
rejecting this suggestion, a response that the Commission concluded
amounted, ``essentially, to a total disinclination to strengthen or
alter the law, in any respect, or indeed to see to its better
implementation in any manner.''
The traditional preference for male children continues. Although a
law passed in 1994 prohibits the use of amniocentesis and sonogram
tests for sex determination, the tests are widelymisused for this
purpose, and termination of a disproportionate number of pregnancies
with female fetuses occurs. In the 11 years since the southern state of
Maharashtra passed a law banning the use of such tests for sex
determination, the state government has filed charges against one
doctor; he was acquitted. Human rights groups estimate that at least
10,000 cases of female infanticide occur yearly, primarily in poor
rural areas. Parts of Tamil Nadu (Dharmapuri, Salem, and Madurai
districts) still have high rates of female infanticide. According to
statistics compiled by the Dharmapuri office of the Directorate of
Health Services, 1,260 female infants were killed in the district in
1997. Police have not investigated these cases. In 1998 the Tamil Nadu
Human Rights Commission suggested that a separate mandatory police
investigation into the death of every female infant become mandatory,
but there is no legislation that requires such action. In addition
parents often give priority in health care and nutrition to male
infants. Women's rights groups point out that the burden of providing
girls with an adequate dowry is one factor that makes daughters less
desirable. Although abetting or taking dowry is theoretically illegal
under the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, it still is practiced widely.
Bonded and unbonded child labor continues to be a serious problem
throughout the country (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.).
People with Disabilities.--According to regional NGO's, there are
over 90 million disabled persons in the country. There is no
legislation or otherwise mandated provision of accessibility for the
disabled. With the adoption of the Persons with Disability (Equal
Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act in
1995, a nascent disabled rights movement slowly is raising awareness
and empowering the disabled. Although the act extends independence,
freedom, and equal rights to all persons with disabilities, most
disabled-related organizations admit that its practical effects have
been minimal so far, in part due to a clause that makes the
implementation of programs dependent on the ``economic capacit'' of the
Government. To a large degree, physical impediments still limit
mobility, legislation prevents equality, and societal discrimination
maintains the status quo of the disabled.
The Disabled Division of the Ministry of Welfare had a budget
provision of more than $38 million (1.65 million rupees) for the 1998-
99 fiscal year for a number of organizations and committees at the
national, regional, and local levels. The Ministry delivers
rehabilitation services to the rural population through 16 district
centers. A national rehabilitation plan commits the Government to
putting a rehabilitation center in each of more than 400 districts, but
services still are concentrated in urban areas. However, the impact of
government programs so far has been limited. Significant funding is
provided to a handful of government organizations such as the
Artificial Limbs Manufacturing Corporation of India, the National
Handicapped Finance and Development Corporation, and the Rehabilitation
Council of India. Each program/entity provides specific services or
training which include producing aids and prosthetics, promoting
disabled-oriented economic development activities, offering training to
health-care professionals and vocational instructors concerning
disabled-related issues, and providing comprehensive rehabilitation
services to the rural disabled.
Additional mini-grants are offered to NGO's that coordinate
programs for the disabled to facilitate their physical, social and
psychological rehabilitation and integration into mainstream society.
During 1998-99, $3 million (130.5 million rupees) was available.
However, only half of this amount was allocated due to funding
restrictions placed on each providing organization and the small number
of them that exist.
Two significant programs to benefit the disabled are the National
Project to Integrate Mentally Retarded in Family and Community and the
National Institute for the Multiple Disabilities. The first project,
launched in six states in 1998, primarily focuses on children from the
economically weaker sections and promotes awareness concerning the
mentally disabled, their problems, and their rights. The second,
currently being proposed by the Ministry of Welfare, is to provide
rehabilitation services to persons with multiple disabilities as well
as develop courses and materials to foster greater awareness among
communities throughout the country.
According to the Persons with Disability Act, 3 percent of
positions in official offices and state-owned enterprises should be
reserved for persons with visual, hearing, or orthopedic disabilities.
The Government provides special railway fares, education allowances,
scholarships, customs exemptions, budgetary funds from the Ministry of
Rural Development, and rehabilitation training to assist the disabled.
However, implementation of these entitlements is not thorough. Although
the Government has made significant steps toward improving theplight of
the disabled, its involvement has been insufficient. The majority of
responsibility for caring for disabled persons still lies with family
members and voluntary groups.
The NHRC continues to receive complaints relating to harassment,
intolerance, and discrimination against the disabled. It currently is
gathering information on these cases and forwarding assessments to
concerned NGO's and government entities. However, this process is slow,
and its effects so far have been minimal.
The NHRC continued its efforts to improve conditions in mental
hospitals and enhance awareness of the rights of those with mental
disabilities during the year. In 1997 it commissioned an assessment of
conditions at mental hospitals throughout the country, to be conducted
by the National Institute of Mental Health and Neuroscience. The rights
of the mentally ill and mentally disabled are provided for in the
Constitution and the Mental Health Act of 1987. However, the NHRC noted
that despite these protections, conditions in many mental hospitals are
far from satisfactory. They continue to embody old concepts of mental
health care and essentially function as custodial rather than
therapeutic institutions. Overcrowded and serving as ``dumping
grounds'' by desperate relatives, some mental hospitals lack even basic
amenities and have poor medical facilities. In August the NHRC reported
that it had assumed the management of mental hospitals in Ranchi,
Bihar, Agra, Uttar Pradesh, and Gwalior, Madhya Pradesh, at the
direction of the Supreme Court.
Indigenous People.--The Innerline Regulations enacted by the
British in 1873 still provide the basis for safeguarding tribal rights
in most of the border states of the northeast. They are in effect in
Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram, but not in Tripura,
where the tribal population has been reduced to 30 percent of the total
population due to increased Bengali migration since partition. These
regulations prohibit any person, including citizens from other states,
from going beyond an inner boundary without a valid permit. No rubber,
wax, ivory, or other forest products may be removed from the protected
areas without prior authorization. No outsiders are allowed to own land
in the tribal areas without approval from tribal authorities.
Despite constitutional safeguards, the rights of indigenous groups
in eastern India often are ignored. Indigenous people suffer
discrimination and harassment, have been deprived wrongly of their
land, and have been subject to torture and to arbitrary arrest. There
has been encroachment on tribal land in almost every state of eastern
India, including by illegal Bangladeshi immigrants, and by businesses
that illegally have removed forest and mineral products. Moreover,
persons from other backgrounds often usurp places reserved for members
of tribes and lower castes in national education institutions. Mob
lynchings, arson, and police atrocities against tribal people occur in
many states.
In the Andaman Islands, the local government implemented a policy
during the year of permitting development of the Jawara tribal area
that threatens indigenous group's way of life. The construction of a
road through the forest that is inhabited by this group and the
encroachment of Indian settlers have impacted negatively indigenous
group's cultural vitality, economic self-sufficiency, and physical and
mental health. These integrative policies have been driven in part by
humanitarian motives, but interest in commercially exploiting virgin
forests inhabited by tribal people is another strong factor. The most
recent manifestation of this negative trend was a destructive outbreak
of measles among the Jawara tribal people, reported in the press in
September.
Such violations led to numerous tribal movements demanding the
protection of land and property rights. The Jharkhand Movement in Bihar
and Orissa, and the Bodo Movement in Assam, reflect deep economic and
social grievances among indigenous people. In the Jharkhand area,
tribal people complain that they have been relegated to unskilled
mining jobs, have lost their forests to industrial construction, and
have been displaced by development projects. The Government has
considered the creation of an independent Jharkand state, but the
affected state governments oppose the idea.
However, there is some local autonomy in the northeast. In
Meghalaya tribal chiefs still wield influence in certain villages. The
Nagaland government controls the rights to certain mineral resources,
and autonomous district councils in Tripura, Assam, and Meghalaya
control matters such as education, rural development, and forestry in
cooperation with the state governors.
The 1991 census, the last conducted, showed that 8.08 percent of
citizens belonged to scheduled tribes. According to the Indian
Confederation of Indigenous and Tribal People (ICITP), 80 percent of
the tribal population live below the poverty line.
In May 1998, the NHRC established a panel to investigate the
condition of the country's 20 million denotified tribal people. These
are tribal people who, in 1871, were labeled by the British colonial
government as belonging to ``criminal tribes.'' The Colonial Act
listing these tribes was repealed in 1951, but the stigma remains and
many of these tribal people still are discriminated against actively.
According to the ICITP, more than 40,000 tribal women, mainly from
Orissa and Bihar, have been forced into economic and sexual
exploitation (see Section 6.f.); many come from tribes driven off the
land by national park schemes. Special courts to hear complaints of
atrocities committed against tribal people were to have been
established under the protection of Civil Rights Act of 1976, but this
has not been done.
Religious Minorities.--The potential for renewed Hindu-Muslim
violence remains considerable. Hindus and Muslims continue to feud over
the construction of mosques several centuries ago on three sites where
Hindus believe that temples stood previously. In 1998 the Sri Krishna
Commission, established by the Government to inquire into the cause of
Hindu-Muslim riots in Mumbai in December 1992 and January 1993,
released its report. The riots, which followed the destruction of a
historic mosque in Ayodhya in December 1992, left more than 1,000
persons, mostly Muslims, dead. Maharashtra's BJP-Shiv Sena ruling
coalition rejected the report, which laid responsibility for much of
the violence on leaders from both parties; several Muslim organizations
have asked the Supreme Court to reverse this rejection, but at year's
end, the Supreme Court had not reached a decision. In September and
October, new state assembly elections were held in Maharashtra and the
incumbent BJP-Shiv Sena government was replaced by a coalition led by
the Indian National Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party. The
new Maharashtra government has pledged to take action on the Sri
Krishna report. On July 20, violence erupted between Hindus and Muslims
in Ahmedabad, Gujarat, claiming one life. The violence began when a
band of Hindu youths set fire to Muslim shops and vehicles after
encountering some Muslim youths teasing a mentally disabled woman in
the Muslim-dominated old city. Police responded by declaring an area-
wide curfew, thereby bringing the rioting under control; however, there
was renewed communal violence on July 22, when the curfew was lifted.
On August 26, a mob of approximately 15 persons, possibly led by Hindu
extremist Dara Singh, mutilated and burned to death a Muslim cattle
trader in Padiabeda village, Orissa. According to press reports, men
with bows and arrows and axes attacked the cattle trader. Both his
hands were severed, and he was thrown into his shop, which had been set
ablaze. Some 400 persons witnessed the killing, and 3 suspects were
arrested in connection with the killing; however, there were no
convictions.
Attacks by Muslim militants seeking to end Indian rule in Jammu and
Kashmir, and continued political violence, drove most Hindus in the
Kashmir Valley (Pandits) to seek refuge in camps in Jammu, with
relatives in New Delhi, or elsewhere. Throughout the year, militants
carried out several execution-style mass killings of Hindu villagers
and violently targeted Pandits in Jammu and Kashmir (see Sections 1.a.
and 1.g.). During the year, there were at least three separate attacks
on Pandit villages in Jammu and Kashmir in which some 41 persons were
killed. For example, on July 1, Muslim militants are believed to have
killed nine members of two Hindu families, including three women and a
child, in Poonch district, Jammu and Kashmir. The Pandit community
criticizes bleak conditions in the camps and fears that a negotiated
solution giving greater autonomy to the Muslim majority might threaten
its own survival in Jammu and Kashmir as a culturally and historically
distinctive group. The NHRC released a 39-page judgement in June, in
response to a petition from Hindu Pandits alleging that genocide had
been committed against them. The NHRC found that the crimes against the
Pandits ``fall short of the ultimate crime: genocide,'' but stated that
compensation to the community had been inadequate.
There was a sharp increase in the number of attacks against
Christian communities and Christian missionaries during the year. On
December 1, Home Minister L.K. Advani told Parliament that there had
been 31 attacks on churches during the year, with 15 occurring in
Gujurat, 7 in Tamil Nadu, 5 in Kerala, 2 in Orissa, and one each in
Haryana and Madhya Pradesh. He said that 89 persons had been arrested
in connection with these attacks and those from previous years. There
were approximately incidents during the year, primarily of mob violence
that took the form of destruction of churches and religious property
and violent attacks on Christian pilgrims and leaders, occurring in all
parts of the country. The press reported the following incidents: On
January 11, two Christian prayer halls were set on fire and damaged in
the Dangs district of Gujarat. On January 27, 12 Christian villagers
forcibly were ``reconverted'' to Hinduism under threat of the loss of
the right to use the local well and the destruction of their homes. The
``reconversion'' was carried out by youths working with Swami Ashim
Anand, a Hindu man active in ``reconverting'' tribal people in the
area. However, the villagers stated that prior to becoming Christians,
they had not been Hindu.
On January 23, Australian missionary Graham Staines and his two
young sons were killed. The three were asleep in their car in
Manoharpur, Keonjhar district, Orissa, when a mob shouting Hindu
slogans set fire to their car. Villagers who tried to help Staines and
his sons reportedly were beaten. Staines and his sons were in the
village to attend an annual bible camp. Staines had worked in the
country for many years and ran a hospital and clinic for lepers in
Orissa. Police arrested 51 suspects in connection with the crime and
sought others, including Dara Singh, who allegedly organized the attack
and is a supporter of the Bajrang Dal. However, most of those arrested
were released due to insufficient evidence. Some of the suspects
reportedly were members or supporters of the Bajrang Dal. On January
30, Home Minister L.K. Advani stated that the Bajrang Dal was not
involved in the Staines killings. However, soon after the incident, the
Government ordered a judicial inquiry into the killings. Supreme Court
Justice D.P. Wadwha was appointed to head the Commission of Inquiry.
The Commission was criticized for not moving as aggressively as many
had hoped; the head of the Commission criticized the central Government
for failing to provide adequate resources to conduct the investigation.
Hearings were held from March 30 to April 17 in Bhubhaneshwar, Orissa.
The report of the Commission of Inquiry was submitted to the Government
on June 21, and was made public on August 5. The Wadhwa Commission
report found no evidence of involvement of the Bajrang Dal or any other
``politico-religious organization.'' It found that the Staines murders
were perpetrated under the direction of Rabindra Kumar Pal, alias Dara
Singh, a wanted criminal and Hindu extremist. The report nevertheless
documented Dara Singh's support for the Bajrang Dal. The National
Commission for Minorities and other human rights monitors disputed the
Wadhwa Commission finding. The National Commission for Minorities's
own, separate inquiry found evidence suggesting that the Bajrang Dal
was involved in the murders. Villagers questioned by the commission
reportedly stated that the killers cheered ``long live the Bajrang
Dal'' shortly before the attack took place.
On March 16, clashes between Hindu and Christian tribal people in
the village of Ranalai, southern Orissa broke out, which resulted in
injuries to more than 12 persons and the burning of 157 Christian
homes. The dispute began in February when a Christian cross that had
been etched into a hillside 20 years earlier was converted into a Hindu
Trishul (trident symbol).
Local Christians painted over the trident and repainted the cross.
Despite local efforts to mediate the dispute, violence broke out on
March 16. By March 17, 26 persons from both communities had been
arrested for their alleged involvement in the incident. Bharat Paik,
head of the local BJP, reportedly claimed that the Christians burned
their own homes. On September 2, Father Arul Doss, a 35-year-old Roman
Catholic priest, was murdered in a night raid by Hindu extremists on a
church in Jambani village in Orissa's Mayurbhanj district. Doss was
pulled from the church, shot with arrows, and beaten to death by his
assailants. The mob also severely beat Doss's associate and vandalized
the one-room church, before setting it on fire. In a public statement
the same day, Prime Minister Vajpayee strongly criticized Father Doss's
murder and called for its perpetrators to be brought to justice. On
September 20 in Chapra, Bihar, two young men attacked a Roman Catholic
nun; they reportedly questioned her about the number of conversions she
and her sister nuns had made at Jalalpur convent. The men stripped the
nun, forced her to drink urine, and attempted to rape her. Bihar Police
Chief K.A. Jacob visited the scene of the crime 3 days later, and the
state government established a three-member committee to investigate
the crime. Christian organizations under the leadership of the
Archbishop of New Delhi held a sit-in on September 26 to protest the
humiliation of the nun.
Tamil Nadu was the scene of multiple church burnings between
September 30 and November 12. During this 6-week period, nine thatched-
roof buildings used for worship services by the Church of South India
(a member of the Anglican Communion), the Syrian Catholic Church, and
various Pentecostal denominations were burnt down; no one was killed.
The incidents involved the destruction of churches on September 30, in
Melkrishnapudur, Kanyakumari (Church of South India); October 4, in
Kuzhithurai, Kanyakumari (Syrian Catholic Church); October 31, in
Mogappair, Chennai (Church of South India); November 5, in Kodambakkam,
Chennai (Seventh Day Adventist Church); November 7, in Thirumangalam,
Chennai (International Evangelist Church); November 7, in Tirumalai,
Tiruchi (Denomination Unknown); November 7, in Reddiarpatti,
Tirunelveli (Pentecostal Mission); November 9, in Santhome, Chennai
(Denomination Unknown), and November 12, in Vellore, North Tamil Nadu
(Methodist). (It is possible that the November 7 and 9 incidents were
started by the widespread use of firecrackers during the Hindu festival
of Deepavali.)
On November 11, a mob of about 40 persons attacked a Christian
gathering outside a church in the Khyala area of Delhi, in the first
such incident in the capital. At least 12 persons were injured in the
attack, when the mob descended on an open-air bible reading session,
allegedly tearing pamphlets and damaging two bibles. A police spokesman
said the mob ``may have had some BJP activists'' and four persons that
are suspected of instigating the attacks were being sought.
Since 1998 Christian aid workers have been harassed increasingly.
Many report having been hampered in their work due to threats,
bureaucratic obstacles, and, in some cases, physical attacks on their
workers. Several Christian relief organizations have reported
difficulty in getting visas renewed for foreign relief workers (see
Sections 2.d. and 4).
Members of militant Hindu organizations (including members of the
Hindu Jagran Manch, the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, and the Bajrang Dal)
reportedly are concerned about Christians' efforts to convert Hindus.
They claimed that Hindus, including economically disadvantaged Dalits
and tribals, were being forced or induced to convert by Christian
missionaries. On September 6, Vishwa Hindu Parishad working president
Ashok Singhal called for enactment of a law banning forced conversions.
Missionaries have been operating schools and medical clinics for many
years in tribal areas, including in the Dangs district in Gujarat.
Tribals, such as those attacked in the Dangs district in 1998, and
Dalits are outside of the caste system and occupy the very lowest
position in the social hierarchy. However, they have made socioeconomic
gains as a result of the missionary schools and other institutions,
which, among other things, have increased literacy among the lowest
castes.
On January 5, a new Hindu militant group, the Hindu Dharma Raksha
Samiti, held its second convention in Peth, Maharashtra. Among other
demands issued by its leaders was an ultimatum to missionaries to close
their offices in tribal districts in certain parts of Gujarat and
Maharashtra by March 31, or be held responsible for any ensuing
conflicts. On February 21, the Bajrang Dal held a convocation in
Mumbai, which approximately 20,000 persons attended. At the
convocation, antiminority rhetoric reportedly was common, and numerous
resolutions were passed, which, if ever acted upon, would restrict
freedom of religion and increase communal tensions. Among the
resolutions passed were ones that called for a ban on conversion from
Hinduism and a ban on using loudspeakers at mosques for the call to
prayer.
On January 29 leading Muslim religious leaders and politicians
joined Christian leaders at a protest held in New Delhi against the
Government's response to violence against Christians. The multifaith
group Religions for Social Justice was established in New Delhi in
January following the Staines murders to help promote inter-religious
understanding.
The practice of dedicating or marrying young, prepubescent girls to
a Hindu deity or temple as ``servants of god'' ``Devadasis,'' is
reported by Human Rights Watch to continue in several southern states,
including Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. Devadasis, who generally are
Dalits, may not marry. They are taken from their families and are
required to provide sexual services to priests and high caste Hindus.
Reportedly, many eventually are sold to urban brothels. In 1992 the
state of Karnataka passed the Karnataka Devadasi (Prohibition) Act and
called for the rehabilitation of Devadasis, but this law reportedly
suffers from a lack of enforcement and criminalizes the actions of
Devadasis. Since Devadasis are by custom required to be sexually
available to higher caste men, it reportedly is difficult for them to
obtain justice from the legal system if they are raped.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country's caste system
historically has strong ties to Hinduism. It delineates clear social
strata, assigning highly structured religious, cultural, and social
roles to each caste and sub-caste. Members of each caste--and
frequently each sub-caste--are expected to fulfill a specific set of
duties (known as dharma) in order to secure elevation to a higher caste
through rebirth. Dalits (formerly called untouchables) are viewed by
many Hindus as separate from or ``below'' the caste system;
nonetheless, they too are expected to follow their dharma if they hope
to achieve caste in a future life. Despite longstanding efforts to
eliminate the discriminatory aspects of caste, societal, political, and
economic pressures continue to ensure its widespread practice.
The Constitution gives the President the authority to specify
historically disadvantaged castes, Dalits, and ``tribals'' (members of
indigenous groups historically outside the caste system). These
``scheduled'' castes, Dalits, and tribes are entitled to affirmative
action and hiring quotas in employment, benefits from special
development funds, and special training programs. The impact of
reservations and quotas on society andon the groups they are designed
to benefit is presently a subject of active debate. According to the
1991 census, scheduled castes, including Dalits, made up 16 percent and
scheduled tribes 8 percent of the country's 1991 population of 846
million. Christians historically have rejected the concept of caste.
However, because many Christians descended from low caste Hindu
families, many continue to suffer the same social and economic
limitations that low caste Hindus do, particularly in rural areas. Low
caste Hindus who convert to Christianity lose their eligibility for
affirmative action programs. Those who become Buddhists or Sikhs do
not. In some states, government jobs are reserved for Muslims of low
caste descent.
The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act of 1989 specifies new offenses against disadvantaged
persons and provides stiffer penalties for offenders. However, this act
has had only a modest effect in curbing abuse. The Union Home Ministry
reported that 14,413 crimes against scheduled castes and 2,413 crimes
against scheduled tribes were recorded in 1998. This represents a
significant decrease from the 20,312 crimes against scheduled castes
and 3,193 crimes against scheduled tribes recorded in 1997. However,
human rights NGO's allege that caste violence is actually on the
increase.
The practice of untouchability (``untouchables''--now called
Dalits--along with tribals occupy the lowest strata of the caste
system) was outlawed in theory by the Constitution and the 1955 Civil
Rights Act, but it remains an important aspect of life.
``Untouchability'' refers to the social disabilities imposed on persons
because of their birth into certain Hindu castes. Dalits are considered
unclean by higher caste Hindus and thus traditionally are relegated to
separate villages or neighborhoods and to low paying and often
undesirable occupations (such as scavenging, street sweeping, and
removing human waste and dead animals). Many rural Dalits work as
agricultural laborers for higher caste landowners. By custom Dalits may
be required to perform tasks for upper caste Hindus without
remuneration. The majority of bonded laborers are Dalits (see Section
6.c.). Dalits are among the poorest of Indians, generally do not own
land, and are often illiterate. They face significant discrimination
despite the laws that exist to protect them, and often are prohibited
from using the same wells as higher caste Hindus and from attending the
same temples as higher caste Hindus. NGO's report that crimes committed
by higher caste Hindus against Dalits often go unpunished, either
because the authorities do not prosecute vigorously such cases or
because the crimes are unreported by the victims, who fear retaliation.
In recent years, groups--including some that use violence--have
organized to protect Dalit rights.
Intercaste violence claims hundreds of lives each year; it was
particularly pronounced in Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Tamil Nadu states.
On January 26, approximately 100 upper caste members of the Ranvir
Sena, a private army, killed 24 Dalits in Shankarbigha, Jehanbad
district, Bihar. President Narayanan criticized the attack and called
on state authorities to intervene to halt the intercaste violence. On
February 10, the Ranvir Sena killed 12 persons in the lower caste
village of Narayanpur, Bihar, including 4 women and a 12-year-old girl.
On February 14, leftist militants reportedly killed seven upper caste
Hindus; on March 2, 5 more upper caste Hindus were killed in Bhimpura
village, Jehanabad District, Bihar. On March 18, militants of the
Maoist Communist Center in Senari village, Bihar, killed at least 35
upper caste villagers who were asleep. On April 21, about 100 members
of the Ranvir Sena killed 12 Dalit and other lower caste villagers in
Sendani subdivision, Gaya district, Bihar. Police responded quickly to
the incident and may have prevented further violence. By late April, 47
persons had been arrested in connection with the April 21 killings.
However, in general, the members of the Ranvir Sena who were arrested
were released on bail shortly thereafter, and none were convicted in
connection with attacks on low caste villagers. According to Human
Rights Watch, police made little effort to prevent the killings,
despite the fact that the Ranvir Sena often publicly announced its
intentions days before each attack; allegedly, police also failed to
provide protection for villagers in the aftermath of such attacks.
According to Human Rights Watch, on June 19 a gang of upper-caste
Hindus looted and destroyed the houses in a Dalit settlement in
Kodankipatti, Madurai district, after Dalits there had demanded a share
in the common property of the village. On February 12, President
Narayanan dismissed the government of Bihar on the recommendation of
the Federal Cabinet, due to concerns about lawlessness in the state.
However, on March 8, the dismissal was reversed, and the Bihar
government was reinstated.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
right of association. Workers may establish and join unions of their
own choosing without prior authorization. More than 397.2 million
persons constitutethe country's active work force. Some 30 million of
these workers are employed in the formal sector. The rest are
overwhelmingly agricultural workers and, to a lesser extent, urban non-
industrial laborers. While some trade unions represent agricultural
workers and informal sector workers, most of the country's estimated 13
to 15 million union members are part of the 30 million member formal
sector. Of these 13 to 15 million unionized workers, some 80 percent
are members of unions affiliated with one of the 5 major trade union
centrals. All major trade centrals are affiliated to a greater or
lesser extent with particular political parties. Central unions
recently have stressed their independence and in some cases are
attempting to sever previously tight party control.
Trade unions often exercise the right to strike, but public sector
unions are required to give at least 16 days notice prior to striking.
Some states have laws requiring workers in certain nonpublic sector
industries to give prior strike notice.
The Essential Services Maintenance Act allows the Government to ban
strikes and requires conciliation or arbitration in specified essential
industries. Legal mechanisms exist for challenging the assertion that a
given dispute falls within the scope of this act. However, the
``essential services'' has never been defined in law. It thus is open
to interpretation and subject to varying interpretations from state to
state. The government of Maharashtra passed a law in February banning
strikes in essential services, including transport services, milk
supply services, the electricity department, and hospitals. The
Industrial Disputes Act prohibits retribution by employers against
employees involved in legal strike actions. This prohibition is
observed in practice.
When abuses, such as intimidation or suppression of legitimate
trade union activities, are perpetrated against nationally organized or
other large-scale unions or unionized workers, the authorities
generally respond by prosecuting and punishing those responsible.
Unaffiliated unions of low caste or tribal workers are not able, in all
instances, to secure for themselves the protections and rights provided
by law. However, six men were convicted in 1998 on charges related to
the 1991 killing of tribal union leader Shankar Guha Niyogi. The gunman
was sentenced to death, while industrialist Chandrakant Shah and four
others received life sentences. On appeal, the Madhya Pradesh High
Court released four of the six men, including Shah. After much
deliberation, the government decided not to appeal the High Court
judgment to the Supreme Court.
According to Ministry of Labor statistics, during the first 9
months of the year there were 601 strikes and lockouts throughout the
country, involving 400,000 workers. In all, 3.9 million ``person-days''
were lost due to strikes and 4 million ``person-days'' were lost due to
lockouts during this period. For example, in January over 800,000 Bihar
government employees, including teachers, went on strike demanding
wages on a par with those paid by the central Government and raising
the retirement age. The strike ended on May 7, with the Bihar
government conceding to worker demands. In May over 10,000 temporary
contract workers in West Bengal belonging to the Center of India Trade
Unions affiliated with the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPM) went
on strike demanding permanent jobs for themselves as well as jobs for
those displaced by Haldia Petrochemicals Ltd. and other local persons.
In October truck operators went on strike over a 35 percent hike in
diesel prices.
The Kerala High Court declared in July 1997 that all general
strikes (bandhs) were illegal and all organizers of protests would be
liable for losses caused by shutdowns. Later in the year, the Supreme
Court of India upheld the verdict drawing attention to the difference
between a complete closedown of all activities (bandh), and a general
strike (hartal). While it is likely that the ruling was introduced in
relation to political strikes, unions stated that remained a potential
threat to their activities. Other court rulings during 1997 also
declared strikes illegal and made striking workers pay damages because
consumers and the public suffered during strikes.
In January the Government announced plans to establish a national
commission on labor to review and reform labor laws. The planning
commission was set up and reportedly is preparing a comprehensive labor
code to replace current central and state labor laws.
Unions are free to affiliate with international trade union
organizations. The Indian National Trade Union Congress and the Hind
Mazdoor Sabha are affiliated with the International Confederation of
Free Trade Unions, while the All India Trade Union Congress is
affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--Theright to
bargain collectively has existed for decades. The Trade Union Act
prohibits discrimination against union members and organizers, and
employers may be penalized if they discriminate against employees
engaged in union activities.
Collective bargaining is the normal means of setting wages and
settling disputes in unionized plants in the organized industrial
sector. Trade unions vigorously defend worker interests in this
process. Although a system of specialized labor courts adjudicates
labor disputes, there are long delays and a backlog of unresolved
cases. When the parties are unable to agree on equitable wages, the
Government may establish boards of union, management, and government
representatives to determine them.
In practice legal protections of worker rights are effective only
for the 30 million workers in the organized industrial sector, out of a
total work force of more than 397.2 million persons. Outside the modern
industrial sector, laws are difficult to enforce. Union membership is
rare in the informal sector, and collective bargaining does not exist.
There are seven export processing zones (EPZ's). Entry into the
EPZ's ordinarily is limited to employees. Such entry restrictions apply
to union organizers. Each company buses its workers directly to and
from the factory door. While workers in the EPZ's have the right to
organize and to bargain collectively, union activity is rare. In
addition unions have not pursued vigorously efforts to organize
private-sector employees anywhere in the years since EPZ's were
established. There have been efforts to organize workers in the EPZ's
and unions have complained that these attempts were suppressed in
Kerala and Gujurat. The fact that organizers are barred from EPZ's and
workers are bused to EPZ's helps prevent unions from forming. Women
constitute the bulk of the work force in the EPZ's. The International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions reports that overtime is compulsory
in the EPZ's, that workers often are employed on temporary contracts
with fictitious contractors rather than directly by the company, and
that workers fear that complaints about substandard working conditions
would result in their being fired. In March the Union Ministry of
Commerce announced its intention to convert all EPZ's into free trade
zones and eliminate government interference in their functioning. Trade
unions fear that this would lead to a curb in worker rights in these
zones and have asked the Government not to implement the plan; by
year's end, the plan had not been implemented.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Both the
Constitution and specific statute prohibit forced or compulsory labor,
and Bonded labor, as a form of compulsory labor, also is prohibited by
statute; however, such practices are widespread. The Bonded Labor
System (Abolition) Act of 1976 prohibits all bonded labor, by adults
and children. Offenders may be sentenced to up to 3 years in prison,
but prosecutions are rare. Enforcement of this statute, which is the
responsibility of state governments, varies from state to state and has
not been effective due to the lack of adequate resources for
enforcement and, to some extent, to societal acceptance. Some NGO's
estimate that the number of bonded laborers is 5 million persons;
however, in a report released during the year, Human Rights Watch
estimated that 40 million persons, including 15 million children, are
bonded laborers (see Section 6.d.). The report notes that the majority
of bonded laborers are Dalits (see Section 5), and that bondage is
passed from one generation to the next.
A Supreme Court decision defined forced labor as work at less than
the minimum wage, which is usually set by the state governments. Under
this definition, which differs from that of the International Labor
Organization (ILO), forced labor is widespread, especially in rural
areas.
Bonded labor, the result of a private contractual relationship
whereby a worker incurs or inherits debts to a contractor and then must
work off the debt plus interest, is illegal but widespread. The
Government estimates that between enactment of the Bonded Labor
(Abolition) Act in 1976 and March 1993, 251,424 bonded workers were
released from their obligations. Other sources maintain that those
released constituted only one-twentieth of the total number of bonded
laborers. State governments are responsible for enforcing the act. In
February 1997, the Supreme Court required state governments to file
detailed affidavits on the status of bonded labor. Some press reports
indicate that Tamil Nadu alone has an estimated 25,800 bonded laborers,
in response to which the state government is working on rehabilitation
plans. It has allocated $1.25 million (54.4 million rupees) for these
plans. Following the state government responses, the Supreme Court
directed each state to undertake a survey of bonded laborers. In West
Bengal, organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi immigrants is a source
of bonded labor (see Section 6.f.). Calcutta police arrested five
members of such a gang on May 19 and detained52 Bangladeshis who had
entered the country illegally, including 19 children. In June the Union
Ministry of Labor directed state government officials in Bihar to
ensure that freed bonded laborers do not revert to bondage; 74 low
caste laborers were released from bondage by the state labor department
during the year. Some 900 laborers were released from bondage in
Arunachal Pradesh, in conformity with a Supreme Court order.
The working conditions of domestic servants and children in the
workplace often amount to bonded labor. Children sent from their homes
to work because their parents cannot afford to feed them, or in order
to pay off a debt incurred by a parent or relative, have little choice
in the matter. There are no universally accepted figures for the number
of bonded child laborers. However, in the carpet industry alone, human
rights organizations estimate that there may be as many as 300,000
children working, many of them under conditions that amount to bonded
labor. Officials claim that they cannot stop this practice because the
children are working with their parents' consent. In addition, in the
following industries, there is a reasonable basis to believe that
products were produced using forced or indentured child labor:
Brassware; hand-knotted wool carpets; explosive fireworks; footwear;
hand-blown glass bangles; hand-made locks; hand-dipped matches; hand-
broken quarried stones; hand-spun silk thread and hand-loomed silk
cloth; hand-made bricks and beedis (hand-rolled cigarettes).
In October 1998, a Human Rights Watch team headed by the Karnataka
state labor commissioner conducted surprise inspections on silk twining
factories in and around the town of Magadi. The team found 53 child
workers under the age of 14 years working in the plants. The
inspections revealed children locked in plants, forbidden to talk to
each other, and beaten for slow work. The labor commissioner estimated
that there were 3,000 bonded child laborers in the Magadi silk twining
factories.
Female bondage, forced prostitution, and the trafficking of women
and children for the purpose of forced prostitution are widespread
problems (see Section 6.f.). According to press reports, prison
officials used prisoners as domestic servants and sold female prisoners
to brothels (see Section 1.c.).
In Punjab persons are sold in an organized trade in weekend bazaars
for the purposes of forced domestic labor and forced sexual service. In
1998 one person was arrested in connection with this human trade. He
was released later on bail.
In December domestic media reported that child laborers were being
sold in an organized ring at the annual Sonepur cattle fair in Bihar.
According to these reports, children of impoverished families in
surrounding districts are brought to the fair and sold in an organized
traffic. One reporter talked to a buyer, a shopkeeper, who had paid
just $21 (900 rupees) for a 12-year-old child. Persons sometimes are
sold into virtual slavery (see Section 6.f.).
In July a spokesman for the South Asian Coalition on Child
Servitude (SACCS), a Delhi-based NGO, told the press that SACCS had
freed 35 bonded laborers from carpet and sari looms in Varanasi and
Allahabad to pay off loans incurred by family members. SACCS filed a
complaint against the employers with the NHRC.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Article 24 of the Constitution and the Child Labor
(Prohibition and Regulation) Act of 1986 are the principal protections
against the exploitation of children in the workplace. Provisions for
the protection of children in the workplace also are made in the Beedi
and Cigar Workers (Condition of Employment) Act of 1966, the Factories
Act of 1948, the Mines Act of 1952, the Motor Transport Workers Act of
1961, the Plantations Labor Act of 1951, and the Minimum Wages Act of
1948. The Government prohibits forced and bonded labor by children but
does not enforce this prohibition effectively (see Section 6.c.).
The enforcement of child labor laws is the responsibility of the
state governments. Enforcement is inadequate, especially in the
informal sector where most children who work are employed. The
continuing prevalence of child labor may be attributed to social
acceptance of the practice and to the failure of the state and federal
governments to make primary school education compulsory.
Work by children under 14 years of age is barred completely in
``hazardous industries,'' which include passenger, goods, and mail
transport by railway; carpet weaving; cinder picking, cleaning of ash
pits; cement manufacturing; building and construction; cloth printing;
dyeing and weaving; manufacturing of matches, explosives, and
fireworks; catering within railway premises or port limits; beedi
(cigarette) making; mica cutting and splitting; abattoirs; wool
cleaning; printing; cashew and cashewnut descaling and processing; and
soldering processes in electronics industries. In 1998 the Government
increased the number of industries and occupations in which child labor
is prohibited from 18 to 54.
In addition to industries that utilize forced or indentured child
labor (see Section 6.c.), there is evidence that child labor is used in
the following industries: Hand-knotted carpets; gemstone polishing;
leather goods; and sporting goods.
In occupations and processes in which child labor is permitted,
work by children is permissible only for 6 hours between 8 a.m. and 7
p.m., with 1 day's rest weekly.
Primary school education is not compulsory, free, and universal.
The BJP-led coalition Government continued its predecessors'
comprehensive plan to eliminate child labor from hazardous industries
and eventually from all industries, but it did not repeat the previous
government's pledge to accomplish the first by 2000 and the second by
2010. This program, for which approximately $260 million (11.3 billion
rupees) was budgeted, includes the enhanced enforcement of child labor
laws, income supplements for families, subsidized school lunches in
areas where child labor is concentrated, and a public awareness
campaign.
Estimates of the number of child laborers range widely. The
government census of 1991 puts the number of child workers at 11.28
million. The ILO estimates the number at 44 million, while NGO's state
that the figure is 55 million. Interpolation of census figures by the
National Labor Institute indicates that of a total of 203 million
children between the ages of 5 and 14, 116 million are in school, 12.6
million are in full-time employment, and the status of 74 million is
unknown. Most, if not all, of the 87 million children not in school do
housework, work on family farms, work alongside their parents as paid
agricultural laborers, work as domestic servants, or are otherwise
employed. A survey of child labor throughout the country ordered by the
Supreme Court in this judgment was completed during 1997 and documented
the existence of some 126,665 wage-earning child laborers. When this
figure was challenged as patently low, the states conducted a second
survey, in which an additional 428,305 child laborers in hazardous
industries were found. However, even the combined total of the two
surveys understates the true dimension of the problem.
According to the ILO, labor inspectors conducted 13,257 inspections
in 1997-98, finding 958 violations of the Child Labor Prohibition Act,
prosecuting 676 of these cases, and obtaining 29 convictions. According
to the Government, from 1996-97, labor inspectors conducted 35,886
inspections, over twice as many as the following year. Between 1993 and
the end of 1997, the government released about 8,000 children from
illegal workplaces and brought charges against approximately 4,000
employers. Since promulgation of the 1987 National Child Labor Policy,
the Government has established 77 ``rehabilitation'' centers for the
education and care of children removed from illegal workplaces
throughout the country. Some 200,000 to 250,000 children have received
care and schooling at these facilities, during which time their
families have received a small stipend--usually $2.35 to $4.70 (100 to
200 rupees) monthly, at an estimated cost to the Government of
approximately $17.68 million (750 million rupees) per year. According
to the Union Labor Minister, the Government spent $63 million (2.7
billion rupees) on these programs in 1998-99. In the hand-knotted
carpet producing area of Uttar Pradesh, the NHRC and NGO's have worked
with the state government to establish a task force for the elimination
of child labor.
Employers in some industries also have taken steps to combat child
labor. The Carpet Export Promotion Council (CEPC), a quasi-governmental
organization that receives funding from the Ministry of Textiles, has a
membership of 2,500 exporters who have subscribed to a code of conduct
barring them from purchasing hand-knotted carpets known to have been
produced with child labor. The CEPC conducts inspections to insure
compliance, and allows members to use voluntarily a government-
originated label to signify adherence to the code of conduct. Rugmark,
which is a private initiative, operates a similar voluntary label
scheme. However, the CEPC states that even with the program it is
impossible to ensure that a carpet has been produced without child
labor, given the difficulties of monitoring a decentralized and
geographically dispersed industry. A private-sector research and
consulting firm conducts the inspections, which cover only 10 percent
of registered looms. The inspectors have difficulty locating registered
looms. The Government also cooperates with UNICEF, UNESCO, the UNDP,
and the ILO in its efforts to eliminate child labor. Since 1992 it has
participated in the ILO's International Program on the Elimination of
Child Labor (IPEC). Approximately 90,000 children were removed from
work and received education and stipends through IPEC programs.
NGO'salso have helped to free children from the work force. The South
Asia Coalition on Child Servitude (SACCS) has freed over 34,000
children from the work force, and operates an education and training
center for children in New Delhi. Since November 1997, the SACCS and
the NHRC have freed 200 children and brought charges against several
employers in eastern Uttar Pradesh.
The NHRC, continuing its own child labor agenda, organized NGO
programs to provide special schooling, rehabilitation, and family
income supplements for children in the glass industry in Firozabad. The
NHRC also intervened in individual cases. A 1996 Supreme Court decision
imposed a penalty of about $570 (20,000 rupees) on an employer who
violated constitutional and statutory prohibitions on the use of child
labor in hazardous industries and ordered the creation of a child labor
rehabilitation fund out of which parents and guardians would receive an
income supplement payment on condition that the children removed from
employment attend school.
The Government continued previous governments' efforts initiated in
1994 to pass more effective laws banning child labor and to enhance the
enforcement of existing laws. The Government's program to eliminate
child labor is aimed at progressively withdrawing children from the
workplace in hazardous industries and placing them in schools through
initiatives in education, rural development, women and child
development, health, and labor programs. Government efforts to
eliminate child labor have touched only a small fraction of children in
the workplace. A 1996 Supreme Court decision raised penalties for
employers of children in hazardous industries and established a welfare
fund for formerly employed children.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The directive principles of the
Constitution declare that ``the state shall endeavor to secure . . . to
all workers . . . a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent
standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural
opportunities.'' Laws set minimum wages, hours of work, and safety and
health standards. Laws governing minimum wages and hours of work
generally are observed in industries subject to the Factories Act but
largely are unenforced elsewhere and do not ensure acceptable
conditions of work for the 90 percent of the work force not subject to
the Factories Act.
Minimum wages vary according to the state and to the sector of
industry. Such wages provide only a minimal standard of living for a
worker and are inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family. Most workers employed in units subject to the
Factories Act receive much more than the minimum wage, including
mandated bonuses and other benefits. The state governments set a
separate minimum wage for agricultural workers but do not enforce it
well. Some industries, such as the apparel and footwear industries, do
not have a prescribed minimum wage in any of the states where they are
manufactured.
The Factories Act establishes an 8-hour workday, a 48-hour
workweek, and various standards for working conditions. These standards
generally are enforced and accepted in the modern industrial sector but
tend not to be observed in older and less economically robust
industries. State governments are responsible for enforcement of the
Factories Act. However, the large number of industries covered by a
small cadre of factory inspectors and their limited training and
susceptibility to bribery result in lax enforcement.
The enforcement of safety and health standards also is poor.
Although occupational safety and health measures vary widely, in
general neither state nor central government resources for inspection
and enforcement of standards are adequate. However, the courts have
begun to take work-related illnesses more seriously.
Industrial accidents continued to occur frequently due to lack of
proper enforcement. Chemical industries are the most prone to
accidents. In April 1998, at least 5 persons were killed and 15 others
were injured when a mixing tank exploded in a chemical factory near
Mumbai. In June five children and an adult were killed in West Bengal
while mining coal illegally. According to the Director General of
Mines' Safety rules, mining companies must seal the mouths of abandoned
underground mines; and open-cast mines are to be bulldozed and
reforested. These rules are seldom--if ever--followed. Illegal mining
is rampant.
Safety conditions tend to be better in the EPZ's. The law does not
provide workers with the right to remove themselves from work
situations that endanger health and safety without jeopardizing their
continued employment.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--The country is a significant source,
transit point, and destination for numerous trafficked persons,
primarily for the purpose of forced prostitution and forced labor.
Women's rights organizations and NGO's estimate that more than
12,000 and perhaps as many as 50,000 women and children are trafficked
into the country annually from neighboring states for the sex trade.
According to an International Labor Organization estimate, 15 percent
of the country's estimated 2.3 million prostitutes are children. The
traffic is controlled largely by organized crime. Corruption at the
enforcement level and a lack of government reslve to combat the problem
tend to perpetuate it.
There is a growing pattern of trafficking in child prostitutes from
Nepal. According to one estimate, 5,000 to 7,000 children, mostly
between he ages of 10 and 18, are drawn into this traffic annually.
Girls as young as 7 years of age are trafficked from economically-
depressed neighborhoods in Nepal, Bangladesh, and rural areas of the
country to the major prostitution centers of Mumbai, Calcutta, and
Delhi. Currently there are some 100,000 to 200,000 women and girls
working in brothels in Mumbai and some 40-100,000 in Calcutta. In
Mumbai an estimated 90 percent of sex workers started when they were
under 18 years of age; half are from Nepal. A similar profile is
believed to exist in Calcutta, though Bangladesh is substituted for
Nepal as a key source of underprivileged women trafficked. NGO's in the
region estimate that some 6,000 to 10,000 girls are trafficked annually
from Nepal to Indian brothels and a similar number are trafficked from
Bangladesh.
Within the country, women from economically depressed areas move
into the sex trade in the cities.
Many indigenous tribal women are forced into sexual exploitation.
According to the Indian Centre for Indigenous and Tribal Peoples
(ICITP), more than 40,000 tribal women, mainly from Orissa and Bihar,
were forced into economic and sexual exploitation; many come from
tribes driven off their land by national park schemes. In Punjab
persons of both sexes are sold in an organized trade in weekend bazaars
ostensibly as farm labor; many instead are purchased for the purposes
of forced sexual service. In 1998 one person was arrested in connection
with this human trade. He was released later on bail.
The number of women being trafficked out of India to other
countries is comparatively small.
In a study published in 1996, the National Commission for Women
reported that organized crime plays a major role in the sex trafficking
trade in the country and that women and children who are trafficked
frequently are subjected to extortion, beatings, and rape.
Trafficking of persons from within and into the country for forced
labor also is a significant problem. In December the media reported
that an organized ring was selling children from surrounding areas for
labor at the annual Sonepur cattle fair in Bihar. There was a report
that a 12-year-old child was purchased for $21 (900 rupees) (see
Section 6.c.).
In West Bengal, the organized traffic in illegal Bangladeshi
immigrants is a source of bonded labor. Calcutta police arrested five
members of one gang on May 19 and detained 52 Bangladeshis who entered
the country illegally, including 19 children. Calcutta is a convenient
transit point for traffickers who send Bangladeshis to New Delhi,
Mumbai, Uttar Pradesh, and West Asia. Persons sometimes are sold into
virtual slavery. Many boys, some of whom are as young as age four, end
up as riders in camel races in West Asia and the Gulf States,
especially to the United Arab Emirates, or begging during the Haj.
Girls and women end up either as domestic workers or sex workers.
The country's legal code generally is technically adequate for
dealing with the problems of trafficking, violence against women, and
prostitution. The Prevention of Immoral Trafficking Act (PITA) of 1986
superseded and strengthened the All-India Suppression of Immoral
Traffic Act (SITA). The PITA sought to toughen penalties for
trafficking in children, particularly focusing on traffickers, pimps,
landlords, and brothel operators, while protecting underage girls as
victims. The PITA requires police to use only female police officers to
interrogate girls rescued from brothels. The PITA also requires the
State to provide protection and rehabilitation for these rescued girls.
The PITA grants a form of quasi-toleration for prostitution, as
prostitution, per se, is not a crime, only solicitation or practice in
or near a public place. Some NGO's note that this ambiguity, which is
intended to protect the victims of trafficking, has been exploited to
protect the sex industry.
However, the country's prostitution and trafficking laws fail to
impose on the clients and organizers of the sex trade the same
penalties imposed on prostitutes found soliciting or practicing their
trade in or near (200 meters) public places. Using the PITA's
provisions against soliciting or practicing, policeregularly can arrest
sex workers, extort money from them, evict them, and take away their
children. The client, on the other hand, largely is immune from any law
enforcement threat as he only has committed a crime if he is engaged in
sex with a sex worker in a public place or is having sex with a girl
under the age of 16 years (statutory rape). Similarly, although the
intention of the 1986 PITA was to focus enforcement efforts against the
traffickers, pimps, and border operators, the opposite currently is the
reality; a Calcutta NGO reports that an averag of some 80 to 90 percent
of the arrests made under the PITA in West Bengal state in the 1990's
are of female sex workers. Implementation of the PITA's provisions for
protection and rehabilitation of these women and children brought out
of the sex trade is seriously lacking. NGO's familiar with the legal
history of prostitution and trafficking laws see the failure of the
judiciary to recognize this inequity in the law's practice as a ``blind
spot,'' which continues.
NGO's allege that corruption at the enforcement level and a lack of
government resolve to combat the problem tend to perpetuate it.
Although charged with enforcing the country's laws on prostitution and
trafficking in women and children, NGO's, observers, and those in the
sex trade uniformly view the police as part of the problem. Sex workers
in Mumbai and Calcutta claim that police intervention in their lives
usually is characterized by harassment, extortion, and occasional
arrests on soliciting charges. Seldom are the police seen as a positive
force, addressing the violence of pimps and traffickers while
protecting underage girls from bonded sex labor. A commonly held view
among sex workers and NGO's is that local police and politicians
responsible for the red light areas receive bribes from organized crime
networks to protect the lucrative sex trade.
NGO's and others allege that when police take action against
brothels suspected of enslaving minors, the resulting police raids
often are planned poorly and seldom are coordinated with NGO's or
government social agencies. Therefore, the police action often worsens
the plight of the girls and women indebted to traffickers and brothel
owners. Girls ``rescued'' from brothels are treated as criminals and
often are abused sexually by their police ``rescuers'' or by the staff
of government remand centers where they are housed temporarily before
being brought back to the brothels as a result of the bribes paid by
brothel operators, or legally released into the custody of traffickers
and madams posing as relatives. In these cases, the debt owned by the
girls to the brothel operators and traffickers increases further as the
costs of bribing or legally obtaining release of the girls is added on
to their bond of labor. NGO's invariably point to the 1996 police
roundup of 476 sex workers in Mumbai when explaining their dim view of
forced ``sweep'' rescues.
As was the case in the 1996 raids, NGO's complain that they seldom
are given advance notice of police raids on brothels and therefore are
not able to lend valuable assistance in identifying and interviewing
underage victims. Nor are the NGO's canvassed by the police for advice
or assistance in planning law enforcement action to protect the victims
during raids; although over 400 girls and women were arrested in the
1996 raids, few pimps or brothel managers were picked up and none were
prosecuted to conviction. The NGO's found themselves caught off guard
by the large-scale police action and were ill-prepared to cope with a
sudden huge demand for shelter for these rescued sex workers. As a
result, many of the girls were sent to government centers known for
their harsh conditions--considered by many to be in a worse state than
the brothels. In the end, some of the girls died in state detention and
many returned to the sex trade voluntarily, given their lack of
options; success stories from this raid were rare.
Some NGO's possess knowledge of trafficking conditions in the
brothel areas such as Kamathipura, including identification of
traffickers and locations of girls being held captive by brothel
owners. However, with the lingering effects of the 1996 raid, most of
these NGO's are reluctant to trust the police with this information.
Cooperation among NGO's in sharing information and mapping out the
magnitude and scope of the trafficking problem in Mumbai has not been
significant to date, but appears to be improving. NGO's working to
rescue women and girls from forced sexual work report that ``complaint-
based'' police rescues are quite effective. Unlike the ``sweep'' type
rescues such as the one carried out in Kamathipura in 1996, these are
focused attempts to rescue a small number of women and girls using
specific information about the victim's location, names and appearance,
often supplied by NGO's; police responses in such cases frequently has
resulted in the rescue of the women and girls involved.
Similar efforts to improve NGO coordination are being made in
Calcutta, where some 10 NGO's meet monthly as part of the ``Action
Against Trafficking and Sexual Exploitation of Children'' forum. Every
3 months the group attempts to meet with counterparts from Bangladesh
and Nepal. Calcutta NGO's such as Sanlaap also are seeking to build
stronger working relationships with local police.
There are roughly 80 NGO's in 10 states around the country working
for the emancipation and rehabilitation of women and children
trafficked into the sex trade.
A group on child prostitution established by the NHRC includes
representatives from the National Commission for Women, the Department
of Women and Child Development, NGO's, and UNICEF. It continued to meet
throughout the year to devise means of improving enforcement of legal
prohibitions.
______
MALDIVES
The Republic of Maldives, which comprises 1,190 islands (less than
200 of which are inhabited), with a population of approximately 270,000
persons, has a parliamentary form of government with a very strong
executive. The President appoints the Cabinet, members of the
judiciary, and one-sixth of the Parliament. The President derives
additional influence from his constitutional role as the ``supreme
authority to propagate the tenets'' of Islam. Political parties are
officially discouraged, and candidates for the unicameral legislature,
the People's Majlis, run as individuals. The Majlis selects a single
presidential nominee who is approved or rejected in a national
referendum. The Majlis must approve all legislation and can enact
legislation without presidential approval. Civil law is subordinate to
Islamic law, but civil law is generally applied in criminal and civil
cases. The judiciary is subject to executive influence.
The National Security Service (NSS) performs its duties under
effective civilian control. The NSS includes the armed forces and
police, and its members serve in both police and military capacities
during their careers. The police division investigates crimes, collects
intelligence, makes arrests, and enforces house arrest.
Fishing, small-scale agriculture, and tourism provide employment
for over one-half of the work force. Tourism accounts for over one-
quarter of government revenues and roughly 40 percent of foreign
exchange receipts. Manufacturing accounts for 6 percent of gross
domestic product.
The Government restricts human rights in several areas. The Majlis
has assumed a more active political role in recent years, and its
members routinely differ with government policy on many issues;
however, the President's power to appoint a significant portion of the
Parliament still constrains citizens' ability to change their
government. Arbitrary arrest and detention remain problems. A continued
easing of government restrictions and the Press Council's balanced
handling of issues related to journalistic standards allowed a greater
diversity of views in the media. Nevertheless, the Government banned a
book in 1997 because it contained derogatory comments about a previous
president. The Government limits freedom of assembly and association.
There are significant restrictions on the freedom of religion; the
Government has detained arbitrarily and expelled foreigners for
proselytizing and detained citizens who converted. Women face a variety
of legal and social disadvantages. Some of these restrictions are
linked to the Government's observance of Shari'a (Islamic law) and
other Islamic customs. The Government restricts worker rights.
Nonetheless, in recent years there has been some progress in certain
areas; the courts were reorganized in 1997, and a new Constitution,
which provides for the protection of certain fundamental rights, went
into effect at the beginning of 1998. In addition, procedural rules
limiting indefinite police detention were instituted, and the
presidential nominating process involved competition among candidates
for the first time in 1998.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--There were no
reports of political or other extrajudicial killings.
b. Disappearance.--There were no reports of politically motivated
disappearances.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--There were no reports of beatings or other mistreatment of
persons in police custody during the year; however, convicted criminals
may be flogged under judicial supervision when this punishment is
prescribed by Islamic law (i.e., only when the criminal confesses to
the crime and only for the offenses of marital infidelity and alcohol
abuse). There were no public floggings during the year. In 1998 there
were two private floggings (carried out without public spectators) due
to the confession of an extramarital affair. The man was subsequently
banished, and the woman was placed under house arrest for 12 months.
Punishments are usually confined to fines, compensatory payment, house
arrest, imprisonment, or banishment to a remote atoll. The Government
generally permits those who are banished to receive visits by family
members.
Amnesty International reported that prisoners have been mistreated,
including by being handcuffed to coconut palms, being handcuffed in
their cells, and being held in solitary confinement for long periods.
Female prisoners reportedly have been jabbed awake for dawn prayers by
male prison guards in a humiliating manner.
Prison conditions, including food and prisoner housing, are
generally adequate; however, Amnesty International reported that cells
may be overcrowded and lack adequate sleeping space. Prisoners are
allowed to work in prison and given the opportunity for regular
exercise and recreation. Spouses are allowed privacy during visits with
incarcerated partners. The country's prison facility was destroyed by
fire during the year, and the prisoners were moved to another island
with improved conditions. The Government is surveying prison facilities
in other countries to incorporate international standards and
improvements in the reconstruction of the prison.
The Government has permitted prison visits by foreign diplomats.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The 1997 Constitution
states that no person shall be arrested or detained for more than 24
hours without being informed of the grounds for the arrest or
detention; however, in 1998 authorities arbitrarily detained foreigners
for allegedly proselytizing Christianity and detained citizens who
supposedly converted (see Section 2.c.). Police initiate investigations
based on suspicion of criminal activity or in response to written
complaints from citizens, police officers, or government officials.
They are not required to obtain warrants for arrests. Based on the
results of police investigations, the Attorney General refers cases to
the appropriate court. The authorities generally keep the details of a
case confidential until they are confident that the charges are likely
to be upheld.
Depending upon the charges, a suspect may remain free, detained in
prison, or under house arrest for 15 days during investigations. The
President may extend pretrial detention for an additional 30 days, but
in most cases the suspect is released if not brought to trial within 15
days. Those who are released pending trial may not leave a specific
atoll. The law providing for the indefinite detention of individuals
under investigation was revised substantially in 1998. Within 24 hours
of an arrest, an individual must be told of the grounds for the arrest.
An individual can then be held for 7 days. If no legal proceedings have
been initiated within 7 days, the case is referred to an anonymous
three-member civilian commission appointed by the President that can
authorize an additional 15 days' detention. After that time, if legal
proceedings still have not beeninitiated, a judge must sanction the
continued detention on a monthly basis. There is no right to legal
counsel during police interrogation. There is no provision for bail.
The Government may prohibit access to a telephone and non-family
visits to those under house arrest. While there have been no reported
cases of incommunicado detention in recent years, the law does not
provide safeguards against this abuse.
The Government detained three individuals in April 1995 who
remained under house arrest without charge until October 1995, when
their detention was lifted. No charges were brought against them. The
Government has offered no reasons for their detention. However, it is
widely believed that their detention was the result of political
differences with the Government rather than due to any threat that the
men--all of whom are elderly and well known figures--pose to national
security. According to an Amnesty International (AI) report in June
1998, Ismail Saadiq, a Maldivian businessman, was taken into police
custody possibly for political reasons in Male and later detained
because he allegedly had been in contact with a British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) reporter. According to AI, he previously had been
under house arrest for alleged business irregularities, and was told
that the media contact violated house arrest rules. The Government
claimed that Saadiq was a businessman involved in fraud and corruption.
At year's end, the exact details surrounding Saadiq's detention could
not be confirmed, but he was convicted of fraud in December 1998, and
is awaiting trial on other fraud charges.
There were no reports of the external exile of citizens, although
24 foreigners suspected of proselytization were banished for life in
1998 (see Section 2.c.). The Government sometimes banishes convicted
criminals to inhabited atolls away from their home communities; a man
who confessed to an extramarital affair in April 1998 was banished for
1 year.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The 1997 Constitution does not
provide for an independent judiciary, and the judiciary is subject to
executive influence. In addition to his authority to review High Court
decisions, the President influences the judiciary through his power to
appoint and dismiss judges, all of whom serve at his pleasure and are
not subject to confirmation by the Majlis. The President nevertheless
has removed only two judges since 1987. Both dismissals followed the
recommendation of the Justice Ministry that found the judges'
professional qualifications to be below standard. The President may
also grant pardons and amnesties.
In September 1997 the court system, under the Ministry of Justice,
was reorganized and court administration has improved. There are three
courts: One for civil matters; one for criminal cases; and one for
family and juvenile issues. On the recommendation of the Ministry of
Justice, the President appoints a principal judge for each court. There
is also a High Court on Male, which is independent of the Justice
Ministry and which handles a wide range of cases, including politically
sensitive ones. The High Court also acts as a court of appeals. Under a
1995 presidential decree, High Court rulings can be reviewed by a 5-
member advisory council appointed by the President. The President also
has authority to affirm judgments of the High Court, to order a second
hearing, or to overturn the Court's decision. In addition to the Male
courts, there are 204 general courts on the islands.
There are no jury trials. Most trials are public and are conducted
by judges and magistrates trained in Islamic, civil, and criminal law.
Magistrates usually adjudicate cases on outer islands, but when more
complex legal questions are involved, the Justice Ministry will send
more experienced judges to handle the case.
The Constitution provides that an accused person be presumed
innocent until proven guilty, and that an accused person has the right
to defend himself ``in accordance with Shari'a.'' During a trial, the
accused also may call witnesses, and be assisted by a lawyer. Courts do
not provide lawyers to indigent defendants. Judges question the
concerned parties and attempt to establish the facts of a case.
Civil law is subordinate to Islamic law, or Shari'a. Shari'a is
applied in situations not covered by civil law as well as in certain
acts such as divorce and adultery. Courts adjudicating matrimonial and
criminal cases generally do not allow legal counsel in court because,
according to a local interpretation of Shari'a, all answers and
submissions should come directly from the parties involved. However,
the High Court allows legal counsel in all cases, including those in
which the right to counsel was denied in the lower court. Under Islamic
practice, the testimony of two women is required to equal that of one
man in matters involving Shari'a, such as adultery, finance and
inheritance. In other cases, the testimony of men and women are equal.
Ilyas Ibrahim, the President's chief rival for the 1993
presidential nomination, and a relative of the President, was tried in
absentia in 1994 and sentenced to 15 years' banishment on the charge of
illegally attempting to become president and to 6 months banishment for
violating his oath as minister. Ilyas returned from his self-imposed
foreign exile in 1996 and was placed under house arrest for several
months. The President has since pardoned him, and there are no
restrictions on his political rights. In November 1998 President Gayoom
appointed Ilyas to the Cabinet as Minister of Transport and Civil
Aviation. In November, Ilyas was elected to a parliamentary seat from
Male.
There were no reports of political prisoners. Amnesty International
reports that Wu Mei De, a Chinese national, has been detained since
1993, which AI states apparently occurred as a result of official
connivance in a dispute with his former Maldivian business partner. De
has been offered the opportunity to leave the country, but has declined
to do so.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The 1997 Constitution prohibits security officials
from opening or reading letters, telegrams, and wireless messages or
monitoring telephone conversations, ``except as expressly provided by
law.'' The NSS may open the mail of private citizens and monitor
telephone conversations if authorized in the course of a criminal
investigation.
Although the 1997 Constitution makes residential premises and
dwellings inviolable, there is no legal requirement for search or
arrest warrants. The Attorney General or a commanding officer of the
police must approve the search of private residences.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--Law No. 4/68 of 1968 prohibits
public statements that are contrary to Islam, threaten the public
order, or are libelous. In April 1996, a journalist was sentenced under
this law to 2 years' imprisonment for comments made about the 1994
general elections in an article published in the Philippines. On appeal
the High Court reduced his sentence to 6 months. The President pardoned
the journalist at the beginning of 1997.
The Penal Code prohibits inciting the people against the
Government. However, a 1990 amendment to the Penal Code decriminalized
``any true account of any act of commission or omission past or present
by the Government in a lawfully registered newspaper or magazine, so as
to reveal dissatisfaction or to effect its reform.''
The Press Council established by the Government in December 1993 is
composed of official government and private media representatives,
lawyers, and government officials. The Council reviews charges of
journalist misconduct (advising the Ministry of Information, Arts, and
Culture on measures to be taken against reporters, when appropriate)
and promotes professional standards within the media (recommending
reforms and making suggestions for improvement). In 1998, the Press
Council organized a 6-month training program for 12 journalists to
improve media reporting and accuracy. The Council met regularly, and
private journalists were satisfied with its objectivity and
performance. Regulations that made publishers responsible for the
content of the material they published remained in effect but did not
result in any legal actions, despite reports in 1994 that the
regulations were under review and that a change was likely. The
Government agreed that private journalists, rather than the Government,
should take responsibility for preparation of a journalistic code of
ethics. Individual newspapers and journals established their own
ethical guidelines in many cases.
There were no reports of government censorship of the electronic
media, nor were there closures of any publications or reports of
intimidation of journalists. However, pornography and material
otherwise deemed objectionable to Islamic values may be banned. In
January the Government banned the animated movie ``The Prince of
Egypt,'' on the grounds that it was offensive to Islam (see Section
2.c.). The Government banned a book in 1997 written by an elderly close
relative of the President for its derogatory comments about a deceased
previous president, after the relatives of the latter complained. No
journalists were arrested during the year. The Government discontinued
its practice of providing reporting guidelines to the media in 1994.
Television news and public affairs programming routinely discussed
topics of current concern and freely criticized government performance.
Regular press conferences instituted with government ministers in 1995
continued. Journalists are more self-confident than in the past; self-
censorship appears to have diminished, although it remains a problem.
Since it is not clear when criticism violates Law 4/68, journalists
andpublishers continue to watch what they say, particularly on
political topics, to avoid entanglement with the Government.
The Government owns and operates the only television and radio
station. It does not interfere with foreign broadcasts or with the sale
of satellite receivers. Reports drawn from foreign newscasts are aired
on the Government television station.
Cable News Network (CNN) is shown, uncensored, daily on local
television. In 1996 a company began providing Internet services. The
Government enacted no regulations governing Internet access but does
seek to block distribution of pornographic material via the Internet.
Although 88 newspapers and periodicals are registered with the
Government, only about 60 regularly publish. Aafathis, a morning daily,
is often critical of government policy. Another daily, Miadhu, began
publishing in 1996, and Haveeru is the evening daily. Both Miadhu's and
Haveeru's publishers are progovernment.
There are no legal prohibitions on the import of foreign
publications except those containing pornography or material otherwise
deemed objectionable to Islamic values. No seizures of foreign
publications were reported during the year. There are no reported
restrictions on academic freedom. Some teachers are reportedly vocal in
their criticism of the Government.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The 1997
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly ``peaceably and in a
manner that does not contravene the law,'' however, the Government
imposes limits on this right in practice. The Home Ministry permits
public political meetings during electoral campaigns but limits them to
small gatherings on private premises.
The Government registers clubs and other private associations if
they do not contravene Islamic or civil law; however, the Government
imposes some limits on freedom of association. While not forbidden by
law, the President officially discourages political parties on the
grounds that they are inappropriate to the homogeneous nature of
society. However, many Majlis members were active and outspoken critics
of the Government and have stimulated closer parliamentary examination
of government policy.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Freedom of religion is restricted
significantly. The 1997 Constitution designates Islam as the official
state religion and the Government interprets this provision to impose a
requirement that citizens be Muslims. The practice of any religion
other than Islam is prohibited by law. However, foreign residents are
allowed to practice their religion if they do so privately.
There are no places of worship for adherents of other religions.
The Government prohibits the importation of icons and religious
statues, but generally permits the importation of individual religious
tracts, such as Bibles, for personal use. It also prohibits non-Muslim
clergy and missionaries from proselytizing and conducting public
worship services. Conversion of a Muslim to another faith is a
violation of Shari'a and may result in a loss of the convert's
citizenship.
Islamic instruction is a mandatory part of the school curriculum,
and the Government funds the instructors who teach Islam. The
Government also has set standards for individuals who conduct Friday
services at mosques to ensure adequate theological qualifications.
In April 1998 the Government asked the Seychelles Government to
stop the radio broadcast of Christian programming in the local
language, Dhivehi, to the country. However, the broadcasts continued
throughout the year. During June 1998, the authorities detained 24
foreigners (including children) for alleged Christian proselytization
without explaining the charges against them, and then expelled them
from the country for life. Following the expulsion of the foreigners,
police took two female citizens into custody for allegedly converting
to Christianity. As many as a dozen other citizens were questioned. The
women were detained from mid-June to late September 1998, during which
time they received extensive counseling. No formal charges were ever
brought against them, and they were released to their families. In
January the Government banned the animated movie ``The Prince of
Egypt'' on the ground that ``its portrayal of the Prophet Moses was
offensive to Islam, because all prophets and messengers of God are not
to be animated or portrayed in any way'' (see Section 2.a.).
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Citizens are free to travel at home and
abroad, to emigrate, and to return. Because of overcrowding, the
Government discourages migration into the capital island of Male or its
surrounding atoll. Foreign workers are often kept at their worksites.
Their ability to travel freely is restricted, and they are not allowed
to mingle with the local population on the islands. The issue of the
provision of first asylum did not arise during the year. The Government
has not formulated a policy regarding first asylum. There were no
reports of forced expulsion of those having a valid claim to refugee
status.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens' ability to change their government is constrained, as a
strong executive exerts significant influence over both the legislature
and the judiciary. Under the 1997 Constitution, the Majlis chooses a
single presidential nominee, who must be a Sunni Muslim male, from a
list of self-announced candidates for the nomination. Would-be nominees
for President are not permitted to campaign for the nomination. The
nominee is then confirmed or rejected by secret ballot in a nationwide
referendum. From a field of five candidates, President Gayoom was
nominated by the Majlis and was confirmed for a fifth 5-year term in
October 1998. Observers from the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation found the referendum to be free and fair.
The elected members of the Majlis, who must be Muslims, serve 5-
year terms. All citizens over 21 years of age may vote. Of the body's
50 members, 42 are elected--2 from each of the 20 inhabited atolls and
2 from Male--and the President appoints 8 members. Individuals or
groups are free to approach members of the Majlis with grievances or
opinions on proposed legislation, and any member may introduce
legislation. There are no political parties, which are officially
discouraged.
The office of the President is the most powerful political
institution. The 1997 Constitution gives Islamic law preeminence over
civil law and designates the President as the ``supreme authority to
propagate the tenets'' of Islam. The President's authority to appoint
one-sixth of the Majlis members, which is one-third of the total needed
for nominating the President, provides the President with a power base
and strong political leverage. The President currently is also
commander in chief of the armed forces, and is the Minister of Defense
and National Security, the Minister of Finance and Treasury, and the
Governor of the Maldivian Monetary Authority.
Relations between the Government and the Majlis have been
constructive. The Government may introduce legislation, but may not
enact a bill into law without the Majlis' approval. However, the Majlis
may enact legislation into law without presidential assent if the
President fails to act on the proposal within 30 days or if a bill is
re-passed with a two-thirds majority. In recent years, the Majlis has
become increasingly independent, challenging government policies and
rejecting government-proposed legislation.
In 1993 the Majlis introduced a question time in which members may
question government ministers about public policy. Debate on the floor
has since become increasingly sharp and more open. Elections to the
People's Majlis were held in November. According to observers from the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the elections
were generally free and fair. However, several losing candidates
challenged the election results and the courts currently are
considering their claims of campaign irregularities.
Women are not eligible to become president but may hold other
government posts. For reasons of tradition and culture, few women seek
or are selected for public office. In order to increase participation
by women in the political process, the Government continued a political
awareness campaign in the atolls. Three women, two appointed by the
President, served in the Majlis before the November elections and sat
in the Cabinet. In November, six women ran for seats in the People's
Majlis and two were elected. During the November elections, observers
from the SAARC noted that women participated equally in the electoral
process.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
Although not prohibited, there are no active local human rights
groups. The Government has been responsive to at least one foreign
government's interest in examining human rights issues. The Government
also facilitated visits of teams of South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation election observers in 1994, 1998, and 1999.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The 1997 Constitution declares all citizens equal before the law,
but there is no specific provision to prohibit discrimination based on
these factors. Women have traditionally been disadvantaged,
particularly in terms of education and the application of Islamic law
to matters such as divorce, inheritance, and testimony in legal
proceedings.
Women.--There are no firm data on the extent of violence against
women because of the value attached to privacy in this conservative
society. The Government commissioned a study in 1997 from a local
nongovernmental organization (NGO) on domestic violence, but it was
never completed. Police officials report that they receive few
complaints of assaults against women. Women's rights advocates agree
that wife beating and other forms of violence are not widespread. Rape
and other violent crimes against women are extremely rare. None were
reported or prosecuted during the year.
Women traditionally have played a subordinate role in society,
although they now participate in public life in growing numbers and
gradually are participating at higher levels. Well-educated women
maintain that cultural norms, not the law, inhibit women's education
and career choices. In many instances, education for girls is curtailed
after the seventh grade, largely because parents do not allow girls to
leave their home island for an island having a secondary school.
Nonetheless, women enjoy a higher literacy rate (98 percent) than men
(96 percent). Due largely to orthodox Islamic training, there is a
strong strain of conservative sentiment--especially among small
businessmen and residents of the outer islands--that opposes an active
role for women outside the home. However, the Government has undertaken
legal literacy programs to make women aware of their legal rights and
has conducted workshops on gender and political awareness in the outer
atolls. The Government also is constructing women centers in the
atolls, which are facilities where family health workers can provide
medical services. The women centers also provide libraries and space
for meetings and other activities.
Under Islamic practice, husbands may divorce their wives more
easily than vice versa, absent any mutual agreement to divorce. Islamic
law also governs intestate inheritance, granting male heirs twice the
share of female heirs. A woman's testimony is equal to only one-half of
that of a man in matters involving adultery, finance, and inheritance
(see Section 1.e.). Women who work for wages receive pay equal to that
of men in the same positions. About 10 percent of uniformed NSS
personnel are women.
Children.--The Government does not have a program of compulsory
education, but provides universal access to primary education. The
percentage of school-age children actually in school is as follows:
(grades 1 to 5) 99.26 percent, (grades 6 to 7) 96.2 percent, and grades
(8 to 10) 51.09 percent. Of the students enrolled 49 percent are female
and 51 percent are male. The Government is committed to the protection
of children's rights and welfare. The Government is working with the
UNICEF to implement the rights provided for in the U.N. Convention on
the Rights of the Child. The Government established a National Council
for the Protection of the Rights of the Child in 1992. Government
policy provides for equal access to educational and health programs for
both male and female children. Laws protecting children's rights apply
with equal force to children of either sex.
Children's rights are incorporated into law, which specifically
protects children from both physical and psychological abuse, including
abuse at the hands of teachers or parents. The Ministry of Women's
Affairs and Social Welfare has the authority to enforce this law, takes
its responsibility seriously, and has received strong popular support
for its efforts. The Government is reviewing this law to see if
improvements and additional protections are necessary. There is no
reported societal pattern of abuse directed against children.
People with Disabilities.--There is no law that specifically
addresses the rights of the physically or mentally disabled. During the
year, the Government initiated a survey to identify the magnitude of
the need in the country. The Government has established programs and
provided services for the disabled. There is no legislated or mandated
accessibility for the disabled.
Persons with disabilities are usually cared for by their families.
When such care is unavailable, persons with disabilities are kept in
the Institute for Needy People, which also assists elderly persons. The
Government provides freemedication for all mentally ill persons in the
islands, and mobile teams regularly visit mentally ill patients. The
Government provides assistance to the physically disabled and enacted a
new building code during the year, which mandated that all new
government buildings and jetties must be accessible to disabled
persons.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--While the Government does not
expressly prohibit unions, it recognizes neither the right to form them
nor the right to strike. There were no reports of efforts to form
unions during the year.
The work force consists of approximately 64,000 persons, about 20
percent of whom are employed in fishing. About 16,700 foreigners work
in the country, many in tourist hotels, retail/wholesale trade,
factories, or on construction projects. The great majority of workers
are employed outside of the wage sector. The Government estimates that
the manufacturing sector employs about 15 percent of the labor force
and tourism another 10 percent.
Workers can affiliate with international labor federations.
In 1995 the U.S. Government suspended Maldives' eligibility for
tariff preferences under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences
because the Government failed to take steps to afford internationally
recognized worker rights to Maldivian workers.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law neither
prohibits nor protects workers' rights to organize and bargain
collectively. Wages in the private sector are set by contract between
employers and employees and are usually based on the rates for similar
work in the public sector. There are no laws specifically prohibiting
antiunion discrimination by employers against union members or
organizers. The Government has exerted pressure in the past to
discourage seamen from joining foreign seamen's unions as a means to
secure higher wages. There have been no reported complaints alleging
such discrimination or claiming government interference with workers'
attempts to join unions in the past 5 years.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is not prohibited by law. However, there were no reports that it
is practiced. The Government does not specifically prohibit forced and
bonded labor by children, but such practices are not known to occur.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--There is no compulsory education law, but more than 96
percent of school-age children to grade 7 are enrolled in school. A
1992 law bars children under 14 years of age from ``places of waged
work and from work that is not suitable for that child's age, health,
or physical ability or that might obstruct the education or adversely
affect the mentality or behavior of the child.'' An earlier law
prohibits government employment of children under the age of 16. There
are no reports of children being employed in the small industrial
sector, although children work in family fishing, agricultural, and
commercial activities. The hours of work of young workers are not
specifically limited by statute. The Government does not specifically
prohibit forced and bonded labor by children, but such practices are
not known to occur (see Section 6.c.). A Children's Unit in the
Ministry of Women's Affairs and Social Welfare is responsible for
monitoring compliance with the child labor regulations. It relies upon
complaints filed with it rather than initiating its own inspections to
ensure compliance. As a result, oversight is incomplete.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1994 the Government
promulgated its first set of regulations for employer-employee
relations. The regulations specify the terms that must be incorporated
into employment contracts and address such issues as training, work
hours, safety, remuneration, leave, fines, termination, etc. There is
no national minimum wage for the private sector, although the
Government has established wage floors for certain kinds of work. Given
the severe shortage of labor, employers must offer competitive pay and
conditions to attract skilled workers.
There are no statutory provisions for hours of work, but the
regulations require that a work contract specify the normal work and
overtime hours on a weekly or monthly basis. In the public sector, a 7-
hour day and a 5-day workweek have been established through
administrative circulars from the President's office.
Overtime pay in the public sector was instituted in 1990. Employees
are authorized 20 days of annual leave, 30 days of medical leave,
maternity leave of 45 days, and special annual leave of 10 days for
extraordinary circumstances. There are no laws governing health and
safety conditions. However, there are regulatory requirements that
employers provide a safe working environment and ensure the observance
of safety measures. It is unclear, however, whether workers can remove
themselves from unsafe working conditions without risking the loss of
their jobs. The Ministry of Trade, Industries, and Labour set up a
Labour Dispute Settlement Unit in 1998 to resolve wage and labor
disputes and to visit worksites and enforce labor regulations.
In 1997 the Government for the first time worked closely with the
International Labor Organization to address a number of labor issues,
including the right of association, the right to organize, and
acceptable conditions of work. A draft labor law is under consideration
by the Government.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--There were no reports that persons were
trafficked in, to, or from the country.
______
NEPAL
Nepal is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary form of
government. In 1990 the King, formerly an absolute monarch, legalized
political parties, after which an interim government promulgated a new
Constitution. The King retains important residual powers, but has
dissociated himself from direct day-to-day government activities. The
democratically elected Parliament consists of the House of
Representatives (lower house) and the National Council (upper house).
In May the country's third national parliamentary elections were held,
which international observers considered to be generally free and fair.
In February 1996, the leaders of the Maoist United People's Front (UPF)
launched a ``People's War'' in the midwestern region of the country,
which has led to violence in 27 of 75 districts. The insurrection has
been waged through torture, killings, and bombings involving civilians
and public officials. The Constitution provides for an independent
judiciary; however, the courts are susceptible to political pressure
and corruption.
The National Police Force maintains internal security. Police
reaction to the ``People's War'' insurgency led to incidents of
unwarranted force against prisoners and noncombatants. The army is
traditionally loyal to the King and has avoided involvement in domestic
politics. The police are subject to civilian control, but local
officials have wide discretion in maintaining law and order. The police
committed numerous human rights abuses.
Nepal is an extremely poor country, with an annual per capita gross
domestic product of approximately $210. Over 80 percent of its 21
million persons support themselves through subsistence agriculture.
Principal crops include rice, wheat, maize, jute, and potatoes. Tourism
and the export of carpets and garments are the major sources of foreign
exchange. Foreign aid accounts for more than half of the development
budget. The economy is mixed, with approximately 50 public sector
firms. Many former government firms have been privatized since 1992.
The Government generally respected citizen's human rights in many
areas; however, problems remain. The police at times used unwarranted
lethal force. One person died in custody due to torture. The police
continue to abuse detainees, using torture as punishment or to extract
confessions. The police also conducted raids on newspapers suspected of
having links to the Maoists. The Government rarely investigates
allegations of police brutality or punishes police officers who commit
abuses.
Prison conditions remain poor. The authorities use arbitrary arrest
and detention. Lengthy pretrial detention, judicial susceptibility to
political pressure and corruption, and long delays before trial remain
problems. The Government continues to impose some restrictions on
freedom of expression. The Government imposes restrictions on freedom
of religion. Women, the disabled, and lower castes suffer from
widespread discrimination. Violence against women, trafficking in women
and girls for prostitution, forced labor, and child labor also remain
serious problems. There were reported instances of forced child labor.
In 1996 Parliament unanimously enacted a bill providing for a
permanent human rights commission with the authority to investigate
human rights abuses. However, the commission still has not been
established.
The Maoist insurgents continued to commit numerous abuses,
including killings and bombings.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--On a number of
occasions, the Government used unwarranted lethal force against persons
suspected of involvement in the ``People's War'' in the central part of
the country. Launched in 1996 by UPF leaders Baburam Bhattarai and
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the ``People's War'' is a self-declared Maoist
insurgency.
In 1997 Amnesty International (AI) reported that police ``have
repeatedly resorted to the use of lethal force in situations where such
force was clearly unjustified.'' AI's statement was based on an
investigation of 50 killings committed by police, mostly in 1996.
In August truck driver Ale Tamang died as a result of torture while
in police custody; in October 1998, Ganesh Rai died after being
tortured by police while in custody (see Section 1.c.).
The Government continued efforts to combat the Maoist insurgency.
In May 1998, the police began a sweep in the mid-western districts.
According to press reports, 139 UPF insurgents and 8 police officers
were killed during the operation, and there were widespread allegations
of police abuses in connection with the sweep. According to Amnesty
International, 227 persons were killed in the 1998 police sweeps
against UPF insurgents. Official sources admitted that more than 3,000
persons were arrested during police operations aimed at locating UPF
members. In June 1998, police Inspector General Kharel stated that 20
to 30 police officers had been charged with abuses against the public
in connection with their actions during the sweep. At year's end it was
not known whether the officers had been brought to trial.
The insurgents were responsible for numerous abuses. Guerrillas,
usually armed with homemade guns, explosives, knives, and sticks,
attacked landowners, civilians, government officials, and government
facilities in a number of districts. On February 1, Bhotechaur
municipality ward chairman Dilli Prasad Chaulagai was attacked by a
group of six insurgents. The assailants severed his leg with a khukuri
knife (a large, machete-like implement common in rural areas) and shot
and killed him. The former chairman of the Ghumkharka municipality,
Bhim Prasad Timilsina, was abducted and murdered by three UPF members
on February 27. In Rukum in early March, Maoists were suspected of
killing Yadu Gautam, a Communist Party of Nepal--United Marxist-
Leninist (UML) parliamentary candidate. Gautam reportedly was killed
with khukuri knives. Clashes between police and Maoist rebels resulted
in a number of deaths, including some during the period prior to and
during the elections in May. On March 11, Maoists killed seven police
officers in Dang district and on the same day burned to death seven
workers of the UML in Rolpa district. Two policemen died and four
others were injured in a police-Maoist clash in Baglung on April 10. A
policeman died and another two were injured in a May 2 encounter with
Maoists in Hajarai. Two more policemen reportedly were killed and
several others injured by Maoists in Gaurigoan on May 3. On May 22,
Maoists attacked and bombed a police post in Takukot village, Gorkha
district. Five police officers and one Maoist reportedly were killed
and two persons were wounded in the incident. On June 20, a group of 15
Maoists killed Nepali Congress worker Nara Hahadur Moktan in Kabhre
district. On August 4, a police official was killed and a child injured
when insurgents attacked a police constable in Siraha district. On
August 29, Maoists killed Majhauwa municipality secretary Dhanik Mandal
and his son. According to December government figures, since 1996 the
insurgency has resulted in the deaths of 1,124 persons, including 109
police officers, 174 civilians, and 841 insurgents. The press has
reported over 1,150 deaths.
b. Disappearance.--Amnesty International reported that on January
8, lawyer and human rights defender Rajendra Dhakal disappeared after
his arrest in Jamdi in Tanahun district. He reportedly was arrested
because of his alleged involvement in Maoist violence. Dhakal, along
with two teachers arrested at the same time, was taken to the Bel
Chantan police post. The teachers later were released. In response to a
Supreme Court order later that month to produce Dhakal within 7 days,
Gorkha police denied having arrested him. In June the government
newspaper reported that families of nine persons missing since police
incarceration filed petitions with the Supreme Court, but that no
action resulted from the petitions. The newspaper indicated the
possibility that the missing persons could have been affiliated with
the Maoists. Amnesty International also reported that Bishnu Pukar
Shrestha, a secondary school teacher, lawyer, and member of a human
rights organization, disappeared after having been forced into a jeep
during an arrest in Kathmandu on September 2. In response to a Supreme
Court writ of habeas corpus, authorities denied that Shrestha was in
custody although he was reportedly being held at the National Police
Academy. In December, AI reported that Suresh Ale Magar and Pawan
Shrestha were released from the central jail in Kathmandu on December
23 under a Supreme Court order, but were reportedly immediately re-
arrested in front of the jail. Amnesty International reported that they
were apparently forced into a police van outside of the jail but the
police deny having them in custody. At year's end, their whereabouts
were unknown. According to local human rights organizations,
approximately 70 persons had disappeared after being in police custody
during the year and over 125 persons had disappeared in the last 4
years.
In July 1998, Amnesty International reported that Mohan Prasad Ali,
a teacher from Dhakeri village in Banke district, was apprehended by
police in June 1998. He has not been seen since. In November 1998 AI
reported that government officials told members of a delegation that it
sent to Nepal that UPF militants had abducted Mohan Prasad Ali. Two men
injured at a June 1998 incident at Sakla village, Lal Bahadur Puma and
Hari Narayan Sham, were evacuated by helicopter and are also reported
to have disappeared. At year's end, the whereabouts of Lal Bahadur Puma
and Hari Narayan Sham were unknown. Two student activists taken into
custody in 1993 and 1994 remain missing.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and criminal law prohibit torture;
however, the police often use torture and beatings to punish suspects
or to extract confessions. According to Amnesty International, torture
methods include boxing of the ears, beating of the feet, and the
rolling of weights over the thighs. Amnesty International noted that
torture apparently was used to intimidate or punish detainees and to
extract information and/or confessions, and that torture often took
place while detainees were held incommunicado and unable to contact
family, doctors, or lawyers (see Section 1.d.). The Government has
failed to conduct thorough and independent investigations of reports of
police brutality and has refused to take significant disciplinary
action against officers involved. Police often are unwilling to
investigate and to discipline fellow officers, and persons are afraid
to bring cases against police for fear of reprisals. The Constitution
provides for compensation for victims of torture, and the Torture
Compensation Act, providing for such compensation, was passed by
Parliament in 1996. According to Amnesty International, 12 persons made
claims under the act in 1998; 6 later withdrew their complaints,
reportedly because of fear for their safety. The Government has begun
human rights education for the police force. According to an August
government newspaper report, the Government suspended seven police
personnel and appointed a high-level commission to probe the death of
trucker Ale Tamang following alleged police torture while in custody on
the charge of theft. The police allegedly doused the victim's legs with
kerosene and set them on fire, dipped them in water, and again burned
them. The appointment of the commission came after considerable public
criticism. In October 1998, Ganesh Rai died in police custody as a
result of torture. Two policemen were suspended in connection with the
case.
Human rights groups have reported instances of torture in areas
affected by the ``People's War.'' Dozens of male detainees reported
having torture inflicted on them by the police, while women in these
areas have reported instances of rape and sexual abuse by the police.
Representatives of Amnesty International who visited the country after
the May 1998 police sweeps against UPF insurgents began reported that
they found evidence of ``the systematic use of severe torture'' by
police. AI also raised its concerns over the relative impunity of the
police for such actions.
Local and international human rights groups also have documented
Maoist violence in areas affected by the ``People's War,'' including
the severing of arms and limbs. The Maoists most often have targeted
political leaders, local elites, and suspected informers, including
representatives of the more moderate Communist Party of Nepal--United
Marxist-Leninist (UML) and of the Nepali Congress Party (NPC).
Throughout the year, Maoists looted banks and bombed or set fire to
government offices, hospitals, and homes of local political leaders.
International nongovernmental organization (NGO) offices also were
attacked on several occasions. There also were cases of intimidation,
torture, or other degrading treatment. On February 16, insurgents threw
a gasoline bomb at a truck in Kathmandu. No one was injured. Maoists
were suspected of bombing the home of Padam Prasad Pokhrel, the
civilian official who controls the country's police force, on March 2.
No one was injured in the bombing. On March 29, the office of an
international NGO in Gadhi, Kabhre district was looted by Maoists. On
April 7, a hospital run by the Adventist Development and Relief Agency
(ADRA) in Makwanpur district was bombed by the Maoists; no one was
hurt. On April 15, in Kathmandu, four suspected Maoists entered a tax
office during working hours, poured gasoline in the office, and set
fire to it. The perpetrators left pamphlets calling for a general
strike. On April 18, insurgents stopped Lalitpur land revenue official
Tara Nath Subedi, smeared black paint on his face, and told him to stop
accepting bribes. They then doused him with gasoline and tried to set
him on fire, but Subedi escaped. On May 1, two policemen and three
election officials were injured by a Maoist bomb while heading to Sisna
village. On June 8, Maoists attacked Govinda Pahadi of Sindhuli with
khukuri knives, and seriously wounded him. On June 25, Maoists attacked
Yadu Prasad Wasti and Gunjeswor Neupane in Gorkha district. The two
reportedly were tied up with ropes and beaten with polythene pipes. In
Tanahu district on August 5, Maoists dragged Raj Lohani, a member of
the Nepali Congress district committee, out of a truck carrying some
100 passengers and killed him in front of them. The Maoists called for
a general strike on October 8; on the night prior to the strike, bombs
exploded in Kathmandu, Gorkha, Bhadrapur, Jhapa, Syangja, Chitwan,
Birgunj, and Sindhulimadi. At least 10 persons were injured in the
bombings. Bombs were defused by the army in Hetauda and Nuwakot.
On September 22, deputy superintendent of police Thule Rai was
abducted by Maoist insurgents in Rukum. He was released on December 20.
Prison conditions are poor. Overcrowding is common in prisons and
authorities sometimes handcuff or fetter detainees. Women are normally
incarcerated separately from men, but in similar conditions. The
Government still has not implemented a provision in the 1992 Children's
Act calling for the establishment of a juvenile home and juvenile
court. Consequently, children are sometimes incarcerated with adults--
either with an incarcerated parent, or, as one local NGO reports, as
criminal offenders. The Department of Prisons states that there are no
cases of children in jail or custody for offenses they have committed;
close to 100 noncriminal dependent children, however, are incarcerated
along with their parents (see Section 5). In Rukum district, a 13-year-
old boy was arrested in 1997 and accused of being a Maoist. He was held
for 6 months with 54 adults in a cell designed for only 15 persons,
before a trial date was scheduled.
There has been some improvement in prison conditions. The
authorities are more likely to transfer sick prisoners to hospitals
than they were in the past. However, due to the inadequacy of medical
facilities in the country, the authorities sometimes place the mentally
ill in jails under inhumane conditions.
The Government permits local human rights groups and the
International Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisons.
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The Constitution
stipulates that the authorities must arraign or release a suspect
within 24 hours of arrest, but the police often violate this provision.
Under the Public Offenses Act of 1970, the police must obtain warrants
for an arrest unless a person is caught in the act of committing a
crime. For many offenses, the case must be filed in court within 7 days
of arrest. If the court upholds the detention, the law authorizes the
police to hold the suspect for 25 days to complete their investigation,
with a possible extension of 7 days. However, the police often hold
prisoners longer. The Supreme Court on occasion has ordered the release
of detainees held longer than 24 hours without a court appearance.
Amnesty International reported that on November 30, 1998, Bhanu Sharma,
a pharmacist, was approached by police at his home in Dang district;
the police requested medicine. On the way to his shop, the police
forced Sharma into a van and took him to the district police office. On
January 5, Sharma reportedly was transferred to a police-training
center in Kathmandu. On January 13, a writ of habeas corpus was filed
in the Supreme Court, and Sharma was released on February 7.
Detainees do not have the legal right to receive visits by family
members, and they are permitted access to lawyers only after the
authorities file charges. In practice the police grant access to
prisoners on a basis that varies from prison to prison. Persons have a
right to legal representation and a court appointed lawyer, but
government lawyers or access to private attorneys is provided only on
request. Consequently, those unaware of their rights may not have legal
representation. There is a system of bail, but bonds are too expensive
for most citizens. According to the Department of Prisons, over half of
the 6,000 persons imprisoned are awaiting trial. Due to court backlogs,
a slow appeals process, and poor access to legal representation,
pretrial detention often exceeds the period to which persons
subsequently are sentenced after a trial and conviction.
Under the Public Security Act, the authorities may detain persons
who allegedly threaten domestic security and tranquillity, amicable
relations with other states, and relations between citizens of
different classes or religions. Persons whom the Government detains
under the act are considered to be in preventive detention and can be
held for up to 6 months without being charged with a crime. Human
rights groups allege that the police have used arbitrary arrest and
detention during the ``People's War'' to intimidate communities
considered sympathetic to the Maoists (see Section 1.b.). Since the
insurgents began their terrorist campaigns, 5,178 Maoist-related
arrests had been made through December. Of those arrested 1,518 had
been charged with crimes and were awaiting trial. The remainder had
been released.
The 1991 amendments to the Public Security Act allow the
authorities to extend periods of detention after submitting written
notices to the Home Ministry. The police must notify the district court
of the detention within 24 hours, and it may order an additional 6
months of detention before authorities file official charges. In 1997
the police asked the Government to enact legislation that would extend
the maximum time of detention under the act to between 2 and 10 years;
by year's end, no action was taken on this request.
Other laws, including the Public Offenses Act, permit arbitrary
detention. This act and its many amendments cover crimes such as
disturbing the peace, vandalism, rioting, and fighting. Under this act,
the Government detained hundreds of civil servants during a 55-day
antigovernment strike in 1991. Human rights monitors express concern
that the act vests too much discretionary power in the Chief District
Officer (CDO), the highest-ranking civil servant in each of the
country's 75 districts. The act authorizes the CDO to order detentions,
to issue search warrants, and to specify fines and other punishments
for misdemeanors without judicial review. Few recent instances of the
use of the Public Offenses Act have come to light, since it has become
more common, particularly with the Maoists, to arrest persons under the
Public Security Act.
Under the Public Offenses Act hundreds of persons were arrested on
March 18, 1996 for staging a peaceful protest of the human rights
situation in China organized by Amnesty International in Kathmandu.
Although most were released the same day, several AI officers and 14
Tibetans were held in jail for up to 7 days, some without being
charged. Amnesty International reported that many persons interviewed
by AI investigators after the May 1998 sweeps against the UPF reported
one or more of the following: That they were detained without having
been given arrest warrants at the time of the arrest; that they were
not presented before a judicial authority within 24 hours, as required
under the Constitution; that they were held for periods longer than the
25 days allowed under the Public Offenses Act; that they were not told
of the charges against them; and that they were denied access to an
attorney, at least during the initial period of their detention.
Authorities detained journalists and their advocates on occasion, on
suspicion of having ties to or sympathy for the Maoists (see Section
2.a.).
The Constitution prohibits exile; it is not used.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary and the Supreme Court has demonstrated
independence; however, lower level courts remain vulnerable to
political pressure. In addition, bribery of lower level judges and
court staff is endemic.
The Supreme Court has the right to review the constitutionality of
legislation passed by Parliament. It has ruled that provisions in the
1992 Labor Act and in the 1991 Nepal Citizenship Act are
unconstitutional. In 1995 the Court also decided that the dissolution
of the Parliament at the request of a former Prime Minister was
unconstitutional, and ordered the body restored.
Appellate and district courts have become increasingly independent,
although they sometimes bend to political pressure. In Rolpa, one of
the districts most affected by the ``People'sWar,'' human rights groups
have accused the district courts of acting in complicity with CDO's in
violating detainees' rights. These groups allege that arrest without a
warrant, prolonged detention without trial, and police torture occur in
these areas.
The judicial system consists of three levels: District courts,
appellate courts, and the Supreme Court. The King appoints judges on
the recommendation of the Judicial Council, a constitutional body
chaired by the Chief Justice. The Council is also responsible for the
assignment of judges, disciplinary action, and other administrative
matters. Judges decide cases; there is no jury system.
Delays in the administration of justice are a severe problem.
According to the latest statistics, approximately 150,000 cases are
active throughout the country. The Supreme Court has a backlog of
approximately 15,000 cases, which it expects to take 4 years to clear.
A case appealed to the Supreme Court may take more than 10 years to
conclude.
The Constitution provides for the right to counsel, equal
protection under the law, protection from double jeopardy, protection
from retroactive application of the law, and for public trials, except
in some security and customs cases. All lower court decisions,
including acquittals, are subject to appeal. The Supreme Court is the
court of last appeal, but the King may grant pardons. The King can also
suspend, commute, or remit any sentence. On the recommendation of the
Government, the King often pardons up to 12 prisoners--if they have
served 75 percent of their sentence and shown good behavior--on
national holidays.
Although the Constitution provides for the right to counsel, there
were reports of cases in which authorities allegedly penalized
attorneys involved in the defense of human rights. Amnesty
International reported that on January 8, lawyer and human rights
defender Rajendra Dhakal was arrested in Tanahum district; the police
had reportedly obtained a warrant for his arrest because of his alleged
involvement in Maoist violence. Dhakal, who was chairman of the Gorkha
district bar association and a member of the local human rights
organization Forum for Protection of Human Rights (FOPHUR), had been
arrested repeatedly since the start of the Maoist insurgency. Dhakal
reportedly has disappeared since his arrest, as has teacher, lawyer,
and human rights organization member Bishnu Pukar Shrestha (see Section
1.b.). Kathmandu newspapers reported that in July four lawyers pleading
for a group of detained journalist themselves were ordered detained by
district judge Surnedra Bir Sing Basnet as they tried to express their
views on the judicial order to detain the three journalists. After
other attorneys came to protest the arrests, the attorneys were
released (see Section 2.a.).
Military courts adjudicate cases concerning military personnel, who
are immune from prosecution in civilian courts. In 1992 the Supreme
Court ruled that military courts could no longer try civilians for
crimes involving the military services.
The authorities may prosecute terrorism or treason cases under the
Treason Act. Specially constituted tribunals hear these trials in
closed sessions. No such trials took place during the past 4 years.
There were no reports of political prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government generally respected the privacy of the
home and family. Search warrants are required before searches and
seizures may be carried out, except in cases involving suspected
security and narcotics violations. As amended, the Police Act of 1955
empowers the police to issue warrants for searches and seizures in
criminal cases upon receipt of information about criminal activities.
Within 24 hours of their issuance, warrants in misdemeanor cases must
be approved by the CDO. Court judges must approve them in felony cases.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution specifies that
all citizens shall have freedom of thought and expression and that the
Government may not censor any news item or other reading material;
however, the Government imposes some restrictions on these rights. The
Constitution prohibits speech and writing that would threaten the
sovereignty and integrity of the Kingdom; disturb the harmonious
relations among persons of different castes or communities; promote
sedition, defamation, contempt of court, or crime; or contradict decent
public behavior or morality.
The Press and Publications Act provides for the licensing of
publications and the granting of credentials to journalists. The act
includes penalties for violating these requirements. The Actalso
prohibits publication of material that, among other things, promotes
disrespect toward the King or the royal family; that undermines
security, peace, order, the dignity of the King, or the integrity or
sovereignty of the Kingdom; that creates animosity among persons of
different castes and religions; or that adversely affects the good
conduct or morality of the public. The Act also provides a basis for
banning foreign publications. However, foreign publications are now
widely available.
There are hundreds of independent vernacular and English newspapers
available, representing various political points of view. The
Government owns the daily Nepali-language newspaper with the largest
circulation. Editors and writers at the Government newspaper practice
self-censorship and generally reflect government policy. Ruling
political parties have influenced the editorial policy of the
government newspaper to their advantage. However, despite the
sensitivity of the Government to the ``People's War,'' the press has
not faced overt pressure to report on it in a particular way. Views of
human rights groups, the statements of the police, and the press
releases of Maoist leaders have all been reported in the local press.
Nevertheless, journalists and their advocates are detained on
occasion. On January 5, the Kathmandu offices of the weekly newspaper
Janadesh were raided, and 13 persons, including 4 journalists, were
arrested. Computers and printing materials were seized. Police
reportedly did not have a search warrant; the newspaper was accused of
having links with Maoists. On April 1, police reportedly seized
computers and printing equipment from the Kathmandu office of the
newspaper Jwala. The journalists and the newspaper were suspected of
having links with Maoists, and Jwala's facilities had been used by the
publication Janadesh since it was closed by police in January. In early
April, several journalists and a photographer reportedly were arrested
in Kathmandu. On April 20, the offices of Mahima and Jana Ahwan, two
small pro-Maoist newspapers, were raided by police. On April 28,
Krishna Shen, the editor of Janadesh, and two other employees of
Janadesh were arrested in connection with the publication of an
interview with Baburam Bhattarai, a leader of the Maoists, in the
newspaper. Thousands of copies of the paper allegedly were confiscated.
Shen remained in detention at year's end. Kathmandu newspapers reported
in July that four lawyers pleading for a group of three detained
journalists themselves were ordered detained by district judge Surnedra
Bir Sing Basnet as they tried to express their views on the judicial
order to detain the journalists. The journalists reportedly were
detained for publishing a news item entitled ``Allegations of
Corruption Against a Judge'' and were released after agreeing to
publish an apology daily for 2 weeks on the front page of their
newspaper.
The Government owns the only television station. The Government
also owns and controls one radio station that broadcasts on both AM and
FM. Television time on the government-owned television station is
leased regularly to private producers. Radio reaches the greatest
number of persons and has the largest influence. Programming currently
reflects a broader range of interests and political viewpoints than
prior to the political transformation in 1990.
There are two private radio stations and one community-owned radio
station that have their own transmitters. Other private or community-
run radio stations lease time on a government-owned transmitter. Six
private radio stations have been licensed outside of the capital city.
Government-owned Radio Nepal broadcasts throughout the country through
a series of repeater stations. Although nongovernment radio stations
legally are precluded from broadcasting locally developed news, private
stations routinely broadcast news without penalty. Private stations are
permitted to rebroadcast news from abroad. Private radio stations, like
print media, practice self-censorship. In August one private radio
station reported that a government official asked the station to stop a
live call-in advice show dealing with the topics of HIV/AIDS and
teenage problems. Other talk shows on sensitive topics continued
without government comment. The Government does not restrict access to
foreign radio broadcasts or to the purchase of television satellite
dishes that can access international news from the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC), the Cable News Network (CNN) and Deutsche Welle. A
small but growing number of citizens also have access to foreign news
through private cable networks. Indian and Pakistani broadcast
television is also readily available in many parts of the country.
The Broadcast Act of 1993 allows private television and FM radio
broadcasts, but implementation by the Government has been slow. There
are two private cable television networks, which have been operating
for close to 3 years in the Kathmandu valley. They provide mainly
entertainment programming, but commentary critical of government
policies occurs occasionally during publicly broadcast discussion
programs.
There have been many debates about liberalizing the media and
privatizing government-owned media. This debate has put pressure, so
far resisted, on successive governments to open the airwaves and divest
government-controlled printing operations.
The Government limits academic freedom to the same extent as it
limits the media. No overt efforts to enforce these limitations were
reported this year.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Although the
Constitution provides for freedom of assembly, this right may be
restricted by law on vague grounds such as undermining the sovereignty
and integrity of the State or disturbing law and order. Persons
protesting Chinese human rights policy were arrested and detained in
1996 before and during peaceful protests (see Section 1.d.). On March
11, 27 Tibetan demonstrators were arrested in Pokhara; the police used
tear gas and batons to break up the demonstration. All of the
protesters were released soon after the incident.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution describes Nepal as a
``Hindu Kingdom'' (although it does not establish Hinduism as the state
religion), provides for freedom of religion, and permits the practice
of all religions; however, although the Government generally has not
interfered with the practice of other religions, conversion and
proselytizing are prohibited and punishable with fines or imprisonment,
and members of minority religions occasionally complain of police
harassment. Some Christian groups are concerned that the ban on
proselytizing limits the expression of non-Hindu religious belief.
The large majority of citizens are Hindu. There are smaller numbers
of Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian citizens, as well. On April 2,
Christian groups in Kathmandu were prevented from holding a planned
Good Friday gathering in a public park in the Lalitpur district of the
city because the organizers had not obtained the required permit.
Similar Christian gatherings celebrating the Easter period have been
allowed in the past. An estimated 400 would-be attendees went to the
local district administrative office to protest, and three reportedly
were injured when police attempted to disperse the group. Two days
later, on Easter Sunday (April 4), the authorities allowed Christians
to hold a procession through the streets of downtown Kathmandu and the
Lalitpur district, which ended at an open air theater. The required
permit was obtained prior to this event.
A conviction for conversion or proselytizing can result in fines or
imprisonment or, in the case of foreigners, expulsion from the country.
However, arrests or detentions for proselytizing are rare, and there
have been few incidents of punishment or investigation in connection
with conversion or proselytization during the last few years. For
approximately 1 month in 1997, a Seventh-Day Adventist aid
organization, the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), was
the subject of slanderous and vituperative attacks in the press by
Hindu extremist organizations. These attacks began after a disgruntled
former ADRA employee alleged that ADRA had been proselytizing. ADRA
denied the allegation. ADRA had links to an Adventist school
(established for the children of Adventist workers in the country),
which also had been accused of proselytizing. The Government later
convened an investigative panel that found the claims baseless and
dismissed them. The investigative panel asked ADRA to confine itself to
the relief and welfare activities for which it was registered; since
ADRA already confined its activities to these areas, the request posed
no new limitations. However, to clarify its function and role, ADRA
severed all official ties to the school. As of year's end both ADRA and
the school were operating normally.
In March a foreign medical doctor who had been operating a
missionary-run clinic in Kathmandu visited the Home Ministry to renew
his visa but learned that the Ministry had canceled his visa 8 months
before. The Home Ministry detained him for 2 nights and then deported
him on March 31. The Government never gave an exact reason for
canceling the visa or for the deportation; the doctor believes that a
former business partner made allegations to the Government that the
doctor had proselytized.
For decades dozens of Christian missionary hospitals, welfare
organizations, and schools have operated in the country. These
organizations have not proselytized and have not faced religious
discrimination. Missionary schools are among the most respected
institutions of secondary education in the country; most of the
country's governing and business elite graduated from Jesuit high
schools. Many foreign Christian organizations have direct ties to
Nepali churches and sponsor Nepali priests for religious training
abroad.
The Constitution prohibits discrimination on the basis of caste,
except for traditional religious practices at Hindu temples, where, for
example, members of the lowest caste are not permitted.
The Press and Publications Act, among other things, prescribes
penalties for the publication of materials that create animosity among
persons of different castes or religions. In August 1998, an Internet
service provider warned a group of foreigners to stop a religiously
oriented electronic discussion group because the content of the
discussions violated laws against proselytizing.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution provides for freedom of
movement and residence, and the Government generally does not restrict
travel abroad. However, the Government restricts travel to some areas
near the Chinese border for foreign tourists and for foreign residents,
such as Tibetans residing in the country. The Government also has
imposed restrictions on women's travel to the Gulf states to work as
domestic servants, in response to cases of abuse of such women in the
past. These restrictions do not apply to women who are traveling to the
Gulf states for other reasons, nor do they apply for travel to other
areas. Women's rights groups have protested the ban as discriminatory.
The Government allows citizens abroad to return, and is not known to
revoke citizenship for political reasons.
The Government has no official refugee policy. However, it does
provide asylum for refugees and has cooperated with the office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and with other
humanitarian organizations, in assisting refugees from Bhutan and Tibet
(China). The UNHCR has maintained an office in Kathmandu since 1989.
Since 1959 the Government has accepted approximately 20,000 Tibetan
refugees, many of whom still reside in the country. Since 1991 it also
has provided asylum to some 97,000 Bhutanese refugees, the great
majority of whom are now living in UNHCR-administered camps in the
eastern part of the country.
In 1995 the Government reversed a 1960's decision to suspend the
issuance of identification cards to Tibetans legally residing in Nepal
before 1989, and again began to issue them identification cards.
However, later that year the program was suspended yet another time in
connection with a change in government, and there remained many
Tibetans with no form of identification and no permanent status.
Undocumented Tibetan residents faced difficulties in obtaining basic
rights and were unable to travel abroad or to access such services as
banking. In 1998 the Government reactivated the program and by year's
end completed documenting the remaining Tibetans legally residing in
the country.
China and the Government of Nepal tightened control of movement
across their border in 1986, but both sides have enforced these
restrictions haphazardly. Police and customs officials occasionally
harass Tibetan asylum seekers who cross the border from China. Border
police often extort money from Tibetans in exchange for passage. With
the change from a Communist Party government to a coalition government
headed by the Nepali Congress Party in September 1995, the former
practice of forcibly returning asylum seekers to China has stopped.
There were no reports of forced expulsion of Tibetan asylum seekers
during the year.
There are approximately 97,000 ethnic Nepali refugees from Bhutan
in UNHCR-administered camps in the southeastern region of the country.
An additional 15,000 refugees reside outside the camps in either Nepal
or India. The total represents approximately one-sixth of Bhutan's
estimated pre-1991 population.
The UNHCR monitors the condition of the Bhutanese refugees and
provides for their basic needs. The Government accepts the refugee
presence as temporary, on humanitarian grounds, but offers little more
than a place to stay. The Government officially restricts refugee
freedom of movement and work, but does not strictly enforce its
policies. Living conditions in the camps have improved dramatically
since 1992. Adequate clean water is available and health, sanitation,
and nutrition standards are acceptable. Violence has sometimes broken
out between camp residents and the surrounding local population. The
UNHCR and other donors and relief organizations have defused tensions
through a refugee-affected areas assistance plan aimed at improving
conditions in communities adjacent to the camps.
In 1993 the Governments of Nepal and Bhutan formed a joint
committee and began bilateral talks to resolve the refugee problem and
to determine different categories of refugees in preparation for future
repatriation. After a 3-year hiatus, an eighth round of bilateral talks
was held in September. Since that time, the foreign ministers of Nepal
and Bhutan have met twice for informal talks on the refugee issue. The
limited progress in bilateral negotiations has led to
increasedfrustration in the camps and to a recent campaign of ``peace
marches'' in 1998 and 1999 by refugees seeking to return to Bhutan.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens, through their elected representatives, have the right to
amend the Constitution with the exception of certain basic principles
that they may not change--sovereignty vested in the people, the
multiparty system, fundamental rights, and the constitutional monarchy.
Parliamentary elections are scheduled at least every 5 years.
Midterm elections may be called if the ruling party loses its majority,
loses a vote of no confidence, or calls for elections. The Constitution
grants suffrage to all citizens aged 18 and over.
The House of Representatives, or lower house, may send legislation
directly to the King by majority vote. The National Council, or upper
house, may amend or reject lower house legislation, but the lower house
can overrule its objections. The upper house may also introduce
legislation and send it to the lower house for consideration.
The King exercises certain powers with the advice and consent of
the Council of Ministers. These include exclusive authority to enact,
amend, and repeal laws relating to succession to the throne. The King's
income and property are tax-exempt and inviolable, and no question may
be raised in any court about any act performed by the King. The
Constitution also permits the King to exercise emergency powers in the
event of war, external aggression, armed revolt, or extreme economic
depression. In such an emergency, the King may suspend without judicial
review many basic freedoms, including the freedoms of expression and
assembly, freedom from censorship, and freedom from preventive
detention. However, he may not suspend habeas corpus or the right to
form associations. The King's declaration of a state of emergency must
be approved by a two-thirds majority of the lower house of the
Parliament. If the lower house is not in session, the upper house
exercises this power. A state of emergency may be maintained for up to
3 months without legislative approval and up to 6 months, renewable
only once for an additional 6 months, if the legislature grants
approval.
The Constitution bars the registration and participation in
elections of any political party that is based on ``religion,
community, caste, tribe, or region,'' or that does not operate openly
and democratically.
National elections were held in two rounds in May. The Nepali
Congress Party (NCP) won 54 percent of the seats in the lower house and
formed the first majority government since 1994. Clashes between police
and Maoist rebels in May left several persons dead and many injured
(see Sections 1.a. and 1.c). There were sporadic incidents of violence
during the voting on May 3 and May 17; the violence occurred mainly
between supporters of rival political parties. On May 17, four bombs
were defused in Karaiya village in Rupandehi district. However, unlike
the 1997 local elections, when Maoist violence and threats forced the
postponement of voting in parts of 15 of the 75 electoral districts,
for the most part the elections were held throughout the country
according to schedule. In polling stations where the voting on May 3
was postponed, the voting took place on May 5 and 6; in polling
stations where the voting on May 17 was postponed, the voting was held
May 19-21. Maoist efforts to disrupt the elections by intimidating
voters and candidates had little effect. Voter turnout was 66 percent,
significantly higher than in previous elections. International
observers considered the elections to be generally free and fair.
There are no specific laws that restrict women, indigenous peoples,
or minorities from participating in the Government or in political
parties. Tradition limits the roles of women and of some castes and
tribes in the political process. However, the Constitution requires
that women constitute 5 percent of each party's candidates for the
House of Representatives. A royal ordinance, which since has been
ratified by Parliament, also requires that 20 percent of all village
and municipal level seats be reserved for female candidates. The spring
elections resulted in an increase from 7 to 12 in the number of women
in the 205-seat lower house and from 5 to 9 in the 60-seat upper house.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are approximately 10 NGO human rights organizations. These
include the Human Rights Organization of Nepal (HURON), the Informal
Sector Services Center (INSEC), the International Institute for Human
Rights, Environment, and Development (INHURED), and the Forum for the
Protection of Human Rights(FOPHUR). The Nepal Law Society also monitors
human rights abuses and a number of NGO's focus on specific areas such
as torture, child labor, women's rights, or ethnic minorities. Groups
are free to publish reports on human rights abuses. The Government also
has allowed groups to visit prisons and prisoners. The Government
rarely arrests or detains those reporting on human rights problems, but
in June 1998 the police arrested Gopal Siwakoti Chintan, a human rights
activist, for alleged collaboration with the UPF. The police also
confiscated audiotapes and videotapes of interviews with victims of
human rights violations from Chintan's office. The police later
released Chintan due to a lack of evidence that he had collaborated
with the UPF. There were reports that the Government and UPF militants
limited the activities of human rights activists.
In 1996 the Parliament enacted the National Human Rights Commission
Act, which called for a government-appointed commission to investigate
charges of human rights violations. However, none of the six
governments in office since the passage of the act has convened the
commission. In July the Supreme Court ordered the Government to set up
the human rights commission immediately. After the July order,
editorials and human rights groups were vocal in calling for the new
Government to activate the commission. As they blocked traffic in
August to demand the implementation of the court order, 29 human rights
activists were arrested. In September the Government organized a task
force to work on the implementation of the National Human Rights
Commission Act, including establishing a budget and providing for an
office for the Human Rights Commission. The task force made its
recommendations to the Cabinet in late December.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution specifies that the State shall not discriminate
against citizens on grounds of religion, race, sex, caste, or ideology.
However, there is still a caste system. Discrimination against lower
castes, women, and the disabled remains common, especially in rural
areas.
Women.--Violence against women is a serious problem. There is no
law against domestic violence, which is widespread. In one study, 50
percent of the respondents said that they know someone who was the
victim of domestic violence. In another survey, respondents listed the
perpetrators of violence in 77 percent of incidents as family members,
and 58 percent reported that it is a daily occurrence. Little public
attention is given to violence against women in the home; the
Government makes no special effort to combat it.
Rape and incest are also problems, particularly in rural areas.
Laws against rape provide for prison sentences of 6 to 10 years for the
rape of a woman under 14 years of age and 3 to 5 years for the rape of
a woman over the age of 14. The law prescribes 1-year's imprisonment or
a fine for the rape of a prostitute.
There is a general unwillingness among citizens, and particularly
among government figures, to recognize violence against women as a
problem. In a survey conducted by Saathi, a local NGO, 42 percent of
the respondents said that in their experience medical practitioners
were uncooperative or negligent in cases of violence against women and
girls. This unwillingness to recognize violence against women and girls
as unacceptable in daily life is seen not just in the medical
profession, but among the police and politicians as well.
The police department has a ``women's cell'' in five cities,
including Kathmandu. These cells are made up entirely of female
officers, who receive special training in handling victims of domestic
violence. The police also have sent out directives instructing all
officers to treat domestic violence as a criminal offense that should
be prosecuted. However, according to a police official, this type of
directive is difficult to enforce because of entrenched discriminatory
attitudes. Even though the police may make an arrest, further
prosecution seldom is pursued by the victim or by the Government.
At least six NGO's in Kathmandu work on the problem of violence
against women and on women's issues in general. Saathi's assistance
program includes a women's shelter and a suicide intervention center.
The shelter provides housing, medical attention, counseling, and legal
advocacy for the victims of violence.
Two conferences were held in 1997 that focused on the problem of
violence against women. One was a national conference of NGO's,
government officials, and parliamentarians organized by the NGO Saathi.
The Government announced new initiatives at the meeting, including the
formation of a new National Women's Commission to help guide government
policy. The conference participantsformulated a common strategy to
unite NGO efforts in the field, as well. There was also an
international conference organized by the UNICEF regional office for
South Asia.
The dowry tradition is strong, with greater prevalence in the Terai
region. The killing of brides because of defaults on dowry payments is
rare, but does occur. More common is the physical abuse of wives by the
husband and the husband's family to obtain additional dowry or to force
the woman to leave to enable the son to remarry.
Trafficking in women remains a deeply ingrained social problem in
several of the country's poorest areas, and large numbers of women
still are forced to work against their will as prostitutes in other
countries (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Although the Constitution provides protections for women, including
equal pay for equal work, the Government has not taken significant
action to implement its provisions. Women face discrimination,
particularly in rural areas, where religious and cultural tradition,
lack of education, and ignorance of the law remain severe impediments
to their exercise of basic rights such as the right to vote or to hold
property in their own names.
Women have benefited from changes in marriage and inheritance laws.
In 1994 the Supreme Court struck down provisions of the Citizenship Law
that discriminated against foreign spouses of Nepalese women. However,
many other discriminatory laws still remain. According to legal
experts, there are more than 20 laws that discriminate against women.
For example, the law grants women the right to divorce, but on narrower
grounds than those applicable to men. The law on property rights also
favors men in its provisions for inheritance, land tenancy, and the
division of family property. In 1995 the Supreme Court also ordered the
Council of Ministers to enact legislation within 1 year giving women
property rights in regard to inheritance and land tenancy that were
equal to those of men. To comply with this order, the Government
introduced an amendment to the Civil Code in April 1998 that would have
allowed daughters to inherit parental property, but only if they
remained unmarried until the age of 35. Moreover, if a woman married
after age 35, the amendment stipulated that she would be obliged to
return the inherited property. At year's end, this amendment, which
would appear to only partially meet the requirements of the Supreme
Court, remained stalled in Parliament.
According to the 1991 census, the female literacy rate is 26
percent, compared with 57 percent for men. Human rights groups report
that girls attend secondary schools at a rate half that of boys. There
are now many NGO's focused on integrating women into society and the
economy. These NGO's work in the areas of literacy, small business,
skills transfer, and against trafficking in women and girls.
There are a growing number of women's advocacy groups and most
political parties have women's groups. Members of Parliament have begun
working for the passage of tougher laws for crimes of sexual assault,
but have had little success so far.
Children.--Although education is not compulsory, the Government
provides free primary education for all children between the ages of 6
and 12, but many families cannot afford school supplies or clothing.
Schools charge fees for further education. Free health care is provided
through government clinics, but they are poorly equipped and too few in
number to meet the demand. Community-based health programs assist in
the prevention of childhood diseases and provide primary health care
services. Due to poor or nonexistent sanitation in rural areas, many
children are at risk from severe and fatal illnesses.
The Children's Act of 1992 provides legal protection for children
in the workplace and in criminal proceedings. Although it calls for the
establishment of child welfare committees and orphanages, the
Government has established few such facilities. The Labor Act of 1992
prohibits the employment of minors less than 14 years of age, but
employers, particularly in the informal sector and in agriculture,
widely ignore the law.
Children under the age of 16 work in all sectors of the economy.
Children's rights groups estimate that up to half of all children work.
As recently as early 1994, the carpet industry employed an estimated
23,000 children, or nearly one-third of all workers in that industry.
Due to negative publicity in consumer nations, these figures have
declined and children now account for less than 2,000 workers (see
Section 6.d.). In 1996 a consortium of carpet manufacturers established
a certification system for carpets made without child labor. The
Ministry of Labor is increasing its efforts to monitor the use of child
labor. Children continue to work in the agriculture, pottery, basket
weaving, sewing, weaving, and ironsmithing industries. There also were
reports that the UPF uses children as messengers andrunners. Forced
child labor exists, but only limited instances have been reported in
recent years (see Section 6.c).
Forced prostitution and trafficking in young girls remain serious
and deeply ingrained problems (see Sections 6.c. and 6.f.).
Social attitudes view a female child as a commodity, to be bartered
off in marriage, or as a burden. Some persons, in fact, consider
marrying a girl before menarche an honorable, sacred act that increases
one's chances of a better afterlife. As a result, child brides are
common. According to the UNICEF's Regional Office for South Asia, 40
percent of all marriages are consummated with a girl under 14 years of
age. The age difference in marriage is often cited as one cause of
domestic violence.
A local NGO reports that approximately 100 children considered
delinquents or accused of public offenses are incarcerated with adults
because the Government has not established juvenile homes. Some of
these delinquent children allegedly are as young as 9 years old, even
though, under the law, children under 18 cannot be charged with crimes;
the Government maintains that there are no persons under the age of 18
that are incarcerated for crimes they have committed. However,
according to the press, close to 100 children are in jails as
noncriminal dependents of incarcerated adults (see Section 1.c.).
People with Disabilities.--The disabled face widespread
discrimination. Families often are stigmatized by and ashamed of
disabled family members, who may be hidden away or neglected. Economic
integration is further hampered by the general view that the disabled
are unproductive. The mentally retarded are associated with the
mentally ill. Sometimes, mentally ill and retarded persons are placed
in prisons due to the lack of facilities or support.
The Government has long been involved in providing for the
disabled, but the level of government assistance has not met the needs
of the disabled. The 1982 Disabled Persons Protection and Welfare Act
and additional 1994 rules mandate accessibility to buildings, to
transportation, to employment, to education, and to other state
services. However, despite government funding for special education
programs, the Government does not implement or enforce laws regarding
the disabled. A number of NGO's working with the disabled receive
significant funding from the Government, but persons who are physically
or mentally disabled rely almost exclusively on family members to
assist them.
Religious Minorities.--In the past, disputes during local elections
have escalated to isolated clashes between Hindu and Muslim supporters.
The country's small but significant Muslim enclaves in the districts
along the border with India and in Kathmandu are not well integrated
with the larger Hindu majority. The lack of integration between these
communities has contributed to this problem.
Some Christian groups report that Hindu extremism has increased in
recent years. In January the Hindu chauvinist political party Shiv Sena
opened an office in Kathmandu; a few Shiv Sena candidates
unsuccessfully ran for office in the 1999 general elections. Some
political figures have made public statements critical of Christian
missionary activities. Some citizens are wary of proselytizing and
conversion by Christians and therefore view the growth of Christianity
with alarm.
Hindu citizens who convert to Islam or to Christianity face
isolated incidents of hostility or discrimination from Hindu extremist
groups, in addition to possible legal penalties (see Section 2.c.).
While this prejudice is not systematic, it can be vehement and
sometimes violent. Nevertheless, converts generally do not fear to
admit in public their Islamic or Christian affiliations.
The caste system strongly influences society, even though it is
prohibited by the Constitution. However, traditional religious
practices at Hindu temples are an exception to this prohibition.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--The country has over 75 ethnic
groups that speak 50 different languages. The Constitution provides
that each community ``shall have the right to preserve and promote its
language, script, and culture.'' The Constitution further specifies
that each community has the right to operate schools up to the primary
level in its mother tongue.
Discrimination against lower castes is especially common in the
rural areas in the west. Although the Government has outlawed the
public shunning of ``untouchables,'' an exception was retained for
traditional practices at Hindu religious sites. Economic,social, and
educational advancement tend to be a function of historical patterns,
geographic location, and caste. Better education and higher levels of
prosperity, especially in the Kathmandu valley, are slowly reducing
caste distinctions and increasing opportunities for lower socioeconomic
groups. Better educated urban-oriented castes (Brahmin, Chhetri, and
certain elements of the Newar community traditionally dominant in the
Kathmandu valley) continue to dominate politics and senior
administrative and military positions, and to control a
disproportionate share of natural resources in their territories.
In remote areas, school lessons and national radio broadcasts often
are conducted in the local language. However, in areas with nearby
municipalities, education at the primary, secondary, and university
levels is conducted almost exclusively in Nepali, which is
constitutionally mandated as the official language of the State. Human
rights groups report that the languages of the small Kusunda, Dura, and
Meche communities are nearly extinct and that non-Hindu peoples are
losing their culture.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Constitution provides for the
freedom to establish and to join unions and associations. It permits
restriction of unions only in cases of subversion, sedition, or similar
conditions. Despite the political transformation in 1990, trade unions
are still developing their administrative structures to organize
workers, to bargain collectively, and to conduct worker education
programs. A prior UML government ``automatically'' registered its own
affiliated unions but interfered in the registration of unions
associated with the Nepali Congress Party's labor organization.
Union participation in the formal sector is significant, but it
accounts for only a small portion of the labor force. In 1992
Parliament passed the Labor Act and the Trade Union Act, and formulated
enabling regulations. However, the Government has not yet fully
implemented the laws. The Trade Union Act defines procedures for
establishing trade unions, associations, and federations. It also
protects unions and officials from lawsuits arising from actions taken
in the discharge of union duties, including collective bargaining.
The law permits strikes, except by employees in essential services
such as water supply, electricity, and telecommunications. The law
empowers the Government to halt a strike or to suspend a union's
activities if the union disturbs the peace or if it adversely affects
the nation's economic interests. Under the Labor Act, 60 percent of a
union's membership must vote in favor of a strike in a secret ballot
for the strike to be legal. On March 24, the Government banned all
strikes in the communications, transportation, and security sectors,
pending the completion of the parliamentary elections in May. This,
along with the hiring of replacement crews, ended a pilot's strike that
had crippled state-controlled Royal Nepal Airlines since March 15. All
but one of the airline's employees were later reinstated.
The Trade Union Act prohibits employers from discriminating against
trade union members or organizers. There have been few reports of
discrimination against union members.
The Government does not restrict unions from joining international
labor bodies. Several trade federations and union organizations
maintain a variety of international affiliations.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The Labor Act
provides for collective bargaining, although the organizational
structures to implement the Act's provisions have not been established.
Collective bargaining agreements cover an estimated 20 percent of wage
earners in the organized sector. However, labor remains widely unable
to use collective bargaining effectively due to inexperience and
employer reluctance to bargain.
There are no export processing zones.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution
prohibits slavery, serfdom, forced labor, or trafficking in human
beings in any form; however, forced labor and trafficking in persons
remain problems (see Section 6.f.). The Department of Labor enforces
laws against forced labor in the small formal sector, but remains
unable to enforce the law outside that sector.
Large numbers of women still are forced to work against their will
as prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.f.). Bonded labor is a continuing
problem, especially in agricultural work. Bonded laborers are usually
members of lower castes. Bonded labor reportedly occurs among certain
ethnic groups in the westernTerai region. An estimated 100,000 persons
also are forced to work under the ``Kamaiya'' or bonded labor system in
the southern Terai region. These ``Kamaiyas'' generally are
agricultural workers who work for the same landlords their family may
have served for many generations. In August the Government announced a
program to free about 83,400 bonded laborers by paying off
approximately $330,000 (22,500,000 rupees) in debt, by providing
laborers with unspecified alternative employment, and by distributing
land to the laborers.
The Nepal Labor Act specifically prohibits forced or bonded child
labor, but enforcement of this law has been inadequate. The law
prohibits forced or bonded labor by children, but it exists in some
sectors. Limited instances of forced child labor have been reported,
and an estimated 40,000 children work as bonded laborers. Each year, an
estimated 5,000 to 7,000 girls between the ages of 10 and 18 are
trafficked to India to work as prostitutes (see Sections 5 and 6.f.).
In late 1998, police freed approximately 12 children, some as young as
8 years of age, from forced 18-hour days of labor under harsh
conditions in a Kathmandu carpet factory. There was a press report in
February that during a raid, police found 14 boys aged 15 to 17 who
were employed forcibly in a wool factory in Jorpati (see Section 6.d.).
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--The Constitution stipulates that children shall not be
employed in factories, mines, or similar hazardous work. The law also
establishes a minimum age for employment of minors at 16 years in
industry and 14 years in agriculture. The Constitution limits children
between the ages of 14 and 16 years to a 36-hour workweek. The law also
mandates acceptable working conditions for children. However, both the
resources and the commitment devoted to the enforcement of these
provisions are limited and child workers are found in many sectors of
the economy (see Section 5). Although the law prohibits forced or
bonded labor by children, it exists in some sectors (see Section 6.c.).
Limited instances of forced child labor have been reported, and an
estimated 40,000 children work as bonded laborers.
According to a recent ILO study, up to 40 percent of all children
work, mostly in agriculture. According to a recent ILO study, most
working children in the country are girls. Roughly 60 percent of the
children who work also attend school. However, approximately 70 to 75
percent of boys who work go to school, compared with 50 to 60 percent
of the girls who work. In 1996 a certification system for carpets made
without child labor was established. Of the 207 carpet factories that
export, approximately 30 have signed on to this or a similar agreement
(see Section 5). Over half of all carpet factories now participate in
this or a similar agreement. Partially as a result of this initiative,
and of consumer pressure, children now reportedly constitute only 5
percent of the work force in the export-oriented carpet industry, and
the carpet manufacturers association in August pledged publicly to end
child labor in the industry by 2005. However, children's rights
activists say that, in the smaller factories, children are still a
large part of the work force. There was a press report in February that
during a raid, police found 14 boys aged 15 to 17 who were forcibly
employed in a wool factory in Jorpati (see Section 6.c.). In December
1998, police freed 12 children from forced labor in a Kathmandu carpet
factory (see Section 6.c). The children were taken to a rehabilitation
home and the factory owner was tried, convicted, and sentenced to a
prison term of less than 1 year; at year's end, he reportedly had
served his sentence and been freed. Children continue to work in the
agriculture, pottery, basket weaving, sewing, weaving, and ironsmithing
industries. Few or no children work in the garment industry.
The Ministry of Labor's enforcement record is improving. In the
urban formal sector, it has had some success in enforcing laws relating
to tenure, minimum wage, and holidays. Government inspectors are also
increasing their monitoring of the use of child labor in carpet
factories. The Government has introduced a number of programs beginning
in 1998 that are designed to reduce child labor. For example, the
Ministry of Labor has set up three centers for children of carpet
weavers, who might otherwise join their parents at the loom. The
centers provide day care or education for the children, depending upon
their ages. The Government also conducts public awareness programs to
raise public sensitivity to the problem of child labor.
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--In 1997 legislation was passed
that raised the minimum wage for unskilled labor to $22 (1,300 rupees)
per month from $19 (1,150 rupees). The law also defined monthly minimum
wages for semi-skilled labor at $23 (1,350 rupees), skilled labor at
$25 (1,460 rupees), and highly skilled labor at $28 (1,650 rupees). The
minimum wage for children ages 14 to 16 was set at $17 (1,025 rupees).
These wages are sufficient only for the most minimalstandard of living.
Wages in the unorganized service sector and in agriculture are often as
much as 50 percent lower. The Labor Act calls for a 48-hour workweek,
with 1 day off per week, and limits overtime to 20 hours per week.
Health and safety standards and other benefits such as a provident fund
and maternity benefits are also established in the act. Implementation
of the new Labor Act has been slow, as the Government has not created
the necessary regulatory or administrative structures to enforce its
provisions. Workers do not have the right to remove themselves from
dangerous work situations. Although the law authorizes labor officers
to order employers to rectify unsafe conditions, enforcement of safety
standards remains minimal.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in women and girls remains
a deeply ingrained social problem in several of the country's poorest
areas. Nepal is a primary ``sending'' country for the South Asia
region; most women and girls trafficked from Nepal go to India.
Estimates of the number of girls and women working as prostitutes in
India range between 100,000 and 200,000. The best available data
suggest that approximately 5,000 to 7,000 Nepali girls between the ages
of 10 and 18 are lured or abducted into prostitution each year.
Prostitution is also a problem in the Kathmandu valley. A children's
human rights group states that 20 percent of prostitutes in the country
are younger than 16 years old. In many cases, parents or relatives sell
women and young girls into sexual slavery. Every year, it is estimated
that hundreds of girls and women return to the country after having
worked as prostitutes in India. Most are destitute, and it is estimated
that over 65 percent of such women are HIV-positive when they return.
There is legislation to protect women from coercive trafficking,
including a ban on female domestic labor leaving the country to work in
Saudi Arabia and other countries in the Gulf (see Section 2.d.).
Women's rights groups have protested the ban as discriminatory.
According to press reports, on August 18, five convicted traffickers
who had been given 20-year sentences but were released within 3 years
attacked a 17-year-old living at the Women's Rehabilitation Center
(WOREC). The attackers reportedly attacked her after failing to find
another woman who had filed a case against them after she had been
rescued from a brothel in Bombay in a 1996 raid. According to WOREC, in
spite of the fact that the five had threatened their accuser in an
effort to get her to change her story, they were released early from
their sentences. WOREC and other organizations involved in the
rehabilitation of women who have been trafficked state that their
members have been threatened and that their offices have been
vandalized because of their activities. However, despite the existence
of antitrafficking legislation and recent attempts to increase the
imposition of penalties on traffickers, antitrafficking legislation is
not well enforced. The fear of the spread of AIDS by returning
prostitutes has discouraged the Government from promoting the
rehabilitation of prostitutes. Government efforts focus more on
preventing prostitution and trafficking in women. The Ministry of Labor
and Social Welfare sponsors job and skill training programs in several
poor districts known for sending prostitutes to India. In May, the
Ministry of Women and Social Welfare opened the Women's Self-Reliance
and Rehabilitation Center, a rehabilitation and skills training center
for women returned from being trafficked and for women and girls at
risk of being trafficked. Several NGO's have similar programs,
including rehabilitation and training programs for victims of
trafficking.
In June the police hosted a workshop in Kathmandu to provide
recommendations for new legislation regarding trafficking and the
sexual exploitation of children. The Prime Minister opened the seminar,
and the Minister of Law and Justice, the Attorney General, and the
Inspector General of Police all gave presentations. A follow-up
workshop was held in July.
______
PAKISTAN
For most of the year, Pakistan was an Islamic republic with a
democratic political system; however, on October 12, the elected
civilian government of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif was overthrown
in a bloodless coup led by Army Chief of Staff General Pervez
Musharraf. General Musharraf, in consultation with senior military
commanders, designated himself Chief Executive, and suspended the
Constitution, the National Assembly, the Senate, and the provincial
assemblies. The office of the President, which is mainly ceremonial,
was retained. General Musharraf appointed an advisory National Security
Council, which included both military and civilian advisers, and a
civilian cabinet. The government bureaucracy continued to function;
however, at all levels, the functioning of the Government after the
coup was ``monitored'' by military commanders. Prior to the coup, the
Prime Minister, selected by a majority within a popularly elected
Parliament, had wide constitutional power. The Pakistan Muslim League
(PML) Government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which came to power in
February 1997 with a two-thirds Parliamentary majority, passed
constitutional amendments (the 13th and 14th) in 1998, which enhanced
the power of the Prime Minister by removing the power of the President
to dismiss the Government at his discretion and banning defections from
political parties, two of the most frequently used methods of bringing
down previous governments. These measures, which enjoyed opposition
support, were aimed at enhancing political stability at the national
level. As a result of these changes, the Sharif Government had greater
power than any of its predecessors since the return of formal democracy
in 1988. However, the military continued to exercise considerable
influence over decision-making. The power of the Government was further
enhanced by a 1997 constitutional confrontation between the Prime
Minister and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court over the selection
of five new justices for the Court. As a result of this struggle, the
former President resigned in December 1997, and the Prime Minister's
candidate was elected by the Parliament to the presidency. That same
month, a Supreme Court panel deprived the Chief Justice of his position
and a new Chief Justice was sworn in. Some observers feared that this
confrontation damaged the prestige and independence of the judiciary.
The Constitution provided for an independent judiciary; however, it was
subject to executive branch influence. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
demonstrated a continued degree of independence on a number of
occasions prior to the coup. Corruption and inefficiency are problems
in all branches.
Responsibility for internal security rests primarily with the
police, although paramilitary forces, such as the Rangers and Frontier
Constabulary, provide support in areas where law and order problems are
acute, such as Karachi and the frontier areas. Provincial governments
control the police and paramilitary forces when they are assisting in
law and order operations. The regular army also occasionally is
deployed to assist in maintaining public order in sensitive areas
during certain religious holidays. After the coup, the army played a
role in enforcing exit control restrictions at airports and border
crossings as part of the Musharraf regime's accountability efforts.
Members of the security forces committed numerous serious human rights
abuses.
Pakistan is a poor country, with great extremes in the distribution
of wealth. Its per capita annual income is $490. The overall illiteracy
rate is 62 percent, and is even higher for women. Cotton, textiles and
apparel, rice, and leather products are the principal exports. The
economy includes both state-run and private industries and financial
institutions. The Constitution provides for the right of private
businesses to operate freely in most sectors of the economy. The
Government has made several economic reforms, including privatizing
state-owned enterprises and reducing tariffs. Politically driven
confrontations with Independent Power Projects (IPPS) and the
Government's inability to repay investors in hard currency have damaged
investor confidence and hampered privatization.
The Government's poor human rights record deteriorated under the
Sharif Government, and there were serious problems in several areas;
however, the situation worsened with the seizure of power by General
Musharraf, in that after the coup, citizens no longer had the right to
change their government peacefully. Despite attempts to reform and to
professionalize the police, both before and after the coup police
committed numerous extrajudicial killings and tortured, abused, and
raped citizens. While the officers responsible for such abuses
sometimes were transferred or suspended for their actions, there is no
evidence that any police officers were brought to justice. In general,
police continued to commit serious abuses with impunity. Prison
conditions remained poor, and police arbitrarily arrested anddetained
citizens. In Karachi killings between rival political factions often
were carried out with the assistance of criminal gangs; however, many
such killings also were believed to have been committed by or with the
participation of security forces. The Sharif Government used the
``accountability'' process--which supposedly was designed to expose
previous wrongdoing, recoup ill-gotten gains, and restore public
confidence in government institutions--for political purposes by
harassing and arresting a number of prominent politicians and
bureaucrats connected with the main opposition party. Few of those
arrested and questioned were put on trial; however, former Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto and her husband were convicted on corruption
charges in April. Bhutto was sentenced to 5 years in prison,
disqualified from holding public office, and fined. The Musharraf
regime used arbitrary detention, including incommunicado detention,
against political figures from the Sharif Government and their
families; and the Musharraf regime's anti-corruption campaign violated
due process. Case backlogs under both Governments led to long delays in
trials, and lengthy pretrial detention is common. The judiciary is
subject to executive and other outside influence, and suffers from
inadequate resources, inefficiency, and corruption. Despite concerns
about damage to the judiciary due to the December 1997 confrontation
between the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
there were instances prior to the coup in which the Supreme Court
showed a continued degree of independence. While in February 1998 the
Sharif Government ceased using military courts to try certain civilian
cases at the demand of the Supreme Court, special antiterrorism courts
expanded their jurisdiction to include murder, gang rape, child
molestation, and ``illegal'' strikes. These courts are authorized to
try terrorists swiftly, and those convicted may appeal only to a higher
military court. In October 1998, the National Assembly voted for a 15th
constitutional amendment, which would oblige the Government to enforce
Shari'a (Islamic law). However, the Senate did not vote on the measure
before it was suspended by the Musharraf regime in October. Both the
Sharif Government and the Musharraf Government infringed on citizen's
privacy rights. Although the press continued to publish relatively
freely, the Sharif Government used its large advertising budget to
influence content, journalists practiced self-censorship, the broadcast
media remain a closely controlled government monopoly, and the Sharif
Government made several attempts to curb press criticism. In
particular, the Sharif Government continued its actions against the
Jang newspaper group and jailed and harassed prominent journalists such
as Friday Times editor Najam Sethi. The Musharraf regime appeared to
cease direct attempts to manage the press, which were common under the
Sharif Government. The Sharif Government imposed limits on the freedom
of assembly. Although it allowed a number of large-scale,
antigovernment demonstrations to take place, it also prevented
demonstrations and strikes and arrested organizers when it believed
that security was threatened, particularly in advance of the September
4 strike called by general traders and sponsored by opposition parties.
The Sharif Government limited freedom of association, and targeted the
activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGO's), revoking the
licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in Punjab. Both Governments imposed
limits on freedom of religion, particularly for Ahmadis. Three Ahmadis
sentenced in 1997 to life in prison for blasphemy remain incarcerated.
Both Governments imposed limits on freedom of movement. Governor's Rule
continued in Sindh province until the coup, under which its citizens
continued to be denied democratic representation at the provincial
level. The Prime Minister in June appointed an Advisor for Sindh
Affairs, who exercised executive authority in the province without a
popular mandate. After the coup, Sindh shared the same status as the
other provinces; assemblies in the other provinces were suspended and
General Musharraf appointed governors for all four provinces. The
Musharraf Government spoke out against some of the human rights abuses
of the previous regime and appointed NGO representatives to a number of
senior positions, but it was not clear at year's end whether the
Musharraf regime would take concrete steps to address such problems.
Significant numbers of women were subjected to violence, abuse,
rape, trafficking, and other forms of degradation by their spouses and
members of society at large. The Government failed to take action in a
high profile ``honor killing'' case and such killings continued
throughout the country. There was considerable discrimination against
women, and traditional social and legal constraints kept women in a
subordinate position in society. Violence against children, as well as
child abuse, prostitution, and trafficking remained problems. Female
children still lag far behind boys in education, health care, and other
social benefits. There was considerable discrimination against
religious minorities. Both Governments as well as sectarian groups
continued to discriminate againstreligious minorities, particularly
Ahmadis and Christians. Religious and ethnic-based rivalries resulted
in numerous killings and civil disturbances. The Government and
employers continued to restrict worker rights significantly. Bonded
labor by both adults and children remained a problem. Debt slavery
persisted. The use of child labor remained widespread, although it now
generally is recognized as a serious problem, and industrial exporters
have adopted a number of measures to eliminate child labor from
specific sectors. Mob violence and terrorist attacks remained problems.
In May heavy fighting broke out between Indian forces and Kashmiri
militants in the Kargil sector of Indian-held Kashmir, and continued
until July. Regular Pakistani forces were also involved in the
conflict. Civilians were killed on both sides of the line of control
during the conflict, and tens of thousands of persons were displaced on
both sides of the line of control.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police committed
extrajudicial killings. The extrajudicial killing of criminal suspects,
often in the form of deaths in police custody or staged encounters in
which police shoot and kill the suspects, is common. Police officials
generally insist that these deaths occur during attempts at escape or
at resisting arrest; family members and the press insist that many of
these deaths are staged. Police have been known to kill suspected
criminals to prevent them from implicating police in crimes during
court proceedings. After an attempt was made on the Prime Minister's
life in early January, as many as 40 Sunni extremists associated with
the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, the group believed responsible, may have been
killed in police encounters. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
(HRCP) estimates that there were 161 extrajudicial killings in the
first 4 months of the year. In March the Sindh Home Department conceded
that at least two incidents since imposition of Governor's Rule
resulted in extrajudicial deaths. Press reports note that in Punjab
alone 265 individuals were killed in 182 encounters with police between
January and June. The Urdu daily newspaper Khabrain reported on
December 6 that there were 285 police encounters in Punjab in the first
10 months of the year and that 357 persons lost their lives. In October
there were reports of police encounter killings of members of the
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi by the police
in Punjab, following a wave of sectarian violence in the province (see
Section 2.c.). Estimates of SSP and Lashkar-i-Jhangvi members killed by
police in this manner range from 16 to 40 persons. Police officials
maintain in private that due to the lack of concrete evidence, witness
intimidation, corruption in and threats against the judiciary, and
sometimes political pressure, courts often fail to punish criminals
involved in serious crimes. Police professionalism is low. The police
view the killings of criminal suspects as appropriate given the lack of
effective action by the judiciary against criminals. The judiciary, on
the other hand, faults the police for presenting weak cases that do not
stand up in court.
Police officers occasionally are transferred or briefly suspended
for their involvement in extrajudicial killings. However, court-ordered
inquiries into these killings so far have failed to result in any
police officer receiving criminal punishment. Punjabi police killed
Tahir Prince on February 10. Following the filing of a writ by the
victim's mother, the Lahore High Court ordered registration of a case
against the police officers involved; however, no departmental action
has been taken. In general police continued to commit such killings
with impunity.
Following the coup in October, a number of police officials were
charged or sanctioned for extrajudicial killings. On December 2, the
Lahore High Court ordered the registration of cases against the Deputy
Inspector General (DIG) of Police Sarghoda Range and six other police
officers in the April 5 killing of two Sarghoda residents. The
residents reportedly were mistaken for a Lashkar-i-Jhangvi member and
killed in a police encounter. On December 7, the Punjab Chief Secretary
announced that three senior Lahore-based police officials would be
removed following the killing of a suspect in police custody. The
suspect was charged in connection with a series of killings of children
in Lahore. One police sub-inspector was sentenced to death during the
year in the 1997 killing of Iraqi Noel, whom the police officer had
taken into custody.
The police and security forces were responsible for the deaths of a
number of individuals associated with political or terrorist groups.
For example, Punjab police officers killed activists of the extremist
sectarian organization Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, which was implicated in an
attempt to kill the Prime Minister in January. During the year, three
individuals charged with attempting to assassinate the Prime Minister
in January were killed in police custody during an alleged escape
attempt. As of August, 21 activists from this organization were killed
in police encounters, according to press accounts and the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan.
The Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM), an opposition party that has
demonstrated a willingness to use violence to further its objectives,
claimed that its adherents were being targeted specifically by the
police for extrajudicial killings. The MQM was formed by Altaf Hussein
in 1984 as a student movement to further the rights of Mohajirs, the
descendants of Urdu-speaking Muslims who migrated from India to
Pakistan following partition in 1947. It soon became an organization
with criminal elements, which generated income through extortion and
other forms of racketeering. The MQM presently is split between the
original MQM, formerly known as the Mohajir Quami Movement, and headed
by Altaf Hussain (MQM-Altaf), a large breakaway group (MQM-Haqiqi), and
other, smaller factions. The MQM-Altaf, in part because of its
efficient organization and willingness to use violence and intimidation
to achieve its goals, became the dominant political party in the Sindh
urban centers of Karachi and Hyderabad. The MQM, despite a number of
moderate and nonviolent leaders now in the Senate, National Assembly,
and Sindh Provincial Assembly, has not been able to separate itself
from its violent past. As a result, it has antagonized followers,
suffered violent breakaways, and continually been at odds with
successive governments. In March MQM Senator Aftab Sheikh accused the
Sindh police, the paramilitary Rangers, and Government intelligence
agencies of abducting two MQM members--Farid and Shamim--and killing
them in custody; the two reportedly were handcuffed when killed. In
July London-based MQM chief Altaf Hussain accused the Karachi police of
killing Mohammed Shahid after his arrest. Altaf Hussain also claimed in
July that 14 MQM workers were killed extrajudicially since the
imposition of Governor's Rule. In a July report, the MQM listed 10
persons, mostly MQM activists, killed in extrajudicial incidents by
Karachi police between October 1998 and March. In September MQM
activist Rehan Bandhani died in police custody. According to the daily
newspaper The News, the police initially argued that Bandhani had died
of a heart attack, but a police officer later was charged with
unintentional murder. On September 7, two MQM activists were killed in
an encounter with police; police officials stated that the two men shot
first, but witnesses claim that the two were taken, unarmed, from their
homes and shot by police in a nearby field.
In NWFP the family of a notorious criminal known as ``Shaitan''
accused police of killing him in custody on May 9. The NWFP government
has taken no action; however, the government of the NWFP set up a
committee of inquiry to look into the death of Pakistan Muslim League
youth wing leader Qasim Khan, who died while in custody of the Peshawar
police on July 18. In 1998, Awais Akram, Arbab Yousah, and Abbas died
while in police custody; in all three cases police officers were
charged in connection with the deaths, but no information was available
as the disposition of the cases at year's end. Ghulam Jillani, a 14-
year-old boy, died while in police custody in Manshera in May 1998.
Then NWFP Chief Minister Sardar Mehtab Ahmed Khan dismissed the entire
staff of the police station involved. The Abbottabad session judge led
a committee of inquiry that investigated the incident; the committee
held the Station House Officer and the staff of the police station
responsible for Jillani's death. At year's end, the officers involved
were appealing the decision.
The Sharif Government also used lethal force against political
opponents and underground organizations.
Politically motivated violence and sectarian violence continued to
be a problem, although in the weeks following the October 12 coup there
were few if any reported cases of such violence. Governor's Rule,
imposed to correct a serious law and order problem created in part by
political tensions in the province, continued in Sindh until the coup.
Despite improved security conditions under Governor's Rule, there were
75 deaths that were presumed to be the result of political violence in
Karachi. Terrorist incidents were frequent in the Punjab. On January 3,
four persons were killed and several were injured when a bomb placed
under a bridge outside of Lahore exploded. The bombing occurred
approximately 1 hour before Prime Minister Sharif wasto have crossed
the bridge, and was believed to be an assassination attempt. Two
members of the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi extremist group were arrested in
connection with the blast later that month. According to press reports,
on May 24, at least 10 persons were reportedly killed by an explosion
near a market in Daska, Punjab. There were several other bombings
during the year, some of which resulted in deaths. The perpetrators of
most such bombings were unknown at year's end. In 1998, there were
several bombings in which persons were killed. At year's end, it was
not known who carried out these bombings.
Women were killed by family members in so-called ``honor
killings.'' On April 6, Samia Imran, who sought a divorce against the
wishes of her husband and family, was shot and killed in the Lahore
office of lawyer Hina Jilani by a man accompanying her mother. The
gunman and the victim's mother fled after the killing. The gunman later
was shot and killed by police. Three members of Imran's family--her
father, mother, and uncle--were charged in connection with her killing.
However, by year's end, the three remained at large (see Section 5.).
There was extensive religious violence, particularly between rival
Sunni and Shi'a organizations, with 1 newspaper estimating that 300
persons were killed in sectarian attacks during the last 2 years (see
Sections 2.c. and 5).
On January 12, in Peshawar, the wife and son of well-known Afghan
moderate Abdul Haq were shot and killed in their sleep by unknown
assailants. A guard also was killed in the attack. Haq was well known
for his efforts to promote an intra-Afghan dialog; his brother was a
former governor in Afghanistan who has joined forces with Ahmad Shah
Masood against the Taliban. On March 27, Mohammed Jehanzeb, the
secretary of Abdul Haq's brother (and Taliban opponent) Haji Qadir, was
shot and killed by unknown assailants in Peshawar. On July 14 former
Afghan senator Abdul Ahad Karzai was shot and killed by two gunmen
while returning home from prayers at a local mosque in Quetta. Between
January 1998 and January 1999, it was estimated that up to 12 Afghan
moderates or former members of the Communist Party were killed by
unknown assailants (see Section 2.d.). Among those reported killed were
Dagarwal Basir, General Nazar Mohammed, Dagarwal Latif, Hashim
Paktyanai, General Shirin Agha, and General Rahim. To date, there have
been no arrests or convictions in connection with these killings.
In May heavy fighting broke out between Indian forces and Kashmiri
militants in the Kargil sector of Indian-held Kashmir. Regular
Pakistani forces also were involved in this engagement, which did not
end until Pakistani forces withdrew in July. Tension along the line of
control was high during this period, and there was shelling in several
sectors. On June 10, the Pakistani army returned the bodies of six
Indian soldiers, which bore signs of severe torture; however, the
International Committee of the Red Cross declined an invitation to do
an autopsy. A senior police official in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir
estimated that approximately 40 civilians were killed on the Pakistani
side of the line of control.
b. Disappearance.--There were no confirmed cases of politically
motivated disappearances. Those killed in intra-Mohajir violence in
Karachi sometimes are first held briefly by opposing groups (or, as the
MQM-Altaf alleges, by security forces) and tortured. However, bodies of
these victims, often mutilated, generally are dumped in the street soon
after the victims are abducted; however, the incidence of such crimes
decreased greatly during year.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--The Constitution and the Penal Code expressly forbid
torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment; however,
police regularly torture, beat, and otherwise abuse persons. Police
routinely use force to elicit confessions; however, there were fewer
such reports during the year than in previous years, particularly in
Sindh after the coup, and human rights organizations reported greater
cooperation from the police in investigating such cases than in
previous years. Human rights observers suggest that because of the
widespread use of physical torture by the police, suspects usually
confess to crimes regardless of their guilt or innocence; the courts
subsequently throw out many such confessions.
Common torture methods include: beating; burning with cigarettes;
whipping the soles of the feet; sexual assault; prolonged isolation;
electric shock; denial of food or sleep; hanging upside down; forced
spreading of the legs with bar fetters; and public humiliation. Some
magistrates help cover up the abuse by issuing investigation reports
stating that the victims died of natural causes.
Torture by the police of persons in custody occurs throughout the
country. Police tortured or mistreated prisoners considered to be
opponents or critics of the Sharif Government. On January 4, Senator
Aftab Sheikh and other MQM officials visited two MQM members of the
provincial assembly at Karachi central prison, including former Labor
Minister Shoaib Bukhari. The parliamentarians accused the police of
torturing and humiliating them for 10 days after their arrest on
November 20, 1998. The prisoners claimed that they had been struck with
rifle butts, slapped, stripped naked, and forced to stand continuously
for up to 36 hours. Seventy prisoners awaiting or undergoing trial at
Karachi prison, all MQM members, charged that they had been arrested
illegally and tortured to induce confessions. Family members alleged
that they also often had been beaten in raids, and that relatives had
been taken as hostage for those whom the police sought.
Opposition leader Hussain Haqqani alleged that he was tortured,
beaten, and subjected to psychological abuse during his incarceration
by the Intelligence Bureau between May 4 and May 7. Haqqani was
arrested on previous dormant corruption charges; he claimed that this
was a pretext for his arrest. Records of a medical examination
conducted by the High Court after Haqqani's interrogation subsequently
were ``lost'' by authorities. Haqqani was transferred to the Federal
Investigative Agency (FIA) on May 7, but remained incarcerated for 2\1/
2\ months. During the May 8 arrest of journalist Najam Sethi, Sethi's
wife reportedly was tied up by police (see Section 2.a.).
In May Asif Zardari, husband of former Pakistan People's Party
(PPP) Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, was taken from prison to a police
interrogation center in Karachi, where he was kept awake for 4 days,
beaten, and cut with knives. On May 19, he was taken to a hospital for
treatment. Observers doubted police claims that cuts on his neck were
the result of a suicide attempt. In August the secretary general of the
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) noted in a public statement that the
IPU was ``alarmed'' over the alleged torture of Zardari.
Despite some cases during the year in which police officers were
investigated or charged in connection with abuse of detainees, the
failure of successive governments effectively to prosecute and to
punish abusers is the single greatest obstacle to ending or reducing
the incidence of abuse by the police. The authorities sometimes
transferred, suspended, or arrested offending officers, but seldom
prosecuted or punished them. Investigating officers generally shield
their colleagues. Amnesty International (AI) estimates that at least
100 persons die from police torture each year. The failure to prosecute
and punish abusers in a timely fashion was one of the chief arguments
used by the Government in introducing the 15th Amendment designed to
enforce Shari'a law throughout the country in 1998.
The 1997 Anti-Terrorism Act allowed confessions obtained while in
police custody to be used to convict defendants in the new ``special
courts.'' Human rights organizations and the press criticized this
provision of the law, as it commonly is believed that the police
regularly torture suspects. Police generally did not attempt to use
confessions to secure convictions under this law and the Government
agreed to amend the law after the Supreme Court in 1998 invalidated
this and other sections of the Anti-Terrorist Act.
Due to greater scrutiny by NGO's and the media, as well as a
program of prison inspections in the Punjab, the incidence of torture
and abuse may be decreasing in prisons. In Karachi human rights groups
are active in particular cases and the Citizens Police Liaison
Committee (CPLC) has been effective in bringing cases against police
who make false arrests, practice torture, or take bribes. Cooperation
between the CPLC and the police human rights complaint cell resulted in
the dismissal of 216 policemen and demotion or fines for 1,226 during
the 9 months between November 1998 and July 1999.
Corruption is an endemic problem among local police officers.
Police and prison officials frequently use the threat of abuse to
extort money from prisoners and their families. Police accept money for
registration of cases on false charges and maytorture innocent
citizens. Persons pay police to humiliate their opponents and to avenge
their personal grievances.
In the past, successive governments recruited police officers in
violation of considerations of merit and the department's regulations.
In some instances, recruits had criminal records. In 1997 Punjab
province Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif declared that his own police
were ``corrupt and inefficient.'' He appointed new senior officials to
improve effectiveness, while resisting pressure to appoint those
recommended by influential supporters to police positions. In an
attempt to increase police professionalism, a Punjab elite police
training academy was established in November 1997 and began training
hundreds of constables. It is widely acknowledged that police
corruption is most serious at the level of the Station House Officer
(SHO), the official who runs each individual precinct. In 1998, 300 new
SHO's recruited on merit were due to begin a long-delayed 20-month
special training course. If they are allowed to replace corrupt SHO's,
observers believe that they might improve police performance greatly.
However, SHO's are very powerful (it is suspected that some have killed
senior police officers that were trying to inhibit their corruption),
and observers question whether their replacement is feasible.
It is accepted commonly, and high-ranking government officials have
stated publicly, that police stations are sold--meaning that police
officials pay bribes to politicians and senior officials in the
department in order to get posted to the police stations of their
choice. The police then recoup their investment by extorting money from
the citizenry.
Even when actions are taken to address police abuses, the results
are often mixed. In urban Sindh, the operation of citizen-police
liaison committees helped to curb some police excesses, but there are
still many complaints of police abuse.
Special women's police stations were established in 1994 in
response to growing numbers of complaints of custodial abuse of women,
including rape. These police stations are staffed by female personnel,
but receive even less material and human resources than regular police
stations, according to human rights advocates. According to the
government's own Commission of Inquiry for Women, the stations do not
function independently or fulfill their purpose. Despite court orders
and regulations requiring that female suspects be interrogated only by
female police officers, women continued to be detained overnight at
regular police stations and abused by male officers. In a study of
Lahore newspapers from January to May 1999, the Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan found 11 cases of violence, rape, or torture of women while
in police custody. In August 1998, ``Nasreen'' accused the SHO of
Lahore's Mozang police station of raping her after she visited the
station to register a complaint against her in-laws. At the end of
1998, the case was under internal investigation by Lahore police; the
disposition of the case was unknown at year's end. Instances of abuse
of women in prisons are less frequent than in police stations. Sexual
abuse of child detainees by police or guards is reportedly a problem as
well.
The Hudood Ordinances, promulgated by the central martial law
government in 1979, were an attempt to make the Penal Code more
Islamic. These ordinances provide for harsh punishments for violations
of Shari'a (Islamic law), including death by stoning for unlawful
sexual relations and amputation for some other crimes. These severe
Koranic penalties--known as Hadd punishments--require a high standard
of evidence. In effect, four adult Muslim men of good character must
witness an act for a Hadd punishment to apply. In 20 years, not a
single Hadd punishment has been carried out. However, on the basis of
lesser evidence, ordinary punishments such as jail terms or fines are
imposed. From 1979 to 1995, over 1 million Hudood cases were filed with
the police, and 300,000 have been heard by the courts. The laws are
applied to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
Women frequently are charged under the Hudood laws on sexual
misconduct, such as adultery. Approximately one-third of the women in
jails in Lahore, Peshawar, and Mardan in 1998 were awaiting trial for
adultery. Most women tried under the ordinance are acquitted, but the
stigma of having been jailed for adultery is severe. A Hudood law meant
to deter false accusations is enforced weakly, and one human rights
monitor has claimed that 80 percent of all adultery-related Hudood
cases are filed without any supporting evidence. According to Amnesty
International, men accused of rape sometimes are acquitted and released
while their victims are held on adultery charges. The Commission of
Inquiry for Women has recommended that the Hudoodlaws be repealed, as
they are based on an erroneous interpretation of Shari'a (see Section
5).
The Federal Crimes Regulation (FCR), which applies in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), allows the punishment of relatives,
friends, and neighbors of suspects. Authorities are empowered to
blockade villages or to detain fellow members of a fugitive's tribe in
order to obtain the surrender of a fugitive. In December 1998, a
Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-Tulaba, an extremist Islamic
group in Orakzai Tribal Agency, fined six alleged accomplices to a
killing and burned down their homes as punishment (see Sections 1.e.
and 1.f.).
Police routinely use excessive force against demonstrators or
strikers. In February police forcibly dispersed a demonstration in
Lahore staged by the Jamaat-i-Islami. Police with batons charged
demonstrators and fired tear gas shells into the party's Lahore
offices. On September 11, police reportedly used force to break up a
demonstration by a coalition of opposition groups in Karachi, and the
headquarters of two major opposition parties, the MQM and the PPP,
reportedly were damaged. On September 12, police used water cannons,
teargas, and sticks to break up a PPP-organized sit-in in Karachi. In
mid-October, the press reported that police used force to break up a
rally in support of former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif; more than one
dozen protestors reportedly were arrested in Karachi on October 14. On
December 11, police used force to disperse a demonstration in Lahore
that was held to protest the handling of a serial murder case by the
police. Police charged the crowd, beat persons with batons, and
arrested 30 persons.
Police at times also beat and arrested journalists. For example,
during a December 11 protest against the handling of a criminal case in
Lahore, the police beat press photographers and smashed their cameras
after photographers reportedly recognized a plainclothes policeman, who
was hurling bricks into the crowd.
Police authorities failed in some instances to protect members of
religious minorities--particularly Ahmadis and Christians--from
societal attacks (see Section 5).
On January 3, several persons were injured when a bomb placed under
a bridge outside of Lahore exploded, in what was believed to be an
assassination attempt against Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif (see Section
1.a.). On September 6, an explosion in a madrassah in Karachi injured
more than 20 persons; those injured had rushed to the scene of a
previous explosion, in which there were no injuries. On April 17,
unidentified men threw small explosives at the home of the Army Corps
Commander in Peshawar, injuring five guards. On November 12, a series
of rocket attacks in Islamabad injured one person. There were several
other bombings during the year, some of which resulted in injuries. The
perpetrators of most such bombings were unknown at year's end.
Prison conditions are extremely poor. Overcrowding is a major
problem. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP),
there are currently 82,000 prisoners in Pakistani jails, which have an
officially authorized population of 35,833; most prisoners are held in
severely overcrowded conditions. In September an investigative reporter
for The Nation visited Adiala jail in Rawalpindi. According to the
reporter, the prison currently holds 4,277 prisoners but was built for
2,000. A press survey in July revealed that the 16 jails of Sindh
province, with a total capacity of 7,769 prisoners, were actually
housing over 14,000. Karachi central prison is the most overcrowded,
with a population of 4,460 prisoners and a capacity for only 991; only
2 toilets are available for each 100 prisoners in the lowest
classification of cells. The HRCP claims that the Lahore district jail,
built to house 1,045 prisoners, contains 3,200. The Punjab Home
Department admitted before the Lahore High Court in July that over
50,000 prisoners were being held in Punjabi jails meant for 17,271. The
department claimed that it had plans on the books to build new jails in
22 district and subdivisional headquarters, but that the work had been
delayed by financial constraints. Some 80 percent of prisoners are
``awaiting trial,'' mostly for petty offenses.
Prisoners in jail routinely are shackled. The principal of the
institute for jail staff training in Lahore admitted in a July press
interview that fettering is the most convenient way of administering an
overcrowded jail. While the Pakistan Prison Act of 1894 permits
fettering for a variety of offenses, the punishment is usually given
for administrative convenience, or to extract bribes from prisoners.
(The shackles used are tight, heavy, and painful, and reportedly have
led to gangrene andamputation in several cases.) Although the Sindh
High Court ruled the practice illegal in 1993, the practice continues,
and outside observers visiting Sindhi jails regularly see fettered
prisoners.
There are three classes (A, B, and C) of prison facilities. Class
``C'' cells generally hold common criminals and those in pretrial
detention. Such cells often have dirt floors, no furnishings, and poor
food. Prisoners in these cells reportedly suffer the most abuse, such
as beatings and being forced to kneel for long periods. In 1998, the
Senate's Committee on Human Rights reported to the Prime Minister that
at one facility in Hyderabad, 60 prisoners were confined in a space 100
feet by 30 feet with only 1 latrine. Such unsanitary conditions are
common in small, poorly ventilated, and decrepit colonial-era prisons.
Inadequate food, often consisting of only a few pieces of bread, leads
to chronic malnutrition for those unable to supplement their diet with
help from family or friends. Access to medical care is a problem.
Mentally ill prisoners usually are not provided with adequate treatment
and often are not segregated from the general prison population.
Foreign prisoners often remain in prison long after their sentences are
completed because there is no one to pay for their deportation to their
home country. Conditions in ``B'' and ``A'' cells are markedly better
than in ``C'' cells. Prisoners in ``A'' cells are permitted to have
servants, special food, and televisions. The authorities reserve ``A''
cells for prominent persons. Especially prominent individuals--
including some political figures--sometimes are held under house arrest
and permitted to receive visitors.
The Government permits prison visits by human rights monitors.
Landlords in rural Sindh and political factions in Karachi operated
private jails (see Section 1.d.).
On June 10, during the Kargil conflict, the Pakistani army returned
the bodies of six Indian soldiers, which bore signs of severe torture;
however, the International Committee of the Red Cross declined an
invitation to do an autopsy (see Section 1.a.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--The law regulates arrest
and detention procedures; however, the authorities do not always comply
with the law and police arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. The
law permits a Deputy Commissioner (DC) of a local district to order
detention without charge for 30 days of persons suspected of
threatening public order and safety. The DC may renew detention in 30-
day increments, up to a total of 90 days. Human rights monitors report
instances in which prisoners jailed under the Maintenance of Public
Order Act have been imprisoned for up to 6 months without charge. For
other criminal offenses, the police may hold a suspect for 24 hours
without charge. After the prisoner is produced before a magistrate, the
court can grant permission for continued detention for a maximum period
of 14 days if the police provide material proof that this is necessary
for an investigation.
Police may arrest individuals on the basis of a First Incident
Report (FIR) filed by a complainant. The police have been known to file
FIR's without supporting evidence. FIR's frequently are used to harass
or intimidate individuals. Charges against an individual also may be
based on a ``blind'' FIR, which lists the perpetrators as ``person or
persons unknown.'' If the case is not solved, the FIR is placed in the
inactive file. When needed, a FIR is reactivated and taken to a
magistrate by the police, who then name a suspect and ask that the
suspect be remanded for 14 days while they investigate further. After
14 days, the case is dropped for lack of evidence, but then another FIR
is activated and brought against the accused. In this manner, rolling
charges can be used to hold a suspect in continuous custody.
If the police can provide material proof that detention (physical
remand or police custody for the purpose of interrogation) is necessary
for an investigation, a court may extend detention for a total of 14
days. However, such proof may be little more than unsubstantiated
assertions by the police. In practice the authorities do not fully
observe the limits on detention. Police are not required to notify
anyone when an arrest is made and often hold detainees without charge
until a court challenges them. The police sometimes detain individuals
arbitrarily without charge or on false charges, in order to extort
payment for their release. Human rights monitors report that a number
of police stations have secretdetention cells in which individuals are
kept while the police bargain for a higher price for their release.
There are also reports that the police move prisoners from one police
station to another if they suspect a surprise visit by higher
authorities. Some women continue to be detained arbitrarily and
sexually abused (see Section 1.c.). Police also detain relatives of
wanted criminals in order to compel suspects to surrender (see Section
1.f.). Police have been known to detain persons in connection with
personal vendettas.
The law stipulates that detainees must be brought to trial within
30 days of their arrest. However, in many cases, trials do not start
until 6 months after the filing of charges. In 1998 the Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan estimated that there were almost as many
individuals awaiting trial in jails as there were prisoners. According
to the chief justice of the Lahore High Court, there were over 500,000
civil and criminal cases backlogged in the province's subordinate court
system as of April. In 62 Lahore city courts, 7,000 prisoners are
awaiting trial in 6,000 cases. In 3,500 of these cases, the police have
not even brought a ``challan,'' or indictment, to the court. In 1997
the Government justified the creation of antiterrorist courts by citing
the large number of murder and other cases that are clogging the
regular court system (see Section 1.e.).
Asif Zardari, husband of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, has
waited for over 2 years for his trial on charges of killing his
brother-in-law, Murtaza Bhutto, to begin. Charges were first filed
against Zardari in July 1997 and transferred successively to two
different courts, where several judges refused to preside. To date only
2 of 223 witnesses have been heard.
The Government permits visits by human rights monitors, family
members, and lawyers. However, in some cases, authorities refuse family
visits and in some police stations, persons are expected to pay bribes
in order to visit a prisoner. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) have a separate legal system, the Frontier Crimes Regulation,
which recognizes the doctrine of collective responsibility. Authorities
are empowered to detain fellow members of a fugitive's tribe, or to
blockade the fugitive's village, pending his surrender or punishment by
his own tribe in accordance with local tradition. The Government
continued to exercise such authority, repeatedly, during the year.
Roman Ali, arrested in 1993 at the age of 12 for his fugitive elder
brother's crimes, was sentenced to a long prison term in 1994. In 1996,
a petition against this sentence in the Peshawar High Court was
dismissed. During the year, Ali's appeal to the Secretary of the Home
Department was denied, and his appeal to the Supreme Court was not
heard due to the Court's lack of jurisdiction over the case.
The Government sometimes uses mass arrests to quell possible civil
unrest. In April approximately 600 PPP members were arrested prior to a
planned May 1 demonstration in Islamabad against former prime minister
Benazir Bhutto's April conviction on corruption charges and
disqualification from holding public office. Most were released on May
2. Early on July 28, police tore down antigovernment posters and
arrested MQM legislators and activists to halt a peaceful hunger strike
being conducted in front of the Karachi Press Club. Most of those
arrested were released quickly, and the protest was resumed a few hours
later. In August and September, police arrested as many as 2,500
activists from the PPP and the Muttahida Quami Movement in Karachi and
other parts of Sindh province in anticipation of a September 4
opposition rally. Several hundred more, including several senior
opposition leaders and parliamentarians, were arrested several days
later prior to an opposition demonstration in Karachi. On September 11,
police reportedly used force to end a demonstration by a coalition of
opposition groups in Karachi; police publicly reported arresting 107
persons in connection with the demonstration, but other reliable
estimates place the number arrested at 600 or more. Police detained
hundreds of MQM and PPP activists and senior leaders prior to a banned
opposition march planned for September 25, as well as in the days
immediately after it was to have occurred. Among those detained was MQM
Senator Nasreen Jalil, who was arrested at her home on September 24 and
held incommunicado for several days (see Section 2.b.) until her
release on September 29. Also in September, the Government placed
Fazlur Rehman, the leader of one faction of the religious party Jamiat
Ulema-i-Islami, under house arrest to prevent him from traveling to the
NWFP tribal areas to attend a political rally. Rehman previously had
traveled frequently to the region to attend rallies, which are
prohibited in the tribal areas. Rehman was released after 3 days (see
Sections 2.a., 2.b., and 2.d.). In early October, hundreds of religious
extremists, including the leader of theSipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Maulana
Muhammad Azam Tariq, and SSP branch president Maulana Mohammad Ahmad
Ludhianvi, were arrested after a wave of sectarian violence broke out
in Punjab and Sindh. However, since the coup, there have been reports
that arrests of political activists have decreased.
The Sharif Government's ``accountability cell,'' which ostensibly
was created to uncover corruption in an evenhanded manner, was headed
by a close associate of the Prime Minister, Senator Saifur Rehman, and
conducted politically driven investigations of, and campaigns of
vilification against, opposition politicians, senior civil servants,
and business figures. These investigations were designed to extract
evidence and in some cases, the televised confessions of alleged
wrongdoers. Rehman may have arranged for the arrest of Hussain Haqqani
and Najam Sethi (see Section 2.a.). However, before the coup, most
politicians and bureaucrats who had been charged with corruption or
other crimes were out on bail. In 1998, authorities arrested and
questioned the wife and daughter of former Pakistan Steel executive
Usman Farooqi in an attempt to pressure the already-imprisoned Farooqi.
At year's end, Farooqi remained in detention. In 1998 in an effort to
compel a former bureaucrat to return to Pakistan, the Government
prevented the departure of family members, even those who were not
citizens of Pakistan, on the grounds that they were ``beneficiaries''
of alleged corruption. In July 1998, the Lahore High Court ruled that
this approach was invalid.
In several high-profile arrests of Sharif Government critics, the
police or intelligence services entered homes and arrested individuals
without warrants or due process and held them for periods of days or
weeks. On May 4, Intelligence Bureau officials arrested opposition
leader and journalist Hussain Haqqani without a warrant and held him
incommunicado until May 7 without filing charges (see Section 1.c.). On
May 8, approximately 30 policemen broke into Friday Times editor Najam
Sethi's home, beat him, tied up his wife, destroyed property, and took
Sethi away without warrant. According to press reports, Sethi was
interrogated by the intelligence services as a suspected ``espionage
agent.'' Sethi was held incommunicado for several days and denied
access to an attorney (see Section 2.a.).
On occasion, persons are detained arbitrarily because of disputes
with powerful or well-connected persons. On January 28, Humaira Mahmood
and her husband Mahmood Butt were detained without a warrant by Punjab
police at the Karachi airport (in Sindh province), as they were trying
to leave the country. Mahmood Butt's mother was also detained. In 1997
the couple had married against the wishes of Humaira's father, Abbas
Khokar, a member of the Punjab Provincial Assembly (see Section 5).
Mahmood and her husband reportedly were taken separately to Lahore,
where they were detained separately and were beaten in an attempt to
force them to renounce their marriage. On February 1, the pair appeared
in court in Lahore. After the hearing, Mahmood Butt and his mother were
released by court order; Humaira was released by court order on
February 18.
The Musharraf Government detained without a warrant and without
charge several dozen political figures, military officers, government
administrators, and Sharif family members following the October 12
coup. Nawaz Sharif and members of his family, including Punjab chief
minister Shahbaz Sharif; most of the Cabinet; several senior advisors
to the Prime Minister or to the Government; and a number of military
and police officials were arrested or placed under house arrest
immediately following the coup. Nawaz Sharif was held incommunicado
from the time of his arrest until he was brought to court on November
18. Most others were released within a few days; however, at year's
end, 32 were estimated to remain in custody. Many of those arrested
immediately after the coup were held incommunicado. Former Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother, former Punjab chief minister
Shahbaz Sharif, were held incommunicado in Chaklala, Rawalpindi; many
other Sharif family members were held with limited outside contact in
``protective custody'' in the Sharif estate outside of Lahore following
the coup. The oldest son of Nawaz Sharif, Hussain Sharif, reportedly
was held incommunicado, except for one occasion on which he was allowed
access to counsel, in solitary confinement from October 12 until a
court-ordered visit with his wife on December 11. Other Sharif family
members still in detention at year's end included Nawaz Sharif's father
Mian Mohammad Sharif; his brother Abbas Sharif; his son-in-law Captain
Safdar; his nephew Hamza Shahbaz (son of Shahbaz Sharif), and his
brother-in-law Chaudhry Sher Ali. Former Information Minister Mushahid
Hussain was kept in ``protective custody,'' along with his family, at
his residence in Islamabad from October 12 until December 14, when he
was removed bymilitary officers from his home and taken to a government
guest house in Islamabad. He then was held incommunicado by the
military until December 24, when he was allowed to meet with his family
under a court order.
Several key figures among those initially arrested without charge,
including Nawaz Sharif, were being held in connection with the
``hijacking'' of General Musharraf's airplane on October 12. On that
day, General Musharraf was returning from a conference in Sri Lanka,
and the commercial aircraft in which he was flying initially was denied
permission to land in Karachi, purportedly under orders from Prime
Minister Sharif. This event, along with Sharif's summary replacement of
General Musharraf with the Director General of the Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate, Khawaja Ziauddin, led to the coup. Military
officers took over the airport in Karachi and allowed Musharraf's
airplane to land. In the weeks following Sharif's arrest, he was
detained without charge and was denied access to counsel and to family
members (see Sections 1.d. and 1.e.). A First Incident Report was not
filed in the case until November 10. The FIR charged Sharif with
attempted murder, hijacking, and criminal conspiracy. Former Sharif
advisor Ghous Ali Shah, former Pakistan International Airlines (PIA)
chairman Shahid Khaqan Abbasi, former Director of Civil Aviation
Aminullah Chaudhary, and former Inspector General of Police Rana
Maqbool were charged along with Sharif. The accused were to be tried
before an antiterrorism court. Nawaz Sharif was formally arrested and
remanded to police custody only after being brought to Karachi on
November 18. On November 19, Sharif first appeared in an antiterrorism
court in Karachi. On November 26, three other individuals--former
Punjab chief minister Shahbaz Sharif, former Senator Saifur Rehman, and
former secretary to the Prime Minister Saeed Mehdi--were named
codefendants in the case. Sharif complained of ``inhumane'' treatment
during his incarceration, including being held incommunicado in a
cramped cell. On November 29, the judge in the case ordered him
transferred to an ``A'' class cell. Following changes in the
Antiterrorism Act (see Section 1.e.), the formal filing of charges
(challan) against Nawaz Sharif occurred on December 8. Nawaz Sharif and
his brother Shahbaz Sharif were paroled briefly on December 15 and
flown by the authorities to Lahore, the day after the death of Nawaz
Sharif's mother-in-law.
Although many of those detained immediately following the coup were
released in the days afterwards or subsequently were charged through
the court system, several individuals remained in custody without
charge. As of year's end, former ministers Muhammed Ishaq Dar, Sayed
Mushahid Hussain, and Chaudry Nisar Ali Khan; former Director General
of the Inter-Services Intelligence Bureau Khawaja Ziauddin; Mujibur
Rehman, brother of Saifur Rehman; former Director General of the
Federal Investigative Agency Mohammed Mushtaq; and several other
officials and members of Parliament or provincial assemblies apparently
still were detained without charge.
Private jails are believed to exist in tribal and feudal areas.
Human rights groups allege that as many as 50 private jails, housing
some 4,500 bonded laborers, were being maintained by landlords in lower
Sindh. Some prisoners reportedly have been held for many years. In the
five districts of upper Sindh, landlords have been defying the courts
and police by holding tribal jirgas, which settle feuds and award fines
as well as the death penalty--even in jails--in defiance of provincial
laws. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan and the district
administration in Umerkot, Sindh, attempted in April to the release of
a family of agricultural workers from their landlord's private jail in
Kunri. A member of the family, Mangal Bheel, escaped from the prison in
January, and approached authorities for help.
The Government does not use forced exile.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Until the October coup, the
Constitution provided for an independent judiciary; however, in
practice, the judiciary was subject to political influence under the
Sharif Government. A series of events in 1997 led to serious concerns
about the prestige and independence of the judiciary under the Sharif
Government. However, under Sharif the Supreme Court demonstrated a
continued degree of independence on a number of occasions. For example,
the Supreme Court ruled in February that the military courts used to
try certain civilian cases were unconstitutional. After the coup, the
Musharraf regime pledged to respect the independence of the judicial
system, despite having suspended the Constitution; however, Provisional
Constitution Order Number 1, issued on October 14, provided thatall
courts functioning at the time of the change in government would
continue to operate, but that no court would have the power to issue
orders against General Musharraf or any person exercising powers or
jurisdiction under his authority, thereby effectively removing the
actions of the Musharraf regime from judicial oversight. However, by
year's end the Musharraf regime had not acted to limit the judiciary.
On November 15, PML legislator Zafar Ali Shah filed a petition with the
Supreme Court challenging the October 12 coup. At year's end, the
Supreme Court was scheduled to hear arguments about the legality of the
military takeover on January 31, 2000. Under both Governments low
salaries, inadequate resources, heavy workloads, and corruption
contribute to judicial inefficiency, particularly in the lower courts.
The judicial system involves several different court systems with
overlapping and sometimes competing jurisdictions. There are civil and
criminal systems with special courts for banking, antinarcotics and
antiterrorist cases, as well as the federal Shariat Court for certain
Hudood offenses. The Hudood ordinances criminalize nonmarital rape,
extramarital sex (including adultery and fornication), and various
gambling, alcohol, and property offenses. The appeals process in the
civil system is: civil court; district court; High Court; and the
Supreme Court. In the criminal system, the progression is magistrate,
sessions court, High Court, and the Supreme Court.
The judiciary has argued that it has not been able to try and
convict terrorist suspects in a timely manner because of poor police
casework, prosecutorial negligence, and the resulting lack of evidence.
In response to this problem, the Sharif Government passed the Anti-
Terrorist Act in 1997; special antiterrorist courts began operation in
August 1997. The antiterrorist courts, designed for the speedy
punishment of terrorist suspects, have special streamlined procedures
but due to continued terrorist intimidation of witnesses, police, and
judges, produced only a handful of convictions of terrorist suspects in
1998. Under the Anti-Terrorist Act, terrorist killings are punishable
by death and any act, including speech, intended to stir up religious
hatred is punishable by up to 7 years' rigorous imprisonment. Cases are
to be decided within 7 working days, but judges are free to extend the
period of time as conditions require. Trials in absentia were
permitted, then subsequently prohibited in October 1998. Appeals to an
appellate tribunal also were required to take no more than 7 days, but
appellate authority since has been restored to the High and Supreme
Courts, under which these time limits do not apply. Under the
Antiterrorist Act, bail is not to be granted if the court has
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is guilty. Because of
the law's bail provisions, Islamic scholar Yusuf Ali was unable to
obtain bail. After the suspension of this provision, judges continued
to avoid hearing his bail application. He was held in a ``C'' class
cell from March 1997 until his release in June.
Leading members of the judiciary, human rights groups, the press,
and politicians from a number of parties expressed strong reservations
about the antiterrorist courts, charging that they constitute a
parallel judicial system and could be used as tools of political
repression. Government officials and police believed that the deterrent
effect of the act's death penalty provisions contributed significantly
to a reduction in sectarian terror after its passage. The antiterrorist
courts also are empowered to try persons accused of particularly
``heinous'' crimes, such as gang rape and child killings, and several
convicts have been executed under these provisions. In 1997 cases filed
under section 295(a) of the Penal Code (one of the so-called blasphemy
laws) were transferred to the antiterrorist courts. Human rights
advocates feared that if blasphemy cases were tried in the
antiterrorist courts, alleged blasphemers, who in the past normally
were granted bail or released for lack of evidence were likely to be
convicted, given the less stringent rules of evidence required under
the Anti-Terrorism Act.
In November 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the
establishment of military courts in Karachi, which had been under
Governor's Rule since October 1998. These courts were to try cases
involving heinous acts and terrorism, which the Government stated were
a serious challenge to public authority that the existing court system
was inadequate to address. They were intended to bring swifter justice
to the city, which had been plagued by terrorism, violence, and a
general breakdown in law and order. Military courts began operating in
December 1998. In January the Supreme Court ruled in an interim
decision that military trial courts could not impose the death penalty.
On February 17, the Supreme Court ruled that the military courts were
unconstitutional and ordered the establishment of additional
antiterrorist courts; however, it allowed thesentences already handed
down by the military courts to stand. The antiterrorist courts were to
operate under the supervision of two Supreme Court justices, and both
courts of first instance and appellate courts were to render decisions
within 7 days; in practice, this did not occur. In response, on April
27, the Sharif Government promulgated an ordinance transferring cases
from military trial courts to antiterrorist courts and expanded the
jurisdiction to cover the same types of offenses as the military
courts, including murder, gang rape, and child molestation. Various
``civil commotion'' offenses (including writing graffiti and putting up
wall posters) also were added to the jurisdiction of the antiterrorist
courts. In August the Sharif Government again promulgated the April
antiterrorism ordinance but dropped the injunctions against graffiti
and wall posters. The April ordinance made strikes and go-slows illegal
as ``civil commotion'' offenses; both were punishable by incarceration
and fine (see Section 2.b. and Section 6). Prior to August, some
opposition leaders and members of the human rights community feared
that the ``civil commotion'' offenses would be used to suppress
political dissent. In the first 7 months of the year, the military
trial courts, which operated until mid-February, sentenced two persons
to death in Sindh, and antiterrorism courts subsequently sentenced 42
persons to death in the same province. Two of the sentences have been
carried out and the rest are on appeal. On December 2, the Musharraf
Government again modified the ATA provisions, by adding a number of
additional offenses to the ATA, including acts to outrage religious
feelings; efforts to ``wage war against the state''; conspiracy; acts
committed in abetting an offense; and kidnaping or abduction to confine
a person. By ordinance the Musharraf regime created a special
antiterrorist court in Sindh presided over by a High Court justice
rather than a lower level judge, as is usually the case. The amended
provision permits the High Court justice to ``transfer . . . any case
pending before any other special court . . . and try the case'' in his
court. Supporters of Nawaz Sharif maintained that these changes were
designed to assist the Musharraf regime with its prosecution of Sharif.
The Musharraf regime also established special courts to deal with
``accountability,'' or corruption, cases. On November 16, the Musharraf
regime created by ordinance a National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and
special accountability courts to try corruption cases. The NAB was
given broad powers to prosecute such cases, and the accountability
courts were expected to try cases within 30 days. The ordinance allows
those suspected of defaulting on government loans or of corrupt
practices to be detained for 90 days without charge and, prior to being
charged, does not allow access to counsel. The NAB was created in part
to deal with as much as $4 billion (approximately PRs 208 billion) that
it is estimated is owed to the country's banks (all of which are state-
owned) by debtors, mainly from among the wealthy elite. It was believed
that many wealthy and politically well connected persons had taken out
bank loans over the years with no intention of repaying them. The NAB
has stated that it would not target genuine business failures or small
defaulters and does not appear to have done so. In accountability
cases, there is a presumption of guilt, and conviction under the
ordinance can result in 14 years' imprisonment; fines; and confiscation
of property. Those convicted also are disqualified from running for
office or holding office for 21 years. According to unconfirmed press
reports, the Musharraf regime made an informal decision that the
military and the judiciary would not fall under the jurisdiction of the
NAB. The Musharraf regime denied this. However, by year's end, no
serving members of the military or the judiciary have been charged by
the NAB. On November 17, the day after General Musharraf's well-
publicized 4-week grace period to repay loans expired, the military
began arresting those suspected of defaulting on bank loans. Persons
were arrested throughout the country on default or corruption charges;
by year's end, it was estimated that at least 100 persons may have been
arrested on charges of defaulting on bank loans or corruption. Those
arrested were prominent persons, from across the business and political
spectrums; some were also retired military personnel and government
bureaucrats. Those included on a published list of persons charged with
corruption by the NAB included deposed Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and
former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. On December 27, former Punjab
chief minister Arif Nakai was disqualified from holding office for 21
years, after he admitted on December 18 that he took approximately
$37,000 (PRs 1.9 million) from official accounts to finance his
family's travel to Saudi Arabia. Nakai repaid the amount to the NAB.
Some persons expressed concern over the concentration of power in the
NAB, the fact that the NAB chairman is a member of the military, and
the presumption of guilt imposed on those tried for corruption.
The civil judicial system provides for an open trial, the
presumption of innocence, cross-examination by an attorney, and appeal
of sentences. Attorneys are appointed for indigents only in capital
cases. There are no injury trials. Due to the limited number of judges,
the heavy backlog of cases, and lengthy court procedures, cases
routinely take years, although defendants are required to make frequent
court appearances. Under both the Hudood and standard criminal codes,
there are bailable and nonbailable offenses. According to the Criminal
Procedures Code, the accused in bailable offenses must be granted bail.
The Code also stipulates that those accused in nonbailable offenses
should be granted bail if the crime of which they are accused carries a
sentence of less than 10 years. Many accused, especially well-connected
individuals who are made aware of impending warrants against them, are
able to obtain pre-arrest bail, and thus they are spared both arrest
and incarceration.
The federal Shariat Court and the Shari'a bench of the Supreme
Court severe as appellate courts for certain convictions in criminal
court under the Hudood ordinances. The federal Shariat Court also may
overturn any legislation judged to be inconsistent with the tenets of
Islam. However, these cases may be appealed to the Shari'a bench of the
Supreme Court. In two areas of NWFP--Malakand and Kohistan--Shari'a law
was instituted beginning in January, in the first by regulation and the
second by an ordinance. On September 20, a bill was passed by the NWFP
Assembly that incorporated the Kohistan ordinance into law; Shari'a law
now applies in Kohistan (see Section 2.c.).
The judicial process continued to be impeded by bureaucratic
inflighting, inactivity, and the overlapping jurisdictions of the
different court systems. Heavy backlogs that severely delayed the
application of justice remained, due to scores of unfilled judgeships
and to archaic and inefficient court procedures. The politicized
appointment process also holds up the promotion of many lower court
judges to the High Courts. Although the higheer level judiciary is
considered competent and generally honest, there are widespread reports
of corruption among lower level magistrates and minor functionaries.
On June 11, 16-year-old Mohammad Saleem was convicted by an
antiterrorist court of killing three police officers; however, Saleem
was tried and acquitted of the same charges by a court in January on
the grounds of insufficient evidence and lack of a motive.
On August 21, two MQM members, Mohammed Saleem and Ahmed Saeed,
were convicted in an antiterrorist court of the 1997 killings of two
foreign employees of Union Texas Petroleum and their driver. The two
were sentenced to death, as well as to and approximately $40,000 (PRs 2
million) in fines. Many questioned the fairness of the trial, since the
convictions were based largely on the confessions of the accused; the
confessions later were retracted on the grounds that they were obtained
by the police through the use of torture.
Persons in jail waiting trial sometimes are held for periods longer
than the sentence they would receive if convicted. Court officials
report that each judge reviews between 70 and 80 cases per day, but
that action is taken on only 3 or 4 each week. Eighty thousand criminal
cases were reported pending in Sindh at the end of 1997, 67,800 of
which were in Karachi. The Law Ministry, in reply to a question in the
National Assembly in 1997, reported that there were over 150,000 cases
pending with the superior judiciary, which includes the Supreme Court
and the four provincial High Courts. During the year, there are
approximately 125,000 cases pending. Clogged lower courts exacerbate
the situation; the majority of cases in the High Courts consist of
appeals of lower court rulings. Once an appeal reaches the High Court,
there are further opportunities for delay because decisions of
individual judges frequently are referred to panels composed of two or
three judges. There continued to be charges that magistrates and
police, under pressure to achieve high conviction rates, persuade
detainees to plead guilty without informing them of the consequences.
Politically powerful persons also attempt to influence magistrates'
decisions and have used various forms of pressure on magistrates,
including the threat to transfer them to other assignments.
Press reports in July noted that hundreds of prisoners remained in
the Karachi central prison after the competition of their sentences.
The Sindh Home Department stated that at least 10 percent of under-
trial prisoners in Karachi central prison had no access to free legal
aid or the possibility of bail, even if qualified. Reporters
interviewing male prisoners in 1 block discovered that 18 out of 110
prisoners, or 16 percent, were notrepresented by attorneys. As of
March, 6,000 cases were awaiting trial in 62 Lahore courts, with 7,000
prisoners awaiting a court date. In 3,500 of these cases, the police
have not yet submitted a ``challan,'' or indictment.
The Penal Code incorporates the doctrine of Qisas (roughly, an eye
for an eye) and Diyat (blood money). Qisas is not known to have been
invoked; however, the Penal Code's provision for Diyat occasionally is
applied, particularly in the NWFP, with the result that compensation is
sometimes paid to the family of a victim in place of punishment of the
wrongdoer. Under these ordinances only the family of the victim, not
the State, may pardon the defendant. The Hudood, Qisas, and Diyat
ordinances apply to both ordinary criminal courts and Shariat courts.
According to Christian activists, if a Muslim kills a non-Muslim, he
can compensate for the crime by paying the victim's family Diyat;
however, a non-Muslim does not have the option of paying Diyat and must
serve a jail sentence or face the death penalty for his crime. Failure
to pay Diyat in non-capital cases can result in indefinitely extended
incarceration, under Section 331 of the Diyat ordinance. In 1998 the
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan noted that there were 58
individuals still in prison after the completion of their jail terms
because they could not pay the Diyat. The HRCP made public the case of
one such convict, Nosheran Khan, in the NWFP. Khan has been in prison
since 1996 and cannot be released until he pays his Diyat fine of
approximately $3,843 (PRs 20,000).
Appeals of certain Hudood convictions involving penalties in excess
of 2 years' imprisonment are referred exclusively to the Shariat courts
and are heard jointly by Islamic scholars and High Court judges using
ordinary criminal procedures. Judges and attorneys must be Muslim and
be familiar with Islamic law. Within these limits, defendants in a
Shariat court are entitled to the lawyer of their choice. There is a
system of bail.
The Hudood ordinances criminalize nonmarital rape, extramarital sex
(including adultery and fornication), and various gambling, alcohol,
and property offenses. Offenses are distinguished according to
punishment, with some offenses liable to Hadd, or Koranic punishment
(see Section 1.c.), and others to Tazir, or secular punishment.
Although both types of cases are tried in ordinary criminal courts,
special, more stringent rules of evidence apply in Hadd cases; Hadd
punishments are mandatory if there is enough evidence to support them.
Hadd punishments regarding sexual offences are most severe for married
Muslims; for example, if a married Muslim man confesses to a rape or
there are four adult male Muslim witnesses to the act, the accused
rapist must be stoned to death; if the accused rapist is not Muslim
and/or married, if he confesses, or if the act is witnessed by 4 adult
males (not all Muslim), the accused must be sentenced to 100 lashes
with a whip, and such other punishment, including death, as the Court
may deem fit in the case. The testimony of four female witnesses, or
that of the victim alone, is insufficient to impose Hadd punishments.
If the evidence falls short of Hadd requirements, then the accused may
be sentenced to a lesser class of penalties (Tazir); since it is
difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to support the Hadd
punishments, most rape cases are tried at the Tazir level of evidence
and sentencing (under which a rapist may be sentenced to up to 25 years
in prison and 30 lashes). No Hadd punishment has ever been applied in
the 20 years that the Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir
punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim
offenders. Under Tazir the evidentiary requirement for financial or
future obligations is for two male witnesses or one male and two female
witnesses; in all other matters, the court may accept the testimony of
one man or one woman (see Section 5).
Administration of justice in the FATA is normally the
responsibility of tribal elders and maliks, or leaders. They may
conduct hearings according to Islamic law and tribal custom. In such
proceedings the accused have no right to legal representation, bail, or
appeal. The usual penalties consist of fines, even for murder. However,
the Government's political agents, who are federal civil servants
assigned to tribal agencies, oversee such proceedings and may impose
prison terms of up to 14 years. Paramilitary forces under the direction
of the political agents frequently perform punitive actions during
enforcement operations. For example in raids on criminal activities,
the authorities have been known to damage surrounding homes as
extrajudicial punishment of residents for having tolerated nearby
criminal activity (see Sections 1.c. and 1.f.).
In remote areas outside the jurisdiction of federal political
agents, tribal councils occasionally levy harsher, unsanctioned
punishments, including flogging or death by shooting or stoning.
For example, in May a local ``jirga,'' or council, sentenced a man
to death in Mohmand agency for the killing of relatives. The council
also expelled the man's brother from the area. In December 1998, a
Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-Tulaba, an extremist Islamic
group in Orakzai Tribal Agency, fined six alleged accomplices to a
killing and burned down their homes as punishment.
Another related form of rough justice operating in the NWFP,
particularly in the tribal areas, is the concept of Pakhtunwali, or the
Pakhtun Tribal Code, in which revenge is an important element. Under
this code, a man, his family, and his tribe are obligated to take
revenge for wrongs--either real or perceived--in order to redeem their
honor. More often than not, these disputes arise over women and land,
and frequently result in violence, such as the Samia Imran case (see
Section 5), in which a woman seeking a divorce against the wishes of
her husband and family was shot and killed in April in the office of
lawyer Hina Jilani, apparently at the behest of her family.
There are limited numbers of political prisoners. Certain sections
of the Penal Code directly target members of the Ahmadi faith. Since
they were adopted, Ahmadis incarcerated under these provisions number
approximately 200, according to Ahmadi sources. A number of minority
religious groups argue that other sections of the Penal Code--
particularly the related blasphemy laws--are used in a discriminatory
fashion by local officials or private individuals to punish religious
minorities. While precise numbers are unavailable, the Ahmadis estimate
that 61 of their coreligionists were charged in criminal cases ``on a
religious basis'' as of August (see Section 2.c. and Section 5).
Some political groups also argue that they are marked for arrest
based on their political affiliation. The Muttahida Quami Movement, in
particular, has argued that the Sharif Government has used
antiterrorist court convictions in Sindh to silence its activists.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government infringes on citizen's privacy rights.
The Anti-Terrorist Act allowed police, or military personnel acting as
police, to enter and to search homes and offices without search
warrants, and to confiscate property or arms likely to be used in a
terrorist act (which is defined very broadly). This provision was never
tested in the courts. While the Antiterrorist Act was partially
suspended in 1998, the Government promulgated new Antiterrorism
Ordinances in October 1998 and in April. By prior law, the police had
to obtain a warrant to search a house, but they did not need a warrant
to search a person. Regardless of the law, the police entered homes
without a warrant and have been known to steal valuables during
searches. In the absence of a warrant, a policeman is subject to
charges of criminal trespass. However, policemen seldom are punished
for illegal entry. In late September, the family members of persons
sought by the police in connection with a banned opposition march
reported forcible, warrantless searches of their homes (see Section
2.b.).
The Government maintains several domestic intelligence services
that monitor politicians, political activists, suspected terrorists,
and suspected foreign intelligence agents. Credible reports indicate
that the authorities routinely use wiretaps and intercept and open
mail. In his order dismissing former Prime Minister Bhutto in 1996,
President Leghari accused the Government of massive illegal
wiretapping, including eavesdropping on the telephone conversations of
judges, political party leaders, and military and civilian officials.
In 1997 the Supreme Court directed the federal Government to seek the
Court's permission before carrying out any future wiretapping or
eavesdropping operations. Nonetheless, that same year, a lawyer for a
former director of the Intelligence Bureau, charged with illegal
wiretapping during Benazir Bhutto's second term in office, presented
the Supreme Court with a list of 12 government agencies that still
tapped and monitored telephone calls of citizens. The case is pending
in the Supreme Court. A press story in October 1998 quoted anonymous
cabinet ministers who complained of wiretapping of their telephones by
the Intelligence Bureau.
Police sometimes arrest and detain relatives of wanted criminals in
an attempt to compel suspects to surrender. In some cases, the
authorities have detained entire families in order to force a relative
who was the subject of an arrest warrant to surrender (see Section
1.d.). In September two adult children of opposition party leaders were
arrested in Karachi when policecould not locate their parents in a
sweep conducted by police prior to a planned opposition march (see
Section 2.b.).
While the Government generally does not interfere with the right to
marry, the Government on occasion assists influential families in
efforts to prevent marriages entered into without the consent of the
families involved. For example, between December 1998 and February,
Punjabi police attempted to stop Humaira Mahmood and her husband
Mahmood Butt from living together as man and wife. The couple were
married legally in 1997, but Humaira's father, Abbas Khokar, a member
of the Punjab provincial assembly, did not approve of the marriage and
enlisted the police to help him prevent the pair from living together
once he discovered the marriage had taken place (see Section 5). In
July police in Kot Ghulam Mohammed (Mirpurkas district, Sindh) raided
the home of Javed Dal and arrested his family members as hostages. Dal
had eloped with his cousin. His wife's father, Somar Dal, used his
influence as a member of the Sindh National Front executive committee
to instigate the arrests, which were carried out without warrants (see
Section 5). The authorities also fail to prosecute vigorously cases in
which families punish members (generally women) for marrying or seeking
a divorce against the wishes of other family members, such as in the
case of Samia Imran, who had sought a divorce against the wishes of her
influential father and was killed in April, apparently at the behest of
the family (see Section 5).
Press reports routinely describe couples who are less fortunate,
such as Abdul Ghaffar and Shabana Bibi of Gila Deedar Singh, who were
abducted from a Gujranwala court on May 15 by 16 armed men representing
Shabana Bibi's parents, who opposed the match. At year's end, the
couple's fate was not known.
Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved (see
Sections 2.c.).
The Frontier Crimes Regulation, the separate legal system in the
FATA, permits collective responsibility, and empowers the authorities
to detain innocent members of the suspect's tribe, or blockade an
entire village (see Section 1.d.). The Government demolished the houses
of several alleged criminals, as well as the homes of those who
allegedly tolerated nearby criminal activity.
On December 13, a Shariat court established by the Tehrik-i-Tulaba,
an extremist Islamic group in Orakzai Tribal Agency, fined six alleged
accomplices to a killing and burned down their homes as punishment (see
Sections 1.c. and 1.e.). On December 29, riots occurred in Karachi in
response to the demolition by security forces of up to 300 homes in the
low income Gharibabad neighborhood, which is widely considered to be an
MQM-Altaf stronghold. Authorities claimed that the homes were built
without permits and that they sheltered terrorists and criminals.
In March three young girls who had converted to Islam from
Christianity were removed from their parent's custody by a court (see
Section 2.c.). The girls' parents attributed the loss of their girls to
the influence of religious extremists who packed the courtroom, and
claim to have suffered harassment because of the case. However, the
importance of the parent's religion in the judge's decision was not
clear. The girls' family since has moved, and reportedly is in hiding.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and of the press, and citizens are broadly free to
discuss public issues; however, journalists practice a degree of self-
censorship, and the situation with respect to freedom of speech and of
the press deteriorated during the first 10 months of the year, as the
Sharif Government attempted to silence several critics, and to
influence directly the substance of media reporting. At year's end, the
Musharraf regime had not attempted to exercise direct control over
views expressed in the print media. Nonetheless, views expressed in
editorials and commentary are often frank and pointed in their
criticism of the Government. True investigative journalism is rare;
instead the press acts freely to publish charges and countercharges by
named and unnamed parties and individuals representing competing class,
political, and social interests.
Anyone who damages the Constitution by any act, including the
publication of statements against the spirit of the Constitution, can
be prosecuted for treason. However, prosecutions under this provision
have been rare. The Constitution also prohibits the ridicule of Islam,
the armed forces, or the judiciary. This provision served as grounds
for the 1997 charges against the presidential candidacy of Rafiq Tarar,
based on press statements made several years previously that were
critical of the judiciary. The charges against Tarar later were
dismissed.
The Penal Code mandates the death sentence for anyone defiling the
name of the Prophet Mohammed, life imprisonment for desecrating the
Koran, and up to 10 years in prison for insulting another's religious
beliefs (i.e., any religion, not just Islam) with intent to outrage
religious feelings (see Section 2.c.). The Antiterrorist Act stipulates
imprisonment with rigorous labor for up to 7 years for using abusive or
insulting words, or possessing or distributing written or recorded
material, with intent to stir up sectarian hatred. No warrant is
required to seize such material (while the Antiterrorist Act was
partially suspended in 1998, the Government promulgated new
Antiterrorism Ordinances in October 1998 and in April). In November two
journalists, Zahoor Ansari and Ayub Khoso, were sentenced to 17 years
in prison and a fine by an antiterrorist court; they were sentenced to
10 years under Section 295(a) and 7 years under the Antiterrorist Act.
The journalists, who worked for the Sindhi daily newspaper Alakh, were
charged with publishing derogatory words against the Prophet and
insulting the religious feelings of Muslims, according to press reports
(see Section 2.c.).
The competitive nature of politics helps to ensure press freedom,
since the media often serves as a forum for political parties,
commercial, religious, and various other interests, as well as
influential individuals, to compete with and criticize each other
publicly. Although the press does not criticize Islam as such, leaders
of religious parties and movements are not exempt from the public
scrutiny and criticism routinely experienced by their secular
counterparts. The press traditionally has avoided negative coverage of
the armed forces, and the Office of Inter-Services Public Relations
(ISPR) has served to hold press coverage of military matters under
close restraint. Officially, the ISPR closely controls and coordinates
the release of military news and access to military sources.
Detailed public discussion of the military as an institution is
hampered severely since any published discussion, let alone criticism,
of the defense budget is proscribed by law. However, in 1997 this code
of silence was undermined when a National Assembly committee, by
discussion of defense appropriations and corruption in defense
contracts in open session, made possible (and legal) newspaper coverage
of the same issues. Discussion of the defense budget continued during
the year, especially in the English language press. The resignation of
Chief of Army Staff General Jehangir Karamat in October 1998 also was
widely discussed in the press.
Government leaks, while not uncommon, are managed carefully: It is
common knowledge that journalists, who routinely are underpaid, are on
the unofficial payrolls of many competing interests, and the military
(or elements within it) is presumed to be no exception. Favorable press
coverage in 1998 of the Prime Minister's family compound/hospital/
college south of Lahore was widely understood to have been obtained for
a price. Rumors of intimidation, heavy-handed surveillance, and even
legal action to quiet the unduly curious or nondeferential reporter are
common. The Government has considerable leverage over the press through
its substantial budget for advertising and public interest campaigns
and its control over the supply of newsprint and its ability to enforce
regulations. Human rights groups, journalists, and opposition figures
accused the Government of attempting to silence journalists and public
figures, especially when critical of the Prime Minister or his family.
A number of high profile cases of arrest and intimidation of government
critics during the year support these claims. The owners of the Jang
newspaper group, which publishes widely read Urdu and English language
dailies, and had published articles unflattering to the Sharif
Government, state that the Sharif Government made a number of demands
on the group in 1998. These demands included that Jang fire 16 senior
journalists who were critical of the Sharif Government and replace them
with journalists of the Sharif Government's choosing; that Jang
publications refrain from publishing negative articles about the Sharif
family; that Jang publications support the adoption of the 15th
Amendment; and that Jang publications adopt a progovernment editorial
slant. There is credible evidence thatSenator Saifur Rehman, a close
associate of the Prime Minister and head of the Accountability Bureau,
demanded that they be fired. The Sharif Government froze Jang group
bank accounts, ceased placing government advertising in Jang
newspapers, filed approximately $13 million (PRs 676 million) in income
tax notices with the group, sealed Jang warehouses, severely limited
Jang's access to newsprint, and raided the group's offices in December
1998. The Sharif Government filed sedition charges against Jang
publisher Mir Shakil Ur Rehman. Police again raided Jang premises on
January 31, reportedly confiscating newsprint. In February the Sharif
Government suspended its sedition case against Rehman and ceased direct
interference with publication of Jang group newspapers. However, by
August, Jang had modified its editorial content, stopped allowing one
prominent journalist to use her own byline, and hired pro-Government
journalists. At year's end, the tax charges remain outstanding.
In May a crackdown on the press began. Prominent journalist Najam
Sethi, editor of the weekly newspaper Friday Times, was arrested and
detained on May 8 after an April 30 speech in New Delhi in which Sethi
highlighted a number of crises faced by the country; the speech
previously was published without incident in the Lahore-based Friday
Times newspaper. Sethi also allegedly had assisted a British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reporting team that was investigating
corruption within the Prime Minister's family. Approximately 30
policemen broke into Sethi's home very early in the morning, beat him,
tied up his wife, destroyed property, and detained Sethi without a
warrant. According to press reports, Sethi was detained and
interrogated by Government intelligence services as a suspected
``espionage agent.'' Sethi was held incommunicado for several days and
was denied access to an attorney. On May 13, a plainclothes police
detachment seized over 30,000 copies of the Friday Times, essentially
the entire press run for the week. Police produced no warrant or court
order. On May 20, the Supreme Court ordered that Sethi be allowed
visits with his wife. On June 1, Sethi was transferred from the custody
of the Inter Services Intelligence Department to police custody. At
that time, Sethi was ordered held for 7 days on police remand, pending
a hearing by an antiterrorist court magistrate regarding charges of
``antinational activities'' filed by a ruling party member of the
National Assembly. On June 2, following intense international pressure
and strong criticism from the Pakistani Supreme Court, the Attorney
General dropped the charges against Sethi and ordered him released.
Sethi was released the same day. However, Sharif Government pressure on
Sethi did not end with his release from jail. Sethi was called to
appear before the Chief Electoral Commission to defend himself against
charges made by a ruling party member of the National Assembly that
Sethi's name should be struck from Muslim electoral rolls. The Pakistan
Muslim League legislator argued that Sethi was a non-Muslim as defined
by Section 260 (3) of the Constitution, and he further argued that as a
former federal minister, his comments in New Delhi disqualified him for
further legislative service under Sections 62 and 63 of the
Constitution. These sections disqualify those who ``oppose the ideology
of Pakistan'' from serving in the National Assembly or Senate. The case
against Sethi was dismissed by the Chief Election Commissioner on
October 6. In June Sethi found that he had been placed on the Exit
Control List, and reportedly was not permitted to leave the country to
receive a human rights award in London. According to Sethi, there are
also approximately 50 tax cases currently filed against him and his
family.
Other journalists also were targeted, many of whom also had
assisted the BBC documentary team that was investigating corruption
within the Sharif family. On May 4, the Intelligence Bureau detained
opposition political leader and commentator Hussain Haqqani. A vocal
critic of the Government, Haqqani highlighted wrongdoing by government
officials in his writings, and assisted the BBC documentary team
investigating corruption. Haqqani was held by the Intelligence Bureau
between May 4 and May 7, based on corruption charges filed previously.
According to Haqqani, his interrogators demanded to know why he had
been critical of the Government and questioned him about the activities
of Najam Sethi; Haqqani was beaten while in custody. Haqqani was
transferred to Federal Investigative Agency custody on May 7. On May
10, Haqqani's lawyer was allowed access to his client. Haqqani was
released on bail on July 30. The charges are still pending. The
authorities also harassed other journalists involved in the BBC
documentary. Idrees Bakhtiar, the BBC's correspondent in Karachi, was
questioned by police and subjected to a warrantless search of his home
in February. Mehmood Ahmed Khan Lodhi, a journalist, was questioned by
police authorities from May 2-4 concerning his involvement in the
documentary. Lodhi was released after journalists covering the Punjab
provincial assembly boycotted the May 4 assembly sessionto protest
Lodhi's arrest. Imtiaz Alam, current affairs editor of The News,
reportedly received threatening phone calls, including death threats,
regarding his contacts with the BBC film crew; on May 5, unknown
persons set his car on fire. Ejaz Haider, news editor at the Friday
Times, also reported receiving death threats in early May.
A number of journalists--including Ejaz Haider Bokhari of the
Friday Times, Imtiaz Alam of the News, and Dawn Islamabad bureau chief
Mohammed Ziauddin--were subjected to warnings from police or anonymous
sources regarding their criticism of government policies. In March Dawn
correspondent M.H. Khan was charged in Hyderabad for a story that
showed photographs of fettered prisoners. Police looking for
``objectionable'' material raided the Karachi home of News reporter Gul
Nasreen Akhter. In July the news editor of the Sindhi daily Kawish was
arrested in Kotri, apparently after criticism of the police in the
press. On July 5, the staff of the magazine Pulse arrived at work to
find that the offices had been broken into and raided by unknown
persons, shortly after the magazine had published a series of stories
detailing corruption within the Intelligence Bureau. An editorial in
the News noted that reports of Sindhi journalists or editors being
taken into custody ``regularly appear'' in newspapers. News reporter
Moosa Kaleem was detained in August on unspecified charges. Journalist
Maleeha Lodhi in January reported harassment including death threats,
phone tapping and threatened accountability cases because of her
position at the Jang publication The News.
Foreign reporters also reported harassment by the Sharif Government
during the year, after publication of stories unflattering to the
Sharif family.
The increasing harassment and detention of journalists during the
first 10 months of the year led to increasing self-censorship by
members of the press. For example, by August, the Jang group, which had
suffered harassment earlier in the year, acceded to some of the
Government's demands regarding its reporting, editorial content, and
hiring, including not publishing stories critical of the Prime Minister
and his business interests.
Following the October 12 coup, the Musharraf regime appeared to
cease direct efforts to manage the press, which were common under the
Sharif Government. Articles critical of the Musharraf regime appeared
regularly in the press. After the coup, editors and journalists
reported no attempts by the ISPR or other government agencies to
influence editorial content. However, some journalists continued to
practice self-censorship as a precautionary measure, and the Supreme
Court charged Dawn journalist Ardeshir Cowasjee with contempt of court
on October 26 following comments Cowasjee made on television regarding
corruption in the judiciary. The chief legal advisor to General
Musharraf, senior National Security Council member Sharifuddin Pirzada,
appeared as a friend of the court on behalf of Cowasjee.
At year's end, the case had not been resolved. During a December 11
protest against the handling of a criminal case in Lahore, the police
beat press photographers and smashed their cameras, after photographers
reportedly recognized a plainclothes policeman, who was hurling bricks
into the crowd (see Section 1.c.). The following day, apparently acting
on erroneous information, the Lahore police entered the Lahore Press
Club and tried to block all entry and exit points in an attempt to stop
a follow-up demonstration. The demonstration, actually scheduled for
December 13, was held without incident.
The State no longer publishes daily newspapers; the former Press
Trust sold or liquidated its string of newspapers and magazines in the
early 1990's. The Ministry of Information controls and manages the
country's primary wire service--APP, the Associated Press of Pakistan.
APP is both the Government's own news agency and the official carrier
of international wire service stories to the local media. The few small
privately owned wire services usually are circumspect in their coverage
of sensitive domestic news and tend to follow a government line.
A Print, Press, and Publications Ordinance, requiring the
registration of printing presses and newspapers, was allowed to lapse
in 1997 after several years of waning application. In practice,
registering a new publication is a simple administrative act, and is
not subject to political or government scrutiny.
Foreign books must pass government censors before being reprinted.
Books and magazines may be imported freely, but are likewise subject to
censorship for objectionable sexual orreligious content. English
language publications have not been affected by the direct proscription
of books and magazines promulgated by the Chief Commissioner in
Islamabad, who banned five Sindhi-language publications in the second
half of 1997 for ``objectionable material against Pakistan,'' i.e.,
expressions of Sindhi nationalism.
Privately owned newspapers freely discuss public policy and
criticize the Government. They report remarks made by opposition
politicians, and their editorials reflect a wide spectrum of views. The
effort to ensure that newspapers carry their statements or press
releases sometimes leads to undue pressure by local police, political
parties, ethnic, sectarian, and religious groups, militant student
organizations, and occasionally commercial interests. Such pressure is
a common feature of journalism, and, when a group is extreme in its
views, can include physical violence, the sacking of offices, the
intimidation or beating of journalists, and interference with the
distribution of newspapers. At times landlords and their agents, who
have become accustomed to terrorizing the powerless on their lands in
an atmosphere of impunity, also retaliate against journalists who shed
light on their crimes. Journalists working in small provincial towns
and villages generally can expect more difficulties from arbitrary
local authorities and influential individuals than their big city
counterparts. However, violence against and intimidation of journalists
is a nationwide problem.
The broadcast media are government monopolies. The Government owns
and operates the bulk of radio and television stations through its two
official broadcast bureaucracies, the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation
and Pakistan Television (PTV). Domestic news coverage and public
affairs programming on these broadcast media are controlled closely by
the Government and traditionally have reflected strongly the views of
the party in power. One private radio station, one television
broadcaster, and a semi-private cable television operation have been
licensed under special contractual arrangements with the Government
(these were under investigation for possible corruption in making
deals, but so far no irregularities have been found). The semi-private
television station, Shalimar Television Network (STN), occasionally has
been closed due to disputes with the Ministry of Information and to
financial difficulties. None of these stations is permitted to produce
news and public affairs programming; the private television station
rebroadcasts or simulcasts the regular PTV evening news. The Shalimar
Television Network also rebroadcasts PTV news, in addition to current
affairs programming from foreign broadcasters, such as the British
Broadcasting Corporation. While the STN routinely censors those
segments considered to be socially or sexually offensive, rarely, if
ever, are foreign news stories censored for content. In July, soon
after STN aired news stories critical of the Sharif Government's
handling of the Kargil crisis, the government-owned and operated
Pakistan Television Corporation (PTV) announced plans to turn the STN
into an ``all-news'' channel, scheduled to start in October; after the
coup, the starting date was rescheduled for March, 2000. This station
would be under direct government control. The Prime Minister
established strict rules regulating morality in government broadcasting
and advertising on PTV in 1997, banning western-style dancing, male and
female co-hosting of programs, and depictions of women washing in soap
commercials. In January 1998, the government of Punjab stated that
dances performed by women would be banned from television broadcasts,
but took no steps to implement the decree. The Ministry of Information
monitors advertising on all broadcast media, editing or removing
advertisements deemed morally objectionable. The Secretary for
Information was quoted in the press as stating that additional, private
television and radio channels would soon be licensed, echoing a pledge
made by General Musharraf. However, by year's end, no such licenses
were granted. Satellite dishes are readily available on the local
market and are priced within reach of almost everyone with a television
set--well into the lower-middle classes. South Asian satellite channels
(usually India-based) have become very important sources of news and
information, as well as popular entertainment. On October 12, as the
coup was occurring, television and radio programming was interrupted
for several hours.
Literary and creative works remain generally free of censorship.
Dance performances, even classical performances, are subject to protest
by certain religious groups. Obscene literature, a category broadly
defined by the Government, is subject to seizure. Dramas and
documentaries on previously taboo subjects, including corruption,
social privilege, narcotics, violence against women, and female
inequality, are broadcast on television, but some sensitive series have
been cancelled before broadcast.
The Government and universities generally respect academic freedom.
The atmosphere of violence and intolerance fostered by student
organizations, typically tied to political parties, continued to
threaten academic freedom, despite the fact that a 1992 Supreme Court
ruling prohibits student political organizations on campuses. On some
campuses, well-armed groups of students, primarily from radical
religious organizations, clash with and intimidate other students,
instructors, and administrators on matters of language, syllabus,
examination policies, grades, doctrine, and dress. These groups
facilitate cheating on examinations, interfere in the hiring of staff
at the campuses, control new admissions, and sometimes control the
funds of their institutions. At Punjab University, the largest
university in the province, Islami Jamiat-e-Tulaba (IJT--the student
wing of the religious political party Jamaat-i-Islami) imposes its
self-defined code of conduct on teachers and other students. On
December 21, 18 persons at Quaid-e-Azam University were injured in a
clash between Pakhtun and Sindhi students at the university. There have
been no arrests in connection with the incident.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The Constitution
provides for freedom ``to assemble peacefully and without arms subject
to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of public
order;'' however, while the Government generally permits peaceful
assembly, it occasionally interferes with large rallies, which are held
by all political parties. Since 1984 Ahmadis have been prohibited from
holding any conferences or gatherings.
District magistrates occasionally exercised their power under the
Criminal Procedures Code to ban meetings of more than four persons when
demonstrations seemed likely to result in violence. During the year,
police made preventive arrests of political party organizers prior to
announced demonstrations. In August police detained as many as 2,500
workers of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) and the MQM in Sindh
several days before a planned September 4 strike organized by the PPP.
On September 24, Sindh provincial authorities prohibited a march that
was to be held by opposition parties on September 25. Police blocked
off the starting point for the march and detained hundreds of MQM and
PPP activists and senior leaders prior to the event, as well as in the
days immediately after it was to have occurred. Among those detained
was MQM Senator Nasreen Jalil, who was arrested at her home on
September 24 and held incommunicado for several days; she was released
on September 29. The family members of those sought by the authorities
reported forcible, warrantless searches, and at least two adult
children of absent opposition party leaders were arrested when police
could not locate their parents (see Sections 1.d. and 1.f.). In October
the authorities blocked a march planned by the Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front in Kashmir. Police arrested as many as 250 activists
prior to and during the planned event.
The MQM has been harassed in its regular political activities,
especially by the Sindh police. In one of several such incidents, the
police cordoned off the MQM headquarters (``nine zero'') on July 31 and
surrounded a residential area. Persons living in the area were barred
from leaving for work, and visitors were not allowed to enter. On the
same day, according to the MQM, a busload of supporters coming from
Nawabshah to support an MQM hunger strike was stopped near nine zero
and told to leave Karachi. On August 14, as party members enforced a
strike by threatening shopkeepers with pistols in Hyderabad, police
beat MQM marchers. However, larger and more prominent demonstrations,
such as the party's August 14 Independence Day march to the tomb of
Pakistan's founder, took place with only minimal harassment.
In August the Government issued a new ordinance related to the
antiterrorism courts (see Section 1.e.). One section of the ordinance
made ``illegal strikes, go-slows, (or) lock outs . . .'' punishable by
up to 7 years' imprisonment and a fine. A wide spectrum of opposition
groups opposed this measure, fearing that it would be used to silence
legitimate dissent. Some groups argued that the ordinance was adopted
specifically to counter opposition plans to organize a strike on
September 4.
Police sometimes used excessive force against demonstrators. In
September, large numbers of police were deployed in Karachi in
preparation for a September 4 opposition strike. The police killed two
MQM activists. On September 4, police used water cannons, teargas, and
batons to counter a PPP sit-in in Karachi on September 12. On September
25, persons who attempted to hold a march, which had been prohibited,
were dispersed by police, who beat and used tear gas against them. In
October police usedforce to disperse a planned march by the Jammu and
Kashmir Liberation Front in Kashmir.
The authorities sometimes prevented leaders of politico-religious
parties from traveling to certain areas if they believed that the
presence of such leaders would increase sectarian tensions or cause
public violence. In April, the leader of the Tehrik-i-Nefaz-i-Shariat-
i-Mohammadi (TNSM), Mullah Sufi Mohammad, was released from house
arrest in Malakand. In April meetings of five or more persons were
banned in Malakand division, but were lifted shortly afterwards when
Sufi agreed to address only his party's meetings. In September Jamiat
Ulema-i-Islami leader Fazlur Rehman was placed under house arrest by
the Sharif Government to prevent him from traveling to NWFP tribal
areas to address a political rally (see Section 1.d.). In November the
Musharraf regime also briefly placed Rehman under house arrest to
prevent him from leading a political demonstration in the NWFP.
The Constitution provides for freedom of association subject to
restriction by government ordinance and law; however, while these
ordinances and laws apparently have not been used since the martial law
period, the Sharif Government targeted the activities of NGO's,
revoking the licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in Punjab. In November, the
government of Punjab lifted the ban on the registration of NGO's
imposed under the Sharif Government, but the NGO's previously
delicensed remained so at year's end. There are no banned groups or
parties.
c. Freedom of Religion.--Pakistan is an Islamic republic in which
approximately 95 percent of the population is Muslim, and while the
Constitution grants citizens the right to ``profess, practice, and
propagate'' their religion, the Government imposes limits on freedom of
religion. The majority of the population is Sunni Muslim, but 20 to 25
percent of the population is Shi'a. The Constitution requires that laws
be consistent with Islam and imposes some elements of Koranic law on
both Muslims and religious minorities. While there is no law
establishing the Koranic death penalty for apostates (those who convert
from Islam), social pressure against such an action is so powerful that
most such conversions take place in secret. Reprisals and threats of
reprisals against suspected converts are common. Members of religious
minorities are subject to violence and harassment, and police at times
refuse to prevent such actions or charge persons who commit them. For
example, according to the HRCP, in one case prior to 1999, Muhammad
Akram was threatened with death by an influential local religious
organization after he joined the Ahmadiyya community, whose members are
regarded as non-Muslims under the Constitution. The threat was
published on the organization's own letterhead, but no legal action has
been taken against the group.
``Islamiyyat'' (Islamic studies) is compulsory for all Muslim
students in state-run schools. Students of other faiths are not
required to study Islam but are not provided with parallel studies in
their own religion. In practice many non-Muslim students are compelled
by teachers to complete the Islamiyyat studies. An education policy
announced by the Government in 1998 included provisions for increased
mandatory Islamic instruction in public schools.
Minority religious groups feared that the explicit constitutional
imposition of Shari'a (Islamic law) favored by the Prime Minister in
his proposed 15th amendment and his goal of Islamizing government and
society might further restrict the freedom to practice non-Islamic
religions. The Sharif Government countered that the proposed amendment
contained specific language protecting the rights of minorities. In two
areas of the NWFP--in Malakand and Kohistan--Shari'a law was instituted
beginning in January, in the first by regulation and the second by an
ordinance. On September 20, a bill was passed by the NWFP Assembly that
incorporated the Kohistan ordinance in into law; Shari'a law now
applies in Kohistan (see Section 1.e.). On December 23, the Supreme
Court ruled that interest is un-Islamic and directed the Government to
implement an interest-free financial system by June, 2001.
Discriminatory religious legislation has added to an atmosphere of
religious intolerance, which has led to acts of violence directed
against minority Muslim sects, as well as against Christians, Hindus,
and members of Muslim offshoot sects such as Ahmadis and Zikris (see
Section 5). Since the coup, no action has been taken on the 15th
amendment.
Then-Prime Minister Sharif spoke out in support of the rights of
religious minorities, and hosted a Christmas dinner in 1997 for 1,200
persons. In September, the Government removed colonial-eraentries for
``sect'' from government job application forms to prevent
discrimination in hiring. However, the faith of some, particularly
Christians, often can be ascertained from their names. General
Musharraf and members of his staff apparently consulted with religious
minorities on some cabinet appointments.
In February 1997, a mob looted and burned the Christian village of
Shantinagar in Punjab. Local police participated in the attack and are
suspected of having instigated the riot by inventing spurious charges
that a Christian man had desecrated a copy of the Koran. Hundreds of
homes and a dozen churches were destroyed, and 20,000 persons were left
homeless. The central Government took immediate relief action,
deploying troops briefly to restore order, and the Prime Minister
visited the village. The Government has rebuilt damaged and destroyed
homes, but has not provided compensation for personal property lost in
the incident. The villagers remain fearful of further attacks, and the
police officers believed to be responsible for the riot, though
transferred and briefly suspended, have not faced criminal sanctions.
The 86 persons who were charged with offenses related to the attack
remain free on bail and there was no indication that authorities
planned to bring them to trial.
In March 1998, a district court in Rawalpindi removed three
sisters, ages 11 to 15, who had converted from Christianity to Islam,
from the custody of their Christian parents. The importance of the
parents' religion in the judge's decision, however, was not clear. A
subsequent court decision in March, over the parents' objections,
awarded custody of the two youngest girls to their older sister (who
reportedly had converted to Islam) and her Muslim husband; the eldest
of the three girls reportedly had married her attorney. The girl's
parents attributed the loss of their girls to the influence of
religious extremists who packed the courtroom, and claim to have
suffered harassment because of the case. The girls' family since has
moved, and reportedly is in hiding.
The Ahmadis are subject to specific restrictions under law. A 1974
Constitutional amendment declared Ahmadis to be a non-Muslim minority
because, according to the Government, they do not accept Mohammed as
the last prophet of Islam. However, Ahmadis regard themselves as
Muslims and observe Islamic practices. In 1984 the Government inserted
Section 298(c) into the Penal Code, prohibiting Ahmadis from calling
themselves Muslim and banning them from using Islamic words, phrases,
and greetings. The constitutionality of Section 298(c) was upheld in a
split-decision Supreme Court case in 1996. The punishment for violation
of this section is imprisonment for up to 3 years and a fine. This
provision has been used extensively by the Government and anti-Ahmadi
religious groups to harass Ahmadis. Ahmadis continue to suffer from a
variety of restrictions of religious freedom and widespread societal
discrimination, including violation of their places of worship, being
barred from burial in Muslim graveyards, denial of freedom of faith,
speech, and assembly, and restrictions on their press. Several Ahmadi
mosques remained closed. Since 1984, Ahmadis have been prohibited from
holding any conferences or gatherings. Tabloid-style Urdu newspapers
also frequently whip up popular emotions against Ahmadis by running
``conspiracy'' stories.
Section 295(a), the blasphemy provision of the Penal Code,
originally stipulated a maximum 2-year sentence for insulting the
religion of any class of citizens. This sentence was increased to 10
years in 1991. In 1982 Section 295(b) was added, which stipulated a
sentence of life imprisonment for ``whoever willfully defiles, damages,
or desecrates a copy of the holy Koran.'' In 1986 another amendment,
Section 295(c), established the death penalty or life imprisonment for
directly or indirectly defiling ``the sacred name of the holy prophet
Mohammed.'' In 1991 a court struck down the option of life
imprisonment. These laws, especially Section 295(c), have been used by
rivals and the authorities to threaten, punish, or intimidate Ahmadis,
Christians, and even orthodox Muslims. No one has been executed by the
State under any of these provisions, although religious extremists have
killed some persons accused under them. Since 1996 magistrates have
been required to investigate allegations of blasphemy to see whether
they are credible before filing formal charges. During the year, the
Ministry of Religious Affairs announced the creation of ``Peace
Committees'' to review charges of blasphemy before the police can act
on them; however, these committees are not yet operative. On September
8, Ataulla Waraich was arrested and charged under Section 298(b) after
he constructed an Ahmadi mosque on his property; during the year, Qim
Ali was charged with violating Section 298(c) because he stated that he
was a Muslim, and Dr. Abdul Ghani Ahmadi was charged under Sections
295(a), 295(c), 298(c) for preaching. In September 1998, aShi'a Muslim,
Ghulam Akbar, was convicted of blasphemy in Rahimyar Khan, Punjab, for
allegedly making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed in 1995.
He was sentenced to death, the first time a Muslim had been sentenced
to death for a violation of the blasphemy law. The case remained under
appeal as of June 30; there was no further information on the case at
year's end. Ghulam Hussain, a Shi'a Muslim, received a 30-year jail
sentence and a $1,500 (PRs 75,000) fine for blasphemy against the
companions of the prophet.
According to Ahmadi sources, 80 Ahmadis were implicated in criminal
cases on a ``religious basis'' (including blasphemy) in 22 cases
between January and early December; 44 Ahmadis were charged with
violating blasphemy and anti-Ahmadi laws during 1998. According to
these sources, a total of 195 Ahmadis have been charged under the law
since its inception. A Christian organization, the National Commission
for Justice and Peace (NCJP), used public sources to compile lists of
accused under the blasphemy law. By the NCJP's statistics, 14 incidents
involving accusations of blasphemy on the part of Muslims took place
between January and June. Ghulam Mustafa, an Ahmadi religious teacher,
was charged for preaching on February 15 under Sections 298(c) and
295c. Intizar Ahmad Bajwa was charged in Purur under 298(c) on May 19.
On June 21, three Ahmadis were arrested and another three were charged
with blasphemy in Sheikupura, Punjab. Seven Ahmadis were charged in
Bakhoo Bhatti, Punjab, with blasphemy on July 3. Mustaq Ahmad Saggon
and Nasir Ahmad, two Ahmadis, were charged in Muzaffargarh on July 19
under Section 295 for preaching and distribution of religious
literature. The case has been transferred to an antiterrorist court at
Dera Ghazi Khan. On July 30, according to Ahmadi sources, a
subdivisional magistrate ordered an Ahmadi mosque sealed in Naseerabad,
Sindh; it remained sealed at year's end. Three Ahmadis were convicted
of blasphemy in December 1997. Abdul Qadeer, Muhammad Shahbaz, and
Ishfaq Ahmad were found guilty of violating Section 295(c) and
sentenced to life imprisonment and $1,250(PRs 50,000) fines. Lawyers
for the men have appealed the decision to the Lahore High Court, whose
ruling had not been issued by year's end. The Lahore High Court has
turned down an application for bail while this appeal is under
consideration. Their request for bail has been taken to the Supreme
Court, which has not yet given a date for a bail hearing. In the
meantime, the men are serving their sentences in the Sheikhupura jail.
A number of other persons are in jails awaiting trial on blasphemy
charges. A Muslim religious scholar, Muhammad Yusuf Ali, was charged
under Sections 295(a) and (c) and was jailed in a class ``C'' cell from
March 1997 until his release in June. Due to threats by religious
extremists, his wife had to resign from her job as a professor and go
into hiding with their children.
On December 14, a group of several hundred persons looted and
burned property in Haveli Lakha, Okara district, Punjab that belonged
to Mohammad Nawaz, a local Ahmadi leader accused of planning to build
an Ahmadi house of worship. A neighbor reportedly incited the incident
by accusing Nawaz of building the house of worship after the two were
involved in a property dispute. Nawaz, a doctor, reportedly intended to
build a free standing clinic next to his home. The mob destroyed the
clinic, which was under construction, and looted and burned Nawaz's
home. Police arrived at the scene, but did nothing to stop the crowd.
By year's end, neither the neighbor nor anyone in the crowd had been
arrested or questioned in connection with the incident, and police had
taken no steps to find or return any of Nawaz's property. However,
Nawaz and his two sons were arrested by the police on December 15 and
charged with blasphemy. On December 20, Nawaz and his sons were granted
bail, but the blasphemy case against them was pending at year's end.
Other Ahmadis in Haveli Lakha also were charged with blasphemy in
connection with the incident, even though they were not in the town at
the time. Abdul Sattar Chaudhry, Muhammad Yar Jandeka, and Nasir
Jandeka were charged under Section 298(c) for declaring themselves
Muslims.
The predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center of Rabwah often
has been a site of violence against Ahmadis (see Section 5). On
November 17, 1998, the Punjab assembly unanimously passed a resolution
to change the name of the Punjab town that serves as the administrative
religious center of the Ahmadi community from ``Rabwah'' to ``Chenab
Nagar.'' The son of a prominent Muslim fundamentalist filed charges in
March against prominent Ahmadi leaders in Rabwah. He charged that Mirza
Masroor Ahmad, the country's senior Ahmadi leader, and retired Colonel
Ayyaz Mahmud, the leader of the Ahmadis in Rabwah, had directed Ahmadi
activists to cross out the name Chenab Nagar on a recently installed
plaque and write in Rabwah. The plaque also contained Koranic verses.
The Ahmadi leaders denied this allegation. On April 30, Ahmad and three
of his colleagues werearrested on blasphemy charges for allegedly
inciting the desecration of the plaque. The blasphemy charges against
three of the four eventually were dropped, and the four were released
after spending more than a week in jail. However, Ahmad still faces
charges under Section 295(c), and the three others still face criminal
charges under the Maintenance of Public Order Act.
In October Shafiq Masih, a Christian, was acquitted of a blasphemy
charge under Section 295(c), but was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment
under Section 295(a) for having uttered derogatory comments against the
Prophet Mohammed; he is appealing the decision. In December Hussain
Masih, a Christian charged with blasphemy under Section 295(c), was
granted bail due to lack of evidence, according to Christian activists.
Masih, his son Isaac, and Sehr Ghuri had been accused in November 1998
of making derogatory remarks against the Prophet Mohammed and against
the Muslim community. Ghuri was previously released on bail; Isaac
Masih never surrendered to the authorities. Ayub Masih (a Christian
detained since October 1996) was convicted of blasphemy under Section
295(c) for making favorable comments about Salman Rushdie, author of
the controversial book ``The Satanic Verses'' and was sentenced to
death in April 1998. Ayub's family and 13 other landless Christian
families were forced from their village in 1996 following the charges.
Masih survived an attempt on his life in 1997, when he was shot at
outside of the courtroom while on trial. Although the case was pending
appeal before the Lahore High Court, Ayub's principal defender,
Faisalabad Roman Catholic bishop and human rights activist John Joseph,
committed suicide in May 1998 with a handgun outside the Sahiwal court
where Ayub had been convicted, to protest the conviction. The High
Court appeal is still pending. Following the Bishop's suicide, there
were violent incidents in Faisalabad and Lahore, involving both
Christian and Muslim perpetrators. Another Christian, Ranjha Masih, was
charged with blasphemy during one of these incidents after throwing
rocks at an Islamic sign; he remains in a Faisalabad prison. Nazir
Masih, a Christian arrested and charged under Sections 298 and 298(a)
in August 1998 for allegedly insulting the daughter of the Prophet
Mohammed, was released on bail during the year.
In March a judge in the antiterrorist court of Muzaffargarh
sentenced Muhammad Ishaq to 17 years in jail and a $2,000 (PRs 100,000)
fine for propagating ``un-Islamic'' ideas. Ishaq was a member of the
association of Partisans of Islam. In November two journalists, Zahoor
Ansari and Ayub Khoso, were sentenced to 17 years in prison and a fine
by an antiterrorist court. The journalists, who worked for the Sindhi
daily newspaper Alakh, were charged with publishing derogatory words
against the Prophet and insulting the religious feelings of Muslims,
according to press reports (see Section 2.a.).
Sectarian violence and tensions continued to be a serious problem
throughout the country. One newspaper reported that there have been 300
persons killed in sectarian violence in Punjab in the last 2 years (see
Section 1.a.). However, sectarian violence decreased after the October
12 coup.
In April Prime Minister Sharif established a 10-member committee of
religious scholars whose declared purpose was to eliminate growing
sectarian terrorism and religious dissension in the country. The
committee collapsed after a few weeks because Shi'a leaders were
unhappy with the committee chairman, Dr. Israr Ahmad, head of the
Tanzeem-e-Islami, who reportedly has a reputation for religious
intolerance. In the same month, President Rafiq Tarar chaired a seminar
in Lahore to foster better understanding between Christians and
Muslims. At this interfaith gathering, participants discussed
reconciliation efforts since the February 1997 anti-Christian violence
in the Christian community of Shantinagar in Punjab, in which mobs
looted and burned the village. Hundreds of homes and a dozen churches
were destroyed, and 20,000 persons were left homeless.
However, after the coup, sectarian violence decreased. General
Musharraf emphasized the rights of religious minorities in his
speeches, and the Musharraf Government stated that it was committed to
protecting the rights of religious minorities. According to persons in
religious minority communities, the Musharraf Government made efforts
to seek minority input into decision-making and offered cabinet
positions to individuals from religious minority communities. General
Musharraf appointed an Islamic religious scholar to the National
Security Council.
When blasphemy and other religious cases are brought to court,
extremists often pack the courtroom and make public threats about the
consequences of an acquittal. As a result, judges and magistrates,
seeking to avoid a confrontation with theextremists, often continue
trials indefinitely, and the accused is burdened with further legal
costs and repeated court appearances. Many judges also seek to pass the
cases to other jurists. Prior to his killing in 1997, Lahore High Court
justice Arif Iqbal Hussain Bhatti, one of the two judges who in 1995
ruled to acquit accused Christian blasphemers Salamat and Rehmat Masih,
received several death threats from Islamic extremist groups. Bhatti's
killer, presumed to be a religious extremist, was arrested during the
year, and is being held in Camp Jail in Lahore.
The Government distinguishes between Muslims and non-Muslims with
regard to political rights. In national and local elections, Muslims
cast their votes for Muslim candidates by geographic locality, while
non-Muslims can cast their votes only for at-large non-Muslim
candidates. Legal provisions for minority reserved seats do not extend
to the Senate and the Federal Cabinet, which currently are composed
entirely of Muslims. Furthermore, according to the Constitution, the
President and the Prime Minister must be Muslim. The Prime Minister,
federal ministers, and ministers of state, as well as elected members
of the Senate and National Assembly (including non-Muslims) must take a
religious oath to ``strive to preserve the Islamic ideology, which is
the basis for the creation of Pakistan'' (see Section 3).
Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved.
The Government designates religion on passports. In order to get a
passport, citizens must declare whether they are Muslim or non-Muslim;
Muslims must also affirm that they accept the unqualified finality of
the prophethood of Mohammed and declare that Ahmadis are non-Muslims.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--Most citizens enjoy freedom of movement
within the country and the freedom to travel abroad; however, the
Government limits these rights. The authorities at times prevent
political party leaders from traveling to certain parts of the country;
on September 3, the Government placed Fazlur Rehman, the leader of one
faction of the religious party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islami, under house
arrest to prevent him from traveling to the NWFP tribal areas to attend
a political rally. He was released 3 days later (see Section 2.b.).
Travel to Israel is prohibited by law. Government employees and
students must obtain ``no objection'' certificates before travelling
abroad, although this requirement rarely is enforced against students.
Citizens regularly exercise the right to emigrate. However, an Exit
Control List (ECL), which is constantly being revised, is used to
prevent the departure of wanted criminals and individuals under
investigation for defaulting on loans, corruption, or other offenses.
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan estimated that there were 1,738
individuals reportedly on the ECL in late 1998, including 56
parliamentarians. As of early November, the press reported that as many
as 8,000 persons suspected of corruption were believed to be on the
ECL, many of them placed there by the Musharraf regime. After the coup,
all parliamentarians also were placed on the ECL. No judicial action is
required to add a name to the ECL, and there is no judicial recourse or
formal appeal mechanism if one's name is added. The process for adding
names to the list is not open to public scrutiny. Zafaryab Ahmed, a
prominent human rights activist, was placed on the ECL in 1998 and was
not allowed to leave the country until December 1998. However, in some
instances, courts have directed the Government to lift restrictions on
some ECL-listed politicians' travel abroad. For example, Benazir
Bhutto, former Prime Minister and leader of the PPP, was placed on the
ECL and was prevented from leaving the country in December 1998. Bhutto
was allowed to leave later that month following a court order to the
Government to lift the travel restriction against her.
The Sharif Government continued to use ECL authority to harass
opponents and assist the politically powerful. Politicians who angered
the Sharif Government were regularly placed on the Exit Control List,
often hearing about the restriction only when attempting to board
international flights. Journalist Najam Sethi, who was charged with
treason by the Sharif Government (see Section 2.a.), also was placed on
the ECL, and reportedly was not permitted to leave the country in June
to receive a human rights award in London. According to press reports,
Syed Qamar Abbas, a former member of the NWFP assembly, was placed
onthe ECL while he was on trial for murder; he was removed after his
acquittal. The ECL sometimes is used by the politically powerful in
connection with personal disputes. Humaira Mahmood, a woman who married
in defiance of her father's wishes, was placed arbitrarily on the ECL
in December 1998 by her influential father. In January she and her
husband were arrested when trying to leave Pakistan from Karachi
airport. The couple eventually was allowed to depart Pakistan following
intervention by the Lahore High Court (see Sections 1.d., 1.f., and 5).
The Musharraf regime stepped up the use of the ECL, particularly to
prevent those suspected of loan defaults or corruption from leaving the
country. According to press reports, over 3,000 names were added to the
exit control list after the Musharraf regime came to power. The focus
apparently was on potential loan defaulters, as part of the Musharraf
regime's emphasis on accountability. The army enforced the ECL,
especially after the expiration of the grace period for the repayment
of defaulted loans on November 17. After October 12, there continued to
be periodic reports of persons denied permission to travel. The
Musharraf regime refused permission for former senator and human rights
activist Nasreen Jalil to travel to a conference on penal reform held
in Nepal in November. Human rights activist Asma Jehangir also was
prevented from attending a meeting in Kosovo in December, in her
capacity as U.N. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Killings.
Pakistan has not signed the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees and has not adopted domestic legislation concerning the
treatment of refugees. In December the office of the U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) noted a change in the practice of
granting ``prima facie'' status to all Afghans in the country; under
the new policy, all refugee determinations are to be made on a case by
case basis. Means for screening Afghan refugees have not yet been
established, but the shift in policy implies an increase in the number
of Afghans to be repatriated and a decrease in the admission of new
arrivals.
The Government cooperates with the office of the UNHCR and other
humanitarian organizations in assisting refugees. First asylum has been
provided to refugees from Afghanistan since 1979, when several million
Afghans fleeing Soviet occupation poured across the border. There still
are believed to be 1.2 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan who have
been granted first asylum. In addition to refugees recognized and
assisted by UNHCR, a large number of unregistered Afghans are believed
to live in the country, mostly in urban areas.
The Government has not granted permanent legal resettlement to
Afghan refugees but allows them to live and work in Pakistan. Many are
self-supporting and live outside of refugee camps, which has resulted
in some hostility among local communities, whose residents believe that
Afghans take job opportunities from them and contribute to crime in the
country. On June 13, police in Peshawar swept Afghan shop keepers and
their patrons out of the Hayatabad Kar Khanah market area, demolishing
stalls as they went, and beating persons who resisted. This incident,
along with the March press reports concerning the possible confinement
of refugees to camps and the April relocation of Afghan refugees from
the Nasir Bagh camp, led some to fear an attempt by the provincial
government to make life more difficult for Afghan refugees and thus to
encourage them to return to Afghanistan. The press reported on similar
initiatives in Islamabad and Rawalpindi in November and December, but
these plans had not been implemented by year's end. At the same time,
authorities in Quetta detained a number of newly arrived Afghans,
mostly non-Pakhtun minorities, with plans to deport them. UNHCR was
permitted to screen a number of these detainees and those determined to
be refugees were not deported.
Most refugee villages (camps) are well established, and living
conditions resemble conditions in neighboring Pakistani villages,
although assistance to the refugee villages has dropped off
considerably since the early 1990's. Most recent arrivals have moved to
urban areas such as Peshawar and Quetta, but some have been located in
camps such as New Akora Khattak camp, established in 1996. Conditions
for newly arrived Afghans are less favorable than for refugees in the
long-established camps. For example, sanitation, health care, shelter,
and fresh water have been ongoing problems in New Akora Khattak,
although new shelters, schools, and health facilities were established
during the year. Some of the most recently arrived families still
reside in makeshift tent dwellings. On April 23, the office of the
Commissioner for Afghan Refugees began relocating 874 Afghan refugees
from Nasir Bagh camp to make room for construction of a new highway.
Some of these refugees were sent to New Akora Khattak camp. However,
many reportedly returned toAfghanistan or moved to other locations in
Pakistan. The relocation effort later slowed in 1999.
According to the UNHCR, there were no reports of the forced return
of persons to a country where they feared persecution. The Government
is cooperating with the UNHCR to support voluntary repatriation of
Afghans to rural areas of Afghanistan considered to be safe. During the
year, approximately 92,000 Afghans returned to Afghanistan; in 1998,
approximately 93,000 Afghans returned to Afghanistan.
Afghan refugees have limited access to legal protection and depend
on the ability of the UNHCR and leaders of their groups to resolve
disputes among themselves and with Pakistanis. Police frequently
attempt to prevent Afghan nationals from entering cities, and there are
reports that some have been forced back into refugee camps. Most able-
bodied male refugees have found at least intermittent employment, but
they are not covered by labor laws. Women and girls obtained better
education and health care than is currently available in Afghanistan
from NGO's who provided services. However, Afghan women working for
NGO's occasionally have been targets for harassment and violence by
conservatives, including Taliban sympathizers, in the Afghan refugee
community.
Afghan moderates also reportedly have been the targets of
harassment and violence from conservatives in the Afghan refugee
community, including Taliban or Taliban sympathizers. On January 12 in
Peshawar, the wife and son of well-known Afghan moderate Abdul Haq were
shot and killed in their sleep by unknown assailants. Haq is well known
for his efforts to promote an intra-Afghan dialog; his brother was a
former governor in Afghanistan who has joined forces with Ahmad Shah
Masood against the Taliban. On March 27, Mohammed Jehanzeb, the
secretary of Abdul Haq's brother (and Taliban opponent) Haji Qadir, was
shot and killed by unknown assailants in Peshawar. On July 14, moderate
Afghan tribal leader and former senator Abdul Ahmad Karzai was shot and
killed by two gunmen while returning home from prayers at a local
mosque. Between January 1998 and January 1999, it was estimated that up
to 12 Afghan moderates or former members of the Communist Party were
killed by unknown assailants (see Section 1.a.). Among those reported
killed were Dagarwal Basir, General Nazar Mohammed, Dagarwal Latif,
Hashim Paktyanai, General Shirin Agha, and General Rahim.
By year's end, there had been no arrests or convictions in
connection with any these killings. On December 4, a fire was
reportedly set at the home of an Afghan moderate active in the intra-
Afghan dialog movement in the Shamsatu refugee camp in Peshawar. The
moderate's car and part of the moderate's residential compound were
burned, but no one was injured.
The resettlement of Biharis continued to be a contentious issue.
The Biharis are Urdu-speakers from the Indian state of Bihar who went
to East Pakistan--now Bangladesh--at the time of partition in 1947.
When Bangladesh became independent from Pakistan in 1971, the Biharis
indicated a preference for resettlement in Pakistan. Since that time,
approximately 250,000 Biharis have been in refugee camps in Bangladesh.
While the Mohajir community--descendants of Muslims who immigrated to
present-day Pakistan from India during partition--supports
resettlement, the Sindhi community opposes it. In 1993 the Government
flew 342 Biharis to Pakistan and placed them in temporary housing in
central Punjab. No further resettlement has occurred.
Tens of thousands of persons reportedly left their homes on both
sides of the line of control during the Kargil conflict; 100 villages
on the Pakistani side of the line of control were reportedly evacuated
in mid-June. In June there reportedly were 14,000 displaced persons
from Indian-held Kashmir living in 20 camps on the Pakistani side of
the line of control.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Until the military coup on October 12, citizens had the right and
the ability to change their government peacefully. With certain
exceptions, citizens 21 years of age and over had the right to vote.
However, several million nomads and bonded laborers could not vote
because the National Election Commission had ruled that they did not
``ordinarily reside in an electoral area'', nor [did] they own or
possess ``a dwelling or immovable property in that area.'' Bonded
laborers with an address and an identity card were eligible to vote.
Political parties were allowed to operate freely after the full lifting
of martial law in 1988. Unregistered political parties were permitted
to participate in elections. Members of the national and provincial
assemblies were elected directly. The Constitution required that the
President and the Prime Minister be Muslims.
Even before the coup, the Chief of the Army Staff historically had
exercised influence on many major policy decisions. After the
imposition of a military government, the Constitution was suspended and
representative bodies, including the National Assembly, the Senate, and
the provincial assemblies, were suspended indefinitely. However, the
Musharraf regime did not ban political parties, and the parties active
prior to the coup, including the Pakistan Muslim League, continued
their activities. The Musharraf regime pledged to return to democracy,
but did not provide a timetable for elections by year's end. In
December General Musharraf stated that local elections would be held by
the end of 2000. Other senior government officials believe that these
elections could be held as early as September 2000. General Musharraf
also pledged to carry out electoral reforms, including the appointment
of an autonomous electoral commission and the reconstitution of
accurate, comprehensive electoral rolls, but took no action to
implement such reforms by year's end. General Musharraf appointed a
cabinet in late October and early November. Musharraf also appointed
new governors in all four provinces in October.
National elections for national and provincial assemblies last were
held in February 1997. Election observers, including teams from the
Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, and groups representing the
European Union, the Commonwealth of Nations, and the South Asian
association for regional cooperation, concluded that the elections were
generally ``free and fair'' with no evidence of systemic or widespread
abuse of the electoral process. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan
Muslim League won a majority of seats and formed a government.
Elections for local government bodies were held in Punjab in May
1998. Although ruling party candidates won the most seats, the
provincial government did not name chairmen to these bodies or allow
them to take office until December 1998. Specially nominated women,
worker, and peasant representatives were chosen, after long delay, in
October 1998. Elections were held in Baluchistan in March and a
chairman was named in August. Elections have not been held in the two
other provinces since 1993, when these bodies were dissolved by a
caretaker government because of charges of corruption. Local government
elections were postponed indefinitely in NWFP and Sindh. In the
interim, appointed civil servants continued to administer local
governments in all four provinces. Since the coup on October 12, there
have not been any active local bodies in any of the provinces. Local
body elections are tentatively planned to occur in 2000.
Citizens' right to change the government has been restricted at the
local level in Sindh. Elected local bodies (the rough equivalent of
district and city councils) were replaced in April 1998 by appointed
Khidmat (service) committees, which were packed heavily with supporters
of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League, and were widely seen as an
attempt to eliminate the need for local elections in Sindh. In November
1998, the Sharif Government imposed Governor's Rule in the province of
Sindh. This decision followed a threat to the Sindh's ruling PML
coalition government by one of its primary coalition partners. The
reason cited by the Sharif Government for the imposition of Governor's
Rule--which suspended the democratically elected provincial legislature
and invested the State's appointed governor with the authority to
oversee the province's affairs--was a critical law and order problem
within the province. On June 17, then-Prime Minister Sharif created the
position of Advisor on Sindh Affairs, and appointed Syed Ghous Ali
Shah, a member of the PML, to the post. Despite the effective
continuation of Governor's Rule in Sindh, Shah, not the governor,
enjoyed executive powers in the province under the Sharif Government.
Neither elected nor responsible to an elected body, Shah had primary
responsibility for the management of the government of Sindh until his
arrest following the October 12 coup. Suspension of the Sindh assembly
did not require new elections, but members were able to do little more
than give speeches and propose private bills 1 day a week. In September
Syed Ghous Ali Shah announced the creation of an appointed ``Members
Advisory Council for the Prime Minister's Advisor on Sindh.'' The
members of this council were to have the powers of a provincial
minister, but the council was eliminated after October 12.
In October the local and provincial governments, including in
Sindh, were suspended by the Musharraf regime; the provinces are ruled
by governors appointed by General Musharraf.
Because of a longstanding territorial dispute with India, the
political status of the northern areas--Hunza, Gilgit, and Baltistan--
is not resolved. As a result, more than 1 millioninhabitants of the
northern areas are not covered under any Constitution and have no
representation in the federal legislature. The area is administered by
an appointed civil servant. While there is an elected Northern Areas
Council, this body serves in an advisory capacity and has no authority
to change laws or to raise and spend revenue. In May the Supreme Court
directed the Government to take steps within 6 months that would
provide the residents of the northern areas with government by their
chosen representatives and an independent judiciary. The court left it
to the Government to determine how this objective would be achieved. On
November 3, the Musharraf regime allowed previously scheduled elections
to take place in the northern areas. Independent candidates and
candidates from the PML, the PPP, and the Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan won
seats.
The right of citizens to change their government also has been
hampered at the provincial level by the failure to release the 1998
census figures and by the likely underestimation of the population of
Sindh and, in particular, Karachi. The national census, held after a
delay of 7 years, was carried out in March 1998. The census was
postponed repeatedly due to pressure from ethnic groups and provincial
rivalries. Census figures serve as the basis for determining political
representation and also for allocating funds to the various provinces
from the federal treasury. Residents of areas who expected results that
indicated either greater population shifts to their regions or smaller
shifts away from their regions disputed preliminary census results. The
9.26 million census figure for Karachi, for example, is estimated to be
3 to 5 million short of the actual figure.
Although women participate in Government, and former Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto is leader of the opposition, they are underrepresented
in political life at all levels. Six women held seats in the 217-member
National Assembly, up from 4 seats in the previous Parliament. Thirty-
five women, more than ever before, campaigned for seats in the 1997
national elections. The Parliamentary Commission on the Status of Women
in Pakistan recommended reserving one-third of seats in all elected
bodies for women. In April 1998, the Federal Cabinet announced that
women's representation in local councils should be increased by 100
percent, but by year's end no steps had been taken to implement this
announcement. While women participate in large numbers in elections,
some women are dissuaded from voting in elections by family, religious,
and social customs in rural areas. According to the Parliamentary
Commission, women in some tribal areas were intimidated into not voting
during the 1997 elections. Announcements were made on mosque
loudspeakers that voting by women was un-Islamic and women going to
polling stations risked having their houses burned down. As a result,
no more than 37 women out of 6,600 registered to vote actually cast
ballots in Jamrud, in the Khyber Agency. General Musharraf appointed a
woman to his National Security Council and another to his cabinet.
Minorities are underrepresented in government and politics.
Under the electoral system, minorities vote for reserved at-large
seats, not for nonminority candidates who represent actual
constituencies. Because of this system, local parliamentary
representatives have little incentive to promote their minority
constituents' interests. Many Christian activists state that these
``separate electorates'' are the greatest obstacle to the attainment of
Christian religious and civil liberties. Ahmadi leaders encourage their
followers not to register as ``non-Muslims,'' so most Ahmadis are
completely unrepresented. In the National Assembly (NA), Christians
hold four reserved seats; Hindus and members of scheduled castes
another four; Ahmadis one; and Sikhs, Buddhists, Parsis, and other non-
Muslims one (see Section 2.c.). Each of the four categories is
maintained on a separate electoral roll, and minorities cannot cast
votes for the Muslim constituency seats. Also, under Article 106 of the
Constitution, seats in the provincial assemblies are reserved for
minorities. However, on June 28 the election tribunal of the NWFP
disqualified Walter Siraj, the elected Christian seat member of the
provincial assembly. Siraj's opponent had filed a petition alleging
that Siraj rigged the election. A by-election was ordered. With the
disqualification of Siraj, two of the three seats reserved for
minorities in the NWFP were vacant. The 1997 general election report
states that each Christian NA member represents 327,606 persons; each
Hindu and scheduled castes NA member, 319,029; the Sikh, Buddhist,
Parsi, and other non-Muslim member, 112,801; and the Ahmadi member
104,244. These figures significantly understate the population of most
of the minority groups because they are based on 1981 census figures.
By year's end, the 1998 census figures for religious minorities had not
been published.
Tribal people are underrepresented in government and politics. The
February 1997 elections for the eight National Assembly members from
the FATA were for the first time conducted on the basis of universal
adult franchise. Prior to 1997, in keeping with local traditions,
tribal leaders, or maliks, appointed in the governor's name by the
central Government's political agents in each agency, elected the FATA
National Assembly members. In accordance with the Government's general
ban on political party activities in the FATA, candidates were not
allowed to register by political party, and political party rallies
were not allowed. However, several political parties did campaign
covertly for their candidates. Tribal people, including large numbers
of women in some of the tribal agencies, registered to vote, despite
campaigns by some tribes against female participation in the elections.
However, on election day, far fewer registered women in proportion to
registered men actually voted, as tribal traditions against public
roles for women reasserted themselves.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are several domestic human rights organizations, and new
human rights and legal aid groups continue to form. These groups
generally are free to operate without government restriction; they are,
however, required to be licensed. The Government has provided
protection to human rights lawyers defending accused blasphemers
following threats and attacks on the lawyers by religious extremists.
These threats became more explicit and public in 1998, with signed
graffiti calling for the killing of well-known human rights activist
Asma Jehangir.
However, the Sharif Government limited the freedom of association
of NGO's, and revoked the licenses of almost 2,000 NGO's in Punjab (see
Section 2.b.). Punjab's minister for women, social welfare, and Bait-
ul-Mal Pir Syed Binyamin Rizvi began a campaign in the press against
NGO's in late December 1998, particularly targeting NGO's that worked
on women's issues and espoused ``un-Islamic values.'' In January the
Prime Minister ordered the government of the Punjab to begin a campaign
to withdraw licensing of certain nongovernmental organizations. Without
such licensing, the organizations were not permitted to operate.
Altogether, the authorities withdrew the licenses of 1,941
organizations out of 5,967 that were licensed in Punjab in early May.
The Sharif Government also reportedly pressed all NGO's to open their
books, and published a list of NGO's receiving foreign funding.
Delicensed NGO's that allegedly were nonexistent or engaged in
fraudulent activity also had their bank accounts frozen. Forty-one
other NGO's were probed, and 944 were given 3 months to improve their
performance. In August the Government of the NWFP began a similar
review of nongovernmental organizations within the province. Prior to
its review of NGO's, NWFP authorities raided and closed the respected
Aurat Association in Manshera, an NGO devoted to women's rights. The
Sharif Government argued that the review of NGO's was an attempt to
remove fraudulent and inactive NGO's from the registers.
Representatives from NGO's countered that a number of legitimate groups
were required to cease operations and that the withdrawal of licenses
was in part an effort to bring NGO's more firmly under government
control. Several prominent human rights groups in Karachi reported in
May that they were harassed by false charges, allegedly planted by the
Sharif Government in the Urdu press, that they were embezzling funds.
At the same time, the head of an organization that publishes books
about women's rights reported that she was the target of charges by a
Sindh government official; the charges involved unspecified ``anti-
State'' and ``anti-Islam'' activities. Prominent figures in the NGO
community feared that this campaign against ``corrupt'' NGO's, along
with harassment aimed at unpopular NGO's that were not shut down, was
an attempt by the Sharif Government specifically to stifle NGO's
working on unpopular issues, such as women's and civil rights, and
those who disagreed with the Government, including those working
against the 15th (Shari'a) Amendment and against the Government on
nuclear issues.
At a conference organized by a number of influential advocacy NGO's
in June, representatives from the NGO community complained that certain
NGO's had suffered harassment by police authorities because of their
advocacy activities. The Musharraf regime began an effort to reach out
to civil society. Soon after taking office, the new Punjab government
under General Musharraf on November 18 lifted the ban on NGO
registration. Several Musharraf cabinet members were active with NGO's
before their appointment.
International human rights organizations have been permitted to
visit the country and travel freely. Several international
organizations operate in the country, many of which aid refugees.
However, since 1998 foreign NGO staff members have at times had
difficulty in obtaining visas; certain international NGO's had
consistent difficulty in obtaining such visas for their foreign staff.
The Ministry of Human Rights, established in 1995, is now a
department within the Ministry of Law, Justice, Human Rights, and
Parliamentary Affairs. Some 125 employees staff the department, which
is headquartered in Islamabad and has four regional offices. The
department has set up a ``fund for women in distress and detention''
and a ``relief and revolving fund'' for victims of human rights
violations. Because of its limited budget, the department operates
primarily on a case-by-case basis, but is seeking help from donor
agencies on projects for institutional capacity building and human
rights awareness. The department was able to finalize and begin limited
implementation of a reform program for jails. However, the department
is not viewed as very effective by human rights observers. The
Government has failed to take follow-up action on the 1997 report of
the Commission of Inquiry for Women.
In August Prime Minister Sharif constituted a cabinet committee on
human rights issues. According to press reports, the committee was to
consider recommendations to remove ``administrative lapses and legal
lacunae'' in the human rights area. No concrete action was taken by the
committee prior to the October coup, and the committee was disbanded
after the coup. However, members of General Musharraf's cabinet and of
the National Security Council continue to meet on human rights issues.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language, or Social Status
The Constitution, which was suspended in October, provided for
equality before the law for all citizens and broadly prohibits
discrimination based on race, religion, caste, residence, or place of
birth. In practice, however, there is significant discrimination based
on these factors.
Women.--Domestic violence is a widespread and serious problem.
Human rights groups estimate that anywhere from 70 to 90 percent of
women are victims of domestic violence at the hands of their husbands,
in-laws, or other relatives. The Progressive Women's Association
reported in September that one out of every two women is the victim of
mental or physical violence. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry
for Women reported that violence against women ``has been described as
the most pervasive violation of human rights'' in the country, and it
called for legislation clearly stating that domestic violence against
women is a criminal offense. Husbands are known to kill their wives
even for trivial offenses. On March 22 in Karachi, Bilawal, after an
argument with his wife Zainab, doused her with kerosene and burned her
to death. This case was one of numerous incidents, consistent with the
findings of a poll reported by the Pakistan Peace Coalition in April. A
survey of 1,000 women in 10 communities of rural Punjab found that 82
percent of the women feared violence from their husbands over trivial
matters. While abusers may be charged with assault, cases rarely are
filed. Police usually return battered women to their abusive family
members. Women are reluctant to file charges because of societal mores
that stigmatize divorce and make women economically and psychologically
dependent on their relatives. Relatives also are reluctant to report
cases of abuse in order to protect the reputation of the family. There
are no specific laws pertaining to domestic violence, except for the
Qisas and Diyat ordinances which are rarely invoked and may privatize
the crime (see Section 1.e.). However, Qisas and Diyat cannot be
invoked where the victim's heir is a direct lineal descendant of the
perpetrator, such as when a woman is killed by her husband. Police and
judges tend to see domestic violence as a family problem, and are
reluctant to take any action in such cases. Thus, it is very difficult
for women to obtain relief from the justice system in cases of domestic
violence.
The Shirkat Gah Women's Resource Center in Karachi published a
report early in the year that summarized reports in the English-
language press about violence against women in Pakistan between 1993
and 1998. Even in this selective medium, and limiting itself to reports
of violence instigated by close male relatives, Shirkat Gah documented
535 women who were killed or who committed suicide during the period;
95 of the women werekilled or committed suicide when they expressed
interest in marrying a man of their own choice.
During the year, there were hundreds of incidents involving
violence against women reported in the press. The press continued to
draw attention to killings of married women by relatives over dowry or
other family-related disputes. Most of the victims are burned to death,
allegedly in kitchen stove accidents; some women were reportedly burned
with acid. In a survey of newspaper reports in Lahore from January to
November, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) found a total
of 675 killings of women and 272 burn cases involving women reported.
Seventy-seven persons were held in connection with the killings; at
year's end it was not known how many had been convicted, or if any
individuals had been charged in connection with the burn cases.
According to the Commission of Inquiry for Women, newspapers from
Lahore reported an average of 15 cases of stove deaths per month during
a 6-month period in 1997; most of the victims were young married women.
The Commission noted that many cases are not reported by hospitals and,
even when they are, the police are reluctant to investigate or file
charges. Human rights monitors agree that most `'stove deaths'' are in
fact killings based upon a suspicion of illicit sexual relationship or
upon dowry demands. Increased media coverage of cases of wife burnings,
spousal abuse, spousal killing, and rape has helped to raise awareness
about violence against women. By year's end, there was no progress in
the 1998 case of Shahnaz, who died after her husband poured gasoline on
her and set her on fire. The police registered a case against her
husband and three other in-laws. The case remained pending.
A crisis center for women in distress was opened in 1997 in
Islamabad. The center, the first of its kind in Pakistan, is an
initiative of the Ministry of Women's Development with the assistance
of local NGO's. The center offers legal and medical referrals from
volunteer doctors and lawyers, counseling from trained psychologists,
and a hot line for women in distress. Although the center opened before
funding had been allocated and staff hired, the center is now fully
staffed. Staff for a second center in Vehari, in southern Punjab, began
training in October.
Rape is an extensive problem. The HRCP estimates that at least
eight women, five of them minors, are raped every day in Pakistan, and
more than two-thirds of those are gang-raped. In 1997 the National
Assembly passed a law that provided for the death penalty for persons
convicted of gang rape. No executions have been carried out under this
law and conviction rates remained low. This is because rape, and gang
rape in particular, is commonly used as a means of social control by
landlords and local criminal bosses seeking to humiliate and terrorize
local residents. Therefore, police rarely respond to and are sometimes
implicated in these attacks. It is estimated that less than one-third
of all rapes are reported to the police. The police themselves
frequently are charged with raping women (see Section 1.c.).
Parliamentary Affairs Minister Muhammad Yasin Khan Wattoo informed the
Senate on April 28 that in the first 90 days of the year 472 women
reported that they were raped. The HRCP in the first 9 months of the
year tallied 485 rape cases recorded in Lahore newspapers. Of these
instances, cases were registered in 74 percent of the rapes but
suspects were arrested in only 10 percent. More than 50 percent
involved gang rape. According to a police official, in a majority of
rape cases the victims are pressured to drop rape charges because of
the threat of Hudood adultery charges being brought against them. All
consensual extramarital sexual relations are considered violations of
the Hudood Ordinances, which carry either Hadd (Koranic) or Tazir
(secular) punishments (see Section 1.e.). Accordingly, if a woman
cannot prove the absence of consent, there is a risk that she may be
charged with a violation of the Hudood ordinances for fornication or
adultery. The Hadd, or maximum punishment for this offense, is public
flogging or stoning; however, in order for Hadd punishments to apply,
special, more stringent rules of evidence are followed. Hadd
punishments are mandatory if there is enough evidence to support them,
and for sexual offenses require four adult male Muslims to witness the
act or a confession. For non-Muslims or in cases where all of the 4
male witnesses are not Muslim, the punishment is less severe. The
testimony of four female witnesses, or that of the victim alone, is
insufficient to impose Hadd punishments; therefore, even if a man rapes
a woman in the presence of several women, he cannot be subjected to the
Hadd punishment. If the evidence falls short of Hadd requirements, then
the accused may be sentenced to a lesser class of penalties (Tazir);
since it is difficult to obtain sufficient evidence to support the Hadd
punishments, most rape cases are tried at the Tazir level of evidence
and sentencing (under which a rapist may be sentenced to up to 25 years
inprison and 30 lashes). No Hadd punishment has ever been applied in
the 20 years that the Hudood ordinances have been in force. For Tazir
punishments, there is no distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim
offenders.
According to an HRCP lawyer, the Government has brought fewer
charges against women under the Hudood Ordinances than in the past, and
the courts have shown greater leniency toward women in their sentences
and in the granting of bail. Even if a woman wishes to bring rape
charges, she may have trouble bringing her attacker to justice.
According to Amnesty International, men accused of rape sometimes are
acquitted and released, while their victims are held on adultery
charges.
According to Human Rights Watch, women face difficulty at every
level of the judicial system in bringing rape cases. Police are
reluctant to take the complaint and may act in an abusive fashion
against the victim; the courts do not have consistent standards of
proof as to what constitutes rape and to what corroboration is
required; and judges, police, and prosecutors are biased against female
rape victims, tending towards a presumption of female consent and the
belief that women lie about such things. Judges on the whole reportedly
are reluctant to convict; however, if there is some evidence, judges
have been known to convict the accused of the lesser offense of
adultery or fornication (consensual sex). Human Rights Watch also
reports that women face problems in the collection of evidence; that
the doctors tasked to examine rape victims often believe that the
victims are lying; that they are trained insufficiently and have
inadequate facilities for the collection of forensic evidence
pertaining to rape; that they do not testify very effectively in court;
and that they tend to focus on the virginity status of the victim, and,
due either to an inadequate understanding of the need for prompt
medical evaluations or to inadequate resources, often delay the medical
examinations for many days or even weeks, making any evidence that they
collect of dubious utility. Medical examiners and police also have been
known to be physically and verbally abusive during these exams,
especially in cases where a woman is charged with adultery or
fornication (for which an exam may be requested) and does not wish to
be examined (such women, despite the fact that by law they should not
be examined without their consent, have been examined, and even have
been beaten for their refusal to be examined). Police and doctors often
do not know that a woman must consent to this type of exam before it
can be performed, and judges may not inform women of their right to
decline. If they report rape to the police, women's cases often are
delayed or mishandled, and women frequently are harassed by police or
the perpetrators to drop the case. Police may accept bribes to get the
complainant to drop a case, or may request bribes to carry it forward.
Police tend to investigate the cases poorly, as well, and may not
inform women of the need for a medical exam or may stall or block
women's attempts to obtain one.
The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for Women has criticized
the Hudood Ordinances relating to extramarital sex and recommended that
they be repealed, asserting that they are based on an erroneous
interpretation of the Shari'a. The Commission charged that the laws on
adultery and rape have been subject to widespread misuse, with 95
percent of the women accused of adultery being found innocent either in
the court of first instance or on appeal. However, by that time, the
Commission pointed out, the woman may have spent months in jail,
suffering sexual abuse at the hands of the police and the destruction
of her reputation. The Commission found that the main victims of the
Hudood laws are poor women who are unable to defend themselves against
slanderous charges. The laws also have been used by husbands and other
male family members to punish their wives and female relatives for
reasons having nothing to do with sexual propriety, according to the
Commission. At year's end, 500 women were awaiting trial for adultery
under the Hudood Ordinance in Lahore; 400 in Peshawar; and 300 in
Mardan (see Section 1.e.).
Marital rape is not a crime. The 1979 Hudood ordinances abolished
punishment for raping one's wife. However, the Commission of Inquiry
for Women has recommended reinstating penalties for marital rape.
Marriage registration (nikah) sometimes occurs years before a marriage
is consummated (rukh sati). The nikah (unconsummated) marriage is
regarded as a formal marital relationship, and thus a woman or girl
cannot be raped by a man to whom her marriage is registered, even if
the marriage has not yet been entered into formally.
There are numerous reports of women killed or mutilated by male
relatives who suspect them of adultery. Few such cases are investigated
seriously and those who are arrested often are acquitted on the grounds
that they were ``provoked,'' or for alack of witnesses. While the
tradition of killing those suspected of illicit sexual relations in so-
called ``honor killings'', in order to restore tribal or family honor,
applies equally to offending men and women, women are far more likely
to be killed than men. The Progressive Women's Association, a human
rights NGO, estimated in September that as many as 300 women are killed
each year by their husbands or family, mostly as a result of ``honor
killings'', known as (``karo/kari'' in Sindh). The problem is believed
to be even more extensive in rural Sindh. ``Karo/kari'' (or adulterer/
adulteress) killings are common in rural Sindh and Baluchistan. The
HRCP reported 19 such cases in February and 22 in May, noting that the
actual figures are doubtless much higher. Tribal custom among the
Baluch and the Pathans also sanctions such killings. The Commission of
Inquiry for Women has rejected the whole concept of ``honor'' as a
mitigating circumstance in a murder case and recommended that such
killings be treated as simple murder. Even women who are the victims of
rape may become the victims of their families' vengeance against the
victims' ``defilement.'' In the Federally Administered Tribal Area's
Kurram agency in March, Amnesty International reported that a tribal
firing squad killed 16-year-old Lal Jamilla Mandokhel, a mentally
retarded girl, after she was raped repeatedly by a field assistant in
the agriculture department. The police took the accused into protective
custody but turned the girl over to her tribe after the filing of a
FIR. Her tribe found that she had brought shame to the tribe, which
could only be remedied by her death. The tribesmen also demanded the
return of her attacker by police for public execution. AI also reported
that if an accused adulteress is killed, and the adulterer manages to
escape this fate, he may be required under the karo/kari tradition to
compensate the family of the accused adulteress; sometimes, a woman
from the adulterer's family is given in compensation to repair the
honor of the adulteress' family.
The Government has failed to take action in honor killing cases,
particularly when influential families are involved. Samia Imran, a
married woman from Peshawar seeking a divorce against the wishes of her
husband and her family and who was thought to be dishonoring them, was
shot and killed on April 6 in the Lahore office of lawyer and human
rights activist Hina Jilani. Her parents arranged the meeting on the
pretext of consenting to the divorce. The victim's mother, Israt Bibi,
was accompanied to the meeting by Habib ur-Rehman, who shot Samia when
his presence at the meeting was challenged. Rehman took a hostage after
the shooting and escaped with the victim's mother. Although Rehman was
killed later in an exchange with police, the victim's mother, father,
and uncle also were charged in the case. The perpetrators, who come
from a prominent family, were not apprehended. The case generated
extensive publicity, and Hina Jilani and her sister, prominent human
rights activist Asma Jahangir, were threatened publicly with arrest and
violence. According to Jilani, the police refused to take statements
from eyewitnesses and tampered with evidence. Asma Jehangir and Hina
Jilani were charged by Samia's father in June with kidnaping her, but
the case has been stayed pending the case against her family members.
FIRs had been filed against them by Samia's father in June. Many
believe that the Sarwar family used their influence to stall the case
and be granted pre-arrest bail. Amnesty International reported that
Ghazala, a woman living in Joharabad, Punjab, was set on fire and
killed by her brother on January 6 because her family suspected that
she was in a relationship with a neighbor. On January 19 in Jampur
city, Punjab, Ameer Bukhsh killed his wife Khadeja and a bank officer
he alleged she was having an affair with. Buksh turned himself in for
the killings, and his brother-in-law Abdul Qadir filed a complaint
against him for murder, stating that Buksh killed the bank officer for
some other reason and then killed his wife to cover it up. However,
Qadir reportedly was threatened by the police with being implicated in
a murder case if he did not change his story.
Trafficking in women also is a significant problem (see Section
6.f.).
There are significant barriers to the advancement of women,
beginning at birth. In general female children are less valued and
cared for than male children are. According to a United Nations study,
girls receive less nourishment, health care, and education than boys
do. According to a 1996 report by the Islamabad-based human development
center, only 16 women are economically active for every 100 men.
Discrimination against women is particularly acute in rural areas.
In some areas of rural Sindh and Baluchistan, female literacy rates are
2 percent or less. A survey of rural females by the National Institute
of Psychology found that 42 percent of parents cited ``no financial
benefit'' as the reason they kepttheir daughters from attending school,
and sent their sons instead. Similarly, a study by the NWFP directorate
of primary education concluded that most girls in rural areas do not go
to school because they have to look after the household while their
mothers help in the fields. In Karachi only 45 percent of girls
completing matriculation (10th grade) exams in science in 1999 would be
able to find places in government-run colleges, as opposed to 95
percent of boys passing the same tests. For 14,424 girls passing the
exam in 1999, only about 8,000 places are available, according to 1998
figures. In Baluchistan conditions are much worse, with only 2 percent
of the province's women having received any formal education.
Human rights monitors and women's groups believe that a narrow
interpretation of the Shari'a has had a harmful effect on the rights of
women and minorities, as it reinforces popular attitudes and
perceptions and contributes to an atmosphere in which discriminatory
treatment of women and non-Muslims is more readily accepted.
Both civil and religious laws theoretically protect women's rights
in cases of divorce, but many women are unaware of them, and often the
laws are not observed. The Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry for
Women has recommended that marriage registration (nikahnama) be made
mandatory and that women, as well as men, have the right to initiate
divorce proceedings. It also has called for the punishment of those who
coerce women or girls into forced marriages. A husband legally is bound
to maintain his wife until 3 months after the divorce. A father is
bound to maintain his children until they reach the age of 14 for
males, or to the age of 16 for females. However, the legal system is so
complicated and lengthy that it can take years for the children to get
maintenance.
In inheritance cases women generally do not receive--or are pressed
to surrender--the share of the inheritance they legally are due. In
rural areas, the practice of a woman ``marrying the Koran'' still is
widely accepted if the family cannot arrange a suitable marriage or
wants to keep the family wealth intact. A woman ``married to the
Koran'' is forbidden to have any contact with males over 14 years of
age, including her immediate family members. Press reports indicate
that the practice of buying and selling brides still occurs in parts of
the NWFP and the Punjab.
A special three-member bench of the Lahore High Court upheld in
1997 the federal Shariat Court's ruling that a Muslim woman can marry
without the consent of her wali (guardian--usually her father).
However, in practice social custom dictates that couples are to marry
at the direction of family elders. When this custom is violated,
especially across ethnic lines, violence against the couple may result,
and the authorities generally fail to prosecute such cases vigorously.
The February 1998 marriage of a teenage Pathan girl to a Mohajir man in
Karachi against her family's will led to large-scale ethnic riots in
Karachi, the bringing of a kidnaping case against the groom, the
shooting and serious injury of the groom in the courtroom, and numerous
death threats against the groom and his family. In May 1998, a woman in
Karachi was killed by her father, Alauddin, for marrying a mechanic
from his auto repair shop. In July 1998 in the NWFP, Hidayat Bibi and
her husband were killed by her uncle after they eloped. In a well
publicized case, Humaira Mahmood, daughter of a Punjab provincial
assembly member, in 1997 married Mahmood Butt against the wishes of her
father. Soon after her marriage, she was beaten severely by her brother
and allegedly was forced to register a marriage to her cousin. In
November 1998, she took refuge in a shelter for women in Karachi.
Mahmood's brother and several Punjab policemen from her father's
district kidnaped her from the home in December 1998, with the
acquiescence of Sindh police. Protests by women's groups led to the
intervention of the governor and Mahmood's release from illegal
detention to Darul Aman, a government-run shelter for women. However,
soon after this she took refuge in another shelter in Karachi.
Mahmood's name, along with her husband's, was placed on the ECL,
preventing them from leaving the country. Mahmood appealed the
placement of her name on the ECL. On January 28, she and her husband
were detained without a warrant by Punjab police at the Karachi airport
(in Sindh province), as they were trying to leave the country. Mahmood
Butt's mother also was detained. Mahmood and her husband reportedly
were taken separately to Lahore, where they were detained separately
and were beaten in an attempt to force them to renounce their marriage.
Humaira was charged with adultery by her father, based on a videotape
of the sham marriage into which Humaira had been forced against her
will. On January 28, Mahmood Butt and his mother were released by court
order. Humaira also was briefly released. On February 2, the pair
appeared in court in Lahore. On February 18, the Lahore High Court
ruled that Humaira and Mahmood's 1997 marriagewas valid, and that her
marriage to her cousin was invalid. The court also dismissed the
abduction charges against Mahmood Butt, ordered the release of Humaira
Mahmood, imposed a 3-month prison sentence against Subah Sadiq, the
police officer who detained the couple at the Karachi airport in
January, and directed the Punjab inspector general of police to ensure
their safety. Humaira's father appealed the court's decision. However,
Humaira Mahmood and Mahmood Butt left the country without incident on
February 20. No action was taken against Humaira's father.
Press reports routinely describe couples who are less fortunate,
such as Abdul Ghaffar and Shabana Bibi of Gila Deedar Singh, who were
abducted from a Gujranwala court on May 15 by 16 armed men representing
Shabana Bibi's parents, who opposed the match. At year's end, the
couple's fate was unknown. In July police in Kot Ghulam Mohammed
(Mirpurkas district, Sindh) raided the home of Javed Dal and arrested
his family members as hostages. Dal had eloped with his cousin. His
wife's father, Somar Dal, used his influence as a member of the Sindh
National Front executive committee to instigate the arrests, which were
carried out without warrants.
Upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of Jewish or Christian men
remain legal; however, upon conversion to Islam, the marriages of
Jewish or Christian women, or of other non-Muslims, that were performed
under the rites of the previous religion are considered dissolved.
The value of women's testimony is not equal to that of a man's in
certain court cases (see Section 1.e.).
Although a small number of women study and teach in universities,
postgraduate employment opportunities largely remain limited to
teaching, medical services, and the law. Nevertheless, an increasing
number of women are entering the commercial and public sectors.
Women's organizations operate primarily in urban centers. Many
concentrate on educating women about existing legal rights. Other
groups concentrate on providing legal aid to poor women in prison who
may not be able to afford an attorney.
Children.--There is no federal law on compulsory education, and
neither the federal nor provincial governments provide sufficient
resources to assure universal education. The education system is in
disarray, with studies showing that only 65 to 70 percent of children
under the age of 12 are enrolled in school, less than half of whom
actually complete primary school. Even in relatively prosperous
Karachi, enrollment figures are low. Before his killing in October
1998, M.I. Memon the head of the Board of Intermediate and Secondary
Education in Karachi estimated that only 1.1 million of Karachi's
school-age children actually were attending school: 500,000 in the
public schools; 500,000 in private schools; and 100,000 in madrassahs
(Islamic religious schools). Since the lowest estimate of school-age
children in Karachi is 4 million, even in the wealthiest, most
developed city in the country, it would appear that no more than 27.5
percent of school age children are attending school. Even those
children who go to school are not assured of being able to read and
write. According to UNICEF figures, a nationwide sample of children in
grade five revealed that only 33 percent could read with comprehension,
while a mere 17 percent were able to write a simple letter. Development
experts point to a number of factors for the poor state of public
education, including the low percentage of gross national product
devoted to education and inefficient and corrupt federal and provincial
bureaucracies. One member of the Prime Minister's education task force
estimated that up to 50 percent of the education budget is
``pilfered.''
Information about progress in educating girls is contradictory. A
recent survey found that the enrollment rate for girls under age 12 was
65 percent, which was less than that of boys (75 percent), but was
considerably higher than the 1990 figure of 50 percent. Since official
government figures count at most 1.5 million school-age children in
public and private schools and madrassahs in Karachi (of an estimated 4
million or more between the ages of 5 and 14), enrollment figures of 65
and 75 percent are difficult to account for. Similarly, the female
literacy rate has doubled during the past two decades, although, at
roughly 27 percent, it is just over half that of males. However, an
Oxfam report released in March stated that the proportion of girls
enrolled in school fell by 10 percent in the first half of the 1990's.
The federal Government announced a new education policy in March
1998, which dealt mostly with the construction of new schools but that
included provisions for increased Islamic instruction in public
schools. Education is a provincial responsibility under the
Constitution. In 1998 the government of Punjab, the country's most
populous province, began an ambitious program to improve the quality of
its educational system. A comprehensive survey was performed to
identify school buildings that were being misused and the large numbers
of teachers and administrators who were not performing their duties or
even showing up for work. Administrative action against these ``ghost
schools'' began, and the Government was better placed to ensure that
its education budget was not misused. The Punjab government also worked
closely with both international and local NGO's to improve primary and
secondary education. However, no legal action has been taken against
those found responsible for the misuse of government property.
Health care services, like education, remained seriously inadequate
for the nation's children. Children suffer a high rate of preventable
childhood diseases. Public health administration suffers from poor
management, avoidance of responsibility, false data, and lack of
cooperation among agencies. Polio, and effective vaccination to prevent
it, remain problems. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported 1,147
cases of polio in the country in 1997. The WHO and the Center for
Disease Control reported that the full (three-dose) course of oral
polio vaccine has been given to only 57 percent of children in Punjab,
50 percent in the NWFP, 42 percent in Sindh, and 22 percent in
Baluchistan. However, even the high number of reported polio cases may
be too low, and the reported protection rate may be too high. Public
health professors at a Karachi medical school report that vaccines
frequently are degraded by poor storage, and that vaccination rates are
inflated. On June 27, the English-language newspaper Dawn reported that
doctors in Sindh had persuaded the Sindh health department to order a
halt to reporting of polio cases. Doctors are required by law to
vaccinate all children under 5 years old within a 1.2 mile range (3
miles in rural areas), but they were taking steps to avoid the
responsibility. Although the Government has undertaken six national
immunization days since 1994, a Center for Disease Control official who
observed a June polio immunization campaign in Quetta, the capital of
Baluchistan, reported that vaccination teams had no maps, census data,
or plans. The International Labor Organization reports that 8 percent
of children suffer from iron deficiency and 30 to 40 percent of
children in the country suffer from stunted growth. According to a
family-planning NGO, up to 50 percent of children are born iodine-
deficient, resulting in high rates of mental retardation.
Many children begin working at a very early age (see Section 6.d.).
At the age of 5 or 6, many female children assume responsibility for
younger siblings.
Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f).
Children sometimes are kidnaped to be used as forced labor, for
ransom, or to seek revenge against an enemy (see Sections 6.c. and
6.d.). In rural areas, it is a traditional practice for poor parents to
give children to rich landlords in exchange for money or land,
according to human rights advocates. These children frequently are
abused by these landlords and held as bonded laborers for life.
Landlords also have been known to pay impoverished parents for the
``virginity'' of their daughters, whom the landlords then rape.
Incidents of rape and killing of minor teenage children are common. A
1996 survey conducted in Punjab showed that 40 percent of reported rape
victims were minors, with the youngest victim in the study only 8 years
old. A UNICEF-sponsored study of Punjab found that 15 percent of girls
reported having been sexually abused. Sexual abuse of boys is more
common in segments of society where women and girls traditionally
remain within the home. A Human Rights Commission of Pakistan study in
the NWFP found 723 cases of sexual abuse of boys and 635 of girls
between January and June 1998. Child prostitution involving boys and
girls is widely known to exist but rarely is discussed. The NGO Shabab-
i-Milli has launched a campaign to combat child prostitution by raising
public awareness about the problem. The Commission of Inquiry for Women
has observed that child sexual abuse is a subject that ``has been
virtually ignored in Pakistan,'' and called for a public education
campaign on the subject, including introducing it into school
curriculums and training nurses and doctors in how to handle such
cases.
Children's rights theoretically are protected by numerous laws that
incorporate elements of the U.N. Convention on the Rightsof the Child.
However, the Government frequently fails to enforce these laws. There
are two facilities--one in Karachi and one in Bahawalpur--that serve as
reform schools for juvenile offenders. There is only one jail in each
province for convicted prisoners under 21 years of age, and children
frequently are incarcerated along with the general prison population,
sharing prison conditions that are extremely poor (see Section 1.c.).
Many children in prison were born to female inmates who were sexually
abused by prison guards. Although Punjab and Sindh provinces have laws
mandating special judicial procedures for child offenders, in practice,
children and adults essentially are treated equally. An estimated 4,000
children were held in the nation's prisons, some as young as 8 years
old, compared with 3,480 in 1998. In Punjab in 1998 1,508 children
under age 18 were found in prison in an NGO survey, 16 of whom were
below the age of 12. Imprisoned children often spend long periods of
time in prison awaiting trial or a hearing before a magistrate, often
in violation of the law. One child spent 3 years and 4 months awaiting
trial. Children are subject to the same delays and inefficiencies in
the justice system as adults are (see Section 1.e.). Peshawar's jail in
1998 contained 183 children, 40 percent of whom were Afghan refugees.
These prisoners were separated from the adult prisoners. According to
some estimates, there are 900 children in Karachi's central jail, in a
space meant to house 300; these children are 18 and under. Human Rights
Watch reports that children frequently are beaten and even tortured
while in detention; usually this is done to extract confessions, but it
is done also to punish or intimidate child detainees or to extort
payment from their families for their release. Sexual abuse of child
detainees by police or guards reportedly is a problem as well (see
Section 1.c.). On April 11, a riot reportedly broke out in the juvenile
ward of the Sahiwal Central Prison in Punjab, after a 13-year-old
prisoner was beaten for complaining about sexual abuse at the hands of
the head warder. Nearly 20 children reportedly were injured as the riot
was quelled, and 10 children were charged in connection with the
incident. The Deputy Inspector General of Prisons visited the prison
soon after the incident and ordered the suspension of the head warder
accused, the assistant superintendent of the prison, and another
warder.
Courts also may order that children be sent to reform schools or
various types of residential facilities, many designed to provide
vocational or other training. Juvenile offenders, and in some cases,
homeless and destitute children, may be sent to these residential
facilities, for terms not to exceed the amount of time until they reach
majority. Conditions in these institutions reportedly are poor, similar
to those found in jails. Abuse and torture of the children in such
institutions is a problem; one study found that 17.4 percent of the
inmates of the Youthful Offenders Industrial School in Karachi had been
tortured or otherwise mistreated. Educational facilities in these
institutions often are inadequate. Extortion on the part of the staff
at such institutions is reportedly endemic; parents of inmates often
are required to pay lower level staff members to visit their children
or bring them food. Drug trafficking by guards and other staff also is
a problem; some children reportedly have developed drug habits while in
these institutions, and are supplied by their guards.
According to press reports, there are several madrassahs where
children are confined illegally and kept in unhealthy conditions, and
there were several reports of the abuse of children studying at
madrassahs during the year. In one 1998 case, 14 children were found in
fetters at a madrassah in Lahore. The principal of the madrassah was
arrested, but was released when he claimed that the parents were
responsible for the use of fetters. A member of the Council of Islamic
Ideology has condemned the fettering of children. Sexual abuse of boys
is widely believed to occur at some madrassahs.
People with Disabilities.--There are no laws requiring equal
accessibility to public buildings for disabled persons. The vast
majority of the physically and mentally disabled are cared for by their
families. However, in some cases these individuals are forced into
begging, while organized criminal ``beggarmasters'' skim off much of
the proceeds. There have been allegations of exploitation of
microcephalic persons at Jhelum, a Punjab town where such individuals
are cared for at a local shrine. There is a legal provision requiring
public and private organizations to reserve at least 2 percent of their
jobs for qualified disabled persons. Organizations that do not wish to
hire disabled persons can instead give a certain amount of money to the
government treasury, which goes into a fund for the disabled. This
obligation rarely is enforced. A NationalCouncil for the Rehabilitation
of the Disabled provides some job placement and loan facilities.
Religious Minorities.--Government authorities afford religious
minorities fewer protections than are afforded to Sunni Muslim
citizens. Members of religious minorities are subject to violence and
harassment, and police at times refuse to prevent such actions or to
charge persons who commit them.
Sectarian violence between Sunnis and Shi'a continued to be a
serious problem throughout the country. In Punjab in particular, a
deadly pattern of Sunni-Shi'a violence in which terrorists killed
persons because of their membership in rival sectarian organizations,
or simply for their religious identification, continued. On January 4,
several motorcycle gunmen fired on an early morning prayer service at a
Shi'a mosque in Karamdad Qureshi, Punjab, killing 17 persons and
wounding at least 25 others. Police arrested 46 members of the Sipah-e-
Sahabah Pakistan (SSP), a Sunni militant group, in connection with the
attack. It was widely believed that an offshoot of the SSP, the
Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, was responsible for the attack. On March 24,
motorcycle gunmen shot and killed Barkat Ali, a leader of the Shi'a
group Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafria, outside his home in the Tunsa
area of Punjab. The gunmen are believed to belong to the SSP. Four
individuals abducted and then killed Mirza Ghulam Qadir on April 14.
Qadir was the nephew of the supreme head of the Ahmadi community.
Ahmadis believe that militants from the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi killed him
for religious reasons. Police killed the perpetrators in an encounter
following the killing. On the evening of April 25, (the 8th of
Moharram), four Shi'a Punjabis visiting a village near Dera Ismail Khan
in the NWFP to recite Moharram morning prayers were killed in their
sleep. Sunni religious militants were believed to have committed the
killings in order to provoke Shi'a-Sunni conflict during the
traditionally tense 9th and 10th of Moharram. Local authorities in the
NWFP and in Punjab took steps to calm sentiments, and there was no
further violence in connection with this incident. On August 19,
Mohammed Khalid Rajput, an SSP activist, was shot and killed,
apparently when members of the rival Shi'a organization, Tehrik-e-
Nifaz-e-Fiqh-Jafria, fired on an SSP rally in Dera Ismail Khan, NWFP.
On the following day, a Shi'a mourning procession was fired upon,
although there were no casualties. Five persons were charged in
connection with the killing; three had been arrested by year's end. On
September 6, an explosion in a madrassah in Karachi injured more than
20 persons; those injured had rushed to the scene of a previous
explosion, in which there were no injuries. On September 24, the
Secretary General of the TJP in Dera Ismail Khan was killed by three
SSP leaders, setting off a wave of sectarian violence. All three of the
leaders were arrested soon after the killing; the case was pending at
year's end. After the killing, attacks began in Punjab and Sindh,
perpetrated by both Shi'as and Sunnis, in which more than 30 persons
were killed. Among those killed were President of the Gujranwala
division of the TJP, Ijaz Hussain Rasool Nagri, on September 30; 9
worshipers in a Shi'a mosque in Karachi on October 1; Assistant
Inspector General of Police in the NWFP, Farooq Haider, a Shi'a, on
October 2; 5 students in a Sunni madrassah in Karachi, on October 2;
Dr. Qaiser Abbas Sayyal, a relative of an advisor to the Prime
Minister, along with several others, in a clinic in Lahore in early
October. On October 6, Nisa Ali Hazara, a Shi'a member of the Baluch
Assembly and the Baluchistan Education Minister, was shot and injured
in Quetta by masked gunmen as his car left the Baluch Assembly; his
driver was killed. Also on October 6, two Shi'a homeopathic doctors,
Al-e Hassan and Muttasim Hassan, were shot and killed at their home in
Karachi by motorcycle gunmen; another doctor, Mohammad Nisar, an
influential member of the Sunni Jamaat-i-Islami, was killed in Karachi
earlier on the same day. Aun Mohammed Rizvi, a senior Shi'a official
from the state-run television station, was shot and killed by
motorcycle gunmen in Rawalpindi on October 7. The Punjab government
ordered a crackdown on extremists in early October, as a result of
which several hundred persons, including the leader of the SSP, Maulana
Mohammad Azam Tariq, and SSP branch president Maulana Mohammad Ahmad
Ludhianvi, were arrested. Tariq has since been released. On November 4,
three explosions occurred in Murdike, where the Sunni militant group
Lashkar-e-Taiba was holding its annual conference; 1 person was killed
and more than 30 were injured. There were reports of between 16 and 40
encounter killings of members of the SSP and the Lashkar-i-Jhangvi. On
December 27, 13 Sunnis were killed and 6 were injured in Sikanderpur
village, Haripur district, NWFP. The victims, who reportedly belonged
to the SSP, were returning from the funeral of another SSP member and
were killed by three Shi'as. Prior to the incident, there had been a
dispute in the area over the construction of a Shi'amosque in a
graveyard claimed by local Sunnis. On December 28, despite an increase
in security in the area, thousands of SSP members destroyed homes and
shops belonging to local Shi'as after attending the funerals of those
killed the previous day. At year's end, no suspects had been detained
in connection with these events.
In July the Government released Sunni extremist leader Mohammad
Azam Tariq, chief of the SSP, who had been arrested in May 1997 and
charged with the murder of a former PPP member of Parliament and in 58
other cases of murder, terrorism, and incitement to sectarian violence.
The SSP and its militant offshoot, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, frequently are
involved in anti-Shi'a sectarian violence.
Ahmadis are often targets of religious intolerance, much of which
is instigated by organized religious extremists. For example, in a July
1998 sermon at a rally in Lahore, the head of the influential Tanzeem
Islami organization, Israr Ahmed, stated that the Government and
Muslims have a right to commit a ``general massacre'' of the Ahmadis,
since they are heretics. Ahmadi leaders charge that militant Sunni
mullahs and their followers sometimes stage marches through the streets
of Rabwah, a predominantly Ahmadi town and spiritual center in central
Punjab. Backed by mobs of 100 to 200 persons, the mullahs purportedly
stride down the streets uttering diatribes against the Ahmadis and
their founder, a situation that often leads to violence. Police
generally are present during these marches, the Ahmadis claim, but as a
rule do not intervene to prevent trouble. A number of Ahmadis were
injured seriously in attacks by religious extremists, and Ahmadi
leaders attribute several killings of Ahmadis during the year to anti-
Ahmadi extremists. The Majlis Tahafuz Khatam-e-Nabuwwat (Committee for
the Finality of the Prophethood) actively promoted an anti-Ahmadi
agenda during the year. According to press reports, in August Religious
Affairs Minister Raja Zafarul Haq asserted that ``un-Islamic''
activities would not be tolerated and sent a message of support to the
international Khatam-e-Nabuwwat movement. According to press reports,
Muslim clerics called on President Tarar on April 23 to ask the
President to extend the anti-Ahmadi ordinance to Azad Kashmir. There
has been no progress in the 1998 killings of Muhammad Ayub Azam and
Maleek Nasir.
Ahmadis suffer from harassment and discrimination and have limited
chances for advancement into management levels in government service
(see Section 2.c.). Even the rumor that someone may be an Ahmadi or
have Ahmadi relatives can stifle opportunities for employment or
promotion. Ahmadi students in public schools are subject to abuse by
their non-Ahmadi classmates, and the quality of teachers assigned to
predominantly Ahmadi schools by the Government is poor. However, most
Ahmadis are home-schooled or go to private Ahmadi-run schools. Young
Ahmadis and their parents also complain of difficulty in gaining
admittance to good colleges, forcing many children to go abroad for
higher education. Certain sections of the Penal Code also have caused
problems for the group (see Section 2.c.), particularly the provision
that forbids Ahmadis from ``directly or indirectly'' posing as Muslims.
Armed with this vague wording, mullahs have brought charges against
Ahmadis for using the standard Muslim greeting form and naming their
children Mohammed.
Other religious minority groups also experience considerable
discrimination in employment and education. In the country's early
years, minorities were able to rise to the senior ranks of the military
and civil service. Today, many are unable to rise above mid-level
ranks. Discrimination in employment is believed to be common.
Christians in particular have difficulty finding jobs other than those
of menial labor, although Christian activists say that the employment
situation has improved somewhat in the private sector. Christians find
themselves disproportionately over-represented in Pakistan's most
oppressed social group--that of bonded laborers. Like Ahmadis, many
Christians complain about the difficulty that their children have in
gaining admission to government schools and colleges, a problem they
attribute to discrimination. Many Christians continue to express fear
of forced marriages between Muslim males and Christian women, although
the practice is relatively rare. Reprisals against suspected converts
to Christianity occur, and a general atmosphere of religious
intolerance has led to acts of violence against religious minorities
(see Section 2.c.). For example, on October 22, a Christian church in
Lahore was set on fire and sustained major damage. An individual was
charged in connection with the incident the same day. There are
restrictions on certain testimony in court by non-Muslims (see Section
1.e.).
In August the leader of the Sunni religious party Jamiat Ulema-i-
Islami (JUI), Fazlur Rehman, accused the Aga Khan Foundation of the
killing of a Sunni religious leader and his nephew in Chitral and
called for the closure of Aga Khan activities. The Sunni leader was
killed by an Ismaili in a property dispute on August 19. The Aga Khan
Foundation is a community service organization sponsored by Ismaili
Shi'as. On November 4, a series of explosions killed one person and
injured 30 others in Murdike. The militant Sunni extremist organization
Lashkar-e-Taiba was holding its annual conference in the town at the
time. In November 1998, nine members of a Christian family were killed
and mutilated in their home in Nowshera, in an attack that some
Christians alleged was sectarian. In December 1998, four family members
were arrested and charged with the crime. They asserted their innocence
to the press. Two alleged that they had been tortured to induce
confessions; one of the family members who confessed was being tried at
year's end.
Although there are few if any citizens who are Jewish, anti-Semitic
sentiments appear to be widespread, and anti-Semitic press articles are
relatively common.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Industrial Relations Ordinance of
1969 (IRO) provides for the right of industrial workers to form trade
unions but is subject to major restrictions in some employment areas.
The Essential Services Maintenance Act of 1952 (ESA) covers sectors
associated with the state administration, i.e., government services and
state enterprises, such as oil and gas production, electricity
generation and transmission, the state-owned airline, and ports.
Workers in these sectors are allowed to form unions. However, the ESA
sharply restricts normal union activities, usually prohibiting, for
example, the right to strike in affected organizations. A worker's
right to quit also may be curtailed under the ESMA. For each industry
subject to the ESMA, the Government must make a finding, renewable
every 6 months, on the limits of union activity. There is no provision
allowing agricultural workers or teachers to unionize, as they are not
defined as ``an industry.'' Following assumption of responsibility of
the utility by the military, a presidential ordinance in December 1998
banned all union activity in the water and power development authority
(employing 130,000 workers) for 2 years. The International
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) reports that in July the
government of Punjab announced that it had decided to curb the
activities of unions and associations, including the All Pakistan
Clerks' Association, because they were perceived as obstructing public
policy.
Other restrictions on union activities include the Antiterrorism
Ordinance of 1999 (ATO), promulgated in the early part of the year. The
ATO codified the crime of a ``terrorist act,'' including, ``an act of
civil commotion.'' Such acts are punishable by imprisonment of 7 years
to life, as well as fines. ``Civil commotion'' include illegal strikes,
go-slows, and lockouts. Under the original ordinance, those
distributing, publishing, or pasting a handbill, or making graffiti or
wall chalking ``intended to create unrest'' were subject to arrest.
According to the ILO, this ordinance prevented leafleting, posters, or
even word-of-mouth notices of public meetings. Later in the year, the
ATO was renewed with an amendment eliminating references to handbills,
graffiti, or the intent to create civil commotion (see Section 1.e. and
2.b.).
According to government estimates, union members make up only about
10 percent of the industrial labor force and 3 percent of the total
estimated work force. Unions claim that the number of union members is
underestimated. Contract labor continues to flourish, undercutting the
power of the unions and exploiting workers willing to work on temporary
contracts. These workers receive fewer benefits and have no job
security.
Legally required conciliation proceedings and cooling-off periods
constrain the right to strike, as does the Government's authority to
ban any strike that may cause ``serious hardship to the community'' or
prejudice the national interest. The Government also may ban a strike
that has continued for 30 days.
Strikes are rare. When they occur, they usually are illegal and
short. The Government regards as illegal any strike conducted by
workers who are not members of a legally registered union. Police do
not hesitate to crack down on worker demonstrations. The law prohibits
employers from seeking retribution against leaders of a legal strike
and stipulates criminal penalties for offenders. The courts may
imprison employers for violating thisprohibition, but they are more
likely to fine them. The law does not protect leaders of illegal
strikes.
Unions may belong to federations, and there are eight major
federations. The Government permits trade unions across the political
spectrum. While many unions remain aloof from politics, some are
associated with political parties. Unions associated with opposition
parties are allowed to carry on their activities freely.
In 1997 the Cabinet passed an amendment to the IRO which states
that: 1) only employees of the represented industry can hold office in
a trade union; and 2) if trade unions form a federation, the federation
cannot bargain with individual employers; each component union has to
bargain for itself. The first provision disadvantages smaller unions,
which may not have enough officers capable of bargaining. The second
provision is an attempt to weaken the power of the federations. This
amendment has been challenged by the trade unions and, as a result, has
not yet come into force. Late in 1997, the Prime Minister announced the
Government's new investment policy, under which, in order to improve
working relations among employees and employers, trade union activity
would be industry-based and not factory-based. The new policy also
decrees that, in order to check the growth of trade unions, unions
receiving less than 20 percent of the votes in a referendum are to be
dissolved automatically and their registrations canceled. No action has
been taken to implement these elements of the investment policy.
The International Labor Organization (ILO) has stated repeatedly
that current law and practice violate the Government's commitments
under ILO Convention 87. The ILO has urged the Government to lift
prohibitions against union activity with respect to teachers, and
radio, television, railway, forestry, hospital, and other government
employees, as well as to rescind the existing ban on strikes. The ILO
also expressed concern about the practice of artificial promotions that
exclude workers from the purview of Convention 111. In response to a
government request, the ILO has provided technical assistance to help
bring the country's labor laws into conformity with the ILO's
conventions. However, no legislative remedies have been applied.
In 1994 a government task force on labor prepared a report
recommending improvements on worker rights problems, which were the
basis for the development of a new labor policy by the Government. The
Government has not yet approved the new labor policy; however, the
Government has implemented two components of the proposed labor policy:
1) improvements in the workers' welfare fund; and 2) increases in
social security benefits for workers. In 1997 the Prime Minister and
trade union representatives agreed to establish a committee to examine
the labor laws and draft legislation to bring them into conformity with
ILO conventions and the national Constitution. No concrete action has
yet been taken by this committee.
Federations are free to affiliate with international federations
and confederations. For example, trade unions belong to the ICFTU and
to secretariats affiliated with the ICFTU.
The United States revoked generalized system of preferences (GSP)
trade benefits in 1996 for failure to make progress on worker rights
issues.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The right of
industrial workers to organize and to freely elect representatives to
act as collective bargaining agents is established in law. The IRO
prohibits antiunion discrimination by employers. Under the law, private
employers are required to reinstate workers fired for union activities.
However, in practice, such redress has not been available to workers,
because workers usually do not pursue redress through the courts,
because they view the legal system as slow, prohibitively expensive,
and corrupt.
In general, legally constituted unions have the right to bargain
collectively. However, the many restrictions on forming unions (see
Section 6.a.) preclude collective bargaining by large sections of the
labor force, e.g., agricultural workers, who are not provided with the
right to strike, to bargain collectively, or to make demands on
employers. The National Bank of Pakistan Employees Union filed suit
against the Government for implementing a banking companies ordinance
that prohibited union activities in banks during working hours and
allowed only current bank employees to serve as bank trade union
officials. Labor unions report that the practice of giving
artificialpromotions to make workers ineligible for union membership is
prevalent in the financial sector.
The ESA also restricts collective bargaining. For each industry
subject to the ESA (see Section 6.a.), the Government must make a
finding, renewable every 6 months, on the limits of union activity. In
cases in which the Government prohibits collective bargaining, special
wage boards decide wage levels.
These boards are established at the provincial level and comprise
representatives from industry, labor, and the provincial labor
ministry, which provides the chairman. The chairman may name additional
industry and labor representatives to the board. Despite the presence
of the labor representatives, unions generally are dissatisfied with
the boards' findings. Disputes are adjudicated before the National
Industrial Relations Commission. A worker's right to quit also may be
curtailed under the ESA. Dismissed workers have no recourse to the
labor courts.
The ESA exempts export promotion zones (EPZ's) from the IRO's
provision granting workers the right to form trade unions. Only one EPZ
currently exists, in Karachi. Nearly 6,000 persons are employed there,
according to government sources. In 1996 the cabinet decided to
withdraw these exemptions beginning in January 2000. However, the
Government has stated that it will honor agreements with investors
regarding the exemptions, making it unlikely that the Export processing
zone Authority provision will be lifted before 2001.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--The Constitution and
the law prohibit forced labor, including forced labor by children;
however, the Government does not enforce these prohibitions
effectively. Critics argue that the ESA's limitation on some worker
rights, especially the right to quit, constitutes a form of compulsory
labor. The ILO has objected to this violation of Convention 29. The
Government has responded that the maintenance of essential services is
required for the defense and security of the country, and that
continued reviews have limited these services to a few, e.g.,
electricity generation and distribution, and air and sea ports.
There is a reasonable basis to believe that hand made bricks and
hand woven wool carpets are produced using forced or indentured child
labor. Illegal bonded labor is widespread. It is common in the brick,
glass, and fishing industries and is found among agricultural and
construction workers in rural areas. A recent study by local unions
suggests that over 200,000 families work in debt slavery in the brick
kiln industry. There is no evidence that bonded labor is used in the
production of export items such as sporting goods and surgical
equipment. However, bonded labor reportedly is used in the production
of carpets for export under the peshgi system, by which a worker is
advanced money and raw materials for a carpet he promises to complete.
Conservative estimates put the number of bonded workers at several
million.
The Constitution and the law prohibit slavery. However, in remote
areas of rural Sindh, bonded agricultural labor and debt slavery have a
long history, despite constitutional and legal prohibitions. Landlords
have kept entire families in private prisons and families have been
sold by one landlord to another. According to press reports, raids by
Government officials and human rights activists over a 2-year period
from January 1995 to January 1997 resulted in the liberation of 349
bonded laborers. The Government of Punjab has now reportedly enhanced
its activities, particularly in regard to bonded and child labor.
The Bonded Labor System (Abolition) Act adopted in 1992 outlawed
bonded labor, canceled all existing bonded debts, and forbade lawsuits
for the recovery of existing debts. The act makes bonded labor by
children punishable by up to 5 years in prison and up to $1000 (PRs
50,000) in fines. However, the provincial governments, which are
responsible for enforcing the law, have failed to establish enforcement
mechanisms. Hence, the law is largely ineffective. Lacking employment
alternatives, many workers have returned to bonded labor.
Children in juvenile detention facilities reportedly are required
to work; children at the Karachi Central Jail, who either are
imprisoned for crimes they have committed, were detained with their
parents, or were born in jail, reportedly are involved in woodcrafts
and television repairs (see Section 6.d.).
Trafficking in children is a problem (see Section 6.f.)Children
sometimes are kidnaped to be used as forced labor. According to 1996
ILO estimates, 3.3 million children between the ages of 5 and 14 years
(about 8 percent of this population group) are ``economically active.''
Of these, about two-thirds work in agriculture. Seventy percent of the
working children have the status of ``unpaid family helpers.'' Many
observers believe that the ILO estimates understate the true dimensions
of the problem. Observers also believe that the incidence of bonded
labor among such children is significant, but there are no reliable
figures available on this.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--Child labor is common and results from a combination of
severe poverty, employer greed, and inadequate enforcement of laws
intended to control it. The Constitution prohibits the employment of
children aged 14 years and under in factories, mines, and other
hazardous occupations. The Employment of Children Act of 1991, whose
provisions were extended by the President in 1998 to the FATA,
prohibits the employment of children under age 14 in certain
occupations and regulates their conditions of work. Under this law, no
child is allowed to work overtime or at night. Penalties for the
violation of the act include fines of up to $400 (PRs 20,000) or 1 year
in prison. The Government acknowledges that child labor is a problem.
The Constitution prohibits forced labor, including forced labor
performed by children; however, forced and bonded labor by children is
common (see Section 6.c.).
Children in juvenile detention facilities reportedly are required
to work; children at the Karachi Central Jail, who either are
imprisoned for crimes they have committed, were detained with their
parents, or were born in jail, are reportedly involved in woodcrafts
and television repairs (see Section 6.c.).
In 1996 the Government announced the results of its first
comprehensive child labor survey conducted with the assistance of the
ILO's International Program for the Elimination of Child Labor (ILO-
IPEC). According to the survey, 8.3 percent (or between 3.3 and 3.6
million) of children between the ages of 5 and 14 worked. The child
labor force was predominately male (73 percent) and predominately rural
(71 percent). About 60 percent of child labor in the country occurred
in Punjab. Some 45.8 percent of child laborers worked 35 hours or more
per week and 12.6 percent worked 56 hours or more. The majority (67
percent) of child laborers worked in agriculture, forestry, hunting,
and fishing industries; 11 percent in the manufacturing sector, 9
percent in wholesale and retail, and 8 percent in social and personal
services. In occupational terms, craft and related trade work accounted
for about 19 percent of child laborers, while 71 percent worked in
unskilled jobs. Only the Government and exporters regard the ILO survey
as an accurate measurement of the incidence of child labor. Many
observers believe that it understates the true dimensions of the
problem, with high-range estimates of as many as 20 million child
laborers. A recent ILO survey indicated that agriculture is the largest
child labor industry; followed by the informal sector, including
domestic work, street vending, illegal work, and family businesses;
hazardous work, such as the leather, surgical instruments, and brick
kiln industries rank third. The report also noted that when programs
are developed to eliminate child labor in one industry, parents often
shift their children to work in other industries. A survey conducted by
the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan published in June noted that
there are approximately 4,000 children working in auto workshops in the
Mardan district of the NWFP. The report stated that most of the
children were between the ages of 3 and 8.
Child labor is widely employed in the carpet industry, much of
which is family-run. Most children working in the carpet industry are
female. Carpet manufacturers are working with ILO-IPEC to establish a
program to eliminate child labor from the industry through monitoring
and rehabilitation. Although surgical instrument manufacturers have
taken steps to remove child laborers from their factories, child labor
in this industry still occurs at rudimentary offsite filing and
polishing centers run by subcontractors for low-end items. Almost all
children working in the surgical instrument industry are male.
According to the ILO and the Punjab Welfare Department, approximately
15 percent of the work force in the surgical instrument industry in
Sialkot is made up of children; it is estimated that 7,500 such
children are under age 14. According to a June report issued by Public
Services International, the average age of children in the surgical
instrumentindustry is 12; children in the industry are prone to
injuries from machinery and burns from hot metal, as well as
respiratory illnesses from inhaling poisonous metal dust. Child labor
is not regarded as a particular problem in the textile and apparel
industries, but no specific studies of the sector have been performed
on this issue.
In October 1997, soccer ball manufacturers, importers, the ILO, and
UNICEF implemented an 18-month action plan agreed upon in February 1997
(the Atlanta Agreement) to eliminate child labor from the soccer ball
industry. This project, based in Sialkot, monitored the production of
soccer balls at newly established stitching centers, and had set up 154
rehabilitation centers for the education of former child laborers and
their younger siblings. The project also sought to identify unemployed
adults from the families of former child stitchers to take up stitching
work and replace lost income. By May 1998, 83 percent of production was
verified as having moved to monitored stitching centers. Women have
been reluctant to move from their homes to stitching centers. The
project is working to establish small home-based stitching centers in
individual villages to counter this unwillingness to travel to work,
and some 80 village-based stitching centers had been set up for women
as of October 1998; by March there were 138 such centers for women.
Saga Sports, which also manufactures soccer balls, has built modern
community-based facilities in 10 villages with a high percentage of
family stitching operations. The facilities contain workspace for
stitchers as well as dining areas, child care centers, recreation
areas, and medical clinics. Each facility also has its own water
system, waste disposal system, generator for electricity, and
transportation system. Meals, child care, medical services, and use of
the facilities are provided free of charge to Saga workers and their
families; use of non-production areas is allowed to all community
members. These centers reportedly have created approximately 6,000
jobs, 400 to 500 of which are held by women. By the end of the year,
approximately 6,000 children had been removed from the industry.
Under a memorandum of understanding with the Government, the ILO/
IPEC program in Pakistan is involved with a number of other projects
concerning child labor. The ILO works with the Government, employers,
workers, and NGO's in pursuing a national policy and plan of action for
child labor. The Government established 30 rehabilitation centers (50
are planned) for former child laborers through the Pakistan Bait-u-Mal,
the Government's social welfare fund. Each center educates 120
children. The ILO created a similar program in conjunction with the
European Union, specifically targeting child bonded laborers. In
December 1998, the ILO and the Swiss Agency for Development and
Cooperation launched a large scale project to combat child labor and
child abuse in the NWFP.
In response to international criticism, the Government has begun to
push provincial authorities to enforce child labor laws. However,
enforcement of child labor laws remains a problem. There are relatively
few child labor inspectors in most districts, and the inspectors often
receive little training and have insufficient resources. By law the
inspectors also may not inspect facilities that employ less than 10
persons; most child labor occurs in facilities smaller than this.
Hundreds of convictions are obtained each year for violations of child
labor laws, but low fines levied by the courts--ranging from an average
of $7 (PRs 364) in the NWFP to an average of $140 (PRs 7,280) in
Baluchistan--do not serve as a significant deterrent. The 1991
Employment of Children Act allows for fines of up to $350 (PRs 18,200).
Often, penalties are not imposed on those found to be violating child
labor laws.
The Child Care Foundation of Pakistan, a national NGO, was
established in 1996 with support from Pakistan's Ministry of Commerce.
Other NGO's, such as the Pakistan Bait-ul-Mal, conduct programs to end
child labor. Bait-ul-Mal, with funding from the Government and from
international organizations, operates 33 education centers for
children, known collectively as the National Center for the
Rehabilitation of Child Labor. Parents of working children are offered
compensation of $6 per month (PRs 300), plus a small daily stipend of
approximately $0.10 (PRs 5) in exchange for sending their children to
school. The children in the centers receive free schooling, uniforms,
books, and meals. However, it appears that many children do not remain
in these schools for more than 1 year; the schools are often in areas
far from their clients; and it has been reported that some children are
sent to these schools rather than to public schools, in order to
qualify for the stipend. The Bunyad Literacy Community Council also
runs schools for children. It focuses on children who work in the
soccer ball industry, and its programs are aimed at transitioning
children out of working and into mainstream schooling. Other local
NGO's are involvedin the elimination of child labor, as well, including
Rugmark Pakistan, Sudhuur, and the Society for the Protection of the
Rights of the Child.
e. Acceptable Conditions at Work.--Federal statutes applicable
throughout the country govern labor regulations. The minimum wage for
unskilled workers is $38 (PRs 1,976) per month, with only slightly
higher minimum rates for skilled workers. It applies only to industrial
and commercial establishments employing 50 or more workers and not to
agricultural or other workers in the informal sectors. The minimum wage
is usually inadequate to provide a decent standard of living for a
worker and family, since families tend to be large.
Federal law provides for a maximum workweek of 48 hours (54 hours
for seasonal factories) with rest periods during the workday and paid
annual holidays. These regulations do not apply to agricultural
workers, workers in factories with fewer than 10 employees, and
contractors. Many workers are unaware of the regulations that protect
their rights because of their lack of education.
Additional benefits required by the Federal Labor Code include
official government holidays, overtime pay, annual and sick leaves,
health and safety standards in the workplace, health care, workers
children's education, social security, employees old age benefits and a
workers welfare fund. Employees earning more than $60 (PRs 3,120) per
month are not considered workers for the sake of these benefits.
The provinces have been ineffective in enforcing labor regulations,
because of limited resources, corruption, and inadequate regulatory
structures. In general health and safety standards are poor. Although
organized labor presses for improvements, the Government has done
little and weakly enforces existing legal protection. Workers cannot
remove themselves from dangerous working conditions without risking
loss of employment. There is a serious lack of adherence to mine safety
and health protocols. For example, mines often have only one opening
for entry, egress and ventilation.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Trafficking in persons, especially in
women, is a significant problem, and the law prohibits the trafficking
of women under age 21 into the country for sexual purposes, as well as
kidnapping and slavery. However, despite widespread general knowledge
about trafficking, the Government has done little to stem the flow of
women trafficked into the country or to help victims of trafficking.
Pakistan is a receiving country for thousands of trafficked women
every year, mainly from Bangladesh. The Commission of Inquiry for Women
drew attention to the problem of ``enforced prostitution and
trafficking in women,'' noting that women are the victims of
exploitation by police and pimps, and should be treated with
compassion. A Karachi-based NGO estimates that 100 to 150 women are
trafficked into the country each day from Bangladesh and are sold for
both domestic labor throughout the country and for forced prostitution
in Karachi. Press reports also indicate that the practice of buying and
selling brides still occurs in parts of the NWFP and Punjab.
Trafficking victims usually are deceived with false prospects of
marriage or offers of work in legitimate jobs in Pakistan. Most are
smuggled from Bangladesh through India to Pakistan. Smaller numbers of
Burmese, Sri Lankan, Indian, and Afghan women also are trafficked. Such
women generally do not have legal residency, and, if arrested in police
raids, end up in jail for violation of immigration laws or violations
of the Hudood ordinance. Without money to pay for bail, they often are
bailed out by their pimps, who force them to return to prostitution.
Small numbers of escaped trafficking victims end up in shelters, but
most do not, as there are few such shelters available. Many women who
are not bailed out never are repatriated; rather, they languish in
confinement while waiting to go home.
Women who are high school graduates reportedly cost approximately
$5,000 (PRs 260,000); less educated women who are not physically
attractive reportedly cost approximately one-third as much. Some women
sold in shops in Karachi reportedly are sent to Persian Gulf states,
where they are slaves; women sent to rural Pakistan reportedly are de
facto slaves. Buyers in such shops reportedly purchase women for
purposes of labor or sex; some are married to their buyers.
There are reports that Afghan and Bangladeshi girls are trafficked
into the country for sexual purposes.
Young boys are trafficked from Pakistan to the Persian Gulf to work
as camel jockeys; sometimes they are abducted by traffickers in the
country and sent abroad without the knowledge of their parents. The
conditions such children live under often are poor, and many children
reportedly are injured or maimed while racing camels. In July the case
of an 8\1/2\year-old Pakistani boy was reported in the United Arab
Emirates. He had been kidnaped in the city of Larkan in 1997 and
smuggled through Iran to al-Ein in the Abu Dhabi emirate, where he was
forced to work as a camel jockey. He was rescued by the police, who
acted on a tip, and returned him to his parents. Within the country,
children sometimes are kidnaped to be used as forced labor, for ransom,
or to seek revenge against an enemy (see Sections 6.c. and 6.d.). In
rural areas, it is a traditional practice for poor parents to give
children to rich landlords in exchange for money or land, according to
human rights advocates. These children frequently are abused by these
landlords and held as bonded laborers for life.
______
SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka is a longstanding democratic republic with an active
multiparty system. Constitutional power is shared between the popularly
elected President and the 225-member Parliament. In 1994 Chandrika
Kumaratunga, the head of the governing People's Alliance (PA)
coalition, was elected President in free and fair elections. In
November President Kumaratunga scheduled presidential elections for
December 21 even though her 6-year term was not set to expire until
November 2000. The preelection period was marked by violence. On
December 18, a member of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)
unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate the President. Kumaratunga was
reelected on December 21 in elections that were characterized as
generally free and fair; however, there were credible accounts of
voting irregularities and at least six persons were killed in election-
related violence. The Parliament was elected in free and fair elections
in 1994; new parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2000. The
Government respects constitutional provisions for an independent
judiciary.
For the past 16 years the Government has fought LTTE, an insurgent
organization fighting for a separate state in the north and east for
the country's Tamil minority. The conflict has claimed approximately
60,000 lives. In a failed attempt to open a land-based supply route to
Jaffna in 1997 and 1998, 5,000 combatants on both sides were killed and
tens of thousands of persons were displaced from their homes. During
the year, government forces gained territory in the north and west of
the island through a series of offensives. In November the LTTE
counterattacked and successfully pushed back the government forces to
new defensive lines, recapturing most of the territory that the
Government had seized over the past 2 years. It is estimated that more
than a thousand combatants were killed on both sides.
The Government, through the Ministry of Defense, controls all
security forces. The 60,000-member police force is responsible for
internal security in most areas of the country and also has been used
in military operations against the LTTE. The 120,000-member army (which
includes the Army Volunteer Force), the 17,000-member navy, and the
18,500-member air force bear principal responsibility for conducting
operations against the LTTE insurgents. The Police Paramilitary Special
Task Force (STF) also battles the LTTE. The more than 15,000-member
Home Guards, an armed force drawn from local communities and
responsible to the police, provides security for Muslim and Sinhalese
village communities in or near the war zone. The Government also arms
and directs various Tamil militias opposed to the LTTE, although at
times these groups act independently of government authority. During
the year, some members of the security forces committed serious human
rights abuses.
Sri Lanka is a low-income country with a market economy based on
the export of textiles, tea, rubber, coconuts, and gems, and on
earnings from tourism and repatriated earnings of citizens employed
abroad. The gross domestic product per capita is approximately $850.
The economy's growth rate was 4.7 percent in 1998 and growth for 1999
was expected to be less than 4.0 percent due to declining strength in
the garment industry and a contraction in the market for export of tea.
In 1997 the Government intensified efforts to promote economic reform
and liberalization, including privatizing some government enterprises
and promoting foreign investment and trade. These steps continued
during the year.
The Government generally respected the human rights of its citizens
in areas not affected by the insurgency; however, the ongoing war with
the LTTE continued to be accompanied by serious human rights abuses by
the security forces. Security forces committed numerous extrajudicial
killings, and almost certainly killed prisoners captured on the
battlefield. In addition up to 15 individuals disappeared from security
force custody in Vavuniya and in the east. In the past, persons also
have disappeared or have been killed after last being seen near the
army's forward defense lines in the north, areas civilians are ordered
by the military to avoid. The circumstances of such disappearances and
killings were unclear, and with the many military offensives and
forward defense line changes throughout the year, the risk to civilians
remained high. Torture remained a serious problem, and prison
conditions remained poor. Arbitrary arrests--including short-term mass
arrests and detentions--continued, often accompanied by failure of the
security forces to comply with the protective provisions of the
Emergency Regulations (ER). Impunity for those responsible for human
rights abuses also remained a serious problem. Little progress was made
in resolving cases of extrajudicial killing or disappearance. In most
cases, there was no investigation or prosecution at all, giving the
appearance of impunity for those responsible for human rights
violations. No arrests were made in connection with the disappearance
and presumed killing of at least 350 civilians whom the security forces
suspected were members or sympathizers of the LTTE in Jaffna in 1996
and 1997. The Government infringed on citizens' privacy rights and
restricted freedom of the press. The Government continued to engage in
censorship of domestic newspaper reporting and foreign television
broadcasts on military and security operations during the year. On
occasion security forces harassed journalists. On one occasion
government forces assaulted journalists and forcibly dispersed a march
by the leading opposition party. There were some restrictions on
freedom of movement, especially from Vavuniya to the south and Colombo.
Violence and discrimination against women, child prostitution, child
labor, and discrimination against the disabled continued to be
problems. There is some discrimination and occasional violence against
religious minorities and widespread ethnic discrimination against
Tamils. Trafficking in women and children for the purpose of forced
prostitution occurs.
In positive developments, the Government took steps to control
abuses. The national Human Rights Commission (HRC) continued its
operations in 11 offices around the nation; however, human rights
observers believed the HRC was not pursuing its mandate aggressively
due to poor leadership. In 1998 the Government also established a
cabinet-level committee initially known as the Anti-Harassment
Committee and later renamed the Committee to Inquire into Undue Arrest
and Harassment (CIUAH). The CIUAH has a mandate to investigate
complaints associated with alleged harassment and arrests and other
security force actions. Human rights groups state that the committee is
somewhat effective; however, critics believe that the committee's
services have not been advertised widely and question its continued
viability. In July 1998, one of the six soldiers convicted in the
Krishanthi Kumaraswamy murder and rape case claimed that he knew where
the bodies of up to 400 Tamils killed by security forces in 1996 had
been buried. In part as a result of international pressure and prodding
by the HRC, the Government agreed to open an investigation. During the
year, two exhumation investigations recovered 15 bodies. At year's end,
the Government was continuing its investigation and had not yet sought
criminal indictments against any security force personnel in relation
to the killings.
There was no attempt, as in the past, to use the ER to cover up
security force misdeeds. Through its rulings, the judiciary continued
to exhibit its independence and uphold individual civil rights.
Security forces continued to take effective measures to limit civilian
casualties during military operations; however, the air force bombed a
civilian village near the north of Puthukudiyiruppu (PTK) on September
15, killing 22 persons, and in November at least 37 civilians were
killed in fighting at theMadhu Church during an exchange of shelling
between SLA and LTTE troops. The Government captured and took prisoner
more than 90 LTTE cadres throughout the year. The Government also
continued to provide relief to those displaced by the conflict even
though many were still in areas under LTTE control such as the Vanni
area. However, government restrictions on medical supplies and a
significant reduction in food rations contributed to poor health
conditions for civilians in the Vanni area. In 1997 three regional
commissions published a report that documented that more than 16,000
persons had disappeared over the period from 1988 to 1994 after having
been removed forcibly by security forces (including paramilitary
organizations) and antigovernment elements, primarily the leftist
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Following publication of this report,
the Government began submitting cases of alleged human rights abuses to
the Attorney General's office for review and possible prosecution of
those involved. The Attorney General referred over 290 indictments to
the courts, action reportedly had been filed against 489 security force
personnel, and 25 cases were moving through the court system by year's
end. A fourth commission was established in May 1998 to investigate the
10,000 cases of disappearance that the first 3 commissions could not
investigate before their mandates expired. The report was scheduled for
release on October 29; however, by the end of year, the commission had
not completed its investigation or released its final report.
There are several former Tamil insurgent organizations that now are
aligned with the Government. These progovernment Tamil militants, who
are armed and at times directed by the security forces, sometimes
committed extrajudicial killings and were responsible for
disappearances, torture, detentions, extortion, and forced conscription
in Vavuniya and the east. The military wing of the People's Liberation
Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) committed many such abuses. Both
PLOTE and the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO) effectively
were disarmed by the Government in Vavuniya after a May 15 shootout
between the groups in Colombo.
The LTTE continued to attack civilians. The LTTE regularly
committed extrajudicial killings, including killing prisoners taken on
the battlefields, and also was responsible for disappearances, torture,
arbitrary arrest, detentions, and extortion. After a period of relative
calm at the beginning of the year, the LTTE began a long series of
attacks, killing close to 100 civilians, including moderate Tamil
politician Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam. In the north, at least 14 persons
found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-described courts were
killed by public execution and their bodies tied to lamp posts or
otherwise left for public display. Through a campaign of killing and
intimidation, the LTTE continued to undermine the work of the local
government bodies in Jaffna whose members were elected in free and fair
elections in January 1998. In addition the LTTE warned Tamil
politicians in the east to discontinue their political activities
during part of the year; however, they later lifted their ban on such
activity.
The LTTE continued to control large sections of the north and east
of the country through authoritarian military rule. It denied those
under its authority the right to change their government, infringed on
their privacy rights, forcibly recruited children, routinely violated
their civil liberties, operated an unfair court system, restricted
freedom of movement, and severely discriminated against ethnic and
religious minorities.
respect for human rights
Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom
From:
a. Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Police, home guards,
and army personnel committed extrajudicial killings in many places,
including the eastern province, and army personnel also were
responsible for killing a number of persons in the Vavuniya area and in
Jaffna in the north. In July Ida Carmelita, a young Tamil girl,
allegedly was kidnaped, gang raped, and killed in the Mannar area by
five soldiers. At year's end, the case still was being investigated. In
September an air force bombing of Puthukkudiyiruppu in the north killed
over 20 civilians and wounded 40 others (see Section l.g.). Security
forces killed at least two other persons in Vavuniya. At least three
killings occurred in the Batticaloa area, associated with operations
against the LTTE insurgents. In November at least 37 civilians were
killed in fighting at the Madhu Church during an exchange of shelling
between SLA and LTTE troops (see Section 1.g.). About 3,000 internally
displaced persons (IDP's) sought shelter at the church a few days
earlier as the fighting between the LTTE and government forces
escalated. The circumstances of the shelling remain unclear; however
both the government security forces and the LTTE knew that civilians
were inside the church. At least one person died in police custody in
Kandy after being arrested for suspected terrorist activity (see
Section 1.c.). The exact number of extrajudicial killings was
impossible to ascertain due to frequent censorship of news relating to
militaryor police operations and to lack of regular access to the north
and east where the war between the Government and the LTTE insurgents
is being waged.
In some cases extrajudicial killings were reprisals against
civilians for LTTE attacks in which members of the security forces or
civilians were killed or injured. In most cases, the security forces
claimed that the victims were members of the LTTE, but human rights
monitors believe otherwise. In Thampalakamam in February 1998, police
and home guards allegedly massacred eight Tamil civilians, including
three children, possibly in reprisal for the LTTE bombing of the Temple
of the Tooth 1 week earlier. Some 31 police officers and 10 home guards
were arrested in connection with the case. Twenty-one of these
individuals were charged, 4 with murder and 17 with unlawful assembly.
The other 20 were released after the Attorney General determined that
there was insufficient evidence against them. The cases were scheduled
to be heard during the year; however, they had not begun by year's end.
The perpetrators of most extrajudicial killings were not arrested by
year's end.
Impunity remains a serious problem. Since April 1995 at least 761
persons have been killed extrajudicially by the security forces or have
disappeared after being taken into security force custody and are
presumed dead. With the exception of the six security force personnel
convicted in the 1996 killing of Krishanthi Kumaraswamy, no member of
the security forces has been convicted for any of these crimes. In the
vast majority of cases where military personnel may have committed
human rights violations, the Government has not identified those
responsible and brought them to justice. In August 1998, the Government
reimposed a state of emergency nationwide. There was no evidence that
the Government was using the ER, as in previous years, to conceal
extrajudicial killings or disappearances. Nevertheless, crucial
safeguards built into the ER and the legislation establishing the HRC
often were ignored by the security forces--especially those provisions
requiring receipts to be issued for arrests and ordering the security
forces to notify the HRC of any arrest within 48 hours. Although
security force personnel can be fined or jailed for failure to comply
with the ER, none were known to have been punished during the year.
The 1997 death of Reverend Arulpalan was not investigated during
the year.
In December 1997, three Tamil prisoners were hacked to death in
prison by Sinhalese prisoners at Kalutara prison. Prison staff and army
personnel at the prison allegedly failed to take measures to protect
the detainees even as the attack occurred. At year's end nobody had
been charged.
In 1998 6 persons were found guilty and sentenced to death and 2
persons were acquitted in the case of the 16 police and army personnel
who were arrested for the rape and murder of Krishanthi Kumaraaswamy,
the murder of 2 of her family members, and the rape and murder of
another individual.
At his sentencing in the Kumaraswamy case, one of those convicted,
former Lance Corporal Somaratne Rajapakse, claimed that he had
knowledge of mass graves at Chemmani in Jaffna where the bodies of up
to 400 persons killed by security forces in 1996 had been buried. On
July 22, 1998, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) issued a statement
indicating that the police criminal investigation department had been
directed to examine the allegation. In August 1998, the MOD stated that
a forensic expert, a government analyst, and police detectives would
visit the site. The HRC also was involved in investigating the claim
and asked for United Nations forensic assistance. The Government was
slow to move on the case; however, due to international pressure the
process again was put in motion early in the year. On January 7, the
Attorney General filed a request in the Jaffna magistrate's court to
order exhumations of the Chemmani site. In March a team of Government
investigators visited the site and collected preliminary soil samples.
On June 16, Rajapakse identified one site; excavations witnessed by
international observers yielded the skeletal remains of two persons.
The two victims were provisionally identified as two young men who had
disappeared in 1996 (see Section 1.b.). In August and September, 5
persons convicted in the Kumaraswamy case identified a total of 16
sites where they said they had buried between 120 and 140 bodies on the
orders of their superiors. Exhumations, again observed by international
experts, resumed on August 30. During this phase of exhumations, an
additional 13 bodies were uncovered. On December 6, the Government
submitted its forensic report to a magistrate in Jaffna; the report
stated that 10 of the remains, including one skeleton that was bound
and blindfolded, showed signs of physical assault and murder. The cause
of death was not determined for the remaining bodies; however, the
report stated that physical assault and murder could not be ruled out.
By year's end, 13 of the bodies had not been identified.
Rajapakse and others convicted in the Kumaranswamy case also
disclosed the names of the 20 security force personnel, including2
former policemen, who allegedly were responsible for the killings in
the Chemmani case. On September 21, the Attorney General announced that
the Government would attempt to confirm the identity of those who
reportedly were involved in the killings; however, by year's end the
investigation was ongoing and no arrests were ordered.
The case against 8 soldiers and 1 reserve police constable arrested
in February 1996 in the massacre of 24 Tamil villagers in Kumarapuram
came to trial in September 1997. In November 1998, six of the soldiers
were charged with murder and the case was scheduled for trial during
the year; however, no action was taken by year's end. The other two
accused security force agents were released due to lack of evidence.
At year's end, the Attorney General had not made a recommendation
concerning prosecution in the case of the six police officers who were
accused of killing a Tamil textile merchant whose charred body was
found in 1996.
The case of the 22 STF members who were arrested on suspicion of
murdering 23 Tamil youths in 1995 was scheduled to be heard in March;
however, the prosecution did not appear. At a resumption of the
proceedings in December the judge asked the case to be assigned to
another court, and a new hearing is scheduled for February 2000.
The PA Government came to power in 1994 and promised to bring to
justice the perpetrators of extrajudicial killings from previous years.
In 1994 it began prosecutions in several extrajudicial murders
allegedly committed by members of the security forces. The trial of 21
soldiers accused of massacring 35 Tamil civilians in 1992 in the
village of Mailanthani in Batticaloa district was transferred to the
Colombo High Court in 1996. The trial is scheduled to begin in May
2000.
There were no developments in the government investigations into
the mass graves at Sooriyakanda, which contain an estimated 300 bodies,
or the grave at Ankumbura, which is thought to contain the bodies of 36
people killed by the police in 1989. There were also no developments in
the Nikaweratiya army camp incident in which soldiers allegedly killed
20 youths in 1989 during the period of the JVP uprising.
In 1996 a presidential commission was established to investigate
alleged torture and murder during the 1988-89 JVP uprising at a
government-run detention center at the Batalanda housing estate near
Colombo. In August 1998, five senior police officials were placed on
compulsory leave for their involvement in the case, but they reportedly
had been returned to duty in December of that year. In a final
judgment, the trial court found the accused not guilty and closed the
case.
Former insurgent Tamil militant groups now aligned with the
Government committed extrajudicial killings in the eastern province and
in the Vavuniya area in the north. The military wing of PLOTE and the
Razeek group were responsible for killing a number of persons. The
security forces arm and use these militias and a number of other Tamil
militant organizations to provide information, to help identify LTTE
insurgents, and, in some cases, to fight in military operations against
the insurgents. The exact size of these militias is impossible to
ascertain, but they probably total fewer than 2,000 persons. Although
the army in some instances took steps to convert Tamil militia groups
into regular army units, military oversight of these groups is
generally inadequate. These groups frequently operated beyond
government control. Complaints about their activities continued,
especially in transit camps for IDP's in Vavuniya. The militias gain
access to these camps through a variety of means, including bribery and
threats. It was impossible to determine the number of victims because
of the secrecy with which these groups operated. Those killed by these
militants probably included both LTTE operatives and civilians who
failed to comply with extortion demands. In May the Government forbade
these groups from carrying arms in public and from stockpiling weapons,
but this prohibition has generally not been effective. The September
killing of the PLOTE military wing leader led to a reduced number of
complaints against the group.
During provincial council elections in January, members of the
country's two main political parties committed over 800 acts of
violence. At least two persons were killed as a result of this violence
(see Section 3).
On September 7, unknown assailants shot and killed controversial
journalist Rohana Kumara, editor of the Sinhala-language newspaper
Satana (see Section 2.a.). Allegations of government involvement were
not substantiated.
On November 2, unknown assailants shot and killed Ramesh Nadarajah,
a Tamil Member of Parliament for the Eelam People's Democratic Party
(EPDP) and the editor of a weekly Tamil-language newspaper. No
individual or group claimed responsibility for this attack by year's
end; however, some persons speculated thatthe perpetrators targeted
Nadarajah either because of his affiliation with the Government or in
an attempt to suppress freedom of expression (see Section 2.a.).
On November 14, a grenade exploded close to a political rally held
by the opposition United National Party (UNP) prior to the December
presidential elections (see Section 3). One person was killed in the
attack and about 35 others were injured. No one claimed responsibility
for the incident.
The LTTE continued to commit extrajudicial killings, including both
targeted attacks and bombings (see Sections 1.c. and 1.g.). On March 9,
a bomb planted by an LTTE insurgent exploded on a bus in Colombo,
killing 1 person and wounding more than a dozen others.
In April an LTTE bomb exploded on a bus in Kandy, killing 2 persons
and wounding 15 others. On July 14, a bomb planted by LTTE insurgents
in Batticaloa killed 2 civilians and wounded as many as 29 others. On
July 26, LTTE insurgents opened fire on the Ranga hotel in Vavuniya,
killing two security force members and three civilians.
On July 29, a suicide bomber killed moderate Tamil parliamentarian
Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam in Colombo. Tiruchelvam also was the founder of
the International Center for Ethnic Studies and the Law and Society
Trust, a human rights research and advocacy organization. Tiruchelvam
reportedly had angered the LTTE by supporting an alternative to a
separate Tamil state.
On August 11, the LTTE detonated Claymore mines in Batticaloa,
killing 9 police agents and injuring 30. On September 2, the LTTE
allegedly killed the vice president of PLOTE and two other persons in a
Claymore mine bombing.
On September 18, members of the LTTE killed more than 50 civilians,
including women and children, with machetes close to Amparai. This
attack allegedly was in retaliation for the airforce bombing of PTK on
September 15 (see Section 1.g.).
On September 27, an explosion attributed to the LTTE killed 1
person and wounded 31 on a bus in Badulla.
On December 18, an LTTE suicide bomber attempted to assassinate
President Kumaratunga at a rally 3 days before the presidential
elections. The bomb injured slightly the President, Justice Minister
Peiris, and many other persons, and killed the perpetrator and 13 other
persons, including a deputy inspector general of police for Colombo
(see Sections 1.g. and 3).
On December 18, an insurgent affiliated with the LTTE allegedly
also bombed a rally of the UNP, killing 11 and injuring 43 (see Section
3).
The LTTE also targeted progovernment Tamil groups. For example, on
May 29, an LTTE suicide bomber targeted Ganesh Kumar, leader of the
Razeek group; Kumar was killed and nine civilians were injured (see
Section 1.g.).
The LTTE also committed a number of ``lamp post'' killings.
At least 14 persons found guilty of offenses by the LTTE's self-
described courts were killed by the LTTE in public executions and their
bodies tied to lamp posts or otherwise left for public display. The
LTTE has attacked government installations, killing and wounding
civilians, and the LTTE sometimes also kills its own injured troops to
avoid their capture (see Section 1.g.).
In July 1997, the Attorney General determined that there was
insufficient evidence to charge anyone in the October 1994 suicide
bombing that killed the UNP presidential candidate Gamini Dissanayake
and 58 other persons, although the LTTE generally is believed to be
responsible. No further investigations were continuing.
On March 26, municipal workers uncovered a pit near the Durraipa
Stadium in Jaffna that contained the skeletal remains of several
persons. Forensic evidence suggested that these remains were about 10
years old. This discovery potentially implicated the Indian
Peacekeeping Force (IPKF), which occupied Jaffna at the time. Critics
contrasted the prompt investigation of the Durraipa stadium graves with
the slow investigation of the Chemmani mass graves.
b. Disappearance.--Disappearances at the hands of the security
forces continued in the north and east. During the year, there were no
reports of disappearances in Colombo, Trincomalee, or Jaffna. At least
15 disappearances involved cases where individuals were last known to
be in security force custody in Vavuniya and Batticaloa. In October
three Tamils were taken by the home guards and later were found
decapitated. As with extrajudicial killings, the exact number of
disappearances was impossible to ascertain due tocensorship of news
about security force operations and infrequent access to the north and
east.
Those who disappeared in 1999 and in previous years are presumed
dead. The commander of the army and the Inspector General of police
both have criticized the disappearances and stated that the
perpetrators would be called to account. Nonetheless, there have been
very few security force personnel prosecutions to date.
Three regional commissions were set up in November 1994 to inquire
into disappearances that occurred from 1988-94, most of which occurred
during the 1988-89 period of the JVP uprising. The commission found
that 16,742 persons disappeared after having been removed involuntarily
from their homes, in most cases by security forces. In other cases,
antigovernment elements--in particular the leftist JVP--were determined
to be responsible for the disappearances. The Attorney General's office
has opened over 900 files and referred over 290 indictments to the
appropriate courts involving 489 members of the security forces on
abduction and murder charges. The courts had initiated proceedings in
at least 25 of those cases by year's end. In December a police officer
was sentenced to 5 years' imprisonment for an abduction carried out in
Hanbantota in the late 1980's.
In May 1998, a fourth commission was established to look into
approximately 10,000 cases of disappearance that the initial 3
commissions had been unable to investigate before their mandates
expired. The commission is not to investigate cases of disappearance,
which occurred after 1994, but is to focus only on cases that were not
completed by the first three commissions. Human rights observers have
criticized the Government for not extending the mandate of this
commission to include cases of disappearance that occurred since the
Kumaratunga Government took office in 1994. The commission is charged
with facilitating payment of monetary compensation to the families of
persons who disappeared, as well as forwarding cases to the Attorney
General for possible prosecution. The commission submitted an interim
report to President Kumaratunga in December. By year's end, the
commission had not published its final report.
The trial of 9 suspects, including an army brigadier general, in
the disappearance of 32 youths from the southern town of Embilipitiya
in 1989 and 1990 concluded. Seven of the nine accused (excluding the
brigadier) were found guilty and sentenced in February to 10 years'
imprisonment. There were no developments in the Vantharamulle case, in
which army troops allegedly abducted 158 Tamils from a refugee camp in
the Batticaloa district in 1990. Observers maintain that there is
credible evidence identifying the alleged perpetrators. Proceedings
began early in the year against an army major and former subinspector
of police in the case of 31 youths who allegedly disappeared following
their arrests in Divulapitiya in 1989. The army major died after being
charged in magistrate court, and the case against the former police
officer is scheduled to continue in March 2000.
Progovernment Tamil militias also were responsible for
disappearances. These militias detain persons at various locations that
serve, in effect, as undeclared detention centers. Human rights
observers believe that the PLOTE was a major offender in the case of
disappearances. However, the HRC has no mandate or authority to enforce
respect for human rights among these militia groups. When the HRC
office director for Vavuniya complained about PLOTE activity, he
received death threats. He eventually departed the country. It was
impossible to determine the exact number of victims because of the
secrecy with which these groups operated. The Government has taken no
clear steps to stop these militants' actions, although tighter
restrictions on these groups' rights to bear arms were implemented
following a May 15 shootout between PLOTE and TELO supporters near a
popular shopping center in downtown Colombo.
The LTTE was responsible for an undetermined number of civilian
disappearances in the north and east of the island during the year.
Although the LTTE has denied taking any prisoners from several of its
battles, it is known to be holding 12 civilian crew members of vessels
it has hijacked since 1995, along with 15 security force personnel. The
LTTE has not notified the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) of any new security forces prisoners since 1994.
c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Despite legal prohibitions, the security forces and police
continue to torture and mistreat persons in police custody and prisons.
At least one person died in police custody during the year as a result
of beatings received after he was arrested for suspected terrorist
activity (see Section 1.a.).
The Convention Against Torture Act (CATA) made torture a punishable
offense. Under the CATA, torture is defined as a specific crime, the
High Court has jurisdiction over violations, and criminal conviction
carries a 7-year minimum sentence.
However, according to a June Amnesty International (AI) report, the
CATA does not implement several provisions in the UN Convention; this
resulted in torture being prohibited under specific circumstances and
allowed under others. The Government has not yet developed effective
regulations under the new legislation to prosecute and punish military
and police personnel responsible for torture; however, it has ceased
paying fines incurred by security force personnel guilty of the
offense. Security force personnel have been fined under civil law for
engaging in torture; however, they have not yet been prosecuted under
criminal law. Members of the security forces continued to torture and
mistreat detainees and other prisoners, both male and female,
particularly during interrogation. Several children reportedly have
been subjected to torture in detention during the past several years.
Most torture victims were Tamils suspected of being LTTE insurgents or
collaborators; however, there also have been sporadic reports of the
use of torture against suspected criminals.
Methods of torture included electric shock, beatings (especially on
the soles of the feet), suspension by the wrists or feet in contorted
positions, burning, and near drownings. In other cases, victims are
forced to remain in unnatural positions for extended periods, or have
bags laced with insecticide, chili powder or gasoline placed over their
heads. Detainees have reported broken bones and other serious injuries
as a result of their mistreatment. There were no reports of rape in
detention.
Under fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution, torture
victims may file civil suit for compensation in the High Court. The
Court has granted awards ranging from $200 (14,200 rupees) to $2,500
(182,500 rupees). However, most cases take 2 years or more to move
through the courts. Despite the existence of this law, torture
continues to be committed with relative impunity, and no one has ever
been convicted under the CATA for torture. During the year, charges
were filed under CATA against fewer than a dozen police officers.
Progovernment Tamil militants in the east and north, directly
responsible to the security forces, also engaged in torture. The PLOTE
in Vavuniya has drawn the most criticism for routinely torturing its
opponents. Security forces have done little to stop this practice.
On July 15, presidential security and police personnel injured 30
members of the UNP opposition party with batons and tear gas at a
protest against the Government's failure to fulfill campaign pledges
(see Section 2.b.). Security forces also allegedly assaulted 12
journalists and photographers and confiscated their cameras at this
protest (see Section 2.a.).
During provincial council elections in January, members of the 2
main political parties participated in over 800 violent incidents,
ranging from defacement of campaign posters to assault. This violence
resulted in scores of injuries and 2 deaths (see Sections 1.a. and 3).
On November 14, an explosion at a UNP political rally killed 1
person and injured about 35 others. No one claimed responsibility for
the attack (see Sections 1.a. and 3).
The LTTE reportedly used torture on a routine basis. Security force
prisoners released by the LTTE said that they occasionally had been
subjected to torture, including being hung upside down and beaten,
having pins inserted under their fingernails, and being burned by hot
rods.
The LTTE was responsible for a number of bomb attacks during the
year, which killed and injured dozens of civilians (see Sections 1.a
and 1.g.). In September the LTTE attacked a Chinese merchant ship,
which had strayed to within about 7 miles of the coast. None of the
crew was hurt in the attack, and the ship was rescued and escorted to
Trincomalee Harbor by the navy (see Section 1.g.).
Prison conditions generally are poor and do not meet minimum
international standards because of overcrowding and lack of sanitary
facilities. An increase in detentions associated with the war with the
LTTE caused a significant deterioration in already poor standards in
short-term detention centers as well as in undeclared detention centers
run by progovernment Tamil groups such as the PLOTE (see Section 1.d.).
The Government permitted representatives from the ICRC to visit
approximately 250 places of detention. The HRC also made over 1,400
visits to police stations and detention facilities during the year (see
Section 1.d.).
Conditions also are poor in detention facilities operated by the
LTTE. Some former prisoners reported being handcuffed and shackled
during much of their captivity.
The LTTE permitted the ICRC to visit only a few detainees (see
Section 1.d.).
d. Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Arbitrary arrest and
detention are problems. Under ordinary law, authorities must inform an
arrested person of the reason for arrest and bring that person before a
magistrate within 24 hours. In practice, persons detained generally
appear before a magistrate within a few days of arrest. The magistrate
may authorize bail or order continued pretrial detention for up to 3
months or longer. Under the ER and the Prevention of Terrorism Act
(PTA), security forces may detain suspects for extended periods of time
without court approval. The ER, in force periodically since 1979 and
reactivated in August 1998, allows pretrial detention for a maximum of
four consecutive 3-month periods. A magistrate must order further
detention. Detainees may challenge their detention and sue the
Government for violating their civil rights in the Supreme Court.
In spite of the Government's announcements that it would close all
secret detention centers, there were continued reports that the
security forces held persons for short amounts of time in smaller camps
for interrogation before transferring them to declared places of
detention. This allegedly occurred on the Jaffna peninsula, in
Vavuniya, and in the east (see Section 1.c.).
Large-scale arrests of Tamils continued during the year; these
arrests were particularly prevalent after LTTE bombings. The Government
detained more than 1,970 persons under the ER and the PTA during the
year, a slightly higher number than in 1998. Many of these detainees
were arrested during operations against the LTTE. The majority of those
arrested were released after periods lasting several days to several
months; however, the total number of prisoners held under the ER and
the PTA was consistently close to 2,000. Hundreds of Tamils who were
arrested under the PTA were being held without bail awaiting trial;
some of these persons have been held for up to 5 years. According to
the Attorney General, there are almost 1,000 cases under the PTA or ER
before the high courts.
Arrests and detentions by the police took place in violation of the
legal safeguards built into the ER and other legislation, particularly
regarding requirements that receipts be issued and that the HRC be
notified of any arrest within 48 hours. Those arrested by the army
generally were turned over to the police within 24 hours as required
under the ER. The HRC has a legal mandate to visit those arrested, and
police officials generally respected this mandate; however, due to
censorship and infrequent access to the area, it was unclear what was
happening in the north and east.
Security forces continued to conduct large-scale detentions and
arrests of young Tamils, both male and female, on suspicion of being
members or sympathizers of the LTTE. Major sweeps and arrests occurred
in Colombo, in the east and on the Jaffna peninsula. Hundreds of Tamils
at a time were picked up during police actions. Most were released
after identity checks lasting several hours to several days. The
Government justified the arrests on security grounds, but many Tamils
claimed that the arrests were a form of harassment. In addition those
arrested, most of whom were innocent of any wrongdoing, sometimes were
detained in prisons together with hardened criminals. Security forces
also caused other problems for Tamils. Tamils complained that they were
verbally abused and held for extended periods of time at the security
checkpoints that have been set up throughout Colombo. In July 1998, the
President established the CIUAH. The committee, which includes senior
opposition party and Tamil representatives, was tasked to look into
complaints stemming from arrests and other security force actions and
take remedial action as necessary. The committee set up a telephone hot
line and received and investigated more than 100 complaints during the
year. Opinions on the effectiveness of the CIUAH are mixed. Some human
rights observers believe that the work of the committee acted as a
deterrent to random arrests and helped to alleviate some of the
problems encountered by detainees and their families. However, some
critics claim that, following an initial rash of publicity, the
committee's services have not been widely advertised. For example, the
fax number for the committee is not in the Colombo telephone directory.
Those wishing to contact the CIUAH usually are referred through human
rights lawyers or find it by word of mouth. Finally, many Tamils
believe that the CIUAH does little to deter police agents from stopping
them more frequently at security forces checkpoints in the capital.
The HRC continued to investigate the legality of detention in cases
referred to it by the Supreme Court and private citizens. Although the
HRC legally is constituted to exercise oversight over arrests and
detentions by the security forces and to undertake visits to prisons,
members of the security forces sometimes breached the regulations and
failed to cooperate with the HRC.
The Government continued to give the ICRC unhindered access to
approximately 250 detention centers, police stations, and armycamps
throughout the country that were recognized officially as places of
detention. This played an important role in enabling the ICRC to
monitor the human rights practices of the security forces. The HRC,
through its 10 regional offices, also visited places of detention;
however, human rights observers believed that due to inadequate
leadership and a failure of the HRC to give long term contracts to many
of its workers, the organization was not pursuing its mandate (see
Section 4).
The PLOTE continued to run places of illegal detention in Vavuniya.
The LTTE continued to detain civilians, often holding them for
ransom. For example, in September the LTTE held three businessmen for a
ransom of $550,000 (40 million rupees). There continued to be
unconfirmed reports that the LTTE was holding in custody more than
2,000 civilians in the northern part of the island. Those held included
12 civilian crew members of 3 vessels hijacked by the LTTE since 1995.
The LTTE did not permit the ICRC or any other humanitarian organization
to visit its detainees aside from these crew members and 15 security
force personnel.
The Government does not practice forced exile. There are no legal
provisions allowing or prohibiting its use.
e. Denial of Fair Public Trial.--The Constitution provides for an
independent judiciary, and the Government respects these provisions in
practice.
The President appoints judges to the Supreme Court, the courts of
appeal, and the high courts. A judicial service commission, composed of
the chief justice and two Supreme Court judges, appoints, transfers,
and dismisses lower court judges. Judges serve until mandatory
retirement age, which is 65 for the Supreme Court and 62 for judges on
other courts. Judges can be removed for reasons of misbehavior or
physical or mental incapacity, but only after a legal investigation
followed by joint action of the President and the Parliament.
In criminal cases, defendants are tried in public by juries. They
are informed of the charges and evidence against them, may be
represented by the counsel of their choice, and have the right to
appeal. The Government provides counsel for indigent persons tried on
criminal charges in the high courts and the courts of appeal but not in
other cases. Private legal aid organizations assist some defendants. In
addition, the Ministry of Justice has created five community legal aid
centers to assist those who cannot afford representation and to serve
as educational resources for local communities. There are no jury
trials in cases brought under the PTA. Confessions, which are
inadmissible in criminal proceedings, are allowed in PTA cases. Most
convictions under the PTA rely heavily on them. Defendants bear the
burden of proof to demonstrate that their confessions were obtained by
coercion. Defendants in PTA cases have the right to appeal. Although
over l,000 cases under the PTA and the ER were before the courts, no
cases came to trial during the year.
Most court proceedings are conducted in English or Sinhala, which,
due to a shortage of court-appointed interpreters, has restricted the
ability of Tamil-speaking defendants to get a fair hearing. Few judges
speak Tamil. The ER was published only recently in Tamil, and there are
no law reports and few legal textbooks in Tamil.
In Jaffna LTTE threats to court officials disrupted normal court
operations. The courts were operating on only a limited basis by year's
end.
The LTTE has its own self-described court system, composed of young
judges with little or no legal training. The courts operate without
codified or defined legal authority and essentially operate as agents
of the LTTE rather than as an independent judiciary. The courts
reportedly impose severe punishments, including execution. During the
course of the year, the LTTE committed several ``lamp post'' killings
in which the bodies of those executed were left for public display (see
Section l.a.).
The Government claims that all persons held under the ER and the
PTA are suspected members of the LTTE and, therefore, legitimate
security threats. There is insufficient information to verify this
claim and to determine whether these detainees or members of the now
legal JVP, who were detained in similar fashion in past years, were
political prisoners. Between 200 and 300 of those previously detained--
mostly JVP members--have been convicted under criminal law and remain
incarcerated. In many cases, human rights monitors question the
legitimacy of the criminal charges brought against these persons.
The LTTE also holds a number of political prisoners. The number is
impossible to determine because of the secretive nature of
theorganization. The LTTE refuses to allow the ICRC access to these
prisoners.
f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--The Government generally respects many of the
constitutional protections of individual privacy and the sanctity of
the family and home; however, it infringes on these rights in some
areas. The police obtain proper warrants for arrests and searches
conducted under ordinary law; however, the security forces are not
required to obtain warrants for searches conducted under either the ER
or the PTA. The Secretary of Defense is responsible for providing
oversight for such searches. There is no judicial review or other means
of redress for alleged illegal searches under the ER. Some Tamils
complained that their homes were searched as a means of general
harassment by the security forces. The Government is believed to
monitor telephone conversations and correspondence on a selective
basis. The security forces routinely open mail destined for the LTTE-
controlled areas and seize contraband. The Government censors
international television broadcasts received in the country that cover
military operations (see Section 2.a).
Progovernment Tamil militant groups, nominally operating under
government control, use forced conscription. There are credible reports
that Tamil youth in the east in particular have been forced to join
these groups under threats to themselves and their families.
The LTTE routinely invades the privacy of citizens, maintaining an
effective network of informants. There are credible reports the LTTE
has warned Muslims displaced from the Mannar area (approximately 55,000
persons) not to return to their homes until the conflict is over. The
LTTE also forcibly recruits children (see Section 6.c.).
g. Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--Hostilities between the Government and the LTTE
continued throughout the year. After failing to open a land-based
supply route to Jaffna during 1997-98, the SLA launched Operation Rana
Gosa in March. In a series of offensives between March and September
the SLA gained territory in the north and west of the island. However,
in November the LTTE counterattacked and successfully pushed back
government forces to new defensive lines, and recaptured most of the
territory the SLA had gained since 1997. The President replaced several
officials in the military, and imposed a ban on press coverage of the
war following the Government's losses to the LTTE (see Section 2.a.).
It is estimated that more than 1,000 combatants on both sides were
killed.
Over 340,000 persons, principally in the Vanni region, remain
displaced by the past several years of fighting.
In the past, the Government often has publicized aspects of its
planned operations to allow civilians time to vacate the probable areas
to be affected. However, the military was more secretive during the
year and did not give public warnings before the commencement of its
advances. At least 36 persons were killed by security forces during the
year. Despite the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to assess targets
before attacks, bombings and artillery fire against LTTE installations
have killed civilians working at those installations or living nearby.
On September 15, the air force dropped 3 bombs on a village near
PTK in the Vanni, killing 22 persons (see Section 1.a.). Human rights
observers, including the ICRC and AI, alleged that those killed were
civilians. Government officials acknowledged that 22 men, women, and
children were killed by the air force bomb; however, they alleged that
the airforce targeted an LTTE training camp, and at first did not admit
the possibility that civilians were killed in error. The Government
later acknowledged quietly that the attack was an accident.
In November at least 37 civilians were killed in fighting at the
Madhu Church during an exchange of shelling between SLA and LTTE troops
(see Section 1.a.).
The security forces continued to receive instruction in
international humanitarian law as part of their training courses (see
Section 4). According to the military, the army also has established
human rights cells in each division and human rights offices in each
brigade and battalion. Civilian casualties in the north and east battle
zone remained relatively low during the year. The armed forces operate
under written rules of engagement that severely restrict the shelling,
bombardment, or other use of firepower against civilian-occupied areas
such as villages. Although incidents occurred where the rules
apparently were breached or waived, these were isolated cases. In some
cases, poor targeting by the armed forces resulted in
civiliancasualties from artillery fire and bombs. The security forces
use aerial observation for selecting targets for shelling and bombing.
They also attempt to locate the source of incoming mortar fire before
responding; however, inaccurate mortar and artillery fire killed
civilians.
The Government continued to provide food relief to displaced and
other needy citizens, including those living in areas controlled by the
LTTE. However, the Government decided to cut significantly food rations
to the north in 1998. Food also is distributed by the Commissioner
General for Essential Services (CGES) and the Multi-Purpose Cooperative
Societies (MCPS). Food rations are delivered by the Government to the
Vanni area through a checkpoint whose location was moved twice as a
result of changes in the battlefield situation. This checkpoint is
controlled on one side by the security forces and on the other by the
LTTE. The border into the territory controlled by the LTTE (``uncleared
area'' in Government parlance) was closed a total of five times during
the year, including a long period of closure from late June until early
August (see Section 2.d.). These closures were related directly to the
armed conflict. As a result, the distribution of food to the north was
erratic during the year. Nongovernmental organization (NGO)
representatives expressed concern that these interruptions had an
impact on food reserves in the Vanni area and may have led to worsened
nutrition there.
The Government maintained a long list of prohibited ``war-related''
medical items, such as sutures, plaster of paris, intravenous liquid
supplies, bandages, and some drugs. NGO's and other groups that sought
to take these items to LTTE-controlled areas in the Vanni region needed
permission from local officials as well as from the MOD. Delays were
common and approval sometimes was denied, due to fear that supplies
would fall into the hands of the LTTE. As a result, many medical items
in the Vanni region were in short supply. This shortfall contributed to
an already serious deterioration in the quality and quantity of medical
care furnished to the civilian population. Government restrictions on
the transport of items such as cement, batteries, and currency into the
LTTE-controlled areas also had a negative impact on the relief work of
NGO's in those areas.
The Ministry of Defense reported that during the course of the
year, over 35 LTTE insurgents turned themselves in and over 400 either
surrendered on the battlefield or were arrested in security sweeps,
with many of those arrested subsequently sent to rehabilitation
centers. The ICRC continued to visit approximately 150 former LTTE
members now in government rehabilitation camps who had surrendered
during the previous 2 years. Given the scale of hostilities and the
large number of LTTE casualties, observers found the number of
prisoners taken under battlefield conditions to be extremely low; many
LTTE fighters apparently were killed rather than taken prisoner.
Observers believed that on the government side, an unwritten ``take-no-
prisoners'' policy generally remained in effect. However, various other
factors may have limited the number of prisoners taken, such as the
LTTE's efforts to remove wounded fighters from the battlefield, the
proclivity of its fighters to choose suicide over capture, and the
LTTE's occasional practice of killing its own badly wounded fighters
(see Section 1.a.). No army or other security forces personnel were
prosecuted or disciplined for executing prisoners.
The Government refused to permit relief organizations to provide
medical attention to wounded LTTE fighters, although it has offered to
treat any LTTE wounded entrusted to Government care. During the course
of the year, there were verifiable instances of wounded LTTE cadres
surrendering to the Government and receiving appropriate medical care.
The LTTE admits that it kills security forces personnel rather than
take them prisoner. Eyewitness accounts confirm that the LTTE has
executed wounded soldiers on the battlefield. The LTTE admits to
holding only 15 security forces prisoners, all of whom were captured in
1993 and 1994. The LTTE is believed to have killed most of the police
officers and security force personnel it has captured in recent years.
However, the LTTE released two army deserters who surrendered to it in
1998. In November the LTTE handed over 11 SLA members who were captured
during the year to the ICRC.
The LTTE uses excessive force in the war. During the course of the
year, the LTTE attempted to assassinate the President, killed a Member
of Parliament, killed other noncombatants, and engaged in hostage
taking, hijackings and bombing of civilian targets.
On December 18, an LTTE suicide bomber attempted to assassinate
President Kumaratunga; the bomb injured the President and Justice
Minister Peiris and killed 14 persons, including the perpetrator (see
Sections 1.a. and 3). That same day the LTTE allegedly bombed a UNP
rally, killing 11 civilians (see Section 1.a.).
On September 18, LTTE insurgents massacred more than 50 Sinhalese
men, women, and children in Gonagala, allegedly in retaliation for the
air force bombing of PTK (see Section 1.a.).
A number of suicide bombings, Claymore mine attacks and ``pistol
gang'' shootings occurred during the year, killing and injuring dozens
of civilians (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
In September the LTTE attacked a Chinese merchant ship, which had
strayed to within about 7 miles of the coast. None of the crew was hurt
in the attack, and the ship was rescued and escorted to Trincomalee
Harbor by the navy (see Section 1.c.).
The LTTE has been accused in the past of using church and temple
compounds, where civilians are instructed by the Government to
congregate in the event of hostilities, as shields for the storage of
munitions; however, there were no reports that this occurred during the
year. Reports that the LTTE was using children on the battlefield were
verified when 25 LTTE fighters surrendered en masse in September 1998.
At least one of those who surrendered was 13 years old; most of the
others were between 15 and 17.
The LTTE expropriates food, fuel, and other items meant for IDP's,
thus exacerbating the plight of such persons in LTTE-controlled areas.
Malnutrition remained a problem in LTTE-controlled and other parts of
the Vanni region. Experts have reported an increase in anemia and a
lower birth rate, both indications of lower levels of nutrition.
Nutrition levels were generally below the national average, and there
were confirmed cases of malnutrition, including hundreds of cases of
malnourished children. Malnutrition resulted from several factors,
including food shortages, poverty, and conflict-related dislocations.
Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:
a. Freedom of Speech and Press.--The Constitution provides for
freedom of speech and expression; however, the Government restricts
these rights in practice, often using national security grounds
permitted by law. During the year, the Government limited the access of
domestic and foreign media to information, and continued to censor news
relating to the military and security situation. In June 1998, the
Government imposed direct censorship on all domestic and foreign media
reports relating to ongoing or possible future military and other
security operations. Although enforcement was lax at the beginning of
the year, the Government reissued its censorship order in November
after the military suffered setbacks in the field. Even when no
specific government censorship is exercised, private television
stations impose their own, informal censorship on international
television news rebroadcast in the country, with almost all references
to Sri Lanka removed.
Despite earlier campaign promises to divest itself of its media
holdings, the Government controls the country's largest newspaper
chain, two major television stations, and the Sri Lanka Broadcasting
Corporation (a radio station). However, there are a variety of
independent, privately owned newspapers, journals and radio and
television stations, most of which freely criticize the Government and
its policies. However, some journalists practiced self-censorship due
to fear of intimidation. There is also one privately owned newspaper
published in Jaffna. There are no political restrictions on the
establishment of new media entries.
The Government still has failed to reform the press law and
privatize government-owned media as promised during the 1994 election
campaign. In 1997 the Government presented a draft broadcasting reform
bill in Parliament, but there was considerable opposition from members
of the media, and the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that the bill
was inconsistent with the Constitution. Revisions subsequently proposed
by a blue-ribbon panel have yet to be implemented. A highly-touted
national media policy proposed by the Government in 1994 and again
during the year was criticized as irrelevant by senior editors.
On March 14, a journalist for an independent Sinhala-language
newspaper, was abducted from his home and assaulted, allegedly by a
brigadier in the army. Army officials placed the brigadier under open
arrest pending a full police inquiry; the case was still pending at
year's end.
On July 15, members of the presidential security division attacked
journalists who were covering an opposition party rally in the vicinity
of the President's residence. The perpetrators injured protesters,
including journalists and photographers and confiscated cameras.
Involvement by the presidential security division was at first denied,
then later confirmed by the media minister (see Sections 1.c. and
2.b.).
In August the offices of the only Tamil-language daily newspaper in
the north of the country were attacked, allegedly by aprogovernment
Tamil paramilitary group accused by the newspaper of extortion and
bullying tactics in and around Jaffna.
A journalist who regularly reports on defense matters, including
corruption in military procurements, was attacked in his home by armed
men in February 1998. He and his family were threatened at gunpoint
before the attackers fled. The Government criticized the attack and
subsequently arrested and indicted two air force personnel in the case,
including the bodyguard of a former commander of the air force. A
formal indictment was handed down early in the year against the accused
and the case was due for trial in November; however, the trial was
postponed until May 2000.
On September 7, unknown assailants shot and killed Rohana Kumara,
editor of the Sinhala-language newspaper Satana. The newspaper was
critical of leading figures in the ruling coalition (see Section 1.a.).
Allegations of government involvement in the attack were not
substantiated.
On November 2, unknown assailants shot and killed Ramesh Nadarajah,
a Tamil Member of Parliament for the EPDP and the editor of a weekly
Tamil-language newspaper (see Section 1.a.).
The editor of a leading national newspaper who was found guilty of
defaming the president in 1997 since has appealed the verdict. After
many postponements the appeal is scheduled for early 2000. Another
defamation case filed by the President in 1995 and three others filed
in 1997--all against editors of major newspapers, either critical of
the Government or proopposition--still were pending and unresolved.
These cases were viewed by journalists as frivolous and intended only
to intimidate and harass the media.
The Sri Lanka Tamil Media Alliance was formed during the year to
protect the interests of Tamil journalists, who allege that they are
subject to harassment and intimidation by Tamil paramilitary groups and
Sri Lankan security forces. Regional Tamil correspondents working in
the war zones have complained of arbitrary arrest and detention and
difficulty in obtaining press accreditation cards. In August the Sri
Lanka Tamil Media Alliance filed the first-ever fundamental rights test
case on behalf of an ethnic Tamil reporter on the staff of the
government owned and controlled Tamil language daily.
Both foreign and national journalists are allowed to go to the
conflict areas; however, they must receive advance permission from the
Ministry of Defense. The Foreign Ministry also must approve visits to
conflict areas by foreign journalists. Bureaucratic delays in
processing requests have been reduced but still prevail. The Government
occasionally arranges for groups of journalists to visit Jaffna and the
vicinity of the front lines on tightly organized briefing tours.
However, after censorship was imposed in June 1998, the Government
became the only source of most news about security and defense matters
that could be disseminated to the public legally.
The LTTE does not tolerate freedom of expression. It tightly
restricts the print and broadcast media in areas under its control. In
the past, the LTTE has killed those reporting and publishing on human
rights.
The Government generally respects academic freedom.
The LTTE does not respect academic freedom and has repressed and
killed intellectuals who criticize it, most notably the moderate and
widely-respected Tamil politician and academic, Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam,
who was killed by a suicide bomber on July 29 (see Section 1.a.). The
LTTE severely repressed members of a human rights organization, the
University Teachers for Human Rights, which formerly was based on the
Jaffna peninsula; most former members of this group have been killed.
b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--The law provides
for freedom of assembly, and the Government respects this right in
practice. Although the PTA may restrict this freedom, the Government
did not use the act for that purpose during the year. The Government
generally granted permits for demonstrations, including those by
opposition parties and minority groups. Nonetheless, both the main
opposition UNP and the PA Government continued to accuse each other of
political thuggery and hooliganism, complaining that supporters of the
opposing party disrupted rallies and other political events.
During the year several incidents of violence occurred at political
rallies held by the PA and the opposition UNP, including an attempted
assassination of the President (see Sections 1.a. and 3).
On July 15, government security forces injured several journalists
and other demonstraters at a UNP rally near the presidential palace
(see Sections 1.c. and 2.a.).
The law provides for freedom of association, and the Government
respects this right in practice. Although the PTA may restrict this
right, the Government did not use the act for that during the year.
The LTTE does not allow freedom of association in the areas it
controls. On the Jaffna peninsula, the LTTE occasionally has posted in
public places the names of those Tamil civilians whose association with
security forces and other Government entities it seeks to prevent. The
LTTE has killed Tamil civilians who have cooperated with the security
forces in establishing a civil administration in Jaffna under a
political leadership elected freely and fairly in January 1998.
c. Freedom of Religion.--The Constitution gives Buddhism a foremost
position, but it also provides for the right of members of other faiths
to practice their religions freely, and the Government respects this
right in practice. Despite the special status afforded by the
Constitution to Buddhism, major religious festivals of all faiths are
celebrated as public holidays.
Foreign clergy may work in Sri Lanka, but for more than 30 years
the Government has prohibited the entry of new foreign Jesuit clergy.
In 1962 the Government reached an agreement with the Catholic Church
that new foreign clergy would not be permitted to enter the country on
a permanent basis. As foreign clergy retired, Sri Lankans would replace
them. It permitted those already in the country to remain. However, the
Jesuits want their clergy to be replaced by foreign members of their
order as they retire. The local Catholic Church hierarchy does not
support the Jesuits in the dispute and is not lobbying the Government
to change the agreement. Most religious workers in the country,
including most Christian clergy, are Sri Lankan in origin.
Some evangelical Christians, who constitute less than 1 percent of
the population, have expressed concern that their efforts at
proselytizing often are met with hostility and harassment by the local
Buddhist clergy and others opposed to their work (see Section 5). They
sometimes complain that the Government tacitly condones such
harassment; however, there is no evidence to support this claim. In
1997 the Assemblies of God Church filed a fundamental rights case with
the Supreme Court after the local village council in Gampaha had tried
to block the construction of a church on the grounds that it would
interfere with Buddhism.
The Supreme Court ruled that the construction of the church could
proceed. The construction of the new church was nearing completion at
year's end. However, in May two bombs exploded in the hall of the
church; no one was injured but the structure was damaged slightly (see
Section 5).
The LTTE has discriminated against Muslims in the past. In 1990 it
evicted some 46,000 thousand Muslims from areas under its control in
the north. The LTTE also has expropriated Muslim homes, lands, and
businesses, and threatened Muslim families with death if they attempted
to return to areas under LTTE control.
d. Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel,
Emigration, and Repatriation.--The Constitution grants every citizen
``freedom of movement and of choosing his residence'' and ``freedom to
return to Sri Lanka,'' and the Government generally respects the right
to domestic and foreign travel; however, the war with the LTTE prompted
the Government to impose more stringent checks on travelers from the
north and the east and on movement in Colombo, particularly after dark.
Tamils must obtain police passes in order to move freely in the north
and east and frequently are harassed at checkpoints around the country
(see Section 1.c.). These security measures have the effect of
restricting the movement of Tamils, especially young males. Prior to
the government military offensive on the Jaffna peninsula in 1995 and
1996, an estimated 600,000 citizens had been displaced by the
insurgency. Most lived in camps financed by the Government and NGO's.
The Jaffna offensive, in addition to the military advance in
Kilinochchi in the Vanni region in July 1996, resulted in the
displacement of hundreds of thousands of persons in LTTE-controlled
areas of the Vanni region; some of these persons were being displaced
for a second or third time. Some of the displaced persons lived with
friends or relatives, or in ``welfare centers'' in schools, religious
institutions and other public buildings. Many others lived in makeshift
shelters or camped out under trees. The Government continued to supply
them with food, medicine and other essential supplies. The military
offensive in the Vanni region that began in May 1997 and continued
until the end of 1998 displaced an additional 70,000 persons. However,
well over 100,000 persons have left the LTTE-controlled parts of the
Vanni region since 1996, and this has helped to relieve the situation.
Most of these displaced persons have returned to their homes on the
Jaffna peninsula.
The movement of persons in Jaffna is regulated strictly by military
checkpoints throughout the city, although the military has reduced the
number of checkpoints there compared with 1997. For Tamils, travel from
Jaffna to other parts of the country is extremely difficult, due in
part to security restrictions imposed by the security forces and in
part by the limited availability of transportation to the south.
From October 1996 until the end of 1999, over 150,000 persons are
estimated to have moved out of LTTE-controlled regions through Vavuniya
and other transit points in government-controlled regions. Of these,
over 100,000 persons were repatriated to or otherwise reached Jaffna
and other Tamil-majority areas. Many had left the Vanni region with the
intention of proceeding south; they opted for other destinations only
after learning that they would have to remain in transit camps until
security clearances for southward travel were obtained. Obtaining a
clearance can take between 2 and 4 months in some cases, and some human
rights groups alleged that the procedures were arbitrary and
unreasonably strict. Clearance procedures were applied to everyone,
including the elderly and the very young. While the Government had a
legitimate interest in identifying LTTE infiltrators, it also appeared
reluctant to allow displaced Tamils to travel to Colombo where they
might contribute to unemployment and other social problems. About
14,000 of these displaced persons continue to live in substandard
conditions in camps in Vavuniya and Mannar. Many of these persons hope
to return to their homes in the areas of conflict once the fighting
stops.
Prior to 1996, the LTTE severely restricted the movement of Tamils
under its control, often levying a large ``exit tax'' on persons who
sought to travel to areas under government control and requiring
travelers to leave all their property in escrow. In addition, it
usually would grant permission to only one family member to travel at a
time. However, following the Government capture of Jaffna the LTTE
began to allow persons to move more freely into government-controlled
areas, although it occasionally disrupted the flow of persons exiting
the Vanni region through the checkpoint. In November most of the
residents of Vavuniya evacuated the town due to LTTE threats that it
was planning to shell the town as part of its counterattack against the
Government. A week later, the LTTE withdrew its threat and most of the
town's residents returned. The LTTE also disrupted the movement of
IDP's from Trincomalee and Mannar to Jaffna by hijacking or attacking
civilian shipping in the north. The LTTE also disrupted civilian air
traffic to Jaffna; in August 1998 it began warning civilians and
humanitarian workers not to use civilian flights servicing the
peninsula. Humanitarian groups estimate that there are more than
200,000 IDP's in LTTE-controlled areas (see Section 1.g.).
Several thousand Tamils fled LTTE-controlled areas to Tamil Nadu in
southern India in 1998. An estimated 64,000 Tamil refugees live in
camps there, having left Sri Lanka at various times throughout the
period of the conflict. Another 100,000 refugees are believed to have
been integrated into Tamil society in southern India.
The Government cooperates with the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations in assisting
refugees. The issue of the provision of first asylum did not arise
during the year. The Government does not permit the entry of refugees
into the country or grant first asylum, nor does it aid those who
manage to enter to seek permanent residence elsewhere. The law does not
include provisions for granting refugee/asylee status in accordance
with the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
its 1967 Protocol. There were no instances of forcible repatriation of
persons to a country where they feared persecution.
Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to
Change Their Government
Citizens have the constitutional right to change their government
through periodic multiparty elections based on universal adult
suffrage. This right was exercised during parliamentary elections in
August 1994, when the PA coalition ended the l7-year rule of the UNP,
during the presidential elections in November 1994, when PA
presidential candidate Chandrika Kumaratunga won 62 percent of the
vote, and in December when Kumaratunga was reelected in elections that
were generally free and fair but were marred by voting irregularities
and violence.
In November President Kumaratunga called for presidential elections
to be held on December 21 even though her 6-year term was not set to
expire until November 2000. The preelection period was marked by
violence. On November 14, a grenade exploded in the vicinity of a UNP
rally featuring opposition leader and presidential candidate, Ranil
Wickremesinghe. One youth was killed in the blast and about 35 persons
were injured (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.). On November 29, the main UNP
headquarters were attacked by 25 armed persons who threatened security
staff, tore down posters, and broke windows.
On December 18, an LTTE suicide bomber attempted to assassinate
President Kumaratunga at a rally 3 days before the presidential
elections. The bomb injured the President, Justice Minister Peiris, and
many others, and killed 13 bystanders (see Sections 1.a. and 1.c.).
On December 18, the LTTE allegedly also bombed a rally of the UNP,
killing 11 civilians (see Section 1.a.).
There also were allegations that the ruling PA party took measures
to undermine free and fair elections. On November 12, President
Kumaratunga appointed an acting election comissioner. There were
allegations that this appointment was politically motivated, although
he permitted local election monitors and some international observers
to participate in elections. On November 6, after a series of military
setbacks in the war with the LTTE, the Government implemented a strict
censorship policy regarding reporting of military or security news (see
Section 2.a.). Opposition figures criticized this policy for curtailing
freedom of expression, and alleged that it was implemented to cover up
the recent military setbacks prior to the elections.
On December 21, President Kumaratunga was reelected with 51 percent
of the vote. There were credible accounts of voting irregularities in
several locations around the country. At least six persons were killed
on December 21 in election-related violence. By year's end, local
observers had not issued reports on the elections; however, they
expressed concern about whether the vote was free and fair. A team of
international observers stated that, despite some irregularities, they
were satisfied with the conduct of the elections. None of the
opposition candidates challenged the election results.
Elections for seven of the country's nine provincial councils took
place during the year. In January elections were held in the northwest
('Wayamba') province; the ruling PA won 28 seats, the UNP won 19 seats,
and the JVP won 3 seats. This election was marked by violence and
accusations of electoral fraud. The Center for Monitoring Election
Violence (CMEV) reported more than 800 instances of violence, including
2 cases of murder and 11 cases of attempted murder, as well as a large
number of assaults and cases of intimidation (see Sections 1.a. and
1.c.). In response to sharp criticism about the way that the vote was
conducted, the President appointed a commission staffed by two retired
judges to evaluate allegations of electoral fraud. Although they agreed
that the poll was flawed, no new election was called. In February the
President also created a bipartisan monitoring committee (which she
chaired) to ensure that the remaining provincial council elections were
``free and fair.'' Although there was some criticism following the five
provincial council elections held in April and the southern province
election held in June, reported incidents of violence were far fewer
than in January. The ruling PA party narrowly won elections in the
April provincial council elections, claiming 120 of 263 seats. The UNP
took 112 seats and the JVP won 15. In the June southern provincial
elections, the PA gained 27 seats, the UNP won 21, and the JVP won 7.
In January 1998, the Government held local government elections in
Jaffna for the first time in over a decade. Although turnout for the
elections was relatively low due in part to threats from the LTTE and
in part to outdated electoral register, observers believed that the
elections were free and fair. Voters elected 239 representatives from 5
Tamil political parties to serve on 17 local councils.
The Commissioner of Elections recognizes 34 parties; however, only
10 parties actually hold seats in the 225-member Parliament. The two
most influential parties, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (the principal
component party of the governing PA coalition) and the UNP, generally
draw their support from the majority Sinhalese community. Historically,
these two parties have alternated in power.
Although there are no legal impediments to the participation of
women in politics or government, the social mores in some communities
limit women's activities outside the home, and they are
underrepresented. Nonetheless, in August 1994, voters elected a
Parliament that chose a female prime minister for the third time in the
country's history. In November 1994, a woman was elected President for
the first time; she was reelected in December for a second term. Eleven
women hold seats in the Parliament. In addition to the Prime Minister,
the Minister for Women's Affairs and the Minister of Social Services, a
number of deputy ministers are women.
There are 27 Tamil and 20 Muslim Members of Parliament.
The LTTE refuses to allow elections in areas under its control.
Through a campaign of murder and intimidation, it effectively
undermined the functioning of local government bodies in Jaffna, whose
members were elected in January 1998. This campaign included the murder
of 2 of Jaffna's mayors and death threatsagainst members of the 17
local councils. Throughout the period of the conflict, the LTTE has
killed popularly elected politicians, including those elected by Tamils
in areas the LTTE claims to be part of a Tamil homeland. During the
summer, the LTTE told politicians in the east to suspend their
political activities and stay away from their constituencies; however,
this ban was lifted by year's end.
Section 4. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human
Rights
There are several domestic NGO human rights groups, including the
Movement for Interracial Justice and Equality (MIRJE), the University
Teachers for Human Rights, Jaffna (UTHR-J), the Civil Rights Movement
(CRM), and the Law and Society Trust (LST), that monitor civil and
political liberties. There are no adverse regulations governing the
activities of local and foreign NGO's, although in February the
Government began requiring NGO's to include action plans and detailed
descriptions of funding sources as part of its official registration
process. Some NGO workers believed that this was an attempt by the
Government to exert greater control over the NGO sector after human
rights groups criticized the Government's handling of the Wayamba
elections in January (see Section 3). However, few NGO's complied with
these new reporting requirements. The Government generally cooperated
with NGO's, with members of Parliament, and with other officials
frequently participating in seminars and other events concerning human
rights and humanitarian affairs.
The Government continued to allow the ICRC unrestricted access to
detention facilities (see Sections 1.c. and 1.d.). In the past, the
ICRC provided international humanitarian law training materials and
training to the security forces on an ad hoc basis. The UNHCR, the
ICRC, and a variety of international NGO's assisted in the delivery of
medical and other essential supplies to the Vanni area, even with the
many restrictions on such supplies (see Section 1.g.). Some observers
believed that increased restrictions on relief work, coupled with a cut
in dry food rations, were linked to a government policy to draw persons
out of the LTTE-controlled parts of the Vanni region. There was
insufficient evidence to verify this claim.
During the year, the HRC conducted more than 1,000 visits to police
stations and over 300 visits to detention facilities. It is estimated
that the HRC has well over 2,500 cases of alleged human rights abuse
pending. The commission also began the investigation into the
allegations by former Lance Corporal Rajapakse about mass graves at
Chemmani in Jaffna, which resulted in the government investigation and
exhumations (see Section 1.a.). Nonetheless, human rights observers
believed that the work of the HRC was hampered severely by a lack of
strong leadership within the organization. For example, after almost 3
years of operation, the HRC has failed to hire permanent staff. The
organization also responded inadequately to requests from its field
officers for protection when inquiries placed them in danger. The HRC
also has been criticized for micromanaging the activities of the field
offices, which are poorly equipped. The establishment of the CIUAH in
1998 strengthened claims of the HRC's ineffectiveness, since the
responsibilities of the CIUAH clearly fell within the HRC's mandate
(see Section 1.d.). The tenure of the HRC commissioners, including the
chairman, is set to expire in March 2000.
Section 5. Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability,
Language or Social Status
The Constitution provides for equal rights under the law for all
citizens, and the Government generally respects these rights. The
Supreme Court regularly upholds court rulings in cases in which
individuals file suit over the abridgment of their fundamental civil
rights. The HRC and the CIUAH are other mechanisms that the Government
has established to ensure enforcement of constitutional provisions in
addition to access to the courts (see Section 1.d.).
Women.--Sexual assault, rape, and spousal abuse (often associated
with alcohol abuse) represent serious and pervasive forms of societal
violence against women. Amendments to the Penal Code introduced in 1995
specifically addressed sexual abuse and exploitation. Rape laws were
modified to create a more equitable burden of proof and to make
punishments more stringent. Marital rape is considered an offense in
cases of spouses living under judicial separation, and laws govern
sexual harassment in the workplace and sexual molestation. While the
Penal Code may ease some of the problems faced by victims of sexual
assault, many women's organizations believe that greater sensitization
of police and judicial officials also is required. The Government set
up the Children and Women Protection Bureau within the police in 1994
to respond to calls for greater awareness and attention. Police
statistics indicated that there were 26,660 crimes against women during
the period from January to July, compared with 26,565crimes between
January and June of 1998. Laws against procuring and trafficking were
strengthened in 1995, facilitating the prosecution of brothel owners;
however, trafficking in women for the purpose of forced prostitution
occurs (see Section 6.f.).
The Constitution provides for equal employment opportunities in the
public sector. However, women have no legal protection against
discrimination in the private sector, where they sometimes are paid
less than men for equal work, often experience difficulty in rising to
supervisory positions, and face sexual harassment. Women constitute
approximately one-half of the formal work force.
Women have equal rights under national, civil, and criminal law.
However, issues related to family law, including divorce, child custody
and inheritance, are adjudicated by the customary law of each ethnic or
religious group. The minimum age of marriage for women is 18 years,
except in the case of Muslims, who continue to follow their customary
marriage practices. The application of different legal practices based
on membership in a religious or ethnic group often results in
discrimination against women.
Children.--The Government is committed to protecting the welfare
and rights of children, but is constrained by a lack of resources. The
Government demonstrates a strong commitment to children's rights and
welfare through its extensive systems of public education and medical
care. The 1997 Compulsory Attendance at Schools Act of 1997 was
implemented in January 1998 and requires that children between the ages
of 5 and 14 attend school (see Section 6.d.). Education is free through
the university level. Health care, including immunization programs,
also is free.
There is a significant problem of child prostitution in certain
coastal resort areas. The Government estimates that there are more than
2,000 active child prostitutes in the country, but private groups claim
the number is much higher; estimates range as high as 15,000 to 20,000
(see Sections 6.d. and 6.f.). A 1998 U.N. International Labor Office
study placed the total at 30,000. The bulk of child sexual abuse in the
form of child prostitution is committed by citizens; however, some
child prostitutes are boys who sell themselves to foreign tourists.
Some of these children are forced into prostitution. The Government has
pushed for greater international cooperation to bring those guilty of
pedophilia to justice. Several foreign pedophiles were brought before
courts during the year. The penalty for conviction is usually a fine
and deportation. Two foreign pedophiles were convicted during the year;
one was sentenced to 14 years in prison and the other was deported (see
Section 6.f.). In 1995 the Ministry of Media, Tourism, and Aviation
created a task force specifically to study the problem of sex tourism
and related offenses. It was abolished at the end of 1997 and
superseded by a presidential task force on child protection.
Following the recommendation of the task force, the Government
created the National Child Protection Authority (NCPA) in 1998. In May
the President appointed board members to the NCPA. The law establishing
the NCPA consolidated existing legislation and defined a child as
anyone under age 18. Under the law, the definition of child abuse
includes all acts of sexual violence against, trafficking in, and
cruelty to children. The law also prohibits the use of children in
exploitative labor or illegal activities or in any act contrary to
compulsory education regulations. The legislation further widened the
definition of child abuse to include the involvement of children in
war. The NCPA board is composed of senior law enforcement officers as
well as representatives from education and the medical and legal
professions, and reports directly to the President. At year's end, the
NCPA was involved in recruiting permanent staff.
In the first half of the year, the police recorded 2,066 cases of
crimes against children, compared with 1,752 crimes in the first half
of 1998. Although NGO's welcomed the NCPA legislation, many attribute
the problem of exploitation of children to the lack of law enforcement
rather than inadequate legislation. Many law enforcement resources are
diverted to the conflict with the LTTE.
Labor force surveys over the past several years have suggested that
more than 16,000 children may be fully employed (see Section 6.d.).
Additional thousands of children are believed to be working in domestic
service. There have been reports of rural children working as domestic
servants in urban households--often given into service by poverty
stricken parents--and being abused by their employers. Some of these
children reportedly have been starved, beaten, sexually abused, and
forced into prostitution (see Section 6.c.). The Government states that
it does not have sufficient resources to protect these children from
such exploitation (see Section 6.d.). Nonetheless, the Government has
supported a high-profile UNICEF advertising campaign aimed at combating
child labor.
The LTTE recruits children for use in battlefield support functions
and in combat. It has been confirmed that some ofthese children are as
young as age 13, and some are recruited forcibly (see Section 1.g.). In
May 1998, the LTTE gave assurances to the Special Representative of the
U.N. Secretary General for Children in Armed Combat that it would not
recruit children under the age of 17; however, it is not clear that the
LTTE has honored this pledge.
People With Disabilities.--The law does not mandate accessibility
to buildings or government services for the disabled. The World Health
Organization estimates that 7 percent of the population are disabled.
Most disabled persons who are unable to work are cared for by their
families. The Department of Social Services operates eight vocational
training schools for the physically and mentally disabled and sponsors
a program of job training and job placement for graduates. Some private
companies, at the urging of the Government, have provided training and
jobs to disabled veterans. The Government also provides some financial
support to NGO's that assist the disabled, subsidizes prosthetic
devices and other medical aids for the disabled, makes some purchases
from disabled suppliers, and has registered 74 schools and training
institutions for the disabled run by NGO's. The Social Services
Ministry has selected job placement officers to help the estimated
200,000 work-eligible disabled persons to find jobs. In spite of these
efforts, the disabled still face difficulties arising from
discrimination and negative attitudes. In December 1996, Parliament
passed legislation forbidding discrimination against any person on the
grounds of disability. No cases are known to have been filed under this
law.
Indigenous People.--The indigenous people of Sri Lanka, known as
Veddas, number less than 1,000. They prefer to maintain their isolated
traditional way of life and are protected by the Constitution. There
are no legal restrictions on their participation in the political or
economic life of the nation. In August 1998, the Government fulfilled a
long-standing Vedda demand when the president issued an order granting
many Veddas the right to hunt and gather in specific protected forest
areas. The executive order granted the Veddas the freedom to protect
their culture and to carry on their traditional way of life without
hindrance. Under a pilot program, special identity cards were issued to
some Veddas to facilitate their use of these forest areas. However,
some Veddas still complain that they are being pushed off of their
land.
Religious Minorities.--Discrimination based on religious
differences is much less common than discrimination based on ethnic
group or caste. In general, the members of the various faiths tend to
be tolerant of each other's religious beliefs. However, on occasion
evangelical Christians have been harassed by Buddhist monks for their
attempts to convert Buddhists to Christianity (see Section 2.c.). In
March 1988, the leader of an Assemblies of God congregation in the
southern town of Tissamaharama was killed by unknown assailants. In
April two bombs were placed in the church hall of this congregation,
now run by the pastor's widow (see Section 1.c.). No one was injured;
however, the building sustained some structural damage.
In the northern part of the island, LTTE insurgents expelled some
46,000 Muslim inhabitants from their homes in 1990--virtually the
entire Muslim population. Most of these persons remain displaced. In
the past, the LTTE has expropriated Muslim homes, lands, and businesses
and threatened Muslim families with death if they attempt to return.
National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities.--There are approximately 1
million Tamils of comparatively recent Indian origin, the so-called
``hill Tamils'' or ``Indian Tamils,'' whose ancestors originally were
brought to Sri Lanka in the 19th century to work on plantations. About
75,000 of these persons do not qualify for either Indian or Sri Lankan
citizenship and face discrimination, especially in the allocation of
Government funds for education. Without national identity cards, they
are also vulnerable to arrest by the security forces. However, the
Government has stated that none of these persons would be forced to
depart the country. During the year, the Government introduced a
program to begin registering these individuals. During the year, some
``Indian'' Tamils received identity cards; however, the program
reportedly was not progressing quickly.
Both Sri Lankan and ``Indian'' Tamils maintain that they have long
been the victims of systematic discrimination in university education,
government employment and in other matters controlled by the
Government. However, in recent years, there has been little clear
evidence of overt discrimination in university enrollment or government
employment, although some groupscontinue to assert that it exists. In
January 1996, the Government established a parliamentary select
committee to consider a ``devolution'' package designed to devolve
wide-ranging powers to local governments, thereby providing ethnic
minorities greater autonomy in governing their local affairs. The
devolution proposals were placed before Parliament in September 1997.
Although much has been made of the devolution proposals as a
springboard to talks with the LTTE and a possible means to end the
ethnic war, the ruling PA and opposition UNP could not agree on several
key aspects of the proposals. The proposal was not voted upon in
Parliament by year's end.
Section 6. Worker Rights
a. The Right of Association.--The Government respects the
Constitutional right of workers to establish labor unions. Any seven
workers may form a union, adopt a charter, elect leaders, and publicize
their views. Over 70 percent of the plantation work force, which is
overwhelmingly ``Indian'' Tamil, is unionized. In total there are over
900,000 union members, 650,000 of whom are women. Approximately 20
percent of the nonagricultural work force in the private sector also is
unionized. Unions represent most workers in large private firms, but
those in small scale agriculture and small businesses usually do not
belong to unions. Public sector employees are unionized at very high
rates.
Most large unions are affiliated with political parties and play a
prominent role in the political process, though major unions in the
public sector are politically independent. More than 30 labor unions
have political affiliations, but there are also a small number of
unaffiliated unions, some of which have active leaders and a relatively
large membership. In 1998 the most recent year for which data are
available, the Department of Labor registered 111 new unions and
canceled the registration of 14 others, bringing the total number of
functioning unions to 1,678. The Department of Labor is authorized by
law to cancel the registration of any union that does not submit an
annual report. This requirement is the only legal grounds for
cancellation of registration.
All workers, other than civil servants and workers in ``essential''
services, have the right to strike. By law workers also may lodge
complaints with the Commissioner of Labor, a labor tribunal or the
Supreme Court to protect their rights. Before September 1994, the
Government controlled strikes by declaring some industries to be
essential under the ER. Subsequently, this practice largely ceased,
with the Government permitting, for example, a 5-week postal strike
early in 1998. However, the President retains the power to designate
any industry as an essential service. In June the Government attempted
to break a doctors' strike by declaring medical services, which are
provided by the State under a program of socialized medicine, as
essential. However, the doctors continued to strike, defying the order
until it was revoked, and the Government agreed to consider the
doctors' grievances. The International Labor Organization has pointed
out to the Government that essential services should be limited to
services where an interruption would endanger the life, personal
safety, or health of the population.
Civil servants collectively may submit labor grievances to the
public service commission but have no legal grounds to strike.
Nonetheless, government workers in the transportation, medical,
educational, power generation, financial, and port sectors have staged
brief strikes and other work actions in recent years. There were 128
strikes in the public sector during the year. There were 115 strikes
during 1998 and 156 strikes in 1997.
The law prohibits retribution against strikers in nonessential
sectors. Employers may dismiss workers only for disciplinary reasons,
mainly misconduct. Incompetence or low productivity are not grounds for
dismissal. Any employees who have been dismissed have a right to appeal
their termination before a labor tribunal.
Unions are free to affiliate with international bodies, and many of
them have done so. However, there is no national trade union center
that is affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions (ICFTU) to centralize or facilitate this contact.
b. The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively.--The law
provides for the right to collective bargaining, and it is widely
practiced. Large firms may have employees in as many as 60 different
unions. In enterprises without unions, including those in the export
processing zones (EPZ's), worker councils--composed of employees,
employers and often a public sector representative--are generally the
forums for labor/management negotiation. However, the councils are not
mandatory outside the EPZ's, do not have the power to negotiate binding
contracts, and have been criticized as ineffective by labor advocates.
For most of the year, the law did not require management to
recognize or bargain with unions, and in some cases employers declined
to recognize the unions in their factories. However, in December
Parliament passed an amendment to the Industrial Disputes Act, which
requires employers to recognize trade unions and the right to
collective bargaining. The law prohibits antiunion discrimination.
Employers found guilty of such discrimination are required to reinstate
workers fired for union activities, but have the right to transfer them
to different locations.
There are approximately 87,500 workers employed in the EPZ's, a
large percentage of them women. Under the law, workers in the EPZ's
have the same rights to join unions as other workers. However, few
unions have been formed in the EPZ's, largely because of severe
restrictions on access by union organizers to the zones. While the
unionization rate in the rest of the country is approximately 25
percent, the rate within the EPZ's is only 0.2 percent. Some labor
representatives allege that the Government's Board of Investment (BOI),
which manages the EPZ's, has discouraged union activity and few unions
have been formed. Work councils in the EPZ's are chaired by the BOI and
only have the power to make recommendations. While employers in the
EPZ's offer higher wages and better working conditions generally than
employers elsewhere, (workers face other concerns, such as security,
expensive but low quality boarding houses, and sexual harassment). In
most instances, wage boards establish minimum wages and conditions of
employment, except in the EPZ's, where wages and work conditions are
set by the BOI.
c. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor.--Forced or compulsory
labor is prohibited by provisions of the Abolition of Slavery Act of
1844; however, there were reports of its use. The act does not prohibit
forced or bonded labor by children specifically, but government
officials interpret it as applying to persons of all ages. There are
credible reports that some rural children are employed in debt bondage
as domestic servants in urban households; some of these children
reportedly have been abused (see Section 5). Some children were forced
into prostitution (see Sections 5 and 6.f.) There are credible reports
that some members of the STF operating in the Batticaloa area forced
local villagers to work without compensation in clearing jungle areas
and in other manual labor in and near STF camps during the year. In
some cases, the villagers were threatened directly or indirectly with
physical abuse if they did not perform the work.
The LTTE continues to conscript high-school age children for work
as cooks, messengers, and clerks. In some cases, the children
reportedly help build fortifications. In the past, children as young as
age 10 were said to be recruited and placed for 2 to 4 years in special
schools that provided them with a mixture of LTTE ideology and formal
education. The LTTE uses children as young as 13 in battle, and
children sometimes are recruited forcibly into the LTTE. In May the
LTTE began a program of compulsory physical training, including mock
military drills, for most of the population of the areas that it
controls, including schoolchildren and the aged. According to LTTE
spokesmen, this work is meant to keep the population fit; however, it
is widely believed that the training was established in order to gain
tighter control over the population.
d. Status of Child Labor Practices and Minimum Age for
Employment.--In 1998 Parliament passed the National Child Protection
Authority Act (NCPA) to combat the problem of child abuse, including
unlawful child labor. The act consolidated existing legislation that
clearly established what types of employment are restricted for
children, which age groups are affected, and what the minimum age for
child labor is for particular jobs. The minimum age for employment is
14, although the law continues to permit the employment of younger
children by their parents or guardians in limited agricultural work.
Under certain circumstances domestic employment is permitted for
children as young as age 12. A recent study reported that child
domestic servants are employed in 8.6 percent of homes in the southern
province. The same study reported that child laborers in the domestic
service sector often are deprived of an education. The law also permits
employment in any school or institution for training purposes. The
Compulsory Attendance at Schools Act of 1997, which requires children
between the ages of 5 and 14 to attend school, has been in effect since
January 1998, although it still is being implemented. The ultimate
effect that this may have on the child labor problem remains unclear.
Persons under age 16 may not be employed in any public enterprise
in which life or limb is endangered. There are no reports that children
are employed in the EPZ's, the garment industry, or any other export
industry, although children sometimes are employed during harvest
periods in the plantation sectors and in non-plantation agriculture.
About 85 percent of children below the age of 16 attend school. The law
permits the employment of suchpersons for not more than 1 hour on any
day before school. However, a 1995 labor survey of the plantations
indicated that half of all children in plantations drop out of school
after the fourth grade, leaving a large pool of children between the
ages of 10 and 15 available to pursue employment.
Despite legislation, some child labor still exists. A 1997 census
and statistics department survey found that 16,511 children between the
ages of 10 and 14 were fully employed. This included 11,132 males and
5,379 females. Additional thousands of children (estimates range from
50,000 to 100,000) are believed to be employed in domestic service,
although this situation is not regulated or documented. Many child
domestics are subjected to physical, sexual, and/or emotional abuse. A
significant portion of employed children work outside their families.
In addition to domestic service, regular employment of children occurs
mainly in the informal sector and in family enterprises such as family
farms, crafts, small trade establishments, eating houses, and repair
shops. Children also are involved in the manufacture of coconut fiber
products, bricks, fishing, wrapping tobacco, street trading, and
farming. Government inspections have been unable to eliminate these
forms of child labor (see Section 5), though an awareness campaign
coupled with the establishment of hot lines for reporting child labor
led to over 500 complaints in 1998. There are an estimated 250 to 300
prosecutions each year in cases related to the employment of minors.
Under legislation dating from 1956, the maximum penalty for employing
minors is about $14 (1,000 rupees), with a maximum jail term of 6
months.
Children work as prostitutes as well (see Section 6.f.). Estimates
of the number of child prostitutes range from 2,000 to 30,000; however,
there are no reliable statistics (see Section 5). Although forced or
bonded labor by persons of any age are prohibited by law, some rural
children reportedly serve in debt bondage (see Sections 5 and 6.c.).
e. Acceptable Conditions of Work.--The Department of Labor
effectively enforces the minimum wage law for large companies through
routine inspections; however, staffing shortages prevent the Department
from effectively monitoring the informal sector. While there is no
universal national minimum wage, about 40 wage boards set minimum wages
and working conditions by sector and industry. According to the
statistics department of the Labor Ministry, current minimum wage rates
average $30 (2,130 rupees) per month in industry, commerce, and the
service sector; and $1.33 (95 rupees) per day in agriculture. The
minimum wage in the garment industry is $35 (2,535 rupees) per month.
These minimum wages are insufficient to provide a decent standard of
living for a worker and the standard family of five, but the vast
majority of families have more than one breadwinner. Most permanent
full-time workers are covered by laws that prohibit them from working
regularly more than 45 hours per week (a 5-and-one-half day workweek).
Such workers also receive 14 days of annual leave, 14 to 21 days of
medical leave, and some 20 local holidays each year.
Maternity leave is available for permanent and casual female
workers. Employers must contribute 12 percent of a worker's wage to an
employee's provident fund and 3 percent to an employee's trust fund.
Employers who fail to comply may be fined, although the effectiveness
of government enforcement of this provision is unknown.
Several laws protect the safety and health of industrial workers.
However, the Department of Labor's small staff of inspectors is
inadequate to enforce compliance with the laws. Workers have the
statutory right to remove themselves from situations that endanger
their health, but many workers are unaware of, or indifferent to,
health risks, and fear that they would lose their jobs if they removed
themselves.
f. Trafficking in Persons.--Penal Code amendments enacted in 1995
made trafficking in persons illegal; however, there are credible
reports that trafficking in women and children occurs. According to
police reports, there is a floating pool of 200 foreign female sex
workers in the country who were trafficked from the former Soviet
Union, Thailand, and China. There are also occasional reports of female
Sri Lankan domestic workers in the Gulf States being abused and
illegally exploited.
Internal trafficking in male children also is a problem, especially
from areas bordering northern and eastern provinces. Protecting
Environment and Children Everywhere (PEACE), a domestic NGO estimates
that there are at least 5,000 male children between the ages of 8 and
15 who are engaged as sex workers both at beach and mountain resorts.
Some of these children are forced into prostitution by their parents or
organized crime (see Section 5). PEACE also reports that there are an
additional 7,000 young men aged 15 to 18 who are self-employed
prostitutes. The country reportedly has a growing reputation as a
destination for foreign pedophiles; however, officials believe that
approximately 30 percent of the clients are tourists and 70 percent are
locals. The Government occasionally prosecuted foreign pedophiles.
During the year, two foreign pedophiles were convicted; one was
sentenced to 14 years' imprisonment and the other received a suspended
sentence and was deported (see Section 5).
APPENDICES
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Appendix A.--Notes on Preparation of the Reports
We base the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices on
information available from all sources, including American and foreign
government officials, victims of human rights abuse, academic and
congressional studies, and reports from the press, international
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO's) concerned with
human rights. We find particularly helpful, and make reference in most
reports to, the role of NGO's, ranging from groups in a single country
to those that concern themselves with human rights worldwide. While
much of the information we use is already public, information on
particular abuses frequently cannot be attributed, for obvious reasons,
to specific sources.
By law we must submit the reports to Congress by February 25. To
comply we provide guidance to United States diplomatic missions in July
for submission of draft reports in September and October, which we
update at year's end as necessary. Other offices in the Department of
State provide contributions and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights,
and Labor prepares a final draft. Because of the preparation time
required, it is possible that yearend developments may not be reflected
fully. We make every effort to include reference to major events or
significant changes in trends.
We have attempted to make these country reports as comprehensive as
space will allow, while taking care to make them objective and as
uniform as possible in both scope and quality of coverage. We have
given particular attention to attaining a high standard of consistency
despite the multiplicity of sources and the obvious problems related to
varying degrees of access to information, structural differences in
political and social systems, and trends in world opinion regarding
human rights practices in specific countries.
It is often difficult to evaluate the credibility of reports of
human rights abuses. With the exception of some terrorist
organizations, most opposition groups and certainly most governments
deny that they commit human rights abuses and often go to great lengths
to conceal any evidence of such acts. There are often few eyewitnesses
to specific abuses, and they frequently are intimidated or otherwise
prevented from reporting what they know. On the other hand, individuals
and groups opposed to a particular government sometimes have powerful
incentives to exaggerate or fabricate abuses, and some governments
similarly distort or exaggerate abuses attributed to opposition groups.
We have made every effort to identify those groups (e.g., government
forces, terrorists, etc.) that are believed, based on all the evidence
available, to have committed human rights abuses. Where credible
evidence is lacking, we have tried to indicate why. Many governments
that profess to oppose human rights abuses in fact secretly order or
tacitly condone them or simply lack the will or the ability to control
those responsible for them. Consequently, in judging a government's
policy, it is important to look beyond statements of policy or intent
in order to examine what in fact a government has done to prevent human
rights abuses, including the extent to which it investigates, tries,
and appropriately punishes those who commit such abuses. We continue to
make every effort to do that in these reports.
To increase uniformity, the introductory section of each report
contains a brief setting, indicating how the country is governed and
providing the context for examining the country's human rights
performance. A description of the political framework and the role of
security and law enforcement agencies with respect to human rights is
followed by a brief characterization of the economy. The setting
concludes with an overview of human rights developments in the year
under review, mentioning specific areas (e.g., torture, freedom of
speech and press, discrimination) in which abuses and problems
occurred.
We have continued the effort from previous years to expand
reporting on human rights practices affecting women, children, and
indigenous people. We discuss in the appropriate section of the report
any abuses that are targeted specifically against women (e.g., rape or
other violence perpetrated by governmental or organized opposition
forces, or discriminatory laws or regulations). In Section 5, we
continue to discuss socioeconomic discrimination; societal violence
against women, children, or minority group members; and the efforts, if
any, of governments to combat these problems.
With regard to governmental policies on the welfare of children,
readers may wish to consult ``The State of the World's Children 1999,''
published by the U.N. Children's Fund, which provides a wide range of
data on health, education, nutrition, and rates of infant mortality and
mortality under 5 years of age in some 145 countries, as well as
information on the degree of progress that these countries are making
in reducing the key mortality rate for those under age 5.
The following notes on specific categories of the report are not
meant to be comprehensive descriptions of each category but to provide
definitions of key terms used in the reports and to explain the
organization of material within the format:
Political and Other Extrajudicial Killing.--Includes killings in
which there is evidence of government instigation without due process
of law or of political motivation by government or by opposition
groups; also covers extrajudicial killings (e.g., deliberate, illegal,
or excessive use of lethal force by the police, security forces, or
other agents of the State whether against criminal suspects, detainees,
prisoners, or others), as well as killings committed by police or
security forces in operations or while in the performance of their
duties that resulted in the death of persons without due process of law
(e.g., mistargeted bombing or shelling, killing of bystanders, etc.);
excludes combat deaths and killings by common criminals, if the
likelihood of political motivation can be ruled out (see also Section
1.g.). Although mentioned briefly here, deaths in detention due to
official negligence are covered in detail in Section 1.c.
Disappearance.--Covers unresolved cases in which political
motivation appears likely and in which the victims have not been found
or perpetrators have not been identified; cases eventually classed as
political killings in which the bodies of those missing are discovered
also are covered in the above category, while those eventually
identified as arrest or detention may be covered under ``Arbitrary
Arrest, Detention, or Exile.''
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment.--Torture is here defined as an extremely severe form of
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, committed by or
at the instigation of government forces or opposition groups, with
specific intent to cause extremely severe pain or suffering, whether
mental or physical. Discussion concentrates on actual practices, not on
whether they fit any precise definition, and includes use of physical
and other force that may fall short of torture but which is cruel,
inhuman, or degrading. This section also covers prison conditions,
including whether conditions meet minimum international standards, and
deaths in custody due to negligence by government officials.
Arbitrary Arrest, Detention, or Exile.--Covers cases in which
detainees, including political detainees, are held in official custody
without charges or, if charged, are denied a public preliminary
judicial hearing within a reasonable period. Also discusses whether,
and under what circumstances, governments exile citizens.
Denial of Fair Public Trial.--Briefly describes the court system
and evaluates whether there is an independent judiciary and whether
trials are both fair and public (failure to hold any trial is noted in
the category above); includes discussion of ``political prisoners''
(political detainees are covered above), defined as those convicted and
imprisoned for essentially political beliefs or nonviolent acts of
dissent or expression, regardless of the actual charge.
Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or
Correspondence.--Discusses the ``passive'' right of the individual to
noninterference by the State; includes the right to receive foreign
publications, for example, while the right to publish is discussed
under ``Freedom of Speech and Press''; includes the right to be free
from coercive population control measures, including coerced abortion
and involuntary sterilization, but does not include cultural or
traditional practices, such as female genital mutilation, which are
addressed in Section 5.
Use of Excessive Force and Violations of Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts.--An optional subsection for use in describing
abuses that occur in countries experiencing significant internal armed
conflict. Includes indiscriminate, nonselective killings arising from
excessive use of force, e.g., by police in putting down demonstrations,
or by the shelling of villages (deliberate, targeted killing would be
discussed in Section l.a.). Also includes abuses against civilian
noncombatants. For reports in which use of this section would be
inappropriate, i.e., in which there is no significant internal
conflict, lethal use of excessive force by security forces (which is
herein defined as a form of extrajudicial killing) is discussed in
Section 1.a.; nonlethal excessive force in Section 1.c.
Freedom of Speech and Press.--Evaluates whether these freedoms
exist and describes any direct or indirect restrictions. Includes
discussion of academic freedom.
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association.--Evaluates the
ability of individuals and groups (including political parties) to
exercise these freedoms. Includes the ability of trade associations,
professional bodies, and similar groups to maintain relations or
affiliate with recognized international bodies in their fields. The
right of labor to associate and to organize and bargain collectively is
discussed under Section 6, Worker Rights (see Appendix B).
Freedom of Religion.--Discusses whether the constitution or laws
provide for the right of citizens of whatever religious belief to
worship free of government interference and whether the government
respects that right. Includes the freedom to publish religious
documents in foreign languages; addresses the treatment of foreign
clergy and whether religious belief affects membership in a ruling
party or a career in government.
Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign Travel, Emigration,
and Repatriation.--Includes discussion of forced resettlement;
``refugees'' may refer to persons displaced by civil strife or natural
disaster as well as persons who are ``refugees'' within the meaning of
the Refugee Act of 1980, i.e., persons with a ``well-founded fear of
persecution'' in their country of origin or, if stateless, in their
country of habitual residence, on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their
Government.--Discusses the extent to which citizens have freedom of
political choice and have the legal right and ability in practice to
change the laws and officials that govern them; assesses whether
elections are free and fair.
Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental
Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights.--Discusses whether
the government permits the free functioning of local human rights
groups (including the right to investigate and publish their findings
on alleged human rights abuses) and whether they are subject to
reprisal by government or other forces. Also discusses whether the
government grants access to and cooperates with outside entities
(including foreign human rights organizations, international
organizations, and foreign governments) interested in human rights
developments in the country.
Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion, Disability, Language,
or Social Status.--Every report contains a subheading on Women,
Children, and People with Disabilities. As appropriate, some reports
also include subheadings on Indigenous People, Religious Minorities,
and National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities. Discrimination against groups
not fitting one of the above subheadings is discussed in the
introductory paragraph(s) of Section 5. In this section we address
discrimination and abuses not discussed elsewhere in the report,
focusing on laws, regulations, or state practices that are inconsistent
with equal access to housing, employment, education, health care, or
other governmental benefits for members of specific groups. (Abuses by
government or opposition forces, such as killing, torture and other
violence, or restriction of voting rights or free speech targeted
against specific groups would be discussed under the appropriate
preceding sections.) Societal violence against women, e.g., ``dowry
deaths,'' wife beating, rape, and government tolerance of such abuse is
discussed in this section under the subheading on women. We also
discuss under this subheading the extent to which the law provides for,
and the government enforces, equality of economic opportunity for
women. Similarly, we discuss violence or other abuse against children
under that subheading. Because female genital mutilation is most often
performed on children, we discuss it under that subheading.
Worker Rights.-- See Appendix B.
Appendix B.--Reporting on Worker Rights
The 1984 Generalized System of Preferences Renewal Act requires
reporting on worker rights in GSP beneficiary countries. It states that
internationally recognized worker rights include ``(A) the right of
association; (B) the right to organize and bargain collectively; (C) a
prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor; (D) a
minimum age for the employment of children; and (E) acceptable
conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, and
occupational safety and health.'' All five aspects of worker rights are
discussed in each report in a final section under the heading ``Worker
Rights.'' The discussion of worker rights considers not only laws and
regulations but also their practical implementation, taking into
account the following additional guidelines:
A. ``The right of association'' has been defined by the
International Labor Organization (ILO) to include the right of workers
and employers to establish and join organizations of their own choosing
without previous authorization; to draw up their own constitutions and
rules, elect their representatives, and formulate their programs; to
join in confederations and affiliate with international organizations;
and to be protected against dissolution or suspension by administrative
authority.
The right of association includes the right of workers to strike.
While strikes may be restricted in essential services (i.e., those
services the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal
safety, or health of a significant portion of the population) and in
the public sector, these restrictions must be offset by adequate
guarantees to safeguard the interests of the workers concerned (e.g.,
machinery for mediation and arbitration; due process; and the right to
judicial review of all legal actions). Reporting on restrictions
affecting the ability of workers to strike generally includes
information on any procedures that may exist for safeguarding workers'
interests.
B. ``The right to organize and bargain collectively'' includes the
right of workers to be represented in negotiating the prevention and
settlement of disputes with employers; the right to protection against
interference; and the right to protection against acts of antiunion
discrimination. Governments should promote machinery for voluntary
negotiations between employers and workers and their organizations.
Reporting on the right to organize and bargain collectively includes
descriptions of the extent to which collective bargaining takes place
and the extent to which unions, both in law and practice, are
effectively protected against antiunion discrimination.
C. ``Forced or compulsory labor'' is defined as work or service
exacted from any person under the menace of penalty and for which the
person has not volunteered. ``Work or service'' does not apply in
instances in which obligations are imposed to undergo education or
training. ``Menace of penalty'' includes loss of rights or privileges
as well as penal sanctions. The ILO has exempted the following from its
definition of forced labor: compulsory military service, normal civic
obligations, certain forms of prison labor, emergencies, and minor
communal services. Forced labor should not be used as a means of (1)
mobilizing and using labor for purposes of economic development; (2)
racial, social, national, or religious discrimination; (3) political
coercion or education, or as a punishment for holding or expressing
political views or views ideologically opposed to the established
political, social, or economic system; (4) labor discipline; or (5) as
a punishment for having participated in strikes. Constitutional
provisions concerning the obligation of citizens to work do not violate
this right so long as they do not take the form of legal obligations
enforced by sanctions and are consistent with the principle of ``freely
chosen employment.''
D. ``Minimum age for employment of children'' concerns the
effective abolition of child labor by raising the minimum age for
employment to a level consistent with the fullest physical and mental
development of young people. In addition young people should not be
employed in hazardous conditions or at night.
E. ``Acceptable conditions of work'' refers to the establishment
and maintenance of machinery, adapted to national conditions, that
provides for minimum working standards, i.e., wages that provide a
decent living for workers and their families; working hours that do not
exceed 48 hours per week, with a full 24-hour rest day; a specified
annual paid holiday; and minimum conditions for the protection of the
safety and health of workers. Differences in levels of economic
development are taken into account in the formulation of
internationally recognized labor standards. For example many ILO
standards concerning working conditions permit flexibility in their
scope and coverage. They may also permit countries a wide choice in
their implementation, including progressive implementation, by enabling
countries to accept a standard in part or subject to specified
exceptions. Countries are expected to take steps over time to achieve
the higher levels specified in such standards. However, it should be
understood that this flexibility applies only to internationally
recognized standards concerning working conditions. No flexibility is
permitted concerning the acceptance of the basic principles contained
in human rights standards, i.e., freedom of association, the right to
organize and bargain collectively, the prohibition of forced labor, and
the absence of discrimination.
F. ``Trafficking in persons'' is defined as all acts involving the
recruitment, abduction, transport, harboring, transfer, sale, or
receipt of persons that occur within national or across international
borders; involving the use of force, coercion, fraud, or deception; and
resulting in persons being subjected to slavery or slavery-like
conditions, or subjected to forced labor or services, domestic
servitude, forced or bonded sweatshop labor, or other debt bondage.
Describes legal prohibitions against trafficking; the extent to which
the government enforces these prohibitions; whether the country is a
source, transit, or destination country for trafficked victims; the
extent of trafficking in persons in, from, or to the country, other
geographic regions or countries affected by the traffic; and aid or
protection available to victims.
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Appendix D.--International Human Rights Conventions
(1) Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery of September
25, 1926, as amended by the Protocol of December 7, 1953.
(2) Convention Concerning Forced Labor of June 28, 1930 (ILO
Convention 29).
(3) Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of
the Right to Organize of July 9, 1948 (ILO Convention 87).
(4) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide of December 9, 1948.
(5) Convention Concerning the Application of the Principles of the
Right to Organize and Bargan Collectively of July 1, 1949 (ILO
Convention 98).
(6) Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
of August 12, 1949.
(7) Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949.
(8) Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Persons and of
the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others of March 21, 1950.
(9) European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of November 4, 1950.
(10) Convention on the Political Rights of Women of March 31, 1953.
(11) Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the
Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery of
September 7, 1956.
(12) Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor of June
25, 1957 ILO Convention 105.
(13) International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination of December 21, 1965.
(14) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of
December 16, 1966.
(15) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
of December 16, 1966.
(16) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of July 28,
1952.
(17) Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of January 31,
1967.
(18) American Convention on Human Rights of November 22, 1969.
(19) Convention Concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment
of June 26, 1973 (ILO Convention 138).
(20) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol I), of June 8, 1977.
(21) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), of June 8, 1977.
(22) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women of December 18, 1979.
(23) Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment of December 10, 1984.
(24) Convention on the Rights of the Child of November 20, 1989.
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Appendix F.--55th UNCHR Voting Record
The following resolutions were adopted without a vote (by
consensus) at the 55th session of the UN Commission on Human Rights:
1999/1 Situation of human
rights in Sierra Leone
1999/4 Question of Western
Sahara
1999/9 Situation of human
rights in Afghanistan
1999/10 Situation of human
rights in Burundi
1999/11 Situation of human
rights in Nigeria
1999/15 Situation of human
rights in Sudan
1999/16 Cooperation with
representatives of
United Nations human
rights bodies
1999/17 Situation of human
rights in Equatorial
Guinea and assistance
in the field of human
rights
1999/20 Situation of human
rights in Rwanda
1999/24 The right to food
1999/25 Question of the
realization in all
countries of economic,
social and cultural
rights contained in the
Universal Declaration
of Human Rights and in
the International
Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural
Rights, and study of
special problems which
the developing
countries face in their
efforts to achieve
these human rights
1999/26 Human rights and extreme
poverty
1999/28 Human rights and
arbitrary deprivation
of nationality
1999/29 Hostage-taking
1999/30 Question of a draft
optional protocol to
the Convention against
Torture and Other Cruel
Inhuman and Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
1999/31 Independence and
impartiality of the
judiciary, jurors and
assessors and the
independence of lawyers
1999/32 Torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment
1999/33 The right to
restitution,
compensation and
rehabilitation for
victims of grave
violations of human
rights and fundamental
freedoms
1999/34 Impunity
1999/35 Extrajudicial, summary
or arbitrary executions
1999/36 Right to freedom of
expression and opinion
1999/37 Question of arbitrary
detention
1999/38 Question of enforced or
involuntary
disappearances
1999/39 Implementation of the
Declaration on the
Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance
and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or
Belief
1999/40 Traffic in Women and
Girls
1999/41 Integrating the human
rights of women
throughout the United
Nations system
1999/42 Elimination of violence
against women
1999/44 Human rights of migrants
1999/45 International Convention
on the Protection of
the Rights of All
Migrant Workers and
Members of Their
Families
1999/47 Internally displaced
persons
1999/48 Rights of persons
belonging to national
or ethnic, religious
and linguistic
minorities
1999/49 The protection of human
rights in the context
of human
immunodeficincy virus
(HIV) and acquired
immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS)
1999/50 Working group of the
Commission on Human
Rights to elaborate a
draft declaration in
accordance with
paragraph 5 of General
Assembly resolution 49/
214 of 23 December 1994
1999/51 Working group on
Indigenous Populations
of the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of
Discrimination and
Protection of
Minorities and the
International Decade of
the World's Indigenous
People
1999/52 A permanent forum for
indigenous people in
the United Nations
system
1999/53 Forum on economic,
social and cultural
rights: the Social
Forum
1999/54 Strengthening of the
Office of the United
Nations High
Commissioner for Human
Rights
1999/66 Situation of human
rights in the
Democratic Republic of
the Congo
1999/60 Development of public
information activities
in the field of human
rights, including the
World Public
Information Campaign on
Human Rights
1999/62 Towards a culture of
peace
1999/63 Human rights and
bioethics
1999/64 United Nations Decade
for Human Rights
Education
1999/65 Fundamental standards of
humanity
1999/66 Implementation of the
Declaration on the
Right and
Responsibility of
Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to
Promote and Protect
Universally Recognized
Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms
1999/68 Enhancement of
international
cooperation for the
promotion and
protection of human
rights in the Asian and
Pacific region
1999/69 Regional cooperation for
the promotion and
protection of human
rights in the Asia and
Pacific region
1999/71 Regional arrangements
for the promotion and
protection of human
rights
1999/72 National institutions
for the protection and
promotion of human
rights
1999/74 Assistance to States in
strengthening the rule
of law
1999/75 Assistance to Somalia in
the field of human
rights
1999/76 Situation of human
rights in Cambodia
1999/77 Situation of human
rights in Haiti
1999/78 Racism, racial
discrimination,
xenophobia and related
intolerance
1999/80 Rights of the child
1999/81 Work of the Sub-
Commission on
Prevention of
Discrimination and
Protection of
Minorities
1999/82 Defamation of religions
The following resolutions were adopted by vote at the 55th session
of the Commission on Human rights (letter designation refers to the
vote chart):
A. 1999/2 Situation of human
rights in Kosovo
(Adopted 44-1-6)
B. 1999/3 The use of mercenaries
as means of violating
Human rights in and
impeding the exercise
of the right peoples to
self-determination
(Adopted 35-12-6)
C. 1999/5 Question of the
violation of human
rights in the occupied
Arab territories,
including Palestine
(Adopted 31-1-21)
D. 1999/6 Human rights in the
occupied Syrian Golan
(Adopted 31-1-20)
E. 1999/7 Israeli settlements in
the occupied Arab
Territories (Adopted 50-
1-2)
F. 1999/8 Human rights in Cuba
(Adopted 21-20-12)
G. 1999/12 Human rights situation
in southern Lebanon and
west Beeka (Adopted 49-
1-3)
H. 1999/13 Human rights situation
in Islamic Republic of
Iran (Adopted 23-16-14)
I. 1999/14 Situation of human
rights in Iraq (Adopted
35-0-18)
J. 1999/18 The situation of human
rights in the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and
Montenegro), The
Republic of Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzogovina
(Adopted 46-1-6)
K. 1999/21 Human Rights and
universal coercive
measures (Adopted 37-10-
6)
L. 1999/22 Effects on the full
enjoyment of human
rights of the economic
adjustment policies
arising from foreign
debt and, in
particular, the
implementation of the
Declaration on the
Right To Development
(Adopted 30-15-18)
M. 1999/23 Adverse effects of the
illicit movement and
dumping of toxic and
dangerous products and
wastes on the enjoyment
of human rights.
(Adopted 36-16-1)
N. 1999/27 Human rights and
terrorism (Adopted 27-0-
26)
O. 1999/43 Abduction of children
from northern Uganda
(Adopted 28-1-24)
P. 1999/46 Contemporary forms of
slavery (Adopted 36-0-
17)
Q. 1999/55 Situation in occupied
Palestine (Adopted 44-1-
8)
R. 1999/57 Promotion of the right
to democracy (Adopted
51-0-2)
S. 1999/58 Impunity of perpetrators
of violations of
economic, social and
cultural rights
(Adopted 21-9-22)
T. 1999/59 Globalization and its
impact on the full
enjoyment of all human
rights (Adopted 30-2-
22)
U. 1999/61 Question of the death
penalty (Adopted 30-11-
12)
V. 1999/67 Convention on the
Prevention and
Punishment Of the Crime
of Genocide (Adopted 48-
0-5)
W. 1999/70 Composition of the staff
of the Office of the
United Nations High
Commissioner for Human
Rights (Adopted 34-16-
3)
X. 1999/73 Mainstreaming technical
cooperation in all
areas of human rights
(Adopted 27-19-7)
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Appendix G.--Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Preamble
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation
of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the
advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech
and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the
highest aspiration of the common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and
oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly
relations between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter
reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and
have determined to promote social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-
operation with the United Nations, the promotion of universal respect
for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of
the greatest importance for the full realization of this pledge,
Now, therefore, The General Assembly, proclaims this Universal
Declaration of Human Rights as a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations, to the end that every individual and every
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall
strive by teaching and education to promote respect for these rights
and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and international,
to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance,
both among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Article 1
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one
another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Article 2
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in
this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race,
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the
political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or
territory to which a person belongs whether it be independent, trust,
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Article 3
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and the security of person.
Article 4
No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave
trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
Article 5
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.
Article 6
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before
the law.
Article 7
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this
Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.
Article 8
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted
him by the constitution or by law.
Article 9
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.
Article 10
Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing
by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his
rights and obligations and of any criminal charge against him.
Article 11
1. Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be
presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law in a public
trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
2. No one shall be held guilty without any limitation due to race,
of any penal offence on account of nationality or religion, have the
any act or omission which did not constitute a penal offence, under
national or international law, at the time when it was committed.
Article 12
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour
and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.
Article 13
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.
2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,
and to return to his country.
Article 14
1. Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries
asylum from persecution.
2. This right may not be invoked in the case of prosecutions
genuinely arising from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to
the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 15
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor be
denied the right to change his nationality.
Article 16
1. Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race,
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a family.
They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during marriage and
at its dissolution.
2. Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full
consent of the intending spouses.
3. The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.
Article 17
1. Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Article 18
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief,
and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or
private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice,
worship and observance.
Article 19
Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this
right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and
regardless of frontiers.
Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
association.
2. No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
Article 21
1. Everyone has the right to take part in the Government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.
2. Everyone has the right of equal access to public service in his
country.
3. The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of
government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine
elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be
held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.
Article 22
1. Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social
security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and
international cooperation and in accordance with the organization and
resources of each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights
indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his
personality.
Article 23
1. Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to
just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against
unemployment.
2. Everyone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay
for equal work.
3. Everyone who works has the right to just and favourable
remuneration insuring for himself and his family an existence worthy of
human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, by other means of social
protection.
4. Everyone has the right to form and to join trade unions for the
protection of his interests.
Article 24
Everyone has the right to rest and leisure, including reasonable
limitation of working hours and periodic holidays with pay.
Article 25
1. Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the
health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and
the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in
circumstances beyond his control.
2. Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and
assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall
enjoy the same social protection.
Article 26
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at
least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education
shall be compulsory. Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to
all on the basis of merit.
2. Education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms. It shall promote understanding, tolerance and
friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall
further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of
peace.
3. Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that
shall be given to their children.
Article 27
1. Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural
life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific
advancement and its benefits.
2. Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic
production of which he is the author.
Article 28
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which
the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully
realized.
Article 29
1. Everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and
full development of his personality is possible.
2. In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for
the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.
3. These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
Article 30
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any
State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to
perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and
freedoms set forth herein.
Hundred and eighty-third plenary meeting
Resolution 217(A)(III) of the United Nations General Assembly,
December 10, 1948
(This material is in the public domain and may be reprinted without
permission; citation of this source is appreciated.)
______
1999 COUNTRY INDEX
Forward
Letter of Transmittal
Introduction
Preface
Africa:
Angola
Benin
Botswana
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cameroon
Cape Verde
Central African Republic
Chad
Comoros
Congo, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Republic of
Cote d'Ivoire
Djibouti
Equatorial Guinea
Eritrea
Ethiopia
Gabon
Gambia, The
Ghana
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Kenya
Lesotho
Liberia
Madagascar
Malawi
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mozambique
Namibia
Niger
Nigeria
Rwanda
Sao Tome and Principe
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Somalia
South Africa
Sudan
Swaziland
Tanzania
Togo
Uganda
Zambia
Zimbabwe
East Asia and the Pacific:
Australia
Brunei
Burma
Cambodia
China (includes Hong Kong)
China (Taiwan only)
Fiji
Indonesia
Japan
Kiribati
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of
Korea, Republic of
Laos
Malaysia
Marshall Islands
Micronesia, Federated States of
Mongolia
Nauru
New Zealand
Palau
Papua New Guinea
Philippines
Samoa
Singapore
Solomon Islands
Thailand
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu
Vietnam
Europe:
Albania
Andorra
Armenia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Belgium
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Bulgaria
Canada
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyz Republic
Latvia
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
Malta
Moldova
Monaco
Netherlands, The
Norway
Poland
Portugal (includes Macau)
Romania
Russia
San Marino
Serbia-Montenegro
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Tajikistan
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
United Kingdom
Uzbekistan
Near East and North Africa:
Algeria
Bahrain
Egypt
Iran
Iraq
Israel and the occupied territories
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Libya
Morocco
The Western Sahara
Oman
Qatar
Saudi Arabia
Syria
Tunisia
United Arab Emirates
Yemen
South Asia:
Afghanistan
Bangladesh
Bhutan
India
Maldives
Nepal
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
Western Hemisphere:
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Bahamas
Barbados
Belize
Bolivia
Brazil
Canada
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Grenada
Guatemala
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Jamaica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
St. Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Suriname
Trinidad and Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Appendixes:
A. Notes on Preparation of the Reports
B. Reporting on Worker Rights
C. Selected International Human Rights Conventions
D. Explanation of Chart in Appendix C
E. FY 1999 U.S. Economic and Military Assistance--Actual
Obligations
F. 55th Session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission: Voting
Record and Voting Table
G. United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights